

Mobility in Transition

Migration Patterns after EU Enlargement

BIRGIT GLORIUS, IZABELA GRABOWSKA-LUSINSKA
& AIMEE KUVIK (EDS.)



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edited by

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Contents

1	Introduction <i>Birgit Glorius, Izabela Grabowska-Lusinska and Aimee Kuvik</i>	7
PART I STUDYING MIGRATION FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE CONCEPTS, DYNAMICS AND CHANGING PATTERNS		
2	Liquid migration Dynamic and fluid patterns of post-accession migration flows <i>Godfried Engbersen and Erik Snel</i>	21
3	Anatomy of post-accession migration How to measure 'liquidity' and other patterns of post-accession migration flows <i>Izabela Grabowska-Lusinska</i>	41
4	Diverging or converging communities? Stages of international migration from rural Romania <i>Ruxandra Oana Ciobanu</i>	65
5	Post-accession migration from the Baltic states The case of Latvia <i>Zaiga Krisjane, Maris Berzins and Elina Apsite</i>	85
PART II POST-ACCESSION MIGRATION, LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION AND MIGRATION STRATEGIES		
6	The race for global talent, EU enlargement and the implications for migration policies and processes in European labour markets <i>Aimee Kuvik</i>	113

7	‘I know that I have a university diploma and I’m working as a driver’ Explaining the EU post-enlargement movement of highly skilled Polish migrant workers to Glasgow <i>Emilia Pietka, Colin Clark and Noah Canton</i>	133
8	Transnational social networks, human capital and economic resources of Polish immigrants in Scotland <i>Marta Moskal</i>	155
9	Why do highly educated migrants go for low-skilled jobs? A case study of Polish graduates working in London <i>Paulina Trevena</i>	169
10	Changes in tertiary education and student mobility in Hungary <i>Irina Molodikova</i>	191

PART III RETURN MIGRATION

11	Understanding the counter-flow Theoretical and methodological aspects in studying remigration processes after EU expansion <i>Birgit Glorius</i>	217
12	Regional selectivity of return migration The locational choice of high-skilled return migrants in Poland <i>Katrin Klein-Hitpaß</i>	237
13	Translators of knowledge? Labour market positioning of young Poles returning from studies abroad in Germany <i>Nina Wolfeil</i>	259
14	Ready to move Liquid return to Poland <i>Marta Anacka, Ewa Matejko and Joanna Nestorowicz</i>	277
15	Concluding remarks <i>Birgit Glorius, Izabela Grabowska-Lusinska and Aimee Kuvik</i>	309
	Contributors	325

1 Introduction

Birgit Glorius, Izabela Grabowska-Lusinska and Aimee Kuvik

Post-accession migration¹ from Central and Eastern Europe (hereinafter CEE) is unique in that it grew in many cases to become massive and spontaneous in a very short period after the European Union (EU) enlargement of 1 May 2004. Membership of the EU for CEE countries created a crucial momentum for social change in terms of migration processes from those countries. Although migration had taken place before, in the 1990s and earlier, there was an elimination of restrictions in access to selected labour markets. Patterns of migration have since been changing mostly in terms of substance and scale, but also in terms of structure, affecting both the countries seen as sending and the receiving countries.

Any explanation of post-accession migration patterns, trends and mechanisms must first get to grips with the complexities of this phenomenon. Migration from CEE countries can be said to fall into a number of epochs based on specific historical events and influenced by policy changes. In the past twenty years or so, mainly since the collapse of communist regimes and the opening up of these economies, migration and mobility of individuals from CEE can generally be said to move from a period of largely illegal migration and specific, limited options for labour mobility to a period of 'free mobility'. Earlier mobility was associated with certain sectors or seasonal work and favoured specific nationalities, for example, through bilateral agreements in the 1990s and early 2000s. However, after EU enlargement, first in 2004² and then in 2007,³ nationals of these CEE member states had more access to live and work in other countries within the EU. Within a maximum of seven years of their EU membership, all restrictions on their access to other EU countries were to be lifted.

The period of transition in the mid-1990s until 2004 saw increasing outflows, albeit with limits in terms of the scope of opportunities. According to the World Bank (2007: 10), only a few countries among the EU-10 had experienced sizeable migration to Western Europe before their membership of the EU (these were Poland, Romania and Bulgaria). Bilateral agreements were of particular importance. The largest bilateral agreement was implemented in Germany beginning in 1991, and Polish temporary workers were the main beneficiaries. For instance, in 2002, around 260,000 seasonal contracts were issued to Polish nationals, mainly for agricultural work, which made up 85 per cent of all seasonal contracts with CEE

nationals in that year in Germany (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration 2003: 123). It is also important to note that the two largest destinations for EU-8 migrants following EU enlargement, the United Kingdom and Ireland – two of the three countries that opened their labour markets for these nationals – both had inflows from CEE before 2004. For example, in the United Kingdom a long-standing programme is the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS), which attracted predominantly workers from CEE in the early 2000s. Among the 18,200 participants in 2002, the main countries involved in this programme were Poland (26.42 per cent), Ukraine (20.96 per cent), Bulgaria (11.99 per cent) and Lithuania (11.72 per cent) (OECD 2004: 129). In the case of Ireland, movements were led by a general expansion of work permits to support the economic boom starting around 1996. The number of work permits grew from around 6,000 in 1998 to more than 40,000 in 2002, half of which went to individuals from the Baltic states or CEE countries (OECD 2004: 146-147). Furthermore, more than 75 per cent of these permits were for unskilled and semi-skilled work. In some cases, rapid expansion of specific migrant groups and gravitation to specific sectors were seen. It is important to point out that established migration networks that predate EU enlargement, including patterns of short-term and temporary employment, may still affect job placements and patterns of mobility to some extent after EU accession, despite the increasing number of legal options for migration.

The next period of migration can be addressed as a period of diversification, both in migration patterns and in characteristics of migrants. While the previously established temporary, often seasonal migration patterns remained, new groups of migrants can be identified, such as young migrants, often students or graduates, without family obligations and without clear plans concerning their future life.

1.1 Rationale of the book

This book follows a dual ambition, both theoretical and empirical. First, it poses a discussion of conceptual frameworks for post-accession migrations by taking into account complexities of the subject, especially methodological ones. This volume also continues the scientific discussion and analysis introduced in previous IMISCOE Research series works on the topic of post-EU enlargement migration from CEE countries (Black et al. 2010). By discussing new approaches in migration research, like the concept of liquid migration, and research gaps, it provides a variety of examples for both qualitative and quantitative approaches to research. Second, it highlights behaviours and strategies of post-accession migrants in the receiving labour markets and those upon return, integrating the new group of migrating

students. Admittedly, post-accession migrations from CEE countries are still recent and difficult to grasp. There is a risk of oversimplification and reductionism of this process, reflected at times by policymakers and in the media. This leads us to make an effort to go beyond a description of post-accession migrations. We aim to discern the emerging patterns and mechanisms of movements in this particular period of time, while questioning which aspects may be part of a 'transition' from older, established mobility options versus those which seem to be new patterns that may persist and hence alter the way we view processes and effects of cross-state mobility and migration in Europe.

At the very beginning, we need to explore a challenging question: what do we mean by post-accession migration? The answer to this question is not, by any means, straightforward. Looking at the annals of migration history, one can distinguish a certain migration wave traditionally from point A to point B and the eventual return to point A. The current diversity of flows often challenges these traditional notions of 'migration'. Salt (2008: 19) suggests:

Migration is thus a subcategory of a wider concept of 'movement', embracing various types and forms of human mobility from commuting to permanent emigration. What we define as migration is an arbitrary choice about where we draw the line and that may be time-specific.

However, we also need to keep in mind that this mobility occurs within specific time-based institutional contexts, which importantly include, but are not limited to, those related to changes in legislation surrounding mobility. We are drawing the line at the point of the 2004 enlargement of the EU and the following years. What changes has it brought?

The 2004 enlargement of the EU certainly changed the dynamics of migration flows in a very short period of time, but not equally for all CEE countries. Poland, Latvia and Lithuania started as frontrunners in the post-accession migration race, relative to the size of their populations, and these large flows shaped the propensity for future migration, migration traditions and economic conditions in the sending labour markets. Other countries, such as the Czech Republic and, to a much lesser extent, Hungary, have been more reserved about engagement in post-accession mobility. Latecomers to the EU, such as Bulgaria and Romania, are joining the post-accession mobility more gradually. The extensive representation of the Polish case within this volume can be explained by the size, dynamics and changes in migration trends that took place after Poland joined the EU.

Roughly 2.21 million people from Poland were engaged in international migration or mobility during the period from May 2004 to December 2007 (see also Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2009).⁴ Poles became a

dominant ethnic group in many of the receiving labour markets where they had not had such a sizeable population before (e.g., in the United Kingdom and Ireland).

Institutional changes, namely, the enlargements of the EU in both 2004 and 2007 and the accompanying 'free' movement of labour (albeit limited in some cases), also brought changes in patterns of mobility. Seasonal, short-term migrations were converted, in a relatively short period, into medium-term and long-term migrations in the majority of cases. The temporality of post-accession migration can also be questioned, as many individuals are choosing to extend their stays for undefined periods, depending on the migrants' individual concerns and conditions. However, this does not mean that seasonal and short-period migrations vanished from the migration map of Europe. They are mostly attached to 'old migration countries' from a CEE perspective, meaning those outflows that were sizeable before EU membership, such as to Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal, and preserved by well-grounded migration networks and institutional arrangements. However, the biggest change in the post-accession migration landscape of Europe seems to relate to the British Isles becoming 'new destinations' for migrants from the CEE countries.

The change can also be considered from the perspective of shifts in the legality and hence in forms of work and purpose of stay in the receiving country. The enlargement of the EU and relaxation of the restrictions in access to selected labour markets brought new characteristics in labour migrations. Roughly one third of formerly 'illegal' migrants from CEE countries in the United Kingdom regularised their status just after the 2004 EU enlargement (Home Office et al. 2005), and newcomers have mostly taken up jobs in the regular labour market.

Free movement of labour, particularly to English-speaking countries in Europe, has also brought new types of behaviours of migrants, both in the labour market and in social spaces. While pre-accession migrants were rather family-oriented 'target-earners', sending most of their income as remittances back home, the 'new' migrants are mostly young, unmarried and less targeted concerning the duration and monetary outcome of their migration. Many of them have fluid, open-ended life plans and therefore open migration plans and career curriculums. British researchers describe this as 'intentional unpredictability' (Eade, Drinkwater & Garapich 2006). This observation may also translate into the proposition that post-accession migrants' positioning in labour markets is often not rationalised. Arriving without plans and obligations, they often say they are ready to take up any kind of job, despite their formal qualifications, which supplies them with income upon arrival. In post-accession flows, many have observed the over-education of migrants, both compared to the education structure of pre-accession migrants and to their labour market positions, which are mostly in jobs demanding low skills. This brings about discussions of the problems of

deskilling, depreciation of skills and finally may lead to degradation of post-accession migrants (more on this in the chapters by Pietka, Clark and Canton and Trevena in this volume). A significant and growing group of post-accession migrants are students or recent university graduates, who produce significant mobility patterns throughout Europe. They share the socio-demographic characteristics of the 'new migrants'; however, they start their migration career with different aims and perspectives and are often addressed under the paradigm of brain drain, brain gain and brain exchange. Another recent development relates to the growth of remigration from Western European to post-accession countries. Before, return either was assumed because of time limits in work contracts or as part of an illegal migration project; but it was not yet systematically explored. Important questions relate to the motives for remigration and the integration in the country of return, namely, the integration in the labour market and the question of skill transfer (see Wolfeil and Klein-Hitpaß in this volume).

The changes in the migration map of post-accession Europe may also be significant for the receiving countries. Various countries benefit differently from post-accession involvement of the CEE countries in a 'free' mobility space. Main differences concern the issue of human capital (socio-economic characteristics of migrants) and reception and absorption (destination within the country and labour market integration). One may observe that migrants of different socio-demographic characteristics went to 'old' or established destination countries and to 'new' destination countries such as the United Kingdom and Ireland. As in the case of migrants from Poland, those who follow old migration paths tend to be older (their median age is 31 as compared to 26 for those migrants who went for new destination countries), more family-dependent (engaged or married, with fewer singles) and less educated (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2009). This implies that the patterns of integration of post-accession migrants are influenced by the responses of governments of the receiving countries. Although the topic of integration goes far beyond the scope of this book, we should note the selectivity of post-accession migration, mostly in relation to destination, age, education and place of origin, not only in relation to emigration, but also for return (*ibid.*).

1.2 Understanding transition of mobility

Bearing in mind all the above arguments, we question in this book whether new migration patterns and paradigms have started appearing or whether we are just rebranding old migration forms. Do the migration patterns and migrants' strategies, behaviours and characteristics represent anything new, different or unique? Or, are we just taking on new perspectives in our research, thus discovering new phenomena and new interplays?

We also question the concepts, methods and tools of migration research. Are they appropriate to analyse changes in migration and integration patterns that are deeply connected to societal changes?

Therefore, the key hypothesis of this book relates to the ‘mobility transition’ and how the impact of it can be observed through emerging changes of migration forms in CEE countries. This book asserts that the unfolding nature of these changes influences research methodologically. A lack of data availability often requires the use of dedicated research or combined methods. This book also reflects on changing economic, political and social realities and career patterns or aspirations of individuals engaged in those processes. By ‘mobility transition’, we mean a change of forms and patterns of migration under a new set of institutional circumstances. However, we consider not only a change from one type of migration to another, but also the parallel appearance and coexistence of traditional and new forms of migration.

On a broader level, we ask whether there is a ‘mobility transition’ taking place in the EU following enlargement. And, if so, what contextual factors are influencing it? Second, what do these changes mean for migration research? What information is currently missing? What kind of changes does this transition bring? In asking these questions, we want to introduce a speculative hypothesis of the ‘mobility transition’ and then highlight the transitional aspects that are particularly relevant to understanding post-accession migration flows.

Zelinsky (1971) offered the mobility transition hypothesis for discussing the successive stages of mobility, both in terms of human mobility and of ideas, as linked with both economic development, or ‘modernisation’, and demographic changes. Zelinsky summarises mobility transition in the following way (1971: 221-222):

There are definite, patterned regularities in the growth of personal mobility through space-time during recent history, and these regularities comprise an essential component of the modernization process. [...] The progress of a community towards advanced developmental status can be gauged by its control over energy, things, and knowledge, as exercised both individually and collectively, and also by the attainment of personal mobility, that is, a widening range of options for locating and patterning one’s life. Obviously, these two attributes are closely related.

The mobility transition hypothesis, while speculative, may still be relevant in linking transitions in terms of institutional, economic and demographic conditions with patterns of human mobility. However, we note here that the goal of this book is not to test and verify Zelinsky’s hypothesis. It is rather to add a context of wider understanding to the already existing

concept of mobility transition, including to understand changes in individual motives and migrant career trajectories.

* * *

All these concepts, questions and uncertainties bring us to the new ‘take-off’ in researching migrations from CEE countries to the West and research challenges. The current book is the result of five IMISCOE Cluster A-1⁵ meetings on post-accession migration, which took place in Rome, Leipzig, Brighton, Bilbao and Budapest. The Polish case is central in this book due to the predominance of Poles in post-accession migration streams. The book consists of three parts.

The first part focuses on dynamics, structures and patterns of CEE migrations as well as on the critical assessment of their measurement. It also reflects on methodological challenges of measuring, analysing and interpreting post-accession migrations, with a special focus on data sources and challenges of designing comparative studies in sending and receiving societies. These issues are addressed through the concept of liquid migration in chapter two by Godfried Engbersen and Erik Snel and in an overview of methodological approaches in chapter three by Izabela Grabowska-Lusinska.

The further two chapters of part I add empirical evidence to those theoretical and methodological explorations made before. They give examples of the dynamic and fluidity of migration patterns and the parallelism of old and new migration patterns and actors. They also address the question of which methodology applies to the analysis of those changing patterns. Chapter four by Ruxandra Oana Ciobanu describes migration patterns from Romania, on the eve of the 2007 accession. Concentrating on rural out-migration, she applies a stage approach to migration (as exemplified by Massey, Goldring & Durand 1994) to explain the onset and further development of out-migration from two rural Romanian communities to Germany, Spain and Italy. This example provides an interesting exploration of the dynamics of ‘old’ migration patterns and related factors influencing mobility, with a strong focus on regional differences and the impact of societal change that both act independently of policy. Chapter five by Zaiga Krisjane, Maris Berzins and Elina Apsite focuses on the ongoing international migration processes taking place in the Baltic states in the wake of EU enlargement. It mainly concentrates on the case of Latvia in showing that the EU enlargement and its free labour market are one of the key factors influencing migration processes in Latvia. Interpreting the results of a large mobility study with 8,500 respondents in Latvia and qualitative interviews among Latvians in the United Kingdom, the chapter shows recent changes of traditional migration patterns and the emergence of new migrant types and migration flows.

The second part of this book analyses post-accession changes from the perspective of the receiving countries with special focus both on migration policies favouring high-skilled migrants and on the flip side of why those highly educated migrants might end up in low-skilled jobs. Special attention in this part is devoted to the transfer of skills both from the migrants' perspective (e.g., transferability of skills and deskilling) and the institutional side (e.g., measures for attracting the highly skilled). It contains six chapters, which derive their explanatory power largely from case study design, explaining the peculiarities of migrants' profiles, labour market integration and contextual factors in the receiving countries.

The first contribution to this part, chapter six by Aimee Kuvik, concentrates on the institutional settings and policies to attract high-skilled migrants. Kuvik explores the contradictions of proactive migration policies and the actual barriers high-skilled migrants experience while trying to enter the labour market. It takes a comparative view on several European countries and discusses the concept of free mobility in the EU.

Chapter seven by Emilia Pietka, Colin Clark and Noah Canton examines recent migration from Poland to Scotland with the focus on high-skilled individuals. Analysing several individual and contextual obstacles to adequate integration in the labour market of high-skilled Polish migrants in Glasgow, the chapter assesses whether the contemporary migration from Poland to Scotland can be viewed as 'brain waste', 'brain gain', 'brain overflow' or 'brain drain'.

Chapter eight by Marta Moskal also draws on the empirical example of Polish migrants to Scotland, but with a different angle of observation. It applies a transnational perspective for analysing recent migration processes of Poles to Scotland, their integration and identity development and explores how different forms of migrant resources, referring to Bourdieu's three forms of capital, are accumulated and transformed in a transnational setting. This chapter draws on original material from a migrant survey and focused interviews to depict the value, convertibility and adjustment of migrants' economic, social and cultural capital from a transnational perspective.

Chapter nine by Paulina Trevena is the last in this series addressing Polish migrants in the context of arrival. She uses empirical material on Polish migrants in London in order to analyse the reasons behind the gravitation of Polish graduates towards low-skilled jobs in the United Kingdom. She presents a multi-level analysis of factors, like institutional and economic conditions in Poland and the United Kingdom on the macro level, social ties and migration behaviour on the meso level, and individual capital, motives and goals on the micro level.

Chapter ten by Irina Molodikova addresses changes in educational structures, including implications for harmonisation of tertiary education and student mobility, and some effects of this process for a low-mobility new

member state of the EU, Hungary. She uses the case of Hungary to show the interrelation of EU-wide changes, the adaptation process of Hungarian educational institutions and the reactions of international students in Hungary, mainly focusing on changes in international students' mobility patterns to and from Hungary.

The third part of the publication deals with the problems and patterns of return migrations and identifies the issues to be further analysed with regard to return migrants after the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements.

Chapter eleven by Birgit Glorius serves as the introductory chapter to this part of the book, developing a theoretical and analytical framework for research on return migration. The following three chapters are devoted to Poland, as the largest source country of post-accession migrants. Chapter twelve by Katrin Klein-Hitpaß analyses the geographical distribution of returning migrants in Poland. Based on the assumption that high-skilled return migrants tend to concentrate in economically advanced and dynamic regions with diverse job opportunities, a statistical analysis is applied to explain the locational choice of high-skilled return migrants. The chapter relates case study findings to general approaches and common patterns of mobility and spatial distribution of the highly skilled and gives hints for generalisations. Chapter thirteen by Nina Wolfeil draws from original qualitative data focusing on the labour market positioning of young Poles returning from studies abroad in Germany. It goes further than only diagnosing the situation of returning educational migrants, as it gives a clue to explicate the phenomenon of return migration and perspectives on transmission of 'migrant capital' in the accession countries. Chapter fourteen by Marta Anacka, Ewa Matejko and Joanna Nestorowicz considers a very recent phenomenon, namely, returns of Polish people in the post-accession period. The authors apply both quality and quantity frameworks to the analysis. The first part of the chapter draws on Polish Labour Force Survey data and interview data among returning migrants to Poland. By means of statistical analysis, the authors prove that return migrations are highly selective regarding age, education, gender and region of return. The second part of the chapter is based on in-depth interviews with return migrants in Poland and relates to the patterns and mechanisms of reintegration upon return.

The concluding chapter by Birgit Glorius, Izabela Grabowska-Lusinska and Aimee Kuvik provides a synopsis of the previous three parts, summarising the main findings of the different issues and cases addressed. The main goal of this chapter is to place the findings into the general conceptual frame of mobility transition and post-accession studies. It develops suggestions towards possible adaptations of both the explanatory frameworks and methodology regarding the phenomenon of post-accession migration. Finally, the chapter reflects on the phenomenon of post-accession migrations in relation to earlier waves and gives an outlook on possible further changes of the East-West migratory system. The main goal of the

concluding chapter is to bring under consideration what is really new for migration research. Is it legitimate to question old patterns of migration, based on complex pieces of analysis presented throughout the course of this book, and is it justified to say that new patterns have started to be created? What can we identify as the consequences for migratory systems of the persistence of *old* and the appearance of *new* migration forms, in general? Are data collection systems and policymaking still appropriate for monitoring and shaping those processes?

Migration has long been discussed as ‘flows’, patterns of people to specific places, and ‘waves’ of certain groups in certain periods of time. Societal change was considered only as one among various frame elements of migration. But what happens when life itself, when careers, family biographies and role models face greater variations? Not only are the economies in CEE countries experiencing transitions from changing political realities and the expanded borders of the EU, but the new patterns of mobility also reflect changes in individual expectations towards the life course and the value of international experience for personal and career goals. Migration research must also adjust to capture these changes. ‘Mobility in transition’, as discussed through the various chapters in this book, highlights and reflects upon this multi-faceted nature of migration.

The title of this book, *Mobility in Transition*, can thus be understood in two directions: mobility patterns under the influence of political and economic transition in Europe, and the transition of human mobility as one aspect of human change under far-reaching political, economic and societal changes. In the latter meaning, this volume on migration patterns during and after EU enlargement can serve as a case study in a global sense.

Notes

- 1 Within EU policy-based discussions, the term ‘mobility’ is used to denote moves within EU member state countries and ‘migration’ only to refer to people residing in the EU from countries outside of this region. However, in this book, the terms mobility and migration are both used to reflect cross-border changes of residence between EU countries. Combining these terms acknowledges that similar mechanisms influence both new and old patterns of movement. It also allows a better look at how new trends can challenge or support existing concepts or theories in the migration literature, and this is one of the goals of the book.
- 2 The countries in this enlargement include Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, also referred to collectively as the ‘EU-8’ or ‘A-8’.
- 3 This enlargement included Bulgaria and Romania, often referred to as the ‘EU-10’ in combination with countries from the 2004 enlargement or as the ‘A-2’.
- 4 However, this does not mean that all these people were away from Poland at the same time and that Poland experienced a loss of two million people. It means that two million people were engaged in various forms of migration, circulation or mobility.

- 5 IMISCOE Cluster A-1 dealt with international migration and its regulation. Recent work of the cluster focused on changes in migration flows and patterns after the EU accessions of 2004 and 2007, with irregular migration, transit migration and the question of migration regulations.

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Part I

Studying migration from Central and Eastern Europe

Concepts, dynamics and changing patterns

2 Liquid migration

Dynamic and fluid patterns of post-accession migration flows

Godfried Engbersen and Erik Snel

2.1 Introduction

In her study, *Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe since 1650*, Moch (1992) analyses three centuries of migration and distinguishes four crucial periods. The periods comprise pre-industrial Europe *c.* 1650-1750, the early industrial age *c.* 1750-1815, urbanisation and industrialisation *c.* 1815-1914 and the twentieth century *c.* 1914-1990. In order to analyse the central characteristics of these specific periods, Moch categorises migration systems into four groups according to the distance and the definiteness of the break with home (see Tilly 1978). The first is *local migration*. Crucial for this system is that people move within their local markets of labour, land and marriage. The second is *circular migration*. This system is based on the premise that people return home after a specific interval, especially after harvest work. The third system is *chain migration*. Established migrants bring their family to the new destination or support newcomers to settle by finding jobs and housing for them. The final system is *career migration*. The needs and geography of 'hiring institutions', for example, the church or the state, prevail over the needs of families or the local communities in this system. The hiring institutions, for example, church personnel or schoolteachers, determine the timing and destination of migration.

Moch argues that in each period all four migration systems were present, but that the balance among the various kinds of migration was different. In the pre-industrial world people moved in systems of local, circular, chain and career migration, but local migration was the most dominant migrant system. In the age of early industry, the dominant patterns of local and circular migration were complemented by new forms of chain migration that led to permanent settlement in new destinations, especially to the growing cities. The nineteenth century was an age of urbanisation and industrialisation, a very mobile age in which a shift away from rural migration to circular migration systems, chain migration to urban areas and career migration

took place. Migrants travelled over longer distances and even crossed the Atlantic Ocean. Moch (1992: 160) writes:

In the end, the men, women, and children who took to the road produced a very different population in 1914 than a century earlier. This was a free, urbanized, and proletarian population. Legally free to move, a decreasing proportion of people were kept in place, or even in the country side, by land ownership. By the end of the century, the boom in city-building [... had slacked] and work in metallurgy and mining became more steady. The combined result of these two trends was to give more people permanent work at the expense of seasonal employment, and a greater proportion of workers were constrained neither by possessions nor by the law to stay in place. The labour force in Western Europe was an international one, in which Belgians, Italians, Irish, and Poles in particular worked across an international boundary – if not across the Atlantic – from home.

The mobile age of the nineteenth century was succeeded by a period in which migration control became dominant and in which questions of citizenship, legal statuses, proper documents and work permits became more important in order to migrate, to return or to settle (Torpey 1998, 2000; Groebner 2007). In the post-Second World War period, the state became more powerful in regulating international migration, and the freedom of European and non-European citizens to take up residence in foreign countries was consequently reduced. The state gained a stronger monopoly over the legitimate means of movement, including the bureaucratic and technological capacity to enforce migration rules (Torpey 2000; Broeders 2009). Two examples of the enlarged role of the state are the labour recruitment policies of Western European states for foreign labour in the 1960s and the restrictive immigration policies from the late 1980s to limit labour migration and asylum seekers, thus resulting in the label of ‘Fortress Europe’. In the years of the so-called guest worker migration, European governments made formal agreements with sending countries to recruit foreign workers. Restrictive policies came later in many European countries and were partly a reaction to the guest worker period, which showed not only the determination of many ‘guests’ to stay in the host country and bring over their family (‘family reunification’), but also to find a spouse in their home country (‘family formation’).

The guest worker period is crucial for the current dominant way of thinking about migration, namely, that ‘guests are often here to stay’, and that when low-skilled migrants become unemployed, they can become a threat to the sustainability of European welfare states. Welfare and immigration policies have become increasingly intertwined. Political elites in advanced European welfare states believe that large flows of migrant

workers may endanger the maintenance of the national welfare state if these groups get equal access to public provisions, especially when they become legal citizens. This attitude is rather new. In the 1970s and 1980s, countries like Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands had included migrants (especially the former guest workers and their families) in the welfare state by giving them comprehensive social rights and limited political rights (Guiraudon 2002: 150). This incorporation process is now questioned because many migrants with a guest worker background and their children have been unable to find and keep a job and have come to rely on welfare state provisions (OECD 2007).

The migration regimes and corresponding migrant categories, as described by Moch, raise the question of which migration categories are typical for the current East-West migration patterns after the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007? What are the dominant patterns in the early twenty-first century? Are contemporary post-accession migration flows different from flows of earlier periods? After the dissolving of the communist bloc, it was assumed that the long-standing tradition of East-West migration would regain momentum. However, initially the East-West migration flows in Europe were not that large, with the exception of the large influx of ethnic Germans, the *Aussiedler*, from the former Soviet Union in Germany. One important reason for this was the cordon sanitaire erected to protect Western Europe from CEE countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union (Fassmann & Münz 1994: 535). However, this cordon sanitaire was broken with accessions of the new CEE member states in May 2004 and January 2007. Since then, citizens of the new EU member states in CEE have been free to settle in the old member states, which gradually opened up their labour markets for A-8 and A-2 citizens. As a result, migration from Eastern Europe to Western Europe rapidly increased, somewhat unexpectedly in both numbers and destinations. Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, as well as Norway outside the EU, countries that had immediately opened their labour markets to migrants from the new member states, received large numbers of migrant workers from CEE countries. In addition, countries that opted for a transitional period and imposed restrictive conditions on labour migration still received many migrant workers, as was seen in the numbers of Polish workers in the Netherlands. Furthermore, established routes of irregular migration – created in the 1990s – to Italy and Spain were used more frequently by migrants from Romania and Bulgaria.

It is not easy to answer the question of what kind of East-West migration regime is emerging, given the short time-span and the lack of relevant data on outflows, return migration, short-term migration and circular migration (Black et al. 2010). Nevertheless, there are indications that the migration regime currently in the making differs from the dominant migration patterns of the twentieth century. Several studies, including quantitative as

well as ethnographic and anthropological research, indicate increasingly fluid forms of migration that bear some resemblance to the circular migration of the nineteenth century, but cover longer distances and more diverse destination countries. This new circular migration is facilitated by the fading of borders within the enlarged EU, changing technologies and by reduced telecommunication and travel costs. It is also related to circular migration being economically more profitable for skilled migrants than settling and working in a flexible, secondary Western European labour market with few prospects of advancement. Furthermore, career migration is definitely becoming more important for elite groups of highly skilled migrants from CEE countries. They are attracted by universities as researchers and students, job openings in governmental institutions like the EU and by health care institutions and international corporations. Finally, there are indications that some groups of migrants are settling permanently in Western European countries. In many countries, migrants from CEE countries have created an infrastructure that facilitates chain migration and integration in European labour markets and societies. However, the current financial crisis has and will have severe consequences for the labour market positions of migrant workers and has stimulated many of them to return to their home country or to find their luck elsewhere.

In this chapter, we will introduce the concept of 'liquid migration' as an aid to understanding contemporary forms of East-West migration (Engbersen, Snel & De Boom 2010). Therefore, we will discuss the literature on new migration to which this concept is related. In addition, we will present empirical evidence on the liquid nature of East-West migration. We conclude with a discussion of the institutional differences between the current East-West migration and the guest worker era.

2.2 'The new migration'

The increasing East-West migration within the enlarged EU fits in the general picture of what is classified as the 'new migration' (Salt 1989; King 1993; Koser & Lutz 1998; Castles & Miller 2003; Snel et al. 2000; Engbersen, Van der Leun & De Boom 2007; Vertovec 2007). Although the extent to which these patterns of international migration are truly new is questionable (see the historical work of Lucassen 1987 and Moch 1992), migration scholars have observed a profound change in international migration patterns in Europe since the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 'old migration' to Europe, in the first post-war decades, was dominated by post-colonial migrants and labour migrants, the so-called guest workers and their families coming mainly from the Mediterranean region. Despite differences, both migrant categories had certain things in common. Both of the groups, the post-colonial migrants and the migrant workers and their

families, generally came for permanent settlement. Furthermore, the arrival of these migrant categories was generally a matter of formal, regularised migration (Guiraudon 2002). There were also exceptions. Many Turkish labour migrants, for instance, first arrived as ‘tourists’ or as ‘temporary guest workers’ in the Netherlands and other European countries with similar guest worker programmes. However, in most cases their permanent stay as guest workers was regularised quite easily (Staring 2001). The ‘new migration’ that is now observed in Europe and elsewhere generally has a more diverse and fluid character than the ‘old migration’ (more temporary migration, more unauthorised residence, etc.). Here we will explore four characteristics of the ‘new migration’: (1) new geographical patterns, (2) new types of migrants, (3) the new, often weaker residence status of migrants and (4) the resulting new survival strategies. When we discuss new migration patterns, we do not advocate that the old patterns have lost significance, but rather that new migration patterns are arising alongside the old ones. However, the effect is a growing pluralisation, fragmentation and irregularisation of migration and migrants. In short, what we see is the rise of liquid migration.

2.2.1 New geography of migration

Until the mid-1980s, migration to Western Europe was dominated by two migrant categories: migrant workers and their families, mainly coming from the Mediterranean region, and post-colonial migrants. Since the late 1980s, there are two main geographical trends in the migration to Europe. Firstly, there is a strong pluralisation of the sending countries and an increase of long-distance migration. Secondly, and this is the main topic of our discussion here, there is a strong increase of migration within the enlarged EU, especially from the new EU member states to old EU member states in the north, west and south of Europe. Providing an overall estimate of the volume of migration from and between CEE countries from 1989 to 2004 is not easy. Estimates based on total net population changes, which account for natural increases and decreases, suggest a net migration outflow of around 3.2 million over this period from the A-8 and A-2 countries, with some 60 per cent of this flow accounted for by emigration from Romania and Bulgaria (Black et al. 2010). However, this estimation does not take into account that a major proportion of migration from and within the region is in the form of temporary, circular migration. This has the effect of inflating net migration figures, as many migrants are abroad for only a short period. In addition, figures of net outflows for each country in the region do not tell us where and specifically whether these destinations were within or outside the region (Mansoor & Quillin 2007; Engbersen et al. 2010).

The consequences of this ‘geography of migration’ (King 1993) are clearly visible in a country such as the Netherlands. For a long time, migrants residing in the Netherlands originated from a very select number of countries. In 1990, almost 80 per cent of all non-Western migrants¹ living in the Netherlands came from Turkey, Morocco, Surinam and the Dutch Antilles, the latter two being former Dutch colonies. In 2006, the share of these four ‘traditional’ sending countries in the total non-Western immigration to the Netherlands had reduced to around 66 per cent. In the same period, the share of so-called other non-Western migrants and their children in the Netherlands increased from 21 to 33 per cent (De Boom et al. 2006: 86). Migrants nowadays arrive from all parts of the world, from countries such as Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, countries with which the Netherlands has no historical ties. Also, immigration from CEE countries to the old member states in North, West and South Europe increased dramatically from the early 1990s. Migrants from former Yugoslavia, many of whom arrived as refugees during the wars that split their country in the 1990s, are now considered the fifth main migrant group in the Netherlands (De Boom et al. 2006, 2008). Vertovec (2007) makes similar observations about Britain. In the 1950s and 1960s, almost all migrants in Britain came from former British colonies or Commonwealth countries. Today migrants come from practically every country in the world. The city of London alone harbours people from 179 countries.

These figures show the increasing fragmentation and pluralisation of the migrant populations in the countries of arrival. Having migrant populations originating from a selected number of sending countries, as was the case in the Netherlands and Britain, is largely a dynamic of the past.

2.2.2 *New types of migrants*

The new geographical patterns of migration are partly the result of the arrival of new types of migrants. Salt (1989) already spoke of the rise of new migrant categories in Europe in the late 1980s. He observed a gradual decline in permanent settlement and a consequent increase in temporary, at least as regards intention, migration, an increase in the numbers of refugees and undocumented migrants and an increase in the spatial scope of international migration. Whyte (1993) has also pointed out the arrival of new types of migrants in Britain. The first two waves of migrants consisted mainly of migrant workers and their families who arrived in North-Western Europe from the 1960s up until the 1980s. Since the mid-1980s, these migration movements were either replaced or complemented by what Whyte (*ibid.*) calls ‘post-industrial migration’, consisting of three separate migration flows, namely, high-skilled workers who seek employment in the Western knowledge economies, refugees and asylum seekers and undocumented migrants.

These three 'post-industrial' migrant categories are now supplemented by a fourth relatively new migrant category consisting of temporary foreign workers, mainly coming from new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe. The arrival of temporary workers from CEE countries had begun before these countries became part of the EU. Shortly after the fall of the Iron Curtain, migration researchers observed the first temporary workers from CEE countries in Western Europe. Wallace (2002), for instance, pointed out the phenomenon of 'international commuting' between what was then still referred to as the 'Central European buffer zone' that included Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and neighbouring countries such as Germany and Austria. Even before these countries joined the EU, the number of temporary migrant workers from these countries who were active in the old EU member states had increased dramatically. To give an impression, some Dutch figures are provided on the number of temporary work permits (TWP) issued to Polish nationals.² In 2000, the Netherlands issued 2,500 TWPs for Polish nationals. In 2004, the year that Poland and the other CEE countries joined the EU, the Netherlands issued no fewer than 20,000 TWPs for Polish nationals, a figure that further increased to almost 54,000 in 2006 (De Boom et al. 2006: 58). After 2006, we lose sight of this development, since residents from the A-8 countries no longer need TWPs to be employed in the Netherlands.

Other important 'new' migrant categories are refugees or asylum seekers and undocumented migrants. Since the mid-1980s, all 'old' EU countries received increasing numbers of refugees and asylum seekers. One major stream of refugees to the EU was those arriving because of the war from the early to the late 1990s in former Yugoslavia. However, asylum seeking declined in many European countries in the period 2000-2006 due to more restrictive asylum legislation. Large declines were apparent in France, Germany, Austria and Belgium. However, in 2006 the number of asylum seekers increased in Greece, Sweden and the Netherlands as compared to 2005 (OECD 2008; De Boom et al. 2006). These diverse trends show that the numbers of asylum seekers in any country can fluctuate, and that these fluctuations depend not only on the international situation (international crises causing people to find refuge elsewhere), but also on the changing legislation in countries of arrival. When a country introduces stricter legislation, asylum seekers tend to go to neighbouring countries.

The category of asylum seekers overlaps with the last, relatively new migrant category of clandestine or undocumented migrants. Many rejected asylum seekers do not leave, but stay in the host country without a formal residence permit. They thus become undocumented migrants. The European Commission estimates that at the beginning of the twenty-first century, between 4.5 and 8 million foreign nationals were residing illegally in EU territory. A lower figure for the year 2005 was provided by the CLANDESTINO research team (2009), which estimated that the range was

more likely to fluctuate between 2.8 and 6 million. The lower figure is a consequence of the enlargement of the EU to include eight more countries (including Poland) in 2004, and another two (Bulgaria and Romania) in 2007. Many CEE migrants residing illegally in Western Europe were legalised overnight as a result of the EU enlargements (Ruhs 2007). This shows that the various types or categories of migrants should not be understood in a static way. The same individual migrant can pass through various migrant categories.

2.2.3 *New residence statuses*

The influx of new migrant categories has resulted in a greater variation in residence statuses. Schematically, we can distinguish three judicial statuses of migrants and their offspring (Faist 2000). Some migrants became nationals of the country of arrival or were already nationals, as was the case for migrants arriving from former colonial areas. Like native residents, these migrants possess full citizenship, including full social rights. Other migrants have full social rights and partial political rights, for instance, the right to vote in local but not national elections. This judicial status can be referred to as ‘denizenship’, as opposed to full citizenship. Many of the current migrants from CEE countries now belong to this category. They have full access to the labour market of the old EU member states, but only partial political rights. However, this only applies to citizens from the new EU member states of 2004. In most old EU member states, citizens from Romania and Bulgaria, countries that only joined the EU in January

Table 2.1 *Residence statuses of migrants and minorities*

<i>Residence status</i>	<i>Categories</i>
Citizenship (nationality)	Citizens of national welfare states Migrants from former colonial areas that are nationals Naturalised labour migrants or asylum seekers, their partners and offspring
Denizenship (permanent residence permit)	Labour migrants with a permanent residence permit Accepted asylum seekers Partners and children (‘family reunifiers’) of both former categories Privileged migrants (for instance, from other EU countries)
Alienship	Migrant workers with a temporary residence and/or work permit (for instance, seasonal workers and holiday workers) Asylum migrants with a provisional residence permit Asylum seekers (still in procedure) Undocumented migrants (including migrant workers without a work permit coming from countries of which a work permit (TWP) is required)

Sources: Faist (2000: 166); De Boom et al. (2008: 6)

2007, do not have free access to the labour market and still needed to apply for TWPs at the time of writing this chapter. Finally, there is a growing category of migrants that do not possess citizenship or acknowledged denizenship. This category includes migrants with temporary or otherwise restricted residence permits and undocumented migrants who generally have very limited social and political rights.

In looking at the changes since 1960, we can establish that migrant workers who managed to acquire access to the EU have clearly strengthened their judicial position. In the Netherlands, for example, many migrant workers obtained Dutch citizenship and consequently the same social rights as the native Dutch population. Migrants with a permanent residence permit have also received social and political rights nearly equal to those of native citizens. This improvement of the social position of migrants is particularly evident within the more traditional labour migrant communities (the former guest workers and their families) and with accepted refugees and asylum migrants. On the other hand, new migrant categories have emerged with more temporary and less clear residence statuses. This is evidently the case with asylum seekers who are still being processed and await a final decision on whether they will be allowed to stay. We know very little about accepted asylum seekers' current social position in the countries of arrival. However, recent Dutch research on this issue is not optimistic. Former asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Somalia participate in the labour market only half as often as the average native Dutch citizen, whereas the chance of unemployment among these refugee categories is four to seven times higher than among the native Dutch population (Dagevos & Odé 2007:14). Undocumented migrants generally have the weakest and most insecure residence status. They have to survive without any support from the welfare state and without any access to the formal labour market (Engbersen 1999; Düvell 2006; Bleahu 2007).

2.2.4 New survival strategies

There is a direct relationship between having a formal residence status and having access to formal sources of income, through either formal employment or social benefits. The inflow of temporary migrants or migrants with an uncertain residence status therefore brings about new, informal survival strategies. Undocumented migrants have, in principle, no access to formal employment and therefore must rely upon informal or even illegal sources of income. Many undocumented migrants work off the books in economic sectors such as construction, agriculture and horticulture or in private households. In addition, migrant workers who have formal residence but limited or no access to the labour market are pushed to informal work arrangements. Until May 2007, this was often the case for nationals of the

new EU countries of 2004, with the exception of those residing in Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, which were the only EU countries that initially allowed A-8 nationals to be employed without a work permit. Work permits are still required for Romanian and Bulgarian nationals, who must either secure a formal work permit or depend on self-employment, informal work or even criminal income-generating activities (Engbersen et al. 2007; Leerkes 2009).

There is indeed a steady increase of self-employment among migrants from CEE countries. In the Netherlands, for instance, in 2006 over 3,000 Polish nationals started their own company – an increase of 30 per cent vis-à-vis the situation one year earlier. Observers argue that this increase in the numbers of small Polish companies is to be seen as an attempt to avoid the legislation with regard to work permits (Pijpers & Van der Velde 2007). Nationals of the new EU members of 2004 no longer need a work permit, but nationals of Bulgaria and Romania (countries that joined the EU in 2007) are still required to have a work permit. It is therefore to be expected that the numbers of Bulgarians and Romanians who are self-employed will increase in the coming years.

It is important to understand that ‘old’ and ‘new’ migrations are not mutually exclusive or successive modes of migration. Traditional migration patterns are still going on, but are now joined by new patterns. In reality, the differences between both modes of migration are much less clear-cut than they appear to be in the ideal types as outlined in table 2.2.

Table 2.2 *Characteristics of ‘old’ and ‘new’ migration*

	<i>‘Old migration’</i>	<i>‘New migration’</i>
Geography	Post-colonial countries Mediterranean area	Migration from all parts of the world (long-distance migration) Migration from Central and Eastern European countries to the ‘old’ EU
Types of migrants	Post-colonial migrants Labour migrants (guest workers) Family migrants	Refugees and asylum migrants Undocumented migrants Temporary work migrants (international commuting)
Residence status	Formal, permanent residence permit	Temporary residence status No valid residence papers
Survival strategies	Formal employment Formal social security	Self-employment Informal work Crime Informal support by the family or compatriots

Source: Snel et al. (2000: 6)

Distinguishing different modes of international migration gives us an instrument to analyse shifts in migration patterns and in the way migrants settle and survive in their respective countries of arrival.

Vertovec (2007: 1025) summarises the complexities of contemporary international migration patterns by using the notion of ‘super-diversity’. This notion emphasises the dynamic interplay of an increased number of new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified migrants who arrived in Britain over the last decade. We speak in terms of ‘liquid migration’. The well-defined migration patterns of the post-war decades are becoming more and more fluid, and therefore harder to trace. Liquid migration is a specific subsection of the more general trends that are classified under the synthesising notions of ‘new migration’ and ‘super-diversity’.

2.3 Liquid migration

The notion of liquid migration is inspired by the work of Bauman (1999, 2003, 2005) on liquid modernity, liquid love and liquid life. Central to the notion of liquidity is the idea that ‘thick’ and stable social institutions (class, family, labour, community, neighbourhood and nation-state) are fading away and being replaced by flexible, ‘thin’ institutions (see also Zijderfeld 2000). Migration has always been strongly embedded in patterns of family, community, local labour markets and the nation-state (Portes 1995). The transformation of these institutions, together with advanced communications technologies and the disappearance of internal borders due to EU enlargement, has changed migration patterns in post-industrial societies and has made migration less predictable. Contemporary migrants respond and adapt quickly to changing conditions in the different labour markets in which they operate (Drinkwater, Eade & Garapich 2010). Nobody foresaw, for example, that so many migrants from Poland would migrate to new destination countries like Ireland and the Netherlands, and that the opening of the UK labour market to citizens of Poland and other A-8 countries would give such a boost to the migration stream to the United Kingdom (see table 2.3). Migration theory, with its strong emphasis on historical embeddedness and path dependency, has difficulties explaining these new migration and settlement patterns of migrants. Liquid migration is a typical phenomenon of post-accession migration. It takes place in an institutional constellation in which national borders – at least within the EU – have lost their significance. Liquid migration is strongly labour-motivated – like the guest worker migration in the 1960s and 1970s – but nowadays workers have more opportunities to come and return as they choose.

Table 2.3 *Main destination countries of Polish migrants in the second quarters of 2000-2008**

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
UK	4	7	7	9	11	2	31	32	33
Germany	35	37	34	31	29	25	2	16	16
Ireland	0	0	0	0	3	6	7	12	11
Netherlands	2	4	5	4	3	2	3	6	7
Italy	6	8	14	13	11	12	8	8	6
US	19	23	19	2	19	11	11	7	6

* Numbers show percentage of all Polish immigrants that year.

Sources: Central Statistical Office, Labour Force Survey; Kępińska (2008)

Table 2.3 shows that Germany is no longer the main destination country for Polish migrants, although it is still very important for *seasonal labour*. Seasonal migration from Poland to Germany – one of the most important labour migration flows from Poland in the 1990s and early twenty-first century in terms of numbers of workers involved – has gradually decreased since its peak in 2004, but it remains substantial. In 2007, approximately 224,000 work permits were issued to seasonal workers from Poland in Germany, 6,000 less than in 2006 (Kępińska 2008).

According to the estimates of the Polish Central Statistical Office, at the end of 2007, 2,270,000 Poles were staying abroad temporarily for more than three months, as compared to 1,950,000 at the end of 2006.³ This is an increase of 16 per cent. However, this increase was smaller than that seen earlier in 2006 (up 34 per cent compared with 2005) and in 2005 (up 45 per cent compared with 2004) (Kępińska 2008). Another relevant trend is that the proportion of ‘short-term moves’ in the total outflow to main destination countries steadily decreased in Poland in the period 2004-2008.⁴ This means that more Poles stay abroad for a longer period of time (Kaczmarczyk 2010). This could indicate that short-term and circular migration have turned into chain migration and definitive settlement. However, in the absence of reliable figures, this is just speculation.

Similar trends to those seen in Poland can be observed in Bulgaria and Romania (Mintchev & Boshnakov 2010; Markova 2010). It is clear that migrants will settle in destination countries, but it is also clear that such settlement will be accompanied by substantial forms of temporary migration and circular migration. The importance of this liquid migration can be illustrated with the official OECD data on the inflow of nationals from CEE countries in several ‘old’ EU member states. This data shows a steep increase in all the selected countries, but the figures are rather small (see OECD 2007 and 2008). No OECD data exists on the inflow from CEE countries to the United Kingdom, however, according to data from the Workers Registration Scheme (WRS),⁵ 328,000 Poles, 55,000 Lithuanians, 52,000 Slovaks, 29,000 Latvians, 25,000 people from Czech

Republic and smaller groups from Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia were registered in the United Kingdom between May 2004 and December 2006. However, these data do not give a description of employment duration or if and when a return home occurs (Bauere et al. 2007: 8). For the Netherlands, it is estimated that up to 160,000 CEE migrant workers, mainly from Poland, have been working or are employed in the Netherlands in the last few years (Weltevrede et al. 2009). Nevertheless, official OECD data claims that only 2,000 to 7,000 migrants from Poland have arrived in the Netherlands in recent years. The official OECD data on Spain provides no information on the inflow of migrants from Romania, although this is one of Spain's largest migrant populations. According to other registries, there were more than 500,000 Romanian migrants living in Spain in early 2007 (OECD 2008: 278). The OECD figures on Italy are also rather low with respect to the inflow of Romanian migrants. The precise nature of contemporary forms of liquid migration is difficult to capture with the current measurements of flows. Large groups of migrants are not visible or are under-represented in the available migration statistics.

The notion of liquid migration is in this chapter related to forms of temporary and circular migration of labour migrants from CEE. Liquid migration has six dominant characteristics (see table 2.4). The first characteristic is the *temporality* of a stay abroad. Migrants do not settle permanently, but move back and forth from their source country to receiving countries (circular and pendulum migration). Their stays abroad may differ from migrant to migrant and from group to group. Many stays are very short, while others opt for a medium-long stay or a longer-term stay. However, the temporal nature of residence, which often goes hand in hand with non-registration, contributes to the *invisibility* of liquid migration. The circularity of liquid migration resembles the circular forms of migration described in the work of Massey on Mexican-US migration (Massey et al. 1987). However, there are also other migrant groups such as students and highly skilled migrants who develop forms of career migration. They have the ambition to capitalise on their foreign education, language proficiency and work experience in their home country for upward social mobility. Many labour migrants reside in temporal housing settings and hardly integrate socially and culturally. Such migrants tend to have few nationals from the receiving country in their social networks.

A second dimension is that liquid migration is predominantly *labour migration*. Student migration may be seen as a minor supplement to this labour migration, since short-term labour migration is sometimes the true motive behind forms of student migration (Ivancheva 2007). Furthermore, particular groups of 'economic' asylum seekers or refugees can be regarded as labour migrants as well. All of the groups aim to earn money or to invest in their education or to better their economic position.

A third dimension is that migrants have a *legal residential status*. Liquid migration is regular migration. However, some migrants have a legal residential status but need work permits in order to gain access to the labour market. If they do not have a work permit, they become irregular workers. However, after the current 'transition periods', in which restrictions are imposed on workers from Bulgaria and Romania, these migrants will gain free access to European labour markets. Another relevant category is students. Many of them are not allowed to stay when they have finished their studies. If they do stay, they become illegal migrants. Therefore, some categories of migrants have a temporary legal residence status (students), while others may face the problem of irregular work. These categories show that legal status itself is a fluid classification that may change over time. The enlargement of the European Union in 2004 and 2007 legalised overnight many migrants, such as those from Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, who previously were residing illegally in Western Europe.

A fourth dimension of liquid migration is that international migration flows have become more *unpredictable*. Some categories of labour migrants work and reside in well-established destination countries, while others travel to new destination countries. Liquid migration partly ignores political and economic factors that have shaped migration flows in the past. The Polish migration flows to Ireland and the United Kingdom are clear examples of this change. Labour migrants react and adapt to altering conditions in the different labour markets of different European countries. A new characteristic of contemporary immigrant flows is the combination of long and short history. Traditional – often seasonal – labour migration flows to Germany go hand in hand with migration flows to new destination regions such as the British Isles.

A fifth dimension of liquid migration deals with the role of *family*. International migration has always been stimulated and facilitated by networks of family (Tilly 1990; Massey et al. 1987; Palloni et al. 2001). Households develop strategies to maximise the household income. These classical forms of migration rely on the solidarity between generations and on extended family patterns. Grandparents take care of children when one or both parents are abroad to earn money for the family. However, next to this classical pattern, new patterns come up that are much more individualised. These more individualised patterns are the logical consequence of changes in family bonds. Family ties have become looser and more fragile, not only in Western European societies but also in the CEE countries. Furthermore, people postpone marriage and having children to a later age. Many contemporary labour migrants are unmarried and have little or no family obligations. They go abroad to try their luck and do not have specific responsibilities to support relatives in their home country.

The relatively autonomous position of labour migrants is facilitated by the demand for their labour skills, low transportation and communications

costs and the disappearance of internal EU borders and the resulting free movement. The social position of migrants and the migration field in which they strategically operate generates a specific *migratory habitus* of ‘intentional unpredictability’ (Eade, Drinkwater & Garapich 2006). Some migrants have no fixed aspirations or ideas about the future. Their options are open. They go to new destination countries without clear-cut aspirations of investing money in their home country or settling in the receiving country. This migratory habitus expresses the more individualistic ethos of unmarried labour migrants, who are less bounded by family obligations, borders and local labour markets than previous generations of migrants.

The notion of liquid migration has some resemblance with the concept of ‘incomplete migration’ as developed in the work of Okólski (2001). However, incomplete migration was a typical *pre-accession* phenomenon. It encapsulates flows of short-term labour migration of varying degrees of legality, without any settlement. It is mostly connected to work in a secondary segment of the labour market in a foreign country. This type of migration did not disappear after accession, but it has transformed in new forms: labour migrants travel over longer distances to new destination countries, and they may stay abroad for longer periods. Liquid migration is a *post-accession* phenomenon. Moreover, this behaviour is strongly facilitated by the free mobility of migrants within the EU. Liquid migration is regular migration. Nevertheless, many migrants are still working in the secondary and informal labour markets.

The six dimensions of liquid migration set out in table 2.4 are supported by the first findings of a Dutch research project on the social and economic position of labour migrants from CEE in the Netherlands. More than 750 respondents have been interviewed for this research project; most of them from Poland (Weltevrede et al. 2009).

Table 2.4 *The characteristics of liquid migration*

1 Settlement	Temporality of migration and stay	Temporal migration Economic integration in destination country
2 Type of migration	Labour and student migration	Labour migrants Student migrants
3 Status	Legal residential status	Regular labour migration Temporary work permit holders
4 Destination	No predestined receiving country	Multiple receiving countries New receiving countries
5 Family	Individualised life strategy (limited family obligations)	Individualised forms of migration First generation pattern
6 Migratory habitus	Intentional unpredictability	No fixed migration aspirations Open options

Source: Authors' own elaboration

2.4 Discussion

This chapter began by raising the question of what kind of East-West migration regime is developing, as based on the four types of migration described by Moch (1992). As Moch emphasised, all four migration systems are present in each period in the history of migration, but the balance between these four types differs. The notion of liquid migration as introduced in this chapter indicates in particular the significance of temporary and return migration. Migrant workers stay for short or longer periods in certain countries and then return. This pattern can repeat itself many times. Polish researchers speak of 'lasting temporariness' (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2005) to characterise current East-West migration within Europe. Furthermore, return migration can be part of career migration. Studying abroad, for example, can bring substantial advantages for getting a good job in the home country (see Wolfeil in this volume).

The fluid nature of East-West migration emphasises the contrasts between the so-called guest worker migration of the 1960s-1970s and contemporary migrant workers from CEE countries, who do not settle permanently in the receiving countries where they work but, at least until now, often tend to return to their home countries and then go abroad again. Return migration occurs when the job is finished. They go for international jobs when necessary, as in the case of seasonal work, or are available on demand in the labour markets of Western European countries, for instance for construction jobs. This raises the question of how to explain this difference between the labour migration from the Mediterranean countries in the 1960s-1970s and the current labour migration from the CEE countries to Western Europe. In our view, a crucial difference between both episodes of international migration is the *institutional context*. The earlier migrant workers, the so-called guest workers, arrived in a period when national borders were still very real and significant. When asked why the guest workers from this period stayed in the countries of arrival, despite their often firm intention to return, migration researchers point out the significance of national borders. According to Sassen (1999), there was a significant increase in the permanent foreign-resident population in Western Europe when borders were closed in 1973-1974. She writes (*ibid.*: 143):

[...] this growth might not have occurred if the option of circular migration had existed. Much migration has to do with supplementing household income in countries of origin; given enormous earnings differentials, a limited stay in a high-wage country is sufficient.

Since it was previously impossible to move repeatedly between sending and receiving countries, many migrants decided not to return but instead to have their families come over. This was the beginning of the permanent

settlement of the former guest workers, who consequently were not 'guests' anymore. There were also other reasons including (1) changing plans of migrants because of their current stage in the life cycle; (2) economic recession in the home country; (3) the integration of migrant workers into welfare systems; (4) legal protection when securing residence status and the right to live with their families (Castles 2006). The current labour migration from Eastern to Western Europe is taking place in a different institutional constellation and in a context in which national borders – at least within the EU – have lost their significance. East-West migration is strongly labour-motivated, like the guest worker migration in the 1960s and 1970s, but nowadays workers can come and go as they choose. However, the other factors continue to be of relevance.

Furthermore, reduced travel costs and increased communications and information technologies make it possible to adjust quickly to economic opportunities. Finally, as argued by Papadimitriou (2009), many CEE migrants work in jobs abroad that discount their education, credentials and experience. Some of them will be able to move up the occupational hierarchy, especially with improving English language skills (Drinkwater, Eade & Garapich 2010). However, as some evidence presented in this volume shows, this is not always the case (Pietka, Clark and Canton and Trevena in this volume). Since low-skilled jobs are cut in the greatest numbers during recessions, it may be more sensible for CEE workers to return to their home country where they have their family and social ties and where they might find work in occupations that are more skilled.

Notes

- 1 In the Netherlands, people are considered to be migrants or non-native Dutch residents if they and/or at least one of their parents were born outside the Netherlands or if they were born in the Netherlands to two foreign-born parents. Secondly, the official Dutch statistics draw a distinction between migrants from 'Western' and from 'non-Western' countries. The term 'Western' comprises of countries in Europe (excluding Turkey), North America, Oceania, Indonesia and Japan. 'Non-Western' comprises Turkey and countries in Africa, South America and Asia, excluding Indonesia and Japan.
- 2 These figures do not refer to individuals since separate individuals can receive several TWPs.
- 3 The 2006 figure applies to migrants who stayed abroad for more than two months instead of three months as was the case in 2007.
- 4 'Short-term moves' are shares of more than two months and less than a year in 2004-2006, and of more than three months and less than a year in 2007-2008.
- 5 WRS data does not include self-employment.

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3 Anatomy of post-accession migration

How to measure 'liquidity' and other patterns of post-accession migration flows

Izabela Grabowska-Lusinska

3.1 Introduction

Economic downturns, expansions of the European Union, demographic shifts and international wage gaps seem to push people to move in numbers, dynamics and ways not seen before (Santo Tomas, Summers & Clemens 2009). These dynamics create challenges for measuring and researching new phenomena that are emerging and shifting.

The lack of migration data creates a significant blind spot in the context of current economic and social realities. The migration flows following the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements have shed additional light on manifest shortages of migration data. With current migration data we have difficulty answering crucial questions: how many migrants left, who left, how did migrants select their destinations, how did migrants fare at their destinations, why and when did they move, how many returned and to what extent does back-and-forth migration occur today, as well as whether and to what extent legal migration affects irregular migration (Santo Tomas, Summers & Clemens 2009).

The aim of this chapter is to describe, discuss and evaluate data sources and their ability to measure and analyse post-accession information, including migration flows and their patterns, categories of migrants and their statuses, and mechanisms, causes and implications of post-accession migration. The analysis presented here largely draws on research accumulated for the Polish case study. However, one must first consider the nature of post-accession migration in general.

3.2 Unique patterns of post-accession migration flows

A question that merits consideration is whether post-accession migration is any different than the waves of migration during pre-accession periods,

which mostly cover the timeframe of the systemic transition in CEE. As argued by Engbersen and Snel in this volume, post-accession migration can be classified as 'new migration'. This suggests the need for a new methodological approach that accounts for the novel and complex usage of established migration data sources, especially as regards the uniqueness or shared characteristics of pre- and post-accession migration waves.

Garapich (2008) argues that post-accession migration is a continuation of migration from a period of systemic transition; the upswing in mobility occurred long before 1 May 2004. Simultaneously, however, Garapich makes note of some unique characteristics in the post-accession wave, namely, that it is demand-driven, depending on the situation in the receiving labour markets, and that it involves migrants who are self-conscious about their labour market status, as reflected in the visible changes in their substitution of irregularity with regularity and the civic attitudes they exhibit. These attitudes are manifest in the creation of ethnic media and through protesting and the claiming of tax rights, such as opposition to double taxation. Polish people, particularly those residing in the United Kingdom, are regarded as an important electorate (see the case of Scotland; more in Moskal in this volume) and the post-accession novelty also involves the creation of organisations parallel to those founded by the old Polish diaspora, the *Polonia*.

Meardi (2007) stresses the uniqueness of post-accession migration using the perspectives of Polish migrants in the United Kingdom. Meardi analyses the dynamics of high-volume flows in a short period and finds that the duration of migration is more than three seasonal months but less than twelve, with a high share of single, unmarried migrants and high levels of involvement in trade unions.

In their latest comprehensive study on post-accession migration from Poland, Grabowska-Lusinska and Okólski (2009) add credible evidence to the hypothesis that post-accession migration may have a unique impact on the Polish economy. The authors call this migration 'ultimate' and show that, for the first time in Polish history, modernisation may be enhanced through migration outflow. It had not previously been the case, since individuals who engaged in migration never emptied the local labour market. They were nominated to migrate by their households and remained strongly attached to them, earning money in foreign labour markets for limited periods, most often only three months, and they spent their earnings at home. During the remaining months, they typically were not economically active in the local labour market. The enlargement of the EU in 2004 shed new light on the mobility of people from CEE, bringing about freedom of mobility both geographically, first in the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden, and for a wider variety of occupations.

Grabowska-Lusinska and Okólski (2009) describe patterns of post-accession migration from Poland and pinpoint high levels of selectivity.

Analyses (Anacka & Okólski 2010) show that after 1 May 2004 the main selective factors for emigration outflows were gender, age, educational attainment, type of settlement and region of origin, which had a strong impact on the selection of destinations. Highly educated migrants from universities and bigger cities more frequently gravitated towards Great Britain and, to a lesser extent, to Ireland. This means that countries that opened their borders after enlargement gained a kind of comparative advantage in absorbing 'better' migrants, while countries that remained restrictive after 1 May 2004 may have received 'less valuable' migrants, in addition to those who were part of pre-accession outflows (Grabowska-Lusinska & Okólski 2009).

Black et al. (2010) consider post-accession migration as the nucleus of a new form of migration in CEE, which may also proliferate globally as liquid migration (see also Engbersen & Snel in this volume).

These arguments illuminate changes for migration research in general, and for post-accession migration in particular. They pinpoint that post-accession migration requires a special research focus and an in-depth perspective for both existing and newly created data sources.

3.3 How patchy are statistics about post-accession migration?

In order to conceptualise post-accession migration in a manner grounded solidly in data sources, rather than in speculative descriptions and false diagnoses, one must focus first on the basic numbers: size, trends and characteristics of post-accession migrants. The biggest obstacle to accurate measurement relates to the free movement of labour. In the global economy, we can measure cross-border movements of 'toys and textiles, of debt, equity and other forms of capital, but not cross-border movements of people' (Santo Tomas, Summers & Clemens 2009: 7). This creates gaps in our knowledge of the stocks and flows of post-accession migrants. Perhaps more alarmingly, the data on flows and stocks are often confused (Grabowska-Lusinska & Okólski 2009). This can lead to artificially inflated estimates and creates a misleading picture of post-accession migration flows.¹

In their complex and pioneering analysis on available international migration data sources in OECD countries, Dumont and Lemaitre (2005) find that data on both flows and stock do not accurately reflect the global scale of migration. Neither do data on movements reflect the scale and size of migration, mainly due to the lack of global comparability among these kinds of data. Moreover, data are not comparable due to internationally differentiated definitions of 'immigrant'. Dumont and Lemaitre (*ibid.*) evaluate both the pros and cons of three key data sources identified as relevant to migration research: (1) studies on emigrants in sending countries; (2)

compilations of databases in receiving countries; (3) statistics compiled by embassies and consulates that register compatriots abroad.

Information about post-accession migration as found in existing data sources is rather patchy, not least because of the developing nature of the phenomenon of post-accession migration, which has been inscribing itself increasingly into the patterns of the general migration fluidity in the world. In order to arrive at a complete picture of post-accession migration, it becomes clear that one must first attempt to create a coherent informational patchwork from available data sources. When selecting data sources, a researcher is necessarily limited by their availability. There is thus a need for a systematic approach to finding data sources and to maximising their utility.

In an effort to close some of the existing knowledge gaps on post-accession migration, three forms of data on migration might be consulted: (1) central statistics offices, including censuses and other surveys such as labour force and other household surveys; (2) administrative data, such as general registers and other work and residence permit systems or identification numbers; and (3) both qualitative and quantitative systematic research and targeted surveys.

3.3.1 *Statistics of central statistical offices*

Population census

One of the most comprehensive sources of data is the population censuses conducted in both sending and receiving countries. It is crucial, however, not to compare the data on immigration in sending and receiving countries, but instead to make them complementary to one another. This is a necessary step for accurately verifying the scale and structure of migration. In addition, population censuses are one of the few data sources that contain information on migrant stocks.

The tabulated presence of foreigners in the census depends on a variety of complicated factors, such as freedom of movement, the size of shadow economies and the willingness of respondents to be recorded in the receiving country's statistics.²

Box 3.1 presents an example calculation of post-accession net outflow from Poland.

Labour force surveys

When a population census has deficiencies and fails to create an up-to-date picture of post-accession migration, one must use other sources of information within public statistics. Although the Labour Force Survey (LFS) has not generally been regarded as a source of migration flow data, for post-accession migration it may actually be one of the most accurate sources of data.

Box 3.1 *Post-accession net outflow from Poland*

Exercise: Post-accession outflow from Poland - how to count how many people left as based on CSO statistics?

Marek Okólski made an effort to count the scale of the post-accession outflow from Poland (Grabowska-Lusinska & Okólski 2009). As a starting point, he took the stock of temporary emigrants who had been abroad more than two months: on 20 May 2002 (census day) 786,000 were abroad; on 31 December 2004 1,000,000 were abroad; on 31 December 2006 the number was 1,950,000.

Herewith, the net increase of temporary emigrants in 2005 and 2006 was 950,000 (1,950,000-1,000,000 = 950,000).

A net increase of temporary emigrants in the period from 20 May 2002 until 31 December 2004 was 1,000,000 – 786,000 = 214,000, within it: until 30 April 2004 55 per cent of 214,000 = 118,000 and since 1 May 2004: 214,000 – 118,000 = 96,000.

This means that net emigration in the period from 1 May 2004 to 31 December 2006 was 55,000.

This led to the conclusion that the total net post-accession outflow from Poland is 1,100,000 (950,000 + 96,000 + 55,000 = 1,101,000)

Sources: Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski (2009: 74) based on CSO (2011); CSO (2008)

The LFS can be considered a reliable data source on migration, and on post-accession migration in particular, as it contains information on immigrant flows as well as on immigrants' duration of stay. It also includes material on 'a source of Europe-wide migration flow statistics, but also of subsequent migration outcomes' (Rendall & Wright 2004: 5). Bailly, Mouhoud and Oudinet (2004) demonstrated the potential of the LFS for European-wide analyses of migration flows. They extrapolated data on immigrants' places of residence from the past year, combining that with questions on nationality, education and employment, thereby discerning the labour market impacts of various migration flows among EU countries. The authors' classification system includes core and periphery countries within the overall migration system. But although Bailly et al. combined LFS data with register data, it did not bring about the expected results.

The most questionable aspects of using LFS for migration studies include the sample size, sampling frames and response rates. The LFS is not uniformly administered in all EU countries:

The sampling frames of the various EU countries are heterogeneous, being approximately evenly divided between being population-register and census-dwelling based. Population register sampling frames may additionally be either person or household based. (Rendall & Wright 2004: 5)

Non-response rates differ across countries: it may be less than 10 per cent in countries where the survey is compulsory and as high as 40 per

cent where the survey is optional. However, many countries simply have insufficiently-sized samples of immigrant populations to publish them.

Additionally the European Commission (2008) published a comprehensive analysis of migration within 27 EU member states with a methodological approach that stemmed from a special *ad hoc* module based on national labour force surveys. However, this study illustrates the limitations of these surveys with respect to their representation and the resulting utility of immigration data, especially in countries where the number of immigrants is extremely low. This fact makes extrapolation to the general population impossible, which calls into question the overall quality of the study.

When attempting to analyse post-accession migration phenomena, it is necessary to remember that not every country produces LFS data appropriate for migration research. Ireland is a telling example with its National Quarterly Household Survey, where the sample for each EU-8 nationality is too small, and data is reported and published only as a general sample for migrants from EU-8 countries.

In post-accession migration studies, apart from a selection of national LFS data as a reliable source of information on migration, LFS in general may provide viable means for creating innovative LFS-based databases and innovative analytical approaches.

One possibility might be to create migration databases grounded in LFS.³ The Centre of Migration Research at the University of Warsaw created an LFS-grounded migration database for both emigrants and return migrants selected from households where at least one family member was present in Poland.⁴ The LFS Migrants Database comprises data from 1999 to 2006, although it contains both pre- and post-accession emigrants and includes records on 6,173 migrants. The database was divided into three pools: (1) those who left Poland before its EU accession; (2) those who left Poland after 1 May 2004 and who were recorded in the survey after 1 May 2005 after being abroad no more than one year; and (3) those who were recorded in the survey between 1 May 2004 and 1 May 2005 and whose departure timing is unclear (as elaborated by Mioduszevska in Grabowska-Lusinska & Okólski 2009). This unique LFS-based migration database helped reveal a great deal about post-accession migrants as compared to migrants from the pre-accession period. Although the database primarily measures the scale of migration outflow from Poland, it also helps address other important issues by comparing post- and pre-accession perspectives on migrants' destination choices, their socio-demographic characteristics (gender, age, education level, type of settlement), and the regions of origin for those migrating during pre- and post-accession periods (Grabowska-Lusinska & Okólski 2009).

The LFS-based analysis also provides a unique opportunity to explore the concept of selectivity⁵ (more in Anacka, Matejko and Nestorowicz in this volume) on the part of post-accession migrants from Poland. Analyses

of selectivity patterns of the latest emigration wave from Poland (Anacka & Okólski 2010) indicate that after 1 May 2004, the main selective factors for migration were sex, age, educational attainment, type of settlement and region of origin.

Additional methodological approaches based on LFS data were facilitated by the UK Labour Force Survey. The first approach ranked foreigners and their positions in the British labour market by analysing their economic profiles (IPPR 2007); the second approach was based on in-depth analyses of Polish households, both pre-accession and post-accession, and as captured in the British LFS (Osipovič 2007).

The first approach, taken by the British Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR 2007), is based on a selection of 25 country-of-birth groups, including post-accession migrants from CEE. The objective was to complete an analysis of the UK-born population to provide a comparison between the immigrant and non-immigrant population. A synthesis of this analysis is presented below for Polish migrants in the United Kingdom per selected variable and as measured in each of the other 24 country of birth groups (table 3.1).

The analysis shows that Polish migrants are beneficial to the British labour market. They are well-educated and work long hours while earning low wages, and they do not rely on British public assistance.

A second research approach within the analysis evaluates Polish households as captured by the British LFS. Osipovič (2007) attempted to collate

Table 3.1 *Position of Polish people in the British labour market*

<i>Characteristics</i>	<i>PL value</i>	<i>PL rank</i>	<i>Best</i>	<i>Worst</i>	<i>British-born</i>
Population size (thousand)	318	4	52,980	60	52,980
Average household size	2.8	2	2.4	5.1	3.0
Employment rate (%)	85	3-4	88	19	78
% inactive	11	2-3	8	71	18
Unemployment rate (%)	4	7-9	2	10	4
Self-employed among active (%)	13	15-16	3	35	13
Age when completed education	20.5	6	21.5	16.5	17.5
Average gross hourly pay (£)	7.3	26	17.1	7.3	11.1
Average hours worked (£)	41.5	2	32.0	42.0	36.5
Average annual income of economically active working population (£)	15,750	23	37,250	13,700	21,250
Average weekly tax and NI contributions (£)	94.4	23	281.6	88.9	140.6
% claiming unemployment benefits	0	1-4	0	5	1
% claiming sickness and disability benefits	0	1	0	10	6
% claiming child benefits	12	2-3	10	40	14
% living in social housing	8	4	5	5	17

Source: Elaborated by Grabowska-Lusinska & Okólski (2009) based on IPPR (2007)

existing data sources on family situations, household compositions and the dependants of Polish newcomers to the United Kingdom. The key aim of this approach was to assess the dynamics of settlement processes in both the pre-accession and post-accession periods. Osipovič analysed the 2005 LFS household datasets⁶ in order to ascertain the UK household characteristics of Polish migrants who arrived in the United Kingdom between 1998 and 2005. The findings revealed that family and household circumstances vary considerably by gender, duration of stay and region of residence in the United Kingdom. Moreover, this particular use of LFS data helped ‘discuss the potential ways in which an uncovered diversity of living arrangements of Polish newcomers might shape their settlement practices’ (Osipovič 2007: 1) and migratory trajectories.

3.3.2 *Registers and other administrative data*

Some scholars argue that register data may be the most comprehensive in the sense that no sampling is necessary. However, as an administrative source, it may be subject to certain omissions due to non-compliance (Rendall & Wright 2004). This is more problematic for emigration than for immigration (Poulain 1993), but varies across countries. The registers and other administrative data seem to reflect with relative accuracy the reality of free versus restricted movements of people. The level of control and regulation in labour markets thus determines the type and level of detail of these data sources (Grabowska-Lusinska & Okólski 2009).

The 2004 EU enlargement changed the rationale and reality of administrative data, in at least some, mostly receiving, countries. First, those countries that decided to lift restrictions relinquished the requirement of work permits for newcomers from CEE countries. The United Kingdom exhibited the most meaningful examples of those changes and adjustments. The United Kingdom introduced the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) on 1 May 2004 for citizens from new EU member states, and Ireland readjusted its Personal Public Service (PPS) number. In this manner, the United Kingdom created a new register dedicated to EU-8 citizens; Ireland simply adjusted its PPS system to apply to foreigners.⁷

Different kinds of registers provide unique sets of information on migration, though most of it is related to migrant stocks. For example, work permit and work visa systems may provide additional information about the registered migrant stock, which is often only part of the whole migration picture. Residence permits and residence cards are another source of information on immigrant stocks, which also differ across countries (e.g., after lifting restrictions on access to the Spanish labour market, residence cards became substitutes for police registration).

The British WRS, which was created specifically to monitor post-accession migrants in the British labour market, presents an interesting example

in light of the topics already discussed in this chapter. The WRS is released in Accession Monitoring Reports, which track the dynamics of inflow and compile limited profiles of migrants and employment data. They thereby provide insight into the patterns and trends of the various occupations and sectors where EU-8 migrants are typically employed. One important caveat, however, is that statistics provide no information on workers who do not register despite the formal obligation to do so, or, even more importantly, those who left the country. The scale of migration after 1 May 2004 and 2007 is therefore likely to be overestimated.

Both positive and negative aspects of the WRS have been noted. One of the positive aspects relates to the active use of this kind of data source. Despite the drawbacks mentioned above, it is, in fact, an additional and unique data source on post-accession migration. One of the biggest faults of this system, notwithstanding the appreciation of sector-specific data on post-accession migrants in the United Kingdom, is that the categories of sectors may be misleading. For example, when evaluating Polish migrants in the United Kingdom, they appear to be employed predominately in the 'administration, business and management sector,' at a rate of about 40 per cent, on average. The LFS data, however, suggests a different sector allocation of Polish migrants in the United Kingdom, with employment in construction predominant for men and employment in hotels and restaurants common for women. Why does this discrepancy arise between these two data sources? As shown by Grabowska-Lusinska (2008), the explanation is found in the specificities of these two data sources and, even more importantly, in the labour market forces driving migrants to certain sectors. Recruitment agencies have been found to list migrants from Poland as working in the 'administration, business and management sector', even though migrants are actually employed in other sectors such as construction and hospitality. In WRS, they have the status of agency workers.

The United Kingdom also established a post-accession system that imposed certain conditions on the ability of A-8 migrants to reside in the country and access employment⁸ connected to the WRS:

The registration rules limit the right of residence for EU8 migrant workers to the effect that an EU8 national is only considered to be legally resident when in work and registered on the scheme. There is only a period of grace within which a migrant can search for employment before UK law classifies him or her as being unlawfully resident (Currie 2007: 92).


This system gave rise to concerns about how this sort of situation impacted the behaviours of migrants in the British labour market (more in Trevena and Pietka, Clark and Canton in this volume).

The Irish register's PPS number provides a very limited range of information on EU-8 migrants. There are also drawbacks to the Irish PPS system because everybody, whether working or non-working, whether a child or adult, is required to register to access education and health care. This fact may skew the real employment data on migrants in the Irish labour market. The PPS system is thus able to register the dynamics of inflow only. However, if tax office records are added to PPS members, the picture becomes more complete. In the Irish case, cross-tabulations of PPS identifications and tax numbers can provide information on those who paid taxes in a given fiscal year. This method may bring about additional information about those who are employed on a regular basis in Ireland (figure 3.1).

Though the PPS in Ireland does not provide information on spatial allocation, the British equivalent of the National Insurance Number (NINo) provides information on the inflow density of EU-8 citizens to certain regions of the United Kingdom in certain fiscal years. For example, there is an observable change in the spatial dispersion of Polish migrants throughout certain fiscal years and a noticeable decrease in their gravitation to the greater London area. Moreover, the population is gradually spreading to include regions that have never before experienced the arrival of immigrants from CEE.

Bauere et al. (2007) completed a novel analysis of data from the WRS. Their study deepened geographical information on labour immigration to the United Kingdom based on county-specific data. The authors

Figure 3.1 *Factual employment of EU 8 in Ireland 2004-2007: PPS v. taxpayers*



Source: extracted from Department of Social and Family Affairs and Tax Office of Ireland


acknowledge that an analysis of WRS data confirms the findings of the British LFS in terms of the overall distribution of EU-8 migrants; that is, they may be increasingly geographically dispersed. However, their most interesting finding relates to the ethnic, geographical and sectoral distribution of EU newcomers to the United Kingdom, which is especially visible among two of the largest EU-8 national groups, Poles and Lithuanians (figure 3.2).

This particular analysis confirms the ethnic, spatial and sectoral clustering of both Poles and Lithuanians and points to a simple conclusion: where Polish people are employed, Lithuanians are barely visible and vice versa. However, it may be premature to discuss ethnic economic enclaves.

The data on social welfare benefit claims may provide additional information on post-accession migration, especially at the time of the global economic crisis, when the numbers on various types of benefits are rising in both the United Kingdom and Ireland. Such data include both individuals at the application stage and those already accepted for benefits (e.g., unemployment, child care, disability).

Public statistics, including those from central statistical offices and administrative and register data sources, appear to offer limited utility in

Figure 3.2 *Geographical distribution of Poles (left) and Lithuanians (right) in the United Kingdom based on WRS data, 2006 (%)*



Source: Bauere et al. 2007 (with authors' permission)

researching post-accession migration. Indeed, no singular source of information seems to present a complete picture of post-accession migration. Combination, not comparability, of data sources may constitute the best method of solving the 'patchy statistics problem,' but it still may not be enough to answer questions regarding the patterns within and mechanisms of this particular wave of migration. In order to attain a firmer grasp on the mechanics of post-accession migration, then, there is a strong need for targeted approaches that can be applied in a variety of settings.

3.3.3 *Targeted approaches to post-accession migration*

After 1 May 2004, the EU's biggest enlargement, targeted research projects on CEE migration entered a new phase. Initially, small, explorative research relied mostly on qualitative techniques with strategically made samples of migrants. Afterward, the complexities of post-accession migration brought about approaches that were more sophisticated, including ethno-surveys revisited, respondent-driven sampling, various kinds of web surveys and 'tracking' studies carried out by qualitative panels.

The ethno-survey

One of the key requirements of the ethno-survey is to map changes at the macro and micro levels. The ethno-survey is best described as a multi-technique research approach developed specifically for migration research: it includes a monographic, descriptive study of the community, quantitative general household surveys and in-depth interviews with migrants in both sending and receiving locations.⁹ The ethno-survey was developed to study migration as a complex social process with the underlying hypothesis that different levels of social life matter, and especially in the local communities that significantly affect the migratory process. The application of different research techniques in one project becomes necessary in order to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the various aspects of migration (Kaczmarczyk 2011).

The ethno-survey makes it possible for research to be conducted without the need for preliminary assumptions and with a broad conception of migration and mobility. It also enables the tracking of social changes, not only changes directly connected to migration but also those related to economic and social structures. The ethno-survey also makes possible the tracking of the whole migration process and different forms of mobility, which allows for the isolation of the role of local factors in migratory decisions. Most importantly, it facilitates the analysis of migratory acts in the form of both household and individual strategies (Kaczmarczyk 2011).

The ethno-survey¹⁰ has been applied to migration studies in Europe since the mid-1990s and used mostly in Poland (Jaźwińska, Łukowski & Okólski 1997; Massey, Kalter & Pren 2008).¹¹ The ethno-survey research

approach led to the discovery of an emigration phenomenon within the systemic transition process, which in turn became a facet of migration theory known as 'incomplete migration' (Jaźwińska & Okólski 2001), along with its characteristic seasonal migrations (Kaczmarczyk & Łukowski 2004). However, the Polish version of an ethno-survey was implemented in a sending location only.

A recent ethno-survey on post-accession migration from Poland revealed new information on movements from Poland (Kaczmarczyk 2008). The study included the following elements: the structural conditions of post-accession migration at both the regional and local levels; evaluations of the 'intensity' of outflows from regions as studied through the prism of their households; the regional selectivity of mobility; the micro-social conditions of post-accession migration and the strategic causation thereof; survival and/or development; post-accession migration in EU labour markets (including destinations, sectors of employment, socio-demographic characteristics of migrants, funding for going abroad, foreign language competence, working and remuneration conditions); and, finally, the economic impacts of post-accession migration on both the micro and macro levels.

Respondent-driven sampling

One of the biggest obstacles in conducting representative research on migrant populations in receiving countries is their accessibility. Researchers often encounter problems ascertaining the size of a given migrant population, which limits the possibility of using random sampling. The challenges inherent in determining the size of a particular population come from the continuous movements of migrants and the lack of detailed registers that capture migrants in a receiving country. In addition, irregular migration effectively prevents comprehensive sampling, since it takes place beyond the scope of most registers.

Considering the arguments presented above, the total population of migrants can justly be referred to as 'hidden populations', to use Heckathorn's (1997) term. Hidden populations are defined as those that are unable to be randomly sampled. As a result, researchers are unable to assess the absolute numbers of the population being studied. A related characteristic in the evaluation of these kinds of populations is the pressure to maintain their privacy, as in the cases of irregular migrants. Potential respondents may feel trepidation about their status and may therefore refuse to participate in the research. In 1997, Heckathorn developed a new method of sampling hidden populations based on a theory of biased networks, which obtains results for an entire population despite the lack of random sampling. Respondent-driven sampling (RDS), also called steered sampling or controlled sampling, is a way of snowball sampling that is sustained by a dual system of structured incentives, which in turn are based on rewarding respondents both for the interview and for bringing in the following

respondent (Heckathorn 1997). In this method, invited respondents can make their own decisions about getting involved in the research without disclosing their identities to the researcher. Application of the RDS method to migration research allows researchers to collect information about the structure of migrant populations, though it does not allow for population size estimates (Napierala 2008; Kaczmarczyk 2011).

In addition, the RDS method was applied to the study of Polish post-accession migrants in Norway, mostly in Oslo, and especially those in the shadow economy, since they were the most difficult to access (Napierała 2008; Napierała & Trevena 2010; Kaczmarczyk 2011). This particular study was clustered in two sectors – construction and household services – and was a successful means of approaching Polish migrants in Norway.

Web survey

With limited access to migrants and no real possibility of random sampling, web surveys on post-accession migration have been implemented. Two methods of approaching respondents have been utilised: (1) dedicated email surveying, including web snowball and network sampling; (2) pop-up sampling with geo-localised modules and cookies attached to portals most often visited by migrants (including social networking sites like Facebook and the local *Nasza Klasa* ('Our Class') and *Grono* ('Circle of Friends')). These two methodological approaches differ significantly, but neither of them supplies any kind of sample representation – despite the fact that the samples may be sizeable and representative of the general population, which may be accidental since a select portion of the population uses computers and the internet. The email list approach is more limited, but it is also more targeted, which can help identify migrants with certain profiles. The second approach through pop-ups is more general but may capture more 'accidental' respondents (Milewski & Ruszczak-Żbikowska 2008; Centre for Research on Nationalism, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism 2006).

The web surveys help respondents to freely answer questions on various topics, including households in receiving countries and relations between co-members who are not necessarily kin; remuneration and spending, including remittances; living and working conditions and life satisfaction; political affiliations and political behaviours; attitudes about products, ethnic brands and motivations to and declarations of return.

Qualitative panel of migrants

The last novel methodological approach presented in this chapter to study post-accession migration involves a tracking mechanism driven by a qualitative panel of migrants. This approach was developed in response to the need to monitor the activities of a targeted and carefully selected group of migrants within a given period (see Trevena in this volume). Trevena's approach focused on the impact of the 2004 EU enlargement on migrants in

the United Kingdom, and especially on their careers in terms of their formal qualifications and professional experience. The author observed a group of Polish migrants in the United Kingdom at two points in time, 2003 and 2007-2008, which allowed Trevena to determine what the impact of enlargement was on their labour market curriculum and the extent to which migrants have taken advantage of the opportunities available to them as a result of their unrestricted access to the British labour market.

The Irish approach was similar in some ways, but it also accounted for the macro situation in the sector in which a given migrant was employed, with a special focus on the construction, hospitality, IT and financial sectors.¹² This analysis ran parallel to in-depth interviews with migrants and employers. The methodology was also innovative because the researchers tracked migrants anywhere they went, whether they had moved back to their home country, gone to a third European country or gone to a non-European country (Krings et al. 2013).

The approaches to post-accession migration presented in this section are being showcased as possible methodologies to enhance research of the phenomenon. This may lead to the conclusion that, given how patchy official statistics are, dedicated approaches could serve as a complementary source of information. Yet dedicated approaches may provide a central source of information, with official statistical data being complementary and added to enhance the rest of the research. A comprehensive methodological approach to collecting data on post-accession migration appears to be very helpful in evaluating various patterns of migration, mostly in terms of their continuity or change, as will be discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter.

3.4 Measuring new migration patterns

An analysis of data sources and methodological approaches to post-accession migration brings me back to the central question in the subtitle of this chapter: how to identify, characterise and measure newly emerging patterns of post-accession migration, also known as liquid migration.

Migratory movements are no longer defined by permanent moves from one place to another. Migrants today might reside in two or more places, connected by one living experience, and are also able to 'move freely in spaces they feel belong to them' (Ganga 2006: 1401). 'In these conditions, it is increasingly important to map the ways in which mobile individuals exercise their agency and shape their migratory strategies' (Osipović 2007: 3). These issues seem to be especially pertinent in the context of post-accession migration flows and emerging new patterns.

A study by Eade, Drinkwater and Garapich (2009) found that about 30 per cent of migrants were indecisive about their length of stay in the

United Kingdom.¹³ The study named this strategy ‘intentional unpredictability’, which is characterised by a migrant’s monitoring opportunities in two countries and keeping all options open. It is possible that the indeterminacy and uncertainty identified by scholars is in response to the constantly changing institutional environment characteristic of modern societies, to an inability to predict the future and to the reality of being subject to an ‘atmosphere of risk’ (Giddens 1991), in which it becomes increasingly difficult to decide on a place of residence, lifestyle, career, family and personal relationships (Osipovič 2007: 8). In some cases, it appears simpler to subscribe to Bauman’s concept of ‘liquid life’ (2005). One could thus argue that ‘intentional unpredictability’ is among the most sensible strategies to pursue in contemporary post-accession migration realities (Osipovič 2007).

The uncertainty inherent in ‘intentional unpredictability’ stems from a somewhat new characteristic of international migration emerging in Europe and elsewhere. Migration patterns exhibit an ever-more complex nature and a wider array of forms than previously known, from temporary to long-term, from circular mobility to settlement migration. This spectrum includes the new, rapidly expanding but rather amorphous form of mobility that Engbersen, Snel & De Boom (2010) and Engbersen and Snel (in this volume) call ‘liquid migration’.

Liquid migration can be loosely described as ‘being here and there’, and at the same time keeping various life options open. As Okólski (2009) suggests, liquid migration requires, among other things, a relatively high degree of freedom of movement on an international scale; a dense, efficient and affordable transportation network spanning many parts of the world; equal access to labour markets and public services; and a more or less universal culture that includes a *lingua franca*. This means that liquid migrants do not put down roots anywhere abroad, and maintain strong, or at the very least deeply symbolic, ties with their country of origin.¹⁴ Liquid migrants are reminiscent of transnational migrants, but they are not easily traced or counted. Eade, Drinkwater & Garapich (2009) argue that these migrants refuse to commit themselves to one national setting, which underlines their ability to adapt to a flexible, deregulated and increasingly transnational, post-modern labour market.¹⁵

Post-accession migrants, especially those who have chosen destinations with unrestricted labour market access, begin exhibiting many characteristics typical of liquid migration over time. In order to identify initial variables and other measures of liquid migration early, it is necessary to compare it with other forms of migration identified in both the pre-accession and post-accession periods.

The characteristics of the different forms of post-accession migration as presented in table 3.2 are not exclusive or complete. In fact, they prompt further research questions. A new pattern of liquid migration does not

exclude the possibilities of both circular migration and long-term migration. All may overlap to some extent.

The typology presented in table 3.2 is a synthesised version of the results of an analysis of Polish Labour Force Survey data (Polish acronym: BAEL), of ethno-survey data compiled by the Centre of Migration Research at the University of Warsaw, and of extensive additional research on fragmented post-accession studies, most commonly through case studies conducted across the EU after the 2004 enlargement (Grabowska-Lusinska & Okólski 2009). The idea underlying this synthesis relates to the combination of quantitative and qualitative findings to thoroughly assess a given migration strategy and its selective indicators. In this synthesis, 'migration strategy' is understood as a life choice to which migration is added in order to attain certain goals, and which is founded on the concepts of a 'social actor' and of 'rational choice.' One of the variants covered by this research includes seasonal migration strategies, which were implemented extensively by migrants in the pre-accession period, mostly because of the bilateral agreements in effect between Germany and Poland. It was typically utilised by individuals for whom seasonal circulation made logistical sense, as they were unable to find adequate employment in their local, sending labour market and needed to care for families based in the sending country. In such cases, migration is often the only option for individuals looking to have their professional qualifications met properly, though they may be outdated or no longer in demand in Poland. This type of migration has proven particularly attractive to people in the peripheral areas of Poland who go to work in the peripheries of a given foreign labour market, for example, from a Polish village to a foreign village (Jaźwińska & Okólski 2001), typically in agriculture, construction and, to a lesser extent, in the hospitality sector. A natural question that arises is whether this form of migration persisted after the EU enlargement, especially given the slightly lowered rates of migration from Poland to Germany and the predominating position of the United Kingdom as a receiving country. Although migrants' average length of stay seems to have been prolonged (Kaczmarczyk & Okólski 2008) and individuals may engage in other forms of migration, this particular form of movement still engages specific parts of the mobile population, especially during the economic crisis of 2008 and 2009. In order to substantiate the existence of this strategy, the structure and behaviour of a household must be considered, as do the means of making remittances to a sending country and the structure of expenditures and consumption at home (Grabowska-Lusinska & Okólski 2009).

Another, different long-term strategy is characterised by planned, organised, well thought-out and intentional migration, begun via a recruitment process in a sending country. If a migrant has a family, his or her goal will most likely involve bringing his or her family to a country with employment opportunities, where children's educations can be continued or begun.

Table 3.2 *Continuity of types and forms of migrants and their selective indicators*

<i>Selective Indicators</i>	<i>Migration strategy</i>			
	<i>Seasonal, pendular</i>	<i>Intentional unpredictability</i>	<i>Long-term (more than a year)</i>	<i>Definitive settlement</i>
Type of migrant	Circular	Liquid migrant (?)	Migrant/Emigrant	Emigrant
Status of residence	Movement based on bilateral agreements or unrestricted access to labour market	Unrestricted movement, no rooting	Regulated residence	From long-term residence to citizenship
Family strategy	Family at sending place	Singles or unmarried couples, mostly DINKs ('double income no kids')	Family at migration destination	Family at migration destination
Usage of formal qualifications	Neutral to positive	Negative to neutral	Positive	Positive
Labour market status	Both irregular and regular; temporary employment	Regular employment, both temporary and fixed-term	Regular, permanent employment	Regular, permanent employment
Sectors of employment	Agriculture, hospitality, construction	Hospitality, construction, food-processing, but also sectors demanding high qualifications: IT and financial	IT, biotech, pharmaceutical, financial and other sectors demanding professionals	IT, biotech, pharmaceutical, financial and other sectors demanding professionals
Spatial allocations	Rural areas and those with clustering of hospitality services	Spatial dispersion which may be connected to new migrant networks	At company's location	At company's location
Form of recruitment	Based on bilateral agreements; via agencies	On spec; unplanned; carpe diem	Well-organised and planned process of recruitment	Well-organised and planned process of recruitment
Return	Incomplete migration	Intentionally unpredictable; liquid return; back-and-forth	After fulfilment of goals	Low probability of return

Source: Based on Grabowska-Lusinska & Okólski (2009: 226)

This sort of migration is usually undertaken by those who consider moving abroad an important step in their career development.

Yet another genre of migration, which usually involves settlement, has as an objective a permanent change of work and/or residence, both generally in better conditions than were available in a given home country. This migration process is also usually well-planned and thoroughly calculated by a family intending to resettle.

Even given the three post-accession migration behavioural strategies described above, a strategy of intentional unpredictability (Eade, Drinkwater & Garapich 2006) with liquidity patterns should also be considered. This strategy applies to people who take life as it is, who do not generally make plans about their careers and who do not plan their mobility, but rather who await the future passively. Their employment trajectories are usually fragmented and disconnected. People who engage in intentional unpredictability, or whose migration strategy is having no set strategy, are usually single or 'DINKs' – double income, no kids – with no or a low need to send remittances home, and who consume most of their incomes abroad. Their attitudes towards work, and especially towards mobility, shed light on a different facet of the migration process, to become part of a broader sociological discourse on the individualisation of social life. This emerging mobility pattern, however, requires further research.

This brief synthesis demonstrates that, in order to better understand an emerging form of migration best described as a 'liquid' pattern of post-accession migration, two aspects of mobility need further assessment: geographic and occupational contexts.

Geographic mobility can imply either a move from one area to another within one country or a move across borders. When an individual's place of residence and his place of work are not one and the same, geographic mobility takes the form of regional or international movement. The duration of the movements is a defining characteristic that can range from long-distance commuting on a regular, daily or weekly basis to short-term, seasonal bouts of migration for intra-company assignments or long-term labour migration (i.e., more than a year).

Occupational mobility can be described as changes in a given worker's employment profile, content or career level, and can happen with or without a change of employer. It can also mean the transition between different labour market statuses, from unemployment or inactivity into employment.

As regards liquidity of geographical mobility, the selection of a destination with unrestricted and unlimited access to the labour market often plays a significant role. Occupational and job mobility seem to be key underlying factors for the liquid behaviours of migrants in the labour market, as well as for return and back-and-forth migration.

Liquidity can be exhibited by a migrant when he or she engages in any of the following: selecting a destination with unrestricted access to the

local labour market and whose proximity translates into easy and inexpensive connections, thereby engendering the potential freedom for job mobility that is strongly connected to regulated versus non-regulated job statuses; having a certain job status (employed part-time or full-time, temporary or fixed term, employee or self-employed) and job profile (matched versus non-matched, content, career level). These variables often involve highly educated migrants working below their qualification levels (Currie 2007; Trevena in this volume; Pietka, Clark and Canton in this volume) as well as those whose jobs adequately match their qualifications, which mostly applies to highly educated migrants (Ackers & Gill 2008). In addition, these job statuses and job profiles can have meaningful impacts on the duration of stay and, even more importantly, on the continuity of stay, that is, on return or back-and-forth types of migration.

This brings me to the identification of key variables to characterise and, to a lesser extent, to measure liquid migration in both its geographical and occupational forms. A *sine qua non* of better understanding liquid migration is to concede that those variables work in combination: destination country, distance, unlimited job mobility and related job status, job profile, continuity and duration of stay all influence the decision to engage in return or back-and-forth migration.

What kind of data can comprehensively and accurately measure these variables? One must again revisit the existing patchwork of data sources in order to attempt to complete the picture of a specific pattern of post-accession migration – namely, liquid migration. There is a clear need to combine existing data with dedicated, targeted research.

The best sources of data for determining destinations and distance are typically generated by central statistical offices in censuses, yearbooks and through household surveys, perhaps with the best example being the LFS.¹⁶

When analysing job mobility and labour market status, it is necessary to consult public statistics, especially within LFS, in both sending and receiving countries. Used in combination, dedicated research such as ethno-surveys, qualitative panels and dedicated web surveys can elicit more targeted information on the topic.

Fully understanding job profiles requires the use of data obtained from questionnaires designed specifically to ascertain this information; specifically, or else from new, targeted projects.

Other variables in liquid migration, such as duration of stay and continuity of stay, involve analyses of both public statistics and LFS and include innovative approaches alongside dedicated research.

3.5 Conclusions

This chapter examined the challenges in identifying patterns of post-accession mobility through the use of statistical data sources and their patchwork combination. It demonstrated that contemporary migration patterns include both traditional and emerging types of mobility such as liquid migration.

Liquid migration appears to be one of the best test cases for working with a patchwork of data sources in order to build a complete picture of post-accession migration patterns. As shown in this analysis, these data sources can be inadequate for understanding mobility patterns when viewed separately, individually or in the way suggested by central statistical offices, that is, by dealing exclusively with the sending or receiving country. There exists a strong need for novel, innovative approaches geared towards the improvement of existing data sources and the creation of new databases. Perhaps the most significant challenge remaining for researchers of post-accession migration phenomena is to find and effectively apply a combination of data sources and research approaches in order to fully grasp the richness and complexity of contemporary migration patterns.

Notes

- 1 In Poland during the early post-accession period, migration numbers were inaccurate and mostly invented by the media. Within a few months, the numbers of migrants who reportedly left Poland grew rapidly from 700,000 at the beginning of 2006 to one million in mid-2006, up to three to four million at the end of this year. These numbers appear to have been almost entirely fabricated by the media, as there appear to be no data or analyses supporting them (Grabowska-Lusinska & Okólski 2009).
- 2 In the Irish Census 2006 about 63,000 Polish people were counted, which makes for a sizable population for the purpose of analysing the population structure and any changes since the 2002 census.
- 3 The Polish LFS is based on a random sampling of 24,700 households, which consist of four sub-samples: (1) households sampled five quarters ago; (2) households sampled a year ago; (3) households sampled the quarter before the survey; (4) newly sampled households whose members were surveyed for the first time (Mioduszewska in Grabowska-Lusinska & Okólski 2009).
- 4 There are research limitations because the researcher cannot monitor households whose members have left Poland permanently.
- 5 The migrant selectivity index is based on the following formula:

$$MSI_{V=i} = \frac{\frac{M_{V=i} - P_{V=i}}{M} - \frac{P_{V=i}}{P}}{\frac{P_{V=i}}{P}}$$

where: $MSI_{V=i}$ is an index for category i of variable V ; $M_{V=i}$ and $P_{V=i}$ are the number of migrants and number of people in the general population, respectively, falling into category (or value) i of variable V ; and M and P are the overall numbers of migrants and

- people in the general population, respectively. The selectivity of outflow takes place if the index assumes a non-zero value for any category (value) of a given variable. A positive value of *MSI* means that migrants falling into a specific category (variable) of a given variable are relatively more numerous than people in the general population with the same characteristic whereas a negative value (but equal to or higher than -1) means the opposite. The higher the positive value or lower the negative value of *MSI*, the stronger the selectivity' (Kaczmarczyk, Mioduszewska & Żylicz 2009: 10).
- 6 Quarterly Labour Force Survey Household data and Office for National Statistics data are Crown Copyright. The LFS data was made available by the Office for National Statistics through the UK Data Archive (Osipovič 2007: 1).
 - 7 The system has been in force since 1998 based on the Social Welfare Act.
 - 8 The Accession (Immigration and Worker Registration) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/121.
 - 9 However, the method was readjusted to Polish conditions, with only local sending units studied.
 - 10 The triangulation of multi-techniques includes monographic descriptive study, quantitative survey and in-depth interviews, in both sending and receiving locations. However, the method was adjusted to Polish conditions, where only sending local units had been studied (Kaczmarczyk 2011).
 - 11 The approach used in the studies was modelled on a project involving the migration of Mexicans to the United States (Massey 1987).
 - 12 www.tcd.ie/immigration/careers/index.php; accessed 13 July 2009.
 - 13 The study was conducted by CRONEM, University of Surrey, for the BBC 'Newsnight' programme.
 - 14 It is crucial to note the importance of what Lash and Urry (1994) called 'instantaneous time' in migrants' accounts: 'The daily lives of migrants include frequent episodes of instant communication via the Internet and other new media, email and conventional telephone, which in a matter of seconds open a communication channel with the home country and enable participation in family affairs, taking household decisions, sharing emotions, upholding ties – in short managing families and households at a distance' (Osipovič 2007: 8).
 - 15 This is reminiscent of the notion of transnational migration (Vertovec 2008), but the biggest question it triggers is to what extent does transnational migration exhibit the 'liquid' pattern of post-accession migration.
 - 16 When the entire household emigrates we often have no possibility to collect data on its individual members.

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4 Diverging or converging communities?

Stages of international migration from rural Romania¹

Ruxandra Oana Ciobanu

4.1 Introduction

Looking at international migration from Romania, one can distinguish various patterns of migration: people moving abroad definitively for permanent emigration, people leaving on a temporary basis and developing a more circular migration, and 'trans-border migrants travelling for short periods of time between localities near the border' (Sandu 2005b: 556). At the same time, studies on Romanian migration from rural communities have identified several migration processes taking place throughout the course of the last twenty years, happening at different paces and with different intensities (Sandu 2000, 2005b, 2006). This finding raises the key question of this chapter: Do rural communities in Romania converge or diverge with each other while undergoing stages of international migration? In other words, are they consistent or inconsistent with each other in relation to the processes, factors and circumstances that make each migration stage feasible and complete?

To better frame migration from the two Romanian villages studied, this chapter first introduces the context of Romanian international migration processes over the past twenty years. Figures on the number of Romanians abroad are vague. An estimated 2 million Romanians live and/or work abroad, but return on a regular basis to Romania. In addition, there is estimated to be another group of 300,000-400,000 who go abroad for short periods of time or visit relatives (Sandu 2007). Four main periods of migration can be identified after the fall of communism in 1989. These are 1989-1995, 1996-2001, 2002-2006 and post-EU enlargement of 2007. From 1989 to 1995, the main destinations were Austria, France and Germany. Migration to these countries was characterised by high selectivity and high costs. Other, secondary destinations were Hungary, Serbia and Turkey for cross-border trade and work in agriculture and in small factories. Due to a lack of opportunities to regularise one's status and more opportunities in Italy and Spain through regularisations, beginning in 1996

these countries grew in importance for migrants and have become main destinations today. The year 2002 constitutes the beginning of the third period. The costs of migration were significantly lowered once visa regulations for the entrance in the Schengen space were liberated. This further increased the number of Romanian migrants in Italy and Spain. Romania acceded to the European Union in 2007. However, the impact of accession on Romanian migration still needs to be explored. Romanian migration to Western Europe is considered to be circular, with migrants going back and forth between the home and destination community and investing in their home communities (Sandu 2005b).

This chapter tackles the question of whether there is convergence or divergence in Romanian rural migration patterns. Thus, it discusses whether the studied migrant communities are experiencing different migration trajectories or the same patterns of migration over time through cumulative structural effects. The research was undertaken from 2005 to 2007, with the last field-work taking place two months after the accession of Romania to the EU. The chapter does not capture the impact of the accession on the patterns of migration of Romanian citizens, but instead highlights dynamics of older forms of pre-accession migration processes, especially those relating to migration networks.

The first question asked is *what are the stages that migrant communities go through along with the development of migration?* The assumption is that migrant communities converge in the long term to similar migration patterns, and in this development one can identify stages. The patterns of migration as well as the stages of migration are shaped by both top-down and bottom-up forces. The top-down element refers to policies, including migration policies, such as regularisations, and bilateral agreements between countries. There are also other policies which have affected migration collaterally, such as the Schengen space regulations and the EU enlargements.² The bottom-up element is represented by different types of networks and economic capital of the migrants, as well as the context in the community of origin. Migration policies are surely an important variable in explaining migration strategies. However, in this chapter, the focus lies on the structure of opportunities in the home community, which varies from one community to another, and thus impacts the process of migration differently.

The second aspect assumes that communities, when observed at one specific moment in time, are different. In order to understand why they are different and what the dynamics of migration are, one would need to go beyond the migration itself and explore the cultural and socio-economic context. Therefore, this chapter sets out to explore *how cultural and socio-economic contexts influence the dynamics of migration* in the studied villages.

In order to be able to specify stages of migration, to verify the assumption of divergence and later convergence, and also to underline the significance of the structure of opportunities in the community of origin, it was necessary to compare two Romanian villages. The selected³ communities differed with regard to their cultural and socio-economic context. The literature on Romanian migration (Sandu 2000, 2004) analyses the different histories of migration at a regional level and shows that Moldavia and Transylvania have a longer history of migration, whereas Dobrogea and Muntenia have a shorter migration history. To compare regions with different histories of migration, a village was chosen from Transylvania with a high prevalence of migration and one in Dobrogea with a lower prevalence rate in relation to the Transylvanian village, but still high for its region. The two villages were Feldru in Transylvania (population 6,386) and Luncavița in Dobrogea (population 3,856).⁴

The novelty and relevance of the current chapter is twofold. Firstly, most comparative studies analyse the differences between their objects of analysis, disregarding their similarities. Looking longitudinally at the migration from two villages allows us to understand the importance of the economic and socio-cultural context in which migration emerged and the dynamics of migration in converging to similar patterns. Moreover, Massey and his colleagues first explored the idea of stages of migration in the analysis of Mexican communities. This would assume that when looking longitudinally, communities are passing through the same stages of migration. Nonetheless, Massey, Goldring & Durand (1994) don't specify these stages in depth, a gap that this chapter aims to cover. Secondly, the chapter explores the explanatory power of variables rarely taken into account in the study of migration. Variables such as level of development of the community and history of migration have been extensively addressed in the literature in explaining the emergence of migration (Massey, Goldring & Durand 1994). In the analysis of Romanian migration, variables like religiosity and ethnic composition of the community prove to have a high explanatory power for the emergence of migration flows. This provides us with an original case study and a novel understanding of social networks.

The chapter is organised in five parts. This introduction is followed by an overview of the literature, which contextualises the questions set forth. The third section contains the research methodology, while the fourth presents the empirical findings, an overview of the two case studies, the socio-economic and cultural context of origin and the migration patterns from the two communities. Finally, comparative analysis of the stages of migration is conducted in order to validate the hypothesis of convergence versus divergence of migration stages between the two communities, based on qualitative studies of patterns of migration and focusing on migration networks.

4.2 Theories regarding the perpetuation of international migration and its stages

The theoretical background for understanding the dynamics of migration from one stage to the other is discussed through social network theory, cumulative causation and culture of migration.

Social network theory has been extensively used in explaining Romanian international migration flows (Elrick & Ciobanu 2009; Potot 2002; Sandu 2000, 2004; Şerban & Grigoraş 2000). Migration networks, as a particular form of social network, play a powerful role in mitigating migration costs and risks, and their accumulation over time tends to reduce the selectivity of migration (Massey et al. 1998). Migration networks are a specific form of social network that influences processes of migration. We can further distinguish between migration networks and migrant networks. The first captures the ties between various persons, whether they are migrants or non-migrants, who facilitate the migration and integration at the destination:

[M]igration networks are sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship and a shared community of origin (Massey et al. 1993: 448-449).

Migrant networks refer particularly to ties between current and former migrants.

Social networks are characterised by trust and, moreover, this can be transferred among its members. Social networks constitute a latent resource that can be activated, transferred between migrants and converted into other forms of resources, according to Bourdieu's (1985) analysis of capitals. For example, if A has economic capital and A is friends with B, then B can 'borrow' economic resources from A. Similarly, if C has ties with X and C is friends with D, D can also access C's ties to X.

In more recent studies, social networks appear as an attempt of a group to stabilise in relation to the outside. Such a stabilisation presupposes a partial closure in relation to the outside (Bommes & Tacke 2006a). The stabilising factors can be religion, ethnicity, the community of origin, friendship and so forth. Using a criterion for closure, social networks create both possibilities for those inside the social network and restrictions for those outside. The factors of cohesion are embedded and defined in a certain context; for example, the migrants' community of origin, where the network emerges. The classic literature on social networks fails to address their changing nature. It is impossible for social networks to be static, because migration involves moving away from the context in which they emerged. We can observe that the same stabilising factor can become a

burden if it is overused, what Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) have called negative social capital. Sometimes people might put too much pressure on the social network to find a job. In this case people can redefine the boundaries of the network. If initially a social network was based on ethnicity, later on people might redefine it into a friendship network. Consequently, at the destination migrants interact with persons outside their networks, either nationals or other migrants, and these connections might be even more significant for their integration in the host society. This dynamic character of social networks allows us to capture the transformation of social networks and thus to observe stages.

Social networks function throughout the migration flow from origin to destination. In these instances they fulfil several functions: they help migrants to receive the necessary residence permits, facilitate hiring by supporting him or her with recommendations, and so forth. The literature on migration networks shows that there are always more networks, with variations in their structure that connect the origin and the destination and help migrants in both locations (Portes & Böröcz 1989). Depending on the country of destination, there can be specialised migration networks for each country or diffuse ones (common migration networks for any destination). Furthermore, migration networks unite the origin and destination, and they facilitate the formation of transnational communities (Glick-Schiller, Basch & Blanc-Szanton 1995; Vertovec 2001). Migrants maintain strong connections to the home community and over time establish economic activities that connect the origin and the destination.

Building on social network theory, the theory of *cumulative causation* also explains the perpetuation of migration:

The theory of cumulative causation shows us that migration produces more migration; in other words, in spite of the different contexts in which migration is 'born', in time it perpetuates itself. The cumulative model of transnational migration outlines how, once initiated, the process builds upon a growing base of knowledge, experience, social contacts, and other forms of social and cultural capital in a self-reinforcing manner. It argues that the process of migration alters origin and receiving localities in such a way that further migration is encouraged. Subsequent migration communities [undergo] profound cultural, economic, social and even physical changes (Massey, Goldring & Durand 1994: 1503).

This leads us to the third theory accounting for the perpetuation of international migration: culture of migration. A long history of migration, whether internal or international, and even intense commuting and changes in the labour market lead to the development of positive perceptions of migration in a community and acceptance of it normatively as a part of the

life cycle. In other words, there emerges a culture of migration (Massey, Goldring & Durand 1994, 1998; Heering, Van der Erft & Van Wissen 2004). Massey et al. (1998) in the book *Worlds in Motion* define culture of migration in the paradigm of path dependency and cumulative causation. Otherwise said, the present flow of migration is attributed to the past history of migration. Heering, Van der Erft & Van Wissen (ibid.) found similar results in Morocco, where they show the role of social networks to be significant in the mechanism of diffusion of values related to migration and in the socialisation of the young.

The culture of migration consists of a set of norms and beliefs that are internalised by members of the community and that strongly influence life strategies. As migration assumes a greater role in the community, it becomes increasingly important as a rite of passage for young men, providing an accepted means to demonstrate their worthiness and ambition to others, and as a transition to manhood, in addition to being a widely accepted vehicle for economic mobility (Kandel & Massey 2002). The same normative character can be found in the writings of Heering, Van der Erft & Van Wissen (2004); the culture of migration involves not just high rates of migration, but also the transformation of migration into a normative behaviour.

Migration is accepted as a desirable method for achieving social and economic mobility, a higher income or an improved lifestyle, which cannot be sustained exclusively by dependence on local resources; [...] over time foreign labour migration becomes integrated into the structures of values and expectations of families and communities [...] young people not considering anymore other options at all (ibid.: 325).

In communities where foreign wage labour has become fully integrated into local values and expectations, people contemplating entry into the labour force do not consider other options: they expect to migrate frequently in the course of their lives and assume they can go whenever they wish. Sayad (1977) found that Algerian men did not even look for job opportunities in their own country before migrating to France, in spite of the availability of jobs in Algeria.

While these theories account for the perpetuation of migration, in order to substantiate the argument of convergence versus divergence, a broader theoretical framework is necessary. To make more refined distinctions between migrant communities, Massey's stage approach was adopted, which includes the above-mentioned theories. When comparing studies from 25 Mexican communities, Durand and Massey (1992) noted many differences across communities in migration strategies.

[A]pparent inconsistent generalisations about Mexico-US migration are not necessarily contradictions when they are examined in comparative perspective. Rather, diverse outcomes occur in various communities when common processes of migration are shaped and differentiated by structural variables operating at the community level (*ibid.*: 4).

Based on older studies (see, e.g., Mines & Massey 1985), the community-level differences with regard to migration were attributed by Massey et al. to 'structural factors that shaped the course of migration at each location' (Massey, Goldring & Durand 1994: 1493).

The emergence of migration appears to be clearly linked to the history of migration and the social networks in place in that community. People living in communities where migration has just begun, for example, generally face significant deterrents to international movement. Since the number of migrants is small, few non-migrants have friends and relatives who have been abroad, and even if they do, the migrants are likely to have limited knowledge about jobs, housing, and transportation at destination sites. In contrast, people living in a community characterised by a long history and high prevalence of out-migration are likely to be connected socially to people who have been abroad, and these people tend to have considerable knowledge about conditions and resources at points of destination. In communities with a well-developed migratory tradition, in other words, non-migrants have access to valuable social capital that can be used to facilitate movement (Massey, Goldring & Durand 1994: 1494-1495).

The amount and quality of social networks are responsible for the different paths migrant communities take, 'making migration patterns appear to be discrepant when, in fact, they reflect the same underlying process' (*ibid.*: 1495). Therefore, the recommendations that one can read between the lines of Massey's article is that migration research should look at the dynamics of the migration process, and analyse these longitudinally and comparatively, and take into account the context in which migration emerges.

A stage of migration is defined in relation to migration networks, costs of migration, risk-taking, selectivity of migration, and so on. It is also embedded in socio-economic and cultural factors. All these concepts are dynamic, allowing for an analysis of changes and an evolution of stages of migration. The initiation of migration is associated with increased risk-taking, high costs and selectivity of migration, while further stages have more established migration networks, which lower the costs and the selectivity of migration.

In this way, stages of migration gain an analytical bite, as opposed to patterns of migration, which remain descriptive concepts. Thus, it is necessary to draw boundaries between migration patterns and stages of

migration. Migration patterns refer to strategies to migrate and certain destinations. Such patterns can be permanent or circular, seasonal, commuting and so on. For example, Canada and the United States are destinations for permanent migration among Romanians, whereas Italy and Spain are destinations for circular migration. Migration patterns can be part of stages of migration, and in one stage several migration patterns can be identified. For example, there was one stage of migration right after the fall of communism, when selectivity of migration was high and many people crossed the border to Hungary or Serbia or a bit further to Turkey for trade and short-term work in factories, construction and agriculture. But at the same time, other groups of migrants departed for permanent migration to Canada, and others participated in temporary labour migration to France and Germany. The current stage of migration is different. With approximately two million Romanians outside of the national borders, migration is less selective with more possibilities to go abroad, and people generally go abroad for more than three months. Short-term migration is still present, but to a smaller extent. When studying permanent migration, the unit of analysis is the individual, whereas when studying transnationalism, the unit of analysis is the migrant group or the community. Similarly, in the case of stages of migration, the unit of analysis is the community, because only at this level we can measure the selectivity of migration and the prevalence rate.

4.3 Research methodology

The field-work research took place from 2005 to 2007, the largest part of the research taking place before Romania's membership of the EU. The field-work started in the Romanian villages, and migrants were followed to their destinations in Spain. To begin the field-work and understand migration as well as the culture around it, in-depth interviews were conducted with local authorities and other informants on migration such as priests and schoolteachers,⁵ and one focus group took place in each village. These were relevant in constructing an overview of the case studies.

Additionally, biographical narrative interviews with migrants were conducted. The relevance of biographical narrative interviews is twofold. First, they provide longitudinal information and thus allow one to understand the development of more stages in migration. One migrant from Feldru, for example, was initially a migrant in Germany and later moved to Italy where he is currently working. Secondly, biographical narrative interviews have a methodological advantage since storytelling constitutes an ordinary way of communication, meaning that the interview situation can be transformed into a natural, casual conversation. Therefore, narrative biographical interviews are less intrusive. Moreover, the information received through stories

is not limited to events that took place and the factual experience of migration, but also includes attitudes, values and beliefs. A further benefit is that the stories are contextualised by the migrants and the migration picture is thus more consistent (Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach & Zilber 2006). With regard to the migrant population, there were more than 50 respondents, and the sampling technique was based on snowballing. In order to diversify the sample and ensure that there would not be just one group of migrants encountered, several initial informants were found who later on introduced other migrants from their villages. The sample is diverse, with ages ranging from 21 to 58 years old, and it is balanced with regard to gender composition. Also, the interviewed migrants were going or had gone to various destinations in Europe, with Spain as a main destination for both villages.

In order to answer this chapter's questions, the field-work results were triangulated with findings from two large-scale research projects on Romanian migration. The two projects, conducted in 2000-2001 and 2006 (Sandu 2000, 2005b, 2006), had both quantitative and qualitative components.

4.4 Convergence versus divergence of migration stages in Luncavița and Feldru

First impressions from the two villages led to the understanding that the two villages were different with respect to migration. From the very first field-work, it appeared that international migration from Feldru is a generalised life strategy. It started soon after the fall of communism. Everyone in the village who wants to migrate can do so; people from Feldru meet up at the destination and keep in touch among themselves and with the villagers at home. The situation in Luncavița was different and puzzling. Although people recommended other contacts, the respondents did not seem to form a social network, to have helped each other in their migration experience or even to share information about potential jobs at the destination. Each respondent was an island within his or her own migration experience. Only later in the research was one extended family identified whose members had helped each other to migrate. These first impressions from the two villages symbolically serve as a snapshot of all migrant communities at any one moment in time, supporting the dichotomy hypothesis and raising questions about the characteristics that make the two villages different or similar.

Migration decision-making is not an individual process; it is very much embedded in community structures. In addition to the individual characteristics possessed by most migrants and especially pioneers, like strength and spirit of adventure and also a certain economic status, community characteristics play a significant role in the development of migration. The

following sections discuss the characteristics of the two communities, comparing their socio-economic, cultural and geographical parameters.

4.4.1 *Diverging contexts for migration*

Socio-economic factors

Luncavița is close to the Danube, and the river has always been an important source of income through fishing. There are two bigger towns near the village: Tulcea fifty kilometres away and Galați twenty kilometres away. Galați plays a central role in the everyday activities of the migrants and others from Luncăvița,⁶ especially for work and education. The proximity of Galați and Tulcea has made it possible for people to commute to either of the two towns. Under communism, industry was developed in both towns and many people from the rural areas were attracted by work opportunities there. At the same time, agriculture and fishing in the village were highly developed. These factors combined meant that people in Luncavița did not need to migrate to find work in other parts of the country. Migration emerged only after 1989. The lack of a history of migration meant that people were less open to migration.

Feldru, situated in Transylvania, is forty kilometres from Bistrița, the county capital. Many people in the village recalled that every morning nine buses used to leave from the village with workers commuting to the big industrial platforms on the outskirts of Bistrița. Because it is located in the mountains, people do not have gardens and the climate is unfavourable for agriculture. Therefore, most people only keep animals. During agricultural seasons the Feldrihani used to migrate to Banat or Dobrogea for agricultural work. This allows us to infer that there is a history of migration in the area.

The economic activities at the origin are related to the history of internal migration before 1989. The history of migration, whether commuting or seasonal work in agriculture in other parts of the country, created a culture of migration that was activated when migration from Romania became possible (Sandu 2005b).

Cultural factors

Data from a 2001 survey conducted in all Romanian villages ‘support the idea that at the level of villages with maximum prevalence rates, the proportion of ethnic and religious minorities among the total number of migrants is much higher than in those communities with limited migration’ (Sandu 2005b: 565). To relate this to the social network theory; diversity provides one of the characteristics based on which people can form social networks. As mentioned earlier, migration networks are forms of self-simplification in stabilising the inside to the outside (Bommes & Tacke 2006a, 2006b). In order to achieve this closure, members use various self-references such as ethnicity, religion, proximity and a community of belonging.

Pre-existing social networks played a significant role in migration from Feldru. The two main bases on which networks emerged were religion and ethnicity. Migration emerged within the Pentecostal community and among those who had ties with ethnic Germans who had returned to Germany. Ethnic Germans played an important role in migration, as many of them acted as intermediaries after their emigration to Germany in the 1960s. They sent invitations to Romanian friends in their former communities, which facilitated the departure of migrants. They mostly mediated the migration to Austria and Germany, where ethnic German friends and acquaintances were living. The ethnic Germans then hosted Romanian migrants in Germany. As there used to be ethnic Germans in Bistrița Năsăud county, where the village of Feldru is located, some of the Feldrihani benefited from their emigration, whereas people from Luncavița did not have ties to ethnic Germans in that part of the country.

The religious structure is another significant element distinguishing the two communities. In Luncavița the majority of the population is Orthodox. In Feldru the variety of religions is much broader, including Pentecostals, Baptists, Greek Catholics and Orthodox. Presently there are migrants from all the confessions; however my field-work found that the pioneer migrants of Feldru were Pentecostals.

Religious and ethnic structures of the population are parts of the environment that have affected the migration patterns of these two communities. Over time and in the context of migration, these ties, reciprocity and trust characteristics of close groups have been activated to support migration. Both these networks evolved over time to include people from the entire community: friends, neighbours and so on. The only difference between the two types of networks is that the latter is country-specific (Austria or Germany), whereas the former is more extensive. Nonetheless, it could be also observed that people using the ethnic German network made contacts in the first countries they went to – Austria and Germany – but later on, when it became difficult to gain regular status in these two countries, they reoriented to other destinations.

Given each of these structures of opportunities that shape migration, the inhabitants of the two villages hold divergent attitudes towards migration. In Luncavița, migration is looked down upon. In contrast, the mayor of Feldru has established formal contacts with a village in Spain where many Feldrihani are working, and the two communities are now ‘twin’ villages. On the village’s website,⁷ migration was featured at the time of the field-work as a kind of advertisement and as one of the main aspects characterising village life.

Luncavița witnessed little migration before 1989. As a consequence, people expect that jobs can be found in the village and its vicinity. This has made people less likely to migrate and also less open to accept migration as a respected life strategy. Therefore it appeared that migration is not

a desirable life strategy. It is important to understand more about the people who did not validate migration as a life strategy and why migration is not appreciated. In spite of having many migrants, in the focus group people hardly ever mentioned migration spontaneously. Only towards the end, when migration was specifically mentioned, did they refer to it. One reason for this difference between the two villages can reside in the fact that in Feldru migration is seen as a successful life strategy, while in Luncavița migration is still considered a failure because the positive consequences are not yet so obvious in the home community.

The local administration in Feldru has initiated a census of the migrant population, conducted by a sociologist employed by the local administration to support migrants. In the application process for regular work and residence in Italy or Spain, migrants need various documents from their home communities, such as birth certificates and marriage certificates. By having a database with all the migrants from Feldru, the migrants' application process for documents from the origin community can be processed faster.

Because migration has become a lifestyle, the inhabitants in Feldru do not even look for job opportunities there. This was the case in one Pentecostal family whose young members planned to migrate shortly after graduating from high school (see Sayad 1977). All these factors demonstrate the culture of migration in Feldru, whereas in Luncavița such a culture is absent.

This impacts the migrants' activities in the home communities. A migrant from a village neighbouring Feldru opened a transport company linking the precise destinations in Spain where Romanian migrants live to their home villages; and currently a migrant from Luncavița wants to start a construction company that would function both in Spain and in Romania and circulate workers between the two locations for exchange of experience.

The argument of the culture of migration and cumulative causation resides in the fact that each event of migration creates the social structure needed to sustain more migration. Therefore, it is an argument about numbers, which can also be observed in the evolution of migration from the two Romanian villages. The appearance of a culture of migration resides in the increasing numbers of migrants. When migrants return to the origin community, their presence in the public sphere leads to an intensification of the discourse on migration. This theme penetrates in the public discourse and brings about the acceptance of migration as a life strategy and the emergence of a culture of migration.

4.4.2 Converging patterns of migration

An overview of the migration flows from Romania since the fall of communism points to several periods of migration with specific patterns, destinations and strategies of migration (see Sandu 2000, 2005a). These two

villages display migration patterns that are similar to those observed at the national level (Ciobanu 2010). After the fall of communism in 1989, migrants from Luncavița went abroad for illicit cross-border trade, and some even left to work in small factories in Turkey. There were also migrants who travelled for seasonal agricultural work in Serbia. Feldru experienced migration to Hungary for cross-border trade as well as migration to Serbia.⁸ Austria, France and Germany were the main destinations for irregular long-distance labour migration. Because of regulations, these destinations were associated with high costs, and thus migration was selective. After 1989, Romanians needed a visa to enter these countries, which was difficult to obtain. The main ways of entering these countries were either to go on a tourist trip, and obtain a visa through the travel agency, to procure a visa on the black market, or to receive an invitation based on which one could apply individually for a visa. Many migrants who overstayed their visa had to choose between bribing border control officials or staying at the destination. Therefore, many were effectively trapped at the destination for long periods of time – up to seven years – hoping to be regularised in time. In the case of these destinations, migration changed towards permanent migration, also for those who managed to become regular migrants. The difficult requirements for regularising one's status led migrants to redirect towards new destinations. Thus, migration to Austria, France and Germany diminished in intensity.

Migration networks played an important role in the migration to these destinations. In order to buy a visa or receive an invitation, one needed to have not only financial resources but also access to information and thus to migrant networks. Ethnic Germans, as discussed earlier, played an especially important role in the migration of others to the destinations mentioned. The inhabitants of Feldru thus migrated to Austria and Germany, but residents of Luncavița immediately after 1989 migrated only across the borders of Romania.

Spain became a main destination for Romanians in the mid-1990s. The Feldrihani started migrating to Spain in the early 1990s. Religious networks played an important role in the migration to Spain. According to the interviews, the pioneer migrants of Feldru were the Pentecostals. The Pentecostal church quickly established religious services at the destinations. Therefore, it was possible for following migrants to obtain support from pastors and other church members by getting information about migration to a certain destination, acquiring invitations from them that facilitated their departure and integration at the destination. In Luncavița, the first departure for Spain took place in 1999, and the pioneer migrant was followed by family members only in 2002, when entrance in the Schengen space no longer required Romanians to hold a visa. The Luncăvițeni did not benefit from the same social networks as the Feldrihani, and therefore they migrated much later.

Due to the importance of networks and their strong effects on migration, inhabitants from some communities and even regions go to one destination only. A destination may be a country or a village or town, depending on the number of migrants involved. In the case of Luncavița, a large group of migrants is concentrated in the Spanish village of Santa Maria de Palautordera and only recently started moving to the neighbouring villages and towns. This is due to the small number of migrants who can be assimilated in the labour market of only one locality; it is an indicator of the stage of migration of Luncavița.

Geographical expansion is a relevant indicator of the stage of migration. In the case of Feldru, the migrants are spread all over Europe: in Austria, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain and so on. Within Spain, even migrants who are friends from school and visit each other, said that they live in different cities in Spain. This is an indicator of the large number of Feldrihani abroad, and of their access to other social networks beyond the ones that emerged in the home community. Having ties to Spaniards and migrants of other nationalities contributes to their mobility at the destination.

A visible change took place among the population of migrants from Feldru. Whereas in the past mainly men in their thirties migrated, now the population encompasses both women and men and there is a mix of generations, ranging from children to people in their sixties. The difference between the two villages can be seen in the demographic structure of the migrant population. People of all ages have migrated from Feldru. Also, many young people in their early twenties and young women migrate for work. In Luncavița, the migrant population is still predominately formed by young families.

The types of labour that Romanians are engaged in have changed little over time. Men usually work in construction, as they have done since their arrival in Spain. The emergence of construction companies owned by Romanians differentiates the two villages again. The Feldrihani started two such companies in the period 1996-2002, but the Luncăvițeni did not set up two construction companies until 2007. The occupations of women are related to their legal status. There are still many women who work as domestic caregivers for elderly people and children. However, those who can work legally are increasingly working in factories, restaurants and shops. Besides the importance of a regular status, the variable that influences the type of job that a migrant does is the acquisition of language.

All these accounts stand as proof of the similar patterns of migration from the two communities, in spite of small discrepancies, for example, at some of the migration destinations.

4.5 Concluding remarks: A stage approach to international migration from Luncavița and Feldru

Based on the conclusion of Massey, Goldring & Durand (1994) in the comparison of nineteen Mexican communities that inconsistencies between communities are levelled in the long term, the aim in comparing Luncavița and Feldru was to understand the internal logic of migration. This chapter also examined to what extent two different communities showed any syncretism through cumulative structural effects. Following from the fieldwork and data analysis, three stages were identified in the migration from the two communities: the pioneer stage, the exclusive stage and the inclusive stage. This concluding section sketches the stages and then compares the villages with regard to the stages of migration they are in.

The pioneer migrant has some social contacts that enable his or her initial move to the destination, though sometimes he or she might leave without any contacts at the destination. Individual characteristics such as a spirit of adventure, courage, entrepreneurship and so forth prevail at this stage. The pioneer stage is marked by high costs of migrating and high risks. The name of the second stage – the exclusive stage – refers to the fact that some people are excluded from participating in migration, while others are supported. In the development of migration, each pioneer brings along several migrants. He or she is the first one to make a selection according to a set of criteria. This is the starting principle of a migration network: a group of persons stabilises itself in relation to the outside, and this stabilisation is based on a set of criteria (see, e.g., Bommers and Tacke 2006a). Over time migration emerges as a life strategy. However, migration selectivity is still high, and family and migration networks play an important role in the process. The number of migration destinations is limited and migrants are clustered at the destination. This is mainly due to the fact that the number of migrants at this stage is still small. At the inclusive stage, migration becomes institutionalised as a life strategy, and selectivity is low. This stage is named inclusive because at this point migration becomes available to almost anyone in a community. At this stage, strong ties are still important, but the criteria for closure of the migration networks are more diverse. Weak ties also play an important role in accessing destination addresses. The development of social networks plays a significant role in the transformations that occur from one stage to the other. As the number of migrants grows, migrants start moving to other towns from the destination in order to be able to integrate in other labour markets.

To be more concrete, the two case studies are presented following the logic of the stages. The village of Luncavița was at the pioneer stage for a long time due to the lack of economic resources. The pioneer migrant to Spain left only in 1999, and was followed by his brother and two brothers-in-law in 2002. This moment marked the change to the ‘exclusive stage’.

As mentioned earlier, migration from Luncavița during this stage was restricted to one extended family that went to the village of Santa Maria de Palautordera in Spain. Thus, there was both a high selectivity (i.e. people from outside the family could not access migration), and also a concentration of migrants at a single destination. Slowly, migration grew among the Luncăvițeni, and the family expanded into a social network. The increase in the number of migrants to Spain has contributed to a change of attitude towards migration and implicitly strengthened the culture of migration. This marked the start of the third stage, named the 'inclusive stage'. A few non-family members came to the village Santa Maria de Palautordera, a few migrants have already moved to neighbouring villages in Spain, and two migrants have started their own construction enterprises.

In Feldru, there was a quicker progression through the stages due to the openness towards migration. The pioneers date from the early 1990s. They went to several destinations: Austria, Germany, Spain and the United States. They were soon followed by their families. The importance of religious, friendship and vicinity networks rose faster than in the case of Luncavița. One could place the second stage as beginning in the mid-1990s. With large migration networks and more possibilities to regularise their status, migration from Feldru has now entered the inclusive stage. The Feldrihani currently migrate to numerous locations in Spain: in and around Madrid, in and around Barcelona, Burgos, Tarragona, Valencia, and so on, and there are also migrants going to Ireland and Italy.

The stages can be also illustrated when looking at family migration from Luncavița and Feldru. In the migration process, the role of the family changes. At the very beginning (Luncavița), family is essential in the migratory process, fulfilling the functions of a migration network. With the increase of the number of migrants (Feldru), the role of the family becomes more loose, given the existence of various networks that facilitate migration. Networks can be based on religion, friendship, neighbourhood or even the broader community. In the case of Luncavița, the narrative of one family's migration involves all the people from one extended family who migrated to the same village in Spain, whereas, a story of a family from Feldru refers to eleven brothers who migrated to different destinations using different networks available in the village, and some of them never migrated. However, they have all played an important role in each other's lives. From this angle, structural factors shape the processes of migration, rendering them different in the two villages.

One way to explain the change from family migration to networks would be by referring to the number of migrants and the emergence of a culture of migration. An alternative answer resides in systems theory. As mentioned in the theoretical introduction, social network theory is a static theory and does not capture the passage from the pre-modern to the modern society. Systems theory grasps the change to a functionally differentiated society (Luhmann

1995). If we think in terms of migration from the two villages to Spain, we notice that the family has an important function at the origin due to the rural society in which migration originated. At the very beginning, family maintains its role in migration. Nonetheless, in the contact with a modern society – Spain – migrants have to adapt to functionally differentiated systems in order to be included in the economic, social and education systems. This differentiation imposes a diversification of ties. In time, migrants learn that it is not only useful to socialise with the people from their own home village, but also with the Spanish employer who can help one get a loan, and also one can find a flat by just going to the letting agency without the intervention of friends and family. This change appears only when migrants have a regular status at the destination. In this context, broad networks that include both Romanians and Spaniards and persons of other nationalities are included; and most of all migrants use institutions to be included in the different sub-systems – and not only one-to-one connections (see, e.g., Boswell & Ciobanu 2009).

If we think in terms of stages in migration development and based on the previous analysis of the contexts that allowed the emergence of migration in the two Romanian communities, we would regard the two communities as being at different stages. In other words, all the conditions were favourable for the development of migration in Feldru. Consequentially, the selectivity of migration is very low, the networks are extended to the level of the entire community, and practically anyone who aims to migrate can realise the goal. In Luncavița, the context at the origin was less supportive of the emergence of migration. The system of transportation is very limited, people lack the resources to migrate, selectivity is still quite high, and other characteristics could be enumerated. Feldru has long advanced to the third stage, whereas Luncavița is only now slowly passing from the second to the third stage. Migrants from Luncavița are still clustered in the village of Santa Maria de Palautordera and three more villages in the vicinity. Although some friends of the extended family have also moved to Spain, migration is still not available to everyone from the community. Nonetheless, if we look at practices, the two villages are not so different. The people from Feldru build houses in their hometown, send money home for everyday consumption, and return migrants started businesses in the home community. In the case of Luncavița, migrants build houses at home, and one migrant started a company in 2007 both in Romania and in Spain and was planning to build a gas system in the village. The essential element in explaining the evolution of migration from the two villages is the structure of opportunities in the home communities in which migration emerges. As shown, the cultural and socio-economic contexts frame the migration process, inhibiting or facilitating migration.

Romania joined the EU in January 2007, two months before the last field-work phase. EU expansion has likely triggered many changes in the

migration patterns of Romanians. It would be interesting to see how the migrant communities in Spain develop. We also need to take into account the recent financial crisis. Spain had one of the EU's highest unemployment rates early in the crisis, next to Estonia and Latvia. In June 2009, the EU-27 unemployment rate was 8.9 per cent and the figure for Spain was 18.1 per cent.⁹ Moreover, unemployment affected migrants more than the Spanish-born population. While the unemployment rate among the Spanish-born population increased from 8.5 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2005 to 17.4 per cent in the first quarter of 2009, for the foreign-born population, unemployment grew from 10.2 per cent to 28.4 per cent for the same time period (Fix et al. 2009). The number of unemployed Romanian migrants in Spain increased by 19,653 in 2007, and by 53,857 in the following year (ibid.). Nonetheless, the financial crisis had a differentiated impact on labour market sectors. The construction sector, where most migrant men are employed, has been one of the worst hit. Regarding the domestic work and care provisions for the elderly, where women are employed, one hypothesis would be that this sector is less affected due to the need for such services and the fact that those who can afford to employ a domestic worker have the economic resources to maintain them in the future.¹⁰ Further questions arise as to whether migration can regress from the third, inclusive stage back to the second, exclusive stage when opportunities diminish. Moreover, will migration again become more restrictive, and will social networks redefine themselves? Further research is needed to address questions concerning whether return migration will accelerate or whether Romanian migrants opt instead to wait for the economic crisis to pass to further develop a transnational profile.

Notes

- 1 The chapter draws heavily on my PhD thesis entitled *A Stage Approach to Transnational Migration: Migrant Narratives from Rural Romania*. The field-work was conducted in two villages as part of an EU Marie Curie Excellence Grant 'Expanding the Knowledge Base of Migration Policy Making in Europe', KnowMig (MEXT-CT-2003-002668). The project was coordinated by Christina Boswell. I thank Michael Bommers, Christina Boswell, Emilia Brinkmeier, Tim Elrick, Maria Margarida Marques and Dragoş Radu for their help and comments.
- 2 For an analysis of the impact of migration policies on the shaping of migration strategies see Elrick and Ciobanu (2009).
- 3 The two villages were chosen based on a 2001 census of all 12,700 villages in Romania. Questionnaires were sent to the villages and local authorities were asked to fill them in with data on international migration. The questions referred to data on migration: number of migrants by gender and age, main destinations of the migrants and data on the socio-demographic structure of the population, ethnic structure of the population (see Sandu 2000).

- 4 Data according to a community census of migration coordinated by IOM in collaboration with the Ministry of Public Information and the Ministry of Home Affairs, 2002 (see Sandu 2000).
- 5 The interviews with local informants were twelve: five in each of the two villages, and two at the destination in Spain.
- 6 'Luncăvițeni' and 'Feldrihani' are the names of the populations from the villages of Luncavița and Feldru, respectively.
- 7 The website of the village is www.feldru.ro; accessed 8 December 2005.
- 8 Destinations differed due to geographical proximity. Migrants from Luncavița, in the south-east of Romania, went to Turkey and those from Feldru, in the north, went to Hungary.
- 9 Eurostat data (<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=teilm020&tableSelection=1&plugin=1> accessed 24 June 2010).
- 10 For a global analysis of the impact of the financial crisis on labour migration see, e.g., Khan, Abimourched & Ciobanu (2009).

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5 Post-accession migration from the Baltic states

The case of Latvia

Zaiga Krisjane, Maris Berzins and Elina Apsite

5.1 Introduction

The profile of migration rates in the Baltic states has gradually shifted from one of net immigration to one of net emigration. Although each of the Baltic states experienced positive net migration during the period leading up to and comprising the Soviet era, a series of demographic shifts has since altered the migratory dynamics of the region. The historically less populous countries of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are today facing considerable demographic challenges, as decreasing fertility rates, increasing mortality rates and population aging are coupled with high rates of emigration. As Krisjane, Berzins and Bauls (2009) observed, migration across the region is expanding under circumstances of depopulation.

These circumstances are both variable and complex. They are the partial derivatives of evolving economic, political and institutional conditions both in-country and abroad. Among the ancillary aims of this chapter is to examine how these and other conditions have affected regional population levels and, in turn, migration patterns over time. The chapter's main purpose, however, is to provide an illustrative overview of migration trends and dynamics in the Baltic region. Topics will include the characteristics and movements of discrete migrant groups, the organisation and impact of social networks and the behavioural attributes of migrants taking part in those networks. In addition, an in-depth analysis of Latvian migration trends will be presented, with an eye to differentiating Latvia from other A-8 countries.

The structure of this chapter is thus as follows. It begins with a brief overview of theoretical concepts taken from relevant literature to illustrate migration trends in the Baltic countries today. These concepts are applied to both historical and present-day phenomena. Next, empirical data on Latvian migrants to the United Kingdom are presented. Certain novel characteristics of these migrant groups, which became especially prevalent after the 2004 enlargement of the European Union, are then highlighted and

show that during the recent global economic crisis, out-migration from Latvia grew. The chapter concludes with several observations about the impact of economic hardship on emigration and the importance of social networks in facilitating transnational movement.

5.2 The changing face of migration in the Baltic states

Migration trends in CEE have received significant attention from scholars in recent years (see Kahanec & Zimmermann 2009, 2010; Kaczmarczyk & Okólski 2008b; White & Ryan 2008; Wadensjö 2007; Glytsos 2009; Galgoczi, Leschke & Watt 2009; Barrett & Duffy 2008). Previous research has examined the consequences of emigration on the labour markets of sending and receiving countries and the possible negative effects of brain drain (Sarvutyte & Streimikiene 2010; Thaut 2009; Eglīte 2006; Krisjane 2008; Kaczmarczyk & Okólski 2008a; Hazans & Philips 2009). In addition to the studies cited above, a large selection of migration literature has evaluated the impact and influence of push and pull factors, usually a function of economic conditions at home and abroad, for mobility. A number of studies have examined migrants leaving home as a direct or indirect consequence of unemployment rates, economic difficulties or a general lack of economic and political freedom. Individuals, according to these studies, depart for countries or regions that feature enhanced flexibility and demonstrated superior economic performance. These theoretical models often emphasise the difference in salaries and in income between the country of origin and the receiving country (Galgoczi, Leschke & Watt 2009).

Unsurprisingly, then, emigration often accelerates during periods of economic recession, which commonly lead to prolonged phases of outward migration. Martin (2009) observed the profound effects of the current global economic crisis on migrant workers, explaining that many of the sectors in receiving countries that were hardest hit by the economic crisis were also those in which migrant workers were over-represented. This reality can be directly linked to multiple other aspects of migrant profiles, such as education and earnings. Drinkwater, Eade and Garapich (2009) show that recent migrants from A-8 countries, for example, experience the lowest earning returns to their education, which is consistent with findings that well-qualified workers from these countries often work in low-skilled occupations.

Other studies have focused in particular on human capital and social capital, or knowledge and skills gained abroad that can be of use back home (Barrett & O'Connell 2001; Coulon & Piracha 2005). In these studies, social capital is typically defined as the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual

acquaintances and recognitions (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992; Massey 2004). However, this can still be a dynamic process. According to some researchers, migrants may be reluctant to invest in human capital if they do not intend to stay in a given country for a long duration (Dustmann 2000).

More recent theoretical approaches consider migration to be a complex and multifaceted process, rather than a discrete event (Boyle 2009). In an increasingly globalised world and interconnected Europe, a large variety of factors can influence individuals' decisions to go abroad. A Eurobarometer survey found that individuals who move more frequently cite discrete 'pull' factors as having influenced their decision to emigrate. Common pull factors include discovering a new environment and seeking out better working conditions or higher incomes (European Commission 2010). According to Krieger (2008), the latent desire to engage in international migration is much stronger among the populaces of the new EU member states, and it is particularly strong in the Baltic states. Latvian migrants who were initially contacted via social networks have shown themselves to be compelled by the rapid increase of financial resources they gained in relatively short periods. In addition, as the time they spend abroad increases, they appear more interested investing in human capital, whether by learning English, developing trades or gaining professional skills to advance their employability in higher rank sectors (Apsite 2010).

The second most frequently cited pull factor for citizens of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia was the testimonials of friends or family members who experienced life abroad (Latvia 66 per cent, Estonia 65 per cent and Lithuania 62 per cent) (European Commission 2010: 59). Even though economic, social and political circumstances can influence the flow of migrants, social networks among individuals are a significant determining factor for the way migration flows are actually initiated. For their part, social networks are commonly established among migrants by the determinant flows of migration, but increased levels of cooperation and information exchange can transform the flows in space and over time. That is, once migration flows are established, they are durable, since they promote the development of social links.

Migration flows in space and time are also influenced by processes of globalisation and the resulting changes in production and economic systems. In many areas of industry, the dominant systems of mass production that previously facilitated mass flows of permanent emigration are diminishing. Long-term migration today is being replaced to an increasing extent by more diverse and shorter-term flows of migrants (Williams, Baláž & Wallace 2004: 27). However, according to Clark and Drinkwater (2009) the boundaries between temporary and permanent migrants are not impermeable. Researchers (Berninghaus & Seifert-Vogt 1988; Drinkwater & Clark 2008) recognise that migrants who initially viewed themselves as

temporary or seasonal can become permanent migrants in response to economic shock in the host and home countries.

The decision to migrate and consequently to stay abroad is not solely made on the basis of economic considerations, but also on the basis of the existence and strength of social networks that facilitate transnational migration (Faist & Ozveren 2004). Poles, who exhibit similar trends to those seen among other Eastern Europeans, and Latvians, in particular, have traditionally relied on informal networks of all kinds for their migration decisions. In the communist era, Eastern Europeans used informal networks to obtain much of what they needed, compensating for inadequacies in the goods and services that were officially provided (Wedel 1986; White & Ryan 2008).

Beets and Willekens (2009) evaluated both historical backgrounds and current migratory trends, and confirmed that migrants who are part of a social network are more likely to be able to confront external shocks such as an economic recession than migrants who do not have the same social capital. Migrants who invest in and integrate themselves into their host societies – frequently at the expense of severing ties with their communities of origin – are not likely to return during an economic downturn. Migration theory tells us, then, that migrants who intend to return to their homes maintain ties and invest via remittances in their places of origin (Beets & Willekens 2009). In the case of Latvia, remittances often constitute significant financial support for families with at least one emigrated person.

5.2.1 *Historical context of migration for the Baltic states*

The turbulent history of each of the Baltic states has affected not only their domestic economic, political and social processes but also their migration patterns.


Together with economic changes characterised by the development of market relations and business, as well as democratisation and liberalisation, which facilitated free movement of people, migration in the beginning of the 1990s was greatly influenced by the collapse of the Soviet Union

Table 5.1 *Baltic states: Key data*

	<i>Estonia</i>	<i>Latvia</i>	<i>Lithuania</i>
Population, million (2008)	1.34	2.27	3.36
Population change (1998-2008)	-52,139	-149,895	-195,904
GDP per capita in PPS, % (EU-27=100)	65.1	55.1	60.6
Population of working age (15-64), % 2008	68.0	69.1	68.8
Unemployment, % 2008	5.5	7.5	5.8
Long-term unemployment, % 2008	1.7	1.9	1.2

Source: Statistics Estonia, Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, Statistics Lithuania

Figure 5.1 *Baltic states in Europe*




Source: University of Latvia on base map provided by GIS Latvia and Envirotech, Ltd.

(Zaionchkovskaya 1998). Over the years, migration influxes changed the ethnic, gender and age structure of the Baltic states' populations, and had a significant impact on their respective economic profiles (Mežs, Bunkse & Rasa 1994; Zvidriņš 2004; Eglīte 2002, 2007; Eglīte & Mežs 2002; Kulu 2004; Krupickaite 2007). Forty years after the Second World War, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania were attractive receiving countries for migrants from other territories of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) because of the job opportunities and higher standards of living they offered.

Since the mid-1990s, the direction and target destination of migration trends changed from the post-Soviet space to the West. These changes were in no small part due to political and socio-economic transformations in the CEE region. After the Baltic states regained their independence, migration among the post-Soviet republics regained its interstate status. Emigration eastwards to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was dominant at the beginning of the 1990s (figure 5.2). Emigrants included those who, during industrialisation, were voluntarily recruited from the CIS and those who returned to their homeland after completing their work, including employees in the Soviet administration and soldiers from the Soviet army. In 1992, when emigration reached its peak, more than 50,000 inhabitants left Latvia, mainly for CIS countries (CSB 2007). Similar phenomena occurred in Estonia and Lithuania (Anniste 2009).

Due to EU enlargement, the free movement of people and increased access to the labour markets of other member states prompted changes in migration directions and intensities from the Baltic states. Latvia, which used to be a receiving country for migrants, has since become a sending country.

Figure 5.2 *Baltic states: Net migration by periods*



Source: Statistics Estonia, Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, Statistics Lithuania

All of the Baltic states have experienced strong outbound-migration trends, mostly from young age groups. The main differences among the Baltic states are in the number of outgoing migrants and their preferred destination countries.

Of the Baltic states, Lithuania has the largest group of labour migrants abroad (Okólski 2007). This is among the few concrete observations that can be made, however, as official statistical data across the region have several debilitating shortcomings. For one, out-migration is poorly recorded, because many emigrants do not report their residences abroad – most likely in order to retain their in-country social benefits. Latvia, as a somewhat drastic example, has in place a purely voluntary system of registering one's place of residence. Previous research has already exposed the shortcomings of such voluntary registration (Sjöberg & Tammaru 1999).

Numerous studies in other EU member states have also concluded that migration statistics do not accurately reflect the actual number of emigrants (Kahanec, Zaiceva & Zimmermann 2010; Hazans & Philips 2009). This may be due to a variety of reasons, among which definitional ones feature prominently. For example, at present, many labour migrants do not exhibit the characteristics of a 'traditional' migrant – one who resides in another country for more than one year and changes his or her permanent residence correspondingly. Not only has the definition of migration itself changed significantly, but new types of migration have emerged: a sharp distinction can no longer be drawn between temporary migrants who leave their native country for a couple of months or years and do not register their changed residence and intention to permanently emigrate. Studies conducted in other countries with transition economies have conclusively shown that people often leave for short-term, money-earning purposes, or else travel several times a year without ever changing their permanent place of residence (Mansoor & Ouillin 2007; Okólski 2007; Kahanec, Zaiceva & Zimmermann 2010).

5.2.2 Migration after EU accession

The first few years following EU enlargement were characterised by distinct and somewhat drastic emigration trends. These were followed by a brief period of stabilisation, as emigrants were either planting roots in their destination countries or beginning to plan a return home. This section will more closely examine economic and political factors affecting migration trends in the Baltic states post-EU accession.

Widespread return trends accelerated in 2007, which was a year of rapid economic growth in the Baltic states; indeed, in many sectors of the economy, there were substantial wage increases. In late 2008, however, the economic conditions across the region began to deteriorate, beginning with a drop in GDP of 18 per cent and a major increase in unemployment in

Latvia (CSB 2010). This led to another sustained period of outward migration from the Baltic states.

The main target countries for Latvians and Lithuanians since EU enlargement have been the United Kingdom and Ireland, while Estonians have shown a preference for Finland. Between 2000 and 2007, more than 17,000 Estonian emigrants departed to Finland. This particular phenomenon is easily explained by the two countries' geographic proximity, and cultural and linguistic similarities; Estonians' contacts with acquaintances already living in Finland; and the fact that there is comparatively more information available about the Finnish labour market in the Estonian language (Anniste 2009: 62). Migrant stock data in receiving countries, meanwhile, do not cover all migrant groups and are far from comprehensive; yet they still partially illustrate recent trends. Useable data is available, for example, on registered workers in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Population register information is also exchanged between Estonia and Finland. As the main destination of Estonian emigrants, Finland – and Finnish data – does provide accurate information on at least one migrant group. However, these data do not cover citizens of other countries who went from Estonia to Finland or persons with unspecified citizenship who have lived in Estonia over time (Anniste 2009: 61).

Table 5.2 *National insurance number (NINO) applicants from Baltic states in the United Kingdom*

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
Estonia	1,060	3,000	2,160	1,680	440	1,950	10,290
Latvia	3,700	13,500	11,420	9,320	7,970	20,120	66,380
Lithuania	10,710	29,100	24,200	22,240	16,500	21,770	124,520

Source: Department for Work and Pensions (2010)

According to the British social security system's data, known as NINO, there was a rapid increase in the number of people arriving from Latvia and Lithuania in the United Kingdom. From 2004 to December 2009, approximately 200,000 migrants from the Baltic states registered with the NINO scheme.¹ Data from this system provide useful information about the demographic make-up of the groups emigrating in large numbers to the United Kingdom. Male workers make up the largest share of all immigrants (Kahanec & Zimmermann 2009). Migration is traditionally understood to be highly selective by age, with migrants trending relatively younger – unsurprisingly, the largest proportion of all migrants to the United Kingdom (more than 40 per cent) is in the 18-24 age group (Department for Work and Pensions 2010; Kahanec, Zaiceva & Zimmermann 2010).

From the 2004 EU enlargement until the end of 2009, nearly 35,000 emigrants from Latvia registered with the Personal Public Service in Ireland

Table 5.3 *Age structure of Latvian residents registered in the British national insurance number allocations, 2004-2009 (%)*

	< 18	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-59	60<
2004-2007	1.0	43.2	29.4	15.0	9.6	1.5	0.3
2008	1.9	44.6	27.5	13.9	9.4	2.0	0.6
2009	1.3	43.9	31.2	13.7	8.0	1.3	0.6

Source: Department for Work and Pensions (2010)

(Department of Social Protection 2010). Many foreign nationals who received Irish Personal Public Service (PPS) numbers are neither currently working nor claiming social welfare in Ireland, mainly because they have already left the country (CSO 2009).

Table 5.4 *Allocation of personal public service numbers for Baltic states in Ireland, 2000-2009*

	2000*	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Estonia	212	858	463	546	1,788	2,011	1,407	648	572	428	8,933
Latvia	1,046	3,023	1,538	1,230	6,266	9,328	7,954	4,674	3,727	3,916	42,702
Lithuania	642	2,735	2,782	2,379	12,817	18,717	16,039	10,728	6,443	3,768	77,050
Total	1,900	6,616	4,783	4,155	20,871	30,056	25,400	16,050	10,742	8,112	128,685

*from 19 June

Source: Department of Social Protection (2010)

Although certain migration patterns became common and widespread following the 2004 enlargement, the 2008 economic downturn significantly altered preferred destinations as well as emigrants' motivation and ability to go abroad. The inability to pay mortgages or loans obtained before the economic downturn, for example, influenced a vast number of potential migrants' emigration decisions. There is now a significant variation in the time spent abroad, which is itself a difficult variable to track. As mentioned, there is a severe lack of valid statistical information due to weaknesses in documenting temporary migration and the sheer impossibility of tracking actual motivating factors. In developing a case study on Latvia, then, social networks become important tools for describing how many migrants manage their moves. The importance of social networks will be explored in more detail in a later section.

5.2.3 *Migration and economic crisis*

The Baltic states, and particularly Latvia, were hit hard by the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. As countries with small and open economies, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia suffered especially because of declining exports and foreign capital inflows, as well as because of a sharp reduction

in public spending and an overall decline in domestic consumption. This section will briefly discuss the impact of the 2008 global economic crisis on migration trends in the Baltic region, and especially in Latvia.

The Latvian economy faced one of the gravest and most complex recessions of all the EU member states. These manifold economic problems intensified the actual emigration of the Latvian labour force. The unemployment rate in Latvia, which was close to 20 per cent in 2009, was one of the factors that, irrespective of their education level and previous work experience, led many Latvians to consider moving abroad. While a significant portion of these migrants were educated and experienced, they tended to choose low-skilled jobs and other expeditious moneymaking possibilities abroad in order to overcome high levels of competition and further domestic financial difficulties during the economic crisis.

As an added complication, during the boom years, low interest rates combined with a fast-growing GDP, rising salaries and an active housing market caused the economy to overheat. Recent evidence has indicated that many unemployed or under-employed mortgage owners in Latvia were unable to make their monthly payments and, as a partial result, chose to leave the country. Today, traditional patterns of emigration destinations appear to be evolving, with a rising number of Latvians settling in the United Kingdom, and a declining number leaving for Ireland. Increasing numbers of migrants are expressing preferences for the Nordic countries, as well as Germany and the Netherlands (DnB Nord 2010).

Previous studies have assessed in detail Latvia's migration flows and the characteristics of its migrants before and after the country's accession to the EU. However, there has only been a somewhat fragmentary evaluation of the so-called 'crisis phase' migration flow and the groups involved therein (Eglīte & Krisjane 2009; Hazans & Philips 2009). Several recent studies reported that the dominant motivation for emigration continues to be the desire for additional income or to accumulate resources for a specific goal. An increasing number of in-country survey respondents, however, said that they were simply unable to find work in Latvia. This is despite the fact that respondents have expressed a greater willingness than in previous years to perform different kinds of manual labour in order to earn additional income (DnB Nord 2010). Migration trends in the region and elsewhere also demonstrate the increasing importance of social networks, as significant numbers of survey respondents cite their aim in moving abroad as joining their family. Indeed, relatives or friends who are already abroad can help new migrants find work and offer initial housing (Hazans 2010).

5.3 Geographical mobility of the labour force in Latvia

5.3.1 *Data and methods*

This section will review the findings of a 2006 study of Latvians in the United Kingdom. The aim of the study was to collect and analyse emigrants' common concerns and thought patterns subsequent to migration. The study was based on an extensive survey² supplemented by qualitative data on the recent emigration patterns of Latvians to the United Kingdom. The findings were twofold: first, the recent economic crisis has facilitated emigration and, second, migrant social networks play a substantial role in the migration process.

The survey, which involved 8,005 respondents, was conducted among individuals aged 15 to 65. It was structured along different themes, including various social, economic and demographic topics, and it included questions related to employment and mobility (Krisjane et al. 2007). A special series of questions were posed to respondents who both worked and lived outside of Latvia. These respondents were asked why they went abroad, which country they went to, why they chose that specific country, how much time they spent there, their type of work, what they did with their earnings and the likelihood that they would migrate again. The responses provided were retrospective – respondents were thinking about the past.

Among all initial respondents, the response rate was 66.5 per cent. A total of 1,001 valid interviews were conducted in Riga and 7,004 were carried out elsewhere in Latvia. The sample was then stratified by age and settlement types. The survey analysis showed that 9 per cent of respondents had spent different cumulative periods abroad. Of these, 64.8 per cent were men and 35.2 per cent were women.

The qualitative supplement provided descriptions of different migrant groups and examples of personal narratives of emigrants living and working in the United Kingdom. Data was obtained from 57 in-depth interviews that took place between 2007 and 2008. These interviews were conducted with people currently living and employed in the United Kingdom and cover topics such as respondents' motivation to migrate, their backgrounds, living conditions, changes in employment and their foreseeable opportunities and plans. Face-to-face interviews were sometimes combined with interviews via email. Respondents were concentrated in Manchester and the London area.

5.3.2 *Migrant profiles and their experiences abroad*

The study discussed above also uncovered statistically significant differences in age, education and income between people who had been abroad and those who stayed in their country of origin. The differences in distribution are based on the results of a non-parametric *Mann-Whitney U test*.³ As might

Table 5.5 Education of respondents who had and had not worked abroad (%)

	Age group	Education			
		Primary or lower	General secondary	Specialised secondary	Higher
Had worked abroad* (N = 721)	15-19	14.3	6.1	0.4	0.0
	20-29	41.4	45.6	31.0	40.4
	30-44	28.6	25.9	41.3	39.5
	45-59	12.9	19.0	23.8	17.0
	60-65	2.9	3.4	3.6	3.1
Had not worked abroad (N = 7,214)	15-19	41.2	12.1	1.3	0.1
	20-29	16.4	25.5	14.2	22.4
	30-44	11.4	26.6	39.7	33.1
	45-59	15.7	26.4	35.3	34.7
	60-65	15.3	9.4	9.4	9.7

* Amongst returnees

Source: Authors' own computation based on Krisjane et al. (2007)

have been expected, younger people were more mobile than older ones. Among men who had worked abroad, 37.5 per cent were aged 20 to 29 (39.0 per cent for women). This section explores the education levels of emigrants surveyed versus individuals who remained in their countries of origin.

Those who had experience working abroad made up a greater share of individuals with higher education levels as compared to the entire survey sample. There were two times fewer respondents with an elementary education in the group that had worked abroad (table 5.5). Once again, this may be attributable in part to the age structure of those who emigrated – that is, few people in the 15-19 and 60-65 age groups left the country. Similarly, groups with a comparatively higher level of education (according to national census data) made up a greater share of people who had worked abroad. Some migrants pursued higher education abroad in addition to working, which may have contributed to the increase in the overall educational level of those who spent time in other countries. Finally, there were more women than men among the group of individuals with higher educations who worked abroad (Krisjane et al. 2007).

In sum, the survey results show that individuals with migratory experience, generally speaking, have higher educational levels than those who have never worked abroad. These findings are in line with the results of Hazans and Philips (2009) regarding the higher education levels of returnees as compared with those who stay in their countries of origin.

5.3.3 Motivation and work experience

This section will delve into the migration motives expressed by individuals surveyed, as well as provide a more complete profile of Latvian emigrants.

For the most part, migration motives for Latvians are closely aligned with the pattern generally observed among emigrants: by and large, the main reason for leaving to work abroad was the perceived opportunity to earn more money (see also results of the 2009 Eurobarometer special mobility survey, Kahanec & Zimmerman 2009). Gaining experience was the respondents' second most-cited reason. By contrast, greater career opportunities outside of Latvia were one of the least important motivations for going abroad. It is possible, however, that those who left Latvia to pursue concrete career goals have not yet returned.

As mentioned above, higher wages were the prevailing motivation among respondents of all age groups, though this reason was cited more often by individuals between the ages of 30 and 44 (45.3 per cent of all respondents). Another major motivation cited by this particular age group was the inability to find adequate work at home (7.3 per cent). Gaining relevant experience and learning new languages were key motivations cited by respondents between the ages of 20 and 29. Respondents in the 45 to 59 age group were most frequently sent abroad by employers.

In comparing the amount of time worked abroad to motivation and age, it becomes clear that younger people (ages 20 to 29) went abroad to gain experience and most of them spent no more than three months abroad. Those who wanted to learn a new language typically left for one to three months (22.1 per cent cited this reason) and most of these, again, were young, aged 20 to 29. Men, who comprised 56.5 per cent of respondents in this age group, said they left to gain experience slightly more often than women did (43.5 per cent). Employers sent men to work abroad two times more frequently than they sent women (67.4 per cent of respondents who gave this reason were men). In addition, men were posted to jobs outside of Latvia for various lengths of time, while women were most often sent abroad for only a brief period – again, no more than a total of three months (40 per cent of respondents). Those who emigrated because they could not find work in Latvia spent one to two years working in another country (31 per cent cited these reasons) (Krisjane et al. 2007).

Analyses of work experiences show that the amount of time spent abroad is most frequently three months or less. On average, 61.6 per cent of men and 65.8 per cent of women in this survey worked abroad for no more than one year; 29.0 per cent and 28.4 per cent, respectively, did so for two to five years, and 3.5 per cent of all respondents worked abroad for more than ten years. These results reflect the temporality of the stay abroad and reflect trends similar to those obtained by the Eurobarometer Survey in 2009 (European Commission 2010).

Respondents also reported working in a total of more than 50 different countries. Somewhat unsurprisingly, among the most often cited countries were the United Kingdom (17.8 per cent) and Ireland (9.8 per cent). On

average, 33 per cent of respondents had worked in more than just one country (Krisjane et al. 2007).

It is worth considering that migration decisions are often quite complex, and respondents weighed a number of factors when choosing a destination country. The United Kingdom and Ireland, for example, were countries where respondents felt they could earn the most additional income. The second most frequently cited reason for moving to Ireland was the recommendations made by individuals who had already worked there. The third most frequently cited reason was the presence of relatives or friends in Ireland. This motivation in particular illustrates the importance of social networks and role of these networks in providing information about the possibilities tied to working abroad versus remaining at home. Both the United Kingdom and Ireland were also often chosen because respondents spoke English or wanted to learn the language (Krisjane et al. 2007).

Comparing the motivations of potential migrants with those of individuals who had already worked abroad, 83 to 86 per cent of potential migrants say that they want to go abroad in order to earn a higher salary. Among those who had already worked abroad, higher salaries were cited 19 to 20 per cent less frequently. This finding suggests that the actual wages paid abroad are not as high as migrants had previously hoped, and that those who cited higher wages as the primary motivation overestimated the importance of their income levels abroad.

Opportunities for growth and career development were also viewed far more sceptically by those who had already spent time abroad (4.5 per cent of men, 2.7 per cent of women) than by those who had yet to do so (19.6 per cent of men and 19.3 per cent of woman migrants) (Krisjane et al. 2007). When asked about what they did with the money they earned abroad, 73.4 per cent of men and 66.6 per cent of women who had worked abroad said that they spent it on everyday needs – 26.6 per cent more men and 17.8 per cent more women than had predicted that this would be what they would do with the added income before they left their home country in the first place. Those who had already worked abroad said that they used the money to pay off loans or lent it to friends or relatives slightly more often than potential migrants predicted that they might do so. Because two thirds of those who went abroad did so because they wanted to earn more money, the issue of what they did with that money was an important one. The second most commonly cited area of spending was the purchase, construction or renovation of homes, cited by 30.5 per cent of those who worked abroad. Potential migrants thought that they would use their earnings to open up their own business back home, but only 1 per cent of those who had worked abroad actually opened a business in Latvia (Krisjane 2008).

The most common sectors of employment among migrants were catering, construction and manufacturing, but the greatest share of all migrants

Table 5.6 *Employment structure of Latvian migrants in the UK and Ireland (% of mentioned jobs)*

	United Kingdom			Ireland			All countries		
	Male N=73	Female N=44	Total N=117	Male N=39	Female N=24	Total N=63	Male N=465	Female N=255	Total N=720
Managers	1.4	0.0	0.9	2.6	0.0	1.6	4.7	0.8	3.0
Professionals, including health care	12.3	2.2	7.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.6	18.4	13.9
Industrial work	17.8	20.0	17.9	5.1	16.0	9.4	10.9	12.4	11.3
Construction	12.3	2.2	8.5	28.2	0.0	17.2	25.0	1.6	16.7
Agricultural work	23.3	33.3	28.2	25.6	36.0	29.7	16.1	18.8	17.5
Transport	8.3	0.0	5.2	10.4	0.0	6.3	8.3	0.8	5.6
Jobs in the service sector	12.3	11.2	12.0	5.1	20.0	10.9	7.8	20.4	12.3
Baby-sitting	0.0	11.1	4.3	0.0	4.0	1.6	0.0	9.2	3.3
Catering and trade	5.5	13.3	8.5	0.0	20.0	7.8	4.9	14.4	8.4
Other	6.8	6.7	6.8	10.2	4.0	7.8	9.0	2.8	6.8
No response	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.8	0.0	7.7	1.7	0.4	1.2

Source: Calculation based on Krisjane et al. (2007)

worked in agriculture. For men, the most common occupations in major cities were in the construction industry; in rural areas, common occupations were in agriculture. Women tended to work within the services sectors, frequently in *au pair* programmes, and in agriculture. In general agricultural work is the most popular form of employment in the United Kingdom for Latvian men and women. Table 5.6 shows that in Ireland the greatest share of women work in agriculture, and the greatest share of men are in construction. In both the United Kingdom and Ireland, many migrants are also employed in the manufacturing sector.

The UK Home Office A-8 Countries Workers Registration Scheme (WRS) indicates that Latvian migrants constitute the predominant proportion working in agriculture (Home Office 2010). Data obtained from interviews also suggest that most of the economic or labour migrants in the United Kingdom have taken on lower-skill jobs than they might have held previously (Eglīte & Krisjane 2009; Apsite 2010).

The survey results indicated that, post-EU accession, Latvian migrants are characterised by the following:

- They were mostly attracted by economic pull factors.
- The majority of the out-migrants were young adults.
- Most have medium skill levels yet were employed in relatively low-skilled sectors.
- All respondent groups included individuals expressing a desire to return to Latvia, but almost none could provide a specific time-frame.

This profile of Latvian migrants largely confirm the findings of Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008b), who found that migrants from the new

EU member countries tend to be male, work-oriented, young, relatively well-educated and intend to stay abroad only temporarily.

5.4 Characteristics of Latvian emigration to the United Kingdom following EU accession

The study's qualitative data describing Latvian migrants' experiences emigrating to the United Kingdom revealed common issues and concerns. A quick 'motive classification' analysis divided respondents into a few discrete migrant groups. The first, dominant group was the economic or labour migrant group, followed by a secondary family reunification group. A third group included students and adventure-seekers, whose motives for migration were distinct from those cited by individuals in the labour and family reunification groups. There were also short-term migrants who spent less than one year in the United Kingdom and long-term migrants who, at the time, were well settled in the United Kingdom and had no return plans. All the groups exhibited strong connections with informal social networks, which served as key information and support sources. The role of social networks will be further illustrated in the examples below. This section will detail some additional characteristics and trends among the survey respondents.

The 57 interviews, as mentioned previously, covered such topics as migration motivation and time spent abroad. At the time of these interviews, 18 respondents considered themselves short-term economic migrants and 36 respondents as long-term family reunification migrants with significant economic considerations; none from this group had plans to leave the United Kingdom. Only three respondents from this group came to the United Kingdom for educational purposes.

Generally, the interviewees shared a common set of characteristics: most were young people under the age of 30 who had completed their education after Latvia regained independence and began their employment after Latvia acceded to the EU. This likely afforded them higher-than-average English language and computer skills.

Both male and female respondents tended to have been educated at specialised secondary trade schools in Latvia, which corresponded largely to the distribution of education levels across the country. Respondents with university-level educations were usually women. Nearly all the respondents were employed prior to leaving Latvia. None of the migrants obtained jobs better than the ones they left in Latvia immediately upon moving to the United Kingdom. A significant portion of the respondents was employed in low-skilled jobs, which seemed to be an indicator of Latvian emigrants' economic niche.

The following show examples of the jobs obtained in Latvia versus after migration from Latvia to the United Kingdom: a former assistant

accountant worked as a vegetable sorter; a student was employed as a warehouse staff member; a civil servant worked as a housemaid; a professional cook as an herb packer; an accountant as a packer in a paper factory; a state revenue service officer worked as a custodian; a security guard was employed as a loader; a former marketing specialist was a bartender; an English interpreter worked as hotel staff.

As was mentioned previously, the motives for emigration were mostly economic in nature – securing higher wages was usually tied to a need or desire for additional income intended for a concrete purpose, such as purchasing real estate in Latvia. Emigration motives are mostly similar within one group: short-term migrants most frequently faced financial problems due to their inability to make mortgage payments, while young people needed additional funds to pay for their university studies. In addition, young migrants were usually unenthused about their future salary prospects in Latvia.

Long-term migrants mentioned all of the motivations listed above, as well as desires to improve their long-term quality of life by securing more comfortable living and working conditions. Migrants who left Latvia for purposes of family reunification, unsurprisingly, were not quite as strongly driven by economic factors as other long-term migrants.

Many among the first wave of migrants began their employment in the United Kingdom with temporary low-skilled seasonal jobs, which included agricultural tasks like working in fields or gathering and packing harvested items. Latvians based in UK cities tended to work in factories or warehouses, perform cleaning or custodial jobs or work in construction. Only long-term migrants later found more challenging positions that fit their education and previous work experience, after better acquainting themselves with work and living conditions and performing a low-skilled job.

Another frequently observed phenomenon was that not all migrants who thought of themselves as short-term migrants adhered to their initial plans. In fact, they often changed their goals and ultimately became long-term migrants. One exception to this is migrants belonging to the family reunification group, whose members were largely committed to long-term stays. These types of migrants also attracted and facilitated the immigration of additional potential migrants. As many as half of all interviewees said they were unlikely ever to return to Latvia, claiming that their future goals were strongly tied to life in the United Kingdom.

The following section aims to illustrate three life stories, each taken from interviews with Latvians living in the United Kingdom. These life stories describe different motives for migration and different lengths of stay, but each demonstrates the importance of social networks.

I lived in very poor conditions. I couldn't cover my everyday costs with my salary in Latvia and I had to pay for my studies. Now I am

working as a kitchen staff and I am living in my own room in accommodation provided by employer. This job I got through my niece who is working here for two years already. I am very satisfied with the work and my pay. But, in the autumn, I am returning back to Latvia and proceeding with my studies at university. (Andrej, 25 years old)

Members of the group exemplified by the above quote are driven by efficiency and expediency; they typically work for a short period in order to attain previously set financial goals and then return to their countries of origin. Their main financial goals were typically the purchase of property, the repayment of debt or making mortgage payments.

Latvians do not leave Latvia to look for better life; they do it to have easier life. For me it is easier to live here and that's why I emigrated from Latvia. In order to find job here you don't need an education and you don't need to have exact experience; you don't even need to know the language. If one wants, anyone can work here. Everything depends on what life conditions you want. My acquaintances from Latvia work overtime, share room, never relax and enjoy; they only save money for the future. Back in Latvia, my husband had company but unfortunately lost it and had debts to pay back. So, all our family decided to move to the UK, because working here allowed us to pay back the debt.

Our friend helped to get me a job in a factory and my husband found job as a driver in three weeks time. I was learning English and now for a couple of months I am already working in my profession as a hairdresser. We both are very satisfied with our salaries and life in general. Our sons have attended school here for two years already and we are not planning to return to Latvia, at least not until they graduate from school. (Ilze, 35 years old)

Members of this group had been living in the United Kingdom for several years and were generally unwilling to return to Latvia, at least in the near term. They have settled into a routine and desire permanent residence in the United Kingdom. Their main motives for emigration were usually personal frustrations with their economic predicament in Latvia, usually attributable to comparatively low income rates and overall financial uncertainty.

Representatives of this group were not thinking about return migration, as their children moved with them. The time period the family intended to spend abroad was usually prolonged in the interest of the family's current needs and future prospects.

I worked in a bakery in Latvia. The salary was low and the work was physically very hard. Both of my sons went to the UK. At first, I went to the UK to look after my grandson, but after a year, I started working in a plastic factory and am working here for two years already. I am very satisfied with the work I am doing. Back in Latvia, I earned 120 LVL a month now I earn £ 300 a week. I am planning to return to Latvia when I will be retired. I am able to travel around and see the world, while in my own country I only experienced a hard job. (Velta, 47 years old)

Velta represents the group of individuals who emigrated for purposes of reunification with family members. Her story exemplifies the experiences of individuals of more advanced ages who decide to pursue a 'last ditch opportunity' and make a permanent move abroad. As was previously mentioned, individuals with sufficient work experience in the United Kingdom are considered valuable and relatively well paid even if they are employed in low-skill jobs. In general, data indicate that the importance of family reunification as a motivation for migration is growing, and in fact is often the last phase of the migration chain. That is, migrants in the first wave began as or intended to be short-term migrants; their stays then became long-term settlements, and ultimately they became permanent residents who later invited family members to join them.

Another seemingly common trend is a decline in the number of people who ultimately intend to return to their home country. When respondents were asked about their future plans, few expressed a desire or intention to return to Latvia (Apsite 2010; Krisjane & Bauls 2011). Still, their reasons for migrating to begin with are tied to factors such as established social networks, the pursuit of language or other skills or knowledge, and the inferior economic situation in their home country.

Describing emigrants' motivation, decision-making processes and attitudes towards return migration is important for a small country such as Latvia. Migrant groups must be viewed as malleable and evolving entities, especially as their strategies and long-term plans change. There are multiple examples of individuals intending to migrate for a short period who end up remaining abroad for an indeterminately longer duration. As the life stories above illustrate, however, most types of migrant groups emphasise their connection to and the importance of existing social support networks, which serve to facilitate their needs whatever their initial motives or amount of time spent abroad.

5.5 Discussion and concluding remarks

This chapter sought to enrich the existing understanding of emigration trends from the Baltic states by focusing on discrete migrant groups as well as migration behaviours tied to social networks. The empirical analyses presented here were based on survey results supplemented by qualitative data on recent Latvian emigrants to the United Kingdom.

Migration is a process that must be viewed in relation to not only the growth and development of a specific location, region or country, but also within a broader global context. Research resoundingly supports the idea that citizens of the Baltic States are reacting positively to the new challenges of globalisation that stem from EU enlargement. Migration processes and the motivations that put them in motion have been linked to a wide range of economic factors, which include better employment opportunities and higher potential incomes and a chance to acquire new or enhance existing skills. Migrating in search of the opportunity to earn more money in order to support a household is typical of the so-called 'new economic migrants' (Stark & Bloom 1985), particularly if there are substantial differences in income between two countries; these typically promote or create flows of migration from one country to another. In accordance with traditional economic theories, structural, macroeconomic pull factors have been shown to attract migrants to old EU member states with open labour markets.

Emigrants from CEE countries usually share a common migration strategy. As observed by De Haas (2005: 1248), a selective process fosters diversity in migrant groups, leading to the emergence of categories such as permanent, temporary and return migrants. Within these categories, individuals adhere to different concepts of circulation and simultaneous commitment to two or more societies. This committed duality is often seen among Latvian migrants, who maintain vibrant communication channels and strong emotional ties with those they left behind, and they support relatives and loved ones with remittances or other economic assistance. Alongside the more traditional economic migrants to the West, there are many cases of highly skilled migrants who lost their jobs in Latvia or who were otherwise unsatisfied with their living conditions and therefore decided to leave in search of new experiences and knowledge abroad. Such migrants commonly plan to return to Latvia eventually, thereby enriching the domestic labour force with the skills and experience they acquired abroad. Though this was not a significant trend in previous years, it is now known as brain gain and circulation, with Latvia widely understood to be suffering a serious brain drain effect. Many of the country's well-educated citizens simply opted for experiences abroad. As De Haas (*ibid.*) noted, however, in the medium to long term, the departure of the highly skilled may actually have beneficial effects for countries of origin in a variety of

ways, including the counter-flow of remittances, new investments, closer trade relations, enhanced knowledge, increased innovation and improved attitudes and information. This effect has been confirmed by multiple studies carried out abroad and in Latvia (Lulle et al. 2006; Williams 2006). The chances are thus high that Baltic migration that is seemingly short-term or temporary will become more long-term and permanent in nature over time, and that the proportion of highly-educated migrants will ultimately grow (Hazans and Philips 2009).

As was previously described, short-term economic migrants from the Baltic region usually seek guaranteed employment via a recruitment agency or by coming into direct contact with an employer. Indeed, the main motivation of temporary and seasonal workers is the obtainment of comparatively higher incomes in a short period. Long-term migrants to the United Kingdom, on the other hand, spend more than one year in the country and are mainly young people wishing to settle there permanently. Finally, the fastest growing migrant group, which happens to have the most diverse make-up, is the family reunification group. This group most clearly illustrates the importance of social networks and multi-destination transnational activities.

Given family reunification's increasing importance, there is a need for additional research into the significance of social networks and transnational activities. In particular, the social networks made up of relatives and acquaintances merit closer inspection, as individuals who have obtained more experience living abroad can help facilitate and accelerate the migration process. Eastern Europeans have historically relied heavily on social networks (White and Ryan 2008: 1468). The survey in Latvia suggests that as many as half of the respondents described here made use of social networks before and during migration abroad.

Social networks thus play an extremely important role in migration, not only by supporting migrants with economic and other migration motives, but also as observed by De Haas (2005: 1248) and Vertovec (1999), because they encourage and entice young people to study abroad or to reunify with their families. As a result, there are increased possibilities for transnational migration, as well as for the adaptation of transnational identities.

Finally, social networks have played an essential role in recent emigration trends prompted by the global economic recession. In cases where the economic downturn resulted in unemployment, social networks have been shown to help migrants obtain initial contacts, then employment and the necessary support abroad. Social networks have helped trigger migrant activity between Latvia and the United Kingdom.

Notes

- 1 NINO, or the national insurance system, provides protection to the unemployed, funds the national health service and provides pension payments at retirement for all those who qualify in the UK. A national insurance number is issued by the UK Department for Works and Pension.
- 2 Material from the Welfare Ministry study No. VPD1/ESF/NAV/04/NP/3.1.5.1/0003, 'The Geographic Mobility of the Labour Force', which received funding from the EU's national 'Labour Market Research' project (Krisjane et al. 2007).
- 3 The *Mann-Whitney U test* is a nonparametric test that can be used to analyse data from a two-group independent groups design. It is also used to tests differences between groups (independent group comparison test) (SPSS Tutorial).

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Part II

Post-accession migration, labour market integration and migration strategies

6 The race for global talent, EU enlargement and the implications for migration policies and processes in European labour markets

Aimee Kuvik¹

6.1 Introduction

Globalisation presents a dilemma for governments in how to best balance participation in international economic systems and the protection of their national citizens and interests. These tensions between global economic processes and supporting the well-being of citizens also mean that there is great room for variation in approaches adopted by governments to support their labour markets and citizens. This variation is illuminated in political-economic debates related to the varieties of capitalism (Esping-Andersen 1990; Hall & Soskice 2001; Schmidt 2002), centred around the existing models of welfare states and welfare capitalism. This has further led to discussions of how countries can be competitive despite high levels of regulation and costly systems of social protection. These tensions are further demonstrated by debates surrounding government responses to the current economic crisis, starting around 2008, with support for protectionist measures on the rise in many countries (see Melik 2009).

The growth of the knowledge economy, as seen in high-tech industries such as IT, software and skilled service jobs, has offered new economic opportunities, particularly since the 1990s. Within the European Union, the Lisbon Strategy launched in 2000 set as one of the top priorities for Europe to become the 'world's most competitive knowledge-based economy' by 2010. In order to maintain prosperity, new economic sectors should be developed and research and development (R&D) spending increased to 3 per cent of GDP across *all* EU member states. However, there are also numerous challenges. The specific areas of growth and employment can be hard to predict, as the technology and demand involved changes quickly, the political economic environment varies from place to place, and competition to build knowledge-based industries is international. Additionally, recent years have seen an increase of outsourcing to firms in countries with lower labour costs, including on R&D and other functions that are considered part of the knowledge economy for which advanced economies in Western countries were assumed to have a clear competitive advantage.

Since the late 1990s, *immigration* has also become associated with the growth and development of the knowledge economy, to fill high-skilled labour shortages and as a way to gain the ‘best’ employees, largely drawing from analyses done on the IT sector in the United States. Great interest has been generated by the example of the success of Silicon Valley, California’s leading IT cluster, and its use of foreign skilled labour and entrepreneurs, particularly building on the research of Saxenian (1994, 1999, 2002). For instance, in 1999, 32 per cent of the science and engineering workforce were foreign-born (Saxenian 1999: viii). Her study was a breakthrough in showing that ‘immigrant’ jobs were not only found among the low-skilled workers in California (Saxenian 2002: iii), and the study and subsequent discussions of the IT sector as a contributor to US productivity growth attracted significant attention. The 1990s can therefore be seen as the beginning of an important change, even a paradigm shift, as skilled migration increasingly became associated with economic competitiveness.

In recent years, media across many advanced economies (see Bauder 2008 on skilled immigration in Germany) as well as policy documents and government speeches have touted a ‘global competition’ or ‘race’ for talent (Shachar 2006; Florida 2005; Kuptsch & Pang 2006; Martin & Lowell 2004), a ‘battle for the brains’ (Doomernik, Koslowski & Thränhardt 2009), or need to attract the ‘best and brightest’ (Kapur & McHale 2005). However, such phrases seem to presume that skilled immigration has been accepted as necessary for competitiveness by national economies and that mobility of individuals proceeds unrestricted, driven by the personal motivation of highly skilled individuals who choose, on a global scale, where to relocate. While elements of this analogy are true, the mechanisms that both limit and restrict possibilities for global migration are completely ignored. Brown (2001) refers to this discrepancy as ‘the myth of the global labour market’:

The view that workers now have to operate in a global rather than a national market is also a simplification of existing realities for most workers. This is because the global labour market does not operate as a ‘free’ market (Castells 1996; Held et al. 1999). Nationality continues to operate as a vital tool for restricting the competition for jobs by excluding millions of well qualified workers from other parts of the world, such as skilled software engineers from India competing for IT jobs within the European Community or North America (Kobrin 2000). [...]

We must avoid conflating the deregulation of world markets with those of how nations are responding to these changing rules of international competition. Contrary to proclamations of the end of the nation state (Ohmae 1995), the economic competitiveness that benefits the many rather than the few will depend on the way national

governments respond to competitive pressures from 'foreign' countries, companies and workers. In other words, nations must confront new problems that threaten the living standards of workers and their families. Globalization has made it more important to have a democratic political voice that serves the 'national' interest (Brown 2001: 26, 28-29).

The myth of the global labour market can also be extended to examine the contradictions in 'free mobility' in the EU's labour markets, as will be done in this chapter.

Immigration policy, in general, remains an area where the tensions of globalisation, in terms of successfully participating and operating in *global economic systems* while simultaneously protecting *well-being and welfare of nationals*, can be especially apparent. On one hand, it is becoming more accepted to see skilled migration as making a positive contribution to the welfare system while also helping to balance the demographic changes associated with the greying of the population and potential workforce shortages. On the other hand, critics of skilled migration argue that training and utilisation of the national workforce should be the priority instead of immigration, and that skills shortages indicate structural problems, such as those in the education system. Immigration in all forms has also been limited due to concerns related to national security, especially after the events of 11 September 2001. Furthermore, although policy mechanisms, such as work permits and visas, may be less contentious for high-skilled jobs, the particular laws and mechanisms vary (e.g., in quotas by nationality or sector of employment, labour market tests, income requirements, and the degree of power afforded to corporations for offering work or residence permits). In light of the economic crisis starting in late 2008, some countries that were seen as relatively open to skilled migration, such as the United Kingdom and Australia, had already announced cuts in quotas for skilled migrants in the first half of 2008 due to economic recession and pressure from the public and trade unions. Similar measures are likely to follow elsewhere as economic woes deepen, as has been observed in past recessions.

The conflicts named above are central both in economic as well as in immigration policy choices, as governments try to balance internal concerns with objectives for advancing economic competitiveness in the global context. While these two factors, global economic participation and a national orientation in terms of welfare and security, have become a crucial part of the political-economic landscape, they have been met with varying responses. For instance, Sassen (1995: 1) has noted this disparity between the various forms of international mobility and their acceptability to governments, focusing on issues of global economic integration. She explains:

Today we can see in all highly developed countries a combination of drives to create border-free economic spaces and drives for renewed border-control [...] Current immigration policy in developed countries is increasingly at odds with other major policy frameworks in the international system and with the growth of global economic integration.

These tensions not only pose questions of selectivity, priorities and mechanisms among states for migration, including skilled migration, but also partially frame attitudes towards openness to foreigners in general. Hence, the tensions also influence the migrant's individual experience and the opportunities afforded to people from other countries and backgrounds.

This chapter will discuss the policy framework within the 'global competition for talent' by looking at examples of policies that aim to facilitate skilled migration to or labour mobility across member states in the European Union. The chapter argues that implicit in the paradigm of a 'race for global talent' are theoretical debates on the foundations for national economic competitiveness arising from processes of globalisation, which need to be discussed in a more nuanced way in light of the relative positioning of states and considering reservations towards opening up national labour markets to foreign populations. This chapter will briefly examine the policy context within EU member states, particularly highlighting and comparing various policies and discourse towards skilled migration and the response of individual member states to the EU accession of ten new member states in 2004. The chapter further discusses contradictions in the concept of the 'race for global talent' by critically assessing the assumptions and controversies surrounding select EU and national policies relating to labour mobility. In taking this approach, the chapter aims more specifically to highlight commonalities and contradictions in approaches to defining the 'desired' mobility in Europe and the various barriers faced in terms of moving towards the EU's standard of 'free mobility'. The chapter does not specifically look at skilled mobility of individuals *from* new EU member states, as research on this issue is still scarce; and given the concept of free mobility in the EU, these movements across EU states are often not captured or are provided in less detail in national statistics. Nonetheless, the issues discussed in this chapter provide a broad contextual base for understanding the receiving context.

6.2 Policy approaches in the 'global competition for talent': Examples from Europe

As highlighted in the introduction, there has been a strong increase in skilled migration across the world, with the 1990s serving as an important

turning point for immigration to be acknowledged across more states as a contributor to economic competitiveness and particularly for the knowledge economy. Is this evidence enough to say there is truly global competition for skilled migrants? Is there any evidence counter to this assumption? The relationships between skilled migration and competitiveness are complex, influenced by a multiplicity of factors at the national level, such as national variations in policies and state structures, including welfare systems. In Europe, political tensions also occur between support for policies of the EU versus the often locally focused interests of their citizens. These tensions have been used to argue against the potential longevity of the EU and present a challenge for European integration and harmonised standards.

6.2.1 *Limits to 'free mobility' within the EU*

'Free mobility' is one of the four freedoms,² along with mobility of capital, goods and services, forming the cornerstone of the EU's existence and operation of the common market throughout all of the EU's territory. This means that a citizen from one EU member state is 'free' to live and work in any other EU member state. However, there are a number of limitations to 'free mobility' in Europe that need to be highlighted. First, statistically labour migration across European regions has been low. There therefore are still internal concerns about how to further integration. Nonneman (2007: 4) argues that there is 'immobility of European labour':

[D]espite high unemployment in the local area, [the European workforce] is disinclined to resettle in areas with more job opportunities. Less than 0.5 per cent of European workers move to a different region every year. This is very little, compared, for example, with the 2.5 per cent of Americans who take up residence in a different state every year.

Nonneman further suggests that the limited mobility is due both to varying social provisions, such as welfare, housing and pensions, as well as to language and cultural barriers. Overcoming such internal divisions therefore is an important priority in ensuring the longevity and functioning of the EU.

Second, there is a sharp division in rights between EU nationals and anyone from outside of this area, defined in legal terms as 'third-country nationals', whether they are from a country that borders the EU, such as the Ukraine, or from further afield, such as citizens of the United States or Australia, India, China or countries in Africa. In terms of policy and strategy set forth by the EU, there is an explicit difference defined in the goals and acceptance of promoting *mobility*, the word used to define when citizens move within the EU, versus by and large, a goal of restricting

immigration, movements from outside of the EU. The ramifications of this idea are also present in statistics for skilled movements. Cervantes and Goldstein (2008: 313, 315) report:

In 2000 there were 3.4 million highly skilled foreigners (foreign-born and noncitizen) from developing countries in the OECD countries and Europe as a region (EU25, Norway and Switzerland) hosted only 13 percent of them [...] Some European countries therefore appear not only to attract fewer higher skilled immigrants for settlement than the US, but those that come tend to come from OECD countries as opposed to from developing countries.

Simply put, Western European immigration has historically been built around post-colonial migrations, the low-skilled guest workers policy of the 1960s and 1970s (and subsequent migration of the guest workers' family members), and migration for humanitarian reasons, such as asylum seekers from the 1980s onwards. These are largely the categories that have been available for residence permits. With this backdrop, the number of skilled migrants in Europe is relatively low and makes up a small percentage of total migrants received. While some of the individuals that fit into these categories are highly educated and skilled, the policies in place to date have typically not focused on this aspect per se. This is an important point, for instance, when looking at the occupational patterns of skilled asylum seekers, for instance, or of spouses that may come in on family migration programmes and face restricted labour market access. It is also important when looking comparatively at immigration trends, in terms of both numbers and the countries individuals come from. For instance, states like Australia and Canada have a points system, which selects immigrants on the basis of personal qualifications and characteristics, such as education, language ability and age. This process also allows for a greater possibility for diversity in the countries of origin of their foreign-born populations.

Third, although 'free mobility' in the EU is one of the main principles of the alliance, there are still great variations across member states as *individual countries* set policies for its implementation, such as residency, work permits and citizenship. Policy approaches for skilled migration then vary between places that focus on labour market needs and labour shortages, which tend to be more short-term programmes, to those with a longer-term 'human capital approach' to try to attract individuals that are seen as making overall positive contributions (Abella 2006: 18-19). While policy is not the only factor that influences where people go for work and studies, it is important in shaping the magnitude of the inflows (Grogger & Hanson 2008) and in setting selection mechanisms, which will shape both the characteristics of the immigrant population present as well as their level of access to public services.

Is the global competition for talent really global? With varying numbers of skilled migrants in OECD countries, there are reasons to question whether all countries are equally trying to attract people. To what extent are the policies spurred by 'global' concerns, or are they rather fuelled by internal concerns? Although these questions cannot be answered in full, the remainder of this chapter will offer reflection on past responses and debates within a few of the EU member states. Three topics are presented in this section to add to this discussion: the level of labour market access afforded to citizens of the EU accession states, variations in national migration policies for skilled migration in several EU countries and early debates surrounding the EU's Blue Card, a high-skilled visa allowing portable work and residence rights across the EU.

6.2.2 Diverging labour market access and rights afforded to citizens of the EU accession states

Almost all the EU-15 member states met the idea of new workers in their territories with some resistance. The majority of the EU member states responded to the EU accession of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in 2004 and 2007 by imposing restrictions on either labour market access or welfare rights for citizens of the new member states. The EU allowed for variations in national responses and said that restrictions on the mobility of individuals from the new states could be imposed first for two years, after which they should be reassessed, and then could be extended for an additional five years (Doyle, Hughes & Wadensjö 2006: 17-18). Doyle, Hughes and Wadensjö (2006: 9) classify the stances taken by the EU-15 members into four groups based on the level of access afforded to citizens of the accession states:

The enlargement debates across Europe resulted in four different regimes being in place in the EU15 Member States. The first regime (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg and Spain) gives citizens from the Accession States no more rights than non-EEA [European Economic Area] nationals. The second regime (Austria, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal) adopts essentially the same rule as the first but opens the labour market to a quota of the Accession State nationals. The third regime (Ireland and the UK) allows unrestricted access to labour markets but restricts access to social benefits. In the fourth regime (Sweden) European Community rules apply.

In summary, only Sweden, the United Kingdom and Ireland did not impose work restrictions upon entry on citizens from the new accession states in 2004.

What has been the result of the inflows from these new member states for the open economies of Ireland, the United Kingdom and Sweden? A few trends can be identified. First, Ireland and the United Kingdom received relatively more individuals than Sweden. Trends in the United Kingdom seem to indicate that they tend to be employed in manual labour (such as construction) or lower-skilled service sectors (hospitality, for instance), at least initially. This employment pattern seems to be due in part to the individuals' plans to stay in the United Kingdom only for the short term. However, caution should be taken in assuming that the employment of individuals from CEE countries is directed solely towards low-skilled streams. For instance in Ireland, while low to medium-skilled employment may be the predominant form, employment in high-skilled sectors is not negligible. For example, the Irish census showed that individuals from the EU-10 accession held 13 per cent of the employment in the Irish software sector (Krings et al. 2008: 7), a notable amount but much less than their 35.7 per cent share of employment in the Irish construction sector in 2007 (Bobek et al. 2008: 8).

Beyond identifying the main trends, the impact of the flows after the EU enlargement on the labour markets in the older member states is difficult to determine; however, recent evidence seems to support an overall positive economic effect. According to analyses from the EU (European Commission 2008: 15),

Four years after the EU's 2004 enlargement and over a year after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, practically all of the available evidence suggests that the economic impact of recent intra-EU mobility has been positive on balance, and that it has not led to serious disturbances on the labour market, even in those Member States that have seen a relatively large inflow of migrants from new Member States.

Yet, as the policy has only been in place for a few years and other EU countries have since further lifted restrictions, the data are likely still inconclusive and need to be assessed in terms of both sector of employment, other social and economic costs and benefits and changing patterns of migration flows. An analysis from the OECD (2008: 38) suggests that citizens of the CEE may have been able to improve their position in the UK labour market, compared to what was possible before EU enlargement. The analysis shows that in the United Kingdom the demand for work permits did not decline, even given the increase in labour mobility from the new EU member states:

The most likely explanation is that the opening up to nationals of EU accession countries in Ireland and the United Kingdom brought

in workers who were largely complementary to those coming in under the permit schemes. The Work Permit System in the United Kingdom was generally oriented towards highly skilled workers, whereas persons coming in from the new accession countries often came to take on lesser skilled jobs, not infrequently for short periods. The seasonal agricultural workers' scheme, on the other hand, actually saw an increase in permits granted to third country nationals, undoubtedly because such jobs were being deserted by nationals from new accession countries, who undoubtedly saw much better opportunities in other sectors of the British economy.

However, it should also be noted that the public response has not always been positive. For instance, an FT Harris Poll in March 2009 found 54 per cent 'of Britons polled resenting the legal right of EU citizens to work in Britain' (White 2009).

The situation for the accession of two additional countries, Bulgaria and Romania, in 2007 was also marked by a large number of countries imposing restrictions on access to either work or welfare benefits, further indicating resistance to the idea that the free mobility of labour is beneficial. The specific roles taken by individual member states had changed and were marked by greater restrictions. Sweden once again adopted a policy of free mobility and was joined by Finland and nine of the ten new EU members (Hungary was the exception) from the 2005 accession. In the United Kingdom, a distinction has been made between low-skilled and high-skilled labour. The BBC (2009) reported:

After an unexpectedly large influx of workers from Central Europe – an estimated 600,000 in two years – the UK announced that it would impose restrictions on workers from Bulgaria and Romania. Up to 20,000 will be allowed to take low-skilled jobs in agriculture or food processing, high-skilled workers will be able to apply for work permits to perform a skilled job, and students will be able to work part-time. Self-employed people from Bulgaria and Romania are already allowed to work in the UK, and this will continue.

In response to current restrictions on mobility of citizens of Bulgaria and Romania in various EU member states, Vladimír Špidla, European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities stated:

The economic downturn is not a reason to keep restrictions. Free labour mobility is self-regulatory and provides a much needed flexibility in both directions: workers go to where there is demand for labour, not to be unemployed in another country.³

6.2.3 *Skilled migration policies and discourse in various EU receiving countries*

Skilled migration, as an explicit category of immigration with its own admission policy, has only recently been acknowledged as important to governments' immigration strategies and priorities within European countries. Starting around 2000, interest in skilled migration, either generally for the knowledge economy or for the IT sector in particular, bloomed in a number of European countries. To give a few examples, Germany adopted a Green Card in 2000 for IT workers (Kolb 2005), the Netherlands implemented the knowledge migrant visa to allow for fast-track labour market access for individuals meeting a set salary requirement in October 2004 (European Migration Network & Dutch National Contact Point and the Netherlands Ministry of Justice 2007), and Swedish law permitted labour migration with a job contract as of December 2008 (Swedish Migration Board 2008). However, it should be kept in mind that the policies are often recent and not uniform across all EU member states. In an overview of skilled migration policies in many of the member states by 2007, the European Migration Network (2007: 5) concluded the following:

While such programmes [referring to those 'to recruit and facilitate the entrance of third-country highly-skilled workers'] are not prevalent in some Member States (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Sweden), other Member States (Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, The Netherlands) have worked to develop them as part of larger visa or work permit schemes giving certain advantages to highly-skilled workers. This will also be the case in the United Kingdom when the Points-Based System is fully in place.

With such mixed attention to skilled migration, it is not too surprising that statistics also show that immigration to the EU is predominantly low skilled. More specifically, it is reported that, 'the EU still tends to attract mainly less-skilled migrants: 48% of recent working-age migrants are low-skilled and only one in five is high-skilled' (European Commission 2008: 15).

For purposes of illustration, a few brief examples are presented below to reflect the novelty of skilled migration in Europe as well as the discourse used when adopting new skilled migration programmes. As these examples show, there has been a changing discourse, with more openness to skilled migration, albeit with many barriers in moving from restrictive to more open policies. It is also important to mention that these tendencies do not reflect the realities of financial or administrative backing for skilled migration programmes, nor do they reflect whether the programmes are successfully able to attract skilled workers from other countries.

Germany

Germany has typically taken a restrictive stance towards migration, including resistance to skilled flows. Long holding on to the perspective that Germany is ‘not a country of immigration’, current immigration to Germany is mostly the result of guest worker policies, an inflow that was assumed to be temporary, inflows related to humanitarian concerns or related to right of return for ‘ethnic’ Germans after the Second World War. Yet, in terms of skilled migration policy in Europe, Germany is often named as a front runner in Europe. The Green Card for IT workers was adopted in 2000, with statistics for the programme broadly showing a large proportion given to individuals from CEE countries or parts of the former Soviet Union,⁴ and 26.4 per cent of the total permits given to IT specialists from India, which received the largest number for any single country. The policy was undertaken due to pressure from the IT industry, but later discussions revealed that the approach of bringing in foreigners to fill jobs was against the long-held German policy and standards of closed borders for labour migration, other than some bilateral agreements, and the programme ended in 2004. It also became associated with the right-wing opposition slogan ‘*Kinder statt Inder*’ (‘Children instead of Indians’) (Doomernik, Koslowski & Thränhardt 2009: 18), showing the plea for more protection of the national labour market while echoing possibilities of discrimination towards foreign workers in Germany.

Although the Green Card for IT workers was one of the earliest skilled migration policies in Europe, it can be seen as the exception rather than the rule. It is sometimes argued that the German Green Card was a failure, due to lower numbers coming than expected, and that Germany is not competitive in the global competition for talent; however, Kolb (2005) points out that it helped set a number of precedents that likely had an effect on immigration policy developments in Germany. The Immigration Act of 2005 made notable reforms in Germany’s immigration system, but is still quite conservative and scaled back from the original proposal. For instance, for skilled migration it was decided:

The ban on recruiting foreign labour remains in effect for unskilled and semi-skilled workers; it even applies to skilled workers except in specific, justified cases when it is in the public interest. Highly skilled workers are eligible for a permanent settlement permit upon entering Germany (Immigration Act of 2005: 36, section 3.2).⁵

However, the act expanded the possibility for high-skilled migration in sectors other than IT and, as mentioned in the quote, also eased work permit restrictions and increased possibilities for permanent residence.⁶ In this case, ‘highly skilled’ workers were defined primarily by having a high salary of at least € 86,000.⁷ Immigration from the CEE countries was

restricted, even for the highly skilled. Based on labour shortages, this restriction has been lifted at times; for instance, an immigration law website reports that in late 2007, 'German employers are now allowed to hire electrical and mechanical engineering skilled migrants from the Eastern European nations that joined the European Union in 2004 without giving priority to local applicants.'⁸ Hence, the German example indicates that despite relatively early adoption of a skilled migration programme for IT workers, 'openness' to skilled migration is still a point of political debate that leans towards labour market protection (even before the recent global economic crisis), is limited to specific occupations and is thus far from indicating an acceptance for skilled migration as a whole.

The Netherlands

Like Germany, the Netherlands has had an overall restrictive approach towards immigration since the end of the guest worker programme in the 1970s. Yet in the mid-2000s, there was an important policy shift when attention turned to skilled migration as a way to advance the knowledge economy. On 1 October 2004, the Dutch government implemented its first formal skilled migration policy for knowledge migrants (*kennismigranten*). This policy was implemented as a response to labour shortages, particularly as related to supporting the growth of the knowledge economy. The programme waives work permits and labour market tests for non-EU individuals to work in the Netherlands, if they meet the minimum income criteria. For 2008 this was € 47,565 or € 34,881 for those under the age of 30. Further, the employer has to be approved within the knowledge migrant programme. Academic researchers, including PhDs, post-docs and lecturers, are eligible for the knowledge migrant status without meeting the income requirement. There are no additional qualifications, such as educational level, outside of the salary requirement and approval of the employer. However, the knowledge worker category is also a form of temporary labour migration, with the permits valid for a maximum of five years.

The policy sets the tone for discussions of immigration and competitiveness in the Netherlands. In 2006, the Dutch Ministry of Justice published *Towards a Modern Migration Policy*. This document expresses the standpoint of the government that 'Dutch migration policy can no longer be exclusively restrictive – it also has to be selective' and include measures to further 'attract' individuals, particularly those with high skills, including tertiary education students and skilled employees (Netherlands Ministry of Justice 2006: 4). The programmes are viewed as 'modernising' immigration in the Netherlands: '[t]o reinforce the international competitive position of the Netherlands, the country needs a society that is permanently in motion at an economic, cultural and knowledge development level. Migration forms part of this motion' (ibid.: 17).

In another example, the Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands (SER) (2007) issued policy advice that urged the government to advance policies for skilled migration even further:

According to the Council, the Netherlands' labour migration policy must undergo a change. The principle of 'no, unless' should give way to a more welcoming attitude towards labour migrants who can offer Dutch society added value. Instead of 'no, unless', the underlying assumption should be 'yes, provided that'. A more welcoming policy is particularly desirable when it comes to highly skilled labour migrants. Non-EU labour migrants in the lower and middle segments of the labour market should be made welcome if the supply of labour from within the EU is non-existent (SER 2007: 1).

As this indicates, there is a potential move not only to increase support for the mobility of the highly skilled, but also to better the position of the Netherlands as an attracter of needed labour in all forms.

The case of the Netherlands shows in part how this changing paradigm has been implemented. The knowledge worker visa allowed a broad basis for further bringing in 'talent', which was defined as individuals with a job offer and a relatively high salary. It is an indication that the earlier assumption that businesses can bring in whomever they want may have been too simplistic and the government aimed to simplify and speed up immigration procedures. Furthermore, it offers an example of how labour market needs are expanded from the national territory to an EU-wide approach, a perspective that is required to be adopted by all member states over time.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is often viewed as the EU's leader for implementing a skilled migration policy and attracting skilled migrants, as well as a magnet for mobility of individuals from CEE, due to both the hard economics of relatively high wages and soft factors, such as English being the international business language and its cosmopolitan cities. While it is out of the scope of this chapter to discuss the nuances of the specific policies, it is important to note three main things. First of all, UK policy towards skilled migration is relatively recent and implemented later than programmes in the United States and Canada. Up until 2002, when the United Kingdom started a policy to attract highly skilled migrants, there was nearly a void of policies to attract or even allow skilled migrants outside of the internal mechanisms put in place by multinational corporations and other businesses and various bilateral agreements, for instance, for health care workers. Iredale (2005: 160-161) explains that the United Kingdom's policy then allowed

[...] individuals with special skills and experience to immigration, initially for a year but with the opportunity to renew. [...] This is the first time in nearly three decades that foreign workers, other than EU member nationals, have been able to enter the UK without guaranteed employment.

Second, the rules are changing. The system of predicting labour market needs as originally instituted became burdensome, and in 2008 the United Kingdom adopted a human capital-based, points system instead, whereby individuals were scored according to characteristics such as their education and age. Further changes to the qualifications for permits and a reduction of many quotas for skilled migrants occurred in 2012, due to the economic crisis.

Third, in line with the developments seen in the United States, the United Kingdom used discussions of relationships between skilled migration and competitiveness to stress the importance of the issue, but this is not fully accepted by the local population. Immigration Minister Barbara Roche set out the new direction of the United Kingdom's immigration policy and the greater attention paid to the highly skilled:

As with other aspects of globalisation there are potentially huge economic benefits for Britain and best talents [...] We are in competition for the brightest and best talents – the entrepreneurs, the scientists, the high technology specialists who make the whole economy tick. In order to seize the opportunities of the knowledge economy and to play a constructive part in shaping these huge changes, we need to explore carefully their implications for immigration policy (in OECD 2002: 338).

However, debate continues as the skilled migration programme is redefined and public debate on the necessity of migration in Britain (as elsewhere) continues.

Taken together, the examples from these three countries, a small subset of states within the EU, shows a reluctant acceptance of skilled migration. While there is a move to framing labour market needs in a context of global *competitiveness*, the global 'competition' is not yet truly global in that there are restrictions both on countries of origin of those immigrating and variations in programmes and accepted occupations for skilled migration across countries.

6.2.4 *The European Blue Card for Skilled Migration*

This section looks at skilled migration from the angle of EU policy. Although immigration still largely remains an issue considered central to

national sovereignty, the EU is increasing its role in setting and harmonising immigration policies across its member states. The EU passed a Directive for adopting a more unified, European skilled migration programme for third-country nationals (individuals with citizenship outside of the EU), known as the 'Blue Card', on 18 June 2009. EurActiv (2009), a private communications initiative which reports on activities of the EU, traces its development:

The Portuguese Presidency was the first to tackle these issues, with a High Level Conference on Legal Immigration organised on 13-14 September 2007 in Lisbon. On this occasion, the Commission presented its proposal for the so-called Blue Card, part of its strategy for legal migration.

The Blue Card is the EU's main policy initiative in the global competition for the best, highly mobile brains. The aim is to create a single application procedure for non-EU workers to reside and work within the EU. The proposal aims to attract up to 20 million highly skilled workers from outside the EU.

Again, the discussion indicates the associations made between immigration, competitiveness and feelings of an advancing 'global competition for talent'. However, tension between national and EU concerns were evident from the earliest phase in the discussions surrounding the proposal. According to the initial Blue Card proposal, the programme would allow a renewable visa and rights for family members of skilled migrants to work, if the individual met education and salary requirements. Initially the salary threshold was set at least three times higher than the minimum wage, but later discussions lowered this to one and a half times. Permanent residency would be possible after five years of employment. However, as discussed in more detail by Collett (2008), there have been many lines of opposition both linked to defining 'highly skilled' and also due to labour market protection concerns. One of the barriers is that the minimum wage levels vary greatly across European countries. Additionally, some countries, particularly the Czech Republic, state concerns that the EU should not be considering policies for immigration from outside the EU until employment restrictions for citizens of the CEE have been fully lifted. Furthermore, it was recognised that EU countries still 'compete' among one another for migrants. Therefore, the Blue Card will act as an additional measure but will not replace individual member states' skilled migration policies (Collett 2009) and was slated to be implemented by June 2012. The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, which each have previously signed agreements that allow them to opt out of some EU policies, have decided not to participate in the Blue Card programme at all.

6.3 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that despite the EU's principle of advocating free mobility across member states and the increasing attention for skilled migration as a contributor to national competitiveness, the number of skilled migrants in Europe remains limited. The tension of globalisation appears in terms of policy decisions regarding how to successfully participate and operate in *global economic systems* while simultaneously protecting *well-being and welfare of nationals*. Although terminology like the 'global competition for talent' seems to suggest an unequivocal acceptance of skilled migration as an economic necessity in the globalising world, immigration remains one of the most debated topic across countries in both economic boom and bust, with concerns about the impact of immigrants on job displacement, depression of wages and welfare burdens. There are also often negative sentiments based on perceptions of lost social cohesion from past migrations, as well as generally high unemployment rates among some immigrant groups in Europe. In Europe, these tensions are magnified at another level as well, as there are tensions between furthering European integration and protecting national ways of life, welfare and security.

The 1990s was an important turning point in skilled migration policies in many countries and in media and policy discussions across the world, as a basis was built for discussing a 'global competition for talent'. Although skilled migration was common in earlier decades, the movements were less influenced by specific state directives, than by internal mobility in companies and particularly of managers in multinational corporations. These movements were seen as unproblematic by governments in advanced countries and did not receive much policy attention. However, the IT boom in the United States and, in the case of Europe, the desire to emulate this success, as indicated by the goals of the Lisbon Agenda, triggered discussions of 'competitiveness' and on growing the knowledge economy. The growth of the IT sector in the United States had also become associated with skilled migration, particularly of Indian and Chinese IT professionals and engineers. As countries aimed to catch up with the US growth, more attention was also turned to the United States as a 'magnet' for foreign 'talent', indicated not only in the presence of skilled labour in IT, but also in the high number of foreign nationals in the US higher education system, especially in science and engineering graduate studies. By the mid-1990s, discussions of 'competitiveness' had become part of the immigration discourse in Europe, as more countries aimed to move from restrictive systems to selective systems, favouring mostly temporary skilled migration and also trying to further advance the attractiveness of the university system and higher education for foreign students. At the same time, it also seems to have brought increasing attention to the potential of 'circular migration' as a contributor to development and for expanding demand for

‘talent’ from all parts of the world. Although policies and trends will continue to change due to the current financial crisis and changing economic needs, in general, the past forms an important backdrop for assessing the attitudes, beliefs and experiences that have influenced policy decisions and mobility to date.

In Europe, a distinction is made between mobility of individuals from within the EU and ‘migration’ from those outside. However, despite the common market of the EU hinging on ‘free mobility’, not only in issues of trade or capital, but also in terms of labour, the majority of the ‘older’ member states initially set restrictions on their labour markets for individuals from the CEE countries. Only Sweden, Ireland and the United Kingdom opened their labour markets, showing the strong resistance to labour mobility in the EU and a general attitude of not ‘attracting’ but of ‘preventing’ increased labour mobility.

While the ‘competition for talent’ has gained attention, national policy responses have been fragmented and often clearly resistant to implementing more migration programmes or supporting labour mobility, even before the start of the global economic crisis. This fragmentation is evidence of lack of both economic integration, including regional disparities, and political integration among the EU member states, as well as of the internal tensions that exist surrounding immigration or foreign populations in the individual countries. At the same time, there are social barriers nationally, including public attitudes at times characterised by resistance to immigration due to assumptions both about immigrants straining national resources and competing with natives for jobs, as well as due to resistance towards cultural differences and societal change. European countries grapple with various issues related to population change, both decline in numbers of working age populations as well as accommodation of different cultural groups, including those from intra-European mobility.

The implications of these mixed reviews will likely have a multitude of effects on both the country’s ability to attract migrants, in general, where programmes are in place, to the individual’s ability to secure a job pursuant to their qualifications when moving to another country. The first part is crucial when looking at the ‘failure’ of some high-skilled migration programmes to attract the people expected. The second may be helpful in analysing processes of ‘deskilling’ of foreign populations, whereby individuals tend to work in jobs well below their qualifications, an issue also pertinent to early post-accession mobility patterns of individuals from CEE who work in Western European countries.

Notes

- 1 The author is grateful to the funders of her PhD research, a Fulbright grant in 2008-2009 in Lithuania and a Swedish Institute Guest scholarship in 2009-2010.
- 2 In 2008, the EU added a 'fifth freedom': the mobility of knowledge. However, the implementation of this concept is still under way (see www.euractiv.com/en/science/summit-backs-fifth-freedom-eu-scientists/article-170989).
- 3 <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/19&format=PDF&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>.
- 4 The statistics given are not fully divided by country, and therefore a total for the EU accession countries cannot be given. The data groups provided that contain data for the recent accession countries include: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Baltic states 12.6 per cent; Romania 7.0 per cent; Czech/Slovak Republic 6.6 per cent; Hungary 3.4 per cent; Bulgaria 2.9 per cent.
- 5 In the German version of document, it reads '*Für Nicht- und Geringqualifizierte, aber auch für Qualifizierte wird der Anwerbestopp beibehalten, für Qualifizierte mit der Ausnahmeregelung im begründeten Einzelfall, wenn ein öffentliches Interesse an einer Beschäftigung besteht. Für Hochqualifizierte ist eine Niederlassungserlaubnis von Anfang an vorgesehen*' and is found on page 32.
- 6 www.workpermit.com/germany/employer1.htm.
- 7 www.workpermit.com/news/2008-07-21/germany/german-cabinet-approves-plan-ease-skilled-immigration.htm.
- 8 www.workpermit.com/news/2007-11-05/germany/germany-opens-labor-market-A-8-electrical-mechanical-engineering-skilled-migrants.htm.

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7 'I know that I have a university diploma and I'm working as a driver'

Explaining the EU post-enlargement movement of highly skilled Polish migrant workers to Glasgow

Emilia Pietka, Colin Clark and Noah Canton

7.1 Introduction

In recent years, the movement of highly skilled migrants has become an important worldwide issue, as it is assumed to reflect the impact of globalisation on the world's economy and the development of communications technology (Salt & Findlay 1989; Salt 2006; Pethe 2007). Based on the supposition that a high level of human capital is positively correlated with having high economic and social status (Becker 1969), qualified immigrants should be able to be incorporated into the host country's labour market relatively successfully. Yet it seems that the process of immigrants' socio-economic incorporation into their new country of residence involves greater recognition and translation of possessed qualifications, since their skills have been acquired in different national contexts where the languages, the education system and the labour market differ from that of the host country. The employability and socio-economic status of particular qualified immigrants largely depends on the transfer, translation and recognition of their human capital value (Jones 1996).

Recent Home Office research concerning EU post-enlargement migration from Poland to the United Kingdom emphasised that although almost half of the Polish migrant workers are well-educated (e.g., around 40 per cent of Polish migrants hold university diplomas), they mostly work in low paid and low-skilled positions, including as factory process operatives (19 per cent), kitchen and catering assistants (9 per cent), packers (6 per cent), or room attendants (6 per cent) (Home Office 2008). Thus, recent EU post-enlargement migration from Poland to the United Kingdom is marked by a high rate of human capital wastage, as most of highly skilled migrants cannot make use of their qualifications and skills.

The aim of this chapter is to look at new patterns of migration from Poland to Scotland within the broader context of the migration of highly

skilled individuals. By analysing the social processes involved in the economic incorporation of skilled Polish migrants, the key question we seek to address is the extent to which contemporary migration from Poland to Scotland can be viewed as brain waste, brain gain, brain overflow or a brain drain. The notion of brain drain refers to the significant outflow of highly skilled individuals while emphasising that the exodus of skilled migrants slows down economic growth of the sending country due to the reduction of the sending country's human capital (Adams 1968; Benchhofer 1969; Das 1971; Grubel & Scott 1997; Beine, Docquier & Rapoport 2001). However, relating to brain overflow theory, the exodus of skilled individual migrants may be related to their over production and low rates of absorption in the national labour market, resulting in such 'brains' migrating to foreign markets (Balwin 1970). Indeed, while the qualifications of highly skilled migrants might be recognised in host labour markets, we can observe the highly skilled being employed in sectors with much lower qualification requirements, whereby their human capital is not being used and is therefore being depreciated over time.

Looking beyond the economic approach to highly skilled movement, the project discussed in the current chapter employs a humanistic approach, focusing on migrants' individual experiences and personal stories alongside their economic contribution to the host country. The project is limited to the Glasgow labour market, given its size and the attraction this labour market has for migrants, and is based on a sample of Polish migrants with various university diplomas who stay, or have stayed, in Glasgow for at least six months.

The project employs a combination of research methods, drawing initially on secondary analysis of microdata produced by the Home Office and by the Department of Work and Pensions, and then on findings from ten in-depth interviews conducted with highly skilled Polish migrants and from an exploratory email survey of 50 highly skilled Polish migrants who stayed in Glasgow for at least six months.¹ The initial distribution of the survey was via dedicated migrants' websites: www.szkocja.net, www.glasgow24.pl and other networking sites such as *Nasza Klasa*,² *Grono.net* and Facebook used by Polish migrants living in Glasgow. Most of the sample respondents were included using the 'snowball' method, recruited through friends or relatives of people already interviewed. In-depth interviews were conducted with ten migrants, with each interview generally lasting an hour. These respondents were selected intentionally,³ in order to provide an in-depth understanding of the various factors influencing the migration of the highly skilled. Survey and interview responses were translated from Polish to English where present throughout the chapter.

The first part of the research, the quantitative analysis, is based on two sets of microdata: the Work Registration Scheme (WRS) (produced by the Home Office) and the National Insurance Number (NINO)⁴ registration

(undertaken by the Department of Work and Pensions). Registration with the Home Office's WRS is required for nationals of all countries that joined the EU in 2004 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia) and who wish to work legally in the United Kingdom for more than one month. Migrants must register for a NINO, which is administered by HM Revenue and Customs and is used to monitor individual insurance contributions. Compared to the NINO system, which records the whole population who have been employed in the United Kingdom, WRS data refers only to A-8 nationals and its socio-demographic characteristics.

The project also draws on studies conducted by the Blake Stevenson Research Group of A-8 migrants living in Glasgow, by Eade, Drinkwater and Garapich (2006) looking at Polish migrants in London, and by Scottish Economic Research examining the Tayside migrant labour population.

The qualitative part of the project, consisting of ten in-depth interviews with Polish migrant workers, concentrates on gaining a better insight into individuals' experiences, including any barriers or motivations that were encountered by highly skilled workers from Poland. The interviews were conducted in the Polish language with ten skilled migrant Poles whose status, migration motives, aspirations, and plans for the future differed substantially from each other. These respondents were selected intentionally, in order to provide an in-depth understanding of the various factors influencing the migration of the highly skilled.

7.2 The phenomenon of highly skilled movement

In the social science literature surrounding this subject, the notion of 'highly skilled workers' refers to 'highly qualified personnel', 'scientists and engineers', 'professionals', 'talents', 'intellectuals', or simply 'brains' (Kelo & Wachter 2004; Salt & Ford 1993). In general, the term 'skills' refers to the qualifications needed to perform certain tasks in the labour market. The notion of 'highly skilled workers' typically refers to the theory of human capital, which argues that people who are more educated and skilled are more attractive to employers – supposedly giving them higher chances of being hired or promoted to better jobs. Based on this, each individual's human capital is comprised of knowledge (a body of facts required to do a particular job), education (qualifications), skills (methods of accomplishing a particular task, including various social and personal skills such as language and communication or self-confidence), and any work experience that contributes to the economic welfare of its holder. However, it should be emphasised that the positive relationship between personal economic welfare and the level of human capital may not be true in terms of migrant workers (Becker 1969).

Recognition of human capital, in the context of migration, can encounter various institutional, social and cultural difficulties that can lead to its waste. Within the context of migration, labour market incorporation can imply the common recognition of migrant workers' eligibility to participate in the labour market. Due to migrants' skills having been acquired in different national contexts, their employability largely depends on the transferability and translation of their skills, knowledge and education by various recruitment agents (Jones 1996). As the lack of accreditation given to migrant human capital may lead to its waste, we can observe situations where highly skilled migrants are employed in sectors with much lower qualification requirements, in environments where human capital is not being used and therefore depreciating over time. However, some migrants might be willing to experience this kind of brain waste in the short term, as migration is viewed as an investment for the future that will bring further benefits in the long-term period (Jones 1996; Williams & Baláz 2005; Chacko 2007; Lien & Wang 2005).

Globalisation, the world economy and information and communication technologies increase the movement and exchange of a highly skilled workforce (Pethe 2007). It is argued that overall increases in labour migration may facilitate the return or circulation of the 'brains'. Such proposals emphasise that individuals may want to migrate back or between home and host country for personal, career, and skills development reasons after their period of staying abroad. The notion of brain exchange and brain circulation exemplifies a broad context of the brain movement phenomenon on which this study is based. The focus here is mainly on brain drain, brain waste and brain overflow in the context of migration from Poland to Scotland.

7.3 Defining brain movement of EU post-enlargement migration from Poland to Glasgow

7.3.1 Characteristics of A-8 nationals staying in Glasgow

In 2007, according to WRS data, 3,135 migrant workers from A-8 countries lived in Glasgow. Similarly, figures from the Department of Work and Pensions show that between 2002-2003 and 2005-2006 there were 3,730 registrations for a NINO made by A-8 nationals (Blake Stevenson Research Group 2007). Even though Glasgow City Council does not keep separate records of migration from accession states, their estimates on the basis of WRS and NINO figures indicate a total number of A-8 migrants closer to 5,000 (table 7.1) (Blake Stevenson Research Group 2007).

The WRS data and NINO applications show the majority of A-8 migrants living in Glasgow came from Poland (table 7.2).

In 2007, eight out of ten A-8 migrant workers were under 35 years old and most of the registered migrants in Scotland did not have dependants

Table 7.1 National insurance registrations in Glasgow, 2002-2006

	2002-2003	2003-2004	2004-2005	2005-2006	Total
A-8 nationals	50	70	760	2,860	3,730

Source: Accession Monitoring Report 2004-2008, Home Office (2008)

Table 7.2 A-8 national registration by nationality in Glasgow, 2002-2006

	2003-2004	2004-2005	2005-2006	Total
Estonia	0	10	10	20
Latvia	0	40	80	120
Lithuania	10	40	140	200
Hungary	10	10	30	50
Poland	30	510	2,060	2,620
Slovenia	0	10	0	10
Czech Republic	10	60	210	290
Slovakia	10	80	330	430
Share of Poles in A-8 migrant population	42.8%	67%	72%	70%

Source: Blake Stevenson Research Group (2007)

with them, indicating that most of the Polish migrant workers in Glasgow are relatively young and childless.

7.3.2 Employment

Findings from the Home Office⁵ analysis indicate that one out of four accession states' migrants in Scotland are working in the hospitality and catering industries. Table 7.3 illustrates that compared to the rest of Scotland

Table 7.3 Employment sector of A-8 nationals (%)

	Share of A-8 nationals in Glasgow	Share of A-8 nationals in Scotland	Share of A-8 nationals in UK
Administration, business and management	17.0	20.0	38.0
Hospitality and catering	24.0	23.4	20.0
Agriculture	0.0	17.0	11.0
Manufacture	15.0	6.6	8.0
Food/fish/meat processing	11.0	11.8	5.0
Retail	8.0	3.2	5.0
Construction	14.0	7.3	4.0
Health and medical	3.0	3.8	5.0
Transport	8.0	2.7	3.0
Entertainment and leisure	2.0	1.2	2.0

Source: Accession Monitoring Report 2004-2008, Home Office (2008)

and the United Kingdom as a whole, Glasgow has a higher proportion of A-8 migrant workers employed in manufacturing (15 per cent), construction (14 per cent), transport (8 per cent) and retail (8 per cent).

Similar results from a recent study on A-8 nationals in Glasgow (Blake Stevenson Research Group 2007) show that aside from manual work, where 71 per cent of respondents were employed, the main occupations of A-8 migrants in Glasgow were clerical/secretarial (8 per cent), junior technical/secretarial (8 per cent), senior technical or professional (8 per cent), and supervisory (5 per cent). Additionally, the study indicates that the majority of A-8 nationalities were employed at a lower skill level than they had been in their home country, as only one in five A-8 migrant workers worked in unskilled or manual work in their country of origin, compared with almost half of that same group being employed in Glasgow. This was a consistent finding in the research and is reflected in the qualitative findings from migrants' own stories and experiences. For instance, graduates who lack work experience relevant to their degrees typically also have difficulties finding work commensurable to their education after arriving in Glasgow.

7.3.3 *Brain drain/brain overflow or brain gain/brain waste? Assessing factors influencing brain movement*

In order to provide a context that allows for a better understanding of recognition of Polish migrants' human capital in Glasgow's labour market, it is useful to look at factors, both macro (structural) and micro (migrant perspectives), affecting its depreciation. The focus here is only on the main issues within such individual and structural analysis, as derived from an in-depth analysis of the available literature, recent studies on A-8 migrants in Scotland, in Glasgow, Edinburgh, Tayside and Fife region, as well as the empirical data collected relevant to the Scottish example. In particular, the emphasis is on migrants' English language proficiency, labour demand in Glasgow, migration strategies and educational development in Poland.

Labour demand in Glasgow

According to interviews with Glasgow-based employers in the 2007 study conducted by the Blake Stevenson Research Group, migrant workers were identified as an important source of labour, addressing the skills gap and taking the hard-to-fill vacancies. Employers reported positive experiences with A-8 migrant workers in terms of work ethic, motivation, productivity and flexibility, especially in relation to working hours and shifts.

It should be emphasised that over the last 25 years Glasgow's economy has experienced a transformation from a major centre of production activity to a more service sector-based economy (Foreman 2007; Glasgow Economic Review 2007). Scottish government statistics show that between

1995 and 2005, the total number of jobs in Glasgow rose by up to 70,000, making it one of the fastest growing cities in the United Kingdom – exceeding Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham.

In 2004, when eight new countries joined the EU, the highest number of vacancies in Glasgow was concentrated in the business, finance and insurance sector, distribution, hotels and restaurants, and public administration (NOMIS 2008). According to the Employers Skill Survey conducted in 2004, Scottish employers reported a lack of sufficiently qualified applicants or, on occasion, no applicants at all, as being the main reason for hard-to-fill vacancies. Yet, jobs advertised requiring lower educational prerequisites also tend to involve low wages, poor working conditions, arduous working hours, and a lack of career prospects. Among unfilled vacancies, hard-to-fill vacancies resulting from applicant skills shortages increased from 40 per cent in 2003 to 55 per cent in 2004. However, the number of average skills shortage vacancies is still not significant, being mainly concentrated in vacancies such as managers and senior officials (62.4 per cent), skilled trades people (62.1 per cent), and sales and customer service staff (70.2 per cent) (Scottish Executive 2004).

It appears that A-8 migrant workers are 'plugging gaps' in the Glasgow labour market and also securing employment in the distribution or hotel and restaurant sectors; that is, those sectors which have experienced the highest increases in the number of vacancies in the past 25 years in Glasgow. The economic contribution of accession state migrants has also been confirmed in research undertaken in other areas of Scotland, in particular, Edinburgh (Orchard, Szymanski & Vlahova 2007), Tayside (Scottish Economic Research 2006), and Fife (Fife City Council 2007), where new EU post-enlargement migrants have become a desirable source of labour for many skills shortage vacancies.

Migration strategies of accession state migrants

According to Home Office analysis, over half of the new post-enlargement migrants are planning to stay in the United Kingdom for less than three months (Home Office 2008). The intended length of stay abroad might be related to migrants' migration strategies and settlement plans. According to studies on Polish migrant workers living in London (Eade, Drinkwater & Garapich 2006), those who were planning to stay in the United Kingdom for up to three months were mostly working in low-skilled and manual occupations, as the process of recruitment in these industries is fast, and thus they were able to start employment soon after arriving. This group of short-term, usually seasonal, migrant workers was mainly composed of agricultural workers, contractual workers and students working in the hospitality sector during the summer in order to pay educational fees in their home country. Temporariness of residence in a destination country has been the main feature of migration for those coming from A-8 nations

since the political and economic transition in 1989. This is mainly a result of seasonal demand for labour in the agriculture and construction sectors of Western countries and the movement of undocumented migrants (Okólski 1997).

The second migration strategy mentioned in the London study is economic migration (Eade, Drinkwater & Garapich 2006). This is especially true in terms of migrant workers perceiving migration as a method of quick capital acquirement. Similar to short-term migrants, economic migrants mainly find their employment in low-skilled and low paid occupations. As they work long hours in order to earn as much financial capital as possible in a relatively short period, they are unable to improve their skills and qualifications, since most of the additional training clashes with working hours. According to the Tayside study (Scottish Economic Research 2006), A-8 migrant workers often accepted employment below their qualification levels, paradoxically earning several times more than they could in their home country. It seems that wage discrepancy, combined with a lack of employment opportunities, may be one of the main 'push factors' for A-8 nations. At the time of accession in May 2004, the unemployment rates in Poland reached 20 per cent – of which 7 per cent possessed tertiary education (CSO 2008). Unemployment among the highly skilled mainly affected new graduates. Consequently, for many skilled Polish migrants, migration abroad can be perceived as a strategy for overcoming unemployment in Poland. Therefore, a decrease in Poland's unemployment rate, a reduction in the value of the British pound against the Polish currency, and diminished discrepancy between wages in Scotland and Poland are all factors that begin to explain the more less pattern of less migration to Scotland (Pollard, Latorre & Sriskandarajah 2008).

For many A-8 migrants living in Scotland, particularly in Glasgow, migration is not just economic in character. According to a recent report on A-8 nationals in Glasgow (Blake Stevenson Research Group 2007), around 45 per cent of migrants come to Scotland to learn English and 24 per cent come to start or continue their education. For these migrants, migration is related to gaining new qualifications and experiences abroad, simultaneously investing in their human capital in order to improve their future position in the labour market. Such a strategy could be viewed as a kind of migrant internship, in the sense that some migrant workers may accept low-skilled employment as a potential 'cost' of migration, which they might regain during their stay in the host country. Therefore, their decision to stay abroad or return to their home country largely depends on the quality of accessed opportunities in both places – that is, will the 'internship' pay off abroad or back home?

The types of migration strategies above can partially explain the location of Polish migrants in low qualified occupations, especially in terms of short-term and economic migrants who tend to treat their migration as a

capital-raising activity, thereby maximising earnings in a relatively short period. For other migrants more open to the advantages gained by living abroad (like acquiring a foreign language, gaining qualifications or work experience), low-skilled employment might be treated as a temporary phenomenon, as improvements in qualifications during their stay abroad might facilitate gaining better employment corresponding to their education level. The choice between a short-term gain strategy and long-term investment depends on the capital that migrant workers possess and the resources they have access to, as well as factors such as personal and family circumstances.

Language

Migrants coming to the United Kingdom vary in terms of spoken and written English proficiency. A lack of competence and confidence in using the English language may limit migrant workers' employment opportunities to low-skilled occupations, where employers generally do not require English proficiency. Consequently, insufficient English language skills may cause discrepancies between migrants' qualifications and occupations. For employers in Tayside (Scottish Economic Research 2006), English language fluency appears to be a more important factor in a migrant's ability to obtain a 'good' job than the qualifications or work experience they may have gained while in their home country.

As language appears to be one of the most challenging barriers facing the incorporation of skilled migrants into the Scottish labour market, improvements in English may enable migrant workers to gain employment commensurable with their qualifications. There are several English classes offered, many free, to migrants throughout the city of Glasgow.⁶ However, various factors affect migrants' attendance or participation in these classes. According to a study in Glasgow (Blake Stevenson Research Group 2007), many agencies providing English to Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) classes reported increasing demand for their services, but at the same time a shortage of available places. For many migrant workers, long working hours and changing shifts can cause difficulties when attempting to undertake language classes. This is especially true in terms of migrants who are working in low paid occupations, where long hours and overtime work provide additional financial capital, but at the same time limit their availability for activities such as English classes. Additionally, for those who manage to participate regularly in English lessons, the level of the class is often found to be inappropriate.

Higher education breakdown in Poland

The transformation of economic systems during the 1990s following the change in demand for a skilled workforce and the increasing demand for places in higher education had major policy implications for education and

training systems in Poland. The primary changes in legislation during these years⁷ assured academic freedom, autonomy and internal governance for each higher education institution (HEI). This formed the legal background for the development of tertiary education.

One of the major outcomes of such educational developments was a rapid increase in the number of university students and graduates with tertiary degrees. By 1991-1992 there were 428,200 enrolled students, but by 2004-2005 the total number of students rose substantially, reaching an enrolment number of 1,926,100 (CSO 2006). In addition, the number of graduates rose from 59,000 in 1991-1992 to 384,000 in 2003-2004, increasing nearly 6.5 times (CSO 2006). Consequently, net enrolment rates (the number of people studying in a specific age group in relation to the total population in the same group) for the 19-24 age group rose from 9.8 per cent in 1990-1991 to 36.8 per cent in 2004-2005, putting Poland in second place within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) area (Fulton et al. 2007).

A prompt expansion in the number of HEIs, along with increased participation rates in tertiary education, meant Poland suffered from complex and difficult challenges, notably related to its education quality. The increasing number of students and graduates did not lead to an increase of public expenditure in higher education. Consequently, the HEIs suffered from poor infrastructure and inadequate equipment in schoolrooms and laboratories. In many cases, high demand and increasing numbers of students pushed public institutions to extend the limits on numbers of new students they accepted, which subsequently caused the overcrowding of HEIs, with Poland being one of the countries with the highest number of students per staff member (Fulton et al. 2007).

Legislation from 12 September 1990⁸ and increasing demand for advanced studies enabled rapid growth in non-public (private) sector higher education. In 2004-2005 Poland had 427 tertiary education institutions, of which 126 were public and 301 were private – substantially different from the 97 public institutions and one private in 1989 (Central Statistics Office in Poland 2006). Private universities were often smaller, mostly vocationally oriented, generally less selective about applicants, and offered a lower quality of education. Most of these offered courses in social science, business management and political science, as these were less expensive in terms of provision compared with engineering and technical courses, for which laboratory equipment is relatively expensive (World Bank 2004). Additionally, they were not established with their own teaching staff, but were created within the old HEI system. The majority of academic teachers, motivated by financial reasons, taught in more than one institution, which further decreased the quality of education (Zahorska 2004).

The most rapid development of HEIs was in the social sciences. Consequently, in 2002, 41.4 per cent of graduates came from the social

sciences area, composing the fourth highest share in the OECD area. By contrast, in 2002, only 3.9 per cent of students graduated in natural sciences, while 6.4 per cent graduated in engineering and construction – constituting the lowest share in the OECD area (Fulton et al. 2007).

At the beginning of the 1990s in Poland, the newly transformed economy needed highly qualified specialists, especially in business and management. Thus for many young people, graduation stood as a guarantor for good employment (Zahorska 2004). During the economic transformation, those with tertiary education benefited the most in terms of financial welfare. For instance, in 2001 the gross earnings of individuals with higher degrees exceeded those with only secondary education by 55 per cent (Fulton et al. 2007). Therefore, for many young people graduation from a HEI was perceived as 'good security' and as a way to get access to well-paid employment. However, in 2002 the unemployment rate increased to almost 20 per cent. The transformation and restructuring process that took place across the Polish economy affected its employment structure, causing an increasing gap between demand and supply in the Polish labour market, and making unemployment one of the major socio-economic problems in Poland.

The unemployment rate among the highly skilled was mainly concentrated within the group of new graduates. In 2002, there were 33,246 highly skilled individuals registered as unemployed with the National Labour Office,⁹ but by 2003, this number had increased to 35,025. This meant that one out of four unemployed people had graduated from a HEI. The highest unemployment rates among graduates were concentrated in those disciplines where educational enrolment had been particularly concentrated in previous years. In 2001, economics graduates were the largest unemployed group registered with the National Labour Office, followed by those in marketing, political science and law (Fulton et al. 2007). This seems to show that the difference between the numbers of graduates in certain fields, coupled with the labour market demand, caused increasing unemployment among new graduates. Consequently, the rising number of graduates (mainly in the social sciences) could not be absorbed by economic demand. In addition, the majority of HEIs did not monitor the labour market destination of their graduates, which in turn led to over-provision of education in fields with no employment prospects.

The high participation rate in tertiary education in Poland over the past twenty years resulted in a growth of a highly skilled workforce, mainly in the age group between 24 and 36 years old (CSO 2008). Seeing that a high propensity to migrate to the United Kingdom, particularly to Scotland, is a typical feature among young Poles aged between 18 and 35 (around 80 per cent of Polish migrants workers in the United Kingdom were younger than 35), the increasing number of well-educated migrants is somewhat predictable. Thus, the discrepancy between the number of Polish graduates and

labour market demand caused increased unemployment rates among the highly skilled workforce.

7.4 EU post-enlargement migration from Poland to Glasgow: Brain drain/brain overflow or brain waste/brain gain?

We now turn to the empirical findings of this study that will allow us to shed light on the key question we posed at the beginning of this chapter. To what extent can the new, EU post-enlargement, migrations of skilled Polish migrants to Glasgow be perceived as brain drain/brain overflow and brain waste/brain gain? Our empirical evidence includes 50 email surveys and 10 in-depth interviews with skilled Polish migrants who arrived in Glasgow after May 2004, and were staying in Glasgow¹⁰ for at least 6 months. Here we assess this data and what it tells us in the context of the themes and issues raised above.

7.4.1 Brain drain or brain overflow?

It is important to note that due to the fragmented availability of migration data, especially in terms of the particular professions of highly skilled migrants, it is not always possible to draw a detailed picture of the 'brain movement' phenomenon. Thus, this chapter will only indicate the general tendencies in the EU post-enlargement migration of highly skilled migrant workers from Poland to Glasgow.

Table 7.4 illustrates the types of qualifications held by Polish migrant workers interviewed in this study, alongside details of recognition and non-recognition of those qualifications. Forty-one out of the 50 surveyed migrant workers graduated from one of the areas within the social sciences: management science, political science, education, economics, languages, geography or history.

The Glasgow employers generally have not recognised the qualifications of this group, and migrants have struggled to find employment commensurable with their education. The majority of them, 23 out of 41, had found employment in manual or semi-skilled occupations, particularly as factory workers, room attendants, packers or administrative assistants.

The performance of skilled Polish migrants in the Glasgow labour market varies depending on their area of qualification. Different perspectives seem to appear in the case of migrant workers who hold diplomas in engineering, architecture, or medicine, as all of the migrants interviewed with qualifications in those areas had found employment corresponding to their qualifications. Additionally, because graduates with engineering diplomas in Poland compose a small group (6 per cent) among the total number of graduates, the migration of specialists within these disciplines can be

Table 7.4 *Recognition of obtained qualifications*

<i>Field of study</i>	<i>Respondents whose qualifications were recognised</i>	<i>Respondents whose qualifications were not recognised</i>	<i>Respondents who did not look for a job corresponding with their qualifications</i>	<i>Total</i>
Engineering	6	–	–	6
Management sciences	4	7	2	13
Political sciences	2	4	–	6
Physiotherapy	–	2	–	2
Education	–	3	1	4
Medicine	1	–	–	1
Sociology	–	2	–	2
Languages	1	5	–	6
Architecture	4	–	–	4
History	1	–	1	2
Economy	1	1	1	3
Geography	–	1	–	1
Total	20	25	5	50

Source: Authors' own computation

damaging for the Polish economy. Accordingly, brain drain may be an issue pertaining to particular specialisations such as medicine and engineering. However, the limitations of Polish official statistics in terms of the migration scale of particular specialisations prevent detailed analysis of the movement of highly skilled workers, indicating a need for further research and consideration.

Similar to the findings on the migration of the highly skilled from Poland during the 1990s, where the authors reported that liberalisation in cross-border movement during the transition period did not cause the external 'brain drain' but rather led to the higher internal mobility of the highly skilled, the EU enlargement in 2004 did not necessarily lead to a brain exodus. Rather, as a consequence of greater economic and political exchange, there was a greater circulation and trade of 'brains' (Kaczmarczyk 2007). Similarly, the higher mobility of highly skilled Poles after the EU accession in 2004 might be the consequence of the greater number of scholarships, scientific internships and other opportunities offered for Poles as EU citizens.

7.4.2 *Brain gain*

Contemporary economic growth theories appear to place peoples' skills and knowledge at the centre of economic progress (Kupstch & Pang 2006). Therefore, migration of the highly skilled has been recognised as

one of the solutions for skill shortages and skill gaps for many national economies. Indeed, one of the key issues related to economic aspects of EU post-enlargement migration from Poland is the economic contribution made by new migrants, in particular how migrants' skills and qualifications can help to fill skills gaps or shortages in a host country.

At the time of interviews, 20 of the 50 surveyed migrants had found employment that corresponded with their qualifications. Most of the group held diplomas in engineering, architecture or medicine, although there were also some migrants with diplomas in political science, economics, and management science (see table 7.4). According to the findings, these migrants made the decision to migrate mainly due to a lack of personal development opportunities and lower wages in their home country. Interviewed migrants reported that migration abroad was not only related to raising economic capital, but also to the development of their human capital, both in terms of career advancement and for gaining additional skills and qualifications.

Table 7.5 presents the responses of five of the migrant workers reporting that migration allowed them to change their profession and acquire desirable qualifications.

Table 7.5 *Is your degree working for you?*

<i>Resp. Nr.</i>	<i>Degree</i>	<i>First employment in Glasgow</i>	<i>Current employment</i>	<i>Does the work you are now doing correspond with your qualifications?</i>
17	University of Poznan, master's in environmental management	Au pair	Customer service	'I did not look for a job in my profession.'
20	University of Zielona Gora, master's in history	Cleaner	Graphic designer	'This job I'm doing at the moment totally satisfies me. So even if I will go back to Poland I want to develop what I'm doing at the moment.'
29	Warsaw University, master's in economics	Labourer	Labourer	'I don't want to work in my profession.'
30	State School of Higher Vocational Education in Slupsk, master's in pedagogy	Picker	Picker	'I haven't looked for a job in my profession.'
3	State School of Higher Vocational Education in Warsaw, BA in management	Factory worker	Landscaper	'I did not look for a job in my profession.'

Source: Authors' own

The findings here are similar to that of the Home Office (2004-2007) analysis in that the migrants' initial employment in their host country is below their qualifications. In particular, 42 of the 50 interviewed Polish migrants found their first employment in low-skilled sectors such as cleaning, factory work and packing. The other eight migrants interviewed, whose first employment corresponded with their qualifications, found their future employers prior to migration or just upon arrival. These migrants had strong work experience in Poland and had qualifications required by the Glasgow labour market, particularly those who were educated as architects or engineers.

The high propensity of skilled migrants' placements in elementary occupations might be explained by the fact that a migrant's skills and qualifications acquired in their home country are not directly transferable to the host economy. However, during their time abroad migrants can adjust and acquire new skills and qualifications to meet the requirements of the host country's labour market. For example, in relation to this study, 17 out of 42 interviewed migrants improved their employment status while in Scotland and, indeed, employment promotion among skilled Polish migrants was positively related with lengths of residence in Glasgow. Although many of the EU post-enlargement Polish migrant workers are relatively highly educated, their educational background may not allow them to access jobs that they would be able to obtain had their educational degree been earned in the United Kingdom. This is especially true for migrant workers holding diplomas in the social sciences, particularly management, political science, education and languages. According to the survey findings, most migrant workers whose occupations at the time of the survey were commensurable with their education participated in various courses to raise their qualifications in the host country. A diploma from a UK college or university seemed to make migrants' skills more recognisable by Glasgow employers. Additionally, a lack of information upon arrival and appropriate work experience and additional skills, such as English proficiency, were some of the main barriers to obtaining jobs in professions related to migrants' education degrees.

For those migrants whose migration strategy was focused on gaining experience abroad or educational aims, the low-skilled employment might be treated as a temporary phenomenon, as upgrading qualifications in the context of host country labour market during their stay abroad might facilitate gaining better employment corresponding to their education level.

7.4.3 *Brain waste*

As previously mentioned, most of the literature concerning EU post-enlargement migration emphasises that the majority of migrants possessing higher education diplomas work below their educational level. This section

will analyse various individual factors and institutional barriers that might lead to migrants' 'deskilling'.

The findings from the 50 email surveys show that 25 migrant workers remain in employment not corresponding with their education level (see table 7.4). Even though they had higher education diplomas, they were working in elementary occupations such as cleaning, packing or factory work. As most of the occupations of the interviewed migrant workers were low paid and consisted of long working hours, including overtime shifts in order to get additional money, they reported not having time for other activities, in particular English classes. According to migrants' answers, lack of fluency in English was the main reason for not being able to acquire a job in their chosen profession. Additionally, some of the respondents reported that they did not want training, or surprisingly, they felt that they simply did not need it. Only three of the interviewed migrants who worked below their qualification level participated in language classes or other training that may have made their qualifications more recognisable to Glasgow employers.

As previously mentioned, various migration 'costs' may also contribute to the inability of migrants to acquire a job equivalent to their qualifications. This suggests that improved language ability is not necessarily the foremost reason for low graded job positions. Most of the interviewed migrants working below their educational level did not have valuable work experience or references while in their home country prior to migration, as they moved abroad straight after graduating. Their work experience was limited to part-time employment in semi-skilled jobs during their studies, which made acquiring a 'proper' job even more difficult.

The email survey asked respondents whether their current work correlates with their qualifications and asked for reasons for not taking part in qualification development. The long hours and thus lack of time for additional activities was a main explanation for not participating in additional training. In the case of some migrants who were working below their educational level, the strategic reason for their migration was economic, in particular to save for their life back in their home country or for higher wages in the host country. Additionally, their stay in Glasgow may be temporary, as their intended length of stay was on average up to six months. Most treated migration as a means of acquiring financial capital in a relatively short period of time for further investment in Poland, thus they did not focus on adequate integration into the job market. Most economic migrants took up the first employment opportunity that they found upon arrival, mainly in low-skilled and manual jobs where the recruitment process was short and uncomplicated:

I'm here because of economic reasons, to earn and save some money for a better life in Poland. At the time I moved abroad, life in

Poland was more difficult. I'm not saying that it was impossible to buy a flat, but getting a mortgage and then paying a mortgage will take many years, it is not for me. (Respondent No. 51)

Additionally, as the main motivation for staying abroad was to save as much capital as possible in a relatively short period, there was no need to acquire further qualifications. However, even those migrants who were working below their education level reported that their stay abroad helped to further their qualifications, especially in terms of the English language. There were only two migrant workers reporting that during their stay abroad they did not improve any of their qualifications. Interestingly, migrants employed in low-paid jobs still perceived their social class position as having been improved, as they were earning more than they used to earn in their home country.

Incidents of discrimination at work revealed through interviews were more common among migrants employed in elementary jobs than among migrants who found work corresponding to their education level. Most experiences of discrimination were offensive comments about Poles, mainly from Scottish co-workers. Additionally, the interviews indicated that some of the Polish migrants received heavier and more complicated work than native workers. Experiences of discrimination deepened the feelings of alienation among migrants working in low paid jobs, further complicating integration in the host country:

Comments from Scottish co-workers that Poles steal their jobs, and that we should go back to our country. (Respondent No. 3)

They [Scots] think that the only thing that Poles can do is cleaning. (Respondent No. 27)

7.5 Conclusion

Globalisation and rapid economic development places peoples' skills and knowledge at the centre of economic progress. Consequently, the majority of developed countries recognise the necessity and value of using migrant workers, especially those with high skill levels, as a factor in national economic development and to respond to the demands of an aging population. Despite recognition of the importance of highly skilled migrants' economic contributions, there appears to be little concern about the economic prospects and professional achievements of individual highly skilled migrants. According to human capital theory, high levels of human capital contribute to an individual's welfare. However, successful adjustment of skilled migrants is an often omitted subject needing further exploration. By looking beyond the economic approach to the migration of the highly skilled (Ruhs

2006; Blanchflower, Saleheen & Shadford 2006; Anderson et al. 2007; Gilpin et al. 2007) and focusing on the personal experiences of skilled Poles adjusting to the Glasgow labour market, this study facilitates a broader interpretation of various factors that can aggravate or facilitate migrants' performance in the labour market. It provides an analysis and comparison of the different motives and patterns causing the movement of skilled migrants within one specific national group. This approach to the issues surrounding the brain movement phenomenon provides empirical information on whether the recognition of migrants' qualifications are influenced by factors such as area of study, migrant motivations, plans for the future, English competence and work experience.

The main goal of this study was to gather evidence to answer the following question: to what extent can the EU post-enlargement migration of highly skilled Poles to Glasgow be perceived as brain drain, brain overflow, brain gain or brain waste? The starting point for this research was the examination of previous studies looking at diverse types of brain movement. Particular attention was given to the characteristics of highly skilled migrants from CEE countries, mainly from Poland, in the context of EU post-enlargement migration since 2004. The first subject of critical scrutiny was the conditions affecting the phenomenon of brain movement from Poland, with particular focus on migrants' English proficiency, their migration strategies, the labour demand in Glasgow, and higher education development in Poland. According to the findings and secondary analysis of data, the EU post-enlargement migration of highly skilled individuals can be perceived as brain overflow, rather than brain drain. This is especially true for migrants holding university diplomas in the social sciences. They often struggled to find employment in Poland, and their qualifications were not recognised by Glasgow employers.

The brain waste phenomenon appears mainly among short-term economic migrants without valuable work experience from their home country or sufficient English proficiency. Their brain deskilling appears to be a temporary phenomenon, as they tended to stay in Glasgow for only six months to two years. Although these migrants were working below their qualifications, they reported improvements in their social class positions and positive acquisitions of human capital. This is particularly true in terms of language and self-confidence, which accords with the findings of the study on Slovakian return migration from the United Kingdom (Williams & Baláz 2005). However, further research is required for a broader analysis of the brain waste or brain gain phenomenon, especially in terms of return migration of Poles who worked below their qualifications in the United Kingdom. Did migration abroad improve their position in the Polish labour market? Additionally, as findings are based on migrants' intentions rather than factual behaviours, the notion of temporariness might be questioned. Therefore, further longitudinal studies are needed on migration patterns of short-term skilled migrants.

Despite the evidence of brain waste of highly skilled Poles presented in earlier literature (Home Office 2008; Orchard, Szymanski & Vlahova 2007; Blake Stevenson Research Group 2007; Fife City Council 2007; Scottish Economic Research 2006), our findings revealed that while most of the interviewees initially worked below their qualifications at the time of arrival, twelve indicated that their positions within the Glasgow labour market improved. Thus, what may initially appear as brain waste can alternatively be viewed as a potential 'cost' of migration, which they regain during their stay in the host country. However, it should be emphasised that the financial and economic crisis that started in 2008 could potentially extend the period of low-skilled employment of Polish migrants, causing the waste of their brains.

Our findings indicate that low-grade employment positions may correspond with whether the migration is for economic, educational or experiential purposes. The economic crisis starting in 2008-2009 might increase return migration among economic migrants due to possible unemployment and lower earnings.

Migrants whose career development and economic welfare improved the most were those working as engineers and architects and in medicine. They can easily find employment that corresponds with their qualifications, either prior to migration or upon arrival in Glasgow. This reflects increasing demand for particular skills and qualifications in the global and national labour market, facilitating the movement of highly skilled migrants, especially those with specific and exceptional knowledge and experience (Kuptsch & Pang 2006; Mahroum 2001). On the other hand, the economic crisis and changes in the demand for migrant labour might affect the employment opportunities that are available to migrant workers.

In the context of Scotland, with its aging population and its economic indicators falling below the British average¹¹ (NOMIS 2008), the loss of an educated workforce through return migration, or because of the lack of recognition of migrants' qualifications, may have consequences for attaining and sustaining the economic growth projected as necessary. According to the respondents, the lack of sufficient English competence was the main factor limiting migrant workers' employment opportunities to low-skilled occupations. Additionally, some employers (especially those whose work is located in the low paid and low-skilled sectors) did not recognise the benefits of up-skilling the migrant workers' qualifications (Harries & Sachdev 2006). Thus, there is further need for improvement in awareness of the value of migrants' qualifications.

The mobility of the highly skilled could be, and in many cases is, a significant factor contributing to the development and exchange of scientific disciplines and research. However, too often there is a lack of awareness and trust in the value of the qualifications and skills held by migrant workers. Effective use of migrant human capital should take place within a

better framework, and with a good level of cooperation between the different agents at the supra-national, national and local levels.

Notes

- 1 The survey was conducted between July 2008 and August 2008 in Glasgow. Most of the people included in the sample that informs this study were purposely selected rather than randomly chosen. This means that the sample is not representative of the wider population of highly skilled Polish migrant workers and therefore the results from the surveys cannot be generalised.
- 2 Nasza Klasa is a networking website in Poland, equivalent to 'Friends Reunited' in the UK.
- 3 In selecting interviewees, attention was given to factors such as age and gender, qualifications, years of staying in Glasgow as well as professional/working status.
- 4 It should be noted that both sets of data present an incomplete picture of the net migration of A-8 migrants in the UK, as they do not record those migrants who are self-employed, students (unless they register to work), dependants, or migrants who do not register with WRS. There is also a reluctance to register due to having to provide personal details to authorities, and a current £ 90 WRS registration fee. In addition, neither dataset measures migrant workers leaving Scotland. Subsequently, the figures do not give a full picture of the scale of migration but only indicate general trends. The UK is not alone in such a data shortfall in relation to migrant numbers.
- 5 The figures reported by the Home Office require greater scrutiny, as they show a discrepancy between most common A-8 migrants' type of work and the sector they are working in. This situation can be observed especially in the administration, business, and management sectors where A-8 migrant workers predominantly work for recruitment agencies, which provide information about the type of work they undertake as an agency but not on the roles undertaken by individual migrants. Migrant workers categorised as working in the administration, business, and management sectors may in reality be working in different occupations outside these sectors.
- 6 See the Glasgow ESOL for the details and a list of available English classes at www.glasgowesol.co.uk.
- 7 The Law of Higher Education (12 September 1990), the Law of Academic Titles and Academic Degrees (12 January 1991), the Law on Higher Professional School (26 June 1997).
- 8 The Law of Higher Education (12 September 1990).
- 9 Some Polish experts (Kabaj 2006) estimate that the unemployment rate among graduates was approximately three times higher, as most of the graduates did not register as unemployed with the National Labour Office.
- 10 It should be pointed out that all of the interviewed migrants chose Glasgow as their destination city, due to an existing migrant network. It seems that functional networks, in particular with friends or family, became the key factor influencing the direction of migrant movement.
- 11 GDP for Scotland in Q2 2007 was 2.3 per cent while the GDP for the UK in Q2 2007 was 3.1 per cent.

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8 Transnational social networks, human capital and economic resources of Polish immigrants in Scotland

Marta Moskal

8.1 Introduction

Post-enlargement Europe provides an interesting site where the traditional distinction between internal and international migration is becoming less useful. The advent of flexibility of movement within the European Union creates a context in which new patterns of migration appear. It is important to understand the new forms of mobility, particularly the emergence of transnational connections and multiple identities. Exploring Bailey and Boyle's (2004) suggestions, this chapter applies transnational theory to migration movements within the single union. Migration from Poland and the other new EU member states raises a number of issues about how we conceptualise labour migrations and transnationalism. This area has started to be addressed by scholars such as Morokvasic (2004), Ryan et al. (2008, 2009) and Baláz and Williams (2004). Studies of transnationalism have shown that immigrants maintain multi-stranded connections to their place of origin and that these continue to have significant influence on their lives. This chapter explores the ways in which different forms of migrant resources (social, cultural and economic capital) are accumulated, exchanged and transformed within a transnational setting. The research evidence was gathered as part of a study concerning the integration and transnational linkages of Polish immigrants in Scotland. The project involved the in-depth interviews as well as survey questionnaires conducted among Polish immigrants in Scotland in 2006-2007.

8.2 Polish post-accession migration to Scotland

Following the EU enlargement of May 2004, a significant number of workers and their families moved from the new member countries to take up employment in the United Kingdom.¹ The opening up of the labour market to citizens of the new member states of the EU initiated what is almost certainly the largest single immigration the British Isles ever

experienced, with Poles the largest single national group of entrants (Salt & Rees 2006). Part of that movement constitutes the arrival of around 50,000 Polish nationals in Scotland between 2004 and 2007.

The portrait of post-enlargement migration from Poland is a mixture of continuity and change. Before 2004, migration from Poland tended to be perceived as short-term, transient and individual (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2005; Düvell 2004), and many moves were undocumented. Migrants were depicted as either having no dependents or as leaving dependent family members 'back home'. However, there is evidence that this population is, in fact, not transient but settling in Scotland, bringing family members for extended periods, and becoming embedded in the host society. A recent study of Polish migration found that networks developed by recent migrants were becoming more rooted in Scotland, and there was, moreover, evidence of the emergence of transnational characteristics associated with accelerating, circular and open-ended mobility among these new migrants (Moskal 2007).

8.3 Scotland's immigration: Past, present and future

Although Scotland, especially the west of the country, absorbed large numbers of Irish migrants in the nineteenth century, and some Italians and Poles post-war, followed by a small population of Asians and, more recently, refugees and asylum seekers, the population has been largely homogenous. The largest migrant group until very recently came from England. Scotland only recently experienced net immigration rather than emigration.²

Population projections suggest that any future growth in the potential supply of labour in Scotland will be driven almost exclusively by future levels of net migration. The data furthermore suggest that much of the increase in net migration in the last few years in Scotland has been caused by higher levels of international immigration. Much of this increase in immigration is from the so-called A-8 countries (eight CEE countries that joined the EU in 2004) (Wright 2008; Lisenkova & Wright 2008). A key question concerns whether this atypically high level of immigration from A-8 countries, and particularly from Poland, will continue into the future and, if so, for how long.

All 15 of the 'old' EU member states, with the exception of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden, imposed restrictions on the free movement of labour from the A-8 countries. The United Kingdom and Ireland opened their markets but restricted the access to welfare benefits; only Sweden offered these countries a free movement regime, with free access to the labour market and welfare benefits (Traser 2006). The restrictions on labour migration to the 'old 15 EU states' have been a factor contributing to the

high levels of A-8 immigration to Scotland and to the United Kingdom more generally. With relaxation of the restrictions to Germany and France in 2011, it is likely that many A-8 nationals who immigrated to Scotland will move to the other EU countries. Net migration to the United Kingdom and Scotland has already eased due to the financial crisis of 2008-2009. However, there are also other aspects of labour market institutions that might influence migrant flows and productivity, for example, the size of informal markets, wage structures and so forth (Jurado & Bruzzone 2008).

8.4 Scotland's immigration: Political strategy and institutional settings

Although immigration is an area of policy under the purview of the UK government, there are important differences between Scotland and England in the reception of migrants. While the UK government is focused on legislation and measures to restrict low-skilled immigration, through, for example, the point-based system introduced in February 2008, the Scottish government places high priority on increasing its population and set a new and ambitious population target in the autumn of 2007. This target requires Scotland's population growth to match the EU average by 2017 (Scottish Government 2007). In order to achieve this, the Scottish government is interested in attracting and retaining migrants. However, since immigration is a legislative domain retained by the UK government, Scotland is restricted to focusing on EU migrants and those who fulfil the skills, income and age criteria set by the UK-wide points-based system.

Thus, Scotland seeks to attract 'fresh talent' and 'new Scots' in order to compensate for depopulation through a discourse of inclusion and opportunity. The Scottish government's 'Fresh Talent' initiative,³ which aimed to redress demographic trends by attracting hard-working and motivated people to live, study and work in Scotland, was accompanied by the 'One Scotland' campaign, designed to tackle racism. The publication 'New Scots: Attracting Fresh Talent to Meet the Challenge of Growth' (Scottish Executive 2004) sets out how the Scottish government intends to operate a scheme of managed migration. The Scottish Government cites an aging population, a declining labour force and the desire to encourage cultural and ethnic diversity as catalysts to create a positive response to integration. This positive response from the Scottish government has significantly changed the political context of official and public debate. Diversity and migration are being projected as natural, inevitable and beneficial. There is also some evidence of more welcoming attitudes towards migrants in Scotland than in England. A study by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR 2007) confirmed that these efforts have produced positive attitudes towards migrants. Many Polish immigrants with experience in

other parts of the United Kingdom report Scots as more welcoming than others. Many say that they came to Scotland because informal networks of friends and peers already living in Scotland had told them it was a friendly place (Moskal 2007).

Scotland's immigration patterns reflect the government's initiatives to manage migration. The arrival of Poles in Scotland is seen as helping to reverse the population decline (2006 interview with Jack McConnell, former First Minister of Scotland). At the regional level, the Scottish government has carried out specific work in Poland to promote Scotland as a destination to live, work and study and to raise awareness of Scotland as well as the 'Fresh Talent' programme to ensure potential migrants are equipped to make a smooth and successful move to Scotland. The government published an information guide in Polish and in English on how to access housing and jobs for workers considering the move (www.talentscotland.com). Government initiatives are viewed as successful in drawing new workers to Scotland at the expense of London, with migrants increasingly opting for less crowded parts of the country.

Although the policy discourse in Scotland focuses on attracting and retaining high-skilled migrants and the context may be welcoming, it is nevertheless the case that recent EU migrants, including Poles in Scotland, are working largely in unskilled or low-skilled employment, in industry, agriculture and the service sector. This reliance on EU migrants to fill low-skilled employment vacancies is problematic when seen in the context of the aspirations of those Polish migrants who are considering settling in the United Kingdom, as many are working at jobs below their education levels, a situation they accept only because it is seen as temporary (Eade, Drinkwater & Garapich 2006). There is a considerable gap between the rhetoric of attracting new migrants to settle in a fair and social democratic society and the low-skilled and poorly paid jobs in which the majority of Poles are working. The discrepancy is particularly large considering the high levels of education of many post-accession migrants (IPPR 2008).

8.5 Migration, transnationalism and migrant resources and capital

The concept of transnationalism is conventionally used to refer to migrant's continuing ties with source countries. However, there is a need to define transnationalism more broadly as a relation between migrants' source and destination countries. As Castles (2002: 1157-1158) argues, transnationalism has already changed the context for migrant incorporation and will continue to do so. He predicts that transnational affiliations and consciousness will become the predominant form of migrant belonging in the future. Most migration and settlement experiences fit within one of the models of

incorporation to the host society (assimilation, differential exclusion and multiculturalism), but a growing group does not. Increasing mobility, growth of temporary, cyclical and recurring migrations, cheap and easy travel and constant communication through new information technologies (Vertovec 2004) all question the idea of the person who belongs to just one nation-state or who migrates from one state to remain permanently in another one. These changes have led to debates on the significance of transnationalism as a new mode of migrant belonging.

Recently, social scientists have sought ways in which local identities are shaped by transnational factors by exploring differing migration processes, collective and individual experiences, policy and institutional contexts and migration flows and patterns (see, e.g., Al-Ali & Koser 2002; Basch, Glick Schiller & Blanc-Szanton 1994; Faist 2008; Glick Schiller, Basch, Blanc-Szanton 1992; Guarnizo & Smith 1998; Portes, Guarnizo & Landolt 1999; Vertovec & Cohen 1999). Migrants are increasingly able to move between places, maintaining connections between 'home' and 'elsewhere' rather than making a permanent move. Migration research thus increasingly interrogates the connections between spatial mobility, identity construction and the structures of inequality in different nation-states, into which economic migrants are absorbed or tolerated. This leads to an increased focus on transnational identities. Immigrants are received differently and socialised depending on their social background and income as well as consumption patterns both in their country of origin and in the country of immigration. McDowell (2008) points out that most countries operate immigration policies that lead immigrants to particular types of jobs, mostly low paid, unskilled work in agriculture, construction and the service sector, often for a limited time period and often despite migrants' sets of skills, educational histories and previous social position in their native countries. Thus, distinctions are created between categories of migrants, based on a combination of their human capital and their willingness to accept low status employment. The growing polarisation between different categories of economic migrants (well-educated and highly skilled, regarded as a valuable social capital, and low-skilled for bottom jobs) reflects the polarisation occurring in the service economy more generally (Goos & Manning 2003), but also distinguishes migrants from other low status workers, exacerbating labour market inequalities. In the context of economic restructuring, changes in the international division of labour and the rise of transnational identities captured in the term 'globalisation', McDowell (2008) raises a range of questions concerning labour migration. In the case of the migrant workers, questions to address include 'how do the recent social and economic transformations alter the ways in which we think about migrant workers and their labour market participation?' And, 'how are these changes linked to new ways of theorising in social sciences?' Institutional structures and regulations and everyday practices position immigrants as

workers of differential worth. This construction of difference is produced and maintained through practices that operate across different transnational sites and spaces.

How these various strands of transnational connectivity are related is a question that seems to be neglected in the transnational literature (Portes 2001; Guarnizo & Smith 1998). For example, how are economic connections linked with cultural and social ties (Kelly and Lusia 2006)? One possible approach to understanding such a process and its consequences is to analyse how patterns of immigrant transnationalism are reorienting individual resources – ‘capital’, using Bourdieu’s term.

In applying Bourdieu’s ideas to the study of international migration, it is important first to clarify the sense in which he uses the concept of capital. Capital represents a range of resources in many forms: material (economic), cultural (human) and social. ‘Economic’ capital refers to the assets and financial worth of an individual which are ‘immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalised in the form of property rights’ (Bourdieu 1986: 243). Social capital is found in the networks and connections that can be mobilised to generate advantages or benefits:

The volume of social capital possessed by a given agent [...] depends on the size of the network of connections he can effectively mobilize and on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is connected (Bourdieu 1986: 249).

In the labour market, for example, these connections might be used to gain referrals and favourable consideration for specific job opportunities, to learn of vacancies, or more broadly to glean labour market intelligence, remark Kelly and Lusia (2006: 834). The various forms of social capital have two important characteristics. First, they are hard to transfer from one country to another, as they are primarily local. However, if transnational networks and chain migration emerge in the course of migration, the transferability of ties enabling obligations, reciprocity, solidarity and carrying the potential for information flows and control increases. Second, the various forms of social capital transmit and link groups and networks in separate nation-states – if migrant and migration networks are available.

What is conventionally treated as ‘human capital’ in economic analyses, and narrowly taken to mean skills and qualifications, is thus a part (but only a part) of an individual’s cultural capital, which may also include embodied markers based on gender, class and ‘race’ (Skeggs 2004). Cultural capital refers to the symbolic assets that a person possesses. This might be in the form of institutional cultural capital (e.g., university degrees) or embodied cultural capital, referring to ‘long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body’ (Bourdieu 1986: 243). All three forms of capital may also

contribute to an individual's stock of symbolic capital, depending on how each form is socially evaluated. A key feature of these various forms of capital (economic, social and cultural) is that they are valued and given meaning according to a particular social and spatial context. A further feature of Bourdieu's various forms of capital is that they are convertible: economic, social and cultural capital may each be converted into the other. For example, social capital in the form of a network may be used to find a job and thereby generate economic capital. The broader point, however, is that forms of capital are not fixed assets or attributes, but are always dynamically circulating. Viewing human action as the accumulation and exchange of various forms of capital is commonplace in immigration studies. Social capital is ubiquitous and networks of ethnicity are widely acknowledged as fundamental to understanding modes of immigrant incorporation (see, e.g., Waldinger & Lichter 2003). Bourdieu's ideas add to the existing usage the possibility of bringing together research on immigrant social ties and 'ethnic networks', human capital and economic resources, and cultural-identity transformation (Kelly & Lusia 2006). A rare attempt to integrate multiple forms of capital is found in work by Nee and Sanders (2001). A key assumption in their analysis is that immigrants arrive with, and then 'spend', capital in their place of settlement. Bourdieu observes that specific habitus shapes a particular set of rules of engagement within a given group. The ability to follow these rules signifies a person's membership to the group. Bauder (2005) argues that immigrants embody a habitus of a foreign place, and that this habitus may not match the rules of the destination. In Bauder's case of the Canadian labour market, the immigrants who are unfamiliar with the rules of the labour market at their destination are not competitive with Canadian workers who know and observe the rules. Bauder investigates how the labour market conventions constrain or enable immigrant groups to integrate into the labour market. The application of Bourdieu theory, especially to the transference and non-transference of capital, is timely, particularly as the debate about international migration and human capital has shifted away from concerns with brain drain or brain waste to brain circulation and brain exchange issues (Salt 1988, 1997; Regets 2001). This is related to the increasing importance of skilled labour migration and new forms of shorter-term mobility. However, knowledge of skilled labour migration is highly selective (King 2002), tending to focus on intra-company mobility of professionals and managers, reflecting the influential pioneering work of Salt (1988), Salt and Findlay (1989) and others. In contrast, our understanding of several other groups of skilled migrants, including international students, remains rather thin (Baláz & Williams 2004).

8.6 Polish post-accession immigrants in Scotland and their transnationalism

This section draws on evidence gathered as part of a post-doc project conducted at the University of Edinburgh concerning the integration and transnational linkages of Polish immigrants in Scotland. The research was based on a detailed 30-item questionnaire in Polish conducted among 158 Polish residents in Edinburgh in 2006-2007, together with 42 in-depth interviews with Polish migrants from all over Scotland. All 200 respondents were adults who had been in Scotland from two months to five years. The interviewees were relatively young Polish migrants, 90 per cent was aged 19-32, 80 per cent were single, 82 per cent were without children, and 46 per cent held a bachelor's degree or higher. These socio-demographic features reflect the characteristics of the studied population. Eighty-four per cent arrived in Scotland after May 2004. Only one third of interviewees had ever lived abroad before coming to Scotland. They came mostly (60 per cent) alone and earn their own living here. They left their families in Poland, and most of their friends were in Poland. Interviews with Poles indicated that 64 per cent had finished their education. One third had never been employed in Poland. In Edinburgh, only 4 per cent were unemployed, 80 per cent held a full-time job or owned their own business. They worked mostly in the hospitality sector or in building and construction.

The migration strategy of the Polish population in Scotland is perfectly adapted to the flexible labour market in the host country – and the contractual service economy in general – and to the socio-economic situation in Poland. The author's research indicates that we may speak of Polish-Scottish transnationalism, as the respondents literally inhabit a world 'in between' – both physically and mentally. They frequently visit Poland, and most maintain strong economic and life interests in their home community, for example, by buying land, a flat or house with the money earned in Scotland or investing in estates or businesses. Their migration plans are strikingly open-ended, difficult to predict and highly opportunistic. Only 17 per cent said they would not go back to Poland. Some 16 per cent said they would soon return to live in Poland. Some 53 per cent said they would return to Poland but did not know when; and 14 per cent had no plans at all regarding whether they would remain in Scotland or return to Poland. Emerging patterns indicate that many of the newly arrived Poles in Scotland are developing a European identity that is contextually fluid. Their strategy is to keep options open and adapt as life goes on, not excluding going back to Poland, bringing family to Scotland, travelling the world and moving further overseas. When we asked them about their plans to return to Poland we received such responses as 'don't know', 'not able to say now', 'I want to go back... but don't know when' and 'I might want to go back ... we have a good life here, and we are not sure what is in Poland'.

This transnational strategy helps migrants try to get the best from both worlds. Looking at both worlds simultaneously has practical consequences. Research shows that this migration has all the features of chain migration – existing migrants are constantly bringing in new ones and new ones create opportunities for their friends and kin back home. Living in Scotland is a valuable asset in itself. By maintaining links with both ends of the migration chain, our respondents built social and economic capital that takes advantage of price differences and readiness to migrate by fellow citizens in Poland. Every migrant who comes back – for longer periods or just holidays – is a valuable source, not only of hard currency, but also of information, potential employment and tips for would-be migrants at home. Migrants in Scotland sustain transnational links to build their migratory social capital in Poland. This expands the density and function of the migration networks through which communication about jobs, conditions and economic opportunities occur (see Moskal 2007).

The following sections explore the value and the transferability of different forms of migrant resources (capital) from the perspective of Polish-Scottish transnationalism.

Economic capital

A simple formulation of the convertibility and value of economic capital would examine the exchange rate and purchasing power of financial assets brought to Scotland, and the wage earnings derived from employment after arrival. Such capital is, however, both converted and evaluated in the transnational sphere. The most obvious form of ongoing transnational conversion is through remittances to family members back home. However, economic capital is found not only in the form of financial assets, but also in physical assets acquired after migration. The author's research shows that remittances accrued in Scotland are mostly consumed in the home country (Poland). Most of the money is from men working to support families in Poland. Quite often fathers (or mothers) have left their families in Poland to work in Scotland. They send back a large amount of what they earn, often only keeping what is necessary for them to live. In response, the major British banks are beginning to tailor products to the Polish community. For example, HSBC offers the so-called 'Passport' – a bank account specifically for migrants that can be opened before they leave their home country and offering discounted money transfer services.

Social networks

Social capital is often seen as acquired through immersion in the 'ethnic community' at the place of settlement. For example, ethnic ties may be instrumental in creating job search networks. Although migration studies often celebrate the use of social networks in the integration of new immigrants, this utilisation is perhaps more accurately interpreted as an indication of

how comparatively bereft of social contacts many immigrants really are and therefore the high relative value a few contacts can provide. The fact that distant contacts, contacts that would have little worth in the home country, become so important is an indicator not just of their value to the immigrant, but also of the diminished social capital resources to which the immigrant has access. But all of this assumes that social capital has a purely instrumental exchange value. In fact, the emotional and psychological need for social ties can also be satisfied in the form of transnational connections, as continued involvement in social life 'back home' is possible through the use of text messaging, email and low-cost phone cards.

One the other hand, some participants in my research also described exploitive networks involving other Poles in relation to employment and housing. This has led to reluctance to socialise in what are seen as 'Polish' venues and hinders the development of supportive Polish networks. Some migrants turn to non-Polish networks, and there are those who have barely any Polish contacts or friends in Edinburgh and appear extremely isolated. The competition for jobs makes migrants' attitudes towards ethnicity ambivalent – it can help, but it can also be a source of deep disappointment (see also Eade, Drinkwater & Garapich 2006). It seems that in a fiercely competitive environment, networks and migratory social capital count more than ethnic affiliation.

Cultural (human) capital

Like economic and social capital, cultural capital is converted and evaluated in a transnational sphere. In this context, some forms of cultural capital are devalued and others enhanced (Kelly and Lusia 2006: 844). An important dimension of any evaluation of cultural capital is found in the elevated cultural capital associated with almost any form of overseas travel or living abroad. In the case of Polish post-accession migrants, it is necessary to move beyond the category of 'economic migrants' since my respondents spoke about their migration in much broader terms, including educational and self-realisation values such as learning the language, acquiring new skills, developing a sense of self-esteem and gaining experience. This is a paradox encountered by many British as well as Polish social scientists – that is, qualified people, often with degrees, accept work and life in low-earning positions. However, if a condition of 'intentional unpredictability' is recognised together with a point of reference of one's social position situated back home, and reinforced by frequent visits, then this becomes both psychologically and socially acceptable. In addition, the temporary nature of that employment helps people to see it in a context of treating migration as a 'school of life'. In other words, Polish migrants (especially those with a university degree) are ready to take a step back in order to leap forward later. Poles are prepared to postpone their reward for a few years, as the price of gaining new networks, experiences and language skills.

8.7 Conclusion

Scotland offers an interesting context in which to study post-EU enlargement migration. Scotland's population has been relatively homogenous, and there has been little experience of minority populations. Population decline prompted the Scottish government to encourage Polish and A-8 countries migrants to come to work in Scotland. The issues raised by the recent movement of Polish nationals to Scotland reflect wider debates about transnational social networks, human capital, economic resources and identity in the 'new' Europe. They also link with existing research on migration flows and patterns.

Immigration is usually presented as an economic phenomenon. Yet, migrants live in a social and cultural world of interdependencies that are not captured by economic calculations, for example, of productivity or welfare support. Bourdieu's sensitivity to various form of capital not normally considered in economic calculations provides a useful basis for understanding the significant other dimensions of social interaction involved in migration. The empirical study presented here supports the idea that migration concerns social and cultural matters as well as economic processes. The economic capital derived even from low-status work in Scotland, for example, can be converted into substantial cultural and social capital back in Poland. Indeed, the very fact of being in Scotland, of being 'abroad', constitutes cultural capital in itself. In the case of international migrant workers, migration equates with social capital not only because the global economy and migrants' role in it is increasing, but also because migration is taking a new form – that of transnational connections rather than permanence. Migrants are increasingly able to move between places, maintaining connections between 'home' and 'elsewhere' rather than making a permanent move. Transnational immigrants maintain multi-stranded connections to their place of origin; and these continue to be of influence. Exploring transnational linkages between Poland and Scotland, this research suggests a predominance of temporary migrants, for whom maintaining strong links with home may be more important than establishing close relationships in the host country. The Polish migration situation is evolving so rapidly that any conclusions can only be provisional. However, it seems clear that future changes will be linked not only to economic and legal developments, such as the relative conditions of the British and Polish economies, but also to networks and the further expansion of, for example, social networking via the Internet, which could have a substantial impact on migration strategies.

Notes

- 1 The Polish Statistical Office estimates that 580,000 were living in the United Kingdom in 2006, and that 30 per cent of Polish migrants living in the EU were in Britain. The British Office for National Statistics estimates that in 2007-2008, 475,000 Polish nationals were living in the United Kingdom.
- 2 Historically, Scotland has been a country of net out-migration, with more people leaving than arriving. However, since the 1960s, net out-migration has diminished. In some years during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Scotland experienced net migration gains. This was also the case in the six years from 2002 to 2007, with net gains of around 9,000 in 2002-2003, 26,000 in 2003-2004, 19,000 in 2004-2005, 21,000 in 2005-2006, 27,000 in 2006-2007 and 20,000 in 2007-2008, according to national statistics. The net migration gain in 2006-2007 was the highest since current records started in 1952. These recent migration gains are a result of people entering Scotland from both the rest of the United Kingdom and overseas. However, in 2006 and 2007 Scotland gained more from overseas.
- 3 The initiative was formally introduced in Scottish Parliament by First Minister Jack McConnell on 25 February 2004, when he laid out the actions to be taken to address Scotland's population decline and support Scotland's continuing economic prosperity. The 'Fresh Talent' initiative ended on 29 June 2008, when the UK government brought in the new points-based immigration scheme.

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9 Why do highly educated migrants go for low-skilled jobs?

A case study of Polish graduates working in London

Paulina Trevena

9.1 Introduction

Beginning from Piore's (1979) seminal work on the existence of a dual labour market in highly developed countries, the secondary sector of the economy has been associated predominantly with low-educated, unskilled labour. The fact that growing numbers of highly educated persons also gravitate towards this sector has only fairly recently been acknowledged in migration studies (Raijman & Semyonov 1995; Morawska & Spohn 1997; Brandi 2001; Reyneri 2004; Düvell 2004; Csedő 2007; Lianos 2007). This phenomenon has become especially conspicuous in the case of Eastern Europeans from A-8 countries, particularly Poles, working in the United Kingdom (Anderson et al. 2006; Drinkwater, Eade & Garapich 2006; Currie 2007).

Research has shown that Poles recently arrived in the United Kingdom are primarily employed in low-skilled and low paying jobs, even if they possess high levels of education (Drinkwater, Eade & Garapich 2006: 18). However, this is by no means a novelty, since this trend actually emerged in the decade preceding Poland's accession to the European Union. Britain has long been a favourite destination for highly educated Poles, who typically undertake work in low-skilled sectors there (see Jordan 2002; Düvell 2004; Trevena 2008). Nevertheless, with the great increase in the numbers of Polish nationals entering the country since May 2004,¹ the phenomenon has become especially conspicuous and has attracted the attention of scholars and the media alike.

In migration research, persons who have a university degree are customarily considered highly skilled workers (Iredale 2001; Kaczmarczyk & Okólski 2005: 45). Their movement has been linked with the global expansion of world trade and the international expansion of transnational companies or with shortages of certain expertise in local labour markets (Mahroum 2001: 28). Typically, the highly skilled are seen as elite global

movers, advancing their professional careers through migration. There is another category of highly skilled migrants acknowledged in the literature, those for whom movement equates to ‘occupational skidding’ and a drop in status. Little attention has so far been given to the reasons behind such experiences.

This chapter aims to elucidate the phenomenon of educated migrants from Poland working in low-skilled jobs in the United Kingdom. Based on research carried out on Polish graduates working in elementary occupations in London, it argues that, despite the micro-level focus of the study (individuals), the graduates’ particular labour market positioning can be explained only through a comprehensive analysis of factors surfacing at three different levels: macro, meso and micro. This is reflected in the structure of the chapter. Firstly, factors at the macro level are discussed: the transformation of Poland and its impact on the increased out-migration of graduates, the supply–demand nexus between the sending and receiving country, facilitating migration to the United Kingdom and the institutional and economic conditions influencing the positioning of Polish graduates in the British labour market. Analysed next are the meso-level factors promoting work below qualifications: the role of networks, ‘national traits’ and British employment agencies. Finally, the micro-level factors are examined that determine gravitation towards low-skilled jobs: the issue of individual capital and the impact of perceived aims of migration on labour market behaviour.

9.2 Research methodology and the target group

The analysis presented here is based on a case study of Polish university graduates working in London, the city with the highest concentration of A-8 citizens prior to enlargement (Tamas & Münz 2006: 86). The aim of the study was to consider the individual perspectives of migrants. The methodology adopted was thus based on Znaniecki’s (1922) concept of the ‘humanistic coefficient’ and elements of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Konecki 2000), as given hypotheses were not formed prior to the research, but in the course of gathering empirical material. Qualitative research techniques were applied, including semi-structured in-depth interviews² and participant observation.³

It is the author’s belief that given the possibility, migration should be studied as a dynamic process rather than a status quo at a given point in time. Clearly, individual perceptions of the migratory experience and one’s life circumstances change over time, and this naturally influences the migrants’ decisions. Hence, the study was carried out over a longer period and involved a panel sample. The focus of the first round of research was primarily on the impact of working below one’s qualifications on the

identity, well-being and values of educated migrants. The main aim of the second round of research was to establish how educated migrants' labour market positions had changed over time, particularly when considering the new institutional conditions, and to find factors that influence the professional advancement of the graduates.

The target group was graduates of Polish higher education institutions aged 25-35, who had been living in London for at least a year and were or had been working in the secondary sector of the British economy.⁴ Only persons in the 'mating' stage of life were considered; that is, single and with no dependants (Giza-Poleszczuk & Marody 2000: 62).⁵ It was assumed that such persons would take migration decisions in a highly independent manner; that is, not for family but for individual reasons (see Düvell 2004: 7).

The research was carried out in London on two occasions over a period of three-plus years: first in summer 2004 and then in winter 2007-2008. Altogether 40 interviews with migrants were conducted, 21 in 2004 and another 19 in 2007-2008. These included a panel sample of 12 respondents who took part in both rounds of the research.⁶

During the first round of research, 21 graduates were interviewed: 13 women and 8 men, aged between 25 and 33. The majority had a master's degree. One person had a bachelor's degree and one had not formally finished her studies (she had a certificate of completion but had not obtained a degree).⁷ All were graduates of accredited Polish institutions of higher education and had finished their studies between 1996 and 2002. They had migrated to London between 1998 and 2003 and had been there for a period of between one and eight years at the time of the interview. All but one respondent had at least one year of experience in menial work in the United Kingdom. At the time of the interview, 13 were still doing such work (in catering, construction, retail and the domestic sector). Seven were doing lower or mid-level white-collar work (as a receptionist, internet content administrator, psychiatric nurse, reflexologist, engineer, journalist and secretary), and one was working according to his qualifications (as an IT specialist).

During the second round of research, 12 respondents from the 2004 sample were interviewed once more, and an additional small sample was drawn of one pre-accession and six post-accession migrants. The latter included four persons with a master's degree,⁸ and three with a bachelor's degree⁹ who had completed part-time studies.¹⁰ The post-accession migrants had arrived in London from one to more than three years prior to the interview. At the time of the study two were doing menial jobs (in building renovation and waitressing) and four were employed in lower level white-collar jobs (as a customer assistant in a bank, a receptionist, a supervisor in a hotel and an archivist).

9.3 The macro level: Institutional and economic conditions

In explaining the gravitation of highly educated Poles towards low-skilled sectors in Britain, let us first analyse factors at the macro level; that is, the structural forces that influence individual decisions. Naturally, these are connected with both sending and receiving country. In the case of the sending country, Poland, macro-level factors are crucial for understanding individuals' decisions to migrate, despite the prospect of carrying out menial work in the United Kingdom. An interplay of economic, institutional and social factors influence the choice of the United Kingdom, and specifically London, as the destination. Further, the supply-demand nexus between the two countries and the institutional barriers encountered by Polish graduates in Britain have been significant in their labour market positioning there.

9.3.1 *Poland: Transformation and growing migration pressure*

Following the fall of the communist system in 1989, Poland moved from a centrally planned economy to a free market one. This process resulted in a number of deep economic, political and social changes and entailed 'adjustment shocks' affecting the whole of society. As to the structural conditions influencing the out-migration of highly educated Poles, four factors connected with the transformation should be pointed to in particular: the generally difficult situation in the labour market since the early 1990s, the higher education boom in Poland, the English language boom and Polish citizens' regained opportunity for international travel.

The situation on the Polish labour market was a major push factor for the group of migrants in this research. Since the mid-1990s, fresh graduates were faced with two forces occurring simultaneously in the labour market: economic downturn and a sharp increase in the number of persons with tertiary education. The fast economic growth the country experienced in the early 1990s resulted in a burst of demand for highly educated employees. This led to an unprecedented educational boom, with the number of graduates rising from 89,000 in 1995-1996 to 384,000 in 2003-2004 (CSO 2008).¹¹ Nevertheless, by the mid-1990s the need for graduates had largely been satisfied and, moreover, recession had brought an enormous rise in unemployment, from 6.5 per cent nationally in 1990 to as much as 14.9 per cent in 1995 and 20 per cent in 2003, reaching a staggering 30 per cent in some regions (CSO 2005). Youth unemployment was especially conspicuous, and university-leavers were no exception. In the wake of EU enlargement in 2004, 7.3 per cent were still registered as unemployed (Fihel, Kaczmarczyk & Okólski 2006). Thus, graduates faced the problem of a shrinking labour market coupled with increased competition for jobs and rising demands on the part of employers.¹² Under these circumstances, many struggled to find work. This rather dramatic situation is evident from

the emotional accounts of the interviewees, especially those who graduated in the 1990s and early 2000s:

And I know that in *Poland* I wouldn't have made it in any field. Because I know how much time I spent looking for work in Poland. [...] In Poland I felt like a workless and useless girlie. That's how I felt in Poland. And I was registered as unemployed, which was really sad. It was affecting me really badly. (Ada, master's studies in philosophy)

It was also reflected by their labour market behaviour: out of the 28 respondents involved in the case study, over half (15 persons) had not entered the Polish labour market after graduating. Those who had worked in Poland prior to migrating painted a rather dreary picture of the labour market there. Typically, they would have to take up positions that were not in consonance with their qualifications or interests – for example, an ambitious graduate in biology worked as a shop assistant in a curtain shop. The low salaries were insufficient to secure an independent living. Moreover, corruption and nepotism were repeatedly mentioned as significant barriers in the Polish labour market: the majority of respondents stated that they were unable to get a good job in Poland as they did not have 'the right acquaintances'. One, based in a particularly difficult local labour market, admitted to getting work only because of 'having the right contacts'. However, even for graduates living in Warsaw – the capital of Poland and most developed regional economy – employment prospects were inopportune:

You know, the situation in Poland was what it was and I didn't want to become one of those graduates who finish their studies and have the never-ending problem that they'll find some job, of course, but not one that they would actually want to be doing. [...] I knew that if I finish my (master's) studies, I won't be able to expect more, even when I do complete those studies. And that's why I thought of London. (Sandra, bachelor's degree in marketing and management)

The macroeconomic conditions in Poland since the mid-1990s thus resulted in the emergence of a pool of surplus labour, of which many graduates became part. A natural consequence of the high unemployment rate and lack of job opportunities was a growing migration pressure.

On the other hand, the freedom of travel fully regained by Poles after 1989 was a crucial factor in shaping new life strategies. Under the communist regime, which imposed a series of restrictions on people's movements, international travel and working abroad was an unattainable dream for most.¹³ Therefore, when such opportunities finally became available,

young adults were especially eager to seize them. Depending on whether travel is for work or study opportunities, various destination countries were chosen by different groups of Poles. The English language boom had a great influence on the migration destinations of students and university graduates. Following the transition to a free market economy, English gained huge importance in Poland: as the modern lingua franca of the global world and as a valuable asset in the national labour market. At the same time, however, there was a generally low level of language skills, even among students and graduates. The interviewees partaking in this study provide a vivid example of this *status quo*: almost half (13 of 28 persons) had little or even no knowledge of English upon migration. In fact, one of the main pull factors for migration (especially for the earlier wave of migrants) was the desire to learn or improve language skills.

[Why did I migrate? Mainly because] my dream was to learn English. To be able to speak it fluently and understand everything.
(Maciej, master's degree in nutrition)

In consequence, English-speaking countries became the most attractive destination for Polish students. From the early 1990s, it became increasingly popular for them to go on working holidays or gap years to the United States or United Kingdom. The majority of the interviewees in this study did so (19 of 28 persons). This trend subsequently resulted in another one, namely, migrating to work abroad upon graduating. Considering the earlier mentioned 'flaws' of the home labour market, especially the low levels of earnings yet relatively high living costs, migrating to work in Britain was commonly perceived as a much easier and promising option than trying to establish oneself in Poland, even before the United Kingdom opened its labour market to A-8 nationals.

At first, I was thinking of moving to Warsaw, but I came to the conclusion that such a move would be much more difficult than going to London. I don't think I could have afforded to risk moving to another Polish town. (Małgorzata, master's degree in Polish studies)

In sum, a number of structural factors in the home country affected the lives of the graduates and facilitated their decision to migrate. It was the difficult situation in the Polish labour market that acted as the major push factor, while the freedom to travel coupled with the growing role of English as a global language constituted the chief pull factors. That latter made the United Kingdom a particularly attractive destination.

9.3.2 *The United Kingdom: Market demand and institutional barriers to occupational advancement*

The opportunity to learn English was a significant factor attracting Polish graduates to Britain. Nevertheless, the crucial pull factor was the continually high demand for foreign labour in the country since the mid-1990s, particularly in London. The section below examines the macro-level factors determining the labour market positioning of Polish graduates arriving to work in the receiving country.

Throughout the mid-1990s and early 2000s the situation on the Polish labour market was very difficult, but the British economy was undergoing considerable growth. Unemployment rates were low (below 5 per cent in 2004), while the number of vacancies was high.¹⁴ As for London, the 1990s brought a considerable expansion of the ‘underground’ economy, which offered jobs for cheap immigrant labour, particularly in the service sector (Sassen 2001: 289-304). Hence, the high demand for both legal and irregular labour acted as a crucial pull factor for Polish graduates. It was common knowledge that low-skilled work was readily available in the capital, and that one could earn one’s keep there even doing a ‘stupid’ job.

Availability and accessibility of jobs are of key significance here and bring us to the issue of institutional conditions in the receiving country. These have continually had a major impact on the graduates’ labour market positioning, particularly in the case of migrants arriving prior to Poland’s accession to the EU.

Before May 2004, Polish nationals wishing to work and live in Britain came up against a number of institutional barriers associated with the legality of entrance, stay and work.¹⁵ The situation of the pre-accession group of graduates in this study is illustrative. The overwhelming majority (19 out of 21) had formally entered the country for purposes other than employment, either as a student or tourist. In practice, however, only working full time allowed them to earn their keep. Breaching the conditions of stay was thus commonplace among the graduates, who took up work semi-legally (on a student visa yet undertaking full-time work) or illegally (on a tourist visa). Consequently, they were naturally driven to the ‘immigrant sector’ of the economy where employers accepted their illegal status.¹⁶ Therefore, up to EU accession the mobility of university-educated Poles in the British labour market was largely limited to horizontal movement within the secondary sector of the economy.¹⁷

The case of post-accession migrants is very different. As the United Kingdom fully opened its labour market to A-8 nationals on 1 May 2004, Polish graduates arriving after this date did not face the problems of legality of stay and work. They were thus in a much more advantageous position than their older counterparts. As Monika, who arrived in the United Kingdom in the pre-accession period, observed:

It's not difficult to find a job [in London] now. They [post-accession Polish migrants] should have come here ten years ago, when we needed a visa, when being able to work legally was a dream. [...] Nowadays everything is within reach; everything is easier. (Monika, master's degree in library studies)

Notwithstanding, the system still seems to steer A-8 nationals towards the lower echelons of the labour market. Inter alia, the structure of labour demand and supply and the problem of diploma recognition can be singled out as barriers to change of occupational positioning.¹⁸

In the United Kingdom, the largest demand over the last decade has been for highly skilled professionals, especially in the finance and banking sector, and for unskilled and low-skilled labour on the other, especially in the hotel and catering sector. Since the supply of national workers willing to take up low-skilled (and low-status, low-paid) positions does not meet the demand, immigrants provide a source to fill these shortages (see Piore 1979). In consequence, if migrants do not have the relevant skills or experience to apply for the professional positions in demand, it is work in the lower echelons of the labour market that is most available to them.

Another supply-demand phenomenon directly affecting the occupational position of Polish graduates in the United Kingdom is that of over-education. Britain also witnessed a great increase in the size of the tertiary-level educated workforce, albeit earlier than in Poland. In the 1990s, it became apparent that rapid expansion in educational attainment in the United Kingdom might 'run ahead of the economy's ability to absorb [higher] qualifications' (Robinson 1995: 2). Indeed, research has demonstrated that a significant percentage of British graduates work below their qualifications: especially those who are young and with limited experience,¹⁹ those employed in the private sector, and graduates of degree courses in social sciences, arts and humanities, and business and finance studies. What is more, the region with the highest proportion of overeducated graduates was Greater London (Alpin, Shackleton & Walsh 1998), a phenomenon that was noticeable to some of my respondents. As Rafał, who worked along Britons on a building site, noted:

If you're educated but have no experience, you stand no chances here [in the UK...] It's the same for the English. I've worked with them, college graduates, other graduates, and they say they can't find [better] work. It's similar to the situation in Poland, you need a stroke of luck to get a [professional] job here. And experience is what counts most. (Rafał, master's degree in materials engineering)

Hence, educated Poles with 'non-marketable' degrees found themselves in a 'double over-education loop', as their skills were in demand neither in

their home country nor in the country of migration. An additional problem faced by Polish graduates entering the British labour market is that of diploma recognition. It has been acknowledged that a general devaluation of CEE education occurs in Western countries (Kofman 2000), and this is certainly true for the United Kingdom (Csedő 2007). Although the EU has developed a system of mutual recognition of qualifications, it has been noted that this system generally works primarily to ensure that professional qualifications are recognised, rather than general education or academic qualifications. In the case of British employers, preference for nationally recognised qualifications seems to be strong, even the recognition of professional qualifications (e.g., in the medical sector) has proved to be problematic (Currie 2007). This was borne out in the author's study, as respondents attempting to use their Polish degrees invariably encountered difficulties. For example, two respondents who attempted to nostrify their master's degrees in psychology found that the relevant professional body would not fully recognise their Polish qualifications, treating their master's degrees as equivalent to a bachelor's, consequently hindering their professional careers. Another interviewee working at a leading British bank as a customer's assistant found that her employer did not recognise her bachelor's degree in finance as valid and was paying her an accordingly lower salary.

It follows then that even after EU accession Polish graduates were still in a disadvantaged position upon arrival in the United Kingdom. Not only did they face competition from their British counterparts, but their qualifications were questioned as well. Moreover, considering the structure of the receiving country's labour market, especially in the metropolis, Polish migrants arriving with 'non-marketable' degrees and little work experience were steered into the lower echelons of the employment market.

9.4 The meso level: Social ties and migration behaviour

In the case of Polish graduates migrating to the United Kingdom, social ties and social capital, constituting the meso level of analysis (Faist 1997), also prove to be important factors contributing to their gravitation towards low-skilled jobs in the beginning of the migration experience.

The majority of interviewees in the study had either migration networks of Polish friends, often other graduates from their studies, and in two cases relatives, or weak ties consisting of contacts to 'friends of friends' or distant family members in London prior to arriving. This social migration capital was not only crucial in the process of migration decision-making (Trevena 2008), but it also largely determined the type of work undertaken by the newcomers. Firstly, the majority of the Polish acquaintances of the interviewees were in low-skilled jobs at the time of their arrival. The new

migrants thus assumed that they would also be employed in similar positions, at least initially. Secondly, especially in the case of pre-accession migrants, jobs were often passed on or arranged for them by their Polish friends working in low-skilled sectors. This 'older' generation of educated migrants perceives working considerably below one's level of qualifications as part and parcel of the migration experience; those post-accession migrants who want to 'have it all' straight from the beginning are frowned upon and even considered insolent by the 'older' migrants.²⁰ In their opinion, newcomers should begin from lower positions in order to 'learn the ropes' and improve their English if necessary. As one pre-accession respondent talking about the 'new' migrants put it:

It's not difficult to find work [in the UK] now. Nowadays I get really annoyed if I hear that somebody [with a degree] has come over here and has problems finding a job. Unless they don't know the language at all ... But, excuse me, if they're educated, they must be aware that it's difficult to find a good job here without knowing the language. [...] If they're coming here for the first time, even if their English isn't bad, the first weeks or months here are a sort of 'transition period', you have to get to know life here. And many people had to go through this [carrying out menial jobs].
(Monika, master's degree in library studies)

Additionally, among many Poles, especially those who had not been in the United Kingdom for long, low self-esteem and a distinct lack of self-confidence is notable. This 'humbleness' is a characteristic feature of Polish migrants, often voiced by Poles themselves and by other nationals. For example, one of my interviewees, a construction engineer, said it had not even crossed her mind to look for a 'proper' job in the United Kingdom until another compatriot, who had already acquired higher professional status, urged her to try to move into her field of expertise:

I wasn't considering finding employment in my professional field at all. I had this attitude, which might appear strange because I feel the French or Germans don't have this type of attitude, [but] I thought that since I'm from Poland, how can I look for work in my profession? It seemed so unattainable to me. I thought didn't stand a chance. (Jola, master's degree in mechanical engineering)

Thus, common knowledge about the type of jobs most accessible to Poles in the United Kingdom, coupled with an inferiority complex and the expectation among compatriots that migrants will take up menial jobs, largely determine the type of work chosen by educated migrants in Britain in the initial stages of migration.

However, it is not only Poles who expect new Polish migrants to take up low-skilled positions. Currie (2007: 106) draws attention to the fact that since the 2004 enlargement, it has become 'increasingly important for [British] employers with significant staff shortages to look towards the CEE accession countries for recruits'. Moreover, 'this process of internationalisation is becoming a common strategy adopted by employers who experience difficulty recruiting at the national level' (ibid.). In consequence, a great number of the job vacancies advertised by job centres in the United Kingdom are for unskilled or semi-skilled positions shunned by nationals. This is the type of work typically offered to foreign job seekers, including Polish graduates.

Other nationals and local employment agencies are typically the first point of contact for Polish graduates seeking work after arriving in Britain. Other educated Poles provide a natural reference point for them. Therefore, it appears that the new migrants' job seeking strategies naturally steer them towards low-skilled sectors.²¹ The pattern of graduates from Poland taking up menial jobs in England is well-established and promotes similar employment among new arrivals.

9.5 The micro level: Individual capital, motives and perceptions

Having considered macro- and meso-level factors promoting the gravitation of university-educated migrants from Poland towards low-skilled jobs in the United Kingdom, let us turn to the micro level, which is of crucial importance here. This section analyses the issue of individual capital and how motives for migration and stay affect labour market performance.

Leaving institutional conditions and social relations aside, the migrant's individual capital largely determines their position in the receiving country's labour market. It is well known that competence in the locally spoken language is a prerequisite to career advancement. Meanwhile, as mentioned earlier, almost half of the interviewees in this study had rather poor language skills upon arrival to the United Kingdom. At the same time, the type of education received by the graduates in Poland (e.g., a master's in history, Polish studies or library studies) was generally not 'marketable' in the context of the British or Polish economy. Therefore, although these migrants may be considered persons of high human capital, the applicability of their knowledge to the labour market and its transferability across national contexts is another matter.

Another factor at the micro level causing the gravitation of highly educated Poles towards low-skilled jobs is their poor financial standing upon migration. Polish graduates arriving in Britain without secured employment typically face the financial pressure of needing to find work quickly. Since they cannot afford to spend much time looking for work, newcomers tend to take the first position available to them (while the recruitment process

for professional positions typically stretches over a longer period). However, after beginning a job many find it increasingly difficult to change occupations for purely practical reasons, for example, due to working long hours or night shifts. Moreover, many interviewees stated that they became socialised into their working environment. If they find co-workers amicable and the salary acceptable, they typically lost their earlier desire to find 'better' employment quickly, especially if they were considering their stay in the United Kingdom as temporary:

I was planning to come over [to London] for a year. A few weeks after I arrived I found a job as a receptionist in a restaurant and stayed there rather long – for almost three years. I liked the job at first, and the people, and the atmosphere, it was something new to me. Then I started growing tired of it all, but somehow couldn't motivate myself to make a move and find another job. Until I had enough of it, really had enough, finally started hating my job, and then I decided to quit, just like that. (Inga, master's degree in history)

In classical economic theory, a prospective migrant is regarded as a highly rational social actor. It is believed that he or she gathers detailed information about the host country and makes his or her decision to move on the basis of careful consideration of prospective gains and losses stemming from migration in the long run (Górny & Kaczmarczyk 2003: 49). However, as Fischer, Martin and Straubhaar (1997) note, the assumption of full rationality on the part of the migrant is false. The case of the group in question fully confirms this criticism: the majority of the interviewees actually made a very spontaneous decision to move, without giving much thought to the consequences of such a step. Their rationale for going abroad was based on the 'I have nothing to lose' principle:

I left [Poland] suddenly; it was a spontaneous decision, taken in the summer when I was in the mood for holidays and entertainment. I never reflected on why, what next, what if not this, what if not that. I left, got work [in London] almost at once, even got paid well for such a simple job, so there was nothing to lose. (Paweł, master's degree in psychology)

The majority of the interviewees initially intended their stay to be temporary, typically one year, and this perception of the timeframe of migration had great consequences for their subsequent behaviour in the British labour market.

As mentioned earlier, as far as the graduates' motives for migration are concerned, the situation in the Polish labour market was the strongest push factor, while the drive to improve language skills was the chief pull factor.

Nevertheless, we must also distinguish between those graduates who had a particular professional or economic goal in mind when moving to the United Kingdom, and those who had no such specific aims. Accordingly, we draw a typology based on the perceived aims of migration within which three different groups of migrants can be singled out:

- ‘drifters’ (pursuing goals other than professional advancement or gathering savings for investment);
- ‘career seekers’ (seeking to embark on, develop or change their career abroad);
- ‘target earners’ (aiming to save a large sum of money for a given purpose).

This typology is not a fixed categorisation, as changing one’s aims and moving across the categories in the course of the migration may occur. Significantly, however, since the three categories of migrants aim to achieve disparate general goals, they apply different strategies for labour market behaviour (table 9.1).

Table 9.1 *Typology of migrants according to migration aims and labour market behaviour*

	<i>Drifters</i>	<i>Career seekers</i>	<i>Target earners</i>
Aim of migration	To pursue a variety of ‘post-materialist’ goals, such as experiencing life in a global city, learning English, travelling	To pursue a professional career	To save for future investment in the home country
Perception of timeframe of migration	Temporary	Long-term	Temporary
Job-seeking strategies	Taking any available employment; high degree of flexibility, typically low-skilled work in catering, cleaning and construction	Seeking possibilities for career advancement and to gain new qualifications. Either pursuing a planned career path or ‘jumping at any opportunity’ for upward mobility	Taking on the most easily accessible and best paid employment in low-skilled sectors, typically in catering, cleaning and construction
Mobility in the UK labour market	Horizontal mobility; in some cases (‘travellers’ especially) frequent job rotation	Mainly vertical mobility and longer-term employment	Low degree of horizontal mobility, tendency towards longer-term employment

Source: Author’s own elaboration

For ‘drifters’, ‘living life to the full’ is more important than having a career. They often get ‘sucked in’ by global city life, so different from the reality known in Poland. ‘Drifters’ value their independence, enjoy ‘the buzz’ of London, and want to make full use of everything the metropolis offers, such as entertainment, culture and educational opportunities. Many graduates belonging to this category are also keen travellers, and tend to focus on earning money towards realising their dream journey, and not on building a career:

I’m working as a shop assistant in a bookshop at the moment. I’m a bit tired of it, and I don’t really want to work in this branch, so this is a good moment to start thinking about changing jobs. But then, I want to go travelling soon ... You know, everything revolves around travelling. (Monika, master’s degree in library studies)

‘Drifting’ is typical of the initial stages of migration. Upon moving to the United Kingdom, the majority of graduates acted as ‘drifters’. They did not think in terms of labour market advancement but in terms of finding any employment allowing them to earn their keep. Their initial aim was to ‘go somewhere else’ and ‘have a look around’ and not specifically to develop a career. Therefore, opting for low-skilled jobs (e.g., cleaning or bartending) came as a natural choice or – in the case of pre-accession migrants – the only viable option:

You know what it’s like in the beginning ... Cleaning ... A real nightmare. You had to attend to such details, as, can you imagine, cleaning the toilet with cotton buds ... And no gloves, of course ... nothing! They didn’t even give me gloves! But my English was so poor at the time that I was happy I managed to get any job. (Monika, master’s degree in library studies)

The above quote yet again draws attention to the issue of capital. As mentioned, almost half of the interviewees did not have satisfactory language skills upon arrival, and the desire to acquire such skills was one of the main reasons for migrating to the United Kingdom. Hence, even if they wanted to advance their position in the receiving country, they did not have the necessary capital to do so (i.e. satisfactory fluency in English). Therefore, many of the ‘drifters’ had one particular aim in mind upon migration, namely, to improve their language skills. Also, while some of them wished to do so for their own satisfaction, others wanted to learn English well so as to improve their position in the Polish labour market. Thus, the ‘drifters’ category includes a ‘subgroup’ formed by ‘new capital seekers’: persons aiming to improve their position in the labour market at home and/or in the host country by improving their English language skills. They

focused their whole energy on this goal rather than on immediate career advancement.

Still, remaining a long-term ‘drifter’ is infrequent and is characteristic of those migrants who ‘suspend themselves in temporality’. Such persons choose to perceive their position as temporary, regardless of how long they have been living abroad. Typically, they have no clear plans for the future, and they do not know what kind of career they would like to pursue. They tend to live day by day, taking advantage of the benefits of living abroad, and not pondering their occupational position:

I just don’t think about it, I don’t reflect on it. I am where I am, I do what I do. (Beata, master’s degree in environmental studies)

After a period of ‘drifting’, the definite majority among the interviewees moved towards the category of ‘career seekers’. Naturally, the decision to embark on a career in the United Kingdom was of crucial importance for their professional biographies, constituting a turning point in their migration trajectories:

When I made the decision (to work towards my professional goal), this really influenced my life here (in the UK). I started organising and regulating my immigrant life. It appeared that leading a Bohemian lifestyle [of an irregular migrant working in a bar] is too risky, so I decided to formalise my stay. At some point, it appeared that there were actually some benefits to this, [...] I started achieving some goals, which corresponded to my ideals. And it was only at that point that I finally understood what I was here for. (Paweł, master’s degree in psychology)

The category of ‘career migrants’ thus consists of two groups: the minority who arrived to the United Kingdom with the aim to establish, change or develop their career, and a majority who made a conscious decision to work towards advancing their career sometime during their stay.²² Regardless of the time when such a decision was made, most ‘career migrants’ started off by working in low-skilled sectors in the receiving country. Only later did they advance to higher positions. Career-oriented migrants have more opportunities to move out of low-skilled sectors nowadays, but were also able to improve their position in the British labour market to some degree, even in the pre-accession period. They usually gather additional cultural and social capital by improving their language skills, gaining UK qualifications, establishing contacts and gaining social capital while working in menial jobs. They either consciously work towards building their new careers or, in the case of those less decided as to their ultimate professional goal, ‘jump at an opportunity’ once it arises.

The time it takes to move to higher positions depends on many highly individualised factors, among them, type of qualifications gained, determination, self-confidence, interpersonal skills, being operative, having the right contacts, having 'insider knowledge' of the host country's labour market²³ and finally sheer luck. Depending on all these and other factors, doing low-skilled work may only be a short phase at the beginning of the migration experience, or it may last for a number of years. It is important to also note that moving out of low-skilled positions frequently entails a sacrifice in salary level (e.g., cleaning private houses pays much more than working as a teacher's assistant).

The category of 'target earners' encompasses those graduates whose main purpose is saving money with a view to future investment in the home country. However, in the researched group, very few migrants belonged to this category (only 4 out of the 28 interviewees). Again, most of them initially acted as 'drifters', only later deciding that savings would be their main aim. Nevertheless, there is a crucial difference between typical target earners and the ones in question here. For the former, earning money is the most important goal and they usually live as modestly as possible, trying to accumulate as much financial capital as possible during their migration. However, the Polish graduates took a different stance. They made the decision to save towards a goal of either buying property in Poland or gaining additional professional qualifications, yet at the same time they see it as important to enjoy life while in the receiving country. Therefore, although they perceive saving as their main goal, they are not obsessive about it. They allow themselves to lead a 'normal' lifestyle, spending money on entertainment and travel. 'Target earners' with 'non-marketable' degrees or poor language skills naturally gravitate towards the low-skilled sectors of the UK labour market, where what they consider to be good earnings are most easily accessible to them and work is readily available. Hence, men typically take up jobs in the construction sector and women in catering and domestic work:

I want to build a house in Poland. My plan is to stay here for a year and earn enough for that, which is possible if you work here every day. Not that I really want to, but I can make such a sacrifice for a year. I want to work on a building site because, in all honesty, that's the best paid work here. (Rafał, master's degree in materials engineering)

This study demonstrate that although the graduates were steered towards the lower echelons of the UK labour market at first, most stopped 'drifting' at some point and managed to advance their occupational position.²⁴ What is more, regarding the pre-accession migrants, many had progressed even before Poland's accession to the EU, when the arduous institutional

barriers to working in the United Kingdom still existed. Therefore, it follows that low-skilled jobs are often simply entrance jobs for Polish graduates, providing they wish to achieve career advancement in the British labour market and work towards reaching this goal. However, for educated migrants who concentrate on other aspects than their professional career, such as self-development, travel and saving or who lack the drive or are indecisive about their career plans, the phase of carrying out menial work may become long-term.

9.6 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to analyse the reasons behind the gravitation of Polish graduates towards low-skilled jobs in the United Kingdom. Based on a case study of educated migrants working in London, it argued that this phenomenon results from a complexity of factors at the macro, meso and micro levels.

Structural conditions have significantly influenced the position of educated Poles in the British labour market. The macro level proved to be of particular importance for pre-accession migrants, whose semi-legal status led them to work mostly in the informal sector. In the case of post-accession migrants, formal institutional barriers were removed, yet a number of other factors continued to promote gravitation towards low-skilled positions, such as the structure of labour supply and demand and the problem of diploma recognition. Migrants without adequate professional qualifications are generally expected to fill shortages in the British labour market, which are most acute in manual occupations. Moreover, Polish graduates face strong competition from British university graduates. Therefore, despite the relative flexibility of the British labour market, the system generally drives highly educated migrants from Poland into low-skilled sectors, at least initially.

The same may be said for social ties and social capital (i.e. aspects constituting the meso-level of analysis). On the one hand, the Polish friends and acquaintances of newcomers often work in low-skilled sectors and volunteer to find similar posts for those newly arrived. Moreover, low self-esteem seems to be almost a national trait among Poles. Hence, many Polish migrants in Britain doubt their ability to work in higher positions there. On the other hand, it is commonly acknowledged that menial jobs are the most accessible to A-8 migrants, and British employment agencies offer primarily lower level work to Polish nationals. Hence, in the case of university educated Poles, factors at the meso-level further promote employment below qualifications in the initial stages of migration.

However, the micro-level is most significant for understanding the tendency of Polish graduates to take low-skilled jobs in Britain. The

timeframe of migration, and migrants' own perceptions of the impermanence of their stay, along with their motives for moving to the host country and for continuing their stay, prove crucial for their labour market behaviour. The overwhelming majority of the graduates at the start of their stay could be classified as 'drifters'. They did not migrate in order to embark on a career or to save for investment. Their aims were more 'post-materialist': to learn English, to travel and to experience life in a global city. Therefore, they opted for low-skilled jobs, which were readily available, entailed little responsibility and allowed them a high degree of flexibility. Also, 'target earners' (i.e. migrants whose main goal was to save) opted for the relatively well-paid low-skilled positions, particularly in construction, catering and cleaning, rather than to pursue occupational advancement. However, the longer the period of living abroad, the stronger the tendency towards seeking occupational advancement in the British labour market. Hence, the majority of 'drifters' became 'career seekers' over time, and depending on a number of highly individualised factors, achieved varying degrees of professional advancement.

Research on the group of Polish graduates working in London has demonstrated that while the macro- and meso-level conditions initially drive educated Poles to the low-skilled sectors, it is the micro-level factors that are most important in determining the length of time that graduates spend working in such positions. In consonance with the results of studies on over-education in the United Kingdom, the longer their work experience, the lower the degree of job mismatch (though apparently it remains much higher than for British graduates). However, in interpreting these results, it must be kept in mind that this study focused specifically on Polish graduates in London – a global city providing numerous opportunities for professional development. Educated migrants living in less developed regions of Britain are likely more limited in their career choices and hence face additional barriers to labour market advancement.

Notes

- 1 In May 2004 some 24,000 Polish nationals were in the UK for longer than a two month stay; by the end of 2007 the number was 690,000 (CSO 2008).
- 2 The interviews were carried out in an autobiographical interview tradition, here understood as following the respondents' line of thought as far as possible. The interview scripts (over the two rounds of research) covered the following themes: motives for migration; the decision-making process; motives for further stay; perceptions of the migration experience; perceptions of London; work and career advancement; social circle in England; maintaining links with Poland; changes brought about by EU accession; identity-related issues; personal values and beliefs; future plans. The interview materials were analysed and coded in line with the principles of grounded theory. However, the process of analysis of the 2007-2008 interviews was more complex than that of the 2004 interviews, as it entailed multiple 'layers'. Firstly, I compared the opinions of the panel sample

participants with those voiced back in 2004. Secondly, I compared the statements of the post-accession sample on themes taken from the 2004 interview script with those made a few years earlier by their older counterparts. Finally, I compared opinions of the pre- and post-accession migrants on common themes covered in the second round of research.

- 3 The participant observation technique could be applied only to a limited degree, as I was not part of the 'community' throughout the field-work. However, I spent as much time with the respondents as possible, often as a guest in their homes, staying overnight, accompanying them to their workplace and attending cultural events with them. Therefore, I played the role of 'participant-as-observer' (Gold 1958 in Scott 1997: 166).
- 4 As for sampling procedures, participants for both rounds of the study were found through personal contacts I had in London as well as internet sites for Poles living in London/the UK, such as www.londynek.net or www.gazeta.pl (I had advertised for participants on these sites). Snowballing was also involved, as many study participants were referred to me by others.
- 5 According to Giza-Poleszczuk & Marody (2000: 62), the 'mating' stage encourages such decisions as migration, as it is characterised by a low level of family obligations on the one hand (no children), and greater flexibility and inclination to take risks on the other. Yet at the same time it is accompanied by strong pressure to achieve professional and financial success.
- 6 At a later stage two return migrants from the original sample were also interviewed, thus expanding the panel sample to 14 persons.
- 7 Out of the 21 graduates, 13 had majored in arts and humanities (psychology, political science, history, language studies, philosophy and library studies), seven in the sciences (environmental studies, nutrition studies, biology, engineering and IT) and one person in business studies.
- 8 Two of the master's degrees were in history, one in sociology, and one in law and administration.
- 9 Of the bachelor's degrees, one was in sociology, one in marketing and management, and one in engineering.
- 10 The fact that so many interviewees within this sample had completed part-time studies can be treated as a sign of the times. Currently the number of students in this type of arrangement is much higher than throughout the 1990s. Part-time students have by far outnumbered full-time students since the early 2000s.
- 11 As higher education was not promoted in Poland under the communist system (Białecki 1996: 13), the number of graduates was relatively low at the time of the collapse of the system: only 6.5 per cent of the population aged 15 and older had a tertiary education in 1988 (CSO 2008).
- 12 These were often beyond reason. For example, it was not infrequent for employers to require tertiary education of shop assistants or knowledge of English for positions where it would not be used at all.
- 13 Between 1945 and 1956 the communist state restricted emigration and international travel by its citizens. From 1956 it became possible, although still quite difficult, to obtain a passport and it was only after 1970 that the passport policy became more liberal, allowing for tourist trips abroad. However, citizens wishing to travel would need to obtain permission from the state and hence undergo a long and complicated administrative procedure. In 1981 martial law was declared in Poland in order to suppress the Solidarity movement, and in consequence a wave of political refugees left country. At the same time, many Poles emigrated for economic reasons. Only after 1989 were all restrictions on international travel removed by the Polish state, allowing for free movement of its citizens (Fihel, Kaczmarczyk & Okólski 2006: 35-36).
- 14 Keep in mind, however, that economic conditions change, and this has a huge impact on the labour market position *inter alia* of migrant workers. Naturally, during periods of

economic crisis (as in the UK in 2008-2009) it is much more difficult both to find work and to achieve advancement in the labour market. It is therefore significant for the analysis that the group under study entered the British labour market in years of relative economic prosperity.

- 15 Before accession, Poles were granted entrance to the UK on the basis of a visa: a business, student or tourist visa. Since obtaining a business visa required securing a job with a British employer prior to migrating and was out of the reach of the majority of Polish graduates, they would commonly enter the UK on a tourist or student visa. The former were given for three to six months and prohibited any work. The latter were given to those entering the country to study and who had enrolled for some prepaid course (typically a language course). It officially permitted 20 hours of work per week.
- 16 Hence the prevalence of London as the destination for Poles in the pre-accession period: the 'underground' economy of this global city offered many jobs for cheap immigrant labour, particularly in the service sector (Sassen 2001: 289-304). Moreover, the capital offered the cheapest language courses in Britain, a highly significant factor for Polish graduates, the overwhelming majority of which entered the country on student visas.
- 17 Although there were certain opportunities for legal employment for Poles in the pre-accession period (e.g., registering as self-employed or obtaining a scholarship at a UK university), lack of knowledge of their existence as well as the language barrier prevented the majority of graduates from tapping them. In the case of the group researched, these opportunities were used by roughly one quarter of the interviewees. Out of the 21 pre-accession interviewees, only one registered as self-employed, two managed to obtain a scholarship, and three had obtained a business visa, yet all but one person did so after a few years' of illegal work and stay.
- 18 Currie (2007) and Tamar and Münz (2006) also point to the prospectively negative impact of worker registration regulations. Currie argues that the Worker Registration System (WRS) may have a hindering effect on the newcomers' ability to change occupation. Her research on Polish migrants has shown that once they register with the WRS, they become reluctant to change jobs and risk breaking the 12-month employment continuity regulation (Currie 2007: 93). Tamar and Münz draw attention to another problem related to the WRS procedures, namely the need to pay a registration fee (£ 90 at the time of this research). In their opinion, some migrants might find the fee to be too high (or consider it to be so), hence abstain from registering (at least for some time), and take up work in the informal sector (*ibid.*: 77). None of the migrants interviewed in the author's study mentioned the WRS as hindering their occupational mobility.
- 19 Alpin, Shackleton and Walsh (1998) found that as much as around 55 per cent of British graduates who completed their full-time education less than one year prior to their research were working in occupations which required a sub-degree level of qualification.
- 20 In the case of the pre-accession interviewees, their path towards professional development was a bumpy and non-linear one. The majority had spent a few years (between one and six, depending on length of stay) working in low-skilled positions, and had only managed to advance their careers after Poland's EU accession. Others have remained in low-skilled sectors.
- 21 Apart from using job agencies, another popular strategy for seeking work among the graduates was going door-to-door among pubs, restaurants and shops and asking for a job.
- 22 An additional group is formed by migrants who returned to Poland after a period of 'drifting' in the United Kingdom, to embark on a career in their home country (two persons).
- 23 Fischer et al. (1997) mention having such knowledge as one of the main advantages of remaining immobile. My study subjects fully prove their point: leaving personal characteristics aside, it is above all lack of insider knowledge of the British labour market that causes their gravitation towards low-skilled sectors. The UK employment market operates very differently from the Polish one, and it takes time for the migrant to recognise this

fact. In Poland, having formal qualifications, appropriate work experience and often also the right 'acquaintances' is seen as crucial for getting a good position. The British labour market is much more open and flexible. There are many more positions at the 'medium level' and opportunities for promotion. Hence, to Polish graduates with little experience of the host country's labour market, moving to higher positions in Great Britain often seems near impossible, especially if they do not have degrees which are in high demand (for instance, IT).

- 24 In the case of the pre-accession migrants, only 3 out of the 18 persons who remained in the United Kingdom during the course of the research (3 persons having returned to Poland between 2004 and 2008) remained in the same low-skilled job they had taken up upon migration. In the case of the post-accession interviewees, three out of six interviewees had already moved out of their low-skilled jobs. Nevertheless, achieving high positions in the British labour market seems rare in the case of graduates who were not professionals when they arrived in the United Kingdom. A ceiling to labour market advancement has been reported by those aiming for professional positions.

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10 Changes in tertiary education and student mobility in Hungary

Irina Molodikova

10.1 Introduction

Education and availability of highly qualified specialists is crucial to economic development. Policies are therefore often aimed at building strong links between universities, to stimulate innovation in science and business. Most Western countries show a widening income gap between those who received a good education and the rest, according to the OECD (2005). It has even been calculated that 1 per cent growth in a population's level of education raises economic output by 3 to 6 per cent (Schleicher 2006).

Studying internationally is becoming more and more popular, and educational migration is one of the most rapidly developing types of migration today. In the mid-1980s its volume was estimated to be 800,000 students. This grew to more than one million by the mid-1990s, and further to about one and a half million by the end of the twentieth century, exceeding two million by the start of the 2000s (Salt & Almeida 2006). Trade in education as a service developed very rapidly in the same decade, reaching about 3 per cent of total trade in services in OECD countries by 1999 (Larsen, Martin & Morris 2002).

Europe still lags behind the United States in investment in tertiary education and research and development (Reich 2006). In response, the EU launched the 'Bologna Process' and European Higher Education Area (EHEA) to raise the competitiveness and attractiveness of European higher education and foster student mobility. Nevertheless, there have been many difficulties in the realisation of the full scope of the EHEA's objectives.¹

The project 'Bologna with Student Eyes' (ESU 2009) describes students' views on progress:

The Bologna Process is all about a vision, a vision of breaking down educational borders and creating a European Higher Education Area where learning is encouraged, facilitated and enabled in a simplified, integrated way across the continent. The Process should be about delivering this vision, translating the concept into a reality on the ground (ibid.: 5).

The new member states of the EU are all managing the implementation of the EHEA differently, in line with their varying political and economic conditions and progress in transforming their economies into a competitive market system (Kwiek 2008). Despite progress made on some aspects, a World Bank evaluation of CEE countries found that ‘since the transition, inequities in learning opportunities have increased’ (World Bank 2000: 28–30). Recent OECD reports support the conclusion that from an international perspective, these countries have been unsuccessful in higher education development (World Bank 2002; OECD 2007a).

To understand the challenges in education faced by the new member states, this chapter looks at the mobility of students from higher education institutions in Hungary. Student mobility is a primary EHEA goal. The chapter uses Hungarian, OECD and European Commission documents and materials, along with interviews with professors, admissions officers, and student union representatives at Hungarian universities. The aim is to provide a better understanding of the evolution of higher education in Hungary, by looking especially at the Central European University (CEU), Semmelweis Medical University and Corvinus University. Interviews conducted at the Hungarian Ministry of Education and Culture (MoE) provide additional insights into the development of higher education as a service, international student mobility to and from Hungary, and the obstacles and future prospects in this regard in the context of EU enlargement.

10.2 Data framework of the study

The distinction and advantage of the present study is its attempt to analyse information that has not typically been collected by universities in Hungary about their alumni and to give a detailed description of the international student body at different higher education institutions. The evaluation is based on information from the Department of Statistics of the Ministry of Education in Hungary, including detailed distributions of foreign students by academic department for the 2001–2002 and 2007–2008 school years. Based on this information, the flows and trends of foreign students from different countries are summarised. To understand the geographic distribution of places students arrive from and later return to, the CEU database on alumni origin and destination after graduation is analysed. Surprisingly, we found that data on international students’ places of origin and destination after their studies are not maintained by other universities or within the Ministry of Education.

The CEU recruitment office, in collaboration with the student records office and alumni office, tries to keep track of alumni. But at Corvinus and Semmelweis, no similar surveys or databases exist on students’ career development after graduation. Founded in the early 1990s, the CEU² became

one of the first universities with a mission to establish scientific links with the West and the transitional countries, offering educational programmes in English, and with the majority of students being international.

An alumni affairs office was established at the CEU in 1998 to develop closer links between the university and its alumni. The CEU database includes information on more than 12,000 former students. We selected 1,820 CEU graduates from each of the 1992-2004 and 2005-2007 periods. We considered only graduates originating from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Baltic states, as they comprised the largest student groups at CEU until 2004, with an estimated total of some 5,000. The analyses of alumni migration behaviour was done using information on students' place of origin and their place of destination after graduation. The data was grouped by the place of origin, distinguishing between a capital city, a regional centre and a peripheral area and the different countries of origin and their destination upon departure.

The indicators available in the CEU dataset allow a description of the socio-demographic characteristics of the students, their country of origin, professional skills and direction of migration (further to the West or back to the home country). In addition to the detailed CEU case study, information was collected from two other universities: Corvinus University and Semmelweis University. Both these universities are well known in Hungary and abroad and offer programmes for foreigners in English.

To understand the education system for foreign students in Hungary, about 25 interviews were conducted by the author. Interview subjects were students and representatives of the student unions of these three universities, as well as recruitment office staff, professors and graduates from each. Interviews were also conducted with three officials at the Ministry of Education.

10.3 Hungary: Low mobility in the context of Europe

Hungary has one of the lowest levels of general mobility of the population (Hárs & Sik 2008a, 2008b; Juhász 2003). Eurobarometer survey data support this statement (Eurofound 2006b, 2007a). The enlargement process did not have much influence on the mobility pattern, for instance, in comparison with Poland, where mobility increased dramatically for several years after it joined the EU. The population of Hungary was 10 million in 2008 and is declining and ageing. Twenty-one per cent are over 60 years of age and the proportion of youth decreased from 21.8 per cent to 16.1 per cent from 1980 to 2004 (KSH 2008). The number of pupils entering school was almost equal to the number of students entering universities in 2007. To stabilise the population, the country needs about 40,000 migrants per year, and according to population forecasting, education migration is

one possible source for permanent immigration (Halbicsek & Toth 2002). The immigrant population in Hungary is small compared to other European states. It stands at around 1.7 per cent of total population, or about 175,000 foreign nationals holding residence permits. About 85 per cent of foreigners are of European origin. The majority of migrants arrived from neighbouring countries.

The 2004 EU enlargement set off a societal and policy debate in many EU countries on free movement of workers and the effects of such free movement on both the sending and receiving countries (Hárs & Kováts 2005). The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions organised a series of research projects on different types of mobility (geographical, occupational, labour, long distance, population and job mobility) (Eurofound 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e, 2007f). A first output was an overview report by Vandenbrande et al. (2006) which presents a descriptive analysis of the data collected and examines four key areas of research: EU policy, geographical mobility, job mobility and restricted mobility. The study concluded that competitiveness in a knowledge-based economy is becoming a cornerstone of EU development and a basis for overcoming negative demographic trends that could bring about labour shortages.

The EU promotes mobility for a better allocation of labour resources across Europe. Yet, the survey results based on Eurobarometer 64.1, on different aspects of European mobilities (Eurofound 2006a, 2006b; 2007a), highlighted the fact that most Europeans have no intention of moving to another country, nor to another region within their own country. Only 8.6 per cent of the working-age population in Europe intended to move to another region within the next five years (Eurofound 2007a). The conclusion is thus that the general level of mobility in EU countries is low: just 18 per cent of people move outside their region of residence (compared to 32 per cent in the United States), about 4 per cent move to other EU countries and a mere 3 per cent migrate beyond EU borders (Eurofound 2006a, 2006b).

According to the authors of these reports, mobility can be improved to some extent by increased mobility of students and postgraduate academics within the framework of the Bologna Process. Research attributes low mobility to fears of losing the support of social networks and to language barriers. Twenty-five European countries were grouped into four clusters according to the mobility of their working age population (the percentage of people who live in a region other than that they were born in). Hungary is in the 'low mobility' group of new member states, along with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia. In these countries, very few citizens – between 0.5 per cent and 1.8 per cent of all respondents – had a firm intention to move to another EU country (Eurofound 2006b: 4). Analysis of long-term mobility indicates that only about 9 per cent of Hungarians had

made a long-term move outside their region of origin; about 1 per cent had moved to another EU country and about 1.5 to 2 per cent had moved to a non-EU country. This is almost half the average rates for the EU-25.

Nonetheless, a survey on job mobility (Eurofound 2007f: 15) placed Hungarian workers higher than average within the EU-25 for 'ever having changed employer'. The various combinations of geographical and job mobility were grouped into five mobility clusters. Hungary was categorised as a country with a high level of job mobility but among the lowest levels of geographical mobility, along with Eastern European new member states the Czech Republic and Latvia.³

Other surveys on migration intention indicate that it increased from 2002 to 2005, from 1.3 per cent to 3 per cent (Eurofound 2007b), and relatively more in the new member states than in the EU-15 countries. This is likely due to an increased awareness among the populations of these countries of the need to invest in language skills and to efforts of the EU to promote cross-border mobility of students, for example, through the Erasmus and Socrates programmes (Vandenbrande et al. 2006: 9). However, students represent a relatively small part of the total population sample.

Large differences continue to exist between the new member states in the measured level of migration intention. There are countries with high intention, like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and those with low intention, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. Hungary has one of the lowest intentions to even move to another region within the country. A Eurofound (2007b: 16) study rated Hungary between Malta and the Czech Republic, at about 2.5 to 3 per cent, while the EU-25 average is 8.6 per cent. Fassmann and Münz (2002) suggest that the inflow of migrant labour from Eastern European countries will depend on the demographic situation in those countries. According to them, the decline in birth rates over the past decade, together with increased mortality rates, will lead to a drop in population sizes. As a result, younger cohorts may benefit from better chances on the labour market. However, they also mention that mobility intention is a product of past, present and future mobility behaviour: people who have migrated in the past are likely to migrate again in the future. That means Hungary will likely retain its position as a low mobility country in the near future (Eurofound 2007b). It is unlikely that there will be a rise in mobility in Hungary, as happened, for instance, in Poland after EU accession.

10.4 Development and current challenges of the higher education system in Hungary

According to the Ministry of Education Yearbook (2009b), public expenditure in Hungary on all educational institutions peaked in 2007-2008 at

about 5.6 per cent of GDP. Later it reached about 5.8 per cent, only slightly below the OECD average (OECD 2008: 237). Higher education institutions' share of public spending on education consisted of about 19.8 per cent in 2007. In 2008, the Hungarian budget allocations to higher education comprised 214 billion forints, equivalent to about one billion dollars for some 400,000 students.

Hungarian higher education has a long history (Meszaros 1999). The first Hungarian university was founded in Pécs in 1367. Now there are 72 institutions offering higher education in Hungary. This includes spiritual and religious education institutions (Buddhist, Adventist and Baptist academies), which are called *Főiskola*, and smaller colleges, typically with 2,000 to 3,000 students. There are 18 state universities, 12 state colleges, 7 non-state universities and 34 non-state colleges. Of the total of about 400,000 students, 16,299 are international students (MoE 2008c).

Several OECD reports on Hungarian higher education point to many gaps in education development, despite the improvement efforts of recent years. For example, the proportion of 25-64 year olds in Hungary that has obtained a tertiary qualification is 17 per cent, substantially lower than the OECD average of 26 per cent (OECD 2007a, 2007b).

An important change in the higher education system was introduced with the Higher Education Act of 1993. The Act promoted greater autonomy of universities and commercialisation of higher education and led to the creation of new public and non-state higher education institutions. Their development was linked to the overall restructuring of the economy. In the face of uncertain job prospects, many young people opted for education instead. Government budgets for universities and colleges were based on the exact number of students attending, so it was profitable to increase the number of students. Since it was necessary and sufficient to have at least two science disciplines to acquire university status, an array of small universities were established across Hungary offering only a few disciplines, such as informatics, communications and business. However, those universities with internationally recognised diplomas are fewer (examples are the University of Szeged, the Eötvös Loránd University, Corvinus University of Budapest) (Hrubos 2003, 2007).

The Hungarian higher education system expanded very quickly, in general, as measured by numbers of higher education institutions, numbers of students and disciplines, and by their geographical spread. Yet, according to Ministry of Education officials, the numerical increase affected education quality:

Earlier lectures were made for small auditoriums, now lectures are delivered to great halls. And all higher education institutions offer lectures on economics and communications. In 40 towns of the country – that is, actually in every town – there are departments of

economics and departments of communications. Well, we don't need so many of them, yet there are lobbies that support these higher education institutions in every town.⁴


Unfortunately, the number of lecturers is insufficient to enable all of the institutions to get through the process of accreditation, which requires professors to be assigned to a single university only. An OECD report (2007b) named low remuneration of lecturers and lack of tenure contracts as adverse features of Hungarian education development. The conclusion was that this situation is not conducive to formation of a faculty elite, and it forces lecturers to hold jobs at several universities at once.

One professor of English at Corvinus University noted, 'the level of lecturers in English-speaking programmes is inadequate'.⁵ Ministry officials support this claim, saying that only with EU enlargement and the introduction of mobility grants for lecturers would professors have the chance to improve their language proficiency, for example, by using grants to visit Western universities. This would contribute to improve the quality of education. The situation regarding student mobility also has complications. The state gives loans to students for tertiary education, but the amounts are relatively low (the average loan sum is only US \$ 1,717) and the interest rate is high (11.95 per cent) (OECD 2007b).

In spite of those problems, Hungarian higher education has developed in a very dynamic way. Data from the Ministry of Education Yearbook (2009b) demonstrate that throughout almost a 50-year period (1960 to 2008) the number of full-time and part-time students increased nearly ten-fold, from 44,585 to 397,704. However, the peak of this increase occurred in the first year after Hungary joined the EU. In the two following years the number of students declined (figure 10.1). This can be explained by the constant decrease in the number of part-time students, while the number of full-time students rose steadily (increasing from 29,344 to 242,893 between 1999 and 2008). Nevertheless, the general trend in recent years is that of declining numbers of students, perhaps due to the influence of the Hungarian demographic crisis.

Demographic problems in Hungary will have a large influence on future education system development. A high-ranking Ministry official therefore insisted on the need to switch from quantitative measures to qualitative indicators in assessments of educational standards. Another difficulty also exists:

There are more seats in some disciplines than students willing to learn. In particular, this is the situation in technical sciences. Nowadays, psychological and communication sciences are particularly popular, not biology or chemistry.⁶

Figure 10.1 Dynamics of number of students in Hungary, 1990-2008

Source: Ministry of Education (2009b)

The Mobility Barometer (ESU 2008) discusses inconsistent information on trends in short-term student mobility. According to a European University Association survey, 53 per cent of Hungarian higher education institutions indicated that outgoing student mobility had increased ‘significantly’ since 2003, while 27 per cent reported a ‘slight’ increase. Student organisations agree that mobility has increased since Hungary joined the Bologna Process. According to statistics from the Erasmus programme, Hungary’s participation as a student hosting nation is just half the European average, while as a student sending nation it is 93 per cent of the average (ESU 2008). Student organisations, however, remain critical of the overall level of student mobility. According to them, the funding available for outward mobility is entirely inadequate. Many students lack funds to live abroad for their studies. Nevertheless, the rate of emigration has increased slightly since Hungary joined the EU.

10.5 Mobility programmes and exchange students to Hungary

The Bologna Process and developments since EU enlargement have pushed Hungary to reconsider the value of higher education both as a profitable market and in the context of its own shrinking population. Hungary is also aware that rankings of university excellence today include their participation in international joint endeavours. As an EU member state, Hungary has been involved in numerous international exchange

programmes for students, teachers and academic researchers. Due to these factors major Hungarian universities have introduced more bachelor's and master's programmes in foreign languages, predominantly English and German. To prevent student migration from functioning merely as an illegal route of entry into the EU, various regulations have been enacted for supervision of foreign students and reporting on third-country nationals.

The Office of Hungarian Scholarship Board and the Central Office for Study in Hungary⁷ were founded in 2004 and unite about 50 institutions of higher education in the country. Their aim is to create publicity abroad for Hungarian higher education and to support the Hungarian higher education system in creating new courses in foreign languages. According to Ministry officials, 22 higher education institutions in Hungary offer 170 academic majors in foreign languages (OFIK 2009).

In the 2000s, Hungary formulated its first national development plan (NDA 2007) to bring higher education revenues more in line with the EU average. Implementation of the plan involves several ministries and governmental organisations.⁸ Together, they established the Hungarian National Commission for UNESCO to support the Network of Research Students, the Model United Nations Conference and the OECD Hungarian National Committee. The ministries and the Governmental Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad also established the Agora Service Network for young Hungarians living in neighbouring countries and state scholarships for foreigners. The latter are based on two systems of application:

1. via the Hungarian Scholarship Board;⁹
2. via bilateral agreements between the Hungarian Ministry of Culture and Education and the relevant ministry of the given country.¹⁰

For many programmes, applicants must be fluent in Hungarian. Hence, their eligibility is limited primarily to ethnic Hungarians in neighbouring countries and foreigners who graduated in the study of the Hungarian language.

Hungary participates in five EU 'Socrates' programmes. One of them, 'Comenius', has strengthened the European dimension in Hungarian education by establishing 17 European Study Centres (ESC). The Tempus Foundation was created in 1996 for the same purpose and coordinates a number of activities: the EU Socrates programme (education), the Leonardo da Vinci programme (vocational training), the Central European Exchange Programme for University Studies (CEEPUS) (for the EU Pestalozzi programme), the World Languages programmes of the Hungarian Ministry of Education (to develop knowledge of foreign languages), and Utavalo scholarship programmes for disadvantaged students (MoE 2005).

In addition, Hungary has participated in various EU programmes, such as Erasmus, Erasmus Mundus, and Research and Development Framework

programmes.¹¹ Erasmus Mundus is a mobility programme to support international relations among European universities. It offers scholarships for Europeans and non-European third-country nationals. CEU and Corvinus University were among the first to participate in this programme, which was proposed by the European Commission to enhance the attractiveness of European higher education outside Europe. Erasmus Mundus is a two-year master's degree programme in which students study for a year at one of the participating higher education institutions and then go abroad to one of four partner institutions for the second year. They receive a degree from all participating universities (MoE 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009a).

Another possibility for international cooperation among universities is the creation of joint degree programmes. Usually such joint programmes are established by two universities. When a student goes to a partner university, their credits have to be counted by the home university upon their return. Such programmes are at the early stages of development in Hungary, with few students involved as yet.

To support the mobility of students in the Erasmus student exchange programme, the government provides supplementary grants of € 250 to € 350 per month. Students, however, have difficulty getting mobility grants that cover both tuition and living costs. A student union representative from Corvinus University said that funds were a large obstacle to participation in international exchange programmes: 'Everything depends on the availability of funds.' Government spending for the Erasmus programme covers about half of the cost to students and consists of € 7.3 million for about 3,000 students who participated in the programme from 1998 until the end of the 2005-2006 academic year, travelling to 31 countries.

Though Hungary's territory is relatively small, universities took little part in student exchanges before the 2000s. Afterwards, especially after EU enlargement, the situation started to change. Now when a student is awarded a bachelor's degree and wants to apply for a master's programme, universities may compete for their application. The largest Hungarian universities have the advantage in this competitive struggle. Many universities have created recruitment desks, but according to an official from the Ministry of Education, 'Not all presidents of universities understand that specialists in recruitment are needed for such tasks and that recruitment nets need to be established.'¹² A recruitment officer at Corvinus University noted that students wanting to continue their studies used to approach the university themselves; now they need to be sought out.

The Bologna Process and formation of the EHEA have pushed Hungarian universities to offer new master's programmes in English, especially in science and engineering. Hungary has now also entered into the global competition for talent (Batalova 2007). But difficulties remain, as pointed out by a student union representative at Corvinus University:

The internationalisation of education is good. Here in Hungary we students generally have very little desire to travel abroad. Even in Corvinus, it is highly stratified, those students who are engaged in the natural sciences, they are not interested in travelling, in international experience and in foreign languages. The situation becomes even worse when some of them cannot get their degree, as they are not able to pass the state foreign language exams. However, those in business administration, management and economics departments are more flexible. They are willing to travel and learn foreign languages. A multicultural environment is good for education.¹³

It is difficult to say for sure how many foreigners are studying in Hungary. Different sources show varying figures, from 11,000 to 17,000 students, or from 1 per cent to 4.2 per cent of the total number of students. According to some reports (e.g., OECD 2007a), international enrolments make up about 2.7 per cent of tertiary students in Hungary (compared with 6.7 per cent on average among OECD countries). This share remained constant between 1999 and 2006. However, in absolute terms, numbers increased considerably because of the growing Hungarian student population in that period. For example, in the 12 academic years from 1995 through 2008, the number of international students more than doubled, from 6,300 to 16,212 (MoE 2009b). The numbers increased from year to year, though they did not peak in the year of accession to the EU, when the total number of Hungarian students reached its highest number. Nonetheless, even the highest estimates of numbers of international students in Hungary are considerably lower than, for example, that in the United Kingdom.

Some foreigners arriving from adjacent states acquire Hungarian citizenship during their studies and then disappear from the statistics on foreigners. Hungarian language studies are free of charge, and usually attract students from neighbouring states. The number of foreign students arriving in Hungary in 2005-2006 was twice the number of Hungarian students who went abroad for education. The majority of international students in Hungary come from neighbouring Romania (23 per cent), Slovakia (16 per cent), Ukraine (9.2 per cent) and Serbia and Montenegro (8 per cent). Germany, too, is among the top five (9.7 per cent).

Destination countries for Hungarian students are predominantly Germany (37.7 per cent) and Austria (14.8 per cent), which together received more than 50 per cent of all Hungarian students abroad. The third main destination is the United States (12.8 per cent). France and the United Kingdom receive an almost equal number of Hungarian students (7.9 per cent and 7.6 per cent, respectively). Although the proportion of international students to all Hungarian students has been constant, the proportion of Hungarian students studying abroad compared to all Hungarian students declined – from 2.4 per cent in 1999 to 1.7 per cent in 2006

(www.lets gocampaign.net). This is largely due to the increase in the total number of students in higher education.

10.6 International students in Hungary: Changes in statistics and mobility strategies from 2001 to 2008

For the analysis of international students' mobility to Hungary, data were compiled from the 2001-2002 and 2008-2009 academic years, with students grouped by region of origin. Ministry of Education data show an increase in the total number of international students from 11,813 to 16,916 from the academic year 2000-2001 to 2008-2009. This translates into a 43 per cent rise (see table 10.1). However, contradictory data can be found in other statistics due to different definitions and indices. For example, the 2009 *Ministry of Education Yearbook* uses several definitions:

- foreigners (full-time without residence permit), 11,245 students;
- foreigners (full-time with and without residence permit), 12,212 students;
- foreigners (full-time and part-time with and without residence permit), 13,878 students.

Foreign students were grouped into four categories by place of origin: (1) EU-15 countries; (2) neighbouring countries, including Serbia with Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Romania and Croatia; (3) other new EU member states, including the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Malta, Poland, Bulgaria and Cyprus; (4) other European states (non-EU). Other countries were grouped by continent. Comparing the academic years 2001-2002 and 2008-2009, it turns out that the number of students increased from all groups of countries and continents, but the shares of the groups changed, sometimes dramatically.

There was a slight decrease in the share of students coming from within Europe (from 80.6 to 78.0 per cent). Changes within this group were more marked. In 2001 and in 2008, most international students came from neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, their percentage in the total dropped from 62.7 per cent in 2001-2002 to 48.6 per cent in 2008-2009. In contrast, students from EU-15 countries were in the third position, after neighbouring countries and Asia, but their number increased more than twofold, from 1,662 to 4,391, raising their share in the total number of international students from 14.0 per cent to 25.9 per cent. The share of students from other continents also slightly increased. For example, African students, though still a small group, more than doubled, from 167 students to 424. Summing up, these numbers clearly show a tendency towards further internationalisation of Hungarian higher education.

Table 10.1 *Foreign students in Hungary by country of origin*

<i>Students' place of origin</i>	<i>Students in 2001-2002</i>	<i>Share of total in 2001, %</i>	<i>Students in 2008-2009</i>	<i>Share of total in 2008, %</i>	<i>Difference 2001-2008, % increase</i>
Europe					
EU-15	1,662	14.0	4,391	25.9	164
Neighbouring (2)	7,412	62.7	8,224	48.6	11
New EU (3)	189	1.5	201	1.1	6
Non-EU	262	2.2	373	2.2	42
Subtotal	9,525	80.6	13,189	78.0	38
Continents					
Africa	167	1.4	424	2.5	154
Asia	1,776	15.0	2,827	16.7	59
Australia and Oceania	5	0.01	16	0.01	220
North America	319	2.7	417	2.4	30
South America	21	0.1	43	0.2	104
Subtotal	2,288	19.3	3,727	22.0	62
TOTAL	11,813		16,916		43

Source: Ministry of Education and Culture (MoE 2009b)

The trend in students from new member states is similar to that for neighbouring countries, also decreasing in share. Students from these countries seem to have reoriented their education aspirations towards the EU-15 countries. After enlargement, they gained access to the best universities in Western Europe and prefer to seek education there where they want to find jobs as well.

Some Western European countries have a tradition of cultural and scientific relations with the new member states and have opened new universities or branches of established universities in these countries. For example, Swedish higher education institutions have traditionally had a strong presence in the Baltic states. Interviewed students from Lithuania and Latvia confirmed this:

Our students prefer to get into universities or their branches opened in our countries by Scandinavian countries (Sweden, for instance). Upon graduation from these universities, chances to continue education in Scandinavia are increasing. Traditionally many young people from here go to Sweden to earn money.¹⁴

CEU data indicates that few of their Estonian, Lithuanian and Latvian alumni moved to the West after graduation (7.2 per cent, 15.6 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively). They returned home instead. Among graduates from other countries (not new member states), the share of those who moved to the West is about 25 per cent, depending on their country of

origin. For some Asian countries, for example, Uzbekistan, more than one third of students did not return home after graduation, but rather went on to Western countries (27 per cent) or to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (8.7 per cent, mostly to Russia and Ukraine). The situation is similar for students from Azerbaijan (35.1 per cent non-return), Belarus (31 per cent) and Ukraine (30.3 per cent). Continued migration is likely the result of socio-economic and political uncertainty in the country of origin (Molodikova 2007, 2008).

The more time students spend in a country, the higher the probability that they will not return home (Borjas 2004). Language proficiency is one of most important steps in integration into the host society. Interviews at Corvinus University, Semmelweis University and CEU support this. Students from neighbouring countries who received their education in either Hungarian or in English, but who also speak Hungarian, often opt to stay in Hungary after graduation. Since the 2007 Schengen expansion, students from neighbours such as Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia no longer need a labour permit to work. After several years of education in Hungary, they usually find a job there. Many have relatives already living in Hungary. An interview with one Serbian Hungarian alumni presents a typical story:

How I got here? After graduation from school, I decided to go to Hungary for education. In our country, after the war, the situation was not the best. My uncle and my elder brother already worked here. I arrived and was accepted into Corvinus University in the Department of Sociology (in Hungarian). I graduated and found the job where I work now. My husband is also from our small town in Serbia and studied in Hungary. We have known each other since then.¹⁵

As mentioned above, the largest group of foreign students comes from neighbouring countries. The second largest group are students from EU-15 states. Western European students are mainly interested in medicine and business (economics), according to the Ministry of Education. About 82 per cent of them apply to medical departments at Semmelweis University (Budapest), the University of Pécs, the University of Debrecen or the University of Szeged. Medical programmes at these particular universities have a good reputation, and their diplomas are recognised in many Western countries. Most of these students return to their home countries or go to another EU country after graduation. Their main motivation for study abroad is only to get an education, not to find a job in Hungary. In-depth interviews with six students confirm this general picture: 'I am planning to return home and will continue my education in some other place in well-known European universities.'¹⁶ North American students do not choose

medicine, but rather business and economics, and have a similar strategy to either return home or go on to another Western country after finishing their education. Asian students (the third-largest group of foreign students) have a different strategy. They usually have scholarships provided by the EU through Tempus and Erasmus programmes. Most hope to find a job in the West. One Asian student from Uzbekistan explained:

Nobody wants to be a king in a country of beggars. That is to say, that the very situation in a country creates a bad mood. The fact that you want to live in another country is one of the reasons to emigrate.¹⁷

Asian students sometimes do return home, to a disappointing situation. As one commented, 'I soon understood that for me it is difficult to work and live in such an unpleasant environment and I found a new job in Europe.'¹⁸

Students from China are less Western-oriented. Corvinus University organises a special preparatory school to help Chinese students get into the university. Subjects are taught in Chinese and English. Those who gained entry to the university via a scholarship have usually gone through a vast competitive selection process and are highly ambitious. They often promptly find jobs in joint ventures owned by Chinese companies or return home to get good positions there. A participant of Erasmus Mundus two-year programme describes his career expectations regarding study in Budapest and the United Kingdom:

I'll work a year or, perhaps, two in England and then I want to go over to some UN structure. There I'll acquire useful connections and contacts too. After that, with the experience of working in business and international organisations and all those contacts, only then will I return. And then they will pay me real money.¹⁹

Sometimes a student visa is the only way to get into a Western country. The Immigration Office in Budapest mentioned the case of a university where 25 Chinese students disappeared from an English language course. The university only reported that it had withdrawn the status of the students upon being questioned by the Office, a week after a report of the incident had appeared in the media. In this case, 4 of the 25 disappeared students had reportedly applied to the programme with the help of a recruiting agency in China. The rest of the students had registered via two Chinese citizens living in Budapest, also operating as recruitment agents.

For international students who are not ethnic Hungarians, remaining in Hungary is not a priority (Molodikova 2007). In many cases, this is connected to the difficulty of learning Hungarian. Even after five years of living and working in Hungary in international organisations, many use

English in their everyday life. They rank their own integration in Hungarian society as a five or a six on a ten-point scale. They have few Hungarian friends; they do not speak Hungarian and do not see a future for themselves in Hungary. The exceptions are those who have a Hungarian spouse or partner. They typically do speak Hungarian to some extent and plan to stay in Hungary in the future. Most other foreigners are pondering whether to move on to an English-speaking country.

Hungarian migration regulations make no allowances for longer stays for foreign alumni from Hungarian universities. There are no laws to allow graduated students to stay in the country for one or two years and search for a job, unlike the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France. In Hungary, the specific difficulty of the language means that graduates have little chance of finding a job, because they can only work in international organisations in English.

10.7 Mobility of international students after graduation

Interviews with CEU alumni from the 1990s indicate that their mobility strategies and intentions were different from those of today's students.²⁰ About three quarters of former CEU international students who completed a master's programme after 2000 returned to their native country. In the 1990s, however, graduates were preoccupied with finding employment abroad:

Students from my course were obsessed with submitting applications to some other universities for some other master's programme. It was a real rage. About 80 per cent of them would go somewhere to continue their studies. As a rule, they thought they would go to the West. Those who planned to come back to their hometowns and proceed with a PhD were few and, strange as it might be, I should not like to say that I wanted to write a PhD or to study more but I was involved in the process and took part in it. By that time, I had clear understanding that the humanities was not my profile and I applied for business administration. All in all, ten years have passed since that time and I now work at General Electric Company.²¹

The migration behaviour demonstrated by students from non-EU European countries is defined by the individual characteristics of the country of origin. Some researchers (Fassmann & Münz 2002; Zaionchkovskaya 2006; Molodikova 2007) agree that since the end of the transition period students' desire to stay abroad by any means has passed. The demographic situation, with its shortage of Western-educated, highly skilled specialists, offers good starting positions for many students in their home countries.

Recruitment officers at CEU and Corvinus University noted important changes in the mobility of students since the 2004 EU enlargement, particularly for those from the new member states. Before the enlargement, students from these states were more willing to come to Hungary. But now they are more inclined to study in the West, said a Corvinus University recruitment officer. 'However, the inflow of Romanians is still high, and more foreign students come via the Erasmus Mundus programme.'²² There is also a growing inflow of students from the United States and Canada, said one recruitment officer:

It is steadily growing, and this is because it is much cheaper to get a degree here than in the United States. However, for North Americans, their engagement is highly dependent on dissemination of information among young people; the student has to be aware of the university, which strictly speaking means the university has to spend money on the recruitment.

... The number of US and Canadian students is not significant. US and Canadian students come with their specific programmes, generally in groups with one or two tutors for undergraduates. They stay here a semester and go back or on to other places.²³

Recruitment offices play an important role in attracting students. For instance, medical universities' recruitment offices have close contacts with German and Scandinavian medical schools, while universities such as Corvinus, Eötvös Loránd, Debrecen, Szeged and Pécs have a traditional orientation towards neighbouring countries. These universities therefore receive their main inflow of international students from these countries.

CEU was a long-time participant in Open Society Institute-related recruitment of international students. Many of these offices have since closed, however, and CEU has shifted its focus away from former Soviet countries to attract more students from Africa, Asia and Latin America. This is reflected in the diminished student applications from former Soviet countries. Their share dropped from 13.7 per cent (for Russia) in 1997-2004 to 4.7 per cent in the 2007-2008 academic year (Molodikova 2008).

CEU data indicates a very high share of alumni returning to their country of origin: 76 per cent, 69 per cent of which return to their town of origin and 7 per cent going to another area in their native country, such as a regional centre or capital city. However, in the early 1990s, a smaller share of international students seems to have opted to return to their native country after graduation from CEU (this picture was confirmed by the alumni of 1992-1995). An opportunity to study abroad for one year only reduces the potential of 'rooting' in the country of study.

There is a wide range of Western countries where the CEU alumni reside after graduation. Most graduates stay within Europe, rather than move to

the United States and Canada. Nevertheless, the United States is a leader, having become the home to 101 graduates. It is followed by Hungary (70), Canada (41), Great Britain (48) and Poland (27). Fewer graduates moved to the Czech Republic (14), the Netherlands (14) and France (13). Other countries received 1 to 3 CEU graduates. Overall, the geographic distribution of alumni after graduation from CEU is quite extensive and includes 33 countries, besides the native country and the CIS countries.

Mobility of CEU graduates is largely a function of their previous place of residence. Most international students at CEU studied previously at a university in a capital city. However, with the passing of the years the share of students coming from regional centres and small towns has been on the rise. We were interested in mobility strategies of students and assumed that differences in place of origin would influence mobility behaviour.

Table 10.2 shows the origin and destinations of students from the capitals and the other towns and periphery areas. As noted, there are almost equal shares of students from the regional centres and from the periphery

Table 10.2 *Distribution of the CEU students according to the country and city in which they currently reside (n = 1,797)*

<i>Place of origin</i>	<i>Place of destination after graduation</i>	<i>Share of total (%)</i>
Capital city	Australia, Canada, US	6.5
	Europe	12.1
	Other countries	0.8
	Returned back home	79.0
	Moved to another city of home country	0.6
	CIS	1.0
	Total	100
Regional centre	Australia, Canada, US	7.5
	Europe	15.8
	Other countries	0.5
	Returned back home	63.2
	Moved to capital city of home country	11.6
	Moved to another city of home country	0.5
	CIS	0.9
	Total	100
Other province	Australia, Canada, US	12.8
	Europe	16.1
	Other countries	0.8
	Returned back home	50.8
	Moved to capital city of home country	16.1
	Moved to another city of home country	1.4
	Moved to regional city	1.4
	CIS	0.6
	Total	100

Source: Author's own computation, based on CEU alumni statistics

(25 per cent), but their return rates are different. Students from the capitals usually came back to their native country and rarely stayed in Europe or moved to the United States after graduation from CEU. Seventy-nine per cent of them came back to their native city (the capital), which is 10 per cent more than the rate for the students from the regional centres (63.2 per cent) and 28.2 per cent more than that for the students from the periphery (50.8 per cent).

The migration behaviour of students from the regional centres more closely resembles that of the students from the peripheral towns. In both groups, a relatively large number of students came back to the native country, but most often to the capital and not to the native town. Thus, 11.6 per cent of students from the regional centres and 16.1 per cent of students from the periphery moved to the capitals, and 2.8 per cent of students from the periphery moved to the regional centres or another town. In all groups, the share of students who moved to other CIS countries was no more than 1 per cent.

The distribution shows that the further from the capital a student lived, the less likely they were to return to their native town. After graduation, students from periphery areas face similar job and accommodation problems, whether in the capital of the native country or a Western country. This is probably why they tend more to try their fortune in the West. Many researchers have considered the quality of the living environment to be an important factor in settlement decisions. Among CEU graduates from peripheral locations, an equal share stayed in Europe and moved to the capital of their native country (16.1 per cent and 16.1 per cent). Education in the West raises the self-esteem of students from the periphery. They become aware of the great gap in the job opportunities offered in their native towns and those in the West and decide (if they can manage it) to stay in Europe or move to the United States.

The share of those who moved to the United States, Canada or Australia among graduates from the periphery (12.8 per cent) is twice that of the graduates from the capitals (6.5 per cent) and from the regional centres (7.5 per cent). Apparently, graduates from the capitals understand that they have a good chance of finding a satisfactory job in their native country as well, while people from the periphery have to begin from the ground up wherever they choose to settle. They gamble on 'the West' and tend more to leave Europe.

10.8 Conclusions

Hungary's entry in the global market of tertiary education has proceeded within limits imposed by overall migration processes in the country. Hungary has one of the EU's lowest rates of migration mobility. It has a

low proportion of international students as well, despite the fact that according to statistical data, the tertiary education market in Hungary expanded in the years under study in terms of both numbers of students and numbers of higher education institutions. However, the rise in quantitative indices was achieved to some extent at the expense of quality. Nevertheless, Hungary is doing a lot to reach the average level of EU countries in higher education development, although the World Bank (e.g., 2000) and OECD have indicated many gaps and problems that remain.

Hungarian students' mobility is stimulated by EU programmes. Though it seems to be rising, it is still low. The demographic situation is a factor in this low mobility, since depopulation and the shrinking size of the younger cohorts give them advantages on the national labour market. Hungarian students have very low mobility intentions. Even if they leave Hungary for a while, they typically try to return. For education, Hungarian students mainly go to neighbouring Western countries, particularly Germany and Austria.

International students in Hungary have varied migration mobility and strategies, depending on their region of origin. For example, EU enlargement has led to a rise in the number of foreign students, but their percentage of all students is still small and has not changed much in recent years. Most international students are from neighbouring countries (ethnic Hungarians). Most conduct their studies in Hungarian and stay in Hungary after graduation.

The internationalisation of Hungarian tertiary education is also clearly evident in the increase of students from EU-15 countries. Their share among all international students more than doubled. This development stems mainly from the increased recognition of Hungarian diplomas within the EU after enlargement and the ongoing Bologna Process.

Students from EU-15 countries and North America have their own tracks of migration, determined by their study areas of interest. The flow from EU-15 countries is directed predominantly towards the medical universities (Semmelweis, Szeged, Pécs) and business programmes taught in English and German. Students usually return to their native country upon graduation. Economics and business programmes taught in English attract students from the EU and North America. Graduates also tend to return home or to take up temporary employment in Western companies in Hungary. These high-skilled migrants have little interest in integration in Hungary.

Students from the newest EU member states (but non-neighbouring countries) who do not speak Hungarian have little interest in education in Hungary. Instead, they choose universities in Western countries as a starting position for seeking attractive jobs in the West.

Asian and African students have yet other migration strategies. The inflow of Asian and African students has risen considerably, and they have

some interest in staying in Hungary. Nevertheless, for many, Hungary is a first step to the West, though an attractive one. Their migration behaviour is determined by the socio-economic and political situation in their home country. Despite the increase in African students, their numbers remain relatively small. Hungary, unfortunately, lacks a law that provides foreign students the opportunity to stay in the country for a defined period after graduation and find a job (such laws are in place in some other EU countries).

The migration behaviour of CEU alumni shows that not only is the country of origin important in determining future migration strategies, but also the place of origin within that country. The already relatively high rate of return after education to the country of origin is increasing for students from capital cities and dropping dramatically for those arriving from small towns. The difficulty of the Hungarian language limits international students' chances of finding a job in the local market. Few find positions in international organisations.

Due to a lack of information and good datasets on the mobility of alumni from Hungarian universities, only preliminary conclusions can be drawn on rates of return. More than 70 per cent of students in the CEU alumni database returned to their country of origin. Of the other 30 per cent of graduating students, half moved on to a Western country. Among those who did not return home, the United States was the destination of first preference among CEU graduates. The United States thus seems to be a very attractive place for graduates to further develop their career, perhaps in part due to restrictive migration policies in EU countries.

Notes

- 1 The ten main actions for creation of EHEA are 1. adoption of a system of easily readable and comparable degrees; 2. adoption of a system based on two cycles (now agreed on a comparable three cycle degree system for undergraduate bachelor's degrees and graduate master's and PhD degrees); 3. establishment of the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS); 4. promotion of mobility; 5. promotion of European cooperation in quality assurance; 6. promotion of a European dimension of higher education; 7. focus on lifelong learning; 8. inclusion of higher education institutions and students; 9. promotion of the attractiveness of the EHEA; 10. doctoral studies and synergy between the EHEA and the European Research Area (ERA).
- 2 CEU is a private institution financed by the philanthropist George Soros.
- 3 The other groups were presented as follows: (2) countries with the highest levels of geographical and job mobility (Scandinavian countries – Denmark, Finland and Sweden – and the UK); (3) countries with a generally low mobility profile, both in terms of geographical and job mobility (three Mediterranean countries – Malta, Italy and Portugal – and four Central/Eastern European countries – Austria, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia); (4) countries with medium scores on one dimension but a higher score on the other dimension (France, Ireland and Luxembourg have a high level of geographical mobility combined with medium levels of job mobility, whereas Estonia, Latvia and the Netherlands have the highest levels of job mobility but only medium levels of geographical mobility);

- (5) countries with average levels of both forms of mobility (Belgium, Cyprus, Germany and Spain).
- 4 An MoE official interviewed by the author in February 2009.
 - 5 A professor at Corvinus University interviewed by the author in March 2009.
 - 6 Interview with Ministry of Education official, February 2009.
 - 7 Central Office for Study in Hungary (2009), www.campushungary.hu.
 - 8 The Ministry of Education, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Youth and Governmental Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad.
 - 9 Bilateral agreements are with Afghanistan, Yemen, Mongolia, Palestine, Ukraine, and Vietnam.
 - 10 Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Korean Republic, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, The Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Russia, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom.
 - 11 This information is from www.studyhungary.hu.
 - 12 Interview with an official at the Ministry of Education, February 2009.
 - 13 Interview with student union representative, April 2009.
 - 14 Interview with a student from Lithuania, March 2004.
 - 15 Interview with ethnic Hungarian from Serbia, February 2009.
 - 16 Interview with EU country national, May 2007.
 - 17 Interview with former CEU student from Uzbekistan, March 2005.
 - 18 Interview with former CEU student from Uzbekistan, March 2005.
 - 19 Interview with former CEU student from China, January 2009.
 - 20 Interview with CEU alumni, 1997-2004 academic year.
 - 21 Interview with CEU alumni 2006-2007 academic year, May 2007.
 - 22 Interview at recruitment offices of Corvinus University, March 2009.
 - 23 Interview at CEU recruitment office, March 2009.

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Part III

Return migration

11 Understanding the counter-flow

Theoretical and methodological aspects in studying remigration processes after EU expansion

Birgit Glorius

11.1 Introduction

Migration research, in its theoretical and empirical forms, has so far largely concentrated on the analysis and explanation of primary mobility processes. However, considerable counter-flows always existed, starting with the historic transatlantic emigration waves, which were believed to be temporary in at least one quarter of the cases (Bade 2002: 141f). A great portion of labour migration from Southern European countries to Northwest Europe was temporary as well. Böhning (1979) estimates that more than 1.5 million of these guest workers returned home during the 1970s, with return rates varying for each sending country concerned. Contrary to transatlantic emigration, the guest worker migration from the 1960s and 1970s was originally conceived as a temporary movement, and even though actual mobility behaviour did not always follow this political agenda, there was a rising interest in the probability of return migration and reintegration in the country of origin. Hence, a growing body of empirical studies on return migration of guest workers has developed since the 1970s (for reviews see Entzinger 1978 and King 1979). Many of those studies followed neo-classical approaches, measuring the return probability of labour migrants from Southern European countries. A further focus of the European migration research agenda was the nexus of return migration and development, mainly in the context of return to less developed countries, the evaluation of return and resettlement programmes and the question of 'brain return'.

Remigration is a dominant feature in the current post EU-enlargement situation. Following the massive emigration waves from A-8 and A-2 countries after EU accession, considerable counter-flows can be observed. Emigrating as well as remigrating post-accession migrants significantly differ from pre-accession migrants, typically being younger and better educated (see Anacka, Matejko & Nestorowicz; Moskal; Pietka, Clark and Canton; Trevena; and Wolfeil in this volume). This raises concerns about

brain drain and questions about the possible scope for regaining human capital through remigration. However, empirical work on those topics so far is scarce. Interdisciplinary and multi-dimensional discussion of theoretical and methodological approaches are needed to appropriately tackle the various questions identified in the context of remigration. These issues include the exact measurement of return migration flows, an appropriate typology of return migrants according to their socio-economic profile, the sustainability of return, as well as the transfer of social and human capital and the initiation of economic development upon return.

The aims of this chapter therefore are to reinvestigate the major theoretical approaches regarding their explanatory power for remigration, to identify case study results which might be applicable to the actual processes, and finally to identify major research questions and methodological challenges in the context of remigration.

11.2 Return migration and migration theory

11.2.1 Definition and typology of return migration

The terms 'remigration' or 'return migration' are generally used when migrants return to their country of origin, after having spent a significant time abroad.¹ The migratory processes falling into the category of remigration are quite heterogeneous. One can differentiate return by choice versus forced return (deportation, expulsion, etc.), intended and definite return of labour migrants, frequent return of circular migrants, return of retirement, return of international students, or return from a 'year abroad'.² Cerase (1974) developed four types of remigration: (1) return of failure, if the migrant failed to integrate into the host society and finally decided to return; (2) return of conservatism, if the migrant mainly migrated to gain an income to be consumed at home; (3) return of retirement; and (4) return of innovation, if the migrant intends to invest the social and financial capital gained abroad in their home country. The last group is perceived to have the highest probability of spurring economic development and modernisation of the country of return. However, the successful reinvestment of their innovative potential is highly dependent on the political and power structure of the country of return.³

Cassarino (2004) stresses the importance of the returnees' preparedness and resource mobilisation to become actors of change and development at home. In his definition, the most successful remigrants demonstrated a high level of preparation, meaning that they were able to plan their own return autonomously, having enough time to evaluate costs and benefits of return as well as considering institutional changes in the country of origin. Well-prepared remigrants are believed to have gathered enough tangible and intangible resources to become actors of change in their home countries.

They draw on their resources and contacts not only before but also after return, whereas remigrants with lower levels of preparedness and resource mobilisation rely on resources available at home in order to reintegrate.

Thus, return typologies mainly focus on the outcomes of return migration on the individual and on the country level, integrating return motives, voluntariness of return and return preparations, as well as the institutional context prior to and after return. This coincides with a number of important research questions arising in the context of post-accession migration in the EU, namely, the question of brain return and the return-development nexus. At the micro level, the definition of 'remigration' still provides insufficient information, for example, on the time of the stay abroad as well as on whether the return is definitive. Further differentiations might also be necessary interpreting spatial aspects of return. For example, even though remigrants may have crossed international borders back to their country of origin, they might not have returned to their place of origin, so the return is not complete. This will mostly be the case for rural emigrants, who may prefer to return to an urban space rather than to a rural region, as empirical studies have shown (compare with Nowicka & Firouzbakhch 2008).

11.2.2 *Theoretical approaches to migration research*

Remigration is analysed in various academic disciplines. Geographical approaches mainly study demographic and socio-economic reasons for and consequences of remigration from a spatial perspective. Sociological studies stress the living conditions of migrants as well as their motives for and reasons and consequences of return. Economic approaches focus on economic aspects of remigration, like brain gain, modernisation processes and economic development. Political science examines the political framework of return migration, and evaluates, for example, return policies or state-supported return programmes. Each of these academic disciplines prefer and implement different theoretical approaches to migration theory, all of which were originally developed to explain initial migratory processes. Their explanatory power for processes of return migration therefore needs to be critically reviewed.

The earliest considerations in explaining population movements were Ravenstein's *migration laws* (1885, 1889). These originally focused on internal migration (rural-urban migration), but later were widely applied to processes of international migration. The direction of migration played a prominent role in Ravenstein's theory: it was considered to lead from regions with lesser possibilities (rural regions) to regions with higher possibilities (urban regions) for individual development, and from smaller entities to bigger entities (rural community, small town, middle town, big agglomeration, capital city). Ravenstein also assumed that every migratory flow induces a counter-flow, which is smaller than the initial flow.⁴

Ravenstein (1885, 1889) saw a direct relation between the onset of migration and the expansion of communication and transport networks and of industry and trade. This connects his theory to more recent approaches, like the transnational approach.

Lee (1966) refined Ravenstein's approach by introducing a classification of *push factors* and *pull factors* driving migration decisions and directions. Harris and Todaro (1970) analysed labour migration in the context of economic development. They explained international and internal migration through regional differentials in wages and work opportunities and assumed that the migratory flow is directed towards regions or countries with higher wage levels. Emigration would lead to processes of adjustment in the countries or regions of origin, with increasing wages (due to scarcity of workers) and a counter-flow of capital (and highly specialised human capital) into lower developed countries or regions.

The *dual* or *segmented labour market theory* (Piore 1979) explains migration at the macro level as induced by labour shortages in modern industrial societies. It focuses on the employer side and their labour needs as well as on supporting institutions. One central assumption is that the dualism of work and capital leads to a segmented labour market, with the first segment being well-paid and secure jobs, and the second segment being poorly paid, insecure or irregular jobs. For the second segment, a 'labour reserve' is needed, which is – among other minority groups – constituted by international (temporary) migrants. One might assume that the explanatory power of this approach is mostly relevant for unskilled migrants and does not apply to the highly skilled. However, given that high-skilled migrants might not manage to apply their skills in the destination countries' labour markets, they might also be subject to the processes explained in this approach.

While the above-mentioned approaches are mainly used in a macro-analytical way, the *human capital theory* (Sjaastad 1962) explains individual migration decisions as results of mainly cost-benefit calculations considering the 'expected' income in the country of arrival. The expected gains from a move are the net difference between the expected wages in the country of arrival and the lower wages in the country of origin incorporating the costs of migration.

Unlike the neoclassical approaches, the new economics of labour migration (NELM) perceives migration decisions as household or family decisions rather than as individual decisions. The migration of one household member aims to minimise risk or stabilising the economic level of the household. Following NELM, an important migration motive is derived from the concept of 'relative deprivation': rising wealth levels for certain groups (upper class, families who receive remittances) in the country of origin lead to increasing relative deprivation, thus influencing migration decisions.

Structuralist approaches integrate a greater number of explanatory elements than the previously described theories, addressing the structural framework within which migratory decisions take place. Critical structuralists also explore topics of global imbalance of capital distribution and development.

The *world systems theory* (Wallerstein 1974; Sassen 1988) explains migration not primarily through wage differentials, but rather through the dynamics which induced and shaped the global economic system. It starts with the penetration of capital into the global periphery, mobilising populations (e.g., through modernisation of agriculture) to move in the opposite direction of the capital flow.

The *migration system theory* (Kritz & Zlotnik 1992) concentrates on the various connections between regions of the world with high migratory movement. The central ideas are three: (1) that migration takes place between regions that are also connected through other bilateral connections (e.g., economic cooperation, shared history or geographical proximity); (2) that structural elements (social, political, economic and demographic) in country of origin and country of arrival are important for structuring the migratory system; and (3) that these elements are interconnected. Changes in one part of the system induce processes of adjustment in other parts of the system (e.g., a high inflow of migrants leads to the adjustment of immigration laws, thus reshaping the flow or direction of migration).

The above-discussed theories concentrate on the onset of migration – mainly with an economic focus – and perceive the persistence of migratory flows as a peripheral aspect. Another group of theories concentrates on the question why migratory flows persist even though the structural elements that originally initiated migration might have changed completely. *Network theory* stresses the relevance of migrant networks for the persistence of migratory flows. Migrant networks are defined as ‘sets of interpersonal connections of former, potential and actual migrants, groups and organisations in countries of origin and countries of arrival that are connected through kinship, friendship or other (even weaker) social relationships’ (Faist 1997: 69f). Migrant networks reduce the costs and risks of migration and increase the probability of international mobility. While the migration decision originally is an individual or household decision, the context of further migration decisions is shaped through the development of migration networks. Migration within a migration network is largely independent of those factors that initiated the first migratory flows. Moreover, the expansion of migratory networks gradually includes all population segments and regions in the country of origin (Gurak & Caces 1992; Massey et al. 1993). Movements are facilitated with the development of supportive institutions in countries of origin and countries of arrival, such as labour agencies and services for travel, housing, documents and irregular border crossings. Both personal networks and institutional settings support the perpetuation

of migration flows and partly disconnect them from those political, economic and other factors that initiated migration.

The theory of *cumulative causation* (Massey 1990) assumes that every migratory process changes the social context for further migratory decisions, leading to the perception of migration as a self-perpetuating process. Relevant factors are, for example, return visits of migrants and their narratives of the migratory experience, the sending of remittances, the perception of relative deprivation of non-migrant families in comparison to migrant families (meaning families with one or more members abroad), stagnating development at the place of origin due to emigration, and the development of ethnic communities at the place of arrival – including markets for ethnic products, services and labour force. These factors are believed to act as strong internal stimulation for migration, eluding the control of the states concerned (Massey et al. 1993).

The *transnational approach* also serves to explain persisting migratory flows. Transnationalism is defined as ‘the process by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement’ (Glick Schiller, Basch & Blanc-Szanton 1992: 1). Transnational social spaces structure migrants’ daily life practices, economic activities and social relationships and serve as an important referential frame for social positioning (Pries 1997). Transnational migrants are perceived as active agents who use cyclical mobility to benefit from the economic and political situation in the country of origin and destination (Portes 1997). Important prerequisites are innovations in transport and communications technologies, which facilitate transnational activities.

11.2.3 *Evaluation of migration theories’ explanatory power for remigration*

Depending on the exact research question, parts of all of the above-mentioned theories might be used for explaining and classifying remigration and its outcomes, even though adaptations to the logic of return migration might be necessary. In the case of *neoclassical theories* for example, the central idea of migration decisions as rational cost-benefit calculations might not work at first, as the country of return usually is economically weaker than the country of immigration. The concept of cost-benefit calculations might need to be adapted to the specific situation in the country of return and the ability of the migrant to adapt to either country. Crucial issues are income variances, the payable value of skills and consumption prices in the countries concerned. In countries with a high degree of income variance, low-skilled migrants are more likely to return, because their relative gains are lower. Similarly, high-skilled migrants are more likely to return from countries with low income variance (Borjas 1987). Those variances are also subject to change, due to different necessities for the labour markets of country of origin and country of destination (e.g., increasing

demand for certain skills in the country of origin, due to massive emigration in this skill segment, thus raising the price of those skills). Another aspect is the value of skills and their assessment. If migrants are able to gain skills and competences in the country of destination for which there is high demand in the country of origin, they might actually be able to raise their income or fuel their career through remigration. Williams and Baláz (2005) find this aspect highly relevant for transition economies like those in CEE countries. The last adaptation is the integration of differentials of consumption prices in the countries concerned. In a rational remigration decision, expected gains from a move not only include income, but also consumption prices. Return might be reasonable if consumption prices are significantly lower in the country of return, even if wages are lower. This aspect might be mostly relevant for retirement remigrants.

Concerning the size and direction of remigration flows, *Ravenstein's laws* might be applicable. Remigration can be perceived as part of an international counter-flow of migrants, which will be smaller than the initial out-flow. Also, remigrants are hypothesised to move to urban areas in their countries of origin rather than returning to a rural environment, due to the better chances offered for individual development.

In addition, the central considerations of NELM are highly relevant for the study of remigration, namely, the perception of migration as a household decision and the role of remittances. Remittances not only raise the individual standard of living in the country of origin, but are also an important element for remigration decisions. Thus, migrants can be perceived as income savers who return if the target is reached. The concept of migration as a household decision applies not only to economic reasons, but also for life cycle considerations: economic theory suggests that life cycle migrants return to consume, but in reality this is likely to be contingent on age and household type (Yang 2006).

Regarding the applicability of *structuralist theories* to return migration, they work when some of the premises are turned around. While high demand for labour in the immigration country induces the migratory stream, decreasing demand for migrant labour – caused, for example, by economic recession – can lead to remigration. This process can be furthered by institutional adjustment, like the propagation of remigration through state agencies of either home or destination countries.

The *world systems approach* assumes a direct connection between migratory flows from peripheral countries and the penetration of foreign capital into these countries. This is an important aspect, but the perspective should be expanded to the general increase in connections, be they economic connections, tourism or the penetration of media and modern communications tools. The latter aspects are incorporated in the *migration system theory*, which seems to serve as a valuable matrix for exploring the various interconnections within a migratory system.

Theories explaining the continuation of migratory flows are largely applicable to return migration. The impact of *social networks*, which is important for the persistence of migratory flows, is also highly relevant for remigration. If migrants are never completely alienated from their social context at the place of origin through frequent visits, communication and media, they are also more at ease with an eventual return decision and with reintegration. Apart from informal sources of information, institutions play a major role in overcoming bureaucratic problems with migration (travel and work documents, housing, social security), which can also be relevant in preparing for remigration and resettlement.

Cumulative causation follows the hypothesis that migratory streams reproduce themselves. The factors that accumulate into a decision to migrate might also be relevant for remigration decisions. The *transnational approach* overlaps with the network and cumulative causation approaches, but stresses the continuation of personal social contacts, which can be an important factor in remigration.

11.3 Empirical evidence on return migration: A literature review

The literature review presented here starts with considerations about the monitoring of return migration flows by means of country statistics and general social surveys. It then turns to specific research questions in the context of return migration, such as the motives for and selectivity of returning migrants and the return-development nexus. It mainly draws on the well-elaborated example of Southern European guest workers in Germany and their return decisions. The intention is to find explanatory variables that might also be applicable to the remigration processes of post-accession migrants and to gain hints for an appropriate methodological device for studying remigration in the context of post-accession mobility.

11.3.1 *Measurement and determination of return migration flows*

A major problem in the analysis of remigration processes is the lack of reliable data.⁵ Immigration is usually well documented, due to procedures for obtaining a visa, residence permit and work permit. However, the departure of migrants from a destination country is not efficiently recorded, as many migrants fail to deregister when they leave the country. Even sheer counts of documented arrivals and departures bear a number of problems in determining remigration movements. For example, German statistics present remigration as every case of foreign departure to the country of origin, neglecting the possibility of circulation as well as of initial emigration of foreigners born in the immigration country.⁶ For the same reason, the return move of naturalised immigrants to their country of origin is not

clearly captured.⁷ The same shortcomings are relevant for statistics of incoming country nationals to countries of origin, which serve as an additional source for the documentation of counter-flows. However, even though an exact assessment of remigration features is not possible, country statistics do give an idea of the quantity of return flows between important source and destination countries (see Engbersen & Snel in this volume).

Regarding the determination of circular movements as opposed to permanent stays or returns, population surveys like censuses and labour force surveys are helpful, as they usually ask the year of arrival of migrants. Thus, using consecutive waves of such surveys, the 'survival' of migrant cohorts can be estimated. However, this procedure also bears weaknesses, as data are usually aggregated and repeated surveys might not address the same sample of respondents. This means that they might fail to monitor migrants' actual mobility behaviour.

Dustmann and Weiss (2007) used data from the quarterly British Labour Force Survey (LFS) to estimate the return rate of migrants. Although the LFS bears a longitudinal element as it interviews the same respondents five consecutive times, the time-span of personalised observation is rather short (15 months) for determining return and remigration rates.⁸ Dustmann and Weiss (2007) found a high propensity for temporary stays, with around 40 per cent of migrant men and 55 per cent of migrant women leaving the country within the first five years of arrival. However, the dataset contains no information about repeated arrivals of migrating individuals nor on the destination of departing migrants, so return migration cannot be exactly determined.

Panel studies can fill this knowledge gap, as they provide longitudinal data. One renowned example is the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). It was developed in 1984 with approximately 6,000 households and 12,000 respondents. One quarter of the respondents originate from the main guest worker sending countries – Italy, Greece, Spain, Turkey and former Yugoslavia (DIW 2009). In 2008, after 24 waves, there remained around 3,300 households and 6,000 respondents. Furthermore, panel mortality was balanced with additional sampling, including an immigrant sample in 1994-1995.⁹ The relevance of the SOEP for the study of remigration lies in its efforts to follow people who move between two panels and to re-integrate them when they return from temporary absence abroad (Constant & Massey 2002: 12). As the panel covers a rich body of items on socio-demographic and economic characteristics of responding households, it is suitable for answering a variety of questions with regard to remigration intentions and the selectivity of remigration.

Using the first 14 waves of the SOEP data (1984-1997) with 4,613 migrants from the guest worker sending countries, Constant and Zimmermann (2007) were able to trace circular movements. More than 60 per cent of respondents exited Germany at least once during the observation period.

Those temporary returnees were mainly migrants from EU member states or migrants with German passports, who could easily re-enter Germany at any time. Social aspects and labour market integration also shaped mobility, as migrants with family members in the countries of origin stayed abroad for a longer period of time, whereas those with close connections to the German labour market remigrated earlier. Mobility was highest among younger and older people, which also correlates with age-specific integration of migrants into the German labour market. Constant and Zimmermann (2007) summarised that discussions on the intensity of migratory behaviour could benefit from the German experience: the lower the formal barriers to mobility are, the higher the circularity of movements. 'Repeat or circular migrants are attractive for employers and policymakers because they are less likely to be illegal and more willing to adjust to the temporary needs of the economy of the receiving country' (Constant & Zimmermann 2007: 17). Furthermore, restrictions of temporary migration patterns could bear unintended consequences, as the German example shows. After the implementation of a general recruitment stop in 1973, the number of foreigners from guest worker sending countries did not decrease, but rather increased. The reason was that many of the temporary migrant workers opted for permanent stay in Germany rather than returning to their country of origin, and a large number of family members subsequently moved to Germany on the basis of family reunification (Glorius 2008: 83).

Another problem in the definition and study of return migration is the difference between intention and actual behaviour of migrants. Mobility decisions might change over time, thus turning return migrants into circular migrants and permanent migrants into remigrants. Adda, Dustmann and Mestres (2006) show changes of intentions over time and differences between intended mobility and its realisation using SOEP data on guest workers over 20 years (1984-2003). They found substantial fluctuations in return plans in the course of time. For example, one quarter of respondents who declared return intentions in 1984 indeed returned by 2000, and additionally 12 per cent of those who had no return plans in 1984 had since returned. Furthermore, almost 60 per cent of migrants who returned before 1998 significantly underestimated or overestimated their intended duration of stay in Germany.

Summarising those shortcomings, we can state that official statistics are able to display migration flows and its quantitative changes, but cannot distinguish between primary and circular movements, while social survey data show intentions and behaviours at a given point of time, but cannot project into the future. Of greatest value for determining return movements are longitudinal surveys or ethnosurvey designs that cover mobility biographies of households. However, all of those designs bear the problem of underestimating return movements, unless they are carried out in both origin and destination country.¹⁰

11.3.2 *Who returns? Migration motives and selectivity of migration*

A further important question in the context of return decisions is the selectivity of return regarding the economic outcome of migration: Do the failing or the successful migrants return? How can their success be determined? What are the main aspects influencing and shaping remigration decisions? Constant and Massey (2002) analyse these questions with the help of SOEP waves 1984-1997, challenging two perspectives of migration economics: (1) the neoclassical perspective, regarding migrants as income maximisers over their lifetime, which implies high selectivity of migrants' qualifications and (2) NELM, which models migrants as target earners, with little selectivity concerning qualification level and with the assumption that migrants return as soon as their income goals are met.

Constant and Massey (2002: 13ff) operationalise their research question with a discrete time event history analysis of the probability of remigration, differentiating remitters and non-remitters as well as those with longer temporary returns to their country of origin and those without longer absences. They constructed several indicators concerning migrants' human capital, their work effort in the country of destination, their attachment to employment, socio-economic achievement (earnings, prestige) as well as the attachment to Germany and to the country of origin.

Their analysis showed only minor selectivity concerning human capital characteristics or socio-economic achievement of return migrants, but a high selectivity of social attributes. Low return probability was found in those migrants who were employed full-time, with a spouse and children in Germany, no close relatives in the country of origin, who felt German, held the German citizenship and did not send remittances. A reasonably higher likelihood of return was found in those migrants who were unemployed, had no relatives in Germany, did not feel German, with spouse and children in the country of origin, and who were sending remittances. Remigration was not selective of age, sex or state of residence in Germany, and only slightly selective with regard to human capital characteristics. After Constant and Massey (2002: 33), the analysis found more consistencies with the neoclassical model, even though 'the relative lack of selectivity with respect to human capital was troubling and generally inconsistent with what we would expect from income maximising migrants'. Thus, heterogeneity of migration motives was suggested, with the greater share of migrants following the neoclassical model.

Möser (2005) also used the SOEP dataset to determine reasons for return migration, analysing 805 cases of returned migrants out of 3,753 respondents of SOEP waves 1984-2002. In his multivariate analysis of return motives, he concentrated on time variables, such as age, socialisation and duration of stay in the host country. In contrast to his expectations, return probability rose with age, even though migration rates are usually highest

in younger age groups. He explained this variance with the phenomenon of retirement remigration, as the former guest workers are able to receive their German retirement pension in the country of origin, thus profiting from consumption price variances.

Like Constant and Massey (2002), Möser (2005) found that return probability decreased with duration of stay in Germany and with childhood and youth socialisation in Germany. Economic factors were also relevant for shaping remigration. While high income and house ownership in Germany lowered return probability, unemployment increased return probability, even though respondents received unemployment benefits. In addition, structural factors, like the implementation of repatriation programmes by the German government in 1983, increased Turkish remigration, but only in the first year of the programme. In line with Constant and Massey (2002), Möser (2005) found a strong impact of social capital in structuring remigration and argued that migrants with low social capital in Germany lacked country-specific problem-solving competence and behaviour routines, which burdened their daily life in Germany and made return rather attractive. However, Möser (2005: 65f) acknowledged that the existing data on the quantity and quality of social capital in the SOEP survey is insufficient to determine its exact effects on remigration decisions.

Concerning the general relevance of the findings discussed above, one needs to consider the low education level of the first generation of guest workers and the prevalence within it of low-skilled industrial occupations. Given the low variance of skill levels in these migrant groups, the lack of evidence on the impacts of skill levels on remigration decisions is not surprising. Summarising the social survey results on remigration, it seems clear that selectivity of remigration and the success of remigration, in terms of social upgrading or implementation of skills acquired abroad, is highly dependent on three factors: (1) migrants' motives, both for the initial migratory move and for the return decision; (2) the quantity and quality of social capital in countries of origin and destination; and (3) structural factors, such as the demographic and economic situation in a country, immigration law and the existence of repatriation programmes. As the structure and quality of social networks are difficult and time consuming to analyse through quantitative survey designs, small-scale qualitative research might be more appropriate to deliver insight into the function of social capital in return decisions and reintegration.

11.3.3 Remigration and development: Historical, empirical and institutional perspectives on brain return

The selectivity of remigration and the success of reintegration are not only of interest at the micro level of the individual migrant, but also at the macro level of a receiving country or region. Therefore, a special focus in the

context of return migration research lies on the impact human capital can have in the country of return. This depends on the applicability of the specific skills that the migrants acquired abroad, which is not only due to the balance of supply and demand of skills, but also to structural factors, such as the status of the economy in the country of return, access to high positions and careers and locational effects, for instance, the regional distribution of core industries.

Under the header of brain gain, Gröberg (2003) undertakes a historical analysis of brain return, studying Swedish engineers returning from the United States between 1880 and 1940. Engineers always were a highly mobile group, with almost two thirds of US immigrants returning to Sweden. Their acquired knowledge was an important form of social capital and fuelled economic development in Sweden in those times. Remigrants primarily introduced new organisational skills, like 'Taylorism'. Remigrants' careers generally benefited from the migration experience. Back in Sweden, they quite frequently obtained core positions in their firms. They developed influential networks among one another as well, united by their migration experience and socialisation abroad. Gröberg (2003: 258) concludes that these remigrants were an important source of knowledge and innovation during the 'second industrial breakthrough' in Sweden. They can be viewed as an historical example of 'brain gain'.

Olesen (2002) takes an institutional perspective in examining the nexus of migration and development. One of the most compelling results is that migration mainly takes place not in very poorly developed or extremely highly developed countries, but in those countries with a medium income (US \$ 1,500-\$ 8,000 per capita in purchasing power parity terms). If we assume that the economic and demographic development of a country directly leads to rising emigration rates, we would expect return migration in general, and especially brain return, in a context of reduced income differentials between sending and receiving countries. Olesen (*ibid.*) stresses the institutional perspective, introducing the impact of 'bad governance' to remigration decisions. Thus, in a badly governed country, with strong corruption, weak state institutions and few possibilities for an objective career development, strong brain drain tendencies will always occur. Improvements in governance could induce the remigration of highly skilled migrants.

Chepulis (1984) stresses the impact of larger socio-economic and political factors for the quantity and direction of international migration flows, including remigration. He interprets the initial out-migration of labour migrants from the European South as part of the Mediterranean countries' export-led development strategy, including the export of labour, which coincided with the implementation of recruitment programmes by the industrialised European countries. The experience with the guest workers from the 1960s and 1970s also shows – quite consistent with Piore's dual labour market theory – that these migrant workers were the most vulnerable in

terms of structural changes, such as recession, rationalisation and industrial relocation. These changes lead to vast unemployment among migrant workers, which can induce the process of return migration. Returning migrants, however, face difficult labour market situations in the countries of origin, which are also hit by the economic downturn that initiated the return flow.

Concerning the possibilities of and constraints to transference of skills for the sake of the home countries' economies, evidence from studies of returning labour migrants to the Mediterranean countries deliver rather ambiguous results. As Cerase's (1974) study on returnees from the United States to southern Italy signals, returnees' labour market integration in countries of origin was deeply influenced by the economic problems in the regions where they returned. They were either forced to return to the low-skilled and poorly paid agricultural and industrial jobs they carried out prior to emigration, or to enter into the service industry – often as small entrepreneurs with a shop or a coffee house – where their acquired skills were of little use (Fakiolas 1984: 40; Reyneri & Mughini 1984: 32). Gitmez (1984) elaborates these aspects in a study of 1,365 returnees to Turkey in 1978. Returnees were found to be reluctant to enter the industrial labour force in their home country because of the low social prestige of the jobs. They opted instead for self-employment in the commercial or service sector. As skills were not transferred,¹¹ savings seemed to be the most important asset of returnees. Four fifths reported some form of investment, mostly in housing and building lots or agricultural land, and in machines and the service sector. Some also created additional jobs on a small scale.

Gitmez (1984: 120) is rather critical in the evaluation of the return-development nexus:

When evaluating the contribution of migration to the individual and to the home country economy, it is clear that these two conflict with each other. Whatever the impact of personal ventures, such as small-scale investment, these do not imply socio-economic development, as they have nothing to do with development in the productive process and therefore, do not represent any real response to the needs of the country.

In contrast, Rogers (1984: 294) labels this common critique as a function of the analyst's 'normative expectations', as no one could consider those migrants who originally left to escape economic hardships, often with little general education and no economic or entrepreneurial knowledge, as acting as agents of innovative social change upon return. Furthermore, many return for personal or family reasons instead of economic ones.

Summarising these various and sometimes competing findings, one commonality is that the developmental impact of return migration is largely dependent on structural factors in countries of origin and destination. Additionally, individual features of the migrants, including not only their skills, but also motives for original out-migration and remigration, as well as their social embeddedness in the society of origin, also influence the effects of return migration.

11.4 Return migration of post-accession migrants: The new 'target earners'?

The review of theoretical approaches to migration and the empirical literature delivered some results that might help to understand the logic of return of post-accession migrants. Emigration and remigration can both be seen as part of individual mobility biographies, which are deeply influenced not only by individual motives and life cycle stages, but also by structural factors, such as economic, political and labour market development. As international mobility is increasingly embedded in transnational processes, it is necessary to understand the linkages and interdependencies between various levels in producing the causes and effects of both migration and return migration.

The elaboration of causes and consequences of the European guest worker migration from the 1960s and 1970s brought about some insights that are also valuable for understanding post-accession mobility, although the processes seem to differ significantly. While guest worker migration took place in the industrial age, when developing countries could profit from the export of (low qualified) labour eagerly needed in Western European industries, post-accession migration appears in the context of post-industrial societies with changing demographics and employment systems, embedded in processes of economic and social transnationalisation.

On the micro level, the empirical literature reveals that motives and strategies of returning guest workers are directly connected to the reasons why they originally left their countries of origin, and this might also apply to post-accession migrants. While many remigrating guest workers were considered to be target earners, who contributed through remittances rather than through innovative or entrepreneurial activities upon return, post-accession migrants follow different targets, acquiring not only economic, but also cultural capital during their stay abroad. Whether they can make use of their cultural capital at home will be mainly dependent on the demographic, economic and labour market development in their home countries. Although the quantitative effect will be small, regarding the economic output of remigrants, in general, the qualitative effect could be significant, as Gröberg's (2003) historical example of remigrating engineers to Sweden

shows. Evidence for this process may be found in the Baltic states, where many of the political opinion leaders who paved the countries' ways into modern post-industrial societies after the revolution were remigrants. However, as Olesen (2002) elaborated, structural constraints may arise for the return of innovative and skilled emigrants to the CEE countries, as quality of life and political culture still lag behind Western European states.

Given the fact that a large share of return decisions of guest workers were not bound to economic rationality but rather were found in the social context, Cassarino's (2004) considerations on the preparedness of migrants might be helpful in order to determine the 'success' of return migration to post-accession migrants.

The striking technological development since the guest workers' remigrations of the 1970s, especially the development of modern internet-based communications and services tools, might have a great influence not only on return decisions, but also on the placement of returnees and networking among remigrants, which also requires further analysis (Aziz 2009).

Summarising those findings and considerations, the appropriate methodology for the study of remigration depends on whether the research takes a micro or macro perspective and on the research focus, whether it be on structural and individual aspects of remigration, consequences of remigration for migrants and country of immigration and remigration, economic and social reintegration of remigrants or identity development of remigrants. As revealed from the above analysis, a multi-stranded research strategy with an interrelated perspective seems to be most appropriate, including (1) the analysis of secondary migration data for the countries or groups concerned with the focus on return movements, (2) the analysis of structural aspects of the migration system and its changes over time and (3) the micro perspective of individual migrant's remigration decisions, their embeddedness in social networks and structural factors, and the process of reintegration in the country of origin. Most appropriate in terms of implementation will be international comparative studies as well as the combination of quantitative and qualitative research strategies.

An important issue not yet considered is the spill-over effects of economic and geopolitical changes on countries outside our research focus. The extended EU as a geopolitical body produced new structural framings, which have also affected adjacent countries. The restricted regime along the new Schengen border, for example, affects cross border mobility. And the economic crisis in the southern EU countries has had immense impact on neighbouring source countries, which have faced rising numbers of remigrants since.

Another geopolitical issue is the attempt to shape remigration by resettlement programmes. Created by destination countries, these focus mostly on groups whose migration-related status has changed, such as refugees

after a conflict has ended, former labour migrants who have lost their jobs and international students who have graduated from universities in the destination country. In our field of interest, the initiative to launch a resettlement programme might come from migrants' home countries rather than from destination countries, as practically all EU members are facing demographic decline and are affected by the global race for talent. The outcomes of those programmes should be monitored thoroughly, thus opening up another promising research field.

Notes

- 1 The United Nations' definition differentiates between long-term migration for stays of at least one year abroad and short-term migration for stays of at least three months but less than one year (UN 1998).
- 2 Bovenkerk (1974: 10-18) and Gmelch (1980: 137f) developed a typology concentrating on the original intention of migrants to stay or return and the eventual migration outcome.
- 3 King (1978) perceives those structural aspects very critically and speaks therefore of a 'myth of modernisation' with regard to qualified remigrants.
- 4 But not saying that the counter-flow exclusively consists of those individuals who emigrated before.
- 5 Koser (2000) presents an overview of return migration data.
- 6 This, for example, applies to second-generation Turks in Germany, of whom a reasonable number have tried to establish a living in the home country of their parents and grandparents, often for sentimental reasons ('back to the roots'), but also because of ethnic discrimination in Germany (Polat 1998).
- 7 In the German case, return migration of ethnic Germans (*Spätaussiedler*) back to Russia – counted as departures of German nationals from Germany to Russia – remained unrecognised by the German government, until recent studies revealed the existence and significance of this movement (compare Schönhuth 2008).
- 8 Recently a boost survey was integrated into the LSF, re-addressing respondents once a year over four consecutive years. This might produce better results regarding remigration. More information on the LSF design can be obtained at www.statistics.gov.uk (last retrieved 27 May 2009).
- 9 Further information on the structure of the survey, sampling procedures and methodological considerations can be obtained at www.diw.de/english/soep/soepoverview/27908.html.
- 10 As a reaction to this shortcoming, the SOEP team recently started a pilot project aiming to integrate internationally moving participants of the SOEP into the survey (see Erlinghagen & Stegmann 2009).
- 11 Hence, skill levels of guest workers did not improve considerably while working abroad.

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12 Regional selectivity of return migration

The locational choice of high-skilled return migrants in Poland

Katrin Klein-Hitpaß¹

12.1 Introduction

Currently, there is a growing interest in the process of return migration and the question of whether return migrants and especially high-skilled return migrants support the economic development of the nations or regions they are returning to. Research thus far has predominantly been based on high-tech regions in newly industrialised countries (NIC), such as Shanghai, China, and Bangalore, India (Saxenian 2006; Iredale & Guo 2001; Chacko 2007; Hunger 2000; Müller 2007; Müller & Sternberg 2006; Fromhold-Eisebith 2002), or the capital regions of some West African countries (Black & King 2004; Ammassari 2004; Ammassari & Black 2001). In all of these studies, an analysis of the regional pattern and selectivity of high-skilled return migration is missing. Instead, they seem to implicitly assume that high-skilled return migrants settle only in economically more advanced and dynamic regions.

The spatial pattern of high-skilled return migrants in Poland shows that this is not necessarily a valid assumption. The Polish census data of 2002 reveals that only 34 per cent of high-skilled Polish return migrants move to the region Mazovian, in which Warsaw as the main destination is located. The remaining two thirds move to other Polish voivodships (i.e., regions), which are quite heterogeneous in their economic structure and development (Fihel, Górny & Matejko 2006; Klagge et al. 2007). Hence, it is – at least for the Polish case – an open research question whether high-skilled migrants, in general, and more specifically, return migrants, actively seek economically advanced and dynamic regions.

At a national level there is evidence that migrants do not return to their country of origin before it has reached a certain level of economic and social welfare (Müller 2007; De Haas 2007a, 2007b). This can be observed in Poland and in other CEE countries, where return migration did not become an important trend before the deep political changes in 1989-1990

and the shift from a planned to a market economy. The extent to which high-skilled return migrants choose to relocate to economically more advanced and dynamic *regions* of their home countries has not yet been analysed. In general, Fassmann and Meusburger (1997) point out that job opportunities for the highly skilled are spatially concentrated, especially in finance and banking, specialised occupations and high management positions in transnational corporations. Hence, high-skilled labour tends to concentrate in political and economic centres. Likewise, Williams, Baláž and Wallace (2004) assume that high-skilled migrants, especially those working in high management positions in transnational corporations, prefer to settle in economically dynamic regions. According to Perrons (2009), the processes of globalisation and increasing economic integration of states has led to the development of a global labour market in which economic centres act as magnets for high-skilled migrants. These considerations lead to the hypothesis that high-skilled return migrants tend to concentrate in economically advanced and dynamic regions with diverse job opportunities for the highly skilled.

It is the aim of this chapter to analyse whether this assumption is valid for the Polish case. A quantitative approach is used in which the number of high-skilled return migrants in Polish voivodships is correlated via multivariate regression analysis with different economic indicators that operationalise the economic situation and dynamics of the respective regions as well the job opportunities for high-skilled return migrants. The Polish example is an especially interesting case for this research question, as both the number of high-skilled return migrants and economic indicators differ widely across the regions. This chapter's analyses concentrate exclusively on economic indicators. Other factors likely to influence the locational choice of high-skilled return migrants, such as place of origin and social relations, are briefly discussed in the concluding section.

The chapter is organised as follows. Section 12.2 gives an overview of return migration processes to Poland, their socio-demographic characteristics as well as regional patterns. Section 12.3 briefly discusses the economic development of Poland with a special focus on regional economic disparities among the Polish voivodships. Section 12.4 presents the theoretical model, followed by the empirical analysis in section 12.5 and a discussion of the results in section 12.6.

12.2 Return migration to Poland: An overview

Throughout most of the twentieth century, Poland was an emigration country, and return migration and immigration more generally did not play a role. With the end of the Second World War and the start of the socialist era in Poland (1945-1989), the international movement of people was


controlled by the national government. However, in this period emigration did take place, both for political and economic reasons, though mostly illegally or under the pretext of tourist visas. It is estimated that in the years from 1945 to 1989 up to 3 million Poles left their country, with especially high numbers exiting during the 1980s, when the political and economic situation in Poland was growing more acute (Okólski 1994, 1999; Sakson 2002; Alscher 2005).

Poland's migration system has changed significantly. While during the socialist era the number of immigrants was negligible, modern-day Poland must be described as an emigration-immigration country (Korcelli 1997; Koryś & Weiner 2005). The opening of borders did not lead to a significant increase in emigration rates. From 1990 until 1999, only 216,000 Poles left their country, representing just one fifth of the estimated 1.1 to 1.3 million emigrants of the 1980s. At the same time, a rising number of people from abroad moved to Poland, exceeding the number of Polish emigrants. Among them were petty traders, refugees, temporary workers, transmigrants and return migrants (Okólski 1999).

Until very recently the phenomenon of return migration to Poland was only marginally addressed in research. In general, three phases of return migration are distinguished. The first phase, lasting until 1938, involves the traditional return of Poles who had left the country as part of the mass emigration wave to the United States in 1919-1938 (Chałasiński 1936; Niemyska 1936; Walaszek 1983). The socialist regime (1945-1989) constitutes the second phase, in which the Polish migration system was dominated by emigration. Statistical data show that out of more than 3 million emigrants only 55,000 returned in the years 1961-1989. Political and other emigrants who left Poland before 1990 and have come back since constitute the third and current phase of return migration (Klagge et al. 2007). During this third phase, return migration to Poland gained momentum and became an issue in political and scientific debate. According to the Polish Population Census of 2002, about 70,000 former emigrants or their foreign-born children returned to Poland from 1990 until 2002.

The 2002 census offers detailed information on return migrants to Poland. It defines a high-skilled return migrant as a Polish citizen who holds a tertiary degree, lived abroad for at least 12 months and moved to Poland afterwards. This definition includes second-generation return migrants who were born abroad but are of Polish origin. The education level of these return migrants is comparatively high, as more than one fourth (27 per cent; 15,512) of returning adults older than 13 years of age hold a tertiary degree (figure 12.1). In comparison, only 14 per cent of Polish adults and about 10 per cent of Polish emigrants are highly skilled (Fihel, Górný & Matejko 2006; Klagge et al. 2007). More than one fourth (19,630) of all Polish return migrants left Poland again before 2002. These so-called remigrants were, on average, less educated than those return


Figure 12.1 Education level of Polish return migrants 13 years of age or older, 2002 (%)



* unfinished elementary

Source: Author's computation based on Fihel, Górny & Matejko (2006)

Figure 12.2 Education level of Polish return migrants and re-emigrants 13 years of age or older, 2002 (%)



* unfinished elementary


Source: Author's computation based on Fihel, Górny & Matejko (2006)

migrants who stayed on in Poland (figure 12.2). In total, about one third (12,223, 30 per cent) of return migrants older than 13 years and still living in Poland in 2002 held a university degree. The following analysis focuses on this group of Polish high-skilled return migrants.

According to the 2002 census, the group of high-skilled return migrants living in Poland in 2002 (around 12,200 persons) is relatively homogenous in terms of age, country of birth, country of residence before return and economic activity. About half of the high-skilled return migrants are women, and the vast majority (90 per cent) is between 20 and 59 years of age, while less than 10 per cent is of retirement age. Most high-skilled return migrants in Poland in 2002 (80 per cent) were born in Poland. About 9,500 of them (78 per cent) have only Polish citizenship, while one fifth (22 per cent) is in possession of dual citizenship (Polish and other, mostly of the United States, Germany or Canada). The main countries of previous residence are the United States (18 per cent), Germany (16 per cent), United Kingdom (8 per cent), France (6 per cent) and Canada (5 per cent). More than two thirds had their previous residence in one of only nine countries (figure 12.3) (Fihel, Górný & Matejko 2006; Klagge et al. 2007).

Corresponding to the age structure, most return migrants are economically active; that is, either employed (75 per cent) or looking for employment (8 per cent). The percentage of economically passive return migrants; that is, those who are neither employed nor looking for a job, is

Figure 12.3 *Main countries of previous residence of return migrants in Poland, 2002 (%)**



* Respondents with missing data not included


Source: Author's computation based on Fihel, Górný & Matejko (2006)

significantly lower in the group of high-skilled return migrants (16.5 per cent) than among all return migrants (35 per cent). In addition, far fewer high-skilled return migrants are job-seeking (8.2 per cent), compared to 13.5 per cent unemployed in the total population of return migrants living in Poland in 2002 (figure 12.4) (Fihel, Górny & Matejko 2006; Klagge et al. 2007).

Among the economically active and employed return migrants with a university degree, more than three quarters (78 per cent) are employees, while only 13 per cent are self-employed without employees, and an additional 9 per cent employ other persons. In general, the majority (90 per cent) of high-skilled return migrants work in the tertiary sector, especially in positions as high-ranking officials, managers and specialists (Fihel, Górny & Matejko 2006; Klagge et al. 2007).

In sum, this statistical analysis shows that high-skilled return migrants are quite similar in socio-demographic characteristics. The majority of those still living in Poland in 2002 returned from a highly developed country and, corresponding to their age structure, they are economically active, mostly as employees in the service sector. In addition, the census data provide information on their place of residence upon return, revealing regional concentrations of returnees in Poland in 2002. The voivodship Mazovian, where the capital city of Warsaw is located, is the place of residence of about one fifth (21 per cent) of all return migrants in Poland; about one third (34 per cent) of the high-skilled return migrants live in this region (table 12.1).

Figure 12.4 *Economic activity of return migrants in Poland 15 years of age or older, 2002 (%)*



Source: Author's computation based on Fihel, Górny & Matejko (2006)

Table 12.1 *Return migrants according to voivodship and education level in Poland, 2002*

Voivodships	All return migrants		High-skilled return migrants	
	N	%	N	%
Lower Silesian (<i>Dolnośląskie</i> , DOL)	3,859	9.5	953	7.8
Kuyavian-Pomeranian (<i>Kujawsko-Pomorskie</i> , KUJ)	1,517	3.7	353	2.9
Lublin (<i>Lubelskie</i> , LUB)	1,347	3.3	369	3.0
Lubusz (<i>Lubuskie</i> , LUBU)	1,050	2.6	216	1.8
Łódź (<i>Łódzkie</i> , LOD)	2,014	4.9	635	5.2
Lesser Poland (<i>Małopolskie</i> , MAL)	4,207	10.3	1,213	9.9
Masovian (<i>Mazowieckie</i>, MAZ)	8,634	21.2	4,161	34.0
Opole (<i>Opolskie</i> , OPO)	957	2.3	181	1.5
Subcarpathian (<i>Podkarpackie</i> , POD)	2,645	6.5	484	4.0
Podlaskie (PODL)	1,544	3.8	366	3.0
Pomeranian (<i>Pomorskie</i> , POM)	2,782	6.8	785	6.4
Silesian (<i>Śląskie</i> , SLA)	4,240	10.4	975	8.0
Świętokrzyskie (SWI)	895	2.2	217	1.8
Warmian-Masurian (<i>Warmińsko-Mazurskie</i> , WAR)	1,203	2.9	280	2.3
Greater Poland (<i>Wielkopolskie</i> , WIE)	2,091	5.1	595	4.9
West Pomeranian (<i>Zachodniopomorskie</i> , ZAC)	1,806	4.4	440	3.6
Total	40,791	100	12,223	100


Source: Author's computation based on Fihel, Górny & Matejko (2006)

All return migrants, but especially those with a university degree, prefer an urban environment. Ninety per cent of high-skilled return migrants moved to Polish cities upon their return, while this share is a bit lower (81 per cent) among all return migrants living in Poland in 2002.


Although this analysis of the regional selectivity of high-skilled return migrants in Poland in 2002 indicates that one third of high-skilled return migrants move to Warsaw, it also reveals that two thirds move to other Polish regions. This includes not only major cities (especially Krakow, Wrocław and Poznan), but also smaller cities and rural areas. To explain the pattern of regional selectivity it is necessary to look at the regional economic structure of Poland.

12.3 Regional economic development in Poland

Since 1989-1990, Poland's economy has been transformed from a socialistic planned economy to a capitalist market economy. In 2004, Poland became a member of the European Union. In the years prior to the accession, major adjustments were made towards liberalisation, privatisation and a stability oriented growth policy. Poland's economy today is characterised by a rising gross domestic product (GDP) (4.8 per cent in 2008, figure 12.5), decreasing unemployment (from 19 per cent in 2004 to 9.5 per cent in 2008, figure 12.6) and rising wages (10.4 per cent growth in 2008 from the previous

Figure 12.5 GDP growth in Poland, 1990-2008 (% change from previous year)

Sources: Author's computation based on PAliIZ (2009), Droth et al. (2000)
www.stat.gov.pl/gus/45_677_ENG_HTML.htm.

Figure 12.6 Unemployment rate in Poland, 1990-2008 (%)

Sources: Author's computation based on GUS (2008a)

year) (Schrooten 2006; Balcerowicz 2007; CSO 2008a, 2008b, 2009). However, this generally positive picture overlooks the regional disparities which are characteristic of the Polish economic landscape.

Regional disparities in Poland are not a new phenomenon. The uneven economic performance of today stems from different historical development paths of the Polish regions and can be traced back to the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, when towns were founded and restructured primarily in the Western regions. During the Second Polish Republic (*II Rzeczpospolita Polska*, 1918-1938) the regions in the east of Poland (Poland B) lagged behind the more industrialised and urbanised areas of the west (Poland A), where the main economic centres were located (Upper Silesian Industrial Region Lodz, Warsaw) (Gorzelał 2001a, 2000; Heyde 2006; Korcelli 1997; Pieper 2006). Therefore, at the end of the

Second World War (1939-1945) and with the beginning of the socialist era (1945-1989), the country was already characterised by a pronounced urban-rural and east-west divide. The introduction of the socialistic planned economy and the integration into the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON, 1945) reinforced the regional differences in economic performance, leading to major regional economic disparities at the beginning of the transformation process (Pieper 2006; Korcelli 2005, 1997; Gorzelak 2001a; Krätke, Heeg & Stein 1997).

Although the economic disparities between the Polish regions are not a direct result of the economic transformation, it nevertheless led to a strengthening of regional differences. Warsaw as the economic centre of Poland as well as other large conurbations (e.g., Krakow, Wroclaw, Poznan) did comparatively well, with relatively low unemployment rates and high wages, a strong service sector and a large degree of internationalisation through foreign direct investment. They can be described as 'growth islands' in an altogether rather complex and mosaic-like pattern (Korcelli 1997: 230). Other, mainly rural, but also some old industrial regions have coped with deep structural problems, such as job losses in agriculture or industry, low levels of investment (both national and international), lack of employment opportunities in advanced industries and services and high unemployment, either open or hidden (Korcelli 1997; Pütz 1998; Abraham & Eser 1999; Czyż 1999; Gorzelak 2000).²

These disparities are apparent in the main economic indicators at the regional level (table 12.2).³ GDP per capita was in 2002 by far the highest in

Table 12.2 GDP per capita and unemployment rate, 2002 (%)

Voivodships	GDP per capita (in 1,000 EUR)	Unemployment (%)
Lower Silesian (<i>Dolnośląskie</i> , DOL)	5.7	26.1
Kuyavian-Pomeranian (<i>Kujawsko-Pomorskie</i> , KUJ)	5.0	21.5
Lublin (<i>Lubelskie</i> , LUB)	3.9	16.6
Lubusz (<i>Lubuskie</i> , LUBU)	4.8	26.3
Łódź (<i>Łódzkie</i> , LOD)	5.8	20.3
Lesser Poland (<i>Małopolskie</i> , MAL)	4.7	16.2
Masovian (<i>Mazowieckie</i> , MAZ)	8.5	17.0
Opole (<i>Opolskie</i> , OPO)	4.4	19.7
Subcarpathian (<i>Podkarpackie</i> , POD)	3.8	18.2
Podlaskie (PODL)	4.2	16.8
Pomeranian (<i>Pomorskie</i> , POM)	5.5	21.5
Silesian (<i>Śląskie</i> , SLA)	6.0	20.1
Świętokrzyskie (SWI)	4.2	18.8
Warmian-Masurian (<i>Warmińsko-Mazurskie</i> , WAR)	4.2	25.9
Greater Poland (<i>Wielkopolskie</i> , WIE)	5.7	18.2
West Pomeranian (<i>Zachodniopomorskie</i> , ZAC)	5.4	26.0
Total	5.0	20.0

Mazovian (MAZ) and the lowest in the eastern regions Lublin (LUB) and Subcarpathian (POD). In general, this indicator shows an east-west divide, with significantly higher numbers in the western regions of Poland. The east-west divide is less obvious when looking at the regional unemployment rates. The western, old industrial regions Lubusz (LUBU), Lower Silesian (DOL) and West Pomeranian (ZAC) show unemployment rates above 25 per cent, while the respective rates are significantly lower in the more rural eastern parts (except the voivodship Warmian-Masurian (WAR)) and comparable with the unemployment rate of Mazovian. This is due to the phenomenon of hidden unemployment in the eastern regions, where a significant number of people are involved in small-scale private farms, although not for income generation.

Regarding employment opportunities, the voivodship Mazovian, which contains the capital, Warsaw, has a unique position with the highest share of employees in the tertiary sector, in companies with foreign capital and – behind Lesser Poland (MAL) with Krakow – the second largest share of employees in research and development (R&D) occupations relative to the total number of employees. Regarding the share of employees in companies with foreign capital, the eastern regions, Podlaskie (PODL) and Lublin (LUB) lag behind, whereas Greater Poland (WIE), Lower Silesian (DOL) and Lubusz (LUBU) in the west show comparatively high rates of employees working in companies with foreign capital. The picture is more diverse when it comes to the percentage of employees in R&D, where the east-west divide is less obvious (table 12.3).

Table 12.3 *Selected economic indicators for Polish voivodships (%)*

<i>Voivodship</i>	<i>Share of employees in tertiary sector (2002)</i>	<i>Share of employees in R&D (2002)</i>	<i>Share of employees in companies with foreign capital (2003)</i>
Lower Silesian (DOL)	59.43	1.52	13.56
Kuyavian-Pomeranian (KUJ)	57.55	1.22	7.02
Lublin (LUB)	58.44	1.56	7.20
Lubusz (LUBU)	66.16	1.94	4.23
Łódź (LOD)	60.14	0.68	13.58
Lesser Poland (MAL)	63.28	2.90	11.57
Masovian (MAZ)	70.24	2.64	30.44
Opole (OPO)	56.27	0.83	9.66
Subcarpathian (POD)	57.80	0.79	9.13
Podlaskie (PODL)	67.35	1.21	4.34
Pomeranian (POM)	61.57	1.36	11.57
Silesian (SLA)	53.40	1.00	7.75
Świętokrzyskie (SWI)	61.29	0.60	8.85
Warmian-Masurian (WAR)	60.01	0.91	8.36
Greater Poland (WIE)	54.96	1.60	15.20
West Pomeranian (ZAC)	62.45	1.12	11.28

Source: Author's computation based on GUS (2008c)

These different regional settings provide very different contexts and opportunity structures for returning migrants. Analysis of the spatial distribution of return migration to Poland has shown that high-skilled return migrants in Poland in 2002 concentrate only to some extent in the, in economic terms, outstanding Mazovian voivodship. Two thirds move to other Polish regions. To help determine whether high-skilled return migrants in Poland tend to settle in economically more advanced and dynamic regions with diverse job opportunities, a regression analysis was done on the inter-relationship between main economic indicators and the number of high-skilled return migrants at the regional level.

12.4 Theoretical model for analysing the regional selectivity of high-skilled return migration

The main hypothesis of this analysis is that the number of high-skilled return migrants in the Polish regions is influenced by three factors: (1) the economic situation, (2) economic dynamics and (3) job opportunities in the respective voivodships. To operationalise these, 'GDP per capita' (GDPPC),⁴ 'average monthly wages' (WAGES) and 'unemployment rate' (UNEMP) serve as indicators for a region's economic situation. Economic dynamics is operationalised via 'GDP growth' (GDPGR). For job opportunities, four indicators are used: 'share of employees in tertiary sector' (SETSE), 'share of employees in primary sector' (SEPSE), 'share of employees in R&D' (SERAD) and 'share of employees in companies with foreign capital' (SECFC) (table 12.4). These indicators are the independent variables employed to explain the variance of the dependent one: 'number of high-skilled return migrants' (RETMIG). The indicator 'population' serves as control variable. All variables were checked for normal distribution; the logarithm was employed for RETMIG, GDPPC, UNEMP, SEPSE, SETSE and SERAD.

As the dependent variable 'number of high-skilled return migrants' refers to 2002, the year of the census. All but one independent variable are defined for this year. For the variable 'share of employees in companies with foreign capital', data was unavailable for 2002, so this refers to 2003 instead. Because the census data refer to the place of residence of high-skilled return migrants in 2002, it is only possible to analyse the regional selectivity of return migrants in 2002 and not in the different years of their return. All variables are defined at the level of voivodship.

Table 12.4 *Variables for regression analysis to explain the variance in the number of high-skilled return migrants in the Polish voivodships, 2002*

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Indicator for...</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Source</i>
<i>Dependent variable</i>				
Return migrants (RETMIG)	Number of high-skilled return migrants (log)	-	2002	Census 2002
<i>Independent variables</i>				
GDP per capita (GDPPC)	GDP at current market prices (in €) per capita (log)	Economic situation	2002	EUROSTAT 2008
Unemployment rate (UNEMP)	Unemployment rate in percent (log)	Economic situation	2002	EUROSTAT 2008
Wages (WAGES)	Average monthly gross wages and salaries (in PLN)	Economic situation	2002	GUS 2008c
GDP growth (GDPGR)	Real growth rate of regional GDP at market prices – percentage change on previous year	Economic dynamics	2002	EUROSTAT 2008
Share of employees in tertiary sector (SETSE)	Share of employees in tertiary sector to total number of employees (log)	Job opportunities	2002	Own calculation based on GUS 2008c
Share of employees in primary sector (SEPSE)	Share of employees in primary sector to total number of employees (log)	Job opportunities	2002	Own calculation based on GUS 2008c
Share of employees in R&D (SERAD)	Share of employees in R&D to total number of employees (log)	Job opportunities	2002	Own calculation based on GUS 2008c
Share of employees in companies with foreign capital (SEFC)	Number of employees in companies with foreign capital participation	Job opportunities	2003	GUS 2008c
<i>Control variable</i>				
Population	Average yearly population	-	2002	GUS 2008c

Source: Author

12.5 Locational choice of high-skilled return migrants in Poland: An empirical analysis

The statistical analysis examines the variances in the number of high-skilled return migrants in the Polish voivodships. A first look at the correlation matrix (table 12.5) reveals – not surprisingly – a correlation among several independent variables. This picture is supported by taking into

Table 12.5 *Correlation matrix^a*

	GDPPC	UNEMP	WAGES	GDPGR	SEPSE	SETSE	SERAD	SECFC	RETMI
GDPPC	1.000	.056	.882**	-.134	-.203	.129	.455	.802**	.778**
UNEMP	.056	1.000	-.191	.136	.556*	-.294	-.436	-.028	-.286
WAGES	.882**	-.191	1.000	-.151	-.363	.357	.481	.838**	.824**
GDPGR	-.134	.136	-.151	1.000	-.400	-.070	.004	-.297	.092
SEPSE	.451	.025	.167	.125	1.000	-.220	-.367	-.090	-.593*
SETSE	.129	-.294	.357	-.070	-.220	1.000	.430	.312	.307
SERAD	.634	.270	.175	.796	.412	.097	1.000	.240	.248
SECFC	.455	-.436	.481	.004	-.367	.430	.387	1.000	.755**
RETMI	.077	.091	.059	.989	.162	.097	.139	.139	.001
GDPPC	.802**	-.028	.838**	-.297	-.090	.312	.387	1.000	.680**
UNEMP	.000	.919	.000	.264	.740	.240	.139	.139	.004
WAGES	.778**	-.286	.824**	.092	-.593*	.307	.755**	.680**	1.000
GDPGR	.000	.283	.000	.734	.015	.248	.001	.004	.004

^a Bivariate correlation coefficients according to Pearson; significance (2-tailed)

** Correlation is significant for the 0.01 niveau (2-tailed)

* Correlation is significant for 0.05 niveau (2-tailed)

Source: Author's computation

account the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF),⁵ which shows high values for selected independent variables (e.g., WAGES and GDPPC). Therefore, before carrying out a multivariate regression analysis, the given problem of multicollinearity needs to be solved.

In addition, the correlation matrix reveals that several independent variables identified to serve as indicators of economic capacity, economic growth or job opportunities do not significantly correlate with the number of high-skilled return migrants. This is true for UNEMP, GDPGR and SETSE. Regarding the lack of correlation between UNEMP and RETMI, two reasons could be given. First, as the regional analysis indicated, economically weak regions, especially in the eastern part of Poland, do not necessarily have high unemployment rates, mostly because of hidden unemployment in the agricultural sector. Second, high-skilled return migrants do not consider unemployment to be a personal risk. Indeed, as the analysis of high-skilled return migrants indicated, unemployment is, in general, not a problem among high-skilled return migrants. The second independent variable not showing a significant correlation is GDPGR. This result is interesting insofar as it suggests that return migrants do not choose their location according to future prospects of economic development, but more in regard to the present state of the economy. In the case of the variable 'share of employees in tertiary sector' the result is surprising, as the

analysis indicates that return migrants in Poland often work in the tertiary sector. A possible explanation for the lack of correlation between RETMI and SETSE is the diverse sectoral structure of the Polish voivodships. While the economically strong regions of the west (e.g., Lower Silesian, Greater Poland) show relatively low shares of employees in the tertiary sector, voivodships in the east of Poland (e.g., Podlaskie and Lublin) have numbers comparable to those of Mazovia. However, the missing bivariate correlation between these variables does not imply that they do not – in combination with other variables – contribute to explain the number of high-skilled return migrants in the Polish voivodships.

To solve the problem of multicollinearity, a principle component analysis (PCA) was employed with which the number of variables was reduced.⁶ Before running a PCA, all independent variables were subjected to z-transformation.⁷ The PCA resulted in a three-component solution (table 12.6). The first component shows high factor loadings for five independent variables: zGDPPC (0.829), zWAGES (0.929), zSETSE (0.514), zSERAD (0.712) and zSECFC (0.830). These variables were subsumed to the new component economic attractiveness (ECATT). This integrates indicators for the economic capacity of the region (zGDPPC, zWAGES), on the one hand, and indicators for job opportunities (zSETSE, zSERAD, zSECFC) on the other, resulting in potentially attractive context conditions for high-skilled return migrants. The second component consists of the two variables zUNEMP (0.673) and zSEPSE (0.726), characterising the economic deficits of a given region. It was therefore called economic deficits (ECDEF). The third component consists of the single component GDP growth (zGDPGR, 0.772), indicating regional economic dynamics (ECDYN).

These three components were integrated in a multivariate regression analysis to explain the variance in the number of high-skilled return migrants in the Polish voivodships. To identify the individual influence of the three independent components, a stepwise regression analysis was done.

Table 12.6 *Component matrix^a*

	1 ECATT	2 ECDEF	3 ECDYN
zGDPPC	.826	.387	.311
zUNEMP	-.375	.673	.465
zWAGES	.929	.190	.153
zGDPGR	-.167	-.505	.772
zSEPSE	-.460	.726	-.300
zSETSE	.514	-.261	-.369
zSERAD	.712	-.309	-.106
zSECFC	.830	.433	.038

^a three components extracted

Source: Author's computation; principal component analysis

Table 12.7 *Regression analysis^a*

	<i>Dependent Variable: RETMI</i>		
	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
ECATT	0.89** (7.54)	0.89** (9.16)	0.89** (9.16)
ECDYN	-	0.27* (2.76)	0.27* (2.76)
ECDEF	-	-	-0,13 (-1.37)
R ²	80.3	87.6	89.3
R ² _{corr}	78.9	85.7	86.6
F-value	56.96**	45.79**	33.26**
N	16	16	16

^a standardised regression coefficient (t-value)

** Correlation is significant for 0.01 niveau (2-tailed)

* Correlation is significant for 0.05 niveau (2-tailed)

Source: Author's computation

The results show that the component ECATT explains 80 per cent of the variance of high-skilled return migrants in the Polish voivodships (coefficient of determination $R^2 = 0.803$, 0.000 level of significance). By introducing the component ECDYN the share of explained variance increased to 87 per cent ($R^2 = 0.876$; 0.000 level of significance) (table 12.6). However, only in combination with the first component ECATT can this component help to explain the variance in the number of high-skilled return migrants, as suggested by the results of a bivariate correlation analysis between ECDYN and RETMI. The third component, ECDEF, does not contribute to explain the variance in the number of high-skilled return migrants in the Polish voivodships (table 12.7).⁸

As a high coefficient of determination (R^2) does not guarantee that a model fits the data well, an analysis of residuals is necessary to validate the model. Model 2 shows no significant variance among the standardised residuals, as no standardised residual differs more than two standard deviation units from zero. In addition, the results show no indication of autocorrelation of residuals.

12.6 Discussion of the results and conclusion

The results of the statistical analysis strongly support the assumption that high-skilled return migrants in Poland tend to concentrate in economically advanced regions with diverse job opportunities. In general, the methodology applied proved suitable for analysing the research question. The sound analysis of the selected independent variables and their correlation with the number of high-skilled return migrants gave further insight into the locational choice of high-skilled return migrants in Poland.

The theoretical model chosen was aimed at explaining the variance in the number of high-skilled return migrants via a multivariate regression analysis. For this, several independent variables were selected as indicators of the economic situation, economic dynamics and job opportunities. However, before multivariate regression analysis could be applied, a PCA was necessary to solve the problem of multicollinearity. In the course of the PCA the independent variables were subsumed into three components. The first component, economic attractiveness, consists of variables indicating the economic situation (GDP per capita, wages) and diverse job opportunities (share of employees in tertiary sector, in R&D and in companies with foreign capital). The second component, economic deficits, integrates variables indicating economic weaknesses (unemployment rate, share of employees in primary sector). The third component, economic dynamics, consists solely of the variable GDP growth.

The stepwise integration of these three components into a multivariate regression analysis led to a two-component model that explains almost 90 per cent of the variance in the number of high-skilled return migrants. In detail, the component economic attractiveness of a region – indicated by GDP per capita, wages, and share of employees in tertiary sector, in R&D and in companies with foreign capital – largely explains the regional selectivity of high-skilled return migrants in Poland. GDP growth as the indicator of economic dynamics contributes far less to explain regional selectivity – and only in combination with economic attractiveness. Furthermore, the results give evidence that the number of high-skilled return migrants in the Polish voivodship does not correlate with the component economic deficits, which subsumes the variables high unemployment rate and a high share of employees in primary sector. This is probably a result of the misleading low unemployment rates in the eastern voivodships or because high-skilled return migrants in Poland are scarcely affected by unemployment, as seen in the socio-demographic profiles of high-skilled return migrants living in Poland in 2002. Further, the results of the regression analysis give evidence of the, in economic terms, unique position of the Mazovian voivodship, which attracts the highest number of high-skilled return migrants by far.

In summary, it can be concluded that regarding their locational choice, high-skilled return migrants in Poland consider the economic situation and diverse job opportunities and, to a lesser extent, future development prospects of the regions. Therefore, the locational choice of high-skilled return migrants in Poland results in a complex regional pattern reflecting the regional economic disparities characteristic of the Polish economy today. The unique economic position of the capital region of Mazovia is highly evident. Furthermore, high-skilled return migration across Poland's various regions shows a similar pattern of locational preference for urban areas and economic centres. Whether this pattern of regional selectivity and

locational preferences of high-skilled return migrants is also valid in other countries is a subject for future research, but there are strong arguments supporting this view.

To explain the regional preferences of high-skilled return migrants in Poland, this study concentrated on economic indicators. Other arguments (e.g., place of origin, social relations) were not taken into account, due to missing statistical data. Nonetheless, these too likely influence the locational choice of return migrants. The place of origin of high-skilled return migrants seems to be particularly important, but in the case of Poland, it is difficult to use as an indicator for two reasons. First, as discussed earlier, a significant share (20 per cent) of high-skilled return migrants in Poland in 2002 was born abroad. Second, due to border changes, the place of origin of some return migrants was no longer part of Poland after the Second World War. This means that for these groups of return migrants their place of origin lies outside current Polish borders. Therefore, although the significance of these factors is acknowledged, their integration into a quantitative analysis seems almost impossible. To gain a more comprehensive grasp of all factors influencing the locational choice of return migrants and to support the research results presented here, a micro-level study with personal in depth interviews seems necessary.

Taking into account research results showing a positive impact of high-skilled return migrants on economic development, the preference of return migrants for economically more advanced and attractive regions leads to the hypothesis that selective return migration of the highly skilled may reinforce regional economic disparities in a given country. The correlation between migration and uneven regional development has long been neglected, but it is now an important topic in scientific debate, with migration seen both as a cause and a consequence of uneven development (see Perrons 2009; Williams 2009; Williams, Baláz and Wallace 2004). A correlation between migration and uneven regional development is also a relevant issue for Poland. With the shift from a planned to a market economy, return migration became an important trend there, and regional disparities increased. Nevertheless, because of the limited scale of return migration in Poland, high-skilled return migration is unlikely to lead to a significant and measurable increase in regional disparities.

There are arguments that the global financial crisis starting in 2008 and the worsening economic conditions in receiving countries thereafter might stimulate Poles living abroad to return to their home country (Blume 2009; Harrison 2009). But Poland's economy too has been affected by the recession, even though Poland's economy did not initially decline to the extent of the British or Irish ones (Ministry of the Economy 2009a, 2009b). Therefore, it remains to be seen if and in how far the number of high-skilled return migrants to Poland will increase as a result of the global financial crisis. The future development of the Polish economy seems to be crucial in this regard.

Notes

- 1 This work would not have been possible without the support of colleagues at the Centre of Migration Research (CMR) in Warsaw, namely, Marek Okólski, Agata Górny, Agnieszka Fihel, Ewa Matejko and Marta Kindler. They provided detailed census data on return migration (see also Fihel, Górny & Matejko 2006) and background information on return migration processes in Poland. I am grateful for this support. I also thank Britta Klagge and Petra Werner and the anonymous referees who helped to improve this chapter.
- 2 For a detailed analysis of the regional disparities in Poland, their patterns, causes and characteristics see Korcelli 1997; Abraham & Eser 1999; Czyż 1999; Czyż, Churski & Hauke 2000; Gorzelak 1996, 2000, 2001a, 2001b; and Kühne 2000.
- 3 To allow comparison with the number of high-skilled return migrants in Poland in 2002 all indicators refer to 2002.
- 4 As a basis for regional comparison, the indicator GDP per capita is not without drawbacks, as it measures the economic output achieved within regional boundaries and does not take into account whether this output was achieved by resident or non-resident employed persons. However, as GDP per capita is in general the best indicator of the economic development of regions and is not equated with regional primary income, its use here seems justifiable.
- 5 The VIF quantifies the severity of multicollinearity. Multicollinearity refers to a situation where two or more explanatory variables in a regression model show a high correlation among each other. In the presence of multicollinearity, the precision of the estimated values is reduced.
- 6 Via the PCA a number of possibly correlated variables are transformed into a smaller number of uncorrelated variables called 'principle components' or simply components. It is the aim of the PCA to explain the variance with as few components as possible. The first component accounts for as much of the variance in the data as possible, and each succeeding component accounts for as much of the remaining variance as possible.
- 7 To run a PCA all variables have to be normally distributed, which makes a z-transformation necessary.
- 8 Incorporating the component ECDEF increases the explained variance only marginally ($R^2 = 0.893$; 0.000 level of significance).

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13 Translators of knowledge?

Labour market positioning of young Poles returning from studies abroad in Germany

Nina Wolfeil

13.1 Introduction

Post-accession migration from Poland has gained prominence in the media and in research during recent years. Researchers have pointed to the strong involvement of young and highly educated migrants in this most recent wave of migration from Poland (Kaczmarczyk & Okólski 2008). While we already know a lot about the labour market outcomes of Poles in the United Kingdom (see, e.g., Drinkwater, Eade & Garapich 2006), post-accession return migration and labour market outcomes of returnees remain blind spots. This is even more true with regard to educational migration and returns from studies abroad. According to UNESCO (2008: table 10), 30,808 Polish students are studying abroad. Forty-three per cent of them chose Germany as their study abroad destination. Throughout the 1990s, educational migration from Poland to Germany saw a steady increase. The numbers of Polish students peaked at 12,301 in winter term 2005-2006 (StBA 2008). In quantitative terms, Polish students still represent the second most important group of international students in Germany. Studying the outcomes of German-Polish educational migration could thus provide insight into a segment of high-skilled migration that has been largely ignored in migration studies, despite indications that it is the young and highly qualified who characterise Poland's migration.

To date, little precise data is available on retention or return of former educational migrants. We know that annually about 1,400 Polish students graduate from German universities (StBA 2008: 223). A survey of 177 Polish graduates from the European University Viadrina – the main target university in terms of Polish enrolments in Germany (DAAD/HIS 2008) – reveals that only 20 per cent lived in Germany upon graduation (Meier 2002, cited in Matejskova, Bergstrom & Szara 2005: 74). Polish government data (KPRM 2002) shows that 90 per cent of the Polish Viadrina graduates take up their first post-graduation employment in Poland.¹ Thus,

the limited data available suggests that the overall majority returns. Hence, some might claim that in this segment of highly skilled migration, Poland observes a brain gain. However, this conclusion would be rash, since little research exists on the labour market outcomes of returnee graduates. This chapter addresses this research lacuna. Its specific aim is to deliver qualitative insights into the labour market positioning of migrants returning from studies abroad by analysing the extent to which they utilise the knowledge and competences gained abroad in their jobs back in Poland. A qualitative approach is used to understand the rationale of return migration and to provide an in-depth analysis of the extent to which knowledge utilisation leads to brain gain.

This chapter presents a qualitative typology of returnee graduates. It is based on 34 interviews that were carried out with Poles who had studied at German universities and returned to Poland, mostly after 2004, either immediately after graduation or after having gained some professional experience in Germany. The typology comprises five types according to the returnees' usage of German cultural capital and the impact of their disciplinary backgrounds on their professional activities. The chapter contains five sections. Section 13.2 presents the current state of knowledge in return migration studies with a special emphasis on returned students and knowledge transfer. Section 13.3 describes methodology and sample structure. The typology is presented in section 13.4. The last section summarises and concludes the discussion.

13.2 Research background

Research on returning students and their role as knowledge translators borrows from diverse research fields. This section presents the main theoretical and empirical inputs from return migration studies, higher education research and research in the sociology and geography of knowledge. The aim is to provide a theoretical framework and empirical reference point for subsequent analysis of the interviews.

Return migration first appeared on the research agenda during the 1960s. It gained prominence throughout the 1970s and 1980s when, as a consequence of economic recession, guest workers left their Western European host countries and returned to their home countries (compare King 1986: 3). This research mainly focused on the return migrants' impact on socio-economic development and analysed the role of migrants as innovators (transfer of knowledge) or as investors (transfer of savings, remittances). The findings are rather disappointing. The majority of returned guest workers became neither innovators nor investors (King 1986: 18-28). The focus of return migration studies changed from the 1990s onwards. Instead of dealing with guest workers, nowadays there is much interest in

high-skilled returnees. There is a consensus that emigration of the highly skilled does not automatically lead to a brain drain, but that upon their return this group may serve as actors of change, and that countries of origin thus benefit from a brain gain. This assumption is reflected in a growing body of literature on the link between migration and development (e.g., Olesen 2002; Hunger 2000, 2004).

The impact of highly skilled return migration on regional development is positively evaluated in studies on regional upgrading in Taiwan, India and China (Saxenian & Hsu 2001; Saxenian 2008; Hunger 2000, 2004; Müller 2007). According to Saxenian and Hsu (2001), the return migration of engineers from Silicon Valley supported the development of the IT sector in Hsinchu Park in Taiwan. This process started in the 1960s and 1970s with Taiwanese students leaving for education at US universities. Upon graduation, they found jobs in the emerging industries in Silicon Valley. In the 1990s, government initiatives back home and professional associations started to function as intermediaries between the two regions, and a first wave of returnees started businesses in Hsinchu Park. Their businesses in Taiwan were positively influenced by the knowledge gained abroad and their networks embedded in both countries. A point of critique with this field of research is its focus on the migrants' roles as entrepreneurs and investors and the exclusion of returnees who do not possess financial means, such as returnee graduates at an early stage of their career.

Quantitative higher education research has focused on young graduates. This field provides an overview of the labour market outcomes of studying abroad. Lianos, Asteriou and Agiomirgianakis (2004) assessed the labour market outcomes of Greeks returning from studies abroad. Problems of labour market positioning were a higher rate of unemployment than that for graduates and misemployment. About one fifth of the respondents said that their field of employment differed from their area of study.² Furthermore, 30 per cent of those holding a first degree regard themselves as overeducated. A Norwegian study assessed the impact of studying abroad on labour market outcomes, offering the advantage of a control group who graduated in Norway. In comparison to home graduates, those who graduated abroad had a lower job probability and a higher risk of overeducation. Contrariwise, their earnings were higher. The gross wage premium for studying abroad was 3.7 per cent. Astonishingly, those home graduates who spent part of their studies abroad had a higher job probability than the other two groups (Wiers-Jenssen & Try 2005: 701). A study that compared labour market outcomes of Malaysians trained abroad with those trained locally found no significant differences with regard to income levels and job satisfaction (Ball & Chik 2001). The most broadly based data on the professional value of educational mobility is offered by three surveys on the outcomes of Erasmus mobility (see, e.g., Bracht et al. 2006; Teichler & Janson 2007). This data allows comparison of labour market outcomes

over three decades (Erasmus cohorts 1988-1989, 1994-1995, 2000-2001). In general, the professional value of the study abroad experience seems to have decreased over time in terms of job content, income level and the degree to which studying abroad helped in obtaining a first job (Teichler & Janson 2007).

One might conclude from these findings that the value of mobility capital decreases as it becomes more of a mass phenomenon (compare with Favell 2008: 96). Overall, according to higher education research, studying abroad may have positive as well as negative impacts on career patterns.

Qualitative research is still scarce on the innovative role of returned early-stage graduates. Particular attention has been paid to Chinese returnees with overseas education (Le Bail & Shen 2008; Shen 2008; Berthoin Anthal & Walker 2006; Müller 2005, 2007). High-skilled emigration from China is said to be mainly for educational purposes. Graduate returnees are called '*haigui*' (sea turtles) and represent a distinct social group (Müller 2007: 165). Targeted return programmes have been initiated at the local and national level in order to facilitate the return of overseas students and scholars (Le Bail & Shen 2008: 12, 15). Berthoin, Anthal & Walker (2006: 109) analysed the impact of Chinese educational returnees on organisational learning by means of qualitative interviews. They concluded that returnees have a positive impact on organisational learning, but major obstacles still exist since locals are more interested in knowledge of minor importance for the organisation. Furthermore, returnees face intercultural problems in knowledge translation due to their unfamiliarity with the Chinese business climate. Waters (2006) looked at Hong Kong graduates who returned from studies abroad in Canada, analysing how recognition of foreign-gained credentials and knowledge, or in other words, cultural capital, depends on evaluation in transnational social fields. Returnees relied on social networks to find a job back home with employers who themselves had studied in Canada. Baláž and Williams (2004) analysed the human capital transfer of Slovakian student returnees from the United Kingdom. They concluded that formal qualifications are not of primary importance; returned students valued above all the enrichment of social and personal competences.³

Sociology and geography are other research fields that provide valuable analytical tools for the assessment of returnees' knowledge transfer. In order to answer the question of whether returnee graduates function as knowledge translators, there is a need to categorise the resources that they have at their disposal. Such discussions tend to be dominated by the terms 'human capital', 'social capital' and 'knowledge'. In previous decades, research on the consequences of highly skilled migration used the parameter human capital. Human capital is defined as the sum of knowledge and abilities embodied by an individual (Sauer 2004: 10). However, it has often been used to refer to formal qualifications as well. By looking at the nexus

of highly skilled migration and development, as illustrated above, we learn that it is not only the formal qualifications of return migrants, but also their networks and soft skills that condition their success as innovators and investors. The expanded concept of capital used by Bourdieu (1986) therefore seems more appropriate to cover migrant resources nowadays.

Bourdieu distinguishes economic, social and cultural capital. Returned graduates may use these resources when entering the labour market in Poland. Economic capital is assumed to be of less importance due to the early stage in the life course of these migrants. In contrast, cultural capital is assumed to be of utmost importance for their labour market positioning. Cultural capital exists in an objectified state as cultural goods, in an institutionalised state, for example, in the form of language certificates or a degree from a well-known German university, and in an embodied state through German language skills or familiarity with German cultural standards (Bourdieu 1986: 243). That last is the most important state, particularly in the area of German-Polish business relations. Cultural capital in an institutionalised state is assumed to have a signalling effect for future employers, which only indirectly affects labour market positioning. Social capital could have a direct impact. For instance, returnees could make use of employer-employee contacts they established in Germany.

While the above-mentioned concept of the forms of capital is useful to explain how graduates find their jobs in Poland, we need a more precise tool to describe how graduates use their skills in their specific jobs. In this regard, a typology of different forms of knowledge could have high explanatory power. Knowledge exists in two forms. Explicit knowledge is objectified (e.g., in texts and theories) whereas tacit knowledge is connected with the personal values of the knowledge carrier (Eschenbach & Geyer 2004: 95). Tacit knowledge can also be divided into four different forms. 'Embrained' knowledge is that derived from cognitive abilities. 'Embodied' knowledge is developed by practical training. 'Encultured' knowledge refers to the stock of knowledge accumulated by socialisation and acculturation. The last form of knowledge is 'embedded' knowledge, which refers to knowledge embedded in organisational cultures (Blackler 2002 cited in Williams 2006: 590; Williams & Baláž 2008: 40). It is important to note that these forms of knowledge intersect to a huge degree with the notion of cultural capital, as presented above. Explicit knowledge is objectified cultural capital. Embodied cultural capital may be split into embrained, embodied, encultured and embedded knowledge. Embrained and embodied knowledge are easily transferable via mobility and therefore by migrants, whereas encultured and embodied knowledge is not easily transferred. Transmigrants play a particularly large role as carriers of knowledge since they directly transfer and translate embedded and encultured knowledge to some extent, as their networks transcend state borders (Williams 2006: 591-592).

13.3 Methodology and sample structure

The following analysis is based on 34 qualitative interviews with returned graduates carried out between March and June 2008 in several Polish towns (amongst others Warsaw, Wrocław, Łódź and Cracow).⁴ The interviews were semi-structured with guiding questions. Sampling was done according to quota sampling with regard to disciplinary background and sex. When deciding for quota sampling, the assumption was that the disciplinary background largely determines whether interviewees act as translators of knowledge. While in most studies on highly skilled migration, researchers have focused on such groups as engineers or physicians, my starting point was the disciplinary background of Polish students in Germany. According to the Wissenschaft Weltoffen database (DAAD/HIS), the most popular subjects among Polish students are economics and business administration (25.1 per cent), German language and literature studies (20.3 per cent) and law (9.4 per cent), followed by information technology (5.2 per cent).⁵ My research sample is also comprised of these main disciplines. Thirteen interviewees had a background in economics; nine studied German language and literature, six were doing law studies, three studied political sciences and one each studied information technology, cultural studies and geography. Additionally, the share of women amongst the interviewees corresponds with the share of women in the whole population. Between 1997 and 2006, women's share among all Polish students in Germany was 68.3 per cent (StBA 2008). Women represented 70.6 per cent of my interviewees. Since this project is on education migration, interviewees needed to be educational foreigners, that is, they needed to have finished secondary school in Poland and moved to Germany only afterwards.⁶ Furthermore, they had to have studied at least one term at a German higher education institution and be working in Poland at the time of interview.⁷

The sample comprises graduates who went to Germany for degree studies (16), spent part of their studies on a scholarship in Germany (16) and did postgraduate studies in Germany (2). The respondents' ages were between approximately 25 and 34.⁸ Thus, they may be regarded as young professionals in an early career stage. The first interviewee returned to Poland in 2000, but most interviewees returned after Poland became an EU member: five interviewees returned in 2004, ten in 2005 and nine later than 2005.

The formulation of the typology, understood as the comparative contrasting of cases with the intention to identify patterns of social reality (Kelle & Kluge 1999: 75), took place in four steps according to the stepwise model introduced by Kelle and Kluge (1999). In a first step of this model, the researcher identifies relevant dimensions of comparison within the material. This research accomplished that step by comparing detailed case

descriptions of every interview. The two dimensions identified were ‘the impact of German cultural capital’ and ‘the impact of disciplinary background’. In the second step, cases are grouped according to regularities. In this stage, this research grouped the 34 cases according to internal homogeneities and external heterogeneity. Meaningful relations with regard to the content are identified in the third stage of the process. In this research, this step used the coded interview material, and the different groups that were identified were described as types (Kelle & Kluge 1999: 83-97).

13.4 Labour market positioning of foreign-trained university graduates: A typology

The typology of returned graduates (figure 13.1) has two dimensions: (1) ‘impact of German cultural capital on career advancement’ (i.e., whether returnees in their jobs were still in touch with the German language and culture) and (2) ‘impact of disciplinary background on career advancement’ (i.e., whether returnees’ careers relied on embrained knowledge gained during studies).

These types are described in more detail below. In order to explain what makes each type distinctive, returnees’ strategies for job search and entering the labour market as well as their fields of activity in their current occupations were examined. This allowed identification of the forms of

Figure 13.1 *Typology of returned graduates according to impact of foreign cultural capital and disciplinary background on career advancement*

	High impact of German cultural capital	Low impact of German cultural capital
High impact of the disciplinary background	Type 1 Knowledge Translators	Type 3 Specialists
Low impact of the disciplinary background	Type 2 Outsourcers	Type 4 Chamaeleons

Type 5
International Career

Source: Author’s own

knowledge that they apply and translate. In other words, in what respects do these young professionals act as brokers of knowledge between Poland and Germany?

Type 1: Knowledge translators

Translators of knowledge share the ability to position themselves on the Polish labour market by making use of both their disciplinary background and their German cultural capital. In other words, they are able to apply both their expertise (embrained knowledge) and German language skills (embodied knowledge).⁹ This group comprised the lawyers among the interviewees, as well as economists and one individual with a background in the political sciences. In most cases, representatives of this type are at the beginning of their career. Job entrance was not at all problematic and, in general, these graduates did not rely on social capital to find their first job.

Witek, a 28-year-old lawyer, came to Germany in 2000 to study German and Polish law at the European University Viadrina. His decision to return to Poland upon graduation in 2006 was mainly for job-related reasons. After sending a few applications to German law firms, he was hired by a Polish firm. He is now a specialist in real estate law, mainly handling investors from German-speaking countries who are buying real estate and office buildings. In this job, Witek functions as a knowledge broker (Williams 2007: 34; Williams & Baláz 2008: 77) since he not only applies German law but also translates¹⁰ between Polish and German law. He applies his knowledge about German law to explain to clients the Polish legal equivalent. In addition to the embrained knowledge (expertise in Polish and German law), language skills are important, but depend upon the client and the stage of the investment.

It is always the question which investor is making which investment at what point of time and what are his needs in that moment. If he does a reinvestment then one has to do more in German for him, this is due diligence, i.e., the checking of real estate and firms and explaining the situation in German and our assessment. ... Sometimes there are more contacts with Polish administration or with the Polish partners of the investor, other times there is less contact in German than in Polish.

Hania, a 32-year-old export manager, came to Germany in 2000 as an exchange student in business administration. Upon her return to Poland and graduation the following year, her job search in Poland ended without success due to the economic situation at that time. Her strategy involved taking another internship in Germany in the interim. She finally returned to Poland in 2002 with the intention of utilising the knowledge of German

business culture she acquired during the internship as well as her disciplinary background. She explained how she had benefited from the need for qualified personnel, or in other words, embrained knowledge from studies.

I was concentrating more on trade firms and this was good [...] because I had been studying external trade in Germany. There I learned the language properly and people with German language skills were needed, especially for German companies, because it is said – and I don't like this – but it is said that sometimes it is better to speak with these people in their own language if you want to sell something because they feel they [...] are] being understood.

Hania is employed in a trading company that sells frozen fruit and vegetables to Western companies that process the goods to produce items such as jam. Their business is based on the role of the Polish trading company as an intermediary between Ukrainian and Russian suppliers and Western customers. Originally, she was hired for the German, Austrian and Swiss market. In the course of time, her career advanced. Initially she was doing mostly administrative tasks to coordinate deliveries. Nowadays her tasks are strategic. She negotiates with potential customers, and one of her subordinates has taken over the administrative tasks. She still speaks German on a daily basis and the knowledge of the German mentality and business culture (encultured knowledge) is still important for her strategic tasks. For instance, German customers generally do not expect rush deliveries, unlike customers from other countries. Knowing about their ordering behaviour enables better coordination with other key customers. The example of Hania's career advancement demonstrates another feature of type 1: Its representatives may switch to type 3 after a certain period of time. As Hania's tasks became more strategic, the German cultural capital lost some of its significance.

Two other interviewees with diplomas in law studies are representatives of type 1. One has employment similar to Witek, and the other is now working for a law firm specialised in tort law. Their customers are mainly Poles who had car accidents in German-speaking countries. The law firm takes over negotiations with the opposing insurance company. I also spoke to a business administration graduate who is now an export manager for a porcelain producer and responsible for the German market. The last example is a political sciences graduate. She is an analyst for a think tank in Warsaw and is in charge of German political affairs, which she also has to present to the Polish public. This task makes her a translator of knowledge.

Type 2: Service providers in outsourcing centres

Unlike the aforementioned type of graduates, type 2 graduates rely on their German language skills, or embodied knowledge, when starting their career

in Poland. In most cases, their disciplinary background does not provide marketable skills, so they regard their foreign language capacity as a special asset. Many of these graduates have diplomas in German language and literature studies. They find their position on the labour market in the services sector; typically their employers are German investors. These German companies have outsourced either IT services or business processes such as accounting to Poland. In order to understand this phenomenon one can once again consult with Witek, the lawyer doing consultancy work for German investors. He explained that Poland is currently experiencing a second wave of investment:

Well, the fields of activity are changing. In the last fifteen years there was more building for less specialised tasks. Now more innovative technologies are ahead. [...] In Poland at the moment they are building these outsourcing centres where accounting or IT services are done by people from outside, since it is cheaper [laughing]. I think that this will be up to date and that this will develop.

In the 1990s foreign investment was dominated by the setting up of plants for simple production tasks, and rather low-skilled workers were needed. The prevailing second wave of foreign investment needs higher qualified labour. Thus, there is a strong nexus to be observed between investment linked to knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) and the structural demand for labour in Poland.

Dariusz found his job in this type of outsourcing centre. He is trained in German language and literature studies. Most of his education was in his Polish hometown, one of the industrial towns severely affected by the economic transformation. He went abroad to Germany once on an Erasmus scholarship for half a year in 2003. Upon his return and graduation one year later he looked for a job connected with his German language skills. He finally found his current job with a German producer of white goods. This company outsources production and IT services to Poland. Dariusz works in a call centre, where employees of this German multinational in Europe are forwarded if they have a computer problem. However, since it is a German-based company most of the call-ins are in German (70-80 per cent) (B9, 350). In this job, he applies his skill in German. The embodied knowledge in information technology is something he was trained for on the job.

While overeducation is a problem for some type 2 returnees, for others jobs in call centres are an opportunity for career advancement. Agnieszka is among the first group. She has a diploma in public economics from a well known German university, and in her current position she deals with German customers at an IT provider. Her task is basically to place adverts on German websites. Thus, there is no connection with her expertise from studies (embrained knowledge) and this is a source of frustration:

It would be the same if I had been studying German language and literature or something else. Well, this is also the reason why I want to change jobs because I don't deal much with economics.

On the other hand, there are some cases where finding a first job based only on German language skills provided chances for graduates to gain new competences and to switch into other fields of activity. This contributed to their career advancement and improved their labour market positioning. They thus either became translators of knowledge (type 1) or specialists (type 3). Emilia, a German language and literature graduate, spent a term as an Erasmus student in Germany in 2003. A German retail company that was opening shops in Poland hired her due to her language skills. She is now an assistant in the expansion office that deals with site development and building new shops. Through her job, she became fascinated with the topic of real estate and recently finished postgraduate studies in real estate management. At the time of the interview, she had been contacted by a recruiter for a company dealing with real estate and without any connections to Germany. She thus had the chance to improve her labour market positioning and become a specialist (type 3).

Type 3: Highly qualified specialists

Highly qualified specialists are the one type for which the stay in Germany had no direct influence on labour market positioning. Representatives of this type are either at an early stage of their career, which is based on the expertise they gained during their studies, or they are people who started their career as translators of knowledge or outsourcers. Because they were taking on more strategic tasks and responsibility for personnel, German cultural capital had become less influential. Aneta, a software engineer with a diploma from Warsaw University, is among the first group of specialists. She spent one term as an exchange student with an Erasmus scholarship at the University in Munich in 2005. In her job she develops software and therefore only uses the embrained knowledge she gained during her studies. Her German language skills and knowledge of the German culture are not important at all.

Type 4: Job chameleons

This group of respondents hold jobs that are connected neither with their disciplinary background nor with their German cultural capital. This group also exemplifies that labour market entrance does not always happen smoothly. Some of these respondents struggle to find their place on the Polish labour market. An illustrative case is Izabela. She studied applied linguistics and spent one term in Germany on a scholarship. She found her first job upon graduation as a flight attendant with a low cost carrier that had opened a base in Poland in 2004 and was flying to destinations such as Ireland and sometimes Germany.

I had been working there for two years as a stewardess. My translator and interpreter activities were moving more and more aside. I even forgot how to speak German.

In the meantime, she has switched jobs and advanced in her career. She is a flight attendant with a well-known international airline. She likes her job since it offers a good work-life balance. When Izabela received my invitation for the interview via a newsletter, she agreed to meet me because she wanted to help dispel the myth that everyone returning from studies abroad in Germany could utilise the experience for career advancement. For her, studying abroad was not useful in the professional sphere.

Type 5: International career

Representatives of the final type are the cosmopolitans among the respondents. Their study abroad experience had no direct impact on their career, but the indirect impact is still tangible. Their international experience rather than the German experience explains their current position. These graduates work either in public administration or private business. Their common denominator is that most have studied in at least three countries or have lived abroad for longer periods in countries other than Germany.

Lukasz, is 31 and holds two degrees in international business. He now has a Polish-based career, but his study period was hyper-international. He studied in six countries: Germany, Poland, Ireland, Australia, Hungary and the United States. Ultimately, he started his career in Germany with a trainee programme at a German multinational. The contacts he had established with his future employer while doing his master's thesis offered valuable social capital. At the time he was initially hired it was agreed that after one year he would move to Warsaw to become an assistant to the board of directors for this German-based company there. Unlike the group of knowledge translators, German cultural capital is only of indirect influence for this type. Lukasz says that only 10 per cent of his workload nowadays is in German (B27, 184) but he emphasises the indirect impact of his German cultural capital:

Germans like working with me more [...] than with Poles who had not been living in Germany because for me it's much easier to understand what the Germans want and what they mean.

This argument and the use of encultured knowledge was also mentioned by Jan, a 31-year-old consultant. He graduated from the Szkoła Główna Handlowa (SGH), which is regarded as one of the leading business schools in Poland and is often compared to the prestigious French ENA.¹¹ Additionally, he did German language business training at his university and was on a scholarship in Mainz in 2000. Today he is a consultant at an

international company without special contacts to Germany. However, social capital connected with an internship in Germany was important when finding his first job with another consulting company. He mentioned how useful encultured knowledge was in his current position when he needs to advise his boss:

He [one of our partners] does not speak German and is more France-orientated. [...] ‘Well, you know Germany very well. Please tell me: How to understand what happened? [...] How shall I understand this with the German colleagues?’

As international managers climb up the career ladder in private business, their counterparts in the public sphere are working for international organisations or public administration. Beata, for example, studied law in Germany and spent one year as an Erasmus student in Paris. She additionally earned a second degree from Strasbourg University. After graduation, she worked for an international organisation in Warsaw as a PR manager. Studies in Germany did not have a direct impact on her work, as she explains:

Honestly, I have to say that virtually I don’t use German at all, so to say, at my workplace. [...] In this work environment [...] first of all you use English, then French and then for a long time nothing and at the end German. Up to now, I used German a few times for my work. If it had helped me? In general, the international profile that I had been studying both in Germany and in France, that’s what I think helped.

Although she does not want to leave Poland for personal reasons, she is thinking about entering the EU concours.

13.5 Conclusion

The literature review in this chapter revealed that highly skilled return migration has recently gained prominence on the research agenda. A large body of literature has been produced on the impact of Silicon Valley entrepreneur returnees on their Asian countries of origin. This phenomenon even served as a model and starting point for major theoretical discussions on the nexus between highly skilled return migration and regional development. Return from studies abroad still remains an under-researched topic. Empirical evidence from educational science shows that the professional value of studying abroad may be positive and negative at the same time. With the growing numbers of mobile students, the professional value of

the study abroad experience has decreased over the past three decades. Overeducation remains a problem. Qualitative insights, however, suggest that social capital embedded in transnational social fields helps to improve one's own labour market positioning. Moreover, the resources of returned students are mainly cultural and social capital. Cultural capital is of utmost importance in an embodied state and corresponds with tacit knowledge as embodied, embrained, encultured and embedded knowledge.

A typology of returnee graduates and their labour market positioning was presented. Two dimensions were identified, according to which the cases were separated into four types. The first dimension is the utilisation of German cultural capital for career advancement; the second dimension is the influence of the disciplinary background. 'Translators of knowledge' are the first type. These returnee graduates used the German cultural capital and their disciplinary background in equal measure for career advancement, which explains their excellent labour market positioning. Using their language skills, their embodied knowledge, is important for the transfer or translation of their embrained knowledge.

Type 2 graduates are the 'service providers in outsourcing centres'. Their labour market positioning is characterised by mixed outcomes. They easily found jobs connected with their German language skills, but in some cases they are considered overqualified. They make no use of their embrained knowledge acquired during their studies. However, some manage to gain new competences in their jobs, which serves as a foundation for career advancement. They transform into type 1 or type 3. The emergence of this type is strongly connected with the second wave of foreign investment in Poland, as investors are no longer only transferring simple production to the country but also outsourced IT services and business processes.

Representatives of type 3, the 'highly qualified specialists', use expertise gained during their studies or first jobs. They, hence have excellent labour market positioning, although they do not use their German cultural capital. Representatives of this type have a background in either information technology or economics.

Type 4, 'job chameleons', use neither their German cultural capital nor their disciplinary background, but find jobs in other fields of activity. Their position in the Polish labour market is sometimes problematic, and these job candidates may be considered overqualified for their positions. This type illustrates that some returnee graduates do not capitalise on their study abroad experience.

Type 5, 'international career', with their excellent labour market positioning, are the cosmopolitans among the returnees. One of the factors explaining their excellent labour market positioning is their international profile. Their German study abroad experience only indirectly impacts their career advancement, but their disciplinary background provides a solid fundament for their career. Social capital was useful when international

managers got their current positions. We may thus conclude that they have access to transnational social fields that they can mobilise for their career advancement. Additionally, international managers experience the mobilisation of encultured knowledge.

These findings correspond with the results of previous research on the returns from studying abroad. While in some cases over-qualification is observed, other returnees from studies abroad in Germany act as translators of knowledge and function as bridgeheads between Poland and Germany. A disciplinary background in law studies or business administration seems to help graduates to find a position in the labour market while simultaneously making use of their language skills and disciplinary background. Translation of knowledge happens more often at an early career stage. The labour market positioning presented in this chapter referred to the situation in Poland in 2008, before the consequences of the global financial crisis were known. Further research should therefore analyse the stability of this labour market positioning over a longer period.

Another important finding refers to a characteristic of the Polish labour market: In this transition economy, foreign language skills have a high market value and provide an entrance gate for outsourcers. Employers hire those with fluent language skills and train them afterwards in their area of expertise instead of hiring an expert and teaching them the foreign language. This last remark also refers to a research lacunae on which further research should concentrate. In order to get a complete picture of returnees' labour market positioning one should shed light on employers' motivations when hiring foreign-trained graduates.

Notes

- 1 Viadrina is a special case since law students there can earn a German and a Polish degree. The fact that they possess credentials from both countries makes them more flexible in their decision about retention or return.
- 2 However, disciplinary background seems to have an impact: 85 per cent of economists, 79 per cent of lawyers and only 38 per cent of graduates in literature and history stated that the content of their work is related to their studies.
- 3 A weak point of their study is that 24 of their 55 returnees were still studying, so the transfer of human capital to the labour market could not be properly analysed. However, the authors mention single cases of returnees who utilised their study abroad experience for labour market positioning.
- 4 Contact persons employed at Polish universities, German funding organisations and alumni associations functioned as gatekeepers, enabling the researcher to access the research field.
- 5 Compare data from www.wissenschaft-weltoffen.de (table 1.5.7) on the ten most important study subjects in first degree studies for the ten most important countries of origin of educated foreigners (2000-2006). Data is also available from the statistical office, but this only allows for analysis of groups of study subjects and not single subjects.

- 6 This selection criterion was introduced to avoid doing interviews with descendants of Polish immigrants in Germany. In the sample, there are two exceptions to this rule. One respondent moved to Germany two years before high school graduation and another girl went to a German secondary school in the border region while she was still living on the Polish side of the border.
- 7 All interviewees are working but two are enrolled in doctoral studies and work part time.
- 8 Age was not asked directly, but can be calculated from the year of high school graduation.
- 9 Whether language skills should be classified as embodied knowledge remains a matter of discussion. One could argue that cognitive abilities are used in order to learn a foreign language and that this makes it embrained knowledge. Many international students go abroad for practical language training. Thus, we will refer to language skills as embodied knowledge.
- 10 The notion of knowledge transfer is more common than knowledge translation. But Williams and Baláz (2008: 40) point to the fact that the process modifies the agents involved as well as the knowledge. Hence, translation is the more appropriate term.
- 11 ENA stands for École Nationale d'Administration and is a French elite university that trains future decision makers.

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14 Ready to move

Liquid return to Poland

Marta Anacka, Ewa Matejko and Joanna Nestorowicz

14.1 Introduction


The accession of CEE countries to the European Union in 2004 had significant influence on migration processes in this geographical area. A main reason for the shift in mobility patterns was the EU policy on free movement of persons and services, which opened the labour markets of some member states, as well as the large migration potential among the ‘new Europeans’. The latter was a result of labour force surpluses and delays in economic modernisation. Undoubtedly, regardless of the size of the population, Poland represented the biggest migration potential. In the opinion of some experts one to four million people emigrated from Poland after 1 May 2004. The most credible estimation was presented by Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski (2009), according to whom the net outflow of people was about 1.1 million between 2004 and 2006. Polish post-accession migrants preferred emigrating to countries where labour markets were open for EU citizens, like the United Kingdom and Ireland. In the case of the latter, though, it is not the numbers that are the most striking but the dynamics of the flow.

Despite the transition periods that delayed full access to some labour markets, those countries that received the largest pre-accession migration flows remained important migration destinations for Poles. These included Germany, Italy and, independent of EU policies, transcontinental migrations to the United States (see Map 14.1).

Moreover, the post-accession outflow from Poland was lower than the observed increase of the number of Poles staying abroad (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2009). One possible interpretation of this phenomenon is that the change in institutional conditions enabled legalisation of stays abroad. Therefore, we may further estimate that the number of migrants already living abroad was much larger than the post-accession outflow alone.

As migration research indicates, significant emigration waves may lead to return migration as time passes (Ravenstein 1889). Slany and Małek

Map 14.1 *Share of all temporary migrants from Poland to main European destinations and the United States before Poland's EU accession (1999-2004) and after EU enlargement (2004-2006)*



Source: Mioduszewska (2008)

distinguish three phases of return migration to Poland in the twentieth century (Slany & Małek 2002). The first phase, starting in 1938, embraced traditional return migration, which was a result of massive outflows of Poles to the United States, the so-called ‘migration for bread’ between 1918 and 1938. The next phase of returns was the homecoming of political and labour migrants during the period of socialism (1961-1989). In light of research and available statistical data, these two stages of remigration were not significant in scale, though. The third phase of remigration consists of political and labour migrants arriving in the period of Poland’s socio-economic transition after 1989. In contrast to previous returns, remigration in the 1990s had economic grounds. As a result of changes, Poland started to become more economically attractive as a receiving country for foreigners, as well as for Poles who had settled abroad.

Referring to the historical background mentioned above, we could expect that in terms of quantity, a significantly large outflow of migrants after Poland’s accession to the EU would cause some scale of remigration. Poland’s accession to the EU, apart from providing institutional conditions for legal labour migration within the EU, gave impetus to economic development. We observe both economic growth and, at the same time, a decrease of registered unemployment. Poles’ emigration partly reduced the disequilibrium in the labour market, which had been characterised by structural unemployment.

Poland’s economic advance, however, was disrupted by the crisis in Western financial markets in 2008. This has likely impacted peoples’ mobility, though it is difficult to say what this effect will be (Stola 2009; Bijak

2009). However, we can assume that pre-accession return migration of Poles provides an apt backdrop against which to project future stages of return migration to Poland.¹

The goal of this chapter is to characterise the newest wave of Polish post-accession return migration. In order to provide robust results, it combines qualitative and quantitative research methods. This approach produces results that can be generalised to the country-level based on the quantitative part of the study, while providing an in-depth analysis of individual migration patterns based on qualitative analysis. The theoretical framework of the research is based on Lee's (1966) concept of push and pull factors as well as on the notion of liquid migration suggested by Malmberg (2004) and in recent work by Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski (2009). The present analysis of return migration will attempt to answer three questions: 'who returns', 'what factors make one inclined to come home and which have the opposite effect', and finally, 'what strategies do individuals adopt with respect to homeward mobility'.

14.2 Theoretical considerations

The theoretical framework for the present research draws on Lee's (1966) concept of push and pull factors of mobility, especially his elaboration concerning streams and counter-streams of migration. Yet in order to provide a less orthodox understanding of the process, we will also incorporate the notion of liquid migration (Malmberg 2004; Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2009).

Lee's approach to analysing and understanding migration patterns was based on Ravenstein's concepts of the push-pull nature of international mobility, developed over a century ago. Despite the diverse character of contemporary migration flows, the notion of push and pull factors still seems to be an adequate theoretical concept. In recent literature, the push and pull perspective has been applied to the phenomenon of return migration by, for example, Cassarino (2004) and Gibson and McKenzie (2009).

The reason for relying on this approach in the present study of post-accession return migration is twofold. Firstly, the explorative character of the research required a relatively general framework in order to be able to encompass a variety of potential outcomes, some of which may have not been identified before. Secondly, two ideas were of primary interest for exploration in the study: (1) the notion of the selectivity of migration, which has high explanatory value in terms of understanding who returns and how returnees differ from emigrants and from the immobile population at home; (2) the idea of streams and counter-streams of migration, which offers a perspective broad enough to understand both emigration from Poland and subsequent returns to the country.

Given the limitations of the framework, we supplement it with the concept of liquid migration, in order to capture the rather complex (i.e., not neoclassical), decision-making process with respect to contemporary return migration.

Ravenstein (1889) stated that the main cause for migration is relativity in advantageous factors, primarily of economic nature, across two distinct locations. In both places Ravenstein distinguished attractive forces (in centres of absorption) as well as discouraging forces (in centres of dispersion). Mobility was said to be a function of a calculation of the pros and cons of both locations. Ravenstein listed decision-making factors that influence an individual's propensity to migrate: (1) *distance*, as distance increases, the volume of migration decreases; (2) *occurrence*, mobility proceeding in stages is more common than one single move; and (3) *personal characteristics*, such as gender, class and age. Ravenstein also noted in analysing statistical regularities of labour mobility that migration is a bilateral process and so every flow in one direction generates a counter-flow in the other.

Following Ravenstein's work, Lee (1966) reformulated the push-pull concept. In his extension, Lee introduced the notion of hindrances that may impede or even put an end to migration. Lee expounded on factors that create obstacles for potential migrants, such as distance, physical and political barriers and one's family status. In turn, the ability to overcome the obstacles was said to affect the selectivity of the migration process. Personal characteristics such as age, gender, education, social ties, social class and cultural awareness were said to differentiate the strength of responding to push and pull factors. In extreme cases, they could be catalysts for the migration process, or they could prevent one from engaging in mobility.

The above factors underlie several hypotheses concerning (1) the volume of migration, (2) the development of streams and counter-streams and (3) migrants' characteristics. These have augmented Ravenstein's original work (1889). For purposes of clarity, the current research exploits only the latter two dimensions, taking the nature and volume of primary outward migration to be a given. What should be noted when employing Lee's framework are two additional features he recognised on top of redefining Ravenstein's 'laws of migration'. Firstly, Lee argued that migration, or lack thereof, is an effect of a collective decision-making process engaging the whole family and not an individual decision-making process. Secondly, Lee's understanding of human mobility was innovative in that, apart from more or less constant push and pull factors, he proposed that one must be exposed to a significantly strong incentive in order to engage in an act of migration. This incentive was said to be a necessary condition for people to overcome their natural immobility.

In his study on the formation of streams and counter-streams of migration, Lee formulated six hypotheses. The fact that 'migration tends to take place largely within well defined streams' seems to be evident nowadays.

In the context of Polish mobility after the 2004 EU enlargement, we found this simple observation crucial when analysing emigration to the so-called 'old' and 'new' emigration countries.

Lee's second postulate, 'for every migration stream, a counter-stream develops' may appear evident, but it is not necessarily so. Remigrants who constitute the counter-stream may actually follow diverse patterns of return. Their return could be a derivative of different individual motivations for emigrating in the first place. The current study deals with this concern by limiting the subject of research to post-accession, non-circular emigrants, for whom the opportunities of the EU enlargement were a common feature. This way, the results become more robust, as they are unaffected by acts of return of post-war political emigrants or contemporary circular and seasonal labourers, for whom 'returning' may in fact denote a different process than the one under consideration in this chapter.

Lee's (1966) four subsequent reflections on the nature of streams and counter-streams rely on a measure of 'efficiency', defined as a ratio of the volume of the stream to the volume of the counter-stream. For the analysis of post-accession remigration, we will replace these hypotheses with the postulate of 'intended unpredictability', derived from the concept of 'liquid migration'. With relatively insignificant intervening obstacles, compared to 50 years ago, the opportunity cost of emigration is now less frequently calculated with respect to the country of origin and one possible destination. Instead, potential migrants face a number of alternatives. This is also the case when migrants debate on where to go after leaving the country of their primary destination. Not having suffered any major socio-economic trauma, such as famine or racial segregation, emigrants may retain the option of returning to the country of origin. Yet regardless of the similarity of the economies or business cycle effects, they may decide to return home, stay in the destination country or move to a third country. This variable nature of the migration flows under study seems a plausible reason behind the patterns of mobility currently observed. Migration appears to be a continuous and dynamic process in which people are constantly evaluating existing opportunities and threats. Their decisions are considered rational and optimal under certain circumstances, at a given point in time. With changes in circumstances – be they exogenous, such as wages, benefits and legal arrangements, or endogenous, such as the migrant's age, marital status and beliefs – the decision to migrate or not might change as well. Thus, adopting the concept of 'liquidity' intuitively seems to be a worthwhile refinement of Lee's approach.

Lee's observation of the selectivity of migration, dependent on the migrant's characteristics, will be extensively referred to in the following, quantitative section of this chapter. The analysis explores a secondary selection of return migrants out of the population who has already migrated. Following Lee, an attempt will be made to characterise certain groups of

people, who, given their heterogeneity, may nevertheless behave in a similar way – that is, it may be relatively more common to emigrate than to return. Geographical selectivity will also be considered.

The emergence of counter-streams, streams of returning migrants, will be further elaborated upon in the qualitative section of the chapter, in which a specification of subsequent stages of counter-stream development will be proposed.

14.3 Return of Poles: Quantitative analysis

14.3.1 *How many have returned?*

Quantitative aspects of social phenomena such as migration receive great attention, not only among researchers but also among politicians and in public opinion as the scale of out-migration reaches a significant level, as was the case for Poland recently. This interest created high demand for estimates of the number of Poles who have emigrated since Poland joined the EU. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, estimates concerning the volume of contemporary migration flows vary significantly.²

These days, apart from asking how many Poles have left, authorities, social researchers and journalists also wonder how many Poles have already returned. To answer that latter question, we look at the most credible estimates of the number of returnees (table 14.1).

The Polish national census revealed that during the first 15 years of transition less than 70,000 Polish emigrants, including those with dual citizenship, returned after at least three months of staying abroad (Grabowska-Lusinska 2010). Yet, estimates based on the results of the 2008 ad hoc module of the Polish Labour Force Survey were about six times larger (CSO 2008). According to a poll by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS 2008), the number of returnees is even higher: 2.9 million people during one decade, representing almost 10 per cent of the adult population of the country. Nevertheless, in light of estimates from experts of the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) the actual number seems to be lower (Pollard, Latorre & Sriskandarajah 2008).

One may ask why there are such huge differences between the numbers presented. There seems to be at least two explanations: (1) *different definitions*, as each of the estimates was calculated based on different datasets, defining returnees in a different way; (2) *different methodologies*, as researchers used different methods to estimate numbers of returnees (table 14.2). The Public Opinion Research Centre as well as the Central Statistical Office's (CSO) labour force surveys (LFS) suffer from several well-known problems connected with this type of research, such as small sample size (Bilsborrow et al. 1997: 238-243) and bias of the results caused by a low response rate. Census data should be of the best quality,

Table 14.1 *Selected estimates of the number of Polish returnees*

<i>Author</i>	<i>Description of the data and methods used</i>	<i>Volume of the return inflow*</i>	<i>Reference period</i>
Central Statistical Office (CSO, Labour Force Survey)	Estimates based on the draft results from the ad hoc module of the Labour Force Survey (Labour market situation of migrants and their immediate descendants). Large sample (almost 25,000 households) enables authors to calculate relatively precise estimates.	1,050,000 580,000 213,000	1989-2008** 2004-2008** 2007
Central Statistical Office (CSO, National Census)	National census recording information about entire population of Poland.	69,704	1988-2002***
Public Opinion Research Center (PORC)	Estimate based on results of opinion poll on job experience acquired abroad. Relatively large sample (38,866 respondents) implies that standard error is almost insignificant.	2,900,000	1998-2007
Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR)	Estimates based on the results from the British Labour Force Survey, number of records from the Worker Register Scheme and experts' knowledge on the scale of the shadow economy (for more details see: Pollard et al. 2008).	388,000	2004-2007

* citizens from A-8 countries having returned from Great Britain, ** until the second quarter 2008; *** as of 20 May 2002

Source: Grabowska-Lusinska (ed.) (2010)

at least for the period it covers. However, in the last Polish census, migrants were not accounted for in a proper way.³ Thus we must be very careful in using this source, even for the analysis of pre-accession migration flows. Finally, estimates by IPPR were based not only on hard evidence from LFS and the UK Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) but also on expert knowledge.

It is clear that no simple answer can be provided. The number of Polish returnees estimated will depend on the definition applied as well as the appropriateness of the choice of methods and data source.

14.3.2 *Who has actually returned?*

Some research (Lee 1974; DaVanzo 1976) indicates that the propensity of a migrant to return to his or her homeland varies among the population of emigrants. Thus, apart from the question concerning the scale of the recent return migration flow, one may ask what is actually its structure?

Data from the last census indicates that those who returned after the collapse of the socialist system in 1989 were relatively well educated. The

Table 14.2 *Definition used by selected institutions to estimate numbers of returnees*

<i>Author</i>	<i>Definition of return migrant</i>
Central Statistical Office (CSO, Labour Force Survey)	Person aged 15 and older who had stayed abroad for at least two or three months and was present in his or her household at the time of the survey (second quarter 2008).
Central Statistical Office (CSO, National Census)	Person with Polish or dual (including Polish) citizenship who came to Poland during 1989-2002 and at the time of his or her return intended to become a permanent resident.
Public Opinion Research Center (PORC)	Person aged 18 and older who had taken a job abroad (either legally or illegally) in the years 1998-2007 and at the time of the survey was present in his or her household.
Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR)	Citizen of one of the A-8 countries employed in Great Britain (either legally or illegally) not recorded in the last quarter 2007 in the British LFS.

Source: Authors' own

advantage of improved language skills and experience acquired while working abroad helped many of them to get prestigious and well-paid jobs (see, e.g., Górny & Osipovic 2006: 52-54). This phenomenon has been called 'successful returns' (Cerese 1974; Iglicka 2002), and those who returned were perceived as 'agents of social change' (Weinar 2002). However, on the eve of the new millennium the situation was dramatically different. An economic slowdown with extremely high unemployment rates weakened the strong pull factors that had been present in the home country until that time. Some of the return migrants remigrated either to the country they had chosen previously or to a completely different destination (Fihel, Górny & Matejko 2006: 32).

To describe patterns of return migration, we introduce an original dataset created by the University of Warsaw's Centre of Migration Research for the purpose of one of its research projects.⁴ Creation of a completely new source of information on returning migrants was necessary since existing datasets did not include even basic information about the characteristics of returnees (IPPR), statistics were not fully available (CSO, CBOS), or were too outdated to describe current return migration.⁵ Thus, to provide information on the structure of the recent reverse inflow to Poland, data from the basic LFS module was used as described below:

- *Step 1.* Records containing information on those household members who at the time of the survey had stayed abroad for at least two or three months were identified.

- *Step 2.* Those who were observed as present in the household in any of the quarters following the quarter when they were emigrants were identified as returnees.⁶

The LFS/CMR database of return migrants contains 542 records with information on those emigrants who returned to Poland in years 2002-2008, after the 2002 national census.

14.3.3 Selectivity patterns of return migration to Poland

The aim of the present analysis is to focus on the selectivity of return migration and anticipate potential consequences of revealed patterns of the phenomenon for the population structure. It will be assumed that the selectivity of this particular migratory process is the result of a certain constellation of push and pull factors. They will be identified and distinguished mainly on a macro level, as the available data does not allow us to formulate conclusions at any lower level of analysis.


This approach has been successfully applied to describe and explain the phenomenon of post-accession emigration from Poland (Mioduszevska 2008; Anacka & Okólski 2010; Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2008, 2009). Moreover, by using a simple measure of selectivity, the selectivity index⁷ (SI), Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski (2009) attempted to prove that the post-accession outflow was ‘ultimate’. This proposition is based on the concept of ‘crowding-out’, that is, depleting Polish society of certain socio-demographic categories. This process was said to be necessary to modernise the country and to transform it from a net emigration country to one with a sustainable positive net migration rate, as reflected in the term ‘ultimate migration’ (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2009). The conclusions derived from the following arguments seem to provide counter-evidence to the above-stated thesis.

14.3.4 Demographic characteristics of return migrants

Gender

In case of both the pre-accession and the post-accession outflow from Poland, men constituted the relatively larger group of migrants. The value of the SI was positive and equal to 0.20 for pre-accession and 0.35 for post-accession migrants (Mioduszevska 2008: 22). However, gender selectivity does not occur in the case of return inflow (SI = 0.02). This may mean that the set of all push and pull factors affecting return migrants have the same impact on both sexes and are not connected with this particular demographic characteristic.

Figure 14.1 *Age distribution among the population of the source country, temporary emigrants and returnees*



Source: Grabowska-Lusinska (2010)

Age


Since the works of Ravenstein (1889), it has been commonplace to understand migratory processes as selective with regard to age. Propensity to engage in international mobility is the highest among young adults. In the official terminology used in Poland by CSO, people aged 20-44 are counted as a 'mobile age' group. However, our database allows us to distinguish more sophisticated differences between these 'mobile agents' (figure 14.1).

It is apparent from the figure that the age distribution among emigrants is concentrated, as more than half of them are in their twenties. Among return migrants this peak is not as distinct. Moreover, there is a large difference between the percentage of 30-39 year old return migrants and emigrants. The former are evidently over-represented. This may suggest that migrants realise an emigration plan in which they assume that the period of staying abroad will be fixed and will not exceed a few years, as is partially confirmed by the results of the LFS ad hoc module. According to CSO, the answer most frequently given for the main reason for returning home was that 'a longer stay was not planned' (CSO 2008). However, this conclusion is far from as definite as the one noted by American demographers, who observed that the peak in the age distribution of returnees is five years later than for emigrants (Eldridge 1965; Lee 1974). This hypothesis requires more in-depth study.

Educational attainment

There is a wide debate on the consequences of contemporary migration flows for the level of human capital in both the origin and destination countries. Researchers have not reached consensus about the effect of liberalisation of immigration procedures in developed European countries –

Figure 14.2 Educational attainment distribution among population of the source country, temporary emigrants and returnees




Source: Grabowska-Lusinska (2010)

‘does it result in “brain drain” or in “brain gain”’ (see Kaczmarczyk 2008a: 210). There is also discussion on whether brain drain has actually occurred in case of the post-accession outflow from Poland (Kaczmarczyk 2008b). However, an analysis of the LFS/CMR data shows that the problem is worth mentioning. Even if the counter-flow is balanced in relation to the recent outflow, one observes a net loss in the group of people with the highest level of educational attainment, due to the selectivity pattern illustrated in figure 14.2.

Region of origin

During the past decade, there has been growing recognition that Poland contains many places with strong and long traditions of emigration. The sudden post-accession outflow from locations such as Monki, Nowy Targ and Lubniany⁸ was, among other factors, driven by existing social networks (Górny & Stola 2001). However, this outflow also strengthened the networks by building Polish diasporas in specific locations (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2001). Thus, networks affected emigration from Poland in two ways: by ‘pushing’ potential emigrants from Poland and by ‘pulling’ them to a common country of destination. Results of the analysis based on selectivity indices of emigration and return migration enabled us to distinguish at least four types of regions:

Map 14.2 *Regional SIs for both emigration and return migration and different types of region distinguished in the analysis*




Source: Authors' own, based on Return Migrants Database LFS/CMR

- 1 regions characterised by the dominance of push factors over the pulling ones (SI for the outflow greater than 0 and negative SI value for return inflow);
- 2 regions characterised by the dominance of pull factors over the pushing ones (SI for the outflow less than 0 and a positive SI value for return inflow);
- 3 those with the relatively most mobile population (SIs for both outflow and return inflow greater than 0);
- 4 those with the relatively least mobile population (negative SIs for both outflow and return inflow).

In the last two types, the relation between strength of push and pull factors remains unspecified (see map 14.2).

The classification presented above may be at least partially explained by regional labour markets. Central Poland, with its large cities, such as Warsaw, Lodz and Poznan, seems to offer the best opportunities for those who are seeking a job. The registered rate of unemployment in Wielkopolskie (west-central) in 2008 was the lowest in the country (6.4

Figure 14.3 *Type of settlement distribution among population of the source country, temporary emigrants and returnees*



Source: Grabowska-Lusinska (ed.) (2010)

per cent, CSO), but in the agglomerations of Warsaw or Poznan it did not exceed 2 per cent, which is probably close to the natural rate of unemployment. However, in Warminsko-Mazurskie (north-east) the unemployment level in 2008 was as high as 16.8 per cent (7.3 percentage points above the national average).

Type of settlement

Selectivity patterns are likely due to the same set of push and pull factors mentioned above. These patterns may be observed in the structure and types of settlement of those who stayed abroad versus those who have already returned (see figure 14.3).

Returnees are over-represented in the group of villagers. The situation of inhabitants of big cities, defined as those having at least 100,000 residents, seems to confirm our conclusion regarding effects related to regional labour markets. Unidirectional, though rather moderate strength of push factors is an attribute of small and medium-sized cities (less than 100,000 residents). These towns and their local labour markets provide less opportunities than larger agglomerations. On the other hand, their inhabitants cannot choose the relatively safe strategy of getting involved in agricultural activities; for example, becoming a member of an agricultural holding (see Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2009). The picture of return inflow as directed to rural areas may suggest that the final crowding-out of the Polish labour market was not successful this time. This, in turn, at least undermines the hypothesis of ‘ultimate’ emigration proposed by Grabowska-

Lusińska and Okólski (2009). When taking into consideration the selectivity of the counter-flow resulting from post-accession migration, it becomes doubtful that the over-proportional returns to rural areas will enable substantial modernisation processes.

14.3.5 *What pushes and what pulls Polish returnees?*

The following section interprets the statistics observed and summarises the socio-demographic structure of this specific type of inflow, which is sometimes called 'retromigration' (Gmelch 1980). First, in the case of return migration, selectivity occurs with regard to certain demographic characteristics, and the process of returning cannot be seen as random. This conclusion reaffirms Lee's (1966) hypothesis. Based on the analysis above, we can state that return migrants are subject to the rule of selectivity, similar to any other type of migrant.

Secondly, when trying to identify classical push and pull factors in the model for both outflow and the counter-flow, one should take into account that both these types of factors affect migrants in the origin country as well as in the country of destination. However, we can distinguish three determinants of recent homeward migration: job opportunities, settling opportunities, and social networks and communities' migratory capital.

Job opportunities (also in country of destination)

Economic opportunities have always constituted the most important factor driving contemporary Polish migration flows. Even during the previous highly restrictive regime, many individuals migrated, despite the Iron Curtain, which made it impossible to become an 'official' economic migrant (Stola 2001). The British, Irish and, to a lesser extent, the Swedish labour markets, which were opened after 1 May 2004 for citizens from A-8 countries, strongly shaped a vast part of recent migratory decisions. During 2002-2008 Poles returned more infrequently from Great Britain and Ireland (relative to the frequency of emigration to these countries), and traditional destinations (Germany and Italy) became much less attractive (see table 14.3). Thus, pull factors, which play a crucial role in determining backward movement of emigrants, may be generated on both ends of a migration path. In the country of origin, developed regions in Poland and large cities had a high demand for well-educated workers. In the country of destination, there was a demand for a relatively cheap labour force in such sectors as construction, domestic services, hotels and restaurants. What is important to remember, though, is that the selectivity patterns with respect to age, gender and educational attainment diversify individuals' perceptions of what they consider an opportunity and how they react to it.

Table 14.3 *Geographical distribution of temporary migrants from Poland and Polish returnees (%)*

<i>Country of destination</i>	<i>Share of all migrants returning to Poland</i>	<i>Share of all temporary migrants from Poland</i>
Germany	33.4	22.6
UK	15.9	24.6
Italy	11.8	9.6
US	7.9	10.6
Netherlands	4.8	4.7
France	3.3	3.3
Spain	3.1	3.1
Ireland	3.1	6.9
Belgium	1.8	2.4
Sweden	1.7	1.6
Norway	1.5	1.6
Greece	1.3	1.3
Austria	1.3	1.9
Canada	0.4	0.7
Other EU countries	3.0	1.7
Other European countries	2.0	1.4
Other countries	3.7	1.6

Source: Mioduszezewska (2010)

Settling opportunities (also in the country of origin)

Many of those who returned lived in rural areas (figure 14.3) where the tradition of living in a home with three or even four generations tends to be very strong. The underdeveloped real estate market in Poland⁹ generates push factors for those who live in medium and small sized cities, where housing opportunities are scarcest.¹⁰ However, in light of the concept of liquid migration, settling is understood as a possibility to ‘nest’ for the time being rather than an intention to become a permanent resident of a certain place.

Social networks and communities’ migratory capital

Since the EU enlargement in 2004 the role of social networks in driving the outflow from Poland has diminished (Anacka & Okólski 2010). However, they seem to remain important for return migration. There are also changes in those factors pulling an individual to stay in the country of destination, illustrated for instance by the upward trend in the numbers of binational marriages (Kepińska 2007). Furthermore, as more than 50 per cent of emigrants are in their twenties, they are less likely to be tied to the country of origin by family obligations.

14.4 The qualitative dimension of post-accession return migrations to Poland

From the perspective of the push and pull factors concept (Lee 1966), return migration should be characterised by relatively intense, positive pull factors to the homeland or negative push factors from the receiving country. As the results of our quantitative analysis show, modern migrations of Poles are quite diverse, both in terms of characteristics of individual actors and regional patterns of mobility. Following Lee's framework of analysis, what remains unexplored are the individual responses to various push and pull factors in the host and home countries.

To supplement the quantitative analysis presented earlier, we would like to give more in-depth insight into mechanisms and patterns of post-accession return migration by presenting a case study of return migration to Warsaw city and its vicinity. The reason for choosing Warsaw and, more generally, the Masovian region as a unit of analysis lies in its distinctive character related to relatively low outwards and inwards mobility. The Warsaw labour market offers many economic opportunities, while the surrounding Masovian region is quite underdeveloped with a relatively high rate of unemployment.

Conclusions presented in this section are based on research conducted from December 2008 to February 2009. In our study we defined a return migrant (comparable to the operational definition used in the quantitative research based of LFS) as a person who fulfils the following criteria: (1) was born in Poland; (2) went abroad with the objective of working or settlement; (3) stayed abroad at least six months; (4) came back to Poland after 1 May 2004; and, moreover, (5) returned to Poland with the intention of settling down, though this plan does not have to have been carried out.

The qualitative analysis, employing the above-mentioned definition of remigration, explored two sources of data: 20 in-depth interviews in Poland and 10 in the United Kingdom with post-accession remigrants and 20 expert interviews in the receiving countries of Great Britain and Ireland, and to compare with a different case, Norway. The interviewed return migrants represented a range of educational qualifications, occupations and age groups. They originally came from small and medium-sized cities as well as from the Warsaw metropolitan area.

This section will follow up the quantitative contribution to understand the individuals' perception of push and pull factors in the receiving country as well as in Poland. Push and pull factors affecting return migration will be discussed by using a composite measure of return migrants' readaptation in the country of origin. This approach will be applied for two reasons.

Firstly, we assume that return migrants are subject to a readaptation process. Adaptation will be defined as a process of adjusting to a new

environment, socially, culturally and economically. In the case of return migrants, the adaptation process starts with their socialisation during childhood. This process halts at the time of emigration. During this time, the social, cultural and economic environment of the migrants' home country changes. Because of this, after returning home, migrants go through the process of adaptation once again, in order to adjust to living conditions in the homeland. This has both an objective aspect, by integrating with institutions of social life, and a subjective aspect, through feelings about their adjustment and perceived status upon return. Dynamic socio-economic changes in Poland, caused by Poland's accession to the EU, as well as experiences of migrants who had lived in the developed economies of the United Kingdom or Ireland, generated new circumstances that required them to readjust.

Secondly, in adherence to the accepted theoretical concept of liquid migration, we believe that the analysis of the *effects* of readaptation will have significant explanatory value in terms of modern return migration processes. We are convinced that the course of readaptation is a key factor in making the decision of a final return. In the first phase of staying in their homeland, return migrants constantly compare the conditions in the receiving and sending country. At the same time, they debate whether their migration strategy should be permanent or temporary.

Readaptation is a multidimensional process that takes place in phases. In light of the conducted research, we could divide it into a few periods: (1) considerations in going home, (2) preparations for going back, (3) 'settling down' in the homeland, and finally (4) completed adaptation or inability to readapt in the home country. In relation to successful integration, adaptation may or may not occur in any of the particular stages. The result of this process might impact the decision on subsequent migration.

14.4.1 *Considering return to the homeland: Should I stay or should I go?*

Residence in the country of emigration was a tough experience for many of the respondents, even those who were 'successful migrants' in the host country. The psychological crisis during emigration is an integral part of life in a different socio-cultural reality to which the migrant has to adapt. Friction occurs between migrants and the surrounding society, provoking considerations of 'should I stay or go?' before the decision is actually made. The interviews showed that the migrants' situation on the labour market and familial situation in the receiving and sending country had significant impact on the decision to return.

Meaningful factors originating in the host labour market were whether one had work matching his or her qualifications, the possibility of personal development in a company or institution, as well as the level of remuneration and cost of living. When one or more of these elements did not fulfil

migrants' expectations, they started a search for work opportunities in other labour markets. Because of low transaction costs, one of the first markets taken into consideration was the home labour market. A major economic consideration of migrants was the level of social benefits for families with children. This is an important pull factor to the emigration country, especially in the case of the United Kingdom. For instance, extra pay to subsidise rents and free health services for children and chronically ill members of a migrant's household are just a few examples of support rendered by social services in the United Kingdom.

Family reasons were an equally important factor influencing the decision to return. Some of the respondents indicated that the most important reason for going home was the fact that they missed their family and friends. Migrants who had family abroad in the host country, especially those who had small children, justified return by the need for children to have closer relations with the family in Poland. They also mentioned the need to educate children in terms of Polish culture and within the Polish educational system. For those with a partner or family abroad, the cost of moving the whole household was very high. During the interviews, return migrants further rationalised their decisions by mentioning economic opportunities in the country of origin. This finding corresponds with the results of the quantitative analysis presented above, as well as with observations of Lee (1966) and Gmelch (1980) – job opportunities are a strong factor in return migrants' strategies.

The relatively high rate of return migration to rural areas (see figure 14.3), although unexplored by design of the qualitative study, need not contradict this finding. It may be related to both settling opportunities, as referred to in the concluding remarks of the quantitative analysis, and a specific response of relatively poorly educated individuals to employment opportunities. Non-recognition of qualifications abroad could also mean being unemployable in the competitive labour markets of large agglomerations in the home country. In this case, return to one's family village was perhaps the most feasible option.

14.4.2 Preparations to return

Preparations to return varied in timing and pattern and were dependent on family and professional status, as well as the age of the interviewed migrant. Highly specialised professionals who lived abroad with their spouse and children started searching for a job in the country of emigration before their actual move. They devoted a lot of time to the job search, while preserving the continuity of their employment. Highly educated professionals searched for work in a selective manner, evaluating criteria of pay, further development in a company or institution, and correspondence of their education and skills to the position. Young people who started their

professional careers in the Polish labour market and people who worked in the services sector searched for jobs after their homecoming. Their preparations prior to return mainly involved terminating their work contracts, resolving rental agreements for flats and closing bank accounts.

At this stage of reintegration, return migrants care about the social aspects of maintaining and renewing ties of friendship and contacts with colleagues from their previous work environment. Connections with friends and colleagues in the country of origin were an important source of information about the constantly changing living conditions in Poland. For the purpose of reviving social connections, returnees used internet communications, such as Skype, as well as societal portals (e.g., *naszaklasa.pl*), which are very popular among Polish migrants.

14.4.3 Homecoming and adaptation to life in the country of origin

The initial stage after return to the homeland could be called a 'euphoric welcome'. After staying abroad and longing to see the country of origin, return migrants were enthusiastic to search for a job, renew social ties and adapt to the culture. Pull factors to the homeland gained meaning. New ones appeared as well. Weather conditions, environmental concerns, cuisine and cooking traditions, access to printed newspapers and other forms of cultural 'familiarity' seemed to be of equal importance.

From the perspective of the labour market, migrants who did not search for a job while abroad primarily focused on finding a job. Most of the interviewees were not completely satisfied with their remuneration in the first phase of return; however, they were able to accept these financial conditions. Their approach to searching for a job was the same as in the case mentioned previously.

It wasn't, let's say, intensive job searching. I'd rather choose those job offers which I'm interested in [...], my financial situation did not force me to search for a job in a fast way. (Male, 27 years old, university education, logistician)

Thanks to the savings accumulated during their stay abroad, return migrants could afford to have a break in employment and search for a job at a more leisurely pace. The decision to return to Poland indefinitely was often driven by a successful job search.

After some time, migrants were confronted with Polish economic and socio-cultural reality, which provoked comparisons between the situation in the receiving and home countries. Both respondents and experts said that migrants who did not find a job were ready to remigrate to the country of previous emigration or to emigrate to another country. The level of income was another push factor from the home country. As mentioned

above, in the beginning, return migrants accepted lower wages than they had obtained abroad. However, if a lower income significantly decreased a migrant's quality of life, labour migration was considered once more.

Return migrants included some unemployed people as well; however, in case of this research sample, unemployment was only a form of waiting to set up one's own business or a way of hiding earnings from operating in the shadow economy. Some of the respondents provided undeclared work or services, because they were experiencing formal and financial problems in setting up a business in Poland.

It is certain that people who come back to Poland need help, because most of them [...] return here thinking that they [...] don't want to work for somebody, because they are used to working for themselves abroad ... that is why everybody wants to establish something [...] but how to do that? (Female, 27 years old, university education, accountant)

The above quotation is an example of problems in readapting to Polish institutions. Clear comparisons are made between the country of emigration, where entrepreneurship was stimulated, and Poland, where establishing one's own business is harder and more risky. Experience gained abroad could not be developed further and was perceived by migrants as a factor pushing them out of the home country. Another negative institutional aspect of life in the homeland was the functioning of labour market institutions, which do not have such rich offerings as those in Great Britain or Ireland. For those who struggled to readapt, differences in the way institutions operate in the sending and receiving country led to frustration and reluctance to reintegrate into the home society. Yet, the problems of return migrants extend beyond the formal way institutions operate.

Informal rules of operation of home institutions, or as migrants said, how 'things are done' in the homeland, were also crucial. Other research has also observed return migrants undergoing a process of transition (Patterson 1968; Dahya 1974; Eikass 1979; Iglicka 2002). This is strongly correlated with the culture of local organisations, which is the subject of a more detailed investigation in the following sections.

Social readaptation mainly occurred through migrants' families and ties with friends. As mentioned above, family and close acquaintances were one of the main reasons for returning to Poland. In general, adaptation in this sphere did not involve significant difficulties. Family and friends were an important pull factor to the country of origin. Migrant households with school-age children especially appreciated the support of family in raising their children.

Relations with friends, however, did not only pull respondents to the homeland. Persons who had lived abroad for some years and had not

established their own families experienced psychological discomfort when comparing themselves to peers and close friends who had remained in the country, established families and had children. This weakened the return migrants' ties with friends, and required them to build new social relations. One of the respondents characterised his return home as returning to 'social emptiness', because the strongest social relations he had were with his parents, brothers and sisters. Friends from the pre-emigration period of life had either established their own households, which made it harder to maintain relations, or they had migrated from their family town or village to another town or abroad. In some situations, especially in the case of young people, relations with friends were stronger in the emigration country, constituting, in turn, a pull factor to the country of previous emigration.

In the cultural context, readaptation was dependent on the degree of cultural integration in the receiving country, as well as migrants' expectations in the home country. Migrants who felt the strongest pull factors to their homeland were those who experienced barriers in integration within the host country. Despite good economic integration, the feeling of 'being a stranger' and 'the other' significantly reduced the quality of life for migrants abroad. Difficulties in 'entering' the culture of the host country increased the strength of pull factors to the homeland. Longing for 'cultural familiarity', norms and values promoted by the church and school, a society which widely cultivates religious traditions and traditional Polish cuisine are just a few cultural pull factors. Among migrants with negative cultural experiences in the emigration country, Polish traditions were highly valued. This group described their return as a 'homecoming'.

As mentioned above, the first days of staying in Poland were a 'time of euphoria'. Yet with time, more and more cultural challenges appeared. Return migrants came back to their homeland with different expectations, often unrealistic ones, related to dreams about a country where happiness and enthusiasm prevail. Gmelch (1980) indicates that a short holiday in the land of birth during an emigration period and letters from close family, relatives and friends had a part in building these unrealistic expectations. Migrants tend to ignore economic problems. Because of that, they come back to confront a harsher reality.

Emigration changes people in terms of their aspirations, needs and lifestyle. We might say that return migrants more or less synthesise cultural values of the home and receiving countries. They are representatives of different cultural qualities, and after coming back, they may have problems adapting. Migrants compare lifestyles, values and social norms in the emigration country and at home. Often their assessment of Poland is not positive. They define the discomfort as 'not being accustomed', 'coming back to Polish reality' or rediscovering the 'Polish way of thinking'. Migrants who highly rated values and social norms of the country of emigration had the most difficulty adapting to the Polish culture. The experience of living

in a Western country, characterised by pluralism, tolerance, multiculturalism, democratisation of public life, egalitarianism, trust, and promotion of entrepreneurship and initiative was the basis of perceiving homeland as different or even strange. In their home country, they did not feel at all at home, but rather like newcomers.

When I came back to Poland and woke up next day, I've been asking myself loudly: 'What am I doing here?' I felt annoyed by all the grey colour. It was horrible. During the first two weeks, I couldn't deal with this country. I was nervous. When I went out, I had the impression that people looked at me all the time. (Female, 27 years old, university education, accountant)

I felt like a newcomer [...] I didn't know if I'm able to deal with life in Poland. Again, coming back to these Polish conditions, Polish way of thinking. In the beginning, it was hard, but with time I got used to this way of life. (Female, 35 years old, university education, administrative worker)

One of the terms that respondents used extensively in the interviews was 'lifestyle'. They compared lifestyle in Poland with that in the country of emigration, underlining the 'tolerance', 'freedom' and 'comfort and ease' in the case of the latter. In the opinion of migrants, this style of life was possible thanks to a satisfactory income. This is contrary to what they experienced in Poland, where they encountered stress and tension.

It is hard to find oneself in this Polish reality [...] there (abroad) are better economic, work conditions [...] there is a different culture [...] and when you come back here [to Poland] for the first time you notice that people earn little money and they cannot deal with this problem ... this generates psychological problems [...] people who earn minimum wages in England can afford some quality of life [...] when you come back to Poland, you are searching for job, you have difficulties to find work [...] slowly you lose your belief in yourself. (Male, 27 years old, university education, logistics operator)

An important aspect of the readaptation process was the organisational culture of work in Poland. All respondents positively assessed the culture of work in their receiving countries. This assessment related to factors like equality in treatment of workers, direct relations with the boss, transparency of the remuneration system, bonus systems, paths of promotion, scope of responsibilities, roles of particular workers and respect for working hours. Return migrants spoke about the utilisation of entrepreneurial and innovative skills of workers. These are well received and well paid for

by employers abroad, but not in Poland. Satisfactory income provided further motivation. A well-paid job was associated with a friendly atmosphere at work. In the eyes of return migrants, valuable organisational solutions include building an atmosphere of responsibility and team work, direct relations among co-workers and with superiors, and openness to new solutions and ideas.

After return, and as more time in the country passed, cultural difficulties were solved by acceptance or adjusting to Polish norms and values. As some migration researchers indicate, adjustment might take from one to two years (Bernard & Ashton-Vouyoucalos 1976; King 1977; Gmelch 1980). It is possible for new 'cultural predispositions' of return migrants to be utilised in everyday professional and social life. At the same time culture somehow 'imported from emigration countries' may be transferred to other members of the home society. As indicated by research on the economic and organisational culture of Polish companies, values characteristic of a capitalist economy are just partially applied in Polish firms or public organisations (Kochanowicz & Marody 2003; Kochanowicz, Mandes & Marody 2007).¹¹

14.4.4 Completed adaptation or inability to readapt in the home country

As presented above, the description of the most important push and pull factors for the receiving and home countries shows the many divergent and sometimes even contradictory elements that impact return migrations. The final stage of the readaptation process is either complete adaptation or inability to readapt or adjust. We define complete readaptation as full adjustment of a return migrant in all dimensions, including the economic, social and cultural. In practice, this means that the migrant has a satisfying occupation, positive social relations with family and friends and feels comfortable in the cultural environment. Completed adaptation leads to settlement in the homeland, but it is not necessarily a permanent state. If conditions change, a migrant's reaction could be to emigrate once more. Inability to adapt means lack of adjustment in at least one of the listed dimensions, making it significantly harder to operate in the country of origin. As a result, a migrant might stay in the country and feel marginalised (Osipowicz 2001) or go abroad, either remigrating to the same country as the previous emigration or to another destination. Yet additional emigration does not diminish the possibility of marginalisation in the new host country (see Carby-Hall 2008).

14.4.5 *Two types of return migration*

To conclude the analysis of the effects of adaptation of return migrants and further migration plans, we define two types of return migration: return with the intention to settle and return that is intentionally unpredictable.

Return migration with the intention to settle is identified when the migrant opts for a long-term stay in his or her homeland and attempts to engage in professional, social and cultural activities there. An intention to end migration, in practice, does not mean resignation from being mobile, but it defines the migrants' place in his or her home country.

Never. I've never wanted stay there [abroad] longer [...] Abroad never was my home. It wasn't my home. I always knew that I will come back home. I always missed my home, I knew that always, that I will come back [...] and I started something in Poland that will be mine [here in Poland]. I built my own house. I have a piece of land here. At last I have something here that holds me here. Here is my family, and besides that I would like to develop my career here in Poland, because I know this is my place. I know that nowhere I will feel like I'm at home. (Male, 27 age old, university education, accountant)

In the words of the respondent: 'at last I have something that holds me here' and 'here is my home'. Hence, wanting to build one's future in the country of origin constitutes an important element of return.

Going abroad had a temporary character for this type of return migrants. It was a form of accumulating, mainly economic capital, but also experiences which would be useful in Poland as a form of cultural and social capital. When plans related to migration were completed and the migration objective was achieved, migrants returned home as part of a rational strategy.

I planned to go abroad just for a few years. To gain new experiences, to learn a foreign language [...] from the very beginning I assumed that I will go for a few years. I didn't specify that it will be two or three or nine years, but a few years [...] it was optimal for me. (Male, 32 years old, secondary education, manager)

The main reason for my return was that I didn't assume that I will stay abroad. I thought that I will fulfil some stage, two years, this was long enough to claim for yourself that I'm able to find myself in a totally different and new situation, in a totally different culture, in a totally different organisational social system. And, let's say some economic needs [...] in that time I fulfilled them as well. (Female, 35 years old, university education, administration officer)

This type of return migrants is recognised in Gmelch's (1980) typology of returnees who intended temporary migration. In other words, the timing of return is determined by objectives set at the start of emigration.

Making a decision about return with the intention to settle does not mean that migrants will not be mobile in the future. If economic problems arise, return migrants express a readiness for subsequent temporary labour migration. This was mainly described as the possibility of short periods abroad for professional purposes, in order to gain new experience or earn additional income. This type of return migrant stresses that Poland is always their point of reference, and returning home is a precondition of going abroad.

I will put it this way, we tried two times. We wanted to return to Poland, and two times we promised ourselves that this return is a return for good. And two times it happened that we returned there (to Ireland) so you never have 100 per cent certainty. Now we assume, that we won't go there (to Ireland), but you know, you never know [...] if we would like to earn money, have some extra money for something, to have a new car or something, then we will go abroad for half a year. I don't know, we will see. (Male, 30 years old, secondary education, chef)

Intentionally unpredictable return constitutes the second type of returnees identified in the study. In this case coming back to the home country has a temporary character and does not exclude remigration or emigration to another country. Intentional unpredictability refers to a migration strategy described as 'rummaging about', 'swimming with the stream' or 'drifting'. This type of migrant does not project his or her future in a particular place. Their behaviour is based on maximising opportunities for mobility, without limiting oneself to one country. Even in the long term, the place of destination is not defined and options remain open (Drinkwater, Eade & Garapich 2006; Trevena in this volume).

Intentionally unpredictable migrants see coming back home as a result of realising the opportunities assumed in their migration plan. However, it does not mean that no other migration will happen.

A curious reader might ask: is this return migration then? The authors of this article are convinced that despite the unpredictability, this form of mobility does constitute return migration, as migrants choose their homeland as the next destination. Returning to Poland justifies the arguments of minimising the costs of readaptation associated with building social and cultural competencies and at the same time maximising opportunities of professional development. Choosing the home country reduces the probability that emotional difficulties related to acclimatisation in the country of migration will appear.

Coming back to Poland at this moment is associated with smaller stress than going abroad to a totally strange country. [...] but I plan to stay here. At the end of the day I always have a safety net that I can come here [to Poland]. (Male, 37 years old, university degree, IT worker)

Intentionally unpredictable return migrants are reserved in definitively locating their future in space and time. They assume that at some point they will have the need to migrate somewhere.

14.5 Summary and conclusion

This chapter was devoted to analysing the process of return migration of Polish post-accession migrants. Based on Lee's (1966) concept of push and pull factors of migration, this analysis explored selectivity in the process of return migration and the motivations these migrants have to return to their homeland or what may prevent them from doing so. The use of different research methods allowed for a holistic analysis of the process.

The quantitative analysis, mainly based on LFS data, described the notion of selectivity of emigration and, as a follow up, selectivity of return migration. The SI was developed with respect to both geographic and personal characteristics of Polish post-accession migrants. The analysis reaffirmed Lee's hypothesis concerning both the non-randomness of return migrants in terms of personal characteristics, as well as the existence of well-defined streams of migration alongside which counter-streams develop.

The qualitative part of the study enabled deeper understanding of how the specific streams of migration develop, how individuals perceive certain push and pull factors and what their response strategies are. Interviews carried out with returnees in Poland allowed for a retrospective exploration of motivations to return. Moreover, the interviews brought insight into reintegration in the home country. Considerations concerning future mobility were also captured.

Based on the evidence provided by quantitative data it has been proven that contemporary return migration of Polish post-accession migrants is indeed highly selective. This selectivity favours (1) people who migrated in their twenties or early thirties and who decide to return after a few years spent abroad; (2) people with relatively lower education than the education of post-accession emigrants, which indicates that people with the highest levels of educational attainment often remain abroad; and lastly (3) people from small villages rather than big towns. The last factor in selectivity should be combined with the notion that generally migrants return more frequently to intensely developing regions. This causes the effect of 'washing out' in some regions, where the outflow is more than proportional to

the return flow. However, it was also possible to identify regions with large agglomerations where the outflow is less than proportional relative to the inflow. These places emit significant pull factors that are highly attractive for potential returnees.

The explanation of the observed patterns was provided through the qualitative study, which explored patterns of contemporary return migration to Poland. Characteristic stages of readaptation show how multidimensional push and pull factors impact return migration. The status of a return migrant is negotiated individually. Migrants wonder whether they should stay or go. This deliberation is made with reference to the country of origin as well as the receiving country. One of the explanations behind this decision process is that Poland is a country where the socio-economic transformation is still under way. Those who went abroad were mainly labour migrants. They were searching for job opportunities and a better quality of life. Nowadays they come back to their homeland with higher expectations. For some of them, the situation on the labour market and standard of living meets their needs. Some are able to accept the socio-economic conditions they find in Poland. If they have difficulty fulfilling their expectations, though, they search for better opportunities by means of migration networks. All in all, they pursue a strategy described by one of the two types of return migrations, return with the intention to settle or intentionally unpredictable return.

Being fully aware of all the limitations of the data, both qualitative and quantitative, we would like to highlight some new trends which continue to materialise in international mobility of labour. As suggested by Lee (1966), push and pull factors are still a feasible framework for interpreting population movements. Yet in the case of return migration, which is a follow up of significant outflows in the past, it is important to analyse the dynamics of how the push and pull factors change over time. If return migration is a rational decision, then we should assume that whatever the push and pull factors were at the time of emigration, they have changed to such an extent that they may generate an opposite effect to what happened in the past. Thus, a more feasible concept to describe current migration phenomena is the concept of liquid migration. These theories do not exclude one another, although they seem sufficient only for one of the two types of return migrants recognised, those who are intentionally unpredictable. Returning with the intention to settle permanently in the home country is led by motives that are not easily captured within this study. These include personal sentiment and longing to live in a society organised according to a well-known culture. Another frequent motive of return is simply fulfilment of the migration objective.

Conclusions derived from our analysis show that, as hypothesised by Lee (1966), pull factors may attract migrants to the country of origin, yet they may also be generated in the country of destination and keep

emigrants from returning home. With diminishing obstacles for mobility of labour, positive signals affecting one's decision to emigrate from a primary destination may be recognised not only in the home country, but in a third country, which due to changing socio-economic conditions becomes a feasible destination. This model of analysis seems to be appropriate in the current 'age of migration' (Castles & Miller 2009), at least in the Polish case. The process under study appears to be a 'fluid' one, as revealed by its multistage and unpredictable nature (Bijak & Wisniowski 2008). The borderline between the concepts of 'migration' and 'mobility' seems much more blurred than ever before. Should we be considering return migration as a distinct migration strategy? Or is it just another form of emigration that ends in one's country of origin?

Notes

- 1 For the purpose of clarity, when referring in this chapter to the 'country of origin' or 'sending country', we will speak of Poland. The host countries will be referred to as 'countries of emigration' or 'destinations countries'.
- 2 However, as Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski (2009) state, these numbers may have been 'guessed' rather than 'estimated' as the methodology of the calculations has never been presented by their authors.
- 3 Regarding the quality of Polish census data, Tanajewski (2006) noted that the number of citizens from particular countries was underestimated. Census data revealed that there were 788 Vietnamese and 593 Armenians in Poland whereas in official registers created for regularisation purposes these numbers were 1,341 and 1,626, respectively.
- 4 The project was funded by the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development.
- 5 At the time of writing, data from the 2011 census were not available yet, therefore data from the 2002 census were used.
- 6 The Labour Force Survey (LSF) is a panel study, and each member of each household in a sample is polled four times during 1.5 years. It enables us to check whether emigrants from step 1 continuously stayed abroad or if they moved back at certain points in time.
- 7 The selectivity index (SI) is a simple measure for comparing the structure of two populations (Cieślak 1992: 252). Its formula is as follows:

$$SI_{V=i} = \frac{\frac{M_{V=i}}{M} = \frac{P_{V=i}}{P}}{\frac{P_{V=i}}{P}}$$

where $MSI_{V=i}$ is the index for category i of variable V ; $M_{V=i}$ and $P_{V=i}$ are the number of migrants and number of people in the general population, respectively, falling into category (or value) i of variable V , and M and P are the overall number of migrants and people in general population (Kaczmarczyk, Mioduszewska & Żylicz 2009). It may be simply calculated for return inflow by assuming that 'general population' is a 'population of emigrants' and those who 'emigrate' are return migrants.

- 8 In these locations, among others, Polish researchers conducted ethnoscapes in the 1990s.
- 9 This is the heritage of times when economic planners decided not to invest in housing construction which resulted in the situation called by Polish demographers 'under-urbanisation' (for details see Okólski 2001).

- 10 Katrin Klein-Hitpaß in chapter twelve of this book showed the opposite regarding high-skilled return migrants before 2002. According to her analysis, in light of the last census data, well educated Poles were prone to settle in the economically more advanced regions. Providing contradictory results, our analysis seems to grasp the whole picture of the process without focusing on the highly skilled; it also exploits data covering the period after the last census, which is more appropriate when talking about post-accession mobility.
- 11 This raises another concern of research on return migration: what is the role of returnees in the home society? To maintain clarity in this text, we simply refer readers to the wide range of literature by such authors as Stark (1996), Stark and Galor (1996), Cerase (1974), Iglicka (2002) and Klage et al. (2007).

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15 Concluding remarks

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The past two decades have brought immense changes to Europe. From political and economic transition following the collapse of communist regimes to European Union membership, countries in CEE have faced transitions on many fronts. With membership of the EU came increased European integration, including more access for individuals to the labour markets in other EU countries. While the wins and woes of economic ‘transition’ have been fairly well documented within individual countries, less is known and understood about changes in human mobility resulting from EU membership. The free mobility of labour within the EU (albeit with limitations) has led to increased access to various EU labour markets and has hence changed the dynamics of European migration flows. This book has aimed to provide a conceptual, methodological and empirical framework for better understanding and further studying post-accession migration. The various chapters have showed impressive changes in terms of substance, scale and structure of migration flows within Europe after the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007. The empirical case studies on migrants in receiving societies and upon return accounted for the complexity of migratory flows and of intentions and behaviours of migrants, both after arriving in the receiving societies and upon return to their home countries. Likewise, the theoretical and methodological parts of the book have clearly shown that there is not one optimal, but rather numerous approaches and methods to study and explain those flows and the social, geographical and structural changes preceding and following them.

In this final chapter, we want to summarise the findings, expressing what may have remained constant versus changed in contemporary mobility, presented in terms of the new and potentially overlooked theoretical, methodological and empirical aspects of post-accession migration. The first section looks at post-accession mobility, drawing particularly from the case studies in this volume, in terms of both structural influences at the macro level and migration strategies taken at the micro level. This section will first underline core structural changes that are presented across the case studies and then will highlight the macroeconomic and geographical perspectives and emerging research issues linked to them. The section then turns to analysis of individual strategies for migration, again summarising findings from the various case studies. It closes with a discussion of how

to place the observed dynamics of post-accession migration into existing theoretical frameworks. On the basis of these conclusions, we then develop a conceptual framework for analysing the patterns and mechanisms of post-accession movements and offer explanations for these processes, which might possibly be generalised and apply to other international mobility processes. As the authors of this chapter have differing academic backgrounds, including economics, sociology, social geography and political science, we try to bring together our individual perspectives in order to enhance the depth of analysis.

15.1 Structural changes in source and destination countries

A number of changes and hence processes of social and economic transitions need to be considered when assessing the post-accession mobility patterns observed from CEE. Drawing both on the discussion in this book and looking to recent developments, we would like to highlight three key fields of change in order to later address the emerging challenges in migration after the EU enlargement: (1) European economic integration and policies for mobility; (2) patterns of economic growth and volatility in the transition economies of CEE; and (3) expansion and internationalisation of higher education.

15.1.1 *European economic integration and changing policies for intra-European mobility*

EU enlargement brings with it the notion of ‘free mobility’ of people, although it was initially fully implemented in only a few countries – the United Kingdom, Ireland, Sweden and European Economic Area (EEA) countries, such as Norway. The EU allowed other countries to impose restrictions either on access to work or welfare for members from CEE countries for a period of initially two years following EU enlargement, but this period could be extended for an additional five years (Doyle, Hughes & Wadensjö 2006: 17-18). In 2011, all citizens of the EU-8 (referred to elsewhere as the ‘A-8’) received full EU labour mobility rights.

Migration flows have changed and continue to evolve due to these changing political and institutional conditions. Engbersen and Snel (in this volume) discuss some of the prevalent patterns between the so-called ‘old’ migration streams from CEE – among which are the temporary mobility of Polish workers to Germany since 1990 and large-scale illegal migration of Romanians and Bulgarians to Southern European countries – to ‘new’ migration destinations, with the United Kingdom and Ireland’s population landscape changing with the dramatically increasing numbers of migrants from CEE after the 2004 EU enlargement. However, the old-new

destination distinction is not clear-cut. Other European countries have only recently opened their labour markets to meet requirements of intra-EU free mobility, or are still in the process of doing so. These changes mean that some new employment patterns are emerging. As one example, Engbersen and Snel discuss the fact that there was a 30 per cent increase in the number of self-employed Polish individuals in the Netherlands, reaching more than 3,000 in 2006, and this may grow as a strategy to evade still-restrictive work permit requirements. Meanwhile, there has long been speculation about the possible size of inflows to 'old' destinations, such as Germany, where migrant populations and networks exist, once the German labour market is opened further. Grabowska-Lusinska in this volume (citing Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2009) argues that even after the period of 'free mobility' in 2004, migration from Poland remained selective. Migrants who were more educated and those from bigger towns and cities gravitated more to Great Britain and Ireland. This means that those countries, just after enlargement, gained a kind of comparative advantage in absorbing 'better' migrants, while those countries that retained restrictions after 1 May 2004 have been receiving 'less valued' migrants as well as those who were part of pre-accession streams.

However, these trends may again shift as economic opportunities diminish due to simultaneous recession across much of Europe, including both traditional labour receiving and labour sending countries. There was a tendency of increasing return migration in 2007 and 2008 and fewer employment opportunities found in Ireland and the United Kingdom due to recession (World Bank 2008: 20). Some anecdotal evidence shows, for instance among Lithuanians, that interest is shifting to the Scandinavian countries of Sweden and Norway. Furthermore, as Krisjane et al. note, 'free mobility' changed Latvia's position from being largely a receiving country to being primarily a sending country. Finally, it should be noted that even in the absence of 'free mobility', migration might remain a viable economic strategy for individuals from less developed countries, despite the legal risks. From the perspective of receiving EU countries, this means that even with the free labour mobility of EU-8 citizens, there is still demand for irregular labour migrants from adjacent non-EU countries. In summary, there are numerous shifts in migration patterns as both policies and opportunity structures continue to impact mobility.

15.1.2 Economic growth and volatility in transition economies

As briefly addressed in the various chapters in this volume, the volatility of the economic situation, including the 2007-2010 global economic crisis, may be even more intense in transition economies and have an impact on the multiplicity of migration patterns.

First, the countries in CEE have gone through rapid economic and social transitions in the adoption of the free market and hence improvement in living standards. Using the Baltic states as an example, the World Bank (2008) reports particularly strong wage increases, with Estonia and Lithuania seeing an 80 per cent increase in wages from 2004 to 2008 and Latvia experiencing more than doubled wages (*ibid.*: 19), which may lead to less perceived benefit of working abroad. However, by the third quarter of 2008, Latvia and Estonia were already feeling economic retrenchment and were the first countries from the EU-10 to be officially deemed in recession (World Bank 2009: 10). Of course, not all of the EU-10 countries experienced fluctuations of this magnitude, but nonetheless it goes to show that macroeconomic factors are far from constant, and transition economies may face even greater vulnerabilities in the economic crisis. These vulnerabilities may be further exacerbated by corruption, both real and perceived, and the loss of confidence of these nationals in their home country's economic situation.

Second, according to the World Bank (2009: 1), the growth has largely been fuelled by an orientation towards European markets and an increase of consumption through credit:

The EU10's heightened vulnerability to this crisis is a by-product of the region's great success at integrating with the EU and globally, linked through financial as well as trade channels. That integration, although differentiated across the 10 countries, has brought major benefits, including rapid convergence in incomes, improvements in living standards, and a sharp decline in poverty rates. But the easy flow of credit that made this possible was mirrored in rising private sector debt, growing exposure to foreign exchange risks, and easily financed large current account deficits. The unprecedented series of external shocks have now revealed the financial sector in the EU10 as even more volatile than those in more advanced economies, while the extreme export dependence of some of the EU10, though supportive of high growth in the past, is now pulling the economies downward.

Third, the growth, coupled with out-migration in some cases, fuelled labour and skills shortages in many CEE countries, prompting discussions on and interest in return migration. Although it is outside the scope of this book, it should be briefly noted that in some cases, CEE countries became attractive destinations for labour migration from outside the EU, as well as for return migration (as noted in this volume by Anacka et al. for Poland). This economic volatility is important to note as it is yet another aspect of the unpredictability of migration flows, at least based on recent experiences, and it is likely to have a strong influence on future movements.

15.1.3 Expansion and internationalisation of higher education

Another change relates to higher education systems. Numbers of university graduates are increasing in CEE countries. This has been paired with a more general rise in the internationalisation of education, including increasing numbers of international students, more international English language programmes and short-term exchange programmes across Europe, mutual recognition of diplomas, and a synthesising of education systems through the Bologna Process in Europe. In this volume, Molodikova notes the increase of university graduates in Hungary – a tenfold increase in the past 50 years. However, the expansion of enrolments in higher education in Hungary has not been coupled with equivalent increases in academic teaching staff. Nonetheless, Hungary has also experienced more inflows of foreign students, particularly ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring countries, from the EU-15 in association with the EU's Erasmus programme, and Asians participating in a degree programme in Hungary as a springboard to access Western European labour markets. Despite a general expansion of higher education, the results of these changes appear mixed for various individuals. This seems to be linked to both the demand for various skills as well as individual strategies for finding employment, as will also be discussed in more detail in the next section. Trevena questions whether all Polish graduates can be considered 'highly skilled'. There are questions about the quality of some of the programmes following the boom in new, private higher education institutions and a potential oversaturation of some popular university degrees. This has led to relatively lower employability and possibility to utilise the knowledge attained. This is in line with a report by the World Bank (2007: 25):

The substantial skills mismatch characteristic of most EU8+2 labour markets may mean that skills acquired under central planning became obsolete, but also may suggest that education systems are not effective in producing workers with the kinds of skills needed in modern economies.

15.1.4 The economic and geographical perspective: Cross-cutting themes for post-accession migration research

The structural changes, which can largely be attributed to either policies or the changing institutions and the relationships between them, then impact other processes of human mobility. Building from these trends, a few cross-cutting themes emerge.

The first theme relates to questions of how to achieve optimal labour utility across regions. Economic geography proves useful for understanding these shifts, recognising that changes are not uniform across a country, but

rather than regional and local variations may be quite pronounced. Several authors in this volume address these issues. Klein-Hitpaß points out that there are not only differences between countries, but also in the economic opportunity structures of various regions. Regional differences need to be considered not only in terms of what attracts migrants to the international destinations they move to, but also to the destination of choice when they return 'home'. Furthermore, the EU rests on a premise of ensuring mobility of goods, capital, services and labour in order to maximise utility of resources across regions.

The second emerging issue relates to job and skills matching for all of the labour needs in the economy, for the full range from low- to high-skilled jobs, and as applied in the dual labour market and the world cities theories, and more broadly to skills transfer and economic development. None of these theories on their own adequately explain structural differences that impact post-accession migration flows. A contradiction emerged between rising demand for labour within CEE countries and the Baltic states, attributed to economic growth after EU enlargement as discussed above, and concern about lack of opportunities for labour market integration upon return. According to the World Bank (2007: 21-23), acute skills shortages were found in Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Hungary by 2005, coupled with high job vacancy rates, especially in construction in the case of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Yet, these statistics must be seen together with migrants' stories of limited employment options, often below their skills level, upon arrival abroad and difficulties in reintegrating into the home labour market after return or adjusting culturally (see Anacka et al. in this volume).

As further addressed by Glorius in this volume, the existing literature on return migration shows varying potential for positive economic contributions of return migrants, depending on factors such as good governance as well as career paths and whether or not skills from abroad are applied in future economic activity. Many studies show return migrants undertaking self-employment in small-scale ventures, which some authors argue make little contribution to development.

In countries of arrival, however, only select knowledge streams are of interest and various impediments exist to achieving skilled occupations, such as the rules requiring worker registration for EU-8 individuals in the United Kingdom within 30 days of arrival (see Trevena in this volume), leading people to first work in lower skilled jobs that can be secured quickly. In source countries, the adequate labour market integration of those returning from abroad not only depends on knowledge and 'modern' organisational skills or 'EU knowledge', but also undergoes various 'stages' (see Wolfeil in this volume). While in the beginning, some language proficiency, international experience and contacts might have been sufficient for career take-off, with the horizontal expansion of migratory

experiences those specific skills may become devalued (compare also Williams & Baláž 2005).

Therefore, the global statement of need for highly skilled migrants may be a chimera, as actual policies and mechanisms to facilitate skilled migration are limited. The often postulated race for global talent (see Kuvik in this volume) is not yet providing a promising strategy on how to adequately fit the various talents or skills needed into the labour market, neither in the source nor in the receiving countries, and great policy variations exist to facilitate skilled worker movements and national interests. Actual job placements widely depend on migrants' individual knowledge, the market applicability of this knowledge and strategies to find an appropriate place in the labour market. While international experience is valued at the individual level, particularly among the younger generations within the CEE countries and Baltic states, it seems to translate more into an initial desire for short-term experience, often below one's qualifications, rather than true integration into economic sectors that operate globally. Krisjane et al. (in this volume), found gaining experience and language skills to be the primary motive to move abroad among the 20-29 year old age group in Latvia. However, at the same time, these authors found that most moves tended to consist of stays of less than three months and in low-skilled jobs, despite generally higher educational attainment. Practically, this observation makes sense as this age cohort largely grew up in times of the free market and with easier travel options. However, these trends present a challenge and new research questions, as they show that skilled individuals from the EU-10 are often not gaining access to higher-level jobs. It is plausible that recruitment is rather limited to job transfers, or in other words, internal, recruiting-from-within in companies. Hence, further analysis of the 'myth of the global labour market', as discussed by Kuvik in this volume, as well as Trevena's questioning (also in this volume) of the persistence of the 'dual labour market' with immigrants working mainly in lower level sectors, could be further explored in other European contexts.

15.2 Migration strategies and patterns in new migration flows: What do we learn from typologies?

The post-accession migration flows presented in detail can be characterised as coexistence of old and new migration patterns; the latter are mostly described as being highly liquid and of unpredictable nature. However, searching for general features within those new mobility patterns and possibly linking them to major theoretical approaches of migration research, the various migrant typologies offered in this volume have a high explanatory value.

Concerning connections between migration strategies and the labour market integration of migrants, we find a lot of evidence that can be ex-

plained in a neoclassical way, that is, with push-pull models at the macro level and cost-benefit calculations at the micro level. Post-accession migrants are described as taking the decision to migrate mainly because of bad employment opportunities on the home labour market (push factor) and because of high wage discrepancies between source and destination country. They quickly gain access to the destination country's labour market, initially accepting low wages and deskilled employment (in a segmented labour market). A considerable part of those migrants will remain in low-skilled employment, as it is either sufficient to reach their economic migration goals ('target earners' in Trevena's typology in this volume) or is identified as a individual migration cost, which is accepted in order to raise one's social capital (language skills and international experience, as defined in Pietka, Clark and Canton's chapter in this volume) to be reinvested back home. Both subgroups of migrants pursue a temporary, short-term migration strategy ('circular migrants' in Grabowska-Lusinska's chapter in this volume and 'short-term migrants' and 'economic migrants' in Pietka, Clark and Canton in this volume). Another group of migrants seeks to build a professional career in the destination country ('career seekers' in Trevena's typology in this volume). They also might initially take on an unskilled job (due to institutional restrictions well described in Pietka, Clark and Canton's chapter), but will strive for any possibility of labour market advancement and to stabilise their social and economic position in the destination country, thus also fitting into neoclassical cost-benefit considerations. Over time, positive social and economic integration in the destination country can lead to a consolidation of the migratory stay and to permanent settlement (resembling 'traditional settlers', called 'emigrants' in Grabowska-Lusinska's chapter).

But as Pietka, Clark and Canton (in this volume) point out, it is only while looking beyond those economic approaches that we can find clues to the postulated fluidity and unpredictability of migrants' behaviour. Concerning labour market performance in the destination country, there seems to be an interweaving of numerous individual factors (area of study, language skills, work experience, motivations, future plans) and structural factors (segmentation and structure of the labour market, legal access to the labour market, employer behaviour, transferability of diplomas, discrimination). Moreover, the social sphere seems to also play an important role in the long-term behaviour and decision-making process of migrants. Moskal (in this volume), with reference to Polish migrants in Glasgow, describes the development of transnational communities and transnational identities, which makes it even harder to predict future mobility behaviour commonly measured using variables of social integration in source and destination country. Thus, apart from understanding the complexity of these economic, physical and social processes, migration scholars must also develop new modules for surveying migrants' social integration and emotional attachments.

Referring to migrants' motives, there is a last group which has to be mentioned: the group of young adventure-seekers or 'drifters', who Trevena describes as mainly pursuing post-materialist goals, such as experiencing life in a global city, having the opportunity to work and travel, and improving their language skills. This group is mostly young, mostly well educated and largely active in low-skilled jobs. They are described as highly flexible, frequently changing jobs and places, and uncertain about the duration of their migratory stay. In more general terms, Grabowska-Lusinska (in this volume) labels this migratory behaviour after Eade, Drinkwater and Garapich (2006) as 'intentionally unpredictable', stressing the multiple and fluid options underlying their migration motives and employment strategies. Even though 'drifting' is often described as a stage in adolescence that can lead to another migratory stage, and even when there is a certain rationality behind it, like in the example of Poland's expanding higher education system and declining labour market opportunities for graduates, economic concepts of migration do not help us to further understand this behaviour.

Liquid migration behaviour should instead be analysed with the help of recent demographic approaches, like the theory of the 'second demographic transition', well described by authors such as Lesthaeghe (1992) and Van de Kaa (1994). Post-industrial societies face not only demographic aging and shrinking of their population, but also an increasing fluidity of individual biographies and familial constellations, which influences this seemingly unconventional and irrational migration behaviour. Evidence of individualisation and loosening familial ties is visible throughout the post-industrial societies of Europe, for instance, in late parenthood, a declining importance of marriage and rise of new family forms such as non-married cohabitation, single parenthood and patchwork families. It might also explain the vague career behaviour and uncertainty about duration of migration expressed by younger post-accession migrants. With regard to migrant behaviour, further aspects of this theory provide explanations associated with diminished social control and inability to predict and secure one's future, coupled with increased individual autonomy and market orientation. Thus, vagueness and fluidity in social and employment constellations are not found exclusively in migrants, but must also exist in the peer groups of non-migrants, and also amongst returnees.

Concerning the issue of return migration to CEE countries, we can again draw on a number of chapters in this book that provide us with theoretical and empirical insight and evaluate the success of those initial migration strategies we discussed before. Again, we will identify the main threads in these typologies and connect them to major economic, social and demographic explanatory approaches.

Anacka et al. find two main groups referring to migratory outcome and finality of remigration decision: those intentionally finished and those

intentionally unpredictable, thus keeping in line with the more general theoretical considerations of Grabowska-Lusinska (in this volume). Intentionally finished migrants are found to be target earners or educational migrants who managed to fulfil their migration objectives and perceive their return as definite (even though this decision might again change over time). The intentionally unpredictable migrants are unable to locate their future definitively in space and time. Three main reasons may underlie this attitude: (1) their initial migration goals may not yet be fulfilled, prompting them to look for the next opportunity to work abroad; (2) they may have integrated former destination countries into their future action space, thus monitoring opportunities in both countries concerned and leaving all options open; or (3) they may find themselves unable to reintegrate and readapt to the local labour market conditions and rules after return. Again, the characterisation of the last group corresponds largely with the definition of 'liquid migration' mentioned before, which may somehow overlap with the notion of transnationality found in the transnational approach in migration research, however with some differences. This post-accession liquidity of mobility is rather unplanned. It may be a consequence, and is sometimes an outcome, of 'failed' migration, while transnationality is rather presupposed, planned and organised.

Applying general explanatory approaches, one can easily connect the first group of intentionally finished migrants both to neoclassical approaches of migration and to Cerase's (1974) renowned typology of remigrants, whereas the second group seemingly does not fit into those classical approaches. In addition, Cassarino's (2004) considerations of preparedness¹ of remigrants are well mirrored by Anacka et al.'s survey results. In Cassarino's definition, the quality of return preparation prior to remigration is directly connected to the success of reintegration, in terms of labour market and social integration. Anacka et al. (in this volume) refine this concept as concluded and non-concluded return through identifying stages of the return process, namely, (1) considering returning home, (2) preparing to go back, (3) 'resettling' in the homeland, and finally (4) completed adaptation or inability to readapt in the home country. The fourth phase seems to be crucial in determining whether the return concludes the migration or whether mobility is engaged in again.

Turning to the general motives for return, beyond positive or negative economic motives, there are strong social and emotional arguments, like nostalgia for home and homesickness, missing family and wanting one's own children to be socialised in the home country. These aspects again remind us that migration decisions have a strong social component and thus should not be analysed exclusively by means of economic approaches, but also with social theory like Bourdieu's (1986) concept of social and other capitals (economic and cultural) and the transnational approach.

The reintegration of returnees in home countries' labour markets is closely aligned with the return-development nexus in migration research and questions of brain drain and brain flow and gain. Wolfeil (in this volume) in her chapter on returning graduates to Poland takes a closer look at the skill transfer of returning graduates to Poland in terms of cultural knowledge and factual knowledge. She shows that skill transfer greatly varies according to the discipline studied and according to the transformative stage of the Polish economy with its varying demand for specific skills. Anacka et al. also showed that the labour market integration of returnees developed in certain stages, according to the labour market transformation, thus again stressing the time variable as a crucial element of analysis. Comparing those results with Cerase's (1974) remigrant typology, Wolfeil's characterisation of the 'translators of knowledge' might fit into Cerase's category of 'return of innovation'. However, her analysis clearly points out that social and cultural capital cannot be reinvested directly but, rather, needs 'translation' into the cultural context of the society of origin and its economic and power system.

15.3 Between structure and strategy: Conceptual considerations for understanding post-accession migration

Summarising the study results on post-accession migratory patterns, we observe a coexistence of 'old' and 'new' migration patterns, which fall together with the coexistence of 'old' and 'new' explanatory approaches. While the 'old' short-term and long-term emigration from CEE states can be analysed largely under the theoretical foci of migration economics in combination with social and demographic approaches (like the migration and family life cycle), the 'new' migratory processes, characterised as 'liquid migration', demand integration of 'new' explanatory frameworks (like the structuralist and transnational approaches and the concept of the 'second demographic transition').

These two aspects, structure and strategy, frame mobility processes, which then are mobilised through meso-level migration networks. Ciobanu (in this volume), in comparing two rural Romanian villages, discusses differences that can occur in the 'culture of migration' in sending areas. This author finds migration networks to be strong in one village and small-scale and limited to the family level in the other. She notes that these differences may be attributed to the length of past experiences with migration, with 'newer' sending regions demonstrating less acceptance of migration when employment is available regionally. She postulates that various 'stages of migration' may be observed, in relation to information regarding migration networks, costs of migration, risk taking, selectivity of migration, and so on. The stages are associated with socio-economic and cultural factors. In

other words, Ciobanu suggests that the structural as well as cultural factors influence observable regional differences in migration systems and the presence, or lack of, migration networks. Moskal (also in this volume) notes the importance of social networks, stating that even short visits to Poland from migrants residing abroad can feed information that facilitates additional migration.

The research perspectives taken in this book, recalled at the beginning of this concluding chapter, were extremely challenging because post-accession migration is 'in the making'. Its patterns and mechanisms seem very difficult to capture because of their very contemporariness and multidimensionality. Yet these characteristics, paradoxically, also help us to recognise and distinguish, to some extent, a new pattern of migration, namely, 'liquid migration' (Engbersen, Snel & De Boom 2009). This has been described by Engbersen and Snel (in this volume) as a 'post-accession phenomenon'. Liquidity of post-accession migration was initially recognised as a specific pattern, generated mostly by free movement of labour, but also as changing demographic patterns, especially in relation to the life cycle and people's life attitudes translated into more individualistic life approaches and loosened connections to family, tradition and the household.

Free movement of labour, introduced in Europe by lifting restrictions on access to the majority of EU labour markets in 2004 and 2007, enhanced people's mobility, especially among CEE nationals. They now 'circulate' between places of origin and destination and may then go to yet another destination. But the movement is different from seasonal migration: it is longer term with more being 'there' (destination) than being 'here' (origin). This new form of circulation also diminishes rooting, and entails more flexibility in taking and changing jobs and places. It is, as discussed by Trevena, Pietka et al. and Moskal in this volume, also a matter of migration strategy, or rather in many cases lack of a strategy, which was described by British researchers as 'intentional unpredictability' (Eade, Drinkwater & Garapich 2006). All of these authors differentiate 'liquid migration' from seasonal migration, which is considered a predominating pre-accession pattern (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2009).

This may lead us to conclude that 'liquid migration' may involve unpredictability at every stage of a migration process: planning, organising, undertaking, and during migration both outwards and upon return (Anacka et al. in this volume). Bauman (2005) even speaks of 'new openings' and 'new beginnings', which can lead one to be constantly on the move. It may create global nomads, vagabonds.

The liquidity pattern of migration raises new methodological questions about the ways and approaches to measure post-accession forms of mobility. Grabowska-Lusinska (in this volume) considers validity and usability of various sources of data both in sending and in receiving countries, including (1) population censuses, public statistics and labour force surveys;

(2) administrative data such as various registers, work and other permit systems; and (3) dedicated innovative research approaches such as ethno-surveys, respondent-driven sampling and qualitative panels. The brief state-of-the-art of research on post-accession migration presented by Grabowska-Lusinska suggests that the variety of forms of post-accession mobility are still emerging and difficult to enumerate. Liquidity patterns make researchers unable to use data sources separately in methodological isolation or may leave them in methodological limbo as previously unidentified, unmeasured patterns emerge. There is a methodological postulate that while researching post-accession migration, it is necessary to use a 'methodological patchwork approach', which means careful combination of data sources in order to paint a more complete and in-depth picture of post-accession migration.

Identification of liquid patterns alongside other, older patterns of post-accession migration raises questions about operationalisation. Among variables suggested to be taken into account while detecting and researching 'liquid migration' are type of settlement, type of migration, migration status, destination, family and migration habitus (Engbersen in this volume). Other variables are proposed orientated to the labour market: destination, job position, job profile and job content and duration or continuity of stay (Grabowska-Lusinska in this volume).

There is no doubt that the 'liquidity pattern' of post-accession migration needs further testing, both theoretically and empirically. The volume presented here serves as a solid 'take off' for further research of the phenomenon.

15.4 Mobility in transition?

As the title of this book suggests, we are experiencing dynamically changing patterns of mobility, rather compressed in time and space, following EU enlargement and based on various transitions (political, economic, social, demographic) in both the sending and receiving contexts. All of these factors add complexity for understanding, in particular, the current period of post-accession migration. In the context of EU enlargement and the sudden increase in movements from CEE countries, including outward and return migration, another nexus of old-new forms of migration emerges, adding to the complexity. This context is aligned with Zelinky's (1971) hypothesis of mobility transition that was mentioned in the introduction to this book.

The political transition of the 1990s brought about rapid economic transformations, which can be mainly characterised by the shift from the industrial to the post-industrial age and from state-controlled, centralised and static employment relations to market-controlled, decentralised and flexible

employment relations. Segments of CEE-country populations which were already in their midlife at the onset of this change often lacked adequate skills to cope with the new situation. However, the following generation (starting from the 1980s cohorts) grew up within the new context and had enough time and opportunity to adapt their life projects to more flexible plans. New economic realities continue to emerge. The current global recession is likely forming a turning point into the next epoch, influencing the opportunity structure, migration and the economic opportunities afforded to nationals and foreigners alike at various destinations. Experience dictates that policies often take a 'tap on, tap off' approach, restricting streams of migration in times when labour market protection is deemed necessary due to weaker economies and less labour demand. Given the global recession, this temporality of demand will generally strongly influence migratory behaviour and migrants' chances in labour markets, leading to even more 'liquidity' and vagueness in terms of accessing patterns of labour mobility, as the situation continues to shift and policies and employment possibilities fluctuate.

Political and economic transition in CEE created new biographical options, especially for those individuals who grew up within the decades of transformation. For those generations, the well-experienced structural transitions fall together with societal changes in post-industrial societies – identified and depicted within the concept of the 'second demographic transition'. Increasingly freed from traditional expectations regarding family, lifestyle and career paths, the post-accession generation is creating new biographical models, which are easily observed in the mobile part of those generations. Thus, young post-accession migrants are experiencing and practising transitions in every aspect of their life. In the eyes of migration research, this is characterised in terms of 'unpredictability' or 'liquidity' of migration behaviour and offers numerous challenges for future research.

This volume explicates the phenomenon of post-accession migration through a prism of different structural dimensions, case studies and discussion of methodological approaches. It identifies a new pattern of mobility, attached to post-accession flows, 'liquid migration' as an outcome of the mobility transition, which is the leitmotif of this book. It may be hypothesised that with all of the transitions occurring in recent times, including political, economic, social and geographical aspects, the liquidity of mobility, in general, and especially among CEE societies, may be a result of recent changes. A *mobility transition*² becomes apparent, because of the emerging pattern of liquidity of living and working in general. We may not see major differences when comparing the migrating and non-migrating parts of each population. At the same time, *mobility opportunities* are also shifting within these CEE transition economies, catapulted by unique national economic changes affecting opportunity structures domestically, as well as the unfolding changes in greater labour market access and individual residence

choices, clearly within the EU, but also at the international level. The recent financial and state crisis in Greece may soon provide another example of a migratory reaction to structural changes within the context of the expanded EU.

Notes

- 1 Cassarino (2004) stresses the importance of the returnees' preparation and resource mobilisation to become actors of change and development at home. In his definition, the most successful remigrants demonstrated a high level of preparedness, meaning that they were able to plan their own return autonomously, having enough time to evaluate costs and benefits of return as well as considering institutional changes in the country of origin, whereas those remigrants with little preparation and resource mobilisation will rely on resources available at home in order to reintegrate.
- 2 As hypothesised by Zelinsky (1971).

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