


András Kovács  
Ruth Wodak (Eds.)

# NATO, Neutrality and National Identity:

the case of Austria  
and Hungary

böhlau



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András Kovács · Ruth Wodak (eds.)

NATO, NEUTRALITY AND  
NATIONAL IDENTITY:  
THE CASE OF AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY

BÖHLAU VERLAG WIEN · KÖLN · WEIMAR

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# CONTENTS

*András Kovács · Ruth Wodak*

Preface

7

Chapter 1

*Karin Liebhart*

Austrian Neutrality: Historical Development and Semantic Change

23

Chapter 2

*Borbála Juhász*

Neutrality in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution

51

Chapter 3

*Zsuzsanna Dákai*

Nato Membership and Hungarian Domestic Politics in the Nineties

75

Chapter 4

*Gertraud Benke*

“From Prices and Prizes to Outmoded Things”

Neutrality and Identity in the Speeches of Austrian Presidents on the  
National Holiday (26. 10.) in the Second Republic

103

Chapter 5

*Gertraud Benke*

“Austria Owes its Policy of Neutrality ...”

Neutrality in Austrian Newspapers in the Second Republic

147

## Chapter 6

*Dénes Némédi*

Nation, Europe, NATO

201

## Chapter 7

*Maria Heller · Agnes Rényi*

Public Debate in Hungary on the NATO Alliance

231

## Chapter 8

*Gertraud Benke · Ruth Wodak*

“We are Facing a New Order in Europe”

Neutrality versus NATO

281

## Chapter 9

*Maria Heller · Agnes Rényi*

Joining NATO: The Analysis of a TV-Debate on Hungary's Alliance with NATO

311

## Chapter 10

*Gertraud Benke*

“Somehow Emotionally – if we LOSE Neutrality that makes me afraid”

An Analysis of Focus Group Discussions on Neutrality (1997)

347

## Chapter 11

*Györgyi Bindorffer · István Siklaki*

Hungary and Euro-Atlantic Integration Focus Group Research

407

## Chapter 12

*Christoph Reinprecht · Rossalina Latcheva*

Neutrality and Austrian Identity:

Discourse on NATO and Neutrality as Reflected in Public Opinion

439

Chapter 13

*András Kovács*

NATO and Hungarian Public Opinion

461

Chapter 14

*Anton Pelinka*

Neutrality, NATO, and the World after the "Cold War"

485



## PREFACE

### End of the brief 20<sup>th</sup> Century<sup>1</sup>

1989—90 saw the collapse of a world political system that had largely determined the post-war order and had long seemed to be unshakeable. As a consequence of the disappearance of the Iron Curtain a number of states collapsed that had been founded after the two World Wars. New states appeared on the map that had long existed only in history books. “Eternal” borders vanished and huge populations began to look for new homes. The brief 20<sup>th</sup> Century (Hobsbawm 1994) drew to an end.

Initially these revolutionary changes were accompanied by general optimism. This was not by chance: dictatorships collapsed, there was an increase in the “extent of freedom” (Hannah Arendt 1963), the new players on the political stage invoked western democratic values, the world spoke of the ultimate victory of liberal democracy. After the first phase, however, the general mood changed. The old-new ethnic conflicts, new types of political extremism, and ultimately bloody wars in former Yugoslavia brought disquiet to all those who had earlier believed in the “end of history”. Suddenly we had to accept that the consequences of the collapse of the Cold War order cannot yet be predicted. This is bound up with the search for new values: old meanings, concepts, ideologies and narra-

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1 The collaboration between the Hungarian team under the leadership of András Kovács (ELTE University, Institute of Sociology, Budapest) and the Austrian team under the leadership of Ruth Wodak (Research Unit *Discourse, Politics, Identity*) was made possible by the award of the Wittgenstein prize to the latter. We wish to thank the FWF for this support. We also wish to express our thanks to the Hungarian National Fund for Scientific Research (OTKA Project no: TO25643), the Soros Foundation Research Scheme in Prague, and the Austrian-Hungarian Action Fund for financial assistance. This comparative study is based on two previous investigations: one was a project, supported by the IFK, on the discursive construction of national identity (cf. Wodak et al. 1998, 1999) and the other was a project in the context of the above-mentioned research area (“Discourses of Neutrality”; cf. Bischof, Pelinka & Wodak (eds.) 2002). The collaborators in this research are, in alphabetical order: Gertraud Benke, Györgyi Bindorffer, Zsuzsanna Dákay, Mária Heller, Borbála Juhász, András Kovács, Karin Liebhart, Rossalina Latcheva, Dénes Némedi, Anton Pelinka, Christoph Reinprecht, Ágnes Rényi, István Siklák, Ruth Wodak. We wish to thank the following colleagues for their help during some stages of our research: Fritz Hausjell, Maria Kargl, Klaus Sondermann. Comments from Richard Mitten and Theo van Leeuwen were very helpful. Lieselotte Martin edited parts of the manuscript. We are also grateful to our translators: Bryan Jenner and Nichols Jenkins. Michael Lyman reviewed the whole manuscript from the perspective of a native speaker. Specifically, we would like to thank Hans Goebl for his patience and support. Of course, the authors are responsible for the final product.

tives are no longer valid. The centre and the periphery, friend and foe, Europe and “Beyond-Europe”, national identity and European citizenship — all these concepts require new interpretations. What is clear is that national identities in the old sense no longer exist, and moreover we are confronted with contradictions, ideological dilemmas (Billig 1991) and fragmented identities (Wodak, DeCillia, Reisigl & Liebhart, 1999). How do the approaches to new identity-constructing narratives appear now? What new interpretations are available?

From the perspectives of these questions, this book would appear to be concerned with a very specific and special theme: namely, a comparison of the attitudes, opinions and discourse on NATO and neutrality in Austria and Hungary since 1945 or 1955. But these discourses, in our opinion, should be looked upon as symptomatic in a fundamentally broader context, since the debates on the possible entry of Hungary into NATO, which signifies for Hungary, for the first time, an institutional membership in the modern Western world, or on the abandonment of neutrality in Austria — one of the most important defining features of the Austrian identity — exist in larger contexts. These debates show their true meaning if we regard them as the expression of a search for new orientation at the end of an epoch. At the first level these discussions are concerned with new socio-political certainties and security systems, with peace and with defence mechanisms. But in them is manifest a search for new European values, for coming to terms with past “unpleasantness” and for new national and supra-national identities. As such they express considerations, judgments and prejudices, political concepts, ideologies and opinions about future European developments at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## Hungary and Austria at the End of an Epoch

Austria and Hungary have both been profoundly affected by all these new developments, albeit in different ways. All the dramatic changes since 1918, after the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, have shaken these two Central European nations. Initially both nations coped badly with the collapse of the empire, and during the inter-war years had authoritarian and fascist regimes. Both countries supported, in different ways, the Nazi regime. After 1945 Austria was occupied by the Allies, and Hungary by the Soviet Union. In 1955 Austria, with its state treaty and its decision for neutrality, was able to become a free democracy, but Hungary remained under communist rule until 1990. This year marked the beginning of a new era for Hungary: the possibility emerged of establishing a democratic political system and of joining the West. In 1998, Hungary became a member of NATO.

The fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War in 1989—1990 also brought about considerable changes in the role and function of Austria. Its function as a bridge

between East and West disappeared, together with its important role as a mediator during Bruno Kreisky's period of "active neutrality" (v. Pelinka & Wodak, 2002). In 1995, Austria joined the European Union and is still debating possible NATO membership. As a result of the dramatic changes of the last 10 years, therefore, Hungary has become a constituent of the Western world, and Austria has lost its special role as the last bastion of the West, and needs to redefine its status. The violence of the debates on EU eastern enlargement and on the EU "sanctions" are a clear indication of the emotionalization of this development. (Mitten 1999, 2000).

All of the significant changes briefly listed here have severely shaken the national identities of the two countries. For Austria, the abandonment of neutrality is not a matter of any calculation based in *realpolitik* but a decision that concerns the strongest pillar of Austrian post-war identity. In Hungary, the moves towards integration into the West set in motion furious debates about the status of the country within Europe and about national identity, in which historicizing arguments about identity regularly occurred. At the centre of the discussion was the question whether Hungary was historically an organic component of the Western world or whether it can only realise and preserve its identity by taking an "own way", a sort of "*Sonderweg*" between the two worlds and opting for neutrality. In the background of the debates on NATO and Europe there was a hidden but paramount question of Hungary's troubled national identity: the relation to the huge Hungarian minority in the neighbouring countries. How would Hungary's Western integration affect their fate? Would it help forward or encumber the preservation of their Hungarian national identity? Would the gap deepen between them and the Hungarian state? And the basic question for all main actors of the Hungarian political scene: how to legitimize any steps toward supranational structures from this perspective?

We therefore expected that the question concerning "neutrality or NATO" would prove to be a relevant indicator in both countries of the search for new political and cultural identities. The use of many historical and historicizing topoi and arguments in the discussions shows that histories occupy a central place and that all the political forces are striving to find new discursive legitimizations, justifications and narratives for the new decisions.

The present economic and political consequences of the changes had a stimulating effect on the origin of the new discourses. The change of direction has caused so many new hopes and fears, and it is no accident that populism has emerged in both countries: such figures as Jörg Haider or Csúrka should also be seen as symptomatic, (cf. Wodak & Pelinka eds. 2002, Wodak 2000a, Matouschek, Wodak & Janouschek 1995, Muntigl, Weiss & Wodak 2000, Weiss 2000, Kovács 2000).

In a more complex world many people require simple answers: new right-oriented populist parties seem to offer these. Globalization at many levels is handled in similar fashion. Numerous fears determine the thinking of the elites and of "ordinary citizens", and these are expressed in hostile forms in precisely that area which we investigated.

The debate on the eastern enlargement of the EU and the so-called EU “sanctions” on the Austrian FPÖ/ÖVP coalition since 4<sup>th</sup> February 2000 have had multiple effects on current political discourse in Austria (v. Report of the “3 Wise Men” and related debates in the mass media, Möhring ed. 2001). A new-old nationalism has appeared and the division between “us” and “the others” has been reinforced. Official Austria feels itself to be a “victim” of conspiracies, on this occasion by the 14 EU partner states, as in the past it was a victim of “other countries” during the Waldheim affair (Mitten 1992, Wodak et al 1990). In a related way, fears of unemployment and “foreigners” are heard, and old and new prejudices and racist arguments go on the attack. (Sedlak-Arduç 1999, ter Wal 2000, Wodak & Van Dijk 2000). This partly chauvinistic and xenophobic discourse comes up against new realities, since for a number of years it has no longer been possible for Austria to deny that it is both a country of immigration and that it is also multicultural (cf. Fassmann & Münz 1996, Reisigl & Wodak 2000). In Hungary similar noises are heard: after the disappointment that the political turn-around did not immediately deliver a Western standard of living, but that the transition to the market economy resulted in new difficulties for many people, there was an increase in the effect of anti-globalist, anti-western, anti-liberal and état-collectivist voices of the extreme right and left at certain levels of society.

In our case-studies we pursue all of these topoi, semantic concepts, discourses of justification and legitimization, and arguments, and seek to determine their functions in identity-politics.

### Theoretical framework of the research.

Without wishing or, indeed, being able to elaborate all our theoretical bases in detail (we refer the reader to Wodak et al. 1999, Billig 1995, Halbwachs 1985, Hall 1994, Kolakowski 1995, Bourdieu 1993, Martin 1995) we shall summarize the most important assumptions underlying our theoretical and empirical procedures.

We assume that nations are mental constructs, “imagined communities”, in the sense of Benedict Anderson (1988, 15ff), that are represented in the minds of nationalized political subjects as sovereign and enclosed political entities.

Consequently, we proceed on the basis that national identities — as special forms of social identities — are produced and reproduced, but also transformed and dismantled discursively. In this process a “national identity” is to be understood as a complex of shared and similar ideas or observational schemata, of shared and similar emotional attitudes and views, and of shared and similar behavioural dispositions that are internalized in the course of “national” socialization (from education, politics, the media, the world of sport or daily praxis). In this conception of national identity we proceed from the *habitus* concept of Pierre Bourdieu. The shared and similar ideas, in the case of the matter on

which we focus, concern the notion of an Austrian or Hungarian person, with a shared culture, history, present and future as well as their "national body" or national territory, but also alien national communities, with their culture, history and so on.

Our next assumption is that there is not *one* national identity in the essentialist sense, but rather that different identities are constructed linguistically according to audience, setting and topic. National identities are therefore understood as variable, dynamic, brittle and ambivalent. We believe that there is a process of reciprocal influence between the identity designs provided by the political elites or the media and those of everyday discourses. For this reason, the study investigated a total of five different corpora from the public, semi-public and quasi-private domains (opinion surveys, political speeches on national holidays, newspaper reports, television discussions and focus groups). The networking and interconnection of the different publics was of particular interest and can be captured by the concept of *recontextualization* (cf. Linell 1998, Wodak 2000b): topoi and arguments are transported, transformed and semantically altered, and take on a dynamic of their own in the respective different genres and publics. This "life of arguments" symbolizes the power struggles within politics: particular meanings become more important and suppress others within a new ideology or a new narrative. In analyzing the different discourses we wish to reconstruct this "life of arguments".

In terms of *content* discourses about national identities may be categorized into thematic blocks about a shared national history, present and future, about a shared culture, a shared territory and a *homo nationalis* (such as *homo austriacus* or *hungaricus*). In the texts which we dealt with, narratives about national history and tradition played a particularly important role. According to Halbwachs (1985, 85ff) the collective and historical memories of a nation differ in that the historical memory seeks to create a "single", unified and "valid" national history, whereas the collective memory, as part of the identity of a social group, is pluralistic, like society itself. In times of radical social changes the universalizing tendencies of the historical memory and the particularity of the group-specific collective memory come into conflict: the shattering of paradigms that were generally held to be valid increases the hunger and the need for new interpretations of events, and at the same time alternative interpretations compete for the position of "valid" history. Clifford Geertz (Geertz 1973, 218ff) gives an apposite explanation of the search for new narratives and ideologies as a consequence of general fears, uncertainties and changes of paradigm:

It is when neither a society's most general cultural orientations nor its most down-to-earth "pragmatic" ones suffice any longer to provide an adequate image of political process that ideologies begin to become crucial as sources of sociopolitical meanings and attitudes (Geertz 1973:219)

He continues:

... ideology is a response to strain. But now we are including cultural as well as social and psychological strain. It is a loss of orientation that most frequently gives rise to ideological activity, an inability, for lack of usable models, to comprehend the universe of civic rights and responsibilities in which one finds oneself located (*ibid.*).

The hunger for new interpretations and new ideologies has two sources: in the first place the need of the elites for legitimization in the new, fundamentally altered circumstances; and secondly, the need of different groups in society for orientation. Radical changes bring new elite groups into being — as in the case of Hungary after the change — or else they force the old elites to find new legitimization — as in the case of the debates on NATO membership and on the abandonment of neutrality in Austria.

On the other hand the increased needs for orientation in larger sectors of society mobilize the contents of collective and particularistic memory and thereby break down the former “unified” and “valid” national histories. But this moves legitimization-seeking old and new elites to construct such new universalising historical narratives as are compatible with the largest possible number of variations of the group-specific memory, or have the greatest possible legitimization and orientation potential. These new narratives have at least three functions: they must guarantee autonomous ego-continuities; they must satisfy group needs and permit a we-discourse; and at the social level they must have an integrative and solidarizing function.

Our most important goal in this book is therefore to reconstruct what types of narratives have arisen in the respective national elites, and to what extent these narratives have been able to satisfy the “demand” among other groups in the population.

## Methods

Our case studies proceed methodically at different levels. In general, we base ourselves in the discourse-historical approach which — in the sense of critical discourse analysis — favours a multiplicity of theories and methods, if this leads to a rational solution of problems (Reisigl & Wodak 2001, Benke 2000).

In an earlier study on the discursive construction of national identity we were able to distinguish four macro-strategies that characterized all discourses of difference and similarity:

In general in the study presented here “strategies” are understood as more or less automatized or else conscious action plans that are located at the various levels of mental organization and are more or less elaborated. In the five sets of material that we analyzed strategies were able to display different degrees of conscious intention and finality in view of the different conditions of origin and utterance.

Depending on the social macro-function we distinguish four mutually interconnected bundles of discursive macro-strategies: namely, constructive (a), destructive or dismantling (b), preserving or justifying (c), and transformational strategies (d).

*Constructive strategies* refer back to such discursive procedures as contribute to the development and establishment of a particular national identity. *Preservation strategies* seek to uphold a threatened national identity, to support and reproduce it. Examples of this are the talk of a threat to the "Austrian person" through immigration (keyword: repopulation "*Umrückung*") or of the danger of annihilation of traditional Hungary values by secular western culture (cf. Reisigl & Wodak 2000). As a special form of preservation strategies we find *Justification strategies*. These focus primarily on the defence and upholding of problematized narrative versions of "national history". Through applying these an attempt is made, for example, to justify Austria's way of handling the crimes of National Socialism, or to describe the adoption of anti-Semitic laws in Hungary in the 1930's as a compromise necessitated by *realpolitik* to avoid brutal persecution of Jews.

*Transformational strategies* again seek to move discursively from one relatively well-established national identity to another, for which the speaker already has approximate contours in mind. For instance, public political discourse in Austria is partly concerned with promoting a new definition of Austrian neutrality which incorporates the changed geopolitical circumstances, without abandoning neutrality; or the attempts of certain post-communist ideologists in Hungary who describe and legitimize the late Kadar era as a system having been no longer socialist but representative of, and in accordance with, national interests, and the last communist governments as the essential actors.

Admittedly the *perpetual Austrian neutrality* which, after it had been incorporated into the constitution on 26<sup>th</sup> October 1955, became an ever more distinctive feature of the Austrian identity, is treated today not only as an object of transformation but also as a preferred goal of *dismantling* or *destructive discourse strategies*. It is a general characteristic of these that they seek to dismantle or destroy parts of a pre-existing national identity construct. One consequence of the process of dismantling the myth of neutrality, which is their political target, is the use of the strategy of *heteronomizing*: this is used to point out that neutrality only came into existence at all through of the insistence of foreigners ("*diktat of the victors*"), and was really only the price that Austria had to pay to the USSR for its independence after the Second World War (v. Haider's keynote speech to the Freedom Party on "50 years of the Republic — retrospect and prospects" on 26<sup>th</sup> April 1995).

Our central hypothesis in the present investigation is that in the thematic areas which are relevant to us, the elites apply principally transformational strategies in order to construct new narratives by discursive means. In what follows we therefore focus on specific aspects of such transformational discourses.

Our investigations had three objectives: firstly the *deconstruction of elite discourse*; secondly *reconstruction of the reception of elite discourse* at semi-public and private levels of dis-

course; and thirdly *measuring the scope of different opinion blocks among the general public*. In the deconstruction of elite discourses, the relevant data are evaluated by a process of discourse analysis. To reconstruct the reception of elite discourse we organized focus discussion groups in both Hungary and Austria, and the discussion material was analyzed using qualitative methods. To measure opinion blocks we evaluated demoscopic data stemming from surveys on representative national samples. Public opinion surveys give a general overview of attitudes and opinions which permits a classification of qualitatively analyzed texts. Newspaper analyses, TV discussions and political speeches are in a state of dialectic interaction with politics and the media. Finally the focus groups give an impression of reception phenomena, and also of group-specific co-construction of concepts and opinions. The materials investigated, therefore, combine to give insight into the different public domains (media, ritualized, semi-public) and into different genres. Finally, through the analysis of *recontextualization* we discover the "life of particular set pieces of ideology, as well as of topoi and arguments". The comparison between Austria and Hungary takes place, on the one hand, within the same genre, and, on the other hand, over the whole range of results. *Interdisciplinarity* in our investigation is not to be understood as merely additive but as an attempt to apply different disciplines, theories and methods and to interpret these as a totality. The individual modes of procedure are presented in separate chapters.

## Summary of Results

### *Austria*

In our investigations we proceeded from the idea that in Austria neutrality is a factor that has been essential in the formation of identity. In this we were able to make use of the study on the *Discursive Construction of National Identity* (Wodak et al. 1998), where both in the media analysis, and in interviews and focus groups, emotional and affective use of a concept of neutrality was found: this frequently happened without any clear definition of the semantics of the concept. It was also evident at the beginning of the study that the debates were carried out in a strongly ideological fashion and that they had multiple political functions. The precise history and transformation of the ideological concept of "neutrality", the meaning shifts and redefinitions were therefore at the centre of our new investigations. From all the materials investigated, and by means of a detailed linguistic analysis of recontextualizations, the following were the most important results we obtained, and we consider these as indicative of a general tendency. The detailed analyses and interpretations may be found in the separate chapters of the book.

Austria is confronted with a decision for or against neutrality: in the course of electoral campaigns over recent years it is this decision that has become a major theme, and it

has been a decisive factor in voting either for the SPÖ or the Green Party (for neutrality) or for the ÖVP or FPÖ (for NATO).

Neutrality is one of the most important factors in the definition of identity, and during recent decades it has been redefined several times as an ideological concept: from being an imposition, neutrality has transformed itself into a popular characteristic of Austria. This was particularly evident in our analysis of the speeches on the national holiday, but Austrian foreign policy has also used varying definitions of neutrality. Ultimately this status has permitted a process of waiting, watching and withdrawal, but also one of supporting refugees from different countries and continents. Moreover, the role of Austria as mediator between East and West was of central importance, particular during Bruno Kreisky's period of "active neutrality".

It is not clear what will replace neutrality. In all the interviews, focus groups and media we found that people are afraid of a "vacuum": a range of concepts, such as "solidarity", are possible contenders.

The debate for and against neutrality is partly a party-political battle and therefore is massively symbolic from a political point of view. We saw this most clearly in the focus groups and in the TV talk-shows. The question remains, what is "behind" this debate: a side-show or real alternatives? The functions of neutrality have changed greatly in the last few decades, the new functions since 1989 and Austria's EU entry are no longer clearly defined, and old functions have become obsolete.

Neutrality has a strong affective dimension without being clearly defined semantically. This fuzziness shows up most markedly in focus groups and interviews: many of those questioned have very dogmatic views, but are unaware either of the legally defined functions of neutrality or of any alternatives.

All in all the discourses for and against neutrality and for and against NATO are representative of the important demarcation from Germany since 1945, and have thereby become part of Austria's "coming to terms with its past". This debate is therefore to be related to the attempt to create a new narrative for Austria during the Nazi period and since 1945.

### *Hungary*

At the start of our investigation we assumed that the change of direction in Europe in the 1990's would inspire many similar reactions in the neighbouring countries of Austria and Hungary which, in many respects, share a common history. At the conclusion of our analyses we have to state, however, that the differences are greater than the similarities. In Austria the debates about neutrality and NATO express profound identity problems and formulate varying identity strategies. In Hungary the situation is completely different.

Our analyses show unequivocally that the majority of people in Hungary support the country's membership of NATO. But this support is much less frequently justified by identity discourses than by discourses of interest. For the majority of Hungarians, NATO membership is a rational choice, corresponding to the security and foreign policy interests of the country, but which is strongly associated with ideological values and positive emotions only by particular groups in the population.

This picture of the "receivers' side" corresponds to the picture set up on the basis of the analysis of the discourse of the elite. In the mainstream elite the arguments in favour of NATO membership are principally pragmatic-political. Of course, different but clearly pro-NATO discourses of interest appear in both main camps in Hungarian politics: for the left-liberal, liberal and liberal-conservative blocks, all levels of integration imply further advantages for the modernization of the country, and further guarantees against the return of any type of authoritarian political system, whereas for those conservatives whose main concern is the loss of sovereignty and the fate of Hungarian minorities, dependency on the West secures at least Hungary's independence from the mighty Eastern superpower, Russia, and in case of any conflict on minority issues, the country would appear as a part of a powerful western alliance.

However, some of our results indicate that a certain part of public opinion was indeed responsive to the arguments that raised the issue of NATO membership from the level of everyday politics and rendered it part of the discourses on constructing national identities. Those for whom western integration also means entry or return to a community of values, are more determined in their support for NATO entry than those who attach no such value to NATO membership. Nevertheless, even in this latter group the rate of support is high.

A strong historicizing anti-NATO discourse appeared only at the margins of the political spectrum: the extreme right and the ideologues and adherents of the left-wing splinter party ("Workers' party", *Munkáspárt*). The extreme right-wing ideology concerning Hungarians as the "people of the East" who have always suffered under the yoke of Western Christian civilisation, who were always isolated and alien in the western world, and who were always betrayed by the West, did appear in both extreme and in more moderate form in the discourse. The moderate form, which has dispensed with the mythology of origin, stressed the danger of western colonization of the country, in full agreement with the anti-colonialist argumentation of the extreme left. Interestingly, the neutrality argument and the positive appeal to the 1956 tradition occupied a central position only in the discourse of this group, and although it is undoubtedly still present as an alternative in public and semi-public opinions, it is otherwise treated as unrealistic and counterproductive. These anti-NATO discourses — like the green-pacifist discourse of small groups of intellectuals — remained weak and peripheral.

The main reason for the absolute dominance of the pro-NATO discourse is the unity of the otherwise extremely divided political elite in this question and, consequently, the stable and massive support for the entry option in the media. The reason for this unity is that the diverging identity discourses of both large Hungarian political camps lead up to the same practical consequences: joining the Western military alliance is the condition, on one hand, for recursion to Christian Europe, for defense of national independence from threatening Eastern neighbours and for an effective support of Hungarian minorities, and, on the other hand, for becoming a part of the modern, liberal-democratic and affluent world.

Discourses on NATO, however, are often kept separate from discourses on Europe. As the analyses of the elite discourse have shown, historicizing arguments are much more frequent in the discussions on Europe. "Europe" in Hungarian historical discourses has a very high value in identity strategy. Both in liberal and left-oriented texts and in that of conservative voices, "Europe" represents positive values: the modern, liberal, democratic political or Christian community of values. In these discourses Hungary's "joining" or "return to" Europe is portrayed as the positive outcome of a long history of suffering — but in the discourses of the extreme right and left as the ultimate abandonment of a distinct national path or accepting a dependent and colonial status. Thus, those discursive strategies which have been observable in Austria concerning neutrality occur much more frequently in the context of Europe-discourses in Hungary.

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*Karin Liebhart*

## AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND SEMANTIC CHANGE

The accession of Austria into the European Union in January 1995 not only amounted to a much-acclaimed highlight in the success story of contemporary Austrian foreign policy, which was aimed at the inclusion of the country in the Western European process of integration, but also confronted the "perpetually neutral" Austrian state with several issues of integration and international law. Indeed these issues had already played an important role in the political discourse in the run-up to integration: In Austria "the prevailing interpretation of the international legal doctrine of neutrality has always determined attitudes towards integration, and has done so to a greater extent than in any other (neutral) state" wrote Hummer (1996, 12). The "'narrowness' or 'breadth' of meaning of the term neutrality" has always "determined [the country's] room for maneuver in the field of integration policy" (*ibid.*). Full Austrian membership of the European Union and the transformation of the Union into a military and defensive community meant, however, that these considerations received greater significance in the domestic and foreign policy debates. Thus, the expiry of the treaty on the Western European Union (WEU), which had functioned as the "operative arm of the EU in issues of defence policy" (*ibid.*, 15), confronted the neutral members of the Union (Ireland, Sweden, Finland and Austria) with several fundamental questions concerning their participation in any future European security system. The concrete structure of such a system is currently being debated as part of the discussion on NATO: "Although on its accession into the European Union Austria accepted the full 'content' of the 'second' pillar of the Maastricht Treaty on the EU (CFSP), it remains to be seen whether or not Austria's perpetual neutrality can be compatible with all possible forms of a future (pan-) European security system" (*ibid.*).

Austrian neutrality — its political functionality and its significance as a core element of Austrian (post-war) identity — has therefore become an issue of the public political debate. Moreover, given that ever since 1955 Austria has derived not only its foreign policy identity but also in large part its national identity from its neutral status (it is for this reason that the 26<sup>th</sup> of October is Austria's national holiday), the raising of this issue means that simultaneously, one of the elements providing the identity of the Second Republic has been called into question.

### 1955: The political connection between the State Treaty and neutrality

In the aftermath of the Second World War, there were just three neutral states in Europe: Switzerland, Sweden and Ireland (cf. Luif in Pelinka, Schaller & Luif 1994, 272). The Austrian declaration of perpetual neutrality of October 1955 was based on the Swiss model<sup>1</sup> and is closely connected to the signing of the Austrian State Treaty in May 1955. The relationship between the State Treaty and neutrality is political rather than legal: in order to ensure that the perpetual neutrality of the Austrian state could be interpreted by Austria alone, rather than by any other of the parties to the State Treaty, the unilateral undertaking of the Austrian National Assembly to uphold neutrality was deliberately excluded from the text of the State Treaty (cf. Nick & Pelinka 1993, 22 and Rotter 1995, 123). Nevertheless, one cannot deny that the neutrality pledge did form an important political basis for the State Treaty, which itself represented, in lieu of a peace treaty, the international legal foundation of a new and independent Austria.

In the course of negotiations (between 1947 and 1955) which were aimed at the securing of a state treaty, it soon became clear that a *conditio sine qua non* for the withdrawal of all allied troops was the avoidance of unbalanced relations with any one of the occupying powers. The demand that Austria should not be allowed in the future to join alliances dominated the negotiations. The worsening East-West conflict of the post-war years meant that Austrian politicians rapidly became less willing to support the establishment of a neutral Austria. Nevertheless, "a policy supportive of the West was greatly limited by the danger of Austria's partition" (Luif 1981, 60). The threat of a detachment of the Soviet-occupied areas of Burgenland, Lower Austria, the Mühlviertel, and parts of Vienna, leading to a partition of Austrian territory (cf. Hummer 1996, 15), as well as the desire for full state sovereignty, led politicians of the two largest parties (SPÖ and ÖVP) to conclude that they should show a willingness to behave in the desired neutral manner in disputes between East and West (Luif 1981, 60 and Lackner 1997, 25f.). According to Luif (1981, 61), however, it would be inaccurate to speak of an "intentional policy of neutrality on the part of Austria" in the period between 1945 and 1954. Luif points to the ambivalence and contradictory nature of official statements in post-war Austria on the issue of neutrality. Oliver Rathkolb (1993)<sup>2</sup> has demonstrated, on the basis of numerous records and a wide range of documentary evidence, the "dual" position of Austrian politicians in the post-war period. The neutrality of Austria should not, however, be viewed

1 Cf. Moscow Memorandum of April 15, 1955: Austrian declared its intention "to practice neutrality on a perpetual basis, as it is applied by Switzerland" (Koja 1986, 231).

2 Rathkolb, Oliver (1993): *Großmachtspolitik gegenüber Österreich 1952/53–1961/62 im U. S.-Entscheidungsprozeß*. Habilitation. Universität Wien.

solely from a foreign policy or international political perspective. Perhaps the most important political function of neutrality was domestic political integration: it became an element providing identity in the establishment of a national community.

For many Austrians, the year 1955 is connected to the "final rebirth" of Austria as an independent state and the regaining of a respected status within the European system of states. On the basis of two official agreements, wrote Gerald Stourzh (1990, 70), "the Second Republic of Austria was able to become a full member of the community of sovereign states". After the negative experiences of the First Republic, the Austro-Fascist corporative state, the civil war of 1934, and above all the National Socialist regime and the annulment of Austrian statehood following the annexation or "Anschluss" of 1938, Austria seemed to be rising like a phoenix from the ashes — at least this was one popular interpretation of modern Austrian history.<sup>3</sup>

The federal constitutional law of 26 October, 1955 (BGBl. 1955/211) was explicitly recognised by the states that were signatory to the State Treaty through identically-worded diplomatic notes issued on 6 December, 1955. On 14 November 1955, sixty-five states with which Austria maintained diplomatic relations were officially notified (cf. Hummer 1996, 17). No objections were lodged by any of these states (Neuhold 1986, 233).<sup>4</sup> Hummer (1996, 17) has argued that, owing to these acts of notification, Austria has been a state with "all the rights and obligations stemming from the legal status of perpetual neutrality" since December 1955.

### Perpetual or permanent neutrality as an institution of international law

International recognition of, and respect for, the neutral status of Austria is based on the international legal institution of perpetual or permanent neutrality, which is binding on

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3 Some authors, however, qualify this euphoric interpretation: "For the price of neutrality (and the resulting irresponsible neutralism and pacifism in the Austrian mentality) Austria regained its independence after seventeen years of occupation" (Bischof 1996, 148). The often derogatory term of "neutralism" arose in the Western European democracies in the context of the East-West confrontation and the Cold War; for example, in Germany as a model for the prevention of partition into two states. In political usage, "neutralism" is often associated with pacifist idealism, passivity, and a tendency to capitulate. (cf. Zemanek 1984, Luif 1981, Verdross 1977 and Ermacora 1975).

4 The constitutional law states the following: For the purpose of the permanent maintenance of its external independence and for the purpose of the inviolability of its territory, Austria, of its own free will, declares herewith its permanent neutrality which it is resolved to maintain and defend with all the means at its disposal. In order to secure these purposes, Austria will never in the future accede to any military alliances nor permit the establishment of military bases of foreign States on its territory.

both Austria and the international society of states (customary law). Whether or not Austria is able to free itself from this obligation through a unilateral act is a matter of political and legal dispute; the various view-points have changed over time.<sup>5</sup> Perpetual neutrality obliges Austria, inter alia, to remain neutral in any future military conflicts, to refrain from joining military alliances or from permitting the establishment of foreign military bases on its territory (Kramer 1997, 715). In addition, the perpetually neutral Austrian state must defend its own territory with all means (Luif 1981, 68). These obligations are derived — at least according to the conventional legal and political interpretations of the period until the mid-1980s — (cf. Zemanek 1984, Luif 1981, Verdross 1977 and Ermacora 1975) from the international legal status of “permanent neutrality”. Unlike “neutral behavior”, which refers exclusively to non-involvement in wars, “neutrality” is a more or less precisely regulated institution of international law. It regulates the rights and duties of states that are not involved in a particular war between other states or groups of states.<sup>6</sup> “Permanent neutrality” is also an institution of international law, albeit of a more specific type: The oldest “permanently neutral” state<sup>7</sup> is Switzerland, which undertook to refrain from participating in any future wars in 1815. According to the Swiss model, “permanently neutral” states are required to make efforts even during peace-time. They always have to conduct themselves in a way that ensures their ability to remain neutral in any future conflict. Links with other states or groups of states may be made only to the extent that they exclude the possibility of the neutral state being drawn into a military conflict. Thus, even in peace-time, there are customary rules based on international legal regulations and obligations.

### The Kreisky era: The policy of active neutrality

At least until the mid-1980s, if not until the end of that decade, Austria derived its foreign policy identity and its international political role from the international legal status of perpetual neutrality (cf. Neuhold 1986, 231). Neutrality was considered to be the guarantee for Austrian independence, “Austria’s way of life, and even its *raison d’être*” (Angerer 1996, 125)<sup>8</sup>. Nevertheless, as time passed, neutrality was interpreted in various different ways.

5 Luif denied this possibility in 1981 (cf. 67f.).

6 The obligation applies only to states and not to private contacts, e.g. private commerce — which is not covered by such a regulation.

7 Belgium and Luxembourg also assumed a neutral status for a period of time, but only Switzerland has remained “permanently neutral” until the present.

8 Cf. also Pelinka (1994, 173), who refers to neutrality as a political “*Leitmotiv*”.

Until the late 1960s, Austrian neutrality inclined towards the Swiss model. The ideology and practice of Austrian neutrality changed after 1970: "It was situated between the more passive understanding of the Swiss and the more active and flexible one of the Swedes, which was characterized as 'not-allied'. The Austrian understanding of neutrality and of neutral policy developed more towards the Swedish model" (Höll 1994, 37). The doctrine of "peaceful co-existence" became the new benchmark for an "active neutrality policy" (cf. Kramer 1997, 715) and the guiding principle of foreign policy practice (cf. Hummer 1996, 12). As an important element in Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky's "Austrian Way" of the 1970s (Reiterer 1988, 172 f.), "active neutrality policy" greatly contributed to the "success story" of the Second Republic and to the image of Austria as an "island of the blessed" (cf. Pelinka 1994, 172).<sup>9</sup> "The notion of a globally-oriented, active neutrality policy became the norm of the Kreisky era that had begun in 1970. In his second initial governmental speech on 5 November 1971, Kreisky explicitly stated that a successful foreign policy was 'the best guarantor of neutrality and security in times of peace'" (Höll 1994, 37f.).

"Active neutrality policy" became synonymous with Austrian foreign policy in general (Höll 1994, 38). In domestic politics, neutrality functioned as "part of the political campaign for an awareness of the responsibilities of statehood" (Prisching 1995, 72). For Austrian citizens, neutrality offered a clearly positive point of identification: "For the Austrians, neutrality was a recipe for success: After the Nazi occupation, the corporative state and civil war, after the state that nobody wanted, the economic crises and collapse, the country had (finally) become, under the aegis of Austrian neutrality, everything that the Austrians valued: a democracy, a wealthy country, a country with a just social order, with freedom, in accordance with European standards" (Khol 1990, 34).

The official national self-image saw the Austrian state in a balancing mediatory position, and especially as the diplomatic host for delicate international negotiations in both the East-West and North-South conflicts: "What it ['a small, neutral country'] could do was to establish channels of communications, arrange events where political talks on a high or summit level could take place or try to make proposals in the search for conflict resolutions" (Höll 1994, 36). It is in light of this, that the status of Vienna as an important conference center and as the third UN city should be interpreted, as well as the general active role taken by Austria in the United Nations and its participation in "peace-keeping operations" (cf. Schmidl 1996, 138ff.). All this gave Austrian citizens a feeling of security, stability and peaceful continuity. In this way, neutrality gained a high symbolic value, one that is expressed in the following quotation: "In a crisis-ridden world, Austria does indeed play the role of an imaginary political first-aid man (...) which contributes

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9 For a critical appraisal, see Unterberger, Khol and Steiner (quoted after Höll 1994, 50).

in a measurable way to the security of Austria. The active foreign policy of a small neutral country, (...) makes Vienna to an important meeting-place for political personalities and power-groups, to an East-West hub of constructive political ideas, cultural flows and economic contacts" (Vajda 1980, 600).

For a long period, Austria's foreign policy was considered synonymous with an active neutrality policy. Nevertheless — and this is indicative of the ambivalence of Austrian neutrality — permanent neutrality was understood by many Austrians (primarily) as permanent impartiality, or as a "happy abdication from international involvement in general" (Pelinka 1994, 172). Rotter (1990, 10) described this "non-involvement" in the following way: "The real purpose of permanent Austrian neutrality is to stop us from getting involved in conflicts or even wars that have nothing to do with us" (1990, 10).

Towards the end of the Kreisky era, the demand for "equidistance" was criticized by some politicians of the ÖVP, f. i. Andreas Khol. Among other things, they were particularly critical of Austria's close co-operation with the Non-Aligned Movement (cf. Höll 1994, 50).<sup>10</sup> Luif (1981, 65) points to the tendency of both larger political parties to equate "neutralism" with "a lack of principles" or even "ideological neutrality", a term connoting disapproval. In an ideological sense, Austria had been firmly anchored to the West from the very start and was clearly committed to 'the values' of the West" (Steininger 1996, 123). This was expressed in its membership of the Council of Europe: Austria joined in 1956 (Neuhold 1986, 245, cf. also Höll 1994, 37 and Gehler 1995, 65f.). After 1955, the West could rely upon Austria despite its neutrality. The period of occupation had already seen attempts to gain acceptance for the country's western ideological and economic orientation. Also, Austria's Western political and strategic orientation was also continued after 1955, as long as the Soviet Union raised no major objections. The country's pro-western neutrality policy and the continuation of Austria's policy of secret alliances after 1955 are best expressed in a United States' National Security Council analysis of October 1958, in which Austria's voting behavior in the United Nations is

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10 "Non-alignment" arose out of the process of decolonization and against the background of the Cold War in the 1950s. As a foreign policy movement, it was supported by states that wished to avoid being drawn into the rivalries of the two super-powers. At first, non-alignment was also described as "dynamic" or "positive" neutrality and was considered to be different from traditional neutrality and the passivity and isolationism that was associated with neutrality. A variety of terms such as "neutralism", "non-engagement", "the uncommitted", "the non-allied" and "non-involvement" were replaced in the mid-1950s by the term "non-alignment", which became the official term at the Belgrade Conference of 1961. The literal German translation of "non-alignment" is "*Nichtpaktgebundenheit*", which is a rather awkward word and therefore the term "*Blockfreiheit*" tends to be used. In the European context, reference was still made to "neutralism" even where a non-aligned policy was meant. In principle, "non-alignment" allows one to take up a political position, and even take sides, on the basis of each individual case. Unlike "neutrality", "non-alignment" is not an institution of international law. Its principles are not legally binding upon states (cf. Zemanek 1984, Luif 1981, Verdross 1977 and Ermacora 1975).

praised for being just as consistently pro-American as that of the NATO partners and "the banana republics of Central America" (Bischof 1996, 149, cf. also Höll 1994, 36).

### The late 1980s: "Austria's home is Europe"<sup>11</sup>

For a long period, there was a consensus among representatives of the two larger political parties in Austria that membership of a supranational organization was incompatible with perpetual neutrality (of the Swiss model) and the foreign policy role defined by such neutrality (cf. Falkner 1995, 331ff; Nick, Pelinka 1994, 24; Luif 1982; Rotter 1990). Nevertheless, unlike Switzerland, which has not joined the United Nations, Austria integrated into that organization as early as in 1955 (Neuhold 1986, 236).

Austrian membership — from 1960 — of EFTA, an exclusively economic-oriented supranational association, was decided upon in parliament with reference to the exclusively military character of Austrian neutrality, which did not impinge upon economic associations (cf. Hummer 1996, 18).<sup>12</sup> The position was different in the 1960s and 1970s with regard to possible Austrian membership of the European Economic Community (EEC). With the exception of the FPÖ, which considered accession to the EEC as compatible with a policy of neutrality, all other political parties agreed that Austria should not strive for full membership of the EEC, since the EEC had always seen itself as a political community as well as an economic community. As a political community, it could also be identified with NATO (Nick & Pelinka 1994, 24).

In the late 1980s, however, the positions of many politicians changed. One reason for this was the changed political environment: as result of "1989" and the collapse of the "Iron Curtain", Austria's "special intermediate position" between the two opposing ideological blocs, lost its defining character for their national self-image. An additional reason was the threat of deterioration in conditions for the Austrian economy after the introduction of the single European market (Falkner 1995, 333, Nick & Pelinka 1994, 24, Kramer 1997, 728—732). In 1987, an expert legal opinion commissioned by the Federal Chamber of Commerce broke through the political consensus concerning the incompatibility of Austrian membership of the European Community (EC) and perpetual neutrality (cf. Pelinka, Schaller & Luif 1994, 152, Wodak et al. 1996). Efforts to integrate in both a political and economic sense into the Western European community, led finally to a rupture in the fundamental continuity of the political interpretation of neutrality. In fact, the perpetual neutral status of Austria had already been breached on several occasions in the preceding years.

<sup>11</sup> For Austrian integration policy, see also Luif (1997, 759—771).

<sup>12</sup> The bilateral trade agreements drawn up as part of co-operation between the EC and EFTA also contained neutrality and termination provisos (cf. Hummer 1996, 21).

For example, the Austrian federal government had permitted state-owned industries to export armaments to belligerent countries and had also permitted foreign military aircraft to fly into Austria's airspace in the course of the Gulf War. Furthermore, Austria did not behave in a neutral manner in 1991 when war broke out in the former Yugoslavia (cf. Pelinka 1994, 173). The events of 1989 and the falling away of the "iron curtain" between the two former blocs, established a completely new framework for Austrian foreign policy and its positioning as a small (European) state. After the loss of the "special intermediary position", the customary points of reference were no longer present (Reinprecht 1995, 341), which led some commentators to speak of a "crisis of orientation" in foreign policy (*ibid.*).

The discussion of possible EC membership arose not just for foreign policy reasons, but concerning above all, issues concerning domestic politics. From 1987, EC membership was supported primarily by the FPÖ, ÖVP, and Association of Industrialists. The SPÖ was quick to follow. The Office of International Law of the Foreign Ministry supported membership of the EC with a neutrality proviso. This was also the position of the leading representatives of the social partnership, who demanded the full retention of Austria's neutral status. On June 19, 1989, the Austrian parliament commissioned the government to begin negotiations in this matter. On July 17, 1989 a "letter to Brussels" was dispatched, and negotiations began on February 1, 1993 (cf. Falkner 1995, 334ff.). The two governing parties (ÖVP and SPÖ) attempted to portray themselves as the "European parties" (Falkner 1995, 334). In addition, there was an expectation from the government side, of receiving a tool that could be used in domestic politics for the purposes of modernization and liberalization (Schaller 1991, 500). Accession to the EC was to serve as a "rod in the window" with which to begin implementing unpopular political decisions in the economic and social fields (Schneider 1994, 8f; Kaiser et al. 1994). At the same time, owing to a number of scandals (Wine scandal, trade in armaments, the Waldheim affair), the Austrian state found itself in a crisis of image (Gehler, Sickinger 1995, 671–683). Austria sought an internationally acceptable (West European) identity (Kramer 1991, 192).

### 1989–1995: Austria's efforts to integrate into "Western Europe"

The idea of the European single market launched in 1985, led to increased efforts on the part of Austria to obtain EC membership. The European Economic Area (EEA), which had been established on the basis of the Luxembourg Declaration of 1984 (Hummer 1996, 22), was considered by most Austrian politicians to be merely a temporary solution, because of the lack of powers of decision. Austria "still retains the option of joining the EC" (*ibid.*, 24). The EEA agreement, which posed no problems for Austrian neutrality because it intentionally avoided closer co-operation between signatory states in the field of foreign policy, was signed in Porto in May 1992 (cf. *ibid.*, 25). Unlike the other neutral countries

who were membership candidates, Austria's membership application of July 1989 contained a formal neutrality proviso. The aim of which was to ensure the ability of the Austrian state to fulfill "its legal obligations flowing from its status as a perpetually neutral state" even as a member of the European Communities "on account of the treaty of accession" and "to continue its [policy of] neutrality as a specific contribution to the maintenance of peace and security in Europe" (*Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989*, quoted after Hummer 1996, 25). In the negotiations leading up to membership, Austria pragmatically assumed that perpetual neutrality was compatible with the Treaty of Maastricht and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the "second pillar" of the European Union (EU). The treaty of accession of June 1994 no longer contained a formal neutrality proviso. According to the then foreign minister, Alois Mock, the Austrian government was of the view "that there was no contradiction between the obligations of a EU member-state and the core elements of neutrality, and thus Austria will join the EU as a neutral state" (*Außenpolitische Dokumentation 1995*, quoted after Hummer 1996, 26). Nevertheless, in agreement with the other candidate member-states (Norway, Finland and Sweden), Austria declared a willingness to take a "full and active part" in the common foreign and security policy (Falkner 1995, 337). In 1994, the Austrian parliament enacted an amendment to the constitution permitting Austria to participate in the implementation of economic sanctions within the framework of CFSP (cf. Hummer 1996, 27).

In June 1994, the compulsory referendum on EU membership resulted in a large percentage in favor of membership (66,6 %). Accession into the European Union, which served to restrict several of the constitutional principles of Austria, may be seen as a break with previous interpretations of the responsibilities and obligations arising out of perpetual neutrality: "The rupture lay in the progression from integration in its wider sense (institutionalized European and international co-operation e. g., within the framework of EFTA or international agreements) to integration in its narrower sense (participation in the supranational exertion of what had been national sovereignty). This change deeply contradicted, and continues to contradict, ideas about sovereignty that hold sway even today in the Second Republic" (Angerer 1996, 124). Meanwhile, Helmuth Kramer has interpreted the political decision to join the EU in the following terms: "[w]ith entry into the European Union [...] the real post-war period [has] finally been closed for Austrian foreign policy" (1997, 737).

### The mythical components of Austrian neutrality

After 1945, perpetual neutrality slowly became a core element of Austrian post-war identity in the discourse of the elites. Nevertheless, acceptance of neutrality, which had been imposed by the allies, was initially quite limited among the party elites, particularly that of

the SPÖ: "in 1955 perpetual neutrality was in no sense an uncontrollable need of the Austrian population. Instead it sprang from the surprisingly advantageous results of negotiations held in Moscow by the Austrian delegation. Since then, it has become the favourite child of the Austrian people. The success of an active neutrality policy in the period of the Cold War led to the assumption that neutrality might provide security against external rigors for all time" (Klenner 1992, 13).

Since 1955, as a result of the public, political, media and academic discourse, neutrality has become embodied in the collective consciousness as a central myth of Austrian identity. Neutrality steadily grew in importance in line with an acceptance of the Austrian nation and an increase of "national pride". In the early 1990s, neutrality still counted as one of the most favored elements (87%) of Austrian national pride (cf. Bruckmüller 1994, 27f.).<sup>13</sup> As one of the symbols of national identity, it continued to receive a high rating at least until the first half of the 1990s: Although the number of people in favor of neutrality declined in the course of the war in the former Yugoslavia, the majority of Austrians nevertheless continued to support the idea of neutrality (cf. surveys in SWS-Rundschau 2/1991, 231—238 and 4/1991, 535—542, as well as the profile survey of 13 January 1992). For example, in May 1993 the *Linzer market-Institut* (Dokumentation market-Archiv M25) recorded 51% agreement with the following statement: "A goal of negotiations must be to prevent neutrality from being endangered by EC membership".<sup>14</sup>

13 Surveys demonstrate, however, substantial differences between age-groups: Thus, at the time of the survey, according to Bruckmüller (1994, 44) and Haller/Gruber (1996a, 89 and 115), 38% of people under 30, versus 62% of those over fifty, considered neutrality to be very important.

14 According to opinion polls, in 1988 74% of the people would have opted for neutrality, rather than Austrian membership of the EU. The corresponding figures were 64% in 1991 and 68% in 1993 (cf. Weninger 1991, 494, and Pelinka 1994, 149).

The following are the results of a survey of 1000 people undertaken in 1994 (Fessel+GfK-Umfrage) on "Identity and membership of the EU":

- *Austria must co-ordinate its foreign and security policy with other EU member-states*

probably: 85%

probably not: 11%

no response: 4%

- *Will this endanger Austrian identity?*

endanger: 39%

not endanger: 51%

no response: 10%

- *Austria must give up its neutrality for the benefit of a European security system*

probably: 49%

probably not: 46%

no response: 5%

- *Will this endanger Austrian identity?*

endanger: 53%

The State Treaty and neutrality have become, in the course of the Second Republic, codes for Austrian nationality and synonymous with Austrian sovereignty (Brünner 1993, 20 and Wodak et al 1998). Neutrality as a political prerequisite for the State Treaty is still, in part, an important element of Austrian national identity, an element that is linked to the image of stability, peace and political continuity of the Second Republic. In a certain way, neutrality is a symbol for everything that is connected with the successful foundation and history of the Second Republic. Neutrality as a core Austrian symbol and the raising of the political field that surrounds neutrality to the level of a myth are very much embodied in the "collective memory" of Austrians. The link that is made between Austria's neutral status and the origins of Austria's statehood and independence, limits opportunities for an objective political discussion of the purpose and political content of neutrality. According to Markus Katzenschläger, the provision of useful information to the Austrian people about the current practicality of the concept of neutrality is made more difficult by the fact that "neutrality was highly stylized as a panacea promoting peace; as such, it seems to be more of a psychological phenomenon — one that (has been) meaningless at least since the end of the Cold War (...)" (1996, 17).

Owing to its high level of acceptance among the population and its identity-providing function, Austrian neutrality has become a taboo — at least in the eyes of many politicians: "Neutrality seems to have lost its Leitmotiv function internationally. Has it lost its respective domestic and symbolic function, too?" (Pelinka 1994, 173). There is a second reason for the placing of neutrality under a taboo: The Austrian State Treaty includes an obligation upon Austria to remove all traces of National Socialism, as well as a ban upon any union with Germany (*Anschlussverbot*): "Neutrality had from its inception both an open agenda — international law and international politics — and a more overt agenda. This less outspoken part consisted of domestic elements as well as of symbolic aspects: neutrality as part of an Austrian identity, which no longer should be seen as a German one" (Pelinka 1994, 173). By declaring itself neutral in 1955, Austria had also "voluntarily" endorsed Article 4 of the State Treaty, which ruled out any form of union with Germany; in doing so, it had sent a clear signal of its distinction from Germany.<sup>15</sup> The Soviet Union had not been convinced that the provisions of the State Treaty represented a sufficient guarantee of Austrian independence; a similar provision in the Treaty of St. Germain had not been adhered to. Thus, neutrality was understood by the Soviet side as an additional constitutional — and, after notification, international law — guarantee of the independence of Austria (Kirchschläger)" (Koja 1991, 62).

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not endanger: 38%

no response: 9%

<sup>15</sup> In the run-up to the referendum on EU membership, this aspect of Austrian neutrality served as a political argument for the opponents of membership.

### 1995 — 1997: From “active neutrality policy” to “common security policy” in an integrated (Western) Europe

Despite accession into the EU and the closer attachment of Austria to the Western world (cf. Kramer 1997, 732—736), for a long period Austrian neutrality was not really up for debate at the official level. For reasons that have already been mentioned, most Austrian politicians rejected any statements that were made against neutrality. Thus, it was frequently stressed that the issue was not the abandonment of neutrality, but its redefinition (cf. Unterberger 1992, 11f., Thalberg 1993, 31, Brünner 1993, 20ff.). However, in terms of content, the definition was very much whatever people wanted it to be: the ideas ranged from the role of mediator in the North-South conflict and in South Eastern Europe, to the special responsibility of Austria as counselor and conflict-resolver within the context of European integration and the eastward enlargement of the EU. With reference to political continuity, which was symbolized by the durability of Austria's neutral status, the “traditional” neutral position of Austria was underlined: This status could be retained, wrote Binter (1992, 14) for instance. This could be done under the motto “Solidarity in neutrality and neutral in Europe”. In 1993, Ernst Sucharipa argued in a commentary that an interpretation of the legal obligations arising out of neutrality that was limited to the original meaning of Austrian neutrality, i. e., the absence of any foreign bases, was quite compatible with membership of the EU. Participation in the EU's common foreign policy would pose no real problems for Austria, especially since “we already hold the same positions in practically all issues; and do so as the natural consequence of a foreign policy that is oriented towards common values”.<sup>16</sup> Sucharipa continued, however, “in the longer term, Austria (...) will (...) also have to examine whether and to what extent the retention of the status of perpetual neutrality is possible and useful against the background of membership of such a system (security, political, ed.)”. Christian Brünner emphasized the important role of Austria as a mediator: “An understanding of neutrality that rules out involvement in armed conflicts can also have a function in a system of collective security. For instance, where parties to a conflict in their dismay are unable to think of imaginative solutions, neutral authorities can help them to find a way out. There are judges to whom conflicting parties may turn, and counselors in whom families may confide, in order to find solutions to crises; and there are good friends whose detachment means that they are able to offer advice which can open doors and windows” (1993, 21).<sup>17</sup> The speeches of several ÖVP politicians, as well as Jörg Haider (FPÖ) and Friedhelm Frischenschlager (FPÖ), which have been analyzed in Wodak et al. (1998), already

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Neisser (1993, 19).

<sup>17</sup> Hans Thalberg meant something similar when he said: “The EC could make good use of a country whose central task is the prevention of conflicts and the promotion of the peace process in Eastern Europe” (1993, 31).

pointed to the future obsolescence of Austrian neutrality.<sup>18</sup> This frequently happened without neutrality being explicitly mentioned. For example, the security policy arguments put forward in the speeches of Busek and Fasslabend both cited changed external circumstances, thereby preparing the Austrian people for a possible abandonment of neutrality at some point in the future. Usually the problems associated with neutrality are implicitly discussed under the issue of EU membership. SPÖ politicians mostly avoided dealing with this awkward issue. At the time of the above mentioned project (i.e. 1994—1996), a questioning of neutrality was still a relative taboo in parts of the politicians' discourse. The exceptions were the FPÖ and the Liberales Forum. Several ÖVP politicians and Federal President Thomas Klestil, chose the safer strategy of historicisation.

In its party program of 1995, the ÖVP gave unequivocal support to the inclusion of Austria in a European security system and dismissed neutrality as a model that was no longer satisfactory within the framework of current political problems. It was within this context that the idea of a so-called solidarity law arose, the aim of which was to permit the participation of Austria in a collective European security system in arrangement with the central committee of the National Assembly. Meanwhile, neutrality should continue to be effective where conflicts arose outside of the European system. As time passed, the position of the SPÖ also began to falter. In this regard, Thomas Nowotny (1996, 20) concluded the following: "Overall, it is unnatural for a left-wing party to support the status quo and a conservative party to hold a more creative position".<sup>19</sup> The two parties of the coalition drew ever closer to each other in terms of their positions.<sup>20</sup> The government program of 1996 already had left all of the possibilities open.

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18 Distinguishing between the role of neutrality in the past and its role in the present, Frischenschlager expresses himself more explicitly than does any other politician: "As a security strategy of an individual state embedded in the security structure of the post—1945 era, neutrality did serve a purpose (fortunately it was never really challenged). But it cannot be considered a suitable security policy recipe for the future. The best protection for Austria is offered by a revamped WEU: a comprehensive collective security system of all the democratic states of Europe (rather than simply collective defense) based on the United Nations' charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."

19 According to Nowotny, the foreign policy (of the SPÖ) was governed by the following principles — at least until 1989:

- a broad interpretation of neutrality policy;
- detachment from the military aspects of security policy;
- a willingness to mediate in international conflicts;
- a critical stance as regards to the US-dominated "global order";
- economic and cultural orientation towards the West, coupled with simultaneous efforts to establish a dialog with the countries of the "Communist East";
- empathy for the "third world" (e.g. support for the sometimes precarious demands for national self-determination);

20 See also Noll (1996, 87ff.).

The current domestic political debate focuses on the (supposed) necessity of a collective European security policy in a situation of supranational threats arising out of the altered geopolitical constellation.<sup>21</sup> The "new" security needs of Europe (and in particular of Austria as the external frontier of the EU) form the most important argument in the present political discourse on neutrality.<sup>22</sup> On 27 April 1995, when Austria was celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Second Republic, Federal Chancellor Vranitzky said: "Austria finds itself in the middle of a world which, without the balance of the great blocs, is less secure than it used to be. Migrations, fundamentalism, nationalism, and international conflict concerning the distribution of resources, are contributing to this insecurity. As a neutral and new member-state of the European Union, Austria must make its contribution to stabilizing transnational security structures" (quoted after Wodak et al 1998). These problems would require a new and intensive solidarity within the framework of a functioning European security system, which even neutral states could not evade in the long term (Hagen 1994).<sup>23</sup> According to one of the main arguments, neutrality offered only relative protection from the new threats, just as at the time of the Cold War it had only been efficient in combination with the NATO deterrent. If NATO was a product of the Cold War, argued Manfred Katzenschläger (1996), then so was neutrality. Geopolitical changes required a rethinking of Austrian security policy, and Austrian Social Democrats should play an active role in the construction of a European security system. A "common foreign and security policy" was one of the main aspects of European integration: "Austria must decide whether it should simply acknowledge the result of this process or play an active role in its design. The latter was in line with the ideas of the EU commission: A common foreign and security policy cannot be established where there is a lack of a determined political will on the part of member-states and there are no clear objectives (Position of the Commission at the intergovernmental Conference of 1996, EUR-OP Office for Publications, page 16, Luxembourg 1996)" (ibid., 16f.). In any future European security structure, NATO would play an important role, and the WEU would be the European arm of NATO, "for this reason Austria should not close its mind to a frank discussion of NATO membership" (ibid., 17). According to the coalition agreement, by the Spring of 1998 at the latest (i.e. before the start of its EU presidency), Austria should have decided whether it wished to join the WEU, an alliance with a compulsory obligation to provide assistance and thus incompatible with

21 Cf. Gärtner (1996), Schmidt (1996), Kux (1996) and Skuhra (1996). Incidentally, in 1994 13% of those who voted in favor of EU membership claimed that domestic and foreign policy security had been a motive for doing so (cf. Plasser & Ulram 1994, 110).

22 See the discussion between Caspar Einem and Heinrich Neisser in *Der Standard*, May 28/29 1997, the pamphlet *EUROPAPerspektiven 1/97* issued by the Dr. Karl Renner Institut, and Gärtner (1996).

23 For the impact of developments in Austrian security policy on the Austrian State Treaty and Austrian neutrality, see Skuhra (1997, 754–757).

neutrality (cf. Nowotny 1996): "In a military-operative sense, the WEU is simply a shell behind which NATO is hiding. The WEU is the organizational framework through which the military arm of NATO can be employed by the EU alone, with the support of the United States" (*ibid.*, 23f.).

In the second half of the 1990's the media discourse reduced the function of neutrality primarily to the security policy aspect: In its traditional form, neutrality was thus considered outdated and obsolete; after the end of the East-West confrontation a redefinition was most urgent. Instability in South Eastern Europe and particularly in the former Yugoslavia was a threat to Austria's security. Thomas Nowotny argued that neutrality had never been a complete security policy, but simply an element of security policy or a means to an end, and thus it could be interpreted only within a certain temporal context: "Even as an element of this security policy, neutrality was still bound to time and external circumstances: and these happened to have changed" (1996, 22). There was no possibility of retaining neutrality and simultaneously receiving security guarantees from third parties. A retention of neutrality would also mean increased military expenditure: "If Austria insists upon a retention of neutrality, then it must pay the price of military rearmament, and join those European states — like Sweden and Finland — that wish to remain neutral and very well-armed even under the new circumstances" (*ibid.*, 21). Opposing views were given little coverage by the media: "I find it paradoxical that the end of the Cold War and the dramatic threats that were associated with it are used as an argument for joining an anti-threat federation. The sneering question 'against whom should Austria be neutral?' seems to me to be less plausible than the question 'against whom should Austria or Sweden now join a military alliance?'" (Fischer 1996, 31).

For Katzenschlager (1996) just two strategies of Austrian foreign policy were up for discussion: Either a retention of observer status in the WEU and continued co-operation with NATO within the framework of the "Partnership for Peace" (under this option, neutrality could be retained, but would have to be redefined) or full membership, which would allow Austria to have its say and take an active role. Katzenschlager argued for the latter option. His argument ran as follows: "Our country would then have the opportunity to make its mark as an active partner on the unploughed field of European security policy after the end of the Cold War. A new image as a social state in Europe would considerably strengthen Austria's position when it came to European integration. We would then no longer have the image of an EU member-state that applies pressure and demands common solutions in areas such as the struggle against unemployment, but which dismissively falls back on neutrality as soon as mention is made of solidarity in connection with security policy. Thus, if we really want to achieve our goal of having a strong voice in Europe, then we cannot remain silent on one particular issue. Otherwise Austria's great efforts in European politics will turn out one day to have been a complete waste of time" (18). In Albrecht K. Konecny's view (1996), however, involvement in a

common security system did not necessarily mean an abandonment of neutrality and the country's joining NATO: "For the alternative cannot be getting involved in 'lashing out' versus bandwagon neutrality" (ibid., 6). The idea of the European Union as a military alliance stands in contrast to the concept of developing new forms of security policy for which "our form of neutrality" (ibid.) could serve as a model. As an example of how Austria could participate in European security policy in a manner that was compatible with its neutrality, Konecny cited the deployment of Austrian military volunteers on OSCE missions (cf. ibid., 6). Even after the end of the bloc frontiers, intervention still primarily meant political intervention that was "unbiased, but not blind to the varying degrees of worthiness of support of the conflicting parties (ibid.)", as well as the provision of assistance for the (re)construction of state and economic structures. With reference to the circumstances that gave rise to the Dayton Peace Accord, Katzenschläger saw NATO as a "Peacekeeper". For this reason, "the deployment of multinational troops under UN or NATO command" (Katzenschläger 1996, 18) could be a reasonable option even for Austria. An opposing opinion was offered by Heinz Fischer: "Today (...) there is no longer any binding necessity to bring the project of European integration into line with NATO. Although we are all following the new developments in NATO with interest, to interpret the differences between the NATO of 1990 and the NATO of 1996 in terms of the North Atlantic defence alliance changing into a pan-European peace movement over a six-year period, is to indulge in an illusion of wishful thinking. There is an enormous difference between a Pax NATO and a Pax Europea, and it is the Pax Europea that we should be striving for. Unfortunately, one faces in this area some very simple-minded thought patterns. 'Neutrality or NATO' is one of the most frequently voiced" (1996, 30). Although he argues that Austria should make a contribution to a pan-European security policy "in many different areas" (196, 31), Fischer does not elaborate on what exactly is to be understood by this.

Even the role of Austria in the process of European Union and NATO eastward expansion was discussed in connection with the debate on Austrian neutrality and the possibility of Austrian membership of NATO. Austria's room for maneuvering in its relations with its Eastern neighbors was now defined in terms of its ability to influence EU policy rather than as the outcome of autonomous Austrian action: "The option of an Austrian 'Ostpolitik' no longer serves as a counterbalance to intensive 'ties with the West'. Instead a strengthening of Western ties is a precondition of such a policy" (Nowotny 1996, 18). Czech and Hungarian membership of NATO changed the general set-up once again: "Austria would become a silent member of NATO just as Switzerland (surrounded by NATO countries) was. Is not open membership of NATO better, given that membership allows one to take part in the process of policy-making, the consequences of which one is affected by anyway?" (ibid., 24).

Franz Vranitzky also saw diminishing opportunities for an independent national policy

and, simultaneously, a removal of barriers between domestic and foreign policy. The goal should be "to develop a democratic, legitimate executive" (1996, 10) that would guarantee the necessary political framework for a European market. In attempting to achieve this goal, the concentration on military guarantees of security should not divert our attention from the "manifold possibilities of co-operation in the field of security, especially in the area of prevention" (ibid.). National defense would become less significant in relation to "complex, multifunctional peace initiatives" in conflicts motivated by ethnic or religious differences (ibid., 12). In this context, Austrian neutrality could also be understood as "a directive addressed to ourselves (...) to refrain from supporting a confrontational, military-based model, and instead to support active co-operation, conflict prevention, the peaceful resolution of conflict, as well as humanitarian and peace-keeping initiatives based on ideas of solidarity" (12). Austria must be able, however, to decide for itself whether or not it should participate in any particular action. One criterion, serving as the basis for any initiative, would be an international legal mandate and whether or not the security of Austria was endangered (ibid.). In this respect, NATO's Partnership for Peace offered a prospect of meaningful and intensive military co-operation with the reform states. "Owing to the velvet revolution in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, there is an opportunity to develop a stable and secure Europe, one that is not just open to the Western democracies, but also to the reform countries (...) As the direct neighbor of four of the five future members, Austria will form the geographical heart of the EU. Considering Austrian history, closer contact with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe seems to be only natural" (Van den Broek 1997, 164 and 166).<sup>24</sup>

Both in connection with the issue of EU and NATO expansion and as regards Austrian participation in a pan-European security system, Austria's role appears somewhat diffuse (Hummer 1996, 46). An example of this is the following quotation taken from one of Franz Vranitzky's texts concerning Austrian membership of WEU or NATO. While on other occasions Vranitzky had argued vehemently for European solidarity, here he stated: "Given the current structure of the military alliances of the WEU and NATO, nothing can happen there against the will of the larger member-states. And this type of foreign direction driven by the interests of larger countries is not in our interest, especially when it comes to the issue of defense. The accusation of 'jumping on the bandwagon', which we hear time and again, is not an idle one: It is not immoral, but clever and farsighted — especially for a smaller state in an exposed geographical situation — if one seeks to avoid being drawn into the power interests of great powers through the automatic mechanisms of an alliance" (1996, 13).

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<sup>24</sup> The decision concerning possible membership of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe taken at the Copenhagen Summit in June 1993.

### The state position of the discussion<sup>25</sup>

With a view towards facilitating understanding, we present in the following a brief schematic summary of the most significant internal and external functions of Austrian neutrality in the course of the Second Republic:

PERIOD	INTERNAL FUNCTIONS	EXTERNAL FUNCTIONS
1955	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Preventing the country's partition and a guarantee of the withdrawal of occupation troops</li> <li>- A guarantee of national independence and sovereignty</li> <li>- Confirmation of the rebirth as an independent and free state,</li> <li>- Self-mythology of the Second Republic as a victim of National Socialism and allied occupation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Promotion of the country's image as an independent small country in the international power arena</li> <li>- Guarantee of non-membership of any alliance amid increasing East-West conflict</li> <li>- Pretence of equidistance and guarantee of non-alignment in the bloc system</li> <li>- Recovery of a distinguished role</li> <li>- Guarantee of the impossibility of a reunion with Germany, major signal of distinction</li> <li>- Codification of the distinction from National Socialism</li> </ul>
Mid-1950s and 1960s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Factor providing identity, constituent element of the national self-image as an independent and respected small country</li> <li>- Construction of image as diplomatic meeting-place</li> <li>- Reason for the choice of 26 October as the Austrian national holiday</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sign of foreign policy independence (Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, voting pattern in the UN)</li> <li>- Image as a humanitarian country offering asylum</li> <li>- Image as a meeting-place</li> <li>- Retention of a pro-Western neutrality policy and a policy of secret alliances</li> </ul>
1970s and 1980s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Element providing identity and an integrating factor</li> <li>- Important part of national pride</li> <li>- Constituent part of the "Austrian way and the success story of the Second Republic"</li> <li>- Creation of a taboo surrounding issues such as EEC membership etc.</li> <li>- Self-image of having special role between the blocs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Image as a small country pursuing an active foreign policy</li> <li>- Significant special role in international politics as a mediator and meeting-place for negotiations (Kreisky)</li> <li>- External perception as the "island of the blessed"</li> <li>- "Active neutrality policy" as synonymous with Austrian foreign policy</li> </ul>

<sup>25</sup> September 2002

1989 and early 1990s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Against the background of increasing insecurity after the loss of a clearly defined role still part of the construct of Austrian identity and national pride</li> <li>- Connection with peace, security, order, the success story of the post-1945 period and the political continuity of the Second Republic</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Declining international significance of neutrality, after the ending of the bi-polar system</li> <li>- This loss of significance facilitate efforts to integrate into a larger Europe</li> </ul>
Since 1995	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Identity function and affirmation remain, but become rather fragile</li> <li>- Creation of a taboo by political elites</li> <li>- EU membership portrayed as compatible with neutrality</li> <li>- Means for symbolic policy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Counter-productive for participation in a future European and/or North Atlantic security system (CFSP, WEU, NATO)</li> </ul>
Since 2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Neutrality was put into question officially by the government coalition ÖVP-FPÖ and, to some extent, functions, <i>inter alia</i>, as a means to represent the difference between the ruling parties and the opposition</li> </ul>	-“-

In the coalition agreement of 1996, the two coalition partners (SPÖ and ÖVP) had committed themselves to presenting a so-called “option report” on Austrian security policy by the Spring of 1998 at the latest. (cf. Gärtner 1998, 4). The coalition agreement itself contained detailed points on security policy ideas and options: the conception of a more comprehensive understanding of security including economic, ecological, and social issues. As well as, security within the framework of the EU treaty incorporating the “Petersberg tasks”, an examination of all security policy options (full Austrian membership of the WEU, active participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program and in the OSCE as a forum for European-transatlantic security (ibid.).<sup>26</sup> The coalition agreement was interpreted in different ways by representatives of the SPÖ and ÖVP: The ÖVP tended to be more willing to see the option of NATO membership (indeed in July 1997 the ÖVP chairmanship resolved that Austria should join NATO), while the SPÖ was more inclined to vote (in the federal party chairmanship and at a party conference held in April 1997) for a full examination of all other possibilities, concentrating on co-operation within the framework of NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program rather than full NATO membership (ibid. 5). Thus, there was no possibility of issuing a joint option-report. The positions of the two coalition partners were mutually exclusive and neither party was prepared to

<sup>26</sup> For the OSCE, see also Tudyka 1998.

back down: the ÖVP defined NATO as a new security-policy formation with new tasks; the SPÖ still saw the organization primarily as an instrument of the Cold War (ibid.). Heinz Gärtner argued that NATO combined both aspects: "Parts of NATO have changed. Other parts have been inherited from the Cold War era. An old item is the alliance's collective defense strategy, which requires member-states to provide assistance in the event of an attack on NATO territory (Art. V of the NATO treaty). Such a scenario no longer exists in the new security situation (...). NATO is also undertaking tasks that no longer have anything to do with the Cold War. Such tasks include crisis management, peace-keeping, humanitarian actions, disaster assistance, as well as peace enforcement and intervention outside the NATO area. Under the expanded program of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), these new tasks may be tackled by both members and non-members alike, as has already been demonstrated by the IFOR and SFOR missions in Bosnia" (ibid., 5f.). According to Peter Kostelka, participation in "peace-keeping and peace-making initiatives" should be seen as compulsory acts of solidarity stemming from perpetual neutrality (International 1—2/1998, 11). On the basis of the Treaty of Amsterdam of June 1997, Austria could already take part, without actually becoming a member of the WEU, in the elaboration and implementation of WEU peace-keeping missions, including armed operations to end crises (ibid., 6). A similar enterprise would be co-operation with NATO within the framework of the PfP. Here too, there would be opportunities for taking part in decision-making where Austria was actually participating in operations (ibid., 8): "International solidarity can be practised in the field of crisis management even without NATO membership, under the auspices of various organizations" (ibid.). In Gärtner's view, Austria is not exposed to any threat to which the only response is a traditional collective defense system. For this reason, it should first take part in all of the "new" elements of NATO and make full use of the inherent opportunities for participation and joint decision-making. Austria had already proven its solidarity in cases of international conflict and crisis. Since 1960 more than 38.500 Austrians (military staff and civilians) had taken part in more than thirty foreign actions and Austria had spent more than 7.5 billion Austrian Schillings (ibid.). In an interview with the magazine "International", Peter Kostelka described Austrian membership of NATO as a "journey into the past". For the SPÖ, it would only be a realistic option if NATO became "a pan-European security structure". Until then, neutrality was not perhaps "just an end in itself", but instead "a meaningful concept which, under the current circumstances, we (the SPÖ, ed.) shall defend by all means (International 1—2/1998, 13). Kostelka, who accused the ÖVP of damaging Austrian foreign policy interests through its offensive action on the issue of NATO membership and the abandonment of neutrality, found that his opinion was contradicted by that of Andreas Khol, (ÖVP). Khol, who based his argument on the core value of solidarity and on the cost factor, saw "no alternative to NATO" (International 1—2/1998, 16). At the same time, he alleged that the SPÖ was acting out of opportunism and of fear of losing

voter support (*ibid.*, 17). The opposing positions of the two representatives of the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition can be seen as paradigmatic for the discussion about the retention or abandonment of Austrian neutrality and the linking of this discussion with security policy and moral arguments: Even though the spectrum of opinion within the two governing parties (until 2000) was clearly heterogeneous and the contributions of opposition politicians naturally also influenced the political discourse, Kostelka and Khol, as spokesmen of their respective parties, were nevertheless laying out the benchmarks for both retrospective and current interpretations of Austria's perpetual neutrality in the late 1990's.

Recently, Austria took part in PfP endeavors and Austrian soldiers participated in NATO-maneuvers. Nevertheless, SPÖ — the leading party of the coalition government until 2000 — presented itself as the party that safeguards neutrality, f. i. during the 1999 campaign for the elections for European Parliament by using the slogan "Only a vote for SPÖ is a vote for a neutral Austria". This strategy turned out as a successful one. A survey (August 2000) shows that 79% of Austrian citizens share the opinion that SPÖ stands for neutrality. The Green party as well chose neutrality as a prominent topic for the respective election campaign. Both parties, in this case, selected a functional majority theme: A survey, undertaken in the forefront of the 1999 European Parliamentary elections, brought the result that 77% of Austrians would like to perpetuate the neutral status of the country (*ibid.*).<sup>27</sup> Although Austrian neutrality is not at all a topic to be discussed in European parliament, it worked very well as a popular theme for the campaign. This may serve as an indicator that in public opinion neutrality is as ever appreciated to a high degree, despite the shift of the elite discourse and the change of the geo-political framework in the wake of "1989/90", that has had a strong implication for Austria's foreign and security policy: The country has lost its function as a neutral player, based on the self-image of being situated "in between".

From the citizens perspective, Austrian neutrality did not lose its symbolic function and meaning and seems as ever to be connected with national sovereignty, sustainable peace, abstaining from military involvement and guaranteed security.<sup>28</sup> The meaning of the domestic, identity building function of neutrality did not decrease, although the international meaning of neutrality has changed considerably.

In the run-up to the Austrian parliamentary elections in 1999, former chancellor Viktor Klima (SPÖ) suggested that neutrality should no longer be disputed by the political parties for the next five years. He did not succeed, ÖVP representatives in contrary requested the integration of Austria into a new architecture of security of the European

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27 Cf. *Profil*, May 31 1999, p. 27, quoting a survey done by IFES: 81% of Austrians would not like to cancel neutrality.

28 The Kosovo war and the NATO offensive including the Belgrade bomb attack additionally increased the popularity of neutrality.

Union as a *conditio sine qua non* for potential coalition building negotiations after the elections.

The coalition government ÖVP-FPÖ (built in February 2000) was the first Austrian government to officially put neutrality under question: Herbert Scheibner (FPÖ), minister for defense, declared Austria as non-aligned, but no longer neutral (*Der Standard*, June 28 1999). The governmental coalition asserted the intension to intensify dialog with NATO, a new doctrine on defense was formulated, including the statement that Austria de facto has said farewell to neutrality (*Der Standard*, January 24 2001). Foreign Minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner underlined this position by stating that there is no place for perpetual neutrality within the new Europe (*Der Standard*, February 9 2001).

The majority of public speakers in politics, as well as in media, do not yet vote for an integration of Austria into a future European and/or North Atlantic security system (CFSP, WEU, NATO) (cf. *Der Standard*, August 20 1999), but this attitude does not correspond to the perspective of the public at large: although 56% of Austrians support the implementation of a common European army and — according to Eurobarometer data November/December 2000 — 65% support the European Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (*Der Standard*, February 9 and May 2 2001), there is a stable majority (71%) for maintaining neutrality (ibid., *News*, February 15 2001). Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) did, not succeed by comparing, in his speech on the National Holiday 2001, neutrality with “Lipizzaner” and “Mozartkugeln”, which — from his point of view — seems as old fashioned as neutrality (*Der Standard*, October 29 2001).

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## NEUTRALITY IN THE 1956 HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

The revolution of 1956 has been a point of reference in political and intellectual discourse and rhetoric ever since those October days. After 1989, it was evident that if the Kádár regime was born out of the negation of the revolution, the new era had to rest on precisely this silenced heritage of the revolution. Defining this heritage, however, seemed more and more controversial. Although providing a coherent and all-encompassing narrative of the revolution (the traditional ideal of history writing) ought to be the task of professional historians and academic circles, it is archival research, scholarly debate and interpretation that seem to take painfully long when politics is already in the making.

For the designers of post-1989 Hungary there were several symbolic milestones available from Hungarian history to be used in the restructuring of the constitutional, economic, international and social fabric of the country, 1956 being only one of them. The post-war coalition period from 1945 to 1947 served as one such point of reference, according to some, an "innocent" era standing for true democracy and long awaited social change, dissolving Hungary's feudal heritage. Although, on the basis of new documents on Cold War history (underpinning the traditional American views of the 1950s) there is no proof that Stalin did *not* plan the sovietization of East-Central-Europe before 1947, the so called "year of turning". Despite the lack of any document that can be called a "proper scenario" for the Soviet expansion in this region, the Communist leaders of Hungary and Czechoslovakia were not hesitant about their ultimate aims. Temporarily coexisting with the restored democratic institutions, a slow but steady transformation was planned to introduce the Soviet system.<sup>1</sup>

For "point zero" other analysts of Hungarian history looked for the break in continuity in March, 1944 when the German army occupied Hungary. According to this argument Saint Stephen's country, with her thousand year old foundations, and strongly intertwined with Christianity, is the desirable state of affairs to return to, which was disrupted when because of foreign occupation, Hungary lost its sovereignty. In this interpretation there is no difference whatsoever between the onslaught of German or Russian forces, both being armies of occupation. Finally, another revolutionary beacon shed light on post-1989 Hungary at the cross-roads: the often invoked Hungarian revolution and war of independence in 1848, which also strongly influenced the concepts of the prime minister of the 1956 revolution, Imre Nagy.

Out of this list, however, 1956 was the one that was elevated symbolically and even legally to represent a line of continuity in history and possibly to serve as a pointer when setting the national targets: liberty, independence and democracy. The dropping of the word "people's" from the name of the country, or more formally the proclamation of the Hungarian Republic in 1989 fell on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of October, the anniversary of the revolution. June 16<sup>th</sup>, 1989, the ceremonial re-burying of the executed prime minister, Imre Nagy and his fellow-victims became the symbolic Antigone act signalling the fall of the communist dictatorial regime and the end to the omnipotence of Soviet power. The first session of the newly elected democratic parliament on 2<sup>nd</sup> May 1990 codified the memory of 1956. The 1990, XXVIII Act declared the 23<sup>rd</sup> of October, the first day of the revolution, a national holiday. Furthermore it stated, "The Parliament declares that in line with the spirit of 1956 it will do everything for multiparty democracy and for the protection of human rights and national independence..."<sup>2</sup> Although deciphering the possible aims of the revolution is a complex task, which is always open to criticism and new interpretations, it is obvious that if we see Imre Nagy's three main declarations as expressions of these revolutionary aims, it cannot be overlooked that the idea of neutrality was lost somewhere along the way: the first declaration, on 28<sup>th</sup> October, when the government declared a cease-fire and identified itself with the demands of the people, the feared secret police was dissolved, and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Budapest was promised, the second on October 30<sup>th</sup>, when the one-party system was abolished, the coalition parties of 1945 were reorganized and Hungary left the Warsaw Pact, and finally on 1<sup>st</sup> November, when Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact *and* its neutrality were declared. This paper attempts to trace the development of the neutrality concept in 1956, this forgotten notion of Hungary's place in the international order, from a number of different viewpoints.

The idea of neutrality is deeply rooted in Hungarian political and popular thought, although it was never achieved in reality. Two main ideas are evoked from the experience of the past in the daily press concerning the revolution: Hungary's smallness (a thought that came into focus after the Treaty of Trianon, where Hungary lost one third of its territories) and its logical consequence, the need for co-operation with other small states in the region. This concept of a "Danubian federation" as an historical alternative to inimical small states dominated by one of the great powers, was first elaborated by Lajos Kossuth, the leader of the 1848 revolution, while in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, two political

1 For a detailed analysis and documentary proof, see Csaba Békés, "A hidegháború eredete" [The origins of Cold War] In *Évkönyv* (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 1999), 218—226.

2 Acts of the Hungarian Parliament, 1990. XXVIII. Quoted in *Az 1956-os magyar forradalom* (The 1956 Hungarian revolution) Ed. György Litván (Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó, 1991), 176. Translated by the author.

thinkers developed the idea after the traumas of the two wars, Oszkár Jászi and István Bibó.<sup>3</sup>

The leaders who appeared on 2<sup>nd</sup> November, 1956, reflecting on the news of the neutrality declaration, emphasized the dangers of being a small nation in the buffer zone. The most important pillar of our independent foreign policy, however, must be friendship among, and co-operation with, neighboring small nations. Our dependence also impeded this, although Kossuth already had this great idea about a strong alliance between the nations of the Danube-basin. "Yes, Hungary from now on, as heir to the honorable heritage of Lajos Kossuth and Mihály Károlyi, must work towards the establishment of a confederation of the Danubian peoples," writes an analyst during the days of the revolution.<sup>4</sup>

Hungary's geopolitical position is its destiny. It could serve as a bridge between East and West, it could be the "last bastion" of Western civilization, but it may at the same time run the risk of drifting into the conflicts of opposing powers. As another leader explains, "During the course of Hungarian history we repeatedly drifted into insane, often criminal, often antidemocratic wars — and we were punished willy-nilly for the crimes of other nations."<sup>5</sup> The idea of punishment is echoed by the last lines of the Hungarian national anthem, with 19<sup>th</sup> century lyrics: "He has suffered with the worst/ Time beyond all measure"<sup>6</sup>.

This often praised neutrality, however, as a modern political category in Hungary, only goes back to the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. At the level of government policy, it surfaced as a contemporary war strategy in 1939 for the Teleki administration, but events soon overwhelmed it, and Hungary entered the war on the German side. The unsuccessful, secret and tentative peace negotiations with the Western powers by the Kállay administration in 1943 already dropped the illusory ideas of neutrality, and aimed at preventing a future Soviet expansion.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, the "pathos of sovereignty" was deeply imbedded in the Hungarian self-image of history, as the political scientist László Lengyel reveals using a

3 A manifold analysis of the question is the collection of essays edited by Ignác Romsics and Béla K. Király, *Geopolitics in the Danube Region. Hungarian Reconciliation Efforts, 1848–1998* (Budapest: CEU Press, 1999). Bibó in English: István Bibó, *Democracy, Revolution, Self-determination. Selected Writings*. Ed. Károly Nagy. Translated by András Boros-Kazai (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991)

4 "A független Magyarország legyen semleges!" [The independent Hungary should be neutral] Signed K.P. [translated by the author] *Magyar Szabadság*, 1956 1st November. Published in *1956 a sajtó tükrében* [1956 in the Press] Ed. Lajos Izsák and József Szabó (Budapest: Kossuth, 1989), 223.

5 "Semleges Magyarországot!" [Neutral Hungary!], *Valóság*, 1956 2nd November [Translated by the author]. *Ibid.* 303.

6 Translated by G. Szirtes.

7 Gyula Juhász, *A Teleki-kormány külpolitikája. 1939–1941* [The Foreign Policy of the Teleki administration] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1964) and *Magyar-brit titkos tárgyalások 1943-ban* [Hungarian-British Secret Talks in 1943] by the same author (Budapest: Kossuth, 1978).

distinct vocabulary reminiscent of István Bibó's rhetoric. "The pathos of sovereignty was developed by the *punishment* for independence and the *reward* for dependence in a tragic understanding of history. A Hungary bleeding for independence and the sovereignty of the state became the symbol of the historical vocation of the Hungarian nation. It is evident that Hungarian independence is punished, because Hungarians always aspire to something that cannot be recognized and cannot succeed. At the same time the acceptance of this dependence, or resignation to accepting the lack of sovereignty, became equivalent with the distortion of the Hungarian character and a *cul-de-sac* development."<sup>8</sup>

What then is the story in a nutshell of the declaration of Hungary's neutrality? By the 30<sup>th</sup> of October, a week after its outbreak, the Hungarian revolution seemed to be taking a more well-defined shape, and consolidation was possible. Imre Nagy could feel a positive change in attitude towards him both in the eyes of the people and the West. I. Mikoyan and M.A. Suslov, the special envoys of the Soviet Union<sup>9</sup> promised the prime minister that the Soviet Union would not send in more troops, their forces started to be withdrawn from Budapest. On 30<sup>th</sup> October, a Soviet statement pronounced that the relationship between the Soviet Union and the socialist countries would be placed on new grounds, respecting the principles of equality and non-interference, they even hinted at a possible revision of the Soviet military presence in Hungary (the declaration also appeared in *Pravda*). Disquieting news arrived, however, on the night of 31<sup>st</sup> October/1<sup>st</sup> November about the Soviet withdrawal coming to a halt, new troops arriving in the country and the surrounding of strategic points such as airports and towns by Russian forces. The second wave of Soviet military interference had obviously started.

Andropov, the Soviet Ambassador in Budapest was summoned to the parliament by Nagy. Andropov's techniques to evade offering any plausible explanation for, or even acknowledging, the military move were alarming. His transparent lies about how these new moves simply served to assist the peaceful withdrawal of the previous troops, made it clear that Moscow had changed gear and that this was the final assault. Although Imre Nagy sympathized with the idea of non-alignment and neutrality, as will be further discussed in the second part of this paper, and the demand for Hungary's independence in this particular form was "in the air", so to speak, from leaflets to editorials and demands of workers' councils, in practice the prime minister should have understood the dangerous nature of declaring neutrality. From the point of international law it was again debated on

8 László Lengyel, "Kisállamok nyomorúsága vagy dicsősége" [The Misery or Triumph of Small States] In *Mozgástér és Kényszerpálya* [Scope for Action and Forced Path] (Budapest: Helikon, 1997), 186. [Translation of the author]

9 On the 25<sup>th</sup> October, two days after the outbreak of the revolution, the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party sent a delegation to Budapest. Its members were two party officials, Mikoyan (at the beginning with a "liberal" reputation) and Suslov, the head of KGB, Ivan Serov and General Michail Malinin, deputy chief of general staff. They left Hungary on the 31<sup>st</sup> October.

what grounds Hungary could leave the Warsaw Pact to fulfill the ideal of withdrawal from the bi-polar international system.

The hopelessness of the military situation was a decisive factor. This also changes the judgement on Imre Nagy's "irreal, provocative and dangerous" move. As Csaba Békés explains, "By 1<sup>st</sup> November ... the situation became so hopeless, that no measures of the Hungarian government could worsen it. The views according to which the withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the declaration of neutrality were hasty, immature steps, provoking the next Soviet intervention, are not correct."<sup>10</sup> György Heltai (1914—1994), reform communist in the Nagy circle and deputy minister of foreign affairs in the Nagy government, also underlines the motivation of the lost situation. In his oral history interview he describes in great detail the decisive day of November 1<sup>st</sup>.<sup>11</sup>

The telephone lines between Imre Nagy and Yuri Andropov (for a short time first secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in 1982—1984), the Soviet ambassador, were constantly hot. Nagy wanted guarantees that the Soviet troops pouring into Hungary and surrounding the strategic military points in the country would stop and withdraw. Although Andropov insisted that these were simply "units maintaining order", Nagy was worried and distrustful. On the morning of November 1<sup>st</sup> he called Andropov and asked him to call back in an hour, but waited for the call in vain. Finally he called again. It was during this call that Heltai stepped into Nagy's room in the Parliament and overheard him talking. "...when I entered he was already talking. Then his face was turning red. I understood from this that something was wrong. I think the Andropov answer was, that he did talk [to Moscow], but there is no change. It's a decision. ... [Imre Nagy] said, now we could initiate something, he has been thinking for a long time. I said: "we'll withdraw from the Warsaw Pact". He said: "Yes."<sup>12</sup> Heltai then made it clear that the declaration of neutrality was a logical consequence of the withdrawal, a guarantee for the Russians that Hungary will not join the Western bloc. A tactical move to "prevent scandal", if you wish.

Nevertheless, if we understand the importance of the idea of neutrality and independence in Hungarian historical thinking, it cannot simply be interpreted as a tactical move. The escalation of the revolution step by step forced the government to accept its demands. Although international power politics is usually at the center of the discussion about neutrality in 1956, domestic politics cannot be overlooked either. Jenő Széll (1912—1994), a reform communist from the Nagy circle, in 1956 government commis-

10 Csaba Békés, "A magyar semlegesség 1956-ban" [The Hungarian neutrality in 1956] In *Semlegesség, Illúziók és realitás. Tanulmányok* [Neutrality. Illusions and Reality. Essays.] (Budapest: 1997) 118. [Translation of the author]

11 Oral History Archive of the 1956 Institute, Budapest. Interview with György Heltai, no. 184. (made in 1988)

12 Ibid. pp.166—167.

sioner at the Hungarian Radio, and member of Imre Nagy's secretariat, describes an almost folk-like tale and lively scene in his interview.<sup>13</sup>

On 1<sup>st</sup> November a miners' delegation from Borsod county, who had been waiting for two days, was admitted to see Nagy. The exhausted prime minister was standing in the doorway and asked them to listen to his radio announcement (the building of the Parliament and the Radio is connected), afterwards he was ready to see them. This was to be the famous speech, declaring neutrality. After the radio speech the miners' delegation refused to take up Nagy's time, saying that he had announced in the radio everything they had wanted to demand. Hungary was independent and out of the Warsaw Pact. Nagy's announcement pacified the people, who, unaware of the seriousness of the military situation and the change in the attitude of the so far sympathizing socialist countries, were still optimistic about the future of the revolution on 1<sup>st</sup> November, and thought it was over. The revolutionary organisations reacted very favorably to the announcement. The government finally won their trust. Even the stubborn workers' councils of Budapest changed their previous decision not to start work until the last Russian soldier had left the country, and at eleven o'clock in the evening they appealed to the people through the radio to end their strike.

The demand for neutrality was present from the very beginning in the revolution. When the newspapers reported the announcement of neutrality, *Magyar Függetlenség* (Hungarian Independence), the paper published by the Hungarian National Revolutionary Committee, prided itself on the fact that all of the twenty-five points they had issued six days earlier as their demands, had been fulfilled. Point number four demanded that Hungary should withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, while point number five claimed, "Hungary declares its neutrality. Modelled on Austria it aims to be good friends with every nation of the world on the basis of equality."<sup>14</sup> Or as the modern historian analyzes the same development, "... in October of 1956, no matter how noble aims motivated it, the withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the declaration of neutrality, as a matter of fact unrealistically and irrationally, resulted from the self-inducting mechanism of revolutionary euphoria. These demands would have increased the dangers of destabilizing the situation and of another Soviet interference, if the Nagy government had not accepted them."<sup>15</sup>

The fateful decision of declaring neutrality in the afternoon session of 1<sup>st</sup> November by the Cabinet, despite the fears suggested by *Realpolitik*, or in a simplified version (as subsequently only one person was blamed for its consequences) by Nagy himself, has subsequently become a hotly disputed resolution. The official Western diplomatic view was that Nagy went too far, and that if Hungary had found a leader of the Polish Gomulka's

13 1956 Institute Oral History Archive. Interview with Jenő Széll, no. 4. (interviewed in 1986)

14 *Magyar Függetlenség*, 1956 November 2. Published in *1956 a Sajtó tükrében ...*, 267.

15 Csaba Békés, "A magyar semlegesség" ..., 119.

calibre, who carefully balanced national communism with being in a defense relationship with the Soviet Union, then it would not have been necessary to say that “the clock had indeed been set back”<sup>16</sup>. It must be mentioned, however, that by “going too far” the analysts did not mean solely Nagy’s declaration of neutrality, but also his declaration of a multi-party system on the 30<sup>th</sup> October. With a neutral and democratic Hungary the double pillars of the Soviet system would have collapsed: its network of satellites and the one-party state securing the ideological monolith of communism. It would have set a dangerous example, the dominoes would have started to fall (as indeed the events of 1989 proved).

The 1990s, however, produced sophisticated, detailed studies of the 1956 revolution in Hungary that could already rely on versatile archival evidence. János M. Rainer, Imre Nagy’s biographer, approaches the problem from a different point of view. He interprets this “dangerous” step of his hero partly as a bold tactical move. In his opinion, by the 1<sup>st</sup> November Nagy only had “one last trump card” to play: the United Nations. He hoped thus, that the Soviets would be confronted with the international organizations and Western public opinion, and as a face-saving measure would negotiate with Hungary.<sup>17</sup> As an old communist, familiar with the mechanism of the Soviet decision making process, and with sufficient experience behind him, Nagy was not naive, but too conscious of the threatening future, and he tried to maneuver. The often quoted Csaba Békés also emphasizes the previous interpretation, and talks about the prime minister’s tactics and attempts at bargaining. So Nagy in this view was not passively “drifting with events”, and he is “rehabilitated” from the verdict of naiveté and uncertainty, as someone who had a good sense of how to find the only possible way that might have had the slightest chance, although this was a very slight chance indeed.

Others, like Tibor Méray, the first biographer of Imre Nagy, argued that the move was motivated not by political calculations (since it was already a lost cause), but by Nagy’s moral conviction, not to abandon and betray the revolution, but rather to appeal to the moral concern of the whole world.<sup>18</sup> In the steps that followed one another (unilaterally cancelling Warsaw Pact membership, declaring neutrality, asking the four great powers through the United Nations to protect this neutrality) Hungary would protest, defend itself and appeal for the support of the United Nations and the West simultaneously. By declaring neutrality they would avert the suspicion of joining NATO or provoking a nuclear conflict between the two superpowers.

16 Leslie Fry, British minister in Budapest to Selwyn Lloyd, on the *Causes and likely consequences of the Hungarian revolution*, 1957, February 5. (PRO, London. FO 371/128670). Mr. Fry was devoted to the Hungarian cause and did not share the above opinion, but it was widespread in Foreign Office circles.

17 See János M. Rainer, *Nagy Imre. 1953–1958. Politikai életrajz II.* (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 1999), pp313.

18 Tibor Méray, *Nagy Imre élete és halála* (Written in 1958, first published in Paris, 1977).

The most up-to-date biographer of Imre Nagy, János M. Rainer also offers a similar, moral-personal interpretation. This comprehensive view argues that the disappointment Nagy felt over a hopeless situation, when he realized that the Soviets were double-crossing him, met with pressure from the people to “go far”. His caution and his discipline were washed away, and at the climax of the drama Nagy was reborn as the true leader of the nation. His own conviction, and the wishes and demands of the revolution, for one ephemeral moment, were identical.

It is almost impossible to reconstruct now minute by minute how the decision making process occurred, although more and more information is coming to light. The official minutes of the decisive Cabinet meeting on 1<sup>st</sup> November was first published in 1989.<sup>19</sup> István Vida, a Hungarian historian, found a precious document in the Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation: the memorandum by the Nagy government to the Soviet government about the withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.<sup>20</sup> Until 1999, only indirect written proof was available from the report of the Soviet ambassador Andropov. Csaba Békés made a similarly unique discovery among Géza Losonczy's documents in the Imre Nagy files attached to his trial: it is a fragmented version of the minutes of the cabinet meeting on the morning of 1<sup>st</sup> November. The results of this meeting were taken over almost verbatim by the official minutes of the same afternoon cabinet meeting. Point 12 discusses neutrality:

The Cabinet was discussing the issue of neutrality in order to end the fighting and to absolutely and finally secure the independence of the country. The Cabinet unequivocally took the position that the government should declare the country's neutrality. For the time being it refrains from deciding which form of neutrality it should adopt (Switzerland, Austria, Yugoslavia) ...<sup>21</sup>

In the heated everyday reality of the revolution, many of the decisive words were lost for future historians, as everyone was using the telephone. This makes a wonderful case for oral history, and the opportunity was not lost. György Heltai and Miklós Vásárhelyi, both

19 The document has been published several times. First by Ferenc Glatz, “A kormány és a párt vezető szerveinek dokumentumaiból 1956 október 23- november 4” *História*, 1989 XI. No 4–5, pp. 25–52, then József Kiss, Zoltán Ripp and István Vida, “Források a Nagy Imre kormány Külpolitikájának történetéhez” In *Társadalmi Szemle* 48. 1993, No. 5, pp. 78–94. In book format see Csaba Békés, *Az 1956-os magyar forradalom a világpolitikában* (Budapest, 1956-os Intézet, 1996), 92.

20 Published by István Vida. “Rutin jellegű megmozdulás — Ismeretlen dokumentum 1956-ból” [Routine movements — Unknown document from 1956] *Népszabadság*, 1999. 3rd November.

21 Hungarian National Archives, MOL, XX-5-h, Imre Nagy and accomplices trial. Briefs of inquiry. Vol 12. Géza Losonczy documents. Published by Csaba Békés, “A magyar semlegesség 1956-ban”... endnote no15. [Translation by the author]

witnesses and active participants, were interviewed. Other written memoirs also revive those moments. One description, for instance, comes from János Kádár, the “turncoat”, who betrayed Imre Nagy. He disappeared from Budapest on 2<sup>nd</sup> November, to return from Moscow as the chosen leader of the reinstalled communist regime, and remained so long in this position that the whole era between 1963 (the year when direct Soviet control of the retributions in Hungary ended) and 1988 was named after him.<sup>22</sup>

As was shown above, neutrality as a demand had been present from the very onset of the revolution. In a practical form it meant the withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact as a first step. On the 31<sup>st</sup> October the Hungarian Foreign Ministry followed in the footsteps of other institutions and formed its own revolutionary committee with Péter Mód as president. In their resolution they appealed to the government both to withdraw and declare neutrality. On the same day, György Libik (1901—1995), the president of the revolutionary committee of the employees of the Parliament also prepared a sketch for a possible neutrality declaration.<sup>23</sup> Both were handed to Géza Losonczy, Secretary of State.

In the morning of 1<sup>st</sup> November Nagy summoned the Soviet ambassador, Andropov, to the Parliament and demanded an explanation for the alarming reports from all over the country about the moves of the Soviet forces.<sup>24</sup> Andropov, who supposedly already knew of the decision about the fate of the Hungarian revolution in the Kremlin, had the day before evaded giving an answer and promised to call back with definite information. He returned at eleven o'clock with a lame excuse. He denied that new forces had entered Hungary and said that the present Soviet forces were carrying out “routine movements”, they were only surrounding the airports to secure the rescue operation of wounded Soviet soldiers. Nagy did not believe this and repeatedly demanded that the Soviet invasion be called off. The telephone conversation between Nagy and Andropov that followed forty minutes later was described above in connection with an analysis of the hopelessness of the situation.

This was the final bluff that was listened to by Nagy. He summoned the most important decision making body, the Temporary Executive Committee of the newly reformed communist party (the “MSZMP”, Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party), sometimes simply referred to in literature as “the cabinet”. The following men were present at this session on 1<sup>st</sup> November, 1956: Imre Nagy, prime minister and from that date minister of foreign affairs, János Kádár, Géza Losonczy, György Heltai, Antal Apró, Zoltán Szántó,

22 See *Döntés a Kremlemben, 1956. A szovjet pártelnökség vitái Magyarországról*. [Decision in the Kremlin, 1956. The debates of the Soviet party presidium about Hungary] Eds Vyacheslav Sereda and János M. Rainer (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 1996) pp.78.

23 The versatile Libik (engineer, anti-fascist and ski champion) emigrated to Sweden, where he published his memoirs, *Üzenet a lesiklásból* [Message from Downhill] (Stockholm, 1981).

24 György Heltai remembers these talks as telephone conversations. See Oral history interview, no. 184, 167. (1956 Institute, Oral History Archive)

Miklós Vásárhelyi (press secretary in the Nagy cabinet, the only participant still alive in 1999) and György Lukács, the famous Marxist philosopher. During the discussion Nagy argued that the Soviets had broken the Warsaw Pact, which gave a reason for Hungary to announce its withdrawal. Nevertheless, this blow "must be softened" in order not to seem too provocative, by simultaneously declaring neutrality. The members all agreed, only Szántó and Lukács raised a slight counter-argument, since they were afraid of the possible Soviet response.

In Heltai's description, a seemingly unimportant, but very typical scene appears that perfectly characterizes the contradiction between words and reality in the communist regime. Heltai and Vásárhelyi left the meeting to look for the text of the Warsaw Pact, so that the declaration could be verbalized. However, no copy could be found either in the Parliamentary Archive, the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court or the Ministry of Defense. The absurd running around for a copy finally ended when someone had the idea of going to look for it in the archives of the AVO (the secret police, the Hungarian variant of the NKVD). The idea proved to be a success, as the only available copy of the Warsaw Treaty, an official document signed by the government of Hungary in 1955 *was* there.

Almost simultaneously the cabinet continued to hold meetings. To discuss neutrality they met in the morning and also in the afternoon. The participants were Nagy, Kádár, Losonczy, Zoltán Tildy (representing the Smallholders Party in the newly established coalition government), Ferenc Erdei (National Peasant Party), István Dobi (president of the Presidential Council) and József Bognár (deputy prime minister).

In the afternoon at five o'clock the government met again, with ambassador Andropov present, and informed him of the following ultimatum: if the Russian troops were not ordered to withdraw immediately, Hungary would turn to the UN and ask it to place the Hungarian situation on its agenda. One hour after the meeting the Soviet embassy received the note of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry signed by Péter Mód, the president of the revolutionary committee of the Foreign Ministry.<sup>25</sup> At the same time as the diplomatic missions in Budapest were being informed about the verbal note, Nagy sent a telegram to Hammarskjöld, the UN secretary. Losonczy was chosen to communicate the note to foreign journalists, while at 7:50 in the evening Nagy read out the declaration on Free Radio Kossuth, followed by the Hungarian national anthem and choral works by Kodály including Petőfi's *Nemzeti dal* (the emblematic "National Song", written by the famous 1848 revolutionary poet). In the evening, Andropov returned to the Parliament to inform the cabinet that his government had accepted the offered compromise, although this was no more than a time saving deception. The next day was All Saint's day,

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25 This is the note found and published by Vida.

the Day of the Dead, and it was only two more before the tragic 4<sup>th</sup> November that marked the end of the political experimental part of the revolution.

It is strange to see that the question of neutrality rarely surfaces in the historiography of 1956. Apart from mere descriptions of the declaration, it is only approached from two aspects: foreign policy on one hand, including both Western and Russian attitudes (in the first case generally the treatment of 1956 is part of an extended Cold War analysis of Western attitudes towards the satellites, or a speculation on the double crisis of Suez and the Hungarian revolution) and on the other hand the question of Imre Nagy's personality and his intellectual *Bildungsroman* in the days of the crisis from staunch communist to democratic patriot. We will attempt to summarise the main findings of both of these viewpoints.

In a newly formed bi-polar world of the Cold War, non-alignment and neutrality were often mentioned alternatives. Finlandization<sup>26</sup> was one of the models available. It was a precedent that demonstrated the possibility of the Soviet Union accepting a non-communist country in her sphere of interest (even if they had been at war with each other in the Second World War), if its government was friendly and not part of the Western bloc. Whether it was wishful thinking or the realization of a missed opportunity, the issue of Hungary's "Finlandization" has appeared several times. Straight after 1945 the Russians were differentiating between the countries their armies occupied. Hungary and Czechoslovakia were allowed more scope for action. The post-war winner of the first free elections in Hungary, the Smallholders Party, tried to pursue a foreign policy that was exactly a case of "Finlandization". A non-aligned, friendly, albeit non-socialist Hungary could just as well guarantee the Soviet Union a safe buffer zone. "... I think it is no exaggeration to say that if the communist take-over had not taken place in 1947—48 in Hungary, then in the coming years most probably even Hungary would have followed a foreign policy characterized by rational self-restraint, similar to the Finnish quasi-neutrality", writes an analyst.<sup>27</sup>

This does not mean, however, that such an opportunity was ever offered. Although we do not wish to give a full historiographical summary of modern literature on the Cold War, it is worth noting that the plans for the regional Finlandization of East-Central-Europe were the hopes of the Western powers, rather than the wishes of Moscow.<sup>28</sup> Despite the plans drawn up by the so called "Mayski committee" in 1944 about securing the safety of the Soviet Union with a zone of friendly states, this was only realized in the case of

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26 For a description of the Finnish case see Domokos Varga, "Bibó István eszméi és a finn fejlődés útja" [István Bibó and the Finnish Way] In *Bibó emlékkönyv I.* (First published in samizdat form in 1979. In official form it appeared as: Budapest-Ber: Századvég-Európai Protestáns Magyar Szabadegyetem, 1991)

27 Csaba Békés, "A magyar semlegesség 1956-ban"..., 113. [Author's translation]

28 For a comprehensive historiography of the recent Cold War history see Csaba Békés, "A hidegháború kezdete" [The beginning of the Cold War] In *Évkönyv*: Budapest: 1956. (Intézet, 1999).

Finland. The question whether the sovietization of East-Central-Europe in the form of a communist take-over was the reason or the consequence of the Cold War, is answered by the contemporary dominant interpretation in favor of the second option.<sup>29</sup> The fate of East-Central-Europe was decided earlier than the actual take-over: Finlandization was illusory.

From the two most important scholars studying the role of Hungary and the revolution in world politics, both Csaba Békés and László Borhi<sup>30</sup> emphasize the role of the available neutrality models (Austria, Finland, Yugoslavia) in forming a strategy towards the Soviet satellites. One such model is obviously Austria, whose Treaty of 1955 was signed by the great powers agreeing to the withdrawal of Soviet troops there and Austria's neutrality. As Borhi describes, "...in the May 18 [1956] meeting of the National Security Council [of the United States], Secretary of State Dulles expressed his conviction that the Austrian Treaty would provide a real occasion to push back the Soviet influence. As a result, Eastern Europe would receive Finland's status. The Americans wanted an advantageous settlement and advocated Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, independence for the buffer zone nations, German unification, and NATO membership."<sup>31</sup>

In line with the above described US State Department visions and preferences, the actual news of the declaration of neutrality was warmly welcomed by Great Britain. In a telegram from the Foreign Office to Sir Pierson Dixon, British UN delegate in New York, on 2<sup>nd</sup> November, 1956 the following directives were sent:

We welcome the Hungarian declaration of neutrality and you should seek to obtain its approval by the United Nations.

2. Warsaw Pact contains no provision for withdrawal before the expiration of twenty years. Nor, however does it contain any provision for sanctions against any seceding state. We hope the United Nations will press the Soviet Government to accept Hungarian neutrality.

3. Budapest telegram No. 536 suggests that Hungarians are contemplating neutrality on Aus-

29 György Bence and János Kis writing in 1979 about the origins of the cold war (admittedly without available archival documents) say exactly the opposite. They doubt the existence of a "communist takeover scenario", and think the break of the two superpowers happened first, which finally triggered the total sovietization of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. György Bence & János Kis, "Határolt forradalom, megszorított többpártrendszer, feltételes szuverenitás" In *Bibó évkönyv 1...*

30 See Csaba Békés, *Az 1956-os magyar forradalom a világpolitikában* (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 1996), László Borhi, *Az Egyesült Államok és a szovjet zóna (1945–1990)* (Budapest: História-Történettud. Intézet, 1994), and "The Great Powers and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956" In *Hungarian Studies* Vol. 12, 1997 and several of their other publications.

31 László Borhi, *The Trumpets of Jericho*, unpublished material. With the kind permission of the author.

trian model. This would involve the passage of constitutional law laying down that Hungary declares

- a) its perpetual neutrality and her intention to defend it; and
- b) its intention not (repeat not) to join any military alliances or to permit establishment of any foreign military bases on her territory.

Other governments would then formally take recognizance of this constitutional law and recognize Hungary's perpetual neutrality as defined therein.

4. As you know there has not been any guarantee of Austrian neutrality and you should avoid any reference to a guarantee of Hungarian neutrality.

5. As regards to tactics, you should try to arrange for your American colleague to take the initiative in view of our own difficulties over Suez; but you should give him close and firm support.<sup>32</sup>

Neutrality was, therefore, part of an ideal scenario by the West for changes in Eastern Europe, and its declaration on 1<sup>st</sup> November, 1956 was appreciated. In a similar vein to the British reaction, the French also issued instructions to their UN mission and its representative, Cornut-Gentile, to press for neutrality. The United States, on the other hand, seemed less ready to support the idea of neutrality.<sup>33</sup> The indirect messages of the West influenced Hungarian political discourse and raised high hopes.

The case of Hungary was before the highest advisory body in US politics, the National Security Council (NSC) on its October 26<sup>th</sup> session. Harold E. Stassen, presidential advisor on disarmament, suggested that the Soviets should be given a guarantee that if any satellite were to achieve freedom (apart from Hungary, Poland was also on the agenda) it would not jeopardize the security of the Soviet Union, as the West would not seize this opportunity to provoke the Russians militarily. After several amendments to the Stassen suggestion there were two ways it reached the right ears (although in a much distorted and pacified version): John Foster Dulles, Head of the State Department, made a speech on 27<sup>th</sup> October in Dallas during the election campaign tour. Eisenhower entrusted him to include this message to the Soviets, but Dulles, after previously consulting the president, left out the two crucial points of neutrality of Eastern Europe and the offer that the US would not insist on NATO membership of the freed satellites. The

32 PRO, Fo 371/122379 No. 1482. Published in the English original: Eva Haraszty-Taylor ed *The Hungarian revolution of 1956. A Collection of Documents from the British Foreign Office* (Nottingham: Astra Press, 1995) 160. It appeared in Hungarian in Sándor Geréb ed. *Titkos Jelentések 1956 október 23-november 4.* (Budapest: Hírlapkiadó Váll., 1989), 107, and Csaba Békés, *Az 1956-os magyar. opcit.* 147.

33 See Csaba Békés, 'Az Egyesült államok és a magyar semlegesség 1956-ban' [The United States and Hungarian neutrality in 1956] In *Évkönyv* (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 1994).

truncated message was actually “watered down” to one often quoted sentence: “... the United States did not see the countries of Eastern Europe as potential allies.”<sup>34</sup> It was ensured that Moscow would also be informed of this, so Henry Cabot Lodge, the UN delegate of the USA quoted this passage of the Dulles speech on 28<sup>th</sup> October, while Charles Bohlen, US Ambassador in the Soviet capital repeated the sentence to the Russian leadership, including Zhukov, on 29<sup>th</sup> October on the occasion of a reception there. The Stassen proposal would have been discussed more intensively at the next session of the NSC on 29<sup>th</sup> October, but the Hungarian case was cancelled, as the Suez crisis took priority over it. Although later on the question of neutrality came up again and again, (the October 31 and November 13 NSC resolutions expressed the view that the neutrality of Hungary would be desirable) Csaba Békés still blames the United States for “neglect-strategy”.

On the whole, however, there was hardly any time for a strategy of practical reaction to the neutrality statement to be crystallized, because the military situation soon presented a *fait accompli*. As the West was in any case preoccupied with its own crisis in Suez, when historians analyze Western reactions to the revolution they have to be contented for the most part with pre- or post-revolutionary ministry plans on policy towards the satellites or the Hungarian question at the UN. A couple of general conclusions surface, however, that have recently undergone revisionist examinations. These can be summarized as follows:

- Western leadership was unprepared and taken by surprise
- Responses were lacking a sound strategy and were often haphazard
- Hungary was neglected because of the parallel Suez crisis
- Détente and the status quo were more important than the Hungarian cause

As László Borhi reviews this traditional stand:

Bennet Kovrig asserts that “the prompt recognition and symbolic guarantee of Hungary’s independence and neutrality by the United States...and the dispatch of an international observation commission could have at least delayed the Soviet decision to intervene and any delay would have increased the chances of consolidating the gains of the revolution.” In a similar vein, Csaba Békés concludes that Nagy’s plea for the recognition of Hungarian neutrality was deliberately thwarted by the Americans. According to Békés, “such a move would have elicited an unpredictable, but expectedly vehement reaction on the part of the Soviets,

<sup>34</sup> The English original of the speech is published from the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton in *Department of State Bulletin*, 1956 Nov 5 and *Foreign relations of the United States, 1955/1957. Eastern Europe* Volume XXV. (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), 317. The Hungarian translation is published by Csaba Békés, *Az 1956-os magyar ...* opcit. 122.

which would have seriously endangered the Soviet-American relationship and the whole détente process."<sup>35</sup>

Borhi and Raymond Garthoff refute all of these statements, arguing that no "sacrifice for détente" and no "bargain for Suez" was made. "Although the US response to the crisis was at odds with the tenets of psychological warfare and with many of J.F. Dulles's belligerent remarks, Washington's sober evaluation of the limits of American power and its resulting cautious approach did have a sound inner logic..."<sup>36</sup>

After this short overview of the concept of neutrality against an international perspective, the second part of the paper will look at how Imre Nagy developed the idea of neutrality for Hungary.<sup>37</sup> It did not simply emerge from the "cries of the street" and was not a sudden act of desperation either, but had a sound intellectual, and we might add, "confessional" background. The main source is Nagy's collected writings, proposals and polemical essays, that were first published in the spring of 1957 by unknown editors, entitled: *A magyar nép védelmében* (In Defense of the Hungarian Nation).<sup>38</sup>

Imre Nagy was the emblem behind the so-called New Course, an attempt to reform Hungarian communism starting in 1953. Ranier notes that "Imre Nagy was the only one during the two decades since the war who had...a definite foreign policy program"<sup>39</sup>, although he rarely dealt with foreign policy issues. His characteristic view, that the transition from capitalism to socialism (as a first generation communist he never doubted that it was wishful) should take on unique national forms, was an important element in the formation of his foreign policy views. His first fallout of favor happened in 1946, he was dismissed from government and "put away" into a foreign affairs committee of the National assembly. For a short period, Nagy thus dealt with foreign policy, and took part in the sub-committee for peace preparation.

In 1955, he fell out of favor for the second time, while Rákosi managed to convince Moscow to reverse all of the economic and political reforms achieved until then. On the pretext of "health reasons" (he had indeed a heart attack in January, 1955) Nagy was prac-

35 László Borhi, opcit. The quotes are from Bennett Kovrig, *Of Walls and Bridges — The United States and Eastern Europe* (New York University Press, 1991), 102, and Csaba Békés, *Hideg háború, enyhülés és az 1956-os magyar forradalom*, (Budapest: 1956 -os Intézet Évkönyv, 1996—97) pp. 206

36 Borhi, opcit. For Garthoff see Raymond Garthoff, *A magyar forradalom és Washington* (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet Évkönyv, 1996—97).

37 For a detailed study of the question see János M. Rainer, "National Independence, Neutrality and Cooperation in the Danube Region: Imre Nagy's Foreign Policy Ideas" In *Geopolitics in the Danube Region. Hungary's Reconciliation Efforts, 1848—1998* Eds. Béla Király & Ignác Romsics. (Budapest: CEU Press, 1999).

38 The English edition is *Imre Nagy on Communism: In Defense of the New Course* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1957 Second edition: Westport: CT, Greenwood Press, 1957). In German: *Politisches Testament, mit einem Vorwort von Hugh Seton-Watson* (München: Kindler Verlag, 1959).

tically under house arrest from 1955 and, except for the few days of the revolution, this isolation continued until his death in 1958, first in Romania, where he was abducted, and then put in prison. From 1955, he was prevented from meeting his colleagues, and receiving any information about the sessions of the Central Committee discussing his future, although nominally he was still president of the Council of Ministers and a member of the Politburo. In this phase, however, he was still bound by his communist disciplines, as a "private member of the Party", and his written protests and petitions were strictly addressed only to the Party leadership.

From April 1955, on the other hand, he arrived at a turning point when it became obvious that his whole 1953 program and he himself would be purged. Breaking with his faithful convictions he changed style, and circulated his essays and polemical treatises through his circle of friends and followers. Every new attack on him by Rákosi motivated a new paper on economic, political and theoretical issues. Although the vocabulary and style remained strictly Marxist and Leninist these writings already signal a new approach to policy making. Each of the papers was sent to the Central Committee of the Party, the presidency of the Soviet Communist Party and the Yugoslav Communist Alliance, some addressed to Tito personally. The typed versions, however, were distributed by his friends in Hungary, possibly creating the first *samizdat* texts in the satellites. These writings were then collected in the February 1957 version, while he had already been under arrest for months. This anonymous, badly circulated publication was later used in his trials as primary evidence for the prosecution. In the following section we will analyze the treatise entitled "*The five fundamental principles of international relations and the question of our foreign policy*"<sup>40</sup> written in January 1956.

The five fundamental principles on which Nagy based his vision were originally the so-called *Bandung* principles, as Bandung (Indonesia) hosted the conference of 29 Asian and African countries in April 1955. The term "peaceful coexistence" (or *pancha sila*) was coined there with its five principles: national independence (that is territorial integrity), sovereignty, self-determination, equality and non-intervention. The principles were previously envisaged during Tito's visit to India in 1955 by a declaration signed by the guest and his host, Nehru. Later, in July 1956 Tito, Nasser and Nehru met on Brioni island in Yugoslavia and reinforced the principle of peaceful coexistence. Nagy matched these principles with a sublime 19<sup>th</sup> century national rhetoric, demonstrating that:

... the principle of national independence, sovereignty, equality and self-determination, which from a historical point of view became the cause of masses with the bourgeois trans-

39 Rainer, "National Independence ..." ..., 281.

40 "A nemzetközi kapcsolatok öt alapelve és külpolitikánk kérdése." In *Nagy Imre: A magyar nép védelmében. Vingtairatok és beszédek 1955–1956*. Enlarged, corrected version (Paris: Magyar Füzetek, 1984)

formation and national liberation movements, is not only the characteristic feature of bourgeois transformation and development but an important factor in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism and also in the socialist transformation and development.<sup>41</sup>

National independence thus was “rediscovered” by the treatise, and shunning even the orthodox Marxist discourse a traditional patriotic one was emerging from these lines. The essence of the five Bandung principles was seen as the idea and ideal of national independence and sovereignty, transplanted, however from old Hungary to the socialist one as the heritage of the working class. “The working class cannot be opposed to the principle of national independence, sovereignty, liberty and equality, it cannot subordinate the universal interests of the nation to its own class interest ...”<sup>42</sup>

The duality of social and political change and the struggle for national independence is evident here, or in other words the 1848 tradition of revolution and the struggle for freedom dominates Nagy’s theory (He refers to the vision of the older Lajos Kossuth about a peaceful confederation of independent states of Eastern Europe<sup>43</sup>). Reading his essay it is no longer surprising that in October 1956 he could take on the new role of the leader of a nation instead of that of a reliable party revolutionary. Nagy further explains the idea of what later became widely known as “national communism”, an alternative to Soviet dominated satellite status as evidenced in the case of Yugoslavia, Romania and, according to some analysts, Gomulka’s Poland. Nagy did not waiver when answering his own rhetorical question: “Can the ideas of socialism, proletarian internationalism and national independence be reconciled? The answer to the question is absolutely yes.”<sup>44</sup>

In addition to the strong emphasis on national independence the idea of neutrality is also stressed. Military skirmishes and war do not, in Nagy’s opinion, stem from the existence of nation states and nationalism (as might assume today), but from the division of these countries into antagonistic power blocks. As a small country, Hungary must vote for peace in every circumstance, “it must avoid the country’s involvement in war, her becoming an active participant in the clash of power blocks, becoming a theater of war or operational base, and it must be guaranteed that the nation could decide in these questions for itself in full power of its sovereign rights.”<sup>45</sup> For small countries to be truly able to distance themselves from power blocs these blocs, have to disappear. How? Together with the principle of peaceful coexistence, goes the optimistic, idealistic argument. This and neutrality will help to achieve the ultimate goal: peace.

41 Ibid. 266 [my translation]

42 Ibid. 228. [my translation]

43 On Kossuth’s Danubian Federation plans see *Geopolitics ...*,

44 Ibid. 230.

45 Ibid. 235.

As has been shown, the ideas of neutrality and national independence were already formed by the beginning of the fateful year of 1956. Nine months on from these ideas a political act, a declaration, was born. According to Rainer, "The fact that a politician headed the country who had been considering the possibilities of a turn of direction in policy — which would have assured independence for the country and would have found a *modus vivendi* with the empire- was of major significance."<sup>46</sup>

If we analyze the text of the radio announcement on 1<sup>st</sup> November<sup>47</sup>, all the elements contemplated in the *In Defense of the Hungarian Nation* are crystallized, while the international situation, the reaction of the great powers and the situation at home, all left their mark on the final version. This can also serve as a summary of the main points of our investigation.

People of Hungary!

The national government of Hungary, inspired by its deep sense of responsibility towards the Hungarian people and history, expressing the unequivocal will of millions of Hungarians, declares the neutrality of the Hungarian People's Republic.

It is true that the idea of neutrality was present. An editorial of *Magyar Szabadság* (Hungarian Liberty), a newly founded newspaper with the people in the editorial board who were purged in 1955 from *Szabad Nép*, the party newspaper, for backing Imre Nagy, among them Miklós Gimes, Pál Lőcsei and Péter Kende, demanded neutrality for Hungary on the Austrian model. Revolutionary and workers' councils all shared this opinion. This was after all, a logical outcome of the clear demands for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Hungary, as seen everywhere from leaflets to captions and slogans painted on captured tanks, even before the Soviet intervention.

The Hungarian people, on the basis of independence and equality and according to the spirit of the UN charter, wish to live in true friendship with their neighbors, the Soviet Union and all the nations of the world.

Mentioning the UN and "true friendship", which is just another term for the more high-brow "peaceful coexistence", reflects both Nagy's view on a desirable non-bloc place for

46 Rainer, "National Independence"..., 294.

47 There are different views on who exactly wrote the speech. According to György Heltai's testimony, Iván Boldizsár, a writer composed the text. In his Nagy biography Rainer, quoting document number 9. from *Források a Nagy Imre- kormány külpolitikájának történetéhez* (published by József Kiss, Zoltán Ripp & István Vida, *Társadalmi Szemle*, 1993, No 5., 87.) attributed the speech to Péter Várkonyi, but emphasized that Nagy always actively took part in verbalizing his most important speeches, so it is highly improbable that someone else would have finished the speech.

Hungary in the international theater and the US policy of guaranteeing the non-aligned status of possible independent communist countries as expressed in the Dulles speech mentioned above.

It desires the consolidation and development of the achievement of its national revolution without joining any power grouping.

Considering that Nagy was deeply embedded in the Marxist revolutionary tradition and discourse, the word “revolution” might not solely refer to the 1956 revolution but to the revolutionary achievements of the post—1945 social and economic changes, such as the nationalization of large-scale property. The fact that Nagy’s beloved working class did not intend to turn the clock back is evident in the workers’ council movements. As Bill Lomax bravely argued, 1956 might be interpreted as the only true socialist revolution, creating the combination of grassroots democracy and communal ownership.<sup>48</sup> Lomax, however is unhappy because he does not see this heritage of 1956 surviving, he considers himself its solitary knight. If this side of the revolution seems to be lost for future generations, what can one say about the idea of neutrality, which was solemnly silenced and put in the grave of Hungarian utopias?

A century old dream comes true with this for the Hungarian people. The revolutionary struggle which was fought by the heroes of the Hungarian past and present finally won the cause of liberty and independence! This heroic fight made it possible for our country to assert its basic national interest in interstate relations: neutrality.

The expression “century old dream” underlies our previous assumptions about Nagy’s references to 19th century patriotic rhetoric. This declaration seems to reconcile all the antagonistic concepts: socialism and nationalism, Soviet friendship and non-alignment, Hungarian present and the past, the continuity of which was severely disrupted in the discourse after 1947, leaving only the revolutionary heritage worth mentioning from Hungarian history.

[...] Working millions of Hungary!

With revolutionary determination, self-sacrificing work and the consolidation of law and order, protect and strengthen our homeland, the free, independent, democratic and neutral Hungary!<sup>49</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Bill Lomax, *Hungary 1956* (London: Allison and Busby, 1976)

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.* 262. [my translation] Several other sources for the announcement are available.

Tragically at the moment when the end game almost started, the full program of the Nagy government was ready, symbolized in the clear-cut words of: *free, independent, democratic* and *neutral*. When Nagy had already been abducted from his refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest and taken to Romania, in the torturing uncertainty of waiting, he started to write. These "Snagov notes" (named after the Romanian resort of Snagov) made an attempt to solve the antagonistic opposition between revolution and his own reform ideas. Finally he found a name for the "event": 1956 was a "national liberating revolution", and it was quelled because of the surviving Stalinist spirit in the Russian leadership, and their imperial ambitions. What he failed to recognize was the reaction of the other socialist countries and most importantly China, who went back on their early sympathetic words, as a multi-party system, withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the declaration of neutrality "went too far".<sup>50</sup>

The neutrality program was later, further developed in an already drastically changed situation by professor István Bibó, minister of state in the Nagy government in his *Emlékirat* (Memorandum)<sup>51</sup>, which, however, will not be discussed here for lack of space. There are no better words to conclude this section on Imre Nagy's role in the neutrality story than Rainer's: "Several elements of his concept — independence, regional co-operation, the perils of bloc policy- fit into centuries-old trends of Hungarian foreign political thinking. Its attractiveness is assured by the fact that Imre Nagy — in the history of Hungarian politics- represented his conviction with rare moral force and personal integrity until his final end."<sup>52</sup>

To conclude, we will mention two items. When investigating the question of neutrality in the 1956 Hungarian revolution one must understand how new the international system still was which the declaration wished to modify. Today the Cold War seems to be a solid block, a chilly, long draught that lasted for a very long time, although between 1945 and 1956, the year of the revolution, only eleven years had passed. Comparing it with the ten years that separates us in 1999 from 1989 we must sense the relativity of time. Nato was founded in 1949, partly as a response to the Berlin blockade, seven years before 1956. The Warsaw Treaty, from which Hungary tried to withdraw among heated debates, on how it would be possible without violating international law, was established on May 14<sup>th</sup>, 1955, one and a half years before the withdrawal was announced in desperation. It was only the previous year when several different answers were given to the question of international security: West Germany joined NATO in 1955, but Austria became neutral in the same year, whereas the Bandung conference of Asian and African na-

50 For an analysis of the Eastern bloc reaction see Csaba Békés, "A magyar semlegesség"...

51 István Bibó in English: *Democracy, Revolution, Self-determination. Selected writings*. (Ed Károly Nagy, translation András Boros-Kazai, Columbia University Press, 1991)

52 János M. Rainer, "National Independence"... 301.

tions establishing the notion of "peaceful coexistence" also took place in the same year. This demonstrates that everything might still have seemed very pliable.

The second point is to see how the meaning of neutrality has changed in the discourse in Hungary between 1956 and the 1990s. The key words of safety, pacifism and non-interference were embedded in the idea of neutrality in 1956. In contrast, however, by the late 1990s all these seem to be safeguarded by NATO on the level of rhetoric. As Gyula Hegyi, a socialist politician in the 1990s (although despite his party affiliation his views are shared by the whole of the political elite) argued in his article in *Magyar Hírlap*<sup>53</sup>, being anti-NATO means nationalism (which has long lost the heroic twilight it still enjoyed in 1956), and paradoxically enough NATO membership is the only possible way of pacifism.

To sum up, the neutrality concepts of 1956 did not survive. Independence, freedom and democracy were put on a pedestal, while neutrality was labelled a hasty, thoughtless decision motivated by utopian idealism and a complete lack of practical, tactical considerations (this view probably originated in the Western view, which always treated Nagy with distrust, although we witness a revisionism among contemporary Hungarian historians). When Hungary was again given the chance more than thirty years later to decide on its own fate it was not neutrality, but the older ideas of looking for a strong ally in the form of NATO which prevailed.<sup>54</sup>

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53 Gyula Hegyi, "A NATO népszavazás és a szocialisták" In *Magyar Hírlap*, 1997 July 17. A virulent anti-NATO answer appeared in the same newspaper by Tamás Csapody, "A Nato és a pacifisták" 1997, August 13. This article is also included in the collected volume, *Ámokfutás a NATO-ba*, Eds. Tamás Csapody and László Vit (Budapest: Cartafilus, 1997), 209.

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Zsuzsanna Dákai

## NATO MEMBERSHIP AND HUNGARIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS IN THE NINETIES

A newspaper cartoon put an ironic spin on Hungary's application to join NATO. Gyula Horn, the socialist prime minister, is made to say 'You do not have to worry about NATO, Comrade Yeltsin. Every power with whom we have made an alliance during the last hundred years has faced total disaster.'<sup>1</sup> And yet NATO membership was entered into with apparent enthusiasm. Herein is a puzzle, namely how the issue was so easily and quickly internalized in the Hungarian political arena. There were of course economic and military considerations, but the role and opinions of the political elite was of great importance. This is the topic of the present paper.

### The political background to 1994

As the result of the first parliamentary elections of the post-socialist era (25 March — 8 April 1990) a conservative coalition of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), the Independent Smallholders and Civic Party (FKgP) and the Christian Democratic Peoples' Party (KDNP) formed the new government on 23 May 1990.<sup>2</sup> The coalition accounted for 59.33% of the seats in parliament, of which the MDF received almost 45%. Hence, understandably, both the Prime Minister (József Antall) and the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Géza Jeszenszky) were members of the MDF. The program of the MDF (which provided the basis for the governmental program) set up as its primary aim the restoration of sovereignty, saying that the 'Hungarian Republic pursues an independent foreign policy based on the primacy of national interest and its aim is the complete restoration of our national sovereignty'.<sup>3</sup> They established three main priorities: (1) the program declared that the restoration of the sovereignty of the country, linked with closer cooperation and integration with the international political, economic and security systems of the

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1 *Magyar Fórum*, 9 October 1997, 6.

2 The opposition were the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and the Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ).

3 *A nemzeti újjászületés programja (The programme of national rebirth)*. Electoral program of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, Budapest, 1990, 177.

West was a key objective; (2) it outlined regional cooperation (with Hungary as the center) as an important element of foreign policy; (3) it pointed out that 'the support of the perseverance of the Hungarian nation as a cultural and national community is a special responsibility of the Hungarian State'.<sup>4</sup> As far as security policy was concerned, it set up as a principal aim the secession from the Warsaw Pact, though it was envisaged to be 'a procedure not a single, prompt action'.<sup>5</sup> NATO membership was not even mentioned; the security of the country was to be strengthened by bilateral, regional and European agreements.

This omission of NATO membership also characterized the parliamentary debate.<sup>6</sup> At the extraordinary parliamentary session on the relations of Hungary with the Warsaw Pact, MPs tried to avoid giving the impression that Hungary's withdrawal from the Soviet military pact would mean the intensification of its relations with NATO. In their speeches, MPs concentrated on the necessity for a small country like Hungary to be cautious in changing its orientation. They emphasised that at the Political Board of the Warsaw Pact in Moscow on 7 June 1990, the Hungarian delegation was alone in its intention to dismantle the Organization, while other delegations aimed for reform and modernization. Hence, the resolution which was passed called upon the 'government to start negotiations on the withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact according the article 62 of the Vienna Convention [on international treaties] referring to the fundamental change in the circumstances of the treaty. It is desirable that we arrive at an agreement with all members, that Hungary would not stay a member'.<sup>7</sup>

One year later this 'shyness' in Hungarian policy disappeared completely, with at first a substantial change in the content of political declarations.<sup>8</sup> Géza Jeszenszky — Minister for Foreign Affairs — announced in Parliament on 15 October 1991 that 'during the last year the Hungarian government made considerable efforts to strengthen its relations with NATO, the principal support of the security of the Euro-Atlantic region. The raising of our relations to an organisational level is more than desirable'.<sup>9</sup> This desire was

4 *A nemzeti újjászületés programja*, 184.

5 *A nemzeti újjászületés programja*, 182.

6 Although Gyula Horn — socialist candidate for the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs — first mentioned the idea at the meeting of the Society of Political Science during the election campaign in February 1990, saying that Hungary might eventually join the political organization of NATO. Quoted in Reich, Alfred, 'Hungarian neutrality: hopes and realities', *RFE, Report on Eastern Europe*, 30 March 1990.

7 Minutes of the proceedings of the Hungarian Parliament, 17th day, Session 1990—1994, 26 June 1990.

8 Nevertheless, in 1990, Géza Jeszenszky and, later, the Prime Minister visited Manfred Wörner at NATO Headquarters, followed by the visit of the secretary-general to Hungary. Subsequently, high-level contacts became regular events. Hungary was also offered the status of associate delegation by the North Atlantic Assembly.

9 Minutes of the proceedings of the Hungarian Parliament, 136th day, Session 1990—1994, 15 October 1991.

confirmed at the Krakow meeting of the Visegrád countries<sup>10</sup> on 5 October, and later on, by the Prime Minister (on 28 October) at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council. In Krakow, the representatives of the three countries declared that 'the present formula of diplomatic relations must be widened considerably in order to establish the conditions for the direct participation of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Hungarian Republic and the Polish Republic in the activities of NATO'.<sup>11</sup> This quick change shows that the idea of integrating Hungary into Western organizations had been largely accepted, but that the geostrategic situation of the country had previously made the political elite cautious in reconstructing foreign policy. Now, however, the international situation had changed completely: by 1991 Soviet troops had already left Hungary, and the Warsaw Pact and Comecon had broken up, hence there was no more reason to be so cautious.

The desire for full integration was reinforced in 1993 by Parliament's adoption, by consensus of two basic documents: one on the principles of security policy, and the other on those of national defense. They state: 'building upon the level of cooperation that we have already reached, we must initiate such concrete foreign and security policy and military cooperation as will gradually lead to the creation of the conditions of full-rights-membership in NATO and WEU (Western European Union),<sup>12</sup> [and that the] aim of the Hungarian Republic is adhesion to the existing international security organizations, such as NATO and WEU on the principle of full membership'.<sup>13</sup> Meanwhile, several steps were taken to build cooperation at the military, scientific and information exchange levels. Some of these were of symbolic value, such as the publishing of the NATO Handbook in Hungarian and the organising of seminars. Others, such as the parliamentary approval of the patrolling of AWACS-planes in Hungarian airspace in October 1992, or the signature of the Partnership for Peace program in February 1994, were of great importance.

There was thus, a continuous aim of rapprochement and Euro-Atlantic integration. However, the conservative coalition, whose principal political leaders were mainly part of the 'humanities' intelligentsia, also incorporated the issue of Hungarian minorities in

10 Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.

11 Annex II Statement made at Krakow on 5 October 1991 by the three ministers for foreign affairs concerning cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Quoted in Dunay, P., 'NATO hitviták (NATO debates)', 298, in Dunay, P., Gazdag, F., *Az Észak Atlanti Szerződés Szervezete (The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation)*, Budapest, SVKI, 1997.

12 Article 4, Resolution of the Hungarian Parliament, No: A 11/1993. (III. 12.), On the security policy principles of the Hungarian Republic, (Országgyűlési határozat a Magyar Köztársaság biztonságpolitikai alapelveiről).

13 Article 16, Resolution of the Hungarian Parliament, No: 27/1993. (IV. 23.) on the principles of national defence of the Hungarian Republic, (Országgyűlési határozat a Magyar Köztársaság honvédelmi alapelveiről).

the core of its political program. Consequently, the government aimed to achieve the inclusion of the national minorities question in every international document dealing with human rights issues.<sup>14</sup> They hoped that international organizations would pay more attention to collective rights, and would recognize that the situation and rights of national minorities cannot be regarded as internal affairs of the host country. The program of '15 million Hungarians'<sup>15</sup> (10.5 million inside, 4.5 million outside of the borders) meant the reintegration of emigrants (who left the country for Western states during the socialist period) and an active protection policy of Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries. The improvement of the situation of Hungarian minorities and the consent of the representatives of the Hungarian minorities abroad became a condition for the improvement of bilateral relations with Hungary's neighbors. Although it became clear that Hungary could have serious difficulties over Western integration if it did not solve its existing problems in bilateral relations with its neighbors (for example, Western anti-enlargement voices claimed that enlargement would bring serious security problems), the Antall government failed to sign the Basic Treaties on Mutual Understanding and Cooperation with Slovakia and Romania. The issues which prevented the signature were the question of national minorities and the recognition of the immutability of present borders. Whether the failure can be blamed primarily on the Hungarian government is a controversial issue, but it is clear that unsettled relations worsened the image of both parties, irrespective of responsibility. The Hungarian government must have been aware of this.

### The policy of the socialist-liberal coalition

As the result of the parliamentary elections of May 1994, a socialist-liberal coalition formed the government in October 1994. As the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) won the majority with 54.14% of the seats they nominated Gyula Horn as Prime Minister, László Kovács as Minister for Foreign Affairs and György Keleti as Minister of Defense. The Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) received only minor posts in the management of foreign policy. The new government did not change the growing Euro-Atlantic orientation of Hungarian foreign policy. The three priorities established by the conservative coalition remained much the same as those followed since 1990: (1) acceleration of the European and Euro-Atlantic integration process; (2) good relations with neighbor-

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14 See the participation in the conclusion of proposition No: 1201 of the Council of Europe and the final documents of the CSCE Summits in Geneva and Copenhagen.

15 Révész, S., *Antall József távolról 1932–1993 (József Antall from a distance 1932–1993)*, Budapest, Sík Kiadó, 1995, 103.

ing countries; (3) the representation and the safeguarding of the interests of Hungarian minorities living beyond the borders of the country.<sup>16</sup>

One could witness an important change, however, for under the new government, priorities seemed to move towards Euro-Atlantic integration, despite the fact that foreign policy was dominated by a left-wing party. Gyula Horn declared in Parliament that 'this government will realize the procedure of adhesion to NATO and to the European Union. It will give priority to that aim [Euro-Atlantic integration] over every other [foreign policy] issue'.<sup>17</sup> Since the unsettled relations with neighbouring countries might decrease the chances of success,<sup>18</sup> the socialist-liberal coalition proclaimed a program of reconciliation and accord and signed the basic treaties with Slovakia and Romania despite protests from minority representatives. Showing that they could achieve results in an area where the conservatives had failed also played a significant role. Their main argument was that the conservative government had not paid attention to the sensitivities of the neighboring countries and that such a policy was dangerous, not only for good relations with neighbors, but also for the integration of Hungary into the West. 'We have to face the fact that without the resolution of problems in a European manner, neither Hungary nor her neighbors can enter into the European Union and NATO.'<sup>19</sup> It was thus in Hungary's enlightened self-interest to do everything possible to improve relations with neighboring countries and also to help their Western integration. The recognition that public opinion was not much interested in the life and rights of minorities outside the borders and that Hungary, because of its size and geographical position, did not possess much leverage on the behavior of the governments of the neighboring countries also helped to encourage this change of policy.<sup>20</sup>

There was more, however, than a fresh approach to basic treaties and a more pragmatic view of minority rights. The socialists argued that Hungary was now in a situation to get on the 'right side' of Europe and this necessitated positive participation in solving international security problems. This initiated the playing of an active role, for example, when Hungary held the chair of the OSCE in 1995. During the Hungarian presidency, the OSCE played a role in the movements towards resolution of the Chechnyan and the

16 *Governmental program*, Budapest, Hungarian Parliament, 1994, 146.

17 Minutes of proceedings of the Hungarian Parliament, 58<sup>th</sup> day, Session 1994—1998, 22 February 1995.

18 'The settled relations with the neighboring countries and the settlement of the questions on minorities and the borders conforming to the European norms are indispensable for obtaining NATO membership' contribution made by Jenő Rácskay to the session of the parliament on 22 February 1995.

19 Kovács, L., 'A hazai háttér hitelesíti a külpolitikát (The internal background attest foreign policy)', *Magyar Hírlap*, 11 March 1995.

20 However, one has to see that this policy strengthened the internal and 'Western' legitimization of the 'Anti-Hungarian' Iliescu and Meciar governments, and missed the opportunity to solve by means of the treaties themselves, the long term minority problems.

Yugoslav crises. Moreover, the country showed that its diplomacy was capable of co-ordinating a major organisation. It was also a good opportunity to participate in NATO debates, getting to know the internal rules of the game and at the same time contributing to improving the country's image.<sup>21</sup>

As far as relations with the North Atlantic Alliance were concerned, mutual high-level visits continued. Hungarian military forces participated in several joint military maneuvers under the aegis of the PfP, and political leaders aimed to get the most out of the NACC meetings.<sup>22</sup> These steps, however, simply represented the realization of initiatives begun by the previous government. The next, more important, step was the Hungarian endorsement on 6 December 1995 of the use of a military base in Southern Hungary (Taszár) for IFOR operations in Bosnia. This not only showed the willingness of Hungary to contribute to the Yugoslav settlement, but also meant a permanent *de facto* NATO presence in the country, which could be seen as an additional proof of practical cooperation. The use of the military base did not meet much opposition, but the next step — the participation in the settlement in Bosnia met with a lot more. The request made by NATO to send a technical corps to Bosnia in December 1995 was intensely debated in Parliament,<sup>23</sup> but finally the view that 'our desire to join NATO must be confirmed by actions, too'<sup>24</sup> won out, confirming the engagement of political circles in NATO accession. In addition, the army reform to support NATO conformity advanced considerably.<sup>25</sup> All these steps were taken against an awareness that Hungary had lost the political capital of being the first reform country and that new active participation in the international arena was necessary to improve its image and to enhance confidence and interest in it.

### The motives behind governmental policy

The coalition government did not change the foreign policy orientation of the country, despite the fact that the left-wing — the socialists — were represented by the Prime Minister and also the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defense. Their motivation can

21 For more details see: Lengyel, L., 'A három kosár (The three baskets)', *Kritika*, 1997, No: 11, 3—11.

22 For more details see: Gorka, S., 'Az Észak Atlanti Együttműködési Tanács és a Békepartnerség (The North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace)', in Dunay, Gazdag, 193—209.

23 It was mainly worries like getting involved in a conflict in a neighboring country, and the shadow of history (Hungary entered World War Two in defense of the Hungarian population in Yugoslavia) that were raised.

24 Contribution made by János Sebők at the 135<sup>th</sup> day, Session 1994—1998 of the Parliament on 5 December 1995.

25 For more details: Végh, F., 'A magyar katonai stratégia kidolgozása és fő irányai (The elaboration and the main directions of the Hungarian military strategy)', *Hadtudományi Szemle*, 1997, No: 1, 3—20.

be summarized as follows: (1) there was a wish to avoid the shadow of the past. Most of the socialist leaders were educated in the ex-Soviet Union and had played an active role in the Party during the Cold War, which was not forgotten, especially by parties of the opposition.<sup>26</sup> Hence, any non-pro-Western move risked the reappearance of accusations that the party was Bolshevik or communist. As the socialist party worked hard during its period in opposition (1990—94) to mark itself off from both its past and the communist party, it understandably did not wish to regress in the eyes of public opinion. As a result, the socialists voted for a pragmatic approach in all policy issues. First, this helped them to become disassociated from 'ideological' policy making, hence avoiding getting into conflict with left-wing ideology. Second, it was better suited to the needs of the country.

The policy choice of the socialists certainly showed some opportunistic characteristics, too. It could be argued that the needs of the country indicated a priority for accession to the European Union rather than to NATO, as Hungary looked primarily for ways of securing economic progress and the improvement of welfare. However, owing to external factors, NATO membership became a realizable aim, while EU membership was pushed back. The socialist government had consequently every reason to take the opportunity offered<sup>27</sup> and to make political capital out of the Madrid invitation, claiming that it was the result of their foreign policy.

### The political consensus behind the governmental position

Arguably, the most important reason for the development of the general consensus was the historical experience of the region of Central and Eastern Europe. As László Valki has noted, 'the observer of the region could see that it is characterised by the syndrom of anything-can-happen-anywhere-and-at-any-time, and the lack of predictability'.<sup>28</sup> In addition, it was clear that after the end of the Second World War, the Euro-Atlantic region managed to establish the basis of long-term stability and prosperity, a situation which was to large extent associated with organizations such as the European Communities and the North Atlantic Alliance.

By contrast, on the eastern side of Central and Eastern Europe one could witness the increase of instability after 1991, with the end of the Soviet Union. Neither the economic

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<sup>26</sup> For example, by the Smallholders Party.

<sup>27</sup> — which could hardly have been done without challenging their democratic self-legitimization (see p. 7.).

<sup>28</sup> Much of this section is based on: Valki, L., 'Szeret nem szeret? A NATO kibővítés kérdőjelei (It likes me, it does not like me? The question marks of NATO enlargement)', *Külpolitika*, 1995, Autumn-Winter, 97—

nor the political situation could be regarded as stable, and the members of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) were struggling with internal and external conflicts. In Hungary, however, the economic and social situation, after the nadir of 1991, started to improve and politicians intended to do everything to preserve that. Euro-Atlantic integration was seen as joining a more developed region: it not only meant stability in social, political and military terms, but was also seen as the pledge of economic development. József Antall — Prime Minister between 1990 and 1993 — expressed concern at the Paris Summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in November 1990 about the rise of the 'wall of poverty' after the fall of the Berlin Wall.<sup>29</sup> The image of the wall of poverty, although not in such a strong form, reappeared later on, too as a fear of missing out on successful economic modernization or the loss of the final chance to put an end to the lag between Hungary and the 'developed world'. Paradoxically, NATO — a politico-military organization — appeared as a solution to securing such economic development.

In addition to the fears of missing the last chance to avoid being on the economic periphery, the economic image of the country was also brought up as the justification of accession. László Kovács — Minister for Foreign Affairs between 1994 and 1998 — declared that 'in several countries of the world (for example in Japan and in the US), representatives of the big investment firms stated that for them it is NATO membership which signifies the genuine guarantee for the security of their investments. For them it is more important than any kind of bilateral agreement on the promotion and protection of investments'.<sup>30</sup> The validity of this argument is questionable, however, since interviews with leading foreign investors in Hungary show that NATO membership was not high on their list of vital conditions.<sup>31</sup>

Paradoxically, the costs of NATO membership were often used as an argument in favor of NATO accession. It was clear that the myth of systemic change, which said that the socialist regime had spent the wealth of the population on armaments, was unfounded. Rather the new system inherited obsolete equipment which had to be changed, irrespective of the status of the country towards NATO. Military leaders emphasized that NATO accession would mean reducing a part of these unavoidable costs deriving from the necessity of modernization of the army. The main justification for that was the explanation that a member of a military alliance does not have to establish a fully comprehen-

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29 Quoted in Valki, L., 'Érvek és ellenérvek (Pros and contras)' in Dunay, *Gazdag*, 159—192.

30 Nagy Mélykúti, E., 'A jövőre gondolva kell politizálni (Politicians must think of the future)', *Magyar Hírlap*, 12 November 1997, 3.

31 For example, the head of Audi Hungaria, the advisor of General Electric and the spokesman of the Dutch ING group welcomed Hungary NATO membership as a factor in increasing stability, but emphasized that investments are based primarily on economic conditions. in 'NATO panoráma (NATO panorama)', *Magyar Hírlap*, 12 November 1997, 11.

sive defense to aim for autarchy in defense matters. This is what made military integration efficient and less expensive than neutrality in the eyes of the Hungarian military and political leaders.

The lack of other options also worked in favor of accepting NATO accession. In the years 1990—1991 with the restoration of sovereignty, the country faced the task of choosing its orientation. In the light of the strategic and geopolitical situation of Hungary, five different options emerged: (1) The option of a reformed or modernized Warsaw Pact, but only considered as a temporary solution if the peaceful, prompt, secession of Hungary was unfeasible.<sup>32</sup> (2) Neutrality was very popular in Hungarian political circles especially during 1989—1990.<sup>33</sup> This was based primarily on a perceived traditional and emotional attachment of the population to neutrality,<sup>34</sup> owing to the bad experience of previous alliances. However, the end of the bipolar world undermined the possibility of a neutral Hungary or a neutral bloc in Central Europe. The lack of any superpower guarantee, the possible increase in defence costs, and the quest for self-justification of the European neutral states made the majority of the political elite renounce the illusion of neutrality. (3) The Central-European option; there were efforts to reinforce regional cooperation, but none of the initiatives could become a genuine catalyst of an emerging Central-European bloc<sup>35</sup>. In reality the years of separation since World War I, reduced the importance of factors which could have served as the basis of a genuine regional cooperation (such as economic complementarity, cultural and political homogeneity), but could not resolve the unsettled issues separating the countries (such as territorial debates, mutual mistrust or even hatred)<sup>36</sup>. Thus today, there are few possibilities for genuine cooperation, only for loose contacts. (4) The European option, which reckoned on joining a European Union which was stronger in political and security terms. This option would have handled the security challenges of the region in more complex and wider terms (including deploying economic integration in order to reduce instability), and was more

32 'Our aim is the secession of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact ... Until this becomes realizable ... a resolution must be taken on the rejection of the Brezhnev doctrine... We feel the reform of the structure of the Warsaw Pact necessary.' in Alliance of Free Democrats, *A rendszerváltozás programja (The program of systemic change)*, Budapest, 1989, 19.

33 'The Hungarian diplomacy must formulate neutrality as a genuine future aim.' in the program of the Hungarian Democratic Forum in 1989, p. 157. 'Our declaration on principles considers the Declaration of neutrality of the revolution of 1956 as its tradition.' in Alliance of Free Democrats: *A rendszerváltozás programja*, Budapest, 1989, 18.

34 See for example the long-term effects in the memory of the population of the Declaration of neutrality of the 1956 revolution.

35 For more details see: Pataki, I., 'Hungarian foreign policy, the European Union and regional cooperation' in Glatz, F., *Europa und Ungarn*, Budapest, Europa Institute, 1996, 17—24.

36 For more details see Kende, P.: *Miért nincs rend Kelet-Közép Európában? (Why is it that there is no order in Eastern Central Europe?)*, Budapest, Osiris-Századvég, 1994.

popular in the eyes of the voters, too. However, as the further withdrawal of the United States from Europe and the strengthening of the European defense identity were taken off the agenda, this orientation became unlikely, primarily because of factors outside the region. (5) The only possible and likely orientation thus, remained the Euro-Atlantic one.

Another important reason which contributed to the general parliamentary consensus behind NATO membership was the democratic self-legitimization of the parties themselves. All of the major parties had built their foreign and security policy (and to some extent their domestic policy) on Western values and value systems. The aim of joining the West and Western organizations became an integral part of the legitimization basis of these parties. The word 'Western-oriented' became equal to 'democratic' in political thought. In other words, only those parties which accepted the aim of integration into the Western system could be regarded as democratic political forces. In these circumstances, none of the major political forces could have risked saying 'no' to the quest for NATO membership.

The importance of cultural identity is controversial. Although political leaders, especially conservatives,<sup>37</sup> usually emphasized the importance and continuity of the European, Euro-Atlantic and Western cultural and historical links (from A.D. 1000 onwards), with which Hungary was tied to Western Europe. Judging whether Central and Eastern Europe has its own identity or can be regarded as a region which was always part of Western Europe or Europe in cultural terms is far beyond the scope of this article. One must, however, keep in mind the fact that such a view was widespread among political forces in Hungary especially after 1990, and acted in part as a justification for full organizational integration within the Euro-Atlantic region.

### Anti-NATO forces

As far as political forces are concerned, three different groups of anti-NATO forces can be distinguished. The first group was the extreme right-wing under the leadership of the nationalist Hungarian Justice and Life Party. The second group was the extreme left-wing, with the communist Workers' Party at their head. The third group being the alternative movements such as green movements, religious organizations, and peace movements. The most powerful opposition (because of their highly developed organization and largest membership) came from the Workers' Party, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, and the peace movement, the Alba Circle. Although the style and ideology of the

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37 'The loosening of bloc solidarity and the sweep of the conception of parliamentary democracy in Central and Eastern Europe shows the European identity of these countries.' in the program of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, 1989, 152.

three groups were considerably different, one can see the similarities between their arguments and motives.

The practical background to ideological motives is clear. From 1994 onwards there was a stable 20–25% opposition to NATO membership amongst the population. The two political parties, the nationalists and the communists, which otherwise did not receive the 5% of votes necessary to enter Parliament, represented the opinion of 20–25% of the population on the NATO issue. They had thus every reason to make political capital of this and to try to turn their anti-NATO campaign into a preparation for the parliamentary elections of 1998. In the case of the Alba Circle — not a political party, but a pressure group — their aim can be viewed as a quest for popularity to become a nationally well-known movement. The lack of any coordination and cooperation between anti-NATO forces<sup>38</sup> did not derive only from the ideological distance between the parties, but also confirms the fact they were seeking electoral (or other) popularity.

The ideological scope of the arguments of the anti-NATO forces was naturally different. The Workers Party argued that NATO would help Hungary only in the defense of the capitalist system and that the Alliance was nothing other than the long hand of American dominance, interested only in selling armaments. This ideology originated from their Marxist values and political and economic preferences. The Hungarian Justice and Life Party stressed that the government had learnt nothing from the past and still wanted to internationalize the country but this time 'not with Soviet tanks, but with New York banks'.<sup>39</sup> Their reluctance was often mingled with racist, anti-Semitic and nationalist elements.

When it comes to the reasons given for these stances, we can see the same arguments in a different mode: a mixture of the costs of membership and adaptation; the sale of sovereignty; the idea of neutrality. A possible Russian reaction, and the fear that Hungary could find itself at war with those Hungarian minorities serving in the forces of non NATO-allied neighboring countries, or the threat of deterioration of bilateral relations, were presented. In addition, issues such as nuclear weapons and foreign troops on Hungarian soil were cited by all opposing parties.<sup>40</sup>

38 For example the spokesman of the Workers Party firmly rejected the possibility of cooperation with other anti-NATO forces in his interview 'Mint aki halkán belépett (As someone who entered quietly)', *Magyar Narancs*, 10 July 1997, 12.

39 In 'Mit tegyünk és miért? (What to do and why)', *Magyar Fórum*, special issue on the referendum, 13 November 1997, 2.

40 Leaders of anti-NATO forces published several articles in weekly political and national daily newspapers and their campaign was well reported, too. However, the best way to follow their reasoning is by looking at the editorials of the weekly political newspapers under their control. They are the *Magyar Fórum* (Hungarian Forum) in the case of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, and the *A Szabadság* (The Liberty) in the case of the Workers' Party. As far as the Alba circle is concerned, they published the book: Csapody, T.

The anti-NATO reasoning of the two parties usually remained on the level of propaganda declarations and were less than professional. The arguments of the Alba Circle were more well thought out, but were determined by their pacifist values. One must also mention the few intellectuals who examined the anti-NATO arguments in greater depth.<sup>41</sup> These voices, however, remained quiet since most of the researchers wanted to avoid being put in the same category as the extremists. 'I am against NATO membership, but I do not want to declare it loudly,' said a famous social scientist to the weekly economic newspaper the HVG.<sup>42</sup>

The result was that otherwise legitimate questions could easily be swept under the carpet as the rantings of demagogues. The importance of this lack of criticism can be seen for example when the question of the referendum was formulated in a pro-NATO, rather than a neutral fashion,<sup>43</sup> and, later on, the problems created for the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina (Serbia) during the NATO air-strikes in 1999.

### The beginning of 1997 as a turning point

The beginning of 1997 was a turning point in how the NATO issue was handled in Hungarian domestic politics. Now it was more or less certain that an invitation to join NATO would be forthcoming. Attention therefore turned from external to domestic aspects of NATO policy. Since the aim of convincing the NATO powers that Hungary was ready for accession seemed to have been realized, the government now planned both to collect the fruits of the external victory in domestic terms, and also to ensure that the internal legitimization of its policy would receive a convincing confirmation in the referendum, thus reinforcing their external policy. In other words, their plan was to finalize a successful referendum on NATO accession in order to reinforce both their external and domestic images. These policies can be traced in the referendum debate in parliament as well as in a public information campaign.

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— Vit, L., *Amokfutás a NATO-ba (Running amuck into NATO)* Budapest, 1997, in which they collected the major articles published by their specialists in the written media.

41 For example see Andor, L., 'Az euro-atlanti csomag (The Euro-Atlantic package)', *Eszmélet*, 1996, No: 32, 204—219.

42 'Kí fizeti a révést? (Who will pay?)', *Heti Világgazdaság*, 14 November 1997, 10.

43 'Do you agree that the Republic of Hungary should provide for the protection of the country by joining NATO?' in a Hungarian National Election Committee report on the referendum on 16 November 1997.

## The legal background and the history of referendums in Hungary

Since referendums were in practice, absent during the socialist period in Hungary,<sup>44</sup> they only really began with the change of their political system (1989) and even then only two referendums had been held by 1997. In the first, held on the initiative of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), citizens were asked to decide on four issues. The first three issues delegitimized the socialist regime, depriving them of the human, economic and authoritarian bases of their power. The last aimed to prevent any survival of socialist power in the form of a socialist President. After a vigorous campaign reflecting the importance that people placed on the debate, 58% of the population voted, the majority for 'four yes's to systemic change'.<sup>45</sup>

The second referendum was not so successful. In 1990, the Hungarian Socialist Party tried to achieve the direct election of the President of the Republic by referendum, but only 13.91%<sup>46</sup> of the voting population turned out, thus invalidating the event. The reasons for the low poll were: bad timing (mid-July), and the efficient government propaganda discouraging attendance. The lessons learned from this experience were (1) a successful referendum can reinforce the initiator's electoral position (there was a clear connection between the success of the first referendum and the fact that the voters of the SZDSZ doubled in number); (2) a badly timed referendum can result in invalidity because of low turn-out; (3) relative political inactivity on the part of the people meant that their decision was unpredictable and easily manipulated. These lessons encouraged the political elite to believe that referendums should be instituted with the greatest care and only in very special cases. A corollary was that parties on the periphery of the political spectrum and social groups outside Parliament continued to regard referendums as a useful means of exercising pressure on the parliamentary political elite.

Legally, the picture was very controversial. As elsewhere the referendum was regulated by the Constitution and by the Referendum Law.<sup>47</sup> These two statutes — both enacted in 1989 — left several questions open. They did not make clear the limits of direct democracy — represented by a referendum — and its relation to indirect democracy — represented mainly by Parliament. Additionally, the modification of the Constitution in 1997 actually increased the anomalies between the Referendum Law and the Constitution. The modified Constitution contradicted the conditions of the validity of a referendum prescribed by the Referendum Law. Hence, because of the lack of clear regulation,

44 Although referred to in the Constitution.

45 The referendum slogan of the SZDSZ.

46 In Szoboszlai, Gy., 'A népszavazás alkotmányos helye és a politika (The constitutional place of the referendum and politics)', in *Magyarország Politikai Évkönyve 1998 (Political Yearbook of Hungary)*, Budapest, BKE, 1998, 104.

47 In Hungary: Law No. XVII. (1989) on the referendum and popular initiative.

referendums were able to become tools of daily political battles, instead of serving as a tool for controlling legislative and administrative power.

### The start of the NATO referendum

The idea of the referendum on NATO membership originates from February 1994, when during the parliamentary elections, the Hungarian Socialist Party declared in its electoral program that it would hold a referendum on NATO accession if it won, although it was the only parliamentary party to do this. This intention — since the Socialists gained a majority at the elections — was confirmed in the program of the new government in October 1994, despite the fact that their coalition partners (the Alliance of Free Democrats) were not very enthusiastic about the issue. The government nevertheless declared that 'the further development of relations between Hungary and NATO is necessary... The government desires to confirm its decision on NATO accession by a referendum'.<sup>48</sup> This program also mentioned that the referendum would only be held after negotiations on accession. At first sight, the referendum might seem to question the hypothesis of this article — namely that the idea of joining NATO was quickly internalized and accepted in Hungary — since it suggests that the Socialist party, being a left-wing party, was trying to find ideologically more acceptable alternatives to joining NATO and that the referendum was a way of keeping the door open to other solutions.

Certainly, there were some in the party who favored alternative solutions, but once in power the Socialist Party followed the foreign policy — Euro-Atlantic integration — of its conservative predecessors, and developed a practical rather than an ideological approach towards foreign and security policy. The reason for including a referendum on NATO enlargement in their electoral program was partly the result of electoral tactics, since the socialists realized it could mean many extra votes. They hoped to use the referendum to appear to be 'neutral', whilst gaining the votes of those citizens who were against NATO membership as well as those who were undecided and who might otherwise have voted for the Workers' (communist) Party, which led an openly anti-NATO campaign. Such a policy also dictated that pro-NATO members of their voting camp could continue to feel comfortable in voting for the Socialists. Hence, the issue of NATO was handled as an issue of secondary importance compared with their electoral interests.

The second stage in the referendum issue was in October 1995, when the Workers'

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<sup>48</sup> *Governmental program*, Budapest, Hungarian Parliament, 1994, 147. This was a small step back from the electoral program of the socialist where they stated that a 'referendum must decide on accession' to the European Union 'as the same is valid for incidental NATO membership'. In *Kérdések és válaszok (Challenges and answers)*, electoral program of the Hungarian Socialist Party, Budapest, 1994, 285.

Party launched a petition in order to force a referendum on Hungary's NATO membership, and started collecting signatures in support. 142,540 valid signatures were collected, which, according to legislation then in force, was more than enough<sup>49</sup> to make the referendum compulsory. Gyula Thürmer, chairman of the Workers' Party, justified launching the referendum initiative by stating that Hungarians did not wish to join the arms race which NATO membership would inevitably bring: internal stability and a predictable system of administration were more important than joining a military organization. He also wanted to build an axis of neutrals, with Hungary joining Switzerland and Austria, later to be followed by Ukraine and Bulgaria.<sup>50</sup> The motives for the petition were several: (1) on Marxist grounds, an anti-NATO program was self-evident, and, since they were outside Parliament, the only way for the Workers' Party to prevent NATO membership was through a referendum; (2) the socialist party was a betrayer of the principles of the left, rather than a natural ally, so taking up their initiative and turning it against them was an appealing option; (3) at the end of 1995 around 26% of the population was against NATO membership. Some might well support the Workers' Party, resulting in the party's reaching 5% of electoral support (the necessary percentage to enter to the parliament) since they already had 3.19%<sup>51</sup> in 1994.

The petition put Parliament in a difficult situation. 100,000 signatures constituted a legal obligation to hold a referendum, but there was a reluctance to organize one; a reluctance which had several causes: (1) fear concerning the result. Opinion polls showed that the number against NATO was increasing, reaching its climax in February 1996 (with 35% of the population against), while the number of those supporting NATO membership had decreased considerably (to 44% in February 1996). Apathy, moreover, might have led to an invalid result. Both outcomes would have been a failure for all the parliamentary parties since both government and opposition had confirmed their commitment to NATO accession. Abroad, the Government might even have to face a more serious loss of confidence since their diplomatic image was one of a country fully engaged in Euro-Atlantic integration.<sup>52</sup> (2) The impact on party loyalty if a nationwide referendum took

49 According to Article 10 of the Referendum Law if 100 thousand citizens initiate a referendum the Parliament is obliged to enact it.

50 'Jogi szakértők a Munkáspárt kezdeményezéséről (Legal experts on the initiative of the Workers' Party)', *Népszabadság*, 18 November 1995, 3.

51 In 'Népszavazás jog és politika határán (Referendum on the border of law and politics)', *Élet és Irodalom*, 5 September 1997, 3.

52 Also, according to the Referendum Law a referendum on the same issue cannot be repeated within two years. In other words the people would not be able to decide on NATO membership until after the negotiations on joining were finished.

53 Proposition A envisaged that an opinion-screening referendum could have been held with the following question: 'Do you want Hungary to be a member of NATO?' on the 10<sup>th</sup> of March 1996.

place. It was feared that the three months authorized by the Referendum Law for campaigning would not be enough to make up for the lack of communications during the previous years between the people and the political elite concerning NATO membership. Conversely, previously little known or unpopular political groups might grab the center of attention. Had the referendum taken place in the spring of 1996, it could predictably have caused a great redistribution of votes to the benefit of extra-parliamentary anti-NATO parties (such as the Workers' Party or the Hungarian Justice and Life Party) at the expense of parliamentary ones. Hence, a referendum would have been a high risk move for the parliamentary parties since a successful outcome was not yet certain.

Parliament therefore accepted Proposal B.<sup>53</sup> of the Constitutional Standing Committee on 19 December 1995, which suggested that a referendum then, would not be well timed, since an informed and well founded decision could not be reached<sup>54</sup>. Parliament did, however, undertake to hold a referendum when conditions allowed. It is difficult to say whether concerns about NATO accession, or about party standings in later general elections were more important in this decision. But one thing is sure, there was a consensus on NATO accession to such an extent that Parliament accepted a resolution which was clearly against the law in order to avoid risking an undesired expression of popular will.

The extent to which NATO accession was internalized amongst the elite can be characterized by the attitude of the Constitutional Court. Shortly after the parliamentary decision, the Workers' Party turned to the court to seek legal remedy against the 'illegal' action of parliament. Despite the fact that 'on paper' their position was more defensible than the parliamentary one, at the end of February 1996, the Court declined to make a judgement, stating that the issue was not within its competence. It stressed that the Constitutional Court was competent to supervise all legal means of the state administration, but not to decide single, concrete, issues.<sup>55</sup> This ruling could mean that the members of the Court accepted NATO membership as a natural aim in essence, and one which was perhaps not to be put at risk by an unprepared referendum, even if the law might have seemed to suggest otherwise.

### The parliamentary debate in 1997

The third time the NATO referendum issue arose, was in the spring of 1997. The characteristics of parliamentary discussions concerning NATO in that period were: (1) the necessity or desire to join NATO was not opposed; (2) NATO membership often played

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<sup>54</sup> A decision which the parliament would have preferred.

<sup>55</sup> Resolution of the Constitutional Court No: 3/1996 (II. 23.).

a secondary role to other issues. Priority was given to domestic issues which could more readily influence the opinion of the voters; (3) even when other issues were not mixed into the debate, technical or legal questions concerning the referendum were discussed rather than the consequences of membership; (4) the main aim of government and opposition was to claim credit for the likely invitation to join NATO for themselves and to show that they were the true representatives people's interests. The debates focused around four issues; whether to hold a referendum or not; when to hold it; whether to organize an opinion-gathering or a decision-making referendum; and the inclusion of the agricultural land issue.<sup>56</sup>

Until the end of April, discussions focused on whether the referendum should be held or not. Several specialists argued that according to the constitution, a referendum was only necessary in the case of accession to the European Union, since that is a supranational body. However, since NATO works on the basis of consensus, accession would not affect the sovereignty of the country. Others worried about external factors, such as the ratification process, which could have been hindered by the referendum. The internal debate, such as potentially insufficient support for NATO membership owing to lack of information, or the emotional arguments used to influence the population by several anti-NATO groups, were also addressed. The technical difficulties of organizing a referendum between the two main elections of 1998 (namely, parliamentary and local elections) were also raised. The main motivation behind these often dubious arguments was the nervousness of the pro-NATO camp which was worried about the result of a possible referendum. For the government though, there was no other choice than to stick to the original plan. Failure to hold a referendum, clearly presented in its program and confirmed by a decision of Parliament, would have been a very powerful tool in the hands of extra-parliamentary forces, and would result in a risky loss of prestige. Anti-NATO voices could only be conclusively diminished by a referendum, in which a convincing majority voted for NATO. Consequently, they had to go ahead and make the best of the referendum. This obligation was reflected in the declaration of László Kovács, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 28 April 1997; 'the government is committed to its program of holding a referendum when the negotiations on accession finish'.<sup>57</sup> The same commitment was confirmed on 9 July 1997 at the Madrid Summit of NATO — where the first wave of countries to be invited to join NATO was determined — by the then Prime Minister

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56 While the agricultural land issue did not have any direct link with the NATO issue, it was considered a vital issue in Hungarian domestic politics. The principal debate centered upon who should own Hungarian agricultural land. Timing was coincidental, but resulted in this issue becoming embroiled with that of joining NATO.

57 In 'Népszavazáskényszer (Push for referendum)', *Magyar Nemzet*, 29 April 1997, 3.

Gyula Horn. He characterized the invitation as 'of great historical importance', and said that 'there will be a referendum in Hungary on NATO membership'.<sup>58</sup>

The second question to solve was the date of the referendum. The Young Democrats and the Smallholders Party — both of them in opposition at that time — backed holding the referendum after the parliamentary elections of May 1998. The reason for this could have been a hope of winning the elections and forming the government which would conduct the event, and thus profit more from its success than they would have done in opposition — or simply delay or reduce the advantage the socialists might gain. On the other hand, early 1998 was supported as a date by a number of politicians regardless of their political affiliation, who argued that this was when the conditions for joining would more or less be known, and the ratification process would already have started. They wished to organize a referendum in favor of joining NATO, and they considered that one organized after some NATO members had already ratified Hungary's accession would have positive effects on public opinion. However, the majority of the government and some of the opposition preferred to hold the referendum before the ratification process, arguing that a positive answer would facilitate the ratification process for 'difficult' and unsure NATO members. In addition, such timing would be an excellent tool for improving the image of Hungary, especially since many NATO officials emphasized how important it was to convince the Hungarian population of the necessity of membership. Indeed, this last option was accepted by the parliamentary parties on 10 July, when they opted for an opinion-gathering referendum<sup>59</sup> on the NATO issue to be held before the end of November 1997. Parliament would also issue a declaration in response to the invitation by the North Atlantic Alliance. The text of the declaration, which was prepared by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the specialists of the parliamentary parties, was sent to a general meeting of Parliament on 15 July 1997, where it was accepted unanimously.<sup>60</sup> Party leaders stressed the importance of the issue for Hungary, but mainly addressed anti-NATO forces which contested their arguments. The style of debate had changed. Hitherto, NATO debates had been dominated by party skirmishes. The new consensus indicated that all the parties were genuinely engaged in Euro-Atlantic integration, and had put aside daily political battles.<sup>61</sup>

While there may have been a consensus, there were also differences in nuance between the spokesmen of the different parties. The centre-right parties, for example, emphasised

58 In 'Év végi népszavazás (Referendum at the end of the year)', *Népszabadság*, 10 July 1997, 1.

59 An opinion-screening referendum only gives an indication of public opinion and does not bind Parliament unlike a decision-making referendum.

60 Minutes of the proceedings of the Hungarian Parliament, 293<sup>rd</sup> day, Session 1994–1998, on July 15 1997.

61 It also indicated that they knew if any one of them made a move to question the merits of NATO membership, all the other parties would regard them as antidemocratic according to the prevailing view that 'NATO = West = Democracy.'

the importance of the national interest<sup>62</sup> and historical values – NATO membership seen against a thousand years of Hungarian history and most notably the events of 1956.<sup>63</sup> In addition the Smallholders Party added a populist spin referring to ‘English parachutists’ and ‘KGB agents’. Both liberals and socialists were more value-oriented<sup>64</sup> and were concerned with the post–1990 present, and concentrated on the prospects for collaboration with the West. The liberals took an unexpectedly objective stance, weighing up the situation in an analytical rather than a political manner.<sup>65</sup> The Young Democrats expressed an interesting mixture of national interest<sup>66</sup> and civic values.<sup>67</sup>

The consensus, however, was short-lived. In July 1997, an opposition party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, expressed its opinion that the issue of NATO membership and the question of ownership of agricultural land should be addressed in a joint referendum. The latter was one of their chief domestic political platforms. The initiative originated from their declaration in June 1997, saying that if the government submitted its proposal for the Law on agricultural land to Parliament, they would initiate a referendum on the issue. Some weeks later, on August 20, they began to collect signatures for a petition to hold a referendum which they hoped would prevent foreign ownership of agricultural land. Similarly, the Young Democrats Hungarian Civic Party – again from the opposition grouping – suggested that it would be useful to hold a decision-making referendum linking both causes – NATO membership and land-ownership. At first, the government parties protested that such linkage was as unnecessary as it was undesirable. However, a week later – on August 28 – they backtracked and agreed to a decision-making referendum in the case of NATO membership and to the possibility of holding a referendum on the land issue. They also presented their own version of questions to be asked concerning the latter, in an attempt to take the initiative away from the opposition.

Since all the parties had agreed on 15 July that a single-issue opinion-gathering referendum should be held on NATO membership, this later debate raises the question of why such a change in political tactics had occurred. I believe that the explanation can be found in the rapid internalization and broad consensus on the NATO issue, and the rela-

62 ‘An Army is needed. A self-confident high-command which respects in equal measure European and national interests... soldiers who can represent the noble virtues of Hungarian military traditions...’ in Minutes of the proceedings of the Hungarian Parliament, 293<sup>th</sup> day, Session 1994–1998, on 15 July 1997.

63 ‘Opening the doors to our Euro-Atlantic community membership is the recognition of our revolution and war of independence of 1956 and our role in the collapse of world communism.’ *Ibid.*

64 ‘This Alliance is the sum of common values of democratic countries and not simply of rockets, soldiers and tanks.’ *Ibid.*

65 ‘From 1990 onwards, Hungary has made great efforts to which each government contributed.’ *Ibid.*

66 ‘Acknowledgement of the desire for freedom and national self-esteem and deeds of [Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland] these nations ...’ *Ibid.*

67 ‘... it is necessary to win over ... civilian organizations and the majority of society.’ *Ibid.*

tively low importance of NATO in everyday politics, compared to that of the land issue. There was a clear divergence of opinion between the opposition and the government with regard to the latter. The ruling socialists (who had strong links with agricultural enterprises) favored the possibility of economic societies being able to buy agricultural land, no matter where they were from. The right-wing opposition on the other hand (aware of the importance of independent farmers to their voting base) defended Hungarian and individual ownership of agricultural land. The issue was very delicate, and of vital interest for both parties. As far as NATO is concerned, all parties had characterized the Madrid invitation as an event of great historic importance.

Why then was there a perceived need to combine the NATO debate with another issue, and thereby possibly endanger the smooth running of the accession campaign? Perhaps from the opposition point of view such a linkage was deemed desirable because the NATO issue had already been integrated into Hungarian political thinking and was taken for granted. The Hungarian Democratic Forum might have thought that a joint referendum would have greater credibility, since more people would come to vote. They could thus ensure that the greatest number possible, would vote on the land issue, so that the referendum on that would be valid. In addition, the government, wanting to organize the NATO referendum before the end of November, was in a hurry, and would be more willing to agree on a joint referendum. Hence, a deal could be concluded which, without damaging the NATO referendum timetable, would enable them to gain influence on a vital issue. As for the Young Democrats, they did not have such a direct interest in the land issue, but as the party seeking to be the leader of the opposition, they tried to play a dominant role in the organization of the referendum. They argued that the anti-NATO forces would be convincingly defeated only by a decision-making referendum as opposed to an opinion-gathering one, since the latter did not have such legal weight. Thus they started to lobby for a change in the referendum conditions.

In fact, this argument was not terribly convincing. Although an opinion-gathering referendum was not legally binding upon the government, no government would risk neglecting public opinion over such an important issue, especially when observed by foreign countries with whom it was planning to enter into an alliance. It is likely that the Young Democrats did not want the government to gain the whole credit for a referendum and were thus aiming to stress their sensitivity to public opinion. The government was being pushed by the lack of time and so agreed to the linkage of the two issues, but took the initiative and composed the questions itself. This action took away any advantage the opposition might have gained. Opinion polls<sup>68</sup> showed that the result of the referendum on agricultural land would have been the same irrespective of whether the ques-

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68 In *Amiről a mese szól* (*The subject of the tale*) analysis made by the Hungarian Gallup Institute in September 1997.

tions of government or opposition had been used. Hence, as the composer of the questions on the referendum, the government would be the main beneficiary of a successful vote in the referendum.

On the first day of its autumn session (on 8 September) Parliament started discussing the governmental initiative on the referendum. The general debate concluded on 16 September. At the same time, a petition was submitted containing the questions favored by the opposition, supported by 280,000 signatures, to the Speaker of Parliament, who considered that it was highly unlikely that the referendum would be held on the basis of these questions.<sup>69</sup> However, the National Election Committee promised to examine the validity of the signatures by 13 October. On 10 September, the Hungarian Democratic Forum turned to the Constitutional Court and asked for its opinion on the priority of the initiative of the citizens (their version of the questions) as opposed to the initiative of the parliament (the governmental questions). They also approached the Supreme Prosecutor, who on 23 September stated that the issue was more political than legal, therefore beyond his competence. Following this, the Forum turned for help to the Ombudsman for civil rights. Meanwhile, on 30 September, the majority of the governing coalition rejected the opposition's referendum questions. Two days later, the Ombudsman asked the Constitutional Court for its interpretation on whether Parliament could decide on the government's initiative, or whether it had to wait for verification of the signatures. Later on, six MPs asked for a ruling on whether the Constitution had been violated or not. Without waiting for the interpretation of the Court the governmental majority in Parliament decided, on 7 October, to hold the referendum on 16 November 1997 using as a basis, their own questions, while opposition MPs walked out in protest against such methods. Despite fierce criticism, not to mention the legal problems, the President of the Republic announced the very next day that the referendum would occur on the basis of the parliamentary decision taken effectively by the Government on 7 October.

Here we can witness the unwise haste of the government coalition. They were bound by their promises for a NATO referendum (made both inside and outside of the country) and the opposition appeared to have begun to spoil their plans. Hence they opted for strong-arm politics and tried to push their version through by using their parliamentary majority. Behind their decision was the hope that the opposition would not risk the success of the NATO referendum by objecting to their preferred questions, and that the Constitutional Court would stick to its decision of February 1996 and would not become involved in political issues. They were, however, seriously mistaken.

On 13 October the Constitutional Court concluded that an initiative of the citizens (i.e. the 280,000 signatures supporting the opposition's proposal) definitely had priority over a governmental initiative. On the same day, the National Election Committee fin-

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69 In 'NATO panoráma (NATO panorama)', *Magyar Hírlap*, 12 November 1997, 14.

ished certifying the signatures and found at least 200,000 valid signatures, hence making the petition legally binding.<sup>70</sup>

The Constitutional Court had changed its policy entirely and in an unprecedentedly short time. It had also ruled on an issue which had direct political consequences. This was contrary to its decision of February 1996, but the circumstances had changed drastically. On the first occasion, there had been a parliamentary consensus, and the verdict of the citizens had only been postponed until some future date. This time, there was a battle between the opposition and the government, and the initiative of the citizens was clearly being overridden by the government.<sup>71</sup>

In response to the decision of the Court, the Government proposed the next day (14 October 1997) to Parliament that, in view of the problems of ownership of agricultural land, the referendum of 16 November should only put NATO membership on its agenda. As this proposition would have required an exemption from the rules of Parliament (which needed the 4/5 of the votes) the opposition had an opportunity to torpedo it. After an emergency Cabinet meeting, the Prime Minister asked the Constitutional Court to decide whether the referendum could be held on the question of NATO membership alone. At the same time it continued to put pressure on the opposition to force it to accept the new proposition. At the Constitutional Standing Committee of Parliament, government MPs rejected putting the petition on the agenda of the general meeting. The Prime Minister declared that, as a last resort, the government would decide by itself on NATO membership, without a referendum, and postpone discussion of the land issue until the next session.<sup>72</sup> Adding to the confusion, the Constitutional Court then rejected the Prime Minister's request for further clarification, referring to its lack of legal competence. On 17 October, after another emergency Cabinet meeting, the government decided, despite everything, to hold a referendum but only on the NATO question, and thus the initiative passed to Parliament for approval.

Finally, on 21 October both the opposition and the government agreed that Parliament would examine the possibility of a referendum solely on the question of NATO membership. On 4 November Parliament decided with 323 votes for, and 16 against, that a referendum would be held on Hungary's NATO membership on 16 November 1997.<sup>73</sup> The issue had at last been resolved.

This messy period clearly showed that although there was a consensus amongst parliamentary parties on NATO membership, and that all of them considered it to be a very important opportunity, it was not handled in Parliament as an issue of primary impor-

70 The modified Constitution of 1997 required 200,000 valid signatures for holding a referendum.

71 Resolution of the Constitutional Court No: 52/1997 (X. 14).

72 In 'Végső esetben a kormány dönt (As a last resort the government will decide)', *Magyar Nemzet*, 16 October 1997, 3.

73 Minutes of the proceedings of the Hungarian Parliament, 319<sup>th</sup> day, Session 1994—1998, on 4 November 1997.

tance. In effect, there was so much confidence that the pro-NATO groups would win that they felt able to play party politics over an extremely significant national issue for Hungary. The question of agricultural land was considered more important for the standing of both parties amongst the Hungarian electorate and the debate in parliament was thus used to serve the everyday electoral interests of the parties involved. The NATO referendum, by contrast, was used as a tool by each side for the strengthening of its own position and the weakening of its adversaries, as each grouping attempted to show that its opposite number was insensitive to public opinion. In fact, this attitude reinforces the argument that NATO membership was indeed deeply internalized in the thinking of the Hungarian political elite. Although politicians expressed concern that such political maneuverings were dangerous and risky for the country's membership of NATO, very few of them were prepared to sacrifice perceived domestic political interests in deference to these concerns. At the back of most politicians' minds, it was considered natural and inevitable that Hungary would join NATO. Only when each side had played every possible card in its hand, was the question finally resolved. Since no one could gain further political advantage from the issue, it finally dawned on politicians of all colors that the whole political system was becoming subject to ridicule and it would be in their own best interests finally to bring the issue of NATO membership to a close.

### Concluding remarks

As far as the information campaign was concerned, there were time constraints, there were major adaptation problems, given the nature of the elite debate on NATO since 1989, and the population remained poorly informed about the perceived benefits of membership. Nevertheless, the result of the November 1997 referendum showed that a clear majority of those Hungarians who chose to take part, favored joining the Western Alliance. Though less than half the eligible voters turned out to vote (3,968,668 out of a total of 8,059,039; or 49.2%) the results in favor of joining NATO were impressive. The number of 'yes' votes from the 10,823 electoral districts totalled 3,334,131 as opposed to only 574,983 'no' votes. In other words, of those who voted, approximately 85.3% voted 'yes' whilst only 14.7% voted 'no'. Fortunately for the politicians, the numbers voting comfortably exceeded the total required by the constitution to validate the result. (Over 25% of eligible voters are required to take part, if an outcome is to become binding). Hungary was thus effectively given the green light by its people to join NATO.

How far was the 'yes' vote due to the politicians' input? A key concern of theirs should, theoretically, have been to show potential NATO partners that the Hungarian people were genuinely enthusiastic about membership. In fact, the politicians of both the government and the opposition probably sailed a little too close to the wind in the handling of parliamentary debates, of legal issues and of the information campaign. Fortu-

nately for them, the referendum result ultimately turned out positive. Hungary's voters expressed a wish to join up with the West.

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## FROM PRICES AND PRIZES TO OUTMODED THINGS

Neutrality and identity in the speeches of Austrian Presidents  
on the National Holiday (26. 10.) in the Second Republic

### 1. Introduction

Karin Liebhart has traced the political development of Austrian neutrality as a political instrument in her chapter. In this chapter we shall focus our attention on the discursive reflection and construction of neutrality in the Second Republic in the light of an analysis of speeches made by Austrian presidents on the national holiday over several decades. By examining the diachronic development of this discourse, we are able to trace the integration of one element 'neutrality' into the (public) national self-image; that is, by employing a micro-sociological discursive approach, and by analyzing texts over an extended period of time, we are able to determine changes of self-image present in the discourse, as well as changes in self-perception which were driven by this discourse.

#### *1.1. Neutrality and the national holiday in the Second Republic*

October 26<sup>th</sup> has been a national holiday in Austria almost since 1955. It is the day on which Austrian independence and statehood is celebrated. As Liebhart has described in her chapter on the history of Austrian neutrality, the declaration of neutrality was made on 26<sup>th</sup> October 1955. The date of the declaration was not an historical accident: the preceding day (25<sup>th</sup> October 1955) was the deadline by which, according to the State Treaty, all of the occupying powers were to leave Austria with their troops. Thus 26<sup>th</sup> October 1955 was the first day of official freedom from the occupying forces<sup>1</sup>. Sitting on this day as the legislative organ of a now free and sovereign state, the National Assembly passed the federal constitutional law on neutrality. In this way, the day acquired a double significance: it was both the first day of (official) liberty and the day on which Austrian neutrality was officially declared.

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1 In fact the troops of the various signatory countries had been withdrawn several days earlier.

In the following year (1956), the decision was taken to celebrate 26<sup>th</sup> October as the "Day of the Flag" in commemoration of the country's regained freedom. But this decision came too late for the day to be declared a public holiday in that year. Thus in 1956, most of the celebrations were organized by schools. The federal president made a short speech, which was broadcast to the nation and printed in the newspapers. The National Assembly held a normal working session, but the day's proceedings began with a short ceremonial address by the president of the Assembly. This speech was also broadcast to the public on the radio.

No mention was made of neutrality in connection with the Day of the Flag. It was only in reply to a congratulatory telegram from Bucharest that Theodor Körner, then federal president of Austria, spoke of the "*premier anniversaire de la proclamation de la neutralité permanente de l'Autriche*". There was no such reference in similar reply telegrams made to the Soviet Union and Poland.

In 1957 the "Day of the Flag" became an official public holiday. The day was designed to be a day of remembrance "of the final liberation of Austria and the signing of the State Treaty, the declaration of perpetual neutrality, and the acceptance into the United Nations". (Bundeskanzleramt ZI. 8762 — PrM/57). The federal president once again made a speech that was broadcast on the radio, but in his speech he made no mention of neutrality. Nevertheless, neutrality was mentioned in a reply telegram to the Soviet Union.

In 1957 and in the immediate subsequent years most of the celebrations were held by schools and the Ministry of Education. In 1958, the president gave his speech on the "Federal Celebrations of Austrian Young People at School" to "young people". Then, in 1959, efforts were made by various committees to mobilize the regions, churches, and village communities of Austria, and an even more important act of state was organized in the *Stadthalle* in Vienna, at which various ceremonial addresses were given.

In subsequent years, interest in the day seems to have waned once again. We have no record of any speeches in 1960, while in 1961 and 1962, school pupils were received by the federal president on the eve of the Day of the Flag. In 1962 the federal president made a speech in honor of the "Week of the United Nations". The archives contain nothing for the Day of the Flag in 1963<sup>2</sup>, and in 1964 the President's speech at a ceremony in the *Burgtheater* was addressed to "young Austrians". Neutrality was not mentioned in any of these speeches.

The situation changed in 1965 when the state holiday of the "Day of the Flag" was declared a national public holiday. In 1965, for the first time, a ceremonial session was held

2 We are grateful to the *Archiv der Republik* for its support.

in the Austrian parliament on 26<sup>th</sup> October. As part of the ceremonial session, the federal president also made a speech. This practice was repeated in the following two years, but for 1968, 1969, and 1971—73 there is no record of any such speeches. For these years, the archives contain only the daily commands of the federal president that he made to the Austrian armed forces as their supreme commander.

From 1974 ceremonial sessions of the National Assembly were held every year on the national holiday with speeches by the federal president, the president of the National Assembly, and the federal chancellor<sup>3</sup>. Over the years it became customary for the ceremonial speech of the federal president to be broadcast on radio and television<sup>4</sup>.

In the following, we present our hypotheses concerning the development of neutrality in the discourse as manifested in the speeches of the various federal presidents. We shall then present our methodological instrument and describe the analyses in more detail.

## 2. Hypotheses.

In her chapter, Karin Liebhart presented the historical context in which neutrality was — and is — embedded. Against a background of changing domestic and foreign policy fundamentals, it seems likely that the position of neutrality as a discursive political concept has changed. In what follows, we shall put forward our ideas concerning the changing meaning of the concept of neutrality.

The following (very much abbreviated) historical circumstances are of particular importance as we attempt this: the historical-political paper demonstrated how neutrality arose out of the negotiations with the occupying powers, with Switzerland being regarded as the (official) model. As the Second Republic progressed, a specific type of Austrian neutrality policy developed: the active neutrality policy. In the late 1980s and in the 1990s, neutrality lost its significance in terms of Austrian security policy.

In the light of these historical-political circumstances, we expect to demonstrate three different discourse configurations, as well as two phases of transition (as one configuration passes into the next). In the first discourse configuration, neutrality is regarded as something external that was determined by a treaty and which subsequently defined (or partly defined) the political limits of the Austrian state. In the subsequent “construction phase”, this is gradually changed; neutrality is still not a part of identity, but it is being

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3 Exceptions are the years of 1981 and 1983. For these two years, no speeches could be found in the archives.

4 The appendix contains a table with details of the federal presidents of the Second Republic.

integrated into the identity discourses. Thus, there arises a new discourse configuration: "We are neutral"; "Austria" and thus 'we', the Austrians, are neutral (a neutral country), (perpetual) neutrality becomes an integral part of Austria. Austria is defined with and through neutrality. After this "peak" in the neutrality discourse, there follows a "deconstruction phase" in which neutrality once again becomes removed from the identity discourse. In the end, neutrality is something that was useful once, but is not so anymore; Austria is also something that is well defined without reference to neutrality.

As linguists we assume that these changes will be manifested in the discourse in a linguistic manner both at the level of content, in the argumentation used, and at the micro-analytical level in the syntax and semantics of sentences. These assumptions led us to a series of hypotheses.

Given the (historical) importance of neutrality for the constitution of the Second Republic, it seems probable that neutrality will be present as an explanatory element. Historically, neutrality can be seen as a means to an end. In a linguistic sense, this means that neutrality — if it is mentioned — ought to be found mostly in the attributive part of the explanations (i.e. in the part in which the explanation is made). We therefore expect that:

1. neutrality will be found mostly in the attributive part of the explanations.

At the same time, we expect that the functions of neutrality in these explanations will change according to the various phases (or discourse configurations) described above. We therefore assume that the change in the meaning of neutrality mentioned above is manifested in a change in the specific characteristics of the attributions in which neutrality is addressed.

2. in particular we expect that, owing to the initial status of neutrality (which was the result of negotiations), neutrality will arise in attributions that we might classify as external, and that after an 'inner acceptance' and incorporation into the self-image, neutrality will be found in attributions that may be classified as 'internal'. (construction-phase)

3. In the deconstruction phase, we assume that the loss of meaning of neutrality will be manifested in the sense that neutrality is now less closely (or not at all) associated with the explanations, and that

4. the attributions in which neutrality continues to arise, may now be classified as variable (whereas the attributions in the construction phase — the second phase — would be constant).

This supposition is linked to the theoretical premise that both identity concepts as well as elements of identities must be generally constant in order to permit a stable identity construction.

In general we also suppose that the different interpretations of, or attitudes towards, neutrality and neutrality policy (active neutrality policy) are reflected in corresponding linguistic roles. In practice, we expect that neutrality will sometimes appear in the role of agent (neutrality does something) and sometimes in the role of patient (something is done to neutrality). This, we feel, would be a linguistic manifestation of the phases described above,

5. in which we expect a more active role to be played in the construction phase and during the peak of neutrality, and a more passive role to be played in the deconstruction phase. In addition, we expect that neutrality will also appear instrumentally until the deconstruction phase.
6. We suppose that 'Austria' as a participant in this discourse (e.g. in sentences like 'Austria has ...') will continuously be found in the role of beneficiary, that is, the person who benefits from the action described in the sentence in question.

Neutrality is both a political concept and the product of certain historical events. We therefore expect changes in the concept of neutrality to be reflected in the historical points of reference that are associated with neutrality (or how and whether, if at all, this happens).

7. We suppose that the historical image of the circumstances which gave rise to neutrality, will initially be rather differentiated, but that this image will become less differentiated as time passes, particularly as neutrality begins to lose its significance.

In addition to changes in the historical points of reference, we also expect that changes in the concept of neutrality will be accompanied by changes in the foreign policy points of reference, that is, by changes in the relationships Austria has with other countries (i.e. countries which Austria is compared to or associated with in some way). Obviously, while neutrality was 'strong', federal presidents were obliged to avoid expressing blunt opinions about any party about a conflict, because the expression of such views might have been understood as an expression of support for one side or the other.

It is only as the significance of neutrality begins to diminish that we see references in the speeches to specific states or conflicts. Nonetheless, in such cases it seems likely that neutrality is no longer mentioned in connection with these foreign countries.

8. In other words, we suppose that neutrality initially appears in connection with an undifferentiated block of foreign countries, and that later these foreign countries will be treated in a more differentiated manner — by which time, however, they will not arise in connection with neutrality.

In this study, we assume that the discursive inclusion of neutrality in the identity discourse expresses itself in the close connection that exists between neutrality as a discursive ele-

ment and the characteristic topoi of identity discourses (see Wodak et al. 1998). We think therefore that the change in neutrality as a discursive element of Austrian identity may be linked to changes in the discursive embedding of neutrality with respect to these other elements of an identity discourse. This change is already anticipated in the hypotheses formulated above (in connection with history and foreign countries, for instance, as the role of neutrality changes, it may be related to other historical events).

As was shown above, we suppose that neutrality as an identity-forming element gradually loses its significance. This leads us to ask what role neutrality had in forming identity and whether the function performed by neutrality is now fulfilled by some other element. Without giving a clear (empirically-based) answer to this question, we should like to suppose in our study that neutrality in the identity discourse is partly replaced by elements of a new identity discourse about "European identity".<sup>5</sup> In view of the intensive discourse about accession to the European Union, we should like to propose in our hypothesis that a change in the meaning of neutrality was accompanied by a change in the meaning of the word 'Europe' — a change that is reflected in new forms of application. It remains an open question whether this is just a coincidence or an actual transfer of function.

### 3. Methodology

The analyses of the speeches of the federal presidents are based on the linguistic methods of text analysis and discourse analysis. In order to provide a point of reference for the detailed analyses of the individual texts, a simple quantitative text analysis was performed. Among other things, this quantitative analysis determined the number of times neutrality was mentioned in the text.

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5 Theoretically speaking, we may assume that this discourse would be considerably more complex than a discourse about neutrality. Neutrality is just one element in an identity discourse, whereas "Europe" has its own identity or may give rise to its own identity-discourse, which would then have to be investigated in its relationship to "Austria" and the Austrian identity discourse. Nevertheless, the assertion "we are neutral" could be elevated into "we are European", particularly if the proposition "we are European" also increasingly implies positions on security policy. Concerning the relationship between European identity and Austrian identity, Bruckmüller (1994) makes the following observation with reference to a survey (p. 52): "People who are for the European Union have (..) on average more areas that they as Austrians can be proud of." Basically, this means that Austrian self-confidence is the safest prerequisite for acceptance of European integration with Austrian participation. This comes as no great surprise given that it is only this self-confidence that permits Austria to accept a secure place in the European concert of the future." (p. 52)

Then a text analysis was performed on each individual presidential speech, focussing on the use of key concepts like neutrality, different historical events and so on.

Text linguists and discourse analysts are careful to distinguish between the macro-level and the micro-level of text-structure analysis. At the macro-level, the global structuring of a text is examined (e.g. how the text begins, what follows, and how the text ends). At the micro-level, experts observe the detailed realization (the specific linguistic means) with which a text is structured (e.g. how a sentence is followed by another sentence, which perspectives are expressed in a given sentence etc.).

Our analysis focused on the linguistic position of neutrality (and history) at the micro-level; the textual macro-level was of little interest to us. For a precise analysis (and using the text analysis program ATLAS.ti), we looked at all sentences in which neutrality was present, as well as adjacent passages of text. At content level, the texts were examined for references to historical events, 'Europe', and foreign countries. Such references were then analyzed in their immediate contexts.

Other methods of analysis employed by us included several linguistic methods chosen in accordance with the linguistic features of the passages under examination. In order to describe each of the phenomena<sup>6</sup> adequately, we applied theories for each of the characteristics observed. Such theories were: the speech act theory (Searle 1990), Toulmin's 'classical' argumentation theory (1958), general methods of rhetoric (trope theory), semantics (for determining vagueness and obscurity of reference — also described as a phenomenon with the help of rhetoric and stylistics), the frame theory of Goffman (1981) (at the level of interaction), and pragmatic theory (in particular concerning deixis, Levinson, 1983).

In the analysis of the incidence of neutrality, we used a role theory<sup>7</sup> based on systemic-functional linguistics (Thompson 1996); systemic-functional linguistics — with its emphasis on the communicatively-determined functional selection of a certain realization — was also used as a method of interpretation (cf. van Leeuwen<sup>8</sup> 1996).

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6 Language as a complex system may be regarded as a linked structure of a multitude of relatively independent subsystems, each of which realizes certain communicative functions. The phenomena under investigation are found at very different levels and manifest themselves in various subsystems. This necessitates different approaches to the material.

7 In systemic-functional linguistics, a distinction is made between three levels of structuralization that determine sentence-realization: the interpersonal, experiential and textual level. At the experiential level, verb arguments are assigned roles primarily but not only as lexical restrictions of the verbs. It should be made clear, however, that to my knowledge a complete role typology is still not available; a series of "proto-typical" roles (e.g. recipient, beneficiary) are widely used in grammatical-syntactic works, and these roles may (or may not) be further differentiated if necessary.

8 Systemic-functional grammar assumes that, from a great number of possibilities of saying something, the realized form is chosen because — with its connotations — it best corresponds to the intentions of the

In addition, we also performed two further special analyses on neutrality. On one hand, we sought to reveal the topical contexts. This would reveal to which elements neutrality is perceived to be linked, where neutrality is seen as topically relevant (in the realized discourse, i.e. in the text). On the other hand, we sought to determine the argumentative contexts in which neutrality is embedded. The methodological framework was provided by attribution theory (see also Herkner 1980). In attribution theory, one distinguishes between the object of attribution (i.e. the element that is explained or 'attributed' in some way) and the attribution (as the explanation). Drawing on psychological theories on the functions of explanations for individuals, attributions are then categorized according to whether they classify what is to be explained as an "internal" feature of the actant (e.g. personal characteristics) or as an "external" feature of the situation (e.g. circumstances). By way of illustration, Ralph may help his mother because he is a good child (internal motivation) or because he is rewarded for doing so (external motivation), or Ralph broke a vase on purpose (internal) or because he slipped (external — 'force majeure'). A further distinction is made on the basis of whether the explanations/motivations are constant or a variable with respect to time, i.e. whether something is always present (e.g. a stable characteristic) or occurs unexpectedly, suddenly, or 'just once' (e.g. as above when the boy 'slips'<sup>9</sup>). As for neutrality, we were interested to see whether the attributions which contained neutrality positioned neutrality or something neutrality is a part of as an internal cause or something external, and whether neutrality was located discursively in a variable or constant context or depicted as a variable or constant concept.

In addition to neutrality, we analyzed a few further 'target objects', namely (changes in the representation of) history, foreign countries and Europe in the speeches. Why did we choose these particular discursive elements rather than other elements? Throughout the investigation, our interest is the role of neutrality in the discourse of (Austrian) identity. Identity discourses are determined by a series of topoi that have been described in more detail in Wodak et al (1998). Based on that study, and taking into account the manner in which the discursive elements of neutrality are linked logically<sup>10</sup>, the above elements were selected for closer analysis.

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speaker. The particular significance of a realization first becomes apparent when it is compared to other (non-used) alternatives. In my analysis, I compare realized sentences with other possible sentences; in this article von Leeuwen compared group-items realized with other possibilities that were not used. (For example, an unemployed person is called a "job-seeker", a "social parasite" or simply an "unemployed person".) At any rate, different evaluations are expressed, and these differences become obvious when the various possibilities of expression are compared.

9 The opposite would be: Ralph broke the vase because he was angry (internal, variable) because it was standing so precariously (external, constant).

#### 4. Analyses of the speeches of the federal presidents of the Second Republic

In the following, we shall attempt to characterize the texts quantitatively. We shall then present the results of the qualitative analyses, beginning with the incidence of neutrality in the speeches. Subsequently, we shall turn to an analysis of the incidence of history, foreign countries and Europe in the texts. While debating these elements, we shall address the hypotheses that have been formulated above.

##### 4.1. Quantitative characteristics

The presidential speeches under analysis are political commemorative speeches, as described by Wodak et al (1998: 165ff.). In order to obtain a first impression of the frequency of certain subject matters and concepts, we noted the frequency of several key words in the text. The word 'neutrality' has no brief substitute word (i.e. functional synonym), and thus one may assume that the lexeme will be used when the subject matter (of neutrality) is under discussion. This also seems to be true for the word 'Europe'. Additionally, we examined the incidence of the word 'Austria'.

Since the speeches under analysis were political speeches (designed to invoke or produce the identity of Austrians), we also analyzed the 'We-discourse'<sup>10</sup>. This is not directly related to the characteristics of the neutrality discourse, but does nevertheless indicate the identity-strengthening character of the speeches. We also observed the addressing of the public in the third person ("Sie", "Ihre" — i.e. polite/formal "you") as well as the 'I-discourse'.

10 In Wodak et al. (1998) the following five topoi are determined as the central characteristics of the Austrian identity discourse:

- (i) *Homo Austriacus*
- (ii) Common culture
- (iii) Common political history and present
- (iv) Common future
- (v) (Austrian) landscape

We thought that points (iii) and (iv) — i.e. the political realm — might appear in the speeches directly related to neutrality. For the change in neutrality as a foreign policy concept, it seemed to us that an investigation of the representation of foreign countries and the perception of Europe would be interesting. The historical representation and the construction of a common past as one of the important elements of an identity discourse, which also quite obviously subsumes the neutrality discourse, offered a second approach to the embedding of neutrality in the general identity discourse. For a further theoretical interpretation, see also Benke & Wodak (1999).

11 This (consciously) brief representation is only indirectly relevant to the subject matter "Neutrality". Nevertheless, given that in the investigation of political communication the "we-discourse" as a means of political language is granted considerable attention, we wished to provide interested readers with a brief characterization in order to facilitate a comparison.

The results of the analysis are shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1. *The first column shows the absolute frequencies, the second column contains the figures for a normalized text of 500 words.*

Summary																	
Year	we(p)		we(Ö)		we(p) - we(Ö)		we (all)		ich (all)		Sie, Ihnen, Ihr		europ		neutrality		words
	abs.	NT	abs.	NT	abs.	NT	abs.	NT	abs.	NT	abs.	NT	abs.	NT	abs.	NT	
1974	42	36.3	24	20.7	18.0	15.5	66	57.0	1	0.9	1	0.9	2	1.7	1	0.9	579
1975	15	16.6	4	4.4	11.0	12.2	19	21.1	4	4.4	1	1.1	1	1.1	1	1.1	451
1976	10	10.6	9	9.5	1	1.1	19	20.1	2	2.1	0	0.0	3	3.2	4	4.2	472
1977	21	30.9	5	7.4	16	23.5	26	38.2	6	8.8	6	8.8	0	0.0	0	0.0	340
1978	38	41.2	5	5.4	33	35.8	43	46.6	6	6.5	3	3.3	1	1.1	2	2.2	461
1979	26	22.1	21	17.9	5	4.3	47	40.0	7	6.0	3	2.6	1	0.9	1	0.9	588
1981	13	14.5	12	13.4	1	1.1	25	27.8	9	10.0	8	8.9	1	1.1	1	1.1	449
1983	10	13.4	9	12.1	1	1.3	19	25.5	3	4.0	1	1.3	3	4.0	0	0.0	372
1984	20	19.3	8	7.7	12	11.6	27	26.0	10	9.6	2	1.9	1	1.0	0	0.0	519
1985	22	18.5	16	13.5	6	5.1	38	32.0	13	10.9	8	6.7	0	0.0	1	0.8	594
1987	15	15.4	6	6.1	9	9.2	21	21.5	3	3.1	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	488
1988	10	9.7	19	18.3	-9	-8.7	29	28.0	5	4.8	6	5.8	2	1.9	4	3.9	518
1989	5	5.0	19	19.1	-14	-14.1	25	25.1	3	3.0	1	1.0	5	5.0	2	2.0	498
1990	4	3.0	16	12.1	-12	-9.1	20	15.2	6	4.6	5	3.8	6	4.6	1	0.8	659
1991	15	13.0	22	19.0	-7	-6.0	37	32.0	4	3.5	3	2.6	10	8.6	0	0.0	579
1992	17	11.6	12	8.2	5	3.4	29	19.8	25	17.1	7	4.8	16	10.9	0	0.0	733
1993	8	5.5	26	17.9	-18	-12.4	34	23.4	15	10.3	7	4.8	6	4.1	1	0.7	727
1994							29	18.7	8	5.2	8	5.2	8	5.2	1	0.6	774
1995							38	25.2	12	8.0	6	4.0	2	1.3	0	0.0	754
1996							43	25.4	24	14.2	4	2.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	845

Key: we(p): number of tokens of "we" referring to a group of people

We(Ö): number of tokens of "we", where "we" may be replaced semantically by "Austria".

We(all): Sum of we(p) and we(Ö) = Österreich

Ich (all): all uses of "Ich" (=I) including self-references like mine, my etc.

Sie, Ihnen, Ihr: all uses of second person pronouns again including possessives etc.

Europ: number of tokens which contain 'europ', e.g. European, Europe,

Neutrality: number of tokens of 'neutrality'

Words: number of words of the presidential speech of that year

The table demonstrates that text-length has increased over the years. As regards neutrality, in general we may state that neutrality was repeatedly mentioned until 1978, hardly mentioned from 1979—1987, 'used' more often in the discourse from 1988 until 1990, and then not mentioned at all after 1994. The subject matter 'Europe' was mentioned particularly often from 1989. Both processes will be studied in more detail in the following sections.

In our analysis of the 'We-discourse', we distinguished between (1) the use of 'we'/'us'/'our' where these could be replaced by 'Austria' or 'Austrian' (we/Austrian in the table), i.e. by a reference to the country (thus Austrian people did not count), and (2) the use of 'we' where such replacement was semantically impossible (e.g. because the verb needed an animate subject, we(p) in the table). This investigation was undertaken on the

basis of the hypothesis that the establishment of national identity is expressed by the fact that one's own group is seen less and less as 'a group of people who...' and more and more as a holistic unit, that may no longer be divided into the single elements (or people) which make up the group. The difference between the use of 'we' as a 'group of individuals' and the use of 'we' as a 'complete group' is demonstrated by *we(p)* — *we(Ö)*. A real change from an "individual we" to a "holistic we" does seem to have occurred between 1974 and 1994. We consider this to be a linguistic manifestation of increasing national consciousness as demonstrated by public opinion research.

Another general conclusion that may be drawn concerning the *we*-discourse is that between 1974 and 1979 the *we*-discourse was stronger than later on. There are two mutually-inclusive reasons for this: on the one hand, the changing content of the speeches supported a development in this direction; in this way, in the pre-1979 period we observe a growing 'domestic/internal discourse' (a discourse about ourselves) together with a very homogeneous image of society. After 1979 and the economic recession, the homogeneity of the 'in-group' is dismantled and an increasing number of different groups may be identified within the group of Austrians as a whole (for example, the various generations). From 1987 the discourse focuses increasingly upon events in foreign countries, and there is also a decrease in the number of times that 'we'/'us'/'our' are mentioned. On the other hand, during these various periods, several different presidents held office, all of whom had their own characteristic style of discourse. However, one may not rule out the possibility that in certain political and economic conditions, politicians with a certain style of discourse will be preferred, that is, that certain idiosyncratic aspects (also with regard to the *we*-discourse) result in particular types of personalities becoming successful politicians.

In addition to changes in the 'we-discourse', there are also changes in the self-representation of speakers, i.e. in the 'I-discourse' and its symmetric<sup>12</sup> 'you-discourse' ("Sie-Diskurs"). Compared with the speeches of Kirchschräger, Waldheim's speeches have slightly fewer references to 'I', while Klestils's speeches have considerably more references to 'I'. Although such differences primarily reflect the 'individual styles' of the three presidents, we should like, nevertheless, to point out the interesting coincidence that at a time when the old Austrian identity-providing element of 'Austria is neutral' is breaking down, Austria has a president who once again emphasizes the individualistic elements in addition to the holistic Austrian 'we', and who talks about what 'he' thinks (I) and what 'we' (you) must do. This is of particular interest if one considers just how few discursive options are available for use when it comes to identity. At the time of his speeches, Austrians considered Austria to be one nation; the holistic 'we' was endowed with a certain

12 "You" ("Sie") is practically the conversational dual of "I" ("Ich") — If I speak to someone as "I", then I am speaking to "you". Thus, where "we" is replaced by "I", we may expect that "you" will occur more frequently.

image of the nation, so that a discursive treatment of the image of 'ourselves' could not be managed in a simple 'we-discourse'. How could one introduce new elements and begin a new identity discourse? It would seem that this could only be done by re-introducing the individual element into the discourse. This was achieved by separating 'I' and 'You'. Suddenly, once again there were clearly identified (signalized) persons who can or must position themselves in the new global political context.

After this short quantitative characterization, we shall now turn to the more detailed analyses. We shall begin by examining our central concept of neutrality, then we shall address history, foreign countries, and finally 'Europe' (as a special case in foreign relations).

#### *4.2. Neutrality in the presidential speeches*

As indicated in the section on methodology, four partial investigations were performed for the analysis of neutrality.

Initially, we examined the topical contexts of neutrality — to what has neutrality been linked (over the time period of the Second Republic) and in what context does neutrality appear?

Secondly — in particular because of our hypotheses — we observed the argumentation contexts of neutrality. Is neutrality used in the various argumentations, and if so, in what form? This sheds light on the (changing) explanatory functions of neutrality.

Thirdly, inspired by systemic-functional linguistics, we observed the (semantic) role relationships and the processes of sentences in which neutrality is embedded. Does the semantic role (i.e. the representation) of neutrality change over time?

By their very nature the three methods are categorizing data, abstracting away from the particulars of the context of use. In order to preserve the tone of the particular uses of key concepts, we also performed detailed contextual and functional analyses of each occurrence<sup>13</sup>, now without imposing presupposed categories on the material. Without the previous categorizations, however, it would be far more difficult to obtain overall conclusions from the detailed text analyses. In other words, we need to complete all these analyses in order to describe the material in a satisfactory manner.

##### 4.2.1. CONTEXTS

For this analysis, we examined all the passages containing the word neutrality, and established the contexts in which the word neutrality occurs. In doing so — as in the case of most of the analyses presented below — we did not apply a given system of categoriza-

<sup>13</sup> As part of our investigation, we performed detailed analyses on all of the presidential speeches; for reasons of space, we shall show just three of them as characteristic of certain periods.

tion, but sought instead — in the light of Grounded Theory (Strauss 1987) — to assign an appropriate type to each of the tokens, and to place these types in a uniform system.

While investigating the various contexts, we found that all references to neutrality in the presidential speeches under analysis were either 'historical' (seeking to remind people why the national day is celebrated on the 26<sup>th</sup> October) or refer to the situation of Austria in the world and Austrian foreign policy. In addition, in 1976, 1978 and 1981 argumentative links are established between the two areas — Austria chose neutrality in order to reach its present foreign policy position. In 1988 the two contexts (foreign policy and history) are mixed once again — this time in the form of an appeal to support the earlier wise decision.

The various contexts of neutrality are presented in chronological order in Table 2.

TABLE 2

Year	Foreign countries	History	The two connected
1974	X		
1975	X		
1976	X	X	X
1977			
1978			X
1979			X
1980			
1981			X
1982			
1983			
1984			
1985		X	
1986		X	
1987			
1988	X	X	X
1989	X		
1990	X		
1991			
1992			
1993	X		
1994	X		
1995			
1996			

It seems that before 1981 the context was both historical and foreign policy-based, from 1982 until 1988 it was mainly historical, and thereafter it was primarily foreign policy-based. If one examines the individual passages in detail, one finds that until 1982 history was usually mentioned in the above argumentative context, i.e. we chose neutrality in 1955 in order to produce a certain positive foreign policy image. From 1982 reference is made only to the day itself, while its function in foreign policy is ignored. From 1988 the foreign policy function is mentioned once again — both in the defense of neutrality and in a rejection of neutrality. Finally, it is declared obsolete after 1990. By this time the historical base of neutrality is of no significance.

In general, the foreign policy points of reference for neutrality are very vaguely formulated (see also the section on foreign countries). Neutrality helps (or is in the interest of) 'Europe and the world'. It is only in 1988 and 1989 that concrete references to the European Union are made and that the Iron Curtain and the territories beyond the country's eastern borders are mentioned (1989).

#### 4.2.2. EXPLANATORY CONTEXTS

TABLE 3

	Object of attribution	Attribution	Classification
1974	(International esteem $\leftarrow$ ) tasks	That fall to us in Europe and elsewhere owing to the perpetual neutral status of Austria.[we are respected <i>because</i> we are neutral]	External, constant
1975	to retain the international function	Based on the perpetual neutral status [We can keep X, <i>because</i> we are neutral]	Internal, constant
1976	to preserve our independence for the future and under any circumstances.	That neutrality shall be a means that will help us [We can preserve independence (we hope) <i>because</i> we are neutral]	External, constant
	The survival of Austria	is therefore closely connected with neutrality [Austria exists, <i>because</i> we are neutral]	External, constant
	And they have obtained a significance even for the other states of Europe	has through this neutrality [Austria has significance ..., <i>because</i> it is neutral].	External, constant
1977	NA		
1978	NoArg		
1979	NoArg		
1980	-		
1981	[We have] known very well how to be effective in the international economic and political field.	Our perpetual neutrality was of great assistance to us in this. [We have been able to be effective	Internal, constant

		<i>because</i> neutrality has helped us to be so.)	
1982	–		
1983	NA		
1984	NA		
1985	NoArg		
1986	To celebrate the national holiday	In commemoration of the neutrality resolution [because neutrality was decided upon at that time]	Internal, constant
1987	NA		
1988	To celebrate the national holiday	In commemoration of the neutrality resolution	Internal, constant
1989	NoArg		
1990	There is thus no reason to question it [neutrality].	[because it] has given the world an unmistakable profile	Internal, constant
1991	NA		
1992	NA		
1993	In recent days, voices have been heard claiming that 26 <sup>th</sup> October is a date that is perhaps outmoded	Because neutrality has lost its original significance.	Internal, constant
1994	NoArg		
1995	NA		
1996	NA		

Key: NA: Neutrality not used at all in the text  
 NoArg: No use of neutrality in any argumentation  
 -: No text available for this year

As in the case of the context-analysis, in this analysis all passages of the text mentioning neutrality were investigated. The clauses were then analyzed in accordance with the attribution theory presented in the methodological section.

Table 3<sup>14</sup> provides an overview of the explanatory contexts in which neutrality arose. The trend that we had indicated in our hypotheses was only partially substantiated: — although a shift from ‘external’ to ‘internal’ is very noticeable, a change from ‘constant’ to ‘variable’ is not clearly recognizable. Nevertheless, the following conclusions may be drawn: between 1979 and 1985 neutrality is rarely present in arguments, and thereafter

14 In the table, in order to facilitate comprehension, the explanations are displayed in paraphrased form in square brackets in the attributions column. As shown by these examples, for the presence of an explanation in the sense of attribution theory, a corresponding marking as an explanation on the surface of the text is not necessary; see Herkner 1980, Titscher et al. 1997.

the variety of arguments is reduced to one explanation, namely why the national day is celebrated on this particular day (1986, 1988, 1993). This is very different from the previous explanations that seek to explain Austria's place in the world through references to the country's neutral status. Such explanations gave meaning to neutrality through the causal relationship that was established between the external image of Austria and neutrality. Explanations of why the national day is celebrated on this particular day are incapable of doing this — they instead tend to assume a background knowledge that is accepted by all. The national day simply 'makes sense' because of neutrality (and any further explanation of why neutrality makes sense is perceived as superfluous).

This new attitude that neutrality is a matter of fact, is expressed through the absence of explanatory arguments containing neutrality rather than through changes in the attributions and the role of neutrality therein.

An exception among all the attributions is the explanation given in 1990. In 1990 neutrality itself becomes, for the first and only time, the object of attribution. This clearly shows that by this time neutrality is no longer the matter of course that it was in previous years.

#### 4.2.3. ANALYSIS OF THE ROLES AND PROCESSES

Our third analysis of the incidence of neutrality in the various speeches, addresses the roles given to neutrality in a sentence. Here we distinguish between the agent (someone who does something), the patient (someone to whom something is done), the instrument (the means in the transaction), the beneficiary<sup>15</sup> (the person who benefits from the transaction), and the transfer object (the object that is transferred).

Table 4 gives an overview of the ways in which neutrality is used. In addition to the roles of neutrality, we have also noted the incidence of evaluations and have included (for readers familiar with functional linguistics) the lexeme denoting on the process of the transaction.

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15 In works dealing with syntactic features, "recipient" is often used instead of "beneficiary". It should be noted that in prototypical transactions the meaning of the two words is indeed the same.

TABLE 4: *Agents, Beneficiaries, Patients, and other roles.*

Year	Agent	Beneficiary	Patient	Instrument	Transfer object	Process
1974	-		we	NEUTRALITY	tasks	fallen to
1975	our republic	-	international function	NEUTRALITY		retained
1976	National Assembly		NEUTRALITY			proclaimed
	NEUTRALITY				our independence	help to preserve
		The existence of Austria	this NEUTRALITY			closely connected to/with
		Austria		Through NEUTRALITY	meaning	received
1978	NEUTRALITY	our republic, Europe			worthy task	mediated
	National Assembly		LAW ON NEUTRALITY			decided upon
1981	NEUTRALITY	us				it was a help
1985	National Assembly		LAW ON NEUTRALITY			decided upon
1986						
1988	National Assembly		STATUS OF NEUTRALITY			decided upon
	—		OUR NEUTRALITY POLICY			enjoys
	Austria		OUR UNDERSTANDING OF NEUTRALITY			is decisive compatibility
1989	NEUTRALITY		process of reform in the East			was helpful for
1990	NEUTRALITY	us			room for maneuver	makes possible
1992	Austria W		ITS NEUTRALITY			understood as
1992	we K		CONTENT AND FUTURE OF OUR NEUTRALITY			consider
	situation in Europe		DEVELOPMENT OF NEUTRALITY			promotes
1993	neutrality		Original meaning			lost
1994			(neutrality)			does not hold out

The table demonstrates that particularly in the early 1970s neutrality was a means (besides being a patient). It then became something more active, something that produces something for you — a kind of transformed means function, in which the instrumental role manifests itself in the corresponding verb (mediated, made possible). Very soon, however, neutrality also appears in a passive context — in references to the formal neutrality resolution. This discursive role — i.e. that of patient — is retained even in 1988 when emphasizing the role of neutrality in order to stress its importance. In the two following years, when again neutrality is defended, the active nature of neutrality is emphasized. Thereafter, the then new president Thomas Klestil proposes a change in the meaning of neutrality: neutrality once again appears in the patient position, but now even as a PP to another object. This indicates linguistically the desired transformation of neutrality. Neutrality is no longer directly understood in the discourse. Instead, several variants and aspects of neutrality (neutrality's content and further development, etc.) have become the subject of discussion.

We should now like to illuminate this brief description with the help of conceptual maps.

FIGURE 1





Figure 1 shows the situation between 1974 and 1976. Neutrality appears above all as a means in an instrumental role. The exception to this is a report explaining how neutrality arose ("the National Assembly proclaims"). In 1976 an identity relationship is established between neutrality and the existence of Austria. Of decisive importance, however, is the fact that neutrality in relation to "us" is always a means. This changes in the following years as the broken arrow in Fig. 1 indicates. Neutrality begins to appear in the role of agent.


FIGURE 2



In a complementary manner, the original means function of neutrality is expressed in corresponding verbs. Several of the connections shown in Fig. 1 continue to be used — the National Assembly (agent or patient) continues to proclaim neutrality (patient). The representation of this predominantly historical relation did not change over time.


On the other hand, the means function, which has now found expression in the verb with an argument position for a transfer object, is expressed in an even more condensed manner. The verb and the additional argument are nominalized (see the circle in Fig. 2). In 1981 the phrase used is simply “was a help”.

FIGURE 3



In all of these cases, “we” (i.e. “us”) was a patient. In 1988 even this changes.


FIGURE 4



“Our neutrality policy” may be seen against the background of what came before as a grammatical metaphor in which what had been the patient suddenly becomes a possessive, and the aiding function of neutrality in the composite “neutrality-policy”. This construction is now incorporated as a patient by a non-realized agent.

In 1988 a completely new perspective on neutrality is adopted. (Fig. 5)

FIGURE 5



Here, for the first time, neutrality is “our” (as AGENT) patient, and it is we who may decide what neutrality is. This new position on neutrality is also subsequently expressed in a change of the processes — two verbs from 1992 (understood, consider) are both mental, intentional verbs, with neutrality in the patient role, i.e. in the scope of the intentional verb. Thus, the negotiability (or non-clarity) of the denotation of neutrality also becomes manifest in a linguistic (semantic) manner.

In the following years, inasmuch as it is mentioned at all as a word, neutrality never appears in relation to “us”. Having been detached from “us”, neutrality is now portrayed as something that is rather superfluous.

#### 4.2.4. FOUR EXAMPLES OF DETAILED ANALYSIS

In what follows, we present four detailed analyses, each of which illuminates a particular neutrality discourse at a certain political and historical point in time.

##### Neutrality — a foreign element: 1974

*P 1: P1\_74.txt — 1:17 (58:63) Our republic of Austria has a good reputation in the international field as well, because we are really able to fulfill the tasks that have fallen to us in Europe and elsewhere in the world as a result of perpetual neutrality.*

As in many of the subsequent years (see the table in the quantitative section), in 1974 neutrality is only mentioned once in the text in a section on the status of Austria abroad.

In the passage in question neutrality appears in a subordinated sentence, which for its part qualifies an explanation. In the following, an attempt is made to examine in more detail the structure of the sentence in question, as well as the role of neutrality in the sentence.

The sentence cited above is made up of three clauses:

A Our republic has a good reputation in the international field as well

B we are really in a position to fulfill those (certain) tasks

C (tasks) that have fallen to us in Europe and elsewhere in the world as a result of perpetual neutrality.

The relationship between these clauses is (a) explanatory between A and B, and (b) elaboratory between B and C. If one considers an object that is the subject of explanation to be the focus element, and an assigned explanation (warrant) as supportive background information, then neutrality as an even more embedded elaboration in this sentence structure appears — in terms of information — to be in the background.

The analyzed sentence (henceforth (1)) is itself embedded in a larger argumentation, and constitutes a continuation of a series (list) of arguments indicating why one may view one's own achievements "with satisfaction". (This explains the "as well" in A). Thus, in (1) a positive evaluation ("good") of a characteristic that is already positive in a lexical sense ("reputation") is expressed, the possessive of which ("has") is attributed to the republic, which in turn belongs to "us". In the concrete realm, "possessivity" is a transitive relation (if I (A) possess something (B) that possesses something else (C), then I (A) also possess this latter item (C)). In the case of abstract notions (like respect/reputation) a positive evaluation of the republic can only be conferred upon "us" through a metaphorical interpretation, or through a metonymic interpretation of "our republic".

B explains the positive evaluation made in A, and at the same time indicates that this should be regarded as something requiring explanation. It is still not obvious that Austria has a good reputation in the international field as well. The fact that this is not obvious is shown by the use of "really" in B. The word "really" explicitly denotes factuality, but its usage again calls into question the extent to which the statement is obvious in a factual sense. This is particularly true given that the preceding "as well" serves, in an adverbial sense, as an intensifier, thus further strengthening the word "really". What is being indirectly disputed and refuted is not the international respect enjoyed by Austria but the capability of Austria to fulfill the tasks it faces. If this capability is not seen as obvious, it follows that the consequence of this capability is also called into question — in this case the reputation of Austria.

The uncertainty surrounding one's own position is expressed in another lexical element. Each utterance, forms part of a series of decisions concerning various alternative utterances. By comparing the various alternative utterances, it is possible to elaborate which meaning was chosen (or not chosen) consciously or unconsciously through the rejection of another variant and through the choice of the components used.

In B. the speaker could have used the following variants:  
 B'. (because) we can also really fulfill the (certain) tasks.

Unlike B, B' emphasizes the intrinsic capability of the agents. "Can" is usually understood to indicate a constant proficiency on the part of the agent, and is also positively connoted. Meanwhile, "in a position to" links a successful outcome to the situational circumstances, rather than to the proficiency of the agent. The agent is placed in an abstract area, which is expressed grammatically through the use of the local prepositional phrase. Locality is, however, an item of variable size, and something that may also contain random elements. In this way, however, capability is deprived of its matter-of-factness — just as before in the case of "as well" and "really". It might easily have been the case that we were "not in a position to" — at any rate, rather than us (or our characteristics), the decisive factor comprises external circumstances.

The determining of the circumstances in B as "external" is achieved lexically through "tasks". Unlike "intentions" or "responsibilities", "tasks" are usually something that are given to people (from outside); one tends only rarely to give "tasks" to oneself. The distance to tasks introduced from outside is also expressed through the use of word "those" (Helbig & Buscha, 1991: 363), instead of the more neutral (in terms of distance) word "the".

The tasks that have been placed at some distance are made more precise by C. In order to elaborate the functional relationships in greater depth, it is possible to reformulate C syntactically (whilst largely retaining the semantics) as demonstrated by C'.

- C'. a) We have been assigned tasks  
 b) in Europe as well as elsewhere in the world  
 c) by perpetual neutrality

C'.a) is a ditransitive passive construction with agent deletion in which "we" appear as the recipients of the external tasks (as outlined above). The passive describes a resultative situation in which "we" are the recipients of the (grammatical) patient "tasks". This produces an interesting contrast, given that the transferred patient "tasks" are closely connected with a series of typical activities (to perform a task, etc.) that are evoked through the mentioning of the lexeme (Devlin & Rosenberg 1996) and which place the passive recipient ("us") in the role of agent. At the same time, however, in C'.a) the passive nature of the recipient is emphasized through the corresponding verb, which unlike other ditransitives has no symmetrical analogue in which the recipient becomes the agent (e.g. give-take). The word "assigned" [*Zukommen*] implies — or, more weakly — associates no other perspective in which the recipient would be active in some way or another.

C'.b) determines more precisely the tasks in one dimension — their spatial dimension — with the focus on Europe.

C'c) finally defines the instrument that made possible or determined the transfer-action in C'.a) "As a result of perpetual neutrality" tasks have been assigned to us. Without perpetual neutrality, we would have no tasks. Nonetheless, neutrality is an instrument rather than an agent. It is not neutrality that has given us the tasks, even though they have been assigned to us as a result of neutrality. The specific role that neutrality plays in this process remains open. Nevertheless, in general the role of the instrument implicitly introduces an agent, since there has to be an agent who performs the action (with the assistance of the instrument). Additionally, the instrument itself limits the possible denotation of the agent (who has to be someone capable of doing something with the instrument). Thus, in the present case, the agents must be able to do something with or through neutrality.

If we consider the recent historical context — in which neutrality was the subject of negotiations between and with the four occupying powers — we may conclude that the agents (at least for the recipients of the text) were these occupying powers.

In summary, an analysis of the speech of 1974 gives the following picture: Through neutrality, which in a historical sense was accepted for political reasons in an agreement with and between the occupying powers, "we" receive tasks (from the occupying powers) that are considered as something external to "us" and which "we" can perform at present for whatever reason. Beneath this uncertainty lies a threat, because — by definition — tasks are something that must be fulfilled or performed, yet in the speech we do not find certainty that "we" are indeed capable of doing this. Thus, the discourse of 1974 does contain a threat to us "stemming from" neutrality, for neutrality places tasks upon "us" which "we" may one day no longer be able to cope with. Meanwhile, "our" status abroad seems to be linked to "our" ability to manage these tasks.

In the following years, neutrality becomes increasingly a matter of fact. In 1979 there is even a change in the way neutrality is referred to: 'this neutrality' becomes 'our neutrality'. From 1978, neutrality is no longer to be found in an argumentation which is signalled on the textual surface (as opposed to the more implicit form of argumentation discerned in attribution theory.)

#### Neutrality as a matter of fact — 1981

P 6: P1\_81.txt — 6:33 (48:50) (... we experience that we as a small country in the politically difficult center of Europe have known very well how to be effective in the international economic and political field.)

*Our perpetual neutrality, the taking effect of which 26 years ago, is commemorated by the national day, was of great assistance to us in this.*

- A Our perpetual neutrality was of great assistance to us in this  
 B The taking effect of which 26 years ago, is commemorated by the national day.

In 1981, neutrality is mentioned in passing. Placed after a longer account, the remark is made that neutrality was of great assistance in this. However, the circumstance itself could have been exposed in a discursive sense without neutrality, that is, neutrality is not given discursively the significance that would have required that it should be directly added to the circumstance as, for example, an adverbial addition or a causal statement. In the final clause, (A.) neutrality is identified as a means: neutrality was of assistance. Of particular interest here is the tense used — “neutrality was of assistance” — in order to reach a certain position which continues to hold. The antecedent clause, however, appears in the present perfect tense, and its meaning is clearly to be understood in a perfective sense rather than a preterite sense, that is, the speaker’s intention is not to emphasize that something happened in the past (preterite) but to indicate a state of being that is the consequence of certain actions and that continues to exist in the present (perfective aspect).

Unlike in previous years, the relationship between “us” and “neutrality” has moved considerably. Neutrality is “our neutrality” and assists “us” (rather than “our republic” as before). Since neutrality was not mentioned in the years in between, we are unable to follow this development in detail. Nevertheless, this change is a further sign of the matter-of-factness of neutrality — as something that belongs to “us” anyway, which does not have to be mentioned additionally. Why then is neutrality mentioned again in 1981? We suppose that this — as in the two subsequent years when neutrality is mentioned — is done in reference to the date, in a metaphorical recognition (or by way of implicit argumentation) of why the national day fell on this day rather than on any other day. This interpretation is also supported by the fact that in 1985 and 1986 neutrality is mentioned relatively early in the two speeches, i.e. at a time when speakers still engage in making the very relevance of the speech explicit.

Turning back to this particular piece of text, we find the relationship established in B between the national holiday and neutrality of additional interest. The reference used here is extremely vague — the “taking effect of neutrality” is commemorated, but no further specification is given. In this way — and in contrast to the immediately preceding years — the definition of neutrality becomes less clear. Is there something which exists, something that is effective before this act? Does neutrality therefore exist before the legislative act?

Within a discourse of identity, such a timelessness of a concept seems quite effective (stabilizing the identity), but in the following years the formulation of 1978<sup>16</sup> is repeated (in 1985 in a nominalized form).

16 “it [the national holiday, GB] reminds us of that 26<sup>th</sup> October 1955, on which the Austrian National Assembly voted in favor of the federal constitutional law on the neutrality of Austria,” (1978).

In summary, we may conclude for 1981 that the distance between “us” and neutrality has disappeared and that neutrality is now “our neutrality”. Although neutrality hardly appears discursively in the sense of being a matter of fact, given the way in which neutrality appears in 1981, it still seems to be active as a means.

In the second half of the 1980s, neutrality was often disputed in the public political discourse, as the country sought to become a member of the European Community (later European Union). Dr Kurt Waldheim, who was federal president during this period, proved to be a strong supporter of neutrality. His speeches (including those of 1988) are distinguished by an intensive attempt to portray neutrality as something valuable.

### Neutrality-threat and defense. 1988

In 1988 neutrality is mentioned in two separate passages of the text. It is mentioned for the first time at the beginning of the speech as part of an historical review, and then for a second time in connection with accession to the European Union. In the first passage, the significance of neutrality is briefly addressed and the emotional value of neutrality discursively strengthened.

*P12: P1\_88.txt — 12:29 (7:9) We commemorate on this national day 26<sup>th</sup> October 1955, on which day the Austrian parliament, that was once again free and independent, voted for the status of our perpetual neutrality. (In this way we unanimously established a foreign policy as a matter of fact, which had not existed at the beginning of the history of our republic 70 years ago.)*

However, at this point we wish to examine particularly the second passage of the text, in which Waldheim explicitly argues for the retention of neutrality.

*P12: P1\_88.txt — 12:25 (35:44) If the federal government — after thorough consultations — strives for the accession of Austria to the European Community, our neutrality remains an indispensable basis. Let me make one thing clear in this connection: it is exclusively a matter for Austria to decide what is reconcilable with our understanding of neutrality and what is not.*

*For 33 years our policy of neutrality has enjoyed a high degree of credibility. If we prepare next year to begin negotiations with the European Union, we do not come as the makers of a petition.*

- A If the federal government strives for the accession of Austria to the European Community,
- B after thorough consultations,
- C our neutrality continues to be an indispensable basis.
- D Let me make one thing clear in this connection:
- E It is exclusively a matter for Austria to decide,

F what is reconcilable with our understanding of neutrality and what is not.

G For 33 years our policy of neutrality has enjoyed a high degree of credibility.

A. — G. consists of a sequence of pure assertions. A. — C. is a syntactic<sup>17</sup> conditional construction that is represented as a rule with no further explanation. Likewise in E. and F. a circumstance — that is recognized explicitly by the speaker in D. as a non-matter of fact — is sustained without explanation. One may presume that the speaker — as a former high-ranking diplomat — considers that his statements, inasmuch as they refer to the international situation, possess sufficient authority (as the opinions of an expert), and thus do not require further explanation, even though they address a dispute characteristic of everyday politics.

To facilitate the analysis, A. is reformulated as A':

A' The federal government strives for the accession of Austria to the European Community.

In A' a subject of everyday politics — affecting neutrality — is addressed. The formulations in A. once again are in an implicit relationship with a series of other possible descriptions, some of which are given here:

A'1. Austria strives for accession to the European Community.

A'2. Austria wants to join the European Community.

A'3. Austrians want to join the European Community.

A'4. We want to join the European Community.

A'5. The federal government strives for an accession to the European Community for Austria.

A'6. The federal government strives for the accession to the European Community.

A'7. The federal government wants Austria to join the European Community.

A'8. The federal government wants Austria's accession to the European Community.

A'9. The federal government wants our accession to the European Community.

In the comparison, the connotation of the assignment of the agent-role to the federal government becomes clear. The federal government wants something that affects Austria (as

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<sup>17</sup> Semantically, A.-C. does not represent the normal conditional, which usually implies a temporal sequence between two events or circumstances. In contrast, in the consecutive part of this sentence, the retention of a state that already exists is presented.

the semantic patient). Discursively, "Austria" and the "federal government" are separated into two quite different objects. While the "federal government" is a clearly defined group, "Austria" is the name for the state, or possibly even for the "nation", to which the listeners belong and with which they can therefore identify themselves. Although a certain amount of distance is given ("Austria" is more abstract than "Austrians" or "we", and so on, — where an identification could take place directly), inasmuch as the listeners can find themselves reflected in the speech, they can associate themselves with "Austria" but not with the "federal government". In this way, the federal government does something as an external agent "to us" or "to Austria". The decision, or the willingness, to join the Union is thus embodied in the federal government rather than in "Austria"/us.

The distance to the activities of the federal republic is also expressed in the choice of the post-positional genitive "Österreichs" (Austria's). The fact that "Austria" is mentioned at all (unlike in A'6), we ascribe to the (already noted) discursive separation of "Austria" from "the federal government". As long as the federal government does not mean *pars pro toto* Austria, Austria (or we) must be explicitly named. Instead of the genitive, however, the prepositional phrase (in A'5) could have been used. This phrase, however, is positively connotated through the preposition "for" (and indicates grammatically the role of "beneficiary" — which, unless negatively evaluated in some explicit form, represents the beneficiary, as the term shows). In contrast, the genitive construction is semantically neutral at the level of evaluation.

As indicated above, lexically Austria could have been replaced by "us" (A'9), which would again have positively connotated the accession to the European Community, as something for which we could have made a claim. Nevertheless, in A, any lexical reference to "us" is avoided, and the issue is represented as an external one managed by the federal government.

Through B, the passivity and the "distance" of the listeners from the decision-making process (in which they were clearly not involved) is further strengthened<sup>18</sup>.

In C, the conclusion is presented. As before, neutrality is attributed as "our neutrality". This should "continue to be" something — a "basis". As elsewhere in this exposition, we should once again point out that a state which already exists can only be thematically relevant (i.e. informative) if it is under threat. Otherwise, the informativity and relevance maxim — and thus the co-operation maxim — would be violated (Grice, 1975).

<sup>18</sup> At first sight, it may seem that a positive evaluation of the federal government is to follow. However, if one examines the field of possibilities, it quickly becomes clear that what we are dealing with is a minimal statement about the decision-making process — at no point does the speaker state that, for instance, the "right" decision was being taken (at either a moral or factual level). Instead he states only that the decision was no arbitrary one. No more than this is claimed in B.

Thus, it is no longer obvious that neutrality "continues to be a basis". In addition, the use of "continues to be" presupposes that the state in question already existed in a factual sense. That is, until "now" "our neutrality [was] an indispensable basis". The use of "indispensable" strengthens and positively evaluates "continues to be". Something that is indispensable cannot be — and should not be — dispensed with.

However, in this connection, the reference to "basis" is unclear. For what or for whom is this basis? Semantically, "basis" is a relational predicate — something is a basis for something. In the text under examination, the semantic role is not filled, i.e. in the interpretation, listeners themselves are required to give a suitable object to the role (e.g. Austria). In addition, one should note that rhetorically such an approach is extraordinarily skillful, for listeners are less likely to question the links that are being made (or to demand an explanation) if, in the interpretation of the text, they themselves have established the links (using what are — to them — plausible elements).

In D., Waldheim directly addresses his public as the speaker, and refers to himself and the difference between himself and his public ("You"-"me"). By referring to himself as the speaker who makes something clear, Waldheim also refers to himself as president, as former Secretary-General, and as a politician. In other words, he refers to himself as an expert and as an authority.

In E. and F. he then presents his "authorized" statements as facts.

In E. he uses an idiomatic figure of speech ("It is matter for x to decide y"), which already contains the exclusivity of the responsibility. This is still further strengthened through the use of the explicit addition of "exclusive". The meaning of this idiom is a meta-discursive one — it means that, in the matter of "y", x receives the role of agent. Here, therefore, "Austria" is given the position of agent in an abstract model of the world rather than syntactically or semantically in this sentence. Austria is active.

This stands in an interesting contrast to A., in which the federal republic was active and Austria was given the role (semantically) of patient. If one sustains the separation between Austria and the federal republic, then the right of the federal government to act is rejected, and that right is then transferred to "Austria". The exact identity of Austria still remains an open question, especially because in F., the more personalized phrase "our understanding of neutrality" is used. (Waldheim could have said that it was "a matter for us ...").

In F., the decision that is to be made is presented. However, Waldheim uses "our understanding of neutrality" rather than "our neutrality"(F).

F', what is reconcilable with our neutrality and what is not.

Unlike "our neutrality", which as such is presumed to be known and defined in a discursive sense and thus to be a concept of static meaning, "our understanding of neutrality"

is a dynamic concept which can have a different meaning depending on each individual's "understanding".

In the sequence of C., with "our neutrality" "to continue to be a basis", such a dynamic seems to be less than logical. "Continue to be" implies a rigidity, as does "basis" also.

We assume that the discursive difficulty of the transitional period is manifested in this sequence — on one hand, there is a desire to hold on to the old image of identity, and on the other, a recognition that prior decisions as well as the political changes in Europe will force Austria to make changes (especially in its foreign policy).

G. contains a historical legitimization of E. and F.

In summary, the conclusion may be drawn that in 1988 neutrality once again becomes an important topic. The speaker (Waldheim) initiates a preservation discourse about neutrality. This is extraordinary in that it seeks to deny those with the power of action the right to determine the fate of neutrality, and gives that right to a rather vague agent — "Austria". Neutrality, which is at issue here, is declared to be "ours". This neutrality should definitely be retained. At the same time, with the introduction of "our understanding of neutrality", the concept of neutrality (i.e. of a single well-defined neutrality) is undermined in terms of content. In this way, the preservation discourse is already dealt a blow. The object that is to be preserved/retained changes in the hands of the preserver.

The entry into office of a new federal president brought with it a change in the political line on neutrality. Dr. Thomas Klestil, an enthusiastic supporter of the European Union, seemed to be prepared to sacrifice neutrality.

### Neutrality as an outmoded concept: 1993

*P17: P1\_93.txt — 17:33 (16:18) In recent days, voices have been heard claiming that 26<sup>th</sup> October is perhaps an outmoded date, because neutrality has lost its original significance.*

*I don't see it like this, since for me this day is — and shall remain — linked to the regaining of liberty. 17 years of dictatorship, war and occupation had to pass before Austrians were once again free on that 26<sup>th</sup> October 1955.*

A In recent days voices have been heard claiming,

B 26<sup>th</sup> October is perhaps an outmoded date,

C because neutrality has lost its original significance.

In A.— C. we find once again an argumentation with an explanation. This does not, however, relate to neutrality and its retention but to the national holiday. The necessity of ar-

going for a retention of the national holiday on this date indicates the close discursive linkage that existed at this time between the national holiday and neutrality. The speaker presupposes that the national holiday is primarily a celebration of the neutrality resolution. Thus he goes on to redefine the meaning of the day (see also our discussion of the representation of history/histories in the speeches).

In the explanation in C. anonymous speakers are quoted, although the authenticity of the quotation, i.e. what is the primary and what is the secondary discourse in the statement, does not become clear. With these "voices of others", Klestil introduces a proposition which he does not return to later, and thus leaves uncontradicted as the only statement on neutrality: Neutrality has lost its original significance. By subsequently redefining the meaning of the day, he implicitly consents to this viewpoint — for it would seem that according to the speaker, neutrality really does not give meaning to the day. As regards neutrality (which appears to be what is affected) it is asserted that it has lost its "original significance" rather than "its significance" which would constitute a much stronger proposition. Thus, Klestil continues the earlier course in which, discursively, he uses neutrality as a lexeme, but speaks of a (necessary) change to this neutrality. In doing so, he places few limitations on these changes. Indeed, he himself promotes changes that obviously conflict with the existing understanding of neutrality.

#### 4.2.5. SUMMARY

The results of the analyses of the discursive use of neutrality may be summarized as follows:

- Thematically, neutrality was primarily linked with the foreign policy (of Austria) and with history. Three or four phases of thematic relevance may be distinguished:
  1. Pre-1981 — historical and foreign references are linked together (teleologically).
  2. Until 1987: only the historical reference to the day is of significance.
  3. From 1988 foreign policy is of primary relevance.
  4. After 1995 neutrality no longer appears in any of the contexts.
- In the course of the 20 year period under examination, there are changes in the explanatory contexts in which neutrality appears.
  1. In 1981 there is a change in the argumentation, from argumentation in which neutrality appears as an external element to argumentation in which neutrality appears as an internal element. Thus, neutrality is considered in the first case as an external element in the explanation of changes, and in the second case as something that influences — as an "internal motivational element" or as an "Austrian characteristic" — the process that is to be explained.

2. Between 1985 and 1989 there are only a few examples of argumentation, and where they do occur, neutrality is used as a self-explanatory final element in the explanatory relationship.
  3. In 1990 the previous matter of fact nature of neutrality is dispensed with.
- The thematic roles used also change during the period examined
    1. Until 1988 there is a gradual grammatical metaphorization of neutrality and a change from instrument to agent. During the whole period, "we" are patients in the relationships examined.
    2. In 1992 this relationship is suddenly reversed, "we" observe neutrality in a mental process, which thus loses its defining matter-of-fact nature
  - In the detailed analyses, a similar transition was observed, from
    1. a rather dismissive attitude towards neutrality, which was considered to be something external (1974),
    2. to a positively valued but still external element (until 1978),
    3. to a discursive matter of fact, expressed also by an absence of discursive references (until 1987).
    4. In 1988 a preservation/retention discourse begins, which among other things falls back on a relatively explicit identity discourse (1990).
    5. In 1992, with the departure of Waldheim and the arrival of Klestil, a proponent of European Community membership becomes president. The preservation discourse is replaced by a legitimization discourse.
    6. Finally, in 1994, a firm rejection of neutrality is made.

Compilation of the linguistic results reveal the following:

1. Even if the trends under discussion take place at all levels and may always be traced back interpretatively to political events, they do not always take place simultaneously and do not mark exactly the same fractures. This once again demonstrates the complexity of the relationship between language and social reality — various linguistic levels react and construct a social reality at different speeds. While in 1990, neutrality had lost its matter of fact nature at the argumentative level, this is only expressed at the level of process in 1992. One might possibly speak of a gradual change in the means of language used, which first introduce a topic indirectly and then express this increasingly explicitly.
2. If one compares the discursive developments that manifest themselves linguistically in the various presidential speeches, it becomes obvious that the corresponding phases occur somewhat later than the real political events. For example, Kreisky's foreign policy was maintained only until 1983, and yet neutrality played an important role in foreign policy (in the presidential speeches) until 1988.

This last observation is probably explained by the function of the federal president in Austria: traditionally the federal president is regarded as a balancing figure who is above politics (i.e. an integrator) rather than as a "pace-maker" of policy<sup>19</sup>.

### 4.3. History

An important element in the construction of national identity is the construction of a national, common history. For this reason, changes in the construction of history also indicate changes in the discursive national identity. In the preceding section, we have seen how, over the decades, the discursive role of neutrality has changed, including the way in which it represents its historicity, that is, how it represents the developments that led to the passing of the neutrality resolution. In this section we wish to address the overall representation of history in the speeches.

In the following, all text-passages containing references to the historical events are categorized according to the time-period in question.

The number of historical events mentioned, that is, events that clearly did not belong to the realm of everyday politics or to the respective legislative terms, is relatively small. Such historical events do include post-war reconstruction, the period of Nazi rule, the "particular date" of 26<sup>th</sup> October 1955, as well as the period leading up to the signing of the State Treaty on this date — 1945—55. On occasion, history is also mentioned in an unspecific manner: "our long history". In addition, there are several (mostly implicit) references to the history before 1938, references to the First Republic and references to the period of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

In table 5, we present a chronological overview of the most important historical events mentioned in the speeches.

TABLE 5 *Chronological representation of the incidence of references to various historical events in the speeches.*

Year	unspecific	Events / history before 1938	1945—55	26 Oct 1955*	Period of Nazi rule	Post-war years, Reconstruction
1974	X (long H)					
1975						
1976				N	X	
1977	X					
1978				N	X	

19 In Austria, the federal president is elected directly by the people rather than by the National Assembly.

1979						
1980						
1981				N		
1982						
1983					X	
1984				X		X
1985			X	N	X	X
1986			X	N	X	
1987	X				X	
1988		X	X	N	X	
1989	X					
1990		X	X	F	(Regained freedom)	
1991		X		F	(Regained freedom)	
1992						
1993		X		F	(Regained freedom)	
1994	X			F		
1995	X		X			
1996		X, 1000 years of Austria				

\*Years marked "N" are years in which a connection was made between the 26<sup>th</sup> October and the neutrality resolution (with a mention of that date); Years marked "F" are years in which 26<sup>th</sup> October stood for "freedom".

Table 5 reveals several trends in the representation of Austrian history. One observation is that the range of historical events mentioned, widens from 1985. References to the period of Nazi rule become more frequent, and with the years of remembrance in 1985 and 1988, the Nazi past of Austria and the period of 1945—1955 are dealt with in greater depth than before. From 1984 the "achievements of reconstruction" of the Second Republic are mentioned. We consider this to be a "historicizing process". Something that previously belonged to the present is transformed into history, and then used in a symbolic manner. (For example, the immediate post-war history is used to demonstrate the capabilities of Austrians.) Prior to 1987, scant mention is made of pre-1955 Austrian history. 1955 is "year zero" and the neutrality resolution is almost the inaugural act in the discourse. This changes in 1987. Austrian history acquires greater "depth" and Austria is seen as part of a continuity stretching back to the First Republic and even to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. From 1990, any direct reference to Austria in what were always indirect references to the period of Nazi rule is faded out. Thereafter, mention is made only of "regained freedom" — whereby on at least one occasion the period of occupation

(1945—55) is also explicitly included. Otherwise references to the period 1945—55 disappear. As a logical consequence, in the anniversary year of 1996 the only historical references left, concern the “1000 year old history of Austria”. This is true once again when it comes to Austria’s attempts to join the European Union. A history of Austria before 1945 — in particular the history of the Austro-Hungarian Empire — is easier to blend into “European history”. And it can then be used to stick “European identity” on to “Austrian identity” or to develop a European identity on the basis of Austrian identity.

As in the case of neutrality, detailed analyses were performed on individual passages of the texts containing historical references. It became clear that in the course of the Second Republic changes had occurred not only in the references to the various historical events but also in the linguistic realization and argumentative basis of the individual historical events.

Based on the detailed analyses, over the decades the following discursive functions of history may be recognized.

On one hand, one may recognize the identity-providing function of history that has been diagnosed by other scholars. History is represented as the “jointly experienced past” or as a common (older) history, and all those who share this history form one unity.

In addition to this “primary function” of history, which is not present in argumentations, there are also several argumentative uses of history. These change over time<sup>20</sup>.

1. In 1976 an indirect reference is made to the period of Nazi rule with the aim of deriving responsibilities for the present, that is to say, the past is used to encourage listeners to adopt a certain (humanitarian) position in a domestic Austrian debate.
2. Between 1983 and 1985 the past is compared repeatedly with the present in order to emphasize the positive aspects of the present, and to create a more positive attitude among listeners towards the republic (and in 1984 to provoke national feeling) at a time of various domestic scandals.
3. In 1988 history is told once again as “collective history”, albeit from a different perspective: history was a lesson in which Austria had to gain experience in order to “find itself”. Thus, this collective history is at the same time a remote “past history”; as it becomes clear in 1990 — the Austrians of today have nothing in common with the Austrians of that period, the lesson has been learnt.
4. This distance between “then” (1945—55) and “now” is subsequently used (at the level of politics) in arguments for changes to conditions that stem from “then”.

<sup>20</sup> Mention is no longer made of the representation of neutrality as an historical concept, because we have already discussed the development of neutrality in the previous section — first embedded in an historical narrative, and then, in an isolated and a-historical manner, as something that happened on 26<sup>th</sup> October 1955.

5. From 1991 there is a return to an older history (to the empire), and this is used to indicate Austria's place in Europe.
6. Similarly, the history of the State Treaty is invoked in order to motivate listeners (through references to the "Austrian" virtues of that earlier period) and imbue them with confidence for a new beginning in Europe. (1994)

The following conclusions may be drawn from an analysis of the passages containing historical references:

1. In the speeches, history serves as a means of visualization and as an appeal to the commonality of the listeners. The mentioning of common history is used to reassure oneself of one's collective identity. Linguistically, the collectivizing function is expressed in the use of many vague terms in connection with history. This allows a great variety of interpretations concerning what exactly is meant and how things should be looked upon.
2. No less significant, however, are the argumentative functions of history; history is invoked in order to argue for an affirmation of, or a change in, the status quo. The fact that, as a result of this process, the historical image sometimes becomes rather contradictory is of no great concern (for example, attempts to distance oneself from the past in order to encourage change are not fully compatible with references to the virtues of the period of post-war reconstruction, through which once again a positive similarity is established).
3. A considerable break in the historical image takes place in 1990. A return is made to a "more profound" history, i.e. the Austrian Empire, while National Socialism and its political consequences are seen as transitory "things of the past" and of no significance in the present.
4. At the same time, neutrality is historicized implicitly. In other words, we find an interesting co-occurrence in the Austrian historical collective narrative: neutrality seems to be both positive and necessary, as long as Austrian history is also narrated at least partly as a story of Austria's Nazi past. Here neutrality appears to take on the function of announcing a new consciousness — and neutrality (with its ideological and international legal consequences) really does offer itself for such a role, given that it puts a stop to any desires of affiliation<sup>21</sup>.

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21 The discursive development may be interpreted sociologically and politically in a variety of different ways. Thus, one could say that "Austria re-entered European history" with its joining of the European Union (as was said of Germany), the "chapter" of Nazi rule was put aside, and thus the legitimizing function of neutrality was no longer of significance. Or one might say that with the loss of the foreign policy significance of neutrality, the legitimization provided by neutrality was considered to have been removed, and there was thus a desire to forget the Nazi period as quickly as possible, because it became more difficult to disassociate oneself discursively from that period through the use of neutrality.

#### 4.4. Foreign countries

There are various very different references to foreign countries in the speeches from 1974 until 1996. These references indicate from what elements "Austria" disassociates itself in these speeches, and thus indirectly how "Austria" defines itself.

A list of all foreign countries mentioned over time was established. Based on this list, we grouped various countries into categories (see table 6). In general, we found that many references to foreign countries were rather unspecific (see table 6 and examples therein).

TABLE 6


Category	Example
Foreign countries	Other countries, foreign countries ("das Ausland"), other states
Europe	Europe, our continent
World	The world, international
Industrialized states	Industrialized states
Central Europe/ Danube region	Central Europe, Danube region
The East	The East
The West	The West
Other	Baghdad, Moscow coup attempt, foreign troops

The use of the various references to foreign countries changes over time. While foreign countries ("das Ausland" — i.e. non-specified) are always a topical theme, it is during the 1970s, at the time of Kreisky's foreign policy successes, that "the World" becomes a favorite reference point. "East" and "West" are mentioned above all from 1989 in connection with the "upheavals in the East". At about the same time "Europe" gains in importance, although Europe was also repeatedly mentioned in earlier periods. See Figure 6 (p. 139)

Changes may be observed not only in the categories from which Austria disassociates itself. Over time there are also changes in the relations used to describe the relationship between Austria and "foreign countries".

Thus, until the mid-1980s Austria is constantly subject to an assessment<sup>22</sup>. Either we are judged by foreign countries ("how well we are doing things") or we compare ourselves favorably with "foreign countries".

<sup>22</sup> Eleven times until 1985, twice after 1985 (1989 and 1994)



*... which brought us the judgement of a well-functioning democracy even from critical observers in foreign countries. (1974)*

*We are no longer the sick child of Europe. (1974)*

This comparative aspect was almost always present, whenever foreign countries were mentioned.

*And yet Austria has a very good place in international statistics (...) with regard to its economic data including its unemployment rate. (1983)*

*There are few European countries in which such basic political decisions as the elections to the National Assembly are acknowledged in such an objective manner ... (1975)*

After 1985, however, the comparative aspect is hardly present. Until 1984, the topic of "giving" is also important in relation to foreign countries. Austria gives something to "Europe" and "the world" — and this is possible, largely owing to Austria's neutrality. Other beneficiaries (see section 4.2.2) are not mentioned.

*The existence of Austria is therefore closely connected to this neutrality, and it [Austria] has gained a significance through neutrality for the other countries of Europe, too. (1976)*

Relations other than those mentioned here (i.e. comparing oneself, giving) occur only sporadically until 1985. Nevertheless, one aspect of the representation of "relations with the East" appears every once in a while over the complete time-period ('78, '81, '89, '90, '95). Austria is always implicitly counted as belonging to the West, and portrayed as a "show-case" of vibrant democracy (for "the East").

*"Austria has become a show-case once again — one that is admired by millions of people in the East." (1989)*

Apart from this one element, there is a significant change in the relations used from 1989. Suddenly there are references to foreign political events which do not directly concern Austria, but which nevertheless indicate the changing circumstances. Mention is made primarily of Europe (European Union) and the East (collapse of the Iron Curtain).

Other "locating aspects" also become significant. With reference to Europe, the specific "situation" or "location" (German: "*Lage*") is mentioned frequently, but it is not always clear whether Austria's geographical or political situation is meant.

Finally, there are also part-whole references again relating to Europe but also to the world.

Throughout the period, but especially from 1989, these references to foreign countries are closely connected with (foreign) political events. Concerning the vagueness of such references (abroad, the world, Europe), the assumption may be made that this is also connected with neutrality — as a neutral country Austria was unable to take a definite stance during the Cold War. Vague references meant that events abroad could be spoken of without taking a stance on certain "foreigners".

With the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the Iron Curtain, this became possible once again — and there are indeed an increased number of references to "West" and "East" as well as "our neighbors" in the discourse. Austria's changing foreign policy orientation and the prospect of European Union membership lead to a greater presence of "Europe" in the discourse after 1989. "Foreign countries" becomes a bit more concrete.

In the following section, we seek to take a closer look at "Europe" as a highly specific foreign reference. We do this particularly because, as indicated in the hypotheses, accession to the European Union might provide an opening for a new European identity discourse. As neutrality becomes obsolete, this new identity might then take over various discursive functions of neutrality.

#### 4.5. Europe

Europe appears in various forms and functions during the period 1974—1996.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup> As in the case of the other elements investigated, as part of the analysis we examined all incidences of 'Europe' in our data.

First of all, it appears as a locality: for instance, when Austria is described as the “center of Europe”, in the “middle of Europe”, and so on. Secondly, “Europe” appears as an abstract term, which stands for a whole to which Austria belongs. This abstract term is both geographically determined and morally loaded: “Austria is (no longer) the sick child of Europe”. The exact meaning of “Europe” (apart from the fact that the word is clearly more than simply a geographical localization) is hard to determine in this usage. We denote this use as “abstract use” as an indication of its abstract content. Thirdly, we find juxtapositions with “Europe” or “European”, which already tend to have their own lexicalized meanings<sup>24</sup>.

Table 7 displays the various incidences in chronological order. Although the first two uses occurred concurrently before 1987, the use of “Europe” in a largely local/localizing sense declined after 1987. Meanwhile juxtapositions occur primarily after 1989.

	Localization use	Abstract use	Juxtapositions	TOTAL
Uses before 1987	1975, 1 1976, 3  1981, 1 1983, 1 1984, 1	1974, 2  1978, 1  1983, 2		
Total before 1987	7 / 0 58,3%	5 41,6%	0 0%	12 30,7%
Uses after 1987	1987, 1  1990, 1A NA 1991, 1A NA 1992, 1A NA	1988, 1 (?) 1989, 3 1990, 4 1991, 8 1992, 2	1987, 1 1988, 1 1989, 2  1991, 1	
Total after 1987	1/3 3,7% 11,1% (14,8)	18 66,6%	5 18,5%	27 69,2%
TOTAL	8/3 20,5% 7,6% (28,2)	23 58,9%	5 12,8%	39 100%

Key: NA — ‘Europe’ is used denoting a place without establishing a relation to or including Austria

Localization uses before 1987 may be divided into two types: localizations that place Austria (e. g. a part of central Europe), and localizations that are established in a more implicit manner in relational contexts: for instance, in comparisons with other states (“other states in Europe ...” 1976).

<sup>24</sup> In other words, above all we face here “proper names” that contain a morpho-semantically recognizable reference to Europe (e.g. European Union).

After 1987 Austria is no longer defined through a factual geographic position in Europe. In this period, almost all references to Europe are made at an abstract level. This difference is also shown in the fact that many localizing uses of Europe before 1987 were made in relation to Austria. However, three of the four uses after 1987 are not relational in this sense, but speak instead of what is happening in Europe (as a locality) (e.g. 1991: "Has our patriotism become questionable — only because we are now seeing tragic cases of degeneration..."). This is also shown by the fact that during this period Europe (also as a geographical area) was becoming an individual discursive unit within the national discourse, it can be discussed without it having to receive its relevance through an explicit reference to Austria.

In the following analysis, we wish to examine in greater depth the uses here referred to as "abstract uses".

Before 1987 we find two types of use: (a) on one hand, Austria is represented as part of Europe (and given further characteristics), (b) on the other hand, Austria's relationship to Europe is represented. In the latter case Austria and Europe are actants that are quite separate from one another, and Austria "gives" something to Europe. (This happened at various levels of abstraction either explicitly (1983 "*Austria ... has much to give ... Europe*") or implicitly [*tasks in Europe*]). The "giving relationship" is the context in which neutrality arises (inasmuch as it does occur with "Europe" which happens five times: three times before 1987, twice after that years). In the main, neutrality is usually perceived as "assistance" that enables (Austria) to give.

- After 1987 (a) is no longer present, (b) is still found, and other uses also appear:
- (c) Europe occurs as a kind of abstract locus even where there is no reference to Austria. It is addressed as a whole and as a unit that is forming politically.
  - (d) This political unity is sometimes placed in relation to Austria, Austria must find its place in the political field of Europe. In a linguistic sense, what is happening is the construction of metaphors as in Lakoff & Johnsons (1980); the "field" of the political is structured analogous to the topological structure of the geographical localization of states. In this localization, Austria is commonly seen as the "center", "core" or "core zone of political stability" etc. This metaphorization of "Europe" appears only after 1987.
  - (e) In addition, a series of further relations between Austria and Europe make their appearance, which develop (b) further (i.e. Austria gives Europe) until there is almost an identification between Austrian attributes and what is European (e.g. "Austrian patriotism can serve as a European model; there is no Austrian security without European security"). This leads finally to:
    - (f) the fusion of "we Europeans"
    - (e) and thus (f) may be seen as a discursive continuation of (a).

Summarizing, the following may be stated about the relationship between "Europe" and "Austria": from 1987 we can observe a change in the meaning of "Europe" from a material-referential level to a symbolic level. "Europe" becomes a symbol that appears in a metaphorical space. As a symbolic space (rather than a factual-topological space) this space is discursively structured, that is, it can be designed and redesigned by the discourse. We consider this as the essential first step towards an identity discourse. In order to gain entry into an identity discourse, an element must first be elevated on to the symbolic level.

At this symbolic level, Austria is increasingly linked discursively with Europe until a quasi-identity is established. It remains to be seen how successful this discursive link will be for Austrian identity. In 1993 Bruckmüller ascribed a "partial identity as European" to 21% of the population (Bruckmüller, 1994: 49), while in 1987 Europe was a primary figure of identification for 4% of the population (*ibid.*: 19).

Neutrality is rarely linked directly with a discourse about Europe. As described above, this happens above all in connection with a transaction, in which Austria gives Europe something aided by neutrality. The only exception is a quotation from 1988 which contains an implicit reference to an inherent contradiction between the European Union and neutrality.

(1) *"If the federal government — after thorough consultations — strives for the accession of Austria to the European Community, our neutrality remains an indispensable basis." (1988)*

In (1) an implicit contradiction between the European Community and neutrality is established. Something that remains unaffected by an action does not normally have to be mentioned. The fact that in (1) mention is made of neutrality means that generally one does not expect there to be no change. In other words in accepted "common knowledge" the European Community and neutrality are indeed contradictory items (i.e. mutually exclusive).

## 5. Conclusion

In this study, we have described the discursive development of neutrality in the presidential speeches from its entry into identity discourses until the deconstruction of these neutrality-identity discourses. Initially we established a series of hypotheses concerning the linguistic realization of this discursive development. Some of these hypotheses have been substantiated, but other aspects have turned out to be different from what we expected. Linguistically, however, it is possible to trace a line from the construction-phase (until about 1978), to the identity-discourse (1979—1987), to the deconstruction-phase (from 1988), even if the various linguistic indicators operate on somewhat different time-frames.

Thus, neutrality appeared in argumentations less often than was expected. Nevertheless, where it did appear, neutrality was to be found mainly in the attributional part of the

sentence as we had expected (hypothesis 1). The transition of the attribution "neutrality" in the construction-phase from something external to something internal (hypothesis 2) was substantiated. The expectation that neutrality would cease to be mentioned in the deconstruction-phase (hypothesis 3) was partially confirmed. Neutrality that was once again the subject of discussion (whereas before it had been largely accepted as an obvious matter of fact), once it appeared as an attributional object in itself, that was finally rejected. The hypothesis concerning the classification of the attributions as constants/variables (hypothesis 4) was only partially confirmed: neutrality was indeed a "constant" element as a part of the identity-discourse, but it remained a constant element thereafter as well. This is probably connected to the fact that the semantics of neutrality changed in this period, neutrality (in the discourse) became a variable in terms of content (one even spoke of "neutrality-policy"). An additional observation (not covered in the hypotheses) was a substantial shift (in terms of content) in the attributions. While in the construction phase neutrality appeared in "normal" explanations, which causally explain a course of events with the assistance of neutrality, in the high-days of the identity-discourse, neutrality tended to be found in "formal" explanations (why the national holiday is celebrated) that refer to the factual existence of neutrality but not to its content or meaning.

The anticipated role-relationships (into which neutrality would enter over the course of the various phases of the discourse) turned out to be more complex than we had imagined (in hypothesis 5). The development of the neutrality discourse at this level proved to be a step-by-step process of grammatical metaphorization. The anticipated means function of neutrality is characteristic (only) in the construction phase; meanwhile, during the neutrality-identity discourse phase, neutrality does not function as agent or as means but as patient in the "formal" explanation that has been mentioned in connection with the attributions. In these, however, neutrality is not used in its historical or political sense but predominantly as a "date" (which has further meaning only in the world-knowledge of the listeners but not at the level of the manifest text). This is an expression of the identity-discourse. Neutrality as an "obvious fact" no longer has to be defined or discussed in discourse. Finally, a characteristic of the deconstruction phase is the patient role of neutrality that is to be defined by "Austria" or by "us". In contrast, previously (in the construction phase) "Austria" or "we" had appeared (as expected) primarily in the role of beneficiary (hypothesis 6), although not in later phases, where "neutrality" was fused with "us" to produce "our neutrality".

The expectations concerning other contextual relationships of neutrality also fit into the framework of the various discursive phases, in particular in the deconstruction phase. With regard to history (hypothesis 7), rather than differences in historical representation, we observed instead a tendency to refer to quite different historical periods (the period of Nazi rule, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, European history). In the representation of foreign countries our hypothesis that (concrete) foreign countries were a little more likely to be named after the abandonment of neutrality (hypothesis 8) was confirmed. At the

same time a new discourse about "Europe" begins. This shows that — with the change in the meaning of neutrality — all other connected areas change, as we expected, following Wittgenstein (1995): thus foreign countries and history were not only a context for neutrality, but neutrality was also a context for the representation of foreign countries and history in the speeches. The step-by-step exit of neutrality from the identity discourse is accompanied by a change in the representation of "the others" as well as the "historical I". Without neutrality the identity discourse is a quite different one; it is more than a discourse "without neutrality". Once again we find here a concordance of real political changes (accession to the EU) and changes in the discourse ("old history", Europe as the point of reference). The (discursive) move away from neutrality was made not so long ago. The future direction of the identity-discourse remains an open question (and we do not know which political path it will take).

The discourse that has been the subject of our investigation is only an official type of discourse, the political discourse of the heads of state. During the period under examination, this discourse was usually — but not always — concordant with "public opinion" as expressed in the newspapers. In the light of the present political situation (from the beginning of 2000), the direction of the road ahead remains uncertain: has the federal president turned away from public opinion, and will neutrality — in an abandonment of the European Union — be addressed once again and used to determine the particular individuality of Austrians? Or will neutrality become obsolete (even in a symbolic sense) while Austria's historical image is "Europeanized"? At any rate, one thing is clear: The current discourse concerning Austrian identity is undergoing profound change.

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## Appendix

### 1. List of the federal presidents of the Second Republic

President	Year of election	Political party membership
Karl Renner	1945	SPÖ
Theodor Körner	1951	SPÖ
Adolf Schärf	1957	SPÖ
	1963	SPÖ
Franz Jonas	1965	SPÖ
	1971	SPÖ
Rudolf Kirchschläger	1974	independent (supported by the SPÖ)
	1980	independent
Kurt Waldheim	1986	independent (supported by the ÖVP)
Thomas Klestil	1992	ÖVP
	1998	ÖVP

*Gertraud Benke*

## “AUSTRIA OWES ITS POLICY OF NEUTRALITY ...”

### Neutrality in Austrian Newspapers in the Second Republic.

This chapter comprises an investigation of the discursive development of neutrality in several Austrian national daily newspapers. In the course of our analysis, we examined in particular (a) the incidence of neutrality on the national holiday (parallel to our investigation of the presidential speeches) and (b) the incidence of neutrality during several important events in foreign policy. In doing so we wanted to uncover to which extent the presidential discourse (and the presidents' voice) on neutrality would be reflected in the mass media. And who would figure besides the president, to inform a public image on neutrality on the symbolic day of celebrating ones nationhood? Which voices are put forward to be heard — and would there be a difference to be found for the analyzed papers reflecting different political orientations and addressed audiences?

Our second analysis of daily papers, looking at the occurrence of neutrality during selected key events, was guided by the fundamental hypothesis that the changing significance of neutrality would be reflected in the discourse surrounding crises in foreign policy. As a defining factor of foreign policy, a major event in foreign policy (or a political crisis in international affairs) is a potential opportunity for a discourse about neutrality to unfold — for one to define oneself as neutral and to act in one's self-defined space. Our particular interest is to find out when and how this kind of discourse occurred. Did neutrality always play an important role during such crises, or was this only so after neutrality became a factor of identity? (That is, in terms of both actual policy and real policy-making, how significant was neutrality in public discourse during the various stages of the development of identity after 1955?)

This kind of discursive investigation is also interesting from a further perspective. Indeed, as we examined the material for the first time, we arrived at the following thesis: history was rewritten retrospectively as the identity function developed. Neutrality was later on regarded as “reason” and “cause” for certain actions, but as such was hardly mentioned in the discourse about events when they did occur. Our discursive investigation permits us to expose myths in the current discourse.

In the following, our first task is to examine the incidence of neutrality in the newspapers published on the national holiday and these newspapers' coverage of the presidential speeches. Then we shall present our choice of major foreign policy events (crises in international affairs) and the related analysis.


Methodologically speaking, the analysis of the reports is based on the same fundamentals that were applied in our investigation of the presidential speeches. Nevertheless, in this chapter we shall primarily apply micro-linguistic parameters from the study of both rhetoric and stylistics.

### The incidence of neutrality and coverage of the presidential speeches in newspapers

For the purposes of this investigation, we examined newspapers published between 26<sup>th</sup> October and 28<sup>th</sup> October each year from 1968 until 1996. For our analysis, we decided to concentrate on three major Austrian daily papers, which were all in print throughout that period. Any article that dealt in any manner with the president (or his speech) or mentioned neutrality was selected (see Figure 1). However, we rejected articles mentioning, for instance, that the president had received congratulatory telegrams (unless neutrality was also mentioned in some way). We also rejected articles that related to the speeches of a variety of different government members, but did so without actually mentioning the federal president or neutrality.

The four papers, we were looking at, are *Kurier*, *Neue Kronen-Zeitung*, *Die Presse*, and *Der Standard*. Of these, all but *Der Standard* are not regional papers that were published throughout this period. In terms of their target audiences, the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* is worldwide the most successful tabloid paper in terms of its reach, *Die Presse* is an old (since 1848) paper for the elite, politically conservative and Christian with a focus on economy and foreign politics. *Der Standard* (since 1988) is presently its major competition, also an elite paper, yet politically oriented towards "left-wing" parties and promoting economic liberalism. The target audience of the *Kurier* is somewhere in between the readership of the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* and *Die Presse*, *Der Standard*, neither completely boulevard, nor an elite paper. Its political orientation is usually also seen leftist. The political orientation of the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* is not readily defined; it is usually held to be a populist paper, yet concerning national identity, immigration etc. it frequently takes a conservative stance. Thus, we have *Die Presse* and *Der Standard* representing papers for the elite, *Kurier* and *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* targeted towards a less educated audience, and *Der Standard* and *Kurier* as media more oriented towards voicing leftist positions, and *Die Presse* and *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* tending to voice more conservative right-wing positions.

FIGURE 1: Number of selected articles by year



### Quantitative Analysis

From chapter 4, we repeat (in the second column) the table showing the occasions (over the 28-year time-period) on which neutrality was mentioned by the federal president in his speech.

TABLE 1. The occurrence of neutrality in the presidential addresses and various Austrian dailies.

Year	BP	Ku	Pr	Kr	St
1968		X (a)	/	/	
1969		X	X (a)	/	
1970		/	/	-(a)	
1971		X	X (a)	-	
1972		/	/	/	
1973		-(a)	-(a)	/	
1974	X	-	/	/	
1975	X	-	X	-(a)	
1976	X	X (a)	X (a)	/	

1977	-	-	/	/	
1978	X	-	-	-	
1979	X	/	-	-	
1980	t.u.	-	-	-	
1981	X	-	X <sup>1</sup> (a)	/	
1982	t.u.	X <sup>2</sup>	X (a)	-	
1983	-	/	/	-	
1984	-	/	-(a)	-	
1985	X	/	X	/	
1986	X	-	X	/	
1987	-	-	-(a)	-	
1988	X	X (a)	X (a)	-(a)	X (a)
1989	X	X (a)	-(a)	-(a)	X (a)
1990	X	X (a)	X (a)	X (a)	X (a)
1991	-	-(a)	-(a)	-	/
1992	-	X <sup>3</sup> (a)	-(a)	-	-(a)
1993	X	X (a)	X (a)	-(a)	X (a)
1994	X	X (a)	X (a)	-(a)	X (a)
1995	-	-	-(a)	-(a)	-
1996	-	-(a)	X (a)	X (a)	-(a)

## Key:

BP presidential address

## Newspapers:

Ku *Kurier*Pr *Die Presse*Kr *Neue Kronen-Zeitung*St *Der Standard*

/ No article

- No reporting of neutrality in connection with the federal president or his speech

X Reports of statements made by the federal president on neutrality

(a) Statements on neutrality by other agents

t.u. No data (text unavailable)

## Notes:

1: in a speech given at the European Academy

2: the president compares his role in domestic politics with the role of a neutral state in international politics in an interview

3: in a radio interview

As shown in table 1, statements on (or references to) neutrality were frequently not covered in the newspapers texts, and this was particularly so in the period 1977–1988. References that are covered tend to have been made by other protagonists. Also remarkable is the number of occasions on which neutrality was not mentioned at all. Neutrality was often completely ignored; there were simply no references in the newspapers to the fact that the neutrality resolution had been passed on that day.

Table 1 demonstrates the differences between the various newspapers in terms of reporting. Whereas, in general, reporting was fairly uniform comparing *Kurier*, *Die Presse* and later *Der Standard*, the absence of references to neutrality — even when neutrality was a disputed political issue — is particularly noticeable in the case of the populist paper *Neue Kronen-Zeitung*<sup>1</sup>.

### Qualitative analysis

In the following, we will present the results of the qualitative analysis of the newspaper texts featuring discourse on neutrality or the presidential addresses. Similarly to the analysis of the presidential speeches presented in the previous chapter, we looked at the discursive context and function of every appearance of the lexeme ‘neutrality’. Yet, in contrast to the discussion in the previous chapter, we will not provide a detailed account of the analysis (which would take up too much space), but summarize our results and discuss a few selected quotations from the texts.

In general, we found that in all the newspapers, statements of various political actors where neutrality is mentioned are very close to the original texts. Changes in the text are usually the result of items being left out or rearranged. While words or parts of sentences are repeatedly left out, on the whole sentences are usually quoted directly or indirectly without any additional changes. However, where various sentences are quoted from a speech, this is frequently done in an order that differs from the order in the speech. Such rearrangement usually takes place where sentences have been taken from various different paragraphs rather than from one single paragraph. Thus, while the construction of argumentation remains intact (given that argumentation is usually restricted to one paragraph), there is a change in the order of the topics. This does not necessarily mean, however, that a change in emphasis may be detected.

From 1988 there is a noticeable trend towards the use of quasi-lead sentences, in which it is stated, for instance, that a particular speech had dealt with a particular topic. This

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1 This finding, which is pervasive for almost the whole time period, is somewhat surprising given the active role the *Neue Kronenzeitung* takes on in other political issues. Yet, we do not have a good explanation why the *Neue Kronenzeitung* refrained from playing an active role in this case.

constitutes an implicit interpretation on the part of the newspaper — something that does not happen in earlier years. In the final two years (1994—1995) mention is also made of the fact that Klestil (the president during that time) or Vranitzky (the federal chancellor) have said nothing about neutrality. This is a significant change; in earlier years the absence of the topic of neutrality from a speech had not been reported.

Given the marked differences in reporting, the period under investigation was divided into two sub-periods (1968—1988 and 1989—1996). Since *Der Standard* was only introduced in 1988, this also means that we are only looking at three papers for the first period, and four for the second one.

### Reflection and reception of the presidential speeches in the newspapers up to 1988

As already demonstrated in the analysis of the presidential speeches, in the years leading up to the mid—1980s, neutrality increasingly became a constituent part of Austrian identity. The arguments surrounding neutrality became fewer in number, and neutrality was increasingly mentioned in connection with the historical reference — that this is the national holiday because it is the day of the neutrality resolution (1978, 1981).

It is hardly surprising that this proposition, where it is made in the presidential speeches, is rarely quoted. The “news-value” of such a statement is minimal, because the president is saying something that his listeners believe they already know. More perplexing, however, is the almost complete absence of this proposition from the primary discourse<sup>2</sup> in the various newspapers.

Over the years, three “institutions” are repeatedly quoted — the federal president, the federal chancellor, and a press organ of the Soviet Union. The three newspapers under investigation are markedly different from one other in terms of the extent to which they quote statements of other protagonists on neutrality in addition to (or instead of) statements made by the federal president. In the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* quotations of statements on neutrality made by other protagonists are rare, and so they are in the *Kurier*, in which just four such quotations were made between 1968 and 1987.

In this respect *Die Presse* differs remarkably: quotations of statements of “others” occur consistently in this newspaper. However, the number of (other) actors is quite small, the same ones appear time and time again: Soviet organs and the incumbent federal chancellor. With

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<sup>2</sup> In report analysis, a distinction is made between primary discourse and secondary discourse, that is, between statements that are attributed to other people in the form of direct or indirect quotations (secondary discourse) and statements for which the writer of the article takes final responsibility (primary discourse) (see also Benke, 1994).

regard to the very quotations of statements made by the federal president, *Die Presse* and the *Kurier* frequently draw on the same statements (the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* brings very few quotations). Finally, since *Die Presse* is a larger newspaper (in terms of the volume and range of reporting), one might describe this newspaper as “a more accurate barometer” of changes in attitudes towards neutrality.

Over the years, a small change in the quotations may be identified:

Until 1973, neutrality and active neutrality policy are repeatedly defined, and provided with content and attributes. From 1976 until 1983 the significance of neutrality is mentioned. In 1984, following a particular remark by Waldheim (the then-president), the content of neutrality becomes once again the subject of debate. Finally, in 1987, the federal chancellor and head of the social-democratic party Vranitzky addresses the identity-oriented components of neutrality.

Thus, the lines of development of the quotations of the federal president and of “others” fully correspond with developments as they have been determined with regard to the presidential speeches. Seen from this perspective, for the period under investigation, the presidential speeches appear in their portrayal of neutrality to be quite representative of the positions and importance ascribed to neutrality during this period.

In the following, three examples of the thematisation of neutrality in this period will be discussed:

*“Both Federal President Jonas and Federal Chancellor Dr. Klaus strongly emphasized on the occasion of today’s national holiday the intention of Austria to defend the inviolability of its sovereign territory, its independence, and its neutrality even at great cost. In an order of the day to the federal armed forces Jonas also expressed his support for the mobilization of units of the federal armed forces during the crisis in Czechoslovakia, ‘even if it is clear that our country itself was not exposed to any immediate danger’.” (ku 6801)*

This first quotation in our data (1968) is clearly motivated by the conditions prevailing at the time — the Prague Spring led to a significant emphasis on Austrian sovereignty and neutrality. From an objective point of view, “the defense of neutrality” was an obvious chimera — if Austria had been attacked, its neutral status would have been irrelevant. Self-defense is simply a completely different issue. In this sense it is impossible to “defend neutrality at great cost”. The fact that in the discursive realm this does happen, indicates that the process of ideologization has at least begun — neutrality is no longer an instrument of international law but a fictive-yet real object which should be defended and preserved.

In subsequent years “neutrality policy” is focused upon repeatedly. The significance of this policy for Austria is emphasized and secured.

"Federal President Franz Jonas has explained, in his order of the day to the soldiers of the federal armed forces, that it is owing to a determined policy of neutrality that our country has not become a center of unrest. Since our neutrality is a military one, the significance of the federal armed forces is particularly great, said Jonas." (ku6901)

1975

"In an order of the day to members of the armed forces, Federal President Kirchschräger spoke about the perpetual neutrality of Austria, which was, in turn, guaranteed by the federal armed forces. "Neutrality has contributed a great deal", according to the wording of the order of the day, "to the Republic of Austria being able to assume a real task within the international community." This neutrality must, however, be upheld and defended by all means. This should happen as part of the comprehensive system of national defense, a vital part of which is the military system of national defense." (pr7501)

As outlined above, after 1976 quotations of statements on neutrality made by the federal president are rare and very brief. Neutrality as such is no longer defined in terms of its content.

### Reflection and reception in the newspapers after 1988

The reflection in the newspapers after 1988 is distinguished by a considerably greater reporting volume on the part of all the investigated newspapers.

From 1988 an increasing number of speakers are quoted in almost all the newspapers. Such speakers usually include representatives of the two governing parties (SPÖ and ÖVP) as well as representatives of the other political parties (Greens, Liberals, FPÖ).

It is noticeable that despite the different political positions of the various political parties in Austria (see Benke/Wodak in this volume), in the late 1980s no significant opposition to neutrality is expressed in any of the papers. The position taken by the *Kurier* on neutrality is initially supportive, while *Der Standard* and *Die Presse* are neutral on the issue (even though the significance of neutrality is more emphasised in *Der Standard*). The *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* expresses no opinion whatsoever.

The positions and perspectives taken by *Die Presse*, *Der Standard* and the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* remain relatively constant throughout the period. In the *Presse* increasing attention is given to the topic, which leads in turn to a greater balance (in terms of presented positions on the topic) in coverage. In the main, *Die Presse* and the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* were quick(er) to present voices promoting the abandonment of, or change in, neutral-

ity (from 1990), whereas *Der Standard* tended to give more room to supporters for a retention of neutrality, which was still the official position of the SPÖ. This clearly demonstrates the party allegiances of the readerships of the three newspapers.

Unlike the other two newspapers, the *Kurier* underwent a significant change in orientation. This newspaper appears to have followed the opinions on neutrality of the various presidents. Thus, after 1992 the newspaper changes its position from one of support for neutrality to a more critical position on neutrality (or to the view that neutrality as a concept should be redefined).

In our opinion, another surprising fact is the relative late appearance of voices calling for a change apart from Haider (the head of the FPÖ). Those politicians of the ÖVP who had previously been in favor of a change in neutrality, or who had even favored its abandonment, were not given a voice in the papers on this occasion until after the newly elected president Klestil's statements in 1992. Instead, the newspapers quoted Josef Riegler, (head of the ÖVP and vice chancellor from 1989 to 1992) one of the few ÖVP supporters of neutrality.

Neutrality became a real political issue in 1989. In this year as well as 1990 statements on neutrality are reported from representatives of almost all parties. It is noticeable that the voices for change are "weak" even among those who do seek "to change neutrality". Even if rhetorically the emphasis has been changed, the supporters of neutrality are still far more numerous and conspicuous in the various reports relating to the national holiday. This is the case despite the fact that according to Schaller (1994) the political reality of the elite had already begun to look quite different by this time.

The various positions of the politicians and the associated coverage in the newspapers are demonstrated in the following example from 1989. In this year of the great political transformations in the East (1989), the social-democratic federal chancellor Vranitzky is presented — as he has been for a while — as the champion of neutrality. In 1989 the minister for foreign affairs Mock and the vice-chancellor Riegler (ÖVP) are also given a voice:

*"At the special meeting of ministers, federal chancellor Vranitzky, foreign minister Mock, and vice-chancellor Riegler, emphasized the significance of neutrality with regard to the request for [EU] membership and the reforms in eastern Europe."*

It should be noted at this point that the mentioning of the "significance of neutrality" leaves the real meaning open. Neutrality as an object of negotiation has an intrinsic "significance", but this does not automatically imply a desire to retain neutrality. The vague reference of "significance" allows supporters of neutrality (i.e. Riegler and Vranitzky) to take a common stand with the "neutrality negotiator", minister for foreign affairs, Mock. There is room for each of their various positions.

The position of Voggenhuber, a leading figure of the Green party, (and of the other Greens) is presented more blunt. Voggenhuber "opposes Austria relinquishing its neutrality for the benefit of the 'world power dreams' of the European Community" (*Die Presse*, 27<sup>th</sup> October 1989, p. 5). In *Der Standard*, the accusation is made in an even more concrete form: "[to say] that accession to the EC is possible [without relinquishing perpetual neutrality] is a pure defensive lie, lip-service, which will be revealed to be a lie after accession." (*Der Standard*, 27<sup>th</sup> October 1989, p. 5)

In 1991 neutrality is not made an important topic, while in 1992 the change in presidency also results in a change in political discourse: Klestil is very prominently in favor of a change in security politics. In that year neutrality is still largely ignored by the newspapers, but in 1993 they do begin to examine the issue in depth with various articles about neutrality (both supportive and dismissive). By now it seems as if the topic has really become a central issue; it is discussed very explicitly in the media and by politicians. There is a tendency for reporting to be more "to the point". Instead of selecting statements made by several of the participants in the discussion and arranging these statements in an implicit argumentative order, the newspapers initiate a primary discourse on neutrality and portray neutrality as a disputed issue. For instance, the following title and subtitle appears in *Der Standard*: "Does neutrality still serve a purpose? Positions taken on the national day reveal a great diversity of opinion."

1994 is the last year in which neutrality remains a topic. The discourse of previous years is repeated, but with less intensity. The referendum on membership of the European Union has just been held (12<sup>th</sup> June 1994) and the question of whether neutrality is reconcilable with membership of the European Union is thus somewhat obsolete. The key issues now are how to deal with neutrality, what to retain of neutrality, and whether to abandon neutrality completely.

## Summary

Over the examined period of almost three decades, it seems that — apart from the final years of Waldheim's presidency — the significance<sup>3</sup> (and ambivalence) of neutrality that was expressed in the newspapers corresponds in the main with that of the presidential speeches. Thus, the results of the analysis of the presidential speeches may also be regarded as representative of the public media discourse, even if the latter obviously has more "voices" and,

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3 Here we do not mean the concrete views that were formulated for or against neutrality, but the degree to which neutrality is defined, as well as its function, in the investigated discourse. In both speeches and newspapers, neutrality is, subsequently, something that is being defined, something that is quite obvious, and something that is disputed.

at the time of transformation, gives expression to more numerous and diverse positions. At such times, the positions of the two public domains may differ briefly, and it seems that this difference (inasmuch as it is politically significant) may have consequences for the presidential elections, thereby re-establishing a synchrony between the public domains<sup>4</sup>.

The difference between the opinion of the federal president and the statements of the newspapers (or the quotations published by the newspapers) never lead to an open confrontation. Either the presidential speeches are received with skeptical detachment (with the detachment being established only through the use of linguistically subtle means, and with no blunt rejection or counter-argument) or certain passages of the text are simply ignored, and quotations from numerous other participants in the discourse are used instead.

### Neutrality in the reporting of events in foreign policy

We now turn from the presentation of neutrality on the national holiday to the way neutrality features during various crises in foreign policy. Doing so, we move from a context which implicitly fosters the presentation of unity (and thus lack of conflict) to one, in which conflict is present and conflict on various issues is newsworthy and may be openly expressed. In looking at these conflicts, we will analyze (a) whether neutrality was an issue at all, (b) what positions on neutrality were present(ed), (c) who took which stance on neutrality, and (d) which paper promoted which vision on neutrality.

The investigation comprised a detailed analysis of the reporting of the following years/events in foreign policy<sup>5</sup>. Each of these events questioned (or could have questioned) Austria's neutral status:

- 1956: The uprising in Hungary
- 1968: The Prague Spring (Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968)
- 1981: Poland (Declaration of martial law in response to the demands of *Solidarność* — the representative organization of the trade unions).
- 1989: Request to join the EC (EU)
- 1992: Use of Austrian air-space by NATO planes

In selecting these events, we intentionally excluded a more in-depth investigation of the discourse on European Community membership, because of the large amount of mater-

4 One might speculate, whether the election of Thomas Klestil for president was also influenced by this discursive "gap", which he was likely to bridge (realigning the position of the president again with the ongoing pro-EU discourse).

5 These events are examined in greater detail in Karin Liebhart's chapter (this volume — historical overview), and so the account given here is brief.

ial on this subject and the availability of several excellent studies (e.g. Schaller 1994, Rinderer 1995).

Once the events had been selected, we looked at reports published in the period of two days before until six days after the key events. Any article that either addressed the event or related to neutrality was included in the analysis. The newspapers investigated were: *Kurier*, *Die Presse*, *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* (from 1968) and *Der Standard* (from 1989).

The following comprises the results of the investigation in chronological order.

### 1956

The reforms of the Soviet Communist Party under Khrushchev gave rise to hopes for a liberalization in the countries of the eastern bloc. At a demonstration on 23<sup>rd</sup> of October 1956, Hungarian students expressed their solidarity with striking Polish workers and at the same time called for greater democratic freedoms and Hungarian independence (the Soviet army had been stationed in Hungary since the end of the Second World War). The demonstration turned into a popular uprising, which was joined by parts of the army and police force. Imre Nagy, a reform-Communist, established a new government and demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops. He then introduced a multi-party system, left the Warsaw Pact, and declared Hungarian neutrality. Moscow reacted with military force, deploying tank units. The uprising was put down after bloody street battles. Imre Nagy was detained (two years later he was executed) and a Communist government backed by Moscow was established.

Both of the two newspapers which we examined gave substantial coverage to the events in the neighboring country. Many of the articles concentrated on the portrayal of events in foreign countries without reference to Austria. Other articles concerned the reactions of Austrian politicians and the Austrian public, as well as the effects of the crisis upon Austria. In the analysis of this event as well as of the others, our attention was focused on articles that contained some reference to Austria or related to the Austrian self-image and Austrian foreign policy. We naturally concentrated on the discussion and representation of neutrality (whether and where these were present).

### *Die Presse*

	21. 10.	22. 10	23. 10	24. 10	25. 10	26. 10	27. 10	28. 10	29. 10
Total number of articles	1	SU	1	1	4	8	12	12	SU
Reports on foreign affairs	1		1	1	2	6	7	6	
Reference to Austria					2	2	5	6	
Neutrality							2	1	

Key: SU ... Sunday. No paper appeared.

In *Die Presse*, the number of reports on foreign affairs only slightly exceeds the number of articles that relate to Austria. Neutrality is rarely mentioned.

Articles “relating to Austria” comprise of articles describing the role of Austrians in the events and their offers of assistance (25, 27, 28 October), security measures and other events along the Austrian border (25, 26, 27, 28), and the consequences for Austrian Communists. On 28<sup>th</sup> October there are reports about the demonstrations of Hungarians in Austria, a statement by the national organization of Academics (*Akademikerbund*), and a plea for assistance. Reports in the newspapers of events as described by Austrians returning to Austria from Hungary were considered “reports on foreign affairs” for the purpose of analysis. (No attempt was made to divide these reports into two groups on the basis of whether they were reports about events in Hungary or reports about the reactions of other countries to the events in Hungary).

Two factors are very noticeable in the reports: first, the low frequency of references to neutrality, and second, at the level of content, explicit support for the “freedom-fighters” in Hungary. In view of the fact that Austria had only just become “neutral” (in 1955), and that there were long discussions in the public domain of what neutrality would imply — whether Austria would now have to refrain from voicing any opinion —, the extent to which the newspapers take up positions is highly surprising. However, most of the normal “public voices” are largely absent in this discourse; statements by federal chancellor Raab or by other top politicians are rare. Where the reports concern Austria, only the “voice of the people” is made known.

This suggests the following: in 1956, neutrality was still not an issue for the general public; ordinary Austrians did not think of themselves as neutral. The silence of the politicians might indicate a feeling on their part of being restricted either by neutrality or by the general world-wide political situation (including the fear that Soviet forces might reoccupy Austria). Thus, in this instance, the discursive location of the politicians is different from that of the people, but no identity discourse on neutrality is present in either case.

In the following, we shall briefly examine three quotations on neutrality as well as a section of text containing the most important positions on the crisis.

#### 1. 27.10. “Austria’s sympathy”

*On the occasion of the Day of the Austrian Flag, a celebration was held by the Association of Trades’ Unions in the Concert Hall. President Böhm declared that the celebration was a profession of loyalty to the democratic constitution. The significance of neutrality and the significance of the freedom and independence of a nation, we are experiencing with devastated hearts in these days.*

In this quotation, neutrality appears syntagmatically with “democratic constitution” and “freedom and independence”. Inasmuch as neutrality had no clear political function at this time (the policy of “active neutrality” was practised only at a later stage), one may assume that the significance of neutrality is restricted to its role in the establishment and maintenance of the much-valued freedom and independence. Given the conflict in Hungary, one’s own “freedom” acquires an even greater value, and neutrality also receives a positive evaluation as a successful means to an end. (The situation is very different in the presidential speeches of later years when neutrality appears to be simply a price that must be paid. Cf. chapter on presidential speeches, this volume)

2. 27.10. Archbishop König: Donate for Hungary!

*In an appeal, the Archbishop of Vienna, Dr. Franz König, called upon believers to pray and make sacrifices for the brethren in Hungary and Poland. The appeal states that however the bloody conflicts are concluded, the suffering that was already present will now increase to an unbearable level. The neutrality of Austria and the links of Austria with these countries through history and geographical proximity impose a doubly-grave obligation upon Austria at this hour.*

*It is possible that assistance from the western countries will not be accepted. Assistance from neutral Austria, however, which is not tied to any political conditions, cannot be turned down by any regime. (...)*

*This appeal by the Archbishop of Vienna expresses what countless Viennese people have been thinking in these days: the obligation to offer assistance in recognition of a shared past stretching back many hundreds of years, the close personal relations that still exist even today between Austrians and Hungarians, and the fate of Hungary, which Austria has been spared.”*

Interestingly, it seems that neutrality is first used for political purposes by the church and by Archbishop König.

Linguistically, neutrality is seen not as a means to a (past) end, but almost as an end in itself, as something we should strive to be (like). Neutrality (as a state of being) imposes a moral obligation upon “us” to take certain (moral) actions. In this formulation, neutrality takes on the role of agent; as the patient “we” or “Austria” receive a task (as in the presidential speeches of 1974). The formulation chosen here connotes neutrality (as such) rather negatively. As has already been described in the chapter on the presidential speeches, this formulation is used to describe an “enforced situation”: instead of our doing something voluntarily, we are actually forced to do something by a certain external agent (i.e. neutrality). The less than matter-of-fact nature of this responsibility (“*Verpflichtung*”: here the lexeme “*Pflicht*” — duty/obligation — indicates the potentially involuntary character) is also apparent through the subsequent explanation that is considered

necessary. If something is obvious, it does not have to be explained. A special status for Austria is established discursively through reference to neutrality, and then a (moral) duty is derived from this special role<sup>6</sup>.

Significantly, in the following extract (“the archbishop expressed what many Austrians are thinking”) the reference to neutrality is left out. The motivating elements noted now are of a quite different nature: personal contacts, emphasis on shared aspects through reference to common history. Neutrality is not mentioned as a motivating factor — probably just because neutrality has not yet become a motivating factor for the people.

The “moral” appeal is effective (in the representation of the newspaper; it will be mentioned again the following day), because it meets people’s emotional needs — even if they take action for other reasons.

One can see in this “discursive dualism” the foundation stones of a transfiguration which is to take place later on: what takes place at first for very personal reasons, is reinforced morally — even at this early stage — with a reference to neutrality, which in retrospect can remain as the single explanatory component.

### 3. 28<sup>th</sup> October: Commentary: help freedom!

(...) *“We follow the events in Hungary with great concern and anxiety, knowing that our own fate will be affected as the situation unfolds for better or for worse. If the brave Hungarian nation were only to break free of the Russian sphere of influence, that would also be a battle won for Austria, for we would move a fair way from the outermost zone of the western world towards the safety of the center.*

(...) *The tangibly capitalistic methods with which Moscow has undertaken the exploitation of the “working class” under the cover of Communism ...*

(...) *It is incumbent upon the most powerful military states of the West to stand by the Hungarian people through effective intervention in the political and diplomatic field. We Austrians, however — citizens of a neutral country — have every reason to heed the courageous appeal of the Archbishop of Vienna and prove our feelings of solidarity with self-sacrificing deeds. All means that are available to us as a neutral state must be summoned, in order to help those who today are standing on the front line in the struggle for freedom and who risk their lives for this. They are fighting and dying for us too, for there is only one freedom in this world, and it is indivisible.”*

Our last example reveals two things: the explicitness of the support for one party to the conflict and another instance of a reference to neutrality. There is little to add to the first

6 For the moral implications which are attributed to neutrality in the Austrian discourse of national identity see also the chapter on focus groups, this volume.

observation; the passages are so explicit in their rejection of the “Russian might” and of “Moscow” that a linguistic analysis is superfluous. An interesting point in this connection is perhaps the identity discourse (which takes place simultaneously) in which Austria is characterized as the “outermost zone of the western world”. Thus, not only is support declared for the “struggle for freedom in Hungary” but also — in the self-definition of belonging to the West — a political position is taken up as early as 1956 that surpasses any kind of “neutrality between the blocs”, although of course this position is expressed only by the public media and not by the political elite.

In the second part, Austria is first marked off from the “most powerful military states of the west” (i.e. we do not belong in that group), and then their role in the conflict is exposed. There follows a discussion of the role of Austrians as “citizens of a neutral country”, which is of course a different role. The description “citizens of a neutral country” is made in apposition, that is, in a manner that is unconnected with the semantic structure of the sentence (Heim & Kratzer, 1998). Thus, the pragmatic function appears to lie primarily in the reference to the speech of the archbishop. However, in reference to the speech, rather than the moral consequences of neutrality, mention is once again made of the solidarity felt by Austrians (which is not linked to such moral consequences), the deeds are again grounded in “direct” emotions felt for “the neighbor” rather than being mediated by “us” being “neutral”.

The key point in this discourse is a struggle for the way to deal (discursively) with neutrality: Austria has a special role because of neutrality, but what this ‘special role’ implies is not at all clear.

#### THE *Kurier*

	21. 10.	22. 10.	23. 10.	24. 10.	25. 10.	26. 10.	27. 10.	28. 10.	29. 10.
Total articles	-	1	-	1	3	7	1	-*	11
Foreign reports		1		1	1	6			7
Austrian reference					2	1			4
Neutrality					1				1

\* A special edition that was unobtainable

The reports in the *Kurier* relating to Austria were similar to those in *Die Presse*. Here too, we find descriptions of events at the border (25, 26 October), the reaction of the Communist Party (25<sup>th</sup> October), an appeal for help (29<sup>th</sup> October), assistance measures, and a demonstration of solidarity by writers (29<sup>th</sup> October). In general, there are fewer references to Austria in this newspaper than in *Die Presse*. In particular, there are fewer articles about events at the border (and the securing of the frontier), and there is no refer-

ence to Archbishop König's appeal, although this may be because we are missing the special edition of 28 October.

There are only two references to neutrality; one of these has nothing to do with the uprising in Hungary and just happens to feature in the newspaper during the period under investigation. The second reference comes from a statement by the federal government.

25.10. Raab on Hungary: "State treaty gave rise to new desire for freedom"

*"The signing of the State Treaty was a precondition for the striving of the peoples of the successor states of the Monarchy for freedom", said the federal chancellor Raab when asked for his opinion about the events in Hungary at a reception for Austrians living in Germany yesterday.*

*(...) When asked whether — in view of the neutrality declaration passed by the National Assembly — Austria would join a Central European system of defense, the federal chancellor stated that Austria "could not take part in a military pact for the time being".*

This article shows both the important role assigned to the State Treaty (even in terms of its effect as a model) and a slightly negative attitude towards neutrality. Neutrality is presented as a hindrance, i.e. as something that "stops one from doing something" (i.e. as an external factor that prevents Austria from doing something) that one would (obviously) like to do. This impression is further strengthened through the use of a temporal restriction "for the time being".

The second passage — from an article appearing some days later — represents the only substantial political statement on the issue to be made public. As already described in the investigation of the reporting of *Die Presse*, the official stance taken is one of restraint.

29.10. A courageous appeal by the Austrian government

*The Austrian government, which, in view of the events in Hungary, had been brought together for a special meeting under the chairmanship of federal chancellor Raab, decided to make an encouragingly resolute and courageous appeal to the Soviets yesterday. The text of the appeal reads as follows:*

*"The Austrian federal government follows with pain and great concern the bloody events and heavy losses which have been taking place in Hungary during the last five days. It urgently requests the USSR to play a part in bringing an end to the military engagements and in preventing any further loss of life.*

*Based on the freedom and independence of Austria that is secured by neutrality, the federal government of Austria calls for a normalization of conditions in Hungary with the aim of*

*strengthening and securing peace in Europe through the re-establishment of freedom in terms of human rights." (...)*

Nowhere in the passage is Moscow blamed directly (unlike in the commentary investigated above). The "events" seem to happen by themselves without any active participants. The government of the USSR is called upon to play a part ("mitzuwirken") in bringing an end to the crisis. Although this would seem to mean that the USSR does have the power to act, thus indirectly placing some responsibility upon it, the extent of this responsibility is immediately limited by the verb "mitwirken". The use of this verb implies that the Soviet Union is not the only agent capable of acting; it is not the Soviet Union alone that can bring an end to the military engagements.

The following section begins with some self-positioning: from which vantage point is the Austrian federal government formulating its position? The first point of departure is neutrality, which has played an instrumental role in the establishment of Austrian freedom and independence. This point of departure is not linked in any meaningful sense to the next statement. Thus, the purpose (or function) of mentioning neutrality also appears to lie outside the context of this passage. This is definitely not an argumentative back-up to a statement on Hungary. Instead, its purpose is probably to provide discursive support for the status of Austria: Austria is neutral and independent, i.e. irrespective of the outcome of the conflict in Hungary, Austria sees itself as a sovereign state pursuing a policy that is independent of Moscow. Unlike Hungary, Poland and other states, Austria is guaranteed this individual existence through the State Treaty and neutrality.

The formulation of a position on the situation in Hungary comes only after one's own invincibility has been established. Even then, only a minimal statement is made: rather than making a demand or an accusation, the government simply "calls for" something, i.e. a normalization of conditions. The term "normalization" leaves open a whole range of interpretations, some of which will accommodate the Soviet position. The most critical phrase would seem to be "freedom in terms of human rights", but this phrase is found in an explanatory subordinate clause, i.e. at a subordinate point in the text structure.

Overall the reporting of the *Kurier* is no different from that of *Die Presse*. In both newspapers neutrality is rather irrelevant, that is, neutrality is still far from being a component of identity. Whenever neutrality does appear, it tends to be negatively connoted.

Nevertheless, some of the models of argumentation that are to be employed in the future (and some of the discursive functions of neutrality) may already be recognized: Neutrality is seen as a positive means, which has established freedom for Austria. Because of neutrality, Austria has been assigned a special status that seems to make Austria especially suitable for the functions of a mediator.

1968

1968 saw the violent suppression of an attempt by another Communist state bordering Austria to introduce democracy.

In the course of 1968 increasing efforts were made by Czechoslovakia to introduce democracy. These developments became known as the "Prague Spring" (or as "Socialism with a human face", and the changes included the abolition of censorship and the introduction of the right to assembly and free association etc.). In a night-time offensive (20—21 August 1968), the country was occupied by the troops of five Warsaw Pact states. Elected representatives were imprisoned, the government was restructured, television and radio stations were occupied, and so on. Owing to this well-organized and rapid occupation, Czechoslovakia made no attempt to resist militarily, but civil resistance did continue for several days. On 26<sup>th</sup> August 1968 representatives of the Czechoslovak government, who had been taken to Moscow, were forced into promising to rescind the reforms.

#### THE *Kurier*

In the *Kurier* the reporting of the Prague Spring is qualitatively different from the reporting of the uprising in Hungary. The volume of reports is significantly higher in the period 19—26 August 1968, and the boundary between reports on foreign affairs and reports about Austrians is blurred. Articles on the events in Prague frequently contain a paragraph on, for example, Austrian border security or the reaction of the Austrian people. There are even differences in the form of the layout: pages are headed by a general subject headline with articles of varying lengths below. In view of the structure and the general mixing of subject-matter, there seems to be no point in counting the number of articles and sub-headings.

In general, about six pages are devoted to the Prague Spring each day.

	19. 8.	20. 8.	21. 8.	22. 8.	23. 8.	24. 8.	26. 8.
Total	1 article	1 article	3 pages	6 pages	6 pages	7 pages	5 pages
Neutrality				4 articles			

As during the uprising in Hungary, the role of neutrality is not a dominant one. All statements on neutrality are made on a single day (22<sup>nd</sup> August 1968). The position on neutrality appears to have changed moderately since the uprising in Hungary. Nevertheless, Austrian politicians are still characterized by extreme reserve.

### 22.8. "With flags against tanks and canons"

*[Czech journalists have asked Austrian Radio and Television to broadcast news programs in Czech when they would be no longer able to do this themselves.]*

*As radio chief Hartner told the KURIER just yesterday evening, for the moment there are no plans to broadcast programs in Czech on Austrian channels. Director-general Bacher is negotiating with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this matter. Since Radio Vienna has not broadcast Czech language programs before, the introduction of such programs could, under certain circumstances, be irreconcilable with the neutral status of Austria."*

Some days later, programs broadcasting in Czech and neutrality is seen as compatible, and, even more, the decision is regarded as the institutional decision of Austrian Radio and Television instead of being a state issue. Nevertheless, the matter demonstrates the existing insecurity. It is still questionable what neutrality really means, what restrictions it imposes, and what freedoms it permits. In 1968 understanding of neutrality is still lacking. This is accompanied by an uncertainty about who is to decide what the correct understanding of neutrality is: Are the Austrians (or their politicians) entitled to decide, and what is the role of the signatory states of the State Treaty?

### 22.8 Commentary: The invasion

*Nobody can say what will happen in the next few days. It is owing to its policy of neutrality that Austria lies on the edge of the difficult epicenter and may watch the events in the neighboring country with sympathy but also with a feeling of relative security. Only relative security — for people who resort to such desperate and brutal measures could, under circumstances, feel themselves compelled to take others, too.*

At the same time, as shown by the above example, neutrality and neutrality policy are regarded as guarantees of freedom, while Austria remains subject to a potential threat from the Soviet Union (an invasion by troops). One may well ask what did "neutrality policy" mean in concrete terms. We hypothesize that this refers to the careful balancing act of the Austrian government between the East and West, which also reaffirms the policy of official restraint.

### 22.8. Austria: Neutral and prepared to help

*Lead: Vienna. While the invasion of Czechoslovakia by troops of the eastern bloc gave rise to strong emotional reactions among the people [of Austria], official Austria, and above all the government, have shown extreme restraint. After a special session of the federal government*

*that had been called together immediately, it was determined in a communiqué that Austria shall adhere strictly to its neutrality-responsibilities, but shall also continue to fulfill its responsibilities in the field of the right to asylum.*

*(...) [Statement by the ÖVP]*

*The ÖVP calls upon the government ... (...)*

*In addition, the government is called upon to take all measures to ensure that the tradition of neutral Austria in the field of the right to asylum and the offering of assistance is upheld. The ÖVP rejects any interference in the internal affairs of another state and has always repudiated attempts to exert foreign influence in Austrian affairs.*

In the statements of “official Austria” quoted by the *Kurier*, the function of neutrality as the “guarantee of freedom” becomes particularly clear. Thus, neutrality appears on one hand as a “reminder” to Communists that Austria is neutral, i.e. an individual sovereign state between the two blocs. At the same time, it is emphasized that the country does not belong to the West as such. These two aspects serve as a basis for argumentation, the expression of criticism, and the legitimization of specific measures (asylum policy). At the same time, the “silence” of the government and the “passivity” of Austria are indirectly legitimized.

#### 22.8. Commentary of Reinald Hübl: *Seen in human terms*

*The bitter suffering of tyranny: The relentless rule of force has snatched at our neighbor with the pincer movement of trained tank units.*

*Let us now say not only: “How fortunate that we are neutral, nothing can happen to us.” Instead let us say: “How fortunate that we are democrats — democrats that now stand once again on the very front line.”*

In 1968 the position of the government outlined above is very different from that of the people and the position expressed in the newspapers (this fact will become even clearer when we analyze the reports in *Die Presse*). The people see more security in neutrality than do the politicians. Indeed, to the people, neutrality already seems to be a matter of fact (as the above passage shows).

Overall we can determine the following position on neutrality: neutrality is both a restriction (it does not permit certain things) and a positive instrument (which has provided freedom and independence). For the various actors, the two aspects are of differing importance. For the people, the positive influences of neutrality are more important, and they regard neutrality as a matter of fact that is no longer endangered. The situation is different for the politicians, who exhibit a certain ambivalence towards neutrality. This may be because the politicians see themselves as actively defining neutrality, yet this

defining of policy is happening under considerable political pressure, and the reaction to their independent measures is waited upon with some anxiety. Another significant factor is the state-legitimizing function of neutrality. Neutrality seems to guarantee the continued existence of freedom and independence, and this function is employed rhetorically in everyday political life. An important aim was to preserve this major political function of neutrality. Therefore, all attempts by Austrian politicians to define neutrality had to ensure that they did not endanger the international consensus (including the Soviet position) on the status of neutrality. One may assume that the length of the internal discussion about the broadcasting of Czech language programs by Austria Radio and Television (it lasted several days) was due to the fact that one wanted to wait for a possible reaction on the part of the Soviets. The uncertainty about the definition and who was to define neutrality would also explain why neutrality was so rarely mentioned.

#### *Die Presse*

Unlike in the case of the *Kurier*, articles in *Die Presse* are more easily set off from each other, and therefore we shall categorize them individually.

	17/18.8	19.8	20.8	21.8	22.8	23.8	24/25.8	26.8
Total	1	3	1	2	23	23	27	15
Foreign	1	2 (1)	1	2	13 (1)	19 (4)	20 (3)	10 (1)
Austrian	-	1	-	-	10	4	7 (1)	5
Neutrality					2	2	-	1 (K)

Key: The number of commentaries is given in parenthesis.

Most of the reporting in *Die Presse* is concerned with the events themselves, and the international reaction; there is much less of a focus on Austria and the domestic reactions. Articles which report reactions in Austria address the following types of subject matter (apart from the political discussion in which neutrality is mentioned): the position of the Austrian Communist Party on the invasion of Czechoslovakia (19, 22, 24 August (commentary and report)), the consequences for, and preparations of, the federal armed forces (22, 24 August), events at the border (22 August (2), 23, 24, 26 August), Czechs and refugees in Austria (22, 23, 24, 26 August), repercussions for travel and the postal service (22, 23, 24, 26 August), events outside the Czechoslovak embassy (22 August), reactions in Austria (23 August), reactions to a violation of air-space (24 August), appeal of youth to the president of the UN (U Thant, 24 August), and a report about attempts to restrict critical press activities in Austria (26 August).

Overall, the official political reaction is only of limited importance: most of the articles concern the immediate concrete repercussions (e.g. for the federal armed forces, for the postal service and travel, etc.). Compared with the situation today, there appears to

exist a lower expectation concerning a political reaction. If the federal president were to remain silent in a crisis today, we would expect to read exactly that — rather than this fact simply being left out of the reports.

The reporting of neutrality in *Die Presse* resembles that in the *Kurier*. Given the large number and length of the texts, as well as the fact that the same basic trend may be observed, we have placed the passages in the appendix. Only individual quotations from the texts will be discussed here. The context of these quotations is to be taken from the appendix.

On 22<sup>nd</sup> August the newspaper publishes statements made by the federal chancellor and a commentary by Thomas Chorherr. In both texts, neutrality plays the role that we have already identified with respect to the *Kurier*. In a statement of the chancellor broadcast on radio, neutrality policy is again linked to freedom and used with a reference to the State Treaty; criticism of the Soviet Union is then portrayed as something that, in principle, contradicts neutrality. Linguistically this is indicated through the use of “at the same time” (*gleichzeitig*) and “nevertheless” (*jedoch*). In the subsequent text, the assumed contradiction is expressed even more strongly: “Austria is quite aware of its neutral status, but cannot, nevertheless, accept ...”. “Solidarity” with Czechoslovakia is still formulated in muted tones, a circumstance that subsequently led to massive public criticism (according to *Die Presse*).

While the very cautious approach taken by the government is criticized in the commentary, there is recognition that “of course, it is an awkward matter whenever neutrality is in jeopardy — from whichever side.” Nevertheless, the same article notes the following: “A clearer statement would have done more good for the reputation of Austria, and would have sounded far less like an attempt at appeasement and lack of courage, and definitely would not have damaged the neutral status of the country. (Bern offers a good example.)” Here too, the ambivalence of the politicians is expressed — this time from the side of the commentators — but it is solved in a different manner. On one hand, a pessimistic picture is still painted — “it is an awkward matter”, on the other hand it is stated “that it [a clearer statement] would not have damaged the country”. In this comparison, the threatening scenario receives no argumentative support — who questions neutrality, how is the question posed, and so on, — and thus the scenario remains very vague. This is then contrasted with the active role played by Switzerland, whose neutrality permits such a role (Austrian neutrality was resolved with an explicit reference to Switzerland). Linguistically subtle means are being used to urge for a more active role: in this argumentation, the potential threat to neutrality turns out to be less motivated than taking up a critical stance.

The criticism of the cautious approach adopted by the government leads to another statement by the government, which is then reported in the newspapers the following day; on the same day, the paper publishes a report concerning the mood of the Austrian

people. The basic direction of the position taken by the government, however, does not change; the general-secretary of the ÖVP supports in a statement, the position of the government: "for political reasons linked to the state and neutrality, the government shall strictly adhere to the policy of non-interference..." Once again the cautious approach of the government is legitimised with a reference to the threat to Austria's freedom and independence: "for the Austrian government, in the interest of its own life interests, measures and considerations are necessary [...] which other states, which are further from the arena, are released from."

Ambivalence is also expressed in an article about the views of the people; in there Austrians are shown to be afraid that the events in Czechoslovakia will have repercussions for Austria — not, however, because of violations of neutrality, but as a result of border violations. At the same time, neutrality is marked linguistically as a hindrance when it comes to the frank expression of opinion: "For all [our] neutrality, we must be clearer ...". "For all" ("*bei aller Neutralität*") is an adversative, something that contradicts the statement or transaction that follows. This is also clearly demonstrated by the following quotation: "We are neutral militarily — that's all well and good, but is one therefore not allowed to speak the truth?" This is one of the few quotations in which an attempt is made to define neutrality; in this case, an attempt is also being made to restrict its area of applicability. Neutrality is "militaristic", and the following question turns into a rhetorical one, which should then lead the position of the government *ad absurdum*.

Three days later, two more articles appear, one of which concerns neutrality directly and the other indirectly. (There were no articles in the *Kurier* about this particular controversy.) According to the articles, an attempt was made by the state to exert pressure upon *Die Presse*, which was asked to be more moderate in its coverage of the Soviets.

In general, in *Die Presse*, ambivalence about neutrality is more frequently expressed than in the *Kurier*. Neutrality provides freedom and the securing of freedom — and this is accepted by the population with very few questions — and on the other hand, neutrality also forbids certain things. A lack of certainty about what is permitted and disallowed by neutrality, stands and falls with the corresponding definition. Even more, one is less than sure of who now owns neutrality, who is in the position to legitimately define neutrality. Thus, neutrality becomes a vague image, which one simultaneously appreciates, does not know, and whose assumed restrictions one rejects. Neutrality itself, however, is not given up in the process. Here one may begin to observe the later division of the discursive construct of "neutrality" into an identity-providing discursive object which has lost its political meaning, and a politically real instrument, which is at the same time discursively non-functional (or not existing as such). Neutrality is valued, but its political consequences (i.e. its political being) are not.

THE *Kronen-Zeitung*

In the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung*, again the identification of articles as separable units is difficult, and so we chose instead to count pages devoted to the coverage of this event.

	20.8	21.8	22.8	23.8	24.8	25.8	26.8.
Total number of articles / pages	2 (1)	1 (1) 5 pictures	11 pages, about 9 pages	11 pages	10 pages	5 articles	
Austria			5	2	1 (1)	1	1 (1)
Neutrality			1		1	-	-

Key: The number of commentaries is given in parenthesis after the total number of articles.

The *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* contains — in comparison to the other newspapers — relatively few articles concerning Austria. In addition, the selection of events is different from that of both the *Kurier* and *Die Presse*.

For example, the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* does not report the internal conflicts in the Austrian Communist Party. There is little about the army, just one article about events at the border (22<sup>nd</sup> August), two articles about the assistance given by the newspaper to Czechs (22, 23 August), nothing about other acts of assistance, and so on. There are, however, other event-stories (see Lüger, 1983): someone throwing a gas bomb in front of the Soviet embassy (22<sup>nd</sup> August), a protest march of Viennese students (22<sup>nd</sup> August), and a bomb alarm at an outer space exhibition (23<sup>rd</sup> August).

Neutrality is mentioned above all in commentaries.

As in the case of *Die Presse*, the cautious reaction of the government is also criticized in the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung*. Unlike *Die Presse*, however, the newspaper does not mention neutrality as a factor that could potentially hinder the frank expression of opinion. “Official Austria is not just behaving in a neutral way, but, more than that, in an expressly reserved manner and with complete detachment” (22<sup>nd</sup> August). Here the approach taken by the government is deemed to go beyond what is required by neutrality: neutrality does not result in a conflict of interests for the government. Instead, the government is acting in a cowardly manner of its own free will.

Two days later, in a commentary by “Cato”, the view is repeated that neutrality does not prevent Austria from condemning the Soviet Union: “If our officials [the government] do not have the civil courage to condemn in a morally unmistakable way the actions of the Soviets in Czechoslovakia — our neutrality would not be impaired by this —, then they do not need to inflate themselves because of a completely trivial violation of air-space ...” In this passage, the potentially limiting function of neutrality is expressed in a very sub-

lime manner: only the necessity of excluding neutrality as a factor that could rule out criticism shows that this could have been a common assumption. "Cato", i.e. the newspaper publisher Hans Dichand, clearly considers this to be an unfounded assumption.

For the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* the potential danger for Austria does not lie in the actions of Austrian politicians, which might violate neutrality and thus give the Soviet Union an excuse to reoccupy Austria, but in the Austrian Communist Party:

26. 8., commentary by Cato: A question:

*The Soviets mention that they were called into Czechoslovakia by "leading personalities of the Czechoslovak Communist Party". Thus, in their opinion, the invasion was "legalized".*

*What will happen if one day leading Communists in the Federal Republic [of Germany], in Italy, France or Austria suddenly think of requesting the help of the Soviets in the same way?*

In brief, the position on neutrality expressed in the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* is substantially different from that expressed in *Die Presse* and in the *Kurier*. In the *Kronen-Zeitung* there is no ambivalence; neutrality is not seen as a factor that might prevent the frank expression of opinion. Neutrality as such is hardly addressed in a meaningful way. Instead neutrality is portrayed as an accepted and integral part of an Austrian self-image. What is revealing here is at most the formulation "our neutrality would ...". The significance of the discursive manner in which neutrality is ascribed to "us" in "our neutrality" has already been described in greater detail in the analysis of the presidential speeches. The conclusion was made that "our neutrality" is distinct — also in a historical sense — from "this neutrality", which was the other phrase used in the presidential speeches. Any one of several other means of reference ("this neutrality", "Austria's neutrality", "neutrality") could have been used by the writer of the article in the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung*. Thus, while the writer rarely mentions neutrality and does so in an unsentimental manner, his choice of "our neutrality" shows that — for him at least — neutrality has already become a constituent part of "us", and as such no longer needs to be debated.

If one also considers the various audiences of the newspapers under investigation, the interpretation suggested in the case of the *Kurier* and *Die Presse*, namely that members of the political elite have an understanding of neutrality that is different from that of the general public, is confirmed. Neutrality was more widely and unconditionally accepted by the general public than by the politicians, who displayed a greater awareness of the political limitations and consequences of neutrality.

1981

Thirteen years after the Prague Spring, a further democratic movement arises in one of the Warsaw Pact states. This movement is not suppressed by an invasion of Warsaw Pact (Soviet) troops, instead the Polish president imposes martial law. Commentaries in the newspapers consider this to be a preventive measure: if Jaruzelski had not acted, an invasion of Soviet troops would have been inevitable.

Whatever the case, from the Austrian perspective, reactions to events in Poland are quite different from reactions to the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or the events in Hungary in 1956. Although once again an eastern European state with a fairly close relations to Austria is affected, and although once again the democratic will of the people is suppressed by military means, Poland lies, nevertheless, at a greater geographical distance from Austria, and the events represent less of a direct threat. Moreover, this is the era of détente. In addition, the "economic debate" regarding people from Eastern Europe has begun. In subsequent years their entry into Austria is seen more and more as economically motivated (see Matouschek, Wodak & Januschek, 1995) and less and less as politically motivated. Shortly before the imposition of martial law, Austria introduced a visa requirement for Poles entering the country. Given that the political situation in Poland clearly does endanger the lives of certain Polish citizens, some people fear that Poles claiming political persecution will use the events as a cover to gain entry into "the golden west". Such a view is expressed in the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung*: "Foreign minister Pahr and interior minister Lanc have indeed ordered our border posts and embassies (Warsaw, Prague, and so on) to handle all visa requests generously. The chancellor, however, has made it clear that we are not a country of immigration for economic refugees." (The Pope issues an urgent warning of bloodshed in Poland, 14. 12., *Neue Kronen-Zeitung*).

Indignation at the military suppression is therefore ambivalent: the Poles should finally sort things out in their own country.

In this whole context, neutrality was not mentioned in any of the newspapers investigated. In order to illustrate the "absence" of neutrality in the newspapers in 1981, we shall now briefly discuss a number of articles in which Austrian foreign policy is mentioned.

In this respect, commentaries, and reactions of Austrian politicians are of particular interest. The *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* may serve as an example of one of the early reactions:

*Neue Kronen-Zeitung*, 18. 12., p. 2.

*Commentary, Consolation: Non-interference*

*The litany was long. The English-language service of Radio Moscow read out the names of prominent western politicians who have described the imposition of martial law on Poland as an internal affair and have stood up for the principle of non-interference. Even federal chancellor Kreisky expressed, in his initial reaction, understanding for the Poles' attempts by*

*drastic means to prevent the complete destruction of the state. Kreisky has since condemned the wave of arrests and the use of force by the military authorities, and has done so in such a way that he will certainly not be quoted by Radio Moscow."*

While overall there are few reports in the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* concerning condemnations of events in Poland by important politicians, the president of the National Assembly, Benya, is quoted. In his "Christmas address to Parliament" Benya emphasized "the great empathy with which Austria follows the events in Poland. It is painful to have to watch how the order of a state can be established using tanks and weapons rather than through law and order." (*Neue Kronen-Zeitung*, 18 12., p. 4., Benya: Sympathy for the fate of Poland). On another occasion the federal chancellor Kreisky is quoted. At a meeting in the press club Concordia, and in reply to a charge made by representatives of the Soviet newspaper *Izvestiia* that "Soviet-Austrian relations would be negatively affected by reports on Poland — which had appeared, among other newspapers, in the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung*" Kreisky stated: "Rumors that a Soviet general may have ordered the proclamation of martial law in Poland, cannot be dismissed out of hand. Moreover, there is no censorship in Austria." (*Neue Kronen-Zeitung*, 19 12., p. 5., "Never so dangerous since the end of the war!").

This last quotation is of course interesting when one considers the (at least perceived) attempts at censorship on the part of the Austrian government during the Prague Spring. By contrast in 1981, when faced with Soviet hostility, the federal chancellor notes in a self-confident manner the freedom of the press in Austria, obviously not at all afraid of any repercussion for Austria.

Official Austria shows itself to be sure of its neutrality, which is never questioned. The issue of the extent of press freedom and ideological neutrality in the broader public sphere is considered irrelevant. Nevertheless, the number of reported statements on Poland made by official Austria in its official function (i. e. diplomatic notes and the like, rather than press briefings) is still noticeably small. This also applies to the other newspapers (see below). The question therefore arises whether Austrian foreign policy is still intentionally cautious, despite its outward self-confidence.

In 1968, stronger statements were demanded by the press and certain political functionaries. In 1981 there are no such reactions. This appears to be linked to the geographical distance between Austria and Poland as well as to the economically framed migration discourse that was developing simultaneously (Viewing Polish immigrants as "economic refugees").

Other reports on Austria are more concerned with refugees and asylum-seekers in Austria and with the issuing of visas.

In the following, we shall briefly examine reports in *Die Presse* which contain statements by "official Austria". (Examples of analogous articles appearing in the *Kurier* may be found in the appendix.). In *Die Presse* article published on 15<sup>th</sup> December 1981, we see again significant restraint in the government's statements.

*Die Presse*, 15. 12., "Despite martial law, strikes in Poland", p. 1

*"In a general statement of all Austrian parliamentary parties the deputies declared on Monday their "great concern" about the introduction of martial law in Poland."*

The report published on 16<sup>th</sup> December shows the ambivalence between the exclusion discourse ("flood of immigrants") on one hand and solidarity with the striking workers on the other.

*Die Presse*, 15. 12., "Kreisky", p.2

Kreisky: Polish workers have the right to resist

*"In Kreisky's view, Polish workers are entitled "to use any form of resistance that they consider effective". As the federal chancellor explained on Tuesday after the cabinet meeting, in this situation "any action taken by working people" was permissible. Kreisky called the suspension of the right to strike by the military government in Warsaw a "violation of human rights", and assured all immigrants from Poland that they would be allowed into Austria: "arrivals at the border will be let in anyway. This has always been the case". The visa requirement for Polish citizens would, however, be maintained, because Austria is not in a position to cope with the flood of immigrants."*

Finally, the report published on 19<sup>th</sup> December includes Kreisky's view of the world-wide political situation. As in similar articles, the fact that neutrality is not mentioned is particularly noteworthy. Such a context represents an ideal opportunity to speak of the mediating role of Austria as a neutral country. Nevertheless, this is never done. Even reports about the CSCE in Helsinki, which was proceeding at this time, contain no references to the neutral status of Austria.

*Die Presse*, 15. 12., Kreisky fears wave of rearmament "The situation in the world is very dangerous", p. 1,

*The Austrian federal president considers the present situation in the world to be "very, very dangerous": As Kreisky observed at a press conference in Vienna, we are living today through "the most dangerous situation since the Second World War". Kreisky linked this to the situ-*

*ation in Poland, the annexation of the Golan heights by Israel, the Iraq-Iran war, and the continuing tension in Afghanistan. All this "requires that every effort be made to prevent the situation from getting out of control" said the federal chancellor" (...)*

Thus, in 1981 a consensus in Austria was reached between the (quoted) politicians and the voice of the people concerning neutrality. Neutrality and the power to define it lay firmly in the hands of Austrian politicians, who are voicing their disagreement with political measures used in countries of the Eastern bloc, even though the statements made still are somewhat cautious. At the same time, we find the precursors of a discourse of exclusion, in which Austria situates itself as part of the 'golden West', setting itself off from the Eastern countries, and seeing upheaval in the East more from a standpoint apart difference and threat for oneself (through immigration of 'foreign cultures') than in terms of solidarity. As for situations of political unrest in neighboring countries, this discourse shall dominate the domestic discussions.

1989

On 17<sup>th</sup> July 1989, the Austrian foreign minister Alois Mock (ÖVP) delivered the Austrian application to join the European Community ("membership application"). This event was preceded by a lengthy domestic political debate on whether or not European Community membership was compatible with Austrian neutrality. The issue at stake in the debate that took place shortly before the application was submitted, concerned the formulation of a "neutrality proviso": in 1989 the SPÖ was committed to the unconditional retention of [Austria's] "perpetual neutrality", and wished this to be clearly expressed in the membership application. Following a compromise between the two then governing parties (SPÖ and ÖVP), the following paragraph was inserted into the "letter to Brussels":

*"5. The neutrality of Austria is its specific contribution to the upholding of peace and security in Europe — a contribution which finds its analogy in the preamble of the EEC treaty, and that reads: 'to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty.'"*

As part of our investigation, we examined statements made on neutrality in the week between 15<sup>th</sup> July and 21<sup>st</sup> July. During this period<sup>7</sup> there are reports of the reactions (15—16 July) in the preparatory committee of the Council of Ministers of the European Com-

7 The account given here is intentionally brief. For example, we do not examine the motives of the Belgian foreign minister, because these motives are irrelevant to the Austrian interpretation of the importance of neutrality within the Austrian self-image. For the same reason, we ignore the full extent of the diplomatic consequences of these events during the reporting week investigated.

munity before the actual submission of the application, and of potential opposition to Austria's accession among the member-states of the Community. The "neutrality proviso" is portrayed as one of the problems surrounding accession. On 17<sup>th</sup> July there are reports concerning the delivery of the application (which takes place on this day). Initially, the Council of Ministers displayed a surprising willingness to deal with Austria's application more rapidly than normal, but later this was blocked by the veto of the Belgian foreign minister (Eyskens). This was reported in the media on 18<sup>th</sup> July and the position of the Belgian foreign minister was criticized even within Belgium (19<sup>th</sup> July). On 20<sup>th</sup> July *Die Presse* published an interview with Eyskens in which the Belgian foreign minister called upon the European Community to initiate a discussion about Austria's neutrality with the Soviet Union. Eyskens had made the same proposal on the same day in other interviews, and thus it was not possible for him to claim that he had been misinterpreted. The request of a European foreign minister to negotiate with the Soviet Union on the issue of Austrian neutrality (without the participation of Austrians) led to a political outcry in Austria with various diplomatic consequences. The independent interpretation of the meaning of neutrality on the part of Austria was being questioned, and the Soviet Union was being granted (by the European side) the right to make its own interpretation. The very next day (21<sup>st</sup> July) it was reported that Belgium had relented. The proposal was referred to as having been no more than an "idea", and was withdrawn. Belgium then voted for the immediate forwarding of Austria's membership application to the European Commission.

All articles on this event are concerned with Austria and many of them address Austria's neutrality. Articles that deal solely with foreign aspects of the events (e.g. reactions in Belgium to Eyskens' comments) are rare exceptions.

Given the nature of the events, it was expected that the discursive "Waldheim effect"<sup>8</sup> would be repeated — this time in relation to "Austrian neutrality" (Wodak et al., 1990). Thus, particularly after the first dismissal by Belgium, the discourse is dominated by an outward defense and the formation of "we" and "them" groups. The substantial and argumentative debate around neutrality suffers. Often neutrality appears as a lexeme, as a "position in a discursive field", whose meaning is derived more from its position than from an independent definition of content. This changes only after Belgium relents, and the discourse can reflect once again upon the multiple voices heard at home. That is, one can think about what neutrality really means in terms of content, what conditions it prescribes, and how these conditions are to be reconciled with various demands.

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8 By the Waldheim effect we mean the stance: "Now all the more" — which was posted during the Waldheim campaign, meaning: "We" won't have anyone (a foreign country) have tell us what to do, and if "we" are told not to do something, that provides all the more reason to do just this.

*Neue Kronen-Zeitung*

In the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* the volume of reporting is rather small, with just six articles in the period under investigation. Five of these articles mention neutrality, one of the five is a commentary.

	15.7	16.7	17.7	18.7	19.7	20.7	21.7
Total number of Articles	-	-	1	1	2	1	1
Neutrality				1	2 (1)	1	1

Key: The number of commentaries is given in parenthesis.

Four of the five articles in which neutrality is mentioned name neutrality without expressing a positive or negative perspective on neutrality. Only one headline speaks of "our neutrality" ("Scandal: EC is to speak with the Kremlin about our neutrality!" 20. 7.), portraying neutrality again as part of Austria, i.e. as something that is very close to us (cf. "Austria's neutrality").

As an illustration of the lack of (explicit) evaluation, let us look at two statements of 19<sup>th</sup> July (EC-application: Belgium wants time to think, 19. 7, p.3.): "The neutrality of Austria should be no obstacle for the EC, it is said in Belgium. Federal Chancellor Franz Vranitzky emphasized once again that neutrality is not up for negotiation [...]". Here worries are expressed by the "adversary of Austria", that is by someone who does not belong to one's own group and has received quite bad press in Austria, that neutrality might be an obstacle and therefore something bad (in relation to the goal of EC membership). This is set against the statement of the Austrian federal chancellor, that is a statement by someone who does belong to one's own group and who is known within Austria as one of the keenest supporters of neutrality. However, instead of making a positive, affirmative statement on neutrality, the federal chancellor simply confirms that neutrality is not for negotiation. The issue of evaluation is not addressed explicitly in his statement. However, the newspaper did have an opportunity to make an evaluation, for it could also have quoted other politicians.

A (more) definite perspective on neutrality is given in a commentary by Staberl:

19.7. *Staberl: Two shoes, but not a pair, p. 2*

*[...] We could really do with a kind of magic hat in Brussels, if we want to cheat ourselves into the EC. The lance was drawn on the very first day, as our foreign minister and courier Mock delivered the application for membership. [...] [Es] The Belgian foreign minister, who was probably asked to step forward, stamped quite a bit and expressed frankly what every-*

*one had known for a long time: that full membership of the EC and neutrality were two shoes that together might never make a matching pair.*

*Until the establishment of the EC internal market in 1992 nothing [will happen]. [...] It certainly cannot harm us to prepare until that date as if we also might be allowed in!"*

In this commentary Staberl twice demonstrates the incompatibility of the EC and neutrality. First he states this indirectly, saying that a magic hat is needed, i.e. that under normal conditions accession is impossible. Then he reiterates this, stating in a very transparent analogy that neutrality and the EC are "two shoes" that do not make a pair. This statement is given extra weight by the headline above the commentary. (The first part of the article concerns US expenditure on armaments.)

At the end of the commentary Staberl draws a picture of a future in which the European internal market has been realized. He states positively, although in weakened form ("it can do no harm"), that we can "prepare as if we might be allowed in". On one hand, by using the subjunctive, he again calls into question whether we really will be able to join the EC, on the other hand he states that we should at least establish the conditions necessary for this. Nevertheless, one of these conditions, if one understands the sentence to mean political as well as economic conditions, is to relinquish neutrality, a condition that arises out of the incompatibility of the EC and neutrality, which has already been expressed. In order to read this evaluation from the text — an evaluation that has been weakened linguistically through the use of "it can do no harm" — one is required to study the text in detail and to follow the argumentative links between the various paragraphs. For this very reason it is doubtful whether readers would have understood the full message. Thus, overall, the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* refrains from making an evaluation. This is surprising, given that otherwise the newspaper is quick to evaluate matters of public interest (Bruck, 1991, Wodak et al. 1985).

#### *Die Presse*

	15.7/ 16.7	17.7	18.7	19.7	20.7	21.7
Articles	2 (1)	1	2	3 (1)	4 (1K, 1I)	2 (1)
N	1	1	2	3	4	2

The volume of reporting in *Die Presse* is considerably greater. Neutrality is mentioned in almost every article, although on almost every occasion from an external perspective. Reports concern events "in Brussels" and the reactions of various diplomats and politicians (most of whom are not Austrian) to the Austrian application for membership. Thus, in the main, an external point of view on neutrality is presented. Contexts are primarily the "debate about Austria's neutrality", "neutrality as an obstacle", the "question of neutral-

ity", and the "neutrality proviso". Parts of the membership application are cited: for example, a passage stating that Austria assumes that it will be able to "fulfill the legal requirements arising out of its status as a perpetually neutral state" (15. 7., p. 1.) and that "despite its neutrality, Austria will not impede a political union." Thus neutrality appears primarily in negatively connoted contexts in which it is seen both as an obstacle and as an impediment. Even the letter drawn up by Austrian politicians speaks of "requirements".

These (foreign policy) requirements are then set against Austria's "insistence" upon "its" neutrality.

*"... raised questions concerning the neutral status, but received only partly satisfactory answers. For instance, Mock stated that the neutrality that arises out of the State Treaty is definitive and irreversible."* (Eyskens in an interview, 18. 7).

Only in exceptional cases is neutrality granted more of a profile and seen as a flexible concept. One instance of this is a quotation from the letter of application where it is stated that Austria assumes that it will be able to "continue its policy of neutrality" (15. 7). On another occasion it is stated "that for fundamental reasons [Mock] does not want to embody neutrality in any future accession agreement, *in order not to establish the "right to a say" in the shaping of neutrality*" (18. 7). The most significant passage includes a quotation from a statement made by Vranitzky: "in the application for membership "neutrality per se is definitely not to be regulated, because Austria is not negotiating about that, but that the purpose of this treaty is to secure room to maneuver in which the neutrality-policy will be resolutely continued as before"." (19. 7)

Although in these quotations the word "neutrality-policy" does offer some indication of the presence of interpretative components of neutrality, the representation of neutrality as a defined concrete object — in the assumed contradiction between the EC and neutrality — is of far greater significance. This is strengthened further by a defense of Austria's sovereignty — it is not up to the Soviet Union to make statements about Austrian neutrality. Consequently, Austria's neutrality is defended from external attacks (negative context) by a refusal to allow neutrality to become the subject of discussion. This implies, however, the existence of concrete knowledge about the identity of this neutrality.

In *Die Presse*, neutrality appears primarily as "neutrality" or "Austria's neutrality" (and corresponding composites). "Our neutrality", which in the past has been used much more frequently, occurs just twice — in questions posed by a journalist while interviewing Mark Eyskens (20. 7). Thus, in *Die Presse* it is "Austria" which wishes to retain "its neutrality" rather than "we" who want to retain "our neutrality".

Compared with other texts (see, for example, the presidential speeches), reports on neutrality in *Die Presse* display a greater detachment. Neutrality is a matter of the state, and this is one step away from "us".

As described at the outset, the content of neutrality is debated only after the Eyskens-conflict. In a commentary by Andreas Unterberger (21.7, p. 1 “Neutral clarities”), it is stated that “Austria must begin an internal clarification about everything that until now has been understood under neutrality policy. In reality, many things that actually have nothing to do with neutrality have been packed into this [term].”

As an example, we now briefly examine the last paragraph of the commentary:

*“Austria shall continue to fulfill the clear obligations that arise out of neutrality. And if the EC so desires, solutions to all the problems will be found — even in the hypothetical case of an EC security union, one could imagine some sort of military autonomy. But even in ten years time Austria will still be sitting in the foyer of Brussels if it believes that it has to inflate neutrality into a great myth, into a model for Europe itself.”*

Two points in this text stick out as representative of the whole discourse. First, obligations are mentioned in connection with neutrality rather than possibilities and opportunities. In this way, a rather negative impression of neutrality is given. Second, as in the case of the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung*, the image established is one of the incompatibility of the EC and neutrality (even if here it is expressed more indirect and less ardent). Austria will stay in the foyer, i.e. will not enter the EC, if neutrality is elevated to the level of a European myth. This leads immediately to the following questions: to what extent is neutrality already considered to be a myth, i. e. as something unreal — after all rather than a myth being created, is it not said that myth is being expanded upon? And what form does the “inflation” of the myth take? We interpret this as being an allusion to the (rather marginal) voices in the pro-neutrality discourse (see analysis of the TV discussion of politicians, Benke & Wodak, this volume) who see neutrality as a positively valued specific form of peace policy.

In general, therefore, for this period we may determine a rather dismissive position on neutrality on the part of *Die Presse*. Rather than making direct negative statements, the newspaper expresses its position through underlying negative perspectives and the resulting detachment. This also corresponds to the image of the newspaper both as a “quality newspaper” with an A-category readership (which restricts the possibility of adopting a direct position to commentaries) and as a newspaper with close relations to the ÖVP. At the time, the policy of the ÖVP was pro-EC, and the party was also prepared to relinquish neutrality (see historical section by Liebhart, this volume).

THE *Kurier*

	16.7	17.7	18.7	19.7	20.7	21.7	22.7	23.7
Articles	2 (1)	3	3	4	2 (1)	4	3 (1)	2 (1)
N	2 (1)	2	1	4	2 (1)	4	3 (1)	2 (1)

The *Kurier* takes a quite different position than *Die Presse*. This becomes clear at the very beginning of the week of reporting, that is, at a point in time when the foreign policy dispute with Belgium was still to begin. At that time, the *Kurier* was publishing a series on the EC which dealt with the political background of the EC and the events that led up to the Austrian application for membership. In an article (16.7, p. 5: "The letter is just the beginning") the conclusion is drawn that the "central issue of accession is naturally neutrality". But what follows is not the foreign policy difficulties or an incompatibility of the EC with neutrality, but statistics on the level of support for neutrality among Austrians:

*"The central issue of accession is naturally neutrality. About three quarters of Austrians are not prepared to give up neutrality for the sake of accession to the EC, and only 16 percent would buy a ticket to Brussels for the price of neutrality. Even one of the most active EC supporters, the secretary-general of the association of industrialists, Herbert Krejci, considers neutrality to be the "greater good".*

*Antipodes in their evaluation of the neutrality of Austria are foreign minister Thomas Nowotny, SPÖ, and former foreign minister Erwin Lanc, who both consider EC membership to be simply "not compatible" with our neutrality, and the constitutional lawyer Andreas Khol, ÖVP, who explains that this is "obviously possible". (...) Khol, however, sees our neutrality as primarily a military one and points to the EC member-state Ireland, whose neutrality was accepted by the Community without complaint. (...)*

*It is only during the negotiations with the EC that it will become clear whether Austria's neutrality is regarded by the EC or by Austria as an obstacle to accession. And that will last at best five years (...)."*

Here a positively connoted framework for neutrality is established. Neutrality is depicted both here and later on as "our neutrality", which never happened then in *Die Presse*. The newspaper is aimed at broad sections of the public and competes with the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung*. As "the voice of the people", the newspaper cannot go against the wave of popular support for neutrality as expressed in the statistics without further argument.

The positioning of the newspaper on the side of those who wish to retain neutrality becomes clear even from the representation of Herbert Krejci as an "active" (a positive term) EC supporter, who even in his respected position does not wish to give up neutrality.

“Antipodes”, that is, people who follow political goals that contradict the wishes of three-quarters of the population, are then set against this positively portrayed figure. An interesting point here is the naming of Andreas Khol (a well-known supporter of the EC) among the antipodes — his opinion, namely that neutrality and the EC are compatible, does not preclude a positive evaluation of neutrality. The statement may come to be regarded as contradictory if one considers Khol’s interpretation of neutrality (as a military one) and contrasts it with other possible interpretations that could be held by the people or by Krejci. We cannot reconstruct the specific interpretation, but we may conclude that for the author of this article neutrality stood for more than just its military components, and that a reduction of neutrality to its military aspects (resulting in compatibility with the EC) was not a desirable goal.

Whatever the case, at the end of the article — again unlike *Die Presse* — rather than emphasizing the possible “incompatibility” of EC membership and neutrality, the issue is left open on account of the long time-span in which these things must be solved and the possibility of further negotiation.

The position expressed on neutrality is accompanied by some rather critical articles the EC. For instance, a commentary published on the same day (Rauscher, 16. 7., p. 2. “At the beginning of a long path”) points out weaknesses and political problems of the EC<sup>9</sup>. Although it does mention possible incompatibilities of neutrality with specific aims of the EC (e.g. common currency), the article nevertheless portrays the issue as just one of many problems (that could arise between us [Austrians] and the EC), rather than as a core problem.

In subsequent reporting, which (because of events) were more concerned with the potential problems linked to neutrality, we find time and again positive statements on neutrality, including one made by Jankowitsch (foreign policy spokesman of the SPÖ): “In Great Britain there is a certain amount of skepticism, which is linked to the distance from Vienna. There exist in part bizarre ideas about neutrality”, said the SP-expert: “One has to keep explaining the political purpose of neutrality”. In this passage, an opinion is expressed, which clearly assumes a positive assessment of neutrality. This opinion goes together with a positive presentation (“expert”) and without a critical commentary or a quotation of a statement made by a politician of a different opinion, “Great Britain has bizarre ideas” — i. e. neutrality does have a purpose, and the only requirement is to explain this properly. If one considers this article to be a “lens” through which one should read subsequent reports in the newspaper, it turns out that negative statements on neutrality made by foreign politicians are not to be taken seriously, for they simply reflect

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9 Another noteworthy feature is that all commentaries appearing in the *Kurier* on the “EC membership application” also deal with the issue of neutrality.

gaps in knowledge. The positive image of neutrality cannot be damaged by such statements. Thus, the view of a domestic "expert" offers a interpretative model for the evaluation of foreign opinions.

Negative evaluations are consequently reported with great detachment. For example: "The Belgian [Eyskens] considers Austria's neutrality to be 'a political obstacle'" (18. 7) By using a direct quotation the newspaper disassociates itself from the content of the statement. The use of the verb "to consider" clearly indicates that the statement is to be regarded as no more than the opinion of "the Belgian", a subjective view on the issue, which casts doubt on the factuality of the statement. This can be contrasted with the verb "to say" which leaves the position of the newspaper open.

Quotations of statements made by important Austrian supporters of EC membership, for example Alois Mock, are rather low-key and can be easily integrated into a positive framework: "We are not disruptive factors — and we have no illusions." And on the main subject: "Austria's neutrality is fully compatible with the present goals of the EC. I cannot make policy for the year 2050. I have to make policy on the basis of what the EC is, and wishes to be, today."

Negative evaluations of neutrality by "foreigners" are rhetorically devalued still further. In this way Belgium's history is used to explain why Belgians have a permanent tendency to reject neutrality as such. Reference is also made to internal EC politics and goals, as well as divergent visions of the future EU, as a way of explaining why certain countries would be pleased to have a neutral country as a member, while others might not (*Kurier* 19. 7).

Overall the *Kurier's* position is pro-neutrality, and the newspaper displays a somewhat critical attitude towards the EC. In terms of party politics, in line with its left-wing liberal reputation, the *Kurier's* reporting reflects the position of the SPÖ, even though the newspaper's party alignment is generally weaker than that of *Die Presse*.

#### *Der Standard*

	14.7.	15./16.7.	17.7.	18.7.	19.7.	20.7.	21.7.
Articles	2 (2,A)	2	2 (1)	5 (1)	4 (1)	3	5 (2)
N	2 (2, A)	2	2 (1)	4 (1)	3 (1)	3	5 (2)

Compared with the other newspapers, *Der Standard* contains a remarkable number of commentaries, including articles presented as "analysis". This allows *Der Standard*, whose reporting in other respects closely resembles that of *Die Presse*, to include other

aspects and points of view in the discussion. As in the case of *Die Presse*, most of the articles in *Der Standard* stem from a correspondent in Brussels. In addition, *Der Standard* makes use of the reports of several news agencies. Thus, similarly to *Die Presse*, *Der Standard* usually offers an external perspective in which neutrality is considered to be an obstacle to EC accession. Neutrality thus appears as “the neutrality of Austria” and never as “our neutrality”. Nevertheless, the number of pro-neutrality statements is higher in *Der Standard* than in *Die Presse* (even if the number of such voices is small in both newspapers).

A slightly different picture from the one in the regular articles is provided by the commentaries. Of particular note here are the commentaries (of others) made at the beginning of the period under investigation. While they offer a perspective on neutrality that is in principle no different from the perspective offered in other reports, they do criticize the approach of the government and argue for a frank discussion on the value of neutrality in Austria today, without actually making a case for EC membership at the same time. According to these articles, it is an open question whether the EC and neutrality are compatible, but in this discussion, accession to the EC is not an indispensable condition.

Subtle positive evaluations of neutrality may be detected in the headlines which accompany the articles: “Diplomatic fraudulent labelling. The ‘Letter to Brussels’ threatens confidence in Austria’s neutrality” and “Need to catch up in defense policy. EC membership application underlines the necessity of a sincere safe-guarding of neutrality”. The first heading assumes the existence of confidence in Austrian neutrality. In everyday language use, “confidence” is usually placed in something positive. In this passage, therefore, neutrality is positively connoted as something that is deserving and worthy of confidence. It is this confidence that is “under threat”. This view is in itself an evaluation, given that something can only be under threat if it has value and its loss would be felt. Something that one would wish to dispose of anyway, cannot be “under threat”. In the second heading, factuality (instead of a subjective opinion of an organization) is established through the use of the lexemes “necessity” and “sincere”. At the same time, the “safe-guarding of neutrality” is portrayed as a necessity, i.e. neutrality is portrayed as indispensable. Thus, the headings (if not the texts) include strong statements in favor of (the retention of) neutrality.

Two further commentaries in *Der Standard* also provide an interesting point of view on neutrality. They both appear on pages dedicated to commentaries and were written by a correspondent who also wrote the new reports from Brussels. The first commentary appears on 18<sup>th</sup> July and the second on the 21<sup>st</sup> July, i.e. after the dispute.

In the first commentary, the heading “From now on, the art of politics is required. Austria’s application forces the EC to reconsider its goals and limitations” introduces a

quite new perspective on the subject matter. At this point in time, the issue of neutrality is already the subject of a lively debate, i.e. the issue of neutrality is always referred to at least indirectly whenever the EC and associated potential problems are spoken of. In this heading, however, the perspective is reversed. The problem is no longer Austria (with its neutrality). Instead, the questions and problems associated with Austria's neutrality are forcing the EC to reflect upon its position, that is, to develop and move forward. Moving forward and making up one's mind on an issue are usually considered to be positive developments. Thus, irrespective of the results of subsequent negotiations, Austria has already presented a "gift" to the EC, by encouraging positive developments. Seen in this context, neutrality is an "opportunity" for Europe rather than a "problem".

The first paragraph states:

*"Since yesterday it is on record. After thorough preparation and a consideration of the advantages and disadvantages, neutral Austria submitted, in Brussels, an application for membership of the EC. Merit and responsibility for this is due to the grand coalition. The way was paved by the SPÖ's foreign policy expert, Peter Jankowitsch, and Alois Mock could rightly play the role of proud courier."*

These events are portrayed using very positively connoted lexemes: "thorough preparation and consideration", "merit", "is due", "the way was paved", "proud courier". All these expressions suggest approval.

Neutrality is later on thematized in the following passage, immediately after a short account of the changes in international politics brought about by the events in the former eastern bloc:

*"The level of interdependence becomes ever clearer, lines of force cross one another, and they lead, even if this does not suit some people, through Austria. One should therefore see the membership application in the context of hopeful signs for a European order of peace, and come to terms with the fact that perpetual neutrality, as an institution of the international law of war, will assume a different role as soon as military conflicts on the old continent have become impossible."*

[...]

*The application registers the wish to participate as an equal partner in the process of European integration and a willingness to fulfill the many associated responsibilities while preserving perpetual neutrality. In terms of the economy, there are no insurmountable problems,*

[...]

*And yet the door to the EC is still stuck. Is it [because of] the intention — regarded by most as an attempt to square the circle — of fully co-operating politically despite the restrictions of neutrality, or are the varied amounts of skepticism shown towards the newcomer the result of an instinctive aversion towards any additional expansion?"*

In these statements, neutrality as such is never seen as a negative factor or dismissed outright. Although in the first section the writer does argue that the historical role of neutrality is now obsolete, he refrains from demanding that neutrality be given up. Instead he suggests that people should come to terms with a "different role", portraying this role as a possibility. In subsequent passages, while debating the application, the writer refers to neutrality as part of the general political make-up of Austria rather than as a federal law. (By contrast, in a similar passage in *Die Presse*, one finds the formulation: "despite neutrality" or a negation: "neutrality will not be an obstacle".)

Finally, mention is made — again with significant detachment — of negative evaluations of neutrality: "the intention regarded by most". That is, agents having a particular opinion are introduced, but their opinion can be rejected, particularly in view of the fact that the author subsequently presents a second reason for dismissing them: namely, that the limitations of neutrality are no longer considered to be the "real" problem by everyone. For a brief moment, the author does indicate a negative assessment of neutrality through his use of the formulation "limitations of neutrality" (in place of, for instance, "perceived restrictions posed by neutrality"). In the nominal construction, the abstract object is given an objective existence (Thompson, 1996). However, in the context of the rest of the article, these limitations, even though perceived as real, do not give rise to any further general negative evaluation.

The second commentary of the correspondent (Eyskens' bad turn, 21. 7, p. 28), which appears after the dispute with Belgium, concerns the value of neutrality and the "ignorance" of certain foreign diplomats. In the course of the commentary, it is stated:

*"Mr Eyskens has not grasped that neutrality is understood by Austrians as an advantage and as an unmistakable contribution to a European order of peace, and not as a burden from which it should be freed. He must acknowledge that Austria alone and nobody else, not even Moscow, has a right to interpret this status."*

Not much needs be added to this. In a very explicit manner, neutrality is presented here as the (positively valued) property of Austrians, despite the complete absence of the nominal phrase "our neutrality".

In general then, positions and attitudes are more heterogeneous in *Der Standard* than in the other newspapers. Although a number of positive internal (Austrian) voices may be heard, the reports deal mainly with the negative views expressed by individuals (diplomats and politicians) on the outside, who have an external perspective. In contrast, the commentaries reflect a view that is critical of the government and ambivalent or positive on neutrality.

It is for others to determine which voice was the more influential among recipients: the "factual" and subtly negative foreign policy perspective present in the reports, or the critical, subjective, domestic and less indirectly formulated, positive perspective offered by the commentaries.

In brief, 1989 sees the development of a wide range of opinion in the newspapers. The positions taken by the various newspapers in the discourse on neutrality differ considerably, reflecting in part the range of party preferences. The reports of previous decades seem rather homogeneous in comparison.

#### 1992

In February 1992, NATO requested that the Austrian government should grant permission for reconnaissance planes to fly through Austrian air-space. Since these planes were not to be armed, the decision fell in the first instance to the foreign minister, who acquiesced to the request. This led to a coalition dispute. The view was expressed that acquiescing to this request at a time when Austria was debating the value, purpose and function of neutrality, could be seen both at home and abroad as an indication of the Austrian interpretation of neutrality. Even though the responsibility lay clearly with the Austrian foreign ministry, the Socialist federal chancellor (as well as other politicians) expressed the view that the decision should have been taken by the government as a whole, given that the ministerial decision represented an interpretation that was more or less binding upon Austria.

The decision of the foreign minister quickly led (on 7<sup>th</sup> February) to reactions from several newspapers. The issue was then discussed at a cabinet meeting held on 11<sup>th</sup> February. This led in turn to further reactions on the part of the press on 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> February.

The following table shows the frequency of the articles published by the various Austrian dailies.

Newspaper		7.2.	8./9.2.	10.2.	11.2.	12.2.	13.2.
<i>Kronen-Zeitung</i>	Total	-	-	-	-	1	-
	Neutrality					0	
<i>Presse</i>	Total	1	3 (1)	-	-	3 (1)	1
	Neutrality	1	1 (1)			2	1
<i>Standard</i>	Total	2 (1)	4 (1)	-	-	4 (1)	1
	Neutrality	2 (1)	4 (1)			2 (1)	1
<i>Kurier</i>	Total	1	2 (1)	1 (1)		2	2 (1)
	Neutrality	1	2 (1)	1 (1)		2	1

Key: Neutrality: Number of articles addressing neutrality.

( ) Number of commentaries among the number of articles stated in parenthesis

As in 1989, several differences may be identified between the newspapers in terms of the range and content of their reporting.

The *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* is once again remarkable for its refrainment to cover the subject-matter. The issue of neutrality is not addressed in this newspaper.

The issue of neutrality received less attention in *Die Presse* than in the *Kurier* or *Der Standard*. The number of articles dealing with neutrality is low and the coverage in *Die Presse* of the issues surrounding neutrality is brief and arbitrary. The conflict tends to be seen as linked to the division of responsibilities between the federal chancellor and the foreign minister<sup>10</sup>, rather than as a neutrality issue. The newspaper quotes a statement made by JVP<sup>11</sup>-chief Himmer: "the federal chancellor is using the neutrality issue as a pretext to interfere in the work of other ministries" (13. 2, p.6, "Busek on the flyovers: "no threat" to the climate of the coalition"). Characteristic of the position of *Die Presse* on neutrality at this point is a commentary that appears on 8<sup>th</sup> February "Radar and mines", which says that:

*"The greatest mistake of the foreign minister is his approach to domestic politics. Such serious questions cannot be solved through the back door, if the front door seems to be locked owing to the myth of neutrality fixation [den Mythos der Neutralitätsfixierung] and the inflexibility of the coalition partner. Such a grave change in neutrality policy cannot be pushed through by the foreign minister acting alone, who also happens to belong to the weaker party.*

<sup>10</sup> Even though we concentrate primarily on aspects of the neutrality debate (in order to elaborate positions on neutrality at this point in time), we should point out that this interpretation was politically well-founded: Austria's choice of a federal president known internationally for a questionable handling of his Nazi past resulted in considerable international isolation. Thus, during the years of Waldheim's presidency, the federal chancellor assumed an increasing number of representative functions.

<sup>11</sup> JVP is the youth organization of the ÖVP.

*The truth is that a good government should have gone on a security and neutrality policy seminar lasting several days a long time ago. [...]*

Of significance here is the manner in which neutrality is criticized — it is branded as the “myth of neutrality fixation” and “inflexibility”. But there is no accompanying indication of what consequence should be drawn: should neutrality be abandoned or should it be changed? Is one simply defending oneself from the “fixation” of neutrality (i.e. the enshrining of a certain interpretation of neutrality), or does one seek to oppose neutrality itself? The vagueness of the passage allows for both interpretations, and thus covers the range of opinions held by the readership (many of whom supported the ÖVP) at this time. Seen from a different perspective (for instance, that of the SPÖ), the two positions lie close to each other anyway, given that the ÖVP’s endeavor to reinterpret neutrality seems to entail the abandonment of what is (or used to be) valued under the name of “neutrality”.

More room is given to neutrality in *Der Standard*. Three of the articles in the period under investigation deal primarily with the neutrality debate, i.e. focus upon neutrality. Moreover, the controversy surrounding neutrality is also seen less as a coalition dispute and more as a real questioning of Austria’s position within the European security system. Thus, almost all articles include references to Europe, NATO and so on, while the coalition dispute is not always covered. In other words, *Der Standard* differs from *Die Presse* primarily in terms of the subject-matter being focused upon. With respect to a particular topic, however, the positions taken do not seem to be very different: of fourteen statements on neutrality found in the articles, only one — a quotation of a statement made by federal chancellor Vranitzky — is in favor of “not changing the basic policy of neutrality”. Another statement (by Fischer) does emphasize the value of neutrality, but refrains from defining this any further. Five statements refer implicitly or explicitly to a change in current neutrality policy or in our understanding of neutrality, and three statements even imply that neutrality should be given up. (The four other statements are to be understood as political criticism of the other political camp.)

Thus, in *Der Standard* the “old” form of neutrality is considered to be outmoded. For this newspaper, the real question is now whether neutrality should be retained in a different form or given up altogether. The following commentary is made within this framework, and pointedly indicates the position of *Der Standard*.

*Der Standard*, 8/9.2, Commentary by Hehnut Spudich: “Virtual neutrality”, p. 28,

*Now that neutrality is not needed anymore, it can just go, but everyone should believe that it is still here. Since our neutrality is “perpetual”, it is literally not at our disposal. Between the lines and in the airy heights in which reconnaissance planes cross neutral airspace for no*

*reason, neutrality has developed into quite an everyday embarrassment of Austrian domestic politics.*

*If something has the status of a national identity formula it is protected against alterations just like a historic building. Nevertheless, the alteration plan is obvious: Austria wants to give up its neutrality for the benefit of European unity. Neutrality is valid in the case of conflicts that do not affect this community — whether it be called the EC, CSCE or something else — unless the United Nations should decide otherwise. There is not much else left.*

*The government does not want to impose either a discussion or its own clear position on the people, and thus there is a new interpretation, read: messing around, every time. However, for neutrality to be really “covered”, it is necessary for the government to formulate its direction, like the Swiss foreign minister did recently for the confederation.*

*Electronics invented the expression virtual reality: things that do not exist in a any real sense but only in electronic simulation. Austria is in the process of inventing virtual neutrality. If someone really wants to know where we are going, they should simply follow the track in the sky. No wonder that reconnaissance planes — of all planes — have been granted permission to fly over.*

The primary object under attack — despite the introductory formula: “Now that it is not needed anymore” — is not the retention of neutrality in itself, but that neutrality “is literally not at our disposal”, that it is not reflected upon, but suddenly changed between one occasion and the next, and thus basically “virtual”. The use of this argument allows the article almost to be read as a plea for neutrality. Thus, although he mentions the inflexibility of the concept, the commentator clearly does not wish to see neutrality given up (or undermined) without any consideration of the consequences. Nevertheless, it seems that the author has nothing against an “alteration”.

The position of the *Kurier* is similar to that of *Der Standard*. While neutrality is strengthened in several statements, at the same time mention is also made of the existence or necessity of a new definition of neutrality. Unlike in *Der Standard*, however, in the *Kurier* the abandonment of neutrality does not appear to be an option. From eighteen statements on neutrality, only two speak out against the retention of neutrality. Both of these are quotations of statements made by foreign politicians. The only reference to an Austrian politician’s opposition to neutrality appears in brackets after a statement:

*“FP-chief Haider considers the flyovers to be incompatible with neutrality (which he wants to abolish).” (80.2).*

The statement made by Haider that is reported (flyovers are incompatible with neutrality) does not tell us whether neutrality should be given up or whether the flyover permits

should not have been issued, i.e. how the dispute should have been solved. Haider's position, which is added on to the sentence, tells us how he would decide, but leaves open how the *Kurier* or its readership would (or should) decide.

The position taken by the *Kurier* may be illustrated through another commentary.

*"If Austria permits US reconnaissance planes (in the service of NATO) a short flyover, it is taking part in concerted measures to protect against a common danger, namely the stubborn nuclear weapons' man, Saddam Hussein. At the same time it demonstrates to the EC that Austria is willing even now to make its contribution to a future common security policy. Although Mock's action clearly contradicts the traditional understanding of Austria's neutrality, Vranitzky did not react directly. For "the westerner" Vranitzky is also very much aware that Austria's security lies in the country being part of the community of values of the western democracies. However, he also knows that neutrality is highly valued by the overwhelming majority of Austrians — even if this is mainly understood in the sense of not wanting to become involved in difficulties." (9. 2).*

Nowhere in the commentary (i.e. the section examined here) is the retention of neutrality itself called into question. Nevertheless, a distinction is made between a "traditional understanding of neutrality" (which is negatively connoted) and current practice.

We may conclude that in 1992 none of the newspapers supported a retention of neutrality in its traditional political form. While the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* expressed no real opinion, the other newspapers were in agreement that change was necessary. The various newspapers do have different ideas about the right solution or at least about the right direction. Whereas, *Die Presse* (in line with in line with abolishment of the ÖVP) tends to argue for an end to neutrality, *Der Standard* is noticeably unsure. It wishes to see a broad discussion of the issue, and for the moment continues to opt for a change in neutrality rather than its abandonment. Finally, the *Kurier* expresses the greatest amount of support for a retention of neutrality, although what neutrality means is seen as changing.

#### 1994

A detailed study of the media coverage a week prior to the referendum on EU membership was undertaken by Wodak et al. (1998, p. 282 — 314). The investigation examined the incidence of neutrality in various Austrian newspapers and magazines.

In contrast to 1992, on this occasion the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* gave substantial coverage to neutrality. At the same time the newspaper also emphasized the necessity of joining the EU.

*"During the period under investigation, neutrality is transformed by the NKZ into an integral part of the policy of peace and security within the framework of the EU. The neutrality debate is completely replaced by a debate about security in the 'new Europe'." (p. 288)*

According to the authors, the assumption made is that Austrian neutrality would be retained even if the country joined the EU, and that the EU would provide an additional (military) safeguard. Neutrality is re-evaluated: The 'old' form of neutrality would be outmoded (since the end of the Cold War), nevertheless, neutrality as an instrument of peace-keeping (which Austrians actively employ) would have acquired a significant new function. However, the latter is not expanded upon; the authors speak of the term's vagueness, which allows neutrality to appear as if it were quite compatible with the EU.

A pro-EU position is also taken by *Der Standard*. This newspaper does not regard neutrality as an obstacle to joining the EU. At the same time, it considers that neutrality is insufficient in terms of security policy (and uses this as an argument for joining the EU). Unlike the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung*, *Der Standard* considers the security policy aspect to be so central that, in principle, neutrality could be given up if this were to be a condition for a common security policy — for neutrality was always no more than an instrument of security policy. In this way, neutrality is defined implicitly at as a factual issue in *Der Standard*, and it is denied any ideological and identificatory aspects. *Der Standard* has therefore changed its position since 1992: the question concerning the definition of neutrality has been answered, and the response gives rise to a "rational" political position.

Finally,<sup>12</sup> in *Die Presse*, while no explicit argument is against neutrality, it is regarded as over and done with and as existing only on a formal level. At the same time, the newspaper demands a new definition of what is left of neutrality. This redefinition should be compatible with the intervention measures of European countries during crises.

Thus, of all the newspapers investigated, *Die Presse* is the most adamant in its portrayal of the "end" of neutrality. The newspaper emphasizes that the concept has lost meaningful content, making a redefinition imperative which should be compatible with European security policies.

## Summary

Over the course of the Second Republic, the following conclusions may be drawn — at least with regard to the periods (the weeks of reporting) under investigation:

In 1956 neutrality had still not become an integral part of Austrian identity. In the media, neutrality was not relevant in the reporting of events. At the same time, the restraint of politicians during this period may reflect the insecurity surrounding Austria's status

12 The *Kurier* was not investigated in Wodak et al. 1998.

(including Austria's neutrality). Additionally, in a statement by a bishop, neutrality became for the first time a "moral duty", fulfilling a certain (assisting) role in political conflicts, i.e. neutrality became an element of a discourse of identity.

By 1968 the situation had changed. Neutrality — as the "guarantee of freedom" — had become an important element (even more important than the State Treaty) in Austria's self-definition as a sovereign state. In this respect, neutrality had begun to function as a positive discursive support, providing enough room to observe and criticize events in foreign countries. While the "voices of the people" seem to be quite sure about this, the politicians continue to act with caution and to understand their own position as something that must be safeguarded by political caution in foreign affairs. Thus, by 1968 the general public had positively identified with neutrality. Nevertheless, politicians continued to regard Austria's "neutral identity" as something that required proper elaboration. In contrast to 1956, the analyzed newspapers differ slightly in how much voice they give the different positions. Not surprisingly, the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* voices only the concerns of the people, while the *Kurier* and *Die Presse* additionally present the more cautious discourse of the politicians.

Neutrality was not mentioned during the crisis in Poland in 1981 (in all papers). This may indicate that by this time neutrality was regarded by both the public and politicians as a matter of course. But it could also reflect the geographical distance between the two countries. Poland does not share a border with Austria, and the events were considerably less threatening in nature. On the other hand, the debate concerning the exclusion of "economic refugees" had already begun, and this appeared to be far more significant in terms of domestic politics than the threat of Soviet sanctions.

In 1989 neutrality became once again a subject of discussion. The main aspect of the discussion was the incompatibility/compatibility of neutrality with the EC: here for the first time differences arose between the newspapers under examination with regard to their positions on neutrality. *Die Presse* concentrated on the negatively connoted external perspective on neutrality; neutrality appeared to be a "hindrance". The *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* also emphasized the incompatibility of the EC and neutrality. The *Kurier* spoke out in favor of the retention of neutrality, and was rather critical of the EC. In *Der Standard* a discrepancy arose between commentaries and reports. While the external perspective presented in reports was negative, the internal perspective taken in commentaries was rather positive and tended to foster discussion.

The "dividing line" between people and politicians is now reflected in the opinions offered by the newspapers. While the top newspapers tended to represent the position of the government (or of politicians), the *Kurier* quoted statistics about support for neutrality among the general public, and then adopted the majority opinion as its own. (The *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* remained silent for most of the conflict.)

In 1992 the trend of 1989 continued. By 1992, however, all the newspapers wanted to

give up neutrality "in its traditional form". The issue now became whether neutrality should be "changed" (but retained) or relinquished. Overall reporting in 1992 seems to be driven more by the "public-political" discourse i. e. the elite discourse, than by the "voice of the people". If one considers that 59 % of those questioned in an opinion poll of December 1998 were in favor of neutrality (in March 1998 the corresponding figure was 67%)<sup>13</sup>, it appears that the "voice of the wo/man on the street" is not reflected in the newspapers very much.

Finally, in 1994 two strategies were adopted. Either neutrality was defined in the discourse in a manner that allowed for an argumentative debate about the definition (*Der Standard*), or as meaningless the concept was presented and thus branded as more or less superfluous (*Die Presse*). Having shown restraint in previous years, the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* now displayed a pervasive vagueness, which allowed for consensus with everyone.

Thus, we find that over the time-span analysed, overall the discourse around neutrality resembles the discourse of neutrality in the presidential addresses. Yet, looking at details, gaps between different political and social groups become apparent. Thus, at times the understanding (and thus the discourse) of neutrality differed remarkably between the people and the politicians. At other times, the political affiliations (or stances) determined the resulting discourse. Yet, despite all the differences, not surprisingly on the national holidays some degree of unity was preserved in discourse.

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<sup>13</sup> Opinion poll of the Linz Market Institute quoted in *Der Standard*, 11<sup>th</sup> December 1998, p. 8 "Nato in an opinion surge [Meinungsaufwind]".

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## Appendix

### *Die Presse*, 1968

22 8. 1968 *Special cabinet meeting in Vienna.*

[...] *It was still morning when the federal chancellor made a speech broadcast on radio in which he underlined Austria's resolute policy of neutrality and independence, which had won the trust of all the states signing the state treaty as well as the neighboring countries. At the same time, the head of the government emphasized that in Austria people have been watching the events in Czechoslovakia with great concern and that our country could not be indifferent to the fate of neighboring peoples.*

[...] *It is said that the chancellor told his visitor [the Soviet ambassador Podzerob] that Austria is fully aware of its neutral status, but it would not be prevented from offering asylum to refugees. Particular importance was attached to the unimpeded return of Austrians currently staying in Czechoslovakia to their home country."*

22 8. 1968 *Commentary t.c. Uncommitted*

*"Was not the first reaction somewhat uncommitted and all too diplomatic, and, as some would say, typically Austrian? We are talking about the position of the government and that of the federal chancellor on the events in Czechoslovakia. Of course, it is an awkward matter whenever neutrality is in jeopardy — from whichever side. And thus people seem to think that it is sufficient that the federal chancellor Klaus informed the Soviet ambassador "Austrians could not be indifferent to the fate of its neighbors". For it was the governing parties not the government — which is a big difference in our country — that chose the stronger words of protest, as well as the SPÖ, FPÖ and ÖGB, and yes even the Mubri-Communists expressed*

*their displeasure. At the level of government, however, restraint is shown. And that — with all due respect — is really shameful. And has nothing to do with being a statesman. A clearer statement would have done more good for the reputation of Austria, and would have sounded far less like an attempt at appeasement and lack of courage, and definitely would not have damaged the neutral status of the country. (Bern offers a good example.) Perhaps the idea is to test, wait, and see what happens — and then say how very much Austria feels for its invaded neighbor. It really does so — you just have to listen to the people ...”*

#### 23.8.1968 Cautious statement by Klaus

Not least because of the lively criticism from the functionaries of the ÖVP about the position of the federal government on the events in Czechoslovakia and some pressure from the public, on Thursday federal chancellor Klaus made a statement on television concerning the events. The commentary climaxed in the rather roundabout formulation that one was continuing to observe developments with sympathy and concern. The concern was directed in particular at the respect for international law, the observation of the UN charter, and the guaranteeing of the rights of smaller countries.

*From the vantage-point of its neutrality policy, the government could only regret that, owing to the events of the last forty-eight hours, its policy of an easing of tension and security has been called into question. The events are a blow to the policy of détente of recent years. One hopes that all remaining opportunities for a peaceful legal and political solution, reflecting the desires of the Czechoslovak people, will be exhausted.*

*The secretary-general of the ÖVP was considerably more frank in a broadcast in which it was stated that if, for foreign and neutrality policy reasons, the government kept strictly to its policy of non-interference, this did not mean that the functionaries and supporters of the ÖVP were following the developments in Czechoslovakia with any less sympathy than the members of other political communities. It is deeply regretted that the UN charter and the declaration on human rights do not prevent the governments of some states from intervening with armed troops in another state which has been forced to submit to the will of foreign powers several times already in the history of this century.*

*Klaus had also indicated in his statement that for the Austrian government, in the interest of its own life interests, measures and considerations are necessary which other states, which are further from the arena, are released from.*

#### 23.8.1968. Sympathy and indignation everywhere.

*[...] Despite all sympathy for the neighbor across the border, the Viennese resident listening to the radio news while having his breakfast, or the Lower Austrian, who perhaps lives close enough to the border to hear the MIGs, thinks not at least of his own country; and the feelings range from “just as long as nothing comes out of a violation of the border that could drag us into the events” to “however important neutrality might be, we must make it better under-*

*stood what all Austrians think of the rotten occupation". From "hopefully, all Austrian holiday-makers will get out safely from the witch's cauldron" to "the Austrian government should immediately and energetically take a stand! We are neutral militarily — that's all well and good, but is one therefore not allowed to say the truth? And the truth is that a crime is being committed against every single international law and against every single human right!"*

*26.8.1968 Commentary db. What do you mean "dramatize"?*

*The counsellors of appeasement (Beschwichtigungshofräte) are on the march. They were ordered in at the weekend to the state secretary Pisa, who is otherwise far from being like a counsellor, in order to call upon the journalists of Austria "not to dramatize" the events in Czechoslovakia. As if there were anything more to dramatize, in view of the things that are happening on the other side of the border. But it really does have to be remembered that these events do closely affect Austria and of course its neutral status, and even more than that: hit it so to speak, right on the nerve center. For people who ignore alliances, will only observe neutrality as long as it benefits them. Correct: that is exactly the argument of the government, which not only has led it to retreat to a position of cautious indifference, but which it now obviously attempts to spread even further. In view of the blatant unpredictability of the irritated Russian bear, one had better not provoke any further. But confronted with a people who, when faced with the cannons of tanks, have still not lost the courage to speak out, pussyfooting by the Austrian public would be more than pathetic. Neutrality may mean all sorts of things, but surely not insensitivity when faced with injustice and raped humanity.*

*26.8.1968 ÖVP wants to muffle the press*

*"The events on the other side and on this side of our borders should be reported without any glossing over but also without any exaggeration. Those affected by these tragic events beyond our borders are not served by any additional dramatizing." This was stated on Saturday by state secretary Pisa in a short radio address; the sentences take on a special significance given the reports from informed circles that the federal government is currently making unofficial efforts to muffle the reporting of the Austrian media, in particular that of the radio, on the events in Czechoslovakia and its tone towards the Soviet Union. Among other things, it is said that interventions above the lines have already been made by ÖVP-members of the supervisory board of the radio. [...]*

#### The Neue Kronen-Zeitung, 1968

*22.8.1968 Austria: detached*

*Vienna (Ed). The special cabinet meeting took place for many hours in Vienna yesterday. The government contacted the opposition. The armed forces were declared ready to march, fed-*

*eral chancellor Klaus made a radio announcement. All this activity showed the following: Official Austria was behaving not just in a neutral manner but with deliberate restraint and complete detachment.*

*24.8.1968 Commentary by Cato: On the edge of the drama*

*Foreign minister Waldheim made a "grave remonstrance" to the Soviet ambassador, because a Russian plane had violated Austrian air-space — clearly by mistake — for a period of two minutes. The event was shown prominently on television with a close-up of the minister. Meanwhile, the government is in session, the provincial governments are in session, the opposition is being informed, politicians appear with grim faces at the borders, where television cameras cannot fail to be absent, the federal chancellor talks on the radio several times a day etc. etc.*

*All this vacuous activity on the edge of a drama of humanity is gradually becoming rather embarrassing ... If our officials do not have the civil courage to condemn in a morally unmistakable way the actions of the Soviets in Czechoslovakia — our neutrality would not be impaired by this —, then they do not need to inflate themselves because of a completely trivial violation of air-space ..."*

*Kurier 1981*

*14.12. Subject of the day: Massive reactions to [events in] Poland*

*In Austria: Head of the VP Alois Mock spoke of a "serious burden" on East-West relations and combined this with an appeal to domestic political forces to demonstrate a high level of willingness to compromise in finding solutions to economic and social problems in Austria. Broda, minister of justice, expressed hope during the TV-press hour that the great achievements of the free trade unions in Poland would not disappear. Friedhelm Frischenschlager (FP) spoke of a declaration of bankruptcy on the part of the Communist Party system. Günther Engelmayer (FCG) demanded the immediate release of detained Polish trade union officials. University students urged the government to reconsider the conditions of entry for Poles (visa requirements).*

*15.12. Dramatic statement by Cardinal König*

*[...] In parliament the three parties elaborated a unanimous statement of intent on the part of the Austrian representation of the people. It reads: "In the foreground of all considerations, must be the interest to ensure that the problems of Poland can be solved without the intervention forceful of other powers in the development of this country. The freely elected members of the Austrian National Assembly express their solidarity with the Polish people, whose great historical task is to achieve an expansion of its democratic rights and a solution to its economic problems without bloodshed and without external interference."*

ÖVP-chairman Alois Mock added: "We see it as a dreadful event, if a Communist Party regime employs all means of power to combat its own people. Responsibility for the situation must be born by the Communist Party rather than by any other societal group, especially not by the Polish workers."

At a press conference Mock was also asked about his opinion concerning a statement by federal chancellor Bruno Kreisky, who had declared that he hoped "that in this way a last great effort has been made to prevent the very worst." Mock: "I cannot come to terms with this statement. I assume that it just slipped out."

The chairmanship of the ÖGB has condemned the military take-over and the arrest of almost all of the leaders of the trade union "Solidarity" as a violation of human rights. The ÖGB urged the immediate release of all trade union officials and the restoration of democratic and trade union rights.

19. 12. Kreisky on the dramatic situation in Poland: "The most dangerous situation since the Second World War"

[...] If a military intervention by another country (without saying it, Kreisky meant the Soviet Union) in Poland were to be added to the already extremely tense world-wide political situation, "then the policy of détente is dead, then Helsinki is dead, then disarmament is dead," said the chancellor. No western parliament would be in a position to prevent a huge rearmament.

[...]

"Should the "peace of the graveyard" enter Poland, all hitherto amicable relations with this government would be cooled down" said Kreisky. His judgment of the regime itself was clear: "One should take a militant stand on all methods of terror."

Dénes Némédi

## NATION, EUROPE, NATO

(Analysis of the President's addresses 1990—1997)

The basic problem of national celebrations is the ritual linking together of the celebrants and the stockpile of symbols at the celebration's center. I will demonstrate what I mean with reference to two classical analyses. Warner's analysis of the foundation ceremony of Yankee City demonstrated that the community was divided into two parts: the active participants in the celebration who were those on the processional float, presenting, by means of a tableau, a (highly selected) history of the town. But the entire production would have been bereft of meaning without the second segment of the community, the onlookers, who lined the processional route. Those embodying historical remembrance performed a theater piece before their peers, and together they constituted what can be called the 'Yankee City identity construction'.<sup>1</sup> The celebrations of the French Revolution, as M. Ozouf presents them, do not generally organize themselves around a historical construction (with the exception of the celebration of the federates), but serve directly to depict the national community's moral and political content.<sup>2</sup> The celebration (procession)<sup>3</sup> required that the members of the community don the attributes of the symbolized values, creating a close connection between the emphasized status of the community members (their age, gender, occupation) and the national values that are assumed to be mutually espoused. The essence of the celebratory identity structure is the connection of these two elements. In themselves, neither the historical evocation of the celebrated event/symbol, the narration of a historical or abstract political national myth, nor the presentation of the community's moral/political problems result in a celebratory discourse. It merely results in them being connected.<sup>4</sup>

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1 Warner, W. Lloyd 1959: *The Living and the Dead. A Study of the Symbolic Life of Americans*, New Haven: Yale University Press

2 Ozouf, Mona 1976: *La fête révolutionnaire 1789—1799*, Paris: Gallimard

3 See. Ozouf 205, particularly 225 I

4 Perhaps the functional importance of this connecting together is that which distinguishes a secular national celebration from an expressly religious one. The religious ritual (according to Durkheimian analysis: Émile Durkheim: *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (7<sup>th</sup> edition), 1985; Mauss, Marcel et H. Hubert 1899: *Essai sur la nature et la fonction du sacrifice*, reprinted: Marcel Mauss: *Œuvres. 1. Les fonctions sociales du sacré*, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1969, 193—307) requires

The realization of these connectional requirements organizes the celebratory discourses in the broad sense. Visual communication, and the commemoration as shown on television (e.g. the historical visual material and the cross-cutting of pictures taken of the political dignitaries celebrating the national rite), use different means for creating the connection. Journalists covering commemorations apply different methods (with the combination of articles with different themes)<sup>5</sup>. And yet other means are available for the official speakers at the celebration. The genre therefore circumscribes the possible processes, but within these limits, those involved are granted reasonable room for maneuver in presenting what are reasonably divergent versions of identity constructing discourses.

The ritual-ceremonial function of the presidential address<sup>6</sup> which constitutes one part of the state commemoration, is precisely that he establish such a connection. The constitutional role of the President, in the absence of real political power, is to express the unity of the nation creating the state. Although there is no lack of current political references in the state presidential celebratory addresses, their backbone is created by an identity constructing discourse. They are thus especially suitable for allowing us to examine the connection of certain central historical-political concepts (in this case, the concepts of Europe and NATO) to the national discourse.

13 addresses by the Hungarian state President will compose the subject for analysis. They were given at the three Hungarian national celebrations between 1990 and 1997 (although one address was prevented by a group of protesters)<sup>7</sup>. The President wrote the

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that the believer enters the sacral space and time, that the profane become temporarily sacred. The rite of national celebration however results in the sacral tradition and its stockpile of symbols coming into connection with the imaginary (and represented/ constructed by the participants/observers) national/political community.

- 5 See. Némédi Dénes: Március 15. Az ünnep és sajtója (March 15<sup>th</sup>, celebration and its press) in: Szabó Márton (ed.): *Szövegvalóság. Írások a szimbolikus és diszkurzív politikáról*, (Writings on symbolic and discursive politics) Budapest: Scientia Humana, 1997, 239—261. and Némédi Dénes: Egy sajátos politikai ritus: a nemzeti ünnepek a napilapokban (kézirat) (A unique political rite: the national celebrations in newspapers (manuscript). For the history of the March 15<sup>th</sup> celebration, see. Gyarmati György: *Március hatalma, a hatalom márciusa. Fejezetek március 15. ünneplésének történetéből* (The power of March, the March of Power, Chapters from the history of the March 15<sup>th</sup> celebration), Budapest: Paginarum, 1998 and Gerő András: *Az államosított forradalom* (The nationalized revolution). 1848 centenáriuma (the centenary of 1848), Budapest: Új Mandátum, 1998; for the story of August 20<sup>th</sup>.: Gyarmati György: A nemzettudat-hasadás ünnepi koreográfiája (celebratory choreography of national consciousness-schizm), Augusztus 20. fél évszázada (August 20<sup>th</sup>, half a century), *Mozgó Világ*, 1995, 8. and 87—99.
- 6 "... das öffentliche Herausstellen von Inhalten historischen Bewußtseins ..." (Ruth Wodak et al.: *Die Sprachen der Vergangenheiten*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1994, 11.; c.f. Ruth Wodak et al.: *Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1998, 165)
- 7 The source of the addresses: Göncz Árpád: Sodrásban. *Selected Speeches*, Budapest: Európa, 1998, 84—110, 114—128, 135—146, 155—172.

The following speeches are analyzed, grouped according to the celebration:

Date of Speech	Length of speech (number of sentences comprising the speech)	Letter code of speech
March 15 <sup>th</sup> speeches	In all: 243 (average 81)	
1992	46	D
1994	98	G
1995	99	J
August 20 <sup>th</sup> speeches	In all: 451 (average 75.2)	
1990	27	A
1990	33	B
1992	144	E
1993	102	H
1995	78	K
1997	67	M
October 23 <sup>rd</sup> speeches	In all: 234 (average 58.5)	
1992 (a right-wing group shouted over the President so the speech was not made)	47	F
1990	24	C
1996	94	L
1997	69	N

Because of the oratorical style of the President, the speeches — if measured by the number of sentences — appear to be longer than they are. He is inclined to create short elliptical sentences, articulated with brief silences. Commemorations of more recent events tend to be shorter on average, although the President himself was an active participant. This is perhaps connected with the fact that the order of ritual of the other two events are worked out, offering more ready formulae than the relatively fresh and, despite the change of system, not yet legitimized celebration.

The length of the addresses per year:

Year	Number of addresses	Total sentences	Average length
1990	3	84	28.0
1992	2	237	118.5
1993	1	102	102.0
1994	1	98	98.0
1995	2	177	88.5
1996	1	94	94.0
1997	2	136	68.0

The President's first year in office differs from the rest with its exceptionally short addresses.

In what follows, I will refer to the President's addresses with the letter of the address (see the above table) and the serial number of the sentence (for technical reasons, the serial numbering is not continuous).

addresses in advance (from the evidence of television broadcasts, he read them from his notes), but they were edited in such a way as to give the impression of a live speech. This is primarily shown by the large number of elliptical sentences. The President is a professional writer, so presumably the texts are of his own work.

During the course of the analysis of these addresses, and before I examine how two current political problems, those of European Integration and NATO accession, are built into the characteristic celebration-discourse of the presidential addresses, I would like to examine how the President constructs the entire celebratory discourse, as a discourse connecting the real moral political constitution of the national community, and the historical constitution of the community of fate. I would like to verify that in this rhetorical construction, the linking together of a historicizing and a moral-political contractual nation construction does not signify a problem. (1) Following this, I will show how the "Theme of Europe" builds into this discourse. Europe now constitutes an organic part of the Hungarian national history of identity, but the role of Europe in this discourse — as will transpire from the analysis of the addresses — is ambivalent. (2) Finally, I would like to show that in spite of its great direct political relevance and exposure through the media of mass communication, the theme of NATO accession appears only as a practical (and not identity-making) question and is powerfully undervalued in the national discourse. (3)

### I.

The President solved the historical construction problem of the national celebration in all his speeches (with a single exception)<sup>8</sup> by a historical model with a basically religious origin. Described schematically, this model appears as follows: the starting point of the story is a large event, the source of values (1). This event is followed by the "descent to hell", and suffering and decline (as a consequence of internal or external causes) (2). The present is the return, or the possibility of a return, to these values which the original celebrated event brought about (3). In part, the model constructs the nation historically, but it also depicts the "community of fate" in the sense used by Otto Bauer.<sup>9</sup>

8 In this speech as well (the second in chronological order) history is present (the rhetorical pointing to the statue of St István, opposite the President), but he places moral-political elements of the celebration in the foreground, independent of history — the celebration was just an excuse for an address (this is the other model of celebratory discourse which is well documented from the press material that was examined in parallel).

9 The President unambiguously — like the "serious" daily papers — used what according to post modern tenets is a vanishing 'large narrative'.

This model –it should be noted in passing — is not the invention of the President. For Hungarians its most familiar example is the poem of Ferenc Kölcsey, written in 1823 and now used as the text of the Hungarian national anthem. A relation can be found between the model and the story of Christ (the President has not exploited this possibility, but originally, the national narratives that drew comparisons with Christ, and which were developed in Polish national identity stories, also appeared in Hungarian discourses)<sup>10</sup>. For those who learn the Hungarian national discourse in a natural mode, effectively as a “mother tongue”, this construction is presumably self explanatory, and for this reason I do not think that the President uses it entirely consciously.

The model, in the strict sense of the word, is a narration-generating structure. In the surface texture of the address it can appear in a variety of modes (which is to say, it is not necessary for it to show explicitly the above narrative structure [as also witnessed in the national anthem]).

Six addresses<sup>11</sup> realize the model in a simple, narrative form. We can take as an example the address of August 20<sup>th</sup>, 1990. The address first evokes the story of the legendary gathering of the Hungarian tribes at Pusztazer (where the address was given) after they had first arrived in the Carpathian Basin. This is based on the first surviving written historical source, the Hungarian Gesta (b030–b037)

b037: “And this tradition, that the assembly decided the nation’s fate, and the first ‘parliament’ took place here, and it lives on today.”

In this address, the President calls this event a “birthday” — a birthday of a community of fate. (1) A longer meditation follows the evocation of “birthday” on the moral requirements of the country’s and national community’s survival (following on from the place where the address was given, the President stressed primarily the values of solidarity and political equality), and it connects the moral discussion expressly to the act of state foundation.

b038–b039: “We have celebrated this birthday since the millennium, since the one thousand year anniversary of Hungary’s birth — as a consequence of changes of historical time, it has been celebrated with varying content, but unchangingly, and with celebrations fitting for this

10 As research on three years’ worth (1995, 1996, 1997) of nation-wide daily newspapers, which was carried out in parallel with the current research, shows that several newspaper articles commemorated the event using this rhetorical model. See Némédi: Március 15. és Egy sajátos politikai rítus (March 15<sup>th</sup> and unique political rite)

11 On the occasion of 1<sup>st</sup> August 20., 2 October 23., 1 March 15.

birthday. In which we find welded together the [memory of the first arrival of the] Hungarians into the Carpathian Basin, the memory of our King, Saint Stephen, and the constitution expressing our state — now the esteeming of the new Constitution of the Hungarian Republic, and the esteeming of our peasant people producing bread, and the thought of country and progress in inseparable service of each other.”

6041: “Kings — the best kings as well — have only subjects; the republic — the gathered community of free people — have only citizens...”

The evocation of decline and “descent into hell” follows the moral ruminations connected to the foundation of the state. (2) In this, the “sins” (sick and disillusioned society) augment the sufferings (quashed revolutions, rule of terror, reprisals) which can be attributed to external factors. This augmentation is natural, since the national identity-construction places great stress on moral elements, which is to say that the expiation of sins committed by collective subject, and those committed by the individual, is more important, from the perspective of national moral dignity and education, than the suffering of external forces.

6052: “The New Hungarian Republic set off from the deep — the time between the two world wars, the lost war, the four year doomed democracy, the revolution crushed on the threshold of victory, the Stalinist nightmare, the reprisals following the revolution — thus it was carrying a sick and disillusioned society on its shoulders.”

Then the optimistic future or future image follows, which almost returns to the description of the starting point. (3) This element creates the unity of the narrative, and makes the structure complete.

6054: “But this people — the Hungarian people — in 1848 and in 1956 as well, was capable of demonstrating that it recognized its own interest, that it knew what to do for it, and that it was guided not by revenge but by wisdom.”

In its pure form, the model organizes a narrative that comprises of three phases. The model however also permits various kinds of transformation. The omission of the (3) element (e.g. L) is possible because the address as a gesture always contains in this phase the essential element of renewal (since the fact of the narrative of the address demonstrates the return to an initial constructing event.) Four addresses (F, G, H, K) create a direct link between (1) and (3). On these occasions, the element (2) appears in references, and instead of a chronological structure, the speaker uses a parallel design. The justification of the parallel is created by the fact that, what happened between the present and the

commemorated event signified decline and suffering. (2) can also precede (1). (L): the address at first, evokes the suffering community of fate of the nation, the community of fate — as we all know and as the President presumes of his audience, and therefore only mentions explicitly in the latter part of the address, — is the result of previous, praiseworthy constituting acts (the nation, suffering from the clashes between 1918 and 1956, had already constructed itself in 1000 and 1848). In this case the order is: (2) – (1) – (3) (In the case of L, (3) is implicit). The one element which cannot be omitted from any of the 12 speeches that follow structurally identical models is (1) — in the case of J, this element hypertrophically squeezes to the end the other two elements which constitute the meaning of the address as a celebratory address<sup>12</sup>.

The structure organizing the speeches makes it clear why sentences with a historical character make up such a large proportion (they relate historical events, they refer to events and historical personalities, they contain historical evaluations).<sup>13</sup>

Table 1: *Historical references in the State President's addresses*

Celebrations	"historical" sentences	non-"historical" sentences
March 15.	140 (57.6 %)	103 (42.4 %)
Aug. 20.	166 (36.8 %)	285 (63.2 %)
Oct. 23.	152 (65.0 %)	82 (35.0 %)
Total	(49.3 %)	(50.7 %)

The numerical division of sentences is slightly misleading. It is understandable why in the president's addresses on October 23<sup>rd</sup> (C, F, L, N) there are a high number of sentences with historical references, since the President himself was imprisoned following the 1956 revolution, and thus each of his October 23<sup>rd</sup> addresses were full of sentences with brief personal allusions. The President narrated with visible relish, the events of 1848 (D, G, J)

12 The speech was made on March 15<sup>th</sup> 1995, two days after the government, which enjoyed the President's sympathy, introduced its economic austerity measures — presumably this event explains the extremely historicizing nature of the address.

13 For information, in the following table I show the rough thematic division of celebratory articles from the 1995–97 period, of four national daily newspapers.

Celebration	Historical theme present	No historical theme
March. 15.	209	88
Aug. 20.	111	88
Oct. 23.	196	70
Altogether	516	246

and in his August 20<sup>th</sup> addresses, which contain relatively many “non-historical” sentences, and (in four of the six: E, H, K, M), it is possible to find the most developed historical representation. 9 of the 13 addresses (C, D, E, H, J, K, L, M, N) are strongly “historical” in character. There is one — (A) — which scarcely contains any historical references, and three — (B, G, F) — where the “historical” references are subordinated.

It is possible to divide the sentences of the address with historical content roughly into two large groups:

1. First, there are those sentences which evoke with brief allusions the celebrated event, they indicate the values belonging and relating to the celebration, they evoke emblematic personalities. As an illustration, let us look at one sentence from each of the three celebrations.

0002: “Standing before the statue of Saint István we are confronted with a millennium, the thousand year bloody storm of Hungarian history.”

In this sentence, St István (in the West, Saint Stephen) the principal player of the August 20<sup>th</sup> celebration and the founder of the state, is the embodiment of the whole of Hungarian history. The President, by standing opposite the statue and personalizing it, also locates himself in history, from which he is capable of turning to the future in a more exalted manner (this early address is filled virtually in its entirety with sentences dealing with questions of the present).

g351: “March 1848 proves sharply that tomorrow — even if today is shackled to the past by a thousand strands — will always be stronger than yesterday.”

The great event of the past in this case is the guarantee of a generally valid moral-political principle. In the context of this speech, this assertion creates a connection with the subject matter of the October 23<sup>rd</sup> commemoration, the 1956 revolution, inasmuch as 1956 is presented as a repeat of 1848. (g355: “The voice of the delayed future even penetrates the stone wall of the century as did the crushed voice of eighteen forty eight for it, in 1956, again to form a unity of the country’s people.”). Also it grants the basic tone for the interpretation of the present and its analysis.

n952: “The abortive objectives of the country’s inner and outer security and peace in 1956 today stand on the threshold of realization: the North Atlantic Alliance has invited us to become one of its members.”

The sentence identifies today’s political objectives with the goals of the sequence of events which constitutes the subject for commemoration. The present thus appears as a contin-

uation of the past, just as in the address, the President alludes to the failure of those endeavors. In this way, the sentence is in itself a surface manifestation of the memorial structure as adumbrated earlier: 1956 and the striving for peace and security is phase I, failure (which the President does not have to characterize in detail, because it is a well known event in public discourse) is the “journey to hell” — phase II —, and finally the invitation to join NATO is phase III, the “resurrection.” The fascination of this sentence is given by the fact that among the objectives of 1956 — as the President mentioned in his previous sentences — was Hungarian neutrality rather than NATO accession. Therefore, the President has to make strenuous efforts to demonstrate that the 1956 demands for neutrality and the 1990 accession to NATO are identical.

2. The greatest proportion of sentences containing historical allusions and elements are historical narrating sentences. History, as it appears in the President’s addresses, is not reduced to allusions and the evocation of historical values and moral-political lessons. History is the story of events — sometimes in quite grotesque forms. The historical past that creates the national community of fate is not reducible to the evocation of well known symbols: in the majority of cases, the President felt the need to reconstruct history for his listeners, and from this, draw moral-political lessons.

Table 2: *The proportion of historical narrative sentences among all sentences containing historical allusions*

Celebration	Narrative sentences	Non-narrative, but sentences containing historical allusions
March 15.	112 (80.0 %)	28 (20.0 %)
August 20.	127 (76.5 %)	39 (23.5 %)
October 23. <sup>14</sup>	100 (65.8 %)	52 (34.2 %)

In numerous cases, the historical narrative sentences describe identifiable deeds of identifiable personalities.

h455—456: “Above all, I would like to summon to mind the memory of Saint István, who founded one of the first Hungarian monasteries here [in Pécsvárad, where the speech was made]. Perhaps there is something fateful — as we know from the Greater Legend — that

<sup>14</sup> The relatively smaller emphasis on narrative sentences in 1956 addresses is probably because of the President’s situation and that the event is still recent. The President often speaks in the first person plural, which (correctly) defines himself as a participant who does not have to explain events, it is enough simply to allude to them. The event is recent, which has the same result: the older people remember it.

after the overthrow of Koppány, and before he acceded to the throne, our great King decided on the monastery's foundation."

The local connection, the allusion to the overthrow of Koppány, the leader of Somogy and a close relative of St István (this is one of the emblematic events of Hungarian historical memory, which is willingly interpreted — as the President does — as the battle for the linking of East and West) strengthens the narrative character.

g358: "It is not accidental that we can trace Hungarian democracy from this symbolic moment, when Petöfi placed his hand on the printing press and declared it the property of the people, and the owner of the printing works bowed his head before the 'revolutionary might', the will of the people."

In this sentence, the President is evoking a scene that is well known and depicted in etchings from 1848, which has, for many years, constituted a stable element of school history teaching. The symbolic act of a popular hero realizes a historical turn-around. The concrete picture is exceptionally useful for introducing the first phase of the story, the great founding act.

n934: "Imre Nagy, in a last desperate effort to save the country from renewed occupation and bloodshed, declared our homeland neutral."

The picture evokes those tragic days of early November 1956. At the time of Imre Nagy's entry into the government, the euphoric atmosphere of victory still prevailed among wide circles of the population. The expression "the last, desperate attempt" evokes the Prime Minister of the 1956 revolution making his radio broadcast on the dawn of November 4<sup>th</sup>, when he announced the renewed Soviet attack. The image is highly suitable for representing in concrete terms the beginning of the tragedy, the "journey to hell" — phase 2 of the story.

The evocation of the story is not restricted to the pictorial evocation of emblematic events and figures. The President selects figurative, descriptive sentences with descriptions and evaluating summations from historical writing, using at times abstract social theoretical terms. These assertions prepare the argumentative connection of abstract problems sketched in the generalizing terms of historical narration and modern politics. The President does not treat individual celebrations in an identical way from this point of view.

The celebrated event, which is also the most distant — the founding of the Hungarian state over 1000 years ago — is strongly connected to the acts of identifiable personalities. There are few true heroes of August 20<sup>th</sup>: those mentioned are primarily St István, otherwise known as King Istvan, founder of the state, and his father, who himself is an

imperfect premonition of his son in celebratory commemorations (starting from the XIth century legends). The general historical lessons are virtually inseparable from the historical heroes (who naturally barely show personal characteristics.)

h465: "With this, [Géza] did not assume the smallest task for himself, and handed it on to his son Vajk — who in baptism, received the name István, or "the crowned one" — and received the obligation to keep on rooting out every tradition, every intellectual, religious and moral inheritance which stood in the way of Hungary's large social transformation, its new European orientation, everything which made it difficult, that is to say, endangered, the survival of the Hungarian people."

The President also feels in this address that it is one-sided to connect everything to the discernment of the personalities. Therefore a few sentences later, he feels it necessary to add the following:

h468—469: "In the interest of the process of a change of system, and precisely in the interest of our future, we must be aware that the biggest "change of system" in Hungarian history — the new order that formed in the tenth and eleventh centuries — cannot simply be linked to Saint István or Saint István and Géza. It needed the predecessors and successors and the majority of the people to have insight."

The abstract historical wording is far more common in the case of the 1848 anniversary, where the number of heroes raised to the fictional national Pantheon is greater.

do88—do89: "We have all gathered to celebrate the memory of 1848, the revolutionary battle for freedom, to celebrate this event, which was a milestone in our modern day history. In spite of defeat it was a decisive step on the road which lead to the creation of a civil society, which, taken in a contemporary sense, lead to freedom."

This wording represents a variety of addresses about history in which the place of directly tangible, real-life events and the place of personalities co-operating in the events with their exemplary good or bad moral qualities, is occupied by abstract entities and subjects, which are identifiable with the aid of actions that transcend the individual in their experiences and symbolic means borrowed from scholarly discourse.

1956 shows a unique duality. The President presents the revolution as the result of non-impersonal processes, but the actors are for the most part collective subjects (people, workers, students, the peasantry, the great powers) characterized by generalizing terms, which is to say the players stand half way between concrete individuals of real-life remembrance and abstract entities of objectivizing social science.

1759: "And when it happened in Poland and when here, sparked by Stalinist stupidity, revolution exploded, and in a historic thousandth of a second — in three days — it had tumbled the Stalinist building that was poised to collapse, and the world held its breath."

m852: "And if the leading powers of the world, with their hands in their laps, just watched at the stormy and authentic flaring up of a wounded nation's self-consciousness, and the demand for human dignity, and then just observed its violent snuffing out, in the interest of preserving the balance of power — this was when, in the eyes of the people of the world, the country was given back its honor."

The president's addresses naturally (with one exception) are not historical essays but texts following the standard model of celebratory commemorations, where historical remembrance is a means of emphasizing current, moral-political values. The President's function, his constitutional political neutrality (which the right wing, be it in government or opposition, has always doubted) defines the tone of the addresses.

This construction, which in my opinion organizes the President's addresses as a basic model, with a three-part structure, offers the most obvious means for the connection of past and present in commemorative form. The addresses go beyond this by dissecting the thoughts and tasks of the present.

It derives from the President's function that it is primarily he who has to stand guard over the nation as a unity of bodies, and give emphasis to this on the occasion of ceremonial acts. And this is what he did.

He stressed the importance of preserving social peace and solidarity.

a009: "We must be very careful: Hungary is again threatened, that it will become again a nation of, if not three million beggars, then of three million poor people!"<sup>15</sup>

He represented values of political equality.

bo41: "The kings — and even the best kings — have only subjects: a republic — the assembled community of free people — has only citizens, who are responsible for the salvation of the homeland, and in the knowledge of their rights — civil and human rights — bravely take their fate in their hands, ..."

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15 In the first two 1990. August addresses (A, B) this theme was in the foreground, and did not shrink from strong wording: c083: "The enemy today is the nightmare of poverty, the existential lack of certainty — let us not make six enemies of each other." k699—700: "We must think very deeply what we pull down. Lest we tear down the homes of the defenseless with a bulldozer."

He gave prominence to the necessity for minimal political agreement, which was a condition for the survival of the nation as a fundamental political unit.

a022: "Now above all we need social peace, strong and open debates pursued for the common good, nursing wounds as best we can, but by no means should we open new wounds."<sup>16</sup>

Civil equality and solidarity is a condition for the happiness of the national community.

h536: our democratic order "is maturing, because this society is mature and strong, and what is still more important, it is awaking to the knowledge of its power, and is thus capable of giving voice to its interests, of securing validity, and at the same time giving evidence, in the absence of state care, of preparedness to help, and of sympathy for those who have fallen by the wayside."

A characteristic and — in the knowledge of the delicacy of relations between Hungary and the neighboring countries — understandable feature of the addresses is that the President often mentioned the creation of agreement with other nationalities living in Hungary.

e198: "We must ensure those same rights for the national and ethnic minorities as those which we demand for ethnic Hungarians living in areas beyond our borders."<sup>17</sup>

In the serious economic and social crisis that followed the change of system, the emphasis on the insight into realities, the "cruel reality" (k717), received unique value. What at other times is a general common-sense rule — the requirement for straightforward, everyday moderation — becomes, in the given context, a founding value of national solidarity. The sense of reality of the members of the nation makes the political community able to preserve their unity in "hard times", and — even if there are material and moral sacrifices — capable of not fragmenting into parties who politicize passionately but pursue ghosts. This system of arguments was always present in the communication of all governments, and the President also adopted it in his addresses. The sense of reality, according to the principal scheme of Hungarian historical-political thinking, is the principle virtue of Saint István, and in the President's addresses it is the figure of István who primarily appears in this connection.

16 This is also the lesson in relation of 1848: d123: "Have we learned that, only holding together, the intention of understanding brings us forward?" g436: "And let us accept that we Hungarians are all Hungarians. And that the Hungarian flag is fine the way it is: red, white and green — it is not worthwhile changing it with the red of Stalin, the white of the aristocracy, and the green of the Arrow Cross", h513: "We were condemned to stick together."

17 Ibid. k689—691

e194—195: "And since the situation provides similarities, the thinking of St Stephen can be an example for us. Above all else, in the assessment and judgement of our place, weight, role and possibilities."<sup>18</sup>

Primarily in connection with the commemorations of 1956, the President had to avoid mentioning that the advertised objectives of the 1956 revolution and the actual goals of the change of system diverged from each other to a significant degree, although the political powers involved in the change of system consciously reached back to 1956 as a source of legitimization.<sup>19</sup>

The President's addresses were not always, in the strict meaning of the word, impartial. For example, in March 1994 (G), when he realized the values of press freedom among the messages of the celebration (which was a theme well founded by the events of 1848), he was in practice arguing against the government which was then endeavoring to acquire greater control over mass communication. Another example is March 1995 (J), when, after a long historical dissertation, he avoided having to talk about the unpopular measures of the new government.

There is no doubt that the President's historical chains of thought and moral-political messages are a collection of political and historical clichés. Considering that these are celebratory addresses, this is natural. This should be mentioned, because the aim of their lengthy presentation must also be clarified. I consider it important to stress that the two differing layers of the addresses, the historical remembrance and the moral-political les-

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18 He devoted the 1995 August address (so after March's drastic measures had been digested) (K) entirely to this theme. But elsewhere as well: e246: "We must give up, like it or not, a part of the living Hungarian tradition, part of the past that carries values." f306—307: "We can only confront it if we confront ourselves. If we think through with a cool head, what values we must preserve like the shining of our eyes, and what we must give up and what we win with it." k694: "Unlike in the times of Saint István, it is not the obligation of survival but the danger of being left behind which forces us to base this path not on idle dreams, but on the hard, strong reality of the present." m885: "Now we are standing here like the Hungarians at the time of Saint István, at the beginning of a newly opened but unknown road. It is perhaps narrow and rugged, but we have to go along it." The sense of reality can also mean giving up the impossible, but also the consideration of self interest: h506: preservation of our independent face "... we must assess our situation and possibilities without underestimating our own values and historical achievements, without haughty and exaggerated self assessment." The wisdom of hindsight shows that in 1993, this address was more optimistic than it ought to have been, and inasmuch as the highly valued sense of reality guided it. This is the fate of celebratory speeches.

19 co80: "To the future, which possibly is not forming as we imagined in nineteen fifty six, for since then many terms — socialism, Europe, neutrality, private property — has been revalued and changed — and is changing still — and all around us the world." The President is personally of social liberal persuasion, so for him this problem is personally more important than for a member of the right wing; he has returned to this several times. (f302, f318, n960)

son related to the present, *together* create a unique configuration.<sup>20</sup> The presidential addresses, using a historical construction, bring into a framework his analyses relating to civic values and the existence of the national community. In the story, the nation or the people are a “collective subject” which has a fate, a fate which guides them from a glorious past through trials and tribulations and a “journey to hell” to current or future prominence. The notion of national fate presumes that the nation is not a community formed by individuals, but an independent entity that transcends them. It is a *community of fate* in the way that this ideal is described in European Romanticism. By contrast, the ideal of the current national community in the President’s speeches is depicted as a democratic community, capable of adapting its desires to reality, one that relies on solidary and rational deliberation and also on resignation, and which is created unambiguously out of sovereign individuals — which is to say, a *contractual community*, in the sense expressed in the Western Rousseau tradition. Is the President being inconsistent when he thinks at the same time in categories of “culture nation” and “state nation.”? Rather I think that these categories are inappropriate for the description of types of national identity. The President’s identity construction is plausible, logical, workable (which is to say, convincing and capable of being produced as broadly usable discourses). As every competent Hungarian reader will immediately recognize, this construction is not the invention of the President but a version of the national concern of Hungarian liberalism.

## 2.

The word “Europe”, which can be used in many senses, indicates the more spacious context in which Hungarian political discourses locate domestic processes. This has been particularly prominent since the change of system, but not only since then.<sup>21</sup> This chapter does not wish to prove that the attitude towards “Europe”, however it is taken, is an essential component of the Hungarian national identity, because this is well known and has

<sup>20</sup> I am thinking precisely of what Lévi-Strauss peerlessly expressed over 40 years ago, when he spoke of the structural similarities of myths and political ideologies: “Or, que fait l’historien quand il évoque la Révolution française? Il se réfère à une suite d’événements passés, dont les conséquences lointaines se font sans doute encore sentir à travers toute une série, non réversible, d’événements intermédiaires. Mais, pour l’homme politique et pour ceux qui l’écoutent, la Révolution française est une réalité d’un autre ordre; séquence d’événements passés, mais aussi schème doué d’une efficacité permanente, permettant d’interpréter la structure sociale de la France actuelle, les antagonismes qui s’y manifestent et d’entrevoir les linéaments de l’évolution future.” Claude Lévi-Strauss: *La structure des mythes*, in: *Anthropologie structurale*, Paris: Plon, 1974, 235—265, quote: 239

<sup>21</sup> See: Helyünk Európában. *Nézetek és koncepciók a 20. századi Magyarországon*, I–II., (Our place in Europe. Views and concepts in 20<sup>th</sup> century Hungary) Budapest, Magvető 1986.

been supported by appropriate scholarly means. However, since the "Europe" symbol has been used in so many ways, it is far from uninformative if we investigate how the President uses "Europe words."

Is Europe mentioned frequently or rarely in his celebratory speeches?<sup>22</sup> In three of his 13 analyzed addresses, (B, C, G) he does not mention either Europe or any synonym for it (primarily "The West"). In other places, "Europe" occupies a stressed place, and plays a central role in the argument.

Table 3: *The frequency of 'Europe' words in the President's speeches per celebration*

Celebration	Number of addresses	Number of sentences in celebratory addresses	Number of 'Europe words'	Number of 'Europe words' / address	Number of "Europe words" / sentence
March 15.	3	243	3	1.0	0.01
August 20.	6	451	67	11.2	0.15
October 23.	4	238	14	3.5	0.06
Together	13	928		6.5	0.09

In his speeches given at various times, the President referred to Europe in very differing degrees, taking the very different meanings of the word together. These differences, however, do not reflect the President's personal values. This becomes clear if we compare the frequency found in the President's speeches with the frequency that can be observed in the celebratory newspaper articles between 1995 and 1997 (in this case, only the number of articles and references to Europe were available). Moreover, it is worth considering with what frequency the "Europe words" appear in the "social liberal" papers, which, in respect of political values, are closest to the President.

<sup>22</sup> According to a humorist, too frequently: "... here, you need a bit of a brain-dead day for a national celebration, so under this banner, there is always a great political gargling competition, cannibalized Kossuth, Széchenyi, Petőfi and Haynau quotes, *with the indispensable Europe gibberish ...*" Uj Péter: A világnap, (world day) NSZ 1997, March 26.

Table 4: Occurrence of mentions of Europe in the four national papers between 1995 and 1997

Celebration	Combined celebratory articles (number)	Celebratory articles in social liberal papers (number)	Number of mentions of Europe	Number of mentions of Europe in social liberal papers	Mentions of Europe / article	Mentions of Europe / article in social liberal papers
March 15.	297	79	197	86	0.66	1.09
Aug. 20.	199	84	384	216	1.90	2.6
Oct. 23.	266	86	132	77	0.50	0.9
Total	762	249	713	379	0.94	1.5

The figures show a very stable and general pattern. On one hand, 'Europe words' occur with greater probability in social-liberal newspapers, and with greater probability in the President's speeches (but in this case there is not only a fundamental social-liberal orientation, but the ceremonial function must also be taken into account). Otherwise it is a political cliché — which can probably be observed in every country in the region — that the "left-wing" is more pro-Europe (in the very uncertain meaning of the word) than the conservative right-wing. What is more interesting is that the celebrants' behavior is at odds with the preconceived ideas of unprejudiced (non-Hungarian) observers.

August 20<sup>th</sup> is the 'true' European celebration in Hungary (although the word was missing from the vocabulary of contemporaries). (In my view — although I cannot prove it — 'Europe' came into use as a secular synonym for the prevailing "Christianity" in celebrations before 1945; in the 1970s the celebration of the founding of the state slowly superseded the celebration of the socialist constitution introduced in 1949). In 1848, in 'the people's Spring', and in 1956, the historical actors themselves began to use "European" representations more widely. However, in the discourse of celebrations "Europe" is mentioned less often than in the celebration of August 20<sup>th</sup>. This fact in itself shows that mentions of Europe have a ceremonial function.

Mentions of Europe are built into the historical narrative exceptionally strongly. They become less frequent in those addresses where the "historical" element is weaker.

Table 5: Connection between mentions of Europe and historical elements

	Number of sentences	Number of mentions of Europe	Mentions of Europe / sentence
Strongly historical addresses (C, D, E, H, J, K, L, M, N)	723	77	0,106
Weakly historical addresses (A, B, F, G)	205	7	0,034

While in the more strongly "historical" addresses it can be expected that the President's every tenth sentence will contain a mention of Europe, if the address is not of an "historical" character, then these mentions can only be expected in every thirtieth sentence (in other words, once or twice per address).<sup>23</sup>

"Europe", if it appears, is generally organically built into the narration and the argument. One August 20<sup>th</sup> speech shows its inclusion in paradigmatic form. The story is connected from the beginning with Europe.

e138 "The fateful question a thousand years ago, and after the passing of these thousand years, is the same: are the Hungarian people capable of becoming part of Europe?"

Naturally St István, who was being celebrated on August 20<sup>th</sup>, answers in adequate mode.

e154 "He created not simply a European Hungarian state, but created a model valid for a thousand years."

István's European orientation, however, is of ambivalent value content.

e164 "He accepted the burden of sacrifice, because without changes in ideals, and changes of behavior, we would remain a foreign body in Europe."

If "Europe" supports a requirement which cannot be fulfilled without loss of value (sacrifice, which in the given context means resignation, loss), then the Hungarian people as a collective subject, are not without sin either. He talks about the sixteenth century aristocratic way of thinking, and its long term influence:

e182 "This did not just oppose the principal direction of the European spirit of the age, but signified a step backwards compared to St István's legal thinking as well."<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> We obtain a similar picture in the press analysis already mentioned.

	Number of articles	Number of articles making mention of Europe	Articles mentioning Europe / total articles
Historically themed articles	359	127	0,353
Non-historically themed articles	403	82	0,203

It can be expected that every third article with an historical theme and every fifth article with a non-historical theme will mention Europe in some form.

<sup>24</sup> The August 20<sup>th</sup> address is of similar character in 1997. The starting point is the unity of the Hungarian people and Europe: m832 "Then a succession of wise kings made the home of the Hungarian people and

The present in this sense means the return to valuable beginnings, that rational insight promises a harmonic relation. The so-called thinking of Saint Stephen can be an example for us.

e195 "Above all, in the measurement of European realities, in the judgement of our place, weight and role and possibilities."

The narration of the story follows the three part structure analyzed above. We must now point out that in all three separable points of the story, the "beginning", the "descent to hell" and the "return", "Europe" is an organic part, as a template, a sympathetic or antipathetic player.

In relation to March 15<sup>th</sup>, "Europe" rather connects to the beginning (1): the celebrated event is naturally a component of a pan-European event.

j553 "It was nearly one hundred and fifty years ago — in the interest of battling for independence, for modernizing the economy, for civilizing society — that Hungary fought for its freedom as its part in the European revolutions."

"Europe" appears at the key point in the story, and so it is the lead player. However, the story then unfolds as a battle between the collective national subject and "the Court of Vienna" which embodies "the bad", where "Vienna" does not connect in any sense to some "European" value.

In the connection between 1956 and the "European" concept<sup>25</sup>, the motives of "purgatory" and "ascension" stand in the foreground. The evocation of the memory of 1956 is ambivalent: the country and the people were betrayed on the great political stage.

n899 "We know the political and military components and origins of the political and diplomatic betrayal of our revolution: that the intention of preserving the balance between the great powers outweighed all other considerations."

"Society" however behaved differently, and positively.

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of those other peoples who lived with them, into a respected empire, one which enriched the whole of Europe with its culture and traditions." Then follows the purgatory, from the late middle ages (m839 "The country was squeezed to the perimeter of Europe.") lasting to the 1950s (m848: "Europe left it on its own, and become morally and politically without friends, something disowned."), then in 1956, the attempt to return to Europe which was realized in the 90s (m855: "By the time its influence had reached other echelons, Hungary had almost imperceptibly ceased to be the pariah of Europe.").

25 In the text the President here uses synonyms for Europe (West, world — i.e. Western world)

n910: "After the revolution was put down, there was a sharp divergence between Western policy and Western public opinion.

This gave the basis for the current ascension.

n918: "Because in world consciousness, the name of Hungary became synonymous with the powerful demands for freedom and democracy."

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'Europe' naturally means many things — and not necessarily or even primarily a geographical area. Of the President's addresses, 6 cases out of 10 (62 %) contain Europe used in a metonymic or metaphorical sense (which is to say, not as a reference to a geographical location).<sup>26</sup> In many cases it is difficult to separate the metonymic or metaphorical use. There are cases where it is clear that "Europe" is being used in a metaphorical sense, for instance as the embodiment of some (usually positive) value.

co80: "To the future, which possibly is not forming as we imagined it in 1956, for since then many terms — socialism, Europe, neutrality, private property — have been revalued and changed — and are changing still — and all around in us the world."

On other occasions, the metonymic use of the word is unambiguous, for the most part in the form: "in place of the name of a geographical area in place of the western half + in place of countries forming the Western half of the geographical area."

do94: "The winds of the French revolution skirted by Hungary. Until then, European modernization had not touched it either."

For the most part though, it cannot be decided whether the President is using a given "Europe-expression" in a metaphoric or metonymic sense.

e138: "The fateful question a thousand years ago and now, a thousand years later, is the same: are the Hungarian people capable of becoming part of Europe?"

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<sup>26</sup> The ratio of metonymic and metaphorical use of words is practically identical with the ratio found in celebratory issues of the daily papers: 59 %. In the same way, in the use of words identifying places, the ratio of mentions of East or Eastern Europe (nearly a third: 28% with the President, 33% in daily papers). The use of Eastern-Europe in articles in daily papers showed only a single metaphorical/metonymic use, while none occurred in the President's addresses. These facts allude to the fact that in the case of Europe-representation, we are here encountering a well-formed and stable representational pattern.

In this case, the use of 'Europe' is metonymic, because the President is referring to the (West)-Europe system of states, but it is also metaphorical because in this case 'Europe' signifies a collection of values, the summation of political, economic and cultural good things. In Hungarian national discourse, this is not too willingly to put into words in this explicit way, but the sense of the President's question is whether the Hungarian national community is capable of (finally) becoming civilized.

The difficulties of separating the metaphorical and metonymic use of terms is not simply a question of linguistic-stylistic problems. The difficulties of separation derive from the term "Europe" being exceptionally pregnant in meaning in normal Hungarian political language. It is strongly connected with the central questions of national identity, so it cannot be reduced to a single aspect of the word's meaning. To put this more clearly: speakers often use the term "Europe", because the many meanings of the word make it possible for them to avoid committing themselves to a particular defined meaning. The sentence e138 which was quoted above emphatically puts this into words, with no further commentary needed, as does the following:

m827: "Our ancient tradition, that on the name day of our Saint-King we celebrate the turning point of our people's history, which stretches back over one thousand years, we celebrate the birthday of European statehood."

m831: "Then a succession of wise kings made the home of the Hungarian people, and of those other peoples who lived with them, into a respected empire, one which enriched the whole of Europe with its culture and traditions."

We are compelled so far to present the well known facts. Analysis of the President's speeches allows us perhaps to draw a slightly less common-place conclusion. The number of Europe references is conspicuously large (39 out of 84, which is almost one half) which, from the point of view of value, appear in a strongly ambivalent environment.

The addresses — as I have already mentioned — present belonging to Europe as a central element of the Hungarian national identity (in the aforementioned multi-colored sense of the term). By the same token, in many cases this joining signified a compulsion in the President's addresses:

e140: "The most significant realization of the tenth century Hungarians was that they were obliged to accept the European order, if they did not wish to follow the fate of other Eastern peoples and be sucked back into history without a trace."<sup>27</sup>

27 f299: "Following our revolution, and then the revolutions of the other East and Central East European countries, the region which embraced us was radically transformed, conforming to the power relations and

The alternative to the otherwise positively valued accession in this case is (in the national sense) destruction, which implicitly defines European accession as the lesser evil. The special and highly valued virtue of the national community, projected back to the Tenth century, is a realistic assessment of the situation and adaptation to circumstances, and therefore it is a secondary moral value. Accordingly, the command of accession follows from insight and from common sense, and does not bring with it any clear identification.

This motive is sufficiently present in the President's image of Saint István, that on August 20<sup>th</sup>, 1995, following the government's wide-ranging economic austerity measures, he gave it the metaphorical title "The economy on the Lech meadow." This parallel, since negative concepts are linked in Hungarian historical memory to the battle of Lech meadow, was dangerous: accordingly, adaptation to the "triumphant West" (k68o) is an enforced consequence of defeat and the acceptance of a model that it not valuable in itself.

k665—666, 668—670: "For us, on the Lech meadow, it was shown unmistakably that the West was also shut before us. Our community of fate bound us to the people of a narrower area, but if we want to protect ourselves, we must also adapt to the wider environment ... Executing the fate-determining — and to this day, most far-reaching — modernization of our history. Let us not fool ourselves, the price is a cruel one. We gave many building blocks of our self-identity for it."

The principal lesson, of course, for the President as well, is that adaptation to Europe in its entirety shows a positive balance, but in any event, it means an interest-driven adaptation and not a value-driven autonomous action.

e156—157: "Saint István built on the trinity of knowledge, integration and circumscription. It is interesting in our time how we strive for precise and ever more exact information, for the assessment and measurement of the power relations of European and narrower environments."<sup>28</sup>

The relation between Hungary and Europe is based on identity of interest.

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compelling reality of the world and of a Europe that was becoming united." h474: "Which in all certainty convinced our ancestors that there was no return back East, but that in Europe there was no other place for us but here — here we must hang on."

28 f303: "If we want to become part of a future united order of Europe, we must adapt to it." h464: "It is unambiguous, and has been confirmed many times ever since, and the recognition [expressed by Géza] is more timely than ever, that the Hungarian people can only survive if they adapt to their environment, to contemporary Christian Europe." h495: "He and his nation must conform to a developed Europe, with regard to its social and economic structure, and — like it or not — become like it."

h520—521: “Self interest governs policy, profit governs economy (let us suppose, in a good case, mutual profit). We must base our future not on the charity of Europe — or the world — but on the mutual interests of Europe and as part of that, Hungary.”<sup>29</sup>

By definition, adaptation brings with it danger:

e164: “He accepted sacrifice [Saint István], because without change and different behavior, we will remain a foreign body within Europe.”

“European linkage” demands a “merciless day of reckoning”, and its perpetuation endangers our inheritance. (h465)<sup>30</sup>. European accession is a difficult and tiring process.

f292—293: “We have a true parliament, and we have set out on the only conceivable route, which leads West, through the market economy towards a United Europe. This road is narrow and rugged.”

Adaptation out of compulsion, obeying the edicts of common sense about “European” fundamentals, ultimately means integration into institutions which, from some points of view, represent a higher degree of value. The European positioning of Hungary, however, brings with it a large measure of powerfully negative elements. This is the tragic “Central-European fate” (e190), the pan-European relevance of which is reduced by the restricting adjective.

Europe is not just the value which must be adapted to (and in this sense Europeanism is a deduced value) but at the same time, in Hungarian national stereotypes, Europe appears as an actor who commits acts against the Hungarian people that are of morally doubtful value: it was ungrateful, it forgot about them, and so on. The President presents this stereotype and rejects it, but with this, he finally introduces the “Ungrateful Europe” element into the discourse.

h514: “One of our unnecessary burdens — our false beliefs — is that Europe — or the world — would owe us gratitude because in our own defense, from the Mongol invasion, through the 1956 uprising, to the collapse of the communist dictatorship, to the redemption of the

29 n872: “It is true: we must adapt to the common values of Europe, and this means that we must give, in exchange, a degree of our own self-possession.”

30 The “mercilessness” was a stable element of the image of Saint István, and this strongly differs from the image preserved in conservative traditions and the media picture of the “kindly king.” The portrayal of István the First in the socialist period gave prominence to his nature as a heavy handed king and quasi-revolutionary.

Central-East European landslide, not only did we serve our own ends and mobilize them, but also the interests of the whole of Europe.”

Europe was “foreign and hostile” (k677) after World War II, Hungary remained “an out-cast of Europe” (l739), where the verb used refers to those inside, and not to the Eastern great power (which simply occupies). The address (L), in which this latter allusion can be found, was made on the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the 1956 revolution, and in the three strategic points contained reproaches addressed to the “European” Western world: on one hand, he mentions that after 1945, the “victors”, the “world”, the “well-wishers” wrote off and identified Hungary with communism. Then, in 1956, the people’s uprising surprised them, and finally Radio Free Europe tried to confront the people with their leader Imre Nagy. In this story then, the “West” consistently leaves Hungary in the lurch and is irresponsible, while the uprising Hungarian people appear in the role of the morally superior victim.

The picture can be usefully supplemented if we look at the extent to which “Europe” and the “Hungarian people” appear as actors<sup>31</sup>, and how much the combined positive-value emphases relate to their deeds.<sup>32</sup>

It is no wonder that in the national celebratory discourse, the “home side” appears in a positive light. It is notable, however, that in a fairly “Europeanized” discourse, “Europe” is rather the sufferer of (positive) actions, and if it acts, then it is strongly ambivalent.

31 I take action in a very wide sense. An action relating to Europe: integration, acceptance, recognition, making room, resemble, adapt, learn, enrich etc. Actions relating to “us”: tolerance, gratitude, shuts the door, forgets, rejects, makes a partner, invites etc. There is no doubt there is a particular asymmetry between “Europe” and “us”: “Europe” only comes into consideration as a collective subject (and not as a real or symbolic individual actor), “we” however both as individual (e.g. St István) and collective actors.

32 In the already quoted examination of the daily papers there was no detailed qualitative analysis, but data was available of how values attributed to players were divided in the sentences of daily papers which mention Europe.

The player	Altogether	The act is positive	The act is negative	Ambivalent or cannot be listed
No player	474			
‘Europe’ acts	70	31	38	1
‘the Hungarians’ act	180	149	22	9

Remark: multiple listing was permitted

It was evident that Europe, which was generally positively evaluated, was less active than “the Hungarians”, and if it was active, it tended towards actions which were negative, rejecting or morally objectionable.

Table 6: *Europe and the actions of 'Hungarian people' (multiple listing permitted)*

Player	Combined	The action is positive	The action is negative	Ambivalent or can not be categorized
No player	867			
Europe acts	18	9	5	3
'Hungarians' act	50	46	3	1

'Europe' therefore constitutes a central element in popular Hungarian identity constructions and fulfills an ambivalent role in them. As we have seen in the President's addresses, "European accession" always means a positive value, but on the periphery there are accompanying negative connotations. In the Hungarian identity, the thought has long been present that the Hungarian people have been missing something or been left out, that "others" did not do everything for their admittance. "Europe" therefore means at least four different things: an object embodying high-level political-moral values, an ungrateful partner, a partner for whose sake "we" made sacrifices (and who should be grateful for those sacrifices), and a partner "with whom" we have mutual values. The question remains, when the question of NATO accession entered political discourse, which element of "European-representation" was best mobilized in the argumentation.

### 3.

In relation to NATO accession, the presentation of the arguments used and the discourse elements in the President's addresses do not require much space since the President only referred explicitly to the question of NATO accession in two speeches, on August 20<sup>th</sup> 1997 and October 23<sup>rd</sup> of the same year. Consequently the number of times NATO is mentioned is low (8 occasions in all). Apart from this, he only referred to NATO accession implicitly (in 1990, (C)) when he spoke about changes to the meaning of neutrality. This fact in itself is remarkable, since we know that the question of NATO accession had featured on the political agenda since 1989, and that every government had committed themselves to it. News about NATO was also frequently featured in mass communica-

33 Naturally, the frequency of mentions of NATO in the President's addresses is more common than in the written press. Of the President's 13 addresses, two mentioned NATO, and if this were reflected in the written press, it would mean that every sixth article would have to mention NATO. The reason, naturally, is that the majority of articles concern themes that have nothing to do with NATO. It would be more worthwhile to compare the frequency of NATO with the frequency of other relevant themes e.g. the Europe theme.

tion.<sup>33</sup> It would have been expected and logical for the President to cite the question of NATO accession as a real national problem, and relate it to national celebratory commemorations. It would have been more logical because on one hand, in political practice and speech, the question of NATO accession and European integration are linked. What is more, the President devoted most attention to the problem of Europe. This linkage would have been logical because all three celebrations had a strongly “Western” theme (all three cases could thus be interpreted by the Hungarian people as wanting to join the “Western” world, which an Eastern great power prevented both in 1848 and 1956). The ‘Westernness’ of both the August 20<sup>th</sup> and March 15<sup>th</sup> celebrations caused more than enough problems for those planning them during the State Socialist era (and October 23<sup>rd</sup> was naturally banned).

The neglect of NATO is not the result of the President’s personal choice. An examination of the celebratory numbers of the daily papers yields a similar result<sup>34</sup>. It appears that those responsible for “staging” the celebrations avoided a connection being made between NATO accession and the highly valued national stockpile of symbols. In this sense, NATO belongs to the world of the profane. This interpretation is also supported by other analyses.

34 Articles appearing in special celebration editions of the daily papers 1995—1997 containing articles mentioning NATO (in brackets, number of mentions)

Paper	Articles mentioning NATO	Total of celebratory articles	Articles mentioning NATO 1995	Articles mentioning NATO 1996	Articles mentioning NATO 1997
Magyar Hírlap	5 (6)	124		2 (3)	3 (3)
Népszabadság	1 (2)	125	1 (2)		
Magyar Nemzet	7 (15)	211	2 (3)	1 (1)	4 (11)
Új Magyarország	7 (15)	302		2 (6)	5 (9)
Combined	(38)		3 (5)	5 (10)	12 (23)

In the daily papers, there were conspicuously few mentions in 1997, the year of the NATO referendum. The liberal papers closer to the governing pro-NATO parties have fewer than usual mentions of NATO. If we look at the value emphases and contexts, then the picture alters.

Newspaper	positive context	neutral context	context contains negative value elements
liberal papers	3 articles	1 article	2 articles
Conservative papers	1 article	2 articles	11 articles

That is to say that in conservative papers, NATO features relatively often, that the context in which it appears carries negative elements. The President’s addresses cannot carry negative references — as we see, reservations are expressed in another form.

More interesting than the relative infrequency of mentions is the argumentative context in which mentions of NATO appear in the Presidential addresses. In the August address, the President directly links the theme of NATO accession to a brief evocation of 1956 and references to the change of system. As a consequence of the change, Hungary ceased to be "the pariah of Europe" (m855), "thanks to his people's courage and wisdom, they discarded their past piece by piece, and stepped back — or arrived again — at the point where Saint Stephen started out" (m858). The historic fulfillment which has been analyzed above is European accession. The question of NATO accession is related to this theme. The President mentions that Hungary has been invited to join NATO. The event is to be welcomed, because (at least this is how the argument can be constructed) finally Hungary's isolation has been left behind.

m863: "For a small, impecunious, virtually indefensible open country, which is bordered by seven countries, and which does not at all crave the role of the last outpost of Europe, and what is more, would like to encourage all its neighbors to enjoy the same security as it does, it is not possible to imagine a more rational, voluntary alliance."

The argument is not perfect, because with accession, Hungary, in this sense, has become a final outpost on the Alliance's Eastern perimeter. Everyone knows this of course, and for this reason, the President mentions the fact of co-operation between NATO and Russia, which could also serve as a counter-argument to accession. This is the only argumentative connection in which the world-political context related to NATO accession, the re-ordering of power in Europe after 1989, found its way into a celebratory address about NATO. By referring to a concrete situation (the relation between Russia and NATO), the President soon gives it a utopian-enhancing interpretation.

m864: "[Accession] is not dangerous, because the alliance endeavors to work out with painstaking care peace and co-operation with its one-time enemy, Russia, which for the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union, is now an important economic and political partner, as it is for Hungary.

The more serious argument follows: the alternative to NATO accession is neutrality, which is expensive.

m867—869: "To be armed to the teeth is the prerogative of the rich. Because it is a very expensive thing. They did not invent it for us."

The argument evokes a national picture, the picture of a "small nation", which otherwise does not feature in the president's story constructions, although it is not missing from

Hungarian historical consciousness. (The concept of the “small nation” is not identical with the “nation of sacrifice” This latter takes its starting point from the fact that the nation has suffered unjustly, or compared to its wrong doing, disproportionately, which is to say unfairly. The former derives from the argument that because of its weakness, it could only appear with what were always smaller demands.)

The 1997 October 23<sup>rd</sup> commemorative address was also directly related to the question of neutrality<sup>35</sup>. In 1956 one of the fundamental demands was neutrality, and so the President has to argue against those demands which carry with them historical legitimization. In the speech, which, compared to the previous occasion, deals with the question of NATO accession at greater length, we find two different arguments that are good enough in their own right.

The President first alludes to the fact that neutrality is in practice unrealizable and serves no aim. That was also the case in 1956.

n936—7: “This status of neutrality [which Imre Nagy declared] was not confirmed by either great power. What is more, to be neutral between two enemies, where both of them are much stronger than the neutral country, is only possible with the endorsement of them both. Because without the “assistance” of one of them, it would be incapable of defending itself.”

Today’s situation is naturally quite different:

n938—9: “Today, the world is militarily monopolar. And the determining power of this monopolar world is the unified army of the North Atlantic Alliance.”

Logically, if we thus interpret the “two opposing” arguments, that neutrality is impossible when and only when at least one of the two opposing sides does not agree, it follows, from the change of situation, that now neutrality is possible. The President does not wish to reach this conclusion, so he tacitly turns to the argument of inexpediency. The inexpediency argument is supported by the allusion to the role of NATO peacekeepers.

n943: “After two murderous world wars, which very nearly swept the world to the brink of oblivion, the aim of the North Atlantic Alliance is the protection of peace in the world, and, above all, in Europe.”

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35 The question of neutrality emerged already in 1990: c080: “To the future, which possibly is not turning out as we imagined in 1956, for since then many terms — socialism, Europe, neutrality, private property — have been revalued and changed — and are changing still, as is the world around us.”

This is supplemented by the economic argument given in the previous address, adding that accession to the military alliance spares the country from future bloodshed (the argument is in itself contradictory: it would be plausible with the peace-keeper argument, if the historical precedent was a little more fortunate. The sufferings listed were not visited on Hungary for preserving its neutral status).

1953—4: "If someone considers the costs of membership, I would ask them primarily not to take into account the cost of weapons to be acquired — although the cost is barely a third of what would be needed to maintain neutral status, and which would not offer the remotest chance of there being the possibility for defense — but rather how many soldiers the Hungarian Army lost at the Don Bend in the Second World War. If NATO fills its role as a peace-keeper — naturally with our own army — the Hungarian people will not have to contend with masses of future widows, war widows, the disabled, the blind and the paralyzed."

The President's three principal "profane" arguments for NATO accession (the impossibility of neutrality, its inexpediency, and its uneconomic nature) are only loosely connected, and are almost totally unrelated to the historically motivated identity constructions which form the backbone of celebratory commemorations. The NATO theme — in contrast to the "Europe theme" — is not built organically into the historical narrative.

Conforming to his ceremonial function, the President scarcely builds actual political strategic considerations into the argument. This leads to the unique "economic" argument — which has become devalued in part since the speech was made — becoming the most emphasized. Which makes the President's arguments similar to someone who wants to persuade someone else to buy something, which for aesthetic or moral reasons, stirs a feeling of dislike, but which the persuader judges highly in terms of its presumed long-term use.

We have seen that the "interest" motive was not absent from the "European" elements of the speeches, either. It could be said that accession to Europe and entering NATO are both in the "interest" of Hungary. However, while the "European" "interest" element was closely linked to identity construction, this link was missing in those speeches which deal with the problem of NATO membership. In the presidential addresses, joining NATO appears to be the result of rational "economical" calculations.

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In summary of the above, it appears that in the President's addresses, which tend to be connected to the thought of liberal left-wing thinking, the concept of Europe is strongly related to national identity-constructing discourse, while the question of NATO acces-

sion is not linked to questions of identity<sup>36</sup>. In the final analysis, it does not integrate either positively or negatively into the sacred discourse of identity construction.

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<sup>36</sup> I suspect that in conservative discourse, the NATO theme also relates to identity discourse, but in a negative manner.

## PUBLIC DEBATE IN HUNGARY ON THE NATO ALLIANCE

### Introduction

On March 12<sup>th</sup>, 1999 Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic officially signed their entry into NATO in Independence<sup>1</sup>, Missouri, (USA). The fact that this happened should not be considered as natural or predictable, since these countries spent several decades in the opposing military alliance — the Warsaw Pact. What makes the event even more significant is the fact that the signature happened three days before the NATO-bombing campaign started against Yugoslavia, Hungary's southern neighbor, (a country with a large population of ethnic Hungarians).

The general aim of our research is to reconstruct the changes that took place in the Hungarian political scene and public opinion when moving from a firm anti-NATO standpoint (as the country's position over the past decades can be characterized) to membership. Our main concern is to examine how this change was elaborated through public discourse. We have conducted various types of analysis on differing segments of the public debate concerning Hungary's relationship to NATO, the planning and realization of joining NATO, and the consequence NATO membership has had on how Hungarians think about national sovereignty, Hungary's place in Europe, and other related topics such as — to mention the most important — national identity. Discourse analysis has been carried out on several corpora of public debate at different periods of time.

The topic itself of Hungary's membership in a military alliance was untouchable during the Kádár regime. Hungary's participation in the Warsaw Pact was not an issue for public discussion. It was one of several taboo topics.<sup>2</sup> Yet the issue appeared in the public sphere quite early in the process of the system-change without much public attention.

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1 The very name of the town gave occasion to ironic observations of anti-NATO public speakers, which constructed a relationship between the geographical denomination and the "loss of independence" that the act of signature meant according to them.

2 While this topic could never appear in public discourse during the Kádár-period and the preceding Stalinist era of Rákosi, it was often treated in private discussions. The phenomenon that topics circulating through channels of public and private communication differ to a very large extent is a strong sign of the existence of constraints on the public sphere. This is characteristic of the so called "restricted public sphere" (Heller, Némédi & Rényi, 1990, 1991).

Real public debate on the issue started only in 1997, when negotiations with NATO had already gone considerably far, and when it had become clear to political decision-makers that Hungary would soon be accepted as a NATO-member. All parties present in the Parliament at that time agreed on the planned membership<sup>3</sup>, and only a few non-parliamentary parties and scattered civic groups expressly opposed it. Because of the growing debate, it became clear to the decision-makers at that point that public opinion had to be prepared for NATO entry, and that steps had to be taken to ensure public support. A rather strong pro-NATO campaign was then orchestrated by public authorities.

Our analysis of the Hungarian public sphere of that period (both printed and electronic media discourse) provides evidence as to the nature and effects of the official pro-NATO campaign held in 1997, especially in the autumn months. The campaign reached its peak during the weeks before the referendum on whether or not to join NATO (November 16, 1997). By that time the number of articles, interviews, televised debates and discussion programs about NATO membership had increased substantially. Daily newspapers appeared with regular supplements<sup>4</sup> on issues related to NATO membership, and to the diplomatic events linked to it. Reports were also published on the need for modernization in the Hungarian army, the high-tech weapons and instruments used by NATO, the successful co-operation of Hungarian and NATO troops in the framework of IFOR and SFOR, the country's good performance in the Partnership for Peace program, etc. Much of public discourse was dedicated to the relative advantage Hungary had acquired in the Partnership for Peace, and in preparations to enter NATO in comparison to other countries also involved in the Partnership.

The aim of our discourse analysis was to explore the strategies employed by different public speakers representing well-defined positions and standpoints in the debate. The analysis attempts to reconstruct the relationship among discursive positions, topic constructions, discursive strategies, modes of argumentation, value-structures, modes of speech, and the status of the speakers. It also tries to investigate the relationship of the general *theme* of NATO-ALLIANCE with the *theme* of NATIONAL IDENTITY, a central topic in Hungarian public debates in recent and most remote past.

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3 The following parties were present in the Parliament in 1997 as a result of the second free elections (1994): MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party) and SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats) had been in the governing coalition and the parties of opposition were: MDF (Forum of Hungarian Democrats), FKGP (Independent Small Holders' Party, KDNP (Christian Democratic Party) and FIDESZ (Alliance of Young Democrats).

4 E.g. The supplement in *Magyar Hírlap*: *Nato Panorama* 12. 11. 1997 (ten-page supplement)

## The public debate on NATO-membership

### *Antecedents of the topic: the political context*

Preparation of public opinion for NATO-entry was made all the more important due to the fact that during the socialist era, and especially during the Cold War, NATO was described in the public sphere in Hungary in the most negative terms (revanchist, militaristic, imperialistic, etc.). In that period (the '50s and '60s) bitter anti-NATO discourse and extremely exaggerated caricatures (an often-used propaganda device of the time) were frequently engaged in<sup>5</sup>. According to our investigations, NATO's extremely negative image became milder during the *détente*, and from the mid-'60s onward the NATO / Warsaw Pact cleavage was less often referred to. Nonetheless, presumably, as long as the opposition between NATO and the Warsaw Pact existed, NATO retained its negative connotations in Hungary.

The whole topic of military alliance versus neutrality appeared in the public sphere quite early in the process of the system-change. Several political forces and public speakers approached the question of whether or not the on-going changes would also affect Hungary's membership in the Warsaw Pact. Several discursive constructions appeared at that time. Our analysis of newspapers from 1988 and 1989 show that in the period of the system-change the topics of *MUTUAL DISARMAMENT* and *NEUTRALITY* were at the center of this discourse (and not the option of joining NATO). Arguments supporting continued membership in the Warsaw Pact were also firmly present (these tried to demonstrate the illusionary character of neutrality with "realistic", pragmatic arguments, similar to the ones that were later used in official speeches supporting NATO). While it was clear that most new political forces strongly backed the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country, these forces differed on their visions of the future. Several alternatives were supported, ranging from: the idea that Hungary should withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact; neutrality as the best way for Hungary to ensure her sovereignty and security, and what was seen as the most unimaginable and improbable idea

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5 We constituted a special corpus of the caricatures about NATO that appeared in the most famous satirical weekly, *Ludas Matyi*, throughout the whole period from the '50s to the end of the '80s. The analysis of this corpus shows that during the Cold War period the journal gladly treated political topics and NATO was one of its favorite targets. NATO was most often symbolised by fully armed grim soldiers, "the blood-thirsty warmongers", dressed in uniform and sitting on bombs and rockets, often accompanied by typical exaggerated drawings of "the rich bourgeois", smoking his cigar and sitting on heaps of dollars, "the imperialist politician", operetta-dressed diplomats and other similar figures. Opposing them one finds strong, healthy and good-looking workers or peasants, sometimes dressed as soldiers, defending peace and liberty. These constructions are quite frequent in the '50s until the early '60s and become more and more scattered and rare later. If NATO is thematized at all in later periods it is more often in scenes where two soldiers (NATO and Warsaw Pact) argue, compete or fraternize.

at the time — that the country should try to join NATO. The first time the topic of joining NATO appeared in public discourse was not in FIDESZ-president Viktor Orbán's notorious radical speech at Hősök tere (Heroes' Square) on the day of Imre Nagy's reburial, when he demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops (June 16, 1989), but much earlier. Gyula Horn, President of the newly formed Socialist Party (MSZP) and Foreign Secretary at the time, raised the idea in February, 1989.

From the change of regime, until 1991, the whole question of military alliance was rarely thematised and was rather not discussed in the Hungarian public sphere. The Warsaw Pact, as an option for Hungary's defense policy, simply faded away. After the Warsaw Pact's dissolution, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, the whole topic became somewhat irrelevant to public discourse. Nevertheless, the issue of alignment could still have been constructed around the alternatives of neutrality versus NATO membership. But for several years public discourse did not crystallize around this topic, and its appearance was very weak. Although the topics of neutrality and national sovereignty have a long history in Hungarian political discourse (consider the political goals of several national uprisings such as 1848, 1956, etc.<sup>6</sup>), the whole alternative of Hungary becoming a neutral country without membership in any alliance was not seriously elaborated in public discourse. No significant political forces attempted to adopt this cause as a rallying point in the public sphere. Although associations of former active militants from 1956 and liberal intellectuals (especially members of the Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ) opted for a position of neutrality in the midst of the regime change, the fact that the new Socialist Party (MSZP) took a position in favor of possible NATO-entry in early 1989 caused a political mix up. The liberals who held, at that time, a very strong anti-communist position, and who were characterized by Western values and relationships (democracy, human rights, individual liberty, etc.), found themselves in an incoherent position when backing the idea of neutrality. This was all the more so since in the meantime the socialists had taken a position in favor of NATO membership, a liberal economy and other Western values, and therefore came to be seen as more Western oriented than the liberals. The issue therefore naturally gradually changed, and the alternative of neutrality became less attractive.

The weak appearance of the topic of neutrality might also have been motivated by a general uncertainty in the value-structure of the society, which came about after the change of regime. This lack of clear choices and assurances in political and ideological matters was responsible for radical political changes. These occurred at the three consecutive legislative elections,<sup>7</sup> and it also resulted in political struggles and heated debates concerning which orientations the country should follow. Huge public debates stemmed

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6 See the article of B. Juhász in this volume, 51–73.

7 In 1990, 1994 and 1998 [and now we can add: also in 2002].

from this situation. These debates were highly ideological and centered around the necessity of deciding how the country, with its economic, political and legal system, could be reorganized in order to end the socialist experiment — to enable the country to build its own future and set its own fate<sup>8</sup>. If NATO was not an important topic in this debate, the relationship towards the West, however, was one of the main issues at stake.

### *Debate on joining NATO*

While in the period of the regime-change, mutual disarmament, and to a lesser degree neutrality, were also discussed in public discourse, when — in the mid-90s — the topic of joining NATO was introduced as a new alternative most political forces, parties and pressure groups had no clear publicly elaborated standpoint on the question. No public analysis on the possible costs and benefits had been carried out, and the consequences of joining or staying out had not been analyzed. In the second half of the '90s, with the "Partnership for Peace" alliance, Hungary's approach to NATO became more and more a part of the political goals of all parliamentary forces. Yet even then, there was no clear communication of details or data in the public discourse about the costs and the consequences of possible entry. When the real debate started in 1997, all parliamentary parties had already agreed on alliance. The underlying consensus had been elaborated in the meantime, but only behind closed doors. The reason for the large political consensus can be found if one closely examines how the whole topic was publicly constructed. Politicians, as well as the media treated NATO-entrance as a technical issue instrumental to making what was perceived as a related more important change. Joining NATO, for most political forces, as well as for the general public, was considered to be the first step in attaining the real and most desired goal: joining the EU. In this process of approaching the West, NATO membership was regarded as a goal that was easier to attain, but which would help to legally and symbolically reconstruct the once existing ties between Hungary and the West. NATO membership with this symbolic value was widely thought to contribute in the long-run to Hungary's eventual EU membership. It is in this general context that the topic appeared in the public sphere in 1997.

As a general observation concerning the whole discourse on NATO-alliance, it should be mentioned that facts and figures were largely lacking from the public discourse. Even

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8 This thematic bundle constituted the main topic of public debates in Hungary at this period. It was strongly related to the problem of national identity. (See: Heller & Rényi 1996 a,b.) But this topic was also present during the Kádár period, even if in a more disguised form. Our former research dealt with the fact that because of political taboos in the restricted public sphere, certain groups of public speakers constructed several topics of the tolerated public discourse in such a manner that they elaborated thematic relations and interpretation-dependent allusions to the taboo topics of national sovereignty and national identity. (See: Heller, Némedi & Rényi 1990 a, b, 1994, 1995)

at the height of the debate, in 1997, calculations of costs (if there were any) were not made public. Virtually no important data was communicated, and a mist of secrecy lingered around the issue. In this context, however, the question was discussed from a pragmatic point of view of Hungary's general interests, without going into embarrassing details. Value choices and alternatives were rarely thematized, and most of the arguments (for or against) turned around questions of utilitarian ideology („what are the country's interests?") without precise argumentation or justification. At the time it appeared that the general public was not too interested in the issue, and there were fears that the referendum would only mobilize a small proportion of the population and thus would be annulled. Debate was also confused by the fact that the parties in opposition wanted to use the opportunity of the referendum to approach the populace with some unrelated issues, such as the ownership of land. The governing coalition and the opposition engaged in very heated debates on these unrelated issues.<sup>9</sup>

### Corpus

Several sets of corpus were examined in the course of the research. The main corpus of our discourse analysis is comprised of a complete collection of articles published in three national daily newspapers from September to November 1997, a period immediately preceding the referendum on NATO membership. Another corpus includes articles from political newspapers and periodicals from January to December 1997. A third corpus includes TV and radio debates from the same period. A special, separate corpus is comprised of newspaper articles from the period before and immediately after the regime change (1989—1991), that made it possible to investigate how and when the topic appeared in the public debate. Analysis was also carried out on articles treating NATO-entrance in certain weekly magazines: *HVG* 1989—1997, *Magyar Narancs* 1989—1997 and *Magyar Fórum* 1997—1998. Finally, another corpus is comprised of pictures and caricatures from *Ludas Matyi*, the satirical weekly from the post-war period (1950—1989).

In this article we concentrate on the results of the discourse analysis conducted on the corpus of three national daily newspapers from September 1<sup>st</sup> to November 15<sup>th</sup>, 1997,

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9 The main controversy was about how to formulate the question concerning the ownership of land. Behind this question there lies the cleavage, which exists between Hungarian political forces whether or not to permit that foreign individuals or institutions buy agricultural land in Hungary. Land has, of course, important symbolic value, especially in discourse treating national identity and national values. It is clear that this discursive struggle was stirred up because the legislative elections had to take place six months later, and all political forces wanted to use the referendum as an occasion for mobilizing masses to back them. They also considered the referendum as a good occasion for measuring public opinion at the same time.

the period immediately preceding the referendum (November 16, 1997). This corpus contains 263 articles.

In order to explain the historical context of the actual debate, we also refer to findings of research carried out on some of the other corpora mentioned above. With respect to the appearance of the topic of NATO-entrance in the Hungarian public sphere, we discuss results of our analysis of articles from four national newspapers in the first six months of 1989<sup>10</sup>. With regard to the change in NATO's public image in Hungary, our analysis of *Ludas Matyi*, the satirical weekly will be used. Analysis of one of the TV-debates is to be found in a separate article. (Címlapsztori, MSAT June 20, 1997)<sup>11</sup>

### Participants in the debate

For a more appropriate analysis, it seemed important to differentiate between two types of public speakers. The author of a public, communicative event (the writer of an article, a participant in a TV program, etc.), is called a *SPEAKER*, while the public speakers who were either mentioned or sometimes referred to or quoted in public discourse are called *ACTORS*. E.g., in the case of a news article, the journalist, who signed the article is the *speaker* and when he or she refers to a politician's opinion or quotes the person, this person is considered to be an *actor*. In the same way, in an opinion article, or an op-ed piece the person who expresses his or her views, and who signs the article, is also identified as the *speaker*. Interviews, however, constitute a special case. Interviews are generally signed by journalists, but they also provide a forum for the individual being interviewed to express his or her opinion on a certain number of topics. Therefore, in this analysis we will consider the interviewed person as a *speaker*.

#### *A hypothetical hierarchy of speakers and actors*

In our concrete analysis both speakers and actors were categorized according to their competencies and authorization, their symbolic resources, their position in the public sphere (e.g. well-known / unknown), according to the level of publicity they manage to achieve, when and where they appear, and how they present themselves<sup>12</sup>, etc.

10 *Népszabadság, Magyar Nemzet, Magyar Hírlap, Népszava.*

11 Joining NATO: The Analysis of a TV-Debate on Hungary's Alliance with NATO. See in this volume, 311–345.

12 It is interesting to note how certain speakers put forward some of their titles, functions and ranks or symbolic resources instead of others. E.g. in an important opinion article, Miklós Dérer, a historian, researcher and intellectual presents himself in the signature by using only one of his titles: President of the Hungarian Atlantic Council. Many similar examples could be quoted.

The following hierarchy was used for classifying speakers as well as actors:

- International political actors
- Members of government
- First-rank politicians: parliamentary, leaders of parties, presidents of parties, Parliamentary Commission of Defense, party functionaries
- Military leaders
- Official experts, and government bureaucrats
- Military experts for the parliamentary parties
- Leaders, office-holders and representatives of the non-parliamentary parties
- Representatives of civic organizations (party-affiliated and independent)
- Private people with special competence (e.g.: historians, lawyers, political scientists, soldiers)
- Private people without special competence
- Journalists

In the course of classification we also considered whether the speaker / actor was a civilian or a professional military person.

### The typology of newspaper articles on NATO-entrance

Public discourse about NATO in 1997 can be divided into two distinct categories. These two categories should be examined in close comparison, because there are similarities of how they treat the issue, but there are fairly important differences, as well. News reports and political or diplomatic accounts in the printed, as well as in most electronic media constitute the *FIRST TYPE OF DISCOURSE: "NEWS ACCOUNTS"*. They treat Hungary's intention of joining NATO as self-evident, and membership as a quasi-fact, the result of a well-planned and successfully performed series of actions. The analysis of this discourse shows that there was a general conception by most public speakers of Hungary as a macro-subject, which had an unwavering willingness, and even desire, to enter NATO. In these texts we often find "the government", "the country" and "Hungary" in the same syntactic position. The topic is constructed in a way to show that membership is the object of a nation-wide consensus, and the intentions of the government and the public are identical. Moreover, these subjects often appear as highly active subjects, as responsible initiators of important and serious activities, thus giving the image of a conscious macro-subject successfully carrying out a well planned and well completed series of acts. The whole process is presented as a rational, well-elaborated scenario, which owes its success to a commonly agreed and carried-out plan, a joint effort on the part of several institutional actors, and a convergent and supportive public opinion. References to tension in this type of discourse are usually connected only to debates within NATO.

The most frequent construction of the topic of the entrance in the news account type of articles, does not treat the question as a "political" issue (Kargl, Liebhart, Sonderrmann 1997) or a question to discuss, but as a fact. Most discourse falling into this category is on the pro-NATO side, and is part of the official campaign organized by state authorities and institutions. Sometimes news accounts did report on events organized by anti-NATO forces, but these reports, in general, are part of larger articles, which constitute a pro-NATO context to an anti-NATO event or opinion, which finds itself, in this way, in a discursively subordinated position.

The SECOND TYPE OF DISCOURSE to be found in the public sphere in 1997, were commentaries, opinions, analyses, interviews, i.e. discourses with a polemic or mobilizing intention: we shall call this type of discourse, "OPINION DISCOURSE". Speakers in these discourses are often Hungarian or foreign politicians, or high officials who represent institutional authority (mainly on the pro-NATO side). They also may be intellectuals, experts on foreign policy and military affairs, representatives of more peripheral political forces, active members of institutions of civil society, or even private individuals with no official authorization<sup>13</sup>. In this sector of the public sphere, contributions to the public debate openly assume a pluralistic distribution of opinions about the country's NATO alliance. Discursive actions in this field attempt to identify and express opposing standpoints, and they explicitly attempt to justify their own point of view by trying to delegitimize and deconstruct opposing viewpoints. As a general tendency we should mention that this second type of public discourse was more heterogeneous concerning standpoints, values, speech strategies, argumentation, modes of speech and topic constructions than news accounts. Because of the strong pro-NATO official campaign in the news, it is in this type of discourse that the divergent standpoints and political alternatives were expressed. The distribution of opinions and standpoints in this category is much larger than in the news account group. (See data below in Table 1.)

According to the findings of the discourse analysis, the following two hypotheses can be formulated:

1. In the news account type of public discourse the topic of joining NATO appears as a fact, as evidence. This type of discourse is more focused on international political and diplomatic aspects and on concrete details of the issue (e.g.: when do we join, what language will be spoken, who will command the troops, how will the Hungarian army fit into NATO structures, etc.). The process is shown as a series of events, which unstopably and steadily comes closer to its goal. The actors in these events are all high-rank-

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<sup>13</sup> Letters to the editor were also part of the corpus. They are short contributions, comporting the speaker's signature. The authors are sometimes publicly known persons, but more often unknown, non-public persons. Some of the authors are professionals in the sense that they are public or military officials but most of them are just laypersons. (See data below.)

- ing politicians, diplomats or military officials. It is only in the period immediately preceding the referendum, when heavy pro-NATO propaganda appears, that the idea that the process could, but should not be, stopped appears. In contrast, in the opinion type of discourse the whole topic appears polemically, in a more pluralistic choreography.
2. In the debate on NATO alliance, the decisive character of the question (in the form of a yes / no-question: whether or not to join NATO) constituted a strong constraint on the participants. This way of putting the question induced a dichotomy in the distribution of the possible answers, and relatively homogenized standpoints around the yes and no positions. The analysis shows that the distribution of supporting and rejecting viewpoints among the different groups of public speakers is not random, but follows a certain logical pattern. Members of the political and governing elite are on the pro-NATO side, while peripheral actors of the political life, representatives of non-parliamentary parties, certain civil organizations and many private people (authors of letters to the editor) representing certain layers of the population are more often against Hungary's NATO alliance.

*The distribution of news accounts / opinion discourse within the newspapers*

The whole NATO-topic has a mosaic-like character in the printed press. Articles are scattered along thematically differentiated pages in the newspapers we analyzed. There is a characteristic difference between the place and position of news accounts and opinion articles in the inner structure of the newspapers examined. In the daily papers pages 1 to 3 contain articles with diplomatic topic constructions (joint army exercises, visits, talks, international negotiations, press conferences, etc.). Page 4 and subsequent pages are devoted to political news on domestic political topics (e.g. parliamentary debates, party gatherings and conferences on concrete topics, events organized by other institutions of domestic politics, etc.) As a general rule, it can be observed that more important, political institutional events are on the front page, but negative news (e.g. about military conflicts) are always set separately. Problems like accidents, etc. are again set apart, and generally appear toward the back of the paper.

Opinion articles, debates, interviews, and background analyses are put in the middle pages of the newspapers, on special pages called "Opinion", "Debate", etc.

We should mention here that in the electronic media, as well, these different types of discourse are also separated. In most media, as in newscasts or other news programs, political, diplomatic, and institutional news are separated from conflicts. Opinions are expressed in short, directly or indirectly quoted phases, generally after the part consecrated for political and diplomatic events and negotiations. Debates, and other longer discourse permitting the expression of viewpoints and argumentation (such as round-tables, debates), are always broadcast in separate programs.

In our corpus there were some cases of negative news concerning NATO. They were always separated from the topic of the NATO-alliance, diplomatic events, negotiations and military accounts. Most of these articles were put on later pages of the newspapers and figured among other "faits divers". This made it possible for the pro-NATO propaganda to separate news with negative connotations from the topic of joining NATO. Such 'negative' articles include reporting on: the accident with the ski-lift in Italy, caused by a NATO plane; problems with the NATO base at Tászár in Hungary, where NATO engines caused damage to roads and houses, and where American soldiers reportedly sexually abused Hungarian kitchen workers. News concerning failures of peace making in Bosnia were also set apart in separate articles.

The separation of news accounts from opinion articles, results in the desired effect that attention can be diverted from the more touchy aspects of the debate. In this way NATO can be introduced as a successful institution, and thus problems as well as debating opinion-articles do not interfere with the positive construction.

TABLE 1: *Distribution of news and opinion articles and their value assignments in 3 national daily newspapers between the 1<sup>st</sup> September and 15<sup>th</sup> November, 1997*

1997	NEWS, REPORTS. ACCOUNTS			INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS (ARTICLES, INTERVIEWS, CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEBATE)											
				POLITICIANS			MILITARY, POLITICAL EXPERTS			INTELLECTUALS			LAYMEN		
				+	+/-	-	+	+/-	-	+	+/-	-	+	+/-	-
Sept.	26	7	1	4			2		1		1		1		4
Oct.	44	50	3	10			7	1		5		2		1	
Nov.	33	35	2	11			5		1	3		3			
Total	103	92	6	25	0	0	13	1	2	8	1	5	1	1	4
N = 263				ARTICLES AND INTERVIEWS OF POLITICIANS: 25			MILITARY, POLITICAL EXPERTS: 17			OTHER INTELLECTUALS: 14			LAYMEN: 6		
	TOTAL NUMBER OF NEWS, ACCOUNTS: 201			TOTAL NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS: 62											

The table above shows that during the two and a half months before the referendum, the number of newspaper articles dealing with NATO entry was rather high. Table 1 also demonstrates that news and accounts were far more frequently published than opinion articles (201 items in the first group against 62 items in the second group.). This fact justifies our initial remark about the existence of a massive campaign before the referendum.

The value distribution of the articles as shown in Table 1, further justifies the starting claim, namely that the campaign was orchestrated by official sources to express an official point of view, to mobilize people for the referendum, and to strengthen existing pro-NATO public opinion. Table 1 classifies each article in one of three categories according to their value assignments. The + and the - groups contain articles, which clearly treat the topic of the NATO alliance in a positive or negative way, respectively. Articles were put into the + group only if they contained facts and opinions strengthening the pro-Nato attitude. In the - category, only articles expressly against NATO entry were taken into consideration. The +/- groups include articles in which both positive and negative facts, opinions and value assignments appear. These articles are assumed to present a plurality of opinions, although, in most of the cases, they are positive articles which merely mention some contradicting arguments or opinions. In other cases, there is a certain attempt to present pro- and anti-NATO arguments in a balanced way. But even in these latter cases, the importance of the speakers (or the actors) of the two opinions are very different.

In a sum total of the different value assignments in the whole corpus, we get the following distribution among positive, neutral or bipolar (positive and negative: +/-) and negative groups: 151 : 95 : 17. We should note that a great number of articles in the category of "neutral" or "bipolar" is prevalently in favor of NATO membership. They do present negative facts and/or opinions also but, generally, in a subordinated form, in much shorter space. As the figures presented above clearly show, negative facts and opinions were granted much less attention in newspapers in the period analyzed. Among 201 news-type articles only 6 are clearly negative, and out of 62 opinion discourses, 11 are negative. The rate of negative articles in the two above mentioned groups justifies our earlier observation that negative views had a much lesser chance of appearing in official, institutional discourse than in individual opinion discourse. But their chance of occurrence is rather weak in both types of discourse.

Among news account articles, positive value assignments are rather high: 103 out of 201 of these articles are clearly part of the official pro-Nato campaign. They treat Hungary's NATO alliance as an ineluctable event, as an evident fact. They describe a process without alternatives, where the acts of both the Hungarian government and NATO authorities irreversibly take the country in the same direction: NATO admission. They suggest there are no real alternatives, contradicting facts or opinions.

*"Hungary approached its NATO entry with one more step yesterday, when András Simonyi handed his letter of mission to Javier Solana, secretary general, in the presence of the sixteen member states."<sup>14</sup>*

14 In: Diplomáciai kapcsolat az atlanti szervezettel (Diplomatic relationships with the Atlantic organization). *Magyar Hírlap*, 9. 10. 1997, 1.

In these pro-NATO accounts (which can also be called mainstream texts, because they are most numerous in the debate), no doubts or fears are expressed. As there seem to be no alternatives, the only fear is that time is passing, so mainstream discourses often speak about the need to accelerate the process. Many of these articles deal with diplomatic events, the actors of which are people with high ranks and titles. The accounts present such events as being extremely serious and significant, blessed with high authority. Consensus is shown on the international level and also on the level of parties in the Hungarian Parliament. It is in these articles that Hungary appears as the "good student" eager to gain recognition from those "above". (See later)

Negative opinions are rarely expressed in the newspapers as can be seen from the figures cited above in Table 1. It seems as if doubting intellectuals and public speakers had become uncertain and reluctant about public appearance and discussion. The pro-NATO consensus was so strong among political forces that it appears to have become difficult to express doubts and uncertainty. Moreover, only marginal political forces expressed their negative opinion about joining NATO, and thus, expressing a more skeptical stand would have classified doubters as joining marginal forces, or as sympathizers with certain extremist groups. In other words, the expression of a negative opinion in a largely pro-NATO discursive field necessitated a high investment and the acceptance of a loss of prestige.

It is interesting to note that in the news account category of articles, bipolar articles are also represented in a rather high number. In other words, there is a high number of articles which contain both positive and negative statements, value assignments, connotations, even if the positive arguments in these articles are disproportionately much longer than the contra arguments. While in the mainstream positive accounts (in the above mentioned 103 cases), the whole situation is highly idealized, and the actors are shown as very positive, idealized figures, the main characteristic trait of the bipolar articles is that they cease to show the issue in such an idealized form. These articles do give information about the fact that the whole topic can be seen and treated from different points of view. They introduce contradictory facts, describe contradicting opinions and, on the whole, present the topic in a more differentiated manner.

The following table examines the topic constructions of the 92 neutral-bipolar articles of the news group with reference to their interior topic-construction:

TABLE 2: *Distribution of sub-topics of neutral-bipolar news-type articles*

	Debate on referendum	Propaganda, information	Debates abroad	Results of opinion polls	Real debate on joining NATO	Neutral news accounts	Documents, chronology
Sept.	2	1	4	0	0	0	0
Oct.	33	2	16	2	3	3	0
Nov.	0	1	5	2	11	2	5
Tot. 92	35	4	25	4	14	5	5

In Table 2, the groups “news accounts” and “documents” contain truly neutral articles — articles dealing with either completely neutral facts, or with the chronology of NATO accession, without any value assignment. All the other groups contain articles in which political alternatives, differing opinions, and positive and negative facts are related. These articles provide a public image about the divergent distribution of standpoints about NATO entrance. The largest group here deals with a meta-question — the quarrel about the referendum. Indeed, there was a long debate among parties and political forces about whether the problem should be decided through referendum, and what questions should be put at the referendum. The main question of debate on the referendum, however, was not the NATO alliance but the questions inquiring about the ownership of land, which finally were not asked at the referendum. The heated debate on this issue was the reason for the high number of articles (35) inside this group.

The second group (propaganda) treats the topic of whether the government informed the population in a democratic way, or if they pour one-sided propaganda at the public. It also includes pieces on how the funds for promoting information have been used. This question gets very little public space in the debate (4 articles) while the topic of foreign debates about NATO-enlargement are largely represented<sup>15</sup> (25 articles).

Four articles deal with opinion polls during the 11 weeks that were analyzed. Although these articles depict a plurality of opinions, they also showed that the referendum would be positive about an alliance.

The 14 articles which relate the existence of real debates about joining NATO, give accounts of conferences, debates, press conferences, demonstrations, etc. concerning the NATO alliance, and organized by political parties, research institutions or NGOs.

Among the opinion articles, even if negative opinion articles are less numerous than positive ones, we should mention the fact that most positive opinion articles written by experts and intellectuals are based on rather strong positive standpoints. These are, in most cases, strongly held opinions. But most of these speakers often quote opposing

15 E.g. Will the Senate in Washington ratify the admission?, etc.

opinions, as well, and in this way, positive opinion discourse introduces, to some extent, negative opinions, their topic constructions, their argumentation, etc. Opinion articles give a more appropriate, or less distorted image of the whole public debate than news accounts because they more clearly present the pluralistic character of the topic.

In Table 1, above, opinion articles are classified according to certain categories of speakers. It is important to note that politicians as well as military and political experts are highly over-represented in the corpus: 25 and 17 out of 62, respectively. The figures in Table 1 make it clear that in most cases these speakers express pro-NATO opinions. Among 42 speakers of the two above-mentioned categories, 39 are pro-NATO, one is neutral and only 2 have negative opinions. The scores are somewhat different in the two other groups: intellectuals and laymen are more likely to express anti-NATO standpoints, and negative opinions: 5 out of 14 and 4 out of 6, respectively. The speaker's high institutional position or rank in the hierarchy is inversely proportional to a negative opinion about joining NATO.

### NATO-entrance: topic constructions and topic connections, characteristic narrative structures

In our research, we differentiate between two related terms. The term *topic construction* is defined to indicate the inner structural construction of a given topic, its structure of related sub-topics. The term *topic-connection* or *topic-link* is defined as discursively elaborated allusions, relationships, bridges, links worked out to build up relationships between different topics, or to create discursive relationships between them. This signifies the construction of symbolic passages in order to relate the given topic to other topics. This, consequently, has an influence on the claim of the given speaker for the definition of the main topic, the *theme* of the discourse.<sup>16</sup>

The most important topic-connection according to the analysis done on our corpus is the relationship that is constructed between the topic of Hungary's NATO alliance and the topic of Hungary's will to join the EU. One of our starting expectations was the assumption that, for several groups, the main topic-connection will be constructed between joining NATO and the topics of national identity and neutrality. This connection, however, proved to be much weaker than expected.

Our analysis shows that there are several competing topic constructions dealing with NATO entry. The question is most often treated as a pragmatic one, based on a calculation of advantages and disadvantages, necessary investments and expected benefits. The

16 E.g.: During the period of the restricted public sphere, the topic of demography was used by certain public speakers, namely populist writers, to construct relationships to the taboo-struck topic of national identity. (See Heller, Némedi & Rényi: 1990 b,c, 1991, 1994, 1995)

topic is less often tackled from the point of view of abstract values and ideological alternatives. These latter topic constructions mainly appear in opinion articles. There are also differences among topic constructions concerning their inner thematic contents: different speakers build up the topic in terms of one or several of the possible sub-topics. The issue is most often treated: as a political topic constituted by sub-topics such as international negotiations, diplomatic events, etc.; or as a security topic, involving problems of a geopolitical context; or as an economic topic, with sub-topics concerning costs and efficiency; and finally, more rarely, as a military topic, involving sub-topics like the modernization of the Hungarian army and often related in this sense with the latter sub-topic (costs of modernization of the army).

In addition to typical topic connections and constructions, characteristic narrative structures or scenarios are also to be found in the NATO-debate. Many of these occur in the pro-NATO discourse, both in news accounts and in opinion articles. This is not only because pro-NATO discourse is more frequent in the Hungarian public sphere before the referendum than anti-NATO discourse, due to the massive and well organized official pro-NATO campaign, but also arises out of structural happenstance. The theme of the NATO-alliance was elaborated by the pro-NATO side, while the anti-NATO discourse was left the discursive role of deconstructing and delegitimizing the discursive constructions offered and claimed by pro-NATO speakers. This contextual condition lies behind the fact that the NATO-debate contains several positive, optimistic discursive constructions in pro-NATO texts, while the anti-NATO discourse can better be characterized by pessimistic views and a negative mode of speech, involving such speech strategies as attack, questioning and rejecting. Most anti-NATO discursive constructions are subordinated to pro-NATO constructions by the fact that they are condemned to borrow and use their themes, arguments and values from the pro-Nato discourse, with the difference that the anti-NATO speakers present them in a negative light. The whole debate is marked by pro-NATO topic construction, the frames of the theme are defined by the pro-NATO side, and the anti-NATO side depends on the so-defined constructions, being confined in discursive attempts at deconstructing adversaries' topic constructions and arguments. The topic construction of the pro-NATO side is so strong, constituting a kind of mainstream legitimated discourse, that it restrains the discursive possibilities of the opposing speakers and sets limits to their discursive achievements<sup>17</sup>. In the written press, anti-NATO opinions and topic constructions had less possibility to appear, while the active participation of anti-NATO speakers in debates organized in the electronic media gave more occasion to elaborate anti-NATO argumentation.<sup>18</sup>

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17 See the concept of "*Definitionsmacht*" in the analysis of world market discourse by Narr & Schubert 1994. Mentioned in Kargl, Liebhart & Sondermann 1997.

18 See our analysis on a TV-debate, in this volume, 305–340.

As we have already pointed out in the analysis of former debates<sup>19</sup>, there are characteristically divergent topic-connections in different speech modes: discourses made by politicians, intellectuals, experts, professional journalists and laymen (e.g. readers' letters) greatly differ in the width of topic-connections. Experts tend to use the narrowest topic connections, denuding the core of the topic from all kinds of adjacent problems, but attempting to give more complex causal explanations while politicians and intellectuals (e.g. writers) generally use deliberately larger topic-connections. Laymen stand on the extreme end of the scale, employing loose and broad topic connections, elaborating loosely connected links among diverse topics, sometimes just juxtaposing them but without attempting to elaborate well-argued causal or functional explanations. In the actual debate on NATO-entrance, the broadest topic-connections are also to be found in letters to the editor.

As example of such broad topic-connections:

*"It is easy to imagine what consequences in [rejecting NATO-membership] would have on our everyday life. With decreasing GDP it would be hard to finance pensions, to sustain the level of subsidies in the health care, in the educational system, in the public security and in agriculture, and one could not even think of raising these subsidies. It would be impossible to preserve the standard of living, let alone increase it! The value of the land as well as of the kettle would decrease," etc. ...*<sup>20</sup>

### NATO's image

NATO's image, as given in the texts, is in strong relationship with how different speakers see the relationship between NATO and Hungary. According to the speakers' viewpoint on the question of NATO membership, their representation of NATO as an organization based on values and/or based on interests differs greatly.

Only some of the pro-NATO speakers see NATO primarily as a value-based alliance, where universalistic values like democracy, progress, peace, etc. prevail. Most other speakers whether pro-NATO or anti, see the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as an interest-based alliance, although they strongly differ according to the kind of interests they attribute to it. Depending on their viewpoints, speakers see differently in both of the following points: NATO's intentions with regards expansion, and Hungary's motivations for alliance (which also define the country's relationship with the organization).

19 M. Heller, D. Némédi & A. Rényi: 1990c, 1995

20 P. Zwack: Nincs pótvizsga NATO-ügyben (There is no make-up exam in NATO-affairs), *Népszava*, 8. 11. 1997.

In mainstream pro-NATO discourses, especially news accounts, NATO is represented by high-ranking officials and internationally famous personalities. NATO appears as a highly active organization and most of the activities characterizing it, have large-scale international significance, such as summits, negotiations, diplomatic events, peace-talks, meetings. Newspapers often illustrate these events with highly official pictures like hand-shaking diplomats, huge negotiation tables, international flags or military reviews attended by luminaries. In some texts, military exercises or military capacity is also tackled, giving details of new technological development and arms precision. These discourses are often illustrated with pictures of high-tech equipment, most often aeroplanes. Such pro-NATO discourses clearly try to demonstrate NATO's great international prestige. Two other ideas are also associated with this topic construction — the idea that Hungarian politicians and diplomats as well as Hungarian army officials are successfully able to negotiate with NATO officials, and that the Hungarian army will rather easily fit into this modern and technologically precise army.

#### *NATO as a value-based organization*

This construction is only typical of some of the pro-NATO viewpoints. According to this construction, NATO is a just and democratic institution, a part of the "Western" establishment, that is, part of the civilization we aim for, or we belong to. Discourses treating the democratic qualities, the consensus seeking decision-making processes within NATO, the decrease of its military character and the peace-keeping role given to NATO by the UN are all meant to support NATO's qualification as a value-community. Thus those who talk about the weakening of the military character of NATO are also inclined to ascribe a political civilizatory role to NATO.

*"NATO tries to assure peace, security, stability, economic development and welfare in Europe."<sup>21</sup>*

#### *NATO as an interest-based organization*

NATO is not mentioned frequently as a value-based organization in the discourse analyzed, although in many pro-NATO discourses, some allusions of this kind appear. It seems to have been much more common to depict NATO as an interest-based organization. There are, however, two different positions concerning the interests NATO is supposed to be willing to observe. Pro-NATO speakers, while admitting that NATO follows its own interests and acts accordingly, do not suppose that NATO only observes its (or

<sup>21</sup> N. B. Kehoe, in: A miniszterelnök szerint a NATO garantálja hazánk biztonságát (According to the Prime Minister, NATO guarantees our country's security), *Népszabadság*, 10. 11. 1997, 4.

its members') selfish interests. In these discourses, NATO's interior interests do not contradict our own interests, or those in the region. A strong characteristic trait of such discourses is to see a community of interests between NATO members and candidates for membership. Common interests (for security, development, etc.) are referred to in order to explain the act of candidature of Central and Eastern European countries and also underline NATO's willingness to negotiate the admission of these countries. Positive NATO discourses thus reinforce the idea of community between Eastern and Western Europe, and depict a basically homogenous European landscape with compatible aims and interests.

Anti-NATO discourses, however, do not assume common interests between NATO and Hungary.

A scenario of denunciation is generally characteristic of anti-NATO discourses.<sup>22</sup> According to this logic, when applying Boltanski's four-fold model, one can easily identify the different discursive roles. The role of the Victim in the denunciation is played by Hungary, by "us". The Denouncer, the person who exposes the persecutor, is the speaker himself; and the role of the Persecutor is usually played by NATO. The Denouncer turns to the public as to an arbitrator or to a Judge.

In these discourses NATO is represented as an alien, interest-based organization, whose interests are antagonistic to "our" interests. It is an institution that wants to use and exploit "us" for its own selfish goals. Thus NATO is an interest-based organization, but observing only its own interests. NATO is the organization of others serving their own particular purposes that are disadvantageous for us. The interests represented by NATO are "dirty interests", either because they are financial ones, or because they are attached to the arms trade.

*"We are talking about a mean business here. We have to buy arms from them". "The interest of NATO is the expansion of the arms-market." "It is all about interests connected with the selling of arms."<sup>23</sup>*

## NATO and EU

Because of the scarcity of previous public consideration of alternatives for future development for the Hungarian defense system, and because this topic has a somewhat ambiguous evaluation in public opinion, the main topic connection that characterized mainstream discourse concerning the topic of NATO-alliance was its relatedness with the

<sup>22</sup> Luc Boltanski 1990.

<sup>23</sup> István Csurka, Tamás Csapody & Attila Vajna, In: Címlopsztori, Msat, 20. 06. 1997.

topic of Hungary's planned and widely expected entry into the EU. This topic has a fairly more positive reception in Hungarian public opinion and constitutes one of the main public concerns. Official discourse, the very campaign for NATO-alliance strongly cultivated the topic-connection between NATO and the EU. Numerous examples were found in "news account" discourse:

a) In public discourse produced by high officials (e.g. László Kovács, Foreign Secretary at the time of the debate, or diplomats, government spokesmen, etc.), EU and NATO seem to be deliberately confounded, both if the officials are quoted in news accounts or if they personally express themselves in the opinion-type of discourse. In their public discourse, the European Union and NATO appear as the subjects of consecutive sentences, and are often used as if they were synonyms.

*"The Hungarian Foreign secretary asked for the contribution of his homologue to assure that the process of ratification of the admission of new NATO-members could rapidly be accomplished also in the Italian Parliament. Concerning the entry in the European Union, Kovács said: 'It is important for Hungary that the elaboration of the inner reforms of the Union should not delay the process of enlargement, and that the process of negotiations could continue in a differential way, depending on the level of readiness of each candidate for membership. In the meanwhile, Hungary is working to assure that no dividing lines should be formed in the region in consequence of NATO enlargement.'"*<sup>24</sup>

*"NATO-membership is part of Hungary's Euro-Atlantic integration, it cannot be separated from the integration to the European Union. Membership in these organizations signifies the most important international guarantee of the country's security, stability and social development. [...] In numerous countries around the world, the great investors that I have met (in Japan or most recently in Houston) asserted that for them, Hungary's NATO-membership constitutes the most important guarantee for the security of their investments."*<sup>25</sup>

*"The referendum on joining NATO will be an important message for the West — said Lamberto Dini, Italian Foreign secretary during his negotiations in Budapest on Wednesday. The politician also gave assurances that Italy backs Hungary's entry into the European Union."*<sup>26</sup>

b) In other discursive acts, where the two institutions are not intertwined in their presentation, joining NATO is still presented as an initial phase in a well planned series of actions: it is often presented as the first step in joining the EU, or sometimes more gener-

<sup>24</sup> NME: Dini az igent sürgette (Dini urged for 'yes'), *Magyar Hírlap*, 13. 11. 1997, 2.

<sup>25</sup> Interview with L. Kovács. In: Nagy Mélykúti Edit: A jövőre gondolva kell politizálni (We have to do politics while thinking to the future), *Magyar Hírlap*, 12. 11. 1997, 11.

<sup>26</sup> Dini Budapesten (Dini in Budapest), *Népszava*, 13. 11. 1997, 1.

ally as Hungary's "return to the West". From the analysis of all the different rhetoric elaborations, it becomes clear that a very strong relationship is constructed between NATO and the EU, between Hungary's entrance to the one and the other.

The linking of the two institutions is well-balanced when the two organizations receive equal stress. This construction was also often found in official statements from diplomats:

*"The Euro-Atlantic Community is built on two pillars. Its military pillar dealing with defense policy is NATO, its economic pillar is the EU. The enlargement of the two organisations is in strong consonance with each other and the joining of the individual countries can only move ahead in a parallel way."*<sup>27</sup>

This balance is sometimes overturned in certain pro-NATO discourses. NATO-entrance here is shown as something which is not an end in itself (military aim, defense policy) but serves more as an instrument for Hungary to get into the European Union, (which is often meant as a synonym for the circle of the democratic, constitutional states). In such texts, NATO is shown as less important for Hungary than the European Union, itself.

*"Nádas reminds us: According to Sir Dabrendorf [...] the Eastern expansion of NATO is only "the second best solution". The first would be joining the European Union, even if the EU is a "disaster" and it will stay so because it still has not told the truth to Eastern Europeans about the future of their joining the organization. That is exactly why we should, in the meantime, do everything in our possibility for the defense of the democratic future of the Eastern European countries and in the interest of this goal we have no other possibility than the Eastern expansion of NATO."*<sup>28</sup>

The same topic-connection appears both in news accounts and in opinion articles, as well. NATO in these texts is described as the antechamber, the precondition of EU-admission. This construction is strongly present in pro-government opinion-discourses.

*"The way Central-Europeans take a stand for NATO-membership is not motivated by the lack of a feeling of military security, for them NATO membership has symbolic meaning. Admission for them is a political act, which symbolizes their belonging to the Euro-Atlantic community. Primarily, they want to become full members of the European Union and they firmly believe that the European Union and NATO are closely related and that the only effective organization for security is NATO."*<sup>29</sup>

<sup>27</sup> László Kovács, in: A semlegesség háromszor annyiba kerülne (Neutrality would cost three times as much), *Népszabadság*, 13. 11. 1997, 1–3.

<sup>28</sup> In: F. Gy: Magyarország a NATO-ba való (Hungary is fit for Nato), *Magyar Hírlap*, 2. 10. 1997.

<sup>29</sup> A. Balogh: Kelet-Közép Európa és a NATO bővítés (East-Central Europe and Nato-expansion), *Magyar Hírlap*, 25. 10. 1997, 18.

Most of the speakers arguing for NATO-alliance, link the topics of joining the two organizations. The tactic of this two-for-one sale suggests that if we want to integrate into the Western world, the integration into the military-defense system is also a necessity.

*"There is a logical connection between participating in the EU and in NATO. The European Union considers the Western European Union (WEU) its own defense component. But at the same time not long ago WEU became the European pillar of NATO [...] The defense policy of the two organizations will probably merge, become one in the historically not so distant future."*<sup>30</sup>

Speakers against joining NATO try to systematically separate the question of the NATO-alliance from the question of entering the EU. Entry to the EU, a topic that has not yet been the object of a real and detailed debate in Hungary, however, is seen more positively in public opinion than NATO, for several reasons. Hungarians, in general, prefer to think of themselves as belonging to the West than to the East or the Balkans. The Balkans in particular is considered to be a very negative symbol throughout Hungarian society.

*"... at the referendum it should be demonstrated that the country is resolutely heading to the West. Those who vote against or those who do not bother to go to vote are voting for the East.»"*<sup>31</sup>

For Hungary's Western affiliation, historical ties, cultural and religious arguments are often advanced. The Western way of life and standard of living also holds strong appeal to the public<sup>32</sup>. Because of these differences in evaluation, it is important for anti-NATO speakers to try to deconstruct the link between NATO and the EU. At the moment of the debate, before the referendum, their main concern was the detachment of the two institutions. To date there has not been any negative campaign against the EU, their target exclusively remained NATO.

*"NATO [...] is a diehard military organization, while the European Union serves the reinforcement of economic collaboration and the development of civilian relationships. The two alliances are not the same and it is not true that one follows from the other"*<sup>33</sup>.

30 M. Dérer: Nato: miért igen (Nato: why yes), *Magyar Hírlap*, 13. 11. 1997, 7.

31 P. Zwack, in: A NATO-tagság nem lehet pártügy (NATO-membership cannot be a party affair), *Népszabadság*, 2. 10. 1997.

32 Public opinion about EU is changing, though. At the time of the debate, public opinion was more positive about EU than it is in 2000, at the moment we are writing this. In the same way, public opinion about NATO also radically changed as a consequence of the Kosovo crisis and NATO bombing of Serbia.

33 T. Csapody: A NATO nélkül is jogállam maradnánk (We would remain a state under the rule of law even without NATO), *Népszabadság*, 13. 11. 1997, 1–3.

*"Why should we start with the dangerous and expensive NATO, while the date of our admission to EU — the only one of which we can hope for some advantages — glides always further away."*<sup>34</sup>

A strategic means to detach NATO and the EU is to stress the American character or a presumed American dominance inside NATO. Nearly all anti-NATO speakers stress American leadership, or speak of an imbalance in favor of American influence inside NATO.

*"Hungary's admission to NATO is mainly backed by the American administration. [...] the main reason for this is to strengthen the weakening position of the United States inside NATO against those who would like to give a European character to the defense of the continent."*<sup>35</sup>

### Hungary's discursive images

In the discourse of the different speakers, rather diverse images of Hungary appear. Speakers construct a symbolic image of the country according to their political and ideological standpoint using a wide range of linguistic devices, which are appropriate with respect to their discursive strategies. In the construction of the image of Hungary, various sub-topics are elaborated, with the help of which the general image of the country and consequently of the emanating "we" category is worked out.

There are two contradictory "we" images that emerge from the debate, and most standpoints crystallize around these two categories. The traditional, continuous or "old we"<sup>36</sup> involves an intentionally secluded, isolated Hungarian identity, different from all other possible identities. The old "we" image is based on traditional values that are considered to be typically Hungarian. The category is strongly built on the country's presumed own interests, which may justify integration to the West in the case of certain speakers, but may, as well, lead to more resolute isolation and segregation in the case of others. Whenever the conclusion of this type of "we" discourse is favorable to integration, it is always justified by particular Hungarian interests in contrast to broader or universal principles. It is an old "we" category also in the sense that it is based on historical arguments, on symbols of the past and of national identity. It emphasizes discreteness, difference, disjunction, although the concrete arguments and linguistic means differ among different speakers and viewpoints.

34 M. Hódos (engineer), in: *Népszabadság*, 12. 09. 1997. (letter to the editor)

35 L. Borhi: NATO: miért nem (Nato: why no), *Magyar Hírlap*, 13. 11. 1997, 7.

36 Here we differentiate between two distinct categories of identity on the basis of the definition made by Ruth Wodak and her team describing the use of the category of "we", See Wodak, R. et al. 1998.

In opposition to the "old we" category, there are discourses which elaborate a "NEW WE<sup>37</sup>" notion. It is characterized by a more universalist discursive mode, and on universal principles, built on open, inclusive categories and values. The "new we" notion constitutes a common participatory category, in which we, "new Europeans" are full time members. Hungary's membership in Europe is based on a common past and culture, and it is presented as a perennial quality. Events of common history, as well as common cultural heritage and values are referred to with predilection. Arguments of interest also find their place in this construction. The discursive mode of this kind of "we" construction is concessive and universalist. Most viewpoints built on this type of new "we" are for integration with the West but some speakers build an anti-NATO conclusion on this base referring to larger solidarity (i.e. with the Balkan region or East European or even non-European countries).

#### *Hungary as a macro-subject*

One of the characteristic features of pro-NATO discourse (both in the *news account* and the *opinion type* of discourse) is the frequent appearance of the construction of Hungary as a macro-subject. In these articles, (where often politicians from the government's side and high ranking actors speak or are quoted), Hungary's NATO-entrance is thematized as the collective wish of a macro subject. The wish to join NATO is shown as preponderant if not unanimous. Thus the problem of choice, the problem of the underlying decision is not thematized as a political question, having several alternatives, it is presented as uniquely evident. The acting subject is either the government, (backed in this endeavor by all parliamentary parties) or Hungary, a macro-subject with its own undivided will. The "government" and "Hungary" are often in the same syntactic positions, showing their interchangeable character. Unity of will is constructed through the following chain of arguments: Hungary is united in wanting the alliance, because all political parties agree on the question, and public opinion supports it (= unity). Moreover, in a great number of discourses, the statement that foreign political and economic forces also agree on and urge Hungary's NATO entrance is also emphasized. Since this construction is overwhelmingly present in news account type pro-NATO discourse, it also means that at the time of the debate it was nearly impossible to legitimately question it. In these articles controversial opinions are either not present at all, or only appear in an already disapproved, delegitimized form.

In the period of the debate before the referendum, the two issues, the broader topic of NATO-alliance and the narrower sub-topic, the referendum, are strongly connected in

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37 See the way this category is elaborated in: Kargl, Liebhart & Sondermann, 1997. But as a difference, in the Hungarian NATO discourses the category of "new we" is not meant in an ironical way.

public discourse. The referendum is presented as a last threshold that has to be surmounted for membership, and the strong connection between the two shows that in spite of the heavy campaign, the pro-NATO side still thought that the outcome of the referendum was somewhat unpredictable. Pro-NATO speakers and actors in the debate kept up an optimistic tone, they evoked the sunny side of the alliance. They expressed their strong conviction that the referendum will be positive and valid and that NATO countries will quickly ratify the admission of the new members. The discourse of the pro-NATO speakers in general is full of positive categories. Optimistic views characterize their construction of sub-topics, e.g. army modernization will be cheaper, Hungary will have more effective defense, and the country's security will be guaranteed. These positive expectations can best be summarized by such oft-used statements: *"At last we shall stand on the right side"*,<sup>38</sup>

There is, however, another strategy, which appears less often. As the pro-Nato side was not totally convinced before the referendum that it would be positive and valid, in some discourses a strategy of threat is used stating that a negative or void referendum will give the country a bad image in the West. Such a result is described as totally illogical, contradicting the long efforts made by the whole country, the government, the diplomatic institutions, etc. for the sake of integration. This discursive strategy constitutes a kind of coercion, a moral and cognitive obligation for a positive referendum.

#### *The image of Hungary in different discursive scenarios*

Our analysis of the debate in newspapers highlighted the existence of several special discursive scenarios. These enabled public speakers to strengthen the importance of joining NATO, the delicateness and precision of the decision-making process, and the inevitability of the result. Several typical identifiable scenarios were found in pro-Nato discourse, some of which appear quite often, especially in the discourse of politicians and experts. These scenarios construct frames of interpretation for the whole debate and, use traditional rhetoric topoi which all serve to direct the readers' interpretation. In the course of the analysis, different scenarios or narrative structures were separated although they often overlap in the discourses as well as in different speakers' strategies. Their role is to represent the decision as evident, unquestionable and to ensure positive answers at the referendum.

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38 The heavy significance of such statements is closely connected to wide-spread feelings and attitudes of the Hungarian population concerning age-long defeats and national afflictions, a feeling of exclusion from European development, etc. Such feelings of inferiority are part of the Hungarian national identity, where they often find their place in a peculiar mixture of negative and positive feelings and attitudes, mixing with national pride and feelings of superiority. The regime change and the integration of the country into various European institutions signifies for many Hungarians the end of long centuries of ill fate and exclusion.

a) One of the most frequent pro-NATO narrative constructions is one (that we called "the good student" narrative), which uses as an analogy a class, with a traditional competition among the students. According to this narrative, several Central and Eastern European countries are in competition for acknowledgement from the West. Among all competitors, Hungary is presented as the best, complying with all the requirements. In many of these texts, Hungary is personalized as "the eminent student", who is able to fulfill all the conditions set by the severe examiners, and who acts like an over-zealous student, an eager-beaver, as he tries to anticipate the requirements and toadily agrees to all new conditions.

The "good student" model is expressed in two different ways. Not only Hungarian speakers treat the country as a student passing a test or an exam, but foreign speakers, e.g. NATO officials also use the same construction when evaluating Hungary's achievements, praising or scolding the country for concrete actions or results. This scenario constructs a meritocratic frame, where achievements and actions count and the actors are continually evaluated according to their achievements. A strong asymmetry can clearly be felt in this scenario among the "students" and the "examiners". As will be shown, in most of the available scenarios there is a strongly asymmetric position between those "inside" and those "outside". All these scenarios depict a paternalistic relationship between the "small" and the "great", the "candidates" and the "judges".

*"Successive governments, the population and our diplomacy have been put to heavy trial by co-operation with the Atlantic organization, and success at the various exams always took the country one step closer to NATO."*

*"This is not an exam where one can fail and then repeat it at a second exam because nobody knows exactly when the second round will follow the first one"<sup>39</sup>*

An integral part of this scenario is the suggestion that relations of solidarity between the candidates are weakened and meritocratic criteria prevail. Achievements are more highly valued in these discourses than solidarity among participants in similar positions. Hungary as the best student defends her position compared to the other contestants. A very strong inequality structure is present in most of the discourses: highest in the hierarchy are NATO members; in second position are the three countries invited to join NATO in the first round; countries not chosen for the first round come next; and in the lowest position of all are the countries which have no chance of getting in, for the time being. But inequality is also supposed to exist among the three countries, among which Hungary is

39 L. Kovács, Foreign secretary in: *Ma startolnak a NATO-tárgyalások (NATO-negotiations start today)*, *Népszabadság*, 10. 09. 1997, 4.

said to be in the first place („the best student”). This is why several speakers urge NATO to admit each contesting country individually, according to their own pace and maturity.

*“ [...] Kovács said: it is important for Hungary [...] that the process of negotiations should proceed in a differentiated way, depending on the state of readiness of each candidate.”<sup>40</sup>*

b) Another narrative structure (not completely detachable from the former one) contains as its central topos a contest or a trial, where among all the different contestants “we” did well, stood the trial, and thus got the expected prize. The main strategic force of this narrative scenario („the contest scenario”) is that it sets the whole issue in a discursive pattern where it becomes nearly impossible to vote against the alliance at the referendum. The frame of a contest signifies that all those engaged in the race want to attain something, and this goal is by definition supposed to be something positive, or worth the effort. The contest is represented as a “clean” one, and the criteria set by the judges are just and legitimate. The referendum is presented as an act of ratification, where negative voting appears as irrational, because one cannot say ‘no’ when success attends one’s own previous efforts (the coercion pattern described above). The outcome of this narrative script is that through its use, the focus of the problem is shifted in public discourse: the question is not whether “we” want to join, but whether “they” want to admit us. As a proof of our qualities and a result of our efforts “they” do accept “us” at the end of the contest. The fact that we managed to comply with the requirements proves that Hungary is a reliable partner.

*“ Feelings and outward appearances do not weigh here. This is not a beauty contest, where external qualities count; what is important here is interior qualities, meeting the requirements; it is according to these criteria that NATO decided who to invite among the countries attempting to join.”- said Great Britain’s NATO ambassador.”<sup>41</sup>*

c) The former narrative structure is close to another one, a typical folk tale narrative: “we” (Hungary, the Hungarians) are in a (gentle, peaceful) race together with other candidates. There are trials, acts to accomplish, proofs to attain, and three of the contestants, (Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic) are chosen by the strict but just judges. There is, indeed, a strong resemblance with a typical narrative structure of Hungarian folk tales, where three boys try their fate, most often attempt to earn a king’s daughter and (half of) his kingdom. The first two fail because they do not make all of the necessary efforts but

<sup>40</sup> NME: Dini az igent sürgette (Dini urged for ‘yes’), *Magyar Hírlap*, 13. 11. 1997, 2.

<sup>41</sup> I. Klátyik: “A NATO-bővítés nem szépségverseny” (“NATO-enlargement is not a beauty-contest”), *Magyar Hírlap*, 22. 09. 1997.

the youngest son, the most intelligent, cunning and handsome, stands all the trials, performs all the necessary qualities and puts in all of the necessary efforts and thus earns all of the possible prizes: the kingdom, the daughter and the esteem of everybody. In the folk tale narrative of the NATO debate, the choice is made according to the countries' achievements, and Hungary, as the cunning youngest son, has met all the trials that were required from the contestants and thus, at the end gets the prize of the contest and is admitted to inherit the old king's kingdom and his daughter.

*"While Hungary has to stand more trials (referendum, ratification) in order to enter Nato..."*<sup>42</sup>

*"Hungary had to prove in the Partnership for Peace movement that it took entrance to NATO seriously,"* etc.<sup>43</sup>

*"An extremely positive image has been formed in Brussels after the first two rounds of negotiations between NATO and Hungary" - answered Javier Solana [...] to Hungarian journalists. [...] 'I am very pleased, even happy that after these two rounds of negotiations, Hungary once more proved its capacity and maturity'"*<sup>44</sup>

d) We often find in pro-NATO discourse, in relationship to the achievements, another well-known narrative construction: the comparison narrative, where Hungary is compared with her more or less immediate neighbors<sup>45</sup>. In the debate on NATO-entrance, this construction allows to boost "our" achievements in comparison with those who have not been chosen for membership, and for whom we will be the benign helper, once inside. Hungary appears in these scenarios as well, as a winning, more skillful and able participant than the other contestants.

*"London did not feel antipathy towards Romania for a minute. [...] Romania did a lot in the last years to comply with the requirements. If it continues, the result will be unquestionable." - Great Britain's NATO ambassador*<sup>46</sup>

42 Z. Gyévai: Kopogtatástól a kapunyitásig (From knocking until the opening of the gates), *Magyar Hírlap*, 12.11. 1997.

43 Z. Gyévai: Kopogtatástól a kapunyitásig (From knocking until the opening of the gates), *Magyar Hírlap*, 12.11. 1997.

44 Cs. Szerdahelyi: Magyarország bizonyította érettségét (Hungary proved her maturity), *Magyar Hírlap*, 25. 09. 1997, 1—3.

45 This construction was widely used as a discursive device for legitimization during the Kádár-period in Hungary. Comparisons between standards of living, political freedom, etc. were often used in political discourse as well as in jokes and political cabaret. This contributed to the widely held image of Hungary being "the most cheerful barrack in the camp".

46 I. Klátyik: "A NATO-bővítés nem szépségverseny" ("NATO-enlargement is not a beauty-contest"), *Magyar Hírlap*, 22. 09. 1997.

*"NATO's Madrid summit [...] did not invite the South-Eastern countries but did not slam the door in their face, and thus stimulates them to action."*<sup>47</sup>

e) In yet another narrative structure, Hungary is represented as a defenseless child that needs the protection of the strong "adults". In this scenario, expressions like "defense", "security", "stability", and "protection" prevail. Hungary is represented as a "small" actor as opposed to the other actors who are represented as strong, and resourceful. The small and weak seek the help, goodwill and protection of the great, as in a parent — child relationship. The weak in return are willing to comply with the requirements and demands made by the strong.

*"Gyula Horn pointed out that belonging to the defense organisation means security and protection."*<sup>48</sup>

*"Nicholas B. Kehoe, [...]. Deputy president of NATO's military committee stressed that NATO tries to assure peace, security, stability, economic development and welfare in Europe."*<sup>49</sup>

*Linguistic representation of the asymmetry between NATO-members  
and the candidates for membership*

All of the above mentioned scenarios share in their representation of Hungary as a small, defenseless actor, seeking the protection, help and good will of the great. This is why it accepts all the trials, examinations, and judgements of the powerful. In all these scenarios, the relationships among the countries and actors are hierarchical. Hungary is shown as preceding the other candidate states, but is in a subordinate position compared to NATO member-states. The asymmetric position of the country with respect to the West is well detectable in the linguistic means used in the discourses.

Very strong asymmetry can be found in the texts before the Madrid summit (8—9<sup>th</sup> July 1997) and after when, beyond the decision to admit the three Central European countries, NATO proceeds to the "audit" of the Hungarian army. At these moments, there is some anxiety to be felt in the official discourse, because the immediate future, (namely the decisions NATO is going to take about Hungary) is still uncertain. It is during these periods of uncertainty that the "good student" narrative construction is especially relied upon. It is as if certain discourse in the newspapers were directed to readers

47 F. Kepecs: Kimaradók a konferencián (The left-out countries at the conference), *Népszava*, 18. 10. 1997.

48 In: Vita a tagságról országszerte (Debates concerning membership, throughout the whole country), *Magyar Hírlap*, 10. 11. 1997.

49 In: A miniszterelnök szerint a NATO garantálja hazánk biztonságát (According to the Prime Minister, NATO guarantees our country's security), *Népszabadság*, 10. 11. 1997, 4.

from “there” from “outside”, as if they wanted to convince “them” and not just the Hungarian readers. In the period of the corpus under analysis the formerly most acute question („Are we going to be invited in the first round?”) is already decided: Hungary has already been chosen among the first three. Public discourse presents this as a great success of Hungarian politics and diplomacy.

*“Invitation into NATO is the success of 15 million Hungarians”*<sup>50</sup>

It follows from the hierarchical representation of the different countries that states and actors at different positions in the hierarchy are represented by different linguistic means. Expressions like: “asked for admission”, “comply with the requirements”, “is up to the standard”, is or isn’t “worthy of NATO membership”, “winning or meriting membership”, “being found suitable”, “is a strong and reliable candidate”, etc. suggest that the positions in the symbolic setting of NATO-enlargement are highly asymmetric. NATO-members are in a superior position, they are already members of the “elite club”, they are the ones who pass the judgement, while the applicants are in a subordinate position: they “ask for admittance”, “stand trials”, “prove their abilities”, “hold their ground”, and then “are judged”, “are weighed”, “are found worthy or unworthy”. The linguistic representation of this situation recalls the terminology of the different discursive scenarios described above. E.g. the student / teacher relationship (“stand one’s ground at exams”) („Good student” narrative), the folk-tale relation between the brave peasant boy, (the youngest son,) and the king setting the conditions for a contest to find the most meritorious son-in-law. (“Hungary will have to stand more trials”)<sup>51</sup> („Folk tale” narrative), etc.

If we disregard the hierarchy within NATO, (i.e. among member states from the US to Turkey), on the top of the hierarchy presented in the discourses we find the group of the NATO-members. The countries whose applications were accepted in the first round precede the ones who dropped out of the first round. The countries that have no chance at all to be accepted are in last place. Those who were left out of the enlargement or are “only partners in peace” often appear as third-rate states in the discourses.

*“During the talks, the Hungarian delegation became acquainted with documents that are still secret for the partners in peace”*<sup>52</sup>

50 Gy. Csóti, In: A miniszterelnök szerint a NATO garantálja hazánk biztonságát (According to the Prime Minister, NATO guarantees the security of our country), *Népszabadság*, 18. 07. 1997. It is worth noting that there are 10 million citizens in Hungary. 15 million is the estimated number of all Hungarians living inside and outside the territory of the nation-state.

51 Z. Gyévai: Kopogtatástól a kapunyitásig (From knocking until the opening of the gates), *Magyar Hírlap*, 12. 11. 1997.

52 D.B.: Rutinleltár után kiszivárgott minden (After a routine inventory everything that leaked out), *Magyar Hírlap*, 12. 11. 1997.

Hungary's subordinate position compared to NATO members is also well symbolized by the fact that in most of the texts the country plays an extremely passive role. While NATO and NATO officials are represented in powerful positions of decision-making, setting conditions, judging and evaluating, Hungary is most often referred to either in passive constructions or in genitive constructions. Although in discursive scenarios like the good student model, the country is represented as an active subject, deliberately following pre-set goals, in numerous texts Hungary just endures the actions of others. This image of a passive country is presumably in relationship with a certain feeling of inferiority, which is an integrated part of a complex and contradictory pattern of Hungarian national identity, in which pride and shame, feelings of superiority and a complex of inferiority constitute a weird mixture.

*"The United States offered 50 million USD credit to Hungary to modernize its army's arsenal."*<sup>53</sup>

*"Today, Hungary is seen in a more objective way and judged according to its own value."*<sup>54</sup>

*"Nobody questions Hungary's ability to become an ally of NATO and the United States."*<sup>55</sup>

*"Hungary may expect much help during its preparation for full membership."*<sup>56</sup>

*"Hungary was invited in the first round — a final decision was taken about our admittance [...], The debate about the referendum does not provide a good international image to Hungary, [...] the events will hopefully not spoil Hungary's evaluation so that catastrophic political consequences would have to be faced."*<sup>57</sup>

*"Hungary's Euro-Atlantic engagement", "Hungary's planned membership", "eventual neutrality of our country", "our country's chances for admission", "Hungary's international evaluation", etc.*

## Hungary's place in the European space

Our analysis of the debate also attempted to describe where the speakers situate Hungary in the concrete European space. It is clear that in most of the texts, Hungary is "somewhere in the center". It is rarely located expressly in the middle of the center but expres-

53 *Visszmondott fegyverhitel* (Cancelled credit for weapons), *Népszabadság*, 4. 10. 1977.

54 M. Dérer: *Miért kellünk a NATO-nak?* (Why does NATO want us?), *Magyar Hírlap*, 26. 09. 1997, 7.

55 L. Kovács In: O. Füzes: *Különleges státusz: gyorsítva a NATO-ba* (Special status: accelerated way to NATO), *Népszabadság*, 1. 10. 1997.

56 In: *Ankara nem gátolja NATO-tagságunkat.* (Ankara does not hinder our NATO-membership), *Népszabadság*, 4. 09. 1997, 1.

57 T. Wachsler in: *Orosz bíráló a brüsszeli bemutatkozáson* (Russian criticism at the presentation in Brussels), *Népszabadság*, 24. 10. 1997.

sions such as Central Europe, Central Eastern Europe or East-Central Europe are extremely frequently used to describe Hungary's position. One of the main issues which seems to be at stake for most of the speakers is to make it clear that Hungary is not on the periphery, which usually means that it is not in the East or in the South and certainly not in the Balkans<sup>58</sup>. For many speakers, the main concern in the whole topic of NATO and EU integration is the question of whether "we" can be considered to be part of, or to belong to, the West. For certain speakers, integration means that "we" are going to be part of the West, at last, („new we”), for others, it means that we are going to get back to the West where we had always been, before our historical afflictions<sup>59</sup> befell us. For certain anti-NATO speakers, NATO-admission and gliding towards the West means giving up national sovereignty, losing specifically Hungarian characteristics, melting into an alien culture, and giving up national interests to serve foreign interests.

*“Our rejection comes from the national side and because of national interests.”<sup>60</sup>*

For another group of anti-NATO speakers, a future stronger alliance with the West means leaving behind former fellow countries, breaking former solidarity and denying or giving up humanistic values and engagements.

Most of the contributions detect a notion of movement in Hungary's position. The process of integration into NATO and even more to the EU is interpreted as a symbolic shift from an old position to a new one. This space-shift is considerably part of the “new we” image of the speakers, whether they back or reject integration itself. For all of them, NATO admission signifies a change compared to the former position, and more concretely an approach to the West. In fact, for most speakers, the “new we” will appear when Hungary, at last, will be part of the Western alliances.

This shifting place, the in-between position of the country is largely felt and expressed by public speakers in the debate, but also in other discursive acts of the public field. It is a rather central topos treated by modern Hungarian literature, as well. Traditional and well-known literary symbols are often evoked in the debate. They stress either Hungary's

58 The word Balkan has an extremely negative connotation in Hungarian. People speak about “Balkan situation” when they want to express their disgust on negative experiences like something out of order, systems not functioning, filthy places, etc. It has always been a national concern that the country should not “glide down to the Balkans.”

59 The long list of afflictions takes its source at different historical periods according to different speakers. It is often considered to have happened after the death of king Matthias at the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, when the period of subsequent occupations started which lasted until the recent past, according to many public speakers.

60 I. Csurka, in: A miniszterelnök szerint a NATO garantálja hazánk biztonságát (According to the Prime Minister, NATO guarantees the security of our country), *Népszabadság*, 18. 07. 1997.

oscillating position between East and West (the "*ferry country*"), or her historic role of defending fortress on the borders of European civilization, culture and religion<sup>61</sup> (the "*border fortress of Europe*"), etc. Symbols of this sort appear regularly in the debate: and they contain a connotation of sacrifice, of suffering, a feeling of being misunderstood, and non-appreciated by those (the West) who should be caring. "*People of the East*", "*the swept away country*", etc.

As has already been mentioned, the space which Hungary sits in is not only horizontally structured, between East and West, understood as geographical categories, it is also organized according to economic and social value scales into a vertical hierarchy. Contributions in the debate also reveal where speakers see Hungary in space defined in this symbolic way. The different discourses also position other countries and institutions on different levels of the metaphorically interpreted, vertically, or hierarchically organized space.

East / West and North / South oppositions, which divide the geographical space horizontally, practically also signify a vertical, hierarchical value distribution. There is a strong difference between pro-NATO and anti-NATO speakers concerning the values and merits of things, ideas, guarantees coming from the West or coming from the East. Criteria for definitions, and the bases of classification also differ according to the speaker's position. Different speakers use different oppositions in their criteria of what dimensions define the borderlines between the two regions.

*e.g. rich / poor, developed / underdeveloped, civilized / barbaric, peaceful / aggressive, stable / unstable, etc..*

Horizontal and vertical representations of space meet at certain points of the discourse:

"*extending stability to the East*". Pro-NATO discourses make it palpable that the West (geographical, horizontal space) is at the same time the stable, positive, superior space (vertical distribution), and the East and South are in every sense the opposite. (This representation may prove important for Hungary in connection with the question of belonging under the Northern or Southern division of NATO, a question that had not yet been decided at the time of the debate.)

This symbolic shift describes the "road" the country has to go over as a collective subject towards the West, towards a "new we", towards a new European identity from which others are left out.

61 Often-used metaphoric constructions are to be found in Hungarian literature but also in schoolbooks and everyday representations: Hungary being the defending fortress of the West during the Tartar wars, the Turkish wars, etc.

The different standpoints of the participants of the debate determine where the speakers place Hungary, both in the representation of the concrete geopolitical space and in symbolic space. In the construction of Hungary's symbolic position, reference-groups play an important role in the "we" representation. Reference-groups may be connected with the "we" representation either with positive or with negative connotations. According to the kind of representation the speaker wants to give Hungary and its symbolic position, different reference groups are cited. E.g.: the former socialist countries appear in the discourses of left-wing speakers more often, while the countries of the Visegrád agreement are more often referred to in pro-NATO discourses of the government side. Central-Europe and Eastern Europe are frequently used categories, and are clearly differentiated from the West, but there are very few occurrences of references to categories with historical connotations like the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Danube-countries or the Danube-confederation, even though these might carry a notion of community or solidarity in the region. However, long-standing historical tensions and actual competition between countries of the region make the relationships among them rather fragile. Relations with the West and competition among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe for high ranking relations are more highly valued and more present in the discourses than solidarity, common past and future, or common action in problem solving, etc. On the other hand, Hungary is often shown as a country which is able to play a certain role of connecting East and West, constituting a bridge between the two sides of Europe. This ligamentary role, however, sometimes goes together with a certain feeling of superiority, a kind of paternalism, where Hungary, once inside, (but only then, once in a secure position) will lend a helping hand to its less fortunate neighbors.

*"[The Foreign secretary...] stressed, with regard to countries which, for the moment, are left out of the integration process to NATO and the European Union, that we would like to avoid the formation of new dividing lines and we will give help to all countries to be able to catch up with the processes of European development by widely enlarging regional co-operation."<sup>62</sup>*

### Allies and threats: the friend / foe dichotomy in the representation of geopolitical space

As the whole debate is more centered around pragmatic problems of alliance than around ideological questions, the geopolitical situation of the country plays an important role in the discourses. Geopolitical considerations, indeed, seem to have more effect on the de-

62 L. Kovács, in: Magyarország nem akar új választóvonalakat (Hungary does not want new dividing lines), *Népszava*, 2, 10. 1997.

cisions as well as on the choice of standpoints of the speakers than ideological considerations, as can be detected from the high occurrence of geopolitical sub-topics in the discourses. In the argumentation of both the pro-NATO and the anti-NATO side, facts and suppositions of geopolitical relevance play an important role.

To orient readers concerning the country's eventual friends and foes, in most of the discourses we do not find unambiguous, bipolar space representation, nevertheless, in many texts the question of threats and dangers as well as a certain opposition between friends and enemies are present. Uncertainties, contradictions, and obscurities characterize the discourses dealing with this topic. This is because it is rather hard to openly affirm that Hungary is under some sort of threat, and it is especially hard to nominate who it is exactly that is threatening the country. The enemy then should be named openly, and this is highly risky from a political point of view. The pro-NATO side makes allusions to some kind of danger coming from the unstable neighboring regions to the East and South, but in most of the cases no concrete countries, institutions or political forces are named, instead abstract sources of danger are referred to (e.g. migration, the Mafia, etc.).

Friends and allies are more easily nominated in the texts. In the discourses of NATO supporters it is obvious who the friends are (the West, Europe, the Western democracies) but it is obscure whether they presume that the country has any enemies or not, and if it does, who they are. Those among the pro-NATO speakers who occupy high public positions are especially unlikely to name concrete enemies, as such an explicit designation would have diplomatic and international consequences. Those against NATO cannot name any specific enemy either, for strategic reasons: in their opposition to the alliance they must minimize danger. This is especially the case of leftist speakers, who would prefer to return to friendly terms with former socialist countries, and prefer not to see them put in the negative category of threats and dangers.

In certain cases, however, there are concrete denominations of threats coming from countries or geographically identified entities: Russia, Ukraine, the Balkans, etc. Even in such cases, however, there is no clarification as to whether the threats coming from these sources are mainly military or are rather of a different character: political, economic, ideological, social, etc. Most often the danger which is hinted at is a mixture of economic, political and military threats without any further precision.

*"The country is menaced by the Mafia, the sex industry, floods, drought, a hole in the ozone, alcoholism, drugs, poverty, environmental pollution, a decrease in child birth, depression, etc. For the moment, I fear more the Chechen, Ukrainian, Russian, Romanian, Serbian and Hungarian Mafia, than the armies of these countries."<sup>63</sup>*

63 A. I. Szabó: *Natoval a békéért?* (With NATO for peace?), *Magyar Hírlap*, 19. 10. 1997. (letter to the editor)

*"The most important threats and challenges concerning security policy: 1. the question marks of Russian development; [...] 4. the restrictions of human rights, especially those of the minorities, and aggressive reactions to the emancipatory efforts of the minorities, 5. the hardships of economic restructuring in the region, the evident decrease of the level of production, of consumption and of the quality of life, 6. varying appearances of aggressive nationalism..."*<sup>64</sup>

*A) There is no danger*

Certain texts in the corpus concretely deny that there is any danger threatening Hungary. Concrete statements expressing the lack of danger are often part of the argumentation both on the pro and the contra side. The *no threats* premise can be followed by different conclusions at the same time, depending on the speakers' viewpoint.

a) Speakers on the government's side conclude from the *no threats* premise that this is exactly the best moment to enter a military alliance when there are no enemies: *"Military alliances have to be made when there is no danger"*

b) In some discourses where mainly ideological statements prevail, (e. g. those depicting a most apolitical, weakly structured world) the NATO alliance is presented as if it had no military component at all. In these discourses the geopolitical space is represented as homogeneous, neutral, and without poles. The conflicts of the world disappear, no antagonism, no tensions are assumed. In this context NATO is a dominantly political (as compared to military) alliance, aimed at development, and is not directed against anyone. NATO is shown as being the place of fellow countries aiming at peaceful development. These discourses characterize the organization as one based on common values. Argumentation in these texts say that while no danger threatens the country, it is not because of threats that we should enter NATO at all. NATO is an institution, which represents important (European) values, so Hungary should enter — for political reasons.

*"If we say yes to the alliance, Hungary will at last get the opportunity to belong to the group of the best in Europe and to participate in decision-making."*<sup>65</sup>

c) Another type of no threat argumentation is to be found in discourses where the NATO alliance is supported by economic arguments. Here, too, geopolitical and military considerations are pushed into the background. Thus, it is not danger that drives the country into NATO, but the country's own economic interests. This is a very frequently used argumentation because most contributions of the debate address the problem from the pragmatic point of view of Hungary's interests, and primarily, economic interests.

64 A. Balogh: Kelet-Közép Európa és a NATO bővítés. (East-Central Europe and Nato-expansion), *Magyar Hírlap*, 25. 10. 1997, 18.

65 In.: Tanácskozások a NATO mellett (Negotiations with NATO), *Magyar Hírlap*, 11.11.1997, 3.

*"We ourselves will create welfare in Hungary, nobody will do it for us. The best means for this is the Euro-Atlantic integration of our country."*<sup>66</sup>

*"... to speak with most citizens and explain to them [...] that their direct revenue, the price of good quality wine, fruit and meat depends on what Hungary is joining."*<sup>67</sup>

d) In most of the discourses the ideological-political and the economic modes of argumentation are joined. Pro-NATO viewpoints typically treat the process of NATO alliance instrumentally: the alliance is important only because through it, we can achieve certain political and economic goals. Among these the most important one is that the NATO alliance will help Hungary enter the EU and move away from this unstable region (political). Becoming a member of the alliance means the country will be part of the rich Western world (economic), where economic, political and military stability reign (stability). NATO alliance will make it possible to have a cheaper army reform (economic-military).

The b), c), and d), modes of argumentation go systematically together with connecting NATO alliance and EU membership.

*"Those who say that they do not back NATO-entrance, but are for our entry to the EU, should know that if they say no to NATO, then they also say no to our quick and smooth integration to EU."*<sup>68</sup>

e) In contrast, in anti-NATO discourse, from the previous premises (i.e. there is no danger threatening the country): *"the cold war is over"* *"Hungary has no enemies"* those against NATO obviously conclude that there is no need for Hungary to join, and even that *"NATO does not have a raison d'être"*.

Although most speakers start from the point of view that there is no danger menacing Hungary, and the country has no enemies, still sooner or later allusions to different dangers, threats and risks, etc. appear in the discourses of both NATO supporters and those against NATO.

*"If there is no attack, if nothing threatens our security, what is NATO for? Why should we join a military organization which decides on prices, and obliges us to buy military high technology, [...]"*<sup>69</sup>

66 Gy. Horn, Prime Minister in: A miniszterelnök szerint a NATO garantálja hazánk biztonságát (According to the Prime Minister, NATO guarantees the security of our country), *Népszabadság*, 18. 07. 1997.

67 P. Zwack, in: A NATO-tagság nem lehet pártügy (NATO-membership cannot be a party affair), *Népszabadság*, 2. 10. 1997.

68 L. Kovács in: Már befogadtak bennünket a NATO-kormányok (NATO-governments have already accepted us), *Vasárnapi hírek*, 2. 11. 1997, 5.

69 T. Csapody: A NATO nélkül is jogállam maradnánk (We would stay a state under the rule of law even without NATO), *Népszabadság*, 13. 11. 1997, 1–3.

B) *There is danger after all*

a) *"There is no question of defense from any direct military threat, because Hungary is not threatened by any of its close neighbors, or even by countries farther away. We are not seeking protection from military attack, we are expecting the guarantee of security and stability in the long run from NATO. We cannot disregard the fact that the region which encircles us — to the East, the South and the South-East — suffers from lack of stability."*<sup>70</sup>

There is no concrete naming of a concrete danger in mainstream discourses, but speakers suggest that the purpose of NATO membership is to expand the secure region and reduce the unstable one. This means that the geopolitical space implicitly does have a bipolar structure, it is divided into two opposing regions: a stable Western and an unstable Eastern part. The euphemistic reference to the "*eastern expansion of stability*" pretends that the issue is *only* that this abstract space of stability, which is without precisely defined outlines but has positive qualities (stable and secure), should be increased and extended. But it is not supposed at all that this might also be a question of interests, that the extension might interfere with the interest of others, or that this process can create tensions. The linguistic asymmetry described earlier can often be found in such discourses.

b) In certain discourses, instead of speaking of military threats, official supporters of NATO-alliance allude vaguely and euphemistically to "*risks and challenges*", which are geographically situated South and East of us, or start from there and head towards us ("*migration*" and "*Mafia*", in particular, are named as sources of danger).

*"Social tensions are the best source for certain populist or sometimes extremist tendencies [...] There are certain dangers which are not particularly characteristic for this region, but which have a heavy presence here, like international crime and terrorism, drug-dealing and even pollution of the environment."*<sup>71</sup>

*"... we will slide back to the Balkans, and from there into Asia into the arms of the Russian, Ukrainian, Chechen, etc. Mafia, putting the country into the menace of great-Russian imperialism."*<sup>72</sup>

In this way, some sources of danger are mentioned without being directly connected to geographical locations (Mafia) while other public discourses systematically connect these dangers with the Southern and Eastern regions (Ukrainian, Serbian, Russian, etc. Mafia)

70 L. Kovács. In: Nagy Mélykúti Edit: A jövőre gondolva kell politizálni (We have to do politics while thinking towards the future), *Magyar Hírlap*, 12. 11. 1997, 11.

71 L. Kovács. In: Nagy Mélykúti Edit: A jövőre gondolva kell politizálni (We have to do politics while thinking towards the future), *Magyar Hírlap*, 12. 11. 1997, 11.

72 Á. Kertész: Pojácák és politikusok (Clowns and politicians), *Népszava*, 30. 10. 1997.

It is quite clear from the analysis of the discourses that in the eyes of most public speakers there are some kinds of dangers and threats to Hungary. Hungary's geopolitical situation has always been considered as a factor of danger. Historical allusions and bits of collective memory keep up this continual notion of the possibility of threats and uncertainty (cf. historical allusions to Trianon, to the German or Slavic supremacy in the region, to the possibility of the reorganization of a Little-Entente around Hungary, etc.)

*" [... If the referendum is unsuccessful] Future member states joining NATO, like the Czech-Republic, Poland and later Romania, Slovenia or eventually Slovakia will form a continuous chain. If the arguments of those against NATO in Hungary become true, Hungary as an isolated loop will not be related to anybody."*<sup>73</sup>

Pro-NATO speakers build on this explicitly unpronounceable common knowledge when they argue for NATO entry. The paradoxical point of their argumentation is that they do not dare to explicitly speak of these threats. On the other hand, with respect to this topic, the anti-NATO side is divided into two distinct groups. Some anti-NATO speakers minimize dangers and thus conclude the lack of justification for NATO-entry, while on rare occasions anti-NATO speakers from the right or extreme right, representing the "old we" construction, heavily lean on these threats when arguing for a national, independent military development, totally isolated from any possible alliances.

c) The main statement of the opponents of NATO is that "*the Cold war is over*" so the danger is over, to; but then they also often use arguments like "*our alliance with NATO will irritate Russia*" and this is then considered to be a source of danger. Such discourses implicitly reaffirm the old idea that Hungary is not surrounded by good friends but by unpredictable, potentially aggressive neighbors. A thorough analysis of references and allusions to dangers in these discourses points out that even anti-NATO speakers refer to the dangers, threats and uncertainties, which characterize the country's geopolitical situation.

In the discourses of anti-NATO speakers, friends and allies appear in various forms. In spite of common human values and solidarity, which characterize the left-wing or some autonomous speakers, there are no real, unambiguous friends, and in the majority of the discourses there are no well-outlined enemies either. (The only exception is the extreme right, with its most active public speaker, I. Csurka, where a precise enemy-image is present — see below).

73 P. Zwack: Nincs pótvizsga NATO-ügyben (There is no make-up exam in NATO-affairs), *Népszava*, 8. 11. 1997.

*"We will lose the friendship of the neighboring countries, especially of Ukraine and Russia because with NATO we join the image of the enemy."<sup>74</sup>*

In most anti-NATO discourses, there are frequent allusions to neighboring countries suggesting that their interests have to be taken into account, stating that Hungary might need to help and back them in their development. But in most discourses, the friendly (sometimes paternalistic) attitude towards these countries is not so much posed in terms of principle-based friendship, common causes or solidarity, but more because of fear of these countries and their political options.

The countries of the region often appear as potential enemies (a potentially reorganized Little-Entente, the easily offended Russian bear, etc.) whose (anticipated) aggression has to be prevented through peaceful, helping gestures.

*"NATO-enlargement is nothing less than pushing the old wall more to the East. This will lead to tensions among those left out. [...] Because of the admission of new members to NATO, nationalist forces may take the power in Russia."<sup>75</sup>*

d) Fears and suspicions in connection with the neighbors who are represented as mistrustful and potentially aggressive appear in the pro-NATO discourses too, but usually with a weaker emphasis, and in a subdued tone. For example, Géza Jeszenszky, president of the Hungarian Atlantic Council recalls the possibility of the creation of a Russian-Belorussian-Slovak military block, but at the same time does not consider this danger to be serious.<sup>76</sup> On the same day Foreign secretary, László Kovács states that:

*"It is in Hungary's vital interest that there should be no mistrust in any of its relationships with its neighbors following our NATO alliance ... Hungary's task is to make bilateral relations with its neighbors more intensive."<sup>77</sup>*

This subdued topic construction is probably the result of the fact that these discourses are made by active politicians, dealing with foreign policy or diplomacy, whose words have to be weighed in all circumstances. It is especially interesting how official speakers avoid frontal representation and explicit naming of the "*Russian danger*". They use cunning means to recall this danger and use it in their pro-NATO argumentation as part of

74 T. Csapody, spokesman of the Alba Circle, in: M. U.: Semleges Magyarország-kép (The image of a neutral Hungary), *Magyar Hírlap*, 12. 11. 1997.

75 In: A NATO-csatlakozás távlatai. (Perspectives of joining NATO), *Magyar Hírlap*, 3. 11. 1997, 3.

76 Géza Jeszenszky quoted in *Magyar Hírlap*, 20. 09. 1997.

77 A NATO egyetért a magyar tervekkel (Nato agrees with the Hungarian plans), *Népszabadság*, 20. 09. 1997

the common public knowledge, and a background conviction that should push the balance towards the NATO-alliance.

*"bad memories of the influence of Russia in the Central European region and contradictory signs of Russian foreign policy..."*<sup>78</sup>

e) The most precise enemy-image pertaining to a well-defined group appears in the discourses of the extreme-right (e.g. I. Csurka, MIÉP). The enemy here is an international "financial oligarchy", which drives "us" into "debtor-slavery" they are clearly "our enemy". NATO defends this phantom, which appears in the shape of the World Bank against "our" interests. Thus NATO is part of the parasitic international creation which reigns over the whole world, and against which we should defend ourselves. In these discourses the danger threatening Hungary appears primarily as a political and economic one. Csurka — as opposed to the pacifist anti-NATO speakers — does not emphasize the military nature of NATO because the enemy-image he has worked out is mostly linked with civilians and not with military threat. (Only in one speech that he made to a general assembly did he affirm: "NATO is the military force of the bankers", "a mercenary force".<sup>79</sup>)

### National identity and neutrality

According to our initial hypothesis, the most prominent topic that was supposed to be linked with the topic of NATO-entrance is that of national identity. It was also claimed that the topic of the nation and of national identity would be introduced at different points in the debate. The speakers' viewpoints concerning the nation may well appear in the space and time representation of Hungary in the discourses. Discourse thematizing national identity usually builds on categories of the past: it uses past events of national history, symbols of national glory and affliction. It often employs emotional discursive means<sup>80</sup> in order to mobilize people's feelings and it generally builds on communitarian categories. In the analysis of the debate, however, it became clear that contrary to prior expectations, the past appears rather rarely in the debate. Historic dimensions do not get much attention on the whole, and there are relatively few cases when argumentation is built on the past. Among these are the (sometimes positive but mainly negative) references to the Warsaw Pact, and, more often, references to some glorious or tragic moments of the Hungarian past. These latter cases occur in argumentation when Hungary's

78 A. Balogh: Kelet-Közép Európa és a NATO bővítés. (East-Central Europe and Nato-expansion) In: *Magyar Hírlap*, 25. 10. 1997, 18.

79 *Magyar Fórum*, Csurka's speech at the general assembly of MIÉP held on 20. 08. 1997.

sovereignty is thematized (e.g. King Matthias's Black Army). Saint Stephen, Hungary's first Christian king is referred to by both pro- and anti-NATO sides, either as the "enlightened" king who created strong ties between Hungary and the West, or as the king who created a strong state and thus laid the foundation of the later nation-state.

Among the positive historic references, military deeds are the most frequently cited events of the past: cases when Hungary defended the West from attacks and danger coming from the East. Such historic references include the Tartar war of the 13<sup>th</sup> century, and the Turkish wars of the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries.

*"The original thought of Saint Stephen is that we can only think in terms of Europe. [...] It is the common responsibility of the political elite what will happen or not happen now when we reached a crossroads and we have to decide where to go. A thousand years ago, Saint Stephen gave us an answer, which is still valid."<sup>81</sup>*

*"Hungary has not had a feeling of success since King Matthias. Not only did we lose the battle of Mohács, and not only did the Turks manage to occupy Buda without a shot and without a whisk of sword, so that we only could get rid of them 150 years later with strong Western help, with the cost attached that the sluttish Turkish occupation was followed by a much more orderly and careful Habsburg occupation, but even all our revolts, revolutions and wars of liberation failed, and we ended all our wars on the side of the losers, and we even were made, most of the time, the scape-goats [...] and now this will be the first occasion for Hungary, since the time of King Matthias, to play in a team of world champions."<sup>82</sup>*

One of the most suitable anti-NATO arguments concerning the past could be the topic of 1956. In 1956 Hungary expected military help from the West in vain, so this deception could form a suitable basis for anti-NATO argumentation. But this topic is rarely mentioned in the articles.

*"Let us consider 1956. Although the Hungarian case was very popular in the United States, they excluded any military inference. One could fear that a military action taken in favor of Hungary would lead to a Soviet-American nuclear war. [...] In the same way, it is highly improbable that Western powers would accept confrontation with a nuclear power."<sup>83</sup>*

80 See: Angenot 1982.

81 I. Völgyes: A történelem: múltó pillanat (History is a fading moment), *Népszabadság*, 20. 10. 1997.

82 Á. Kertész: Pojácák és politikusok (Clowns and politicians), *Népszava*, 30. 10. 1997.

83 L. Borhi: NATO: miért nem (Nato: why no), *Magyar Hírlap*, 13. 11. 1997, 7.

“»Hungarians waited in vain. The Americans did not come and our great European neighbors could not do more than admit the refugees and send us Danish butter and Dutch cheese» — wrote Péter Nádas about 1956.”<sup>84</sup>

1956 as the symbol for neutrality is rarely thematized either. Although in 1956 the short-lived Imre Nagy government proclaimed neutrality, this is not taken up as an argument by the participants in the debate. Neutrality in general does not play an important role in the debate. Several speakers allude to deceived hopes of 1956, and then come to the conclusion that Western integration will definitely heal this problem as well.

“Imre Mécs (SZDSZ) considered that joining NATO makes late amends for the crushing of 1956. [...] In his speech József Torgyán, President of FKGP, condemned those who, distorting ‘the spirit’ of 1956, use the anniversary to express anti-NATO feelings. Both in the name of his party as well as [...] in the name of KDNP he affirmed that in spite of all irresponsible agitation against Euro-Atlantic integration, the moral lesson of the revolution of ‘56 strengthens the necessity of Hungary’s joining NATO.”<sup>85</sup>

Hungarian history, as represented in the texts, is seen at the same time not only as a series of glorious moments but also, and often simultaneously, as centuries of bitter deceptions, defeats and losses. Both anti-NATO and pro-NATO speakers use historical allusions of one or the other view concerning history to argue their own point of view. There is an underlying debate about how to evaluate Hungarian history and how to put it in relationship with the important shift that is taking place with regard to Hungary’s place and position inside Europe.

There are certain common points in the view of history between the two sides, but the differences are very important. For pro-NATO speakers, Western responsibility in Hungarian defeats is minimized (Trianon, Yalta, 1956, etc.), while Hungary’s responsibility in the two wars of the 20<sup>th</sup> century is stressed, stating that Hungarians have always been on the wrong side. This view of history contributes to the foundation for the argument that we all must do our best to join the right side, the West, at last. According to expectations, NATO will solve the historic problem of affiliation, it will establish long-standing peace between Hungary and the West, and it will also contribute to the pacification of the problems with the neighboring countries that have accumulated throughout history.

On the opposite side, right-wing anti-NATO discourse emphasizes and idealizes the role of Hungary in the defense of the West during long drawn out centuries, while it depicts the West as an ungrateful, selfish traitor, which never takes into account the heavy

84 Gy. E.: Magyarország a NATO-ba való (Hungary is fit for NATO), *Magyar Hírlap*, 2. 10. 1997.

85 Gy. Balácsi: Vita a NATO-népszavazásról (Debate on NATO-referendum), *Népszava*, 28. 10. 1997.

sacrifices Hungary has made. Hungary's role and position in the wars of the 20<sup>th</sup> century is not considered by this type of discourse, and speakers representing this standpoint reach the conclusion that Hungary should not join NATO, it should not enter any military alliance. Hungary has to stay alone and defend itself against all possible enemies, wherever they come from. They claim the importance of a strong, independent national army and isolation from all possible international forces.

In spite of the fact that both sides use history as an argument, in both anti-NATO and pro-NATO discourse, we find certain meta-statements claiming that the other side uses history in a distorted or illegitimate way.

*"... It is a typical strategy of false historical analogies and historical demagoguery when a well-known citation is taken out of its historical context to be applied to a completely different situation in the present."<sup>86</sup>*

### The topic of national sovereignty

Just as the topic of national identity and national past, we also supposed that the topic of national sovereignty would have a strong relationship with the theme of NATO-entrance. In the starting phase of our research, we supposed this was one of the key issues which would determine the distribution of opinions and discourses in the debate about NATO. But just as in the case of national identity and neutrality, this topic also proved to rank much lower among the underlying values in topic constructions than expected. The weak occurrence of the topic might be due to the fact that the debate, (as mentioned earlier), was much more pragmatic, and centered more around utilitarian topics than around ideological ones. Argumentation dealt with the interests of the country, and both pro- and anti-NATO arguments addressed questions of economic interests, security and costs of development. This was because the participants of the NATO-debate had no interest in tackling the problem on an ideological level. This can be explained by many causes, one of which is the fact that wide-spread ideological debates during the first period of legislation after the regime change ('90—'94) did not bring success to the participating political forces. Thereafter the general tone of public debates during the second legislative period (the one under scrutiny) was much more characterised by utilitarian debates.

Conditions, regulations, requirements, the necessity of adjustment, NATO-compatibility, etc., however, are often on the table for debate. References to constraints on national sovereignty are frequent (e.g., during the talks Hungary "*assumed obligations*", "*com-*

86 Gy. Csákány (retired university teacher) in a letter to the editor, *Népszabadság*, 12. 09. 1997.

*mitted itself*", or that Hungary has to cope with requirements in order to join NATO). Regular references to constraints necessarily decrease the strength of the notion of sovereignty. But constraints and requirements seem to be considered as necessary conditions for NATO-admittance, and they are rarely put into a context of national sovereignty. Thus, NATO requirements do not seem to affect national sovereignty in the texts. In most of the discourses no contradiction is set up between the two notions.

In the discourses of NATO-supporters, sovereignty does not become a central topic, and its importance is minimized. As an explicit argument, NATO is described as a democratic institution, where each country takes part in the decision-making as a sovereign entity, where consensus has to be achieved and where even the US has no more votes than any other countries. When rejecting the fear of our loss of sovereignty, most pro-NATO speakers point to the opposite problem: if the country is left out of NATO, it will have no possibility in participating in important decision making.

*"We should not be afraid that our country will lose its sovereignty, because no decision affecting our country can be made without Hungarian political acceptance."*<sup>87</sup>

*"NATO is not a supranational organization. Decisions can only be taken with each member's approval. The majority cannot force its will on Hungary."*<sup>88</sup>

*"If we are left out of decision making possibilities offered by NATO, then decisions will be taken without us in the future."*<sup>89</sup>

In anti-NATO discourses, however, the topic appears more often in a contrasted form. Threats to national sovereignty and national independence are explicitly and consciously expressed. In some of these cases, the topic of sovereignty is related to the topic of neutrality. In the discourses of those talking about neutrality, two different Hungary-images appear. In one of them, Hungary is an oppressed but heroic small community that can only rely on itself (*"We are alone"*), this topos is well-known from traditional nationalist ideology and is used by the right and extreme-right speakers (as already mentioned concerning the use of history in the debate). The outside world is, in general, strange, different, potentially hostile. Admittance of the small Central-European countries by NATO

87 A. Simonyi Hungary's NATO ambassador, In: *Tanácskozások a NATO mellett* (Negotiations with NATO), *Magyar Hírlap*, 11. 11. 1997, 3.

88 L. Kovács, Hungarian Foreign secretary, In: *Holnap zárul a NATO-kampány* (NATO campaign ends tomorrow), *Népszabadság*, 13. 11. 1997, 1—3.

89 Gy. Keleti, Hungarian Minister of Defense, In: *Vita a tagságról országsházaiban* (Debates about membership, throughout the country), *Magyar Hírlap*, 10. 11. 1997.

forces is denounced as an attempt to extend influence, and thus a case of fight for more power. This point of view is characteristic of speakers on both the extreme-right and the extreme-left.

*"In the future, NATO-Hungary we will lose all hope that in our own country Hungarians might possess power."<sup>90</sup>*

*"Today what is at stake is the independence of the country, let's say no to NATO. » — «Yankee, go home! » — answered the crowd."<sup>91</sup>*

In the discourses of the peace-group, Alba Circle, though, another Hungary-image appears. Here the notion of neutrality is used not as an argument for national isolation but is considered as an element of solidarity between the underprivileged Eastern European and Third World nations. In these texts, neutrality and sovereignty can better be interpreted in the dimension of the North / South dichotomy and they signify that we should not join the triumphant, selfish North but should show solidarity with the countries of the oppressed South. The representation of the countries of the North, the conceited, haughty, rich and selfish West (sometimes Europe), is strongly negative and draws heavily on traditional left-wing rhetoric.<sup>92</sup> Sovereignty here is interpreted as the country's liberty to act freely and in solidarity with others, to chose its place on the side of the small, the underprivileged yet just and worthy.

*"With NATO-membership, Hungary would lose its classical role as a bridge in Europe with all its cultural and economic consequences. [...] At any time foreign troops could be stationed in the country. The geopolitical problems of the country would not be solved — on the contrary, integration into this military structure without the neighboring countries and their Hungarian population would only increase already existing tensions between nationalities in the region. We would lose the friendship of neighboring countries, especially the Ukraine and Russia because with NATO, we join the image of the enemy."<sup>93</sup>*

90 I. Csurka, president of MIÉP in: Vita a tagságról országszerte (Debates about membership, throughout the country), *Magyar Hírlap*, 10. 11. 1997.

91 Gy. Thürmer, president of the Workers' Party, in: Tanácskozások a NATO mellett (Negotiations with NATO), *Magyar Hírlap*, 11. 11. 1997, 3.

92 The extreme right, the universalist and the extreme left all use the rhetoric about imperialism worked out by the traditional Left. Nato supporters accept the *raison d'être* of this negative Nato image but they consider it valid only as a description of the past. "This Nato is not that Nato any more".

93 T. Csapody, spokesman of the Alba Circle, in: M. U.: Semleges Magyarország-kép (The image of a neutral Hungary), *Magyar Hírlap*, 12. 11. 1997.

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## “WE ARE FACING A NEW ORDER IN EUROPE”. NEUTRALITY VERSUS NATO

### Introduction

On January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1995 Austria joined the European Union. This marked the end of a long-standing debate about whether Austria's neutrality would permit Austria to join a supra-national union (see Karin Liebhart's chapter, this volume). While this effectively closed this particular debate, a further debate about the meaning and usefulness of neutrality was raging on. For supporters of the People's Party (ÖVP), Austria's joining the European Union was seen only as the beginning, with the next step being Austria's joining NATO and the abolition of Austria's neutrality. With the end of the cold war, they no longer considered neutrality to be an asset in foreign policy, but saw it as a hindrance to a fully integrated Europe. In contrast, the Socialist Party (SPÖ), having been more hesitant in its policy on Europe all along and looking back at almost two decades of a successful policy of “active neutrality”, wanted to ensure that Austria's neutrality would not be given up. In particular, neutrality had become part of the Austrian discourse of identity under the SPÖ government, and thus the Socialist Party and its electorate has strong emotional ties to this neutrality (see also Reinprecht & Latcheva in this volume).

This was the situation in 1997 when a number of prominent Austrian politicians met to discuss “Austria between Neutrality and NATO” in a widely broadcast TV-discussion. At this point, the SPÖ and the ÖVP were still engaged in a coalition and jointly governing the country. While both parties clearly had different visions of Austria's (international) future, at that time they were nevertheless unwilling to risk a major conflict in public. Differences of opinion did exist between the two parties, but in direct confrontation they were mitigated and negotiated, and an amicable atmosphere was retained. This changed as little as two years later<sup>1</sup> (in the autumn of 1999) when (after elections) the coalition was not reinstated, but the SPÖ faced the ÖVP as a governmental opposition.

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<sup>1</sup> According to an interview with the former leader of the Socialist Party, Victor Klima with *Profil*, the cooperation ceased to function in the spring of 1999, but both parties kept up appearances in order not to harm their chances in the governmental elections in the fall of 1999.

In what follows we will analyze this TV discussion with politicians of both parties and several other participants. As will be explained in more detail below, because of its very nature, the broadcast provides a good example of the public discourse about neutrality at this time. In analyzing this TV program, we will seek to answer the following questions about the ongoing discourse:

How do the politicians involved discuss neutrality and NATO? What are the positions of the parties (in particular the coalition) in this debate and what arguments are put forward? How do they try to address their audience and gain support for their perspective?

How does the coalition reconcile different opinions where direct public confrontations occur?

Who is successful in this discussion and why?

The following section will introduce the data and each of the participants. Then we will present our methodology, and in the next section, we will provide an overview of the whole TV discussion with a characterization of the roles different participants played in the discussion. We will then turn to the analysis of the contributions of the politicians of the coalition, and analyze a short excerpt of their contributions qualitatively. This presentation will be enhanced by contrasting it with the role of a participating "expert". In the final section, we will summarize our analysis and come back to our research questions and discuss some of the results in the framework of the meaning and changes of public space (Fairclough 1999).

### The data

On February 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1997, six people were invited by the Austrian national broadcasting service (ORF) to discuss "Between neutrality and NATO" in a well known weekly TV discussion which is broadcast live and called "*Zur Sache*" (roughly translated: "concerning the issue"). This TV discussion is broadcast every Sunday night at 10 p.m. on the second (national) channel, which is generally oriented towards an educated audience displaying an interest in politics. The program addresses topics of public interest, and usually features well-known politicians and other public figures among the participants. In this respect, the show informs a wide public about the present positions of the various political parties (or the government ministries). However, this feature of the discussion also hinders a real "discussion" in which people would present their opinions and then be led to change their points of view. Instead, participants tend to state their points of view, these are then contested before someone else takes over the discussion or changes the topic altogether (Wodak & Vetter 1999; Fairclough 1999, Gruber 1997).

On the day of the discussion, six people had been invited to participate. The discussion moderator was Peter Rabl (PR), (ORF) and the discussion was to last about 75 minutes<sup>2</sup>. The discussion participants were (in alphabetical order):

- Georg Hoffmann-Ostenhoff (GO): a "leftist" journalist and weekly editor of a foreign politics column in one of the most established Austrian weekly news magazines called "*Profil*"
- Andreas Khol (AK): party leader of the People's Party (ÖVP) (member of parliament)
- Erich Reiter (ER): head of a division within the defense ministry, and working as a consultant for the right-wing Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), whose program resembles that of Le Pen's party in France
- Peter Schieder (PS): foreign policy spokesman of the Austrian Socialist Party (SPÖ) (member of parliament)
- Heinz Schmutzer (HS): unaffiliated, relatively unknown person, who initiated a political petition concerning neutrality. The success of this petition would require the national assembly to hold a referendum before neutrality could be abolished.
- Andreas Wabl (AW): Green Party spokesman on peace (member of parliament).

Of the parties not mentioned so far, the Freedom Party (FPÖ), which is led by a right-wing extremist<sup>3</sup>, would like to see Austria joining NATO. At the other end of the spectrum stands the Green Party, which promotes neutrality as the most peaceful international stance possible. For the Green Party, joining a military alliance is equivalent to abandoning a clear orientation towards peace, and to buying into the logic of the arms race.

Most of the participants confirmed the positions implied by their political affiliation. The exception was GO, who was strongly in favor of Austria joining NATO, despite his leftist orientation.

## Overview of the discussion

At the beginning of the broadcast, there is a short section in which you can see the participants advancing towards the building or walking up the stairs. A voice-over introduces them, and for each participant presents a short position statement summarizing their position.

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2 The following description is based on the political positions people held in 1997. Since then, the political landscape in Austria has changed remarkably, and so have the political functions and positions of various politicians.

3 According to Scharsach 1992, this was actually settled in court, when Haider tried to sue the historian Wolfgang Neugebauer for defamation for being called a right-wing extremist, and lost. Thus, Haider is an officially recognized right-wing extremist.

Next, the discussion leader (PR) introduces the topic of the day, and begins to address the participants one after the other, providing room for them to make a first statement and reveal their general positions.

After that, HS, the initiator of the poll, introduces the first overall topic. He asks what kind of peace people are trying to defend by joining NATO. This leads to statements questioning the role of a military organization in upholding peace (AW, Green Party) as well as the idea that wars in the old sense could ever happen again in Europe (AK, People's Party). PS (Socialist Party) finishes this discussion by directly asking the military expert ER (Freedom Party) whether the obligation to defend an ally ("*Beistandspflicht*") might possibly be dropped by NATO.

This shifts the overall discussion to the topic of NATO and the issue of "security". The military expert and the journalist GO present NATO as an organization that enhances Europe's (and Austria's) security. The green politician AW protests against NATO and accuses the socialist PS, i.e. the Socialist Party, of supporting the People's Party in a policy of undermining the meaning of neutrality. This leads to a brief digression in which the conservative AK and the socialist politician PS state the overall political positions of their respective parties on Austria's place in a future European security system. The military expert reintroduces the issue of NATO with a European-wide perspective. In particular, he addresses NATO's relationship with Russia, which is seen as a potentially destabilizing factor. The journalist supports him once again.

The discussion leader changes the topic by asking the conservative politician AK whether his party is willing to give up Austria's neutrality. AK responds rather cautiously, declaring that his party will wait until the results of currently negotiated issues (within the EU) are in hand.

The military expert follows this with a lengthy statement in which he declares neutrality obsolete. He argues that it is upheld for purely "ideological" reasons. This claim is refuted by the socialist politician who questions whether the arguments for NATO membership are any less ideologically-based. As expected, the expert rejects such a notion (he claims to be speaking simply of security issues). This in turn is questioned by the politician of the Green Party, who wants security to be understood in social and economic terms and who addresses the issue of the assignment of one's resources. The conservative politician counters by stating that there is no security without military security. He is followed by the socialist who argues that the real issue is who (i.e. which organizations) may legitimately use military measures (e.g. the United Nations).

Next the discussion turns to the overall topic of "costs". The green politician AW has already attempted to introduce this topic several times but on each occasion he has been asked to wait. Now it is reintroduced as a legitimate topic by the discussion leader. The journalist predicts that joining NATO will enable Austria to reduce spending on defense, the socialist presents some figures on the defense expenditure of European states in gen-

eral, the military expert assumes that the defense budget can remain as it is but points to the current absence of any serious calculations. The green politician rejects all of these estimates and cites a US congress budget report on the estimated costs of an expansion of NATO to include Eastern Europe. Based on this, he posits that Austrian membership of NATO will force the country vastly to increase its defense budget. This proposition is rejected by the conservative politician, the journalist and, less emphatically, by the military expert, as well as perhaps by the discussion leader (see analysis below).

Then the socialist returns to the issue of (military) requirements resulting from a possible Austrian membership of NATO. The military expert responds by discussing once again the "*Beistandspflicht*" (i. e. the obligation upon each NATO member to defend any other member if it is attacked by a third country).

The green politician AW briefly moves the discussion back to the issue of costs. The military expert responds by claiming that no one could force Austria to pay a particular sum, even if "moral pressure" were exerted.

The discussion moderator closes this discussion by introducing the final sequence, asking the politicians to outline their stance on the poll promoted by HS.

Thus we see that the discussion focusses on NATO rather than on neutrality. NATO is introduced, questioned and defended in various forms and from various perspectives. Neutrality never becomes the main focus of the interaction. Although within the flow of the discussion arguments, for or against neutrality are raised on several occasions (see below), neutrality never becomes a topic in its own right (for any longer segment of the discussion).

## Arguments

In the following analysis, we analyze the arguments put forward by different speakers. In this section, arguments were defined as statements with "new" propositional content (this therefore excludes evaluations that simply supported or refuted previous statements without offering new information) that were meant to make a point about the topic under discussion.

If one categorizes the contributions of the individual speakers<sup>4</sup>, one finds five differ-

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4 In the analysis, the transcript was read for the appearance of arguments; a list of all arguments was made and then analyzed for topical overlap. Thus, our categories were found through an analysis of the material. Concerning our segmentation into arguments, we would like to note that a "story" or reasoning for something providing more or less extensive evidence is counted only as one argument (i.e. evidence for an argument is not counted as an argument itself). In problematic cases, we decided to break a sequence of propo-

ent classes of arguments<sup>5</sup>: arguments concerning the function of neutrality (whether it still had a function, what that function was, and so on), arguments concerning NATO in its present role (as a positive, modern organization, ensuring security in Europe), arguments concerning the costs of joining NATO, arguments concerning (other) aspects of Austria joining NATO, and arguments concerning aspects of an enlargement of NATO to include Eastern European states.

Speakers differed remarkably in terms of the number/ratio of their contributions to the different areas, and in terms of their evaluation of the topics under discussion. Table 1 presents an overview of the breakdown of arguments put forward by the different speakers, as well as their evaluative stance.

It shows that speakers favoring neutrality, (AW — green politician, HS — poll initiator, PS — socialist politician) make no positive evaluations of NATO, while speakers clearly favoring NATO make no positive evaluations of neutrality (ER — military expert, GO — journalist). The assessment of the cost situation and of other “aspects of joining NATO” confirms this picture. The only participant who does not fall clearly into these categories is the conservative politician AK. Although he is very much in favor of NATO, his stance towards neutrality features both positive and negative evaluations.

The greatest number of contributions is made by the military expert ER, and he is followed by the socialist politician PS. The poll initiator HS makes the smallest number of contributions: he is completely marginal in the discussion. With respect to neutrality, the politicians of the major parties, AK and PS, contribute the largest number of statements. Nevertheless, the military expert ER and the green politician AW also contribute noticeably to this discussion. The discussion of NATO is clearly dominated by the military expert ER; he makes almost twice as many arguments as the journalist GO, another active proponent in this discussion. However, a close look at ER’s statements on NATO reveals that although he makes the greatest number of arguments, most of them are not clearly evaluative (which might add to his image of being an expert, see below).

Finally, the topic of costs is strongly promoted by the green politician AW.

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sitions down into the smallest units which each make conversational sense as being arguments for or against something in their own right.

5 Only arguments that appear more than once are described here.

TABLE I

Person	Functions of neutrality			NATO			Costs			Aspects of joining NATO	Eastward enlargement of NATO	Total			
	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+/-					
AK People's Party	10	2	5	3	4	3	1		1		1	0		2	17
AW Green Party	5	4	1		1			1	10	10		0		1	17
ER Military expert	7			7	11	4	7		4	3	1			7	29
GO journalist	3			3	6	5	1		2	2	1	3	+	2	16
HS poll initiator	2	2			0				1	1		2	-	0	5
PR discussion leader	1	1							2	2					3
PS Socialist Party	9	5	4		4	4			2	2		4	-	2	21

Legend: In this table the first entry of each main column presents the number of arguments falling in this class. The first gray area shows positive evaluative statements, the second gray area contains arguments that were neither positive nor negative (but provide, for instance, information about general political developments), and the third gray area presents negative evaluations. For costs the first gray column indicates statements assuming rising costs, the second one indifference, and the third one falling costs. In the column of "Aspects of joining NATO" the plus indicates that positive aspects were mentioned, while the minus indicates negative aspects. In this category people only had evaluative comments of the one or the other kind.

### The interactional profile of the discussion

A further important aspect of the analysis of this TV discussion is the interactional profile. This provides not only an important contextual characterization, but also constitutes an explanatory level in its own right. While examining the interactional dynamics, we also reveal who (as a person) had most to say, who received the most attention, and so on. Since people are very tightly linked to positions in discussions such as the one under investigation, tracking the interactional dynamics also constitutes an indirect means of tracing the success of the positions and ideologies put forward.

To analyze the interactional profile, we segmented the discussion into units in which one speaker was holding the floor. By that we mean a speaker who was the main speaker and who was talking about a particular topic (whether by his own choice or in response to a request for his opinion)<sup>6</sup>.

For each of these units (henceforth: floor) we noted how the main speaker obtained the floor — through self-selection or through assignment by the discussion leader or another participant. We also registered/coded who was holding the floor before and after the floor, who commented on the floor, whether the initial statements made during having the floor were an “answer” to a previous contribution, who tried to interrupt the floor, and finally, whether the main speaker of the floor got into a “conversation” with another participant. We only registered/coded turn-sequences as conversations if someone commented on something that the main speaker had said and the main speaker went on to address this comment in his following turn. Thus, the shortest conversation comprised of one turn of another speaker and an “answer” to this turn by the main speaker. In other cases a longer interaction ensued.

The following example from our data will illustrate these categories:

1. ER the Security Council of the United Nations has to be informed about this immediately and ALL military measures of the NATO — are to be suspended — ermm / as soon as the Security Council has taken appropriate steps with a view to re-establishing security and order
2. ER this is very far this  
PS it is also a matter of the run-up to the UN measures
3. ER this is very much embedded in the -
4. PR good second point  
ER activity of the United Nations, (XXXXXXX) uh  
PS that means we
5. PS would have to — take part in the fighting.
6. ER it may — happen. if it [AW laughs]
7. ER came to that well >(admittedly) this is this is<  
AW it may happen
8. ER [it is] theoretically possible in practice — things look  
PS this is the question

6 We do not wish to claim that this category would be successful in all situations, but in this TV-discussion it was the case that one person — either an invited speaker or a self-selected speaker — would address a particular topic at length. This speaker, although interrupted and commented upon, usually remained the center of the conversation; i.e., the conversation came repeatedly back to him. The boundaries between floors are fuzzy, and there may be a number of turns in which nobody can be considered the main speaker.

9. ER different. who is going to attack NATO. — and who is going to attack an expanded NATO

1. is the continuation of a longer turn of ER who holds the floor. In 2 PS raises a question, which is immediately (with an overlap) answered by ER. Thus, ER and PS are involved in a "conversation". In 4 PS raises another question, which is again answered by ER in 6. In our analysis, we only coded the existence or non-existence of a conversation between PS and ER on each of the occasions that ER held the floor, thus the ongoing exchange between ER and PS does not influence our analysis any further. In 7 AW ironically repeats ER's answer to PS. While ER seems to be a little thrown off track, he does not address AW, but continues his interaction with PS. Thus, AW's statement is classified as a comment (it is not an interruption, since he is not trying to take over the floor).

While this analysis will allow us to gain some insight into the interactional dynamics of the discussion, its methodological shortcomings have to be kept in mind: naturally, the "floors" vary considerably in length from a few lines of transcript to up to two pages. This difference in length influences the number of possible interruptions, conversations and comments. It is more likely that a longer floor will show more of all of these, even if a per minute count would result in the same or even reversed figures. For this reason, we did not count the frequency of any of these categories, but took only identified the individuals that commented, interrupted or conversed during a floor. We believe that the results of the analysis allow us, at the very least, to see who reacted to whom, and provide us with a crude measure of strength. Another aspect which is not considered in this analysis, is the unsuccessful attempts of participants to take over the floor (at the end or beginning of a floor) and unsuccessful assignments of the floor by the moderator of the discussion.

Main speakers and their floors.

TABLE 2

Speaker	Number of floors assigned by PR	%	Number of self-selected floors	Total
AK	7.0	100%	0.0	7.0
AW	6.0	100%	0.0	6.0
ER	5.0	56%	2.0	9.0
GO	2.0	29%	5.0	7.0
HS	5.0	83%	1.0	6.0
PS	2.0	18%	9.0	11.0
Mean:	4.5		Mean: 2.5	7.7

Table 2 provides an overview of the total number of floors for each participant, and whether these floors were self-selected or assigned by PR or somebody else.

The participants differ remarkably in the number of floors they hold during the entire discussion.

AW and HS have little to say, AK and GO say neither a lot nor very little, while ER and PS have the largest number of contributions. PS and GO are seldom invited to make a contribution, but they do frequently contribute to the discussion (self-selection). In contrast, AK only speaks when invited to do so by PR. AW behaves in a similar manner. While he does try to speak on other occasions, he fails to get the floor. Most of HS's contributions are also made following invitations from the moderator. ER sometimes speaks after being invited by PR and sometimes after being invited by somebody else (PS) — he is the only participant who is invited to make a contribution by somebody other than the discussion moderator. Both the number of floors assigned to him by the PR and the number of his self-selected floors are relatively low as a consequence.

### Sequence of speakers

TABLE 3

Subsequent speaker	speaker					
	AK	AW	ER	GO	HS	PS
AK	1	1			2	3
AW	3			1		1
ER		2	1	2	1	2
GO		1	1		2	1
HS	1	1	1	1		1
PS	1		5	3	1	1

Table 3 shows “who speaks after whom” and “who responds to whom”. In other words, the columns indicate the reactions of speakers to previous speakers, for example, AK seems to respond the most to AW's statements, while he never responds to the statements of ER or GO, the two other NATO supporters in this discussion.

While AW never responds to the statements of PS, he does get the floor after each of the contributions of the NATO supporters. ER seems to be in a complementary position to AK, that is, he never succeeds him and responds in particular to one proponent of neutrality, PS. For GO, no clear preference for proponents of neutrality or NATO can be


discerned, while HS predominantly follows up on the NATO supporters. PS is the only participant to respond to all the other participants (he also has the highest overall number of floors), but he responds more to the NATO supporters than the proponents of neutrality.

The rows indicate which speakers followed a particular speaker. Thus, one can see that PS followed AK on three occasions. This was more often than any other participant. Further analysis of the data reveals that where PS did not immediately follow AK he often followed the subsequent speaker.

AK is the predominant speaker after AW. For ER no clear preference as regards the following speaker is discernible, but one concrete conclusion is that AK never follows him. For GO and HS we do not find any clear preference as regards the subsequent speakers. PS is mostly followed by ER or GO, that is by NATO supporters.

The above relationships are indicated in the following diagram (Figure 1). This diagram shows the sequence of contributions using arrows. The thickness of the lines indicates the frequency with which speakers followed other speakers. A count of frequencies was not included.

FIGURE 1



### Responding

The sequence of speakers does not clearly indicate the 'reactions' of participants to the contributions of a particular speaker or to the content of contributions. Speaker A might follow speaker B for a number of different reasons. To look more closely at the particular reactions, we also noted whether a contribution referred directly or indirectly to a previous contribution, for instance by referring to a particular previous speaker by name. The resulting table (table 4) confirms the general trends that have been established with regard to the sequence of speakers. However, there are slight modifications. Overall the distinctions indicated in table 4 are even greater than those indicated in the speaker-diagram.


TABLE 4

Speaker	Initiative	PR	AK	AW	ER	GO	HS	PS
AK		3		3				
AW		2			3	1		
ER	2	2		0,5				4,5
GO	2	1					1	3,0
HS	3	1	1			1		
PS	5	1			3	1	1	

The table shows once again that AK responds in particular to AW. However, we also find that AK makes an equal number of responses to questions posed by PR. AW is especially responsive to ER, who, in turn, responds mostly to PS. Similarly to ER, GO replies mostly to PS. HS shows no clear preference for any individual participant, but his responses are made exclusively to NATO supporters. PS has the highest number of contributions that are not made in response to previous contributions. At this point, we should note that PS frequently introduces topics in the form of questions instead of responding to issues that are already being discussed. Where a response is made by PS, it usually comes after a contribution by ER.

A diagrammatic representation results in the following impression (figure 2):

FIGURE 2



In comparison with the speaker-diagram, one particular difference may be noted: in figure 2 the participants can clearly be grouped into two separate groups — on one hand we have AK, AW and PR, and on the other we have PS, ER and GO. We think this impression is primarily due to the fact that AK and PS never “respond” to each other. Thus, we find that although PS frequently follows the contributions of AK, he never responds to

anything AK has said in a manner that questions AK's contribution. PS's statements are elaborative and enhancing. He adds the opinion or perspective of his party, which is in a coalition with AK's party, without indicating the differences between the positions of the two parties. He simply states their (common) point of view. Thus, at a thematic level (in the macrostructure), it frequently becomes obvious that both participants are discussing the same topic. Nevertheless, references to the preceding statements are rather indirect ("We are *also* of the opinion that ..."). There is no direct reference to the speaker. And there is also an absence of explicit disagreement as well as of direct strong agreement. PS's contributions are above all 'statements' directed at all of the participants. They tend to present the party's position, rather than move towards or away from AK.

### Conversing

Another important category which picks up aspects of the responsiveness of participants to each other is 'conversing'.

TABLE 5

Speaker	Having conversations with					
	AK	AW	ER	GO	HS	PS
AK	\					
AW	3	\	2	1		1
ER	1	2	\			5
GO				\		3
HS				1	\	
PS	3		3			\

An analysis of conversing clearly shows the monologue character of AK's contributions. He is never involved in 'conversations' with other participants; instead he makes his statements without getting involved with other participants. At the same time, he frequently converses with other participants — in particular proponents of neutrality — while they are holding the floor. In contrast to AK, AW gets into conversations with almost all of the participants while presenting his positions. He only gets into conversations with ER when the latter is stating his point of view (i.e. no one else is willing to react to AW's comments). ER is in turn mostly involved with PS, but he also gets into conversations with AW when the latter is speaking. Similarly, GO has discussions with PS when he (GO) is holding the floor, but he rarely gets into discussions with other par-

ticipants when they are speaking. HS is completely marginalized. Finally, PS most frequently converses with AK and ER.

To sum up, we find the following picture: the interactional dynamics reflect the 'battle-lines' between the proponents of neutrality and the supporters of NATO. Participants rarely react to contributions made by other participants who share their views. Most reactions are made to speakers of 'the other camp'. Almost everyone has his preferred 'opponent'. We see a symmetrical relationship between ER and PS, who follow each other, respond to each other and converse with each other. In contrast, the interactions between the other participants are predominantly asymmetric. AK is oriented towards AW, but AW reacts mostly to ER. PS frequently 'follows' AK in the flow of the discussion (which indicates that he is monitoring AK), yet he does not take any open stance towards AK's contributions. HS is completely marginalized (his contributions are usually also quite short) and his arguments are frequently ignored. In one instance, even the discussion moderator changes the topic after one of HS's statements.

GO is another marginalized participant. Mainly he reacts to ER (thus he is the only participant to respond to somebody holding the same position in the discussion),<sup>7</sup> but his own contributions are reacted to only by HS.

We consider this discussion, therefore, to be a typically party political one. The peculiarity of such discussions is that discussion participants (politicians and administrators) simply state their conflicting points of views and demarcate their topical 'territory', rather than giving reasons, challenging them, and working on an agreement. In the above discussion, the lay person and the journalist, who follow a different discursive strategy, remain mere observers of this process. The main axis of the discussion runs between PS and ER, who both make the highest number of contributions.

## Comments

One further aspect of 'reactivity' to a particular speaker is the number of comments which were evoked by the contributions of a particular speaker. (Naturally, the total number of contributions will to some extent vary according to length of time someone holds the floor.) Therefore, we have again opted for a categorical coding scheme — for each participant we noted the presence or absence of 'commenting acts' while someone else is holding the floor.

<sup>7</sup> One might explain this by the particular party affiliations of the two participants, which would usually place them in strong opposition to one another. As noted before, GO's opinion was rather unusual considering his party preference; and given the strong emotions of many intellectual socialists against the Freedom Party (FPÖ), it is not surprising that they should override the momentary thematic agreement.

TABLE 6

Commenter	Getting comments (per floor)										
	Speaker										
	AK	AW	ER	GO	HS	PS	Floor with no	%	total Floor	total Com	Com/Floor
AK		2	1	1	2	2	2	29%	7	8	1.14
AW	3		4	1	3	1	1	17%	6	12	2.00
ER	3	6		1	3	4	2	22%	9	17	1.89
GO	3	4	2		3	6		0%	7	18	2.57
HS				1		1	4	67%	6	2	0.33
PS	2	5	3	3	3		4	36%	11	16	1.45

In general, we can observe that almost all participants are to some degree commenting on each other, with the sole exception of HS, who is almost never reacted to. His contributions are silently listened to (or not), and afterwards we often observe a change in topic.

One speaker who seems to be particularly reacted to is GO, although we did not find reactions at the level of speaker-sequence or 'responding'. More than anybody else, PS comments on GO's statements, which is not surprising considering that GO often follows PS and responds to something PS has said. Thus, PS comments in turn on GO's response to him.

Another person who is strongly reacted to is AW; this time it is ER who gives comments more frequently than other participants. Again, we see the same interactional pattern as before: AW follows and responds to what ER has said, while ER in turn comments on AW's contribution.

To an extent AW foreshadows his later contributions by frequently commenting on ER's contributions. We might say that he tries to preselect himself as the addressee and next respondent. This strategy appears to be successful if we consider that although he never manages to select himself for a contribution, he does get his floors by assignation from PR.

Another person who is very active in his commenting on ER is PS. In fact, his overall involvement with ER is even higher than noted in the table, as his "comments" frequently lead to conversations (which do not figure in this table).

In contrast, PS's contributions are not commented on to the same degree (36% of his floors go by without any comment). However, as he also has the highest number of floors in the overall discussion, the overall attention paid to him during the whole discussion is not lower than for the other participants. Moreover, he is often engaged in conversations, which naturally lowers the frequency of his comments.

PS is most frequently commented on by AW; the "comments" of ER often lead into conversation. He himself is frequently commenting on the contributions of other participants, in particular upon the contributions of GO.

The arguments put forward in the case of PS cannot be applied to AK. On average there is only one commenting person per floor, and he does not engage in any conversation. 29% of his floors do not result in any comment. Taken together with the low number of responses, we find AK to be a rather peripheral participant in this discussion. His contributions are long, coherent and do not evoke any reaction. He is frequently commenting on the contributions of other participants without any discernible preference for any particular speaker.

### Attempts to take over the floor

Last but not least — and again in a categorical fashion — we looked at attempted interruptions. A turn was counted as an attempted interruption, if it was placed like a comment, but heeding it would have resulted in a change of topic, or would have shifted the interaction to another participant (than the one presently holding the floor), for example, by putting a question to a third participant.

TABLE 7

Interruptions							
Speaker	Interrupter						Total
	AK	AW	ER	GO	HS	PS	
PR		1	2		1	3	7
AK			1			1	2
AW	3		2	3			8
ER						3	3
GO			2				2
HS				1		1	2
PS		1		2			3
floor w/o Com	4	5	4	4	5	7	
%	57	83	44	57	83	64	
Total floor	7	6	9	7	6	11	
Attempted interruptions	3	2	7	6	1	8	
%	43	33	78	86	17	73	
Interruptions every xth floor	2.3	3.0	1.3	1.2	6.0	1.4	

Again we find that HS is the participant whose contributions are listened to without any reaction. Also a very low frequency of attempted interruptions can be found in the contributions of AW. It seems that in his case the high frequency of comments and responses indicated strong reactions which disputed what he was saying, and so little attempt was made to change the topic or change the main addressee.

As for AK, we interpret the low number of attempted interruptions again as indicator for his self-contained statements, which were not closely tied into the overall discussion.

GO, PS and ER all face a number of attempted interruptions. In detail, ER is interrupted by GO, who agrees with him and tries to take over the floor to elaborate what ER was saying, and he is interrupted by AW, who strongly disagrees with ER. PS is interrupted predominantly by ER (who disagrees) and by PR, who tries to control PS's relatively successful self-selections as the next speaker.

The main 'interrupters' are PR and AW. In that respect, it is telling that AW has more attempts to take over the floor than actual occasions in which he is holding the floor. AW is unsuccessful in his attempts to gain the floor by himself; we saw that in all his instances of holding the floor, it was assigned to him by the discussion moderator.

### Summary

In terms of the interactional dynamics, we do not find clear groupings by any characteristics — the politicians differ remarkably from each other, with AW trying to speak much more than he can and does, with AK given the word by PR and being only rarely interrupted, and PS who speaks a lot, self-selecting his turns, and who is very much in the focus of the discussion. The 'political lay person' HS, is slighted in the discussion, while the political observer GO stays on the fringe. Most of the discussion revolves around ER, an expert with a clear opinion and political preference. His main conversational partner is PS. Not surprisingly, people of the same opinion (see arguments), in general do not converse with each other.

If we split people into groups according to opinions (PS, AW and HS for neutrality; ER, GO for NATO; AK at odds with neutrality), we see that each of the groups has a prominent speaker: PS for neutrality and ER for NATO. In seeking AW as his main conversational opponent, AK affiliated himself implicitly with the pro-NATO group. However, he would not attack PS, he would not endanger the official agreement and cooperative political stance with his partner in the governmental coalition. How AK and PS managed to maintain the semblance of a uniform position for the duration of the discussion is what we want to look at in more detail now.

## Negotiating the coalition

A short time before this discussion, there was a significant change in the political situation in Austria. The former Austrian chancellor, Franz Vranitzky, resigned and Viktor Klima became the head of the Socialist Party and the new chancellor. Only about a month before the discussion analyzed here,<sup>8</sup> the new chancellor presented his government's program (*Regierungserklärung*). The People's Party declared its support for the new government and its readiness to continue the coalition under the new leadership of the Socialist Party. According to an article written at the time, the head of the People's Party was said to be astonishingly supportive and welcoming of the new chancellor.<sup>9</sup>

This constitutes an important context for the discussion. At the very time of the discussion, the parties of the coalition had been able to avoid a conflict that would have been damaging to the image of both parties. Now they wanted to show unity, and the desire and will-power to govern the country together. Yet the positions of the two parties regarding the measures that needed to be taken in order to preserve Austria's security, as well as their attitudes towards neutrality, were quite different.

In the following section, we will present the programmatic positions that were put forward by AK and PS in the discussion<sup>10</sup>. This will be followed by an analysis of a short transcript of each of them, which allows us to characterize them in terms of their linguistic or rhetorical strategies. The strategies used constitute another means for explaining why a particular position ends up as being interactionally more successful.

### *AK's programmatic position: Austria in a period of change*

The main tenor of AK's arguments dealing with neutrality was "change". "Neutrality has a different function today and we are facing a new order in Europe." "Neutrality used to be valuable, but it has a different meaning today, although it is still significant." This change is presented as the overall loss of importance or significance of neutrality.

At the same time, this change is accompanied by an overall change in European politics. The new developments in Europe, and in particular the outcome of negotiations within NATO are uncertain, and AK presents his party as cautiously waiting for the results of these debates before making a decision about neutrality.

Nevertheless, the overall framing of the discussion suggests a preference for joining NATO: "One may not see European politics as being simply European, we also see efforts to establish peace at the UN. In Europe it is not neutrality that is called for today,

8 *Die Presse*, 30. 1. 1997: VP-Sanftmut, ein "böser Geist" und "intellektuelle Hochseilakte"

9 *Die Presse*, 30. 1. 1997: Schlüssel nach dem "Down": Die letzte Chance der "Firma".

10 This might differ from the one put forward in other media.

but solidarity." "One should replace neutrality with active policies for peace." Moreover, AK believes in and stresses the necessity of military power as a means of enforcing peace and providing security. His orientation towards NATO is in general positive; his evaluations of NATO are all positive. (e.g. "NATO has never led a war.") Taken together with the summarizing statement presented in the preface to the whole discussion, "peace and security for Austria are of the utmost importance", this leads to the implicit conclusion that Austria should indeed join NATO, which is in line with the party's later official statement.<sup>11</sup>

*PS's programmatic position: An alternative future*

In contrast to AK, PS tries to uphold the meaning of neutrality for the present, yet frequently follows AK in the discussion (see below). He seems to respond to AK's skepticism concerning the current importance of neutrality: "Neutrality has still a considerable significance for our country." But for one statement: "Neutrality is our contribution to the effort to establish peace in the world", his arguments for neutrality are either oriented towards the past, highlighting former accomplishments, or question the alternatives. His stance towards NATO is skeptical. However, he rarely uses assertions to express his skepticism. Instead he raises doubtful and sometimes rhetorical questions, such as "Is it indeed the case that European security can only be won in cooperation with NATO?" In particular, he wants to strengthen the role of the UN and is worried by a strong NATO that is able to take action in the international arena without necessarily being bound by international law and political guidelines (in the manner of the UN).

His future vision of Europe strongly contrasts with that of AK; however, it is not directly bound to the issue of neutrality. For instance, PS can imagine a European security system "in which the different organizations are closely linked with each other and cooperate without everyone being part of each of the organizations involved."

In other words, while PS does not take a strong stance on neutrality (and can even imagine abandoning neutrality in the long run, depending on the European political situation), his idea of the possible future is quite different from that of AK. PS is much more oriented towards traditional international peace-keeping organizations, which are not military pacts. He favors the UN, the OSCE etc., and tries to bring alternatives to NATO into the discussion. In this, however, we judged him to be rather unsuccessful.

Each of the two politicians uses particular linguistic strategies to make their point and convince their audiences.

<sup>11</sup> *Die Position der ÖVP zur Zukunft der österreichischen Sicherheitspolitik. Beschluß des Bundesparteivorstandes der Österreichischen Volkspartei.* (Wien: Bundesparteivorstand, 14.7.1997).

## AK

“And I think the political petition is a really important matter, one that is to be taken seriously. The aim is — I think we all agree on this — that Austria should not participate in any war in the future as well — we don’t want a war at our borders, and we don’t want a war in Europe. And we don’t want Austrian soldiers abroad, and we don’t want any foreign soldiers in Austria, and in the end we all strive for the goal — I hope you do as well — mentioned in the biblical prophecy — that swords will be made into plough-shares and spears into ... — that this some-time, uh will come true. And THIS is the important question. And I think that neutrality — which has been of great benefit to us for many years — has a different meaning today, we are facing a new order in Europe (...) And we simply have to find out, if — everything is evolving this year, what — is the best way to reach the aims which I have mentioned. (...).

Of all the politicians present, AK proves to be the most prolific in his use of the all-inclusive “we”. In the quoted example, which is taken from his first contribution (right at the beginning of the discussion), he starts with a wish of “all Austrians”, and thus sets the stage for a discourse in which he can project the point of view of his party on to all of “us” and portray it as something all (sensible) Austrians would wish for. Thus it is no longer clear who is being referred to in the last sentence — who has to find out what is the best way — “we” Austrians (as in the preceding discourse) or “we” the People’s Party?

In this respect, AK’s language displays the typical features of political discourse in which the audience is drawn into the perspective of the speaker (Wilson, 1990). Frequently speaking about “we” Austrians, he occasionally slips into “we” the People’s Party, obliterating the different points of view.

Moreover, AK’s longer statements tend to be quite general and vague or otherwise hedged. For instance, “*we don’t want war at our borders*” is a common-sense truth which he uses to build up a line of argument that ends with the vague conclusion that neutrality has a “*different*” meaning today. In other places, where he takes a clear stance, he personalizes his position: “*because I am personally of the opinion that our national defense costs us a lot of money right now, we don’t spend enough to safeguard neutrality, but if we are members of a European peace-keeping system, we can probably save considerable costs.*”

AK frequently projects long statements and delays conclusions with insertions and digressions. This might — in conjunction with his vagueness, the “we-”discourse and the use of common-sense truths — explain the small number of interruptions and comments occurring during his statements.

## PS

“but in the meeting on Wednesday — and we were all there, all three of us — the issue was not neutrality itself, nor whether the existing law should be changed. Instead the debate was

whether your proposal — whether the text of the Volksbegehren — should be recommended or not. And all of the scientists who were there, and it was a hearing of scientists, you were there yourself, with these university professors who told us they were of the opinion that this text would not contribute anything to neutrality (...)"

"Most were of the opinion, and in particular my party as well, that, even if neutrality has changed, even if the politics of neutrality is changing, neutrality still has a significant meaning for our country; one should uphold neutrality, and everybody who wants to do away with neutrality should say what they would like to put in its place. And whether what they would put in its place would do the same for us, and would achieve the same things as neutrality. And not only in legal terms. Not only legally, and not only politically. But also in terms of the thinking and feeling of the people. And we may not — only one more sentence (to PR) — and we may not forget that neutrality also led to Austrians becoming active, that they cared about the world at a time when people used to think much more locally."

Although a politician himself, PS does not use the "we"-discourse to the same extent. In the first example, his "we" is much more oriented towards (some of) the participants in the discussion. In this sense, the TV-audience is only watching a debate among the participants in which they have no projected role. In Goffmanian terms they are overhearers rather than a targeted audience (Goffman 1981).

This tendency continues in the second excerpt, which constitutes a more programmatic presentation of the party line. In this statement, PS introduces his party's position with a particularization "most were of the opinion" and "my party" — but definitely not "all" and "everyone" and "we". That is, he presents his statement as a group of people thinking about "us", "the Austrians" and so on. In their perspective, neutrality is still of importance for "us". In this way the addressed audience, "the Austrians", tends to appear in the "patient position". It is not something active, but something that holds the recipient position. This stands in contrast to the active "they", who try to do away with neutrality. "They" is also presented as a group that threatens "us" by taking away the benefits of neutrality without necessarily replacing them with something equally good.

In this discourse, PS uses the only general "we" in this whole section. However, the reference to this "we" is rather vague. Does "we" mean the people in the discussion group he is asking not to forget? Is it the general TV audience? Since he continues with "led Austrians...", he makes a co-referential relation of "we" with "Austrians" rather unlikely, i.e. in general, "we" will not be interpreted to mean "we Austrians".

In short, in the whole section being presented here, PS does not use a single all-inclusive active "we" in his discourse. Instead, where it appears at all, "we" is the passive recipient of other people's doing. At the same time he presents rather straightforwardly his party and its position, in other words, in contrast to AK, he sets up his party as an entity

that is clearly separate from “the Austrians” and “we”. Thus, whereas AK tries to fuse both concepts into one, PS preserves the distinction and tries to portray his party as the one party that “serves” the people.

In studies of political discourse (Chilton & Schaeffner 1997), these different styles are frequently (and critically) interpreted as follows: the obliteration of the difference between the speaker and the audience, in the use of the all-inclusive “we”, leads to a loss of detachment on the part of the audience. Listeners or readers may simply accept what is being said if it must be processed immediately. However, in doing so, they do not only accept the position of the speaker, but also a point of view in which they are already situated. The discourse does not readily offer a position outside the discourse which can be used to evaluate one’s own position towards what is being said. Thus, it takes extra mental, cognitive effort to distance oneself and critically reflect on whether one truly is part of this “we” and believes in everything that “we” are said to do or to believe. If listeners do not make this extra effort (which often they will not), they will end up with a model which already incorporates unintentionally their own positioning, i.e. their “opinion”. Without further reflection and later critical examination of this model, the listener will in terms of beliefs and actions be informed by this model.

Thus, the use of the all-inclusive “we” proves (under these theoretical assumptions) a very potent political means — which is, in a critical perspective, termed “populist discourse” (because it tries politically to “convince” the viewers with implicit linguistic means).

In contrast, PS’s style of upholding the distinction between “the party” and “the people” affords a critical detachment which invites one to think about whether or not the party’s actions are in one’s own interests. This is often deemed the more ‘enlightened’ democratic discourse style. Nonetheless, in affording this distance, it is also considered less persuasive and less politically effective. In this discourse, it is the affiliation with the party ideology which takes active participation and reflection.

Thus, in terms of discursive studies of political discourse, AK’s style might be considered ‘populist’ and more successful, and PS’s style ‘morally superior’, yet politically less effective.

As we have already discussed, there are very few instances of AK and PS interacting with each other. Both tend to direct their contributions at other participants. However, in an attempt to assess how they dealt with the coalition issue in this discussion, we also looked at instances in which PS and AK did interact. We were particularly interested to find out how they managed disagreement and how they negotiated the coalition.

In total we found 26 segments in the texts in which PS and AK talk at the same time or in sequence. In four of these segments, their contributions are not related to each

other in terms of subject matter (i.e. they are made in response to the contributions of other participants). In one further case, AK comments on somebody else's remark to PS (who is holding the floor).

The remaining 21 segments can be grouped into four classes:

- Either PS or AK is talking about neutrality and the other one disagrees or tries to weaken the expressed position (of the other).
- Or one of them is talking about NATO, and again, the other disagrees or tries to weaken the expressed position (of the other).
- Or one of them is speaking on any other topic and the other one agrees.
- Or both are acting in mutual agreement and momentary support of each other while taking a stance against a third participant.

Speaker	Neutrality	NATO	Agreement	Collaboration against third party
PS	1	2	3 agreeing, 3 elaborating	8
AK	1	-	5 agreeing	

Thus, the two politicians of the coalition tend to cooperate with each other rather than actually enter into a debate, as long as the discussion does not concern their different points of view on "neutrality" or on "NATO". Even when the discussion does revolve around these last issues, differences of opinion are slight or indirectly expressed. This is shown in the following example, which contains the most elaborate interaction of all.

PS we may not forget that neutrality also led to Austrians becoming active, that they cared about the world at a time when people used to think much more locally,

AK but it is just this

PS their perspective for the larger issues

AK (issue xxxx) that the Swiss expert

PS and that is a good thing for a country. That is good for

AK has said that neutrality has lost its function.

PS country<

? yes

PR what should in

- AK in this matter.  
 PS the — Swiss expert (has) in this respect
- PR I:) (what should) (xxx) na=na m=m  
 PS be critical >(one) should talk about whether <
- PR (we)  
 PS that is indeed the case and what should be put in in the place of neutrality

In this example, AK contests PS's claim by quoting the opinion of an "expert". This way he can defer the responsibility for his refutation to this expert, it is not he himself, that is AK, who is contesting PS, but the opinion of somebody else, which stands in possible conflict with PS's statement. This move allows him to retain the image of joint action within the coalition, even while he is questioning PS. In response, PS does not start a debate about neutrality itself (as he could do), nor does he reject the content of the statement. Instead he redefines what was actually said in the reported statement. This, however, is a different matter altogether, and the two politicians may happily disagree or agree on this issue, without touching any of their respective party politics.

It is possible that both politicians were invited with the expectation that they would argue on some of the points. This might also explain why the discussion moderator, without any apparent reason, changes the topic at one point and asks AK about his party's position on neutrality. But, as already noted, AK's answer is quite cautious, and can be readily accepted by PS, who is only led to affirm when AK says that "the meaning of neutrality has changed (AK)", "but it still has one (PS)". In the same vein, we do not see PS making negative evaluative statements about NATO: potentially critical statements are, on several occasions, put forward as questions to ER ("Will we have to fight, if we join NATO?" "What does it REALLY cost?"). In general we thus observe that AK and PS do not confront each other. Their orientation towards each other and the difference of opinion show up in other aspects: (a) as was already demonstrated above, PS frequently tries to make a statement after a statement by AK, and (b) both of them chose other participants as opponents to whom they may react critically, and it is during interactions with these other participants that they express their positions. For AK the "opponent" is AW, while for PS it is ER.

*ER: an expert in conversation with PS.*

In the following, we shall briefly analyze the interaction of PS and ER, as it is ER (and his main conversant PS) who hold the floor for extended periods of time. ER's talk differs linguistically from that of both PS and AK. He displays a lot of features of expert speech (Kotthoff 1997; Wodak & Vetter 1999), which — at least in this interaction — proved to be a very effective register:

ER: Uh, something which NATO, uh, which neutrality most definitely is not — remember of parliament Wabl — is an up to date instrument of peace-maintenance. It is an ancient instrument of international law from a time when war was still an acceptable means. Since we joined the UN, there is no permissible war any more — This means neutrality does not provide an additional security to the status of a normal country. Because everyone has the right not to be attacked.

However, neutrality does add something in contrast to one not being neutral, and these are obligations. The obligation not to join a military treaty and so on. And also the obligation to pursue a policy of neutrality. It constrains — without yielding in turn any specific advantages.

And now to you, member of parliament Schieder. Naturally, you are completely right in that one has to respect people's feelings. And I know that it is easy for a security advisor to give good advice — but you then have to put it into action. This is a difference, I am well aware of that. Nevertheless, it is the function of a security advisor to be frank about the situation,

ER: and to state his reasons. In here we want to talk about the

PS: There must be a place for debates

ER: the dimension of "neutrality", which concerns national security, in this there are a lot of people who talk/understand something different. For some this is an important element of Austrian national identity, for others [...] and so on. Our neutrality, if conceived as a security instrument, is based on the federal law on neutrality and that states without doubt ...

ER's talk in this and other contributions features many of the characteristics of 'scientific' language (Dressler 1989; Wodak & Vetter 1999). He uses a number of indirect passive constructions (there is almost no "we" or "they", but frequent use of "one", where an agent isn't mentioned at all), many nominalizations (in German), and so on. Everything sounds factual. The speaker does not have opinions and points of view, but simply tells everyone the one and indisputable "truth", the "plain facts". When he mentions a range of opinions (about the possible meanings of "neutrality"), he restricts his point of view explicitly to the one which a security advisor would give. In other words, he is making explicit reference to his expertise (as a security advisor) and implicitly asserts that every security advisor would be of this opinion, as it is the only rational one in terms of a national security policy.

In the course of the discussion, ER is very successful in establishing his position as an expert. Although he is originally introduced as an individual who is affiliated to the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), throughout the discussion he is more and more explicitly ad-

dressed with reference to his function within the defense ministry. (At the beginning of the discussion he is often addressed as “Mr. Reiter”, but towards the end the specific administrative title of his position within the ministry is used).

As an expert with a seemingly impartial position, he can dismantle neutrality (as in the transcript shown above) without being contested by the other participants.

In interaction with PS, we see a change of the interactional style from the beginning of the discussion to the end. At the beginning, PS has a more antagonistic discourse behavior, which displays unmitigated disagreement, or refutations.

E.g. (example repeated from above)

ER: But, nevertheless it is the function of a security advisor, to be frank about the situation,

ER: and to state his reasons. In here we want to talk about the

PS: There must be a place for debates

ER: the dimension of “neutrality”, which concerns national security,

In this example, ER tries to assert himself as the impartial security expert. PS rejects this self-presentation, indirectly stating that there is more than just one point of view.

In the following discussion, PS raises critical questions at several points. In doing so he calls into question several assumptions forming the basis of arguments used by the supporters of NATO. His tone changes when he directs a long question directly to ER. Meanwhile, he actively seeks to establish common ground — things that they both agree upon (e.g. that NATO does have positive aspects), and addresses the question explicitly to ER in his function in the ministry. Already in the elaboration of that question, ER begins to participate in a collaborative manner in this discourse (see example).

PS: article five of the NATO-treaty

PR: what does this mean exactly?

ER: “Beistandsverpflichtung”

PS: which is the obligation to offer support

PS: all states, if they are attacked...

In his subsequent answer, ER explicitly exempts PS when attacking some opponents of

NATO. For most of the rest of the discussion, ER and PS collaborate in their interactions, even though they are still clearly of different opinions.

ER: all military measures of NATO are to be stopped as soon as the "security council" takes measures to ensure the restoration of order and security.

ER: this is very much

PS: So, at issue are the measures that are to be taken prior to the measures of the UN.

ER: aligned with the operations of the UN (xxxxxxx) uh

PS: But that means we would have to fight for them

ER: This could happen. If it came so far. Uh. Of course, this

ER: is possible theoretically. In practice, however, things look different.

PS: This is the question, yes.

ER: Who would attack NATO? And even more so: who would attack a larger NATO?

In addition, PS and ER would occasionally give each other interactional support, saying "of course", "sure", "yes", and the like. Throughout the following discussion, PS directs a number of additional questions at ER. He is the only participant who explicitly directs his questions at somebody. The questions usually contain the administrative title of ER, establishing him as the expert. Since PS addresses ER as an expert on national defense, his questions usually concern NATO (and costs, and so on), and do not deal with neutrality. Thus, as the principal speaker of the participants in favor of retaining neutrality (for the moment), PS helps to make NATO the dominant topic in this discussion at the expense of the topic of neutrality.<sup>12</sup> In addressing ER solely in his administrative expert function, he participates in co-constructing ER as the impartial expert, although his affiliation to the Freedom Party is known to everyone present. AW's protests remain unheeded when ER says:

PS: [...] Partnership for Peace in service of the UN — that is terrific. But you [ER] use that as a legitimization for article five. And is THAT right?

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12 The role of the moderator was important inasmuch as he allowed this topic to take hold of the floor, whereas he curtailed other people and their topics — e.g. AW. In restricting the access or the topic-definition of others, he did not give them the space to show their expertise and establish themselves with their favorite topic.

ER: Member of parliament Schieder, it is not ideology when I say that in the end you need to be able to defend yourself, to defend a collective; this is not philosophy but security policy.

In brief, in this conversation, the two main speakers (i.e. speakers with most floors) both end up talking most of the time about NATO, and the supporter of neutrality ends up deferring to the expert who supports NATO. Both stick to their positions, but overall NATO dominates the discussion. The NATO expert and supporter "ranks" higher than the supporters of neutrality.

Only a study of the reception of this discussion could discern the exact nature of the impression that was left on the audience. However, it seems reasonably clear that NATO was ultimately conceived as more important and effective than the concept of neutrality.

## Conclusion

Although both representatives of the main coalition parties present their position programmatically, they do not insist on the program or on the ideologies behind these programs<sup>13</sup>. In this paper we understand and define ideologies as clusters of beliefs and opinions (Fairclough & Wodak 1997). This leads us to conclude that the politicians of the governing parties avoid confrontation and seek instead to transfer the conflict to other participants in the debate. In one case, this transfer leads to a rather marginal discourse between a representative of the Green Party and the conservative politician. In another case, this transfer leads to an interaction between participants with different backgrounds and different interactional styles: namely a (military) expert and a politician. In the context of the topic under discussion, it is the expert whose style of speech proves to be more successful. Given that he is drawn into the discussion in his role as an expert, the topic becomes constrained by the particular expertise he displays. In this discussion, this leads to one topical side of the proposed discussion (neutrality and NATO) being much more prevalent in the discussion. In a theoretical account, in which topic-hood, i.e. sheer discourse presence, can sometimes be much more important than a particular stance towards a topic, this also means that the expert topic was quickly equated with "importance" and probably looked upon favorably.

We may suppose that the conservative politician, who is known for his eloquence, saw no need to involve himself in a problematic and "dangerous" dispute. He doubtlessly concluded that his party's attitudes towards NATO were being sufficiently well defended by the expert.

13 Yet we may assume that viewers of the discussion know these ideologies: they are thus presuppositions.

In brief, what we saw in this discussion was a strong identification of people with particular positions, a subsequent split of the participants into two opposing camps, and — with the support of the discussion moderator — the formation of a prominent speaker in each of the camps (highlighting their respective issues and downplaying the particular concerns of the other participants, e.g. costs for AW; peace for HS). In our analysis of how the coalition was maintained in this confrontation we saw a relocation of the "battlefield" (sanctioned by AK, who possibly did not see a need to intervene) to the interaction between the two main participants in this discussion: an expert and a politician. A shift from an interaction between politicians to an interaction between a politician and an expert (who stresses his role as expert) changes the "rules of the game"; expertise now becomes the main token of acceptability. Thus it is not surprising that NATO (whom the expert viewed favorably) became the main topic of the discussion and seemed to "win through".

What are we to make of this? Looking at the results of the focus groups, of the newspaper analysis and in particular the paper on opinion polls by Reinprecht & Latcheva (in this volume) suggesting a declining but overall still prevailing emotional attachment to neutrality, the success of the pro-NATO line in this show may seem surprising. However, we think that this success should not be attributed to the success of the concept (security provided by NATO) in general, but to the failure to communicate arguments in favor of neutrality. As shown in Reinprecht & Latcheva and also in the chapter on the focus groups, the neutrality discourse may be divided into two different discourses: a discourse on the historical meaning of neutrality, and a discourse on the political state of affairs. Using a literary metaphor, we may say that the latter discourse has not (yet) found its voice. Regardless of the emotional component, neutrality becomes infused through its historical significance, in direct confrontation and however, neutrality discourse is silenced out by the military NATO discourse.

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*Maria Heller · Agnes Rényi*

## JOINING NATO: THE ANALYSIS OF A TV-DEBATE ON HUNGARY'S ALLIANCE WITH NATO

The present article summarizes some aspects of a discourse analysis done on a TV-debate, which was broadcast on one of the Hungarian private commercial satellite channels: MSAT, on July 6<sup>th</sup>, 1997. The analysis was part of a larger research project carried out on several sets of corpora concerning the public debate about Hungary's NATO membership<sup>1</sup>. The televised debate fitted into a series of similar public debates in the electronic media, the printed press and also public meetings where the topic was discussed before the referendum on Hungary's NATO membership (November 16<sup>th</sup>, 1997).

The analysis aimed at describing discourse strategies of the different participants, their topic constructions, their way of establishing topic-links, their value-structures and techniques of argumentation. The concrete TV-debate also gave occasion for the exploration of how coalitions are formed during a discourse, how the choreography of opposing groups is executed, how different speakers support or attack each other. The analysis made it possible to explore the legitimizing and delegitimizing strategies of the two opposing groups.

### The MSAT debate (July 6<sup>th</sup> 1997)

This televised debate was broadcast in a weekly series of the MSAT channel under the title: *Címlapsztori* (Cover story). It lasted for 60 minutes, and opposing each other were two clearly distinct groups of public speakers. The cleavage between the two groups was constituted by the different answers they gave to the yes/no question regarding NATO membership. The participants were all public figures, either active politicians, representatives of civic organizations, or experts. The public was already acquainted with their standpoints in the debate because of their previous public appearances, and the spatial arrangement in the TV studio stressed the gulf between them. They were arranged in two opposing groups according to their viewpoints in the debate:

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1 M. Heller & A. Rényi: Public Debate in Hungary on the NATO Alliance. See in this volume, pp. 231–280.

On the pro-NATO side<sup>2</sup>:

PP: Pál Papp, an MP from the Hungarian Socialist Party, and member of the Parliament's Committee of Foreign Affairs.

DP: Péter Deák, a military expert, and researcher at the center of the Research Institute on Security Policy and Defense.

GYI: István Gyarmati, Deputy-Secretary of State of the Defense Ministry, in charge of NATO negotiations

WT: Tamás Wachslar, MP of the center-right FIDESZ party, member of the Parliament's Military Committee.

On the anti-NATO side:

CST: Tamás Csapody, sociologist, and President of the Alba Circle, a pacifist, anti-militarist civic organization.

CSI: István Csurka, writer, and President of the extreme-right (Le Pen type) MIÉP party, not represented in Parliament at the time of the debate.

VA: Attila Vajnai, Vice-President of the Munkáspárt (Workers' Party, a non-parliamentary left-wing party, descendent of the former state-party: MSZMP)

BR: Rezső Bányász, a left-wing senior politician, former diplomat and government spokesman during the Kádár period, and President of the Foundation for a Neutral Hungary (Semleges Magyarországért Alapítvány), a small and rather weak left-wing civic organization.

The debate was orchestrated by a moderator who sometimes addressed the speakers and asked them questions. He is neither well-known, nor a professional communicator, and his political views or opinions on the topic were not expressed.

The scene of the debate was arranged in a rather peculiar way stressing the dividing line between the two opinion-groups. The moderator stood in the middle and the four pro-NATO and four anti-NATO speakers stood in opposing rows behind two high counters, (a red and a blue one respectively), a copy of the type that can be found in low-class, ill-famed Hungarian pubs. This setting lent a rather vulgar connotation to the whole debate, making it look like a pub quarrel or a quarrel between supporters of two opposing football clubs. (The use of the two colors, red and blue, contributed to this connotation). Apart from generating such uncontrollable and bizarre connotations, the setting also implied two things: it opposed four persons in each of the two groups, and thus concealed the differences which exist among the participants in both groups. The equal number of participants in each group also gives the false idea that the two groups are

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2 With positions held during the time of the debate.

equally important, or have a similar distribution among the population, which is, to put it mildly, a highly dubious supposition.

Moreover, the two counters were set in an unnatural position: because of the technical constraints of a manifestly poorly equipped television studio, the two opposing groups did not face each other. They were set next to each other facing the camera and the moderator stood in the same line between the two groups. This setting caused an unnatural space for discussion, and the participants were visibly frustrated by it<sup>3</sup>. There was also another detail in the setting which further deepened their frustration: there was not enough space for four people behind the counters, so they kept bumping into one another. The counters were also too high, and the speakers behind them could not use them as tables and could not put their papers on them. The counters were just suitable for the speakers to rest their elbows on them. This bodily position also contributed to the pub-style setting of the whole TV program.

Our analysis of the TV debate concerning the participation of the eight speakers shows that the debate is quite equally distributed between the two opposing sides if one considers the number of speech turns<sup>4</sup> on each side. (See Table 1)

TABLE 1: *Number of turns by speakers*

Pro-NATO side	no. of contributions	Anti-NATO side	no. of contributions
PP	19	CsT	20
DP	21	CsI	25
GyI	23	VA	24
WT	16	BR	12
TOTAL	79	TOTAL	81

The anti-NATO side has somewhat more turns, but the difference between the two groups is relatively small. However, there are more important differences between the individual speakers. We will try to explain these individual differences by examining the different speech strategies which can be extrapolated from the individual speakers' contributions. But let us first consider the results of the analysis of the total length of individual contributions.

3 Their frustration and uneasy feelings could easily be detected by observing their bodily movements, gestures and other behavioral patterns.

4 We counted an individual speech turn whenever a speaker had the opportunity to make an accountable contribution, a whole sentence, or an understandable utterance.

There are characteristic differences concerning the total length of contribution by the different speakers<sup>5</sup>. These results show that despite of the advantage of the anti-NATO group in the number of turns, the pro-NATO group spoke more during the debate. (See Table 2)

TABLE 2: *Total length of contributions* (calculated according to transcript lines)

PRO-NATO SIDE	LENGTH IN LINES	ANTI-NATO SIDE	LENGTH IN LINES
PP	129	CsT	113
DP	103	CsI	71
GyI	78	VA	92
WT	63	BR	43
TOTAL	373	TOTAL	319

The difference in length between the two groups is 54 lines, which accounts for 7.8% of the total length of the debate (692 lines, without taking into consideration the few questions from the moderator.)

The average length of contributions was also calculated for each individual speaker as well as for the two opposing groups. Here again, there are important differences between the different individual speakers, as well as the two groups. (See table 3)

TABLE 3: *Average length of contributions* (transcript lines)

PRO-NATO SIDE	AVERAGE LENGTH	ANTI-NATO SIDE	AVERAGE LENGTH
PP	6.8	CsT	5.7
DP	4.9	CsI	2.8
GyI	3.4	VA	3.8
WT	3.9	BR	3.5
TOTAL	4.7	TOTAL	3.9

The results shown in the previous tables display differences of speech strategies used by participants in the debate. In the pro-NATO group the two experts (DP and GyI) have the highest number of turns. PP, the political figure, and representative of the biggest coalition party (MSZP), closely follows them. Although he has slightly fewer turns, he is the person who speaks most in the debate (129 lines, see Table 2) and he also has the highest score in the average length of turns (6.8, see Table 3). His role is to defend and

<sup>5</sup> The *Total length of contribution* was the sum total of the number of lines of each contribution of each individual speaker in the program calculated according to the transcription of the debate.

explain the official policy of the government and his party, and this discursive task explains his long contributions. The differences between the two experts, DP and GyI can be explained by the fact that DP, being a military expert, gives explanations on military questions, which necessitates some time (here: space), while GyI, the diplomat, intervenes with short, sometimes ironic answers when the government's defense policy or diplomatic relations are attacked. WT has fewer turns and his total contribution is considerably shorter. This can be explained by the fact that although he and his party (FIDESZ) agree on Hungary's NATO entry, because it is an opposition party, his discursive task is more ambiguous. He is not there to defend the government's military or diplomatic policy.

In the anti-NATO group CsI is the most active in taking turns in the debate, while BR is by far the least active. While CsI has more turns than CsT, this latter speaker speaks considerably more volubly than CsI, who is even behind VA in total length of contributions. Here again, different speech strategies can be detected: CsI, the extreme-right party leader, has constructed a discursive strategy to challenge the government's policy as well as the consensus of all parliamentary parties concerning NATO membership. This discursive goal is best attained by numerous but short, un-argued attacks, like the strategy in a guerrilla war. He uses short turns to advance radical attacks with un-argued short utterances to delegitimize the government's policy in many different sub-topics. CsT's strategy is different. Being a well-known intellectual, and president of a civic movement, his challenging strategy is to take up many different topics, including some of the most sensible in the debate (values, universal principles). He uses his argumentation to point out negative consequences of NATO membership, contradictions in the government's policy or argument, weak points in public consensus, or the main reasons for hesitation among the population. His discursive strategy is highly argumentative. VA's strategy is quite similar, with the exception that some of his turns are quite short attempts to publicize his party's political views — views which are then quickly rejected by all participants. BR, the least active in the whole debate from all points of view, does not have a very strong discursive position: he represents a very weak, nearly invisible left-wing movement and he himself belongs too clearly to the nomenclature of the former Kádárist political establishment. This position destabilizes his discursive activity. In addition to this, his argumentation is too narrow and too closely rooted in the former state-socialist ideology.

### The introduction of new topics

All the participants tried to introduce new topics or sub-topics in the course of the debate. This is an important part of the speech strategy of each speaker, especially in a debate, where many opposing standpoints or discursive positions are represented. With the

introduction of new topics a speaker can attempt to prove to the audience his or her competence, public commitment, cognitive and discursive qualities, and can proceed to the elaboration of a discursive capital, containing topic constructions, modes of speech, argumentative modes, and so on. At the same time, the construction of public topics can give an occasion to the speaker to proceed to the delegitimization, and destabilization of opposing standpoints and the deconstruction of opposing speech strategies.

Our analysis of the TV debate shows typical results concerning the introduction of new topics or sub-topics<sup>6</sup> by each speaker in the course of the debate.

TABLE 4: *Introduction of new topics<sup>7</sup> or sub-topics by each participant*

PRO-NATO SIDE	NEW TOPICS	ANTI-NATO SIDE	NEW TOPICS
PP	16	C&T	12
DP	5	C&I	11
GyI	2	VA	11
WT	4	BR	7
TOTAL	27	TOTAL	41

Beyond the individual cases it is interesting to note here that the anti-NATO group is more active in broadening the domain of discourse by introducing new topics. The introduction of new topics constitutes an attempt to take control of the definition of the legitimate topic of the discourse, and to impose one's own topic construction on the other speakers. It represents an attempt at discursive control over a topic, and also an attempt at self-presentation in the role of a competent public speaker. The speakers who manage to introduce new topics are successful in defining or at least modifying the course of the debate; by specifying their own points of view, putting constraints on the other participants by pushing rival topic constructions into the background, and thus redesigning the discursive playground. A newly introduced topic is not automatically accepted and discussed by the other participants, it is always a proposition or a claim that might be rejected or accepted depending on the distribution of forces present in the situation of communication. Our analysis found only a small number of rejected topic introductions.

6 The overall general theme of the whole debate is NATO-entry. This general theme has its own topic construction, i.e. its internal structure constituted by the main topics of the debate: e.g. legitimacy of the decision, the geopolitical situation, NATO-image, and so on. These topics and their constitutive sub-topics will be treated below.

7 Topics and sub-topics will be described below.

For example, VA twice attempts to introduce the sub-topic of mobilization for a referendum initiated by his party<sup>8</sup>. On one occasion he also tries to introduce the fact that his own party initiated a movement for neutrality together with other Central European forces, but all three attempts at topic introduction fail. It is clear that all of the three remarks are attempts to increase the visibility of his party, and it is no wonder that the other participants reject his strategy.

Another example is CSI, a well-known writer and representative of the extreme-right, who also attempts to start a discussion of one of his favorite topics. He tries to trap the other participants into entering one of his own familiar symbolic domains: by mentioning the World Bank as "our worst enemy" he evokes his favorite amalgamated scapegoat, the international liberal judeo-bolshevik-plutocratic conspiracy.

But this topic proposition is also left without any reactions, even negative. The participants in this debate are not open to this level of ideological discussion, they are on a different, more pragmatic level. They are more concerned about the concrete decisions and alternatives concerning the topic at hand. As a general remark on this particular TV-debate, we could say that it was ideologically rather weak, unlike other public debates in Hungary, where ideological topics are more often treated and discussed than pragmatic ones (See Table 12 below).

Table 4 shows that the anti-NATO group is significantly more active in introducing new topics. Most of the new topics taken up by this group of speakers are intended to delegitimize the NATO-consensus or the government's policy. These newly introduced topics are sometimes just short utterances, thrown in at random, or evoking an issue already publicly debated. The pro-NATO speaker who introduces the highest number of topics of all the speakers is PP, who initially has the opportunity to introduce many topics at the beginning because he is the first person to speak, and later because he is the person who speaks most (see Table 2).

### Topics and sub-topics in the debate

In order to analyze the distribution of the different viewpoints and the discursive strategies in detail, we proceeded to a detailed categorization of the topics treated by the speakers in our corpus. In the following chapter the results of the analysis of the TV-debate will be presented according to the main topics and the sub-topics discussed by the participants. The overall general theme of the debate was identified as "HUNGARY'S NATO-

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8 At the time of this televised debate it had not yet been decided that there would be a referendum on NATO-entry. The representative of the Workers' Party tries to forge a symbolic profit out of the fact that they had gathered public support for a referendum.

ENTRY". Our analysis of the debate made it possible to identify the interior structure of the general theme: the different topics and sub-topics as they were constructed and used by the different speakers. Topics are elaborated by the speakers in order to specify their own viewpoints, and to construct their own discourse about the general theme. This means that the global theme of NATO-entry was discussed along the dimensions described by the thematic constructions constituted by the different topics. These different topic constructions, sorted in the analysis, are displayed in the tables that follow.

Each table treats one topic with its constitutive sub-topics (horizontal lines), showing (vertical columns):

- the total occurrence of the topic and its sub-topics,
- the distribution of the topic and sub-topics among pro and anti-NATO speakers,
- the value assignment of each category (whether the different speakers attach a positive, negative or neutral value to them). In this part of the analysis connotation and context were taken into account.

The analysis was conducted at the level of sentences. The methodology of the analysis consisted of assigning scores to the topics and the sub-topics according to their use by the participants. A topic or a sub-topic was given a mark each time it was thematized in a sentence. The hierarchy of topics and sub-topics was elaborated through the general rule that topics are more general categories than their sub-topics. Scores were assigned according to the rule that whenever a sub-topic was clearly thematized or mentioned concretely during the debate, it received a mark. When a participant mentioned the topic in its general sense, a score was assigned to the general topic.

Value assignment was carried out according to the context and connotation the speaker expressed concerning each topic or sub-topic. Positive, negative and neutral assignments were differentiated in the hope that they would help to find the characteristic features of the different discourses. As a general rule, positive and defending discourse was characteristic of the pro-NATO side and negative, delegitimizing, or challenging discourse of the anti-NATO side.

In our detailed analysis careful attention was paid to how different speakers supported or rejected each other's discourse. For each sentence the anaphoric relationships were identified to determine temporary coalitions, negotiations, hostility, and denunciation, and to establish the topics, sub-topics or value-assignments to which support or rejection was directed.

### *1. Legitimacy of the decision to join NATO.*

This topic was largely debated in the course of the public discussion carried out several months before the referendum. It also figures prominently in the TV-debate. This cate-

gory includes questions concerning sub-topics of political relevance. The main topic crystallizes around procedural questions at a meta-level. Discourse belonging to this category thematizes problems concerning the rules of the political discussion and rules of decision-making. (What procedures should be followed to decide about the alternatives of entering NATO or staying outside the alliance? Should the dilemma be decided through referendum, parliamentary consensus, or public debate? Does it necessitate a nation-wide publicity or propaganda campaign? What procedures can legitimize such decisions?)

The most important alternatives of the question are described in the sub-topics:

a) Consensus: this sub-topic treats problems of the following kind:

- there should be consensus before such an important move,
- there is consensus among all parliamentary parties,
- nation-wide consensus should be attained,
- there is no consensus in the population,
- and so on.

b) referendum:

- only a referendum can bring a decision on such an important question,
- there will be a referendum,
- certain parties have already gathered public support for a referendum,
- the present government will not hold a referendum,
- it is not important to have a referendum,
- and so on.

c) public information:

- is the question being sufficiently debated by the public?
- does the public get enough data and information for discussion, or does it just get propaganda?
- is the media activity concerning the problem sufficient?
- and so on

d) government activity:

- does the government give enough information or does it only throw one-sided propaganda at the population?
- government propaganda is too expensive and biased,
- the government does its best to give the public sufficient and comprehensive information,
- the government has a clear policy,
- and so on

In the following table (Table 5) the occurrence of the topic "Legitimacy of the decision" and its sub-topics have been accounted for as follows: their occurrence in contributions of pro- or anti-NATO participants; and the co-occurrence of each of the sub-topics with their positive, negative or neutral signifiers, connotations or context.

Value assignments took into consideration the speaker's open or hidden value judgements, and positive or negative connotations in a particular context. Consider the following examples:

- \* A positive value is assigned to the sub-topic of referendum in the following sentence of CsT:

*"It is very important that a referendum should be held about Hungary's NATO entry."*

- \* A neutral case of the referendum in PP's utterance:

*"... there are debates about it (i.e. the referendum) and it is a fact that so far there has only been one country, Spain, where a referendum decided about NATO entry ..."*

- \* A negative connotation is assigned to the referendum in WT's utterance:

*"[While there are no exact details],... the referendum is, if I put it mildly, just misinformation, but if I want to give it a sharper formulation then it is a political provocation or a bluff."*

TABLE 5: *Distribution of contributions about the legitimacy of the decision*

	Topic, subtopics	Items	pro	anti	positive	neutral	negative
1.	Legitimacy of the decision	3	1	2	1	0	2
1a.	consensus	2	2	0	2	0	0
1b.	referendum	20	8	12	13	4	3
1c.	public information	17	5	12	4	1	12
1d.	government activity	25	6	19	5	1	19
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>36</b>

The legitimacy of the decision of joining NATO is judged differently by the two sides (the general time-context of the debate is still before calling the referendum): this whole topic is mainly cultivated by the anti-NATO group, (45 occurrences out of 67). It gives the opposition an opportunity to depict and thus delegitimize the pro-NATO policy of

the government as non-democratic, propagandistic, and manipulative. This topic is mainly directed against the ruling coalition and its institutions rather than against opposition parties, which also agree on joining NATO.

The pro-NATO side is rather passive and defensive on this topic, (22 occurrences out of 67). Their passivity can perhaps be explained by the fact that they rely on the parliamentary consensus of the six parties, and the apparent evidence of this political consensus might nourish their conviction that most factions of the population also agree on joining NATO. At the time of the debate the government had not yet decided clearly about the referendum: it was quite ambivalent, especially because certain parties of the opposition would have liked to include questions concerning the ownership of the land. This political struggle leaves the pro-NATO side with little to say on this topic, a situation that is deepened by the fact that speakers close to coalition parties also try not to thematize the activity of the government and the parliament about the question of "the legitimacy of the decision".

While the pro-NATO speakers base their argument on the consensus between the six parties, the anti-NATO group try to delegitimize the reference to the consensus by calling attention to the lack of a referendum. The four anti-NATO speakers represent political groups which are all outside of the parliament. In their discourse they construct an opposition between the political elite (the establishment, the parliamentary parties, etc.) and the public (the nation for CsI, the citizens for CsT), and they all insist on the subtopic of the referendum because they see in it the possibility for a political mobilization and activity which is outside the Parliament and where they can all gain ground in opposition to the established political elite. A referendum is demanded by all four participants of this group, but of course they all argue from different positions.

- CsI uses the fact, that the pro-NATO political forces as well as the ruling coalition are rather ambivalent at this time about the referendum. He makes a connection between the topic of the referendum about NATO membership and the topic of the election of the president through a referendum, a topic which is judged negatively by the government.

*"The government, or rather the two parties<sup>9</sup>, do not want to create a precedent, this is why they do not want to call for any referendum, because then the president should also be elected by a referendum and they do not want that at all."*

9 The ruling coalition at that time: MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party) and SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats)

CsI constructs a delegitimizing argument, showing that the political elite and the government are against the referendum and thus he hopes to prove that the government is antidemocratic.

- The arguments of the Left-wing (Workers' Party) and the pacifists (Alba Group) presumably meet here because implicitly they both hope that in the case of a referendum the majority of the population would vote against NATO membership.

The high scores for the two sub-topics "public information" and "government activity", and especially the fact that they are mainly taken up by anti-NATO speakers, show that these two sub-topics are especially apt for delegitimizing the government. The sub-topic "public information" gets 12 negative values because here the anti-NATO group expresses its belief that instead of real information, only propaganda and manipulated figures are made available to the public. The 19 negative scores for government activity also accuse the government of unwillingness to take into consideration the will of the population, and of concealing the real figures, and so on.

*"What is going on here is juggling, the bewildering of the population. It should be ended." (CsT)*

*"This is only party propaganda, the propaganda of the government." (CsI)*

*"We have no role whatsoever in this. Nothing else is happening in this debate. The question of NATO hasn't been with us for long: this is just because of the gentle, concealed or even feverish party propaganda that is going on." (CsI)*

## 2. NATO-image

Table 6, below, summarizes the NATO-image presented by the different speakers. Under this category we took into consideration all utterances expressing the different speakers' general description and judgement on NATO's inherent features, either in general, or in particular (i.e. as a value-based community, or as an alliance based on mere interest.) The meaning of these categories is rather ideological if compared with the other topics. It became clear from the analysis that an underlying opposition can be found here between interest and value. The opposition between the viewpoints of the pro-NATO and anti-NATO group concerns the different speakers' attributive suppositions as to NATO's motives for accepting new members. The topic is treated by the two sides in a dual framework: NATO is either a value-based community aiming at the extension of stability, democracy and security, or it is an interest group busy trying to ensure its own interests in new parts of the world.

NATO-image in general is treated in topic 2, while the dual framework is to be found in the two sub-topics. Sub-topic 2a consists of expressions and statements about NATO's standing for universalistic values like democracy, justice and lawfulness. In some of the discursive constructions NATO appears in a highly idealized representation, the defender of values of human civilization, an image close to that of a "good crusader".

*"... the countries which considered liberty, legal rights and democracy as basic values created this alliance, the alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty, as the institutional representative of these values, so I would insist once more that it is a value-community" (PP)*

The opposing sub-topic 2b encompasses statements about NATO being an interest-based institution, serving the (economic, political, military) interests of its members. This is nearly always treated negatively.

*"It is a question of business, dirty business. They want to push us somewhere where a lot of weapons have to be bought, and on credit." (CsI)*

TABLE 6: Distribution of contributions about NATO-image

Topic, subtopics	total	pro	anti	positive	neutral	negative
2. NATO-image in general	23	15	8	10	6	7
2a NATO as value-community	8	7	1	7	0	1
2b NATO as interest group	21	1	20	1	0	20
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>28</b>

The topic is treated by both sides, although the anti-NATO side is somewhat more active in dealing with it. More than half (28) of the 52 occurrences of topic 2 give a negative image of NATO. Most of these (20) conceive of NATO as an interest-oriented organization. NATO was described as a value-community 8 times (of which 7 were positive).

There are 10 positive contributions about the NATO-image in general (topic 2), and most of these talk about facts concerning the actual organization of NATO. This type of discourse uses rational argumentation, or concrete expert categories making allusions to concrete facts and data, and can most typically be found in contributions from experts:

*"the standard of modernization appears in the organization of a modern army", "... modern military technology, flexible structures, mobility suitable for dealing with crises, ..., such armies can only be found westward from us" (DP)*

There were 7 occurrences of explicitly positive, idealized NATO-images (2a), which depict NATO as the carrier of such universal values as democracy, constitutionalism, liberty and "Europeanness". These utterances, in contrast to the former ones, are highly ideological and are made by political actors.

According to a particular division of discursive roles, certain pro-NATO speakers affirm that NATO is a value-based union characterized by democracy, constitutionality and freedom (PP). This argument is connected with the sub-topic, according to which NATO is becoming less and less a military and more and more a political organization, within which democracy is the norm. This indicates an estrangement from the earlier (socialist) official propaganda, which gave a revenge-oriented, military NATO-image, which is probably still very alive in the minds of the participants as well as in parts of the audience. So if they argue that NATO is less and less a military organization, this can only be a positive argument here, as otherwise an organization for security policy can rightly be expected to be a military organization. The weakening of the military character is related to the end of the bipolar world and to the lack of military threats or dangers. The pro-NATO side want the people to see NATO as an organization under transformation in which both its inner structure (democratic), and its role (stabilizing, peace-making) are positive. Other pro-NATO speakers, politicians, government officials also talk about NATO positively but with completely different sub-topics: not universal values but pragmatic details.

In total, there are 28 highly critical, negative opinions against 18 positive ones, and most of the positive comments are less expressive, showing a weaker expression of the speaker's personal commitment than in the case of the negative statements. This finding can be explained by the fact that topic 2, just because it concentrates on the speakers' opinion of NATO, is one of the playgrounds where the well-known discursive game of legitimization / delegitimization takes place. Anti-NATO speakers construct a negative, repellant image using techniques of denunciation, discursive annihilation, and a whole symbolic arsenal which gives them the possibility to excel in rhetoric. NATO as an interest group is overwhelmingly mentioned with negative connotations. There is only one case where NATO as an interest-based organization is treated positively: GyI is the only speaker who gives a realistic interpretation of interest, and so does not fit into the aforementioned dual framework.

*"In my opinion, NATO has only one big interest in its enlargement, [...], that it will be able to perform its new function, a function which is really taken seriously — the extension of stability. NATO has no other interest whatsoever, but this is a rather realistic interest because the security of the actual members of NATO, the stability of Europe, depends on whether there will be stability and security in this region." (GyI)*

All other participants (both in the pro- and anti-NATO group) agree either explicitly or implicitly on an underlying assumption which defines NATO as an interest-based institution. They question the real representation of constitutionality and democracy, on which NATO's characterization as a value-based organization is based in the discourse of the pro-NATO speakers. NATO, according to them, is an alliance serving the interests of its members, and this standpoint fits well with the conviction of the participants that the question of Hungary joining NATO should also be weighed according to the country's own interests. This general assumption shared by most participants (certain utterances of CST, BR and PP offer a few exceptions) explains why the whole debate is characterized by utilitarian and pragmatic considerations and arguments<sup>10</sup>. It can be said as an overall observation that the whole debate revolves around rational considerations and not around the choice of abstract values or principles.

Anti-NATO denunciation is often built on the discursive technique of confrontation of abstract principles and concrete facts. This is the case in the present debate when the membership of Turkey is set against the value-principles of democracy and justice. The argument of the anti-NATO side is that the NATO-member Turkey does not respect human rights and the values of bourgeois democracy, and that NATO puts up with this (CsT, VA). (As an answer to this WT advances the argument of the independence of member states within NATO, i.e. the fact that NATO cannot interfere with the internal affairs of its members.) A counter-argument of the anti-NATO side: the geopolitical situation does count inside NATO, so interests and strategies and not abstract values and principles govern the organization. (VA)

*"If it were true that political democracy and the defense of human rights were [...] one of the main structural principles of NATO, then Turkey would not have a place in NATO." (VA)*

NATO is seen by all anti-NATO speakers as an interest-based organization. They are divided on the question of which interest is the most central: military ("*NATO is basically a military organization*", (BR)), political or economic. The military character is seen by most participants as clearly negative. If it is a military organization then its primary interests are in the selling of arms and the enlargement of the military arsenal (CsT, CsI). Its character as an interest-based organization is indicated by the fact that it aims at exclusion, killing solidarity and the exploitation of the new applicants.

*"NATO needs us so that we could buy their weapons" (CsI)*

<sup>10</sup> There are, of course, differences as to how the participants define Hungarian interests.

NATO's character as a value-based organization is denied most radically by CsT, who bases his argument on general, universal values.

*"it serves the interests of the white people of the North", "we leave our old friends, the Baltic states in the lurch [...], this is a betrayal of the social-democratic values of solidarity, justice and equality" (CsT)*

On the other side, the creation of a positive image does not provide the same possibility of rhetoric power: indeed, pro-NATO speakers feel more uneasy in their attempt to construct a positive image or positive, convincing arguments: among 15 pro-NATO topic constructions for topic 2, only 10 are positive. This may be the result of several converging problems: a general discursive constraint, the lingering ghost of NATO's former negative image, and the difficulty some speakers may have had in constructing a positive image for a military organization at all. As to the first reason mentioned above concerning the general discursive constraint, we can observe that commendatory texts are generally rather close to apology, and the dividing line between the two types is rather narrow. The role of a laudatory speaker is not always comfortable, and this may make some of the pro-NATO speakers in this debate feel somewhat embarrassed. Some pro-NATO speakers try to avoid an overly strong commitment, and try to keep some distance, and so their identification with the topic, and their engagement with it, is somewhat ambiguous or hesitating. At some points, anti-NATO speakers gripe about the weak points of the adversaries' positive discourse and construct ironical ripostes by turning their statements upside down, taking them in the literal meaning or pushing them to the extreme. While pro-NATO speakers try to avoid the use of overly idealistic terms, the ironic counter-discourse pushes them towards apology, such as when CsI asks the following question after a pro-NATO value-community had been argued for:

*"Is it a Bible-circle then?" (CsI)*

### *3. The relationship between Hungary and NATO*

This topic deals with the type of relationship the speakers see or suppose between Hungary and NATO. In most of the topic-constructions under this category, the relationship is assumed to be based on interest, the question being whether its character is economic, political, military or ecological, as reflected in the sub-topics. The main discord between the two sides, however, concerns the assumption about whether the interests are only NATO's own, or whether Hungary's interests are also being taken into consideration. This gap strongly defines the distribution of the positive / negative scores in Table 7. Here NATO's interests, in most cases, are judged negatively, but Hungary's interests are considered as legitimate and thus valued positively in most cases. This accounts for the bipolar distribution of positive and negative scores in the following table.

TABLE 7: *Distribution of contributions about the character of the NATO-Hungary relationship*

	Topic, sub-topics	total	pro	anti	positive	neutral	negative
3.	Nato-Hungary rel.	7	5	2	5	0	2
3a.	financial, economic	30	10	20	8	4	18
3b.	political	8	5	3	4	1	3
3c.	military	14	7	7	6	1	7
3d.	ecological	3	0	3	0	0	3
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>33</b>

In dealing with the NATO-Hungary relationship and its character, the anti-NATO group is more active: they take 35 turns, while the pro-NATO speakers take only 27 turns. The speakers provide more thoughts on the economic character<sup>11</sup> of the relationship between Hungary and NATO (30 of the total of 62 utterances in the category), than to any of the other sub-topics describing the possible types of relationship between NATO and Hungary. Even the evidently logical relationship — the military one — is granted much less attention in the debate, (14 out of 62). These results clearly highlight the underlying tendency that characterized both the public debate in the country, and also the main motivations of the political forces in the process of integration. The main driving force in the willingness of Hungarian political actors and the population for NATO-membership can be found in the long-standing desire to belong to the West (or to return to it, as certain public speakers put it). Joining NATO, in this process, is seen as the first step towards the most desired stage of integration: entry into the EU. This widely shared hope and belief can also be detected in the public debate, and in the official propaganda on NATO-entry. There is a general conflation of the two topics in the official discourse. It is also clear that while there are political, cultural and other facets of the willingness to belonging in the West, the most important motivation is economic. The importance of this motivation can well be measured through the high scores of sub-topic 3a. It is also quite clear that in general, NATO's value assignment is less positive than the EU's. NATO-membership is often regarded as a necessary price to pay to attain the more desirable EU-membership. This difference in evaluation can be detected in the following utterance:

<sup>11</sup> Questions concerning economic interests of both NATO and Hungary in the alliance are treated under this sub-category.

*"I would most respectfully claim that it should not be stated that NATO is a pacifist peace-organization... When it is said that it is an institution for security, a lot of things are hidden. I think it would be correct to say that it is a military and political institution. And inside this, regarding its coercive means, it is predominantly a military organization. Otherwise we would be speaking about the European Union." (CsT)<sup>12</sup>*

The figures in Table 7 also clearly show that it is the anti-NATO group which is responsible for the high score of 3a in this debate. The economic character of the relationship is rather negatively treated (18 negative comments) in this debate because it is thematized around the economic, financial interests of NATO. This involves such topic-constructions as NATO accepting Hungary as a member only to be able to enlarge the market for their military industrial complex, or that NATO only wants to defend the interests of its members, of the Western countries, of the World Bank, and so on.

In general we can say that the whole topic of integration is constructed as a calculation of expenses and benefits. Military and security expenses are set against expected symbolic and concrete profits. When the pro-NATO side thematizes Hungary's interests, they consider that the end sum of the calculation is positive.

*"...But if we have to choose on which side of this problem to stay, I would rather choose to stay on the credit side than on the side of those who are begging. If one can choose..." (WT)*

Anti-NATO discourse tries to overcome the general high level of expectation which is attached to this topic construction. They try to argue that the expected positive outcome of the calculation is false: the prices to be paid are higher and the benefits highly questionable. If the debate crystallizes around this sub-topic, it is also because there are not many concrete figures available to the public about the costs of membership.

Other sub-topics are given less attention. The sub-topic of ecology (3d) is rather weak in the debate, as it is, in general, in the Hungarian public sphere. Topics of ecological interest are still not very widely debated in Hungary and the issue does not receive too much public attention. In this TV-debate the speaker of the Workers' Party tried to introduce this topic several times, but his attempt remained unsuccessful (3 scores out of 62).

*"In Hungary, NATO tanks or other NATO weapons will cause as much pollution as Russian weapons did..." (VA)*

12 The above citation belongs to topic 2. It is quoted here to illustrate the strong relationship between NATO and the EU as described in the text.

Topic 3 and its sub-topics are more often treated in a negative light. This is because the whole topic is more often thematized by anti-NATO speakers, who feel that the relationship between NATO and Hungary is not based on equality, and that NATO can dictate conditions to Hungary, but that Hungary will not have the right to claim its own interests.

*"NATO does not need us, they only want us to buy very expensive weapons, and they want to exercise a certain pressure on Russia through this. ... It is a rather primitive game, we have to admit. We do not have any role in this [...]. Do we decide if we want to join NATO? No way, we don't decide anything..." (CsI)*

Pro-NATO speakers try to negate the unreciprocal nature of the relationship, and insist on negotiations and the interior consensual decision making procedures:

*"...they do not exercise pressure, [...] I do not understand why [it is said] that NATO force their will on the member-states, when even [an MP...] stated that there is a consensual decision-making process." (GyI)*

#### 4. Neutrality

"Neutrality" gets little attention in this debate, although its distribution between the two sides of pro and con speakers is rather even. The sub-topics deal with the question of neutrality from different points of view, approaching different facets of the issue. (See Table 8)

TABLE 8: *The distribution of contributions about neutrality*

	Topic, sub-topics	total	pro	anti	positive	neutral	negative
4	Neutrality	4	3	1	1	2	1
4a	financial, economic	11	7	4	3	1	7
4b	political	3	1	2	2	0	1
4c	military	2	0	2	1	1	0
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>9</b>

The above scores show that in the same way as the topic of the NATO-Hungary relationship, the topic of neutrality is also more often treated from an economic and finan-

cial point of view, rather than from a political or military one. This means that the speakers construct the topic of neutrality versus joining NATO as a pragmatic question, where economic points of view (interests) play a more important role than political ones (like questions of national sovereignty or ideological principles).

In contradiction to the preliminary expectations of the research, neutrality did not play an important role in the public debate before the referendum. Although neutrality could have been one of the main topic constructions in Hungary's relationship with NATO, and the whole debate could have crystallized around this question, it only played a minor role and was seldom used in discursive constructions. The anti-NATO side especially could have built their opposing strategy on this topic, using symbolic historic allusions: events, names and dates to strengthen their argumentation. Discursive ties could have been constructed upon certain "sacred" moments of Hungarian history, when neutrality was among the main political demands, such as during the revolution in 1956. Furthermore, strong ties could have been constructed between "neutrality", (topic 4) and "national sovereignty" (topic 5), both topics being heavily loaded with highly evaluated historical and national symbolic values. The inner distribution of topic 4 shows that also this category is treated in a rather pragmatic way: the general topic gets only 4 scores out of 20 and here again, the economic, financial sub-category (sub-topic 4a) gets more than half of all the scores. Neutrality is discussed in the debate as a concrete, pragmatic problem — whether it is cheaper to be a neutral country, which has to defend itself alone, or whether the benefits of integration are higher than the price of the entry. The calculation game can also be found in sub-topics 4b and 4c, and this demonstrates that once again the ideological facets of the question are neglected, or are pushed into the background by pragmatic ones. In some cases several sub-topics are put into relationship, such as the following example of military and financial, economic sub-topics:

*"I think, in opposition to what had been said by CsT, that Hungary's NATO-alliance will cost nothing. The question is not whether we want to finance our NATO-membership but whether we need a Hungarian army [...]. Those who think that Hungary as a sovereign country, needs armed forces or needs an army (topic 4) also think, by consequence, that money has to be spent on it. And once we have decided that we want to spend money on the maintenance and modernization of the army then I think, and it is my conviction, that we can manage to do this much more cheaply if we can share certain tasks with others and only parts of it should be financed out of our own pocket." (WT)*

The 7 negative statements about the economic sub-topic of neutrality are made by pro-NATO speakers, who insist on their conviction that it is cheaper to defend the country from within the alliance.

*"The countries in Europe which spend a lot of money on defense, are the small neutral countries like Sweden, Switzerland or even Austria. (sub-topic 4a, negative) Small countries like us can get off cheaper if they are in NATO." (WT)*

### 5. Hungarian national sovereignty, particular Hungarian interests<sup>13</sup>

The topic of "national sovereignty" and its sub-topic, the "sovereign national army", are not mentioned frequently either although, in other public debates<sup>14</sup>, this topic is rather central and important.

TABLE 9: *The distribution of contributions about national sovereignty and the national army*

	Topic, subtopic	total	pro	anti	positive	neutral	negative
5	Nation, sovereignty	10	2	8	6	2	1
5a	national army	6	3	3	6	0	0
	Total	16	5	11	12	2	1

While this topic is weakly represented in this TV-debate, it is mentioned 5 times by pro-NATO speakers (of which 3 times by WT) and 11 times by the anti-NATO side. It seems normal that the topic is mentioned more often by the anti-NATO group. WT, the speaker, who treats this topic most often in the pro-NATO group, addresses it in terms of the importance of the existence of a national army (as opposed to a latent but presumed view that there is no need for a national army at all). This construction in WT's discourse finds its place in an argumentation that such a national army is more effective in an alliance than on its own.

*"The question is not whether we want to finance our NATO-membership but whether there is a need for a Hungarian army or not, whether there is a need for Hungarian military defense." (WT)*

Anti-NATO speakers mainly treat 5 and 5a positively, and attach positive values to both the topic and the sub-topic, as they constitute a solid basis for anti-NATO argumentation.

<sup>13</sup> Neutrality is defined as a military term, belonging to the semantic field of defense, while national sovereignty is defined as a political term, belonging to the semantic field of statehood, nation.

<sup>14</sup> Debates on national identity, on national symbols, on the ownership of land, etc. to mention just a few rather ideological debates of the recent Hungarian public sphere.

*"We are against NATO-membership because we don't want foreign troops, foreign troops again to be stationed on the territory of Hungary ..."* (VA)

*"We do need a Hungarian army, but we need a Hungarian army and not one commanded by NATO."* (BR)

*"The population of a neutral Hungary would gladly defend it and would gladly spend money on its [defense]."* (BR)

Here we should mention that while in the larger public debate some speakers took a clearly anti-militarist point of view, and completely rejected both the possibility of joining NATO, and also the alternative of a national army, these discursive constructions do not occur in this TV-debate, despite the participation of CsT, the president of an anti-militarist organization. However, the only negative utterance concerning topic 5 was pronounced by him, but there seems to be a kind of a consensus running throughout the TV-program about the non-thematization of anti-military values and alternatives:

*"I think that it is a narrow-minded approach to think that ecological problems stop at the borders and that these or other problems can be solved at a local level."* (CsT)

### 6. The geopolitical situation

The topic of "geopolitical situation" involves several sub-topics: the existence of "danger" in Hungary's direct neighborhood, and the existence of the possible "enemies" or "friends and allies" outside NATO.

TABLE 10: *The distribution of contributions about the geopolitical situation around Hungary*

	Topic, sub-topics	total	pro	anti	positive	neutral	negative
6	Geopolitical situation	23	10	13	8	8	7
6a	danger - security	21	12	9	6	2	13
6b	enemies	6	2	4	2	1	3
6c	friends	2	0	2	2	0	0
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>23</b>

The anti-NATO group has somewhat more affinity to the topic of the geopolitical situation than the opposing group. Of 52 contributions mentioning this topic, the ratio of anti-NATO comments is 28 to 24 from the pro-NATO group. While topic 6 is more often mentioned by the anti-NATO speakers, the sub-topic of danger — security has a higher score in the pro-NATO contributions. The distribution of the whole of topic 6 among the different speakers is very uneven. There is one participant in the pro-NATO group, WT, who only mentions topic 6 once, and in the anti-NATO group VA only tackles it twice. But at the same time, in the pro-NATO group GyI mentions the topic 10 times, while in the anti-NATO group CsI mentions it 12 times. Anti-NATO speakers have a more negative standpoint concerning the whole topic of the geopolitical situation but the general topic (6) is granted a rather even treatment between positive, neutral and negative occurrences.

It is especially the sub-topic of “danger and security”, which gets a high negative score in the debate, while there are only a few cases of naming a concrete enemy.

*“...If we enlarge NATO, we will irritate the Russians and push them to reinforce their army with all possible means...” (CsI)*

While concrete “enemies” are rarely named during the debate, possible sources of danger are often mentioned and identified (21 cases).

*“The region and Hungary within it is not threatened by any kind of total, traditional invasion or war, for several reasons. [...] But we also have to see that after the disappearance of the bipolar world [...] there are new defiances and risks in this region. [...] I am talking not only of the Balkan conflict and the possible outcomes of the Russian — Belorussian alliance, or the Albanian problem, but also of the appearance of Islamic fundamentalism, phenomena of the Mafia, migration and other things, which all signify that the region to the East and South of us is unstable.” (DP)*

*“...the future role of Russia, because it probably still has the second strongest army in the world. Until now there has been a certain balance between the two systems, or between the two world-systems, but this is gone now. [...] What will happen now to this very strong military potential, which does not belong to any alliance, which just hangs around like that...?” (PP)*

The whole topic, however, is full of ambivalent standpoints and argumentation. (See details concerning argumentation below). Our detailed analysis points to internal contradictions in both groups, and sometimes even between one speaker's different contributions. BR gives a positive treatment to geopolitical questions (having a rather optimistic view on the region's future).

*"First of all, I think, we should start from the question whether there is any military threat to Hungary. If there is none, as is asserted by the military experts as well, if it is true that now and in the foreseeable future nobody is trying to threaten Hungary, then it is absolutely unnecessary to spend hundreds of millions of our non-existent money on armament."* (BR)

*"Should we not believe in the development of a bourgeois-democratic Russia?"* (BR)

Most other participants of the anti-NATO group see the problem in either a neutral or a negative light. Only CsI (MIÉP) speaks of enemies in an explicit way, mixing the topic of geopolitical danger with the image of an international phantom hanging over the region: the World Bank, an institution which is often referred to as the worst representative of the amalgamated enemy in CsI's numerous political pamphlets.

*"I would be a devotee of NATO and of entry to NATO if, for instance, NATO defended us from the World Bank. If it wiped out the World Bank right here, then I would be NATO's great friend. But it will not do that, on the contrary, it will defend the World Bank here, against us, so I am against it."* (CsI)

"Friends" are only mentioned explicitly by CsT, speaking of the Baltic countries, and by BR in a more implicit way when he talks of the countries of the former Eastern bloc. Apart from them nobody mentions international solidarity, and a value-community is only mentioned by PP in his abstract contribution about NATO being a value-based alliance.

*"NATO has no more role to fulfill, they want the territories to the East of us to be shut into a political and military quarantine, and this is a serious mistake."* (BR)

*"... letting down the Baltic countries, our former friends, because it becomes necessary in order to enter, at any price, into this elite set, and then we will vote about the others from inside ..."* (CsT)

## 7. History and the past

TABLE II: *The distribution of contributions about the past and history*

	Topic	total	pro	anti	positive	neutral	negative
7	History, past	5	3	2	2	0	3

The topic of "history and the past" also receives little attention in this debate. This topic could have been a base for the construction of either a pro-NATO argument, as it is often used in the public debate concerning Hungary's belonging to the West, or the country's chances to join the EU. Anti-NATO argumentation usually also uses historical topics to

construct anti-NATO arguments by making reference to past events, historical claims like 1956, or the past victories and glory of former Hungarian armies, and the like.

It is rather surprising that the topics of "Neutrality" (Topic 4), "National sovereignty" (Topic 5) and "History and past" (Topic 7) are given so little attention in the debate. If we add up the scores of the three, they would still only amount to 41 utterances, and this is lower than occurrences of all other topics. (See Table 12). This fact contradicts the anticipations, as well as the usual scenario of traditional debates on political matters, which find their inner structure around dividing lines, (in topics of sovereignty, national history and national identity), like populist vs. urban, Hungarian vs. alien, and so on. On the contrary, the formation of a new dividing line can be observed here, between, on one hand, the center-left and the center-right parties, represented in Parliament, and the extreme-right and extreme-left parties together with civil organizations, on the other. In this new distribution of the battle-field, both opposing groups are politically and ideologically heterogeneous, and this prevents them from engaging in traditional ideological debates, using traditional topics and usual topic-relations, such as historical references.

The findings listed above concerning the topics dealing with military and political independence (neutrality and national sovereignty) and history can only be accounted for if one takes into consideration that the whole NATO-debate in Hungary was more a matter of pragmatic solution-seeking than a matter of principles. The general topic of the debate was embedded in a large consensus for EU-entry, of which NATO-membership was considered a fore-runner. This is generally why, both among the political elite and the population, the opinion and decision for joining NATO became so self-evident (see the proportions of the referendum) without being characterized by the usual dividing lines of left/right, populists/Westernizers, and so on.

Taking into consideration all the topics and sub-topics mentioned by the participants, we arrive at the following scale showing the relative weight of the topics during the TV-debate:

TABLE 12: *Order of importance (occurrence) of topics in the TV-debate*

1. (topic 1) Legitimacy of decision about entry	67
2. (topic 3) NATO-Hungary relationship, (especially economic)	62
3. (topic 6) Geopolitical situation	52
4. (topic 2) NATO-image	51
5. (topic 4) Neutrality	20
6. (topic 5) National sovereignty	16
7. (topic 7) History, past	5
<hr/>	
Total contributions	273

If we examine the share of the above-mentioned topics and sub-topics in the contributions of the eight participants, the even distribution that characterized the number of turns (see Table 1) between the two opposing groups fades away.

TABLE 13: *The number of topics and sub-topics in the contribution of the participants*

PP	39	CsT	47
DP	26	CsI	41
Gyl	33	VA	41
WT	17	BR	29
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>158</b>

Table 13 clearly shows that by using the “extended topic assignment” mode<sup>15</sup>, the speakers of the anti-NATO group are more active, and treat or mention more topics and sub-topics in spite of the even distribution of turns (as seen in Table 1). Broader topic-construction (relating several sub-topics and topics)<sup>16</sup>, is more characteristic of the opposition group, especially CsT and CsI. Out of 79 turns, the pro-NATO speakers provide 115 topics or sub-topics, while the participants of the anti-NATO group mention 158 topics or sub-topics in their 81 turns.

### Analysis of the topic constructions of the speakers in the TV-debate

The following table gives a complete picture of all topics and sub-topics mentioned by each participant and the value assignment that is attached to each occurrence. (See Table 14)

<sup>15</sup> The assignment of several topics or sub-topics addressed by the same speaker during one turn with the possibility of assigning the same utterance to several topics or sub-topics.

<sup>16</sup> See Heller, Némédi, Rényi 1991, 1994.

TABLE 14. Total distribution of topics, sub-topics and assigned values, by participants

Subtopics	PP			DP			GYI			WT			CsT			Csl			VA			BR			E			
	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-				
1									1									2				1	0	2	3			
1a	1						1																2	0	0	2		
1b	1	1					1	2			3	1				1		6	1			3		13	0	4	17	
1c	1	1					3							9			2			1				4	1	12	17	
1d	1			1			3				1			7			6			4			2	5	1	19	25	
<b>E 1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>		<b>1</b>			<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>1</b>		<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>3</b>		<b>2</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>64</b>	
2	3	1		2	1		5	1			2			3		1	1			2			1	10	6	4	20	
2a	6			1																1				7	0	1	8	
2b							1	0						10			5			3			2	1	0	20	21	
<b>E2</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>1</b>		<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>		<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>			<b>2</b>			<b>13</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>			<b>6</b>			<b>3</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>49</b>		
3	2						2			1										2				5	0	2	7	
3a	2	1		1	1		2				3			2	5			4			4			5	8	4	18	30
3b	2			1	1		1							1			1			1				4	1	6	11	
3c	2	1		1			3							2			2			2				6	1	6	13	
3d																				3				0	0	3	3	
<b>E3</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>		<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>		<b>9</b>			<b>4</b>			<b>2</b>	<b>8</b>			<b>7</b>			<b>13</b>			<b>5</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>64</b>	
4		2	1																1				1	2	1	4		
4a			1				2				2								1	1			2	3	1	7	11	
4b						1													1				1	2	0	1	3	
4c																1	1							1	1	0	2	
<b>E4</b>		<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>				<b>3</b>			<b>2</b>		<b>2</b>				<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>		<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>		<b>3</b>		<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>20</b>	
5				2						2			1	1	2		1	2			1			10	0	2	12	
5a											1					1			1				1	3	1	0	4	
<b>E5</b>				<b>2</b>						<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>		<b>2</b>		<b>2</b>		<b>13</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>16</b>	
6	2	3		1			1	2			1			1		1	3			2	4	1	1	9	8	7	24	
6a		1		4			4	1						3		1	3				1		1	6	2	13	21	
6b	1			1												1	3							2	1	3	6	
6c											1											1		2	0	0	2	
<b>E6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>		<b>6</b>		<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>		<b>1</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>		<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>		<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>53</b>		
7			2			1																2		2	0	3	5	
<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>271</b>

### Standpoints and values

The following table gives a comprehensive picture of the opposing world-views of the speakers in the two groups. Pro-NATO speakers have three times as many positive utterances as negative (69 vs. 21). While in the opposing group BR is the only person who has more positive utterances than negative ones (16 vs. 12). The other anti-NATO speakers see the whole theme in a significantly more negative light.

TABLE 15: *Distribution of positive, neutral and negative value assignments in the contributions of the two opposing groups*

Pro-NATO: 70 : 24 : 21  
 Anti-NATO: 36 : 10 : 112

Significant differences can be observed between the two groups of speakers concerning the value-judgement of all the topics and sub-topics. The way the speakers assign positive, neutral and negative values reveals their optimistic or pessimistic world-view and their expectations about the future.

TABLE 16: *Distribution of values assigned to topics and sub-topics*

	positive	neutral	negative	total
Pro-Nato group	70	24	21	115
Anti-Nato group	36	10	112	158
TOTAL	106	34	133	273

The differences between the two groups are significantly high. The pro-NATO group has a more positive approach to the whole question: more than 3 times as many positive utterances as negative ones (70 positive utterances against 21 negative ones), while the opposing group has a much stronger negative approach. They make 3 times as many negative assignments as positive ones (36 positive accounts versus 112 negative ones). Pro-NATO positive assignments are approximately twice as numerous as anti-NATO positive responses (70 vs. 36) but anti-NATO negative assignments are 5 times higher than the same category for the pro-NATO speakers. A similar distribution can be observed when taking in account the neutral utterances: speakers of the pro-NATO group tend to be neutral in judging the topics more than twice as often as speakers of the anti-NATO group (24 vs. 10 cases).

This distribution of values is closely related to the global context of the general theme of NATO-entry in the Hungarian political field and public sphere. Pro-NATO arguments and standpoints were the prevailing political views in the country at the moment of the TV-debate. The government, Parliament and all official institutions shared this view, and the political proceedings (diplomatic negotiations, the official government policy, and so on) all strengthened it. The state of balance of political forces, and the fact that the problem of NATO-entry is put in the form of a yes-no question, constitute the main structural constraints on the debate. Because of the existence of these constraints, both groups (pro- and anti-NATO speakers) are forced into a particular role of defenders and opponents. In addition, the anti-NATO opposing group is rather scattered in the Hungarian political and intellectual sphere, and these forces are highly divided among themselves, representing directly opposed positions and ideologies<sup>17</sup>.

The negative coloring of the discourse of anti-NATO speakers is also caused by a discursive structural constraint: it is related to the discursive fact that they are in the position of attacking, refusing, deconstructing the discursive property of their opponents. Anti-NATO discourse attempts to deconstruct and delegitimize pro-NATO discourse — that is, its topic constructions, its definitions, and its assertions of discursive claims. This discursive role explains the higher activity of the challenging anti-NATO group, their broader topic-constructions and their negative value assignment. And because of their will for strong and coherent attack against the pro-NATO side, anti-NATO speakers have had to give up their heterogeneity. Because of their fear of weakening anti-NATO discourse and argumentation, they cannot afford to enter into discussions concerning ideological, political and ethical questions because they would reveal the fundamental differences that exist among anti-NATO forces. This is why they fail to elaborate alternative topics-constructions such as neutrality, and why, in the whole public debate, and especially in the TV-debate under analysis, political, ideological and ethical questions are left mainly unthematized. They need all their ammunition to fight and reject the topic constructed by the pro-NATO side and cannot build up diverse counter-topics, especially because their alternative topic constructions would differ according to the different stand-points they occupy in the public sphere. Their incompatible stand-points and positions prevent them from being able to construct strong rivalling counter-topics.

We also conducted a detailed analysis of the "choreography" of the TV-debate. In this part of our analysis attention was paid to how the different arguments of each participant reinforced or challenged statements pronounced earlier in the debate, either by the same

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17 Extreme right- and left-wing groups and parties are involved on this side as well as civil organizations of diverse ideological backgrounds.

speaker<sup>18</sup> or another participant. With this type of analysis, the discursive relationships among the whole dyadic group can be examined, and the strategies of strengthening or weakening discursive positions can be detected. The following two tables (Tables 17 and 18) show the results of the dyadic analysis of anaphoric references. Table 17 demonstrates the positive, consorting references, i.e. how often the utterances of the different speakers give/gain support (through arguments using the same or similar words, phrases, statements, agreeing remarks). Table 18 summarizes the negative, opposing references: it gives the figures for opposing or negated utterances throughout the TV-debate. Table 17 shows the level of agreement, temporary or more durable discursive coalitions, while Table 18 elucidates strategies of contention, steps in the process of weakening the argumentation, and thus the discursive position of opponent speakers.

TABLE 17: *Supporting arguments and utterances*

<i>X backing Y</i>	PP	DP	GYI	WT	CST	CSI	VA	BR
PP	3	4	3	1	1	0	0	1
DP	4	0	2	1	0	0	0	0
GYI	3	4	1	3	0	0	0	0
WT	1	1	0	3	3	1	1	1
CST	0	0	0	0	5	4	4	5
CSI	0	0	0	0	4	2	3	2
VA	0	1	0	1	7	3	2	1
BR	0	0	1	1	0	1	2	1

Internal support in the pro-NATO group is 34, (i.e. members of the pro-NATO group support their own, or other group members' utterances 34 times during the TV-debate) but the external support is very weak: they only receive support from the anti-NATO group on 4 occasions. The total score of supporting utterances backing pro-NATO discourse is 38.

Internal support in the anti-NATO group equals 46, and they also receive 8 external supporting utterances (i.e. from speakers in the pro-NATO group). The overall figures indicating the support of the arguments are higher in the case of the anti-NATO group: 54 items.

Thus Table 17 gives evidence that argumentative solidarity is weaker among speakers in the pro-NATO group: they give external support 8 times. Anti-NATO speakers show more internal solidarity in their support for one another's arguments (in spite of the

18 Tables 17 and 18 contain figures of anaphoric references of consorting and debating utterances with no limitation on the personal source, i.e. all anaphoric references were taken into account, whether they concerned speakers of the same or the opposing group. Self-references are also taken into account.

greater political differences among the participants of this group) and they give only four supporting arguments to the pro-NATO side.

Rate of support: 38/54 to the advantage of the speakers of the anti-NATO group. External support received is also higher in the anti-NATO group: 4/8.

Table 17 makes it possible to draw more specific conclusions about the discursive strategies of particular speakers. In the role of the "traitor" one can find WT, who backs the speakers of the opposing group 6 times. Table 17 also shows that there is strong harmony among speakers of the same group (in spite of their political differences, which — and this should be stressed — are not thematized in the course of this debate). CsT backs all other anti-NATO speakers in a nearly equal way. Among these, surprisingly enough, he also backs CsI's utterances 4 times and, in return, CsI also backs CsT's utterances 4 times. As may be seen from Table 18, CsT and CsI do not contradict each other during the TV-debate, they do not weaken each other's argumentation, and there seems to be a certain latent solidarity between them. This, however, contradicts CsT's already existing public image and public representation, by which his movement attempts to create a clear demarcation line to separate itself and its discourse from "the nationalist, fascistic, racist-rooted" anti-NATO movements<sup>19</sup>. It should be mentioned, however, that CsI's behavior and discourse during the TV-debate is rather moderate in comparison with some of his public appearances. In this debate he does not offer harsh points of discordance. He refrains from extreme statements and his few claims of extremist topic-construction are not taken up by the other participants (e.g. when he starts to talk about the World Bank as Hungary's worst enemy, other fellow discussants isolate him and do not react to this topic-offer). Tables 17 and 18 give some evidence about the "forced" or temporary solidarity among anti-NATO groups, which was imposed on them by the structural constraints of the discursive context.

TABLE 18: *Contradicting arguments and utterances*

<i>X attacking Y</i>	PP	DP	GYI	WT	CST	CSI	VA	BR
PP	0	0	0	0	1	2	5	3
DP	0	0	0	0	2	4	7	4
GYI	1	0	0	0	3	11	8	4
WT	0	0	0	0	5	0	9	0
CST	11	8	7	1	0	0	0	0
CSI	13	4	6	0	0	0	0	0
VA	7	1	3	5	0	0	0	0
BR	2	3	4	3	0	0	0	0

19 "If all groups opposing NATO-membership clearly take a stand, by their own means, against the nationalist, fascistic, racist-rooted anti-NATO opposition, then it can be made clear that there are basic differences among diverse NATO-opposing argumentations", In: Csapody, T & Vit, L. (1997): *Ámokfutás a NATO-ba*. Cartafilus: Budapest, 183.

Speakers of the anti-NATO group use 78 utterances attacking the viewpoints of the speakers of the opposing group. There is no attack within the group. The speakers of the pro-NATO group attack opposing views 68 times and there is one case of discord within the pro-NATO group. Here, again, speakers of the anti-NATO group mobilize the contradicting arguments more actively than the pro-NATO speakers.

Scores of the contradicting discourse:

External: 68 / 78 to the advantage of the anti-NATO speakers

Internal: 1 / 0

Comparing the rates of support and attack that each participant of the debate receives from all the other speakers (without differentiating between opinion groups) we get the following results:

TABLE 19: *Support and disagreement received by each participant in the TV-debate*

SUPPORT	ATTACK
CST: 20	PP: 34
VA: 12	VA: 29
BR, CSI, PP: 11	GYI: 20
WT, DP: 10	CSI: 17
GYI: 7	DP: 16
	CST, BR: 11
	WT: 9
TOTAL: 92	TOTAL: 147

The above results show that CsT is the person, who is given most the support, and one of the lowest scores of attacks. While he is attacked only 11 times, he is the person who speaks most in the debate. The fewest counter-arguments, however, are addressed to WT (9) but he speaks little in the whole debate (see Table 1). PP, in contrast, gains the highest score of attacks: although the number of his contributions is not outstanding, he is the speaker with the highest length of contribution (Tables 1 and 2). CsT's high score of support and low score of attack can also be explained by the fact that he is the speaker who most often advances universal, humanistic principles. It is difficult in a public debate to attack or reject such normative principles of civility, solidarity and peace because they are advanced as characteristic of a positively represented large group in the community (a positive WE-GROUP). In this debate, as well as in the political and discursive context of the debate, the EU, Europe in general, the West, and the civilized human world are constructed as we-categories, assigned positive values (the more restricted we-group — Hun-

gary, the Hungarians — want to belong to this larger group). Therefore it would be very difficult to reject, negate or delegitimize these categories. The only opposing strategy that might lead to success would be the construction of an opposing “we-category”, that of the nation, (the neutral, sovereign nation, built on past glory and victory). As we have seen from our analysis, the elaboration of the opposing “we-category” is rather weak in this TV-debate. It is refrained from because of the political consensus for NATO-entry, in which all the important political forces take part, and also because of the nature of this particular TV-debate. It is indeed quite easy to elaborate a nationalistic discourse using excluding, foreclosing categorization, emotive argumentation, mobilizing and populist discursive modes, but a face-to-face debate is not the appropriate context for the elaboration of this type of discourse.

The following table summarizes support and attack addressed to both groups without taking into account the origin of the remark.

TABLE 20: *General support and attack on speakers' utterances*

	supported	attacked	total
Pro-Nato speakers	38	78	116
Anti-Nato speakers	54	69	123
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>239</b>

These general figures also demonstrate that, at least formally, the speech and argumentation strategy of the speakers of the anti-NATO group was more active and effective than that of the pro-NATO speakers.

The analysis of the TV-debate showed the clear cleavage between pro-NATO and anti-NATO political forces and also that the main dividing line lay between left and right Parliamentary parties on one hand and civil movements, extreme-right and extreme-left non-parliamentary parties and political forces on the other hand. The peculiar setting of the TV-debate that divided the participants into “two groups in a pub” proved to be relevant in the representation of their points of view concerning NATO-alliance.

The whole debate can be characterized by the lack of ideological questions and the over-emphasis of pragmatic aspects<sup>20</sup>. It seems that participants on both sides find their interest in this fact: this is the only way to demonstrate some kind of unity inside the opposing two groups. The analysis proved that a certain constraint for consensus existed

<sup>20</sup> The discourse analysis done on the larger newspaper corpus also proved the same results. M. Heller & A. Rényi: Public Debate in Hungary on the NATO Alliance. See in this volume, 231–280.

among political parties of the center (right and left) concerning NATO-membership and political or ideological differences were definitely left in silence. NATO-alliance is seen and shown by them to the public as the first step for EU-membership, an issue that definitely carries a much greater value for the Hungarian public. In the light of this construction, the discourse strategies of the political parties in the center show important similarities, especially the emphasis of unity concerning pragmatic topics.

A similar converging discourse strategy can be observed among anti-NATO speakers. Although they are sometimes rather far from each other in the political field, their participation in the debate concentrates on common topics. They sacrifice their differences in order to join their forces to fight back pro-NATO argumentation.

The analysis of discursive relationships between the participants (backing, attacking) also clearly shows the existence of the two opposing groups. There seems to be some kind of latent solidarity among the members of the two groups, respectively, which can also be pointed out by the lack of some deliberately non-treated questions.

So we can say that the particular debate under analysis is an exceptional one in the sense that the political alliances are not marked by the typical traditional dividing lines and cleavages (left and right) and where the ideological struggle is "suspended". This is how in the group of anti-NATO forces traditional communist, extreme-right and pacifist discourse can co-exist and form a temporary coalition. The price they have to pay for anti-NATO coalition is the shading of their political and ideological heterogeneity.

The fact that ideological issues are relegated to the background can best be seen by the fact (see e. g. Table 12), that highly ideological topics which are in general in the foreground of Hungarian public debates, (topics like neutrality, national sovereignty and history) are far less present in the debate than utilitarian questions (geopolitical situation, costs, etc.) Economic questions are all the time in the centre of the debate. Anti-NATO discourse is characterised by the emphasis of NATO's military role and its American supremacy while pro-NATO discourse insists more on the European character of NATO and on its importance in the modernization and stabilization of the European region and its role played in the construction of European unity.

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Gertraud Benke

“SOMEHOW EMOTIONALLY –  
IF WE LOSE NEUTRALITY,  
THAT MAKES ME AFRAID”

An analysis of focus group discussions on neutrality (1997).

SE

F<sub>3</sub> *i versteh zwor von dem GONZLN ned so viel i hob nur Ongst  
(Mebrere reden)*

F<sub>3</sub> *irgendwo: (xxxxxxx) gefüblsmäßig — wenn wir die Neutraltat/ ä die Neutralität verLIERN,  
dann >des mocht mit Ongst< dabei*

F<sub>3</sub> *kannt i jetzt gor ned definiern warum.*

[F<sub>3</sub> *I don't understand so much about ALL this, I am just afraid  
(Several people speak )*

F<sub>3</sub> *somewhere: (xxxxxxx) emotionally — if we LOSE neutrality ub neutrality, then >that makes me  
afraid<*

F<sub>3</sub> *I couldn't say exactly why.]*

## Introduction

In the autumn of 1997, we conducted seven focus group discussions on neutrality in order to explore what people, who are not politicians or otherwise heard in public, think about neutrality today, and to find out whether or not they wish to preserve neutrality, and to determine what they associate with neutrality.

The composition of the seven groups varied in terms of age, education, and so on. Nevertheless, similar issues were addressed repeatedly in the discussions of the groups. When speaking about neutrality, members of the groups refer among other things to war, the Second World War, and the Nazi period. Some of the discussion participants immediately move on to justify the Nazi period — to explain how “things” came to be “that way”. In addition, in almost all discussions Austria's neutrality is compared to the Swiss one. Other issues mentioned include the changing political and economic situation in

Europe, the European Union, and the NATO. In connection with the NATO, the discussions often turn to the United States, and the question is raised to who is to decide what in world politics, and where, i. e. whether the small state of Austria may have no choice but to do as others say.

Our aim in the following is to briefly present the method of focus group research and the questions put to the groups and to characterize each group. We shall then describe in greater detail the various 'topics' mentioned, citing contributions from the focus groups by way of illustration. Subsequently, we present a longer example of the discourse, which links together almost all of the subject matter previously discussed.

## Methodology

The social scientific method of focus group analysis was already successfully employed in a previous project by Wodak et al. (1998)<sup>1</sup>. This method of inquiry permits — in the course of group discussions led by hosts — the semi-public opinions of discussion participants to explore. While opinions elevated in this way may be less profound than opinions expressed in the course of personal interviews, the developing group dynamics promotes frank discussions of the issues. In addition, the small size of the groups allows participants to express their opinions at length.

Moreover, owing to the dynamics of the interaction, in the course of the sessions discussion participants often anticipate issues that are to be raised by their hosts later on. And sometimes they return to aspects that have already been covered. In this way, differing points of view may be given varying amounts of emphasis, and the discussions may lead to various different conclusions. In other words, group discussions are not always consistent: contradictions will also appear. Thus, although most of the groups wish to retain neutrality, they nevertheless believe that neutrality is irreconcilable with membership of the EU. Inasmuch as such statements are discussed on different occasions during the sessions and as different aspects of the same topic — rather than being set against each other directly — they may be regarded as parts of the same discourse (Billig 1988).

## The focus groups and the questions asked

In the course of the research, in late 1997 seven focus groups on "Neutrality" met, each group being directed by the same host. The discussions were recorded on video and transcribed for subsequent analysis.

1 For a longer theoretical discussion, see Wodak et al. (1998, 315 ff.).

In accordance with the method of focus group research, the focus groups were given topics directed by the host. On average six questions were raised. The number and order of the questions varied depending on the topics raised by the participants.

In general, the following questions were asked<sup>2</sup>:

- When did you first hear about neutrality, what personal experiences do you associate with neutrality, what/who do you associate with neutrality (particular politicians, etc.)? This was usually the first question.
- What other experiences or memories do you associate with neutrality (from the 1950s until the present)?
- What advantages or disadvantages do you associate with neutrality?
- Have your attitudes towards neutrality changed?
- To your knowledge, has Austria's neutrality ever been violated or disregarded?

The seven focus groups were carefully selected to cover as broad a spectrum of the population as possible. A particular aim was the inclusion of young and old, urban and rural, well-educated and less educated members of the general public, as well as to ensure the representation of various political views and national backgrounds (domestic and foreign). Of course we do not claim to cover the population in full. Nevertheless, we do hope that through the broad selection of people we will be able to record qualitatively a wide range of different opinions<sup>3</sup>.

Thus, the following groups were formed:

- Journalists, JO, (Academics) from the 1950s to the 1990s — this was a group of people from various age-brackets who were well-informed politically, expressed a variety of political views, and lived in or close to Vienna. It was in this group that the most complex contributions on neutrality were made. Usually the various subject areas were linked together; various elements were associated and discussed with neutrality — sometimes in the form of long monologues.

With regard to neutrality, the group turned out to be very heterogeneous; opinions ranged from strong support to strong rejection ("it's had its day"). In addition, the journalists' group is the only one in which individual participants consciously observe

2 In fact, several other questions were asked. However, these questions were partly not taken up by the participants, because they did not add anything substantial to the subject matter already covered by the discussion of the others questions.

3 We were less interested in statistical representation, but in documenting the range of discourses about neutrality. For this reason older people are rather more numerous among the discussion participants; we expected that their discourse would be "richer" than the young people's discourse, because they have first-hand experience of political events affecting neutrality, while young people know about neutrality only "from school".

the changes in their attitudes towards neutrality over time, from detachment (legitimization of an “*Operettenarmee*” [pretend army]) to acceptance (the pacifism of 1968 directed against NATO, the pointlessness of armaments for a small country in the era of nuclear weapons) and then to detachment once again (must join in “burden sharing”).

- Academics, AK, who studied in Vienna in the 1950s. Compared with the other groups, this senior citizens’ focus group is well informed and rather sceptical about retaining neutrality. The consensual view of the group is that — with the referendum on EU membership and Austria’s accession to the Union — implicitly neutrality has already been relinquished. While this is the consensual view, most members of the group nevertheless regard neutrality as something positive and as something that they would like to retain if they could. The group solves the paradox by arguing for the retention of neutrality as well as for a change in the content of neutrality. Overall the discussions in the group tended to take the form of detached reflections rather than personal and emotional contributions — probably owing to the influence of one of the participants who, as a constitutional expert, had once worked for the Austrian Parliament. This particular participant made several lengthy and substantial contributions to the discussion.
- Active senior citizens from Vienna, SE. Participants in this group were contacted through a center that regularly stages political (and other) discussions for senior citizens. Senior citizens in this group were mostly left-wingers or former Communists. (Expert) knowledge about neutrality and current politics was relatively widespread in this group, and the views expressed were strongly influenced by political attitudes.
- Migrant workers and political refugees, MI. Most of the participants in this group were emigrants from the countries of the former Eastern Bloc who had come to Austria after the Hungarian uprising or the Prague Spring. Only one of the participants had come from the “West”. This participant was German (with an Austrian mother) and had moved to Austria as an adult. Members of this group have an external view of both neutrality and Austria. Nevertheless, some of the participants have been living in Austria for over thirty years. In the main, the participants are very well-informed both politically and historically. Their judgement of neutrality is ambivalent — sometimes neutrality is considered to be a positive factor that kept Austria free, while sometimes it is seen as a negative factor that strengthens the tendency to “maneuver around” and keep out of things, as well as fostering a mentality of isolation. As regards neutrality today, there seems to be a consensus that neutrality has been relinquished, and that one must accept this as a fact and acknowledge it — even if this is done with a feeling of sorrow.

Otherwise, the discussions in this group focus on Austrian identity, the Austrian character, and Austrian history. This group tends to remember and debate earlier scandals (Noricum, Lüdigendorf) more frequently than other groups.

- Young people aged 16—20, JU. This group also includes two participants with a different and somewhat more reflexive relationship towards Austria and Austrian neutrality because of their backgrounds: the first of these participants is a woman from South Tyrol who sees herself as an Italian (in the first instance) and who states that she has no relationship to neutrality. The second participant is a Carinthian Slovene<sup>4</sup>. The discrimination of his ethnic group has led him to study the history and politics of Austria in depth, and he demonstrates this knowledge in lengthy and well-informed contributions to the discussion. This group displays a minimal “depth of experience”. Neutrality was first perceived just a short time ago (usually in school). Thus, attitudes towards neutrality, which are generally positive in the group, have not changed much in the course of the lives of these young people.
- Generations-Families’ Group, FA: This group consisted of two families — one of the “families” comprised the grandmother, the mother, and her school-age daughter, while the other family was made up of a great-uncle, a father, and his son, who was still studying at a university in Austria. The two families had different educational backgrounds: The first family (the mother, and so on) clearly belonged to the upper middle class of Vienna; this was obvious by the way they spoke and the answers they gave. The “mother”, who was the main contributor to the discussion, seemed to know what she ought to say what the “correct” opinions were — even though she in fact displayed only a limited knowledge about neutrality. In the other family, the son seemed to be the first member of the family to have gone to university and to have concerned himself in depth with Austrian history. As the “main speaker” in this family, he explained his views — sometimes in lengthy monologues. Even though minor differences of opinion are expressed in the group, these differences are never expanded upon, and the range of opinions is very limited. Within the families, there seems to be a constant consensus and a uniform outlook on life.
- Senior citizens and middle-aged employed people (workers and farmers aged 35 —50) from Upper Austria (OÖ). Of all the groups, it is this group which is the most rooted in the past — four of the participants were born between 1913 and 1917. It is only with difficulty that the host manages to steer the discussion towards the present. Participants in the group repeatedly refer back to “the war” and “unemployment in the pe-

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4 The Slovenes are a small ethnic minority in Austria who were guaranteed minority rights (particularly the right to use their own language) in the State Treaty. Some of these rights are disregarded even today, and Slovenes are forced to in the mostly only German-speaking educational institutions. Owing to this discrimination, increasing numbers of Slovenes raise their children in German.

riod between the two wars". Compared to other groups, personal experiences dominate the discussions. Neutrality is (still) welcomed as an instrument that has brought Austria peace and liberty.

### Topics in the focus groups

For the analysis, the focus group discussions were transcribed and their content analyzed qualitatively. In particular, this means that the transcriptions were read repeatedly and summarized with their characteristic passages. Thereafter, a semantic web of the (significant) "topics" was established for each group<sup>5</sup>. This part of the analysis — the determination of the individual topics — was a hermeneutic process undertaken through the repeated reading of the various discussions. The items picked out as topics<sup>6</sup> were above all specific "keywords" or "actants" that were mentioned/raised repeatedly in different groups: For instance, "Switzerland", "NATO", "war" and the like.<sup>7</sup>

In the course of the analysis, initially only the connections between the various topics were recorded and there was no evaluation. For example, Switzerland is often mentioned in connection with neutrality, sometimes as a positive example (they did well during WWII while things were going badly "for us") and sometimes as a negative example (the "wheeling and dealing" of the Swiss during the Nazi period — "we" don't want to be "neutral" like that).

As discourse analysts, the thematic connection is initially just as important to us, as the evaluations that will follow. We are interested in finding out what people associate with neutrality — and this does not vary much in a discourse about one thing. Differences between individuals and sub-groups of a society appear above all in their evaluation and their argumentation; the topics (or the relevance attached to the topics) seem to be of a

5 Three examples, one with an explanation may be found in the appendix.

6 Linguistically the "themes" correspond most closely to the hyper-themes of the Theme-Rheme theory (Firbas 1992). That is, the themes are prototypes of NPs (that are related to neutrality) but are quite different from the macro-propositions of Van Dijk (1980).

By limiting them to NPs (rather than to propositions) we are able to record the occurrence of the themes in the various groups, while leaving open the specific relationship in the discussion in question, i.e. without presupposing a certain attitude.

7 Methodologically, it should be noted that given the non-operationalized (and only partially operationalizable) approach, some themes (which other forms of investigation might have covered) were probably disregarded. In our opinion, this does not affect the validity of the themes that we did discover — the semantic networks and the connections would become at most richer and more substantial, i.e. more complex, but in principle the existing connections would not be changed.

more general and collective nature. And this is what particularly interests us here — in addition to the manner in which the individual topics are linked together. Obviously, some topics may be approached from various angles. For example, a discussion may turn to “war” where neutrality is being considered as the solution to the “never again” problem, or “war” may also be raised in discussions about NATO — an organization that some consider belligerent.

The following topical associations arose in a majority of the groups, and will be described below — together with their evaluations:

- Neutrality as “War, never again!”
- The neutrality of Switzerland
- Neutrality and history: the Austrian State Treaty, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, “the Russians”, the Cold War
- Neutrality as an answer to the Nazi past
- Neutrality and Identity
- European Union, the economy and neutrality — a contradiction
- Neutrality, NATO — Americans and the small state

In addition, there were two specific issues that were not formed out of a combination of various topics (as in the list above), but that addressed the definition and valuation of a topic directly, namely:

- What does it mean to be neutral: Political, economic, and military neutrality
- Neutrality and moral obligation

It is impossible, of course, to draw a clear dividing line cutting up the discourse into segments belonging to one or another topical association. For example, stories about the war are mixed up with personal experiences of war-time Switzerland, and so on. Thus, in the following, there will be a constant influx of elements associated with other topics.

The connection between the EU and NATO proved to be so strong in the discussions that it seemed appropriate to treat the two topics as one item. Likewise, in most of the discussions, the topic “What does it mean to be neutral?” was linked to a moral evaluation.

### *1. Neutrality as “War, never again!”*

JO

M2: *ich glaub Neutralität is auch Deswegen so ein wirklich umsch/ wirklich um HEISS umstrittener Begriff. — weil — die Neutralitäts-Befürworter sicherlich auch meinen — das Gegenteil von Neutralität ist Kriegslust.*

[M2: *I think that neutrality is such a hot issue because the supporters of neutrality doubtlessly think that the opposite of neutrality is a craving for war.*]

FA

M4 *i man — sicher i würd sogn DIE Leute, die — den Krieg MITGEMOCHT bobn.*

FH *Erinnerungen*

M1 *ja,*

M4 *SICHER für die Neutralität. — weil's das NICHT nochmal erleben wollen.*

M1 *ja, ja,*

F1 *ja GENAU [lachen] es is ganz KLAR (xx) [lachen]*

[M4 *I mean — definitely, I would say that THE people who have EXPERIENCED war.*

FH *memories*

M1 *yes,*

M4 *DEFINITELY for neutrality. — because they do NOT want to experience that again.*

M1 *yes, yes,*

F1 *yes EXACTLY [laughter] it is quite CLEAR (xx) [laughter]*

In all of the focus groups except the migrants' group, neutrality was regarded as a reflection of the desire — or even as the “legal” guarantee — that Austria should (would) never again take part in a war. This topos was a major element in most of the discussions, especially in the group of senior citizens from Upper Austria and in the group of active senior citizens from Vienna. In these groups, neutrality was directly linked to memories of the war, “a lost youth”, and the like. Participants felt that their children and grandchildren should not “have to go through something like that”. Neutrality was seen as the primary guarantee.

OÖ

MZ: *was fällt ihnen ein zu dem Thema Neutralität*

WH: *mei, was sollt mir denn einfalln. es ist gut, daß der Krieg ned kummt. und? was denn no*

MZ: *jo?*

[MZ: *what comes to your mind regarding neutrality*

WH: *well, what should come to my mind. it is good that war does not come. and? what else*

MZ: *really?]*

FA

M1 *ja also Nachtei/ — NACHTEILE also Nachteile kömmt ich wirklich für MICH — würde mir ÜBERHAUPT NICHTS einfallen eigentlich, — und VORTEILE, ja, oja, AB UND ZU, ich*

*mein eber denk ich wie ich KIND war. Also in Gedanken wenn (ma noch a bissel ANGST so) wasß weiß ich, bricht noch ein Krieg aus oder irgendw/, — daß man dann schon das Gfühl hat, Naja naa, und eigentlich — wir sind ja NEUTRAL*

[M1 *well then, disadvantages/ — DISADVANTAGES well disadvantages, I couldn't really think of — of ANY AT ALL, — and ADVANTAGES, well, yes, FROM TIME TO TIME, I mean I tend to think more when I was a CHILD. So in my thoughts if (it still makes me a bit AFRAID) what do I know, another war were to break out or something/, — that you still have the feeling, well, you know — we are NEUTRAL after all]*

The evaluation of this “realization” varied among the groups. While some of the groups considered this to be little more than “wishful thinking” (something that would not reflect the “realities” in any way whatsoever), other groups did indeed see some kind of guarantee in neutrality. The following example (a passage from the discussion of group AK) reveals both a certain amount of skepticism as well as ideas about what “people” would think.

AK

F1 *also bitte ich glaube es war JEDN kla:r*

F1 *daß wenn es WIRKLICH zu einer Auseinandersetzung kommt*

F3 *daß im — Kaltn Krieg (xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)*

F1 *zwischen Amerika und Rußland — daß — Österreich natürlich ÜBERFLOGN und — und äb — ein äb die s die: — geographische Lage war SO — daß JEDE — JEDER TEIL dieser Truppm einmarschiert wäre bei UNS und der Krieg — natürlich — von Neutralität — in DEM Sinn keine SPUR mehr FRAGE, — ob sich dann TEILE unserer — östreichischen Truppm — ANGESCHLOSSN hätten den westlichen Truppm. — also das war eigentlich jedem KLA:R. — aber — ich mein*

F1 *das — GRO:s der Menschheit hat das GefÜHL gehabt -*

F2 *aba wir HABM uns da — durch*

M3 *ja.*

F1 *wir sind NEUTRA:L und jetzt*

F1 *Gott sei Dank is amol a RUH. — nicht,*

[F1 *there you are, I think it was clear to EVERYONE*

F1 *that if it REALly came to a conflict*

F3 *that in the — Cold War (xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)*

F1 *between America and Russia — that — Austria would of course be FLOWN OVER— and ub — a ub the the: — geographical situation was SUCH — that EACH — EACH PART of these troops would have marched in to OUR country and the war — of course — no sign — of*

neutrality in this sense, you could ask — whether then PARTS of our — Austrian troops — would have JOINED the western troops. — well that was quite CLEAR to everyone. — but — I think

F1 the — MAJORITY of people had the FEELING -

F2 but we HAVE one through — this

M3 yes.

F1 we are NEUTRAL and now

F1 Thank God that things are quiet for once. — don't you think,]

AK

F3 eines würd ich SEHR in äb in s — MITTLPUNKT setzn das VOLK. — der — sogenannte KLEINE MANN. — der war SEH:r SEH:r froh darüber.

F1 ja.

M1 sicher.

F3 der hat das GEFÜHL der SICHERheit gehopt. — UNabhängig jetzt von dem (WISSN.)

[F3 one thing I would put VERY much in ub the — CENTER the PEOPLE. — the — so-called LITTLE MAN. — he was really VERY VERY happy about it.

F1 yes.

M1 sure.

F3 he had the FEELING of SAFETY. — INdependent of that (KNOWLEDGE.)]

Similar ideas are expressed in the group OÖ. In this group, however, one of the participants argues that neutrality might somehow reduce the number of soldiers if war were actually to break out. Skepticism aside, the (consciously irrational) hope is that neutrality would — in some way or another — offer protection.

OÖ

MZ: und i kamma, nojo, auf da oan Seitn Neutralität, deng i ma, daß irgndwie wo/ Neutralität is jo effektiv ka Gegengewalt. oiso do hot ma (xx/)

MT: na, übabaupt ned.

MZ: ma hot, ma hot eigntlich nua an Zettl in da Hand, der besagt, daß woabscheinli neamt kummt ((Gelächter)) (xxx) Krieg mochn (eina), ned? und — ob des jetzt effektiv nützt oda ned, des woafß i a ned. oba wanns euch zum Beispiel die Geschichte es so Mustabeispiele gebn hot, was gbulfn hot, dann deng i ma, na, vielleicht hot ma a wieda des Glück ((lacht))

WK: (netta) vielleicht (xxx) das Glück ((lacht))

[MZ: and I can see, well, on the one side neutrality, I think that somehow where/ neutrality is well in effect no counter-force. well then you have (xx/)

MT: *no, not at all.*

MZ: *you have, you have really just a bit of paper in the hand that states that probably nobody will come ((laugther)) (xxx) to make war (here), isn't it so? and — whether it is of any use, I don't know that either. and if there have been examples, models in history, that have helped, then I think, well, maybe we might have some luck again ((laughs))*

WK: *(maybe) possibly (xxx) luck ((laughs))*

The idea that neutrality is a form of protection from war was also a major element in the discussion of the young people's group. The scope of these ideas becomes clear if one considers just what views they need to hold if they are to debate in all seriousness whether Austrian troops should fight if foreign troops enter Austrian territory!

The appearance of these ideas in the young people's group is of particular interest given that this group is the only one to know neutrality purely as "history". Indeed, we may categorize the ideas associated by the young people with neutrality as historical or collective memory (Halbwachs 1985).

JU

FH *mbm [4 sec] TANJA?*

F5 *nja. also i mein: — s bot EHA VORTEILE Östareich RAUShalten wird wann IM Lond kü/selba kämpft wird vo FREMDE — also der Meinung bin i auch. — und des mit m KRIEG des stimmt schon. aba es wird ja ned rund UM die Grenzn gekämpft also de — werdn do keine Rücksichtn nehmen drauf — STAATSGRENZN oda so? — und werdn — TROTZDEM durch uns durch — KÄMPFM und i glaub net daß si donn*

FH *mbm*

F5 *MÄCHTE und i man — zerstört wird ja trotzdem olls und i glaub net daß si dann Östareich — zurückhalt JA es hat kann Krieg ONGFONGEN oba — MITMOCHN tut's donn vleicht SCHON. —*

FH *mbm —*

F5 *nja verteidigt? — soll Östareich DOCH werdn und — i glaub net daß da TA:TNLOS zugschaut wird wie — KÄMPFT wird IM Lond. —*

FH *mbm*

F5 *a wonn ma's net selba IS.*

FH *mbm —*

F5 *also — aba sonst — GLAUB i eba daß: Vorteile hat. —*

[FH *mbm [4 sec] TANJA?*

F5 *well. well I think: — it has more ADVANTAGES not to involve Austria if if FOREIGNERS fight IN THE country — well I am of that opinion too. — and what has been said about WAR, it's quite true. but the fighting won't be done AROUND the borders they won't — show any*

*consideration for that — national borders or something? — and will — fight through DESPITE THIS through us and I don't believe that they will then*

FH *mbm*

F5 *the POWERS and I think — everything will be destroyed anyway and I don't believe that then they that Austria — would hold back YES it didn't START the war but — it might well then JOIN IN. —*

FH *mbm —*

F5 *well Austria should STILL be defended? — I don't think that people will just STAND BY and watch as — the FIGHTING goes on in the country. —*

FH *mbm*

F5 *even if it's not oneself doing it.*

FH *mbm —*

F5 *well — but otherwise — I tend to THINK that: it has advantages. —]*

In general, we may conclude that in all groups (except the migrants' group) neutrality was (and is) very closely related to the subject of "war", and that the possible surrendering of neutrality awakens fears about war. Depending upon people's ages, these fears are either more concrete (older participants) or more abstract (younger participants). "No war" is understood as the main advantage of neutrality. Thus, in the discourse of the participants, neutrality is still the antithesis of war.

### The neutrality of Switzerland

In all the focus groups, Swiss neutrality was also mentioned whenever Austrian neutrality was spoken about. This topos is often connected with the topic "war" — how the Swiss fared during the war.

FA

F1 *weil das WEISS ich vom meinem LEBEN her, daß die SCHWEIZ immer NEUTRAL war, — und am BESTEN gefahren is im Krieg.*

FH *mbm,*

F1 *als neutrales Land. Und für mich is DAS eigentlich, Neutralität verbind ich mit SCHWEIZ. Mit SCHWEIZ und KRIEG nicht,*

FH *mbm,*

F1 *also —*

FH *mbm,*

F1 *das heißt also wenn — ICH ich plä/ würde natürlich PLÄDIEREN daß Österreich neutral BLEIBT aus DIESEN Gründen heraus weil ich's einfach so GESEHN hab. Nicht,*

FH *mbm,mbm,mbm, Gut, -*

M4 *najo wenn sich sogn ma WIR so UMSTELLN würden wie die Schweiz dann wär jo des sebr ANGENEHM.*

[F1 *because I KNOW it from my own LIFE that SWITZERLAND was always NEUTRAL, — and fared the BEST during the war.*

FH *mbm,*

F1 *as a neutral country. And for me THIS is really, I connect neutrality with SWITZERLAND. With SWITZERLAND and WAR. you see,*

FH *mbm,*

F1 *well -*

FH *mbm,*

F1 *that means therefore if — I I arg/ would of course ARGUE that Austria should STAY neutral. for THESE reasons because I have simply SEEN it like that. You see,*

FH *mbm,mbm,mbm, Good, -*

M4 *well if thngs would, let's say, WE would CHANGE to be like Switzerland then that would really be quite NICE.]*

Apart from the young people's group, among whom any reference to Switzerland was no more than a citation of a fact probably learned at school ("Switzerland is neutral, too"), all other groups discussed Swiss neutrality at length, and compared it with Austrian neutrality.

SE

M3 *und die LEUT san olle sbe ANZOGEN und so, und von diesem: AUGENBLICK on is mir BEWUßT wordn und i hob donn in den JA:HREN sechsundfünfzig und siebenundfünfzig zwei Jahre in der Schweiz geARBEITET in mein Beruf als GÄRTNER, und od hob i des: A — do wor schon bei UNS: — des beschlossn, ned — (xxx) hob i s ebn durch verschiedene Zeitungen: ä g/ den Begriff kennengelernt oba i hob des SCHWEDN UND SCHWEIZ zwa Lā/ Länder die nie an KRIEG ghobt hom ne, — und: — i hob des: als etwas*

M3 *UNGEHEUER POSITIVES — >ä=begrüßt= und hob i wor immer<*

F1 *Positives*

M3 *DAFÜR ned und: i bin HEUTE noch nicht dagegen.*

[M3 *and the PEOPLE were all well-dressed and the like, and from this: MOMENT onwards it became CLEAR to me and then, in the YEARS OF fifty-six and fifty-seven, I WORKED in my job as a gardener in Switzerland, and then I did: A — it was already decided at home, you see — (xxx) then through various newspapers: I got to know the concept but I thought of SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND two co/ countries that have never had a WAR, — and: — I [thought of] this: as something*

- M<sub>3</sub> INCREDIBLY POSITIVE — >ä=welcomed= and I have I have always been<  
 F<sub>1</sub> positive  
 M<sub>3</sub> IN FAVOR you see and: I am not against it even TODAY.]

Despite the positive tone of these two contributions, Swiss neutrality tended to be given a negative evaluation. It seems that the debates about the “Nazi gold<sup>8</sup>” have been read by most of the discussion participants, and led them to adopt a critical stance with regard to “wheeling and dealing” under the cover of neutrality: “We don’t want to be neutral like that”<sup>9</sup>. This type of rejection was not usually linked to a rejection of neutrality per se, but constituted a rejection of a specific form of neutrality (see also “morality”).

## JO

- M<sub>2</sub> *aba — und das zweite is=wie sich jetzt immer mehr HERAUSstellt.=warum — v:/ konntn sie ihre Neutralität bewahren im GROSSN Konflikt, — weil sie sich praktisch als HEHLER — äh angeboten habm und als MITSPIELER. — das sind zwei: Gesichter der Neutralität. — gfalln mir (nämlich) BEIDE nicht.=weder das sich dann ANBIEDERN an den Aggressor — um — verschont zu bleibm,=des is net WIRKLICH NEUTRAL. — des is eigentlich eine — eine — HEHLEREI. des is eine MIThilfe. — und des Zweite is — bis an die Zähne bewaffnet zu sein um so richtig schön TRUTZIG allein auf der Insl sich zu verteidign,=gfallt ma auch nicht. — das sind echt zwei unsympatische Gesichter von NeutraliTÄT.*

- [M<sub>2</sub> *but — and the second thing is=which is becoming increasingly CLEAR now.=why — v:/ they could keep their neutrality in the GREAT conflict, — because they in effect — uh offered themselves as RECEIVERS OF STOLEN GOODS and as CO-ACTORS. — These are two: faces of neutrality. — I don’t (actually) like EITHER ONE = neither OFFERING oneself to the aggressor — in order to — be spared,=this is not REALLY NEUTRAL. — this is in fact — receiving stolen goods. this is contributing. — and the second thing is — to be armed to the teeth in order to defend yourself so one can be really proud of oneself and alone on the island, = that doesn’t appeal to me either. — these are two really unappealing faces of neutrality.]*

Thus, other negative features emphasized in connection with Switzerland were Swiss rearmament and the isolationism of the Swiss. It is in this context that one of the few negative evaluations of neutrality is made:

- 
- 8 “Nazigold” (as it has been described by the press) refers to money stolen from Jews and deposited in Switzerland by the Nazis. After the war the money was left in the possession of Swiss banks. In the Autumn of 1996 the “Nazigold” received a lot of attention in the Austrian mass media.
- 9 The exact quotation from group M1 is the following: F<sub>2</sub>: “because I thought to myself, thank God I live in Austria, and Austria is neutral in a manner that is different from Switzerland.”

JO

M2 *so wie mir jetzt die Schweiz komisch vorkommt wenn ich*?F2 *(xxxxxxx spezifisch xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)*M2 *seh wie sie sagt sie sin — also wie sie auf ihra Tradition da Neutralität beharrn, und sie kommen mir von AUSSN gesehn immer mehr als a Insl vor, — und wie a komische Insl. also wenn ich des eine Assoziation hab, fällt mir zur Schweiz nicht mehr hell, transparent, und weltoffen ein, — (wohl) es die Schweizer ja schon SIND teilweise, sondern — mir falln eigentlich nur noch eher DÜStare Gschichtn ein. INSL ist nicht mehr so ein heimeliges Wort, — wie s vielleicht amal war, MIR kommt des a bissl — isolationistisch — und a bissl nach Weltflucht und — nur nicht anstreifn nicht einmischn vor, und des ka=i=mi erinnern, des hats sich so im Lauf dea — dea da MITTLschulzeit imma mehr heraus. — entwickelt. Neutralität NICHT mehr SO positiv besetzt, — wie i s ehm von den Eltern, ursprünglich — mitbekommen hab*[M2 *just like Switzerland seems quite funny to me when I*?F2 *(xxxxxxx specifically xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)*M2 *see how they say they are — how they insist on their tradition of neutrality, and from the OUTSIDE they look to me more and more like an island, — and like a funny island. so if I have an association, I don't think of Switzerland as light, transparent, and open to the world, — (as) the Swiss clearly ARE in part, instead — I only think of rather more SINister stories. ISLAND is not such a comfy word — as it used to be perhaps, it seems to ME to be a bit — isolationist — and a bit like escapism and — trying at all costs not to get involved and not to interfere, and I can remember, this developed more and more while I was — at secondary school. To see neutrality NO longer SO positively, — as I had understood it originally, from my parents]*

### Neutrality and History: Austrian State Treaty, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, “the Russians”, and the Cold War

In part influenced by the questions of the host, but also in part spontaneously, the discussions turned sometimes to the context in which neutrality arose. Contributions were made particularly by those who had been experiencing this period (or in those groups where some of the participants). The “State Treaty” was mentioned in all groups. Repeatedly, it was pointed out that “in general” neutrality was incorrectly regarded as something embodied in the State Treaty.

The evaluation of neutrality in the context of the State Treaty ranged from “the price” to the “desired end result” (with reference to Switzerland). Mostly, the negative connotations of “price” were immediately weakened, for instance in group AK.

AK

F2 *man hat nur zu der damaligen ZEIT im fünfundfünfzigsten Jahr, — schon GEWUSST. — daß wir — mit der immerwährenden Neutralität uns den Staatsvertrag eigentlich*

F1 *ja:.*

F2 *ERKAUFT bobm.*

F3 *ja:.*

F2 *und waren eigentlich GLÜCKlich: daß also — WIR — zum Unterschied von den OSTblockstaaten — es ERREICHT bobm daß die Russen OBZIEHN.*

[F2 *at that TIME in the fifties people did — KNOW. — that we — had bought the state treaty*

F1 *yes:.*

F2 *with perpetual neutrality.*

F3 *yes:.*

F2 *and were in fact HAPPY: that well — WE — unlike the states of the EASTERN bloc — had ACHIEVED the WITHDRAWAL of the Russians.]*

AK

F1 *eigentlich war zu MEINER Zeit die Hauptsache daß wir — ab*

F1 *wollten daß eigentlich die BesATZUNGStruppen abmarschiern. — nicht, —*

F2 *ja. —*

F1 *und — erst DANN kam — der Begriff der NeutraliTÄT.*

F1 *in dem Sinn war der Staatsvertrag für uns ein GESCHENK.*

F2 *ja: — alles danach. ja:.*

F1 *und — die Neutralität war ein gutes NEBM. — [lächelt] — PRODUKT sozusagen*

FH *mbm. —*

[F1 *in fact in MY time the main thing was that we — uh*

F1 *- wanted the OCCUPATION troops to march off. — didn't we, —*

F2 *yes. —*

F1 *and — it was only THEN — that we thought of neutrality.*

F1 *in this sense, the state treaty was for us a GIFT.*

F2 *yes: — everything that came afterwards. yes:.*

F1 *and — neutrality was a good SIDE. — [smiles] — PRODUCT so to say*

FH *mbm. —]*

People reported to be pleased that they were neutral — especially in 1956 (just one year after the signing of the State Treaty) when fears had been large that “the Russians” would invade Austria as well.

The strong political linkage between the State Treaty and neutrality in the 1950s is still operative in discourse for some of the participants more than 40 years later:

SE

F1 *und ich glaub nicht nur für MICH ist die Neutralität im STAATSvertrag sozusagen EINE SACHE — uns auch JETZT innerlich das EMPFINDEN, GIBT MAN DIE NEUTRALITÄT AUS[auf] unterhöhlt man die Neutralität — unterhöhlt man die Kraft (in) den STAATSVERTRAG. können KÖNNTEN ALLE diese abenteuerliche*

F1 *Dinge wieder vorkommen. freilich —*

[F1 *and I don't believe neutrality in the STATE treaty is only for me as it were AN ISSUE — even NOW inside us is the the FEELING, IF YOU GIVE UP NEUTRALITY, you undermine neutrality — you undermine the power (in) the STATE TREATY. ALL these risky things can COULD*

F1 *Things could happen again. quite possibly —]*

Asked how they had “then” experienced the neutrality resolution and the State Treaty, (the older) participants remarked that they did not take much note of the ongoing political affairs at that time, unless they had been involved in politics at the time because of their jobs (journalists’ group). The evaluations shown above are made as participants “look back”: at the actual time of events, they had not really been very interested in politics, but had been concerned with other, more immediate problems of their everyday lives. The participants had been children or young adults, who were starting their family or attempting to return to (or to begin) their careers after the years of war and occupation.

When mentioning briefly the “context” of how neutrality “came into being” (or the “first memories of neutrality”), reference is also made to the “Day of the Flag” or the national holiday. Here, neutrality proves to be in part “de-historicized” — neutrality is remembered as a day of remembrance without any specific reference to the historical context that gave rise to neutrality. Particularly striking are the contributions made by the young people, who have only second-hand knowledge of the events. Here, subsequent events in international politics such as the Prague Spring do not appear at all.

This dehistoricization is also apparent in the attempt of one of the young people to re-historicize the national holiday:

JU

F4 *also — was ICH damit verbinde is eigndlich — daß — also zum: sechsunzwanzigsten Oktober gehört ja eigndlich der erste MAI: irgendwo DAZU: weil des ja begonnen hat. — und meine Mutta hat mir immer erzählt daß sie DAMALS am erstn MAI — also — am Belvedere WAR? — und DABEI war — wie also — die Unterschriften hergezeigt wordn — SIND. daß*

*äh — Österreich ehm FREI is? — und — daran DENK ich eigentlich IMMA weil sie mir das erzählt hat daß des für sie AUCH ein prägendes Erlebnis war? — und das erzählt sie ehm MIR damit ich das auch WEISS [lacht] WAS da — DAMALS passiert is. —*

[F4 *well — what I think of is actually — that — well: the twenty-sixth of October is linked to the first of MAY: in some way: because that's when it started. — and my mother always told me that she — well — WAS at the Belvedere? AT THAT TIME on the first of MAY— and was THERE — as — the signatures were shown. that uh — Austria is FREE? — and — I always THINK of this because she told me that this was a decisive experience for her TOO? — and she tells this to ME so that I should also KNOW (laughs) what — happened there AT THAT TIME. —]*

This young person confuses Labor Day (May 1<sup>st</sup>) with the day on which the State Treaty was signed (May 15<sup>th</sup>) and the passing of the neutrality resolution (October 26<sup>th</sup>).

Events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia are mentioned spontaneously by some of the older participants when asked to recall their memories of the role of neutrality. But such events are not given great emphasis in this context. This aspect is more prominent among participants in the migrants' group (most of whom emigrated from the countries of the Eastern Bloc). These participants are the only ones to bring "the Russians" into a direct argumentative connection with neutrality. In all the other groups "the Russians" tend to be seen as actors in other events which are then in turn linked to neutrality (e.g. their role in the drafting of the State Treaty, or their role in the occupation of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and so on).

MI

M2: *WENN Sie jetzt äh — erWÄHNEN sie hat in der SCHULE geLERNT oder geHÖ:RT in da ZEITungen geLESEN — oder im RUNDfunk gehört — das lag für mich auf der STRASSE e das lag in der LUFT. also JEDES Mal. — also UNSERE — immerwährende — Neutralität. — und äh — ich hab das dabei: auch [als; lacht] —/als ZAUBAforma äh — äh — EMPFUNDN. — SPEZIELL — bei da —/beim EINmarsch äh der — Truppen des äh Warschauer PAKTES äh ACHTunsechzig — in die Sch/äh TschechoslowaKEI? — ich KANN mich erinnern? — äh das wa:r Bundeskanzla KLAUS. —*

F1 *ja.*

M2 *hat das äh — KUNDgetan was ist passiert? — UND — wie gesagt als —/quasi als ZAUBAFORMEL. — aber unsere immerwährende NeutralITÄT WIRD uns vor alle Komplicationen und so weiter schützen. — also — man brauchte östereichischerseits also NUR zu sagen unsere immerwährende — Neutralität UND wir waren geschützt. —*

F1 *mbm*

[M2: IF you now ub — mention sbe LEARN'T it at school or HEARD READ it in the newspapers — or heard it on the RADIO — for me it lay on the STREET and it lay in the AIR. EVERY time. — OUR — perpetual — neutrality. — and ub — I ub — ub — SAW it: [also laughs] —/ also as a magic formula. — ESPECLALLY — at the time of — the INvasion of ub — the troops of the Warsaw PACT ub in sixty-EIGHT — into Czech/ub Czechoslovakia? — I CAN remember? — ub how ub federal chancellor KLAUS. —

F1 yes.

M2 announced ub — what had happened? — AND — how he said like —/almost like a MAGIC FORMULA — but our perpetual neutrality WILL protect us from all complications etc. — so — all one had to say on the Austrian side was our perpetual — neutrality AND we were protected. —

F1 mbhm]

In the politically well-informed groups (i.e. in the journalists' group and in the active senior citizens' group) mention is also made of Kreisky's role in the shaping of neutrality policy (active neutrality), as well as the effects of this policy on Austrian identity.

JO

M1 i i muaß sogn i bob des — i bob des wirklich auch ähnlich — schon auch ähnlich erlebt, a: nämlich — wei i zerst gsogt bob aiso — a: Tschecnkrise, — a: do woa irgndwie so die Empfindung, — duckn, net dazuaagbean, n: n: Kopf einziehn daomn — passiert scho nix, — a: während DANN. diese diese diese kreiskysche — a Aufsnpolitik a: — Aktivität vamittlt bat. a: — beWUSST ausgleichend — zu wirken.

[M1 I I have to say I — I experienced this really in a similar way — in a similar way, a: — because I said at first well — a: the Czech crisis, — a: I somehow had the feeling, — duck, don't get involved, n: n: keep your head in then — nothing will happen, — a: whereas THEN this this this Kreiskyan — a foreign policy a: — brought activity. a: to act — consciously balancing.]

JO

M2 ist daß mir aufgefalln is (so xxxx) im Lauf der siebziger Jahre in meiner Mittelschulzeit, — daß — Neutralität, — is MIR vorgekommen eigentlich erst untern Kreisky, — beWUSST eingesetzt wurde — um Selbstwertgefühl — den Menschn zu vermittln.

[M2 it occurred to me (so xxxx) in the course of the seventies during my school years, — that — neutrality, — it occurred to ME only under Kreisky, — was INTENTIONally applied — in order to give people self-esteem.]

In the other groups, however, Kreisky is not mentioned.

Only in the journalists' group do participants continue the historical reflection (almost) all the way through to the present. In the other groups, while individual elements of the recent past are mentioned in connection with specific questions (e.g. when participants recall violations of neutrality), "history" is usually put aside with the signing of the State Treaty — or at most with events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. This is probably the reason why differentiated positions on neutrality corresponding to different periods of contemporary Austrian history are to be found only among the journalists. In this way M<sub>4</sub> determines the "golden age" of neutrality (under Kreisky); and this is said to come to a definite end with the fall of the Iron Curtain:

JO

M<sub>2</sub> vereintes ro/ Europa mal gebm könnte hat erstmals so ausgschaut (als obs) vielleicht DOCH — keine —

M<sub>2</sub> totale Utopie (sondan) vielleICHT irgendwann a Möglichkeit.

?F danke

M<sub>2</sub> und das hat INsofern meinen — meine meinen Blick dann auf unsere eigene Stellung väändat, weil ich mir — schon gedacht hab — WENN man — ein vaeintes Europa anstrebt. (dann xxxxxxxxxxx) IRGNDwo etwas (einbringen oder auch) dieser Idee etwas opfern. und wenn JEDES Land, auf — auf liebge gewordenen Sonderrolln. beharrt, — dann wird es irgend (xxxxxx), — die Idee einer Vereinigung — behindern. auf Dauer.; Nebengeräusche: Gschirrschieben, Geschirrkloppern, Schritte% wie gsagt i hab — zur Neutralität — einige POSitive Empfindungen einige NEgative — aba ich denk mir EIGndlich müßte man SO eine Tradition, zugunstn — da da Chance auf eine (s) vereinigtes Europa MÜSST ma eigentlich aufgebm.

[M<sub>2</sub> that there could be a united ro/ Europe at some time, looked at first (as if it) perhaps was nevertheless — no -

M<sub>2</sub> total utopia (but) perHLAPS at some time a possibility.

?F thank you

M<sub>2</sub> and that changed — my outlook on our own position, because I — had already thought — IF one — strives for a united Europe. (then xxxxxxxxxxx) SOMEwhere sacrifice something to this idea or contribute. and if EVerY country, insisted upon — upon special roles that had become dear to them, — then this will hinder somehow (xxxxxx), — the idea of union. forever; as I said I have some POSitive feelings — about neutrality — as well as some NEgative — but I think one should SHOULD probably give up SUCH a tradition — because of the chance of a (the) united Europe.]

The fall of the Iron Curtain and the ensuing radically changed global political situation are mentioned on isolated occasions by participants in other groups, e.g. "the son" in the

group FA. This event, or the acknowledgement that the global political situation has changed, is always accompanied by calling neutrality into question. In the focus group discussions on neutrality, the Iron Curtain becomes relevant as a topic only to the extent that a political connection is seen between it (or the Warsaw Pact) and neutrality. With the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the implicit argument for neutrality — its political function with regards to the Iron Curtain — is also lost. As a result, either neutrality itself is declared obsolete or a change of its content is proposed (FA). This leads directly into the ongoing public discussion about the EU and to the question of an Austrian NATO membership.

FA

*M2: — Nur auf dem Weg in a vereintes Europa und deshalb is die Neutralität irgendwie zu überdenken. — Wei was BRINGTS heut noch. — Es is irgendwie ab — ja — a KONSTRUKT gewesen, um einen bestimmten Zweck zu erfüllen, aber dieser Zweck HOT si erfüllt und — jetzt muß ma des ganze glaub i neu DEFINIEREN. -*

*[M2: — Only on the way to a united Europe and therefore neutrality should be reconsidered somehow. — Because how does it BENEFIT us Well today. — It was somehow ub — yes — a CONSTRUCT, in order to fulfill a specific role, but this purpose has been fulfilled and — now one has to reDEFINE the whole thing, I think.]*

Thus, the discourse on the role of neutrality in Austrian history leads directly to the current debate on the relationship between EU membership and neutrality (see below).

### Neutrality as an answer to the Nazi past

The National Socialist past of Austria was a regular feature of the discussions. The Nazi period was explicitly addressed at some point in all the groups apart from the migrants' group, in which it also turned up without being named as such (see below).

There are a number of different ways in which the NS-time enters the discussion on neutrality. In four of the groups, an explicit connection is established between National Socialism and neutrality, and neutrality is seen as more or less *the* answer to the burdened past (JO, FA, MI, OÖ) when discussing, for instance, personal experiences, or advantages and disadvantages of neutrality (the function of neutrality) for Austria.

MI

*F1 — mir Gedanken gemacht — warum? — für die Östareicha also WICHTIG — IST — wie ich imma wieda sag — UNSERE — UNSERE — Neutralität. so BETONT. — vielleicht —*

*aus äb der — historische GESCHICHTE da sie doch in diesem — ZWEITN Weltkrieg — MITGEMACHT habm in einem KRIEG? — [...] — und PLÖTZLICH — SIND wir — NEUTRA:L. — WIR — SCHLIESSEN — eine — GESCHICHTE? — bis DA:, — und auf einmal sind wir ANDERS. —*

M1 *mhm — (xxxxxx)*

F2 *ja aba das is ja*

F1 *nehm ich an.*

F2 *das is ja WIRKLICH*

M1 *das is irgdnwie anders.*

F2 *das: is: irgendwie wirklich eine große LÜGE wenn das dann SO is. weil*

F1 *ja: aba die FÜHLN sich so.*

F2 *man kann doch net/man kann do net sogn ob JETZ/JETZ hob ma irgendwie an Vertrag untaschriebm und ab jetz sind wir GU:T bis jetz warn ma nicht so GU:T*

M1 *mhm mhm*

[F1 *— I was thinking — why? — IS — it so IMPORTANT for the Austrians — as I always say again and again — OUR — — OUR — neutrality. EMPHASIZED in this way. — perhaps — out of ub the — historical history because they TOOK PART in this — SECOND world war? — [...] — and SUDDENLY — we ARE — NEUTRA:L. — WE — CLOSE — a — CHAPTER? — until HERE:. — and suddenly we are DIFFERENT. —*

M1 *mhm — (xxxxxx)*

F2 *yes but that is*

F1 *I assume.*

F2 *that is REALly*

M1 *that is somehow different.*

F2 *that: is: somehow really a great LIE if it is like THAT. because*

F1 *yes: but they FEEL like that.*

F2 *but one can't just say/one can't say that from NOW/NOW we have signed some kind of a treaty and from now on we are GOOD, until now we weren't so GOOD*

M1 *mhm mhm]*

JO

F2 *aus eina — politisch denkendn Familie. — die Neutralität war wirklich die die die die die DIE Antwort, auf, das Problem des Nazionalsozialismus unsere — Värwiggung in den Nazionalsozialismus diese — diese valogene Opferrolle die wir angenommen hattn — un wo jeder ein bissl unbehaglich sich gefühlt hat — un DANN kam die Neutralität >un wir warn von dem ALLN befreit< =wir warn nicht mebr SCHULDig wir warn nicht mebr SCHMUTZig wir warn keine MÖRder mebr wir warn GOR nix mebr wir warn NUR einfach Selige. [341]*

[F2 from a — family that thought in political terms. — neutrality was really the the the the the THE answer, to, the problem of national socialism — the involvement in national socialism this — this false role of victim that we has assumed — and with which everyone had felt a bit uneasy — and THEN came neutrality >and we were freed of ALL this = we were not GUILTY anymore we were not DIRTY anymore we were not MURDERers anymore we were not ANYTHING anymore we were JUST simple souls. [341]]

JO

M1: also für mich war die Neutralität in der — in der Phase schon — insoferne wichtig als sie glaub ich Österreich — äh — eine Phase der — RUHE gebracht hat sich selbst — zu entwickeln, sich von dieser — von diesem — BALLAST äh:: — der Nazizeit — a bissl zu BEFREIEN. — äh wie weit des gelungen is oder net gelungen is: und obs vielleicht anders besser gewe/ — waß i ne:t. — äh: — aba — m: — in gewisser Weise war s schon eine eine eine: — MÖGLICHKEIT — eine eigene — PERSÖNLICHKEIT. — als — Nation zu entfalten. — des glaub i schon. — des: — war wahrscheinlich der HAUPTVORTEIL aus meiner Sicht.

[M1: well for me neutrality was in that — in that period — important inasmuch as it I think brought to Austria — uh — a period of — REST in which to develop itself, to FREE itself a little from this — from this — BURDEN uh:: — of the Nazi period. — uh to what extent this worked or didn't work: and whether perhaps it would have been better otherwise / — I don't know that. — uh: — but — m: — in a certain way it was a a a a: — POSSIBILITY — to develop a a — PERSONALITY. — as — a nation. — I do believe that. — this: — was probably the MAIN ADVANTAGE from my perspective.]

The connection between neutrality and National Socialism arises in the discussion not only in this conscious and explicit form, but also as an automatic discursive link (made as a matter of course). This happens, for example, when a student says “in history I think we spent TWO years on Nazi rule to neutrality” (FA). In this quotation, Nazi rule up to neutrality appears as a logical historical unit. The final point of this chapter of Austrian history is neutrality — and none of the participants questions (or scrutinizes) this.

The second point of reference that often leads participants to mention the Nazi period is Switzerland (already described above). When talking about Swiss neutrality, participants often turn to the role of Switzerland during the Nazi period.

The other points of reference are of various types. Thus, mention is made of the Nazi period as participants discuss the differing attitudes of parents and children — taking the experiences of the Nazi past either as a yardstick (the same — or different — political outlook) or as an extreme — which “young people today” can no longer even imagine; and as they discuss the role of the EU — where the hope that the EU might solve the unemployment problem leads some participants to recall the unemployment of the 1930s

and then to justify their support for Hitler. On the other hand the hopes that the EU might bring lasting peace to Europe gave raise to memories of the war, leading one participant to defend his own role in the Second World War (as a member of the SA).

As the discussions turn to these different topics, one aspect becomes very clear: the velocity and ease with which the discourse moves from a discourse about neutrality to a discourse about the Nazi period and a justification of one's own role and the behavior of a generation. The following two quotations should illustrate this:

FA

FH *Sie wolltn was dazusagn noch,*

M2 *ja. ZUERST müß ma a VEREINTES Europa habn net, dann — is des — viel BESSER zu zum VERHANDELN n, — die GROSSE OARBEITSLOSIGKEIT bei uns (xx bringt x mit sich) des woa jo (xx) net in die DREISSIGER Jahre GENAUSO net, (da sind viel illegale) Nazi woarn net, — wei sovü OARBEITSLOSE woarn.net, — I hob von dreiunddreißig bis sechsunddreißig GELERNT, dann woa i a boibes Joa — ARBEISLOS, — und dann woa i AUSGESTEUERT, hot ma do gsogt. Ich weiß net ob's ihnen vielleicht erinnern können aber — dann habn sie NICHTS bekommen, KEINE Unterstützung. — dann hob i gsogt. SO net. Arbeitsamtleiter, na von wos soll ich jetzt LEBEN, — hot er gsogt, najo gengans zum BAUERN oarbeite, des wo (xx) und DRUM dann — ja die ILLEGALITÄT sehr stark ZUGENOMMEN, — dann is der — Umschwung kummen ja, — dann hat der Hitler a lei/ leichtes — Lebn — also*

M1 *aber was hat das jetzt mit der Neutralität zu tun, was sie da erzähl.*

M3 *Najo i glaub, daß des die PARALLELEN zu HEUTE sand. — mhm Also er hot ange-*

M1 *mhm,*

M3 *sprochen >die die ARBEITSLOSIGKEIT, als MASSIVES Problem — und die Arbeits-*

M1 *Arbeitslosigkeit*

F1 *a die ARBEITSLOSIGKEIT.*

M2 *man könnte sogn*

M3 *losigkeit's damols die woa WIRKLICH einer der der HAUPTgründe für des daß die*

M3 *daß da NATIONALSOZIALISMUS — ÜBERHAUPT. Ja. — jo. — Na und WEN homma*

F1 *daß (xx) da reingekommen sind. Ja.*

M1 *ja ja.*

[FH *You wanted to add something more,*

M2 *yes. FIRST we have to have a UNITED Europe, then — this is — much BETTER to deal with, — the GREAT UNEMPLOYMENT here in Austria (xx brings x with it) it was really (xx) wasn't it exactly like that in the THIRTIES yes, (because there were many illegal) Nazis, — because there were so many UNEMPLOYED people, yes — I was STUDYING from thirty-three*

till thirty-six, then I was UNEMPLOYED for half a year, — and then I was TAKEN OFF THE BOOKS, that's what people called it. I don't know whether you can still remember but — then you didn't get ANYTHING, NO support whatsoever. — then I said, it can't be LIKE THAT. (I asked) the head of the employment office, well now what should I LIVE from, — he said, go and work for the PEASANTS, that was it (xx) and THEREFORE — yes the ILLEGALITY INCREASED a lot, — then there was the — change yes, — then Hitler an eas/ easy — life

M1 but what has that got to do with neutrality, I mean what you are saying.

M3 Well I think that there are PARALLELS to today. — mhm He did add-

M1 mhm,

M3 address >the the UNEMPLOYMENT, as a massive problem — and the unemploy

M1 unem

F1 a the UNEMPLOYMENT.

M2 one could say

M3 ployment at that time was REALLY one of the the MAIN reasons for the fact that the

M3 that NATIONAL SOCIALISM — AT ALL. yes. — yes. — And WHO do we have

F1 that (xx) there came in. Yes.

M1 yes yes.]

OÖ

MZ: jo. oba, in da Praxis hots im Zweitn Weltkrieg so ausgschaut. daß die neutraln Stootn, äh mehr oda weniger abgeschottet woarn, vom Kriegsgeschehen.

MR?: jjo

WK: ja, in da Schweiz is a da Hilter ned einmarschiert. und bei uns is er einmarschiert do hot neamt was zredn ghobt mehr.

MZ: is er wegn da Neutralität ned einmarschiert oda

WK: na, der hots, er hot jo (xxxxxxx)

MT: (xxxxxx) der hot jo scho is (xxxxxxx) im Ochtadreißgajohr. war unmöglich gwesn. ne? wer hätt ibn denn aufghoitr. kein Mensch ned. (xxxx) hamma eh gsehn.

MR: ober i mueß sogn (xxxx) und woar jo kein Nazi ned do obwohl olle dafür gstimmt ham, hams gsogt (xxxxxxx)

WH/K?: jo weils a Oarbeit ghobt ham

[MZ: yes. but, in practice what happened in the Second World War was. that the neutral states ub were more or less isolated, from the events of war.

MR?: yeah

WK: yes, Hitler didn't march into Switzerland. and he did march into Austria, nobody could speak up anymore.

MZ: but was it because of neutrality that he didn't march in or

WK: *well, he did, he did (xxxxxxx)*

MT: *(xxxxxxx) he did it already (xxxxxxx) in thirty-eight. it would have been impossible. no? who would have stopped him. Nobody at all. (xxxx) we saw it too.*

MR: *but I must say (xxxx) and I was no Nazi although everyone voted for it, they said (xxxxxxx)*

WH/K?: *yes because they had work]*

## Neutrality and Identity

The identity discourse may be found at two levels in the transcripts. On one hand, the whole of the discourse about the neutrality of Austria is an identity discourse in itself; very many of the propositions that have been examined — or will be examined — describe positions that feature in the discourse of Austrians about Austria. On the other hand, the transcripts also contain explicit reflections on the manner in which — or the extent to which — neutrality has become a part of Austrian identity.

The identity discourse finds its clearest expression in the young people's group, because participants in this group can refer only to collective memory (for lack of subjective memories of Austria before the 1980s). This was revealed when participants in the group made an association between neutrality and the national holiday. In general, it appears that a profession of loyalty to the state is often linked to neutrality. Discursively, state, statehood, and neutrality are one and the same thing.

JU

F2 *ämhb: ja. — na das ERSTE was ich mich erinnern kann war in da VOLKSSCHULE so mit siebm ACHT. weil — unsre Völksschullehrerin ehm — anlässlich des Nationalfeiertages da irgndso: — ERZÄHLT halt — JA: Österreich: ja. — geht in keinen KRIEG und — wir s — können so STOLZ sei:n und ehm daß wir in FRIEDN und WOHLSTAND lebm im Vergleich jez zu ANDEREN ehm — JA. — und da hab ich am Nationalfeiertag [lacht] vor meinen ELTERN eine Rede gehalten.*

F2 *[mmb: yes. — the FIRST thing I remember was at PRIMARY SCHOOL about seven EIGHT years old. because — our teacher SAID — because of the national day somehow: YES: Austria: yes. — won't take part in any WAR and — we — can be so PROUD: because we live in PEACE and PROSPERITY compared to OTHERS — YES. — and then on the national day [laughs] I made a speech in front of my PARENTS.]*

JU

FH — WAS: äb — welche — BEGEBMHEITN oda ERFABRUNGEN oda welche ERLEBNISSE — verbindest du mit da Neutralität Östaerreichs? —

F5 n: also — STAATSFEIERTAG?

F5 [lächelt]

FH mbm —

F5 njo.: — N:neutralität im M: — es kann keiner — MITREDN bei uns also ka fremdes Land bei UNS. —

FH mbm

[FH — WHAT: ub — which — EVENTS or EXPERIENCES — do you link connect with the neutrality of Austria? —

F5 n: well — the NATIONAL HOLIDAY?

F5 [smiles]

FH mbm —

F5 well.: — N:neutrality in the: — nobody can — INTERFERE in our country that is, no foreign country in OUR country. —

FH mbm]

Neutrality defines Austria in many respects. Some aspects linked with neutrality are evaluated positively. The following example from the young people's group illustrates the connection between neutrality and self-image.

JU

F1 äb: des mit de: ursprünglichn BEDEUTUNG der Neutralität? — äbm: — nicht nur für UNS aber auch für die ANDREN oder es: es es mocht — es gibt in: irgendwie so ein BILD. — äb ja Östereich is HARMLOS. — und — äb des Bild is holt daß ma nach Möglichkeit auch nich VERLORN gehn. — DENK ich mir halt mal. — und — in DEM Sinn is die URSPRÜNGLICHE BEDEUTUNG hat sie DOCH noch einen Wert. —

[F1 ub: as for the: original MEANING of neutrality? — bmm: — not only for US but for the OTHERS or it: it it could — there is in: somehow a kind of PICTURE. — ub yes Austria is HARMLESS. — and — ub the picture is such that if possible it shouldn't be let go. — I THINK. — and — in THAT sense the ORIGINAL MEANING does STILL have a value. —]

The discussions contain many aspects that Wodak et al. (1998) have already determined to be elements of the discourse about Austrian national identity: in particular, the articulated self-conscious identity of being a citizen of a neutral country (when abroad), and stories about the preferential treatment received in Communist countries, and so on. There is pride in Austria's role of intermediary (the policy of active neutrality) and regret that Austria's reputation abroad suffered under Waldheim.

Relatively often participants talk about “Austria as a small country”. They sometimes state that they have read Andic’s book “*Der Staat, den keiner wollte*” [The state that nobody wanted]. The small size of Austria is seen in part as something positive, but it also leads to feelings of impotence. Such feelings are expressed in the next passage and in the debates about the EU and NATO.

OÖ

MZ: *oiso kriegerisch kamma si ois neutrala Staat nicht helfn.*

WK: *so a kloas Landl ned*

MZ: *jo. aba, in da Praxis hots im Zweitn Weltkrieg so ausgschaut. daß die neutraln Stootn, äb mebr oda weniger abgeschottet woarn, vom Kriegsgeschehen.*

[MZ: *well in terms of fighting as a neutral state one can't help oneself.*

WK: *no, [not as] such a little country*

MZ: *yes. but, in practice what happened in the Second World War was, that the neutral states ub were more or less isolated, from the events of war.]*

## The European Union, the economy and neutrality — a contradiction, and Neutrality and NATO — Americans and the small country

The European Union is mentioned in all groups, and is considered to be irreconcilable with neutrality. In some groups, a phenomenon observed in connection with the State Treaty occurs once again: there is a consensus among discussion participants that broad sections of the population believe (or have been made to believe by the government) that the EU and neutrality are reconcilable — even if discussion participants themselves disagree with this proposition.

AK

F1 *also ich glaube in dem AUGNblick wo wir der EU beigetreten*

F2 *sind is die Neutralität äb — für uns schon PASSE.*

F1 *das stimmt also ALLES. — aba das VOLK —*

M1 *i find s einfach (xxxxx) szagn* *jo.*

F2 *aba das geh:t ja nich. — wir können da auch.*

F3 *spürt s ANDERS.*

[F1 *well I think as SOON as we joined the EU*

F2 *neutrality ub — was for us a thing of the PAST.*

F1 *ALL that is true. — but the PEOPLE —*

- M1 *I find it simple (xxxxxx) as it were*                    yes.  
 F2 *but*                    *it can't be like that. — we can also.*  
 F3 *see it DIFFERENTLY.]*

The conclusions drawn from this evaluation vary greatly among the groups. In one group (AK) the common view is that if you say yes to one thing ("A" — the EU), you must also say yes to "B" — the consequence of "A" (and thus relinquish neutrality)<sup>10</sup>; another group put forward that Austria should not insist upon a special role (JO) which might slow down the process of European unification. A similar view is expressed in the following passage:

- AK  
 F1 *ja. — selbstverständlich. — weil sich die ganze politische SITUATION verändert hat. — also ich — GLAUBE daß: äh — mit dem Augenblick des: — Eintritts zur EU. — die NEUTRALITÄT. — äh VERLORN war. — es gibt eine ein DOPPELTE Identität ich fühl mich als Österreicher aba zugleich auch als EUROPÄER. und wenn ich mich als Europäer FÜHLE muß ich mich auch damit IDENTIFIZIERN. — also ich KANN nicht wenn heute — Auseinandersetzungen SIND, — jetzt sagt ja. — das: GUTE wolln wir wohl habm die wirtschaftlichn Vorteile und so weita aba — das können wir wieda NICHT daß wir jetzt da — mit — ein eingreifn oa sowas. — das is BEDAUERLICH aba es IST nicht anders. Es is eine SITUATION. — die gegeben is. — die Neutralität war etwas anderes domols die — äh auch die ZEIT war eine andere in den fünfziger Jahren als heute.*  
 FH *mbm okay. Frau G, -*  
 F2 *jo ich kann mich der Soche nur anschließen. muß ich sogn. — es STIMMT. — es is natürlich wir hobm JO gesogt zu EU: — also werdn wir auch zur NATO — JA sagt müßn. — mebr oder weniga sind ma schon — JETZ — DRINNEN. —*  
 [F1 *yes. — of course. — because the whole political SITUATION has changed. — so I — BELIEVE that: uh — as soon as we: — joined the EU. — NEUTRALITY. — was uh LOST. — there is a a DOUBLE identity I feel myself as an Austrian but at the same time as a European too. and if I FEEL myself to be a European then I must IDENTIFY with that as well. — that is I CANNOT say now if today there are — conflicts, — we want the GOOD things the economic advantages etc. but — on the other hand — we can't interfere or something. — this is UNFORTUNATE but this IS the simple truth. It is a SITUATION. — which is given.*

10 "Wer A sagt, muss auch B sagen" — the one who says A, has to say B, too, is a well known German proverb, which implicitly refers to syllogistic reasoning. A is presumed to be taken for granted, as well as A→B. Thus, one wants to stress that the hearer ought to accept B. Consequently, the speaker presupposes that the European Union and neutrality are mutually exclusive.

— neutrality was something different at that time the — ub the TIMES were also different in the fifties from today.

FH *mbm okay. Frau G, -*

F2 *well I can only agree with what has been said. I have to say. — it is CORRECT. — it is a natural thing we said YES to the EU: — so we shall have to say YES to NATO too. — we are more or less already — INS IT — NOW. — ]*

This passage also reveals the close discursive link between the EU and NATO. F2, for instance, makes no distinction between the EU and NATO. In her view the links between the two organizations are so strong that the decision to join the EU also implies a decision to join NATO.

In two groups (AK, FA), participants proposed a change in the content of Austrian neutrality<sup>11</sup>, while expressing their support for neutrality — whatever neutrality was to mean:

AK

M1: *also man ZEIGT hier — daß HIER äh — daß äh — die ZEIT sich geändert hat. — daß jeder Anpassungs äh — äh — äh — FAKTOR. — ANDERS ist als wie neunzehnbundrtfünfundfünfzig. — und ob dieser ANpassungsfaktor sozusagen, — vom VOLK beantwortet werden kann. — und nicht von einem POLITIKER gesetzt werden muß, — is ne ANDRE Frage. — nicht, — ICH persönlich bin — für die Neutralität, — ich sage aber — sozusagen — sie IST nicht nur DURCHFührbar, — man muß sie ei/ AUS. — EIN. muß sie EINSchleifn sozusagn. — dieser — diesn BÜNDNISEFAKTOR — in die NEUE — LAGE — in Europa. — WEU:, — und Europa. —*

F1 *(jo. xxxxx)*

[M1: *so one is SHOWING here — that HERE ub — that ub — the TIMES have changed. — that any adaptation ub — ub — ub — FACTOR. — is DIFFERENT from in nineteen fifty-five. — and whether this adaptation factor so to speak, — can be addressed by the PEOPLE. — and does not have to be set by a POLITICLAN, — is ANOTHER question. — isn't it, — Personally I am — in favour of neutrality, — but I say — as it were — it IS not realisable/enforceable,*

11 The semantic emptiness of neutrality, which enables people to go and redefine it to their liking, was already noted by Anton Pelinka (1994, 14): "Joining the EU after Maastricht and accepting Maastricht's terms was the the beginning of the end of Austrian neutrality. Now the final stage has begun. What is still missing is the coup de grace. But here there is no longer much to be finished by such a coup. It is primarily the semantics which are still alive. Neutrality is just a word, but one which still causes a lot of headaches with the upper echelons of Austrian politics."

— if one has to adapt it. has to adapt it as it were. — to this — this FEDERATION FACTOR — in the NEW — SITUATION — to Europe. — WEU:, — and Europe. —

F1 (yes. xxxxx)]

FA

M3 aber Neutralität könnt ma a a neu definieren als EIGENSTÄNDIGKEIT ÖSTERREICHS. Zumindest a — was KULTURELLE — a Belange betrifft oder — eben was zu einer Nation

M3 gehört. — Eigen/ — a a eigenes SELBSTWERTGEFÜHL.

M? eigen-

M1 ja, —

M3 also MILITÄRISCH ist das SOWIESO überholt. Also. —

[M3 but one could uh redefine neutrality as the INDEPENDENCE OF AUSTRIA. At least uh — with respect to — cultural issues or — whatever belongs to the nation

M3. its own / — SELF-ESTEEM.

M? own-

M1 that's right, —

M3 well in a military sense it is OUTMODED anyway. Well. —]

Others express once again their fears that Austria as a “small state” would be subject to the pressure of the (economically) powerful, and would be unable to take independent action.

Participants repeatedly point out that, *de facto*, neutrality has already been relinquished:

MI

M2 daß wir wieda äh: — ich — bitte das hab ich ernst gemeint also

FH mbm

M2 nicht zynisch also — wie kommt äh die Jungfrau zum Kind. — also wir — sind äh fassadn-mäßig nach außn n:utra:l. — und wir habm unsere — so zur Jungfräulichkeit als neutrale Staat [lacht] schon längst aufgegebm. — nur wir -/wir habm nicht so viel Zivilcourage das — zuzugebm daß wir [lacht] — schon längst nicht neutral sind.

[M2 that we again uh: — I — believe me, I mean that quite seriously

FH mbm

M2 I was not being cynical — how does the virgin get child — so we — are n:utr:al on the outside. — and we have given up our — on this virginity as a neutral country [laughs] a long time ago. — but we don't have enough civil courage — to admit that we [laughs] — haven't been neutral for a long time.]

In one group, the European Union is seen as an organization dominated by Germany (which Austria has finally joined or been joined to [angeschlossen]). Other participants see the EU as a "Europe of business corporations". A close link is established between NATO and the EU (in part through the WEU). Indeed, as we have already seen, sometimes participants fail to make a clear distinction between the EU and NATO. Thus, they fear that by means of the NATO Europe will be run by the Americans. (Most participants consider NATO to be dominated by Americans). (Some consider this to be already the case (SE)).

## OÖ

*MT: jo, mei (xxxxxxx) zamm, weil es gibt einige Großmächte, ganz große — die bom ja s Wort. do wern die Leut eh ned gfrogt. ne? China. — d Asiatn. ne? Amerika. (xxxxxxx) no dazue. ned? die moehens wohl aus. und mia hängen orwei dran, irgendwo hänga ma dran. meine Meinung.*

*[MT: well (xxxxxxx) together, because there are several great powers, great big ones — they call the shots. people are not even it. right? China. — the Asians. right? America. (xxxxxxx) on top of this. OK? they decide things and and then we are attached to them and we are always also implicated, somehow we are part of this. That's my opinion.]*

Thus, great fears are expressed in most groups (JU, FA, SE, OÖ, JO) concerning a loss of sovereignty as "a small country"<sup>12</sup> as well as the possibility of being "sold out" (SE) or "run from abroad" (by the US or "NATO"). Neutrality still being associated with elements such as "liberty" and "independence" continues to be seen as a bullwark against these dangers. But even this hope is met with skepticism:

## SE

*M2 jo AUCH erwähnt, und die Deutschn san jo WIRKLICH deutlich die STÄRKSTEN, jo — wie wolln Sie da eine Neutra/ eine Neutralität VERTEIDIGEN irgendwie. = des i komm mir des AUCH ned vorstelln. — ich bin AUCH dafür daß die Neutralität, — a: daß sie einen WERT hot. ned, — daß man sich sog mir — als — a Letztes no SOGN komm,*

*M2 >jo ober DOCH< Sie können NED mit uns mochn wos s wolln.*

*FI (xxxx xxxxx)schrecklich [Durcheinanderreden]*

<sup>12</sup> Smallness of size is not always seen as something negative. In accordance with the "small is beautiful" motto of Ernst Friedrich Schumacher (a follower of Leopold Kohr, winner of the alternative Nobel prize) smallness is explicitly considered by some participants in some contexts to be an advantage and as something desirable.

M2 *jo oba — WENN i des sog, locht mi doch der nächste AUS der sogt — na — sigst as EH was s GMOCHT bom. — ned, — die MASCHINEN homs sogor weggeschleppt — und in die TSCHECHOSLOWAKEI AUFGESTELLT und unsere Leute sind — was ham ma von der Neutralität — wenn DIE mit UNS MOCHN was sie wolln [mit hoher Stimme und erregt] — und das stimmt ja AUCH: ned, —*

[M2 *yes mentioned that TOO, and the Germans are really by far the strongest, yes — how do you want to DEFEND neutrality somehow. = that I that I can't see AS WELL. — I'm ALSO for supporting neutrality, — ub that neutrality should have a VALUE. right, — that one can say — as — still say IN THE END,*

M2 *>yes BUT< They can NOT do whatever they want with us.*

F1 *(xxxx xxxxx)awful [various voices]*

M2 *yes but — IF I say that, other people will just laugh at me, they say — well — you see what they've done. — right, — they've even taken the MACHINES away — and ERECTED them in CZECHOSLOVAKIA and our people — what is neutrality worth — if THEY can DO whatever they want to US [in a raised voice and worked up] — and that's true AS WELL you know, —]*

In other groups, there is only great pessimism in this respect:

OÖ

MT: *nojo, i sog, vielleicht is s ned amoi am Schlechtesten, Neutralität. ne? oba boitn tue i ned viel drauf. weil die Großn mochen wanns soweit is was sie wolln. die hom die Mittel. (xxxx) geht die Luft aus. is aso.*

MO: Frau WK

WK: *wos soi ma song. hoffentlich darboit mas, und dann wird niemand frong wann was kimmmt, ob mas ham oda ned. weil die andern san stärka wie mia. (is scho a) bissi a kloas Land. hm? s geht ned.*

MO: Frau WH

WH: *i sieg übabaupt nix daß anders worn war für mi weng da Neutralität und dann*

WH: *i man nua die Sorgn bot ma ned, daß an Krieg angangert.*

[MT: *well, I think that perhaps it's not such a bad thing this neutrality. But I don't put much faith in it because the great powers will do what they want when it comes to it. they have the means. (xxxx) this is how it is.*

MO: Frau WK

WK: *what should I say. hopefully we keep it, and then nobody will ask if something happens whether we have it or not. because the others are stronger than us. it (really is) tiny this small land. hm? it doesn't work.*

MO: Frau WH

WH: I don't see anything that has developed differently for me because of neutrality and then

WH: I mean one is only free of the worry of starting up a war.]

Apart from the inscrutibility of the "Great Powers", some discussion participants suspect that other interests (e.g. the interests of business corporations) are connected in some way to the discourse about NATO membership:

JO

F1: — was ICH mich frag. bei aller Sympathie — zum Beispiel für IHR — für Ihrn EU-Idealismus. — ä i seh net ein warum die Neutralität, — a: m: europafeindlich sein soll. und ich frag mich auch, — ob — nicht — persönliche Eignintaressn — Profilierungintaressn — und auch WIRTschafliche Intaressn diese ganze Diskussion irgendwo — SO sehr in ins ROLLN gebracht hat d/ ebn daß ma zur Nato will -

[F1: — the thing that I ask myself. even though I might like — for example your — your EU idealism. — but I don't understand why neutrality, — a: m: should be anti-Europe, — and I also ask myself whether — or not — personal interests — interests to show off- and also ECONOMIC interests have given SUCH momentum to this discussion about wanting to join NATO -]

SE

F1 i man i/ i glaub i/ i glaub und: — u/ und DAS is: mein

M? [Flüstern ]

F1 BeDENKEN, — bei dieses EINgehn in größere Bündnisse, egal welcher ART, — a: daß: die EU wies das Schlagwort HEIßT, — ein Europa der KONZERNE ist und ich kein Europa der Leut. — das is das EINE und

[F1 I think I/ I believe/ I believe and: — a/ and that is: my

M? [whispering ]

F1 conCERN, — with JOINing larger alliances, it doesn't matter of what KIND, — a: that: the EU as the catchword goes, — is a Europe of the CORPORATIONS and not a Europe of the people. — that is ONE thing and]

An additional factor is that NATO is considered to be first and foremost a military alliance. It is considered an organization that is very much concerned with war (and the making of war).

## JU

*MI* *naja i:/ich: — ich WOLLT mich — äh — do onschließn. — ähm: — WEIL — das muß schon darauf hingewiesn werd'n daß: — daß NATO eigndlich: ähm: — die EINZIGN Aktionen die sie durchgeführt wa: äh HAT. — die WARN eigndlich ebe: — AGGRESSIVEREN — Charaktas. — also — STICHWORT GOLFKRIEG jo.: — und wenn man's jetzt AUCH wieda hört — da geht des: — da äh die BEDROHUNG — von dem VERTEIDIGUNGS-BÜNDNIS aus ja? — und — des is schon ein wichtige Aspekt der — ähm: UNTAGEHT und und da zweite Aspekt is holt JENA daß: — ähm: in meinen Aug'n: — die Nato: ehm von de: von den USA DOMINIERT is und — daß ich das als Europäa nicht AKZEPTIERN kann. —*

[*MI* *well I:/I: — I WOULD LIKE to agree with — uh — what has been said. — uhm: — BECAUSE — it should be pointed out that: — that NATO is really: uhm: — the ONLY actions that it has performed — were really more like: — of an AGGRESSIVE — character. — that is — think of the GULF WAR.: — and if one hears it again — the: — the THREAT comes more from the — from the DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE doesn't it? — and — this is quite an important aspect which — uhm: is IGNORED and the second aspect is that: — uhm: in my view: — Nato: is: DOMINATED by the USA and — that I cannot ACCEPT that as an European. —]*

In several groups, participants do not understand why Austria should join a military alliance at a time of no visible threat to the country. (MI, JU)

## JU

*F3* *ja mir ist AUCH noch etwas eingefall'n — [räuspert sich] wenn da Thomas das VORHIN gesagt hat — n: de: n DISKUSSIONEN in seine Familie. — m WIR BRAUCHN — wir könn: auch nicht ALLEINE dastehn sondern — ja. — ähm: — WIESO: brauchn wir denn überhaupt — dieses große BÜNDNIS der VERTEIDIGUNG? — ich mein wenn's jetzt ganz speziell um die NATO geht. — wer hat denn vor — in nächsta Zukunft einen KRIEG zu führen? — ha?*

[*F3* *yes something else has ALSO occurred to me — [clearing of throat] when Thomas was saying EARLIER — about the DISCUSSIONS in his family. — m WE DON'T NEED — we can't: stand ALONE but — yes. — uhm: — WHY: do we need this great ALLIANCE of DEFENSE at all? — I mean if what we are now talking about is NATO in particular. — who is planning — to go to war in the near future? — well then?]*

Nevertheless, the fear is expressed that as a small country Austria really has no other choice:

FA

M2 *ja, MI tät interessieren, wenn wenn jetzt WIRKLICH Österreich neutral BLEIBT, — bei dem ganzen, und die ANDEREN Länder ALLE — zur EU und und und — NATO geben und alles, — (xx) wie's dann WIRTSCHAFTLICH weitergeht, — ob uns die GROSSEN dann net irgendwie —*

M1 *unter DRUCK setzen.*

M2 *Unter Druck setzen. Net, —*

M1 *naja, (das is eh)*

M2 *is a große GEFAHR, net also — (weiß net)*

[M2 *yes, it would interest ME to see, if if Austria would REALLY STAY neutral, — in all of it, and all the OTHER countries — join the EU and and and — NATO and everything, — (xx) what would then happen to the ECONOMY, — whether the GREAT POWERS would then somehow —*

M1 *place us under PRESSURE.*

M2 *place us under pressure. right -*

M1 *well, (that's a)*

M2 *is a great DANGER, isn't it — (I'm not sure)]*

On several occasions, the question is raised as to whether or not Austrian soldiers would also have to fight; participants recall the Gulf War and the engagement in Yugoslavia, and talk about the high costs of NATO membership (JO). Again in this context, anti-Americanism becomes apparent particularly in the Family group; America is negatively portrayed as the "global policeman". And members of the group do not want to stand by.

JU

M1 *— und ich GLAUBE daß EUROPA: halt — weniga: — AGGRESSIV gegnüba ondarn Ländern is als so man kömmt auch sagn IMPERLALISTISCH — ALS — die USA. — und DESWEGN — hab ich hier Probleme. — DAMIT. —*

F1 *mja:*

M1 *si — daß daß wir uns da Nato anschließn. —*

[M1 *— and I THINK that EUROPE: is simply — less: — AGGRESSIVE towards other countries than and also less IMPERLALISTIC — THAN — the USA. — and FOR THIS REASON — I have some problems here. — with —*

F1 *yes:*

M1 *with — joining Nato. — ]*

In other groups and passages (OÖ, MI, FA), however, a positive evaluation of the EU is made. The hope is that the EU as an economic alliance will be capable of solving conflicts before they escalate. In other words the EU is seen as a peace-making organization. In connection with this, other discussion-participants note that the (perceived<sup>13</sup>) peace-keeping function of neutrality is no longer as significant as before, or that this function is now performed (or could be performed) by the EU.

OÖ

MZ: *oba, für die Zukunft bot si für mi wos ergebn, insofern weil i ma deng — jetzt äh vo die Erfahrungen, des es habts ghobt, vom Krieg, daß Wirtschaft und Krieg imma und und was a sie gsagt ham, daß Wirtschaft und Krieg imma in an relativ direkten Zusammenhang steht/*

WK: *des geht in in, des geht örwei/*

MZ: *und wann jetz die Zukunft äh EU heißt praktisch und Wirtschaftspakt, dann dann bedeutet des für m/ oda scheint des — äh jo des bedeit für mi daß des praktisch äh auch Wirtschaft und — dann amoi a Sicherheitspakt wird in weitera Form und daß dann die Neutralität mebr oda weniga fost sicha aufgegebn — werd'n mueß*

WK: *die löst sie eh vo selba auf*

MZ: *jo oda löst sich auf*

[MZ: *but, for the future it does have something for me, inasmuch as I think — from the experience you've had of war, that the economy and war are always, as people have said, that the economy and war are always closely linked /*

WK: *they go together/*

MZ: *and if the future is the EU, and an economic pact, then then this means for me/ or it seems — ub yes it means for me that in practice an economy and — then at some time become a security pact in a further form and that then neutrality will more or less have to be given up*

WK: *or it will disappear by itself*

MZ: *yes or it will just disappear by itself]*

13 This is to be seen in the context of Point 1, in which it was shown that neutrality is regarded by the participants as a "guarantee of peace". The fact that in reality neutrality can offer no such guarantee is of no great importance inasmuch as we are concerned with the beliefs of the discussion participants.

## Moral ideas and neutrality: What does it mean to be neutral — political, economic and military neutrality

In all groups, participants state during the discussions what they believe neutrality to be, or what it means (or implies) to be neutral.

OÖ

*MZ: für m/ für mi is Neutralität, daß äh, also erstns muess i sogn daß i, heut Vormittag hab i ma durchglesen was die Neutralität äh im Neutralitätsvertrag gmocht worn is, und daß des im Nationalrot beschlossn wordn is und eigentlich ned direkt mitm Staatsvertrag zambängt und für mi woars einfach a vorher wo i ma docht hob is Neutralität, daß es do an Vertrag gibt daß ähm neamt Österreich angreift, und daß mia a militärisch ned so stark wern dearfn, daß mia wen angreifn kinnen und so. das is für mi Neutralität, und i denk ma, vo vo den Wert her find i s ganz positiv, und äh — jo. des is für mi die Neutralität.*

*[MZ: for m/ for me neutrality is, that uh, well first I must say that I that this morning I read through what neutrality is in the neutrality treaty, and that it was voted for by the National Assembly and isn't actually linked to the State Treaty directly, and for me it was simply before when I still thought that neutrality, that there is a treaty that uhm nobody would attack Austria, and that we may not become strong enough to be able to attack someone. that is neutrality for me, and I think, in in terms of its value I find it quite positive, and uh — yes. this is neutrality for me.]*

This topic turned into a real discussion in just one group — the migrants' group. In this group a number of misunderstandings occurred, owing to language problems, and this led to a more intensive discussion of the definition of the word. In addition, personal experiences of the Communist east (e.g. restrictions on freedom of speech, and so on) mean that members of this group have a greater awareness of freedoms in neutral Austria. Moreover, they tend to link these freedoms specifically with neutral Austria — and therefore with neutrality.

MI

*FH wie*

*F3 denke DARAN daß also — MIR bat die äh Neutralität äh s -/SOVIEL bedeutet daß ich äh mich FREI gefühlt habe*

*FH [what*

*F3 I'm thinking that — for ME neutrality meant uh uh -/that I felt myself to be FREE]*

MI

M5 *bis jetzt — DADURCH: SÄMTLICHE — Messen/Ma/Massemmedien — äh — habe mich: — meine INTERESS — über das Wort — Neutralität imma. — — äh an erste Stelle? — GENOMMEN. — — in Gedanke — Neutralität. — das HEISS — Unabhängigkeit von der — se — äh ANDERE — ganz NEUTRAL. —*

F2 *das heißt das aber NICHT.*

M5 *NATÜRLICH — für MICH: — NEUTRAL — DAMALS: — hat sie BEDEUTET — äh mich ENGAGIERT? — — und NICHT VERPFLICHTET. —*

F1 *(xxxxxxxxxxx)*

F2 *das is dann aba was SCHLECHTES.*

M5 *wieso? —*

F2 *nicht ENGAGIERT und nicht VERPFLICHTET das ist doch was SCHLECHTES. — i mein NEUTRAL heißt doch nicht*

F2 *daß man irgendwie sagt um GOTTES willen (xx) ÜBAHAUPT nicht*

M5 *UNABHÄNGIG — UNABHÄNGIG — UNABHÄNGIG.*

F1 *nein. äh bis jetzt*

F1 *is eigkli a. — ANDERS jetzt.*

M5 *UNABHÄNGIG. — NEUTRALITÄT nach — meiner Meinung NACH SOLLTE unab-  
hängig SEIN? — von der — ANDERE SEIT. — für EIN LAND. — WIR werden —*

[M5 *until now — GIVEN the MANY — mass/ma/mass media — uh — I have always  
PLACED: — my INTEREST — about the word — neutrality. — — uh in first place?. —  
— in the idea of — neutrality. — that MEANS — independence of — the — uh OTHERS  
— quite NEUTRAL. —*

F2 *but it does NOT mean that.*

M5 *OF COURSE — for ME: — NEUTRAL — AT THAT TIME: — MEANT — uh not be-  
ing INVOLVED? — — and without OBLIGATIONS. —*

F1 *(xxxxxxxxxxx)*

F2 *but that is something BAD.*

M5 *why? —*

F2 *not being ENGAGED not having OBLIGATIONS that is something BAD. — I mean being  
NEUTRAL doesn't mean that*

F2 *that one says somehow for GOD's sake (xx) not AT ALL*

M5 *INDEPENDENT — INDEPENDENT. — INDEPENDENT.*

F1 *no. until now*

F1 *it is really — quite DIFFERENT now.*

M5 *INDEPENDENT. — NEUTRALITY in — my opinion SHOULD MEAN being INDE-  
PENDENT? — from the — OTHER SIDE. — for ONE COUNTRY. — WE will —]*

This discussion demonstrates the extent to which a definition of neutrality is linked to moral ideas. When trying to define neutrality, many of the participants end up making normative statements about what neutrality ought to be (or how people ought to behave). Thus, in the discourse, neutrality is considerably more than a juristic term or concept: it is the hinge point to which normative notions about an ideal society are attached.

In the following we see two examples of neutrality being “just” defined. But elsewhere such definitions encourage participants to begin normative discussions and to ask themselves whether or not this is something good. If nothing else, these attempts at definition reveal just how little participants know about the political-juristic dimension of neutrality (or just how irrelevant this dimension is for them): rarely in the discussions do participants concern themselves with the legal aspects or implications of neutrality. Instead, the discussions tend to concentrate on the consequences of neutrality in terms of action (a functional definition). The main issue, therefore, is how a neutral country should act. Nevertheless, the attempt to formulate a functional definition leads inevitably to a normative debate — even though the “norm” is seen as something established by law. Thus, in the discussions, the yardstick is changed: the objective is no longer a legislative “aim” (creating a societal fact) but an idealized aspiration — one that is determined by subjective moral ideas.

SE

M1 *mir früher hots nicht NEUTRALITÄT geheißen sondern hot NICHTeinmischung: — geheißen. [Mehrere Personen reden] was aufs GLEICHE (xxx kommt), die NICHTeinmischung hot SO ausgesehn daß man sich EINGemischt hot. —*

FH *mbm —*

M1 *ned=ENGLAND is ja a gutes Beispiel dafür mit/ für dei NICHTEINMISCHUNG — für die SOgenannte Neutralität. —*

[M1 *but it it didn't use to be called NEUTRALITY but simply NON-interference: [Various people speak] which (xxx is) the SAME. In practice NON-interference meant that one did INTERfere. —*

FH *mbm —*

M1 *right=ENGLAND is a good example of / NON-INTERFERENCE — of SO-called neutrality. — ]*

AK

M2 *also FÜNFZIGER Jahre, es gibt — MEINER MEINung nach — WER neunzehnhundertsechsunfünfzig bei der Niederschlagung des ungarischn VOLKSAufstandes — noch gesagt hat das gebt mich nichts AN. — wir sind NEUTRA:l. — also die Östreicher worn Gott sei Dank damals NICHT so — SCHÄBIG, — sie habm sich GUT verhalten.*

F2 *sie bobm sich gut verhalten*

F3 *jo.*

F2 *das würd ich AUCH sagen.*

[M2 *well in the FIFTIES. there were people — in MY OPINion — who said in nineteen fifty-six during the Hungarian people's uprising — that it has NOTHING to do with us. — we are NEUTRA:l. — the Austrians were thank God at that time NOT so — CHEAP, — they behaved WELL.*

F2 *they behaved well*

F3 *yes.*

F2 *I would say that TOO.]*

This discursive link may also be explained in linguistic terms. The term neutrality is not only used in international law. "To be neutral" is a phrase often employed in everyday language, where it is applied to persons. Thus, as in the above example, a "shortcut" is often taken in the discussions from the international legal term (which is applied to states) to the everyday language-use (to describe people). Some of the discussion-participants were convinced that as citizens of a neutral state they also were subject to certain restrictions.

For example, in the young people's group, the media reports of several events are criticized for "not being neutral". The assumption of the group is that neutrality should also apply to the citizens and media of a neutral country.

JU

FH *aufgrund de:: — WAFFNtransporte war das DIESES was du DAMALS gesagt hast also mit äh*

F1 *NA. von WAFFN hab ich*

F1 *nicht gredet das muß diese — ähm: — daß man die Meinungen*

FH *oda war's war's was anderes? —*

F1 *aba nicht durch die Neutralität wegekriegen kann. — und — daß: — ehm durch MEDIEN? — — TEIL wie die untastützt WURDN sind — WORDN sind.*

FH *ach so. — jaja — jetzt wa*

F1 *auch HILFSGÜTA nicht — ähm — NEUTRAL verteilt wurden. —*

FH *NICHT gleichmäßig verteilt wurden.*

F1 *jaja genau.*

FH *ja. — mbm — mbm. —*

F1 *und des is: — ja. — doch eine auch eine — ANTI: neutral — (Ausdrucksweise)*

FH *mbm — mbm. —*

F2 *njo: Berichterstattung: — im GOLFKRIEG war AUCH ziemlich einseitig. —*

FH *mbm*

- [FH based on the:: — transport of ARMS was that THIS what you said THEN with a uh  
 F1 NO. I didn't speak about WEAPONS  
 F1 that must be this — uhm: — the opinions  
 FH or was it was it something different? —  
 F1 cannot be got rid of by neutrality. — and — that: — by the media? — PART how they have  
 been supported have been SUPPORTED.  
 FH I see. — oh yes — now  
 F1 even care packages — uhm — were not divided up NEUTRALLY. —  
 FH NOT divided up equally.  
 F1 yes yes exactly.  
 FH yes. — mhm — mhm. —  
 F1 and this is: — yes. — still a also a — ANTI: neutral — (method of expression)  
 FH mhm — mhm. —  
 F2 well: the reporting: — in the GULF WAR was also quite one-sided. — —  
 FH mhm]

In several groups, participants began to make a distinction between political, military and economic neutrality. Thus, private acts were separated in discourse from acts of state. This helped solve the contradiction between individual actions and the neutrality of the state.

MI

M4 *ein neutrales Land heißt für mich nicht daß ich nicht — wirtschaftlich politisch oda politisch schon. entschuldigung — äh wirtschaftlich — nicht etwas produziern kann? — was ich wohin verkaufen kann. —*

M? *aba*

M4 *es is was anders ob ich dann persönlich diese Waffn einsetze?*

F1 *das is es.*

M? *na:*

[M4 *a neutral country doesn't mean for me that I cannot produce something — economically politically or politically yes. excuse me — uh economically —? — what I can sell and to where. —*

M? *but*

M4 *it is something different if I personally use those weapons?*

F1 *yes it is*

M? *well:.]*

SE

M3 *es gibt a MILITÄRISCHE Neutralität und a GEISTIGE*

M<sub>3</sub> Neutralität. des is a UNTERSCHIED ob: im/ i mi militärisch, — also mit der Hand in der Waffe neutral verhalte und zu kan hülf, oder ob i von den A:N — die GEISTIGEN Sochn  
 M<sub>3</sub> annehm und (xxxxxx)

[M<sub>3</sub> there is a MILITARY type of neutrality and a SENTIMENTAL type of

M<sub>3</sub> Neutrality. it is different if: I behave myself/ militarily, — that is behave neutrally with a hand on the weapon and help nobody, or if — I accept — the SENTIMENTS of someone]

SE

M<sub>1</sub> a ERDBEBM is ka Neutralitätsver/ (verstoß) nei:n

M<sub>3</sub> na selbstverSTÄNDLICH das ist ebn der

M<sub>3</sub> Beweis daß es — Neutral/ tät gibt der militärischen Art, oba nicht a Neutralität der MENSCHLICHEN Art. — ned, es gibt verschiedene SOCHN. ned,

M<sub>1</sub> na

[M<sub>1</sub> an EARTHQUAKE is no breach of neutrality/ no

M<sub>3</sub> well that is obviously the

M<sub>3</sub> proof that there does exist — a neutral/ ty of the military type, but that there is no neutrality of the HUMANITÄRLAN type. — no, there are different THINGS. isn't that so,

M<sub>1</sub> yeah]

FA

M<sub>3</sub> politisch politisch war war eigentlich auch NIE die WIRKLICHE Neutralität da, weil — irgendwie hat man Anschluß GEBRAUCHT, zumindest WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN, — und um WIRTSCHAFTLICHE Beziehungen aufbauen zu können, braucht man Politik, — politische Beziehungen, — und die hat man sowieso — mit'm WESTEN — VORNEHMLICH geführt, und des — also in DEM Sinn — WIRKLICH neutral war Österreich NIE, —

[M<sub>3</sub> politically politically there was NEVER such a thing as REAL neutrality, because — people NEEDED to have links, at least ECONOMIC ones, — and you need politics to establish ECONOMIC relations, — political relationships, — and these already existed — with the WEST — and were FAVORED, and this — thus in THIS sense — Austria was NEVER REALLY neutral, —]

These examples also reveal the skepticism that surrounds the issue of whether or not Austria really was neutral (or ever could be neutral). Several times this is explicitly contested: participants refer to current international economic relations, the Internet, and Austria's important geopolitical position, all of which would make it very difficult for the country to stay out of a conflict — thus rendering neutrality impossible in practice.

SE

M<sub>3</sub> *wo die ganze Welt verZAH:NT is elektronisch, kann man doch nimmermehr auf allen Gebieten NEUTRA:L sein:, wo an jeder in Ondern frogt, und die Wirtschoft so zusammenhängt. obm wir a: — aus Mittelamerika BABANEN kaufen, und de in Brasilien wie wir GESTERN gsehn habm von Österreich EISENWAREN verkaufen, aber wenn mir NEUTRAL san können wir an DIE nix verkaufen,*

[M<sub>3</sub> *given that the world is electronically intertwined, one can't be NEUTRAL in all areas any more:, given that everyone is asking everyone else, and the economy is so interlinked. whether we a: buy BANANAS from Central America, And those in Brazil who are selling IRON GOODS from Austria as we saw YESTERDAY, but if we are NEUTRAL we can't sell anything to THEM,]*

Nevertheless, neutrality was seen mainly as a positive value, especially because neutrality was linked closely to morality. The moral implications of neutrality were discussed at length in the migrants' group and in the journalists' group, and were mentioned briefly in the other groups as well.

MI

F<sub>2</sub>: — *weil für mich neutral ni/NICHT heißt sich NICHT einmischn sich aus allem raushalten keine Verantwortung für olles ÜBRIGE übanehmen und zu sogn — NA:. — des geht uns olles NIX an weil — mein Gott wir sind ja NEUTRAL. — weil des is irgendwie für mich: — das is NICH die Neutralität. die Neutralität heißt unabhängig im POLITISCHN Sinn daß ma IMMA so entscheidet wie ma sozusagn — MORALISCH verpflichtet is oder sich verpflichtet FÜH:LT oda wie die — REGIERUNG holt da jetz di/die ma gewählt hot äh:*

F<sub>2</sub> *holt grad irgndwie AUSgerichtet sein soll*

[F<sub>2</sub>: — *because for me neutral does not /NOT mean NOT to interfere not to take on any responsibility for anything ELSE and to say — WELL:. — that is NOTHING to do with us — my GOD we are NEUTRAL. — because for me that is somehow: — that is NOT neutrality. neutrality means to be independent in the POLITICAL sense that one ALWAYS decides in the way that one is as it were — MORALLY obliged to or FEELS obliged or how the — GOVERNMENT, which one has elected uh:*

F<sub>2</sub> *should be aligned]*

MI

F<sub>2</sub> *wos mir da: — äh wos: — f: -/für mich irgednwie i hob das Gefühl daß die — Neutralität den Östareicher? oft irgndwie als Entschuldigung für wos auch imma gedient hot. daß man dann imma so sich's a bissl ausgeredet hat. — de imma gsgt hot das müß ma jetz weil jetz — san*

*ma neutra:l. also die Argumente warum Bundesbeer nich abschaffm? — bat man si des leicht gemacht hat gsagt steht im Staatsvertrag. — müß ma habm. — genau:so: — dann bolt viele andere Dinge. — wos mir aba — irgndwie wirklich abgeht — äbm — weil ich die Neutralität insgesamt irgndwie auch noch so mit so einer — Moral in da Politik oda so verbundn hab. — oda ich tät ma's wünschn ich weiß daß ma von Moral heute nich spricht und unsre Politika holtn schon goa nix davon. — aba irgndwie geht des insgesamt ab — daß es anfoch Dinge gibt die: moralisch sind und die unmoralisch sind. — und — des irgndwie eine Kategorie die ich ma in da*

F1 *Anständigkeit.*

[F2 *the thing that makes me: — uh that: — f: -/for me somehow I have the feeling that — neutrality has often served the Austrian? as an excuse for something or other. that somehow one has always found some kind of excuse. — because people always said that we don't have to do that because — we are now neutra:l. that is, the arguments about why not to abolish the federal armed forces? — one made it easy for oneself, and said that it's required by the State Treaty. — so we have to have it. — just like that — then many other things. — which I — really miss — uhm — because I always linked neutrality with some kind of — morality in politics or something. — I know that today people don't talk about morality and that our politicians don't think anything of it at all. — but somehow that's missing — that there simply are things that: are moral and that are immoral. — and — that is somehow a category that I make in the*

F1 *decency.]*

Among the journalists, a long discussion about the meaning of neutrality in the war in Bosnia was the starting point for a debate about the moral obligations of a state. Once again, some participants criticized the fact that neutrality was sometimes used as an excuse for staying out of everything and for not “getting one's hands dirty”. Furthermore, participants considered it “unfair” to wait until all the neighboring countries had joined NATO and thereby save on defense spending.

Moreover, the fear was expressed that the great powers are more inclined to act according to their interests (because they can afford to do so) and are therefore less inclined to think about the moral issues.

JO

F2 *und HIER ist das eigentliche Problem aba das is in in — in jeden — in JEDER Ausformung ist dieses Problem da: WENN man sich einem Größeren anschließt wird — die — ETHISCHE Komponente kleiner weil Großmächte halt einfach weniger — moralisch: äh denken als kleine Länder die wenig bedroht sind.*

M1 *najo: Sachinteressn habm kleine genauso wie große.*

- F2 *Sachinteressn schon. aba wegn Sachinteressn geht ein KLEINER nicht in den Krieg. ein GROSSER viel leichter. — oder eine große — EINHEIT ein ein — ein BÜNDNIS. — äb — aba sicherlich. wenn es möglich wäre eine zukünftige — Sicherheitsstruktur — ETHISCH. — — wie soll ich sogn äb — EINZUWICKLN. — äb — dann is: — JEDE Lösung gut ob MIT Neutralität oder OHNE. — weil es kommt net auf die Neutralität an sondern auf die ANSTÄNDIGKEIT.*
- [F2 *and HERE is the real problem but that is in in — in every — in EVERY manifestation this problem is present: IF one joins up with a greater power — the — ETHICAL components becomes smaller because the great powers simply think less — morally: ub than the small countries that are less threated.*
- M1 *well yes: both small and large ones act according to their interests.*
- F2 *yes interests. but a SMALL country won't go to war for its interests. while a LARGE state is more likely to do so. — or a great — united group a a — an ALLIANCE. — ub — but of course. if it were possible to — — how should I say ub — TO DEVELOP — a future — security structure — in an ethical manner. ub — then: — EACH solution is good whether WITH or WITHOUT neutrality. — because the key factor is not neutrality but decency.]*

### Other assessments of neutrality

In this last section, we wish to cover two further areas that were introduced explicitly by the host's questions but were less present in the contributions made by the participants in the course of the discussions. The answers, therefore, display not topical links that would tend to be appear when people talk about neutrality. Nevertheless, they are of interest as reflective meta-statements about neutrality.

The two questions are the following:

- What advantages and/or disadvantages do you associate with neutrality?
- To your knowledge, has Austria's neutrality ever been violated or disregarded?

The question about the advantages and disadvantages of neutrality was answered in part with examples of positive experiences abroad (see the section on identity) but also with a criticism of isolationism (see the section on morality). The statements tended to be rather vague, and there was no clear idea about what really was an explicit advantage or disadvantage.

In general, however, a positive assessment of neutrality was made, even though participants were not always able to define exactly what was positive about it.

- JU
- FH *mbm* [8 sec] ELKE wie is das bei DIR wenn du -
- F4 ja.
- FH so BILANZ ziebst?
- F4 also ich KANN mir nicht vorstelln daß es Nachteile HAT? -
- FH *mbm*
- F4 weil: - eba VORTEILE weil wir ebm FREI sind? - gut das EINZIGE was - vleicht n  
Nachteil is is irgndwie mit da EU: - weil die anderen Länder ja nicht WOLLN daß wir  
dann: - eine SONDASTELLUNG babm. - das is vleicht da NACHTEIL daß wir das -  
DADURCH dann ABGEBM SOLLN? - - die Neutralität aba - ALLGEMEIN glaub  
ich daß es eba VORteile bat. -
- FH *mbm*
- F4 obwohl i äh - nicht WEISS ob - was die Vorteile uns wirklich BRINGEN? - und was sie ja  
gesagt bat. - was ich richtig find irgndwie - WENN wirklich ein Krieg AUSbricht -  
angenommen; - wie ein Weltkrieg der - ebm - in ganz Europa is - KANN ich mir nich  
vorstelln daß wir uns rausbaltn können. -
- FH *mbm*
- F4 so gesehn bringt's - also dann EHA weniga. -
- [FH *mbm* [8 sec] ELKE what conclusions do you come to if you-
- F4 yes.
- FH kind of weigh things up?
- F4 well I cannot imagine that it HAS disadvantages? -
- FH *mbm*
- F4 because: - rather ADVANTAGES because we are FREE? - good the ONLYTHING that  
- perhaps is a disadvantage is is somehow linked to the EU: - because the other countries  
don't want us to have a kind of: - SPECIAL STATUS. - that is perhaps the DISADVAN-  
TAGE that therefore we - SHOULD GIVE UP? - - neutrality but - IN GENERAL I  
think it tends to have advantages. -
- FH *mbm*
- F4 although I uh - don't KNOW whether - how the advantages really HELP us? - and what  
she said. - what I find correct somehow - IF a war did break OUT - let's suppose: - like a  
world war that - takes place in all of Europe - I CANnot imagine that we could stay out of it. -
- FH *mbm*
- F4 seen like this, it benefits us - well not very much -]

The second question is of interest because there have been a number of different foreign policy events recently that some politicians have judged to be violations of neutrality. How were these events perceived by the discussion participants?

Interestingly, participants seem to have a relatively good knowledge of the violations of neutrality. A great number of different neutrality violations were mentioned in all groups (transport of troops, use of airspace, and the like). This knowledge, however, is not connected very much with the neutrality discourse — it is not something that occurs to people automatically when talking about neutrality. It is mentioned, however, when participants express their regret that neutrality has already been abandoned by the politicians (or with joining the EU). That is to say, the political dismantling of neutrality is not reflected in the discourse; in the discourse neutrality is still seen as a monument — political violations of neutrality damage the politicians or the organizations involved rather than neutrality itself. As an institution, neutrality is not placed in any further doubt.

MI

M<sub>3</sub> *oder — als auch in/zwischen TÜRKEL: und ZYPERN und so weita — und das hat SCHON — auf die internationale ab: SZ:ENE eine BESONDERE — ab NA: MEN für Österreich —*

F<sub>1</sub> *gemacht.*

M<sub>3</sub> *gemacht. — und — JETZ: — also in de LETZTE Zeit — ich bin selber SCHOCKIERT? — daß: die: — MILITÄRISCHE: — ab: — RÜStungen — üba ÖSTAREICH zum Beispiel — TRANSPORTIERT werden. — u:nd — ab: — ich bin: SELBE — üba MICH ENT-TÄUSCHT. — u:nd — üba östareichische PoliTIK. — daß ich -/daß ich eignedlich in einem LAND LEBE? — daß: — KEINE — neutrale Zukunft mehr habm KÖNNTE. — wenn es SO: weitaginge.*

[M<sub>3</sub> *or — like in/between TURKEY: and CYPRUS etc. — and this has REALLY*

F<sub>1</sub> *made.*

M<sub>3</sub> *made a SPECIAL — ub NA:ME for Austria on the international STAGE — and — NOW: — that is just RECENTLY — I have been SHOCKED myself? — that: — MILITARY: — ub: — EQUIPMENT — is transported — over AUSTRIA for example. — a:nd — ub: — I am: myself — DISAPPOINTED about MYSELF. — a:nd — about Austrian poliTICS. — that I -/that I LIVE in a COUNTRY? — that: — canNOT have a — neutral future any more. — if things go on: IN THIS WAY.]*

The same participant says the following:

MI

M<sub>3</sub>: *— ich glaube auf de anderen Seite hat Östareich große Cha:ncen? — wenn diese — Neutralität — weitahin — beibeholten wird. [5 sce]*

[M<sub>3</sub>: *— I think on the other hand Austria has great oppor:tunities — if this — neutrality — is re-tained — in the future as well. [5 sce]]*

## Qualitative analysis of a discussion segment

The final example of this chapter shows the inter-connectedness of the topics mentioned above. The selected section occurs half-way through a long discussion about Austria's conduct during the war in Bosnia. The topic is war and neutrality, while the issue of the moral action of the state forms the implicit issue in this discussion.

The Nazi period is touched upon in this section in the form of a reference to the Holocaust; and the activities of the UN and NATO in ex-Yugoslavia are also mentioned implicitly.

Typical of the discussion is the easy transition from one topic to another, from one contribution to the next. When, for the sake of analysis, individual contributions were selected and described individually, on each occasion what we were looking at were elements of a longer discussion and of a single great discursive network — at the center of which<sup>14</sup> was neutrality.

What is unusual about this discussion in comparison to the discussion in other groups is the vehement way in which neutrality is questioned here; but this is what is interesting for us, for it leads to a relatively explicit discussion of the values linked to neutrality.

JO

- 1 M2 *i muß Ihnen wirklich sagen. — jo. — i muß Ihnen wirklich sagen. — das HAT schon etwas.*
- 2 *— und das ZUSCHAUEN der Aggression — ist in Wahrheit auch eine Art von Krieg. —*
- 3 *das GEWÄHRENlassen von Aggression ist NATÜRLICH eine Art von Krieg. — nur halt*
- 4 *— das man sich net einmischt und die HÄNDE angeblich sauber läßt.*
- 5 F2 *des*
- 6 M2 *des is — des war die des war des des große ARGUMENT — daß man immer sagt — alle*
- 7 *sind sozusagen nicht schuld am HOLOCAUST — — weil des habm nur die DEUTSCHN*
- 8 *gnacht. — es habm abab auch viele zugschaut die s GWUSST bobm. — ist das eine Teil-*
- 9 *nahme daran oder NICHT,*
- 10 F2 *ich glaube das geht zu weit — das führt zu weit von der*
- 11 M2 *hat man der Aggression zugeschaut*
- 12 F2 *Neutralität weg, der Holocaust is ein — eigenes PROBLEM und natürlich bobm Sie recht*
- 13 *warn alle mitSCHULD aba —*

14 In general, in our opinion, discourse has no a priori center (or focus). The various elements hang together as in a net, and it depends solely upon the participants (or those analyzing their discussion) what theme will be emphasized, from which perspective the network will be viewed, which node will be chosen for further inspection to determine its neighbours. For us, neutrality was of course the main item, and this was probably also true for the discussion participants, who were aware that they were taking part in a discussion about the role and importance of neutrality.

- 14 M2 *weil wir bewußt net — zuschaun — nur Verhandler schicken*
- 15 F2 *das läßt sich nicht mit einem —*
- 16 M2 *den Herrn Owen schicken — der sich tausnd Mal was — äh unterschreibm laßt was dann*
- 17 *nicht EINGehaltn wird nur zuschaun und wartn. — ist das — was ist des — ist das n —*
- 18 *neutral ist das —*
- 19 F1 *na sicher net.*
- 20 M2 *sich nicht die Hände schmutzig machen*
- 21 F2 *des war kein — keine NEUTRALITÄTSFRAGE. —*
- 22 M2 *na ich denk des is was PrinziPIELLES net,*
- 23 F2 *aba die Frage die EIGNTLICHE Frage is — wäre — eine — Armee der österr des öster-*
- 24 *rein de / Division oder irgndsowas des österreichischn Bundesbeeres. — in Bosnien ein-*
- 25 *marschiert und hätte dort ORDNUNG gemacht, — hätte die Serbn davon abgehaltn die*
- 26 *armen Moslems zu —*
- 27 F2 *killn und die Kroatn — und umgekehrt und so weiter, -*
- 28 M2 *und umgekehrt a,*
- 29 F2 *äh glaubm Sie WIRKlich daß das österreichische Bundesbeer da etwas GUTES getan hätte*
- 30 *und vor allem — was wäre das Ende gewesn. die Österreicher sind schon EINMAL in*
- 31 *Bosnien einmarschiert habm drei Monate lang einen BRUTALN Krieg geführt*
- 32 M2 *jo.*
- 33 F2 *wurdn auch brutal von den anderen äh — attackiert, — und das Ende war halt i waß net*
- 34 *zwanzg oder — nein. wobl eher vierzich Jahre [lacht]*
- 35 M2 *i würds nur gern — eine Stufe PRINZIPIELLER machen wenn man sagt Neutralität is*
- 36 *gut und richtig dann muß das nicht nur für Österreich geltn dann muß es für JEDES*
- 37 *Land geltn und an sich HOCHgerechnet ja, — nur um das PRINZIP, —*
- 38 *HOCHGERECHNET jedes Land sagt es is neutral. — und jedes Land hat GUTE*
- 39 *Gründe — seine — Menschn dort NICHT hinzuschickn in einen Krieg. — dann IS es*
- 40 *eigentlich so: daß der Aggressor tun kann — solange er will — und WAS er will. (..) —*
- 41 *warum sollte irgendeiner HINMÜSSN und dort Ordnung schaffen und die anderen*
- 42 *NICHT, — und da muß ich schon sagn. — ganz PRINzipiell. — ist es — ba/ hat man*
- 43 *wirklich saubere Hände, — wenn man sagt geh wir gehen NICHT hin und machen sie uns*
- 44 *nicht SCHMUTZIG, — ich glaub des irgndwo nicht. — weil man damit in/ INDIREKT*
- 45 *dem Aggressor HILFT. —*
- 46 F2 *und hat man saubere Hände WENN man bingebt — und dem —*
- 47 M2 *(und die Gewährleistung)*
- 48 F2 *Opfer bilft*
- 49 M2 *SAUBER bleibm sie NICHT. — aba des ist. — nein.*
- 50 M2 *sauber bleibm sie NICHT.*
- 51 F2 *also waru/ — also dann dann -*
- 52 F2 *in DIESM Fall. — entschuldign Sie:*

- 53 M2 *ja?*
- 54 F2 *aba in DIESM Fall ist — IHR Argument für die Diskussion über den WERT der Neu-*  
55 *tralität eigentlich nicht sehr — nicht sehr releVANT.*
- 56 M2 *wirklich nicht,*
- 57 F2 *denn wenn der EINE schmutzig wird und der ANDERE schmutzig wird dann — is es*  
58 *wurscht welche Position man EINnimmt. —*
- 59
- 60 ..
- 61 MO *darf kurz der Herr Klein eingreifen,*
- 62 F2 *ja z natürlich.*
- 63 M3 *ich ich glaube daß ähm: — ähm das hat auch schon der Golfkrieg gezeigt diese wenigen*  
64 *Beispiele von von — von InterventionISMUS von globalem — äh gehorcht großen Inter-*  
65 *ESSEN. — ähm die Probleme dort sind net wirklich GELÖST sondern irgendwie befriedet*  
66 *im besten FALL. (..)*
- 67 M2 *is des ein Plädoyer fürs Zuschauen,*
- 68 M3 *i bin sehr skeptisch fü äh über diesn Interventionismus in jeder Hinsicht. — auch wenn er*  
69 *sehr — auch wenn er sich sehr MORALISCH äh — hm — definiert. — ich glaub net das*  
70 *des:!*
- 71 M2 *wenn ich ein Einwohner von Sarajewo wär...*

- 1 [M2 *I must tell you. — yes. — I really must tell you. — that it IS TRUE to an extent. — and*  
2 *WATCHING aggression — is in truth a type of war. — PUTTING up with aggression is*  
3 *OF COURSE a form of war. — only — that you don't get involved and your HANDS are*  
4 *said to stay clean.*
- 5 F2 *this*
- 6 M2 *this is — this was the this was the the great ARGUMENT — that one always used — no-*  
7 *body is guilty for the HOLOCAUST — — because that was done by the GERMANS*  
8 *alone. — but lots of people watched who KNEW what was happening. — is that taking part*  
9 *or NOT,*
- 10 F2 *I think that goes too far — that is going too far from*
- 11 M2 *people who just watched the aggression*
- 12 F2 *from neutrality. the Holocaust is a — distinct PROBLEM and of course you are right all*  
13 *were partly responsible but —*
- 14 M2 *because we consciously — watch — just send mediators*
- 15 F2 *that can't be —*
- 16 M2 *send Mr Owen — who can be made to sign something a thousand times that — is not*  
17 *KEPT to, just watch and wait. — is that — what is this — is this n — neutra:l is this —*
- 18 F1 *of course not.*
- 19 M2 *not getting your hands dirty*

- 20 F2 *that was not — not a QUESTION OF NEUTRALITY. —*
- 21 M2 *I think it is a matter of principle,*
- 22 F2 *but the question the REAL question is — would be — if an — army of the Austr of the*
- 23 *Austrian / division or something of the Austrian federal armed forces. — had marched into*
- 24 *Bosnia and had restored ORDER there, — that would have stopped the Serbs from killing*
- 25 *the poor Muslims —*
- 26 F2 *and the Croats — and vice versa and so on, -*
- 27 M2 *and also vice versa,*
- 28 F2 *uh do you REALLY believe that the Austrian federal armed forces would have done some*
- 29 *GOOD there and above all — where would it have led to. the Austrians did already march*
- 30 *into Bosnia once and carried out a BRUTAL war there for a period of three months*
- 31 M2 *yes.*
- 32 F2 *they were also brutally attacked by the others, — and the end was I don't know twenty or —*
- 33 *no. I think closer to forty years [laughs]*
- 34 M2 *I would like to move — to a more theoretical level, if one says that neutrality is good and*
- 35 *legitimate then that must be valid not just for Austria but for EVERY country and the*
- 36 *SUM of this, — only at a THEORETICAL level, — SUPPOSE that every country says*
- 37 *it is neutral. — and each country has good reasons NOT to send — its — people into a war.*
- 38 *— then the aggressor can do — if he wants — WHATEVER he wants. (..) — why should*
- 39 *anyone HAVE TO GO there and sort things out while the others do NOT go, — and I*
- 40 *have to say here. — purely at the THEORETICAL level. — it is — do you really have clean*
- 41 *hands, — if you say we are NOT going and we're not getting them DIRTY, — I don't*
- 42 *believe that somehow. — because in a way you are helping the aggressor in/ INDI-*
- 43 *RECTLY. —*
- 44 F2 *and you have clean hands IF you do go there — and —*
- 45 M2 *(and the guarantee)*
- 46 F2 *help victims*
- 47 M2 *they do NOT stay CLEAN. — but that is. — no.*
- 48 M2 *they do NOT stay clean.*
- 49 F2 *then why/ — then well then -*
- 50 F2 *in THIS case. — excuse me:*
- 51 M2 *yes?*
- 52 F2 *but in THIS case — YOUR argument for the discussion about the VALUE of neutrality is*
- 53 *not — not very relevant.*
- 54 M2 *really,*
- 55 F2 *because if ONE gets dirty and the OTHER gets dirty then — it really doesn't matter which*
- 56 *position one TAKES. —*
- 57
- 58 ...

- 59 M<sub>0</sub> *may Herr Klein join in,*  
 60 F<sub>2</sub> *yes of course.*  
 61 M<sub>3</sub> *I think that ubm: — ubm the Gulf War has shown already that these few examples of of*  
 62 *— of interventionism of global — ub that is, of great interESTS. — ubm have not really*  
 63 *SOLVED the problems there but have at most led to people putting down their arms. (...)*  
 64 M<sub>2</sub> *is that a plea for watching,*  
 65 M<sub>3</sub> *I am very skeptical for ub about this interventionism in every respect. — even if it is — even*  
 66 *if it — bm — is defined in very MORAL terms. — I don't think that this:!*  
 67 M<sub>2</sub> *if I were an inhabitant of Sarajevo ...]*

The first statement above (lines 1—4) made by M<sub>2</sub> indirectly questions the antagonistic connection between neutrality and war which arises in all of the discussions. “Watching aggression” is equated implicitly with neutrality, and is declared explicitly to be “a form of war”. Thus the normal antagonism between war and neutrality is discursively set aside and replaced by a relation of identity.

This is supported argumentatively in the subsequent passage (lines 6—9) through a reference to the Holocaust. The Holocaust as the ultimate failure of humanity — or as the failure of the state/states vis-à-vis the people — serves as an argument for doing more than simply standing by watching aggression; the assumption is made that the Holocaust would not (or could not) have taken place if other states had intervened. The issue of the guilt of the non-intervening states is raised, but not answered.

In lines 10, 12, 13 and 15, F<sub>2</sub> questions the relevance of this discussion. The habitual discursive linking of neutrality with a series of different topical elements allows discussion participants to question each single realized topical link and to replace it with another supposedly more relevant one. This is exactly what F<sub>2</sub> is doing when she states that the Holocaust has nothing to do with neutrality. When making her objection, she sees herself forced to answer the question of guilt in an almost reflexive-cliché manner, while claiming that M<sub>2</sub> had declared that all (!) states were guilty, something which would “of course” be correct<sup>15</sup>.

Then, in lines 14 and 16—17, M<sub>2</sub> returns to the war in Bosnia, and questions the specific conduct of Austria as a neutral state. In line 19 he goes on to attack neutrality by referring to a biblical metaphor (to get one's hands dirty — “to wash one's hands in innocence”).

15 The cliché aspect is expressed in the brevity and alleged self-evidence of the statement, which was introduced much more cautiously by M<sub>2</sub> as a point in the discussion. The question is not answered in a considered manner, but addressed as an already accepted statement — with which F<sub>2</sub> agrees, employing a stereotyped utterance.

In the next contribution, F1 seems (line 18) to attempt to get to address the link between neutrality and Austrian foreign policy, but fails to elaborate on this. F2 again questions the relevance of the connection; and states that what M2 is saying has nothing to do with neutrality.

F2 then expands upon her position concerning the war in Bosnia (lines 20—31). Without establishing any (explicit) discursive relation to neutrality, she concentrates on what Austria could have done — or could have refrained from doing — during the war in order to prevent a human disaster.

After these comments, M2 returns to his topic (lines 35—44) and poses his question in the form of an unreal scenario: what would happen if everyone were neutral. Thus, once again he equates war with neutrality.

F2 counters (line 45) in an ironic manner, pointing out that active engagement also requires “dirty hands” and is therefore no better (than the neutral position). She then expands upon this explicitly, placing the two positions essentially on the same level<sup>16</sup>. Moreover she again denies the relevance of the argument, thereby defending neutrality — this argument does not alter the value of neutrality, and it may thus still be regarded as the best foreign policy alternative.

After a short while, the host (MO) encourages a contribution from another discussion participant. This participant implicitly continues the discussion on the war in Bosnia and (also implicitly) attacks NATO; explicitly he refers simply to “global” organizations and their interventions. In the context of the discussion so far, he thus gives support to F2 and her pro-neutrality position; he sees global interventions as negative and as driven by (selfish) interests. Thus for a brief moment the topic of small country versus international organizations is addressed, a theme that we have covered in section 6.

In general, this discussion, which is rather unusual because it directly questions neutrality, reveals the following (which is also valid for many other of the discussions in our corpus): (a) what lies behind the discussion of neutrality is the question of what the correct conduct of a state in a normative sense should be. In the “normal” neutrality discourse, the positive assessment (evaluation) is made in comparison with war, which is considered inherently “bad”. (b) In the debate under examination, the assumption that neutrality is something good (because it is the opposite of war) is questioned and then linked with negative elements (neutrality in the Nazi period, neutrality and indifference). In certain respects, this line of argument is a logical necessity. If — as in our discussion — neutrality is seen as connected with various thematic elements, and its positive assessment (evaluation) is based on its relationship to these elements, then in order to change the evaluation of neutrality it is necessary to separate neutrality from the positive context.

16 Even if both positions do leave “hands dirty”, one could stress differences in degree, i.e. that one alternative is “dirtier” than the other, e.g. because more people die in the other case.

In this discussion an attempt is made to show that what is commonly regarded as a positive context is in fact a negative one (in which “war” is not universally “bad”, but in some cases “good” as well). In this way, however, the discourse still remains within the thematic context described here. While the relationships to the individual topics are evaluated (assessed) differently, those aspects that are seen as being linked to neutrality do not change.

(c) The “counter-strategy”, which is typical of discussions in general rather than specifically of the current debate, is a questioning of the relevance of the arguments put forward. Neutrality, with its great symbolic meaning, but at some distance from its juristic definition, is very suited to such an argumentative strategy. As the need arises, neutrality can be restricted to its juristic core meaning (whereby the moral-ethical questioning becomes insignificant) or expanded to its discursive symbolic and identity-providing senses.

## Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined the discourse on neutrality in the semi-public arena on the basis of seven focus groups. The same discursive elements arose time and again in all groups, some of which were positively linked to neutrality and some negatively linked. Most of the evaluations were positive, but skepticism about neutrality was greater among the more informed discussion participants (JO, AK) than among the less informed — this was also found in a separate analysis of the content of the same material (Palt & Kirchner 1999). What seems to be at the root of these evaluations is a linking (taken from everyday language) of neutral behaviour with a moral position. The moral (or “good”) position is strengthened through an association with other positions that are generally considered to be “good” or “morally correct”, such as “no war”, “no wheeling and dealing”, and “never again Nazism”. In such instances, neutrality is incorporated into a semantic structure in which individual concepts (and their opposites) are seen — in a dichotomous manner — as “right” or “wrong”<sup>17</sup>. Neutrality belongs to the group of “good concepts” and its content is tied up with strong emotions.

Furthermore, neutrality also plays a part in the discourses that do not fall within this evaluated field: e.g. the discourses about the European Union and NATO. These new discourses have a different structure; they are not (yet?) structured into a system of evaluation; and in part they contradict the old semantic field (e.g. it is good that we are neutral, it is good that we are in the EU, the EU and neutrality are irreconcilable). Thus,

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<sup>17</sup> See Lakoff (1994), who describes in greater detail how, in language, concepts are integrated into an internal structure which — through similarity, classifications etc. — also in part determines values. (This is reflected in the title of the work: According to his analysis, unlike men, women belong to the class of “fire” and other dangerous things.)

neutrality stands at the center of an ideological dilemma, such as Billig has already described (1988). As Billig states, dilemmas of this type do not have to be solved immediately; they may even exist over long periods of time.

At the present time, however, the first field still seems to be dominant. Neutrality is primarily connected — as a discursive matter of course — with war. And it appears only secondarily as a conscious reflection in the debates about the relationship with the EU. Even if neutrality is dead already, and we have to go on and bury it, as Anton Pelinka has stated<sup>18</sup>, neutrality is still very much present in the feelings, thoughts and national ideology of the Austrians examined in the course of our research.

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### Appendix

The semantic network shown below describes the thematic connections that were made in the discussion of the family group. While constructing the networks, we read the transcripts sequentially and observed various topics and their argumentative development. We used the text analysis program ATLAS.ti for the description. For each topic (of suffi-

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<sup>18</sup> Personal communication, 16.—19. 4.1998, Vienna, Conference: "Western Europe between Nationalism and Globalization — the Discursive Construction of European National Identities". See also Footnote 11.



The transcript passage of the family group presented in section 4 (see also the semantic network in Figure 1) should be regarded as an example. This passage gave rise on one hand to the introduction of the topics “unemployment” and “Nazi period”, and on the other hand to the relationship linking the two themes (in this case: unemployment causes National-Socialism). National-Socialism was not discussed further as a theme, and was not linked in a relationship to anything else, and therefore no (further) lines lead away from the theme “National-Socialism”. The theme of “unemployment” was linked somewhere else to “war”; unemployment was seen as a cause of war.

Further examples of semantic networks for different groups are provided below in order to demonstrate the variability of the discursive formations.

Figure 2: Semantic network of the youth group





Fig. 3: Semantic network of the group of journalists





*Györgyi Bindorffer · István Síklaki*

# HUNGARY AND EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION

Focus group research

## Introduction

Focus groups and in-depth interviews are qualitative methods, so what we can learn from this research is a repertory of attitudes toward Hungary and NATO, and Hungary and the European Union. This qualitative approach provides insight into the arguments, feelings, ambivalences surrounding the respondents' attitudes, and with this insight we are better able to interpret survey results. While there are characteristic differences between groups of respondents, valid extrapolation to broader social strata is impossible from our results.

This report is divided into two parts. The first part describes some aspects of the research and the respondents, and provides an overall report of the whole research. The second part contains a more detailed, individual description of what are in our view the two most interesting of the six groups:

- The group of university undergraduates and graduates, because they can be regarded as the age group most likely to be affected
- The group of politically active persons, because they are expected to have a more reflective and informed view on these issues

## I. General Report

### *Research objectives*

The aim of the research was to obtain a deeper insight into the underlying arguments, attitudes and values concerning Euro-Atlantic integration. We broadened the scope to include — beside NATO — the European Union as well, because at the time of the research Hungary's joining NATO was a matter of fact. The main interest was whether and

how values of neutrality and national independence occur in discussions about joining these two international organizations, both of which require Hungary to give up some of her sovereignty.

It was also an aim of this qualitative research to provide complementary data for the other parallel studies. While in the group discussions we tried to touch upon the main topics of the survey, we expected to and actually did find interesting qualifications of some of the survey results. As to why, one may give the same proposition as an answer to a question for a number of different reasons. These subtle reasons were in the focus of our discussion groups.

### *Research methodology*

The method of focus group interview was chosen because it is very suitable for discovering underlying motives during a 1.5 — 2 hour group discussion moderated by an expert psychologist (Barbar & Kitzinger 1999). Relying on group dynamics this method provides the best ways to look behind the surface of stereotypes inflicted on people by the media — or, at least, to find out whether such issues are important enough for the respondents to consider genuine attitudes about them at all. Focus group interviews can offer a repertory of ideas, associations, and emotional reactions of individuals, which can contribute to a more refined view of an attitude object, and it can be evaluated against the background of quantitative data such as survey research (Krueger 1988).

To make our research as comparable as possible to that of using Austrian data, we conducted focus groups as similar to the Austrian sample as was permitted by the differences between the social contexts. We had five focus groups and one batch of in-depth interviews replacing a focus group:

- Journalists between 30 — 70 years of age interested in political issues
- Older persons (over 40) presently or in the past active in grass roots political life
- University undergraduate and graduate students
- Emigrants who have resettled in Hungary
- A group of two, third-generation families
- One group in the far east of Hungary in the corner close to the Ukrainian and Romanian borders — the town of Fehérgyarmat

### *Main topics discussed in the focus groups*

- Background
- Hungary's position in the world
- Hungary's position in Europe

- Spontaneous associations with NATO
- Spontaneous associations with the EU
  
- Meaning and significance of Euro-Atlantic integration
  - In general
  - Concerning Hungarian values
  - Concerning Hungarian interests
  - Concerning Hungarian traditions and history
- Detailed discussion of advantages and disadvantages of joining NATO, including the obligations undertaken by Hungary
- Detailed discussion of advantages and disadvantages of joining the EU, including the obligations to be undertaken by Hungary
- A projective task: personification of NATO and the EU respectively

A remark is in order concerning this last point, "projective task." Since focus groups try to grasp sub- or unconscious emotional attitudes, in addition to rational arguments and opinions, special methods are often used for this purpose. One such task is to imagine the attitude object as a person, and then project on to this fantasy person emotions and traits associated with the attitude object. A picture obtained by this method provides a tool to refine or check our interpretation of the more rational data.

A coding sheet was set up based on the main topics. The interviews were transcribed into a word processor and coded with the use of a computer tool for analyzing qualitative interview material, TextBase Alpha.

### *The focus groups conducted*

#### Group 1 Far East

Ten high school students of a school of economics in Fehérgyarmat, including an unemployed young man attending a special course at the school, and a young man from the part of Ukraine inhabited by ethnic Hungarians (Kárpátalja).

#### Group 2 Graduates and undergraduates

Ten university undergraduates and graduates in Budapest from various disciplines such as law, philosophy, natural sciences, sociology, foreign trade, engineering, language and anthropology.

#### Group 3 Families

Two third-generation families

## Family 1:

- Anna, retired, living alone, spent all of her working life (35 years) as an unskilled worker in the wool industry
- Her daughter Ágnes, an interpreter
- Her granddaughter, Mirjam, 23, university undergraduate student and part-time journalist

## Family 2

- Mária, retired, skilled electrical technician, used to work as the head of a department of personnel management company, 80 years old
- Her son András, 53, literary historian
- Her grandson Bors, 25, newly graduated sociologist

## Group 4 The politically active

- Zsuzsa, formerly a teacher, presently an entrepreneur, used to be involved in the liberal political movement
- Joli, retired, part-time accounting consultant for a Budapest municipality, used to be active in the former communist party
- Andrea, teaches etiquette, used to be active both in liberal and conservative political movements, especially around the change of regime
- Antal, involved in management training, worked in the establishment of the first freely elected Hungarian government
- Zoltán, executive manager of a limited partnership dealing with property management, active in a rightist party and holds a position in the World Association of Hungarians.

## Group 5 The journalists

- Senior journalist for the conservative national daily, *Magyar Nemzet* (male)
- Journalist for the national economic daily, *Napi Gazdaság* (male)
- Deputy editor-in-chief for the Hungarian version of *Cosmopolitan* magazine (female)
- Senior journalist for the liberal national daily, *Magyar Hírlap* (female)
- Program manager for *Hungarian Radio* (male)

## Group 6 The resettled

These people turned out to be over-cautious and distrustful, resulting in two failed sessions: most of them either refused to take part right away, or cancelled at the last minute. Therefore we decided to conduct one-on-one interviews with them instead of the more public focus group discussion.

### *Main findings*

#### Hungary's place in the world

There are three main aspects influencing this positioning:

- Cultural/historical: Although settled by Asians, Hungary belongs very closely to the Christian European culture and civilization as a nation living here for more than a thousand years, and throughout its history fought for Christianity against Islam. This is a very widely held stereotype, and a pivotal element of the Hungarian self-image. It was most expressed in the politically active group irrespective of their ideological preferences, i.e. whether the respondent revealed views characteristic of a socialist, a liberal, or a right-wing extremist.
- Geographical: Hungary definitely belongs to Europe, and another widely held stereotype is that it is the geographical center of Europe.
- Economical: Hungary belongs to the countries economically lagging behind (Western) Europe mainly because of the decades spent under communist rule in the Soviet sphere.

Three remarkable attitudes could be observed in three groups of respondents: the Budapest university graduates, the politically active, and the repatriated.

The university graduates reported experiences concerning economic and civil aspects of Hungary's relationship to Western and Eastern Europe. A number of personal reports quoted experiences with public restrooms as trivial but representative examples of the civil gap between East and West. The quotation below is especially typical in that it combines material and spiritual elements in a funny way:

*"It was a great trauma for me. It was the time that I started secondary school. I lived in an bubble during elementary school. I was an eminent pioneer, I regarded Hungary as belonging to the East, and this was quite a positive thing for me. Then I happened to start a secondary school with more of a Christian, than a real communist background, and it favored more a Western orientation than an Eastern one. I used to be an eminent schoolboy, and suddenly, in secondary school I failed in mathematics in the very first year. And we visited [West]Germany with my parents and I was shocked that in a public restrooms everything was working, the ventilation system and all, and I felt very happy, and on the way back home I saw the gradual fall in the level of civilization, Germany—Austria—Hungary, and all through the restrooms, and then I was confronted with the fact that the bubble I had been living in was gone, it disappeared during that Spring and Summer."*

This is a psychologically very interesting and marvellously formulated compression of ideological and trivially material aspects of a national self-identity, and while it seems to

be (tragi)-comical, this experience is quite a common and genuine one, with the hygienic level of public restrooms being an emblem of a gap in level of civilization between East and West.

Economically, Hungary was placed halfway between East and West:

*"When we were in East Germany or Bulgaria as tourists, we had money, there was no problem at all. However, in England it was nothing, I was penniless, it did not matter that I had money, it had no value."*

Another aspect is that Yugoslavia used to be perceived as closer to the West than to the East, but now the situation has changed in favor of Hungary:

*"We used to visit relatives in Yugoslavia every Summer, they were a very rich family, they financed our holiday, we were the poor relatives; they used credit cards as early as that time, and it was very shameful for my parents, but still we visited them every year, and now it is the other way around. Then we thought Yugoslavia is the West and as compared to them we were Eastern, but now the situation has reversed."*

Implicit in this personal report is a favorable attitude toward Euro-Atlantic integration with these changes serving as evidence that this is the successful route to take.

For the politically active group it was the historical and cultural differences that mattered and that contributed to our national identity. In this, there were no differences among the respondents, whether they were former communists, present right-wing nationalists, liberals or conservatives. A central element of this view is Hungary's cultural isolation, while at the same time the strong feeling of our belonging very strongly to Europe, which is mainly justified by our cultural assimilation (taking up Christianity), and the fight against Islam on behalf of Christian Europe.

*"I would say that Hungarians live in the center of Europe in the Carpathian Basin, and they are famous for somehow ending up here. However, they have not much in common with Europe, they have no relatives in Europe, and they have lived during the last 1000 years as a strange small island. Their relationship with the people living around them has always been problematic, and this nation is still uncertain about her roots, about where she belongs."*

The repatriated respondents were characterized by a kind of self-justifying attitude: they had to justify to themselves that it was a good idea to resettle from the West. There were both economic and cultural-historical arguments to this effect. The typical argument of economy goes like this:

*"Hungary is similar to the West. After all, Spain or Portugal also count as Western Europe, but I think most people live better here. The average people have higher living standards in Hungary than in those countries. What is more, although I have not been there, I think the living standard is higher here than in Greece. The average Hungarian lives better than the average Greek."*

The historical-cultural argument is muddled, but the emotional meaning seems to be clear:

*"Helmut Kohl was an historian and he might even know that the first wife of their first king was the beautiful daughter of Henrik the Quarrelsome, who was a 'Germanophile', and the K.U.K. Monarchy has probably also an influence on this, that Hungarians have an advantage in Germany. If you are Hungarian, it is agreeable in Germany. What is more, if you are Hungarian, then you do not count as a foreigner at all."*

*"We belong to the West. Because we have always been the gatekeeper of the West. The wall between East and West. When the Turks came, or the Tartars, it was always us who shed blood. If we had not shed our blood, we might also have had a population of 40-50 million."*

To sum up, this positioning provides a sound psychological basis for the claim that Hungarian national identity fits very well, from a number of different angles, with the idea of belonging to (Western) Europe, and hence is in accordance with the political goal of Euro-Atlantic integration. The main aspects of fitting in are: Christianity as an historical tradition, economic trends, and geographical position. There is a certain ambivalence, however, concerning our remote Asian origin, which has the consequence that Hungarians have no related nations as Slavs or Germans do.

#### Hungarian values with respect to Euro-Atlantic integration

As to the values relevant for integration there is self-criticism, as well as national pride.

Two negative characteristics were mentioned of Hungarians by the conservative-liberal etiquette teacher: intolerance in debates, and dishonesty.

*"We are quarrelling all the time. That is, if someone expresses a view, the result is that everybody comes forward with a counter-argument at that very moment. Even in the most trifling matters. As if we were able to show who we are only by contradicting. This is a matter of communication culture. The other is dishonesty. This nation has become dishonest. I've been waiting for a long time for a query in mass communication asking for a Hungarian citizen above 20 years of age who has never cheated. To ask such a person to come out and show up. Who has never used the tram without a valid ticket? I believe we would find very few such persons. One single room would be enough to contain those deaf-mutes, crippled, handicapped people, who have never cheated. I think this is a cultural peculiarity of*

*Hungary. This is not so widespread in European culture. They cheat sometimes, I'm sure, but here it is a group norm. We cannot join Europe this way."*

An important theme is a kind of fatalism, survival as a value in itself. This attitude is somewhat related to the geopolitical position of Hungary as a "ferry country" that always made desperate efforts to break out of isolation and belong somewhere.

*"We always wanted to belong somewhere. Hungary had the chance of belonging to the West for a long time, but this aspiration had failed. In the recent past a number of happenings were more than sheer chance, the orientation of the country, but it was something forced on us from outside, and joining NATO is the first step to joining the EU, as well, which means a Western orientation, at last."* [Students group]

*"The most important Hungarian value is survival. There is no other value in history but mere survival, to choose the least bad of the unfavorable options."* [Students group]

There is a feeling of one-sidedness in Hungary's aspiration to belong to the West, which is a kind of criticism, too. Note the fatalistic attitude, which is an important underlying feeling that returns in many forms during the discussions.

There is an important and widely held myth that Hungary is over-represented in world culture and science. Typical references are to the invention of the atomic bomb, or the art of film-making and business.

*"A film historian friend of mine told me that if you put a focus point in Eastern Europe and drew a circle of 500–1000 km diameter around it, then all the famous film directors and producers came from this circle, all those who created the American dream, and had great influence on American society. This is why I want to live here in Eastern Europe, this is what shapes my personality, good things, bad things alike had an effect on me, I don't want to live in America."* [Students group]

This cultural chauvinism is complemented by a claim for some exceptional general talent, and all the blame for our gloomy present situation is put on the previous regime.

*"If a Western company comes here, that is, a Western European, a Swedish, a German, after a time they realize that they do not need to bring here any experts, because Hungarians are able to do everything excellently. (...) This is a nation that need not be taught how to manage a firm, how to direct an economy, how to do things cleverly and reasonably. At the beginning of the century the Hungarian was the best worker in Germany. They were brought to farms, anywhere from here, because the Hungarian worker was world famous. They went to America, and many of them became rich, became really successful, made a real career. Not to mention music or arts, we are everywhere. We are number one*

*in sports, too. As compared to our small number as a population, we achieve several times more. Let me stress that the fact that we are where we are presently because of 40 years of communism, a Byzantine system."* [Right-wing nationalist]

Another positive feature of Hungarian society as compared to Western Europe is formulated by the young people in the far East of Hungary: we are not yet alienated.

*"Alienation is not that expressed here so far, not so much as in the Western countries. So, there, when people are walking on the street, they walk past by each other without a word. Here, if two acquaintances bump into each other they would stop, shake hands, have a little chat."*

To sum up, the overall view is that Hungary's bad fate has caused some distortions in the national character, so some improvements are necessary before we can join the EU, but Hungary's genuine talent in a number of areas of culture and science entitle us to a better future within the European community.

### Overall views on Hungary's Euro-Atlantic integration

There is a recurring theme relevant to attitudes toward Hungary's Euro-Atlantic integration: Hungary has always been exploited by other, more powerful nations and there was a very frequent pessimism that these new developments will not bring any change in this. Both NATO and the EU will probably selfishly take advantage of us. This pessimistic attitude was quite strong in four of the groups; only the journalists and the repatriated people differed.

*"This country has always wanted to belong somewhere: Christianity, Habsburgs, Warsaw Pact, now it is NATO which is described as all good and nice. We are made for political reasons to believe that this is in our best interest, and we do believe it, but from a broader perspective it seems tragicomic, for this is what we have always believed and we know from history what was the result."* [Students group]

*"We'll be the oppressed. Hungary will please the Western nations, as it used to do toward the Russians."* [Far East group]

*"Europe has never helped us. Neither the Americans, nor Europe. And we can go back here as far as the Tartar conquests, if you please. Here Europe helped only when it wanted to put its puppet under a crown suitable for it. Otherwise Europe never defended us. I have no illusions that, if ad absurdum the Serbs transgress the Hungarian border, anybody would come to our defense. Rather I feel that we risk a danger, which was not inevitable."* [Conservative-liberal]

Another topic relevant here is the possibility of neutrality. The overall view is that neutrality has never been a real option for Hungary, and it is not really important, either. The only exception again is the politically active group, where pro-neutrality feelings dominated. As to the value of neutrality, the dominant view was that our famous declarations in the middle of the last century and in 1956 was only a reaction to the threatening outside forces, mainly the Russians. In 1956, for example, when neutrality was declared, it is said that NATO affiliation would have been preferred both by the Hungarian people, and by the politicians, but then it would have been too risky a move to go straight from the Warsaw Pact into NATO. But there was no deeper, ideological value underlying that declaration. Only the right-wing nationalist politician debated this position, and a slight doubt was detected on the part of the conservative respondent, both in the politically active group.

Basically five main motives were found in the group discussions with regard to neutrality. The sequence of presentation does not reflect priority or degree of importance.

The first one is again a kind fatalism: Hungary has never had a choice, and it was no different this time, either.

*"I think neutrality was nothing but a forced decision in 1956, because it was impossible then to join NATO directly."* [Students group]

*"The country cannot really get ahead alone in relation to the other developed countries."* [Far East group]

*"There was an alternative, it was not inevitable to join NATO. The other option, which to my mind would have been possible, was total neutrality. However, it cannot be realized in this particular situation. Then, I prefer NATO as a possible partner..."* [Politically active group]

Another somewhat similar argument is that neutrality has no historical precedent in Hungary.

*"Basically neutrality was never achieved by Hungarians. Never in its history, that it could have been independent. There always was influence, once Russian, Czech or German; recently it has become under Western influence. So, after all, independence is just a concept that has never been realized."* [Far East group]

*"It seems to me that neutrality is not an option for Hungary, and it cannot be, either. This was proved in the last decades, and even earlier. It was always pushed here and there, and there were no favorable consequences. Well, now we have joined NATO, it means again that we are pushed somewhere, but this time at least there was a referendum about it."* [Journalist group]

A more sophisticated view claims that neutrality has no political reality anymore in general, not only for Hungary.

*"Neutrality has no real value anymore because as long as there were two world political systems opposed to each other, and the super powers counter-balanced each other, neutrality made sense. It was a delicate balance but still a balance. So neutrality could be guaranteed in this balanced situation, each opposing party was a guarantee. But now it's all over."* [Family group]

*"This is a beautiful dream, that I would like to remain neutral. However, that means that I don't take any responsibility, I pull out from everything. But it doesn't work that I would like to take the good parts and only the good ones. And the one who is neutral in actuality is not neutral because it is immersed in the global economic system."* [Repatriated]

Some respondents expressed their wish to become neutral even in such improbable circumstances.

*"Independence would be the best. Like Switzerland, not to join anybody."* [Far East group]

*"Rather the neutral Austria, our neighbor, should be the model for us to follow."* [Family group]

*"I think Hungary is the odd man out in Europe, a cuckoo in the nest dropped here from somewhere. Therefore neutrality would be very important for it. This is a kind of joining, too, if you wish. Why, Europe has a neutral core. Even geographically it might have been possible. It did not happen. And I think, it was yet another wrong step by the nation."* [Politically active group]

And finally, there was some tricky wishful thinking; an example of the cheating mentality one respondent was talking about before as a characteristic of Hungarians:

*"Perhaps we may join, then break away when we have become developed."* [Far East group]

*"Presently we are too weak to stand alone, later I can imagine, but not now."* [Repatriated]

Let us summarize these general views about integration. The most remarkable is the bad mood, the pessimism about the possible consequences of integration. One corollary is the unfortunate history, the view that Hungary has always been oppressed and exploited. Another corollary is a kind of learned helplessness. Neutrality might be good in principle, however, it never was, and — as it now seems — never will be a real prospect, and there is nothing we can do about it. Let us surrender to our fate and join NATO and the EU. We will now turn to the views about NATO and the EU respectively.

## Hungary and NATO

The groups were very ambiguous in their attitudes towards Hungary's joining NATO, which was a matter of fact when the discussions were conducted. It is generally regarded as a necessary evil. It is not sympathetic, nobody likes it, nobody is happy about it. NATO does not bring any positive values for Hungary. However, there are a number of cold, reasonable arguments in favor of joining, which made this decision inevitable: Hungary is too small, too poor, too weak a country to defend itself, while it is surrounded by potentially inimical populations such as the Serbs, the Slovaks, or the Romanians.

As to the detailed argumentation about the advantages and disadvantages of joining NATO, only those aspects emerged during the discussion that were already familiar from the public discussions of the issue in the media, but these issues came up quite regularly in the groups, except, again, in the group of journalists, who were determined to stress the positive aspects, even though they were embarrassed by the bombardments going on when the discussion was conducted (see Table 1).

TABLE 1. *Perceived advantages and disadvantages of joining NATO*

Advantages	Disadvantages
NATO will improve Hungary's security	NATO membership makes us just as dependent on NATO as we were on the Warsaw Pact
By joining NATO Hungary's relative position will improve among its neighbors	Hungary would be better off associating with its neighboring countries instead of with NATO
By joining NATO we are more able to assert our national interests.	We shall have to take on obligations that are not in the interests of Hungary.
Joining NATO may defend us from Russia's attempts to influence Hungary	Joining NATO will provoke Russia
Joining NATO may help us defend the interests of ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries	Hungary would be better off associating with its neighboring countries instead of with NATO
Joining NATO helps reduce our defense budget.	Joining NATO costs more for Hungary than it can afford or than is worth spending.
Joining NATO will encourage foreign capital investment in Hungary	NATO is interested in our joining because it can sell its weapons to Hungary

First let us consider in detail what the negatives are associated with NATO, then turn to the positives and the reasons or rationalizations in favor of joining. Finally we shall give a picture of the image of NATO, the associations it evoked, and the kind of personality attributed to it.

## Negatives of joining NATO

There is a general feeling of danger, an anxiety that our joining NATO might be an excuse for a conflict with some neighbors — and a worry that NATO perhaps does not help.

*“They stress very much that joining NATO may cause no harm to Hungary, but, I must admit, I cannot believe it at all. One small event might put Hungary in flames.”* [Family group]

*“I’m afraid of getting into trouble with the neighboring countries. Now that we belong to NATO and are so involved in the conflict in Yugoslavia, and Kosovo, it may bring about even greater danger for the Hungarians living in the neighboring countries.”* [Students group]

NATO is regarded by some respondents as belonging to a culture alien to it, which may result in getting into conflicts which have nothing to do with it, with its values and interests:

*“This alliance, after all, ... I don’t see it as a natural alliance for us. Not at all. On the contrary, I find it definitely forced. Just because there is no alternative ally around at the moment, it does not mean that we have to jump into this one. NATO is an alliance for another, a different culture. I’m strongly opposed to NATO. It is not mere pacifism, although I have two sons of obligatory age to serve in the army.”* [Politically active group]

*“I wouldn’t like my son to be sent to a far away part of the world just because the USA got into a quarrel with some country on the other side of the world, and even die for aims and interests totally alien to ours.”* [Students group]

There are also some direct internal political arguments against NATO. One trivial negative result is the price Hungary will probably have to pay for joining, while NATO was perhaps only interested in getting access to our territory to be used in the Balkan war. Another counter-argument has to do with corrupt politicians.

*“A good friend of mine is a soldier and he says that the Hungarian army is not ready to join. It couldn’t have joined if the conditions had been taken seriously, but NATO wanted our territory in the Yugoslav war.”* [Student group]

*“There is one thing nobody speaks about: the vested interests of a great many politicians in joining NATO. For example, soldiers who like fighting. Or politicians who can get advantages — both political and economical — out of it, there are huge amounts of money here, weapons, machine and airplanes have to be purchased.”* [Students group]

## Positives of joining NATO

Obviously the main advantage of joining NATO is peace in general, defense against outside enemies, and political stability.

*"Advantages may be expressed by . . . well, now they bombard Serbia and if Serbia attacks Hungary, they hopefully will keep their promise and defend us, unlike in 1956."* [Politically active group] — the skepticism is palpable underlying this 'positive' claim —

*"Well, if Russia for example attacked us now, it could be expected of NATO, the other members, to defend us. For this is what it is all about."* [Repatriated]

*"New power centers are developing in the world, I mean not so much China, but the Islamic world, which means a threat for us against which NATO is a defense, therefore I accept joining as a necessary evil."* [Family group]

*"A number of Western companies suggested that they are ready to invest in Hungary, if it joins NATO, because then they feel safe."* [Students group]

There were also some very sober and practical considerations in favor of joining NATO concerning young men's obligations of serving as soldiers, more efficient army structure, and opportunities for technological development.

*"I was very glad because I haven't been able so far to make sure that I could avoid service in the army, and I was waiting for the Hungarian Army to be turned into a professional one, so I thought, my son will not have to be afraid of being obliged to serve as a soldier."* [Students group]

*"Those will become soldiers who want to, and they will be paid for it. This is a fair alternative to unemployment, as well."* [Family group]

*"Hungary might easily become a country taking part in technological developments, research will be done."* [Repatriated]

At this moment the Hungarian Army is in very bad shape and its prestige is quite low. Many respondents see joining NATO a solution to this problem.

*"I served as a soldier and I saw high ranking officers, those who are the leaders in the army, vomiting all along the corridors, and I could tell you scores of interesting details like this, so this army is not led by people who have the talent and skill, they have their positions only by their former political connections."* [Students group]

*"My father used to be a professional officer, later he taught at the military academy, and he told us unimaginable horror stories about the medieval conditions in the army. And it probably has not changed in many parts of it. From this respect NATO is all right."* [Politically active group]

*"Experts calculate that neutrality costs more than joining, at least in the long run, and neutrality carries no guarantee, either."* [Journalist group]

There are also some value-related arguments in favor of joining NATO. NATO is associated with the western democracies and with the values attributed to them.

*"Freedom, democracy, they are general human values and by joining NATO we oblige ourselves to support these values."* [Journalist group]

*"After all, we have always wanted to belong to the West, for decades, and by joining NATO we are much closer now to this aim."* [Journalist group]

There was an idea of international political relevance for Hungary. A typical criticism was by those opposing NATO that it would cause harm to Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries, which remain outside the alliance. Here is an argument to the contrary:

*"If Hungary is a member of NATO, it really can take a stronger position in negotiations with neighboring countries, it can bring its prestige higher."* [Students group]

A special paternalistic or infantile attitude was observed in the remarks of different repatriated respondents.

*"I think most Hungarians look up with respect to such an organization. Somehow they are proud of being a member."* [Repatriated 1]

*"Hungary is such a country that it does need a strong soldier father and a strong soldier mother."* [Repatriated 3]

*"After all, it is a good feeling to know that my daddy is stronger than your daddy, and then I'm defended. This is that simple."* [Repatriated 4]

In general, respondents mentioned mainly practical arguments in favor of NATO such as defense, a professional and significantly more efficient army, technological development, and a safe environment for foreign investment. Only the journalists referred to the support of humanistic values as a possible positive consequence of joining NATO.

## Image of NATO

So far we have discussed those aspects of the respondents' views that are predominantly rational. However, emotional aspects of the attitudes may and often do differ from rational ones, sometimes even contradicting them. To give insight into these affected aspects, respondents were asked to take part in projective games: spontaneous associations and personification. The instruction concerning spontaneous associations was to say the first word(s) that came into their mind when they thought of NATO. The other task was to imagine NATO as a person, and give a detailed description of him/her.

To anticipate the results, the image of NATO is practically identical with the image of the United States as a military power. Despite the many positive attributes and arguments mentioned during the discussions, the emotional attitude ranges from negative aggressiveness to machismo.

First, let us take a look at the results of the spontaneous association game played towards the end of the students group: what comes to mind when thinking of NATO. Here is the list:

Weapon, USA, cold war, violence, chewing gum, fear, obsession with an absolute measure

It was very instructive that — while all the respondents in this group claimed to support joining NATO on rational grounds — none of the associations is emotionally positive. This ambivalence was palpable when it came to the personification game. There were nice and perhaps significant differences in the persons the different groups imagined as an idealized representative of NATO. Here are some examples illustrating how ambivalent the respondents' attitudes are toward NATO:

### *Students group:*

- a man with a big gown with which he can do all kinds of things: he can strangle you, but just as well defend you, he is ambivalent
- American mold, brushy hair, aggressive
- private Ryan : wishy-washy, disgusting and attractive at the same time

### *Family group:*

- thin, skinny, white, but a little bit overbearing
- middle-aged German or English figure with a frosty expression and a moustache, has an utterly tough and honest look, but down inside is biased and prone to corruption

### *Politically active group:*

- he reminds me of Bill Clinton: good looking on the outside, nothing to criticize, suggesting strength and authority. Inside, however, corrupted.

### *Journalist group:*

- a brushy haired older officer, who tells lies not because he is evil, but because he has to. That is, he follows basically gentle goals, but he can succeed only by using unfair means.

Thus, the other groups gave strongly and explicitly ambivalent descriptions of the personality of their image of NATO. He can either strangle, or defend you. He is all right, but a little overbearing. Seems to be honest, but yet prone to corruption. Very instructive is the emotional reaction of the journalists. This was the only group that gave an unambiguously positive rational description of NATO, and reported a perfectly "pro" attitude. Yet NATO is described here as dishonest, while this negative trait is explained away by referring to situational constraints. This projective game, which enabled us to gain some access to the less conscious layers of respondents' attitudes, convincingly reinforced the ambivalence perceived during the discussion of rational arguments for or against joining NATO.

### Hungary and the EU

The plan to join the EU is much less controversial than the fact that Hungary have joined NATO. This ambition is perceived to be consistent with our self-image as historically and culturally an integral part of Europe. There is a rational awareness that joining the EU will mean giving up some of its sovereignty, but for the moment it seems to be nothing more than a theoretical issue, and respondents seem unable to experience any emotional reactions about this sacrifice.

Most respondents expect more positive consequences than negative ones, but they seemed to be rather superficially informed about the probable outcomes for Hungary. The only concern articulated generally, and most strongly in the Far East group, is that Hungarian agriculture is bound to suffer a lot, even may collapse as a result of joining the EU. Otherwise, the most important positive outcome seems to be that joining the EU will consolidate Hungary's position in Europe in the long run. The young man from Ukraine expressed his worry about the probable isolation from the mother country of ethnic Hungarians living in Ukraine, and he saw no chance of avoiding this fate.

The main advantages and disadvantages mentioned are as follows — reflecting again the arguments disseminated by the media:

Advantages	Disadvantages
Joining the EU will improve our economy	Western companies will completely take over the Hungarian economy
It will be easier to find a job abroad	Unemployment will grow
The standard of living will improve	Prices will skyrocket
	Hungarian agriculture will go bankrupt
Travelling will become easier	Chances of ethnic Hungarians in the neighboring countries will suffer

## Negatives of joining the EU

The most important worry about joining the EU is the same as the widespread fear, superstition or negative experience that Western capitalists will buy up Hungarian properties and means of production, in order to exploit and take unfair advantage of the Hungarian people. This danger was formulated from various viewpoints anticipating different negative consequences. Here are some examples.

*"OK. We join and do what they expect of us, but what if they just exploit our country like so far."* [Far East group]

*"They come and buy Hungarian companies cheap, and take the profit out of the country."* [Family group]

*"Foreigners buy up Hungarian soil, the prices will skyrocket, to a level higher than Hungarians can pay, so that our good, quality soil will be lost to foreigners."* [Family and politically active group]

*"Real estate will become freely accessible to Westerners, so prices will skyrocket, making the Hungarian housing situation even worse. That can create social stress and as a consequence nationalism may increase."* [Family group]

A related worry, mainly in the Far East group that belongs to an agricultural area, is that Hungarian agriculture would collapse as a result of joining EU.

*"It will be a disaster for agriculture. Let us take Holland or Italy, farmers are paid not to produce because there is redundancy. And they say that it is cheaper to produce in Holland than in Hungary. So there will be an enormous crisis."* [Far East group]

There was a generational difference in the extent to which respondents were worried about joining the EU. The middle or older generations were much more worried than the younger generation. Even young people in the Far East group were more optimistic than the Family group or the Politically active group. This is partly rational, partly emotional.

*"So many bad things happened to the people that the majority can see no promising perspectives. People above 40 or the pensioners won't find their place even in the EU."* [Family group]

A similar idea is that there are great expectations, which are bound to fail.

*"I don't think it will be harder to live in the EU, but there will be no significant difference and this will make many people disappointed."* [Repatriated]

Finally, many respondents consider the prospect of losing some of Hungary's sovereignty and/or national character. However, this outcome is viewed with resignation.

*"We have to give up some of our national sovereignty in the traditional sense, but if we look around in the world, we see that the idea and practice of traditional national sovereignty is in the past."* [Journalist group]

### Positives of joining the EU

Before turning to the positive outcomes expected from joining the EU, let us quote an interesting remark concerning the above cluster of negatives: a perspective.

*"Basically, I think we are ungrateful, because if we had been discussing these very same issues 8 years ago, we would have found a great many indisputable advantages in joining the EU"* [Student group]

This quotation suggests that Hungarians have forgotten very quickly how backward our country had been before the change of regime, and how much the Hungarian population used to admire Western Europe. This change of attitude may partly be due to the disillusionment following the great expectations.

There are two, somewhat related arguments in favor of joining the EU: one is freedom to travel; the other concerns various economic advantages. It is very interesting, however, that even these relatively undisputed advantages are formulated with some reservation: respondents are quick to add a 'but' to the positive outcome.

Supporting beliefs:

*"What I see as an advantage of the EU is that many new resources open up for the Hungarian economy to help modernization. Although it is not always fair, because for example in PHARE you can get support, but with the condition that you have to invite and pay a Western expert for the project, so that they get back 70–80% of the money. Yet, the EU is perhaps the best of many bad things."* [Students group]

The Portugal example:

*"I have known Portugal from the time when joining the EU was out of question. It was a beautiful country, but desperately poor. And then, when they joined, really fantastic amounts of money poured in,*

*they built roads, reconstructed everything. It was fantastic. And people became much happier. The problems begin, however, because after a while these amounts must be paid back slowly. Yet I hope we can join, we have no other choice.*" [Family group]

A related issue is management culture:

*"They bring us a new corporate culture, work ethics. A Western multi expects you to work 12–14 hours a day and to be maximally loyal."* [Student group]

As these few quotations illustrate, an ambivalence is expressed here, quite similar to the one concerning NATO. PHARE money is fine, BUT most of it flows back to the EU; financial aid is fine, BUT it has to be paid back; developed management culture is fine, BUT it involves exploitation. The conclusion is the ambivalent and somewhat fatalist statement: "We have no other choice."

#### PERSONIFICATION OF THE EU

In the discussion of the attitudes toward joining NATO, we found that the ambivalence that could be inferred from the rational arguments was reinforced and became more expressed by the projective techniques that were used to gain access to less conscious reactions. Here we found something similar: as the ambivalence at the rational level was slighter, the emotional reactions to the EU were less ambivalent, but reservations are still easy to assess.

The almost unanimous association in all five groups was a kind of matron. A powerful female head of household, who holds the key to the pantry, the one who looks over the personnel in the family economy, as well as the budget of the family members. She is firm but fair. Particular associations ran from a matron of a medieval manor house through the Madame of a Montmartre brothel to the powerful granny or to the emancipated businesswoman of our times. Let us look at some quotations:

*Students group:*

- "On the Montmartre a Madame from a red light house"
- "For me she is a Spanish dancer lady, with a garter-belt, hot, fervent, but when it comes to the point, she cuts that thing off"
- "A woman, extremely fat and sits over everything with her big bottom"
- "She has a style of Honthy Hanna [she was a famous operetta prima donna, a dame] a very knowledgeable, wise woman, who keeps the family together, settles the matters around the household, about 40–50 years of age"
- "A Swiss banker who always calculates how much it will cost to have us among them, weighs everything."

*Far East group:*

- “It is more of a female.”
- “French, strong character, brave, isn’t afraid of anything.”
- “Has a strong will, awful.”
- “Sticks to the rules and regulations, any resistance is in vain.”
- “Keeps her eye on everything.”

*Family group:*

- “A gray-headed man of 40–45 years of age, looks very nice and friendly, but when it comes to negotiations he ruthlessly gets his interests through.”
- “A forceful woman, strong, determined, brave, who can gather people around her, very efficient.”

*Politically Active group:*

- “A female. She is a matron, a housekeeper, a bit cunning, a bit aggressive, she is very alert, keeps an eye on everything. Perhaps not a housekeeper but the owner, the lady housewife herself who is very cunning and spies upon the maid lest she cheat her out of a rotten apple. So she is not that generous.”
- “A careful matron who hands out wheat to the farm hands. A patriarch but female. A matriarch.”

*Journalist group*

- “A woman, no doubt. She holds the key to the pantry. And wouldn’t give it over to anybody.”
- “Maybe a Swiss banker, definitely the French type.”

It is amazing how similar the image is in these otherwise very different groups. And this image seems to be far from being a stereotype. While personification of NATO was explicitly ambiguous, which was reflected, for example, by the use of “but” conjunctions, here the ambiguity is more semantic: the description of a “material woman” who at the same time has authority. She is not somebody to love, but neither is she corrupted.

## II. DETAILED RESULTS

Two of the six groups are described separately in more detail: the group of university graduate and undergraduate students, and the group of politically active persons. The point of this is to present a particular group’s views as a whole unit. In this way we can gain a more coherent picture from a particular viewpoint. The Student group was cho-

sen because these respondents were perhaps the most affected by integration, while the politically active group was chosen because they were the most informed. Our attention will be focused on the specific attitudes characteristic of these groups toward NATO and the EU, and we will also look for group specific differences.

### *1. Group of university graduates and undergraduates*

Hungarian values did not seem to be resonating deep in the heart of these students. They mentioned some values belonging to the general national stereotypes such as our doomed fate, our role as a bastion of Christianity, and our being a nation of outstanding talent. What seem to be subjectively more important to them are quite trivial and very material symbols of the civil gap between (perhaps the former) Hungary and Western nations. Their emotions toward Europe can be grasped against this background.

*"As to the transition I remember that the boundary marker 'People's Republic' was changed. I saw it on the television. And we stopped learning Russian."*

*"In connection with toilets I remember when we first visited Austria we stopped in a rest area along the highway. We wanted to go to the toilet and we took paper with us. [It was typical then in Hungary that there was no toilet paper in public restrooms] As we were returning to our car we were asked by a service man why we had stolen the paper!"*

There were also some other quotations related to this material attitude and civilization gap in the general discussion (e.g. another toilet-story, the "Western" Yugoslavian relatives with the credit card, etc.)

As to Euro-Atlantic integration, this is the only group which explicitly expressed the view that the connection between joining NATO and the EU need not or should not be taken for granted, one is not a precondition of the other, or more particularly, to join NATO was not a condition for joining the EU. However, they admitted that in the final assessment the two could be separated only in theory.

*"NATO and the EU are always mentioned together. I do not understand why. It seems to me as if joining the EU has to be preceded by joining NATO. We have to separate them, they are separate organizations."*

*"The country would develop more rapidly under international protection. But I do not think that we could not join the EU without joining NATO. Of course, under NATO protection the EU investments are safer in the region. But joining NATO is not a stipulation."*

Thus, students accepted the necessity of joining NATO, but very half-heartedly. While they paid lip service to the advantages of NATO, their emotions were very ambiguous.

The logical ambiguity in these quotations — the statement that joining the two organizations are not related, and the admission that joining NATO makes joining the EU easier — actually reflects a psychological ambiguity. Another, even stronger symptom of affective ambiguity is a kind of fatalism. Like it or not, this is “our fate”:

*“Man’s strongest wish is to survive. Joining NATO is the least bad option to choose.”*

*“Fear is very often stressed as a reason to join NATO. Since Hungary is a small country, we have no other way to protect ourselves.”*

*“We did not want to join NATO, but in spite of this fact it would have been explicitly an error not to join. We had no other choice.”*

One might expect this generation to anticipate a number of advantages for them, opportunities for more favorable careers by joining the EU. Yet along with the politically active group, these young people were the most skeptical about the possible outcomes, only a few of them mentioned any positive expectations. Let us begin with the hopes, and then turn to skepticism.

*“The EU: yes. It guarantees a West-European standard of living. It means a more liberal way of life, another kind of thinking. Without the EU it would take several decades to reach that level. My life will be really my life without instructions from the outside.”*

*“As to the economy, it is questionable whether Hungary is in a position to have her own way or whether it is necessary to join the EU. I think, however, that the joining period has already begun. The big American and European “multis” are in the country. That way joining the EU — just like joining NATO — is a second-best solution again.”*

*“Joining the EU will be a long procedure. As long as for 15–20 years after joining, migration of labor forces from Eastern Europe will be forbidden. I shall be nearly a pensioner when I’ll be allowed to go and work in Western Europe.”*

*“Look at the countries in the EU! Ethnic and social conflicts in France, the Basques in Spain, religious and cultural differences in Great Britain, which begin with Molotov cocktails and end with baseball bats as a soft solution to the problems. I ask whether these are such civilized and highly developed countries we have to join? In spite of their flourishing economies they have to face the same problems as we do in Hungary. I do not see how they are on a higher level than Hungary. I agree with the Norwegians who were drunk for two days after they had refused to join in the referendum. I understand all the pros and cons, but I’m not happy about joining the EU.”*

Finally, let us turn to the values of neutrality and national independence. As a matter of fact, these values did not seem to be really important for these students and occurred only in an historical context.

*"Neutrality in 1956 came from the pressure of 'real-politik'. It could not be said explicitly that we really wanted to join NATO."*

*"Replies to the different questions of life in Hungary are always directed against something and not in favor of something. Neutrality in 1956 was declared against the Russians."*

In summary, the group of graduate and undergraduate students regarded Euro-Atlantic integration as something Hungary has to go through for rational, material reasons, forced by objective circumstances. It may bring some advantages, but reservations are justified. These young people showed a rather cold, affected attitude toward the two organizations. In their thinking material values dominated, they considered more spiritual values such as neutrality and national independence as unrealistic and not relevant.

## *2. Group of the politically active*

Members of this focus group were all professionals with degrees in economics, theology, and philosophy. Most of them were opposed to joining NATO and were not very happy about joining the EU, either. Those whose opinions were not so sharply expressed, and who were from a particular point of view pro-NATO, were not too happy, and emphasized our present economic, military and safety affairs that force us to join.

Judgements about NATO cannot be divided along party affiliations. Whether liberal or conservative, communist or right-wings, some opinions about joining were a very definite "no" and in this case respondents voted for neutrality. The other group of opinions can be characterized as "yes, but"; "if, then"; "necessary, because" replies, which showed a certain ambivalence, similar to that of the students. Obviously there is some distrust both toward NATO and the EU. Therefore the importance of neutrality was emphasized. Hungarian historical and cultural values, the strong will of the Hungarian people to survive, and injustices committed against Hungary dominated the argumentation. The daily events of the war and the fear of Serbia attacking Hungary also influenced the participants' replies.

*"During the reign of King Matthias, Hungary was one of the greatest powers in Europe. The Peace Treaty of Trianon resulted in serious consequences and influenced the life of Hungary together with that of the whole of Middle-Europe. If we do not take care of ourselves, we shall be swept away."*

*"I believe in the strength of Hungarian culture, and I know that the Hungarian people within and outside the borders of Hungary will be able to survive in the Carpathian basin. And they do not need any support. When we were supported, it was always disadvantageous and we always had to pay its price."*

The respondents of this group ( first of all those against NATO ) vigorously criticized the media for their one-sided information. They argued that the press, television, and radio

did not help them to make an informed decision, since only the advantages could be read or heard.

*"I am very poorly informed about NATO. I was not supplied with enough information. And what I know, I do not understand a word of it. The government tells only lies even when it puts questions. What I have been told about this topic is not authentic or credible to me."*

The anti-integration voice in this group was quite strong and had very emotional arguments. They felt that this process of joining NATO and the EU is something forced on them.

*"The Swiss and the Danish people have solved this issue very well when they decided it was better for them to be alone."*

*"Hungary differs from the West in its culture, development of its economy and its habits. As to the economy, Hungary should stand on its own feet. And then, if NATO or the EU says, OK, you are welcome, we could join by our own decision without any force. We do not need to toady to them, as we do to the EU."*

*"We always wanted to be neutral, independent and free. We did not want to join anybody. These characteristics are really Hungarian values. And now, when we have achieved the goal of independence, we give up. We feel an undetermined inducement to join NATO. We hated the Warsaw Pact and now we voluntarily join another one. Why? We could manage it alone as well. And let me ask, "Why is NATO more European than the Warsaw Pact used to be?" Instead of one red star, now we have fifty."*

*"A treaty should work on a voluntary basis. In the previous military and economic treaties we were exploited, and to a certain extent NATO is the same."*

Although neutrality was always preferred, it was acknowledged that with respect to the safety of Hungary against her possible enemies, NATO was the only alternative. But its only positive feature was its ability and power to defend us.

*"Serbia has already announced its wish to join the Commonwealth of Independent States of the former Soviet Union. After the years of the Warsaw Pact this was no alternative for us. And now we are on the other side. The Soviet Union, China and the countries around them are practically on the opposite side. And if we have to cope with them, which I hope will not occur, then we have no other choice than NATO. We have to regard it from such a practical point of view."*

*"It would have been good to remain neutral and independent, but we have to understand that in the present economic situation it is impossible. Apart from our geographical situation, neutrality, which we wanted so much, cannot be realized. We are too small, too weak and we need some bigger power behind us."*

NATO membership is already an accomplished fact. In connection with joining the EU, however, the Hungarian people still have a choice. Let us see how members of this focus

group think about joining the European Union. In the argumentation Hungarian interests and self-confidence stay in the foreground.

*"Before joining we have to consider very thoroughly the advantages and disadvantages in connection with the EU membership. We must not join until the EU members accept our most important interests. I mean land ownership, agriculture, and food production, which are very important for Hungary, and they belong to the image of our country. If we could not defend these branches from the negative effects of the EU market, it is not worth joining, because we shall destroy everything that we have already built up."*

Another counter-argument concerns Hungary losing its sovereignty, mainly through economic processes.

*"Yes, there is a problem. Transdanubia has already been sold out. Now the Great Hungarian Plain follows. But I think the Parliament has to pass such bills that prevent this procedure."*

*"If we are members of the EU, we have to give up issuing our own money outright. There will not be the Forint, only the Euro. In the big United States of Europe we shall lose our sovereignty. And we shall be fully subordinated."*

The different culture, habits and norms seem to be important arguments against joining, too. Although such cultural aspects contribute to a self-critical attitude, these differences are attributed by this group mainly to the communist era.

*"Culturally Hungary differs from the West. During the last 40 years of communism everybody had to learn to lie a little bit. This fact has inconvenient effects on the Hungarian way of communication up to our present days. Another difference is that Hungarian people think that certain norms are not compulsory to follow. They may travel without a ticket; they do not want to pay tax, etc. With such non-observance of the norms we cannot join Europe."*

Interestingly enough, personification of NATO seems to be less negative than might have been expected after the discussion. Perhaps the views expressed in the group discussion reflect more an intellectual standpoint, and less an emotional attitude. Also, a critical attitude towards a majority opinion might be a means of presenting themselves as independent-minded intellectuals.

*"NATO is something like Sean Connery. He is accurate, balanced, quiet, self-confident."*

*"NATO is masculine, with a big, strong body. His clothes are regular, and everything is in order on his clothes."*

*"NATO looks like Bill Clinton. He is handsome, quiet, seems to be perfect from all point of view, has respect, but from inside he is morally depraved and corrupt."*

Personification of the EU reveals a cautious, ambivalent attitude. We may remember the picture of a head of household keeping her suspicious eyes on servants. Here are some other personifications:

*"She is a woman and a real bureaucrat, but she is very polite to the clients. In her office everything has its place and she manages the affairs silently but decisively."*

*"The EU is a mixture of different nations. She hasn't got a real character and doesn't know who she is at all. Therefore she is a hermaphrodite. The Germans represents the masculine features, the Southern countries are more feminine. Now she is looking for her real identity."*

In summary, national pride dominated the attitude of this group. Accordingly, in their feelings they were in favor of neutrality, and were suspicious, to say the least, of the benevolence of the West. On the other hand, they acknowledged that Hungary was not able to defend herself in case of aggression, and so, however sad it is, we have to join NATO. A number of cultural and economic reservations were expressed concerning joining the EU, while there was no definite decision either for or against it. It is quite interesting that at the emotional level reactions of this group were more positive toward both NATO and the EU than at the rational level. We may suppose that the strong criticism at the rational level was a kind of self-presentation of the intellectuals.

### III. SUMMARY OF THE FOCUS GROUP RESULTS

#### 1. Overall characterization of the groups

While such small groups of people cannot be validly compared to each other, it is worth enumerating the features that can be tentatively used to characterize them.

- 1 The young people of the Far East group were not knowledgeable about any details of either NATO or the EU, and reflected general, uninformed optimism with some reservations mainly concerning Hungarian agriculture.
- 2 The group of journalists seemed to stick to their 'official' role and gave voice to the government's optimistic interpretations of Hungary's prospects in the two organizations.
- 3 The most critical were the groups of university undergraduates and graduates and the (currently or formerly) politically active, middle-aged intellectuals. The main difference was that the younger people were more rational in their skeptical attitude, and perhaps less pessimistic, while the middle-aged people reacted more emotionally, especially towards NATO, and they saw the future of Hungary in these organizations more gloomily. At the same time, some of this pessimism may be due to the typical intellectual critical attitude, and so part of it may be discounted.

- 4 Remember that the repatriated persons were interviewed individually because they were too suspicious to take part in a group discussion. However, in the interviews they proved to be the most optimistic about Hungary's future in both organizations. Their attitude sometimes seemed to be even naive. One plausible reason is their special psychological situation: as repatriated people they have to be optimistic, otherwise they would be inconsistent in their own, and probably in others' eyes. Another explanation is that they wanted to conform to social expectations — as they perceived them. Of course, the two motivations do not exclude each other.

### 2. *Hungarian values*

All the groups share the same stereotypes about Hungary and relevant Hungarian values such as

- Hungary is an integral part of Europe despite its Asian origins. This position is well deserved and proven by Hungary's role in defending Christian Europe from the Turkish conquests.
- Hungarian people are unusually talented. This claim is supported by various examples from the area of science (for example physics) or culture (for example film).

These stereotypes form a basis for Hungary's claim to be integrated into (Western) Europe. On the other hand there is some self-criticism, as well as reservations about Hungary's maturity as a member.

- Hungary is a poor, small and weak country, economically lagging behind the West, partly or mainly due to the decades spent under communist rule within the Soviet bloc.
- Hungarian people have yet to learn some organizational, communicational and behavioral skills necessary for a successful future in an integrated Europe.

Thus, the dominant values attributed to Hungary are in accordance with its ambition to become an integral part of the European community.

### 1. *Hungary and the West*

There are some commonly held reservations towards European integration based on Hungarian history.

- 1 'Ferry country.' Hungary was oscillating between an Eastern (Russian) and Western (Austrian, German) orientation, but neither brought it much advantage. On the contrary, it was exploited both ways.
- 2 Hungary was left on its own by the West when it was in danger, be it at the hands of

the Tartars, the Turks, or the Russians. The most recent and most painful occasion was the 1956 revolution, when Soviet troops defeated the revolutionaries and the West did not defend Hungary from intervention despite promises given by the United States.

Altogether, the typical attitude towards the West was found to be ambiguous: admiration on one hand and resentment on the other.

### *2. Neutrality*

The stereotypes concerning Hungary's historical relationship to the West outlined above have resulted in a kind of learned helplessness, and this is the background against which the concept of neutrality is viewed. Being independent and neutral is a wish that never had a real chance to be fulfilled. There was only a weak voice in one of the groups (the politically active), which claimed to believe that this time we had a real chance (the referendum about joining NATO), but we missed it once again.

### *3. Hungary and NATO*

The overall attitude to Hungary joining NATO is characterized by a serious ambiguity or ambivalence.

- 3 There is a rational surface level where joining NATO is accepted on such objective, rational grounds as Hungary being a small, economically weak country surrounded by potentially (and historically) inimical nations, and so only a big power can defend her. Therefore, NATO: yes. This level was straightforwardly reflected in the stereotypes disseminated by the media and repeated in the group discussions.
- 4 There is, on the other hand, a deeper, more emotional level, where all the disappointments concerning the U.S. and Western European nations are reflected. Deep in their hearts most respondents have doubts whether NATO really can be trusted (remember 1956). It is also destructive of national pride to admit that Hungary is weak and helpless, and has no other choice than to trust in a power proven to be untrustworthy only decades ago.

The upshot of all these considerations is that Hungary (and the respondents themselves) had no other choice but to say 'yes' to NATO as a necessary evil, but they refuse to be happy or proud about it.

#### 4. *Hungary and the EU*

The EU has more favorable associations than NATO. There seems to be a number of reasons for this:

- 5 The EU is not a military organization, and also relatively new, therefore less painfully associated with negative historical remembrances.
- 6 Joining the EU is a symbolic reinforcement of Hungary's age old national claim of belonging to Europe (as opposed to the East or the Balkans).
- 7 The bulk of negative feelings of resentment has already been put onto NATO and so Hungarian people have disposed of them.
- 8 Both the general and the particular personal experiences of Western Europe are positive, while nobody has any concrete, detailed knowledge about the future possible disadvantages of integration.

The respondents are aware that the consequence of joining the EU is that Hungary will have to give up some of its sovereignty; this price is seen as a fair one. On the other hand also there are reservations. The EU is seen as a very selfish organization, and the chances are that it will exploit Hungary if it is not cautious. And again, the fatalistic attitude: "we have no other choice but to join".

#### 5. *Personification of NATO and the EU*

Understandably, both organizations were personified as autocratic, and neither was seen as really sympathetic:

- 9 NATO was an alien soldier or a powerful politician with both positive and negative traits.
- 10 The EU was a domineering matron looking over the households of European nations.

#### 6. *Relationship with the survey results*

Altogether, the results of the focus group research are consistent with those of the survey and, at the same time, highlight some of the ambiguities. One such ambivalence in the survey results is that the majority supports joining NATO, while agreeing to statements about its probable negative effects. This is at a rational level, where the expected advantages are considered to be greater than the possible disadvantages. The focus groups reinforced this ambivalence, but added to it a strong emotional underpinning. These underlying feelings can be described as disappointment and disillusionment with the West. This negative attitude is set against the rational argument that keeping out of the alliance is too dangerous to our future to risk. This feeling is related to the ambiguities of our na-

tional identity: the survey showed that the proportion of those who regard Hungary as belonging to the West is close to those who deny this.

As to the issue of neutrality, the survey showed that the majority prefers joining NATO to remaining neutral. However, focus groups revealed that neutrality would be much more agreeable, even to those who support joining. There is a relaxed, disillusioned, rational consideration that bends these people toward NATO. In a somewhat mitigated way, the same also holds for overall attitudes toward the EU. The main contribution of the focus groups to the favorable attitude toward Euro-Atlantic integration shown in the survey results is that this support is accompanied with a strong feeling of discontent.

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## NEUTRALITY AND AUSTRIAN IDENTITY: DISCOURSE ON NATO AND NEUTRALITY AS REFLECTED IN PUBLIC OPINION

### 1. Introduction

Neutrality represents a crucial point of orientation for national self-confidence in Austria. Both the State Treaty of 1955 and the notion of perpetual neutrality together constitute the cornerstones of civic education — and even today, Austrian children are still made aware of their meanings from their earliest schooldays: the idea of the country's freedom and independence; of a democratic republic that is the very antithesis of the civil-war experiences, the Nazi regime, annihilation and foreign rule; a state exercising voluntary self-control in the face of its own problematic heritage and traditions. As empirical studies indicate, the idea of neutrality was integral to the consolidation of Austrian patriotic sentiments and still remains constitutive of Austrian identity to this day.

Yet since the democratic change in Eastern Europe, at the very latest, a growing discrepancy has been observed between the ideal and reality (Reinprecht 1995). Prevailing for decades, the country's self-description as neutral and belonging to the West, yet not fully committed to its institutions, seems to remain firmly anchored in public consciousness. The rapidly changing historical-political context, however, has triggered off a lively debate in political discourse on Austria's international position: What sort of status does this country hold after the end of the East-West conflict? What kind of self-understanding governs Austrian participation in the process of European integration? What does the "post-national constellation" (Habermas 1998), the loss of nation-state sovereignty, mean for the national self-image of a small, neutral state "at the heart of Europe"? And what does this mean for a recently consolidated national consciousness?

These issues are indeed a matter of conflict, as shown by Austrian social and political development by the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the new century. In almost any European country, the end of the postwar era was characterized by intense self-interrogation and identity crises. In this country's case, the process consisted of confronting the Second Republic's historical preconditions, especially the Nazi period, and in a lifting of taboos, as far as authoritarian politics and the populist demagoguery of the Right was concerned. Joining the European Union in 1994 marked an important caesura: although accession was approved by two-thirds of the Austrian population, a reactive-defensive pa-

triotism soon emerged to be directed against Union membership. Neutrality, too, has since undergone a certain change in meaning (see Neuhold 1992; Luif 1995 et al). Yet the situation remains contradictory. Crises in the Near East (such as the Gulf War) and in ex-Yugoslavia have made it seem inevitable fundamentally to reassess Austria's role, implying in particular a rejection of the popular definition of neutrality as "permanent non-partiality" (Rotter 1995). Contributions to the current discussion are controversial, ranging as they do from recommendations for neutral politics under stronger parliamentary control (for instance, see Gärtner 1998) to demands for membership in the Atlantic Alliance put forward by politicians adhering to the conservative camp. Yet in the mirror of public opinion, neutrality continues to appear as an esteemed collective good — virtually, as a particular habit of the heart, or even as an "essential trait of the conceptual character of the nation" (Burger 1994, 364). Habits of the heart, however, are not receptive to rational arguments. Rather, such susceptibility would require emotional dissociation or, in a pointed formulation, a slow "weaning" process (Prisching 1995, 72).

## 2. Subjects and structure of this article

The connection between neutrality and national identity will also be discussed in the following contribution: in the first part, recent opinion polls will serve as a basis to represent continuity and change in people's attitudes toward neutrality, with some attention paid to the questions of NATO membership (section 3). The second part of this paper will analyze the capacity of the idea of neutrality to constitute identity (section 4). In this connection, three issues will be centrally important: First, it will be necessary to investigate various aspects of the way people evaluate neutrality with respect to their socio-structural background, which in this case will be facilitated by a secondary analysis of a quantitative survey. The second line of inquiry focuses on the question as to what dimension of national identity — emotional attachment, constitutional patriotism, nationalism — is most strongly linked to attitudes regarding neutrality: Is neutrality a constituent element of emotional attachment to Austria or is it rather a factor of patriotic attitudes or of a nationalistic syndrome? Finally, evaluations of neutrality will be examined in the context of social change: how significant are the fundamental changes in the political framework, such as membership in the European Union, in terms of neutrality and the relation between neutrality and national identity?

The poll results summarized in section 3 have been provided by various institutions operating with significantly divergent questions. For this reason, caution must be exercised in drawing comparisons between the resultant data. Moreover, polls are often carried out on politico-strategic grounds, thus suffering from commercial or (party-)political bias. Nonetheless, they do convey an impression of tendencies in the public.

Data of entirely different kinds are the key to section 4, presenting the results of a secondary analysis based on a representative survey conducted by the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) in 1995. For several years, and in more than twenty countries, representative surveys have been carried out, within the ISSP framework, on a specific set of issues. This endeavor has been supported by a fully standardized questionnaire, developed by an international research team and supplemented by focus areas for each nation. In 1995, the survey concentrated on the "national identity" complex, with a series of complementary questions designed for Austria, addressing such issues as neutrality and NATO membership (for the Austrian results, see Haller 1996).

Unlike pure opinion polls, basic quantitative research in the social sciences seeks to do justice to the complexity and the manifold layers of attitudes prevalent in society. A concept such as national identity, integrating a multitude of ideas, thus calls for measurements performed in terms of more than just one or two statements. Our secondary analysis has the objective of disclosing the structure of a latent complex of attitudes and making visible their interdependent relations.

In the ISSP framework, national identity was operationalized as a multidimensional concept, linking to such relevant items as emotional commitment to the nation and national self-referentiality, to self-exaltation (nationalism and ethnocentrism), and to pride taken in the efficacy of democratic and legal institutions ("constitutional patriotism"). Attitudes regarding neutrality were tested by means of three statements pertaining to two dimensions of neutrality (to be elaborated in the following). This has served to delineate the options arising from (secondary) analysis in a fairly clear fashion. Of course, the concepts and operationalizations applied in secondary analyses have been developed both on the basis of conventions (e.g. the questionnaire being a time-tested tool) and in view of theoretical considerations. The analysis is ultimately dependent on such considerations, since it can only lay claim to plausibility within the framework of a given theoretical model. For this reason, primary research cannot simply be superseded by secondary analysis. An analysis of attitudinal changes with respect to neutrality and NATO membership touches not only on diverse aspects of national identity, but also on socio-political attitudes and value orientations regarding democracy, militarism and authoritarianism related to the issue. Since these crucial aspects could not be examined in the framework of ISSP, in what follows we refrain from analyzing the effects of these factors. Such an analysis must be postponed for future investigations.

### 3. Continuity and change in attitudes toward neutrality

If one wanted to summarize the most important trends in Austrian public opinion, the following picture could be delineated: according to findings of empirical opinion polls,

esteem for neutrality seems to be based primarily on the idea of passivity in military confrontations and “staying out” of international conflicts (see Haerpfer 1998). It is especially among the elderly groups of the population that we find a very positive emotional attachment to neutrality, associated with cherished memories of occupying powers withdrawing from the country in 1955. Yet even in the younger generations, researchers observe a strongly developed awareness of neutrality. Despite the remarkably widespread esteem given to neutrality, however, poll findings are suggestive of increasing doubts that mostly refer to the significance of a neutral status in terms of national security. In particular, there has been a decrease in the percentage of Austrians who are convinced that neutrality would guarantee security in cases of emergency, while possible participation in a military alliance is no longer evaluated as negatively as it used to be in the 1980s. These poll results, however, suggest no increase in support for NATO membership. The majority of the population continues to reject this option and would instead support a reinforced security role to be played by the European Union including Austria.

Looking beneath the surface of this complex picture, the first important finding to be formulated is a difference in the way the historical and the present meanings of neutrality are assessed. Table 1 suggests that the historical role of neutrality generally tends to be evaluated in a very positive sense, appearing to be influenced neither by the historical-political context, nor by ongoing debates on national security. In 1998, in a poll commissioned by the Austrian Society for European Politics and conducted by the “Sozialwissenschaftliche Studiengesellschaft”, 91% of the respondents considered neutrality to have been a historically correct decision. In contrast, evaluations of neutrality in the contemporary political context turn out to be more discriminating. Although 68% believe neutrality to be an indispensable element of the Austrian state concept — a majority of roughly the same percentage considering neutrality to be a continuously valid principle — the very opposite applies to every fourth interviewee: 27% judge neutrality to be obsolete. Those questioned provided skeptical responses to the question whether neutrality would offer security under military threat: 51% had doubts in this regard (Haerpfer 1998). Investigations carried out by other institutions have produced similar results, although, as one might expect, the semantics of the questions have a considerable influence. For example, a poll conducted by the “market-Institut” in 1998 showed that 62% consider neutrality “topical and up-to-date”, whereas 32% feel it is “outdated and superseded”. A majority of 69% concurred in “adhering” to neutrality, while 23% were in favor of “abandoning it” (Beutelmeyer, Seidl & Wührer 1998, 19).

TABLE 1: *Evaluation of the historical and present-day significance of neutrality 1998*  
(percentile results)

	yes	no	don't know
in order to receive a state treaty, Austria had to choose neutrality in 1955, according to the Switzerland model. Was this decision right?	91	4	5
is neutrality an indispensable part of the Austrian concept of state?	68	20	10
is neutrality still a valid principle?	68	27	5
how is Austrian neutrality to be evaluated now?			
does it offer the country protection from military threat?	40	51	9

Round figures (sometimes more or less than 100 %)

Source: SWS/Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik 1998; N=1006

Another important finding can be observed with regard to how approval of the neutrality idea is socially distributed. As repeatedly confirmed, political orientation plays a decisive role in evaluations of neutrality: above-average affinity for neutrality is to be observed among sympathizers of both the Social Democratic (SPÖ) and Green parties. The highest percentage of neutrality skeptics was detected among followers of the FPÖ (the so-called "Freedom Party"). According to the Austrian Society for European Politics survey, 78% of SPÖ sympathizers thought that neutrality represents an indispensable component of the Austrian state concept, whereas the corresponding figure for FPÖ followers was only 57%. In the latter group, there is indeed a relatively strong minority of 10% that is dismissive of the historical significance of neutrality (Haerpfer 1998). What manifests itself in this skeptical attitude toward neutrality is no doubt the altogether critical stance of the FPÖ with regard to the Second Republic's self-understanding, notoriously identified by Jörg Haider as an "ideological monstrosity". An above-average percentage of people with right-wing sympathies — the "People's Party" (ÖVP), alongside the FPÖ — and similarly strong parts of the male and more highly educated population consider neutrality a principle that is no longer valid and historically obsolete. Among those with higher education, the prevailing opinion seems to be that although neutrality once was an historically appropriate decision, it has lost a good deal of its significance in terms of national security. Among women, by contrast, support is solid for neutrality.

Turning to long-term tendencies, we note a change in the significance of neutrality. Sympathy for the idea of neutrality is not simply dropping — in 1992, 80% still held that neutrality was an indispensable component of the Austrian state concept — but the internal differentiation among the population has additionally increased. Thus, according to an investigation of the "Imas-Institut", only 12% of the respondents in 1992 thought that neutrality had become "pointless", rising to 21% by 1998 (*Die Presse*, Sept. 3, 1998) and, according to an opinion poll of the "market-Institut", to 26% in 2001 (*Profil*, Feb. 5,

2001). Over the same time period, the percentage of those convinced of the meaningfulness of neutrality remained relatively stable, oscillating up and down from 62% in 1992 to 59% in 1998 (*Die Presse*, Sept. 3, 1998) and to 69% in 2001 (*Profil*, Feb. 5, 2001). The overall change in sympathies has repeatedly been related to the political turmoil of the late 80s, the collapse of “state socialism” in the communist bloc. A glance at poll results confirms that a change in public opinion had, “quietly and inconspicuously”, become evident by that time. In 1980, for instance, 46% of the Austrians asked about the benefits and disadvantages of perpetual neutrality stated that it only had benefits, 48% seeing it as both beneficial and disadvantageous. But by 1987, 35% were convinced that neutrality only had benefits, whereas 61% saw disadvantages as well (Weninger 1991, 491).

When considering long-term trends, however, we must not overlook the fact that evaluations of neutrality are crucially influenced by current political events, such as Austria's joining the European Union in 1994, the 1999 Kosovo war or the Sept. 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attack on the USA in 2001. Thus, neutrality became less attractive with EU membership. According to investigations carried out by the “Gallup Institut”, the percentage of approvers of preserved neutrality dropped from 81% to 63% over the 1993–96 period. Positive evaluations of neutrality in fact continuously decreased: according to the “Österreichische Gesellschaft für Marketing”, 71% of the interviewees in 1995 were in favor of maintaining neutrality (*Der Standard*, July 17<sup>th</sup>, 1999). An opposite effect was generated by the Kosovo war which, as poll results suggest, gave rise to renewed trust in the country's “old” neutrality. While a mere 57% would have maintained neutrality at the time the war began (March 1999), “Spectra-Institut” inquiries found the figure to be as high as 68% three months thereafter (*Der Standard*, June 11<sup>th</sup>, 1999; see *Die Presse*, July 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1999, for similar findings generated by a “Gallup-Institut” poll). With the dramatic events in Kosovo, a long-term trend seems to have come to a standstill: an investigation carried out by the “Sozialwissenschaftliche Studiengesellschaft” in 1999 revealed a percentage of 55% of people who considered neutrality to be a principle of continuing validity, which is higher than the corresponding figure for 1991 (46%), while the number of those who no longer found neutrality up-to-date and opted for a change in national security policies had noticeably shrunk (1991: 43%, 1999: 33%) (Haerpfer 1999). An increasing support of neutrality could be noticed also in aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11: In a survey, carried out in October 2001 by the “market-Institut”, 75% of the interviewees were convinced that neutrality is extremely important (*Profil*, Oct. 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2001). In the course of the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, opinions have nonetheless tended to become more clear-cut in general, which is why almost twice as many people thought that neutrality should be abandoned in 1999 as in 1991 (7% and 4%), and this tendency continued to increase at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The most powerful vehicles of a “neutrality renaissance” in the late 1990s (and after September 11) turn out to be groups who could fully identify with neutrality as an integral part of the Aus-

trian state concept. According to political affiliation, these groups include sympathizers of the SPÖ and the Greens, alongside pensioners and the majority of women who express little gain from neo-militaristic discourse on armament and NATO membership.

The emergence of crises in Austria's immediate proximity has resuscitated the discussion about how national security should be viewed now that the bipolar postwar constellation has dissolved. In particular, the public debate about "neutrality" vs. "NATO membership" was intensified prior to the 1999 elections to the European Parliament. An increasing sense of uncertainty manifested itself in the course of the debates. Influenced by the experience of the Kosovo war, only 25% of the respondents shared the opinion "that Austria could be under military threat in the near future"; yet 53% deemed it possible "that military conflicts between neighboring states might extend to Austria even if we are not involved" (figures taken from Haerpfer 1999). In this situation, public opinion was divided into two major camps defined by conflicting views on national security. Strengthened by the crises in Southeast Europe, the pro-neutrality group proved stronger (see table 2): In 1999, 58% of the interviewees believed that neutrality provided the best protection, a mere 44% sharing this view in 1998, the year before the Kosovo war. On the other hand, there was a smaller group of Austrians who would have welcomed membership of a military alliance.

As table 2 documents, the latter camp has somewhat decreased as a result of the historical-political events of the time; yet support for NATO and/or WEU has distinctly risen, and the climate of opinion has been accordingly polarized.

TABLE 2: "What can give Austria the best protection?" (percentile figures)

	1998	1999
neutrality	44	58
our army	12	10*
a European alliance for security	21	**
membership in NATO	13	**
membership in a military alliance	**	26
don't know	10	6

\* in 1999, the question read "a well-armed army capable of defending Austria"

\*\* was not asked this year

Source: SWS/Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik 1998 (N=1006) and 1999 (N=1049)

Thus, according to an investigation of the "Gallup-Institut", 15% were in favor of NATO membership, 34% considered accession conceivable, and 45% were absolutely opposed to it by the beginning of the nineties (in 1993) (*Der Standard*, Nov. 11<sup>th</sup>, 1993). At the end of the decade, in 1998, a poll carried out by the Austrian Society for European

Politics already identified 24% who were unconditionally in favor of NATO membership, 25% approved of joining under certain conditions (preservation of "residual neutrality"), and with 40% opposing membership altogether.

Of course, external factors play an especially important role in this issue. The war in Kosovo, in particular, shifted the proponents of NATO membership into a defensive position. According to a poll conducted by the "Spectra Institut" at the beginning of the war (March 1999), 17% of those questioned were in favor and only 39% were absolutely opposed to membership — by the end of the war (July 1999), only 11% were for, and 59% against joining the European Union. The findings of the Austrian Society for European Politics, quoted variously, argue in a similar direction: In the summer of 1999, only 16% of Austrians were in favor of NATO membership, with 54% stating that the country should not enter any military alliance whatsoever, and 12% placing confidence in the Austrian army. At the same time, 25% favored the idea of joining a European military alliance. This study also makes it clear, however, that an overwhelming majority would like to see the EU play a more central role in international security. 78% of the respondents agreed that the European Union should not simply be limited to economic and financial policies, but rather should also attempt to guarantee Europe's security (Haerpfer 1999).

In the aftermath of the attacks on Sept. 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 many people feared terrorism and war. However, this did not lead to a stronger support for NATO membership. According to an opinion poll conducted in September 2001 by "Gallup-Institut", only 21% of the interviewees believed in the protecting role of neutrality; at the same time only 23% spoke for a NATO membership. That the majority of the Austrian population is rejecting this option and supports a strong role of the national government is also confirmed by the Eurobarometer opinion survey. In autumn 2001 (Eurobarometer 56) only 9% believed that decisions about security and defense should be taken by NATO; 41% preferred a leading role of the national government, 31% favored the European Union. Comparison of Eurobarometer surveys shows that the support for a common European defense and security policy has decreased under the impression of the terrorist attacks in September 2001. Whereas in autumn 2000, 65% of the Austrians supported a further integration in the field of common security and defense policy, in autumn 2001 only 57% shared this view. The average for all 15 EU-countries remained unchanged within this period: 73% of the Europeans favor a further integration in this policy field (see also Giller 2001).

The enormous reservations shared by the Austrian population regarding NATO membership become evident in comparison with the countries of East Central Europe (table 3). While in every one of Austria's Eastern European neighbors, including the Slovak Republic, a distinct majority of the population view participation in NATO as beneficial for their population, only 29% of those questioned in Austria share this opinion. For a conspicuously large majority, disadvantages outweigh benefits.

TABLE 3: "Do you think that membership in NATO is beneficial or disadvantageous?"  
(percentile results)

	Poland	Hungary	Czech Republic	Slovak Republic	Slovenia	Austria
Beneficial	74	68	70	59	66	29
Disadvantageous	7	18	18	41	30	59
don't know	20	14	13	0	4	12

round figures (sometimes more or less than 100%)

Source: SWS/Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik 1998

Note: The attitude towards NATO membership in each of these countries is subject to strong fluctuations. The unstable climate of public opinion does not alter the fact that the possibility of NATO membership is evaluated much more negatively in Austria than in the other countries. Thus, table 3 is meant as a snapshot of this circumstance.

How are these poll results to be evaluated? As indicated in qualitative studies (e.g., Wodak et al. 1998; Benke in this volume), neutrality has many facets. It is a doctrine of both the State's political self-definition and of national security, bearing positive connotations that are linked to security and peace, to freedom and sovereignty regained, self-determination, democracy and the welfare state, as well as to Austria's position in the international system. Likewise, neutrality has a strong emotional dimension, which is why it is frequently claimed to have "struck roots in the people's hearts". The circumstance that people enjoying a higher level of education, along with those belonging to younger generations, have distanced themselves from neutrality and are principally open to the idea of NATO membership seems to be indicative of a change in attitudes. Yet in what directions is such change likely to proceed? And what dimensions of the people's attitudes will be affected?

One difficulty in evaluating the above findings derives from the fact that the debates on neutrality and NATO membership are located at different levels of discourse. Emotional discourse barely seems to converge with politico-strategic discourse on the part of the elites. Attitudes towards neutrality seem to express a certain concept of the Austrian nation, often transfigured into an ideal ("Island of the Blest"). Moreover, the symbolic significance shown by neutrality is more of an item of discussion than its political meaning. But on the other hand, the debate about NATO membership, though also touching on symbolic and emotional aspects, primarily concerns the evaluation of a certain conception of national security. If polls have tended to suggest a more sophisticated attitude with regard to neutrality and NATO membership among younger and more highly educated people, this may act to give expression to increasing criticism of an unwritten post-war consensus, according to which neutrality means being impartial and avoiding conflicts. Concerning this issue, unfortunately, there is a scarcity of empirical research results

that would allow for a refined analysis of attitudes toward neutrality, of comparisons between NATO membership and neutrality, or concomitant hypotheses. Incidentally, this scarcity of research findings seems to be less than accidental: Until very recently, neutrality was a powerful taboo (Wodak et al. 1998, 160) in terms of a “tribal legend of the Second Republic” (Bruckmüller 1994, 135).

## 4. National identity and neutrality: Empirical findings

### 4.1 *Concepts and hypotheses*

Should neutrality indeed prove to be a habit of the heart, as political researchers would claim and poll results suggest, then there must be an internal connection between national identity and neutrality that can be empirically measured. The following will discuss this connection on the basis of a representative random sample of the Austrian population, conducted in 1995 in the framework of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). Questions regarding national identity, patriotism and nationalism, as well as attitudes toward immigrants and minorities, were the center of this international research program. A specific research module was designed to capture both current political themes and aspects of Austrian history (the monarchy, inter-war era, National Socialism), in addition to the question of neutrality. The sample size of the Austrian survey totaled  $N=1007$ .

In accordance with international research, the ISSP endeavor operationalized national identity in terms of a multidimensional concept. In the following secondary analysis, national identity will comprise three sub-dimensions — sense of identity, constructive patriotism, and nationalism — which can also be extracted in a theoretically consistent manner as mutually independent factors of statistical analysis. The distinction between these dimensions is conceptual, and it is based on the assumption that national identifications are linked to various contents beyond the mere fact of emotional attachment. Instances of national identification are thus often associated with an overestimation or idealization of one's nation, such cases being referred to in terms of a nationalistic attitude syndrome. Yet they may also fulfill a positive function in establishing a basis for trust in the community, for a commitment to democratic norms and institutions, and for a collective self-understanding beyond nationalistic arrogance and ethnic intolerance. Scholars have variously referred to such “nation-affirming” behavior as “constructive patriotism” (Staub & Bar-Tal 1997) or “constitutional patriotism” (“Verfassungspatriotismus”, see Habermas 1990; Sternberger 1990).

One premise found in the research literature is that patriotism, as a “nation-affirming” system of convictions, is always based on positive emotional commitment, whereas this does not necessarily apply to nationalistic attitudes (aggressive nationalism is often cou-

pled with emotional indifference). Both patriotism and nationalism, however, are based on establishing differences, that is, of a dividing line between “we” and “the others”. Collective symbols, a common language, and instances of ritualization tend to stabilize the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. A destructive effect may arise when (artificial) in-group unity or (likewise artificial) inter-group differences are overemphasized. The crucial question therefore seems to be whether it is possible to cherish constructive patriotism without a notion of enemies or hatred for foreigners — and whether loyalty to a nation-state is necessary, or at all possible, under the conditions of late modernity. Indeed, several authors believe that the destructive potential of nationalism is inherent to each and every form of national commitment.

As a habit of the heart, attitudes toward neutrality should correlate with both positive emotional commitment and patriotic pride, yet not with a nationalistic mind (neutrality is scarcely suited to function as an aggressive, ethnocentric concept). Haller (1996) also sees neutrality as an essential component of Austrian identity — failing to distinguish, however, between historical and current, political neutrality, even though this author’s indicators would seem to suggest such a differentiation. At any rate, the differentiation is particularly important from our point of view, assuming that these dimensions are variously related to such concepts as the sense of identity, patriotism or nationalism. Therefore, evaluations of the historical significance of neutrality are regarded as strongly linked to a positive sense of identity and patriotism, while this connection is probably looser in the context of current political debates.

#### *4.2 Social and political background of the evaluation of neutrality*

The ISSP framework operationalized the concept of neutrality by means of the following items: “Owing to Austria’s consistent politics of neutrality, the country managed to secure much international reputation after World War II”; “Basically, neutral countries are nothing but ‘free loaders’ who are protected by other countries’ security efforts”; and “Today, after the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War, neutrality has lost its meaning”. It is not difficult to recognize that these three items cover two distinct dimensions of attitudes toward neutrality: The first item unequivocally concerns the historical implications of neutrality, whereas the second and third are relevant for the current meaning and sense attached to the question of neutrality (see table 4).

TABLE 4: *Attitudes toward neutrality* (percentile results)

	1+2*	3**	4+5***	don't know	X
owing to Austria's consistent politics of neutrality, the country managed to secure much international reputation after World War II	84	7	2	7	1.6
basically, neutral countries are nothing but "free loaders" who are protected by other countries' security efforts	23	17	42	18	3.3
today, after the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the end of Cold War, neutrality has lost its meaning	23	13	53	11	3.8

Answers on a five-point scale: 1 = I fully agree, 5 = I don't agree at all

\* 1+2 = approval

\*\* 3 = neutral attitude ("neither — nor")

\*\*\* 4+5 = disapproval

X = mean value

Source: ISSP 1995; N=1007; calculation by the authors

The distribution of the attitudes fully corresponds to the poll findings quoted in the first sections of this study. According to these results, an overwhelmingly large part of the respondents identify with the historical significance of neutrality, and only few of them are indifferent or negative. With regard to the other two items, however, the picture is entirely different: almost one in four affirms the statement that neutral countries are just "free loaders", an argument that was frequently used by people opposed to neutrality in the mid-90s. The percentage of those who approve of neutrality is 42%; however, nearly one in five interviewees chose to refrain from responding. Likewise, the view that neutrality has become meaningless after the collapse of the Soviet bloc is held by every fourth respondent. Responding to this question, 53% turned out to be strong proponents of neutrality; but about every tenth respondent answered with "don't know".

Brought to bear on the current neutrality debate, these findings are indicative of a differentiated, yet uncertain and unstable climate of public opinion. Is it possible analytically to identify specific sociopolitical milieus as primary sources of support for the idea of neutrality? As far as the historical dimension is concerned, we observe a merely weak influence deriving from such socio-demographic variables as age, sex, education, income, occupational status, community size or political orientation. Thus, there are somewhat more people in their thirties who express a distanced attitude (13% answered with the "neither — nor" category), while the opposite is true for Austrians in their sixties (95% approval). Political party preferences are also key factors (see table 5): adherents of the SPÖ show the highest level of identification with neutrality (96%), whereas the strongest skepticism appears to prevail among those of the FPÖ (84%). Sympathizers of the ÖVP, the Greens and the Liberals can be located between these two extremes. However, it is important to note that the statistical connection between evaluations of neutrality and

age is altogether quite weak (with a correlation coefficient of Pearson  $-.13$ ), whereas the correlation with political orientations is virtually deficient (see table 6). Complex analytical tools (multiple regression) also confirm the fact that lower age tends to influence negatively the evaluation of neutrality, yet socio-demographic variables only explaining 1% of the variance. This would imply that evaluations of historical neutrality have almost entirely detached themselves from social and political milieus and now represent general opinions.

TABLE 5: *Evaluation of neutrality according to party preference* (approval in percent)\*

	SPÖ	ÖVP	FPÖ	Greens	Liberals
owing to Austria's consistent politics of neutrality, the country managed to secure much international reputation after World War II	96	88	84	87	89
basically, neutral countries are nothing but "free loaders" who are protected by other countries' security efforts	23	35	41	21	33
today, after the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the end of Cold War, neutrality has lost its meaning	24	32	33	23	40

\* answers on a 5-point scale 1 = I fully agree, 5 = I don't agree at all; approval = 1+2; unlike table 3, "don't know" responses have here been excluded from analysis

Source: ISSP 1995; N=1007; calculations by the authors

When it comes to evaluating the role played by neutrality in the current political contexts, the factor of age disappears, while party sympathies and positions occupied in the left-right scale together acquire greater significance. Thus, those who consider themselves to be right-wing, approve of statements criticizing neutrality significantly more often than others. As far as party preference is concerned, evidence is once again clear for the neutrality-affirming attitude of Social Democrat sympathizers, as opposed to the critical opinion of those sympathizing with the Freedom Party: Only 23% of the SPÖ sympathizers affirm the "free loaders" thesis, whereas the rate is 41% among followers of the FPÖ (table 5). The figures are 24% and 33%, respectively, for the thesis that neutrality has lost its meaning. Interestingly, with regard to the contemporary role played by neutrality, the tendencies are more pronounced among sympathizers of the Greens and the ÖVP than with respect to the historical significance of neutrality: 35% of the ÖVP sympathizers and 21% of the Greens agree with the "free loaders" thesis, with 32% and 23%, respectively, stating that neutrality has lost its meaning. To sum up, followers of the ÖVP, unlike those of the FPÖ, think highly of the historical significance of neutrality, but nonetheless would encourage a change in policies under the current circumstances. By contrast, Greens tend to be more reserved about the historical implications of neutrality, while evaluating its contemporary role positively. Furthermore, the analysis supports a

conclusion already confirmed by opinion polls, namely, that men are more likely than women to agree with the thesis that neutrality has lost its meaning (see table 5).

As soon as the analysis goes beyond a merely descriptive level, however, it also becomes clear that the tendencies described above should not be overestimated as to their significance. Thus, the correlation matrix in table 6 shows a connection between the "free loaders" thesis and political preference that is relatively weak (Pearson  $-.18$ ). But further analysis reveals that a mere 3% of the variance of this attitude is explained by socio-demographic variables — of which political orientation is the only one to have any important influence (a left-wing orientation has a negative effect on this item). Significant correlations only emerge with respect to the thesis that neutrality has become meaningless after the collapse of Soviet communism: correlations with income (Pearson  $.16$ ) and political orientation (Pearson  $-.14$ ), slightly weaker with sex (Pearson  $.10$ ), and tenuously with education (Pearson  $-.09$ ). This seems to indicate that this is the item that most powerfully measures the change in attitudes and that the evaluation of neutrality amid an altered political framework is more strongly differentiated according to socio-structural features. But even here the explanatory power shown by these factors of influence is fairly modest. No more than 5% of the variance of attitudes can be explained in terms of socio-demographic variables, the most significant role being played by political orientation, less significant ones by personal income and sex, and none by education. By consequence, left-wing orientation, low income, and being a woman are variables that tend to exert a negative effect on approval for this thesis.

TABLE 6: *Evaluation of neutrality and socio-demographic variables* (correlation coefficients)

	Sex	Age	Education <sup>1</sup>	Income <sup>2</sup>	Political orientation <sup>3</sup>
owing to Austria's consistent politics of neutrality, the country managed to secure much international reputation after World War II	-	-.13	-	-	-
basically, neutral countries are nothing but "free loaders" who are protected by other countries' security efforts	-	-	-	-	-.18
today, after the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the end of Cold War, neutrality has lost its meaning	.10	-	-.09	.16	-.14

significant  $p < .01$

1 highest school degree obtained

2 personal net income

3 answers distributed along a 10-point scale, 1 = far left, 10 = far right

Source: ISSP 1995; N=1007; calculation by the authors

In summary we may say that education (measured according to the highest level of personal education) and age evidently have a much smaller influence upon the evaluation of neutrality than one might have supposed on the basis of available poll findings. On the other hand, there has expectedly proved to be a connection with political orientation, especially in the context of the discussion concerning the current role of neutrality. The political "camps" generally function as milieus that advocate positive evaluations of the idea of neutrality. The altogether small explanatory power of socio-demographic variables would indicate that neutrality is more closely linked to attitudes and values relating to society, including the relation to Austria. The next section will focus on this connection between neutrality and national identity.

#### *4.3 Neutrality as a component of national identity*

The hypothesis that neutrality is an important component of national identity was put to the test by means of complex statistical procedures. We attempted to identify connections between the latent constructs of "national identity" and "neutrality". In this connection, it proved necessary to represent the interdependence maintaining between the components which are essential for this inquiry — the various dimensions of national identity as well as the two dimensions of the concept of neutrality. The analysis proceeds in two steps: first, the connection is analyzed between the constructs of "national identity" and "neutrality", and second, the change of attitudes with regard to political neutrality is focused on in connection with attitudes toward the European Union.

As mentioned above, our analysis sees national identity as comprising three sub-dimensions: sense of identity, constructive patriotism and nationalism. Sense of identity always shows some relation to strong, emotional, national attachment, however the nation itself may be defined. Sense of national identity was examined with the following questions: "to what extent do you feel attached to Austria?"; "how strongly do you feel attached to Austrian nationhood?"; and "how important is it to you to feel Austrian?". Finally, the answers were distributed along a four-point scale (from very strong/very important to not strong/not important).

Constructive patriotism is an individual attitude characterized by positive identification with, and critical distance to one's nation (Blank & Schmidt 1997; Staub & Bar-Tal 1997; Sternberger 1990). In the ISSP and other such surveys, patriotism is frequently operationalized as a dimension of national pride in view of certain collective goods, such as democracy, social welfare, the country's international prestige or economic success. In other research, patriotism is more strongly defined in terms of emotional commitment to one's nation (Weiss & Reinprecht 1998). The present analysis applies the ISSP indicators, measuring constructive patriotism with respect to questions concerning pride taken in "the way democracy functions", "Austria's political influence in the world", "eco-

conomic success" and "the achievements of the welfare state". Once again, a four-point answer scale has been used (ranging from "very proud" to "not at all proud").

Unlike constructive patriotism, nationalism involves an idealized and hence uncritical overestimation of one's own nation, together with a negative valuation of the foreign (Weiss & Reinprecht 1998). Nationalism and national arrogance (chauvinism) give rise to statements such as "overall, Austria is a better country than most others"; "everyone ought to support their country even if that country is wrong"; and "whenever my country succeeds in international sports, that makes me feel proud to be Austrian". The answers were measured applying a five-point scale (ranging from "I fully agree" to "I do not at all agree").

Figure 1 shows the results of the analysis,<sup>1</sup> clearly confirming the assumed connection between historical neutrality and national identity. Historical neutrality has proven to be a key component both of emotional commitment to Austria ( $r = -.35$ ) and of a nationalistic attitude syndrome marked by an overestimation of the Austrian nation ( $r = -.34$ ), whereas the connection with constructive patriotism is somewhat less strongly pronounced ( $r = -.29$ )<sup>2</sup>. As one might expect, the two dimensions of neutrality (current political and historical) strongly correlate with one another ( $r = .40$ ).


However, it seems important to note another meaningful insight: the current-political concept of neutrality appears to have no significant connection with the three sub-dimensions of national identity. This would imply that the ongoing debate concerning the role of neutrality has detached itself from attitudes toward the nation. While historical neutrality is highly significant in terms of emotional commitment to the nation, this does not apply to the present situation. In other words, the debate about the meaning and advantage of neutrality for contemporary Austrian society has virtually no bearing on the country's national self-understanding.

The analysis shows the obviously large contribution historical neutrality makes to an idealized self-understanding of the Austrian nation, representing as it does a crucial element in the national narrative structure of the Second Republic. This impression is confirmed by analyzing the attitudes that refer to history, especially to country's role in the Second World War, which have been investigated in the context of the ISSP. What this investigation has shown is that commitment to historical neutrality is closely connected to an attitude toward the past, including the Nazi regime, that tends to be uncritical. This serves to explain why such commitment shows a stronger correlation with nationalistic

1 The present analysis tests for the measurement quality of particular indicators by means of confirmatory factor analysis, correlations between the latent constructs additionally becoming visible. The estimated coefficients were calculated with the LISREL8.30 program (Joreskog/ Sörbom, 1988), by using polychoric correlation matrices and asymptotic covariance matrices as weighting factors. In view of the oblique distribution of the data and the ordinal scaling, the WLS (Weighted Least Squares) method was used as an estimation procedure.

2 The negative signs are product of the opposite item's scaling.

Figure 1: Confirmatory factor model: Neutrality, patriotism and emotional attachment to the nation (standardized solution)



Legend:

NATID = sense of identity, comprising variables V 56 (“to what extent do you feel attached to Austria?”); V117 (“how strongly do you feel attached to Austrian nationhood?”); and V70 (“how important is it to you to feel Austrian?”)

NAT = nationalism, comprising variables V74 (“overall, Austria is a better country than most others”); V75 (“everyone ought to support their country, even if that country is wrong”); and V76 (“whenever my country succeeds in international sports, that makes me feel proud to be Austrian”)

PAT = (constructive) patriotism, comprising variables V77 (“proud of the way democracy functions”); V78 (“proud of Austria’s political influence in the world”); V79 (“proud of economic success”); and V80 (“proud of the achievements of the welfare state”)

NEUTR1 = historical neutrality, comprising the (reversed-polarity) variable V 339 (“owing to Austria’s consistent politics of neutrality, the country managed to secure much international reputation after the Second World War”)

NEUTR2 = neutrality in the current political context, comprising variables V340 (“basically, neutral countries are nothing but ‘free loaders’ who are protected by other countries’ security efforts”) and V341 (“today, after the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War, neutrality has lost its meaning”)

Chi-Square=90.31, df=55, P-value=0.00189, RMSEA=0.032

The model has been well confirmed with a goodness of fit index (GFI) of .990 and an adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) of .984. In addition, other statistical measures of inference calculated for the goodness of the model (such as  $\chi^2 = 90.3$ ,  $df=55$ ,  $RMSEAs=0.032$  and  $RMR=0.046$ ) confirm compatibility between the data and model structure.

than with constitutional-patriotic attitudes which are primarily based on identification with a modern and democratic Austrian state. Historically, the idea of neutrality has decisively contributed to a positive sense of nationhood pertaining to the Second Republic. This required a clear dissociation from the problematic past for which people failed to feel responsible — but on the other hand, this was not necessarily accompanied by a clear commitment to democracy. The state doctrine of perpetual neutrality made it easier “to steal out of history” and fail to acknowledge historical responsibility. Perhaps this is not the least important reason to consider (historical) neutrality more in terms of a mythical, historicizing figure of thought than as a constructive patriotic mind-set.

#### *4.4 Neutrality in the process of social change*

At the end of the century, poll results indicate a change in attitudes toward neutrality. The results of our analysis have so far shown that the generational effect — a frequently used indicator of social change — plays only a minor role in this context. To be sure, this effect becomes manifest in evaluations of the historical significance of neutrality, yet the connection is rather weak, such that age and other socio-structural variables show a minor explanatory power.

The following section will therefore attempt to examine the change in attitudes toward neutrality as linked to those with regard to EU membership and Austria's role in the European Union. This procedure appears justified insofar as joining the EU has opened a new chapter in the country's history, giving rise to far-reaching consequences for its international and security position.


The ISSP questionnaire contained two questions that are relevant to this set of problems. They addressed the process of joining the EU, which took place a year before the ISSP survey, and Austria's future role: Should Austria “enter into full unity with the European Union” or rather “secure the country's independence within the European Union”?

Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate that connections are causal between approval or rejection of EU membership and the attitude concerning the meaningfulness of neutrality in the current political context. The same applies to preference for maintaining Austria's sovereignty within the Union and the idea of neutrality in the current political context (Gamma = .25 and .31, respectively). In particular, this suggests that those who opposed EU membership and/or supported the maintenance of Austrian sovereignty within the EU tend to give preference to preserving neutrality (the amount of explained variance is 21.4% and 22.1%, respectively). By contrast, opinions concerning the historical meaning of neutrality seem to have little significance in this respect. In other words, positive or negative evaluations of historical neutrality do not influence attitudes toward the European Union (and vice versa).

At the same time, the structural models enable us to recognize the strong influence ex-

erted by the historically formed idea of neutrality upon the development of contemporary attitudes toward neutrality (.41 and .33, respectively). This supports the insight according to which the contemporary discussion concerning neutrality is shaped by mythical and historicizing ideas that, as Rudolf Burger (1994, 364) has argued, make a "fetish" of neutrality. As long as the discussion fails to dissociate itself from the myth of historical neutrality, however, such a taboo may well hinder the transition to a dynamic function of neutrality — a function that would be based on a constant revision of Austria's position within the international community of states without necessitating a renunciation of the idea of neutrality. Another remarkable feature is the significant causal relationship that obtains between historical neutrality and emotional attachment to the nation, and that can be recognized in both models. Once again, the immense importance shown by the neutrality construct for Austrians' emotional attachment to the nation becomes visible (-.43 and -.38, respectively) and is reflected in the quantity of explained variance (19.9% and 17%, respectively). On the other hand, attitudes toward the EU have no significant effect on the sense of identity.

Figure 2: Structural equation model: Emotional attachment, approval of EU membership, historical neutrality, and neutrality in the contemporary political context (standardized solution)



Legend:

NATID = national feeling (see fig. 1 for detailed explanations)

NEUTR1 = historical neutrality (see fig. 1 for detailed explanations)


NEUTR2 = neutrality in the contemporary political context (see fig. 1 for detailed explanations)

EUZU = attitude toward EU membership, comprising variable V310 ("were you in favor of Austria's becoming an EU member state?"); this item was coded as a dummy variable

Chi-Square=23.83, df=11, P-value=0.01345, RMSEA=0.039

GFI=0.996, AGFI=0.990, RMR=0.037

Figure 3: Structural equation model: Emotional attachment, approval of full integration into the EU, historical neutrality, and neutrality in the contemporary political context (standardized solution)



Chi-Square=19.59, df=11, P-value=0.05128, RMSEA=0.032

GFI=0.955, AGFI=0.982, RMR= 0.030.

Legend:

NATID = national feeling (see fig. 1 for detailed explanations)

NEUTR1 = historical neutrality (see fig. 1 for detailed explanations)

NEUTR2 = neutrality in the contemporary political context (see fig. 1 for detailed explanations)

EUUNB = Austria's role in the European Union, comprising variable V120 ("which of the following statements do you more strongly agree with?": (a) "Austria should do everything it can to unite entirely with the European Union"; (b) "Austria should do everything to secure the country's independence within the European Union"); this item was coded as a dummy variable.

## 5. Summary and prospects

The empirical analyses confirm a key function held by the idea of historical neutrality in the constitution of Austrian identity, while at once revealing the broad extent to which current ideas of neutrality are impacted under the sway of prevailing forms of thinking. The public discussion about the future of neutrality is taking place against the background of the historical neutrality model — a model that is more closely connected with feelings of national identity and attitudes of collective arrogance than with democratic patriotism. This is no less remarkable than the fact that no significant causal connection can be detected between emotional attachment to the country and evaluations of the meaningfulness of neutrality in the current political context. This indicates that public discourse is less concerned with neutrality as a concept of national security than with safeguarding a myth. We argue that a redefinition of Austria's international role — including

its concept of neutrality — will not prove feasible, therefore, until current political discourse detaches itself from this mythical pattern of thought. Let us emphasize once again that critical opinions concerning neutrality do not automatically imply approval for NATO membership. Indeed, the available data indicate a discriminating structure of attitudes (although the discussion itself is not always conducted in a differentiated manner), while, for whatever reasons, many people have still failed to form a coherent opinion.

There has been much speculation in recent years about an impending change in Austria's self-understanding, brought about by the new century. The 1986 Waldheim Affair, the great historical-political turning point of 1989, the 1994 accession to the European Union, along with the wars in ex-Yugoslavia, altogether mark important milestones in this process of redefining Austrian identity. Yet it has become evident, at the very latest since the turbulent change of government in the winter of 2000, that Austrians' notion of their country is in need of a fundamental correction. This involves a dissociation from the old definition of neutrality reflected in the desire to "stay out", "be uninvolved", and "be impartial". It is painful to realize that, once again after the Waldheim Affair, "proving attention" paid by the international arena was what reminded Austria of responsibilities for its past and present. This experience has made it clear, however, that Austria's identity in a "cooperative Europe" (Ralf Dahrendorf) can only be based on a vigorous civil democratic culture and the rule of law alike — and neither on nationalistic attitudes nor historical ideologies. Indeed, the concept of historical neutrality ultimately represents such an ideology, even though it persists as the main scale of orientation for many Austrians.

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## NATO AND HUNGARIAN PUBLIC OPINION

If we look back at the decades of Communist rule in Hungary, we are probably right to conclude that, of all the consequences of the post-war Communist take-over, it was Hungary's political and military dependence on the Soviet Union that the Hungarian public was least able to accept. Although from the mid-1960s the administration's efforts to pacify society did achieve some kind of internal acceptance, the legitimacy of the whole system remained in doubt throughout the period. This was because the Kadar system's legitimacy was rooted in the suppression of the 1956 revolution, an event that the majority of society had experienced as a struggle for national independence. The regime was never able to free itself from this stigma despite the fact that, from the 1960s, it began gradually to abandon the Stalinist policies of total control of society and constant interference in the everyday lives of the general public, and made numerous concessions to individuals who wished to achieve a peaceful existence in the private sector after the political frustration of the post-1956 period. Over many years, this more moderate policy was rather successful, and there are still numerous signs (as well as public opinion research evidence) indicating a considerable amount of nostalgia on the part of contemporary Hungarian society for the etatist paternalism of the latter years of the Kadar regime. For sections of society struggling with the difficulties of the transition and finding it difficult to adapt to the capitalist system, the idealized image of the wise, provident, but in everyday life non-interfering state continues to have an effect on political sympathies, views, and party choices. Nevertheless, one of the fundamental elements of the old system — a *sine-qua-non* of its existence — is missing from this nostalgic and idealized impression: membership of a military and political bloc dominated by the Soviet Union.

The majority of Hungarian society clearly experienced Hungary's membership of the Soviet system — including the Warsaw Pact and COMECON — as a restriction of the country's independence and its right to self-determination. Hungarians tended to think that their ability to lead lives free of politics and the relatively favorable economic situation had been established *in spite of* the given framework of conditions. Indeed, much of society believed that the country's dependence on the Soviet Union was the only obstacle preventing the continuation and extension of reforms. This resulted in many unfulfilled expectations in the initial period of the transition: many people wrongly thought that, freed from the yoke of the eastern alliance, Hungary would immediately begin to enjoy western levels of affluence.

The fact that membership of the Soviet alliance was unable to achieve even the limited degree of legitimacy of other policy areas of the system was due to a number of factors. The first of these was undoubtedly the suppression of the 1956 revolution and the circumstances that gave rise to the Kadar regime. Despite an improvement in the internal political atmosphere, the feeling of being at the mercy of the Soviet superpower was kept alive by such dramatic events as the Cuban missile crisis, the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the constant military threat against the opposition movements in Poland during the years of the Solidarity movement. Moreover, the wars fought by the Soviet Union and its allies in the third world (Afghanistan, Angola) repeatedly raised the possibility of Hungary's involvement in military conflicts in which it had no interest whatsoever.

Nevertheless, the fact that people were aware of the country's lack of national self-determination did not mean automatically the existence of a widely accepted vision of Hungary's place in the international system. There was nothing that one might compare with the vision of German unity in both halves of Germany. In general, public opinion tended to support the idea of neutrality as against dependence on the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, neutrality had few political traditions in Hungary: the idea became popular for practical considerations alone. In the first half of the 1950s, Hungarian public opinion watched with great interest both the implementation of Communist Yugoslavia's policy of self-determination and the development of Austria's neutral status. It saw in the former an example of a Communist government that was able to renounce total dependence on the Soviet Union without losing political control and, at the same time, enjoying the support of the West. In the latter, meanwhile, it saw proof that it was indeed possible for a country occupied by the Red Army at the end of the war to change its international status. In 1956 it was probably these two examples that both Imre Nagy's government and the leading revolutionaries had in mind when they decided upon neutrality as the main aim of Hungarian foreign policy.<sup>1</sup>

After the suppression of the revolution the symbolic significance of neutrality continued to strengthen. This process was enhanced by the disappointment felt by Hungarians after the revolution, owing to the passivity of the West and its failure to offer assistance during the revolution. The idea of neutrality became popular once again with the appearance of small political opposition groups after 1976 who regarded a policy of neutrality or "Finlandization" as the most realistic aim of foreign policy in the long term. They hoped to attain to a status quo in a distant future in which, in return for full domestic autonomy, Hungary would voluntarily take into consideration and realize the interests of the Soviet Union when formulating its foreign policy. Even after the Soviet system had begun to collapse, Hungarians continued to regard the possibility of membership of the Western alliance as highly unlikely and as a most dangerous demand. Thus, even in the late 1980s, such ideas were still absent from all the written manifestos

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1 See Borbala Juhasz' essay in this volume.

of the opposition parties and movements. The opposition hoped to achieve greater maneuverability in foreign policy by avoiding security policy issues, and their policy was characterized by, if anything, the idea of self-limiting independence.

We may conclude from the above that when, with the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the abrogation of the Warsaw Treaty, the earlier barriers were removed, and it became clear that a crisis-ridden Russia would be unable to prevent its former allies from co-operating with the western military alliance. The only certainty in the eyes of Hungarian politicians was that the majority of Hungarian society supported their efforts to lead Hungary out of the eastern alliance. Nevertheless, they could not be sure how the population would react to a policy of integration with the West (EU and NATO) once the illusion of a rapid economic transition had been dispelled and under conditions of widespread regional conflict and growing nationalism. Other parts of this volume have revealed the strategies used by the politicians to promote a general acceptance of NATO membership. This study examines the other side of the issue, namely the reaction of public opinion to the political offer of NATO membership.

When examining the ways in which public opinion was persuaded to accept accession to NATO, we sought answers to a number of questions. Firstly, of course, we wanted to find out whether public opinion in the country really did support the decision of the politicians to join NATO, or whether by not participating in the referendum on NATO membership the majority of voters were in fact expressing their rejection of membership.<sup>2</sup> We were also curious to discover how many people who opposed NATO membership were supportive of clear alternatives, that is, how many people wished the country to be neutral and how many people belonged to some kind of anti-Western camp.

Apart from registering the respective sizes of these groups and defining them in social and demographic terms, we sought also to answer two other important questions: whether the positions held by respondents were based mainly on current political considerations and factors, or whether they could be explained by deep-rooted socio-political attitudes. In addition, we also examined whether, in public opinion, Hungary's integration into the western military structures was linked in some way to the identity debates about Hungary's place in the world.<sup>3</sup>

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
2 49.24% of eligible voters took part in the referendum on 16 November 1997, and 85.33% of those who took part voted for NATO membership.

3 In the course of a public opinion survey in February 1999 staff at Gallup/Hungary personally interviewed 1000 people, who formed a representative sample of Hungary's adult population in terms of gender, age, domicile, and education. I am indebted to György Fischer and Róbert Manchin for providing me with the data of the earlier Gallup surveys on NATO membership. Funding for this research was provided by: Országos Tudományos Kutatási Alap (TO25643 projekt), Wittgenstein Forschungsschwerpunkt "Diskurs, Politik, Identität", Vienna, and the Soros-Foundation Research Scheme, Prague. I am indebted to Kata Csizér for her assistance in the analysis of the data.

## 1. Public opinion on NATO membership

Since Hungary was already a member of NATO at the time of the survey, respondents were asked retrospectively how they would vote if the referendum were to be held now. More than two-thirds of participants in the survey (69%) stated that they would now vote for accession to NATO, 21% said they would vote against NATO membership, while 10% were unable to decide how they might vote. These results show that support for NATO membership among the adult population has increased since the referendum.

DIAGRAM 1: *Support for Hungary's NATO membership among the adult population between 1994 and 1999*



As diagram 1 illustrates, during the five years before our survey, support for NATO membership among the population increased steadily, although the curve contains several significant fluctuations. The arrival of the first NATO troops in Hungary (at the beginning of 1996) resulted in a reduction in support, while the Madrid summit (1997), which was portrayed as a great triumph of Hungarian foreign policy, was followed by a dramatic increase in support: it was at this summit that the NATO countries accepted Hungary's application to join the organization. The ensuing political campaign in Hungary, the goal of which was to spread information about NATO and to win acceptance of membership, resulted in a steady increase in support for membership. The data from the survey also demonstrate a link between knowledge of NATO and choice. When asked to choose between several alternatives, 62% of respondents correctly identified the group of countries constituting NATO as well as the functions of the organization (the ratio was 68% for a similar question concerning the European Union). Analysis of the data showed that support for NATO membership is higher than average among well-informed people and lower than average among uninformed people: Hungary's NATO membership was sup-

ported by 75% of those who correctly selected both definitions, while just 53% of those who stated both definitions wrong were in favor of accession.

Growing support for NATO membership is demonstrated by the answers of respondents with regard to majority opinion in the country: at the time of the referendum, 55% of respondents thought that the majority of the country supported accession, while by the time of the survey in February 1999, this ratio had risen to 62%.

There was little change in the relationship between majority and minority opinion even when we posed the question in a different way, namely when we offered the choice of neutrality as an alternative to NATO membership. When we did this, 60% of respondents chose NATO membership and just 32% neutrality (the others took no position). If we consider the answers to the two questions together, we find that in both cases 58% of those surveyed chose the pro-NATO answer, while in both cases 18% rejected NATO. The proportion of inconsistent respondents was also 18% (6% took no position on either question).

All this demonstrates that in the period before the Kosovo war the majority of the Hungarian population really did support the Hungarian government's decision to join NATO.<sup>4</sup> Survey data from the last years show that despite of short term fluctuations the support of NATO membership permanently grew in Hungary. In June 2002 71% of the adult population agreed with the country's membership in the organization and only 18% opposed it.<sup>5</sup>

## 2. Supporters and opponents of NATO membership

If we seek to characterize the groups of supporters and opponents of NATO membership on the basis of socio-demographic variables, we find that there are surprisingly few variables clearly distinguishing the two groups. In general we may state (see diagrams 2 and 3) that support for NATO is greater among young people, males, the more educated, and inhabitants of larger towns in country areas (county seats) than among members of


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4 In the time of NATO intervention in Kosovo the Hungarian public opinion showed a strong fluctuation: on March 26, 1999 66% of the interviewees supported the NATO action, until May this proportion went back to 50%, and in June the proportion of the supporters was 53% of the adult population. (see The Gallup Kosovo Page, <http://www.gallup.hu>). After the end of the Kosovo action the first Gallup survey was carried out in December 1999. In this time the question sounded slightly different: the researchers asked whether NATO membership is advantageous or disadvantageous for Hungary. According to the results 73% of the adult population thought that NATO membership is advantageous and 11% that it is disadvantageous for Hungary. (See <http://www.gallup.hu>).

5 The survey on a representative national sample of 1000 interviewees was carried out by the TÁRKI Institute in Budapest.

other socio-demographic groups. However, these differences are statistically significant in only a few cases — for instance, place of residence and level of education.<sup>6</sup> If we compare support for NATO membership with support for neutrality, we receive the same results, but here there is also a significant difference between the two genders ( $\chi^2 = .04$ ): in this case 32% of men took a position against NATO and for neutrality, while 38% of women chose neutrality.


DIAGRAM 2: *Supporters of NATO membership by demographic data II.*



In the debates surrounding NATO membership and during the campaign preceding the referendum, the political parties often clearly expressed their positions on the issue. For this reason, we may suppose that party preferences did influence opinions on NATO. Perhaps they did so in such a way that supporters of parties arguing in favor of NATO membership were more likely to support Hungary's accession to NATO. Indeed, this hypothesis is supported by the data in Table 1.<sup>7</sup>

6 The results of the  $\chi^2$  test in the two cases was: .01 and .04. The survey results from 2002 show a very similar picture. NATO membership is significantly more supported by men, by the inhabitants of Budapest and by the educated, politically active groups of the population.

7 The governmental coalition at the time of the survey in Hungary consisted of three parties: the liberal conservative Alliance of Young Democrats — Hungarian Civic Party (FIDESZ-MPP), and the conservative Independent Smallholders Party (FKGP), and the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). The left Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), the left liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and the extreme right Hun-

DIAGRAM 3: *Supporters of NATO*TABLE 1: *Support for NATO membership and party choice I.*

"If a referendum were to be held today, how would you vote: that Hungary should join NATO, or that Hungary should not join NATO?" (percentage)

	YES	NO	DON'T KNOW
FIDESZ	76	16	8
FKGP	57	38	5
MDF	92	8	0
MIÉP	53	42	5
MSZP	72	20	8
MUNKÁSPÁRT	37	38	25
SZDSZ	81	17	2
DON'T KNOW	68	19	13
WOULD NOT VOTE	51	27	22

garian Life and Truth Party (MIÉP) formed the parliamentary opposition. The largest non-parliamentary party has been the far left Workers Party (Munkáspárt).

*Support for NATO membership and party choice II.*

*"If you had to choose between Hungary being a neutral and non-aligned country and Hungary being a member of NATO, which would you choose?" (percentage)*

	NATO	NEUTRALITY	DON'T KNOW
FIDESZ	72	23	5
FKGP	52	48	0
MDF	75	25	0
MIÉP	26	74	0
MSZP	60	36	4
MUNKÁSPÁRT	25	63	15
SZDSZ	73	22	5
DON'T KNOW	54	33	13
WOULD NOT VOTE	46	39	15

As shown, the dividing line between the positions taken on NATO membership does not run between the governing parties and the opposition parties. Supporters of NATO membership form the majority of supporters of the all main governing and opposition parties in 1999. The greatest antipathy towards NATO is to be found among supporters of parties that openly oppose Hungary's joining NATO: members of the extreme right-wing MIÉP and of the extreme left-wing Munkáspárt (and those who indicated that they would not take part in the vote). Interestingly, however, there do appear to be significantly higher than average numbers of opponents of NATO membership and supporters of neutrality among supporters of the — officially pro-NATO — Independent Party of Smallholders, which was one of the parties comprising the governing coalition, and among the voters of the post-communist socialist party, which was one of the main proponents of NATO membership.<sup>8</sup>

In the next part of our analysis, we examined whether there were any connections between opinions on NATO and general social-economic attitudes, which — according to previous surveys — do influence political positions and party choice (see Angelusz-Tardos 1991a, 1991b, Kovács 1996). Based on the questions on the questionnaire we constructed variables that reflect the social-economic attitudes of respondents.<sup>9</sup> Some of

8 The 2002 survey has indicated that the effect of party preferences diminished in the last years. Fidesz-voters still supported Hungary's NATO membership above the average but the voters of the extreme right seized to oppose the country's military affiliation more than other parts of the population. The right-left cleavage appears more accentuated in the case of the EU membership.

9 We used principal component analysis. The variables included in the analysis and the results of the analysis were:

these variables — feelings of anomie (ANOMIA), xenophobia (XEN), strong national sentiment (NATION), anti-liberalism in the economy (ANTILIB) and egalitarianism (EGALIT) — are again correlated with positions on NATO: if the question was posed in terms of voting for or against NATO membership, then those who rejected membership received significantly higher scores on the indicators measuring rejection of liberalism and xenophobia, than did those who voted for NATO membership. If, however, the question was related to a choice between NATO membership and neutrality, then those selecting neutrality received significantly higher scores than did the other groups on the anomie factor as well as the two other factors already mentioned.<sup>10</sup>

	eigenvalue	explained variance (%)
1. ANOMIA	2.65	20
2. XEN	1.75	14
3. NATION	1.43	11
4. ANTILIB	1.17	9
5. EGALIT	1.01	8
		<i>Total 62 %</i>

*Factor loadings:*

	ANOMIA	XEN	NATION	ANTILIB	EGALIT
You would limit the number of black people in the country		.801			
You have an aversion for Gypsies		.784			
You don't like Jews		.667			
Private ownership should rule throughout the economy				-.729	
Differences in income should be reduced					.673
People with national feeling should be given greater influence			.765		
A tougher stand should be taken for Hungarian minorities			.807		
Market competition should be restricted				.542	
In the interest of economic growth, one should accept that many will become poor					-.825
Hungarian interests should not be sacrificed for the sake of joining the EU				.640	
People had more faith in the future under the previous Socialist system	.620				
It doesn't make any difference that there are laws. They will be messed around with until those in power are proved right	.856				
Nowadays the courts often fail to deliver justice	.835				

<sup>10</sup> In the course of one-way anova analysis the result of the F-test was significant in every case (at a level of at

Finally, we sought to determine the extent to which the attitudes that are linked to support for or rejection of NATO membership together explain the differences in positions. The result of the analysis was that, in the case of the first question, three social-economic attitudes and two decisions concerning party choice had a significant effect on the position relating to NATO: rejection of NATO membership was positively linked to anti-liberalism and xenophobia, while negatively linked to the indicator of national sentiment — i.e. respondents with strong national sentiments were inclined to choose NATO membership. In addition, voters for the Smallholders' Party (FKGP) as well as non-voters were strongly inclined to reject NATO membership. An analysis of the second question revealed that respondents who chose neutrality are characterized — in addition to the above factors — by a strong feeling of anomie, and that a significantly large proportion of these respondents are MIÉP and Munkáspárt voters, while a significantly small proportion of them are Fidesz voters.<sup>11</sup>

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least .007). A similar result was produced by a TÁRKI (Institute for Social Research, Budapest) survey in February 1999: the report on the survey concludes that xenophobia in all its forms is more common among opponents of NATO membership, as well as among those respondents who expressed no opinion about the NATO, than among NATO supporters (see Sik 1999).

- 11 The dependent variable in the discriminant analysis was defined by us in the first case as acceptance or rejection of NATO membership and in the second case as the choice of NATO membership or neutrality. The independent variables were the previously described social-demographic variables, social and economic attitudes, party choice as a dummy variable. We performed the analysis using the stepwise method. One function was established as the result of both analyses. The standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients are the following:

FKGP-voter	.421
ANTILIB	.480
Non-voter	.561
NATION	-.384
XEN	.388

On the basis of these variables, in 78% of cases the categorization was correct.

In the second case, the variables and coefficients were the following:

ANOMIA	.313
FIDESZ	-.328
MIÉP	.397
MP	.319
ANTILIB	.408
Non-voter	.280
XEN	.399

On the basis of these variables, in 69% of cases the categorization was correct.

Summarizing these results, we may state that among the opponents of NATO membership, but especially among respondents favoring neutrality, we found large numbers of people with poor social standing and characteristically negative attitudes towards the new political system, and that these respondents — where they have any articulated political preferences — tend to be attracted by groups on the margins of Hungarian politics.

### 3. The structure of opinions concerning NATO

Support for, or rejection of, NATO membership is, of course, the combined result of opinions formed in many areas. In the next part of our examination, our objective was to discover the types of opinions which led finally to the choice of one of the alternatives.

The questionnaire contained sixteen statements relating to NATO, and the respondents were required to indicate on a scale of one to five the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the various statements. If, for a given question, the average score of respondents was higher than three, this showed that respondents tended to agree with the statement. If their average score was less than three, this indicated that respondents rejected the statement. The following table shows the extent of agreement with, or rejection of, the sixteen statements.

TABLE 2: *Opinions about joining NATO*  
(average scores; 5 = completely agree, 1 = completely disagree)

	average	SD
If Hungary joins NATO, this will increase Hungary's security.	4.06	1.16
Hungary's joining NATO will lead to a considerable increase in the country's military expenditure.	4.05	1.04
By joining NATO, Hungary may gain access to advanced military equipment and technology.	3.88	1.11
Hungary's membership of NATO will strengthen confidence among foreign investors and thus more western capital will flow into the country.	3.88	1.15
Joining NATO would cost the country too much.	3.86	1.16
NATO membership would mean protection if Russia once again wanted to extend its influence over the country.	3.78	1.26
By joining NATO, Hungary could become involved in a conflict in which it has no interest.	3.70	1.27
As a NATO member, we have more chance of realizing our national interests.	3.30	1.30
NATO membership makes us dependent on the West just as we were once dependent on the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union.	3.05	1.43

The West supports Hungary's accession to NATO so that they can sell their weapons to us at a good price.	2.84	1.33
NATO membership will help us to take a firmer stand when defending Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries.	2.77	1.36
Joining NATO significantly restricts Hungary's independence.	2.74	1.37
Instead of joining NATO, Hungary should stay neutral.	2.68	1.66
If Hungary joins NATO, nuclear weapons may be deployed in the country.	2.67	1.51
Instead of NATO membership, Hungary should co-operate militarily with neighboring countries.	2.14	1.33
Hungary's security would be better served if the country were to forge a closer alliance with Russia rather than joining NATO.	1.46	.94

Table 3 shows the numbers of people agreeing with the five most supported statements and the three most rejected statements.

TABLE 3: *Opinions about joining NATO* (percentage; 5 = fully agree, 1 = fully disagree)

	Accept (5—4)	Reject (1—2)
Hungary's joining NATO will lead to a considerable increase in the country's military expenditure.	72	8
If Hungary joins NATO, this will increase Hungary's security.	72	10
Hungary's membership of NATO will strengthen confidence among foreign investors and thus more western capital will flow into the country.	67	12
Joining NATO would cost the country too much.	65	11
NATO membership would mean protection if Russia once again wanted to extend its influence over the country.	65	16
Instead of joining NATO, Hungary should stay neutral.	34	53
Instead of NATO membership, Hungary should co-operate militarily with neighboring countries.	17	62
Hungary's security would be better served if the country were to forge a closer alliance with Russia rather than joining NATO.	6	86

The responses demonstrate that participants in the survey strongly reject the alternatives to NATO membership — i.e. neutrality, and a regional or eastern alliance — but are also aware that NATO membership may be accompanied by consequences which they fear. An analysis of the above opinions and of a series of statements serving to reveal opinions about the possible consequences of NATO membership (table 4), shows that Hungarian public opinion supports NATO membership for political reasons, and accepts that membership will have certain economic and political consequences, but is far less willing to accept the responsibilities that go with membership in times of military conflict.

TABLE 4: *Opinions on the consequences of NATO membership*  
 "Please tell me to what extent you accept ..."  
 (average scores; 5 = fully agree, 1 = fully disagree)

	average	SD
... that NATO should be able to use military installations in Hungary.	3.51	1.30
... that NATO troops may be stationed in Hungary.	3.42	1.34
... that Hungary should contribute to the NATO budget.	3.38	1.36
... that the Hungarian army should only enter into action with NATO consent.	2.99	1.46
... that Hungarian soldiers might be deployed in foreign countries.	2.78	1.46

As the next step in the survey, we sought to find out whether acceptance or rejection of NATO was linked in some way to hidden attitudes which the various statements on their own do not express, but which could be indicated by agreement with certain statements. We therefore performed a principal component analysis with the help of sixteen statements concerning NATO. The result of the analysis was that the sixteen statements fell into three factors, and so we could suppose the existence of three groups of opinions lying behind acceptance or rejection.

TABLE 5: *Connections between opinions on NATO*<sup>12</sup>  
 (principal component analysis; factor loadings)

	1. PC	2. PC	3. PC
- Joining NATO would cost the country too much.	.732		
- Hungary's joining NATO will lead to a considerable increase in the country's military expenditure.	.719		
- NATO membership makes us just as dependent on the West as the Warsaw Pact once made us on the Soviet Union.	.653		
- By joining NATO, Hungary could become involved in a conflict in which it has no interest.	.627		
- The West supports Hungary's accession to NATO so that they can sell their weapons to us at a good price.	.607		
- Joining NATO significantly restricts Hungary's independence.	.546		

12. The results of principal component analysis:

	eigenvalue	explained variance
1.	4.940	31 %
2.	1.977	12 %
3.	1.344	8 %
	<i>Total:</i>	51 %

- Instead of joining NATO, Hungary should stay neutral.	.543		
- If Hungary joins NATO, nuclear weapons may be deployed in the country.	.490		
- By joining NATO, Hungary may gain access to advanced military equipment and technology.		.721	
- Hungary's membership of NATO will strengthen confidence among foreign investors and thus more western capital will flow into the country.		.696	
- As a NATO member, we have more chance of realising our national interests.		.675	
- If Hungary joins NATO, this will increase Hungary's security.		.666	
- NATO membership will help us to take a firmer stand when defending the minorities in the neighboring countries.		.642	
- NATO membership would mean protection if Russia once again wanted to extend its influence over the country.		.543	
- Hungary's security would be better served if the country were to forge a closer alliance with Russia rather than joining NATO.			.756
- Instead of NATO membership, Hungary should co-operate militarily with neighboring countries.			.601

On two (the first and the third) of the three principal components opinions rejecting NATO appear, while the second principal component comprises the opinions of those who support joining NATO. As Table 5 shows, in the first principal component rejection is based on fears concerning the costs of accession, the associated military risks, and the restriction of the country's independence. These factors are accompanied by the choice of neutrality instead of NATO. This factor may therefore be called the neutrality factor. The third factor comprises those statements which express a clear rejection of NATO membership for political reasons.

Next we examined the specific characteristics of the groups supporting the various types of opinion. Once again we included three variable groups in the study: social-demographic variables, socio-economic attitudes and party preferences.

With regard to the second principal component expressing opinions supporting NATO membership, the same differences developed between the various groups as had already been identified: residents of the larger country towns scored significantly higher than Budapest residents, Fidesz voters scored higher than voters for other parties, and people with strong national sentiments were also found to be more supportive of accession than other respondents. In contrast, MIÉP voters and non-voters could most often be found among those who reject NATO.

There are interesting differences between the two groups rejecting NATO on the basis of different groups of opinions. The group of opinions on the first principal component, which express the costs and risks accompanying NATO membership and the fear

of dependence on the West and support for neutrality, are characteristically expressed by a group in which over 70 year-olds are significantly more numerous than under 25 year-olds, people with less than eight grades of schooling are more numerous than other educational groups, and there are large numbers of voters for MIÉP and for the Munkáspárt (Workers' Party) and non-voters. In this group, anomie, anti-liberalism and egalitarianism are strong, but there are also strong national sentiments. In contrast the group of opinions expressed by the third factor (principal component), which would prefer an eastern or regional alliance instead of the western alliance, are widespread among a group in which there are above average numbers of persons belonging to the oldest and youngest age groups, people with few educational qualifications (a maximum of eight grades of schooling) and voters for the Munkáspárt. This group is not characterized, however, by egalitarian ideas, which are rejected to a significant extent by members of the group, but strong national sentiments are present among members of the group.

We also examined — employing regression analysis — the extent to which the various groups of opinions (as dependent variables) are explained by the socio-demographic data, socio-economic attitudes, and party preferences (as independent variables) included in the examination<sup>13</sup>. The result was that while these variables explain support for joining NATO

### 13 Results of regression analysis (stepwise method)

#### 1. "SUPPORT FOR JOINING" PRINCIPAL COMPONENT

Model	R	R Square
1	.209	.044
2	.240	.058
3	.256	.066

a Predictors: (Constant), NATION

b Predictors: (Constant), NATION, NONVOTE

c Predictors: (Constant), NATION, NONVOTE, ANTILIB

	Beta	T	Sig T
NATION	.205	4.754	.000
NONVOTE	-.114	-2.647	.008
ANTILIB	-.090	-2.095	.037

#### 2. "SUPPORT FOR EASTERN ALLIANCE" PRINCIPAL COMPONENT

Model	R	R Square
1	.300	.090
2	.393	.154
3	.415	.172
4	.429	.184

a Predictors: (Constant), EGALIT

b Predictors: (Constant), EGALIT, NATION

only at a low level ( $R^2 = 7\%$ ), they do help to explain the groups of opinions expressing rejection of NATO ( $R^2 = 18\%$ , or  $R^2 = 20\%$ ). It seems probable that a variety of motives lie behind support for membership, and therefore the group of NATO supporters is more heterogeneous than the group of NATO opponents, who can be easily divided into two

c Predictors: (Constant), EGALIT, NATION, EDUCATION

d Predictors: (Constant), EGALIT, NATION, EDUCATION, MP-VOTE

	Beta	T	Sig T
EGALIT	-.299	-7.421	.000
NATION	.249	6.177	.000
EDUC	-.131	-3.239	.001
MP-VOTE	.111	2.761	.006

### 3. "SUPPORT FOR NEUTRALITY" PRINCIPLE COMPONENT

Model	R	R Square
1	.235	.055
2	.296	.088
3	.334	.112
4	.370	.137
5	.394	.155
6	.412	.170
7	.430	.185
8	.440	.194
9	.451	.204

a Predictors: (Constant), ANOMIA

b Predictors: (Constant), ANOMIA, XEN

c Predictors: (Constant), ANOMIA, XEN, MPVOTE

d Predictors: (Constant), ANOMIA, XEN, MPVOTE, EGALIT

e Predictors: (Constant), ANOMIA, XEN, MPVOTE, EGALIT, NATION

f Predictors: (Constant), ANOMIA, XEN, MPVOTE, EGALIT, NATION, ANTILIB

g Predictors: (Constant), ANOMIA, XEN, MPVOTE, EGALIT, NATION, ANTILIB, MDFVOTE

h Predictors: (Constant), ANOMIA, XEN, MPVOTE, EGALIT, NATION, ANTILIB, MDFVOTE, FIDVOTE

i Predictors: (Constant), ANOMIA, XEN, MPVOTE, EGALIT, NATION, ANTILIB, MDFVOTE, FIDVOTE, DOMICILE

	Beta	T	Sig T
ANOMIA	.200	4.885	.000
XEN	.198	4.916	.000
MPVOTE	.151	3.729	.000
EGALIT	.172	4.280	.000
NATION	.149	3.693	.000
ANTILIB	.131	3.212	.001
MDFVOTE	-.130	-3.176	.002
FIDVOTE	-.104	-2.511	.012
DOMICILE	.101	2.493	.013

sub-groups. In the first sub-group — supporters of an eastern alliance — there seem to be a high number of people who, in spite of having few educational qualifications, do not appear to be poor, for they do not support a reduction in income differences or a restriction of the economic transition for social reasons. While they are not characterized by egalitarianism, they do have strong national sentiments. Supporters of the far-left Munkáspárt are to be found in greater than average numbers among this group.

The group of those who oppose NATO membership and support neutrality is of a different composition. Although there are also relatively high numbers of voters for the Munkáspárt in this group, members of the group appear to belong to sections of society that have been frustrated by the change of political system: characteristically, they are inclined towards anomie, xenophobia, a rejection of economic liberalism, and egalitarianism. In this group such attitudes are also accompanied by strong national sentiments. Voters for the center-right parties are relatively rare in this group, which indicates — as previous data have already shown — the presence of large numbers of supporters of the extreme-right in this group, as well as extreme left-wing supporters.

#### 4. The European Union and NATO

The questionnaire included eight statements reflecting the typical opinions often expressed in connection with Hungary's joining European Union. Table 6 demonstrates the extent to which participants in the survey agreed with, or rejected, some statements. (Don't knows and those choosing a score at the middle of the scale, do not appear in the table.)

TABLE 6: *Opinions about joining the EU*  
(Scale of 1–5, 5 = fully agree; 1 = fully disagree; percentage)

Do you agree with the statements below?	Agree (5—4)	Disagree (2—1)
If Hungary joins the EU, it will be easier to travel and work in Europe.	67	12
If Hungary joins the EU, this will bring an economic upturn.	67	9
If Hungary joins the EU, prices will go up.	56	19
If Hungary joins the EU, the standard of living will improve.	50	18
If Hungary joins the EU, then western companies will really push all Hungarian companies out of the market.	37	31
If Hungary joins the EU, unemployment will rise.	27	40
If Hungary joins the EU, the Hungarian agricultural sector will collapse.	22	50
If Hungary joins the EU, the situation of Hungarians living in neighboring countries will become more difficult.	16	55

The break-down of answers shows that a majority of Hungarian society supports Hungary's joining the European Union: two-thirds of survey participants stated that membership of the European Union would bring an economic upturn or that membership would make it easier to travel and work in Europe. Half of all respondents expected living standards to rise as a result of joining the EU.<sup>14</sup>

In order to characterize groups supporting or opposing membership of the EU, with the help of principal component analysis an indicator was formed which expressed overall support for or rejection of membership.<sup>15</sup> Analysis of the social and demographic variables showed that significantly large proportions of young people, people with higher educational qualifications, and inhabitants of larger towns in the country supported Hungary's membership of the EU, whereas older people, the least educated, and inhabitants of other towns and villages, including Budapest, were opposed to membership. With regard to party preferences, Fidesz voters are significantly numerous among supporters of membership, while MIÉP voters are over-represented among those who oppose membership.<sup>16</sup> When we examined social-economic attitudes, we received results that were similar to those recorded in the case of NATO: opponents of EU membership were typically characterized by strong feelings of anomie and a rejection of economic liberalism.<sup>17</sup>

14 In the 2002 survey 73 % of the adult population stated that in case of an EU referendum they would vote for the membership, and 11 % was against it.

15 Accession to European Union (principle component, factor loadings)

eigenvalue            explained variance  
2.9606                    37 %

	loadings
If Hungary joins the EU, this will bring an economic upturn	.692
If Hungary joins the EU, the standard of living will improve	.679
If Hungary joins the EU, then western companies will really push all Hungarian companies out of the market	-.667
If Hungary joins the EU, the Hungarian agricultural sector will collapse	-.660
If Hungary joins the EU, unemployment will rise	-.619
If Hungary joins the EU, it will be easier to travel and work in Europe	.536
If Hungary joins the EU, prices will go up	-.510
If Hungary joins the EU, the situation of Hungarians living in neighboring countries will become more difficult	-.458

16 According to the results of the one-way anova analysis (Duncan-test), the F-test in all these cases is significant at the level of .05.

17 We performed the analysis using step-by-step regression analysis, in which the dependent variable was the EU factor, while the independent variable was the sum of the social and economic attitudes shown above. ( $R^2 = 5\%$ ; Anom:  $\beta = -.156$ , sig. T = .000; Antilib:  $\beta = -.128$ , sig. T = .001)

Support for joining the European Union and acceptance of NATO membership are closely linked: the correlation between the two relevant indicators is highly significant ( $p = .500$ ).

### 5. Western integration and the discourse on national identity

The primary issue of our research was the meaning of western integration — in this case accession to NATO — for public opinion: is public opinion in this area formed on the basis of pragmatic political and economic considerations, or is it linked to a wider historical framework and Hungary's position and role in Europe? As we have seen, both arguments were used on numerous occasions in the debates on European integration and on NATO membership. The situation is the same with regard to the positions taken by public opinion: there is considerable public support for pragmatic political and more complex arguments both for and against NATO membership.

Our questionnaire included a series of questions designed to assist us in forming a more exact impression of the views of opponents and supporters of NATO membership concerning those arguments which encase this political decision in historical connections. Table seven shows the break-down of answers:

TABLE 7: *NATO membership and Hungary's place in Europe*  
 "From the statements below, please select the one that is closest to your personal opinion"  
 (percentage)

Joining NATO manifests that Hungary is part of the West and belongs to the West.	48
Hungary belongs neither to the West nor to the East, and has to defend its interests against both.	31
Hungary's roots lie in the East, and one of the great dangers threatening the country is that the West will annex it.	10
Don't know, no response.	11

As shown by the break-down of answers, the relative majority of the adult population (48 %) thinks that NATO membership is an expression of belonging to the western world, but for many Hungarians (41 %) Hungary is not part of the West and must defend its interests against both West and East. Table 8, however, proves decisively the existence of a close link between the positions taken by people on NATO membership and whether they consider that Hungary belongs to the East or to the West (or to neither).

TABLE 8/A: *NATO membership and Hungary's belonging (to East or West)*  
(percentage)

	Hungary is part of the West	Hungary belongs neither to the West nor to the East	Hungary belongs to the East	don't know, no response
Supports NATO membership	86	62	37	47
Does not support NATO membership	10	28	54	14
Don't know, no response	4	10	9	39
	100	100	100	100

TABLE 8/B: *Neutrality and Hungary's belonging (to East or West)*  
(percentage)

	Hungary is part of the West	Hungary belongs neither to the West nor to the East	Hungary belongs to the East	don't know, no response
supports NATO membership	77	53	22	42
supports neutrality	21	42	72	23
don't know, no response	2	5	6	35
	100	100	100	100

More than three-quarter of those, who think that Hungary belongs to the West support NATO membership, and only one-fifth of them preferred neutrality. It comes as no surprise to find that the composition of the three camps — Hungary belongs to the West, Hungary belongs to the East, intermediate positions — is very similar to that of the camps supporting or rejecting Hungary's participation in western integration. Age and place of residence are the only two social-demographic indicators which are slightly different for the two groups: older people and inhabitants of provincial towns consider the country's eastern roots to be important, while residents of Budapest and inhabitants of villages tend to be found in the other camp. Social and economic attitudes do, however, distinguish between those — on one hand — who emphasize the connection between NATO membership and the country's western character, and the others on the other side: members of groups displaying strong feelings of anomie, opposition to liberalism, and xenophobia are over-represented in the latter camp.

The opinions that respondents were required to select from the questionnaire concerning Hungary's belonging to East or West and its associated interests contain some of

the typical identity-options that were formulated in the course of the political debate on NATO membership. If we examine the break-down of answers, it becomes quite obvious that, rather than evading the question, most of the survey-participants — almost 90% — were quick to select one of the alternative positions offered by the questionnaire. This demonstrates that the respondents accepted what was being suggested by the elite groups who were directing the discourse: namely that there are dimensions of the debate about the country's western integration that are linked to national identity. However, the data collected in the course of our survey give an interesting impression of the public's interpretation of these connections.

The first noteworthy piece of data is that the indicator of the strength of national sentiment (*NATION* — principal component) correlates positively with both the indicators of support for NATO and EU membership and with the indicators of opposition to membership of the two organizations.<sup>18</sup> In addition, we found no significant difference in terms of the strength of national sentiment between groups formed on the basis of answers to the question of Hungary's belonging to East or West. This all shows that both supporters and opponents of NATO membership found a version of the national discourse that was suitable for the expression of their political goals, and that both supporters and opponents of membership succeeded in mobilizing national sentiments with a view to promoting their aims.

It is obvious that many of the opponents of NATO membership could be susceptible to isolationist, anti-Western national rhetoric, for — as we have seen — many of them may have suffered from the consequences of the transition and have drifted towards the extremes of the political spectrum. But it is also quite understandable if national sentiments are used to mobilize support for the pro-NATO camp. On one hand, support for NATO membership may have a content that sees the realization of the country's national interest through integration into the institutional system of the developed West. But support for membership may also be motivated by the experiences of the past, and above all by anti-Communist national sentiment. The presence of this ambiguity is suggested by

18 Correlations of principal components measuring support for integration and of the factor measuring the strength of national sentiment:

	<i>NATION-factor</i>	
	P	Significance
Support for NATO membership	.177	.000
Support for an eastern alliance	.256	.000
Support for neutrality	.126	.002
Support for EU membership	.108	.008
Opposition to EU membership	.153	.000

the existence of a group of NATO supporters whose support for membership is not accompanied by strong national sentiments. This is the group that not only agrees with most of the opinions expressing support for NATO membership (i.e. with the statements comprising the “support of membership” — principal component), but also accepts the consequences of NATO membership as they appear in the statements of Table 3. Apart from the factor measuring the strength of national sentiments, this group also received low scores on the indicators of anti-liberalism and social egalitarianism. Another group of respondents were those who supported NATO membership but refused to accept the consequences of membership. This group had large numbers of old people (over 60) living outside Budapest and people with strong national sentiments — which could mean that their opinions had been greatly influenced by historical experiences. (Support for NATO membership does not always mean support for western integration in general, and this is shown by the fact that six percent of the representative sample supported NATO membership while rejecting membership of the EU.)

Summarizing the findings of our research, we may state that public opinion on NATO membership is influenced on one hand by political factors. On the other hand, the effect of the attempts of politicians, writers, and other “opinion-makers” to link attitudes to NATO to more deep-rooted attitudes with historical dimensions, has been considerable. The effect of the first factor — political developments — is shown by the clear link between fluctuations in public support for NATO and political events (see Diagram 1). While support for NATO has fluctuated where fears have arisen that the country might become involved in a military conflict or be required to accept responsibility for the consequences of such a conflict, NATO membership continues to be supported overall by a majority of society — even during crises such as the Kosovo war. The extent of support for NATO indicates that a proportion of public opinion was indeed responsive to the arguments that raised the issue of NATO membership above the level of everyday politics and rendered it part of the discourse on constructing national identities. Thus, the efforts of the elite were successful: both the “modernists” and the “traditionalists” were able to evoke national sentiments rooting in totally different collective memories. These memories served as a basis for unifying the political camps in supporting NATO membership, and gave historical pathos to a pragmatic decision.

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*Anton Pelinka*

## NEUTRALITY, NATO, AND THE WORLD AFTER THE "COLD WAR"

### A Political Scientist's Summary

In his essay "Neutrality in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution", Borbála Juhász indirectly raises the decisive question: Why had the concept of neutrality such an appeal for Hungary in 1956 — and why has that attractiveness almost completely vanished after the transformation of 1990? Why was a Hungarian government, looking for an alternative option to Hungary's involvement into the Soviet bloc in 1956, following the Austrian path and declaring Hungarian neutrality after the Austrian (and Swiss) model — and why was practically nobody interested in Hungary, from 1990 onwards, to follow the very same Austrian (and Swiss) path of "permanent neutrality"? Why was neutrality so attractive for Hungarians in the 1950s — and why was the very same neutrality "out" in the 1990s?

The answer is simply that forty years after the heroic failure of the Hungarian revolution neutrality just was not the same as it used to be in the 1950s. Even if Austria and Switzerland may not have fully realized it: neutrality in Central Europe under the auspices of the bipolar conditions of the Cold War cannot survive the end of the defining framework of the East-West conflict.

It is a paradox that Hungary, in 1956, wanted to follow the Austrian lead towards neutrality — but was not allowed to do so by the USSR's military intervention. Beginning with the 1990s, Hungary would have been free to choose the Austrian way — but was no longer willing to do so. Now Austria, already a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace program and a participant in NATO-led military actions in the former Yugoslavia, could be tempted to follow the Hungarian example and officially deal neutrality for NATO membership. There is even a certain logic in the expectation that the Hungarian (and Polish and Czech) NATO membership must be considered a model for opting out of neutrality.

Austrian neutrality has ceased to be a model for Central Europe. None of the European post-communist countries opted for neutrality; practically all those west of Russia opted for NATO. Austria's neutrality is not perceived as a positive example for today's Europe. But Hungary could become a model for Austria. If, in the foreseeable future, Austria finds itself surrounded (with the exception of Switzerland and Liechtenstein) by NATO countries only, Hungary (and the Czech Republic and Slovenia as well as Slovakia) could be seen as positive examples for Austria.

## Neutrality as a function — not as a purpose

Neutrality is not a concept designed by and for a specific country, independently of general global conditions. Neutrality is always to be seen together with the background of interests and dependencies. Neutrality is not a goal in itself. It is an instrument which can offer the best possible outcome for a country under specific conditions. Under different conditions, the very same country could find that neutrality has outlived its usefulness. Belgium was permanently neutral prior to 1914. The experience of two wars and two occupations made Belgium rethink its neutrality. In 1949 Belgium became one of NATO's founding members.

Neutrality has to be seen in a functional way. It has to fulfill a purpose, it has to serve specific interests. This was clearly the case with Austrian neutrality in 1955: Austria's main interest was to make the occupational powers leave. The main interest of the USSR was to prevent Austria, led by democratically legitimized anti-communists, from becoming a member of NATO. The main interest of the US and the other western powers was a kind of guarantee that a fully sovereign Austria would not be manipulated by the Soviets, whose tanks would be stationed just one hour east of Vienna.

In 1955 neutrality for Austria was the recipe able to serve all these interests. In that respect Austrian neutrality was the "right" decision. Austria's neutrality became a success story — under the conditions of the bipolar conflict between East and West. The waning of these conditions necessarily implies the rethinking of neutrality.

In 1956, neutrality for Hungary was not the recipe to satisfy the basic needs of the major players. For Hungary, for the Nagy government, Hungarian neutrality — shaped after the Austrian pattern — would have been a perfect way out of the Soviet orbit. But for the USSR this must have looked like the beginning of a domino process. Which country would have been next? Considering the anti-communist mood prevailing beneath the surface of communist one party-rule, Hungarian neutrality would have been the beginning of the end of Moscow's control of Eastern Europe.

A broad consensus, combining the interest of all major players, stood behind Austrian neutrality in 1955. Such an consensus was clearly missing in respect of Nagy's neutrality declaration in 1956. The function of Hungary's neutrality was significantly different from the function of Austria's neutrality. That was the reason why Hungarian neutrality was not allowed to prevail and to become a success story like Austrian neutrality. Austria's neutrality fitted into the contemporary dominant pattern of European and international politics — the balance of power. Hungary's neutrality would not have fitted into that pattern. Therefore Hungary's neutrality was not allowed to survive the few days of illusion.

In his speech of November 1, 1956, Imre Nagy based Hungarian neutrality on the linkage between national sovereignty and neutrality. Nagy claimed, somewhat romantically, that neutrality would serve the "cause of liberty and independence". (See Borbála

Juhász's article in this book.) This used to be the official philosophy behind Austria's neutrality as well. In both cases, this linkage is understandable. In both cases, neutrality was justified as an instrument for maximizing national independence. In both cases, the interests of the major actors in European politics had to be considered — in the Austrian case, everyone agreed; in the Hungarian case, one power used its opportunity to veto neutrality by using military force.

The linkage between neutrality and sovereignty is difficult to understand from a legal viewpoint. The status of permanent neutrality includes certain restrictions on sovereignty. A permanently neutral state is not allowed to join military alliances or to permit foreign troops on its own territory. A non-neutral state is free of these restrictions. It can be argued that neutrality is an instrument not for maximizing but for limiting national sovereignty. But both cases — the Austrian and the Hungarian — demonstrate that sovereignty must not be seen as an absolute but as a relative concept. The real status of sovereignty must be evaluated from a comparative viewpoint: Would the alternatives to neutrality increase or decrease the national freedom to act?

In 1955, the answer for Austria was clear — neutrality was the only choice to end the occupation. In 1956, the answer for Hungary seemed also to be clear — neutrality was an instrument to get rid of the direct control of the USSR over Hungary. In both cases, the claim to use neutrality for the improvement of sovereignty was credible. In the Hungarian case, the government was just not independent, not sovereign enough to implement its neutrality decision. Hungary was considered, by the logic of the East-West-conflict, to belong to the Soviet zone of influence, to be part of one bloc. Hungary was not entitled to maximize national sovereignty — differently from Austria, which in 1955 was considered to lie between the blocs.

When Hungary decided to join NATO, it was sovereign enough to choose between different options — between the status Imre Nagy would have preferred in 1956 and NATO membership. In 1956, NATO membership was out of the question: the US was unable to invite such a move, nor would Hungarian membership of NATO have been feasible. In 1956, Hungary was surrounded by the USSR and two of its allies — the ČSSR and Romania. Non-aligned Yugoslavia, which played very much to the tune of Moscow in the decisive days of November 1956, and neutral Austria were the other neighbors. In 1956, the alternatives were either to stay in the Warsaw Pact or to opt for neutrality — or so Nagy and his partners thought. In the 1990s, the choice was between neutrality and NATO — or so some analysts thought. In reality, in both periods neutrality was not much of an option. In 1956, Soviet tanks easily destroyed Hungary's neutrality option. Forty years later, NATO membership remained the only practical possibility, because of the unattractiveness of neutrality in the 1990s.

## The preconditions of neutrality

According to the experience of neutrality in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, permanent neutrality must be based on certain preconditions:

- **Power Balance:** Neutrality must not be seen as a threat to the balance of power as it exists in a given situation. To be neutral means to be accepted as neutral by the others, especially by the major powers. To be neutral means also to accept the existing power balance. Permanent neutrality cannot and will not survive as a threat to the given balance of power, because it will lose its acceptance by at least one side. This explains why Austrian neutrality, beginning in 1955, was globally accepted — but not Hungarian neutrality in 1956. The neutralization of a Soviet ally would have been a significant violation of the balance between East and West. Neutrality is the product of a status quo — and must not jeopardize this status quo.
- **Geopolitics:** Neutrality has a lot to do with geography. Belgian neutrality was established in the 1830s because it was “between” British, French, and Prussian (German) territorial interests. But Belgium could not survive as a neutral country in 1914 and again in 1940 because of Belgian geography. Belgium was strategically too important to have its neutrality respected by Germany. Austria and Finland were able to establish their post-1945 neutrality because they were situated “between” — between the Eastern and the Western spheres of influence. Yugoslavia could develop its non-aligned, quasi-neutral status because it was “between” NATO countries (Italy, Greece), Warsaw Pact countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Albania), and neutral Austria.
- **Size:** Neutrality as a principled position — “permanent neutrality” — has usually been the orientation of smaller countries only. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, among the great powers only the USA prior to 1917, and again prior to 1941, could be considered permanently neutral. And the USA became just too important to remain neutral. Stalin’s (and others’) proposition to unify and neutralize Germany was turned down precisely because the general assumption was that a unified Germany would be too large to be allowed to become neutral. India’s non-alignment and quasi-neutrality did not survive fully the military conflict with China: India was potentially too powerful to be left alone. All the passive and active roles usually associated with neutrals (e.g. abstaining from active political involvement, good services for and between belligerents) are qualities which could be expected from small but not from major powers.

Post-communist Hungary is lacking especially the geopolitical precondition of permanent neutrality. It is no longer situated “between”, as Europe’s political landscape is no longer characterized by a bipolar conflict. In geopolitical terms, Hungary is on the fringes of an overwhelming center — defined as the European Union and as NATO. This center enjoys monopolistic hegemony. Hungary came to feel the power of attraction of the

hegemonic center in such a geopolitical situation. What could, and what should "neutrality" mean for such a position?

For the Austrian case, the changing geopolitical framework had a strong implication on the perception of neutrality. The Hungarian media in the 1990s played an important role influencing the public mood in favor of NATO membership — as the focus group research by Györgyi Bindorffer and István Síklaki shows. (See the article in this book.) In Austria, as demonstrated by Christoph Reinprecht and Rossalina Latcheva, the media reflected the decline of neutrality as a determining factor for Austrian politics: neutrality was withering away — not in a legal sense but as a broadly accepted concept able to define Austria's position in Europe.

The position that both countries choose does not have much impact on the European power structure at all. Russia, faced with the NATO orientation of the Baltic republics, is not indifferent to Austria's neutrality. But as NATO has reached Russia's border, the future of a neutral country surrounded by NATO is not in Russia's primary interest. And as Moscow had to accept Poland's option for NATO, the parallel option of Hungary (and the Czech Republic) also had only a secondary effect on Russia and its interests. Austria's and Hungary's decisions for or against NATO membership do not effect the global or even the European power balance in any significant way.

The strategic situation in post cold war-Europe implies a certain logic for countries like Hungary and Austria. And this logic means Westernization. About 1990, Hungary and Austria started to gravitate towards the now undisputed European center. Austria joined the EU — and keeps the option of NATO membership open. Hungary joined NATO — and is among the candidates for the next round of EU-enlargement. In what must be seen as a nostalgic sentiment, Austria hesitates to declare neutrality dead — and joined the EU first. Without any reason for the same nostalgic sentiment, Hungary did not postpone NATO membership and tried to get what was possible for the country — NATO first, EU second.

### The domestic politics of neutrality

The comparison between Hungary and Austria emphasizes another dimension of neutrality — the domestic side. By opting for permanent neutrality in 1955, neutrality became part of Austrian "identity building" and "nation building". (See especially Gertraud Benke's contribution to this volume.) A pattern of international politics and of foreign policy developed a function for domestic purposes. By stressing its neutrality, Austria became "different" — especially different from Germany which was, in 1955, fully integrated into the confrontation between East and West. The need to be different was sat-

ified by an international “mission”: Austria was accepted, Austria could even think to be loved — because it was not German; and because it was part of neither bloc.

This domestic function of Austrian neutrality seems to have stronger roots in the Austrian society than its international function. Austrian neutrality is withering internationally — especially after the end of the Cold War and after Austria has joined the EU: This is the clear message of all the analyses of Austria’s international behavior since 1989. (Hauser 2002) But Austrian neutrality still enjoys a broad consensus domestically — even years after joining EU, the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and NATO’s “Partnership for Peace.” (Neisser & Puntcher Riekmann 2002)

Neutrality is not neutrality. Neutrality as an instrument to reach a specific goal internationally is one thing. Neutrality as a concept to fulfill domestic expectations is another one. But what are the domestic expectations which neutrality can fulfill in Austria, even after the end of the East West-conflict has put an end to almost all international meanings of neutrality in Europe? And why is Austrian public opinion eager to believe in neutrality — while Hungarian public opinion is not so eager at all?

The possible answer is the perception of the years of the Cold War. In Austria, neutrality has been and still is identified as a way out of the explosion of the arms’ race; of keeping Austria’s armed services financially at the lowest level of all comparable European countries. By staying neutral, Austria has escaped the military costs the rest of Europe had to accept. Austria, happily, stayed on the sidelines. By most Austrians, neutrality is perceived as a kind of soft, pragmatic pacifism. This interpretation has of course nothing to do with the Swiss or the Swedish pattern of neutrality — but it is a kind of specific Austrian pattern. Is it surprising that this interpretation is still very popular in Austria?

In Hungary, the Cold War is seen differently. The Hungarian experience was dominated by the center-periphery-relationship within the Eastern bloc system. The transformation of the 1990s was the escape of Soviet (and Russian) dominance. This is the explanation of why Hungarian public opinion was looking for an alliance which could protect Hungary from a possible revival of Russian hegemony. (See Zsuzsanna Dákai’s article.)

The consequence was that the Hungarian response to the end of the Cold War was different from the Austrian response. Hungary’s option for NATO was backed by a significant majority in Hungary — as is the Austria’s formula “neutral within the EU” in Austria.

The contradiction between the domestic and the international function of neutrality is not actual as long as the consequences of the EU’s CFSP are not fully defined. As long as the relationship between NATO as the military alliance, accepted by most EU-members, and the EU is vague, Austria can live with such a contradiction. As the crisis between the EU and Austria in 2000 has demonstrated, the role and the “nature” of the EU is not completely agreed upon by many Austrians — as well as by many Europeans in general. (Hummer & Pelinka 2002)

Neutrality is not neutrality. Austria's decision to declare its permanent neutrality in 1955 was internationally accepted because it fulfilled a specific function for all major actors in world politics in a given geopolitical situation. Hungary's declaration of neutrality in 1956 was internationally not accepted because it violated the interests of one of the major players. In Austria, the international function of neutrality created a domestic function which became more and more independent from neutrality's international meaning. In Hungary, the failure to become neutral internationally implied the lack of any domestic function neutrality could have had.

The consequence: In 1999, Hungarians comfortably accepted NATO-membership as the consistent answer to the global and European situation as newly developed in the 1990s. No domestic function prevented this option. In Austria, the still broadly accepted domestic function of neutrality did not allow such a decision — yet.

### Neutrality and post cold war "Grand Theories"

When the Warsaw Pact and the USSR collapsed in 1991, all the basic assumptions of the "nature" of International Politics fell apart. Gone was the "evil empire", gone were bilateralism, containment, and détente. Wars became possible which had been unthinkable during the decades of the "cold war". The only superpower demonstrated its ability to dominate global politics. In 1991, the second Gulf War followed the script of the "New World Order".

When Francis Fukuyama published his essay "*The End of History?*" in 1989, his approach was seen as a Hegelian vision of an end of all principal contradiction. Liberal democracy had triumphed — communism had practically ceased to be an alternative, an antithesis to the Western thesis. In a world consisting only of liberal democracies neutrality has no conceivable function. As liberal democracies do not go to war against each other, neutrality has lost its meaning. In Fukuyama's (1992) book, the term "neutrality" is not even mentioned. History is nearing its culmination without any understanding of neutrality. According to Fukuyama, neutrality is clearly a phenomenon of the past. By overcoming the basic contradictions of this past, history has overcome the possibility of neutrality.

But Fukuyama's interpretation was soon to be challenged by another "grand theory". Samuel P. Huntington first published his version of the world after the cold war in "*Foreign Affairs*", 1993, and then as a book in 1996 — *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. History is not going to be fulfilled and consumed in a unified democratic world. The world is going to be deeply fragmented by "civilizations" which were defined primarily by religious traditions. Huntington's political landscape, which divided the world into different blocs of civilizations, became the most favorite wall-map

for strategic thinkers, especially within the military profession. According to Huntington, the end of the cold war opened up a Pandora's box of ethnic, religious, and cultural conflicts: fanatics of different creeds thinking to fulfill their respective gods' wishes by killing as many of their enemies as possible — that is the impact of Huntington's assumption.

The Huntingtonian perspective of potentially nuclear conflicts out of control does not consider neutrality as a viable concept either. Especially for countries like Hungary and Austria, Huntington's world interpretation gives Hungary and Austria a clear position within the Western-Catholic-Protestant civilization. Unlike Huntington, Benjamin R. Barber's *Jihad vs. McWorld* — published in 1995 — does not seem to exclude the concept of neutrality. Barber's view of a world, disintegrating into different social and regional layers under the weight of globalization, is based much less on religion and much more on the economy. Countries like Hungary and Austria are not seen as part of a specific bloc. But as Barber sees the traditional state crumble, neutrality as a state-based concept also does not fit into this perspective. The idea of the (nation) state as a sovereign entity has outlived its usefulness — especially as the result of a globalizing economy. Consequently it makes no sense to expect from states to see themselves as “neutral”. The conflict between “Jihad”, the forces challenging the Western rational economized logic, and “McWorld” divides neither countries nor states. This conflict separates subcultures within countries — within Hungary, within Austria.

Interestingly enough, it is Henry Kissinger who gives neutrality a future. In his *Diplomacy* (1994), the former National Security Adviser and Secretary of State, who was never a friend of “neutralist” trends among liberal democracies, sees the next future dominated by multi-polarism. There is no monopolistic center. There is not much of an ideological (or fanatical) drive behind the world which Kissinger sees growing. There is a large amount of traditional power politics. And within the power structures, dominated by the US and other big powers (Russia, China, Japan, India), there is some room for smaller states in specific geopolitical positions to behave “neutrally”. Kissinger's view of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is very much influenced by his view of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. But even when Kissinger concedes the possibility of neutral niches, he does not see them for countries like Hungary and Austria. Kissinger predicts “Europe” as one of the major power players — not Germany, not France, not Britain. Kissinger's Europe will be the EU — or there will be no Europe able to play in the same league with the US, Russia and China. Countries which have opted for EU membership have abandoned the possible niche of neutrality.

Kissinger's expectation for a unified Europe west of Russia is also Paul Kennedy's expectation. In his book *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (1993), Kennedy sees the former communist bloc managing disintegration — and the former Western bloc integration. Opting for integration into this newly defined Western bloc means an end for

neutrality as a consistent concept of international behavior. If the EU succeeds in its drive to overcome the nation state, then there will be no neutrality thinkable within the EU.

### Summary

Hungary and Austria — traditionally neighbors, partners, and opponents — had been in completely different situations during the decades of the cold war. The outcome of World War II and the power configuration in Europe after 1945 decided that Hungary had to live under Soviet dominance. For that reason, neutrality was a — utopian — dream for all Hungarians who tried to shake off the dependence on Moscow. As this dependence was part of a world-wide power of balance, the Hungarian dream of neutrality was not allowed to become reality. For Austria, unlike Hungary, "between" East and West, neutrality was the pragmatic formula combining a maximum of independence and a guarantee of the balance of power.

With the end of the bipolar stability, both countries started to move towards the now undisputed monopolistic center — the West. Hungary did it without bothering about neutrality as a possible interlude in the country's journey to the West. Austria's western orientation was less dramatic, was a lesser break with its post 1945-politics. Austria was allowed to join the EU without declaring "permanent neutrality" obsolete. By joining the EU as a neutral country, Austria has postponed the decision to accept the logic of post-1991 Europe.


But the logic of the new order does not really permit a position "between" — because there is no other, no second center. All the analyses of post-cold-war Europe include a clear message: there is no niche, there is no function, there is no possibility for neutrality.

It is the logic of an inclined plane. Europe has become lopsided. The general assumption of national interests is that every nation is anxious not to end at the lower side of the plane. Everybody west of Russia — with the remarkable (but seemingly not very attractive) exception of Serbia — wants to be part of the upper side, of the monopolistic center. This center has two different names: EU and NATO. Both are firms of the same political entity — the center.

For some countries, it was possible to join the first of the two firms — like Austria. For others, joining the second firm was easier — like Hungary. But for the first time since 1945, Hungary and Austria are bound together by the same geopolitical logic.

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After the end of the Cold War vigorous discussions developed about new alternatives in security policy in almost all the countries of the former Warsaw Pact and in the neutral and non-aligned states, including both Austria and Hungary. Central to this book are discourses and debates on neutrality and NATO, and the authors attempt to shed light on the identity-policy aspect of the NATO discussion by means of an analysis of the argumentation strategies used by supporters and opponents of NATO-membership. Whereas in Hungary it is a question of whether the country is historically a component of Europe or whether it can only realize its identity by pursuing a special course between the western and eastern worlds, in Austria it is the consequences of possibly abandoning neutrality – one of the most important constituents of the modern Austrian identity – that have been the subject of the most heated discussions.

