

Routledge Studies in Anthropology

SLOGANS

SUBJECTION, SUBVERSION, AND THE POLITICS OF NEOLIBERALISM

Edited by

Nicolette Makovicky, Anne-Christine Trémon, and
Sheyla S. Zandonai



Slogans

Focusing on contexts of accelerated economic and political reform, this volume critically examines the role of slogans in the contemporary projects of populist mobilization, neoliberal governance, and civic subversion. Bringing together a collection of ethnographic studies from Slovakia, Poland, Abu Dhabi, Peru, and China, the contributors analyze the way in which slogans both convey and contest the values and norms that lie at the core of hegemonic political economic projects and ideologies.

Nicolette Makovicky is Departmental Lecturer in Russian and East European Studies at the University of Oxford, UK.

Anne-Christine Trémon is Senior Lecturer in Anthropology at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland.

Sheyla S. Zandonai is Research Associate in the Laboratoire Architecture Anthropologie at the École Nationale Supérieure d'Architecture de Paris – La Villette (ENSAPLV), France.

Routledge Studies in Anthropology

- 44 **Critical Times in Greece**
Anthropological Engagements with the Crisis
Edited by Dimitris Dalakoglou and Georgos Agelopoulos
- 45 **An Ethnography of Global Environmentalism**
Becoming Friends of the Earth
Caroline Gatt
- 46 **Linguistic and Material Intimacies of Cell Phones**
Edited by Joshua A. Bell and Joel C. Kuipers
- 47 **Hybrid Communities**
Biosocial Approaches to Domestication and Other Trans-species Relationships
Edited by Charles Stépanoff and Jean-Denis Vigne
- 48 **Orthodox Christian Material Culture**
Of People and Things in the Making of Heaven
Timothy Carroll
- 49 **Bureaucracy, Integration and Suspicion in the Welfare State**
Mark Graham
- 50 **Slogans**
Subjection, Subversion and the Politics of Neoliberalism
Edited by Nicolette Makovicky, Anne-Christine Trémon, and Sheyla S. Zandonai

www.routledge.com/Routledge-Studies-in-Anthropology/book-series/SE0724

Slogans

Subjection, Subversion, and the
Politics of Neoliberalism

Edited by
Nicolette Makovicky,
Anne-Christine Trémon,
and Sheyla S. Zandonai

An electronic version of this book is freely available, thanks to the support of libraries working with Knowledge Unlatched (KU). KU is a collaborative initiative designed to make high quality books Open Access for the public good. The Open Access ISBN for this book is 9780429486401. More information about the initiative and links to the Open Access version can be found at www.knowledgeunlatched.org.

First published 2019
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2019 selection and editorial matter, Nicolette Makovicky, Anne-Christine Trémon, and Sheyla S. Zandonai; individual chapters, the contributors

The right of Nicolette Makovicky, Anne-Christine Trémon, and Sheyla S. Zandonai to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalog record has been requested for this book

ISBN: 978-1-138-59837-9 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-367-58405-4 (pbk)

ISBN: 978-0-429-48640-1 (ebk)

DOI: 10.4324/9780429486401

Typeset in Sabon
by Newgen Publishing UK

Contents

<i>List of figures</i>	vii
<i>Notes on contributors</i>	viii
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xi
<i>Preface</i>	xiii
JONATHAN FRIEDMAN	
1 Slogans: circulations, contestations, and current engagements with neoliberal policies	1
NICOLETTE MAKOVICKY, ANNE-CHRISTINE TRÉMON, AND SHEYLA S. ZANDONAI	
2 From place name to slogan name in Abu Dhabi: nation branding and the “economy of renown”	24
SOPHIE CORBILLÉ	
3 “Start here”: foundational slogans in Shenzhen, China	50
ANNE-CHRISTINE TRÉMON	
4 “Macau people ruling Macau”: gambling governance and ethnicity in postcolonial China	77
SHEYLA S. ZANDONAI	
5 “The dog in the manger”: neoliberal slogans at war in the Peruvian Amazon	101
PETER BILLE LARSEN	
6 “Work pays”: the moral politics of labour in post-socialist Slovakia	122
NICOLETTE MAKOVICKY	

vi *Contents*

7 “We are building Poland”: on the history and
circulation of a contested slogan 145
JARO STACUL

Index 166

Figures

2.1	Reem Island, Abu Dhabi 2011	28
2.2	Advertisement for Abu Dhabi in the Paris metro 2015	32
2.3	Abu Dhabi 2007 – Main Island	39
3.1	Universiade slogan	51
3.2	Lineage hall <i>duilian</i>	58

Contributors

Sophie Corbillé, University of Paris-Sorbonne, is Assistant Professor in communication studies and anthropology at the Graduate School of Journalism and Communication (CELSA) of Sorbonne Université. Her research and publications focus on urban issues (residential practices, market and fashion places, tourism and heritage policies, urban identities) in the context of globalization. Her main research field site is Paris, where she has done ethnographic research on the gentrification of north-east neighbourhoods (*Paris Bourgeoise Paris Bohème. La ruée vers l'est*, Presses Universitaires de France, 2013) and on second homes bought or rented by foreigners who live regularly in Paris and perform the “myth of Parisianity” (*Paris résidence secondaire. Enquête sur ces habitants d’un nouveau genre*, Belin/Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 2013). Her most recent work studies how professionals in the branding and communication business act as key players to the contemporary economy by creating “value” as part of what she calls a global “economy of renown”.

Jonathan Friedman, University of San Diego/EHESS, earned his PhD at Columbia University in 1972. He is Emeritus Professor of Anthropology at the University of California, San Diego, and former directeur d’études à l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), Paris. Friedman has done most of his research in Hawaii and the Republic of Congo and has published widely on themes of cultural identity and global processes, global systemic anthropology, transformation of the nation state, multiculturalism, and migration. Friedman is the author and editor of numerous volumes, including *Cultural Identity and Global Process* (SAGE 1994), *Consumption and Identity* (Taylor & Francis 1994), *Globalization, the State, and Violence* (AltaMira Press 2004), *Worlds on the Move: Globalisation, Migration, and Cultural Security* (IB Tauris 2004), and *Historical Transformations: The Anthropology of Global Systems* (AltaMira Press 2011).

Peter Bille Larsen, University of Geneva, is a researcher at The Environmental Governance and Territorial Development Hub/Institute, University of Geneva. He has a PhD in Social Anthropology and Development Studies

from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, and the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), Paris, followed by a visiting fellowship at the University of Oxford. Larsen works on human–environmental relationships, environmental governance, and sustainable development issues. He has a strong interest in the intersection between environmental conservation and social equity concerns, including work in the field of World Heritage policy and practice, international rights standards and the anthropology of international organizations. His primary fieldwork sites include the Peruvian Amazon, Vietnam, and global policy arenas, and he has worked extensively with international organizations, NGOs, and community-based organizations, seeking to translate anthropological insights into better practice on the ground. His recent books include *Post-Frontier Resource Governance* (Palgrave 2015), *The Anthropology of Conservation NGOs* (Palgrave, co-edited with Dan Brockington, 2017), and *World Heritage and Human Rights* (Routledge 2018).

Nicolette Makovicky, University of Oxford, is Departmental Lecturer in Russian and Eastern European Studies at the School of Global and Area Studies, University of Oxford. She previously held a junior research fellowship at Wolfson College, Oxford and was tutor in the History of Design at the Royal College of Art until 2011. Her research considers the impact of socio-economic reforms and European Union integration policies on historically embedded modes of economic activity in Central Europe, including artisanal crafts and food production. She has a particular theoretical interest in processes of value creation, work ethics, entrepreneurialism, gender, and citizenship in a post-socialist society. Makovicky is editor of *Neoliberalism, Personhood, and Postsocialism: Enterprising Selves in Changing Economies* (Ashgate/Routledge 2014) and co-editor of *Economies of Favour after Socialism* (University of Oxford Press 2016).

Jaro Stacul, University of Victoria, is Assistant Teaching Professor at the Department of Anthropology of the University of Victoria, British Columbia, Canada. He holds a PhD in Social Anthropology from the University of Cambridge and has held full-time positions in various academic institutions in Britain, Bulgaria, and Canada. His research focuses on issues of nationalism and the state in Europe, examining the ways in which political messages emanating from national, regional, and other centres are accommodated to local-level discourses. He has conducted research on local identity in the Italian Alps of Trentino since the mid-1990s and has researched the redevelopment of post-industrial spaces in Poland since 2008. Stacul is the author of the monograph, *The Bounded Field: Localism and Local Identity in an Italian Alpine Valley* (Berghahn Books 2003), as well as co-editor of the volume *Crossing European Boundaries. Beyond Conventional Geographical Categories* (Berghahn 2005).

Anne-Christine Trémon, University of Lausanne, is Senior Lecturer in Anthropology at the Université de Lausanne, Switzerland. She obtained her PhD at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), Paris, in 2005 and since then she has been a postdoctoral fellow at the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica in Taiwan, a lecturer at EHESS and the Ecole normale supérieure (ENS) in Paris, and a EURIAS fellow at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in 2012–13. Her research examines Chinese globalization and the Chinese diaspora in a global anthropological and historical perspective. She is the author of *Chinois en Polynésie française. Migration, métissage, diaspora* (Société d'ethnologie 2010) and has published over twenty journal articles in, among others, *l'Homme*, *Anthropological Theory*, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* and the *J.R.A.I.*

Sheyla S. Zandonai, Laboratoire Architecture Anthropologie, ENSAPLV, is Research Associate at the Laboratoire Architecture Anthropologie (LAA), École Nationale Supérieure d'Architecture de Paris La Villette (France) and Editor-in-Chief of Macau News Agency (MNA). She holds a PhD in Social Anthropology and Ethnology from the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), Paris. Zandonai was a postdoctoral fellow at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Macau and Lecturer of Ethnography at Trent University, Canada. She is the author of several articles and book chapters, including “The Portuguese calçada in Macau: Paving residual colonialism with a new cultural history of place”, in *Current Anthropology* (2018), and “Encounter and counter-narratives of heritage in Macau”, in *Citizens, Civil Society and Heritage-Making in Asia* (ISEAS 2017). Her current research examines the relationships between urban transformation and the political economy of gambling and tourism, and the emergence of practices and discourses of heritage in Macau.

Acknowledgements

A shorter, earlier version of the chapter “‘Work pays’: Populism and the moral politics of labour in Slovakia”, by Nicolette Makovicky, was published as “‘Work pays’: Slovak neoliberalism as ‘authoritarian populism’”, in *Focaal: Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology* (67 (2013): 77–90).

Part of Anne-Christine Trémon’s chapter, “‘Start here’: Foundational slogans in Shenzhen, China”, was first published in *Focaal: Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology* (71 (2015): 71–85) under the title “Local capitalism and neoliberalization in a Shenzhen former lineage-village”.



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

Preface

Jonathan Friedman

The subject of slogans is often a mere peripheral interest, especially in anthropology, where I for one have not encountered any discussion of the order presented here. This volume investigates the nature and effect of slogans in relation to another issue, neoliberalism, which has itself been subject to much debate in the social sciences in general.

Slogans are motivated by an ideological thrust and aim to muster support, perhaps to even form subjects. But as they are a kind of tip of the iceberg phenomenon they are dependent on the larger imaginaries in which they are embedded. They are effective insofar as they resonate with the population, or a portion of the population, that might be designated as the target of such slogans.

Slogans work best within social movements, especially within what Francesco Alberoni (1968) refers to as “the nascent state” – a state in which the individual subject engages totally with the larger collective identity, offering his own individual intentionality for that of the movement itself. As movements lose steam they lose adherent subjects as well, and the increased distance to engagement, the reindividuation of the subject leads to a loss of power of attraction of slogans as of other symbols of the movement. This might be offered as a contextual addition to the assertions of speech-act theory in which it appears as if it is the linguistic expressions themselves that embody causal efficacy. When X orders me to “open the door!”, I am only prone to do so if I accept the nature of the relation implied by such an order.

In the Republic of Congo, the Marxist–Leninist government produced innumerable slogans that may have had some power in the past but, in the face of increasing impoverishment in relation to the enormous wealth of the political class, led to a cynical and ironic reinterpretation or rewriting of the slogans. Thus, the earlier “*Tout pour le peuple. Rien que pour le peuple*” (Everything for the people. Only for the people) was mostly erased, leaving simply “*Rien pour le peuple*” (Nothing for the people). This might also be understood as a slogan or perhaps anti-slogan. It is the kind of communication that circulated outside the official public media, usually called “*radio trottoir*” (sidewalk radio / urban myth) where it was

assumed that the only truth about reality could be found. Counter hegemonic slogans are perhaps especially revealing about the structures of power in which they occur. Consider the expression common in Poland before the fall of the communist regime, “If it’s not in the newspapers, it must be true”, which might qualify as an anti-slogan insofar as it resonated with a large population.

The Chinese example, “To Become Rich is Glorious”, is interesting as a transfer of neoliberalism to individual subjectivity. This is well known in discussions of American capitalism whose various metaphors are infamous and certainly not limited to the so-called neoliberal era. So, the question of the nature of the economic basis of the slogans is not completely transparent. The issue of neoliberalism itself needs to be clarified and this has, of course, been done in variously contested ways. The two issues are that of the nature of the economy itself and the nature of the forms of economic governance. For a great many researchers, not least Keynesians, neoliberalism is the unfettering of capitalism from the regulations of the state. Thus, one could argue that the brief period that began in the 1980s and is associated with the triumph of Hayek and that other Friedman is in fact a return to an older economic order that predated World War II.¹ In this interpretation the *neo* refers to the return in perhaps a different form of what once was the norm for the capitalist market. Unfettered, or more unfettered, capitalism is what neoliberalism refers to in this interpretation. But if we reflect just a little on the word itself, we might glimpse what is something of a slogan in itself: neoliberalism as an epoch that accounts for everything we may have thought was right with globalization but turned out to be quite the contrary, increasing class polarization, the race to the bottom for the once-working class. While not perhaps slogans, these keywords – that is, millennial capitalism, neoliberal globalization, and so forth – are clearly negative to neoliberal regimes but they successfully reify them as well.

If neoliberalism is not a regime but one of a number of variants of governance within capitalism, then one might ask what it is that produces the slogan effect. It might be suggested that it is precisely the movement character of neoliberal politics itself. When politicians harp on the dead hand of government and on the way the liberation of the market will lead to growth and thus employment and more welfare they are engaging a discourse. And there is, of course, the individualist rhetoric of mobility, “If you work hard you will make it”, always opposed to the welfare model, but only in appearance. These are slogans that have been generated by capitalism as a general phenomenon, not by neoliberalism, and these slogans have been around for a couple of centuries, stronger in colonial settler societies and weaker in state-centred regimes. One might perhaps speak of a substrate of imaginary propositions about the world that reflect and reinforce the categories themselves. The contrast is much stronger in

those parts of the world in which capitalist markets are relatively new, as in China.

The core of this process is not the application of Hayek's ideology of the free market but a more sinister historical process. The decline of a more vertical organization of the economy, referred to by some as Fordism, was not simply a competition for new models, but the result of the crisis of Fordism itself. The latter was dependent on an expansionist hegemonic power that disintegrated at the same time as capital became increasingly decentralized. From the end of World War II to the 1970s, class relations became increasingly egalitarian in terms of income, and profit on capital began to decline significantly. The crisis of the 1970s led to the fragmentation of large firms and the reemergence of finance capital, which absorbed a formerly industrial capital at the same time as a massive amount of productive capital was exported to East and South Asia. In the West the equalization process was reversed, and a new period of class polarization ensued in which there was long-term unemployment in the productive sector, a combined pauperization and yuppification. Neoliberalism was the product of this process, generated out of the projects of deregulation (primarily of financial markets) and flexibilization of accumulation as a whole, including the flexibilization of labour as well as the flexibilization of investment processes. None of these projects are new, of course, but are simply part of the nature of capitalist accumulation. The liberal in all of this refers to the notion that markets are self-regulating and need no external regulation. This is one side of an old debate that has pervaded the twentieth as well as the twenty-first century. But the reality to which it refers is clearly not applicable equally to all places, that is, countries. The opening up of Eastern European economies to global capital flows did produce a great deal of displacement and unemployment, including the production of flexible migrant labour to Western Europe. For many this was simply the "price of freedom" (another interesting slogan). But to call it all neoliberalism is to misplace the category. Likewise, in much of Africa and other parts of the Global South, private capital has indeed been on the rampage, but not in any way that represents a rupture with the past. In fact, it might be argued that neoliberalism as a term has become something of a slogan among those who oppose what is in fact simply global capitalism.

There is also the issue of counter slogans, more cynical in appearance, as discussed above, but applicable to the neoliberal turn itself. The excellent book by Angelique Haugerud, *No Billionaire Left Behind*, discusses such slogans, the most striking of which is "It's a class war, and we are winning", displayed in a satirical demonstration in New York City (Haugerud 2013: 5). And this is, of course, more than mere satire, since it has become increasingly possible to express an explicit class position – in the United States, at least – which is apparently the heart of neoliberalism.

Slogans are revealing of the explicit intentionalities and mystifications of the social order. And they work for precisely those reasons. If slogans are one of the royal roads (if less mystified) to the unconscious of contemporary capitalism, then the present collection will surely provide crucial insights into the state of the world. As the editors demonstrate in their introduction, there is a specific process involved in slogan formation, one that articulates the projects of elites as of movements to their conditions of realization. The performative aspect of slogans is central to this collection, but it is, of course, often a failure. The Obama “Yes We Can” became the “Yes Who Can?” and, later, the “No We Can’t”. The editors refer to a number of mechanisms involved in the production of slogans that fuse performative intentionality and subject formation, or at least the formation of contexts in which the slogans resonate with their audiences. There is a kind of secular ritualization about slogans, but they are clearly much weaker in relation to those at whom they are directed, since they are not organized into ritual acts. Alberoni, in his classic *Movement and Institution*, discusses the way charisma is generated as a social phenomenon in which individual subjects invest themselves in a larger social project to which they willingly submit. The “nascent state” of such movements generates representations of the world that are based on a fracture in relation to the past and a performance of historical discontinuity. The slogans produced within such states are eminently successful, since they totally resonate with the subjects they engage. But, in the decline of movements, slogans take on a different characteristic, like rituals in an often-desperate attempt to maintain control over the movement after it has lost its immediate attraction – that is, after it has become institutionalized.² Slogans are usually produced in a situation of engagement in which they carry significant emotional impact, but their careers extend far beyond such nascent moments, and they are caught in the ensuing distancing and opposing slogans they leave in their wake.

Thus, slogans can function as expressions of initial engagement, but they have an array of possible uses in situations in which engagement is not present. Irony is one important transformation of slogans, and here one might even suggest it is part of an oppositional engagement that inverts the values of the dominant ideology. Again, from the Congo there is a famous poster in which President Sassou offers a basket of tomatoes to a poor citizen. “This is for you!”. The image is supposed to represent the generosity of the president providing development to the people. The oppositional interpretation is that he gives the people some tomatoes and keeps the rest for himself, not least the gigantic oil revenues. Terms and images that condense a set of values, intentions, and conditions in order to represent a break with the past are an important way of gaining insight into the relation between the politics of the imaginary and the real conditions in which the former emerge. Thus, slogans can be understood as the top of the discursive iceberg, as we suggested above, and an important symbolic key to the regimes in which they are formed, transformed, and reinterpreted.

Notes

- 1 Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992), economist and philosopher, and Milton Friedman (1912–2006) economist and statistician. Both were among the cofounders of the Mount Pelerin Society in 1947 and both won a Nobel prize in economics (in 1974 and 1976 respectively).
- 2 In Alberoni's analysis, the transformation of movements into institutional forms, i.e., either state or nonstate organizations, leads to a weakening of their force of attraction. Rituals are a way of symbolically reinforcing the lost power of such movements.

References

- Alberoni, Francesco. 1968. *Statu Nascenti*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Haugerud, Angeliq. 2013. *No Billionaire Left Behind: Satirical Activism in America*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

1 Slogans

Circulations, contestations, and current engagements with neoliberal policies

*Nicolette Makovicky, Anne-Christine Trémon,
and Sheyla S. Zandonai*

In January 2017, the billionaire businessman Donald Trump became the forty-fifth president of the United States. During his campaign, he courted controversy by promising to repeal the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”), tear up several free trade agreements, and stop illegal immigration from Mexico by building a wall along the nation’s southern border. Together with his brash presentation style and his disdain for political correctness, his pledge to “Make America Great Again” won over a significant portion of the voting public. His choice of slogan illustrates some of the paradoxes of the slogan as a contemporary political technology. For example, while positioned himself as a Washington outsider, Trump was not the first candidate to have campaigned using this catchphrase: it originated in the 1980 presidential campaign of fellow Republican Ronald Reagan.¹ Famously embracing social media as his chosen political platform, he nevertheless chose a slogan with pedigree. Unlike Reagan, however, Trump recognized the commercial and political value of the phrase and successfully applied to the United States Patent and Trademark Office for the exclusive right to use the slogan for political purposes.² Thus, while the slogan was formulated as an encouragement to every citizen to act in the interest of the nation, it was Trump himself who took possession over any moral and commercial benefit it generated. And yet, he soon learned that neither words nor the meanings attached to them could be contained by fiat. Very quickly, the phrase became part of American popular culture, featuring in a parody of his campaign by the makers of the satirical television show *South Park*, and becoming the inspiration for title of the rock band Fall Out Boy’s remix album *Make America Psycho Again*.³

In this volume, we examine the production and use of political slogans in various locales across the globe, seeking to throw light on how words are employed to persuade and affect publics in an age of global capitalism. This is an age where 24-hour news and social media platforms such as Twitter have bestowed new value to the political soundbite, and – as seen in the case of Donald Trump above – the pervasiveness of advertising and

branding has rendered the use of language commodifiable. In other words, we consider how the slogan as a particular cultural form operates in settings where political performance is shaped by the neoliberal logic of governance. In the ethnographic case studies collected for this volume, slogans emerge as the product of both government policy and popular action in circumstances of accelerated economic and political transitions. Taking us from Slovakia, Poland, Peru, and Abu Dhabi to Macau and Shenzhen in the People's Republic of China, these studies illustrate how slogans are an integral part of state experiments in governance and models of sovereignty, accompanying stringent austerity measures as well as economic booms. In doing so, they illustrate how verbal and graphic slogans can convey – but also contest – the values and norms that lie at the core of neoliberal ideologies. Indeed, paying careful attention to the semantic content of slogans and their pragmatics, we analyse the ways in which slogans legitimate, but may also subvert, neoliberal agendas, and thereby champion and contest the construction of new economies, societies, and/or citizens. In other words, we treat slogans as an entry point for examining the relations between neoliberalism – as a globally circulating set of discourses and policies – and the specific practices by which these policies are interpreted, enacted, or rejected on the ground.

In so doing, we highlight two main aspects of the relationship between slogans and neoliberalism. First, we show how slogans are – more often than not – expressions of the orientations and instruments of governance that lie at the core of neoliberal policies. Designed to foster support for and contribute to the enactment of government strategies, their semantic content is partly born out of the rhetoric and logics of neoliberalism, and their forms and uses reflect a shift in policy and practice. Yet, slogans are not just *about* neoliberalism. As a number of the chapters illustrate, slogans may be constructed in order to promote the marketing and further integration of cities and regions into the global economy. In the context of economic austerity and welfare reform, they are used to promote the ethics of hard work and enterprise in a bid to make otherwise socially and culturally divisive policies acceptable. And, in spite of their calls for rupture, slogans everywhere tend to create a sense of coherence between the past, the present, and the future. While they may appear to be anonymous statements and sources of diffuse power, slogans are also discursive elements aimed at constituting subjects in the Foucauldian sense. In fact, as “formulas with an effect” (Navarro 2005), we argue that slogans may function not only as a tool for the legitimization of novel political agendas, but they can become a mode of their implementation as well. Given that their very forms and uses reflect a shift towards a new mode of governing populations, we consider slogans – as formulaic statements with performative effects – tools of neoliberal governance.

Discourse, however, is also always dialectic, a two-way street. The second aspect we wish to highlight is therefore the way in which slogans are reinterpreted

or redeployed by their intended audiences. Documenting how slogans circulate from one period or regime to another – socialist to post-socialist, colonial to post-colonial, and (at different scales) the city and the nation, the local and the global – we show how people at times use slogans and imbue them with meaning in ways unforeseen by their designers. This circulation renders them subject to processes of decontextualization and recontextualization: slogans are recycled from one historical situation to another; they migrate between different cultural genres and tropes, and between different ethical and ideological regimes. Owing to their semantic ambiguity and borrowings from established cultural genres, neoliberal slogans can also find fertile ground among populations by appealing to local-level values and cultural understandings. This, however, leaves them open to reinvention and reinterpretation by citizens in ways that contest, as well as foster, neoliberalism: as some of the cases authors demonstrate, slogans can offer counter narratives to official discourse, thus playing a central part in countering the neoliberal policies and processes they were designed to promote. Members of the target audience – nonstate actors – may even use the self-same slogans to defy the neoliberal projects they were designed to enact. Therefore, rather than simply seeing slogans as modes of hegemonic mobilization, the essays collected here analyse the uses made of slogans and the ways in which their meanings are accommodated to local experiences and perceptions or are changed and twisted to contest neoliberal economic policies and their intended reforms.

Despite the growing interest in contemporary political cultures, anthropologists have only rarely taken slogans as an object of study. Peter Benson and Stuart Kirsch (2010) are amongst the few to have addressed slogans as such, focusing on how commercial slogans and the manipulation of language are used by corporations to manage or neutralize social critique. Others have addressed slogans in a more peripheral way: slogans are used as introductory vignettes in Borneman and Senders' (2008) work on the Berlin love-parade; slogans are mentioned in studies of political symbols and rituals in post-socialist Eastern Europe (Kurti 1990, Miklavcic 2008); and they introduce Angelique Haugerud's monograph on satirical activism in the United States (2013). Thus, while we make selective use of linguistic anthropology to offer some observations about what makes slogans persuasive, we do not set out to conduct a strictly linguistic analysis of their efficacy.⁴ Rather, our focus in this volume is primarily on exploring slogans as a matter of neoliberal rhetoric and as tools for political performance. We believe that giving serious consideration to slogans as a particular cultural form can foster an understanding of the dynamics of social life in its fundamentally interactive dimension. Exploring not only how slogans are used as expressions and instruments of governance that lie at the core of neoliberal policies, but also their linguistic, symbolic, and ideological "promiscuity", enables us to examine particular formations of neoliberalism across multiple spatial and temporal scales (see Brenner and Theodore 2002, Hilgers 2010, 2012, Leitner *et al.* 2007, Nonini 2008).

We start this Introduction with a definition and genealogy of slogans in order to emphasize the features that establish a particular relationship between them and the politics of neoliberalization. We suggest that one of the reasons as to why slogans have gained increased importance in recent years is not only because of the medialization of politics and the new media – which have undeniably heightened the circulating power of catchwords and phrases – but also because of the global spread of neoliberalism. In the following two sections, we introduce the various contributions, describing how neoliberal stretches of discourse are made into slogans, and suggest some of the mechanisms that account for their effective circulation. We start by examining how the selection of particular stretches of language and their “entextualization” in the form of neoliberal slogans refract changes in policy and attempts at their political and social legitimation. Adopting and adjusting Alan Rumsey’s concept of “condensation”, we illustrate how slogans seek to generate public support and promote political unity by collapsing frames of interaction and reference. Processes of condensation and entextualization, however, leave slogans open for reappropriation and reinterpretation by the public. Expanding on this point in the final section, we show how both slogans and anti-slogans pilfer their form and content from everyday language – from well-known cultural idioms, and discursive tropes. Thus, along with processes of condensation and entextualization, we suggest that the mechanism of sloganization – and the persuasiveness of slogans themselves – rely on processes of “iteration”. Furthermore, their semantic openness allows slogans and the slogan form to be manipulated through their recontextualization, or even to be subject to mockery and dismissal.

Slogans and the uneven politics of neoliberalization

Scholars have typically treated slogans as convenient entry points to study the reproduction of economic power and political authority, paying less attention to their formal patterning and symbolic content (although, see Navarro Dominguez 2005, Reboul 1975). Historians, linguists, and political scientists alike have considered slogans primarily as part of political rhetoric, conceptualizing them as instruments of persuasion and authoritative control (e.g., Feldman and Landtsheer 1998, Beard 2000, Charteris-Black 2006). Political slogans, they tell us, are able to “simplify complicated ideas, express group ideology and goals, and create identification, provoke violent confrontations, and fulfil hopes for the future” (Lu 1999: 493). They are “significant symbols” of society, their study revealing the “cultural and ideological formation of society”, as well as providing an index of a group’s norms and values (Stewart *et al.* 1995: 403, Denton 1980). The effectiveness of slogans as a political technology, however, has always remained a question of scholarly debate. In one early study, for example, political scientist Daniel Jacobs argued that decades of Stalinist propaganda reduced

Soviet slogans to nothing more than “ritualistic incantations” (1957: 299). Working on communist propaganda in China, Lucy Xing Lu (1999, 2004) has drawn the opposite conclusion, arguing that political slogans were an effective means of political indoctrination, which succeeded in destroying traditional culture and remoulding society.

Although comprehensive, this body of literature is built on problematic assumptions. The conception of slogans as “significant symbols” of society, for example, presumes that ideologies reside in text and can easily be “read” off by their audience – be they citizens or scholars. However, as Norman Fairclough has taught us, ideologies do not sit *in* text, but are “located in structures that constitute the outcome of past events and the conditions for current events, and in the events themselves as they reproduce and transform their conditioning structures” (1999: 308). Thus, while the form and content of a text may bear the imprint of ideological processes and structures, these generally feature as implicit assumptions rather than explicit expressions. Indeed, as recent work by Dominic Boyer and Alexei Yurchak has shown, political discontent in both late Soviet Russia and the contemporary United States follow “the formal features of authoritative discourse to such an extent” that it is difficult to tell whether they reflect “sincere support, subtle ridicule, or a peculiar mixture of the two” (2010: 179).⁵ Their observations are supported by a growing body of anthropological work that focuses on political satire, parody, and language as a type of contemporary political engagement and contestation, and shows how linguistic tropes and political soundbites circulate between figures of the political establishment and those political actors who sit in opposition (Bernal 2013, Bardan 2012, Haugerud 2013, Molé 2013, Petrović 2015).

With these reservations in mind, the starting point for our own analysis is that slogans fit a “pragmatic model” of language (Mertz 1996), according to which the meaning of texts is neither literal nor final but depends on the context and on the reader’s interpretation. Starting from Fernando Domingo Navarro’s definition of the slogan as a “formula with effect” (2005: 270), we suggest that slogans relate to language as a mode of action and social practice and should therefore be approached as performative discourse rather than simply as a form of directive speech. More than any other form of discourse, slogans illustrate the fact that speaking and writing are acts on a par with other social practices, rather than simply being a commentary on them (Austin 1962, Butler 1990, 1997). Indeed, the etymology of the word indicates that slogans are in general sense speech acts, or graphic speech acts, since their utterances are both graphic and verbal: an anglicization of the Scottish Gaelic *sluagh-ghairm* (*sluagh* means “army”, “host” + *gairm* “cry”), slogans were used in heraldry as a motto that appeared on a coat of arms of Scottish clans to “inspire the members...to fight fiercely for its protection or the extension of its glory” (Xing 1999: 492; cf., Bloch and Wartburg 1991).⁶ The fact that the term *slogan* is now used distinctly from “war cry” or “motto” underscores that

it has taken on a specific meaning over the centuries. Distinguishing the slogan from the motto (*devise*, in French), the French philosopher Olivier Reboul notes that the former carries a pejorative connotation (which may be stronger in French than in English) as in the verb “sloganeering”, which he explains as a result of the fact that “the incentive power of the slogan always exceeds its explicit sense” (Reboul 1975: 42).

Suggesting a connection between the (re)production of authority and the performative nature of language, Reboul’s notion of “incentive power” seems to be a good starting point to reflect on the function of the slogan as an instrument of neoliberal governance. Indeed, this conceptualization sheds light on the fact that slogans have a second life as an instrument of the market: as Reboul himself notes, commercial and political slogans have been tightly interwoven since the term itself was introduced into the domain of politics in the late nineteenth century (Reboul 1975). The very first political slogan is said to have been “Full Dinner Pail”, a Republican slogan in the 1900 American presidential election campaign, which was used to emphasize the prosperity of William McKinley’s first term and to position himself as an ally of working-class America. While slogans have moved back and forth from politics to commercial advertisement at different times in different national settings (Reboul 1975: 14), on the whole, they appear to have shifted further towards a mixed “politico-commercial” genre since the 1970s (Herdam 2010, Zhao and Belk 2008). Indeed, many of the slogans studied in this volume circulate in a grey area in which the domains of politics and consumption overlap: while their job is to “sell” government policies at the local or national levels, political slogans often end up being appropriated and manipulated by corporations and civic organizations alike.

Owing to their hybrid genealogy, which situates slogans halfway between politics and advertising, slogans can be seen as iconic of the expansion of both market principles and economic language to novel domains of social life and human activity that has accompanied neoliberalization (Fairclough 2006, Dean 2009). Recently, scholars across several disciplines have linked language, ideology, and economic liberalism, casting light on the degree to which political rhetoric and everyday speech have incorporated the vocabulary of the market (Block, Gray, and Holborow 2013, Holborow 2007, 2015, 2016, Nguyen 2016). As Doreen Massey has argued, this change in vocabulary has been “crucial to the establishment of neoliberal hegemony” by reclassifying the “roles, identities, and relationships – of people, places, and institutions – and the practices which enact them” (2013: 10–11). She claims that the language of (economic) interest has thereby been universalized: not only has liberty become defined as self-interest and freedom from restraint by the state, but the message promulgated is that “in the end, individual interests are the only reality that matters; that those interests are purely monetary; and that so-called values are only a means of pursuing selfish ends by other means” (*ibid.*: 10). Indeed, charting the increasing use of corporate language and vocabularies of the market in public policy discourse,

Marnie Holborow (2016: 44) has shown how the re-description of citizens and subjects into customers and entrepreneurs induces the individual to “translate herself voluntarily into a marketable commodity”, turning him or her into “an object equipped to compete on the market” (*ibid.*).

As we shall see below, the blurring of political and commercial categories of slogans, as well as their potential use for the propagation of an individualist doctrine, point to some of the ways in which slogans operate as “neoliberal formulas” in the ethnographic contexts. However, the formulation, circulation, and use of these slogans also raises certain questions about the limits of the nature of neoliberalism as a discursive formation. As Lucy Xing Lu (1999: 503) notes, the same celebration of economic citizenship has accompanied the introduction of “market socialism” in China, where propaganda has gradually shifted away from celebrating the collective (“The Commune is Good”) toward the praise of economic success and individual prosperity (“To Become Rich is Glorious”). Whether such a change in political rhetoric reflects a “neoliberalization” of Chinese society, however, is a matter of debate (cf., Breslin 2006, Nonini 2008, Kipnis 2011, and the chapters by Zandonai and Trémon). Indeed, if neoliberalism is in fact a free-floating, de-territorialized “migratory technology of governing” that creates new production, labour markets and “flexible” citizens (Ong 2007: 5), the question becomes not only how far its technologies are understood to reach, but how exactly their co-habitation with other ethical regimes is arranged, and to what degree neoliberal assemblages are actually qualitatively different from their bedfellows.

Over the past decade, there has been increasing fatigue with the use of neoliberalism as an analytical tool, with various scholars questioning its imprecise use and granted omnipresence by other scholars (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010, Peck and Tickell 2007, Clarke 2008).⁷ Like its conceptual cousin, “globalization”, the term has suffered a great degree of theoretical ambiguity, resulting in its application as a label for certain kinds of economic projects, models of governance, and politico-ethical doctrines, as well as its use as a descriptor for their alleged real-life outcomes. As John Clarke (2008) has argued, the category of neoliberalism has to some extent become the victim of its own success: its ability to cohabit with any number of theoretical perspectives has fuelled a tendency to label it the cause and effect of a number of socio-economic and political changes across the globe (also Falk Moore 1999; Leitner *et al.* 2007, Peck and Tickell 2007). Therefore, many scholars have pointed out the necessity of distinguishing between neoliberalism as doctrine and theory and neoliberalism as process and practice (Harvey 2005, Nonini 2008: 149–150; Leitner *et al.* 2007: 5), or between neoliberal economic policies as conception, inspiration or model, and the results, formations, and impact that they promote and produce (Brenner and Theodore 2002).

On the whole, a consensus has emerged advocating the analysis of “actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner and Theodore 2002, Gledhill 2004) in

order to accommodate the geographically uneven and contextually embedded nature of neoliberal projects and processes (Gupta and Ferguson 2002, Peck and Tickell 2002, Stenning *et al.* 2010). The contributors to this volume investigate what might be called spaces of neoliberal experimentation at different scales. The chapters by Jaro Stacul and Nicolette Makovicky analyse the consequences of social and economic reforms instigated by post-socialist states seeking to further their “transition” to a purer form of market capitalism. Peter Larsen’s chapter, on the other hand, explores the responses of the Peruvian Amazonian populations to processes of privatization and deregulation, and to austerity measures implemented by their respective governments. The chapters by Anne-Christine Trémon and Sheyla S. Zandonai on two cities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Shenzhen, a Special Economic Zone (SEZ), and Macau, a former Portuguese colony and a Special Administrative Region (SAR) since 1999, respectively, follow the “late-socialist” (Zhang 2006) or “neo-socialist” (Pieke 2005) Chinese state in its efforts to accelerate the liberalization of the country’s new spaces of capitalist accumulation. And finally, also at the city scale, Corbillé’s chapter illustrates how, in a context of deep transformations, the production of Abu Dhabi’s territorial brand renders the cityscape and the city name itself “commodifiable”.

In short, the contributions to this volume explore how slogans as formulaic statements participate in the construction of neoliberalism as a historically and geographically situated phenomenon, investigating the encounter of neoliberal policies and techniques of governance with other political, economic, and ethical regimes within a range of capitalist formations. Regardless of whether they deal with situations of economic downturn and crisis or contexts of economic boom, what the contributions show is the unevenness of the process of neoliberalization, its contradictions, and the deep, contested histories in which it is embedded. Focusing on slogans as a cultural form, the contributors thus take an oblique approach to the study of neoliberalism, following Mathieu Hilgers’s (2012: 91) call to study the “effects of neoliberalism” as they are “anchored in bodies, representations, and practices”. Neoliberalism, he argues, must simultaneously be approached as a matter of structure, culture, and governmentality because “even when representations and practices are partially a product or effect of infrastructures, they become embodied, undergo a relatively autonomous development”, and may “persist in new forms and continue to affect new structures” as they develop (*ibid.*). Documenting the circulation of political slogans (and counter-slogans) from one period or regime to another – socialist to post-socialist, colonial to postcolonial – and at different scales – the city and the nation, the local and the global – the contributions show how forms of government are intertwined with economic and cultural processes that participate in neoliberalization while signalling its historicity, limits, and contestations.

In the following two sections we sketch out the ways in which this exercise can prove anthropologically illuminating. Turning to aspects of linguistic

pragmatics and speech act theory, we start by showing how slogans are closely related to linguistic units that are more usual objects of anthropological scrutiny, such as magic spells or ritual formulas. Furthermore, we show how, in order to lend themselves credibility, slogans alternately draw on historical precedents or seek to draw a line under an uncomfortable past in order to herald a prosperous future. We argue that by conflating historical time and/or acting as propitiatory formulas, as well as appropriating and recycling well-known verbal and textual genres, slogans promote the sense that the candidates, policies, or reforms they advocate are not only ineluctable, but also likely a desirable step towards a common good.

Neoliberal “formulas with effect”

Anthropologists have long studied the role that language plays in the construction of economic inequalities, power relations, and political hierarchy in everyday and ritual speech (e.g., Bloch 1974, Bourdieu 1991, Friedrich 1989, Irvine 1989, Gal 1989). They have shown how state power and political legitimacy are asserted through ritual language and symbols (e.g., Malinowski 1948, Gluckman 1963, Abeles 1990, Kapferer 1988) and how the “performative” power of narratives such as myths, can spur the construction of shared identities (e.g., Sewell 1992; Sutton 2000; Jolly 2010). Rhetorical by nature, slogans not only propagate or encapsulate representations. In contrast to myths, they also aim to bring about a particular mode of being and a course of action. Accordingly, slogans are conceptually as related to magical spells, divinatory formulas, and ceremonial oration as they are to the profane (political) speech act. Not only do they fit Bronislaw Malinowski’s (1935) view of language as a mode of action (rather than primarily as a means of thinking), as in the obscure formulas of Trobriand garden magic he studied, slogans also aim to bring a desired reality into existence by acting upon the world. This connection has already been made by Alfred Gell (2006), who observed that both magic and the commercial advertisement aim to fulfil an event by announcing it. Magic, he argued, is divination “plus” accomplishment; it draws its efficacy from invisible forces that regulate the world to remove contingency and ensure orderliness (2006: 34). In fact, several slogans in this volume bear a close resemblance to magic spells, in that they announce the achievement of a desired future.

One example is the Chinese slogan “Start Here, Make a Difference” examined by Anne-Christine Trémon. Specifically designed for a sporting event in Shenzhen, China, Trémon notes, it expressed a broader, recurrent narrative of the city as a laboratory for China’s economic reforms – and therefore a brand new city that prefigures the future, and a place where anyone can start anew. Indeed, taking the form of a *duilian*, a genre of traditional Chinese auspicious formulas, the very structure of the slogan carries a propitiatory function in that it announces future prosperity. The talismanic

properties of slogans are also highlighted by Sophie Corbillé in her chapter on Abu Dhabi's territorial brand. Tracing its development by the Office of the Brand Abu Dhabi, she shows how in the process of nation branding the name Abu Dhabi becomes a sort of "slogan-name". This "faitiche" (Latour 2009) is meant to capture the essence of the country and create value by attracting tourists, investors, and global trade to the region. Such territorial brands, which circulate in an "economy of renown", Corbillé argues, are generally situated at the crossroads of commodification and heritage production.

Corbillé's chapter points to what differentiates slogans from magic spells and divinatory formulas: slogans are aimed at acting upon people, rather than on invisible forces. Formulated in order to appeal to a general public or audience, their function is to produce inclusive and uniting effects that operate across cultural, political, and socio-economic boundaries by engendering collective responses and action. Indeed, as Jaro Stacul writes in his contribution on the slogan "We Are Building Poland", what makes certain political catchphrases powerful is precisely the fact that they make people believe that they can play a prominent role in changes occurring at a national level. Sheyla S. Zandonai's study of the slogan "Macau People Ruling Macau" offers perhaps the best example of how catchphrases are employed to foster national sentiment and political consensus. The slogan came to prominence following Macau's handover to the PRC in 1999, when the city became an SAR. Appealing directly to the Chineseness of Macau residents, the slogan revoked Portuguese colonialism and invited them to write a new chapter in their common history with mainland China. By synchronizing Macau's and its residents' future within the future of China, Zandonai argues, the slogan not only espoused a sense of continuity through a historical reorientation, but it channelled a new rhetoric of Chineseness into the core of the local nation-building process. Thus, while appearing at first to be a pledge to political autonomy, "Macau People Ruling Macau" ultimately emerged as an instrument of governance aimed at the successful implementation of a new Chinese political agenda of reunification.

Alan Rumsey (2000, 2009) has highlighted the ability of ritual language to project and produce such political unity. Borrowing the notion of condensation from Carlo Severi's (2004) work on shamanistic speech, Rumsey argues that in political speech, as in ritual, frames of interaction may fuse and collapse one into another. This happens when, for example, big men pronounce oratory speeches in their own name and simultaneously in the names of the segmentary groups they claim to represent: what occurs is a synthesis of the immediate frame of interaction – the here and now of the discursive situation – and the larger frame of interaction projected in the background. Following Rumsey, we can see how slogans are formulas that operate as "condensers" in that they are an unspecified address to each individual and, simultaneously, to a body of citizens. Employing the notion of condensation, however, requires the reverse perspective to the one commonly

adopted by scholars of the speech act, as well as by students of magic and ritual language: instead of starting from the micro-discursive situation and examining how speech comes to include elements of the wider context, we take slogans as our starting point and look at how they are generated and circulate within a macro-political and social context. Most of the slogans examined in the present book are not uttered in the same way as oratory speeches or magical spells – in a micro-context of interaction by a particular person (political leader, shaman or magician) – but rather are anonymously circulated in a macro-discursive situation. Thus, instead of describing how the speech produced by a singular individual comes to condense frames of interaction, we ask how slogans – as anonymous and public formulas – are the result of processes of condensation in neoliberal political rhetoric.

The clearest indication of how slogans perform this work of condensation can be seen in the way they purposefully collapse the individual and collective. As in the case of “Macau People Ruling Macau”, the function of many slogans is to generate unity across ethnic, ideological, or class divides by appealing to voluntarist and collectivist ideals. Stacul’s “We Are Building Poland” belongs to a recent genre of political slogans that have made use of the collective pronoun “*we*” to legitimize controversial reforms by claiming common suffering (George Osborne’s “We Are All in it Together”) and calling for united action (Barack Obama’s “Yes We Can”).⁸ And, yet, one common feature of the slogans studied in this volume is that they condense individual and collective levels of action by promoting the notion that the collective societal project rests on *individual* effort, involvement, responsibility, and success. Slogans such as Trémon’s “Start Here, Make a Difference”, do not openly appeal to a popular (or ideological) notion of the common good or direct individuals to sacrifice themselves for the good of the collective. Indeed, unlike many of their historical predecessors, they appear less explicitly propagandistic or bound to a particular ideological source, speaking to citizens as private individuals rather than as a body politic (for example, as “comrades” or “workers”). Rather, they promote what might be broadly characterized as liberal ideals of civic responsibility: the ethics of hard work, of enterprise, and individual accountability.

As such, the slogans studied here appear to be less about mobilizing crowds around a particular ideology or political leader, and more about legitimizing reform policies aimed at turning them into modern political and economic subjects. This is perhaps best illustrated in Nicolette Makovicky’s chapter examining the Slovak slogan “Work Pays”. Coined by the centre-right Dzurinda government to promote the introduction of a new “workfare regime”, the slogan advocated (neo)liberal notions of responsible citizenship by presenting labour as the crux of the relationship between the citizen and the state. Makovicky illustrates the degree to which the slogan’s formulation relied not only on stereotypes of the Roma minority as “idle”, but also resonated with vernacular concepts of honest labour shared by the general population. Furthermore, she shows how it echoed the discursive coupling

of employment and citizenship found in communist-era celebrations of collective labour, leading to the resurrection and repetition of long-standing political tropes. Makovicky's chapter thus illustrates how slogans operate not only by appealing to popular notions of civic responsibility, but also by establishing particular historically and ideologically circumscribed connections between speech and its larger context. Similarly, Daniel Knight (2015) shows how the slogan "Together We Ate It," coined by the Greek deputy prime minister Theodoros Pangalos in 2010, gained semantic currency through its employment of the phrase "to eat" – a well-known metaphor for pilfering and theft in Greece. Suggesting every Greek citizen had in some way played a part in creating a ruinous culture of corruption and profligacy ("to eat"), following the vertiginous debt the state contracted and accrued during the "fat" years of economic boom in the early 2000s, Pangalos's statement implied that every individual had to bear his or her share of the stringent austerity measures subsequently imposed by the so-called "Troika".⁹

As we see below, the process of condensation is often accompanied in this way by a certain degree of linguistic and discursive iteration across space and time. When writing about the social relationship between producers of discourse and those who use it ("originators" and "copiers"), linguistic anthropologist Greg Urban observes that "[t]he more discourse is overtly coded as nonpersonal, that is, not as something generated by the originator but as transmitted by him or her, and the less it is linked to a present context and circumstances, the more likely will the copier be to replicate it; hence, the more shareable it is" (1996: 40). The replicability of discourse is a consequence of its "entextualization" (Urban 1996: 21), that is, the "process of rendering a given instance of discourse text, detachable from its local context" (Bauman and Briggs 1990: 73). The chapters show how, as anonymous and public formulas addressed simultaneously to individuals and at the body politic, slogans are themselves the product of entextualization: slogans make text of neoliberal discourse in an attempt to normalize recent social, economic, and political transformations. In that sense, entextualization involves a certain degree of decontextualization of historical transitions and cultural tropes, as well as a dehistoricization of neoliberal policies themselves. Indeed, most slogans come across as common sense, almost simplistic propositions about how things are and how they ought to be, reinforcing their claims to represent universal truths. Like the frequent use of inchoate pronouns ("*we*"), to which we come back below, such claims of universalism enhance the use and re-use of slogans across very different interactional contexts.

Together with the concept of condensation, then, paying attention to instances of iteration enables us to grapple with the effective power of slogans as not simply the product of their referential content and/or syntactic structure, but also as conveyed by their interplay with micro/macro frames of action and interaction in the situated politics of neoliberalization.

Furthermore, this approach allows us to consider how neoliberal policies may be accommodated and, at times, resisted. As several of the chapters in this volume demonstrate, economic marginalization and political dissatisfaction often lead populations to inscribe slogans into alternative regimes of value and historical narratives to contest and resist policies of neoliberal reform. In the last section, we show how the appropriation of slogans by institutions and individuals, and their manipulation, point to ways in which publics may question and contest, as well as reaffirm, the legitimacy of neoliberal projects.

Subverting neoliberal slogans

The majority of the slogans under scrutiny in this volume depend on some form of mimicry for their performative efficacy. They borrow liberally from local cultural and textual genres (aphorisms, mottos, or vernacular sayings) as well as from older traditions of political propaganda. Such widespread use of linguistic commonplaces suggests that everywhere the form of slogans matters as much as their semantic content, with their poetic function being as important – if not more – than their referential function. Indeed, when defining poetics as the manipulation of formal features of discourse, Roman Jakobson (1960) referred to Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1952 United States presidential campaign slogan “I Like Ike” as a prime example. Following Judith Butler, we further argue that, as speech acts, the efficacy of slogans rests in their iteration across contexts. As Butler points out, a speech “act” “is not a momentary happening, but a certain nexus of temporal horizons, the condensation of an iterability that exceeds the moment it occasions” (1997: 14). The delimitation of the ‘total speech situation’ (which, according to Austin, makes the force of an utterance effective) is fraught with difficulty, since the ritualized moment of utterance is never merely a single moment, but one of “condensed historicity: it exceeds itself in past and future directions, an effect of prior and future invocations that constitute and escape the instance of utterance” (Butler 1997: 3). As for performatives in general, but likely even more in the case of political slogans aiming at normalizing neoliberal discourse, the effect of slogans depends on their citation of local vernaculars, and on their own repetition.

Such citation and iteration may be material, as well as discursive. Thus, Corbillé shows how the graphic simplicity of Abu Dhabi’s brand-slogan ensured that the logo could be reproduced in several different colours and be transferred onto a wide range of objects and materials, maximizing its circulation in and beyond Emirati society. The aim of this exercise, Corbillé argues, was not only to make the logo (and its referent) instantly recognizable, but to turn every citizen, resident, and corporate partner into an “ambassador” for the brand – that is, both a vehicle for its promotion and individually responsible for the nation’s reputation. Nearly all the slogans studied here are reproduced graphically in print, on banners, and even on

walls as graffiti, this case perhaps best shows how processes of sloganization rely on formal familiarity and replicability to (as well as cultural and historical references) for their efficacy.

An even more compelling example of iteration is given by Stacul, in his chapter on the slogan “We Are Building Poland”. Coined by the Polish Civic Platform-led government coalition in 2010, it was used to promote urban renewal projects throughout the country. These projects included the former Vladimir Lenin shipyard, in the city of Gdańsk, erstwhile birthplace of the anti-communist Solidarity movement. Deconstructing the slogan, Stacul notes that the term “building” (*budować* in Polish) was popularized by the postwar Communist Party. Thus, while the slogan was meant to be a specific reference to the post-socialist modernization projects of the contemporary liberal-conservative Civic Platform-led government, “We Are Building Poland” emerged as a nearly word-for-word copy of communist-era slogans, evoking both a sense of continuity and impending change. Furthermore, while the slogan was meant to convey ideas of urban renewal and the reconstruction of society after the demise of socialism, the notion of “building” was interpreted quite differently by former shipyard workers who had been socially and economically marginalized by post-socialist reform. Mocking the neoliberal agenda of the political elites and their narratives of history, protesting workers ironically declared that they were “Destroying Poland” – a sentiment that they acted out through a number of symbolically iconoclastic acts of defacement.

Such a deflection and creative reformulation of slogans act as signals of the limits of neoliberal hegemony. Slogans are appropriated and recycled by their audience; their intended messages may eventually be subverted through irony or popular deconstruction. As Edward Sapir (1921), Richard Bauman (1983), and Michael Silverstein (1985) have shown, “conflicts between proponents of competing (linguistic) forms and ideologies are often played out in diachronic shifts between patterns for relating form and meaning” (Bauman and Briggs 1990: 66). In much the same vein, Judith Butler, taking the revaluation of terms such as “queer” as an example, argued that speech can be “returned” to its speaker in a different form, be cited against its original purposes, and perform a reversal of effects. Citizens may distort a slogan’s original semantic content and form by using local cultural idioms and discursive tropes. In Trémon’s chapter on Shenzhen, the lineage slogan reveals how local notions of enterprise are inextricably linked to traditional values of filial piety and kinship solidarity. The village’s communal project – a set of collectively owned joint-stock companies managing local real estate assets – is increasingly regarded by the Shenzhen authorities as culturally and economically retrograde. Openly celebrating lineage heritage, and ironically mirroring the city slogan, the local slogan implicitly defies modernizing reforms aimed at secularizing and dismantling community relations.

Slogans may thus also undergo “decondensation”. Refusing to identify with the “us”, the “together”, and the “people” that are promoted by slogans, citizens may distort their original semantic content and form by

using local cultural idioms and discursive tropes. As several of the chapters in this volume demonstrate, economic marginalization and political dissatisfaction often lead populations to inscribe slogans into alternative regimes of value and historical narrative to contest and resist policies of neoliberal reform. Thus, in the process of being “de-condensed” – the de-coupling of the individual and the collective – slogans also rest on, and may undergo, re-textualization. Daniel Knight (2015), observing that Greeks were largely unconvinced by efforts to persuade them of their collective responsibility for the economic crises, notes that emotive and/or ironic counter-slogans became a crucial way for citizens to voice their opposition to neoliberal austerity measures. Popular slogans of protest and resistance from other events were reborn and recycled, such as the “Bread, Education, Freedom” from the 1973 Athens Polytechnic uprising. Reflecting people’s increasing fear of returning to times of hunger, violent conflict, and foreign occupation, these counter-slogans are part of a wider temporal project that links past crises with the present situation while proposing possible alternative futures. The formal familiarity and semantic openness that enables political slogans to circulate also allows for their appropriation and manipulation by citizens.

Indeed, if the efficacy of slogans relies at least in part on the decontextualization of their messages, one effective method of subverting their intended meaning is precisely to recontextualize slogans (and their elements) by inserting them into an alternative historical narrative. And yet, as Peter Bille Larsen notes in his chapter, neoliberal reforms and policies are not always met with resistance. He shows how, in Peru, the move to allow for the private titling of Amazonian resources elicited heterogeneous responses from indigenous groups who occupied the land in question. Larsen traces this plurality back to former president Garcia’s use of the “Dog in the Manger” analogy, arguing that it effectively quashed public debate about reform measures by presenting the issue in terms of a moral choice between an ideological collective “them” against a neoliberal pragmatic “us”. Interpreting the reform program as a replay of the centuries-old discrimination of Peru’s aboriginal population, indigenous actors became polarized in their response to deregulation. Producing counter-slogans (“The Rainforest Is Not for Sale”) and political manifestos (“Live Well Without Neoliberalism”), some groups chose to openly protest the government’s proposals, with devastating consequences. Embracing a neoliberal partnership philosophy, others sought to avoid bloodshed by negotiating agreements between enterprises and their communities. Arguing that slogans are structuring *dispositifs* that “render politics meaningful and frame the contours of political action”, Larsen thus demonstrates how neoliberal slogans have the power to both incite resistance and reinforce neoliberal ideals and identities at the same time.

Thus, while popular reactions to neoliberal discourse and political sloganeering may initially appear to be unambiguous, the ideological effects of both neoliberal governance and resistance against it may be less clear-cut. Investigating how slogans reflect and enforce neoliberal transformations,

as well as how they are circulated, used and, at times, countered by populations, can therefore shed light on the ways in which the global spread of neoliberalism is negotiated by social agency. If anything, the chapters in this volume demonstrate that one cannot simply equate the agency of popular actors with resistance against the neoliberal discourse and ideology of politicians and policymakers.¹⁰ Rather, agency is equally present in the ways in which slogans promoting neoliberal policies find positive receptions among social actors: agentive capacity is entailed not only in those acts that result in change, but also in those that aim towards continuity, stasis, and stability (Mahmood 2001: 212). We thus follow Gledhill (2004) in considering that the hegemony of neoliberalism is not only contestable when it is being challenged on the ground, but also when it resonates with a diversity of local “grassroots” values and principles. Asking questions about the limitations of political rhetoric should mitigate the danger of assimilating neoliberal aspects of economic governance with a wide range of more ambiguous governing actions, and thus overstating their unique nature and their importance (see Kipnis 2008: 280).

In keeping with the above, slogans not only allow us to critically assess the degree to which neoliberalism can be analysed as a particular “style” of government; they also illustrate how forms of discourse (and thus, of government itself) are subject to ideological interpretation on the part of its subjects. Shedding light on the uses (and “misuses”) of slogans, we show how the appropriation of the slogan form by institutions and citizens can lead not only to their manipulation through recontextualization of the immediate context, but even their mockery and dismissal. However, it can also lead to the recasting of popular sentiments and vernacular politics within the logics of neoliberal politics and the values of economic liberalism. Indeed, Corbillé’s opening chapter in this book is the one that places the most emphasis on the production of a slogan, while Stacul’s closing chapter focuses most on their ironic reinterpretation. The rest of the chapters are broadly distributed along a continuum between these two poles. Ultimately, what the contributions to this volume illustrate, then, is how slogans – along with the concepts of progress, democracy, development, enterprise, and responsibility – are taken up in the creation of new forms of political language at *both* institutional and grassroots levels in ways that may contest, as well as reaffirm, the legitimacy of the neoliberal project.

Notes

- 1 Tumulty, Karen (January 18, 2017). “How Donald Trump came up with ‘Make America Great Again’”. *The Washington Post*.
- 2 U.S. Service Mark 4,773,272. United States Patent and Trademark Office. Retrieved November 18, 2016.
- 3 “Fall Out Boy Shares Disney ‘Jungle Book’ Cover, Plots Rapper-Filled Remix Album”. *Billboard*. October 23, 2015. Retrieved November 12, 2015.

- 4 Although the focus is on slogans – rhetorical devices – our approach to slogans is therefore much broader than the one dismissed by Lempert and Silverstein (2012), i.e., the classical tradition of applied rhetoric. We are interested, rather, in how the selection of particular stretches of language and their “entextualization” in the form of neoliberal slogans refract changes in policy and attempts at their political and social legitimation and refutation. Anthropologists studying processes of neoliberalization have so far paid little attention to the linguistic dimensions of these processes. We join in the efforts of a small number of scholars (Gershon 2011, 2016; Inoue 2012; Urciuoli and LaDousa 2013; Graan 2016a, b) who have recently sought to bridge this divide between linguistic anthropological approaches to political economy and sociocultural anthropological approaches to contemporary neoliberalism.
- 5 In addition, the link between social dynamics and forms of language is itself ideologically shaped: “linguistic ideologies”, or culturally variable notions of how communication works as a social process, mediate the relationship between linguistic form and the sociopolitical context (Bauman and Briggs 2003, Woolard and Schieffelin 1994). Thus, linguistic production “does not just reflect ideology, but also produces and reproduces it” (Besnier 2009: 99, see also Gal 1989).
- 6 We understand slogans not just in the extended sense listed in second by the Merriam-Webster dictionary as “a brief attention-getting phrase used in advertising or promotion” but also in the first sense (after “war cry”): “a word or phrase used to express a characteristic position or stand or a goal to be achieved”.
- 7 Neoliberalism has been understood as a political economy of capitalist expansion that operates through an aggressive process of commodification, privatization, and redistribution of resources in favour of capital (e.g., Harvey 1987, 2003, 2005). Alternatively, neoliberalism has been conceptualized as a globally migrating technique of regulatory control that “relies on market knowledge and calculations for a politics of subjection and subject-making” (e.g., Ong 1999, 2006:13, also Rose 1996, 1999). Seeking to bridge the gap between these two approaches, scholars have recently brought together Marx and Foucault, sometimes via the work of Gramsci and Stuart Hall, to understand neoliberalism as a particular, historically situated articulation of state, market and citizenship (e.g., Neveling 2014, 2015; Wacquant 2009, 2012). Building further on this perspective, others have shed a welcome light on the growing inequality, class polarization, disenfranchisement, and technocratic authoritarianism that has accompanied projects of neoliberalization (e.g., Kasmir and Carbonella 2015, Kalb and Halmai 2011, Carrier and Kalb 2015).
- 8 Although perhaps more prominent in the political slogans of the recent era of economic austerity, this appeal to an imagined collective is not necessarily in itself a neoliberal characteristic. Indeed, Michael Carrithers has already pointed out that the rhetorical use of such “inchoate pronouns” (I, you, we, they) can energize nationalist and patriotic sentiment by linking “the intimate, modest, and domestic with the broad and generic” (2008: 184, also Herzfeld 1997).
- 9 Daniel Knight’s (2015) article, which was originally intended for publication in this volume, could not be included due to permission reasons.
- 10 For a critique of the tendency to find (and romanticize) “resistance” in the uses of specific language forms, as in Scott’s notion of “hidden transcript”, see Gal (1995).

References

- Abeles, Marc. 1990. *Anthropologie de l'État*. Paris: Armand Colin.
- Abu Lughod, Lila. 1990. "The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of Power through Bedouin Women". *American Ethnologist*, vol. 17(1), pp. 41–55.
- Austin, John. 1962. *How to Do Things with Words*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bardan, Alice. 2012. "The Tattlers' Tattle: Fake News, Linguistic National Intimacy, and New Media in Romania". *Popular Communication*, vol. 10(1–2), pp. 145–157.
- Bauman, Richard. 1983. *Let Your Words Be Few: Symbolism of Speaking and Silence Among Seventeenth-Century Quakers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bauman, Richard and Charles L. Briggs. 1990. "Poetics and Performance as Critical Perspectives on Language and Social Life". *Annual Review of Anthropology*, vol. 19, pp. 59–88.
- . 2003. *Voices of Modernity: Language Ideologies and the Politics of Inequality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Beard, Adrian. 2000. *The Language of Politics*. London: Routledge.
- Benson, Peter and Stuart Kirsch. 2010. "Corporate Oxymorons". *Dialectical Anthropology*, vol. 34, pp. 35–48.
- Bernal, Victoria. 2013. "Please Forget Democracy and Justice: Eritrean Politics and the Powers of Humor". *American Ethnologist*, vol. 40(2), pp. 300–339.
- Besnier, Niko. 2009. *Gossip and the Everyday Production of Politics*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Block, David, John Gray, and Marnie Holborow. 2013. *Neoliberalism and Applied Linguistics*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Bloch, Maurice. 1974. "Symbols, Song, Dance and Features of Articulation: Is Religion an Extreme Form of Traditional Authority?" *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, vol. 15(1), pp. 55–81.
- Bloch, Oscar and Walther V. Wartburg. 1991. *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue française*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Borneman, John and Stefan Senders. 2008. "Politics Without a Head: Is the 'Love Parade' a New Form of Political Identification?". *Cultural Anthropology*, vol. 15(2), pp. 294–317.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991. *Language and Symbolic Power*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Boyer, Dominic and Alexei Yurchak. 2010. "American Stib: Or, What Late-Socialist Aesthetics of Parody Reveal About Contemporary Political Culture in the West". *Cultural Anthropology*, vol. 25(2), pp. 179–222.
- Brenner, Neil, Jamie Peck, and Nik Theodore. 2010. "Variegated Neoliberalization: Geographies, Modalities, and Pathways". *Global Networks*, vol. 10, pp. 182–222.
- Brenner, Neil and Nik Theodore. 2002. "Cities and Geographies of 'Actually Existing Neoliberalism'". *Antipode*, vol. 34(3), pp. 349–379.
- Breslin, Shaun. 2006. "Serving the Market or Serving the Party: Neo-liberalism in China". In Richard Robison (ed.), *The Neo-liberal Revolution: Forging the Market State*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 114–134.
- Butler, Judith. 1997. *Excitable Speech, a Politics of the Performative*. New York: Routledge.

- Carrier, James and Don Kalb. 2015. *Anthropologies of Class: Power, Practice, and Inequality*. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press.
- Carrithers, Michael. 2008. "From Inchoate Pronouns to Proper Nouns: A Theory Fragment with 9/11, Gertrude Stein, and an East German Ethnography." *History and Anthropology*, vol. 19(2), pp. 161–186.
- Charteris-Black, Jonathan. 2006. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Clarke, John. 2008. "Living with/in and Without Neoliberalism", *Focaal—European Journal of Anthropology*, vol. 51, pp. 135–147.
- Dean, Jodi. 2009. *Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Denton, Robert. 1980. "The Rhetorical Functions of Slogans: Classifications and Characteristics". *Communications Quarterly*, vol. 28(2), pp. 10–18.
- Fairclough, Norman. 1999. *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*. London: Longman.
- Falk Moore, Sally. 1999. "Reflections on the Comaroff Lecture". *American Ethnologist*, vol. 26(2), pp. 304–306.
- Feldman, Ofer and Christ'l Landtsheer. 1998. *Politically Speaking: A Worldwide Examination of Language Use in Public*. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Friedrich, Paul. 1989. "Language, Ideology and Political Economy". *American Anthropologist*, vol. 9(1–2), pp. 295–312.
- Gal, Susan. 1989. "Language and Political Economy". *Annual Review of Anthropology*, vol. 18, pp. 345–367.
- . 1995. "Language and the 'Arts of Resistance'". *Cultural Anthropology*, vol. 10(3), pp. 407–424.
- . 2016. "Language and Political Economy: An Afterward". *HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory*, vol. 6(3), pp. 331–335.
- Gal, Susan and Kathryn Woolard, eds. 2001. *Language and Publics: The Making of Authority*. Manchester: St. Jerome Publishing.
- Gell, Alfred. 2006 "Parfum, symbolisme et enchantement". *Terrain*, vol. 47 – special issue, "Odeurs", Online. URL: <http://terrain.revues.org/index4229.html>.
- Gershon, Iana. 2011. "Neoliberal Agency". *Current Anthropology* vol. 52(4), pp. 537–555.
- . 2016. "I'm Not a Businessman, I'm a Business, Man": Typing the Neoliberal Self into a Branded Existence". *HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory*, vol. 6(3), pp. 223–246.
- Gledhill, John. 2004. "Neoliberalism". In David Nugent and Joan Vincent (eds.), *A Companion to the Anthropology of Politics*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 332–348.
- Gluckman, Max. [1963] 2004. *Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa: Collected Essays with an Autobiographical Introduction*. London: Routledge.
- Graan, Andrew. 2016a. "The Nation Brand Regime: Nation Branding and the Semiotic Regimentation of Public Communication in Contemporary Macedonia". *Signs and Society*, vol. 4(S1), pp. S70–S105.
- . 2016b. "Introduction to Hau Special Section: Language and Political Economy, Revisited". *Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory*, vol. 6(3), pp. 139–149.
- Gupta, Akhil, Ferguson, James. 2002. "Spatializing states: Toward an ethnography of neoliberal governmentality". *American Ethnologist*, vol. 29(4), pp. 981–1002.

- Harvey, David. 1987. "Flexible Accumulation Through Urbanization: Reflections on 'Postmodernism' in the American City". *Antipode*, vol. 19(3), pp. 260–286.
- . 2003. *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Haugerud, Angelique. 2013. *No Billionaire Left Behind: Satirical Activism in America*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Herdam, Ayaal. 2010. "Keine Experimente!", *Discours* [Online], 6. URL: <http://discours.revues.org/7753>; DOI: 10.4000/discours.7753.
- Herzfeld, Michael. 1997. *Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics and the Nation State*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Hilgers, Mathieu. 2012. "The Historicity of the Neoliberal State". *Social Anthropology/Anthropologie sociale*, vol. 20(1), February, pp. 80–94.
- Holborow, Marnie. 2007. "Language, Ideology, and Neoliberalism". *Journal of Language and Politics*, vol. 6(1), pp. 51–73.
- . 2015. *Language and Neoliberalism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- . 2016. "Neoliberal Key Words, Political Economy, and the Relevance of Ideology". *Key Words*, vol. 14, pp. 38–54.
- Houseman, Michael and Severi, Carlo. 1998. *Naven or the Other Self: An Essay on Ritual Action*. Leiden: Brill.
- Inoue, Miyako. 2012. "Neoliberal Speech Acts: The Equal Opportunity Law and Projects of the Self in a Japanese Corporate Office". In *Global Futures in East Asia*, eds. Ann Anagnost, Andrea Arai, and Ren Hai. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 197–221.
- Irvine, Judith. 1989. "When Talk Isn't Cheap: Language and Political Economy". *American Ethnologist*, vol. 16, pp. 248–267.
- Jacobs Daniel N. 1957. "Slogans and Soviet Politics". *American Slavic and East European Review*, vol. 16(3), October, pp. 291–300.
- Jakobson, Roman. 1960. "Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics". In T. A. Sebeok (ed.), *Style in Language*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 350–377.
- Jolly, Éric. 2010. "L'épopée en contexte Variantes et usages politiques de deux récits épiques (Mali/Guinée)". *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales*, vol. 4, pp. 885–912.
- Kalb, Don and Gábor Halmai. 2011. *Headlines of Nation, Subtexts of Class. Working Class Populism and the Return of the Repressed in Neoliberal Europe*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books.
- Kapferer, Bruce. 1988. *Legends of People, Myths of State. Violence, Intolerance and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia*. Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Kasmir, Sharryn and August Carbonella. 2015. *Blood and Fire: Toward a Global Anthropology of Labor*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books.
- Kingfisher, Catherine and Jeff Maskovsky. 2008. "Introduction. The Limits of Neoliberalism". *Critique of Anthropology*, vol. 28(2), pp. 115–126.
- Kipnis, Andrew. 2008. "Audit Cultures: Neoliberal Governmentality, Socialist Legacy, or Technologies of Governing?". *American Ethnologist*, vol. 35(2), pp. 275–289.
- . 2011. *Governing Educational Desire: Culture, Politics, and Schooling in China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Knight, Daniel M. 2015. "Wit and Greece's Economic Crisis: Ironic Slogans, Food, and Antiausterity Sentiments". *American Ethnologist*, vol. 42, pp. 230–246.

- Kurti Laszlo. 1990. "People vs. State: Political Rituals in Contemporary Hungary". *Anthropology Today*, vol. 6(2), pp. 5–8.
- Latour, Bruno. 2009. *Sur le culte des dieux faitiches suivi de Iconoclash*. Paris: Éditions La Découverte.
- Leitner, Helga, Jamie Peck, and Eric Sheppard. 2007. *Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers*. New York: The Guilford Press.
- Lempert, Michael and Michael Silverstein. 2012. *Creatures of Politics. Media, Message and the American Presidency*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Mahmood, Saba. 2001. "Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival". *Cultural Anthropology*, vol. 16(2), pp. 202–236.
- Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1935. *Coral Gardens and Their Magic*, vol. 2. London: Allen and Unwin.
- . [1948] 1954. *Magic, Science and Religion, and Other Essays*. Reprint, Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 2003 (11th Edition). Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster.
- Mertz, Elizabeth. 1996. "Recontextualization as Socialization: Text and Pragmatics in the Law School Classroom". In Michael Silverstein and Greg Urban (eds.), *Natural Histories of Discourse*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 229–249.
- Miklavcic, Alessandra. 2008. "Slogans and Graffiti: Postmemory Among Youth in the Italo-Slovenian Borderland". *American Ethnologist*, vol. 35(3), pp. 440–435.
- Molé, Noelle. 2013. "Trusted Puppets, Tarnished Politicians: Humor and Cynicism in Berlusconi's Italy". *American Ethnologist*, vol. 40(2), pp. 288–299.
- Navarro Dominguez, Fernando. 2005. "La rhétorique du slogan, cliché, idéologie et communication". *Bulletin hispanique*, 1, pp. 265–282.
- Neveling, Patrick. 2014. "Three Shades of Embeddedness, State Capitalism as the Informal Economy, Emic Notions of the Anti-Market, and Counterfeit Garments in the Mauritian Export Processing Zone". *Research in Economic Anthropology*, vol. 34, pp. 65–94.
- . 2015. "Flexible Capitalism and Transactional Orders in Colonial and Postcolonial Mauritius: A Post-Occidentalist View". In Jens Kjaerulf, (ed.), *Flexible Capitalism: Exchange and Ambiguity at Work*, Oxford: Berghahn, pp. 207–234.
- Nguyen, Kim Hong. 2016. *Rhetoric in Neoliberalism*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Nonini, Donald M. 2008. "Is China Becoming Neoliberal?". *Critique of Anthropology*, vol. 28(2), pp. 145–176.
- Ong, Aihwa. 1999. *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- . 2006. *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- . 2007. "Neoliberalism as Mobile Technology". *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, vol. 32(1), pp. 3–8.
- Peck, Jamie and Adam Tickell. 2002. "Neoliberalizing Space". *Antipode*, vol. 34(3), pp. 380–404.

- . 2007. "Conceptualizing Neoliberalism, Thinking Thatcherism". In Helga Leitner, *et al.* (eds.), *Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers*. New York: The Guilford Press, pp. 26–50.
- Petrović, Tanja. 2015. "Serbia in the Mirror: Parodying Political and Media Discourses". *Slavic Review*, vol. 74(2), pp. 288–310.
- Pieke, Frank. 2005. *The Reinvention of the Party-State. The Training and Careers of China's Political Elite*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Reboul, Olivier. 1975. *Le slogan*. Paris: Editions Complexe.
- Rose, Nikolas. 1996. *Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rumsey, Alan. 2000. "Agency, Personhood and the 'I' of Discourse in the Pacific and Beyond". *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Society*, vol. 6(1), pp. 101–115.
- . 2009. "L'anthropologie a-t-elle besoin de sa propre pragmatique?". In Bonhomme, Julien and Severi, Carlo (eds.), "Paroles en actes", *Cahiers d'Anthropologie sociale*. Paris: L'Herne, pp. 43–62.
- Sapir, Edward. 1921. *Language: An Introduction to the Study of Speech*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
- Severi, Carlo, 2004. "Capturing Imagination. A Cognitive Approach to Cultural Complexity". *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, vol. 10(4), December, pp. 815–838.
- Sewell, William H. Jr. 1992. "Introduction: Narratives and Social Identities". Special Section: Narrative Analysis in Social Science. *Social Science History*, vol. 16(3), Fall, pp. 479–488.
- Silverstein, Michael. 1985. Language and the Culture of Gender: At the Intersection of Structure, Usage, and Ideology. In Elizabeth Mertz and Richard J. Parmentier (eds.), *Semiotic Mediation. Sociocultural and Psychological Perspectives*. Cambridge, Mass: Academic Press, pp. 219–259.
- Smith, Pierre. 1979. "Aspects de l'organisation des rites". In Michel Izard and Pierre Smith (eds.), *La Fonction symbolique*. Paris: Gallimard, pp. 139–170.
- Stenning, Alison, Smith, Adrian, Rochovska, Alena *et al.* 2010. *Domesticating Neoliberalism: Spaces of Economic Practice and Social Reproduction in Post-Socialist Cities*. Oxford: Wiley.
- Stewart, Charles J., Craig Allan Smith, and Robert E. Denton, Jr. 1995. *Persuasion and Social Movements*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.
- Sutton, Donald S. 2000. "Myth Making on an Ethnic Frontier, The Cult of the Heavenly Kings of West Hunan, 1715–1996." *Modern China*, vol. 26(4) (October), pp. 448–500.
- Urban, Greg. 1996. "Entextualization, Replication, and Power". In Michael Silverstein and Greg Urban (eds.), *Natural Histories of Discourse*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 21–44.
- Urciuoli, Bonnie and Chaise LaDousa. 2013. "Language Management/Labor." *Annual Review of Anthropology*, vol. 42, pp. 175–190.
- Wacquant, Loïc. 2009. *Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- . 2012. "Three Steps to a Historical Anthropology of Actually Existing Neoliberalism". *Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale*, vol. 20(1), pp. 66–71.
- Woolard, Kathryn A., Schieffelin Bambi B. 1994. "Language Ideology". *Annual Review of Anthropology*, vol. 23, pp. 55–82.

- Xing, Lu. 1999. "An Ideological/Cultural Analysis of Political Slogans in Communist China". *Discourse & Society*, vol. 10(4), pp. 487–508.
- . 2004. *Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Zhang, Li. 2006. "Contesting Spatial Modernity in Late Socialist China". *Current Anthropology*, vol. 47(3) pp. 461–484.
- Zhao, Xin and Russel Belk. 2008. "Politicizing Consumer Culture: Advertising's Appropriation of Political Ideology in China's Social Transition", *Journal of Consumer Research*, vol. 35(2), pp. 231–244.

2 From place name to slogan name in Abu Dhabi

Nation branding and the “economy of renown”

Sophie Corbillé

“Be Berlin”, “I Amsterdam”, “So Toulouse”, “GREAT Britain”, “It’s Me!bourne”, “Lond-on”, as well as “Only Lyon”. These are a collection of slogans and promises accompanying the development of what communications and marketing professionals call territorial, country, or national brands. It is a phenomenon that is becoming commonplace and concerns all sorts of territories, from Dubai to Great Britain, Singapore to Peru, France to India. This diffusion is related to globalization and urbanization that place localities in competition with one another: cities, metropolises, regions, and even nations are now seeking to construct and reinforce their attractiveness to invite inhabitants, investors and consumers as well as tourists. The phenomenon is also part of the expansion of the neoliberal economic model across many parts of the world, a process also often accompanied by an expansion of the commercial sphere.

The enlargement of marketing to territories is one of the signs of this generalized commodification. Initially confined to products and trademarks, marketing practices now no longer seem to have any limits, as everything – or nearly everything – can become a brand and be sold: the media, which are increasingly being defined as brands (Patrin-Leclère 2013); universities that adopt clearly expressed marketing strategies; individuals who can no longer escape the phenomenon through the development of “personal branding” (Gershon 2016), as well as, of course, territories and nations (Aronczyk 2007; Graan 2013). Consequently, territorial brands clearly represent a social and symbolic fact that merits examination. My intention here is to treat these brands as material and immaterial objects that are characteristic of contemporary societies, and as objects invested with meanings and representation. As Manning and Uplisashvili argue in their work on “ethnographic brands in Postsocialist Georgia”, brands are “Janus faced...between the material world of commodities and the immaterial world of signs – immaterial wealth such as goodwill (Manning 2006, 2007: 629).

Based on the analysis of the creation of its brand in 2007 by the Abu Dhabi emirate, this chapter seeks to examine the links between slogans as defined

in the introduction to this volume – “a formula with effect” – the contemporary economy characterized by the spread of neoliberalism, and the context of socioeconomic and urban change. Priority is given to understanding the production of this type of object and accompanying discourses and rhetoric, rather than its circulation and reception. The task is in fact to understand the methodologies, beliefs, and imaginative approaches developed by professionals in the marketing sector with regard to the production of territorial or national brands. How do they produce a territorial brand? What challenges underlie this type of construction? How does this kind of object “work”? And to what extent do territorial brands take part in the global economy?

In the case of territorial or national brands, it is generally the name of the place itself that makes the slogan. The name is occasionally reworked in what is often a tautological formula, as can be seen with “Be Berlin” or “London”, whereas in other cases, such as the Abu Dhabi brand, the name in itself seems sufficient. This results from the specificities of the contemporary economy characterized at the same time by growing competitiveness within the capitalist system and the spread of neoliberalism. In this context, players and places are engaged in strategies to create “monopoly rents”, seeking to affirm their difference by placing emphasis on their identity (Harvey 2001, 2005; Graan 2013; Corbillé 2017). And what is more unique and specific than a name? Starting from this general point, I will propose a few avenues for further reflection concerning the economy of territorial brands. My aim is to understand how the production of what I call a “slogan-name” bears witness to the complexity of the forms of exchange on which the economy is based. Territorial brands might in fact not just be the expression of a growing commodification, but also be the manifestation of something that is not really sold but that can be used commercially within the framework of what can be called an “economy of renown” (Corbillé 2013).

I mainly analyse the brand-manufacturing discourse presented in a document titled *Abu Dhabi Brand Identity*, published by the Office of the Brand of Abu Dhabi (OBAD), shortly after the brand was launched.¹ This office was formed in 2007 to develop and manage the implementation of the brand. The document explains the brand’s cornerstones: the diagnostic carried out, the positioning, the essence as well as the “promise”. Many of these elements were also included in press articles or websites dedicated to the analysis of the Abu Dhabi brand,² and on websites of governmental entities.³ This chapter also examines communications actions, for example those carried by Etihad Airways, promoting events such as the Abu Dhabi Formula One Grand Prix and cultural events organized in the city. Further material included texts published in marketing and communications magazines and on blogs – written by professionals and practitioners who are particularly active in the field of nation branding (Anholt 2007; Kapferer 2011).⁴ I also carried out an in-depth interview in France with a professional

from the world of finance to understand the methods used to calculate the value of a brand. In addition to this analysis of speeches and signs, there were the observations made in the city of Abu Dhabi during educational assignments at Sorbonne University Abu Dhabi over a period of several days. Each trip there provided an opportunity to experience and observe situations: hotels that offer an environment in which to work, socialize, and engage in leisure activities, public and retail spaces as well as visits to cultural exhibitions.

This chapter first focuses on the production of the Abu Dhabi brand, showing that it results from a dual process of association and reduction. This combined process leads to the production of a slogan-name. Secondly, I show that understanding the development of a slogan-name requires that we take into consideration the specificity of the contemporary economy. On the one hand, the context of globalization intensifies and accelerates the flows of people, goods, ideologies, and imaginaries, particularly “in emerging countries”. In this context, the production of a slogan-name appears as one of the forms developed by the national narrative in order to face deep changes and to promote the figure of the “ambassador”, which can be seen as an element of neoliberalism understood as a mode of governance. On the other hand, the competition between places leads territories to develop and valorize their specificity and identities (Graan 2013). The slogan-name and national brands thus appear as ways to create “collective symbolic capital” (Harvey 2001), which is particularly important to produce marks of distinction and attractiveness. For all these reasons, national brands can be considered as valuables, sacred objects and “inalienable possessions” (Weiner 1992). Third, I analyse more in depth what I call the “economy of renown”, reconsidering from the point of view of players involved in this economy the notion of the territorial brand’s value in a situation characterized by new forms of creation of values (Foster 2007; Boltanski and Esquerre 2017). I focus more specifically on the intertwined relations between “giving”, “keeping”, and “selling”.

Abu Dhabi as an emerging globalized place

Abu Dhabi is the largest of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as well as one of the most populated and richest because of the presence of oil and gas reserves in the country.⁵ Abu Dhabi is also the name of the UAE’s capital city. The UAE is a federation, created in December 1971, joining together seven emirates in the north-east of the Arabian Peninsula, with shoreline on both the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. This state, like others in the Gulf region, is often qualified as an emerging place. It should be noted that it is a young country and that the city of Abu Dhabi, which first emerged towards the end of the eighteenth century, up to the 1950s resembled nothing more than a Bedouin camp whose local economy was based on fishing and

pearling. It was only after the discovery of oil towards the end of the 1950s that the place gradually evolved into a real town (Khalaf 2006; Boulanger 2010; Elsheshtawy 2011).

Until recently, Abu Dhabi was fairly unknown, and it was not unusual to hear Western expatriates arriving in the middle 1990s saying they had no idea where the country was, and that they had rarely even heard its name. This situation contrasted with the worldwide reputation of its confederated neighbour, Dubai, which, although smaller and not as rich in natural resources, was nevertheless much better known. A centre of luxury tourism, trade, and property deals, this city-Emirate had during the 1990s become a global destination attracting transnational elites from the worlds of finance, trade, and industry, alongside workers from Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, Egypt, Syria and, above all, Asia (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Bangladesh), with the latter group working in all sorts of sectors, including construction and the provision of services. Over and above Dubai's considerable advantages – the presence of ancient trading communities – and bold economic choices – the development of transport infrastructures and the introduction of legislation highly favourable to business (Lavergne 2002) – its attractiveness also relied on a communications strategy that has resulted in the country being talked about and “being on the map”.

However, the 2000 decade represented a period of change for Abu Dhabi, described as more provincial and conservative than the festive and cosmopolitan Dubai. The assumption of power in 2004 by Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan following the death of his father, founder of the UAE and president of the federation up to that date, certainly played a role in accelerating the Emirates's transformation projects.⁶ The change is particularly visible in the capital. In just a single decade, the city of Abu Dhabi has been transformed, modernized, and expanded vertically and horizontally. Entire sectors, be they residential, touristic, commercial, or business, have been or are being developed. Several projects have been constructed on the islands around Abu Dhabi Island. On Saadiyat Island, the Louvre Abu Dhabi opened in 2017 alongside hotels, marinas, sports complexes, and luxury residences, and several other museums are under construction (among others, the Zayed National Museum as well as the Guggenheim Abu Dhabi). The city continues to spread beyond the main island with new compounds rising up out of the ground. These are mainly occupied by high-income expatriates seeking accommodation. Finally, it is worth mentioning the appearance of new buildings presenting extraordinary forms and dimensions, such as the Emirates Palace, a very large hotel located on the west side of The Corniche and inspired by neo-orientalism; the Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque built at the entrance of Abu Dhabi; and Capital Gate, a leaning skyscraper that makes subtle reference to the Tower of Pisa.



Figure 2.1 Reem Island, Abu Dhabi 2011. Photograph by the author.

This has resulted in the city taking on the appearance of a giant building site, where a vast number of buses transport foreign workers from the camps where they live to the construction projects. The physical geography of the city is in a state of constant change and living in Abu Dhabi or just visiting it from time to time, is to experience a space that seems to be transformed minute by minute, unlike European cities with their protected architectural heritage sites. The metamorphosis is physically expressed at several points of the city. In the airport, large format black and white photos of Bedouin life prior to urban development were displayed for a while to those arriving in the country. Events presenting the changes that have taken or will be taking place are also regularly shown. This is the case of “The Saadiyat Story” exhibition at the Manarat Al Saadiyat centre, bringing together in the same location photos of the past, models of future buildings, and films revealing the metropolis yet to come.⁷ Following the thought of Claude Lévi-Strauss (1961), Emirati society thus seems “heated”: change has become one of its fundamental frameworks for structuring representation and action.

All these transformations are carefully planned. Since the early 1960s, several master plans have been established to develop the city in relation with the vision of the ruler (Elshehtawy 2011: 266–277). In 2006–2007, a new political agenda for the years up to 2030 was initiated for the development of

the Emirate and presented in a document titled *Abu Dhabi economic vision 2030 – Abu Dhabi urban planning vision 2030*.⁸ In the introduction, titled “Global City”, one can read, “The resulting Policy Agenda outlined the key goals and Government initiatives required for Abu Dhabi to realize its vision of a confident, secure society and to build a truly sustainable, open and globally competitive economy”.⁹ The plan is described as continuing the “wise vision” set out by the UAE founder and incorporates the main developments for the country and its values. Emiratis regularly insist that, thanks to a savings and investment policy, this vision has made it possible for the country’s natural resources to profit the local population and the generations to come. It is important to remember that Abu Dhabi has one of the largest sovereign wealth funds in the world, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, created in the late 1970s. It is obvious that this economic planning (as well as urban, social, and cultural planning) is taking place within the context of dwindling oil reserves. This has called for an anticipatory approach to the diversification of the economy, with emphasis placed on cultural, educational, and tourism development, and on sustainability. If the economic plan and the urban plan are so intertwined, it is because, as explained in the report, “cities are becoming the economic drivers of the global economy with competition intensity increasing every year. Factors such as investment, influence, education and ingenuity are increasingly becoming elements of how cities are judged... To raise a city’s competitive advantage and behave in a sustainable manner, an understanding of the local resources – human, natural and economic – is essential”¹⁰.

The plan also reveals the Emirate’s wish to adopt some of the behavioural values and rules of a globalized free-market economy as defined by international bodies and, in particular, the WTO (Harvey 2005): the promotion of an “open economy”, changing for example the property ownership law¹¹ and trying to attract foreign investors with the establishment of investment zones (Elsheshtawy 2011: 274–275), the modernization of the bureaucratic public sector by subjecting it to performance-based logic and the principle of transparency, as well as encouragement for the private sector and an entrepreneurial approach. The government itself, as do many governments in today’s world, promotes this logic, having given itself objectives and values aiming to develop openness, performance, and a greater reliance on individual initiatives. All these changes seem to reflect the development of certain aspects of neoliberal policies in a country where hereditary dynastic family rule still operates in each emirate as a local system of governance under the umbrella of the federal system. While the political system continues to retain some of its traditional values at formal and informal levels, it has also been able to keep pace with economic and social change. The sheikhs are highly regarded for performing the dual roles of modernizers and guardians of the cultural heritage (Khalaf 2001: 2327–2328).

There is no doubt that all these transformations take part in making the Emirate part of the world system and show the will to turn it into a global player. The latest developments suggest that Abu Dhabi is becoming

a globalizing city, promoting policies – among which are nation-branding strategies – to enhance its “international recognizability and competitiveness in a global marketplace” (Graan 2013: 161) and to cater to the global class (Elsheshtawy 2011: 296; Assaf 2017). With the arrival of renowned museums, the Saadiyat cultural district is a clear example of the current transformations: they aim to connect the place to a global cultural network, targeting “culture seekers” and “world-class” people. This process is accompanied, as in many globalized places in the world, by a phenomenon of dualization of the city between a highly skilled, and highly paid, workforce and low-wage employees, and between areas with a high concentration of the poor in contrast to enclaves housing the very rich (Elsheshtawy 2006: 237). Elsheshtawy, an architect wondering about these new “spaces of exclusion” in Dubai, proposes the idea of “transitory sites”, these “forgotten settings” where low-income migrants exchange information, resist globalized forces and establish links to their home countries despite their transient situation (2008). Likewise, Sulayman Khalaf notes in his work on transnational workers in Dubai’s camel market, that “in spite of the transitory, precarious and underclass globalized life conditions at the margins of Dubai city[, migrants manage] to reconstruct many aspects of their local communities” (2010: 97). The camel market is both “an exile and refuge” (*ibid.*: 115).¹²

Are these changes sufficient to make Abu Dhabi a “global city” as defined by Saskia Sassen (2001)? This is not certain. First, according to Elsheshtawy, the “examination of the city’s urban character suggests a certain reluctance to become fully global and to engage the region (it never claimed to become another Singapore). Rather it aims at being the country’s administrative and political centre without sacrificing its traditional (and conservative) roots. At the same time, it is trying to become modern – and in turn global – as well” (2011: 262). In that sense, Abu Dhabi is different from the city-corporation described by Ahmed Kanna in his article dedicated to Dubai (2010). Other elements could also qualify the idea of a “global city”: Abu Dhabi, as other emerging places, is not yet a site of production or technological innovation, or a financial global market place (Elsheshtawy 2011: 297).

The construction of the Abu Dhabi brand: from name to slogan-name

It was within this context that the decision to create the Abu Dhabi brand was taken. It was spearheaded by Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan,¹³ who mandated the Abu Dhabi Tourism Authority (created in 2004 and, since 2012, renamed as Abu Dhabi Tourism and Culture Authority) and the Executive Affairs Authority, one of the Emirate’s senior levels of government, to develop a strategy to define and promote the brand identity of the Emirate.¹⁴ Much was at stake for the brand and decision-makers as one of the aims was to reinforce the attractiveness of the country vis-à-vis tourists

who visit and consume, foreign companies that set up businesses and invest, and non-citizen residents who are crucial to Abu Dhabi's development (according to the 2016 estimates published by the Statistics Centre of Abu Dhabi, 19 per cent of the Emirate's population were Emirati citizens).¹⁵

To successfully complete this work, a new government entity was created in 2007: the Office of the Brand of Abu Dhabi. This initiative was linked to the fact that the brand is considered a national brand. Consequently, the intention was not just to promote a setting or a tourist destination but rather to emphasize the concept of nation, supporting the government policy or "vision". Two assignments were given to OBAD: "1. The creation of a brand that captures the essence of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi in an identity that is visual, literal and behavioural, and; 2. To act as the guardian and patron of this brand identity".¹⁶ This second assignment implies that OBAD acts as the brand promoter for public and private organizations (considered to be its stakeholders) by, for instance, encouraging them to use aspects of the brand name and participate in its promotion. It also implies that the brand be explained to assure that it is well understood by the audiences.¹⁷

The approach adopted by the brand makers is absolutely standard for professionals in the marketing sector who have the skills needed to develop what they call the "brand strategy".¹⁸ The initial step was that of the diagnostic, which established what the territory could offer: What were the economic, historic or geographic characteristics of the "product" (for example, in the case of Abu Dhabi, the islands, the legacy of Sheikh Zayed, the natural resources, Emirates Palace, or Falconry)? What were the advantages of the place (for example, the possibility to invest, to enjoy the sun or to be in the middle of the region)? What kinds of emotions could one expect from the place (for instance authenticity and confidence)?¹⁹ All these and other elements were then considered to be brand components. In addition to this work, an analysis was conducted of the way in which the country was perceived, in other words, its image insofar as foreigners and locals are concerned. This implied choosing targets and carrying out a segmentation exercise: if tourists were obviously the audience for the "touristic destination", Emiratis were also taken into consideration due to the fact the brand has to reflect "the essence of the Emirate". On completion of the diagnostic, the professionals sketched out the identity of the territory and the brand, its "portrait" and its "personality". This work allows a differentiation achieved by adopting a competitive brand positioning that takes the form of a "promise",²⁰ a logo and, occasionally, a slogan. In the case of Abu Dhabi, "the essence" that was chosen was "respect". A logo was designed, and the destination promise "Travellers welcome" was devised.²¹ To complete the exercise, local promotional actions were incorporated into campaigns intended to increase brand awareness. This, for instance, is what took place in New York in 2012 with the installation of a traditional Bedouin tent on Times Square²² or in the Parisian metro in 2015 with a communication for the Abu Dhabi destination.



Figure 2.2 Advertisement for Abu Dhabi destination in the Paris metro 2015. Photograph by the author.

When looking at the entire process, it becomes clear that the production of this brand, as with many other brands, results from a dual operation with, on the one hand, work based on association and, on the other hand, work based on reduction. Initially, there is a need to associate the name Abu Dhabi with a number of specific elements (geographical and historical data, images, emotions, landscapes, values, etc.) that would be used to characterize the country and represent a number of competitive advantages. The previously described diagnostic work contributed to this, as did the production of photographs within the framework of tourism promotion campaigns that successively showed dhows (the traditional boats of the region), men practicing falconry, the desert with its camels, as well as luxury hotels and the Formula One race track. The work based on association is occasionally taken to very high levels of abstraction when it comes to choosing colours that conjure up Abu Dhabi, leading to the development of a colour palette dominated by four colour categories: “Heritage”, “Desert”, “Seaside”, and “City”.²³

The association operations, lying at the crossroads of what is real, imagined and symbolic, would seem to aim to give form to the sort of representational and emotional universes that create ambiance and memories, even for those people who have not yet visited Abu Dhabi. In other words, they are produced to create a level of familiarity with the setting and the name. This essential point is taken into consideration during the evaluations of brands carried out by agencies such as FutureBrand which notes that

the strength of a country brand is determined in the same way as any other brand – it is measured on levels of awareness, familiarity, preference, consideration, advocacy and active decisions to visit. However, the most important factors that truly differentiate a nation(s) brand are its associations and attributes – the qualities that people think of when they hear a country’s name, read or see images of a location, or plan a business or leisure trip.²⁴

Alongside this associative work, there is another operation, that of reduction, which is essential for defining the brand identity. The identity hypothesis now lies at the heart of the approaches taken by marketing professionals for whom places, companies, products, and people all have a hidden identity that needs to be revealed. This occasionally even slides towards a biological vision of the social world, as shown by the generalized expression of “brand DNA”. In this particular case, the brand identity and thus its singularity takes two forms. First, a word, “respect”, which is presented as the brand’s keystone inasmuch as it is taken as being fully representational of society in the Emirates: respect of people and family, which is presented as a key-element of society; respect of culture and customs, for example, national dress, falconry and dhows, or foreign cultures and heritage; respect for women thanks to initiatives that promote education and career opportunities; or respect for free trade and foreign investment.²⁵ Another element used to represent the brand identity, much like an emblem, is the logo. Expressed in “Red Heritage” according to the colour palette, its form evokes that of the dhow sails, as well as the capital letters A and D in the Latin alphabet. Inside the logo, as if it were encapsulated, “Abu Dhabi” is written in Arabic. The name can also be written in English on the side, in roman typeface that evokes the calligraphy of the Arabic script, since many situations of its circulation need the use of both languages, aiming at the Emirati population, Arabic-speaking and non-Arabic speaking people.²⁶ The logo is adaptable and can be presented alongside other names, particularly those of partner government organizations. The logo can also be placed on objects such as bags and mugs. These operations aim to further the awareness of the brand and its name.

The intended outcome of these operations is that the name “Abu Dhabi” – in the same way as well-known place names such as Paris, London, or New York – no longer simply designates an emirate and a territory; it becomes a name that in itself reflects a history, heritage, customs, landscapes, emotions, images, and values. Let us not forget the approach taken by the FutureBrand agency, which explained the need to measure the quality of a territorial brand against the capacity of its name to evoke a setting. From this point of view, the Abu Dhabi brand works as a sort of “operator” and “enabler” of identity, invested by a symbolic and an imaginary effect, that of being able to conjure up a setting, to express its

identity and even its essence. This is possible because, as Gershon explains in her work on personal branding, commodification and authenticity are no longer opposed as they were before, but closely intertwined (2016: 227). In other words, the identity of a brand and the identity of the place and people it represents seem to overlap. This is also because the boundaries between all these notions – essence, “brand DNA”, promise, positioning, name, and so forth – used by the practitioners in their discourses and practices are not always clear.

But this is not the only effect counted on by the developers. In the section of the document titled “Behavior”, one can read:

A brand is more than a logo or slogan [in the purely commercial sense]... It has to be experienced. And this experience commences from the first moment we come into contact with visitors to our land...In this way, we – the people of Abu Dhabi – are the owners of the Emirate’s reputation and are empowered to bring its true essence of respect to life through our behaviours and interactions.²⁷

The day of the launch of the brand in 2007, the director general of Abu Dhabi Tourism Authority confirmed this when he claimed that the brand “defines how we should project ourselves to the outside world and how we should interact as an Emirate”.²⁸ In other words, it is expected that the brand is embodied by the Abu Dhabians and guides their behaviour. In this sense, we can say that, in the frame of nation branding, the name is becoming a slogan-name resulting from a process of condensation: because first it “propagate[s] and encapsulate[s] representations” and, second, it operates as a “condenser” in that it is “an unspecified address to each individual and, simultaneously, to a body of citizens” (see Introduction). The condensation is at the very core of nation branding everywhere and participates in producing images of countries and their people that then circulate worldwide, and according to which citizens are expected to behave. This is very clear in the latest on-board safety video of Air France (which is a sort of partner of the brand of France) in which six very chic women explain how to behave during the flight. In this video, Air France evokes the French as “chic people”²⁹ and conveys a “French way” of travelling/being.

The slogan-name, a written and oral formula that circulates every time it is written and spoken, is thus expected to produce effects of sense and action. This shows the performative dimension of what can be called a “graphic speech act” (Trémon this volume).

The construction of a national narrative

The decision to create a national brand is closely tied to the specificities of Abu Dhabi. As mentioned previously, the brand is intended to attract

tourists, investors, headquarters and regional branches of global firms, famous architects, and “talent people” as well as prestigious institutions and big events, and to boost the competitiveness of the place. But can we not also see in the development of the brand a way to produce a contemporary myth within Emirati society, a myth in the sense of a system of communication that has the characteristic of being a “mode of signification” (Barthes 1957: 181)?

It should first be noted that the work involved in the creation of the brand provides professionals with an opportunity to review the founding story of the country, a young federation. The brand is in fact presented as being representative of the vision of the founding sheikh. Taking the form of citations, the founding words of Sheikh Zayed appear several times in the book dedicated to the brand, as well as in some places such as in the “The Saadiyat Story” exhibition. For example: “We cherish our environment because it is an integral part of our country, our history, and our heritage”; or “A nation without a past is a nation without a present or future”. This evokes one of the hypotheses concerning the etymology of the word “slogan” as a rallying cry to gather members behind a clan (see Introduction).³⁰

More generally, the history of a people is called upon through the brand: traditions are recalled, values reaffirmed, and heritage enhanced. As analysed by Khalaf, it is a call partially based on reinvention when it comes to the current uses of camel racing and national dress (1999, 2005). The more recent transformations following the discovery of oil and gas resources are also integrated into the discourse alongside those projects that are underway or programmed, such as the Louvre Abu Dhabi, which was already an element representative of the brand while it was under construction. Thus, the founding story, because it blends in with the founding sheikh’s vision, is not just a look back over the past but also reaches out towards the future that the Emirate is currently building.

The construction of this national story incorporates another important aspect of the myth, namely its capacity to resolve contradictions, incorporate elements that oppose or ignore one another, and move beyond cognitive dissonances (Lévi-Strauss 1959). This factor is all the more important for Abu Dhabi which, like other emerging and globalized places, faces tensions linked to economic, social, and demographic changes. As a reminder, while the region of Abu Dhabi was home to just a few thousand inhabitants in the early 1960s, it now boasts nearly 2 million inhabitants. Another transformation lies in the fact that, as stated, the Emiratis citizens represent almost 20 per cent of the entire resident population. Most of the very large number of transnational migrants, essential to the country’s development, belong to a plurality of nationalities and cultures from Asian and Arab countries, as well as from Western countries. A large number of these workers represent a volatile population whose working and living conditions are sometimes subject

to debate and criticism by the media and non-governmental organizations (Elsheshtawy 2010). It is also important to mention the presence of communities, such as Indian business communities, that have settled over time and which profit from a more stable situation (Lavergne 2002). Finally, it is necessary not to forget business and leisure tourists for whom a proportion of the infrastructures have been developed. All these transformations raise a large number of questions: How to reconcile traditions and lifestyles linked to the liberalization of the economy? How to transform and modernize without losing a sense of identity? What sort of society to build considering the very specific demographic situation? While these questions are being addressed by governmental entities, they are also considered to be important by the Emirati people. Thus, the multicultural aspect of society is sometimes a source of concern that questions its effects on the local culture. This has resulted in, for example, debates concerning the clothes that should be worn in shopping malls where the “traditional dress” worn by locals is to be seen alongside the clothing worn by foreigners.

On looking at the construction of the brand, it would seem that the professionals are attempting to find ways in which these contradictory elements can cohabit. The choice of the term “respect” probably expresses a wish to untangle the tensions between residents and transient populations and between past, present, and future. It is a resolution of contradictions also expressed by a global aesthetic developed for this work on the semiotization of location, allowing images of the past to lie alongside those of the present and future. In this way, the brand and its slogan-name, as an object of communication, are given a pacifying role by its architects, one seeking to produce continuity in a period of change and a feeling of shared belonging able to overcome differences and dissensions.³¹ One finds here the proposal made by Roland Barthes concerning the concept of the myth, the function of which is to organize

a world which is without contradictions because it is without depth, a world wide open and wallowing in the evident, it establishes a blissful clarity; things appear to mean something by themselves. (1957: 127)

As in any process of founding a community, the myth creates at the same time inclusion and exclusion. In the present case, one can wonder which persons are concerned by the myth, since nation branding always implies making a choice in “targeting” some specific categories of people.³²

One last element is that the brand, much like the myth, is thought of as a narrative that, as Barthes claims, “imposes” itself. This is clearly revealed in the section called “behaviour”: “As the true ambassadors of the Emirate, all residents who interact with visitors to the Emirate must understand the brand and represent it in all of their behaviours”.³³ It is therefore up to the brand engineers to give it a form that is structuring

because it is significant, that essentially *imposes* itself on individuals by proposing to share values and common behaviour patterns: all residents, as ambassadors would have a role of being representative of the brand and giving form to “Abu Dhabi”, from the taxi driver to the restaurant waiter, from the Western executive of a large company to the Indian businessman, and without, naturally, forgetting the Emirate citizens themselves. And this is also the case of the various brand partners such as property developers who, because they actively participate in the construction of Abu Dhabi and because they are considered stakeholders, must respect and promote the brand spirit.

The term “ambassador” is of particular interest. Much – if not overly – used by marketers for commercial as well as nation brands, it relates brands and nation brands, to subjection technologies that are shown by Aihwa Ong (2006) to be at the heart of the neoliberal world. This echoes the analysis of a large number of researchers for whom neoliberalism represents a mode of governance inasmuch as it participates in the shaping and influencing of the behaviour patterns and emotions of individuals and populations – in particular by promoting self-governing and self-enterprising (Foucault 2001; Ehrenberg 1991; Ong 2006; Kanna 2010). This mode of governance is linked to the globalized context that favours the flow of persons, goods, money or even imagination without extinguishing the concepts of state, territory, and citizen. This is true for emerging countries that are the product of intense worldwide flows and construct themselves at the same time as states in their own right, but also for “older” countries that face difficulties in defining their strategy and identity within the frame of globalization. The term “ambassador” would seem to meet this dual constraint: if it is an explicit reference to the state (we are in the lexical field of diplomacy), it is more plastic than the category of citizen. This is a particularly important factor in a space where several categories of persons with multiple and complex statuses cohabit,³⁴ where citizens are few, and where many people are on the move and not expected to stay. But it is also a category that has links with the commercial sphere inasmuch as the frontier between the figure of the ambassador and that of the salesperson occasionally seems very narrow: it is well to “represent”, and, somehow, “sell”, in a symbolic meaning, a place. This echoes a trend observed in the domain of work, where almost everyone, and whatever their profession, is asked to become a salesperson of its enterprise, of their products or services, of their values and even of himself (Gershon 2016).

The brand, because it is partly constructed in the same way as a myth, is therefore based on what Alain Ehrenberg calls a “real fiction” invested with a performative mission (1991). It remains to be seen if the uses of the brand and the slogan-name on their release, reception, and circulation will result in an attachment to the developed values and the sharing of a common narrative.

The brand and its name: from sacred objects and valuables to magic formula

In the narratives developed by practitioners, nation brands often appear as precious objects that merit protection. This is also true for the Abu Dhabi brand as suggested by the second mission attributed to OBAD, which was asked to be the guardian and patron of the brand identity. In this sense, these objects evoke, to a certain degree, other sacred objects and valuables studied by anthropologists at different times and in both nearby and distant societies. Thus, the way that these objects are developed makes a certain reference to fetishes, renamed in French by Bruno Latour as “faitiches” (2009), in order to underline that their construction results from the accumulation of assorted elements of varying natures. This is also the case of the Abu Dhabi brand, which assembles material objects such as the dhows and architectural construction, landscapes, traditions, elements of food, values and images.

The comparison does not stop there. Like sacred objects, territorial brands are often considered as autonomous objects or even as “persons” able to act. This at least is what a large number of marketing professionals would have us understand when they state, without a shadow of a doubt, that “the brand conjures up dreams”, or that “it invests new territories”. It is true that brands, like persons, share the particularity of having a specific name registered and thus protected. In addition, it should not be forgotten that professionals occasionally imbue them with a “spirit” and even a “soul”, making them types of persons–objects. This is perhaps due to the fact that they are constructed on the idea of “capture” (OBAD’s primary mission is “to capture the essence” of the Emirate), thus making the brands operate as types of “identity traps” (Bazin 1997). In other words, it seems that the brand as object is not separated from persons and people as the discourse on the “ambassadors” shows: on the one hand the brand encapsulates a place, its soul, and its name, and on the other hand the people are the “owners” of the reputation of the brand, and they represent it.

A final factor is that a large number of practitioners give the brands a force that measures up against their ability to produce “attractiveness”. Through the use of this term, experts from the world of economics mean a capacity to attract all sorts of people (consumers, investors, journalists, inhabitants, and tourists), narratives (news articles), and objects (merchandise). This reminds of the “power of objects” described by Mauss when he discusses Potlatch coppers or Kula objects (1997). The power of the brand or the slogan-name is very much akin to that of the magic spells described by Malinowski – that is, a mode of action affecting the world; or as detailed by Gell in his work on perfume advertisement (2006), a way of regulating and imposing order on the world by making happen what has been announced (see introductory chapter). This is particularly true for countries that face transformations and actively work to build and project their image on the global scene.



Figure 2.3 Abu Dhabi 2007 – Main Island. Photograph by the author.

Collective Symbolic Capital and the Economy of Renown

While attractiveness reveals the power of brands and is one of the effects expected from the slogan-name, the power would also lie in their “creation of value”. We constantly hear that “the brand creates value”, but what particular value is being discussed by professionals? And what is the specificity of the value for a territorial or national brand?

Above all, marketing professionals give the brand a use value, its usefulness, or how they can profit by using it as a tool: “More specifically, the territorial brand is considered, thanks to the use of differentiation, as a means to increase the perceived value of its territory in the eyes of economic stakeholders”, explains a French professional (Gollain 2011: 8). From this point of view, the use value of the Abu Dhabi brand would seem to be the increase in identification: in other words the capacity as a tool to express the country’s identity and to differentiate it while incorporating it into the global market of nation brands.

Brands in general can also be provided with an exchange value inasmuch as they are attributed a price equivalent to what they are worth and against which they can be purchased. This price is what brand and finance professionals call “the financial value of the brand”. It is also this same value that explains why,

at the moment of buying a company, the “price” of the latter is not necessarily just what it possesses. This price differential is also called the “brand bonus” or the “attractiveness surplus” (Kapferer 2011: 14) and is why professionals occasionally say that the brand is an “added value”. This value belongs to the domain of “immateriality” in an economy where materiality (factories, production tools, and manufactured goods) is no longer the only element evaluated, sold and bought. In addition, the accounting standards in the case of buying a company now require that the value of the company’s brand name be taken into consideration when calculating its value.

Various techniques are used to evaluate a brand,³⁵ but professionals seem to agree that its value is “the economic value of specific discounted future earnings specific to the brand” (Sattler, Högl, and Hupp 2003: 23). Consequently, what counts is what the brand can create, its “brand potential”. Despite established methods of calculation, the value often results in a makeshift solution (use of different calculation methods) and/or negotiations between agencies. This is because it is always difficult to evaluate what is immaterial. Nevertheless, these methods allow for the evaluation of all or nearly all, including nation brands. Thus, Vincent Bastien, Professor of Marketing in a French business school and former CEO of various big companies in the luxury market, estimates the “France” brand by counting together the added value (the effect of the brand) in the export sector of “Made in France” goods and services and symbols of France, the touristic consumption within the country and direct overseas investments, to be worth around €310 billion, a result that Bastien explains “should obviously not be taken as an absolute truth” (2011: 129).

While territory brands might be attributed a value, they do not have a “price” as such, given that, at least for the time being, they cannot be sold or bought on a market in exchange for a price. This would appear to be a specificity of these brands and is certainly based on their power dimension, as can be seen with the example represented by Abu Dhabi. Because they are linked to a nation, and since their names are derived from a common rather than a private good, these brands seem to find themselves less on the side of merchandise than *regalia*, which are symbolic objects of power created by the power and, as such, require protection in the form of flags and anthems. This echoes the concept of “inalienable possessions” developed by Annette Weiner, which refers to objects that cannot be sold or given and need to be preserved to be given or transferred (1992). As developed also by Maurice Godelier, who designates them “sacred objects”, they “present themselves and are experienced as an essential element of the *identity* of groups and individuals that hold them in trust” (2007: 83). This explains why national brands cannot be subject to a commercial transaction as defined by the market economy. They are objects that, rather than being sold, are preserved in order to transmit and ensure the continuity of power, territory, and identity.

What exactly is this value that does not have a fixed market price? Once again, it is necessary to return to what the professionals have to say: “The brand is a name that has a particular power, being that of adding a credibility

and desirability value to a product, a service or a company” says one of them (Bonnal 2011: 28). The “brand potential” or its value would therefore depend on its capacity to create attractiveness through its name – in other words, its renown. Lying in the heart of the territorial brands market, the name is a symbolic capital, underlying what might be called an “economy of renown” (Corbillé 2013).

To provide a clearer understanding of the brand economy and, in particular territorial brands, it is necessary to look at one of the specificities of the contemporary economic world, namely the important place held by “the singular”. As Harvey demonstrated in his essay dedicated to “the art of rent”, the changing conditions of transport and communication and the weakening of local protections participate to make capitalism more competitive (2001: 398). Thus “the question upon the agenda is how to assemble monopoly powers” (*ibid.*: 399). In that situation, one of the answers is the use of culture (“local cultural innovation”, (re)invention of traditions, promotion of collective memories) as an attempt “to reassert such monopoly powers precisely because claims to uniqueness and authenticity can be best articulated as distinctive and non-replicable cultural claims” (*ibid.*: 399). In other words, what is at stake “is the power of collective symbolic capital, of special marks of distinction that attach to some place and which have a significant drawing power upon the flows of capital more generally” (*ibid.*: 405). This analysis is close to the one of Sassen who explains that “what now counts in a globalized economy are the specific differences between cities” (2011: 32). These differences only have meaning in the relations that territories have with one another, and this explains why global cities operate as networks. This economy is also probably related to what Boltanski and Enquerre call the “enrichment economy”, which is partly characterized by the boom of luxury, finance, culture, and tourism sectors and strong relations between them, and by the fact that the “past” now plays a crucial role, “transforming dormant heritage into assets” (2017: 39).

For Abu Dhabi, the stakes are high. Despite its considerable wealth, the UAE is a young federation that came into being in the early 1970s and, consequently, its place on the international scene is recent. Abu Dhabi is a place with a small population of citizens, is surrounded by strong regional powers, and is part of a delicately balanced regional geopolitical context confronted with conflicts. Finally, the Emirate has no export industry able to give it a reputation in the same way as luxury products do for France or industrial products do for Germany, even if recent decisions taken, as the development of museums among which the opening of the Louvre Abu Dhabi will probably make a change, positioning the place on the art market.

Players and forms of exchange around the name

The stakeholders participating in this symbolic economy seem to be betting on a virtuous circle within which the greater the attractiveness of the name (and the territory), the greater will be the value of the brand, and reciprocally.

It is a virtuous circle that occasionally bases itself on the sharing of brands between players, as would seem to be the case with the construction in Abu Dhabi of museums linked to others that already have a worldwide reputation and designed by famous architects whose names can be compared to global brands. Apart from the financial advantages that the new museums might attract, their construction also aims to increase their international reputation within the cultural industries' competitive context. Concerning Abu Dhabi, the aim is particularly to develop its reputation as a city of culture, knowledge, and the arts. This use of brands by professionals is reminiscent of the "money of renown" discussed by Mauss when he mentioned the coppers exchanged in the Potlatch. He wrote that these coppers had "an attractive virtue that called on other coppers, much in the way that wealth attracts wealth, dignities lead to honours, the possession of spirits leads to attractive alliances and conversely" (1997: 223–224).

The economy of renown is therefore based on a large number of players who are the more or less close partners of a brand and responsible for its name. In most situations, these players involved in nation branding do not see themselves as buyers or sellers. As explained by Thierry Breton, former French minister of finance and promoter of the creation of the state's intangible cultural heritage agency (APIE):

I decided that this intangible heritage (among other French brands, traditional knowledge and the heritages of our fellow citizens) needed to be protected if it were to be enhanced...Not to sell it...but rather to transfer a specific use. When using the Sorbonne brand, it is important to remember that the rights of use should not be given away indiscriminately and that behind the name lies an important symbol. The same applies when the Harvard or Princeton brand is used.³⁶

Rather than selling a territory brand by authorizing the use of the brand, the approach is to transfer it for a given period to bodies recognized as partners. Likewise, in the Kula exchange, once an object enters the Kula ring, what is given is not the right to property but the right of use (Godelier 2007: 81). These objects are thus at the same time alienated and inalienable. Within this framework of analysis, national brands could also belong to this category of valuables. In return, the bodies that can "use" the brand are expected to represent the identity, to participate in its promotion, and to contribute to increasing its reputation. This sets up a relationship of reciprocity in which the renown of the brand and its value depend also on the renown of the different players in whose hands it will circulate. This explains the attention given to the choice of partners. Finally, territorial brands, which appear both as valuable and sacred, are a clear example of the inter-dependence of the forms of exchange that led Weiner to propose the paradox of "keeping-for-giving" (1992), reformulated by Godelier by "keeping-for-giving-and-giving-for-keeping" (1996: 53). Obviously,

in contemporary societies, and specifically in marketing activities, a deep understanding of the exchanges related to territorial brands requires an analysis at local, national, and international levels of both commercial and property laws, in particular the intellectual property rights that have “become a major field of struggle through which monopoly powers more generally get asserted” (Harvey 2001: 399).

For this symbolic economy to work, stakeholders need to have confidence in the brand and the name. The state, a “central bank of symbolic capital” (Bourdieu 2003: 344) and, more widely, those in power, clearly play a key role in creating the credit given to territorial brands, much as they do in their role of guaranteeing the value of the currency within the monetary system. However, other stakeholders also play an important role: “signature” architects (often winners of international prizes) who associate their names to that of the city (such as Zaha Hadid, Franck Gehry, and Jean Nouvel in Abu Dhabi); journalists writing about specific settings; investors demonstrating their confidence in the territory; tourists and even inhabitants talking about the place in social media or elsewhere; as well as the administrations responsible for the protection of the heritage and who work towards developing the identity of the territory. Nor should one omit the stakeholders responsible for evaluating the practices of partners involved in these exchanges, establishing rating systems that operate as “judgment systems”, which are essential to what Lucien Karpick calls the “economy of singularities” (2007): brand notation agencies such as FutureBrand that set up the “Country Brand Index”, as well as a multitude of bodies producing all types of classifications ranging from the Pritzker Prize to the Shanghai ranking of World Universities, via prizes rewarding hotels and airlines.³⁷ Another condition without which the economy of renown could not function is that the stakeholders involved in the exchanges be fully involved in the interplay of brands – in other words that they find it worthwhile to accept the same rule and belief, being that the brand and the name express a singularity and a difference, that they possess their own personality, which gives them a specific value. This is linked to the fact that sacred objects and valuables “are first objects of belief, the nature of which is imaginative before it is symbolic insofar as these beliefs concern the nature and the sources of power and wealth which, everywhere, have for a part, an imaginary content” (Godelier 2007: 71). In other words, without that which Bourdieu calls *illusio* (2003: 147), and which lies at the root of the beliefs governing the social world, the brand economy might not be able to survive.

Conclusion

“Abu Dhabi” as a brand and a slogan-name represents an important element in the Emirate’s development strategy. As a “communication object”, it aims to reinforce the attractiveness of the Emirate at a worldwide level, focusing

on its specificities. This specific case reveals to what degree in the globalized world the spheres of political, symbolic, and economic life are intertwined. In addition, the analysis underlines to what degree symbolic activities lie at the centre of the construction of territories and participate in the economy of renown, a symbolic battle in which vast amounts of money, time, and energy are spent (others might say invested). It is an inflationist competition in which renown depends on oneself as well as on others with their perception, confidence, and recognition.

This economy is based on forms of exchange that are not always easy to characterize – probably because they also depend on how they are used by the stakeholders and the ways in which they qualify them. Thus, territorial or country brands, provided they can be treated as valuables and as sacred objects, can be attributed a value that is not a price. Similarly, while they seem to escape from monetized market transactions, they are nevertheless no less central in business, since they contribute to the commodification of culture and identity by creating “monopoly rent” (Harvey 2001). This explains why “monopoly rent is a contradictory form” (*ibid.*: 409). Players face a dilemma: “veering so close to pure commercialization as to lose the marks of distinction that underlie monopoly rents or constructing marks of distinction that are so special as to be very hard to trade upon” (*ibid.*: 408). From an anthropological point of view, this leads to an analysis that needs to embrace the interactions between the very different spheres of exchange, between keeping, giving and selling and the means used by players to create and protect value.

Acknowledgements

I am deeply grateful to Anne-Christine Trémon, Nicolette Makovicky, and Sheyla Schuvartz Zandonai for all their very precious advice, and to Franck Mermier for his bibliographical recommendations. My thanks also go to all the students of Sorbonne University Abu Dhabi for the very rich exchanges we had, especially those who wrote their dissertations about the Abu Dhabi brand. I am also grateful to those persons I met there who helped me to know better the city of Abu Dhabi. This chapter explores further the ideas developed in previous articles (Corbillé 2013, 2014).

Notes

- 1 http://brand.abudhabi.ae/en/main_download/ Accessed and downloaded on 05/06/2012. Online: http://issuu.com/mo.arabi/docs/abu_dhabi_brand_book-e
- 2 www.brandchannel.com/features_effect.asp?pf_id=449 (Accessed 15/09/2013); www.underconsideration.com/brandnew/archive/the_abu_dhabi_brand_rich.php#.UyrW7n-9KK1 (Accessed 23/09/2013); www.uaeinteract.com/docs/New_Abu_Dhabi_brand_identity_unveiled/27512.htm.
- 3 www.adced.ae/en/economicreview/Article.aspx?Article_ID=37 (Accessed 15/09/2013).

- 4 In particular, the blog of Vincent Gollain, Dean of L'Agence Régionale de Développement Paris Île-de-France: www.marketing-territorial.org/pages/definition-du-marketing-territorial-5608177.html; and the blog of Marc Thébault, <http://thebaultmarc.expertpublic.fr/2011/07/11/peau-de28099ame-le-marketing-territorial-revele/>.
- 5 It covers approximately 85% of the country's surface, and in mid 2016 the population was estimated to be 2,908,173 persons (Source: Statistics Center – Abu Dhabi. See *Statistical Yearbook of Abu Dhabi 2017*, p. 112). www.scad.ae/en/pages/generalpublications.aspx?topicid=24. In 2012, the UAE's oil reserves were estimated to represent approximately 8% of the world reserves and around 90% of these reserves are to be found in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. "Statistics of the population in the two largest emirates in 2014 revealed that the number of residents of the emirate of Abu Dhabi was about 2.6 million (according to Statistics Centre – Abu Dhabi) and about 2.3 million in the emirate of Dubai (according to Dubai Statistics Center)". <https://government.ae/en/information-and-services/social-affairs/preserving-the-emirati-national-identity/population-and-demographic-mix>
- 6 The UAE is a federation of seven emirates, each one with its own ruler. The president (head of state) and vice president of UAE are elected by the rulers of each emirate. However, according to convention, the ruler of Abu Dhabi is president, and the ruler of Dubai vice president and prime minister (head of government).
- 7 www.saadiyat.ae/en/cultural/manarat-al-saadiyat1.html.
- 8 The document can be downloaded from: www.upc.gov.ae/template/upc/pdf/abu-dhabi-vision-2030-revised.pdf
- 9 *Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030 – Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Vision 2030*, p. 5.
- 10 *ibid.*, p. 16.
- 11 See the article in *Gulf News* "Foreigners get rights to own surface property" on February 12, 2007, quoted by Elsheshtawy (2011): "According to Article (4)–non-UAE nationals, natural or legal persons, shall have the right to own surface property in investment areas. Surface property refers to that property built on land Thus, the non-nationals can own the property, but not the land on which it is built...This shall be done through a long-term contract of 99 years or by the virtue of long-term surface leasing contract of 50 years renewable by mutual consent". http://gulfnews.com/business/property/foreigners-get-rights-to-own-property-1.127459#SÄ©quence_1.
- 12 The author (Khalaf 2010: 115) quotes Sassen for whom the global city is "a space of power and empowerment", "enabling the emergence of two critical forms of agency in a global economic system: global corporate capital and the mix of disadvantaged actors increasingly assembling in large cities (Sassen 2005: 17)".
- 13 Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Chairman of the Executive Council of Abu Dhabi and Commander of the UAE Armed Forces.
- 14 *Abu Dhabi Brand Identity*, Section 1.0 The Brand Strategy, Introduction.
- 15 "Of the total Emirate of Abu Dhabi population, 551,535 (19.0%) are Emirati citizens". Source: Statistics Center – Abu Dhabi. See *Statistical Yearbook of Abu Dhabi 2017*, p. 112. www.scad.ae/en/pages/generalpublications.aspx?topicid=24
- 16 *Abu Dhabi Brand Identity*, Section 1.0 The Brand Strategy, Introduction; and see also www.adced.ae/en/economicreview/Article.aspx?Article_ID=37.

- 17 To achieve this work, OBAD has worked with international agencies specialized in marketing, communication and branding.
- 18 Professionals from an international advertising agency participated with the OBAD in the construction of the brand and to the communication campaigns www.underconsideration.com/brandnew/archives/the_abu_dhabi_brand_rich.php and www.mcsaatchi.ae
- 19 *Abu Dhabi Brand Identity*, Section 1.0 The Brand Strategy, Branding Abu Dhabi; and www.brandchannel.com/features_effect.asp?pf_id=449.
- 20 In marketing and advertising language, the “promise” is the main advantage of a product, service or brand. As a differentiating element, it should be able to convince the “consumer”. It is also considered as an implicit contract between the product, service or brand and the consumer.
- 21 *Abu Dhabi Brand Identity*, Section 1.0 The Brand Strategy, Branding Abu Dhabi; and the website of the Abu Dhabi Council for Economic Development: www.adced.ae/en/economicreview/Article.aspx?Article_ID=37.
- 22 Taimur Khan, “Abu Dhabi majlis lights up New York’s Times Square”, *The National*, May 12, 2012.
- 23 *Abu Dhabi Brand Identity*, Section 2.0 Our Brand Assets, Masterbrand Colour Palette & Extended Sub Brand Colour Palette; www.underconsideration.com/brandnew/archive/the_abu_dhabi_brand_rich.php#.UyrW7n-9KK1.
- 24 www.futurebrand.com/news/press-releases/launch-country-brand-index-2010/ (Accessed 05/05/2012).
- 25 *Abu Dhabi Brand Identity*, Section. 1.0 The Brand Strategy, One Word Equity; and www.adced.ae/en/economicreview/Article.aspx?Article_ID=37.
- 26 See http://www.underconsideration.com/brandnew/archive/the_abu_dhabi_brand_rich.php#.UyrW7n-9KK1
- 27 *Abu Dhabi Brand Identity*, Section. 2.0 The Brand Strategy, Behavior.
- 28 “New Abu Dhabi brand identity unveiled”, www.uaeinteract.com/docs/New_Abu_Dhabi_brand_identity_unveiled/27512.htm, posted on 08/11/2007.
- 29 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0N3J6fE-0JI&v=fr>
- 30 Regarding the links between nation branding and national identity, see Graan (2013). This link can be also observed in the case of France and the attempt to create “La marque France”, throughout a national/economic narrative. See Gaël Brustier, “La marque France’: le combat culturel de l’économie française”, *Slate.fr*, 25/10/2016.
- 31 See also the speech of the manager of the OBAD: “Today the brand is helping Abu Dhabi to build its reputation on the world stage while protecting the authentic sense of place and national identity which is so important to Emiratis”, www.adced.ae/en/economicreview/Article.aspx?Article_ID=37.
- 32 See the work of Graan (2013) regarding the nation branding in Macedonia, which presents similarities and differences.
- 33 *Abu Dhabi Brand Identity*, Section. 2.0 The Brand Strategy, Behaviour.
- 34 See the analysis of Lavergne (2002) of the various population categories in Dubai.
- 35 I am grateful to Jean-Christophe Pic who explained the various ways of calculating the financial value of a brand to me: 1) “The historic cost method”: the brand is worth everything that has been spent on marketing and communication in its creation and its management since its creation. 2) “The cost of creation method”: addition of marketing and communication costs to obtain and

- retain brand renown with regards competitors. 3) “The market method”: A brand is worth the price of other equivalent and comparable brands that have been (re)sold and where the transactions are known. 4) “The excess profits method”: A brand is worth the additional wealth that it creates when compared with a product commercialized as a generic or by a distributor brand (method encouraged by the European Court of Auditors, known as IFSR, and widely used by European consultancy firms and auditors). 5) “The exemption from charges method”: The brand is worth the price that someone is prepared to pay for its rental (licence) and the use of its name.
- 36 Interview of Thierry Breton, TV program “Economic intelligence”, France 24 TV channel, January 7, 2012.
- 37 See Foster (2007) on how brand value is co-constructed by many players, among these sometimes a “public”, and on the issue of the control of this value.

References

- Anholt, Simon. 2007. *Competitive Identity: The New Management of Nations, Cities and Regions*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Aronczyk, Melissa. 2007. New and Improved Nations: Branding National Identity. In Craig Calhoun and Richard Sennett, eds. *Practicing Culture*. New York: Routledge, pp. 105–129.
- Assaf, Laure. 2017. “Le *shopping mall* comme moment urbain”, *Ateliers d’anthropologie*, vol. 44 [Online].
- Barthes, Roland. 1957. *Mythologies*. Paris: Le Seuil.
- Bastien, Vincent. 2011. “Quelle valeur pour la marque France?” *Revue française de gestion*, vol. 37(218–219), pp. 125–138.
- Bazin, Jean. 2008. “Des clous dans la Joconde”. In Jean Bazin, (posth.) *Des clous dans la Joconde. L’anthropologie autrement*. Paris: Anacharsis, pp. 107–130.
- Boltanski, Luc and Esquerre, Arnaud. 2017. *Enrichissement: une critique de la marchandise*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Bonnal, Françoise. 2011. “Comprendre et gérer la marque France”. *Revue française de gestion*, vol. 37(218–219), pp. 27–43.
- Boulanger, Philippe. 2010. “L’identité bédouine dans l’architecture et l’urbanisme à Abou Dhabi au début du XXI^e siècle”. In Philippe Boulanger and Céline Pouyat, eds., *Espaces urbains à l’aube du XXI^e siècle. Patrimoines et héritages culturels*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de Paris-Sorbonne, pp. 231–252.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 2003. *Méditations pascaliennes*. Paris: Le Seuil.
- Corbillé, Sophie. 2013. “Les marques territoriales, objets précieux au cœur de l’économie de la renommée”. *Communication*, vol. 32(2) [Online].
- . 2014. “Les marques territoriales: opérateurs de patrimoine en contexte globalisé. Le cas d’Abou Dhabi”. In Caroline de Saint-Pierre, ed., *La ville patrimoine*. Rennes: PUR, pp. 163–182.
- . 2017. “Le commerce de l’identité: (se) ressembler, (se) distinguer au cœur du tourisme parisien”. *Téoros* [Online].
- Godelier, Maurice. 1996. *L’énigme du don*. Paris: Flammarion.
- . 2007. *Au fondement des sociétés*. Paris: Albin Michel.
- Ehrenberg, Alain. 1991. *Le culte de la performance*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy.

- Elsheshtawy, Yasser. 2006. "From Dubai to Cairo. Competing Global Cities, Models, and Shifting Centers of Influence?" In D. Singermann, and P. Ammar, eds., *Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture, and Space in the New Middle East*. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, pp. 235–250.
- . 2008. "Transitory Sites: Mapping Dubai's Forgotten Urban Spaces". *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, vol. 32(4), pp. 968–988.
- . 2010. *Dubai: Behind an Urban Spectacle*. London: Routledge.
- . 2011. "Cities of Sand and Fog: Abu Dhabi's Arrival on the Global Scene". In Yasser Elsheshtawy, ed., *The Evolving Arab City. Tradition, Modernity and Urban Development*, New York: Routledge, pp. 248–304.
- Foucault, Michel. 2001. "Les techniques de soi". In *Dits et Ecrits*, t. II, 1976–1988. Paris: Gallimard, pp. 1602–1632.
- Foster, Robert J. 2007. "The Work of the New Economy: Consumers, Brands and Value Creation". *Cultural Anthropology*, vol. 22(4), pp. 707–731.
- Gell, Alfred. 2006. "Parfum, symbolisme et enchantement". *Terrain*, vol. 47, pp. 19–34.
- Gershon, Ilana. 2016. "'I'm Not a Businessman, I'm a Business, Man'. Typing the Neoliberal Self into a Branded Existence". *HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory*, vol. 6(3), pp. 223–246.
- Gollain, Vincent. 2011. "Entretien: Le territoire doit-il être une marque". *Inter Régions*, vol. 296, p. 8.
- Graan, Andrew. 2013. "Counterfeiting the Nation? Skopje 2014 and the Politics of Nation Branding in Macedonia". *Cultural Anthropology*, vol. 28(1), pp. 161–179.
- Harvey, David. 2001. *Spaces of Capital. Towards a Critical Geography*. Milton Park: Routledge.
- . 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kanna, Ahmed. 2010. "Flexible Citizenship in Dubai: Neoliberal Subjectivity in the Emerging "City-Corporation". *Cultural Anthropology*, vol. 25(1), pp. 100–129.
- Kapferer, Jean-Noël. 2011. "France: pourquoi penser la marque?" *Revue française de gestion*, vol. 37(218–219), pp. 13–23.
- Karpick, Lucien. 2007. *L'économie des singularités*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Khalaf, Sulayman. 1999. "Camel Racing in the Gulf. Notes on the Evolution of a Transnational Cultural Sport". *Anthropos*, vol. 94, pp. 85–106.
- . 2001. "United Arab Emirates". In M. Ember, and C. R. Ember, eds., *Countries and Their Cultures. Volume 4. Saint Kitts and Nevis to Zimbabwe*. New York: Macmillan Reference USA, pp. 2325–2331.
- . 2005. "National Dress and the Construction of Emirati Cultural Identity". *Journal of Human Sciences*, vol. 11, pp. 229–267.
- . 2006. "The Evolution of the Gulf City Type, Oil and Globalization". In J. W. Fox, N. Mourtada-Sabbah, and M. al-Mutawa, eds., *Globalization and the Gulf*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 244–265.
- . 2010. "Dubai Camel Market Transnational Workers: An Ethnographic Portrait". *City and Society*, vol. 22(1), pp. 97–118.
- Latour, Bruno. 2009. *Sur le culte moderne des dieux faitiches* followed by *Iconoclash*. Paris: La Découverte.
- Lavergne, Marc. 2002. "Dubai ou la métropolisation incomplète d'un pôle en relais de l'économie monde". *Cahiers de la Méditerranées*, vol. 64, pp. 257–296.

- Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1959. *Anthropologie structurale*. Paris: Plon, pp. 235–265.
- . 1961. *Entretiens avec Claude Lévi-Strauss*, Georges Charbonnier (interview conducted by). Paris: Juillard.
- Manning, Paul. 2006. “Words and Things, Goods and Services: Problems of Translation between Language and Political Economy”. *Language and Communication*, vol. 26(3–4), pp. 270–284.
- Manning, Paul and Uplisashvili, Ann. 2007. “‘Our Beer’: Ethnographic Brands in Postsocialist Georgia”. *American Anthropologist*, vol. 109(4), pp. 626–641.
- Mauss, Marcel. 1997. *Sociologie et anthropologie*. Paris: Quadrige/Presses Universitaires de France.
- Ong, Aiwha. 2006. *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in citizenship and sovereignty*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Patrin-Leclère, Valérie. 2013. “Un média est-il une marque?” *Communication*, vol. 32(2) [online].
- Sassen, Saskia. 2001. *Global City*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- . 2005. “The Network of Global Cities: A Space of Power and Empowerment.” *Journal of Social Affairs*. (*Sharjah, UAE*), 22(86), pp. 13–31.
- . 2011. “Interview: les défis de la ville du futur”. In Jean-Pierre Sueur, ed., *Les Villes du futur, futur des villes: quel avenir pour les villes du monde* (Rapport d’information fait au nom de la délégation sénatoriale à la prospective). 1 “Enjeux” no. 594, pp. 29–34.
- Sattler, Kenrick, Siegfried Högl, and Olivier Hupp. 2003. “L’évaluation de la valeur économique des marques”. *Revue française de marketing*, vol. 195, pp. 21–38.
- Weiner, Annette. 1992. *Inalienable Possessions. The Paradox of Keeping-While-Giving*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

3 “Start here”

Foundational slogans in Shenzhen, China

Anne-Christine Trémon

Slogans have characterized the visual landscape of socialist China. They have been the hallmark of political campaigns (*yundong*), a political technology by which the party-state mobilized a target population (cadres, intellectuals, peasants, the people) to enact the application of a new policy (Hertz 1998). In the past decades, the state has relaxed direct control on citizens and abandoned the mass mobilization campaigns of the Mao era. The huge roadside boards in major Chinese cities that used to be covered with quotations from Mao and campaign banners have for the most part disappeared. Although commercial signage and advertisement billboards are threatening to overwhelm official political public writings, slogans remain nonetheless a central medium of propaganda and are still very much used today as techniques of government, albeit with a changed form and content. The party-state “has retained a significant portion of the overall ‘sign-space’ for political propaganda messages” (Chau 2008: 198) and for promoting “socialist spiritual civilization” and issues related to health, birth control, or the need for a “civilized city”.

In this chapter I focus on one particular form of slogan, which is drawn from a specific genre in Chinese written culture, the *duilian* (对联). *Duilian* (*dui*, opposite, *lian*, join) are parallel couplets, consisting of two counterbalanced phrases with matching semantic and phonic properties. Owing to their propitiatory quality, they are often used on some important events to frame the main entrance of a building or site. “*Cong zheli kaishi, bu yiyang de jingcai*” (从这里开始, 不一样的精彩) was a slogan that could be read everywhere in downtown Shenzhen during the summer of 2011. Along with its English version, “Start here, make a difference” (the literal translation being “from here start, not the same wonderfulness”), it was posted in two vertical lines, in the typical manner of *duilian*, on banners that hung at regular intervals along the motorway verges. This slogan was the official motto of the Universiade World University Games that were held in Shenzhen in mid-August.

Just before my visit to the city centre and the discovery of the vibrant atmosphere around the Universiade, I had spent several weeks in Pine



Figure 3.1 Universiade slogan. Photograph taken by author.

Mansion, an urbanized village located in Bao'an district, in the north of Shenzhen.¹ I was struck by the resonance between the Universiade slogan and the one I had discovered in the former village's ancestral hall. The hall is dedicated to the founding ancestor of the Chen lineage, whose members constitute the overwhelming majority among Pine Mansion's native population.² On both sides of the entrance door to the hall, parallel verses (*duilian*) painted on wooden boards, proclaim, "The source rises in Changle [on the right] the enterprise starts in Bao'an" [on the left] "源从长乐, 业创宝安". These formulas constitute a *slogan* in the etymological sense of the word, the rallying cry of Scottish clans (cf. Introduction). They are foundational in that they encapsulate the founding act of ancestor Chen Zhenneng, who had migrated from Changle (present day Wuhua) in northern Guangdong province to Bao'an (now a district of Shenzhen), where he settled in the middle of the eighteenth century. They also act in the present by signalling and singling out the foundational spaces of Pine Mansion's Chen lineage, whose members mobilized to protect them against government policies aimed at their erasure.

The striking resemblance between the foundational statement made by the *duilian* in the village's ancestral hall ("the enterprise starts in Bao'an")

and on the banners that were hanging everywhere in the city (“start here”) constitutes my starting point in this chapter. I use the Shenzhen city slogan as a contrastive frame for analysing the village slogan’s meaning and the reality it indexes. In spite of their similarities in form and content, the slogans differ in the ideologies and logics of practice they express and enact. As *duilian*, they are composed of two parallel verses. Whereas one verse of each pair is similar to the other in proclaiming a new start, the other verse opposes them. The city slogan’s second line (“not the same wonderfulness”) celebrates Shenzhen as a new city turned toward the future, while the village slogan’s first line (“the source is in Changle”) acknowledges the origins of the lineage. Furthermore, the lineage-village local slogan stands in a part-whole relationship to the larger-scale city slogan – the city contains the village, and the village is one of the city’s building blocks. Yet this part-whole relationship is actually supposed to be suppressed – villages are supposed to dissolve within the modern city, and their native inhabitants (deemed uncivilized and backwards) are meant to become modern urban dwellers.

The Shenzhen slogan can be seen as condensing all inhabitants of the city within a new undifferentiated ensemble of modern citizens. It is a synthesis of a larger discourse that is turned against the kind of territorially rooted local organizations represented by lineage-villages such as Pine Mansion. Although they are both foundational, the two slogans differ with respect to the temporal and spatial frames they index – the lineage slogan was made a century prior to the city slogan and expresses attachment to a local territory. While the continuous use in the present of the lineage slogan, in a way, anticipates the city slogan, it also challenges it. Using the lineage slogan as an entry point to analyse the social and economic transformations that have occurred in the village, I ask how these participate in, but also how they may be at odds with, the processes that unfold at the larger scale of the Shenzhen special economic zone. The latter can be viewed as the product of a particular Chinese form of state-endorsed neoliberalism, which is encapsulated in and promoted by the city slogan.

In what follows I take a broad outlook on neoliberalism as a working, although far from hegemonic, practice in China. I regard it as an ideology that gives shape to government policies aimed at expanding capitalism. Neoliberalism is a process, not an end state. Thus, an analysis “of this process should therefore focus sharply on *change*” (Peck and Tickell 2001: 4). I refer to neoliberalization as the process of dis-embedding the economic from the social and ensuring the full expansion of capitalist logics (beyond the mere logic of the market), a process implemented by techniques of government. It is largely state-driven in that it depends on the conditions that only the state is in a position to implement: subjects that play the game by conforming to their allocated function as self-governing entrepreneurs, and rules of the game (an institutional environment) that allow the exercise of individual entrepreneurial freedoms. To achieve this, neoliberalism uses “technologies of subjection” that regulate populations by subjecting them

to different rules and granting them different rights as well as “technologies of subjectivity” that seek to instil an entrepreneurial ethos and a particular world view. The aim of these governing technologies is thus to promote and advance the transition to capitalism.

In the second and third sections of this chapter, I show how both the city and lineage-village slogans can be seen as performative and propitiatory formulas bringing a desired reality into existence and ensuring its success. I examine the particular form of the *dulian* and outline to what extent the Shenzhen slogan, as an emanation of government policy, and the lineage slogan, posted at the entrance of the Chen lineage ancestral hall, echo each other, pointing out a historical irony in the reverberation of contemporary and past formulaic statements and their celebration of entrepreneurial spirit. In this respect the city slogan, which is both a vehicle and an instrument of neoliberal governance, encounters the lineage “ideo-logics” (Augé 1975) and ethos of enterprise.

In the two later sections, I point out the extent to which the dissimilarities between the two slogans reveal discrepancies. The village-lineage politics of collective real estate management and the protection of the ancestral land consist in a set of practices that participate in capitalism but contradict state-driven neoliberalization. When tracing the recent history of the transformation of Shenzhen’s peasant villages and the survival of the collective economy, some discordance can be detected between the collectivist values of the lineage-village community and the ideology of freedom of enterprise and individual ownership that drives the transition toward capitalism. We see, moreover, that the lineage ideo-logics that rest on territorial roots and lay claim to ownership of the land that was chosen and cleared by the founding ancestor, goes against neoliberal zoning whose spatial planning entails deterritorialization, the creation of spaces where the logics of the market and of capitalism fully prevail. By taking as an illustration the way in which the villagers managed to save their founding ancestor’s grave site, however, I argue that this situation cannot be interpreted as a diametrical opposition between the Confucian ethical regime of the lineage and neoliberalism as endorsed by the state. It is rather a complex configuration whereby the village-lineage community takes part in a local capitalist coalition and tries to maintain its autonomy and historical identity in the face of state policies that are a complex blend of state intervention in the economy, neoliberal governance, and Neo-Confucian principles.

Shenzhen’s neoliberal urbanization

Although it was specifically designed for a sporting event, the slogan “Start here” is very much part of a larger reality and the general discourse that is held about Shenzhen, the first and most ambitious of all five Chinese special economic zones created in 1980 at the start of the “reform and opening” (*gaige kaifang*) era to experiment with capitalism and develop an export

economy (Ng 2003; O'Donnell 2001). In these zones local officials set up tens of thousands of town and village enterprises (TVEs) that brought together overseas capital and expertise with the mainland's abundant cheap labour and land.

The slogan proclaims the creation of Shenzhen as a new city, the product and outgrowth of the special economic zone that was announced in 1979 and officially launched two years later. The city embodies the Chinese *gaige kaifang*, “reform and opening”. The economic reforms introduced market principles and involved the de-collectivization of agriculture, opening up the country to foreign investment and granting permission to entrepreneurs to start businesses. As the first city to have been opened up to foreign capital and the first to have introduced a market in land use rights, among others, Shenzhen is indeed the place where the new China started.

It is also a new place. The city has ascended from villages and fields to a modern international metropolis in the space of three decades, growing at an annual rate of over 27 per cent from 1980 to 2006. The city centre, roughly corresponding to the original special economic zone, has been built by erasing entire villages and replacing them with centrally planned urban high-rise residential neighbourhoods, skyscrapers and high-tech factories. Shenzhen also prides itself on having become “the first Chinese city without villages” after the last remaining rural villages in its northern districts, Bao'an and Longgang, were urbanized in 2004, and their inhabitants lost their peasant status to become citizens of Shenzhen.³

Pine Mansion, located in the northern part of Bao'an district in Guanlan sub-district, was no longer officially a village after 2004 (but its inhabitants still call it a *cun*, village). It had become the smallest administrative unit in the city, a community (*shequ*) run by a workstation (*gongzuozhan*). In this process, the former villagers lost their peasant *hukou* (residence permit) classification and became citizens of Shenzhen. In fact, urbanization had already started long before this legal shift, in the 1980s and 1990s. Pine Mansion's population has exploded from 3,000 inhabitants at the end of the 1970s to over 50,000 in 2010 as the result of a massive inflow of migrants from inland China.⁴ This migrant population holds only temporary residency in the village, in contrast with the estimated 1,300 original inhabitants living today in Pine Mansion. Most of the original residents bear the surname Chen and form the Pine Mansion Chen lineage community. They claim descent from the first Chen to have settled in Pine Mansion, Chen Zhenneng.

When I first arrived in 2011, the former village was undergoing the same kind of erasure that had taken place in the core of Shenzhen and was being witnessed all over China, namely the wholesale destruction of old houses to build a new urban neighbourhood (the *jiucun gaizao* policy). The open ground in the old centre of Pine Mansion was covered with rubble from the tiled roof houses that had been built a century ago and were now being destroyed. The walls that enclosed the rubble-strewn ground were covered with large advertisements for the Universiade and recommendations to the

residents to smile at strangers, not to spit, and with translations into English of sentences such as “How can I help you?” Next to the pulverized buildings stood the ancestral hall of the founding ancestor of the Chen lineage. By 2017, the eight high-rise apartment buildings that will form a new “garden residence” (*huayyuanshi zhuzhai*) were almost completed, and the lineage hall had been renovated to be on par with the high-standard, “world-class” residential apartments, as they are advertised.

The city slogan may be seen to contribute in two aspects to the neoliberal shaping of Shenzhen. First, it promotes Shenzhen as a special economic zone, the very locus and product of neoliberal “technologies of subjection”, as defined by Aihwa Ong (2006). These inform political strategies that instrumentalize a form of market-driven rationality to regulate populations and categorize spaces so as to achieve optimal productivity. The creation of special economic zones such as the one in Shenzhen seeks to capitalize on the specific locational advantages of economic flows, activities, and linkages and to “achieve strategic goals of regulating groups in relation to market forces” (2006: 7). The Shenzhen city slogan may furthermore be seen as an example of the second mode of neoliberal government identified by Ong; “technologies of subjectivity”. Relying on “an array of knowledge and expert systems” they promote the acquisition of skills and techniques of self-engineering “to induce self-animation and self-government” (2006: 6). Indeed, the city’s population was mobilized around the Universiade in ways that were very similar to the Olympics in Beijing in 2008 or the World Expo in Shanghai in 2010. Armies of volunteers were dispatched at the entrance of metro stations and other strategic spots in the city to guide visitors and participants. The city administration and many large companies gave their employees two days’ special leave to encourage them to attend the opening ceremonies and games. The slogan “start here” aims at shaping the modern Shenzheners, modelled on the entrepreneurial individual who dares to launch new ventures.

In what follows, I further illustrate this point with an example of how such technologies of subjectivity inform current discourses on the necessity of obliterating the remains of the collective economy in Shenzhen’s former villages and its reliance on particularistic social ties. Indeed, the city slogan points to the opposition of urban and rural that has shaped the creation of Shenzhen (Bach 2010: 422). “The ideology of urbanization-as-modernization legitimates a spatial order in which the rural is always posed to be superseded by the urban” (O’Donnell 2002: 419).⁵ Villages are seen as uncivilized, messy and disorderly, and their inhabitants, former peasants, as carrying on backward customs. Peasants, who had been elevated under Mao to the revolution’s collective mass subject, are defined today “mainly in terms of a ‘problem’ (*wenti*) of development and order, as a product of rejected political pasts” (Brandstädter 2011: 268). In former villages such as Pine Mansion, peasants-turned-citizens are considered to be perpetuating forms of social organization (the lineage) that had been termed “feudal” at the advent of the communist regime in 1949. Whereas Maoism has not succeeded in getting

rid of the lineage, policies of economic liberalization since the beginning of the reform era have been rather ambivalent, in that they have de facto led to the revival of the lineage by encouraging a form of village collective economy that was seen as favourable to the transition toward capitalism but is now starting to be viewed as incompatible with further liberalization.

According to Frank Pieke, the type of governmentality taking form in China has “roots in both socialism and neoliberalism” (2009: 126). Although Liew (2005), Kipnis (2007), and Nonini (2008) criticize the tendency to envision neoliberalism as a dominant ideology, the recognition that neoliberalism is not hegemonic does not detract from the fact that it has, at least partly, taken hold in China. Aihwa Ong states that neoliberalism is far from having been generalized, and that we should examine how, as an ethos of self-government, it encounters and is articulated with “other ethical regimes” in particular contexts (2006: 9). Yet in her chapter on Shenzhen she limits her analysis to the set of neoliberal technologies that have carved out this zone and does not address the other ethical regimes, nor specify what they might be. This further points to the limits of these kinds of governmentality studies and their exclusive focus on (top-down) projects, which lead them to “foreground specific temporalities and spatialities of power” to the neglect of others (Graan 2016: 299).

More generally, the conceptual reduction of neoliberalism to the technology of governing is not satisfactory; we must tie the analysis of governing techniques to the goals that are being pursued and the direction of the social world they are oriented toward (Smith 2011: 12). By confining the analysis of neoliberalism to a set of governing techniques, little space remains for analysing how the actual process of the neoliberalization of the economy occurs, and how it conforms or does not conform to the theory of neoliberalism. In Shenzhen, and more generally in the Pearl River Delta region, the transition to market socialism that has taken place did not amount to an overall conversion of the economy to capitalism, even though it installed the preconditions for the further spread of capitalism in the near future. Former rural village communities, when undergoing legal urbanization, have generally retained land-use rights on their former collective lands. A shareholding system was introduced in Guangdong Province to securitize collective assets (Fu 2003; Po 2008). The cooperative shareholding companies (*gufen hezuo gongsi*), which evolved out of the former cultivation groups of the Mao era are now the major economic agents in urbanized villages. Decollectivization has therefore been only partial.

If we accept that the Chinese state partly endorses a neoliberal ideology and is attempting to go beyond market socialism by neoliberalizing an economy that is still largely governed by non-capitalist principles, then we should ask how, in the course of this process, it encounters other logics of action and ethical principles. The latter are not necessarily oppositional, as there can be resonances between some aspects of neoliberal ideology and grassroots attitudes (Gledhill 2004: 339). Before turning to what the divergences

between the slogans reveal about these discrepancies between local communities' and the state's ideo-logics, I first explore their commonalities.

Propitiatory formulas and the shaping of new spaces

A slogan is usually short and easy to remember and encapsulates a call to action. The Chinese language lends itself well to such concise expressions. A four-character slogan may well require at least six or more English words in order to express the same idea. Although the exact translation for slogan is *kouhao*, literally an oral message (*kou* means mouth and *hao* code or message), slogans may be a graphic as much as a verbal utterance. I follow Adam Chau's (2008) argument that slogan banners and murals are merely one instantiation of the textual acts that are legion in Chinese culture – temple steles, seals and one-character blessings such as *fu* (good fortune) that are hung on doors during the Chinese New Year. They have in common a strong visual impact, a graphic presence that overpowers the content of the texts (Chau 2008: 197). They are “graphic speech acts” in that they act upon, rather than simply communicate with, their audience.

This is especially true when considering one particular form of slogan, the *duilian*, on which this chapter focuses. *Duilian*, or parallel couplets, are hand-painted on narrow strips of paper or cloth or carved on wooden boards. They are used to frame the main entrance to a residence or official building or as hanging scrolls in an interior. They consist of two counterbalanced phrases that have a one-to-one correspondence in metrical length. Each pair of characters must have certain matching properties; the lexical category of each character must be the same as its corresponding character; the tone pattern of one line must be the inverse of the other. The meaning of the two lines need to be related, with each pair of corresponding characters having related meanings, too. With respect to doorway couplets, a third line (*hengpi*) is sometimes pasted on the horizontal lintel above, complementing or uniting the antithesis (Thornton 2002: 29–30).

It is such a doorway couplet that I became interested in when I read it first in the Chen lineage's genealogical book, which contained a picture of it, and I saw it later in the village of Pine Mansion, where it frames the entrance of the ancestral hall of the Pine Mansion Chens. The *duilian* celebrate the endeavour of the Chens' founding ancestor, Zhenneng, when he came in the middle of the eighteenth century from northern Guangdong to settle in Bao'an: *yuancong Changle, yechuang Bao'an*, “the source rises in Changle, the enterprise starts in Bao'an”. The contrapuntal quality of the two phrases is very clear; the source and the enterprise, the origin and the start, Changle and Bao'an are complementary opposites (*dui*). These *duilian* were hand-painted in 1925 by a famous calligrapher from Guangzhou at the time when the ancestral hall was restored and embellished with contributions from those among the Pine Mansion Chens who had migrated overseas.



Figure 3.2 Lineage hall *duilian*. Photograph taken by author.

Duilian blend with their immediate context; any place may be suitable for hanging these lines. Most commonly displayed during the Chinese New Year, they may also be posted to mark other prominent occasions, such as a birth, a wedding, a birthday or opening a new business – and may either remain permanently or until they are replaced by new ones. Their occurrence is determined by calendric events or more or less fortuitous events linked to human activities. *Duilian* are considered part of the general corpus of Chinese poetry, although they are considered a minor poetic genre. However, the *duilian* differ from poetic writing in respect to their public and illocutionary, rather than their representational, character. *Duilian* are not proverbs, and they do not offer a moral or sententious learning. They act as a signal to the public of a new situation. They announce something to the visitor; “*les duilian parlent [duilian speak]*” (Delahaye 2002: 64). Moreover, they are propitiatory and beneficial. The custom of hanging doorway couplets appears to have talismanic origins (Delahaye 2002: 49; Thornton 2002: 31). Over time, the couplets themselves came to be viewed as amulets, presaging auspicious outcomes for the forthcoming year and celebrating the successes of the recent past. The Chen ancestral hall *duilian* commemorate the past event of the ancestor Zhenneng settlement in Pine Mansion, but also signalled, at the time they were written down, the rebuilding of the ancestral hall and thus the continuation of the lineage. They celebrate the past achievements of the Chen lineage and presage future prosperity.

Duilian are meant to underscore the importance of a new situation or a crossing; they draw a line between two spaces of different nature. Thus, they act as a marker to the visitor that he is entering “a new space” (Delahaye 2002: 43). The *duilian* have a special ability to create a close relation between particular people and specific places. The *duilian* that frame the entrance of the hall where the tablet and altar are placed for the founding ancestor of the Chen lineage in Pine Mansion not only set this place apart as a cultural space devoted to the apical ancestor; they also frame the space of the (former) village itself, the place that had been founded by ancestor Zhenneng. According to the history narrated by the genealogy, ancestor Zhenneng had been taught geomancy by a *fengshui* master before he left northern Guangdong for Bao’an. He was thus endowed with a special capacity to select propitious places. The *duilian* also act as a propitiatory text that protects the descendants of Zhenneng in Pine Mansion and elsewhere. They tie together two socio-spatial frames, the ancestral hall at the heart of the village and the lineage itself within the space of the village. It is a propitiatory graphic speech act and a foundational statement that acknowledges the importance of ancestor Zhenneng’s linking the old and new localities and his judicious choice of beneficial places.

In recent years, many *duilian* that are satirical toward the administration or the government have been anonymously posted on public buildings, resembling the more modern *dazibao* or *koubao* (Thornton 2002). In reform era China, the ironic hijacking of slogans is an instrument for the articulation of dissenting views in the face of repressive state power (Ching 2010: 68). Perry and Selden note that it is the residual sense of entitlement, a legacy of the revolutionary era extending to the most remote parts of the countryside and to people of diverse social classes and ethnicities, that fuels protest strategies (2010: 11). Thus, workers and women who find themselves disadvantaged by the industrial reforms are quick to remind authorities, with considerable irony, of Maoist slogans and promises: “The working-class must lead in everything!” And “Women hold up half the sky!” But slogans may also ironize the paradoxes of state policy itself. *Wei renmin fuwu*, “Serve the people”, is one of the most famous slogans, first used in the 1940s, and one of the few that may still be heard or seen today. In Pine Mansion I heard a derisive reform-era version from a Hong Kong Chen villager who had returned to his native place to invest in industrial real estate: *Wei renminbi fuwu* (“Serve the money”, the *renminbi* is the Chinese monetary unit).

The resemblance between the Shenzhen slogan and the *duilian* posted at the entrance of the Chen lineage ancestral hall is less an instance of a deliberate use of irony to express resistance than a historical irony inherent in the reverberation of contemporary and past formulaic statements. I start by exploring this likeness before turning to where their difference lies. It is this divergence, in spite of the similarities, that generates a sense of irony and discloses the subversive character of the lineage slogan when compared to the city slogan.

The Shenzhen and Chen lineage slogans echo each other not only in their representational content, but first and foremost in their pragmatics, insofar as they participate in the shaping of a new space. The Shenzhen slogan is formally derived from the genre of the *duilian*, although it does not follow the rules of metric and semantic correspondence. The pink and blue colours ensure the slogan does not look like Communist public writings, which are usually written in white or yellow characters against a red background. It is halfway between the commercial genre – an advertisement for the newly branded city – and the political slogan. By means of this slogan, Shenzhen city was advertising itself more than the games – as a place of new beginnings and the city of the future. This was explicitly stated on the Universiade website: “The Universiade provides a platform for Shenzhen to show the achievements of China’s reform and opening-up policy to the rest of the world”. That a large international event such as the Universiade is a means of branding a Chinese city and asserting its place in the global arena is so evident it hardly needs to be elaborated. This slogan and event are yet another instance of the current worldwide competition between local territories that aim to present themselves as alluring to attract investment.

In this respect, the city slogan does take on the same informative and propitiatory function of announcing future prosperity, which has made *duilian* very useful as a means of political propaganda. And in the same way as traditional *duilian*, it announces to visitors that they are entering a new space; the space that is being marked out here being Shenzhen city as a whole. Furthermore, the Universiade slogan resonates with the interpretation of pre-Shenzhen history offered in the Shenzhen museum, which depicts the Pearl River Delta area as a region of pioneers.⁶ The overall narrative that the Shenzhen slogan and the lineage hall *duilian* encapsulate are thus very similar: the city slogan depicts Shenzhen as a pioneering place, a new frontier, where people dare to launch new enterprises and are animated by the entrepreneurial spirit being promoted by the authorities; the lineage hall *duilian* celebrates the start of a new enterprise by the pioneer ancestor Zhenneng. The echo of these formulas seems to suggest a perfect accordance between the history of Shenzhen and the Pearl River Delta region (as it is currently being emphasized) and the actual history of the Chen Pine Mansion lineage. It also seems to offer a fine match between the entrepreneurial spirit promoted by the Chinese government and that which guides the lineage as an enterprise.

The lineage village as an enterprise

The second line of the *duilian* reads *yechuang Bao’an*. The first character, *ye* (业), means business, occupation, estate, property. It is found in the two-character words *qiye*, (company, firm, enterprise); *shiyè* (undertaking, project, activity) and *shangye*, (business, trade, commerce). *Chuang* (创) means

to begin, to initiate, to create. *Chuangye* signifies to begin an undertaking, to venture and, as a noun, it refers to entrepreneurship. *Ye chuang* are two single-character words in the classical Chinese style typical of *duilian*, and together they may be translated as “the enterprise starts here”.

Pine Mansion village has long been typical of the lineage-village complex, widespread in the Guangdong and Fujian provinces of South China (Freedman 1958, 1966). Many villages were composed of male agnatic descendants of a single ancestor together with their unmarried sisters and their wives – they were “single-lineage villages” or “single-surname villages”. Pine Mansion was an almost single-surname village, where the Chen constituted most of the inhabitants. Lineage organizations, considered characteristic of feudal social formations, were made illegal with the advent of the communist regime and, although their activities have been tolerated since the beginning of the reform era, today they are still illegal, or at least unrecognized, entities.⁷

Historically, the creation of the lineage as a corporate group was the result of the extension of state power to local communities, mainly in the Ming and early Qing dynasties. It was in the period stretching from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century that local groups focusing on places of worship were replaced by those that registered their holdings for taxation purposes (Faure 1989). They followed the official model of the lineage that under the Song dynasty had been the privilege of aristocratic families and was promoted and popularized by neo-Confucian writers who emphasized patrilineal unity and patriarchal hierarchy. As an agrarian empire, the Chinese state generally followed a basic philosophy of expanding agricultural production and distribution to create a steady source of revenues and a stable social order (Wong 1997: 98). Economic expansion came from opening new land and improving productivity on already cultivated fields. It is in this very context that the lineage was created. The lineage served to legitimate settlement rights that included the right to build houses, to gather fuel on the hillsides, and to open up land for cultivation (Faure 1989: 6). For this reason, genealogies, such as that of the Pine Mansion Chens, contain foundational statements in the guise of settlement accounts.

In the past decades the lineage-village community has sought to perpetuate itself as a collective social entity in the face of increasing state impingements. In theory, legal urbanization and the transformation of the village into an urban community entails the state taking over of the land heretofore managed by the collective. In many cases, the local government buys the land at low prices and sells the use rights at higher prices to real estate development companies. What is specific about Shenzhen is that the former villages (in many cases they are lineage communities) have retained many of their former rights as collectives. Elsewhere in China entire village communities have been deprived of their lands, at times leading to social protests such as the one that broke out in December 2011 in Wukan, a village in the south of Guangdong province, where holiday resorts and

luxury villas were gradually erected on confiscated cooperative farmland and subsequently sold by the local cadres to developers. In Pine Mansion, the Shenzhen government took over only a very small part of former collective land, mainly the forest and hilly land that had been left unused. The villagers received monetary compensation that they used to invest in factory buildings and dormitories.

Villages with active temple associations or strong lineage organizations are more likely to avoid or resist cadres' predatory practices and to implement community projects. When social networks exist that "incorporate both village officials and citizens, they...facilitate public projects that might not otherwise become a reality" (Tsai 2002: 26). In Shenzhen the more unified and disciplined villages have been able to use the joint-stock company format to expand into other income-generating activities (O'Donnell 2002). This is the case in the Pine Mansion community. The lineage structure of the village offers a unifying framework that protects against encroachments from the higher level of government and discourages opportunistic behaviour by local officials. The composition of the former village leadership is almost all Chen: the heads of the village committees, now urban resident committees (*juweihui*) and the heads of the shareholding companies, which I present in more detail below, are Chens. There is one notable exception: one of the most important leaders of the new urban community is a Huang. Nevertheless, he participates in the dense intra-village network of ties that the predominance of the Chen lineage leads to the former village community. This network is not based just on kinship ties but also on territorial and social ties (all those were brought up in the village, including children sent back from overseas, went to the elementary and middle schools established by the Chen lineage).

Since their "invention" (Faure 1989) in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, lineages have been conceived of as a corporate enterprise, and it is still very much so today. "A spirit of enterprise may be detected in many lineage regulations" (*ibid.* 1989: 27). Conversely, forms of business in China have until very recently been patterned on the type of social relationships that prevail in lineage organizations. Until Western law came to be applied, China did not have any law to deal with a business company. "It has taken China all of the twentieth century to make the transformation and to this day, it is far from complete" (Faure 2006:3). We see below that this is indeed what is at stake today in the transformation of the former collectives.

The lineage is conceived of as an enterprise in several ways. Firstly, the foundational act of Zhenneng is depicted in the genealogy history as an entrepreneurial act in the sense that he settled in a new place with his three sons, cleared the land and domesticated a savage and hostile environment. He established an estate by clearing woods and starting to cultivate the land, laying down the foundations for the prosperity of his descendants. Secondly, the lineage in itself is a corporate entity that acts in the name of Zhenneng, with the goal of continuing Zhenneng's enterprise.

This is, for instance, clearly stated in the first pages of the genealogy, where all the compilation committee members are portrayed. Underneath their photographs are a few biographical lines that systematically detail their generational rank, starting from Zhenneng, summarize their achievements, and end with a standard formula: “He is actively contributing to Zhenneng’s cause”. The private foundation that runs the money gathered locally and overseas and the interest on the villagers’ assets is called the Zhenneng Foundation. It was founded in Hong Kong in the early 1960s, when many villagers fled the Great Leap Forward, and subsequently repatriated to Pine Mansion. Its head is a wealthy businessman who had left the village at the age of 18, migrated from Hong Kong to Canada, where he started a business, and returned after the reopening of the border to invest in the village. He is the one who diverted the “Serve the people” slogan into “Serve the money”.

Thirdly, the Chen villagers collectively constitute an enterprise insofar as they collectively retain use rights on the land. During the Maoist period, in a rural district such as Bao’an 80 per cent of the land was owned and cultivated by the village collectives. Along with the transformation of their legal status from rural to urban residents in 2004, the land of the collectives was transformed to urban land and became subject to “use rights”. The former collectives were turned into joint-stock companies, *gufengongsi* 股份公司. In Pine Mansion there were originally three production teams (*shengchandu*). In the early 1980s each team became a cooperative company for economic development (*jingjifazhan hezuoshe*). With urbanization, in 2004 they were turned into seven joint-stock companies that manage the real estate assets of the former collectives. “We receive factory rent every month, and we do the maintenance” is how the manager of one *gufengongsi* summarized their activity.

The village and lineage structure that underlies these collectives turned into companies has remained largely the same over time. Although the former Chen villagers are no longer officially villagers and are certainly no longer peasants, they still act collectively by retaining shares in the enterprises that manage the land in Pine Mansion. At the time of the opening-up reforms the villagers had called on their kin from Hong Kong and the diaspora to build the factories they rent out to foreign companies (mainly Taiwanese), together with dormitories for the factory workers. Smart and Lin’s (2007) notion of “local capitalism” refers to these capitalist practices that are made possible not so much by the social and legal infrastructure of the nation state but by local conditions of existence that may vary considerably from one place to another. “Kinship or social networks provide non-market frameworks within which the locality engages in external market transactions to accumulate collective capital” (Smart and Lin 2007: 285).

I show in the next sections how neoliberal principles are combined with other ethical traditions, in government-led policies as well as in local,

grass-roots organizations. The lineage's Confucian ethics blend with a "religion of productivity" whose logic rests on sacrifice to the founding ancestor turned toward the goal of economic development and prosperity. The self-definition of the lineage as an "enterprise" and a cause to be pursued makes it a very favourable ground for the embrace of entrepreneurial ethics; therefore, these should not be seen as either a monopoly of neoliberalism or as a product of its promulgation. These ethics of popular religion and lineage organization, however, not only encounter the state's neoliberal projects. They also differ from them to the point where they can be considered subversive. These divergences are found in the moral economies of local communities that emphasize equity and collective solidarity among members of the same lineage and village and attach importance to the proper veneration of ancestors.

The moral economy of the collectives and neoliberal reforms in the making

The second line of the *duilian*, *yechuang Bao'an*, may also be translated as "the estate was created here" (*ye* means business, occupation, estate, property). This draws our attention to the collectivist and redistributive aspects of this form of lineage-based capitalism that certainly do not conform to neoliberal logic.

What emerged in Pine Mansion, as in many other former villages of Shenzhen, is thus a local capitalist coalition that links local residents, local officials and trans-local kin. It is supported by the lineage ideo-logic of brotherhood that stretches the claims of shared local belonging across national borders; a logic of inclusion. In contrast, the migrants from China's inner provinces who reside temporarily in the village are excluded from the distribution of dividends and welfare by the shareholding companies. Bao'an district is an area with one of the highest concentrations of immigrant population, standing at approximately 93 per cent of the total population (Li 2006), which is even higher than in Shenzhen as a whole (approximately 75 per cent). The ratio of migrants is higher still in Pine Mansion. According to the official census of August 2010, there were 59,980 residents. Interestingly, the local census divides this population into three categories: those under the jurisdiction of the three main resident committees (46,658 individuals); the factory workers living in dormitories (11,881) and the original villagers (*yuancunmin*; 原村民) (1,441). This categorization appears to be an emergent one, for the category *yuancunmin* is not official, although it is starting to be used in legal documents. The reason why this categorization has taken on importance is that it defines who is entitled to a share in the shareholding companies. Only the *yuancunmin* can be shareholders (*gudong*). Only they receive annual dividends derived from the management of the land previously collectively owned by the Chen villagers, as well as the welfare benefits distributed by the shareholding companies: health insurance for all, pensions

for women over 50 and men over 60, various money gifts on festivals, and scholarships for promising young Pine Mansioners.

The continuation of the lineage structure that lies behind the division between natives and migrants may be regarded as serving to participate in the maintenance of a labour reserve, a readily usable workforce deprived of basic rights that Harvey identifies as being central to the logic of “accumulation by dispossession”. It is central to the process by which the Chinese economy is undergoing neoliberalization (2005: 153–155). However, it is at odds with the theory of neoliberalism in itself, with its emphasis on individual rights and an open and competitive economic environment.

In this context of newfound prosperity, being a native becomes decisive as it entails the right to a share of the collective income and to welfare benefits. Yet the existence of such remnants of former rural collectives, collectively owned estates, is now being questioned in government spheres. The official term for the former villages’ real estate management companies is *cooperative shareholding companies* (*gufen hezuo gongsi*).⁸ Cooperative shareholding companies are governed by local (municipal and district) regulations, not national legislation.⁹ They are independent legal entities and government cannot interfere in their management. They are not officially categorized as a form of business in the PRC company law. A tool in the transition toward market socialism, they have a hybrid character. They differ from the Maoist commune in that they are oriented toward profit-making and embrace market principles. Yet they differ from other business types in that they aim to promote cooperation among farmers or workers and do not distinguish between owners of the capital and employees. Moreover, the shareholders have limited rights to transfer their shares to outsiders.

The very fact that shareholding companies were designed as a means to build a socialist market economy and are therefore not included in company law is increasingly regarded as problematic. In 2011 90 per cent of the 108 *gufen gongsi* (11 large and 97 smaller ones) in the sub-district where Pine Mansion is located, were in deficit.¹⁰ In Pine Mansion, as could be seen from the bulletin boards that stand outside on the street in front of the companies’ office buildings, the shareholding companies were all in deficit except the largest one.

There are signs of a future change in the regulations governing shareholding companies. A “draft notification of opinions on the reform of *gufengongsi* rules and regulations” was posted at the end of 2010 on the Shenzhen government website.¹¹ Although very tentative, this public communication had a performative effect in that it triggered the various Shenzhen district governments, at the next lower administrative level, to investigate the state of affairs and consider the possibilities of reform. A Bao’an district government document entitled “Opinion on the sustainable development of *gufen gongsi*” encapsulates the government and administrative outlook on *gufen gongsi*.¹² The opening statement starts with a positive appraisal, stating that they “have been an important way of promoting the development of the

Shenzhen local (*bendi*) economy”. However, the text continues, they have three major shortcomings: they are not purely economic, since they are not a “company law” type of company; the shares are not open to outside capital, and “their basis is the *yuancunmin* (original residents)”. The shares are not mobile, as they cannot be transferred to outsiders, but may be transferred and inherited only among the *yuancunmin*. Therefore, the author suggests that the geographical limitations to ownership should give way to a system of business property rights (*chanquan*) that would grant the right for shares to be disposed of freely. It thus appears from these documents that government officials are contemplating a change in regulations in order to put a definitive end to the remains of the rural collective economy that, in Shenzhen’s former villages, have been based on territorial and kinship ties. The reform that is being envisaged amounts to creating an institutional framework that would ensure full capitalist logics, that is, a system of individual ownership of shares, and a management exclusively oriented toward profit instead of being subjected to principles of redistribution that generate deficits.

As this book goes to press in 2018, reforms of shareholding companies have taken place, but they have not turned them into full-fledged capitalist enterprises. The opinions that various officials had voiced on the administrative blogosphere are part of a “performative apparatus” (Holmes 2014) which, in China’s specific authoritarian context, prepares lower-level officials for a future change in policy and the eventuality of reform. This envisaged reform is framed by the larger civilizing discourse that prevails in China and that places the former villages at the opposite pole to modernity, as backward vestiges of a bygone era, the last traces of which have to be erased. More specifically, these communications signal a change in official policy, as the particularist ties of kinship and geographical proximity that prevailed in the formation of the shareholding companies as a legacy of the Mao period¹³ are starting to be considered an impediment to the development of a purely economic logic and a managerial rationality. Ultimately, it is the lineage, as a social form that is not adequate to fulfilling a role in a market economy oriented to profit, that is being targeted. The last sentence of the document quoted above refers to the lineage and reveals the discursive contrast that is being made between the conservatism of kinship ties and the modernity of entrepreneurial managerialism:

In the traditional management of shareholding companies, lineage relations (*zongfa guanxi*), a clannish ideology and kinship ties hold together the shareholding companies, and the enterprises’ development is conservative. In order to realize the sustainable development of shareholding companies, it is necessary to establish incentive mechanisms that will bring into play a higher order of management and a spirit of endeavour “want to do, dare to do, be quick to do” (*xiang gan, gan gan, kuai gan*).

The statement contained in this last sentence is a clear expression of the neoliberal ideology of governance, and the formula is a typical instance of a slogan used as a technology of subjectivity (this slogan is an ad hoc creation I have not found elsewhere). The traditionalism, conservatism, and backwardness of lineage ties are seen as running against Shenzhen's road toward modernity.

Yet, although the lineage as a "feudal form" in the rhetoric that has prevailed since 1949 is easy to blame, there is more than the prevalence of the lineage at stake here. If the lineage structure of the village economy has endured in spite of the advent of communism, it has not remained unchanged. The large lineages of South China, such as the one in Pine Mansion (whose size is considerably larger than that of other similar lineages in the area), were segmented and socially stratified entities. At the time the Party came to power the lineage as a whole held land in trust in the name of founding ancestor Zhenneng, but various segments also collectively retained land in the name of the later ancestors of the fourth or fifth generations. The land reform of the early 1950s broke down this system by equalizing land tenure. Land from then onwards belonged to the village commune and not just to the lineage.

The present Pine Mansion lineage-village community is a kind of mixture of the pre-communist social formation of the village and the Maoist social formation of the rural commune. Even today, the social organization and egalitarian spirit of the commune is still very much present. On the whole, the former village community persists in the shape of the shareholding companies system and upholds the values of equality and social justice inherited from the communist area. This is clearly shown in the egalitarianism that prevails in the allocation of shares and the paying out of dividends and welfare benefits. These collective and redistributive ethics also animate the functioning of the lineage as a community of worship, although this aspect is more in line with the paternalist values of traditional pre-communist lineages. This leads us to another important dimension that should be taken into account in analysing the way in which the lineage and village remain part of the social structure in the context of Shenzhen's transformations, and the final way in which the village slogan is dissonant with the Shenzhen city slogan.

Remembering the source: Confucian neoliberalism and popular religion

At the end of the 1990s, the Pine Mansion Chens built a mausoleum around the tomb of founding ancestor Zhenneng. The entrance that faces the tomb, now covered (*gai*) by this tall building, was newly framed by the same *duilian* as in the lineage hall, "The source rises in Changle, the enterprise starts in Bao'an". This iteration of the lineage slogan hammers home the importance of this site to the Chen lineage, and caps the successful building of the

mausoleum itself – in full contravention of the policy led by the Shenzhen government. The ancestral tomb – and now the mausoleum – together with the temple, are the locus of a collective gathering and annual sacrifice to the ancestor. It is the lineage foundation (an unregistered organization) that pays for lineage and village activities: the two annual worship ceremonies and sacrifices, followed by the collective meal in which the entire lineage-village community participates, and the maintenance of the two lineage sites – the ancestral temple and the mausoleum – as well as the activities hall for elderly people (*laoren yiyuan*).¹⁴ The foundation draws an income from real estate initially built with overseas and Hong Kong money. In the face of the loss of autonomy brought about by legal urbanization, as the community workstation administers the former village and is subordinate to the different echelons of the urban administration, the Chen lineage Zhenneng Foundation has taken on increased importance.

The case of the mausoleum is particularly interesting with respect to what it reveals about the relation between the lineage and state-promoted neoliberalism. The Chen villagers decided to build this mausoleum following the funeral reform (*binzang gaige*) implemented in Shenzhen in 1997 as a result of national regulations ordered by the state council. The rapid urbanization of Shenzhen's former rural villages explains the dramatic way in which the national reform has been applied there. A decision was made to reach a rate of 100 per cent cremations in a very short time. Moreover, the authorities have ordered that all buried remains be disinterred and cremated and the ashes spread out or stored in a publicly accredited cemetery. In Pine Mansion village, a government team came down during the year 1998 to proceed with the exhumations. The villagers were threatened with being stripped of their shares in their companies if they did not comply.

The mausoleum was a very clever solution to a double challenge: how to protect at least the founding ancestor's remains (avoid their cremation) and where to store the remains of the ancestors they could not avoid exhuming and burning to ashes. The mausoleum was built above and around Zhenneng's tomb, and the aisles of the building offer storage space for the ashes of all Zhenneng's descendants as well as that of some other (non-Chen) ancestors of the villagers.

The funeral reform is justified in the name of building a “socialist spiritual civilization”. Its stated goals are to clear space to make way for infrastructures as well as “to eliminate superstitious activities (*mixin huodong*) in funeral customs”.¹⁵ It goes against long-standing burial practices that are guided by the goal of transforming the dead into proper ancestors and avoiding their becoming evil-doing and revengeful spirits, *gui* (Ahern 1971: 125; Bapandier 2001:15). If ancestors are properly cared for and receive regular ritual attention, they are expected to be benevolent to their descendants. It is therefore important to bury a dead relative in a propitious site whose geomancy (*fengshui*) will canalize the vital energy (*qi*)

that is contained in the bones and is a source of vitality and fertility to their descendants (Bruun 2003; Feuchtwang 1974; Paton 2007). The grave sites and remains of the ancestors are therefore of utmost importance; destroying the sites amounts to putting an end to the benefits of *fengshui*, and cremating the remains amounts to destroying the ancestor and, therefore, the lineage as a whole.

The funeral reform aims at suppressing these ancient and powerful spaces and replacing them with abstract modern ones. Mayfair Yang sees in this reform the continuation of an imported Western colonialist discourse decreeing the character of modern civilization as one defined by science (Yang 2004: 732). However, the critique by orthodox Confucians of “superstitious” funeral customs has a long tradition in China. This trend promoting secular mores and rational thought is more than a Western import. The idea that individuals owe their destiny to favourable geomancy rather than their own endeavours has long been criticized by Confucians (Yang 1957: 276).¹⁶ This does not mean that Confucianism is opposed to the respect and remembrance of deceased family members; filial piety (*xiao*) lies at the very heart of the Confucian doctrine. Nor does the official state atheism that the Communist Party has endorsed since 1949 oppose all form of remembering the dead; the funeral reform as it has been implemented to varying degrees since the beginning of the People’s Republic of China seeks to replace traditional funeral customs and ancestor worship with commemorative ceremonies. In that, the ideology of the state conflates with a particular strand of Confucian thought that opposes the material, corporeal dimension of ancestor worship (the continued, territorial, presence of the ancestors through the medium of their bones) and argues that it should be replaced by spiritual commemoration and symbolic gestures. Ancestral halls, for this reason, are tolerated in reform-era China.

Here, Confucian principles and state-promoted secularism serve as arguments to justify the clearing of tombs and land requisition for the purpose of economic development, but it is hard to reduce them merely to a form of legitimization. The ideology that carries forward the funeral reform rests on a combination of economic goals and an alliance of orthodox Confucian and state atheist rejection of traditional customs that are seen as backwards. The funeral reform thus expresses an amalgamation of the government-promoted values and principles of economic efficiency, secular rationality, and loyalty to the state rather than to the lineage. Therefore, where the ideological mix that drives funeral reforms comes very close to neoliberalism, as described by the tenets of the governmentality school, is when it encourages a rational and individually rooted way of remembering the ancestors that is more compatible with economic efficiency than the collective worship of ancestors at their tombs.

To summarize the process, it was the return to Pine Mansion, in 1997, of a high-level government cadre who had just retired from his position as

the vice-president of Shenzhen airport that triggered the collective mobilization to build the mausoleum. Ganhua had returned to his village to help out a cousin residing overseas in Belgium, who wanted to use his fortune to benefit his fellow villagers by building an older people's activities hall. The mausoleum was built thanks to Ganhua's connexions in government, the construction industry, and among the overseas Chens.

Such a collective mobilization to save the gravesite from destruction is at odds with the state-driven policy of economic neoliberalization. The protection of the founding ancestor's tomb and the way the Chen villagers have succeeded in exempting this piece of land from any future appropriation by the state for economic development demonstrates that, to a certain extent, the logic of lineage as an enterprise is one in which the preservation of the lineage itself is its own end. To protect the tomb is also to preserve the lineage's history against the tendency in Shenzhen to erase traces of the past and replace "uncivilized" villages by modern urban compounds. The duplication of the lineage slogan at the entrance of the mausoleum is then as provocative as it is performative; it brings into existence the continued presence of the Chen lineage and its control over their territory.

This discrepancy between state-planned economic and urban development and lineage-village continuation is not oppositional. The Chen genealogy stresses the future development of the lineage and the prosperity of its members as a desirable goal. The means to achieve this goal differ, however, insofar as the Chens believe success cannot be achieved without protecting the heritage of the past. This divergence is visible where the Shenzhen slogan and the lineage hall *duilian* differ. Whereas the Shenzhen city slogan evokes the image of a new city and a radical departure from the past ("not the same wonderfulness"), the first line of the *duilian* recalls the founding ancestor's place of origin. The origin is in Changle, Northern Guangdong, and if this is not acknowledged, the Chen lineage in Pine Mansion will not be prosperous. It is a reminder of the Confucian moral imperative that is central to the religious cult of ancestors: "When you drink the water, remember the source". It is on this precise point that the state-promoted enterprise of neoliberalization, turned toward the future ("start here"), differs from the lineage enterprise, which is aimed at perpetuating the estate created in the past.

Conclusion

The two slogans I have taken as a starting point for this discussion show similarities that reside in their foundational character and their celebration of an entrepreneurial spirit. Both are propitiatory formulas that signal the creation of new spaces and proclaim future prosperity. However, the Shenzhen city slogan may be considered an enactment, in the Chinese tradition of the party-state mobilization politics, of the technology of subjection that has

established Shenzhen as a place for experimenting with neoliberal economic reforms. The city slogan legitimizes the policy of reform and opening that have led to urbanization on a forced walk and advertises Shenzhen as a modern international metropolis turned toward the future. The Chen lineage hall *duilian* in Pine Mansion appears, through its celebration of the foundational act and entrepreneurial venture of ancestor Zhenneng, as a historical antecedent and local prefiguration of the processes that are occurring today on a large scale in Shenzhen and elsewhere in China.

However, the rationale for the perpetuation of the lineage as a social entity that the formula encapsulates is not totally congruent with neoliberal theory and practice. The transformation of this local group of former peasants – the original Chen villagers – into a native elite benefiting from their monopoly of rentals to some extent conforms to the process of neoliberalization as characterized by David Harvey, relying as it does on the presence of a readily usable workforce and capital accumulation in the hands of a few. In this context, recalling the foundational act of the ancestor in annual rituals, and “using his name to rally all his descendants around public matters” (as one of the leaders put it), is then all the more crucial. Yet the ideology and politics of lineage maintenance are at odds with the neoliberal theory of open economic competition. They are also incongruent with the aims of economic development pursued by the state and city government that require the urbanization of villages and push toward the abolition of the former collectives.

The resonance between the two slogans in spite of their historical distance, points to the factors that may explain why the transition to a market economy in the special economic zone has been such a success. Yet this transition has also to be based on mechanisms such as the cooperative shareholding company system, designed to protect the local people from increased job competition and to guarantee their livelihoods in the context of urbanization and the shift from agriculture to industry. The transition to capitalism in the Shenzhen special economic zone, and in the Pearl River Delta more generally, has partly rested on non-capitalist principles that have profited the former villagers and generated a category of native landlords. It is much less certain that further neoliberalization in the sense of the dis-embedding of economic practices from social relations as is being considered (the reform of shareholding companies would de-link shareholding companies from kinship and territorial ties) will be embraced with the same enthusiasm.

The difference between the Shenzhen city slogan and the lineage hall *duilian* resides in their attitudes toward the past. The religious cult of the ancestors and the logics of the lineage as a collective social entity are unsuited to the current emphasis on the future and the erasure of the past. However, this remark also needs to be qualified. Indeed, the Shenzhen city government has undertaken a heritage program by making inventories and

protecting selected sites and, consequently, many ancient ancestral halls – or recently built mausoleums, as in the case of the Pine Mansion Chens – are being protected. From this point of view, it could be argued that the lineage logic of a territorial anchor is meeting the new trend toward promoting a greener economy in Shenzhen, one that is less dependent upon polluting factories and relies more on tourism and high-tech industries, for which some preservation of the city's heritage may be needed. Rather than leading to a radical opposition between the local villagers and the state, this heritage policy testifies to the relative tolerance of government authorities toward lineage logics, and possibly a way forward for a state seeking legitimacy among its citizens by acknowledging their practices and traditions; hence, the role played in the local capitalist coalition by local officials who are members of both the lineage and the Party.

Lastly, therefore, we could see in the Shenzhen city slogan an echo of the foundational formulas that are central to the ethical regimes of the local people in Shenzhen. Therefore, it is hard to agree with Harvey that neoliberalism has become the dominant way in which people everywhere make sense of their lives (2005: 3). My point is that, if economic neoliberalization has encountered such success in the special economic zone, this has to do with the way in which, in this particular region, it encounters long-standing economic practices and the conception of the lineage as an enterprise, dating back, as David Faure has shown, from at least the seventeenth century. These practices and regimes of value may, however, if their embeddedness in kin and territorial relationships is threatened, come into friction not with neoliberalism as a monolithic force, but with the neoliberal spirit mixed with a kind of secular Confucianism that animates Chinese state policies today.

Notes

- 1 This was my first stay in the village as part of a new research project on the connections linking this long-standing emigrant village with its diaspora. Since then, I have returned six times, in July 2012, March and October 2013, October 2014, April 2017, and April 2018.
- 2 Lineages are descent groups whose members are patrilineally related and claim a common ancestry (Ebrey and Watson 1986: 6).
- 3 The Shenzhen special economic zone initially occupied an area of about 392 sq km with four administrative districts: Yantian, Luohu, Futian, and Nanshan. Bao'an and Longgang counties fell outside this zone. In 1993 the two counties were turned into districts and formally became part of Shenzhen City. Today Shenzhen covers 2,000 sq km.
- 4 The authorities have permitted rural migration to the cities to expand while continuing to enforce social and political distinctions between urban and rural residents inherent in the *hukou* system of population control.
- 5 This development is not specific to Shenzhen; Helen Siu (2007) has described a similar situation in Guangzhou.

- 6 The Shenzhen museum (*Shenzhen bowuguan*) was established in 1981, the year when the Shenzhen special economic zone was officially created.
- 7 Since China's reopening, the Pine Mansion Chens have been active in restoring the lineage cultural activities that had been prohibited under Mao. Worship at the hall and the tomb were resumed as early as 1981 and the altar in the ancestral hall was repaired and the tomb re-cemented. All these activities have been carried out with the financial contributions of relatives in Hong Kong and overseas (in Canada, Malaysia, Panama, Surinam, Belgium, Holland, and French Polynesia). The authorities' tolerance toward these activities is linked to the involvement of Overseas Chinese and especially Hong-kongers, whose financial investments mattered very much in the period following the reopening.
- 8 According to legal scholar Gu Minkang (1999), the shareholding system introduced in China in 1985 was borrowed from the West, and its main motivation was to change the operating mechanisms of state-owned enterprises.
- 9 In Shenzhen they are ruled by the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone regulations on joint-stock cooperative companies (1994, modified in 1997).
- 10 Interview with an employee of the collective property office (*Jitizichan bangongshi*) at the Guanlan office bureau, July 2011.
- 11 "Notification of opinion (draft document): proposals to reform the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone cooperative shareholding companies rules and regulations", November 2010.
- 12 "Opinion on the sustainable development of *gufengongsi*", 17 January 2012 by Wang Jun. It refers to the above-mentioned document. Available at www.bajj.gov.cn/gcstk/lltt/201201/t20120117_473573.htm (Accessed 3 April 2013).
- 13 In spite of the outruling of all particularistic ties as part of the communist ideal of "working for the greater good", the land reform of the 1950s, although it equalized property, did not break up traditional social organizations. On the contrary they very often structured the brigades and work teams (Parish and Whyte 1978, Chan *et al.* 2009).
- 14 cf. endnote no 7.
- 15 Bill no 63, dated 3 March 1997. Available at www.szgm.gov.cn/publish/main/1/9/12/15/20121101110740875740296/index.html (Accessed 14 October 2013).
- 16 Confucianism has been reactivated in the last two decades by a number of intellectuals who are close to the circles of power. They are instrumentalizing Confucianism with the nationalistic goal of building a "properly Chinese" ideology, and they assert China's place in the world by criticizing "Western" values such as individual freedoms and democracy.

References

- Ahern, Emily. 1971. *The Cult of the Dead in a Chinese Village*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Augé, Marc. 1975. *Théorie des pouvoirs et idéologie. Etude de cas en Côte d'Ivoire*. Paris: Hermann.

- Bach, Jonathan. 2010. "They Come in Peasants and Leave Citizens'. Urban Villages and the Making of Shenzhen, China". *Cultural Anthropology* 25, no. 3, pp. 421–458.
- Baptandier, Brigitte, ed. 2001. *De la malemort dans quelques pays d'Asie*. Paris: Karthala.
- Brandstädter, Susanne. 2011. "The Law Cuts Both Ways: Rural Legal Activism and Citizenship Struggles in Neosocialist China". *Economy and Society* 40, no. 2, pp. 266–288.
- Bruun, Ole. 2003 *Fengshui in China: Geomantic Divination between State Orthodoxy and Popular Religion*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Chan, A., R. Madsen, and J. Unger. 2009. *Chen Village: Revolution to Globalization*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Chau, Adam Yuet. 2008. "An Awful Mark: Symbolic Violence and Urban Renewal in Reform Era China". *Visual Studies* 23, no. 3, pp. 195–210.
- Ching, Kwan Lee. 2010. "Pathways of Labor Activism". In Mark Selden and Elizabeth J. Perry, eds., *Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance*. London, New York: Routledge Studies in Asia's Transformations, pp. 57–79.
- Delahaye, Hubert. 2002. "The *Duilian*, Parallel and Converging Sentences. A Few Sociological Aspects". *Études chinoises* 21, no. 1–2, pp. 41–66.
- Ebrey, Patricia and Watson, James. 1986. "Introduction" In Patricia Ebrey and James Watson, eds., *Kinship Organization in Late Imperial China, 1000–1940*. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 1–15.
- Faure, David. 1989. "The Lineage as a Cultural Invention". *Modern China* 15, no. 1, pp. 4–36.
- . 2006. *China and Capitalism: A History of Business Enterprise in Modern China*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Feuchtwang, Stephan. 1974. *An Anthropological Analysis of Chinese Geomancy*. Vientiane: Vithagna.
- Freedman, Maurice. 1958. *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China*. London: Athlone Press.
- . 1966. *Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung*. London: Athlone Press.
- Gal, Susan. 1989. "Language and Political Economy". *Annual Review of Anthropology* 18, no. 1, pp. 345–367.
- Gledhill, John. 2004. "Neoliberalism". In David Nugent and Joan Vincent, eds., *A Companion to the Anthropology of Politics*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 332–348.
- Graan, Andrew. 2016. "Strategic Publicity: On International Intervention and the Performativity of Public Communication in Postconflict Macedonia". *Hau, Journal of Ethnographic Theory*, 6, no. 3. Online, <https://doi.org/10.14318/hau6.3.019>
- Harvey, David. 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hertz, Ellen. 1998. *The Trading Crowd. An Ethnography of the Shanghai Stock Market*. Cambridge: Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology.
- Holmes, Douglas R. 2013. *Economy of Words: The Communicative Imperatives of Central Banks*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Kipnis, Andrew. 2007. "Neoliberalism Reified: Suzhi Discourse and Tropes of Neoliberalism in the People's Republic of China". *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 13, no. 3, pp. 83–400.
- Li Lianjiang and Kevin O'Brien. 1996. "Villagers and Popular Resistance in Contemporary China". *Modern China* 22, no. 11, pp. 28–61.
- Li, Ruojian. 2006. "Diwei huode de jiyu yu zhangai: Jiyu wailai renjou juji qude zhiye jigou fenxi. (Locational advantages opportunities and obstacles: An analysis of the occupational structure in areas of high concentrations of migration population)", *Zhongguo renkou kexue, Chinese Journal of Population Science* 5, pp. 69–78.
- Liew, Leong H. 2005. "China's Engagement with Neo-liberalism: Path Dependency, Geography and Party Self-Reinvention". *Journal of Development Studies* 41, no. 2, pp. 331–352.
- Ng, Mee Kam. 2003. "Shenzhen". *Cities* 20, no. 6, pp. 429–441.
- Nonini, Donald. 2008. "Is China becoming Neoliberal"? *Critique of Anthropology* 28, no. 2, pp. 145–176.
- O'Donnell, M. A. 2001. "Becoming Hong Kong, Razing Bao'an, Preserving Xin'an, An Ethnographic Account of Urbanization in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone". *Cultural Studies* 15, no. 3–4, pp. 419–443.
- Ong, Aihwa. 2006. *Neoliberalism as Exception, Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Ong, Aihwa and Li Zhang. 2008. "Introduction: Privatizing China. Powers of the Self, Socialism from Afar". In Aihwa Ong and Li Zhang, eds., *Privatizing China: Socialism from Afar*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 1–19.
- Parish, William L. and Martin K. Whyte. 1980. *Village and Family in Contemporary China*. University of Chicago Press.
- Paton, Michael J. 2007. "Fengshui: A Continuation of 'Art of Swindlers' "? *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 34, no. 3, pp. 427–445.
- Peck, Jamie and Adam Tickell. 2002. "Neoliberalizing Space", *Antipode* 34, no. 3, pp. 380–404.
- Pieke, Frank N. 2009. "The Production of Rulers: Communist Party Schools and the Transition to Neo-Socialism in Contemporary China". *Social Anthropology* 17, no. 1, pp. 25–39.
- Selden, Mark and Perry, Elizabeth J. 2010. *Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance*. London, New York: Routledge Studies in Asia's Transformations.
- Siu, Helen. 2007. "Grounding Displacement. Uncivil Urban Spaces in Postreform South China". *American Anthropologist* 34, no. 2, pp. 329–350.
- Smart, Alan and George C. S. Lin. 2007. "Local Capitalisms, Local Citizenship and Translocality: Rescaling from Below in the Pearl River Delta Region, China". *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 31, no. 2, pp. 280–302.
- Smith, Gavin A. 2011. "Selective Hegemony and Beyond: Populations with 'No Productive Function': A Framework for Enquiry". *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 18, no. 1, pp. 2–38.
- Thornton, Patricia M. 2002. "Framing Dissent in Contemporary China: Irony, Ambiguity and Metonymy". *The China Quarterly* 171, pp. 661–681.
- Tsai, Lily. 2002. "Cadres, Temples, Lineage Institutions, and Governance in Rural China". *China Journal* 48, pp. 1–27.

- Wong, Roy Bin. 1997. *China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Yang, Ching-kun. 1957. "The Functional Relationship Between Confucian Thought and Chinese Religion". In John K. Fairbank, ed., *Chinese Thought and Institutions*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 269–290.
- Yang Mayfair Mei-hui. 2004. "Spatial Struggles: Postcolonial Complex, State Disenchantment, and Popular Reappropriation of Space in Rural Southeast China". *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 63, no. 3 (Aug.), pp. 719–755.

4 “Macau people ruling Macau”

Gambling governance and ethnicity in postcolonial China

Sheyla S. Zandonai

In 2006, when I started my fieldwork in Macau, the slogan “Macau people ruling Macau” (Macau governado pelas suas gentes, 澳人治澳)¹ was occasionally mooted in conversations I had with residents, and it made the pages of official documents and the press while infusing, now and then, a dramatic line into political speeches. More than ten years have passed since I first learned about the expression in the beginning of what became a long-term incursion in the city.² Nowadays, its usage is more widespread than ever, its meaning interpreted in ways as varied as the populations that are either impugned or justified by its existence. Following Deng Xiaoping’s formula “one country, two systems,” which defined the political framework within which the Special Administrative Regions (SARs) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) operate, the principle I analyse in this chapter has endowed the “people of Macau” with rights of self-government and autonomy. Since the city’s handover to the PRC in 1999, Macau has moved from being the last possession of the Portuguese overseas empire to becoming one of China’s new chapters in a plan of national reunification. Important economic, social, and urban transformations ensued, of which gambling liberalization emerged as arguably the most powerful one, with the city moving from being a remote Portuguese enclave in the Far East to being ascribed a particular place on the world map of the economy of tourism and leisure. Under Chinese sovereignty, the Macau SAR continued, however, to have much of a political and an economic life of its own. Backed by a long and indisputable capitalist tradition that is bound to its historical formation as a trading outpost as well as to its colonial past, Macau’s integration into the PRC opened up to considerations about the political and economic dynamics that have been enacted and have impacted social life under a new political system devised to recover part of China’s territory via a sovereign yet non-localized power. To what extent these dynamics have been shaped under neoliberal governance, and what part does the slogan have in legitimizing or contesting this process are questions I bring to scrutiny in this chapter.

There are two forces at work here that need be pointed out: first, the normalization of a political process that put an end to the Portuguese

administration, and second the liberalization of Macau's gambling sector, which drove the city to the leading global position in the field, spearheading an era in which gambling has developed and institutionalized at its fastest pace around the world (Abt in Stokowski 2004: 405). Since the end, in 2001, of the 40-year monopoly held by the Sociedade de Turismo e Diversões de Macau (STDm), foreign groups have entered the game, mainly from the United States and Australia – with the latter now partly out, after the partnership with a local operator broke up in 2017. Although the activity is far from being new in the city, it has gained momentum since 2006, when Macau became the world's richest gambling centre, posting then revenues seven times higher than Las Vegas with less than half the number of casinos and counting on patronage mostly from Chinese of Mainland China and Hong Kong. In addition to two-digit growth rates – in 2010 the local economy grew 27.5 per cent³ – heavy investments have entailed drastic changes to the landscape, with major urban projects harnessing an architecture of excess and extravagance, which made parts of the city unrecognizable to residents.

Alongside casino urbanism, important population movements from the Mainland transformed the human and demographic topographies of Macau. Initially reaching out to its connections with global circuits of money and transnational entrepreneurial elites, the city has concomitantly turned *inward* to its historical and cultural links with China. The new Individual Visit Scheme enacted in 2003 by the Chinese central authorities brought an overwhelming influx of visitors from the Mainland, which increased by the millions from the second half of 2000 onwards (Breitung 2007: 100).⁴ In tandem, working migrants (known as non-resident workers) have also flooded into the city on a daily basis (Liu 2008: 122).⁵ Many of my informants, locally born Chinese and Macanese (Eurasians) or long-term residents of Macau, mostly Portuguese, complained that the city could not bear the extent of transformation being inflicted over its urban and social fabric, arguing that it became a place for tourists. In particular, Chinese residents I met and interviewed in 2007 argued that not only there were too many people entering Macau, but too many Mainland Chinese.

The ambiguity conveyed by this observation reveals the position of Macau Chinese confronted with the national imperative of turning “inland” to the narratives and the experience of reunion with China – after centuries of Portuguese presence in and later administration of the city (1846–1999) – while at the same time being promoted and recognized as the rulers by right of Macau. As an idea embodied in the slogan proper, the understanding that local ethnic Chinese are appointed to rule the city is inscribed in the Article 3 of the Basic Law of the Macau SAR – of which the slogan is acknowledged to be an interpretation – which states that “[t]he executive authorities and legislature of the Macau Special Administrative Region shall be composed of permanent residents of Macau” (1993), further supported by subsequent

articles that state the position of chief executive and other senior positions of the Macau SAR administration can only be performed by Chinese nationals who were either born in or are permanent residents of the city. Crafted after the city’s handover to China, the slogan also addresses the normative framework that redressed the political fate of Macau by ending nearly a century and a half of Portuguese colonial rule. Yet, the values it promotes seemingly run counter both to China’s centralizing and autocratic political approach, and to the call of a global economy of gambling in which corporate interests and meddling have a strong, if not final, say in local governance. Given that none of the latter essentially furthers the autonomy of the people of Macau, two ambivalences raised by the slogan need be pointed out and unpacked here.

The first, emerging from the slogan itself, deals with the intricate equation of local autonomy and national sovereignty by inviting considerations about political balance and the ways the question of ethnicity has been therein articulated. The second ambivalence concerns the extent within which Macau people’s self-governing rights coexist with a powerful gambling industry, the main business of which (casinos) and related activities (hotels, retail), while generating roughly 90 per cent of the city’s GDP, act by governing many of its economic and political decisions (see Lo 2005; Liu 2008; Lo 2009). In this chapter, I examine how the slogan has been produced and performed within the context of China’s national re-integration programme and the development of gambling as a standout source for economic growth and urban transformation. By analysing the entanglement and social impact of these processes, I aim to provide an understanding of the extent to which the slogan, while producing reactions that build on the broader question of ethnic and cultural positioning towards China, also constitutes a strategy of neoliberal governance.

Situational neoliberalism

In order to understand how Macau’s postcolonial existence has been reconciled with China’s sovereignty, it is important first to focus on the matter of administrative autonomy. Limiting political interference from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the right to self-government, embodied in the threefold set of principles “Macau people ruling Macau,” “no change for fifty years,” and “a high degree of autonomy,” operates as a key element in this process (Clayton 2009: 7, 305). Defining the conditions of Macau’s integration into China as a SAR until 2049, these principles translate, in more concrete terms, into the establishment of an autonomous government and the right for a local constitution, the Basic Law. Second, to understand Macau’s transfer to and further reunion with Mainland China it is crucial to reflect on the question of capitalist practices. Here, I borrow the idea of synchronization (as in “adjusting” or “gearing with the world”) from Hai Ren’s work on the integration of Hong Kong into China, extending it to

Macau. According to the author, the term refers to processes of adjusting China's economic system with global capitalist practices under a socialist government, in which the incorporation of Macau and Hong Kong responds to the double imperative of economic development and national reunion (2010: 3–5, 13).

In what regard China's "renewed" engagement with global capitalism after decades ostracised by communism (Hai 2010: 3),⁶ this strategy should be primarily perceived as a reaction to the absence of opportunities and spaces of development and investment necessary to the stimulation of economic growth in a country until recently torn by poverty and social inequalities (Zhao 2001: 27, 29; Wu 2010: 622). Accordingly, the origins of China's economic transition from a socialist planned economy to a socialist market economy, launched in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping's leadership through the Four Modernizations Reform (agriculture, industry, education and science, and defence), can be largely traced to the collapse of an economic system based on state-led accumulation (Zhao 2001: 25; Harvey 2005: 120; Nonini 2008: 158; Hai 2010: 10). The creation of China's Special Economic Zones (SEZ),⁷ and the "return" of Macau and Hong Kong as Special Administrative Regions is thereby justified by the need to accelerate the location of new spaces of capital accumulation (Ong 2006: 100; Wu 2010: 622; Hai 2010: 15). Economic reform is one means by which to conceive of the ways the existence and future of the SARs have been synchronized with China's. In spite of the fact that Macau and Hong Kong are and remain quite different cities with respect to their historical formation and social and economic realities, both handovers have engendered political challenges, more or less problematic – which can be more clearly perceived nowadays in localized independence movements in Hong Kong – and that have so far been counterbalanced, with more or less success, by the promise and effective observance of economic and institutional freedom. Second, synchronization as I adopt it here, especially in regard to the case of Macau, responds to the ethnic and affective mobilization that has permeated national discourse, which, I argue, has been catalysed by fast economic growth following the gambling liberalization.

In Macau, the liberalization refers to the end of the gambling monopoly held by the STDM, when the market was deregulated to allow foreign investment and development. Harking back to a law drafted and approved by the former Portuguese administration in 1986 (Law 10/86/M), the liberalization act ruled that gambling licenses (commonly referred to as "concessions" in Macau) could be granted to a maximum of three holders. Accordingly, in 2001, three gambling licenses were awarded to the Sociedade de Jogos de Macau (SJM) – a subsidiary of the previous monopoly holder, STDM – Wynn Resorts, from North America, and Galaxy Entertainment Group, from Hong Kong. These, in turn, unfolded into three other licenses or "sub-concessions." Although not initially envisioned

by the liberalization act, the so-called sub-concessions were allowed when Galaxy Casino broke with precedent by granting a license to Sheldon Adelson’s Las Vegas Sands Corporation. Subsequently, the other main gambling license holders, SJM and Wynn Resorts, granted concessions to MGM Grand Paradise (now MGM China) and Australian group Melco Crown (former Melco PBL), later turned Melco Resorts & Entertainment. For the first time, foreign companies entered into a field that had been in the hands of local Chinese businessmen since the first gambling licenses were issued by the then-incipient Portuguese colonial administration of Macau to the commercial exploration of Fantan, in 1849, and the Chinese lottery, in 1851 (Porter 2000: 94; Pina-Cabral 2002: 94; McCartney 2006: 38–39).

Akin to the creation of China’s Special Economic Zones, designed to attract foreign investment and trade on the basis of privileged fiscal and customs regimes (Cun 1990: 394; Smart, Li 2006: 486; Ong 2006: 18–19), Macau has devised special investment schemes (e.g., land concession to new developers) while maintaining labour and investing regulations independent from the PRC, in addition to what scholars have pointed as being rather loose legislation with regard to money-laundering control. Although regulations have been progressively tightened, initially, external audits were seldom performed in the casinos in town (McCartney 2006: 50), ultimately leading the CCP in 2007 to prohibit Mainland civil servants from visiting Macau. In addition, the city’s expanded connections to regional and global markets and circuits owe much to it’s being the only locality in the PRC where gambling is permitted since it was banned in the aftermath of the CCP’s rise to power in 1949 (Fifoot 1994: 54).⁸ In that regard, the city’s political autonomy and economic freedom contribute to the maintenance of an exclusive position, or a niche, that arises primarily from its political economy of gambling, constituting a locale of *exception* in the sense argued by Aihwa Ong (2006). Established as an alternative territoriality across China’s national territory, Macau’s specificity owes to its development as a strategic and located neoliberal intervention that accompanies the restructuring of the Chinese state (2006: 98), highlighting the city’s *situational neo-liberalism*. Problematizing the positions of Macau and Hong Kong within the context of China’s opening and reforms and national programme is fundamental to grasping the intricate nature of political processes under its state reengineering.

Replicating a neoliberal orientation with regard to the idea of exception to Chinese sovereign rule, the question of Macau responds to two different but complementary approaches in the light of the PRC’s endeavours for political modernization and economic restructuring, namely, the implementation of an agenda dictated by the imperative of reunion, and the incorporation of a historical capitalist locality to Chinese communist law. Therefore, the conversion of Macau (and Hong Kong) into SARs draws

further on the mandate to overcome national shame largely associated with China's partial subjection to Western – to the cases in point, Portuguese and British – imperialism and colonialism (Hai 2010: 16–17). The alternative of reunion with autonomous territories is thus enabled through the adoption or integration, rather than the creation, of territories as spaces of economic experimentation (2006: 98, 100), or as capitalist laboratories of the PRC (Hai 2010: 4–5, 13). Hence, already during the 1980s, Macau has been receiving considerable flows of people, owing to the easing by the Chinese central authorities of regulations on the internal movement of populations across China (Mackenzie 2002: 308–309; Pina-Cabral 2002: 26). Bringing new investments to the city, these movements helped launch a phase of economic expansion and demographic pressure, which tendencies would only be deepened by the liberalization of gambling after the handover. In the next section, I will examine some of the political and social stakes accompanying the enactment of self-governing principles brought by the handover in order to analyse later on how they have informed Macau's position with regard to neoliberalism.

The peoples of Macau

The handover granted the Chinese exclusive rights to govern Macau for the first time since the mid-nineteenth century.⁹ Planned years in advance by the Portuguese and Chinese national authorities, the attendant political process followed a prearranged and almost steady path of transition (Fernandes 1997; Pina-Cabral 2002; Clayton 2009: 305). As early as 1972, the PRC requested the United Nations Special Committee on Colonialism to withdraw Macau (as well as Hong Kong) from its “list of territories under colonial rule,” with the intention to redefine the “question of Macau” as an internal matter (Fifoot 1994: 29; Clayton 2009: 50). Following the signature of the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration of 1987 – the document that officially launched the handover process – much of the effort deployed by the Portuguese and Chinese central authorities was devoted to negotiations that dealt with technical matters crucial to the functioning of the city's administration under the Chinese. These included the cumbersome task of translating laws and official documents into the Chinese language and the localization and training of civil servants (Fifoot 1994: 41, 57; Clayton 2009: 138–139), followed by the replacement of the majority of Macanese and Portuguese public servants – the latter then occupying roughly 80 per cent of the administration's superior positions – by Macau's Chinese residents (Fifoot 1994: 57). The “sacking” of civil servants of Portuguese origin, to use a term employed by my respondents, was not often well received by the former, being also questioned by some of the Macanese people who participated in the present study. Filipe, a Portuguese resident and public servant in Macau for roughly thirty years, observed that this strategy had its flaws:

A lot of time has been devoted so that the transition of Macau happened as it should be. But it was not well accomplished. For the simple reason that ... there were not sufficient locally qualified cadres ... We are talking about training that begun in 1987, twelve years of training. There is quite a possibility that local servants would have been ready even ten years earlier, as it happened in Hong Kong. However, people were not qualified to do their jobs. Not even a university capable of forming civil servants existed in Macau.

While Filipe raised technical considerations about the difficulties that emerged during the transition, another resident, Henrique, argued that political misunderstandings also marked the process. Himself a civil servant in one of the higher-education institutions of Macau, this Macanese in his late thirties explained that “during the transition, the public cadre was already composed in majority by Chinese. By the way, there was a time when several departments sacked quite a number of Portuguese ... until the moment the [central Chinese] government protested: ‘this is not what we want.’” Henrique’s comments highlight the contradiction ensuing from the local understanding of what the principle “Macau people ruling Macau,” taken literally, should entail, while the national frame mandated the second system, which allowed a broader interpretation of the latter.

In that regard, Filipe, who kept his position in the administration after the handover, suggested that the hasty replacement of sitting civil servants was a “big mistake.” He explained that “the civil servants of the administration were the Portuguese and the Chinese who have been serving the Macau administration. On 20 December, when China was to assume the administration of Macau, it would assume it ... with the administration it had in place.” The same principle guided the fate of political and juridical institutions operating during the Portuguese administration, which were maintained after 1999. Amidst the slight misunderstandings made patent during the transition process, as highlighted by my informants, the principal of autonomy prevailed in the arrangements that guided the shaping of Macau as a SAR. The fact that Portuguese, Chinese, and Macanese failed to agree about the meaning of this autonomy and the ways it should have been enacted is tied up with the ethnic angles and social impact of the slogan analysed here.

While people of ethnic Chinese origin comprise the great majority of Macau’s population,¹⁰ it is also worth mentioning that over 50 per cent of its nearly 650,000 inhabitants were born outside the city.¹¹ My choice of the word *resident*, rather than citizen, national, or autochthonous, is thus an attempt to grasp the multifaceted question of ethnic origins and foreign nationalities informing the lives of different populations under the same jurisdiction. Legally and broadly defined, the resident of Macau is someone who, holding a particular set of local identification documents (the SAR passport and the Resident’s Identity Card¹²), was most likely

born in Macau. Commonly defined across the spectrum of my informants and easily spotted in daily usage, the term currently employed is “local,” 本地人, or a person from the land, from here. According to Liz, one of my Chinese acquaintances, a resident is also someone whose several years of residency in the city is recognized by other long-term dwellers, and whose experience often translates into a willingness to settle down, perhaps constitute a family, as well as pursue a career or build a professional life in Macau. One of my regular informants, Simão – who was Liz’s co-worker when I first met her – shares a similar idea as to what it means to be a *local*:

The people from Macau, the people who have been living here for a long time, have a very natural relationship with the Portuguese and the Macanese community. It is a relationship of cohabitation.... There is no fear, no distrust, there is no astonishment to see someone speaking Chinese or not, it is something natural. And it is also having this different way of being [maneira de ser], a rhythm different from Hong Kong, of having words specific to Macau.

Liz and Simão’s accounts characterize the relationships between the three populations that have participated in the historical formation of Macau, namely, the Macau Chinese, or 澳門人, for the Chinese expression, which translate into “Macao person” or “person from Macau”; the Eurasian population, known as the Macanese people, or *Macaense* in Portuguese and 土生仔 in Cantonese Chinese, literally the “land-born child” (see Pina-Cabral, Lourenço 1993: 19; Pina-Cabral 2002: 22; Clayton 2009: 104); and the Portuguese. But Macau is host to populations of other origins, mainly immigrant workers arriving in large numbers from Mainland China and from Asian countries such as the Philippine and other localities in Southeast Asia. Most of the non-Chinese immigrant population, however, in possession of a work permit known as the “Blue Card” cannot apply for the status of resident, being thus denied benefits of social security, such as subsidized education and access to medical services at nearly free cost. This distinction between residents and “non-residents” suggests the operation of criteria that include and exclude people and populations, emulating situations replicated in other Southeast Asia countries where legal immigrants are entitled to limited rights of employment, but cannot apply for citizenship (Ong 2006: 83). In fact, Macau remains a particularly segmented society in terms of class, language and ethnic origin, where non-Chinese inhabitants, either poorly or highly educated and skilled, continue to fulfil specific functions and perform specific professional activities, often related to their capacity to mobilize personal networks and capitalize on language skills. By way of example, while the Portuguese are often employed in law-related jobs or in the local Portuguese press (e.g., radio and television

broadcasting, and newspapers), the Filipinos work mainly in domestic services, security, and casino-related jobs, where their command of English is an asset.

Yet, in the light of reintegration with China and distancing from colonial rule, the ambiguity that marks the situation of Macau Chinese residents – both *inside* and *outside* China – is worth examining here. When in conversation with Eva, a young Chinese woman I first met in 2007, she claimed the Macau Chinese “have a different world view from the Mainland Chinese,” she was reflecting the position of other middle-class Chinese of her generation, confronted with the arrival of constant and increasing flows of immigrants, for the most part originating from the southern Guangdong Province, and whom they tended to often perceive as “backward” and “uneducated.” To her, differences between the Macau and the Mainland Chinese were chiefly defined by an economic rationale, with my informant singling out elements of distinction that touched matters such as education, status, and privileges. “Macau people think they are special because of the SAR. They do not have to pay tax; we are rich, better educated.... You got money, you are respected. They feel they are at the upper level, especially after the handover. I’m lucky to be born in Macau.” In addition to the fact that being a SAR resident marks an administrative separation between them and the Mainland Chinese, the sense of distinction Eva evoked is also outlined by her as an aspect looming from the long-term coexistence with foreigners, that is, non-Chinese, in Macau. A claim in which there also resides a material aspect if we consider that nearly one-fourth of the residents of ethnic Chinese origin born before 1981 acquired a Portuguese passport.¹³ The possession of this document by those who had acquired Portuguese nationality before 19 December 1999 (or any other foreign passport for that matter) sits, however, in strict contradiction with the provisions of the Nationality Law of the PRC, which does not recognize dual nationality (Clayton 2009: 109, 116, 122). This is an inconsistency further highlighted by the fact that the people eligible to govern Macau ought to be, for the most part, *national* Chinese residents.

Defined by the Basic Law of Macau, the chief executive and other senior official roles in the Macau administration can only be performed by Chinese who were either born in or who are permanent residents of the city.¹⁴ However, as we can infer from Article 3 of the same law quoted in the introduction to this chapter, permanent residents of different ethnic origins can assume other, minor public functions, for example, in the legislative branch. In fact, one of the first times representatives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) invoked the principle “Macau people ruling Macau” during the sixth session of the party’s 16th Congress (8–11 October 2006), it was associated with Article 3.¹⁵ Coined by the central government, and although often associated with the Sino–Portuguese Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, this “principle-turned-slogan” is not, however, written anywhere in

those texts, with the slogan being also made use of, formally and otherwise, in translated forms. When my Portuguese and Macanese informants highlighted misunderstandings ensuing from the political transition process, they were actually pointing out the ways the slogan's lack of precision – Who it is actually being addressed to? – left room for appropriation and interpretations that revealed incompatible political understandings that raised ethnic aspects eventually deemed problematic. Because the Macanese and the Portuguese – as holders of the Macau SAR ID, born locally, or fitting criteria that define them as “locals,” as discussed earlier – can equally identify as “Macau people,” the slogan acts here as a “condenser,” not only by collapsing the individual into the collective, but also by flattening out ethnic divides, although rather at face value than in practice, since it excludes certain peoples from some political privileges.

The “Macao people”

While the slogan circulates from one language to another and among the diverse populations of Macau, it remains subject to different interpretations and representations. As a formula with an effect, it operates both as a means to legitimize the Chinese political agenda and as a mode of its implementation, replicating a central feature of Chinese politics and practice largely used during the Maoist era (Lu 1999; Li 2008: 128–129). The widespread use and impact of the slogan is thus reinforced by other forms of emotional capital and historical affiliation invested in the linguistic repertoire, as they are experienced through shared symbols and practices that reveal China's post-handover approach to Macau is not built from scratch. There is a long history of the party's “shadow” intervention and participation in civic life and association activity in the city (Fernandes 1997; Pina-Cabral 2002). The local education system is also worth noting in this regard, as another Chinese resident told me: “most of the textbooks used in the schools in Macau come from the Mainland and from Hong Kong,” explained Miriam, a psychological counsellor at a Chinese Catholic school, “so that the kids have a very narrow sense of the city's history and important events.” This perception was also raised by Mário, who studied in the Portuguese College (Liceu) when Macau was still under Portuguese administration. He pointed out that “a discipline about the history of Macau was never organized.” With hardly any pedagogical material being produced *in situ*, it is no surprise that June, a young Macau Chinese whose family has been residing in the city for roughly three generations, is more comfortable naming the late Chinese dynasties than the Portuguese governors of the city. “At school, we had two kinds of history textbooks, one about the history of China and another about world history,” she commented.

The observations raised by my informants reveal the imprint of Chinese cultural and national histories and narratives, showing how China's influence has been crafted against a background of social interaction, building

on what Michael Carrithers described as the performance of “rhetoric-in-culture” (2005: 582). Harnessing the past to legitimize a planned future, the slogan “Macau people ruling Macau” functions in a way similar to the political slogans used during the Maoist era, intended to pair the reality of changing social conditions with the needs of the Chinese authorities to establish control (Lu 1999). As a discursive element, designed to elicit a response from a rather specific public, that is, the ethnic Chinese residents of Macau, the slogan implies an intersubjective activity (Carrithers 1990: 201–202) in which the Chinese state plays an active part. In addition to other principles that bind the construction of the Special Administrative Region, the slogan is used as a strategy to boost confidence in the SAR’s transforming present and future as part of Greater China, downplaying the city’s immediate hectic, colonial and, now, seemingly undesirable past.

The slogan “Macau people ruling Macau” thereby invites the Chinese residents to take part in a new chapter of the city’s history, which revisits and downplays Portuguese colonialism. In a conversation with Carmen, a new Portuguese acquaintance I met when I paid a short visit to Macau in December 2013, she insisted that we should not forget that all the Portuguese governors of Macau since the Carnation Revolution took place in Portugal in 1974 were appointed military men, with the exception of Carlos Melancia, who preceded the last governor, Rocha Vieira. To her, on account of such colonial designs, some degree of distrust and dislike of the Portuguese administration has emerged among the local Chinese population. In that line, June observed that the people she knows usually tend to think of the Portuguese as people who tried to “take advantage” of Macau. Besides, during the time of the Portuguese administration, she went on, “It was very difficult to get a job in the government, since we (the Chinese), did not know how to speak Portuguese.” Eva’s perception of the matter is slightly different, with her claiming that the Chinese lived their lives “separately” and had no “hard feelings” towards the Portuguese. But she quickly dismissed the importance of the latter with her throwaway remark: “They happened to be our rulers.”

Arguably, the absence of deep conflict between the Portuguese and the Chinese, as some of my respondents have pointed out, lies in the limited communication that has historically characterized social relations in Macau. “That after all those years Portuguese and Chinese do not communicate,” Liz suggested, “can be explained by the ‘you don’t bother me, I don’t bother you’ formula.” But regarding the fact that the Portuguese did not systematically learn Chinese, she was less complacent: “being proud and arrogant, looking people from the up, they did not care.” Given that the few Portuguese schools that existed in Macau were created to meet the educational needs of children of Portuguese civil servants and of Macanese elite families, this also explains why the Portuguese language was seldom spoken or learned by the Chinese population. As Liz explained, this arrangement had much to do with “the idea of ‘separating’ a place for them [the Portuguese] and the

Macanese.” The fact that the Portuguese seldom learned Cantonese and that the Portuguese language was seldom spoken or learned by the Chinese population further highlights the role of intermediation of the Macanese, whose bilingual skills conferred them a significant position in the colonial administration. Yet, Liz acknowledged that a few exceptions appeared later in time, when some of the heads of departments who integrated the cadres before the handover were sent to Portugal for training and language programmes. As Filipe also told me later, the Sino–Portuguese Joint Declaration already raised the question of bilingualism in the administration. In fact, he noted that it was not uncommon that Portuguese and Chinese civil servants working in the same government department would speak English among themselves, rather than Portuguese or Chinese. One of the answers to this problem, according to him and, as Liz herself has pointed out, was to develop a “Plan of Studies” designed for people from Macau to go to Portugal for a year or two, to improve their Portuguese language skills.

Although Liz’s straightforward comments were not quite common in the conversations I had with Macau Chinese, more reserved than the Portuguese or Macanese in their assessment of changes, they often showed a glimpse of pride and fresh confidence in Macau now being part of China, somewhat vindicating Ong’s idea that “the ethnic Chinese in the Asia-Pacific countries and/or communities take great pride in the emergence of China as a global actor” (2006: 115). The excitement that took over Macau in 2008, when China was about to hold the Olympic Games, is a case in point. On the occasion, the Olympic Torch was walked through the streets of Macau, which were packed with many Chinese proudly waving China flags and wearing shirts with sayings supporting the country, such as “I [love] China” – where the word love was represented by a heart. Cathryn Clayton argued that Greater China’s scope and influence appear as an important element in the processes of identity construction among the local Chinese in Macau (2009: 19–21). But, as Ong suggested, it is also an influence that constitutes the driving force behind China’s national integration (2004: 70, 98). Ong explains the idea of Greater China – comprising China itself, Hong Kong, and Macau, as well as Taiwan and the ethnic Chinese populations in Southeast Asia – involves a form of regionalization based on ethnic and civilizational principles developed through a patterning of “cultural sovereignty,” which stands for a “China-dominated archipelago” (2006: 98, 115).

Rooted in links that collate ethnicity to belonging, China’s discourse of overcoming national shame associated with European colonialism is central to the prospect of reunification. Identifying colonial subjugation as a common experience shared by the Chinese residents of Macau, the central government values and celebrates *Chineseness*, promoting a slogan that succeeds in fostering group formation and affective attachment to the Mainland. Carter Bentley argues that ethnic affinity is founded on common

life experiences that generate similar habitual dispositions (1987: 32). The ways in which habitus and its values and world views participate in the processes of social reproduction are thus crucial to understanding ethnic mobilization and the collective experience of belonging, but also the ways the lack of a common habitus accounts for patterns of conflict and disagreement (Bentley 1987: 28–29). Thus, whereas the slogan “Macau people ruling Macau” strengthens the experience of belonging among the Macau Chinese, offering them “a renewed coherence in experience of the world and conceptions of one’s place in it” (Bentley 1987: 47), it divests other populations, namely, the Macanese people and the Portuguese from claims of attachment to place.

Therefore, we are dealing with processes related to the ethnicization of power in Macau in which the Chinese, as members of the dominant group, receive special treatment and benefit from affirmative actions because of their ethnicity (cf. Ong 2006: 79). In spite of the fact that different populations, historically present or economically driven, happen to coexist in the city, processes of bureaucratic and ethnic inclusion and exclusion remain central to ruling in Macau. Ultimately, this translates into an overlapping matter of nationality and ethnicity, invested by the residency element. Based on material and subjective criteria, the notion “people” contained in the slogan only partially equates with Macau’s social complexity. Ong claims that certain practices – unequally distributed rights between residents and immigrants, or between residents of different ethnic and national origins – are typical of neoliberal rationalities and correspond to the deployment of different techniques of governing and treating populations that define a situation of “graduated citizenship” (2006: 78–79). In what follows, I will consider the ways different calculative strategies have been deployed with regard to gambling liberalization, aiming to show how they work to *entextualize* the Macau slogan, while informing policies that continue to define the *us* and the *other*, affecting the lives and rights of different groups of people.

Gambling governance

In the previous sections, I showed how the idea of people conveyed by the slogan “Macau people ruling Macau” privileges the place of Chinese residents regardless of other populations of and from Macau. Here, I will examine how important financial resources during the first years of gambling liberalization have been combined with strategies of labour incentive and control and programmes of social assistance to shape preferential policies enacted to regulate the flow and the “quality” of people who entered and remained in the city. Different means of governing populations have been a common feature in postcolonial Macau, although in that they are not necessarily different from *colonial* Macau. On the one hand, they

respond to the political and ethnic stakes brought by the handover. On the other, they evolve from a combination of *laissez-faire* economic policies, heavy investments, and government intervention that together account for the tremendous impact of liberalization. I therefore characterize the grip of capital on Macau's urban and social fabric as a form of *gambling governance*.

Following the canon of a political economy of capitalist expansion led by the interests of global entrepreneurial classes, the liberalization of gambling has enabled a new dimension of investment and of human and capital circulation in and through Macau. In one of my conversations with June, who works in one of the new hotels that opened since the liberalization, she argued that more people from China and other countries were arriving in the city: "There are people from Hong Kong working in management levels, because Macau does not have enough trained workers to work in the casinos and hotels. So, it is necessary to import from other countries." As a matter of fact, people coming from Hong Kong, Australia, and the United States, among other countries, have arrived in great numbers to be employed in different levels of casino and hotel management structures. On the one hand, these movements show that Macau's gambling sector has been controlled from abroad, from Hong Kong and US management boards, to Australian and American investment groups (e.g., Wynn, Galaxy Group). On the other hand, the long history of Chinese entrepreneurship in the sector also explains why it is still subject to the interference of triads – clandestine organizations historically connected to the casinos (Eadington, Siu 2007: 20) – which have been more recently associated with the junket operators, assigned to attract high rollers to the VIP rooms and to recover debts.

Bringing the city's physical and urban capacity to accommodate new property developments and to absorb the influx of populations to a limit, construction projects and policies of labour importation have engendered a degree of instability, somewhat jeopardizing the very development they were intended to enact. Filipe insisted that Macau's urban fabric has been deeply affected. Accustomed to a rather laid-back atmosphere, residents felt they have been suddenly battered by a storm that swept everything away. "In the old days, around the Lisboa [casino]," Filipe recalled, "there were not only pawnshops. There were hotels, Vietnamese, Chinese, Portuguese restaurants, offices, goldsmith stores, tailor stores. Now, the pawnshops are the only ones that exist around the casinos." Talking with Mário, a Macanese resident, in 2007, he expressed his concerns: "So much happened in the last five years. I think the population cannot keep up. Well, I do not.... I have the feeling of being really lost in Macau, of having no reference whatsoever." As Liz suggested, there are other "negative" sides to the recent developments engendered by the liberalization: "Old and traditional businesses are gradually disappearing. They are destroying the city that I knew from my childhood, my city." But as with other informants for this study – individuals who have not

necessarily welcomed the dramatic changes the city has undergone, but who came to terms with it by accepting the new phase Macau has entered into as a pledge to the future – Liz continued: “A living city is just like a human being, it grows, it changes. You grow and become something else. It means that you are alive. You cannot keep everything forever. We have to accept that.”

Direct or indirect involvement from public and private agents has, however, aided in countering some of the effects of liberalization that are perceived as less desirable. Promoted as a new means of economic stimulation, job creation, and enhancement of tax revenues, states and national governments worldwide progressively rely on gambling revenues to support public functions (Stokowski 2004: 399; cf. Hannigan 1998: 145). With taxes that amount to some 40 per cent of all casino revenue, the Macau administration finds a profitable way to perform its administrative duties, allowing it to further provide a number of social programmes mostly to the benefit of *residents*. In 2008, for instance, a system of distribution of government subsidies based on socio-economic criteria enabled the accomplishment of a nearly free education programme up to the high school level for Macau residents.¹⁶ Accordingly, enrolment in any of Macau’s universities costs more to a foreign student, including Mainland Chinese, while locals benefit from rebates. Cultural and scientific initiatives have also been sponsored through local foundations maintained by the government, such as the Macao Foundation, which receives roughly 3 per cent of gambling revenues every year to fund academic and artistic projects. Increasing gambling revenues have also prompted the creation of a wealth-partaking scheme, initially devised as an ad hoc policy that ended up becoming a permanent fixture, in what the government labelled as an effort to fight increasing living standards. In 2008, the administration instituted an annual financial allocation of MOP 5,000 (USD621) to permanent residents of Macau, that is, those in possession of the Resident’s Card (Lo 2009: 36). As of 2017, the amount had nearly doubled, with the latest scheme setting the allocation at MOP9,000 (USD1,118) for permanent residents.

Accordingly, the soaring demand for labour forces at the onset of liberalization as well as the subsequent imperative of reducing labour importation raised by local associations-cum-parties (Liu 2008: 121–122), which materialized in a law in 2008 that establishes quotas on the recruitment of foreign workers, especially in casinos, constitute strategies framed by regulation that attests to government actions and interference in the political economy of Macau. Shaping strategies of labour incentive and control, selective policies have further reinforced situations of uneven opportunities and advantages that distinguish official or “full” status residents from Blue Card workers in Macau. As a friend and informant, Marcos, was keen to emphasize that one of the reasons he got a job back in Macau after several years spent in Portugal and the United Kingdom, was the possession of the

Resident's Card. "It is important to highlight the fact that I got this job because I am Macanese," he stated. Education and labour policies in Macau somewhat define situations with effects analogous to the *hukou* (戶口), the household registration system instituted in the first decade of the PRC (1950), which continues to regulate population movements on the Mainland (Mackenzie 2002: 308–9). Whereas this system reserves some jobs, university places, and welfare benefits for those registered within a given urban territory, it shows that market segmentation and artificial operation tend to limit competition for some while reinforcing the chances of others (Kipnis 2007: 394).

In Macau, this type of situation led to the rise of social tensions between locals and immigrants, voiced, for instance, during the Labour Day (1 May) demonstrations in 2008. This was encouraged by civic associations that represent the interests of the working classes of Macau, such as the New Macau Democratic Association (Associação Novo Macau Democrático, ANMD) and the Macau Federation of Trade Unions (Associação Geral dos Operários de Macau, AGOM). Opposition to the existing immigration policies often translated into propositions that denounced the recruitment of illegal workers and sought to reduce labour importation (Ian 2008a: 4, 2008b: 6). Others, more extreme, have advanced the use of distinctive signs denoting immigrant workers employed in the casinos (Ian 2008c: 4; Nunes 2008: 3),¹⁷ which was soon endorsed by the government. When I returned to Macau in 2009, frontline casino workers were already using identification signs in the form of subtle marks on their uniforms, for example, a small flag of the worker's country of origin on their identification badges. Several of the informants I met during different stages of fieldwork in Macau have expressed a degree of concern or discontent regarding the recent immigrants. Gonçalo, a Macanese in his early thirties, was among them: "The majority of my friends seem to have a big dislike of the new immigrants. Because of them it seems that Macau is changing too quickly and negatively." In another conversation with his friend, Camila, a young Macanese woman who returned to Macau from the United Kingdom in 2005, admitted that "the population [used to be] less, places are [now] crowded, there is more tension."

Among the reasons I chose to give particular attention to gambling are observations of this kind, which account for the changes in experience and perception the liberalization entailed. More often than not, my respondents pointed to the fact that the activity, and the tourism sector to which it is associated, is held more accountable for the changes the city has undergone recently than the handover itself, even though it is unlikely that any of these would take place were it not for the latter. While explaining how economic growth has affected Macau, Marcos insisted that "it is not only one casino that has been opened, but several, and on a scale never known [to Macau]." To Simão, who also returned from Portugal a few years after the handover,

gambling has also incontestably redefined the city and people’s lives and expectations:

When I arrived, before the opening of the Sands [casino], Macau was as before, impeccable ... It seemed like there was a new world, that there was hope to build a place of our own, of the people of Macau. And then I do not know, and this is a very personal opinion, if people got disillusioned. I got disillusioned myself, because what you see is the authentic prostitution of the city, the selling of the city without any love for it.

As Simão and Marcos as well as Mário, in a comment in the beginning of this chapter, have pointed out, it is the scale and the momentum of gambling that is overwhelming, especially after the liberalization’s initial take-off with the opening of the Sands Macau in 2004. Clearly, during the political transition, there was disruption as much as rupture. “In the early 1990,” Marcos recalled, “my parents thought about leaving Macau. My mother actually bought a house in Portugal ... and that is also why I ended up there. We did not know what was going to happen. Everybody was a little afraid.” However, the large migration movements of Chinese, Portuguese, and Macanese who left Macau before the handover was effective was soon enough replaced by the choice of return and by a degree of confidence in the future of the city. As the handover day came on 20 December 1999, to much excitement and scepticism, a historical page was rather smoothly turned to give place to another chapter of Macau’s new, if alternative history. As Gonçalo explained: “I remember in 1999, in December, I was in Portugal ... and it was also the handover.... At that time ... I just thought OK. It is not my business. I am not going to go back there. I had no feelings.” Indeed, as he came to mention later on, Gonçalo found that Macau was pretty much the same after the handover took place. An opinion that also resonated in Marcos’s thoughts: “When Macau’s turn came by, I think that many people were sad. I was already living abroad for a few years then and, in the end, it did not mean that much to me.... I thought that everything was just the same.”

Gonçalo and Marcos’s apparent lack of involvement should not downplay the fact that many people had experienced mixed feelings and expectations before the transfer of power. The very fact that they were abroad pursuing their education was a sign that families have strategically chosen to send young people away so as to provide a means to secure their future if things went wrong in Macau. Their apparent “detachment” from the changes taking place thus partially reflects the several years spent in a foreign country. Echoing the voices of other people of the young and older generations I encountered, their position also underlines the fact that the economy of gambling remains, after all, at the epicentre of life choices as

well as at the core of important social transformations in the city. After six years in Canada, Lúcio, a Macanese in his early thirties who returned to the city in 2004, replied to my question about the possibilities of staying abroad: “I wanted to, but I did not because tourism in Macau was booming, a lot of opportunities, the possibility to gain experience.” Lúcio, Gonçalo, and Marcos chose to settle again in the city a few years later, in 2006, after the years spent in Portugal and the United Kingdom, thanks to promising working opportunities in Macau. For them and other residents I met, this was a lifetime opportunity to get back to the city in good professional and living conditions.

From my informants’ observations, however, we get the general idea that massive capital investments and subsequent growth have not done away with social instability. To them, people of Macau, there is also a general feeling that they have not been invited to participate in the construction of this new Macau. While the “invasion” of immigrants and tourists distressed the residents, increasing prices in real estate along with public corruption disclosed in a scheme of land concession to private investors in 2006 (Liu 2008) added to the general feeling of uncertainty and frustration to effectively channel social demands and expectations. Mário reflected on the youth who have abandoned high school or decided against pursuing a university degree, lured by the promise of making “easy money” working for the casinos. Indeed, monthly wages for a job as a croupier are quite attractive, currently as much as MOP25,000, or roughly USD3,000. “There is a whole generation going [to work] to the casinos ... and the government will have to make ... big, serious decisions about the youth. If they do not stop that, we risk losing a whole generation.” Affecting the young generation in particular, the new economy of gambling has generated effects that are, in June’s opinion, twofold: “The good thing is that there are many working opportunities. We do not worry very much about jobs. One of my brothers works for the Wynn, the other is a policeman. My parents are retired. The bad thing is that it is too much. I prefer a quiet Macau. Sometimes I think the casinos are too much. They bring too many people, traffic, inflation, criminals, more thieves, robbery, more triads.”

June’s perception echoed the experiences of other residents of Macau who, in general terms, widely benefited from the process that released the city from the period of economic stagnation it had faced in the late Portuguese administration during the transition. Finding Macau in a state of economic prosperity during the different periods in which I conducted fieldwork in the city, criticism and discontent were not far from the conversations I had and the reports in the press. Yet most people were well off, and many had indeed returned to Macau after several years living abroad in the search for better professional opportunities. In the beginning, full employment was reached, local wages were set according to higher standards, and people experienced a wave of enthusiasm for the future. In improving the living standards of

many, outstanding economic growth also became an important element to the cultural positioning of the Macau Chinese. Nevertheless, economic inequality has deepened (Liu 2008: 121; Lo 2009: 21), while the arrival of tens of thousands of immigrant workers has drastically transformed the city’s social and demographic landscapes, adding to the sense of frustration. Triggering as much controversy as satisfaction, Macau’s political economy ultimately reveals that gambling governance has been designed to the taste of some to serve the interests of a few.

Conclusion

While striving for capital accumulation and creating conditions to foster increasing levels of private investment, the Chinese state had an indirect but crucial role in allowing the development of entrepreneurial initiatives that aided the connecting of Macau globally in a new and more intricate manner, if only by granting its administration rights to self-government, not least the choice to pursue its policies on gambling. Combining economic freedom and administrative autonomy, this approach reveals how neoliberalization, as a macroeconomic process, can be primarily located in state policies (Harvey 2005: 75; Ong 2006: 4; Jayasuriya 2006: 42; Wacquant 2012). It also shows how the combination of national and private interests has shaped local governance with neoliberal constituents. In fact, both the handover and the liberalization have been regulated by political entities – local, national, and global – involved with the channelling and scaling of human and material resources to Macau. Raising concerns about the government of an ethnically diverse population in a postcolonial context, these processes dealt with the city’s regional integration, both on the basis of national narratives and growing global connectedness centred in the services and businesses of tourism and gambling.

Thus, while gambling reflects the infiltration of “market-driven calculations” into the domain of politics in order to capitalize, as Ong claims, on a specific locational advantage (2006: 101), the deployment of social programmes and affirmative action towards selected categories of people in a context of multi-ethnic cohabitation also suggests that “graduated” citizenship and sovereignty constitute the rule in the neoliberal exception. Therefore, and although I concur with Kipnis that there may be no *intention* on the part of governments, especially China’s, of actually enacting neoliberal policies or seeking the achievement of neoliberal goals (2007: 386), the *practice* of liberalization enabled by Macau’s administrative autonomy and national design points rather to the carrying out of neoliberal strategies. When these very affirmative or selective actions towards certain groups of people, or when straightforward economic policies anchored in market principles are enacted, neoliberal principles deeply shape governance in Macau.

The situation of a gambling-led political economy shows how economic growth, while triggering uncertainty and anxiety, has also generated jobs, pride and confidence (especially among the Macau Chinese), further facilitating the political project of national integration. Hence, one of Macau's specificities when examined under the lens of neoliberalization is that it is not placed in a context of crisis and economic fallout (see, for instance, Stacul in this volume). The often-gloomy effects associated with this process are not obvious here. And this is where the slogan "Macau people ruling Macau" binds gambling liberalization and China's national programme together. Crafted as a principle by the Chinese central authorities, the slogan was not primarily conceived as a response to a situation of economic crisis and distress, or as a reaction to urgent economic restructuring and reforms, but rather to the necessity of political normalization. Yet, its production and reception were ultimately embedded and reasserted thanks to economic prosperity. Given its appealing resonance of both command and self-governing invitation, the slogan's force has been partially derived from an ambivalent, but definitely institutionalized, appeal to the Chinese residents of Macau. Drawing on the ethnic profiling of power, it evokes neoliberal values on the basis of political and social policies that privilege the Chinese to the detriment of other local populations. Tied to a project in China of ethnic mobilization and the rhetoric of overcoming Western domination, the slogan "Macau people ruling Macau" encapsulates political and historical experiences that gravitate toward the double question of Greater China and Chineseness, and emerges as a powerful instrument of governance in the light of a market economy ruled by liberalization.

Notes

- 1 Also referred to in English translation as "Macau people governing Macau" (Liu 2008: 116).
- 2 In 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2013, and 2014. I settled down in the city in 2015, when I returned once again to conduct research on casino development as a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Macau.
- 3 GDP growth rates in real terms for selected years: 26.9% in 2004; 8.3% in 2005; 14.7% in 2007 (DSEC 2012: 366–367). Macau's GDP is independent from Mainland China's. According to Fifoot, the Macau Basic Law states that "Macao is to have independent finances, to keep its own revenue and to be exempt from mainland taxes" (1994: 53).
- 4 From roughly 4 million in 2002 to 17 million in 2012. The same year, the total number of visitors to Macau amounted to 28 million (DESC 2012: 180).
- 5 The number of working migrants legally entering Macau reached nearly 137,830 in 2013 over a population of approximately 607,000 inhabitants for the same year (Yearbook of Statistics 2013: 47, 77).
- 6 Of which Andre Gunder Frank and Janet L. Abu-Lughod are among the most notable proponents of the Chinese Empire's supremacy before the European

- expansion. According to Frank: “Europe was certainly not central to the world economy before 1800.... In no way were sixteenth-century Portugal, the seventeenth-century Netherlands, or eighteenth-century Britain ‘hegemonic’ in world economic terms. Nor in political ones” (1998: 5). See also Abu-Lughod 1989, Chapter 10 (“All the Silks from China”).
- 7 The first SEZ were established in the Provinces of Guangdong (Shantou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai) and Fujian (Xiamen) (Cun 1990: 394; Ong 2006: 7, 19, 104).
 - 8 Although gambling on horses has been recently allowed in the Mainland, joining then the only type of gambling permitted in Hong Kong (Spencer 2008), since the activity had been forbidden by the British administration in 1844 (Eadington, Siu 2007: 4).
 - 9 Since the arrival of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century parallel jurisdictions have coexisted, represented by the Portuguese Senate and the Mandarin House (Sena 1996: 41; Wu 1999: 71, 82).
 - 10 94.3% in 2006 (Global Results By-census 2006: 164).
 - 11 In 2006, the resident population born outside Macau was estimated at 57% of the total population, of which 47.1% came from Mainland China and 3.7% from Hong Kong (Global Results By-census 2006: 157).
 - 12 Bilhete de Identificação de Residente (BIR).
 - 13 Roughly 150,000 Chinese residents in 2006 (Clayton 2009: 21, 109). See also Law n. 37/81, 3 October, Portuguese Nationality Law. After 1981, the right to the Portuguese nationality will be granted exclusively to the children born to Chinese parents who already have the Portuguese nationality.
 - 14 That is, having resided in Macau for seven consecutive years. These conditions are defined in Chapter III, Article 24 of the *Basic Law of Macau*. The public functions that can only be performed by Chinese nationals who have been permanent residents for a varying number of years, are the following: “the Chief Executive (20 years), the members of the Executive Council, principal officials (15 years), President (and Vice-President) of the Legislative Council (15 years), the President of the Court of Final Appeal and the Procurator-General (none)” (Fifoot 1994: 46–47; Basic Law, Chapter IV, Articles 46, 57, 63, 72, 88 and 90).
 - 15 I owe this information to Filipe.
 - 16 Since 2007–2008, the first year of its implementation, the Lei de Bases do Sistema Educativo Não Superior (Lei n. 9/2006) makes access to education almost free in Macau (Varela, Falcão 2007).
 - 17 The idea came from Deputy Leong Iok Wa, a representative of the Macau Federation of Trade Unions (AGOM), and was approved in November 2008, to be put in effect from January 2009 onwards.

References

- Abu-Lughod, Janet L. 1989. *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Basic Law of the Macau Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China*. 1993. March 31.
- Bentley, Carter G. 1987. “Ethnicity and Practice.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 29(1) (January), pp. 24–55.

- Breitung, Werner. 2007. *Overcoming Borders, Living with Borders*. Macau: Instituto Cultural do Governo da R.A.E. de Macau.
- Carrithers, Michael. 2005. "Why Anthropologists Should Study Rhetoric." *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, vol. 11(3) (September), pp. 577–583.
- . 1990. "Why Humans Have Cultures." *Man*, New Series, vol. 25(2) (June), pp. 189–206.
- Clayton, Cathryn H. 2009. *Sovereignty at the Edge: Macau and the Question of Chineseness*. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Asia Center.
- Cun Wang. 1990. "The Development of Information Activities in the Special Economic Zones of China." *Journal of Information Science*, (16), pp. 393–398.
- Eadington, William R. and Siu, Ricardo C. S. 2007. "Between Law and Custom. Examining the Interaction Between Legislative Change and the Evolution of Macao's Casino Industry." *International Gambling Studies*, vol. 7(1), pp. 1–28.
- Fernandes, Moisés Silva. 1997. "Portuguese Behavior Towards the Political Transition and the Regional Integration of Macau in the Pearl River Region." In *Macau and Its Neighbors in Transition*, eds. Wilson Ramos, José Rocha Dinis, Rex Wilson, and D. Y. Yuan. Macau: Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Macau and Macau Foundation, pp. 45–56.
- Fifoot, Paul. 1994. "One Country, Two Systems – Mark II: From Hong Kong to Macao." *International Relations*, (12), pp. 25–58.
- Frank, Andre Gunder. 1998. *Reorient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*. Berkley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, Ltd.
- Hai Ren. 2010. *Neoliberalism and Culture in China and Hong Kong: The Countdown of Time*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Hannigan, John. 1998. *Fantasy City. Pleasure and Profit in the Postmodern Metropolis*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Harvey, David. 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jayasuriya, Kanishka. 2006. "Beyond New Imperialism. State and Transnational Regulatory Governance in East Asia." In *Empire and Neoliberalism in Asia*, ed., Vedi R. Hadiz. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 38–51.
- Kipnis, Andrew. 2007. "Neoliberalism Reified: Suzhi Discourse and Tropes of Neoliberalism in the People's Republic of China." *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, vol. 3(2) (June), pp. 383–400.
- Li Liu. 2008. "Yang and Yin in Communication: Towards a Typology and Logic of Persuasion in China." *Diogenes*, vol. 55, pp. 120–132.
- Liu Shih-Diing. 2008. "Casino Colony." *Metropolitan Disorders-5, New Left Review*, (50) (March–April), pp. 109–124.
- Lo Shiu Hing. 2005. "Casino Politics, Organized Crime and the Post-Colonial State in Macau." *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 14(43) (May), pp. 207–224.
- Lo, Sonny. 2009. "Casino Capitalism and Its Legitimacy Impact on the Politico-Administrative State in Macau." *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, vol. 38(1), pp. 19–47.
- Lu, Xing. 1999. "An Ideological/Cultural Analysis of Political Slogans in Communist China." *Discourse & Society*, vol. 10(4), pp. 487–508.
- McCartney, Glenn. 2006. "Casino Gambling in Macao: Through Legalization to Liberalization." In *Casino Industry in Asia Pacific: Development, Operation, and Impact*, ed., Cathy H. C. Hsu. New York, London, and Oxford: The Haworth Hospitality Press, pp. 37–58.

- Mackenzie, Peter W. 2002. “Strangers in the City: The *Hukou* and Urban Citizenship in China.” *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 56(1), (Fall), pp. 305–319.
- Nonini, Donald M. 2008. “Is China Becoming Neoliberal?” *Critique of Anthropology*, vol. 28(2), pp. 145–176.
- Ong, Aihwa. 2006. *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty*. Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press.
- . 2004. “The Chinese Axis: Zoning Technologies and Variegated Sovereignty.” *Journal of East Asian Studies*, vol. 4, pp. 69–96.
- Pina-Cabral, João de. 2002. *Between China and Europe: Person, Culture and Emotion in Macao*. London and New York: Continuum.
- Pina-Cabral, João de, and Lourenço, Nelson. 1993. *Em terra de tufões: dinâmicas da etnicidade macaense*. Macau: Instituto Cultural de Macau.
- Porter, Jonathan. 2000. *Macau: The Imaginary City*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Sena, Tereza. 1996. “Macau: o Primeiro Ponto de Encontro Permanente na China.” *Revista de Cultura*, ICM, (27/28) (Abril–Setembro), pp. 25–59.
- Smart, Alan and Li Zhang. 2006. “From the Mountains and the Fields: The Urban Transition in the Anthropology of China.” *China Information*, vol. 20(3), pp. 481–518.
- Stokowski, Patricia A. 2004. “Gaming and Tourism: Issues for the New Millenium.” In *A Companion to Tourism*, eds. Alan A. Lew, C. Michael Hall, Allan A. Williams. Malden, Oxford, and Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 399–409.
- Wacquant, Loïc. 2012. “Three Steps to a Historical Anthropology of Actually Existing Neoliberalism.” *Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale*, vol. 20(1) (February), pp. 66–79.
- Wu Fulong. 2010. “How Neoliberal is China’s Reform? The Origins of Change During Transition.” *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, vol. 51(5), pp. 619–631.
- Wu Zhiliang. 1999. *Segredos de Sobrevivência. História Política de Macau*. Macau: Associação de Educação de Adultos de Macau.
- Zhao Renwei. 2001. “Increasing Income Inequality and Its Causes in China.” In *China’s Retreat from Equality: Income Distribution and Economic Transition*, eds. Carl Riskin, Zhao Renwei; Li Shi. Armonk, NY, and London: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 25–43.

Press

- Ian, Island. 2008a. “Operários aumentam pressão.” *Hoje Macau*, 28 de agosto, p. 4.
- . 2008b. “Democratas pedem congelamento.” *Hoje Macau*, 10 de setembro, p. 6.
- . 2008c. “Xenofobia na farda dos profissionais dos casinos.” *Hoje Macau*, 8 de agosto, p. 4.
- Nunes, Sónia. 2008. “Estrangeiro, identifique-se.” *Hoje Macau*, 7 de novembro, p. 3.
- Spencer, Richard. 2008. “China to Legalise Horse Racing and Betting.” *The Telegraph*, 12 January. www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1575374/China-to-legalise-horse-racing-and-betting.html, retrieved on 19 March 2014.
- Varela, João Costeira; Falcão, António. 2007. “Virar de página na educação.” *Revista Macau*, setembro. www.revistamacau.com/rm.asp?id=008081, retrieved on 19 April 2010.

Statistics, Reports

DICJ. “História da indústria de jogos de Macau.” www.dicj.gov.mo/web/pt/history/index.html, retrieved on 1 April 2014.

Global Results By-census 2006. DSEC.

Yearbook of Statistics 2013. DSEC.

5 “The dog in the manger”

Neoliberal slogans at war in the Peruvian Amazon

Peter Bille Larsen

There are many resources that are left unused, that don't receive investment and don't generate employment. All of that is due to ideology, idleness, laziness or the law of the *perro del hortelano* “dog in the manger”: “If I don't do it, no one should do it” (*si no lo hago yo, que no lo haga nadie*). The first such resource is the Amazon.

President of Peru Alan García Pérez, 2007

Introduction

How are we to make sense of neoliberal slogans?¹ What does the Peruvian context offer in terms of lessons? Slogans have long accompanied neoliberal reform processes in Peru like the one initiated under President Alan García Pérez, during his second presidency (2006–2011). Are such slogans merely clever propaganda and window dressing orchestrated by savvy spin doctors to promote deregulation and market-driven approaches, or is something else at stake? From one perspective, slogans may appear as shallow “form” greasing the wheels of underlying, structural real “contents” of neoliberal reforms such as privatization and deregulation. Slogans in this respect are merely propaganda instruments for underlying political battles between markets versus state redistribution, central planning versus individual initiative, responsibility versus solidarity, and so forth. From another perspective, neoliberal slogans have continuously appeared in long-standing political, social, and economic conflicts at times even evoked during violent confrontations. Cases such as the escalation of the violent *Baguazo* events in 2009 suggest the need for far more attention to what slogans are and how they are used.

Indeed, in this chapter, I question relegating slogans to mere questions of form. I argue that this disguises their role as vehicles with distinct properties and social effects. Based on Peruvian material, I suggest that neoliberal slogans have been instrumental in generating, rather than merely accompanying, the contradictions at stake. They are, from this perspective, not merely a carefully orchestrated form, but carriers of social significance that deserve ethnographic attention and anthropological theorization. Rather

than taking the dichotomy implied in the critique of smooth form (slogan) and contents (poorly camouflaged neoliberal ideology) for granted, this chapter explores abandoning the idea of the neoliberal slogan as empty camouflage, instead seeing it as a particular form of political performance with distinct social effects. To develop this argument, the chapter particularly explores the use and effects of neoliberal slogans during the second presidency of Alan García, including the escalation of conflict and violence during the so-called *Baguazo*, a dramatic confrontation of military, police, and protestors in the Peruvian Amazon in 2009. This is not to say that slogans and neoliberalism were unique to García. While his first successor, Ollanta Humala (president from 2011 to 2016), initially opted for an anti-systems discourse promising a “great transformation,” critics argued that fundamental neoliberal policy was not rethought (see, e.g., Poole and Rénique 2012). The current president, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, an economist with both World Bank and private-sector background, began his political career in 1980 as a minister of energy and mines, among other things, facilitating tax exemptions to boost oil and gas exploration. His presidential campaign stressed equality, economic growth, and a pro-market position. Yet, it was during the García period that the role of neoliberal slogans arguably took on its clearest expression, a period that equally coincided with multiple fieldwork stays of the author in the Peruvian Amazon between 2007 and 2010 (Larsen 2015).

Neoliberal slogans, I argue, are powerful, if ambiguous, vehicles of simplicity, polarization, and morality. This is, however, due neither to the competencies of expensive “spin doctors” authoring them, nor to the innate virtues of neoliberal dogma and market principles. Rather, their use evolves, I argue, around performances of simplification and polarization, which are accentuated by and necessary for the affirmation or reworking of moral superiority of the neoliberal project in political space. Neoliberal slogans, in this sense, are not merely neoliberal because of their adherence to political priorities as private property, individual entrepreneurialism, or downsized states, but as a distinct form of politics formed around ahistorical narratives of simplicity. While there is increasing *fatigue* with the use of neoliberalism in anthropological literature questioning its omnipresence and analytical imprecision, this analysis suggests recuperating its empirical significance in terms of distinct governance modalities grounded in a particular form of moralization of the politico-economical landscape. To make this argument, the present chapter takes up the proliferation of neoliberal slogans and their reception in the Peruvian Amazon between 2006 and 2011. A period marked by intensive neoliberal reform, Amazonian protests and violence, it lends itself particularly well to exploring the social significance and effects of neoliberal slogans.

The starting point is the sloganeering appearing with the publication in a major newspaper of a series of articles by President García himself. This is followed by a brief introduction to neoliberal policies in the Latin American

and Peruvian contexts. The chapter then proceeds by exploring the discursive significance of neoliberal slogans, seeking to identify and qualify the reception, use, and effects of slogans in a context of intense protests, blockades, and social mobilization across the country. The chapter discusses the significance of the *Baguazo* clashes in June 2009 from the perspective of slogans as well as bringing in ethnographic data from the *Selva Central* (Central Jungle) in the years preceding it.

El Perro del hortelano: neoliberal slogans as simplification

“*El síndrome del perro del hortelano,*” the syndrome of the gardener’s dog or the “dog in the manger syndrome,” was initially the title of an article by the then-president of Peru, Alan García, in the national daily *El Comercio* in October 2007 (García 2007a). Using a narrative image from an ancient fable of a lazy dog “neither eating nor letting others eat,” García launched a battle cry, the etymological sense of slogans, against what he perceived as overregulation and ideology hindering private titling and the entrepreneurial use of Peru’s resource wealth, not least in the Amazon. It quickly became an emblematic slogan, reiterated in a trilogy of articles over the theme, but equally as a favoured target of critique. The title of the second article, published on 25 November the same year, “*Receta para acabar con el perro del hortelano,*” recipe for terminating the dog in the manger, illustrated with all clarity the prescriptive properties of the slogan. It emphasized the need to “change the attitude to investments,” replacing “exaggerated criteria” with the “market and private competition fixing the conditions.” The prosperity of the country remained idle for ideological and bureaucratic reasons, García argued, allowing for neither adequate titling nor third party entrepreneurialism. Depleted forestlands were not being put to productive use due to inadequate property rights. The state, the president argued, should drop its control obsession, free up resources for investments, and put in place attractive investment procedures (García 2007b). Referring to an ancient fable, at times ascribed to Aesop, the analogy portrayed the selfish behaviour of Amazonians not willing to share what was needed by the rest of the country and its investment-eager entrepreneurs.

These articles have been seen as a “manifesto” or discourse, which later decrees rolled out as a national variant of continent-wide processes to open up frontiers (Bebbington 2012). Certainly, the ideological tone was unmistakably neoliberal, yet what makes it relevant to consider it a “slogan?” García himself described the current state of affairs as a “syndrome.” The term syndrome, of course, is not only a description of a concurrence of symptoms, but equally a prescription or a battle cry for immediate intervention – in this case of a political nature – to save the health of the nation. García argued in a third article that radicals and extremist positions prevented Peruvians from leaving material and education poverty behind (García 2008). Formulated as the dog in the manger in all of us, like a

psychological predicament, it was a diagnosis with which Peru had to deal. A businessman, Pablo Bustamante Pardo, would, in a commentary in the same newspaper, describe this “unequal battle”: “On the one hand, are the antis, the anti-free trade agreement, anti-globalization, anti-mining, anti-property rights in the forest, anti-private investment, and on the other side nobody; thank god President García is now exercising leadership in provoking a battle of ideas, a battle in which we cannot leave behind” (Pardo 2007: my translation).

The battle of ideas would soon translate into massive lawfare (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006). By December 2007, García received congressional approval for the executive branch to legislate by decree, bypassing Congress in order to speedily facilitate the implementation of the US–Peru Free Trade Agreement. In the 180 days of exceptional executive power, from 1 January to 28 June 2008, 99 legislative decrees were expedited, 34 of which appeared on the very last day. The explosion of decrees cemented the point that the neoliberal state was not about “no regulation” *laissez faire* politics leaving market forces do their work, but rather fundamentally about a regulatory intervention to allow for entrepreneurialism to take hold in the Amazon. It was a legislative process evading democratic scrutiny. Congressional commissions were hardly consulted, nor were many interested parties and stakeholders. Nine decrees in particular were raised by indigenous organizations in the Amazon as threatening their territorial security, undermining their collective rights and resource base. “*Perro del hortelano*” narratives gained significance as the legitimacy script preparing the ground for the reform package. At stake were more than carefully orchestrated messages about entrepreneurs and private property but, equally, if not more so, about the moral condemnation of the “dogs in the manger” hindering the nation from advancing (“Peru Avanza” being the APRA² government slogan *per se*).

Neoliberalism in Latin America

Latin America is often singled out as an early laboratory for neoliberal reform closely tied to the implementation of the Washington Consensus spreading across the continent in the last decades of the twentieth century. In practice, however, analytical use of the concept remains notoriously ubiquitous, normative, and slippery. Furthermore, proponents of market-based measures rarely identify themselves as neoliberal.

Whereas the overthrow of Allende in 1973 and the advice of Chicago school economists to Pinochet to restructure the Chilean economy are often listed as the kick-off of the neoliberal era, it is important to articulate the different meanings often associated with the term neoliberalism. In a very narrow sense, neoliberal reform refers to a subset of policy measures promoting greater reliance on the market (Walton 2004: 165). For some, down-scaling of the state in Latin America was inevitable given the poor economic conditions faced in the 1980s, whereas for others neoliberalism reflected the

arrival of a major reformulation of state–society relations altogether. Such policy debates obviously pre-date late–twentieth century Latin America, even if they appeared with force in that period. From a broader perspective, neoliberalism is about adherence to a doctrine or theory of political economy proposing that “human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey 2005: 2). The “neo” is thus not about market measures per se, but about political ideology linked to specific policy measures in a project based on faith in the market to solve socio-economic problems. Neoliberalism from this perspective is about more than economics. It is fundamentally tied to questions of ideology, shifting political practices, and how this ultimately relates to society and people. Latin America offers a particularly fertile ground to explore such intersections and break with the rampant use of neoliberalism as a misguided catch-all descriptor of the contemporary condition (Allison and Piot 2014: 3). Not only have a wide range of market measures been instigated in the region, from sector-specific initiatives to overall macroeconomic policies, but the sheer social, cultural, and demographic diversity begs for detailed anthropological description. What is described as neoliberal reform in Latin America covers several decades of diverse and uneven reform processes, appearing at different moments under varying political regimes (Margheritis and Pereira 2007: 27). In what has been defined as the most unequal region in the world, on par with sub-Saharan Africa (Lopez and Perry 2008), such reforms have more often than not been met with disenchantment, resistance, and the search for alternatives (Buono and Lara 2007). This triggers critical questions about how economic, political, and social processes are entangled and play out in ethnographic terms. As a starting point, neoliberalism has a deeper and longer history in Peru preceding recent events. Neoliberal reforms have restructured and left deep traces in the social, economic, and development landscape. Bury argues that neoliberal reform in the mining sector, for example, has transformed land tenure institutions and value (2005). Whether looking at the resources and identity in the highlands (Hogue and Rau 2008), social policy in cities, or dynamics in the Amazon, neoliberal state craft has taken multiple forms (Pinker and Harvey 2015). Neoliberal slogans in Peru are in this sense not merely empty promises, but markers of legitimacy in a highly contested political economy.

Slogan politics in Peru

Indeed, the “dog in the manger” slogan appeared in a longer history or battlefield of slogan wars understood here as the use and counter-use of slogans in politics. Such practices were not invented by García but have long played a central role in both Peruvian and Andean politics as a whole, and to neoliberal reform in particular. Employed across the political spectrum,

slogans arguably represent a key political *dispositif*. From Hugo Blanco's "land or death" (Mayer 2009:49) to President Velasco ending a television speech on the day of the *indio* in 1969 with "The master will no longer feed off your poverty" upon launching the wide-reaching agrarian reform programme (Mayer 2009), slogans have continuously accompanied major socio-political movements and transformations in the country.

Neoliberal reform processes were no exception. When Alberto Fujimori, *el Chino*, ran for president in 1990, his electoral slogan, "Work, honesty and technology," translated into economic reforms requesting "that *chinos* and *cholos* forget their collective battles and instead struggle individually against poverty by becoming microentrepreneurs" (de la Cadena 2001: 12). In this first major neoliberal policy push, state structures and the public sector were deregulated and key sectors privatized alongside reduced state intervention in the economy as a whole. A particularity of neoliberal reform during Fujimori's administration was the centrality of authoritarian methods and technocratic expertise. Weakened unions, military liberties and, ultimately, the suspension of democratic rule accompanied a massive top-down decree process (Mauceri 1995) resulting in a "legislative tsunami" with the issuance of 923 decrees between 1991 and 1992 (Durand 2010: 188). Economist Hernando de Soto and the Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD) were the chief architects of neoliberal reform during the Fujimori period (Mauceri 1995) closely backed by international support. The process also led to the 1993 constitution, which consolidated core neoliberal pillars such as the "subsidiary role" of the state to the economy. Both the Fujimori and García periods thus involved top-down driven neoliberal reform, situating slogans as a connecting element in relation to wider society.

As with slogans, the employment of dog imagery was also somewhat of a tradition in Peruvian politics, not least in debates on capital and the state. The Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*), for example, hung dogs from lamp posts to represent the "running dogs of capitalism" (Becker 2006: 654). As described by journalist Gustavo Gorriti:

On the morning of December 26 (1980) ... several dogs met the morning hung from street lights in Central Lima. Tied at the neck ... their sad bodies were wrapped in cloth painted with strident characters. As the streets filled with people, a rumour spread that inside the bundles were not only dogs, but also explosives. Hours later, several civil guard officers climbed the posts and cut down the dogs. The bundles contained no explosives. On the shrouds, the paint was scribbled in furious letters. The words said simply, "Teng Hsiao-Ping, son of a bitch."
(Gorriti 1999: 76, my translation)

Authored by the emerging Shining Path³ insurgents, this was both a moral critique of Deng Xiaoping's reforms, seen as betraying true Maoism and the start signal of the internal conflict to deeply affect Peru for two decades.

Even without dynamite, it was a highly explosive package. Twelve years later, the *senderistas* bombed the office of Hernando de Soto's organization, "Institute for Liberty and Democracy." De Soto would later see this as "a sign that we were actually winning our intellectual war against the Shining Path." As he quoted his think tank colleague Mariano Cornejo for saying: "What more proof do we need that we have the Shining Path on the run?" he asked me. "They have run out of arguments. They can only make statements with gunpowder. They don't know what to do anymore."⁴

De Soto, himself, was also known for neoliberal slogans such as "dead capital" and "289 days."⁵ He reportedly even called his two dogs Marx and Engels because "they are German, hairy and have no respect for property."⁶ As lead negotiator of the US free trade agreement in Peru and a chief architect of private property prescriptions in both Peru and abroad, for de Soto dogs seem to have been a favourite source of inspiration. On an advisory mission to Indonesia, de Soto tells about learning about informal property from barking dogs while strolling in the rice fields of Bali.

I had no idea where the property boundaries were. But the dogs knew... Indonesian dogs may have been ignorant of formal law, but they were positive about which assets their masters controlled. I told the ministers that Indonesian dogs had the basic information they needed to set up a formal property system. By traveling their city streets and countryside and listening to the barking dogs, they could gradually work upward, through the vine of extralegal representations dispersed throughout their country, until they made contact with the ruling social contract. "Ah," responded one of the ministers, "jukum adat (the people's law)!"
(de Soto 2002)

Images and slogans allowed de Soto to condense complex neoliberal prescriptions, above related to property rights, into simple narratives, whether in Indonesia or Peru. The *perro del hortelano* slogan package of Garcia was in similar terms about winning the slogan war using imagery and simple narratives. It epitomized the neoliberal aesthetics of simplicity offering immediate solutions and order where heavy state apparatus, including cumbersome legislative process, socialist utopians, and the chains of protective measures had failed. As the president would later note, this "big legal transformation" would allow "our country to move ahead on the path of modernity, administrative speed, investment, and employment ... Had I preferred convenience and not required an effort, I would not have promoted these norms, which seek to change Peru, but I think it is our obligation to help the birth of the 21st century modern Peru."⁷

James Carrier has argued that simplification is not merely a persuasive or rhetorical device, but has consequences for "understanding people, their lives, and relationships" (Carrier 2009: 27). As persuasive devices, slogans simplify and reduce the legal complexity of trade, property right systems,

and budgetary reform to do-able, “no other alternative” solutions. Such slogans are thus not simply empty language, but simultaneously explanatory and prescriptive narrative devices recasting the essence of the neoliberal development promise. In doing so, they equally redefine the contours of the political debate and its objects. Slogans are in that sense not merely tools of legitimation, but form part of framing the issues and agencies at stake. As vehicles of simplicity, they told a story that could be understood. The particular neoliberal nature of this story was ahistorical in terms of its overall logic, yet equally historical in the sense of advocating liberation from the past. Its neoliberal nature was not merely about creating better conditions for capitalist accumulation, but fundamentally about a new development promise. Such representations had social effects.

The government highlighted decrees as a prerequisite for a free trade agreement, while the opposition pointed to fundamental contradictions. Indigenous organizations and other civil society organizations started writing against the slogan, organizing protests, questioning the constitutionality and lack of consultation in the ensuing decrees. Such protests would increase in intensity and coverage throughout 2008 and 2009 across the Amazon, affecting road and river access as well as oil installations. By 1 June 2009, the US embassy noted, “The government’s reluctance to use force to clear roads and blockades is contributing to the impression that the communities have broader support than they actually do.” The same US embassy cable, published by Wikileaks, emphasized the role of “highly ideological foreign and domestic NGOs” in fomenting political crisis.⁸

One of the protests against the decrees took place in the province of Bagua in Northern Peru, with thousands of Amazonian and *mestizo* protestors blocking a stretch of highway and police and military forces sent in to reopen it. On 5 June 2009, shooting and violence broke out, leading to the death of indigenous protestors as well as 23 police officers, 11 of whom had been held hostage and were executed (Valverde and Calleja 2010). For many critics it was a tragic sign of deep conflict between neoliberal reforms, resource grabs, and indigenous peoples. Media descriptions of indigenous uprisings, in turn, rewrote specific decisions and politics in the language of violence and clashes between primordial identities. From the left wing, events were interpreted as popular uprisings against neoliberalism, just like *La guerra del agua* around the privatization of water in Cochabamba, Bolivia. It was another chapter in the ongoing continental story of a neoliberal push and social struggles of those most affected (Buono and Lara 2007: 3–4). The social drama, from this perspective, was a reflection of the material conditions and violence of capital in an ever-expanding omnivorous extractive economy generating anti-neoliberal sentiments. However, such structural analysis would fail to account for the specific processes as well as individual actions and responsibilities involved. It would assume the prototypical exemplification of social protest against neoliberalism, indeed, misrepresenting the governance complexity and social premises.

Understanding the *Baguazo*, I would contend, involves taking into account complex interactions among government, social movements, histories, and practices. Within this bundle of issues, I focus in particular on the role of slogans in moral warfare as an illustration of the need for more fine-grained analysis.

Neoliberal slogans as moral dramatization and polarization

The only thing being said is that we are *perro de hortelano*, that we don't eat, nor allow others to eat ... that our communities are lazy ... but it's thanks to them (indigenous peoples) that we have our forests, our biodiversity, our whole ecosystem ... yet, all he [Alan García] wants is to earn money... !

(Local activist about the “perro del hortelano,” 2008, personal communication)

What took place in Bagua was not about the “Indians at war” or an “uprising,” even if portrayed by news agencies as a war between primordial identities based on structural difference. Rather, such media reports reproduced stereotypical images, in part resulting from the ongoing use of slogans in moral warfare, fueling polarization rather than democratic politics.

Whereas it is commonplace to bemoan the lack of morals in neoliberalism, I here emphasize the central role of moralization in neoliberal politics (Amable 2011: 4). The acceptance of neoliberal reform measures was far from a given. Indeed, it was highly contested on moral grounds. Far from a “dominant ideology,” neoliberal tropes of entrepreneurialism and self-realization had a tainted history of benefiting the few, not only in Peru, but in Latin America as a whole. At stake in winning the (moral) war were not only questions of being right or wrong in political, even constitutional, terms, but of slogans as vehicles of polarization to build legitimacy and delegitimize the other. Indigenous communities and their supporters were being represented not only as the “poor man sitting on a heap of gold,” but as being guided down the wrong path by irresponsible leaders and dubious outside institutions. At stake in this dramatization were not merely political differences, but the moral representation of politics as such. Indigenous (dis) involvement, protests, and organizations were repeatedly “alterized” as the radical, violent, and warrior-like other whether in terms of the “radically indigenous” (against dialogue) other or the “indigenous radical” (in bed with subversion) other. Slogans served to delegitimize the neoliberal “other” – NGOs, environmentalists, and indigenous leaders as utopian reactionaries, and thus simultaneously building legitimacy around top-down decrees as “good conduct.” Just as “Either Chavez or Peru” (*O Chávez o Perú*) had been an electoral campaign slogan in 2006, what mattered in the neoliberal reform project was not the right decision, but the righteousness of politics in the first place and, conversely, the immorality of the radicalized other.

Bypassing democratic conduct was less important than saving the nation. Slogans served as a moral battle cry against an internal enemy manipulated by foreign forces dividing the world into friends and foes. Politics were thus displaced from questions of political choice (contents of decrees) to a choice between “us” and “them,” reigniting profound moral politics and historical conflicts around the internal war in Peru. The moral drama thereby reduced complex politics to a question of selfish behaviour and a neoliberal government willing to act responsibly.

A confidential US embassy communiqué on 5 June, the day of the *Baguazo*, spoke in a similar vein of protests against decrees as “pretexts” for the “larger objectives” of “Reversing Peru’s pro-growth, development-focused anti-poverty strategy and replacing it with a Bolivia-style ‘people’s revolution,’ on the one hand, and on the other ‘destabilizing the García government ... in order to prepare the terrain for anti-system candidates.’”⁹ It thus became the moral duty to intervene quickly, as the dogs in the manger were keeping Peruvians from self-reliance (oil and gas projects stalled). The *Perro del Hortelano* was about internal and foreign forces against the common national good of the country. Just as insurgency had legitimized authoritarianism and neoliberal reform under Fujimori, the *perro de hortelano* polarization intended to legitimize top-down politics and delegitimize indigenous rights and environmental defense as irrational, even fueled by foreign institutions – a political strategy of neutralizing opposition equally seen in neighbouring countries (Bebbington 2009).

The immediate government reaction to the *Baguazo* involved blaming indigenous leadership calls for insurgency and subversive forces as the cause behind violence. A spot by the Ministry of the Interior denounced violence as the consequence of “extremist action against Peru,” leading to “murder, not confrontations,”¹⁰ alongside allegations of a foreign complot. In particular, AIDSESEP, the main national indigenous organization protesting the decrees, was accused of abandoning negotiations and inciting insurrection. The result was the increasingly confined space of the *indio permitido* (Hale 2004) as age-old stereotypes of the *indio* as obstacle to development blended with more recent forms of criminalization and radical alterity. Indigenous leaders present a month earlier at a public meeting where a call for insurgency was made were put under arrest for inciting insurrection. The significance of polarizing slogans hardened as the criminalization of leadership referenced violence, internal war, and national trauma. The president of AIDSESEP, Alberto Pizango, would flee to Nicaragua. Teresita Antazu, a Yanasha leader from the central jungle area, with whom I had conversed regularly, had equally been present in the meeting. As she later told me, “We had to flee ... ‘you can’t stay,’ people told me ... ‘prison would be terrible’ ... ‘but I haven’t done anything’, I told them ... but they convinced me to go into hiding ... ‘maybe it’s the last time ... ’ I told my daughter ... ‘be brave as your mother....’” (Personal interview).

Polarization had real effects. Open democratic debate was replaced by an atmosphere of mistrust and criminalization. Teresita would remain in

hiding for three months in the jungle before the arrest order was eventually dropped.

Social mobilization and n(e)o-liberalism

Alan escucha la patria no se vende. La patria se defende.

(Listen, Allan, the fatherland is not for sale, the fatherland is to be defended.)

Counter-slogan in numerous protests and meetings

I argue here that intensified Amazonian politics, epitomized by the Bagua “event,” can largely be understood from this prism of moral dramatization rather than as a result of structural conflict *per se*. Such dramatization had important effects. Teresita explained it recounting how her grandfather would always say: “Don’t mess with the *indigena*’ ... he’s like a wasp. A wasp hanging around won’t do you anything ... but if you hit out at it, it will attack you ... that’s what my *abuelo* always said, ‘Don’t mess with me’” (Personal communication).

My point is exactly that the moral dramatization was perceived as the government once again “hitting out” at indigenous peoples. Polarization, in other words, backfired, igniting a massive social critique and mobilization across the Amazon, reinterpreting the dog in the manger and the neoliberal reform project as elite arrogance and the replay of centuries-old discrimination. In mid-November 2007 AIDSESEP, the indigenous federation, responded with a letter noting how “we are called ‘dogs in the manger’ for defending the life of our indigenous peoples and protesting against the imposition of external development models responding to the interests of transnationals, wolves dressed up as sheep” (Letter addressed to García, 13 November 2007, my translation).

As one Yaneshá woman, during fieldwork, explained how the slogan was perceived: “García looks with contempt at those who live in the Amazon ... he only thinks there is forest, minerals, oil ... never thought about people living there, only interested in selling, earning ... and he didn’t care about the rest, whether people died, were being killed even if they’d lived there for many years” (Personal interview).

The dog in the manger analogy was reimbued with different meaning; no longer centred on obstacles to economic policy, but around social inequities, discrimination, and mistrust in the merits of liberal economic models. Whereas García’s dog in the manger was about lying idle and obstructing entrepreneurship, the very polarizing nature of the slogan rendered neoliberal prescriptions visible, allowing for what I call “no-liberalism” to take hold.¹¹ “The strikes are totally legitimate,” a former government official noted. “The state isn’t doing anything. There’s a marriage between company and state” (Personal interview). It was no longer merely a question of trade reform, but about Amazonian fundamentals; respect

for indigenous rights, dignity, and territoriality facilitating and legitimizing the unprecedented social mobilization through protests, strike, river and road blockades, and occupation of oil installations. Polarization did not undermine resistance, but in some respects facilitated it by rendering neoliberal reform visible and symptomatic of deeply engrained historical experience of indigenous marginalization. Thus, where the former Minister of the Environment Manuel Pulgar-Vidal summarized the *perro del hortelano* as rendering indigenous peoples invisible,¹² the social effect was in fact the very opposite. As Federica Barclay has noted if it had not been for the presidential articles, the government's intentions would likely have gone unnoticed (Barclay 2009). The polarization effect of neoliberal slogans created a boomerang effect, where counter-slogans and political manifestos helped to foster the emergence of Amazonian politics and collective action.¹³ Counter-slogans such as, "the rainforest is not for sale" were repeated continuously in the marches, as the Amazonian "dogs" bit back through cartoons, web articles, and meetings rejecting decrees as n(e)oliberalism took hold as part of the slogan war.¹⁴ "No" connected to "neoliberalism" and was no longer confined to questions of economic policy. The slogan had become a sign of deep-running structural inequality and discrimination. Such reactions were to be heard across the Amazon. The issue at stake was no longer confined to legal decrees alone, but concerned the land, forests, and natural resources of indigenous peoples at large. This included the massive increase in oil concessions that affected large parts of the Amazon (Finer *et al.* 2008).

Interlude

Aranza, an indigenous woman in the region of Madre de Dios in the Peruvian Amazon, stops her husband on his way out to play football. She explains that she is heading to a meeting with the oil company. "I don't want the company to enter our lands to contaminate," she says as she forces him to sit down. "They'll bring diseases and destroy our forests and culture," she continues. "You wash your own clothes!" She ends their talk.

The scene above is taken from the *Perro de Hortelano*, a prize-winning movie using the neoliberal slogan as its title. It features Aranza together with Brus, a Bora-Huitoto painter, as two indigenous Amazonian protagonists alongside Western volunteers seeking to organize their community against an oil company, "Kenny Oil." The movie shot used a "radical dialogic method" (Beaulieu 2013), was directed by Renzo Zanelli Baretto, and involved indigenous actors from six different groups, Western artists and activists (Zanelli 2010). A former Lehman Brothers stock trader, laid off during the crisis, impersonates the representative of "Kenny Oil" while attempting to lure villagers to agree to exploration. Valbina Miguel, a Yanesha woman from the Selva Central, plays the firm and incorruptible *jefa*, head of the community. Valbina had joined the film crew initially thinking a script was

already written, only to learn that “everyone would make their own story in relation to what was happening on indigenous themes,” as she told me. The dialogic method was used to generate what was perceived as “the most important issue facing the Peruvian Amazon” (Beaulieu 2013). Questions of the decrees and the *perro del hortelano* thus appeared side-by-side as the hot topics of the time. In the movie, for example, Brus finds inspiration in Eduardo Galeano’s *Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent* (Galeano 1973). Polarization and slogan wars were being re-embedded in longstanding Latin American politics of historical rights and wrongs.¹⁵ As Valbina told me in the summer of 2013, reflecting on the film experience:

At that moment the oil theme was what was going on ... at that time I was not a leader. I was just a person ... always thought that I didn’t agree with the company entering ... so in the film I play an *autoridad* that is not in agreement that the company entered. Because ... we didn’t have any knowledge, we hadn’t been well-informed, because it has always been like that ... so I dedicated myself to play that role because at that moment and time I felt I had to do it. I play the *jefe* of a community that does not agree ... It was a person in opposition to the entrance of the company.

By the end of the film, after unsuccessful attempts to bribe and lure *comuneros*, oil representatives are thrown out of the area and jump into the river to escape. Back in Aranza’s home region, in the Selva Central, things were not that simple. A single mother, she had little influence over negotiations taking place with the oil company. Her community, just like the indigenous federation of the Yanesha (FECONAYA), had entered into collaborative agreements, and company officials had conducted seismic exploration rounds in the area without problems. Unlike the neighbouring organizations, FECONAYA had chosen to abstain from participating in the Amazonian protests against the decrees and chosen a dialogue approach for their engagement. Indigenous politics differed in the neighbouring federations. Teresita’s organization, UNAY, comprising both Yanesha and Ashaninka communities, had in turn rejected oil exploration and taken part in organizing protests and roadblocks. As neoliberal slogans were being re-imbued with different meanings, perceptions of their social significance varied. How are we to make sense of the heterogeneous responses?

Vernacularization of slogans in the Selva Central

Allan has ordered COFOPRI [land titling agency] to take away our lands and sell them to the Chileans ... we should rise up.

(Local activist 2008, personal communication)

This section explores – with a particular emphasis on how indigenous federations took up the matter – how slogans were perceived and articulated during fieldwork in the Central Jungle. The area concerned the indigenous Yanasha and Ashaninka communities inhabiting the Pichis, Palcazu, and Pachitea river basins. The section briefly contrasts heterogeneous vernacularizations of slogans and their significance.

Among Ashaninka, in the Pichis valley, the spirit and language of resistance to neoliberal reform would gradually intensify throughout late 2007 and 2008. At the Forty-second Congress of their organization (Puerto Bermudez 2008), ANAP¹⁶ leaders explained to the hall full of *jefes* how they were taking part in the fight against the laws joining the *cumbres* (summits) organized in the region. “Let’s fight for our children,” one leader said. “The Incas lost the gold. Now it’s the fight for the black gold,” he continued as the proposal by the national organization to organize a strike was being debated. Decrees were linked to questions of oil as well as indigenous territoriality. As one Ashaninka leader put it in 2008: “The big ones want to sell out to the transnationals ... that’s what the *gringos* want, that’s what the free trade agreement is about, our government has signed, the state wants to sell our land, water, oil, our air, we are communities, and they want to take what we’ve got left ... it’s our territory, they don’t have forest left in Europe ... now they’re desperate” (Personal communication).

The vernacularized narrative struck a fundamental chord of deep-felt sensations of indigenous marginality, loss of territory and of political power. References were made to eighteenth-century uprisings. Neoliberal remedies were interpreted as another chapter of longstanding histories of colonization and resistance. By the end of the Congress, several decisions were made to take part in the *lucha amazonico* (the Amazonian fight), intensify protests, and paralyze the local economy. The neighbouring UNAY federation, presided over by Teresita Antazu, had equally taken decisions to strike. As roadblocks were organized in 2008 between the ANAP and UNAY, events became crucial in the recognition of a woman indigenous leader:

We coordinated the initial *paro* (strike) together with ANAP, blocking the road, preparing proposals, coordinating with authorities here ... I think communities understood it was a question of values and not trousers ... no? They saw that this woman didn’t run, but remained steering and producing public statements ... In 2009, it was much stronger, people came from all over, “*Señora*, we are with you,” from different places, people backed the protests. On the last day, in *la quinta*, we made a final speech, at the time one law had been derogated ... the *lucha* hadn’t been in vain ... that’s when the *jefes* from Unidad Yanasha and San Jorge stopped and said, ‘We want first of all to greet the *Señora Cornesha*.’ For the first time, I felt so much emotion ... because they were finally recognizing I was a *Cornesha*.

(Personal interview)

While Teresita was a recognized national leader, she had not dared use the title *cornesha*, the title used by Yanéscha men presiding over indigenous organizations.¹⁷ The process nicely illustrated how polarization generated a process of social mobilization and emergent forms of collective action, also at the local level.

Fears quickly spread in Puerto Bermúdez, the main district town, that violence would escalate comparable to the internal conflict and the Asháninka uprising of 1990. As part of the armed internal conflict that affected Peru between 1980 and 2000, the Selva Central was notably between 1988 and 1993 affected by the presence of both the Shining Path (PCP *Sendero Luminoso*) and the MRTA (*El Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru*) insurgents. This had important effects in terms of escalating violence and militarization and transformed governance dynamics. In 1990, a self-declared “Asháninka army” of some two thousand men in a few months drove out MRTA *guerilleros* from the valleys.¹⁸ In some ways, the *uprising* stood as an invisible subscript to questions of politics, power, and indigenous people in the region.

The situation and reactions were different among the neighbouring Yanéscha organized in the *Federación de Comunidades Nativas Yanéscha* (FECONAYA). As counter-slogans and calls for protests to “save the jungle” spread among social movements and indigenous federations, leaders in the FECONAYA called for calm. At the annual congress in 2008, leaders reported back not participating in the *cumbres amazónicas*. “The meetings have been politicized,” the president explained. “Political parties, *frentes de defensa* ... you don’t know whether they are from *coordinadora bolivariano* or FARC,” he added. The president of their national federation, Oseas Barbaran, formulated in terms of “dialogue”: “CONAP doesn’t promote violence, it doesn’t block bridges, the dialogue is halted that way ... we’re for a dialogue” (personal interview, 2008). “The oil company is our ally,” one leader emphasized. “We need private investment,” he added. Slogans and language around “enterprise building” private property were frequently evoked. “We also want companies, we want to be big, have money – and not continue begging,” another representative put it. It was a neoliberal partnership philosophy reflecting individual choice and negotiated agreements between enterprises and communities. For some observers, such emphasis was seen as political buy-in to corporate–government alliances by certain branches of indigenous federations. Their national indigenous federation, CONAP,¹⁹ had in effect signed a cooperation agreement with PeruPetro, and leaders had gone on study tours to extraction sites both home and abroad as well as had signed cooperation contracts locally. Yet, others framed it differently. One Yanéscha leader described himself as “dialogista,” not a “violentista.” A year later, in July 2009, at the fortieth-year celebration of FECONAYA congress, flags were lowered to half-staff to pay tribute to founding leaders and the victims of violence in Bagua. The 2010 head

of the organization, Jesus Colina, would in similar terms note that “We don’t head out in the streets, don’t burn rubber – we function with ILO Convention 169 ... our politics is dialogue” (Personal communication). Yet, it was not the absence of critical politics that explained the Yanesha abstention from “rising up,” but rather its historically embedded nature. Many Yanesha leaders had leaned towards left-wing politics throughout the years (Smith 1994). Yet, accounts of the period of terrorism, where communities confronted growing militarization, and the presence of the insurgents were often fraught with pain and violence – a dark chapter to be left behind. Narratives concerned not only violence inflicted from the outside, but equally tales of youth being co-opted by insurgents and struggles to retain them from joining the ranks. In some communities, at the height of the conflict, schools had been taken over, curriculum being replaced by insurgent training and Marxist–Leninist slogans. Polarized politics had divided indigenous communities both internally as well as their organizational politics. Few Yánesha romanticized the Ashaninka uprising in 1990. The Asháninka suspected both Yánesha and settler involvement with insurgents and entered the valley with the goal of “cleansing” it with highly violent results. Merely reducing Yanesha reactions to political compromise would dismiss or neglect the equally significant process of retreating from polarized politics and slogan wars. This reaction – or rather retraction by opting out of the active conflict – was not merely a pacified indigenous agenda. It reflected a longstanding political non-confrontational culture, and a historical experience of dealing with the contradictions of neoliberalism from within. The question for most representatives was not about choosing sides, but about how politics mattered for everyday development concerns.

Ethnographic data revealed how slogans were imbued with social meaning and vernacularized in distinct ways. Both the *Baguazo* reactions and Yanesha retractions were arguably consequences of and reactions to polarization of slogans: one allowing for the formulation and intensification of social mobilization, the other for retracting from slogan wars. The different forms of vernacularization illustrated how neoliberal slogans were taken seriously as structured meaning rather than empty “form.” We now turn to some concluding remarks regarding the nature, or rather cultural production, of neoliberal slogans.

Conclusion

This analysis has suggested that the importance of slogans should be explained not as “superficial form,” but as vehicles of simplification, polarization, and moralization. Slogans were signs of longstanding (m)oral politics: a dual process of simplifying and rendering complex politics intelligible in everyday language, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, embedding politics morally, socially, and culturally. In this sense, slogans were not

merely superficial epiphenomena, but structuring *dispositifs* rendering politics meaningful and framing the contours of political action. This becomes particularly important and meaningful in the context of neoliberal reform process, which remain highly contested in the Latin American context. As vehicles of simplification, slogans render neoliberal reform tangible and intelligible, creating storylines of past failure and future promise. Moral dramatization and polarization were central properties of the *perro del hortelano* slogan, installing moral choices between “us” and “them” that displaced democratic politics and the need for debate with top-down intervention. Only by taking slogans seriously in ethnographic and anthropological terms can we grasp their social significance.

The analysis points to diverse forms of reception and vernacularization pointing to the complexity of political process, even where top-down simplicity replaces democratic dialogue. Polarization reignited narratives about deep-running structural divides and inequities fueling the escalation of conflict leading to the *Baguazo*. To paraphrase Hernando de Soto, the *Baguazo* epitomized the end of argumentation and the resort to gunpowder. Initial accounts from Bagua spoke of bodies being hidden away, thrown out from helicopters into distant sites. It was a wake-up call that the conflict had escalated to previously unseen levels. This chapter has argued that the social drama cannot be seen in isolation from processes of simplification and polarization preceding it. Neoliberal slogans were instrumental in displacing the need for political debate around reform measures to a question of either-or choices. This, nonetheless, facilitated the social mobilization of Amazonian counter politics, where neoliberal slogans and polarization were “re-signified” as signs of elite arrogance and historical marginalization. When Hernando de Soto, following Bagua, wrote an article titled, “The Amazon is not Avatar,” he sought to disqualify drawing parallels to the Hollywood Avatar counter-narrative of big business against indigenous victims in the Amazon.

Instead, he again promoted another path, rendering “real” property rights accessible to the indigenous poor (de Soto 2010). Yet the attempts to speak “beyond” ideology were, in some respects another equally important chapter in polarizing the ideological and irrational collective “them” against the neoliberal pragmatic “us” addressing the “real” needs of the Amazon. Peruvian society has since then sought to transform politics “after Bagua” through roundtables, reconciliatory measures, and truth reports. Polarized neoliberal politics have taken their toll, leaving a stark contrast between macroeconomic growth and deep-running social inequalities. Ollanta Humala subsequently made social inclusion and *gran cambio* (big change) in both the highlands and lowlands a major presidential campaign topic, using the slogan “honesty to make a difference.” It was no coincidence that reconciliatory language to resolve social conflicts and promises to promulgate a long-debated law on prior consultation²⁰ helped to secure Humala’s election as president in 2011. Yet shifts from polarized politics to the language of social

inclusion were no quick fixes to the underlying tensions between neoliberal policy measures, macroeconomic dependency on extractive industries, and deep-running social inequities. Balancing acts around contentious mining projects, lengthy contested judicial processes following the *Baguazo*, and neoliberal compromise – during Humala’s time in office and more recently under the presidency of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski – all recall that the structural nature of the conflicts is still very much present.

Notes

- 1 This chapter was initially presented at the panel “Slogans and their publics: circulations, contestations, and current engagements with neoliberal policies,” AAA, Chicago, November 24, 2013.
- 2 The American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA).
- 3 The name was taken from Peruvian socialist party founder Mariategui’s maxim that Marxism-Leninism would open the Shining Path: “*El Marxismo-Leninismo abrirá el sendero luminoso hacia la revolución*”
- 4 www.ild.org.pe/publications/books/the-other-path/the-new-preface#sthash.czurpd0L.dpuf, (accessed 1 August 2014)
- 5 The number of days it took de Soto and his team to get official authorization to run a small sewing factory with two Singer sewing machines in Lima. Hernando de Soto. *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
- 6 www.economist.com/node/1559905, (accessed 14 May 2014).
- 7 elcomercio.pe/edicionimpresa/html/2008-07-06/una-apuesta-crucial-siglo-xxi.html, (accessed 14 May 2014).
- 8 www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09LIMA777_a.html (accessed 13/5/14).
- 9 www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09LIMA793_a.html (accessed 15/5/14).
- 10 www.youtube.com/watch?v=JDVgw4pbHEk, (accessed 14/5/2014).
- 11 I call this noliberalism based on a typo in the following quote from Elizabeth Povinelli: “Conceptualizing noliberalism as a series of struggles across an uneven social terrain allows us to see how these heterogenous spaces provide the conditions for new forms of sociality and for new forms of sociality and for new kinds of markets and market instruments (‘or products’).” Elizabeth Povinelli. *Economies of Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in Late Liberalism* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011): 17. Rather than stressing the novelty implied in *neo*-liberalism, the idea of no-liberalism underlines the antagonistic field in the making through highly polarized political debates around market, state and society.
- 12 <http://laprensa.pe/actualidad/noticia-manuel-pulgar-vidal-perro-hortelano-fue-articulo-invisibilizacion-pueblos-indigenas-7558>
- 13 It is telling that concepts of similar “no-liberal” slogans as “vivir bien” are often defined as counterproposals. “Vivir bien sin neoliberalismo” as the Cochabamba declaration from the cumbre social de los pueblos, noted it (*italics added*).
- 14 Similarly, the so-called gas war in Bolivia (2003) was triggered by a presidential proposal to allow foreign corporations to export natural gas, leading to massive protests, among other things claiming “*el gas es nuestro*” (the gas is

- ours) and protests against the *modelo* – eventually leading to the elections of Evo Morales for a critique, see Maria Elena Garcia and José Antonio Lucero, “Un País Sin Indígenas? Rethinking Indigenous Politics in Peru,” in Nancy Grey Postero and Leon Zamosc (eds.), *The Struggle for Indigenous Rights in Latin America* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2004).
- 15 Hugo Chavez, that same year, would hand over a copy of the same book to Barack Obama upon meeting him for the first time.
 - 16 ANAP Apatywaka Nampitsi Asháninka, Ashaninka organization of the Pichis Valley. At the time, the organization was presided over by Hector Santos Lucas.
 - 17 The term was culturally originally used for priest figures, who were at the same time politico-religious leaders. Fernando Santos-Granero, “Los Yanesha,” in Fernando Santos Granero and Frederica Barclay De Rey De Castro (eds.), *Guía Etnográfica De La Alt Amazonía* (4: Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos, 2003).
 - 18 It was a response kidnapping and killing of their leader Alejandro Calderón Chávez by the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) guerillas. An intensive campaign against presumed emertistas was initiated across the valleys eventually taking control of Puerto Bermúdez, Ciudad Constitución and the Palcazu valley. Roads were controlled and sympathizers with MRTA sought out.
 - 19 Among the two national federations, AIDSESEP and CONAP, the latter has in recent years been more active in terms of promoting dialogue with oil companies and the state, whereas the former had taken a more critical stance.
 - 20 Legislation had remained stalled, since it emerged as a reconciliatory measure in the aftermath of the Bagua conflict in 2009.

References

- Allison, Anne and Piot, Charles. 2014. “Editor’s Note on ‘Neoliberal Futures.’” *Cultural Anthropology*, 29, 1, pp. 3–7.
- Amable, Bruno. 2011. “Morals and Politics in the Ideology of Neo-liberalism.” *Socio-Economic Review*, 9, pp. 3–30.
- Barclay, Frederica. 2009. “Un reclamo justo.” *Revista del Instituto de Defensa Legal*, p. 193.
- Beaulieu, Devin. 2013. “El Perro del Hortelano: Producing Activist Film in the Peruvian Amazon,” in James M. Cooper and Christine Hunefeldt eds., *Environment and the Law in Amazonia: A Plurilateral Encounter*. Brighton: Sussex Academic.
- Bebbington, Anthony. 2009. “The New Extraction: Rewriting the Political Ecology of the Andes?” *NACLA Report on the Americas*, 42, 5, pp. 12–20.
- . 2012. “Extractive Industries, Socio-environmental Conflicts and Political Economic Transformations in the Andean Amazon,” in Anthony Bebbington, ed., *Social Conflict, Economic Development and Extractive Industry: Evidence from South America*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Becker, Marc. 2006. “Peruvian Shining Path,” in James V. DeFronzo, ed., *Revolutionary Movements in World History: From 1750 to the Present*. Santa Barbara: ABC CLIO, pp. 650–659.
- Buono, Richard A. Dello and Lara. José Bell, eds. 2007. *Imperialism, Neoliberalism and Social Struggles in Latin America*. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

- Carrier, James G. 2009. "Simplicity in Economic Anthropology: Persuasion, Form and Substance," in Stephen Gudeman ed., *Economic Persuasions*. New York and Oxford: Berghan Publishers.
- Comaroff, John and Comaroff, Jean. 2006. *Law and Disorder in the Postcolony*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- de la Cadena, Marisol. 2001. *The Racial Politics of Culture and Silent Racism in Peru*. Geneva: UNRISD.
- de Soto, Hernando. 2000. *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else*. New York: Basic Books.
- . 2002. "Listening to the Barking Dogs: Property Law Against Poverty in the Non-West," *Focaal*, 41, pp. 179–185.
- . 2010. *The Peruvian Amazon is not Avatar*. Lima: Institute for Liberty and Democracy.
- Durand, Francisco. 2010. "Corporate Rents and the Capture of the Peruvian State," in José Marques and Peter Utting, eds., *Business, Politics and the Public Policy: Implications for Inclusive Development*. UNRISD: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Finer, M., et al. 2008. "Oil and Gas Projects in the Western Amazon: Threats to Wilderness, Biodiversity, and Indigenous Peoples," *PLoS ONE*, 8.
- Galeano, Eduardo. 1973. *Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- García, Alan. 2007a. "El síndrome del perro del hortelano," *El Comercio*, 28 de octubre de 2007.
- . 2007b. "Receta para acabar con el perro del hortelano," *El Comercio*, 25 de noviembre 2007.
- . 2008. "El perro del hortelano contra el pobre," *El Comercio*, 2 de marzo de 2008.
- García, María Elena and Lucero, José Antonio. 2004. "Un país sin indígenas? Rethinking Indigenous Politics in Peru," in Nancy Grey Postero and Leon Zamosc, eds., *The Struggle for Indigenous Rights in Latin America*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press.
- Gorriti, Gustavo. 1999. *The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru*. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Hale, Charles. 2004. "Rethinking Indigenous Politics in the Era of the 'indio permitido,'" *NACLA Report on the Americas*, September/October, pp. 16–37.
- Harvey, David. 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hogue, Emily J. and Rau, Pilar. 2008. "Troubled Water: Ethno-development, Natural Resource Commodification, and Neoliberalism," in *Andean Peru: Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development*, 37, 3/4, pp. 283–327.
- Lopez, J. Humberto and Perry, Guillermo. 2008. *Inequality in Latin America: Determinants and Consequence*. Washington, DC: The World Bank, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, Office of the Regional Chief Economist.
- Margheritis, Ana and Pereira, Anthony W. 2007. "The Neoliberal Turn in Latin America: The Cycle of Ideas and the Search for an Alternative," *Latin American Perspectives*, 34, 3, pp. 25–48.
- Mauceri, Philip. 1995. "State Reform, Coalitions, and the Neoliberal Autogolpe in Peru," *Latin American Research Review*, 30, 1, pp. 7–38.

- Mayer, Enrique. 2009. *Ugly Stories of the Peruvian Agrarian Reform*. Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press.
- Pardo, Pablo Bustamante. 2007. "¿Nos quedaremos sin riqueza nueva?" *El Comercio*, Noviembre 7, 2007.
- Pinker, Annabel and Harvey, Penelope. 2015. "Negotiating Uncertainty: Neo-liberal Statecraft in Contemporary Peru," *Social Analysis*, 59, 1, pp. 15–31.
- Povinelli, Elizabeth. 2011. *Economies of Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in Late Liberalism*. Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press.
- Santos-Granero, Fernando. 2003. "Los Yanasha," in Fernando Santos Granero and Frederica Barclay de Rey de Castro, eds., *Guía Etnográfica de La Alta Amazonía*, 4: Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute & Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos.
- Smith, Richard Chase. 1994. "The Politics and of Diversity: COICA and the Ethnic Federations of Amazonia; Published in Spanish as 'La política de la diversidad: COICA y las federaciones étnicas de la amazonía,'" in Stefano Varese ed., *Pueblos Indígenas y Globalismo*. Quito: Abya Yala.
- Valverde, Jesús Manacés and Calleja, Carmen Gómez. 2010. *Informe en Minoría de la Comisión especial para investigar y analizar los sucesos de Bagua*. Lima.
- Walton, Michael. 2004. "Neoliberalism in Latin America: Good, Bad, or Incomplete," *Latin American Research Review*, 39, 3.

Film

- El perro del hortelano. 2010. (www.perrodelhortelano.com/), Film, 89 minutes.

6 “Work pays”

The moral politics of labour in post-socialist Slovakia

Nicolette Makovicky

In the recent American political television drama *House of Cards*, a Machiavellian southern Democrat by the name of Frank Underwood cheats, lies, and manipulates his way to the United States presidency. Determined to leave a lasting legacy, Underwood launches a new federal jobs programme using the slogan “America Works” (or “AmWorks” for short): telling the American public that they are “entitled to nothing”, he proposes cutting funding for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid in favour of creating 10 million new full-time jobs through federal investment in infrastructure, the private sector, and the military. Government, he declares, would finally serve the American public by “giving them the tools to serve themselves”. Although it is a work of fiction, Underwood’s scheme echoes the moral sentiment of much social policy reform instituted across Europe over the last two decades. In 2002, for example, British prime minister Tony Blair told the public that the Labour Party would deliver the “opportunity for people on benefit to get into work” but would demand “responsibility in return”. A few years later, incoming French prime minister Nicolas Sarkozy declared that his centre-right UMP party was working to build a “France of those who get up early” (“la France de ceux qui se lèvent tout”), and set out to convince French citizens that it was necessary to “work more to earn more” (“travailler plus pour gagner plus”). Despite ostensibly emerging from opposite ends of the political spectrum, both Blair’s and Sarkozy’s governments viewed social policy as a handy tool for the promotion of a flexible labour market and commercial competitiveness, rather than a tool for ensuring the protection of universal entitlements. As such, they embraced the basic tenets of neoliberal government: deregulation, privatization, and the “responsibilization” of the public.

In this chapter, I examine a similar set of neoliberal welfare reforms in Slovakia in January 2004 by the centre-right government of Mikulaš Dzurinda, and the media-led “moral panic” (Cohen 1972) that surrounded subsequent protests by disadvantaged populations in Eastern Slovakia. Promoted under the slogan “Work Pays”, the so-called New Social Policy promised to deliver a “fair” redistribution of public funds by substituting universal welfare for means-tested “work-fare”. Signalling the end of

universal welfare provision, the reforms were initially viewed negatively by the majority of the Slovak citizens. However, the public mood changed dramatically when scattered unrest and rioting began to be reported by the Slovak press. Picking up on this change in public opinion, Dzurinda's cabinet ministers took the opportunity to present themselves as the defenders of the hard-working Slovak citizens: citing press reports that the unrest had been perpetuated by members of Slovakia's Romany community, they ordered the largest deployment of Slovak troops since World War II to the affected areas in a show of strength. Harnessing negative stereotypes of the Roma as uncivilized, work-shy "problem" citizens (Drál' 2008), they constructed a neoliberal notion of responsible citizenship, which revolved around active employment and appealed to popular concepts of labour as a moral virtue. In so doing, they not only presented labour as the crux of the relationship between citizen and state, but citizenship itself as less a birthright than a matter of a social contract – that is, a conditional access to rights (van Baar 2012). Furthermore, by declaring it was time to get Romany citizens "used to working"; they drew the distinction between "deserving" and "undeserving" citizens along ethnic lines. Presenting the undeserving as social pariahs who had forfeited their rights through ostensible laziness, the coalition thereby successfully curtailed any critical, public debate about the wider consequences of the New Social Policy for the Slovak public at large.

Studies of Central and Eastern European social policies have consistently shown how post-socialist health, pension, and welfare reforms have followed a general, European-wide shift away from universalist models towards individualized welfare provision (Cerami 2006, Cook 2013). These developments, they note, have contributed to the (re)production of social inequalities, particularly amongst the already socially and economically marginalized Romany populations across the region (Sigona and Trehan 2009, Vermeersch 2006). Indeed, in the Slovak case, neoliberal technologies of governance aimed at freeing Romany citizens from the "inactivity trap" have in some cases resulted in dehumanizing practices in which they are forced to perform well-established stereotypes of minority behaviour (van Baar 2012: 1290). My aim here, however, is not to add to this already substantial literature on its consequences for the Romany minority. Rather, my interest lies in exploring how Slovak politicians sought to construct legitimacy for such radical policy changes, examining the role played by these stereotypes in the political justification of social-policy reform. Focusing on the slogan "Work Pays," I illustrate the degree to which its formulation relied not only on stereotypes of the Roma as "idle", but it also resonated with vernacular concepts of honest labour, corruption, and laziness shared by the general population. Furthermore, I show how it echoed the earlier discursive coupling of employment and citizenship found in communist-era celebrations of collective labour. Thus, I do not share the view that the governing coalition's frequent use of ethnic stereotypes as an indication that the new "active" welfare regime was aimed primarily at members of the

Roma minority (see Drál 2008). Rather, I argue that their iteration was part and parcel of the coalition's revival of a familiar political trope in a bid to gain popular support for their reforms.

In doing so, I wish to draw attention to three aspects of neoliberalism and its rhetorical style. First, I problematize the commonplace characterization of neoliberalism as a morally bankrupt ideology that promotes a society “in which materialism overwhelms moral commitment” (Stiglitz 2010). Rather, I suggest that the case at hand illustrates how ethics not only supply the justification for neoliberal intervention, but that liberal politics itself operates through the moralization of civic action. In the words of Andrea Muehlebach, neoliberalism combines “the gospel of *laissez-faire*” with a specific type of hypermoralization, creating a state of “moral authoritarianism that idealizes the family, the nation, God or, in the United States especially, right-to-life issues” (2012: 6). While the Dzurinda coalition appealed to notions of productive labour and work ethics rather than to the nation or the Almighty, it too relied on morality for political legitimacy. Indeed, I would argue that the coalition successfully sold the New Social Policy to an otherwise hostile Slovak public precisely by presenting it as a programme of social and moral rehabilitation rather than simply a necessary fiscal reform. Second, I hope to illustrate the ideological promiscuity of political rhetoric (neoliberal, populist, or otherwise). In North America and Europe, neoliberal rhetoric – traditionally associated with the (neo)conservative right in the form of the American Republican Party and Britain's Conservatives under Thatcher – has increasingly infiltrated the political left (Amable 2011). In Central and Eastern Europe, I argue, the picture has been further complicated by the fact that political rhetoric tends to travel more freely across the divide between the Left and the Right, as well as across the ideological and temporal barrier of the end of communism (see Stacul in this volume).

And, finally, by focusing on morality in political rhetoric, I challenge the conventional view that the flourishing of nationalist populisms across the region has primarily been fuelled by the suppression of class politics and the silencing of working-class voices (see Kalb 2009). Rather, I show that under certain circumstances populist essentialism has emerged in collusion with – and not just in opposition to – liberal hegemony. In this case, I argue, the liberal, centre-right government appropriated and rearticulated already-existing populist discourses and ethnic stereotyping within a new (liberal) political logic in order to appeal to a body politic tired of the economic austerity imposed by post-socialist structural reforms. Taking my inspiration from Stuart Hall's (1980, 1985) notion of “authoritarian populism”, I suggest these appeals to popular moralities constituted an effort to construct a populist “common sense” that could be used to justify their political (and military) intervention into society and the economy. The production of this “common sense” entailed the aligning of the values of economic liberalism (enterprise, self-reliance, and freedom from regulation) with the normative values of diligence, decency, and respectability. Indeed, as I show

below, the slogan itself was coined in a way that translated the values of neoliberal political philosophy into the Slovak vernacular: focusing on work (*práca*) as the locus of citizenship, it managed to resonate not only with long-standing political tropes, but also with popular perceptions of labour as the locus of moral subjectivity. Thus, like other slogans in this volume, it worked through what the editors have called a process of “condensation”: it translated neoliberal rhetoric into everyday concepts and language in an attempt to speak directly to individual citizens, as well as to the Slovak “people” as whole. Before elaborating on the theoretical underpinnings of my analysis, however, I start with a brief description of the New Social Policy itself, set against the socio-economic conditions and everyday experiences of my interlocutors at the time.

“Work pays”: The new social policy

The spring of 2004 was a time when many men and women in the city of Banská Bystrica, Central Slovakia, found themselves repeatedly tightening their belts. After five years of “soft” economic policies and increasing political autocracy under the first, post-independence prime minister, Vladimír Mečiar, the general election in 1998 ushered in a succession of unstable, broad coalitions in support of the implementation of stringent market reforms in preparation for European Union membership. Slovakia went from being seen as a politically unreliable “pariah state” (Pridham 2001) to being hailed as the “world’s next Hong Kong or Ireland, i.e. a small place that’s an economic powerhouse” (Forbes 2003). By all conventional measures, Slovakia was enjoying explosive economic development, borne on a wave of radical neoliberal economic reforms that attracted heavy foreign investment. This “second transition” (Krause 2003), however, proved to be a difficult period economically for many ordinary citizens and their families in Bystrica. While large villas with Italian designer kitchens, marble bathrooms, and even swimming pools were being built on the hills surrounding the city, almost a quarter of its inhabitants found themselves without work and facing steep inflation and rising housing costs. The de-nationalization of utilities, infrastructure, and transport in the preceding years had led to a rocketing of the price of living, exacerbated by the introduction of an investment-friendly, single value-added tax (VAT). At the same time, the closure of many local enterprises left men and women to take up employment in retail, hospitality, and construction sectors where the work was often seasonal and the wages low.

In short, as Slovakia neared its entry into the European Union, many people faced an incongruous situation in which their ability to find work and make ends meet diminished as the fortunes of the nation ostensibly improved, and their frustrations and hardships went largely unacknowledged by a government set on meeting the targets of “euro-globalization” (Gille 2009) prescribed by the IMF and the European Union’s *acquis*

communautaire. The stark contrast between the celebratory discourse of Forbes and the hardships experienced by many families was further heightened by reforms of social welfare and the labour market by the centre-right government of Prime Minister Mikulaš Dzurinda. Declaring the popular ideal of a well-developed welfare state economically unsustainable, the coalition introduced a raft of novel policy measures in January 2004 in a package optimistically branded the New Social Policy (*Nová sociálna politika*). Designed to cut the umbilical cord between the state and its citizens by forcing individuals to be “active in resolving his/her problems” (Beblavý 2007: 3), the New Social Policy marked a radical departure from earlier policies of universal social security and collective responsibility. Eligibility for welfare went from being a universal right to becoming dependent on means testing, while child support was redesigned as a tax credit available only to families in which least one adult was in employment. Likewise, the receipt of unemployment benefits became conditional to participation in “activation” programs in the form of voluntary work, community service, or retraining (Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, and the Family 2004).

The introduction of this novel “workfare” regime was accompanied by the adoption of a new moralizing tone by policymakers. Promoted using the slogan “*Pracovať sa opláti*” (literally “It Pays to Work”, or more succinctly, “Work Pays”), the reforms were justified by the suggestion that the generosity of the existing system had created disincentives to work. According to policy documents, high replacement rates in the existing system had “supressed the natural human trait of labour activity” (Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, and the Family 2004: 6), particularly among those sections of the population who lacked “deep-rooted working habits” (Zákon 599/2003). The popular ideal of a well-developed, universal welfare state was not only economically unsustainable, but the “result of value orientations and attitude that were already formed under the old regime” (Szomolányi 1994: 44) – in other words, as a legacy of the paternalism of the communist past. As the minister for social affairs, L’udovít Kaník, explained to the Slovak daily *SME*, the old system of welfare provisioning had been “unfair to all of society” because it had allowed the vulnerable and long-term unemployed to become dependent on welfare at great cost to ordinary, working citizens (Hajdúchová 2004). By making access to benefits dependent on participation in the labour market, the New Social Policy thus promised to distribute benefit entitlements in a more socially and morally equitable fashion. Indeed, the very wording of the slogan “Work Pays” indicated that welfare would now be the “just reward” for those willing to work, rather than a universal right available to all citizens.

The slogan, in other words, encapsulated liberal policymakers’ desire to instil a novel sense of enterprise and self-reliance in the working populace. Andrea Muehlebach (2012) has argued that such “sacralisation of activity” in social policy reflects a wider, post-Fordist reimagination of work as

a good in itself, rather than simply a means to an end. Investigating the neoliberalization of Italian welfare, she notes that changes in social policy have contributed to the emergence of a new, “highly moralized kind of citizenship” that is enacted through participation in various forms of voluntary work and spurred on by a moral imperative to work (on oneself, on others, and for money) (*ibid.*: 7). Although it exhorted citizens to pursue paid employment, rather than unpaid work, the slogan “Work Pays” cogently expressed a similar social bargain by presenting citizenship in terms of a simple, straightforward transaction of welfare for employment or social activation. It also encapsulated the key liberal axioms of self-reliance, self-help, responsibility, and success through application, appealing to similar notions of work as a moral virtue and social good. Indeed, looking at its formulation, it is clear that it was meant to appeal to everyday, common-sense understandings of work as a moral good, rather than simply work as waged labour: there are three terms in Slovak for work: *zamestnanie* (employment), *robota* (labour, often physical), and the more generic term *práca*, which can cover physical, spiritual, and mental labours, paid or unpaid. While the ostensible goal of the New Social Policy was to get men and women into employment, the governing coalition chose to use *práca* for their slogan “*Pracovať sa oplati*”, rather than the somewhat dry and linguistically difficult *zamestnanie*.

In Banská Bystrica that spring, however, such appeals to notions of enterprise and responsibility appeared initially to fall on deaf ears. While politicians and policymakers encouraged individuals to see themselves as masters of their own destiny, the sharply rising living costs and rampant unemployment left people with few tangible assurances that such personal autonomy was profitable or even possible. Contrary to the slogan’s claim that “Work Pays”, the general experience amongst working-class and middle-class citizens in the city was that work did not pay (or at least, did not pay enough). With employment no guarantee of a living wage, people across the city adopted a “portfolio approach” to work in order to make ends meet: teachers offered private tuition, craftsmen and mechanics moonlighted in the evenings and weekends, and others sold handicrafts at local markets, pocketing small amounts of informally earned, untaxed, and unrecorded cash (see Stenning *et al.* 2010). One case in point was that of Zuzana, who worked as a textile technician at the local clothing manufacturer, Slovenka. Specialized in the production of cotton foundation wear, pyjamas, and sportswear, the company was struggling to compete against cheap Turkish and Chinese imports and appeared to be nearing insolvency. Zuzana was no longer receiving her salary every month. In order to secure some extra income, she turned to making and selling handmade craft items in several folk-art outlets in the city and the capital, Bratislava. “She comes home from the factory,” her husband complained, “and works, works, works (*pracuje, pracuje, pracuje*)”.

Despite being exhausted by the endless toil and financial pressures, however, neither Zuzana nor her husband believed there was any use at all in

making their disaffection known through the ballot box. Like many of their fellow citizens, they shared a strong conviction that national politics was driven by a corrupt and thieving elite interested more in lining their own pockets than in providing fair and workable policies for their citizens. My neighbour Veronika also expressed scepticism about the virtues of the political process and the value of further European integration. A single, unemployed mother of two teenagers, she complained bitterly about the consequences of coalition policies on the welfare of her family. Despite her economic hardship, however, Veronika was of the firm conviction that good citizens solved their own problems without recourse to public action: “Only gypsies protest”, she told me. Referring to the widespread stereotype of the Roma as anti-social and work-shy, Veronika’s comment implied that ethnic Slovaks took it upon themselves to work their way out of their financial difficulties, rather than asking for handouts from the state. Noting that “post-1989 politics in East-Central Europe has always been more a politics of resentment than a politics of endorsement”, Don Kalb has observed that Romany groups have often served as the focal point for political disaffection with liberal policies, as well as for nationalist–populist mobilizations, playing the criminalized “ethnic other” to a large section of “struggling citizens in massively declining provincial cities, desperately clinging to the old standards of respectability” (2011: 18). As we shall see below, however, it was the very same cultural clichés and popular sentiments to which Dzurinda’s liberal, centre-right coalition appealed when implementing the New Social Policy that spring.

Populism, Liberalism, Neoliberalism

Much of the recent scholarship on Central and Eastern Europe has documented the manner in which in which neoliberal fiscal and social policy reform in Central Europe has contributed to the social marginalization of those disadvantaged by economic restructuring (e.g. Kideckel 2008; Ost 2005; Stenning *et al.* 2010). The greatest attention has been paid to the working class, which has suffered both material deprivation and cultural dispossession at the hands of the regional political elite and media alike: believed to be indelibly marked by socialist paternalism, blue-collar labour has been declared “civilizationally incompetent” (Sztompka 1996) and represented as “[d]eprived of any responsibility for their own lives and lacking an ‘innate’ entrepreneurialism” (Stenning 2005: 984). Their tendency to express support for right-wing, populist-nationalist political parties is blamed on a reanimation of dormant nationalisms (Tismăneanu 1998), or seen as the characteristic of a post-totalitarian mentality (Klicperová-Baker 1999; Jowitt 1992). Functioning through the “concealment of relationships of class under the rubric of culture” (Young 2007: 72), this “liberal othering” of the working class has transformed problems of structural poverty into a question of cultural (or personal) deficiencies. Indeed, in a highly perceptive

article, Michał Buchowski (2006) argues that such processes of “othering” are appropriated and replicated at all levels of post-socialist society: “a restructuring of the perception of inequalities by the hegemonic liberal ideology” has been responsible for the creation of a “nested” or “domestic” orientalism in which the once “spatially exotic other has been resurrected as the socially stigmatized brother” (Buchowski 2006: 476).

Focusing on the formulation and use slogan “Work Pays”, my aim here is to investigate how such “domestic orientalisms” emerge, and to suggest that they are recognized and mobilized by political actors *across* the social and ideological spectrum. As such, I am sympathetic to more recent readings of the rise of post-socialist political populism – generally identified as right-wing nationalism – as a “defensive response by working-class people to the silences imposed by liberal rule” (Kalb 2009: 207). The proliferation of “culture talk” and the dominance of liberal discourses of self-government, together with the near absence of a viable leftist alternative, have worked to keep discussions of class out of the public debate. Reflecting on these developments, Don Kalb suggests that “nationalist populism is in fact a displacement of experiences of dispossession and disenfranchisement onto the imagined nation as a community of fate, crafted by new political entrepreneurs generating protest votes against neoliberal rule” (2011: 1). And yet, while I agree that academics, politicians, and citizens alike “risk reproducing ethno-national discourses ... by classifying as cultural phenomena issues that can better be seen in terms of class-related experiences” (Bartha 2011: 95), I am weary of defining populism solely in terms of a class-based rejection of (liberal) elites. Neither do I wish to assign populism or nationalism a firm political constituency. Rather, I would argue that if Buchowski’s nested orientalism constitutes a vernacular form of “liberal othering”, and nationalist populism can be understood as the result of a frustrated class dynamic, then the formation of post-socialist, populist essentialisms emerge *both in opposition to and in collusion with* liberal hegemony.

Indeed, the strategic uses of nationalist and anti-minority sentiments by parties across the political spectrum has already led political scientists to call populism a “characteristic, rather than an identity” of the Slovak political scene (Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2009). After independence in January 1993, two successive governing coalitions (1994–1998) led by the nationalist-populist prime minister Vladimir Mečiar and his HZDS party were characterized by the widespread infringement of minority rights and harassment of the press, as well as rampant corruption. The HZDS portrayed the country’s substantial Hungarian minority as a fifth column prepared to undermine the sovereignty of the Slovak state. Meanwhile, Jan Slota, the leader of Mečiar’s right-wing nationalist coalition partner the Slovak People’s Party (SNS), repeatedly expressed xenophobic and inflammatory comments about the Romany minority. Slovakia’s subsequent exclusion from the first round of negotiations toward European Union membership in 2004 did little to dent the HZDS’s popularity among voters. However, it

did render the party “un-coalitionable”, paving the way for two centre-right coalitions (1998–2006) led by Mikulaš Dzurinda of the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ) after the 1998 elections. Despite their dedication to economically and politically liberal policymaking, the prevalence of anti-Hungarian and anti-Roma sentiments continued to cause friction within the coalition, as well as with their European neighbours (Strážay 2005). Indeed, while the centre-left Direction (SMER) party won a decisive victory in the 2006 general elections, campaigning on socio-economic themes, the national question found its way in through the back door when they subsequently formed a coalition with the HZDS and SNS (Haughton and Rybar 2008).

Given the changing fortunes of the Slovak Right and Left in the mid-2000s, and their complex relation to pre-existing national populist discourses, I choose here to operate with a formal, rather than a substantive, definition of populism. There is increasing recognition that populism is “neither a set of particular ideological contents nor a given organizational pattern, but rather a discursive logic” (Stavrakakis 2004: 256) that can be employed by parties across the entire political spectrum (Canovan 1999, 2004). Defining populism as a particular mode of articulating ideological content that constructs an “internal divide” between the “people” and a negatively conceived power bloc, Ernesto Laclau (2005a) suggests that such ideological promiscuity is enabled by the openness of populist discourse itself. Crucially, Laclau distinguishes between interpellations that create class subjects and those that constitute the popular subject: the construction of the “internal divide” depends less on class politics than on the successful deployment of a “logic of equivalence” in which diverse political demands are aggregated and subsumed under a single demand or “empty” signifier. The symbolic poverty of populist discourse, in turn, leaves it open to “the pressure of contradictory articulating attempts” (Laclau 2005b: 41) by both subaltern and hegemonic groups, and reflects the fact that articulation itself relies on “the existence of non-class contents ... which constitute the raw material on which class ideological practices operate” (Laclau 1977: 161). Yet, if, as Laclau claims, populist themes are ideologically neutral and populisms are *not* an expression of class subjectivities held a priori, then both the relationship between existing political themes and emerging populist discourse, as well as the link between class politics and popular interpellation, remain theoretically opaque (Mouzelis 1978; Stavrakakis 2004; Žižek 2006).

Examining the particular nature of the Slovak process of neoliberalization, however, delivers a starting point for unravelling the country’s shifting populist articulations of class and ideology. Bolstered by the country’s near miss at European Union membership, as well as by a fractious political environment that frustrated the “translation of social opposition into a credible political opposition”, Dzurinda’s two coalition governments enjoyed a certain measure of insulation from social and political pressures, which allowed swift implementation of painful fiscal and social reforms (O’Dwyer and

Kovalčík 2007: 3–8). Having gained and retained their position by virtue of party politics rather than through the ballot box, however, they suffered a fundamental lack of legitimacy in the eyes of a large proportion of the voting public. Indeed, just as the “Roma riots” were being played out, public disaffection had become so widespread that Robert Fico of the centre-left SMER successfully petitioned for a referendum on early elections to be held simultaneously with the April presidential election. Although Fico’s attempts to oust the leading coalition proved premature, they did indicate the tentative re-emergence of conventional left-right class politics in Slovakia. Despite these shifts, however, the language of class remained conspicuously absent in both the public and political debate following the “Roma riots” in February 2004 – a debate that focused instead on a discourse on responsible citizenship. Indeed, after its uptake by the Slovak media, this discourse became refracted through the categories of ethnicity and nationhood, leading to the alignment of a liberal rhetoric of “responsibility” and “self-help” with existing popular stereotypes of the Romany as idle, antisocial, and even violent “welfare scroungers”.

Appropriating Laclau’s notion of articulation, Stuart Hall and colleagues (1978) have offered a comparative example of how race and ethnicity can become the vehicle for populist interpellation. In this study of the rise of law-and-order discourse in Thatcherite Britain, the researchers examine a series of “moral panics” around issues of race, sexuality, and criminality. They note that the media played a crucial role in creating a popular consensus on social issues by selecting “newsworthy” items and coding them into the “particular language form” of the “public idiom” (Hall, Crichter, Jefferson, Clarke, and Roberts 1978: 61). Social evils were reformulated within “the context of an old problem with which the public was already familiar” (Hall *et al.* 1978: 232), giving already well-known social problems a new status as social threats by casting them in the light of recent events. Such “convergences” they claim, constituted the translation of “formal official references and interpretations into the terms of ordinary everyday conversation” (Hall *et al.* 1978: 62). By creating a link between official and popular discourses, in short, the media was pivotal to the creation of a populist “common sense”. These moral panics became a mode of populist enlistment symptomatic of a shift in class politics from a consensual to a coercive dynamic. Coining the term “authoritarian populism”, Hall sought to capture the mechanism through which political elites (right *and* left of centre) manufactured popular support by presenting particular groups as a threat to the moral order, ultimately leading to “a dominative and ‘authoritarian’ form of democratic class politics – paradoxically, apparently rooted in ... populist discontents” (Hall 1985: 118). Unlike Laclau, then, Hall made a clear distinction between “the genuine mobilization of popular demands” and a top-down “populist” mobilization that, at a certain point in its trajectory “flips over or is recuperated into a statist-led political leadership” (Hall 1985: 118).

In the following, I translate Hall's notion of "authoritarian populism" into the Slovak context and here suggest that the moral panic created around the Romany as a security concern constituted not simply a form of "othering" by liberal elites, but was also employed as a political tool aimed at mobilizing labour to the liberal cause, even while it was ensuring its exclusion. Encapsulated in the government slogan "Work pays" (*Pracovat sa oplati*), this mobilization worked through an appeal to the "moral calculus of labour" (Hall *et al.* 1978: 142), which posited welfare as a system of "just rewards" for those willing to work, while constructing the Romany as social deviants seeking to defraud the nation-state. In short, I argue that in the particular context of the "Roma riots", the "liberal othering" of the Romany minority was itself a form of populist appeal. I start, however, by mapping out the contours of a different, competing populist narrative as it circulated among working-class and middle-class citizens of Banská Bystrica that spring of 2004: the discourse of dispossession as "theft". Showing how this "theft" figured in the way skilled workers, teachers, librarians, and low-level administrators experienced and spoke about liberalization, I argue that the term blurred the distinction between privatization and corruption becoming a powerful political weapon for opposition figures such as Robert Fico.

"Stealing" and "honest labour": Everyday heroes and popular "folk devils"

Milan, an electrician in his late fifties, took a philosophical view of the economic difficulties of his fellow citizens: "Democracy! People think that means they can do what they want, but actually it means strict discipline". Milan was already in his forties when he lost his job at the electronic goods manufacturer TESLA after the Velvet Revolution, but he managed to beat the odds of falling into long-term unemployment by finding work in the regional archives. Unaware of his luck – or perhaps only too aware of it – Milan often lamented the state of the nation's workforce and told me: "You know, people nowadays expect to do no work and money to fall from the sky". Idleness, diligence, and corruption were themes that came up regularly in my everyday conversations with men and women that spring of 2004. Like Milan, many of my acquaintances not only regarded the recent fiscal reforms as revealing the true nature of liberal democracy, but liberal democracy as revealing the true natures of their fellow citizens: On the one hand, the protection of idle workers afforded by the socialist policy of full employment had disappeared, supposedly constructing a new meritocracy that rewarded enterprise and effort. On the other, the widespread corruption that had pervaded the privatization process in the 1990s led some to regard market democracy as having opened the floodgates to practices of insider dealing and asset stripping. Indeed, while he considered hard work a virtue,

Milan was convinced that “no one can become rich today without having stolen something [*bez kradnutia*]”.

In Banská Bystrica that spring, the verb *kradnúť* (to steal) was used often, and had many complex meanings and connotations. In its most straightforward form, *kradnúť* covered petty thefts and pilfering, an activity associated specifically with the city’s Roma population. The Roma, I was told by my otherwise open-minded and mild-mannered teacher friend, Jana, would “steal the bulbs out from under the heads of tulips”. Brushing away my protestations at this uncharitable characterization of her fellow citizens, she patiently explained to me that as a foreigner I could not know that thievery was simply “in their nature”. Convinced that a local Romany family was to blame for the mysterious disappearance of a proportion of the fruits and vegetables she grew on her domestic plot, Jana adhered to the common belief that Romany families chose to scrape a living from welfare benefits and the produce of their rural neighbours, rather than seeking employment (Scheffel 2005). In February 2004, reporting of the “Roma riots” was taken by many to be a confirmation of these stereotypes. Indeed, they caused great anxiety among members of the local public administration. Sharing a cup of coffee with the mayor of the village of Staré Hory a few kilometres outside of the Banská Bystrica city limits on a cold February day, we were interrupted by a municipal worker who told us a villager had called to let them know a group of Roma had been seen loitering near a pile of scrap. Assuming a theft was under way, the mayor hastily grabbed his coat and hat and ran out of the office, muttering his apologies.

“Stealing”, however, was also common parlance for corruption. It covered a diverse range of illegal activities, including blackmail (*vydieranie*), bribery (*úplatok*), clientelism (*klientelizmus*), embezzlement (*sprenevera*), and fraud (*podvod*). A permanent feature of the Slovak political landscape in the 1990s, corruption took multifarious forms, from the “misappropriation or embezzlement of public resources for private gain, taking kickbacks in public procurement, accepting commissions for awarding public tenders” to “establishing bogus companies to strip assets from publicly owned firms, composing legally unenforceable or “mined” contracts, home improvement fraud, car repair fraud, and tax frauds” (Ivantyšin and Sičáková 1999, quoted in Pawelke 2010: 5). While the prevalence of such practices was ostensibly on the decline as a result of the Dzurinda government’s anticorruption drive, the public’s ire continued to be incited by a constant flow of new cases reported in newspapers and weeklies, often including pictures of the large villas, automobiles, and holiday homes of the accused. Such journalism not only reinforced the sense that these luxuries were gained through illegitimate means, but that they were appropriated at the expense of the taxpayer. Reporting on the lack of transparency surrounding the sales of and tenders for property from the National Property Fund (*Fond národného majetku*), one reporter wryly observed that a “poor state” is a “real blessing” because

“where there is nothing even the cleverest person cannot steal” (quoted in Fialová 2007: 12).

The use of theft as an umbrella term for fiscal malfeasance conveyed the degree to which the ordinary Slovak citizen experienced the process of liberalization as riddled with corruption. For some, this impression of rampant wrongdoings acted to blur the distinction between the liberalization of state assets and the incentives offered foreign investors and multinationals wishing to establish themselves in the country: “We are losing our factories,” Veronika told me. “The people who emptied the companies are now rich, they got rich at our expense, they stole from us. And now foreign companies are coming in [building factories] and using us as cheap labour”. Although Veronika’s use of *stealing* echoed Milan’s reference to corruption, the term also revealed the degree to which she felt foreign capital presented a threat to labour: using the term cast privatization as an act of “dispossession of assets from worker constituencies and their subsequent transfer to the hands of the states and the global market ... beyond the control of the asset’s moral proprietors” (Kalb 2009: 213). Indeed, her notion that the nation’s factories were “stolen” by a cosmopolitan elite, turning workers into “cheap labour”, for foreign investors spoke of her experience of liberalization as a symbolic proletarianization of the workforce. While “theft” became refracted through the category of class, Veronika’s recourse to the categories of “us” and “them” bent the language of class into the language of nation: regarding the Slovak citizen as the rightful proprietor of the nation’s assets, Veronika constructed the entire Slovak nation as “a community of fate” suffering a grievous injustice.

“Theft,” writes Don Kalb, is “a motive in populist narratives par excellence” (2009: 213), and Veronika’s comment exhibited the trademark characteristics of populist logic in its absolute distinction between the Slovak populace as a collective of hard-working citizens and a corrupt, cosmopolitan elite. Milan’s and Veronika’s statements populated each side of this “internal frontier” (Laclau 2005a): on the one hand, were the “everyday heroes” – ordinary working citizens struggling to make ends meet – and, on the other, a series of “folk devils” in the varying guise of corrupt politicians, devious businessmen, and pilfering Roma, who by luck or stealth had appropriated capital and assets previously in the hands of individual citizens or the nation-state. Pandering to such sentiments in early February 2004, Robert Fico of the centre-left party SMER accused the sitting coalition of implementing unsustainable socio-economic reforms without a public mandate, resulting in “price rises, privatization, corruption, and clientelism” (quoted in Fialová 2007: 28). Prone to using corruption as a synonym for processes of privatization, Fico employed the issue to attack the Dzurinda government. In the 2002 general elections, SMER posted a billboard campaign declaring, “As they stole under Mečiar so they steal under Dzurinda” (*Ako sa kradlo za Mečiara, tak sa kradne za Dzurindu*). Fico campaigned on a promise to bring stability, justice, and order (*poriadok*) to government – a message reinforced

by the production of a television advertisement emulating a commercial, in which two soiled T-shirts emblazoned with pictures of Mečiar and Dzurinda were bleached a sparkling white by Fico, wielding a box of washing powder named “*Majster Poriadok*” (Master Order or Master of Order).

At the same time as the wealth of the elites was branded illegitimate, the efforts of the ordinary working public to make ends meet under difficult economic circumstances became normatively loaded with notions of “decency”, “respectability”, and – as Milan described it – “discipline”. People felt that not only waged labour and local industry, but also everyday domestic practices were under threat. A month before Slovakia’s entry into the European Union, confusion arose about whether the harmonization of agricultural laws and food hygiene would apply in equal measure to the industrial and the domestic cultivation of foodstuffs. Men and women in Banská Bystrica worried about the possibility that domestic production might be criminalized for noncompliance. Life without a *zahrada* (literally “garden”) was inconceivable to most families in the city, who headed out to plots of land beyond the city boundaries or back to cottages in their ancestral villages to grow and harvest their own fruits and vegetables. They shared boxes of fresh produce, homemade pickles, juices, marmalades, and plum brandy amongst kin, and for some struggling households in the urban centre these boxes constituted an important part of the family’s staple diet (cf. Acheson 2007, Smith *et al.* 2008). More importantly, however, the *zahrada* symbolized the integrity of the household by constituting a symbolic gesture towards a deep-seated ideal of self-sufficiency. As my friend, Anna, a retiree in her early 60s, told me: “I – as a housekeeper – realize myself in that I process what I have grown, set it aside and in the winter I don’t need to go to the shop; I have enough”.

Writing about concepts of “work” in rural Central Slovakia, Josef Kandert (2004) notes that during socialism, a high value was placed on physical labour and the demonstration of constant productive activity, particularly in areas outside the state economy and primarily in the domestic plot. Over and above their performance in their place of employment, such activities were the measure of a person’s social worth in the eyes of their peers (see Lampland 1995, Pine 2002 for parallels). Having migrated from a distant village to the city in the early 1970s in search of factory work, Anna confessed she had never been able to rid herself of the rural imperative that a household should reproduce itself on the basis of its own resources. Tending to her plot and processing the fruits and vegetables she grew there gave her a sense of independence from the vagaries of the marketplace. More importantly, however, it served as an expression of her belief in the existence of a certain moral calculus of labour in which security and leisure were the rewards for diligent application. Indeed, if the New Social Policy appeared to operate with a “presumption of laziness”, assuming citizens needed to be incentivized into work, the “moral calculus of labour” shared by my interlocutors operated

with a “presumption of diligence”, casting suspicion on anyone unable or unwilling to demonstrate a determination to get by on the fruits of their own labour. Thus, the notion that liberalization constituted a form of dispossession, then relied not simply on Fico’s demonization of the ruling coalition as “thieves”, but also on the popular perception that wealth could not be built on the humble rewards of “honest labour”: both the politicians and the nouveaux riche they courted were seen as having gone against the “moral calculus of work” in successfully having “acquired by speed, stealth, fraudulent or shorthand methods what the great majority of law-abiding citizens can only come to through arduous toil, routine, expenditure of time” (Hall *et al.* 1978: 142).

If one reflects upon Anna’s pride in her self-sufficiency, Zuzana’s desperate attempts to supplement her income through craftwork, and Veronika’s lamentation over the death of domestic industry, it becomes clearer how the slogan “Work Pays” (as well as discourses of “theft”) had the potential to resonate with the Slovak public. The perception of what constituted “real work” undertaken by “decent” citizens thus reflected both the pragmatism of those forced to supplement their insufficient wages (or welfare) with extra work, and the existing normative values that celebrated physical labour, as well as evidence of thrift and self-sufficiency. Despite the widespread moral condemnation of corruption (and, for some, liberalization), such “real work” cut across the division between the “official” and “informal” economies and modes of employment. It is against this background that Veronika’s comment that “only gypsies protest” should be understood: With the line between “honest work” and “scrounging” drawn so tightly around the notion of the self-sufficient, labouring person, calls to make the welfare of vulnerable communities the collective burden of society made the Roma an easy target for moral condemnation. Indeed, as Michael Stewart (1997) has argued, it was the opposition between a peasant “work ethic of self-sufficiency” and the Roma notions of the good life that historically determined relations of mutual suspicion and distrust between the groups. As we shall see below, different shades of this historically entrenched discourse reverberated through the public and political debate surrounding the so-called Roma Riots that spring of 2004 – lending credence to both Veronika’s statement and the coalition’s declaration that radical intervention into social and labour market policy was needed to “make work pay”.

The “Roma Riots”: Citizenship, labour, and moral politics

In early February 2004, the Slovak small press began to report on public unrest in towns across economically depressed regions of eastern Slovakia. As the impact of the New Social Policy began to be felt by receivers of social welfare and unemployment benefits, a series of small-scale, peaceful (and largely unreported) protests by citizens took place across the region. The demonstrations only gained the media spotlight when a group of

angry Romany citizens reportedly looted a shop in the city of Levoča on 12 February, citing hunger and destitution. Disproportionately represented among the ranks of the unemployed, Romany families were especially hard hit by the fall of welfare payments. Over the next fortnight, a number of copycat incidents took place, sparking alarmist newspaper headlines emphasizing the threat of violence, plundering, and destruction. Peaceful demonstrations in some areas thus became discursively linked to antisocial behaviour in other locations through the media-generated label the “Roma riots” (Drál 2008). The Dzurinda government reacted by mobilizing 1,000 soldiers and 1,600 police officers in an effort to restore public order: while visiting the eastern Slovak city of Košice, Dzurinda stated that the state authorities would “make use of any legal tools to punish violence so that people could feel safe” (SITA 2004). They also gave the media’s ethnic inflection of the events public affirmation. Thus, the interior minister, Vladimír Palko, referred to the protests as “the Roma unrest” in an interview on television channel TA3 (quoted in Drál’ 2008: 106).

As the media coverage of protests, lootings, arrests, and unrest multiplied, two distinct camps emerged in the media spotlight. Voices of opposition from the Roma community and the third sector pointed to discrimination, impoverishment, and structural poverty as the root of the problem and urged a redrafting of the reforms. They argued that the recent cuts in welfare payments would exacerbate the social and economic marginalization already affecting many Romany communities and individuals. “The ring-leader of these lootings is hunger, and he is a formidable force”, remarked the chairman of the Slovak Roma parliament poetically. “We do not want to loot, we do not want to steal, we want to work and be decent citizens of the state” (*Pravda* 2004). Members of the ruling coalition, however, denied that the reforms had created real need. Mikulaš Dzurinda told reporters that Roma families had been “speculating on the welfare system” (Maryniak 2004). The unrests, he hypothesized, had been staged by Roma loan sharks who had previously made a profitable business lending cash against regular benefit payments (Fisher 2004). Likewise, Ludovít Kaník declared the roots of the problem as being the Roma’s “decade long habit of living on benefits” (in Drál 2008). With such statements, coalition members lent official credence not only to the notion that the unrests were perpetrated primarily by Romany citizens, but also to popular stereotypes of the Roma as work-shy and prone to criminality. Indeed, making good use of the public anxiety and moral approbation triggered by the unrests, the coalition managed to present themselves as being firmly on the side of the majority – decent, hard-working (and Slovak).

The coalition’s image of the Roma as “welfare scavengers”, however, was more than a reanimation of an old cultural stereotype within the framework of neoliberal policymaking. It also constituted a revival of a well-worn political trope, namely the so-called “gypsy problem”. Shorthand for the perceived “backwardness” of Romany culture, the concept originally emerged out of the

efforts of the post-World War II Czechoslovak Communist Party to improve the socio-economic conditions of minority communities. In accordance with their Marxist–Leninist ideology, party officials regarded the predicaments of the Roma as rooted in class oppression. The development of capitalist modernity, they argued, had deprived Romany groups of their traditional occupations and had led to their social and economic marginalization by the Slovak peasantry (McCagg 1991; Barany 1994). It was this, they reasoned, that lay at the root of their ostensible aversion to wage labour, and their propensity for dealing and profligacy. Communist Party policy, in other words, treated the “gypsy problem” as a question of labour, rather than race or ethnicity. Consequently, state-socialist policies prescribed the assimilation of Roma citizens into mainstream society through their incorporation into the workforce. It was thought that the morally elevating powers of socialist labour would rid them of their “anti-social traits such as begging, stealing, dishonesty and above all laziness” (Stewart 1990: 142). Indeed, as Michael Stewart notes with respect to the case of the Hungarian Roma, there was an “ideological importance attached to ‘getting the Gypsies used to working’” (1990: 145): it was thought that participation in the collective “building of socialism” would provide the Roma with a positive education in communist citizenship.

The remarkable discursive symmetry between state-socialist discourses of integration and the pronouncements of coalition politicians in the wake of the “Roma riots” reveals the degree to which both communist policymakers and post-socialist liberal reformers conceived of labour as an appropriate disciplinary tool. The similarity, I would argue, was more than merely rhetorical. During state-socialism, work was the “activity which constituted one as a full member of society” (*ibid.*: 142). Undertaking socially productive work was not simply a right, it was an obligation. Employment thus differentiated the citizen from the “parasite”, the socialist subject from the abject. By making access to welfare dependent on participation in the labour market, The New Social Policy once again placed work in the centre of the relationship between the citizen and the nation-state. Forcing the long-term unemployed into various “activation programmes”, the New Social Policy operated with much the same categories of social and ethnic inclusion and exclusion. Participating in such programmes not only secured a citizen’s right to minimal benefits by demonstrating their willingness to labour, but allowed “ostensibly dependent citizens to purchase some sort of social belonging” while radically reconfiguring their citizenship rights (Muehlebach 2012: 9). Thus, unlike state-socialist policy, which regarded not only the duty to work but also citizenship as a birthright, the New Social Policy reconfigured citizenship into a matter of social contract – that is, a conditional access to rights (van Baar 2012). Indeed, beyond permitting the state to cut welfare in anticipation that the unpaid labour of citizens could fill the gaps, the overtly discriminatory nature of the public debate surrounding the reforms filtered this new concept of “ethical” citizenship through categories of race and culture.

Reading the New Social Policy in the light of the subsequent “Roma riots”, Slovak sociologist Peter Drál’ has argued that it was Romany citizens who were the primary target of Dzurinda’s New Social Policy (2008; see also Marušák and Singer 2009). I would suggest that the coalition’s construction of these ideologically informed, essentialized images of the Roma as “welfare scavengers” was more than a case of institutionalized racism. Rather, it formed part of a wider attempt to translate the values and rhetoric of liberal policies into the vernacular categories, concepts, and terminologies of the voting public. Centred on the word “work” (*práca*), the “public idiom” used to discuss the “Roma riots” mobilized a set of vaguely defined – and yet socially meaningful – notions of “decency”, “fairness”, “responsibility”, and “honest labour”. Statements like “No one can help the Roma, if they refuse to help themselves” (Ľudovít Kaník, quoted in Hajdúchová and Filipko 2004) acted to construct a conceptual link between the social values of self-help, responsible behaviour, good citizenship, and employment. The image of the Roma “welfare scavenger” as “folk devil” (Cohen 1972), in other words, constituted the reanimation of an old stereotype within the particular framework of neo-liberal political and economic philosophy. To use Stuart Hall’s terminology, the racialization of the public idiom led to a “convergence” between negative ethnic stereotypes of Romany citizens and the figure of the antisocial, irresponsible “welfare scavenger”, while at the same time elevating the majority Slovak population into the position of the righteous majority.

Animated by the iteration of well-known phrases (“getting the Roma to work”) and linguistic tropes (“theft” versus “work”), this particular convergence opened up official statements about the reform to some interesting slippages of meaning. In November 2004, for example, Ľudovít Kaník declared the reforms a success, noting that particularly those programmes targeting minority Roma communities had radically changed the municipal environment: “It is cleaner, the long-term unemployed are getting used to working (*získavajú pracovné návyky*), and are being socialized” (quoted in Hajdúchová 2004). His use of the vernacular *práca* signalled that these activation schemes were not simply shoehorning Roma citizens into a job, but actually *teaching them how to work*. In doing so, Kaník cleverly absolved himself from any responsibility for the actual employment of persons participating in such schemes by his intimating that the programs themselves would instil in them the appropriate work ethic and moral fibre to seek out employment. Indeed, by repeatedly asserting that welfare dependency, social protest, and unrest were Roma problems, Dzurinda and Kaník effectively worked to curtail any critical public debate about the consequences of the welfare reform on other disadvantaged groups of the population, such as pensioners, young families, or unskilled workers stranded in now-defunct one-company towns. The construction of social unrest as a “Roma problem”, in other words, secured the translation of a political issue into an ostensibly unpolitical matter of criminal behaviour, absolving the political elite from any responsibility in its creation.

Conclusion

In recent years, studies of class, politics, and socio-economic change in Central and Eastern Europe have fallen largely into two camps. The first – emerging largely from the post-socialist environment itself – has declared large sections of the population “civilizationally incompetent” and has read their attraction to populist nationalism as a symptom of this civic immaturity. The second strand of scholarship regards such characterizations as a form of representational violence rendered by the hegemony of liberal political and economic reason onto those disadvantaged by socio-economic restructuring. In turn, they posit the flourishing of nationalist populisms as a response to the silencing of working-class voices and suppression of class politics caused by such “liberal othering”. Emphasizing the exclusionary nature of the dominant liberal discourse, they reveal the affinity between local discourses of inequality and the general loss of popular sovereignty under neoliberal globalization. They have less to offer, however, in terms of explicating how a liberal hegemony is constructed, or its relation to existing, populist discourses. Furthermore, they tell us little about the specific mechanisms through which liberal elites seek (and gain) the support of the general public, or the political and historical conjunctures that colour hegemonic discourses with local meaning and symbolism. Indeed, as Buchowski’s concept of “domestic orientalism” indicates, the hegemony of liberal discourse in Central Europe has been achieved primarily through its successful replication across the social and political spectrum.

By focusing on the government-coined slogan “Work Pays” and situating it within the populist discourses and popular stereotypes that circulated in Slovakia in the spring of 2004, I have sought to shed some light on this process. As such, my interest here has been less in examining the public circulation, iteration, or manipulation of the slogan itself, and more focused on understanding what its formulation can tell us about how political rhetoric is employed to put neoliberal tools and rationales to work in the post-socialist context. Making use of discursive theories of populism, I started by showing how both Slovak politics and everyday discourse at the time were characterized by two competing populist narratives articulated through interrelated discourses of “work” (*práca*) and “theft” (*kradež*). I then showed how Robert Fico, the leader of the centre-left party, SMER, made use of popular notion of liberalization as “theft” to bolster his popularity against an unpopular ruling centre-right coalition, while the Dzurinda coalition appealed to “common sense” values of “work”, “responsibility”, and “decency” in order to justify the implementation of stringent welfare reform. As such, I argue that the neoliberal discourse of “workfare” – and the slogan that was meant to encapsulate and market it to the population (“Work Pays”) – did not simply emerge in a social and political vacuum to become hegemonic political discourse. Rather, they appeared precisely at a time when concepts of “work”, and its complimentary opposite, “stealing”,

marked out the ideological battleground between neoliberal reformers, a centre-left opposition, and a disgruntled public who felt their jobs and livelihoods were under threat from processes of privatization and fiscal austerity.

References

- Acheson, Julianna. 2007. "Household Exchange Networks in Post-Socialist Slovakia". *Human Organization*, 66(4), pp. 405–413.
- Amable, Bruno. 2011. "Morals and Politics in the Ideology of Neo-liberalism". *Socio-Economic Review*, 9(1), pp. 3–30.
- Bartha, Eszter. 2011. "Because It Can't Make Me Happy that Audi Is Prospering": Working-Class Nationalism in Hungary After 1989. In Don Kalb and Gábor Halmai, eds., *Headlines of Nation, Subtexts of Class: Working-Class Populism and the Return of the Repressed in Neoliberal Europe*, pp. 92–112. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Barany, Zoltan. 1994. "Living on the Edge: The East European Roma in Postcommunist Politics and Societies". *Slavic Review*, 53(2), pp. 321–344.
- Beblavý, Miroslav. 2006. "The Political Economy of Comprehensive Social Policy Reform and Emergence of a Social Policy Paradigm: The Case of Slovakia". SSRN <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2403770>.
- Buchowski, Michał. 2006. "The Spectre of Orientalism in Europe: From Exotic Other to Stigmatized Brother". *Anthropological Quarterly*, 79(3), pp. 463–482.
- Burgermeister, Jane. 2004. "Roma Face Starvation in the Slums of Slovakia". *The Observer*, 29 February.
- Canovan, Margaret. 1999. "Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy". *Political Studies*, 47(1), pp. 2–16.
- . 2004. "Populism for Political Theorists?" *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9(3), pp. 241–252.
- Cerami, Alfio. 2006. *Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe: The Emergence of a New European Welfare Regime*. Berlin: Lit Verlag.
- Cohen, Stanley. 1972. *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of Mods and Rockers*. London: Routledge.
- Cook, Linda. 2013. *Postcommunist Welfare States: Reform Politics in Russia and Eastern Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Drál', Peter. 2008. "Symbolic Processes of Social Exclusion of Roma in Slovak in Public Policy Discourse". *Etniškumo Studijos*, 2008(1–2), pp. 85–115.
- Fialová, Zuzanna. 2007. *Korupcia vo verejnej diskusii 1996–2007*. Bratislava: Transparency International Slovensko.
- Fisher, Ian. 2004. "Raslavice Journal; Where Gypsy Life Gets Harder, the Bitterness Boils Over". *New York Times*, 1 March.
- Gille, Zsuzsa. 2009. "The Tale of the Toxic Paprika: The Hungarian Taste of Euro-Globalization". In Melissa Caldwell (ed.) *Food and Everyday Life in Postsocialist Eurasia*, pp. 97–128. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Hajdúchová, Andrea. 2004. "Ministerstvo: Reforma má pozitívny efekt aj na Rómov". *SME*, 26 November.
- Hajdúchová, Andrea, and Richard Filipko. 2004. "Rómovia na reformy doplácajú". *SME*, 20 February.

- Hall, Stuart. 1980. "Popular-Democratic Versus Authoritarian Populism". In Alan Hunt, ed., *Marxism and Democracy*, pp. 157–185. London: Laurence and Wishhart.
- . 1985. "Authoritarian Populism: A Reply to Jessop *et al*". *New Left Review*, no. 151 (May–June), pp. 115–124.
- Hall, Stuart, Chas Chrichter, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, and Brian Roberts. 1978. *Policing the Crises: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hajdúchová, Andrea and Richard Filipko. 2004. "Rómovia na reformy doplácajú". *SME*, 20 February.
- Haughton, Tim. 2001. "HZDS: The Ideology, Organisation, and Support Base of Slovakia's Most Successful Party". *Europe-Asia Studies*, 53(5), pp. 745–769.
- . 2003. "We'll Finish What We Started": The 2002 Slovak Parliamentary Elections. *Communist Studies and Transition Studies*, 19(4), pp. 65–90.
- Haughton, Tim, and Kevin Deegan-Krause. 2009. "Towards a More Useful Conceptualization of Populism: Types and Degrees of Populist Appeals in the Case of Slovakia". *Politics and Policy*, 37(4), pp. 821–841.
- Haughton, Tim, and Marek Rybar. 2008. "A Change of Direction: The 2006 Parliamentary Elections and the Dynamics of Party Politics in Slovakia". *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 24(2), pp. 232–255.
- Ivantyšin, Michal, and Emília Sičáková. 1999. Public Security and Corruption. In Miroslav Kollár, Grigoriy Mesežnikov, and Tom Nicholson, eds., *Slovakia 1998–1999: A Global Report on the State of Society*. Bratislava: IVO.
- Jowitt, Ken. 1992. *The New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kalb, Don. 2009. "Conversations with a Polish Populist: Tracing Hidden Histories of Globalization, Class, and Dispossession in Postsocialism (and Beyond)". *American Ethnologist*, 36(2), pp. 207–223.
- . 2011. "Introduction". In Don Kalb and Gábor Halmai, eds., *Headlines of Nation, Subtexts of Class: Working-Class Populism and the Return of the Repressed in Neoliberal Europe*. New York: Berghahn Books, pp. 1–36.
- Kideckel, David. 2008. *Getting by in Post-Socialist Romania: Labour, the Body and Working-Class Culture*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Klicperová-Baker, Martina. 1999. *Post-communist Syndrome*. Budapest: Open Society Institute.
- Krause, Kevin. 2003. "Slovakia's Second Transition". *Journal of Democracy*, 14(2), pp. 65–79.
- Laclau, Ernesto. 1977. *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*. London: Verso.
- . 2005a. *On Populist Reason*. London: Verso.
- . 2005b. "Populism: What's in a Name?" In Francisco Panizza, ed., *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*. London: Verso, pp. 32–49.
- Lampland, Martha. 1995. *The Object of Labour: Commodification in Socialist Hungary*. Chicago: University of Chicago.
- Marušák, Martin, and Leo Singer. 2009. "Social Unrest in Slovakia 2004: Romani Reaction to Neoliberal 'Reforms'". In Nando Sigona and Nidhi Trehan, eds., *Romani Politics in Contemporary Europe: Poverty, Ethnic Mobilization, and the Neoliberal Order*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 186–208.
- Maryniak, Irena. 2004. "Think Roma, Say Jew – You Won't Get Away with It". *Index on Censorship*, 33(3), pp. 58–63.

- McCagg, William. 1991. "Gypsy Policy in Socialist Hungary and Czechoslovakia, 1945–1989". *Nationalities Papers*, 19(3), pp. 313–336.
- Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, and the Family. 2004. *Nová Sociálna Politika*. Bratislava: Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, and the Family.
- Mouzelis, Nicos. 1978. "Ideology and Class Politics: A Critique of Ernesto Laclau". *New Left Review*, no. 122 (November–December), pp. 45–61.
- Muehlebach, Andrea. 2012. *The Moral Neoliberal: Welfare and Citizenship in Italy*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Nohlen, Dieter, and Philip Stöver. 2010. *Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
- O'Dwyer, Conor, and Branislav Kovalčík. 2007. "And the Last Shall Be First: Party System Institutionalization and Second-Generation Economic Reform in Post-Communist Europe". *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 41(4), pp. 3–26.
- Ost, David. 2005. *The Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Pawelke, Andreas. 2010. *Civil Society Against Corruption: Slovakia*. Berlin: Hertie School of Governance.
- Pine, Francis. 2002. "'Retreat to the Household? Gendered domains in postsocialist Poland'". In C. Hann, ed., *Postsocialism: Ideologies and Practices in Eurasia*. London: Routledge.
- Pravda. 2004. "Po rabovačkach hovoria Rómovia o vojne". 23 February.
- Pridham, Geoffrey. 2001. "Uneasy Democratizations – Pariah Regimes, Political Conditionality and Reborn Transitions in Central and Eastern Europe", *Journal of Democratization*, 8(4), pp. 65–94.
- Scheffel, David. 1999. "The Untouchables of Svinia". *Human Organization*, 58(1), pp. 44–53.
- . 2004. "Slovak Roma on the Threshold of Europe". *Anthropology Today*, 20(1), pp. 6–12.
- . 2005. *Svinia in Black and White: Slovak Roma and Their Neighbours*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Sigona, Nidhi and Nando Trehan. 2009. *Roma Politics in Contemporary Europe: Poverty, Ethnic Mobilization, and the Neoliberal Order*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- SITA. 2004. "Dzurinda Visits Spots of Unrest in Eastern Slovakia on Tuesday Night". *Slovak News Agency*, 25 February.
- Smith, Adrian, Alison Stenning, Alena Rochovská, and Dariusz Świątek. 2008. The Emergence of a Working Poor: Labour Markets, Neoliberalisation and Diverse Economies in Post-Socialist Cities. *Antipode*, 40(2), pp. 283–311.
- Szomolányi, Sonia. 1994. Kríženie modernity a tradicionality: Slovenská mutácia. In Z. Kusa, ed., *Slovensko v 90. Rokoch. Trendy a problem*. Bratislava: Slovenská Sociologická Spoločnosť pri SAV.
- Stiglitz, Joseph. 2010. "Moral Bankruptcy. Why Are We Letting Wall Street off so Easily?" *Mother Jones*, January/February.
- Stavrakakis, Yannis. 2004. "Antinomies of Formalism: Laclau's Theory of Populism and the Lessons from Religious Populism in Greece". *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9(3), pp. 253–267.
- Stenning, Alison. 2005. "Where Is the Post-Socialist Working Class? Working Class Lives in the Spaces of (Post) Socialism". *Sociology*, 39(5), pp. 983–999.

- Stenning, Alison, Adrian Smith, Alena Rochovská, and Dariusz Świątek. 2010. *Domesticating Neoliberalism: Spaces of Economic Practice and Social Reproduction in Post-Socialist Cities*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Stewart, Michael. 1990. "Gypsies, Work, and Civil Society". *Journal of Communist Studies*, 6(2), pp. 140–162.
- Strážay, Tomáš. 2005. "Nationalist Populism and Foreign Policy: Focus on Slovak-Hungarian Relations". *Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*, 6(1), pp. 47–60.
- Sztompka, Piotr. 1996. "Looking Back: The Year of 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break". *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 29(2), pp. 110–123.
- Tismăneanu, Vladimir. 1998. *Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Communist Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- van Baar, Huub. 2012. "Socio-Economic Mobility and Neo-Liberal Governmentality in Post-Socialist Europe: Activation and the Dehumanisation of the Roma". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 38(8), pp. 1289–1304.
- Vermeersch, Peter. 2006. *The Romani Movement: Minority Politics and Ethnic Mobilization in Contemporary Central Europe*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Young, Jock. 2007. *The Vertigo of Late Modernity*. London: Routledge.
- Zákon č. 2003. 599/2003 Z.z. o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi [Act on assistance in material need no. 599/2003].
- Žižek, Slavoj. 2006. "Against the Populist Temptation". *Critical Enquiry* 32(Spring), pp. 551–574.

7 “We are building Poland”

On the history and circulation of a contested slogan

Jaro Stacul

This chapter discusses the role political slogans play in communicating the values of neoliberal ideology, and particularly the ways in which their messages are accommodated¹ to local-level discourses in contemporary Poland.² What makes slogans an intriguing object of research is the fact that they tell us a great deal about the ways the values at the core of the neoliberal project are propagated. In anthropology and cognate disciplines, neoliberalism is invoked at a number of levels. While on the one hand it refers to a type of economic policy, on the other hand it is expressed by a “culture”, by an “ideology” that is functional to neoliberalism’s reproduction (Kipnis 2007: 383–385). According to the Comaroffs (2000) and Harvey (2005), for example, neoliberalism is marked by the demise of the welfare state, the rise of finance within global capital, and the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) insistence on free markets, transparency, and private property. Yet neoliberalism can also be a “culture” expressed by inclination towards transparency, competition, responsibility, and self-improvement. As the main goal of neoliberalism is the removal of the social and political constraints that were dominant in the previous period of embedded liberalism (e.g., Junghans 2001; Harvey 2005; Ong 2006; Collier 2011), neoliberal states do not set out to mobilize crowds around high ideals, but to implement reform policies and legitimate them in the face of the uncertainty and fluidity in peoples’ lives (Narotzky and Smith 2006: 11). The propagation of a culture of entrepreneurship, economic success, and individual prosperity, then, can be instrumental in inculcating neoliberal values across gender, class, and locality lines, and slogans can play a pivotal role in this process.

My point of departure, in this chapter, is the realization that although neoliberal slogans promote the individualist ideology that is central to neoliberalism as a “culture”, in order to achieve their appeal these slogans also have to make people believe that they too can play a significant part in the transformations occurring at the national level. At a time when Europe witnesses the emergence of what Holmes (2000) has called a “new entangled politics” that merges seemingly incompatible political doctrines, slogans contribute to the enactment of neoliberal values and norms by making them appear acceptable: because of their semantic ambiguity, they set out to leave

individuals with the sense of having the right to their own interpretive space in which they can appropriate certain messages for their own requirements (Cohen 1996; Laclau 2005; Charteris-Black 2011), even though they do not foster a political dialogue that might give force to a collective political agency (Narotzky and Smith 2006: 193).

Poland is a powerful site for an examination of this issue: the political and economic changes it has undergone since the 1980s signified the exposure of Poles to a wide range of slogans communicating completely different values – namely, those associated with socialist ideology and those emanating from the political forces that came to the fore after the Cold War. After 1989 Poland witnessed dramatic transformations, among which the adoption of a market economy and the subsequent accession to NATO in 1999 and the European Union (EU) in 2004 are the most significant. While the adoption of a market economy signified a complete break with the institutions and policies associated with socialism, the introduction in 1990 of economic measures in the form of so-called shock therapy resulted in rising levels of unemployment, Polish firms' exposure to international competition, and large-scale redistribution of income away from workers and in favour of entrepreneurs (Hardy 2009: 28–29). In the context of these developments, the role of the Polish state as provider of welfare was diminished. Upon their accession to the EU, Poland and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe were pushed towards adopting specific neoliberal reforms. While these resulted in the removal of trade barriers and in the creation of an undifferentiated area in which capital can operate, they also had the effect of disciplining capital and public spending (Hardy 2009: 45–47).

Despite the effects of the economic crisis in Europe, by 2008 Poland was pointed to as the “tiger economy” of Central and Eastern Europe (Hardy 2009), and the socialist period was filed away: the Polish economy was growing steadily, as shown by widespread privatization and the largest inflow of foreign investment, and the Polish prime minister could state, “There is no crisis in Poland” (*Nie ma kryzysu w Polsce*). As international aid agencies and political advisors encourage postsocialist and other governments to redefine the role of the state as a “consumer state” as opposed to a “citizen state”, Poles are exposed to a new hegemonic ideology of neoliberal privatization and have become vulnerable to “corporate decisions that undermine an established sense of what citizenship is worth” (Ong 2006: 160). In sum, despite Poland's allegedly successful “transition” to capitalism, the economic reforms promoted by the postsocialist state have so far benefited primarily the entrepreneurial fraction of Polish society and have marginalized the people whose lives were situated in the economic and geographical periphery of the new Poland (Dunn 2004; Ost 2005; Shields 2007; Hardy 2009; Kalb 2009a).

In the context of these developments, the postsocialist state has to reconcile two tasks: on the one hand, it has to follow the directives of international and supra-national agencies; on the other hand, it has to legitimate itself and

appeal to people who have lost faith in politics (Kolankiewicz 1994). While the formation of new political parties after 1989 resulted in Poles' exposure to their electoral slogans, Poland's adoption of a market economy resulted, inter alia, in a proliferation of commercial slogans to which many Poles were not yet accustomed: during the socialist period most slogans were an integral part of the propaganda of the party-state and were grounded in the language of national, socialist, and moral values. As such, they were meant to promote governmental ideas or social restructuring and advertise the party-state's role in Polish society and its link to national values and history (Kolankiewicz 1994: 143; Johnson 2009: 29–31). This does not mean that neoliberal slogans are not grounded in the language of values: after all, self-improvement, success, and prosperity are values. Markets, for example, were seen as helping to reward good workers and punish the bad (Kalb 2009b: 294). What I am trying to stress is that, at a time when the state no longer has the monopoly over public discourse, the messages slogans convey may be so ambiguous, that it is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether they are meant to deliver a political message or advertise a product. Most of these do not necessarily emanate from the centres of political power, yet they have the effect of mediating people's encounters with market forces and the ideology of neoliberal globalization, and particularly with a "grey area" in which the domains of politics and consumption seem to overlap.

In contemporary Poland slogans circulate from one domain to another: as a result, those that are meant to be politically significant are often altered and subsequently take on a "non-political" dimension. In 2008, for example, mobile phone operator and Internet provider Netia used the slogan "Freedom of choice" (*Wolność wyboru*) to advertise its products. The choice is not accidental, for it brings to mind "Freedom of elections" (*Wolność wybór*), which refers to the first "free" elections held in socialist Poland in 1989. Likewise, in his 2010 presidential campaign the candidate of the nationalist Law and Justice (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*) party and former prime minister Jarosław Kaczyński used the slogan "Poland is the most important thing" (*Polska jest najważniejsza*). Shortly after the election that resulted in Kaczyński's defeat, his party split because of internal disagreements. Thus, dissidents established a new party, and named it "Poland is the most important thing". The creation of a new political force made headlines and, in 2011, discount retail chain Pepco appropriated and altered the party's name (and slogan), and produced a poster with the heading, "The price is the most important thing" (*Cena jest najważniejsza*).³ While the mode of parody imitating the formal features of official discourse brings to mind aesthetics of parody dating back to the late socialist period, it is also part of a trend within modern political ideologies and public cultures that has been recorded elsewhere (Boyer and Yurchak 2010).

My interest, in this chapter, is not so much in the migration of slogans from the domain of politics to that of consumption, as in the ways their meanings change from one era to another, as well as in their role in mediating

people's encounters with the new Polish state. I analyze such phenomena in the city of Gdańsk, on the Baltic Sea, which has occupied a central role in Polish history ever since the end of World War II. Because of its significance, Gdańsk's inhabitants have long been exposed to a broad range of slogans expressing the values of the socialist and postsocialist states. One concept that mediates Poles' encounters with the postsocialist state is the idea of "building" (*budować*). Nowadays the concept plays a central role in slogans such as "We are building Poland" (*Budujemy Polskę*), deployed by Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska*), the pro-EU party in power from 2007 until 2015. While the slogan was used in connection with the promotion of large-scale projects partially funded by the EU, such as the construction of roads or the improvement of infrastructure, it was also an implicit reference to the project of rebuilding the Polish state according to free-market principles. The same idea figured prominently in electoral propaganda: in his successful 2010 presidential campaign, Civic Platform's candidate Bronisław Komorowski availed himself of the slogan "Unity builds" (*Zgoda buduje*),⁴ when he promised the construction of a united, conflict-free Polish society in the face of political divisions. Later, in the 2011 electoral campaign, Civic Platform made use of both "We are building Poland" and "Poland under construction" (*Polska w budowie*) in brochures and videos illustrating what the party had accomplished and what it was planning to achieve.

Yet the emphasis on "building" is not entirely new: both "Unity builds" and variations of "We are building Poland" were deployed by the socialist state when promoting the construction of a new society as well as the physical reconstruction of Polish cities in the aftermath of World War II. In this sense, who "builds", and what place the idea of "building" occupies in the collective imagination in Gdańsk and elsewhere may be important factors for Poles to make sense of the changes Poland underwent after the Cold War. On the one hand, the appropriation of a socialist slogan raises the issue of how the messages the slogan encodes are interpreted and accommodated to local-level discourses; on the other hand, because "We are building Poland" does not seem to propagate the individualist culture that is central to neoliberalism, it opens up questions of to what degree it is neoliberal, and of what neoliberalism, as a culture, is about.

A very brief history of "building"

What characterized Polish history from the late eighteenth century until the beginning of the twentieth century, and from the outbreak of World War II until the demise of socialism, was subjection (direct or indirect) to foreign rule. During this period the idea of "Poland" was associated with a nation, a culture, and a religion (Roman Catholicism), but not with a state or a clearly bounded territory (e.g., Davies 2001; Lukowski and Zawadzki 2006; Mach 2007; Zubrzycki 2011). In this sense, the idea of "building" a nation with its own state and territory has long occupied a central place

in the Polish collective imagination. After World War II, “building” took on both a material and a symbolic dimension: the new Polish state was very different from the one that appeared on maps before 1945, given that Poland’s territorial losses in the East had been compensated by expansion in the north and west. The new Poland was also different in terms of the size and composition of its population: approximately 20 per cent of its people perished during the war, and the ethnic minorities disappeared. Moreover, Poland suffered extensive material destruction, and was the most devastated country in Europe (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2006: 281). In the aftermath of World War II, then, the use of terms such as “construction” (*budowa*), “reconstruction” (*odbudowa*) and “We are building” (*budujemy*) became conspicuous in the propaganda of the new state. Such terms were central to the state-produced slogans hung on the façades of buildings and factories or carried by the crowds marching during parades, and figured prominently in patriotic poems, too (Paluch 1997).⁵ More importantly, carrying such slogans during parades was instrumental in reproducing a “collectivity of belonging” (Yurchak 2006: 121–122).

The idea of “reconstruction” was extensively used in official discourse, particularly in the formerly German cities, like Gdańsk, which had become Polish and were still reduced to rubble and ash. However, since rebuilding a city also implies knowledge of its past and reclamation of that past, such cities were not so much rebuilt, as they were discovered and reinvented as Polish cities (Kenney 1997: 141–142; Friedrich 2007). The reconstruction (or reinvention) of the country was also accompanied by revolutionary transformations: on the one hand, the economy was transferred from private hands into the hands of the new state; on the other hand, the Communist Party gained control of the Polish state and Polish society (Kenney 1997: 4). The term “building” also signified the beginning of a new era and a break with the past: in socialist countries it was associated with postwar enthusiasm and with a “teleology according to which society was developing towards communism, a version of modernity” (Laszczkowski 2011: 82). The construction of modern housing, for example, was expected to produce new social forms (like socialist subjects) and moral values (Humphrey 2005: 39–40; Schwenkel 2013: 254–255). In the context of Stalinist rapid industrialization the construction of gigantic steelworks and “socialist cities”, such as the southern town of Nowa Huta, was instrumental in “building socialism” (Lebow 2013: 14–15), and so was the glorification of socialist workers dedicated to “building the nation” (or the capital city of Warsaw). Thus, the 1950s saw a proliferation of posters depicting labourers in the act of building,⁶ and what fostered the spread of such images was the party-state’s monopoly over public discourse in the country.

The idea of “building” regained a central place in official propaganda in the 1970s, when the state led by Edward Gierek availed itself of the slogan, “We are building a second Poland” (*Budujemy drugą Polskę*) to begin an era of technocratic pragmatism (Bralczyk 1987: 158–159; Głowiński

1993: 196–197; Kubik 1994: 51). At the root of this project was easy access to Western credit, which resulted in a rapid (albeit temporary) expansion of the economy through the introduction of modern technology. Economic expansion was accompanied by an improvement in the standard of living and by the construction of gigantic industrial plants.⁷ More importantly, improving economic conditions enabled the state to undertake the construction of housing blocks throughout the country in an effort to reverse the chronic housing shortage (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2006: 281).

While “building” was meant to be the epitome of positive change in the context of the socialist state, the emphasis on the collective “we” in many slogans was also designed to evoke images of unity, egalitarianism, and social cohesion, and to construct some aura of legitimacy for the state’s practices (Kubik 1994: 71). Although the concept of “building” played a lesser role in political rhetoric after the Cold War because of its association with socialism (Siewierska-Chmaj 2006: 90), material construction did not, as shown by the major redevelopment projects undertaken in Poland following its accession to the EU. Thus, because “construction” may be a convenient metaphor for positive social change (Laszczkowski 2011: 81), the concept of “building” became incorporated into the political messages of Civic Platform. The deployment of a variation of a socialist concept by a postsocialist government needs to be understood in the context of the political changes that occurred in the last few years: in 2007 Civic Platform won the parliamentary elections, defeating the nationalist Law and Justice that had governed Poland between 2005 and 2007.⁸ Since Law and Justice has achieved considerable appeal, especially in the impoverished regions in the eastern part of the country, ever since its rise to power Civic Platform has been endeavouring to legitimate itself and increase its electorate.

Thus, in 2011 Civic Platform ran its campaign under the slogan “We are building Poland”. While the slogan was a specific reference to the huge modernization projects the Civic Platform-led government had undertaken with EU funds, it also referred to the project of narrowing the gap between Poland’s living standards and economic productivity and those of its Western neighbours. In this sense, “we” was meant to convey ideas of social cohesion (depending, of course, on who “we” refers to). Yet “building” also had a neoliberal dimension, in that it referred to the project of rebuilding the country’s infrastructure in order to make it attractive to investors. Thus, while the form of the slogan is not neoliberal, its actual content is. It seems safe to suggest, following Rumsey (2000), that the slogan collapsed the “individual” and the “collective”: it appeared to appeal to collective values, even though it actually championed entrepreneurship and self-realization. It worked as a “condenser” in the sense that it addressed individuals and collectivities at the same time.

Because it brings to mind the myth of the construction of a new Poland that was central to the propaganda of the socialist state, “We are building Poland” was also meant to appeal to the many dissatisfied supporters of the

party of the Left, whose popularity has been steadily declining since 2005. Yet most Poles have been distrustful of the discourses of politicians ever since the socialist period (Kubik 1994: 185–194): the demise of socialism was not followed by the emergence of a state the majority of the population could trust, and the conviction that the country is still controlled by communists is widespread among those hard hit by the processes of economic restructuring (Kalb 2009b: 293). Thus, one question that the appropriation of a socialist slogan opens up is how far the slogan itself allows people to connect socialist forms of collective representation to those of neoliberal capitalism. To which I am turning next.

“Building” for whom?

Gdańsk lends itself very well to the exploration of the material and symbolic forms that “building” takes on. Until 1945 the city was inhabited largely by a German-speaking population and became part of Poland only at the end of World War II. Most of the Poles who settled there after 1945 were new to the area, having just come from territories that had been lost to the USSR to replace the German expellees (Tighe 1990: 224–225; Lukowski and Zawadzki 2006: 279). Gdańsk’s physical and cultural landscape has been altered by the many conversions of rule over the city, and the shapes of the urban scenery were often used for political reasons: the Nazis manipulated Gdańsk’s historical legacy in an effort to demonstrate Germany’s supremacy over that part of Europe.⁹ Likewise, since the city’s historical centre was reduced to rubble and ash during the conflict between Germans and Russians in 1945, when Gdańsk became Polish the socialist state endeavoured to assert the city’s Polish identity by reconstructing it solely in terms of its Polish heritage (Czepczyński 2004: 279; Friedrich 2012: 121–123). Later, in the 1970s, the socialist state adopted the “new development strategy” to modernize its economy (Kubik 1994: 22–24), and the city witnessed the construction of the northern port and of housing blocks on its periphery. It seems arguable, then, that local history is also a history of reconstructions – each marking the beginning of a new era. Thus, although in Gdańsk different histories and historiographies intersect, in local discourses different eras seem to follow (rather than intersect) one another in a linear fashion, in the sense that one era obliterates another.

Gdańsk also occupies a central place in Polish history, given that in the 1980s it became the cradle of *Solidarność* (Solidarity), the mass social movement guided by the principle of labour self-government that made a significant contribution to the downfall of the socialist state. A detailed analysis of the history of *Solidarność* is outside the scope of this chapter,¹⁰ but suffice it to say that while *Solidarność* set out to protect the workers’ interests in the face of the socialist state’s increasing pressures on the workers themselves, it also endeavoured to question the state’s claims to “truth”. During the labour unrest of August 1980 that resulted in the establishment of *Solidarność* as

a trade union, for example, anti-state slogans could be seen on every corner of the town centre and on the walls of the shipyard that was the heart of the strike (Kubik 1994: 190).¹¹ The content of such slogans varied, yet what united many of them was the conviction that truth (*prawda*), as a value, had been violated, and that the messages propagated by the party-state through the official media were lies (*klamstwa*).¹² Although in the 1990s *Solidarność* split into several smaller parties and eventually disappeared,¹³ in official discourse its rise in 1980 is described as the beginning of a new era in Polish history.

In the context of the transformations that resulted in the city's shift from an economy of production to one of consumption, Gdańsk is attempting to redefine itself through culture, in an effort to attract tourists, investors, and potential residents. The city's incorporation into the political economy of the EU appears in material structures, given that several major public works in the historical centre are funded by the EU itself and by the countries of the European Economic Area. Gdańsk's urban landscape is in the process of being transformed, and the municipal council is implementing a large-scale project of urban recovery aiming to transform a city in a state of decay.¹⁴ The remark, "But at least something is being built" (*Ale przynajmniej się buduje*), often made by locals in response to other people's scepticism about the benefits deriving from such unprecedented levels of construction, is very telling about the meanings attached to construction itself as a conventional metaphor for positive change. While some of these initiatives set out to improve the living conditions of the people residing in certain areas (the lower city, for example), others were primarily meant to attract investors and raise the value of land and of historic buildings.

In the summer of 2010 the slogan "We are building Poland" (*Budujemy Polskę*) made its appearance on huge billboards on Gdańsk's main thoroughfares in connection with the large-scale projects (particularly road construction) promoted by the Civic Platform-led government. Most of these had to be undertaken in preparation for the 2012 European football championships played in Poland and the Ukraine and partially funded by the EU. Because Gdańsk was to host some of the games, extensive works were expected to be carried out in the city.¹⁵ In 2011, the year of the parliamentary elections that gained Civic Platform a second consecutive term in office, slogans such as "We are building Poland" and "Poland under construction" were repeated ad nauseam, especially on television, and appeared on electoral leaflets illustrating the party's (and government's) achievements. The brochure "See how Pomerania is changing" (*Zobacz jak zmienia się Pomorze*), for example, is an illustration of these plans at the regional level, and places special emphasis upon road construction. This emphasis is not surprising given that road construction expresses, inter alia, the state's ambition to unite a country through infrastructural provision (Harvey and Knox 2015: 51).

In Gdańsk "building" is not simply tantamount to "construction" in the material sense, but also involves dealing with the city's socialist past. Outside

the historical centre, an extensive area earmarked for redevelopment is the Gdańsk shipyard. The shipyard has a complex legacy as simultaneously the embodiment of socialism and a site of dissent. Formerly a German shipyard, after 1945 it became the pride of the Polish state, and meant to be the material expression of socialist ideology. When socialist regimes were installed in the aftermath of World War II, the reconstruction of cities was one of their main priorities, and architecture became one of the key arenas of ideology (Kenney 1997; Buchli 1999; Humphrey 2005). The contexts in which a new socialist way of life was moulded were housing blocks and factories, and the Gdańsk shipyard, as the largest shipbuilding operation in the Eastern Bloc, was expected to play a key role in the creation of a new working class (Jarecki 1985: 24–25). Ironically, three decades ago it became the cradle of the *Solidarność* movement and the site where socialist ideology itself was contested.

Because of its legacy as a site of opposition to the socialist state, in official and popular discourses the shipyard is referred to as a monument to Polish freedom, and several state-sponsored ceremonies taking place in Gdańsk are held in front of its main gate. Although the shipyard was privatized after the demise of socialism, it was totally unprepared for the challenges posed by free markets and the rapid decline of heavy industry and, in 1996, it went bankrupt. Even though the shipyard was subsequently bought by a Ukrainian investor, the European Commission is putting a lot of pressure on the Polish government to close it down. Despite such pressures, the shipyard is still in operation, but it is much smaller than it was in the socialist era. In political discourse the shipyard is referred to as the cradle of a “national myth” (*mit narodowy*) attached to *Solidarność*. However, past its main gate visitors face a scenario of desolation: most warehouses are abandoned and earmarked for demolition, and huge open spaces are densely overgrown and littered with scrap metal.

In the years that followed Civic Platform’s rise to power, the shipyard was expected to serve, not just as a significant memory and identity-building function, but also as a legitimating one for the newly elected political party. When the shipyard started downsizing, the Civic Platform-led municipal council pushed for the redevelopment of the grounds no longer devoted to shipbuilding and for the reinsertion of the site into the city. At the core of the redevelopment is an attempt to reinvent the area’s public image, not only as a former shipyard, but particularly as an area for living, leisure, and business. Thus, in the summer of 2009 the municipal council organized an outdoor photographic exhibition in front of the old town hall. The focus of the exhibition was on the post-industrial landscape of the shipyard, and the photographs on display were meant to throw into relief its state of decay. Yet the purpose of this and related exhibitions was not to make the residents of Gdańsk aware of a situation they already knew very well, but to influence public opinion as to the necessity to redevelop the site. While the photographs’ captions were informed by a rhetoric of “development”

(*rozwoj*) and “heritage” (*dziedzictwo*), the identification of “ruins” or “empty spaces” that do not have economic value was designed to legitimate land privatization and real estate speculation (Weszkalnys 2010: 61–65; Schwenkel 2013: 257). The mayor of Gdańsk (affiliated with Civic Platform) endeavoured to promote the project in the face of the opposition of shipyard workers and of the *Solidarność* trade union, and the Polish state’s ambition to release capital from undue regulation in order to encourage development became instrumental in legitimating his initiative.

The redevelopment, as it has been designed, does not differ significantly from others undertaken on the city’s outskirts or in other Polish cities (except in size). However, it will entail a comprehensive redesign of a post-industrial site according to different principles, given that it will involve the construction of luxury apartments on the waterfront, as well as offices, hotels, a shopping mall, and a large supermarket (Grabkowska 2006: 91–92). Moreover, unlike other projects carried out elsewhere, the connection between the shipyard and Polish national history will be made very explicit: the brochure issued by the company in charge of the redevelopment clearly states that the project is designed to commemorate the labour unrest of 1980 and the country’s transition from a socialist to a free-market economy, and to preserve some landmarks associated with the history of *Solidarność*.¹⁶

There is little doubt that the organization of urban spaces through the creation of an atmosphere of leisure sprawled around the context where the new Poland was born becomes a means to attract capital and potential residents (Harvey 1989: 92; Zukin 2010). It is a situation found in former industrial towns that shift their economies from production to consumption, promote revitalization projects based on culture and heritage, and use the past for commercial purposes. The construction of luxury apartments contributes to the aestheticization of the place just as it involves the removal of the material traces of socialism: while the socialist era was characterized by housing shortages, and dwellings often took the form of huge housing blocks, nowadays the availability of luxury apartments has become an indicator of Poland’s expanding middle class (Pozniak 2013: 118–121).¹⁷ In this sense, the redevelopment is not designed to reconstruct the past, but instead to obliterate part of it, and to make the site accessible only to those who have the financial (and cultural) capital to buy property there (Zukin 2010: 87).

Yet although the shipyard was expected to become the principal material emblem of the mayor’s policies, eventually it became a contested object of planning. Whereas “building” once offered the promise of care, renewal, and inclusion in a global socialist polity, the luxury apartments to be constructed in the shipyard point instead to a future of exclusion (Schwenkel 2013: 273). The several state-sponsored ceremonies held in Gdańsk gave factory workers opportunities to contest both the redevelopment project as well as the Polish state’s neoliberal agenda. People expressed their discontent on 4 June 2009, when the grounds outside the shipyard became the scenario

of the celebrations of the twentieth anniversary of the first “free” elections in the country. In the course of the event, shipyard workers, angered at the European Commission’s pressures to have the shipyard closed down and at the Polish state’s compliance with these requests, made their voices heard: they hung a large banner beside the main gate, which read (in English) “Dictator from the East has not destroyed our shipyard. Now Brussels officials play the cards”. While the slogan set out to convey the message that history repeats itself, behind it was another message: that Poland is losing sovereignty (Golanska-Ryan 2006: 162–163; Kalb 2009a: 217).

When the 2011 electoral campaign was in full swing, Civic Platform made extensive use of slogans such as “We are building Poland” and “Poland under construction”. However, most of the people I talked to said they were largely indifferent to such slogans. For them, they were simply *hasła*, a term that in its pejorative meaning refers to “empty words”. Yet, while for those who lived through the socialist era such slogans were reminiscent of the lies (*klamstwa*) circulated by the socialist state, for young people the slogans’ “emptiness” seems to reflect an idea that has long-standing resonance in postsocialist countries, namely, that formal politics and state power are corrupting (Greenberg 2014: 149–152). This attitude did not result in people’s withdrawal from politics, nor did it mirror indifference to the consequences that “building” may have on their lives. More importantly, it did not index people’s inability (or reluctance) to create new meanings out of such slogans and to engage with propaganda and its language forms (Yurchak 2006).¹⁸ For example, soon after the 2011 parliamentary elections that resulted in Civic Platform’s re-election, many of my respondents contested the slogan “We are building Poland” by producing counter-slogans such as “We are destroying Poland” (*Rujnujemy Polskę*). Although this was not used in the anti-government demonstrations that I witnessed, people often deployed it in private conversations and in blogs. The construction of a conceptual opposition between building and destroying is not accidental, and should be understood in relation to another slogan circulated earlier: in 2010 Civic Platform’s candidate for presidential elections Bronisław Komorowski availed himself of the slogan “Unity builds” (*Zgoda buduje*), which is part of the popular Polish proverb “Unity builds, division destroys” (*Zgoda buduje, niezgoda rujnuje*). By drawing upon another slogan previously deployed by Civic Platform, those disillusioned with politics tried to convey another message, namely, that the Polish state and the governing party are not keeping their promises. The slogan, then, underwent “decondensation” in the sense that its intended recipients distanced themselves from the collective “we”: they drew a clear-cut distinction between themselves and those promising to build Poland, and they altered the slogan’s original semantic content for their own requirements.

Many workers who participated in the strikes in the 1980s – and became victims of the economic reforms introduced by the political forces that laid claim to the legacy of *Solidarność* – joined several demonstrations to voice

their dismay at the policies implemented by the Polish state and the municipal council. Although in the 1980s such workers had strongly believed in privatization as a solution to Poland's economic problems, they did not expect that it would mean selling public assets to private enterprises (Kalb 2009a: 211). In this context, the language workers used to make their concerns heard was not that of class, but that of national or religious identity and that of the anti-state resistance of the 1980s. Anger was not directed at capitalism *per se*, but at the governing parties that allegedly allowed communists' control to continue (Ost 2005: 108), and at the foreign countries (especially Poland's potential foes such as Germany and Russia, not to mention the EU) that are believed to keep the Polish economy under control.

"Building" stirred up anger when it turned out that the EU funding for large-scale works would decrease after the conclusion of the European football championships, and that the optimism deriving from the flow of global capital and EU funding into Poland after its EU accession had to be taken with a pinch of salt. Popular anger reached its peak a few months before the beginning of the championships, when the mayor of Gdańsk contemplated the idea of turning some landmarks associated with the history of *Solidarność* into heritage sites in order to make the shipyard more attractive to potential investors. One of these landmarks is Gate Two, where *Solidarność* movement's leader (and then Polish president) Lech Wałęsa used to address the crowds during the labour unrest of 1980.¹⁹ The shipyard's being the symbolic terrain where Poles articulate their relationship to the Polish nation and national history (as a history of martyrdom) is indicated by the Polish flag and the vases of flowers that decorate the gate. The Vatican flag and pictures of John Paul II (the late Polish Pope) and the Black Madonna of Częstochowa, in turn, highlight the connection between national identity and Roman Catholicism (Kubik 1994: 195).

In 1967 the shipyard was named after Lenin and, until 1990, bore a dedication to the socialist leader over Gate Two. In May 2012 the mayor, with the backing of municipal and regional conservators, pushed for the return of the Lenin dedication. Behind this initiative was the idea that restoring the original Cold War appearance of Gate Two would help turn the area into a protected heritage site. Despite the mayor's efforts to endow his plan with an aura of legitimacy, the initiative stirred up nationalist feelings among supporters of Law and Justice and members of the *Solidarność* trade union, who fiercely opposed it. A few days after the dedication had been reinstated, someone covered it with the logo of the *Solidarność* trade union, and over one hundred people staged an anti-government protest in front of the gate by throwing eggs at photographs of Lenin and of the Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk.

Soon after the European football championships came to an end, Poland's prime minister announced on television that the country's economic situation was about to worsen, and Poles soon woke up to the news that Poland was not immune to the crisis. These developments had repercussions in Gdańsk,

too, given that the project for the redevelopment of the shipyard had not yet attracted the hoped-for investments. Such investments were conditional on the existence of roads linking the shipyard site to the town centre, and an expenditure of public funds was necessary for their construction. As it turned out, that construction work would drain the funds that in the past had been allocated to social programmes and cultural initiatives, and a barrage of complaints was aimed at the municipal council. Meanwhile, the *Solidarność* trade union started collecting signatures for a proposed referendum to recall the mayor and advertised it through posters plastered across the city. One of them depicted images of Lenin and of the mayor's being thrown into a large litter bin, and bore the heading, "We do not want Il'ich and Adamowicz" (*Nie chcemy Ilicza i Adamowicza*).²⁰

Because of the fierce opposition encountered, the mayor allowed the removal of the dedication, and the referendum was not held. Yet the dismay the project had caused sparked a debate not only about the mayor, but also about redevelopment projects in the city, which became particularly heated in early 2013, when the shipyard saw the beginning of the long-awaited road construction works. While such works did not involve bulldozing existing dwellings, they generated much anxiety among the factory workers and their families living in the apartment blocks next to the shipyard and alerted them to the possibility that their houses be targeted by investors for "renewal".

As soon as the works commenced, some local cultural institutions organized a series of meetings with the families residing in the neighbourhood. Such meetings set out to provide explanations as to what the works would involve, and to reassure residents that they would not impact the local community. Such explanations failed to convince most of the people I came across, and instead evoked nationalist sentiments. Some seized the opportunity to criticize the mayor on the grounds that he only pursues the interests of the so-called "developers' mafia" (*mafia deweloperska*). Yet while some of these were worried about the possibility of gentrification of the area, others expressed instead the concern that such works would never come to completion, and that the shipyard would remain a pile of rubble.²¹ Some of my respondents made the comment that the promises of a better future made by the mayor and by the Polish state (expressed by the slogan "We are building Poland") were mere propaganda. As such, they could not be taken seriously. "It's just like in Gierek's time" (*Tak jak za Gierka*), said one of these people.

The man's reference to Edward Gierek's era is not accidental: when Gierek came to power, in 1970, he set out to modernize the Polish economy and improve the supply of food and consumer goods. As stated earlier, what enabled him to undertake this ambitious project was easy access to Western credit and the import of technology from the West. "Building", then, was central both to his rhetoric and to his economic policies. However, the improved performance of the economy was only temporary: both mismanagement

and unstable agricultural policies resulted in market imbalances that had disastrous effects in the late 1970s (Kubik 1994: 22–25). In this sense, the ambitious economic plans undertaken by the Civic Platform-led government three decades later were interpreted through the prism of recent Polish history. The reference to corruption (expressed by the concept of “developers’ mafia”) is not accidental, either, as it brings to mind the language of the anti-state resistance of the same era (Kalb 2009a: 210). It seems arguable that, for many people “building Poland” twenty years after the demise of socialism did not convey ideas of a break with the socialist past: if anything, the legacies of socialism form the background against which the postsocialist state and its policies are understood.

“We are building Poland” and other similar slogans were inserted into broader national narratives of protest and resistance: within such narratives, as we have seen, the mayor of Gdańsk and Poland’s prime minister represented the embodiment of Lenin, and Civic Platform was viewed as a new party-state; similarly, the slogans used by the governing party were referred to as “empty words” like those formerly used by the socialist state, just as news of Poland’s economic success reminded many Poles of Gierek’s policies that had led to economic disaster; finally, in the eyes of many Poles the EU represented another USSR (Golanska-Ryan 2006: 165–166). It is because the idea of “building” was not new, then, that Brussels officials, the Polish state, and the mayor were contested. After all, threatening to “destroy” the shipyard was seen as contradicting what was promised in slogans such as “We are building Poland”.

Conclusion: Time and the slogan

The information discussed so far brings us back to the issues raised at the beginning of this chapter, most notably to the question of how the idea of “building” is accommodated to local-level discourses. When the governing political party availed itself of the slogan “We are building Poland”, its main goal was to convey ideas of “building” in the broadest sense in order to appeal to a wide range of people across gender, class, and locality, and increase its electorate. Reconstruction and redevelopment are not new in Polish history: in a country that had been the theatre of conflict, reconstruction has often been functional to the revitalization of communities after a period of crisis, yet they have also served to rewrite local and national history. While “building” takes on a material dimension when it is associated with urban development, it also brings to mind images of social solidarity, epitomized by the idea of the construction of a new society. Yet in the context of the political and economic transformations Poland is undergoing, the idea of “building” was not meant to evoke a nostalgia for the socialist past, nor did it celebrate the achievements of communal labour, although it was clearly designed to create a sense of participation in Poland’s history. If anything, because in Polish dominant discourse “building” has long been

associated with positive change, one of the messages encoded in the slogan in question was an exhortation to look to the future and leave the socialist period behind.

Although the slogan “We are building Poland” was meant to draw a clear-cut line between the socialist era and the present, it was also expected to appeal to the largest number of people by communicating with them in terms with which they are already familiar. Because the idea of “building” figured prominently in the rhetoric of the socialist state, the slogan was expected to achieve its appeal by allowing people to connect socialist forms of collective representation to those of neoliberal capitalism. Thus, behind the slogan is also a vision of society within which the mechanism for mediating social relations is the market rather than the state. However, there are often differences between official representations and people’s interpretations of those representations. As we have seen, the meanings attached to these slogans at the local level were not necessarily the meanings intended by the political establishment, and the temporal context of slogans mattered to their intended recipients: behind the idea of “building”, as it was conceived by the governing party, was a vision of history as “progress” and a conception of time as “linear” and not altogether at odds with that championed by the socialist state. “Building” entails the beginning of a new era in the sense that epochs follow one another in a linear fashion. Implicit in this notion, then, is the idea that history does not repeat itself.

The temporal context of slogans brings us back to the second question asked at the outset: What do slogans such as “We are building Poland” reveal about neoliberalism as a culture. In his seminal study of neoliberalism, Harvey has pursued the argument that neoliberals achieved their appeal by mobilizing cultural and traditional values to mask other realities, and particularly by appealing to individual freedom, private property and entrepreneurship as sacrosanct values (2005: 39–41). However, he has also made the point that if we look at the neoliberal state in practice and at the ways it works we will notice divergences from the template of neoliberal theory (2005: 70). What the examination of slogans in Poland has revealed is instead that divergences are also temporal: whereas after 1989 the propagation of neoliberal values was high on the agenda of the postsocialist state, two decades after the downfall of state socialism it became clear that appealing to such values would have the effect of marginalizing those who do not have the resources to achieve the prosperity the neoliberal project promises. Because of what the allegedly “inclusive” message “We are building Poland” seems to encode, the slogan was expected to achieve the appeal that explicit references to individualism could not achieve by helping its recipients reconcile apparently incompatible ideas.

The lesson we learn from this discussion is pretty simple: neoliberalism, as a culture, is not given once and for all, just as its doctrine is not necessarily at odds with the public ends of government (Collier 2011: 1). Slogans, as we have seen, throw this contradiction into relief: those slogans with content

that is vague may be reinterpreted by individuals for their own requirements. They lend themselves to reinterpretation because they migrate across a wide range of domains, such as politics, consumption, and everyday life. However, what unites these slogans is also the fact that they are conceived at the centres of economic and political power, and are almost inevitably decontextualized from specific local contexts: as such, they are tethered to markers of universal human experience in order to foster a sense of shared values across lines of gender, class, and locality. Yet for the workers whose experience of “building” differs markedly from that of state or party officials, such slogans had a temporal dimension and mobilized ideas about historical time. Because they may be interpreted in ways that are at odds with the logic of neoliberal capitalism, understanding their appeal (or lack thereof) also entails understanding the social and cultural contexts within which they are given meaning, which may be more complex than indicated by an approach that takes individualism, the market, or neoliberalism itself as its points of departure.

Acknowledgements

This chapter is an expanded version of papers delivered at the 12th Conference of the European Association of Social Anthropologists (EASA) at the Université Paris Ouest Nanterre, 10–13 July 2012 and at the 112th Annual Meetings of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) in Chicago, 20–24 November 2013. Fieldwork in Poland, on which this chapter is based, was made possible by three research grants awarded by the Faculty Research, Scholarly Activity and Creative Achievement Fund of Grant MacEwan University. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Centre for Advanced Study Sofia for awarding an Advanced Academia Fellowship, which enabled me to collect much needed data at the Polish Cultural Institute in Sofia; and to the European Solidarity Centre in Gdańsk for giving me access to its digital photographic archive. I am grateful to Marysia Galbraith, Douglas R. Holmes, Don Kalb, Ewa Klekot, and the book’s editors, Nicolette Makovicky, Anne-Christine Trémon, and Sheyla S. Zandonai, for their comments on drafts of this chapter. I also owe an intellectual debt to the colleagues who provided me with the information and many of the insights on which this chapter is based, particularly Agata Bachórz, Jacek Friedrich, Jacek Koltan, Maria Kozakiewicz, Maria Mendel, Lesław Michałowski, Tomasz Rakowski, and Tomasz Szkudlarek.

Notes

- 1 Accommodation is a very complex process. On the one hand, it refers to people’s reinterpretation of a political message for their own requirements; on the other, it refers to the political establishment or political party’s attempts to appeal to a group of people by using the language and values with which these people are already familiar.

- 2 This chapter is based on research conducted in the Polish city of Gdańsk in several spells between 2008 and 2016 through a combination of participant observation, attendance of official ceremonies, and examination of published and unpublished materials.
- 3 The appropriation of political symbols and slogans for commercial purposes is a frequent occurrence in contemporary Poland. For example, while *Solidarność* (Solidarity) is the name of the mass social movement and trade union that contributed to the downfall of the socialist state, later on it also became the name of a brand of chocolates that can be found in most supermarkets throughout Poland. For an analysis of the commercialization of Polish national symbols, see Zubrzycki (2011: 47–52).
- 4 The slogan forms part of the popular Polish proverb “Unity builds, division destroys” (*Zgoda buduje, niezgoda rujnuje*).
- 5 One of the best known slogans is “The whole nation is building its capital city” (*Cały naród buduje swoją stolicę*), and can still be seen on a building on Warsaw’s main street. However, slogans such as “Today we build tomorrow’s Poland” (*Jutra Polskę budujemy dziś*) could also be noticed at the main entrance of many factories until recently (Marysia Galbraith, personal communication).
- 6 The socialist state produced countless posters with slogans conveying this idea. Some examples are: “Come with us to build a new home – People’s Poland” (*Chodź! Razem z nami budować nowy dom – Polskę Ludową*); “We are rebuilding the country” (*Odbudujemy kraj*); “We work as a trio – We do the (building) work of twelve” (*Pracujemy w trójkę – Budujemy za 12-tu*); “United we build the strength and future of Poland” (*Zjednoczeni budujemy siłę i przyszłość Polski*). “We are building Socialism” (*Budujemy Socjalizm*) was also the title of a newspaper. On official propaganda in socialist Poland, see Bralczyk (1987), Głowiński (1993), Kuroń and Żakowski (1995), and Zblewski (2000). For an analysis of “building” in Vietnam in the 1970s, see Schwenkel (2013).
- 7 Such works included particularly the Katowice Steelworks and Gdańsk’s northern port.
- 8 It must be borne in mind that Law and Justice stresses Christian and nationalist values and champions a notion of Polish history as a history of martyrdom, whereas Civic Platform advocates a vision of Poland as an integral part of a larger EU dedicated to market and pluralist principles.
- 9 This manipulation took on the form of Germanization of the city (Tighe 1990: 154–177), and the Jewish population paid the highest price.
- 10 *Solidarność* came to be through a dialogue between workers and intellectuals. However, as Kubik (1994: 232) notes, it “was a multistranded and complicated social entity from the beginning of its existence”.
- 11 Such slogans include: “We demand the truth in the press, radio, and TV” (*Żądamy prawdy w prasie, radio i TV*); “TV lies!” (*TV kłamie!*); “The Polish United Workers” Party lies” (*PZPR kłamie*); “Polish United Workers” Party + TV news = falsehood” (*PZPR + DTV = fałsz*); “(We have) enough of the lies of TV” (*Dość kłamsTV*).
- 12 This was an explicit reference, inter alia, to the discrepancy between the image of Poland’s economic success that informed the propaganda of the state led by Edward Gierek in the 1970s and the actual economic situation.
- 13 It is important to make a distinction between *Solidarność* as a trade union and *Solidarność* as a political party. As a party, it splintered into a number of political

- forces with a broad range of platforms, and some of these parties turned against the workers. However, Solidarność, as a trade union, continues to represent the workers, although not in the way it did before the demise of socialism.
- 14 Information about some revitalization projects in Gdańsk can be found at: www.gdansk.pl/download/2009_04/25328.pdf (Retrieved 18 March 2014)
 - 15 The slogan's appearance was very timely, for it coincided with the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of Solidarność as a trade union. As a consequence, both the anniversary and the upcoming works provided opportunities for the governing party to lay claim to the legacy of Solidarność.
 - 16 The redevelopment also included the construction of the European Solidarity Centre, an imposing building that stands by the shipyard's main gate and functions as a research institution documenting the activities of opposition movements in late socialism.
 - 17 For a comparison with Hungary, see Fehérváry (2013).
 - 18 It is necessary to make a distinction between the slogans propagated by the state in socialist times and those to which Poles became exposed after 1989. While, during socialism, engaging with propaganda and its language was almost inevitable, given the state's monopoly over public discourse (Kubik 1994; Yurchak 2006; Luehrmann 2011), in a world that is saturated with slogans of different sorts, propagated by the old and the new media, the dismissal of certain slogans should not come as a surprise.
 - 19 Nowadays there is a European Heritage plaque by the gate.
 - 20 "Il'ich" stands for Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, whereas "Adamowicz" refers to Paweł Adamowicz, Gdańsk's mayor since 1998.
 - 21 Such concerns derived from the awareness that many large-scale projects undertaken by the Polish state in preparation for the European football championships, like the construction of major motorways, had not yet come to completion. For details about these unfinished projects, see Grzeszak (2012).

References

- Boyer, Dominic, and Alexei Yurchak. 2010. "American Stibob: Or, What Late-Socialist Aesthetics of Parody Reveal about Contemporary Political Culture in the West." *Cultural Anthropology* 25, no. 2, pp. 179–221.
- Bralczyk, Jerzy. 1987. *O języku polskiej propagandy politycznej lat siedemdziesiątych* [On the language of Polish political propaganda of the 1970s]. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis.
- Buchli, Victor. 1999. *An Archaeology of Socialism*. Oxford: Berg.
- Charteris-Black, Jonathan. 2011. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphors*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Cohen, Anthony P. 1996. "Personal Nationalism: A Scottish View of Some Rites, Rights, and Wrongs." *American Ethnologist* 23, no. 4, pp. 802–815.
- Collier, Stephen. 2011. *Post-Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Comaroff, Jean, and John Comaroff. 2000. "Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming." *Public Culture* 12, no. 2, pp. 291–343.
- Czepczyński, Mariusz. 2004. "Living the Cultural Landscape: The Heritage and Identity of the Inhabitants of Gdańsk." In *Featuring the Quality of Urban Life in*

- Contemporary Cities of Eastern and Western Europe*, Iwona Sagan and Mariusz Czepczyński eds. Gdańsk: Bogucki Wydawnictwo Naukowe.
- . 2008. *Cultural Landscapes of Post-Socialist Cities: Representation of Powers and Needs*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Davies, Norman. 2001. *Heart of Europe: The Past in Poland's Present*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dunn, Elizabeth. 2004. *Privatizing Poland: Baby Food, Big Business, and the Remaking of Labor*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Fehérvári, Krisztina. 2013. *Politics in Color and Concrete: Socialist Materialities and the Middle Class in Hungary*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Friedrich, Jacek. 2007. "Odbudowa Gdańska jako miasta polskiego po 1945 roku" [The Reconstruction of Gdańsk as a Polish City after 1945]. *Pomerania* 3, no. 396, pp. 6–11.
- . 2012. "Polish and German Heritage in Danzig/Gdańsk: 1918, 1945 and 1989." In *Heritage, Ideology and Identity in Central and Eastern Europe: Contested Pasts, Contested Presents*, ed. Matthew Rampley. Woodbridge: Boydell Press.
- Głowiński, Michał. 1993. *Peereliada: Komentarze o słów 1976–1981* [A Tale of the People's Republic of Poland: Comments on Words, 1976–1981]. Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy.
- Golanska-Ryan, Justine. 2006. "Strategies of Resistance in the Polish Campaign against EU Membership." In *Postsocialism: Politics and Emotions in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Maruška Svašek. Oxford: Berghahn.
- Grabkowska, Maja. 2006. "Przemiany krajobrazu postindustrialnego na przykładzie gdańskich terenów postoczniovych" [Transformations of a postindustrial landscape: The example of the grounds of the former Gdańsk shipyard]. In *Przestrzenie miast postsocjalistycznych: Studia społecznych przemian przestrzeni zurbanizowanej* [Spaces of postsocialist cities: Studies of social transformations of urbanized space], ed. Mariusz Czepczyński. Gdańsk: Bogucki Wydawnictwo Naukowe.
- Greenberg, Jessica. 2014. *After the Revolution: Youth, Democracy, and the Politics of Disappointment in Serbia*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Grzeszak, Adam. 2012. "Budowaliśmy, budowaliśmy i co zbudowaliśmy?" [We built, we built, and what have we built?] *Polityka* 20, no. 2058, pp. 42–47.
- Hardy, Jane. 2009. *Poland's New Capitalism*. London: Pluto Press.
- Harvey, David. 1989. *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- . 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harvey, Penny, and Hannah Knox. 2015. *Roads: An Anthropology of Infrastructure and Expertise*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Holmes, Douglas R. 2000. *Integral Europe: Fast-Capitalism, Multiculturalism, Neo-Fascism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Humphrey, Caroline. 2005. "Ideology in Infrastructure: Architecture and Soviet Imagination." *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 11, no. 1, pp. 39–58.
- Jarecki, Edward. 1985. *Stocznia Gdańska im. Lenina: Życie społeczno-polityczne w latach 1945–1984* [Gdańsk's "Lenin" shipyard: Socio-political life in the years 1945–1984]. Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza.
- Johnson, Jeffrey. 2009. *American Advertising in Poland: A Study of Cultural Interactions since 1990*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company.

- Junghans, Trenholme. 2001. "Marketing Selves: Constructing Civil Society and Selfhood in Post-Socialist Hungary." *Critique of Anthropology* 21, no. 4, pp. 383–400.
- Kalb, Don. 2009a. "Conversation with a Polish Populist: Tracing Hidden Histories of Globalization, Class, and Dispossession in Postsocialism (and Beyond)." *American Ethnologist* 36, no. 2, pp. 207–223.
- . 2009b. "Headlines of Nationalism, Subtexts of Class: Poland and Popular Paranoia, 1989–2009." *Anthropologica* no. 51, pp. 289–300.
- Kenney, Padraic. 1997. *Rebuilding Poland: Workers and Communists, 1945–1950*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kipnis, Andrew. 2007. "Neoliberalism Reified: *Suzhi* Discourse and Tropes of Neoliberalism in the People's Republic of China." *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 13, no. 2, pp. 383–400.
- Kolankiewicz, George. 1994. "Elites in Search of a Political Formula." *Daedalus* 123, no. 3, pp. 143–157.
- Kubik, Jan. 1994. *The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Kuroń, Jacek, and Jacek Żakowski. 1995. *PRL dla początkujących* [The People's Republic of Poland for beginners]. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie.
- Laszczkowski, Mateusz. 2011. "Building the Future: Construction, Temporality and Politics in Astana." *Focaal*, no. 60, pp. 77–92.
- Lebow, Katherine. 2013. *Unfinished Utopia: Nowa Huta, Stalinism, and Polish Society, 1949–56*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Luehrmann, Sonja. 2011. "The Modernity of Manual Reproduction: Soviet Propaganda and the Creative Life of Ideology." *Cultural Anthropology* 26, no. 3, pp. 363–388.
- Lukowski, Jerzy, and Herbert Zawadzki. 2006. *A Concise History of Poland*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mach, Zdzisław. 2007. "Constructing Identities in a Post-Communist Society: Ethnic, National, and European." In *Identity and Networks: Fashioning Gender and Ethnicity across Cultures*, eds. Deborah F. Bryceson, Judith Okely, and Jonathan Webber. Oxford: Berghahn.
- Narotzky, Susana, and Gavin Smith. 2006. *Immediate Struggles: People, Power, and Place in Rural Spain*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ong, Aihwa. 2006. *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Ost, David. 2005. *The Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Paluch, Adam. 1997. "Nierealny świat realnego socjalizmu: Czyli poezja na usługach propagandy" [The unreal world or real socialism: Or, poetry at the service of propaganda]. In *Nim będzie zapomniana: Szkice o kulturze PRL-u* [Before it is forgotten: Sketches of the culture of the People's Republic of Poland], ed. Stefan Bednarek. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.
- Porter-Szűcs, Brian. 2014. *Poland in the Modern World: Beyond Martyrdom*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Pozniak, Kinga. 2013. "Reinventing a Model Socialist Steel Town in the Neoliberal Economy: The Case of Nowa Huta, Poland." *City & Society* 25, no. 1, pp. 113–134.

- Rumsey, Alan. 2000. "Agency, Personhood and the 'I' of Discourse in the Pacific and Beyond." *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 6, no. 1, pp. 101–115.
- Schwenkel, Christina. 2013. "Post/Socialist Affect: Ruination and Reconstruction of the Nation in Urban Vietnam." *Cultural Anthropology* 28, no. 2, pp. 252–277.
- Shields, Stuart. 2007. "From Socialist Solidarity to Neo-Populist Neoliberalisation? The Paradoxes of Poland's Post-Communist Transition." *Capital & Class* no. 93, pp. 159–178.
- Siewierska-Chmaj, Anna. 2006. *Język polskiej polityki: Politologiczno-semantyczna analiza expose premierów Polski w latach 1919–2004* [The language of Polish politics: A politico-semantic analysis of the discourses of the prime ministers of Poland in the years 1919–2004]. Rzeszów: Wyższa Szkoła Informatyki i Zarządzania.
- Tighe, Carl. 1990. *Gdańsk: National Identity in the Polish-German Borderlands*. London: Pluto Press.
- Weszkalnys, Gisa. 2010. *Berlin, Alexanderplatz: Transforming Place in a Unified Germany*. Oxford: Berghahn.
- Yurchak, Alexei. 2006. *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Zblewski, Zdzisław. 2000. *Leksykon PRL-u* [Lexicon of the People's Republic of Poland]. Cracow: Wydawnictwo Znak.
- Zubrzycki, Geneviève. 2011. "History and the National Sensorium: Making Sense of Polish Mythology." *Qualitative Sociology* 34, no. 1, pp. 21–57.
- Zukin, Sharon. 2010. *Naked City: The Death and Life of Authentic Urban Places*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Index

- Abu Dhabi 2, 8, 10, 13, 24–35, 37–49
accumulation 8, 38, 65, 71, 80, 95, 108
activism 3, 109, 112–13
advertisement 1, 6, 9, 17, 32, 38, 46,
50, 60, 135
aesthetics 107, 147
agency 16, 33, 42, 45–46, 113, 146, 165
agenda 2, 10, 14, 28–29, 41, 82, 86,
116, 154, 159
agriculture 54, 61, 71, 80, 61, 135, 158
Amazon 101–5, 107–9, 111–13, 115, 117
ambassador 13, 26, 36–38
ambiguity 3, 7, 79, 85, 145
America 1, 6, 81, 104–5, 109, 113,
122, 124
ancestors 64, 67–71
Andean 105
- Banská Bystrica 125, 132–33, 135
boom 8, 12, 41
brand 8–10, 13, 24–26, 30–44
branding 2, 10, 24–26, 34, 36, 42, 60
building 1, 10–11, 14, 17, 28, 35, 50,
52, 57, 67–68, 70, 73, 87, 109, 115,
134, 138, 145, 148–52, 154–62, 164
- capitalism 1, 41, 52–53, 63–64,
80, 106, 146, 151, 156, 159–60;
capitalist accumulation 8, 108;
capitalist expansion 17, 90; capitalist
principles 56, 71
China 2, 5, 9, 50, 52, 54, 59, 61–62,
66–67, 69, 71, 73, 90; Chinese
communism 80, 82, 86; Chinese
culture 57, 87; Chinese language
57, 82; Chinese nationals 79, 82,
97; Chinese politics 10, 86; Chinese
population 87–88; Chinese residents
77–78, 83, 85–87, 89, 96–97;
Chinese society 7, 74–75; Chinese
state 8, 56, 61, 72, 81, 87, 95
circulation 3–4, 7–8, 13, 25, 33, 37, 90,
140, 145
citizenship 7, 11–12, 17, 21, 48–49,
74–75, 85, 89, 95, 99, 123, 125, 127,
131, 136, 138–39, 143, 146, 164
city 3, 8–10, 14, 20–21, 25–30, 32,
39–40, 42–45, 48–50, 52–55, 59–60,
67, 70–72, 77–79, 81–82, 84–87,
89–94, 96, 98–99, 107, 125, 127,
133, 135, 137, 148–49, 151–53, 157,
161, 163–65
civic 6, 11–12, 14, 86, 92, 124, 140,
148, 150, 152–55, 158, 161; Civic
Platform 14, 148, 150, 152–55,
158, 161
civil 81–83, 88, 106, 108, 143–44, 164;
civil servants 81–83, 88; civil society
108, 164
class 11, 17, 30, 85, 124, 128–31,
134, 138, 140, 145, 153–54, 156,
158, 160
coalition 14, 53, 64, 72, 123–24,
126–31, 134, 136–38, 140
collective 7, 10–12, 17, 26, 39, 41, 53,
73, 86, 89, 104, 106, 112, 117, 123,
134, 136, 138, 146, 148–51, 155,
159; collective action 115; collective
economy 55–56, 66; collective
responsibility 15, 126
colonialism 3, 8, 10, 78–79, 82, 85,
87–90; colonial administration
81, 88
commercial 1, 3, 6–7, 9, 24, 27, 34, 37,
40, 43, 50, 60, 81, 122, 135, 147,
154; commercialization 44, 161
communication 17, 31, 35–36, 41, 43,
46, 65, 87, 109, 111, 113–14, 116

- communism 5, 14, 55, 60–61, 67, 69, 73, 75, 80, 82, 86, 98, 123–24, 126, 138, 142–44, 149
 communities 15, 27, 30, 36, 56–57, 61, 64, 88, 108–9, 113–16, 136–39, 158
 community 14, 36, 53–54, 61–62, 67–68, 84, 112–13, 123, 126, 129, 134, 137, 157
 competition 24, 26, 29, 31–32, 41–42, 44, 60, 65, 71, 92, 103, 145–46; competitiveness 25, 30, 35, 122
 condensation 4, 10–13, 34, 86, 125, 150
 conflict 15, 87, 89, 102, 106, 108, 111, 115–17, 119, 151, 158
 Confucianism 53, 64, 67, 69–70, 72–73
 construction 2, 8–9, 25, 27–28, 30, 34–38, 42, 44, 46, 70, 87–88, 90, 94, 125, 130, 139, 148–52, 154–55, 157–58, 162
 contestation 1, 5, 8
 corporate 6, 13, 45, 61–62, 79, 146
 crisis 8, 96, 108, 112, 146, 156, 158
 culture 1, 5, 12, 30, 33, 36, 41–42, 44, 50, 57, 87, 112, 116, 128–29, 137–38, 145, 148, 152, 154, 159; cultural form 2–3, 8; cultural idioms 4, 14–15; cultural landscape 151, 162–63

 decollectivization 54, 56
 decondensation 14, 15, 155
 decontextualization 3, 12
 development 8, 10, 16, 24, 26–29, 31–32, 35, 43, 55, 61, 63–66, 69–72, 79–81, 90, 95–96, 105, 108, 110–11, 116, 125, 138, 151, 153–54, 158
 discourse 3–6, 12–13, 15–16, 25, 35, 38, 52–53, 66, 69, 80, 88, 102–3, 126, 130–32, 136, 140, 147, 149, 152–53, 158, 162; discursive coupling 11, 123; discursive element 2, 87; discursive tropes 4, 14–15
 duilian 9, 50–52, 57–61, 64, 67, 71

 economy 24, 27, 29, 31, 35, 39–41, 44–45, 61, 63–66, 85, 90–92, 101–2, 104–6, 125, 132, 135, 154–58, 160–61; economic anthropology 21, 120; economic austerity 2, 17, 124; economic boom 2, 8, 12; economic crisis 21, 96, 146; economic development 46, 63–64, 69–71, 80, 119–20, 125; economic expansion 61, 82, 150; economic growth 79–80, 95–96, 102; economic inequalities 9, 95; economic liberalism 6, 16, 124; economic marginalization 13, 15, 137–38; economic policies 3, 7, 90, 95, 111–12, 125, 145, 157; economic reform 8–9, 54, 71, 80, 106, 125, 134, 143, 146, 155; economic restructuring 82, 96, 128, 140, 151; economic zone 8, 52, 54–55, 71–73, 75, 80–81, 98
 education 15, 29, 33, 80, 84–86, 91–93, 97, 103, 138
 enterprise 2, 11, 14, 16, 37, 51, 53, 57, 60–64, 67, 70, 72, 115, 124, 126–27, 132
 entextualization 4, 12, 15, 17, 89
 entrepreneurial 29, 52, 55, 62, 64, 66, 71, 78, 90, 95, 102–4, 105, 109, 128, 146
 entrepreneurial spirit 53, 60, 70
 ethics 2, 3, 8, 11, 63–65, 67, 124; ethical doctrines 7, 56; ethical regimes 7–8, 53, 56, 72; ethical citizenship 138
 ethnicity 11, 77, 79–80, 83–90, 97, 128, 131, 137–38, 149, 164; ethnic Chinese 79, 84–85, 87–88; ethnic mobilization 96, 142–43, 89, 144; ethnic stereotypes 123–24, 139
 European 28, 47, 88, 96, 123, 128, 152, 156, 160, 162; European commission 153, 155; European union 125, 129–30, 135, 146
 exchange 25, 30, 39–42, 44

 factory 40, 54, 62–64, 72, 118, 127, 134–35, 149, 153–54, 157, 161
 family 29, 33, 69, 84, 86, 124, 126, 128, 133
 formula 5, 25, 32, 34, 38, 63, 67, 71, 77, 86–87; formulaic statements 2, 8, 53, 59
 foundation 63, 68, 91, 127; foundational act 62, 71; foundational slogans 50–51, 53, 55, 57, 59
 future 2, 4, 9–10, 13, 28, 35–36, 40, 52, 56, 58, 60, 65–66, 70–71, 77, 80, 87, 91, 93, 95, 117, 154, 157, 159

 gambling 77–82, 89–97; governance of 77, 89, 90, 95; liberalization of 77, 80, 89, 96; gambling sector 78, 90
 Gdańsk 14, 148–49, 151–54, 156, 158, 160–61

- gender 145, 158, 160
 genealogy 4, 6, 57, 59, 61–63, 70
 globalization 7, 24, 26, 37, 104, 140, 147
 government 11, 14, 16, 29–30, 33, 45, 55, 59–62, 65–66, 68–72, 80, 83, 86–92, 94–95, 104, 108–11, 114, 122, 124–26, 129, 132, 134, 137, 150, 152–53, 158–59; government policies 2, 6, 31, 51–53; governmentality 8, 56, 69
 grassroots 16, 56, 64
 Greater China 87–88, 96
 Guangdong 51, 56–57, 59, 61, 70, 85, 97
 gypsies 128, 136, 137–38
- handover 10, 77, 79, 82–83, 85, 88, 90, 92–93, 95
 hegemony 6, 14, 16, 52, 56, 75, 97, 124, 129–30, 146; hegemonic discourses 140; hegemonic mobilization 3
 heritage 10, 14, 28–29, 32–33, 35, 41–43, 70–72, 151, 154, 156, 162
 history 3, 9–14, 32, 33, 35, 53, 59–60, 62, 75, 77–78, 80, 82, 84, 86, 93, 96, 108, 110, 112–13, 116–17, 140, 151–53, 160; historical anthropology 22, 71, 99; historical narrative 13, 15
 Hong 59, 63, 68, 73, 78, 80–84, 86, 88, 90, 97, 125
- identity 25, 30–31, 33–34, 36–40, 42–45, 53, 84, 88, 105, 129, 151, 156, 162
 ideology 4, 6, 11, 16–17, 52–53, 55–56, 66–67, 69, 71, 73, 101–3, 105, 109, 117, 119, 124, 129–30, 138, 145–47, 153
 indigenous 104, 119; indigenous actors 15, 112; indigenous communities 109, 116; indigenous federation 111, 113–15; indigenous leadership 109–10, 114; indigenous organizations 104, 108, 110, 115; indigenous peoples 108–9, 111–12, 120; indigenous politics 113, 119–20; indigenous rights 110, 112, 119–20
 individual 6–7, 10–12, 15, 29, 34, 52–53, 55, 65–66, 73, 78, 86, 101–2, 105, 108, 115, 125, 134, 145, 150, 159
- interpretation 5, 16, 60, 79, 83, 86, 131, 159
 irony 14, 53, 59
- kinship 14, 62–63, 66, 71
- labour 7, 11–12, 54, 65, 81, 89–92, 122–28, 132, 134–36, 138–39, 151, 154, 156, 158
 land 15, 34, 45, 53–54, 61–64, 69–70, 81, 84, 94, 106, 112–14, 135, 152, 154; land reform 73, 67; land tenure 67, 105
 language 2–6, 9–11, 16–20, 22, 46, 48, 57, 74, 82, 85–86, 88, 108, 114–17, 125, 131, 134, 147, 155–56, 158, 160, 162, 165
 law 20–21, 29, 62, 65–66, 74, 79–82, 85–86, 91, 96–98, 101, 107, 114, 117, 119–20, 142, 147, 150, 156, 161
 Law and Justice party 150, 147, 156, 161
 legitimacy 9, 13, 16, 72, 104–5, 109, 123–24, 131, 150, 156
 liberalization 8, 36, 56, 77–78, 80–82, 89–92, 95–96, 132, 134, 136, 140
 lineage 14; lineage-village 52–53, 61, 67, 70
 linguistic 3, 5, 8–9, 12–14, 17, 20, 86, 139
 local 3, 6, 8, 10, 12–16, 29–31, 36, 41, 43, 77–81, 83–88, 91, 94–96, 125, 127, 133, 135, 157–60; local activist 109, 113; local capitalism 53, 63–64, 72, 75; local communities 30, 57, 61, 64, 157; local discourse 140, 151; local economy 27, 78, 114
 locality 63, 81–82, 145, 158, 160
- Macanese 77–78, 83–84, 86, 88–90, 92–94
 Macau 2, 8; Macau people 10–11, 77, 79, 80, 83, 85–87, 89, 96
 magic 9–11, 21, 38
 management 46, 53, 64–66, 90
 Mao 50, 56, 66, 73; Maoism 55, 59, 63, 65, 67, 86–87, 106
 marginalization 13, 15, 112, 117, 128, 137–38
 market 6–8, 17, 30, 39–41, 44, 52–56, 63, 71, 80–81, 92, 95–96, 103–5, 118, 122, 125–26, 132, 134, 136, 138, 140, 158–61; market economy 29, 40, 65–66, 71, 80, 96, 146–47,

- 154; market forces 55, 147, 104;
 market principles 6, 54, 65, 95, 102,
 148; market socialism 7, 56, 65;
 marketing 2, 24–25, 31, 33, 38–40,
 43, 46, 49, 164
 mayor 133, 154, 156–58, 162
 meaning 3, 5, 14–15, 37, 41, 52, 57, 77,
 83, 111, 116, 139–40, 155, 160
 mockery 4, 16
 modernity 66–67, 107, 138, 149
 modernization 14, 29, 82, 150
 monopoly 25, 41, 43–44, 64, 71, 78,
 81, 147, 149, 162
 morality 1, 15, 58, 64, 70, 102, 104,
 106, 147, 149; moral calculus 132,
 135–36; moral dramatization 109,
 111, 117; moral politics 110, 122–23,
 125, 127, 129, 131, 133, 135–37,
 139, 141, 143
 myth 9, 35–37, 150, 153
- narratives 3, 9, 13–14, 38, 79, 87, 95,
 102, 104, 107, 116–17, 134, 140, 158
 nation 1, 3, 8, 10, 63, 103–4, 110,
 124–25, 134, 148–49, 161; branding
 of 24–26, 30–31, 34, 39, 40, 42;
 national discourse 80, 129; national
 dress 33, 35, 48; national history 87,
 154, 156, 158; national identity
 46–47, 156, 165; national narrative
 26, 34, 95, 158; national reunification
 77, 80; nationalism 128–29, 140;
 nation-state 132, 138
 neoliberalism 2–3, 7–8, 15–22, 25–26,
 37, 48–49, 52–53, 56, 64–65, 67–69,
 72, 74–75, 79, 82, 98–99, 102,
 104–5, 108, 116, 119–21, 124, 128,
 144–45, 148, 159–60, 162–64;
 neoliberal slogans 3, 13, 15, 17,
 101–3, 105, 107, 109, 111, 113,
 115–17, 119, 121, 145, 147
 no-liberalism 111, 118
- opposition 5, 15, 53, 55, 72, 92, 108,
 110, 113, 124, 129–30, 132, 136–37,
 141, 153–55, 157, 162
- peasants 50, 55, 63, 71, 74;
 peasants-turned-citizens 55
 performance 2–3, 5–6, 9, 13, 29, 34, 37,
 53, 65–66, 70, 87, 102, 135, 157
 persuasion 3–4, 19, 22, 98, 107,
 120, 162
 Peru 2, 15, 24, 101, 103–10, 115
- Poland 2, 10–11, 14, 145–61
 polarization 17, 102, 109–13, 115–17
 political 1–17, 28–30, 44, 55, 60, 72,
 77–83, 86–87, 93, 101–3, 108–10,
 112, 114–18, 122–25, 128–33,
 136–37, 145–48, 151–53, 155,
 158–61; political autonomy 10, 81;
 political economy 17, 19–20, 48,
 74, 77, 81, 90–91, 95–96, 105, 141,
 152; political performance 2–3, 102;
 political process 78, 82, 117, 128;
 political propaganda 13, 50, 60, 162;
 political rhetoric 4, 6–7, 11, 16, 124,
 140, 150; political slogans 1, 4–6, 8,
 11, 13, 15, 17, 23, 60, 87, 98, 145;
 political soundbite 1, 5; political
 symbols 3, 161; political technology
 1, 4, 50; political transition 2,
 86, 93, 98
- Portugal 87–88, 92–94, 97
 Portuguese 77–79, 93–94, 98;
 Portuguese administration 78,
 81, 83, 86–87, 94; Portuguese
 colonialism 8, 10, 87, 81; Portuguese
 nationality 85, 97
 postcolonial 3, 8, 77, 79, 98, 90, 95
 postindustrial 153–54
 postsocialism 3, 8, 14, 24, 122–24,
 129, 138, 140, 146, 148, 150, 155,
 158–59, 163–64
 pragmatics 2, 9, 60
 private 11, 15, 31, 40, 63, 91, 94–95,
 127, 133, 155–56, 159; private
 property 102, 104, 105, 107, 115,
 145, 159; private sector 29, 102, 122
 privatization 8, 17, 101, 108, 122, 132,
 134, 141, 146, 154, 156
 propaganda 4–5, 7, 13, 50, 60, 101,
 147–50, 155, 157, 161–62
 property 27, 29, 37, 42–43, 45, 60, 64,
 66, 73, 90, 102–5, 107, 115, 117,
 133, 145, 154, 159
 propitiatory 9, 50, 53, 57–60, 70
 prosperity 6–7, 9, 58, 60, 62, 64–65, 70,
 94, 96, 103, 145, 147, 159
 protest 15, 59, 61, 102–3, 108–15,
 118–19, 122, 128–29, 136–7, 139,
 156, 158
 proverb 58, 155, 161
- recontextualization 3–4, 16, 21
 reinterpretation 3–4, 16, 160
 religion 64, 67, 70–71, 148, 156;
 religious cult 70–71

- resistance 15–17, 59, 105, 112, 114, 156, 158
 resources 15, 17, 27, 29, 31, 35, 89, 95, 101, 103, 105, 112, 133, 135, 159
 rhetoric 2–4, 6–7, 16–17, 25, 67, 77, 96, 124–25, 131, 139–40, 150, 153, 157, 159, 162
 ritual 68; ritual language 9–11
 Roma 123, 128, 131–34; Roma citizens 138–39; Roma minority 11, 124
 rupture 2, 93
 Russia 5, 156
- sacred 26, 38, 40, 42–44; sacred objects 26, 38, 40, 43–44
 scale 8, 52, 71, 93
 self-government 55–56, 77, 80, 95, 151
 semantic 2–4, 12–15, 50, 60, 155;
 semantic ambiguity 3, 145
 shareholding 62; shareholding companies 56, 64–67, 71, 73
 Shenzhen 2, 8–9, 14, 50–57, 59–73
 shipyard 14, 152–58
 simplification 102–3, 107, 116–17
 Sino–Portuguese 82, 86, 88
 situation 3, 10–11, 13, 15, 26–27, 30, 36, 41, 53, 58–59, 72, 85, 89, 92, 96, 115, 125, 153–54, 156, 161;
 situational neoliberalism 79, 81
 slogans 1–17, 24, 50, 52–53, 57, 59–60, 70–71, 87, 101–3, 105–10, 112–18, 125, 145–50, 152, 155, 158–62;
 slogan-name 10, 25–26, 30, 34, 36–39, 43
 Slovakia 2, 122–23, 125, 127, 129, 131, 133, 135–37, 139–43
 social 1, 3–6, 8, 11–12, 16–17, 24, 29, 33, 35, 43, 52, 59, 61–63, 77–80, 82–83, 87, 89–92, 94–96, 101–3, 105, 135–40, 145, 147, 157–60;
 social contract 107, 123, 138; social inequalities 80, 111, 117–18, 123;
 social mobilization 103, 111–12, 115–17; social movements 22, 109, 115, 151, 161; social organization 55, 67, 73; social policy 105, 122–28, 135–36, 138–39, 141; social security 84, 122, 126
 socialism 7, 14, 56, 65, 75, 135, 138, 143, 146, 148–51, 153–54, 158–59, 161–62, 164
 society 4–5, 7, 13–14, 19, 22–23, 28–29, 33, 35–36, 48, 74–75, 85, 97–98, 105–6, 108, 117–18, 124, 126, 129, 136, 138, 142–44, 146–49, 158–59, 164
 solidarity 14, 64, 101, 143, 151, 158, 160–62, 164–65
 Solidarność 151–57, 161–62
 sovereignty 2, 21, 49, 75, 78–79, 88, 95, 98–99, 129, 140, 155, 164
 space 12, 21, 28, 37, 45, 47, 49–50, 54, 56, 60, 68, 75–76, 102, 110, 146, 163; spatial frames 52, 59
 special 41, 44, 53–55, 59, 77, 85, 87, 89, 152; special economic zone 8, 52, 54–55, 71–73, 80–81
 speech 5–6, 9–14, 106, 114; speech act 5, 9, 11, 13, 20, 34, 57, 59
 state 2, 6, 8–9, 11–12, 17, 26, 28, 37–38, 43, 45, 50, 52–53, 56, 59, 61, 63, 65, 68–72, 79, 81–82, 87, 94–95, 101, 103–7, 111, 114, 118–19, 123–26, 128–29, 132–35, 145–53, 155–62; state socialism 138, 159
 stereotypes 11, 110, 123, 128, 131, 133, 137, 139–40
 subjection 17, 37, 52, 55, 70, 82, 148
 subversion 2, 13–15, 59, 64, 110, 109
 symbols 3–5, 9, 40, 86, 140, 161
- tax 85, 91, 96, 102, 125–26, 133
 technologies 7, 37, 52–53, 55–56;
 of governance 123; of subjection 52–53, 55
 television 1, 85, 106, 122, 135, 137, 152, 156
 territory 8, 10, 24–26, 31, 33, 37–39, 41–44, 52–53, 66, 70–72, 78, 81, 92, 104, 114, 148–49
 transnational 27, 30, 35, 78
- unity 4, 10–11, 61, 148, 150, 155, 161
 unrest 123, 136–37, 139, 151, 154, 156
 urban 14, 25, 45, 52, 54–55, 68, 72, 77–79, 90, 92, 135, 151–52, 154; urban community 61; urban development 28, 48, 70, 158
 urbanization 20, 24, 53–54, 56, 61, 63, 68, 71, 75
- value 1, 10, 13, 15, 26, 39–44, 46, 72, 86, 105, 126, 128, 135, 152, 154
 village 51–52, 54, 70, 72, 133, 135;
 village collective 56, 63; village community 53, 61–62, 67–68; village lineage 53
 virtue 42, 45, 123, 127, 131–32

war 5, 17, 101, 107, 109–10, 112,
118, 123, 138, 146, 148–51,
153, 156
welfare 2, 64–65, 67, 92, 122–23,
126–28, 131–33, 136–40,
145–46
work 2–3, 5, 10–11, 17, 21, 25–26,
30–38, 43, 46, 73, 78, 80, 84–85,
89–90, 94, 104, 106–7, 122–29,

132, 135–40, 157, 161; workfare
11, 126, 140
workers 11, 14, 27–28, 30, 35,
63–65, 78, 84, 90–92, 95, 134, 139,
146–47, 149, 151, 154–57, 160–62;
working-class 6, 59, 124, 127, 129,
132, 140

Yanesha 110–16



Taylor & Francis Group
an **informa** business

Taylor & Francis eBooks

www.taylorfrancis.com

A single destination for eBooks from Taylor & Francis with increased functionality and an improved user experience to meet the needs of our customers.

90,000+ eBooks of award-winning academic content in Humanities, Social Science, Science, Technology, Engineering, and Medical written by a global network of editors and authors.

TAYLOR & FRANCIS EBOOKS OFFERS:

A streamlined experience for our library customers

A single point of discovery for all of our eBook content

Improved search and discovery of content at both book and chapter level

REQUEST A FREE TRIAL
support@taylorfrancis.com

 **Routledge**
Taylor & Francis Group

 **CRC Press**
Taylor & Francis Group