

WOMEN UNDER SUSPICION

Fraternization, Espionage, and Punishment in the Soviet Union During World War II

REGINA KAZYULINA

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This book is dedicated to my grandparents, whose stories inspired me to make their world legible.

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Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Terms

BShPD	Belorussian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement
ChGK	Extraordinary State Commission to Investigate German-Fascist Crimes
GKO	State Defense Committee
gorkom	city committee
Gulag	Main Administration of Corrective Labor Camps
Komsomol	Communist Youth League
komsomolka	female member of the Komsomol
KPZ	preliminary detention cell
KRO	Counterintelligence Department
NKGB	People's Commissariat for State Security
NKO	People's Commissariat of Defense
NKVD	People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs
oblast	region
Ostarbeiter	Eastern workers
partizanka	female member of the partisans
raion	district
OUN	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
PPZh	"mobile field wife" or "camp partisan wife"
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Socialist Republic
SMERSH	Main Directorate for Counterintelligence (aka "Death to Spies")
Tsk KP(b)U	Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party
UkrSSR	Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
UPA	Ukrainian Insurgent Army
UShPD	Ukrainian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement

A Note on Transliteration, Place-Names, and Terms

This book follows the Library of Congress transliteration system without diacritical marks to transliterate Russian and Ukrainian personal names, place-names, and words. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, place-names in Ukraine have been Ukrainianized and further changes have occurred since the passage of the "Decommunization" Laws in 2015. To avoid confusion and in recognition of the historical context, this book refers to locations and individuals as they appear either in the documents or the secondary sources being cited, except in the case of cities such as Kyiv. Whenever the present-day location and name of a village, town, or city can be identified, both names are given. This choice is made solely for the purposes of clarity and to avoid confusion.

Because this a book about women, it is also necessary to note that the terms "young women" and "girls" are used interchangeably throughout. This also reflects the language used during the period under investigation. In the 1930s and 1940s, Soviet men and women semantically differentiated between "women" (zhenshchiny) and "young women" or "girls" (devushki). Young women or girls were thought to be sexually innocent, and they only became women once they married and lost their virginity. Officially, all women became adult citizens when they turned eighteen, but girls were not considered adult women until they were married.

WOMEN UNDER SUSPICION

Introduction

In 1944, Mark Donskoi's film adaptation of *The Rainbow* (*Tęcza*), a prize-winning novella by Wanda Wasilewska, debuted in the Soviet Union.[1] Set during World War II, *The Rainbow* tells the story of the mostly female inhabitants of a Ukrainian village during the German occupation. The main protagonist is a female partisan (partizanka) named Olena. Pregnant with her first child, Olena is imprisoned and tortured by a German commandant who seeks to learn the whereabouts of her comrades in the forest. Rather than reveal their location, Olena sacrifices herself and her unborn child. Her selflessness is contrasted with the actions of Pusya, a local woman who spends her days in the company of the German commandant. While Olena and her neighbors suffer a multitude of torments, Pusya is seen lounging in bed, eating chocolate while waiting for her German lover to return. She is overtly sexual, and her sexuality amid the horrors of the occupation suggests that something is innately wrong with her. Throughout the film and the eponymous novella, Pusya is likened to a sick animal.[2] And like a rabid dog, Pusya is killed by her avenging husband when he returns to liberate the village at the end of the film.

A year later, Soviet cinemagoers were introduced to a more nuanced image of a female fraternizer in *It Happened in the Donbas* (*Eto bylo v Donbasse*).[3] The film follows the exploits of a female member of the Communist Youth League (komsomolka) named Lena who returns to her occupied hometown in Ukraine to lead an underground resistance. However, when she first arrives, Lena discovers that her friends are doing little to resist. One girl is so frightened that she cannot bring herself to leave her room, let alone to act, and is waiting for the Red Army to return. Another girl, a nineteen-year-old *komsomolka* named Liza, is passing her time with Germans. On the surface, Liza resembles the self-serving Pusya. She goes on dates with German soldiers and seems to be only concerned with having a good time. However, unlike Pusya,

Liza eventually recognizes the error of her ways. Her epiphany comes when she learns that the blouse she has been seen wearing throughout the film, a gift from her German boyfriend, previously belonged to a murdered *partizanka*. Horrified, Liza begs forgiveness and volunteers to take Lena's place as a forced laborer. Like *The Rainbow*, the film ends with the Red Army about to liberate the town. But with no hint of what might await women like Liza, it leaves open the possibility of an outcome different from the swift vengeance that awaited Pusya.

As World War II came to an end, these representations provided Soviet audiences with different ways of thinking about and evaluating the phenomenon of wartime fraternization. Although both films likened it to treason, *It Happened in the Donbas* was less certain about where fraternization stood in the hierarchy of wartime "crimes." Whereas earlier representations had suggested that Soviet women who had relations with enemy soldiers should be summarily executed, by 1945 their actions, and consequently their fates, were subject to less clear-cut interpretations. Few, if any, had taken up arms against the Soviet Union. And while some may have worked for the German occupation regime, their wartime actions were more ambiguous than those of other real and imagined traitors. Soviet film critics, however, remained unconvinced. Although both films opened to mixed reviews, critics found particular fault with *It Happened in the Donbas*, in large part because of Liza's character.[4] Finding her "contradictory," they assessed the entire "melodramatic episode" in which she begged forgiveness as "[un]convincing."[5] The film's striking attempts to humanize "traitors" like Liza fell flat with Soviet critics for whom *The Rainbow*'s Pusya was a more accurate portrayal of a wartime fraternizer.

The Rainbow and *It Happened in the Donbas* represent some of the earliest attempts in the Soviet Union to address the German occupation and make sense of the actions of civilians inside occupied territory. But what kind of fate actually awaited women suspected of fraternization in the Soviet Union? Did the genocidal violence of the German occupation and the starvation and forced labor that were imposed on civilians have any impact on the way their actions were perceived? And what about the women themselves? How did they understand their actions and those of their neighbors? What factors encouraged them to pursue relations with enemy combatants? Did their neighbors' treatment of them resemble that of the secret police and Communist Party officials or did neighbors advance different views and interpretations of fraternization given their own wartime experiences? Was there any hope for redemption or were alleged fraternizers considered innately deviant and therefore irredeemable, like Pusya? And, if the latter was the case, what was the basis for these sentiments, particularly among Soviet authorities?

The Soviet Union was far from unique in having to deal with the issue of fraternization as World War II ended. Indeed, the period of liberation saw civil and judicial authorities across war-torn Europe condemn women for their real and alleged relations with enemy combatants. In France, for example, women suspected of "horizontal collaboration" had their hair publicly shorn and were paraded before jeering crowds; as many as twenty thousand women were publicly shamed in this way during the first weeks and months after liberation.[6] Similar scenes occurred across Europe, including in Belgium, Holland, Italy, Norway, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.[7] In addition to such incidents, which began as early as 1940 in Denmark, as many as five thousand Danish women were detained and arrested for fraternization in the immediacy of liberation.[8] During the German occupation of Poland, neighbors denounced alleged fraternizers to the Armia Krajowa. In some cases, beatings replaced the head-shaving incidents that transpired elsewhere in Europe, and some women may have even been killed by the Polish underground.[9] Meanwhile, in Czechoslovakia, a "considerable" number of the nearly one hundred eighty thousand people who were tried by Czech honor courts were "Czech women accused of having consorted with German men during the war."[10] With women's patriotism closely linked to procreation, sexual liaisons with enemy combatants were "considered a far greater crime than the similar trespasses of men." More than just a betrayal of the family, their actions represented a betrayal of the nation.[11]

Until recently, scholars believed that Nazi racial laws and prohibitions against "race mixing" precluded any social or intimate contact between Germans and local civilians in the German-occupied East.[12] However, we now know that this was not so. Official prohibitions were often ignored, and sexual violence against Jewish and non-Jewish women and men was widespread.[13] While violence against civilians proliferated, a wide range of relations between non-Jewish women and German soldiers also developed.[14] Requisitioned and sometimes hired to wash clothes and cook food for German soldiers, who were often billeted in their homes, local women were forced to engage on a personal, everyday level with the occupiers. And with the occupation sometimes lasting years, non-Jewish women were often presented with the "choiceless choice" of cultivating a relationship with a German soldier, whether out of acute need, personal gain, love, or any combination of these and other factors.[15] But with Soviet women's patriotism increasingly linked to procreation, as was the case elsewhere in Europe, these relationships exposed them to charges of unpatriotic and even criminal behavior, sometimes entangling the women in their partners' crimes and, by extension, those of the occupation regime.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars have done much to elucidate the lived experiences of civilians on the Eastern Front.[16] They have also

cast light on Soviet wartime and postwar retribution.[17] However, with some notable exceptions, including Regina Mühlhäuser's work on sexual relations in the German-occupied East and Vanessa Voisin's articles on fraternization, much of this scholarship has failed to take gender into account.[18] By foregrounding gender, this book reinscribes women into the history of occupation on the Eastern Front. It considers how enduring assumptions and expectations about gender and "proper" wartime behavior informed the range of options available to them and how their subsequent choices were judged and punished. By delineating the gendered assumptions, anxieties, and fears that first gave rise to Soviet concerns about fraternization, it illuminates the roles Soviet and German military planners assigned to Soviet women and how they in turn attempted to negotiate and survive the unfathomable conditions they encountered within occupied territory.

This book traces how Soviet authorities punished women for their real and imagined interactions with enemy combatants during World War II. Specifically, it investigates how gendered anxieties and expectations encouraged Communist Party and military officials to view women in close contact with German soldiers as "socially dangerous," invoking a uniquely Soviet legal concept that specified numerous punishments, including imprisonment and exile. Although the Soviet Union legislated gender equality into law, deep misgivings remained about women and their contributions to the revolutionary project. Often considered "weak" and "politically unreliable," women were thought to be particularly susceptible to foreign influences that could transform them into a fifth column. Still more troubling was their supposed ability to lead men astray. Cast as "temptresses" who could corrode society from within, sexually active women came to represent everything that was dangerous and anti-Communist. I discuss this in detail in chapter 1, which traces the contradictory position of Soviet women in the interwar period and the anxieties and fears directed toward them. Although Soviet citizens did not accept all aspects of the official ideology and its evolving representations of and expectations for men and women, the outbreak of war would nevertheless see many fall back on these ingrained beliefs and models of behavior to evaluate the actions of their neighbors and comrades-in-arms.

Enduring expectations about "proper" wartime behavior that were shaped by interwar assumptions about gender roles had a profound impact on the lives of women not just in occupied territory but within the Red Army and the partisan movement. Within these spheres, their perceived deviation from the roles expected of them began to breed anxieties about their political reliability. Until recently, the contributions and experiences of women within the Soviet armed struggle remained marginalized.[19] Still, even as recent work has

done much to illuminate women's contributions and the full range of relations that existed between them and their male comrades, anxieties over their presence continue to be framed almost exclusively in relation to the armed forces.[20] However, as the following chapters will show, concerns about women's perceived negative influence within the Red Army and the partisan movement were closely linked to anxieties about what was transpiring in occupied territory, particularly fraternization.

In fall 1941, the Soviet leadership decided to accept and later mobilize women into the Red Army. Taken in response to wartime exigencies, this unprecedented step quickly encouraged a host of anxieties. Military and Communist Party officials began worrying that "backward" and "morally loose" women would corrupt the men in their midst, thereby undermining military morale and discipline. Initially, these fears focused on the "PPZh phenomenon," or the tendency of military commanders to pursue relations with their female subordinates.[21] But what started as a moral crisis quickly turned into a security crisis once Soviet intelligence began receiving reports that German forces were trying to recruit women and girls in occupied territory to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities. I trace the convergence of these crises in chapter 2 and the measures Soviet authorities subsequently adopted. While Soviet officials recognized that the PPZh phenomenon not only undermined military discipline but also exposed commanders to infiltration and sabotage, they did little to curtail it. Instead, they began calling for the surveillance and investigation of what many continued to see as the "morally loose" and "politically unreliable" women in their midst. A series of directives soon followed that called for the surveillance and investigation of any woman who was thought to have been in close contact with the enemy. Thereafter, the secret police continued to rely on these directives to identify targets for their policing operations.

Fears that German intelligence organs were recruiting local women as spies extended beyond the Red Army to the partisan movement. Chapter 3 explores the role of *partizanki* and the tragic consequences such fears had for fighters and civilian bystanders alike. Forced to operate in a hostile environment in which virtually anyone could be a spy or saboteur, the partisans were initially distrustful of all civilians inside occupied territory. Reports of female spies amplified this distrust and extended it to existing fighters. Although women were often relegated to traditional roles within the movement, they also served as scouts, couriers, and intermediaries between the partisans and civilians. These vital roles forced *partizanki* to spend extended periods of time away from their units while interacting with civilians, local collaborators, and enemy combatants. Every mission brought with it the threat of capture, interrogation, and doubling but also scrutiny upon the fighter's successful return.

With no foolproof way of verifying an individual's story, partisan commanders and intelligence officers were left to use their own judgment to identify enemy agents. Under such circumstances, personal prejudices often colored a commander's decisions. And with no way of neutralizing a potential threat other than by eliminating it, women and girls suspected of espionage were often summarily executed.

By reading Soviet intelligence reports "against the grain," we can see how gendered anxieties and fears informed Soviet wartime policies and the lived experiences of women caught in the maelstrom of total war.[22] As fraternization became associated with espionage and German recruitment, Soviet women inside occupied territory were cast as "temptresses" who, for a pair of stockings or cologne, were thought to be willing to "sell" themselves and lead loyal Communists astray. The reality, of course, was far more complicated. A close reading in chapter 4 of a diary of a former *komsomolka* turned fraternizer from a small town in central Ukraine serves as a counterweight to the official reports and pronouncements analyzed elsewhere. A multiplicity of factors encouraged women and girls to engage in what we would today consider sexual barter or survival prostitution, but for many Soviet officials and neighbors their actions were interpreted as a sign of moral corruption and treason.

By the time the Red Army began to liberate large swaths of occupied territory following the Battle of Stalingrad in February 1943, Soviet counterintelligence officials considered women and girls in close contact with the enemy to be potential spies, saboteurs, and members of German stay-behind networks. Acting on directives that were issued earlier amid concerns about enemy infiltration, the secret police detained and arrested suspected fraternizers in "mass cleansing" operations carried out in the wake of the Soviet advance. As I show in chapter 5, this often occurred with help from neighbors who shunned and sometimes denounced suspected fraternizers to the secret police. As Soviet forces advanced and the immediate threat of espionage diminished, alleged fraternizers continued to be surveilled and punished because of their perceived ability to corrupt the men in their midst. Having been exposed to an alternative way of life while showing themselves to be "weak" because of how they had handled their private lives, such women could no longer be trusted. Afraid of their impact on the body politic, Soviet officials evicted them from such strategically important cities as Kyiv while sentencing others to the Gulag as "socially dangerous elements."

Because of the relative accessibility of archives in Ukraine, many of the examples and cases discussed on the following pages occurred in what was Soviet Ukraine. Unlike present-day western Ukraine, which was forcibly grafted onto the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR) following the Molotov-

Ribbentrop Nonaggression Pact, these territories were part of the Soviet Union from the time of the Russian Civil War, and civilians living there were exposed to Soviet ideology, including its gender prescriptions, for a significant portion of their lives. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Soviet Ukraine was quickly overrun by the Wehrmacht. Most of the republic remained under occupation until the latter half of 1943 and early 1944. Meanwhile, Germany and its allies carved the republic into several occupation zones. The Transcarpathian region (oblast) of Ukraine, which was historically known as Subcarpathian Rus, was annexed by Hungary following the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in 1939. Large parts of the western regions, which were grafted onto the republic following the nonaggression pact, were incorporated into the General Government. Territory southwest of the Bug River fell under Romanian control and became part of Transnistria. The western and central regions of the pre-1939 republic were incorporated into the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Finally, the easternmost regions, those closest to the rear operating areas of the Wehrmacht, remained under military control throughout the German occupation.

The administrative divisions Germany and its allies imposed on Soviet Ukraine and other parts of the Soviet Union had a profound impact on the lived experiences of civilians. So too did the ferocity of partisan and/or nationalist activity in a particular area and the interethnic dynamics that predated the occupation there. All these factors, in addition to race, gender, and age, worked to demarcate the choices available to civilians inside occupied territory, and scholars must take them all into account when considering the actions of individuals on the ground. I strive to do this in the case study presented in chapter 4, but I contend that these distinctions had little impact on the official Soviet response to fraternization that evolved during the war.

Soviet directives calling for the surveillance of women in close contact with enemy soldiers did not target specific ethnic groups or areas of what had been occupied territory. Of course, this did not mean that individuals acting on these directives were necessarily blind to the ethnic backgrounds of the women they were investigating. Still, it seems that officially no distinctions were made between Ukrainian, Russian, or Belorussian women when it came to the issue of fraternization with German soldiers. The situation was different in present-day western Ukraine, where the Soviet Union waged a counterinsurgency against the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) starting in 1944. Pioneering work by Ukrainian scholars such as Marta Havryshko, Oksana Kis, Olena Petrenko, and others has shown that Ukrainian women suspected of being part of the nationalist underground or fraternizing with members of the OUN and the UPA were

violently targeted by Soviet secret police organs.[23] Their treatment and subsequent fate lie outside the scope of this study. Still, when appropriate, examples from western Ukraine are used, particularly in chapter 5, to illustrate larger points about the Soviet response to real and alleged fraternizers.

During World War II, Soviet analysts read reports from underground agents and partisan scouts operating across German-occupied territory, including present-day Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, to make policy recommendations. By adopting a similar methodology, we can trace the anxieties and fears that encouraged the Soviet secret police to view women in close contact with the enemy as "socially dangerous." Many relevant archival collections, particularly those of the former KGB, remain inaccessible to foreign scholars in Russia. Still, by using relevant collections available in Ukraine together with declassified reports, it is possible to document how a uniquely Soviet response evolved to the European-wide phenomenon of fraternization.

As the first book-length study of fraternization and its punishment in the Soviet context, this volume leaves many questions unanswered. Although I point to the stigma and lasting trauma women suspected of fraternization experienced in the postwar period in chapter 5, the book ends in 1945. Scholars continue to debate how the larger Soviet retribution campaign evolved in the postwar period. While some suggest that punishment became "less indiscriminate and less strict" as the Soviet Union transitioned to peacetime and official goals shifted from retribution to reconstruction, others maintain that some categories of individuals continued to be viewed as irredeemable. It remains to be seen whether postwar considerations, including the breakdown of the wartime alliance and the start of the Cold War, had any impact on the way suspected fraternizers were treated. Similarly, little information exists about their children and their subsequent fates. The ongoing inaccessibility of archival collections in Russia means that it will be up to future scholars to determine the exact dimensions of the retribution campaign I identify in the following chapters.

1

Soviet Women Between the World Wars

A Story of Contradictions

Although the Bolsheviks and their Communist successors were wedded to the goal of women's emancipation, they inherited several beliefs from the nineteenth century that influenced their conception of women's "nature" and subsequently their roles in society. Women were "backward" and in need of tutelage from a more "advanced," male proletariat.[1] If their "apolitical" and "passive" nature could be overcome, then, the Bolsheviks believed, women could serve as a valuable lever in the transformation of society.[2] However, if left unchecked, their "backwardness" was thought to leave them susceptible to counterrevolutionary influences that could transform them into a fifth column. This dichotomous view of women as potential allies and comrades on the one hand and as sources of danger and contamination on the other persisted throughout the first two decades of Soviet rule. Despite changing approaches to the "woman question" and subsequently to women's roles in society, it remained a fixture, coloring the way both rank-and-file Communists and ordinary citizens approached the women in their midst.[3]

Soviet citizens did not accept all aspects of the official ideology and its evolving representations of and expectations for New Soviet Men and Women. Still, they had to engage with it on a daily basis. While some aspects of the ideology may have initially seemed completely foreign to them, others may have appealed to what remained in essence a peasant society. This was especially the case once the Stalinist leadership began to retreat from the more revolutionary goals set forth earlier by the Bolsheviks.[4] Thus, even as Soviet citizens internalized some aspects of the ideology and rejected others, many came to rely upon official representations and models of behavior to guide their actions and evaluations of their friends and neighbors.

Over the past three decades, much has been written about Soviet women and their roles in society. This chapter relies on this pioneering work to

examine the evolving expectations for and anxieties about women that persisted throughout the interwar period. Despite the hopes the Communist Party placed in women, many Party members as well as ordinary citizens remained wary of them. Notwithstanding the dramatic changes in Soviet society during these years, anxieties about women and their reliability persisted. These anxieties were often linked with sexuality: a woman's sexual practices were seen as a reflection of her inner soul and her commitment to revolutionary ideals. Communist Party members and ordinary citizens carried these ideas with them into the war. And, as we shall see in the following chapters, these inherited beliefs and anxieties subsequently informed how government officials and ordinary citizens related to, evaluated, and ultimately punished women for their real and perceived wartime transgressions.

Women in the Russian Empire amid Revolutionary Change

The position of women in the nineteenth-century Russian Empire resembled that of women in other European states, with one difference: they were allowed to own property.[5] Prior to the Russian Revolution, a woman "owed complete obedience to her husband. She was compelled to live with him, take his name, and assume his social status. Up to 1914, when limited reforms permitted a woman to separate from her husband and obtain her own passport, a woman was unable to take a job, get an education, receive a passport for work or residence, or execute a bill of exchange without her husband's consent."[6]

In the deeply religious countryside, an "oppressive patriarchal system" dictated the lives of peasants.[7] Steeped in Judeo-Christian teachings, which interpreted original sin as a sexual act initiated by Eve, peasants considered women, as the daughters of Eve, to be temptresses.[8] Peasants believed that women required strict control because they were widely thought to be weak and prone to uncontrollable sexual urges.[9] A double standard of morality, similar to what prevailed elsewhere in nineteenth-century Europe, existed. Whereas women were expected to remain chaste until marriage and thereafter to remain faithful to their husbands, men were allowed to blame their sexual desires on "enticing" women.[10] The position that women were sources of corruption and pollution also had its basis in religious teachings reinforced by the Russian Orthodox Church.[11] These beliefs helped maintain the status quo in the countryside and were widely shared by men and women alike.[12]

In intellectual circles, meanwhile, women were often considered in terms of the "citizen-mother," who was charged with rearing and socializing future generations. During the nineteenth century, intellectuals increasingly began recognizing that the subordinate status of women in the Russian Empire impeded

this process and therefore the transformation of society. Influenced by the Enlightenment, they began calling for women's emancipation starting in the mid-nineteenth century.[13] As the most radical of the various Marxist groups that emerged by the end of the century, the Bolsheviks naturally accepted the need for women's liberation. Like other Social Democrats, they believed that equality between the sexes could only be achieved if women were allowed to leave the confines of the home and be integrated into the industrial labor force, where they could become wage-earners. Eventually, according to Bolshevik theorists, the bourgeois family would "wither away" and be replaced by companionate marriages or free unions between free, independent, and equal partners. The functions of the family, meanwhile, would be taken over by the state. Housework, child education, and childrearing would all fall under the purview of the state, which would open state-run cafeterias, laundry facilities, kindergartens, and crèches.[14] These institutions, in turn, would free women to pursue educations and careers, thereby gaining independence.

The Bolsheviks began enacting reforms aimed at transforming everyday life (byt) along these lines almost immediately after seizing control in November 1917. As one of their first orders, they replaced religious with civil marriage and established divorce upon the request of either spouse.[15] Then, in October 1918, they passed the Code on Marriage, the Family, and Guardianship, which, in the words of Wendy Goldman, "swept away centuries of patriarchal and ecclesiastical power and established a new doctrine based on individual rights and gender equality."[16] Initially, the Bolsheviks were skeptical of organizing women separately around women's issues out of fears that this would divide the revolutionary movement.[17] But by 1919, they acquiesced to pressure from prominent female Bolsheviks, such as Aleksandra Kollontai, to create a women's section of the Party. The resulting Zhenotdel had two functions: to train and organize female cadres for the nascent Communist Party and to transform *byt* through the socialization of housework.

The Zhenotdel functioned throughout the 1920s, but it often encountered opposition from Party members and local activists notwithstanding the Party's support of women's emancipation.[18] In large part this was due to the deep-seated mistrust the Bolsheviks inherited from the nineteenth century of not just women but of the entire feminine sphere and all the attributes associated with it.[19] Whereas Ukrainian and Russian peasants often considered women in terms of the "temptress," social thinkers thought of them in terms of the *baba*. The colloquial term *baba* connoted a woman who was illiterate, superstitious, and generally "backward" and therefore susceptible to negative influences.[20] Seen as passive, *baba*s were thought to "embody the dangers of a reactionary past by virtue of their association with the private spheres of home

and family."[21] Such a belief was succinctly voiced by Lenin, among others, when he worried that "the backwardness of women, their lack of understanding for the revolutionary ideals of the man, decrease his joy and determination in fighting. They are like little worms, which unseen, slowly but surely rot and corrode."[22] Through their perceived lack of knowledge and understanding of the revolutionary movement, women were thought to have the potential to lead their husbands and lovers astray. Ultimately, whether it was in the countryside or in the revolutionary movement, women were sometimes seen as sources of corruption and danger.

Soviet youth within the nascent Komsomol, the Communist Youth League, often reproduced such representations and the discriminatory behavior associated with them throughout the first decade of Soviet rule.[23] Although the Komsomol officially encouraged girls to participate, it remained a predominantly masculine organization in which women, even those who joined, were considered "backward" and denigrated as *baba*s.[24] Societal norms, meanwhile, often prevented women and girls from participating, reinforcing negative stereotypes. Parents, especially those from peasant backgrounds, discouraged their daughters from joining the Komsomol or attending its meetings. They believed the organization to be immoral because it removed girls from parental control to attend meetings at night in the company of men. In general, the parents of both urban and rural girls worried that those who joined the organization were "looser" than their non-Communist counterparts.[25] Such views, combined with the callous treatment girls received at the hands of their male comrades, discouraged them from participating in the revolutionary movement. But while some Komsomol leaders may have recognized the barriers that women and girls had to overcome, many nevertheless blamed them and their lack of cultural sophistication for their failure to become involved in the transformation of society.[26] Meanwhile, the dire economic and social situation in the Soviet Union following World War I and the Russian Civil War inhibited the transformation of *byt*, thereby further undermining the position of women and girls in the new society.

Economic shifts added to the significant social pressures women and girls faced during the first decade of Soviet rule. Lenin's adoption of a tax-in-kind in place of grain requisitioning in 1921 and the subsequent economic policies that collectively became known as the New Economic Policy (NEP) created a mixed economy. The NEP enabled the Bolsheviks to begin rebuilding the country, but progress came at a significant price. Because funds were limited, government agencies and enterprises had to run at a profit or risk being shut down. Many of the first casualties of these austerity measures became the government-run day-care centers, cafeterias, laundries, and children's homes

that had been recently opened to facilitate the transformation of *byt*.[27] Their closures coincided with the demobilization of millions of Red Army soldiers who, upon returning home, took jobs away from the women who had been performing them in their absence. As a result, many women not only lost access to the promised communal facilities that would have freed them from the double burden of home and work, but many lost their jobs at a time of high unemployment in the country. Despite official propaganda calling for gender equality and the integration of women into the labor force, women were thought to be unskilled and inferior to their male counterparts. They were considered physically and biologically unfit for work and were thought to embody any number of negative characteristics, similar to those exemplified by the *baba*, which made them unsuitable for work in the eyes of managers and male coworkers.[28] Moreover, since the state defined workers who were eligible for state support as those who possessed prerevolutionary *stazh* (seniority) and industrial skills, many women, lacking such credentials, were unable to apply for unemployment benefits.[29] This came at a time when easy access to divorce, combined with the state's inability to enforce alimony payments, left many without the support of a husband.[30]

Nascent Soviet jurists were aware of the myriad problems their revolutionary legislation was creating and attempted to address them throughout the 1920s. They remained committed to free unions and the emancipatory ethos of their legislation, but they introduced modifications aimed at addressing the perceived chaos it had unleashed.[31] The Communist Party also recognized the ills that female unemployment and continuing discrimination were causing. However, with its attention focused on economic reconstruction, and in the face of limited funds and latent ambivalence about the position of women in society, the Party did little to address these problems. Wendy Goldman has argued that because of the way the Party defined workers and the proletariat, many Soviet officials considered women as potentially alien and counterrevolutionary elements. Thus, even when faced with an acute labor shortage at the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan, the Party initially vacillated about recruiting women to the labor force out of fears that their greater participation might contaminate and dilute the working class.[32] Alone, often unemployed, and without the promised support of the state, many urban women had little choice but to resort to prostitution to support themselves and their children. Prostitution, in the words of Wendy Goldman, "made a mockery of the idea that women were free, independent individuals who could enter a union on the basis of personal choice" while demonstrating just how much the regime's revolutionary goals strayed from the reality of everyday life for a large segment of Soviet men and women during NEP.[33]

Nowhere was this gulf between the revolutionary ideals and the reality of everyday life more evident than in the emergence of the so-called NEPmen and NEPwomen. They were middlemen and entrepreneurs who were able to take advantage of the mixed economy. Dressing in furs and flapper dresses and often seen frequenting the clubs, restaurants, and casinos that sprang up during the 1920s, these men and women became the visual representations of inequality in the NEP era. Their conspicuous consumption and pursuit of pleasure contrasted sharply with the "qualities of self-discipline, moderation, patience, and mastery" that the Bolsheviks expected of New Soviet Men and Women.[34] Moreover, their presence in a revolutionary society inflamed Bolshevik anxieties that the mixed economy was ushering a return to capitalism and sparked fears of contagion. Alongside the *baba* and the "backward" wife, both of whom remained powerful tropes throughout the decade, it was the NEPwoman, variously called a "coquette" or "doll-parasite," who became the embodiment of these fears.[35] Portrayed as being solely concerned with her appearance, the "shapely, painted, quasi-prostitute became a pervasive symbol of the ideological taint of NEP."[36]

In recognition of these associations, revolutionary men and women believed that attention to clean and fashionable dress was unrevolutionary. To distinguish themselves from the NEPmen and women, Komsomol girls and boys wore "leather jackets, crumpled skirts, and patched shoes."[37] To them, consumer goods such as lipstick, powder, and cologne, as well as the attention to one's appearance that these items represented, were all suspect. They were thought to be signs of *meshchanstvo*, a prerevolutionary term referring to petit-bourgeois vulgarity used "to label all kinds of 'non-communist' behavior, dress, language, and manners."[38] Still, her appearance and petit-bourgeois preoccupations were not the only reasons that the "coquette" was singled out for opprobrium. Rather, her overt sexuality and supposed active pursuit of men made her a perceived threat to the revolution and the emerging social order.

In addition to their anxieties about the feminine sphere, the Bolsheviks inherited several Victorian assumptions about sex and sexuality. For one, the belief in innate biological differences between the sexes went unquestioned, as did the corresponding gender roles this encouraged.[39] Women were expected to remain passive, and any woman who actively pursued men and pleasure was thought to be adopting masculine traits and, in so doing, "upset[ing] nature's sexual order."[40] Despite the Bolsheviks' belief in companionate marriage and free unions, there was little discussion of pleasure in the Soviet Union. Rather, sex was mainly seen through its reproductive function, as was common elsewhere during the nineteenth century. Any discussion of pleasure was deeply mistrusted because uncontrolled sexuality was thought to be a sign of cor-

ruption, and sex was thought to alienate the individual from the collective.[41] The Bolsheviks were not alone in their mistrust. Indeed, thinkers of all political stripes expressed revulsion on the eve of World War I in the face of what they perceived as promiscuous and hedonistic relations between young men and women.[42] Ironically, this meant that the Bolsheviks' mistrust at times resembled the pronouncements of nineteenth-century antifeminist writers who associated free love with "civil immorality, political unreliability, and—in some cases—hopeless degeneracy."[43]

Alongside their mistrust of pleasure, the Bolsheviks also inherited a belief in the closed-bodily economy, which is the idea that the human body has a limited store of energy that is wasted through any number of activities, including sex. Although neither Lenin nor any other Bolshevik theorist expected complete asceticism from Soviet men and women, they believed that Communists should show "sobriety" in their personal relations. Lenin was concerned with the glass of water theory, an idea prevalent during the Russian Civil War that sex should be akin to drinking a glass of water. The pursuit of sexual pleasure, to him, was "un-Marxist" and "anti-social." Rather than "run after every petticoat and get entrapped by every young woman," he suggested that young people should take up "healthy sport, swimming, racing, walking, bodily exercises of every kind, and many-sided intellectual interests."[44] Nascent Soviet sex educators and public health officials adopted a similar line in their pronouncements during the 1920s by advocating abstinence or sublimation of sexual desire through work, civic activity, and physical culture.[45] As a result, "normal" adult sexuality was envisioned solely within the confines of marriage or a long-term monogamous relationship and only when it resulted in pregnancy.[46] Within this context, any woman who actively pursued sex and pleasure was not only perceived as upsetting the "natural order" but more importantly as wasting a limited supply of energy that she was supposed to devote exclusively to the revolution.[47] Even more troubling, however, was the belief that she had the potential to corrupt the politically reliable men in her midst. For example, in her discussion of the "doll-parasite," Aleksandra Kollontai argued that anyone who associated with her would be pulled into the "swamp of philistinism."[48] This conception of the NEP-era "coquette" as a potential threat to both the social and political health of the country became a symbol of everything that was wrong with NEP and a negative model of feminine behavior that good Soviet women and girls were expected to eschew.

In the 1920s, these expectations were widely disseminated through sex-education posters, which provided a "behavioral blueprint" for men and women.[49] According to Francis Lee Bernstein, Soviet sex-education posters usually portrayed women as either sexually passive wives or sexually active

prostitutes carrying venereal disease.[50] And although the posters often portrayed men as being responsible for introducing venereal disease into the family, they suggested that sexually active women bore responsibility for the initial transmission.[51] In so doing, sex-education posters suggested that sexually active women were not only responsible for leading men astray but also for spreading contagion throughout the body politic. This harkened back to prerevolutionary depictions of Russian prostitutes, who were often thought to be inherently degenerate.[52] And, as we have already seen, it also fit with traditional, peasant views of women as "temptresses." Ultimately, as with prerevolutionary depictions, which suggested that women could either be "honest" or "dishonest," "fallen" or "non-fallen," these representations left good Soviet women with only one choice.[53] They admonished them to remain sexually passive or risk being deprived "of the rewards of family and motherhood."[54]

Despite the significant changes which the revolution and the Bolsheviks' support for women's emancipation had brought to the lives of Soviet women, some preexisting ideas and practices remained. Because the Bolsheviks never questioned the belief in innate biological differences between men and women, they continued to see childcare and housework as women's work, notwithstanding calls for their socialization. Whereas before women were expected to perform this labor for free within the confines of the home, now they would do so in state-run institutions where they would be compensated by a wage. Although they assigned important roles to women within the new society, the Bolsheviks nevertheless remained wary of them. Thus, even as they recognized women as potential comrades in the transformation of society, they also continued to view them as potential sources of danger and corruption. During NEP, this danger was most visibly represented by the NEPwoman or "coquette." Although she would be swept away along with other so-called class enemies by the end of the 1920s, the anxieties that she induced and the associations that she represented would endure within the public psyche long after she ceased to pose any real or perceived threat to the revolutionary order.

Soviet Women amid Stalin's Revolution from Above

Following Lenin's death in 1924, a power struggle ensued within the Communist Party, which became closely linked with the future of NEP. Although the mixed economy had enabled the Soviet Union to rebuild to prerevolutionary levels, it was unclear where new sources of revenue would be found to fund industrialization. While some Party leaders recognized the benefits of NEP and wanted to maintain the mixed economy into the foreseeable future, others were wary of the moderate pace of economic development and the ideological taint that it represented. By 1927, Stalin emerged victorious, having out-

maneuvered all his opponents in the Party, and was ready to steer the Soviet Union onto a new path. The country subsequently embarked on a crash course in industrialization and collectivization that irrevocably transformed Soviet society. By the start of the 1930s, Soviet women would arguably have more opportunities than they had in the 1920s. But latent ambivalence and distrust about them and their roles in society would remain. Indeed, although the "coquette" would be long gone, the anxieties she represented would continue to manifest in new and familiar ways. Despite the emergence of a new Soviet culture with its attendant symbols, meanings, and expectations, old fears about women as potentially weak and unreliable elements of the revolutionary society continued to linger.

Immediately following the start of the First Five-Year Plan in 1928, the Communist Party focused on fulfilling the plan, relegating *byt* and women's issues to the back burner. Rather than pursue the transformation of *byt*, the Party began favoring a new policy of *vydvizhenie* that saw the promotion of individual men and women, often from humble backgrounds, to leadership positions.[55] This policy rewarded them for their hard work and dedication with unprecedented opportunities for education and career advancement. But while it expanded the opportunities of many and was often perceived as a positive development, *vydvizhenie* replaced the more revolutionary goal of transforming *byt*, which was largely abandoned following the elimination of the Zhenotdel in 1930.[56] From that point forward, the double and at times triple burden of Soviet women, who also participated in political work, largely went unquestioned, even as increasing numbers of women entered the labor force.

Initially, during the First Five-Year Plan, the Communist Party continued to question women's political reliability. But once an acute labor shortage developed in 1930, the Party began attracting millions of urban women into the labor force. The result, according to Wendy Goldman, was a "regendering" and "resegregating" of entire sectors of the economy into women's work, even as other sectors, such as industry and construction, were feminized.[57] The presence of women in traditionally male industries soon redrew women's roles by expanding the limits of the permissible. Men's gender roles, however, largely remained unchanged not only because the women who entered the labor force at this time did not displace them but also because household labor still remained largely the purview of women.[58] Meanwhile, skepticism, prejudice, and harassment toward women from coworkers, managers, and union officials remained. Indeed, since many continued to believe that women lacked not only the ability to perform skilled labor but also the mental and physical capacity to learn them, women who sought the training and experience necessary to advance in their chosen fields faced continued obstacles.[59]

Similar developments took place in the countryside, where the Communist Party began encouraging peasant women to become tractor and combine drivers as well as mechanics. Here too, however, collective farm chairmen and ordinary male and female peasants resisted state efforts to train and hire women.[60] As in the 1920s, when the parents of rural children forbade their daughters from participating in Komsomol meetings because they were considered to be sites of moral dissolution, opposition to women entering these professions focused on notions of morality. The countryside remained conservative, notwithstanding the changes wrought by the revolution, and a woman's reputation continued to play an important role in everyday life. Young women, according to Liubov Denisova, "cherished their reputations for being 'proper girls' and feared rumors of indecent behavior."[61] With arranged marriages still common in the interwar period, a woman's reputation remained an important factor for her standing in the community and her chances for a good match.[62] Female tractor drivers and mechanics, however, had to work late hours in the company of men. And they often had to spend nights during the growing season sleeping outside in the fields. Under these circumstances, which contested established patriarchal norms, women were seen as disreputable.[63] Even when a woman was married, her reputation suffered. This was the fate of the famous Pasha Angelina, one of the most celebrated female tractor drivers of the period, who was forced to choose between her husband and her profession in part because of the rumors that her work was generating.[64]

Throughout the 1930s, Moscow responded to the intransigence of male workers and local Communist Party officials by setting high quotas for women in training programs and places of higher education and by setting aside positions for them in industry. Furthermore, through propaganda efforts and repeated campaigns, central authorities called on rural officials to promote women into administrative positions on collective farms and in rural soviets. Local officials, however, only reluctantly followed through with these demands.[65] Still, despite ongoing opposition, the regime continued to promote women in part because their work helped alleviate labor shortages. At the same time, their integration into the labor force suggested the fulfillment of the revolution's promise to emancipate women. As Choi Chatterjee has argued, the transformation of the *baba* into a modern, politically conscious *chelovek* (human being) came to represent the achievements of Soviet modernity and Stalinism.[66] Whereas "women had received legal rights and little more" after the revolution, Stalinist propaganda could claim that with the start of the First Five-Year Plan, "women became economically independent and fully-fledged Soviet citizens."[67]

Now that women had been transformed into industrial workers, they were no longer portrayed as "backward" and potentially counterrevolutionary elements of Soviet society. Instead, a cohort of female heroines, often depicted as grateful workers who toiled away for the glory of the state, began appearing on the pages of Soviet newspapers and magazines. And with war increasingly likely, the regime also began appealing to women to begin preparing themselves to defend their rights on the battlefields of that future war. Films such as *Chapaev* (1934) and *Podrugi* (1935) depicted women fighting alongside men while suggesting that they might also be called upon to take up arms in the near future.[68] Other films contained subplots in which women apprehended spies and saboteurs, reflecting not only the spy mania of the decade but also the notion that Soviet women should always be ready to protect the state.[69]

Alongside these official representations, the Communist Party launched a series of military preparedness campaigns during the 1930s that were meant to train Soviet youth in military-related skills, such as skydiving, shooting, and flying.[70] Communist Party and Komsomol leaders appealed to prospective members as "youth," "Komsomol members," and "young people" without differentiating between the sexes. Such undifferentiated appeals, combined with ubiquitous visual representations of women performing the same tasks as men, encouraged women and girls to connect with "the defense effort's ultimate goals—preparation for service in the Red Army and to fight and die on the fronts of the future war."[71] By participating in the campaigns, many young women acquired the skills to begin new careers in previously male-dominated fields. More importantly, they were also encouraged to view their participation in the upcoming war as "natural and constitutive of their Soviet womanhood."[72] According to Anna Krylova, the new image of Soviet womanhood that emerged from these campaigns "combined the conventionally incompatible: femininity and military prowess; the determination to kill and motherhood; courage and disciplined cold-bloodedness."[73]

The regime's gender-neutral rhetoric and emphasis on defense and military preparedness helped expand women's roles throughout the 1930s. But elsewhere, developments served to reinforce and re-create traditional gender roles. Although the Communist Party had adopted measures throughout the previous decade to alleviate the various social ills stemming from World War I and the revolution, these problems proved intractable. With birth rates declining and the Party increasingly worried about the prospect of war by the early 1930s, the regime began adopting a pronatalist policy aimed at strengthening the family.[74] Whereas before, the "withering away" of the bourgeois family was heralded, now the family was increasingly seen as a bulwark against the social

dislocation first unleashed by the Russian Civil War and later accelerated by Stalin's "revolution from above." By 1936, the regime codified its pronatalist and pro-family policy into law by enacting reforms that outlawed abortion, made it more difficult and expensive for citizens to obtain a divorce, and imposed higher penalties for a man's failure to pay child support. While these measures reversed the revolutionary policies of the previous decade, they all, save for the ban on abortion, were universally hailed by women who saw in them the protections that they had been calling for during NEP.[75]

Alongside these transformations, a new culture that synthesized aspects of a previously condemned bourgeois culture with the socialist ethos for self-transformation was also beginning to take shape. Gone were the debates of the 1920s about what did and did not constitute proper Communist behavior as previously condemned leisure activities, such as dancing, were rehabilitated. Seeking to incentivize a recalcitrant labor force and illustrate the supposed achievements of collectivization and industrialization, the Stalinist leadership began to cultivate a new celebration of consumption that replaced the asceticism of the early Bolsheviks.[76] With the Soviet press soon regularly reporting on newly available products, such as ice cream and frankfurters, and consumer goods such as sewing and washing machines, these items also came to symbolize Soviet modernity.[77] And although they were inaccessible for all but the elite, they came to represent the promise of the new world being built.

For Soviet men and women, "culturedness" (kul′turnost′), a concept delineating the values, manners, and interests a "cultured" Soviet citizen and good Communist was supposed to exhibit, provided a new blueprint for behavior. It was first marshalled by the Stalinist regime in 1935 to discipline and "civilize" a newly minted urban population and labor force created largely through the First Five-Year Plan.[78] "Culturedness," according to Sheila Fitzpatrick, consisted of several layers of culture that Soviet citizens, striving to transform themselves into New Soviet Men and Women, were expected to master.

> The first was the culture of basic hygiene—washing with soap, tooth-cleaning, not spitting on the floor—and elementary literacy. . . . The second, emphasizing such things as table manners, behavior in public places, treatment of women, and basic knowledge of Communist ideology, was the level of culture required of any town-dweller. The third, part of what had once been called "bourgeois" or "petty-bourgeois" culture, was the culture of propriety, involving good manners, correct speech, neat and appropriate dress, and some appreciation of the high culture of literature, music, and ballet. This was the level of culture implicitly expected of the managerial class, members of the new Soviet elite.[79]

Women, especially those who were married, had an important role to play in the acquisition of "culturedness" and the formulation of the "new and uniquely Soviet culture of daily life [kul´tura byta]" that was being created in the mid-1930s.[80] Portrayed as "helpmates," married women were charged with creating a "cultured" environment in the home to boost health and facilitate rest and relaxation, which would in turn encourage productivity. *Obshchestvennitsy*, the wives of engineers, administrators, and Red Army officers, were at the forefront of this movement.[81] In addition to cultivating "culturedness" at home, *obshchestvennitsy* were encouraged to undertake efforts to improve the quality of food in cafeterias, expand day-care services, and raise the overall hygiene levels of workers' dormitories in order to raise "culturedness" in the workplace.[82] Officially encouraged to undertake this free labor for the good of the state and society, they served as role models for other Soviet women.[83] But while they were officially thought to have the potential to raise the cultural level of their husbands and that of their coworkers, fears remained that "backward" wives could also interfere with, distract from, and ultimately undermine their husbands' work.[84] Thus, the dichotomous image of women as either virtuous or corrupt remained even as new models of behavior were advanced during the 1930s.

Elsewhere, the rehabilitation of bourgeois values and morals exemplified by "culturedness" was not without its tensions. With certain consumer goods, such as white curtains and tablecloths, seen as both marking and inculcating "culturedness," the desire to acquire consumer goods, dress well, or use makeup and perfume was no longer taken as a sign of "petit-bourgeois vulgarity." However, Communist Party and Komsomol leaders continued to worry that an individual's ability to master the outward signs of "culturedness" did not necessarily reflect the inner makings of a "cultured" citizen. Vadim Volkov has noted that as "culturedness became increasingly associated with inner culture, with broad knowledge and education, those obsessed with superficial attributes and consumerism could be labelled 'petit-bourgeois'" once more.[85] Furthermore, as spy mania increasingly took hold of the Soviet Union throughout the 1930s, Komsomol leaders expressed concerns that leisure activities such as dancing could lead to enemy recruitment. For example, in 1937, Komsomol leaders launched a series of attacks against leisure in which they declared that the enemies of the regime "operated in youth hostels and on dance floors; dressed in smart clothes in the 'Harbin' style [kharbinskii stil´], they introduced young Komsomolers to their 'beautiful and joyous lifestyle,' and eventually recruited them into the ranks of spies."[86] Such concerns mirrored 1920s fears of contamination associated with dancing that, as we shall

see, would resurface again during the war.[87] Thus, even as aspects of bourgeois culture were rehabilitated on the eve of World War II, an inherent distrust of these markers persisted as Soviet officials worried that outward compliance with official models of behavior masked inner deviance.

Nicholas Timasheff famously suggested that the rehabilitation of bourgeois culture exemplified by "culturedness" and the accompanying abandonment of attempts to transform *byt* during the 1930s represented the "Great Retreat" of the Soviet Union from the revolutionary ideals of the Bolsheviks toward conservatism and authoritarianism.[88] However, it may be more fruitful, as historians have since suggested, to interpret these developments as a series of concessions granted by the regime to segments of the population in exchange for their loyalty rather than as a wholehearted retreat. Indeed, while these trends clearly signaled a more traditional approach to gender roles and social organization, the Communist Party remained committed to gender equality through its rhetoric and its education and labor policies.

Throughout the decade, photos published in *Pravda*, the official newspaper of the Communist Party, as well as other newspapers and magazines continued to showcase women in industrial and nontraditional pursuits while identifying them by their professions.[89] Even the *obshchestvennitsa*, who at first glance evoked the circumscribed position of the middle-class woman in Nazi Germany, was far removed from the attenuated "helpmate" of "Aryan" man.[90] Whereas the gender policies of the Third Reich were meant to push German women out of the labor force to make way for men, all the while encouraging women to have children, the *obshchestvennitsa* movement was meant to encourage Soviet women, who had previously remained outside of the labor force, to become active in society as a first step to becoming workers.[91] Indeed, despite its pronatalist policies, the Communist Party remained committed to women's integration into the labor force and approved legislation aimed at reconciling its seemingly contradictory goals.[92] The resulting double and at times triple burden made life difficult for Soviet women, but the fact that the state did not abandon this commitment demonstrates the continuity of its goals. Finally, even as the Communist Party criminalized abortion and made it more difficult for individuals to obtain a divorce, it officially enshrined gender equality into law. Scholars have debated the impact of this on the real-life experiences of Soviet women, with many concluding that merely legislating gender equality did not translate into actual equality.[93] Still others, such as Anna Krylova, have demonstrated that the Party's rhetoric did have a profound impact on the everyday lives of Soviet women and the way they imagined themselves. By enabling some to articulate an alternative vision of femininity

from the one exemplified by the glorified figure of the mother or even the *obshchestvennitsa*, the gender-neutral rhetoric of the 1930s encouraged some women to imagine different roles for themselves.[94]

The articulation of a militant feminism alongside reemerging traditional gender roles during the 1930s underscores the complexity of Stalinist ideology, when new and old clashed and "enduring traditions and beliefs met with revolutionary and utopian visions of equality."[95] For Soviet men and women, this meant they had a number of seemingly contradictory models of behavior with which to evaluate their choices and those of their neighbors once war broke out. As wives and mothers, women would be expected to contribute to the home front while dutifully waiting for their husbands and lovers to return. Such an articulation of a woman's wartime role was expressed in the beloved wartime poem "Wait for Me," by Konstantin Simonov, and countless wartime songs. Women would eventually be able to go off to fight for the motherland, but they too would be expected to remain faithful. Wartime newspapers explicitly stated that women should defer love until peacetime, and female Red Army soldiers were expected to remain "girls" (i.e., virgins), having only chaste relations with men.[96] Thus, although the articulation of a militant femininity expanded the realm of possibilities available to Soviet women, it did not challenge the underlying, inherited assumptions about how men and women should interact. In what was a continuation of earlier Bolshevik attitudes toward sex, the topic was rarely discussed and was considered an aberration in time of war.[97] Previously, good Communists were expected to sublimate their sexual desires in favor of building the revolution: now they were expected to do the same thing for the war effort. Under these circumstances, any man or woman who was thought to be pursuing personal goals was apt to be considered insufficiently patriotic. But with the degenerate prostitute and politically unreliable "coquette" still serving as prevalent models of negative feminine behavior, the actions of women who were thought to be breaking with established gender norms were also likely to be interpreted in this light.

Meanwhile, despite the official rhetoric of gender equality, many Soviet citizens, including Communist Party members, remained deeply uncomfortable with the idea of women entering militant roles. Indeed, the Law on Universal Conscription, passed in 1939, clearly stated that only young men would be conscripted in the event of war, while women would serve in supporting roles.[98] Thus, even as the military preparedness campaigns of the 1930s encouraged some young women to envision themselves as comrades within the traditionally masculine arena of war, official concerns remained that they were unsuited for the task. The war, however, soon forced not only civilians but also the Communist Party to make decisions that would have been unthinkable

in peacetime. With the Red Army suffering immense losses during the summer and early fall of 1941, the Soviet leadership made the decision to recruit women into the military not simply to fill auxiliary roles but to serve on the front lines.

The presence of an unprecedented number of women in the Red Army soon sparked familiar anxieties about their reliability and impact on military morale and discipline. As men and women began cultivating relationships with each other on the front lines and in the Red Army's rear operating areas, Party, Komsomol, and military officials began voicing concerns about military discipline. It was not long before the relationships and the men and women who were party to them were being surveilled and investigated. With women still largely considered to be more "backward" than men, more often than not they were perceived as the source of moral corruption within the Red Army. The following chapter will explore these anxieties and the various directives that came about as a result. As we shall see, these relationships gained an added dimension of danger once reports about female spies began to emerge. With concerns about spies increasing, these relationships began to be scrutinized for signs that women were using their "charms" to seduce unsuspecting Soviet commanders, in what was a return of the "temptress" trope to the military milieu. From there, it did not take much before women, especially those who had remained in occupied territory and were suspected of deviating from established gender norms, began to be perceived as potential security threats.

2

Comrades or Spies

Women in the Red Army

Following the German invasion on 22 June 1941, countless women and girls, some as young as fifteen, voiced a desire to go to the front to fight the Wehrmacht and defend the Soviet Union.[1] Having come of age during the 1930s and benefited from the educational and vocational opportunities of the decade, many young women strongly identified with the Soviet project. And having participated in or read about the military preparedness campaigns of the previous decade, they felt that it was their patriotic duty as *komsomolka*s to volunteer for the front lines. These were the thoughts of Maria Morozova, a future sniper who, at the age of seventeen, volunteered for the front along with other young women from her collective farm after hearing a Komsomol appeal.[2] While some considered it to be their patriotic duty to fight, others wanted to avenge the atrocities that Wehrmacht soldiers had committed against their loved ones and communities. Still others hoped that service in the Red Army would enable them to make amends for the alleged crimes of family members who were previously branded "enemies of the people."[3]

Regardless of the reasons for their desire to fight, many women were initially rebuffed by a military and Soviet leadership wary of accepting women into what was still largely considered a masculine sphere. It was not long, however, before the heavy losses suffered during summer and fall 1941 encouraged the Stalinist leadership to begin accepting female volunteers, first into training programs and then into active service.[4] An estimated one million women served throughout all sectors and branches of the Red Army during World War II.[5] Their presence in such unprecedented numbers posed numerous challenges for the women, the men serving alongside them, and the Soviet leadership. From problems as simple as uniforms for female recruits, which the army did not have and would not have until the second half of the war, to

the far more complicated question of relations between men and women, a range of issues had to be negotiated and solved.[6]

In official propaganda, Soviet women who volunteered or were later mobilized into the Red Army were portrayed as "raising the 'cultural level' of military men, civilizing them, so to speak" by initiating cultural activities aimed at boosting military morale.[7] Referred to as sisters and daughters, they represented chaste reminders of peacetime who raised the fighting spirit of the men in their midst.[8] This was often interpreted as their most important role, above and beyond their military contributions, in what Brandon Schechter has suggested was an adaptation of the *obshchestvennitsa* model of feminine behavior to the military milieu.[9] But while such official representations gave the impression that the Soviet leadership was comfortable with and welcomed the presence of women in the Red Army, they concealed deep misgivings.

Until recently the subject of relations between men and women in the Red Army remained taboo, but the partial opening of Soviet-era archives has revealed the reality of these relationships, which ran along a spectrum ranging from love affairs to rape.[10] Far from the chaste, comradely love expected of soldiers, relations between men and women within the Red Army quickly turned into a moral crisis in the eyes of Soviet officials. To be sure, some Communist Party and Komsomol officials recognized just how unrealistic it was to expect abstinence from soldiers in the face of death. Still, most worried about the effects that such relationships would have on military morale and discipline.[11] Before long, these anxieties became intertwined with fears of espionage and sabotage, giving rise to questions about the political reliability of women soldiers, often in light of their sexuality. As we shall see in this chapter, several factors, including the legacy of the spy mania of the 1930s and German tactics on the Eastern Front, encouraged these doubts. By December 1941, anxieties about relations in the Red Army led to calls for increased scrutiny of women. This was especially the case when the women in question had arrived from newly liberated territory. These calls had a profound impact on the lives of countless women who found themselves under investigation by the NKVD. But even more far-reaching, however, was the effect on all future Soviet policing operations as the underlying anxieties were incorporated into policing directives that remained in force throughout the war.

This chapter begins by exploring a purge of civilian personnel that was carried out in the Fifth Army, which was stationed on the outskirts of Moscow in late 1941. Coinciding with the Winter Counteroffensive, the purge and the moral crisis it represented became intertwined with security concerns once reports of female spies began to filter into the NKVD. As NKVD analysts assessed the information coming out of newly liberated areas, top NKVD

officials issued directives that reflected this new perceived threat. As we shall see, at this time, women who were thought to have been in close contact with the enemy began to be included on lists of potential targets for detention and investigation. Meanwhile, women in the Red Army who had questionable backgrounds or were suspected of having extramarital affairs with their superiors were cast as "temptresses" whose sexuality became at once a sign of political unreliability, a source of contamination, and a potential weapon of the would-be spy. An analysis of the recommendations and directives that were issued in spring 1942 will demonstrate how Soviet policies regarding fraternization evolved in response to the overlapping crisis in the Red Army and anxieties about women's sexuality. This chapter will conclude with a discussion of how Soviet military and Party officials eventually resolved the moral crisis in the Red Army even as concerns about female spies continued to inform security measures thereafter.

Women and Men in the Red Army and the Making of a Moral Crisis

In late November 1941, the heads of the Special Departments of the Fifth Army received two separate telegrams instructing them to carry out a "cleansing" operation (chistka) in all the hospitals and rear area departments of the army.[12] Arriving mere days before the start of the Winter Counteroffensive on 5 December 1941, the telegrams instructed the special departments to identify and remove individuals who failed to inspire "political trust."[13] NKVD Special Departments (osobye otdely, or OOs) existed at every level of the Red Army from the front to the division. They were responsible for running intelligence and counterintelligence operations and maintaining security. From the outbreak of the war until April 1943, special departments were jointly controlled by the NKVD and the NKO (People's Commissariat of Defense). From April 1943, the counterintelligence departments functioned under the NKO's Main Directorate for Counterintelligence, which was popularly known as SMERSH, or "Death to Spies."[14] The telegrams were sent in response to an order from Stalin and the State Defense Committee (GKO) and called for increased scrutiny of all civilian personnel (vol´no-naemnye litsa) serving in the Red Army such as female signalers (sviazistki), record keepers (deloproizvoditeli), typists, medical personnel, and translators.[15] Although the number of women in civilian personnel roles would grow significantly over the course of the following year, in November 1941 many women served in these positions.[16]

While it remains to be seen what exactly prompted Stalin's call for increased scrutiny of civilian personnel at this time, it is likely that ongoing security concerns played a role. Although the Soviet Union had instituted a Red Army booklet that served as the main form of identification for soldiers starting in

October 1941, the Red Army initially had no systematic way of identifying soldiers since no "single, army-wide document" existed at the start of the war.[17] This situation not only made it difficult to document and control the movement of troops, it also exposed the Red Army to the threat of infiltration by enemy assets as tens of thousands of soldiers streamed back to the front lines after escaping enemy encirclement and capture during the first chaotic months of the war. The introduction of the Red Army booklet alongside additional security measures eased the situation, but security concerns persisted throughout the fall of 1941.[18] As the Winter Counteroffensive became imminent, the Soviet leadership seems to have decided to use the breathing space afforded by the successful defense of Moscow to verify what was evidently perceived as a weak element in the Red Army.

According to a top-secret report that summarized the outcome of the cleansing operation carried out in the Fifth Army, the special departments uncovered "a series of individuals who were previously located on territory occupied by the enemy, as well as people who, with their behavior, demoralize the surrounding command personnel."[19] Among them were several waitresses who worked in a cafeteria that served the command staff of the Fifth Army. One was a twenty-six-year-old waitress named K., who failed to inspire "political trust" because she was allegedly "sexually depraved [and] with her behavior introduced an element of moral decay onto her surrounding environment."[20] Another waitress who also allegedly evinced evidence of "moral decay" (moral′no-bytovoe razlozhenie) was a twenty-four-year-old who had also spent time in German-occupied territory. Because of this, the report concluded, she was "suspicious" and likewise did not "inspire trust."[21]

The report never specifically identified what it was about the behavior of these women that prompted the special departments to make these allegations against them. But it is safe to assume that these women were suspected of flirting and perhaps having intimate relations with the men who frequented the cafeteria where they worked. Instead of raising the men's "cultural level," these women were thought to be leading them astray and undermining discipline. Moreover, since the cafeteria where they worked was reserved for the command staff of the Fifth Army, those allegedly falling prey to these "morally loose" women were high-ranking military personnel. Here, it is important to note that despite their positions of power, the men in question were only mentioned in passing. Thus, their prerogative to have intimate relations with their female subordinates seems to have gone largely unquestioned.

The situation in the hospitals attached to the Fifth Army was said to be particularly bad, with "cohabitation flourish[ing]" and the "heads of hospitals and the commissars tak[ing] an active part in this cohabitation."[22] For example,

one report described the case of a political instructor named F., who was allegedly neglecting his work because he had been having a relationship with a nurse named Kh. from the first days of the war. In a different case, the man responsible for the food supply of the same hospital, a Communist Party member and organizer (partorg), "married" a nurse despite being already married and having a child with his civilian wife. Both cases were going to be a topic of discussion at a future Party meeting scheduled for 7 December 1941. But their fate was already decided. They were to be sent to the front lines as punishment for their moral transgressions. In yet another case, the head of the administrative-economic department (administrativno-khoziaistvennoe otdelenie), a man named Ia., reportedly began a relationship with a nurse named V. After living with the *komsomolka* for about six weeks, Ia. decided to end the relationship. However, he soon began a new relationship with yet another nurse. Ia.'s betrayal led V. to commit suicide. Ia. was then transferred to another unit.[23]

In response to a growing number of such cases, the chief of medical services for the Fifth Army and its political commissar decided to transfer a "series of nurses, doctors, and hospital heads" to different hospitals and units within the army. They also scheduled lectures and talks for December 1941 about the proper behavior expected of Red Army personnel, titling the series "The moral appearance of a Soviet citizen during the Patriotic War."[24] Although these measures were equally directed at men and women, the report's conclusions clearly reflect the belief that women bore responsibility for all these problems. Thus, it was concluded that "the units of the Fifth Army have a considerable number of women who have attached themselves [pristavshie] to the units and institutions of the army after its formation and with their behavior [are] demoralizing the Communist Command Personnel [komnachsostav]."[25]

In the eyes of Soviet officials, the presence of an unprecedented number of women in the Red Army destabilized traditional gender norms and created a moral crisis. In hindsight, the perilous conditions that existed on the Eastern Front combined with the proximity in which men and women served, were likely to encourage many of them to seek companionship among their comrades-in-arms. Moreover, since women largely continued to fulfill subordinate roles in the Red Army, their lack of power, combined with the hierarchical nature of the military, was certain to expose many of them to coercion from their superiors. For the NKVD, however, neither of these factors explained the unfolding situation. Rather than blaming commanders for abusing their positions of power, they blamed the women for being "morally loose." In their eyes, they were "temptresses" who were corrupting good Communists. Such an interpretation was reminiscent of the fears of contamination

previously associated with the NEPwoman and the "coquette," who, as we have seen, were considered inherently suspect and dangerous by virtue of their femininity and overt sexuality. Falling back on these earlier models of negative female behavior to guide their assessments, NKVD officials interpreted the alleged behavior of the women mentioned above as a threat to military discipline.

Over the following years, many rank-and-file soldiers came to share a similar assessment of the women who were serving alongside them, with some going as far as to believe in the "total depravity" of all women who were serving at the front.[26] According to Catherine Merridale, such beliefs were encouraged by the stories of sexual exploits and conquests soldiers shared around their campfires to help pass the time between battles.[27] Furthermore, the tendency of commanders to pursue their female subordinates also reinforced perceptions of women soldiers as being both sexually available and "morally loose."[28] Commanders considered this to be one of the privileges that came with their rank, a belief that, as we shall see, largely went unquestioned by either the Communist Party or the command structure of the Red Army. Much as before, a man's prerogative to be sexually active went unchallenged, while women were expected to remain chaste. A woman's decision to be sexually active marked her as "loose" and "depraved." In the context of the perceived moral crisis unfolding in the Red Army, the persistence of such double standards meant that women soldiers were more likely to be found culpable for any deviation from the expected norm.

The Red Army was far from unique when it came to concerns about women's supposedly deleterious effect on military discipline. In their African colonies, British and French officers similarly believed that civilian women posed a threat to military effectiveness and set up brothels to control soldiers' sexuality and patrol the distance between African soldiers and civilians.[29] Similar measures were adopted in France and other occupied parts of Europe by the Wehrmacht.[30] While brothels were opened in the occupied East, German soldiers were consistently warned against striking up relations with civilians.[31] Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, for example, worried that close contact with local women contributes to a "significant increase in venereal diseases . . . abets enemy spy activities and leads to a complete blurring of the necessary distance to the people of the occupied Eastern territories."[32] Because of their perceived threat to military discipline and security, civilian women had to be kept separate from male soldiers. But what happened when the women in question were serving alongside them? How could military authorities maintain discipline and security in these circumstances? Given the double standards

that persisted in Soviet society and the anxieties around allowing women to serve in the Red Army, women would clearly be the ones to bear the brunt of any measures aimed at maintaining discipline and distance between the sexes.

After receiving the telegrams at the end of November 1941, the NKVD Special Departments of the Fifth Army adopted several measures to remove "politically unreliable" women from the army. Any woman serving in the medical services who was suspected of having relations with her superior was transferred to another unit rather than dismissed, most likely because her skills were sorely needed.[33] Meanwhile, female suspects attached to other departments or to the Army's Rear Administration (Upravlenie tyla armii) were subject to dismissal. This applied not only to those whose behavior was thought to show signs of "moral decay" but to any woman whose biography was in question, including those who had been inside German-occupied territory or who had reported to their units without proper documentation. Although such measures made sense in light of tactics adopted by German intelligence organs on the Eastern Front, they likely led to many innocent women being investigated and wrongly dismissed. Indeed, because the desire to fight was so strong, many young women did everything in their power to get to the front even if it meant making their way there illegally. This is what Nina Vishnevskaia, a seventeen-year-old future medical officer of a tank battalion, did when her application to volunteer was rejected. Rather than accept the rejection, she hid in the bed of a truck that was transporting her friends to the front.[34] Although Vishnevskaia's future commanding officer allowed her to remain at the front following her unexpected arrival, it is not hard to imagine the suspicion that such an arrival might have generated. Indeed, what in this case was likely interpreted as an act of youthful naïvety and impulsiveness could have just as easily been seen as a sign of espionage.

Less than a week passed after the receipt of the telegrams before twenty-five women were fired from their positions with the Fifth Army.[35] Not only were they fired, but their new employers were notified of their alleged moral transgressions at the front, a treatment reminiscent of the way prostitutes were treated in the 1920s.[36] During NEP, the Bolsheviks opened special labor clinics where prostitutes were housed, treated for venereal disease, and taught new trades.[37] Once a prostitute was cured of venereal disease and provided with a new job, her employer was notified about her past so that he could monitor her.[38] In much the same way, the women who were dismissed from the Fifth Army acquired a reputation as "sexually depraved." It is not clear how widespread these and other measures were since the only available reports are from the cleansing operation carried out in the Fifth Army. But it is more than

likely that similar telegrams, which would have prompted similar security measures, were sent in response to Stalin's call for increased scrutiny of civilian personnel to all NKVD Special Departments stationed along the front lines.[39]

Before we move on, it is also worth mentioning here that a similar crisis, likewise prompted by and attributed to the presence of large numbers of women, occurred in Yugoslavia in 1943–44. In her work on women in the Yugoslav partisans, Jelena Batinić recounts their prominent role in the movement as well as the ambivalence and discomfort that their presence engendered at various times during the armed struggle. Significantly, she notes that a rapid increase in female recruits from newly liberated zones over the winter of 1943–44 prompted a campaign against "disreputable" females. As more and more women volunteered for the partisan army and concerns about relations between men and women grew, Batinić points out that "internal Party reports increasingly began to complain about the quality of new recruits, noting among them the presence of women with suspicious pasts and problematic reputations."[40] According to Batinić, these anxieties quickly gave rise to orders calling for the investigation and expulsion of questionable women. And as was the case in the Soviet Union, the policy targeted women because leaders in the Yugoslav Communist Party concluded that female recruits were the source of all immorality in the partisan army.[41]

Although it is tempting to wonder whether the Yugoslav campaign against "disreputable" women looked to the earlier Soviet purge for guidance, especially given the relationship that existed between the two Communist Parties during the war, there is no evidence to suggest that this was the case.[42] Still, the Yugoslav example is instructive because it reinforces the conclusion that the cleansing operation carried out in the Fifth Army was not an isolated incident but rather a symptom of a much larger campaign that targeted women in the Red Army and had a similar outcome. While some "disreputable" women were simply expelled from the Red Army, those who had questionable biographies or had spent time within occupied territory were subject to investigation because they were perceived as sources of corruption and danger.[43] With decisive battles raging around Moscow in late 1941, whichever side managed to undermine the discipline and morale of their enemies' soldiers could conceivably gain an advantage. Under these circumstances, the perceived moral crisis in the Red Army stoked fears of deliberate acts of sabotage by the enemy.

Several factors encouraged such assessments. First, women, as we have seen, were often mistrusted in Soviet society and considered more likely to be "backward" and therefore susceptible to foreign influence and recruitment. Sexuality figured prominently in these assumptions since a woman's purity continued to signify her moral character and political conviction (or lack

thereof). Second, because of the legacy of the Great Terror and the spy mania of the 1930s, Soviet citizens and members of police organs were predisposed to see spies and saboteurs everywhere. Rather than interpreting relations between men and women in the Red Army as the naturally occurring result of placing them in close contact under life-threatening conditions, the NKVD was predisposed to see something nefarious at work. Finally, as the Wehrmacht encountered its first setbacks in fall 1941, German intelligence organs began dispatching spies, including women and children, to infiltrate the Red Army and the Soviet rear. It is not clear when Soviet intelligence organs first became aware of this threat or whether their recognition of it underpinned Stalin's initial call for increased surveillance of civilian personnel in the Red Army. However, once this previously overlooked threat was discovered, Soviet counterintelligence organs began adopting security measures that targeted women, especially those who had been in occupied territory.

Women, Espionage, and Counterintelligence in the Red Army

Although the Nazis' adherence to traditional gender roles barred local women from holding positions of power in local collaborationist administrations or participating in armed collaborationist detachments, it did not preclude German intelligence organs from exploiting these women for espionage. Once the German Blitzkrieg ground to a halt on the outskirts of Moscow in October 1941, German intelligence organs began trying to reactivate the intelligence assets that had already infiltrated the Soviet rear while recruiting new ones.[44] Several organizations were responsible for running intelligence and counterintelligence operations in occupied territory, including the Abwehr, the SD, and the Gestapo. However, Soviet reports almost universally referred to them as the "Gestapo."[45] Robert W. Stephan has estimated that during the entire course of the war, German agent deployments ranged anywhere from thirty-six thousand to forty-four thousand, with most recruited from the ranks of Soviet prisoners-of-war.[46] According to Boris Kovalev, the "Gestapo" recruited agents from among imprisoned Communist Party and Komsomol members, prisoners-of-war, and Soviet youth between the ages of fourteen and nineteen.[47] They were assigned tasks that ranged from infiltrating units of the Red Army and the partisan movement to carrying out intelligence and sabotage work in the Soviet rear.

While most German agents were men, available German and Soviet sources suggest that women and children were also recruited for espionage. For example, as early as October 1941, instructions issued to the German security police and SD operating near Leningrad instructed them "to try to send women, if possible young [ones]," into the besieged city.[48] According to individuals who

were allegedly employed by the 301st Abwehr group stationed in Krasnodar, the group recruited agents from among local women who were living with German soldiers and officers, along with teenagers between the ages of sixteen and seventeen.[49] To train such agents, Abwehr operated a series of espionage schools in occupied territory, some of which are known to have had courses for female recruits.[50] For example, a women's section existed in a German-run school in Poltava where rank-and-file recruits took a one-to-two-month course and radio operators took a two-to-four-month course before infiltrating into the Soviet rear.[51] According to a Soviet intelligence report from May 1942, "Gestapo"-run schools for training spies existed in "almost all cities," including Kharkiv, Kursk, Orel, and Belgorod. Recruits consisted predominantly of prisoners-of-war and "youth, especially young women."[52] In Kursk, female recruits were all reportedly between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two.[53] According to a different report, a school for training women existed in the village of Nikitinka, where at least thirty women were undergoing espionage training in January 1943.[54] Most of these schools were successfully infiltrated by Soviet agents, enabling Soviet counterintelligence to identify and neutralize a large percentage of German recruits soon after they crossed Soviet lines.[55]

Although most Soviet intelligence reports remain classified, the first to list local women as a security threat date to late 1941, when, during the Winter Counteroffensive, the Red Army began temporarily retaking German-occupied territory. While clearing newly liberated areas of potential threats, the NKVD first encountered and assessed the alleged threat posed by women spies.[56] Among the areas temporarily recovered after the Winter Counteroffensive were parts of Voroshilovgrad (Luhansk) oblast in Ukraine.[57] Immediately following the liberation of this territory, the NKVD began implementing security measures aimed at ferreting out potential security threats. In a report from 21 December 1941, Sergei Savchenko, the deputy head of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR,[58] relayed the results of these operations to his superiors in Moscow.[59] According to Savchenko, the counterespionage branch of the Ukrainian NKVD had arrested a total of ninety-five suspects during the preceding weeks: seventy-five in Voroshilovgrad/Luhansk oblast and twenty in Kharkov (Kharkiv) oblast. Almost half of these suspects were detained between 10 and 20 December, during a period that corresponds with the first days of the Soviet advance beginning on 5 December.

Although the vast majority of the detainees were men, several were women. One of them was Valentina Kozlovskaia, a twenty-year-old former *komsomolka* who was detained in Voroshilovgrad/Luhansk. Originally from Krasnoarmeisk (Pokrovsk), Kozlovskaia was allegedly recruited by German intelligence in early November 1941.[60] She told NKVD investigators that she was first arrested

by the Germans after they discovered and destroyed her Komsomol card during a search of her apartment. Following her arrest, she was recruited by German intelligence and infiltrated into the Soviet rear near the village of Sergeevka (Serhiivka) with the task of scouting the location of Soviet troops in the vicinity of Voroshilovgrad/Luhansk. What happened to her after she was arrested by the NKVD is not clear, but it is likely that Kozlovskaia suffered a similar fate to that of Vera Zozulia, another woman captured at this time.

Zozulia was a seventeen-year-old paramedic from the village of Sheki, Lubny raion, Kharkov/Kharkiv oblast.[61] She was arrested by the NKVD's Counterintelligence Department for Voroshilovgrad/Luhansk oblast on 16 December for allegedly spreading pro-German propaganda. Zozulia was previously expelled from the Komsomol because one of her parents was convicted of counterrevolutionary crimes, a fact that likely fueled suspicions of her. She told the NKVD that she was captured with a group of women while building Soviet defensive fortifications near the city of Pavlograd (Pavlohrad), Dnepropetrovsk (Sicheslav) oblast. Following their capture, the women were "subjected to interrogation, and then all the women, including Zozulia, were taken by German officers and soldiers to their apartments and raped."[62] Zozulia allegedly remained at the German headquarters for some time before she was recruited by German intelligence in November 1941. Not long after, she was infiltrated behind Soviet lines to the village of Konstantinovka with the "mission of conducting extensive Fascist propaganda among the population."[63] After her arrest and investigation by the NKVD, the military tribunal for the Voroshilovgrad/Luhansk oblast garrison sentenced Zozulia to ten years in the Gulag notwithstanding her claims that she was a victim of German imprisonment and rape.[64]

Whether any aspect of these cases had any truth to them cannot be ascertained. Ongoing military operations and the chaos of war made it virtually impossible for security personnel to verify their stories. Moreover, the NKVD's continued reliance on confessions discouraged any effort to check the facts of a case once a suspect had confessed to their alleged crimes. Still, these cases are important not because they shed light on the true actions and motivations of these women but because Soviet analysts relied on them to make conclusions about evolving security threats. Indeed, Savchenko's report generated interest from Moscow. After receiving it, Bogdan Kabulov, the deputy commissar of the NKVD, forwarded the report to P. V. Fedotov, the head of the Second Department of the NKVD, with a hand-written note stating that the report is "interesting, reveals the methods of German intelligence and is evidence that we have not yet fully launched [razvernuli] a struggle with its agents."[65] Kabulov also instructed Fedotov to "urgently develop and submit a draft letter [circular] to all organs [noting] the orientation [orientirovka] and specific tasks

for the decisive improvement of the work [of the] KRO."[66] While this specific letter is unavailable, the contents of a letter from a certain Rogatin, the head of NKVD Border Troops for the Southwestern Front, addressed to his superiors in Moscow, sheds light on some of the conclusions that Savchenko's report encouraged.[67]

Dated 11 January 1942, Rogatin's letter was based on an analysis of Savchenko's report. It began by stating, "It is being established that recently German intelligence is intensely infiltrating saboteurs, terrorists and spies across the front line."[68] While Rogatin identified the majority of these agents as Soviet prisoners-of-war, he noted, in what may have been a reference to cases like Zozulia's, that German intelligence was "at the same time recruiting young workers from the captured raions of the Donbas [and,] under the threat of physical violence against their parents, forcing these young people to enter on the path of treachery, sabotage, and espionage."[69] He also stated that "in some cases, German intelligence infiltrates across the front lines entire groups of saboteurs from among the Donbas youth, most of whom are girls and women."[70] Having captured and interrogated several alleged women spies, the leadership of the Ukrainian NKVD was beginning to identify women and girls from occupied territory as a potential security threat. Rogatin concluded by stating that "the above is taken into account in our future work combating enemy agents."[71] Rogatin did not specify what this entailed. But as the NKVD further assessed this emerging threat, specific recommendations were soon developed.

Earlier in December 1941, a mere nine days before Savchenko submitted his report to Moscow, Lavrentiy Beria, the chief of the NKVD, issued his first instructions outlining the immediate tasks of NKVD operatives in recently liberated territory. Taking the form of Order No. 001683, his instructions charged the NKVD with "establish[ing] and arrest[ing] traitors and provocateurs—those in the service of the German occupation authorities, as well as those assisting them in carrying out anti-Soviet activities and the persecution of Party and Soviet activists and honest Soviet citizens."[72] Essentially, Order No. 001683 called for the arrest and investigation of virtually anyone who had worked for or assisted the enemy, regardless of the circumstances surrounding their actions. Over the next few months, Order No. 001683 was modified, and as more detailed instructions were released, women and girls were incorporated as a separate category of suspects. Thus, already as early as 27 December 1941, additional instructions, based on Order No. 001683, suggested that "women living with German officers or organizing drinking sessions, receptions or parties" should be targeted.[73] Then, on 7 January 1942, Beria clarified that such women should be investigated in order to identify

spies.[74] Finally, on 18 February 1942, Vsevolod Merkulov, the deputy head of the NKVD, issued additional guidelines to Order No. 001683 that contained a specific list of potential targets, including local women who had married German officers, soldiers, or Wehrmacht officials.[75]

Historians have previously cited Order No. 001683 among other directives that delineated the parameters for all future Soviet punitive operations. Indeed, despite additional clarifications, the groups Merkulov listed on 18 February 1942 became the main targets of an unfolding retribution campaign in the Soviet Union. But while retribution for wartime actions was one of its goals, it is important to note that the main focus of the unfolding campaign was security. This becomes clear when we consider the other categories singled out for immediate arrest in Merkulov's guidelines from February. Among them were "personnel from German intelligence, counterintelligence, police, and administrative organs," the owners and tenants of the buildings where these organs were headquartered and their personnel housed, and their "servicing staff [obsluzhivaiushchii ikh personal]."[76] Also included on the list were "secret agents of German military intelligence, the Gestapo and the Secret Field Police," including "residents, terrorists, radio operators, liaisons, landlords of safe houses, conductors and smugglers [perepravshchiki]."[77] Merkulov's instructions called for the identification and arrest of these people and also provided a set of protocols for their doubling into Soviet assets.

The focus on enemy intelligence assets in Merkulov's guidelines from February support the conclusion that the Soviet retribution campaign evolved as part of a counterintelligence operation and that it was initially heavily intertwined with security concerns, which often dictated who would be subject to surveillance and arrest.[78] Previously, Vanessa Voisin made a similar argument, contending that ongoing fears about spies and a potential fifth column were what first encouraged the arrest of women suspected of having intimate relations with enemy combatants.[79] She noted that although civilians were often quick to condemn men and women thought to have been in close contact with the enemy, Soviet punitive authorities were initially slow to develop a response. However, once they began to perceive this danger, Soviet authorities started surveilling and eventually charging potential spies under existing Soviet laws.

If we take into account the perceived moral crisis unfolding in the Red Army at the same time, we can see how anxieties about morality and the role of women in the army became intertwined with concerns about enemy infiltration and espionage. Merkulov's instructions not only reinforced the sense of crisis within the Red Army but encouraged Soviet counterintelligence personnel to consider any intimate relationship as a potential threat to security. Eventually, as we will see shortly, the Soviet leadership resolved the ostensible moral crisis in

the Red Army by essentially deciding to ignore it. But although the moral crisis may have been resolved, the various directives calling for the surveillance of women remained in place. Thus, once German-occupied territory began to be liberated in 1943, NKVD operatives had a wide range of instructions to draw upon to identify potential suspects.

The apparent frequency of reports suggesting that German intelligence organs were stepping up efforts to infiltrate spies into the Soviet rear prompted Beria to issue additional instructions on 20 February 1942. In them, he demanded, yet again, that the NKVD strengthen its work identifying enemy agents.[80] Echoing Rogatin's conclusions from January, Beria stated that German intelligence "continues the mass recruitment of captive Red Army soldiers, workers of defensive fortifications, inhabitants of temporarily occupied territory and citizens of rear areas of the USSR stuck there [in occupied territory] for one reason or another, including women, girls, children, and the elderly."[81] In light of this, Beria ordered counterintelligence organs stationed near the front lines to undertake all "necessary measures" that would ensure "the arrest and thorough filtering of all persons, without exception, including women and children, crossing the front lines from enemy territory."[82] Women and children were now clearly identified as potential security threats. Still, the fact that Beria felt the need to emphasize that no exceptions should be made for women and children suggests that Soviet intelligence organs had been continuing to underestimate them.

Although Beria's instructions from 20 February largely focused on the threat of infiltration posed by individuals arriving from German-occupied territory, they also delineated a new line of work that was expected of the NKVD now that occupied territory was being liberated as part of the Winter Counteroffensive. Specifically, Beria noted that "according to uncovered cases, it has been established that German intelligence organs have prepared in advance in these areas a network of their espionage bases [rezidentury] . . . and a series of safe houses for agents infiltrated across the front lines with tasks to collect military intelligence, [and carry out] sabotage and terrorist work."[83] Although Beria did not specify who was being recruited into these stay-behind networks, suspicion was likely to fall on women and men alike. Indeed, it stood to reason that if women were being recruited as spies, then they would also be used as clandestine agents for German stay-behind networks. Within this context, local women suspected of having intimate relations with German soldiers and officers were subject to scrutiny. As Vanessa Voisin has previously argued, such relationships were not criminal according to existing Soviet laws.[84] Still, the possibility that the women involved in them may have been privy to important information or subject to recruitment by German intelligence made

them targets for the NKVD. Meanwhile, even as the NKVD was beginning to look at local women in this light, anxieties about the behavior of Red Army personnel had not abated. Indeed, despite the earlier purge of "politically unreliable" women and the subsequent adoption of additional security measures in the Red Army, these fears remained and were likely amplified by reports of female spies.

For example, on 2 March 1942, the Head of the NKVD Special Department for the Southwestern Front, a man named L. Tsanava, sent a directive to his subordinates in which he reiterated these fears.[85] Tsanava stated:

> Recently there has been an increase [uchastilis´] of cases of women penetrating headquarters who have legalized themselves as "wives," "secretaries," and "medical professionals" with unit commanders. There were also cases when these women were taken by commanders in areas just liberated from the enemy. These women, while located at headquarters where secret conversations are conducted, know not only the number, arms, and weak spots of our divisions [podrazdeleniia], but also the intentions of our commanders who in their presence give verbal and telephone orders. However, until now, not one of the NKVD Special Departments of the army and division has made a single arrest among women or has uncovered a single spy among them, even though based on the data available to the NKVD Special Department it is known that these women are used by German intelligence.[86]

Tsanava was referring to the well-documented tendency of Red Army commanders to take lovers, often by force, from among their female subordinates. Indeed, his mention of "wives" was a direct reference to the so-called PPZh. Although debates about the PPZh phenomenon within the Red Army primarily focused on issues of morality in what was a manifestation of the perceived moral crisis, Tsanava's concerns clearly had little to do with morality. Like his counterparts in the Fifth Army, Tsanava did not question the prerogative of Red Army commanders to expect sexual favors from their subordinates. However, he recognized the inherent danger that this posed for security. With reports of German intelligence utilizing local women for espionage as well as accounts of German stay-behind networks, the tendency of commanders to "employ" women from newly liberated territory left them vulnerable to infiltration. While this vulnerability stemmed from the behavior of the commanders, Tsanava blamed the women in their midst. Rather than recommending that sexual relationships with their subordinates be forbidden, Tsanava demanded still more thorough vetting of all women who had been in German-occupied territory. His concerns and recommendations were echoed

later that month by Merkulov, who suggested that the prevalence of German agents relying on forged or stolen Soviet documents warranted the detention and investigation of "suspicious women trying to strike up an acquaintance with soldiers."[87]

By spring 1942, women, especially those who had been in occupied territory, were increasingly seen as a distinct and tangible threat. They were potential spies, infiltrators, and clandestine members of German stay-behind networks who, NKVD officials thought, could be seducing unsuspecting Red Army commanders to undermine the Soviet military from within. These views clearly did not reflect the opinions of everyone, but they were sufficiently widespread to encourage additional security measures. While one would think that such concerns would eventually lead the Soviet leadership to either curtail the recruitment of women into the military or to take a firm stance against intimate relationships, the opposite occurred. Having suffered additional military setbacks during the Winter Counteroffensive, the Soviet leadership decided to authorize a secret, mass mobilization of women into the Red Army to free up men for the front lines.[88] As a result, "between March 1942 and January 1943, the GKO and NKO issued more than a dozen secret decrees calling for the mobilization of 250,000 women into the military."[89] Meanwhile, although the issue of relations between men and women continued to be debated, a decision was finally adopted in favor of such relationships in summer 1942. At a meeting of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army in July 1942, Aleksandr Shcherbakov, the head of the Political Directorate, signaled what would subsequently become the new position of the Soviet leadership. Shcherbakov stated that

> the Party has striven and will continue to strive for our political workers to be unsullied people, otherwise they will lose their authority. But we take this to wild extremes . . . We need to fight against drunkenness by all means. If people come together—a commander and a woman, it is nothing extraordinary. Why cause a commotion, why spy on them and then write, discuss and investigate? Does the Party Commission really have nothing else to do? We have to strictly ensure that in a commander's entourage there is no bitch-spy. That type needs to be unmasked and driven out. I don't want people to think that "everything is permitted," but we don't need to have our heads in the clouds. We are all grown-ups and should understand what is permissible and what is not, what are normal human relations and what is moral decay. The moral make up of our commanders, particularly political workers, should be clean. This all has to be understood properly, in the manner of the Party, in a humanistic way.[90]

Whereas before, all intimate relationships had been subject to investigation and disciplinary action, Shcherbakov's edict signaled an end to this process, assuming that such relationships were consensual. Faced with a dire need for women to replace men who could be transferred to the front lines but unwilling to question the authority and power of military commanders, the Communist Party decided to solve the perceived moral crisis in the Red Army by essentially ignoring it. Doing so exposed female soldiers to expectations of sexual favors from their commanders and comrades-in-arms, thereby complicating their already difficult military service.[91] As Lev Kopelev recalled in his memoirs, "some generals quickly came to regard all nurses, waitresses and women typists and radio operators as fair game."[92] Indeed, the situation became such that some women deliberately sought partners from among the command staff in order to protect themselves from the advances of their comrades-in-arms.[93] At the same time, Shcherbakov's mention of the "bitch-spy" clearly suggests that women continued to be subject to additional scrutiny and security measures because of their potential to corrupt the men in their midst. While it would now be considered natural and acceptable for commanders to pursue their female subordinates, Party officials remained wary of the potential for such pursuits to undermine security in light of German espionage efforts. Therefore, women would continue to be surveilled while special departments would continue to urge vigilance. Indeed, although it remains to be seen how widespread such measures were, it seems that NKVD Special Departments notified not only commanders but rank-and-file soldiers about the myriad dangers posed by German intelligence.

In September 1942, Major Stasiuk, the head of a special department attached to the 234th Rifle Division stationed on the Kalinin Front, held what was likely a routine meeting with the division's reconnaissance company. Sof'ia Avericheva, a fighter in the company, recorded the details of the meeting in her diary. During the meeting, Stasiuk informed her and her comrades about German espionage tactics, including the use of women and children, and urged them to remain vigilant. To underline the need for vigilance, Stasiuk recounted the story of a nurse, named Ania, who was working in the division's medical battalion (medsanbat) before she was unmasked as a German spy. The "beautiful blonde," whom Avericheva had previously met, allegedly drew the attention of her comrades by her reticence. While the rest of the nurses in her unit shared the most intimate details about their personal lives, Ania was said to have been "awkwardly silent" about her past. All that she told her comrades was that she had been forced to remain in German-occupied territory following a visit home during the previous summer.[94]

While we will likely never know if Ania was truly a German spy, this episode illustrates how anxieties about women made their way down to the rank-and-file. Much like their commanders, rank-and-file soldiers were urged to remain vigilant and scrutinize the women in their midst. Under these circumstances, suspicions were likely magnified whenever a woman was known to have spent time in German-occupied territory. Indeed, it is likely that Ania's alleged reticence combined with the fact that she had spent time in occupied territory were what initially encouraged scrutiny. It is not known how many women were ultimately investigated because of these suspicions, but they clearly had the potential, if acted upon, to ruin lives.

By spring 1942, women who had been in German-occupied territory, especially those suspected of close contact with the enemy, had emerged as a tangible security threat within the Red Army. Once reports began to filter into the NKVD that German intelligence organs were recruiting women inside occupied territory for espionage, what had started as a crisis of morality evolved into a crisis of security. From the beginning, a double standard of morality within Soviet society had made it far more likely that women would be scrutinized and disciplined for any deviation from the norm. Their alleged behavior was thought to reflect their souls and the moral corruption within. They were cast as "temptresses" guilty of leading men astray. But once reports of female spies began to emerge, both the relationships and the women who were party to them garnered an added dimension of danger. Their actions were no longer thought to be merely dictated by their political and cultural "backwardness" but rather by the enemy. Within this context, close or intimate relations with enemy combatants first began to be scrutinized. They were thought to signal potential enemy recruitment. Thus, any woman who was suspected of fraternization had to be investigated because of what she might know about the enemy and because she might be an enemy agent herself.

We will return to these anxieties and the measures that were ultimately adopted to neutralize them in chapter 5. But first we will look at the anxieties that these reports generated within the partisan movement. As we shall see in the following chapter, concerns about espionage and women existed in the partisan movement as well. However, there, the partisans' operating environment, combined with their relative autonomy, often proved deadly.

3

Scouts or Assassins

Women in the Partisans

Soon after the start of the German invasion on 22 June 1941, Stalin called for the creation of a resistance movement to wage a guerrilla war behind enemy lines. Stay-behind networks and sabotage groups were hastily assembled from Communist Party and Komsomol members. While the latter were successful in carrying out controversial mining operations in cities such as Kyiv and Kharkiv, most of these groups were soon betrayed and liquidated.[1] Those that survived the first six months of the war were initially too weak to effect much change inside occupied territory. Moreover, until a unified central command was created in May 1942 under Panteleimon Ponomarenko, the first secretary of the Communist Party of Belorussia, surviving partisan detachments had little to no contact with Moscow or other nearby units.[2]

Meanwhile, most civilians in occupied territory were either indifferent or openly hostile to the Soviet underground, the partisans, and the Red Army soldiers caught behind enemy lines.[3] This continued to be the case until the second half of 1942 notwithstanding regional differences.[4] Consequently, rather than acting as a popular guerrilla movement, the Soviet partisan movement initially consisted, for the most part, of Communist Party members and former Red Army soldiers. Conditions were particularly bleak in Soviet Ukraine, where an inhospitable terrain lacking deep forests forced most partisan bands to operate from bases near Briansk, Russia, or from the forested regions at the border between present-day Ukraine and Belarus. The partisans' position on occupied territory gradually improved in spring 1942 as civilians started fleeing to the forests to evade German forced labor policies. Still, it was only after the German defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943 that the partisan movement developed into a real people's movement capable of harassing and engaging large German detachments within occupied territory.

Much has been written about the partisan movement in the Soviet Union. Veterans and Soviet historians began chronicling its history almost immediately after the end of hostilities. And although much of this work was encumbered by ideological constraints, it nevertheless shed light on the movement's contributions as well as the everyday lives of its fighters. With the opening of Soviet-era archives, a new generation of historians started to consider this topic. From general and regional histories to works that have begun to explore the lived experiences of women and Jews, recent historiography has done much to deepen our knowledge of the Soviet partisan movement. This chapter does not seek to recount this history. Rather, it explores how enduring anxieties about women manifested themselves in new but also familiar ways within the movement and how they in turn encouraged suspicion of women in occupied territory.

The partisans' initial weakness in the midst of an often hostile operating environment encouraged a general distrust of civilians. Anxieties about espionage and infiltration were particularly pronounced in 1941 and early 1942 but remained to a lesser extent until liberation.[5] As a result, partisan leaders were initially instructed to recruit only Communist Party members and other regime loyalists.[6] Even as late as summer 1942, fighters and intelligence officers who were infiltrated behind enemy lines were instructed to be wary of anyone they might encounter in occupied territory.[7] All outsiders, regardless of sex and ethnicity, engendered security concerns. However, once reports of alleged female spies started to emerge, operational reports to and from partisan headquarters began warning about the dangers posed by women, particularly "beautiful" ones.[8] Meanwhile, rumors circulating throughout the partisans portrayed civilian women as infected with syphilis.[9] While not unique to the Soviet Union, such rumors suggested the possibility that the women in question were deliberately infected and were thus being used as "vectors of biological warfare" by the enemy.[10]

Partisan concerns about women focused on their sexuality and the possibility that female agents were using their "charms" to infiltrate the movement to undermine it from within. While these concerns mirrored those found in the Red Army, they also took on a particular tone in the context of partisan warfare. Specifically, some reports suggested that German intelligence organs were recruiting women to assassinate partisan leaders.[11] For instance, a report detailing German anti-partisan methods described the case of a former Soviet scout, code-named "Masha," who was allegedly recruited to poison the commanders of the second brigade of Vasil′ev.[12] Although Soviet reports suggested that German intelligence also recruited men to carry out such assignments, it is not hard to imagine the methods that women such as "Masha" were thought

to employ, especially in light of the rumors that circulated throughout the movement.

As with similar concerns within the Red Army, partisan anxieties had their origins in 1930s spy mania, which predisposed some partisan leaders and rank-and-file fighters to see spies and saboteurs everywhere. They were also to some extent a product of wartime conditions. The nature of partisan warfare, with its hostile operating environment, combined with the tactics deployed by German intelligence organs, encouraged male fighters to project their fears and desires onto women. Each new report and warning amplified existing fears while casting women suspected of close contact with the enemy as potential spies, saboteurs, and traitors. The results, as we shall see, often proved deadly for female fighters and civilians alike.

The Risks and Realities of Being a *Partizanka*

Like their counterparts in the Red Army, many *komsomolka*s volunteered to join stay-behind networks and partisan detachments during the first months of the war. Despite initial reservations, women were accepted into the ranks of the partisans. Nevertheless, the world of the forest camp remained overwhelmingly masculine.[13] This was in sharp contrast to the surrounding German-occupied villages, where the majority of the civilian population consisted of women, children, and the elderly since most able-bodied men were drafted into the Red Army at the start of the German invasion. According to Kenneth Slepyan, the number of female fighters did not exceed 5 percent at the start of the war. And although their number increased as the war progressed, women accounted for only about 9.3 percent of all rank-and-file partisans by the end of hostilities.[14] Women participated in all aspects of partisan warfare but "were primarily used as scouts, information gatherers, and intermediaries between the local population and the partisans."[15] Since the majority of the civilian population inside occupied territory consisted of women and children, female fighters had an easier time blending in. They could often rely on their youth and good looks to allay suspicions and successfully evade German patrols to traverse occupied territory.[16] This was true for both non-Jewish women and Jewish women who worked as couriers for the Jewish resistance in the ghettos.[17] In general, women were far more likely to be discounted and overlooked by enemy combatants as opposed to their male comrades as a result of German gender norms and expectations.

Although women were widely used as couriers in the partisan movement, most were nevertheless marginalized to traditional roles, serving as nurses and cooks.[18] Even as German gender myopia sometimes opened up possibilities for women to operate behind enemy lines, Soviet myopia circumscribed them.

Indeed, despite the propaganda campaign of the previous decade, most Soviet men and women continued to believe that women were less suited for warfare because of their "natural psychology and biological function."[19] As a result, men often refused to go on assignments with women because they thought women were "incapable of performing 'masculine' tasks as riding horses and planting mines."[20] Consequently, *partizanki* had to advocate for themselves and fight for their right to go on military assignments. However, even when they were able to win the respect from their comrades-in-arms, female fighters still had to perform "women's work" by cooking and washing clothes for their comrades.[21] Moreover, like their counterparts in the Red Army, *partizanki* were often objectified by male fighters who sometimes saw them as little more than commodities.[22]

Male-female relationships in the partisan movement resembled those found in the Red Army. While chaste lifelong friendships as well as intimate relationships based on mutual respect and love frequently developed, coercive relationships and instances of rape abounded as well. Severe gender and power imbalances within the movement enabled commanders and intelligence officers to acquire lovers from among their female subordinates.[23] Young women entered such relationships for a variety of reasons, from genuine attraction and love to coercion, but those who accepted their superiors' advances were often denigrated as PPZhs.[24] Some *partizanki* blamed commanders for the overall perception and treatment of women within the movement, but many blamed other women for "a lack of initiative, of craving comfort and of undermining the position of girls in the unit in particular and moral ethos in general."[25] Rather than blaming commanders for abusing their positions of power, male and female fighters often saw women who were party to these relationships as the sources of moral corruption within their units and the movement in general. Meanwhile, since rank-and-file fighters usually had little opportunity to acquire "wives," some took women by force from the surrounding civilian population.[26] This seems to have been especially prevalent when the women in question were suspected of collaborating with the enemy.[27] In such instances, real or imagined collaboration became a pretext for sexual assault and rape.

To be sure, many partisan commanders and rank-and-file fighters respected the contributions of women, defended their female comrades, and punished instances of rape.[28] In fact, within the pre-1939 borders of Soviet Ukraine, partisans accused of rape were sentenced to death.[29] Still, the situation was such that the Komsomol found it necessary to carry out a concerted propaganda campaign in 1943–44 to combat sexual harassment and discrimination in the movement and to boost female participation. As part of this campaign, Ponomarenko ordered more women to be trained as "machine-gunners, mor-

tar gunners, snipers, sappers, reconnaissance personnel, and signalers" and called for the creation of "special, all women's units." Men who were found guilty of "dissolute" behavior and "incorrect attitudes towards women" were subject to harsh disciplinary measures. Finally, in an effort to boost loyalty among civilian women in occupied territory, outstanding female partisans were sent behind enemy lines to conduct propaganda among their civilian counterparts.[30] Still, the fact that the Komsomol stressed the need to incorporate women on a more equal basis with men as late as 1944, even though Stalin had called for this as early as mid-1942, underscores just how marginalized and underestimated women continued to be within the movement.[31] Meanwhile, the few roles in which they were able to excel often placed them in situations that likely only exacerbated ingrained concerns about women's loyalties.

As scouts, information gatherers, and intermediaries, *partizanki* were forced to spend extended periods of time away from their units and in proximity to the enemy. Evdokiia Karpechkina, a *partizanka* who participated in a two-day conference in January 1944 that was sponsored by the Komsomol, shed light on the contributions of female scouts as well as some of their sources of information. Karpechkina oversaw a sixteen-strong, all-woman intelligence team whose members were responsible for recruiting enemy policemen, local female teachers, an entire local band together with their instruments, and even "250 Vlasovites" to the partisan cause.[32] Using these and other local contacts, they gathered intelligence on enemy deployments.[33] Although local contacts such as these provided helpful information, the most useful sources of information were nevertheless German. However, "German sources were most easily accessible when put at ease by a love affair or plain sexual liaison."[34] Soviet sources rarely spoke about this aspect of a female scout's work, most likely because it was at such odds with Soviet wartime propaganda and gender expectations.[35] Still, anecdotal evidence found in Soviet reports makes it clear that some female scouts did in fact pursue such relationships to gather intelligence for the Soviet Union. For example, during the same Komsomol meeting in 1944, Karpechkina noted that scouts who fulfilled their intelligence tasks, and especially those who had police or Gestapo contacts, were promised Soviet awards. Furthermore, those who lived well under the German occupation, presumably because of the privileges they enjoyed from their German contacts, were expected to contribute food and supplies to their units.[36] Similarly, in April 1943, Senior Lieutenant Fedor Salianik reported that the female typists under his command in occupied Minsk who also doubled as liaisons for the Communist underground had German boyfriends.[37] Moreover, some scouts, such as Masha Poryvaeva, were reportedly known as "German Fräulein" among their comrades.[38]

Despite the general silence surrounding this topic in the Soviet Union, starting in the early 1960s, some former *partizanki* and members of the Communist underground did write about their wartime experiences and the relationships they cultivated with enemy combatants. Encouraged by the passage of time and the relative openness of the Khrushchev Thaw, they recounted going on dates with German soldiers and officers and attending get-togethers.[39] While they maintained their wartime identities as "girls"—that is, virgins—they sometimes alluded to their unsuspecting German targets pressuring them to have sex. We will likely never know the full extent of these relationships or the lengths to which some of these women may have been forced to go, but it is likely that some of them did break with Soviet wartime expectations and have sexual relations with their targets to fulfill their intelligence tasks. However, the social stigma that such an admission would have incurred, even decades after the war, combined with ongoing censorship, prevented them from fully speaking out or writing about their wartime experiences and the dangers they faced, whether at the hands of enemy combatants or neighbors and other partisans.

While Soviet scouts maintained connections with enemy combatants for the good of the Soviet Union, the majority of onlookers would have interpreted their actions as a sign of collaboration.[40] This, in turn, would have made the scouts potential targets of vigilante justice from neighboring partisan units whose fighters would have been ignorant of their real identities. In general, proximity to the "other" raised the specter of contamination for a group that, as we have seen, was thought to be more susceptible to foreign influence by virtue of their gender. Notwithstanding women's military service or their contributions and sacrifices on the home front, these concerns remained throughout the war. For example, Komsomol reports from 1943 consistently fretted over the political reliability of young women while highlighting a range of possible sources of contamination, from German music and dance halls to religion.[41] Even as late as January 1944, a Komsomol report noted, "Through fraternization, marriages, and by organizing casinos, balls and dances, the Germans seek to conquer young women politically on a personal basis, encouraging a vested interest in a German victory . . . through 'courtship,' amorousness, and bestowing gifts."[42] Considering Soviet scouts' extended periods among the enemy, they are likely to have been seen as vulnerable. Even more troubling, however, was the possibility of capture that accompanied prolonged exposure to the enemy.

Unlike male partisans, who were usually killed while engaging the enemy in open combat, female scouts were more likely to be detained and arrested.[43]

While under arrest, they were subjected to the same kinds of torture as men, but women were also assaulted, raped, and victimized in gender-specific ways.[44] During searches, German soldiers groped women under their clothing, made "derogatory comments" about their naked bodies, and scratched their breasts.[45] Moreover, in addition to beating prisoners, burning them with cigarettes, and depriving them of water regardless of sex, German interrogators also reportedly cut star-shaped pieces of skin from the breasts and backs of female prisoners.[46] Meanwhile, capture also raised the specter of doubling, or the possibility that an agent could be turned into an enemy asset through torture or other coercive measures. In their reports, Soviet intelligence analysts warned that "a lot of partisan scouts" were turned and forced to work for German intelligence organs after they or their loved ones were captured and imprisoned.[47] Moreover, they suggested that those who agreed to work for German intelligence were later released, but their loved ones remained under German surveillance to ensure their future cooperation. Since many of their comrades-in-arms already suspected women to be less reliable, the possibility of capture and doubling likely reinforced concerns about them, thereby encouraging fears that they were more likely to cave under torture as members of the "weaker sex."

Ultimately anyone who was captured and managed to escape German captivity, regardless of sex, was suspected of being a double agent. But with no foolproof way of determining a person's intentions or their stories, partisan leaders and intelligence officers had to rely on intuition to determine the fate of an escapee or any newcomer who arrived at their forest camp. In his memoirs, Petr Vershigora, a decorated intelligence officer who served with the legendary Sydir Kovpak in Ukraine, reflected on the difficult decisions that he and others like him were forced to make during the war. For him, the answer could be found in the "eyes—they are a mirror of the human soul. This is how you look into his soul and decide what kind of person is in front of you."[48] The reliance on such methods, combined with the general distrust and fear that permeated the movement, led some scouts to worry that they would eventually be killed not by the enemy but by their own side. In his memoirs, Vershigora recalled a female scout from a neighboring unit whose only hope was that death would "not be by our side. It would be better [to die] from a German bullet."[49] Ultimately, trusting the wrong person could lead to the destruction of an entire unit, but suspecting someone who had not been turned could lead to the execution of an innocent person. But with little to go on to determine a person's intentions or verify their stories, personal convictions, along with conscious and unconscious biases, invariably influenced the decisions commanders made.

Espionage and German Anti-Partisan Methods

Partisan concerns about women and their loyalties, mirroring anxieties in the Red Army, were exacerbated by the real and perceived tactics German intelligence organs deployed against them. In addition to mounting large-scale punitive actions, German intelligence organs dispatched an unknown number of spies into the partisan movement. Some may have been double agents, but others were civilians who were recruited inside occupied territory. All, as we shall see, were acting under various levels of duress. A series of German-run schools in occupied territory existed for the purpose of training would-be agents. According to the Belorussian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (BShPD), "Gestapo-run" schools operated in a number of Belorussian cities, including Gomel, Mogilev, Gorki, Petrikov, Bobruisk, and Minsk.[50] Within Russian territory, the "Gestapo" operated schools in Briansk to train local policemen as well as various kinds of German agents. According to a Soviet intelligence report, the most capable graduates of these schools went to work for German military intelligence, while the rest fulfilled sabotage and terrorist tasks directed against the partisans.[51]

German intelligence organs used a variety of methods to infiltrate their agents into the partisan movement. Men caught behind enemy lines or having managed to escape from prisoner-of-war camps reportedly posed as Red Army soldiers. Some claimed they were local policemen or members of other collaborationist organizations who wanted to defect to the partisans. Women, meanwhile, were said to "join the ranks [of the partisans and] predominantly marry the command staff of the detachments."[52] For example, one report mentioned the case of Teliatnikova and Kalashnikova, two women who allegedly "married" their commanders soon after joining their units only to be unmasked as German spies and shot.[53] Citing this case, Aleksei Popov has suggested that the "Gestapo" was well aware of the PPZh phenomenon and attempted to exploit it by deliberately sending "beautiful women" to the partisans in hopes that they would become the "wives" of partisan commanders.[54] This is an intriguing argument, but it needs to be vetted against German sources before any sweeping conclusions can be made. Still, it is evident from such reports that the participation of an unprecedented number of women in the partisan movement, combined with the PPZh phenomenon, sparked anxieties and fears of infiltration. Soviet analysts clearly recognized that the PPZh phenomenon undermined military discipline and left partisan commanders vulnerable to infiltration. But since the Party and Central Command refused to question the authority of military or partisan commanders, little was done to curb these practices except in cases of sexual assault and rape.

While German intelligence organs clearly did try to infiltrate spies into the partisan movement, it is difficult to say how many spies, let alone female spies, they recruited, trained, and dispatched. Soviet personnel returning from occupied territory reportedly encountered large numbers of alleged spies and informers. For example, Captain R. I. Kaprelian, who spent time fighting with a partisan detachment from February to October 1942, stated, "Besides the police, every village has secret Gestapo agents, among whom are a considerable number of women. These agents are known to the partisans and destroyed."[55] The preponderance of women among these alleged networks is hardly surprising since the civilian population in occupied territory was predominantly female. However, the claim that organized networks existed in every village is hard to accept. It is more likely that Kaprelian and others like him ascribed a higher level of participation and complicity to individuals who denounced partisans out of political conviction, hatred of the Soviet system, or simple self-gain. Although civilians who denounced partisans and other Soviet activists were ultimately responsible for the fate of those they denounced, their denunciations did not necessarily mean they were paid informants and spies.

In addition to general reports about German espionage networks that reportedly existed in occupied territory, Soviet intelligence reports often referenced specific female agents who were allegedly dispatched into the partisan movement. For example, a report detailing the work of the Belorussian NKVD noted that on 1 July 1942, two young women, codenamed "Vera" and "Taisiia," were apprehended as suspicious characters by Daniil Raitsev's partisan detachment. After a "thorough interrogation" of the seventeen- and sixteen-year-old girls, Raitsev's unit determined that they were graduates of a German espionage school charged with ascertaining the location of partisan detachments in the area.[56] Another report from 19 November 1942 informed Timofei Strokach, the head of the Ukrainian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (UShPD), that six young women were dispatched to the partisans stationed in the Komarichi and Suzemka regions of Briansk oblast. One of them, a seventeen-year-old, was detained near one of the detachments after she had previously visited and gathered information on two other detachments.[57] On 10 June 1943, General Pavel Sudoplatov, the head of the Fourth Directorate of the NKGB, informed Panteleimon Ponomarenko that his operational group had arrested an SD agent from Gomel, Belorussia, named Liudmila Makarevich. During her interrogation, Makarevich stated that she was sent to infiltrate the partisan detachments stationed near Gomel and named another woman, who she claimed was likewise dispatched by the Germans.[58] In yet another note, dated 2 December 1943, L. E. Eitingon, the Deputy Head of the Fourth Directorate

of the NKVD, informed Bel´chenko, the Deputy Chief of the Central Partisan Headquarters, of two Soviet spies codenamed "Tasia" and "Tamara" who were allegedly doubled by German intelligence.[59]

Partisan units also reported encountering and liquidating large numbers of alleged spies. For example, the BShPD reported in July 1943 that their detachments had "unmasked and shot" 944 "Gestapo agents" since the beginning of 1942 but warned that there was still more work that needed to be done.[60] Meanwhile, the UShPD reported that its units had unmasked 9,883 "spies, traitors, and other accomplices of the Nazi invaders" from 1942 until 1945, of whom 1,998 were alleged spies.[61] One detachment operating near Smolensk, Russia, reported that its fighters had "unmasked" nearly seven hundred "spies, counter-revolutionaries, and police" over a period of several months.[62] Similarly, in his recent memoirs, Nikolai Obryn´ba, a partisan from the Polotsk region of Belorussia, claimed that just in the spring of 1943 his unit had arrested one hundred fifty spies, all of whom had been sent on sabotage or murder missions.[63] Citing the improbable figures of former partisans such as Obryn´ba, Alexander Statiev has concluded that they "leave the impression that many, perhaps most of those accused of spying, were innocent victims of witch-hunts."[64] Indeed, given partisan suspicions and their general distrust of civilians, it is more than likely that many of the people who were suspected of espionage were not really spies.

After analyzing Soviet reports alongside German reports, Alexander Gogun has concluded that Soviet officials within the UShPD exaggerated the effectiveness of partisan warfare "by 10 to 20 times."[65] This is not surprising given the tendency of Soviet officials to exaggerate production and harvest figures. Still, even if the actual number of liquidated enemy assets was much smaller than what was officially reported, the number of suspected spies was still quite high. It is impossible to say how many of them were real spies as opposed to innocent victims of witch-hunts. However, given the fact that German intelligence organs were indeed training and dispatching spies, it is likely that some of them were real. Soviet counterintelligence, however, could not easily identify them, and this situation inevitably resulted in the arrest and execution of innocent people. Nowhere is this more evident than when we consider the fate of some Jewish survivors who attempted to make their way to the partisans following the ghetto liquidations of summer and fall 1942.

Partisan detachments were still relatively weak in 1942, and although they would ultimately prove to be one of the best means of survival for Jews, Jews were not always welcomed or trusted in them.[66] Just as Soviet partisans were warned of the dangers posed by women, so too were they warned of alleged German efforts to recruit Jewish spies.[67] Soviet reports suggested that German-

run schools operated in Minsk for this purpose.[68] And at least one report suggested that German intelligence organs provided poison to beautiful Jewish women and girls with the goal of having them "carry out acts of poisoning."[69] According to Leonid Smilovitskii, the records of the BShPD, partisan memoirs, and the testimonies of Jewish survivors mention isolated instances when German intelligence organs did in fact attempt to use Jewish spies.[70] However, in such cases, Germans had seized family members who were imprisoned in the ghettos and used them as hostages for recruitment purposes.[71]

Although these were isolated cases, they extended suspicion to all Jewish arrivals, sometimes resulting in the execution of innocent people.[72] This is what happened to three Jewish women who escaped the Minsk ghetto only to be shot by partisans on suspicion of being German assassins because several vials of poison were previously found by partisans on other ghetto escapees.[73] A similar story was told to Anika Walke by the *partizanka* Polia Shostak. After escaping from Minsk and making her way to Staroe Selo, where she and her friend Ania hoped to join the partisans, the two women were interrogated by four partisans who asked them if they were Jewish and whether they were spies. According to Shostak, the partisans said that they "had killed a whole group of twenty female Jews who were sent by the Germans to poison the partisans" and threatened to do the same thing to them.[74] Jewish survivors sometimes carried poison with them to take their own lives rather than risk being captured, but some partisan fighters who were warned of the danger posed by would-be assassins interpreted this as a sign of betrayal. Although such suspicions were encouraged by the partisans' operational environment, in which anyone could be a spy or informer, the personal prejudices, biases, and overt antisemitism exhibited by some commanders and fighters also played a role.[75] This was especially the case regarding the proliferation of rumors about Jewish spies. In his recollections, Iakov Abramov, a member of the partisan detachment Imeni Stalina, commanded by I. I. Starodub, recalled just such an incident. Abramov remembered how a Jewish courier named Eva Kutsina was nearly shot when an antisemitic officer accused her of being a German spy on the grounds that she was Jewish and yet had managed to survive.[76] Although Abramov attributed the officer's accusations to antisemitism alone, it is not hard to imagine how conscious and unconscious sexism could have similarly contributed to accusations of espionage and the spread of rumors about female assassins.

Counterintelligence and the Partisans

Partisan leaders, according to Aleksei Popov, were initially slow to recognize the dangers posed by enemy agents and did little to counteract them.[77] However,

NKVD Special Departments were eventually attached to each partisan unit to "unmask" and neutralize the alleged spies that German intelligence organs were sending. Within the partisans, the special departments were responsible for "maintaining internal security against spies and anti-Soviet elements, developing intelligence networks among the local population, and initiating intelligence operations against the enemy." They were also responsible for "unit discipline by investigating and punishing cases of rape, plundering, and other criminal violations."[78] It is important to keep in mind that while these were their official objectives, this did not necessarily mean that all representatives of the special departments were fully trained in their implementation. For example, Kenneth Slepyan uncovered the case of Z. T. Gobets, an NKVD official appointed to head the special department of the Mogilev oblast's 208th partisan detachment, who seemed wholly unprepared for his assignment. In a letter addressed to the head of the Special Departments of the Western Front from November 1942, Gobets wrote, "Requesting information for how to deal with marauding, unmasking enemy agents and police, and confirming and verifying documents of local partisan officials and plenipotentiaries."[79] The lack of preparation reflected in this request must have had a detrimental impact on the work of the special department and more importantly the civilians and partisans who would subsequently be investigated by him and his subordinates.

The partisans' pervasive fear of spies meant that all newcomers as well as all existing partisan fighters were scrutinized by the special departments. All outsiders, including Communist Party members still in possession of their documents, underwent verifications and were restricted from performing tasks that could put their units in danger, such as guard duty, until their identities could be confirmed.[80] The special departments also maintained informant networks within detachments to ferret out any suspicious fighters.[81] Although these efforts were geared toward ascertaining the identities of alleged spies, some NKVD operatives used their positions and the general atmosphere of fear to extort sex from their subordinates. For example, one NKVD chief accused a nineteen-year-old fighter of spying for the enemy when she refused his sexual advances. The girl was subsequently shot.[82] Similarly, some unit commanders threatened to expose women as spies whenever they refused their advances. This was what occurred in the case of a girl identified in the records as Sonia. Sonia tried to resist the advances of her commander, Hero of the Soviet Union N. N. Popudrenko. After she had refused him for several months, Popudrenko accused Sonia of working for the Germans and threatened to shoot her. When she still refused him, he raped her.[83] It is important to note that Soviet commanders were not unique in this regard: German men similarly used the pre-

text of partisan warfare, including the threat of exposing women as partisans, to commit acts of sexual violence on the Eastern Front.[84]

While some of the individuals detained by the special departments on suspicion of espionage were investigated, most were shot either after cursory investigations or in some cases without any preliminary investigation at all.[85] Since conditions in occupied territory made it nearly impossible to keep suspects under arrest or transfer them to the Soviet rear, partisan commanders and intelligence officers often chose to eliminate them rather than run the risk of allowing a potential spy to go free.[86] Additionally, whenever partisan leaders did carry out investigations, torture seems to have been employed to gather evidence.[87] Kenneth Slepyan has noted that reports of excesses eventually led the "Central Staff to draft an order in June 1943 instructing commanders to stop 'baseless shootings' of partisans and civilians and to rely on more political work to maintain discipline." Although it is not clear whether this order was ever issued, Slepyan has suggested that the fact that it was drafted means that excesses were sufficiently widespread to "attract Moscow's attention."[88]

Much of the information that we have about alleged German spies comes from individuals who were detained, interrogated, and then likely shot. The explanations they gave to their Soviet interrogators suggest that many if not most of them were operating under various levels of duress. In fact, while Soviet reports noted that some men and women volunteered to spy for German intelligence either out of political conviction or, in the case of prisoners-of-war, to escape internment in prisoner-of-war camps, they acknowledged that many were coerced.[89] Arrest, imprisonment, and the threat of execution against captured partisans, civilians, and their loved ones were used to force recruits into service.[90] For example, two separate reports on German anti-partisan methods mentioned the case of Antonina Krukovskaia, from the city of Ordzhonikidzegrad (Briansk), Russia, whose family was used as leverage against her.[91] Krukovskaia was arrested by the "Gestapo" and induced to work as a spy. When she refused, her German handlers threatened to shoot her. They then arrested her mother and brother and threatened to execute them as well. To save herself and her loved ones, Krukovskaia eventually agreed to work as a German spy.[92] Another exemplary case involved a man named Petrov who was arrested with his eighteen-year-old daughter in one of the villages of the Zhurinichesk *selsoviet* (village Soviet) located in the Smolensk oblast. He was also induced to spy on the partisan detachments based in the Briansk forests while German authorities kept his daughter under arrest and threatened to shoot her if he failed.[93]

Regarding alleged female spies, Soviet reports suggested that German intelligence organs also bribed women to "buy" their cooperation. For example,

one report suggested that the "Gestapo" "[bought] our people, especially young girls, who, while in severe material conditions, go to work for German intelligence for money, clothes, food, and sometimes just for [face] powder and cologne."[94] A report on fraternization in the Krasnodon (Sorokyne) raion, Voroshilovgrad/Luhansk oblast, stated that German soldiers and officers "tempted girls and even inclined them to a depraved life by means of various cheap presents (cosmetics)."[95] E. Belitskii, a member of the UShPD, echoed these conclusions when he reported that recruits for a two-month course in German-controlled Sevastopol, Crimea, were allegedly enticed by "good food, clothes, sweets, but are warned of the consequences for the family in the event of desertion."[96] Even as late as January 1944, a Komsomol report expressed concern that the Germans were enticing women in occupied territory to their side through gifts (i.e., by engaging in fraternization).[97]

While such reports reflected a certain level of understanding of the dire living conditions and want that drove Soviet men and women to agree to spy for the enemy, they also betrayed an underlying anxiety about women and their loyalties. By suggesting that women were recruited by something as seemingly frivolous as face powder and cologne, such reports created the impression of pettiness among women who, in time of war, seemed to be more concerned with their appearance than with fighting the enemy. Invoking connotations of *meshchantstvo*, an association that officials reading these reports would have likely made, such descriptions encouraged links between women, decadence, and political unreliability.[98] Similarly, by stating that German intelligence officers "bought" girls, the reports likened them to prostitutes who, for the price of face powder and cologne, were seemingly willing to sell out their comrades and their motherland. Such items, however, were sought-after commodities due to the severe shortages occasioned by the war and occupation and could have been traded along with clothes and household items for food. The failure to recognize the importance of such items for survival, especially in light of the famine conditions that prevailed in occupied cities, reinforced negative stereotypes of women as "weak" and unreliable members of society.

A similar dynamic can be seen with regard to women who were forced to work in German brothels. In a telling passage about German-run brothels in occupied Kyiv, intelligence officers noted in 1942 that

> in some cities, the bureau of labor is also the supplier of "live merchandise" for officers' brothels. Thus, for example, in Kyiv, the bureau of labor offers pretty women work as waitresses in cafeterias (considering the difficult situation with food, this area of work is considered the most tempting). A woman who gives her consent is sent to the owner of the cafeteria; here she works for 2–3 days and

> then is openly offered work in the officers' brothel. Those who refuse are threatened with reprisals or arrested. There have been cases of executions by shooting. The less stable elements [maloustoichivye elementy] give their consent; the strongest consent to this provocation and then, after they are released home, commit suicide.[99]

Such conclusions reflected a hierarchy in which the strongest and therefore most loyal members of society sacrificed themselves for the good of the motherland, with little regard for themselves or their loved ones, while those who were allegedly weak succumbed to the pressures of war and occupation. If women who faced such "choiceless choices" could be considered "weak," then what could be said about those who survived the occupation on their own terms or those who accepted an enemy assignment to stave off hunger or save a loved one?

Finally, Soviet reports also suggested that women and girls were recruited because of their alleged relationships with enemy combatants. For example, one report claimed that "A lot of young women live with German soldiers and officers and through them begin to work in the Gestapo."[100] This was how a woman named Aleksandra Vasil′evna Fomicheva was allegedly recruited. According to the report, "She worked as a cleaner in the barracks of the Germans for two months, cohabitated with them, and was recruited for work as an intelligence agent."[101] Neither the circumstances of how she originally began to work for the Germans nor the level of force and coercion that may have been used against her are known. With little information to go on besides the fact that she allegedly cohabitated with German soldiers before being recruited, such reports likely reinforced links between fraternization and espionage. It remains to be seen whether the Komsomol concerns raised elsewhere were a direct response to these kinds of reports, but it is likely. Such reports reinforced existing anxieties about women and girls that had persisted throughout the interwar period while raising new ones that were a direct result of the war and the occupation. Moreover, they reinforced the need to surveille women who were thought to be in close contact with the enemy. Indeed, if such reports were to be believed, then any woman in close contact with the enemy was a potential spy or saboteur.

The bitter experiences of summer and fall 1941 taught partisan leaders and rank-and-file fighters to be wary of civilians living in occupied territory. Reports of alleged female spies reinforced concerns about civilians and inflamed longstanding anxieties about women that mirrored those found in the Red Army. References to scouts allegedly turned into enemy assets or civilians

coerced or bribed to spy for the enemy were intended to reveal German methods and encourage the adoption of appropriate measures to counteract them. And while they did inspire vigilance and the adoption of counterintelligence measures, they also encouraged a pervasive fear of spies and saboteurs within the partisan movement that extended suspicion to civilians and fighters alike.

This chapter as well as the previous one explored the various anxieties and fears regarding women that arose within the Red Army and the partisan movement and how they in turn encouraged associations between fraternization and espionage. We saw how the real and perceived actions of women were interpreted in light of enduring tropes and expectations and in response to the tactics employed by German intelligence organs. But the voices of women who found themselves scrutinized and judged were rarely heard, except for in the women's alleged statements to their Soviet interrogators. The following chapter attempts to recover some of their voices through a close reading of the diary of a young woman who maintained relationships with German soldiers and officers during the occupation of her hometown. Using her fragmentary records, the chapter will explore the complex constellation of factors and motivations that encouraged some non-Jewish women to pursue relations with local collaborators and enemy combatants. The reality, as we shall see, was complex and ambiguous.

4

The Diary of a *Komsomolka*

Fraternization and the View from Below

During the war, Nazi officials estimated that Germans stationed in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine fathered ten thousand children with local women.[1] While such statistics must be treated with extreme caution, recent scholarship has shown that, even as sexual violence was widespread across German-occupied territory, fraternization between non-Jewish women and Germans was also common. German prohibitions against social and intimate relations with local civilians were never fully enforced and even members of the SS applied for permits to marry women from the Baltic states and Ukraine.[2] Although mutual attraction and love sometimes characterized these relationships, they were never simple love affairs. The stark power imbalances and the inferior position of Slavs vis-à-vis Germans meant that they never enjoyed the same kinds of liberty to pursue relationships as their German partners. Moreover, since acute need was often a significant factor underlying these relationships, the line between consensual relations and what might be considered survival prostitution was often difficult to disentangle.[3]

Contemporary diaries and postwar memoirs are full of references to fraternization that testify to its ubiquity and the responses it elicited in onlookers.[4] For example, in his recent memoirs, Roman Kravchenko-Berezhnoy recalled Katya, the older sister of one of his classmates, who had an Austrian admirer named Kurt. Katya met Kurt while he was recovering in a German convalescent home in Kremenets, Ukraine. During the winter of 1941–42, "Kurt brought food—canned foods, bacon, sausage, and bread" to Katya and her younger sister, Zhenia, whose parents had been deported to Kazakhstan by Soviet authorities in 1940. Khravchenko recalled that Kurt "had the most serious intentions toward Katya." Once Kyiv was liberated by the Red Army in fall 1943, Kurt returned to Kremenets and took the two sisters with him to Vienna, where he placed them in his mother's care.[5] Kravchenko did not refer

to Katya in his wartime diary.[6] But from his memoirs it is clear that even if he did once disapprove of her behavior, he no longer condemned her for her actions. Orphaned by the Soviet regime, Katya and Zhenia were trying to survive the occupation as best they could.[7] Moreover, Kravchenko recalled that Katya's relationship also helped feed two Russian prisoners-of-war who visited the girls.[8]

Kravchenko's personal knowledge of Katya's situation and the distance of time enabled him to view her wartime relationship with an enemy soldier with a certain level of understanding. Contemporaneous opinions, however, were often much harsher. For example, on the eve of the winter holidays in 1941, O. Shargorodskaia, a citizen of Yalta whose Jewish husband was murdered during a ghetto liquidation, condemned her neighbors for planning a party where Germans would be present. "Some of the inhabitants [of our building] feel festive. For example, our neighbor, Iakutskaia, feels festive. She is getting ready to welcome guests. The krauts are coming for a 'little dance.' Her daughter flirts with and pays compliments to [the Germans], but she used to be a *komsomolka*, an activist who was celebrated in print. It's disgusting. Now she dances to a German tune."[9] While Soviet officials worried that such women and girls were being recruited to work for German intelligence, many of their neighbors considered them to be little more than prostitutes who had sold themselves and were now "dancing to a German tune."

Historians have advanced a variety of theories to explain the phenomenon of fraternization in German-occupied territory. In the case of Kyiv, for example, Karel Berkhoff has attributed fraternization to the artificial famine conditions that German occupation authorities cultivated in the city. However, Berkhoff also suggested that young women sought German boyfriends in other cities where famine was not nearly as much of a factor. Furthermore, he noted that young women seem to have preferred German men over local men in parts of Ukraine, a preference that he speculated may have arisen from a shortage of local men and curiosity.[10] Meanwhile, Jeffrey Burds has suggested that the "hardships of war and the seeming inevitability of German victory combined to promote a reevaluation of values among local girls throughout the East."[11] Indeed, a constellation of factors, ranging from acute need and desperation to curiosity and sometimes sheer boredom, encouraged women to pursue relations with enemy combatants. And as the situation inside occupied territory and at the front shifted, so too did the nature of fraternization and the meanings ascribed to it.

Until fairly recently, the voices of civilians in occupied territory and especially those of women were seldom heard in accounts of World War II on the Eastern Front. Censorship combined with decades of stigma and fear of repri-

sal prevented discussions of the occupation that did not uphold the Soviet myths of the war. Soviet intelligence reports, the majority of which remain classified, were far less encumbered by censorship. However, as the previous chapters have argued, they often reflected the fears and anxieties of Soviet officials and intelligence analysts far better than the complexity of lived experience on the ground. This chapter seeks to complicate the image of the fraternizer-cum-spy that so worried Soviet officials. Through a close reading of a diary of a young woman who pursued relations with enemy combatants,[12] this chapter explores the multifaceted factors that stood behind her actions and those of her friends and neighbors.

Olga was seventeen years old when war broke out and Znamenka (Znam´ianka), her hometown in the Kirovograd (Kropyvnytskyi) region of Ukraine, was overrun. Like many of her compatriots, Olga was a *komsomolka*. Although her identity remains a mystery, her fragmentary wartime diary provides a unique window onto her world.[13] Reading it together with available Soviet and German records enables us to partially reconstruct the occupation of her hometown, the dynamics that developed between occupier and occupied, and how neighbors reacted to and ultimately sought to police the actions of their female neighbors.

"I Am a Member of the Lenin Youth"

Located approximately 40 kilometers northeast of Kirovograd/Kropyvnytskyi and approximately 30 kilometers west of Alexandriia (Oleksandriia), Znamenka was a relatively small town located in what remains a predominantly rural part of Right Bank Ukraine.[14] In 1939, its population totaled 13,604 and included 653 individuals, or a little more than 20 percent, of Jewish descent.[15] Its claim to fame was its railroad station and strategic location as a railroad hub. This encouraged German authorities to house a significant contingent of administrators and personnel in the town following its capture on 6 August 1941. In addition to a local police force, German gendarmes, and a local administration, several railroad-related bureaus operated out of Znamenka, and the town also housed a military hospital. This concentration of German organizations meant that a significant number of German personnel, including soldiers, civilian administrators, and railroad workers, stayed for extended periods of time in Znamenka. Consequently, numerous opportunities existed for Soviet civilians to interact with Germans, which many did from the first days of the occupation.

Relatively little is known about those first days and weeks. However, reading Olga's diary entries from late August and early September 1941, one gets the impression that many non-Jewish civilians began interacting with German

soldiers on a relatively amicable basis soon after the area was secured and the front moved eastward. This was the case throughout much of Ukraine but especially in the western regions, which were annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939. There most people, according to Karel Berkhoff, were "glad to see the Germans." It was only farther east "that the population was initially far more reserved and sometimes even fearful."[16] In her first entry from 26 August, Olga recorded how her father played chess with a German soldier and later with a translator in their yard. "Dad checkmated him in the game and when they were playing the second match, the translator came by. Dad asked for a good player and he presented himself. He was putting on such nasty airs. He would have been checkmated if the *komendant* had not called for him. He kept repeating that dad will be *kaput* just like the USSR. He is so disgusting!"[17] Olga spent much of the following day's entry describing her evening, which she spent at home talking and passing notes with her sister, Liuda, the German translator, and another soldier named Ludolf. Several days later, she mused that she "would have had a new love if he [Ludolf] remained here a little longer."[18] Clearly, neither Ludolf nor the translator inspired much fear in either Olga or her parents.

On 31 August, a new regiment arrived in Znamenka to replace Regiment K, whose soldiers Olga had started to get to know. After seeing some of the newly stationed soldiers in her neighbors' yard, Olga stated that "they are not Germans but something like . . . like gypsies. And they are also so impudent! Beggars (Golodrantsy). The others that had driven by were all cultured, but these . . . It's disgusting even."[19] Whereas the previous regiment had seemed to live up to her expectations of "cultured" Germans, Olga found the soldiers from the new regiment to be lacking. Not only were they rude, but they soon started soliciting sexual favors from local girls. On 7 September, Olga recorded her anger and frustration after being propositioned. "At first, he spoke courteously, but afterward, God! Save me from ever having to hear such nonsense again. He spoke like the most depraved person for whom there is no more shame. He said that he will come tomorrow to invite me to go for a walk (and to where: into the forest). Pah! Wretched creature! [Tvar´ neschastnaia!] What a scoundrel. . . . I restrained myself so that I would not spit in his snout. This is beyond impudence, it's an outrage."[20] Such attempts to pressure women for sex antagonized local civilians. Meanwhile, although one rarely senses fear in Olga's diary entries, the possibility of violence was always present, and every interaction had the potential to escalate beyond a woman's control. On 23 September, she wrote: "Three Germans frightened Zhorzha and Tol´ku so that they would go to bed and then started pestering us. They encircled me. They do not let me go and are themselves singing. I almost began to cry. Then,

luckily, dad came out. I called him [over]. They embraced dad as well. With difficulty, I broke free."[21] Although Olga was able to escape thanks in part to her father's intervention, this situation could have easily escalated beyond her control. Indeed, recent scholarship has shown that incidences of individual and gang rapes by German soldiers and SS and police personnel were common and usually went unpunished unless such crimes were deemed to undermine military discipline.[22] Still, it was the uncertainty of war rather than the conduct of German soldiers that seems to have been foremost in the minds of non-Jewish civilians in Znamenka.

Although there were those who initially welcomed the Wehrmacht and feared the return of Soviet power, there were also many who longed for a Soviet victory. Consequently, early autumn 1941 was characterized by both hope for and fear of a Soviet counterattack. The uncertainty of war was underscored several times during the early weeks of occupation as Soviet planes flew over Znamenka, forcing civilians to hide in their bomb shelters. "For two nights in a row we sat in our 'shelter from fear' ['otstrakhoubezhishche'] as Soviet planes attacked. But I am not at all disappointed [No mne nichut´ ne dosadno] since I want their victory. It seems to me that the Soviets will win even though it does not look like it. There are rumors that America has declared war on Germany and that Japan has declared war on us. We'll see whose victory it will be. In no way do I want to be with the Germans."[23] The absence of any reliable information about what was happening at the front contributed to the uncertainty. Still, as long as signs of Soviet power remained, those longing for a Soviet victory retained hope. Meanwhile, those inclined to support German forces were cautioned against throwing their full support behind the occupation regime out of fear that the Red Army might soon return. But following the fall of Kyiv on 19 September, hope for a Soviet victory began to fade.[24]

Soon, elements of a local administration began taking shape. On 1 September, a local collaborationist newspaper was issued that "curse[d] Stalin and the Soviets and sen[t] a welcome to Hitler."[25] Olga criticized the authors for their unpatriotic sentiments and the speed with which they were adapting to the new situation. "These Ukrainians are so vile! [Do chego podlyi etot Ukrainskii narod!] I do not love them for this even though they are my people. But still they are better than strangers."[26] Olga was likely referring to both the newspaper's authors and some of her neighbors who were beginning to change their allegiances in recognition of the altered situation. While some volunteered for work with the local administration and the auxiliary police, others went as far as to claim Volksdeutsche, or "ethnic German," status in order to receive the additional benefits it afforded.[27]

As non-Jewish civilians began rebuilding their lives under the new regime, many quickly found that there was nothing for them to do since there was little work in Znamenka and the schools remained closed. "Today is a day off. But this is not like former days off. There is nothing to rest from. I am loafing about [lodyrnichaiu]. We do not go to school. There is no work. How nice it had been before. You come home from school tired and take up a novel or something and read . . . You fall asleep over the book. But now I go to bed and I cannot fall asleep. Boredom, boredom. I used to write little poems. . . . Now nothing comes to mind. Yes, things are bad!"[28] Throughout autumn 1941, Olga repeatedly complained that she had nothing to do and longed for her old life, when she was able to attend school. Education was important for the generation that came of age during the 1930s.[29] It was considered a prerequisite for anyone wishing to move to the country's cities. Moreover, it was thought to be a marker of "culturedness" and modernity. For much of the non-Jewish youth, the absence of educational prospects and sources of entertainment inside occupied territory contributed to their eventual disaffection with the occupation regime.[30]

Meanwhile, Olga continued to tell everyone, in language that resembled the Soviet slogans she had grown up with, that she was a *komsomolka*. Perhaps these slogans gave her a sense of comfort and normalcy amid the dislocation of war and occupation. However, even as she continued to take pride in her Komsomol membership, she was also beginning to feel increasingly alone. "I tell everyone over and over again that I am a member of the Lenin youth. . . . No one will ever break me. I am a patriot of my homeland. And there are thousands, millions like me. But for now I am alone and I have nothing to do."[31] Whereas before she "was always waiting for something [vse chegoto zhdala]," now she did "not wait for anything."[32] The future seemed bleak, and the only things life seemed to bring were more tedious days that differed little from the rest. Under such circumstances, her previous life seemed like a bright beacon shining from the past. On 21 November, she heard rumors that the Red Army was advancing and wrote about how she wanted her "previous life. Raia, the movies, the garden, Vladimir, *** how pure and sweet! And now? Eternal longing [toska] for the past."[33] Not everyone, however, felt the same way. In the same entry, Olga wrote about her friend Zhenia, who had no similar yearnings. "Zhenia does not want our people to return. What does it matter to her? [Chto ei?] It's all the same to her as long as she lives. But why am I not like her in this way?"[34] Having concluded that Soviet power would not return, Zhenia decided to live her life in the present, something Olga was finding it hard to do.

Earlier, Olga began noticing that her friends were becoming more attentive to the soldiers and were acting differently. She observed that Zhenia "has already begun to understand a lot about beauty and has lost the appearance of modesty."[35] Her friends were paying more attention to their looks and the way they dressed, and this upset her. She complained that they "behaved repulsively" around German soldiers and that their actions were beginning to resemble "debauchery."[36] Although Olga's objections focused on the way her friends were behaving around German soldiers, they seem to have had little to do with the identity of the soldiers themselves. Indeed, it is likely that she would have found her friends' actions equally disturbing had they been directed at local men. Rather than objecting to fraternization on principle, Olga seems to have been upset by how quickly her friends were maturing. They were all in their late teens or early twenties and were just beginning to experiment with their sexuality when war broke out. Even without the war, this process would have placed strains on friendships as some girls matured faster than others. But this already complex time in their lives was further complicated by the war and the occupation. Meanwhile, Olga's own interactions with soldiers simultaneously thrilled and repulsed her.

On 1 September, Olga wrote about her first kiss. She was playing checkers with her friend Zhenia when two soldiers sat down to play with them. Olga described what followed when her partner later got up to leave. "He took my hand, squeezed it firmly, and . . . (I am even ashamed to admit it) kissed it! I jerked back my hand and only answered 'no!' What did I mean by 'no,' I don't know myself. Splendid! [Eto da!] My first kiss. After all, I do not remember anyone ever kissing me before even if only on the hand. But this is not a sweet mood since I felt (albeit a little) disgust for this person."[37] Although she had professed to be in love with a Jewish boy named Vladimir, Olga was still young and sexually inexperienced.[38] She was just starting to mature into a young woman when war broke out. Without the direction of the Komsomol and with little to occupy her time, she soon began spending time in the company of soldiers who had access to radios and in whose presence it was possible to temporarily forget about everyday life. While it is likely that Olga's initial interactions were thus motivated by the "sheer boredom" that characterized life for Soviet youth in occupied territory, it was not long before she too began searching for her version of the "ideal" among them.[39]

Initially, she compared them with her idealized version of true love and was left pining for Vladimir and her old life. In September, Olga wrote about how "vexing" (dosadno) it was to think that she was "starting up conversations with my enemies. I have not lost my stupid habit of searching for the ideal. Still,

Vladimir remains dear to me as before."[40] As the novelty of her interactions waned, they began contributing to her frustrations. On 2 October, she wrote that she was "tired of these empty entries. What is there to write about? Again about how Zhenia told me that this railroad worker shamelessly lied when he said that he loved me or that one or the other was polite to me. This is repulsive. I would be delighted [Ia by voskhishchalas′] if this one at least looked like a hero."[41] Still, notwithstanding her frustrations, Olga soon began expressing a desire to win their respect.[42] But even as she did this, she continued to question her own motivations. In part, it seems that she simply wanted to have fun. This is what she suggested when she wrote, "You see, I only want to merrily pass the time."[43] Meanwhile, after nearly half a year of life under occupation, she was finding it difficult to hate the enemy. On 7 December, she noted that "Even though my anger boils, still I can't drop this habit (or how to call it). That is, I cannot treat my enemies with contempt if not the complete opposite. I feel sorry for myself. I need love, life, energy, but what has life given to me? Only eternal longing [toska] for the ideal, eternal dreams and recollections. . . . Why don't I have a happy 'now' like others?"[44]

While Olga struggled to reconcile her feelings, girls like Zhenia were forging new lives for themselves, having concluded that the Red Army would never return. At this point, Olga's actions seem to have been largely motivated by a combination of curiosity and boredom. Whereas need and basic survival often stood behind the actions of city dwellers who were already experiencing famine in 1941, such concerns only became factors for Olga much later in the occupation. As a resident of a rural town, Olga had access to food from the surrounding countryside and was thus in a relatively privileged position when compared to her urban counterparts. Still, as elsewhere, German racial and gender policies shaped her everyday life and the choices available to her. Meanwhile, the violence of the occupation and the Holocaust became the backdrop against which girls like Olga forged their new lives.

Nazi Atrocities and the Holocaust in Znamenka

Although Olga rarely mentioned what was happening outside her circle of close friends and acquaintances, the horrors of the occupation clearly did not bypass Znamenka. By September 1941, two prisoner-of-war camps for Soviet soldiers were opened in the nearby village of Bogdanovka (Bohdanivka), located approximately fourteen kilometers northwest of Znamenka. According to eye-witness testimony collected by the Extraordinary State Commission to Investigate German Fascist Crimes (ChGK), Soviet prisoners-of-war were kept in unsanitary conditions in two former school buildings in the village. They were subjected to "inhuman labor" and issued a mere two hundred grams of

bread and bran soup per day.[45] Whether similar camps existed in Znamenka or in any of the other nearby villages is not known. Still, Soviet prisoners-of-war were a common sight in the late summer and fall of 1941.

In late September, Olga recorded how she "almost began to cry" when she saw Soviet prisoners being led down the road.[46] About a month later, on 10 November, she described seeing Soviet prisoners-of-war on work detail.

> I saw how they beat our prisoners. Goodness! Tears splashed from my eyes when I saw how they strained themselves carrying oaks. I cursed their torturers. They laugh, scoundrels, [and] walk around with sticks like savages. I know that many will die in this way. Many of them are Komsomol members, loyal to the motherland! All of them, poor things, are waiting for our victory like me. Yes! But who will win? I believe in our victory although there is very little hope of it. I am sorry for all that has passed. I love my motherland although its inhabitants lied a lot. It does not matter! I will reconcile myself to everything so long as it is with my people.[47]

The sight of such suffering steeled Olga's resolve but also contributed to the internal struggles that her interactions with German soldiers were provoking.

Whereas Olga voiced concerns about the treatment of Soviet prisoners-of-war, she was remarkably silent about the fate of Znamenka's Jews. However, available Soviet war crimes trial records suggest that several massacres took place in Znamenka over the course of the occupation. One of the first occurred on 14 October 1941. That Tuesday, members of the 304th Police Battalion arrived in Znamenka at about five in the evening and immediately murdered forty-seven Jewish civilians.[48] Ivan Stasenko, who lived at Number 15, Trudovoi Street, witnessed the massacre.[49] In his testimony, Stasenko recalled seeing a group of about forty to forty-five Jewish men, women, and children being led past his house.[50] A large group of armed local policemen numbering between twenty-three and twenty-four individuals, as well as a smaller group of approximately six Germans, was leading them from the direction of Krasny Prospekt toward the radio station located on the edge of the Black Forest.[51] Stasenko was standing by his gate when he saw them. Soon after, he heard them "scream[ing] hysterically [and] begging for mercy" as shots emanated from the massacre site that was located approximately five hundred to six hundred meters away.[52]

Although Olga never mentioned the events of that day in her diary, 14 October did not pass unnoticed. That evening, she celebrated her eighteenth birthday in the company of two friends and three "noble-looking" (blagorodnye) German policemen.[53] While her father played chess with two of them,

Olga showed the third one, a man named Hanz, her German-language books.[54] The following evening, Hanz and his comrades returned and, after exchanging notes with Olga, Hanz asked her if he could return on 16 October to take her out for a walk.[55] Their date, however, was not meant to be because Hanz left Znamenka that morning.[56] Coincidentally, the 304th Police Battalion, whose members had participated in the massacre on 14 October, boarded a train on 16 October leaving Znamenka for Kyiv via Fastiv.[57] Whether Hanz was a member of the battalion is not known. Still, the time frame is suggestive. At the very least, the episode underscores how the mundane continued to coexist with the horrors of the Holocaust and the occupation.

In addition to the massacre perpetrated by the 304th Police Battalion, evidence exists that an SS Maintenance Repair Platoon, which was attached to the First SS Brigade, also carried out a massacre in Znamenka in fall 1941. In 1942, the SS tried SS Officer Max Täubner, the leader of the Maintenance Repair Platoon, and his men for unsanctioned and savage conduct against civilians. According to Yehoshua Büchler, the SS accused Täubner of taking trophy photographs during massacres and mailing them home to family and friends in the Reich.[58] Based on the testimonies collected during Täubner's trial, we know that his unit carried out anti-Jewish operations (Aktionen) from "Volhynia in the west to Konotop in the northwest Ukraine," including in Znamenka.[59] Details about the *Aktion* in Znamenka are unavailable because the SS tribunal focused its attention on larger massacres in Novograd-Volynskii, Sholokhovo, and Aleksandriia and did not gather information about locations where the killings were deemed to have been "routine" in nature.[60] Still, we know that the *Aktion* in nearby Aleksandriia occurred while Täubner's unit was stationed there from 22 October to 12 November 1941. And while it is possible that Täubner's unit assisted the 304th Police Battalion, it seems more likely that Täubner and his men initiated a separate *Aktion* in Znamenka either while stationed in Aleksandriia or at some point immediately before or after their deployment there.

In early 1944, Soviet authorities tried several local men who worked as policemen in Znamenka during the occupation. Their testimonies suggest that massacres of Jewish civilians were common in the area during autumn 1941 and spring 1942. For example, Vasilii Kovalenko recalled arresting Jews on several occasions during the period.[61] He admitted to participating in the arrest of seven families that were subsequently shot and of appropriating some of their property for his personal use.[62] According to Kovalenko, at the time, all the Jewish victims were living along three streets: Karl Marx, Detovska, and Lenin.[63] While no evidence pointing to the existence of a ghetto in Znamenka has previously been found, Kovalenko's testimony suggests that Znamenka's

Jews may have been forcibly congregated on these streets at some point during autumn 1941.

The second wave of arrests, which, according to Kovalenko, occurred in spring 1942, coincided with yet another massacre that took place at some point in March of that year. Details about this massacre are scarce save for the testimony of Siliverst Vikhrovski, who testified in late 1943 that sixty-three Jewish men, women, and children were shot on this occasion.[64] Vikhrovski was being held in a death cell (v smertnoi kamere) in the town jail when he witnessed the victims being led away.[65] According to Vikhrovski, Mikhail Kravchenko, another policeman who was tried alongside Kovalenko, participated in the massacre along with six others.[66] As in the previous massacre in October 1941, these Jewish men, women, and children were all allegedly shot behind Znamenka's radio relay center (za radiouslom).[67]

As Soviet authorities prepared their case against Kovalenko and Kravchenko in December 1943, they carried out exhumations at the sites of two mass graves in Znamenka. Their findings largely corroborated the testimonies provided by Stasenko and Vikhrovski. The first grave was located in the garden of the railroad hospital where Soviet forces had dug an anti-tank ditch in the weeks prior to the start of the occupation.[68] It measured fifteen by eight meters and was approximately eighteen to twelve months old at the time of the exhumations. Inside, Soviet investigators found the remains of men, women, and children. All the adults were shot at nearly point-blank range, while the youth and children had injuries consistent with bludgeoning. In all, the remains of sixty-three individuals were discovered in the first grave, including those of thirty-one men, twenty-three women, and nine children.[69] The second grave was located on the edge of the Black Forest opposite Znamenka's radio station, where Soviet authorities had also previously dug anti-tank ditches and trenches.[70] The remains of nineteen men, thirteen women, and seven children were found inside.[71] Additional exhumations were carried out in 1946, but I was unable to obtain their records.[72] Still, the findings from late 1943, read together with available Soviet and German sources, clearly show that several massacres occurred in Znamenka over a period of several months starting in fall 1941.

Although only two witnesses testified about these massacres to Soviet authorities in December 1943, it is almost certain that many more civilians saw or heard what happened. The Holocaust in the East took place in the open with German perpetrators and local collaborators making little effort to conceal their actions.[73] Moreover, many civilians were conscripted to participate in various aspects of the massacres, from digging and later covering up mass graves to sorting the clothes of murdered Jews.[74] Meanwhile, prior to their murders on the outskirts of their communities, Jewish civilians were subjected

to a series of discriminatory measures that were meant to dehumanize and separate them from the rest of the civilian population. While it is unclear whether Znamenka's Jews were forced to wear identifying markers or live in a ghetto, it is unlikely that non-Jewish civilians would have remained ignorant of their neighbors' fates. So why, then, was Olga silent about the Holocaust?

While Olga's silence can be interpreted as a sign of indifference or even approval, it does not seem that she harbored antisemitic sentiments. Indeed, her teenage crush, Vladimir, was Jewish, a fact that she supposedly did not hesitate to declare to her German acquaintances as late as November 1941.[75] The fact that she continued to talk about Vladimir even after the 304th Police Battalion carried out a massacre suggests that she might not have known what was happening. Still, it was nearly impossible for civilians to have remained ignorant for long. Non-Jewish civilians quickly learned about their Jewish neighbors through the rumors that circulated following an *Aktion*. But since locals provided guard duty and participated in other ways in the massacres of their Jewish neighbors, it was not wise to speak openly about what was happening. With this in mind, it is thus possible that Olga was silent about the massacres because her friends were likely reading her diary. The reading and sharing of women's personal notebooks was a prewar tradition that Olga and her friends continued to practice.[76] Therefore, it is possible that she may have deliberately omitted references to the Holocaust because she was concerned about who else might read her words.

While we will likely never know why Olga remained silent about the Holocaust, it was clearly an ever-present aspect of the occupation in Znamenka. It is hard to imagine how everyday life with its attendant worries could continue amid such horrors, and yet it did. While Olga and her friends went on walks and dates with German soldiers, their Jewish neighbors suffered and died nearby. As we shall see, the meaning of Olga's interactions and relationships with German soldiers changed over time, as did her motivations. But knowing the larger context in which they were pursued underscores just how deeply ambivalent and morally ambiguous they were. Meanwhile, her interactions continued to fuel the internal struggles and doubts that Olga first experienced following the rapid retreat of the Red Army in the late summer of 1941. As the frequency and intensity of her interactions increased, Olga's previous values and convictions began to change. As we shall see, these changes would ultimately prove disturbing to her neighbors and returning Soviet officials.

"My Future Lies Ahead"

Although she was only eighteen and had yet to finish her last year of school, Olga was appointed to be a teacher on 28 October 1941. Her first assignment

did not last long because the school soon closed. However, several weeks later, she was hired to teach at another school in the nearby village of Orlova. Writing about her new position, Olga stated that she "liked the director immediately and the students aren't bad either. . . . Everything seemed familiar to me and I felt wonderful."[77] Soon after, she was praised by the director, and even the German *Komendant* asked to hear her translate.[78] Later, in January 1942, Olga attended a teachers conference in the village of Dmitrovka where she was praised yet again. "There are a lot of teachers and all of a sudden I am one of the best among them. Oh! My future lies ahead."[79] While many of her peers were becoming increasingly disenchanted with the occupation, Olga's new position gave her a glimmer of hope. Meanwhile, she was no longer simply interacting with soldiers at home and in the streets of Znamenka. Now, she was also working for the occupation regime.

On 7 December, the local theater opened. Although its reopening promised to bring some relief from the monotony of daily life, the occasion did not bring her much happiness.

> Today was the first day during the war that our theater reopened. But oh how disappointed was I on this day! The Germans took all the front-row seats while everyone else "languished in the back" [zadnikh pasli]. The soldiers chose girls and sat them next to themselves. It was so debauched! Of course, none of the chosen girls was to my taste. Shura, Zhenia, Olga [her friend], and I all sat together, but only Olga could understand me at that moment. She was also indignant over the German tricks [prodelki] [and] offended for the honor of her motherland but we remained silent. Nobody will hear us anyway. We sang the song "Dear Country, Dear Motherland" ["Strana dorogaia, otchizna rodnaia!"] with such pleasure![80] But we will get something in the end! [No my chegonibud´ dozhdemsia!] They will not rule us! [Ne byvat´ im starshimi nad nami!][81]

Despite her own interactions, Olga was offended by the conduct of the other local girls at the theater. While some of her indignation probably resulted from jealousy over not being among the chosen ones, much of her anger was caused by the second-class status of Ukrainians. The theater was open to everyone, but tickets were often only available to German soldiers. As a result, civilians had to beg soldiers and "suffer humiliation" to obtain tickets.[82]

While her sentiments might be read as nationalist in nature, her nationalism seems to have manifested itself only in a desire to feel pride in herself and her people as well as a desire for Ukrainians to be treated as equals. Thus, whenever she wrote that Germany would never rule over them, these sentiments were usually followed by hopes for a Soviet return. Still, by December

1941, such assessments were tinged with a recognition that not everything in the Soviet Union was as she had once believed. After listening to a chance radio broadcast from Moscow on 14 December, Olga wrote: "Happiness—to feel love for one's motherland and hatred for one's enemies. No! I cannot be reeducated. I had not felt before that the Komsomol had brought me up so firmly. Even though I had been angry at the Soviet press [because] there were peccadillos there [tam byli grezhki], I have remained true to my ideas and I will never betray them."[83] Olga wanted to believe that nothing had changed and that she was still living up to her Komsomol upbringing, but her interactions with German soldiers belied these words. At times, she recognized the contradictions between her words and deeds, and she berated herself for her apparent inability to live up to her previous ideals. On 16 December, she reminded herself, "I must not forget that there are enemies active around me and fall into complete trust and moreover into friendly relations. I scolded myself again. Why don't I have pride to hate the enemy but instead do the opposite [a naoborot eshche]! Why can't I live as the real Olga? Everything somehow makes me gloomy and I am becoming a stranger to myself."[84]

The contradictions between expectations of how she should behave and her actual behavior upset her, yet she did not know how to reconcile the two. On 24 March 1942, she scolded herself yet again for being a "bad *komsomolka*." "I am not a patriot. I am not a citizen of my Soviet Union. I am a very weak girl and nothing else. How I want to write something about Franz!!!"[85] Even as she scolded herself, she could not stop thinking about her new infatuation. She recognized that this was unpatriotic behavior, and yet she remained drawn to the soldiers in her midst.

Despite her internal struggles, Olga rarely reflected on the consequences of her actions. She worried about her reputation but only as it related to her status as a "girl," that is, a virgin. The Soviet countryside remained conservative, and a woman's reputation continued to play an important role in everyday life. Although girls were allowed to attend get-togethers, dances, and Soviet clubs during the interwar period, they continued to cherish their reputations as "proper girls."[86] It was "unthinkable even for best friends of the opposite sex to enter each other's house without direct supervision of parents (or better not at all) for fears that such 'indecent behavior' would generate 'improper rumors.'"[87] Accordingly, most of the dates and get-togethers Olga attended with German soldiers occurred either under the supervision of her parents or in the company of friends.[88] The fact that her parents never rebuked her until the very end of the occupation suggests that they initially believed that it was in her best interest to associate with Germans. Moreover, since other girls were also going on dates, Olga apparently did not think that her

reputation would suffer. However, her friendship with girls whose behavior was supposedly less restrained than her own did become a source of concern. On 5 December 1941, she worried that "People speak badly about Zhenia and this is in no way pleasant for me. I am with her sometimes and people will think the same about me."[89] Although she recognized that some girls were developing reputations, she continued to believe that her own actions were beyond reproach. As long as she remained "modest," Olga thought that she would maintain her reputation as a "proper girl." What she failed to recognize, however, was that there was much more at stake than her reputation as a "girl."

In April 1942, Olga wrote about the increasing resentment that her neighbors directed at girls like herself. She noted that "Our Russian boys are really offended by our girls. That all the attention right now is directed at the Germans."[90] For local men, the walks and dates were a daily reminder of their own diminished positions. Many felt betrayed and, in a sign of growing condemnation, referred to women and girls seen in the company of soldiers as prostitutes. In early 1943, Olga became the target of such accusations. "I am not ashamed to write that they allowed themselves to apply this disgusting word, 'prostitute,' to innocent girls. But why be surprised by our peasant men? Moreover, they are very angry at the girls because they go out with the Germans."[91] Although Olga only mentioned the resentment of local men, it is clear that many women shared such sentiments. According to Karel Berkhoff, most civilians "believed that most young women who had relatively good jobs, such as interpreting and translating, were having sexual relations with a German—in short, that they were 'German whores'—*shliukh-doiche*."[92] Soviet civilians were not alone in this regard. For example, Maren Röger has shown that most Poles also saw no difference between prostitutes and Polish women who were having relations with Germans.[93] Such beliefs not only preceded the war but have remained a fixture of the workplace in many parts of the world to this day. Still, it is also true that German officials enjoyed immense power over their subordinates. And with work often meaning the difference between starving to death, being sent to forced labor, or surviving the occupation at home, German administrators were able to extort sex from their subordinates in exchange for allowing them to keep their jobs.[94] Onlookers, however, did not know the circumstances surrounding a woman's employment during the occupation and, relying on prewar customs and expectations, often judged their neighbors uncharitably.

As Olga wrote about the growing resentment of local men in April 1942, she confided in her diary that "Our boys have become so disgusting [protivnye] to me, but why—I don't even know myself. I am even hostile to them [s vrazhdoiu otnoshus′] because they are at the front. I hate them for this."[95] Instead

of blaming the Germans, Olga blamed the Red Army for leaving civilians to face the Wehrmacht on their own. Although Olga's preference for German soldiers was only dimly articulated, others were much more pragmatic about their motivations. For example, it was not uncommon for girls and young women in and around the Kirovograd/Kropyvnytskyi region to bluntly express their preference for German men by noting, "Our boys were employed in dirty work."[96] Local men were forced to accept the most menial positions and were paid less than Germans, who enjoyed the privileges of victorious soldiers. While this encouraged bitterness in some and likely contributed to the opprobrium that was increasingly directed at local women and girls, in others it encouraged a reevaluation of everything they had previously held dear. With no end in sight to the occupation, cultivating a relationship with a German allowed non-Jewish women access to extra rations and sought-after manufactured goods. Moreover, it provided them with protection against forced labor, which, as we shall see, became a distinct possibility beginning in spring 1942. In contrast, maintaining a relationship with a local man, especially someone who was not collaborating with the enemy, offered few benefits.

In addition to local girls' purely material motivations in preferring Germans to local men, some of these young women seem to have been drawn to the prestige and promise German soldiers seemed to represent. This appears to have been the case for Olga. After temporarily fleeing Znamenka for a neighboring village after the battle for the town commenced in October 1943, Olga expressed contempt for the "simple" peasant boys she encountered. "Out of boredom we go with Liuda to relatives in a different village. People pay attention to us. But there is no one here before whom to show off [shchegoliat′]. This is a beaten, gray mass of people. . . . I am disgusted by the simple behavior of the Ukrainian guy Shura. Ah! How I want to go to Znamenka again."[97]

Despite the danger that returning to Znamenka posed after the Soviet advance, Olga wanted to return so that she could be among German soldiers again. She found them exciting and foreign when compared to the "simple" and "gray" men she encountered in the village. They represented an imagined life that was both "cultured" and "European." While the negative comparison between local men and German soldiers stemmed from the stark power dynamics of the occupation, it is also likely that the divergence in education levels and values that had always existed between the Soviet countryside and its towns and cities was a contributing factor. Despite Bolshevik efforts to combat illiteracy, it remained a problem in the countryside throughout the interwar period.[98] And although rural education expanded during the 1930s, peasant children continued to lag behind their urban counterparts.[99] Under these circumstances, it is likely that Olga would have found many of the

village boys beneath her regardless of the circumstances. But with foreigners now in her town, local men seem to have paled in comparison.

Her neighbors' opprobrium and her own internal struggles left Olga feeling lonely. Like any eighteen-year-old, she wanted to find someone in whom she could confide her thoughts and feelings. Her desire for love seems to have been reinforced by the apparent absence of love in her parents' marriage. At various times, Olga noted that there was not much love between them while commenting on how "unhappy" they were.[100] Prior to World War II, arranged marriages were still common in the countryside despite the Bolsheviks' radical marriage decrees.[101] This pattern began to change in the wake of World War II as rural women increasingly began to cite love as a "necessary precondition for a marriage."[102] Olga's fears for her reputation as a "proper girl" reflected both the traditional mores of the countryside and her Komsomol upbringing. In this regard, both aspects of her identity overlapped, but in others they would have likely diverged. Specifically, when it came to love and marriage, her Komsomol upbringing would have instilled the idea that she had choices, but rural mores would have prescribed deference to her parents. Even without the war, it is likely that Olga would have struggled to reconcile her Komsomol upbringing with the dictates of her rural surroundings. But the occupation shattered the existing order, throwing into doubt both her Komsomol upbringing and the traditional norms of rural life.

Olga confided her internal struggles to the pages of her diary. Despite her new job and the diversions provided by the local theater, Olga continued to feel that there was something missing. On 10 December 1941, she wrote: "Again, I have nothing to write about. I [write] about the theater again! But what's new? The same girlfriends; the same things are on stage. I feel sorry for myself. After all, my heart is still so young! It thirsts for love, but I cannot find an ideal for myself among this monochromatic audience."[103] Throughout spring 1942, a series of German suiters found their way onto the pages of her diary. Then, at some point in 1942, Olga seems to have found her "ideal" in a soldier named Heinz. The circumstances of their meeting are not known because this portion of her diary is missing, but based on her later entries it seems that Olga fell in love. The relationship with Heinz, however, was not meant to be. Although they exchanged letters throughout spring 1943, he was injured at the front and subsequently returned to Germany without her. However, while the relationship lasted, it seems to have further exacerbated her doubts. For example, on the eve of the German defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943, Olga wrote: "There are rumors that the affairs of the Germans are not very good right now, that they are retreating at full speed. Is this true? But there cannot be smoke without fire. I cannot imagine a time when we will be

free of the Germans again. But even now I do not feel myself to be a slave. Afterall, I love Heinz and I would go anywhere with him. I even want to live There [in Germany]."[104] Whereas before she had longed for a Soviet victory, now she could no longer imagine such an outcome. Moreover, she was contemplating going to Germany with the hope that she would be able to start a new life with Heinz.

> Yes, everyone is awaiting the Reds. This same time last year I was likewise inclined. And what has changed my views? Or will I once again be of my earlier opinion? Maybe I do not want this because of Heinz. He loves me and I also find him to be sweet and we would be happy together. But what should I do? Maybe something will push me toward different thoughts, but right now news that our people are near is not happy for me . . . Oh! What a traitor I am to my own thoughts! After all, only a few months ago I wrote that I would never betray our traditions! Oh! How lightly this word had been written that is so terrible under all circumstances. Can a former *komsomolka* think like this? But I did not see anything good in Russia. It was all dreams. . . . If it weren't for the dreams and hopes for the future, my life would seem like a gray thread.[105]

What started as doubts prompted by the swift defeat of Soviet forces had transformed into a recognition that most, if not all, of what she had previously known was a lie. The occupation provided an alternative to the Soviet system, but her continued doubts suggest that she recognized that this alternative was in no way better. Furthermore, her invocation of treason to describe her vacillations demonstrates that she too saw an element of betrayal in her actions.

Olga continued to hope that someday Ukrainians would be treated as equals and German promises of a better life would come true. To some extent, she seems to have accepted the German propaganda seeking to juxtapose the bleakness of life in the Soviet Union to the supposed good life that awaited Ukrainians under German rule. Still, she recognized that life under occupation was a far cry from the life portrayed in the propaganda. Nowhere was this more evident than in the *Ostarbeiter* (Eastern worker) program. Even more than the Holocaust or the treatment of prisoners-of-war, it revealed the depths of the contradictions between the propaganda and the reality of life under occupation, erasing any remaining doubts in the minds of most civilians about the fate awaiting Ukrainians under Germany's new order. Moreover, it also encouraged a reappraisal of fraternization. Whatever their actions and motivations may have been prior, the possibility of being sent as forced laborers to Germany encouraged women and girls to do anything in their power to avoid

such a fate. By looking at the various methods that civilians adopted to avoid forced labor in Germany, we can see the complex and ever-evolving nature of fraternization in occupied territory.

Fraternization in the Context of Forced Labor

In spring 1942, German authorities started recruiting civilians from the occupied East to alleviate labor shortages in the Reich through the *Ostarbeiter* program. Initially, they called for volunteers, and because of the famine conditions that prevailed in large cities, many young people signed up to go to Germany. Even more rural civilians initially volunteered out of curiosity after exposure to propaganda that depicted the supposedly good working conditions that awaited them in Germany.[106] However, once reports of the real working conditions that awaited *Ostarbeiter* began to filter back home, including reports of sexual violence, the pool of volunteers evaporated.[107] Before long, labor in the Reich became synonymous with death in the minds of most civilians in occupied territory.[108] Indeed, fears were so prevalent that some Soviet women even consented to work in German military brothels to avoid this fate.[109] As a result, occupation authorities resorted to violence to fill the quotas. Both the scale of the program, which by June 1943 had forcibly displaced more than one million people from the Reichskommissariat Ukraine alone, and the escalating violence with which the campaign was carried out turned most civilians against the occupation regime.[110] Ultimately, the *Ostarbeiter* program became one of the major grievances leading to the disaffection of most civilians in occupied territory. It also contributed to the growth of the partisan movement, which beginning in spring 1942 attracted civilians who fled to the forests in increasing numbers to avoid "recruitment."[111]

For Olga, forced labor in Germany, more than any other issue beyond her circle of close friends and acquaintances, absorbed her attention. She mentioned the possibility for the first time in late March 1942. "How I want to have a friend right now! Right now, when things are so troubling, when mother is crying at home that her children may be taken to Germany to work. Oh! How horribly hard it is!"[112] Having lost her position as a teacher after her school was closed earlier in the year, Olga now faced the possibility of being sent to Germany as an *Ostarbeiter*.

> It's very painful for me that I am now facing unemployment and like everyone else am searching for comfort [uspokoenie] somewhere. I never imagined what it means to have no work! All the unemployed are driven like cattle to Germany. Girls and decent [people] from large cities go there saying, "All right, I don't

> want to die!" They are tormented by hunger and sometimes taken by force. I wasn't home all day. I go anywhere just so as not to see the worried faces of my parents.[113]

Employment in the context of the occupation was often a matter of survival. Of course, there were those who attempted to avoid working for the Germans in any capacity while others volunteered from the first days of the occupation. But with the occupation often lasting years, most civilians were forced to find a way to provide for themselves. However, once the *Ostarbeiter* program was adopted, employment also meant avoiding forced labor. Those who could prove their indispensability to the occupation regime would be spared the fate awaiting Eastern workers in the Reich.[114]

During the first round of "recruitments" in spring 1942, Olga managed to find work as a translator in the train depot and was temporarily spared.[115] However, in spring 1943, the fear of "recruitment" returned. By then, the Wehrmacht was in full retreat from the Caucasus following the German defeat at Stalingrad, and Znamenka was full of retreating soldiers and German and Russian evacuees.[116] They brought news of setbacks in the Caucasus that fueled panic in the town, generating rumors that all young people would be taken to Germany along with evacuated machinery.[117] Fear was palpable, and civilians refrained from going to public places out of fear that they would be rounded up and driven to Germany. "We hurry to the theater with Zhenia but it is all in vain, nothing took place there because too few [people] came here. And who will go if everyone is afraid? They are afraid because the youth theater is going to Germany again and that they can simply encircle the theater and force everyone to go from there. . . . There is such panic already but I still won't see reason [a ia vse eshche ne doidu do zdoravogo uma]. I still don't believe in the Germans' collapse."[118] So much time had elapsed since the start of the occupation that Olga could no longer believe in the possibility of a German defeat, and she continued to live her life from one day to the next. However, by April 1943, she also began to fear for her own life after her German supervisor and then her sister's took away their passports. Olga did not know why their passports were confiscated, but rumors of another imminent round of "recruitments" made her uneasy. She was still working as a translator at the train depot, but her employment no longer guaranteed her safety. Although the German position in Znamenka was still secure, they were beginning to "evacuate" human resources.

As part of the "recruitment" process, German authorities instituted medical exams at some point in late 1942 to determine the eligibility of *Ostarbeiter*.[119] These exams quickly became a method of evading forced labor for civilians

who devised various schemes to fail them. In May 1943, both Olga and her sister, Liuda, received their summons to appear for a medical exam to determine their eligibility. "Oh! What horror! Liuda and I both received summons to go to Germany . . . What is happening to mom? I am like a crazy person, screaming for all to hear [na ves′ dom], cursing my poor mom . . . But here I am at the doctor's and I have a certificate in my hands that Liuda is there. She will not have to go . . . But what about me? I give my summons to Giza, but he returns it to me unsigned . . . It means that they do not need me here and that is why they are sending me . . . Oh! What sorrow!"[120] Liuda received the exemption because she had had an operation at the German military hospital a few days earlier. It is not entirely clear what prompted the operation, but based on Olga's cryptic entries, it seems that Liuda was likely undergoing an abortion. Earlier that month, Olga noted, "Something unpleasant happened between Heinz and Liuda. And, moreover, very important for him."[121] This was not Olga's Heinz but a different German soldier who was billeted in their home. Less than two weeks later, on 21 May, Olga accompanied her sister to the military hospital where Liuda was put under anesthesia.[122] Then, several days later, she had a surgery.[123] Meanwhile, the German gendarmes came by their home to arrest the soldier.[124] It is impossible to say whether the relations between Liuda and Heinz were consensual or whether his arrest was a direct result of Liuda's pregnancy. Officially, relations between Germans and local civilians were forbidden. However, these bans were often ignored.[125] Still, whenever German soldiers were punished for their relations with local women, it was usually because their actions had resulted in children or sexually transmitted diseases.[126]

Although Liuda's pregnancy was likely unplanned, some women used pregnancy as a survival strategy to avoid forced labor. "Because initially only single people were deported, many rushed into marriage, and because the mothers of children up to the age of twelve were ineligible, girls tried to become pregnant."[127] This method was apparently so common that a German journalist reported, in June 1943, that birthrates in Ukraine kept rising because women were becoming pregnant to avoid deportations.[128] While some found local partners, others pursued relations with German soldiers with this outcome in mind. Recognizing the prevalence of such pregnancies, German authorities sometimes forced women to have abortions, a fate that most likely befell Liuda.[129] Meanwhile, although this was a survival strategy, many onlookers did not recognize it as such. Thus, even Olga stated that all the women she encountered in the hospital were "such 'tramps'!"[130] It is worth noting here that pregnancy was also sometimes used as an escape strategy by women who were mobilized into the Red Army or Navy.[131] But as with women who chose

this method in occupied territory, most onlookers failed to recognize it as a survival strategy.[132]

While Liuda's operation enabled her to obtain a doctor's waiver, Olga was left searching for a way out. Previously, she had vacillated between volunteering to go to Germany and remaining with her family. But with Germany no longer an abstract possibility, Olga decided to do everything in her power to stay in Znamenka. She initially went to her German acquaintances and coworkers for help. However, unlike some girls who had German lovers, Olga did not have a benefactor who was willing to sign her papers.[133] In mid-May 1943, she speculated that the Germans were demoting people and replacing them with their mistresses. Indignant, she wrote that "they recruited their mistresses. It is now like this everywhere!"[134] Although she was working as a translator herself, Olga adopted the widespread view that any young woman with a decent job under the occupation was a "German whore." Like everyone else, Olga did not know the circumstances of their employment and yet she was convinced that they had received their positions because they were sleeping with their superiors. Still, with widespread "recruitments" on the horizon, it is likely that some German administrators and soldiers were trying to protect their lovers. This practice seems to have been relatively common in occupied territory, so much so that it was remarked upon and even criticized by German administrators.[135]

For some women, these liaisons were a potential salvation from forced labor. However, they came at the expense of those who had no benefactors, a situation that likely fueled the growing ire of neighbors. When Olga went to speak with one of her superiors, he told her that "some girl must go instead of me, only then would I stay."[136] Olga refused to make such a sacrifice, and with her German superiors unwilling to help her, she contemplated taking drastic measures.

> I have lost hope that my trip will be canceled the way it was for Olga and the other girls. That is why I am taking different measures. I am making myself sick. I asked for advice from Victor's mother. What have I come to! [Do chego dozhit´sia!] I am making myself sick so that I do not pass the commission and do not go THERE! Oh! If only all these disasters would soon end! I am not really afraid to leave, but only mother, father. . . . As if they want to give me poison to drink! [Razve oni khotiat davat´ mne pit´ iad!] To drink boiled tobacco just to get ill or to be completely laid up in bed. . . . But we will have to resort to this as well if nothing else can be done![137]

Such forms of self-mutilation were common in Ukraine. In addition to drinking various kinds of poisons, including tobacco and smoked tea leaves, peas-

ants adopted a variety of measures to provoke skin irritations and diseases that would prevent them from passing the medical exams.[138] In extreme cases, civilians cut off body parts, burned themselves, and underwent fake appendicitis operations to avoid "recruitment."[139] The results were often life-threatening and in some instances fatal.[140] In Znamenka alone, it is estimated that more than one thousand young people injured themselves between February 1942 and July 1943 to avoid forced labor.[141]

On 3 June, Olga met Liuda's German doctor while visiting her sister in the military hospital and convinced him to sign an exemption for her.[142] Such practices, according to Karel Berkhoff, were common, especially among local medical professionals. But due to the dangers it posed, many local nurses and doctors required compensation. Still, others seem to have assisted out of a sincere desire to help.[143] Liuda's doctor did not ask Olga for monetary compensation; instead, it seems that he may have had less altruistic motives in mind. Indeed, some of the girls at the hospital described him as a "ladies' man."[144] And, based on the way she wrote about their interactions, it seems that Olga may have been contemplating having relations with him in exchange for his help. Such behavior on the part of German administrators was not uncommon. Indeed, as Maren Röger has noted in the case of occupied Poland, German administrators often used their positions to sexually blackmail women in exchange for jobs, travel permits, and other important documents.[145] Luckily for Olga, Liuda's doctor left Znamenka soon after he signed her exemption, and she gained a three-month reprieve without having to give in to any of his demands. Many of her peers, however, were less fortunate. In all, 1,121 young people from Znamenka were sent to Germany over the course of the occupation.[146]

Whatever the motivations of women and girls having relations with Germans may have been before spring 1942, the *Ostarbeiter* program gave new meaning to fraternization. Seeking to save themselves, some women and girls broke with traditional moral codes, pursuing sexual relations with soldiers to become pregnant and remain at home with their families. Others attempted to leverage their existing relationships with German acquaintances to obtain exemptions. In both instances, their actions were prompted by need and the mortal danger that being sent to Germany as a forced laborer represented. But to many of their neighbors, these women and girls were little more than "whores." Moreover, since exemptions often came at the expense of someone who was less connected, their moral transgressions seemed all the more odious. Meanwhile, with the end of the occupation fast approaching, civilians had to seriously consider how their previous actions would be interpreted once Soviet power returned. As we will see, the growing condemnation of their

neighbors, combined with the rumors that circulated within occupied territory, suggested that a reckoning was coming. This, in turn, encouraged civilians, including girls like Olga, to alter their previous behavior in anticipation of the Soviet return.

"We Are a People Without a Motherland!"

The German defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943 shattered the image of the enemy's invincibility, making it clear to most that Germany would eventually lose the war. The looming return of Soviet power encouraged civilians to reevaluate their previous behavior, and soon many did everything in their power to distance themselves from the occupiers. Thus, thousands of local policemen fled to the forests in the wake of Stalingrad hoping that service with the partisans would allow them to either hide or atone for their acts of collaboration. Many girls who had either worked for or lived with German officers also decided to join the partisans at this time.[147] Although it was less of an option in central and eastern Ukraine, in western Ukraine, civilians had the choice of joining the Ukrainian nationalist underground.[148] Others, meanwhile, simply eschewed their previous behavior.[149]

In September 1943, Olga noted that very few girls in Znamenka were still interacting with the Germans.[150] "There are many soldiers in Znamenka right now. But [people] think very badly now of girls that go out with them. Before this was not noticeable, but now . . . our people are so malicious [kakoi nash narod vse-taki ekhiden]: they hear that the Reds are close and already they change their skins. But I don't even want Soviet power to return again. I want something else. I'm already so used to them. I don't know myself what I want."[151] It was now clear that Germany would lose the war and that some kind of reckoning would follow. Olga, however, maintained her previous behavior. Her insistence on maintaining relations with Germans even as others were increasingly abandoning such connections prompted reproach from her friends and arguments with her parents.[152] On 11 September 1943, Olga's father threatened to leave her and her sister, Liuda, if the pair did not stop associating with Germans.[153] Although her parents had not previously reproached them, they now recognized that such connections were no longer a benefit and that their daughters' actions would reflect poorly on the entire family.

It is not clear why Olga maintained her previous behavior even as the prevailing winds shifted around her. A combination of denial and fear about what might happen to her following the Soviet return seems to have kept her from making the same calculations as others. On 21 September, Olga wrote: "The Reds are near, but unlike before this does not make me happy one bit. On the contrary, it even scares me. Here's what they say, that all female translators are

shot. But I want to live! I imagine how they lead me to be shot, my eyes filled with tears and a thirst to live . . . Oh, how terrifying!"[154] Although it is not clear to what extent Soviet authorities singled out translators in their propaganda, her fears reflected the overall tenor of Soviet leaflets.[155] Combined with rumors that were deliberately spread by Soviet activists, they urged local civilians to take up arms against the occupiers or suffer the consequences.[156] While the efficacy of these methods prior to Stalingrad remained doubtful, they clearly sowed fear and encouraged civilians to alter their behavior once it became evident that Germany would lose the war.

Meanwhile, German propaganda, which sought to portray the Red Army as a barbarian force to steel the resolve of German soldiers as well as local collaborators, compounded such fears.[157] "We can hear the guns firing nearby. The Reds are a few kilometers away. I am afraid. Moreover, the front line is held by Mongols, these half-people, half-beasts. I cannot imagine how I will see [uvizhu] this company. They do whatever they want. For whom then do I guard my honor as a girl? And to also cast aside without memory these German-Europeans! Oh! I do not know what to do. Now I regret those past, traceless days when I was loved and wanted but I hesitated. But I still have Paul!"[158] The tropes that Olga repeated as the battle for Znamenka raged around her in late October 1943 were taken straight from the pages of German propaganda. Indeed, these very same images of "Mongol hordes" were widely disseminated to German civilians as the Red Army neared Berlin in 1945.[159] While her words can be read as a manifestation of her fears, they ultimately speak to the extent to which the occupation had changed her. Two years prior, Olga had hoped for a Soviet victory, but now she was afraid that she would be raped by her own soldiers. Faced with the uncertainty of liberation and afraid that she might die, Olga decided to spend the night with Paul, a member of a German tank crew whom she had met only a few weeks before.[160] Throughout the previous years of occupation, Olga had guarded her virginity and her reputation as a "girl." But now, amid the battle for Znamenka, she made the decision that she had previously resisted. While it was one of desperation and fear, to neighbors her decision would have signaled her complete "fall" into "depravity." Meanwhile, Olga also contemplated fleeing Znamenka with the Wehrmacht. Although she initially refused to leave behind her parents, Olga decided to ask for a permit after her mother and sister were both killed during one of the Soviet bombardments.[161] By then, however, the Red Army was so close that it was no longer possible for her to flee.

Znamenka was liberated on 9 December 1943. And, while Olga's darkest fears proved unfounded, it was not long before the anticipated reckoning began. In a brief entry from 14 December, Olga noted, "Olia F. was arrested.

The arrests have started. I was interrogated at home by someone from counterintelligence. I agreed to help them."[162] Over the following days, Olga was repeatedly interrogated about her wartime actions and those of her neighbors. "I find it disagreeable to sit and talk for others, for their deeds. But I do it."[163] Although she was "disgusted" with herself, she knew she had to cooperate. "I gave my word. God, what have I become? A spy! No! Everything must stop!"[164] Neither the reason for nor the extent of her cooperation with SMERSH are known. Still, it seems that she agreed to be an informant, a decision that she likely made under duress as she found herself under investigation.

Although her cooperation may have forestalled an immediate arrest, it did not spare her the condemnation of local officials and neighbors. During a visit to the *gorkom* (the town committee) in mid-December 1943, Olga noted that they looked at her as if she were the "devil" because she had worked as a translator during the occupation.[165] Everywhere she went, people "devoured" her "with their eyes" and reminded her about the Germans.[166] "I've been arguing since morning with our 'peasant women' ['baby']. Why do they keep taunting me with the Germans? At the slightest provocation—immediately there are reproaches about the Germans."[167] The general ill will was such that some of her friends were hatching plans to escape Znamenka. One girl was even considering "going into the army just because [people] look askance at her that she worked for the Germans and associated with them."[168] It is not clear what befell Olga after these entries were written because her diary ends abruptly at the end of February 1944. However, even if she managed to remain free, her neighbors were not likely to let her forget her actions during the war.

A few months before Znamenka was liberated by the Red Army, Olga reflected on her life in the Soviet Union. On 29 September 1943, Olga wondered: "What kind of country was it? . . . We had nothing to wear and sometimes not even to eat. But, on the whole, it was impossible to be aggrieved [No v osnovnom nel´zia bylo obizhat´sia]. It was good politically. You felt that a useful person would come out of you as well. You had hopes and imagined a bright future for yourself. But just like today, you waited."[169] In some ways, these words encapsulate the changes the occupation had wrought upon Olga. More than two years of life under occupation had revealed to her some of the contradictions and lies of her previous life in the Soviet Union. She recognized that Soviet slogans celebrating the bright, happy life that everyone was allegedly living were nothing more than an illusion. And she understood that the promised future was far away. Olga was dangerous not because she was a spy but because the occupation and her interactions with enemy combatants had exposed her to an alternative. The alternative proved to be worse than Stalin-

ism, but it nevertheless enabled her to see through the lies of socialist realism. In the villages and small towns that dotted the Soviet landscape, such women posed a limited threat. But in the country's cities, where Communist power was concentrated, they posed a political and social threat because of their perceived power to corrupt.

As difficult as it is for us to evaluate fraternization today, this task was even more difficult in the immediacy of liberation, when emotions were running high. Just as Soviet officials harbored fears about local women, so too did their neighbors. And while some limited their condemnation to harsh words, others shunned the offenders and denounced them to Soviet authorities. Public outrage at those who were thought to have abetted the occupation regime was strong, and it coincided with state efforts to secure newly liberated areas against real and perceived threats. By calling women "prostitutes" and shunning them, neighbors isolated them from the moral community. Ominously, using the term could also indicate support for policing measures that were already common by the mid-1930s. As Soviet attitudes hardened throughout the 1920s and into the early 1930s, a range of marginal groups from homeless children to petty criminals to prostitutes were subject to social isolation as "socially dangerous elements."[170] Whereas during the early Bolshevik period prostitutes were considered victims of the old order, by the mid-1930s, they were being exiled and sentenced to labor camps because of their perceived threat to Soviet society. Similarly, although many women in occupied territory were motivated by hunger and acute need, neighbors often failed to see them as victims of the occupation. By labeling real and perceived fraternizers as "prostitutes," neighbors helped delineate and police what was and was not acceptable wartime behavior. Moreover, they gave their tacit support to the policing methods that, as the next chapter will show, Soviet authorities would ultimately adopt to neutralize the perceived social and political threat women such as Olga posed.

5

"Socially Dangerous" Women and Retribution After Liberation

In late 1943, members of the Population Committees for the liberated zones of eleven different regions of the Soviet Union, including Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Poltava, were asked for their opinions about "compromised women." Among other things, people asked them how they were supposed to act toward women whose husbands were serving in the Red Army but who married Germans during the occupation. They also wondered what would happen to such women.[1] Like their counterparts across German-occupied Europe, such women were thought to have compromised themselves by their actions during the German occupation. While family members worried about what would happen to their sisters, daughters, and partners—and by extension themselves—neighbors wanted to know if these women would be punished for what many had come to see as their treasonous behavior.

While civilians sought to learn what would happen to "compromised women" and how they should therefore respond, the NKVD had already identified them as a category of suspect individuals who would be subject to surveillance and investigation as early as 1942. To do this, NKVD operatives relied on policing methods, including denunciations and mass cleansing operations, which they had routinely used throughout the previous decade. Although these methods did not differ from those deployed against male suspects, their adoption precipitated the arrest of an unknown number of women not because of any specific crime they had committed but because of their relationships with enemy combatants. Their alleged relationships raised concerns about enemy recruitment and contamination that transformed them into "socially dangerous elements," a legal concept that in the 1930s was applied to an ever-expanding list of people who were thought to pose a threat to public order.[2] In addition to sanctioned measures, which included arrest and eviction, alleged fraternizers were also subject to unsanctioned violence

and discrimination. This was all reinforced by the same assumptions about women's "nature" and sex and their links to anti-social and anti-Soviet behavior that stood behind anxieties about women in the Red Army and the partisan movement.

Meanwhile, because existing laws and the various directives regarding treason that were issued in the course of 1941–43 failed to address the complexity of occupation, civilian and official onlookers had to rely on interwar conceptions of morality and "proper" behavior to make sense of the world around them.[3] Even as their wartime experiences inevitably altered their perceptions and values, interwar gender roles and tropes remained important markers upon which they could fall back to evaluate, punish, and alienate those they felt had crossed a line. By participating in the official investigations of alleged collaborators or by simply shunning their neighbors for their wartime behavior, local men and women became active participants in the state's retribution campaign. But like Party and punitive officials, civilians could not know what lay in the hearts of the women they were judging, nor could they fully assess how different forms of coercion may have motivated women's actions.

Sexual Violence and Vigilante Justice in the Wake of Liberation

As elsewhere in Europe, the cleansing of newly liberated territory "began in a context of anger and haste" that often coincided with the discovery of Nazi crimes.[4] Under these circumstances, retribution was often swift and harsh. While much of the anger focused on the role played by local collaborators, such as policemen and village elders, anecdotal evidence suggests that women suspected of having relations with enemy combatants were also targeted. For instance, in his work on the Donbas, Hiroaki Kuromiya has noted that "Soviet women who had borne children to Germans were murdered by the secret police along with their children" in Slov´ians´k, Kramators´k, Kostiantynivka, and elsewhere.[5] German officials claimed that women, some of whom were pregnant as a result of their relations with German soldiers, were among the four thousand local inhabitants of Kharkiv who were allegedly killed by the NKVD when Soviet forces temporarily retook the city in spring 1943.[6] More research is necessary to determine the scope of such reprisals and whether they had any official sanction. Still, fears of violent reprisals were widespread. Indeed, they were so prevalent that some women may have gone as far as to take the lives of their children borne from German fathers to prove their own loyalty.[7]

The Soviet regime attempted to maintain a monopoly on violence in newly liberated territory. However, state organs were initially quite weak, and this situation enabled extralegal violence to flourish.[8] Recent scholarship has shown

that long before the Red Army crossed the borders of the Soviet Union and entered German-occupied eastern Europe, soldiers were implicated in a wide range of crimes on Soviet territory, including armed robbery, murder, and rape.[9] NKVD personnel were no different.

For instance, in December 1942, Lieutenant V. I. Grebeniuk from the Ninety-First NKVD border regiment raped two women in the village of Nagibin in the Rostov oblast of Russia. Grebeniuk arrived in Nagibin ten days after it was liberated in command of a unit charged with carrying out operational tasks. On the evening of 29 December, an intoxicated Grebeniuk called a village meeting. Afterward, he went to the homes of two different women and attempted to convince each of them to sleep with him. When the women refused, Grebeniuk raped them. For these crimes, Grebeniuk was sentenced by a military tribunal to five years in the Gulag with an assignment to the front. Although his case was heard behind closed doors, the report detailing it stressed the "political effect" that the tribunal had on local inhabitants because it allowed everyone involved, including "the village and district authorities as well as the public [to] learn in this way that Grebeniuk's crimes did not go unpunished."[10] While Grebeniuk was sentenced for his crimes, it is likely that many similar cases went unpunished either because women were too afraid to come forward and accuse their assailants or because such men were protected by their superiors.

Once the Red Army reached the western borderlands of the Soviet Union, the region witnessed a "pandemic spread of sexual violence" that, according to Alexander Statiev, continued after the arrival of NKVD and police personnel who "committed proportionately more crimes than the Red Army."[11] For example, on 13 March 1945, a group of fighters commanded by Senior Lieutenant Sadko was carrying out an operation in the Kazimirov villages of Rivne oblast when, in a state of intoxication, Sadko beat and raped a woman.[12] For this crime as well as another, Sadko was stripped of his Party membership and arrested. His case was subsequently transferred to a military tribunal.[13]

On 20 March 1945, Lieutenant Lobov of the Twentieth Rifle Brigade got drunk and went to see a female acquaintance at her home. Having found her in bed, Lobov tried to persuade her to sleep with him. When she refused and escaped through the window of an adjoining room, Lobov went out to search for her and, having found her, brought her back inside the house, where he shot her. His case was also transferred to a military tribunal.[14]

On 1 May 1945, in the village of Berestovets′, Kostopil′ raion, Rivne oblast, Petty Officer (Starshina) Baranov from the 192nd Regiment's service platoon (khozvzvod) got drunk with his subordinates and went to the home of a war invalid named Polid′ko. Having found Polid′ko asleep in bed, Banarov forced

Polid´ko out of his own home and then raped his wife. Baranov tried to rape four more women after this incident. His case was also transferred to a military tribunal.[15]

These cases were not isolated instances, nor were they anomalies. Indeed, the report detailing these and other cases involving incidences of public intoxication, theft, and murder committed by NKVD troops stated that they were among the "most characteristic."[16] Moreover, despite Communist Party orders to strengthen political work among NKVD troops, with the aim of decreasing amoral behavior, the number of such incidences continued to rise. Thus, whereas 3,273 NKVD soldiers were disciplined in the fourth quarter of 1944, this number rose to 3,602 in the first quarter of 1945.[17] Although these crimes occurred within the context of the escalating war against Ukrainian nationalists in western Ukraine, they point to a larger wave of sexual violence that descended on Soviet territory with the arrival of the Red Army.

The causes of this rise in sexual violence stem from a tangle of multiple, intersecting roots. Alcohol played a significant role, but alcohol alone cannot explain such crimes or their apparent frequency as Soviet forces advanced westward.[18] The brutalizing effects of war on soldiers combined with the sudden availability of women also contributed, as did the intensification of the confrontation with Ukrainian nationalists.[19] Still, the prevalence of these crimes the farther west Soviet forces moved suggests that perceptions of local civilians and especially women also played a role.

In her work on masculinity and gender relations in the Red Army, Kersten Bischl has argued that the nature of the war of annihilation in the East combined with conditions in the Red Army encouraged the emergence of a "radicalized" and "chauvinistic masculinity" within its ranks.[20] According to Bischl, this "radicalized masculinity" manifested itself in a growing association among Red Army soldiers between bravery and boldness and sexual potential and availability as their natural reward. Soviet propaganda, which depicted Red Army soldiers as "defender[s] or avenger[s] of women's honor," reinforced such views.[21] Indeed, almost from the first days of the war, Soviet recruitment efforts, including posters and lectures, called on self-sacrificing men to defend the motherland, that is, the female homeland.[22] Such propaganda, according to Benjamin Schechter, "clearly stated that real men [who] defeated the enemy would be able to garner the attention of women after the war."[23] And, beginning in 1942, Soviet propaganda posters depicted "kidnapped female, Soviet citizens" as waiting for the liberating Red Army in what Bischl has argued was a "highly sexualized manner."[24] Within this context, Bischl suggested that the PPZh phenomenon actually served the function of protecting female soldiers and restricting "men's sexual aspirations (mostly) to their talking." However,

with the liberation of eastern Europe, male soldiers were presented with the real possibility of claiming sex as a reward for their boldness and bravery.[25]

Once Soviet forces crossed into eastern Europe, the frequency of sexual assault and rape increased. Perceptions of most eastern European women as both "sexually depraved" and available in the eyes of Red Army soldiers may have informed some of this violence.[26] Meanwhile, hatred of the enemy and a thirst for revenge undergirded the mass rapes Red Army soldiers committed in Germany.[27] It is likely that a combination of these factors informed the sexual violence that had previously occurred on Soviet territory as well. Local women who had cohabited with the enemy or were perceived to have done so were likely considered "sexually depraved" because their actions were at odds with the behavior that was officially expected of them. Meanwhile, as the supposed beneficiaries of the Red Army's liberation, it is likely that some soldiers expected them to be sexually available. Finally, since rape is also about power and control, it may have been a means for some men to reassert their dominance.

Communist Party officials initially encouraged the prosecution of sexual assault and rape in the western borderlands of the Soviet Union.[28] But although prosecutions did occur, they "remained haphazard and depended on the personality of the unit commander."[29] Moreover, as the war against Ukrainian nationalists intensified in the years following World War II, some punitive and police officials used sexual violence and rape as an interrogation method against women suspected of being affiliated with the OUN and UPA.[30] As a result, many cases of sexual assault and rape went unreported while others were ignored by regional officials who either condoned such violence or sought to protect their subordinates.

More research is necessary to ascertain the scope of the sexual violence that descended on recently liberated Soviet territory in the wake of the Red Army's advance in the eastern and central regions of Ukraine. Alcohol, the brutalization of warfare, and the sudden availability of women likely encouraged this violence even as a different kind of dynamic developed in the west. However, the way that perpetrators perceived not only the conduct of their female victims but also their own wartime actions likely played a role. Women who remained in occupied territory were expected to either wait for their husbands and lovers to return or to contribute to the war effort by joining the Soviet underground or the partisan movement. Many, however, could not do this. Faced with hunger and untold privations, some made the "choiceless choice" to pursue relations with the enemy. Red Army soldiers, meanwhile, may have interpreted their actions as a personal betrayal, especially if they had come to believe that their bravery would be rewarded.

It is possible that some of the sexual violence that accompanied liberation and that only increased as Soviet forces moved westward was exacerbated by these expectations. Soviet soldiers had suffered unimaginable hardships only to find that some civilians had collaborated while others had seemingly "sold" themselves to the enemy. With emotions running high and the discovery of German atrocities the backdrop against which liberation occurred, it is likely that some took their frustrations and anger out on women suspected of accommodating or collaborating with the enemy. Others may have used the opportunity to take by force what they had come to believe would be their reward for fighting.[31] This violence was not condoned by the Communist Party, but given the weakness of Soviet institutions and the priority that was given to identifying enemy assets and local collaborators, it is likely that a significant amount of it went unpunished.

NKVD Mass Cleansing Operations and the Search for Enemy Assets

Soviet advances, first during the Moscow Counteroffensive in late 1941 and early 1942 and again after Stalingrad in February 1943, opened the way for Soviet punitive organs to carry out mass cleansing operations (massoperatsii) on recently liberated territory. The Soviet secret police had relied on this "form of social prophylaxis" throughout the 1930s to cleanse large areas of the Soviet Union of an ever-expanding list of people who were deemed "socially harmful" and "socially dangerous."[32] What began as an effort by overstretched police organs to control the social upheaval unleashed by Stalin's First Five-Year Plan had culminated in a wave of mass arrests during the Purges of 1937 and 1938. Working from prepared lists, police organs arrested hundreds of thousands of former kulaks alongside members of "suspect" nationalities, such as Poles, Germans, and Koreans. Once the prepared lists proved insufficient to fulfill the arrest quotas emanating from Moscow, police organs also relied on raids of public spaces to arrest petty criminals, vagrants, and other individuals on the margins of Soviet society.[33]

Mass operations subsided with the end of the Purges in late 1938, but faced with the enormous task of cleansing newly liberated territory of real and imagined threats during World War II, the NKVD leadership once again concluded that mass operations were the best way to meet security needs.[34] Working from previous directives that, as we saw in chapter 2, had delineated a list of suspect groups to be detained and investigated once occupied territory was liberated, Soviet punitive organs arrested tens of thousands in the wake of the Red Army's advance using methods they had come to rely on during the previous decade.

Table 5.1 Results of a mass operation carried out by the NKVD in April 1943 in the Kharkov, Voroshilovgrad, and Stalino oblasts of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

Spies	5
Suspected of espionage	56
Anti-Soviet elements	90
Deserters	483
Marauders	18
Burgomasters	1
Traitors	135
Policemen	334
Elders	138
Assistants to elders	21
Constables (*sotskie*)	21
Criminal elements	47
Speculators	17
Refusing service in the Red Army	837
Fallen behind army units	120
Enemy soldiers	3

Source: TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 685, l. 158: "Spetssoobshchenie o provedennoi operatsii na territorii naselenykh punktov, raionov i gorodov UkrSSR, osvobozhdennykh ot nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov," 30 April 1943.

For instance, in April 1943, the internal troops of the NKVD carried out a mass operation in Kharkov/Kharkiv, Voroshilovgrad/Luhansk, and Stalino (Donetsk) oblasts. Over the course of some twenty days, from 1 April to 20 April, the NKVD searched 260 settlements as well as any surrounding roads, forests, swamps, and ravines that could serve as hiding places.[35] As a result, 2,324 individuals were arrested during this one operation.[36]

Table 5.1 re-creates the breakdown of arrests by category of individuals arrested that was included in a report on this operation. While more than 60 percent of the total number of individuals arrested were men of military age suspected of desertion or draft dodging, the rest were arrested for counterrevolutionary crimes. Simply being male and of military age constituted sufficient grounds for detention since virtually all able-bodied men would have

been drafted into the Red Army at the start of the war. However, more information was necessary to arrest men and women for espionage and counterrevolutionary crimes. This information came from neighbors and Communist activists whose assistance punitive organs and the ChGK solicited to identify potential suspects.[37]

Several months earlier, in February 1943, Alexander Werth, a BBC correspondent embedded with the Red Army, recalled seeing in Kharkiv "two large letter-boxes marked U.N.K.V.D.—the Ukrainian Security Police—into which people were invited to drop denunciations and other relevant information." Recalling this scene, Werth remarked that "Here was scope for some ugly vendettas."[38] While he was correct that this enabled unscrupulous individuals to settle old scores by falsely denouncing their neighbors, not all denunciations were inherently malicious and based on self-interest.[39] Historically, denunciations served multiple functions, and the situation was no different in the aftermath of liberation.[40]

Indeed, in some instances, denunciations and the larger retributive process enabled local inhabitants, including Jewish survivors, to seek justice. Soviet trials of local collaborators, according to Tanja Penter, "seem to have satisfied a strong desire for revenge, order and the re-establishment of social hierarchies inside local communities." Rather than being "simply imposed on the population and directed from above . . . they also provided a locus for interaction between Soviet authorities and local communities."[41] Similarly, Franziska Exeler has noted that some of those who sought to mobilize the state "could find moral justice [spravedlivost′] in this process or see in the Soviet state a guarantor of morally right punishment."[42]

In her memoirs, A. K. Ziberova, a former SMERSH operative who was stationed in Moscow during the war, recalled that many women were denounced by their neighbors once German-occupied territory was liberated. Whenever her colleagues received a tip about a woman who still had family in Moscow, Ziberova would visit them to ascertain the whereabouts of their female relative who stood accused of working for or having relations with Germans.[43] Punitive organs did not just rely on denunciations but also actively sought the assistance of neighbors and Party activists.[44] For example, Sofiia Khabai, a Jewish survivor of the Minsk ghetto, recalled how she was approached in summer 1944 by a secret police officer who wanted her to "take revenge on the enemies that were residing in Minsk."[45] Khabai agreed to help because her "blood was boiling and [she] wanted to take revenge on a lot of people."[46] Others, however, were less comfortable with the role they were asked to play. For instance, Vladimir Motel′kov, a citizen of Luga in Leningrad oblast, recalled feeling "uncomfortable" when he was asked to appear at the city's

newly opened SMERSH headquarters to answer questions about his neighbors. Although he "was aware that certain citizens had made 'mistakes' . . . he did not want these people to suffer for them."[47] However, Motel´kov believed that one individual named Alexeyev "deserved to be punished for having denounced a Russian patriot" to German authorities during the occupation.[48] Acting on this conviction, Motel´kov denounced Alexeyev to SMERSH, and as a result, Alexeyev received a fifteen-year sentence.

If we return to the mass operation of April 1943, it is clear from the data that the vast majority of individuals arrested during this operation were men suspected of desertion or draft dodging. In his work on post-liberation Kyiv, Martin Blackwell observed the same thing regarding similar mass operations carried out in Voronezh and Kursk oblasts.[49] Extrapolating from these earlier operations, Blackwell suggested that mass operations were primarily used to "find men for the Red Army rather than cleanse Kyiv."[50] While it is true that the vast majority of those arrested as part of these operations were men of military age, this does not necessarily mean that security concerns were not a driving factor as well. Hidden among the data, one can find women who were arrested on suspicion of espionage and anti-Soviet behavior. Their arrest, albeit on a much smaller scale than that of men, suggests that security concerns rather than simply the need to find bodies for the Red Army undergirded these operations.[51]

For instance, among the "most characteristic" cases mentioned in the report for the mass operation of April 1943 was the case of a twenty-six-year-old woman named E. S. Iudina, who was detained in Voroshilovgrad/Luhansk on suspicion of espionage.[52] During a search of her apartment, the NKVD discovered fifty-five bracelets, twelve watches, twenty-two pairs of new shoes, thirteen pairs of underwear, forty-six towels, money, and other valuables. The report did not mention how she came by these items or to whom they originally belonged. But most likely most if not all these items once belonged to her Jewish neighbors, a conclusion that is reinforced by the fact that the NKVD suspected Iudina's husband of fleeing Voroshilovgrad/Luhansk with the Germans. Meanwhile, the alleged departure of her husband, even as she remained in the city, raised concerns and suggested the possibility that she was deliberately left behind. It is not clear if the NKVD's initial interest in Iudina arose because they had received some information about her or simply because she was married to a man who was suspected of fleeing with the Germans. But once a cache of stolen goods was found in her home, Iudina's own wartime actions came under investigation.

After being detained during a mass operation, suspects such as Iudina were held in a preliminary detention cell, or KPZ (kamera predvaritel´nogo zak-

liucheniia), while waiting for their cases to be investigated. In her memoirs, Elena Markova, a former citizen of Krasnoarmeisk/Pokrovsk, located in Stalino/Donetsk oblast, who was falsely accused of wartime collaboration, recalled seeing many women in the KPZ after liberation. According to Markova, "Many women ended up in the KPZ for liaisons with the Germans. Some of them did in fact have such 'relations,' but some found themselves guilty without fault. The thing is, during the years of occupation, Germans were quartered in almost every home. No special barracks were built for them and so the local population had to accept Germans to be quartered in their homes and had to survive with them."[53] Neighbors, as we have already seen, had no way of knowing what was happening in the homes of their female neighbors. As a result, some women were denounced simply for washing clothes or cooking food for the German soldiers quartered in their homes. But even when a woman did have relations with German soldiers, the reasons for her actions were often far more complicated and nuanced than either her neighbors or Soviet punitive organs could see or understand.

The unprecedented levels of destruction wrought in German-occupied territory meant that few prisons remained intact. Those that did survive the occupation were soon dangerously overcrowded because of the mass cleansing operations, which saw thousands of arrests over a very short period of time. For example, in April 1943, Prison Number 1 in Kursk oblast held 5,084 prisoners even though the facility was only equipped to hold 1,000. As a result of the overcrowding, 250 prisoners were kept outside in the prison yard.[54] After a cleansing operation was carried out in the liberated regions of Smolensk oblast, 1,810 individuals were arrested and subsequently "placed in sheds, barns, and peasant huts" in lieu of a prison.[55] According to officials, prison conditions were "exceptionally bad."[56] For example, the prisons of Kursk were described in the following way: "Cells are overcrowded, prisoners are forced to stand, the air is stale, [and] there is dirt everywhere."[57] A mere hundred grams of bread was allocated per person, hot food was issued only once per day, and prisons had no stockpiles. Moreover, because of overcrowding, poor sanitation, and lack of health and safety measures, twenty-five cases of typhus had been reported.[58] In some instances, suspects were incarcerated without first undergoing legally mandated medical checks, disinfection, and quarantine.[59] Kursk was not alone in this regard, and prisons located in other recently liberated cities reportedly experienced similar conditions.

In her memoirs, Markova recalled the conditions in which she was kept soon after Krasnoarmeisk/Pokrovsk was liberated. The Germans had set fire to the local prison, and so the NKVD opened a makeshift prison in the basement of the city's flour mill.[60]

> If I were to describe our cellar life, then not one detail would fit the stereotypical notion of a prison. A small shuttered slot in the door? We did not have any small windows; daylight did not penetrate our dungeon [podzemel′e]. A bright electric bulb which would not let us sleep? The power plant hadn't been restored yet so there was no electricity in the city, in general, and in our cellars, in particular. We had to content ourselves with oil lamps and the semidarkness. The famous "bucket" ["parasha"]? They deprived us of this prison improvement [blagoustroistvo] as well—they took us out two times a day "for air" (as they say in Ukraine) and if someone couldn't wait then, just like that, on the floor . . . Three meals a day and hot water? Nothing of the kind! The food supply hadn't been established yet, the water tower had been blown up, the entire population was starving. Was it possible under such conditions to regularly feed and give water to "fascist bastards"? Being able to wash or bathe oneself was out of the question—difficulties with water and a lack of wash basins made this problem unsolvable. Walks? There was no prison yard. . . . So we fumbled around [koposhilis′] in the darkness and dampness, dirty, hungry, tormented by thirst, in an environment suitable only for underground reptiles.[61]

As Soviet authorities restored basic services in the liberated regions and built new prisons and KPZ to replace those that were destroyed during the German occupation, conditions gradually improved. Still, overcrowding and the threat of disease persisted until the war's end. Markova recalled that even after a new KPZ was built in Krasnoarmeisk/Pokrovsk, the holding cells were still overcrowded.[62] Soviet reports, meanwhile, noted that as late as spring 1945, outbreaks of infectious diseases continued to hamper the ability of military tribunals to adjudicate cases in a timely manner. For example, in the first quarter of 1945, the military tribunal for Vinnytsa oblast had to suspend hearing cases for an extended period because of prison quarantines.[63] The same thing occurred in Ternopil and Volhynia as well as other oblasts throughout the UkrSSR in early 1945.[64]

Due to the gravity of the crimes committed in German-occupied territory, suspects detained during mass operations were immediately consigned to the category of especially dangerous political prisoners.[65] NKVD Special Departments, which became SMERSH in April 1943, were charged with investigating cases originating in combat areas and near the front lines.[66] Unlike in Western Europe, where special laws had to be written to prosecute wartime crimes, Soviet authorities could rely on existing legislation.[67] Specifically, Article 58 of the Russian Criminal Code of 1934 and its republic equivalents dealt with counterrevolutionary crimes or treason, including "espionage, passing over military or state secrets, going over to the enemy and escaping over the

border."[68] As early as 1934, cases involving treason, espionage, and acts of terrorism were tried by military tribunals and the Military Collegium of the Soviet Supreme Court, the highest military court in the Soviet Union.[69] But starting in June 1941, a series of decisions transferred an increasing number of these cases to the jurisdiction of the military tribunals of NKVD troops and the Special Conference of the NKVD.[70] The Special Conference was an extrajudicial court created in 1934 that "considered cases investigated by the NKVD under Articles 58 and 59 that could not be heard in civilian or military courts 'because of operational reasons.'"[71] During the 1930s, the Special Conference of the NKVD was authorized to sentence individuals deemed to be "socially dangerous" to five years of banishment, exile, or hard labor.[72] Despite various changes in the structure and fortunes of the Soviet secret police, the Special Conference continued to exercise this power up to and during the war.[73]

In his work on military tribunals, Aleksandr Epifanov has found evidence that during the mass operations countless women were detained and arrested on nothing more than the suspicion of having relations with enemy combatants. According to Epifanov, "Soviet citizens, not in the service of the Germans, but found guilty of voluntary 'intimate or close domestic relations'" with enemy combatants, were arrested as "socially dangerous elements" when it was believed that they "could have been or could be used to assist the enemy due to their connections."[74] As in the 1930s, an unknown number of such cases was heard by the Special Conference of the NKVD.[75] For example, Epifanov cited the case of I. V. Sazonchikova, who was arrested on 16 January 1942 by the Special Department of the Twelfth NKVD Aviation Division. She was accused of treason and of having a criminal relationship with employees of the Gestapo. Even though the subsequent investigation by members of the Second Department of the NKVD determined that she did not betray any Soviet citizens but merely washed clothes and cooked dinner for the Gestapo employees who were quartered in her home, the Special Conference sentenced her to three years in the Gulag.[76]

Similarly, in her work on Kalinin oblast, Vanessa Voisin cited the case of three women who were convicted on 3 June 1942 for maintaining intimate relations with German officers.[77] Originally arrested based on a denunciation from an older female neighbor following the liberation of the region, the women were suspected of espionage because of their close relations with German officers. Witnesses in the case testified that the women organized parties that were frequented by German officers and that the officers often spent the night in their apartments. After a two-month investigation failed to uncover any evidence of wrongdoing, the Article 58 charges against these women were requalified. Each woman was subsequently sentenced to between three and

five years in the Gulag as "socially dangerous elements." Voisin suggested that their punishment stemmed from the authorities' belief that these women needed to be isolated and removed from the area because they had been compromised by their wartime behavior.[78]

The legal basis for such sentences was Article 35 of the Russian Criminal Code and its republic equivalents.[79] It stated, in part, that individuals could be relocated beyond the borders of a particular locality, the RSFSR, or even the Soviet Union for a period of no more than five years, with or without an additional sentence to the Gulag, if their continued presence in a particular locality was deemed to pose a "social threat."[80] Such individuals were sentenced as "socially dangerous elements," a legal concept that originated in the 1920s. Initially, "socially dangerous elements" referred to individuals who were considered recidivists, meaning they had ties to the criminal underworld and histories of multiple offences. Such individuals were subject to extrajudicial repression because they were thought to pose a "social threat." At the time, the concepts of both "social danger" and "social harm" were used in reference to such marginal individuals as prostitutes, beggars, alcoholics, and drug users. Although these individuals might have had ties to the criminal underworld, they were seen to pose a lesser threat to society than those categorized as "socially dangerous" and were thus initially subject to intervention by the welfare system rather than extrajudicial repression.

By the late 1920s, however, the concept of "social danger" began to expand and the distinctions between the legal categories of "socially dangerous" and "socially harmful" started to erode. Amid the chaos unleashed by Stalin's Five-Year Plan, prostitutes began being categorized with members of other marginal groups as "socially dangerous" and were increasingly subjected to extrajudicial repression alongside hardened criminals. By the mid-1930s, "socially dangerous" had become a self-evident term much like "enemy of the people." It denoted the supposed deviance of the individual in question and justified that person's isolation from the body politic.[81]

Although a Soviet statute criminalizing wartime fraternization may yet be found, the existence of Article 35 made such a statute unnecessary. As long as women in close contact with the enemy were thought to pose a "social threat," Article 35 made it possible to isolate them as "socially dangerous elements" either through exile or by sentencing to the Gulag. Having been accused of "selling" themselves to the enemy, alleged fraternizers seem to have been treated in much the same way as prostitutes were in the 1930s. Whereas prostitutes were initially seen as victims of the old order, by the early 1930s they were largely considered to be deviant and incapable of reform. Together with members of other marginal groups, such as homeless children and vagrants,

prostitutes were categorized as "socially dangerous" and subject to extrajudicial repression, including internment in correctional colonies and exile.[82] Lacking evidence of any criminal wrongdoing on the part of alleged wartime fraternizers such as Sazonchikova, but fearful of the consequences that allowing them to remain free would have on society, Soviet punitive organs seem to have sentenced them under Article 35 in order to neutralize the alleged "social threat" they posed to Soviet society.

Recent findings by Liudmila Novikova have shown that Article 35 was also applied to women who had relations with British and American men during the war. Specifically, Novikova found that women in Arkhangel´sk, Russia, were evicted from the city as "socially dangerous elements" for their real and alleged relations with Allied soldiers. Once tensions between the Soviet Union and its Western allies began to increase at war's end, some of these women were also tried for espionage and treason under Article 58.[83] Novikova's findings suggest a link between the Soviet treatment of these different groups of women and the possibility that the response in Arkhangel´sk developed in tandem with the Soviet response to women who were perceived to have been in close contact with German soldiers. Indeed, whereas an unknown number of alleged fraternizers were detained, investigated, and sentenced as "socially dangerous elements" under Article 35, others were also evicted from strategically important areas of the Soviet Union, as the next section will show.

"Social Danger" and Mass Evictions from Regime Cities

In 1932, the Soviet Union introduced internal passports to control the unchecked movement of people who were streaming into the country's urban centers during the First Five-Year Plan. Urban residents were issued internal passports, which subsequently became the main form of identification in the Soviet Union, whereas rural inhabitants were not. As part of this process, a series of so-called regime cities and locations were created and subsequently became subject to strict passport control. During the 1930s, passportization gave police organs a semblance of control over the country's urban and rural populations by preventing peasants from fleeing the collectivized village and allowing police organs to evict "socially dangerous elements" from regime locations. Kulaks, *lishentsy* (disenfranchised individuals), "anti-Soviet elements," petty criminals, as well as anyone who was convicted of counterrevolutionary crimes were among the many categories of people who were refused residency permits in regime locations.[84] Just as the categories of individuals who were considered "socially dangerous" grew throughout the 1930s, so too did the number of cities and districts that fell under regime control. By 1938, there were some 130 regime cities in the RSFSR alone and more than five hundred across

the entire Soviet Union, with the number continuing to rise as the Soviet Union entered World War II.[85] Mass operations, as the previous section showed, made it possible for police organs to identify and investigate "politically unreliable" and "socially dangerous elements" during the war. But this was not all. They also enabled police organs to evict these categories of people from areas designated as regime locations as Soviet officials attempted to rebuild and repopulate war-torn cities along regime lines in the aftermath of liberation.

During the interwar period, Article 35 was increasingly applied not only to individuals who were convicted of various real and perceived crimes but also to their family members, who became "socially dangerous" by virtue of their relationships. Collective responsibility of this kind had been a part of Soviet society to varying degrees since the Russian Civil War.[86] For example, the wives of "enemies of the people" were thought to have been guilty by association during the Purges and arrested alongside their husbands or soon after their arrest. During World War II, collective responsibility was first instituted to combat high desertion rates within the Red Army in late summer of 1941. From there, a series of wartime decrees extended it from the families of Red Army deserters to the families of civilian transgressors. For instance, on 27 December 1941, the GKO allowed the Special Conference of the NKVD to evict to remote regions of the Soviet Union the families of individuals who were employed by German administrative and punitive organs as well as individuals who voluntarily retreated with the Wehrmacht.[87]

The main decree legislating collective responsibility was issued on 24 June 1942. It prescribed deportation for a period of five years to remote regions of the Soviet Union for all adult family members of Red Army personnel as well as any civilians who were found guilty of and sentenced to death for wartime transgressions.[88] Exceptions were granted in cases when these families also had family members serving in the Red Army or the partisan movement or who were the recipients of government awards and medals.[89] Since men were far more likely to be sentenced to death for wartime transgressions, this meant that the vast majority of civilians who were subject to these measures were women and children. This decree effectively criminalized familial relationships with real and perceived collaborators.

The events surrounding this decree's promulgation suggest that security concerns and anxieties about political reliability informed it as well.[90] Discussion of the 24 June 1942 decree was precipitated by a telegram sent by Dvinskii, the secretary of the Rostov *obkom* (oblast committee) of the Communist Party, on 16 June 1942. In the telegram addressed to Stalin, Dvinskii voiced his concerns about the security situation in the newly liberated region. Specifically, he opined that although some of the "families of traitors who had left

with the Germans" had already been evicted from Rostov and numerous other areas, other such families remained free in some parts of the oblast. Dvinskii worried that it was "becoming more and more dangerous" to keep these families in the region because "units of the Red Army are now in these areas, defensive fortifications have been built, and these families, whose mood, of course, is bad, need to be evicted and as quickly as possible."[91] Dvinskii suggested that 1,447 families in the region needed to be evicted.[92] In two handwritten notes scribbled on Dvinskii's telegram, Stalin signed off on his request and asked Beria for his opinion.

Two days later, on 18 June, Beria submitted a report to the GKO in which he outlined the repressive measures the NKVD had adopted against the family members of alleged traitors. Beria noted that the family members of military personnel found guilty of a variety of crimes were being evicted to Siberia for a period of five years based on existing laws.[93] As to the families of alleged civilian transgressors, Beria stated: "Based on existing regulations and government orders . . . the families of persons convicted of espionage or treason and assistance to the German occupiers, of service in punitive or administrative organs of the German occupiers on occupied territory, and those persons voluntarily departing with occupation forces during the liberation of areas captured by the enemy . . . are not being held accountable [k otvetstvennosti ne privlekaiutsia]."[94] Beria estimated that 10,298 such families, consisting of 37,350 individuals (2,244 men, 15,251 women, and 19,855 children) lived in newly liberated areas. He concluded by reporting that the "NKVD believed that the families of these people, if they are condemned to death, should also be subject to repression."[95] While these recommendations were only supposed to concern the family members of individuals who were sentenced to death, judicial organs were soon interpreting them more broadly. As a result, on 13 November 1942, the chief military procurator of the Soviet Union felt compelled to issue additional directives in which he specified that the family members of individuals who were merely convicted of collaboration were not to be subject to arrest and deportation.[96]

Collective responsibility reached its zenith in 1944, when entire ethnic groups, such as the Chechens and Tatars, were marked as collaborating nations and deported to remote regions of the Soviet Union.[97] In the midst of these large-scale deportations, a less noted operation took place in Kyiv and its environs, where collective responsibility was applied to alleged fraternizers and their families. On 28 July 1944, the Military Soviet of the Kyiv Military District issued Decree Number 53, which called for the eviction of several categories of "politically unreliable" civilians from Kyiv and a fifty-kilometer zone surrounding the city.[98] The text situated the need for such evictions within the context of

wartime security, stating, "As a result of the two-year stay of German-Fascist and German-Ukrainian Nationalists on the territory of Ukraine, Kyiv, the capital of the Ukrainian SSR, became clogged [zassorenoi] with unreliable and socially dangerous elements."[99] Such "socially dangerous elements" included:

- families of individuals, convicted and arrested for anti-Soviet work, for treason [:] spies, traitors, those who voluntarily left with the occupiers, former workers of punitive and administrative organs of the enemy, families of spies and traitors [who were] executed by shooting without trial by frontline units of the Red Army and partisan detachments
- individuals and their families not repressed by organs of the NKVD-NKGB [:] rank-and-file workers of administrative and punitive institutions created by the occupiers [and] women who cohabitated with the German invaders[100]

All these categories of people were deemed to be "socially dangerous" and thus a threat to the security and public order of the city by virtue of their relationships with suspected local collaborators and/or representatives of the occupation regime.

Kyiv was a regime city of the first category, on par with Moscow and Leningrad. This designation enabled police organs to evict "socially dangerous elements" from the city and a surrounding fifty-kilometer zone.[101] It also enabled them to take measures to prevent "unreliable" and "socially dangerous elements" who had been previously removed from the city from ever returning.[102] Social danger, as we have already seen, referred to not only the physical well-being but also the political and ideological well-being of the body politic. In the context of post-liberation Kyiv, the alleged social danger posed by the groups of individuals mentioned in the decree referred to both kinds of well-being, especially regarding Communist Party members. During the German occupation, Kyiv witnessed a drastic depopulation. The prewar population of one million declined to 220,000 because of German policies.[103] In the months and years that followed, hundreds of thousands of civilians, many of whom had remained in occupied territory, returned to Kyiv. Their presence in the regime city quickly became a concern for local Party officials, especially given the acute lack of housing in the war-torn city. Shortages of living space and resources gave way to tensions and crime. Although a report from February 1945 noted that "the overwhelming majority" of the gangs and "bands of robbers" (grabitel´skie formirovaniia) that had been liquidated by the police "included servicemen, disabled veterans of the Patriotic War and students who had not previously engaged in criminal behavior," punitive officials attributed much of this behavior to negative influences stemming from criminal and "so-

cially dangerous elements."[104] In July 1944, V. Komarov, the chief of Kyiv's police suggested as much when he stated that criminal incidences were caused by the "everyday influx of population into the city of Kyiv together with which penetrate criminal offender elements."[105]

In addition to crime, officials also worried about the political reliability of those individuals who had remained in the city, including Communist Party members. As early as 13 November 1943, officials signaled their distrust by noting, "District Party committees allowed breaches in the creation of the first Party organizations. They began creating the first Party organizations from those Communists who had remained in occupied territory and from their ranks appointed Party organizers."[106] Most if not all Party and Komsomol members who had remained in the occupied city were considered unreliable by virtue of having remained under occupation. Meanwhile, in January 1944, Party officials resolved to move the republic-level government bureaucracy from Kharkiv to Kyiv. As a result, thousands of bureaucrats were soon arriving in the city.[107] By July 1944, the number of Communist Party members had risen from a mere seventeen hundred to ten thousand, largely as a result of cadres who were brought in from other oblasts.[108] Within this context, the "politically unreliable" and "socially dangerous elements" mentioned in the decree from July 1944 were perceived as potential sources of criminal behavior as well as physical and ideological danger. The latter issues, particularly as they related to the newly arriving Communist Party officials, became the biggest source of concern for Party and punitive officials who were initially bent on repopulating the city along regime lines.

A draft resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, "On measures to strengthen public order in the city of Kyiv," clearly made this connection. Specifically, the resolution recommended that Sergei Savchenko, who was by then the people's commissar of the NKVD of the UkSSR, take all necessary measures to ensure the "cleansing of the city from the contingents indicated in [the decree of the Kyiv Military District], especially from the areas adjacent to the buildings in which members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Tsk KP(b)U and members of the government live as well as the routes they travel."[109] An additional resolution reiterated this goal, calling for the NKVD to implement a "strict regime of residence control," especially surrounding the "private residences [and] central government offices where Comrade N. S. Khrushchev and members of the Politburo of the Tsk KP(b)U live and work as well as the routes they travel."[110] Combining anxieties about stay-behind networks and fears of assassination, these resolutions linked the presence of "socially dangerous elements" in the city to the physical safety of the Party leadership.

Given that several of the categories of people slated for eviction were the family members of individuals sentenced to death for real and imagined wartime transgressions, such concerns were not farfetched. Having lost a loved one to state repression, it is not hard to imagine that some of them might turn against the state. Meanwhile, those who had worked for the German occupation authorities or women who had cohabitated with German officers and soldiers raised anxieties about infiltration, espionage, and assassination that we have already witnessed. Having worked for the enemy, it was possible that these individuals were deliberately left behind to carry out missions against the state. While physical harm was the main concern, the threat of ideological contamination was never far behind. Even if they did not harbor any nefarious motives, these individuals had been exposed to an alternative, and their proximity to loyal Party officials posed a threat of contagion.

Although collective responsibility was legal according to existing Soviet laws, the expansively worded text of the decree from July 1944 ensured that it would be broadly interpreted. It did not specify how the guilt of most of the individuals listed would be determined. Presumably, it would be the military tribunals or the Special Conference of the NKVD that would determine guilt. However, the verdicts handed down by the Special Conference usually took place without much of an investigation or trial. The military tribunals were also far from perfect and were open to error and abuse, especially during the early years. In contrast, the guilt of individuals executed by Red Army units or the partisans was determined by those units with minimal or no investigation, as we have already seen. Moreover, although the decree stated that organs of the NKVD and the NKGB would provide documentation in support of evictions, nowhere was it specified what this documentation would be.[111] This was particularly a problem with regards to individuals who allegedly fled with retreating German units. Their absence was undoubtedly grounds for suspicion, but it also made it impossible for them to defend themselves against allegations that they had left voluntarily.

Determining the intentions and guilt of women who had relations with German soldiers was equally problematic, again as we have already established. Not only was it often impossible to draw a line between consensual and forced relations, but complicating the situation even further was the fact that local civilians were often forced to quarter German soldiers in their homes. While occupation authorities typically evicted urban dwellers to make way for Germans, in the countryside, soldiers were often quartered in the homes of civilians for extended periods of time.[112] Under these conditions, voluntary and coerced sexual liaisons often developed, especially since most local men of

fighting age were away serving on the front. This situation made it not only difficult to determine who was and was not arguably guilty of fraternization, but it also made it relatively easy for neighbors to denounce women, many of whom were living alone without their husbands or other family members, for real or imagined relations with enemy combatants. The decree made no allowances for this situation. In so doing, it left little room for nuance in accounts of what was a complex phenomenon. Ultimately, in the absence of any evidence linking their relationships to espionage, women in close contact with the enemy were still subject to eviction together with their families. This undoubtedly revictimized many women who were forced into such relationships in the first place. It also exposed them to potential abuse from neighbors or unscrupulous officials who could use the threat of exposure of real or alleged transgressions to settle old scores or make new demands.

While the July 1944 decree only extended to Kyiv and a fifty-kilometer zone surrounding the city, it seems that similar operations took place in other regime areas as well. For example, a special report from Beria, dated 18 August 1944, notified the GKO and Stalin of the NKVD's decision to evict 850 people who were related to individuals convicted of treason or those who had voluntarily retreated with German forces from the cities of Piatigorsk, Kislovodsk, Zheleznovodsk, Yessentuki, and Mineral´nye Vody to the Novosibirsk oblast of Russia.[113] More research is necessary to ascertain the extent of these smaller operations and to determine whether alleged fraternizers were subject to eviction in other regime cities and border regions. But given the history of Soviet policing during the interwar period, it is likely that operations similar to the one that unfolded in Kyiv, which targeted alleged fraternizers alongside other "socially dangerous elements," took place across newly liberated territory in the closing years of the war.

Although the decree of the Kyiv Military District was initially adopted as written, the vagueness of its language raised objections from some Soviet officials. In a letter addressed to the military procurator of the Kyiv Military District, Nosov, the chief military procurator of the Soviet Union, expressed concerns regarding the decree's legality.[114] Although Nosov did not object to collective responsibility in principle, he did voice several concerns regarding the decree's broad language. Specifically, he objected to the indiscriminate eviction of families of individuals convicted of counterrevolutionary crimes and stated that this would go against the GKO's decree from 24 June 1942, which provided numerous exceptions. Thus, Nosov believed that the exceptions granted in June 1942 should also be extended to the families of all the categories listed in the decree of the Kyiv Military District. While he objected

to the eviction of such families on the grounds that doing so would go against previous government decrees, his other objections suggest that he recognized that the vagueness of the Kyiv Military District's decree would result in abuse.

First, Nosov noted that the families of individuals arrested for but not yet found guilty of counterrevolutionary crimes could not be evicted because the possibility remained that they could be innocent. Second, he argued that evictions could only be carried out if there was "indisputable proof" of guilt. For instance, in the case of local women who were suspected of cohabitating with Germans, Nosov stated that their eviction "is permissible only if there are indisputable facts of their cohabitation."[115] He did not specify what would constitute "indisputable facts" in such cases. However, his insistence that these words be included in the final text of the decree suggests that he was both wary of women being indiscriminately arrested and evicted for real and imagined relations with enemy combatants and aware that this was already taking place.

In his note, Nosov requested Colonel Ryzhikov, the military procurator of the Kyiv Military District, to notify either Nikita Khrushchev or Demian Korotchenko, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, of the decree and his objections to it. Since it was already under review, Nosov stated that he would not protest its passage until the review was finished. We do not know what kinds of debate the decree generated within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Still, a slightly modified version was subsequently adopted on 6 September 1944 as Decree No. 71. The new decree did not take most of Nosov's objections into account. Specifically, the words "indisputable proof" did not feature anywhere within the amended text. Still, the new decree did include the exceptions that were previously outlined in June 1942.[116]

By the time the text was amended, hundreds of cases for eviction had already been initiated in Kyiv. Indeed, according to a report from April 1945, 2,516 cases had been registered for the period beginning on 10 August 1944 and ending on 1 March 1945, including 1,135 cases for Kyiv and 1,381 cases for the fifty-kilometer zone surrounding the city.[117] Still, due in large part to the exceptions granted in the amended decree, only 888 of these cases had been approved as of April 1945.[118] The rest were dropped after it was determined that a family member belonged to the aforementioned categories of people who were to be exempted.[119] While this saved hundreds of families from eviction, hundreds more were forced to start new lives in other regions of the Soviet Union. According to the same report, 554 families had been evicted from the city, while a further 329 families were evicted from the surrounding fifty-kilometer zone.[120] The report also noted that the eviction of a further 302 families had been approved, but had not been carried out for a variety of

reasons.[121] Although we do not know under what conditions these evictions took place, it is not hard to imagine, given the ongoing war and the devastation wrought upon Soviet territory, that these families suffered extreme privations as a result of these evictions. Moreover, as long as regime restrictions remained in place, they could never legally return to Kyiv.[122]

Setting aside the morality of holding families accountable for the crimes of individuals, it is clear from both the wording of the decree and the lack of a systematic means for determining guilt that the families of innocent people suffered alongside those of collaborators. Furthermore, while the exceptions granted to the families of Red Army soldiers and partisans that was included in the final version of the decree saved many from eviction, its inclusion highlights both the complexities of defining and punishing collaboration and ultimately its arbitrary implementation. A large number, perhaps the majority, of people who remained in occupied territory had a "freak" within their family who had collaborated with the occupation regime.[123] Simultaneously, many also had family members who served in the Red Army or with the partisans. This situation ensured that any measures attempting to impose collective responsibility would be painful and arbitrary. Finally, collaboration and, as a result, Soviet retribution, were "structurally gendered" in that those involved were mostly male local policemen and village elders. This meant that the individuals evicted in accordance with this decree were invariably women and children. While an unknown number of women were evicted from Kyiv and the surrounding fifty-kilometer zone for real or alleged relations with German men, many others suffered as the wives, sisters, mothers, and daughters of men who were accused of committing real or imagined crimes against the state.

Discrimination and Stigma in Everyday Life

Historians disagree about how Soviet retribution evolved in the years following liberation. Amir Weiner has argued that as the Soviet war myth took hold, local policemen, village elders, and Ukrainian nationalists became irredeemable "even through the so-called baptism by fire." Despite a dire need for qualified personnel to rebuild the country, individuals accused of any form of collaboration were, according to Weiner, denied political and social rehabilitation as the Party strove to purify the body politic.[124] Jeffrey Jones and Tanja Penter have since suggested that the regime did in fact show leniency to certain groups of suspected collaborators out of pragmatic considerations precisely because of the country's acute need for qualified personnel.[125] Furthermore, Jones raised the possibility that this leniency reflected some understanding of the "moral gray zone" of occupation.[126] Similarly, Franziska Exeler has suggested that while ideology and pragmatism both played their roles, "retribution

evolved into a process in which different objectives and interests [i.e., retribution vs. reconstruction] had to be weighed against each other, which in turn explains why punishment became less indiscriminate and less strict after the winter of 1943/44."[127]

While official goals may have shifted from retribution to reconstruction as the war drew to a close, civilians who remained in occupied territory continued to face discrimination in their everyday lives. Women and girls accused of "flirtation with Germans" were excluded from the Communist Party and the Komsomol even as such "smears became standard accusations in political and personal infighting in the years after the war."[128] They were often called "German mattresses" (nemetskie podstilki) or "German sluts."[129] Their children, meanwhile, were called "little fascists," "Germans," or "Spaniards."[130]

Recalling his wartime childhood, Victor Shnayder, a former citizen of Artemovsk (Bakhmut), Stalino/Donetsk oblast, Ukraine, recalled a woman who had fraternized with German soldiers during the occupation. The woman and her redheaded son lived in the same building as his family. Shnayder recalled that neighbors, both young and old, called him a "fascist." As a young boy, Shnayder did not understand what was happening. He remembered asking his grandmother why the neighbor's boy was called a "fascist" and her telling him that it was because the boy's father was a German soldier. Stories about such women, according to Shnayder, were common in postwar Artemovsk/Bakhmut. Neighbors believed such women to be traitors and showed them little pity, especially considering the horrors Germans had committed in the city.[131]

In her recollections, Nionila Timoshenko, a witness of a massacre of Jewish civilians in Ust′-Labinsk, Krasnodar oblast, Russia also recalled some of the women from her hometown who had maintained relations with enemy soldiers during the occupation.[132] One of them was a former friend, named Valia, who, according to Timoshenko, "sold herself" to the Germans. Valia lived with a German during the occupation, and when the Red Army returned, she was forced to hide and eventually flee Ust′-Labinsk because of her wartime actions. Another woman remained in Ust′-Labinsk and continued to live on the same street as Timoshenko. Timoshenko recalled that the second woman joined the Red Army to make amends for her wartime transgressions and specifically her wartime relationship with a German officer. However, despite her service in the Red Army and the passage of more than fifty years, most of her neighbors, according to Timoshenko, continued to treat her with "disdain."[133]

With their reputations ruined and their wartime children a living reminder of their actions, such women would have had no way to escape their past. Given the severe gender imbalances that were created by the war, it is likely

that many remained alone, haunted by their pasts for the rest of their lives. In the Cherkasy oblast of Ukraine, for instance, women who had relations with German soldiers were reportedly unable to marry because of their wartime actions and the condemnation they received from neighbors.[134] Others, meanwhile, were abandoned by their husbands. Having spent the war fighting on the front lines, some soldiers could not forgive their wives even when their actions were motivated by hunger and need. For example, in his request for a divorce, Captain I. M. Sukach wrote,

> During the German occupation of Ukraine, my wife got married to a German militia man in order to avoid labor deportation to Germany. She lived with him for a while, that is, until the arrival of the Red Army. Then he was killed, and she was left alone. I learned about this directly from her in the letters she wrote to me. She asks me to accept her again. But because I was at the front for the whole time, and she got married to a German lackey, I decided to break off all ties with her . . . Please explain to me what I need to do so that my official documents do not include my wife, who got married to a German lackey.[135]

Faced with the possibility of being sent to forced labor in Germany, Sukach's wife sought the protection of a local collaborator. Even though she admitted her actions to her husband, he ultimately could not forgive her.

According to a 1944 study of the People's Commissariat of Justice, two of the three most common reasons for divorce in Russia and Ukraine following the promulgation of the 1944 Family Law was "the presence of another *de facto* family and infidelity of the spouse."[136] In many cases, both spouses were guilty of infidelity. However, women were often held to a higher moral standard. Indeed, although officers often took "wives" from among their female subordinates, many still expected their home-front wives to remain faithful.[137] For example, Mie Nakachi described the divorce petition of a World War II veteran named I. T. Avdeev who demanded a divorce from his wife even though he was also guilty of infidelity. Avdeev wrote:

> At this time my wife is not in Osipenko and it is not clear where she is. Now I must divorce her, because I found for myself a different wife, who is a real Soviet woman (*polnost´iu sovetskaia zhenshchina*) [. . .] If my former wife returned to Osipenko, no-one could force me to live with such a woman, who betrayed not only me, but also our Fatherland and our people whom I defended. I was decorated for destroying German fascist beasts, so if I live with this bitch (*svoloch´*) again, it will be a shame and a disgrace (*pozor*) for the people (*narod*) whom I

> freed and defended. I ask for your help in this matter so that I can purge (*ochistit´*) myself and my document of such scum (*nechist´*). Also, I do not have the means to pay the legal costs because my wife squandered everything while I was absent.[138]

Despite the ubiquity of wartime liaisons, a woman's infidelity was often interpreted as the greater betrayal.

In addition to living the rest of their lives with the stigma of having had relations with the enemy, some women lived in fear that the authorities would discover their actions and prosecute them. In the early 2000s, while on an expedition in search of mass graves of Jewish victims of the Holocaust in Ukraine, Father Patrick Desbois interviewed an elderly Ukrainian woman who initially refused to speak to him. She was afraid to tell him that her house had been requisitioned by the Germans to house the Gestapo during the occupation because such women were deported to Siberia.[139] Thus, almost sixty years later, the emotional and psychological violence that wartime anxieties and suspicions encouraged toward women continued to exact their toll.

This chapter explored the various sanctioned and unsanctioned measures state and civilian actors directed at women who were suspected of fraternization. Relying on previous directives that identified women as potential security threats, punitive officials arrested countless women on suspicion of espionage based on their real or perceived relationships with enemy combatants. With sex linked to "abnormal," that is, "anti-Soviet" behavior and political unreliability, women who failed to live up to wartime expectations were seen as unpatriotic and unfaithful at best and as "socially dangerous" at worst. Alleged fraternizers were likened to prostitutes and ultimately treated in similar ways. In this context, the anxieties that first manifested themselves in the Red Army had their most far-reaching effects. Once categorized as "socially dangerous," local women could be sentenced, evicted, and deported to remote regions of the Soviet Union without having committed a crime. Simply being perceived as having the potential to physically or ideologically harm others was enough to justify their removal and that of their families to areas where their threat was thought to be minimized.

While these measures were instituted in the context of war, the end of hostilities only brought a modicum of relief. Women who were accused of fraternization faced ongoing discrimination from officials, neighbors, and family members who could neither forgive nor forget their alleged actions. Given the nature of the war and its horrific costs, some of this condemnation is understandable. But while many of those who were arguably guilty of wartime trans-

gressions were punished, many others who were forced into these relationships by wartime conditions were revictimized. Indeed, the situation on the ground was far more complicated than either Soviet officials or onlookers could imagine, and actions that in light of interwar notions of morality may have been considered unpatriotic often became a means of survival in the context of war and occupation.

Conclusion

On 16 May 1945, three members of the Kudriavtsev family committed suicide in Odessa (Odesa), Ukraine. The triple suicide garnered the attention of Roman Rudenko, the Chief Procurator of the UkrSSR, who ordered an investigation. It was soon determined that the family had previously lived in German-occupied Dnepropetrovsk (Dnipro) where all three members of the family—father, mother, and daughter—had allegedly collaborated with the Germans. The daughter, Antonina, worked as a translator and lived with German officers from whom she received "material rewards." NKGB investigators discovered this on 15 May when Antonina allegedly confessed to everything during an interrogation. Instead of arresting her immediately, however, NKGB investigators allowed her to go home, where she and her parents drank poison to avoid the fate that awaited them.[1] As with so many of the fragmentary reports and stories investigated in this book, this episode leaves us with more questions than answers. We will likely never know the extent of Antonina's alleged relations with enemy combatants, the reasons for those relations, or the mechanisms by which she first came to the attention of the NKGB. Still, such cases are important because they are evidence of the unfolding retribution campaign and the fears and violence that accompanied liberation and the return of Soviet power for those who had remained in occupied territory.

As elsewhere in Europe, women like Antonina were scrutinized by their neighbors for what many had come to see as their treasonous behavior. In France, Holland, Norway, Denmark, and elsewhere, such women were considered traitors and excluded from their communities. "In France they were known as *femmes à boche*, in Holland as *moffenhoer* or *moffenmeiden*, in Norway and Denmark as *tyskerpiger, tyskertøser* or *feltmasdrasser*," and in the Soviet Union as *shliukhi-doiche* or *nemetskie podstilki*.[2] Public shaming rituals where alleged fraternizers were shorn of their hair and paraded before jeering crowds

were common across Europe. But it seems that such spectacles did not occur in the Soviet Union except in western Ukraine, where the OUN shaved the heads of Ukrainian women suspected of "horizontal collaboration."[3] Still, while Soviet civilians may not have participated in such public shaming rituals, they nevertheless shunned their female neighbors and semantically and physically distanced themselves from those they believed had crossed a line. Additionally, like their counterparts in Western and Central Europe, Soviet civilians also denounced alleged fraternizers to Soviet police and judicial organs.

Soviet women pursued relations with German soldiers and officers for a variety of reasons spanning the spectrum from love to personal gain to survival. Often a combination of these or other factors were at play. Given what we know about German occupation policies in the East and the uneven power relations that prevailed between occupier and occupied, it is nearly impossible to disentangle what were arguably consensual relations from instances of survival prostitution. For Soviet officials and many of their neighbors, however, these relationships were often interpreted in terms of personal weakness and moral and political failure. With official expectations clearly stating that women in occupied territory were either supposed to actively resist with the partisans or passively wait for Soviet power to return, those who made the "choiceless choice" to take control of their own fate by engaging with the enemy, no matter how circumscribed that choice may have been, were thought to be unpatriotic and weak. None of this was unique to the Soviet Union. What made the Soviet situation different, however, was the position that women held in society vis-à-vis their sisters in other parts of Europe together with conditions in occupied territory and the tactics that both belligerents attempted to deploy against the other.

The roles and positions of women in the former Russian Empire changed radically over the course of the preceding two decades. Notwithstanding the ambivalence and difficulties of the 1920s, women were able to leave the confines of the home and join the ranks of the industrial working class. By the middle of the 1930s, the Soviet Union had legislated gender equality into law and, despite the double and at times triple burden women continued to shoulder, many believed themselves to be equal members of Soviet society. Moreover, following the military preparedness campaigns of the decade, many young women came to see military duty as "constitutive of their Soviet womanhood."[4] Still, even as the Communist Party and Komsomol sought to mobilize women and girls for the revolutionary project, latent anxieties about their roles and contributions remained. Fears of the *baba* who could corrupt the men in her midst persisted throughout the interwar period notwithstanding the belief that women were comrades to the "New Soviet Man."

Once war broke out between Germany and the Soviet Union, countless Soviet women and girls volunteered for the front lines. Although many were initially rebuffed by a military and Party leadership that remained wary of them entering what was still considered a masculine sphere, the articulation of more progressive gender roles in the Soviet Union would eventually allow them to serve on the front lines. This was in stark contrast to most European states where women, despite being able to join the resistance, nevertheless continued to fill auxiliary roles or serve as nurses within their respective armed forces. The decision to accept and later mobilize women into the Red Army posed numerous challenges for the Soviet leadership and the women and men who would serve by their side. Moreover, it quickly gave rise to anxieties about their roles and contributions in the Red Army that centered on the PPZh phenomenon and the supposedly deleterious effect some women were having on military morale and discipline. But what began as a moral crisis in the Red Army soon developed into a crisis of security once Soviet officials began to consider the possibility that German intelligence was recruiting women from occupied territory to spy on Soviet forces.

Once reports of German intelligence recruiting women and girls from occupied territory began to emerge, close contact with enemy combatants started to be interpreted as a sign of enemy recruitment. Tapping into preexisting concerns about the so-called "backwardness" and corruptibility of women, these fears engendered the return of the "temptress" trope to the military milieu. With Red Army and partisan commanders often taking lovers from among their female subordinates, reports about alleged female spies encouraged suspicions of any woman who was thought to be breaking with established sexual norms, especially when the woman in question had been in occupied territory. To combat the real and perceived threat posed by German intelligence, in late 1941 and early 1942 Soviet security organs issued numerous directives calling for the surveillance and investigation of women in close contact with the enemy. These directives became the basis for all future policing operations that sought to identify and neutralize potential threats on recently liberated territory.

To date, no order criminalizing relations with foreign combatants has been found in the case of the Soviet Union. But the existence of Article 35 in the Russian Criminal Code and its republic equivalents likely made such an order unnecessary. Previously used to expel an ever-growing list of marginal groups who were thought to pose a danger to society, Article 35 enabled Soviet punitive organs to evict individuals deemed to be "socially dangerous" from their homes or sentence them for up to five years in the Gulag. While directives issued earlier in the war had identified women in close contact with the enemy

as a target for surveillance and investigation, Article 35 provided the legal framework by which they could be isolated from the body politic. Women in close contact with enemy combatants were thought to have "sold" themselves to the enemy and seem to have been treated in much the same way as prostitutes had been in the 1930s. Even when no evidence of foreign recruitment was found, they were thought to pose a threat because of their ability to corrupt the men in their midst. Having been exposed to foreign influences and proven themselves to be "weak" and "unpatriotic" because of the way they had handled their private lives, such women were isolated to prevent them from being able to corrupt the loyal citizens around them.

As the first book-length study of fraternization and its punishment in the Soviet context, this work leaves many questions unanswered. More research will be necessary in the future to determine the exact scope of the retribution campaign outlined above, but given the history of Soviet policing and mass operations, it is likely that this campaign was widespread. Throughout this book, I have attempted to point out areas for future research to address. For example, little is known about how the treatment of women suspected of collaboration evolved in the years following the end of World War II. Similarly, we know little about the subsequent fates of women who were evicted from their homes and their children. While I was only able to identify the operation in Kyiv, it is likely that mass evictions took place in other regime cities and locations as well. Finally, more research is needed to determine the nature of reprisals in the countryside and on collective farms.

A significant amount has been written about the disputes over apartments and other property that engulfed large Ukrainian cities such as Kyiv following liberation as Jewish and non-Jewish evacuees and later demobilized Red Army soldiers returned home to find that their prewar apartments and property had been seized and appropriated by others during the German occupation.[5] Less has been written about the restitution process in the countryside, and yet reports from Ukrainian procurators' offices suggest that this phenomenon was just as widespread and chaotic.[6] Like their urban counterparts, Soviet peasants attempted to gain restitution for stolen or confiscated property, especially farm animals, through the intercession of Soviet courts and the police. Such legal recourse provided a means by which civilians could settle scores and seek justice against those they thought had wronged them during the war. But what did this process look like at the village level? How were these disputes resolved? And, more specifically to the topic at hand, how were women who had been accused of fraternization treated on collective farms? Were they forced out, and if so, where did they go and what kind of fate awaited them? These are but a few of the many questions that remain unanswered.

German efforts to recruit women from occupied territory to spy on Soviet forces encouraged latent fears and anxieties about women to resurface that extended suspicion to any woman perceived to have been in close contact with the enemy. This profoundly impacted the lives of countless women, many of whom were innocent of any wrongdoing. Because it was nearly impossible to identify real spies in the context of ongoing military operations, an unknown number of innocent women fell victim to Soviet witch-hunts. Others who were coerced into spying for the enemy or forced to pursue relations with enemy combatants to survive were revictimized in the process. Branded "German whores" because of their alleged wartime behavior, Soviet women suspected of fraternization had to live with the stigma for the rest of their lives.

Occupation is messy. It defies our collective imaginings and forces men and women to make decisions that would otherwise be unimaginable. The formal end of hostilities does not mark the end of war and occupation as societies continue to grapple with their fallout for years and decades after the last shots are fired. As warring nations and societies move toward peace, gender must be part of the equation. Any attempt at postwar justice and reconciliation is doomed if we continue to take the experiences of men as universal and fail to recognize how gender affects lived experience. We must refrain from passing judgment too quickly and consider how our individual and collective biases and assumptions color how we judge the "choiceless choices" of others. Failure to do so will inevitably result in more violence.

Notes

Introduction

1. *Raduga*, directed by Mark Donskoi (1943; Kievskaia kinostudiia khudozhestvennykh fil′mov).

2. In the novella, Pusya is alternately described as a "sick monkey" or a "black little rat." Wanda Wasilewska, *The Rainbow*, trans. George Hanna and Elizabeth Donnelly (Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1943), 8, 21.

3. *Eto bylo v Donbasse*, directed by Leonid Lukov (1945; Kinostudiia "Soiuzdetfil′m").

4. Regarding criticisms leveled at Donskoi, see Alexander Prokhorov, "She Defends His Motherland: The Myth of Mother Russia in Soviet Maternal Melodrama of the 1940s," in *Embracing Arms: Cultural Representation of Slavic and Balkan Women in War*, edited by Helena Goscilo and Yana Hashamova (Central European University Press, 2012), 72–74.

5. E. Koval′chik, "Kino 'Eto bylo v Donbasse,'" *Izvestiia*, 11 August 1945, p. 3; A. Derlemenko, "Kino 'Eto bylo v Donbasse,'" *Pravda Ukrainy*, 2 September 1945, p. 3.

6. Fabrice Virgili, *Shorn Women: Gender and Punishment in Liberation France*, trans. John Flower (Berg, 2002), 52.

7. Anette Warring, "Intimate and Sexual Relations," in *Surviving Hitler and Mussolini: Daily Life in Occupied Europe*, ed. Robert Gildea, Olivier Wieviorka, and Anette Warring (BERG, 2006), 88.

8. Anette Warring, "War, Cultural Loyalty and Gender: Danish Women's Intimate Fraternization," in *Children of World War II: The Hidden Enemy Legacy*, ed. Kjersti Ericsson and Eva Simonsen (BERG, 2005), 38–39.

9. Maren Röger, "Sexual Contact Between German Occupiers and Polish Occupied in World War II Poland," in *Women and Men at War: A Gender Perspective on World War II and Its Aftermath in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Maren Röger and Ruth Leiserowitz (Fibre, 2012), 143–44.

10. Benjamin Frommer, "Denouncers and Fraternizers: Gender, Collaboration, and Retribution in Bohemia and Moravia during World War II and After," in *Gender and War in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe*, ed. Nancy W. Wingfield and Maria Bucur (Indiana University Press, 2006), 112.

11. Wingfield and Bucur, *Gender and War*, 9.

12. Dalia Ofer and Lenore J. Weitzman, eds. *Women in the Holocaust* (Yale University Press, 1998), 7–8.

13. Birgit Beck, "Rape: The Military Trials of Sexual Crimes Committed by Soldiers in the Wehrmacht, 1939–1944," in *Home/Front: The Military, War, and Gender in Twentieth Century Germany*, ed. Karen Hagemann and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum (Berg, 2002); Wendy Jo Gertjejanssen, "Victims, Heroes, Survivors: Sexual Violence on the Eastern Front During World War II" (PhD diss., University of Minnesota, 2004); Sonja M. Hedgepeth and Rochelle G. Saidel, eds., *Sexual Violence Against Jewish Women During the Holocaust* (Brandeis University Press, 2010); Regina Mühlhäuser, "The Unquestioned Crime: Sexual Violence by German Soldiers During the 'War of Annihilation' in the Soviet Union, 1941–45," in *Rape in Wartime*, ed. Raphaëlle Branche and Fabrice Virgili (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 34–46; Zoë Waxman, *Women in the Holocaust: A Feminist History* (Oxford University Press, 2017); Regina Mühlhäuser, "Reframing Sexual Violence as a Weapon and Strategy of War: The Case of the German Wehrmacht During the War and Genocide in the Soviet Union, 1941–1944," *Journal of History of Sexuality* 26, no. 3 (2017): 366–401; Elissa Mailänder, "Making Sense of a Rape Photograph: Sexual Violence as Social Performance on the Eastern Front, 1939–1944," *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 26, no. 3 (2017): 489–520; Waitman Wade Beorn, "Bodily Conquest: Sexual Violence in the Nazi East," in *Mass Violence in Nazi-Occupied Europe*, ed. Alex J. Kay and David Stahel (Indiana University Press, 2018); Alex J. Kay and David Stahel, "Reconceiving Criminality in the German Army on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942," in *Mass Violence in Nazi-Occupied Europe*, ed. Alex J. Kay and David Stahel (Indiana University Press, 2018); Anika Walke, "'To Speak for Those Who Cannot': Masha Rol'nikaite on the Holocaust and Sexual Violence in German-Occupied Soviet Territories," *Jewish History* 33, no. 1/2 (2020): 215–44; Regina Mühlhäuser, "Understanding Sexual Violence During the Holocaust: A Reconsideration of Research and Sources," *German History* 39, no. 1 (2021): 15–36; and Marta Havryshko, "Rape on Trial: Criminal Justice Actors in 1940s' Soviet Ukraine and Sexual Violence During the Holocaust," in *No Neighbors' Lands in Postwar Europe: Vanishing Others*, ed. Anna Wylegała, Sabine Rutar, and Małgorzata Łukianow (Palgrave Macmillan, 2023), 205-227.

14. For the Soviet Union, see Regina Mühlhäuser, "Between Extermination and Germanization: Children of German Men in the 'Occupied Eastern Territories,' 1942–1945," in *Children of World War II: The Hidden Enemy Legacy*, ed. Kjersti Ericsson and Eva Simonsen (BERG, 2005), 167–89; Regina Mühlhäuser, "Between 'Racial Awareness' and Fantasies of Potency: Nazi Sexual Politics in the Occupied Territories of the Soviet Union, 1942–1945," in *Brutality and Desire: War and Sexuality in Europe's Twentieth Century*, ed. Dagmar Herzog (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 197–220; and Regina Mühlhäuser, *Sex and the Nazi Soldier: Violent, Commercial and Consensual Encounter During the War in the Soviet Union, 1941–1945* (Edinburgh University Press, 2021). For Poland, see Röger, "Sexual Contact Between German Occupiers and Polish Occupied"; Maren Röger, "The Sexual Policies and Sexual Realities of the German Occupiers in Poland in the Second World War," *Contemporary European History* 23, no. 1 (2014): 1–21.

15. In her work on Belorussia, Franziska Exeler adopted the term "choiceless choices" to describe the options available to local civilians, noting that "when people

were confronted with decisions, all options entailed a destructive effect on their personal lives, families, and local communities." Franziska Exeler, "What Did You Do During the War? Personal Responses to the Aftermath of Nazi Occupation," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 17, no. 4 (2016): 810–11. This term was first coined by Lawrence L. Langer to describe the choices of Jewish ghetto and concentration camp inmates.

16. Prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union, research on everyday life during the German occupation was stymied on both sides of the ideological divide. Soviet historians could not address the topic due to political myopia, while Western historians were limited to the use of captured German documents because Soviet archives were inaccessible. As a result, most works during the Cold War largely focused on German policies and their implementation. The best and perhaps most useful example is Alexander Dallin's *German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945: A Study of Occupation Policies* (Macmillan, 1957). Other works that followed a similar approach were Gerald Reitlinger's *The House Built on Sand: The Conflicts of German Policy in Russia, 1939–1945* (Viking Press, 1960) and Timothy Mulligan's *The Politics of Illusion and Empire: German Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union, 1942–1943* (Praeger, 1988). Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, new research has been undertaken utilizing Soviet archives to approach the topic from the bottom up. For examples, see Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine Under Nazi Rule* (Belknap, 2004); I. Ermolov, *Tri goda bez Stalina: Okkupatsiia- sovetskie grazhdane mezhdu natsistami i bolshevikami; 1941–1944* (Tsentropoligraf, 2010); Boris Kovalev, *Povsednevnaia zhizn´ naseleniia Rossii v period natsistskoi okkupatsii* (Molodaia Gvardiia, 2011); O. B. Budnitskii and G. S. Zelenina, *"Svershilos´. Prishli nemtsy!" Ideinyi kollaboratsionizm v SSSR v period Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny* (ROSSPEN, 2012); Laurie R. Cohen, *Smolensk Under the Nazis: Everyday Life in Occupied Russia* (University of Rochester Press, 2013); I. Ermolov, *Pod znamenami Gitlera: Sovetskie grazhdane v soiuze s natsistami na okupirovannykh territoriiakh RSFSR v 1941–1944 gg.* (Veche, 2013); and Johannes Due Enstad, *Soviet Russians Under Nazi Occupation: Fragile Loyalties in World War II* (Cambridge University Press, 2018).

17. Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton University Press, 2002); Alexander Victor Prusin, "'Fascist Criminals to the Gallows!': The Holocaust and Soviet War Crimes Trials, December 1945-February 1946," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 17, no. 1 (2003): 1–30; Aleksandr E. Epifanov, *Otvetstvennost´ za voennye prestupleniia, sovershennye na territorii SSSR v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny: 1941–1956 gg.; Monografiia* (Volgogradskaia akademiia MVD Rossii, 2005); Tanja Penter, "Local Collaborators on Trial: Soviet War Crimes Trials Under Stalin (1943–1953)," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 49, no. 2/3 (2008): 341–64; Ilya Bourtman, "'Blood for Blood, Death for Death': The Soviet Military Tribunal in Krasnodar, 1943," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 22, no. 2 (2008): 246–65; Francine Hirsch, "The Soviets at Nuremburg: International Law, Propaganda, and the Making of the Postwar Order," *American Historical Review* 113, no. 3 (2008): 701–30; Sergey Kudryashov and Vanessa Voisin, "The Early Stages of 'Legal Purges' in Soviet Russia (1941–1945)," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 49, no. 2/3 (2008): 263–95; Nathalie Moine, "Defining 'War Crimes Against Humanity' in the Soviet Union: Nazi Arson of Soviet Villages and the Soviet Narrative on Jewish and Non-Jewish Soviet War Victims, 1941–1947," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 52, no. 2–3 (2011): 441–73; Juliette Cadiot and

Tanja Penter, "Law and Justice in Wartime and Postwar Stalinism," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, *Neue Folge* 61, no. 2 (2013): 161–71; Lev Simkin, "Death Sentence Despite the Law: A Secret 1962 Crimes-Against-Humanity Trial in Kiev," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 27, no. 2 (2013): 299–312; Jeremy Hicks, "'Soul Destroyers': Soviet Reporting of Nazi Genocide and Its Perpetrators at the Krasnodar and Kharkov Trials," *History* 98, no. 4 (2013): 530–47; Oleksandr Melnyk, "Stalinist Justice as a Site of Memory: Anti-Jewish Violence in Kyiv's Podil District in September 1941 Through the Prism of Soviet Investigative Documents," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, *Neue Folge* 61, no. 2 (2013): 223–48; Kiril Feferman, "Soviet Legal Procedures Against the Nazi Criminals and Soviet Collaborators as Historical Sources," *Legacy* 6 (2014): 34–43; Diana Dumitru, "An Analysis of Soviet Postwar Investigation and Trial Documents and Their Relevance for Holocaust Studies," in *The Holocaust in the East: Local Perpetrators and Soviet Responses*, ed. Michael David-Fox, Peter Holquist, and Alexander M. Martin (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014), 142–57; Lev Simkin, *Korotkim budet prigovor* (Zebra-E, 2015); Franziska Exeler, "The Ambivalent State: Determining Guilt in the Post-World War II Soviet Union," *Slavic Review* 75, no. 3 (2016): 606–29; Daria Rudakova, "Soviet Women Collaborators in Occupied Ukraine 1941–1945," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 62, no. 4 (2016): 529–45; Franziska Exeler, "Nazi Atrocities, International Criminal Law, and Soviet War Crimes Trials: The Soviet Union and the Global Moment in Post-Second World War Justice," in *The New Histories of International Criminal Law: Retrials*, ed. Immi Tallgren and Thomas Skouteris (Oxford University Press, 2019), 189–219; and Wolfgang Schneider, "From the Ghetto to the Gulag, from the Ghetto to Israel; Soviet Collaboration Trials Against the Shargorod Ghetto's Jewish Council," *Journal of Modern European History* 17, no. 1 (2019): 83–97.

18. Vanessa Voisin, "Spécificités soviétique d'une épuration de guerre européenne: La répression de l'intimité avec l'ennemi et de la parenté avec le traître," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge* 61, no. 2 (2013): 196–222; Vanessa Voisin, "The Soviet Punishment of an All-European Crime, 'Horizontal Collaboration,"' in *Traitors, Collaborators and Deserters in Contemporary European Politics of Memory: Formulas of Betrayal*, ed. Gelinada Grinchenko and Eleonora Narvselius (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 241–64.

19. The contributions of female soldiers were largely forgotten at the end of World War II, and it was not until several decades later that their memory began to be resurrected in the Soviet Union.

20. For recent work on women in the Red Army, see Elena Spartakovna Seniavskaia, *Frontovoe pokolenie, 1941–1945: Istoriko-psikhologicheskoe issledovanie* (Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 1995); Anna Krylova, "Stalinist Identity from the Viewpoint of Gender: Rearing a Generation of Professionally Violent Women-Fighters in 1930s Stalinist Russia," *Gender & History* 16, no. 3 (2004): 626–53; Euridice Charon Cardona and Roger D. Markwick, "'Our Brigade Will Not Be Sent to the Front': Soviet Women Under Arms in the Great Fatherland War, 1941–45," *The Russian Review* 68, no. 2 (2009): 240–62; Anna Krylova, *Soviet Women in Combat: A History of Violence on the Eastern Front* (Cambridge University Press, 2010); Reina Pennington, "Offensive Women: Women in Combat in the Red Army in the Second World War," *Journal of*

Military History 74, no. 3 (2010): 775–820; Oleg Budnitskii, "Muzhchiny i zhenshchiny v Krasnoi Armii, 1941–1945," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 52, no. 2/3 (2011): 405–22; Roger D. Markwick and Euridice Charon Cardona, *Soviet Women on the Frontline in the Second World War* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Brandon M. Schechter "'Girls' and 'Women': Love, Sex, Duty and Sexual Harassment in the Ranks of the Red Army 1941–1945," *Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies* 17 (2016); and Steven Merritt Miner, "'Things Must Be Bad at the Front': Women in the Soviet Military During WWII," *MCU Journal*, special issue (2018): 41–64. For work that either focuses on or mentions the role of women in the partisan movement, see Nechama Tec, "Women in the Forest," *Contemporary Jewry* 17, no. 1 (1996): 34–47; Juliane Furst, "Heroes, Lovers, Victims—Partisan Girls During the Great Fatherland War: An Analysis of Documents from the *Spetsotdel* of the Former Komsomol Archive," *Minerva: Quarterly Report on Women and the Military* 18, no. 3–4 (2000): 38–75; Kenneth Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerrillas: Soviet Partisans in World War II* (University of Kansas Press, 2006); Adrienne M. Harris, "The Lives and Deaths of a Soviet Saint in the Post-Soviet Period: The Case of Zoia Kosmodem´ianskaia," *Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes* 53, no. 2/4 (2011): 273–304; Irina Rebrova, "Soviet Women in Partisan Groups and in Occupied Zones During the Second World War: Experience, Survival and Flight," in *Women's History in Russia: (Re)establishing the Field*, ed. Marianna Muravyeva and Natalia Novikova (Cambridge Scholars, 2014), 86–100; Anja Tippner, "Girls in Combat: Zoia Kosmodem´ianskaia and the Image of Young Soviet Wartime Heroines," *The Russian Review* 73, no. 3 (2014): 371–88; and Alexander Gogun, *Stalin's Commandos: Ukrainian Partisan Forces on the Eastern Front* (I.B. Tauris, 2016).

21. PPZh (pokhodno-polevaia zhena), or "mobile field wife," was a pejorative term used to describe female soldiers who had or were suspected of having extramarital affairs with their commanding officers.

22. Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton University Press, 2008).

23. A small sample of their work includes Olena Petrenko, "Anatomy of the Unsaid: Along the Taboo Lines of Female Participation in the Ukrainian Nationalistic Underground," in *Women and Men at War: A Gender Perspective on World War II and Its Aftermath in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Maren Röger and Ruth Leiserowitz (Fibre, 2012), 241–60; Olena Petrenko, "Sub″ektivnaia otvetstvennost´: Uchastie zhenshchin v organizatsii ukrainskikh natsionalistov i ukrainskoi povstancheskoi armii (1930–1950-e gg.)," in *SSSR vo Vtoroi Mirovoi voine: Okkupatsiia, Kholokost, stalinizm*, ed. Oleg Budnitskii and Liudmila Novikova (ROSSPEN, 2014), 134–48; Oksana Kis, "National Femininity Used and Contested: Women's Participation in the Nationalist Underground in Western Ukraine During the 1940s–50s," *East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 2, no. 2 (2015): 53–82; Marta Havryshko, "Illegitimate Sexual Practices in the OUN Underground and UPA in Western Ukraine in the 1940s and 1950s," *Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies*, no. 17 (2016); Marta Havryshko, "Love and Sex in Wartime: Controlling Women's Sexuality in the Ukrainian Nationalist Underground," *Aspasia* 12 (2018): 35–67; and Marta Havryshko, "Women's Bodies as Battlefield: Sexual Violence During Soviet Counterinsurgency in Western Ukraine in 1944–1953," *Euxeinos* 9, no. 27 (2019): 85–312.

Chapter 1. Soviet Women Between the World Wars

1. Such perceptions were bolstered in the nineteenth century by women's virtual subjugation, low levels of education, and association with the home and the family.

2. Such a view was adopted during the unveiling campaigns in Central Asia. Douglas Tyler Northrop, *Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia* (Cornell University Press, 2004).

3. Tarik Cyril Amar, "Reframing Sovietization: Sovietization with a Woman's Face; Gender and the Social Imaginary of Sovietness in Western Ukraine," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 64 (2016): 368.

4. In her work on the Yugoslav partisans, Jelena Batinić has suggested that aspects of the official Communist ideology, including its "stress on discipline, propriety, and heroism," catered to the "patriarchal moral code of traditional peasant communities" and therefore likely appealed to many of the peasant partisans. In a similar vein, it is likely that the more traditional aspects of Communist ideology likewise appealed to large segments of the predominantly rural population in the nascent Soviet Union. Jelena Batinić, *Women and Yugoslav Partisans: A History of World War II Resistance* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 209.

5. Wendy Z. Goldman, *Women, the State and Revolution: Soviet Family Policy and Social Life, 1917–1936* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 49–50.

6. Goldman, *Women, the State and Revolution*, 49.

7. Christine D. Worobec, "Temptress or Virgin? The Precarious Sexual Position of Women in Postemanicipation Ukrainian Peasant Society," in *Russian Peasant Women*, ed. Beatrice Farnsworth and Lynne Viola (Oxford University Press, 1992), 41.

8. Worobec, "Temptress or Virgin?," 42.

9. In her work on marriage and separation in late-Imperial Russia, Barbara Alpern Engel has shown that men often invoked their "role as custodian of women's morality" to argue against efforts by their spouses to obtain separations. In such cases, men would suggest that if their wives had not yet fallen morally, then they certainly would if they were allowed to live on their own. Barbara Alpern Engel, "Marriage and Masculinity in Late-Imperial Russia: The 'Hard Cases,'" in *Russian Masculinities in History and Culture*, ed. Barbara Evans Clements, Rebecca Friedman, and Dan Healey (Palgrave, 2002), 119–20.

10. The tradition of bundling, a courtship practice encouraging members of the opposite sex to initiate intimate encounters that did not result in intercourse to get to know their future partners, placed a lot of pressure on young women to engage in sexual activity. Nevertheless, women were still expected to remain chaste, and if a woman did succumb to these pressures, she was publicly shamed for being weak, while her partner did not suffer moral opprobrium for his actions. Worobec, "Temptress or Virgin?," 47.

11. Worobec, "Temptress or Virgin?," 44.

12. Many women believed that their own bodies were unclean and actively shamed others for what they perceived to be their transgressive behavior. Worobec, "Temptress or Virgin?," 44–46. In her article on advice literature in the Russian Empire and the nascent Soviet Union, Catriona Kelly has noted that in women's self-help and hygiene

manuals, which became popular at the turn of the century, women were told how to "regulate the female body's potential for pollution and insanitariness." Catriona Kelly, "The Education of the Will: Advice Literature, *Zakal*, and Manliness in Early Twentieth-Century Russia," in Clements, Friedman, and Healey, *Russian Masculinities in History and Culture*, 134–35.

13. For an overview of the "woman question" and the genealogy of women's emancipation in the Russian Empire, see Elizabeth A. Wood, *The Baba and the Comrade: Gender and Politics in Revolutionary Russia* (Indiana University Press, 1997), 13–39. See also Richard Stites, "Women and the Russian Intelligentsia: Three Perspectives," in *Women in Russia*, ed. Dorothy Atkinson, Alexander Dallin, and Gail Warshofsky Lapidus (Stanford University Press, 1977), 39–62; Richard Stites, *The Women's Liberation Movement in Russia: Feminism, Nihilism, and Bolshevism, 1860–1930* (Princeton University Press, 1978).

14. Neither Lenin nor any other Bolshevik theorist ever questioned the idea that innate biological differences existed between the sexes, a belief that persisted throughout the history of the Soviet Union and even prevails today. Because of this, although women were to be freed from housework, much of this work was still expected to be performed by women in the new society, even though women would now be paid for their labor outside the home. Even Aleksandra Kollontai, the leading female Bolshevik theorist on issues concerning the family and male-female relations, subscribed to this idea. For example, see her criticism of feminism and what she saw as the failure of feminists to attend to biological differences in "Excerpts from the Works of A. M. Kollontay: Critique of the Feminist Movement" in Rudolf Schlesinger, *The Family in the U.S.S.R.: Documents and Readings* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949), 45–48. It is also worth noting that many women also initially continued to hold on to traditional views that men should not have to do "women's work." For the persistence of traditional views among women in the 1920s, see Diane P. Koenker, "Men Against Women on the Shop Floor in Early Soviet Russia: Gender and Class in the Socialist Workplace," *American Historical Review* 100, no. 5 (1995): 1446.

15. For more information about the various pieces of legislation passed by the Bolsheviks immediately following their seizure of power, see Wood, *The Baba and the Comrade*, 49–52; Goldman, *Women, the State and Revolution*, 48–57.

16. Goldman, *Women, the State and Revolution*, 49.

17. Both male and female Bolsheviks considered feminism to be a "bourgeois" venture. They feared that once feminists gained rights for women of their own class, they would betray the working class. Bolsheviks also feared that "any 'particularistic' interests (except those of the working class, which were considered 'universal') would undermine the solidarity of the revolution, the discipline and unity required to overthrow the autocracy." Wood, *The Baba and the Comrade*, 30.

18. Wendy Z. Goldman, *Women at the Gates: Gender and Industry in Stalin's Russia* (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 36. For a history of the Zhenotdel and examples of the hostility facing the Zhenotdel during its formative years, see Wood, *The Baba and the Comrade*, 69–70, 82–85, 87–89, 138.

19. See Wood, *The Baba and the Comrade*, 13–39. Eric Naiman, "Historectomies: On the Metaphysics of Reproduction in a Utopian Age," in *Sexuality and the Body in*

Russian Culture, ed. Jane T. Costlow, Stephanie Sandler, and Judith Vowles (Stanford University Press, 1993), 255–76. Eric Naiman, *Sex in Public: The Incarnation of Early Soviet Ideology* (Princeton University Press, 1997), 27–45.

20. Following the revolution, and especially during Stalin's collectivization drive, rural women were sometimes able to leverage these stereotypes to their advantage. This was specifically noted in discussions of the *bab'i bunty*, women-led protests against collectivization. In her work on this phenomenon, Lynne Viola has noted that because they perceived women as "backward," Soviet officials usually interpreted women's protests in nonpolitical terms. Communist officials often thought that such women were being manipulated by outside forces and did not hold them accountable under Article 58 of the RSFSR Penal Code, which would have made them liable for counterrevolution. Similar protests led by men, however, were invariably considered in terms of Article 58. For more information, see Lynne Viola, "*Bab'i Bunty* and Peasant Women's Protest During Collectivization," in Farnsworth and Viola, *Russian Peasant Women*, 189–205.

21. Anna E. Gorsuch, *Youth in Revolutionary Russia: Enthusiasts, Bohemians, Delinquents* (Indiana University Press, 2000), 102.

22. "Excerpts from Klara Zetkin: *Reminiscences of Lenin*," in Schlesinger, *The Family in the U.S.S.R.*, 78.

23. Gorsuch, *Youth in Revolutionary Russia*, 97.

24. For a discussion of gender relations within the Komsomol during NEP, see Gorsuch, *Youth in Revolutionary Russia*, 96–115.

25. Gorsuch, *Youth in Revolutionary Russia*, 100.

26. Gorsuch, *Youth in Revolutionary Russia*, 103–4.

27. For information on *besprizorniki* and their impact on NEP-era Soviet society, see Alan M. Ball, "State Children: Soviet Russia's *Besprizornye* and the New Socialist Generation," *The Russian Review* 52, no. 2 (1993): 228–47; Alan M. Ball, *And Now My Soul is Hardened: Abandoned Children in Soviet Russia, 1918–1930* (University of California Press, 1994).

28. For a study of the misogyny prevalent on the shop floor during the 1920s, see Koenker, "Men Against Women on the Shop Floor," 1438–64. For more information about the effects of NEP on women's employment, see Wood, *The Baba and the Comrade*, 147–69.

29. According to Wendy Goldman, the Bolsheviks defined a worker as someone who was "removed from the customs, beliefs, and worldview of his peasant forebears; he had severed his ties to the land; and he depended solely on a money wage. He was a 'hereditary' worker whose parents had also been workers. He held prerevolutionary *stazh* (seniority) and industrial skills. The worker could be expected to support and benefit from socialism, not simply because he was poor but because of his particular relationship to the means of production." Goldman, *Women at the Gates*, 6–7.

30. In the mid-1920s, the Soviet Union had the highest marriage and divorce rate of any European country, with divorce rates in the country's cities and towns far surpassing the national average. Goldman, *Women, the State and Revolution*, 106–7.

31. For a study of the family legislation, debates surrounding it, and various modification attempts, see Goldman, *Women, the State and Revolution*.

32. Goldman, *Women at the Gates*, 21–32.

33. Goldman, *Women, the State and Revolution*, 122.

34. Gorsuch, *Youth in Revolutionary Russia*, 18.

35. In 1922, Aleksandra Kollontai identified the "doll-parasite" as the new threat to the revolution during the NEP era in an article entitled "The New Threat." The threat of the "doll-parasite" stemmed from her idleness and the perceived parasitic way in which she depended on her husband or lover instead of working for the good of the family or the public. For more information on the "doll-parasite" and a discussion of the ongoing fears associated with the "backward" wife in the Soviet press of the 1920s, see Wood, *The Baba and the Comrade*, 176–79, 201–8.

36. Francis Lee Bernstein, *The Dictatorship of Sex: Lifestyle Advice for the Soviet Masses* (Northern Illinois University Press, 2007), 68.

37. This attire, which resembled the dress of the Civil War period, was also adopted as a critique of the older generation of Bolsheviks supporting the slower pace of change represented by NEP. Young people, who quickly became disillusioned with NEP and the retreat from the utopianism of War Communism that it represented, showed their displeasure through their attire, which contrasted with the new dress and attention to hygiene exhibited by older Bolsheviks. Gorsuch, *Youth in Revolutionary Russia,* 89.

38. Peasant girls adopted such dress not necessarily as a rejection of the revolution but because to them it represented modernity. Gorsuch, *Youth in Revolutionary Russia*, 88, 134.

39. During the 1920s, these beliefs were reinforced by Soviet research into the sex glands and endocrinology. For more information about their importance to the social construction of gender difference and heterosexuality in the nascent Soviet Union, see Bernstein, *Dictatorship of Sex*, 41–72. Research into and discussion of gender difference and roles ended with the advent of Stalinism in the early 1930s, as did virtually all discussion of sex, but these subjects were taken up again beginning in the late 1960s in response to a perceived demographic crisis. Although Soviet social scientists developed various theories regarding gender difference and roles during this later period, arguments about innate biological differences between the sexes continued to inform their work. For more information about Soviet approaches to gender difference during this later period, see Lynne Attwood, *The New Soviet Man and Woman: Sex-Role Socialization in the USSR* (Indiana University Press, 1990).

40. Bernstein, *Dictatorship of Sex*, 68.

41. For a study of Soviet discourse surrounding sex and the various anxieties it signified during NEP, see Naiman, *Sex in Public*.

42. Stites, "Women and the Russian Intelligentsia," 53.

43. Stites, "Women and the Russian Intelligentsia," 42. Stites noted that these authors often leveled these accusations at revolutionary women, whom they portrayed as depraved.

44. Lenin's concerns were specifically sparked by the perceived chaos in male-female relations that were unleashed by the revolution and the Russian Civil War. See "Excerpts from Klara Zetkin," in Schlesinger, *The Family in the U.S.S.R*, 75–79.

45. Bernstein, *Dictatorship of Sex*, 130.

46. Bernstein, *Dictatorship of Sex*, 163–64.

47. This was one of the criticisms leveled at prostitutes and prostitution during the period of War Communism, which accompanied the Russian Civil War and early NEP. Although the Bolsheviks believed that prostitution was a social ill created by capitalism

and that prostitutes were therefore the victims of bourgeois exploitation, they increasingly interpreted prostitution as a threat to "the new social order because it actively removed individuals from production through disease and exploitation as well as uncontrolled sexual activity." Wood, *The Baba and the Comrade*, 111. Criticisms of prostitutes during the Russian Civil War focused on the idea that they were labor deserters. Some officials went as far as to suggest that women who refused to perform "socially useful labor" should be sent to labor camps. Elizabeth Waters, "Victim or Villain? Prostitution in Post-revolutionary Russia," in *Women and Society in the Soviet Union*, ed. Linda Edmondson (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 163.

48. See Elizabeth A. Wood, "Prostitution Unbound: Representations of Sexual and Political Anxieties in Postrevolutionary Russia," in *Sexuality and the Body in Russian Culture*, ed. Jane T. Costlow, Stephanie Sandler, and Judith Vowles (Stanford University Press, 1993), 130–31.

49. Bernstein, *Dictatorship of Sex*, 121–22.

50. Bernstein, *Dictatorship of Sex*, 121. For a discussion of the evolution of Soviet policies toward prostitution, see Waters, "Victim or Villain?," 160–77; Philippa Hetherington, "Prostitution in Moscow and St. Petersburg, Russia," in *Selling Sex in the City: A Global History of Prostitution, 1600s–2000s*, ed. Magaly Rodríguez García, Lex Heerma van Voss, and Elise van Nederveen Meerkerk (Brill, 2017): 140–44, 168–69. For a discussion of the anxieties prostitution and prostitutes bred in the nascent Soviet Union, see Wood, "Prostitution Unbound," 124–35.

51. Bernstein, *Dictatorship of Sex*, 121–22.

52. In the nineteenth century, two main schools of thought existed regarding prostitution and prostitutes in the Russian Empire. Those who subscribed to the "anthropological" school of thought "believed that prostitutes were women genetically doomed to prostitution and degenerate individuals." Meanwhile, those who subscribed to the "sociological" school of thought "insisted on the primacy of social and economic reasons behind prostitution." Susanna Kradetskaia, "'The Fallen Sisters': Prostitution in the Discourse of Russian Feminists at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century," in *Women's History in Russia: (Re)establishing the Field*, ed. Marianna Muravyeva and Natalia Novikova (Cambridge Scholars, 2014), 50–51.

53. For a discussion of the two images of women as delineated through the discourse around prostitutes in the nineteenth century, see Kradetskaia, "'The Fallen Sisters,'" 57.

54. Bernstein, *Dictatorship of Sex*, 121–22.

55. Goldman, *Women at the Gates*, 56–60.

56. The Party abandoned the goal of transforming *byt* due to several factors, including the economic limitations of NEP, underdevelopment, and widespread opposition from within and without the Party. For a study of the various factors that contributed to the decline of the Zhenotdel, see Goldman, *Women, the State and Revolution*.

57. Goldman, *Women at the Gates*, 92.

58. Thomas G. Schrand, "Socialism in One Gender: Masculine Values in the Stalin Revolution," in Clements, Friedman, and Healey, *Russian Masculinities in History and Culture*, 194–95.

59. Goldman, *Women at the Gates*, 16–21, 212–23. For information about the obstacles women faced in seeking advancement in the printing industry during the 1920s, see Koenker, "Men Against Women on the Shop Floor," 1451–57.

60. Roberta T. Manning, "Women in the Soviet Countryside on the Eve of World War II, 1935–1940," in Farnsworth and Viola, *Russian Peasant Women*, 218–19.

61. Liubov Denisova, *Rural Women in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia*, ed. and trans. Irina Mukhina (Routledge, 2010), 87.

62. Denisova, *Rural Women in the Soviet Union*, 84.

63. Manning, "Women in the Soviet Countryside," 219.

64. Manning, "Women in the Soviet Countryside," 219.

65. For more information on the repeated efforts of central authorities to incorporate women into administrative positions in rural government, see Manning, "Women in the Soviet Countryside," 222–25.

66. Choi Chatterjee, "Soviet Heroines and the Language of Modernity, 1930–39," in *Women in the Stalin Era*, ed. Melanie Ilič (Palgrave, 2001): 49–68.

67. Chatterjee, "Soviet Heroines," 56.

68. Alison Rowley, "Ready for Work and Defense: Visual Propaganda and Soviet Women's Military Preparedness in the 1930s," *Minerva: Quarterly Report on Women and the Military* 18, no. 3–4 (2000): 3–12.

69. Rowley, "Ready for Work and Defense," 3–12.

70. This was not the first time in Soviet history that women were encouraged to receive training in the skills necessary to defend the state. Indeed, during the Russian Civil War, the Bolsheviks debated both the "proper" role of women in the defense of the revolution and the necessity of training them for the Red Army. Ultimately, according to Elizabeth A. Wood, somewhere between fifty thousand and seventy thousand women served in the military during the Russian Civil War. While many served in administrative and economic work and others worked as nurses, women also worked as "communications and telephone operators, espionage agents, supply agents, translators, secretaries, switch controllers on the railroads, and police at home." Some also participated in military actions. For more information, see Wood, *The Baba and the Comrade*, 52–59.

71. Krylova, "Stalinist Identity from the Viewpoint of Gender," 633.

72. Krylova, "Stalinist Identity from the Viewpoint of Gender," 633, 638.

73. Krylova, "Stalinist Identity from the Viewpoint of Gender," 647.

74. For a discussion of these concerns and their impact on Soviet social policies, see, for example, David L. Hoffman and Annette F. Timm, "Utopian Biopolitics: Reproduction Policies, Gender Roles, and Sexuality in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union," in *Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared*, ed. Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 93–94.

75. Most of these measures were positively received by urban and rural women alike, many of whom had been calling for more protections for women and the family throughout the 1920s. The ban on abortion was the only measure that saw a negative reaction, largely voiced by urban women and younger, better-educated, rural professionals. Most rural women, however, welcomed the ban on abortion. According to Roberta T. Manning, during the month-long public discussion that preceded the legislation, "some older women even suggested that criminal sanctions, including arrest, be applied to women who sought abortions as well as to abortionists and persons forcing women to undergo abortion, as the June 1936 decrees stipulated." Manning, "Women in the Soviet Countryside," 207. For a view of some of the concerns voiced

in the press during the public discussion of the law, see "Public Discussion on the Law on the Abolition of Legal Abortion, etc.," in Schlesinger, *The Family in the U.S.S.R.*, 254–66.

76. For a discussion of this turn toward consumption, see Julie Hessler, "Cultured Trade: The Stalinist Turn Towards Consumerism," in *Stalinism: New Directions*, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (Routledge, 2000): 182–209.

77. Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s* (Oxford University Press, 1999), 90–114.

78. For more information, see Vadim Volkov, "The Concept of *Kul'turnost'*: Notes on the Stalinist Civilizing Process," in Fitzpatrick, *Stalinism: New Directions*, 210–30.

79. Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism*, 80.

80. Rebecca Balmas Neary, "Mothering Socialist Society: The Wife-Activists' Movement and the Soviet Culture of Daily Life, 1934–41," *The Russian Review* 58, no. 3 (1999): 397.

81. For additional information on the *obshchestvennitsa* movement, see Mary Buckley, "The Untold Story of the *Obshchestvennitsa* in the 1930s," *Europe-Asia Studies* 48, no. 4 (1996): 569–86.

82. Thomas G. Schrand, "Soviet 'Civic-Minded Women' in the 1930s: Gender, Class, and Industrialization in a Socialist Society," *Journal of Women's History* 11, no. 3 (1999): 134.

83. Schrand, "Socialism in One Gender," 202; Neary, "Mothering Socialist Soci⊖ ety," 409.

84. Schrand, "Socialism in One Gender," 202; Neary, "Mothering Socialist Soci⊖ ety," 407.

85. Volkov, "The Concept of *Kul'turnost'*," 226.

86. Volkov, "The Concept of *Kul'turnost'*," 226.

87. For a discussion of the controversies surrounding dancing in the 1920s, see Gorsuch, *Youth in Revolutionary Russia*, 120–25. Gorsuch noted that such popular dances as the foxtrot and the tango were thought to be immoral influences on Soviet youth that contributed to their corruption.

88. Nicholas S. Timasheff, *The Great Retreat: The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia* (E. P. Dutton, 1946).

89. Manning, "Women in the Soviet Countryside," 211.

90. In her comparative work, Barbara Einhorn has demonstrated that a comparison of Soviet gender policies with that of the Nazis is not useful since the two were so different. Barbara Einhorn, "Mass Dictatorship and Gender Politics: Is the Outcome Predictable?," in *Gender Politics and Mass Dictatorship: Global Perspectives*, ed. Jie-Hyun Lim and Karen Petrone (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 34–62. David L. Hoffman and Annette F. Timm made a similar argument in "Utopian Biopolitics," 87–129.

91. Buckley, "The Untold Story of the *Obshchestvennitsa*," 574; Neary, "Mothering Socialist Society," 401–2, 410.

92. For example, in October 1936, the Soviet leadership approved a decree "making it a criminal offense to refuse to hire or to lower the pay of women during pregnancy." Hoffman and Timm, "Utopian Biopolitics," 117.

93. According to Karen Petrone, the divisions in the historiography regarding this question can broadly be divided into those who see the "glass half empty" and those

who see the "glass half full." On one side, historians argue that Soviet women in the 1930s were "powerless to change the realities of exploitation" and that the Stalinist rhetoric of equality was nothing more than that. On the other side, historians suggest that the rhetoric was important for "opening up new possibilities for women's self-definition and women's action" by broadening the limits of what was permissible. Karen Petrone, "Between Exploitation and Empowerment: Soviet Women Negotiate Stalinism," in Lim and Petrone, *Gender Politics and Mass Dictatorship*, 126–27.

94. Krylova, "Stalinist Identity from the Viewpoint of Gender" and Krylova, *Soviet Women in Combat*.

95. Petrone, "Between Exploitation and Empowerment," 129.

96. Schechter, "'Girls' and 'Women.'"

97. Schechter, "'Girls' and 'Women.'"

98. Krylova, *Soviet Women in Combat*, 83.

Chapter 2. Comrades or Spies

1. Markwick and Cardona note that although precise figures are unavailable for the total number of women who volunteered nationwide, available data suggest that as many as 50 percent of the applications received during the first two months of the war came from women. Markwick and Cardona, *Soviet Women on the Frontline*, 32–37. For statistics of female volunteers for many cities across the Soviet Union, see Krylova, *Soviet Women in Combat*, 89–90.

2. Svetlana Aleksievich, *U voiny ne zhenskoe litso* (Vremia, 2016), 39–44.

3. Markwick and Cardona, *Soviet Women on the Frontline*, 35.

4. Markwick and Cardona, *Soviet Women on the Frontline*, 32–55. See also Krylova, *Soviet Women in Combat*, 89–143.

5. For a discussion of the latest figures regarding women in the Red Army, see Markwick and Cardona, *Soviet Women on the Frontline*, 150. Anna Krylova noted that "520,000 Soviet women served in the Red Army's regular troops and another 300,000 in combat and home front antiaircraft formations." Krylova, *Soviet Women in Combat*, 3.

6. Aleksievich, *U voiny ne zhenskoe litso*, 206–18; Catherine Merridale, "Masculinity at War: Did Gender Matter in the Soviet Army?," *Journal of War & Culture Studies* 5, no. 3 (2012): 315. According to Krylova, the Commissariat of Defense created a position for the production and distribution of military uniforms for women at the end of 1942, and by early 1943, new uniforms gradually began to replace the altered male uniforms that women had been wearing. Krylova, *Soviet Women in Combat*, 167.

7. Markwick and Cardona, *Soviet Women on the Frontline*, 77.

8. Markwick and Cardona, *Soviet Women on the Frontline*, 79.

9. Schechter, "'Girls' and 'Women.'"

10. Budnitskii, "Muzhchiny i zhenshchiny," 405–22; Kerstin Bischl, "Telling Stories. Gender Relationships and Masculinity in the Red Army 1941–1945," in *Women and Men at War: A Gender Perspective on World War II and its Aftermath in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Maren Röger and Ruth Leiserowitz (Fibre, 2012): 117–33; Merridale, "Masculinity at War," 307–20; A. E. Larionov, "Liubov′ v kontekste frontovoi povsednevnosti Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny," *Sovremennye problemy servisa i turizma* no. 1 (2012): 59–67; and Schechter, "'Girls' and 'Women.'"

11. See Lt. Colonel Kolchak's remarks as quoted in Schechter, "'Girls' and 'Women.'"

12. David M. Glantz explains that "the basic building block of the Red Army's ground force structure and its associated air force were the combined-arms and air armies, which were numerically identified, operational-level formations (soedineniia) designated to conduct military operations independently or in conjunction with other armies assigned to a wartime *front*. . . . Like *fronts*, armies had no standard table of organization, and they varied considerably by type and by size and strength, which depended on their assigned mission and operational sector." For more information about the army in the Soviet Union, see David M. Glantz, *Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941–1943* (University Press of Kansas, 2005), 143–46. Regarding the Fifth Army, specifically, it was raised in October 1941 to defend Moscow. During the Moscow Counteroffensive, the Fifth Army supported the offensive, which was led by the First Shock and Sixteenth Armies, together with the Twentieth, Thirtieth, and Thirty-Third Armies. Glantz, *Colossus Reborn*, 145. For information about the telegrams, see P. N. Knyshevskii, ed., *Skrytaia pravda voiny: 1941 god; Neizvestnye dokumenty* ("Russkaia Kniga," 1992), 294–96.

13. Knyshevskii, *Skrytaia pravda voiny*, 294–98.

14. In addition to counterintelligence, they were also responsible for maintaining discipline and investigating and suppressing any real or perceived acts of disloyalty or sabotage within the ranks of the Red Army. For more information, see Glantz, *Colossus Reborn*, 384–85.

15. Knyshevskii, *Skrytaia pravda voiny*, 294.

16. Civilian personnel attached to the Red Army usually consisted of older men, men whose service was limited due to health, and women. By 1 January 1945, the number of civilian personnel within the Red Army numbered 512,161 individuals. Budnitskii, "Muzhchiny i zhenshchiny," 409

17. Brandon M. Schechter, *The Stuff of Soldiers: A History of the Red Army in World War II Through Objects* (Cornell University Press, 2019), 29–30.

18. According to Schechter, the Red Army booklets were checked every three days at the front and every single day in the rear. Any soldier found without one was subject to arrest as a potential spy. Schechter, *The Stuff of Soldiers*, 30.

19. Knyshevskii, *Skrytaia pravda voiny*, 294–95.

20. Knyshevskii, *Skrytaia pravda voiny*, 295. The names of all individuals recorded in this report as well as another report related to this operation published in *Skrytaia pravda voiny* were redacted.

21. Knyshevskii, *Skrytaia pravda voiny*, 295.

22. Knyshevskii, *Skrytaia pravda voiny*, 297.

23. Knyshevskii, *Skrytaia pravda voiny*, 297–98.

24. Knyshevskii, *Skrytaia pravda voiny*, 298.

25. Knyshevskii, *Skrytaia pravda voiny*, 298.

26. Budnitskii, "Muzhchiny i zhenshchiny," 414–15.

27. Merridale, "Masculinity at War," 313.

28. Bischl, "Telling Stories," 130–32.

29. Timothy Parsons, "The Military Experiences of Ordinary Africans in World War II," in *Africa and World War II*, ed. Judith A. Byfield, Carolyn A. Brown, Timothy Parsons, and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 19.

30. Byron Schirbock, "Wehrmacht Brothels, Prostitution and Venereal Desire," in *Vichy France and Everyday Life: Confronting the Challenges of Wartime: 1939–1945*, ed. Lindsey Dodd and David Lees (Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 139–52.

31. For numerous examples, see Omer Bartov, *The Eastern Front, 1941–1945: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare*, 2nd ed. (Palgrave, 2001), 126–29. See also Gertjejanssen, "Victims, Heroes, Survivors," 164–67.

32. Quoted in Mühlhäuser, "Between 'Racial Awareness' and Fantasies of Potency," 208.

33. For a discussion of the dearth of nurses and other medical personnel in the Red Army at the start of the war and Soviet efforts to recruit and train women for these positions, see Markwick and Cardona, *Soviet Women on the Frontline*, 57–61.

34. Aleksievich, *U voiny ne zhenskoe litso*, 105–16.

35. Knyshevskii, *Skrytaia pravda voiny*, 296–98.

36. Knyshevskii, *Skrytaia pravda voiny*, 299.

37. For more information, see Francis L. Bernstein, "Prostitutes and Proletarians: The Soviet Labor Clinic as Revolutionary Laboratory," in *The Human Tradition in Modern Russia*, ed. William B. Husband (Scholarly Resources, 2000), 113–28.

38. Wood, "Prostitution Unbound," 132.

39. On the eve of the German invasion, the Red Army had twenty-seven Armies, but by 31 December 1943, the number of Armies had expanded to ninety-four. Glantz, *Colossus Reborn*, 588.

40. Batinić, *Women and Yugoslav Partisans*, 189.

41. Batinić, *Women and Yugoslav Partisans*, 189–91.

42. Batinić notes that Tito and the Yugoslav Communists looked to the Soviet Union for guidance throughout their struggle. Batinić, *Women and Yugoslav Partisans*, 163.

43. Knyshevskii, *Skrytaia pravda voiny*, 299.

44. S. V. Stepashin, ed. *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine: Sbornik dokumentov*, vol. 3, kn. 1 ("Rus," 1995–2014), 25, 302. Six intelligence, six sabotage, and five counterintelligence Abwehr teams operated on the Eastern Front. Each of the teams had between two and six Abwehr groups under their control.

45. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Aleksei Popov, *Diversanty Stalina: Deiatel′nost′ organov gosbezopasnosti na okkupirovannoi sovetskoi territorii v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny* (Eksmo, 2004), 116–17.

46. Robert W. Stephan, *Stalin's Secret War: Soviet Counterintelligence Against the Nazis, 1941–1945* (University of Kansas Press, 2004), 52.

47. Kovalev, *Povsednevnaia zhizn′ naseleniia Rossii*, 72–73.

48. "Instruktsiia politsii besopasnosti i SD po podgotovke agentury, prednaznachennoi dlia zabroski v osazhdennyi nemetskimi voiskami Leningrad," 6 October 1941, in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 2, kn. 2, 548.

49. "Iz spravki NKVD po krasnodarskomu kraiu o deiatel′nosti nemetskikh razvedyvatel′nykh organov na okkupirovannoi territorii Kubani," 15 March 1943, in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 4, kn. 1, 281.

50. In 1941, the Abwehr had thirteen espionage schools within occupied territory. By May 1942, the Abwehr had opened an additional sixteen schools. Most of the

recruits were prisoners-of-war or anti-Soviet elements, although civilians were also present. *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 3, kn. 1, 147.

51. *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 3, kn. 1, 149.

52. (RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 713, l. 111: "Agenturnaia Spravka po sostoianiiu na 15 maia 1942g.") Reel 3, RG-22.005M, Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History records relating to Jewish partisan resistance in the Soviet Union, 1941–1946 (bulk 1942–1943), USHMM.

53. (RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 713, l. 111: "Agenturnaia Spravka po sostoianiiu na 15 maia 1942g.") Reel 3, RG-22.005M, Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History records relating to Jewish partisan resistance in the Soviet Union, 1941–1946 (bulk 1942–1943), USHMM.

54. RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 738, l. 2: "Dislokatsiia nemetsko-fashistskikh shkol," ND.

55. Perry Biddiscombe, "Unternehmen Zeppelin: The Deployment of SS Saboteurs and Spies in the Soviet Union, 1942–1945," *Europe-Asia Studies* 52, no. 6 (2000): 1128–30; Kovalev, *Povsednevnaia zhizn´ naseleniia Rossii*, 65.

56. Although the first reports mentioning women seem to date from late December 1941, it is important to note that Soviet intelligence organs had earlier already identified children and teenagers as potential threats. Thus, on 4 September 1941, the NKVD for Smolensk oblast notified the Special Department of the Western Front about the German use of children and teenagers after they had detained and interrogated several children who were allegedly sent across the frontlines. Moreover, on 4 December 1941, the Special Department of the Southwestern Front had identified by name several teenaged girls who were allegedly employed as spies by German headquarters. They then suggested measures to be adopted to identify further teenage agents. "Spetssobshchenie UNKVD po Smolenskoi oblasti No. 3044/2 v Osobyi otdel NKVD Zapadnogo fronta ob ispol´zovanii nemetskoi razvedkoi detei i podrostkov," 4 September 1941, in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 2, kn. 2, 18–19. "Orientirovka Osobogo otdela NKVD Iugo-Zapadnogo fronta No. 1244/6 osobym otdelam NKVD armii ob ispol´zovanii nemetskoi razvedkoi podrostkov dlia sbora razvedyvatel´noi informatsii o chastiakh Krasnoi Armii v prifrontovoi polose," 4 December 1941, in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 2, kn. 2, 383–84.

57. By the start of fall 1941, most of Left Bank Ukraine, including parts of the DonÐ bas, were under German control. *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 2, kn. 2, 465. Voroshilovgrad remained under Soviet control until 17 July 1942, when the city was overrun by German forces as part of the Wehrmacht's advance on the Caucasus. It was liberated by the Red Army on 14 February 1943.

58. Although Savchenko was only the Deputy Head of the Ukrainian NKVD and was answerable to Vasyl Serhiienko, who was the People's Commissar of the Ukrainian NKVD from 1941 to 1943, Savchenko was the one who was really in charge of the organization during this period. Gogun, *Stalin's Commandos*, 12.

59. "Dokladnaia zapiska NKVD Ukrainskoi SSR v NKVD SSSR o metodakh raboty nemetskoi razvedki na territorii Ukrainy," 21 December 1941, in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 2, kn. 2, 455–65.

60. "Dokladnaia zapiska NKVD Ukrainskoi SSR," in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 2, kn. 2, 458–59.

61. Today, Lubny raion is located in Poltava oblast.

62. "Dokladnaia zapiska NKVD Ukrainskoi SSR," in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 2, kn. 2, 462.

63. "Dokladnaia zapiska NKVD Ukrainskoi SSR," in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 2, kn. 2, 462.

64. "Dokladnaia zapiska NKVD Ukrainskoi SSR," in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 2, kn. 2, 462.

65. "Dokladnaia zapiska NKVD Ukrainskoi SSR," in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 2, kn. 2, 455.

66. "Dokladnaia zapiska NKVD Ukrainskoi SSR," in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 2, kn. 2, 455.

67. "Soobshchenie komandovaniia voisk NKVD po okhrane i oborone tyla Iugo-Zapadnogo fronta No. E/OP/00174 nachal´niku pogranvoisk NKVD SSSR o zaderzhannykh i razoblachennykh agentakh protivnika," 11 January 1942, in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 3, kn. 1, 28–30.

68. "Soobshchenie komandovaniia voisk NKVD," in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 3, kn. 1, 28–30.

69. "Soobshchenie komandovaniia voisk NKVD," in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 3, kn. 1, 28–30.

70. "Soobshchenie komandovaniia voisk NKVD," in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 3, kn. 1, 28–30.

71. "Soobshchenie komandovaniia voisk NKVD," in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 3, kn. 1, 28–30.

72. "Prikaz NKVD SSSR No. 001683 ob operativno-chekistskom obsluzhivanii mestnostei, osvobozhdennykh ot voisk protivnika," 12 December 1941, in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSR*, vol. 2, kn. 2, 414.

73. These instructions were issued to Kalinin's First Party Secretary and the regional head of the NKVD. Voisin, "The Soviet Punishment of an All-European Crime," 249.

74. Voisin, "The Soviet Punishment of an All-European Crime," 249.

75. "Iz ukazaniia NKVD SSSR No. 64 o zadachakh i postanovke operativno-chekistskoi raboty na osvobozhdennoi ot nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov territorii SSSR," 18 February 1942, in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 3, kn. 1, 131.

76. "Iz ukazaniia NKVD SSSR No. 64," in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 3, kn. 1, 131.

77. "Iz ukazaniia NKVD SSSR No. 64," in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 3, kn. 1, 131.

78. Concerns about enemy agents were less pervasive in Order No. 001683. Still, it is worth noting that one of the first tasks returning NKVD organs were expected to carry out was, according to Order No. 001683, "to organize the exposure and removal of German agents of intelligence organs who will be left by the enemy for subversive work in our rear." "Prikaz NKVD SSSR No. 001683 ob operativno-chekistskom obsluzhivanii mestnostei, osvobozhdennykh ot voisk protivnika," 12 December 1941, in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 2, kn. 2, 413.

79. Voisin, "Spécificités soviétique d'une épuration de guerre européenne," 196–222.

80. "Ukazanie NKVD SSSR No. 66 ob usilenii operativno-chekistskoi raboty po vyiavleniiu agentury razvedyvatel´nykh organov voiuiushchikh s SSSR stran," 20 February 1942, in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 3, kn. 1, 141–46.

81. "Ukazanie NKVD SSSR No. 66," in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 3, kn. 1, 143.

82. "Ukazanie NKVD SSSR No. 66," in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 3, kn. 1, 143.

83. "Ukazanie NKVD SSSR No. 66," in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 3, kn. 1, 144.

84. Voisin, "Spécificités soviétique d'une épuration de guerre européenne," 203.

85. By September 1943, Tsanava was both the head of the NKGB in Belorussia and the deputy to Panteleimon Ponomarenko, the head of the Soviet partisan movement. Exeler, "The Ambivalent State," 621.

86. "Iz direktivy osobogo otdela NKVD Zapadnogo fronta No. 6/4136 v podchinennye organy ob usilenii bor′by s agenturoi protivnika," 2 March 1942, in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 3, kn. 1, 186–87.

87. "Direktiva NKVD SSSR No. 129 ob usilenii bor′by s agenturoi protivnika, deistvuiushchei na nashei territorii pod prikrytiem sovetvskikh dokumentov," 28 March 1942, in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 3, kn. 1, 301–2.

88. For more information, see Glantz, *Colossus Reborn*, 551–54; Krylova, *Soviet Women in Combat*, 144–70.

89. Markwick and Cardona, *Soviet Women on the Frontline*, 149–50.

90. Quoted in Schechter, "'Girls' and 'Women.'"

91. Quoted in Schechter, "'Girls' and 'Women.'"

92. Lev Kopelev, *No Jail for Thought* (Secker & Warburg, 1977), 30.

93. For instance, see the testimony of Zoya Gorokhova quoted in Bischl, "Telling Stories," 129.

94. Sof′ia Avericheva, *Dnevnik razvedchitsy* (Verkhne-Volzhskoe knishnoe izdatel′stvo, 1966), 122–23.

Chapter 3. Scouts or Assassins

Portions of this chapter previously appeared in "In Their Words: Soviet Women in the Ranks of Soviet Intelligence During World War Two," in *The Eastern Front*, ed. Yan Mann and Olga Kucherenko (Routledge, 2024). Reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Group.

1. For a discussion of the reasons for these weaknesses and the mistakes Soviet officials initially made when creating these units, see Gogun, *Stalin's Commandos*, 41–44. For a discussion of the role played by collaborators from among Communist Party cadres in undermining these units, see Jeffrey Burds, "'Turncoats, Traitors, and Provocateurs': Communist Collaborators, the German Occupation, and Stalin's NKVD, 1941–1943," *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures* 32, no. 3 (2018): 606–38.

2. For a discussion of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TsShPD) and the role the NKVD played in both its creation and later functions, see Aleksei Popov, *NKVD i partizanskoe dvizhenie* (OLMA-PRESS, 2003), 56–61.

3. Peasant hostility was not universal, and acts of kindness did occur. Still, Oleg Budnitskii and Jason Morton have noted that many acts of kindness were "motivated by the thoughts of 'our own' husbands, sons and brothers off serving somewhere." For examples of the hostility directed at Red Army soldiers caught behind the frontlines in 1941, see Oleg Budnitskii and Jason Morton, "The Great Patriotic War and Soviet Soci-

ety: Defeatism, 1941–42," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 15, no. 4 (2014) (New Series): 786–88. For information about the hostility displayed by civilians toward partisans at the start of the war, see Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerrillas*, 79–80.

4. Gogun, *Stalin's Commandos*, 49–50. For a discussion of the factors that impacted the operating environment of the partisans see Popov, *NKVD i partizanskoe dvizhenie*, 64–72.

5. Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerrillas*, 28, 161.

6. Anika Walke, *Pioneers and Partisans: An Oral History of Nazi Genocide in Belorussia* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 139–40.

7. Petr Vershigora, *Liudi s chistoi sovest´iu* (Voennoe izdatel´stvo Ministerstva vooruzhennykh sil Soiuza SSR, 1947), 37.

8. RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 1074, l. 47: "O partizanskikh otriadakh i ikh bor´be v tylu protivnika." For a more general report listing women among several groups that partisans were advised to be wary of, see RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 739, l. 6–14: "Formy i metody bor´by fashistskikh zakhvatchikov protiv partizanskikh otriadov," ND. This report stated that the "Gestapo" recruited agents from among "anti-Soviet elements, prisoners-of-war from among the rank-and-file Red Army soldiers and commanders, women, Jews, pioneers, and former Communist and Komsomol members."

9. Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerrillas*, 250.

10. Concerns about women being used as "vectors of biological warfare" existed within both the German and Soviet armed forces during the war. For German concerns about partisans deliberately infecting local women with venereal diseases, see Bartov, *Eastern Front*, 126–29. For similar Soviet fears that German forces were deliberately infecting German women with venereal diseases, see Elena Spartakovna Seniavskaia, "Zhenshchiny osvobozhdennoi Evropy glazami sovetskikh soldat i ofitserov (1944–1945 gody)," *Uchenye zapiski Petrozavodskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta* 124, no. 3 (2012): 16–17. See also Schechter, *The Stuff of Soldiers*, 238. Meanwhile, within the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement, OUN leaders believed that Soviet forces were deliberately infecting Ukrainian women as a form of biological warfare. See Havryshko, "Women's Bodies as Battlefield," 101–6. Finally, American soldiers in Germany were also warned that women were potential spies and that the "disease prostitutes supposedly harbored was 'Jerry's deadliest V. weapon.'" Mary Louise Roberts, *What Soldiers Do: Sex and the American GI in World War II France* (University of Chicago Press, 2013), 189.

11. For a description of the various goals German handlers reportedly set before local recruits, see RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 739, l. 8: "Formy i metody bor´by fashistskikh zakhvatchikov protiv partizanskikh otriadov," ND.

12. Upon discovery, she was executed for her alleged betrayal.

13. While the relatively small number of women who served in partisan detacha ments usually served alongside men, an all-female unit under the command of Tat´iana Kiseleva existed in Kalinin oblast. Furst, "Heroes, Lovers, Victims," 43. See also L. A. Bolokina, "Zhenshchiny okkupirovannykh raionov Kalininskoi oblasti v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny," *Zhenshchina v Rossiiskom Obshchestve* 75, no. 2 (2015): 30.

14. Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerrillas*, 195. Slepyan suggested that the increase was due to more women seeking to join the movement and increased pressure from Moscow. Juliane Furst placed the number of women in the partisan movement slightly higher, at 9.8 percent, or roughly 28,500 fighters. Furst, "Heroes, Lovers, Victims," 41.

15. According to Furst, this was because their gender made it easier for them to blend in and because it was "known that women were better in establishing contact with the local population, which did not always welcome the presence of partisans in their neighborhood." Furst, "Heroes, Lovers, Victims," 48. For specific examples of female scouts and agitators, see Markwick and Cardona, *Soviet Women on the Frontline*, 133–36.

16. Writing about their experiences decades later, former *partizanki* often noted how their youthful appearance and good looks helped them disguise their true intentions. For example, see Aleksandra Anisimova, *Na korotkoi volne* (Sovetskii pisatel′, 1961). According to Regina Mühlhäuser, "successfully playing with concepts of femininity" was a "common topos in the narratives of female former partisans." Mühlhäuser, *Sex and the Nazi Soldier*, 107n195.

17. Waxman, *Women in the Holocaust*, 46.

18. Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerrillas*, 195. See also Furst, "Heroes, Lovers, Victims," 50–51. For specific examples, see Markwick and Cardona, *Soviet Women on the Frontline*, 139.

19. Furst, "Heroes, Lovers, Victims," 45–46.

20. Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerrillas*, 195.

21. Furst, "Heroes, Lovers, Victims," 52. As late as June 1943, Nikolai Mikhailov, the general secretary of the Komsomol, complained, "In the units under the command of comrade Fiodorov (Chernigov province), many young women ask to be enlisted for combat, but they are confined to the kitchen or other ancillary work. In other cases, women are not considered fit for combat, and they don't receive proper military training. This limits women's military effectiveness and undermined their authority as combatants." Quoted in Walke, *Pioneers and Partisans*, 150–51.

22. Oleg Budnitskii noted that rumors circulated in the Red Army that women were there simply to fulfill the sexual needs of male soldiers. Budnitskii, "Muzhchiny i zhenshchiny," 412. For similar views within the partisan movement, see Furst, "Heroes, Lovers, Victims," 58–59; Tec, "Women in the Forest," 39.

23. Aleksandr Gogun, *Stalinskie kommandos: Ukrainskie partizanskie formirovaniia, 1941–1945* (ROSSPEN, 2012), 422–34; Budnitskii, "Muzhchiny i zhenshchiny," 412–13.

24. In this case, as "pokhodnye partizanskie zheny," or "camp partisan wives," counᴓ terparts to the Red Army's "pokhodnye polevye zheny," or "field wives."

25. Furst, "Heroes, Lovers, Victims," 62.

26. Gogun, *Stalinskie kommandos*, 429.

27. Gitelman, "Evreiskie partizany v Belorussii: Kontekst, konflikt i sravnenie," in *SSSR vo Vtoroi Mirovoi voine: Okkupatsiia, kholokost, Stalinizm*, ed. Oleg Budnitskii and Liudmila Novikova (ROSSPEN, 2014), 82.

28. Slepyan noted that Panteleimon Ponomarenko, the head of the partisan central staff, "condemned commanders who had 'incorrect' relations with the women under their command and instructed them that their behavior had to be 'crystal clean' because they were representatives of Soviet power." Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerrillas*, 196n47.

29. In western Ukraine, however, commanders seem to have been much laxer. Gogun suggested that this may have had something to do with partisan perceptions of the local population as being hostile. Gogun, *Stalinskie kommandos*, 429–31.

30. For more information about this campaign, see Markwick and Cardona, *Soviet Women on the Frontline*, 140–45.

31. In late summer of 1942, Stalin issued NKO Order No. 189, which stipulated that the partisan movement should become an "all-people's movement." According to Kenneth Slepyan, the order was meant to transform the partisan movement into a "microcosm of the Soviet Union," with the movement redefined as a war of "national liberation" that was supposed to incorporate all people, including women, in the struggle. Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerrillas*, 186–87.

32. Markwick and Cardona, *Soviet Women on the Frontline*, 143.

33. Markwick and Cardona, *Soviet Women on the Frontline*, 144.

34. Furst, "Heroes, Lovers, Victims," 48–49.

35. For information about Soviet propaganda directed at women inside occupied territory, see Regina Kazyulina, "Women's Antifascist Resistance on German-Occupied Territory Through the Lens of Soviet Leaflets, 1941–1945," *Journal of Contemporary History* 56, no. 4 (2021): 1127–46.

36. Markwick and Cardona, *Soviet Women on the Frontline*, 144.

37. RGASPI Fond 69, op. 9, d. 4, l. 69: "Beseda s komandirom spetsial′noi gruppy, starshim leitenantom tov. SALIANIKOM Fedorom Ivanovichem, pribyvshem iz Minskoi oblasti, iz brigady 'Zhelezniak,'" 26 April 1943, Reel 1, RG-22.005M, Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History records relating to Jewish partisan resistance in the Soviet Union, 1941–1946 (bulk 1942–43).

38. Furst, "Heroes, Lovers, Victims," 48–49. In her autobiographical novella, Mariia Georgievna Iukhno wrote about a young woman who was allegedly known to everyone in and outside her unit by the nickname "My Fritz." According to Iukhno, the woman worked as a German translator and cultivated a relationship with a German officer to gather intelligence for the Soviet underground. Mariia Iukhno, *Razvedchitsy* (Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1962), 90–96.

39. See, for example, Praskov′ia Didyk, *V tylu vraga* (Gosudarstvennoe izdatel′stvo MSSR, 1960); Raisa Khvostova, *Zhit′ ne dano dvazhdy: Frontovye zapiski razvedchitsy* (1972).

40. In her work on women in the Ukrainian Nationalist underground, Marta Havryshko has written about the way the OUN used women's sexuality for intelligence gathering in its fight against Soviet forces. Even though Ukrainian women were expected to guard their virginity and eschew any relations with enemy men, the OUN encouraged some to use their sexuality to gain information from Soviet sources. Such women, Havryshko noted, were in a particularly perilous position since the behavior they were told to cultivate "ran counter to their upbringing and the moral and ethical norms of the time, and could undermine their social standing, particularly among people not acquainted with the details of the undercover spy games the nationalist underground played with the enemy." Havryshko, "Love and Sex in Wartime," 35–67.

41. Furst, "Heroes, Lovers, Victims," 61.

42. Quoted in Markwick and Cardona, *Soviet Women on the Frontline*, 145–46.

43. Furst, "Heroes, Lovers, Victims," 64.

44. Regarding rape during interrogations carried out by German interrogators, see Mühlhäuser, "Between 'Racial Awareness' and Fantasies of Potency," 201; Mühlhäuser, "The Unquestioned Crime," 38; Mühlhäuser, *Sex and the Nazi Soldier*, 65–66.

45. Mühlhäuser, *Sex and the Nazi Soldier*, 66–67.

46. Furst, "Heroes, Lovers, Victims," 64.

47. RGASPI f. 69, op.1, d. 911, l. 42a: "Agenturnaia obstanovka na vremenno okkuk pirovannoi nemtsami territorii," ND, Reel 3, RG-22.005M, Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History records relating to Jewish partisan resistance in the Soviet Union, 1941–1946 (bulk 1942–43), USHMM.

48. Vershigora, *Liudi s chistoi sovest´iu*, 209.

49. Vershigora, *Liudi s chistoi sovest´iu*, 323.

50. RGASPI f. 69, op. 9, d. 14, l. 74–75: Report from Kalinin and Protopopov to Bel´chenko, July 1943, Reel 1, RG-22.005M, Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History records relating to Jewish partisan resistance in the Soviet Union, 1941–1946 (bulk 1942–43), USHMM.

51. RGASPI f. 69, op.1, d. 911, l. 42: "Agenturnaia obstanovka na vremenno okkuk pirovannoi nemtsami territorii, ND, Reel 3, RG-22.005M, Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History records relating to Jewish partisan resistance in the Soviet Union, 1941–1946 (bulk 1942–43), USHMM.

52. RGASPI f. 69, op.1, d. 911, l. 43a: "Agenturnaia obstanovka na vremenno okkuk pirovannoi nemtsami territorii, ND, Reel 3, RG-22.005M, Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History records relating to Jewish partisan resistance in the Soviet Union, 1941–1946 (bulk 1942–43), USHMM.

53. RGASPI f. 69, op.1, d. 911, l. 43a: "Agenturnaia obstanovka na vremenno okkuk pirovannoi nemtsami territorii, ND, Reel 3, RG-22.005M, Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History records relating to Jewish partisan resistance in the Soviet Union, 1941–1946 (bulk 1942–43), USHMM.

54. Popov, *Diversanty Stalina*, 119.

55. RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 744, l. 42–48a: "Dokladnaia zapiska letchika, kapitana Kaprelian R. I. o polozhenii v gorodakh Krivoi Rog, Nikolaev, Zhitomirskoi obl. i na Volyni," ND.

56. The report noted that thanks to the apprehension and interrogation of these girls, NKVD agents were allegedly able to ascertain the identity of several other graduates of the same espionage school and to learn its location and the names of the instructors who were employed there. "Iz kratkogo obzora raboty organov NKVD BSSR za pervye dva goda Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny," in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 4, kn. 1, 11.

57. RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 1027, l. 79–85: "Doklad o svedeniiakh, poluchennykh pri vypolnenii zadaniia po soprovozhdeniiu vooruzheniia ukrainskim partizanskim otriadam," from Sotrudnik UShPD E. Beletskii to T. Strokach, 19 November 1942.

58. RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 748, l. 94: Report from Sudoplatov to Ponomarenko, 10 June 1943

59. RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 748, l. 199: Report from Eitingon to Bel´chenko, 2 December 1943.

60. RGASPI f. 69, op. 9, d. 14, l. 74–75: Report from Kalinin and Protopopov to Bel´chenko, July 1943, Reel 1, RG-22.005M, Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History records relating to Jewish partisan resistance in the Soviet Union, 1941–1946 (bulk 1942–43), USHMM.

61. Quoted in Gogun, *Stalinskie kommandos*, 252.

62. Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerrillas*, 250.

63. Nikolai Obryn′ba, *Red Partisan: The Memoir of a Soviet Resistance Fighter on the Eastern Front* (Potomac Books, 2007), 210.

64. Alexander Statiev, "Soviet Partisan Violence Against Soviet Civilians: Targeting Their Own," *Europe-Asia Studies* 66, no. 9 (2014): 1542.

65. Gogun, *Stalin's Commandos*, 91.

66. For an overview of the various reasons why Jews were not always welcomed in Soviet partisan detachments, see Gitelman, "Evreiskie partizany v Belorussii," 84–87.

67. Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerrillas*, 148. For an example, see RGASPI f. 69, op.1, d. 911, l. 43: "Agenturnaia obstanovka na vremenno okkupirovannoi nemtsami territorii," ND, Reel 3, RG-22.005M, Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History records relating to Jewish partisan resistance in the Soviet Union, 1941–1946 (bulk 1942–43), USHMM.

68. Leonid Smilovitskii, "Antisemitism in the Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941–1944: The Case of Belorussia," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 20, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 218.

69. Smilovitskii, "Antisemitism in the Soviet Partisan Movement," 218.

70. Smilovitskii, "Antisemitism in the Soviet Partisan Movement," 218.

71. Smilovitskii, "Antisemitism in the Soviet Partisan Movement," 218.

72. For an example of a Jewish man being apprehended on suspicion of being a German spy by an NKVD Special Department, see (File M-37/11), Reel 1, RG-68.116M, Holocaust-related records from European archives collected by Yad Vashem, 1939–1960, USHMM. The man in question stated that he had allegedly been a member of a partisan unit in Lubny, Ukraine, which was disbanded soon after the Wehrmacht occupied the area. After apprehending him on 9 March 1942, the head of the special department wrote requesting information about the partisan unit to verify the Jewish man's story and determine whether or not he was a German spy.

73. Smilovitskii, "Antisemitism in the Soviet Partisan Movement," 218–19.

74. Quoted in Walke, *Pioneers and Partisans*, 169.

75. Smilovitskii, "Antisemitism in the Soviet Partisan Movement," 217. This conclue sion was echoed by Alexander Gogun, who noted that the attitude of the Red partisans to the Jews "depended considerably on the personality of the commander of the detachment or larger unit." Alexander Gogun, "Indifference, Suspicion, and Exploitation: Soviet Units Behind the Front Lines of the Wehrmacht and Holocaust in Ukraine, 1941–44," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 28, no. 2 (2015): 383. Similarly, Zvi Gitelman noted that former collaborators, who had been exposed to antisemitic propaganda while in occupied territory and subsequently made their way to the partisans, also encouraged the growth of antisemitism within the movement. In general, Gitelman noted that antisemitism within the partisan movement in Belorussia was widespread but began to improve once Moscow sent commanders from the center to exert better control. Gitelman, "Evreiskie partizany v Belorussii," 76, 87–95.

76. See the testimony of Iakov Iosifovich Abramov in Pinkhas Agmon and Anatolii Stepanenko, eds., *Vinnitskaia oblast′: Katastrofa (Shoa): Svidetel′stva evreev, uznikov kontslagerei i getto, uchastnikov partizanskogo dvizheniia i podpol′noi bor′by* (Izdanie "Beit Lokhamei kha-Gettaot," 1994), 101. In his work, Zvi Gitelman noted that the stories of Jewish ghetto survivors were sometimes so incredible that many partisans

suspected they were lies, fueling further distrust of the newcomers. Gitelman, "Evreiskie partizany v Belorussii," 85.

77. Popov, *Diversanty Stalina*, 183–85.

78. Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerrillas*, 248.

79. Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerrillas*, 249.

80. Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerrillas*, 249.

81. Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerrillas*, 249.

82. Popov, *Diversanty Stalina*, 206–7.

83. Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerrillas*, 235–36; Furst, "Heroes, Lovers, Victims," 59. Furst cited his name as Popuchenko.

84. Mühlhäuser, *Sex and the Nazi Soldier*, 66–67.

85. Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerrillas*, 251.

86. In her work on Soviet children at war, Olga Kucherenko notes that children suspected of being German spies were usually executed by the partisans. "Having to contend with a siege situation on a daily basis and aware of Germans using women and children as agents, some partisan leaders did not require any proof of guilt to order an execution." Olga Kucherenko, *Little Soldiers: How Soviet Children Went to War, 1941–1945* (Oxford University Press, 2011), 218–19.

87. Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerrillas*, 250.

88. Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerrillas*, 251.

89. RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 739, l. 6–7: "Formy i metody bor´by fashistskikh zakha vatchikov protiv partizanskikh otriadov," ND.

90. Olga Kucherenko similarly found that Soviet children who collaborated with German intelligence were encouraged to do so because they "considered collaboration critical to their survival or the well-being of their loved ones. While many orphans planned to change loyalties as soon as they reached the Soviet side, children with parents feared repression against their relatives should they choose to defect." Kucherenko, *Little Soldiers*, 217.

91. Ordzhonikidzegrad was the name given to the city of Bezhitsa, Briansk oblast, in 1936. In 1943, the city's name was restored, but in 1956 Bezhitsa was incorporated into the city of Briansk. Today, one of Briansk's train stations still retains the name of Ordzhonikidze.

92. RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 739, l. 6–7: "Formy i metody bor´by fashistskikh zakha vatchikov protiv partizanskikh otriadov," ND. A more detailed description of this case can also be found in RGASPI f. 69, op.1, d. 911, l. 42a: "Agenturnaia obstanovka na vremenno okkupirovannoi nemtsami territorii," ND, Reel 3, RG-22.005M, Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History records relating to Jewish partisan resistance in the Soviet Union, 1941–1946 (bulk 1942–43), USHMM.

93. RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 739, l. 6–7: "Formy i metody bor´by fashistskikh zakha vatchikov protiv partizanskikh otriadov," ND. A more detailed description of this case can also be found in RGASPI f. 69, op.1, d. 911, l. 42a: "Agenturnaia obstanovka na vremenno okkupirovannoi nemtsami territorii," ND, Reel 3, RG-22.005M, Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History records relating to Jewish partisan resistance in the Soviet Union, 1941–1946 (bulk 1942–43), USHMM.

94. RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 739, l. 6–7: "Formy i metody bor´by fashistskikh zakha vatchikov protiv partizanskikh otriadov," ND.

95. Quoted in Oleg Zarubinsky, "Collaboration of the Population in Occupied Ukrainian Territory: Some Aspects of the Overall Picture," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 10, no. 2 (1997): 145.

96. RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 1027, l. 79–85: "Doklad o svedeniiakh, poluchennykh pri vypolnenii zadaniia po soprovozhdeniiu vooruzheniia ukrainskim partizanskim otriadam," from Sotrudnik UShPD E. Belitskii to T. Strokach," November 1942.

97. See Markwick and Cardona's discussion of this report in *Soviet Women on the Frontline*, 145–46. Based on this report, they argued that Komsomol efforts to include women on a more equal basis with men within the partisan movement in 1944 stemmed not from a desire to encourage women's equality but rather from a "fear that unless women under enemy occupation were won to the resistance, they would succumb to German blandishments."

98. Sarah Davies noted that during the 1930s, some party officials believed that women were only preoccupied with *byt* and had no "serious opinions." She stated that "At one party meeting it was observed that 'many women are *meshchanskie* [bourgeois, philistine]; they love their comfort, are not interested in social life, don't worry about production.'" Sarah Rosemary Davies, *Popular Opinion in Stalin's Russia: Terror, Propaganda, and Dissent, 1934–1941* (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 61.

99. RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 713, l. 81a: "Agenturnaia spravka razvedyvatel´nogo otdela Shtaba Iu. Z. Fronta po sostoianniu na 20.5.42 goda," Reel 3, RG-22.005M, Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History records relating to Jewish partisan resistance in the Soviet Union, 1941–1946 (bulk 1942–43), USHMM.

100. RGASPI f. 69, op.1, d. 911, l. 42a: "Agenturnaia obstanovka na vremenno okkupirovannoi nemtsami territorii," ND, Reel 3, RG-22.005M, Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History records relating to Jewish partisan resistance in the Soviet Union, 1941–1946 (bulk 1942–43), USHMM.

101. RGASPI f. 69, op.1, d. 911, l. 43a: "Agenturnaia obstanovka na vremenno okkupirovannoi nemtsami territorii," ND, Reel 3, RG-22.005M, Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History records relating to Jewish partisan resistance in the Soviet Union, 1941–1946 (bulk 1942–43), USHMM.

Chapter 4. The Diary of a *Komsomolka*

1. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 182; Mühlhäuser, "Between Extermination and Germanization," 171.

2. Gertjejanssen, "Victims, Heroes, Survivors," 63; Mühlhäuser, "Between 'Racial Awareness' and Fantasies of Potency," 211.

3. Röger, "The Sexual Policies and Sexual Realities of the German Occupiers," 13.

4. Berkhoff has noted that local men frequently commented on women going on dates with German soldiers and railroad workers in a variety of locations across Ukraine. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 182–83.

5. Roman Kravchenko-Berezhnoy, *Victims, Victors: From Nazi Occupation to the Conquest of Germany as Seen by a Red Army Soldier* (Aberjona, 2007), 71–73.

6. GARF f. 7021, op. 75, d. 493, l. 59: "Dnevnik shkol´nika Kravchenko." Kravchenko reproduced most of this diary in his memoirs.

7. For a similar reaction to local girls who had relations with local policemen, see RG-50.674*0051, Oral history interview with Raisa Semashko, USHMM. Semashko suggested that locals in Minsk reacted normally to such girls because they had been under occupation for three years, and they recognized that all were trying to survive in their own way. However, since these were her recollections from 2012, one cannot definitively say which they represented: the way she interpreted the sentiments of her neighbors during the occupation or how she came to understand these attitudes in the intervening decades.

8. In his memoirs, Kravchenko suggested that he had tolerated Kurt's presence precisely because the food he brought also helped these prisoners-of-war.

9. State Archives of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea [DAARK] f. 156, op. 1, d. 31, l. 159. I would like to thank Mikhail Tyaglyy for bringing this diary to my attention.

10. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 183.

11. Jeffrey Burds, "Sexual Violence in Europe in World War II, 1939–1945," *Politics and Society* 37, no. 1 (2009): 40–41.

12. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 80.

13. Olga's diary consists of two volumes. The first begins on 26 August 1941 and ends on 30 April 1942. It can be found in TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4. The second volume begins on 4 January 1943 and ends on 23 February 1944. It can be found in TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108. Both diaries have been partially reproduced in Olena Betlii and Kateryna Dysa, eds., *Identychnist. Mizhkulturnyi dialoh* (Dukh i Litera, 2009), 2:287–447.

14. Znamenka was founded in 1869 following the completion of the Odesa-Kharkiv railroad. Ivan Aleksandrovich Gerasimov, *Kniga pamiati Ukrainy: Kirovogradskaia oblast´* (Tsentral´no-Ukrainskoe Izdatel´stvo, 1994), 797.

15. Shmuel Spector and Geoffrey Wigoder, *Encyclopedia of Jewish Life Before and During the Holocaust* (NYU Press, 2001), 1515. According to Kruglov, 565 Jews lived in Znamenka in 1939 and an additional 108 lived in the villages of the raion. A. I Kruglov, *Katastrofa ukrainskogo evreistva, 1941–1944 gg.: Entsiklopedicheskii spravochnik* ("Karavella," 2001), 126.

16. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 20–21. Similarly, in the case of what would become Transnistria, Vladimir Solonari has noted that "many people—probably an overwhelming majority of the non-Jewish population—initially greeted the Germans and Romanians as potential benefactors, if not as disinterested liberators." Solonari, "Hating Soviets—Killing Jews: How Antisemitic Were Local Perpetrators in Southern Ukraine, 1941–42?," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 15, no. 3 (2014): 510.

17. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 69: Diary entry of 26 August 1941.

18. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 69a–70: Diary entry of 29 August 1941.

19. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 70a: Diary entry 31 August 1941.

20. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 71a: Diary entry 7 September 1941.

21. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 73–73a: Diary entry of 23 September 1941.

22. Gertjejanssen, "Victims, Heroes, Survivors," 291–317; Mühlhäuser, "Between 'Racial Awareness' and Fantasies of Potency," 201–3; Mühlhäuser, "The Unquestioned Crime," 34–46; Beck, "Rape: The Military Trials of Sexual Crimes," 262.

23. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 72a: Diary entry of 15 September 1941.

24. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 73: Diary entry of 23 September 1941.

25. The name of this newspaper and its authors is unknown. Often these newspas pers were published by Ukrainian nationalists or locals eager to show their loyalty to the occupation regime. However, it was also common in large cities for newspapers with similar content to have been published by nationalist adherents originating from Poland or western Ukraine who traveled alongside units of the Wehrmacht as translators and interpreters.

26. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 71: Diary entry of 3 September 1941.

27. Nazi racial policies did not just call for the elimination of Jews and other so-called *Untermenschen*. They also stipulated the promotion of individuals deemed to be racially valuable to the Reich, such as the *Volksdeutsche*, who during the occupation enjoyed extra privileges. At their most basic, the *Volksdeutsche* were identified as people whose language and culture were supposedly German but who did not hold German citizenship. I say supposedly because in reality the majority of those who were ultimately identified as *Volksdeutsche* had at best only a very tenuous relationship to this categorization. For more information about the *Volksdeutsche* concept in Nazi ideology, see Doris L. Bergen, "The Nazi Concept of 'Volksdeutsche' and the Exacerbation of Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, 1939–45," *Journal of Contemporary History* 29, no. 4 (1994): 569–82.

28. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 74: Diary entry of 28 September 1941.

29. For the importance of education in shaping the mentality of the interwar geng eration of young women who volunteered to defend the Soviet Union, see Markwick and Cardona, *Soviet Women on the Frontline*, 9–11.

30. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 229.

31. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 80: Diary entry of 11 November 1941.

32. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 84a: Diary entry of 22 November 1941.

33. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 84a: Diary entry of 21 November 1941.

34. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 84a: Diary entry of 21 November 1941.

35. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 77–77a: Diary entry of 30 October 1941.

36. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 77a: Diary entry of 30 October 1941.

37. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 71: Diary entry of 1 September 1941.

38. At one point, in early January 1942, Olga wondered, "What would it have been like with him[?] After all, I did not even know him." TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 94a: Diary entry of 12 January 1942.

39. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 229.

40. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 73a: Diary entry of 25 September 1941.

41. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 74a: Diary entry of 2 October 1941.

42. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 79a–80: Diary entry of 11 November 1941.

43. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 80: Diary entry of 11 November 1941.

44. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 88: Diary entry of 7 December 1941.

45. GARF f. 7021, op. 66, d. 123, l. 61: Act of 10 November 1944.

46. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 73: Diary entry of 23 September 1941.

47. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 79–79a: Diary entry of 10 November 1941.

48. "Iz dnevnika byvshego chlena 304-go politseiskogo batal´ona Otto Miullera," in A. Kruglov, ed. *Sbornik dokumentov i materialov ob unichtozhenii natsistami evreev Ukrainy v 1941–1944 godakh* (Institut Iudaiki, 2002), 276.

49. HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 65, Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM.

50. HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 65, Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM.

51. GARF f. 7021, op. 66, d. 123, l. 86–90: "Obvinitel´noe zakliuchenie," 27 January 1944.

52. HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 65, Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM.

53. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 75–75a: Diary entry of 14 October 1941.

54. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 75a: Diary entry of 14 October 1941.

55. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 76: Diary entry of 15 October 1941.

56. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 76: Diary entry of 16 October 1941.

57. "Iz dnevnika byvshego chlena 304-go politseiskogo batal´ona Otto Miullera," in Kruglov, *Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, 276.

58. Büchler noted that Täubner's crimes against Jewish civilians were cited as mitigating circumstances during his sentencing as evidence of his patriotism. See Yehoshua R. Büchler, "Unworthy Behavior: The Case of SS Office Max Täubner," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 17, no. 3 (2003): 416–22.

59. Büchler, "Unworthy Behavior," 412–13.

60. Büchler, "Unworthy Behavior," 411.

61. HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 111–115, Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM.

62. HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 115, Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM.

63. HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 115, Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM.

64. HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 63, Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM.

65. Earlier that month, Vikhrovski was arrested along with his entire family on suspicion that he and his son were members of a partisan unit. HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 63, Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM.

66. HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 63, Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM.

67. HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 65, Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM.

68. HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 127, Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM.

69. HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 128, Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM.

70. HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 128, Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM.

71. HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 128, Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM.

72. Eleonora Groisman, "V Ukraine nevozmozhno sozdat´ edinuiu bazu pamiatnikov i bratskikh mogil evreev-zhertv Kholokosta," *Kiev evreiskii* (blog), 31 July 2012 (1:36 pm), http://evreiskiy.kiev.ua/v-ukraine-nevozmozhno-sozdat-edinuju-11404.html.

73. With the opening of Soviet-era archives, significant new research has been done on the Holocaust in the former Soviet Union that has transformed our understanding of the Holocaust in the East. Some of these works include Lucjan Dobroszycki and Jeffrey S. Gurock, eds., *The Holocaust in the Soviet Union: Studies and Sources on the Destruction of the Jews in the Nazi-Occupied Territories of the USSR, 1941–1945* (Routledge, 1993); Martin Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–1944* (St. Martin's Press, 2000); I. A. Al´tman, *Zhertvy nenavisti: Kholokost v SSSR 1941–1945 gg.* (Fond "Kovcheg," 2002); Shimon Redlich, *Together and Apart in Brzezany: Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians, 1919–1945* (Indiana University Press, 2002); Wendy Lower, *Nazi Empire Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine* (University of North Carolina Press, 2005); A, I. Kruglov, *Khronika kholokosta v Ukraine 1941–1944 gg.* (Premer, 2004); Boris Zabarko, ed., *Holocaust in the Ukraine* (Vallentine Mitchell, 2005); Michael Kipp, "The Holocaust in the Letters of German Soldiers on the Eastern Front (1939–44)," *Journal of Genocide Research* 9, no. 4 (2007): 601–15; Jürgen Matthäus, "Controlled Escalation: Himmler's Men in the Summer of 1941 and the Holocaust in the Occupied Soviet Territories," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 21, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 218–42; Omer Bartov, "Eastern Europe as the Site of Genocide," *Journal of Modern History* 80, no. 3 (2008): 557–93; Martin Dean, *Robbing the Jews: The Confiscation of Jewish Property in the Holocaust, 1933–1945* (Cambridge University Press, 2008); Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower, eds., *The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization* (Indiana University Press, 2008); David Furber and Wendy Lower, "Colonialism and Genocide in Nazi-Occupied Poland and Ukraine," in *Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation and Subaltern Resistance in World History*, ed. A. Dirk Moses (Berghahn Books, 2008); Yitzhak Arad, *The Holocaust in the Soviet Union* (University of Nebraska Press, 2009); Mikhail Tyaglyy and Jack Piotrow, "Were the 'Chingené' Victims of the Holocaust? Nazi Policy Toward the Crimean Roma, 1941–1944," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 23, no. 1 (2009): 26–53; I. A. Al´tman, *Kholokost na territorii SSSR: Entsikloediia* (ROSSPEN, 2011); Jeffrey Burds, *Holocaust in Rovno: A Massacre in Ukraine, 1941* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Yuri Radchenko, "'We Emptied Our Magazine into Them': The Ukrainian Auxiliary Police and the Holocaust in Generalbezirk Charkow, 1941–1943," *Yad Vashem Studies* 41, no. 1 (2013): 63–98; Mikhail Tyaglyy, "Nazi Occupation Policies and the Mass Murder of the Roma in Ukraine," in *The Nazi Genocide of the Roma: Reassessment and Commemoration*, ed. Anton Weiss-Wendt (Berghahn, 2013); Michael David-Fox, Peter Holquist, and Alexander M. Martin, eds., *The Holocaust in the East: Local Perpetrators and Soviet Responses* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014); Natalia Aleksiun, "Gender and the Daily Lives of Jews in Hiding in Eastern Galicia," *Nashim: A Journal of Jewish Women's Studies & Gender Issues* 27 (2014): 38–61; Markus Eikel and Valentina Sivaieva,

"City Mayors, Raion Chiefs and Village Elders in Ukraine, 1941–4: How Local Administrators Co-operated with the German Occupation Authorities," *Contemporary European History* 23, no. 3 (2014): 405–28; Arkadi Zeltser and Erina Megowan, "Differing Views Among Red Army Personnel About the Nazi Mass Murder of Jews," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 15, no. 3 (2014) (New Series): 563–90; Diana Dumitru, *The State, Antisemitism, and Collaboration in the Holocaust: The Borderlands of Romania and the Soviet Union* (Cambridge University Press, 2016); Natalia Aleksiun, "Intimate Violence: Jewish Testimonies on Victims and Perpetrators in Eastern Galicia," *Holocaust Studies: A Journal of Culture and History* 23, no. 1–2 (2017): 17–33; Omer Bartov, *Anatomy of a Genocide: The Life and Death of a Town Called Buczacz* (Simon & Schuster, 2018); Waitman Wade Beorn, *The Holocaust in Eastern Europe: At the Epicenter of the Final Solution* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2018); and Jared McBride, "The Tuchyn Pogrom: The Names and Faces Behind the Violence, Summer 1941," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 36, no. 3 (2022): 315–33.

74. Father Patrick Desbois, *The Holocaust by Bullets: A Priest's Journey to Uncover the Truth Behind the Murder of 1.5 Million Jews* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Father Patrick Desbois, *In Broad Daylight: The Secret Procedures Behind the Holocaust by Bullets* (Arcade Publishing, 2018).

75. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 78a–79: Diary entry of 9 November 1941.

76. Markwick and Cardona, *Soviet Women on the Frontline*, 78.

77. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 85: Diary entry of 25 November 1941.

78. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 87: Diary entry of 3 December 1941.

79. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 94: Diary entry of 8 January 1942.

80. This is the first line of the "Physical Fitness March," a song from 1938. The lyrics were written by A. Churkin, and Isaak Dunaevskii composed the music.

81. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 88: Diary entry of 7 December 1941.

82. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 91: Diary entry of 25 December 1941.

83. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 89a: Diary entry of 14 December 1941.

84. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 90: Diary entry of 16 December 1941.

85. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 108a: Diary entry of 24 March 1942.

86. Denisova, *Rural Women in the Soviet Union*, 87.

87. Denisova, *Rural Women in the Soviet Union*, 87.

88. Denisova suggested that it took the "experiences and social transformations of World War II to drastically alter the fabric of rural life." Denisova, *Rural Women in the Soviet Union*, 84.

89. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 87a: Diary entry of 5 December 1941.

90. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 112a: Diary entry of 27 April 1942.

91. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 1a: Diary entry of 9 January 1943.

92. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 183.

93. Röger, "The Sexual Policies and Sexual Realities of the German Occupiers," 12.

94. Maren Röger has argued that such sexual blackmailing was common in German-occupied Poland. Röger, "The Sexual Policies and Sexual Realities of the German Occupiers," 16.

95. TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 112a: Diary entry of 27 April 1942.

96. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 183, citing Pavel Negretov, *Vse dorogi vedut na Vorkutu* (1985), 50.

97. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 48: Diary entry of 1 November 1943.

98. According to Denisova, by the 1927–28 academic year, "Almost all children in towns and cities between the ages of 8 and 11 were in schools. In contrast, the same could be said about only approximately 16 percent of rural youth." Denisova, *Rural Women in the Soviet Union*, 47.

99. Fitzpatrick noted that universal primary education became mandatory for all Soviet children starting with the 1930–31 school year. "For rural schools, grade five was to become mandatory for all students from the 1937–38 school year, grade six from the subsequent year, and grade seven from 1939–40." Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village After Collectivization* (Oxford University Press, 1994), 224; see also Denisova, *Rural Women in the Soviet Union*, 47.

100. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 36: Diary entry of 8 August 1943.

101. Denisova, *Rural Women in the Soviet Union*, 84.

102. Denisova, *Rural Women in the Soviet Union*, 88.

103. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 88a: Diary entry of 10 December 1941.

104. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 4: Diary entry of 25 January 1943.

105. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 4: Diary entry of 26 January 1943.

106. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 255.

107. Regarding reports of sexual violence, see Mühlhäuser, *Sex and the Nazi Soldier*, 57.

108. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 253.

109. Beck, "Rape: The Military Trials of Sexual Crimes," 267.

110. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 253.

111. Juliane Furst has noted that the *Ostarbeiter* program encouraged a sudden influx of girls seeking to join partisan detachments in late 1942. Furst, "Heroes, Lovers, Victims," 43.

112. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 108a: Diary entry of 25 March 1942.

113. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 109a: Diary entry of 30 March 1942.

114. For more information about Eastern workers and their fate both in the Reich and after their repatriation to the Soviet Union at the end of the war, see P. M. Polian, *Zhertvy dvukh diktatur: Ostarbaitery i voennoplennye v Tret' em Reikhe i ikh repatriatsiia* ("Vash Vybor TSIRZ," 1996); Herbert Ulrich, *Hitler's Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany Under the Third Reich* (Cambridge University Press, 1997); Iu. Arzamaskin, *Zalozhniki vtroroi mirovoi voiny: repatriatsiia sovetskikh grazhdan v 1944–1953 gg.* (Focus, 2001); and Vanessa Voisin, "Retribute or Reintegrate? The Ambiguity of Soviet Policies Towards Repatriates: The Case of Kalinin Province, 1943–1950," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge* 55, no. 1 (2007): 34–55.

115. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 109a: Diary entry of 31 March 1942.

116. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 7a: Diary entry of 21 February 1943.

117. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 7a: Diary entry of 21 February 1943.

118. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 7a: Diary entry of 20 February 1943.

119. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 268.

120. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 21: Diary entry of 29 May 1943.

121. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 18a: Diary entry of 10 May 1943.

122. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 20: Diary entry of 21 May 1943.

123. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 20a: Diary entry of 25 May 1943.

124. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 20a: Diary entry of 25 May 1943.

125. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 182; Mühlhäuser, "Between 'Racial Awareness' and Fantasies of Potency," 211–12.

126. Mühlhäuser, "Between 'Racial Awareness' and Fantasies of Potency," 213.

127. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 270. See also Mühlhäuser, *Sex and the Nazi Soldier*, 57.

128. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 270.

129. In November 1942, the Reich Health Leader Leonardo Conti proposed a series of measures to curb the number of "racially mixed" children that were being sired by German soldiers in the occupied East. These measures included abortions and the use of chemical contraceptives by the local population. For Conti's proposals, see Mühlhäuser, "Between Extermination and Germanization," 174. For forced abortions, see Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 270; and Burds, "Sexual Violence in Europe," 41–42.

130. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 20: Diary entry of 21 May 1943.

131. Oleg Budnitskii suggested that predominantly village girls, who were mobilized into the Red Army, tried to get pregnant as quickly as possible to return home from the front alive. Budnitskii, "Muzhchiny i zhenshchiny," 413.

132. According to Brandon Schechter, some Komsomol organizers in the Red Navy even considered pregnancy to be a form of self-mutilation. Schechter, "'Girls' and 'Women.'"

133. This was not just a survival strategy in occupied territory but also a strategy by some Soviet women to avoid active combat. Evasion, as Juliane Furst has pointed out, was not limited to women. Still, becoming a "wife" was yet another route available to women in the Red Army and the partisan movement. Furst, "Heroes, Lovers, Victims," 50.

134. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 19a: Diary entry of 19 May 1943.

135. For examples, see Mühlhäuser, *Sex and the Nazi Soldier*, 123.

136. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 21a: Diary entry of 31 May 1943.

137. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 21a: Diary entry of 31 May 1943.

138. For various examples, see Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 268–69.

139. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 269.

140. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 269.

141. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 269.

142. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 28a: Diary entry of 3 June 1943.

143. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 270.

144. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 29a: Diary entry of 6 June 1943.

145. Röger, "The Sexual Policies and Sexual Realities of the German Occupiers," 16.

146. Gerasimov, *Kniga pamiati Ukrainy*, 798.

147. Furst, "Heroes, Lovers, Victims," 44.

148. Petrenko, "Sub″ektivnaia otvetstvennost´," 147.

149. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 183. For a specific example of a village elder who allegedly collaborated with the Germans but began to cover his tracks once it became evident that the Red Army was about to return by delivering horses and chickens to the partisans, see the story of Vasiliy Boykov as related by Maria Mikhaelova in Alexey Vinogradov and Albert Pleysier, eds., *Unlocked Memories: Young Russians Under German Rule* (University Press of America, 2011), 27–28, 98–99.

150. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 36a: Diary entry of 11 August 1943.

151. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 41a: Diary entry of 19 September 1943.

152. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 36: Diary entry of 9 August 1943.

153. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 40a: Diary entry of 11 September 1943.

154. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 42: Diary entry of 21 September 1943.

155. Kazyulina, "Women's Antifascist Resistance on German-Occupied Territory," 1127–46.

156. Such rumors were directed at both men and women inside occupied territory, but following the Komsomol campaign in 1943 to encourage women's participation in the partisan movement on an equal basis with men, propaganda efforts specifically targeting local women were adopted. According to a January 1944 Komsomol report, Soviet officials believed that local women in occupied territory represented a mass reserve of untapped potential for the partisan movement. To discourage fraternization, students were encouraged to spread leaflets and foment rumors. Mass leaflet drops specifically targeting local women contained "appeals from family members, partisan commanders and 'militant young women' to their sisters" to urge "'merciless struggle against the German occupiers.'" In addition to appeals to their patriotism, these leaflets also contained "veiled" threats that "fraternization could bring the ultimate penalty." Markwick and Cardona, *Soviet Women on the Frontline*, 145–47.

157. For examples of similar rumors that all locals who had worked for the Germans would be punished and shot in Kyiv, see Martin J. Blackwell, *Kyiv as Regime City: The Return of Soviet Power After Nazi Occupation* (Rochester University Press, 2016), 140.

158. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 47: Diary entry of 26 October 1943.

159. Atina Grossmann, "The 'Big Rape': Sex and Sexual Violence, War, and OccuO pation in Post-World War II Memory and Imagination," in *Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones: From the Ancient World to the Era of Human Rights*, ed. Elizabeth D. Heineman (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 141.

160. Olga first mentioned him in a diary entry on 8 October 1943. Regarding her decision to spend the night with Paul, see TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 47: Diary entry of 27 October 1943.

161. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 51–52: Diary entries of 29 November 1943; 2 December 1943; 3 December 1943; and 5 December 1943.

162. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 52a: Diary entry of 14 December 1943.

163. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 53: Diary entry of 16 December 1943.

164. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 53: Diary entry of 19 December 1943.

165. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 53: Diary entry of 17 December 1943.

166. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 53: Diary entry of 17 December 1943.

167. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 60: Diary entry of 23 February 1944.

168. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 58: Diary entry of 3 February 1944.

169. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 43: Diary entry of 29 September 1943.

170. For a history of the legal concept of "social danger" in Soviet jurisprudence, see Paul Hagenloh, "'Socially Harmful Elements' and the Great Terror," in Fitzpatrick, *Stalinism: New Directions*, 286–308; Paul Hagenloh, *Stalin's Police: Public Order and Mass Repression in the USSR, 1926–1941* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); and David R. Shearer, *Policing Stalin's Socialism: Repression and Social Order in the Soviet Union, 1924–1953* (Yale University Press, 2009).

Chapter 5. "Socially Dangerous" Women and Retribution After Liberation

Portions of this chapter previously appeared in "Women's Antifascist Resistance on German-Occupied Territory through the Lens of Soviet Leaflets, 1941–5," *Journal of Contemporary History* 56, no. 4 (2021): 1126–46.

1. Voisin, "The Soviet Punishment of an All-European Crime," 258.

2. Hagenloh, "'Socially Harmful Elements,'" 286–308.

3. Soviet punitive organs relied on existing legislation about treason and counterrevolutionary crimes, specifically Article 58, to prosecute individuals for wartime transgressions. Although this legislation provided a mechanism for sentencing, it did not address the complexity of the situation inside occupied territory, including but not limited to mitigating circumstances. For a discussion of the difficulties this posed, see Kudryashov and Voisin, "The Early Stages of 'Legal Purges' in Soviet Russia," 270–73.

4. Kudryashov and Voisin, "The Early Stages of 'Legal Purges' in Soviet Russia," 281.

5. Hiroaki Kuromiya, *Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s–1990s* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 298.

6. Mühlhäuser, "Between Extermination and Germanization," 171–72; Zarubinsky, "Collaboration of the Population in Occupied Ukrainian Territory," 145.

7. Kovalev, *Povsednevnaia zhizn´ naseleniia Rossii*, 336–37.

8. Mark Edele and Filip Slaveski, "Violence from Below: Explaining Crimes Against Civilians Across Soviet Space, 1943–1947," *Europe-Asia Studies* 68, no. 6 (2016): 1020–35.

9. For numerous examples, see Edele and Slaveski, "Violence from Below," 1020–35. For many examples of crimes committed by soldiers and disabled veterans in Kyiv, see Blackwell, *Kyiv as Regime City*, 167–77.

10. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 684, l. 12a: "Otchetnyi doklad o rabote voennogo tribunala voisk NKVD ukrainskogo okruga za 3-i kvartal 1943 goda."

11. Alexander Statiev, *The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 279–80.

12. The fighters were either from the 231st separate rifle or sapper battalion. It is not entirely clear from the report on this incident what kind of division this was.

13. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2410, l. 79: "Dokladnaia zapiska o faktakh narusheniia sovetskoi zakonnosti i amoral´nykh iavlenii v chastiakh VV NKVD Ykrainskogo okruga," from Strokach to A. I. Kirichenko, 27 May 1945.

14. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2410, l. 82: "Dokladnaia zapiska o faktakh narushes niia sovetskoi zakonnosti."

15. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2410, l. 81: "Dokladnaia zapiska o faktakh narusheniia sovetskoi zakonnosti."

16. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2410, l. 79: "Dokladnaia zapiska o faktakh narushes niia sovetskoi zakonnosti."

17. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2410, l. 78: "Dokladnaia zapiska o faktakh narushes niia sovetskoi zakonnosti."

18. Timofei Strokach, who was in charge of the pacification campaign in western Ukraine, believed that "Drunkenness is the major evil that provokes all sorts of offenses." Quoted in Statiev, *The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands*, 282.

19. Furloughs did not exist in the Red Army, and the mail service was unreliable. Thus, Red Army soldiers had little access to or contact with their loved ones on the home front. Bischl, "Telling Stories," 124.

20. Bischl, "Telling Stories," 117–33.

21. Schechter, "'Girls' and 'Women.'"

22. Merridale, "Masculinity at War," 308.

23. Schechter, "'Girls' and 'Women.'"

24. Bischl, "Telling Stories," 127.

25. Bischl, "Telling Stories," 132–33.

26. For a discussion of the way Soviet soldiers perceived and described eastern European women, see Seniavskaia, "Zhenshchiny osvobozhdennoi Evropy glazami sovetskikh soldat," 13–18.

27. Burds, "Sexual Violence in Europe," 47–55.

28. Communist Party officials condemned rape and other forms of violence in the region. Statiev, *The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands*, 295–96.

29. Statiev, *The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands*, 279.

30. Jeffrey Burds, "Gender and Policing in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944–1948," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 42, no. 2–4 (2001), 317–18; Havryshko, "Women's Body as Battlefield," 97–101.

31. Wendy Jo Gertjejanssen has argued that mass rapes committed by Soviet soldiers on the Eastern Front were fueled by the massive amounts of alcohol Red Army soldiers imbibed and by a "sexual arrogance or belief in one's right to sexual activity with another, often as a 'reward' for having risked one's life." Gertjejanssen, "Victims, Heroes, Survivors," 345.

32. Hagenloh, *Stalin's Police*, 285.

33. Hagenloh, *Stalin's Police*, 1–3.

34. Blackwell, *Kyiv as Regime City*, 22.

35. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 685, l. 158: "Spets-soobshchenie o provedennoi operp atsii na territorii naselenykh punktov, raionov i gorodov UkrSSR, osvobozhdennykh ot nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov," 30 April 1943.

36. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 685, l. 158: "Spets-soobshchenie o provedennoi operp atsii na territorii naselenykh punktov, raionov i gorodov UkrSSR, osvobozhdennykh ot nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov," 30 April 1943.

37. For information on the ChGK and the role of civilians, see Marina Sorokina, "People and Procedures: Toward a History of the Investigation of Nazi Crimes in the USSR," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 6, no. 4 (2005) (New Series): 797–831. For information on the ChGK and its documentation of German atrocities against civilians and specifically the burning of villages, see Moine, "Defining 'War Crimes Against Humanity' in the Soviet Union," 448–54. For the role of Jewish witnesses, see Elana Jakel, "'Ukraine Without Jews?' Nationality and Belonging in Soviet Ukraine, 1943–1948" (PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2014), 184–89.

38. Alexander Werth, *Russia at War 1941–1945* (E. P. Dutton, 1964), 616.

39. For a discussion of people using false denunciations to exact revenge against individuals against whom they held a grudge, see Exeler, "What Did You Do During the War?," 831.

40. Sheila Fitzpatrick and Robert Gellately, *Accusatory Practices: Denunciation in Modern European History, 1789–1989* (University of Chicago Press, 1997). For a discussion of denunciations, their function as a backchannel to the authorities, and the various motivations of those responsible for them, see Vladimir A. Kozlov, "Denunciation and Its Functions in Soviet Governance: From the Archive of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1944–53," in Fitzpatrick, *Stalinism: New Directions*, 117–41. For the role of denunciations during the Great Terror, see Wendy Z. Goldman, *Inventing the Enemy: Denunciations and Terror in Stalin's Russia* (Cambridge University Press, 2011). For a discussion of the varied uses of denunciation in the setting of the collectivized Soviet village, see Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants*, 254–61. For a discussion of denunciations specifically within the context of wartime and postwar retribution, see Exeler, "What Did You Do During the War?," 823–24. See also Nicholas Terry, "Enforcing German Rule in Russia 1941–1944: Policing the Occupation," in *Conflict and Legality: Policing Mid-Twentieth Century Europe*, ed. Gerard Oram (Francis Boutle, 2003), 131–32.

41. Penter, "Local Collaborators on Trial," 359–60.

42. Exeler, "What Did You Do During the War?," 808.

43. A. K. Ziberova, *Zapiski sotrudnitsy Smersha* (Izdatel′stvo "Izvestiia," 2016), 138–39.

44. As early as 12 December 1941, Beria had called on the NKVD to use "agents, informants, partisans, as well as honest Soviet citizens to identify and arrest traitors and provocateurs." "Prikaz NKVD SSSR No. 001683 ob operativno-chekistskom obsluzhivanii mestnostei, osvobozhdennykh ot voisk protivnika," 12 December 1941, in *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR*, vol. 2, kn. 2, 414.

45. Quoted in Exeler, "What Did You Do During the War?," 822–23.

46. Exeler, "What Did You Do During the War?," 822–23.

47. Vinogradov and Pleysier, *Unlocked Memories*, 99–100.

48. Vinogradov and Pleysier, *Unlocked Memories*, 100.

49. Blackwell based his conclusions on an All-Union NKVD report that outlined the outcome of several mass operations carried out on the recently liberated territories of Voronezh and Kursk oblasts during the spring and summer of 1943. For the contents of this report and his observations, see Blackwell, *Kyiv as Regime City*, 22–23.

50. Blackwell, *Kyiv as Regime City*, 187.

51. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 685, l. 158: "Spets-soobshchenie o provedennoi operatsii na territorii naselenykh punktov, raionov i gorodov UkrSSR, osvobozhdennykh ot nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov," 30 April 1943.

52. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 685, l. 158: "Spets-soobshchenie o provedennoi operatsii na territorii naselenykh punktov, raionov i gorodov UkrSSR, osvobozhdennykh ot nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov," 30 April 1943.

53. E. V. Markova, *Vorkutinskie zametki katorzhanki 'E-105'* (Pokaianie, 2005), 31.

54. GARF Fond 8131, op. 20, d. 74, l. 104–105a. "Spravka k instruktsii o rabote organov prokuratury v mestnostiakh osvobozhdennykh ot nemetskikh okkupantov, 11 June 1943."

55. GARF Fond 8131, op. 20, d. 74, l. 104–105a. "Spravka k instruktsii o rabote organov prokuratury v mestnostiakh osvobozhdennykh ot nemetskikh okkupantov, 11 June 1943."

56. GARF Fond 8131, op. 20, d. 74, l. 104–105a. "Spravka k instruktsii o rabote organov prokuratury v mestnostiakh osvobozhdennykh ot nemetskikh okkupantov, 11 June 1943."

57. GARF Fond 8131, op. 20, d. 74, l. 104–105a. "Spravka k instruktsii o rabote organov prokuratury v mestnostiakh osvobozhdennykh ot nemetskikh okkupantov, 11 June 1943."

58. GARF Fond 8131, op. 20, d. 74, l. 104–105a. "Spravka k instruktsii o rabote organov prokuratury v mestnostiakh osvobozhdennykh ot nemetskikh okkupantov, 11 June 1943."

59. GARF Fond 8131, op. 20, d. 74, l. 104–105a. "Spravka k instruktsii o rabote organov prokuratury v mestnostiakh osvobozhdennykh ot nemetskikh okkupantov, 11 June 1943."

60. Markova, *Vorkutinskie zametki katorzhanki*, 21–24.

61. Markova, *Vorkutinskie zametki katorzhanki*, 24.

62. Markova, *Vorkutinskie zametki katorzhanki*, 29.

63. TsDAHOU Fond 1, op. 23, d. 2374, l. 34: "Otchetnyi doklad o rabote voennogo tribunala voisk NKVD Ukrainskogo okruga vo 2 kvartale 1945 goda," 12 October 1945.

64. TsDAHOU Fond 1, op. 23, d. 2374, l. 34: "Otchetnyi doklad o rabote voennogo tribunala voisk NKVD Ukrainskogo okruga vo 2 kvartale 1945 goda," 12 October 1945.

65. Epifanov, *Otvetstvennost´ za voennye prestupleniia*, 38.

66. Epifanov, *Otvetstvennost´ za voennye prestupleniia*, 63–64.

67. For a discussion of the difference between Western European and Soviet approaches to legislation on collaboration, see Kudryashov and Voisin, "The Early Stages of 'Legal Purges' in Soviet Russia," 268–73.

68. Penter, "Local Collaborators on Trial," 349, citing Vasyl´ Maliarenko, ed., *Reabilitaciia represovanych, Verkhovnyi sud Ukrainy. Zakonodavstvo ta sudova praktyka* (Iurinkom, 1997), 20. Beginning in April 1943, military procurators could also rely on the Decree of 19 April 1943, which legalized the prosecution of Nazi war criminals and introduced additional sanctions for local inhabitants found guilty of murder and the torture of civilians. For the history of this decree, see Kudryashov and Voisin, "The Early Stages of 'Legal Purges' in Soviet Russia," 287–94.

69. Kudryashov and Voisin, "The Early Stages of 'Legal Purges' in Soviet Russia," 273–74. Military tribunals, consisting of three officers and a secretary, operated within the Red Army at the front, corps, brigade, and divisional levels as well as in the NKVD. Vadim J. Birstein, *SMERSH: Stalin's Secret Weapon: Soviet Military Counterintelligence in WWII* (Biteback Publishing, 2011), 55–56.

70. Kudryashov and Voisin, "The Early Stages of 'Legal Purges' in Soviet RusR sia," 278.

71. The Special Conference of the NKVD "consisted of the NKVD Commissar and two of his deputies. The chief USSR prosecutor or his deputy attended the hearings, which were conducted without the defendant being present." Birstein, *SMERSH*, 68–69.

72. Hagenloh, *Stalin's Police*, 154–56.

73. For information about similar powers previously exercised by the special boards of the OGPU, see Hagenloh, "'Socially Harmful Elements,'" 290–95.

74. Epifanov, *Otvetstvennost´ za voennye prestupleniia*, 47; Aleksandr E. Epifanov, *Organizatsionnye i pravovye osnovy nakazaniia gitlerovskikh voennykh prestupnikov i ikh posobnikov v SSSR: 1941–1956 gg.* (IUNITI-DANA, 2017), 86.

75. Epifanov, *Otvetstvennost´ za voennye prestupleniia*, 47–48; Epifanov, *Organizatsionnye i pravovye osnovy*, 86–87.

76. Epifanov, *Otvetstvennost´ za voennye prestupleniia*, 48; Epifanov, *Organizatsionnye i pravovye osnovy*, 87.

77. Voisin, "Spécificités soviétique d'une épuration de guerre européenne," 206–7. See also Voisin, "The Soviet Punishment of an All-European Crime," 254–55.

78. Voisin, "Spécificités soviétique d'une épuration de guerre européenne," 207; Voisin, "The Soviet Punishment of an All-European Crime," 255.

79. Epifanov, *Otvetstvennost´ za voennye prestupleniia*, 47–48; Voisin, "The Soviet Punishment of an All-European Crime," 250–52.

80. Epifanov, *Otvetstvennost´ za voennye prestupleniia*, 47–48. For an English translation of Article 35, see Oleg V. Khlevniuk, *The History of the Gulag: From Collectivization to the Great Terror* (Yale University Press, 2004), 364–65.

81. Hagenloh, *Stalin's Police*, 117.

82. Hagenloh, *Stalin's Police*, 118.

83. Liudmila Novikova, "Criminalized Liaisons: Soviet Women and Allied Soldiers in Wartime Arkhangel'sk," *Journal of Contemporary History* 55, no. 4 (2020): 745–63.

84. Hagenloh, "'Socially Harmful Elements,'" 295–96. See also Shearer, *Policing Stalin's Socialism*, 194–95.

85. Hagenloh, "'Socially Harmful Elements,'" 298; Hagenloh, *Stalin's Police*, 207.

86. For a concise discussion, see Statiev, "Soviet Partisan Violence," 1542–43.

87. "Postanovlenie gosudarstvennogo komiteta oborony o sem´iakh lits, sotrudnichavshikh s germanskimi vlastiami," 27 December 1941, in V. N. Khaustov, V. P. Naumov, and N. S. Plotnikova, eds. *Lubianka: Stalin i NKVD-NKGB-GUKR "SMERSH," 1939–mart 1946* (MFD, Materik, 2006), 324.

88. "Postanovlenie GKO o chlenakh semei izmennikov rodiny," 24 June 1942, in Khaustov et al., *Lubianka*, 350–51.

89. "Postanovlenie GKO o chlenakh semei izmennikov rodiny," 24 June 1942, in Khaustov et al., *Lubianka*, 350–51.

90. Vanessa Voisin has previously written about the events surrounding the promulgation of this law. See Voisin, "Spécificités soviétique d'une épuration de guerre européenne," 210–19.

91. "Shifrotelegramma B. A. Dvinskogo I. V. Stalinu o vyselenii semei izmennikov rodiny iz rostovskoi oblasti," 16 June 1942, in Khaustov et al., *Lubianka*, 348–49.

92. "Shifrotelegramma B. A. Dvinskogo I. V. Stalinu o vyselenii semei izmennikov rodiny iz rostovskoi oblasti," 16 June 1942, in Khaustov et al., *Lubianka*, 348–49.

93. Such evictions had become legal based on Decree Number 270 of the Stavka or the Supreme Main Command of the Red Army (Glavnoe verkhovnoe komandovanie Krasnoi armii) from 16 August 1941.

94. "Spetssoobshchenie L. P. Berii I. V. Stalinu o repressiiakh v otnoshenii chlenov semei izmennikov rodiny," 18 June 1942, in Khaustov et al., *Lubianka*, 349–50.

95. "Spetssoobshchenie L. P. Berii I. V. Stalinu o repressiiakh v otnoshenii chlenov semei izmennikov rodiny," 18 June 1942, in Khaustov et al., *Lubianka*, 349–50.

96. Epifanov, *Otvetstvennost´ za voennye prestupleniia*, 53.

97. For more information, see Epifanov, *Organizatsionnye i pravovye osnovy*, 263–68.

98. The decree was prompted by a memorandum signed by Vasilii Riasnoi, Sergei Savchenko, and Roman Rudenko, the Ukrainian procurator. It was sent to Gerasimenko, the commander of the Kyiv Military District and also the head of the UkrSSR's new People's Commissariat of Defense on 21 July 1944. Blackwell, *Kyiv as Regime City*, 37.

99. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 1377, l. 6: "Postanovlenie voennogo soveta kievskogo voennogo okruga No. 53," 28 July 1944.

100. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 1377, l. 6: "Postanovlenie voennogo soveta kievskogo voennogo okruga No. 53," 28 July 1944.

101. For information about the distinction between regime cities of the first and second categories, see Hagenloh, *Stalin's Police*, 301.

102. Blackwell, *Kyiv as Regime City*, 28.

103. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 317.

104. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2410, l. 19: "Spravka o resul´tatakh vypolneniia postanovlenii Politbiuro TsK KP(b)U i SNK UkrSSR ot 23 noiabria 1944 goda," 14 February 1945. For numerous examples of crimes committed by soldiers and disabled veterans in Kyiv, see Blackwell, *Kyiv as Regime City*, 167–77.

105. Quoted in Blackwell, *Kyiv as Regime City*, 168.

106. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 539, l. 6: "Protokol soveshcheniia u sekretaria TsK KP(b) U Tov. Korotchenko D. S. po voprosy o polozhenii v gor. Kieve," 13 November 1943.

107. Blackwell, *Kyiv as Regime City*, 33.

108. Blackwell, *Kyiv as Regime City*, 74.

109. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 1378, l. 2: "Postanovlenie tsentral´nogo komiteta kommunisticheskoi partii bol´shevikov Ukrainy o meropriiatiiakh po ukrepleniiu obshchestvennogo poriadka v gor. Kieve," n.d.

110. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 1378, l. 5: "Postanovlenie TsK KP(b)U: Ob ustvanova lenii tverdogo rezhima po revoliutsionnomu poriadku v gorode Kieve, sredi naseleniia goroda, Organami Narodnogo Komissariata Vnutrennikh Del UkrSSR," n.d.

111. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 1377, l. 7: "Postanovlenie voennogo soveta kievskogo voennogo okruga No. 53," 28 July 1944.

112. Mühlhäuser, *Sex and the Nazi Soldier*, 51–53.

113. "Spetzsoobshchenie L. P. Berii I. V. Stalinu o pereselenii semei izmennikov rodiny," 18 August 1944, in Khaustov et al., *Lubianka*, 448.

114. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 1377, l. 1–2: "Voennomu Prokuroru KVO Polkovniku Iustitsii Tov. Ryzhikovu," ND.

115. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 1377, l. 2: "Voennomu Prokuroru KVO Polkovniku Iustitsii Tov. Ryzhikovu," ND.

116. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 1377, l. 5–6: "Postanovlenie voennogo soveta kievske ogo voennogo okruga No. 71," 6 September 1944.

117. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2410, l. 40: "Spravka o khode raboty po vypolneniiu postanovleniia voennogo soveta kievskogo voennogo okruga ot 6 sentiabria 1944 goda No. 071," 21 April 1945.

118. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2410, l. 40: "Spravka o khode raboty po vypolneniiu postanovleniia voennogo soveta kievskogo voennogo okruga ot 6 sentiabria 1944 goda No. 071," 21 April 1945.

119. For a discussion of the process by which this information was gathered, see Voisin, "Spécificités soviétique d'une épuration de guerre européenne," 213.

120. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2410, l. 41: "Spravka o khode raboty po vypolneniiu postanovleniia voennogo soveta kievskogo voennogo okruga ot 6 sentiabria 1944 goda No. 071," 21 April 1945.

121. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2410, l. 41–42: "Spravka o khode raboty po vypolneo niiu postanovleniia voennogo soveta kievskogo voennogo okruga ot 6 sentiabria 1944 goda No. 071," 21 April 1945.

122. Hagenloh, *Stalin's Police*, 421n46; Shearer, *Policing Stalin's Socialism*, 255.

123. Jeffrey W. Jones, "'Every Family Has Its Freak': Perceptions of Collaboration in Occupied Soviet Russia, 1943–1948," *Slavic Review* 64, no. 4 (2005): 747–70.

124. Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, 183.

125. Jones, "'Every Family Has Its Freak,'" 755; Penter, "Local Collaborators on Trial," 353.

126. Jones, "'Every Family Has Its Freak,'" 756.

127. Exeler, "The Ambivalent State," 609.

128. Warring, "Intimate and Sexual Relations," 93.

129. Exeler, "What Did You Do During the War?," 834–35; Gertjejanssen, "Victims, Heroes, Survivors," 368–69.

130. Kovalev, *Povsednevnaia zhizn´ naseleniia Rossii*, 339.

131. Author interview with Victor Shnayder recorded on 16 December 2022 in Lynn, Massachusetts.

132. RG-50.653*0008, Oral history interview with Nionila Timoshenko, USHMM.

133. RG-50.653*0008, Oral history interview with Nionila Timoshenko, USHMM.

134. Gertjejanssen, "Victims, Heroes, Survivors," 369.

135. Quoted in Mie Nakachi, "A Postwar Sexual Liberation? The Gendered Experip ence of the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 53, no. 2/3 (2011): 436.

136. Nakachi, "A Postwar Sexual Liberation?," 435.

137. Merridale, "Masculinity at War," 312–13.

138. Quoted in Nakachi, "A Postwar Sexual Liberation?," 436.

139. Desbois, *The Holocaust by Bullets*, 102–3.

Conclusion

1. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2373, l. 91: "Sekretariu tsentral´nogo komiteta KP (b) U Tov. Kirichenko," 20 June 1945.

2. Warring, "Intimate and Sexual Relations," 95.

3. For information about the OUN's adoption of such practices, see Havryshko, "Illegitimate Sexual Practices in the OUN."

4. Krylova, "Stalinist Identity from the Viewpoint of Gender," 633, 638.

5. Jakel, "'Ukraine Without Jews?,'" 39–51. See also Blackwell, *Kyiv as Regime City*.

6. Like apartment disputes, property disputes over farm animals originated in the war and the occupation. German occupation authorities confiscated farm animals as part of so-called meat levies on the populations of the occupied zones. During such levies, occupation authorities sometimes forced families to consolidate and share their farm animals. Whereas before two families would have each had a cow, under occupa-

tion the authorities would confiscate one of the animals, forcing the two households to share the remaining animal. In other cases, occupation authorities confiscated animals from pro-Soviet families and gave them to pro-German families. Individuals who benefited from such actions argued that the Germans merely allowed them to trade their less productive animals for those that had been confiscated from pro-Soviet families. For more information about these kinds of cases and the way in which Soviet procurators initially approached them, see GARF f. 8131, op. 22, d. 36, l. 56–58: "Grazhdansko-Sudebny Nadzor (Chernigov)," ND. See also GARF f. 8131, op. 22, d. 36, l. 60–61a: "Grazhdansko-Sudebny Nadzor (Dnepropetrovsk)," ND.

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op. 23, Dokumenty zagal´nogo viddilu (osoblyvyi sektor) TsK Kompartii Ukraïny (sekretna chastyna)

f. 166, Komisiia z Istoriï Velykoï Vitchyznianoï Viiny pry Akademiï Nauk URSR

op. 2, Dokumenty komisiï (stenogramy besid, spogady uchasnykiv viiny, lysty gromadian z fashyystskogo polonu, kopiï aktiv pro zbytky ta zlochyny, zapodiiani okupantamy, inyi dokumenty voennogo chasu) . . .

DAARK

Derzhavnyi arkhiv v Avtonomnii Respublitsi Krim (State Archives in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Simferopol)

f. 156, Krymskaia Komissiia po istorii Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny

GARF

Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (State Archive of the Russian Federation, Moscow)

f. 7021, Chrezvychainaia gosudarstvennaia komissiia po ustanovleniiu i rassledovaniiu zlodeianii nemetsko-fashistskikh zakhvatchikov i ikh soobshnikov i prichinennogo imi usherba grazhdanam, kollektivnym khoziaistvam (kolhozam), obshchestvennym organizatsiiam, gosudarstvennym predpriiatiiam i uchrezhdeniiam SSSR (ChGK).

op. various

f. 8131, Prokuratura SSSR

op. 20, Opis´ arkhivnykh materialov Prokuratury SSSR za 1943 g., sdannykh v Tsentral´nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Oktiabr´skoi Revoliutsiii i sotsialisticheskogo stroitel´stva SSSR

op. 22, Opis´ arkhivnykh materialov Prokuratury SSSR za 1945 g., sdannykh v Tsentral´nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Oktiabr´skoi Revoliutsiii i sotsialisticheskogo stroitel´stva SSSR

RGASPI

Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial´no-politicheskoi istorii (Russian State Archives of Socio-Political History, Moscow)
f. 69, Tsentral´nyi shtab partizanskogo dvizheniia pri Stavke Verhovnogo Glavnokomandovaniia (TsShPD) (1942–44)
op. 1, Komandovanie i operativnye otdely TsShPD

USHMM

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC
RG-22.005M, Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History records relating to Jewish partisan resistance in the Soviet Union, 1941–46 (bulk 1942–43)
RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust
RG-50.653*0008, Oral history interview with Nionila Timoshenko
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