

DS Mayfield

Variants of Rhetorical Ventriloquism

sermocinatio, *ethopoeia*, *prosopopoeia* (and Affine Terms) in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Cicero, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Quintilian, Augustine – Including Tentative Remarks on the Oratorico-Dramatic Concepts of *ethos* and *persona*, as well as Their Potential with Respect to Authorial Selfcraft in Shakespeare and Cervantes

Online Supplement to
***History and Drama*, 978-3-11-060426-9**

Edited by
Joachim Küpper, Jan Mosch and Elena Penskaya

DE GRUYTER

I N M E M O R I A M

FRIEDRICH WILHELM SCHUSTER *16.04.1924 †24.06.2004
FRIEDLINDE KÄTHE LISETTE SCHUSTER *29.11.1924 †27.11.2016

IN GRATITUDE FOR THEIR COUNSEL AND ENDURING GUIDANCE
BY WAY OF THE EXAMPLE THEIR LIVES SET.

Note

This is the extended rendering of an essay that has appeared in the volume *History and Drama*, edited by Joachim Küpper, Jan Mosch, and Elena Penskaya (Berlin: de Gruyter), which features condensed versions of chapters 1 and 5.

Acknowledgements

The preliminary research conducing to the study at hand was performed while receiving funding from the European Research Council (ERC) as a member of the DramaNet project at Freie Universität Berlin, headed by Professor Joachim Küpper.

In addition to affine material written in addition (specifically parts 1, 2, 6, and subchapter 4.1), it integrates the revised and augmented versions of two thematically interrelated papers given in October 2016. An initial version of chapter 3.3, the opening of part 4, and subchapter 4.2 was presented at the Humboldt Forum “World Literatures – Masterpieces: Shakespeare and Cervantes 2016” (held in Bonn, October 12–16, 2016), which was attended as a guest at the suggestion of Professor Küpper, and the invitation of the scholarly committee, consisting of Professors Claudia Olk, Martina Wagner-Egelhaaf, David E. Wellbery, and Matei Chihaia. The author is grateful to the Humboldt Foundation for the opportunity of attending, and speaking at, the congress (in the section “Functions of Authorship”, with a talk entitled: “im Grunde *persona*’—Towards a Rhetorico-Theatrical Approach to Authorship”). He wishes to thank the panel’s audience for their response. The author is particularly grateful to Professor Jane K. Brown for her suggestions in conversations following the paper, as well as during the conference.

An earlier version of part 5 was presented at DramaNet’s concluding International Conference “History and Drama: The Pan-European Tradition”—organized by Dr. Jaša Drnovšek, Dr. Tatiana Korneeva, and headed by Professor Küpper—which took place at Freie Universität Berlin from October 26–27, 2016; the overall project (‘Early Modern European Drama and the Cultural Net’), including the conference, was funded by a five-year ERC Advanced Grant (2011 to 2016). Entitled “The Economy of Rhetorical Ventriloquism”, the initial version of this paper was located in panel III, “Theoretical Perspectives on History and Drama”. For their questions and comments following the talk, the author is grateful to Professor Hoxby (asking about layered *sermocinationes* and generic specificities in this regard), Professor Dickhaut (stressing the significance of the *aptum*), Professor Küpper (commenting on the import of differentiating factual and fictional figures with respect to *sermocinatio*), Dr. Sven Thorsten Kilian (inquiring about collective voices personified), and Professor Gasan Gusejnov (adducing a nexus with *ratiocinatio* and mentioning the Theophrastan *Characters*). Thanks go to the chair (Dr. Gaia Gubbini), the general audience, and particularly to the conference’s international respondents, Professors Jan

Bloemendal, Kirsten Dickhaut, Susanne Friede, Blair Hoxby; as well as to Lena Maria Hein for her assistance in proofreading parts of an earlier version.

The author is grateful to de Gruyter, especially Gabrielle Cornefert and André Horn, for their reliable support in publishing the present work.

Above all, he wishes to express his gratitude to Professor Kathy Eden (Columbia U, NYC) and Professor Küpper for reading and commenting on drafts of the study at hand.

The likelihood of *errata* increases with the quantity of data: the remaining are the author's—who (being human) requests the reader's indulgence.

Table of Contents

1	Self Sells. On Augustine’s Putting Personified Voices into Writing — 1
2	Provisional Heuristics — 7
2.1	On Dialog and Ventriloquism — 9
2.2	Notes on Method — 20
3	Theoretico-Conceptual Groundwork (By Recourse to the <i>Rhetorica ad Herennium</i>, Cicero, Quintilian, and Further Theorists) — 25
3.1	The <i>Rhetorica ad Herennium</i> on ‘ <i>sermocinatio</i> ’ and ‘ <i>notatio</i> ’ — 37
3.2	Quintilian’s <i>Institutio Oratoria</i> on ‘ <i>prosopopoeia</i> ’ (With Remarks by Cicero) — 47
3.3	The Rhetorico-Dramatic Terms ‘ <i>prósopon</i> ’ and ‘ <i>persona</i> ’ in Ancient and Early Modern Times (With Correlative Remarks on ‘ <i>ethos</i> ’) — 59
3.4	Taxonomico-Conceptual Synopsis (Subchapters 3.1–3.3) — 82
4	Selling Selves. Variants of Rhetorical Selfcraft — 96
4.1	Dionysius of Halicarnassus on ‘ <i>ethopoeia</i> ’ (with a view to ‘ <i>evidentia</i> ’ and respect to ‘ <i>decorum</i> ’) — 101
4.2	Toward an Oratorico-Dramatic Approach to Authorship: Selfcraft in Shakespeare and Cervantes — 119
5	The Economy of Rhetorical Ventriloquism: Applications from Antiquity to the Present — 138
5.1	Concerning the Nexus of ‘ <i>oikonomía</i> ’ and ‘ <i>dialogismós</i> ’ — 143
5.2	Variants of Rhetorical Ventriloquism in Historiography, Literature, Philosophy (<i>inter alia</i>) — 154
6	Concluding Synopsis (With a Brief Coda on Concealing the Art) — 195
	Bibliography — 200
	Primary Literature — 200
	Secondary Literature — 215
	Index — 236

General Keywords

Rhetoric, drama (in Greco-Roman and Late Antiquity, Early Modern times); **ventriloquism**, perspective-taking, **vicariousness**, **delegation**; authorship, rhetorical **selfcraft** (*auto-etho-poiesis*, poetics of self).

Main Authors (Respectively Texts)

Plato, **Aristotle**, **Lysias**, Thucydides; *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Cicero, **Dionysius of Halicarnassus**, **Quintilian**, Livy, Seneca, Tacitus; the *Progymnasmata* (**Aphthonius**, Hermogenes, Nicolaus, Priscian, Aelius Theon, et al.); Lucian, D. Laertius, **Augustine**; Machiavelli, Erasmus, Montaigne, **Cervantes**, **Shakespeare**; Nietzsche, **Blumenberg** (see the index also).

Technical Keywords (With Taxonomic and Spelling Variants)

Pertaining to rhetorical ventriloquism: **sermocinatio**, διαλογισμός (*dialogismós*), *allocutio* (*adlocutio*); **ἠθοποιία** (*ethopoíia*, *ethopoeia*, *etopeya*), *notatio*; **προσωποποιία** (*prosopopoíia*, *prosopopoeia*, *prosopopeya*), *fictio personae*, *conformatio*, personification, impersonation; **εἰδωλοποιία** (*eidolopoíia*, *eidolopoeia*, *idolopeya*), *anthropopatheia*, *pathopoeia*.

Affine terms: **ὑποφορά** (*hypophorá*, *ánthupophorá*), *subiectio*; **χαρακτηρισμός** (*charakterismós*), ἠθολογία (*ethología*), προσωπογραφία (*prosopographía*), *effictio*, μίμησις (*mímesis*), *imitatio*; **χαρακτήρ** (*charaktér*); **προσώπον** (*prósopon*), *persona*, **ἦθος** (*ethos*), ἕξις (*héxis*); **πρέπον** (*prépon*), *aptum*, *decorum*, *accommodatum*; τάξις (*táxis*), *ordo*, **οἰκονομία** (*oikonomía*), *dispositio*; **ἐνάργεια** (*enárgeia*), *evidentia*, ὑποτύπωσις (*hypotýpōsis*, *διατύπωσις*); πάθος (*páthos*); ὑπόκρισις (*hypókrisis*), *actio*; **ὑπόληψις** (*hypólepsis*).

1 Self Sells. On Augustine’s Putting Personified Voices into Writing

et voluptate ad fidem ducitur[.]
Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 278, 4.2.119)

In Book VIII of his *Confessions*, at the crux of the entire endeavor—as regards the literary composition, the life and self it is to reflect—Augustine introduces “Chastity [‘continentiae’]” personified as having “appeared [‘aperiebatur’]” to him (*Conf.* 1–8. 404–405, VIII.11.27).¹ Twice the orator ventriloquizes in writing what she might say (“quasi diceret”, iterated)—and is then careful to clarify (in forensic terms): “ista controversia in corde meo non nisi de me ipso adversus me ipsum” (“[t]his debate took place within my heart; it was myself arguing against myself”, *Conf.* 1–8. 406–407, VIII.11.27; cf. 406n.).² Said envisioned

1 In a context declaring a (previously) prodigal use of his God-given “intellectual ability” (“de ingenio meo, munere tuo”, *Conf.* 1–8. 48–49, I.17.27), Augustine mentions performing a *prosopopoïa* with *allocutio* during his student years, detailing the resp. oratorico-theatrical process as follows: “A task [‘negotium’] was assigned to me [...]. It was to perform the speech of Juno when she was angry and hurt [...], words that I had never heard Juno utter. Instead we were obliged to go astray by following the footsteps of poetical inventions [‘figmentorum poeticorum’], and to declaim in prose something similar to what the poet [sc. Vergil] had written in verse. The one who was displaying a more realistic [‘similior’] impression of anger and hurt in defending the honor of the character being delineated [‘adumbratae personae’] (using appropriate words to clothe the ideas [‘verbis sententias congruenter vestientibus’]) was the one whose speech won the most praise” (*Conf.* 1–8. 48–49, I.17.27; cf. Lanham “Instruction” 85: “Augustine [...] describes being made to impersonate an angry goddess Juno in an exercise of ethopoeia”; see “Composition” 121). The young Augustine outperformed everyone—a triumph for which the mature writer has only contempt, albeit rather ostensibly so (cf. *Conf.* 1–8. 49, I.17.27). Seeing that the basic procedure outlined for the Greek goddess is repeated in the personification of an abstract entity equally ‘inexistent’ (from the Church Father’s angle), it is not the technique itself that is at issue, but the (intended) use to which it is put—with *Continentia* personified serving a moral, and (more importantly) Christian purpose, here; as to motive, Augustine’s craving for personal glory is reallocated to disseminating the Deity’s.

2 Iulius Rufinianus’ taxonomy would term this ‘*dialogismós*’ (“secum disputat et velutat”, 43–44, §20); see also Priscian (“ipse per se loquens”, “praexercitamina” 558, §9). Cf. an obsolete use in English (the second s.v.): ‘sermocination’, “a form of prosopopoeia in which the speaker answers his own question or remark immediately” (Merriam-Webster “sermocination”); this seems to stress the aspect of anticipation qua (foremost) function of the device; see subchs. 3.1 and 5.1, herein. Generally, cf. Bonner (*Declamation* 21; 53; 150); and Kennedy: “In deliberative declamation a speaker composed a *suasoria*, a speech dealing with a dilemma confronting some mythological figure or some famous historical person in the past. [...] The speech could

prosopopoeia with interior *sermocinatio* causes emotional upheaval (a form of *auto-movere*, to be experienced vicariously by the reader), the tension of which the speaker feels he must “let [...] all pour out, in words as well [‘cum vocibus’]” (*Conf. 1–8. 406–407, VIII.12.28*)—wherefore he leaves his silent (“tacitus”) interlocutor Alypius, sensing “that the business [‘negotium’] of weeping was better suited [‘aptior’] to solitude” (*Conf. 1–8. 406–409, VIII.12.28*).³

In an even “remotius” place—somewhere (albeit inevitably “sub quadam fici arbore”) and “somehow” (the speaker stresses his ignorance, “nescio

be a *prosōpopoeia*, for which grammatical exercises had provided some training and in which the speaker impersonated a specific individual giving advice to another or debating with himself what action to take in a given situation, or it could be addressed to someone in the second person” (*New History* 168). “The more difficult, but much more popular, judicial declamation was the *controversia* in which one or more laws, Greek, Roman, or often imaginary, was stated. [...] The orator may speak in the person of any of the individuals involved or as an advocate for any of them” (*New History* 169). Concerning Augustine’s relationship to rhetoric (including as to passages under consideration here), see Olmsted (passim; spec. 79–80), who stresses: “Rhetoric operates in books VI–VIII not so much through the structure and effects of particular formal speeches as through the interaction between readers and texts or verbal expressions” (80). Generally, cf. Niehues-Pröbsting: “Augustinus stellt den bekanntesten und prominentesten Fall der Verbindung von Rhetorik und Theologie dar, kein Sonderfall, sondern eher die Regel” (“Glauben” 34). See Momigliano (referring also to Augustine): “this effort of explaining oneself and one’s own purposes to a personal audience, if not to one’s own direct accusers, may well have been a decisive contribution to the recognition of the self as a person with a definite character, purpose and achievement. After all, in so far as they express a relation to gods or God, confessions have an element of self-defence which links them to judicial speeches” (90; cf. 91). Despite this statement with a view to forensic practice and its (literary) aftermath, Momigliano all but relegates rhetoric (save a brief mention at 89); in Mauss’ essay (passim; but cf. references to Roman law, 14, 16; and grammar, 24n.), as well as throughout the resp. volume it occasioned (see Carrithers et al. passim), rhetoric is treated to all but consummate silence. Even so, the following is to the point: “It is Christians who have made a metaphysical entity of the ‘moral person’ (*personne morale*), after they became aware of its religious power. Our own notion of the human person is still basically a Christian one” (Mauss 19). The rhetorico-dramatic view of the *persona* is at variance therewith (as to the Christian refunctionalization, see spec. Fuhrmann “Persona” 102–104; cf. Oesterreich “Person” 865; Boriaud/Schouler 799; Gill “Particulars” 129; also De Temmerman/Emde Boas “Intro.” 7–8); generally, see Mayfield (“Interplay” 21n.); and subch. 3.3, herein.

3 The terms employed *katà tò parón* in this introduction will be dealt with in detail, and with the resp. source-related references, in part 3 (cf. spec. the synopsis in subch. 3.4). At this point, see Fuhrmann’s précis: “Die Ethopoiie (*sermocinatio*) besteht darin, daß der Redner eine andere Person einführt, ihr ein Stück Rede in den Mund legt und dabei auch deren charakteristische Redeweise nachahmt [...]. Die Prosopopoiie (*personificatio*) unterscheidet sich von der Ethopoiie dadurch, daß nicht reale, sondern fiktive Personen und zumal personifizierte Gegenstände auftreten, redend oder handelnd” (*Die antike Rhetorik* 138).

quomodo”)—he addresses himself to the Deity twice, thus paralleling the structure of the utterances put in Chastity’s mouth moments ago.⁴ In this case, however, the qualification differs: given his spatial isolation, the speaker writes that he actually voiced himself “non quidem his verbis, sed in hac sententia” (“not in these actual words, but along these lines”, *Conf.* 1–8. 408–409, VIII.12.28).⁵ After having imagined a personified *Continentia* addressing him in

4 As to ‘fig trees’ qua familiar settings, vivid mental (nominal) anchors in various parables or related encounters within the *New Testament* (partly highly significant), see e.g. the narrative of Jesus ‘cursing a fig tree’ (*Mt* 21:18–22; *Mk* 11:12–14, 20–24; the analogous parable in *Lk* 13:6–9), with its (figurative) foci both on ‘bearing fruit’ and on ‘faith alone’; the tree’s leaves are also referred to as a seasonal indicator, and functionalized as an anticipative sign of coming things (*Mt* 24:32; *Mk* 13:28; *Lk* 21:29–31); finally—and arguably most importantly for Augustine’s case (from his point of view)—see the fig tree’s (apparently incidental) nexus with men (and sinners) being called into the Lord’s service (*Lk* 19:4–5, plus context; especially also *Jn* 1:48–50).

5 Petrarch—emulating Augustine in many matters literary—also uses the tool of putting words into his own mouth (an *auto-allocutio*): “and [I] addressed myself in words like these” (“Mont Ventoux” 39), “talibus me ipsum compellabam verbis” (*Epistole* 122, 9*[IV, i]); the ensuing features an embedded *sermocinatio* (“they say”, “ut aiunt”, “come dicono”), with the added piquancy that he is here citing *Scripture*, while treating beatitude Nominalistically: “The life we call blessed” (“Mont Ventoux” 40), “vita, quam beatam dicimus”, “La vita che noi chiamiamo beata” (*Epistole* 122–123, 9*[IV, i]). The process of *auto-sermocinatio* (metapoetically speaking) is repeated further down: “and I said to myself” (“Mont Ventoux” 42), “Dicebam [...] ad me ipsum” (*Epistole* 126, 9*[IV, i])—with the ensuing remarks featuring an embedded citation from Augustine (cf. “Mont Ventoux” 42; *Epistole* 126, 9*[IV, i]); again: “and asked myself” (“Mont Ventoux” 43), “et querebam ex me ipse” (*Epistole* 128, 9*[IV, i]). Then, of course, he reenacts the Augustinian ‘*tolle lege*’ scene in a sort of intertextual *mise en abyme* (explicitly so: “The same had happened before”, “Mont Ventoux” 45; “Quod iam ante [...] acciderat”, *Epistole* 130; 9*[IV, i])—and from on high, Petrarch being on a mountain at this (at least physical, temporal) turning point; the imposing setting might be part of the *aemulatio*, given the trouble taken to describe it in vividmost detail, while Augustine is just ‘out there in the nowhere under some fig tree’. Cf. Blumenberg: “Die Darstellung der Besteigung des Mont Ventoux exemplifiziert anschaulich, was ‘Realität’ der Geschichte als Umbesetzung formaler Stellengefüge bedeutet” (*Legitimität* 399); in an affine context, the philosopher adds: “Bekehrungserlebnisse dieser Art setzen fast allemal formale Identitäten voraus, erweisen sich also als Umbesetzungen” (*Quellen* 160). “Durchsetzung und Bestätigung der Umbesetzung sind rhetorische Akte” (“Annäherung” 426). Petrarch logs: “I thought it fit to look into the volume of Augustine’s *Confessions* [...]. I opened it with the intention of reading whatever might occur to me first” (“Mont Ventoux” 44; cf. 45; with *Epistole* 128–130, 9*[IV, i]). “Aperio, lecturus quicquid occurreret” (*Epistole* 130; 9*[IV, i]). Before the passage is read out, Petrarch’s brother is said to stand “beside” him, “intently expecting to hear something from Augustine on” the speaker’s “mouth”—the Humanist envisions himself as, writes himself into the role of, the Father’s mouthpiece (“Mont Ventoux” 44): “per os meum ab Augustino aliquid audire” (*Epistole* 130; 9*[IV, i]). As to the persistence of said reading *praxis*, see Blumenberg: “Goethe war, vom elterlichen Hausumgang

the interiority of his mind with words he attributes to her, Augustine here confesses to be ‘writing words into his own mouth’ (so to speak).⁶ The envisioned interlocutor is silent.⁷

Then—accentuated by the crucial indicator “*ecce*” (see *Jn* 19:5; *Vulgate*), by a change to the present tense (“*audio*”) for purposes of vivid immediacy (*evidentia*), and couched in ignorance (“*nescio*”) once again—the decisive *sermocinatio* occurs, which everyone knows:

et ecce audio vocem de vicina domo cum cantu dicentis et crebro repetentis, quasi pueri an puellae, nescio: ‘tolle lege, tolle lege’. statimque mutato vultu[.]

And look!—from the house next door I hear a voice—I don’t know whether it is a boy or a girl—singing some words over and over: ‘Pick it up and read it, pick it up and read it!’ Immediately my expression transformed. (Augustine *Conf.* 1–8. 408–409, VIII.12.29)⁸

mit der Bibel her, ein Glücksaufschlager. Er öffnete Bücher aufs Geratewohl und fand, was er suchte. Es bestätigte ihm, daß das Leben in exemplarischer Selbstdarbietung auf ihn zulief” (*Arbeit* 587–588). “Zu Adele Schopenhauer sagt Goethe 1819, er habe *immer das Glück* [...] in Büchern die bedeutendsten Stellen aufzuschlagen ... (Werke XXIII 44)” (*Arbeit* 587n.).

6 This being possible or plausible due to the temporal (and notional) distance between the narrating (refining) *persona*—the *auctor* called ‘Augustine’ (including his projected *ethos*)—and the work’s protagonist (by the same name), whose previous experiences are said to be rendered in narrative form (an ‘ethopoietic’ act). As to chronology, Hammond suggests “354–386” CE in terms of the events referred to in the *Confessions* overall; “397” as “the time when Augustine composed this account”; while it was not until “426 or 427” that “he looked back [...] at what he had written and evaluated it” (“Intro.” xv). Contrast Enterline’s unrhetorical take (*Body* 93–94).

7 See Küpper: “Der Augustinische Mono-Theos ist erfahrbar, konzeptualisierbar einzig in den Kategorien der Differenz. Dementsprechend ist die Augustinische Theologie über ihren Basis-Satz hinaus weitgehend (nur) Rhetorik” (“Ordnung” 216). There may seem to be a certain caution with respect to hearing God speak (lest one be putting words into His mouth); after the prophets and Christ, and especially by the time of Late Antiquity, God has always already spoken (in the past and canonized *Scripture*), wherefore talking to the Deity may regularly amount to a soliloquy—perchance especially so if done ‘by the book’. In this regard, cf. e.g. “vides haec, domine, et taces [...] numquid semper tacebis” (*Conf.* 1–8. 50, I.18.28)—see *Ps* 82:2 (*Vulgate*; i.e. *Ps* 83:1, *NIV*); “habitans in excelsis in silentio, deus” (*Conf.* 1–8. 52, I.18.29); cf. the gloss: “A[ugustine] repeatedly associates silence with God” (*Conf.* 1–8. 52n.). Regarding Petrarch’s *Secretum*, and the ‘silence of Truth personified’, see Küpper: “die Allegorie der Veritas, hinter der sich niemand anderes als der christliche Gott selbst verbirgt, jener Gott, der zu Zeiten des fiktiven Interlokutors [sc. Petrarch’s ‘Augustinus’] noch gesprochen hatte (‘tolle, lege’), schweigt in diesem von Anfang bis Ende kontroversen Gespräch” (*Schweigen* 52).

8 Cf. Küpper (*Diskurs-Renovatio* 184; 295; *Discursive Renovatio* 174; 285; *Schweigen* 32; 52). Given the context—it being a passage from Paul’s *Letter to the Romans* (“codicem apostoli”) that effects Augustine’s ‘conversion’ (*Conf.* 1–8. 410–411, VIII.12.29)—a comparison with the words that bring about Saul’s volte-face is meet (and a scholarly consensus, of course): “Saul,

The face turns first—owing to the outward sign—quasi ‘prefiguring’ the inner conversion resulting from the perusal of the message within the book subsequently opened.⁹ Standing in for the tacit Deity, a child—see “parvulos” (*Mt* 19:14, *Mk* 10:14), “pueros” (*Lk* 18:16), and “pueri” (in the plural at *Conf.* 1–8. 408, VIII.12.29, hence no matter which gender)—is heard to utter the above, with the writer (decidedly) putting them into the mouth of those with respect to

Saule quid me persequeris”—the situation having been specified as “audivit vocem dicentem” (*Acts* 9:4, *Vulgate*; resp. “audivi vocem dicentem” in *Acts* 22:7, “loquentem” in 26:14). For the expediency (hence durability) of this (quasi ‘ethopoietic’) pattern in the Christian tradition, see Küpper on Constantine’s ‘conversion’ as per Eusebius and Lactantius (*Diskurs-Renovatio* 181–186, spec. 183–184; *Discursive Renovatio* 171–176, spec. 173–174). Augustine not only accommodates his own version to the intentional structure and significance of the situation that is to prefigure his own, but also ‘ties in with’ (sc. *hypólepsis*) the precise wording (“audio vocem”), and even with the ‘tonality’ of the prefiguring statement—the iterated vocative “Saule, Saule” being comparable to the twofold imperative repeated (“tolle, lege”). As a bilingual *synkrisis* will render patent, the trans. here is likely to seem infelicitous. While naturally conceding Hammond’s commonsensical comments concerning the dissimilar linguistic configurations of (synthetic) Latin and (analytic) English (cf. “Intro.” xxxvi), defending the choice of converting the crucially concise (hence memorable, highly ‘portable’), partly paronomastic formula ‘tolle, lege’ into such prolixity might prove problematic; there seems to be no (linguistic, grammatical) reason for not rendering the dictum (trochaically) as ‘take it, read it’—or even (less gently and euphoniously, while entirely in line with the imperative) ‘take! read!’. The formula is repeated and varied (as per the resp. rhetorical precept) in the following paragraphs: “ut aperirem codicem et legerem quod primum caput invenissem” (*Conf.* 1–8. 408, VIII.12.29); “arripui, aperui, et legi in silentio capitulum quo primum coniecti sunt oculi mei” (*Conf.* 1–8. 410, VIII.12.29)—here a paronomastic tricolon, featuring a (continued) density of *cl*. As to the above semiotic marker, see Hammond: “The terms *ecce* [...] and *vide* [...] are fundamental to how emphatically Augustine draws the reader’s attention to key points in his argument; they also remind the reader repeatedly that *Conf[essions]* is [sc. to be] a dialogue with God and the reader, not a soliloquy” (“Intro.” xxxvii)—implying that, as to crafting his *ethos*, a *sermocinatio* would be misplaced, here. Regarding the density of references to ‘not knowing’, cf. that the writer takes care to intimate his being unable to recall exactly what his earlier ‘self’ had been doing at said point in time: “Then I put my finger [‘aut digito’], or some other marker [‘aut nescio quo alio signo’], into the book and closed it” (*Conf.* 1–8. 410–411, VIII.12.30); in the next sentence, Augustine describes his not having known at the time (“quod ego nesciebam”) what had been going on in Alypius while the aforesaid was taking place with(in) himself (*Conf.* 1–8. 410, VIII.12.30). As regards the significance of an “absence of facial expression” in a Tacitean context (“immoto...vultu”, “neque...vultu mutato”), cf. Gill (“Question” 486; 486n.). On the concept of ‘*hypólepsis*’ (‘taking up and tying in with’), see Mayfield (“Variants of *hypólepsis*” passim; spec. 239–266).

9 Cf. (paralleling the above): “Immediately [‘statim quippe’], the end of the sentence was like a light of sanctuary poured into my heart; every shadow of doubt [‘dubitationis’] melted away” (*Conf.* 1–8. 410–411, VIII.12.29). The trans. does not render the emphatic “quippe”.

whom it is written that “*talium est enim regnum Dei*” (*Mk* 10:14, *Lk* 18:16; *Vulgate*).¹⁰ It seems unlikely that the ‘momentaneous evidence’ effectuated by this Augustinian *sermocinatio* could have escaped anyone living in a prevalently Christian community pertaining to Late Antiquity, Medieval times, or the Early Modern period.¹¹

By making various personified voices speak in his place, the Church Father is acting on the rhetorico-‘ethopoietic’ assumption *par excellence*: ‘self sells’.¹²

10 Cf. *Mt* 19:14, which has “caelorum” in lieu of “Dei”. It will be ethopoetically significant that Augustine, consistent with his gestures signaling doubt and uncertainty as to knowledge prior to the ‘conversion’—“nescio”, “nescio” (*Conf.* 1–8. 408, VIII.12.28–29), “nescio”, “nesciebam” (*Conf.* 1–8. 410, VIII.12.30)—instantly tries (hence fails) to apply reason to the situation: “I started to ask myself eagerly whether it was common for children [‘pueri’] to chant such words when they were playing a game of some kind. I could not recall ever having heard anything quite like it. [...] I understood it as nothing short of divine providence that I was being ordered to open the book and read the first passage I came across” (*Conf.* 1–8. 408–409, VIII.12.29). This course is induced by recalling an occurrence heard about (or read) that seems to quasi ‘prefigure’ (sc. with repeatable ‘fulfillments’, here; generally, cf. Küpper *Diskurs-Renovatio* 100 with 184; *Discursive Renovatio* 89–90 with 174) Augustine’s own case at hand: “I had heard [‘audieram’] of Antony, how he had been challenged by a reading from the gospel which he happened to [‘forte’, sc. by chance] encounter, as if what he was reading was being spoken for himself [‘tamquam sibi diceretur quod legebatur’]” (*Conf.* 1–8. 408–411, VIII.12.29)—*Scripture* itself acts as a ‘speaker’, the word *kat’ exochén* (for a Christian) is quasi personified. The (basic structure of the) passage that follows seems similarly formulaic (being likewise paronomastic, memorable): “vade, vende [...] et veni, sequere me”—the result of which is an ‘instantaneous conversion’: “et tali oraculo confestim ad te esse conversum” (*Conf.* 1–8. 410–411, VIII.12.29).

11 On the concept of ‘*momentane Evidenz*’, here employed *mutatis mutandis*, see Blumenberg (e.g. “Möglichkeit” passim; spec. 10–12; 15; 26; for further references and applications, cf. Mayfield *Artful* 48n.; 92; spec. 92n.; 256n.); and the n. in 4.1, herein.

12 What Kopperschmidt states in an Augustinian context may seem to apply to the Bishop of Hippo himself: his “Werk ist bis in die Rhetorik hinein ‘Selbstdarstellung’” (103); with the former not only concurring to, but factually crafting, the latter. Similarly, one might read the phrase the critic uses to qualify the “‘Confessiones’”: “eine vor Gott bekenntnishaft abgelegte und ihn zugleich rühmende Lebensbeichte” (107; without 122n.)—taking “ihn” to refer to the writer, rather than his Deity (against Kopperschmidt’s grain).

2 Provisional Heuristics

a study of how exactly a technique like *ēthopoiia*, for example, is used in different genres and throughout different eras could considerably enhance our understanding of narrative practice and rhetorical texture in literary history.

—De Temmerman/Emde Boas (“Epilogue” 652)¹³

From a metapoetical perspective, ventriloquistic tendencies—words being put into someone’s mouth—seem to be present in works of history, mythology, ‘(auto)biography’ (for instance), and prevalent in declamation, drama, and dialog (*inter alia*).¹⁴ Having commenced with a well-known example from Late

13 See this pertinent assessment on the part of De Temmerman/Emde Boas: “The notion that speech indicates character is [...] central to the ancient concept of *ēthopoiia*. In its broadest sense, this [...] refers to the construction (*poiia*) of *ēthos* in general, i.e. both direct and indirect characterization in all its forms. [...] in practice, the notion of characterization through speech is usually central: the term can refer, among other things, to an orator’s ability to depict himself in his speech as good and trustworthy and, perhaps most famously, to a rhetorical exercise (*progymnasma*) that trained students to speak ‘in character’ of a (possibly fictitious) person” (“Intro.” 22). The ensuing nuances seem called for: one is dealing with the crafting of an impression; De Temmerman’s/Emde Boas’ (pertinent) focus on the process of reception (see “Intro.” 2–3; 12; 18; “Epilogue” 650) may incidentally deprioritize the (*peistikó*-purposive) poetics (of effect) involved—for which a functional analysis is requisite. The eds. concede this in their conclusion: “As the underpinning in ancient rhetoric of techniques of characterization central to this book suggests, and as many chapters [...] show, the way in which character is constructed is not neutral; it is a rhetorical phenomenon involving strategies of (c)overtness, im[...]explicitness, [...] (inter[-]/[...], intratextual or ‘internarrative’) a[...]dissociation” (“Epilogue” 650); “notions evoked by the concept of character (performance/observability, permanence, shapeability/external influence, habituation)” are “not simply a given, but rather constructs [...] consciously designed and used [...] in larger rhetorical agendas” (“Epilogue” 651). Even so, a decisive uptake, assessment of diachronically pluralistic taxonomies, technical variants, including a correspondingly detailed discussion of functional applications, may not appear to be taking place in a comprehensive (or structural) manner. This would apply even to a (somewhat limited) narratological take, since Ancient discourses will require express recourse to rhetoric also in the diagnostic instrumentarium utilized. It seems significant that said volume features but two subchs. on ‘Oratory’ (cf. *Characterization* VII; in part 5: 407–442). The eds. explicitly exclude “Isocrates and, of course, Theophrastus” (“Epilogue” 651)—which must seem somewhat curious, given the title (and despite the narrow, narratological focus).

14 In line with Lanham, epistolography might be added to this list: “as part of the centuries-long shift from an oral culture to one dependent on writing, the written letter replaced the spoken declamation as the primary vehicle for practice in prose composition” (“Composition” 127); “the letter form would provide an excellent framework for [...] *prosopopoeia* or *ethopoeia*” (“Composition” 126). In this respect, see spec. subch. 5.1, herein.

Antiquity in chapter 1, the submission of selected Ancient and Early Modern examples from the dialogic genre (*sensu lato*) in this heuristic *synkrisis* is to prepare the detailed taxonomic description of various forms of rhetorical ventriloquism and the affine concept of oratorico-dramatic ‘*personae*’ in section 3 (concerned with the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Cicero, Quintilian, *inter alia*).¹⁵ With an increasing focus on the plane of application, section 4 addresses variants of rhetorical ‘selfcraft’ (dealing with Dionysius on *ethopoïa*, and a rhetorico-theatrical approach to authorship by recourse to Shakespeare and Cervantes).¹⁶ Part 5 features assorted transgeneric and diachronic applications of oratorico-ventriloquistic devices from a *comparatiste* perspective. The conclusion is of synoptic character (percursorily recapitulating parts 1 through 5), and includes a concise coda on ‘entechnic’ artlessness.

¹⁵ The term ‘heuristic’ is used in an (etymologico-)rhetorical sense qua relating to provisional ‘findings’, initial ‘encounters’, tentative ‘discoveries’ (the orator’s first office: *heuresis*, *inventio*). In the first and this ch., assorted examples and passages featuring various forms of ventriloquism are presented side by side to facilitate a preliminary comparison at the level of specific instances, prior to moving on to the more general, taxonomic descriptions in part 3. In so doing, this essay proceeds inductively—from particular instances (chs. 1, 2) to the more universal plane (part 3, with subchs.), and back to (increasingly) specific cases (chs. 4, 5). This method is characteristic of rhetoric, which begins with the finite (facts, situation), proceeds to the nonfinite (generalizations, more universal, ‘infinite’ questions)—applying, in a concluding step, the latter back to the case resp. at hand. See Moos (188–190, §50; spec. 190).

¹⁶ With respect to a morphological pattern for the term ‘selfcraft’, see Lever’s comparable Early Modern word formations in his *Arte of Reason*, as qualified by the ensuing subtitle: *rightly termed, Witcraft, teaching a perfect way to argue and dispute* (*.i.; with 1, I.1.1, A.; spelling accommodated here and below); see Lever’s meta-morphological preface (*.iijj.r-*.i.r); plus the explanatory ‘table’ qua word index (no pag., equivalent to 238–239, Q.ii.v–r; with the n. in the facsimile’s fm, no pag.). Lever demonstrates that <-craft> is morphologically productive, giving his own, as well as other examples thereto: “witcrafte, speachcraft, starrecraft, etc.” (6–7, I.1.35, A.iijj.v–r); likewise in the tabular appendix: “crafte is the aunciente English worde, whereby wee haue used to expresse an Arte: whiche two wordes knit together in Witcrafte, doe signifie the Arte that teacheth witte and reason. And why shoulde handcrafte and witchcraft bee good englishe names: and Starcraft and Witcrafte bee none: the simples beeing knowne, and the composition lyke” (no pag., equivalent to 238–239, Q.ii.v–r); in employing the term “composition”, Lever pragmatically performs the linguistically bilateral, cross-referential function of this index, having previously written the equivalent phrase “two wordes knit together”. As to another term at issue, Lever takes a strictly logical and material (rather than rhetorical) view, Englishing “indiuiduum” as “a Selve thing, or a sole thing” (no pag., equivalent to 238, Q.ii.v; cf. 5, I.1.24, A.iij.; 77, II.6.2–4, E.vij.r). On Early Modern neologicistic practice, cf. Puttenham’s meta-statements (242, III.9; with Wigham/Rebhorn 58–60).

2.1 On Dialog and Ventriloquism

Mihi videtur omnis oratio effe *διαλογισμός*[.]
 Scaliger (126, III.xlviii)¹⁷

Whereas the title of the Erasmian “Ciceronianus” will inevitably be received as a nominal gesture also—hence prompt diverse, historically accrued connotations associated with the Roman *rhétor*’s name in the respective reader’s mind—its “Personae” are “Bulephorus, Hypologus et Nosoponus” (“Ciceronianus” 2). Not only will the appellations of said protagonists hardly be familiar; they are also speaking names (and Humanist coinages).¹⁸ Accordingly, words put into the

17 John of Sardis emphasizes the pervasiveness of the devices at issue: “Ethopoeia [...] is suitable in all parts of a speech and especially in the proofs; for it makes the language alive and moves the hearer to share the emotion of the speaker by presenting his character”; it “occurs in almost all [...] exercises and is a part of each, starting with fables”; “to compress” or “extend them, we” employ “ethopoeia” (213, §11.194). “Practice in ethopoeia is most useful everywhere; for it does not contribute to only one species of rhetoric, but to all. Everywhere [...] we form characters and attribute speech to persons” (217, §11.200). See Kustas: “The influence that *ἠθοποιία* exercised upon other forms of literature and the high esteem in which it was held in Byzantine circles are [...] illustrated [...] in an anonymous scholium on Aphthonius that *ἠθοποιία* is the perfect kind of progymnasma and in this capacity contributes to the *ἐπιστολιμαῖος χαρακτήρ*” (59–60; cf. 60n.). Lanham sees it as a transgeneric craft: “Establishing an authorial voice, an *ethos*, is a central task for any speaker or writer” (“Instruction” 111).

18 With ‘Bulephorus’ qua ‘bearing counsel’; ‘Hypologus’ as ‘(additional) partner in dialog’ (*de re*), or ‘all but reasonable’; ‘Nosoponus’ may mean ‘plagued by pain’ (approx.; cf. Payr’s gloss at “Ciceronianus” 3n.; with 345n.; Payr XLIII; Cave *Cornucopian* 149); paronomastically, the text draws attention to the naming process: “ex Hypologo fiam Hyponosus” (“Ciceronianus” 344)—hence “‘halfway ill’ as opposed to ‘halfway reasonable’” (“Ciceronianus” 345n.; trans. dsm). Cf. Payr on the typical make of one of the *personae*: “Tatsächlich hat Nosoponus außer seiner Vorliebe für Cicero so gut wie keine individuellen Züge” (XLIV)—rendering this a sort of ‘effictionalizing’ *notatio* (see subch. 3.1). She stresses the need for differentiating which words are being put in whose mouth, logs that this was apparently not done in the contemporaneous reception (IL). The set of issues resulting from an equalization of (intratextual) *personae* with (verifiably) factual beings (resp. the *auctor*) is another matter (cf. XLIII–XLIV; IL). It is linked to ethopoetic considerations in that (usually intertextual, rather than ‘historical’) consistencies are taken as evidence by a given audience: an *ethos* crafted and projected during what is perceived as speech *in propria persona* is found to align with the ‘character’ of what is deemed a ‘mouthpiece’. Cf. Henderson’s formulation: “the attack on Ciceronian letter-writers that [...] Erasmus [...] deliver[ed] through his character Bulephorus” (348). Eden sees “Bulephorus” as Erasmus’ “porte-parole” (“Acclaim” 46). Generally, a rhetorico-poetic act of ventriloquism (*de re, per se*) signifies that a resp. position may be taken (heuristically, potentially, conceivably): one is dealing with *prosopopoiiai* of, and for, particular perspectives (overall stances or specific viewpoints personified, so to speak; cf. subch. 5.2, herein). Referring also to “the *Ciceronianus*”,

mouths of these *prósopa* with the insinuating identifiers of Erasmian craft will likely differ—in their (immediate) effect on the recipient—from encountering utterances by ‘Socrates’ or ‘Gorgias’ in the respective dialog on Plato’s part.¹⁹

While the latter’s list of ‘*dramatis personae*’ (“TA TOY ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ”) also includes ‘Callicles, Chaerephon, Polus’ (see “Gorgias” 258–259, 447A), it may seem all but indisputable that the text would have a different ring (and reception, probably), if entitled ‘ΠΙΛΛΟΣ’—rather than “Gorgias”.²⁰

Cave states: “the colloquial relationship of writer and reader is enacted and almost [...] preempted by the *sermocinatio* of the characters in the dialogue. Rabelais and Montaigne likewise dramatize their would-be oral communication with the reader, caricaturing him, tricking him, simultaneously inviting and excluding him” (*Cornucopian* 146).

19 Generally, Kennedy logs that, among “[t]he wandering teachers known as ‘sophists’, [...] Gorgias and Protagoras are probably the most famous because of their roles in dialogues of Plato” (“Intro. [2003]” xi). Any history of reception ‘follows the names’ incidentally or expressly (in the scholar’s investigative tracing). As a matter of course—and all but irrespective of philosophical wishful thinking, (apparently capable of) believing in readings for reasons of content—texts are received and reread all but exclusively on account of their (nominal) attribution to a particular *auctor*, and the expectations said name generates; or in view of the apparent or recognized authority of the intratextual *personae*, whose (extraliterary) positions are conceived of as being faithfully represented (mainly due to a rhetorically effected and -ive, hence ultimately ‘entechnic’, impression of consistency; see subch. 3.3, herein).

20 The case differs in that other “dialogue” whose “chief theme [...] is rhetoric” (Fowler 407; cf. 408)—which is precisely not called ‘Lysias’; the ed. logs: “Some of the persons mentioned in the dialogue are so well known that no further account of them is necessary” (410); but “[o]f Phaedrus [...] little or nothing is known except what we learn from Plato” (410). For a rhetorical analysis of said work, see Dionysius (“Demosthenes” 258–265, §7; spec. 263; with “Pompeius” 358–359, §1; 369–371, §2; vs. Plato, 352–371, §1–2). Cf. “Für die Würdigung der rednerischen Verdienste des Lysias sind Kunsturtheile aus dem Alterthum in bedeutend[...]er Fülle überliefert [...]: von Platon bis zu Photius reihet sich ein mehr oder minder berühmter Name an den andern an” (Blass *Beredsamkeit I* 383; on Plato’s view or version of ‘Lysias’, cf. 383–386). The scholar logs that the former, “den Phaidros ausgenommen, [...] Lysias nicht erwähnt” (*Beredsamkeit I* 386). As per D. Laertius, it was said or supposed that the logographer had writ a speech for Socrates, whereby he might defend himself in court—which the latter refused as ‘unsuitable to himself’ (see *Lives I*. 171, II.40–41; with Montaigne *Essais III*. 387–388, III.xii; cf. 571n.). Meeting Socrates, Plato’s titular *persona* claims to be coming from Lysias (“Phaedrus” 413, 227A, §1). After some to and fro, it turns out that Phaedrus will not have to “tell from memory, in a way that is worthy of Lysias” a certain “love-speech” delivered by “the cleverest [‘δαινότατος’] writer of our day” (“Phaedrus” 414–415, 228C–D, §1); nor “repeat the general sense of the whole” (“Phaedrus” 417, 228D, §3)—having brought “the actual discourse [‘τὸν λόγον αὐτόν’]” (“Phaedrus” 418–419, 228D, §3); he delivers the speech in the orator’s name (“Phaedrus” 424–435, 230E–234C, §6–10). In forensic terms, the Lysian ‘client’ Phaedrus reads out a discourse before the ‘judge’ Socrates—with the difference that the ‘enargico-ethopoietic’ effect expressly relates to the absent logographer, for whom (and on whose behalf) the speech

Writings and detached statements by the latter (qua historico-virtual presence) were highly familiar, floating in the cultural networks during the dialog's initial reception (variously mediated, potentially enduring to this day).²¹ In line

is given, rather than to his (current) spokesperson: “when Lysias is here [‘παρόντος δὲ Λυσίου ἑμαυτὸν’] I have not the slightest intention of lending you my ears” (“Phaedrus” 418–419?, 228E, §3; cf. 526–527, 263E, §46)—hence ‘Lysias himself is present’ (‘evidently’, ethopoetically) in the speech assigned to him. “The first of the three discourses on love is ascribed to [...] Lysias [...] it approaches the style of his extant speeches as nearly as a discourse on such a subject can be expected to approach the style of a speech intended for delivery in [...] court [...] Plato was a consummate literary artist” (Fowler 409; contrast: Süss 10–12, spec. 11). At the metalevel, Plato is ascribing words to Phaedrus, into whose mouth (written) *lógoi* are said to have been put by Lysias. In other words: the philosophizing *rhétor* has writ a (discursively, ethopoetically functionalized) discourse for the (extra-dialogic) logographer—delivered vicariously by an intratextual *persona*. When Phaedrus (still feigning not to have the speech in writing) states: “I have not at all learned the words by heart; but I will repeat the general sense of the whole” (“Phaedrus” 417, 228D, §3; cf. 415, 228A, §1)—he implies his putting other (while verisimilar, *de re* adequate) words into Lysias’ mouth. The *ethopoíai* of the speakers are performed explicitly and intra-dialogically, by the resp. other (“If I don’t know Phaedrus, I have forgotten myself”, “Phaedrus” 417, 228A, §2, with 228A–C; and 441–443, 236C–E, §12–13; ‘auto-hypoleptically’ pointing back to: 417, 228B–C, §2; 425, 230D–E, §5). Socrates is “quite overcome by” Phaedrus’ ‘syn-homoio-pathetic’ *actio* (“Phaedrus” 435, 234D, §10) of Lysian *elocutio* (“Phaedrus” 437, 234E–235A, §10). With characteristic conceit, he then goes so far as to put a verdict (hence a *prohairesis*) on (what is said to be) the logographer’s own discourse into the latter’s mouth *in absentia* (since he is not present in, or vicariously represented by, speech at that point): “even Lysias himself would not think that [sc. ‘the rhetorical manner’] satisfactory” (“Phaedrus” 437, 235A, §10). Into some minds the notion may be put that Plato has placed a discourse into the mouth of the orator’s *vicarius* that is as criticizable as possible. Lysias’ ‘image’ continues to be present, e.g. when Socrates logs that his *lógos* will be hypoleptic of necessity (“Phaedrus” 438–439, 235E, §11; cf. 522–525, 262C–E, §45; 526–529, 263D–264A, §46–47); or when giving himself as Phaedrus’ mouthpiece: “do you not believe that Love [...] is a god? / [...] So it is said / [...] Yes, but not by Lysias, nor by your speech which was spoken by you through my mouth that you bewitched” (“Phaedrus” 461, 242D–E, §20)—which ironico-humorously, but still effectively ‘accuses’ Phaedrus of ventriloquism (cf. “Phaedrus” 465, 244A, §22, for the attribution of the ensuing). With (typically Platonic) hauteur, Socrates “advise[s] Lysias also to write” another speech *in utramque partem* (“Phaedrus” 463–465, 243D–E, §21; cf. 505, 257B–C, §38–39); and addresses him in an apostrophe: “Do we want to question Lysias about this” (“Phaedrus” 511, 258D, §40). The dialog concludes with Socrates’ delegating Phaedrus to “Go and tell Lysias” all about his ‘philosophical rhetoric’ as the only legitimate (hence mono-) *lógos* (“Phaedrus” 575, 278B, §64; cf. 574–577, 278C–279B, §64; 570–571, 277B–C, §62)—another (intra-, extratextual) *sermocinatio*. On the whole and in (always) other words: ventriloquistic devices are present at various discursive levels throughout a dialog that, *inter alia*, is precisely concerned with such a (particularly rhetorical) enactment of vicariousness (a formal or structural *mise en scène et abyme*; see this subch., as well as 3.1, 5.2). On Lysias, cf. segments 4.1 and 5.2, herein.

²¹ On “culture as a (virtual) network”, see Küpper (“Hypotheses” 1; 4; passim, spec. 6–9; cf.

therewith, words put into the mouth of the protagonist named ‘Gorgias’ in Plato’s work also had (and have) a (conceivable) extratextual measure determining their expediency.²² Consequently, his intra-dialogic reply to the Socratic inquiry regarding ‘rhetoric’s particular concern’ as “With speech [‘*Peri lógous*’]” (“Gorgias” 268–269, 449D) is likely to seem plausibly ‘Gorgianic’.²³

What is a *sermocinatio* metapoetically speaking—an (implied) extratextual author attributing probable words to protagonists, here named like otherwise historical (and apparently familiar) human beings—also occurs intratextually, in a quasi ‘*mise en abyme* of the device itself’.²⁴ For the Platonic ‘Socrates’ waxes

Cultural Net passim; “Rhetoric” passim; Küpper/Pawlita V; Küpper et al. 2); Mayfield (“Proceedings” 220–222; “Interplay” 3–5; 28; 36). See Bloemendal’s affine approach (“Polish Pindar” 115–117; 122–123; 130; “Transfer” passim). Provisionally, *hypólepsis* may be described as the ‘poetics’ of the (virtual) cultural network (see Mayfield “Variants of *hypólepsis*” passim).

22 As Blumenberg notes, the fact that words are being put into the mouth of someone whose name is associated with extratextual temporality and events may modify the process of reception (and endow the device of *sermocinatio* with an anticipatory function, for instance): “Der Philosoph vertritt die Wahrheit, aber sie vertritt ihn nicht: es wäre gar nicht so verwunderlich, wenn er ihretwegen sterben müßte (521D). Man darf nicht vergessen: für Autor und Leser des ‘Gorgias’ ist diese Aporie bereits im Tod des Sokrates realisiert!” (*Paradigmen* 112–113). Cf. Schwartz (with a grain of salt): “So scharf auch Platons Angriffe gegen die Redekunst des Gorgias sind, so ist er selbst bei Platon doch ein gemütlicher alter Herr, der sich dagegen verwahrt, daß von seiner Kunst eine schlechte Anwendung gemacht werde” (79). A rhetorico-technical approach to various forms of ventriloquism must render untenable any value judgmentalism of the ensuing cast: “There is no other first-class thinker whom Plato ever represents as speaking in his own person except Socrates” (Robinson 226).

23 Cf. K. Morgan’s expedient observations concerning the ‘ethopoietic’ technique in relation to both the sender and the receiver: “Socrates [...] crafts an argumentative strategy that is tailored for the character of a particular interlocutor, and the character of the interlocutor emerges through the answers he gives [...]. His philosophical quest thus proceeds in an *ad hominem* manner” (445–446). See Niehues-Pröbsting: “Die für den sokratischen Dialog wesentliche Verbindung von *logos* und *ethos* verlangt eine bestimmte Art von Themen. [...] mit den Sachen, die in Frage und Antwort erörtert werden, [‘stehen’] die Personen, die die Sachen vertreten, auf dem Prüfstand. [...] In der ‘Apologie’ erklärt Sokrates die Menschenprüfung als sein Hauptgeschäft” (*Die antike Phil.* 59). The above, ‘brachylogic’ reply (complying with the ‘Socratic’ desire for brevity, to which he himself does not adhere, “Gorgias” 266–267, 449C) is restated as follows: “rhetoric[’s] [...] whole activity [‘praxis’] and efficacy [‘*kýrosis*’] is by means of speech. For this reason I claim for the rhetorical art that it is concerned with speech [‘*peri lógous*’]” (“Gorgias” 270–271, 450B–C); this will probably not be (all that) far from Aristotle’s accent and focus on ‘entechnicity’ (cf. subch. 3.3). Generally speaking, Niehues-Pröbsting logs: “Die rhetorische Form schlechthin ist die Rede” (*Die antike Phil.* 54). Cf. “The root *rhê/rha* refers to speech and is found also in Greek *erô* and Latin *orator*” (Kennedy’s gloss, Nicolaus 132n.).

24 As to the latter, see Küpper’s formulations in a (structurally) comparable context (*Diskurs-Renovatio* 342; 370; 372; 381; *Discursive Renovatio* 333; 362; 364; 373).

‘makrologic’ by contrast, decidedly performing the effectuality of speech in several, cumulated ventriloquisms.²⁵ First, he has recourse to an unspecified someone (cf. “Gorgias” 272–275, 451A–C); then puts words into the mouths of generic representatives pertaining to particular professions (“doctor”, “trainer”, “money-getter”, “Gorgias” 274–277, 452A–D); finally—lest the *rhétor* speak too much—‘Socrates’ even anticipates a reply his interlocutor is likely to make:

And your opinion is right, as you can prove in this way: if some one asked you—Is there, Gorgias, a false and a true belief?—you would say, Yes, I imagine [‘phaías án, hos egò oimai’]. (“Gorgias” 284–285, 454D)²⁶

25 Prior to treating affine terms in III.iii, III.xxxiii–xxxv, III.xlviii, Scaliger signals the layering of *prosopopoeiae* (and *sermocinationes*) at the onset of the first book; this may be performed *in propria persona*, or by putting words into someone’s mouth, who might be ascribing speech to yet others: “Difceptat orator in foro, de vita, vitii, virtutibus: atque ea examinat in ftatu qualitatis: & in eo, quo quaeritur, Quid fit. Item in conciliis quid fit eligendum. Quae omnia eodē animo tractat Philoſophus & Poeta: vterque vel ex ſua vel alterius perſona: quemadmodum Socrates introducitur vel Diotimā vel Alpaſiam: & ipſum Socratem Plato. fic etiam orator interponit profopopœias” (3, I.i). Referring to the “Gorgias” as a “lively drama” (“Intro. Gorgias” 249), Lamb sees language and certain concepts as (quasi) personified: “Plato’s dramatic art is at its height: not only are the disputants intensely alive, but the very statements [...] seem for the moment to become active participators in the contest; and ‘the truth’, ‘the good’, and ‘the just’ are similarly invested with a certain august personality. The characters of the three men who in turn oppose Socrates are ingeniously chosen” (“Intro. Gorgias” 254)—sc. crafted and projected (ethopoetically speaking). With its focus on *dispositio*, the latter stresses one aspect of what is herein termed the ‘economy of rhetorical ventriloquism’ (see ch. 5). As to a metapoetical view focusing on the (implied, extratextual) author, cf. Lamb’s formulation: “Plato is speaking through the mouth of Socrates to the world at large” (“Intro. Gorgias” 255). As to “*makrologia* and *brachylogia*” in this context, see Eden (“Refutation” 61). Blumenberg refers to the “vielleicht einzig authentischen Ausspruch, der uns von dem Nicht-Schriftsteller Sokrates überliefert ist: Ich weiß, daß ich nichts weiß” (*Beschreibung* 479)—which would entail that every other ‘Socratic’ utterance amounts to a Platonic ventriloquism.

26 Cf. “suppose some one asked [...] I should tell him [...] And suppose he went on to ask [...] I should say [...] And if he asked again [...] I should say [...] And if he proceeded to ask [...] I should say [...] And suppose, on my saying [...] he were to ask me [...] I should say” (Plato “Gorgias” 273–275, 451A–C). This basic pattern of layered (conjectural) *allocutiones* is repeated with the generic representatives (cf. “Gorgias” 274–277, 452A–D); said segment ends on an exhortation to virtual vicariousness: “Now come, Gorgias; imagine yourself being questioned by those persons and by me” (“Gorgias” 277, 452D). When not receiving the (terminological) setup he wants, ‘Socrates’ puts the coveted words into the interlocutor’s mouth (quasi autohypoleptically via delegation, tying in with himself by way of an *alter* qua dialogic pawn): “Ask me now what art I take cookery to be”; hence ‘Polus’: “Then I ask you, what art is cookery?” (“Gorgias” 311, 462D). In other words: ‘Socrates’ employs the device of *sermocinatio* to mitigate the (otherwise ‘momentaneously evident’) impression that he is in fact holding a monolog.

Having initially infinitized (“Some have said”) that Platonic *sermocinatio*, Quintilian takes up the brief reply on the part of the protagonist ‘Gorgias’ by way of a partial citation, while qualifying this *hypólepsis* with a comment indicating its character as ventriloquistic:

Some have said [‘quidam dixerunt’] that the subject matter or material of rhetoric [‘Materiam rhetorices’] is ‘speech’ [‘orationem’]: Gorgias is given this opinion in Plato [‘qua in sententia ponitur apud Platonem Gorgias’]. (*Inst. Orat.* 1–2. 406–407, 2.21.1)²⁷

Three paragraphs down, Quintilian ties in with his initial quotation:

Socrates in Plato seems to say [‘dicere (...) videtur’] to Gorgias that the subject matter [sc. ‘of rhetoric’] consists of things, not words, and in the *Phaedrus* he openly proves that rhetoric is concerned not only with law-courts and assemblies, but also with private and domestic affairs. This shows that this was Plato’s own opinion [‘quo manifestum est hanc opinionem ipsius Platonis fuisse’]. (*Inst. Orat.* 1–2. 408–409, 2.21.4)

Using a metapoetico-comparative approach, the Roman *rhétor* reattributes said words to the extratextual *auctor*—rendering patent the ventriloquistic process.

Differing both from the Erasmian neologisms personified and from Plato’s choice of notorieties, Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations*—explicitly staging argument *in utramque partem*—feature interlocutors that, rather than being entirely generic, seem somewhat particularized (also situated with regard to time and place), while still remaining unspecified ultimately, seeing that they are simply labeled “A.” and “M.” (*Tusc. Disp.* 10–11, I.v.9).²⁸

²⁷ Then follows a list of alternative views, launched with a triply paralleled “Quidam”, ended by an “Alii” (*Inst. Orat.* 1–2. 406, 2.21.2–3); the fourth paragraph opens with Quintilian’s take: “Ego (neque id sine auctoribus) materiam esse rhetorices iudico omnes res quaecumque ei ad dicendum subiectae erunt” (*Inst. Orat.* 1–2. 408, 2.21.4). Generally, see Cicero’s etymological reflections on the term ‘*rhétor*’: “the all-inclusive word [‘haec complexus est omnia’] is not ‘discoverer’ [‘inventor’], or ‘arranger’ [‘compositor’], or ‘actor’ [‘actor’], but in Greek he is called *ρήτωρ* from the word ‘to speak’ [‘ab eloquendo’], and in Latin he is said to be ‘eloquent’ [‘eloquens’]. [...] Theophrastus received his name from his divinely beautiful language [‘divinitate loquendi nomen invenit’]” (“Orator” 350–351, xix.61–62); the glosses add the (etymologically) implied terms “*eloquor*, ‘speak’”, “*ἔρω*, ‘speak’”, and (as to the cognomen “Theophrastus”) “*φράζω*, ‘speak’” (“Orator” 350n.–351n.); on the latter, cf. Rusten (8).

²⁸ Opening his work, Cicero states that he will adopt “the old Socratic method [‘vetus et Socratica ratio’] of arguing against your adversary’s position [‘contra alterius opinionem disserendi’]” as the basic structure; he explains that he will (virtually) stage this procedure of ‘*in utramque partem*’ by “put[ting] them [sc. the ‘disputationes’] before you” (*Tusc. Disp.* 10–11, I.iv.8)—i.e. ‘Brutus’ (cf. *Tusc. Disp.* 2, I.i.1; 546, V.xli.121), a generic recipient being implied (see King xxvi, xxviii)—“in the form of a debate [‘quasi agatur res’, stressing *actio*] and not in

With particular regard to the experience on the part of the recipient, another nuance concerning the selection of *personae* for the respective (extratextual) author's ventriloquistic *praxis* may be indicated by reference to those posited in the Tacitean "Dialogus": when contrasted with encountering statements ascribed to 'Socrates', reading their (historical) names ("Curiatius Maternus", "Marcus Aper", "Julius Secundus", at "Dialogus" 233, §2.1), and ventriloquized positions (throughout), would likely have (significantly) differed already for the contemporaneous audience—and even more so in the present (being known only to specialists). The Tacitean text itself draws attention to this fact, by expressly taking its initial stimulus from Maternus' having enacted 'ethopoietic' *sermocinationes* for 'Cato' the previous day—which Aper castigates on the grounds that "it looks as if of set purpose you had selected a notorious personality ['elegisse personam notabilem'], whose words would have great weight ['et cum auctoritate dicturam']" ("Dialogus" 256–257, §10.6).²⁹

narrative form ['non quasi narretur']" (*Tusc. Disp.* 10–11, I.iv.8). Featuring two speakers labeled "A." and "M.", a dialog then begins *in medias res* (*Tusc. Disp.* 10–11, I.v.9)—without the latter being clarified further. King glosses: "It is uncertain whom the initials A. and M. stand for. A. may stand for *Adolescens* or *Auditor*. It is not likely to stand for Cicero's friend Atticus, then sixty-five. M. may stand for Marcus, Cicero's own name, or for *Magister*" (*Tusc. Disp.* 10n.–11n.; cf. King xxvii). The aforesaid structural (or procedural) reference is repeated in Book II: the writer first mentions the "Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetudo de omnibus rebus in contrarias partes disserendi"—wherein is "maxima dicendi exercitatio"—and then signals that he will "not present" what follows "in narrative form ['non quasi narrantes'], but as nearly as I can in the exact words of our actual discussion ['ut actum disputatumque est']" (*Tusc. Disp.* 154–155, II.iii.9; cf. Trimpi *Muses* 57n.). Depending on the precise meaning of the speaker's (inclusive) reference here, this may also comprise *auto-allocationes*. See Cicero's later mention of Socrates' "multiplex ratio disputandi rerumque et ingenii magnitudo" (*Tusc. Disp.* 434, V.iv.11); for the device of arguing *in utramque partem*, cf. also the n. below.

29 With a (partly) ethopoietic function, another protagonist is made to fulminate ("Aper acrius, ut solebat, et intento ore", "Dialogus" 258, §11.1) against Maternus—who had the day before "given a reading of his 'Cato' [sc. the younger]", with "court circles" allegedly having "taken umbrage at the way in which he had thrown himself in the play heart and soul into the role of Cato, with never a thought of himself" ("Dialogus" 233, §2.1)—using (*inter alia*) the following words: "it is not in defence of a friend that you make yourself objectionable, but, what is more dangerous, in defence of Cato" ("Dialogus" 256–257, §10.6). With regard to what follows (and is cited above), employing the '(re-)personifying' device of an ethopoietic *sermocinatio* is here seen as, or taken to be, a political statement (on stage, in a declamation, or a similar activity). By hypoleptically selecting 'Cato' as the 'character' to be ventriloquized, Maternus is tapping into the received, familiar view of said *persona's ethos* (which 'everyone knows'). From an Aristotelian perspective, such preestablished *ethos* (quasi extra-oratorical, vicariously adopted) would be *'átechnon'* (cf. *Rhetoric* 14–17, 1355b–1356a, I.ii.2–6)—although one might argue (in this specific, declamatory case) that the very choice (*prohaíresis*) of said name, and

Another aspect concerning the choice of *personae* and their implications may be clarified with regard to (more) diegetic variants of the dialogic genre. In Shakespeare's (epic) poem "Lucrece", featuring considerable amounts of direct speech and some (immediate) exchanges, the familiar historical protagonists appear and speak within a narrative framework explicitly present. After a respective stanza ("Lucrece" 281, v.505–511), the ensuing commences with words put into Tarquin's mouth (by the implied author, from a metapoetical perspective)—a process signaled intratextually by the diegetic intercalation in the second iamb: "'LUCRECE', quoth he, 'this night I must enjoy thee. / If thou deny, then force must work my way'" ("Lucrece" 281, v.512–513). At the climax—moments before Tarquin has his will indeed (which falls into a *praeteritio*)—he intrudes upon Lucrece's speech, violating her utterance: "'So let thy thoughts, low vassals to thy state –' / 'No more', quoth he. 'By heaven, I will not hear thee! / Yield to my love'" ("Lucrece" 294, v.666–668).³⁰ At once, the *sermocinatio*'s

the authority (known to be) associated therewith (hence conveyed), pertains to the art. On "auctoritas" in an affine respect, see Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 280–281, 4.2.125; this seems to include 'atechnic' aspects; Russell's trans. also renders said term as "power to convince", *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 76–77, 9.2.72). Wisse gives "auctoritas" as "'authority, prestige'" (53).

30 Cf. Duncan-Jones/Woudhuysen (34). When the poem's focus has shifted to the female protagonist, Lucrece commences a long speech (Shakespeare "Lucrece" 300–324, v.747–1078, at times briefly interrupted by narrative comments); in its course (and *inter alia*), she curses Night personified (see "Lucrece" 301–305, v.747–812), blames the *prosopopoiiai* of Opportunity ("Lucrece" 310–313, v.874–924; cf. Duncan-Jones/Woudhuysen 45) and Time ("Lucrece" 313–316, v.925–966). See Enterline (*Schoolroom* 124–125). Summarizing her tirade—"In vain I rail at Opportunity, / At Time, at TARQUIN, and uncheerful Night" ("Lucrece" 320, v.1023–1025)—she curses her own eloquence: "Out, idle words, servants to shallow fools" ("Lucrece" 320, v.1016); "This helpless smoke of words doth me no right" ("Lucrece" 320, v.1027; cf. Duncan-Jones/Woudhuysen 46). Later (to pass the time until her husband's arrival), she studies a "skilful painting" ("Lucrece" 345, v.1367) relating matters pertaining to the Trojan War, as instigated by "HELEN's rape" ("Lucrece" 345, v.1369); its ekphrasis, and Lucrece's (hermeneutic and haptic) engagement with the work of art—as well as the afflictions it depicts, which she suffers vicariously, granting her a certain amount of relief—continues for more than 200 lines ("Lucrece" 345–363, v.1366–1582). As part of her (virtual) reception, she expressly states that she will put words into the mouth of (the depicted) 'Hecuba' (cf. the overall segment, "Lucrece" 352–356, v.1447–1498; contrast Enterline *Body* 183; her construal is problematic throughout: 152–197; see the detailed discussion below; also *Schoolroom* 126–133, spec. 128). Lucrece indicts "[t]he painter" for "giv[ing] her so much grief and not a tongue" (Shakespeare "Lucrece" 353, v.1461–1463). She herself will remedy the situation by proxy (literally speaking for, as well as on behalf of, Hecuba): "'Poor instrument' quoth she, 'without a sound, / I'll tune thy woes with my lamenting tongue'" ("Lucrece" 353, v.1464–1465; cf. Duncan-Jones 78). Said ventriloquist segment ends with the narrator's explaining: "So LUCRECE, set a-work, sad tales doth tell / To penciled pensiveness and coloured sorrow; / She lends them words, and she their looks doth

narrative indicator (“quoth he”, necessary for generic and formal reasons) infringes Tarquin’s own speech act.³¹

Technically speaking, the aforesaid again differs from a “colloquy” by Cervantes, featuring interlocutors called ‘Cipión’ and ‘Berganza’. While both are also historical names (the former being of particular fame) the words put into the mouths of these protagonists are unlikely to be checked against (or even associated with) the historical Scipio and a descendant of the House of Braganza—seeing that the respective Cervantine speakers are, from the outset, presented as canine.³² Moreover, the ventriloquistic technique is intratextually embedded—and expressly reflected upon—in the narrative framework of the “coloquio de los perros”, the *novela ejemplar* “El casamiento engañoso”.³³

To review these exploratory samples metapoetically suggesting an affinity between *sermocinatio* and various dialogic genres: an implied (seldom explicit) author—sometimes stylized as a sort of scribe, observing and noting (or, more likely, restoring from memory) a conversation apparently partaken in (or witnessed silently)—is taken to be putting words into the mouths of the respective interlocutors in all of the above cases (which, in terms of degree, will

borrow” (“Lucrece” 356, v.1496–1498). One is thus dealing with a layered (meta-) *sermocinatio* (considering the various extra- and intratextual planes, as well as the reader’s participation). For another instance of the device in “Lucrece”, see Skinner (*Forensic* 206).

31 Generally, cf. that Lucrece (using a distinctive *antanáklasis*) later also personifies her heart, suggesting words it should say (with respect to her intended suicide): “Faint not, faint heart, but stoutly say ‘So be it’” (Shakespeare “Lucrece” 334, 1209). On *distinctio* and *antanáklasis*, see Lausberg (*Elemente* 93–95, §289–292; *Handbuch* 333–336, §660–663).

32 Cf. “cada uno [‘de los dos perros’] tenía el suyo [sc. ‘nombre’] propio y significativo: Scipión o Cipión el uno, en recuerdo del gran patricio romano, y Braganza o Berganza, a la castellana, por alusión a este gran linaje portugués, el del barcino color” (Amezúa y Mayo 412); cf. “Berganza puede ser una derivación de Braganza” (Castro García 198); “Cervantes manipula sus referentes” (200). Generally, see Mayfield (“Talking Canines” *passim*).

33 The narrator Campuzano claims: “yo oí y casi vi con mis ojos a estos dos perros, que el uno se llama Cipión y el otro Berganza”; he adds: “a poco rato vine a conocer, por lo que hablaban, los que hablaban, y eran los dos perros Cipión y Berganza” (Cervantes “casamiento engañoso” 293). Initiating the colloquy, the talking dogs also call each other by said names: “CIPIÓN.—Berganza amigo [...] retirémonos a esta soledad [...] donde podremos gozar sin ser sentidos desta no vista merced que el cielo en el mismo punto a los dos nos ha hecho. / BERGANZA.—Cipión hermano, óyote hablar y sé que te hablo” (“coloquio” 299). As to this twofold *novela* (“El casamiento engañoso” and “El coloquio de los perros”), the processes of *sermocinatio* are patently layered (in a quasi *mise en abyme* manner), spec. since the framing narrative provides an intratextual author and recipient, who (in the implied service of the extratextual author) conjointly craft the resp. reader’s experience of ‘the dialog of the dogs’. For a detailed analysis of these processes and techniques, see Mayfield (“Talking Canines” *passim*; spec. 13–18).

be especially patent in such as must seem entirely fabricated).³⁴ At once, this very act of (what one might call) ‘rhetorical ventriloquism’ is differently accentuated and variously effectuated for (and received by) the reader—who is also free to take it at face value (of course).

While the genre is relatively stable in the above paradigms (*mutatis mutandis*, all are dialogic), the particular textual circumstances of the oratorical devices employed differ (considerably). In the Erasmian “Ciceronianus”, the concept describing the dominant aspect most pertinently will be *prosopopoiia* (*de re*), seeing that the reader is facing (purposively) crafted (and more or less generic) *personae* (*prósopa*) articulating themselves. As regards Plato’s “Gorgias”, the most suitable terms may seem to be *sermocinatio* and *ethopoiia*, since the focus is both on the speech acts as such (*sermones*), and on the ‘characteristic’ (distinctive, accustomed, recognizable) *ethos* of the protagonists thereby expressed.³⁵ These terms also apply to the above dialogs on the part of

34 Cf. Trimpf (*Muses* 389). Prefacing the Stoic’s diatribes, Arrian asserts: “I have not composed [‘Oúte synégrapha egò’] these *Words of Epictetus* as one might be said to ‘compose’ books of this kind, nor have I of my own act published them [...] I have not ‘composed’ them at all. But whatever I heard him say I used to write down [‘grapsámenos’], word for word, as best I could, endeavouring to preserve it as a memorial [‘hypomnémata’], for my own future use, of his way of thinking and the frankness of his speech. They are, accordingly, as you might expect, such remarks as one man might make off-hand to another, not such as he would compose for men to read in after time. This being their character, they have fallen, I know not how, without my will or knowledge, into the hands of men” (*Disc. I–II. 4–7, 1*). Even so, their virtual rendering is to “produce that same effect” of Epictetus’ actual words: “to incite the minds of his hearers” (*Disc. I–II. 7, 1*). While König plausibly logs that “[t]he imagined dialogue, and the second-person address to an imagined interlocutor, [...] are entirely typical of Epictetus’ style” (60), the critic’s value judgments also testify to the effectuality of Arrian’s (professed) agenda: “it is tempting to feel”, “one might feel” (König 59), “wonderfully passionate”, “we as readers can hardly fail to feel” (60). A scholarly stance will likely be characterized by distance and sobriety; the same applies to the projected *persona* and *ethos* of a ‘reporter’ (literally speaking). Cf. Tacitus: “So it is not intellectual ability that I require, but only power of memory [‘Ita non ingenio, sed memoria et recordatione opus est’], in order to recount the sagacious thoughts and the weighty language which I heard from the lips of those eminent men” (“Dialogus” 230–233, §1.3–4). For a discussion of an affine formulation in the Cervantine “coloquio”, see Mayfield (“Talking Canines” 16–18; 22). The (factual) *allocutiones* are quasi said to be without the prefix (*‘ad-’*), which also conduces to (sc. serves to craft and project) the writer’s (envisioned, desired) *ethos*.

35 See Trimpf: “in the Socratic dialogues, ‘accompanying peculiarities of each individual character’ become ‘ethical indications’. Hence, characterization will particularize the narrative in quality” (*Muses* 271n.). Expediently, K. Morgan accentuates the meta-level: “Plato not only employs techniques of characterization as author, but pervasively makes character an object of analysis” (445). “*Mimesis prosōpōn* was regarded by ancient literary critics as a distinctive feature of Platonic dialogue”; the latter “offer more than ample scope for the examination of

Cicero and Tacitus—although one might tentatively nuance the former as emphasizing *sermocinatio* more (given the all but anonymous speakers); whereas the latter rather noticeably aims at ‘characterizing’ (qua ‘crafting and representing the *éthe* of’) the (named, but hardly transhistorically paragonal) *personae*. In Shakespeare’s “Lucrece”, the notorious (mythologico-)historical protagonists (familiar from several Ancient sources, and myriad later variations) are principally portrayed with respect to their *ethos* (‘hexical’ dispositions, as set in relief by extraordinary circumstances); and while the latter is an effect to which the (recurrent) narrative elements also conduce, it is primarily the (mono- and dialogic) speech acts placed into their mouths, which perform this ‘ethopoietic’ function (metatextually speaking).³⁶ With respect to the Cervantine “coloquio”, the reader might seem to be dealing with a *sermocinatio* (qua *adlocutio*) from the viewpoint of the narrative framework (the intratextual author claiming to be recording quasi verbatim the actual words of dogs); and with a *prosopopoiia* from a metapoetical perspective (the *auctor* ‘Cervantes’ endowing canines with human speech).³⁷

characterization” in general—and spec. of “dramatized *ēthopoiia*”, “characterization through setting or speech patterns”, as well as “the assessment of Socrates’ character” (446).

36 Certain taxonomies refer to deliberative soliloquies as *dialogismoí* (cf. Iulius Rufinianus 43–44, §20); Priscian speaks of ‘simple (sc. auto-)allocutions’ (“praeexercitamina” 558, §9).

37 Cf. Vives: “Porro non hominibus tantum damus sermonem, sed rebus mutis, rebus etiam prorsum confictis, ut patriæ, paupertati, et ejusmodi, quæ fictio personæ prosopopœja verbo Græco nominatur, prior illa proprie est ethopœja” (186, Aa.v, II.xvi). Rico Verdú gives Bravo’s definitions as follows: “es una imitación de las costumbres ajenas. Puede ser etopeya si finge las palabras de una persona real y existente; idolopeya, si las de un difunto; prosopopeya, si además finge la persona. La pasiva expresa los afectos y mociones del ánimo; la moral, las costumbres, y la mixta, ambas” (102); the latter may refer to Nicolaus (cf. 165, §10.64). Rico Verdú gives de Céspedes’ definition of “*Etopeya*” as “Oración que referimos de alguna persona de la misma manera que la hizo y con sus palabras formales. Puede ser: etopeya, idolopeya, prosopopeya” (107). He also cites those by Núñez: “*Etopeya*.—Imitación del habla acomodada a las costumbres, personas y cosas que se tratan. Pueden ser: etopeya, si finge el habla de personas vivas ([ad] Her., IV: *Sermocinatio*); idolopeya, si finge el habla de difuntos ([ad] Her., *Conformatio*); prosopopeya, finge el habla de otros seres” (164). Like both of the above, this is given in a progymnastic context; “*etopeya*” is defined again, now as “cuando se relatan en primera persona los hechos ajenos” (166). Rico Verdú adds a conceptual overview, plus textual locations in Spanish *rhétores* of the *Siglo de Oro*. These will be of spec. import: “*Dialogismo* διαλογισμός. [...] ‘Cuando el orador introduce dos o más hombres hablando’ (*Barberá*). [...] Otras denom.: diálogo, sermocinación, conformación” (296). “*Etopeya* ἠθοποιία. [...] ‘trato fiel de alguna persona, considerada y examinada en sus acciones, carácter y costumbres’ (*Capmany*). [...] Otras denom.: *effictio*, caracterismo, notación” (308–309). “*Idolopeya* εἰδωλοποιήσις. Prosopopeya en la que los personajes introducidos están ya muertos” (318).

2.2 Notes on Method

πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τὰκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν
καθ' ἕκαστον γένος ἐφ' ὅσον ἢ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται.
—Aristotle (*Nicomach. Ethics* 8, 1094b, I.iii.4)³⁸

we are not the only ones doing it or the first[.]
Aelius Theon (“*Exercises*” 48, §8.116)³⁹

nur eine Nachlese zu dem auf diesem unabsehbaren Felde bereits von Andern Geleisteten.
Schopenhauer (402, V)

the history of rhetoric [...] continues to move forward by looking back.
—Eden (“*Rhetoric*” 826)

In the above subchapter and its summary, the terms ‘*ethopoïia*’, ‘*sermocinatio*’, ‘*allocutio*’, ‘*dialogismós*’, and ‘*prosopopoïia*’ were employed (entirely) *de re*—taking their etymologico-conceptual implications as a tentative guideline. By recourse to central and prevalent rhetorico-theoretical texts, part 3 overall, as well as subchapter 4.1, describe the above (with further and affine) concepts in greater detail—including their variant utilizations in different theoreticians. Being more ‘argumentative’ than said taxonomic subchapters, segment 3.3, part 4 (especially its opening, as well as 4.2), and the *comparatiste* section 5 are concerned with assorted applications in a diachronic perspective. Part 6 tenders a concluding *summa*. A balance between the largely descriptive and the somewhat more ‘thetical’ chapters constitutes the general rationale.

“*Prosopopeya* προσωποποιία. ‘Es propiamente ficción de alguna cosa como dando habla o alguno de los sentidos a cosas que dellos carecen, o dando personalidad o entidad real corporea a entes de razon ymaginados por phantasias o espíritus solos’ (*Patón*). [...] Puede ser perpetua, si no habla ella sola, o sermocinación, si existe diálogo. [...] Otras denom.: *personarum inductio*, sermocinación, conformación, ficción de persona, etopeya” (339–340). For a synopsis of Spanish treatises on rhetoric published in the sixteenth century, cf. Rico Verdú (75–76). He offers abstracts of such works as pertain to the *Siglo de Oro* (76–245), e.g. for de Céspedes (104–108), Fox Morcillo (117–119), Gracián (134–135), Núñez (160–172), Sánchez de las Brozas (200–204), Suárez (212–216), Vives (220–243). Rico Verdú also includes an edited version of de Céspedes’ treatise ‘Del Vso Y Exercicio De La Rhetorica’ in an appendix (355–364). Cf. incidental uses of the terms ‘etopeya’, ‘prosopopeya’ (11; 123; 131; 153).

38 See Trimpi’s authoritative reading (*Muses* 125).

39 “μὴ μόνοι πράττομεν μηδὲ πρῶτοι” (Aelius Theon “ΠΙΠΟΓΥΜΝΑΣΜΑΤΑ” 116, [237], §10). Cf. Bakhtin: “one’s own word” cannot be the ultimate word” (*Speech* 152); “and these words are the words of other people” (*Speech* 163; “*Methodology*” 67).

In the (predominantly) taxonomic segments and notes, the guiding directive is to signal and offer diachronic, transgeneric, pragmatic interrelations and affinities between various conceptual phenomena and strands of tradition. Etymologico-philological references and considerations are tendered with a heuristic purpose. A functional approach is aimed at throughout, especially in the more applicative sections.⁴⁰ An emphatically contextualized, diachronic, pluralistic (meaning, Humanistic) method—“a thoroughly comparative perspective” (Küpper “Hypotheses” 4)—is to counter monolithic tendencies (which are considered to be generally and academically inexpedient).⁴¹

The overall approach employed is meta-rhetorical (inductive): starting *in medias res*, from ‘finite’ facts in chapters 1 and 2 (specific samples featuring oratorico-ventriloquistic techniques), part 3 moves to a more universal, taxonomic-conceptual plane (designed to cover and describe diverse instances under relatively general headers); while retaining a predominantly theoretical tendency, the opening of part 4 and subchapter 4.1 already signal the plane of application, to which section 4.2 and part 5 return by analyzing particular (textual) instances relating to the conglomerate of issues here treated (oratorico-theatrical concepts, specific cases, ventriloquistic phenomena and devices).

40 See Blumenberg: “Funktionale Interpretation verlangt [...] die Zuordnung der uns vorliegenden Aussagen zu den je akuten Problemen und zwar inhaltlich *und* formal” (“Epochenschwelle” 102). The substratum and (inductive) starting point of such an approach is the diversity of given particulars—in Küpper’s accentuation: one is to begin with “observable surface phenomena”, since “Culture [...] is characterised by rapid and erratic change in phenomena; if there is stability at all, it is to be found neither in the pheno- nor in the genotype, but rather in function” (“Hypotheses” 5n.; 5; with “National Lit.?” 29). In this way, the (literal) ‘theorization’ of variants will likely conduce to a “theory of *constants*” (Blumenberg *Beschreibung* 487; trans. dsm; with 484–485; also *Phänomenologische* 13): “Ströme ohne Ufer, Dynamik ohne Statik, gibt es als Erfahrbares jedenfalls nicht” (*Quellen* 160). On this process, cf. Mayfield (“Variants of *hypólepsis*” 238–239). Generally, see Kibédi Varga’s linking ‘functional’, ‘poly-perspectival’, and ‘contextual’ interpretation to rhetoric (84–85; *passim*). Cf. Ptasek: “Das rhetorische Praxiskonzept kann einander ausschließende Perspektiven als Standpunkte nebeneinander bestehen lassen. Rhetorische Rationalität ist nicht zuletzt darin begründet, daß anstehende Fragen des richtigen Handelns von mehreren Seiten beleuchtet werden” (65).

41 See Küpper’s formulation of the “main” methodical “desiderata of the DramaNet project”—here *mutatis mutandis* for the pan-European, transgeneric, polyfunctional phenomenon that is the art of rhetoric (including its affinities to, and impact on, various genres): adopting “a thoroughly comparative perspective”; going “beyond the confines of literary discourse” in a limited sense, *spec.* as articulated by the so-called ‘national’ disciplines; taking into consideration “the societal function of early modern” rhetoric at the *kathólou* level (as well as its particular nexus to “drama”); and “integrat[ing] the data available in the cultural field into” a “general” description of the “dynamic[s]” resp. obtaining (“Hypotheses” 4).

Decidedly taking up and tying in with previous scholarship (also *ex negativo*), the purpose of this heuristic study—which aims at being as descriptive as possible—is to conduce to further research. In so doing and to said effect, the balance of *agón* and *accommodatio* characteristic of all rhetorico-Humanistic approaches will obtain throughout—on both the ‘horizontal’ plane (the continuous text) and the ‘vertical’ levels (the specialist, expressly polyglot glosses *ad locum*).⁴² Rather than merely giving bare (author–page) references only, the present method aims at visibly providing—and engaging with—the respectively pertinent passages from various diachronic sources, equitably setting them side by side wherever expedient; and specifically with a view to indicating the numerous nuances the concepts and devices under consideration have received. In that the terms themselves also reflect sedimented takes and viewpoints, their pluralism is held to be scholarly valuable—above and beyond the decided solidarity with the past that will ever be requisite in the Humanities.⁴³ Perhaps comparable to the ratio obtaining in an iceberg, the main body of (continuous) text represents the more thetical or argumentative plane; and the (vertical) footnotes the underlying (literally ‘hypo-thetical’) groundwork consisting of various previous perspectives on the phenomena at hand (with both attempting to be as descriptive as possible); this approach aims at counteracting the latter’s typical latency.

42 Ever have the *studia humanitatis* thrived on the catalyzing *mélange* of agonal debates (disputes, discussions) and accommodative consensus (see Mayfield “Proceedings” 203–204; 206; 212; 224–225; “Interplay” 10n.; 20, 20n.; 22n.; 34); the latter tends to be mapped by the very diversity of the former—hence precisely by (vicariously) arguing *in utramque partem* (cf. “Interplay” 14–15; 15n.–16n.; “Otherwise” passim); by expressly quoting conflicting views and tendencies. In academic microcosms (the same as societies at large), the relegation or banishment (to say nothing of a downright lack or neglect) of productive contrarianism—typical of ideologically ‘streamlined’, herd-coerced jargon, and comparably mono-lateralized, overly harmonistic language regimes—will be overcome by decided recourse to the contextualized, pragmatic, polyfunctional, transgeneric and -temporal, supra-disciplinary, universalist *téchne kat’ exochén*. Applied to the case at hand: it will not do to be spiriting away (let alone demonize) the taxonomic pluralism as factually obtains. See Sloane, noting “rhetoric[’s] [...] life-giving linkage to fractiousness” (“Education” 165). With respect to John of Salisbury (here infinitized), Moos notes that one will “mit den Zitatwaffen antiker und moderner ‘Freunde’ fechten [...]. Kampf scheint schlechthin die Form des Denkens und der literarischen Äußerung zu sein” (289, §70; cf. “das effektvolle Zitieren”, 251, §63; with 251–253, 252n.). On Machiavelli’s quotionally agonal poetics, cf. subch. 5.2, herein.

43 See Trimpi (*Muses* xiii–xiv; 25; 258); and Blumenberg’s scholarly ethics—as expressed in this statement of purpose: “whatever men have ever thought is noteworthy; to read it, where it may be rendered readable, [is] an act of diachronic ‘solidarity’” (*Lesbarkeit* 409; trans. dsm).

The effect of a supra-disciplinary, comparatist, neo-Humanistic method—making pragmatic use of, and conducing to, the technical possibilities and research-related potentials afforded by a ‘digital’ age—is fourfold (at least).⁴⁴ First, it has literal recourse to (Ancient, Medieval, Early Modern) texts, lets the ‘sources’ speak for themselves (*ad fontes*, as far as possible)—with ‘Theory’ being but a ‘contrast agent’.⁴⁵ Secondly, this approach provides a diachronic, discernibly comparative synopsis of scholarly *consensus* obtaining in a given area—with complementary, variously nuanced, (partly) divergent positions being actually cited (hence present on the page). Thirdly, said method expressly calls to mind latent ken, foregoing scholarship (of Antiquity, Early Modernity, but also of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) in need of being actively kept in (and, at times, decidedly reentered into) circulation—considering the dynamics of uptake (*hypólepsis*) and floatation obtaining in virtual cultural

44 This is no endorsement of the (largely) quantifying, (hence) supposedly ‘scientific’ slants classed as the ‘Digital Humanities’ (*soi-disant*). The (mathematical) logic of identity, statistics for the sake thereof, virtually interminable series of ones and zeros (etc.), are fundamentally at variance with the qualitative approach distinctive of the *studia humanitatis*. See Bakhtin: “The interpretation of contextual meanings cannot be scientific” (*Speech* 160; “Methodology” 64). “The exact sciences constitute a monologic form of knowledge” (*Speech* 161; “Methodology” 65). “Is there anything in the natural sciences that corresponds to ‘context’? Context is always personalized (infinite dialogue in which there is neither a first nor a last word)—natural sciences have an object system” (*Speech* 167–168; “Methodology” 71). “*Question* and *answer* are not logical relations (categories); [...] any response gives rise to a new question. [...] If an answer does not give rise to a new question from itself, it falls out of the dialogue and enters systemic cognition, which is [...] impersonal. [...] From the standpoint of a third consciousness and its ‘neutral’ world, where everything is *replaceable*, question and answer are inevitably depersonified” (*Speech* 168; “Methodology” 71). “The limit of precision in the natural sciences is identity ($a = a$). In the human sciences precision is surmounting the otherness of the other without transforming him into purely one’s own (any kind of substitution, modernization, nonrecognition of the other, and so forth)” (*Speech* 169; “Methodology” 72).

45 Cf. Blumenberg (*Beschreibung* 153); Mayfield (“Talking Canines” 11n.). Bakhtin takes “Understanding as correlation with other texts and reinterpretation, in a new context [...] the point of departure, the given text” (*Speech* 161; “Methodology” 65). On the Renaissance, see Schanze: “[w]herever the classical tradition [re]occurs, it is changed as a whole by the new conditions the media have brought about and by the change in the concept of tradition itself [...] precisely that time[,] which advocated a return to the [...] sources[,] basically altered the latter in practice and, consequently, also in theory. Adhering to the idea [of] *ad fontes*, the humanist comes out in support [...] of a new rhetoric”—the critic’s value judgments have been bracketed (e.g. “problem”, “paradox”, “this problematic situation”, 109). Such indicate a misconception of the transtemporal ‘hypoleptic’ process ever in effect (which might therefore be described as the ‘poetics’ of the cultural net): any uptake entails variation (cf. Küpper et al. 18; with Mayfield “Variants of *hypólepsis*” 243–246; 249n.; 252n.; 254; 269; 273; *passim*).

networks: “Auffinden und Weiterdenken” (in Moos’ felicitous formulation, 295, §71).⁴⁶ This approach tenders a (literal) *copia* of references likely to be expedient in terms of conducing to future research—a depot digitally available in a thematically focused, arranged, entirely searchable format.⁴⁷ Such a fund may conduce to what Trimpi describes as the function “of the *studia humanitatis*”: a “selection of those opinions which have the greatest probability” (*Muses* 391).⁴⁸

46 Meaning, ‘rhetorical *inventio* with notional elaboration’ (emphatic of the toil involved). See Blumenberg: “Geschaffen wird durch ‘Rezeption’ weitere Rezeptionsfähigkeit” (*Phänomenologische* 228). Cf. Gordon: “the precedents were always there. What is important is that they are suddenly invoked again and developed” (380). See Bakhtin’s approach—rhetorical in stressing settings (with *personae*), arguing against decontextualization: “I hear voices in everything and dialogic relations among them. [...] Contextual meaning is personalistic; it always includes a question, an address, and the anticipation of a response, it always includes two (as a dialogic minimum). This personalism is not psychological, but semantic. There is neither a first nor a last word and there are no limits to the dialogic context [...]. Even *past* meanings, [...] born in the dialogue of past centuries, can never be stable (finalized, ended once and for all)—they will always change (be renewed) in the process of [...] the dialogue. At any moment in the development of the dialogue there are immense, boundless masses of forgotten contextual meanings, but at certain moments [...] they are recalled and invigorated in a renewed form (in a new context). Nothing is absolutely dead” (“Methodology” 72–73; *Speech* 169–170). The past is present.

47 Spies sees “Scaliger’s poetics” as “a means by which to come to terms with a huge mass of empirical data, augmenting and changing in the course of time [...]. It[...] is based on the conviction that an empirical analysis of earlier achievements could help to direct one’s endeavours in any field” (260–261); his “less rigid combinatory system makes it possible to account for a [...] more differentiated field of poetical phenomena” (262); “the structure of most poetical genres is defined by Scaliger in rhetorical terms” (265). “Poetry, as far as references to the norms of the audience are concerned, is to be equated with rhetoric” (269). In general, Kibédi Varga notes that “[w]e need an exhaustive inventory of possible relations” (87; with 90), and stresses: “Lausberg’s [...] rhetoric is a complicated network of cross-references” (85n.). There may well be an added value and yield in being able to compare various descriptions of a phenomenon within a single gloss, rather than meeting a string of author-page references only, sans citations. Rhetorically, the research-related expediency of a copious approach is taken to be beyond doubt (in a ‘digital’ age); the same holds true for its scholarly advantageousness as regards elucidating a specified phenomenon—any such being effectually constituted by the assorted viewpoints diachronically adopted in describing it. Cf. Fuhrmann: “Dionysios rechnet wohl [...] mit einer rationalen Tätigkeit des Beobachtens und Sammelns, die zur Übernahme von mancherlei einzelnen Wendungen und Motiven führen kann” (*Dichtungstheorie* 193); in other words (adapted to the present approach): submitting a focused, nuanced, pluralistically diverse variety of views conduces to the Humanistic *sine quibus non* of *libertas* and *aequitas*.

48 Trimpi’s method—particularly the scholarly *ethos* evinced in his *opus magnum* (*Muses* passim)—may be taken as being authoritative and foundational for the present endeavor.

3 Theoretico-Conceptual Groundwork (By Recourse to the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Cicero, Quintilian, and Further Theorists)

multa renascentur quae iam cecidere, cadentque
 quae nunc sunt in honore vocabula, si volet usus,
 quem penes arbitrium est et ius et norma loquendi.
 Horace (“Ars Poetica” 456, v.70–72)⁴⁹

Diese Vielfalt gilt es zu berücksichtigen, um einen engen Blickwinkel zu vermeiden.
 Asmuth (“Angemessenheit” 580)⁵⁰

et adhuc augeri potest.
 Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* 1–2. 376, 2.19)

In dealing with scholarly concepts and taxonomies, the present, transtemporal, comparatist approach adopts Aristotle’s method—as elucidated by Ritter, performatively terming this process itself ‘*hypólepsis*’: “The load-bearing philosophical concepts [...] are not posited by Aristotle. Philosophy takes them up ‘hypoleptically’ from preexisting linguistic usage” (53; trans. dsm; cf. 54n., 58, 65n.).⁵¹ Such ‘tying in with’ (‘*Anknüpfung*’) ‘accepts’ as given a conceptual state of play, describing its potential uses by application—here, the ‘underlying conception(s) and assumptions (including taxonomies)’ advanced, specified,

49 Cf. Blumenberg (*Phänomenologische* 234). Bakhtin logs: “assimilated words” are “renewed in new contexts; and others’ inert, dead words, ‘word-mummies’” (*Speech* 168; see 165, 169; “Methodology” 68; 71–72). He stresses the latencies: “The semantic treasures Shakespeare embedded in his works were created and collected through the centuries [...] millennia: they lay hidden in the language [...] [‘in’] diverse genres [...] forms of speech [...] plots whose roots go back to [...] antiquity, [...] in forms of thinking. Shakespeare, like any artist, constructed his works [...] out of forms that were already heavily laden with meaning” (*Speech* 5).

50 Cf. Sloane on “Erasmus’s lesson about words [...] that they are wrapped in their own historicity and circumstance, that their meaning arises functionally from person, situation, and motive, and inheres not so much in the things they represent as in the often multiplex points of view from which they are spoken” (“Education” 175–176; cf. 166). The present study aims at describing the polyphony of views on the ventriloquistic techniques and affine phenomena under scrutiny—permitting them to stand side by side, and ‘speak for themselves’ (so to say).

51 Ritter is here referring to Aristotle (*Meta.* 1–9. 8–11, 982a, I.ii.1–4; 18–21, 983b, I.iii.4–6). As to ‘*hypólepsis*’ (including the term’s use in rhetorical contexts), see Mayfield (“Variants of *hypólepsis*” passim; here spec. 239–251). Insofar as (the *abstractum*) ‘philosophy’ is conceived of as an agent in Ritter’s above observation, one will be dealing with a *prosopopoía*.

and organized by various theories, systems, or traditions of rhetoric.

When there are many words for a phenomenon in a given language—and (correlatively) in translations—such may serve as a heuristic trace of its import in a certain field.⁵² The conglomerate of affine techniques one might figuratively describe as ‘rhetorical ventriloquism’—or rephrase as selectively ‘putting words (including conspicuous silences) into someone’s mouth’—have been referred to by a variety of terms, given numerous nuances of meaning, and employed in a considerable range of ways and genres over the course of the overall *téchne*’s two and a half millennia of alternating prevalence and latency.⁵³ The same as the universal art of discourse itself—“rhetoric” being “a trans-generic system of diction” (Küpfer *Discursive Renovatio* 289; see *Diskurs-Renovatio* 300)—these particular devices are likely to have had their initial uses in a forensic context.⁵⁴

Depending on the theoretician, the relevant terms (where present) will tend to be differently accentuated, or considered substitutable (on occasion)—while further coinages are conceivable; and do occur, as well.⁵⁵ In certain cases, a

52 Cf. Bakhtin on “the [...] heuristic significance of rhetorical forms” (*Dialogic* 269; cf. 268).

53 As to the art’s latency, see Mayfield (“Interplay” 6; 6n.–7n.). The affine techniques (to be) indicated need not necessarily involve (explicitly) attributed speech; cf. the n. below, spec. on *charakterismós*, *effictio*, *descriptio*, as well as certain (variant) conceptualizations of *ethopoeia*; in such cases, an (implied) author’s or narrator’s presence will be more in the forefront.

54 Bakhtin logs “[t]he importance of another’s speech as a subject in rhetoric” (*Dialogic* 353): “The speaker and his discourse is [...] one of the most important subjects of rhetorical speech [...]. In the rhetoric of the courts [...], rhetorical discourse accuses or defends the subject of a trial, who is [...] a speaker, and in so doing relies on his words, interprets them, polemicalizes with them, [...] erecting *potential* discourses for the accused or for the defense (just such free creation of likely, but never actually uttered, words, sometimes whole speeches—as he must have said’ or ‘as he might have said’—was a device very widespread in ancient rhetoric)” (*Dialogic* 353). That is, *sermocinatio* (*allocutio*), with an (implied) reference to *ethos*; from a more universal perspective: the practice of (anticipatory, probable) virtual vicariousness.

55 Quintilian includes ‘*sermocinatio*’ in ‘*prosopopoeia*’, as differentiated from *ethopoeia*. See Lausberg (*Handbuch* 141, §257; 408–409, §821–822; 548, §1147, 548n.), stating—in one of his recurrent, characteristic phrases: “Delimitations are fluid” (*Handbuch* 409, §823; trans. dsm); the (scholarly) point (ever) being “verfließende Grenzen scharf genug zu ziehen” (Blumenberg *Phänomenologische* 69). Nicolaus reflects on the conceptual state of affairs: “Different writers regard what is called ‘*prosopopoeia*’, being almost the same as *ethopoeia*, as differing from it in differing ways. [...] Some call *prosopopoeia* that which specifies both the persons and the supposed circumstances, and *ethopoeia* what is in all respects freely made up, which they also called a *rhêsis*, giving this name to the same thing. Those who have the best opinion think that in *ethopoeia* real persons are specified, while *prosopopoeia* is that in which we invent persons and attribute words to them. This they attribute especially to the poets, who have the privilege of changing lifeless things into persons and giving them things to say” (165, §10.64–65). See Plett: “*Ethopoeia* depicts mild affections, *pathopoeia* vehement ones. [...] *Ethopoeia* [...] creates

(Modern) uptake might retain only the name, while altering the function and signifieds of a given device (completely).⁵⁶

As provisionally indicated above, the term ‘*prosopopoiia*’ tends to signify the ‘personifying’ of an (other-than-human) animal, mute object, or immaterial

the semblance of natural persons, and *prosopopoeia* that of non-natural ones [...] it clothes that which is inanimate (e.g., abstractions, objects, deceased persons) in human form, language, and action. Distinctions like these [...] have only limited validity in the Renaissance, since *prosopopoeia* is in some cases expanded to all fictional impersonations, and certain other categories are added [...] – *eidolopoeia*, [...] and *anthropopatheia* for the depiction of God” (*Culture* 284; cf. 284n.). Herrick believes that “in the rhetorical discussions of *mimesis*, *prosopopoeia*, *proso[po]graphia*, *ethopoeia*, and *dialogismus* [...] [a]ll these terms were used more or less synonymously. [...] Although all the terms for imitation mentioned were interchangeable, some rhetoricians tried to discriminate” (21). Despite its vacillating formulation—and while Herrick is referring to “Terentian commentators”, “Donatus, Latomus, and Willichius” (21; 21n.)—such seems hardly tenable (taking various rhetorical traditions into account). Herrick himself notes that, halfway through the sixteenth century, “Richard Sherry [...] designated six kinds of *prosopopoeia*: *Characterismus*, *Proso[po]graphia*, *Ethopoeia*, *Pathopoeia*, *Sermocination*, *Mimesis*” (134). The present study aims at clarifying the sedimented perspectives, the factual uses, as well as the (latent, descriptive) potentials of such and further devices, which may indeed be differentiated on an etymological and functional basis.

56 For a highly problematic twentieth century construal, contrast de Man (in a Wordsworthian context): “Voice assumes mouth, eye, and finally face, a chain that is manifest in the etymology of the trope’s name, *prosopon poiēn* [sic], to confer a mask or a face (*prósopon*). *Prosopopeia* [sic] is the trope of autobiography, by which one’s name [...] is made as intelligible and memorable as a face. [...] The dominant figure of the epitaphic or autobiographical discourse is [...] the *prosopopeia* [sic], the fiction of the voice-from-beyond-the-grave” (76–77); “the rhetorical function of *prosopopeia* [sic] [i]s positing voice or face by means of language” (81); he ultimately extends the trope to reception in general: “to read is to understand, to question, to know, to forget, to erase, to deface, to repeat—that is to say, the endless *prosopopoeia* by which the dead are made to have a face and a voice” (122). Chase employs that terminology (see 82–89; *passim*): “De Man’s translation or definition of *prosopopoeia* is already a reading, and is in fact a giving of face. Translating *prosopon* as ‘face’ or ‘mask’, and not as ‘person’, is to imply that a face is the condition—not the equivalent—of the existence of a person” (83). “De Man not merely reads *prosopopoeia* as the giving of face; he reads *face* as that which is given by *prosopopoeia*. Face is not the natural given of the human person. It is given in a mode of discourse, given by an act of language” (84). She also notes that de Man connects “*prosopopoeia*” to “apostrophe” (88; cf. 68–69, 80, 105). For the latter on “*prosopopoeia*” as “the master trope of poetic discourse”, see also Brogan et al. (1121); with Vickers’ incisive discussion of the approach and critic in question (*Defence* 453–454). Menke stresses: “*Eine-Stimme-Geben*’ ist die rhetorische Figur, die ein Subjekt der Rede (erst) voraussetzt und einsetzt, das nachträglich, als sprechendes, immer schon gegeben zu sein scheint. Insofern verstellt diese Figur in ihrem Effekt ‘lebendigen Sprechens’ auch schon ihr Funktionieren als rhetorische Figur und ihre Voraussetzung von Stummheit und Tod” (7). As to examples from German literature (Brentano, Hoffmann, Kleist, Kafka), see Menke (*passim*).

abstract entity.⁵⁷ Often (though not always or necessarily), this will comprise an

57 Cf. Isidore: “Personification [...] endows inanimate objects with personal character and [...] the power of speech [‘Prosopopoeia est, cum inanimalium et persona et sermo fingitur’]. [...] we endow mountains, rivers or trees with the power of speech [‘loquentes inducimur’], awarding a personal character to objects [‘personam inponentes rei’] which have not the ability to speak [‘quae non habet naturam loquendi’]. This method, so popular among dramatists [‘tragoediis’], is often found in orations” (“Concerning Rhet.” 94, XIII.1–2; “de arte rhet.” 514, XIII; the definition is reiterated at 522, XXI.45, instancing Cicero); cf. Bonner (*Declamation* 53, 53n.); Baldwin (*Medieval Rhet.* 97); on Isidore’s rhetoric, Kendall (147–149; spec. 148). See Alberic: “*prosopopoeia* [...] is a method of applying foreign characteristics to objects; [...] it ascribes to things qualities which nature does not bestow. [...] often [...] a phrase about an inanimate object attributes one of the senses to it. [...] it [...] attribut[es] senses to things which lack them” (155, VII.6). Volkmann gives “P r o s o p o p o e i e” as “erdichtete Rede einer abwesenden Person, oder eines als Person behandelten leblosen Gegenstandes” (280, I.i.28; cf. 563, III.54). “die Prosopopoeie [‘lässt sich’] auch an anderen Stellen der Rede als bloß im Epilog anbringen” (281, I.i.28; plus a Lysian sample); “wir [‘tragen’] Unterredungen zwischen uns und anderen, oder anderen unter sich mittelst der Prosopopoeie auf glaubwürdige Weise vor. Auch Götter und Unterwelt lassen sich [...] in Scene setzen, Städte [...] Völker können personificirt werden und reden” (489, III.49). While “der Sprachgebrauch sehr schwankend [‘war’]”, Volkmann’s claim that “[d]ie Ausdrücke *προσωποποιία* und *ἠθοποιία* [...] ursprünglich völlig synonym [‘waren’]” (490n., III.49) seems untenable. Blass gives “P r o s o p o p o e i e” as obtaining “wenn man Lebloses oder Verstorbene redend und empfindend vorführt” (*Beredsamkeit III.1.* 177); he logs Andocides’ using a “Prosopopoeie, indem er den Richtern seine verstorbenen Ahnen als gegenwärtig vor Augen stellt [...] ähnlich[...] Lysias[,] am Schluss der Eratosthenika” (*Beredsamkeit I.* 308). Aeschines employs a “Heraufcitiren Verstorbener” (*Beredsamkeit III.2.* 214n.), “eine vortreffliche Prosopopoeie der früheren grossen Männer Athens, welche der Redner einzeln [...] als seine Fürsprecher vor Augen führt, [...] so den Solon und Aristides [...] reden [‘lässt’]” (*Beredsamkeit III.2.* 214). “Nicht nur die Reden sind [...] ethisch gefärbt, sondern auch die Art des Auftretens charakteristisch angegeben” (*Beredsamkeit III.2.* 215). Blass logs Demosthenes’ being “sehr behutsam und nüchtern. Er muthet seinen Zuhörern nicht zu, Todte als anwesend, oder Land [...] Bäume [...] Tempel als [...] flehend sich vorzustellen [...] seine Personificationen [‘sind’] äusserst einfach [...] auf die Gefühle Verstorbener bezieht er sich nur in hypothetischer Form. [...] innerhalb dieser Grenzen [...] entwickelt Demosthenes in den Formen der Ethopoeie und Prosopopoeie einen ausserordentlichen Reichthum” (*Beredsamkeit III.1.* 178). Generally, cf. Lausberg (*Elemente* 140, §425; *Handbuch* 406, §817; 409, §822; 411–413, §826–829): “Die *factio personae* ist die Einführung nichtpersonhafter Dinge als sprechender sowie zu sonstigem personhaftem Verhalten befähigter Personen [...]. Die Unterscheidung zwischen *factio personae* (*prosopopoeia*) und *sermocinatio* (*ethopoeia* [...]) wird von den meisten Theoretikern scharf aufrechterhalten, indem die Prosopopoeie auf die nicht personhaften Dinge (und die Toten [...]) beschränkt wird, während die Ethopoeie die natürlichen Personen betrifft” (*Handbuch* 411, §826); “Die *factio personae* durch Reden verleiht besonders gern Kollektiven ([...] Städte usw.) Stimme” (*Handbuch* 412, §828). Cf. Hartmann (passim); Boriaud/Schouler: “Die Prosopopoeie, durch die der Redner einem sonst stummen Geschöpf oder einem Verstorbenen Leben und Ausdrucksfähigkeit verleiht bzw. wiedergibt [...], verdeutlicht die

endowment with human language.⁵⁸ An entire genre—the fable—is largely constructed on said process.⁵⁹ Functionally as well as taxonomically, it is

Nähe zwischen P[ersona] als rhetorischer Schöpfung und P[ersona] als dramatischer Rolle. Als sprechende P[ersona] kann der Redner auch seinen Gegner selbst einführen. [...] Dies geschieht in der ὑποφορά [...] genannten Figur. [...] Sie ist die vorweggenommene[...] Formulierung eines gegnerischen Einwandes (ἀντιθεσις [...]) samt dessen Widerlegung” (798). Vickers gives “*prosopopoeia*” as “an impersonation speech put into the mouth of” a “client” (*Defence* 78); as “representing an imaginary or absent person as speaking or acting; attributing life, speech or human qualities to dumb or inanimate objects” (*Defence* 498; cf. 174). Mack sees it as “[a] speech written for an animal, object or abstraction, or the *progymnasmata* exercise of writing a speech for a character or object” (*History* 336).

58 While vividly described and explicated in terms of purpose, the two Dionysian ‘rhetorics’—personified as lady (“the old philosophic rhetoric [‘archaia kai philósophos rhetorikè’]”) and harlot (seen as “intolerably shameless and histrionic [‘theatrike’]”)—do not actually talk (“Ancient Orators” 4–7, §1; here: 4–5); the term ‘*sermocinatio*’ would not seem suitable, here. The very fact that it is precisely (this twofold) ‘Rhetoric personified’, who does not speak (for) herself, will be deemed significant (discursively). Referring to Dionysius, Usher remarks that “two rival Rhetorics form the subjects of a *prosopopoeia* which recalls the visual arts. The sober and chaste Attic Muse [...] and the wanton Asiatic harlot, form an unharmonious *maison-à-trois* with their master (the literary world?), who is unable to decide between their claims until Rome has restored his sanity. This colourful allegory enables Dionysius to disguise or conceal two embarrassing realities. The first was a delicate matter of politics. The real reason for the initial decline of literature, and particularly of oratory, was the demise of freedom; and this was not a subject which a privileged visitor could raise in Augustan Rome without appearing to abuse the emperor’s hospitality. The second concerns the literary debate personified by the two ladies above—the recent wrangle between the Atticists and the Asianists. [...] for by Dionysius’s time [...] it was utterly impossible to say [...] what constituted Attic and what Asiatic style” (“Orators. Intro.” 1–2; cf. Fuhrmann *Dichtungstheorie* 191–192).

59 Animals seem natural choices for allocating human speech; cf. Mayfield (“Talking Canines” 16n.; 19–20; passim). On a speaking goose in Montaigne (*Essays* 397, II.12), see Blumenberg (*Höhlenausgänge* 280n., III.vii). As to a fable significant in terms of the *status qualitatis*, cf. “A lioness, on being criticized by a fox, because she bore only one cub at a time, replied, ‘True, only one, but it’s a lion’” (Babrius and Phaedrus 473, §257); Blumenberg comments: “Daß Löwen nicht nur Löwen zeugen müssen, sondern es auch sollen, ist eine polemische Variante. In der Fabel des Äsop verwarnt sich die Löwin, verhöhnt von der vielwürfigen Füchsin ob ihres einzigen Jungen, mit dem geballten Hochmut des Satzes: *hena alla leonta* – Eines nur, dafür ein Löwe! Das allerdings, anders ausgedrückt, sollte dann auch einer sein” (*Löwen* 77). In such contexts, *prosopopoiiai* have an ‘ethopoietic’ function also. Not only animate beings are endowed with human language; as Blumenberg logs, there is a speaking “trumpet” (“Fabeln” 341; trans. dsm), a sword: “Unter den Fabeln des Phaedrus, der sich rühmte, auch Bäume sprechen zu lassen, findet sich eine, in der ein Schwert spricht” (“Fabeln” 340). “Der Wanderer findet auf seinem Weg ein geworfenes Schwert und befragt es: *quis te perdidit?* Das Schwert antwortet: *me quidem unus, at multos ego!* Das ist schlagfertig”; in Blumenberg’s ingenious rendering: “Wer ließ dich fallen? – / Mich einer, ich viele” (“Fabeln” 341).

associated with *evidentia*.⁶⁰ Moreover, the overall device is typically related to allegory *sensu stricto* (hence also to drama, historically).⁶¹ The personifications having accrued diachronically are legion.⁶²

60 In terms resembling what is otherwise called *prosopopoiia* in the ensuing first subtype, the anon. “Schemata Dianoeas” give “Ἐνάργεια” as “imaginatio, quae actum incorporeis oculis subicit”; “fit modis tribus: persona, loco, tempore. Persona, cum absentem alloquimur quasi praesentem” (“schemata dianoeas” 71, §1; with samples from Vergil on the three subcategories; said terms also follow each other in Iulius Rufinianus 62, §14–15). Göttert links “Evidenz und Personifikation” as to a “besonders kunstvolle[...] Darstellung einer ‘Sache’”, defining “*fictio personae*” qua “das Auftreten und entsprechende Reden sei es bereits toter, sei es fiktionaler Personen wie etwa von Tugenden” (61; also referring to Boethius); he signals the “confusion” caused by speaking of “personification” as “allegory” (62; trans. dsm). Cf. Plett (*Systematische Rhet.* 189), who calls “Prosopopoiie” a “kommunikativel[...] Rollenfigur”, seeing its function in enhancing a ‘statement’s immediacy’ (“Direktheit”, *Systematische Rhet.* 161).

61 A *prosopopoeia* voicing itself (in dialog, drama) might be distinguished from the making of notionalities only said to be speaking (‘personification allegories’ of States, Vices, being mute). See Plett: “*Prosopopoeia* gained such popularity in [...] the sixteenth century that the Italian [...] Bonciani [...] composed a *Lezione della Prosopopea*” (*Culture* 284; cf. Bonciani passim); as to the latter, Weinberg speaks of “create personaggi” (502), stressing the craft involved. An all but non-figurative use may be said to occur when someone is called “‘common sense’ personified” (Blumenberg *Literatur* 83; trans. dsm); as to generic conventions (restrictions) with a view to verisimilitude (cf. “Wirklichkeitsbezug und Glaubhaftigkeit im Roman”), the philosopher notes “daß Ideen nur im Medium der Gestalten Akteure der Handlung werden können” (*Literatur* 98). See Plett’s performative definition (personifying the art itself): “If the action of figures is not merely described but presented *in persona*, as it were, rhetoric speaks of *προσωποποιία* or *fictio personae* [...] *Prosopopoeia* is therefore a theatrical impersonation” (*Culture* 283); cf. subch. 5.2 (on Shaw). As to *prosopopoeiae* generally, see Curtius (112–115, §5.9; 141–144, §7.2; 212, §11.1; 417, Exkurs.III), who notes: “Das Wort *prosopopeya* [...] hat im Spanischen einen [...] Bedeutungswechsel erfahren: es bedeutet auch *afectación de gravedad y pompa* [...]”. In diesem Sinne braucht es Cervantes” (417–418, Exkurs.III; with *Quijote II*. 339, II.xxxvi).

62 For a précis of Ancient samples, see Webster (38–43; 100–106; 137–138; passim). On “*kharis* personified” (217n.) in Pindar, cf. Nagy (53). For Rhetoric and Dialog per se facing the writer’s *persona*, see Lucian (“Double” passim; spec. 135–151; with Branham: “comic personifications”, 36; cf. 4–5, 28–37). In the former, “Odysseus is characterized in his own words in a letter to Calypso (2.35), a familiar literary variant of the rhetorical exercise of *prosopopoiia* in the epistolary form” (Hodkinson 553)—sc. of a nymph. On “Boethius’ famous description of Lady Philosophy”, see Trimpi (*Muses* 233n.); Moos (574–575, §118); cf. the onset of Book I, where she is given (*effictio*) in terms of her exterior (Boethius 10–13, I; with Grasmück iv; xiv); the first speech (*sermocinatio*) defies the “Musas”, defamed as “has scaenicas meretriculas”, “Sirenes” (12, I); ‘Boethius’ (qua *persona*) renders Plato the mouthpiece of Philosophy personified: “Atqui tu hanc sententiam Platonis ore sanxisti [...] Tu eiusdem viri ore hanc sapientibus capessendae rei publicae necessariam causam esse monuisti” (24, I)—hence (tacitly) himself likewise. As to the reception of Martianus Capella’s *prosopopoiiai* (“Philologia”, “Phronesis”), see Curtius (47–49, §3.1; with 266, §14.4); Plett, on Puttenham’s ‘uptake’ (“Style” 367–368). For Medieval kinds,

Sometimes seen as a subcategory of *prosopopoiia*, ‘*eidolopoiia*’ (always) refers to putting words into the mouth of the departed—specifically when imagined as speaking while in the state of being dead.⁶³

cf. Leach on “Lady Nature” (being “most commonly personified as God’s sub-vicar”, 73), “Lady Musica” (“turning” the latter “into a harlot”, 75). Petrarch: “persuaded by one whom it is hard to disbelieve: I mean Love” (“Self-Portrait” 34). On Death in Johannes Teplensis’ “*Ackermann aus Böhmen*” (“1401”), see Burger (*Renaissance* 48–53; here 48). As to “*Sige*, das hypostasierte Schweigen”, cf. Blumenberg (*Legitimität* 334); likewise on “Thalassa, in Gestalt eines Weibes” (“Fabeln” 340). Above all, see Erasmus’ *Morías Enkómion*, opening “*Stultitia loquitur*” (“*Laus Stultitiae*” 8): “Praises you shall hear [...] my own [...] of myself” (*Praise of Folly* 8; cf. “*Laus Stultitiae*” 10–11); see (Greek) abstractions qua Folly’s “companions”: “*Philautia*”, “*Kolakia*”, “*Hedone*” (*Praise of Folly* 11; with “*Laus Stultitiae*” 18–19). Cf. Altman: Erasmus “fuses two Aphthonian forms—the *prosopopoeia* and [...] *laus*—to create a [...] speech of self-praise” (54); see his analysis (53–63)—spec. of “*prosopopoeiae* inserted with *prosopopoeiae*” (59); “sophistic *notationes*, [...] character sketches” (56). Cf. Harvey: “Erasmus’s ventriloquization of Folly” (*Voices* 7). Noting that “[d]ie personifizierte *stultitia* [...] ungefähr die gleiche Rolle [‘spielt’] wie bei Cusanus der *idiota*” (*Renaissance* 384), Burger logs a layered *sermocinatio*: “*Affectibus movere* bzw. [...] *moveri* lautet [...] die Maxime der Neuen Rhetorik: Indem sie [...] der Torheit und von dieser dem stoischen Weisen in den Mund gelegt wird, also doppelt abgewertet zu sein scheint, läßt Erasmus den Leser selbst ihren Wert entdecken” (*Renaissance* 383; cf. “*Laus Stultitiae*” 36–37, §16). See Bakhtin on Rabelais’ “King Lent” qua “grotesque personification of the Catholic fast and *askesis* [...] of the bias against natural processes” (*Dialogic* 175). In the sixteenth century, “Morel edited [...] Palamas’s *Prosopop[oe]ia*, [...] a judicial debate between [...] mind and [...] body” (Monfasani 182–183). Fraunce’s *Arcadian Rhetorike* has diachronic, pan-European samples from Homer, Virgil, Sidney, Tasso, Saluste du Bartas, Boscán (G2r–G7v, I.31). Schade’s *Tabulae de schematibus et tropis* (cf. Knappe 274–275) give “*Prosopopoeia*” as “a feigning of persons [‘*Personarum fictio*’], [...] when speech is given to many things [‘*cum multis sermo tribuitur*’]. The poets allowed themselves much in this [...] the Orators took it over [‘*usurpant*’] from them” (qtd. in: Mack *History* 215; 215n.; 216n.). On (seasonal) *prosopopoiiai* in Nashe, cf. Trimpi (“*Interpretation*” 502); for “*Time*” personified—anticipating what it might say (“*thou shalt not boast*”), Shakespeare (*Sonnets* 357, §123, v.1). On a “*portrait of Envy*” as “*kite*” in Chapman, see McDonald: “a *prosopopoeia*, the Aphthonian personification and description of an abstract quality” (190; cf. 193–194). For Milton’s “*Personifying Truth as a dismembered virgin*”, see Dobranski (44; as to “*Areopagitica*” 364–365). Mack refers to “*personification*” in “*Geoffrey de Vinsauf’s Poetria nova*” (*History* 28–29), Erasmus (*History* 80), Luis de Granada (*History* 271). For a diachronic synopsis of the device, see Nash (63–70; 125–127).

63 In the Renaissance, the term “*anthropopatheia*” was used “for the depiction of God” (Plett *Culture* 284; cf. 284n.); for notorious Early Modern words put into the Deity’s mouth, see Pico’s *sermocinatio*, legitimizing man’s *plus ultra* in the beginning of his “*Oratio*”: “the best of artisans [...] took man as a creature of indeterminate nature and [...] addressed him thus: ‘Neither a fixed abode nor a form that is thine alone nor any function peculiar to thyself have we given thee [...]. Thou, constrained by no limits [...] [art] the maker and molder of thyself’” (224–225, §3; cf. Oesterreich “*Subjektivität*” 1290). On ‘*eidolopoiia*’, cf. Lausberg (*Handbuch* 411–412, §826; 543, §1132). Vallozza logs Priscian’s using “*simulacri factio*” in said respect

The terms ‘*allocutio*’ and ‘*sermocinatio*’ (at times used to denote particular and dialogic instances, respectively) foreground the ventriloquistic procedure as such.⁶⁴ Implicitly, the latter also holds good for (the affine technique of) ‘*ethopoïia*’, performed with a view to semiotically crafting (or redescribing) and conveying distinctively habitual (common, socio-moral) traits—typically in, and

(414; “quando mortuis verba dantur”, Priscian “*praeexercitamina*” 558, §9). See Kennedy: “The status of the speaker at the time the speech is imagined as being given is what determines whether it is *ethopoeia* or *eidolopoeia*” (Aphthonius “*Exercises*” 115n.; with Hermogenes 85n.). Aspects of temporality are rhetorically decisive: “What is said is [...] affected by [...] when it is said” (Aelius Theon “*Exercises*” 48, §8.116). One of the most characteristic refunctionalizations will be Montaigne’s preemptive refutation of future *eidolopoiiai*: “I would willingly come back from the other world to give the lie to any man who portrayed me [‘me formerait’] other than I was, even if it were to honor me” (*Essays* 751, III.9; *Essais* III. 288, III.ix; cf. Friedrich 216, 216n.; Rendall 330n.–331n.)—i.e. ‘to form (*poiein*) me other than as per the essayistically projected, diachronically diverse, *personae*’. Montaigne is taking the (rhetorico-forensic) practice literally; in the same segment: “Je ne veux pas, après tout, comme je vois souvent agiter la mémoire des trépassés, qu’on aille débattant. Il jugeait, il vivait ainsi: il voulait ceci: S’il eût parlé sur sa fin, il eût dit, il eût donné, Je le connaissais mieux que tout autre” (*Essais* III. 288, III.ix)—the (ethopoetically functionalized) *sermocinationes* being particularly pertinent, in said respect.

64 Vallozza gives *allocutio* as “Rede, die einer historischen oder fiktiven Person zugeschrieben wird, damit ihre Charakterzüge [...] herausgestellt werden”; ‘equating’ it with *ethopoïia*, ‘allied to *sermocinatio*’ (413), she finds “‘ethopoïia’, ‘sermocinatio’ [...] ‘prosopopoiia’” ‘difficult to distinguish’—“aufgrund der beweglichen Grenzen zwischen den einzelnen Begriffen” (413); see the n. below. With Iulius Victor, Vallozza stresses “die emotionale Wirkung der A[ll]ocutio” (414; cf. 422, XV); “die ausdrückliche Gleichsetzung” of ‘*allocutio*’ and ‘*ethopoïia*’ is taken from Emporius (414; with “de *ethopoeia*” 561–563; here 561; Naschert 1515; Lanham “Instruction” 111). Cf. phrases describing the process: “sermonem attribuunt [...] damus sermonem [...] sermo est dandus” (Vives 186, Aa.v, II.xvi); “loquentem facimus [...] personas loquentes introducunt” (185, Aa.r, II.xvi). “Lysias [...] makes Euphiletus consistently refer to himself as” (Bakker “Lysias” 421). “Cicero [...] makes Appius Caecus and Clodius [...] address [‘adloquitur’] Clodia” (Quintilian *Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 142–143, 3.8.54). “Cicero has Antonius suggest” (Christiansen 307). “Cicero [...] engages in debate [...] with imagined spokesmen” (Gill “Personhood” 198). He “makes him [sc. ‘Antonius’] the mouthpiece”; “makes Crassus [...] the spokesman for style” (Baldwin *Ancient Rhet.* 46). See Machiavelli: “E Vergilio nella bocca di Didone dice” (*Il Principe* 109, XVII). Blumenberg offers the following (*inter alia*): “Bruno läßt seinen Teofilo sagen” (“Universum” 42); “Galilei [‘läßt’] den Salviati sagen” (*Legitimität* 465). Nor is the former’s (literary) *persona* ‘safe’ from the device: “Der Ausspruch, den Brecht Galilei hier in den Mund legt” (*Legitimität* 463). In an epistolary context, cf. “Lambert läßt seinen Korrespondenzpartner schreiben” (*GKW* III. 647); plus a ventriloquized reaction: “Das ist nun wieder ein Punkt, an dem Lambert seinen Korrespondenzpartner empört und verwirrt reagieren lassen kann” (*GKW* III. 650; cf. 652). “[Jünger] läßt [...] den Bruder Otho [...] sagen” (*Literatur* 28; cf. *Jünger* 12); “läßt Stefan Andres den Maler El Greco sagen” (*Phänomenologische* 104)—such metapoetical formulations presuppose an (extratextual) author. On *dialogismós*, cf. subchs. 3.1, 3.4, 5.1, 5.2.

by way of, language.⁶⁵ De Temmerman and Emde Boas pertinently accentuate the foundational assumption in this respect: “The notion that speech indicates character is [...] central to the ancient concept of *ēthopoia*” (“Intro.” 22).⁶⁶

65 At times, ‘*ethopoeia*’ is called ‘*mimesis*’, ‘*imitatio*’—with potentials for confusion, while also signaling a (plausible) affinity to drama; see Lausberg (*Elemente* 142–143, §432–433; *Handbuch* 408, §820–821; 543, §1131). Cf. “*μίμησις*, Latin *imitatio*, *figuratio*, *expressio*, is another word [...] used as synonymous with *ἠθοποιία*, but it is a more comprehensive term” (Devries 9). Naschert gives *ethopoia* as “die Darstellung von Charakterzügen durch Rede”: “des Redners selbst”, or “den fiktiver oder historischer Personen in Form einer nachahmenden Rede” (1512). Like Vallozza (413), Naschert logs: “Schwierigkeit bereitet [...] die Abgrenzung des Begriffs” (1512); his description is functional: “In ihrem nachahmenden und beschreibenden Moment kommt die E[thopoeia] in die Nähe der *μίμησις* [...] und *ἐνάργεια* [...], in ihrer Darstellung von Reden oder Gesprächen abwesender Personen gleicht sie der *allocutio* und *sermocinatio*” (1512; cf. Cave “Mimesis” 161). “AQUILA beschreibt sie [sc. *ethopoeia*] als ‘*moralis confictio*’ im Gegensatz zur *prosopopoeia*, [...] ‘*personae confictio*’ [...] Die ‘*Schemata Dianoeas*’ bezeichnen E[thopoeia] als ‘*data locutio certae personae*’” (1514). Cf. Aquila: “Προσωποποιία est p e r s o n a e c o n f i c t i o. [...] rem publicam ipsam loquentem inducimus, aut defunctos aliquos quasi excitamus ab inferis” (23, §3; instancing Cicero); “Ἠθοποιία, m o r a l i s c o n f i c t i o. Haec figura differt a superiore [sc. *prosopopoiia*] eo, quod ibi et personas fingimus, quae nusquam sunt, hic certis quibusdam [vel] personis verba accommodate adfingimus” (23–24, §4; “vel” bracketed in Halm; with a Ciceronian sample; cf. Volkmann 490, III.49). The anon. “*Schemata Dianoeas*” give “Ἠθοποιία” as “*data locutio certae personae*”; and “Προσωποποιία” as “*alicui rei inanimatae vel defuncto adcommodata locutio*. Haec figura a superiori [sc. *ethopoiia*] hoc differt, quod in illa vox tantum viventibus datur, in hac vero eis, quae naturam vivendi non habent” (“*schemata dianoeas*” 72, §5–6; with examples from Cicero). Vives has: “Unicuique sermo est dandus naturae ac ingenio suo conformis, tum habitui, quem illi affingimus” (186, Aa.v, II.xvi). The nexus of *héxis* (*habitus*) and *ethos* will be particularly patent here—and will be implied, whenever the latter term is used; see subch. 3.3, below.

66 Cf. Kennedy: “What the speaker says [...] show[s] what he is like” (*Persuasion* 136). As to perceiving *ethos* from *lógos*, see Plutarch: “It is possible [...] to get a glimpse of the character [ἡθους] of each in his style of speaking [λόγους]” (“Demosthenes and Cicero” 210–211, §886, I.3). Cf. Menander: “ἀνδρὸς χ α ρ α κ τ ῆ ρ ἕκ λόγου γνωρίζεται” (qtd. in: Körte 79); Terence: “nam mihi quale ingenium haberes fuit indicio oratio” (218, II.iv.384; cf. Körte 79). Iulius Victor: “Fere sermo cuiusque mores probat” (446, XXVI); Alcuin: “fere cuiusque mores sermo probat” (547, §43). Noting that “*Mores* in infinitum abeunt, ut est eorum indicibilis diversitas”, Vives gives an “*universalis*” (only ostensibly “*obscura*”) “*formula*” implying the effectuality of (a) speech qua diagnostic: “*capi quenque oratione suis moribus conformi*” (179, Z2.r, II.xvi). Cf. Scaliger: “*Orationes enim quodam modo picturae sunt animorum. & qualis quisque est, ita loquitur. & in obliquo*” (123, III.xxxv). “Mihi videtur omnis oratio esse *διαλογισμός*: Perfonæ verò habitum nequaquam pingi debere, fed orationem per se fati posse ad perfonam illam declarandam” (126, III.xlviii). See Puttenham: “because this continual course and manner of writing or speech showeth the matter and disposition of the writer’s mind [...] there be that [sc. such as] have called style the image of man (*mentis character*), for man is but his mind, and as his mind is tempered and qualified, so are his speeches and language at large” (233, III.5);

Variants of rhetorical ventriloquism dependably formed part of the common curriculum from Antiquity to the Early Modern Age—wherefore every student (including such as would later be referred to as ‘Seneca’, ‘Ovid’, and ‘Augustine’, or ‘Montaigne’, ‘Shakespeare’, and ‘Cervantes’) had ample practice in these (and related) techniques.⁶⁷ Given their observable prevalence over the

“men do choose their subjects according to the mettle of their minds” (234, III.5). Cf. Hellwig: “was er sagt, legt zugleich seine [...] Einstellung frei” (270). In drama, action—being decisive (Aristotle “Poetics” 46–53, 1449b–1450b, VI)—is similarly performed (chiefly) in, by speech; as *ethos* in oratory; hence Pearson’s remarks apply to both: “actions [...] establish [...] character”; the “Greek language represents a man as ‘becoming an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός’ when he fights bravely to the end [...]; his ἀρετή is not established until then. [...] Only when the action is completed have they ‘acquired the character’ which the dramatist wants us to recognize in them” (“Character.” 81); “the actions of a dramatic personage imply or involve character-development [...] he picks up and acquires character in the course of a play” (“Character.” 82); “‘characterization’ is one of the consequences [...] of their actions” (“Character.” 82); a “‘revelation of ἦθος’ is included” in “representing actions” (“Character.” 82). Cf. “just as the orator selects arguments which reveal his character, so a character in a drama, through the way he argues (*dianoia*), shows his *ethos*” (Sattler 59; his overall take *cum grano salis*). With Aristotle (“Poetics” 52–53, 1450b, VI; cf. 78–81, 1454a, XV), Pearson logs: “‘it is by representing people’s actions that one shows what kind [...] they are’. Apart from the relative importance of πρᾶξις and ἦθος, Aristotle seems to be insisting on the temporal priority of πρᾶξις in drama. [...] [‘in’] orator[y] [...] representation of ἦθος often precedes the narrative [...] to make the representation of πρᾶξις more effective” (“Character.” 79–80); “character in tragedy is created as speech or action reveals motivation” (“Character.” 80n.; cf. “Poetics” 78–79, 1454a, XV). Drama is (incidentally) ethopoetic through action—taking place in, by way of, language; ‘*ethopoïia*’ (not only forensically) effects a (quasi) ‘personalizing’ transference from a case-related ‘*quale*’ to a speaker-focused ‘*qualis sit*’, which redirects the attention: away from the *res*, toward the (supposed) ‘make’ of the given *persona*, its *ethos* (see subch. 4.1, herein). Said shift is produced ‘entechnically’—in, through language: “the narrative [‘diégesin’] should be [...] [‘ἠθικὴν’], and in fact it will be so, if we know what effects this [‘τί ἦθος ποιεῖ’]. One thing is to make clear our [...] [‘προαίρεσιν’]; for as the [latter][...], so is the character [‘ποῖόν δὲ τὸ ἦθος τῷ ποιῶν ταύτην’], and as is the end [‘τέλει’], so is the [...] [‘προαίρεσις’]. For this reason mathematical treatises have no [...] [‘ἦθη’], because neither have they [...] [‘προαίρεσιν’]; for they have no [...] [such] end” (Aristotle *Rhetoric* 446–447, 1417a, III.xvi.8; cf. 288–289, 1395b, II.xxi.16; “Poetics” 52–53, 1450b, VI; 78–81, 1454a, XV; with Trimpf *Muses* 271n.; Niehues-Pröbsting “Ethos” 344; *Die antike Phil.* 59; Bruss 42; 42n.; contrast: Süß 219). Freese’s trans. of ‘*ethos*’, ‘*prohairesis*’ seem misleading (hence are bracketed). See Baumlin’s sober take: “rhetoric” is “an art that emphasize[s] the role a speaker’s character plays in persuasion” (xii); the “Aristotelian tradition asserts the sufficiency of *seeming* good. [...] discourse becomes an active construction of character [...] Aristotelian theory [...] outline[s] the means whereby such image-making is achieved. [...] appearance will suffice” (xv); as per “Aristotle’s model of *ethos*, the rhetorical situation renders the speaker an element of the discourse” (xvi); “*ethos* is [...] a linguistic phenomenon” (xxiii).

67 See Kennedy: “Latin literature, beginning in the Augustan age, shows the influence of

course of (at least) two millennia, as well as their instrumentality *de re*, the general impact and distinct import of the various ventriloquistic devices must seem considerable. By describing their acceptations and functions, as well as potential latencies with a view to additional forms of application, the ensuing subchapters detail the treatment of the above and affine concepts in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Cicero, Quintilian, and other Greek or Latin *rhētores*—especially also as handed down to the pan-European tradition in the set of texts usually referred to as the *Progymnasmata*.⁶⁸ Among the latter, those by

exercises in composition, which even became literary genres. The *Heroides* of Ovid are versified *prosōpopoeiae*, [...] common [...] in schools. Often literary versions of exercises are combined as structural units in larger works: Ovid's *Metamorphoses* uses myth, personification, narrative, comparison [...] *ekphrasis* (vivid description of a place or work of art). The comparisons of Greeks and Romans that Plutarch included in his *Lives* are literary versions of *synkrisis*, another ['common'] exercise" (*New History* 202). Cf. Bonner: "the *Heroides* would be [...] accurately described as *prosopopoeiae*, or *ethopoeiae* or 'imaginary monologues'" (*Declamation* 150); with Seneca the Elder: "Ovid rarely declaimed *controversiae*, and only ones involving portrayal of character ['ethicas']". He preferred *suasoriae*, finding all argumentation tiresome" (*Controv. 1–6. 264–265, 136M, 2.2.12*). Lanham logs: "Ovid's *Heroides*" were "created in accordance with the rhetorical rules for *ethopoeia*"; he adds: "The fourth-century invented correspondence between Seneca and [...] Paul is best explained as a classroom exercise in style and characterization" ("Composition" 121). Generally, cf. Bloemendal ("Polish Pindar" 115–117, spec. 116; Mayfield "Interplay" 29, 29n.). Vickers logs: "a Renaissance schoolboy would achieve a mastery of rhetoric that would never leave him"; the context is problematic, reducing the art to *elocutio* (cf. "figures", *Artistry* 30; also *passim*). See Christiansen, as to Early Modernity: "in England [...] the word 'rhetoric' was on every schoolboy's lips" (297); for Renaissance *praxis* (stressing *actio*), she logs: "This personification of the figures [sc. of rhetoric, per se] along with the experience of writing the *prosopopoeia*, the 'character' or impersonation exercise from the *progymnasmata*, [...] [which] most [...] schoolboys would have practiced, makes obvious that style is behavior. [...] to write a speech that a particular character would make to a particular audience in a particular situation, the pupil must be able to identify specific speech habits that would create the character. Style inevitably connects mental operations with speech patterns and outward actions" (326; for applications, 327–329; also on Shaw; cf. subch. 5.2, herein). Preparing them for a public career (and continued later in life), *prosopopoiiai* are likely to have been a preferred exercise (with leisure qua pleasure ever conducting to industry)—being highly competitive, calling for *aemulatio*, affording the possibility for declamatorily demonstrating ('showing off') various talents, thereby linking *elocutio* (the spec. linguistic performance) with a comprehensive *actio* (simultaneously gestural, histrionic, dramatic), and providing ample space for the students to aim at (or appear to be) 'outshining' one another. Generally, see Fothergill-Payne on the Jesuits (*passim*; spec. 376–377); Mareel on the *Rederijkers* (1151); cf. Mayfield ("Interplay" 29n.); also the n. on Augustine in ch. 1, above; see subch. 4.2, part 5.

68 Cf. Kennedy (*New History* 202–208; "progymnastic", that is, [...] 'preparatory', 202); Conley (30–31); Lanham ("Instruction" 105); Trimpi ("Quality" 75–81; *Muses* 305; 321–327); Eden ("Rhetoric" 827–828; also on "speeches in character", 828). Cf. Quintilian's 'rhetorical' versions

Aphthonius proved particularly influential.⁶⁹ The decidedly rhetorical poetics of Early Modern literature cannot be described without recourse to said exercises.⁷⁰

(*Inst. Orat.* 1–2. 280–301, 2.4.1–42)—seen to tie in with those “learned with the *grammatici*” (*Inst. Orat.* 1–2. 281, 2.4.1; with 208–213, 1.9.1–6); cf. Trimpi (“Quality” 75–76; *Muses* 321–322); Lanham (“Composition” 120). Kennedy describes the *Progymnasmata* as “the system of teaching prose composition and elementary rhetoric[,] practiced in European schools from the Hellenistic period until early modern times”; and stresses that “[t]hese texts were the common basis for teaching composition in western Europe for several centuries”, that all “writings” were “molded by the habits of thinking and writing learned in schools” (“Intro. [2003]” ix); he stresses argument *in utramque partem*: “the exercises [...] tended to encourage the idea that there was an equal amount to be said on two sides of any issue” (“Intro. [2003]” x).

69 Kennedy logs that “Aphthonius[’]” was “the most commonly used work on progymnasmata in late antiquity” (intro. to Aelius Theon “*Exercises*” 2; italics removed): “His *Progymnasmata* became the first text in the standard Hermogenic corpus, [...] because it included examples of all exercises as well as brief and clear descriptions of each” (intro. to Aphthonius “*Exercises*” 89; italics inverted). “The clarity of his discussion and division and his inclusion of examples won for Aphthonius’ work an authoritative place in Byzantine education. An extensive body of commentary was built up over the next millennium, [...] the treatise was translated into Latin by [...] Agricola in the late fifteenth century, making it available for use in the schools of western Europe” (*New History* 203; cf. *Classical Rhetoric* 164). For the Byzantine context, Kustas logs “the ever present and [...] used outlines of Hermogenes and his commentator Aphthonius” (56); on the latter, “through whom the Christian world was to learn so much of its rhetoric”, he notes: “The special success of Aphthonius lies in the simplicity of his exposition as well as in his inclusion of examples for each of the types under discussion” (57). See also part 5, herein.

70 On the prevalence of the *Progymnasmata*, cf. W. Crane’s ch. ‘Rhetoric in the Schools of the Sixteenth Century’ (57–79; on “*Ethopoeia*”, affine devices, 66, 75–76; see 160, *passim*). Cf. Rainolde’s “discussion of *ethopoeia* [...] combined Aphthonius, Priscian ([...] Hermogenes), [...] Quintilian” (Herrick 135; cf. 136; Clark 262); for “*Ethopoeia*” (see Fol.xlix.r–Fol.lj.r, N.j.r–N.iiij.r; here: xlix.r), Rainolde refers to Priscian thrice (Fol.xlix.r–Fol.l.r, N.j.r–N.ij.r; to Quintilian at xlix.r), dividing it into three subgroups: “*Eidolopoeia*”, “*Profopopoeia*”, “*Ethopoeia*”—the latter also qua hypernym (similarly: Volkman 490n., III.49). It is defined as “that, whiche hath the perfone knowne: but onely it doeth faigne the maners of the fame, and imitate in a Oracion the fame”; subdivided into an “imitacion paffiue”, “a morall imitaciō”, and one “mixt” (Fol.xlix.r, N.j.r). “*Eidolopoeia* is that part of this Oracion, whiche maketh a perfone knowne though dedde, and not able to fpeake” (Fol.l.v, N.ij.v)—emphatic of the craft. “*Profopopoeia* is properlie, when all thinges are faigned bothe the maners, [and] the perfone” (Fol.l.r, N.ij.r). Rainolde adduces an ethopoetic speech, written for “Hecuba Quene of Troie” (Fol.lj.v–r, N.iiij.v–r). Cf. Desmet (60, 134); she employs the term “ventriloquist” (94); her use of the technical concepts may seem vague (cf. 68–69, 109, 143; spec. 167; *passim*); at times, she misconstrues: 46–47). Fraunce (cf. G2r–G7v, I.31; with F8v, I.30) defines “*Profopopoeia*” as “a fayning of any perfon, when in our fpeach we repretent the perfon of anie, and make it fpeake as though he were there prent : an excellent figure, much vsed of Poets, wherein wee muft diligentlie take heede, that the perfon thus repretented haue a fpeach fit and conuenient for his eftate and nature”; he offers two subclasses: it is “imperfect, when the fpeach of fome other

3.1 The *Rhetorica ad Herennium* on ‘*sermocinatio*’ and ‘*notatio*’

even if theory cannot have the last word,
a good many words before the last rightly belong to it[.]
—Grube (214)

rhetorical discourse [...] with all its living diversity[.]
—Bakhtin (*Dialogic* 268–269)⁷¹

Long ascribed to Cicero, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* sees *sermocinatio* as an aspect of “Refining [‘Expolitio’]”, which “consists in dwelling on the same topic and yet seeming to say something ever new [‘et aliud atque aliud dicere videmur’]” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 364–365, IV.xlii.54).⁷² One is “not [to] repeat the same thing precisely [...] but with changes”; such may take place “in the words [‘verbis’], in the delivery [‘pronuntiando’], and in the treatment [‘tractando’]” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 364–365, IV.xlii.54)—comprising ‘*sermocinatio*’, ‘*exsuscitatio*’

perfon is but brought in by the way and lightlie and fleightlie repreffented” (G2r, I.31). For the other variant, he stresses its being set apart: “The perfect *Profopopœia* is, when the whole fpeech of anie perfon is fully and liuely repreffented; wherin we muft make both a fit and orderly acceffe too, and regreffe from the fame *Profopopœia*” (G3v, I.31; cf. “preparation”, “left off”, G3v–r). Moreover: “By this figure wee fometime make dumme and fencelès things fpeake”, e.g. “*Xanthus Achilles horfe*” (G5r, I.31). In Homer, the hero first addresses both of his steeds, is then answered by one—which segment opens with the ensuing: “from beneath the yoke spoke to him the horse [...] Hera [...] gave him speech”; and concludes: “[w]hen he had thus spoken, the Erinyes checked his voice” (*Iliad* 13–24. 362–365, XIX, v.404, 407, 418; cf. 364n.).

71 Cf. Fuhrmann on Dionysius of Halicarnassus: “Außerdem aber war er [...] bestrebt, eine große Vielfalt von Formen und Ausdrucksmitteln anzuerkennen” (*Dichtungstheorie* 196).

72 Cf. “res simplex multiplici ratione tractetur” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 370, IV.xliv.56); the Greek being ‘*exergasia*’ (*Rhet. ad Her.* 370n.). “Refining [‘expolitio’] [...] gives force and distinction to the speech [‘adiuvat et exornat orationem’]” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 374–375, IV.xliv.58). For a précis of said work’s “Devices for Achieving *dignitas* in Style”, cf. Murphy (*Middle Ages* 21); those relevant herein are given as follows: “13. *effictio* (portrayal) / 14. *notatio* (character delineation) / 15. *sermocinatio* (dialogue) / 16. *conformatio* (personification)” (*Middle Ages* 21); an appendix has: “*effictio* [...] consists in representing and depicting in words clearly enough for recognition the bodily form of some person. / 14. [...] *notatio* [...] describ[es] a person’s character by the definite signs which, like distinctive marks, are attributes of that character. [...] / 15. [...] *sermocinatio* [...] assign[s] to some person language which [...] conforms with his character. [...] Quintilian [...] joins this figure and Personification [...] / 16. [...] *conformatio* [...] represent[s] an absent person as present, [...] mak[es] a mute thing or one lacking form articulate, [...] attribut[es] to it a definite form [...] language or [...] behavior appropriate to its character” (*Middle Ages* 373).

(qua “Dialogue”, “Arousal”, *Rhet. ad Her.* 366–367, IV.xliii.55).⁷³

The former is defined as follows: “Sermocinatio est [...] in qua constituetur alicuius personae oratio adcommodata ad dignitatem”, “putting in the mouth of some person language in keeping with his” status (*Rhet. ad Her.* 366–367, IV.xliii.55).⁷⁴ Before giving an explication of said device, a section on “Portrayal [‘Effictio’]” ensues—which “consists in representing [‘exprimitur’] and depicting [‘effingitur’] in words clearly enough for recognition [‘ad intellegendum’] the bodily form of some person [‘corporis cuiuspiam forma’]” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 386–387, IV.xlix.63). A longer disquisition on “Character Delineation [‘Notatio’]” follows—which describes (“describitur”) someone’s habitual bearing (“alicuius natura”) by way of ‘certain distinctive signs or marks’ (“certis [...] signis [...] sicuti notae”, *Rhet. ad Her.* 386–395, IV.l.63–li.65; here: 386–387, IV.l.63).⁷⁵

73 “Arousal” means a direct appeal to the audience—aiming at *movere* by “seem[ing] to speak under emotion [‘nos commoti dicere videamur’]—induced quasi ‘syn-homoio-pathetically’ in the captivated (“auditoris animum commovemus”, *Rhet. ad Her.* 368–369, IV.xliii.55).

74 As Caplan notes, auto-deliberation is entailed: “διαλογισμός occurs when someone discusses with himself and ponders what he is doing or what he thinks ought to be done” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 366n.; cf. “secum disputat et velutat”, Julius Rufinianus 43–44, §20). This aspect is embedded within a *sermocinatio* in the *Rhetorica*’s example: “The wise man will think [...] Often he will say to himself: ‘Not for self alone was I born[.]’” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 367, IV.xliii.55).

75 Cicero gives “χαρακτήρ” as ‘*forma*’ (“formam [...] exponere”); Hubbell has “pattern”, “type” (“Orator” 330–331, xi.36; “character”, 406–407, xxxix.134): “distinctive mark’ or ‘character’, ‘stamp on a coin’” (“Orator” 331n.). It is also equated with “descriptor” (“hallmark”, “Topica” 446–447, xxi.83); Körte glosses: “Da bedeutet χαρακτήρ [...] in Anlehnung an Theophrast [...] Kennzeichnung, Beschreibung” (81n.). See W. Crane: “English writers of the early seventeenth century used [...] ‘character’ at times as a synonym for ‘description’” (155; cf. 160n., with Cicero, as cited). Cf. Rusten: “The meanings of [...] χαρακτήρ are derived from [...] *inscribing* (χαράσσειν) onto a surface: the *imprint* on a coin, [...] *form* of a letter, [...] *style* of an author for rhetorical analysis. ‘Character’ in the modern sense is *not* one of its meanings—the Greek word for ‘character’ is usually ἥθος—[...] Theophrastus’ title might better be rendered ‘traits’” (12–13). Cf. “‘character’ derives from [...] *kharassō* (‘to engrave’). It etymologically privileges a connotation of distinctive, visible mark that already in Aeschylus and Herodotus is semantically transferred to the realm of moral depiction” (De Temmerman/Emde Boas “Intro.” 6; with 6n.); “Herodotus uses *kharaktēr* to indicate traits of distinction in appearance [...] or in language” (Bakker “Herodotus” 137n.). Noting that “‘character is a notoriously slippery concept” (“Intro.” 1; cf. “Epilogue” 650), De Temmerman/Emde Boas define it as “(the representation of) a human(-like) individual in a [...] text”; and as “the sum of relatively stable moral, mental and social traits and dispositions pertaining to an individual” (“Glossary” XII; cf. “Intro.” 2, whose list includes “personal”). Using the word “individual” is inadvisable: the authors see the issue, but still speak of “the self” (“Intro.” 7; cf. “individual”, 2). As to Antiquity, spec. Theophrastus, Körte logs: “Niemals wird die Darstellung eines Individuums erstrebt, sondern stets die eines Charaktertypus [...] dem Individuum ist auf diesem Wege nicht beizukommen” (78). Noting

Typically, *'effictio'* (qua *'charakterismós'*) does not feature words being put

“welche Sinneswandlungen es schon im Altertum durchgemacht hat”, “wie wenig sich seine antike Verwendung mit der modernen deckt”, he stresses: “Das Wort Charakter ist ein [...] fester Besitz aller abendländischen Kultursprachen geworden” (69). For the conceptual path, see Körte’s descriptive synopsis: “χαρακτήρ ist seiner formalen Bildung nach ein nomen agentis, bezeichnet [...] den Ausübler der durch das in ihm steckende Verbum angegebenen Tätigkeit” (69). “Zunächst ist [...] χαρακτήρ ‘einer der χαράσσει’. Das bei Homer fehlende Verbum χαράσσειν kommt zuerst bei Hesiod in den Erga vor und heißt hier schärfen, schleifen [...]. Diese auch [...] später[...] gelegentlich vorkommende Bedeutung ist [...] abgeleitet aus der Grundbedeutung aufreißen, ritzen, verwunden” (70). “Metaphorisch wird χαράσσειν [...] für kränken, erzürnen, aufreizen gebraucht” (70n.); “häufig [...] wird das Verbum später in zwei technischen Bedeutungen angewendet”: it signifies “das Schreiben auf Stein, Holz [...] Erz” (70); another “häufige Verwendung ist die für das Prägen der Münze” (71). “Eine schon bei Homer [...] einsetzende Bewegung degradiert [...] die nomina agentis auf -τήρ zu den Werkzeugen, mit denen der Mensch eine Tätigkeit ausübt” (72). “So ist auch χαρακτήρ zunächst das Instrument [...] de[r] [...] Münzprägung [...], der Prägestempel” (72). “Theoretisch [...] könnte [...] χαρακτήρ in Hesiods Zeit der Schleifer, später der Schreiber, [...] Präger bedeuten” (71). “Bis hierher ist die Entwicklung des Wortes [...] normal, aber nun tritt etwas Überraschendes ein, aus dem Prägestock wird das durch ihn Hergestellte, das Gepräge” (73); “diese Verwendung, χαρακτήρες = Schriftzüge, Buchstaben, hat sich [...] in den modernen Sprachen zäh behauptet” (84). By the first century BCE: “es kann [...] der Plural χαρακτήρες [...] für Geld gesetzt werden” (75). Körte stresses: “Das Bild vom Stempel [...] wird ziemlich früh auf den Menschen angewendet, aber nicht zur Bezeichnung seines seelischen Gepräges, der [...] individuellen Eigenart, wie wir heute das Wort Charakter überwiegend gebrauchen. Es geht mitunter auf die körperliche Erscheinung” (75). From being applied to physical externals, it moves to a human animal’s decisive ‘characteristic’—first as to regional differences: “Ist in diesen Fällen der Sprachcharakter noch mehr physiologisch genommen, der [...] Stempel der Mundart [...], so wird nun [...] χαρακτήρ das Gepräge der geformten Rede, die Art sich auszudrücken, der Stil” (76); cf. “χαρακτήρ λέξεως” (80). Qua “Verwendung [...], die in der späteren griechischen Literatur weitaus die häufigste ist”, Körte gives “χαρακτήρ = Stilart” (76). “Niemals [...] dient das Wort in der klassischen Zeit [...] zur Bezeichnung der seelischen Eigenart eines Menschen. Aristoteles, der χαρακτήρ für [...] Gepräge mehrfach verwendet [...] hat es ebensowenig in seinen ethischen Schriften wie in seiner Poetik. Erst [...] Theophrast hat in seinen [...] Ἠθικοὶ χαρακτήρες die Übertragung auf das ethische Gebiet vollzogen und [...] die Bedeutung des Wortes angebahnt, die in allen modernen Kultursprachen die vorherrschende ist. Freilich verwendet er das Wort nur im Titel, in der Schrift selbst kommt es, [...] in der uns erhaltenen [...] Fassung, niemals vor” (77; cf. 77n.; for the title, cf. D. Laertius *Lives* I. 496, V.47; Hicks has: “Character Sketches”, 497). Plausibly, Körte locates the shift in a Stoic(izing) context: “Das ständige Hereinziehen des Münzgepräges zeigt [...], daß Epiktets Hörern die Verwendung von χαρακτήρ im Sinne der angeborenen [...] Eigenart nicht unbedingt geläufig war [...]. Vom Individuum wird hier ganz abgesehen, der Mensch als Gattungsbegriff hat seinen χαρακτήρ, sein bestimmtes [...] Gepräge” (85; cf. Epictetus “*Disc. III–IV.*” 336–339, IV.v.15–18). The Greeks used it “ganz überwiegend für etwas Formales, [...] das feste Gepräge des Stils [...]. Wenn sie es auf die menschliche Seele anwenden, so denken sie meist an Typen” (Körte 86).

into the mouth of the person sketched—seeing that it focuses primarily on the outward shape and physical frame (*‘effingitur forma’: ‘figura, de re*).⁷⁶ Conversely, *‘notatio’* (*‘ethopoia’*) will usually (if not necessarily) contain language attributed to the ‘characters’ respectively (re)described (*Rhet. ad Her.* 388–393, IV.l.63–li.64); and plausibly so, since said device deals with their *ethos* (an acquired disposition being a somewhat ‘more inward’ shape), their general (habitual, customary) comportment under typical, non-extraordinary circumstances.⁷⁷ In a précis as to such “notations”, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*

76 A versified treatise defines “Χαρακτηρισμός” thus: “Fit depictio, cum verbis ut imagine pingo” (“Carmen de figuris” 69, v.148; with two subsequent v. as a sample); another tract gives said term as “quod latine informatio vel descriptio appellatur” (“schemata dianoeas”). Cf. Tryphon (201, §751, ζ). “Characterismus est descriptio figurae alicuius expressa” (Isidore “de arte rhet.” 521, XXI.40; with a sample from Vergil). Cf. Hodgkinson: “An anonymous sophist/‘philosopher’ type is very briefly sketched in *Peregrinus* (40) on the basis of his appearance [...]—grey hair, long beard, a dignified bearing [...] fitting the short-hand imagery for characterizing a philosopher” (553). Said *‘charakterismós’* is functionalized with a view to a speaker’s *ethos* (cf. “ἀξιολόγω τὸ πρόσωπον”)—while the “confidence” he is said to ‘inspire’ is (evidently) deceptive (Lucian “Peregrinus” 44–45, §40). On “the Reeve’s self-portrait in the *Canterbury tales*” as a Chaucerian “*notatio*”, cf. Gallo (83–84). Scaliger sees *‘effictio’* as pertaining to *‘prosopopoeia’*: “Effictio enim est pars fictionis in Profopopoeia” (122–123, III.xxxiii). In his “*Treatise of Schemes and Tropes*, 1550”, “Richard Sherry” defined “*Charactirismus*” as “the efficion or pycture of the bodye or mynde” (qtd. in: W. Crane 158; cf. 160–161, 160n.–161n.). The latter does not square with the tradition; cf. and contrast Desmet (46–47). With a narratological agenda, De Temmerman/Emde Boas (re)use the term “*kharaktērismos*” as “[d]irect characterization” (“Intro.” 23). Caplan links *‘charakterismós’* to “comedy” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 386n.); re *notatio*, he logs the Greek term (*‘ethopoia’*, with Cicero’s equivalent “*Morum ac vitae imitatio*”), refers to “Theophrastus’ *Characters*”, and observes that “Lysias employs Ethopoeia with special skill” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 387n.); cf. subch. 4.1. See Baldwin, giving “ἠθοποιῶν” as “character sketches”, “the rhetorical method of characterization by typical traits” (*Ancient Rhet.* 187). Bruns stresses that the “Kunstübung, welche die Alten Ethopoiie nannten, [...] typenbildend und verallgemeinernd [‘ist’], nicht individualisierend und das Besondere hervorhebend” (433; cf. Naschert 1513; Hellwig 259n.; 270n.). This qualification links *‘ethos’* to an affine term (treated in subch. 3.3), with respect to which Fuhrmann notes that “persona always points to something typical”: it “always means the bearer of a social role, not the absolute person, [not] the individual” (“Persona” 91; trans. dsm).

77 Cf. De Temmerman/Emde Boas: “The notion that speech indicates character is [...] central to the ancient concept of *ēthopoia*” (“Intro.” 22)—as cited at the onset of ch. 3 (with n. *ad locum*). Montaigne—for (a meta-)instance—describes his habitual *ethos* thus: “Il m’est souvent advenu, que sur le simple crédit de ma présence et de mon air, des personnes qui n’avaient aucune connaissance de moi, s’y sont grandement fiées: soit pour leurs propres affaires, soit pour les miennes” (*Essais III.* 396, III.xii; cf. Cave *Cornucopian* 312). In the ensuing, *tò prépon* is linked to *ethos*: “Composer nos mœurs est notre office [...], et gagner [...] l’ordre et tranquillité à notre conduite. Notre grand et glorieux chef-d’œuvre, c’est vivre à propos” (Montaigne *Essais*

stresses the ever needful nexus with the *aptum* (“quod consentaneum sit unius cuiusque naturae”), gives its function as delighting (“magnam delectationem”) by way of *evidentia* (“naturam cuiuspiam ponunt ante oculos”, *Rhet. ad Her.* 392, IV.li.65)—both continue to be accentuated throughout the tradition.⁷⁸

Then follows the second section on “Sermocinatio” qua “assigning to some person language [‘cum alicui personae sermo adtribuitur’] which [...] conforms with his character [‘cum ratione dignitatis’, sc. status, rank]” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 394–395, IV.lii.65).⁷⁹ The examples elucidating said device include uses of (otherwise infinite) *sententiae*—specifically as an (acute) highlight and (expressive) climax in a longer speech being attributed (here put into the mouth of a protagonist’s wife): “[‘nosce te esse hominem’]” (“[‘Remember that you are human’]”, *Rhet. ad Her.* 394–395, IV.lii.65).⁸⁰ In the same sequence of tragicizing dialog serving as a sample, the antagonist (after yet another dictum, now on the part of the husband) draws attention to the process meta-performatively: “‘Ut in extremo vitae tempore etiam sententias eloqueris! [‘]’” (“‘Sententious even at the point of death! [‘]’”, *Rhet. ad Her.* 396–397, IV.lii.65)—again expediently rendered in an apophthegmatic manner.⁸¹ Moreover, this same *sermocinatio* also features what might amount to a *mise en abyme* of the very device treated: within the dialog featuring attributed speech, the wife—with the aim of moving the antagonist (“commovere”)—explicitly claims to be speaking for her husband, putting ‘pleas and supplications’ (“rogat et supplicat”) in his mouth that, from his perspective,

III. 470); all significative terms are oratorical, here (“Composer”, “mœurs”, “office”, “ordre”, “chef-d’œuvre”, “à propos”—and, by contextual implication, “conduite”, in terms of a rhetorical *héxis*). With reference to Early Modernity (spec. Montaigne), Beaujour logs “rhetoric’s traditional emphasis on *ethos*, the orator’s projection of a persuasive *persona*” (196; the context is problematic). For a detailed treatment of *ethos*, see subch. 3.3 (with n.), herein.

78 Baldwin notes “[t]he pervasive classical inculcation of appropriateness” (*Ancient Rhet.* 71).

79 Caplan trans. the device as “Dialogue” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 395, IV.lii.65), as per the Greek term “*διάλογοι*” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 394n.). Generally thereto, see Hartmann (811).

80 The glosses refer to Isocrates, Hippothoön (via Stobaeus), Sophocles for previous usages of comparable variants (*Rhet. ad Her.* 394n.–395n.). While the device seems dramatic per se, many of the *sermocinationes* (here and elsewhere) refer (or allude) to utterances in plays; see Caplan’s glosses (*Rhet. ad Her.* 394n.). For the Isocratean version of the above *sententia*, cf. “You will attain [...] self-control [‘enkrátēian’] [...] if, when you are in trouble, you contemplate the misfortunes of others and remind yourself that you are human [‘ánthropos’]” (“Demoniacus” 16–17, §21). For the nexus of “drama and oratory” in the above, see Altman (49n.).

81 Caplan glosses “Sententious” as “*γνωμολογεῖς*” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 396n.). See Lausberg (*Elemente* 130–131, §398–399). Cf. Kennedy: “*Sententiae* are what Aristotle ([*Rhetoric*] 2.21) had called *gnomai*. These are maxims or epigrammatic generalizations about life and human beings, couched in a novel form to give them ‘point’” (*New History* 169; with Aristotle *Rhetoric* 278–289, 1394a–1395b, II.xxi.1–16; also 454–455, 1418a, III.xvii.8–9).

are not apposite to his status (“loqui quae me digna non sint”, *Rhet. ad Her.* 396, IV.lii.65).⁸² The text’s (anonymous) *auctor* reaccentuates this focus on the *aptum* by a comment concluding the aforesaid segment of extended *sermocinationes*: “the language assigned to each person [‘datos esse uni cuique sermones’] was appropriate to his character [‘ad dignitatem adcommodatos’]—it being particularly “necessary to maintain” *decorum* in this device (“id quod oportet in hoc genere conservare”, *Rhet. ad Her.* 398–399, IV.lii.65).⁸³ In a rhetorical (as well as metapoetical) perspective, a consideration of circumstances will always be critical and decisive: it matters in whose mouth words are being put, as well as when, in which way, what setting, whose presence—and (above all) in the interest of whom or what (including vicariously).⁸⁴

82 Cf. Horace: “si dicentis erunt fortunis absona dicta, / Romani tollent equites peditesque cachinnum” (*Ars Poetica* 458, v.112–113; with context, 458–461, v.112–127; also: 462–465, v.153–178). On the proliferation of *sermocinationes* in terms of an intratextual multiplication of rhetorico-ventriloquistic layers, see subchs. 2.1 and 5.2, herein.

83 Cicero stresses: “In an oration, as in life [‘ut enim in vita sic in oratione’], nothing is harder than to determine what is appropriate [‘quid deceat’]. The Greeks call it *πρέπον*; let us call it *decorum*” (“Orator” 356–357, xxi.70); “semperque in omni parte orationis ut vitae quid deceat est considerandum; quod et in re de qua agitur positum est et in personis et eorum qui dicunt et eorum qui audiunt” (“Orator” 358, xxi.71; cf. Cope 111n.). See Trimpi: “decorum [...] can never be expressed by (formal) axioms, (philosophical) propositions, or (rhetorical) sanctions to be codified and transmitted by manuals” (“Reason” 109; with 105n.). Cf. Eden: “Decorum requires that the orator accommodate the circumstances of the case, among other things, subject matter, speaker, time, place, and especially audience” (“Rhetoric” 827); it “is that rule that trumps all others in giving the orator the flexibility to accommodate the particularities of his case, including the demands of a particular audience” (“Rhetoric” 826; with Mayfield “Proceedings” 206; 224–226; “Interplay” 18–20; 18n.–20n.). As to the various terms used (diachronically), cf. Asmuth: “prépon [...] ‘ansehnlich’ [...] *harmónton* [...] *decorum* [...] *deceat* [...] *quid deceat* [...] *aptum* [...] ‘apte dicere’ [...] ‘adaptieren’ [...] *accom[m]odatum, conveniens* [...] *decens* [...] ‘angemessen’ [...] *gemäß*” (“Angemessenheit” 581); “Bis zur Goethezeit bedeutet auch *bequem* angemessen” (“Angemessenheit” 582; plus affine German terms).

84 Thereto, see spec. subchs. 5.1 and 5.2, herein. Isidore tenders the following list: “Who is speaking? In whose presence? About what? Where? When? [‘quis loquatur et apud quem et de quo et ubi et quo tempore’]” (“Concerning Rhet.” 95, XIV.1–2; “de arte rhet.” 514–515, XIV). In stressing the *aptum*—“Et hominum et locorum et temporum ratio servanda est”—Iulius Victor also gives the *ex negativo*: “Hi sunt enim, quos Cicero ineptos vocat, qui neque ubi nec quando nec cum quibus fabulenter existimant nec quam diu nec quo modo” (447, XXVI). See the Medieval hexameter (as qtd. by Lausberg): “*quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando*” (*Elemente* 25, §41; cf. Moos 258, §64; Rico Verdú 102, referring to Bravo). As to Castiglione, see Altman (73–74). Said formula’s utility extends beyond the forensic (hence primarily past-related) context. Given the present focus on (a potential) vicariousness, the queries ‘on whose behalf’ or “for whom [‘pro quo’]” (Quintilian *Inst. Orat.* 11–12. 30–31, 11.1.43,

Before transitioning to a brief section on ‘*conformatio*’ (see *Rhet. ad Her.* 398–401, IV.liii.66), the text adduces that there are also “sermocinationes consequentes” (translated by Caplan *de re*, as “Hypothetical Dialogues”), which draw attention to the device itself while employing it: “Indeed what do we think those people will say [‘Nam quid putamus illos dicturos’] [...] Will not every one say [‘utentur oratione’] [...]’ And then one must add what they will say [‘deinde subicere sermonem’]” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 398–399, IV.lii.65).⁸⁵

including contextualization: “apud quem”) might be added—with this being implicit in “*quibus auxiliis*” to some extent; a variant wording has “*quibus adminiculis*” (Lausberg *Handbuch* 183, §328; cf. 203, §374). W. Crane gives this list: “Under circumstances of special concern in oratory fall such considerations as who, what, where, when, to whom, how, and why” (58). Sloane logs “rhetoric[s] [...] insistence upon circumstance” (“Education” 169n.), “that all arguments should be attached to sources and purposes, to speakers and occasions” (“Education” 171). Cf. Christiansen on “balanc[ing] the demands of the multiplex context, demands which change as circumstances change” (305): “Texts are always connected to speakers, purposes, audiences, occasions, and effects” (315); in line with Quintilian, she uses the formulation: “varied to suit” (305). See Niehues-Pröbsting: “Rhetorik hat es wesentlich mit Einzellnem und Speziellem zu tun. Ihre Unvermeidlichkeit beruht auf der Unbestimmtheit des Einzelfalles” (“Ethos” 346). “Rhetorik [...] ist zeitgebunden und situativ” (“Rhet. und Ästhetik” 51). Circumstances are ever decisive, rhetorically—hence the accent on *kairós* and *tò prépon* (cf. Trimpi *Muses* 273; 276)—all is “with a difference” (Shakespeare *Hamlet* 359, IV.v.181); accordingly, adjustment, flexibility are paramount: “He [...] will be eloquent [‘eloquens’] who can adapt his speech [‘accommodare orationem’] to fit all conceivable circumstances [‘ad id quodcumque decebit’]” (Cicero “Orator” 398–399, xxxvi.123). Cf. Aristotle’s description of rhetoric: “Rhetoric [‘ῥητορικῆ’] [...] may be defined as the faculty [‘δύναμις’] of discovering [‘θεωρησαί’] the possible means of persuasion [‘τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν’] in reference to any subject whatever. This is the function of no other of the arts [‘τέχνης’]” (*Rhetoric* 14–15, I.ii.1, 1355b; cf. 12–13, I.i.14; with Trimpi *Muses* 18–19).

85 According to Lausberg (*Elemente* 143, §433), as well as *de re*, the ensuing seems to be an affine device (cf. “subicere”): “Hypophora [‘Subiectio’, also ‘ἀνθυποφορά’] occurs when we enquire of our adversaries, or ask ourselves, what the adversaries can say in their favour, or what can be said against us [‘quid contra nos dici possit’]; then we subjoin [‘subicimus’] what ought or ought not to be said [‘id quod oportet dici aut non oportet’]” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 310–311, IV.xxiii.33; 310n.). “There is much vigour and impressiveness [‘acrimoniae et gravitatis’] in this figure because, after having posed the question, ‘What ought to have been done?’, we subjoin [‘subicitur’] that that was not done. [...] In another form of the same figure we refer the hypophora [‘subiectionem’] to our own person [‘ad nostram (...) personam’]” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 312–313, IV.xxiv.34); moreover, one may ‘accumulate’ “subiectiones” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 314, IV.xxiv.34). As to *hypophorá* generally, see Quintilian, who mentions it in passing (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 158–159, 9.3.98); but see the examples pertaining to the former, given by Lausberg in the resp. sections (*Handbuch* 381–383, §771–775); cf. also Boriaud/Schouler (798); Murphy (*Middle Ages* 367). On “Hypophora mit Ethopoeie, insofern der Gegner redend eingeführt wird” (here in Hyperides), see Blass (*Beredsamkeit III.2.* 40; also: “Selbstfrage”, “mehrfache[...] Hypophora”). Volkman stresses: “Sehr häufig ist die Hypophora bei Lysias” (493, III.49). “[A]ls eine bei

Rather than following the Greek taxonomy (which fronts the *‘prósopon’*), the Latin concept employed in the present text’s concise description of (what is else termed) *‘prosopopoiía’* accentuates said compound’s suffix—meaning, the device’s ‘figurative’ potential and ‘poetico-formative’ capacity (*de re*):

Personification [‘Conformatio’] consists in representing an absent person as present [‘aliqua quae non adest persona confingitur quasi adsit’], or in making a mute thing [‘res muta’] or one lacking form [‘aut informis’] articulate [‘eloquens’], and attributing [‘adtribuitur’] to it a definite form [‘forma’] and a language [‘oratio’] or a certain behaviour [‘aut actio quaedam’] appropriate to its character [‘ad dignitatem adcommodata’][.] (*Rhet. ad Her.* 398–399, IV.liii.66; 398n.)⁸⁶

Lysias übliche Figur”, Blass notes “die Hypophora, subjectio, wo der Redner gegen sich selbst Einwendungen erhebt oder einen andern erheben lässt, um dieselben sodann zu widerlegen, wodurch [...] ein lebhaftes dialogisches Element hineingebracht wird. Auch diese Figur hat viele Formen [...] in öffentlichen [‘Reden’] gebraucht er nicht ganz selten länger fortgesetzte ὑποφωραί mit rasch folgenden Fragen und Entgegnungen, namentlich zum Abschluss des Beweises, um alle noch übrigen Einwendungen zusammen abzufertigen” (*Beredsamkeit I.* 415). Cf. (*cum grano salis*): “Künstlicher ist schon die Selbstfrage: ‘weshalb sage ich dies?’ sowie die dialogisch an den Gegner gerichtete; weshalb denn auch diese, dem Demosthenes so geläufigen Formen bei Lysias recht selten sind” (*Beredsamkeit I.* 415). In general, Bakhtin logs: “In secondary speech genres, especially rhetorical ones, [...] frequently within the boundaries of his own utterance[,] the speaker (or writer) raises questions, answers them himself, raises objections to his own ideas, responds to his own objections, and so on” (*Speech 72*; “secondary”, i.e. “complex”, 61–62). See also subch. 5.1, herein. The technique of *hypophorá* serves an anticipatory, preparatory, deliberative function; it is related to “Ratiocinatio” *de re* (cf. *Rhet. ad Her.* 284–289, IV.xvi.23–24; here 284; cf. Lausberg *Handbuch* 197–201, §367–372; also Volkmann 492, III.49); Murphy gives the latter as “Reasoning by Question and Answer” (*Middle Ages* 366). When rendered in direct speech and dialogically, it may seem similar to a sequence of *sermocinationes* for the other party. A further, apparently affine ‘figure of thought’ is referred to as the “Distribution [‘Distributio’]” of “certain specified rôles [‘negotia’] [...] among a number of things or persons [‘in plures res aut personas’]”, using formulae such as “Whoever of you [‘Quibus vestrum’] [...] loves the good name of [...]. Whoever [‘Qui’] of you wishes [...]. You who [‘Qui’] have parents [...]. You who [‘Quibus’] have children” etc. (*Rhet. ad Her.* 346–347, IV.xxxv.47; 346n.). This refers back to the *‘narratio’*—(here) as part of the “*progymnasmata (praexercitamenta)*”—in which respect the *Rhet. ad Her.* states that “one [is] based on the facts [‘in negotiis’], the other on the persons [‘in personis’]”; Caplan’s glosses add the Greek qua [‘a]ccording to τὰ πράγματα or τὰ πρόσωπα” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 22–23, I.viii.13; 23n.). As to the above, see also subchs. 5.1 and 5.2, herein.

86 The gloss refers to “*προσωποποιία*”, to Cicero’s formula (“*personarum ficta inductio*”), to the device of “[m]aking the dead speak” as “sometimes called *εἰδωλοποιία*”, while suggesting that “[r]epresenting an absent person as present would not today be regarded as strictly within the meaning of Personification” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 398n.). As indicated in what follows above, this might depend on the quality of that (supposed) absence. Generally, cf. also Iulius Rufinianus’ definition: “Προσωποποιία est figura sententiae, qua oratio *ad* alterius personae orationem

Endowing the crafted ‘entity’ with speech is thus seen as but one aspect of the process described, which chiefly comprises its ‘formation’ (and action). The examples include a city personified, as well as a conceivable speech by the

imitandam retorquetur. Latine dicitur *d e f o r m a t i o* vel *e f f i g u r a t i o*” (62, §14). The use of the aforesaid and the above taxonomic variants may also have been (largely) discontinued due to the term’s evidently conducting to *errata*—as in Vickers, glossing “*Prosopopoeia*” as “(or *confirmatio*)” (*Defence* 498). For pertinent Medieval examples of the device, see Campbell, who (with “Schlauch”) notes that “one of the finest poems in Old English, *The Dream of the Rood*, was constructed on the principle of *prosopopoeia*” (195). Curtius mentions the “Schwalbengedicht des Bischofs Radbod von Utrecht (917)”, in which “[d]ie Schwalbe [...] in eigener Person [‘spricht’] und [...] den Leser [...] an[‘redet’]” (168, §8.4)—glossing: “Das Stück ist also eine *conformatio* (*quando rei alicui contra naturam datur persona loquendi* [...])” (168n.; cf. the definition on the part of Priscian, “*praexercitamina*” 557–558, §9). Concerning a comparable technique in a sermon on Luther’s part (“eine fiktive Rede der Vögel und wilden Tiere”, here with the function of ‘amplifying’), see Stolt (41–42; 42n., referring to Curtius); with Quintilian, she speaks of a “*Fictio personae* (*prosopopoeia*)”, adding: “es handelt sich um eine hochpathetische Figur” (42n.; cf. 68). In a rhetorical analysis of the resp. passages—where “[*fictio personae*]” is defined as “fingierte Rede, die in den Mund nichtsprechender Wesen oder Dinge gelegt wird” (67)—Stolt demonstrates Luther’s couching of this *prosopopoeia* in various forms of “[f]ictional dialog (*subiectio*)” (its function being “Belebung der Gedankenfolge”, 66, 66n.; her gloss refers to *Rhet. ad Her.* 284–289, IV.xvi.23–24, on “*Ratiocinatio*”, 284; cf. spec. “et animum auditoris retinet adtentum”, 288, IV.xvi.24; as well as to “*Subiectio*”, resp. “*Hypophora*”, 310–315, IV.xxiii.33–xxiv.34, here 310–311). Luther’s sermon features “fabricated objections”, ‘words put into the auditor’s or reader’s mouth’ (Stolt 66; trans. dsm; cf. 69); “fabricated statements and objections by unspecified persons [...] put into the mouth of an anonymous person” (68; trans. dsm; referring to Quintilian’s “*dicat aliquis*”, cited in Lausberg *Handbuch* 410, §824; Stolt does not concur with the latter’s taxonomy, here); “the sun” (68n.; trans. dsm), even “God” Himself are “introduced as speaking”, and “the reply is put into the mouth of the addressed” (67; trans. dsm); while Luther takes up and ties in with *Scripture* (“Mt. 25, 42 ff.”) in the latter case, the following *prosopopoeia* is ‘freely fabricated’ (67). He also uses a “[f]ingiertes Gegenargument”, which is ‘put into an opponent’s mouth and refuted’ (“in den Mund gelegt und widerlegt”, 45)—here spec. “in the mouth of a ‘geitz wanst [sc. ‘miser’, more literally, a ‘stingy paunch’]” (69; trans. dsm). In one place, Luther attributes a “(fabricated) dictum” to “a ‘fine noble man’”, while later repeating the same saying “as his own opinion” (70; 70n.; trans. dsm); said scholar gives the function of this move as ‘cautionary’ (70n.). She summarizes: “Alle diese fingierten Aussprüche, [...] teils in direkter, teils in indirekter Rede [...], dienen der Belebung der Argumentation sowie der Stärkung bzw. Schwächung der *causa*. Dadurch, daß Gründe und Gegengründe verschiedenen Menschen, [...] Tieren und unbelebten Gegenständen in den Mund gelegt werden können, ergeben sich unerschöpfbare Möglichkeiten der Variation. Die *varietas* wirkt der Langeweile entgegen und bildet den gedanklichen *ornatus*”—the effects being a “gespannte Aufmerksamkeit”, and “eine größere Bereitschaft, den Inhalt zu glauben und sich von der Rede fortreißen zu lassen” (70–71). Listing “verschiedene Mittel, die Langeweile zu bannen”, Stolt similarly refers to “*sermocinatio*” as “Aufmerksamkeitserreger” (56).

absent (being dead) Roman exemplar *par excellence*: “But if that great Lucius Brutus should now come to life again [‘revivescat’, his ‘reconfiguration’, so to speak] and appear here before you [‘et hic ante pedes vestros adsit’], would he not use this language [‘hac utatur oratione’]”—then follow words put into this *persona*’s mouth (*Rhet. ad Her.* 398–399, IV.liii.66).⁸⁷ The *Rhetorica ad Herennium* also logs the polyvalence of “conformatio” (utile “in plures res, in mutas atque inanimas”), its being especially expedient (“Proficit plurimum”) in “Amplification”, and (with a view to *movere*) when ‘appealing to pity’ (“commiseratione”, *Rhet. ad Her.* 400–401, IV.liii.66).

The quasi personifying of a text or work—all but inevitable in the present case, its “*auctor*” being “*incertus*” (Caplan “Intro.” xiv; *Eloquence* 7)—might also be taken to pertain to this category (*de re*).⁸⁸

87 Cf. Rainolde’s variation (Fol.l.v–r, N.ij.v–r). Emporius has: “a fourth kind of impersonation [‘adlocutionis’] [...] involves giving words to the dumb [‘cum mutis damus verba’] and creating a person who does not really exist [‘et fingitur persona quae non est’], as when M. Tullius [Cicero] attributes words to the province of Sicily or represents the republic as speaking [‘rei publicae loquentis inducit’]; this is called *prosopopoeia*” (“Ethopoeia” 35; “de ethopoeia” 562).

88 For the (also historically) effectual personification of a book, see Moos: “Wichtig ist [...], daß *Policraticus* sprachlich ein Mensch und keine Sache ist. [...] (Gerade die Personhaftigkeit des Titels führte übrigens im Spätmittelalter zu kuriosen Verwechslungen von Titel und Autor bis zu jener Anführung eines unter dem Namen *Policraticus* bekannten Kirchenvaters). Die Personifikation gilt primär dem Buch, nicht einer darin enthaltenen Idee. In dem Widmungsgedicht [...] schickt Johann [of Salisbury] sein Buch [...] auf eine gefährliche Wanderschaft (wie einst Ovid und Horaz)])” (573, §118). “Der [...] *Policraticus* ist [...] ein Buch in einer *fictio personae* oder Prosopopoeie” (574, §118). Chase (in a de Manian context) refers to “the persuasion that a text has a voice” as “prosopopoeia” (80). Cf. Prins’ phrasing: “The pages speak in place of Sappho” (36); “the text is made to speak in place of the author [...] Sappho comes to be read as the personification of her own texts” (48); with reference to Lardinois, she mentions “recent speculation that Sappho was a stock persona in archaic poetry” (42; 42n.). Generally, see Eco’s semiotico-linguistic references to *prosopopoiia*: “in Italian it is customary to say that an inanimate object (a clue, an imprint) ‘accuses’ someone [...] there is a sort of anthropomorphization of the object which is considered to ‘speak’. In fact this [...] use of */accusare/* has to be viewed as a rhetorical figure (a *prosopopoeia*) even if it has been definitely catachresized by usage” (109). Cf. “All English it-names are he-names or she-names in Italian and this naturally has its consequences in fairy tales. But these connotations are due to a rhetorical process of personification relying on the semantic markers” (146n.).

3.2 Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* on 'prosopopoeia' (With Remarks by Cicero)

Utimum enim fictione personarum et velut ore alieno loquimur[.]

—Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* 11–12. 28, 11.1.39)

considerandum est quid cuique personae conveniat[.]

—Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 140, 3.8.51)

In certain respects, Quintilian's later position differs significantly from the previous Latin treatise. He specifically deals with the matter at hand in books 3 and 9 of the *Institutio Oratoria*; to begin with the former:

I regard *prosopopoeia* ['prosopopoeiae'] as far the most difficult ['longe (...) difficillimae'] exercise, because the difficulty of maintaining a character ['personae difficultas'] is added to the other problems of the *suasoria* ['suasoriae laborem']. Caesar, Cicero, and Cato will all have to be assigned different ways of giving the same advice. However, it is a very useful ['Utilissima'] exercise, whether because it does involve this double effort ['duplicis est operis'], or because it is particularly valuable ['plurimum confert'] also to future poets and historians ['poetis quoque aut historiarum futuris scriptoribus']. But it is essential for orators ['oratoribus'] too. (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 138–139, 3.8.49)⁸⁹

⁸⁹ The trans. of "personam" as "personality" seems problematic (generally). Russell gives said form of *prosopopoeia* as "an elementary exercise, in which the speaker plays the part of a specific historical character" (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 138n.). See Volkmann (312–313, I.ii.32), also as to the context in Quintilian; cf. Bonner (*Declamation* 53, 53n.). Above, the choice of names is not only alliterative in effect, but also attributable to their particular familiarity as (commonplace) *personae*, spec. in terms of a customary, recognizable *ethos*—hence their prevalence in said exercises. On the preparations for rhetoric, Quintilian remarks that "[t]he *grammatici* [...] make inroads as far as *prosopopoeiae* ['ad prosopopoeias'] and *suasoriae*, in which the burden of speaking is very great ['in quibus onus dicendi vel maximum est']" (*Inst. Orat.* 1–2. 262–263, 2.1.2; cf. 262n.; problematically, 210, 1.9.3, 210n.; cf. Murphy "Habit" 62; Percival 306; 324). As to the "Order of Treatment of Progymnasmata in Extant Treatises" (reflecting an increasing level of difficulty, given the educational context), Kennedy's table shows "*Ethopoeia*" (resp. "*prosôpopoeia*, Characterization, Personification") as ranked 6th (of 10) in the *Progymnasmata* by Theon, 9th (of 12) in 'Hermogenes', 11th (of 14) in Aphthonius, 9th (of 12) in Nicolaus ("Intro. [2003]" xiii); the latter (while not adhering) also indicates that "[s]ome [...] put [...] ethopoeia after thesis", making it the second to last, since (they say) "there is a path leading from thesis, through ethopoeia, to complete hypotheses" (164, §10.63; cf. John of Sardis/Sopatros 214, §11.195,4; 216, §11.198–199). See Clark, who speaks of "a graded series": "all textbooks of progymnasmata [...] build each exercise on what the boys have learned from previous" ones, while "each [...] adds something new" (260). He defines 'impersonation or prosopopoeia' as

The reason for the latter being that speeches were often ‘ghostwritten’ (so to say)—a form of vicarious labor requiring accommodative and anticipative capacities on the part of the proxy in the background:

there are many speeches composed by Greeks and Romans for others to deliver [‘quibus alii uterentur’], in which the words had to be adapted to the position and character [‘ad quorum condicionem vitamque aptanda’] of the speaker. Did Cicero think in the same way [‘eodem modo cogitavit’] or assume the same personality [‘eandem personam induit’] when he wrote for Gnaeus Pompeius [...] and the others? (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 138–141, 3.8.50)⁹⁰

Rhetoric ever reckons with contingency and context, hence with various forms and degrees of particularity.⁹¹ Quintilian accentuates that the orator (Cicero

“requir[ing] the pupil to compose an imaginary monolog which might appropriately be spoken or written by an historical, legendary, or fictitious person under given circumstances” (260).

90 For a formulation similar to the above in a rhetorico-dramatic context, see Quintilian (“induere personas”, *Inst. Orat.* 6–8. 62, 6.2.36; with Plett *Culture* 283n.). On the nexus of *personae* and *mores* in this regard, cf. Quintilian: “Tragic and comic poets pay greater attention to characters [‘Maior in personis observatio’], because they use many different ones [‘variis’]. The same was true of those who wrote speeches for others [‘qui orationes aliis scribebant’], and is true of declaimers today, since in declamation we do not always speak as advocates, but very commonly as litigants. However, even in Causes in which we do appear as advocates, the same differentiation must be carefully observed. This is because we use imaginary persons [‘Utimur enim fictione personarum’] and speak as it were with other men’s lips [‘et velut ore alieno loquimur’], and so have to provide the appropriate personalities [‘accommodamus sui mores’] for those to whom we lend our voice [‘dandi (...) vocem’]” (*Inst. Orat.* 11–12. 28–29, 11.1.38–39). Quintilian reaccentuates the pragmatic pluralism of the device: “it is not only that there are just as many varieties [‘varietates’] of Prosopopoeia [‘prosopopoeia’] as there are Causes: there are more [‘plures’], because in Prosopopoeia we simulate [‘adsimulamus’] the emotions [‘adfectus’] of children, women, nations, and even things which cannot speak [‘mutarum etiam rerum’], and they are all entitled to their appropriate character [‘quibus omnibus debetur suus decor’]” (*Inst. Orat.* 11–12. 30–31, 11.1.41); “we often have to speak differently on behalf of different people [‘aliter enim pro alio saepe dicendum est’]” (*Inst. Orat.* 11–12. 30–31, 11.1.42); “aliud alios decere” (*Inst. Orat.* 11–12. 178, 11.3.177); “alii aliud decet” (*Inst. Orat.* 11–12. 24, 11.1.31; cf. 30, 11.1.42). Quintilian notes the (conventional) renown of Lysias in this respect, having written plausible (cf. “veritatis fidem”) orations “for uneducated clients” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 140–141, 3.8.51). Similarly, “Declaimers [‘declamatoribus’] [...] rarely deliver their speeches as advocates [‘advocati’], but generally as sons, parents, rich men, old men” etc. (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 140–141, 3.8.51). Cf. subch. 4.1 (regarding the art of Lysian ventriloquism); as well as 5.2 (with respect to vicariousness generally, and logography in particular).

91 See Eden: “That rhetoric and historiography should be complementary arts in antiquity is not surprising given their common stake in contingency and particularity” (*Rhet. Tradition* 27n.; with “Augustinian Hermeneutics” 57n.). Cf. “Rhetoric is, above all, an art based on contingency” (Enterline *Body* 21; the context is highly problematic).

being the nominal exemplar) “consider[s] the fortune [‘fortunam’], position [‘dignitatem’], and career [‘res gestas’] of each” when crafting a (hypoleptic, socio-morally acceptable and plausible) likeness (“*imaginem*”) of those to whom he (vicariously) ‘gives’ or ‘lends his voice’ (“*voce[m] dabat*”)—achieving or conducing to the impression (“*viderentur*”) of their effectually “speak[ing] better than themselves [‘*melius (...) dicere*’]”, while remaining recognizable (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 140–141, 3.8.50). Probable adaptation (“*accommodari*”) to the “speaker [‘*ab homine*’]” and “subject [‘*a re*’]” (meaning, the given context) are ever paramount (thereby to conceal the artfulness involved)—with Quintilian explicitly lauding “Lysias”, in said respect (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 140–141, 3.8.51).⁹²

From a generic perspective, the device of *proso-poeia* links rhetoric and drama with a view to audience assumptions and expectations (the oratorical being comparable to such as obtain in the theater). “Declaimers of course must especially consider what best suits each character [‘*considerandum est quid cuique personae conveniat*’]”—seeing that “they rarely deliver their speeches as advocates” (meaning, quasi *in propria persona*, while vicarious in function); rather, they actually have to play a wide variety of parts, so that

comic actors [‘*comoediarum actoribus*’] hardly have more roles [‘*plures habitus*’] to sustain [‘*conciipiendi*’] in their performances [‘*in pronuntiando*’] than these men do in their speeches [‘*in dicendo*’]. (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 140–141, 3.8.51)⁹³

⁹² See subch. 4.1 on Dionysius for a detailed discussion of the issues involved in (Lysian) *ethopoia*; for samples, cf. also section 5.2; on *celare artem*, see subch. 4.2 and part 6, herein.

⁹³ Cf. Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* 1–2. 240–241, 1.11.12–13; generally, 236–241, 1.11.1–14; with 241n.; *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 284–289, 10.1.65–72; 316–317, 10.1.119; with *Inst. Orat.* 11–12. 248–249, 12.5.5; also: 28–31, 11.1.38–42; 178–183, 11.3.177–184, spec. “non enim comoedum esse, sed oratorem volo”, 180, 11.3.181). Cf. Bonner (*Declamation* 21, 21n.); with Winterbottom’s gloss (in Seneca the Elder *Controv.* 1–6. 379n.); Curtius (435, Exkurs.V.1); Herrick (15); Mayfield (“Interplay” 10n.–11n.; 30n.–31n.). Referring also to the above, Bonner logs: “the Roman student of rhetoric, who frequently had [...] to impersonate historical or mythological personages in his exercises, and to simulate their emotions, needed to be something of an actor” (*Declamation* 21); in a gloss (*Declamation* 21n.), he points to Seneca the Elder’s assessment of Cassius Severus, whose “delivery [‘*pronuntiatio*’] would have made any actor’s [‘*histrionem*’] reputation, without being at all reminiscent of an actor’s [‘*histrionis*’]” (*Controv.* 1–6. 378–379, 205M, 3.Preface.3; cf. 379n.). Bonner suggests that “the early use of the term *declamatio* at Rome [...] may have had a close connection with the stage” (*Declamation* 21). Winterbottom defines it as “a model speech [...] put in the mouth either of one of the parties in the case or of an advocate”: “Declaimers [...] preferred to take the role of one of the parties, and prided themselves on their ability to speak in character (*ἠθικῶς* [...])” (xi, with n.); cf. “to represent [...] [a] character as faithfully as possible [...] was to speak *ethicos*” (Bonner *Declamation* 53). Winterbottom refers to the second book, where Seneca describes one declaimer’s speaking “in character” (“*a parte patris ethicos*”).

As per alternative conceptual conventions focusing on the aspect of *ethos* in the same procedure, said device would characteristically be termed *ethopoïia*; Quintilian uses this term otherwise (see *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 68, 9.2.58).⁹⁴

The Roman *rhétor* also logs an overarching nexus between poetics, historiography, and (declamatory) oratory via (his comprehensive understanding of) *prosopopoeia*, since “both poetical and historical themes [‘poeticas et historicas’] are often set as [rhetorical] exercises [‘exercitationis’]”—such as “Priam’s words to Achilles, or Sulla resigning the dictatorship in the public assembly” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 140–141, 3.8.53).⁹⁵ Quintilian accentuates the technique’s versatility and polyfunctionality—both in various segments of a speech, and in the different *genera* (“in materia iudiciali deliberativa demonstrativa”): “Indeed we very often employ [‘frequentissime (...) utimur’] fictitious speeches of persons [‘ficta personarum’] whom we set up ourselves [‘substituimus’]” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 140–143, 3.8.53–54).⁹⁶

dixit”, *Controv.* 1–6. 296–297, 150M; 2.3.23; “Suasoriae” 502–503, 529M, 1.13). The reception is central: one declaimer’s “remark was in character [‘ethicos’], as many think (at least it was praised when he uttered it)” (*Controv.* 1–6. 306–307, 155M, 2.4.8). Whether or not something was (meant to be) prosopo-ethopoetic, or spoken *in propria persona*, would affect the assessment on the part of the audience (whose role will always have to be taken into account in any rhetorico-dramatic context). As to the term, cf. Sulpicius Victor: “E t h i c a igitur erit causa, id est moralis, cum erit suscipienda persona vel rustici vel dyscoli, aut patris indulgentis aut contra severi. In eiusmodi causis, si t e a s intellexerimus, poterimus id facere, quod fieri oportebit, ut omnis oratio personarum apta sit moribus” (316, §6). On the nexus of oratory and the theater generally (and with spec. regard to Early Modern times), see subch. 3.3, below.

94 Cf. “It is quite right also to use the word *ēthos* [‘ἦθος’] of the sort of school exercises [‘in scholis’] in which we often represent [‘effingimus’] countrymen, superstitious men, misers, and cowards according to the terms of our theme. For if *ēthos* [‘ἦθος’] means *mores*, then when we imitate *mores* we base our speech on *ēthos*” (Quintilian *Inst. Orat.* 6–8. 52–55, 6.2.17). Russell’s n. refers to “this type of declamation” as “often humorous, largely inspired by comedy” (*Inst. Orat.* 6–8. 54n.). Quintilian’s use of said term seems akin to what is else called *charakterismós* (*effictio*). Cf. Bruss (43, 43n.), *cum grano salis*. See the n. below (on *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 68, 9.2.58).

95 For further examples and comparable applications, see subch. 5.2, herein.

96 Cf. Cicero, who uses the same collocation, while giving its function as pertaining to *ornatus*: “impersonation of people [‘personarum ficta inductio’], an extremely brilliant [‘gravissimum lumen’] method of amplification [‘augendi’]” (*De Orat.* III” 162–163, III.liii.205; see López Grigera 175n.). Cf. Consultus Fortunatianus, who (*inter alia*) gives ‘*allocutio*’ (“adlocutionibus”) in the context of “[o]rnata elocutio” (125, III.8). Followed by “descriptio” (*De Orat.* III” 162, III.liii.205), this ‘fictional personifying’ or ‘crafting of *personae*’ is preceded by the device of “imitatio” in Cicero: “imitation of manners and behaviour [‘morum ac vitae imitatio’], either given in character [‘in personis’] or not, is a considerable ornament of style [‘ornamentum orationis’], and extremely effective in calming down an audience [‘aptum ad animos conciliandos vel maxime’] and often also in exciting it [‘ad commovendos’]” (*De Orat.* III” 162–

characters as speakers [‘certis agentium nominibus’], and as (typically) “based on history [‘ex historiis’]” *sensu lato* (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 140–141, 3.8.52).⁹⁷

These hypotheses regarding an underlying etymological rationale as far as taxonomy is concerned may be verified by recourse to the ninth book. Having chiefly focused on generic applications and affinities in the third, Quintilian here treats the technique as a ‘figure of thought’, giving “προσωποποιία” as “fictiones personarum” (“Impersonations”, *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50–51, 9.2.29).⁹⁸ In this sense, their general function is to “vary and animate a speech [‘cum variant orationem tum excitant’]” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50–51, 9.2.29).⁹⁹ Specifically, the

97 The *rhétor* introduces these qualifications when considering the appearance of ‘*prosopopoeiae*’ not only in ‘*suasoriae*’, but also “in *controversiae*” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 141, 3.8.52); the trans. uses various English terms for Quintilian’s forms of ‘*persona*’: “character” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 139, 3.8.49; 141, 3.8.51; 141, 3.8.52), “personality” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 139, 3.8.50), “persons” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 143, 3.8.54)—all of which are (potentially) problematic, on account of their (often) misleading connotations in other (especially Idealist) discourses (cf. subch. 3.3, herein). **98** For the context (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 46–59, 9.2.26–44; 68–71, 9.2.58–63), see Russell’s précis: “More emotional are exclamations and outbursts of frankness [...]; bolder still, *Prosopopoeia* [...], *Apostrophe* [...], and various kinds of ‘vividness’, which aim to make the events come alive, as if seen happening at the present moment [...] whereas *ēthopoeia* [...], the vivid description of persons and characteristic traits, belongs rather to the less emotive range of Figures [sc. of Thought]” (“Intro. 9” 5). In Quintilian, the resp. section commences: “The Figures adapted to intensifying emotions [‘augendis adfectibus accommodatae’] consist chiefly in pretence [‘simulatione’]” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 46–47, 9.2.26); after mentioning “Free Speech [‘oratione libera’]” (also called “Licence [‘licentiam’]”), being “*parrhesia*” in Greek (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 48–49, 9.2.27; cf. *Rhet. ad Her.* 348–355, IV.xxxvi.48–xxxvii.50; 348n.), a longer segment deals with ‘*prosopopoeia*’ (Quintilian *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50–55, 9.2.29–37). After a brief intercalation on ‘*apostrophe*’ (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 54–57, 9.2.38–39) follows “*evidentia*”, termed “*hypotyposis*” in Greek (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 56–59, 9.2.40–44). Before ‘*ethopoïia*’ (here deviatingly qua “*imitatio morum alienorum*”, i.e. otherwise *charakterismós*, *effictio*) is treated (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 68–71, 9.2.58–63; here: 68, 9.2.58; with *Inst. Orat.* 6–8. 52–55, 6.2.17; cf. Volkman 490, III.49; Bruss 43; 43n.), Quintilian refers to irony qua figure (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 58–65, 9.2.44–65), as well as to ‘*aposiopesis*’ (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 64–67, 9.2.54–57). After his (otherwise) unconventional construal of ‘*ethopoeia*’ ensues an extended segment on ‘*emphasis*’ (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 72–91, 9.2.64–99). As per W. Crane, “*The Arte of English Poesie*, 1589” used “*hypotyposis*” (“which Puttenham Englished as ‘the counterfeit representation’”) qua hypernym that also included “*prosopopoeia*” as a subcategory (alongside “*proso[po]graphia*”, “*topographia*, *topothesia*, *chronographia*”, “*pragmatographia*”); while other “rhetorics of the Renaissance omitted [...] both *hypotyposis* and *proso[po]graphia* and treated the remaining figures as varieties of *prosopopoeia*”—which caused “confusion in terminology” (159; as an “example of complete confusion”, W. Crane cites ‘John Sturm’s 1576 discussion of character’, 160); for instance, “[s]ome authorities included *pathopoeia* and *ethopoeia*, as varieties of *hypotyposis*” (160). Cf. Puttenham (323–324, III.19; as also cited in subch. 4.2, herein).

99 Cf. Cicero, stating that in a “plain style of oratory”, the *rhétor* “will not represent the State

device serves to “display the inner thoughts of our opponents as though they were talking to themselves”; “to introduce conversations [‘sermones’]” with, or among others (“nostros cum aliis [...] et aliorum inter se”); and “to provide appropriate characters [‘personas idoneas’] for words of advice, reproach, complaint, praise, or pity” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50–51, 9.2.30).¹⁰⁰

At the *kathólou* level (with Aristotle’s qualification as *philosophóteron*), said technique (most feckful in politico-deliberative contexts) seems to exploit an elemental capacity for vicarious experiences and actions on the part of human beings qua apparently primed for taking other perspectives: “Der Mensch ist ein extremer Standpunktwechsler” (Blumenberg *Beschreibung* 879).¹⁰¹

as speaking [‘rem publicam loquentem’] or call the dead from the lower world”—as “[t]his requires stronger lungs” (“Orator” 368–369, xxv.85; Quintilian cites the latter qualification at *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50–51, 9.2.29; 50n.). Cicero adds that this ‘extenuated’ (cf. “tenuitati”) style will not feature the “delivery [‘actio’] [...] of tragedy [‘non tragica’] nor of the stage [‘nec scaenae’]” (“Orator” 368–369, xxv.86). The first instance above is usually called a *prosopopoiia* proper, the latter *eidolopoiia*. See also Volkmann (280, I.i.28; 489, III.49).

100 Cf. López Grigera (134–135; 134n.). See Quintilian: “prosopopoeiae, id est fictae alienarum personarum orationes” (*Inst. Orat.* 6–8. 30, 6.1.25; cf. Baldwin *Ancient Rhet.* 71). In this context, the *rhétor* stresses the quasi-synaesthetic, instant evidence induced by proxy via said device—with decisive affinities to drama in all three respects (vividness, vicariousness, artfulness): “When an advocate speaks for a client, the bare facts produce the effect; but when we pretend [‘fingimus’] that the victims themselves are speaking [‘loqui’], the emotional effect is drawn also from the persons [‘ex personis’]. The judge no longer thinks [‘videtur’, sc. ‘it does not seem to him’] that he is listening [‘audire’] to a lament for somebody else’s troubles, but that he is hearing the feelings and the voice of the afflicted, whose silent appearance [‘mutus aspectus’] alone moves [‘mouet’] him to tears [...]. The pleas become more effective [‘ad adficiendum potentiora’] by being as it were put into their mouths [‘cum velut ipsorum ore dicuntur’], just as the same voice [‘vox’] and delivery [‘pronuntiatio’] of the stage actor [‘scaenicis actoribus’] produces a greater emotional impact [‘plus ad movendos adfectus’] because he speaks behind a mask [‘sub persona’]” (*Inst. Orat.* 6–8. 30–31, 6.1.25–26); cf. Volkmann (281–282, I.i.28); Altman (glossing: “Quintilian devotes much space to impersonation”, 49n.); Vickers (*Defence* 78); Skinner (*Forensic* 168); *de re*, see Cicero (*De Orat.* I–II. 336–337, II.xlvi.193).

101 Approx. ‘man is an (sc. human beings are) extreme shifter(s) of standpoints (qua views, positions, perspectives)’. Aristotle logs that *poiésis* is “more philosophical [‘philosophóteron’]” than *historía* (“Poetics” 58–59, 1451b, IX; cf. Trimpi “Ancient Hypothesis” 49–50). Following Quintilian, Baldwin defines “*prosopopoeiæ*” (qua exercises) as “an imaginative entering into the character, the emotional as well as the intellectual habit, of the person for whom one was speaking”—while (problematically) taking “*ethopœiæ*” to mean a “more elementary form” thereof (*Ancient Rhet.* 71; cf. 245). Referring to Seneca the Elder’s “*Controversiæ*”, Baldwin notes: “That such dramatization is obviously an extension of [...] school *prosopopoeiæ* shows how pervasive was the preoccupation with imaginative development” (*Ancient Rhet.* 99).

As Quintilian's *'idoneus'* signals, considerations pertaining to the *aptum* are (dependably) involved in all of the above—chiefly with a view to (ethopoetic) probability (“a fide non abhorrent”, “credibiliter”, *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50, 9.2.30), hence effectuality (ultimately). The latter will also be decisive with respect to the fact that, in this *rhétor's* acceptance, the scope of said technique includes “to bring down the gods [...] or raise the dead”, while even “cities and nations [...] acquire a voice [‘voce[m] accipiunt’]” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50–51, 9.2.31).¹⁰²

What ensues is utile for comparing Quintilian's conceptual preferences with the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*.¹⁰³ In a historico-taxonomic remark, he notes:

Some confine the term *Prosopopoeia* [‘προσωποποιία’] to cases where we invent both the person and the words [‘et corpora et verba fingimus’]; they prefer imaginary conversations between historical characters [‘sermones hominum adsimulatos’] to be called Dialogues [‘διάλογους’], which some Latin writers have translated *sermocinatio* [‘sermocinationem’, qua ‘conversation’]. (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50–51, 9.2.31)¹⁰⁴

102 As to projection being implied, see Cicero's quarrel with Homer: “Fingebat haec Homerus et humana ad deos transferebat: divina malle[m] ad nos” (*Tusc. Disp.* 76, I.xxvi.65).

103 Caplan logs that “there is no evidence that Quintilian knew or made use of” the *Rhet. ad Her.* (“Intro.” xiv; *Eloquence* 7), but gives “ἠθοποιία and χαρακτηρισμός” with respect to Rutilius (“Intro.” xiv n.; *Eloquence* 7n.; cf. *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 160, 9.3.99; 160n.), which “appear in” the *Rhet. ad Her.* “as *notatio* [...] and *effictio*” (Caplan “Intro.” xiv n.; *Eloquence* 7n.). Russell trans. the Rutilian terms as “Description of Thought and Feelings”, “Characterization” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 160n.). Cf. Rutilius on *ethopoia* (12, I.21; with samples from Demosthenes, Lysias, but sans definition, 12n.; Halm states that the 1521 Basel ed. had “Ethologia” instead, 12n.); on *prosopopoeia*: “Hoc fit, cum personas in rebus constituimus, quae sine personae sunt, aut eorum hominum, qui fuerunt, tamquam vivorum et praesentium actionem sermonemve deformamus. [...] Hoc genere usi sunt poetae [...]. Nam humana figura prodixerunt personas, quae in veritate artis et voluntatis sunt, non personae” (15, II.6; with samples from Hyperides, Charisius; cf. Blass *Beredsamkeit* III.2. 41; 41n.); on *charakterismós*: “Quem ad modum pictor coloribus figuras describit, sic orator hoc schemate aut vitia aut virtutes eorum, de quibus loquitur, deformat” (Rutilius 16, II.7; with a long sample from Lyco of Troas).

104 As to *'sermocinatio'*, Russell's gloss *ad locum* refers to “*Ad Herennium* 4.55, 46.5”, adding that “this is commonly called *ēthopoia* [...], a term used by Q[uintilian] in a different sense” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50n.)—i.e. qua “Imitatio morum alienum, quae *ἠθοποιία* vel, ut alii malunt, *μίμησις* dicitur”; it takes place “in factis et in dictis”, is expressly ‘associated with *hypotyposis*’ (“quod est *ὑποτυπώσει* vicinum”), spec. as to ‘facts’ (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 68, 9.2.58; cf. Volkman 490, III.49). Above, Russell trans. “hominum” as “historical characters” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50–51, 9.2.31), which may seem debatable: the adjective is at best implied in the Latin, the noun may be misleading (in this collocation); in a rhetorical context, the trans. of “fingimus” as “we invent” is similarly problematic (due to the latter's ‘modern’ implications, at variance with the rhetorical). Iulius Victor (446–447, XXVI; cf. Lanham “Composition” 119–120) and Alcuin of York (547, §43) use the last term in the above quote in its literal sense. The former tenders a

Quintilian decides against previous practice,

follow[ing] the now established usage [‘recepto more’] in calling them both by the same name, for we cannot of course imagine a speech except as the speech of a person [‘nam certe sermo fingi non potest ut non personae sermo fingatur’]. (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50–51, 9.2.32)¹⁰⁵

segment ‘de sermocinatione’ (446–447, XXVI; cf. a reference forward at 441, XXIV, on delivery; one backward, at 448, XXVII, on letter writing). Since he otherwise refers to the attribution of speech as “allocutio” (426–427, XVI, ‘de narratione’, here 426; cf. 422, XV, ‘de principiis’), this subch. takes the term in its root meaning (from ‘sermo’, resp. ‘sermocinari’), and consequently speaks about (informal) conversation *sensu lato* (generally see Lanham “Composition” 119; 126; 127n.), as opposed to (formal) orations: “Sermocinandi ratio non in postremis habenda est; et quidem sermonis usus multo frequentior quam orationis est. Igitur sermonis est virtus elegantia sine ostentatione [...] sine figuris insignibus, [...] sine periodo, sine enthymemate [...] sit simplex et aequalis et ante omnia carens obscuritate. [...] Ubique brevitatis bonum est, sed in sermone praecipuum” (Iulius Victor 446, XXVI). Nevertheless, he also states the ensuing, which facilitates a nexus with *ethopoia*: “Fere sermo cuiusque mores probat” (446, XXVI). Cf. Alcuin’s comparable treatment of ‘conversation’, where the same line is put into (the textual) Charlemagne’s mouth: “in omni parte vitae honestas pernecessaria est, maxime in sermonibus, quia fere cuiusque mores sermo probat, nisi tibi, magister, aliud videatur”—(to which Alcuin’s *persona* replies)—“Mihi vero de hac re nil aliud videri potest, ac ideo consuetudinaria sermocinatione verba sint lecta, honesta, lucida, simplicia”, etc. (547, §43; cf. “sermocinandi ratio”, at the onset of said segment). Extratextually speaking, one will be dealing with a *sermocinatio*—while the overall disputation’s opening verses naturally assert that the reader is facing “Unum opus amborum”, since: “hic dedit, ille probat” (525, v.4–5). The first verse (and line in the book) explicitly gives the purpose of what follows as “civiles [...] cognoscere mores” (525, v.1)—to which end the (implicitly) ethopoetic presentation of the two deliberating *personae* (King Charles the Great and his advisor Alcuin) will also conduce, seeing that what they are performing is precisely a (dialogic) conversation (in writing). With regard to the above quote from Quintilian, López Grigera notes: “Sobre la denominación de esta figura, que consiste en dar voz ficticia a los personajes [...], hay cierta confusión que ya señalaba Quintiliano”; she quotes the definition by “el Brocense”, which combines the terminology on the part of Cicero, Quintilian, and the *Rhet. ad Her.*: “Prosopopeya sive sermocinatio est ficta personarum inductio, per quam res, cuiuscumque generis sint, vocem et sermonem possunt accipere” (*Organum Dialecticum et Rhetoricum*)” (175n.).

105 For Quintilian’s own modification thereof, see below (the second to last sample cited in the present subch.). Concerning an expansive use of the term in question, cf. Hartmann: “Die rhetorische Tradition setzt noch nicht den erst seit dem Idealismus gebräuchlichen philosophischen Begriff ‘Person’ voraus, sondern nur das Verständnis der ‘Persona’ ([...] πρόσωπον [...] als ursprünglich theatralische ‘Maske’ oder ‘Rolle’. [...] Die Auffassung der prosopopeia als dramatische Fiktion hat zur Folge, daß es zwar gebräuchlich ist, sie als P[ersonifikation] von erfundenen Reden natürlicher Personen (*sermocinatio, ethopoia*; [...] ἠθοποιία [...]) abzugrenzen. Da aber *prosopopeia* primär die Zuschreibung der Fähigkeit zu

It is thus an etymological reflection—giving primacy to the term *‘prósopon’*—that suggests and supports said conceptual decision.¹⁰⁶ This specific emphasis will be developed in the following subchapter (3.3), and taken up in 4.2 with regard to the contextual crafting and conveying of rhetorical ‘selves’.

In his ensuing examples, Quintilian stresses the nexus of *prosopopoiia* with *evidentia* (here specifically as a ruse), while mentioning that words (“dicta”) and written statements (“scripta”, such as the formulation of a “testamentum”, or ‘last words’) may be ‘feigned’ or ‘counterfeited’ (“fingi”, *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 52, 9.2.34–35; see also subchapter 5.2, herein); and that abstract concepts—he

reden oder deren Produkt bezeichnet, kann der Begriff auch mehr einschließen als die bloße P[ersonifikation] und alle Arten fiktiver Reden abdecken” (811; cf. 812). Cf. Murphy (with regard to the *Progymnasmata*): “Despite the[...] theoretical divisions of the textbooks, the term *Prosopopoeia* (as in Quintilian) is often used to denote the whole range of impersonative exercises” (“Habit” 68). Quintilian signals that it is indeed possible for the *persona* to remain unspecified, or implied only (“sine persona sermo”, *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 52–55, 9.2.37; here 52). Generally, see the distinction drawn between the infinite and finite in Aelius Theon: “Thesis differs from prosopopoeia, because thesis does not reveal a personality but prosopopoeia does, because the latter is most often involved with the invention of words appropriate to the persons who are introduced” (“Exercises” 55–56, §11.120). Cf. Moos, with respect to the “immer wieder neu gestellten philosophisch-rhetorischen Frage nach den Beziehungen des Partikulären zum Universalen, der *quaestio finita* (Hypothesis) zur *quaestio infinita* (Thesis, des geschichtlich Kontingenten zum Möglichen und Immergültigen (im aristotelischen Sinne)” (163, §44; with 162n.–163n.; cf. 258, §64, with 258n.–259n.).

106 Russell glosses: “*Persona* represents *prosōpon* (‘face, mask, person’) as in *prosopopoeia*” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50n.). Giving “*personae*” as “masks, roles, (dramatic) parts, or characters”, Gill states: “the term is explicitly dramatic” (“Personhood” 173; 173n.). Cf. Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca: “The concept of ‘person’ introduces an element of stability” (*New Rhetoric* 294, §68); “whenever one wishes to make a group or an essence stable, concrete, and present, *personification* will be used” (*New Rhetoric* 331, §74). “The personification of the republic [...] reinforces its importance as a group that is more stable than the individuals who are [...] its manifestation and that is [...] opposed to the accidents and vicissitudes occasioned by events” (*New Rhetoric* 331, §74). Perelman’s taxonomic distinction seems problematic: “An essence may be linked to a person through the use of such rhetorical figures as *personification*, *apostrophe*, and *prosopopoeia*” (*Realm* 101). “Personification will often be stressed by the use of other figures. By the use of *apostrophe*, a speaker will address that which is personified and has therefore become capable of being made a hearer. By means of *prosopopoeia*, the thing personified is turned into a speaking and acting subject” (*New Rhetoric* 331, §74). Such does not seem to be in line with rhetorical *praxis* and theory, nor to be etymologically sound, since both terms signify the same device (with ‘personification’ Latinizing the Greek ‘*prosopopoeia*’). Even so, the quote highlights that the feat of personifying an animal, object, notion, and that of putting words into a (personified) entity’s mouth, may be distinguished diagnostically.

offers ‘*Fama*’, ‘*Voluptas*’, ‘*Virtus*’, ‘*Mors*’, ‘*Vita*’ (see *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 52, 9.2.36)—are often ‘personified’ (“formas [...] fingimus”, *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 52, 9.2.36).¹⁰⁷

Moreover, the Roman *rhétor* remarks that “[o]ne can also have an imaginary speech [‘*ficta oratio*’] with an undefined speaker [‘*incerta persona*’]: ‘At this point someone says’ or ‘Someone may say’” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 52–53, 9.2.36–37); *de re*, this variant of rhetorical ventriloquism would also include appeals to such apparent phenomena as the ‘*vox populi*’—or (comparable) claims as regards one’s speaking for the norm or majority (‘it is said’, ‘they say’, ‘everyone

107 As to a density of references to forms of ‘*fingere*’, see Quintilian: “*fictiones personarum*” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50, 9.2.29), “*locutos finxerimus*” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50, 9.2.30), “*corpora et verba fingimus*” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50, 9.2.31), “*sermo fingi [...] sermo fingatur*” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50, 9.2.32), “*rerum personarum vocum imagines fingimus*” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 52, 9.2.33), “*dicta [...] scripta [...] fingi solent*” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 52, 9.2.34), “*formas [...] fingimus*” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 52, 9.2.36), “*ficta oratio*” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 52, 9.2.36). With Auerbach’s opening sentence—“Etymologically, *figura* comes from the same root as *fingere*, *figulus*, *factor* [the German ed. has ‘*factor*’, and *effigies*” (“*Figura* [1938]” 65; cf. “*Figura*. Neuedition” 121)—and his citation from Varro, “*fictor cum dicit fingit*[,] *figuram imponit*” (“*Figura* [1938]” 66; cf. “*Figura*. Neuedition” 122), one might add Quintilian’s uses of ‘*figura*’ in the resp. passages (qua etymological density): “fit *figura* [sc. *prosopopoeia*, here]” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50, 9.2.32), “per se *figura* est” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 52, 9.2.34), “*mixtura figurarum*” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 54, 9.2.37). Auerbach refers to Quintilian’s resp. subchs. as follows: “Under the *figurae sententiarum* he lists” (*inter alia*) “*prosopopoeia*, in which one has others [the German has ‘*andere Personen*’]—the enemy or a personification of the motherland [the German has ‘*Vaterland*’] [...]—speak in their own words” (“*Figura* [1938]” 77; cf. “*Figura*. Neuedition” 137). As regards simulated ‘evidence’ (for purposes of inducing vicarious effects), see Quintilian: “It may be convenient also to pretend [‘*fingimus*’] to have before our own eyes [‘*ante oculos esse*’] images of things, persons, or utterances [‘*rerum personarum vocum imagines*’], or to express surprise that this is not happening to our opponents or to the judges”—with Quintilian stressing the particular difficulty of this tactic (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 52–53, 9.2.33). The notional presence of such a device in the curriculum (spec. as linked to *prosopopoeia*) is likely to have given rise to (metapoetically) affine renderings, e.g. in drama (cf. “A dagger of the mind”, in Shakespeare’s *Macbeth* 174–175, 2.1.33–49; here: 175, 2.1.38). “*Ante oculos ponendi*” may be achieved by way of “*similitudo*”, spec. “in the form of a detailed parallel [‘*per conlationem*’]” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 380–381, IV.xlvii.60); likewise, the “*Exemplum*”—“*παράδειγμα*” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 382, IV.xlix.62; 382n.)—“renders a thought [...] more vivid [‘*ante oculos ponit*’], when expressing everything so lucidly [‘*perspicue*’] that the matter can, I may almost say [‘*ut (...) prope dicam*’], be touched by the hand [‘*manu temptari*’]” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 384–385, IV.xlix.62). The *auctor* stresses that “*frequenter ponere ante oculos*” also serves the orator’s own processes of “*inventio*” qua “hunt[ing] out some likeness [‘*venari similitudinem*’] which is capable of embellishing [‘*ornare*’] or proving [‘*docere*’] or clarifying [‘*apertiorrem rem facere*’] or vivifying [‘*ponere ante oculos*’]” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 382–383, IV.xlviii.61). As in all matters rhetorical, (what is resp. deemed to be) the *aptum* is the effectual measure: “In *similibus observare oportet diligenter ut [...] verba ad similitudinem habeamus adcommodata*” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 382, IV.xlviii.61).

knows' or 'agrees', etc.).¹⁰⁸ Likewise, “[o]ne can even have speech without any

108 See Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 378–381, 1408a, III.vii.7); Machiavelli (*Il Principe* 115, XVIII; *Discourses* 55, I.21; 58, I.23; 65, I.29; 293, III.36; with Strauss 86; 101; 210; 312n.–314n.; 320n.; cf. Mansfield with respect to “such favorite phrases as ‘everyone knows’”, *Modes* 10); Mayfield (“Variants of *hypólepsis*” 246n.; 251n.; 253n.; 256n.; passim; *Artful* 80n.–81n.; 115; 187; 192n.; passim). Cf. “Chacun l’entend” (Montaigne *Essais* III. 363, III.xii). Blumenberg—whose second sentence in the *Legitimacy of the Modern Age* begins with “Jedermann kennt” (*Legitimität* 11; cf. “Jeder weiß”, *Sorge* 176; “Bekannt ist”, 179; “das weiß jeder”, “den jeder verstehen zu können glaubt”, *Beschreibung* 250)—gives the “‘consensus als Ideal der Rhetorik’, spec. “weil Überredung Gemeinsamkeit eines Horizontes voraussetzt, [...] Anspielung auf Prototypisches, [...] Orientierung an der Metapher, am Gleichnis” (“Annäherung” 412; see *Quellen* 212). Cf. “Gemeinsamkeit von Wahrheiten ist Bedingung jenes *minimalen*”—and (one might add) ‘jedes’—“*Konsensus*, den man wohl selbst noch mit dem Teufel haben muß, um von ihm in Versuchung geführt werden zu können” (*Beschreibung* 488). Generally: “Rhetorik arbeitet mit Vertrautheiten. Sie will nicht beweisen, sondern Widerspruch erschweren” (*Quellen* 212); he gives “Rhetorik als [...] Einstimmung bei nicht erreichter oder nicht erreichbarer Eindeutigkeit” (*Schiffbruch* 81). Moos logs: “Blumenberg setzt, auf die antike Verschmelzung von Philosophie und Rhetorik Bezug nehmend, Konsens und Realität so gut wie gleich” (16, §6). Cf. Niehues-Pröbsting: “Rhetorisch ist jede Argumentation mit vermeintlichen Selbstverständlichkeiten, das heißt mit Ansichten, die auf einem allgemeinen Konsensus beruhen und die daher ohne weiteres akzeptiert werden” (*Überredung* 30)—in a context on the “rhetoric” and potential ‘*éthe*’ of “philosophy” (*Überredung* 30; trans. dsm). As to the *téchne*’s being constitutively hypoleptic (*de re*), see Ptassek: “Tatsächlich [...] artikuliert sich das Ethos im Austausch der handlungsleitenden Meinungen, die von der Rhetorik fallweise und kunstmäßig zur Sprache gebracht werden. [...] Damit Standpunkte durchgesetzt oder Ansichten plausibel gemacht werden können, müssen diese mit vorgefundenen Standpunkten in Beziehung gebracht werden [...]. Die Rhetorik [...] erzielt Zustimmung oder Überredung dadurch, daß sie sich der gemeinsamen Handlungsgrundlage versichert, [...] daß sie ausdrücklich macht, was sonst im Handeln fraglos gilt. Glauben erwecken kann nur das, was zu den allgemeinen Überzeugungen gehört, die im Handeln bereits wirksam sind: Rhetorik generiert somit keine Handlungsmotivationen, sondern knüpft an diese an” (64); “die Fähigkeit, jeden Gegenstand mit dem Auslegungshorizont in Beziehung zu setzten, ist das Charakteristikum der Rhetorik” (66). “Dieser elementare Bezug auf Gemeinsamkeit findet seinen Niederschlag in den beiden Bedeutungen der rhetorisch vermittelten πίστις als dem ‘Glaubenerweckenden’ einerseits und dem vorausgesetzten ‘Glauben’ oder ‘Vertrauen’ andererseits” (66n.). “Wesentlich ist [...], daß es ihm [sc. dem Redner, durch seine ‘Selbstdarstellung’] gelingt, seine Überzeugungsabsicht in eine gemeinsame Handlungsperspektive zu stellen” (68). “‘Voreingenommenheit’ wird der Rhetorik nicht zum Problem, sie ist vielmehr ihr Element” (69). With regard to application, Harding observes that Lysias’ client in Oration 24 “defends himself not by fact, but by resorting to an argument from popular prejudice. Everyone knows, he says” (205). The presence and effectuality of such (textualized) *praxis* will lead to related counsels in theoretical respects (at the progymnastic level): “A style without contrivance fits ethopoeias; for the speaker will say what is acknowledged universally in a scattered fashion, in short phrases and without connectives. And it ought to be wholly consistent with the character and the subject. Concise

person [‘sine persona sermo’]” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 52–53, 9.2.37)—that is, letting the (somatic or virtual) ‘carrier’ fall into a *praeteritio*, and be present by implication (“detractum est enim quis diceret”, *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 54, 9.2.37).

Lastly, Quintilian logs the tool’s presence in diegetic contexts: “Sometimes Prosopopeia takes the form of Narrative [‘Vertitur (...) in speciem narrandi’]. Thus we find indirect speeches [‘obliquae adlocutiones’] in the historians [‘apud historicos’]—such as in “Livy”, where a city (hence a collective) is personified (qua unified whole) by an implied speaker (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 54–55, 9.2.37).¹⁰⁹

3.3 The Rhetorico-Dramatic Terms ‘*prósopon*’ and ‘*persona*’ in Ancient and Early Modern Times (With Correlative Remarks on ‘*ethos*’)

nam certe sermo fingi non potest ut non personae sermo fingatur.
—Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50, 9.2.32)

The p[ersona] appears as [a] constitutive element in literary genres such as comedy, tragedy, the Socratic Symposium or in dialog.
—Boriaud/Schouler (798; trans. dsm)

Societal life consists of a network of the most various roles[.]
—Moos (511, §106; trans. dsm)

As an expedient starting point for this emphatically diachronic, comparatist, as well as more argumentative subchapter—taking up a concept (latently) present in the foregoing—one might tender Nietzsche’s pertinent dictum: “Aller Charakter ist erst R o l l e. Die ‘Persönlichkeit’ der Philosophen — im Grunde

(*syntomos*): Vigorous, forceful; for that is the style of commonly accepted ideas and what each person knows” (John of Sardis/Sopatros 217, §11.208,4; bold emph. removed from ‘concise’). In a deliberative context, Quintilian uses the formulations “nemo ignorat”, and “nemo est qui neget” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 122, 3.8.10, resp. 3.8.13); such might also be taken at the meta-level (i.e. with respect to the orator’s own line of argument).

109 As Russell specifies, the sample cited from Livy refers to a section of “indirect speech” that “states arguments supposed to be advanced by envoys” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 54n.). One is dealing with a form of double (verbal) delegation, both intra- and metatextually. Generally, and for further instances (e.g. from Thucydides), cf. subch. 5.2, herein. In the above, the Roman *rhétor* uses a variant of the term ‘*allocutio*’—which, in other theorists, is (turned into) a (quasi) technical term (typically in place of, and signifying what would else be called, ‘*sermocinatio*’ or ‘*ethopoeia*’); cf. e.g. Consultus Fortunatianus (125, III.8); Emporius (“de ethopoeia” 561–562); Iulius Victor (422, XV; 426–427, XVI); Priscian (“*praeexercitamina*” 557–558, §9).

persona” (KSA 11. 438, 34[57]); ‘a philosopher’s character, personality basically comes down to a role, a part played, a *persona*’.¹¹⁰ On the stage, the latter signifies ‘mask’—like its (equally polysemous) Greek equivalent (‘πρόσωπον’).¹¹¹

110 Literally: “any [or: every(one’s)] character is [a] r o l e [,] first [of all]. The ‘personality’ of the philosophers — *persona* at bottom” (KSA 11. 438, 34[57]; trans. dsm; see Mayfield *Artful* 341; 341n.–342n.). Cf. “Von der ‘Einheit’, von der ‘Seele’, von der ‘Person’ zu fabeln, haben wir uns heute untersagt: mit solchen Hypothesen e r s c h w e r t man sich das Problem” (KSA 11. 577, 37[4]; cf. Mayfield *Artful* 345). As regards a use of the initial term in Nietzsche’s above remark, see the etymological note in subch. 3.1, herein; as well as the ensuing synopsis (related *de re*): “Crucially, no ancient term offers a straightforward equivalent of our modern notion of ‘character’ or of related terms such as ‘individuality’, ‘personality’, ‘self’, or ‘identity’, which are all [...] heavily burdened with modern connotations of idiosyncrasy, singularity, uniqueness, complexity and originality. The nearest Greek equivalent, *ēthos*, in fact seems to convey none of these [...]. In its ancient use the term regularly privileges notions of outward performance and display. As one of Aristotle’s three rhetorical techniques of persuasion, it designates the morally and intellectually positive self-portrayal that an orator constructs in speech in order to enhance his credibility. In later rhetorical treatises, *ēthos* can designate a specific stylistic category [...] which again implies an appreciation of speech as a performative tool used to display character. [...] character is something to be displayed [...], particularly through speech, and observed by others” (De Temmerman/Emde Boas “Intro.” 7). Its being a product of craft must be underscored; this includes the reception: “Character was assessed [...] by actions that result from conscious [...] choice (*prohairesis*)[]; it was taken to [...] conform to or diverge from moral standards” (“Intro.” 7–8). Cf. Sattler (his context *cum grano salis*): “Fundamental to the Aristotelian conception of *ethos* is [...] voluntary choice” (64).

111 The Ancient polyvalence of ‘*prōsōpon*’ is evinced in Bion’s ‘autobiographical’ synopsis (refunctionalized by Montaigne, *Essais* III. 284, III.ix), where the philosopher–sophist refers to his father as someone “with no face [‘πρόσωπον’] to show, but only the writing [‘συγγραφήν’] on his face [‘πρόσωπον’], a token [‘σύμβολον’] of his master’s severity” (D. Laertius *Lives* I. 424–425, IV.46; cf. IV.47); the pun turns on a polysemy that, *mutatis mutandis*, tends to remain active in the Latin equivalent. With regard to drama, see Aristotle’s mentioning “τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον” (“Poetics” 44, 1449a, V; cf. Nédoncelle 281). The latter gives the etymology of “πρόσωπον” as “πρό et ὤψ. [...] Le sens est donc: la face ou le visage [...] l’‘avant’ d’un objet” (278). He asserts: “Il était fatal que du masque on glissât au personnage, puis au rôle qu’il joue et à l’acteur qui joue ce rôle. Il était fatal que πρόσωπον, après avoir désigné la fonction accomplie sur la scène, désignât celle qu’on exerce dans la vie” (281); “ce seraient les fonctionnaires de l’Empire qui traduisirent en Asie mineure *persona* par πρόσωπον dans les documents officiels” (282). Noting that “l’‘étymologie” of “[*p*]ersona [...] est obscure” (284; for a series of speculations, see 284–293), Nédoncelle adduces a number of folk (or paronomastic) etymologies—one of which (certainly specious) is taken up by Aquinas (“*Summa theologica*, I, q. 29, a. 4”): “*persona* dicitur quasi per se una” (qtd. in: Nédoncelle 286n.; with: “Sénèque est un raffiné qui joue sur les étymologies”, 299); as to the former, cf. Mauss (20); also on “the notion of the Latin *persona*” (13; with 14–17). For the etymology, see Boriaud/Schouler: “bei Homer [...] bezeichnet [‘*prōsōpon*’] [...] das menschliche Antlitz, aber auch die Fassade eines Gebäudes. Im 4. Jh. v.Chr. übernimmt es eine zusätzliche Bedeutung, die gewöhnlich von der

With dramatic affinities, it may also be encountered in grammar, but particularly in rhetoric.¹¹²

While said art has tended to chiefly (if not exclusively) denote a mode of expression since Ramus or Descartes—and is still routinely reduced to *elocutio* even in ostensibly academic settings (to say nothing of its facile use as a nondescript value judgment)—the *rhetorikè téchne* (comprising discovery, disposition, diction, memory, delivery) represents a versatile arsenal of noetico-semiotic devices, with decidedly interdisciplinary, diachronic, transcultural, supra-personal, hence altogether universal(ist) applications potentially.¹¹³

Ableitung πρόσωπεῖον [...] wiedergegeben wird: die von den Schauspielern im Theater getragene Maske. [...] Das Wort evoziert schließlich eine dramatische Rolle mit einem deutlich umrissenen Charakter” (790; cf. Fuhrmann “Persona” 97–98; Hirzel *Person* 40–42)—the latter in terms of *ethos*, whereby the two terms are linked (*de re*); thereto, see also the further line of argument herein. The initial, quasi Homeric notion seems to align with the usual employment in Marcus Aurelius, who utilizes the Greek equivalent of *persona* for ‘facial exterior’: “serenity of countenance [‘tou prosópou’]” (146–147, VI.30.2); “[a]n angry scowl on the face [‘tou prosópou’] is beyond measure unnatural [‘parà phýsin’]” (174–175, VII.24); cf. “countenance [‘prósopon’]” (180–181, VII.37; in a similar context: 188, VII.60). As to the etymologies of “πρόσωπον” and “persona”, Oesterreich indicates “ein bereits in der Antike lebendiges theatralisches und rhetorikaffines Verständnis”, and notes “die seit der Antike gebräuchliche Metapher der dramatischen ‘Rolle’, die der *homo rhetoricus* auf dem *theatrum mundi* spielt” (“Person” 862). As to the latter, see the n. below (in the present segment, and subch. 4.2).

112 As to theater and grammar, Fuhrmann notes: “Man hat wohl mit Recht vermutet, daß die alexandrinischen Philologen durch die drei πρόσωπα des griechischen Dramas angeregt wurden, die drei ‘Personen’ oder besser ‘Sprecherrollen’ des Pronomens und des Verbs mit demselben Ausdruck zu bezeichnen; die römischen Grammatiker gaben ihn dann durch *persona* wieder” (“Persona” 94; cf. Nédoncelle 296, 296n.; contrast Hirzel *Person* 41n.). Concerning the term ‘πρόσωπον’ in rhetoric, Hirzel notes: “Dieser ganze Gebrauch führt uns in die Welt des Dramas” (*Person* 41). As to the nexus, see Nietzsche: “Actor and orator: the former presupposed” (*KSA* 7. 758, 32[14]; trans. dsm; with Mayfield “Interplay” 11; passim). Bonner notes: “the Roman student of rhetoric [...] needed to be something of an actor” (*Declamation* 21). On the concept of the ‘*persona*’ in this regard (with further references), see Mayfield (“Interplay” 21n.). For the German context, Burger cites from “Grimms Deutsches Wörterbuch [...] 1571: ‘person, ein gmachts ansicht, ein schempart, ein butznantliz’ [...] eine Formulierung aus dem Jahr 1516: ‘personatus, der in einem spyl ein person ist’. Eine Person wird demnach gespielt” (*Rolle* 89)—emphatic of the ‘making’, in addition to the ‘playacting’.

113 Cf. Sloane (“Education” 165); Bloemendal (“Polish Pindar” 130–131); Mayfield (“Interplay” 5–8; passim). On “the interrelation of the various levels [...] of rhetoric”, see Kibédi Varga (88; with 90; passim). Lewis stresses: “In rhetoric, more than in anything else, the continuity of the old European tradition was embodied” (61). As to “the ‘ubiquity of rhetoric’” (with Dockhorn), cf. Schanze (107). Noting “the pervasive influence of rhetoric” (506), Gray has: “The humanists applied to their analysis of many disciplines the ideas and the vocabulary of rhetoric” (506); “the *studia humanitatis* [...] represent[...] an interconnected whole, sharing the common

As conceived in Ancient and Early Modern times (especially where inflected by Humanism), the art of rhetoric is integrated with (and, to a considerable extent, constitutes) the respective civic ‘sphere’ or shared domain. In such environments, ‘*persona*’ will usually refer to a ‘function’ or ‘office’ (a communal ‘front’); and ‘*ethos*’ to a corresponding, equally customary set of contextually relevant (socio-moral) habits or acquired dispositions—being ‘voiced’ (more or less consistently), or otherwise expressed (semiotically speaking).¹¹⁴ An initially

purposes and methods of eloquence” (502). See Eden: “Renaissance rhetoric made league [...] with poetry, philosophy, and history to form a new liberal arts—the *studia humanitatis*” (“Rhetoric” 829). Humanistic approaches will be emphatically supra-disciplinary, transgeneric, diachronic, contextual, comparatist: “‘Literature’ as strictly distinct from [...] other discourses is not a phenomenon, it is an ideal[ist] concept” (Küpper “Hypotheses” 9). See subch. 2.2.

114 In a structural or formal view, *ethos* is effected by giving an impression of consistency. Cf. Barthes’ ch. “*Personnage et figure*”: “Lorsque des sèmes identiques traversent à plusieurs reprises le même Nom propre et semblent s’y fixer, il naît un personnage. Le personnage est donc un produit combinatoire: la combinaison est relativement stable” (74, XXVIII; with 67, XXVIII). Any use of the term ‘*ethopoïia*’ renders recourse to the (contextual, multilateral) concept of ‘*ethos*’ requisite (cf. subch. 4.1). See these caveats: “Das Wort [‘ἦθος, ἠθικός’] ist eine sog[enannte] vox media, ein neutraler Begriff” (Schwartz 14; cf. 18; contrast Gill “Question” 472). “Der Begriff ‘E[thos]’ bezeichnet in der Rhetorik komplexe Zusammenhänge, die durch verschiedene Denk- und Überlieferungsströme gebildet wurden” (Fortenbaugh et al. 1516; cf. passim). Contrast Kennedy: “even in classical rhetoric the concept of *ethos* was broadened” (*Comp. Rhet.* 223). Rather (and more likely), it was used *sensu lato* from the onset (since this is a spec. hypoleptic *terminus technicus*, if that)—and (reductively) narrowed in certain technicians (resp. -ocrats). Cf. Wisse (31); contrast Süß (215–216; passim)—who does give the factual state of affairs also: “Man sieht, der Terminus ἦθος ist in einem nimmer ruhenden Flusse begriffen” (224); and logs a lack of “eindeutige[r] Bestimmtheit”, “heterogene[...] Begriffsfüllungen” for “ἦθος” in Antiquity (1). Pertinently, Hellwig notes: “die Grenzen zwischen de[n] [...] Begriff[en] von ἦθος [‘erweisen sich’] als fließend” (259; cf. Sattler 55). Cope refers to a “variety of ἦθος” (112)—three, to his mind; cf. Wisse (60–61); Bruss (35; 35n.; 36n.). Ptassek has: “Der griechische Terminus ἦθος läßt sich in seinen Bedeutungsnuancen nur schwer mit einem einzigen Ausdruck übersetzen” (67). Schütrumpf claims: “Einerseits ist ἦθος ein recht unbestimmter Begriff. [...] Andererseits ließ sich auf vielfältige Weise die Verflochtenheit von ἦθος mit den ἠθικὰ ἔξεις nachweisen” (25; with 36–37). “In den ethischen Schriften ist ἦθος [...] mit einer Bedeutungsverengung gebraucht” (37); but in the *Rhetoric*, one is dealing with a “Gebrauch von ἦθος” in an “erweiterten, umfassenderen Sinne” (29; cf. “erweiterte[r] Gebrauch”, 35; with 36–37); the term is not used “in einem [...] so engen Sinne wie in der Ethik” (30): “Dieses ἦθος bezeichnet [...] die besondere Eigenart, Angewohnheit eines Menschen, ohne sich auf den Kreis der ἠθικὰ ἔξεις zu beziehen. – An diese Bedeutung von ἦθος und ἠθικός knüpft die nacharistotelische Rhetorik an”; as to the latter, Schütrumpf offers “eine der drei Formen von Ethopoïien, die ἠθική” in “Hermogenes” (31). Generally, he notes: “Diese Vielschichtigkeit der Bedeutung hat ἦθος von Anfang an [...]. Der Begriff ἦθος ist nicht einmal auf Menschen beschränkt, sondern kann die ‘gewohnten Stätten’ bezeichnen” (36). For the concept’s history,

recognizable, then apparently familiar, outbound ‘character’ pertains and conduces to the overall ‘public image’ (the ‘face’ received for the duration of a

cf. “Gr[reek]. *êthos* usage, character, personal disposition, f[ormed on] I[ndo-]E[uropean]. **swedh-*, f[ormed on] refl[exive] pron[oun] **swe-* oneself + **dhē* place, DO” (Onions et al. 329, s.v. ‘ethic’). See Eden: “Denoting physical location before it becomes a psychological construct, *êthos* pertained first to the place or habitat most natural for an animal—its ‘haunt’” (*Rediscovery* 18). Cf. “In der Sprache Homers sind ἦθεα die Aufenthaltsorte von Tieren, ihre συνήθειες τόποι. Die Alten haben ja immer den Zusammenhang mit ἔθος empfunden” (Schwartz 15). “Weil in ἦθος das ἔθος mitempfunden wird, darum werden die ἦθη gern mit den νόμοι (letzteres im Sinne von Herkommen, Überlieferung) zusammengestellt” (16); cf. Sattler (55); contrast Wisse (64n.). Pearson stresses: “The word *ethos* in the sense of ‘character’ does not occur in Homer”; instead, “noos” appears to be used (*Ethics* 57). In Hesiod, “[t]he word noos” may “be coupled with a word that will replace it in time, *ethos*” (*Ethics* 83): “when Zeus creates Pandora, he orders Hermes to put in her ‘a shameless noos and a deceitful character (*ethos*)’” (*Ethics* 60; with 83). On a “very peculiar” use of the word *ethos* in *Antigone*, cf. Pearson (*Ethics* 247n., giving it as “rule of conduct”; 246n.), referring to Schwartz: “Sehr eigenartig [...] ein singulärer Gebrauch des Wortes, gewaltsam und katachrestisch; normalerweise würde man *μίαν γνώμην* sagen” (15). See Sophocles (68–69, v.705, where the trans. of ἦθος as “mood” seems misleading; cf. Wisse 62; 64); the context or Haemon’s drift suggest that a (notional) ‘*hêxis*’ on the part of Creon is meant—wherefore said use might not seem all that ‘unusual’. Cf. Sattler: “the idea of custom is often [...] implicit in the rhetorical application of [...] *ethos*” (55). “*Ethos* is derived from the Greek word for custom, habit, or usage”; he logs “a close similarity in meaning between *ethos* and ‘folkways’, [...] accepted and approved practice [...] *mores*”; “*ethos* may be defined as ‘totality of characteristic traits’” (55). See Hellwig: “In der Theorie sind die ἦθη auch auf ἔξεις zurückgeführt” (259). “Once a certain ἔξις is established, [...] we expect appropriate and predictable actions ‘in character’ to follow, but this may be a more important consideration for oratory than tragedy” (Pearson “Character.” 80). Similarly De Temmerman/Emde Boas: “the Platonic-Aristotelian notion of stable (adult) character [...] is the result of the confluent effects of inborn nature, habituation, and reasoned choice, and therefore relatively permanent” (“Intro.” 10; with 10n.). Niehues-Pröbsting gives this perceived state of affairs as a condition of possibility for rhetorical plausibility: “Weil dem Charakter eine gewisse Konstanz zukommt, kann er zum *eikos* beitragen. Aufgrund seines Charakters ist der Mensch relativ berechenbar. Das ist weniger als totale Durchsichtigkeit, aber mehr als völlige Unberechenbarkeit” (“Ethos” 347; cf. Hellwig 259). For the process, see Quintilian (*de re*): “frequens imitatio transit in mores” (*Inst. Orat. 1–2*. 236, 1.11.2). Hellwig accentuates: “Nur als ἔθος kann wohl das ἦθος unmittelbar handlungsauslösend wirken [...] ἦθος bedeutet [...] eine bestimmte Disposition des Menschen, bei der die natürlichen Gegebenheiten wie das Alter und die äußeren Umstände [...] zwar noch eine bestimmende Rolle spielen, selbst aber das Tun des Menschen nicht mehr auslösen können. Zu den formenden Kräften des ἦθος darf man wohl auch die Bräuche, Satzungen und Vorteile der verschiedenen Staatsformen rechnen [...] die Staatsform [‘prägt’] auch das Wertdenken der Bürger” (236). Consequently, “[e]thical theory presents *êthos* as inferable from observable *praxis* [...]. Aristotle (*Po.* 1449b35–1450a7, 1454a17–19) is explicit that in tragedy the qualities (*poious tinas*) regarding character (*êthos*) and disposition (*dianoia*) are revealed by action” (De Temmerman/Emde Boas “Intro.” 22n.).

given speech act, or quasi-dependably).¹¹⁵ While seemingly ‘natural’ (or even ostensibly wanted), it is literally a product (while factures vary).¹¹⁶ In expedient

115 Aphthonius implies a method for describing the (conceptual) affinity or interrelation of ‘*prósopon*’ (‘*persona*’) and ‘*ethos*’: “Ethopoeia has a known person as a speaker [‘*πρόσωπον*’] and only invents the characterization [‘*τὸ ἦθος*’], which is why it is called ‘character-making’; [...] Heracles is known, but we invent the character in which he speaks [‘*τοῦ λέγοντος ἦθος*’]. [...] In the case of *prosopoeia*, everything is invented, both character and speaker [‘*καὶ ἦθος καὶ πρόσωπον*’], as Menander invented *Elenchos* (Disproof)” (“*Exercises*” 115–116, §11.34R–45; “*ΠΡΟΓΥΜΝΑΣΜΑΤΑ*” 44–45, [101], §11). In line therewith, a ‘*prósopon*’ might be seen as the (virtual) ‘carrier’ or ‘bearer’ of various *éthe*—qua socio-morally relevant habits, (ostensively) settled conduct relative to the resp. context. In keeping with Kennedy’s giving “*πρόσωπον*” as “speaker”, Aphthonius seems to use said term in a spec. grammatical sense, and (apparently) sans reference to its root meaning of ‘mask’ or ‘face’. Since the aspect of being “known” is generally contingent (and upon nominal references), a pluralization of *personae* would seem to result by implication—and also as regards what are otherwise considered to be human agents.

116 In rhetoric, ‘*ethos*’ is a linguistico-semiotic phenomenon and fabrication—a product and effect of craft: Aristotelian “*ἦθος* [...] consists in conveying to the audience a favourable impression of *your own* character (auctoritas, Quint. III. 8. 12), in making them believe *by the speech itself* that you are an honest man and incapable of misrepresenting the facts of the case, intelligent enough thoroughly to understand them, and well disposed to your hearers and their interests. In this way you express *your own character* in the speech; it is the *ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος* that is herein represented” (Cope 109; cf. 110). See Quintilian (*de re*): “I must not omit to mention [...] the credibility [‘*fidem*’] which the personal authority [‘*auctoritas*’] of the narrator lends [‘*adferat*’] to his story. We have to earn this [‘*mereri debemus*’], primarily, by our life [‘*vita*’], but also by our style [‘*genere orationis*’]” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 280–281, 4.2.125; hence apparently including, or even privileging, ‘atechnic’ aspects). Volkmann glosses: “Daher muss alles [...] berechnet [A]uffällige vermieden werden” (164, I.i.13). With respect to Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 16–17, 1356a, I.ii.3–7), Pearson takes the speaker’s “*ἦθος*” qua amounting to “[...] presenting himself as a person who commands credit” (“Character.” 77; contrast: Garver 173; 175–176; cf. the discussion below). For his Latin environment, Quintilian deems the (polysemous) Greek concept untranslatable: “*ἦθος*, cuius nomine, ut ego quidem sentio, caret sermo Romanus” (*Inst. Orat.* 6–8. 48, 6.2.8; cf. 54–55, 6.2.17; on his use of the term, see also *Inst. Orat.* 11–12. 30–31, 11.1.42). Cf. Dockhorn (“Kritische Rhet.?” 269; with “*Rhet. movet*” 25; 32); Niehues-Pröbsting: “Die lateinische Übersetzung von *ethos* durch *mores* trifft nicht genau das, was rhetorisch damit gemeint ist” (“Ethos” 350). Contrast Roth’s overstatement, claiming “[d]asz Quintilian mit dem *ἦθος* nicht zurechtkommt und die ganze macht der rede im *πάθος* sucht und findet” (858). See the *rhétor*’s definition: “*ēthos* means [...] a certain special aspect of *mores* [‘*morum quaedam proprietates*’]” (Quintilian *Inst. Orat.* 6–8. 48–49, 6.2.9). Cf. Wisse (5), the context *cum grano salis*. Eden pertinently accentuates the qualifying term: “*morum quaedam proprietates* the particular mental attitudes that” (are made to) appear to “belong to the [...] speaker” (“Lit. Property” 34; cf. 35–36). See Freese’s note: “*ἦθος* ‘in the widest sense, includes all that is habitual and characteristic; in a limited sense, it expresses the habitual temper or disposition’ (Twining)” (Aristotle *Rhetoric* 248n.–249n.). As to the latter, cf. the ensuing formula (cited in Quintilian): “Adiciunt quidam *ἦθος* perpetuum, *πάθος* temporale

instances, an effectual *ethos* will dissimulate (or all but eclipse) the overall artfulness and ongoing process of rhetorical ‘personation’ (as far as the reception is concerned).¹¹⁷ Technically speaking and with a descriptive measure, any essentialist construals—and (their routinely concomitant) moralizing—must seem misguided (especially, while not only, in this respect).¹¹⁸

esse” (*Inst. Orat.* 6–8. 48, 6.2.10). See Volkmann (273, I.i.28). Grube has: “The Roman critics themselves were evidently confused by the word [sc. ‘*ēthos*’] and made no attempt to translate it; even Quintilian is not very sure, though he suggests *mores*, or rather *morum quaedam proprietates*, ‘a certain appropriateness of temper’. [...] He then mentions another meaning of *ēthos* [...] namely characterization, when we portray character [...] the *ēthos* of a speech may refer to characterization or to speaking in character, to the character of the speaker himself, to the less exalted emotional tone or the naturalness of his manner” (291–292). Cf. Bruns: “Die Rede soll ἦθος, d. h. sittliche Grundstimmung des Wesens verrathen” (433). See also Dockhorn (*Macht* 49–68; spec. 52–54, 58), who (with recourse to Cicero, Quintilian) glosses “Ethos” as “Charakter, Eigenart menschlichen Verhaltens [...] ‘mores’ [...] ‘naturae et mores et omnis vitae consuetudo’, ‘morum proprietates’ [...] ‘omnis mentis habitus’”; as well as the scholar’s counseling (with Quintilian) against conceiving of “Ethos [...] im Sinne der Moralphilosophie [...], also nicht Norm und Regel” (*Macht* 54; cf. 52, 57–58); cf. Stolt (18–30). See the n. below.

117 Cf. Blass: “ungezwungen, wie es dem Ethos angemessen ist” (*Beredsamkeit I.* 418). For the present context, the ensuing may seem decisive: “The great virtue in expressing it [sc. ‘ἦθος’] lies in making it seem [‘videantur’] that everything flows [‘fluere’] from the nature of the facts and the persons [‘ex natura rerum hominumque’], so that the speaker’s character [‘mores dicentis’] shines through his speech [‘ex oratione perluceant’] and is somehow recognized [‘et quodam modo agnoscantur’]” (Quintilian *Inst. Orat.* 6–8. 50–51, 6.2.13)—crafting, by way of speech, an impression of effortlessness in one’s projected self-‘characterization’. The *rhētor* reiterates this emphasis on generating an effectual appearance with regard to what might be termed vicarious coloring: “*ēthos* in all its forms requires a good and even-tempered person [‘virum’]. Since the orator needs to demonstrate these qualities, if he can, in his client too, he must at any rate possess, or be thought to possess, them himself [‘ipse aut habeat aut habere credatur’]. He will thus do the best service to his Causes, as his own good character [‘ex sua bonitate’] will lend them credibility [‘faciet fidem’]” (*Inst. Orat.* 6–8. 54–55, 6.2.18). Figuratively put, the orator’s *ethos* should not only ‘rub off onto’ the defendant, but almost ‘bleed into’ him (if this textile metaphor be permissible). On *celare artem*, cf. also subchs. 4.1 and 6, herein.

118 See Schwartz’ needful caveats: “Das Wort [‘ἦθος, ἠθικός’] ist eine sog[enannte] vox media, ein neutraler Begriff” (14; cf. 18). “Platon spricht viel von ἦθος ψυχῆς; da ἦθος allein zu allgemein ist, hält er den Zusatz des Genitivs für nötig, wenn er das Wort auf den menschlich-moralischen Bereich anwenden will” (15; see Schütrumpf 37–38). Contrast Kennedy: “*Ēthos* in Aristotle means ‘character’, esp. ‘moral character’, and except in 2.21.16 is regarded as an attribute of a person, not of a speech. Aristotle does not use the term in the technical sense of ‘rhetorical ethos’, the technique or effect of the presentation of character in a discourse” (*Civic Disc.* 37n.; cf. and contrast: 163n.; “Prooemion” ix). Apart from bypassing the text (e.g. at *Civic Disc.* 78–79; 120; 235–236), Kennedy also contradicts himself (cf. *Civic Disc.* 163n.–164n.; 186n.), stating (incidentally): “This widens the concept of *ēthos*” (*Civic Disc.* 77n.; cf. *Comp. Rhet.* 223)—

Both *personae* and *éthe* will effectively involve craft, hence the *ars par excellence*: theirs is an ‘entechnic’ production and -jection.¹¹⁹ Given its end focus

which he himself had narrowed; when coming up against what does not fit his schematizing, the critic resorts to this ruse: “An unusual expression for Aristotle” (*Civic Disc.* 186n.). As a result, the severance of dissimilar *éthe* (“something rather different”) seems labored, if not forced (*Civic Disc.* 163n.). His ed. practice invades the text to such an extent that the reader may seem to be facing Kennedy’s ‘*Rhetoric*’, rather than Aristotle’s. In general, it will hardly be plausible to sidestep an express nexus with the affine treatise (cf. Aristotle “*Poetics*” 50–51, 1450a, VI; 78–81, 1454a, XV). While also encountered elsewhere (to an extreme degree in Garver’s textually untenable construals: cf. e.g. 43; 173; 175–176; *passim*), Kennedy’s sustained moralizing cannot reasonably do justice to the pragmatic philosopher; cf. Elam’s reference to “the sober Aristotelian account of the speaker–discourse relationship” (218). In his comparative approach, Kennedy performs the same: “ethos, the moral character of the speaker projected into a speech (or text) to secure credibility or sympathy with the audience” (*Comp. Rhet.* 42). “To be a means of persuasion, ethos, or moral character, requires an understanding of the moral values on the part of members of a society” (*Comp. Rhet.* 42). Such an (implicitly) substantialist use of the word “moral” will be misleading (not least in unrhethorically limiting the scope of the noun it qualifies); similarly Carey: “the moral character of the speaker (*ethos*)” (“Intro.” 10). Garver tries to unilateralize, bend *ethos* (and rhetoric) into a ‘philosophically palatable (essentialized, moralized, logified) notion (cf. *passim*; spec. 173, 175)—leading him to assert (untenably, in an Aristotelian context): “Art and *ēthos* are incompatible” (43); circularly: “any *ēthos* that can be the product of art can’t be real *ēthos*” (176). Contrast Naschert (noting the crafting, projecting, insinuating involved): “Die Erzeugung von Ethos gerät [...] in den Rang einer herstellbaren Qualität. Den Terminus technicus ‘[E]thopoeia’ verwendet Aristoteles zwar nicht, allerdings gibt er den Rat, zur Glaubhaftmachung des eigenen Charakters unangenehme Dinge, besonders Vorwürfe, anderen Personen in den Mund zu legen” (1513; with *Rhetoric* 460–463, III.xvii.16–17, 1418b). See below; as well as subchs. 4.1 and 5.1, herein.

119 Aristotle’s ‘*ethos*’ emphasizes (intra-discursive, speech-related) ‘entechnicity’ (cf. *Rhetoric* 14–17, 1355b–1356a, I.ii.2–6; Dionysius “*Lysias*” 60–61, §19; Süß 125–129, largely *cum grano salis*). Aristotle has: “since all men are willing to listen to speeches which harmonize with their own character [‘ἡθεῖ’] and to speakers who resemble them [or: ‘speeches which resemble (or reflect) it’], it is easy to see what language we must employ so that both ourselves and our speeches may appear to be of such and such a character” (*Rhetoric* 254–255, 1390a, II.xiii.16; 254n., giving the reading qtd. in brackets). This ties in with his opening remarks: “The orator persuades by [...] character [‘τοῦ ἡθους’] when his speech is delivered in such a manner as to render [‘ποῦ ἰσχυρῶς’] him worthy of confidence; [...] this [...] must be due to the speech itself [...] character [‘τὸ ἡθος’] [...] constitutes the most effective means of proof. [...] persuasion is produced by the speech itself” (*Rhetoric* 16–17, 1356a, I.ii.4–5); see Dionysius (“*Lysias*” 60–61, §19; with Bruss 39–41). Cf. “das ist [...] die wichtigste Quelle der *πίστις*” (Schwartz 17). Niehues-Pröbsting stresses “die wesentliche Funktion, die sie [sc. die ‘aristotelische Rhetorik’] dem Ethos beimißt” (“Ethos” 340). Oesterreich has: “Die Personenzentriertheit der *peitho* bezeugt [...] die Aussage des Aristoteles, daß das *Ethos* des Redners das wichtigste Überzeugungsmittel sei” (*Fundamentalrhet.* 49; cf. 5, 85, 112–113). See Carey on (Aristotle’s) ‘entechnic’ *pisteis* (qua “produced by the rhetorician’s art”, “Rhet. means” 26); Sprute (282); Elam (217–219); Eden

on the ‘making’ factually involved, the compound ‘*ethopoía*’ is most apposite.¹²⁰

(*Fiction* 12–13, 13n.); Niehues-Pröbsting (“Ethos” 342); Süß (125–126; 144–145; 212–214), *cum grano salis*. Kennedy gives “entechnic” as “embodied in art, artistic” (*Civic Disc.* 37). Cf. Cope: “These three kinds of proof are all effected secundum artem by means of the speech itself” (109). See Elam: “The character that appears to lie behind – but is instead the creation of – the speech, acts (or speech acts) of the stage speakers has much the same status as the product of the speech and acts of Aristotle’s orator (who is, in this sense, a kind of actor-dramatist)” (218–219; with 217). Baumlín defines ‘*ethos*’ qua “‘character as it emerges in language’” (qtd. in: Sloane “Selfhood” 113). In citing the former, the latter does not seem to note that said definition jars with his own—being a direct result of the critic’s essentializing (“*Ethos*, identity or selfhood [...] highly individualized personalities”), plus a (concomitantly) problematic reliance on Greenblatt: “*ethos*” is “the means whereby a speaker or writer projects a self-image” (Sloane “Selfhood” 113; cf. “rhetorical selfhood”, 115–116). On the contrary: it is an “effect” (Baumlín xxvi)—and spec. one produced in, and by way of, language (see xv–xviii; “necessarily linguistic”, xx; “quintessentially a linguistic phenomenon”, xxiii; xxvi; passim). As such, it may be instrumentalized (with a view to ‘handling’ the reception in an advantageous manner). Generally, see Küpper (“Subjektivität” 139). Niehues-Pröbsting stresses: “Lediglich das in der und durch die Rede ausgedrückte Ethos gehört zur rhetorischen Theorie, nicht der Charakter des Redners als solcher beziehungsweise das Vorurteil des Publikums darüber” (*Die antike Phil.* 121; cf. “Ethos” 342; 352). Kennedy opts for “regard[ing] authority as a ‘nonartistic’ counterpart to ethos” (*Comp. Rhet.* 42), and posits: “The emphasis on ethos and the neglect of authority in classical rhetoric derives from the egalitarian assumptions of Greek democracy” (*Comp. Rhet.* 43; on said “*Topos*”, cf. Oesterreich *Fundamentalrhet.* 89). To be speaking of a “neglect” will seem too strong; the other notions must be nuanced by the competitiveness of said culture: if the best craftsman prevails (in whichever genre), this will inevitably conduce to a focus on ‘entechnicity’ as pertaining to that which is manipulatable by art (including the recipient). Moreover, *ethos* could be described as tying in with communal “authority”: any use of (per se supra-personal) language will be ‘ethical’ to the extent of being hypoleptic (tying in with a foregoing competence)—whether consciously so or not; the *téchne* ensures the former, hence conduces to victory by an artful recourse to habitualized givens. Kennedy does grant this in the latter part of the ensuing: “the authority or ethos of the speaker [...] partly derive[s] from natural ability, partly from imitating effective speakers of the past” (*Comp. Rhet.* 79); “formal language [...] carries the collective values of the community” (*Comp. Rhet.* 79)—especially, while not only, said ‘official’ kind of speaking. In general, Kennedy stresses: “nonartistic authority and artistic ethos are primary means of persuasion throughout the world, often adequate in themselves to secure persuasion” (*Comp. Rhet.* 223). Cf. Baumlín: “The terms are often equated[:] loosely speaking, to have *ethos* is to be an authority” (xxix, qua n.)—for the spoken time being. In a meta-rhetorical view, the economy (selection, arrangement) of ‘atechnic’ *písteis* will (most likely) have to count as artful (thereby making them so, in a sense). On assorted samples for “autorité”, cf. Montaigne (*Essais III.* 223, III.viii; with 215).

120 Roth appears to be using the term for the orator’s ‘crafting’ of his own ‘*ethos*’: “Dasz die ἠθοποιία eine gute aus der rede erkennbare gesinnung des redners gegen seine z u h ö r e r voraussetze, ist ganz unzweifelhaft” (855); “der redner [‘musz’] so zu sprechen wissen, dasz er nicht nur nicht gegen die *mores civitatis* verstöszt, sondern dasz seine z u h ö r e r

From a technical perspective, “the rendering [‘Darstellung’] of another human being is effected by the same means as those” employed with regard to someone’s self-(re)presentations (Hellwig 257; trans. dsm).¹²¹ Prefixed by ‘*auto-*’, the latter may therefore be described as variants of *prosopopoeia* and

auch die conformität seines ἦθος mit dem ihrigen erkennen” (856). While routinely advantageous, showing a favorable disposition toward the audience or spectators may not always be the most expedient course to take; likewise, being ostensibly at variance with the customary may prove effectual under certain circumstances; the setting decides, not the overall directive. Yet Roth generally defines “das ἦθος des redners” as “die in seiner persönlichkeit und seiner ausdrucksweise hervortretende gesinnung, welche dem sinne seiner zuhörer correspondiert” (856); in so doing, he wishes to modify Aristotle’s view of *ethos*: “bei dem groszen werthe, den das altertum der ὑπόκρισις (*actio*) belegt, ist es ganz undenkbar dasz die persönlichkeit des redners jemals oder irgendwo als entbehrlich zur ῥηθοποιία angesehen worden ist” (856)—once again using the term in question for the orator’s ‘*auto-etho-poiesis*’ (so to speak); at any rate, the performance would also count as ‘entechnic’.

121 Hellwig (257) gives the relevant passages in Aristotle: “when speaking of these [sc. ‘virtue and vice’, etc.], we shall incidentally bring to light the means of making us appear of such and such a character [‘ex hon poiōi tines hypolephthesómetha katà tò ethos’] [...]; for it is by the same means that we shall be able to inspire confidence in ourselves or in others in regard to virtue” (*Rhetoric* 90–91, 1366a, I.ix.1); plus this intratextual reference backward: “The means whereby he may appear [‘phanein’] sensible and good must be inferred from the classification of the virtues; for to make himself appear such he would employ the same means as he would in the case of others” (*Rhetoric* 170–171, 1378a, II.i.7). Cf. Ptassek thereto, speaking of the “Selbstdarstellung des Redners” (68). Apart from being replete with hardly descriptive value judgments such as “ownership” and “truth” (cf. “obtrusive”, 313), Currie’s article evinces a problematic bias against the art: “rhetorical poses do relatively little to characterize the poet” (312–313). This directly affects his grasp of the concept at issue: “Epiničan *ēthopoīia*, unlike the *ēthopoīia* of oratory, is more concerned with constructing the character of the *laudator* (a rather shallow rhetorical construct) than of a historical person; again, the way Cicero draws on his own historical (or would-be historical) character is different” (313). Particular and contextual functionalizations will inevitably vary (needless to say, rhetorically speaking); formally or structurally, the devices utilized are similar or comparable, while their degree of application (hence prominence) may differ. Currie’s (implicitly substantialist) value judgments cannot tend toward tenability: a resp. recipient’s presuppositions are likely to cause a severance of the same—the beholder’s eye being always already primed and directed by previous experiences and (generic) knowledge. The ensuing is pertinent initially, but then veers round to said essentialism: “Epiničan characterization takes very different forms according to who is being characterized: *laudator*, *laudandus*, or the characters of the mythical narrative. The *ēthopoīia* of the epiničan *laudator* is very roughly analogous to the *ēthopoīia* of the speaker in (forensic) oratory, but we are dealing more with a rhetorical construct than a real person, mimetically conceived” (314). On the contrary, the decidedly artful techniques for crafting *ethos*—which, in any of its actively semioticized, rhetorico-poetic variants, is always ‘entechnic’ (cf. Aristotle *Rhetoric* 14–17, 1355b–1356a, I.ii.2–6; 442, 1416b, III.xvi.1)—differ but in terms of the ever needful adaptation to the spec. context and functionalization, hence in degree only; see below.

ethopoeia—considering the craft (*poiein*) formally or structurally implicated.¹²²

Signifying a role determined by a communal outlook and *praxis*, *prósopa* are generally based on, and established by, a collective defining itself in competitive terms as regards (artfully) performing or representing such *personae* effective- and expediently—hence with a view to what will typically be considered apposite at a given time. The latter immediately involves (culturally) acquired habits, a settled bearing: “*Ethos* necessarily overlaps with *decorum*”

122 Pertinently accentuating that this particular variant of the craft does not fundamentally alter the rhetorical production and projection (resp. performance) of a received ‘self’, Bakker’s consistently lucid analysis also tenders an exemplification of what one might refer to as ‘*auto-ethopoia*’: when “the orator talks about himself, and is not writing a speech on someone else’s behalf [...] the terms and *topoi* [...] Lysias uses to describe himself and his family as well as his opponents [are ‘similar’], and [...] his technique of contrastive characterization matches that of his other speeches” (“Lysias” 423). “Lysias evaluates himself and his family in terms that are no different from his other speakers” (“Lysias” 424). On two consecutive pages, Carey refers to “Lysias’ characteristic vividness” (“Comment.” 210), to the oration’s “speaker himself” qua “not emerg[ing] as a vivid personality”, and to “[t]he mother”, ventriloquized “as a powerful personality [...] not [...] defined in detail” (“Comment.” 211). The first instance applies a stylistic measure, and intimates a writerly *ethos*; the second refers to a speaker’s recognizable *persona*, and is equally elicited from a written text; the last statement cited aims at defining a female protagonist rendered in what are deemed typical terms, as portrayed in and by words attributed to her by the intratextual speaker and extratextual author. In all three cases, *ethos* is conceived of as being (or having been) crafted by linguistic (or, more generally, semiotic) expedients (sc. rhetorico-poetically)—and this includes the (and any) reception also (meaning, in hermeneutic respects). The ensuing survey of instances from Carey’s text provide applied examples for the three potential ‘carriers’ of *ethos* outlined above. First, concerning the speechwright: “The reader who can resist the spell of Lysias’ characterization” etc. (“Comment.” 90). “It is [...] difficult to believe that a speech so typical of Lysias is spurious” (“Comment.” 208); or the reverse, where ‘inauthenticity’ is presumed on account of “the absence of any quintessentially Lysiac trait, particularly the lack of *ethopoia*” (“Comment.” 147). As to the client’s projected *ethos* and that of a *persona* in his discourse: “the strongest argument [...] is made obliquely through the narrative [...]. The effect is to create the impression of a man so simple as to be incapable of any kind of trickery [...]. He falls neatly into the role of the gullible cuckold found in popular tales in many cultures [...] the stereotype was familiar in Greece” (“Comment.” 61); “as well as the rhetorical effectiveness of the choice of character we should note Lysias’ subtlety. The character presented is not complex, but the presentation is skilful. [...] Euphiletos is Lysias’ most impressive creation. [...] The wife [...] remains a vague presence. She plays the archetypal unfaithful wife to Euphiletos’ archetypal cuckold. [...] The speech as a whole is persuasive. Its greatest strength is the remarkably vivid *persona* which Lysias has created for Euphiletos” (“Comment.” 62). “Euphiletos’ clear affinities with the cuckold type support the view [...] that the characters projected by Lysias’ clients are dramatic creations” (“Comment.” 62n.; cf. 71). Cf. Bakker (“Lysias” 422n.).

(Herrick 136).¹²³ As regards the Roman environment, Fuhrmann elucidates the nexus between the aforesaid concept's various applications:

The figurative usage, that is[,] the meaning *persona* = role, character in life [...] evinces several typical areas. These are mainly 'systems', which are similar to the theater in that a certain 'ensemble'[,] with respectively specific roles[,] acts in them, as well: [...] the judicial system [...] the state [...] the society [...] the family [...]. The [metaphorical] transition from the theater to the court was particularly effortless: for[,] here as there[,] there were actions in the emphatic sense (*agere, actio, actor*) [...] fixed roles, and [...] the entirety – from the first to the fifth act in drama, from the complaint or summons to the sentence in the lawsuit – [...] could only emerge from a conjoint, reciprocal [...], interdependent action. ("Persona" 88; trans. dsm)¹²⁴

123 In the *progymnasmata*, Lanham sees 'ethopoeia' as "character portrayal" ("Composition" 120): "Considered to be among the more difficult of these preliminary rhetorical exercises was the speech in character, *prosopopoeia* or *ethopoeia*. This exercise was very popular [...]. The larger rhetorical principle being stressed in this exercise was *decorum*, suiting one's words [...] to the situation" ("Composition" 121). Generally speaking, 'ethos' is a flexible term, and a relative category—hence the close nexus with the *aptum* (see also the above n. on *ethos* in the present subch.); it is contingent upon the given state of affairs (resp. that which is considered to be so), and thus (potentially) subject to change (and contingent in that sense also: it might as well be otherwise). Eden notes that "*oikeion*" signifies "a style that expresses those properties that best characterize" ("Lit. Property" 35) a speaker in the resp. setting (with a view to an advantageous position in a given context), wherefore a rhetorical "ethics or character-formation" ("Lit. Property" 37) might be said to obtain. See Bruss: "Dionysius associates *ethopoeia* with [...] Aristotelian *ethos*—persuasive proof through character" (36n.; cf. 38–40, 39n.); with a view to crafting the latter, the critic notes the Dionysian "emphasis on style, or word choice, as a means" (38; her context is generally problematic; see the discussion in subch. 4.1, herein). As suggested in the opening of ch. 3 (above), a distinctive *elocutio* may (tend to) be taken as signaling *ethos*. For oratory's general functionality in this respect, see Friedrich: "Man pflegt die rhetorisch-formale Kunst [...] um ein biegsames Instrument zu gewinnen für die je nach Temperament, Charakter und Denkweise verschiedenen Ausdrucksbedürfnisse der [...] Autoren" (83; infinitized). Cf. Eden: "Changing over time and place, [...] style also differs between one stylist and the next" ("Montaigne on Style" 389).

124 See Gill ("Personhood" 171; 177; 192–193; passim), spec. "These modern studies [sc. of 'social psychology', by Goffman and others] resemble *de Officiis* in viewing the person from a strongly social perspective, and in regarding inter-personal relationships as the enactment of a set of largely pre-determined roles" ("Personhood" 195). Cf. "Bei den Römern tritt der Begriff der 'P[ersona]' hauptsächlich in der Sprache des Theaters, des Rechts, der Grammatik [...] und der Rhetorik auf. [...] Die P[ersona] ist zunächst die Maske im Theater (ein Äquivalent zu *larva*), die auf der Bühne die verschiedenen 'Personen' voneinander abhebt und die zu spielende Rolle festlegt: So gibt es die P[ersona] des Parasiten oder des Kupplers. Generell kennzeichnet die P[ersona] die Theaterrolle durch ihre soziale Dimension, an die sich eine psychologische Persönlichkeit mit ihren typischen Verhaltensweisen knüpft. Seit der Zeit Ciceros wird

Likewise, Blumenberg accentuates that “[t]he figurative uses of the term ‘role’, once more current today, rest on a very solid tradition illustrating life and [the] world as [a] ‘theater’” (“Annäherung” 417; trans. dsm).¹²⁵ The overall (micro- and macrocosmic) metaphor appears to have seemed momentarily evident—or been of heuristic value—from the very onset of drama’s prevalence in Western cultures.¹²⁶ A corresponding synopsis of samples is likely to reveal

‘P[ersonal]’ im Sinne einer determinierten ‘Rolle’ vom Theater auf die Gesellschaft übertragen und bezeichnet die in ihrem Gesamtgefüge oder ihren Teil- und Subsystemen (z.B. im Gerichtswesen, Ämterhierarchie) zu übernehmenden bzw. übernommenen Funktionen” (Boriaud/Schouler 803–804). The above mention of a ‘psychological personality’ will have to be quarantined as inapplicable, here (a fact that might be acknowledged at 805). As to “medieval comments on the word *persona*”—spec. concerning its “polysemy”, and “tak[ing] advantage of it”—cf. Otter (161–163; here: 161). For a diachronic, comparative, anthropological, and global approach, see Mauss (passim), spec. “a whole immense group of societies have arrived at the notion of ‘role’ (*personnage*), of the role played by the individual in sacred dramas, just as he plays a role in family life. The function [...] created the formula [...] and subsists in societies at the present day” (12). Synoptically, Hollis remarks: “Mauss ranges from the Pueblo to the Romans, from mediaeval Christianity to the individualism of today, showing the different forms which the idea of the self has taken” (218); as to the aforesaid allocation of roles with a view to the functioning of society, see Hollis (221–222).

125 Cf. Blumenberg: “*Simmel* hat darauf hingewiesen, daß die Rollenmetapher nur deshalb so leistungsfähig ist, weil das Leben eine *Vorform der Schauspielkunst* sei; [...] Lebenkönnen und Sich-eine-Rolle definieren sind identisch” (“Annäherung” 417–418; with Simmel 80); as to the latter, cf. the n. below. Cervantes joins the (arch-familiar) metaphors of a play (“*comedia*”) qua ‘mirror of human life’ (“*un espejo [...] de la vida humana*”), of the world as a stage (“*la comedia y trato deste mundo*”), and as ‘a game of chess’ (“*juego del ajedrez*”), while putting the ensuing qualification in Sancho’s mouth (responding to Don Quijote): “*Brava comparación [...], aunque no tan nueva, que yo no la haya oído muchas y diversas veces*” (*Quijote II*. 122, II.xii; with Quiring 14). Generally, see Moos (489n., §103; 509n., §106). As to said isotopy’s prevalence, Süß notes: “In unzähligen Variationen wiederholt die Weltliteratur den peripatetischen Vergleich der Komödie oder des Dramas überhaupt mit einem *s p e c u l u m vitae*, wofür auch noch *imago veritatis*, *imitatio consuetudinis* eintritt. Dieses zu welthistorischer Berühmtheit gelangte Schlagwort ist [...] der Sache nach gorgianisch” (87–88).

126 For Ancient examples, see the dictum ascribed to Democritus: “ὁ κόσμος σκηνή, ὁ βίος πάροδος· ἤλθεες, εἶδες, ἀπήλθεες” (qtd. in: Kranz *Vorsokratiker II*. 165, 68B115*84; formally, see Aristotle *Rhetoric* 420–421, 1413b, III.xii.4). Moos has: “Auch das Theatergleichnis ist wie viele andere dieser ‘*exempla*’ platonischen Ursprungs” (509n., §106). Cf. “Let us suppose that each of us [...] is an ingenious puppet [*ῥαῦμα*] of the gods, whether contrived by way of a toy of theirs or for some serious purpose—for as to that we know nothing” (Plato *Laws I–VI*. 68–69, 644D, I; with “*θαυμάτων*”, 68, 645B, I; cf. 106, 658B–C, II; on the former, see Heraclitus, qtd. in: Kranz *Vorsokratiker I*. 162, 22B52). See Palladas: “ALL life is a stage and a play [*ῥαῦμα πᾶς ὁ βίος καὶ παίγνιον*]: either learn to play laying your gravity aside, or bear with life’s pains” (qtd. in: *Greek Anthology* 40–41, X.72; cf. Curtius 148, §7.5); for said tendency, cf. the Petronian take, as

both a diachronic invariance, and considerable differences with respect to contextual functionalizations.¹²⁷

discussed below. The Epictetian view proved particularly influential for Early Modernity (see subch. 4.2, herein): “Remember that you are an actor [‘hypokritès’] in a play [‘drámatos’], the character of which is determined by the Playwright [‘didáskalos’]: if He wishes the play to be short, it is short; if long, it is long; if He wishes you to play the part of a beggar, remember to act even this rôle adroitly [...]. For this is your business, to play [‘hypokrinasthai’] the rôle [‘prósopon’] assigned you; but the selection of that rôle is Another’s” (“Encheiridion” 496–497, §17; cf. Nédoncelle 283–284; Niehues-Pröbsting *Kynismus* 232–233). Similarly, Marcus Aurelius (340–343, XII.36, with 56–57, III.8; 296–299, XI.6, with 294–295, XI.2–3; cf. Quiring 10); also Cicero (“De Senectute” 80–81, xix.70). The nexus of said metaphor with dramatico-rhetorical ‘*personae*’ will suggest itself, and may be particularly plain in the (characteristically categorical) Stoic take as articulated in Epictetus; cf. the assertion of—and implicit claim to—consistency (linking to the above via the terms employed): “But different characters [‘prósopa’] do not mix in this fashion; you cannot act the part [‘hypokrinasthai’] of Thersites and that of Agamemnon too” (“Disc. III–IV.” 308–309; IV.ii.10). For an affine tenor, cf. “Lay down for yourself, at the outset, a certain stamp [‘charaktera’] and type [‘týpon’], which you are to maintain whether you are by yourself or are meeting with people. And be silent for the most part” (“Encheiridion” 516–517, §33; with 530, §48). “If you undertake a rôle [‘prósopon’] which is beyond your powers, you both disgrace yourself in that one, and at the same time neglect the rôle which you might have filled with success” (“Encheiridion” 525–525, §37). Stoic(izing) instances will probably have conduced to (or even be responsible for) the semantic changes in the Greek term ‘*charaktér*’; generally, cf. Körte’s detailed conceptual history (passim; spec. 85), as outlined in subch. 3.1, herein. For a different (and ultimately anthropistic) take on said isotopy of life qua play, see the nexus of (rhetorical) sophistry, mercantilism, acting in the Hippocratic corpus: “The trainer’s art is of this sort: they teach how to transgress the law according to the law, to be unjust justly, to deceive [...]. It is a display of the folly of the many. [...] Many admire, few know. Men come to the market-place and do the same things; men deceive when they buy and sell. He who has deceived most is admired. [...] The actor’s [‘ὑποκριτικὴ’] art deceives those who know. They say one thing and think another; they come on and go off, the same [...] yet not the same. A man too can say one thing and do another; the same man can be not the same; he may be now of one mind, now of another. So all the arts have something in common with the nature of man” (260–263, I.xxiv). For a nuanced view of dramatic deception, see Gorgias (as qtd. in: Kranz *Vorsokratiker II*. 305–306, 82B23; with Schwartz 80; 80n., referring to Plutarch). As to the above, Hippocratic passage, cf. Starobinski (*Montaigne* 11n.; *Motion* 309n.; with “Remarques” 343), *cum grano salis*.

127 Cf. Curtius’ seminal subch. “Schauspielmetaphern” (148–154, §7.5; spec. 149–151; with Ancient samples likening life to drama at 148). Via John of Salisbury’s adaptive *hypólepsis* (see below), it is particularly Petronius’ take that seems to have ensured the metaphor’s persistence during Medieval times: “A company acts a farce on the stage [‘Grex agit in scaena mimum’]: one is called [‘vocatur’] the father, [/] one the son, and one is labeled [‘tenet’] the Rich Man. [/] Soon the comic parts [‘partes’] are shut in a † book †, [/] the men’s real faces [‘facies’] come back, and the made-up [‘simulata’] disappear [‘perit’]” (188–189, §80; cf. 189n.). On mime in this regard, cf. Walsh (24–27; for the passage cited, 25): “Petronius consistently compares the

The dominantly pragmatic disciplines implied in the above tend to have

action of his story to scenes from the mime [...] almost every episode is at some point compared to a low comic drama” (24, referring to Salisbury; also 24n.). The critic calls this a “deliberate alignment” (25), indicative of “Petronius’ attitude”: “He wishes to present the whole of life as a series of risible, unexpected happenings, in which nothing is taken seriously and no man’s motives are what they seem. Every gesture is rehearsed, every attitude a studied pose” (27). Cf. Curtius (149, §7.5); Moos (509); and John of Salisbury’s highly influential—partly hypoleptic—Medieval rendering and refunctionalization of the Petronian general drift (hence not verbatim): “fere totus mundus iuxta Petronium exerceat histrionem” (*Policraticus I* [1909]. 194, III.8, 491a–b; cf. “fere totus mundus [...] mimum uidetur implere”, 191, III.8, 489b; see the overall context: 190–194, III.8, 488c–491b; *Policraticus* [1479/81]. 174–177, in the digital facsimile; with Curtius 149–151, §7.5; Walsh 24, 24n.; Burger *Rolle* 82–83; 90; Quiring 12). On John’s uptake, cf. Moos (220–224, §59), spec. as to the “Theatermetapher”—being among “den einflußreichsten Stücken des *Policraticus* bis in die Barockzeit” (508–512, §106; here 508): “Johann gelingt es [...], mehrere Hauptthemen des *Policraticus* in diesem Bild des Rollenspiels brennpunktartig zu vereinen” (510, §106; it is among the “dispositionellen Großmetaphern”, 509n.). For Early Modern refunctionalizations (generally, cf. Mayfield “Interplay” passim; spec. 32n.–33n.; *Artful* 64n.), see Erasmus (*Praise of Folly* 28–29, 49); Gracián (*Criticón* 74–83, I.ii); Calderón (passim; spec. 52, v.376; 53, v.427–428; 41, v.46–47, v.52–56; with 41n.). Moos believes: “was neu hinzukommt, ist [...] die Vorstellung, daß Gott das Schauspiel leitet, und der Mensch trotz aller Scheinhaftigkeit des Theaters auf der Weltbühne seine Rolle verantwortungsvoll zu spielen hat” (510n., §106); cf. the Epictetian take, as cited above. Montaigne’s *hypôlepsis*: “La plupart de nos vacations sont farcesques, *Mundus universus exercet histrionam* [sic: *histrionem*]” (*Essais III*. 327, III.x; with context: 328). “Most of our occupations are low comedy. *The whole world plays a part*” (*Essays* 773, III.10; cf. 774; Friedrich 366n., as to Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius; see Starobinski *Montaigne* 11–12, 11n.–12n.; *Motion* 1; 309n.; with “Remarques” 343; his context being problematic; cf. Moos 508n.–509n., 511n., §106). Florio’s 1603 rendering has: “*Mundus universus exercet histrioniam* [sic]. *All the world doth practise stage-playing*” (*Essays III* [Florio]. 262, III.x). Giving Lipsius as the source for the attribution to Petronius (*Essais III*. 557n.), the French ed. trans. Montaigne’s Latin line as “‘Le monde entier joue la comédie’” (*Essais III*. 327n.). In a context associating (self-interested) hypocrisy and the theater (see “histrione”, “actitaret”, “repraesentandus”, “theatrum totum”, “Comoediam”, “Iuditis”, “velati persona”, Lipsius 54, I.viii; plus the emphatic appeal: “histrion pone personam”, 56), the Neo-Stoic’s 1584 *de constantia* (cf. F. Neumann 426; 438), ascribes this to Petronius: “*Mundus / vniuersus exercet histrionam, ait / Arbitr*”—which Neumann gives as “*Alle Welt spielt*” (Lipsius 54–57, I.viii). Generally, see Barner’s seminal study on the metaphor of life qua play in the Baroque (86–131); for the German context, cf. Burger (*Rolle* 75–93; spec. 85–87). See Mayfield (“Interplay” passim; spec. 32n.–33n.; *Artful* 64n.); as to striking cases in Early Modern opera, cf. Feldman (passim; spec. 71, 80, 89; with Mayfield “Interplay” 21, 24). Like the affine one with recourse to the *agorá* (cf. Eden *Fiction* 6; Mayfield “Interplay” 32n.), the metaphor in question may be ‘internalized’: “Renaissance rhetorics depict the mind as a dramatic microcosm [...] the mind as a stage” (Christiansen 319–320; cf. 321). On the whole, Moos’ general assessment in the present respect will (in all likelihood) continue to hold good: “zweifellos [‘bleibt’] noch eine große rezeptionsgeschichtliche ‘Dunkelziffer’ aufzudecken” (509n., §106).

their conceptual foundations in rhetoric and drama; Goffman (whom Blumenberg mentions in addition to Simmel, “Annäherung” 418) stresses that “issues dealt with by stage-craft and [...] management are [...] quite general; they seem to occur everywhere in social life” (26). This accent on the arts involved is further elucidated in the ensuing:

Audiences tend to accept the self projected by the [...] performer during any current performance [...] of his social establishment. Audiences also accept the [...] particular performance as evidence of his capacity to perform the routine and even as evidence of his capacity to perform any routine. (Goffman 235)¹²⁸

While their respective virtuosity will vary (and tend toward concealment or blatancy proportionally), oratorico-contextual ‘selves’ (diverse *personae*, or particular *éthe*, crafted and projected with regard to, and in, a given setting) are always ‘products’ in fact (involving a form of ‘*poiein*’, ‘*facere*’)—even (and especially) where they may yield the impression of being ‘natural produce’.¹²⁹

128 See Blumenberg: “Die ‘Zustimmung’ die das Ziel jeder ‘Überredung’ (sogar der Selbstüberredung) sein muß, ist die in allen Situationen gefährdete und immer neu zu sichernde Kongruenz von Rollenbewußtsein und Rollenerwartung seitens der anderen. [...] Im Grunde kommt es darauf an, keinen Widerspruch zu finden, sowohl im internen Sinne der Konsistenz als auch im externen Sinne der Hinnahme. Rhetorik ist nicht nur ein System, um Mandate zum Handeln zu werben, sondern um eine sich formierende und formierte Selbstauffassung bei sich selbst und vor anderen durchzusetzen und zu verteidigen” (“Annäherung” 418). There may seem to be an affinity with the Aristotelian notion of rhetorical ‘*ethos*’, in the above (cf. e.g. *Rhetoric* 16–19, 1356a, I.ii.3–7; 90–91, 1366a, I.ix.1; 168–171, 1377b–1378a, II.i.1–7; 254–255, 1390a, II.xiii.16; 262–265, 1391b, II.xviii.1–3; 378–381, 1408a, III.vii.6–7; 446–447, 1417a, III.xvi.8–9; with Dionysius “Lysias” 60–61, §19). Rhetorically, ‘apt’ (always) signifies ‘situationally advantageous’; for further references, see Mayfield (“Interplay” 18n.; 21n.). Cf. Evans: “dialectic and rhetoric [...] are activities which [...] involve other *actual* people [...] success is achieved when one has secured the agreement of a particular opponent. To secure this agreement one must produce a sense of conviction, but one must produce it in a particular person [...]. Pure logic is not concerned with the vagaries of the individual’s reaction” (74–75). On “the central concept of rhetoric”, the scholar logs: “what is persuasive is [...] persuasive *to someone*”; “the persuasive and the apparent syllogism, [...] the province of rhetoric and dialectic, are [...] relative concepts. The persuasive must persuade *someone* [...] this element of relativity [...] characterises all the concepts in ethics and dialectic” (76). Cf. Ptassek: “So überzeugt auch der Logos [...] nicht voraussetzungslos: Glaubwürdiges ist immer nur in bezug auf bestimmte Adressaten glaubwürdig und damit vom Ethos abhängig” (66).

129 The (technical) question being “wie der Verfasser es ‘macht’ – denn *daß* er es ‘macht’, steht fest” (Blumenberg *Literatur* 74; infinitized). Like the Ancients, Early Modern writers were aware of the ‘*poiein*’ entailed in “the maker or poet” (Puttenham 234, III.5; cf. 323, III.19). Boriaud/Schouler refer to ‘*personae*’ “as rhetorical creation[s]” (798; trans. dsm). Avoiding metaphysico-substantialist, organicist construals (tacitly) underwriting a considerable number

Pertinently signaling the device's artful instrumentality, Hellwig refers to “ἠθοποιία” qua “Kunstmittel” (270).¹³⁰ In its very make, the Greek compound

of positions on *ethopoia*, Kasprzyk expediently accentuates the constructive aspect: “all of Dio’s speech is used to characterize the speaker, as, according to the principles of *ēthopoia*, words reflect *ēthos*, and this fact allows the orator to build his own *ēthos*” (527); said remark, spec. the latter, may be seen or taken to apply more universally. Cf. De Temmerman/Emde Boas: “In its broadest sense, this term [*ēthopoia*] refers to the construction (*poia*) of *ēthos* in general, i.e. both direct and indirect characterization in all its forms” (“Intro.” 22). Bruss notes: “*Ethopoeia*, literally, ‘character making’ (*ethos*, ‘character’ + *poiein*, ‘to make’), is commonly described as dramatic characterization, which involves the fitting or plausible representation of a speaker’s (or other character’s) distinctive traits” (35). While the critic rejects this view as far as Dionysius is concerned (see the discussion of her take in subch. 4.1, herein), she also fails to render problematic the trans. as “character” (here); thereto, cf. subch. 3.1. The term ‘*ethos*’ is frequently (or even typically) encountered in the vicinity of the verb ‘*poiein*’, including its various (participial, adjectival, nominal) derivatives (e.g. Aristotle *Rhetoric* 246, 1388b, II.xii.1; 256, 1390b, II.xv.1; 262, 1391b, II.xviii.1; 288, 1395b, II.xxi.16; 446, 1417a, III.xvi.8; 454, 1418a, III.xvii.8; with “Poetics” 48–50, 1449b–1450a, VI; 7, 1454a, XV); such will probably have conduced to the formation of the compound ‘*ethopoia*’. In a decidedly ‘somatic’ (rather than rhetorico-virtual) context, a variant of the latter is found within the corpus of the ps.-Aristotelian *Problēmata*: “black bile [...] has an affect [sic] on character [‘τὸ ἠθοποιὸς εἶναι’] ([...] heat and cold are the greatest agents in our lives for the making of character [‘ἠθοποιὸν’]), just like wine according as it is mixed in our body in greater or less quantity it makes our dispositions of a particular kind [‘ποιεῖ τὸ ἦθος ποιὸς τινας ἡμᾶς’]” (“Problems II” 168–169, 955a, XXX.1). Cf. and contrast Bruss, who speaks thereof as “this early reference to *ethopoeia*” (34n.); in a contextual, functional analysis, such an equation between expressly somatic and entechnic (or virtual) uses of the term will not be tenable. Even so, the above is also of import in that a short paragraph on ‘*hēxis*’ follows immediately afterward, testifying to a (notionally) customary nexus thereof with *ethos* (*de re*): “Why is it that in some branches of knowledge we say that we have a habit [‘ἔξιν’], and in others not? Are we said to have a habit [‘ἔξιν’] in respect of those branches of knowledge in which we make discoveries [‘εὐρητικοί’]? For discovery [‘τὸ (...) εὐρίσκειν’] depends on habit [‘ἔξεως’]” (“Problems II” 168–169, 955b, XXX.2).

130 As to the crafting of a (representative) *ethos*, contrast Foucault’s Idealist construal, which deprioritizes rhetoric (as generally; cf. “Author” 193; *Hermeneutics* 381–386; *Courage* 13–14), restricts the technique’s functionality (rendering it descriptively inexpedient): “As an element of self-training, writing has, to use an expression that one finds in Plutarch, an *ethopoietic* function: it is an agent of the transformation of truth into *ēthos*” (“Self Writing” 209). In his lectures, Foucault defines “‘ethopoetic’ knowledge (*savoir*)” as “knowledge which provides or forms *ēthos*” (*Hermeneutics* 238) qua “the subject’s mode of being” (*Hermeneutics* 238): “the subject’s way of doing things” is “his *ethos*. The Greeks had a very interesting word, which can be found in Plutarch as well as in Denys [sc. Dionysius] of Halicarnassus. It exists in the form of a noun, verb, and adjective. It is the expression, or series of expressions, of words: *ethopoiein*, *ethopoia*, *ethopoios*. *Ēthopoiein* means making *ēthos*, producing *ēthos*, changing, transforming *ēthos*, the individual’s way of being, his mode of existence. *Ēthopoios* is something that possesses the quality of transforming an individual’s mode of being. [...] We will keep more or

might be taken as a most precise taxonomic condensation of Aristotelian ‘entechnicity’ (see *Rhetoric* 14–15, 1355b, I.ii.2).

In Antiquity, one encounters this rhetorico-theatrical view of, and approach to, the concept of *personae* in the Roman arch-orator, who (among other uses) employs it for a lawyer’s arguing *in utramque partem*—here as an anticipatory technique for tentatively taking the perspective of the other (forensic) parties implicated.¹³¹ With a view to describing the virtual and vicarious procedure of

less to the meaning found in Plutarch [...]: producing *ēthos*, forming *ēthos* (*ēthopoiein*); capable of forming *ēthos* (*ēthopoios*); formation of *ēthos* (*Ēthopoia*)” (*Hermeneutics* 237). In so doing, he (underhandedly) reverses the diachronic, conceptual, and (above all) discursive dependencies. Foucault notes: “In Denys of Halicarnassus, the word *ēthopoia* is found in the sense of a painting of mores [...]. In Plutarch, however, the practical meaning is present [...] 153b” (*Hermeneutics* 245n.). He thus dismisses out of hand the reference to the rhetorico-literary scholar (see Dionysius “Lysias” 32–35, §8; as well as subch. 4.1, herein)—hence to the *téchne* the latter represents professionally. Foucault’s notion of the general term in question—inserted into the sequence “the management techniques, [...] the morality, the *ēthos*, the practice of the self” (“Freedom” 298)—is (almost) entirely philosophical *sensu stricto* (i.e. in terms of the scope allowed, the tendency presupposed, and his tacit omissions): “*Alētheia* becomes *ēthos*. It is a process of the intensification of subjectivity” (“Technologies” 239; cf. “Freedom” 293); “*ēthos* was a way of being and of behavior [...] for the subject, along with a certain way of acting, a way visible to others. A person’s *ēthos* was evident in his clothing, appearance, gait, in the calm with which he responded to every event, and so on. [...] extensive work by the self on the self is required for this practice of freedom to take shape in an *ēthos* that is good, beautiful, honorable, estimable, memorable, and exemplary” (“Freedom” 286; cf. “subject and truth”, 289). On the contrary, any variant of *ethos* involves a kind of adaptation (to communal *mores*, prevalent customs, cultural habits). In its more actively ‘poietic’ (crafty) forms with a view to an always (already) *alter*-related (‘conative’, to adopt Jakobson’s term, 67) self-representation, it includes (seemingly) taking up and tying in with, or (plausibly) impersonating common values, estimates, views generally held (humoring the narcissism of the recipients)—since such will seem utile in a given situation. An impression expedient under the spec. circumstances (expressive of, conforming to, communal assumptions) is crafted and projected to produce effects of recognizability and familiarity, and conduce to yielding (the appearance of) a (temporary) *consensus*. This approach presupposes that audiences will usually be susceptible of socio-moral (sc. gregarious) phenomena (ostensively) concerned with their self-interests.

131 Cf. Skinner: “Cicero’s immensely influential analysis centres around the term *persona*, [...] the mask that actors wore in the ancient theatre to indicate what roles they had assumed. When I speak or act for others, Cicero suggests, it is as if I put on their mask, in consequence of which I may be said to ‘bear’ or ‘sustain’ their person—to play their part, to act in their name” (“Representation” 161); “just as we may be said to have many *officia* or duties to perform, so we may be said to have many *personae* or roles to play” (“Representation” 162; 180n.). On ‘argument (always) also on the other side(s)’, see Mayfield (“Interplay” 15n.–16n.; “Otherwise” *passim*). Cf. Moos: “Die Argumentationskunst, deren Beherrschung im Streit Erfolg [...] verspricht, beruht auf der Kenntnis oder geistigen Präsenz aller möglichen Gesichtspunkte für

preparing for a lawsuit, Cicero has ‘Antonius’ state that, his client having “departed, in my own person and with perfect impartiality I play three characters, myself, my opponent and the arbitrator [‘Itaque cum ille discessit, tres personas unus sustineo summa animi aequitate, meam, adversarii, iudicis’]” (*De Orat. I–II. 274–275, II.xxiv.102*).¹³² Comparably, Quintilian counsels that a prospective orator learn roleplay from drama:

und wider einen Gedanken, [...] in der Ausbildung eines [...] allseitigen Problembewußtseins”; “in Ermanglung eines Opponenten”, one may “mit sich selbst einen fiktiven Disput [...] führen” (253, §63; cf. 410, §88). He notes “den experimentellen Dialog als Denkform [...] das eristische Als ob in der Wissensbildung [...] die hypothetische Ernstfall-Simulation [...] ‘Denken in Alternativen’” (253–254, §63; cf. 290–291, 290n., §70). Moos logs the nexus with the “*praeexercitamina*” (“der von der Spätantike bis zur frühen Neuzeit konstanten Progymnasmat-Praxis”): “Die Methode, aus Fiktionen aller Art, insbesondere aus fiktiven Konfliktsituationen denken und reden zu lernen, gehörte längst vor ihrer hochmittelalterlichen Blüte und Expansion [...] zu den Grundpfeilern des mittelalterlichen Bildungswesens, das im wesentlichen dasjenige der spätantiken Rhetorenschule fortsetzte. [...] dazu [‘gehörten’] auch Prosopoeien und Ethopoeien, erfundene Reden historischer Personen in denkwürdigen Entscheidungslagen (Suasorien *in nuce*)” (254, with 254n.–255n., §63; 256, 256n.). Cf. “Nicolaus [...] recommends practicing the exercise of *ethopoeia* in letter form, because one must take into account the character (êthos [...]) of *both* the sender *and* the recipient of the letter” (Lanham “Composition” 121). “The link between *ethopoeia*-theory and real letters is made explicit by Cassiodorus” (“Composition” 122). With Macrobius, John of Salisbury defends “erfundene[...] Gespräche[...] mit historischen Dialogteilnehmern: d[ie] platonischen Dialoge[...], de[n] *Somnium Scipionis* und d[ie] *Saturnalia*” (406–407, §88; with 407n., plus the relevant rhetorical terms). See subch. 5.1, herein. For ‘hypothetical anticipation’ from a philosophical angle (with reference to rhetoric), cf. Oesterreich (*Fundamentalrhet.* 83, 83n.), who mentions Kant’s ch. on the “*sensus communis*” (*Urteilkraft* 173–177, B156–B161[293–296], §40, I.i.2; here 173); cf. these formulations: “sich in die Stelle jedes anderen versetzt” (*Urteilkraft* 174, B157[294], §40, I.i.2); “an der Stelle jedes anderen denken” qua “erweiterte[...] Denkungsart” (*Urteilkraft* 175, B158[294], §40, I.i.2); “aus einem allgemeinen Standpunkte (den er dadurch nur bestimmen kann, daß er sich in den Standpunkt anderer versetzt) über sein eigenes Urteil reflektier[en]” (*Urteilkraft* 176, B159[295], §40, I.i.2). Lobsien reads the conclusion of the essayist’s “*Des Cannibales*” (“Je parlai à l’un d’eux fort longtemps”, *Essais I.* 410, I.31) as a *sermocinatio*: “Hier spricht, mit anderen Worten, Montaigne durch die persona des Besuchers aus der Neuen Welt. [...] [er] spielt den anderen” (136; “Bauchrednerisch”, 137); cf. Wells (251; 254; 258–260). In other words, (the vicariousness constitutive of) ventriloquism conduces to notional anticipation, (virtual) perspective-taking: “The exercise [of ‘*ethopoeia*’] was [...] devised to train the fledgling orator to put himself in his client’s place” (Altman 48). With regard to Early Modernity, said scholar states: “the student was taught to imagine himself in circumstances utterly unlike his own and to see with eyes other than his own” (45).

132 Where the Latin has “personas” for all of the above (including the speaker’s), Rackham trans. “person” and “characters”; such may serve as an indication of the alterity faced, hence of the issues involved, in the present respect. Writing well before the (rhetorically inapplicable)

I think he [sc. Menander, the comic poet] has even more to contribute to declaimers, because they have [...] to play many different roles [*plures subire personas*]: fathers, sons; [...] husbands; soldiers, farmers; rich men, poor men; the angry and the submissive; the gentle and the harsh. In all these, this poet preserves propriety [*decor*] marvelously. (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 288–289, 10.1.71)¹³³

Idealist essentialization of the term, Hobbes can plausibly refer to all three as “Persons” when trans. Cicero (*Leviathan* 112, I.xvi.80). Generally, cf. Currie: “the split between *patronus* and *cliens* parallels that of *laudator* and *laudandus* in epinician (Greek oratory lacks a tradition of advocacy)” (312); where it factually obtains, said ‘gap’ may be bridged by techniques of (notional, anticipatory) virtual vicariousness; see the Hobbesian uptake below (with n.). Apart from the several layers of *sermocinatio* in effect at the above point, and throughout Cicero’s treatise (featuring various *orationis personae* as expedient, poly-perspectival mouthpieces), the spec. setting is fundamentally dramatic: while the defendant to be is still present (hence for his benefit), ‘Antonius’ (or Cicero) initially impersonates the client’s (putative) forensic antagonist, in anticipation of the court case proper (cf. *De Orat.* I–II. 272–275, II.xxiv.102; on the speaker and context, 270–271, II.xxiii.97–98). For a variant of the above setup in Cicero, see Volkmann (280, I.i.28); cf. Oesterreich (“Polypersonalität” 78). On the diverse uses of the term “*persona*” in Cicero (including the above passage as the first cited), see Nédoncelle, listing (at least) seven (297–298). Oesterreich states: “Gemäß seiner theatralischen Ursprungsbedeutung und ihrer spezifisch rhetorischen Fortentwicklung versteht Cicero unter ‘Persona’ in Analogie zur Maske des Schauspielers zunächst die jeweilige ‘Rolle’, welche der Redner zu verkörpern hat, um auf den öffentlichen Foren der *res publica* erfolgreich agieren zu können. Von daher erschließt sich sein Personbegriff vornehmlich aus der Perspektive der glaubwürdigen Selbstinszenierung des Orators inmitten der öffentlich-politischen Lebenswelt. Dieses [...] auf die *res publica* bezogene römische Persona-Modell basiert auf einem durch das *Decorum* geregelten topischen Rollen-Repertoire, welches sich aus den Standardsituationen der politischen und gerichtlichen Rede, der Ämterlaufbahn und den Amtspflichten der staatlichen Behörden ergibt. Dementsprechend widmet sich die römische Redekunst [...] der artifiziellen Professionalisierung rednerischer Personendarstellung. [...] So schenkt der [...] Übungsbetrieb innerhalb seiner Suasorien und Kontroversien der Prosopopöie [...] besondere Aufmerksamkeit. Die Kunst der rhetorischen Persondarstellung wird hier durch die [...] Simulation [...] trainiert” (“Polypersonalität” 77). Oesterreich’s trying to square the latter with “Subjektivitätsphilosophie” (“Polypersonalität” 84) is fundamentally anti-rhetorical, and descriptively untenable—in that he consistently presupposes ‘the self’ (to be crafted first of all): the typical move of any Cartesianizing slant.

133 Cf. Russell (*Criticism* 10). Altman accentuates: “The cross-fertilization between drama and oratory is everywhere apparent” (49n.). “In the [...] rhetorical treatises of Cicero and Quintilian, examples of *ethopoeia* are often drawn from the tragic or comic actor, and the orator is urged to imitate the stage performer” (48–49). For nuances concerning the nexus of rhetoric and drama, see Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 490–491, 5.13.43), with Eden (“Refutation” 68). Quintilian refers to “Theophrastus” as “say[ing] that reading the poets is very useful for the orator”—and affirms this also with respect to *ethos* and the *prépon* (“ab his [...] in personis decor petitur”, *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 266–267, 10.1.27). On the import of the *aptum* in oratory, see Eden (“Lit. Property” 33–37), spec. “to *prepon* designates the chief excellence of style that Cicero will translate as *decorum*

That comedy can conduce to a feckful rhetorical ‘(auto-)impersonation’ (or ‘characterization’)—the redescribing (or crafting) and conveying of ‘selves’ (or *éthe*) likely to be plausible and advantageous in a given context—had also been indicated by Cicero, who accentuates that orators might learn from performers how to pick and play roles in keeping with their (tempo-corporal) capacities:

we should not let actors [‘scaenici’] display more practical wisdom [‘prudētiaē’] than we have. They select, not the best [‘non optimas’] plays [‘fabulas’], but the ones best suited to their talents [‘sibi accommodatissimas’]. (*De Officiis* 116–117, I.xxxi.114)¹³⁴

The ever requisite, particularly active and attentive acclimatization to contexts (hence the inevitable pluralization of roles) also includes the respective speaker’s elemental aptitudes. Moreover, all relevant terms are in the plural: the givens and contexts being contingent, many parts will be played.

[...] and that rhetoricians from antiquity through to the eighteenth century will consider the single most important standard of literary composition” (“Lit. Property” 35). Oesterreich notes the “vom Theater und der Rednerbühne auf das gesamte menschliche Leben übertragene, maßgebliche Ordnungsprinzip des Decorum” (“Polypersonalität” 77).

134 Cicero continues: “Those who rely most upon the quality of their voice [‘voce’] take the Epigoni and the Medus; those who place more stress upon the action [‘gestu’] choose the Melanippa and the Clytaemnestra [...]. Shall a player [‘histrio’] have regard to this in choosing his rôle upon the stage [‘in scaena’], and a wise man fail to do so in selecting his part in life [‘in vita’]” (*De Officiis* 116–117, I.xxxi.114). Noting a nexus with *pronuntiatio*—“[t]o perform a speech was to interpret it as the expression of a character in a drama” (314)—Christiansen refers to “the acting of plays as a preparation for oratory” (314). The scholar stresses *actio* throughout, and in a comprehensive sense: “The holistic practice of rhetoric in the schools [...] suggests that the principles of delivery apply to all discourse [...]; that delivery is not an expendable appendage of rhetoric, since all texts, both arguments and dramas, are embedded in a larger social drama” (318). On the Ciceronian theory of the four *personae*, see Fuhrmann’s reading (“Persona” 97–102), with spec. reference to the above: “Das Ganze der ciceronischen Darlegungen sucht den Einzelnen zur richtigen Rollenwahl und zum richtigen Rollenverhalten anzuleiten. Der Autor illustriert diese Absicht durch einen Vergleich aus der Sphäre des Theaters (I, 114)” (“Persona” 99–100). Generally, cf. Gill (“Personhood” passim; “Particulars” passim); Reiss (127–129), *cum grano salis*. Eden sees “Cicero’s *De officiis*” as “the most popular ancient philosophical text in early modern Europe” (“Acclaim” 51–52). As to the “anthropologischen Polypersonalismus Ciceros”, cf. Oesterreich (“Polypersonalität” 76–81; here: 76; spec. also: “die [...] rhetorikaffine und pluralistische Vier-Personen-Lehre”, 77); the critic does not seem to appreciate (see spec. “Polypersonalität” 79) that the Ancient writer’s arguing Stoico-ethically in *De Officiis* (hence along the lines, and as per the limits, of moral philosophy) is fundamentally at variance with a ‘technico-rhetorically affine’ view—the overall *ars* being supra-discursive, polyfunctional and transpersonal (sc. generally ‘impartial’, prior to particularization or ‘finitization’).

In the seventeenth century, Hobbes emphatically takes up the Ancient implications of the term at issue—in a chapter entitled “*Of PERSONS, AUTHORS, and things Personated*” (*Leviathan* 111, I.xvi.80).¹³⁵ His succinct remarks might be taken to reflect the Early Modern view more generally:

The word Person is latine: instead whereof the Greeks have *πρόσωπον*, which signifies *Face*, as *Persona* in latine signifies the *disguise*, or *outward appearance* of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and sometimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a Mask or Visard: And from the Stage, hath been translated to any Representer of speech and action, as well in Tribunalls, as Theaters. So that a *Person*, is the same that an *Actor* is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation; and to *Personate*, is to *Act*, or *Represent* himselfe, or an other; and he that acteth another, is said to beare his Person, or act in his name. (*Leviathan* 112, I.xvi.80–81)¹³⁶

135 Hobbes’ (legal) view of authorship (and delegation) follows shortly after: “Of Persons Artificiall, some have their words and actions *Owned* by those whom they represent. And then the Person is the *Actor*; and he that owneth his words and actions, is the *AUTHOR*: In which case the Actor acteth by Authority” (*Leviathan* 112, I.xvi.81).

136 See also Greenblatt (“Psychoanalysis” 221–223), albeit in a highly problematic context: if ideology may be described as a critic’s holding on to his mindset—qua normalized system of ‘seeing’ and ‘speaking’—even (or especially) when facing a blatant alterity, the twist in the tail of Greenblatt’s article will hardly prove surprising. The critic refers to the abovesited segment, glossing: “in Hobbes the ‘natural person’ originates in the ‘artificial person’—the mask, the character on a stage [...]. There is no layer deeper, more authentic, than theatrical self-representation. This conception of the self does not deny the importance of the body [...] authority is vested in an artificial person who represents the words and actions of the entire nation. All men therefore are impersonators of themselves [...]. A great mask allows one to own as one’s own face another mask. [...] for Hobbes there is no person, no coherent, enduring identity, beneath the mask; strip away the theatrical role and you reach either a chaos of unformed desire that must be tamed to ensure survival[,] or a dangerous assembly of free thoughts [...] that must—again to ensure survival—remain unspoken. Identity is only possible as a mask, something constructed and assumed [...]. In his conception of a person as a theatrical mask secured by authority, Hobbes seems far closer than Freud to the world of Shakespeare” (“Psychoanalysis” 222–223). With this segment—and irrespective of his attempt at salvage by making the case a matter of degree (cf. “closer”), rather than of inapplicability—the critic not only confutes the (declared) historicity and (descriptive) pertinence of his argument in said article, but also any of the (essentialist) claims with regard to what Greenblatt calls ‘self-fashioning’ (for a discussion thereof, see subch. 4.2, herein). Immediately after said auto-refutation, the critic continues in applying his terminology (and the latter’s implications) to Early Modern times: “identity”, “identity is fashioned”, “the prepsychoanalytic fashioning of the proprietary rights to selfhood” (“Psychoanalysis” 223); as well as the finalistic “notion that psychoanalysis is the historical outcome of certain characteristic Renaissance strategies” (“Psychoanalysis” 224). Contrast Børnstad, who—calling “for methodological sobriety” (5)—wishes “to complicate a story often too hastily told, [...] that of a linear development towards modern authorial consciousness and selfhood” (12). As regards (tacit) essentialisms, the often

The vicarious aspect is underscored in that Hobbes proceeds to cite Cicero's line: "*Unus sustineo tres Personas; Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis*, I beare three Persons; my own, my Adversaries, and the Judges" (*Leviathan* 112, I.xvi.80).¹³⁷ In reference thereto, Skinner confirms: "invoking the theatrical understanding of the issue that Cicero had [...] put into currency [...] this originally theatrical terminology was eventually generalised" ("Representation" 168; cf. "Persons" 160)—the sources being Greek, of course. A general awareness as to the rhetorico-dramatic, forensico-pragmatic concept in question appears to have been prevalent throughout Early Modern times; applied to the present, it may seem akin to what tends to be called a '(personal, public, corporate) image'.¹³⁸

Being explicit in the first part of the Greek compound '*prosopopoia*', the Ancient and Early Modern, rhetorico-dramatic concept of '*personae*' is indispensable to the present study and the phenomena described, since—as Quintilian observes (see *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50–51, 9.2.32)—it is always *de re*

concomitant (hence symptomatic) recourse to teleological construals pertain to the problem.

137 See Cicero (*De Orat.* I–II. 274–275, II.xxiv.102; with Nédoncelle 297); it is notable what Hobbes excludes from the quote. On vicariousness with regard to the above, see Trüstedt ("Novelle" 547–553; *passim*), spec. "Der Leviathan is ein Theater besonderer Art, in dem die Vertretbarkeit konstitutiv für jeden Agenten ist" ("Novelle" 551).

138 Cf. "Auch dort, wo sich der Begriff P[ersona] dem heutigen Verständnis der 'Persönlichkeit' nähert, indem er mehr die konstanten Eigenschaften eines Menschen als ihre gesellschaftliche Rolle meint, bleibt er von der Außenperspektive der sozialen Wahrnehmung bestimmt: Er weist dann auf das mehr oder weniger fixierte Bild, das sich die Gesellschaft von dem Einzelnen aufgrund wiederkehrender Verhaltensmerkmale macht, und entspricht somit etwa dem modernen 'Image'" (Boriaud/Schouler 805); *mutatis mutandis*, this description would also seem applicable to the Ancient use of '*ethos*'. For the basis of Modern sociology in the aforesaid respect, see Simmel (if prepared to quarantine any Idealist implications): "Das 'Spielen einer Rolle' [...] als das Einströmen des persönlichen Lebens in eine Äußerungsform, die es als eine irgendwie vorbestehende, vorgezeichnete vorfindet – dies gehört zu den Funktionen, die unser tatsächliches Leben konstituieren" (79); "meistens sehen wir eine präexistierende Form vor uns, die wir mit unserem individuellen Verhalten erfüllt haben" (80); "daß der Mensch ein vorgezeichnetes Anderes [...] darlebe oder darstelle, damit aber dennoch sein eigenes Sein nicht schlechthin verläßt, sondern das Andere mit diesem Sein selbst erfüllt [...] – das ist die Vorform der Schauspielkunst [...]. In eben dieser Bedeutung sind wir alle irgendwie Schauspieler" (80); "wir *tun* nicht nur Dinge, zu denen die Kultur und Schicksalsschläge uns äußerlich veranlassen, sondern wir stellen unvermeidlich etwas dar, was wir nicht eigentlich *sind*. Das ist freilich nicht, oder nicht immer, Darstellung nach außen um eines Effektes willen" (79). "Der Schauspieler ist nicht die Marionette der Rolle. [...] Die schauspielerische Kunstleistung ist selbst das Ziel des Weges und nicht eine Brücke, über die hin es zu einem weiterhin gelegenen Ziel ginge" (78–79). "Schauspielen ist keine reproduktive Kunst [...]. Reproduktiv ist ein Schauspieler, der einen anderen kopiert" (81). "Das Sein hat auf der Bühne nichts zu suchen"—"Being has no place on the stage" (77; trans. dsm).

implied in any form of rhetorical ventriloquism (regardless of the specific taxonomies respectively utilized). At once, ‘putting words into one’s own mouth’ (so to speak) will be conducive to selfcraft and -portrayal (the producing and projecting of *personae* and corresponding *éthe*).¹³⁹

Emphasizing the plane of application, the issues delineated in the above are to be taken up in part 4—where the facture involved in ‘*ethos*’ is described (4.1); and the focus on oratorico-dramatic selfcraft (‘*auto-etho-poïesis*’) is reaccentuated with a view to rhetorico-authorial self-representation (4.2).

3.4 Taxonomico-Conceptual Synopsis (Subchapters 3.1–3.3)

in verbis summa diligentia[.]
Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 276, 4.2.117)

While frequently reduced to *elocutio*, rhetoric comprises neither one of its *partes* only; nor is the overall *téchne* tantamount to a partisan (‘ideologically’ inflected) form of expression.¹⁴⁰ Its various diachronic *artes* conduce to a respective approach to, and view of, the world. The oratorico-dramatic term ‘*persona*’ evinces such a conceptually sedimented tendency *pars pro toto*. As Quintilian notes, its prevalence extends to all forms of rhetorical ventriloquism: “for we cannot of course imagine a speech except as the speech of a person”

139 Generally speaking, the instantial “say” (Lanham “Composition” 125) might be said to signal an *auto-sermocinatio*. The intratextual ‘Epictetus’—typically taken to be “speak[ing] *in propria persona*” (Dobbin 126)—makes copious use of (*auto*-)*allocutiones* in his diatribes, which are utilized in a virtually dia-, but factually monologic setting, and functionalized with a view to preemptive *reprehensio*; cf. e.g. “Epictetus, we”, and so forth—“Then it would be my part to say: ‘Men[.]’” etc. (*Disc. I.* 20–21, I.9.12 and 16). Montaigne talks to himself (and thus to his readers) by way of (*auto*-)*sermocinationes*: “When I have been told, or have told myself” (*Essays* 667, III.5)—then follow several sentences or phrases put into the mouth of others (and his own); *inter alia*: “You are too thick in figures of speech. [...] Here is a dangerous phrase’ [...] ‘Yes’, I say” etc. (*Essays* 667, III.5); generally as to the latter, see Eden (“Montaigne on Style” 392); cf. the scholar’s reference to “Montaigne’s pointed accusations of these unnamed adversaries” (*Rhet. Tradition* 102). On said technique, see the samples in subch. 5.1, herein.

140 Cf. Sprute: “Nach Aristoteles ist die Rhetorik eine Kunstlehre, die wie u.a. die Dialektik in moralischer Hinsicht neutral ist. Die Möglichkeit moralischer Qualifizierung ergibt sich für Aristoteles erst bei der Anwendung der an sich wertneutralen Technik” (281; 281n.; with *Rhetoric* 12–15, 1355b, I.i.13–14, I.ii.1). See Niehues-Pröbsting: “Rhetorik wurde im Lauf ihrer Geschichte immer mehr auf Stilistik reduziert” (“Glauben” 25); with Oesterreich, noting Kant’s (characteristic) ‘reductionism’ (*Fundamentalrhet.* 98–99). See Mayfield (“Interplay” 4n.–6n.).

(*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 51, 9.2.32).¹⁴¹ Said concept permeates the various rhetorico-poetic planes, pertaining to the *auctor* as much as to the protagonists into whose mouths words (or silences) are being put.¹⁴²

The ensuing taxonomic synopsis recapitulates the terms tentatively advanced, provisionally described, and applicatively utilized—taking as its initial guideline their (etymologico-)linguistic implications in the respective compounds and transliterations.¹⁴³ As always, scholarship is in the nuance.

141 See Sidney: “But heereto is replied, that the Poets gyue names to men they write of, which argueth a conceite of an actuall truth, and so, not being true, prooues a falshood. And doth the Lawyer lye then, when vnder the names of *Iohn a stile* and *Iohn a noakes* [sc. ‘John atte stile’, ‘John atten Oke’, *de re* equivalent to ‘John Doe’, ‘John Roe’] hee puts his case? But that is easily answered. Theyr naming of men is but to make theyr picture more liuely, and not to builde any historie; paynting men, they cannot leaue men namelesse. We see we cannot play at Chesse but that wee must giue names to our Chesse-men; and yet, mee thinks, hee were a very partiall Champion of truth that would say we lyed for giuing a peece of wood the reuerend title of a Bishop. The Poet nameth *Cyrus* or *Aeneas* no other way then to shewe what men of theyr fames, fortunes, and estates should doe” (185–186; 394n.; cf. Trimpi *Muses* 33n.; generally: 32, 34n.).

142 On conveying *ethos* via *prohairesis*, see Mansfield: “Machiavelli remarks in *Discourses* II 10 that Livy indicates his opinion by failing to mention something when one would expect him to mention that thing; it is possible, then, for an author to contrive a pregnant silence [...], which] consists in an obvious answer to a suggested question that one must have the sense to ask oneself” (*Modes* 10). Cf. “Zu den redenden Künsten gehört die schweigende”. Jean Paul” (Nietzsche *KSA* 7. 693, 29[142]; with 707, 29[186]). Blumenberg: “Ein Schweigen, eine sichtbare Unterlassung in einem Verhaltenskontext können so rhetorisch werden wie ein vom Blatt abgelesener Aufschrei” (“Annäherung” 407); see his reference to “die implikative, rhetorisch verschwiegene Voraussetzung” (*Sorge* 216). As Bakhtin notes, there are “various forms of silence” (*Speech* 149); cf. his modifying the dictum “*Things fraught with the word*” (*Speech* 162; “Methodology” 66) qua “fraught with the word and the potential word. The ‘unsaid’ as a *shifting boundary*” (*Speech* 163; “Methodology” 67). On *ethopoïa* by way of silence, see the remarks on Plato in subch. 5.2; as well as Gomperz: “Mitunter charakterisiert sich eine Figur durch das, was sie verschweigt, nicht viel weniger als durch das, was sie ausspricht” (*Griech. Denker* I. 421). Cf. Carey: “For the projection of *ethos* what is unsaid may be as important as what is said” (“Rhet. means” 38). He stresses omissiveness as an ethopoetic tactic—considering its (implicit) recourse to playing by the “tacitly accepted norms [...] of decorum”: “in practice this etiquette allowed a speaker credit for good moral character by refusing, implicitly or explicitly, to call a spade a spade. [...] The result is a sustained presentation of the speaker as a man who will not stoop to describe vile behaviour, and the effect is to create a rapport between speaker and audience and [a] commensurate gulf between audience and opponent” (“Rhet. means” 38). While a resp. “silence may become explicit” (“Rhet. means” 38), the opposite might be just as expedient (as the case may be); for a potential use of ‘digressions’ qua functional with a view to ‘obscuring’ matters ‘omitted’, see Carey (“Comment.” 117).

143 To accommodate the synoptic aims of the present précis, further references are given as expedient. Cf. Priscian’s concise *summa*: “Impersonation [‘A d l o c u t i o’] is the imitation of

The *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (subchapter 3.1) offers the term ‘*effictio*’ (also called ‘*charakterismós*’) for the device of vividly sketching and strikingly portraying primarily a *persona*’s exterior (usually sans attributed utterances)—with a discernible nexus to theatrical practice, especially comedy (and farce).¹⁴⁴ Accordingly, quasi-equivalents of this concept appear in Cicero and Quintilian as ‘*imitatio*’ (‘*mimesis*’), including advice against effecting affinities with mime (stressing the proximity *ex negativo*).

The term ‘*notatio*’ (otherwise ‘*ethopoïa*’) denotes an evocative, verbal (re)description and likely (re)presentation (that is to say, the crafting and projecting) of a *persona*’s familiar, habitual, characteristic marks (‘notable’ traits)—including, and especially, via attributed speech acts—thereby to render a complex (and contextually relevant, hence) ethopoetic portrait.¹⁴⁵

speech [‘*imitatio sermonis*’] accommodated to imaginary situations and persons [‘*ad mores et suppositas personas accommodata*’] [...]. This becomes personification [‘*c o n f o r m a t i o* (...) , *quam Graeci προσωποποιίαν nominant*’] [...] when the speaker is given a personality contrary to its true nature [‘*quando rei alicui contra naturam datur persona loquendi*’] [...]. There is also another part of this kind of figure [‘*Est praeterea s i m u l a c r i f a c t i o* , *quam Graeci είδωλοποιίαν dicunt*’], when words are put in the mouths of the dead [‘*quando mortuis verba dantur*’] [...]. Speeches of impersonation [‘*adlocutiones*’] can be addressed either to particular persons [‘*finitarum* (...) *personarum*’] or to indefinite [‘*infinitarum*’] ones; an example of a speech to an indefinite person would be the use of the kind of speech anyone might address to his family [...]. There are simple forms of impersonation [‘*Adlocutionum*’], as when one creates a speech as though he were speaking to himself [‘*supponitur aliquis ipse per se loquens*’]; and [...] double impersonations, as though he were speaking to others. [...]. Always [...] be careful to preserve the character of the persons and times being imagined [‘*Ubique autem servanda est proprietates personarum et temporum*’] (“*Fundamentals*” 64, §9; “*praexercitamina*” 557–558, §9, ‘*de adlocutione*’). “Always [...] adhere to a style suited to the imaginary speaker” (“*Fundamentals*” 65, §9; cf. López Grigera 95–96; 157, 157n.). See Baldwin’s overview (*Medieval Rhet.* 303–305), giving “*sermocinatio*” as “direct discourse”; “*effictio*” as “portrait”; “*notatio*” as “ethopoeia”; “*conformatio*” as “prosopoeia” (*Medieval Rhet.* 305).

144 Cf. “*Effictio*, or portrayal, is concerned with the externals” (McDonald 45). Quintilian calls this ‘*ethopoïa*’ (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 68, 9.2.58), which may lead to confusion. The apparent volatility of terms is often due to the set of problems inevitably incurred in translations: lacking equivalents in the target language; rendering of only one connotation pertaining to the term in the emitting context; more or less etymological, as opposed to rather liberal renderings; etc.

145 Cf. Isidore: “We call that figure ethopoeia, in which we achieve the expression of a man’s character [‘*in qua hominis personam fingimus pro exprimendis affectibus*’], age, interests [‘*studii*’], rank [‘*fortunae*’], pleasures, sex, habits [sic, misreading ‘*moris*’; Halm’s ed. has: ‘*maeroris*’, sc. sorrows, griefs], courage. [...] In this type of speaking these points must always be borne in mind: Who is speaking? In whose presence? About what? Where? When? [‘*quis loquatur et aput quem et de quo et ubi et quo tempore*’]” (“*Concerning Rhet.*” 95, XIV.1–2; “*de arte rhet.*” 514–515, XIV; cf. Baldwin *Medieval Rhet.* 97; Lanham “*Composition*” 121; 130).

With a view to describing cases of extraordinary and vehement passions, later theoreticians would coin ‘*pathopoeia*’ as a complementary term.¹⁴⁶

Isidore adds a short definition later: “E t h o p o e i a est, cum sermonem ex aliena persona inducimus” (“de arte rhet.” 520–521, XXI.32, instancing Cicero); it is preceded by “P a r r h e s i a” (“oratio libertatis”, “de arte rhet.” 520, XXI.31), followed by “E n a r g i a” (“rerum gestarum aut quasi gestarum sub oculis inductio”, “de arte rhet.” 521, XXI.33).

146 Distinguishing between *ethos* and *páthos*—cf. “Adiciunt quidam ἦθος perpetuum, πάθος temporale esse” (Quintilian *Inst. Orat.* 6–8. 48, 6.2.10)—Emporius adds *pathopoiia*: “Although impersonation [‘a d l o c u t i o’] is not the whole substance of the orator’s duty, still it is a major part of the material and is necessary in the preparation of all the material. Attitudes [‘Adfectus’] are [...] essential to all orations, and major attention must be given to the art of reproducing [‘imitandi’] them. Some there are who call this use of material *ethopoeia*, because it brings out [‘effingat’] the character [‘ethos’] or the emotional state [‘adfectum’] of the speaker” (“Ethopoeia” 33; “de ethopoeia” 561); “we should express in every phrase the life-style [‘mores’] of him whose words are being created [‘cuius verba fingenda sunt’]. [...] this kind of impersonation [‘adlocutionis’] [...] is called *ethopoeia*. *Pathopoeia* is also valuable, being an extension of *ethos*. Through it we also imitate those attitudes [‘adfectum’] which are not natural, but are cultivated [‘incidentem’]. [...] Some accident of mood [‘affectus’] often undermines one’s natural approach to life [‘morem’] [...] when a passing mood is predominant [‘cum incurrens praeponderabit adfectus’], then the process of imitation is called *pathopoeia*, although the native [‘ingeneratus’] character [‘adfectus’] is not completely eliminated still” (“Ethopoeia” 34; “de ethopoeia” 562). Iulius Rufinianus defines “Παθοποιία” thus: “Hac vel odium vel iracundia vel misericordia commovetur” (47, §36). Cf. Nicolaus: “Some ethopoeias are ethical, some pathological, some mixed” (165, §10.64); “ethopoeia is speech suiting the proposed situations, showing ethos or pathos or both [...] it is necessary to take account of the speaker and the one to whom he is speaking [...] one looks either to the universal or to what came from the circumstance [...] this is how ethos differs from pathos” (164, §10.64). Cf. Peacham’s definitions of *prosopopoeia*, *sermocinatio*, *mimesis*, *pathopoeia*. He gives “*Profopoeia*” as “the fayning of a perfon, that is, when to a thing fenceleffe or dumme, wee fayne a fit perfō, this figure Orators vfe as well as Poets, an Oratoure by this figure maketh the common welth to fpeake [...] and fometime they rayfe as it were the deade agayne, and caufe them to complayne or to witneffe that they knewe [...] and it is not only vfed of Poets and Orators, but also in holy fcriptures” (O.iiij.r). “*Sermocinatio*” is “when we fayne a perfon and make him fpeake much or little, according to comelineffe, very like to that before, whē the perfon which we fayne, fpeaketh al him felfe, then is it *Profopoeia*, but when we anfwere now and then to the queftyon, which he putteth vnto vs, it is called *Sermocinatio*, in this figure wyfedome and warineffe muft be vfed, that the fpeech may be agreeable, for the perfon that is fayned, and that it be no otherwife, then is lykely the fame perfon woulde vfe [...] Therefore in this place, it behoueth vs dilligently to confider the circumftaunces, both of persons, and thinges” (O.iiij.v; cf. Skinner *Forensic* 206; 258). Peacham adds: “Poets and Oratoures, haue alwayes bene dilligent in obferuing a comelyneffe” (O.iiij.r). “*Mimifis*” ensues, defined as “an immitation of fpeech, wherby we counterfeit not only what one fayd, but also vtteraunce and gefture, immitating euery thing as it was [...], feruing to the purpofe. To rehearce a wife mans words, and to immitate his modeft māners, caufeth great attentiueneffe, and bringeth much

The term ‘*notatio*’ is related to ‘*sermocinatio*’ (otherwise ‘*dialogismós*’, ‘*allocutio*’)—denoting the rhetorical expedient of ‘putting speech into someone’s mouth (in accordance with his received or conceivable *ethos*)’. This connects the device to drama and all dialogic genres.¹⁴⁷ The concept of ‘*distributio*’ may be considered affine (in that it indicates the allocation of roles); and similarly *subiectio* (*hypophorá*), which (deliberatively) anticipates an opponent’s probable rejoinders or objections.

Lastly, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* tenders the term ‘*conformatio*’ (otherwise ‘*prosopopoíia*’), which signifies the ‘fabrication’ of *personae* from non-(respectively no-longer-)human entities or notional abstract(ion)s—often (but not necessarily) including likely speech and action on their part.¹⁴⁸

delection to the hearers, for a cunning Orator will make a wyfe mans tale appeare very pithy and pleafant” (O.iiij.r). Finally, “*Pathopeia*” is “when the Oratoure mooueth the mindes of his hearers [...] of this there be two kynds, the fyrft is when the Oratour being moued with [certain ‘vehement’] [...] affections [...] doth apply and bend his speeche, to ftirre his hearers to the fame [...] this kynde is called imaginatiō [...]. The other is, when the Oratour by lamenting fome pittiful cafe, maketh his hearers to weepe, and also mooueth them to pittye, and mercy” (P.iiij.r). As Vickers notes, the term “*pathopeia*”—defined as “a form of speech whereby the Speaker moves the minds of his hearers to some vehemency of affection[.]” (*Defence* 331)—was also taken up by “John Smith” in “*The Mysterie of Rhetorique Unvail’d* (1657) [...], which had ten editions by 1721” (*Defence* 330). On ‘*páthos*’ and ‘*ethos*’ (the latter with reference to ‘*schésis*’ and ‘*héxis*’), cf. Scaliger (83, III.i; cf. 104, s.v. “MORES”, III.xx; also 122, III.xxxiii). With recourse to Quintilian, see Dockhorn (“*Kritische Rhet.*?” 268–270). Cf. Lausberg (*Handbuch* 141–144, §257). On the “distinction” between “*ethos* and *pathos*”, see McDonald (50–53; here 53), who gives this as having “an important effect upon the form and dynamics of all Stuart tragedy” (53); and “as of central significance in interpreting both the classical and Renaissance construction [...] and critical evaluation of drama” (83; cf. 86).

147 Cf. Bruss: “Arguably, all ethopoetic activity can be understood as dramatic, for all forms of *ethopeia* involve scripting words for another character” (56; the critic’s context is generally problematic: see subch. 4.1, herein). The nexus of ‘charactercraft’ with playwrighting will be in the vicarious, as well as the decidedly ‘poietic’, aspect.

148 Raising (‘re-forming’) the dead (in that state) to speech (acts) is sometimes referred to as ‘*eidolopoíia*’. Cf. “Ethopeia (*êthopoíia*) is an imitation of the character of a person supposed to be speaking; for example, what words Andromache might say to Hector. It is called personification (*prosôpopoíia*) when we personify a thing, like Elenchus (Disproof) in Menander and as in Aristides’ speech where ‘The Sea’ addresses the Athenians. The difference is clear: in ethopeia we imagine words for a real person, in prosopopeia we imagine a non-existing person. They say it is image-making (*eidolopoíia*) when we attribute words to the dead” (Hermogenes 84, §9.20; cf. Bonner *Declamation* 150; Baldwin *Medieval Rhet.* 34; Murphy “Habit” 67–68). Kennedy notes that, as to when the deceased “are imagined as coming back to life [...], Sopatros claimed this was ethopeia rather than eidolopoieia since the speakers were represented as alive. The best example of eidolopoieia in ancient oratory is probably Cicero’s

Quintilian (subchapter 3.2) condenses the range of concepts referring to ventriloquistic practices. He employs ‘*prosopopoeia*’ (loan translated ‘*factio personae*’) as the general and comprehensive term, wherein he expressly encompasses ‘*sermocinatio*’ (respectively ‘*adlocutio*’, qua ‘attributing speech’), seeing that ‘*prósopa*’ (*personae*) are inevitably (if latently) involved in all forms and variants of rhetorical ventriloquism. Quintilian’s decision seems to signal his general accent in that matter—apparently deprioritizing ‘*sermo*’ and ‘*ethos*’, here; or rather (and more likely), considering them comprised in the term ‘*persona*’ (see subchapter 3.3, as well as the overall chapter 4, herein).

In a semiotic respect, the aforesaid terms signal aspects of the oratorico-ventriloquistic phenomena under scrutiny, while none yields the entire range of nuances—this being one reason for their diversity, and their continuing utility.¹⁴⁹ Rather than adhering to the (often highly thetical) language regime of

evocation of the ghost of Appius Claudius Caecus in *Pro Caelio* 33–34; speeches by ghosts occur in Greek and Latin tragedy” (Hermogenes 85n.). Along these lines, the speaking specter of Hamlet the Elder (Shakespeare *Hamlet* 215–221, I.v.1–91; cf. 192–197, I.iii.189–258) would (metapoetically) be an *eidolopoïia*; *de re*, the second part of this compound is stressed in the verses: “If it assume my noble father’s person” (*Hamlet* 196, I.iii.244); “Thou com’st in such a questionable shape / That I will speak to thee. I’ll call thee Hamlet” (*Hamlet* 211, I.iv.43–44)—with a naming process that ‘personifies’ the phenomenon. Initially, it does not speak, as Horatio reports: “But answer made it none. Yet once methought / It lifted up it [sc. its] head and did address / Itself to motion like as it would speak” (*Hamlet* 194, I.ii.215–217); also with Hamlet, at first: “It will not speak. Then I will follow it” (*Hamlet* 213, I.iv.63). Cf. Plett: “The ghosts of deceased persons are [...] a favourite element in dramas of the Senecan type [...] – like the ghost of the murdered king in *Hamlet*” (*Culture* 288). As to *eidolopoïia* with a view to Senecan and English Renaissance drama, see McDonald (45; 121n.; 129–130, 132; 150; 212).

149 A (quasi) etymological approach is discernible in Aphthonius; he spec. accentuates the dominant ‘crafting’ involved: “Ethopoeia (*êthopoïia*) is imitation of the character by a proposed speaker. There are three different forms of it: apparition-making (*eidôlopoïia*), personification (*prosôpopoïia*), and characterization (*êthopoïia*). Ethopoeia has a known person as a speaker and only invents the characterization, which is why it is called ‘character-making’; for example, [...] Heracles is known, but we invent the character in which he speaks. In the case of *eidolopoeia*, the speaker is a known person, but dead and no longer able to speak [...]. In the case of *prosopopoeia*, everything is invented, both character and speaker, as Menander invented *Elenchos* (Disproof); for *elenchos* is a thing, not a person at all; which is why this is called ‘person-making’” (“*Exercises*” 115–116, §11.34R–45); cf. Altman (48; 49n.). The focus on the reception (“known”) as the decisive gauge is of central import, here (as elsewhere in rhetoric qua ‘poetics of effect’). See Kennedy’s assessment of the above passage: “Aphthonius thinks of *ethos* in Aristotelian terms as the presentation of moral character by a speaker through words and arguments. There are three species: *eidolopoeia* is a speech attributed to the ghost of a known person [...]; *prosôpopoeia*, the term used [...] by Aphthonius to mean personification of an imaginary or mythological character; and *êthopoieia* in the narrow sense

one theoretician only, the present study purposes to tie in with and employ the extant taxonomies *de re*—in their descriptive signifying potentials, including a scholarly regard for etymological implications and notional affinities.

As a specifically pertinent instance in said respect, *‘ethopoia’* thus refers to the contextual (socio-moral) concept of *‘ethos’*.¹⁵⁰ The latter is dependably associated with the dramatico-rhetorical term contained in *‘prosopoia’*. Conjointly, they imply that the speaker, who places words into the mouth of a certain (historico-)rhetorical *‘persona’*, effectually crafts “their characteristic diction” (Lausberg *Elemente* 143, §432; trans. dsm)—again foregrounding *ethos*.¹⁵¹ The focus in *‘sermocinatio’* will be on its first part (qua *‘speech, words,*

of personification of a historical character” (*New History* 205–206). The latter will seem problematic (certainly *de re*); while frequently encountered with respect to the concept of *‘ethos’*, the qualifying adjective “moral” is infelicitous, since it evinces an almost inevitable tendency to be misleading. Cf. also Devries’ concise *summa*: “following Aphthonius, we may define *ἠθοποιία* as the portrayal of the character of a known and living being, *εἰδωλοποιία* as the dramatic representation of a known but dead person, and *προσωποποιία* as the personification of a person or object entirely fictitious and non-existent” (9); as well as his more detailed outline: “Ethopoia is dramatic delineation of character, especially as displayed in speeches written for court by a logographer, who has studied and depicted in the thought, language and synthesis of the oration, the personality of the client who delivers the speech. It differs from *προσωποποιία*, or personification, in that the latter is the feigned speech of an absent party, or of an inanimate object treated as a person. [...] *εἰδωλοποιία* [...] is dramatic representation of the dead” (9). Contrast Süß (217). Given its misleading connotations, a use of the term “personality” will be problematic, in this context. Unlike Aphthonius’ accent, Devries’ choice of the words “delineation”, “displayed”, “depicted”, does not seem to sufficiently stress the craft involved; but the critic does signal the latter in the ensuing formulation: “The practical value of ethopoia as a tool in the oratorical workshop was as a means of persuasion” (12; cf. 13). M. Morgan also gives “*ἠθοποιία*” as “*delineation of character*” (“Intro.” xxx, §27; cf. xxxv, §31; “XXXII. Intro.” 156). Such may seem to deprioritize the art entailed, which may conduce to problematic presuppositions concerning a speaker’s (extratextual) ‘person’ being rendered in quasi-mimetic terms, as in M. Morgan’s construal: “His method was to study his client’s character quite as carefully as his client’s case, and to bring out that character in speech which he put into the client’s mouth [...] by suiting the speech to the speaker” (“Intro.” xxx, §26; cf. xxix). Consistency is a (rhetorico-linguistically induced) effect, and conduces to the impression of a ‘character’, which is a product, and of art. While Devries appears to proceed from a ‘mimeticist’ assumption, he does note the possibility of craft: “When his life affords no opportunity for this method of treatment, Lysias himself makes up such a character for his client” (14); cf. M. Morgan’s uptake (“Intro.” xxxi, §27); he also observes “characters so clearly and successfully drawn that they are [...] real to the reader” (“Intro.” xxxii, §28).

150 See the detailed n. in subchs. 3.3 and 4.1, herein.

151 This also explains why it might be termed *‘mimesis’* or *‘imitatio’*. Cf. Lausberg (*Handbuch* 408, §820–822): “*sermocinatio* [...] *allocutio* [...] ἠθοποιία [...] ist eine einer Person zum Zwecke ihrer Charakterisierung in den Mund gelegte ausgearbeitete Rede über einen beliebigen

discourse’)—an aspect usually implicit (to various degrees) in other nomenclatures. The term entails what the English (para)phrase (‘putting words into someone’s mouth’) also highlights—while simultaneously implying a (quasi) dramatic dynamization of voices (qua ‘conversation’, *dialogismós*).¹⁵² Like *allocutio* (a taxonomic variant stressing the directedness of said process by way of the prefix ‘*ad*’), the term ‘ventriloquism’ contains another Latin word for ‘speaking’ (‘*loqui*’); the latter uses a physical potential figuratively, in order to describe the techniques at hand.¹⁵³ On the whole, a heuristic value may be seen

Gegenstand. Es kommt darauf an, das dem Charakter und der Stimmung der betreffenden Person entsprechende πρέπον [...] zu treffen [...]. Die ἠθοποιία dient eigentlich der Zeichnung des ἠθοῦς, der dauernden Gemütsverfassung [...]. Darüber hinaus aber kann auch [...] [ein] πάθος [...] [der] betroffenen Person gezeichnet werden. [...] Die ἠθοποιία wird von der προσωποποιία [...] unterschieden, die unpersönlichen Dingen eine Rede in den Mund legt [...]. Die εἰδωλοποιία [...] legt Verstorbenen als Verstorbenen eine Rede in den Mund” (*Handbuch* 543, §1131–1132)—the qualification (“als Verstorbenen”) being significant.

152 Emphasizing its dynamic implications (here), ‘*sermocinatio*’ typically refers to a dialogic situation—cf. the Greek term ‘*dialogismós*’; the latter is still used in several derivations: Lausberg mentions French “*dialogisme*”, English “*dialogism*”, Italian and Spanish “*dialogismo*”, each with different shades of meaning (*Elemente* 143n.). Such a ‘*Zwiesgespräch*’ (to use the pertinent German loan trans.) may also take place with(in) oneself—this being Iulius Rufinianus’ take on ‘*dialogismós*’ (43–44, §20). Puttenham defines “*dialogismus*, or the Right Reasoner” (321, III.19) as follows: “We are sometimes occasioned [...] to report some speech from another man’s mouth [...], in which report we must always give to every person his fit and natural, and that which best becometh him” (320, III.19). The emphasis is on the ‘conferring’ involved; in other words: it is to sound plausibly like him or her to the given recipient—which need not necessarily be how what is reported factually took place (if it did). Frequently, the “report” will be fabricated entirely, e.g. “Vergil, speaking in the person of Aeneas” (320, III.19). While not using the term, Puttenham also subsumes what would amount to *eidolopoïia* under this figure: “if by way of fiction we will seem to speak in another man’s person, as if King Henry VIII were alive, and should say” etc. (320, III.19). Wigham’s/Rebhorn’s gloss *ad locum* seems insufficient (omitting the term adduced last), spec. in that they comment: “Why Puttenham translates the figure as ‘the Right Reasoner’ is obscure” (320n.). Knowledge of the tradition, especially the *progymnasmata* (which they also fail to mention in this respect), dispels the only ostensive issue: *dialogismós* (resp. *sermocinatio*) is particularly useful for the deliberative *genus*, and the corresponding declamatory exercises (*suasoriae*), which display a process of ‘reasoning’ in a dramatico-dialogic manner (also as virtually multipurpose and -part soliloquies). Generally, see Moos on “den experimentellen Dialog als Denkform” (253, §63; cf. 254, 256, 256n.). With regard to “*suasoria*”, Bonner notes that “the purpose of that exercise” is “to train the speaker in deliberative oratory”: “the object of a *suasoria* was ‘consilium dare’” (*Declamation* 53). Cf. Plett on “*Dialogismus*” in Puttenham (*Culture* 286n.). Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca wish to distinguish “the fictitious attribution of words to a person (*sermocinatio*) or to a group of persons engaged in conversation (*dialogism*)” (*New Rhetoric* 176, §42; cf. 176n.).

153 At the linguistico-formal level, the very signifier ‘*allocutio*’ may (incidentally) be

to inhere in all of these concepts.¹⁵⁴ A comparable use and prevalence may be

refunctionalized for exemplifying (in a quasi-performative manner) the accommodative assimilation *de re* involved in its signifieds. Quintilian (cf. *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 54, 9.2.37) has the unassimilated rendering; as do Consultus Fortunatianus (125, III.8), Emporius (“*de ethopoeia*” 561–562), and Priscian (“*praexercitamina*” 557–558, §9); in Halm’s ed., Iulius Victor has both variants (“*adlocutionem*”, 422, XV); the anon. “*Schemata Dianoeas*” have “*alloquimur*”, for instance (“*schemata dianoeas*” 71, §1). Scaliger uses the forms “*alloquutiones*”, “*alloquimur*”, “*alloquutiones*” (126, III.xlviii). Cf. the etymology of ‘ventriloquism’, defined as the “art of throwing one’s voice so that it seems to come from some source other than the speaker. 1797, formed as a descriptive noun to *ventriloquist* [...] the word has generally replaced the older *ventriloquy* [...]. 1584, formed from Late Latin *ventriloquus* [...] ([...] *venter* [...] + *loqui* [...]) [...] patterned on Greek *engastrímýthos*, literally, speaking in the belly” (Barnhart/Steinmetz 1198, s.v. ‘ventriloquism’); cf. “speaking so that the sound appears to come from somewhere other than the speaker” (Onions et al. 974, s.v. ‘ventriloquy’). For the figurative use, see the ensuing definition (the second s.v.): ‘*ventriloquism*’, “the expression of one’s views and attitudes through another / *especially* [...] such expression by a writer through a fictional character or literary persona” (Merriam-Webster “ventriloquism”). Generally, cf. Hodkinson’s formulation (infinitized): “characters are ventriloquized by the author of [...] mimetic dialogues” (556).

154 Nominally, Harvey uses said metaphor in her resp. volume (*Voices* *passim*), taking it spec. qua “male appropriations of the femine voice”—hence “transvestite ventriloquism” (*Voices* 1; cf. 4; 11; 12; 13; 32; 50–53; 118; 133), “accentuat[ing] the issues of gender, voice, and authorial property” (*Voices* 1). She has these variants (*inter alia*): “ventriloquistic cross-dressing” (*Voices* 2); “ventriloquizations” (*Voices* 5; 7; cf. 6, 141); “ventriloquizers” (*Voices* 9); “ventriloquized” (*Voices* 8; 9; 10; 11; cf. 13); “[v]entriloquizing” (*Voices* 9; cf. 116–139); “strategies of ventriloquism” (*Voices* 7; cf. 10; 11; 12)—plus a nexus with vicariousness: “Ventriloquism [...] is a [...] strategy of silencing, of speaking on behalf of another, of disrupting the boundaries of a propertied utterance” (*Voices* 142). Having mentioned the term “*persona*” and its ‘utility’ (cf. “useful”), Harvey discards it for being “neither historicized nor gendered as a theory” (*Voices* 3). She allows that “[w]e can no longer assume that the authorial ‘voice’ resides in the text to which a particular signature is affixed, or that a text is the same for different readers, or that there is a clear correlation between the gender of a body and the gender of a text” (*Voices* 5). Fueling—sans defusing (save by assertiveness: “our construal of transvestite ventriloquism [...] will nevertheless be contingent upon the intersection of three factors: gender, property, and the author”, *Voices* 12)—the objections to her take, Harvey declares: “the various authorial and cultural voices that inhabit these texts [...] undermine the illusory sense of closure and stability sometimes attributed to them. In this respect, ventriloquism and intertextuality overlap” and “destabilize[...] questions of origin, authorship, and ownership; an intertextual allusion opens a text to other voices and echoes of other texts, just as ventriloquism multiplies authorial voices” (*Voices* 10). It may not seem sufficiently clear how Harvey’s thesis might square with that last sentence; or this: “Ventriloquistic cross-dressing [...] transgresses the laws of gender, propriety, and property by undermining in a fundamental way the conventional relationships between author and voice, making visible in the process the radical contingency of poetic and authorial voice” (*Voices* 134; cf. “Sappho” 98). Enterline speaks of “ventriloquizing” (*Body* 3)—or derivatives (cf. e.g. *Body* 11; 20–21; 40; 87; 89–90; 181–183; 187; 195–197; “Shakespeare’s

noted for the oratorico-theatrical concept of *‘prósopon’* (*persona*)—being present (if latently) in all variants of the rhetorical attribution or ascription of speech (as Quintilian accentuates, *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50, 9.2.32).

ventriloquism”, 197; 224)—spec. by recourse to Ovid: “the poet who developed the art of female complaint in the *Heroides* into its own influential genre also gives us a narrator in the *Metamorphoses* who constantly engages in acts of ventriloquism” (*Body* 11; cf. 3: “Ovid’s penchant for ventriloquizing female voices”; 21, 40, 89; *Schoolroom* 79–80; 87–88); he “honed his art of transgendered *prosopopoeia*” (*Body* 21); his “trademark habit of ventriloquizing female voices – a rhetorical technique Quintilian calls *prosopopoeia*” (*Body* 40; 238n. refers to the orator, but sans discussion of the term, while her entire study is based thereon; cf. 48–49, 87). Enterline equates said concepts passim; together with an insistent essential- and biologism (plus psychoanalytical positivism), this leads to taxonomic construals such as “transgendered *prosopopoeiae*” (*Body* 40; cf. 87–88, 226). The critic’s idea of ‘ventriloquism’ (which takes up Harvey’s, see Enterline *Body* 233n.–234n.; 238n.) is substantialist, reductive (presupposing a historical author’s biological sexuality, deeming it present in virtual narrators, etc.), hence unrhetorical; more pertinent formulations (“efficient fictions for producing a convincing *effect* of gendered identity”) remain incidental (cf. “femininity effect”, *Body* 201). Enterline confesses to her essentialism outright: “It will be clear by now that throughout this book I view the voice as embodied” (*Body* 22)—apparently taking the term “ventriloquism” (also given as “the [...] act of ‘lending a tongue’”, *Body* 21) literally, instead of describing its factual virtuality; as a result, her claims to an entechnic take (cf. “the [...] rhetorical practice of ventriloquism”) will be void (*Body* 87; 164, 182, 195; they culminate in this contradiction in terms: “a psychoanalytic and historical account of the poem’s rhetorical practice”, 185). Cf. further essentialist jargon, such as the critic’s construal of “early modern representations of the self”, “subjectivity” (*Body* 2; cf. 164; “authorial subjectivity”, 55; 168, 180; “the subjects”, 61; “the self”, 93; 94, 164–165, 168; “identity”, 164)—presupposing, mono-lateralizing the latter (hence unable to describe a factual pluralism). While dealing with semiotized artifacts, Enterline premises a perceived author’s somatic status: “male authors took Ovid’s poetry as the *locus classicus* for their attempts to speak in or through the voices of women” (*Body* 21; referring also to Shakespeare). Such a slant inevitably leads to self-made contradictions: “part of the problem for clearly identifying the author-ventriloquist as ‘male’ is that this act of supplying a mute woman with a voice involves some form of *identification* with the victim” (*Body* 182; cf. 196–197). On the contrary, the vicarious taking of other perspectives is a technically transpersonal potentiality. As a result of her essentialist, anti-pluralistic presuppositions—precluding reciprocities and multilateralism as even conceivable—the critic spirits away the recipient’s position, decisive participation in the processes of perusal, appresentation. In general, functional (re)readings would be requisite throughout (spec. at *Body* 182). When, in the conclusion to her ch. on Shakespeare’s “Lucrece”, the critic incidentally arrives at descriptively pertinent, pluralistic formulations (cf. “several acts of lending a tongue [...] multiple [...] overlapping [...] various voices”, *Body* 197), it seems to be *malgré soi*—her positivistic-biologistic, psychoanalytico-essentialist jargon and premises being in the way. In her later monograph, Enterline’s affective bias produces the ensuing density of value judgments: “acts of poetic ventriloquism, in this [sc. Early Modern] period, could be at once profoundly moving and deeply enigmatic; and they therefore testify to the heuristic pallor of the term *persona*” (*Schoolroom* 29).

On the *agorá* and stage alike, the techniques in question are related to the forensically provisional, deliberative practice of arguing ‘also on the other side(s) of a given question’ (“in utramque partem vel in plures”, Quintilian *Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 156, 3.11.2).¹⁵⁵ With an anticipatory function (for instance), a speaker may vicariously adopt the viewpoint of his adversary—or any *alter*—and virtually simulate potential conduct or statements, in order to be prepared for

155 It is also of import during the *officium* of *inventio*. Cf. Cicero: “mihī semper Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetudo de omnibus rebus in contrarias partes disserendi [...] quod esset ea maxima dicendi exercitatio; qua princeps usus est Aristoteles, deinde eum qui secuti sunt” (*Tusc. Disp.* 154, II.iii.9)—stressing “consuetudo”, “usus”, the ‘habitualized’ praxis of *in utramque partem*; “discussing both sides of every question [...] because I found it gave the best practice in oratory” (*Tusc. Disp.* 155, II.iii.9). The ensuing offers an overview of the phenomenon’s pervasiveness, particularly in rhetorical contexts. Cicero puts these words in Crassus’ mouth: “we must argue every question on both sides [‘disputandumque de omni re in contrarias partes’], and bring out [‘eliciendum atque dicendum’] on every topic [‘in quaque re’] whatever points can be deemed plausible [‘quod probabile videri possit’]” (*De Orat. I–II.* 108–109, I.xxxiv.158). Cf. the reference to “debates [‘disputationes’] allowing copious [‘copiose’] arguments to be advanced both *pro* and *contra* [‘in utramque partem disseri’] in regard to the general question [‘de universo genere’]” (*De Orat. III* 84–85, III.xxvii.107); “we orators are bound to possess the intelligence [‘animos’], capacity [‘et vim’] and skill [‘et artem’] to speak both *pro* and *contra* [‘in utramque partem dicendi’] on virtually anything” (*De Orat. III* 85–87, III.xxvii.107); also translingually (Cicero to Atticus)—“disserens in utramque partem tum Graece tum Latine”—and linked to utility: “et τῶν προῦργου τι delibero” (*Atticus III.* 28, §173.3, IX.4). Apart from the above, Quintilian also uses these formulations (*inter alia*): “in utramque partem valent arma facundiae” (*Inst. Orat. 1–2.* 374, 2.16.10); “in utramque partem tractantur” (*Inst. Orat. 3–5.* 40, 3.5.5); cf. (embedded): “in utraque parte [...] probari” (*Inst. Orat. 3–5.* 500, 5.14.1); “cogitare [...] quid ex diverso dici possit” (*Inst. Orat. 3–5.* 490, 5.13.44); hence: “A good teacher [‘bonus praeceptor’] ought in fact to praise a pupil just as much for having a smart idea [‘acriter excogitavit’] for the opposite side [‘pro diversa’] as for having one for his own [‘sua parte’]” (*Inst. Orat. 3–5.* 490–491, 5.13.44). Generally, see Lausberg (*Handbuch* 51, §55; 62, §69). Sloane describes “a rhetorical cast of mind [...] [as] an insistence that one get down to cases, and – above all – a lawyerly willingness to argue both sides of a question” (“Education” 164; cf. 172)—stressing “Ciceronian and humanist *disputatio in utramque partem*” (“Education” 165): “The ancient alliance of rhetoric and two-sided argument is historically unmistakable” (“Education” 165). He notes: “even in the advisory *suasoria*[,] when no opponent is manifest[,], the speaker must still refute unspoken objections in his hearers’ minds – and rhetorical education trained him to do that by training him to play his own opponent’s role, requiring him to give voice to those objections through arguing the other side of the case in a *dissuasoria*. This centrality of *disputatio in utramque partem* is made abundantly clear by Quintilian” (“Education” 167); “rhetorical *inventio* [...] relies [...] on generating arguments with one eye on the opposition[; a]nd, in educational practice, on actually developing ideas on both sides of the question” (“Education” 174). Generally, see Mayfield (“Otherwise” passim).

the actual situation.¹⁵⁶ The aforementioned Ciceronian *locus classicus* is decisive, in this respect (“tres personas unus sustineo summa animi aequitate, meam, adversarii, iudicis”, *De Orat. I–II. 274–275, II.xxiv.102*).¹⁵⁷ Curtius stresses the applicability of this *praxis* in educational settings: “The student puts himself in the place of any well-known [or: familiar] persona[...] of the past[,] and deliberates the course of action” (78, §4.3; trans. dsm).¹⁵⁸ Such and similar taking of perspectives—respectively the (virtual) crafting or adopting of *personae*—as occurs in the various forms of rhetorical ventriloquism marks a practice of vicariousness (notional activity by proxy) that decisively links rhetoric and drama, while also highlighting a *nexus* with (predominantly) diegetic genres (such as historiography). Within the present study, the applicative part 5 (and specifically subchapter 5.2) tenders a diachronic and poly-perspectively *comparatiste* diversity of variants in said respects.

To conclude this synopsis, the ensuing descriptions—which Lausberg distills and formulates by recourse to assorted rhetorical traditions (and strands thereof)—may prove expedient:

156 Cf. “Die Anwalt-Rolle in der *declamatio* ist bereits der erste Schritt auf dem Wege zur ἠθοποιία = *sermocinatio* [...]. Die Konkretisierung der *sermocinatio* erfolgt dadurch, daß der Übende nicht als Anwalt, sondern als Prozeßführender, der sein eigener Anwalt ist, spricht” (Lausberg *Handbuch* 548, §1147)—causing a pluralization of perspectives (potentially, virtually, vicariously) taken (serially, quasi-simultaneously). Ottmers/Klotz give ‘*Sermocinatio*’—“in welcher der Redner vorgibt, die Rede eines anderen wiederzugeben oder einen Dialog mit ihm zu führen”—a certain “Sonderstellung unter den kommunikativen und appellativen Figuren”, adding: “In der *Sermocinatio* kann freilich auch die Meinung eines anderen Sprechers oder der Gegenpartei Ausdruck finden, wenn der Redner einen anderen Redner wörtlich zitiert”; and stressing its Ancient function as “eine von der eigenen Meinung abweichende Position einzunehmen” (191). As to “argumentative hypothesis”, Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca log that the orator “imagines what the behavior and reactions of each [...] would be in this fictitious situation [sc. which he ‘supposes hypothetically’] in order to deduce the correct behavior and reactions in the real situation” (*New Rhetoric* 146, §37; infinitized); referring to Ruyter, they link this to “utopia”, which “confronts reality with an imaginary presence” (*New Rhetoric* 146, §37).

157 See Hobbes’ reception (*Leviathan* 112, I.xvi.80–81); cf. Skinner (“Representation” 162; 168); generally, see Mayfield (“Interplay” 15n.–16n.); and subch. 3.3, herein. Cf. “the theme of the actor recurs in Cicero’s advice on appropriate styles [...] Cicero seems to presuppose a degree of awareness of one’s own actions, and of other’s reactions, that assimilates social life to a theatrical performance” (Gill “Personhood” 194).

158 In the absence of (reliable) records, and where featuring direct speech, historiography will be entailed; a writer may tentatively adopt the viewpoint of the (apparently) factual *personae* involved in a given setting—since, for instance, the (general) outcome is known (or has been ascertained to some degree of plausibility), while not the precise steps or process leading to it.

Serving for the characterization of natural (historical or fictional) person[ae], *sermocinatio* is the crafting [‘Fingierung’, hence also: simulation, fabrication] of statements, conversations [also: dialogs] and soliloquys or unstated notional reflections on the part of the respective person[ae]. (Handbuch 407, §820; trans. dsm)

In terms of content, *sermocinatio* need not be historically accurate [literally: true]; it must only be ‘verisimilar [‘wahrscheinlich’, likely, probable, credible]’, i. e. [it must] especially correspond to the character of the speaking person[a] [envisioned]. (Handbuch 408, §821; trans. dsm)¹⁵⁹

Ethopoeia as a literary exercise [...] transitions into literary forgery without the possibility of drawing a line of demarcation. (Handbuch 549, §1150; trans. dsm)¹⁶⁰

159 “Neque enim refert an [...] pro veri simili probabilem credibilemve dicamus” (Quintilian *Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 234, 4.2.31; cf. 244–249, 4.2.52–60). Cf. Mayfield (“Interplay” 10n.).

160 As to what one might call epideictic logography (taking advantage of the virtual vicariousness and delegative potentials inherent in ventriloquistic techniques), see Volkmann: “Der Archidamus des Isokrates ist ein Product der Kunstberedsamkeit, eine Prosopopoeie, d. h. eine Rede, die nicht wirklich gehalten, sondern einer bestimmten Person in den Mund gelegt ist. Derartige Reden finden sich nun zahlreich bei den alten Historikern von Thucydides an, und sie sind [...] nach denselben Kunstregeln gearbeitet, welche für die Anfertigung wirklicher Suasorien in Geltung waren. Solche Prosopopoeien wurden auch von bereits anerkannten Rednern vielfach zur Uebung angefertigt” (312, I.i.32). Blass (whose stance is hardly impartial) considers only the intratextual instance a variant of *prosopopoïa*: “Prosopopöie haben wir nur am Schluss des Archidamus; sonst überhaupt keine künstlichere Einführung von Reden Anderer, jenen unschuldigen Kunstgriff ausgenommen, dass er manchmal die in seiner Schule über eine Rede gepflogene Verhandlungen naiv erzählt und dabei manches sagen lässt, was er in eigener Person nichts sagen möchte” (*Beredsamkeit II.* 168; cf. 168n.); as to the latter, see subch. 5.1. The Isocratean passage in said speech for the Spartan is hedged: “if in imagination [‘ei tais dianoïais’] you could see your parents and your children standing, as it were, beside you” (“Archidamus” 410–411, §110). Generally as to the above, see Moos: “Wir werden immer in erster Linie fertige Ergebnisse der literarischen Praxis vergleichen müssen” (257, §63). Cf. Boriaud/Schouler: “Die Besonderheit der Chrie [*chreïa*] ist es, historische Personen in die [rhetorischen] Vorübungen einzuführen. Diese Eigenschaft hat sie mit bestimmten Formen der Ethopöie gemein. Es findet hier ein doppelter Prozeß statt: Das literarische Werk bereichert sich mit realen P[ersonae] der Geschichte, und die reale P[ersona] wird in die Welt der literarischen Schöpfung versetzt, wo sie sich inmitten rein fiktiver Ausführungen befindet” (793); see Moos (174–176, §48; 219, §59). Rhetorically, any *persona* and *ethos* crafted and projected will be an artful, ‘entechnic’ product. On ‘Diogenes’ in a comparable respect, cf. Mayfield (*Artful* 11–12; 19n.; 21; 30n.; 43; 57n.; 77; 309n.; passim; “Interplay” 21n.; “Talking Canines” 22; 23n.; 25; 27). As to “Biographies of saints” (“*Vitae*”), Lanham “think[s] it likely that” their “revision” (qua “stylistically [...] rewritten, prefaced [...] replaced”) “was also done as a school exercise to practice paraphrase, narrative, and ethopoeia” (“Instruction” 92–93). Generally, the Enlightenment took such and similar assumptions as a pretext for culling many (Ancient) anecdotes as ‘unhistorical’, claiming (e.g.) that the “Zuspitzung der Anekdote [...]

Rhetorical *personae* or *éthe* may be—and are factually—crafted as well as disseminated. In an “[e]pideictic” context (“genus ostentationi compositum”), Quintilian likens the orator to “a sort of salesman of eloquence [‘institor quidam eloquentiae’] [...] allow[ing] the customer to see [‘intuendum’] and almost handle [‘paene pertractandum’]” his rhetorical ‘produce’ (*Inst. Orat.* 6–8. 346–347, 8.3.11).¹⁶¹ Such craftsmanship in the realm of momentaneous *evidentia* might be seen in connection with *ethos*: ‘selves sell’.¹⁶²

‘nur exercitii gratia von Sophisten aufgesetzt worden’ [ist]. Diese aus Übungsgründen Dokumente fingierenden Sophisten spielen in der Theorie der kritischen Reinigung der Tradition eine große Rolle” (Blumenberg “Sturz” 49; here as to Bayle).

161 Cf. Martial: “vendere verba” (342, V.16.6). See Montaigne: “Étalé, il est à demi vendu”, “put on display, it is half sold” (*Essais III.* 345, III.x; *Essays* 783, III.10). Generally, Hacking notes: “advertising [...] is largely engaged in trying to make up people” (236).

162 In Gorgias, the “ἔγῶ” is mirrored phonetico-paronomastically in “γέγονεν” (754, 49.2).

4 Selling Selves. Variants of Rhetorical Selfcraft

Pure self seems to me an illusion; but a plausible illusion[.]
—Hollis (229; cf. 231)

and many fine names beside.
—Emerson (234)

[a]nd words and dogmas are other masks[.]
—Santayana (128; §30)¹⁶³

Aller Charakter ist erst R o l l e.
Die ‘Persönlichkeit’ der Philosophen — im Grunde persona.
—Nietzsche (*KSA 11. 438, 34[57]*)¹⁶⁴

Philosophical discourse cannot be anything else than [a] mise en scène of self.
—Kablitz (193; trans. dsm)

163 Cf. “it is not urged against cuticles that they are not hearts; yet some philosophers seem to be angry with images for not being things” (Santayana 131, §32; with Goffman 7, in the fm; cf. 64–65). See also Santayana’s various chs. on ‘masks’ (128–139, §31–33; 160, §38). The source of the above may (or will) be Nietzsche: “Jede Philosophie v e r b i r g t auch eine [...]; jede Meinung ist auch ein Versteck; jedes Wort auch eine Maske” (*KSA 5. 234, IX, §289*).

164 “Any [or: Every] character is [a] r o l e [,] first [of all]. The ‘personality’ of the philosophers — persona at bottom” (*KSA 11. 438, 34[57]*; trans. dsm). Cf. comparable remarks (*KSA 11. 577–578*), spec. “Wir enthalten den E n t w u r f zu **vielen** Personen in uns: der Dichter verräth sich in seinen Gestalten. Die Umstände bringen Eine Gestalt an uns heraus: wechseln die Umstände sehr, so sieht man an sich auch zwei, drei Gestalten. — Von jedem Augenblick unseres Lebens aus giebt es noch viele Möglichkeiten: der Zufall spielt i m m e r mit!” (*KSA 11. 45, 25[20]*); “Und wenn sich Einer tausend Male widerspricht und viele Wege geht und viele Masken trägt und in sich selber kein Ende und ‹keine› Horizontlinie findet” (*KSA 11. 656, 40[57]*; with Mayfield *Artful* 341–345). Cf. this passage on the *auto-partus* of metaphysics by way of essentializing linguistics: “ein Gedanke kommt, wenn ‘er’ will, und nicht wenn ‘ich’ will; so dass es eine F ä l s c h u n g des Thatbestandes ist, zu sagen: das Subjekt ‘ich’ ist die Bedingung des Prädikats ‘denke’. Es denkt: aber dass dies ‘es’ gerade jenes alte berühmte ‘Ich’ sei, ist, milde geredet, nur eine Annahme, eine Behauptung, vor Allem keine ‘unmittelbare Gewissheit’. Zuletzt ist es schon mit diesem ‘es denkt’ zu viel gethan: schon dies ‘es’ enthält eine A u s l e g u n g des Vorgangs und gehört nicht zum Vorgange selbst. Man schließt hier nach der grammatischen Gewohnheit ‘Denken ist eine Thätigkeit, zu jeder Thätigkeit gehört Einer, der thätig ist, folglich —’” (*KSA 5. 31, I, §17*). Contrast Ellrodt, who, as to Nietzsche (and his “admiration for [...] Montaigne”), speaks of “the plurality of the self” (7; 20n.), presupposing it (as throughout). For the philosopher’s reading of the essayist, see Kablitz: “Montaigne zählt zu jenen Autoren, die die Wertschätzung [...] Nietzsches genossen” (144; with further references, 144n.–145n.); cf. Mayfield (*Artful* 95n.; 202n.; 380).

In the first motto, a critic may seem to be playing the monolithic language game intermittently *en vogue* since Akhenaton, Plato (with Parmenides passing for the latter), or Paul of Tarsus (to name but the more time-worn): the decisive phrase being “to me”; the advantage of the ‘illusory’ that there are so many of them.¹⁶⁵

Otherwise, a pluralistic neo-Nominalism will be preferred, proceeding from Blumenberg: “While the names for this center of being [‘Daseinsmitte’] may well have changed – initially: image of God, imperishable soul, later: Reason, then: personality, finally: character, consciousness” (*Literatur* 101–102; trans. dsm)—the terminological festivities are verily open-ended, with anyone free to bring their own concoctions; some time in the twentieth century, a critic apparently felt like home- or micro-brewing “Pure self”.¹⁶⁶

Such wholesale will hardly seem all that noteworthy, save for his doing so in an article entitled “Of masks and men”—placed in a joint monograph on *The category of the person* (in *Anthropology, philosophy, history*), taking its cue from a seminal Maussian essay of 1938. Whereas the latter (as per its reception) will likely be deemed notable indeed, the most significant aspect of the volume it prompted nearly fifty years later may seem to be a prominent absence (not only in its title)—while clearly not all that conspicuous to its contributors.¹⁶⁷

Even so, said latency does not appear to be out of the ordinary; in an article expressly on Ancient oratory indeed, one might still read: “Socrates represented so many and differing images to his contemporaries that modern scholars must

165 Calling for a “reconsideration” of rhetorical “*ethos*”—in the process of which “selfhood, as a category, comes under question” (xvii)—Baumlin tenders this diachronic synopsis of an enduring state of affairs: “with a few striking exceptions, Western intellectual culture has tended to embrace the [...] *philosophical* model of selfhood over the ‘social’, dramatic, or *rhetorical* model. Western culture [...] has largely identified itself with the tradition beginning with Plato [...] and developed by Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant—all of whom treat the self as a moral, metaphysical, and ultimately, theological category (rather than as a function or effect of verbal behavior). An alternative, sociolinguistic model is only occasionally affirmed—by Aristotle [...], by the sophists Gorgias and Protagoras, by [...] Machiavelli and Montaigne, by Nietzsche” (xviii); while “Western culture asserts the existence of the self as a philosophical category, its own literary and rhetorical practice confirms quite the opposite” (xx).

166 Generally, Kablitz notes that the latter may be thought of as being replaced by language: “Philosophiehistorisch betrachtet läßt sich dieser Perspektivwechsel als eine Umbesetzung der Funktionsstelle beschreiben, die in der Kantschen *episteme* das Bewußtsein einnahm. An dessen Stelle tritt nun die Sprache” (117). As to the above, cf. Blumenberg: “Die Namen dirigieren uns” (*Sorge* 89; 91). “Die Tyrannei der Namen ist darin begründet, daß sie einen Ruch von Magie behalten haben: Umgang mit dem Unbegriffenen zu versprechen” (*Sorge* 92).

167 In Mauss’ essay (*passim*), as well as throughout the resp. volume (cf. Carrithers et al. *passim*), rhetoric is passed over—and quickly relegated in Momigliano’s brief mention (89). For a pertinent reaccentuation in expressly rhetorical terms, see Baumlin (xix–xx; xxii).

continue to seek the ‘real’ person” (Thomas/Webb 3).¹⁶⁸ Apart from an apparent displacement of the fact that said “images” are in effect mediated by second or third (to say nothing of further removed) parties, the end-focused assertion will seem problematic for reasons of method and tendency (hence fundamentally).¹⁶⁹

Habitually skeptical of such essentialisms as ‘unchangeable Being’, ‘stable subject’ (see “μέμνησ’ ἀπιστεῖν”, *KSA* 11. 487, 34[196]), Nietzsche rhetorico-dramatizes philosophical *auctoritas*—a take one might extend to authorship in general. It may be likely to have affinities with donning various masks; with crafting, honing, projecting ‘images’ for public display; with putting words into the mouths of said *personae* (*auto-sermocinationes*, so to speak). The structural position of ‘auctor’ generally (or ‘rhétor’ and ‘playwright’ specifically) forms part of a text’s (respectively an oration’s or drama’s) economy: a role assumed or expected to exist, a function to be filled (if tacitly).¹⁷⁰ Reciprocally and

168 Gill’s take is comparably problematic (cf. “Question” 471–472); while nuanced, this also applies to De Temmerman/Emde Boas (“Intro.” 4–5; spec. 5n.; 11; 13). Kennedy believes: “The *Apology* of Plato and a similar work by Xenophon are reconstructions of what Socrates said, or might have said, at his trial in 399 B.C.” (*New History* 64); though the phrase signaling (a poetic use of) contingency may seem to mitigate matters, the term “reconstructions” all but urges misconceptions—spec. since the critic repeats it as to oratorical “speeches” (even intensifies the issue by adding the phrase “after the fact”, *New History* 65; cf. 68). Contrast Niehues-Pröbsting’s warier formulation (emphatic of *sermocinatio*): “Schließlich hat Platon fast seine gesamte Philosophie dem Sokrates in den Mund gelegt, so dass es unmöglich ist, zwischen dem, was davon historisch auf diesen und was auf ihn selbst zurückgeht, zu unterscheiden. Doch besteht kein Grund, daran zu zweifeln, dass Platon dem historischen Vorbild das Ethos seines Protagonisten verdankt” (*Die antike Phil.* 67). In its inductive thrust, the latter is not a Platonizing argument: for such would probably (have to) presume that ‘the idea Socrates’ is supratemporal. Niehues-Pröbsting may seem to be arguing along basically Aristotelian lines, by emphasizing that certain forms of elemental *hypolépseis* always tend to obtain (including in ethopoetic *praxis*)—wherefore they will be plausible, hence must be reckoned with.

169 Referring to a Montaignian context, see Cave: “Socrates himself, the oral man, has to be mediated to us by his friends and disciples” (*Cornucopian* 305; cf. 308); and spec. with the ensuing qualification against taking an effect as a cause: “Socrates, the natural man, is itself a product of art” (*Cornucopian* 311). As Prins demonstrates with respect to another notorious (textual) *persona* of (Greek) Antiquity, there are alternative approaches: “Rather than reclaiming Sappho’s ‘original’ voice, I approach the Sapphic fragments as simultaneous cause and effect of translation. [...] it is the performance of translation itself that ensures Sappho’s afterlife” (37). Baumlin’s relevant caveat will be in effect: “To say that a text has ‘voice’ [...] is to resort to a fundamentally incarnationist metaphor[,] in which the text ‘speaks’ as a unified, consistent, self-present consciousness” (xxiii). Being a decidedly rhetorical device, *prosopopoiia* has frequently been utilized to generate various *metaphysicae*.

170 As to “the image of self projected” (204), Goffman logs: “When an individual appears before others, he knowingly and unwittingly projects a definition of the situation, of which a

bilaterally, an authorial *persona* pertains to the impressions and (rhetorical, literary, dramatic) experiences on the part of any (given or potential) receiving party—irrespective of (historical) accuracy (to say nothing of ‘Truth’).¹⁷¹

conception of himself is an important part” (234–235; cf. 204). “It is always possible to manipulate the impression” (243; cf. 20)—the vector being to “sustain” it (225). While this is a trans-discursive phenomenon, a genre’s rhetorical contours will reflect back onto the resp. *persona*. Schulz-Buschhaus logs a “wechselseitige Abhängigkeit [...] zwischen morali(sti)schen Argumenten und poetologischen wie rhetorischen Formen”; “[D]iskursgebunden[heit]”; and “Möglichkeiten zur Selbststilisierung [...], die dem lyrischen Ich etwa in der [...] Renaissance-Dichtung zur Verfügung stehen. Auch hier erweist sich, daß gerade die moralischen Konturen, die das Ich annimmt, jeweils mit den rhetorischen Gegebenheiten der verschiedenen (petrarkistischen, burlesken [...] horazisch-satirischen) Genera zusammenhängen” (246). For a similar set of (narratological) issues, cf. De Temmerman/Emde Boas (“Intro.” 4–5).

171 The notion of an authorial, authoritative *persona* will be of spec. import when (as is often the case in Ancient, Medieval times) works (or mss.) were ascribed to a well-known author, and read—hence copied, later reprinted—(solely) due to that name. Aware of a misattribution, modern criticism might tend to neglect the resp. texts, based on their (apparently) being contrived—inverting the effect in so doing, while in fact (if tacitly) retaining the argument from authority. The *Rhet. ad Her.* is a relevant case—dependably attached to a notorious name for more than a millennium: “The fact that the treatise appeared, from Jerome’s time on, as a work by Cicero gave it a prestige which it enjoyed for over a thousand years” (Caplan “Intro.” vii–viii; *Eloquence* 2; cf. 2n.). For (logographic) oratory, cf. Blass: “an Lysias’ Hinterlassenschaft, wie an die [...] ander[er] [...], [‘haben sich’] [...] unechte Reden angeschlossen” (*Beredsamkeit I.* 353–354; cf. 375–377). See Grube’s wording re “*On Style*”: “The manuscript tradition attributes it to Demetrius” (110). In such and similar cases, the authorial *personae* pertaining to a set of texts seem to have been deemed compatible (to some degree); generally, the factual reception (citation, allusion, emulation) will prevail. See Foucault’s meta-analysis (with neo-Nominalist affinities): “an author’s name is not simply an element of speech [...]. Its presence is functional [...] serves as a means of classification [...] can group [...] a number of texts [...] differentiate them from others [...] establishes different forms of relationships among texts. [...] that [...] texts were attached to a single name implies that relationships of homogeneity, filiation, reciprocal explanation, authentication [sic], [...] common utilization were established among them. [...] the author’s name characterizes a particular manner of existence of discourse. [...] [it] is not to be [...] consumed and forgotten; [...] its status and [...] manner of reception are regulated by the culture in which it circulates. [...] the name of the author remains at the contours of texts—separating one from the other, defining their form, [...] characterizing their mode of existence. It points to the existence of certain groups of discourse and refers to the status [there]of [...] within a society and culture. [...] the name of an author is a variable that accompanies only certain texts to the exclusion of others. [...] the function of an author is to characterize the existence, circulation, [...] operation of certain discourses within a society. [...] books or texts with authors [...] are objects of appropriation” (“Author” 184); “discursive [...] returns [...] tend to reinforce the enigmatic link between an author and his works. A text has an inaugural value precisely because it is the work of a particular author, and our returns are conditioned by this knowledge” (“Author” 191–192). While the art seems to be passed over here (and routinely

A writer will not only be seen to craft texts (including vicariously, on behalf of others), but also (and concomitantly) to insinuate a polyfunctional, (more or less) ‘characteristic’ image—usually several, multifaceted (public) ‘faces’ over time, or simultaneously—for underwriting, intensifying said effect: by seeming recognizable, (even) familiar; by appearing consistent or to be speaking from a position of authority; and via other means (and to ulterior ends), as well.¹⁷² With selective recourse to intratextually sedimented signals (as well as, typically, any other contingent source), such *personae*—and their associated *éthe*—are also in large part constructed by a diachronic readership (including by simply deeming them likely).¹⁷³ It is not only an ‘elemental (or source) self’ under variation that, in its capacity as physical *auctor*, (decidedly) crafts and conveys the impression of ‘public *prósopa*’ through a particular textual information policy; but also the (transtemporal) recipients, who take up and read a nominally ‘identified’ writer (or voice) in considerably diverse ways—syn- and diachronically.

Over the course of the past centuries, such processes have yielded myriad and dissimilar portraits of the (authorial) *personae* customarily referred to as ‘Lysias’, ‘Shakespeare’, ‘Cervantes’ (for instance). Tying in with subchapter 3.3, the latter two will be considered in 4.2. The ensuing deals with the Greek arch-*rhétor*, who—via the mediation (and due to the assessment) of the Ancient comparatist Dionysius—is particularly renowned for variants of *ethopoïia*.¹⁷⁴

rejected later), the philosopher’s otherwise pertinent account may require a rereading in rhetorical terms. See the n. on Foucault’s construal of *ethopoeia* in subch. 3.3, herein.

172 Cf. Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 122, 3.8.12–13; 280–281, 4.2.125); with Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 16–17, 1356a, I.ii.3–6; 168–171, 1377b–1378a, II.i.1–7); Dionysius (“Lysias” 60–61, §19). Volkman has: “Ethos ist [...] eine [...] sich gleichbleibende [...] Haltung [...], die in der [...] Ausdrucksweise des Redners hervortretende [...] Gesinnung, welche im allgemeinen dem Sinne seiner Zuhörer entspricht und bei ihnen den Eindruck hervorruft, dass sie es mit einem [...] wohlwollenden Manne zu thun haben” (273–274, I.i.28; value judgments quarantined); “ἦθος” is “das Charakteristische der Darstellung” (562, III.54). Cf. “forms of typification are [...] instrumental in generating authenticity, credibility [...] persuasion” (De Temmerman/Emde Boas “Intro.” 9). With “Rhetorik II 1”, Schüttrumpf states: “Die Selbstdarstellung des Charakters des Redners als ein Mittel im Zuhörer eine Überzeugung zu schaffen, hat Aristoteles von älteren rhetorischen Theorien übernommen. [...] Eine solche Übernahme einer vorgeprägten Wendung sehe ich auch in Rhetorik II 13” (33). See the n. in subchs. 3.3. (above), 4.1 (below).

173 In case the author pertains to what has tended to be called ‘world literature’—qua having been read, if to intermittent degrees (of intensity), over several generations, in various cultures, or even (quasi-)globally. Generally, see Auerbach (*Weltliteratur* passim; “World Literature” passim); Küpper (*Approaches* passim; “Remarks” passim; “National Lit.?” 35, with context).

174 See Bonner: “The extensive use of comparative criticism was one of the most promising departures made by these Augustan critics [sc. ‘Caecilius’ and ‘Dionysius’]” (*Lit. Treatises* 9–10; cf. “the great predominance of the comparative method”, 62).

4.1 Dionysius of Halicarnassus on ‘*ethopoeia*’ (with a view to ‘*evidentia*’ and respect to ‘*decorum*’)

intueri ex ipsis operibus[.]

—Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* 1–2. 404, 2.20.8)¹⁷⁵

in [...] literary criticism, he was a hard and assiduous worker.

[...] He united most effectively philological with rhetorical studies.

He was at once a scholar and a critic. Thoroughness was his watchword.

—Roberts on Dionysius (47–48)¹⁷⁶

In the ensuing, a close reading of select passages in Dionysius’ treatise “Lysias” will serve to illustrate the particular nexus between *evidentia*, *decorum*, and *ethopoeia*—while also linking the latter to various forms of vicariousness.¹⁷⁷

175 Cf. “Dionysius’s main message in each case was ‘Read the orator’” (Usher “Intro.” xxi)—followed by comparing and contrasting: “For many things which appear fine and admirable when considered on their own turn out to be less good than they had seemed when they are set side by side with other things that are better” (Dionysius “Pompeius” 357, §1; cf. Bruss 47n.).

176 “Dionysius had a[...] [‘practical’] aim [...] bound up with the exercise of his profession as an active rhetorician in the metropolis. He was not a solitary worker” (Bonner *Lit. Treatises* 11). His “basic concern, like [...] Isocrates[’] [...], is with the social function of rhetoric” (Conley 44). If graced with a Humanist’s sense of humor, see Norden, (symptomatically) claiming “daß mir der von vielen bewunderte Kritikus Dionys ein äußerst bornierter Kopf zu sein scheint” (*Kunstprosa I.* 79, I.i.iv). What cannot be spirited away, Norden ascribes to others: “Das Gute, ja Ausgezeichnete, was er enthält, hat er aus den feinen Erörterungen eines Theophrast” etc. (*Kunstprosa I.* 80, I.i.iv); “er [hat] sich aus allen das Beste zusammen gelesen und daraus ein neues Gewebe gemacht [...]. Daß wir ihn [...] trotzdem öfters werden nennen müssen, verdankt er nicht sich, sondern seinen Quellen” (*Kunstprosa I.* 81, I.i.iv; cf. 82). Norden outperforms himself in li- or labeling ‘Dionysius’ as “ein[en] Mann, den die Musen bei seiner Geburt mit zornigen Augen angeblickt haben” (*Kunstprosa II.* 884–885, II.Anhang.I.viii). Süß alike: “Die verwaschenen Kunsturteile des Dionys sind höchstens für ihn selbst charakteristisch” (219n.).

177 To précis: the Dionysian “Lysias” is a rhetorical tract and ethopoetic portrait. It evinces a nexus between *evidentia*, the *aptum*, *ethopoeia*—while illustrating, practicing the latter. The present study covers §1–15, focusing on §7–9 (“Lysias” 20–53, §1–15; spec. 32–37, §7–9). Such adheres to the text, in that §16 opens: “Having completed my discussion of the virtues and the elements of Lysias’s style, I shall now consider him in relation to the forms of debate which must be studied by an aspirant to public life” (“Lysias” 53, §16)—giving the function (*docere*), and the envisioned addressees, of the overall tract. With the exception of §19 (see below), its remainder (“Lysias” 52–99, §16–34) cannot be dealt with *en détail*, here. For readings of Lysias through, or with reference to, Dionysius, see Blass (*Beredsamkeit I.* 388–407); Devries (9–17, spec. 11, 14–15); M. Morgan (“Intro.” xxx–xxxvi, §27–32; he largely relies on the former *passim*; cf. xxxi–xxxii, §27–28, with n.); Bruns (432–434, with 433n.; 439); Bonner (*Lit. Treatises* 43–48; 98; 100–101), *cum grano salis* (Romanticist value judgments); Harding (202); Bakker (“Lysias”

After a biographical sketch, and assigning to Lysias the (stock) rhetorical virtues of *puritas*, *perspicuitas*, *brevitas*, Dionysius proceeds to the description of the *rhétor*'s capacity for 'vivid description' ('enárgeian', "Lysias" 32–33, §7), "characterisation ['ethopoïian']" ("Lysias" 32–33, §8), observing "propriety ['tò prèpon']" ("Lysias" 34–35, §9)—all conducing to his marked "quality ['areté']": Lysian "χάρις" ("charm"), said to be "beyond description and too wonderful for words" ("Lysias" 38–39, §10), an *ineffabile* effected in and by speech.¹⁷⁸

409–410; 416); De Temmerman/Emde Boas ("Intro." 6); Bruss (*passim*). Contrast Süss (10–12, spec. 11). Wisse's take may seem ambivalent (57–58; 58n.; 64)—perhaps due to a taxonomic bias: defining the term in question as "the need of making the client speak 'in character'" (32), he declares that "the word *ethopoïia* [...] will be avoided as far as possible" in his study (5).

178 For a synopsis of the "virtues", see Russell (*Criticism* 137). Dionysius commends Sappho's "eloquence ['εὐέπεια'] and charm [χάρις]" ("Composition" 198–199, §23). On *enárgeia*, cf. also Hermogenes (86, §10.22; with Kennedy's gloss, 86n.). Dionysius proffers a *percursio* of the steps taken: "I shall [...] summarise the virtues of style [...] I have assigned to him: purity of language ['tò katharòn'], correct dialect, the presentation of ideas by means of standard ['kyrion'], not figurative expressions; clarity ['saphéneia'], brevity ['syntomia'], concision, terseness, vivid representation ['tò hypò tàs aisthéseis ágein tà deloúmena'], the investment of every [...] ['prósopon'] with life and character, the pleasing ['hedonè'] arrangement ['synthéseos'] of words after the manner of ordinary speech, the choice of arguments to suit the [...] ['prosópois'] and the circumstances of the case, the ability to win over ['tò pithanótes'] and persuade ['tò peistikòn'], charm ['cháris'] and a sense of timing ['kairós'] which regulates everything else" ("Lysias" 45–47, §13). As to the initial virtues, Dionysius logs Lysias' linguistic 'purity' (see this density: 'katharós', 'tò kathareúein', 'katharótatos', 'katharos', "Lysias" 22, §2); his using "standard ['kyrion'], ordinary ['koinon'], everyday ['en méso keiménon', sc. lying in the middle] language" ("Lysias" 24–25, §3); his "lucidity ['saphéneian']" ("Lysias" 28–29, §4; also *ex negativo*: 'saphéneia', 'asaphe', 'saphès', 'tò saphés', 'saphéneian', 'tou saphos', 'asapheias', in the same §4); and (linked thereto) Lysian "brevity ['tó (...) brachéos']"—of both "expression" and "subject-matter" ("Lysias" 28–29, §4–5). Cf. "He [...] combin[ed] brevity with lucidity; the secret of his success being his refusal to allow the matter to be slave to the manner" (Bonner *Lit. Treatises* 44). The "terseness and concentration", "the brevity ['tèn brachýteta'] of Lysias", his "manner of expression in which ideas are reduced to their essentials and expressed tersely" ("Lysias" 30–31, §5–6) is repeatedly stressed—leading to Dionysius' contrasting Demosthenic speech as "labored and harsh" ('periérgos kai pikros', "Lysias" 31–32, §6) with Lysias' "limpid simplicity" ('leukos', 'aphelos', "Lysias" 30–33, §6). See Vives: "non una fuit Atticismi facies"—giving "Lysias" as "*macilentus, et textura tenui*" (134–135, R3.v–R4.r, II; with Quintilian *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 170–171, 9.4.17; Webster 78). Cf. Blass: "Kürze charakterisirt wesentlich Lysias' Stil: [...] nicht Gedrängtheit, sondern Magerkeit" (*Beredsamkeit I.* 393; cf. 399, 411–412). For the effectuality of said impression, see Quintilian: "if the orator's only business were to give information ['docere'] one could ask for nothing more perfect" than "Lysias" (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 292–293, 10.1.78; cf. Blass *Beredsamkeit I.* 391n.; 390–391). Said (taxonomic) sketch is to evince Dionysius' crafting conceptual densities by iteration with (grammatical, lexical) variation. The first three qualities seem linked (*de re*); synoptically, cf. Lausberg on the "*virtutes elocutionis*"

In the present context, the focus will be on the decisive affinity and inseverable nexus—accentuated by sequence, hierarchization, taxonomic interrelation—between the triad of capacities ascribed to the arch-*rhétor*.¹⁷⁹

of “*puritas*” (“*Latinitas*”, ‘*hellenismós*’)—including “*consuetudo, usus*” (*Elemente* 44–45, §103–104)—“*perspicuitas*” (*Elemente* 50, §130). See Carey’s functional, historico-cultural, rhetorico-literary contextualization, arguing that it is with a view to “avoiding a glaring inconsistency between the professions and style of the litigant[,] and facilitating concealment of rhetorical devices within the speeches”, that the logographers—‘reacting’ “to the grand style” of Gorgias—“opted on pragmatic grounds for a style [...] less obviously removed from the Greek spoken by [...] the audience”: “Lysias belongs to this reaction” (“Intro.” 7). Blass logs “[d]ass Lysias sich bewusst in diesen diametralen Gegensatz zu Gorgias gestellt hat” (*Beredsamkeit I.* 389). Cf. Lamb: “We may well believe that he [sc. Lysias] found little or no use for the jingling epigrams of Gorgias [...]. The mere limitations of the time allowed to the speaker, and the constant endeavour to produce an impression of sincerity, would naturally preclude any scholastic pomp of words or phrases” (“Intro. [Lysias]” xvi). Cf. M. Morgan (“Intro.” xxx, §26; xxxiv, §29). On Lysias qua logographer, see also subchs. 2.1 and 5.2, herein.

179 See Devries for the nexus (the rest *cum grano salis*): “The difference between τὸ πρέπον, or appropriateness, and ἠθοποιία is not clear at first. [...] Dionysius states that τὸ πρέπον concerns the character of the speaker, [...] audience and [...] speech. [...] the two terms are almost, if not quite, synonymous. [...] the sphere of ἠθοποιία is more restricted than that of τὸ πρέπον, [...] the former [...] is [...] a subdivision of the latter. [...] ἠθοποιία is also closely allied to [...] ἐνάργεια” (11); “τὸ πρέπον” is “of prime importance as the ultimate origin of the distinctive characteristics of this orator [sc. Lysias]. [...] ethopoia is linked in closest union with τὸ πρέπον” (16). See M. Morgan (“Intro.” xxxv, §32). On the relation of τὸ πρέπον and ethopoia in the *progymnasmata*, cf. Lanham: “The larger rhetorical principle being stressed in this exercise [sc. ‘ethopoia’] is *decorum*” (“Instruction” 111). Contrast Carey: “Dion. Hal. *Lysias* 9 [...] sees to *prepon* solely in terms of style” (“Rhet. means” 44n.). Bruss notes a tendency to see a “connection between *ethopoia* and faithful representation”: “character-drawing is akin to dramatic portraiture” (35). “The emphasis on dramatic characterization continues in later accounts of *ethopoia*” (43). “Descriptions of *ethopoia* in [...] Greek *progymnasmata* [...] emphasize faithful portrayal” (36). “*Ethopoia* and *prosopopoeia* appear [...] in the [...] *progymnasmata* [...] these writers differ somewhat in their description of characterization, [but] all of them emphasize plausible imitation rather than persuasive proof through character. [...] Although character dominates such portrayals, it is not likely the same as the persuasive *ethopoia* created by Lysias” (44). She tries to delimit the latter from the former—which severance hinges on a (strictly) ‘mimetic’ construal of the *prépon* (cf. spec. 45–46)—and so fails to take into account the governing aim of effectuality: what appears apt will seem (hence be) plausible; the familiar is *eo ipso* (more) credible; one cannot sever propriety from persuasiveness. Yet Bruss’ purpose is “to produce a clearer understanding [of] *ethopoia*, particularly in Dionysius’s *Lysias*” (38); she “promote[s] a clear distinction between senses of *ethopoia*”, “propose[s] that the characterization Dionysius describes can be understood most precisely as persuasive *ethopoia*, the function of which is to create trustworthy speaker-centered *ethos*” (37); “when Dionysius speaks of *ethopoia*, the ‘character’ in character-making is persuasive *ethos*” (42). The latter cannot be detached from what is deemed ‘appropriate’ at a given time (sc. the contingency of the *aptum*)—to say nothing

“Vividness [‘enárgeian’][...] consists in [...] conveying the things” an orator “is describing to the senses [‘aisthéseis’] of his audience”—produced via artful description: “it arises out of his grasp [‘lépseos’] of circumstantial detail” (“Lysias” 32–33, §7).¹⁸⁰ By way of ‘likeness’ (‘eikòs’), this promotes or facilitates the receiving party’s ‘taking up or tying in with’ (‘hypolépsetai’) the (notional) impressions insinuated or effected: the recipient “can see the actions which are being described going on”, apparently “meeting face-to-face [‘parousin’] the characters [‘prosópois’] in the orator’s story” (“Lysias” 32–33, §7; cf. 46–47, §13)—*personae* crafted precisely to be vividly envisioned (*evidentia*).¹⁸¹

of the fact that Bruss’ thesis and her choice of terminology might be taken to imply that what she conceives of as the other and separate variants of *ethopoíia* would not be “persuasive” (which must seem untenable, considering the directedness of the overall *téchne*).

180 Volkmann glosses: “d. h. doch wohl aus der Gabe der lebendigen Auffassung der für die Gegenstände charakteristischen Merkmale und deren Wiedergabe durch geschickte Rede [...]. Sie hängt [...] mit der [...] Virtuosität dieses Redners in der Kunst der Charakterzeichnung, der *ἠθολογία*, zusammen. Wir haben es bei der *ἐνάργεια* gleichsam mit einem kunstvollen Gemälde in Worten zu thun” (442, III.46). While the nexus with *evidentia* must be upheld against such construals as would sever these interwoven Dionysian segments, Volkmann’s positing an ‘external portrayal of character’ (in place of its ‘*poiein*’) seems reductive; proceeding from a largely (if not exclusively) aesthetic (rather than forensico-pragmatic) estimate of the Lysian orations, Volkmann appears to assume that the orator’s spec. capacity is *ethología* (qua *charakterismós*), not *ethopoíia* (with Rutilius’ terminology): “Gerade durch die lebendige Anschaulichkeit der Schilderung, durch die lebensgetreue Darstellung der dabei auftretenden Personen ist die Erzählung des Lysias so meisterhaft, oft [...] von vollendeter Schönheit. Man nehme [...] die Erzählung der ersten Rede, die mit köstlichem Humor gewürzt ist, oder das herrliche Bruchstück, welches Rutil. Lupus I, 21 als Muster feiner Charakterzeichnung aufbewahrt hat” (163, I.i.13). Volkmann’s gloss on the latter reads: “Als *ἠθολογία*, denn so ist bei ihm zu lesen. Die Ethologie (synonym mit *χαρακτηρισμός*) ist das, was wir Charakteristik, Charakterbild nennen [...], und darf mit der Ethopoeie nicht verwechselt werden” (163n.–164n.; see Rutilius 12, I.21; with Halm’s gloss, 12n.; cf. Süß 218, in a highly problematic context).

181 To be speaking of ‘*prosopopoiiai*’ would seem pertinent here (*de re*). The text continues: “And he will require no further evidence of the likely [‘eikòs’] actions, feelings, thoughts or words of the different persons” (“Lysias” 32–33, §7). The immediacy of impression produced by *enárgeia* may be said to effect something akin to what Blumenberg terms ‘momentaneous evidence’ (see e.g. “Möglichkeit” passim; spec. 10–12; 15; 26; also *Arbeit* 533; *Selbstverständnis* 111; 122–123; 124; *Quellen* 43; *Beschreibung* 161; *Lebenswelt* 180; *Lebenszeit* 114; 127; 137; 139; cf. Mayfield *Artful* 48n.; 92, 92n.; 256n.)—which effectually renders other forms of ‘proof’ (virtually) irrelevant. The Dionysian comment cited at the onset of this gloss may seem to be an especially abysmal remark in what is (after all) a forensic context also. For comparable instances in said respect, see Küpper (“Düstere Welt” 184n.; Mayfield “Talking Canines” 23n.).

enárgeia, the specific technique for the oratorico-dramatic ‘crafting and projecting of *ethos*’ is guided by the rhetorically universal gauge of relative propriety (see Herrick 136; contrast: Süß 218)—a dependable groundswell of the art, in that it warrants a maximal degree of probable efficacy with respect to the given circumstances (audiences, viewers).¹⁸³ Generally speaking, ‘*ethopoïia*’

vocally to the drama as it unfolded on the stage. Any sensible orator should take this situation into account. Clarity and consistency about the main events of the case, as well as the characters involved, were of crucial importance, and too much complexity was to be avoided” (“Lysias” 411); “the *corpus Lysiacum* reveals a consistent methodology in characterization. Lysias prefers clarity to complication” (“Lysias” 426; cf. 427). The oratorico-dramatic nexus will not seem incidental. As regards affinities between play- and speechwright, see Bakker’s ensuing formulation: “Lysias makes his speakers portray themselves, as well as their opponents” (“Lysias” 412). Generally (and with reference to Dionysius), Bonner gives *ethopoïia* as “character-drawing” (*Lit. Treatises* 42; 44), “character-representation” (*Lit. Treatises* 44), “portrayal of character” (*Lit. Treatises* 45), “character-portrayal” (*Lit. Treatises* 46). Bruss stresses: “One of the first extant works in which the term *ethopoeia* appears is *Lysias*, written by [...] Dionysius [...] in the first century BC” (34). In conceptual respects, cf. subch. 3.3, herein.

183 Demoting the pragmatico-forensic context, its needful (vital) adapting to givens (charges), Süß construes: “Lysias läßt die ἦθη reden, nicht wie es gerade ihr ἦθος erfordert, sondern wie ihnen der Schnabel gewachsen ist” (218). Carey believes: “In the matter of *ethos* Lysias goes far beyond the establishment of the good moral character necessary for credibility. He also makes extensive use of ‘dramatic’ character, termed by modern scholars *ethopoïia*” (“Intro.” 10). “Usher [...] rightly argues that Dionysios when praising Lysias’ *ethopoïia* (*Lys.* 8) meant moral character. Dionysios treats dramatic characterization under ‘vividness’ and ‘propriety’, *Lys.* 7, 9” (“Intro.” 10n.). Said claim seems to be based on a (forced) severance of three sequential Dionysian paragraphs interrelated at a thematic level—plus a formal nexus of taxonomic signifiers in transition from §7 to §8 (in consecutive sentences): “ἦθη” (“Lysias” 32–33, §7, on “Vividness”), “εὐπρεπεστάτην”, “ἠθοποιῖαν” (“Lysias” 32, §8). Usher’s giving the latter as “characterisation” (“Lysias” 33, §8) may appear to be spiriting away the ‘*poiein*’ involved. His choices in trans. the terms crucial to his construal seem problematic: rather than as ‘trait’ (or ‘imprint’), “χαρακτήρ” is given as “nature” (“Lysias” 34–35, §8); the variants of ‘*prósopon*’, found in all three segments (“πρόσωποις”, “Lysias” 32, §7; “πρόσωπον”, §8; “πρόσωπων πρόσωπα”, 36, §9), are trans. as “characters”, “person” (“Lysias” 33, §7, §8), “characters” (“Lysias” 37, §9)—whereby Usher changes his nomenclature precisely in §8, on *ethopoïia*. Yet it is also here that ‘*personae*’ are (*ex negativo*) referred to as having “character or vitality” (“οὐδὲν εὐρεῖν [...] πρόσωπον οὔτε ἀνηθοποίητον οὔτε ἄψυχον”), whereby §7–9 are dependably linked at the taxonomic level (via the reference to dramatico-rhetorical ‘*prósopa*’); cf. a later, affine segment (“Lysias” 60, §19). As Usher’s gloss for the first sentence of §8—stating that “ἠθοποιῖα never means individual or personal characterisation” (“Lysias” 33n.)—might render patent, the critic’s tacit premises, hence his scales, are (post-)Cartesian, Kantian (even Romanticist). In most (and likely all) of its variants, the Greek conception of ‘*ethos*’ refers to contextual (customary, socio-moral) factors (aspects, phenomena), which inevitably suggest something ‘typical’; but the same holds good for the oratorico-theatrical notion of *prósopa* (*personae*)—as

might be said to signify a ‘contextually effectual charactercraft’—the ‘*poiein*’ of ‘*ethos*’, with respect to a contingent ‘*prépon*’ and a view to ‘*enárgeia*’.¹⁸⁴

opposed to the (Platonically inflected, Stoicizing, Christian) essentialism of ‘the person’ (see subch. 3.3, herein). Sans Idealist premises, and with respect to (rhetorico-poetic) technique (as well as *de re*), there will hardly be a descriptive difference between an orator’s (resp. philosopher’s, etc.) producing, projecting an *ethos* in ‘staging’ himself; a logographer’s performing the same procedure vicariously (on behalf of a client); a playwright’s (or any writer’s, including all of the above) comparable process when putting words into the mouth of (potentially or factually performed) dramatic (or diegetic) roles—counting an actor’s possible performance thereof, giving voice to such rhetorico-poetic ventriloquisms; see Quintilian’s nexus of *histriones*, speechwrights, (oratorical) “declaimers”, “advocates” (*Inst. Orat.* 11–12. 28–31, 11.1.38–42; here: 29, 11.1.38–39). If said (and similar) practices and their effects are considered to be ‘essentially’ different, such a (metaphysical) construal will neither be taking into account, nor be made on the basis of, the craft involved (hence be tantamount to an ‘untechnical’, ‘nonrhetorical’ estimate). To return to Carey—after having endorsed Usher’s position, he may seem to invalidate the latter (*de re*): “By fitting the speech to the character of the speaker, Lysias both hides his own role [...] and builds a consistent character-outline for the speaker which enhances the plausibility of the statements he makes about himself. In the same way, Lysias sometimes creates a consistent picture of the opponent’s character [...]. It is possible that Lysias was inspired in such cases by the actual personalities of his clients. But it is more likely that these are dramatic creations. [...] the delineation of character was so conceived by the ancients” (“Intro.” 10). The latter—with the gloss *ad locum*, referring to Aristotle (“14088a25ff.”), to all three related paragraphs in Dionysius (“*Lys.* 7–9”)—plus Carey’s accent on the craft involved (“builds”, “creates”, “creations”), on an analogy of method (“[i]n the same way”), do not seem to square with the previous endorsement of Usher’s severing what he construes as ‘*ethopoia*’ (in a narrow, moralizing sense of *ethos*, unemphatic of the ‘*poiein*’) from ‘dramatic characterization’. At once (like Usher), Carey seems to proceed from essentialist premises; cf. “actual personalities” (“Intro.” 10); “the real personality of the speaker” (“Intro.” 11). His fluctuating use of “personality” (qua ‘historical’ being, but also as a type, role) seems problematic (“Comment.” 62; 89; 90, by parallelism equated with “character”; 147; 183; spec. 211; also: “Rhet. means” 29; 36; 41; 42; 44n.); “*persona*” (“Comment.” 62; 66; 99; 106; 211; cf. “Rhet. means” 36; 39) would be more descriptive (in any case).

184 See the conceptual caveats in subchs. 3.1, 3.3. In discussing the ‘entechnic’ *písteis* (“τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸ πάθος καὶ τὸ ἥθος”), Dionysius speaks of Lysias’ “constructing proofs from character [ἔκ τῶν ἡθῶν]”. He [...] makes us believe in his client’s good character by referring to the circumstances of his life and [...] parentage, [...] by describing his past actions and the principles [προαρέσεων] governing them. And when the facts fail to provide him with such material [παρὰ τῶν πραγμάτων], he creates his own moral tone [αὐτὸς ἠθοποιεῖ], making his characters [τὰ πρόσωπα] seem by their speech to be trustworthy and honest [τῷ λόγῳ πιστὰ καὶ χρηστὰ]” (“*Lysias*” 60–61, §19; a trans. as “moral tone” will be misleading). Bruss glosses: “The influence of Aristotle’s theory of *ethos* is unmistakable in this passage” (41; with 38–40, 39n., 41n.). “Dionysius was thoroughly familiar with the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle” (Usher “Intro.” xi). Contrast Wisse (57–58; 58n.). Cf. further mentions of the logographer’s ‘*ethopoietic*’ art: “He credits them with [...]; he makes them voice [...] introduces them as [...] represents them as [...]

It is by virtue of (and with regard to) “thought [‘dianoías’], language [‘léxeos’] and composition [‘synthéseos’]” that the orator will perform the verbal redescription, (partial) modulation of a (rhetorico-theatrical) *ethos*—an (apparently) habitual, acquired disposition (in contextual, socio-moral terms), which is to be rendered pertinent to the “πρόσωπον” (forensically, a client’s public ‘image’) staged, conveyed in a likely manner (“Lysias” 32–33, §8).¹⁸⁵

ascribes to them every” thing as may “ἥθος φανεῖν” (Dionysius “Lysias” 60–61, §19). Bruss observes: “Lysias’s speeches [...] possess recognizable character and are presented in a lifelike and animated manner. Dionysius [...] defines *ethopoieia* [...] as a stylistic virtue aimed at creating a persuasive and lifelike sense of character” (38–39; cf. 50–52). “Lysias’s characters are deemed lifelike [...] on the degree to which they sound unscripted. [...] animation [...] is an ideal of persuasive *ethopoieia*” (56). The terms used (“recognizable”, “sense of”, “deemed”, “sound”) entail a recipient (which Bruss apparently tries to spirit away throughout). It is with respect to a given audience or reader that the craftedness is not to show; sans context, *celare artem* is point- and aimless; being a received impression, the appearance of ‘artlessness’ will always be (culturally, temporally) contingent. See the n. below, subch. 4.2, and part 6, herein.

185 Cf. Devries (14), *cum grano salis*. Contrast Süss (216–222; spec. 220–221, where his claims do not square with the Dionysian text, for which he faults the latter; see 222–225). On the nexus of *lógos* qua *ethos* seeming *eikós*, cf. “the thoughts” Lysias “ascribes to his clients” are “worthy, reasonable and fair, so that their words seem to reflect their good moral character [‘hóste eikónas einai dokein ton ethon toús lógous’]” (Dionysius “Lysias” 32–34, §8). The trans. gives an (implied) ‘*quale* (resp. *qualis*) *sit*’ (“good moral”) as stated—backed by a gloss claiming that *ethopoiia* signifies “favourable characterisation, portraying the moral qualities which will win the audience’s good will” (“Lysias” 33n.). Crafting the likeness of a client’s general disposition is to conduce to such a valuation. In its overtness, the trans. arguably spirits away the (not only forensically) decisive nuance that hardly any (and surely no artful) *rhétor* will state the aforesaid outright; rather, the judge or jury are to arrive at this (insinuated) impression as if on their own—to their minds, and ‘ideally’ sans any awareness as to this processuality even. See Dionysius’ formulation of Lysias’ ‘artful artlessness’ (“Lysias” 34–35, §8); also the n. below, subch. 4.2, and part 6. On “the inclusion of [...] material” not directly related to a case’s “main issue”, Carey logs: “the most important factor is cultural. [...] the Athenians viewed the trial within the lives of the parties, the judges and the community as a whole” (*Trials* 18); it was vital “to project a character which invited trust”, “present oneself as deserving [...] goodwill” (*Trials* 18), “project a personality which invited belief” (“Rhet. means” 36); “the Athenian tendency to view the trial as a detail in a broader canvas [...] made appeal to activity beyond the courts inevitable. In such a context, [...] general conduct [...] offers a useful means of determining the balance of probability in [...] [a given] instance. This implicit view was reinforced [...] by the increased reliance on argument from probability. *Ethos* may [...] overlap implicitly with explicit argument. The simplest way to project the appropriate persona was to list explicitly the services one had bestowed on the city. [...] Less blatant is the use of [...] general observations. By laying claim to certain beliefs [...] agree[ing] with accepted social values a speaker can with contrived inadvertence reveal something of his character. A wide range of effects may be sought” (“Rhet. means” 36; cf. 37). Cf. Kennedy on “portray[ing] [...] character by citing

When detailing the aforesaid, Dionysius refers back to the qualities introduced earlier—purity, perspicuity, simplicity—qua generally effective guidelines.¹⁸⁶

honorable actions of the past” (*Comp. Rhet.* 124; infinitized). Morford logs: “even [...] legal tactics” may be “used in the cause of *ethopoia*” (243)—i.e. that one chooses to apply them, and which. Having noted “the stress laid in Greek rhetoric on argument from probability [...] from general tendencies to specific instances”, Carey shows the notional process: “the importance of this mode of argumentation will have reinforced the commonsense assumption that the plausibility of specific statements about [...] [someone] can be assessed with reference to [...] established patterns of behaviour” (*Trials* 18; cf. “increased reliance on argument from probability”, “Rhet. means” 36); “argument from the general (the evidence of character implicitly presented to the court) to the particular (the specific allegations) on the basis of probability [...] is the staple of argumentation from the birth of Greek rhetoric” (“Rhet. means” 42); it “had evolved during the fifth century [BCE]” (“Intro.” 10; for applications linked to a ‘crafting of characters’, cf. “Comment.” 61, 90, 117). “[I]n Lysias”, “characterization effects an implicit argument” (*Trials* 82): ostensibly “providing necessary background information [...] in fact presenting a characterization” (*Trials* 96; infinitized)—a response to the *status qualitatis* (here as regards the speaker). Kennedy also stresses “the use of argument from probability” as spec. relevant to “Greek speeches”: “If the facts were in doubt, as they often were, the question became one of what such a person as the defendant or the prosecutor was likely to have done. His character was the key” (*New History* 67)—a ‘personalizing’ shift from ‘*quale*’ to ‘*qualis sit*’ (deprioritizing the *res*, focusing on the ‘make’ of the *persona*, its *ethos*). Cf. Pearson: “the τέλος of a speech was not so much to prove that X injured Y as to show that X and Y are ‘of a certain character’; because once that is established, it will be easy to jump to the conclusion that X injured Y; [...] the matter of character has logical priority over the action” (“Character.” 77). Cf. Eden’s (forensico-poetic) observation as to the (usual) reading habits on Montaigne’s part, who tends to “tak[e] more interest in the advocate [...] than in the case he pleads” (*Rediscovery* 109)—a focus on *ethos*. The (decidedly) rhetorical poetics operative in the essayist’s signature work may seem to yield a similar bent in the reception, inasmuch as (virtually) all attention is characteristically directed to said speaker—thereby crafting ‘him’ (for the time being, as the case may be)—rather than to language, (which facilitates) ‘personifying’ the latter first of all.

186 See Dionysius’ *synkrisis* of Isocrates and Lysias (“Isocrates” 106–107, §2; 132–133, §11: “ἐν ταῖς ἠθοποιαῖς”, 132; cf. Blass *Beredsamkeit II.* 188–189; 189n.); of Thucydides, Demosthenes with Lysias (Dionysius “Demosthenes” 244–247, §2; 252–253, §4; cf. 276–277, §11, plus context; 288–289, §13; 294–295, §15; see “Thucydides” 616–623, §51, §53; with Blass *Beredsamkeit I.* 227; 399). Cf. Atkins (104–136, spec. 121–122, 125–126); Trimpi (“Meaning” 15n.). Dionysius logs that the “style [‘lêxin’] [...] appropriate to [‘oikeian’]” an *ethos* is to adopt “clear [‘saphe’], standard [‘kyrian’], ordinary [‘koinên’] speech [...] thoroughly familiar to everyone” (“Lysias” 32–35, §8; cf. “persuasiveness [...] depends on [...] clarity [‘saphei’] and familiarity [‘synêthei’]”: Demetrius 478–479, §221)—since (in terms of function) the accustomed will (*eo ipso* seem to) be plausible (contrast: Bruss 45–46). Avoiding “pompous [‘ônkos’], outlandish [‘tò xénon’]”, “contrived [‘tò epitedeúseos’]” language, the “composition [‘syntithesí’]” is to be ‘altogether’ “simple [‘aphelos pány’]”, “straightforward [‘haplos’]” (Dionysius “Lysias” 34–35, §8). Hence “characterisation [‘tò ethos’] is achieved not by periodic structure and [...] rhythms, but by loosely constructed sentences”—leading to an articulation of ‘artful artlessness’ (“Lysias” 34–

He proceeds to “propriety [‘τὸ πρέπον’]—qua “most important [...] crowning virtue” (“Lysias” 34–35, §9).¹⁸⁷ Given its applying “to the speaker [‘λέγοντα’] [...] audience [‘ακούοντας’] [...] subject [‘pragma’]” (“Lysias” 34–37, §9), it is likely said comprehensiveness regarding the factors relevant to any speech (emitter, recipients, reference, cumulatively the setting) that its particular eminence

35, §8). “Lysias possesses charm naturally [‘πέφυκε’]; Isocrates is always looking for it” (“Isocrates” 110–111, §3; cf. Blass *Beredsamkeit I.* 398, 398n.; *Beredsamkeit II.* 188); “properties of Thucydides’s style [...] are forcefulness [...] compulsion, while [...] Lysias[’] can deceive the listener [...] conceal the facts from him [‘κλέψαι τὰ πράγματα’]”; he “is apparently unstudied [...] an illusion which the orator deliberately fosters” (Dionysius “Demosthenes” 246–247, §2; with 247n.; “Lysias” 58–59, §18); cf. Bonner on the Lysian capacity “to mislead and to conceal” (*Lit. Treatises* 63). Seeing that “[t]he dominant impression created is one of artlessness” (“Intro.” 8), Carey logs: “surface simplicity is deceptive”; “the narrative is [...] used to create an image of the speaker or his opponent [...]; its plausibility [...] contribut[es] to [...] persuasion. His narratives are vivid [...] internally consistent [...] fluent [...] economical; details [...] are not laboured [...]. There is throughout a simple [...] apparently artless inevitability which [...] is [...] the product of precise skill” (“Intro.” 9). Cf. Blass: “Lysias [...] besitzt, nach Hermogenes, eine ausserordentliche rednerische δεινότης, nur von der Art, welche es ist ohne es zu scheinen” (*Beredsamkeit I.* 400); “die scheinbare Kunstlosigkeit ist das Produkt der höchsten Kunst” (*Beredsamkeit I.* 396). “Es ist [...] künstlerische Nachbildung der gewöhnlichen Rede, nicht diese selbst, obwohl [...] der Anschein dies glauben lässt” (*Beredsamkeit I.* 390; cf. 390n.; with Cicero “Orator” 362, xxiii.76). See Bakker: “Behind this—almost deceptive—accessibility [...] lie subtle strategies of characterization. For these, Lysias was [...] praised in antiquity [...] particular[ly] his talents in *ἔθοποιία* [...] guaranteed his reputation as a canonical orator” (“Lysias” 409). On Lysian subtlety, cf. Devries (13); Morford (247); Carey (“Comment.” 62); Kennedy: “Lysias’ style conceals its art” (*New History* 66); cf. M. Morgan (“Intro.” xxxiv, §29). Pearson insinuates his virtuosity: “Although it is usual to think of Lysias as the master of *ἡθοποιία*, it is Isaeus who lets us see more clearly what he is trying to do” (“Character.” 76).

187 As to a textual cohabitation of “lucidity”, “brevity of expression”, Dionysius logs these as “two ingredients which are naturally difficult to blend in due proportion [‘kerásai metróis’]—“Lysias manages this combination”, by “not mak[ing] his subject the slave of his words, but [...] the words conform to the subject” (“Lysias” 28–29, §4). An overarching concern for *τὸ πρέπον* is accentuated passim. As to textual economy, cf. ‘oikeía pány kai anankaía’ (“Lysias” 30, §6), ‘kairós’ (“Lysias” 46, §13), ‘oikeías’ (“Lysias” 50, §15), *ex negativo*, ‘ákairós’ (“Lysias” 28, §5), ‘ou (...) kairo’ (“Lysias” 48, §14); also (performatively) the writer’s: “κατὰ τὸ παρόν” (“Lysias” 30, §6), ‘katà tòn oikeion [...] kairón’ (“Lysias” 32, §6), ‘katà tòn oikeion (...) tópon’ (“Lysias” 38, §10), ‘ouk écho kairòn en to parónti lógo’ (“Lysias” 50, §14); on (rhetorical) ‘kairós’, cf. the n. below. There is a nexus of timely pragmatism with *τὸ πρέπον*, of necessity with appositeness—linking to ‘oikonomía’ (literally, *de re*), where ‘oikeion’ is used. On the affinity of ‘*prépon*’ and ‘*oikeion*’, cf. Eden (*Rediscovery* 14–27, spec. 20, 27; 43; 45; passim; as to Dionysius, 43n.); see Blass (*Beredsamkeit I.* 402–403). The description of Lysian discernment seems to imply an assimilation, simultaneity of appositeness and expediency: “κριτικὸς ὦν δεῖ λέγειν” (“Lysias” 50, §15)—rhetoric being an art of effect(uality), seeing that ‘one cannot argue with results’.

resides in—accommodation being ever needful and expedient.¹⁸⁸ Its effectuality

188 A *conditio sine qua non* in a dominantly audience-focused art, the *aptum* (a noetic lubricant) facilitates *hypólepsis* for a recipient—the feckful prevailing upon whom being the gauge: “The rhetorical [...] is a dispute in which it is important to gain victory over the opponent, not to approach the truth” (Bakhtin *Speech* 152); see Plato (*Laws VII–XII*. 470–471, 937E–938A, XI); Hobbes (*Man and Citizen* 231, X.11); Mayfield (“Interplay” 18n.–19n.). As to a logographer’s (client’s) tying in with the contextual (socio-moral, cultural) givens, see Bakker: “Lysias could make his clients appeal to [...] values [...] commonly shared and held in esteem” (“Lysias” 411). Carey logs “a consistent tendency to present the offence as an attack on values important to the city as a whole” (“Rhet. means” 30; cf. 31–32; Bakker “Lysias” 411–412; 414; 417; 421; 423; 425; 427); “it was useful, given the [...] hostility towards meddlesomeness (*polypragmosyne*), to stress the public spirit” (Carey “Rhet. means” 28; cf. 32). “Nobody ever alienated a Greek jury by praising the laws” (“Rhet. means” 36). Cf. Hellwig’s pragmatic take: “das in der Rede sichtbar gemachte ἦθος [‘gewinnt’] nur dann das Vertrauen der Zuhörer [...], wenn es sich in den Grenzen eines Maßes, des πρέπον, bewegt. Dieses Maß wird [...] nicht nur von allgemeinen [...] Normen, sondern auch von den Vorstellungen der Hörer bestimmt” (265); “in der Anpassung der Rede und ihrer τέλη an [...] Publikum bzw. [...] Staatsform zeigt sich: die Rede wird ‘ethisch’, wenn in ihr erkennbar wird, daß die [...] Grundsätze, [...] die [d]er [‘Redner’] in seinen Worten vertritt, den allgemein oder in einer [...] Gruppe anerkannten Normen entsprechen” (265). Cf. Oesterreich: “in der Rhetorik der Lebenswelt [...] [‘wird’] eine] für die [...]praxis bedeutsame [...] *pragma* [...] thematisiert”; “die parteilich interessierte [...] ihre Überzeugungen verkörpernde [...] Persönlichkeit des Redenden (*ethos*) [‘ist’] ausschlaggebend beteiligt” (*Fundamentalrhet.* 5; cf. 85, 112–113). “Das Gewinnen des anderen durch Konvenienz [...] der Werthaltungen ist eine wesentliche Funktion persuasiver Rede” (*Fundamentalrhet.* 69; cf. 87–88); besides ‘value’, said word may also take ‘world’ (qua view): via “Aufweis der Topizität der Lebensweltbilder [‘wird’] die [...] kulturelle Vermitteltheit lebensformtragender Hintergrundüberzeugungen herausgestellt” (*Fundamentalrhet.* 82; cf. 85). Cf. Ptasek: “Es ist [...] vernünftig, bewährten Meinungen zu folgen [...] endoxa, [...] die für Aristoteles eine überindividuelle Orientierungsfunktion ausüben, sind das sich stets neu bestimmende Resultat des Meinungsaustausches” (63). “We ought [...] to consider in whose presence we praise [...] speak of what is esteemed among the particular audience” (Aristotle *Rhetoric* 99, 1367b, I.ix.30; cf. Sattler 59–60). “If you wish to write a pleasing speech, be careful as far as possible to adapt the character of your speech [‘τὰ ἦθη τῶν λόγων ὁμοιοῦν’] to that of your public. You will achieve this if you observe their character [‘τῶν ἠθῶν’]” (“Rhet. ad Alex.” 364–365, 1434b, XXII; contrast: Wisse 51n.). Cf. Sprute (283–284); Cope: “as all men readily accept, like to hear, words and sentiments in accordance with their [...] character and resembling themselves, i.e. those [...] they [...] are in the habit of using, we may act upon this” (111). This serves as a diagnostic in Vives (cf. 179, Z2.r, II.xvi). Thucydides logs: “it is a hard matter to speak in just measure on an occasion where it is with difficulty that belief in the speaker’s accuracy is established”—spec. if what is (to be) said will not align with the audience’s “wishes”, “knowledge”, exceed its “capacity” (*History I–II*. 319–321, II.xxxv.2). Hellwig glosses: “Wahrheit gerät in Gefahr, unglaubwürdig zu werden, wenn sie das Erkenntnis- oder Vorstellungsvermögen der Hörer übersteigt” (266n.); “ἦθος wirkt nur, wenn es vom Zuhörer als solches anerkannt werden kann, [...] [seinen] Anschauungen [...] nicht zuwiderläuft” (265). Cf.

(or sheer reception) being contingent upon the context, rhetorico-dramatic

Cope: “appeals to their understanding and feelings must be made in accordance with their known sentiments and habits of thought” (110; see Aristotle *Rhetoric* 254–255, 1390a, II.xiii.16). “Es gibt kein ethosfreies Pathos. [...] wer Stimmungen beeinflussen will, [‘muß’] die Charaktere seiner Adressaten in Rechnung stellen” (Niehues-Pröbsting “Ethos” 348; cf. *Die antike Phil.* 53). Aristotle gives (infinite) *sententiae* as “of great assistance to speakers”—due to “the vulgarity of the hearers, who are pleased if an orator, speaking generally, hits upon the opinions which they specially hold. [...] The maxim [‘gnóme’] [...] state[s] [...] the general [‘kathólou’]” (*Rhetoric* 286–287, 1396b, II.xxi.15). See the function of (the phrase) ‘everyone knows’ (*Rhetoric* 378–381, 1408a, III.vii.7): “For most people will think so [‘dóxei te gár tois pollois’]” (*Rhetoric* 98–99, 1367b, I.ix.29); cf. subch. 3.2. “Wortspiele [‘gehören’] [...] dem populären Sprachgebrauche an[...]/wie [...] Metaphern [...] Gleichnisse [...]. Derartiges stört also das Ethos nicht” (Blass *Beredsamkeit I.* 412): in (likely) producing familiarity (an impression of the wonted, hence apt), these devices conduce to the crafting of *ethos*. Unlike Idealist critics, Aristotle will not spirit away the (decisive factor that is the) reception. With Jakobson, one may speak of a dominant “CONATIVE function”, described as “[o]rientation toward the addressee” (67; see 66–71, for his overall model). Cf. “Polyphony and rhetoric [...] Rhetorical speech argues from the viewpoint of the third party” (Bakhtin *Speech* 150). As Küpper logs, an “aesthetics of effect consistently” underwrites the Stagirite’s “line of reasoning” in the *Poetics* (“Ordnung” 213n.; trans. dsm)—likewise in the affine (rhetorico-political) works. Cf. “die primäre Orientierung der Rhetorik an der Wirkung” (Niehues-Pröbsting “Ethos” 351); “Wirkungsästhetik der Rhetorik” (Dockhorn *Macht* 69); “das Regulativ der Publikumswirksamkeit” (Fuhrmann *Dichtungstheorie* 133; as to Horace). Said nexus is inseverable (in form, function, *de re*), spec. given Aristotle’s dictum that human beings are the comparatively ‘more political animal’, since men “alone of the animals possess[...] speech”—“λόγος” being their “special property” (*Politics* 10–11, 1253a, I.i.10; cf. “Poetics” 99, 1456b, XX; *Rhetoric* 18–19, 1356a, I.ii.7; 18n.–19n.; 89, 1366a, I.viii.7). Even so, differing agendas obtain—spec. as to *ethos*; Pearson (“Character.” 76–78; with “Poetics” 50–51, 1450a, VI) logs Aristotle’s “drawing” an implicit “contrast[...] between poetry and [...] forensic oratory” as to “characterization”: “the purpose of tragedy” is not “to illustrate character”; “action, not ethical quality, is the τέλος of tragedy”; “ἦθος” is not “essential to tragedy” (“Character.” 76). Cf. “In der Poetik geht es bei[...] Ethos um [...] kunstgerechte Darstellung von Charakteren [...]. Wie drückt sich in Reden und in welchen [...] Charakter aus? Das [...] [‘haben’] Poetik und Rhetorik gemeinsam [...] Präsentation des Ethos im Logos [‘ist’] die Hauptaufgabe. [...] die Gesichtspunkte [‘sind’] für [...] Dichter und [...] Redner nur partiell dieselben. Jener muß darauf achten, daß der Charakter [...] zur Handlung [...] paßt [...] in sich stimmig ist. Stimmigkeit ist [...] für die rhetorische Ethopoie eine notwendige Bedingung, aber keine hinreichende. [...] der Redner [‘will’] nicht bloß stimmige Charaktere dem Publikum zum Vergnügen präsentieren, sondern [...] mit der Charakterdarstellung [...] überzeugen” (Niehues-Pröbsting “Ethos” 341). Qua ‘*philosophóteron*’, drama is (free, able) to convey the ‘*kathólou*’ (Aristotle “Poetics” 58–59, 1451b, IX). Pragmatico-inductively, rhetoric proceeds from particular givens, passes to a general plane (as expedient), reapplies the latter to the case at hand. Even so, neither the (rhetorico-poetic, formal) techniques, nor the (ultimate) aim, will differ in a final (functional) analysis: “the dramatist, like the orator, adopts [...] various means to achieve the verdict [...] he wants his audience to pass” (Pearson “Character.” 78).

ethopoia is underwritten (respectively superstructured) by—hence cannot be severed from—what tends to be deemed apposite at a given point in time.¹⁸⁹

189 Generally: “*Ethos* necessarily overlaps with *decorum*” (Herrick 136). Cf. “Mit [...] *Ethos* hängt zusammen, dass Lysias [...] τὸ πρέπον [...] [‘beobachtet’], indem er seine Rede [...] nach den [S]prechenden [...] einrichtet, [...] [‘und’] nach den Hörenden” (Blass *Beredsamkeit I.* 396). See Cicero: “in alioque ponatur aliudque totum sit, utrum decere an oportere dicas—oportere enim perfectionem declarat officii quo et semper utendum est et omnibus, decere quasi aptum esse consentaneumque tempori et personae” (“Orator” 360, xxii.74). Bruss logs “Lysias’s [...] ability to dramatize his characters”, “excell[ing] at suitable, distinctive characterization” (36), but rejects the “mistake” of calling this “*ethopoeia*” in “Dionysius”: “he makes this observation *not* in his discussion of *ethopoeia*, but of propriety. *Ethopoeia* [...] is concerned with a wholly different sense of characterization, [...] the creation of persuasive *ethos*” (36; cf. 44). Rifting an (if not the) overarching directive from spec. devices is fundamentally unrhetorical. Yet (the possibility of) said severance makes (hence breaks) Bruss’ case: “the focus” is “on persuasive proof through character, not propriety. [...] Dionysius [...] addresses *ethopoeia* in a separate section [...], suggesting a clear distinction” (37); his “description of Lysias’s propriety may seem like an elaboration of the speechwriter’s ethopoetic art [...], but Dionysius discusses *ethopoeia* and propriety as distinct virtues” (45). Bruss deprioritizes that §7–9 are sequential (which may suggest affinity); that there are taxonomic, semantic links (to say nothing of inextricable interrelations in application). Her “classificatory” (37; cf. “the need for classification”, 56) take appears to construe severances, where associations, continuities would else be seen to obtain. In case her claim—that the serial listing in the “summary of Lysias’s virtues” (§13) “reinforc[es] the separation” (45)—should not seem a *non sequitur*: a succession may argue the opposite just as well (rhetorically put). Here as passim, the critic fails to give a functional analysis of the *aptum*. It is a means for easing persuasion, rendering it more effectual (saturating, lasting): one cannot sever the plausible from the apposite. Bruss’ postulate appears to entail that there could be *ethos* sans taking τὸ πρέπον into account—an assumption that must seem misguided. Apart from gainsaying the very ground swell of rhetoric, the critic’s dichotomism is also inexpedient to her case, since it urges a modification: “Both propriety and persuasive *ethos* are relevant to character portrayal, but the two concepts should not be conflated in Dionysius’s *Lysias*” (45). Such only seems to relativize her contrived rigor; for Bruss sets up an extreme case—to be able to reject it: from τὸ πρέπον and *ethopoia* not being ‘identical’, it does not follow that they are ‘clearly separate’. “As described by Dionysius, the style of persuasive *ethopoeia* focuses not on the fitting representation of a character’s manner of speaking (as is the case with propriety-oriented *ethopoeia*) but rather on unaffected, plain-spoken naturalness” (38): like the (equally reductive) take she counters, Bruss seems guided by (ultimately) Romanticist premises; failing to allow for the contingency of the customary (with decontextualization, depragmatization qua corollary) tends to be paired with a want of appreciation for the craftedness of what is seen as (the) ‘natural’ (Bruss uses the phrase “artfully mimics nature”, which appears to presuppose the latter: 56). The aforesaid is linked to the critic’s further claims: “Dionysius makes a novel move, departing from the theories of his [...] predecessors and introducing an aesthetic dimension to persuasive *ethopoeia*” (53); “noteworthy [...] is Dionysius’s attention to the critical role of artless composition [...] in the portrayal of favorable *ethos*. Effective *ethopoeia* [...] is not only persuasive but also aesthetically pleasing, as indicated by his emphasis on lifelike,

Having rendered *τὸ πρέπον* paramount, Dionysius returns to the ‘ventriloquistic’ *praxis* on the part of the speechwright ‘Lysias’—meaning, as he sees and (ethopoetically) conveys the latter’s textually sedimented ‘image’.¹⁹⁰ Since *persona* differs from *persona*’ (*diaphérei ton prosópon prósopa*—which Usher gives as “characters differ from each other”, “Lysias” 36–37, §9),

Lysias puts words [‘phonàs’] in their mouths which suit [‘oikeías’] their several conditions. Similarly, with regard to his audiences, his words are gauged to suit [‘oikeíos’] their several dispositions[.] (“Lysias” 36–37, §9; cf. 46–47, §13)¹⁹¹

charming composition. The term *apsychos* (unanimated, lifeless) [...] appears to be unique to Dionysius’s account, [...] underscor[ing] the aesthetic dimension of persuasive *ethopoieia*” (38; cf. 53). “With his attention to charm and animation, Dionysius expands the vocabulary of characterization, adding an aesthetic dimension to the portrayal of persuasive *ethos*” (56–57). It will not be needful to stress a critic’s apparent failure to perceive the *‘suavis’* in ‘persuasion’ (cf. Mayfield “Proceedings” 210; see this telltale phrasing: “not only persuasive but charming and lifelike”, Bruss 56); nor her (tacitly Kantianizing, Romanticist) view of ‘aesthetics’ (aligning with a degrammatizing slant *passim*); nor that, in so doing, she brings the (all but) excluded ‘mimetic’ assumptions or connotations (cf. 35–36; 44–45) back into her argument. The central (dependable) problem of Bruss’ construal is a (general) lack of functional analyses—here: the fact that (so-called) ‘aesthetic’ pleasure (*delectare*) conduces to (an effectual) persuasion. As a crafted impression, the latter depends on the presence of an *alter* (spectators, readers); such were needless to say, if Bruss’ overall logic (of severance) did not relegate the reception and context *passim*. While referring to aptness in a given setting—“as is the case in forensic pleading”, “well-suited for the courtroom” (40; cf. 40n.), “best suited to the task”, “particularly useful in the ancient Greek courtroom” (46; cf. 47, 47n.; plus a mention of Plutarch’s pertinent sample: 55), “untimely” (48; cf. 48n.; 51, on “the rhetoric of display”)—Bruss does not (seem to) apply this to her overall claim. Along with a proclivity for degrammatization and neglecting functional analysis (spec. the decisivest query ‘why’), the critic also deprioritizes the ever requisite contextualization *passim*, hence (all but) spirits away the reception (a direct corollary of Bruss’ thetical severance). There can be no rhetoric sans situatedness; a conative tendency characterizes the art; every effect pertains to the moment, environment; a speaker cannot be isolated from the spec. conditions, audience: a given probability will (always) be persuasive (only) in a resp. setting; what is (per-, received as) verisimilar varies; effectuality is tied to what is considered apt under the particular circumstances. The latter would implicate Bruss’ thesis—hence render its key claim (a severance of *ethopoieia* from *tò prèpon*) fundamentally untenable.

190 Cf. “modern judgements on Lysias’ style take as their starting-point the perceptive essay of Dionysius” (Carey “Intro.” 6n.). Roberts sees a “singularly happy estimate” as to “purity of expression [...] gift of characterisation [...] unfailing propriety [...] vividness [...] inimitable charm” (21). In this “most substantial of the three early essays” (Usher “Lysias. Intro.” 16), Dionysius “give[s] a clear [...] comprehensive description of the archetype of [...] Attic style, which furnishes a basis for the examination of subsequent models” (“Lysias. Intro.” 17).

191 On this basis of diversity, Dionysius tenders a legitimization of (stylistic) variation with respect to settings (audiences) and the *partes* of (a forensic) speech (cf. “Lysias” 37, §9).

Being an (expressly) verbalized practice of propriety here, the semiotic act of accommodating—of rendering suitable and (apparently) pertinent (*'oikeion'*)—is immediately connected to the ‘crafting’ of ‘character’ (*'ethopoíia'*), in that it conduces to, or ensures, an effectual reception (with this always being the rhetorical measure).¹⁹² The result of this consistent alliance between the *aptum* and an *ethos* verbally rendered (*poietón*) will tend to be a likely, vivid (re)presentation (*evidentia*) via description or (semiotic) enactment.

At the metalevel, the express nexus of *'enárgeia'*, *'ethopoíia'*, *'tò prépon'* (see Blass *Beredsamkeit I.* 397; with 396, 394, 398) implements an ‘ethopoietic’ portrait of the arch-*rhétor's* *persona*—the quasi-performative treatise “Lysias” itself.¹⁹³ For ‘characterizing’ is precisely what Dionysius is ‘doing’: both in the sense of *ethos*—qua (ostensively) consistent, habitual, (con)textual, general *praxis*, as (plausibly) ascribed to a *persona* denotated or crafted; and in terms of a more particular (speech-writerly, oratorical) ‘profile’, specifying a distinctive, memorable (if nominally or *de facto* elusive) trait: in this case, Lysian *'cháris'* (cf. “Lysias” 38, §10; 40, §11; 42, §12; 44, 46, §13).¹⁹⁴ By way of end focus in the

192 Cf. “When persuasive *ethos* is the aim, style should be clear, simple, [...] uncontrived, whatever the character type” (Bruss 49). This will not be so generally (let alone regardless of a given setting): in drama or epideictic, the case may (and often will) differ—*elocutio* is always contextual also. There can be no *ethopoíia* sans taking into account what is regarded as *prépon* at a given time (including *ex negativo*). Apart from the general inapplicability of presuming ‘non-fluid’ demarcations between rhetorical categories (considering the *téchne's* universality), unconditionalities and decontextualizations will be seen as going against the art’s very grain.

193 This will be conducive: “Lysias shows self-consistency [*homologouménós estin*] in both his private and his public speeches” (Dionysius “Dinarchus” 264–267, §6). Said impression of the orator’s (textual) *ethos* will also be due to the Ancient critic’s *praxis* of reception—removing from (not adding to) the corpus any oration as will not seem to ‘fit’. Mainly descriptive initially, the tract also cites the logographer, effecting a ‘characterization’ by speech (cf. “Lysias” 62–85, §20–27; with a ventriloquistic act: 74–77, §25); the parts given by Dionysius are the only remaining source for that oration (cf. Carey “Comment.” 207)—hence for the (speech-writerly) *persona*, its projected *ethos*, (latently) present therein. The ‘ethopoietic’ character of Dionysius’ rhetorical disquisition (focusing on *docere*) seamlessly integrates with the epideictic (chiefly geared toward *delectare*). Some *formulae* imply performance: “But I shall keep my eye on the time [*chrónou'*]” (“Lysias” 36–37, §10). This links to a justification of Lysian “terseness”: “Far from introducing inessential material, he may sometimes appear to have omitted much that might have helped his case; but of course he does this not through poverty of invention, but in order to keep within the time [*chrónou'*] allowed for the delivery of his speeches. The short [*brachýs'*] amount of time [...] was adequate for the ordinary citizen to explain his case, but insufficient for an orator [...] to display his rhetorical powers” (“Lysias” 30–31, §5).

194 See the term *'notatio'* in subch. 3.1. On *cháris*, cf. Plutarch: “καὶ σκόπει τὴν Λυσίου πειθῶ καὶ χάριν” (“Talkativeness” 408, 504C, §5). Blass gives it as “A n m u t h” (*Beredsamkeit I.* 397,

Ancient critic's *summa* (of the devices detailed), “χάρις” is superstructured by—or all but equalized with (the latter being reinforced by *paronomasia*)—the (not only oratorically) critical concept of “καίρος” (“Lysias” 46, §13; cf. 48, §14).¹⁹⁵

cf. 398–399). Dionysius employs the term “χαρακτήρα” in contexts concerning the (stylistic, effectual) “quality” (“ἀρετή”) of “χάρις” (“Lysias” 38–39, §10): “This charm [...] is the most important [‘kratísten’] and characteristic [‘charakterikotátēn’] virtue [‘aretēn’] of Lysias’s style [‘léxeos’]” (“Lysias” 40–41, §11; cf. 44, §13). The nexus with ‘léxis’ is dependable (see “Lysias” 44, §13; 50, §15; “Composition” 192, plus 199, §23); here *ex negativo*: “if the style [‘ho tes léxeos charaktēr’] is devoid of grace [actually: ‘hedonēn’] and beauty [‘aphroditēn’]” (“Lysias” 40, §11); cf. “certain characteristics of style [‘állous idíous léxeos charakteras’]” (“Lysias” 40–41, §11)—the (formal) ‘peculiarity’ (‘ídios’) is put in relief. Cf. Körte: “Auch [...] Dionysios [...] ist der Gebrauch von χαρακτήρ für den individuellen Stil des einzelnen Schriftstellers nicht fremd. [...] Von dem χαρακτήρ Δυσίου ist mehrfach bei ihm die Rede” (82). The discernment of ‘chárís’ is due to the ‘critic’ (in the etymological sense: cf. ‘krínas’), as Dionysius takes care to accentuate (“Lysias” 36–37, §10; here: 36; cf. 40, §11; 42, §12). In his metapoetical treatise, he gives ‘chárís’ as a subcategory of ‘hedonē’ (“Composition” 70–71, §11; see Russell *Criticism* 133–134; Usher speaks of their being “related”, “Lit. Comp. Intro.” 7; cf. Bruss 53n.). In §12, and §14 (vs. Theophrastus), Dionysius uses this ‘aesthetic’ (cf. “Lysias” 38, 40, §11) “criterion [‘tekmerío’]” of charm (“Lysias” 40–41, §12) for establishing a work’s authorship (see “Lysias” 40–45, §12; 46–51, §14; “Dinarchus” 268–269, §7)—in addition to more ‘commonsensical’ gauges pertaining to questions of probable dating (“Lysias” 42–45, §12). As regards the former, see M. Morgan’s remark, telltale in its brevity: “If the Charm is there, the speech is genuine” (“Intro.” xxxvi, §32); comparably Bonner (*Lit. Treatises* 47–48; 100–101). In his essay on Dinarchus, Dionysius also offers a reading of this orator as contrasted with Lysias (“Dinarchus” 264–269, §6–7).

195 Cf. “charm [‘chárís’] and a sense of timing [‘kairós’] which regulates everything else” (“Lysias” 46–47, §13); a phenomenon such as “felicities [‘charientizómenos’] at an infelicitous time [‘ou charíenti kairo’]” (“Lysias” 48–49, §14) reinforces said nexus, rendering ‘chárís’ sans ‘kairós’ incongruous. Generally, cf. Quintilian: “Lysias’ delicate, clean-shaven texture [‘dicendi textum tenue atque rasum’] was not to be spoiled by richer rhythms. He would have lost the exceptional charm [‘gratiam’] of his simple, unaffected tone; [...] also [...] his credibility [‘fidem’]. He wrote in fact for others [‘Nam scribebat aliis’], and did not deliver the speeches himself [‘non ipse dicebat’]; his words, therefore, had to have a rough, unstructured look; yet this itself is a type of Composition” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 170–171, 9.4.17; cf. Blass *Beredsamkeit I.* 396n.; with 390, 393, 395–396). Quintilian links ‘celare artem’ to rhetorical ventriloquism, here. See Grube: “the simple style is as much a product of art as any other” (106). With respect to a sermon on Luther’s part (and his *praxis* generally), Stolt summarizes her rhetorical analysis as follows: “alles ist bewußt, gekonnt und nirgendwo auffällig. Daß das einfache Lesepublikum sich all dieser Kunstmittel nicht bewußt wurde, versteht sich von selbst” (77); cf. part 6, herein. For the elusiveness of ‘kairós’, see Dionysius’ lucid (meta-rhetorical) remark: “in every field of activity, how are we to define what is called ‘timeliness [‘kairós’]’? And where do we find the mean [‘tò métrion’]? In each case it is our senses [‘aisthēsei’] and not our reason [‘ou lógo’] that provide the key” (“Lysias” 38–39, §11; cf. 40–41; “Composition” 86–87, §12; with Roberts 46n.). Seeing that ‘tò prépon’ had been given as the overarching rhetorical virtue earlier (“Lysias” 34, §9), it seems to be assimilated to (even equalized with) the ‘kairós’ in the concluding clause of

Dionysius thus tenders (or rather, renders) a rhetorical *ethopoïia* of (and for) the (textually) perceived *prósopon* of the orator ‘Lysias’—including his capacity for precisely that technique: a structural *mise en abyme* (iterated in an affine context, below).¹⁹⁶ The reader is facing an ‘ethopoietic’ description of a *persona* highly capable of rendering vivid, momentarily evident *éthe*—also by putting suitable (hence plausible) words into the mouths of the protagonists (to be) envisioned or (re)presented (respectively staged).

The ‘etho-poet’ Dionysius will indeed perform the latter at another point in his treatise, where a ‘characteristically’ Lysian oration is selected and quoted at length (see “Lysias” 62–85, §20–27).¹⁹⁷ A *sermocinatio* also occurs at another

Dionysius’ *summa* of the Lysian (and more generally rhetorical) “virtues of style”: “and a sense of timing which regulates everything else [‘kai ho pánta metron kairós’]” (“Lysias” 46–47, §13)—a function it shares with appositeness (see “Composition” 86n.; with Aristotle *Rhetoric* 380–381, 1408a, III.vii.8). On the timely, calculatedly ‘occasional’ cast of Lysian logography, cf. Plutarch’s anecdote (“Talkativeness” 408–409, 504C, §5; with Bruss 55, 55n.). Generally, see Schwartz: “der *καυός* spielt bei Gorgias eine außerordentliche Rolle” (80). Contrast Süß (166–168, spec. 167). See the Theophrastan portrait of “ἀκαρία” (86–89, §12; here: 86; cf. Gomperz *Griech. Denker III*. 409; with context, 403–411)—which may seem to be the most ‘rhetorical’ of the extant sketches (*de re*). Niehues-Pröbsting deems *ethopoïiai* as “rhetorische Schulübung” a *hypólepsis* from the Peripatetic tradition; on an “Entwerfen von Charakterbildern, wie wir sie aus [...] Theophrast kennen”, he notes: “Hintergrund dieser didaktischen Praxis dürfte [...] die Advokatennotwendigkeit sein, nicht nur sich selber dem Publikum günstig zu präsentieren, sondern auch den Klienten zu charakterisieren und [...] den Charakter der Gegenpartei in ein ungünstiges Licht zu rücken: Charakterdarstellung als Teil der Präsentation des Falles, der zur Beurteilung ansteht. Die Rhetorik hat jene eigenartige [...] höchst wirkungsträchtige, für die Moralistik unverzichtbare Literaturgattung der Charakterbilder, die in der aristotelischen Schule aufkommt und die Ethik, Poetik [...] Rhetorik integriert, in ihre Ausbildungspraxis aufgenommen und fortgeführt” (“Ethos” 351–352). On ‘negative’ *ethopoïia*, see subch. 5.1.

196 The reception displays its effectuality. Cf. Carey: “The reader who can resist the spell of Lysias’ characterization” (“Comment.” 90). “It is [...] difficult to believe that a speech so typical of Lysias is spurious” (“Comment.” 208). “Charm is a hallmark of Lysias’s art” (Bruss 53; with 53n.). See Blass on the Lysian ‘Gesamtcharakter’ (*Beredsamkeit I*. 381–421). “Ausmalung und Verwerthung eines Ethos [...] ist ja seine besondere Stärke” (*Beredsamkeit I*. 283). “Nicht minder charakteristisch [...] für Lysias” (*Beredsamkeit I*. 418; cf. 419). Devries: “Lysias as we know him in his logographic speeches” (17; “distinctive style”, 16). Cf. “this excellence in *ἡθοποιία*” (M. Morgan “Intro.” xxxiii, §29; with xxxi, §27; “XXIV. Intro.” 119). “Lysias war ein Virtuose der Kleinmalerei [...] die lysianische Kleinkunst” (Gomperz *Griech. Denker II*. 330). “Dionysius is [...] showing Lysias to be supreme in the rendering of character (*ἡθοποιία*)” (Grube 214); see Fuhrmann (*Die antike Rhetorik* 122). Generally, cf. Cope’s note that “Sophocles [...] was said to be δεινός ἡθοποιεῖν” (113; he gives no citation, but refers to Aristotle’s “Poetics”, ch. VI).

197 Lysias is present in words (ascribed to him). As noted in subch. 3.3 (with Hellwig 257), the device is ‘technically’ the same, whether used for a given speaker, or on behalf of (resp. with a view to) another. As to what one might call ‘vicarious *ethopoïia*’, Bruss has: “the speeches [‘of

structural level, when the Ancient critic mentions Aristotle's successor as (claiming to be) citing the arch-orator: "I suppose that there will be no objection if I quote the actual words of Theophrastus. They are as follows" ("Lysias" 48–49, §14).¹⁹⁸ In said passage—precisely on the grounds of inappropriateness ('hetton harmóttei', 'aprepès)—the philosopher criticizes 'Lysias' for 'indulging in wordplay ('onómasi paízein') in a serious ('spoude', 'spoudázonta') context' ("Lysias" 48–49, §14). Theophrastus (being quoted) then apparently cites from the orator to prove the point that Dionysius aims to refute—not on stylistic and propriety-related grounds (being in line with the philosopher in this respect), but by challenging the respective oration's ascription to 'Lysias', deeming it words put into the latter's mouth mistakenly and inequitably:

If this had really been written by Lysias, he might justly be thought deserving of censure for introducing felicities ['charientizómenos'] at an infelicitous time ['en ou charienti kairo']. But if the speech is by someone else, which it is, it is the unfair critic who deserves blame, not Lysias. ("Lysias" 48–49, §14)¹⁹⁹

Lysias'] were written for performance by the very person being characterized" (55). "The task of the ethopoet [...] is to create this sort of character [sc. a 'fair-minded, reasonable speaker'] when writing for a client" (40); "the aim of ethopoetic style is to create an impression of favorable [...] character" (48). Bruss' (generally problematic) severance of logographic *ethopoeia* from other forms of said technique cannot plausibly apply to Dionysius—precisely since his is also a rhetorico-theoretical metatext. The Ancient *rhétor* is concerned with describing the practice of vicarious, forensic *ethopoiía*—as available in written form: relegating (let alone detaching) the epideictic or deliberative will hardly seem plausible, much less descriptive (*de re*).

198 As suggested (cf. subchs. 3.1, 5.2), the ventriloquistic devices seem to evince a tendency toward layering, proliferation (even 'virality'). Devries frames his paraphrase in such a way as to render it a *sermocinatio*: "Of Lysias' use of ethopoiía Dionysius [...] says in substance: 'Lysias proved himself the superior of all the orators in perception of human nature [...]. Every detail that will serve [...] the orator does not fail to introduce'. Such is the opinion of the Greek critic on Lysias' use of ethopoiía" (14–15; cf. M. Morgan's uptake at "Intro." xxxi–xxxii, §27).

199 Cf. Blass (*Beredsamkeit I.* 386); contrast Norden (*Kunstprosa I.* 120n., I.i.iv). Webster thinks that "Plato's treatment of Lysias in the *Phaedrus*" might "lie[...] behind" the Theophrastan "judgment[...]" (122). Dionysius uses a timeless ploy: "That Lysias did not write the speech for Nicias, [...] that it is written neither in his spirit ['psyches'] nor his style ['léxeos'], I can prove by an abundance of evidence ['pány tekmeríois']; but the present treatise does not afford me the opportunity ['kairòn'] to do so. I am [...] composing a monograph [...] in which [...] I shall show which are his genuine speeches, [...] giv[ing] a detailed account of this speech and its [...] authenticity" ("Lysias" 48–51, §14). A validation being unattainable—with claims to historicity tending to be rhetorical (ruses) at any rate—focusing on the process of *sermocinatio* will suffice. On the oratorico-poetical nexus, cf. Fuhrmann: "Dionysios hat durch sein Œuvre eine [...] stark literarisierte Art der Rhetorik [...] entscheidend gefördert" (*Dichtungstheorie* 196). One may note his yield for a (neo-)Humanistic, comparatist approach generally—*pace* Vickers (*Defence* 51n.).

4.2 Toward an Oratorico-Dramatic Approach to Authorship: Selfcraft in Shakespeare and Cervantes

Do we yet appreciate fully the effect of rhetoric upon even so obvious a field as education? Diplomats? Preaching? Science? These are [...] questions whose answers [...] require concerted, persistent efforts over time.
—Murphy (“Authors” 36)²⁰⁰

at homines [...] non nascuntur, sed finguntur.
—Erasmus (“Declamation” 31, LB493)²⁰¹

200 Cf. “Renaissance rhetoric must surely be one of the most-mentioned and least-studied subjects in modern scholarship” (Murphy “Authors” 29).

201 Cf. “Los maestros de retórica se empeñan en fabricar oradores, según aquello de que *poeta nascitur, orator fit*” (Rico Verdú 11). See Vives, in particular: “neque vero tam spectabimus quid eum, quem loquentem facimus, deceat, ut personam, quam nos ei imponimus [...] tales ipsi non sunt, at nos facimus” (185, Aa.r, II.xvi). Cf. Hacking (*cum grano salis*): “anyone who thinks about the individual, the person, must reflect on this [...] idea, of making up people” (233). This heuristic segment aims at applying the taxonomic reflections of subch. 3.3 to spec. cases—the publicly (textually) projected *personae* named ‘Shakespeare’, ‘Cervantes’—with the purpose of conducing to a comprehensive reassessment of authorship in terms of rhetorical selfcraft. An extended notion of the term in question is common in Antiquity: “Die Bedeutung persona = dramatische, literarische Figur deckt sich nicht selten mit der Bedeutung persona = historische Figur oder geht fügenlos in sie über” (Fuhrmann “Persona” 87n.); for “a similar transition from the persona in drama to th[at] in [real] life”, he refers to *De Officiis* (“Persona” 87n.; trans. dsM; cf. 98; Cicero *De Officiis* 98–99, I.xxviii.97). As to the Byzantine context, cf. “Der Gebrauch des P[ersona]-Begriffs, der bald den Adressaten (Hörer, Leser, Richter [...] Publikum), bald den Autor des literarischen Werkes bezeichnet, weitet sich aus” (Boriaud/Schouler 800). For further references, see Mayfield (“Interplay” 26n.–27n.). Greenblatt appears to be writing off the rhetorico-dramatic term in a half-line on Chaucer (*Self-Fashioning* 1): while not making an etymologico-conceptual (let alone descriptive) use thereof, he explicitly rejects the utility of “the view that the speaker is a *persona*” in one case, apparently since he takes the latter to be “detached” from “both poet and audience” (*Self-Fashioning* 151)—a separation disallowed in view of the resp. text’s “remarkably intense [...] *presence*” (*Self-Fashioning* 152). In so doing, the critic takes the unified identity of the sender (as well as that of any receiver) for granted; and the impression (linguistically) effected as proof for an expressive essence. The concept in question appears to be discarded due to Greenblatt’s (tacitly) presupposing ‘the’ self (passim); cf. e.g. “More’s [...] engagement in the world involved precisely the maintaining of a calculated distance between his public persona and his inner self” (*Self-Fashioning* 45; reiterated at 68); neither are pluralized—so as to preserve the consistent identity of the latter by severance from the former (with the externalization, essence posited). When the critic speaks of “Elizabeth’s conscious sense of her identity as at least in part a *persona ficta* and her world as a theater” (*Self-Fashioning* 167), he similarly presupposes the substance believed to be (partly) shrouded by the drapery. It will hardly be incidental that Greenblatt writes off rhetoric summarily (*Self-Fashioning* 162); the proportions must seem problematic, given the *téchne*’s pervasiveness—in

Given a culture suffused with an all-encompassing oratorical education (with worldviews and forms of conduct reliably guided by rhetorical conceptions), it may seem plausible to apply the latter to the *litterae* also—hence see a given writer or playwright as (virtually) performing a role, taking on *personae* in keeping with the (con)textual (socio-moral, pragmatic) situation at hand.²⁰²

Cultural settings as may be deemed especially rhetorical in said comprehensive sense are (*inter alia*) the Greece of the (itinerant) Sophists, the Hellenistic Age *tout court*; the (Republican, Imperial) Rome of Cicero, Seneca,

terms of education, social (public, civic, communal) life; as to forensic, politico-deliberative oratory, homiletics, pamphleteering, letter writing, the affine arts (particularly the theater), etc.

202 The set of problems inherited from an Idealist, Romanticist terminology may seem spec. patent in takes laying claim to a rhetorical approach otherwise. M. Crane aims “to resituate the commonplace book in its intellectual, social, [...] ideological milieus”, whose “twin discursive practices of ‘gathering’ [...] textual fragments and ‘framing’ [...] them” she deems “an influential model for authorial practice and for authoritative self-fashioning” (3). She uses a narrow view of oratory: “Gathering and framing were not just rhetorical strategies” (3; also: 9, 202n.). Instead of perceiving the *téchne* qua versatile, poly-purposive, (potentially, historically) transcending disciplinary, sociopolitical confines (being the Ancient, Humanist case), M. Crane submits an ideologically loaded dichotomy, positing “individualistic, imitative, imaginative, [...] aristocratic paradigms for selfhood and authorship” on the adverse side, claiming rather “a version of authorship that was collective instead of individualist, published instead of private” (4; the dualism is repeated at 6). While she opposes “overly teleological accounts” (11), wishes “to begin to understand the English Renaissance in all its otherness” (199), “to push aside anachronistic assumptions”, the latter is qualified by this tacit presupposition: “about the nature of the self” (11). Still, M. Crane refers to “subjectivity and authorship” (5), “the process of forming the ‘modern subject’ as a ‘self-regulating bourgeois individual’”, “individuality” (6), a “curiously modern subjectivity” (197). The critic confesses her projecting “a mix of theoretical fragments, divorced from their [...] systems” (referring to Derrida, Foucault, Bourdieu, “Lacanian subject-formation”) back onto the Early Modern Age, thereby to counter the “Renaissance” that is “the product of the nineteenth century” (10): she apparently believes to be remedying the latter’s anachronisms by another—and in the name of “the demands of historicism” (10). M. Crane adopts a teleology construing that “those nineteenth-century concepts of self and work had not yet been fully formulated in the Renaissance”, asserting a “halting and uncertain movement in this period toward ‘modern’ concepts of self and work”; then claims that she is “concerned [...] to excavate traces of sixteenth-century *difference* from these modern concepts”—while her next sentence proffers a self-refutation: “In the long process of creating the individual” etc. (10; cf. 202n.–203n.). There may be (linguistic) traces of a more rhetorical view; in passing, she speaks of “versions of self”, a resp. “present self”, “rival versions of the self” (which still presupposes ‘it’), “Shakespeare’s sonnet speaker project[ing] a self”, “tak[ing] up” a “role”; these partly descriptive insights decidedly jar with the Idealist terminology used *passim*—M. Crane has “modern subjectivity”, “shap[ing] the subject” on the same page (197; cf. 198). The critic’s take is also problematic due to its narrow focus on the English Renaissance—Early Modern rhetoric being a pan-European phenomenon.

Quintilian, and the Second Sophistic, up to (and including) Augustine; (Late) Medieval times (under the influence of Nominalism), as well as the Early Modern Age throughout Europe—from the rise of Humanism to the Baroque.²⁰³

203 Baumlín, giving a comparable list (xviii), logs: “In each of these epochs [...], rhetoric achieves a dominant position in intellectual culture” (xxviii, an endn.); he states that “the early Renaissance” is “described as a third sophistic” (xviii). Despite a brief mention of Altman’s study (cf. *passim*)—noting that arguing “*in utramque partem* [...] permeated intellectual life in the early sixteenth century” (Greenblatt *Self-Fashioning* 230–231)—and ostensibly irrespective of his incidental claim (in the same paragraph) that “the cornerstone of the humanist project was a rhetorical education” (*Self-Fashioning* 230), this is neither reflected in the critic’s overall take (or applications); nor do said remarks seem to conduce to any more precise, detailed (let alone sustained) deliberations in Greenblatt’s inexplicit use of the polyfunctional, universalist *téchne kat’ exochén*. Apart from casual references (cf. *Self-Fashioning* 17, 22, 215, 283n.)—almost always sans technical taxonomies (added here for the reader’s convenience)—the art of rhetoric (including the resp. adjective, adverb, words relating to ‘eloquence’) is incidentally referred or alluded to in terms of *persuadere* (*Self-Fashioning* 102; 105; 215), *movere* (*Self-Fashioning* 103), *elocutio* (*Self-Fashioning* 23; 65; 87; 155), *copia* (*Self-Fashioning* 81), *actio* (*Self-Fashioning* 29–30; 87), often downplayed in so doing (*Self-Fashioning* 16, “anxious”; 60; 86; 97, “inflated”; 235, “rhetorical extremism”; cf. *Negotiations* 2, “anxious”), or used as an (ideological) offhand (see *Self-Fashioning* 69, 79, 89, 141, 151, 164, 203, 206, 253). With a passing reference to Burckhardt as his chief source for presuming the existence of what he calls “Renaissance self-fashioning” (*Self-Fashioning* 161), Greenblatt takes “established forms of identity” to be replaced by a view of “the self and the state as works of art”, whose act is given said label (*Self-Fashioning* 162); as the critic’s intertext signals (cf. *Self-Fashioning* xiii; 258n.), that construal is ultimately indebted to Mirandolian Neo-Platonism (see Greene 242–243). In this context, Greenblatt has a rundown on the art: “men created new models [...]. The chief intellectual and linguistic tool in this creation was rhetoric, which held the central place in the humanist education to which most gentlemen were at least exposed. Rhetoric was the common ground of poetry, history, [...] oratory; it could mediate [...] between [...] past and [...] present [...] the imagination and the realm of public affairs. Encouraging [...] to think of all forms of human discourse as argument, it conceived of poetry as a performing art, literature as a storehouse of models [...] offered [...] the power to shape [...] worlds, calculate [...] probabilities, [...] master the contingent [...] implied that human character itself could be similarly fashioned, with an eye to audience and effect. Rhetoric served to theatricalize culture, or rather it was the instrument of a society [...] already deeply theatrical” (*Self-Fashioning* 162). Apart from ostensibly giving an account as minimally invasive as possible, this précis will hardly seem balanced (see “at least exposed”, “could”, his bias implied in “storehouse of models”), or precise (cf. “Rhetoric”, “oratory”); the want of any descriptive taxonomies must seem problematic, spec. with respect to *ethopoía*—where Greenblatt’s (titular) thesis is directly concerned (cf. “human character itself could be [...] fashioned”—the reflexive stress signaling a discordant essentialism). As to “Theatricality” (qua “disguise and histrionic self-presentation”) the value judgments continue (“alienated”, “uneasily”, “fetishistic”, “essentially”, “simply”); and while the “handbooks for actors” are seen as “closely related to the rhetorical” ones, their purpose—“offering an integrated rhetoric of the self, a model for the formation of an artificial identity” (*Self-Fashioning* 162)—is seen in

In line with its guiding metaphor—seeing every human being as performing on the stage of the world—the latter period might seem to stand out, in that it conceives of actor and orator as one, of rhetoric as an “eminently social phenomenon” (Barner 89; trans. dsm; see 86–131).²⁰⁴ Such may well be said of

substantialist terms (premising “the self”, a preestablished “identity” veiled by an “artificial” one). Greenblatt is dressing (up) an essence. As per a tacit ethopoetic hint, he seems prepared to log an “ethos of rhetorical self-fashioning”, plus “a sophistic view of the world”, amounting to “a celebration of Protean man”; but disavows all of the above by prefixing value judgments presuming an authenticity or verity said descriptions fail to meet (cf. “several convenient distortions”, “discreet omission”, *Self-Fashioning* 164). A similar take colors a related case: “Confident in his shaping power, Iago has the role-player’s ability to imagine his nonexistence so that he can exist for a moment in another and as another. [...] ‘Were I the Moor, I would not be Iago’ (1.1.57)” (*Self-Fashioning* 235); this all but descriptive remark leads to the query “Is the ‘I’ in both halves of the line the same?” (*Self-Fashioning* 235)—but the critic directly dualizes, as per his premising “identity”, “the subject” (*Self-Fashioning* 236). At once, the passage on ‘Iago’ had been prequalified as “a parodically sententious theory of self-fashioning” (*Self-Fashioning* 235). The critic’s devotion to psychoanalytico-biographistic speculations superstructures all of his construals, inhibiting descriptivity: “Iago is not the playwright’s only representation of himself. [...] Shakespeare [...] possessed a limitless talent for entering into the consciousness of another, perceiving its deepest structures as a manipulable fiction, reinscribing it into his own narrative form” (*Self-Fashioning* 252). That leads him to declaring “Montaigne” an ‘inventor’ of a “mode of *non-narrative* self-fashioning” (*Self-Fashioning* 252), while Shakespeare is construed as “the supreme purveyor of ‘empathy’, the fashioner of narrative selves” (*Self-Fashioning* 252–253). The critic’s reductive, non-diachronic, ideological take on rhetoric affects his claims (here as elsewhere), renders problematic his wish to be guarding against “losing a sense of the larger networks of meaning” (*Self-Fashioning* 4; cf. 5); as well as his asking “what forces were at work in sixteenth-century England that enabled individuals to conceive of themselves as malleable roles in life itself as well as in writing” (*Self-Fashioning* xiii). A failure to pertinently address the art’s linguistico-technical aspects will typically result in a disregard for (or even a denial of) its methodical, poly-purposive, transgeneric, universal im- and applications. In Greenblatt’s later monograph, the lack of any significant, detailed discussion of rhetoric—let alone as a whole (cf. passing remarks, *Negotiations* 2, 6, 46, 54, 57)—seems spec. problematic, given the critic’s focus on “cultural transactions”, “collective production”, “the social dimension of literature’s power” (*Negotiations* 4), “contingent social practices”, “a poetics of culture” (*Negotiations* 5; cf. *Self-Fashioning* 5)—all of which not only imply the noetico-linguistic *téchne par excellence*; but would, in any (discourse) historical, descriptive approach to Early Modernity, unequivocally necessitate a sustained, methodical, thorough recourse to the art and traditions of rhetoric. Cf. Küpper’s critico-functional evaluation of Greenblatt’s overall (and narrowly “national”) take, spec. as to the latter’s “metonymy of circulating social energy” (“Hypotheses” 5; with 3–6).

204 Cf. Plett: “in the Renaissance [...] practically every pupil was trained to be an actor-poet” (*Culture* 283). “The world [...] becomes one grand stage on which the actor-poet performs in varying costumes” (*Culture* 288). Stressing “[d]ie große Theaterfreudigkeit der Menschen”, Burger logs: “Im Zeitalter des Barock lebt der Mensch in der Tat [...] sein Leben als Rolle [...] als mehrere wechselnde Rollen” (*Rolle* 85). “Modell der Barockgesellschaft ist der Hof [...]er [...]

Early Modernity overall—whose rhetorico-dramatic worldview is condensed in notable lines from the Shakespearean corpus:

Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player, / That struts and frets his hour upon the stage[.] (*Macbeth* 288, V.v.23–24)

All the world's a stage, / And all the men and women merely players. / They have their exits and their entrances, / And one man in his time plays many parts[.] (*As You Like It* 227, II.vii.140–143; with 227n.)²⁰⁵

This socio-dramatic isotopy—prevalent for well over two millennia of Western culture—refers to an oratorico-theatrical conception of the term '*persona*', with

bedeutet die Welt. Ein Mann von Welt [...] heißt der Hofmann. Er spielt [...] eine Rolle" (*Rolle* 87). Cf. "Barockrhetorik [...] ist auf Mitspielen, auf Kommunikation ausgerichtet, ein eminent soziales Phänomen" (Barner 89; with Heudecker/Wesche 104). "Durch [...] Gestaltung und Durchstilisierung seines leibhaften Auftretens rückt den Redner in die Nähe des Schauspielers" (Oesterreich *Fundamentalrhet.* 129; cf. 136). Moos observes: "Da jedermann schauspielert, muß es auch Zuschauer geben" (512, §106); "quia spectaculum facti sumus mundo, et angelis, et hominibus" (*ICor* 4:9; *Vulgate*; with Moos (512n.); Quiring (11). Cf. "zur epochalen Metapher wurde nicht die 'Weltmusik', sondern das 'Welttheater': weil [...] hier der Mensch wirklich als agierende *persona* in Erscheinung tritt, als Schauspieler [...] Rhetor" (Barner 93; with Marschall 520). Cf. Gordon on "Peletier du Mans"—for whom, "as for Shakespeare[,] all the world's a stage", with "the poet [...]play[ing] the most conspicuous role" (380). As to Hermogenes' influence on Delminio's "gnoseo-magical system" elaborated in his "*Theater of the World*", cf. Monfasani (186). On the metaphor of the 'world qua theater', see Blumenberg (*Höhlenausgänge* 373, as to Condillac; *Paradigmen* 27; 34–35; with Bacon's *Advancement* 85, [II.ii.3]; *Schiffbruch* 39–40; 45–46; with Trüstedt "Schiffbruch" 108); cf. Quiring (8): "der Erfolg der Metapher ['hängt'] mit ihrer enormen Variabilität und [...] Zirkularität zusammen[...] sie kann [...] dazu dienen, die Welt als Theater zu repräsentieren, [...] das Theater als Welt; beide Elemente [...] können die Position des Bildspenders wie die des Bildempfängers einnehmen" (7); "als *theatrum mundi* kann [...] die gesellschaftliche [...] [und] die kosmische Ordnung bezeichnet werden; [...] die Metapher kann eingesetzt werden, um d[eren] Spannung [...] zu verdecken [...] zu betonen" (19). On Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, see Marquard: "In dieser Vorstellung namens Welt spielen wir unsere 'Rolle' [...] werden [...] zu dem, 'was einer vorstellt'" (*Aesthetica* 110; cf. Schopenhauer 315; 350–401). For further references, see Mayfield ("Interplay" 27n., 32n.–33n.).

205 Cf. Prospero's affine remarks (*Tempest* 253–254, 4.1.148–158; 285–286, Epilogue.1–15). In a (meta-)soliloquy ("the world is populous / And here is not a creature but myself"), with "thoughts" vicariously "peopl[ing] his little world" (*Richard II.* 461, 5.5.3–4, 5.5.9), Richard engages in virtual roleplay: "Thus play I in one person many people" (*Richard II.* 463, 5.5.31; with 463n.). Cf. "The stage of Shakespearean theater is the [...] world (*Theatrum mundi*). [...] This [...] is a [...] legacy of the medieval theater [...] public spectacles" (Bakhtin *Speech* 171n.; "Methodology" 74n.). "Totus mundus agit histrionem" [...] ein möglicher Epochenschlüssel der Renaissance" (Plett "*Theatrum Rhet.*" 328). See Curtius (150–151, §7.5); Moos (508–512, §106); F. Neumann in Lipsius (379n.–380n.); Quiring (14–15); Dusing (42–43). Cf. subch. 3.3, herein.

decidedly communal and public implications (see subchapter 3.3, above).²⁰⁶ Even so, the ‘modern’ state of play as regards the word ‘person’ is at variance therewith: its dramatico-rhetorical associations have largely been displaced, primarily due to Pauline, (Neo-)Platonizing, Stoicizing Christianity—including modifications, (secularized) derivatives, (tacit) byproducts.²⁰⁷ Fuhrmann notes:

the Romans took *persona* [...] to mean something like ‘function’ or role, but not, what we today ([...] since Kant, at the latest) are wont to understand by [the term] ‘person’. (“*Persona*” 83; trans. dsm; cf. 85)²⁰⁸

206 Cf. “la tragédie utilisait masques typiques [...]. La comédie [...] aussi, de types généraux” (Nédoncelle 280). On “*persona*”: “Comment s’est effectuée la transposition du théâtre à la vie? [À] la fois par l’idée de masque et [...] de personnage. La première conduit plutôt à la notion d’un *type* ou [...] *caractère* observables du dehors [...]. La seconde [...] mène à une *conception sociale ou morale de la personne*” (298). Said article (all but) neglects the art—apart from brief (forensic) references: “*rôle en justice*” in Cicero (297; cf. “fonctionnaires”, 282; “juristes”, 298).

207 See Fuhrmann (“*Persona*” 102–104). Cf. “Tragende Bedeutung erhält die P[ersona] in zwei [...] Bereichen der [...] Theologie: [...] der Trinitäts- und [...] Inkarnationslehre. [...] *prósōpon* entspricht [...] de[r] neuplatonischen [...] Hypostase oder [...] der Person” (Boriaud/Schouler 799). See Oesterreich: “Ciceros pluralistisches Modell menschlicher Selbsterfindung in seiner Vier-Personen-Lehre [...] [‘bildet’] die für eine rhetorikaffine Rekonstruktion des Begriffs der P[erson] vielleicht wichtigste antike Quelle. Dagegen kommt es in der christlichen Metaphysik [...] zu einer [...] Substantialisierung, Rationalisierung [...] Uniformisierung des Personbegriffes. [...] Durch diese [...] geht für die [...] Personen der [...] Trinität der typisch theatralische [...] rhetorische Rollen-Charakter des römischen *Persona*-Modells verloren” (“*Person*” 865; cf. “Polypersonalität” 77; Cicero *De Officiis* 108–109, I.xxx.107; 116–119, I.xxxii.115). On the idea of the “subject”, of “individual autonomy [...] at least since Descartes and Kant”, Gill notes: “underlying this idea [...] is the conviction, which forms part of Christian thought, that each individual person, or soul, is an object of special concern to God” (“Particulars” 129). Qua shoots of such (otherworldly) construals, Cartesianism, Idealism, Romanticism (plus countless spinoffs) assert a stable, substantialist ‘subject’, unified ‘identity’, sundry forms of entitlement to ‘dignity’, an essential, unchangeable, inalienable ‘Being’ for each ‘individual’ (*soi-disant*). From a rhetorical perspective, letting philosophers speak of ‘the Self’ may seem akin to having theologians preach about ‘the Soul’: ‘*cui bono*’. Thereto, cf. Lausberg (*Handbuch* 93, §158–159).

208 “Die[...] rationalistische [...] identitätslogische Tendenz der [...] Subjektivitätsphilosophie, die von [...] rhetorikaffinen [...] [A]spekten wie Leiblichkeit, Orationalität [...] Rollenpluralität abstrahiert, läßt sich bis in die ‘Transzendente Logik’ in Kants ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’ [...] verfolgen”—which Oesterreich calls “rhetorikrepugnant[e]r Kognitivismus” (“*Person*” 867; cf. “Subjektivität” 1292; *Fundamentalrhet.* 95–102). His attempt at a “fundamentalrhetorische Rekonstruktion der von Descartes ausgehenden Tradition der Subjektphilosophie, die für eine starke theoretische Positionierung des Ich plädiert” (“Polypersonalität” 76; cf. “Identität”, 83)—Oesterreich’s “Projekt der Exploration dieser möglichen Symbiose von Rhetorik und Subjektphilosophie” (“Polypersonalität” 75)—amounts to a *contradictio in adiecto*. In line with a subjectivist slant, he (circularly) presupposes the self (cf. “Polypersonalität” 78: “der eigenen

For heuristic purposes, one might call to mind the Ancient and Early Modern

Person”; Descartes projected backward: “Gesamtpersönlichkeit”, 81; with 83). On the contrary, rhetoric is transpersonal, contextually conative. Oesterreich’s mysticisms, -fications—seeing an “arkane[s] Wissen[...] um die artifizielle [...] plurale Formbarkeit der eigenen Persönlichkeit” as “Berufsgeheimnisse[...] professioneller Rhetoriker” (“Polypersönlichkeit” 78)—are Romanticist, (symptomatically) anachronistic. Such will not pertain to an Ancient context, where ‘rhetoric’ may have been many a thing, but hardly ‘arcane’ (to say nothing of the stock *progymnasmata*). Oesterreich’s seeing “drei gegeneinander relativ abgeschlossene Sinngebiete (inter-)personaler Überzeugungsbildung” (*Fundamentalrhet.* 83; cf. 82–88) seems fundamentally unrhetorical—a result of rationalistic, Enlightenment, Romanticist bias in said critic: “Essenz der [...] Identität” (*Fundamentalrhet.* 82), “‘Geburtsstätte’ der Subjektivität” (*Fundamentalrhet.* 83), “‘eigentlicher Sinnidentität’” (*Fundamentalrhet.* 86; cf. 87), “authentisch[...]” (*Fundamentalrhet.* 88; 132–142; most problematically: “das authentische Ethos”, 100); his moralizing is but consequential (“denaturieren”, “Deformation”, *Fundamentalrhet.* 88; cf. 87; passim). As to ideas of ‘the Selfe’, Reiss speaks of “whoness—from [...] Petrarca’s time to [...] Descartes”, with “personhood” qua “sense [...] of *who* and *what* she or he was in everyday experience, in doing and being in the local world” (1). While wishing to offer “*aspects*”, “‘takes’ on experiences of who-ness” (6), to start from “a communally embedded sense of being human” (3; cf. 2, 23–24)—with “*circles* or *spheres*” that “*precede*[...] the person”, giving in “public and collective” terms “what a person was” (2)—Reiss essentializes the latter (cf. “integral to my very substance”, “existential”, 2; “essential”, 3, 21; “divine”, 5; “essential differences”, 16; despite disclaimers at 8–9, 23); such a ‘socializing’ metaphysics obtains passim (cf. 2–3; 5–6). The critic thus rejects that these “were [...] social roles or positions [...] adopted [...]. These realms *were* what it was to be human” (3). He perseveres in said dismissal when faced with “Aristotle[’s] [...] functional concept of the human”, Cicero’s theory of “roles (*personae*)”—by asserting: “this misdirects attention” (4)—i.e. away from his presuppositions, to where he could hardly want it (a dramatico-oratorical view); in parentheses, apparently sans bearing on his case, Reiss notes that “(like others, Cicero stressed the theatrical meanings of *persona*)” (128). In light thereof, it will hardly be accidental that the critic (all but) entirely neglects that other “two-thousand-year overarching system” (23)—rhetoric—throughout (for incidental mentions, cf. e.g. 195, 288–289, 399, 430, 478, 484–486, partly in citations or titles); in at least one instance, this (ostensively purposive) oversight seems to veer into outright contempt for the art: “At worst, these chapters may be useful in classicists’ and philosophers’ debates” (8). Referring to “divers personhoods”, Reiss apparently means various versions of his construal; coming up against “several names” (a structurally symptomatic instance), the critic supposes “unreliability”, premises an entity in stating: “who she was fades in and out” (24). Similarly: “The community had to know whether that *persona* was a mask or a person” (385). Reiss not only believes his coinage “who-ness” to “seem fairly neutral”, but also the concept of “‘person(hood)’” (25); virtually all of his mentions of the Ancient terms (*‘persona’*, *‘prósopon’*) refer to Cicero’s Stoicizing “four *personae*” (127; cf. 128–129, 210, 261), or affine takes (241; 252–253). For Petrarch, he logs that “[t]o choose the civic (‘political’) life was to elect a *persona*”—but qualifies: “What *persona* was available depended on one’s particular human *natura*” (322). A poetico-rhetorical conception of the term may be involved as to the *Canzoniere*: “the present *persona* [...], by collecting the scattered rhymes, brings itself into existence [...]. It is a *persona* rebuilt from and in all these poems” (342).

conception of *personae* (with their forensico-theatrical, politico-mercantilistic implications), and tentatively apply them to the present: Oesterreich, for instance, discerns a ‘pluralization or multiplication of roles’ in a globalizing world (cf. “Person” 862; 867; 869; 871); *de re*, the thoroughgoing virtualization characterizing the new millennium may seem to signal an intensely and comprehensively rhetorical age worldwide.²⁰⁹

Like ‘*éthe*’, the affine concept in question is (highly) contextual: *personae* are seen as agents in relation to the society they live and act in.²¹⁰

209 As to the multimedia cultures of a virtual age, Oesterreich discerns a “Rollenvermehrung des gesellschaftlichen Selbst”—a “general consciousness of the rhetorical artificiality of [one’s] own[,] personal roleplay”—while speaking of the “artificial rhetorical forming of [one’s] own[,] self-staged personality” (“Person” 871; trans. dsm); the latter might be pluralized.

210 Cf. Bakhtin: “rhetoric has always to do with social man” (*Dialogic* 353). “The world has contextual meaning” (*Speech* 159; “Methodology” 63). As per Currie, “indirect characterization [...] through membership of the key micro- and macro-social groups (*genos* and *polis*)” (314) is paramount—not only in Ancient times and *litterae*; cf. Bakker on “characterization by group membership” (“Lysias” 423). De Temmerman/Emde Boas log: “characters [...] are embedded in societal norms and codes” (“Intro.” 22n.; cf. 7–9)—with their references to Gill *cum grano salis*, given his routine deprioritizing of the art (wherein they partly partake). As to Cicero, Gill does note: “*De Officiis* [...] presents *officia*, duties or obligations, as grounded in the nexus of roles, *mores* [...] *instituta* that [...] make[s] up the culture” (“Personhood” 196); “the *decorum* theory as a whole (of which the *personae*-theory is a part) presupposes a particular social structure” (“Personhood” 193; cf. “Particulars” 133). Yet said critic’s take seems enfeebled by an ostensive innocence of rhetoric’s import in this respect (its absence being spec. striking at “Particulars” 137–138; 141n.; 142–143; likewise *passim*); while pointing to a significant lacuna in Gill’s slant (here re “*kairos*”), Hobbs equally eludes the art (150; *passim*). On contextualism, cf. “Jeder Persontopos besitzt einen gegenüber [...] anderen Positionen mehr oder weniger definierten Ort im Ordnungsgefüge der Gesamtopik, den [...] gesellschaftlichen status. [...] einzelne[...] Persontopoi sind [...]pragmatische Vor-bilder, [...] Gesinnungs- [...] Handlungstyp[en] [...]. Diese [...]pragmatischen Persontopoi sind [...] [als] ‘ethos’, ‘persona’ [...] ‘soziale Rolle’ bekannt. [...] In der Bedeutungstradition der *persona* als *prosopon*, [...] Maske [...], entwickelt sich mit der *theatrum-mundi*-Idee die Vorstellung der Person als rollenspielende”—acting “eine Pluralität sozialer Rollen” (Oesterreich *Fundamentalrhet.* 86). “Persontopoi” are “*habitualisierte* Gesinnungs- [...] Handlungstypisierungen, die einem [...] geschichtlichen Lebensweltbild zugehören”: “ein Reservoir für die [...] Gestaltung” of roles; “jeder Topos ist aufgrund seiner *Potentialität* [...] vielsinnig interpretierbar [...], das jeweilige Rollenschema” is “ausgelegt, ausgestaltet [...] situativ verwirklicht”; “die Kombination einer ganzen Reihe von Persontopoi” is possible, leading to ‘multidimensional social’ *personae*; “die *Symbolizität* der Persontopoi [‘besteht’] vor allem in den für sie bezeichnenden sprachlichen Typisierungen und persuasiven ‘Rollen’”; “die Vorweg-Geltung des allgemeinen Sozialstatus [‘verbindet sich’] mit den in der [...] Realisation bedeutsamen [...] Geltungselementen zur [...] *Autorität*” (*Fundamentalrhet.* 87; see the felicitous wording: “Reservoir der rhetorischen Typisierungen”). As to the Baroque, cf. Burger: “die ‘Person’ [‘steht’] in [...] Wechselbeziehung zur Mitwelt, zu den Mitmenschen,

‘Individualistic’ notions (*soi-disant*) are secondary (if that).²¹¹ Essentialist approaches must seem misguided, given the typical contingency of communal ‘habits’ and ‘mores’, ‘parts’ or ‘roles’.²¹² Even so, the inductive description of variants may lead to the discernment of certain general tendencies.²¹³ In Ancient Athens or Rome, Early Modern England, France, or on the Iberian Peninsula (for instance), one is dealing with societies—be they democratic, republican, imperial, or courtly—wherein *actores* are perceived with respect to the prevalent social fabric and its corresponding roleplay. The preponderance of a distinctly rhetorical worldview in Castiglione may be taken as a Renaissance case in point—specifically the emphasis on *decorum* qua situational effectuality:

a universal rule [...] valid [...] in all human affairs whether in word or deed: [...] avoid affectation in every way possible [...] practice in all things a certain *sprezzatura* [...] [‘usar in ogni cosa una certa sprezzatura’], so as to conceal all art [‘che nasconda l’arte’] and make whatever is done or said appear to be without effort[.] (*Courtier* 32, 1.26; *Cortegiano* 59, I.xxvi)²¹⁴

antwortet auf deren Anspruch [...] bringt sich zur Geltung” (*Rolle* 88). See Davis (53; *passim*), *cum grano salis*: while wishing to differ from Burckhardt’s idea of individualism, stressing that “the exploration of self in sixteenth-century France was made in [...] relation to the groups to which people belonged”, she proceeds from a dualistic premise (cf. “the conceptual self and the bodily self”), presupposes “the self” or “identity” (53; cf. 56, 63), speaks of “autonomy”, “individuality” (60; cf. 62), of “the person” (63)—and does not perceive that the notion of a ‘*persona*’ is present, even when citing a resp. instance from her sundry sources (cf. 54).

211 To say nothing of (Romanticizing, psychoanalytico-)metaphysical construals—premising ‘the’ self, appending whichever terminological couture may happen to be *en vogue* at the time.

212 Accentuating contingency (see Mayfield *Artful* 12n.; 36–38, 36n.; 53; 445–451; *passim*) will seem expedient with respect to defusing a fashionable desire for essentializing. Cf. “das Ethos [‘wird’] ständig durch den konkreten Fall modifiziert, [...] neu ausgelegt” (Ptassek 65). Likewise Baumlin, noting that “*ethos*” will “change over time and among cultures” (xxii). See Geertz: “Human thought is consummately social: [...] in its origins, [...] functions, [...] forms, [...] applications. [...] thinking is a public activity—its [...] habitat is the houseyard, [...] marketplace, [...] town square” (385, §14). “In [...] anthropolog[y] [...], the moral ([...] aesthetic) aspects of a given culture, the evaluative elements, have commonly been summed up in the term ‘ethos’ [...]. A people’s ethos is the tone, character, [...] quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style [...] the underlying attitude toward themselves and their world” (136–137, §5.i). He admits: “The concepts [...], ethos and world view, are vague [...] imprecise” (153, §5.iv). While employing a problematic gauge (cf. “Burckhardt”, “Renaissance princes”, 433, §14), Geertz’ application is of heuristic value: he describes “public men, [...] for whom other aspects of personhood—individual character, birth order, kinship relations, procreative status, and prestige rank take, symbolically at least, a secondary position. [...] they, focusing on social position, say that their role is [...] their [...] selves” (411, §14; infinitized, essentialisms quarantined).

213 See Blumenberg (*Beschreibung* 487; cf. 485); Mayfield (“Variants of *hypólepsis*” 238–239).

214 Cf. Castiglione’s context: “facility in such things causes the greatest wonder; [...] we may

Said accent on an apparently artless adaptation to given environs involves the concept at issue: to speak of *'personae'* signifies the playing of 'roles', donning of 'masks', taken up from a civic, official inventory (always with variation); as well as the contextual crafting (re-describing), feckful conveying, of public 'faces' or 'images' (with correlative 'voices', 'bearings')—'worn', performed, projected, staged, in accordance with customary, recognizable functions, within a social setting, as per prevalent cultural routines.²¹⁵ The condition of possibility for a (decidedly) rhetorico-pluralistic 'poetics of self' will likely be the (ostensible) processual stability—a simultaneity of variance and consistency—facilitated by a technico-natural *héxis*: one might lend a hand to habit.²¹⁶

call art true art which does not seem to be art [*'esser vera arte che non pare esser arte'*]; nor must one be more careful of anything than of concealing it [*'nasconderla'*] [...] certain most excellent orators in ancient times [*'alcuni antichi oratori eccellentissimi'*] [...] tried to make everyone believe [*'far credere ad ognuno'*] that they had no knowledge whatever of letters [*'sé non aver notizia alcuna di lettere'*]; and, dissembling [*'dissimulando'*] their knowledge, they made their orations appear to be composed in the simplest manner" (*Courtier* 32, I.26; *Cortegiano* 59, I.xxvi; cf. 59n.). Cf. Cicero's "neglegentia [...] diligens" ("Orator" 362, xxiii.76; with: "quod indicet non ingrati neglegentiam", xxiii.77). See Plett: "The *sprezzatura* concept, which Castiglione—in accordance with classical authorities on [...] *celare artem* [...]—applied to the courtly code of conduct, means [...] the alleged artlessness of art or the pretended effortlessness with which the artificiality of the courtly code is practiced in social life. The courtier fashions his existence into a work of art, but he does so in such a way that it has the appearance of supreme naturalness [...]. The courtier is an actor playing roles; he takes pleasure in fictionalizing his existence" ("Style" 369). "Castigliones Traktat *Il Cortegiano* macht durch sein *sprezzatura*-Konzept, das auf dem rhetorischen *celare artem*-Theorem basiert, den Höfling zu einem Schauspieler" ("Rhet. der Renaissance" 9). Christiansen notes: "Castiglione's *The Book of the Courtier* applies rhetoric to manners" (330n.). Cf. Oesterreich: "Dabei knüpft auch der frühneuzeitliche Idealtypus des Hofmannes, wie er i[m] [...] 'Libro del Cortegiano' beschrieben wird, wieder an das durch die antike Rhetoriktradition vorgebildete Modell der artifiziiellen Selbsterfindung der öffentlichen P[erson] an, die durch das äußere soziale *decorum* und das gesellschaftlich herrschende *honestum* reguliert wird. Das [...] Vorbild des vollendeten Hofmannes, dessen weltläufiger Stil der Selbstinszenierung unter ständiger Berücksichtigung des rhetorischen Kunstverbergungsgebotes (*celare artem*) dem Ideal der Leichtigkeit (*sprezzatura*) zustrebt, bildet [...] eine frühneuzeitliche Postfiguration des ciceronischen *orator perfectus*" ("Person" 866). Moralizing will be offset by stressing the pragmatic-factual value of appearances. Generally: "Rhetorische Bildung stellt einen unerläßlichen Bestandteil und die Legitimation des höfischen Menschen schlichthin dar" (Briesemeister 103). "Puttenham has merged his poetics and rhetoric manual with the core functions of a courtesy book" (Wigham/Rebhorn 60). On Castiglione and rhetoric, see Kahn (380–381); Hempfer (115–116; 115n.; passim); Mack (*History* 296–298); Mayfield ("Interplay" 6n.; 37n.–38n.); cf. part 6, herein.

215 Not the dressing or maquillage of a presupposed 'identity', 'subjectivity', 'Being' (or any fashionable substantialism else).

216 Generally, see Schwartz: "*κατὰ τρόπον* ist ein pleonastischer Zusatz, der nichts anderes

Where temporality, corporeality, and contingency are permitted to return from their enforced sojourn in essentialist neglect and negation, *personae* will be seen to vary: none are dealing with one only—certainly not over the course of a life, where a “pluralization of roles” (Oesterreich “Person” 862; 869; 871; trans. dsm) effectually obtains. Moreover, masks do have a ‘face value’, which may (and typically will) be read as such.²¹⁷ Above all, incidentally expedient and poetico-selective acts of dependably multilateral, reciprocally effected, oratorico-virtual selfcraft occur at all times—yielding a factual pluralism of *éthe* and *personae*: neither does anyone play but one role, nor will these commonly be ‘homemade’; and even the craftier ones are hypoleptic in effect.²¹⁸

As a matter of course, a somatic substratum (including vital, decidedly physical *hēxeis*) is always to be reckoned with at an elemental level. A ‘monopolylogic’ anecdote by one of the most multifaceted, rhetorically versatile writers of all time might prove expedient on and at this point:

Noticing that the dancer had five masks [‘πρόσωπα’] ready—the drama had that number of acts—since he saw but the one dancer, he [sc. a ‘βάρβαρος’] enquired who were to dance and act the other rôles [‘πρόσωπεῖα’], and when he learned that the dancer himself was to act and dance them all, he said [to him]: ‘I did not realise [...] that though you have only this one body [‘σῶμα’], you have many souls [‘ψυχὰς’].’ (Lucian “Dance” 268–269, §66; cf. 270, §67)²¹⁹

bedeutet als ἦθος selbst” (15; with Plato “Timaeus” 92, 42E). Cf. the Aristotelian notion of “ἔξις” qua “settled disposition” (*Nicomach. Ethics* 94–95, 1107a, II.vi.15; see 68–69, 1103a, I.xiii.20; 364–365, 1143b, VI.xii.1; with Lausberg *Handbuch* 28, §7–8; Trimpf *Muses* 123; 259–260; 268–269; 353). Cf. also these descriptions: “our actions [...] determine the quality of our dispositions [‘ἔξις’]” (*Nicomach. Ethics* 74–75, 1103b, II.ii.1); “dispositions [‘ἔξις’] are [...] formed states of character” (*Nicomach. Ethics* 86–87, 1105b, II.v.2). Hahn sees selves as “Habitusensemble[s]” (10). For the nexus of (a) rhetorical (concept of) *ethos* and *hēxis*, cf. Aristotle: “Character [‘ἠθικὴ’] also may be expressed by the proof from signs, because to each class and habit [‘ἔξει’] there is an appropriate style. [...] I call habits [‘ἔξις’] those [...] states which form [‘ποιός’] a man’s character in life; for not all habits do this. If then anyone uses the language appropriate [‘τὰ ὀνόματα οἰκεῖα’] to each habit [‘ἔξει’], he will represent [‘ποιήσει’, sc. ‘make, craft’] the character [‘τὸ ἦθος’]” (*Rhetoric* 378–379, 1408a, III.vii.6–7); see Eden, accentuating that the orator is “to present an *ēthos* that audiences find persuasive” (“Lit. Property” 35).

217 The received ‘image’ of a (visible) speaker (‘face value’) is (politico-)rhetorically decisive.

218 Cf. “the Renaissance conceived of human beings as actors who perform not one but a host of different roles in the social world, [...] ‘figures’—that is, all the varied masks or personas or selves—that human beings might assume on the great stage of the world [...] social interaction is always a matter of ‘counterfeiting’ one role or another” (Wigham/Rebhorn 59).

219 Cf. Nédoncelle: “quand la tragédie, après Eschyle, comportera des rôles multiples, le nombre des acteurs restera fixé à trois et c’est grâce au changement de masques qu’ils pourront s’acquitter de leur tâche” (280). Generally, see Grube, with reference to Plato’s *Republic* (“397

It should always prove difficult to forego the (implicit) knowledge of a specific material body—an elementally polytropic, tempo-corporally variable ‘source self’—in the (notional) background of a given artifact floating in various (virtual) cultural networks. Yet this expedient bulwark against spiriting away the very humanity of art need not—and, from a scholarly perspective, will not—open the provisory loopholes of the otherworldly: “The confounding of rhetoric and metaphysics belongs to the vices of our tradition [and] its interpreters likewise” (Blumenberg *Präfiguration* 25; trans. dsm).

For heuristic reasons, one may provisionally deprioritize said immediate evidence, and consider the *éthe* or *personae* projected and publicly vended via an *objet d’art* or *œuvre*: meaning, the (virtually) sedimented, semiotically induced ‘images’ of an *auctor* as crafted and conveyed by works of art—including any reciprocities effected by a given recipient’s participation in said process.²²⁰ The various traditions of eloquence—polyvalent, transgeneric, universalist *téchnai*—may prove functional as regards describing authorship in terms of the rhetorico-dramatic concept of ‘*personae*’. Expressly with a view to future scholarship, the conceivable potentials of such an application will be provisionally suggested for two Early Modern writers in the ensuing.²²¹

e”): “we lose all our singleness of character by impersonating different types” (51; 51n.)—the (Idealist) presupposition *par excellence*, (tacitly) present in any substantialist account; it would seem difficult to forfeit what did not ‘preexist’. As regards “lysianische Kleinkunst”, Gomperz observes the flexible adaptation involved (as evinced in the *prépon*-related, rhetorico-dramatically significant terms used, e.g. “anzupassen [...] trefflich”, “in der Charaktermaske [...] aufzutreten”); he speaks of “[t]his art of ‘ethopoiía’”, perceived as a Protean quality—which is said to explain Plato’s animosity toward the *rhétor*, seeing that the former “frowned upon the capacity for [accommodatingly] transforming oneself into any possible shape whatsoever [‘sich in jede beliebige Gestalt zu schicken’]” (*Griech. Denker II*. 330; trans. dsm; cf. 574n.).

220 Generally: “Characterization [...] is to an important degree a readerly competence” (De Temmerman/Emde Boas “Epilogue” 650); “a dynamic [...] integrative process” (“Intro.” 18). Bakhtin stresses “[t]he inclusion of the listener (reader, viewer) in the system (structure) of the work” (*Speech* 165; “Methodology” 68): “Nothing is more perilous [...] than to ignore the [...] role of the listener” (*Speech* 171n.; “Methodology” 74n.). Cf. Sloane’s insistence on “the reader’s craft as well as [...] the poet’s” (“Reading” 410); “rhetorical reading may show [...] some of the conscious craft whereby the [...] poet turned that relationship [sc. of the reader, poet, text] into an art” (“Reading” 410); “rhetorical reading presupposes a certain attitude toward language: language reflects a speaker’s design as he confronts an audience, who he assumes are not possessed of *tabulae rasae* but of minds filled with associations, conventions, expectations, which he must direct, control, or take advantage of. This is the attitude that distinguishes rhetorical reading from other types of close analysis. [...] rhetorical reading preserves the greatest potential complexity of [a] reader’s response and [a] poet’s control” (“Reading” 398).

221 The scholarship and criticism having accrued on Shakespeare and Cervantes during more

Due to sundry stages of reception (*inter alia*), manifold *personae* are associated with the given name ‘Shakespeare’.²²² A (more or less ‘initial’) source conducive to a writer’s diverse voices or (publicly received) images will be the customary genre of the dedication.²²³ Nominally directed toward a specified addressee (typically a patron, benefactor), such and similar frontmatter also conveys (or is plausibly wrought and honed to express) an authorial *ethos* and *persona* (at said point in time): “early modern writers [...] were [...] acutely aware that they were writing in a larger discursive space” (Küpper et al. 7).

The epico-dramatic “Venus and Adonis” is dedicated to the “Earl of Southampton”, and signed “William Shakespeare”—suggesting that it speaks for the author recognized, referred to, by that name (“Venus and Adonis” 128).²²⁴ The *persona* (re)presented or staged is setting itself within a decidedly social context. A tone of modesty and humility signals both the rhetorico-traditional *tópos* in this respect, and the communal function it serves: to be apposite (as per the estimate of a given time)—conducting to, if not effecting, the ‘face’ conveyed and *ethos* projected.²²⁵ The closing formula focuses on the word “duty”—again a

than four centuries are beyond reckoning, and cannot plausibly be assessed in this context; the study at hand is heuristic in function, and aims at conducting to further research by tentatively suggesting applications of a rhetorico-dramatic approach to authorship.

222 Cf. Bakhtin: “neither Shakespeare [...] nor his contemporaries knew that ‘[...] Shakespeare’ [...]. There is no possibility of squeezing our[s] [...] into the Elizabethan epoch” (*Speech* 4).

223 Cf. and contrast Bakhtin’s *hypomnémata*: “The speaking person. As whom [...] how ([...] in what situation) the speaking person appears. Various forms of speech authorship [...]. It is customary to speak about the authorial mask. [...] in which utterances (speech acts) is there a *face* and not a mask, that is, no authorship? The form of authorship depends on the genre of the utterance. [...] The one who speaks and the one spoken to. All this determines the genre, tone, and style of the utterance [...]. One and the same actual character can assume various authorial forms. In what forms and how is the face of the speaker revealed?” (*Speech* 153).

224 Cf. Vickers, noting that “the dedication of [...] *Lucrece* to Southampton” is “one of the few pieces which Shakespeare wrote *in propria persona* [...]. Incidentally the dedication of *Venus and Adonis* is a good example of that vein of courtly, expanded metaphor which was to prove so useful later for characterizing gentlemen – [...] Shakespeare sounds like Camillo” (*Artistry* 36–37); “in his own person – as [...] through the mouths [...] of imagined characters – [he] writes prose which belongs to a widespread and vigorous tradition over two thousand years old at the time”; the critic’s added value judgment (“The dedication itself is insignificant”, *Artistry* 38) is scholarly untenable. Duncan-Jones claims: “Shakespeare’s terse but richly rhythmical epistle is [...] likely to have been closely read by its addressee” (68); she refers to “*Lucrece*” as “a masterpiece of terseness [...] [c]arefully varying the earlier epistle” (75).

225 In this sense, Lanham’s definition of the term may seem pertinent: “Establishing an authorial voice, an *ethos*, is a central task for any speaker or writer” (“Composition” 121). Cf. “it is the tenor of the speech [...] that brings out the *ethos* of the speaker” (Morford 241); “*ethos*, the

socio-rhetorical term, equivalent to the Latin ‘*officium*’, pertaining to the public realm (“Venus and Adonis” 128).²²⁶ Moreover, the primarily demonstrative character of what ensues is stressed in the term “pleased” (the oratorical function of *delectare*); the work is labeled an “invention”, referring to the art’s first (heuristic) *pars*; and discernibly epideictic terms (“censure”, “praised”) are expressly employed in said dedication (“Venus and Adonis” 128). The tone insinuated, the terms used, the genre referred to, all signal a rhetorical culture, a respective *persona* (re)presented (qua public, contextualized ‘image’)—with a corresponding *ethos* being (semiotically) wrought and projected.²²⁷

In the Cervantine ‘Prólogo al lector’ (*Novelas I. 50*), the writer suggests that the recipient might be missing “a portrait” of the former—thereby

to become familiar with the face [‘rostro’] and demeanor of one who dares to sally forth with so many fanciful notions [‘invenciones’] into the marketplace of this world [‘en la plaza del mundo’], in plain sight for all to see [‘a los ojos de las gentes’]. (*Novellas 9; Novelas I. 50–51*)²²⁸

To satisfy this (supposed) desire, a “likeness” (“retrato”) not provided in the front pages of the *Quijote* is invoked—the responsibility for which oversight is delegated to a certain “friend” (*Novellas 9; Novelas I. 50*; cf. Kruse 171, 171n.). To remedy the apparent lack, a vivid description of the authorial *persona* (to be

character of a speaker, [...] is always implied in style; the *ethos* of a poet in particular is implied in the stylistic controls he places on his implied reader’s response” (Sloane “Reading” 410).

226 Likewise, the dedication of Shakespeare’s “Lucrece” is to the “Earl of Southampton”, and equally accentuates “duty”—both within, and in the closing formula (“Lucrece” 232). Duncan-Jones stresses: “Shakespeare [...] sought worldly recognition on the world’s terms” (83). Cf. Greenblatt: “Shakespeare approaches his culture [...] as dutiful servant, content to improvise a part of his own within its orthodoxy” (*Self-Fashioning* 253); while the biographistic tendency is problematic (and the overall context will have to be taken *cum grano salis*), said observation may be corroborated by recourse to the two published and printed dedications in Shakespeare’s name—precisely in terms of a socio-dramatic view of public life qua permeated, and decidedly inflected, by rhetoric, the latter perceived as a comprehensive whole (including its arsenal of techniques, inductive method, and the worldview the art induces, or conduces to). For the historico-cultural context in this respect, see Skinner (*Forensic* 32–33).

227 Contrast Greenblatt, who (in line with his general relegation of rhetoric) wishes to see “identity as property”, and claims: “I think property may be closer to the wellsprings of the Shakespearean conception of identity than we imagine” (“Psychoanalysis” 220); the presupposition of the latter leads to an equation with the former—in a circular attempt at defining an ideologically loaded position projected backward.

228 As to Cervantes’ accent on the public, ludic role of his *Novelas ejemplares*, see Velázquez (78–83, spec. 82–83). For a ‘rhetorical reading’ of the *Quijote* ‘in light of Hermogenes’, cf. López Grigera (165–178; on ventriloquism, spec. 175, 175n.; cf. 137–138; passim).

appresented by the recipient) is tendered, framed as a *subscriptio* to the portrait said to have not been printed.²²⁹ The “retrato” (*Novelas I. 51*), placed in a discernibly rhetorical context, suggests a desire on the part of the reader, refers to the *prépon* (“como es uso y costumbre”, *Novelas I. 50*), stages a certain situation as a pretext, then writes an ostensibly lifelike, ethopoetic description (with a view to *enárgeia*) that is to circularly fulfill a demand the text premised.

The written portrait is similarly hedged: “this, I affirm, is the face of the author [‘el rostro del autor’] of *La Galatea* and of *Don Quijote de la Mancha*” (*Novellas 9; Novelas I. 51*); “[h]e is commonly known as [‘Llámase comúnmente’] Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra” (*Novellas 10; Novelas I. 51*).²³⁰ The entirety of this *ethopoeia* (a *descriptio* for *evidentia*) is given as *peistikó*-purposive—specifically as regards “the better to extend my fame [‘nombre’] and lend further credence to my talent [‘ingenio’]” (*Novellas 10; Novelas I. 51*). In said respect, providing anything as might conduce to effecting persuasion will seem expedient:

229 The Cervantine *œuvre* is replete with such and similar techniques of indirection; generally thereto (with further references), see Mayfield (“Talking Canines” 11; 21; 31; *passim*). Regarding the comparable case of a “missing painting” in Montaigne, see Cave (*Cornucopian* 299, 299n.).

230 Cervantes gives a detailed, auto-prosopographic description: “Este que véis aquí, de rostro aguileño, de cabello castaño, frente lisa y desembarazada, de alegres ojos y de nariz corva, aunque bien proporcionada; las barbas de plata, que no ha veinte años que fueron de oro, los bigotes grandes, la boca pequeña, los dientes ni menudos ni crecidos, porque tiene sino seis, y éstos mal acondicionados y peor puestos, porque no tienen correspondencia los unos con los otros[.]” (*Novelas I. 51*, Prólogo). The description of a face (per se) is called *prosopographía*, as Rico Verdú signals with respect to said Cervantine example (citing Barberá y Sánchez): “προσωπογραφία. ‘Cuando el orador expresa con palabras el semblante, figura y facciones del rostro de alguno’” (339). Cervantes proceeds to give an (auto-)*effictio* of the remainder: “[‘]el cuerpo entre dos extremos, ni grande, ni pequeño, la color viva, antes blanca que morena; algo cargado de espaldas, y no muy ligero de pies[.]” (*Novelas I. 51*, Prólogo). Distinctly, the face is given primacy (“rostro” also being repeated)—in terms of quantitative treatment, qualitative detail, and in the assertion ensuing after the last segment cited: “éste digo que es el rostro del autor” (*Novelas I. 51*, Prólogo). The deictic and the “digo” signal that this is not a ‘description’ simply (should said term be taken to mean a ‘mimetic’ representation): the poet’s ‘making’ is insinuated (to which the humorous tone will be seen as conducing, simultaneously hiding and highlighting the artfulness); the *tractatio*, the choice of foci (or facials featured), indicate that this (apparent) *prosopographía*’s function is ethopoetic. Puttenham Englishes the device as “the Counterfeit Countenance”, when “a poet or maker [...] feign[s] as artificial [...] the visage, speech, and countenance of any person absent or dead” (323–324, III.19); “*prosopographia*” is distinguished from “*prosopopeia* [sic]” in that the latter is said to refer only to otherwise abstract, mute, unfeeling entities; the margin renames this “the Counterfeit Impersonation”, which is defined as “feign[ing] any person” (emphatic of the ‘*poiein*’, “by way of fiction”)—spec. when “attribut[ing] any human quality, as reason or speech, to dumb creatures or other insensible things, and [...] to give them a human person” (324, III.19); cf. Elam (60; 315n.).

it is folly to think that such encomiums [‘elogios’] convey the exact truth, seeing that neither praise [‘alabanzas’] nor blame [‘vituperios’] are based on anything fixed or exact. (*Novellas* 10; *Novelas I*. 51)²³¹

The terms explicitly refer to the epideictic *genus*—including a corresponding focus on the *status qualitatis*—while the parrhesiastic admission of rhetorical ‘*colores*’ being involved will likely conduce to the crafting of a writerly *ethos*.

To précis the Cervantine prolog from a rhetorical perspective: having availed itself of the conventional appeal to the reader’s indulgence (*captatio benevolentiae*: “dearly beloved reader”); having—supposedly, and with all modesty—tried to find an excuse for not penning the very prolog written (*Novellas* 9); having suggested a desire on the part of the reader to see a portrait of the (perceived) author; and having crafted a pretext for satisfying said demand, the preface expressly places itself in the demonstrative *genus*, downplays the verisimilitude of the vivid, ethopoetic description just given, and then (to cap it all) acts as if the entire setup had not occurred in the first place: “In short, since this opportunity [‘*ocasión*’] has now been missed, and I have been left, as it were, empty-handed and with no likeness [‘*figura*’]” (*Novellas* 10; *Novelas I*. 51)—eloquently disavowing rhetoric’s effectuality.²³²

The tone remains playful, aims at ‘entertaining’ (*delectare*), and offering some ‘expedient samples’ (*docere*) in what follows (see *Novellas* 10; *Novelas I*. 52). Said portrait itself is initially a description of the projected *persona*’s features and stature (*charakterismós*), and then turns into a *vita* with (expressly) hypoleptic and ethopoetic functions—hence including what would likely have been considered the central events from a contemporaneous perspective (presupposing and tying in with the latter’s socio-moral assumptions).

231 On the latter, see Lausberg’s concise synopsis (*Elemente* 21–22, §31.4). Cf. Gill, with regard to “Plutarch and most Roman historians”: “As though in some kind of historical law-court, they set out to answer the question ‘what sort of person was X?, what qualities, what virtues and vices did he have?’” (“Question” 477)—meaning, ‘*qualis sit*’. A reaccentuation of the (dramatico-)rhetorical implications will generally be needful in said critic’s case.

232 “*ocasión*” implies (rhetorical) ‘*kairós*’. Generally, cf. “al cabo de tantos años como ha que duermo en el silencio del olvido, salgo ahora, con todos mis años a cuestras, con una leyenda seca como un esparto, ajena de invención, menguada de estilo, pobre de conceptos y falta de toda erudición y doctrina, sin acotaciones en las márgenes y sin anotaciones en el fin del libro, como veo que están otros libros” (Cervantes *Quijote I*. 96, Prólogo). As to humoring the recipient, see Vives (187–189, II, Aa2.r–Aa3.r; with Rico Verdú: “se debe captar su atención y benevolencia”, 238). Cf. Fothergill-Payne: “*Benevolentiam parare* is one of the main principles of rhetoric” (378). Montaigne has: “arrêter l’attention du lecteur” (*Essais III*. 306, III.ix); with Compagnon (29–30). Cf. Wisse (234; 237; 238n.; 243).

Said *persona* (or overall ‘image’) is expressly tendered in dramatio-rhetorical terms: not only by eloquently conjuring up a lifelike description (*evidentia* for delight); but also in accentuating its contextual character. With regard to function, it may appear as the verbal equivalent of an ethopoetic-pictorial portrait crafted for the public eye—meeting the (customary) expectations of a given community, while (virtually) adding ornamental brushstrokes for purposes of pleasure (here and there).²³³ Simultaneously, this notable depiction articulates the theatrico-oratorical conception of ‘*personae*’ prevalent in the—decidedly pan-European—rhetorical culture from which the portrayal emanates, and to which it responds. The reader is likely to admire the witty diction (*elocutio*), and feel humored (*conciliare*); the ethopoetic description is vivid, and will have a similarly ‘enargic’ effect. Said Early Modern *curriculum vitae* is thoroughly rhetorical, and presents a corresponding authorial *ethos* and *persona* qua contextual, social ‘image’ conforming to expectations on the part of a potential reception—to which it effectually caters.

With respect to method, the present, oratorico-dramatic approach to authorship accentuates a pluralistic diversity of views, voices, and matters of degree, while aiming at contouring nuances and describe shifts of emphasis in provisional and heuristic terms. To a considerable extent, any rhetorical culture will be based on a certain framework of roles considered functional in given social settings: some of said *personae* may be taken on simultaneously (by ‘elemental selves’, tempo-corporally under variation); all are susceptible of situational adaptation; and there will always be a potential for crafting, conveying, and circulating any number of nuanced variants—floating in, and (with diverse modulations) taken up from, (virtual) cultural networks.

The above instances from the Shakespearean and Cervantine corpus intimate textually sedimented authorial *personae* and *éthe*, as well as a density of indicators conducive to formulating their socio-rhetorical roles and functions. In either case, an ‘*auto-etho-poïesis*’ may be discerned by way of the textual (or otherwise semioticized) signals tendered: reticent, almost tacit (and virtually impervious) in ‘Shakespeare’—*de re* comparable to the ‘ventriloquist’ speechwright ‘Lysias’; oblique and ludic (while no less opaque) in ‘Cervantes’.

Rhetorical selfcraft is always reciprocal, multilateral: it not only implies, but requires an equally ethopoetic participation on the part of (diachronic,

²³³ Kibédi Varga notes that, in 1760, Gérard de Benat “trie[d] to correlate the terminology of rhetoric and poetics by saying: [...] ‘Le portrait est cette figure que les Rhéteurs appellent [É]thopée” (88). The scholar glosses: “what are [...] compared to rhetoric in these quotations are [...] pictorial metaphors applied to poetics” (88n.).

transcultural) recipients.²³⁴ One is facing decidedly pluralized, assembled, ‘engineered’ images, tendered with respect to what may be deemed suitable and effectual (*prépon*) at a given time—hence partially reflecting other projected *personae*, various socio-moral functions, received customs (relating to *ethos*).²³⁵

Ever is context decisive—meaning, what is thought to pertain to a particular situation, setting, overall culture. As far as Ancient and Early Modern times are concerned, one might therefore perceive authorship in such rhetorico-dramatic terms, specifically by recourse to the concept of ‘*personae*’ (and correlative *éthe*) qua highly contextual public ‘images’ (acquired, semiotically significant, settled dispositions)—crafted, scripted, (re)presented, performed, projected, put on, staged, changed, sold, outsourced (and so forth, as the case may be).²³⁶

As to public, official, communal roles, Fuhrmann notes that the word “always means the bearer of a social role, not the absolute person, [not] the individual. [...] *persona* always points to something typical” (“*Persona*” 91;

234 Given globalizing tendencies, rhetorico-comparatist case studies of a cosmopolitan make, take, purpose will ultimately be needful with a view to ‘world literature’ (in terms of reception).

235 As to “the image of self” (240), Goffman refers to “engineering a convincing impression” (243; cf. 16, 25)—his closing *sententia* being: “the role of expression is conveying impressions of self” (241; caps removed). The ethopoietic effect will be a plurality of rhetorical selves. Generally, see Goffman on “techniques of impression management” (203–230; here: 228; cf. 231, 233); his conceptions are dependably rhetorical (cf. 163; 246), as indicated by the ensuing: “preparing in advance for likely contingencies and exploiting the opportunities that remain” (212; cf. 210, 216); “ethos”, “decorum” (231); “persuasion”, “manipulation”, “coercion” (234); likewise his central statements, such as: “Power of any kind must be clothed in effective means of displaying it, and will have different effects depending upon how it is dramatized” (234).

236 Blumenberg adduces: “*personam agere, induere, mutuare, ferre*” (“Epochenschwelle” 102); cf. “appetere [...] capere [...] sumere [...] suscipere [...] imponere [...] induere [...] gerere [...] ferre [...] mutare [...] abicere [...] ponere [...] deponere [...] detrahere” (Fuhrmann “*Persona*” 88n.; with Mayfield “Interplay” 21n.). Cf. “what rôle [*personam*] we ourselves may choose [*velimus*] to sustain [*gerere*] is decided by our own free choice [*‘a nostra voluntate’*]” (Cicero *De Officiis* 118–119, l.xxxii.115). “*E t h i c a* igitur erit causa, id est moralis, cum erit suscipienda persona vel rustici vel dyscoli” (Sulpicius Victor 316, §6); “*persona suscipitur [...] sermo simulatur*” (Isidore “*de arte rhet.*” 515, XIV); “*inducitur aliena persona [...] personam, quam nos ei imponimus [...] nos facimus*” (Vives 185, Aa.r, II.xvi); “*persona nova infertur, fingere [...] finxit*” (186, Aa.v, II.xvi; taking up Horace’s “*personam formare novam*”, “*Ars Poetica*” 460, v.126). Seeing “Selbstmythisierung” as “ein rhetorisches Phänomen” (*Präfiguration* 18), Blumenberg applies the above to textual and public *personae*: “Friedrich II. [...] ist ein Mann der Selbststilisierung auf die Tat” (*Präfiguration* 22). “Goethe hat sich stilisiert” (*Schiffbruch* 50). “Das Artefakt der Kultfigur” (*Goethe* 64); “Es ist [...] Inszenierung” (*Goethe* 66). Such also includes vicarious attempts (here with respect to Sartre): “wir müssen ja wohl nicht alles glauben, was Simone de Beauvoir uns an schöner Stilisierung zum Ausgleich des Unschönen der *criteria realitatis* erzählt hat” (*Phänomenologische* 148).

trans. dsm)—and likewise for ‘*ethos*’.²³⁷ A corresponding perspective pertains to, and obtains in, cultures or periods suffused with an oratorical education—conducting to correlative views of society and the world.²³⁸ Considering the potential scholarly yield, it may seem plausible to apply this rhetorical approach (to authorial selfcraft) more generally—perchance also to the present.

237 In addressing an issue as tends to be neglected (by much criticism), Schwartz’ caveat will seem spec. needful: “ἦθος mit ‘Charakter’ zu übersetzen, wäre [...] unrichtig. Unter Charakter verstehen wir die individuelle Beschaffenheit eines Menschen; der Begriff ist über das Französische (charactère) zu uns gekommen. Das griechische *χαρακτήρ* ist der Prägestempel, genau wie *τύπος*, meist also, auf den Menschen bezogen, gerade das Gegenteil des heutigen Begriffes, nämlich der Typ, das Überindividuelle” (16; cf. subch. 3.1, herein). As per Bakker, it is requisite to “avoid equating the terms [‘*ēthos* and *ēthopoia*’] with our concepts of ‘character’ or ‘personality’. In antiquity, *ēthos* used to be defined in terms of (moral) categories [...] Lysias [...] did not portray his speakers and their opponents as individuals, but made their behavior and utterances adhere to certain distinctive recognizable types” (“Lysias” 410). While always tending toward particularization, rhetoric is the polyfunctional, universalist *téchne par excellence*—transpersonal like (the system, code of) language overall.

238 Generally, see Kustas: “Rhetoric for the Byzantine was not simply an educational force but a way of life. *παιδεία* means both education *and* culture” (64).

5 The Economy of Rhetorical Ventriloquism: Applications from Antiquity to the Present

prosopopoeia [...] is particularly valuable also to future poets and historians. Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 139, 3.8.49)²³⁹

While its indisputable impact has tended to go unnoticed in ‘modern’ times (and the latter’s criticism or study of literature), the rhetorical practice of *ethopoïa*—‘the artful crafting (*poiein*) of *ethos* by way of descriptive and actual speech (*sermocinatio*, *allocutio*)’—decisively molded, dominated the Western literary tradition (*sensu lato*) from Antiquity to the Early Modern Age, with a sustained (if latent) effect on the present.²⁴⁰ During the Renaissance, versions of

239 Quintilian subsumes *sermocinatio* under *prosopopoeia* (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 50–51, 9.2.31–32). For Aelius Theon, the latter “is not only a historical exercise but applicable also to oratory [...] dialogue [...] poetry, [...] is most advantageous in everyday life [...] conversations [...] in study of prose writings” (“*Exercises*” 4, §1.60). Kennedy glosses “historical exercise” as “practice in the composition of speeches, a regular feature of ancient historiography”; “oratory [...] dialogue [...] poetry” as “genres in which characters are imagined as speaking” (“*Exercises*” 4, with 4n.). Theon gives “*prosôpopoeia*” as “the introduction of a person to whom words are attributed that are suitable to the speaker and [...] subject [...] one should have in mind [...] the personality of the speaker [...], and to whom the speech is addressed” (“*Exercises*” 47, §8.115). He observes: “[d]ifferent ways of speaking belong to different ages of life” (“*Exercises*” 48, §8.115); in closing the section, he logs the device’s being “most receptive of characters and emotions” (“*Exercises*” 49, §8.117). Kennedy notes that “Theon uses ‘prosopopoeia’ of any speech in character and is apparently unaware of the distinction between ‘prosopopoeia’, ‘ethopoieia’, [...] ‘eidolopoeia’ found in the later progymnastic treatises” (“*Exercises*” 47, §8; italics removed).

240 This sentence is indebted to Prof. Eden, urging a reaccentuation and “foreground[ing]” of “the central place of ethopoetic construction in the literary tradition [...] as a way to account for the peculiar shape of at least some of its most well known texts” (email to the author: June 26, 2017). Cf. Moos (254–257, with 254n.–257n., §63), spec. “Johanns [sc. of Salisbury] Vorliebe für Personifikationen und Ethopoien [‘ist’] von literaturwissenschaftlichem Interesse” (290n., §70). See Naschert: “In der Praxis spielte die E[thopoiea] auch in der *Poetik* eine besondere Rolle” (1515; cf. Fortenbaugh et al. 1541). On the Medieval “exercise in prosopopoeia”, cf. Baldwin (*Medieval Rhet.* 141n.)—qua “imaginary adaptations” (*Medieval Rhet.* 215); with a letter by Sidonius Apollinaris, he gives “Ethicam dictionem” as “prosopopoeia” (*Medieval Rhet.* 83; 83n.); and such as “imaginary addresses” (*Renaissance* 40). W. Crane logs: “The comments on *ethopoiea* by Emporius, Aquila [...] Isidore [...] were widely known in the Middle Ages. Erasmus drew some of his material for [...] *De copia* from Emporius” (160). Scaliger handles it under the header ‘Expressio Personarvm’, praising Vergil for his “*varia genera personarum*” (83, III.ii); cf. spec. “*Humilem quoque personam, atque eius officium nõ fine Ethopoeia, & Oeconomia*” (85, III.ii; the former reappears in Greek, 227, V.iii; cf. the subch. on ‘Oeconomia’, 103–104, III.xix). He refers to “*personæ fictæ*” under the header ‘Qvasi Personæ’—instancing (*inter alia*): “apud

the Aphthonian *Progymnasmata* proved especially influential in said respect.²⁴¹

Maronem Fama: apud Ouidiū Fames [...] apud Plautum Inopia, Luxuria, Lar, Arcturus. apud Æschylum, Vis, Neceſſitas. apud Ariftophanem, Fas, Nefáfque” (85, III.iii). Cf. Spies (267). As to *prosopopoïa* with *ethopoïa*, *sermocinatio*, see Carruthers for “[a] courtly French treatise [...] (1463) [...], divid[ing] the procedures of rhetoric among twelve handmaids (*dames*), each of whom gives a speech [...] *enseigne*, a rhetorical ‘character’ or *ethopoëia*” (205). Cf. Herrick: “Renaissance schoolmasters emphasized the study of human character” in “the training of rhetoric” (132); “the *Ad Herennium* exerted a considerable influence” in said respect (134). See Sloane/Jost: “Ciceronian tactics drawn from judicial rhet[oric] [...] fire[d] the [...] imaginations [...]: arguing in *utramque partem* [...] reappear[ed] in the [...] fabric of Tudor poetry [...] drama; *qualis sit* [...] suffuses Boccaccian fiction [...] Sidneyan crit[icism]; *ethos* and *ethopoësis* [...] pervade dialogues, mock encomia, [...] most discussions of courtliness” (1179). Kinney logs “the common practice, [...] in [...] Tudor grammar schools, of delivering orations and disputations by what Sherry calls ‘effiguration’ or *prosopographia* or *prosopopoëia*, the description of a feigned person or the act [there]of” (388). McDonald uses “*ethopoëia*” in an extensive sense qua “ability to create character”, “character-sketches”, “character portraits” (18; cf. 195, 291), “character delineation” (45), “set-passages of character-sketch” (49), as a “formal *ethopoëia*” (288–289; cf. 274, 297); cf. “the satiric *ethopoëia* of the typical courtier” (190). It is also taken technically: “*Ethopoëia*, the art of characterization” (83–84); cf. this felicitous formulation, linking *ethos* and (linguistic) *héxis*: a poet “endows his character” with “habits of speech” (291). All but equating the term with “*illustrationes*” (166; cf. 243), McDonald applies it to intratextual cases: “*ethopoëiae* or estimates of the character of other *dramatis personae* given by each figure in the play” (182); “varying *ethopoëiae* [...] give ‘running estimates’” (223); “in his *ethopoëia* of himself” (257; cf. 258, 274, 289); on Marston’s *Malcontent*: “If Malevole supplies *ethopoëiae* of all the other characters, Mendoza supplies a variety of characterizations for himself” (173); the former “is a convenient [...] mouthpiece for *ethopoëiae* of the other[s] [...], strengthening [...] impressions of their personalities gained from their own speech, or [...] prejudicing the audience to accept their utterances at *his* evaluation” (165). This metapoetical view—also otherwise characteristic of the matter—is signaled by such phrases: “the [...] *ethopoëia* given her” (234; cf. 235; 288); “Tourneur has his character make use of *ethopoëia* [...] *pathopoëia*” (239)—linking various ventriloquist devices (*sermocinatio*, with a view to crafting, projecting *ethos*, *páthos*). While given in her title, Hutson’s use of the word—“the historical legacy of Shakespeare’s ethopoetic dramatic tradition” (145), “the rhetorical persuasiveness of” his “*ethopoëia*” (157)—hardly ties in with her claims; the progymnasmatic terms cited are problematic (140–141), possibly due to the ms. (cf. 158n.). Cf. Plett: “Die Prosopopoïe erlangt während des 16. Jahrhunderts in der Dichtung [...] Popularität” (“*Theatrum Rhet.*” 356). “Estiennes [...] *The Art of Making Devises* (1646) empfiehlt [s]ie [...] als ‘a certain manner of speech used by Rhetoritians, very efficacious to move and strike the mind’ und kennt keine Grenzen in ihren Anwendungsmöglichkeiten” (“*Theatrum Rhet.*” 359); “teils wird [s]ie [...] auf alle [...] Impersonationen ausgedehnt” (“*Theatrum Rhet.*” 355). “Im Rhetorikunterricht der [...] Renaissance nehmen [...] Rollenübungen nach antikem Vorbild einen so großen Raum ein, daß praktisch jeder Schüler zum Schauspieler-Dichter ausgebildet wird” (“*Theatrum Rhet.*” 355).

241 McDonald logs “[t]he phenomenal popularity of Aphthonius in the English Renaissance” (75n.), calling him “the mentor of practically every [...] schoolboy trained up in the arts of

Various forms of ventriloquism having featured prominently in such and similar “*praexercitamenta*” (*Handbuch* 532–533, §1106; cf. 543, §1131–1132), it is particularly in this manner that the technique of *sermocinatio* “enters into poetry” (qua literature)—thereby providing a nexus between history, drama, and oratory, as Lausberg observes (*Handbuch* 548, §1146; trans. dsm):

This complete merging of the practicing orator into the represented person[a] and [...] the social and historical situation brings the practice of [rhetorical] exercises into proximity with the theater[.] (*Handbuch* 549, §1149; trans. dsm; cf. 128, §234; 409, §823)²⁴²

composition”—here as to “*ethopoeia*” (124); “the *Progymnasmata* of Aphthonius in a Latin translation by [...] Agricola and [...] Cataneus, edited with extensive commentary by [...] Lorch, [...] published in 1542, with [...] frequent reprintings [...], became almost the standard grammar-school textbook of composition” (75; cf. 87); see Knappe (6–7; 234–235); Clark (261: “It was printed at least 73 times from 1546 to 1689”); the latter tenders a (plausible) reason: “Without model themes[,] Theon could not hold the textbook market”; having such, “Aphthonius had been the most popular author of *Progymnasmata* in antiquity. Likewise in the Renaissance. From 1507 to 1680[,] he was given ten [...] Latin versions by ten [...] translators as well as an eleventh [...] made by combining two previous translations. There were 114 different printings”, as far as Clark had “identif[ie]d” (261; cf. 262). See Eden: “Aphthonius’ *Progymnasmata* formed the very bedrock of Renaissance rhetorical education”, hence of its “literary production” (“Rhetoric” 829). Cf. Burrow (42–43); Enterline (*Schoolroom* 20; 31; 79–88; 91–93; 113; 127; 157n.; 175n.; 178n.), *cum grano salis*; her construal of “*ethos*” is not only unnuanced, but highly problematic, partly misguided (cf. “ἔθος”, *Schoolroom* 31; spec. 160n. “Aphthonius’s ἔθος is not quite the same as Theophrastus’s χαρακτήρ”). Monfasani notes: “Scaliger made extensive use of Hermogenes’ forms in his massive *Poetics*” (184). As to “cultural transmission” in said respect, he adds: “Dionysius [...] was also translated in the sixteenth century and available in many editions, as were Demetrius [...] and Aphthonius. These [...] were significant authorities for the Byzantines [...] the West was accepting a Byzantine perspective” (184; with 184n.). For the *Progymnasmata*’s impact on German schooling, cf. Asmuth (“Entwicklung” 280–287), spec. Gottsched’s “Von der Kunst, eine fremde Person zu spielen” (“Entwicklung” 283), which adapts Aphthonius’ definition: “Ethopoiie, [...] *ethopoiia*, [...] *sermocinatio*, [...] die fiktive Rede einer fremden, meist historischen Person, durch deren Stil eben diese [...] charakterisiert wird” (“Entwicklung” 281; on Gottsched, cf. Naschert 1515–1516). Asmuth inveighs against the elimination “der sich situationsgebunden gebenden Ethopoiie” in current German education—itsself a symptom of a “depragmatization”, “undervaluation of partisan argumentation”, loss of ‘relation and reference to the situation, the other’ (“Entwicklung” 286; trans. dsm).

242 Cf. McDonald (on the *Rhet. ad Her.*, *Progymnasmata*, 44–46): “*Sermocinatio* [...] introduces the problem of *decorum* in composing fitting dialogue for a character” (45); such “figures” show the “affinities of rhetorical teaching to [...] dramatic composition”; most “examples” are “based upon dramatic practices” (46). Cf. “der schulrhetorische Übungsbetrieb [...] [‘widmet’] der Prosopopoiie [...] besondere Aufmerksamkeit. Die Kunst der [...] Persondarstellung wird [...] durch die [...] Simulation von sozialen Charakteren [...] trainiert. Innerhalb dieser spielerisch inszenierten Schulübungen studiert der Redner [...] eine Vielzahl unterschiedlicher [...] Rollen

Another link to the stage is provided by the oratorical art of ‘vivid description’ (*enárgeia*)—producing ‘a mimetic effect’ of “simultaneity”, visual or ‘earwitnessing’, ‘putting something before the eyes of someone’ (*Handbuch* 400, §810; trans. dsm).²⁴³ This rhetorical *desideratum* is evidently accomplished

[...] nähert sich [...] dem Schauspieler” (Oesterreich “Person” 863; cf. “Polypersonalität” 77–78). Cf. Mayfield (“Interplay” 11; 11n.–12n.); tailored to a *rhétor*’s *actio*, *prosopopoïa*, *dialogismós*, *ethopoïa* are affine to dramatic performance (in all physical aspects: motion, face, gesture). On the nexus of ‘*hypókrisis*’ (here rendered “impersonating”), *ethos*, the preservation of *decorum* (cf. “accommodating [‘tò eoi kénai] themselves to the rôles [‘prosópois]’ [...] they assume, so that what they say is not inappropriate”) with regard to “dancing” and “exercises” on the part of “the rhetoricians”, see Lucian (“Dance” 268–269, §65; with Baldwin *Ancient Rhet.* 74n.).

243 Cf. “In antiquity, *prosopopoeïae* were [...] exercises in which writers took on the persona of a famous historical or mythological figure [...]. At times, [...] rhetorical and poetic theoreticians use *prosopopoeia* [...] more expansively to indicate the vivid presentation of something absent or imaginary before the eye and ear” (Brogan et al. 1121). See Plett (“Evidentia” *passim*). These terms are (quasi) synonymous or affine: ‘*enárgeia*’, ‘*hypotyposis*’, ‘*demonstratio*’, ‘*descriptio*’, ‘*ékphrasis*’ (cf. subchs. 3.1, 4.1). Being particularly interactive, various oratorico-ventriloquistic devices conduce to *evidentia*—the generally desirable, rhetorico-theatrical end (see Mayfield “Interplay” 15–17, spec. 16n.–17n.). In “Ocular Demonstration [‘*Demonstratio*]’ [...] an event is so described in words [‘*ita verbis res exprimitur*]’ that the business [‘*negotium*]’ seems to be enacted [‘*geri*]’ and the subject to pass vividly before our eyes [‘*res ante oculos esse videatur*]’” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 404–405, IV.lv.68). Caplan glosses: “*ἐνάργεια* [...] *evidentia*, *repraesentatio*, *sub oculos subiectio* [...] *ὑποτύπωσις* [...] *descriptio*” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 405n.); on the latter, see Priscian (“*praexeritamina*” 558–559, §10, ‘de descriptione’). Cf. “*Ενάργεια* est figura, qua formam rerum et imaginem ita oratione substituimus, ut lectoris oculis praesentiaeque subiciamus” (Iulius Rufinianus 62, §15). Quintilian logs: “A considerable contribution to the effect [‘*multum confert*]’ may be made by combining [‘*adiecta*]’ the true facts [‘*veris*]’ with a plausible picture of the scene [‘*credibilis rerum imago*]’, which [...] gives the impression [‘*videtur*]’ of bringing the audience [‘*perducere audientis*]’ face to face with the event [‘*in rem praesentem*]’” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 278–279, 4.2.123); the above qua “*descriptio*” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 278, 4.2.123; cf. “*dilucida et significans descriptio*”, *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 58–59, 9.2.44, qua “of places”; see *Rhet. ad Her.* 356–357, IV.xxxix.51; 356n.). Latin syntax permits ‘juxtaposing’ the terms: “*adiecta veris credibilis*” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 278, 4.2.123). When treating it as a ‘figure of thought’, Quintilian echoes Cicero on “*evidentia*” qua “‘putting something before our eyes [‘*sub oculos subiectio*]’”, and gives the Greek (“*ὑποτύπωσις*”, *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 56–57, 9.2.40). He notes: the “mode of vivid description [‘*in diatyposi*]’” is usually hedged by formulae such as “‘Imagine that you see [‘*credite vos intueri*]’”; or (like Cicero) by referring to ‘the mind’s eye’ (“*haec, quae non vidistis oculis, animis cernere potestis*”, *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 56–57, 9.2.41; with 56n.–57n.). See Shakespeare: “In my mind’s eye, Horatio” (*Hamlet* 191, I.ii.185). Cf. Puttenham (323, III.19). The “Figure” is said to have “something particularly vivid [‘*manifestus*]’ about it” (Quintilian *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 58–59, 9.2.43). For a quasi equivalent use of ‘*tractatio*’, ‘*diatyposis*’, ‘*hypotyposis*’, see Scaliger (122, III.xxxiii); he links these to ‘*ethologia*’ (a linguistically enacted *charakterismós*; cf. below): “*Est autē Tractatio, quum rem sub oculis ponemus, luculenta narratione perfequentes eas partes, quæ ἠθολογίαν maxime comprehendunt in perfonis: in locis autem notabiles quafdam*

on the stage, seeing that—in terms of “mimesis”—“drama” yields “the maximal degree of immediacy” (*Handbuch* 565, §1185; trans. dsm; cf. 560, §1171).²⁴⁴

difpofitiones” (122, III.xxxiii); to *notatio* (*ethopoia*): “M. Gallio *διατύπωσιν*, perfonæ accuratam admodum ac feftiuam pofuit in quarto, quam appellauit Notationem” (122, III.xxxiii). Having handled ‘*hypo-*’ resp. ‘*diatýpofis*’, he turns to ‘*demonftratio*’, ‘*descriptio*’, ‘*effictio*’ (with respect to ‘*protopopoeia*’): “Defcriptionem, quam M. Gallio definit, perfpicuam rei expofitionem. Quæ verò minutius circa perfonam verfaretur, Effictionem. Non quòd fit ficta, id eft falfa: fed quafi effigationem. Effictio enim eft pars fictionis in Profopopœia” (122–123, III.xxxiii). A brief segment on ‘*Sermocinatio*’ ensues, which Scaliger links to the preceding: “HVic adiuncta eft Sermocinatio, quū certus attribuitur fermo perfonæ [...] Orationes enim quodam modo picturæ funt animorum. & qualis quifque eft, ita loquitur. & in obliquo” (123, III.xxxv). The nexus to ‘*diatýpofis*’ is reaffirmed for ‘*attributio*’ (qua general term) and ‘*protopopoeia*’: “Attributio [...] fit quoties Rei aut Perfonæ attribuum rē, aut perfonam, aut modum, aut orationem. Rei res, vt anno fertilitas, aeri tempeftas, nocti filentium, faxo afperitas” (126, III.xlviii); ‘*protopopoeia*’ is given as “duplex”—the crafting of *prósopa* for phenomena not (or no longer) thought to have said status (comprising also what is else called ‘*eidolopoiia*’): “Primus modus, vbi ficta perfona introducitur, vt Fama à Virgilio, & Fames ab Ouidio. [...] Alterum genus Protopopœiæ, vbi non perfona fingatur eo modo, fed orationis attributione. quæ adeò pertinet ad *διατύπωσιν*, vt fuprà eius partem fecerimus Sermocinationem. [...] nánque fi attribuum Æneæ orationem, erit fermocinatio: propterea quòd vera perfona eft. quòd fi extra argumentum introducat: veluti quum Æneas ait fe fe à patre per fomniū obiurgari: fanè eft Protopopœia. [...] præfertim fi rei mutæ fermo attribuitur [...] Eft & alius modus, quo non oratio, fed fenfus rei brutæ afignatur. ex re enim, quæ non eft perfona, fit perfona [...] quando alloquimur brutam rem, quæ non intelligit, quafi intelligat. [...] Quintilianus fcribit, oportere eius perfonæ cui attribuitur oratio, habitum defcribi: alioqui non effe Protopopœiam, fed *διαλογισμόν*. Mihi videtur omnis oratio effe *διαλογισμός*: Perfonæ verò habitum nequaquam pingi debere, fed orationem per fe fati poffe ad perfonam illam declarandam” (126, III.xlviii). Scaliger logs the affinity of ‘*apostrophe*’ (‘addressing those absent’) in said context of ‘*attributio*’ (qua ‘*allocutio*’): “Similes illis fuperioribus attributionibus funt alloquutiones, quæ ad abfentes diriguntur: qualis Æneæ ad Palinurum iam non exaudientem. & Apoftrophæ quædam” (126, III.xlviii). For a nexus of “*Apostrophas et protopopoeias in narratione*”, cf. Consultus Fortunatianus (112, II.19; also: Iulius Victor 426, XVI; Fraunce F8v, I.30), who refers to “ῥηθοποιία” as a ‘*dianoetic figure*’ (127, III.10; cf. “*adlocutionibus*”, 125, III.8). Sulpicius Victor logs the latter’s tending to be left out of *narrationes*; he permits a frugal use: “Ἡθοποιίαι quoque plurimorum præceptis excluduntur a narratione: quæ si quando erunt, et raræ et breues effe debebunt” (323, §19). Cf. Iulius Victor, giving a functional rationale for exceptions: “*allocutio* quoque æque perquam raro admittenda eft, nisi ubi opus tibi et ubi ad celeritatem et ad fidem plurimum confert” (426–427, XVI, ‘*de narratione*’). Conducing to *movere*, its proper place is seen to be in the *peroratio* (likewise for *eidolopoiia*): “in epilogo et adlocutionem permittitur inducere et defunctos excitare et pignora producere et cetera, quæ animos audientium moveant” (422, XV, ‘*de principiis*’).

244 As to Plato’s *Republic*, Grube logs: “any direct speech” is “counted as impersonation” (“*μιμήσει*”); “[d]rama proceeds [...] by impersonation” (51; cf. 70n.–71n.); “rhapsodes [...] dramatized [...] speeches in recitation” (51n.). Cf. “*Imaginary direct speech* increases the feeling of presence by the [...] attribution of words to a person (*sermocinatio*) or [...] group [...] engaged

Focusing on rhetorical ventriloquism in application, this part takes up the exploratory approach employed earlier for (auto)biography, dialog—extending it to other (literary) genres, such as historiography, philosophy (*sensu lato*).

5.1 Concerning the Nexus of ‘*oikonomía*’ and ‘*dialogismós*’

οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος.

Dionysius, citing Demetrius’ quoting Euripides with respect to Plato
 (“Demosthenes” 256, §5; 257n.)²⁴⁵

in conversation (*dialogism*”); it “can have a variety of purposes”, e.g. “reveal the intentions ascribed to a person, or what is thought to be the opinion of other[s] [...] regarding those intentions. It can be [...] half spoken [...] half thought [...] [a] very equivocal form of imaginary speech” (Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca *New Rhetoric* 176, §42; with Vico, 176n.). Their bias seems problematic; terms are not always integrated with (or signal) the various traditions of rhetoric.

245 Plato “is quite the hierophant [‘ὁ τελέτης’] [...], as Demetrius [...] and several of his predecessors said; for ‘the saying is not mine’” (Dionysius “Demosthenes” 256–257, §5; cf. 257n.; “Pompeius” 364–367, §2; 367n.). On Aristides pro rhetoric, vs. Plato, see Vickers (*Defence* 170–178; with ch. 3, 148–213); said critic’s (characteristic) value judgmentalism often gainsays a scholarly approach (cf. *Defence* 171; 173; spec. 177–178). Staging Plato qua speaker, Aristides defends rhetoric by recourse to what may seem to be a variant of a *prosopo-* resp. *eidolopoíia*: “I want it to be as if he were standing here in person [...] testifying with his own voice [‘τῆ ἐαυτοῦ φωνῆ’]” (538–539, §394). A (literal) quote from the *Nómoi* ensues—words which Plato (as ever) had put into a protagonist’s mouth: here, the Athenian stranger (cf. *Laws VII–XII*. 126, 829A, VIII). Aristides thus takes the *sermocinatio* as stating Plato’s view, and by repeating it verbatim, deems him present. A hedged, layered *eidolopoíia* follows later, where the Sophist cites Plato for the technique, then adds an *allocutio* of his making: “what if” the Four Athenian statesmen “could somehow come back to life [...], as Dion is represented by Plato talking to the Syracusans, and say this to him: ‘Plato[.]’” etc. (553, §321; cf. 551n.; direct addresses also at 563, §331; 565, §334; 569, §339); the *sermocinatio* is closed with the formula “If our men said this”—after which Aristides cites Plato’s *eidolopoíia* (“in the part where he represents the dead Dion speaking as still alive, we read”, 555, §324; “they would say”, 557, §325). Cf. Vickers: “Isocrates had validated Miltiades, Themistocles, [...] Pericles by his [...] account of their public-spirited [...] courageous actions[;] Aristides writes a *prosopopoeia* in which they speak in their own defence” (*Defence* 174). There often is a frame: “Speaking in his own person again” (*Defence* 175). In writing on behalf of the dead by putting words into their mouths, the Sophist logs the tools employed (*eidolopoíia*, a bilaterally ethopoetic *dialogismós*): “‘Tell me, Plato’, any one of those men would be glad to ask, ‘did you lead the Athenians, or any other Greek or barbarian people, for the best? You would not be able to say [...] you did, because you did not lead anyone’” (563, §331). Rhetorical vicariousness, variants of ventriloquism are functionalized to attack Plato: “That is, I think, what they would say, and in my view they would be speaking with restraint” (565, §333). While subtly, Aristides had not done so afore: “how much [...] would those who wish to be tyrants give for orators as a class [...] to be mistrusted in their states [...]

ἕτερον χρὴ λέγοντα ποιεῖν[.]
Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 460, 1418b, III.xvii.16)²⁴⁶

looked on as flatterers and no better than caterers” (549, §314)—so insinuating (nay, effectually saying) that Plato desired to be a tyrant (whereby he would have been one; see *Rep.* 6–10. 480–481, 619b–c, X; with “Gorgias” 312–313, 462E–463B; 316–321, 464C–466A; 450–453, 502C–D).

246 Aristotle’s context: “In regard to [...] character [‘τὸ ἦθος’], since sometimes, in speaking of ourselves, we render ourselves liable to envy, to the charge of prolixity, or contradiction, or, when speaking of another, we may be accused of abuse or boorishness, we must make another speak in our place [‘hétéron chrè légonta poiein’]”—(artfully) utile variants (*Rhetoric* 460–461, 1418b, III.xvii.16). Cf. “The character of the speaker, since statements may be [...] tactless, offensive, or too favourable to himself, is best conveyed by putting them into the mouth of some other” (Freese I). Naschert (1513); Sprute (287). Blass logs “Formen der Ethopoeie, wo der Redner eine fingirte Person an seiner Stelle sprechen lässt [...] oder dem Gegner Worte in den Mund legt, die derselbe hätte sprechen müssen” (*Beredsamkeit II.* 483; cf. 483n.; with Tiberius 63–64, §11). Blass notes cases “wo der Redner ein mit ihm vom Ankläger angestelltes Verhör fingirt” (*Beredsamkeit III.2.* 41); also “diejenige Ethopoeie, wo geständigermassen ein Phantasiestück gegeben wird” (*Beredsamkeit III.2.* 215); and “Antworten, die den Richtern zur Abwehr gegnerischer Ausflüchte in den Mund gelegt werden”: “Aischines [‘bringt’] unter dieser Maske eine Verdächtigung vor[...], die er vielleicht aus eigner Person zu äussern nicht wagte” (*Beredsamkeit III.2.* 216). Demosthenes “[‘führt’] die Reden der Gegner nachahmend vor[...], causing “hohe Lebendigkeit [...], indem der ausgeprägten Rede des Gegners die des Sprechers scharf gegenübertritt. [er] [...] führt [...] vor, was der Gegner hätte sagen s o l l e n oder m ü s s e n” (*Beredsamkeit III.1.* 178); “legt [...] den Richtern Antworten in den Mund” (*Beredsamkeit III.1.* 178–179); “führt [...] Gedanken und Ueberlegungen vor, die ein Abwesender bei seinen Handlungen hatte [...] der Redner [‘fingirt’] auch [...] bestimmte Fälle hypothetisch [...]”; es folgt [...] eine lange Rede, in welcher der Redner vermittelt dieser Unterschiebung einer andern Person den Athenern alles viel schärfer sagt, als er es aus der eigenen könnte”; such a setup “[‘gibt’] dem Redner Gelegenheit [...], mit minderem Anstoss von seinen Verdiensten zu reden” (*Beredsamkeit III.1.* 179). On the uses of delegation in Aristotle (spec. the “Einführung einer anderen sprechenden Person”), cf. Hellwig: “der Redner [‘gibt’] seinen Anspruch, einen [...] Sachverhalt aufhellen oder das Richtige raten zu können, an einen Dritten ab [...] und sei es [...] die Autorität der communis opinio” (266). Kennedy sees said segment in strictly structural terms (sans functional focus): “an ‘ethical digression’, [...] elaborating on the character of the speaker or [...] opponent, at the end of the proof [...] before the epilogue” (*Civic Disc.* 277n.; cf. *New History* 67). See Hellwig (262–266): “Zur Hervorhebung des eigenen oder eines fremden Charakters empfiehlt Aristoteles einen Verfremdungseffekt: Damit sich das eigene Ich nicht zu sehr in den Vordergrund drängt und so allzu leicht Vorwürfen aussetzt [...], soll der Redner die Worte [...] einem fiktiven Sprecher in den Mund legen. [...] So[...] kann das ἦθος des Redners wie auch [...] eines anderen [...] in der Rede zum Gegenstand gemacht werden: [...] durch den Redner selbst oder [...] einen fingierten Dritten” (262–263). She states: “Einen Sammelnamen für dieses Kunstmittel gibt es in der antiken Rhetorik wohl nicht”; while noting the possibility of ‘employing the expression’ “‘Ethopoiie’” *sensu lato*, she prefers “Prosopopoiie” (263n.). As *exempla*, Aristotle tenders epideictic uses in Isocrates (delegated self-praise), Archilochus (“in censure”). The glosses add: “in the *Antidosis*”, “Isocrates puts compliments on his composition

Rhetorical economy (“*dispositio*”) is the expedient “selection and arrangement” (Lausberg *Elemente* 27, §46; trans. dsm) of the (verbalized) matter at hand: “it is

into the mouth of an imaginary friend” (*Rhetoric* 461, 1418b, III.xvii.16; 460n.; cf. “Antidosis” 264–271, §141–149; contrast: Blass *Beredsamkeit II.* 168); “Archilochus”—“instead of attacking the daughter directly”—“represented her as being attacked by her father” (*Rhetoric* 460n.–461n.). “Sophocles [...] introduces Haemon, when defending Antigone against his father, as if quoting the opinion of others [‘hos legōnton hetéron’]” (*Rhetoric* 460–463, 1418b, III.xvii.16); the gloss has: “Haemon [...] puts his own feelings as to Creon’s cruel treatment of Antigone into the mouth of the people [...] refers to popular rumour” (*Rhetoric* 461n.); “for me it is possible to hear under cover [...], how the city is lamenting for this girl [...]. Does she not deserve, they ask, to be honoured with a golden prize? Such is the dark saying [...] silently advancing” (Sophocles 66–67, v.692–693, v.699–700; cf. 70–71, v.733). Hellwig: “Haimon verkleidet seine Meinung als [...] Volksgerede” (263n.). Such forms of delegation rely on the timeless effect of the ‘everyone knows’: cf. Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 378–381, 1408a, III.vii.7); subch. 3.2. See Vives: “Reprehendi [...], admoneri a nobis eum in quem non credamur esse amico animo, inducitur aliena persona *hæc aut hæc de illo dici, aut in illo desiderari, ab his aut illis, sive suppresso nomine, seu edito*: cujus quidque persona dicitur, ei erunt aptanda omnia, non nobis, perinde prorsum atque ipse idem diceret, ut fiat verisimile sic eum nec aliter fuisse dicturum; neque vero tam spectabimus quid eum, quem loquentem facimus, deceat, ut personam, quam nos ei imponimus”; for: “tales ipsi non sunt, at nos facimus” (185, Aa.r, II.xvi; but cf. 186, Aa.v)—emphatic of the craft. Sans the virtually vicarious, ventriloquistic shift, such an effect may be attained by the art of the *en passant*—veiling its involvement (cf. part 6): “you should incidentally narrate [‘paradiegesthai’] anything that tends to show your own virtue [‘aretên’]” (Aristotle *Rhetoric* 444–445, 1417a, III.xvi.5). Carey logs that *dispositio* conduces to “the presentation of *ethos*”, by stressing “the effects” of an “adroit presentation of the ‘facts’ [...] Aristotle shows an awareness [...] of the potential of narrative as proof. He notes (*Rhetoric* 141[7]a) [...]: ‘You may slip in[...] such things as relate to your virtue[’] [...] the exposition of character appears uncontrived [...] the hearer draws the character by inference for himself. The resultant persona is therefore more plausible” (“Rhet. means” 38–39). A similarly incidental *modus operandi* will prove utile for opposing parties. Cf. Sattler (his context *cum grano salis*): “whenever Aristotle deals with the portrayal of the character of others in a speech, he indicates the relationship of such *ethos* to the *ethos* of the speaker” (60–61). Noting that “*diabole* [...] is derived from [...] *diaballein*, [...] ‘to cause hostility between/against’”—an “element [...] at home in any part of the speech”—Carey sees the tool of “destroy[ing] [...] character” as spec. efficient if employed “in passing” (“Rhet. means” 31). Cf. the countermeasure (*antidiaballein*): Aristotle *Rhetoric* 440, 1416a, III.xv.7; 456, 1418a, III.xvii.10; Süß (245–246); Wisse (22): “*διαβολή* is relevant to *ethos* in any variant” (22n.). On “character assassination” in Lysias, see Carey (“Comment.” 147; with 72, 89n., 111, 148, 162, 207). Bakker refers to “the negative *ēthopoia* of his adversary” (“Lysias” 419n.). Cf. Pearson: “in [...] lawsuits”, spec. “in those that have some political significance, the aim of a litigant is not only to prove that certain incidents took place, but to ruin his adversary’s career by blackening his character” (“Character.” 76). Cf. Bakker’s wording: “blackens [...] reputation” (“Lysias” 415); Morford (242; passim). Pearson sees a “fashion of merciless characterization” (*Greek Historians* 40). Kennedy stresses: “Character assassination becomes a significant feature of Greek and later of Roman oratory” (*New History* 67; cf. *Persuasion* 136–138).

not only what we say and how we say it that matters, but also in what sequence: Disposition is therefore essential [‘opus ergo est et dispositione’]” (Quintilian *Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 22–23, 3.3.2).²⁴⁷ Likewise, Dionysius considers it to be paramount:

247 Blass accentuates: “In der Art aber, wie die Verbindung hergestellt wird, offenbart sich gerade des Redners Kunst” (*Beredsamkeit II.* 168). Cf. “Dispositio est ordo et distributio rerum”; “Arrangement is the ordering and distribution of the matter” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 6–7, I.ii.3); “dispositio est per quam illa quae invenimus in ordinem redigimus” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 184, III.ix.16). Caplan’s glosses use “τάξις”, “οἰκονομία” interchangeably (*Rhet. ad Her.* 6n., 184n.), while noting that “Sulpitius Victor [...] distinguishes between the Natural Arrangement (*ordo naturalis*) and the Artistic (*ordo artificiosus, οἰκονομία*) [...]. Cf. Quintilian’s *oeconomica dispositio* in 7. 10. 11. Athanasius [...] distinguishes τάξις from οἰκονομία on the same principle” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 184n.–185n.; see Sulpicius Victor 320, §14). The *Rhet. ad Her.* uses the term (“alia dispositio”) also for the latter, modified by “accommodated to circumstance [‘ad tempus adcommoatur’]” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 186–187, III.ix.17). Context constitutes the *aptum*—the guiding directive (as generally in the pragmatic art *par excellence*) being expediency (“commode”, “si commodum erit”, *Rhet. ad Her.* 186, III.ix.17). Cf. Quintilian, stating “that it is [...] not always expedient to be lucid [‘nec dilucida semper sit utile exponere’]” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 234–237, 4.2.32); Russell glosses: “the expediency of the case is always decisive” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 236n.). As to narrative arrangement, the orator likewise accentuates utility: “I prefer to narrate events in the order that is most advantageous [‘eo malo narrare quo expedit’]” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 260–261, 4.2.83). Whether or not one accepts the possibility of a ‘natural order’ will depend on the measure applied; taking the technical character of the *ars* into account (as does the *Rhetorica*), the ‘natural’ sequence will be tantamount to the ‘normal’ one as per “the rules of the art” (“ordine artificioso”, *Rhet. ad Her.* 186–187, III.ix.17; with 184n.). Any arrangement will be ‘economical’ in this sense—all *dispositio* being artful (see part 6, herein). On “*oeconomia*”, cf. Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 26–27, 3.3.9; 26n.; here: 27); including Russell’s gloss that “[t]he term οἰκονομία was widely used”, also defined as “*éntechnos epikrisis ton heurethénton*”, a “technical review of what has been discovered” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 26n.). Prior, and with respect to drama, the *rhétor* states: “The old Latin poets [...] are also more careful [‘diligentior’] about organization [‘Oeconomia’] than most of the moderns, who have come to think that clever phrases (*sententiae*) are the only virtue in any work” (*Inst. Orat.* 1–2. 202–203, 1.8.8–9; cf. Herrick 102). Baldwin takes “the ancient term[s] [...] *dispositio, collocatio*, or more generally *οἰκονομία*” to mean “*composition* in our larger modern sense” (*Ancient Rhet.* 103n.). Discussing the “rhetorical terms [...] *dispositio, ordo*, and *oeconomia*” with respect to drama (94–106; here: 94), Herrick observes: “The Terentian commentators, Donatus included, did not favor the term *ordo* though they were familiar with the conception of natural and artificial order” (101; cf. 98); they “preferred [...] *oeconomia*, which they used to express the orderly, unified disposition of scenes in a comedy” (102)—following Quintilian, as cited above; in Renaissance drama, “*Ordo* [...] usually meant the arrangement of a particular speech. *Oeconomia* [...] was larger than individual speeches” (102). The rhetorical variant: “duplex dispositio est: una per orationes, altera per argumentationes” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 184–186, III.ix.17). Herrick notes that “*Ordo* [...] was not used by Robortellus as synonymous with *dispositio* and *oeconomia*”—while he does employ the latter two interchangeably (105); likewise Ben Jonson (“the oeconomy and disposition”), and Milton (“such oeconomy or disposition”, qtd. in: Herrick 106).

for the achievement of pleasing, persuasive [...] powerful effects in discourse [...] [‘the arrangement’] is far more potent than [...] [‘the selection of words’]. [...] composition [‘σύνθεσις’] [...] possesses so much importance and potency that it surpasses and outweighs all the other’s achievements. [...] the potentialities of composition are second in logical order to those of selection, but are prior in potency. (“Composition” 22–23, §2)²⁴⁸

The practice of *oikonomía* applies to all written and delivered genres: given a (copious) substratum heuristically encountered during the phase of *inventio*—whether factual and historical, or already based on a literary rendering, on (*ex tempore*) fabrication—no text or speech (nor any other work of art) could do without the procedures of selecting, assembling, arranging, organizing, framing, and displaying (in terms of ‘layout’) the material at hand in a manner deemed conducive to the respectively present case, the mode of treating it, and the desired effect: be it dissuading or accommodating, competitive and conflictual, pondering and assessing, or vituperative and laudatory (or again otherwise).²⁴⁹ That it is always significant rhetorically in whose mouth words are

248 Cf. Roberts (9). Dionysius refers to rhetorical *dispositio* by way of forms and derivatives of *synthesis* and *kataskueú*—see e.g. ‘*synthéseos*’ (“Lysias” 32, §8), ‘*syntithesi*’, ‘*kataskueue*’, ‘*kateskeuasménos*’, ‘*kateskeuásthai*’, ‘*synthéseí*’ (“Lysias” 34, §8), ‘*kataskueon*’ (“Lysias” 46, §13); also forms of ‘*táxis*’ (“Lysias” 38, §11), ‘*táxei*’, ‘*táxin*’ (“Lysias” 52, §15), and *oikonomía*: ‘*oikonomesai*’ (twice, “Lysias” 52, §15); cf. Bonner (*Lit. Treatises* 46). Noting that “Lysias seeks to achieve his effects subtly”, Carey accentuates “his ability to suggest an emotional response by the skilful deployment of material (by selection, juxtaposition, expansion [...] contraction)” (“Intro.” 11); “the ‘inartificial’ proofs admit of skill in drafting and deployment” (“Intro.” 10)—spec. as to their placement in a speech’s rhetorical economy. On the import of Lysian *dispositio*, see Bakker: he “carefully weaves” facets “into his speeches wherever [...] most effective” (cf. “the distribution of characterizing elements”, “Lysias” 412; with applications: 413–416).

249 Cf. “Ammonius [...] quotes Theophrastus as saying that every speech has two aspects, the content and the effect upon the audience; the philosopher is mainly concerned with the first, the poet or rhetorician mainly with the second: they *choose* their words for effect and *arrange* them harmoniously” (Grube 106). To impress ‘philosophical’ (including *soi-disant*) recipients, it is primarily the *lógos* (*prágmata*, *res*, nominal equivalents) that tends to be efficacious. Cf. Kustas: “Psellus [...] remarks that philosophy without rhetoric has no grace, and rhetoric without philosophy no content. [...] [‘]there is a philosophizing rhetoric as well as a rhetoricizing philosophy” (69; with 69n.). Ever will effectuality be relative to the given context (its priming, presuppositions, hence expectations). Cf. Sprute (286; 289); Niehues-Pröbsting: “Rhetorik ist [...] unverzichtbar, weil die große Menge [...] wissenschaftlicher Belehrung unzugänglich ist. Selbst wenn die Wahrheit eines Sachverhaltes an sich beweisbar ist, ist sie das doch nicht immer für alle“ (“Glauben” 35). “Die sophistische Rhetorik ist nur so ‘logisch’, wie es im Hinblick auf das jeweilige Publikum und nicht im Hinblick auf die Sache notwendig ist” (*Die antike Phil.* 53). One may say the same about the relative ‘logicalness’ of philosophy—since one might question whether something like a ‘*res*’ (‘*lógos*’) sans audience is even possible (beyond its nominal, propositional conceivability); rhetorically, anything (the issue at hand) is

being put—at what time, in which context and whose presence, by which means, and (above all) in the interest of what or whom (including vicariously)—marks a decisive nexus between *dispositio* and *sermocinatio*.²⁵⁰

constituted by, contingent upon, the context (being a case's *conditio sine qua non*). As to the above, Theophrastan view, cf. Devries' binarism for another elemental *pīstis*: "There are two classes of ethos, the universal and the particular. The sphere of the former is philosophy; of the latter, oratory [...] [where] it is the means by which the speech is adapted to the speaker, [...] hearers, [...] opponent, [...] subject, [...] circumstances" (10). A strict dichotomy seems problematic: any dissemination of 'philosophy' will require a form of (self-)representation (an agent, carrier being involved). The rhetorical accent on specifics, contextuality is to the point.

250 Nicolaus claims that ethopoetic "speech" will not "be argumentative", since "its only aim is to move the hearer to pleasure or to tears" (166, §10.67). He does not seem to grant rhetoric's polyfunctionality, or that of its devices; see Mayfield ("Interplay" 5; 5n.–6n.; 8n.; 14n.; 33n.). Cf. Carey: "narrative can be varied, [...] achieve more than one effect" ("Rhet. means" 43). Ventriloquism cannot be restricted to *elocutio, ornatus*. Noting that "*Ēthopoiia* is a concern of epinician, as it is of oratory", Currie states (as to "Pindar and Bacchylides"): "[t]he relevant technique of characterization [...] is [...] speech, involving both *ēthopoiia* and *gnōmai*. But [...] qualifications [...] need to be recognized. First, [...] the problem of who speaks" (312); this will usually apply. Describing variants of rhetorical ventriloquism may have a diagnostic function: "Pindar's epinicians are full of *gnōmai* presented in the speaker's persona (in Bacchylides there is a greater tendency to place them in the mouth of characters)" (Currie 313). On the *dispositio* of *sententiae*, see Vives: "sordent enim sententiæ non suo loco positæ, et sicut intempestivum omne, molestæ sunt"; one may 'finitize' them: "verum enimvero illud plurimi refert, *quid cuius persona dicatur, nostra an aliena*, sunt enim multa quæ a nobis nostro nomine et persona dici expedit, sicut non pauca alieno nomine, quemadmodum etiam in causis forensibus" (185, Aa.r, II.xvi). Cf. Corneille's "Discours du poème dramatique": "il les faut placer judicieusement, et surtout les mettre en la bouche de gens qui ayent l'esprit sans embarras, et qui ne soient point emportés par la chaleur de l'action" (qtd. in: Asmuth *Dramenanalyse* 166–167)—counseled, performed with a view to *docere*; other functionalizations are conceivable. The "*aptum*" is involved: "in Platons Dialogen finden sich Lebensweisheiten fast nur im Munde älterer Personen" (Hellwig 265n.)—for reasons of plausibility (hence with a view to the recipients). The effect being the gauge, a flouting thereof may prove expedient (relative to the setting, genre): in a Theophrastan context, Rusten logs that Menander's "philosophizing passages [...] are often given an ironic turn when put in the mouths of unsuitable characters" (17); on the "affinity" of said philosopher and poet, see Fuhrmann (*Dichtungstheorie* 157; trans. dsm). In a context of paradoxography, burlesque, "cynicism", Schulz-Buschhaus speaks of Rabelais' "putting in the mouth of Panurge" an "encomium of creditors and debtors" (8; trans. dsm). In artful, even devious texts, inadvertency as to in whose mouth words are being put may lead to problematic views on what is supposed to be a text's 'meaning' or 'the author's intent'. For one of Erasmus' "most infamous" *sermocinationes* ("Saint Socrates, pray for us!"), in the mouth of "Eusebius"), cf. Sloane ("Selfhood" 112; cf. 114). Among Cervantes' "formal strategies", Fuchs logs "moments of ventriloquism[,] in which marginalized characters voice the ideology that condemns them" (17). Cf. Mayfield ("Talking Canines" 14n.; 19; 19n.; 22; 22n.; 29; spec. 32n.–33n.; *Artful* 91n.; 128; 182n.; 184; 273). As to the Machiavellian (and Livian) practice, see Strauss

With respect to poetics, any writer will select, (dialogically) situate, specific *personae* (*éthe*), putting convenient words into their mouths; or (often at once) citing their (apparently) ‘historical’ counterparts (also with regard to selves) in a manner (deemed) advantageous to the respectively present purpose and context (this being the Platonic *praxis* generally)—sometimes so as to speak specifically in the extratextual writer’s stead (as received by the audience or reader).²⁵¹

Concerning the internal economy, Lausberg logs “the poet’s conversation with the muse” as “a special variant” of *sermocinatio* (*Elemente* 143, §433; trans. dsm). On the stage, or in ‘autobiography’ (see part 1), it may tend to take the form of a “monolog” or “soliloquy” (cf. *Elemente* 143, §432; trans. dsm), and include a speaker’s putting words into her own mouth (so to say)—for instance with a view to (imagining herself in, preparing for) a future situation.²⁵²

(10; 42, “mouthpiece”, 139; cf. 137–167; Mansfield *Virtue* 132; 320n.); see subch. 5.2, herein. In line with the above, Cicero’s ensuing claim must be modified: “the poet avoids impropriety [‘dedecere’] as the greatest fault which he can commit; he errs also if he puts the speech [‘orationem affingit’] of a good man in the mouth of a villain, or that of wise man in the mouth of a fool; [...] even the actor seeks for propriety [‘si denique histrio quid deceat quaerit’]; what, then [...] should the orator do” (“Orator” 360–361, xxi.74). A calculated indecorum will not exactly be out of the ordinary, given a *téchne* aiming for maximal effectuality: “Que es arte ir contra el arte quando no se puede de otro modo conseguir la dicha del salir bien” (Gracián *Oráculo manual* 138, §66). On (Diogenical) cynicism, cf. Mayfield (*Artful* 7n.; 50–51; 55, 55n.; 129n.; passim). As France notes for another notorious case, Rousseau’s rhetoric “works[,] because it flouts the oratorical conventions of modesty and self-effacement, but also because it uses some of the old devices, notably prosopopoeia”—a tactic fusing “brutal effrontery” (259) with technical *hypólepsis*. On the nexus of *dispositio* and *actio*, see Cicero: “Aeschines [...] thought that the same speech with a change of speaker would be a different thing [‘qui orationem eamdem aliam esse putaret actore mutato’]” (“*De Orat. III*” 169–171, III.lvi.213). Similarly: “Multa fiunt eadem, sed aliter” (Quintilian *Inst. Orat. 1–2*. 406, 2.20.10). “Wiederholung ist prinzipiell vom Wiederholten unterschieden” (Stierle “Moralistik” 2). “Each word of a text is transformed in a new context” (Bakhtin *Speech* 165; “Methodology” 68).

251 This phenomenon seems pervasive (and elusive); it may also apply to a spec. citational practice (often with an ethopoetic agenda); cf. “‘au nom du dieu! [...] ne me parlez pas de cet-homme-là!’” (Voltaire ventriloquized, or qtd., in: Nietzsche *KSA* 13. 44, 11[95]347). It matters, who is cited—when, in what context, whose presence. Cf. Pfister on the “produzentenbezogene Phänomen der Verwendung einer Figur als ‘Sprachrohr’ für die Meinungen und Ansichten des Autors” (149) qua determining the process of reception. As Burger indicates with reference to Wittenwiler’s “*Der Ring*” (a “Monstrum, halb Lehrgedicht, halb Verserzählung von epischem Ausmaß”), *sermocinatio* may be functionalized in (ostensibly) didactic respects (*Renaissance* 62): “Die lehrhaften Partien sind Personen der unterhaltenden Erzählung in den Mund gelegt. Ohne letztere, entschuldigt sich der Verfasser, fände die Lehre keine Leser” (*Renaissance* 63).

252 Iulius Rufinianus refers to such ‘*auto-sermocinatio*’ as “Διαλογισμός”: “Haec fit ita, cum quis secum disputat et volutat, quid agat vel quid agendum putet. Apud Terentium: Q u i d

From a (meta-)poetico-hermeneutic perspective, the above procedure might also be taken to apply to an author's anticipating his recipients intratextually—(tacitly, expressly) putting words into their mouths (*sermocinatio* functioning qua *subiectio*), so as to reply immediately (on the page).²⁵³ Dynamizing the

igitur faciam? Vergilius: / En, quid ago? [...] Cicero pro Cluentio: [...] Quod est igitur remedium? quod?" (43–44, §20). Also citing Terence (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 40, 9.2.11), Quintilian classes the process under “interrogare vel percentari”—which Russell captions “*Rhetorical Questions*” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 36–43, 9.2.6–16; here: 36, 9.2.6): it includes “interrogandi se et respondendi sibi”; “imaginary interrogation” (“ficta interrogatione”)—e.g. via “Someone will say [‘dicit aliquis!’]” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 40–41, 9.2.14–15); “ask[ing] a question and [...], without waiting for the answer, supply[ing, ‘subicere’] one yourself”—“sometimes called Suggestion [‘per suggestionem’]” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 42–43, 9.2.15). Cf. “man richtet an Jemand[en] eine Frage, [...] ohne die Antwort abzuwarten, schiebt man ihm seine eigen unter”: “*subiectio*”, “ὑποφορά [...] ἀθυποφορά” (Volkman 493, III.49; see Tiberius 77, §39). Said scholar links “die Figur des *διαλεκτικόν*” to the affine “*διαλογισμός*” (492, III.49; the former with Tiberius 67–68, §19). See subch. 3.1. Bonner adduces Seneca’s “*prosopopoeia*” of Andromache, “in which she debates with herself” (*Declamation* 164; see “Troades” 228–229, v.642–662; “Quid agimus?”, v.642). Cf. Priscian on “onefold allocutions”: “Adlocutionum [...] quaedam sunt simplices, quando supponitur aliquis ipse per se loquens” (“*praexercitamina*” 558, §9). Such pertains to the deliberative: “Die Fingierung von Selbstgesprächen beruht auf der *coniectura animi*” (Lausberg *Handbuch* 410, §823)—vicariously (anticipatingly, prudentially, purposively) putting oneself in the position of an (potentially any) *alter*. For epistolography, Lanham logs: “*quasi praesens* is the motto [...] of *ethopoeia*, speaking in character” (“Composition” 123). Cf. Shawcross, on Wyatt’s “Patience, though I have not”: “While the poet seems to address a personified Patience, it is clear that he is counselling himself” (15). For (dramatic) realizations, cf. Plett: “*fictio personae*” (“Prosopopoeie”) is “eine theatralische Impersonation nach den Regeln des *decorum*. Ihre poetische Applikation führt zu Erscheinungsformen” such as “Rollenlyrik oder *dramatic monologue*” (“*Theatrum Rhet.*” 354; cf. 356); see Barner (103–104; spec. “Rollentrieb”, 103; “Lust zur Rolle”, “Spieltrieb”, 104).

253 In Antiquity, declamatory *praxis* was decisive in this respect—‘performed’ (*actio*, delivery) in schools, but also later in life; it is present in Medieval scholastic disputations, Humanist dialogs; cf. Bloemendal (“Polish Pindar” 115–117); Feldman (75); Mayfield (“Interplay” 23; 24n.; 29; 29n.). See Christiansen: “examples for imitation came from all disciplines (poetry, history, philosophy, oratory, [...] scripture) and from all genres (*sententiae*, dialogues, epistles, verses, themes, [...] orations proper), all texts were treated as ‘declamations’” (316). On the aspect of anticipation qua linked to the *aptum*, cf. Nicolaus: *ethopoeia* “is useful for the three kinds of rhetoric; [...] we often need ethopoeia when speaking an encomium [...] in prosecuting [...] giving counsel. To me, it seems also to exercise us in the style of letter writing, since [...] there is need of foreseeing the character of those sending letters and those to whom they are sent” (166, §10.66–67). In various formulations, the import of the *aptum* is stressed in the *Progymnasmata* (*pace* Bruss’ decontextualized construal 44): “Throughout the exercise [of ‘characterization’] you will preserve what is distinctive and appropriate to the persons imagined as speaking and to the occasions” (Hermogenes 85, §9.21). “Speeches [...] need to fit the places and occasions [...]. We shall [...] give what is appropriate to each” (John of Sardis/Sopatros 214, §11.196); “the

discourse, Blumenberg uses this technique in the following formulation: “Maybe someone [will] say” (*Unbegrifflichkeit* 38; trans. dsm).²⁵⁴ One also

speech should be proper to those supposed to be speaking” (217, §11.209). Alberic emphasizes *decorum* in virtually every phrase on “*ethopoeia*” with respect to “letter writing” (151, VII.1; cf. Lanham “Composition” 120; 122; “Instruction” 115–116; with 115n.): “a suitable simplicity of language”; “take care to preserve [...] balance with the greatest diligence”; “one will succeed in [...] moving the heart when he suits [...] his words and [...] thoughts to the dignity of the theme”; “he must study [...] the person so as to determine who is speaking, to whom, when, how, and about what”; “he will be able to vary his approach according to the [resp.] nature”; “the qualities suitable to each” (Alberic 150, VII.1); “one must carefully adapt his material to the age of the listener. Nor should one ignore the background”; “one [...] deals with each according to his [...] nature”; “not all speak the same language”; “one must study who is speaking, what, where, with what aids, when, why, [...] how; by scrutinizing all these elements very carefully, he will be able to treat each [...] according to its merits” (151, VII.1). Cf. Lanham: “a letter should reflect the writer’s character and personality, [...] be adapted to the relationship between writer and addressee” (“Composition” 122)—as is suitable, effectual under the given circumstances. For letters have purposes (normally more than one)—hence said ‘reflecting and adapting’ are governed by the case at hand (ultimately by expediency only). See Demetrius on the epistolary genre: “the letter [...] is like one of the two sides to a dialogue” (481, §223; a remark given to Artemon). “Like the dialogue, the letter should be strong in characterisation [‘tò ethikòn’]” (482–483, §227). Kustas notes: “Photius [...] list[s][...] βραχύτης, σαφήνεια, χάρις, ἀπλότης as the qualities by which to convey the ethos of the letter writer and his subject. [...] a late anonymous writer reminds us that ἠθοποιία should be καθαρά, and without ruggedness” (67–68; see 67n.–68n.). Cf. Sloane: “Humanists [...] taught letter-writing as if letters were a kind of conversation” (“Education” 171). Eden associates *ethos* (“this understanding of character”) “with epistolary writing” (*Rediscovery* 109). Cf. Kustas: “Epistolography [...] falls under the heading of ἠθοποιία, the progymnasma par excellence[,] which gave the freest scope to the expression of personality traits” (59). Citing the latter (“Instruction” 110), Lanham glosses: “*ethopoeia* [...], the speech in character, was considered to be among the more difficult [...]. The larger rhetorical principle being stressed in this exercise is *decorum*, suiting one’s words to the speaker’s age, rank, [...] fortune, [...] to the situation. Establishing an authorial voice, an *ethos*, is a central task for any speaker or writer, but character portrayal addressed the very essence of the letter, which is, after all, a substitute for one’s physical presence. [...] one must take into account the [...] *ethos* [...] of [...] sender and [...] recipient” (“Instruction” 110–111). The vicariousness characteristic of *epistolae* entails products of art as standing in for ‘nature’—evinced the craftedness of *ethos*, incidentally. As “[v]arious formulas” show, “a letter substitutes for face-to-face conversation”: “it seeks to bridge physical separation *quasi* (or *tamquam*) *praesens*, *littera pro lingua*, and *absens corpore, praesens spiritu*” (“Composition” 122; cf. 127n.; Lanham’s table of ‘epistolary formulas’, 131n.–134n.); see spec. “*per vicarium meum*” (“Composition” 132n.), referring to the letter as (quasi-personified) proxy. Such and affine phrases “dramatize[...] both the persona of the sender and the moment of receiving or reading the letter” (“Composition” 122).

254 Cf. Blumenberg (*Phänomenologische* 11; 55); Sloane on “prolepsis, anticipatory refutation” (“Education” 163; *Contrary* 81): “one should always keep the opposition in view [...]. ‘Wariness’” (“Education” 173; *Contrary* 123)—“bold with all wareness” (Wilson 58, I; cf. 121, I).

encounters it as a sequentialized structuring device in Seneca (conspicuously with a view to *dispositio*): “Now some person [...] will say [...] Again, the objector mentioned above wonders at our saying [...] Again, this same objector wonders at our saying” (“Hoc aliquis [...] ait [...] Deinde idem admiratur, cum dicimus [...] Deinde idem admiratur, quod dicimus”, *Ep.* 66–92. 224–227, LXXXI.11–12).²⁵⁵

255 Cf. “‘But how’, you will reply [‘Dices’]” (*Ep.* 1–65. 22–23, V.7)—putting words in Lucilius’ mouth (as often in the epistles). See Augustine: “DICET aliquis”, “SOMEONE will say” (*de civ. Dei I–III.* 34–35, I.viii). Likewise, Machiavelli: “And if someone should reply” (*Prince* 64, XVI). Montaigne: “But, someone will answer [‘me répondra-on’]” (*Essays* 274, II.6; *Essais* II. 77, II.vi). As part of a *hypophorá*, *sermocinationes* serve as a setup for oneself. In Seneca, the technique may be seen as ‘fictionalizing’ an other (a *prosopopoiía*), while simultaneously ‘tying in with oneself’ (a hypoleptic *dialogismós*, so to speak)—for ethopoetic purposes. On “Letter writing” during the “Roman age” in connection with “portraiture and character expression”, see Kustas (58). As to the vivid crafting of presence by way of (plausibly) predicted recipient responses—qua intratextual *sermocinationes* (not only expedient in letters)—cf. Iulius Victor: “Lepidum est nonnumquam quasi praesentem alloqui, uti ‘heus tu’ et ‘quid ais’ et ‘video te deridere’” (448, XXVII, in the ch. ‘de epistolis’; cf. Lanham “Composition” 120, 121n.). For a pertinent example (involving vicariously induced, cynical laughter), see Lucian: “I think I can see you laughing [...]—indeed, I hear you give tongue as you naturally [‘εἰκός’] would: ‘Oh, the stupidity! Oh, the vainglory! Oh’—everything else that we are in the habit of saying [‘λέγειν εἰώθαμεν’] about it all” (“Peregrinus” 4–5, §2; see 41, §37; cf. Hodkinson 552; with 557). Such might be described as a *sermocinatio* qua embedded reader response: the express reference being to this (epistolary) satire’s intratextual addressee (Kronios), hence to the general recipient. Often, one encounters *sermocinatio* in an imagined objector, (preventively) inserted (also in direct speech) into a tract or essay—a useful technique for stealing an opponent’s thunder, for dynamizing (what would else seem) a monolog by adding other voices; see Mayfield (“Otherwise” passim; spec. parts 1, 6, therein). Cf. Sloane’s wording: “as Fish makes his enemy[,] the formalist[,] insist” (“Reading” 410). Hermogenes has these variants: “[t]here are characterizations of [...] definite and indefinite persons [...]. Those [...] are single where someone [...] is imagined as making a speech by himself; [...] double[,] when he is speaking to someone else” (85, §9.20–21). This might as well be a *sermocinatio* qua setup (the verbalized *alter* a *prosopopoiía*): “Scribere me quereris, Velox, epigrammata longa. / ipse nihil scribis: tu breviora facis?” (Martial 120, I.110). Seneca puts a protest in Lucilius’ mouth: “‘Epicurus’ inquis, ‘dixit. Quid tibi cum alieno?’” (*Ep.* 1–65. 72, XII.11)—only to invalidate it; or rather, to anticipate, defuse a conceivable objection, placed in the mouth of a protagonist equally functionalized. This dialogic rendering of the letter or essay has affinities to an ‘internal debate’—the *persona* ‘Seneca’ might be said to be externalizing an (otherwise) notional ‘Lucilius’ (*prosopopoiía*), interacting with him (quasi auto-etho-poetically) by putting words into his mouth (*sermocinatio*): “In secretum te meum admitto et te adhibito mecum exigo”; “I am admitting you to my inmost thoughts, and am having it out with myself, [...] making use of you as my pretext” (*Ep.* 1–65. 192–193, XXVII.1). The above *sententia* had not been ascribed previously (as far as is assessable); hence Seneca synergizes its possible functionalizations. He first names a (noted) authority for a given *dictum*, then appropriates it: “Quod verum est, meum est [...] quae optima sunt, esse communia” (*Ep.*

With respect to ‘(famous) last words’, *sermocinationes* (likely the rule) are encountered qua attributing apposite (pregnant, laconic, prophetic) utterances to the departing—as, emphatically, their ‘last word’. Blumenberg’s *Die Sorge geht über den Fluß* ends with the ensuing *sententia*, wryly put into the dying Heidegger’s mouth (hypothetically): “*Kein Grund mehr zur Sorge*” (*Sorge* 222).²⁵⁶

1–65, 72, XII.11). Focusing on Erasmus in said respect, see Eden (*Friends* passim; “Intellectual Property” passim). As suggested, it would probably not have been beyond the writer’s crafted, projected *ethos* (cultivated as ‘Seneca’) to have posited ‘Lucilius’ as a fictional addressee *tout court*, functionally standing in for another of ‘his own’ *personae*; the diction often yields the impression of a sender’s addressing himself; this circularity is then reproduced in (or by) the reader, who vicariously finds—or (deliberately) puts—himself in the position of the addressee and (if taken to be the same) the message’s (departed) emitter; such circuitousness seems spec. effectual in terms of auto-persuasion. Conversely, a writer might choose to reply implicitly to a friend (Montaigne to La Boétie); or teacher, often tacitly (Aristotle to Plato). For samples of said technique in John of Salisbury, see Moos: “Du sagst mir vielleicht [*Sed dices fortasse*]” (293, 293n., §71); “Sollte jemand [*Si quis*]”, etc. (406, 406n., §88). Cf. Blumenberg, noting an affine use in Descartes: “Wahrscheinlich war es einer der fiktiven Antwortbriefe, die von ihm in Umlauf gesetzt wurden, um auf gedachte oder indirekt übermittelte Einwände einzugehen” (*Höhlenaugänge* 450)—delegating a dynamic *disputatio* to paper (seeing that *scripta manent*); in exploring a current genre, such also serves for tying in with (hence implicitly legitimizing) a given utilization. The various functions of rhetorical ventriloquism are polyvalent, Protean.

256 Approx. ‘no longer any grounds for caring’—the discursive implications are not retained in trans. The section is entitled ‘Ein noch unbestätigtes Schlusswort’ (*Sorge* 222); Marquard takes it up with respect to Blumenberg (cf. “Entlastung 1991” 26). This *sermocinatio* (the philosopher putting apt last words in Heidegger’s mouth) is itself a (partial) citation of a (putative) Roman epitaph (given the telling caption ‘Das Dasein’): abbreviated as “N F F N S N C”, it is said to signify “NON FUI; FUI; NON SUM; NON CURO” (*Begriffe* 29); cf. quotes serving as last words (*Goethe* 88; *Matthäuspassion* 225–230). In “Ein Dementi”—as to the ‘future of reception’—Blumenberg gives his motives for inventing “ein angemessene Sterbebettfazit” for Heidegger as ‘not having wished to let him take his leave from Time and Being wordlessly’ (“habe ich [...] [ihn] nicht wortlos aus Zeit und Sein abgehen lassen wollen”, *Verführbarkeit* 107); at once, he notes that “Bröcker” (notified by Heidegger’s wife) had sent him the (supposedly) actual last words: “*Ich bleibe noch liegen*” (*Verführbarkeit* 107; roughly, ‘I will stay in bed a while longer’); also cited in a more assertive, quasi-non-temporal version (as far as change or action in the future is concerned): “*Ich bleibe liegen*” (*Vollzähligkeit* 224). Counting himself a “lover of ‘last words’” (“Liebhaber ‘Letzter Worte’”), Blumenberg justifies his having ‘crafted the apposite for lack of the factual ones’ (“in Ermangelung des faktischen das angemessene [...] erfinden”), and declares his ‘confiding in the fact that fiction will prevail’: “Trotzdem bin ich zuversichtlich, daß meine Fiktion – weil Fiktionen doch immer stärker sind als Fakten – überleben wird” (*Verführbarkeit* 108). See another of Blumenberg’s characteristic remarks to this effect: “Letzte Worte dürfen erfunden sein, wenn sie gut erfunden sind, da sie ohnehin zumeist erfunden werden müssen” (*Höhlenaugänge* 386n.; cf. Mayfield *Artful* 42n.). On legitimization as per the (effectuality of the) *aptum*, Blumenberg logs: “Auch wenn den pointierten Überlieferungen von

5.2 Variants of Rhetorical Ventriloquism in Historiography, Literature, Philosophy (*inter alia*)

Quae omnia vera esse sciet si quis non orationes modo
sed historias etiam [...] legere maluerit
quam in comentariis rhetorum consenescere[.]
Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 146–148, 3.8.67)²⁵⁷

[...] Malraux nicht durchweg zu trauen ist, wird man doch geziemend finden, als letztes Wort des sterbenden [...] Valéry gesagt zu finden” etc. (*Lebensthemen* 152). Cf. Meyer: “Blumenberg, immer auch ein Sammler ‘letzter Worte’” (115). With respect to Fontane, the philosopher suggests a short poem on the former’s part as his plausible ‘last word’ (“der [...] Fünfzeiler [...], der Fontanes ‘letztes Wort’ sein könnte”, Blumenberg *Fontane* 38). Cf. the short essay “Letzte Worte Wielands”, which opens: “Not everyone gets the chance to die as he deserves. Death is simply the precise opposite of a chance. This has an effect on [‘färbt auf (...) ab’, sc. ‘dyes’] the circumstances. Also on the last words, for which there still is time. Or on those, who have conveyed them to us” (*Goethe* 101; trans. dsm). For the arch-Phenomenologist, Blumenberg suggests: “E i n Buch möchte ich noch fertig machen, das sollte mir vergönnt sein’. [...] Als letztes Wort [...] Husserls wäre das eines Gelehrten würdig” (the latter qtd., commented on, in: *Lebensthemen* 136); cf. “Daß es eine ‘unendliche Arbeit’ sein würde, war nicht nur eine Phrase” (*Lebensthemen* 137). With respect to Benn, Blumenberg writes a short essay entitled “Letztes Wort des Zynikers” (*Lebensthemen* 170–172; here: 170), which opens: “Letzte Worte spielen im Bestand des Überlieferten eine eigene Rolle. Der sie gesprochen hat, ist in absoluter Weise der Belangbarkeit für sie entzogen. Er erfährt nicht mehr und kann nicht mehr bestätigen, was ihm zugeschrieben wird. Der sie gehört hat oder haben will, ist in singulärer Weise für sie verantwortlich. Die Intimität der Situation, in der sie gesprochen oder geschrieben sind, verleiht Bedeutung auch dem, der dabei oder ihr Adressat war. Der Zeuge ist dem Bild dessen verpflichtet, der danach zu ihm nichts mehr gesagt hat” (*Lebensthemen* 170; cf. *Jünger* 148). Such may entail the notion of a concluding ‘image’ or impression—the (for somatic reasons) ‘ultimate’ variant among a series of *éthe* projected; while it lasts, the reception will add others, as a matter of (virtual) course. Cf. the initial words of the essay entitled “Das eine letzte Wort”: “Letzte Worte werden von den anderen überliefert, die sie gehört haben oder gehört haben wollen. Sie fallen sehr verschieden aus, sonst wäre es nicht interessant, sie zu berichten noch sie kennenzulernen” (*Jünger* 143). The eds. of this posthumously published volume group further essays with said theme in the resp. section (“IX. Letzte Worte”, *Jünger* 143–151)—among them a miniature entitled “Letztes Wort”, giving that on the part of “Ernst Robert Curtius” (via Hochhuth, then *Jünger*) as “Aufmachen!” (*Jünger* 147); Blumenberg’s comment: “Kann man das ausdenken?” (*Jünger* 147). In the same essay, he refers to “*Jünger*” as a ‘collector of last words’ (“seine Sammlung Letzter Worte”, *Jünger* 147; cf. 149), which might will apply to his own practice also. With respect to Goethe’s (supposed) “‘Mehr Licht’”, see *Jünger*’s quote, cited in Blumenberg (*Jünger* 148; cf. the appropriation thereof in *Höhlenausgänge* 55).

²⁵⁷ See Kennedy: Quintilian “thinks that historical narrative is best taught by a rhetorician” (*New History* 202; cf. *Inst. Orat.* 1–2. 300–301, 5.1); generally, Lanham (“Composition” 128–129).

Applying the concepts described in parts 3 and 4, the present subchapter offers instances of rhetorical ventriloquism as occur in different genres and discursive contexts. To facilitate the reader's tying in with the ensuing samples, the latter are drawn from (what are likely to be) more or less familiar sources and authors (as in parts 1, 2, section 4.2).²⁵⁸ Moreover, they are emphatically comparatist—diachronic, transgeneric, interdisciplinary, diverse (contentwise, discursively)—precisely with a view to describing the functions and applications of the various ventriloquistic devices in their specific context, as well as *de re*.²⁵⁹

In historiographic genres, such as the Thucydidean, Sallustian, Livian, or Tacitean corpus, one encounters the nexus of *dispositio* and *sermocinatio* at every turn.²⁶⁰ Any writer will inevitably choose the specific material to be

258 See Goffman's statement, tying in with Simmel's method: "The illustrative materials used in this study are of mixed status [...]. The justification for this approach [...] is that the illustrations together fit into a coherent framework that ties together bits of experience the reader has already had" (9–10). In other words: it is to conduce to *hypólepsis*.

259 As 'universally' (qua Aristotelian '*kathólou*') as possible (see "Poetics" 58, 1451b, IX).

260 Cf. "Außer bei Lysias findet sich [...] E[thopoeia] [...] häufig in der rhetorisch beeinflussten *Historiographie*. THUCYDIDES [...] setzt [...] Reden und Charakterisierungen berühmter Politiker und Feldherren zur Darstellung von Geschichte ein" (Naschert 1514). Rusten sees "the famous sketches of historical figures in Sallust and Tacitus" (19) as inspired by the Theophrastan tradition of "Character sketching", qua '*charakterismoí* or *ethologíai*' (18; cf. Cicero "Topica" 446, xxi.83; Quintilian *Inst. Orat.* 1–2. 210, 1.9.3; 210n.; with Rutilius 12, I.21; see Halm's gloss, 12n.; Murphy *Middle Ages* 23; 25; 26n.): Rusten seems to mean '*ethopoíai*' plus '*charakterismós*' (qua '*effictio*'—with the latter typically referring to externals only). He notes that Gill "slights rhetorical influence" in this respect (19n.; cf. Gill "Question" passim); the same holds true for another article on the latter's part ("Personhood" passim; a brief mention of the art: 194). As to the function of the Theophrastan *Characters*, Rusten notes: a "suggested purpose is rhetorical instruction. [...] this is the use to which the work was eventually put; [...] it owes its [...] survival to its inclusion among the handbooks of the schools" (22; cf. Grube 103); "every [...] medieval manuscript [...] contain[ing] it is derived from collections of treatises on rhetoric [...] it must owe its preservation to a decision to make it part of a rhetorical corpus, doubtless as an aid to the description of character" (Rusten 29; cf. 33). Contrast Gill's ideological, unrhetorical take on "Theophrastus' *Characters*" (declaring "the relative triviality of this work"): "It is not apparent whether the 'characters' are intended to be one-dimensional caricatures (types of personality dominated by one overriding trait), or simply collections of the behavioural 'marks' or 'tokens' (*charaktères*) of a given defective trait" ("Question" 469n.). Monolateral value judgments tend to prove uncondusive to a scholarly approach. On "Charakterzeichnung" in Horace, see Fuhrmann (*Dichtungstheorie* 135; with "Ars Poetica" 462–465, v.153–178; spec. "notanda sunt tibi mores", 462, v.156; "decor", v.157; "morabimur aptis", 464, v.178; cf. Baldwin *Ancient Rhet.* 245); Fuhrmann logs a nexus with "Hellenism, especially [...] Theophrastus, who [...] had given considerable attention to characterology" (*Dichtungstheorie* 136; trans. dsm); as to a "Rhetorisierung der Poetik", he notes "die bedeutende Rolle [...] die [...] dem Konventionellen

modeled from a vast corpus of contingent particularities—few of them based on his own experience, the far greater share gathered from various sources already extant, frequently amplified, varied, reaccentuated by personified collectives, dead men revived, attributed speeches and envisioned dialogs, appearances verbally sketched, (re)descriptions of *ethos* (*prosopopoiia*, *eidolopoiia*, *allocutio*, *dialogismós*, *charakterismós*, *ethopoiia*).²⁶¹ He will be likely to aim at arranging actualities, pragmatic fabrications (such as conceivable speech acts, probable portrayals of ‘character’), in a plausible, appositely expedient manner, always being—in his way, and as a matter of course—‘economical with the facts’.²⁶²

und Typischen zukommt. Die Kategorie der Angemessenheit, des Passenden und Schicklichen (prepon, harmotton; *decorum*, *aptum*) entstammte der Rhetorik” (*Dichtungstheorie* 156); “das Konventionelle und das Typische [...] scheinen in dem Aristoteles-Schüler Theophrast den für die hellenistische Zeit wichtigsten oder gar maßgeblichen Theoretiker gefunden haben” (*Dichtungstheorie* 157). Cf. Baldwin: “Ancient poetic was [...] rhetoricated” (*Ancient Rhet.* 240); “most of the *Ars Poetica* applies equally to *ars rhetorica*” (*Ancient Rhet.* 246).

261 White refers to Michelet’s conception of “the historian” as “writing on behalf of the dead”, and as “also writing for the dead”—i.e. as a “Prometheus”, who “will bring to the dead a fire sufficiently intense to melt the ice in which their ‘voices’ have been ‘frozen’, so that the dead will be able to ‘speak once more’ for themselves”; moreover, “[t]he historian must be able to hear and to understand ‘words that were never spoken [...]’. The task of the historian, finally, is ‘to make the silences of history speak[.]’ (158–159). Rhetorically, such would be *eidolopoiia*; in a ‘*philosophóteron*’ view (hence *de re*), the cultural fundamentals of vicariousness, delegation are involved. Thereto, cf. Blumenberg (*Sorge* 137–138; *Beschreibung* 223; 490; 512; 539; 551; 630; 777; 863; 879; 891; “Nachdenklichkeit” 57; “Grenzfälle” 65; *Höhlenausgänge* 351; *Arbeit* 13; 106; 182; on rhetoric in an affine respect, cf. Niehues-Pröbsting “Glauben” 26). White also mentions Marx’ putting words into the mouths of “[t]he French bourgeoisie” (cf. “has them say”, 325)—a *sermocinatio* with a view to a collective, hence also a *prosopopoiia*. While diachronically and dependably central to historiography—as well as to White’s own project *de re*—he does not seem to focus on such ventriloquistic processes, and in one instance explicitly recants their interpretive function: “The protagonist of *The Old Regime* was the old regime itself [...]. It is too strong to say that Tocqueville actually personified the old regime and made of it the Tragic hero of his story, but there is a certain Lear-like quality about its dilemma” (215).

262 Norden has: “insofern der *ιστορικός* mit Hilfe seiner Phantasie die Lücken der Tradition ausfüllt, ist er auch ein *ποιητής*” (*Kunstprosa I.* 91, I.i.iv). Even so, it is not primarily (let alone only) *inventio*, but *dispositio*, that matters: form prevails (being constitutive). In his reflections on retroact- and -spective ‘charactercraft’ on the part of (or for) others, Montaigne’s ethopoetic focus is on fabricating (“à former”), weaving, a certain “contexture” of (and for) such *éthe*, particularly in relation to the task of being ‘economical with the factual’—i.e. rhetorical *dispositio*, ‘selecting and arranging’ (*choisir et ranger*), which inevitably includes ‘concealing’ (*dissimuler*); the technique described proceeds from a human being qua ‘agent’ (“actions d’un personnage”), and organizes a ‘self’ to be wrought and ‘marketed’ around a recognizable ‘aspect’ or ‘appearance’ (“air”) to ‘characterize’ it (*Essays* 239, II.1; *Essais II.* 14, II.i). By ‘buying’, retailing, hence circulating said ostensibly holistic ‘image’, recipients decisively

In a renowned procedural passage, Thucydides explicates his professional guidelines concerning *sermocinationes* within historical narratives:

As to the speeches that were made by different men [...] it has been difficult to recall with strict accuracy [*akribeian*] the words actually spoken, both for me as regards that which I myself heard, and for those who from various other sources have brought me reports [*apangéllousin*]. Therefore the speeches are given in the language in which, as it seemed to me, the several speakers would express, on the subjects under consideration, the sentiments most befitting the occasion [*perì ton aiei parónton tà déonta málist(a)*], though at the same time I have adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of what was actually said. (*History I–II*. 38–39, I.xxii.1)²⁶³

partake in the process. Consequently, said *personae* (plus *éthe* ascribed to them) are inevitably pluralized—above and beyond the fact that their projected appearance of distinct particularity is always (already) based on a (tempo-corporal, virtual) diversity, variety to begin with.

263 Cf. Burckhardt (413); Blass (*Beredsamkeit I*. 233–234; for a systematization of the speeches, cf. 231–244); Norden (*Kunstprosa I*. 85; 87n.; 88–89, 88n.; I.i.iv); Gomperz (*Griech. Denker I*. 420–424); Pearson (*Greek Historians* 40; 148; 181); U. Neumann (264–265); Trimpf (*Muses* 57n.). Distinguishing “Reden und Dialogen”, Blass finds two for the latter, “41” for the former—“die sich ziemlich ungleichmässig über die ersten 7 Bücher vertheilen” (*Beredsamkeit I*. 231). The scholar logs the “Zweckwidrigkeit” of “getreuer Wiedergabe” (*Beredsamkeit I*. 233): “Nicht nur weil dies ein seltsames Gemisch [...] gegeben hätte, sondern [...], weil vieles [...] Gesprochene für das Ergebnis bedeutungslos gewesen [...] war”—whereas the purpose of the speeches is “Motivierung” (*Beredsamkeit I*. 234); “es spricht in dieser Hinsicht überall Thukydides. [...] Alles Verdienst [...], das eine Rede als solche besitzt, gehört [...] Thukydides” (*Beredsamkeit I*. 234; cf. 244; 242: “der Grundcharakter der thukydideischen Sprache [*bleibt*] überall”). Pertinently, Blass stresses the hypoleptic dimension (significant in rhetorico-poetic, hermeneutic respects): “Sinnsprüche und allgemeingültige Ausführungen [...] hat Thukydides überall” (*Beredsamkeit I*. 236). Dionysius takes the historian at his (abovected) word (“Thucydides” 588–589, §41), finds him wanting (spec.) as to the Attico-Melian dialog (discussed at length, “Thucydides” 574–593, §37–41; see the last part of the fifth Book, *History V–VI*. 154–177, V.lxxxiv–cxiv). Cf. Forster Smith: “the language of the speeches has a uniform character, both in the structure of the sentences and in particular expressions—[...] it is that of Thucydides [...] at the same time the character and mode of thought of the assumed speaker are [...] manifest in each speech. In the hands of Thucydides such a means of presenting to us a critical situation is extraordinarily effective; [...] his readers become spectators, as Plutarch expressed it” (xvii; cf. Blass *Beredsamkeit I*. 234). As to the nexus of clarity, *dispositio*, Forster Smith logs the Thucydidean “way of leaving facts clearly stated and skilfully grouped”: “He dramatises history” (xviii). Briefly referring to the above passage, Kennedy notes the ‘enactment’ of argument *in utramque partem* via dialogs embedded in narrative: “Thucydides includes many speeches in his *History*, often arranging them into debates on two sides of a question. [...] These speeches often sharply polarize the issue” (*Comp. Rhet.* 204; cf. Dionysius “Thucydides” 566–567, §36; 574–575, §37; spec. 578, §38: “τὸ δραματικὸν”). See Pearson’s comparatist remarks: “whereas Thucydides must have heard some of the [...] speeches and reports of others, so that he could claim to reproduce the general sense of what had been said or at least work out ‘what they must have

The concept and practice of *dispositio* will per se signal that chronology does not tend to be the primary concern (even more so in other genres). In this respect, rhetorical economy is the *téchne*'s foremost task—especially with a view to employing it so effectually as to go unnoticed (*'celare artem'*).²⁶⁴ Moreover, any historian will seek to vary his subject matter and its *tractatio* to avoid tedium, precisely by producing an intense and dynamic effect in the reader's experience (*enárgeia*). To this end, he provides lifelike descriptions of certain settings (*ékphrasis*) and protagonists (*charakterismós, effictio*)—or puts (striking) words into the mouths of familiar, (supposedly) historical or mythological protagonists (*dialogismós, sermocinatio, allocutio*); brings the dead to life, in (and by) speech (*eidolopoíia*); drafts and disseminates distinctive (including verbalized) portrayals with a 'characterizing' function (*ethopoíia*,

said', Timaeus' speeches must be almost pure fiction, and those of Ephorus can hardly be different. Polybius complains not only that Timaeus' speeches are fictitious, but that they are unrealistic, ill-suited to the speaker and the occasion" (*Greek Historians* 40; as to the latter, cf. 147–148, 180–181). Similarly, Norden (speaking with Polybius): "bei jeder Gelegenheit legen sie Reden ein, ohne sich zu fragen, weder ob einer in jenem Falle habe reden können noch was er wirklich gesagt habe noch was er habe sagen müssen, sondern sie behandeln dieses [...] notwendige Ingredienz der Geschichtsschreibung [...] wie in der Schulstube" (*Kunstprosa I*, 83, I.i.iv). Generally: "seit [...] Thukydides [...] ['waren'] die Historiker [...] rhetorisch gebildet, und umgekehrt ['behandelten'] die Rhetoren [...] seit Isokrates gern historische Stoffe" (*Kunstprosa I*, 85–86, I.i.iv). "Eine [...] unmittelbare Folge [...] war die Sitte, in die Geschichtserzählung Reden einzulegen" (*Kunstprosa I*, 86, I.i.iv). As to the fact "[d]aß Thukydides durch seine Reden charakterisieren wollte", Norden adduces "Markell", using the phrase "*δεινὸν ἡθογραφῆσαι*" with respect to the historian (*Kunstprosa I*, 87n., I.i.iv). Yet said critic gives his value judgments free rein (passim): "Thukydides ließ sie reden [sc. 'Perikles, Alkibiades', here], [...] jedes Wort atmet den Geist der Männer und ihrer Zeit" (*Kunstprosa I*, 87n., I.i.iv). Burckhardt sees the Thucydidean "Fähigkeit [...] alles, was man ihm berichtet hat, als Kundiger nachzudenken [...] ohne aufdringliche Bemerkungen, mit den leisesten Mitteln [...]. Die Gesinnungen, aus welchen das Tun hervorgeht, läßt Thukydides sich hauptsächlich in den Reden äußern, die er den [H]andelnden [...] in den Mund legt. [...] ['Er'] bekennt [...], daß er [...] seine Personen das ihrer Lage Angemessenste (*τὰ δέοντα μάλιστα*) sprechen lasse" (413). "Einmal, bei der Verhandlung zwischen den Athenern und Meliern (V, 85ff.), charakterisiert er die Parteien auch durch einen Dialog" (413n.). "Während er aber die Leute völlig in ihrem Charakter reden und handeln läßt, begnügt er sich in der eigentlichen Charakteristik mit wenig Worten. Bei Perikles Tode gibt er (II, 65) [...] nur das Politische [...] und vermeidet [...] auf das strengste alle weiteren Personalien, und ähnlich sparsam ist er überall" (414). In general, such 'ethopoietic' frugality also functions as a delegative device with respect to (engaging) the recipient. As to the Renaissance afterlife of (*inter alia*) the Thucydidean guidelines for historiography, cf. Kohut (81). Cf. Lausberg on the use of "*sermocinatio*" in historiography: "die bei Historikern [...] zahlreichen Reden ['haben'] das *verisimile* zum Ziel. In der *historia* dient [...] das *verisimile* dem *verum*" (*Handbuch* 166, §291).
264 See subch. 5.1, above; as well as (the n. in) sections 4.1, 4.2; and the coda in part 6, herein.

notatio); personifies (and semiotizes) collectives or abstract entities (*prosopopoiia*, *fictio personae*, *conformatio*).²⁶⁵

265 In their narratological “Glossary”, De Temmerman/Emde Boas define ‘characterization’ as “the ways in which traits and dispositions of any kind are ascribed by a narrator to a character, and the processes by which those [...] are interpreted by narratees as pertaining to that character” (“Glossary” XII; cf. “Intro.” 2). While an accent on the reciprocities of projection and reception is to the point (cf. “Intro.” 2–3; 12; if warily handled: 15–19, spec. 18; cf. “Epilogue” 650), a narrow, narratological take will hardly seem expedient (this multilateral device being a matter of *poiesis sensu lato*). They offer these variants, *inter alia* (thematically rearranged; see the outline at “Intro.” 23): ‘characterization by focalization’ (“Glossary” XIII; with “Intro.” 23); ‘inter-’, or ‘intratextual characterization’ (“Glossary” XIV); ‘characterization by *praxis*’, resp. ‘by appearance’ (“Glossary” XII; with “Intro.” 22–23); ‘by emotion’, ‘by group membership’ (“Glossary” XIII; with “Intro.” 22); ‘by setting’ (“Glossary” XVI); ‘by name (speaking names)’, by recourse to “the literal meaning or (folk) etymology” (“Glossary” XIV); ‘altero-’, resp. ‘auto-characterization’ (“Glossary” XII); ‘(in)direct characterization’ (see “Glossary” XIII–XIV; with “Intro.” 20). The variant ‘by speech’ (“*ethopoiia*”) is defined as ‘a form of indirect, metonymical characterization’: “traits and dispositions are inferred from a character’s speech (both style and content); a [...] frequent method is the use of generalizations [...] maxims (*gnōmai*)” (“Glossary” XVI; cf. “Intro.” 22–23). While in line with a neglect of ‘*sermocinatio*’ (in taxonomic, technical respects) throughout, the view that this may only be ‘indirect’ (to say nothing of ‘metonymical’) will seem problematic also *de re*; a narrowly narratological take appears to be uncondusive (cf. “Intro.” 6; “Epilogue” 651). At variance with said limitation in De Temmerman’s/Emde Boas’ “Glossary”, their opening ch. does refer to the concept’s “broadest sense” as including “both direct and indirect characterization in all its forms” (“Intro.” 22). Equating ‘personification’ with ‘pathetic fallacy’ (“Glossary” XV) seems to insinuate twentieth century criticism—plus corresponding value judgments (cf. the express ‘disinterest’ in “Aesop’s fables”, “Intro.” 2n.)—rather than a consideration of the rhetorical tradition on ‘*prosopopoiia*’. The relative absence (spec. at “Intro.” 19, as to “the schemas—both social and literary—that would likely have been available to Greek authors and readers”) of a comprehensive and detailed recourse to the art may seem problematic throughout (with mentions tending to be brief or extratextual: cf. e.g. “Intro.” 6–7; 9; 20n.; 22); and this especially so, since the eds. assert (in a brief conclusion) that “the underpinning in ancient rhetoric of techniques of characterization” is “central to this book” (“Epilogue” 650). De Temmerman’s/Emde Boas’ terminological choice of ‘metaphorical’, ‘metonymical’ to modify ‘characterization’ (cf. “Glossary” XIV; “Intro.” 20) seems infelicitous, given the extent to which these terms are (all but incomparably) fraught with myriad (often not intercompatible) associations—hence will hardly conduce to scholarly descriptiveness. Equally problematic is the view of ‘bottom-up’ (sc. inductive) ‘characterization’ qua “the gradual accumulation of information about an individual’s character which cannot immediately be connected to pre-existing schemas, categories, or types” (“Glossary” XII). Yet human reception is always hypoleptic (apparently acknowledged at “Intro.” 16–19, spec. 17). The ‘top-down’ variant is said to “activate[...] a ‘package’ of corresponding expectations and knowledge” (qua “pre-existing types or categories”), based on a “piece of information about the character” (“Glossary” XVI); said formulation may lead to (or does not aim at preventing) essentialist misunderstandings, or even conduce to Platonizing construals (conforming to the deductive

As to certain of these technico-taxonomic clusters mentioned, one might have recourse to the Ancient Greek historian again, seeing that one of the most significant (or notorious) collective *ethopoïai* in world literature is put into the Thucydidean Cleon's mouth—who invectively 'characterizes' the Athenians:

It is your wont [‘εἰώθατε’] to be spectators [‘θεαταί’] of words [‘τῶν λόγων’] and hearers of deeds [...]. You are adepts [...] at being deceived [...]. Each of you wishes above all to be an orator himself. You seek [...] a world quite unlike that in which we live, but give too little heed to that which is at hand [‘περὶ τῶν παρόντων’]. [...] you are in thrall to the pleasures of the ear and are more like men who sit as spectators [‘θεαταίς’] at exhibitions of sophists than men who take counsel for the welfare of the state. (*History III–IV*. 62–63, III.xxxviii.4–7; with further details in the context)²⁶⁶

approach). Such seems to be part of the agenda in the definition of what De Temmerman/Emde Boas call ‘transtextual character’ qua “appear[ing] in different texts (i.e. [a] character by the same name and referring to the same mythical or historical person)” (“Glossary” XVI; cf. the formulation “one instantiation of”; with “Intro.” 5; and despite general disclaimers at 7).

266 See Blass (*Beredsamkeit I*. 233–234; 237; 240; 242–243); Gomperz (*Griech. Denker I*. 424); Bers (181); Kennedy (*Comp. Rhet.* 204, briefly); Croally (33–34); Bornscheuer (112–122, spec. 116). Among other (political) speeches, Dionysius does “not approve of the debate between Cleon and Diodotus” (“Thucydides” 595, §43; 595n.)—on stylistic, propriety-related, and (likely also) ethopoetic grounds; cf. Bonner (*Lit. Treatises* 91). Carey refers to the above as “the (somewhat hypocritical) tirade which Thucydides puts into Kleon’s mouth” (“Intro.” 6n.; cf. also “Rhet. means” 34). Dionysius discusses several Thucydidean speeches at considerable length, and in detail (see “Thucydides” 566–615, §36–49); cf. Bonner (*Lit. Treatises* 90–92; spec. as to the assessment of the following dialog, 90–91). The Dionysian criticism centers on the ‘diplomatic’ exchange between Athenians and Melians (cf. “Thucydides” 574–593, §37–41; with Thucydides *History V–VI*. 154–177, V.lxxxiv–cxiv); at the outset, Dionysius employs the rhetorical term typically used for the ‘personifying’ of collectives: “Thucydides begins by stating in his own person [‘ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου προσώπου’] what each side said, but after maintaining this form of reported speech for only one exchange of argument, he dramatises [‘δραματίζει’] the rest of the dialogue and makes the characters speak for themselves [‘προσωποποιεῖ τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα διάλογον’]” (“Thucydides” 574–575, §37; cf. *History V–VI*. 154–157, V.lxxxiv–lxxxv). In line therewith, Dionysius stresses the ‘craft’ involved in the *sermocinationes*: “Thucydides makes [‘ποιεῖ’] the Athenian representatives reply” (“Thucydides” 580–581, §39; cf. 578, §38; 582, §39; 584, §40). The Ancient critic finds fault with the historian in terms of *ethopoïa* and *decorum*—meaning, it goes against his sense thereof (resp. of taste): “I do not know how these words can be considered appropriate in the mouths of Athenian generals” (“Thucydides” 585, §40; cf. 588–591, §41). Cf. “These would have been suitable words [...] to use in a historical statement about Pericles, but they are not appropriate words to put in his mouth when he is defending himself before an incensed crowd” (“Thucydides” 597, §44)—i.e. taking the (quasi-forensic) context into account; also: “He follows this with a statement which is true and strikingly expressed, but is certainly not applicable to the current situation” (“Thucydides” 597, §44; cf. 599); generally: “The invention [‘εὑρεσις’] of the most potent arguments is not to be admired for its own sake, unless they be appropriate to the characters [‘προσώποις’], the

While a comprehensive (traditionally dependable) oratorico-dramatic nexus is set in relief incidentally, the protagonist's 'personifying', 'ethopoietic', (highly) performative speech act for a particular collective (being a *sermocinatio* from a metapoetical perspective) might also be read in a '*philosophóteron*' manner: that is, for its '*kathólou*' insights concerning human culture, whose vector may seem

situation [‘καίποις’], and all other relevant factors. [...] the historian seems to have used these words, in which he is expressing his own opinion [...], in the wrong context” (“Thucydides” 600–601, §45). Accordingly (and again as to the Attico-Melian dialog), Dionysius puts the Thucydidean ventriloquisms ‘back into the writer’s mouth’ (so to speak): “he neither was present at this meeting nor took part personally in the discussion, nor received a report of it from any of the Athenian or Melian spokesmen, because he spent all the rest of the war, after his command at Amphipolis, in exile in Thrace” (“Thucydides” 589, §41; see Blass’ criticism thereof, *Beredsamkeit I.* 234, 234n.; 235; spec. 237). Personal reasons, as per Dionysius, are at the root of these particular *sermocinationes* and their tendency: “Perhaps it was because the historian bore his city a grudge for the sentence passed on him that he has deluged her with these reproaches, which were calculated to make her universally hated: for when the leaders of a state, entrusted by her with great power and appointed to represent her on missions to other states, seem to express certain views, those views are assumed by all to be those of the state which sent them out” (“Thucydides” 591–593, §41). More plausibly, Blass observes: “wenn [...] die Athener nackt aussprechen, was sonst sich jeder wenigstens zu sagen scheut, so ist doch ihre [...] thatsächliche Politik und folglich auch ihre Denkweise, auf die für den Historiker alles ankam, getreu gezeichnet” (*Beredsamkeit I.* 237). On the Thucydidean ‘characterization’ of “Attica and Athens” in general, cf. Foster (174–182). Regardless of what the Thucydidean intent might have been: Dionysius’ line of reasoning demonstrates the potential (generally plausible) functionalization of the devices of *prosopopoíia* (a group of delegates speaking for a collective), *ethopoíia* (the crafting and conveying of *ethos* in and by speech, including rhetorical *color*), and *sermocinatio* (the words being attributed to, put into the mouths of, the resp. *personae*). In general, Rood logs: “an important thematic role is played by the characterization of groups” in Thucydides (153)—implying a ‘notational’ poetics; said collective *ethopoíiai* might be placed in the mouths of protagonists (as above), hence amount to *sermocinationes* (given an extratextual author). Gomperz observes the dramatic aspects of Thucydidean historiography (“Figuren, die über die Bühne seines [...] Geschichtswerkes schreiten”, *Griech. Denker I.* 423), and perceives a poetics said to effectually ‘avail itself’ of the *historiae personae* as ‘mouthpieces’ (*Griech. Denker I.* 422); cf. “in den Mund legt”; “sich [...] des geeignetsten Sprachrohrs bediente” (*Griech. Denker I.* 422); “darauf [...] läßt der Geschichtsschreiber [...] verweisen”; “der durch den Mund jenes Feldherrn zu uns spricht”; “dieser Hinweis im Munde” (*Griech. Denker I.* 423); “sich [...] dieses [...] Sprechers zu bedienen” (*Griech. Denker I.* 423–424); “die Überzeugung des Geschichtsschreibers [...], die er durch keines andern Mund wirksamer kundgeben kann” (*Griech. Denker I.* 424). Focusing on Pericles, cf. Foster’s study, accentuating “the relation of speech and narrative”: the resp. “speakers [...] illuminate Thucydides’ [...] explanations by demonstrating the responses of characters imbedded in the action. [...] we see human beings fully under the power of the passions their situation has produced. [...] The reader is called upon to understand and assess their words in the context of the narrative of events” (4).

to be an immersion in consummate virtuality and pervasive experience by proxy—hence a life (increasingly or ultimately) based on vicariousness.²⁶⁷

In a chiefly narrative environment, likely ventriloquisms will often amount to individual *sententiae* only. Suetonius recounts Caesar’s arrival in Africa thus:

No regard for religion ever turned him from any undertaking, or even delayed him. [...] Even when he had a fall as he disembarked, he gave the omen a favorable turn by crying: ‘I hold thee fast, Africa’ [‘Teneo te’, inquit, ‘Africa’]. (111–113, I.lix)²⁶⁸

Given the context and its economy, the words put into Caesar’s mouth here also serve an ethopoetic purpose (to say nothing of their discursive potential).²⁶⁹

Tacitus deploys ventriloquistic techniques most efficaciously—typically for terse sentences, at climactic moments.²⁷⁰ Relating the mutinies stirring in the largely unsubdued area known as ‘*Germania*’ (from the *imperium*’s perspective), he presents them as worse than any “civil war” (“Annals I–III” 325, I.xlix) in the ensuing vivid description, which culminates in a distinctive *sermocinatio*:

267 For the method of eliciting ‘more philosophical’, ‘universal’ aspects (*quaestiones infinitae*, relating to the *status qualitatis*, as per later taxonomies), see Aristotle (“Poetics” 58–59, 1451b, IX); Trimpi’s authoritative analysis (“Quality” passim; *Muses* 241–361; spec. 353–355). See Küpper: “events and performances with a mass appeal produce social cohesion [...], or are [...] intended to do so. [...] Language-based performative practices that are presented in order to be consumed by a given public are [...] apt to produce cohesion and then to steer [...] the body social [resp. politic] into one specific direction” (“Hypotheses” 11; on Early Modern theater).

268 “VENI•VIDI•VICI” (notorious words on Caesar’s part) are not put into the victor’s mouth in Suetonius, but “displayed among the show-pieces” of the triumph (“an inscription of but three words”): “not indicating the events of the war [...], but the speed with which it was finished” (82–83, I.xxxvii.2). In said sense, they seem paradigmatically ethopoetic: comparable to the typical Laconian case (see the sample in this subch.), style (hence speech) is deemed indicative of *ethos* (cf. the onset of part 3) to such an extent that the words are received as actually uttered by the *persona* to whom they are attributed, or in whose vicinity they appear. Generally, cf. this (linguistically significant) appraisal: “In announcing the swiftness and fierceness of this battle [...], Caesar wrote three words. ‘Came, saw, conquered [ἦλθον εἶδον, ἐνίκησα]’. In Latin, [...] the words have the same inflectional ending, [...] a brevity [...] most impressive” (Plutarch “Caesar” 562–563, §731, L.2; cf. 562n.). For affine samples, see Democritus (as qtd. in: Kranz *Vorsokratiker II*. 165, 68B115*84; cf. subch. 3.3); and spec. Aristotle, who—in a context of “delivery”, variation, “amplification”—has these asyndeta: “‘I came, I met, I entreated [ἦλθον, ἀπήντησα, ἐδέσμην]’. [...] here delivery is needed [...] an asyndeton produces amplification: thus, in ‘I came, I conversed, I besought [ἦλθον, διελέχθην, ἰκέτευσά]’, the hearer seems to be surveying many things” (*Rhetoric* 420–421, 1413b, III.xii.4; cf. 418–419, 1413b, III.xii.3; 418n.).

269 For a refunctionalization in Calderón, see Küpper (*Discursive Renovatio* 342–343, with n.).

270 Cf. Baldwin: “*ethopœiæ*” typically deal with what “some [...] character of history or fiction [‘must have said’] on a critical occasion” (*Ancient Rhet.* 71–72; cf. 218)—emphatic of the latter.

The yells, the wounds, and the blood were plain enough; the cause, invisible [‘causa in occulto’]: chance ruled supreme [‘cuncta fors regit’]. [...] No general or tribune was there to restrain: licence [‘licentia’] was granted to the mob [‘vulgo’], and it might glut its vengeance to the full [‘satietas’]. Before long, Germanicus marched into the camp. ‘This is not a cure, but a calamity’ [‘non medicinam (...) sed cladem’], he said, with a burst of tears, and ordered the bodies to be cremated. (“Annals I–III” 326–327, I.xlix)²⁷¹

The entire scene is disposed like the climax and (quasi-cathartic) *dénouement* of a tragedy; the ‘pathopoetic’ words put in Germanicus’ mouth (under extreme, extraordinary conditions) are patently functionalized with a view to *movere*.²⁷²

One noted case from Livy—being incomparably feckful also in generating myriad adaptations, reworkings, floating in (virtual) cultural networks—is the ‘rape of Lucretia’, her consequent suicide, and the establishing of the Roman Republic by Lucius Junius Brutus: first, two short sentences are put into Sextus Tarquinius’ mouth—prior to his violation of the archetypal lady. They begin: “Tace, Lucretia” (*History. I–II*. 200–201, I.lviii.2).²⁷³ The female protagonist is later given a longer sequence of direct speech, reporting Tarquin’s physical

271 The trans. stresses the *sermocinatio*’s centrality, effectuality by a proximate, alliterative paronomasia in the parallelism (adapted to the needs of a dominantly analytical language).

272 The distance constitutive of a (poetico-)historical context may render spec. manifest what obtains in (any form of) ‘emotive’ oratory: “‘Die mächtigste Beredsamkeit ist die, welche eigene Leidenschaft in ihre Worte hineinwirft und doch die Leidenschaft mit kalter Berechnung als Mittel verwaltet’” (Justi, qtd. in: Norden *Kunstprosa I*. 121, I.i.iv). Valéry has: “La littérature est l’art de se jouer de l’âme des autres. [...] Étant donnés une impression, un rêve, une pensée, il faut l’exprimer de telle manière, qu’on produise dans l’âme d’un auditeur le maximum d’effet — et un effet entièrement calculé” (“technique littéraire” 1786; see *Dichtkunst* 227). By way of contrast with an *ethos* of ‘sobriety’ (*Sachlichkeit, Nüchternheit*) characterizing historiographical works (and their authorial *personae*), the intercalated, ‘pathopoetic’ parts may accentuate (and so elucidate) said technique’s effectuality. Cf. Aristotle: “Appropriate style also makes the fact appear credible [‘pithanoi’]; for the mind of the hearer is imposed upon under the impression that the speaker is speaking the truth, because, in such circumstances, his feelings are the same, so that he thinks (even if it is not the case as the speaker puts it) that things are as he represents them; and the hearer always sympathizes [‘synomoiopathei’] with one who speaks emotionally, even though he really says nothing. This is why speakers often confound their hearers by mere noise” (*Rhetoric* 378–379, 1408a, III.vii.4–5). On the Greek term, cf. Oesterreich (*Fundamentalrhet.* 101); Niehues-Pröbsting: “Affekte [...] gehorchen [...] dem [...] *homoion homoio*; sie wirken durch Ansteckung” (“Ethos” 347; cf. “Glauben” 27). See Blumenberg as to a “Zusteuern auf die wirkungssicheren ‘Reizwörter’” qua “im Typus ‘rhetorisch’”: “Wie schnell kann man [...] Konsens erreichen, wenn man die kleinen Gefälligkeiten erweist, mit denen man bei jedermann Beifall findet, ohne etwas gesagt zu haben” (*Sachen* 39, v; cf. *Begriffe* 165).

273 “‘Tace, Lucretia’, inquit; ‘Sex. Tarquinius sum; ferrum in manu est; moriere, si emiseris vocem’” (Livy *History. I–II*. 200, I.xviii.2). For intertexts, cf. Donaldson (passim); subch. 2.1.

transgression to her spouse (and others). The descriptive narrative transitions into a dialogic sequence of some plausibility: “to her husband’s question, ‘Is all well?’ she replied, ‘Far from it’”—the Latin being even more dynamic, with question and answer immediately succeeding one another in Livy’s textual economy (“‘Satin salvae?’ ‘Minime’”, *History. I–II.* 202–203, I.lviii.7).

Needless to say, said writer was not present, nor does it seem likely that he had at his disposal documents giving a verbatim account of Lucretia’s precise wording; yet such quasi ‘historical’ notions are unlikely to occur (irrespective of their irrefutability), seeing that momentaneous *evidentia*—effected by *descriptio* and the verbal high point of the *sermocinatio*—is so effectual that the recipient’s *ratio* (whatever its valence otherwise) will here be suspended.²⁷⁴

Augustine treats said arch-familiar event by referring to some orator:

A certain declaimer develops [‘declamans ait’] this theme admirably [‘Egredie’] and accurately [‘veraciterque’]: ‘A wonderful tale [‘Mirabile dictu’]! There were two and only one committed adultery [‘duo fuerunt, et adulterium unus admisit’]’. (*de civ. Dei I–III.* 84–85, I.xix)

Discursively, the Church Father requires this specific superstructure, his ‘moral of the tale’—not Lucretia’s direct speech (evoking her paganly inflected *ethos*, for which Augustine has no use). Since the declaimer is not known (see *de civ. Dei I–III.* 84n.)—while being all but tailored to the Christian orator’s purpose—the latter might as well have thought up the former, using said *sententiae* as a pretext for the discursive needs in the economy of this precise context.²⁷⁵ When words are being put into the mouth of what is deemed a deity at a given point in time (as per the respectively prevalent language regime), cases like these have a tendency to turn especially problematic (qua ‘speaking in the name of’).²⁷⁶ For lack of competence in said field, one may leave such aside, here.²⁷⁷

274 A text’s basis in an alleged ‘historical’ substratum includes (semi-)mythological *personae*.

275 Nor would it be beyond that *rhétor malgré soi* to draw on his prior *praxis*—delegating his words to another; or discerning a (rhetorical) ‘self’ prior to, and after, the ‘*tolle lege*’ (cf. ch. 1).

276 As to *Measure for Measure’s* *hypólepsis* of *Rom* 9:15 (and 18), itself an uptake of *Ex* 33:19, one critic believes that “St. Paul is quoting God” (*Measure* 33n.; with 32–33, TLN213–214, I.ii)—which may well seem to be about as credible (sensible) as saying the same of ‘Shakespeare’. ‘Ideology’ might be seen as putting words into the mouth of a ‘school’ or ‘movement’: “Es ist von vernichtender Ungemäßheit, daß aus [...] Philosophie eine ‘Mode’ werden konnte, daß in ihrem Namen mehr zitiert worden ist als jemals sonst” (Blumenberg *Literatur* 103; infinitized).

277 Cf. “*Deum autem velle*” (Blumenberg *GKW II.* 406). This piece of writing is attributed to “Menippus the Cynic”: “Epistles artificially composed as if by the gods [‘apò tou ton theon prosópou’]” (D. Laetius *Lives II.* 104–105, VI.101). Similarly, when a writer or *rhétor* is said to

Being human, however, a scholar could seem qualified with respect to what is thought by some to be the other side, the Humanities—wherefore one might adduce these words, which Milton aptly places in the mouth of his protagonist: “Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven!” (*Paradise Lost* [2005] 10, l.263).²⁷⁸ They are particularly pertinent here, since said assertion is a variation on a Homeric *sermocinatio* (with ethopoetic function), which had long been floating in various (virtual) cultural networks—the source context being the *Odyssey*’s hero meeting Achilles in Hades.²⁷⁹ The latter is made to say:

speak for—to be the ‘mouthpiece’ of—another entity or phenomenon envisioned (vice versa, *de re*): “et Xenophontis voce Musas quasi locutas ferunt”, “and the Muses were said to speak with the voice of Xenophon” (Cicero “Orator” 350–351, xix.62). Cf. a *sermocinatio* for “God” in Seneca: “Put a itaque deum dicere”, “Think, then, of God as saying” (*Essays I.* 42–43, VI.3); at the outset: “the task is not difficult [...] I shall be pleading the cause of the gods” (*Essays I.* 3, I.1); plus the (quasi theodicy-like) setup or (ventriloquist) pretext: “You have asked me, Lucilius, why, if a Providence rules the world, it still happens that many evils befall good men” (*Essays I.* 3, I.1). See Horace’s *sermocinatio* for the goddess Juno on Troy and Rome (“Odes” 146–151, III.3) in the latter part of the noted ode containing the “si fractus illabatur orbis, / impavidum ferient ruinae” (“Odes” 146, III.3.7–8); after a more or less epideictico-deliberative onset, this insertion occurs: “Juno had made a speech that brought joy to the council of the gods”, “gratum elocuta consilientibus” (“Odes” 146–147, III.3.17)—then follows her speech, actually to Rome, a caveat against greed and re-erecting Troy (cf. “Odes” 150–151, III.3.49–68). Horace interrupts or ends his *sermocinatio* for Juno with the words (externalizing and ‘personifying’ the Muse by addressing her): “This will never do for a cheerful lyre. Where are you going, Muse? Don’t be so headstrong. Stop reporting the talk of the gods, and diminishing momentous matters with your trivial ditties”; “non hoc iocosae conveniet lyrae; / quo, Musa, tendis? desine pervicax / referre sermones deorum et / magna modis tenuare parvis” (“Odes” 150–151, III.3.69–72). This simultaneously serves an ‘auto-ethopoetic’ purpose, as far as the speaker is concerned. Cf. Augustine’s *prosopopoiia*, treated in part 1, above.

278 See Mansfield: “Precisely where Machiavelli makes a bold remark, [...] he also makes a bolder insinuation, that is, he conceals a bolder remark. His boldness hides his boldness, for men are not ready to believe that a man who seems bold is bolder than he seems” (*Modes* 12). By ‘technical’ extension (and *mutatis mutandis*), the Florentine’s irreverent words in *propria persona* could be taken to camouflage (deflect attention from) the even more abysmal (not to say cynical) utterances conveyed via his manifold variants of ventriloquism (being legion): “Machiavelli proclaims openly and triumphantly a corrupting doctrine which ancient writers had taught covertly or with all signs of repugnance. He says in his own name shocking things which ancient writers had said through the mouths of their characters” (Strauss 10).

279 For a figurative reapplication (and -functionalization with respect) to (actual) political life, cf. Cicero’s citing (or attributing) part of a letter by Atticus, (implicitly) equating ‘Odysseus’ with ‘Caesar’, and the ghosts with the latter’s followers (see the keyword “νέκυιαν”, *Atticus III.* 60, §177.IX.10; cf. 60n.); Atticus (as per Cicero) inverts the process of *prosopopoiia* (*eidolopoiia*), in that he quasi de-personifies (or ‘ghostifies’) human beings along the lines of a paradigmatic segment of an arch-familiar text. Cf. Dio Chrysostom’s (moral philosophical, ‘diagnostic’)

Never try to reconcile me to death, glorious Odysseus. I should choose, so I might live on earth, to serve as the hireling of another, some landless man with hardly enough to live on, rather than to be lord over all the dead that have perished. (*Odyssey* 1–12. 435–437, XI.488–491)²⁸⁰

While varied, the context remains similar, hence (formally or structurally) recognizable; but the Homeric *eidolopoía* (Achilles being defunct at this point) has been transferred to an altogether different discursive setting in Milton.²⁸¹

ethopoía of ‘Alexander the Great’ by way of contrast with the archaic warrior *kat’ exochén*: “His state of mind [...] was the opposite of what Homer says was that of Achilles’ ghost. For that hero said that he preferred to live in bondage to / ‘Some man of mean estate, who makes scant cheer, / Rather than reign o’er all who have gone down to death’. / But Alexander, I doubt not [‘dokei moi’], would have chosen [‘helésthai’] to die and govern [‘árchein’] even a third part of the dead rather than become a god and live for ever—unless, of course, he became king over the other gods [‘basileüs (...) ton állon theon’]” (190–193, IV.50). Showing preference, hence (mental) habits, Homer’s ‘characterizing’ *sermocinatio* for ‘Achilles’ is used as a foil for (what seems to Dio) a plausible, putative choice on the part of ‘Alexander’—which indirectly ‘ethopoieticizes’ the latter: speech being implicit, it might be crafted for said stance (e.g. as a progymnastic task). On another significative *sermocinatio* in Dio, see Trimpi (“Meaning” 22).

280 Plato’s Socrates tells “the story of a brave man, Armenius’ son Er [‘Ἡρός’], by race from Pamphylia” at the *Republic*’s end—stating (hardly sans irony) that this is not “going to” be “an Alcinous’ tale” (*Rep.* 6–10. 462–465, 614b, X; cf. 464n.–465n.; the book closes with the story’s framework: 487–489, 621c–d, X). Having died, the warrior Er is said to have been a delegate of Hades—functioning qua “messenger to mankind [‘ángelon anthrópōis’]” (*Rep.* 6–10. 464–465, 614d, X; cf. 481, 419b, X), sent back alive to report of conditions *post mortem*: “Plato presents the idea of a ‘messenger’, [...] like the *angelos* [...] in Greek tragedy, whose function it was to inform the audience (and those onstage) about events which have taken place offstage” (Emlyn-Jones/Preddy xxiii–xxiv). In so doing, Plato ascribes to Socrates a tale in which the latter puts words into the mouth of a *prósopon* named Er—acting as the (writing, speaking) philosopher’s indirect spokesperson (another delegation): see the frequent formula “[h]e said [‘éphe’]” (*Rep.* 6–10. 464–465, 614c; 466–467, 615a; 468–469, 615c; 480–481, 619c; 482–483, 620a, X). An *eidolopoía* would be taking place within Er’s story only—i.e. when speaking of himself while being dead (*Rep.* 6–10. 464–487, 614c–621b, X). In Socrates’ setup, a revived Er is said to be “describ[ing] what he had seen on the other side” (*Rep.* 6–10. 465, 614b, X, with 487, 621b, X); i.e. an intratextual speaker’s *sermocinatio* for another *persona* (speaking in his stead, a delegative device for rhetorical effect); and Plato’s *protopoía* plus *allocutio*—if Er is “a fictional character” (*Rep.* 6–10. 464n.–465n.)—with a discursive function. Generally, cf. Emlyn-Jones/Preddy—their value judgments (“philosophically disconcerting”) *cum grano salis* (xlirii). On Macrobius and John of Salisbury’s *hypólepseis* of the myth, see Moos (406; 407n.; §88). As to the Homeric passage, cf. words put into the mouth of Shakespeare’s Claudio (not dead, but sentenced): “The weariest, and most loathed worldly life / That Age, Ache, pe[n]jury, and imprisonment / Can lay on nature, is a Paradise / To what we feare of death” (*Measure* 146, TLN1348–1351, III.i; with 146n. for “ri” qua “n”; cf. *Hamlet* 279–280, III.i.76–82).

281 “‘Odysseus, do not gloss over death to me. I would rather be above ground still and

As to affine recontextualizations of a particularly Machiavellian make, the ensuing will likely be among the most striking and significative ventriloquisms (the relevance of which greatly exceeds the limits of its immediate vicinity).²⁸² The Livian *sermocinatio* for one of his protagonists is cited and characteristically glossed by the Florentine in his setting and economy of discourse:

[‘]Parva sunt haec; sed parva ista non contemnendo, maiores nostri maximam hanc rempublicam fecerunt’. Perchè in queste cose piccole è [...] forza [...]. Nonpertanto, conviene con queste cose sia accompagnata la virtù: altrimenti, le non vagliano. (Machiavelli *Opere* 246, III.xxxiii)²⁸³

labouring for some poor portionless man, than be lord over all the lifeless dead[’]” (*Odyssey [Oxford]* 139, XI)—the ch. is there called ‘Odysseus Among the Ghosts’. For the reference, cf. Ellege’s note: “An ironic echo of *Odyssey* 11.489–91, where the shade of Achilles tells Odysseus that it is better to be a farmhand on earth than a king among the dead” (Milton “Paradise Lost [1674]” 1838n.)—whether or not there is ‘irony’ in play here would depend on the sense attached to that concept in this context. In Milton, the term *eidolopoiia* would likely no longer be applicable, since Satan is not dead and cannot die (dogmatically speaking).

282 Pertinence, applicability beyond the (circumscribed) confines of an ‘individual’ passage or time is stressed by the Florentine’s textual economy: “speaking of the Livian mouthpieces in *Discourses* III 33, Machiavelli does not say, as he ordinarily does, that the characters [...] ‘said’ what they said but that they ‘say’ it” (Strauss 152). Cf. “he says thus”; “who speaks thus” (Machiavelli *Discourses* 286, III.33); “Livy says these words” (*Discourses* 287, III.33).

283 Livy: “parua sunt haec; sed parua ista non contemnendo maiores uestri maximam hanc rem fecerunt” (*Ab Vrbe Condita* VI. 80, VI.41.8). Cf. Kraus: “*parua* lead to *maxima*”, with “Appius’ *maxima res*” qua “new Rome” (324). Said scholar discusses the Livian ventriloquism for Appius Claudius (who himself puts words in the mouth of others)—at several points in her commentary. She logs the passage “capti et stupentes animi uocibus alienis” (*Ab Vrbe Condita* VI. 73, VI.36.8), wherein the latter (“‘in others’ words”) is later “literalized” by “Appius’ *sermocinatio*” (Kraus 284); the first part of said section would also have attracted Machiavelli’s attention (cf. *Il Principe* 47, VII.28; 130, XIX.41; with Mayfield *Artful* 120n.; 149n.). In the segment at issue, “Appius relies on the rhetorical devices [of *sermocinatio* [...] and *permissio* [...], each of which allows him to caricature, and then to temporarily concede, the plebeian position in order to counter it. There is a danger [...] in these [...] devices that the conceded position will seem more valid than the speaker’s own [...]. Appius is careful [...] to make his opposition voices as unpleasant as possible [...]. Within the story, his strategy results in a stalemate: the audience is not convinced, but the vote is postponed (42.1). On the level of discourse, [...] Appius loses the battle for the *patres*. The *uoces alienae* [...], in which he speaks[,] are all plebeian, [...] they fragment his argument as strife fragments the city” (Kraus 306; cf. 323). Intratextually, “[t]he effect this rhetorical tactic has on the audience is not specified. Narratively, [...] it is counter-productive, as it gives the plebs a direct voice – indeed a multiplicity of voices – for the first time since 35.8, ending patrician monopoly [...] and making Appius into his own heckler” (312). Kraus also notes that “Appius [...] cannot stay out of his own *sermocinatio*” (314). The scholar defines “*sermocinatio*” as “a device which brings an

[‘]These are little things, but by not despising these little things, our ancestors made this republic the greatest’. For in these little things is [...] force [...]. Nevertheless, virtue must accompany these things; otherwise they have no value. (*Discourses* 286, III.33)

Machiavelli’s context indicates the technique in question by initially framing the above quotes and ventriloquisms as follows: “Although this part is known in all the Roman histories, nonetheless it is proven more certainly by the words that Livy used in the mouth of Appius Claudius” (*Discourses* 286, III.33).²⁸⁴ This might seem to say that, while the general sense will always already be plausible to a reader conversant with the relevant (textualized) environment, it is not only the particular *elocutio*, but (more decisively) the *dispositio* of this *sermocinatio* that may yield the effect of momentaneous evidence:

adversary or a supporter ‘to life’ by conjuring them up inside one’s own discourse” (312). She does not mention the (taxonomic) variants of rhetorical ventriloquism, which would probably have been expedient here (qua distinguishing the different devices, layers).

284 “E benchè questa parte in tutte le istorie romane si conosca, nondimeno si puova più certo per le parole che Livio usa nella bocca di Appio Claudio” (Machiavelli *Opere* 246, III.xxxiii). Cf. Strauss (150–152). See also: “lo storico benissimo dice con queste parole, in bocca poste del” (*Opere* 246, III.xxxiii); “Livy demonstrates in the mouth of” (*Discourses* 156, II.14); “Machiavelli quotes some words said by Livy which the historian put into the mouth of” etc. (Strauss 151). In terms of *dispositio*, said scholar observes: “Nowhere in the First Book had Machiavelli even alluded to the problem posed by the difference between Livy and Livy’s characters. Only once therein did he make an explicit distinction between an author and a character of that author: he said that Sallustius ‘put’ a certain sentence ‘into the mouth of Caesar’. In the Second and Third Books, however, he refers 11 times to the difference between Livy and his characters by using expressions like ‘Livy makes someone say or do certain things’ or ‘Livy put these words into the mouth of someone’” (137–138; see “Livian characters [...] are introduced [...] as mouthpieces of Livy”, 151). In one place (and several), “Machiavelli ascribes to Livy an expression used by a Livian character” (303n.). Cf. “In the first two quotations from Dante and Virgil (I 11 and 21), Machiavelli ascribes to Dante what is said to Dante by Sordello[;] and he ascribes to Virgil what is said to Virgil by Anchises” (322n.; with Machiavelli *Discourses* 36, I.11; 55, I.21). As to such particularization, (re)contextualizations in John of Salisbury, see Moos, stressing “die [...] Bemühungen Johanns, infinite Zitate der Literatur in finite Aussagen historischer Persönlichkeiten umzuformulieren” (219, §59): “Eine stilistische Eigenart Johanns besteht darin, daß er Zitate häufig so wendet, daß sie als bestimmte Aussprüche autoritativer Gestalten in einer konkreten historischen Situation erscheinen (etwa ein Psalmvers als Aussage Davids), oder daß er [...] literarische Figuren aus antiken Werken wie Autoren reden läßt [...], ohne den [...] Autor im philologischen Sinn [...] zu zitieren” (174, §48; cf. 408, §88); “Laelius, nicht Cicero, erscheint als Verfasser von *De amicitia*. Plato wird [...] als Autor eines Zitats vorgestellt, das [...] aus Macrobius stammt” (175, §48). “Dies kann so weit gehen, daß er [...] Aussprüche oder Personen ganz erfindet” (175–176, §48). “Als vorbildliche ‘Autoren’ werden [...] die fingierten Gestalten, nicht [...] die fingierenden Schriftsteller bezeichnet” (408, §88).

in attending to ‘little things’ we are taking a hint from Machiavelli [...], who] praises a Roman consul for not despising *cose piccole* [...]; but he also praises Livy for putting these words in the mouth of the consul[.] (Mansfield *Modes* 10)²⁸⁵

Where said scholar stresses a comprehensive (re)applicability, the Straussian contextualization specifies the various ventriloquistic layers involved:

Among the words used by Appius Claudius there are some which he puts into the mouth of plebeians who mock religion. Those mockers regard the very foundations of religion [...] as ‘little things’. We do not know this from the mouths of the mockers themselves. [...] Livy uses characters of one of his characters in order to inform us about Roman criticism of the Roman religion. Appius [...] adopts the words ‘little things’ as applied to religion [...]; so does Livy[,] who puts these words into Appius[?] [...] mouth; so does Machiavelli who uses these words in his own name when commenting on the Livian speech. The expression or the thought migrates from the minds of the mockers through the mouths of a Livian character and of Livy himself to Machiavelli. [...] The mockers are mistaken, say Appius [...] Livy and Machiavelli in unison, for they are blind to the usefulness of religion[.] (151)²⁸⁶

285 Cf. Mansfield’s (abysmal) remark: “I dwell on detail because the greatest discoveries are to be made in the details” (*Modes* 13)—since (to take said *kairós* for spelling out what will else or otherwise remain an enthymematic latency) that is where Old Nick is thought (or tends) to be.

286 Strauss counsels wariness as to contexts, viewpoints: “Machiavelli [...] presents Livy as revealing the truth about [...] Roman religion by using as his mouthpieces Roman authorities addressing two different types of audience” (152); “they did not put their reliance in ‘little things’ but in other men’s reliance on ‘little things’, [...] a big thing. [...] little things [...] are not the same” (151). Generally: “using a variety of characters as his mouthpieces, Livy was enabled [...] to expound the principles on which the Romans admittedly acted or in which they believed, and to criticize them” (141); said “republic [...] rose to pre-eminence initially by fraud, [...] he proves this by quoting from Livy a speech by an enemy of the Romans; Livy is presented as revealing the truth about Roman fraud by putting certain words into the mouth of an enemy of Rome. [...] a respectable Roman [may] have been unable to say the truth about Rome except by making an enemy of Rome his mouthpiece” (42; with Machiavelli *Discourses* 156, II.13). As to a nexus of *dispositio*, *sermocinatio*, the latter’s vicarious functionality (in terms of delegation), cf. Strauss: “Livy [...] laid bare the fraud through which Rome rose to greatness by using a victim of Roman fraud, an enemy of Rome as his mouthpiece. [...] Livy speaks through the mouth of a foreigner about the fraud committed by his own rulers. [...] Being ‘a good historian’, Livy was not so servile as to suppress truths which were unpalatable [...] being wiser than the Romans, he outwitted them. He uses a noble deception to lay bare an ignoble deception. This is not the only case in which he reveals a harsh truth about the Romans through the mouth of an enemy of Rome” (139). The arch-hermeneutician contrasts two script-based sets in said respect: “Livy used not only Romans but also enemies of Rome as his mouthpieces. The Biblical authors do not use enemies of the Biblical religion as their mouthpieces” (144)—to say nothing of the Straussian utilization of Machiavelli. What he notes for Livy might apply to a veritable legion of ostensibly ‘orthodox’ writers (interpreters): “being the mouthpiece of pagan theology, he was

In other words: the above anatomizes the discursive, intra- and intertextual stratification of rhetorico-ventriquoistic layers having accrued diachronically.

From a metapoetical perspective, dialogs consist of a (virtually synchronic) series of *sermocinationes*—while the latter tend to be embedded in (short) narratives or anecdotal exchanges (with a corresponding framework). Such typically feature two, or more, (allegedly) historical figures, during whose encounter celebrated or clever utterances are being put into the respective mouths for maximum effect (arranged with a view to an especially vivid immediacy, functioning as ‘momentaneous evidence’). Similar *allocutiones* may have already been floating in (virtual) cultural networks in certain variants (as ‘infinite’ *sententiae*, for instance); whereas others are crafted for, and disposed to suit, the particular (discursive) purpose at hand. In a context concisely exemplifying Spartan “terseness” (‘laconism’)—and also with an ethopoetic agenda—Plutarch attributes words to the respective collective:

when Philip wrote to them, ‘If I invade Laconia, I shall turn you out’, they wrote back, ‘If. And when King Demetrius was annoyed and shouted, ‘Have the Spartans sent only one [ἕνα] envoy to me?’ the envoy replied undismayed, ‘One to one [ἕν(α) (...) ποτὶ ἕνα]’.
(*Moralia* VI. 444–445, 511A)²⁸⁷

perhaps also its critic” (137); he “revealed his judgment [...] to some extent through judgments [...] put[...] into the mouths of his characters” (153). “Although Machiavelli refrains from saying so [in *Discourses* II.14], the words used by Anniius are [...] put by Livy into Anniius’ mouth [...]. Anniius [...] is a creation of Livy. By referring first to Livy and then to Anniius, Machiavelli refers [...] to one and the same source. What this means appears if we remember that [...] the Bible is of human origin [...] must be read ‘judiciously’ [...] these premises [...] must raise the question ‘Who has spoken to a prophet?’ if [...]he [...] says that God has spoken to him [...]: the words of God are words which [...] prophets ascribe to God or put into the mouth of God. It is not God who speaks through the mouth of [...] inspired speakers [...], but [...] writers who speak through the mouth of God [...]. God stands in the same relation to the Biblical writers as the characters of Livy stand to Livy. [...] creativity [...] is not limited to the speeches” (147; cf. 146–148; with *Discourses* 156, II.14)—to say nothing of ‘intentions’. Strauss is reading Machiavelli judiciously (to say the least): “Livy ‘made’ his characters [...] ‘do’ what they did” (148). “Among the [...] things [...] our historian makes Camillus say and do, so as to show how an excellent man ought to be made, he puts these words in his mouth” (Machiavelli *Discourses* 281, III.81; cf. “words that Livy makes him say”, 296, III.38); the ‘poietic’ accent points to the (vicarious) crafting of ‘*ethos*’. Strauss glosses the aforesaid: “This assertion regarding Livy’s intention is not borne out by the Livian speech to which he refers” (153). In other words: one might prudently place (or be putting) ‘intentions’ into someone’s head or text (to say nothing of the virtuoso thoughts thereon). On the ‘feedback effect’—hence layering of *sermocinationes* (“nameless characters of a Livian character”, 151)—typically seen to obtain once the technique has been discerned, cf. “Machiavelli makes Livy make his characters say what Livy himself says or thinks” (155).

287 Cf. the common (ethopoetic) assumptions subtending the above *sententiae*: “the words of

In the second case, a delegate—functionally standing in, actually speaking for, a collective—shows that the device of *prosopopoiia* might be replaced (with a view to verisimilitude) by referring to (an otherwise abstract political institution typically represented by) specific agents (such as emissaries, ambassadors).

Comparable to the technique of advantageously embedding *allocutiones* in (dominantly) narrative writing, multilayered proliferations of various (dramatico-rhetorically) ventriloquistic devices might occur within a given work—an artful *mise en abyme*, structurally and metapoetically speaking.²⁸⁸ In the Lysian Oration “Against Diogeiton”, said (ghostwriting, extratextual) logographer vicariously composes a discourse on behalf of a client (whose *persona* is ‘etho-poetized’ in the process).²⁸⁹ Using direct speech, the latter

a Laconian, sparse and clear, differ from those of a man of Attica, which are voluble” (Aelius Theon “*Exercises*” 48, §8.116); “the words of a Laconian will be ‘few and clear’, and those of a man of Attica garrulous” (John of Sardis/Sopatros 214, §11.196). At the metalevel, Kustas links the arch-rhetorical regard for circumstances to the given linguistic structure: “The influence of rhetoric is not limited to the literary arts. The Greek language has, built into it, a surprisingly large number of ways of saying ‘if’. [...] It compels a consideration of all possibilities in a given instance. *ἡθροποιία* concerns itself with what so-and-so would have said if—” (64).

288 Cf. subchs. 2.1, 3.1. Technico-conceptually, see Küpper on the device of “a *mise en abyme du discours*” (*Discursive Renovatio* 333; cf. 362; 364; 373; *Diskurs-Renovatio* 342; 370; 372; 381).

289 Said oration is cited (preserved), treated by Dionysius (“Lysias” 62–85, §20–27). Cf. Carey: “This speech is not found in the direct tradition” (“Comment.” 207), “does not survive in its entirety” (*Trials* 102; cf. Lamb “XXXII. Intro.” 656). On the orator, see subchs. 2.1, 4.1, herein. As to logography generally, cf. Plato (“Phaedrus” 504–509, 257C–258D, §39–40; 570–571, 277B, §62; also on Lysias); Norden (*Kunstprosa I.* 35–38, I.i.i), *cum grano salis*; Kennedy (*New History* 65); Conley (7). Cf. Bruns: “Es war erlaubt und [...] üblich, sich die Rede schreiben zu lassen” (434); Devries: “‘Every man his own lawyer’ was the principle at Athens [...] the interested party had to plead his own case, [...] [but] could consult another and have his speech written for him [...] the clever speech writer [...] place[d] those words [...] in the mouth of his client, that would produce the effect of innocence [...] worth, without any overt statement” (12). Bruns has: “to seem as unpracticed [...] as possible [...] would have been particularly useful in the ancient Greek courtroom, where, due to a strong anti-professional bias in the culture, litigants spoke for themselves. In such circumstances, maintaining the image of a ‘legal virgin’ worthy of a fair hearing was [...] paramount” (46; 46n.; cf. “the illusion of amateurism so prized in democratic Athens”, 52); with Carey (*Trials* 12), accentuating a forensico-logographic need for consistency: “an[...] aspect to the use of character as a means of persuasion [...] is dramatic characterisation. In any legal hearing the listener will be on the alert for signs of dissimulation. In the Athenian context the tradition that the litigant represent himself, together with the scope for the use of bought material or expertise (from commonplaces to whole speeches), made the ‘fit’ between speech and speaker a factor of some importance [...] any obvious dissonance would jar” (“Rhet. means” 39). See Devries (13); M. Morgan: “The judges seemed to see and to hear the same man, instead of seeing one man and hearing the words of another” (“Intro.” xxx, §26); contrast Süss

ostensively reports (that is, represents and virtually stages) the (supposedly) very words of a third party unable to appear before the jury (“Diogeiton [1976]”

(221–222). Cf. Carey, as to crafting “the plausibility which comes from internal consistency” (“Rhet. means” 32): “consistency and vividness [...] through intrinsic plausibility invite belief, irrespective of the [...] supporting evidence” (“Rhet. means” 43). Hellwig notes: “das πρέπον [‘liegt’] [...] in der Übereinstimmung der [...] Bilder: dessen, das der Redner von sich selbst entwirft, mit dem, das sich der Zuhörer vom Redner macht” (266). In said sense, consistency conduces to concealing the art (see part 6): “Lysias uses dramatic characterisation to secure two effects [...] first [...] a plausible ‘fit’ between the alleged or discernible circumstances of the speaker and what he says so that the intervention of the professional speechwriter is concealed. [...] second[ly] [...] to confirm the speaker’s version of his case by presenting an [...] argument from probability; the implication, sometimes reinforced [...] by explicit argument, is that the character before the jury is incapable of behaving in the manner alleged” (Carey “Rhet. means” 42). The oratorico-theatrical nexus is spec. relevant to logography: “appreciat[ing] the potential of dramatic characterisation, [...] Lysias [...] creates a vivid [...] consistent portrayal of the speaker [...] not [...] a detailed character portrayal. Too much detail would obtrude [...]. Lysias [...] selects [...] distinctive characteristics and by presenting these consistently creates the illusion of depth” (“Rhet. means” 40–41; cf. Bakker “Lysias” 411; 419; 421; 426–427; 426n.). Such *ethopoiiai* may be (and usually are) performed *in utramque partem* (so to speak): “the presentation of the opponent [...] is [...] used [...] to create a consistent picture [...] which increases the plausibility of the allegations against him” (Carey “Rhet. means” 43). As to “the potential of character in this theatrical sense” (“Rhet. means” 39)—“of *ethos* in the dramatic sense” (“Rhet. means” 40)—Carey notes: “Aristotle touches [...] on this aspect [...] in his discussion of [...] *to prepon* [...] at *Rhetoric* 1408a [...] the use of language appropriate to [...] external characteristics [...] imparts *ethos*. Here and at *Rhetoric* 1417a, where he advocates the inclusion [...] of details appropriate to ‘each *ethos*’ in order to make the narrative *ethikos*, he has in mind not just moral character but also plausibility” (“Rhet. means” 39–40; with *Rhetoric* 378, 1408a, III.vii.6–7; 446–447, 1417a, III.xvi.8–9; contrast: Süß 219). While Carey refers to “chapter 15 of *Poetics*” (“characters must be fitting”), to “the requirement that character should be consistent (*homalos*)”, he maintains: “Aristotle has not thought through the implications for rhetorical theory of the notion of character as dramatic construct”; and “[p]ractitioners too were slow to grasp the potential of dramatic characterisation” (“Rhet. means” 40; see Aristotle “*Poetics*” 78–79, 1454a, XV). Apart from being unverifiable, the latter seems implausible, given the saturation with drama obtaining in Greek society, Hellenistico-Roman culture (see Sansone passim; spec. x–xi, 4–5, 20, 223). Carey’s other claim rests on a (strict) severance of the Stagirite’s *Poetics* from his *Rhetoric*—untenable not only *de re* (the more important factor, in an Aristotelian view); but also *de dicto*, given several express cross-references between these texts (the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *Politics*, would also have to be adduced); cf. Aristotle (“*Poetics*” 94–97, 1456a, XIX; with 29n., 95n., 97n., 100n., 105n., 111n., 115n.; *Rhetoric* 124–125, 1371b, I.xi.23; 350–355, 1404a–1405a, III.i.10). Blass associates “Rhetorik”, “Dialektik”, “Moralphilosophie”, “Staatskunst” (*Beredsamkeit II*. 61; cf. 62). With Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 344–349, 1403b, III.i.3–7), Sansone logs: “Aristotle sees no fundamental difference between delivery as it relates to [...] acting and [...] oratory” (13; cf. 12). On the nexus of the *Rhetoric*, *Poetics*, cf. Hellwig (271n.); Elam (218–219); Eden (*Fiction* 13n.); Asmuth (“Drama” 185); subch. 4.1, herein.

666–669, §507–510, XXXII.12–18).²⁹⁰ Moreover, he also includes the reaction on the part of the initial context with a view to the present one.²⁹¹

290 Concerning the *sermocinatio* in Oration 32, see Lysias (“Diogeiton [2002]” 55–56, §12–18; with Dionysius “Lysias” 74–77, §25, for the mother’s complaint). See a brief discussion of her role in Blass (*Beredsamkeit I.* 415); Devries (47–48), *cum grano salis*. M. Morgan’s judgment seems problematic, in not accentuating the mother’s being virtually present only (wherefore, in a sense, his wording may hint that the act of ventriloquism has been effectual): “The figure of the woman is even better drawn [...] the scene in which she appears [...] the words she speaks are something unique in Greek prose” (“XXXII. Intro.” 156). Cf. Carey: “perhaps the finest touch [...] is the use of the widow [...] the quotation of the woman’s speech to her father allows Lysias to circumvent [...] one of the procedural limitations of the Athenian courts [...] women could not appear in any capacity” (*Trials* 109). The speaker—described by Carey as projecting a “restrained *persona*” (“Comment.” 211)—first reports her having stated “that even though she had not before been accustomed to speak in the presence of men [‘*eíthistai légein en andrási*’], the magnitude of their misfortunes would force her to give us a full account of their hardships” (Dionysius “Lysias” 72–73, §25; cf. Devries 48n.). The functionally delegative dimension of the ensuing *sermocinatio*—“a harrowing invective presented in direct speech” (Bakker “Lysias” 417), which “adds dramatic life to the scene” (Lamb “Intro. [Lysias]” 658)—is noted by Carey: “while sustaining for the speaker a restraint appropriate to one intervening against a kinsman [...], Lysias provides for the required emotional effect through the medium of the mother’s powerful denunciation of the treatment of the orphans [...]. By including speeches ascribed to her[,] Lysias creates the illusion that we are actually hearing the mother speak. Since all [...] she says is what one would expect under the circumstances, we may reasonably suppose that something along these lines was said, though the words will be those of Lysias. But even if the content of the speeches were fabricated, it would waste valuable time in court for Diogeiton to attempt to refute this portion of the narrative” (“Comment.” 211; cf. *Trials* 109). As to (Roman) declamation, Bonner notes: “In most *controversiae* the speaker would imagine himself in the position of the accuser or defendant and act the part, but there were certain circumstances in which it was the custom to ‘grant an advocate’ (*patronum dare*), and to defend or [...] to accuse in the third person. If [...] the person bringing the action should be a woman, she would not speak for herself in a declamation any more than she would, normally, [...] as this would offend the Roman sense of decorum” (*Declamation* 52; cf. 52n. on “certain exceptions in practice”); “a citizen who had forfeited his right to speak [...] would not declaim *in propria persona*, but would require to be represented by a ‘patronus’. These instances conform to legal practice. [...] in certain circumstances, even a free citizen might prefer not to speak for himself, if, for instance, as a son, he should have to attack his own father and thereby offend the Roman conception of the dignity of the *pater familias*” (*Declamation* 52). “Even when the declaimer spoke as a *patronus* he was frequently able to enhance the vividness of his speech by direct quotation of alleged remarks of his client—a favourite device” (*Declamation* 53).

291 Having (re)cited the mother’s (past) words spoken in the presence of family members and friends, the speaker addresses the “gentlemen of the jury [‘*o ándres dikastai*’]” (Dionysius “Lysias” 76–77, §25; reiterated), producing a sort of *mise en abyme* of said past and the present situation before court—with a view to ‘syn-homoio-pathizing’ (so to say; cf. Aristotle *Rhetoric* 378, 1408a, III.vii.4) these two audiences (domestico-familial, publico-forensic): “when we had

In other genres, such as the Platonic or Lucianic dialog, one frequently encounters protagonists that ‘everyone knows’ from similar renderings: these are familiar *personae* (with corresponding *éthe*) floating in the vast virtual networks of a culture’s oral and written tradition, with characteristic sayings, dialogic anecdotes, or exemplary feats and sayings (at times rather loosely) attached to them (*allocutiones, dialogismoí, ethopoíiai*).²⁹² In such cases, there is a need to maintain a certain recognizability (as per the *aptum*), but also a

heard all these shocking accusations from the mother, we who were present were all so affected by this man’s conduct and by her account of it” (“Lysias” 77, §25)—i.e. precisely the sort of *páthos* to be induced in the jurymen, as well. With regard to Oration 3 (‘Against Simon’), Bakker comparably notes that “the *narratio* subtly encourages the jury to do the same” (“Lysias” 420)—meaning, to follow suit. As to intratextual ‘audience construction’ in Lucian, cf. Hodkinson (557). In the aforesaid respect, Lamb’s remark might not be doing justice to the passage: “Instead of amplifying her remarks, the speaker merely makes brief mention of their effect upon the company” (“XXXII. Intro.” 658). Contrast Carey’s functional analysis: “The use of direct speech creates the illusion that we are actually hearing the woman herself. It also allows the speaker to achieve pronounced emotional effects while maintaining for himself the restrain[t] [...] appropriate [...] [if] embroiled in a dispute with kin” (*Trials* 109). On the (virtual) vicariousness *de re* involved, see words Cicero puts into the mouth of ‘Antonius’: “compassion is awakened if the hearer can be brought to apply to his own adversities [‘ad suas res revocet’], whether endured or only apprehended, the lamentations uttered over someone else, or if, in his contemplation of another’s case, he many a time goes back to his own experience [‘ad se ipsum revertatur’]” (*De Orat. I–II*. 352–353, II.lii.211); this is to be “intenta ac vehemens” (spec. “ad commutandos animos atque omni ratione flectendos”)—in contrast to “that other kind of style, which[,] by bearing witness to the speaker’s integrity [‘probitatis’][,] is to preserve the semblance [‘speciem tueri’] of a man of worth [‘boni viri’]”, hence “should be mild and gentle [‘lenis’]” (*De Orat. I–II*. 352–355, II.lii.211). In the Lysian oration, a brief recapitulation of the case’s particulars (‘the treatment of the children’, ‘the unworthiness of their guardian’) is rounded off by a general statement, which the present (juridical) audience would likely be able to tie in with: “we [...] reflected [‘enthymóumenoi’] how difficult it is to find a person who can be trusted with one’s affairs” (Dionysius “Lysias” 76–77, §25). Structurally, content-related and formal instances of vicariousness tend to be found in close proximity: here, the practical (also moral philosophical) matter of steward-, guardianship; and a multi-layered *sermocinatio* (a logographer, writing words for a speaker to deliver, who, in so doing, ventriloquizes another’s).

292 On a rhetorical use of the phrase ‘everyone knows’, see Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 378–381, 1408a, III.vii.7); and subch. 3.2. “Exemplum est alicuius facti aut dicti praeteriti cum certi auctoris nomine propositio” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 382, IV.xlix.62). Cf. “it is normal for Roman and Hellenistic writers to choose as their *exempla* for a given topic people who are well-known to their audience” (Gill “Personhood” 181). Stressing “[t]he powerful effect of *prosopopoeia* on Elizabethan readers” (*Culture* 287)—spec. as to *The Mirror for Magistrates* (wherein “the donning of a role is often signalled by a formula such as ‘I will take upon me the person of[.]’”, *Culture* 286)—Plett notes: “The dramatic figures brought to life in this way were well known to the English public of the sixteenth century from the chronicles” (*Culture* 285).

considerable leeway in precisely said respect; hence a writer might flexibly produce the desired effects of both recognition (formally, an effect of repetition) and novelty (unfamiliarity) or variation in the recipients.²⁹³

This ties in with Aristotle's *Poetics*, stating that a (well-known) mythological ('historical') character must be rendered as per the tradition—for the most part:

Now, one cannot break up the transmitted stories (I mean, e.g., Clytemnestra's death at Orestes' hands, and Eriphyle's at Alcmaeon's), but the poet should be [rhetorically] inventive ['heuriskein'] as well as making good use of traditional stories. ("Poetics" 74–75, 1453b, XIV)²⁹⁴

To some degree of probability, a *persona's* remodeling must proceed within certain limits set by custom, and be in keeping with what may be familiar to—hence be deemed apposite by—a given audience as to a particular (mythologico-historical) protagonist, respectively a (usual) set thereof.²⁹⁵ Aristotle habitually

293 On effectually using something '*xenikôn*', see Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 352, III.ii.6, 1404b). As to the *aptum* in said respect, cf. Asmuth: "The ties between the poetics of drama and rhetoric are even closer with regard to the *characters* and their style of speaking. When Aristotle introduces *appropriateness* (πρέπον, [...] ἄρμόττον [...]) as a stylistic principle in his 'Rhetoric', he is thinking of diction as adequate to the situation and case at hand, but especially to the speaker's social status. Accordingly, the conceptions of his 'Poetics' concerning [...] ἔθῆ [...] in drama entirely adhere to the principle of appropriateness: the character of a dramatic persona is to be in accord with its social role, with the historical tradition, and with itself" ("Drama" 185; cf. "Angemessenheit" 581; 584). On variation with a view to the audience, see Cicero: "it is necessary to choose ['est eligendum'] the style of oratory ['Genus (...) dicendi'] best calculated to hold the attention of the audience ['quod maxime teneat eos qui audiant'], and not merely to give them pleasure ['delectet'], but also to do so without giving them too much of it ['sine satietate']" ("De Orat. III" 76–77, III.xxiv.97)—i.e. 'variation sans satiety for maximum efficacy'; the context being the *ornatus*. Stressing that one "escape causing satiety ['satietatem']", Cicero logs: "Thus in all things the greatest pleasures ['voluptatibus maximis'] are only narrowly separated from disgust ['fastidium']" ("De Orat. III" 80–81, III.xxv.99–100); cf. "quae varietate taedium effugiat et mutationibus animum levent" (Quintilian *Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 276, 4.2.118).

294 The fact that most of the (mythologico-historical) names given by Aristotle (e.g. 'Eriphyle', 'Alcmaeon') will be known to specialists only—in contrast to (say) 'Achilles', 'Helen'—may seem to prove the philosopher's point (cf. the n. below). One might have infinitized the citation (*de re*), supplied familiar ('modern') names in a gloss; in the present context, it seems more apposite to signal the specific oscillation of alterity and familiarity. As to the above, see Horace: "Aut famam sequere aut sibi convenientia finge" ("Ars Poetica" 460, v.119; with context, v.119–127); also Vives (referring thereto): "si persona nova infertur, fingere eam licebit qualem collubuerit, sin vetus, qualem accepimus, iuxta præceptum Horatii in arte poetica, qui enim finxit primus, velut jus in ea antecepit, et legem statuit sequentibus" (186, Aa.v, II.xvi).

295 Temporal relations may come into question in said respect. Cf. Moos: "Macrob, *Sat.* I 1, 4–5 sieht seine disputierenden Philosophen als Imitatio der Ciceronischen Dialogfiguren [...] und

counsels to initially tie in with what ‘everyone knows or might know’—with what is likely to be literally ‘plausible’—as such evokes and effects a ‘universal’ common ground, on which to draw or build for utmost impact: “With character, precisely as in the structure of events, one should always seek necessity or probability [‘τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκόσ’]” (“Poetics” 80–81, 1454a, XV).²⁹⁶

The Aristophanic *Clouds*—staging ‘Socrates’ in a manner somewhat at variance with other renderings—may be the most notorious case in this respect: when contrasted with Plato’s diversely nuanced versions, the play evinces both a certain set of overlapping characteristics being ascribed to said *persona*; and a considerable scope as regards (the tendency of) the overall, ethopoetic ‘image’ conveyed.²⁹⁷ In a dialogic exchange with the would-be student ‘Strepsiades’, the

entschuldigt seine Fiktionen damit, daß auch Platos Dialoge Par[...]menides, Timaios [...] Sokrates [...] wie Zeitgenossen miteinander reden lassen, [...] Diachrones synchron behandeln” (407n.). The above relates to the rhetorical directive of ever reckoning with, adhering to, *decorum*—thematic suitability, plus being credibly in accord with common ken floating in, habitually extracted from, (virtual) cultural networks at any given time. Cf. Trimpi, connecting *aequitas* and the *aptum*: “Equity gains its freedom from (written) statutes[,] and poetry its freedom from (recorded) history[,] by concentrating on qualitative issues. Equity seeks the proper relation between the individual controversy to be judged and the body of statutes to be applied to it, while poetry seeks the proper relation of given particular events, historical or imaginary, to a principle by means of which they may gain significance” (“Reason” 104).

296 Naturally, one might as well claim to be referring to a general consensus, common ground as does not obtain (or no longer); “for this is already common knowledge, and there is nobody who does not agree [‘homologeí’], both from what he has been told [‘akoe mathèn’] and from personal experience [‘peíra’]” (Dionysius “Lysias” 36–37, §10; infinitized). Meta-technically, cf. Most: “I introduced this [...] story with the words, ‘As everyone knows’. But presumably for most readers it was quite unfamiliar” (12; with 11). See Mayfield (*Artful* 80; 80n.–81n.; 115; 187).

297 Quintilian stresses: “Plato excell[ed], ‘eminuit’ in all the things [...] a future orator should learn” (*Inst. Orat.* 1–2. 250–251, 1.12.15). Montaigne’s views on the ‘ventriloquizing’ philosopher (cf. *Essais II.* 263, II.xii) are unequivocal: “Lui-même [sc. ‘Platon’] est tout poétique” (*Essais III.* 305, III.ix). “Et certes la philosophie n’est qu’une poésie sophistiquée. [...] Platon n’est qu’un poète découstu. Timon l’appelle par injure grand forger de miracles” (*Essais II.* 300, II.xii; cf. 435, II.xvi); Blumenberg (“Sturz” 37); Friedrich (34); Eden (“Montaigne on Style” 391). Niehues-Pröbsting logs “[d]ass der platonische Sokrates eine im hohen Grade literarische Figur ist” (*Die antike Phil.* 66). Generally, a *sermocinatio* for a familiar *persona* implies that others (are likely to) have similar, variant sources, associations as to this (virtual, notional) ‘figure’, (hence) will gauge what is produced with reference to this name (including the *ethos* projected) by a given standard. There will be a significant difference between putting words into the mouth of an animal (a wolf, bear), or of ‘Dido’, ‘Brutus’—even if the words happen to be the same (floating *sententiae*). Moreover, the degree of familiarity with the ‘mouthpiece’ (so to speak) is decisive: words attributed to a turtle are likely to differ in effect from such as are put into the mouth of a platypus (depending on the receiving context). Traditional *personae* pertain to, are associated

latter asks: “Well, first of all tell me, please, what you’re up to”; and (the Aristophanic) ‘Socrates’ replies: “I tread the air and scrutinize the sun” (39, v.224–225).²⁹⁸ With regard to the dramatist’s poetics, these words represent a *sermocinatio* specially suited to the context and its economy.

Generally (and metapoetically) speaking, rhetorical ventriloquism may also serve as an (implicit) pretext for writing in the first place. With regard to Plato’s delegated prolixity, Blumenberg wryly remarks: “Of course, only someone who lets Socrates speak is permitted to write that much” (*Selbstverständnis* 84; trans. dsm)—while spiriting away his own philosophical *persona* in (and by) said process.²⁹⁹ Branham suggests that one discern “Plato’s comic technique” in

with, a *copia* of (aural, textual, notional) experiences on the part of the recipients—into which fund a *rhétor* or writer may tap when putting (other) words into their mouths. Above all, rhetoric encourages consideration of (utter attentiveness to) settings, nuances. Cf. Bakhtin’s accent: “All rhetorical forms, monologic in their compositional structure, are oriented toward the listener and his answer. This orientation [...] is usually considered the basic constitutive feature of rhetorical discourse. [...] this relationship toward the [...] listener, taking him into account, [...] enters into the very internal construction of rhetorical discourse” (*Dialogic* 280).

298 On the Aristophanic play in a rhetorical view, see Bornscheuer (122–127, here spec. 122).

299 Ostensible ‘logography’ *sensu lato* (“we wrote for a forlorn lover”) may serve as “vicarious self-depiction” (Wigham/Rebhorn, glossing Puttenham’s aforementioned line, 291, with 291n., III.19). Cf. the motto (with n.) for subch. 5.1, above. In delegating a (philosophically desirable) *ethos* to the Socratic *persona* crafted and projected, the resp. writers (Plato et al.) ‘treat themselves’ to a vicarious image (sc. more faces). See Niehues-Pröbsting: “Platon [‘hat’] fast seine gesamte Philosophie dem Sokrates in den Mund gelegt [...] er [‘schreibt’] in einer Form, die [...] es ihm ermöglicht, mit der eigenen Person völlig hinter dem Geschriebenen zu verschwinden” (*Die antike Phil.* 67). Cf. Moos: “Der Begriff [‘Auctor’] steht [...] in einem für Johann [of Salisbury] charakteristischen [...] Sinn für Pseudonym, Maske, Rolle, Persona [...]. Die Verwendung einer *factio auctoris* oder ‘Autor-Ethopoeie’ ist nach einer [...] Grosseteste zugeschriebenen Aussage ein eminentes Bescheidenheitszeugnis: ‘Plato war in seiner Lebensführung klug [...]; daher hat er seine philosophischen Abhandlungen lieber anderen in den Mund gelegt [‘*sub nomine potius alieno stilo mandasse*’]” (408–409, 409n., §88). There seems to be a dependable nexus between delegative devices and legitimization as one of their (distinctive) functions; an associated use (with comparable primacy) will be wary prudence: “Der *Policraticus*-Prolog läßt sich [...] als [...] Rechtfertigung literarisch-rhetorischer Fiktion verstehen[:] [...] im Sinne der *sermocinatio* (Ethopoeie), mit der ein Redner einer erfundenen Person, einem Autor oder [...] Helden seine [...] Worte in den Mund legt[:] [...] im narrativen Sinne des *argumentum*, der realitätsgerechten Erfindung einer passenden, charakteristischen Geschichte. Beide Male steht ein Name aus dem Literaturkanon stellvertretend, zeichenhaft für einen nicht im eigenen Namen aussprechbaren Gedanken” (412, §88). The elemental directive for all variants of rhetorical ventriloquism will be situative expediency (an arch-pragmatic grasp of the *aptum*—not one reducing it to *elocutio*, *ornatus*). Plato’s technical reticence may be seen as a form of ‘*auto-etho-poiesis*’ that virtually guarantees (self-)consistency with respect to (an authorial) *ethos*: while ever uniform itself, the signifieds of silence—being delegated to the resp. recipients—will tend to be myriad in effect.

(ethopoetically) “presenting thinkers as personified expressions of their theories, as comic instantiations of their own dominant ideas” (72).³⁰⁰

Blumenberg’s context: “Dialoge können nicht geschrieben, allenfalls nachgeschrieben werden, wie fiktiv auch immer. An der sokratischen Verweigerung des Schreibens rechtfertigt Plato den [...] Dialog: So viel darf eben nur schreiben, wer Sokrates reden läßt” (*Selbstverständnis* 84). The writer—ostensively keeping silent about ‘himself’—puts ‘Socrates’ (qua *persona*) into the notional (semantic) *locus* labeled ‘god’ in other (not only religious) contexts. As to such silence with another accent, see Bacon’s “De nobis ipsis silemus” (*Neues Organon* 32, Praefatio; being 132 in Spedding/Ellis/Heath). Hypoleptically, Kant’s motto for the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* opens with the former’s words: “De nobis ipsis silemus: De re autem” (*Vernunft* 1. 7)—in other words, still letting the resp. prevalent ‘god’ speak (be it called ‘res’, ‘Reason’, or else). Having situated said dictum as “a keyword of the epoch” (*Schriften zur Technik* 74; trans. dsm), Blumenberg restates it in a synchronic, self-inclusive form: “daß wir über uns schweigen” (*Beschreibung* 15; “that we be silent about ourselves”; trans. dsm). Ways of express, decided, incidental (transmission-related) silence may conduce to, downright yield, the inverse effect, catalyze attempts at ‘personifying’ an *auctor* from the text—a state of play offering considerable potentials for a resp. poetics. In this regard, Sappho may be spec. elucidating. On “the complex relation between face and voice in fragment 31”, “the mutual implication of speaking and not speaking in this poem”, see Prins (43; Sappho 78–81, §31; Longinus 198–199, §10.2), who (with de Man; cf. Harvey *Voices* 124; “Sappho” 88–89) asserts: “The anacoluthon [...] opens a space for personification and depersonification, producing *prosopopoeia* as the figure that gives face by conferring speech upon a voiceless entity, yet in doing so also defaces it. [...] fragment 31 performs its own figuration as an act of disfiguration: the face is systematically disfigured, broken down into component parts” (Prins 43)—“a poem anatomizing [...] *prosopopoeia*” (53). The ‘break’ or ‘opening’ refers to “[t]he problem of the τό in line 5” (Robbins in: Prins 42), that “pronoun [...] introducing a relative clause” (41); one answer is “to give face to it—by projecting voice into the text [...] assuming a speaking persona” (42). Prins logs “the primary critical strateg[ies]”: to see “fragment 31 [...] as a monologue in which we may ‘refer to the *persona loquens* as Sappho’, [...] a dramatized dialogue that creates Sappho as a dramatic speaker, [...] an internal dialogue in which Sappho speaks as ‘the face behind the mask’” (Prins—partly citing Koniari, Lidov, McEvilly, 42). She notes readings (here by Svenbro) as “animat[e] the writing itself, giving it face and voice”, “personif[ying] [...] the written utterance as ‘you’”—with “[t]his *prosopopoeia* becom[ing] increasingly complex” (45; cf. 46). An Ancient move: via “personification Longinus [...] conflate[s] poem and poet: Sappho is fragment 31” (49–50). Cf. Prins’ agenda: “Rather than reclaiming Sappho’s ‘original’ voice, I approach the [...] fragments as [...] cause and effect of translation. [...] the performance [there]of [...] ensures Sappho’s afterlife” (37). Even so, her conclusion seems to signal an interest in ‘seeking the source’ (“to recuperate Sapphic voice”): “in the long tradition of translating fragment 31, Sappho is defaced in the very attempt to give face and voice to this text” (67). At any rate, the reception decidedly partakes in this (and any) ethopoetic process: “in the *Poetics* [...], as in the *Rhetoric*, character is represented as a factor constructed or inferred by the audience” (Elam 218); “*ethos* describes an audience’s projection of authority and trustworthiness onto the speaker, [...] triggered or elicited by the speaker but [...] supplied by the audience” (Baumlin/Baumlin 99; cf. 100).

300 See Blumenberg’s felicitous dictum (infinitez): “der Inbegriff [...] läßt sich figuralisieren”

Dialogs—such as Plato’s *Symposium*, Lucian’s artful pieces—might be seen as virtually giving themselves to being put on stage (despite elaborate diegetic scaffolds). Branham—also noting Lucian’s use of *prosopopoeia* (see 5)—states:

Where New Comic or classical tragic poets appear to have constructed their plays from the plot up, Lucian’s procedure is just the opposite: he begins by selecting a recognizable voice or set of voices and then projects them into a provocative situation, whether in Hades, on Olympus, or in ancient Athens. Here his rhetorical training in imitating the masters serves him well. In fact, Lucian’s protean ability for imitation and parody brings him into contact with every major genre from Homer through Theocritus. (4–5)³⁰¹

(“Universalbibliothek” 33). Cf. Murphy: “Sometimes a single passage will give a striking insight into the whole rhetorical stance of an author” (“Authors” 33). The above phenomenon is transgeneric; for a personification of (oratorical) perspectives, see Fumaroli’s wording: “the point of view suggested by Tacitus in the *Dialogue of the Orators* through the voice of Maternus” (257); cf. subch. 2.1. As to “die auffällige Stilfigur der Gegner-Umbenennung” in John of Salisbury, see Moos: “Die Gegenthesen zu Johanns Ansichten [...] werden personifiziert [...] mit Phantasienamen literarischer Provenienz versehen [...] erhalten Pseudonyme, Deck- [...] Spitznamen, Schimpfmetonymien” (289, §70). “Dies[...] erweist [...] die [...] ‘Kampfhandlungen’ als eine Art rhetorisch inszenierter ‘Charakterkomödien’ mit diatribischen Dialogelementen (wie dem einredenden *factus interlocutor*). Sie lassen sich [...] auch nach dem Modell [...] fiktive[r] Probestreitgespräche mit einem imaginierten Gegner verstehen [...] scheinen einem rhetorisch-dialektischen Doppelziel zu dienen: Als argumentative ‘Kriegsspiele’ schärfen sie das Denken *in utramque partem*, und durch den dramatisch gesteigerten Antagonismus [...] zwingen sie den Leser in die Rolle des Richters” (289–291, §70; cf. spec. 290n.).

301 For Lucian, Hodkinson notes: “Certain well-known figures appear as characters [...], such as Homer and Odysseus, and here the narrator can rely on the reader’s knowledge in order not to have to describe them in any way. But he can then exploit this knowledge in order to characterize them in surprising ways which go against their conventional characterizations” (553). Moreover, “[t]he class of purely mimetic dialogues among Lucian’s works (*Dialogues of Courtesans*, *Dialogues of the Gods*, *Dialogues of the Sea-gods*, *Dialogues of the Dead*, *The Judgement of the Goddesses*) [...] can be seen as literary exercises in characterization through *ēthopoia*. [...] The characters are ventriloquized by the author of the mimetic dialogues [...], put in unusual or comic situations and then characterized mainly through their own speech, [...] by what their interlocutors say about them, [...] by their actions and reactions to one another” (556)—all of which are linguistically rendered, of course. As described by Branham, the above reverses Aristotle’s recommended procedure: “A plot is not unified, as some think, if built round an individual. Any entity has innumerable features, not all of which cohere into a unity; likewise, an individual performs many actions which yield no unitary action” (“Poetics” 57, 1451a, VIII). Cf. Halliwell: “unity of ‘hero’ is not a sufficient (or even necessary) condition for unity of plot” (“Poetics” 57n.). This links to the accentuation of the *‘kathólou’* in *‘poiesis’* (*sensu lato*), as contrasted with an emphasis on “particulars” in “history” (“Poetics” 58–59, 1451b, IX): “In comedy [...] the poets construct the plot on the basis of probability, and only then supply arbitrary names; they do not, like iambic poets, write about a particular person. But in tragedy they adhere to the actual names. The reason is that the possible seems plausible [...]. Yet even

Plato and said (neo-)Sophist might be taken as expedient examples with a view to suggesting that the temporal distance to the ‘actual life’ of the historical human being is only of secondary import: once a recognizable *persona* is floating in the vast virtual networks of various (interwoven) cultures, it may take on—or relinquish en route—many different ‘masks’ or ‘public images’; the latter suggest what will be deemed appropriate for that *persona* (at a given point in time), and relatively regardless of genre (*de re*).³⁰² Ventriloquistic techniques are of universal application, the same as the *rhetorikè téchne* on the whole—whether applied in historiography, drama, (philosophical) dialog, or otherwise.

D. Laertius represents a *copia* in said regard: with rather few references to sources, and all but indiscriminately as to the emitting discourse or context, his *Lives* collect and assemble myriad instances as are likely to have been *sermocinationes* (stand-alone *allocutiones*, embedded in more complex *ethopoíai*, part of dramatic works, etc.).³⁰³ Frequently (or even typically), the

in some tragedies there are only one or two familiar names, while the rest are invented; and in certain plays no name is familiar [...] adherence to the traditional plots of tragedy should not be sought at all costs. Indeed, to seek this is absurd, since even the familiar subjects are familiar only to a minority, yet nonetheless please everyone” (“Poetics” 61, 1451b, IX).

302 Speaking of “technically diverse characterization”, Hodkinson stresses: “Lucian’s works display great variation in their use of characterization techniques [...]. As a sophistic author, he is well aware of ancient rhetoricians’ definitions of characterization techniques and sometimes refers to them in terms which display that knowledge, as well as employing the full range. The single most important character across his works is ‘Lucian’ himself or his alter-egos” (556). From among the “wide range of characterization techniques” in Lucian, Hodkinson’s noting the possibility of *ethopoíia* by proxy is of spec. import: “Anacharsis is characterized by others’ reactions to him” (550); this applies more generally: “very often in Lucian’s satire, the target is characterized by his own actions and the reactions they provoke in others” (552). Generally, Rusten notes that “Lucian [...] shows a direct knowledge of the [Theophrastan] *Characters*” (18).

303 With respect to the floating and refunctionalized (including cross-generic) uptake of *sermocinationes*, the ensuing case will be particularly significant, seeing that it also evinces the workings of *hypólepsis* in world literature more generally. Dante’s *Divina Comedia* abounds in *allocutiones*, some of which are put into the mouths of (apparently) historical human beings. In the following instance, the extratextual author’s words for the Medieval poet Guinizzelli offer a concise ethopoetic portrait (with laudatory purpose) of a renowned fellow writer: “‘he there whom I [sc. ‘Guinizzelli’] point out to you [‘Dante’, intratextually]—and he pointed to a spirit ahead—‘was a better craftsman of the mother tongue [‘fu miglior fabbro del parlar materno’]: verses of love and tales of romance he surpassed them all—and let the fools talk” (Dante 286–287, v.115–119). In Eliot’s dedication to “The Waste Land”, said central characteristic—the poet qua linguistic ‘*homo faber*’—is tied in with as follows: “For Ezra Pound / *il miglior fabbro* [‘the better craftsman’]” (3). See the gloss *ad locum*: “Eliot’s tribute to friend and fellow poet [...] Pound [...], whose poetic craftsmanship was invaluable in editing the *Waste Land* manuscript. The phrase echoes the tribute offered by Dante [...] to twelfth-century

reader of anecdotes is probably facing rhetorico-energetic fabrications crafted with a view to effecting strikingly vivid scenes, specifically by putting (plausible, distinctive) words into the mouths of particular *personae*. The *Lives* may thus be seen as a rhetorical arsenal of effectual attributions and the crafting of *ethos*: a depot that might serve as a sort of ‘checklist’ as to what may be (thought to have been) aptly—always meaning, feckfully—attached to certain (supposedly) historical *prósopa*.³⁰⁴ Multiple ascriptions of similar sayings or anecdotes to different protagonists point to overlaps in the ‘personating’ (typifying, ‘characterizing’) process—this being one of the necessary results of any (ethopoetic) ‘image’ floating in a given (virtual) cultural network: once a (crafted and projected) rhetorical ‘self’ is found to ‘sell’, it will inevitably be recycled, leading to further *sermocinationes* (a dynamics remaining fairly stable to this day).³⁰⁵ The ensuing set of layered statements might serve as a sample:

Provençal poet Arnaut Daniel in Canto 26 of Dante’s *Purgatorio*, a section from which Eliot also borrows l[ine] 427” (3n.; cf. 19, v.427; 19n.). In his capacity as dedicatory, Eliot puts what, in Dante, had been a *sermocinatio* with an ethopoetic function into his own mouth (so to speak), thereby to ‘characterize’ a fellow craftsman also involved in the collaborative “Waste Land” project—hence implicitly (vicariously) also his own *persona*. Refunctionalizations will vary.

304 Blumenberg hints that various ventriloquistic devices (*sermocinatio*, *ethopoïia*) may serve in heuristico-hermeneutic respects (cf. *Beschreibung* 152; *Phänomenologische* 94): “Klingt es glaubwürdig, wenn Leo Strauss [...] schreibt: *Husserl sagte mir einmal* [...] [‘]Wenn es ein Datum Gott gibt, werden wir es beschreiben[‘]? [...] Es ist aber wohl das, was Husserl hätte sagen müssen und daher auch gesagt hat” (*Begriffe* 30)—if the exchange took place; the bottom line: “Husserl [...] konnte sehr wohl gesagt haben, was Leo Strauss von ihm berichtet” (*Begriffe* 31).

305 For Plotinus’ *hypólepsis* and (discursive) refunctionalization of a dictum on the part of the *Iliad*’s Agamemnon by ‘putting it into the mouth of’ the *Odyssey*’s hero, cf. Blumenberg (“Plotin legt es dem Odysseus in den Mund”, *Arbeit* 87–88); in line with his overall thesis therein, the philosopher deems this “work on myth” (*Arbeit* 88; trans. dsm). Cf. Weinrich’s formulation: “Sokrates [...], dem Plato die [äsopische] Fabel in den Mund legt” (436). The ensuing gives a *sermocinatio*’s distinctive recipient, in place of its (‘unknown’) emitter: “Hercules [...] dem ein unbekannter Tragiker [...] jene [...] Worte geliehen hat” (Hirzel “Selbstmord” 284n.). Once one qualitative, or a sufficient number of *ethopoïiai* have conduced to the floatation of a (more or less) reliable *ethos*, the attributing party (or author) may tend to be of lesser import than what ‘all (are said or thought to) know’. Conversely, if the source is considered to be authoritative to such an extent that the ‘that’ of their utterances trumps the (or any) ‘what’, the vicariousness constitutive of rhetorical ventriloquism might lead to such phenomena: “Goethe ist tot, und nun spricht Eckermann wie Goethe” (Blumenberg “Momente” 53); incidentally, this may be taken as another—elemental—ground for the rationality of Aristotle’s accidental (or Plato’s *praxis*): ‘one must make another speak in one’s place’ (cf. *Rhetoric* 460–461, 1418b, III.xvii.16; subch. 5.1). The remaining ‘tell the story’ (see Blumenberg *Sorge* 25)—hence perform *sermocinationes*: “this 71-year-old woman, the survivor, has put the words in everyone’s mouth” (Davis 59). Samples may be infinitized, the (potentially) delegative functions of the device elicited.

Sotion [...] says that he [sc. Anaxagoras] was indicted [...] on a charge of impiety [‘asebeías’] [...] and that sentence of death was passed on Anaxagoras by default. When news was brought him that he was condemned and his sons were dead, his comment on the sentence was, ‘Long ago nature condemned both my judges and myself to death’; and on his sons, ‘I knew that my children were born to die’. Some, however, tell this story of Solon, and others of Xenophon. (*Lives I.* 142–143, II.12–13)³⁰⁶

Metapoetically, the reader is here facing the characteristic floating of *sententiae* qua *sermocinationes*—as Blumenberg notes, Goethe refunctionalized said aphorism, applying it to the (factual) demise of his own son: “*Non ignoravi me mortalem genuisse*” (Goethe 225).³⁰⁷

306 Cf. Cicero on “the words Euripides has put into the mouth of Theseus [‘a Theseo dicta’] [...]: [‘]this lesson from wise lips I learnt, / Within my Heart I pondered ills to come: [...] that [...] / No sudden care should rend me unprepared [‘*Ne me imparatum cura laceraret repens*’][‘]. By the lesson which Theseus says he learnt from a wise man, Euripides means a lesson which he had learnt himself. For he had been a pupil of Anaxagoras, who, according to the story, said when he heard of his son’s death, ‘I knew that I had begotten a mortal [‘*Sciebam me genuisse mortalem*’]’. This saying shows that such events are cruel for those who have not reflected upon them” (*Tusc. Disp.* 260–263, III.xiv.29–30). See Seneca’s *sermocinatio* for ‘Demetrius’: “Do you [‘immortal gods’] wish to take my children?—it was for you that I fathered them” (*Essays I.* 37, V.5). “Good men lose their sons; why not, since sometimes they even slay them?” (*Essays I.* 43, VI.2); a gloss refers to “Lucius Junius Brutus [...] Manlius Torquatus” (*Essays I.* 42n.).

307 As related by Blumenberg: “auf die Nachricht, das einzige von ihm [sc. Goethe] bewirkte Leben sei erloschen, erwiderte er ohne Zweifel oder Verzweiflung, ausweichend in die lateinische Sprache, was zuerst von einem Griechen gesagt worden war, er habe gewußt, nur einen Sterblichen gezeugt zu haben: *Non ignoravi me mortalem genuisse*” (Goethe 225). Frequently, similar remarks ascribed or attributed to specific philosophers, or other *personae*, will actually derive from dramatic, dialogic, comparable renderings—at times even explicitly, e.g. in D. Laertius: “Menippus in his *Sale of Diogenes* tells how, when he was captured and put up for sale, he was asked what he could do. He replied, ‘Govern men [‘*andron árchein*’]” (*Lives II.* 30–31, VI.29). Other cases do not feature direct speech (in the particular rendering given): “Through watching a mouse running about, says Theophrastus in the Megarian dialogue [...], he [sc. ‘Diogenes’] discovered the means of adapting himself to circumstances [‘*peristáseos*’]” (*Lives II.* 24–25, VI.22). As of Early Modern times, the source will often be novels; since the twentieth century, they predictably derive from motion pictures—and from comparable forms of immediate, ‘enargic’ virtuality in the twenty-first. As to the ‘floating of *sententiae*’, see the following phrases on the part of D. Laertius: “Sotion, however, [...] makes the Cynic address this remark to Plato himself” (*Lives II.* 29, VI.26); “Others give this retort to Theodorus” (*Lives II.* 45, VI.42); “But others attribute this remark to Diagoras of Melos” (*Lives II.* 61, VI.59). Ascribing an entire book to a particular authority might be described as an editorial *sermocinatio*, with (potentially) far-reaching consequences in terms of (the history of) reception; a notorious case would be the *Rhet. ad Her.* Caplan states the needful: “The fact that the treatise appeared, from Jerome’s time on, as a work by Cicero gave it a prestige which it enjoyed for over a thousand years” (“Intro.” vii–viii; *Eloquence* 2). As far as the ‘poetic’

From a pragmatic perspective, D. Laertius' *Lives* demonstrate the degree to which the diverse forms of rhetorical ventriloquism are in fact effectual: crafting sayings (also in verbal exchanges) to be put into the mouths of various *personae* (*allocutio*, *dialogismós*), its assorted techniques conduce to producing vivid, 'characteristic', probable 'images' (*ethopoíia*, with respect to *eikós* and a view to *enárgeia*).³⁰⁸ So as to effect plausibility, attention is paid to remaining in accord with their received *ethos* (meaning, as generally understood), while a certain flexibility obtains as to what will be deemed apposite in terms of redescriptions and attributions. Negotiating this tension in his textual economy—navigating with respect to the *aptum*—delineates the scope and leeway for the writer (dramatist, philosopher, orator, historian) as regards making his particular point (including where 'universal' by implication). The same as the overall *téchne* (see Küpper *Discursive Renovatio* 289), the ventriloquistic devices are transgeneric in terms of application.³⁰⁹

perspective is concerned, see Carey (*de re*): "the tendency of artefacts to vary in value according to the identity of the creator offered an incentive to deceive" ("Intro." 11). Cf. Moos, stressing the "Vorrang der mitzuteilenden Sache vor der mitteilenden Person" as among "den wichtigsten Legitimationsmotiven christlicher Pseudoepigraphie" (409, §88).

308 See D. Laertius' definition of 'dialog' (with recourse to the terms '*ethopoíia*', '*prósopon*'): "A dialogue is a discourse consisting of question and answer on some philosophical or political subject, with due regard to the characters of the persons introduced [μετὰ τῆς πρεπούσης ἡθοποιίας τῶν παραλαβανομένων προσώπων] and the choice of diction" (*Lives I.* 318–319, III.48; cf. 292, III.18, "ἡθοποιῆσαι"; thereto, see K. Morgan 445–446). Apelt trans. the resp. phrase as "unter angemessener Charakteristik der auftretenden Personen" (*Leben I.* 159, III.48).

309 In a genealogical argument, Sansone wishes to reverse dependences: "we are willing to believe, on the authority of Aristotle and others, that the earliest dramatists needed to learn from the earliest rhetoricians how to put persuasive words into the mouths of their characters. [...] on the contrary, it was the revolutionary innovation represented by the development of the drama that inspired the creation of rhetorical theory" (20). At any rate, the phenomenal plane yields an unequivocal finding: "Die Tragödie war hochrhetorisch" (Norden *Kunstprosa II.* 889, II.Anhang.I.viii). Cf. Mayfield ("Interplay" 10n.–12n.; with further references). Noting that "Lysias' [...] ability to delineate character (*ethopoíia*[...]) [...] left scope for comic characterisation" (202), Harding focuses on the ensuing: "Perhaps Lysias' most memorable creation in this ['comic'] medium was the *physically handicapped person* of Speech 24, an *alazon*, if ever there was one, and one who [...] personified the comic representation of rhetoric as the skill in 'making the worse into the better argument'" (202). "Lysias decided to take the bull by the horns and use the technique of comic imposture (*alazoneia*) as his form of attack" (203). "In this brilliant speech Lysias has used many of the techniques of the comic dramatist – exaggeration, incongruity, parody, absurdity, the impossible and [...], as he makes his own character admit, he has masterfully taken the comic hero off the stage and put him in court" (206). Cf. M. Morgan ("XXIV. Intro." 119). With respect to Lysias in general, Blass notes "dass sich in mancher Rede ein [...] Bild im Kleinen menschlicher Zustände findet, wie in der besten

Whereas the specific, rhetorico-poetic disposition (selection and placement, hence function) in a work with historical claims will typically be a privileged point or climax (not least for reasons of variation in the textual economy), dialogic works (frequently featuring familiar *personae*) consist of sequential, contextualized *sermocinationes* (with narrative elements reduced in keeping with generic conventions).³¹⁰ In an equally metapoetical perspective, the techniques in question prove especially expedient in plays, where words have actually been put in various mouths, speech is dynamically enacted on the stage, and performed with a high degree of vivid immediacy and intensity.³¹¹

Komödie" (*Beredsamkeit I.* 397). On the *ethopoïa* of the aforesaid *persona* from a linguistic perspective (including a close reading of the syntax and *dispositio*), see Forman (passim); his conclusion that one be dealing with an "individualize[d] [...] character" (106) may seem problematic (contrast Bruss 54, who goes so far as to claim such as evidence of "contemporary scholars" being "equipped with more advanced conceptual categories"; cf. 54n.–55n.). Given the transpersonal qualities of language, as well as the fact that one seems to be dealing with a somewhat typified protagonist, "individuality" (Bruss 54) cannot be pertinent (to say nothing of the term's 'utility' in general). Even so, Kennedy's contrasting view need not necessarily obtain: "Lysias does not attempt to vary the diction to suit the speaker; farmers, merchants, and aristocrats all speak the same simple, flawless Attic Greek" (*New History* 66). His ensuing assessment is equally problematic: "Lysias made two great contributions to Greek oratory. The first was a prose style of elegant simplicity [...] [the] second [...] was ethopoeia [...] Lysias [...] br[ought] out unique features of each client's personality. Often, by showing some trivial weakness through a naturalistic touch, he succeeded in establishing a rapport with the audience that could convey the credibility of his client" (*New History* 66; cf. *Persuasion* 135–136). The (hardly implicit) value judgments conveyed by the terms "unique" and "naturalistic" are inapplicable *de re*, and will (all but) inevitably give rise to misleading connotations.

310 See Blass: "Offenbar sind die Reden des Thukydides Glanzpunkte des Werks" (*Beredsamkeit I.* 235)—from rhetorico-poetic, as well as hermeneutic points of view.

311 Such accommodates the audience's delight in, as well as gusto for, 'special effects'—and is thus conducive to effecting an unreflected persuadedness (an only apparently 'informed consent'); see Aristotle on "the weakness ['asthénéian'] of audiences": "the poets follow, and pander to the taste of, the spectators" ("Poetics" 72–73, 1453a, XIII; with 53–55, 1450b, VI). Quintilian accentuates: "etiam credit facilius quae audienti iucunda sunt, et voluptate ad fidem ducitur" (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 278, 4.2.119). Cf. Augustine's "*dilige et quod vis fac*" (as qtd. in: Hammond "Timeline" lxii); in Green's rendering: "Once your auditor thinks you love him, you can tell him anything" (7); he gives a mediated version as "Ama, & dic quod vis" (22n.; see Mayfield "Interplay" 18n.–19n.). The rhetorical theory of *accommodatio* will be apposite in this respect: "He, therefore, will be eloquent who can adapt his speech to fit all conceivable circumstances" (Cicero "Orator" 399, xxxvi.123). Cf. Paul's version: "omnibus omnia factus sum" (*1Cor* 9:22; *Vulgate*); with Gracián (*Oráculo manual* 145, §77; 145n.); and Nietzsche's cynical *hypólepsis* of the Pauline slant: "'Dem Reinen ist Alles rein' — so spricht das Volk. Ich aber sage euch: den Schweinen wird Alles Schwein!" (*KSA* 4. 256, III, "Von alten und neuen Tafeln", §14); also Merleau-Ponty's nonchalant remark (in a Montaignian context): "In public

In (apparently) referential works, citations may take on a character akin to *sermocinationes*—specifically if the respective ‘authority’ is overtly or subtly recontextualized, overstated, misquoted, or fabricated altogether.³¹² As indicated above with reference to the textual yield, Machiavelli may well seem to have outperformed all in the art of rhetorical ventriloquism.³¹³ The Tuscan

life I become mad with the madmen” (204). Generally, see Eden: “rhetoric itself is first and foremost the art of accommodation” (*Rhet. Tradition* 14; cf. 2, 26, 42n.); cf. Mayfield (“Interplay” 18–19, 18n.–19n.; “Proceedings” 206, 224–225); as well as subch. 3.1, herein.

312 For a pertinent nexus of *hypólepsis* and *sermocinatio*, see Blumenberg: “man [‘könnte’] Paulus in Abwandlung jenes dunklen Wortes des Thales [...] sagen lassen: Es war alles voll von Gesetzen” (*Arbeit* 35); should the (author’s) hedging be omitted or forgotten in future citations, the turncoat Pharisee might be thought or said to have written or uttered these words indeed. Generally, see Blumenberg: “Thales is quoted verbatim by Seneca, although he left nothing written behind” (*Schiffbruch* 10n.; trans. dsm). Cf. Grube’s formulations (here as regards gleaned fragments to form a tentative notion of lost works): “Theophrastus is quoted as saying”; “Ammonius [...] quotes Theophrastus as saying” (106); “a passage of Dionysius of Halicarnassus [...] quotes Theophrastus as saying”; “attributes to Theophrastus a statement” (108). Grube also cites “Gellius['] quot[ing] Varro as saying” (163); these might as well be *sermocinationes*. Cf. Kohut’s description of a Renaissance case: “der [...] Humanist Pedro de Rhua [...] [‘unterzieht 1549’] die Werke des damaligen Erfolgsautors Antonio de Guevara einer strengen Kritik [...]. Guevara [...] gebe ‘Fabeln für Geschichten’ (*fábulas por historias*), eigene Erfindungen für Erzählungen anderer [aus] und zitiere von anderen Autoren, was sie nicht oder anders gesagt haben” (90; brackets around “aus” in the source). With a view to metapoetical effects (including *mise en abyme*), Borges often uses such or similar devices (expressly)—e.g. in his “Pierre Menard, Author of the *Quixote*” (passim). As to *dispositio*, Bakhtin stresses “the transmission and re-processing of another’s word”: “the speaker introduces into the other’s words his own intentions and highlights the context of those words in his own way” (*Dialogic* 355). “Rhetorical genres possess the most varied forms for transmitting another’s speech, and for the most part these are intensely dialogized forms. Rhetoric relies heavily on the vivid reaccentuating of the words it transmits (often to the point of distorting them completely) [...]. Rhetorical genres provide rich material for studying a variety of forms for transmitting another’s speech, the most varied means for formulating and framing such speech” (*Dialogic* 354); “in the makeup of almost every utterance spoken by a social person [...] a significant number of words can be identified that are implicitly or explicitly admitted as someone else’s, and that are transmitted by a variety of different means. Within the arena of almost every utterance an intense interaction and struggle between one’s own and another’s word is being waged, a process in which they oppose or dialogically interanimate each other” (*Dialogic* 354).

313 Cf. Strauss (35–36; 42; 106–107; 137–167); spec. “It would appear [...] that Machiavelli stands in the same relation to Livy in which Livy stands to some of his characters: [...] Machiavelli’s Livy is a character of Machiavelli” (141); “Tacitus is less Machiavelli’s model than his creation” (165); see Mansfield (*Virtue* 132; 320n.); Mayfield (*Artful* 83n.; 91n.). In such cases, the active participation in ‘*etho-poíesis*’ on the part of any process of reception will be spec. discernible. This also applies to other (including reciprocally delegative) forms of rhetorical

shows a general tendency to slightly modify (traditional) *dicta* by Livy or Tacitus (partly fictive, to begin with), as well as *Scriptural* passages.³¹⁴ The manipulation of the source text or author will be effective both in terms of the resulting statement, and with a view to readers able to discern the difference—hence that Machiavelli has placed (altered or fabricated) words into the mouths of ‘Livy’, ‘Tacitus’, or the *Biblical* ‘David’, while seemingly ‘just’ citing.³¹⁵

ventriloquism: “ich überlasse die Rückübersetzung der gesamten Prosopopöe dem Leser” (Küpper “Bemerkungen” 32). On Livy’s “us[ing] his doubting *persona* to engage the reader in the historiographical process”, cf. Kraus (158). On the refunctionalization of *Scripture*, Tacitus, see Machiavelli (*Il Principe* 93–96, XIII); with Strauss (329n.–330n.); Mayfield (*Artful* 180–182).

314 The plane of phenomena or textual effects seems to render inevitable Strauss’ ensuing observation: “Machiavelli impresses his form on the Livian matter” (316n.). In particular, the scholar notes: “None of the six quotations from Livy in I 40 is completely literal” (318n.). Such a poetics renders close readings especially needful—as the following might demonstrate: “that Sallustian sentence, put in the mouth of Caesar, is very true: that ‘all bad examples have arisen from good beginnings’” (Machiavelli *Discourses* 95, I.46; with 95n.: “Sallust says that ‘all bad examples have arisen from good things’; see Strauss 137; 322n.). Cf. Aristotle (*Politics* 390, 1303b, V.iii.2); with Ovid’s “Principiis obsta” (“Remedia” 184, v.91); Machiavelli (*Il Principe* 18, III.27; 18n.); Mayfield (*Artful* 171, 171n.–172n.; 222–223, 223n.). Generally, see these formulations in Trimpi (infinetized here—with a view to demonstrating a quasi-universal applicability): “In referring to” a text, he “makes certain important, though inconspicuous, changes. [...] Each time” he “cites this passage [...], he omits the qualifying phrase [...]. The omission is probably not accidental”; with context: “Plotinus has changed Plato’s ‘to become like God (ὁμοιωσις θεῶν)’ [...] into ‘to be god (θεὸν εἶναι)’” (*Muses* 170). See a comparable case elucidated by Kasprzyk: while Dio’s rendering of “Achilles [...] contradicts the entire epic tradition”, he “goes further, using an episode from the *Iliad* to belittle the character [...]. Not only is the invention of an episode attributed to the poet, but also the negative conclusion that Dio himself draws, in a particularly sophisticated way, from sparse information. Rewriting Homer, commenting on the Homeric text and judging the character are inextricably linked” (527; with Dio Chrysostom 522–525, XI.101–102, spec. the latter’s mention of “Homer [’s] [...] eagerness to conceal the truth concerning that hero”, 523–525, XI.102). Expediently, Kasprzyk also notes the delegative technique of “attributing [...] commentary to another character” (527).

315 This will likewise apply to scenes dramatizing (spec. *Il Principe* 38–54, VII) the exploits of the (otherwise) historical protagonist Cesare Borgia, whom the factual author is known to have met; in such cases, an intratextual ‘Machiavelli’ (with the *ethos* of a counselor) puts words (or thoughts, intents) into the mouth (or head) of his (textual) *persona* ‘Cesare’ so effectively that the *sermocinatio* might go unnoticed, and be taken at face value (sc. ‘historically’). Cf. Quintilian: “Valeat autem in consiliis auctoritas plurimum. Nam et prudentissimum esse haberique et optimus debet qui sententiae suae de utilibus atque honestis credere omnes velit. [...] consilia [...] secundum mores dari” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 122, 3.8.12–13; Russell’s trans. “very wise and very good” will be misleading: both in general, semantic regards, and in view of the decidedly pragmatic context; for the nexus with Aristotle, see Cope 109). “Multum refert etiam quae sit persona suadentis” (Quintilian *Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 138, 3.8.48); *de re*, see this collocation:

In one instance, the Tuscan's proclivity for—and notable virtuosity (not to say artfulness) in—all variants of rhetorical ventriloquism may be seen (or said) to come to the fore in a rather crafty manner.³¹⁶ As per its context, the ensuing is functionalized with a view to setting up an argument *in utramque partem*—also signaled by its opening with Machiavelli's characteristic 'even so'—in the course of which a line ascribed to Tacitus reads: "'In multitudine regenda plus poena quam obsequium valet'" (*Opere* 228, III.xix; "'In ruling a multitude, punishment is worth more than compliance'", *Discourses* 260, III.19).³¹⁷

"auctoritate personarum" (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 304, 10.1.97). Cf. "Nichts ist dem rhetorischen Erfolg so abträglich wie ein negatives Image des Redners, nichts so förderlich wie Autorität und Ansehen beim Publikum" (Niehues-Pröbsting "Ethos" 342). Rhetorical ventriloquism is similarly utile in terms of this subtle device: "Hase de hablar a los presentes en los passados" (Gracián *Oráculo manual* 217, §210)—with the gloss: "referir la censura a un personaje de la historia" (*Oráculo manual* 217n.); "es [...] el arbitrio empleado por los tacitistas [...] que se sirven de personajes de la antigüedad para verter sus juicios en sus libros" (*Oráculo manual* 217n.); another statement is glossed: "que lo pone en boca de" etc. (*Oráculo manual* 133n.). As to the (Imperial) Roman practice of "declamation", Kennedy notes (in general): "Contemporary subjects were avoided as potentially dangerous" (*New History* 168). On Shakespeare, see Maxwell (passim), spec. her central claims: "In scholarship, misquotation is vexing. In literature, it is an art" (56); "Misquotation occurs in two [...] ways: [...] verbal inexactness [...] quoting out of context, in ways that are recognizably transgressive: irreverent, self-serving, devious [...] 'The devil can cite scripture for his purpose' [...] *The Merchant of Venice* (1.3.98)" (57–58; with Shakespeare *Merchant* 213, I.iii.94, cf. 213n.; *Richard III.* 169–170, I.iii.334–338; Marlowe 83, I.ii.111; cf. 83n.). Maxwell stresses: "Renaissance readers and writers [...] were taught to misquote creatively. Renaissance England was a quoting culture" (58). "The New Testament is full of quotations from the Old, used mainly to justify arguments. So to quote or misquote the Bible, argumentatively, is to imitate its strategies" (63). "Shakespeare's misquotations often economize" (67). "Misquoting is an art" (71). The value judgment inherent in the negative prefix will be anachronistic, as a matter of course: with respect to Early Modern (or comparably rhetorical) cultures, it would hardly have been considered 'state-of-the-art' or 'playing by the book' to be taking up something without variation.

316 See Christiansen—against her grain: "rhetoric can so easily become Machiavellian virtuosity" (300). From a descriptive (hence scholarly) perspective, the art *kat' exochén* is a versatile, universal arsenal of expedients (see Aristotle *Rhetoric* 14–15, I.ii.1, 1355b; with Sloane "Education" 166; Bloemendal "Polish Pindar" 130; Mayfield "Interplay" 5–8; "Variants of *hypólepsis*" 249); any moralizing must seem misguided.

317 Cf. "Nondimeno, Cornelio Tacito, al quale molti altri scrittori acconsentano, in una sua sentenza conchiude il contrario, quando ait: 'In multitudine regenda plus poena quam obsequium valet'. E considerando come si possa salvare l'una e l'altra di queste opinioni, dico" etc. (*Opere* 228, III.xix); said 'consensus' insinuates the indirect presence of further ventriloquisms. Machiavelli continually refers to his *allocutio* ("ragiona Cornelio", reiterated, *Opere* 228, III.xix), and then concludes: "la sentenza di Cornelio, dentro ai termini suoi [...], merita d'essere approvata" (*Opere* 229, III.xix)—thereby legitimizing his own *sermocinatio* for

Naturally, the Latin text resembling Machiavelli's partly hypoleptic *sermocinatio* tenders the precise opposite: "Obsequium inde in principem et aemulandi amor validior quam poena ex legibus et metus" (Tacitus "Annals I–III" 610, III.lv).³¹⁸ There appears to be a scholarly consensus that the Florentine—in his distinctive irreverence (not to say cynicism)—"invented" (Strauss 160; Mansfield *Modes* 373) the line he prudently places into Tacitus' mouth.³¹⁹ Even so, said word will have to be reaccentuated in rhetorical terms (with respect to *héuresis*); for the 'consenting' anonymous others—to whom Machiavelli alludes in this context ("al quale molti altri scrittori acconsentano", *Opere* 228, III.xix)—will likely not only include the authorial *persona* itself.

In the Attico-Melian dialog, Thucydides puts the following words into the mouths of 'his' Athenian delegates:

[...]your hostility does not injure us so much as your friendship; for in the eyes of our subjects that would be a proof of our weakness, whereas your hatred is a proof of our power'. (*History V–VI*. 161, V.xcv)

Tacitus (spec. with its qualifications, see Mansfield *Modes* 374). Moreover, this state of textual affairs renders the (only virtual) movement from "ait" to "dico" an auto-arbitration (so to speak): Machiavelli crafts the counterweight for the balanced sentence. See the ch.'s title: "Whether to Rule A Multitude Compliance Is More Necessary Than Punishment" (*Discourses* 260, III.19); with Mansfield's comment: "We note that both indulgence and punishment are said to be necessary, but the discussion has to proceed from their contrariety" (*Modes* 372).

318 Strauss' argument seems consistent: "Machiavelli introduces the citation with the Latin *ait*: he draws our attention to the fact that he can write Latin; he thus prepares us for his writing some Tacitean Latin. The wording of the citation reminds us of a statement of Tacitus which expresses the opposite opinion to the apocryphal statement that Machiavelli put into Tacitus' mouth. The genuine statement of Tacitus is immediately followed in his work (*Annals* III 55) by a remark which expresses doubt of the moral superiority of the olden times to the present [...]: Machiavelli's treatment of Tacitus as an authority is linked to a reminder of his own criticism of the root of the belief in authority" (325n.).

319 Cf. "The passage quoted in Latin does not occur in Tacitus" (Machiavelli *Discourses* 260n.). "As far as we know, the statement which he cites as a statement of Tacitus in order to 'save' the opinion that it expresses was invented by Machiavelli: so far from bowing to an authority, Machiavelli treats himself as an authority" (Strauss 160; with 325n.). "The Tacitean quotation to which Machiavelli bows appears to have been invented by Machiavelli. Tacitus is quoted [...] in invented Latin. Machiavelli's means of invention is translation" (Mansfield *Modes* 373). It seems needful to place emphasis on the rhetorico-heuristic implications of said terms. On the Tuscan's characteristic lack of respect, see Machiavelli: "non istima persona" (*Mandragola* 7, Prologo); "sanza alcuno rispetto" (*Il Principe* 149, XXI.11; cf. *Discourses* 5, I.Preface); with Strauss (40); Mansfield ("Cuckold" 1); Mayfield (*Artful* 13–14; 88–89; 107n.; 109; 120; 128; 186; 197, 197n.; 77–198 *passim*).

Spelling out the latencies in this “ἐνθύμημα”, Dionysius paraphrases (or puts notions into the minds of) the Thucydidean Athenians (along their lines):

‘If you show us friendship you will make us seem weak in the eyes of others, but if you hate us we shall be thought strong; for we seek to rule our subjects not by the help of their good will but through their fear’. (“Thucydides” 582–583, §39)

Like Dionysius (and without him), Machiavelli could (or rather, would) have arrived at the same notional conclusion from the Thucydidean text—inferring the suitable *sententia* cited, and using it in his *sermocinatio* for Tacitus.³²⁰ When Mansfield emphasizes that “Machiavelli’s means of invention is translation” (*Modes* 373), not only the first, but also the second (expressly) Latinate word will have to be read in rhetorical terms.

In line therewith, a note by the Florentine’s interpreters might indicate that the diverse techniques and phenomena of ventriloquism will (all but) inevitably also affect—or (as here) downright shape—the (various layers of) reception (to say nothing of their articles of faith):

We believe that giving currency to Machiavelli requires us to convey as much as we can of his words, his terms, and his phrasing, because we wish to be sure that we are not putting our words in his mouth, thus putting our ideas in his head. (Mansfield/Tarkov xlix)³²¹

Whereas Machiavellian changes are typically tacit, a scholarly or translational ethos will render the opposite requisite.³²² Yet another variant of the device might wish to make a point of the distortion (likely with no less an ethopoetic intent); this will be the case in the ensuing ‘twisting of words’ as is central to a highly ‘floatational’, frequently quoted (and recycled) Ancient example:

when Aristotle observed that Isocrates succeeded in obtaining a distinguished set of pupils by means of [...] devoting his discourses to empty elegance of style [‘ad inanem

320 Machiavelli would thus not only be reading Tacitus’ text against the grain—but also be putting a notion into the latter’s mouth that might be inferred from the speeches attributed to the Thucydidean Athenians. Rhetoric is an art of latency and effect(uality).

321 Mansfield notes the technique’s ‘virality’: “Machiavelli observes Livy putting words in the mouths of the men he writes about, making them his characters; and Machiavelli could be said with his *Discourses* to have appropriated Livy’s characters for himself and thus to have reformed the Livian matter” (*Modes* 7). Cf. Mayfield (*Artful* 78–79).

322 Generally, see Bonner’s emphatically comparatist (and otherwise, or *de re*, Machiavellian) comment: “the method of recasting an author’s remark in order to bring home a criticism is among the most satisfactory methods of critical exposition” (*Lit. Treatises* 92–93)—express or tacit recontextualization (with concomitant refunctionalization) being another.

sermonis elegantiam’], he himself suddenly altered [‘mutavit repente’] almost the whole of his own system of training, and quoted a line from *Philoctetes* with a slight modification [‘paulo secus’]: the hero in the tragedy said that it was a disgrace for him to keep silent and suffer the barbarians to speak, but Aristotle put it ‘suffer Isocrates to speak’; and consequently he put the whole of his system of philosophy in a polished and brilliant form[.] (Cicero “*De Orat. III*” 110–111, III.xxxv.141; cf. 110n.)³²³

Rhetoric is performed with a view to victory—what is effectual will be thought factual.³²⁴ As regards assessing the “*cui bono*” (Lausberg *Handbuch* 93, §158–159), it will always be decisive, which words are being put into the mouth of whom, at what time, in which setting and whose presence, by which means, as well as on behalf of what or whom (potentially)—a matter of rhetorical *dispositio*; and ventriloquistically discrediting someone is not just a political, but also a literary and philosophical phenomenon.³²⁵

323 Cf. Webster (59). See Blass (*Beredsamkeit II*. 59–63, spec. 60, 60n.): “Jedenfalls ist die feindselige Haltung des Aristoteles gegen Isokrates nicht zu bezweifeln” (*Beredsamkeit II*. 60). While the scholar defends the *rhétor* passim, his passing remark is telling and (incidentally) pertinent: “er”—“Der Vergleich” or “Isokrates” (the reference being ambiguous, Blass will probably mean the former)—“hat seine Wahrheit, wenn man ihn nicht zu sehr ausdeutet” (*Beredsamkeit II*. 188). Sattler stresses: “Aristotle began instruction in rhetoric in competition with the well-established school of Isocrates” (63). Cf. Cicero: “Aristotle [...] under the stimulus of the fame of the rhetorician Isocrates, began like him to teach the young to speak and combine wisdom with eloquence [‘prudenciam cum eloquentia iungere’]”—with “dicere docere” adjoined in the Latin (*Tusc. Disp.* 8–11, I.iv.7). Referring to “Isocrates, ‘that old man eloquent’”, the gloss reads: “With reference to his rivalry with Isocrates [,] Aristotle made, it was said, constant use of the line, αἰσχρὸν σιωπᾶν, Ἰσοκράτην δ’ ἔαν λέγειν” (*Tusc. Disp.* 8n.–9n.). Cf. “Aristotle and Isocrates, each of whom, engrossed in his own profession, undervalued the other [‘contempsit alterum’]” (Cicero *De Officiis* 4–5, I.i.4). “Who was a more violent opponent of Isocrates [sc. than Aristotle]” (“Orator” 451, li.172). Quintilian gives this version: “Isocrates’ pupils distinguished themselves in every branch of study, and when he was an old man (and he lived to be 98), Aristotle began teaching rhetoric in afternoon lectures, often parodying (we are told [‘ut traditur’]) the well-known line [‘versu (...) frequenter usus’] in the *Philoctetes*: [‘]Shame to keep quiet, and let Isocrates speak [‘turpe esse tacere et Isocraten pati dicere’]” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 14–15, 3.1.14; cf. 14n.). D. Laetius cites the same verse, but inserts “Xenocrates” instead (*Lives I*. 447, V.3; see the gloss at 446n.). Generally, Dionysius notes that “Aristotle [...] is trying to besmirch Isocrates” (“Isocrates” 157, §18).

324 See the n. in subch. 4.1; with Plato (*Laws VII–XII*. 470–471, 937E, XI; cf. 937E–938A); Hobbes (*Man and Citizen* 231, X.11); Bakhtin (*Speech* 152); Mayfield (“Interplay” 18n.–19n.).

325 To say nothing of statements such as “The devil speaks in him” (Shakespeare *Tempest* 271, 5.1.129). Even so, an epideictic functionalization (with a different tendency) is also conceivable; in this respect, see the assorted words put into Lichtenberg’s mouth by Blumenberg as an *hommage* (“*Wie geht’s*” 21–23). In certain cases, placing ostensibly unsuitable, *prima facie* inadvisable, otherwise self-evidently detrimental words into someone’s mouth—on whose

One may here tie in with the focus of section 2.1, and note that the polyphony constitutive of dialogs allows much leeway in the textual economy of *sermocinationes*.³²⁶ It will be no accident that Plato perfected this particular art of discourse—seeing that *dialogismós* is also a delegative device, enabling the

behalf one may be speaking (including one's own)—may yield an ultimately utile effect, prove advantageous in the final analysis: “Que es arte ir contra el arte quando no se puede de otro modo conseguir la dicha del salir bien” (Gracián *Oráculo manual* 138, §66; cf. Mayfield *Artful* 217). Pace Devries' otherwise commonsensical remark—that “the object of comedy is to lay bare a man's weaknesses and eccentricities, of rhetoric, to explain away his weaknesses and bring out his good points” (17)—one will therefore have to maintain that (not only forensic) expediency will sometimes dictate using someone's (including the speaker's) apparent or contrived limitations express- and purposively, spec. with a view to another (secondary, tertiary, etc.) interest. See Kennedy: “In general, character portrayal is effected by what the speaker is made to say, often by the seemingly unconscious revelation of some weakness of character” (*New History* 66). The Lysian *corpus* offers several such examples; cf. e.g. “[t]he defendant [...] consistently claims to speak the ‘whole’ truth [...], although it may reflect badly upon his character and position” (Bakker “Lysias” 419; with 419n.)—for “[o]penness, manifested explicitly in a readiness to reveal things which one might be expected to conceal, [...] helps to establish trust” (Carey “Rhet. means” 37). In another case: “The account at this point takes quietism almost to the point of cowardice [...]. The advantage for characterization [...] was evidently felt to outweigh the disadvantage that some [...] of the jurors might take exception to his lack of spirit” (Carey “Comment.” 99). Generally, cf. Niehues-Pröbsting: “Der spezifische Aspekt, unter dem die Rhetorik das Ethos thematisiert, ist ihr leitender Gesichtspunkt überhaupt, das Überzeugungspotenzial” (“Ethos” 341); he notes “rhetoric's primary orientation toward impact [‘Wirkung’]” (“Ethos” 351; trans. dsm). As always in the art *par excellence*, the yardstick will be effectuality—above and before all else.

326 Cf. Sloane: “humanist prose is [...] always many voiced” (“Education” 175). For Galilei's writings in this genre, several analyses on Blumenberg's part demonstrate a functional process of dialogic distribution (rhetorical *dispositio*); in one case, the censor(s) had demanded that a certain formula be inserted—and the writer puts it into the mouth of the protagonist who does not prevail: “Anstoß sollte erregen, daß Galilei diese ärgerliche Formel dem Simplicio in den Mund legt, also der Figur des Dialoges, die am Ende Verlierer ist” (*Legitimität* 461). “Galileis raffinierte Dialektik besteht nun darin, daß er der konservativen Figur des Scholastikers in seinem Dialog, dem Simplicio, die Äußerung in den Mund legt, die der Argumentation ihre Wendung gibt” (*Legitimität* 459); cf. “daß er den so folgenreichen Einwand am Schluß dem Simplicio in den Mund legt” (“Fernrohr” 64). With regard to Valla's “*De vero bono*”, Struever notes the (potentially) conative function of *prosopopoiiai*: “what, precisely, did he intend his readers to do with the *personae*, which he insists over and over again are the *factae personae*, of Stoic and Epicurean? Within and without this dialogue, his reader is the recipient of subtle and not so subtle tactics of subversion: [...] the Epicurean *persona*, in particular, seems inadequately undermined [...]. His apologetic strategy [...] may actually [...] make easier [...] the reader's [...] coming to terms with the radical doctrine he has the Epicurean espouse. Valla uses disjunction heuristically: [...] ‘dum pro Epicureis loquor, Stoicum agere’. The counterfactual *personae* confront the reader's expectations” (201–202).

distribution of otherwise (self-)contradictory statements, the (virtual) enactment of argument *in utramque partem*.³²⁷ Most importantly, it conduces to an effectual practice of *parresía* in permitting one's saying anything one cannot—or does not wish to—say in one's own name (or language) even so: “je fais dire aux autres ce que je ne puis si bien dire” (Montaigne *Essais II*. 119, II.x).³²⁸

327 As Montaigne notes, matters of *tractatio* are also relevant: “Platon me semble avoir aimé cette forme de philosopher par dialogues à escient pour loger plus décement en diverses bouches la diversité et variation de ses propres fantaisies. Diversement traiter les matières est aussi bien les traiter que conformément, et mieux: à savoir plus copieusement et utilement” (*Essais II*. 263, II.xii; cf. Stierle “Gespräch” 313). For argument ‘also on the other sides’, see Mayfield (“Otherwise” *passim*); and subch. 5.1. Cf. this ventriloquistic variant in Emporius: “There is a third kind of *ethopoeia* [‘Tertium genus est ethopoeiae’], which is introduced only on account of the thing to be done [‘quod rei gerendae causa tantum inducitur’]; [...] this approach is called the attorney’s [‘quae materies p r a g m a t i c a nominatur’]”; the gloss adds: “Emporius means [...] creating an imaginary agent for a desired action” (“Ethopoeia” 35; 35n.; “de ethopoeia” 562). “It is brought in once in a great while so that a certain attitude will not appear at all or will appear very vaguely [‘Raro tamen ita ponitur, ut non vel leviter aliquis illic adfectus operetur’]” (“Ethopoeia” 35; “de ethopoeia” 562); his sample implies a mode of indirection (qua function of said device), whereby one artfully shifts accountability or deflects attention to another (hence away from the resp. speaker). As to the device of delegating the responsibility (or shifting the blame) for any, all rhetorical effects (impressions, convictions, having been influenced, etc.) to the recipient, see Nicolaus’ distinction (in Kennedy’s formulation): “[t]he goal of rhetoric is not to persuade, but to speak persuasively” (*New History* 207); its “end is not to persuade in every case, but to speak persuasively in accord with what is available” (Nicolaus 132, §1.3). See Mayfield on delegation in an affine sense (“Talking Canines” 13n.; 22n.), spec. as to Nolting-Hauff’s remark concerning Cervantes (cf. 194).

328 “I make others say what I cannot say so well” (Montaigne *Essays* 296, II.10); the context being his (decidedly polyglot) citational praxis, the economical intercalation of choice quotes—qua indicative of *prohairesis* (in an affine context: “Je l’ai fait à escient”, *Essais III*. 388, III.xii). Any immediate appearances notwithstanding, the aforesaid will not refer to *elocutio* only. Cf. the motto for subch. 5.1. On a (narrative) variant of delegative *allocutio* in Sidney, see Altman (91). Formulations such as the ensuing will seem to scent of *sermocinatio* to anyone versed in rhetorical ventriloquism—including (‘intentionally’, to be sure) the arch-hermeneutician: “A liberal theologian once said within my hearing that” (Strauss 50); especially since the ensuing is found in the immediate vicinity: “Some might say in defense of Machiavelli that” etc. (50). Formally speaking, the latter may yield the impression of functioning like Machiavelli’s “*ait*” (*Opere* 228, III.xix; with Strauss 325n.). As to reapplications of said vicarious procedure in terms of (diachronic) *hypolépseis* of *sermocinationes*, Montaigne’s case will be indicative. Regarding ‘oratorical procedures’ associated with the genre of the “apology” in the Early Modern essayist, Teuber refers to “sermocinationes, which are put into the mouth of certain persons or [...] personifications” (114; trans. dsm; see 114–126); in particular, he logs: “Montaigne legt ihm [sc. ‘Socrates’] in enger Anlehnung an Platon eine entsprechende sermocinatio in den Mund” (124; with Montaigne *Essais III*. 385–387, III.xii; “fait [...] parler Socrate”, 570n.)—and “identifiziert

The metapoetically decisive tool is also employed intra-dramatically (a *mise en scène ou abyme du dispositif*).³²⁹ Like a Platonic Socrates (with both seeming to be in love with *sermocinatio* more than with the *lógos* itself), the Duke in Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure* is (seen and heard in the act of) putting words into the mouth of his interlocutor: "Now (pious Sir) / You will demand of me, why I do this" (*Measure* 43, TLN306–307, I.iii); the theatrical audience is (evidently and audibly) being addressed, as well—and likely supposed to react with the (intradramatic) Friar's "Gladly, my Lord" (*Measure* 43, TLN308, I.iii).

Even so, said Duke is not 'safe' from the device he delights in—which incidentally demonstrates the *rhetorikè téchnē*'s generally supra-personal, instrumental, multipurpose status and use.³³⁰ In the last act, a flippant Lucio shiftily reattributes previous, defamatory remarks on his own part: "do you remember what you said of the *Duke*. [...] And was the *Duke* a flesh-monger, a foole, and a coward, as you then reported him to be?" (*Measure* 259, TLN2711–2712, 2714–2716, 5.1); to which the ruler replies: "You must (Sir) change persons with me, ere you / make that my report: you indeede spoke so of him, and much more, much worse" (*Measure* 259, 2717–2719, 5.1). By placing his own words into the Duke's mouth, the slanderer Lucio replaces himself (so to say).³³¹

sich mit der Rede des Socrates, als wäre es seine [...] Socrates ist offensichtlich eine weitere persona des Essayisten" (Teuber 125; cf. Cave *Cornucopian* 308; with 302–312; McGowan 150–162; Mack *Reading* 28; 30; 66). Teuber's context is (highly) problematic—given his tendency toward substantialism, a (concomitant) relegation of rhetoric (incompatible with his own take).

329 On the latter, see the above n. in this section; as well as subchs. 2.1 and 3.1, herein.

330 Regarding the reasons for his (supposed) absence, the Duke uses a form of ventriloquistic relay (that is sure) to disseminate (any mis)information in a self-plausibilizing manner: "And he [sc. Angelo] supposes me trauaild to *Poland*, / (For so I haue strewd it in the common eare) / And so it is receiu'd" (Shakespeare *Measure* 43, TLN304–306, 1.3); in effect, the ruler (indirectly) delegates the *vulgus* to act in his stead and interest. His surrogate also has recourse to the conglomerate of techniques in question, particularly *prosopopoiía*; this intradramatic choice not only 'characterizes' him in ethopoetic terms, but is also rather apt from a metapoetical perspective—considering his vicariously enacting the ruler's part and official role; in more than one sense, the Deputy's 'persona' is 'made' by the Duke (so to say). See the following lines on Angelo's part, all of which personify 'Lex'—to various degrees and contextually differing functions (the latter often with a view to an ostensible legitimization, or the efficient delegation of responsibility): "We must not make a scar-crow of the Law" (*Measure* 57, TLN451, 2.1). "It is the Law, not I, condemne your brother" (*Measure* 85, TLN833, 2.2). "The Law hath not bin dead, thogh it hath slept" (*Measure* 86, TLN845, 2.2). "You seem'd of late to make the Law a tirant" (*Measure* 116, TLN1123, 2.4). In the ensuing, Angelo expressly styles himself a mouthpiece: "I (now the voyce of the recorded Law)" (*Measure* 110, TLN1067, 2.4).

331 Said intratextual *hypólepsis* (see *Measure* 168–171, TLN1604–1654; 172–173, TLN1666–1673, 3.2) entails Lucio's expressly asking the (cucullate) Duke to "say that I said so" (*Measure*

Ultimately, the multilayered versatility and performative polytropism generally characteristic of rhetorical devices will probably all but inevitably lead to their being staged.³³² Playfully and incisively performing its characteristically artful vicariousness in the meta-rhetorical play *Words made visible*, Shaw's personified *Sermocination* may therefore have the last word:

Sermo. I am that Figure, Sir, by whom men recite the words of another in their difcourse. I am that Author of that ingenious Art of *Quotation*, whereby men may fpeak as much *Herefie*, *Blafphemy*, *Treafon*, as they will, and yet not be guilty of any thefe. The Author of that pleafant Divertifement of *Tale-bearing*, *Detraction*, *Mifpriffion* and *Mifrepresentation*: the Author of that profitable Trade of *revealing fecrets* and *betraying Counfels*. I have taught the *Teachers* themfelves to fteal a whole Goofe, feathers and all; and yet this is not felony but a large Quotation; and fo that paffes for *Sermonizing*, which is nothing but *Sermocination*. [...] more men live and act *Sermocination* than fpeak it; *feeing* with other mens eyes, *acting* by other mens policy, and *flaunting* with other mens wit and money. (170)³³³

172–173, TLN1669–1670, 3.2); in other words: the slanderer himself delegates the fake friar to act as his mouthpiece. Lucio is generally depicted as a gossipmonger (ethopoetically): “They say”, “Some report [...] Some” etc. (*Measure* 167, TLN1591 and 1596, 3.2).

332 Neologisms may be conceived of as a way for putting words into a (personified) tradition's mouth: “Puttenham's Englishings invite the reader to imagine a persona actually uttering the figure to another in some sort of localized social context. Thus, *ironia* becomes ‘the Dry Mock’ and *sarcasmus* ‘the Bitter Taunt’ [...]. Puttenham's use of personified renamings [...] connects language and behavior in the social world [...] he transforms the vast majority of the tropes and schemes into *characters* [...]. Sometimes the personifications seem to identify actual social types [...]. If the Renaissance conceived of human beings as actors who perform not one but a host of different roles in the social world, Puttenham's Englishings of the figures of speech transform them into all the varied ‘figures’—that is, all the varied masks or personas or selves—that human beings might assume on the great stage of the world. Since the figures suggest that social interaction is always a matter of ‘counterfeiting’ one role or another, Puttenham's personifications [...] turn life into a continual allegory” (Wigham/Rebhorn 59). Such would conduce to, if not call for, dramatic enactments (such as Shaw's ensuing piece).

333 In this witty, parrhesiastic, and highly political school play on Shaw's part, the *persona* of *Sermocination* is preceded by *Apofopefis* (168–169; with reference to the Jesuits, 168); and followed by *Profopope* (170–171), *Sarcafsm* (172–176). The former gives the ensuing exposition of itself—featuring another anti-Catholic invective, here by way of paronomastic punning on the Early Modern English spelling of *prosopopoiia*: “I am that *Figure*, Sir, whereby men act fome other perfon living or dead. I need not take much pains to difcover to you, what fucces my pains have had. The very laft fyllable in my name is greater than all the names of the Monarchs upon Earth; and I have given him the power to be fo, by teaching him to act the perfon of one that died fixteen hundred years ago. I raife the dead as familiarly as any *Conjurer*: I make the vileft *Ufurper* upon earth to pafs for a *Reformer*, the falleft *Traytors* to be efteem'd as faithful

6 Concluding Synopsis (With a Brief Coda on Concealing the Art)

More matter with less art.
Shakespeare (*Hamlet* 241, II.ii.95)

I perceive that even plainness it self is *Figurative*.
Shaw (139)³³⁴

By effecting verisimilitude, plausibility, immediate evidence, the various ventriloquistic techniques detailed in part 5 at once accommodate and potentially manipulate texts, (historical) *personae* and *éthe*, as well as the respective recipients (readership, audience). The present conclusion provides a précis of parts 1 through 5, and offers a short coda on ‘entechnic’ artlessness.

In Augustine’s *Confessions* (section 1), several variants of rhetorical ventriloquism occur in a dense and decisive context: a Chastity personified and envisioned as speaking (*prosopopoïia*) is succeeded by (ethopoetic) words put into the mouth of the writer’s former self—which device prepares the crucial *sermocinatio*, the words attributed to children that everyone knows.

Also tendering a note on the method employed in the present study (2.2), the second heuristic part commences by outlining various ways in which rhetorical ventriloquism might obtain in dialogic genres (*sensu lato*). The Erasmian “Ciceronianus” features personified Humanist neologisms endowed with speech (*prosopopoïia*); regarding one of the protagonists (‘Nosoponus’), one might add that elements of *notatio* (his excessive Ciceronianism qua characteristic trait) seem to be playing a role, as well. Plato’s “Gorgias” presents

Counfellors, a meer *Afs* to pafs for a *Lion*, and a *Carrion Crow* for a *Peacock*; and all this without any change of natures at all” (171); when asked whether its name not rather be “*Hypocrifie*”, *Profopope* replies with an accentuation of pervasive representative action and life by proxy in human affairs that is similar to *Sermocination*’s aforesaid statement, thereby linking the two figures via the vicarious: “Men call me fo fometimes, Sir, but alafs that name is too narrow for my nature. For in one word, all men act over again the lives of other men, and whatever is done in the World is done by *Profopope*” (171). For an analysis of this school play staging and enacting rhetorical figures as such, see Vickers (“Reflections” 92–98); on *prosopopoïia* in Shaw, cf. Vickers (“Reflections” 94); Christiansen (332). For an earlier, *de re* comparable play, see Burger on Reuchlin’s “*Scenica Progymnasmata: Hoc est: Ludicra preexercitamenta*”, “1497 [...] von Heidelberger Studenten aufgeführt”, and trans. by “Hans Sachs” in “1530/31” as “*Henno*”: “Reuchlin will [...] rhetorische Übungen auf szenische, [...] schauspielmäßige Weise in einem *Ludus* durchführen” (Burger *Renaissance* 277; cf. 278–279).

334 Cf. Christiansen (329).

two notorious *personae* (*inter alia*)—primarily by endowing them with likely speech acts (*allocutiones*) as per their familiar, hence likely bearing textually represented (drawing on previous, and conducing to further, *ethopoïiai*). From an equally metapoetical perspective, Cicero’s all but generic interlocutors “A.” and “M.” seem similarly disposed with a view to stressing the attributed words themselves (*sermocinatio*), while the Tacitean “Dialogus” might be seen to evince an especially dynamic ethopoietic agenda. Shakespeare’s “Lucrece” attributes (longer) speeches to (in)famous *personae* of Roman mytho- and historiography in a narrative framework—with the latter additionally accentuating that forms of ventriloquism are taking place. In the Cervantine “coloquio de los perros”, the extratextual reader faces a *prosopopoïia*—animals otherwise not deemed capable of (a distinctively) human (kind of) speech being (re)presented as talking—while the intratextual author claims to (simply) be recording all but verbatim the words actually spoken by dogs.

Subchapter 3.1 describes the concepts, and implications of, ‘*effictio*’ (‘*charakterismós*’), ‘*notatio*’ (‘*ethopoïia*’), ‘*sermocinatio*’ (‘*dialogismós*’), and ‘*conformatio*’ (‘*prosopopoïia*’) in the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium*; segment 3.2 indicates the use of the terms ‘*prosopopoeia*’ (seen to comprise ‘*sermocinatio*’) and ‘*imitatio*’ (quasi ‘*effictio*’, here deviatingly called ‘*ethopoeia*’) in Quintilian (see the more detailed taxonomic synopsis in 3.4). Subchapter 3.3 deals with the affine, rhetorico-dramatic concept of *prósopa* (*personae*) and the correlative notion of *ethos*—with due regard to the respective cultural contexts.

As to variants of rhetorical selfcraft (part 4 overall), subchapter 4.1 tenders a close reading of pertinent segments in the Dionysian treatise “Lysias”, which articulates the particular nexus between ‘*enárgeia*’ (‘*evidentia*’), ‘*ethopoïia*’, and ‘*tò prépon*’ (the *aptum*)—thus taking up, applying, and elaborating on aspects entailed or prepared in part 3; crafting a concentrated description of the respective *rhétor*’s notable capacities, Dionysius at once elucidates, and textually performs, the very quality the tract attributes to its protagonist, the *persona* of ‘Lysias’ and its (received) *ethos*. Applying the concept of ‘*personae*’ as advanced in 3.3, segment 4.2 reads frontmatter in Shakespeare’s and Cervantes’ name with a view to an oratorico-dramatic approach to authorship.

Tying in with the heuristic method of parts 1, 2, and the conceptual groundwork laid in 3, the fifth offers additional, comparatist applications of the various forms of rhetorical ventriloquism. Via emphatically diachronic and transgeneric examples, said overall chapter focuses on the nexus of *dispositio* and *sermocinatio*—accentuating both the choice of words to be attributed, and their situative arrange- and placement in the mouth of particular *personae* (with selection and textual location pertaining to rhetorical economy). The conclusion

of part 5 highlights the particular artfulness required for—and articulating itself in—the various forms of ‘effectually putting plausible words into someone’s mouth’; said emphasis transitions to a brief coda on concealing the same.³³⁵

335 On ‘*celare artem*’ qua rhetorical premise and subtending value, see Heraclitus: ‘*harmonie aphanès phaneres kreitton*’; “Unsichtbare Fügung ist stärker als sichtbare” (Kranz *Vorsokratiker I.* 162, 22B54). Blass has: “das scheinbar Gelöste ist in Wirklichkeit dennoch gebunden” (*Beredsamkeit I.* 419). Cf. Aristotle “Wherefore those who practise this artifice [sc. ‘giving their language a *xénon* (approx. unfamiliar, distinctive, *verfremdet*) air] must conceal [‘*lanthánein*’] it and avoid the appearance of speaking artificially instead of naturally; for that which is natural persuades [‘*pithanón*’], but the artificial does not. For men become suspicious of one whom they think to be laying a trap for them [...]. Art is cleverly concealed when the speaker chooses his words from ordinary language and puts them together like Euripides, who was the first to show the way” (*Rhetoric* 350–353, III.ii.3–5, 1404b); “if a speaker manages well, there will be something ‘foreign’ [‘*xenikòn*’] about his speech, while possibly the art may not be detected [‘*lanthánein*’], and his meaning will be clear [‘*sapheniei*’, sc. ‘have perspicuity’]. And this [...] is the chief merit of rhetorical language [‘*tou rhetorikou lógou areté*’]” (*Rhetoric* 352–355, III.ii.6, 1405a). Cf. “it is [...] in speaking, that the orator’s skill conceals his art, so that it may not obtrude and be apparent to all [‘*ne possit ars eminere et ab omnibus videri, facultate oratoris occultatur*’]” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 250–251, IV.vii.10; with: “*ne ars appareat*”); for such would “instil[!][...] in the hearer the suspicion of premeditation and artifice, and this robs the speech of conviction [‘*fidem*’]” (*Rhet. ad Her.* 30–31, I.x.17). Caplan’s expedient and copious gloss *ad locum* (cf. *Rhet. ad Her.* 250n.–251n.) signals further textual locations of the ‘*celare artem*’ directive—*inter alia* in Aristotle, Dionysius, Longinus, Quintilian (as also cited herein). See the latter’s encomium of apparent effortlessness: “*et perire artem putamus nisi appareat, cum desinat ars esse si appareat*”; “and we think our art is wasted unless it can be seen, when the truth is that it ceases to be art once it is detected” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 280–281, 4.2.127). The rhetorical gauge will always be ‘effectuality above all’. Cf. the orator’s applications: “The best [‘*Optimae*’] preparatory remarks will be those which go unnoticed [‘*quae latuerint*’]. [...] Most effective of all is [‘*plurimum tamen facit*’] this clever pretence [‘*callidissima (...)* imitatio’] of simple candour [‘*simplicitatis*’] [...]. The most eloquent of orators [‘*vir eloquentissimus*’] achieves his end [‘*consecutus est*’] [...] by his common, everyday language and well concealed art [‘*et arte occulta*’]” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 246–249, 4.2.57–58); “expressions [...], in set commonplaces [‘*in locis*’], can be borne along with the tide and pass unnoticed [‘*latent*’] because of the richness [‘*copia*’] of their stylistic environment” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 276–277, 4.2.117); “*compositio dissimulata*” (*Inst. Orat.* 3–5. 276, 4.2.117). Quintilian spec. accentuates *dispositio*: “*si quae sunt artes altiores, plerumque occultantur ut artes sint*” (*Inst. Orat.* 6–8. 340, 8.3.2; with Eden “*Later Works*” 93, 93n.; *Rhet. Tradition* 42n.). This pertains to latency literally: “*Est emphasis [...]* cum ex aliquo dicto latens aliquid eruitur” (Quintilian *Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 72, 9.2.64)—qualified as “*aliud latens et auditori quasi inveniendum*” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 72, 9.2.65), hence as engaging the audience in a notionally collaborative manner. Regarding the use of figures: “*Sed ne si optimae quidem sint esse debent frequentes. Nam densitate ipsa figurae aperiuntur*” (*Inst. Orat.* 9–10. 76, 9.2.72). Cf. Ovid: “*Si latet, ars prodest*” (“*Art of Love*” 86, II.313). As a means functional qua remedy for any detrimental blatancy of the art, ‘Longinus’ counsels fighting ‘fireworks’ with the same by adducing awe-inspiring ornateness

The textual dynamics effected by various forms of rhetorical ventriloquism are specifically visible in cases where source texts (be they historiographical, literary, philosophical, or otherwise) are available for contrastive purposes. Often, such references will not (or no longer) be extant—and what may well have been a *sermocinatio* might not be discerned as such.³³⁶ With a view to manipulating an audience or readership, these contingencies achieve the most

and the induction of striking emotions for purposes of overpowering the recipient's *ratio*: "There is an inevitable suspicion attaching to the sophisticated use of figures ['schemáton']. It gives a suggestion of treachery, craft, fallacy [...] So we find that a figure ['schema'] is always most effective when it conceals the very fact of its being a figure. Sublimity ['hýpsos'] and emotional intensity ['páthos'] are a wonderfully helpful antidote against the suspicion that accompanies the use of figures. The artfulness of the trick is no longer obvious in its brilliant setting of beauty and grandeur, and thus avoids all suspicion. [...] Much in the same way that dimmer lights vanish in the surrounding radiance of the sun, so an all-embracing atmosphere of grandeur obscures the rhetorical devices" (230–231, 17.1–2). This is directed against excess: "For art ['téchne'] is only perfect when it looks like nature ['phýsis'] and Nature succeeds only when she conceals latent art" (240–241, 22.1)—while "[t]o have bells hung all over you is the mark of a sophist" (247, 23.4). As to '*celare artem*', see Trimpi on "Plotinus" reaccentuation thereof with regard to "consciousness itself, which becomes more effective the less we are aware of it. 'Conscious awareness, in fact, is likely to enfeeble the very activities of which there is consciousness [...]' (1.4.10)" (*Muses* 192n.). For Early Modern restatements, see Erasmus (here put into the mouth of Bulephorus): "docuit Cicero caput artis esse dissimulare artem" ("Ciceronianus" 86); as well as Castiglione (*Courtier* 32, I.26; *Cortegiano* 59, I.xxvi), as cited in subch. 4.2, above. On Montaigne's concealing the art, see Sayce: "underneath" an "impression of spontaneity [...] there is abundant evidence of rhetorical patterns and devices, of cunning echoes and modulated cadences" (312). "Supreme art consists in concealing art" (Knop 403; cf. 412–414). In Shakespeare's "Lucrece", the following line provides a *mise en abyme* of the rhetorical device and directive: "In him [sc. Sinon] the painter laboured with his skill / To hide deceit" ("Lucrece" 357, v.1506–1507). See the gloss *ad locum*: "Sinon is the type of *deceit*, but the painter is also hiding his own art, as in the Latin tag '*Ars est celare artem*' ('It is art to hide art')" ("Lucrece" 357n.). Gracián states: "Toda arte se ha de encubrir" (*Oráculo manual* 127, §45). Generally, see Oesterreich ("Person" 864; problematically, *Fundamentalrhet.* 138); Marschall (522); Asmuth ("Angemessenheit" 585); Mayfield ("Interplay" 6n.). The process and effect of *celare artem* has a pragmatic function: "Irrepimus tacite in rem, vel *recta*, quum altius repetitis principiis, prius quàm sentiat auditor quorsum evasurus sis, subruisti fundamenta rei contrariæ, et stabilivisti tuæ" (Vives 190, Aa3.v, II.xvi).

336 Generally, see Strauss, referring to "Machiavelli[s] indicat[ing] how easily the [...] origin of utterances can be forgotten" (147). Bakhtin notes "[t]he process of gradual obliteration of in authors as bearers of others' words"; the latter "become anonymous and are assimilated (in reworked form, of course)", hence "enter[...] into a new dialogue (with the [...] voices of others)", wherein "others' words, [...] voices that have become anonymous" are (again) "personifie[d]"; even so, "the *authoritative word* [...] usually does not lose its bearer, does not become anonymous" (*Speech* 163; "Methodology" 67).

expedient forms of the respective technique, seeing that they ‘accidentally’ consummate the rhetorical *desideratum par excellence*—to be deploying a particular device (and the overall *ars*) so effectually that its use goes unnoticed:

For this artlessness is itself the product of art [‘pepoíetai gàr auto touto tò apoíeton’]: [...] it is in the very illusion of not having been composed with masterly skill that the mastery lies [‘en auto to mè dokein deinos kateskeuásthai tò deinòn échei’]. (Dionysius “Lysias” 34–35, §8)³³⁷

337 See Dionysius’ artful (re)statement of the formula with respect to Lysias: the “ἡρακτῆρ” of his “composition seems [‘dokei’] [...] not to be contrived [‘apoiétós’] or formed by any conscious art [‘atechníteutos’]”, so that “every layman” and “many [...] scholars [‘ton philológon’] [...] not specialised in oratory” are likely to “receive the impression that this arrangement has not been deliberately and artistically devised [‘ou katà téchnen’], but is somehow spontaneous [‘automátos’] and fortuitous [‘étyche’]. Yet it is more carefully composed than any work of art [‘érgou technikou’]. For this artlessness is itself the product of art: [...] it is in the very illusion of not having been composed with masterly skill that the mastery lies” (“Lysias” 34–35, §8; see the priming sequence: 26–27, §3). Cf. Bruss (50–51), stating: “Lysias is a master of the art of artlessness” (51; with 56). Usher: “his apparent artlessness conceals art” (“Lysias. Intro.” 17). Roberts: “the best art is that which best conceals itself” (47)—precisely because, as “Dionysius more than once reminds us [...] the excellence of the ancient authors was the result of [...] elaborate art”; he notes “the infinite pains bestowed”, that “the labour is severe” (46); and Roberts says as much of the Ancient critic himself (47–48). This pertains spec. to rhetorical *dispositio* (cf. subch. 5.1). Ultimately, the process and technique of *celare artem* also implies that art is discerned by the same, hence by those practicing it; see Quintilian’s reference to “the speaker’s plan and hidden artifice [‘occulta calliditas’]”—stressing that “in this business the only art is that which can only be seen by an artist [‘namque ea sola in hoc ars est, quae intellegi nisi ab artifice non possit’]” (*Inst. Orat.* 1–2. 302–303, 2.5.7–8; with 302n.). Cf. “Nam si qua in his [sc. delivery, facial expressions, gestures, here] ars est dicentium, ea prima est ne ars esse videatur” (*Inst. Orat.* 1–2. 238, 1.11.3). Likewise Blumenberg, on the overall *téchne*: “Rhetoric teaches to discern rhetoric” (“Annäherung” 423; trans. dsm). “Gegen Rhetorik hilft nur Rhetorik” (Niehues-Pröbsting “Ethos” 345).

Bibliography

Primary Literature

- “ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗ ΠΡΟΣ ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΝ / Rhetorica ad Alexandrum / [ps.-]Aristotle’s Rhetoric to Alexander”. Trans. H. Rackham. *Problems II. Books XXII–XXXVIII. Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*. 1937. Eds. W. S. Hett, and H. Rackham. Vol. XVI. *Loeb Classical Library*. 317. Ed. G. P. Goold. Cambridge, MA / London, UK: Harvard UP / Heinemann, 1983. 257–449. Print.
- “ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΦΥΣΙΚΑ ΠΡΟΒΛΗΜΑΤΑ ΚΑΤ’ ΕΙΔΟΣ ΣΥΝΑΓΩΓΗΣ / [ps.-]Aristotle’s Physical Problems II. Books XXII–XXXVIII”. Trans. W. S. Hett. *Problems II. Books XXII–XXXVIII. Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*. 1937. Eds. W. S. Hett, and H. Rackham. Vol. XVI. *Loeb Classical Library*. 317. Ed. G. P. Goold. Cambridge, MA / London, UK: Harvard UP / Heinemann, 1983. 1–255. Print.
- Aelius Theon. “The Exercises of Aelius Theon”. Ed. and trans. by George A. Kennedy. *Progymnasmata. Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric. Writings from the Greco-Roman World*. 10. Eds. John T. Fitzgerald, and Donald A. Russell. Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003. 1–72. Print.
- . “XII. ΘΕΩΝΟΣ ΠΡΟΓΥΜΝΑΣΜΑΤΑ [progymnasmata]”. *Rhetores Graeci*. Ed. Leonhard Spengel. Vol. II. Leipzig: Teubner, 1854. 57–130. Print.
- Alberic of Monte Cassino. “Flowers of Rhetoric”. Trans. Joseph M. Miller. *Readings in Medieval Rhetoric*. Eds. Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson. Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1973. 131–161. Print.
- Alcuin of York (Flaccus Albinus Alcuinus). “Albini (vulgo Alcuini) dialogus de rhetorica (Disputatio de rhetorica et de virtutibus sapientissimi regis Karli et Albini magistri)”. *Rhetores Latini Minores. Ex codibus maximam partem primum adhibitis*. Ed. Karl [Carolus] Halm. Leipzig: Teubner, 1863. 523–550. Print.
- Aphthonius. “The Preliminary Exercises of Aphthonius the Sophist”. Ed. and trans. by George A. Kennedy. *Progymnasmata. Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric. Writings from the Greco-Roman World*. 10. Eds. John T. Fitzgerald, and Donald A. Russell. Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003. 89–127. Print.
- . “XI. ΑΦΘΟΝΙΟΥ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΟΥ ΠΡΟΓΥΜΝΑΣΜΑΤΑ [progymnasmata]”. *Rhetores Graeci*. Ed. Leonhard Spengel. Vol. II. Leipzig: Teubner, 1854. 19–56. Print.
- Aquila Romanus. “Aquilae Romani de figuris sententiarum et elocutionis liber”. *Rhetores Latini Minores. Ex codibus maximam partem primum adhibitis*. Ed. Karl [Carolus] Halm. Leipzig: Teubner, 1863. 22–37. Print.
- Aristides, Aelius. “ΠΡΟΣ ΠΛΑΤΩΝΑ ΥΠΕΡ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ / Oration 2. A Reply to Plato: In Defense of Oratory”. Ed. and trans. by Michael Trapp. *Orations 1–2*. Vol. I. *Loeb Classical Library*. 533. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA / London, UK: Harvard UP, 2017. 325–659. Print.
- Aristophanes. “ΝΕΦΕΛΑΙ / Clouds”. Ed. and trans. by Jeffrey Henderson. *Clouds. Wasps. Peace*. Vol. II. *Loeb Classical Library*. 488. Ed. G. P. Goold. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1998. 1–211. Print.
- Aristotle. *ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ / Politics*. 1932. Ed. and trans. by H. Rackham. *Loeb Classical Library*. 264. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. XXI. XXIII Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1944. Print.
- . *ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ / The ‘Art’ of Rhetoric*. 1926. Ed. and trans. by John Henry

- Freese. *Loeb Classical Library*. 193. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. XXII. XXIII Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2006. Print.
- . *ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΤΩΝ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΑ ΦΥΣΙΚΑ / Metaphysics. Books 1–9*. Ed. and trans. by Hugh Tredennick. *Loeb Classical Library*. 271. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. XVII. XXIII Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1933. Print.
- . *ΗΘΙΚΑ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΑ / Nicomachean Ethics [Ethica ad Nicomachum]*. 1926. Ed. and trans. by H. Rackham. *Loeb Classical Library*. 73. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. XIX. XXIII Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1934. Print.
- . “ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ / Poetics”. Trans. Stephen Halliwell. *Aristotle. Poetics. Longinus. On the Sublime. Demetrius. On Style*. Eds. W. H. Fyfe, Stephen Halliwell, Doreen C. Innes, and Donald Russell. Vol. XXIII. *Loeb Classical Library*. 199. Ed. G. P. Goold. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1995. 27–141. Print.
- Augustine, Aurelius. *Confessiones / Confessions. Books 1–8*. Ed. and trans. by Carolyn J.-B. Hammond. *Loeb Classical Library*. 26. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. I. II Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2014. Print.
- . *de civitate Dei contra paganos / The City of God Against the Pagans. Books I–III*. Trans. George E. McCracken. *Loeb Classical Library*. 411. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. I. VII Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1957. Print.
- Babrius and Phaedrus. *Fables*. Ed. and trans. by Ben Edwin Perry. *Loeb Classical Library*. 436. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1965. Print.
- Bacon, Francis. *The Advancement of Learning*. 1861. Ed. G. W. Kitchin. London, UK: Heron, [1969]. Print.
- . *Neues Organon (Instauratio Magna. Novum Organum: Liber primus et secundus aphorismorum de interpretatione naturae sive de regno hominis)*. Lateinisch – deutsch. 1620 / Latin 1858 (London: Longmans. Eds. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath) / German 1962 (Berlin: Akademie. Ed. Manfred Buhr). Trans. Rudolf Hoffmann, and Gertraud Korf. Ed. Wolfgang Krohn. Subvol. 1 & 2 in One Vol. Darmstadt / Hamburg: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft / Meiner, 1990. Print.
- Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhaïlovich. *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*. 1981. Trans. Caryl Emerson, and Michael Holquist. *Slavic series*. I. Ed. Michael Holquist. Austin, TX: U of Texas P, 2002. Print.
- . *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays. Éstetika slovesnogo tvorcestva*. Trans. Vern W. McGee. Eds. Caryl Emerson, and Michael Holquist. *University of Texas Press Slavic Series*. 8. Ed. Michael Holquist. Austin, TX: U of Texas P, 1986. Print.
- . “Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences”. *Professing the New Rhetorics. A Sourcebook*. Eds. Theresa Enos, and Stuart C. Brown. Boston, MA / Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Blair P / Prentice Hall, 1994. 63–74. Print.
- Barthes, Roland. *S/Z. Tel Quel*. Ed. Philippe Sollers. Paris: Seuil, 1970. Print.
- . *S/Z*. 1970 (Paris: Seuil). Trans. Richard Miller. Ed. Richard Howard. 15th ed. New York, NY: Noonday P, 1988. Print.
- Blumenberg, Hans. “Anthropologische Annäherung an die Aktualität der Rhetorik (1971)”. *Ästhetische und metaphorologische Schriften*. Ed. Anselm Haverkamp. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2001. 406–431. Print.
- . *Arbeit am Mythos*. 1979. 6th ed. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2006. Print.
- . *Ästhetische und metaphorologische Schriften*. Ed. Anselm Haverkamp. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2001. Print.
- . *Begriffe in Geschichten*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1998. Print.

- *Beschreibung des Menschen*. Ed. Manfred Sommer. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2006. Print.
- “Das Fernrohr und die Ohnmacht der Wahrheit”. *Galilei. Sidereus Nuncius. Nachricht von neuen Sternen*. 1965. Ed. Hans Blumenberg. 2nd ed. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2002. 7–75. Print.
- *Der Mann vom Mond. Über Ernst Jünger*. Eds. Alexander Schmitz, and Marcel Lepper. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2007. Print.
- “Der Sturz des Protophilosophen – Zur Komik der reinen Theorie, anhand einer Rezeptionsgeschichte der Thales-Anekdote”. *Das Komische*. Eds. Wolfgang Preisendanz, and Rainer Warning. *Poetik und Hermeneutik*. VII. München: Fink, 1976. 11–64. Print.
- *Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt. Der kopernikanische Komparativ. Die kopernikanische Optik [GKW III]*. 1981. 3rd ed. Vol. III. III Vols. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1996. Print.
- *Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt. Typologie der frühen Wirkungen. Der Stillstand des Himmels und der Fortgang der Zeit [GKW II]*. 1981. 3rd ed. Vol. II. III Vols. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1996. Print.
- *Die Lesbarkeit der Welt*. 1981. 2nd ed. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986. Print.
- *Die Sorge geht über den Fluß*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1987. Print.
- *Die Verführbarkeit des Philosophen*. 2000. Ed. Manfred Sommer. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2005. Print.
- *Die Vollzähligkeit der Sterne*. 1997. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2011. Print.
- *Ein mögliches Selbstverständnis. Aus dem Nachlaß*. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1997. Print.
- “Eine imaginäre Universalbibliothek”. *Akzente* 28.1 (Feb: 1981): 27–40. Print.
- “Einleitung: Das Universum eines Ketzers”. *Bruno. Das Aschermittwochsmahl*. 1969. Ed. Hans Blumenberg. Frankfurt a.M.: Insel, 1981. 9–61. Print.
- “Epochenschwelle und Rezeption”. *Philosophische Rundschau* 6 (1958): 94–120. Print.
- “Glossen zu Fabeln”. *Akzente* 28.4 (Aug: 1981): 340–344. Print.
- *Goethe zum Beispiel*. 1999. Eds. Manfred Sommer, and Hans Blumenberg-Archiv. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014. Print.
- “Grenzfälle”. *Akzente* 33.1 (Feb: 1986): 53–73. Print.
- *Höhlenausgänge*. 1989. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1996. Print.
- *Lebens Themen. Aus dem Nachlaß*. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1998. Print.
- *Lebenszeit und Weltzeit*. 2nd ed. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986. Print.
- *Legitimität der Neuzeit*. 1966. 2nd ed. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1999. Print.
- *Löwen*. 2001. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010. Print.
- *Matthäuspassion*. 1988. 3rd ed. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1991. Print.
- “Momente Goethes”. *Akzente* 29.1 (Feb: 1982): 43–55. Print.
- “Nachdenklichkeit. Dankrede”. *Jahrbuch Deutsche Akademie für Sprache und Dichtung*. 1980.II (Spring: 1981): 57–61. Print.
- *Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie*. 1960. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1998. Print.
- *Phänomenologische Schriften. 1981–1988*. Ed. Nicola Zambon. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2018. Print.
- *Präfiguration. Arbeit am politischen Mythos*. Eds. Angus Nicholls, and Felix Heidenreich. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014. Print.
- *Quellen, Ströme, Eisberge*. Eds. Ulrich von Bülow, and Dorit Krusche. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2012. Print.
- *Schiffbruch mit Zuschauer. Paradigmen einer Daseinsmetapher*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1979. Print.

- *Schriften zur Literatur. 1945–1958*. Eds. Alexander Schmitz, and Bernd Stiegler. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2017. Print.
- *Schriften zur Technik*. Eds. Alexander Schmitz, and Bernd Stiegler. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2015. Print.
- *Theorie der Lebenswelt*. Ed. Manfred Sommer. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010. Print.
- *Theorie der Unbegrifflichkeit*. Ed. Anselm Haverkamp. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2007. Print.
- *Vor allem Fontane. Glossen zu einem Klassiker*. Frankfurt a.M.: Insel, 2002. Print.
- “Wie geht’s, sagte ein Blinder zu einem Lahmen. Wie Sie sehen, antwortete der Lahme”. *Lichtenbergs Funkenflug der Vernunft. Eine Hommage*. Eds. Jörg-Dieter Kogel, Wolfram Schütte, and Harro Zimmermann. Frankfurt a.M. / Leipzig: Insel, 1992. 21–23. Print.
- “Wirklichkeitsbegriff und Möglichkeit des Romans”. *Nachahmung und Illusion. Kolloquium Gießen Juni 1963. Vorlagen und Verhandlungen*. 1964. Ed. Hans Robert Jauß. 2nd ed. *Poetik und Hermeneutik*. I. Eds. Hans Blumenberg, Clemens Heselhaus, Wolfgang Iser, and Hans Robert Jauß. München: Fink, 1983. 9–27. Print.
- *Zu den Sachen und zurück*. 2002. Ed. Manfred Sommer. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2007. Print.
- Boethius. *Philosophiae Consolatio / Trost der Philosophie*. Trans. Ernst Neitzke. Frankfurt a.M.: Insel, 1997. Print.
- Bonciani, Francesco. “Lezione della prosopopea [1578]”. *Trattati di Poetica e Retorica del Cinquecento. Volume Terzo*. Ed. Bernard Weinberg. Vol. III. *Scrittori D’Italia*. 253. Bari: Laterza, 1972. 235–253. Print.
- Borges, Jorge Luis. “Pierre Menard, Author of the *Quixote*”. Ed. and trans. by Andrew Hurley. *Collected Fictions. Penguin Classics*. New York, NY: Penguin, 1998. 88–95. Print.
- Burckhardt, Jacob. *Griechische Kulturgeschichte*. 1957. *Gesammelte Werk*. VII. Vol. III. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1962. Print.
- Calderón de la Barca, Pedro. *El gran teatro del mundo. El gran mercado del mundo*. 1974. Ed. Eugenio Frutos Cotés. *Letras Hispánicas*. 15. 20th ed. Madrid: Cátedra, 2009. Print.
- “Carmen de figuris vel schematibus”. *Rhetores Latini Minores. Ex codibus maximam partem primum adhibitis*. Ed. Karl [Carolus] Halm. Leipzig: Teubner, 1863. 63–70. Print.
- Castiglione, Baldesar. *The Book of the Courtier. An Authoritative Text. Criticism*. 1959. Trans. Charles S. Singleton. Ed. Daniel Javitch. *Norton Critical Edition*. New York, NY: Norton, 2002. Print.
- *Il libro del Cortegiano*. Ed. Walter Barberis. *Biblioteca Einaudi*. 40. Torino: Einaudi, 1998. Print.
- Cervantes, Miguel de. *Don Quijote de la Mancha I*. Ed. John Jay Allen. *Letras Hispánicas*. 100. 29th ed. Madrid: Cátedra, 2010. Print.
- *Don Quijote de la Mancha II*. 1977. Ed. John Jay Allen. *Letras Hispánicas*. 101. 25th ed. Madrid: Cátedra, 2005. Print.
- “El coloquio de los perros”. *Novelas ejemplares II*. 1980. Ed. Harry Sieber. 21st ed. Vol. 2. *Letras Hispánicas*. 106. Madrid: Cátedra, 2002. 297–359. Print.
- *Exemplary Novellas*. Ed. and trans. by Michael Harney. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2016. Print.
- “Novela del casamiento engañoso”. *Novelas ejemplares II*. 1980. Ed. Harry Sieber. 21st ed. Vol. 2. *Letras Hispánicas*. 106. Madrid: Cátedra, 2002. 279–295. Print.
- *Novelas ejemplares I*. 1980. Ed. Harry Sieber. *Letras Hispánicas*. 105. 22nd ed. Vol. 1. 2 Vols. Madrid: Cátedra, 2003. Print.

- Cicero, Marcus Tullius. "Cato Maior De Senectute / On Old Age". Ed. and trans. by William Armistead Falconer. *On Old Age. On Friendship. On Divination (De Senectute. De Amicitia. De Divinatione)*. Vol. XX. *Loeb Classical Library*. 154. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1923. 1–99. Print.
- . *De Officiis / On Duties*. Ed. and trans. by Walter Miller. *Loeb Classical Library*. 30. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. XXI. XXVIII Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1913. Print.
- . "De Oratore / On the Orator. Book III". Ed. and trans. by H. Rackham. *On the Orator (De Oratore), Book III. On Fate. Stoic Paradoxes. Divisions of Oratory*. Vol. IV. *Loeb Classical Library*. 349. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1942. 1–185. Print.
- . *De Oratore / On the Orator. Books I–II*. 1942. Trans. E. W. Sutton, and H. Rackham. Ed. H. Rackham. *Loeb Classical Library*. 348. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. III. XXVIII Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1948. Print.
- . *Letters to Atticus. Volume III*. Ed. and trans. by D. R. Shackleton Bailey. *Loeb Classical Library*. 97. Ed. G. P. Goold. Vol. XXIV. XXVIII Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999. Print.
- . "Orator". Trans. H. M. Hubbell. *Brutus. Orator*. 1939. Eds. G. L. Hendrickson, and H. M. Hubbell. Vol. V. *Loeb Classical Library*. 342. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1962. 295–509. Print.
- . "Topica / Topics". Ed. and trans. by H. M. Hubbell. *De Inventione / On Invention. De Optimo Genere Oratorum / Best Kind of Orator. Topica / Topics*. Vol. II. *Loeb Classical Library*. 386. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1949. 375–459. Print.
- . *Tusculanae disputationes / Tusculan Disputations*. 1927. Ed. and trans. by J. E. King. *Loeb Classical Library*. 141. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. XVIII. XXVIII Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1945. Print.
- Consultus Fortunatianus [C. Chirius Fortunatianus]. "C. Chirii Fortunatiani artis rhetoricae libri III". *Rhetores Latini Minores. Ex codibus maximam partem primum adhibitis*. Ed. Karl [Carolus] Halm. Leipzig: Teubner, 1863. 81–134. Print.
- D. Laertius. *Leben und Meinungen berühmter Philosophen I*. Trans. Otto Apelt, and Hans Günther Zekl. Ed. Klaus Reich. *Philosophische Bibliothek*. 53. Vol. 1. 2 Vols. Hamburg: Meiner, 2008. Print.
- . ΔΙΟΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΛΑΕΡΤΙΟΥ ΒΙΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΓΝΩΜΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΕΝ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΙ ΕΥΔΟΚΙΜΗΣΑΝΤΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΕΙΣ ΔΕΚΑ / *Lives of Eminent Philosophers I*. 1925. Ed. and trans. by R. D. Hicks. *Loeb Classical Library*. 184. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. I. 2 Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2006. Print.
- . ΔΙΟΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΛΑΕΡΤΙΟΥ ΒΙΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΓΝΩΜΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΕΝ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΙ ΕΥΔΟΚΙΜΗΣΑΝΤΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΕΙΣ ΔΕΚΑ / *Lives of Eminent Philosophers II*. 1925. Ed. and trans. by R. D. Hicks. *Loeb Classical Library*. 185. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. II. 2 Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2005. Print.
- Dante Alighieri. *The Divine Comedy. Purgatorio. 1: Text*. 1973. Ed. and trans. by Charles S. Singleton. *Bollingen Series*. LXXX. 6th ed. Vol. II.1. III Vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1991. Print.
- de Man, Paul. *The Rhetoric of Romanticism*. New York, NY: Columbia UP, 1984. Print.
- Demetrius. "ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ / On Style". Trans. Doreen C. Innes, and W. Rhys Roberts. *Aristotle. Poetics. Longinus. On the Sublime. Demetrius. On Style*. Eds. W. H. Fyfe, Stephen Halliwell, Doreen C. Innes, and Donald Russell. *Loeb Classical Library*. 199. Ed. G. P. Goold. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1995. 309–525. Print.
- Dio Chrysostom. *Discourses 1–11*. Ed. and trans. by J. W. Cohoon. *Loeb Classical Library*. 257.

- Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. I. V Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1932. Print.
- Dionysius of Halicarnassus. “ΔΙΟΝΥΣΙΟΥ ΑΛΙΚΑΡΝΑΣΕΩΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΘΟΥΚΥΔΙΔΟΥ / Thucydides”. Ed. and trans. by Stephen Usher. *Critical Essays*. Vol. I. *Loeb Classical Library*. 465. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1974. 456–633. Print.
- “ΔΙΟΝΥΣΙΟΥ ΑΛΙΚΑΡΝΑΣΕΩΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΔΗΜΟΣΘΕΝΟΥΣ ΛΕΞΕΩΣ / Demosthenes”. Ed. and trans. by Stephen Usher. *Critical Essays*. Vol. I. *Loeb Classical Library*. 465. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1974. 232–455. Print.
- “ΙΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΑΘΗΝΑΙΟΣ / Isocrates”. Ed. and trans. by Stephen Usher. *Critical Essays*. Vol. I. *Loeb Classical Library*. 465. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1974. 100–169. Print.
- “ΛΥΣΙΑΣ ΣΥΡΑΚΟΥΣΙΟΣ ΠΑΤΡΟΘΕΝ / Lysias”. Ed. and trans. by Stephen Usher. *Critical Essays*. Vol. I. *Loeb Classical Library*. 465. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1974. 20–99. Print.
- “ΠΕΡΙ ΔΕΙΝΑΡΧΟΥ / Dinarchus”. Ed. and trans. by Stephen Usher. *Critical Essays*. Vol. II. *Loeb Classical Library*. 466. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1985. 245–249. Print.
- “ΠΕΡΙ ΣΥΝΘΕΣΕΩΣ ΟΝΟΜΑΤΩΝ / On Literary Composition”. Ed. and trans. by Stephen Usher. *Critical Essays*. Vol. II. *Loeb Classical Library*. 466. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1985. 3–243. Print.
- “ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΡΧΑΙΩΝ ΡΗΤΟΡΩΝ / The Ancient Orators”. Ed. and trans. by Stephen Usher. *Critical Essays*. Vol. I. *Loeb Classical Library*. 465. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1974. 4–15. Print.
- “ΠΡΟΣ ΠΟΜΠΗΙΟΝ ΓΕΜΙΝΟΝ ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΗ / Letter to Gnaeus Pompeius”. Ed. and trans. by Stephen Usher. *Critical Essays*. Vol. II. *Loeb Classical Library*. 466. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1985. 347–399. Print.
- Eliot, T. S. *The Waste Land. Authoritative Text. Contexts. Criticism. Norton Critical Edition*. Ed. Michael North. New York, NY: Norton, 2001. Print.
- Emerson, Ralph Waldo. “Montaigne, or the Skeptic [From *Representative Men*]”. *Emerson’s Prose and Poetry. Authoritative Texts, Contexts, Criticism*. Eds. Joel Porte, and Sandra Morris. *Norton Critical Edition*. New York, NY: Norton, 2001. 234–247. Print.
- Emporius the Orator. “Concerning Ethopoeia”. Trans. Joseph M. Miller. *Readings in Medieval Rhetoric*. Eds. Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson. Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1973. 33–36. Print.
- “Emporii de ethopoeia. de loco communi. de demonstrativa et de deliberativa materia”. *Rhetores Latini Minores. Ex codibus maximam partem primum adhibitis*. Ed. Karl [Carolus] Halm. Leipzig: Teubner, 1863. 561–574. Print.
- Epictetus. *Discourses. Book I*. 1998. Ed. and trans. by Robert F. Dobbin. *Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers*. Eds. Jonathan Barnes, and A. A. Long. Oxford, UK: Clarendon P, 2011. Print.
- *ΑΡΡΙΑΝΟΥ ΤΩΝ ΕΠΙΚΤΗΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΤΡΙΒΩΝ / Arrian’s Discourses of Epictetus. Books I–II*. 1925. Ed. and trans. by W. A. Oldfather. *Loeb Classical Library*. 131. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. 1. 2 Vols. Cambridge, MA / London, UK: Harvard UP, 1998. Print.
- *ΑΡΡΙΑΝΟΥ ΤΩΝ ΕΠΙΚΤΗΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΤΡΙΒΩΝ / Arrian’s Discourses of Epictetus. Books III–IV*. Ed. and trans. by W. A. Oldfather. *The Discourses. Books III–IV*. Vol. 2. *Loeb Classical Library*. 218. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1928. 1–437. Print.
- “ΕΠΙΚΤΗΤΟΥ ΕΓΧΕΙΡΙΔΙΟΝ / The Encheiridion”. Ed. and trans. by W. A. Oldfather. *The Discourses. Books III–IV*. Vol. 2. *Loeb Classical Library*. 218. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson.

- Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1928. 479–537. Print.
- Erasmus, Desiderius. “De pueris statim ac liberaliter instituendis declamatio / A Declamation on the Subject of Early Liberal Education for Children”. Trans. Beert C. Verstraete. *Literary and Educational Writings* 4. Ed. J. K. Sowards. Vol. 26. *The Collected Works of Erasmus*. Toronto, CA / Buffalo, NY / London, UK: U of Toronto P, 1985. 291–346. Print.
- . “Dialogus cui titulus Ciceronianus sive de optimo dicendi genere / Der Ciceronianer oder Der beste Stil. Ein Dialog”. Ed. and trans. by Theresia Payr. *Dialogus cui titulus Ciceronianus sive de optimo dicendi genere / Der Ciceronianer oder Der beste Stil. Ein Dialog — Adagiorum Chiliades (Adagia selecta) / Mehrere Tausend Sprichwörter und Sprichwörtliche Redensarten (Auswahl)*. 1972. 2nd ed. Vol. 7. *Erasmus von Rotterdam. Ausgewählte Schriften. Acht Bände. Lateinisch und Deutsch. Sonderausgabe*. Ed. Werner Welzig. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1995. 2–355. Print.
- . *The Praise of Folly and Other Writings. A New Translation With Critical Commentary*. Ed. and trans. by Robert M. Adams. *Norton Critical Edition*. New York, NY: Norton, 1989. Print.
- . “ΜΟΡΙΑΣ ΕΥΚΩΜΙΟΝ sive Laus Stultitiae. Das Lob der Torheit”. Trans. Alfred Hartmann. *ΜΟΡΙΑΣ ΕΥΚΩΜΙΟΝ sive Laus Stultitiae. Das Lob der Torheit. Carmina Selecta. Auswahl aus den Gedichten*. 1975. Ed. Wendelin Schmidt-Dengler. 2nd ed. Vol. 2. *Erasmus von Rotterdam. Ausgewählte Schriften. Acht Bände. Lateinisch und Deutsch. Sonderausgabe*. Ed. Werner Welzig. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1995. 1–211. Print.
- Foucault, Michel. *The Courage of Truth: The Government of Self and Others II*. Trans. Graham Burchell. Ed. Frédéric Gros. *Lectures at the Collège de France. 1983–1984*. Ed. Arnold I. Davidson. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Print.
- . “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom”. Trans. P. Aranov, and D. McGrawth. *Ethics. Subjectivity and Truth*. 1994 (*Dits et écrits, 1954–1984*. Ed. Daniel Defert, and François Ewald. Paris: Gallimard). Ed. Paul Rabinow. Vol. I. *Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984*. Ed. Paul Rabinow. London, UK: Penguin, 2000. 281–301. Print.
- . *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*. 2001 (*Herméneutique du sujet*. Paris: Seuil/Gallimard). Trans. Graham Burchell. Ed. Frédéric Gros. *Lectures at the Collège de France. 1981–1982*. Eds. Francois Ewald, Alessandro Fontana, and Arnold I. Davidson. New York, NY: Picador, 2005. Print.
- . “Self Writing”. Trans. Robert Hurley, and James D. Faubion. *Ethics. Subjectivity and Truth*. 1994 (*Dits et écrits, 1954–1984*. Ed. Daniel Defert, and François Ewald. Paris: Gallimard). Ed. Paul Rabinow. Vol. I. *Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984*. Ed. Paul Rabinow. London, UK: Penguin, 2000. 207–222. Print.
- . “Technologies of the Self”. Trans. Robert Hurley, and James D. Faubion. *Ethics. Subjectivity and Truth*. 1994 (*Dits et écrits, 1954–1984*. Ed. Daniel Defert, and François Ewald. Paris: Gallimard). Ed. Paul Rabinow. Vol. I. *Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984*. Ed. Paul Rabinow. London, UK: Penguin, 2000. 223–251. Print.
- . “What Is an Author?”. Trans. Donald F. Bouchard, and Sherry Simon. *Professing the New Rhetorics. A Sourcebook*. Eds. Theresa Enos, and Stuart C. Brown. Boston, MA / Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Blair P / Prentice Hall, 1994. 178–193. Print.
- Fraunce, Abraham. *The Arcadian Rhetoric* [1588. *The Arcadian Rhetorike: Or The Præcepts of Rhetorike made plaine by examples, Greeke, Latin, Engliſh, Italian, French, Spanijh*]. 1588 [London: Thomas Orwin]. *Scolar Press Facsimiles*. Menston, UK: Scolar P, 1969. Print.
- Gaius Iulius Victor. “C. Iulii Victoris ars rhetorica”. *Rhetores Latini Minores. Ex codibus maximam partem primum adhibitis*. Ed. Karl [Carolus] Halm. Leipzig: Teubner, 1863. 371–448. Print.

- Gorgias. “Encomium of Helen”. Ed. and trans. by Daniel W. Graham. *The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy. The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics*. Vol. II. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2010. 754–763. Print.
- Gracián, Baltasar. *El Criticón*. 1980. Ed. Santos Alonso. *Letras Hispánicas*. 122. 11th ed. Madrid: Cátedra, 2009. Print.
- . *Oráculo manual y arte de prudencia*. 1995. Ed. Emilio Blanco. *Letras Hispánicas*. 395. 9th ed. Madrid: Cátedra, 2011. Print.
- The Greek Anthology*. 1918. Ed. and trans. by W. R. Paton. *Loeb Classical Library*. 85. Eds. T.E. Page, E. Capps, W. H. D. Rouse, L. A. Post, and E. H. Warmington. Vol. IV. V Vols. Cambridge, MA / London, UK: Harvard UP / Heinemann, 1948. Print.
- Hermogenes. “The Preliminary Exercises Attributed to Hermogenes”. Ed. and trans. by George A. Kennedy. *Progymnasmata. Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric. Writings from the Greco-Roman World*. 10. Eds. John T. Fitzgerald, and Donald A. Russell. Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003. 73–88. Print.
- Hippocrates. “ΠΕΡΙ ΔΙΑΙΤΗΣ / Regimen I–IV”. Ed. and trans. by W. H. S. Jones. *Hippocrates. Volume IV. Heracleitus. On the Universe*. Vol. IV. *Loeb Classical Library*. 150. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1931. 223–447. Print.
- Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan*. 1991. Ed. Richard Tuck. *Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought*. Eds. Raymond Geuss, and Quentin Skinner. 11th ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2008. Print.
- . *Man and Citizen (De Homine and De Cive)*. 1972. Trans. Charles T. Wood, T. S. K. Scott-Craig, and Bernard Gert. Ed. Bernard Gert. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1991. Print.
- Homer. *The Odyssey*. 1980. Trans. Walter Shewring. Ed. G. S. Kirk. *Oxford World’s Classics*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998. Print.
- . *ΙΛΙΑΣ / Iliad. Books 13–24*. 1925. Trans. A. T. Murray, and William F. Wyatt. Ed. William F. Wyatt. *Loeb Classical Library*. 171. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. 2nd ed. Vol. II. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999. Print.
- . *ΟΔΥΣΣΕΙΑ / Odyssey. Books 1–12*. 1919. Trans. A. T. Murray, and George E. Dimock. Ed. George E. Dimock. *Loeb Classical Library*. 104. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. 2nd ed. Vol. I. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1998. Print.
- Horace. “Ars Poetica”. Ed. and trans. by H. R. Fairclough. *Satires. Epistles. Ars Poetica*. 1926. *Loeb Classical Library*. 194. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2005. 442–489. Print.
- . “Odes”. Ed. and trans. by Niall Rudd. *Odes and Epodes*. 2004. *Loeb Classical Library*. 33. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2012. 21–267. Print.
- “Incerti auctoris schemata dianoeas”. *Rhetores Latini Minores. Ex codibus maximam partem primum adhibitis*. Ed. Karl [Carolus] Halm. Leipzig: Teubner, 1863. 71–77. Print.
- Isidore of Seville. “The Etymologies, II.1–15: ‘Concerning Rhetoric’”. Trans. Dorothy V. Cerino. *Readings in Medieval Rhetoric*. Eds. Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson. Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1973. 79–95. Print.
- . “Isidori libellus de arte rhetorica”. *Rhetores Latini Minores. Ex codibus maximam partem primum adhibitis*. Ed. Karl [Carolus] Halm. Leipzig: Teubner, 1863. 505–522. Print.
- Isocrates. “ΑΡΧΙΔΑΜΟΣ / Archidamus (VI)”. Ed. and trans. by George Norlin. *Volume I*. 1928. *Loeb Classical Library*. 209. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1991. 341–411. Print.

- . “ΠΕΡΙ ΑΝΤΙΔΟΣΕΩΣ / Antidosis (XV)”. Ed. and trans. by George Norlin. *Volume II. Loeb Classical Library*. 229. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1929. 179–365. Print.
- . “ΠΡΟΣ ΔΗΜΟΝΙΚΟΝ / To Demonicus (I)”. Ed. and trans. by George Norlin. *Volume I*. 1928. *Loeb Classical Library*. 209. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1991. 1–35. Print.
- Iulius Rufinianus. “Iulii Rufiniani de figuris sententiarum et elocutionis liber. [Rufiniani] de schematis lexeos. [Rufiniani] de schematis dianoeas”. *Rhetores Latini Minores. Ex codibus maximam partem primum adhibitis*. Ed. Karl [Carolus] Halm. Leipzig: Teubner, 1863. 37–62. Print.
- John of Salisbury (Johannes Sarisberiensis). *Ioannis Saresberiensis Episcopi Carnotensis Policratici sive De Nugis Curialium Et Vestigiis Philosophorum Libri VIII*. Ed. Clemens C. I. Webb. Vol. I. Oxford: Clarendon P, 1909. Print.
- . *Policraticus de nugis curialium*. [Brussels] / Düsseldorf: [Fratres vitae communis] / Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, [~1479/81] / 2011. Print.
<http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:061:1-70855>.
<http://digital.ub.uni-duesseldorf.de/ink/content/titleinfo/2627723>.
- John of Sardis, and Sopatros. “Selections from the Commentary on the *Progymnasmata* of Aphthonius Attributed to John of Sardis, Including Fragments of the Treatise on *Progymnasmata* by Sopatros”. Ed. and trans. by George A. Kennedy. *Progymnasmata. Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric. Writings from the Greco-Roman World*. 10. Eds. John T. Fitzgerald, and Donald A. Russell. Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003. 173–228. Print.
- Kant, Immanuel. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft 1*. 1974. *Werkausgabe*. Ed. Wilhelm Weischedel. 13th ed. Vol. III. XII Vols. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1995. Print.
- . *Kritik der Urteilskraft*. Ed. Heiner F. Klemme. *Philosophische Bibliothek*. 507. 2nd ed. Hamburg: Meiner, 2009. Print.
- Kranz, Walther, ed. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Erster Band*. 1903. Trans. Hermann Diels. 6th ed. Vol. I (1–58). 3 Vols. Zürich / Hildesheim: Weidmann, 1985. Print.
- , ed. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Zweiter Band*. 1903. Trans. Hermann Diels. 6th ed. Vol. II (59–90). 3 Vols. Zürich / Hildesheim: Weidmann, 1985. Print.
- Lever, Ralph. *The Art of Reason 1573 (THE ARTE of Reason, rightly termed, Witcraft, teaching a perfect way to argue and difpute)*. 1573 (London: H. Bynneman). *English Linguistics 1500–1800 (A Collection of Facsimile Reprints)*. 323. Ed. R. C. Alston. Menston, UK: Scolar P, 1972. Print.
- Lipsius, Justus. *De Constantia / Von der Standhaftigkeit. Lateinisch – Deutsch*. Ed. and trans. by Florian Neumann. *excerpta classica*. XVI. Mainz: Dieterich, 1998. Print.
- Livy. *Ab Vrbe Condita. Book VI*. Ed. Christina Shuttleworth Kraus. *Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics*. Eds. E. J. Kenney, and P. E. Easterling. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1994. Print.
- . *History of Rome. Books I–II*. 1919. Ed. and trans. by B. O. Foster. *Loeb Classical Library*. 114. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. I. XIV Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1988. Print.
- Longinus. “ΠΕΡΙ ΥΨΟΥΣ / On the Sublime”. Trans. W. H. Fyfe, and Donald Russell. *Aristotle. Poetics. Longinus. On the Sublime. Demetrius. On Style*. Eds. W. H. Fyfe, Stephen Halliwell, Doreen C. Innes, and Donald A. Russell. *Loeb Classical Library*. 199. Ed. G. P. Goold. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1995. 143–307. Print.
- Lucian. “ΔΙΣ ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ / The Double Indictment, Or Trials By Jury”. Ed. and trans. by A.

- M. Harmon. *Volume III. Loeb Classical Library*. 130. Eds. E. Capps, T.E. Page, and W. H. D. Rouse. London: Heinemann, 1921. 83–151. Print.
- “ΠΕΡΙ ΟΡΧΗΣΕΩΣ / The Dance (Saltatio)”. Ed. and trans. by A. M. Harmon. *Volume V (The Passing of Peregrinus—The Runaways—Toxaris or Friendship—The Dance—Lexiphanes—The Eunuch—Astrology—The Mistaken Critic—The Parliament of Gods—The Tyrannicide—Disowned)*. 1936. Vol. V. *Loeb Classical Library*. 302. Ed. E. H. Warmington. London, UK / Cambridge, MA: Heinemann / Harvard UP, 1972. 209–289. Print.
- “ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΠΕΡΕΓΡΙΝΟΥ ΤΕΛΕΥΤΗΣ / The Passing of Peregrinus (Peregrinus)”. Ed. and trans. by A. M. Harmon. *Volume V (The Passing of Peregrinus—The Runaways—Toxaris or Friendship—The Dance—Lexiphanes—The Eunuch—Astrology—The Mistaken Critic—The Parliament of Gods—The Tyrannicide—Disowned)*. 1936. Vol. V. *Loeb Classical Library*. 302. Ed. E. H. Warmington. London, UK / Cambridge, MA: Heinemann / Harvard UP, 1972. 1–51. Print.
- Lysias. “32. Against Diogeiton”. *Selected Speeches*. 1989. Ed. Christopher Carey. *Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics*. Eds. P. E. Easterling, Philip Hardie, Richard Hunter, and E. J. Kenney. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2002. 53–58. Print.
- “ΚΑΤΑ ΔΙΟΓΕΙΤΟΝΟΣ / XXXII. Against Diogeiton”. Ed. and trans. by W. R. M. Lamb. *Lysias*. 1930. *Loeb Classical Library*. 244. Ed. G. P. Gooch. Cambridge, MA / London, UK: Harvard UP / Heinemann, 1976. 656–679. Print.
- Machiavelli, Niccolò. *Discourses on Livy*. Ed. and trans. by Harvey C. Mansfield, and Nathan Tarkov. Chicago, IL: U of Chicago P, 1998. Print.
- *Il Principe*. Ed. Giorgio Inglese. *ET Classici*. 309. Torino: Einaudi, 1995. Print.
- *Mandragola*. Ed. Guido Davico Bonino. *Collezione di Teatro*. 33. Torino: Einaudi, 1980. Print.
- *The Prince*. 1985. Ed. and trans. by Harvey C. Mansfield. 2nd ed. Chicago, IL: U of Chicago P, 1998. Print.
- *Tutte le Opere*. Firenze: Barbèra / Giunti, 1969. Print.
- Marcus Aurelius. *ΤΑ ΕΙΣ ΕΑΥΤΟΝ / Meditations [To Himself]*. 1916. Ed. and trans. by C. R. Haines. *Loeb Classical Library*. 58. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1930. Print.
- Marlowe, Christopher. *The Jew of Malta*. 1978. Ed. N. W. Bawcutt. *The Revels Plays*. Eds. F. David Hoeniger, E. A. J. Honigmann, and J. R. Mulryne. Manchester, UK: Manchester UP, 1979. Print.
- Marquard, Odo. *Aesthetica und Anaesthetica. Philosophische Überlegungen*. 1989. München: Fink, 2003. Print.
- “Hans Blumenberg: Entlastung vom Absoluten”. *Du. Die Zeitschrift für Kultur*. 609. Heft 11: *Das Verschwinden der Wirklichkeit. Ein Kursbuch. Zentrale philosophische Positionen der Gegenwart* (Nov: 1991): 25–26. Print.
- Martial. *Epigrams. Spectacles • Books 1–5*. Ed. and trans. by D. R. Shackleton Bailey. *Loeb Classical Library*. 94. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. I. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1993. Print.
- Mauss, Marcel. “A category of the human mind: the notion of person; the notion of self”. Trans. W. D. Halls. *The category of the person. Anthropology, philosophy, history*. Eds. Michael Carrithers, Steven Collins, and Steven Lukes. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1986. 1–25. Print.
- Milton, John. “Areopagitica. A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing to the Parliament of England”. *Paradise Lost. Authoritative Text. Sources and Backgrounds. Criticism*. Ed. Gordon Teskey. *Norton Critical Edition*. New York, NY: Norton, 2005. 339–374. Print.
- *Paradise Lost. Authoritative Text. Sources and Backgrounds. Criticism*. Ed. Gordon Teskey.

- Norton Critical Edition*. New York, NY: Norton, 2005. Print.
- “Paradise Lost. Second Edition (1674)”. *Paradise Lost: A Norton Critical Edition, Second Edition*. 1975. Ed. Scott Ellege. 8th ed. *The Norton Anthology of English Literature*. I. Eds. Stephen Greenblatt, and M. H. Abrams. New York, NY: Norton, 2006. 1830–2055. Print.
 - Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de. *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*. 1958. Ed. and trans. by Donald M. Frame. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1989. Print.
 - *Essais I*. Eds. Emmanuel Naya, Delphine Reguig, and Alexandre Tarrête. *Folio classique*. Vol. I. III Vols. Paris: Gallimard, 2009. Print.
 - *Essais II*. Eds. Emmanuel Naya, Delphine Reguig, and Alexandre Tarrête. *Folio classique*. Vol. II. III Vols. Paris: Gallimard, 2009. Print.
 - *Essais III*. 2009. Eds. Emmanuel Naya, Delphine Reguig, and Alexandre Tarrête. *Folio classique*. Vol. III. III Vols. Paris: Gallimard, 2012. Print.
 - *The Essayes of Michael Lord of Montaigne*. 1603. Trans. John Florio. Ed. A. R. Waller. *Everyman’s Library. Essays and Belles Lettres*. Ed. Ernest Rhys. Vol. III. III Vols. London, UK / New York, NY: Dent / Dutton, [1965]. Print.
- Nicolaus the Sophist. “The *Preliminary Exercises of Nicolaus the Sophist*”. Ed. and trans. by George A. Kennedy. *Progymnasmata. Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric. Writings from the Greco-Roman World*. 10. Eds. John T. Fitzgerald, and Donald A. Russell. Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003. 129–172. Print.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Also Sprach Zarathustra [KSA 4]*. 1967. *Kritische Studienausgabe [KSA]*. Eds. Giorgio Colli, and Mazzino Montinari. 2nd ed. Vol. 4. 15 Vols. München / Berlin / New York, NY: dtv / de Gruyter, 1999. Print.
- *Jenseits von Gut und Böse. Zur Genealogie der Moral [KSA 5]*. 1967. *Kritische Studienausgabe [KSA]*. Eds. Giorgio Colli, and Mazzino Montinari. 2nd ed. Vol. 5. 15 Vols. München / Berlin / New York, NY: dtv / de Gruyter, 1999. Print.
 - *Nachgelassene Fragmente 1869–1874 [KSA 7]*. 1967. *Kritische Studienausgabe [KSA]*. Eds. Giorgio Colli, and Mazzino Montinari. 2nd ed. Vol. 7. 15 Vols. München / Berlin / New York, NY: dtv / de Gruyter, 1999. Print.
 - *Nachgelassene Fragmente 1884–1885 [KSA 11]*. 1967. *Kritische Studienausgabe [KSA]*. Eds. Giorgio Colli, and Mazzino Montinari. 2nd ed. Vol. 11. 15 Vols. München / Berlin / New York, NY: dtv / de Gruyter, 1999. Print.
 - *Nachgelassene Fragmente 1887–1889 [KSA 13]*. 1967. *Kritische Studienausgabe [KSA]*. Eds. Giorgio Colli, and Mazzino Montinari. 2nd ed. Vol. 13. 15 Vols. München / Berlin / New York, NY: dtv / de Gruyter, 1999. Print.
- Ovid. “*Artis Amatoriae / The Art of Love*”. Trans. J. H. Mozley, and G. P. Goold. *The Art of Love and Other Poems*. 1929. Ed. G. P. Goold. 2nd ed. Vol. II. *Loeb Classical Library*. 232. Ed. G. P. Goold. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999. 11–175. Print.
- “*Remedia Amoris / The Remedies for Love*”. Trans. J. H. Mozley, and G. P. Goold. *The Art of Love and Other Poems*. 1929. Ed. G. P. Goold. 2nd ed. Vol. II. *Loeb Classical Library*. 232. Ed. G. P. Goold. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999. 177–233. Print.
- Peacham, Henry. *The Garden of Eloquence*. 1577 (1st ed. London: H. lackfon). *A Scholar Press Facsimile*. Menston, UK: Scolar P, 1971. Print.
- Perseus Digital Library*. Ed. Gregory R. Crane. Medford, MA: Tufts U.
<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu>.
- Petrarca, Francesco. “The Ascent of Mont Ventoux”. Trans. Hans Nachod. *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*. 1948. Eds. Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman Randall Jr. 9th ed. Chicago, IL: Chicago UP, 1965. 36–46. Print.

- *Epistole*. Ed. Ugo Dotti. Torino: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 1978. Print.
- “A Self-Portrait”. Trans. Hans Nachod. *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*. 1948. Eds. Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman Randall Jr. 9th ed. Chicago, IL: Chicago UP, 1965. 34–35. Print.
- Petronius. “Satyricon, Fragments, Poems”. Trans. Michael Heseltine, and E. H. Warmington. *Petronius. Seneca, Apocolocyntosis*. 1913. Ed. E. H. Warmington. *Loeb Classical Library*. 15. Ed. G. P. Goold. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1975. vii–430. Print.
- Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni. “Oration on the Dignity of Man”. Trans. Elizabeth Livermore Forbes. *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*. 1948. Eds. Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman Randall Jr. 9th ed. Chicago, IL: Chicago UP, 1965. 223–254. Print.
- Plato. “ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ / Gorgias”. Ed. and trans. by W. R. M. Lamb. *Lysis. Symposium. Gorgias*. Vol. III. *Loeb Classical Library*. 166. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1925. 247–533. Print.
- *NOMOI / Laws. Books I–VI*. 1926. Ed. and trans. by R. G. Bury. *Loeb Classical Library*. 187. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. X. XII Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1984. Print.
- *NOMOI / Laws. Books VII–XII*. 1926. Ed. and trans. by R. G. Bury. *Loeb Classical Library*. 192. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. XI. XII Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1984. Print.
- ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ [*Politeia*] / *Republic. Books 6–10*. Ed. and trans. by Chris Emlyn-Jones, and William Preddy. *Loeb Classical Library*. 276. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. VI. XII Vols. Cambridge, MA / London, UK: Harvard UP, 2013. Print.
- “ΤΙΜΑΙΟΣ [Timaios] / Timaeus”. Ed. and trans. by R. G. Bury. *Timaeus. Critias. Cleitophon. Menexenus. Epistles*. 1929. Vol. IX. *Loeb Classical Library*. 234. Ed. G. P. Goold. Cambridge, MA / London, UK: Harvard UP, 1989. 1–253. Print.
- “ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ [Phaidros] / Phaedrus”. Trans. Harold North Fowler. *Plato. Euthyphro. Apology. Crito. Phaedo. Phaedrus*. Eds. Harold North Fowler, and W. R. M. Lamb. Vol. I. *Loeb Classical Library*. 36. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1914. 405–579. Print.
- Plutarch. *Moralia VI. 439 A–523 B*. 1939. Ed. and trans. by W. C. Helmbold. *Loeb Classical Library*. 337. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. VI. XVI Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2005. Print.
- “Γ. ΚΑΙΣΑΡ / Caesar”. Ed. and trans. by Bernadotte Perrin. *Lives VII. Demosthenes and Cicero. Alexander and Caesar*. Vol. VII. *Loeb Classical Library*. 99. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1919. 441–609. Print.
- “ΔΗΜΟΣΘΕΝΟΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΚΙΚΕΡΩΝΟΣ ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ / Comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero”. Ed. and trans. by Bernadotte Perrin. *Lives VII. Demosthenes and Cicero. Alexander and Caesar*. Vol. VII. *Loeb Classical Library*. 99. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1919. 210–221. Print.
- “ΠΕΡΙ ΑΔΟΛΕΣΧΙΑΣ / Concerning Talkativeness (de garrulitate)”. Ed. and trans. by W. C. Helmbold. *Moralia VI. 439 A–523 B*. 1939. Vol. VI. *Loeb Classical Library*. 337. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2005. 393–467. Print.
- Priscian the Grammarian. “Fundamentals Adapted from Hermogenes”. Trans. Joseph M. Miller. *Readings in Medieval Rhetoric*. Eds. Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson. Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1973. 52–68. Print.
- “Prisciani praeexercitamina ex Hermogene versa”. *Rhetores Latini Minores. Ex codibus maximam partem primum adhibitis*. Ed. Karl [Carolus] Halm. Leipzig: Teubner, 1863. 551–560. Print.

- Puttenham, George. *The Art of English Poesy. A Critical Edition*. 1589 [London: Richard Field]. Eds. Frank Wigham, and Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca, NY / London, UK: Cornell UP, 2007. Print.
- Quintilian. *Institutio Oratoria / The Orator's Education. Books 1–2*. Ed. and trans. by Donald A. Russell. *Loeb Classical Library*. 124. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. I. V Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001. Print.
- . *Institutio Oratoria / The Orator's Education. Books 3–5*. Ed. and trans. by Donald A. Russell. *Loeb Classical Library*. 125. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. II. V Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001. Print.
- . *Institutio Oratoria / The Orator's Education. Books 6–8*. Ed. and trans. by Donald A. Russell. *Loeb Classical Library*. 126. Eds. Jeffrey Henderson, and G. P. Goold. Vol. III. V Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001. Print.
- . *Institutio Oratoria / The Orator's Education. Books 9–10*. Ed. and trans. by Donald A. Russell. *Loeb Classical Library*. 127. Eds. Jeffrey Henderson, and G. P. Goold. Vol. IV. V Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001. Print.
- . *Institutio Oratoria / The Orator's Education. Books 11–12*. Ed. and trans. by Donald A. Russell. *Loeb Classical Library*. 494. Eds. Jeffrey Henderson, and G. P. Goold. Vol. V. V Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001. Print.
- Rainolds, Richard. *The Foundation of Rhetoric [A booke called the Foundacion of Rhetorike]*. 1563 (London: Ihon Kingston). *English Linguistics. 1500–1800. (A Collection of Facsimile Reprints)*. 347. Ed. R. C. Alston. Menston, UK: Scolar P, 1972. Print.
- Rhetorica ad Herennium*. 1954. Ed. and trans. by Harry Caplan. *Loeb Classical Library*. 403. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2004. Print.
- Ritter, Joachim. *Metaphysik und Politik. Studien zu Aristoteles und Hegel*. 1969. Ed. Odo Marquard. 2nd ed. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2003. Print.
- Rutilius Lupus, Publius. “P. Rutilii Lupi schemata lexeos”. *Rhetores Latini Minores. Ex codibus maximam partem primum adhibitis*. Ed. Karl [Carolus] Halm. Leipzig: Teubner, 1863. 1–21. Print.
- Santayana, George. *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies*. London, UK / Bombay / Sydney, AU: Constable, 1922. Print.
- Sappho. “Sappho: Testimonia. Text”. Ed. and trans. by David A. Campbell. *Greek Lyric I. Sappho and Alcaeus*. 1982. *Loeb Classical Library*. 142. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1990. 2–205. Print.
- Scaliger, Julius Caesar. *Poetices Libri Septem. Faksimile-Neudruck der Ausgabe Leipzig von Lyon 1561*. Ed. August Buck. 2nd ed. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 1987. Print.
- Schopenhauer, Arthur. “Aphorismen zur Lebensweisheit”. *Parerga und Paralipomena I*. Vol. IV. *Haffmans Ausgabe: Werke in fünf Bänden*. Ed. Ludger Lütkehaus. Zürich: Haffmans, 1988. 311–483. Print.
- Seneca, L. Annaeus. *L. Annaei Senecae Ad Lucilium Epistulae / Epistles 1–65*. Ed. and trans. by Richard M. Gummere. *Loeb Classical Library*. 75. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. IV. Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1917. Print.
- . *L. Annaei Senecae Ad Lucilium Epistulae / Epistles 66–92*. Ed. and trans. by Richard M. Gummere. *Loeb Classical Library*. 76. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. V. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1920. Print.
- . *Moral Essays [I]*. Ed. and trans. by John W. Basore. *Loeb Classical Library*. 214. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. I. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1928. Print.

- “Troades / Trojan Women”. Ed. and trans. by John G. Fitch. *Tragedies I. Hercules. Trojan Women. Phoenician Women. Medea. Phaedra*. Vol. VIII. *Loeb Classical Library*. 62. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2002. 161–271. Print.
- Seneca the Elder. *Controversiarum / Controversiae. Books 1–6*. Ed. and trans. by M. Winterbottom. *Loeb Classical Library*. 463. Ed. E. H. Warmington. Vol. I. II Vols. Cambridge, MA / London, UK: Harvard UP / Heinemann, 1974. Print.
- “Suasoriarum / Suasoriae”. Ed. and trans. by M. Winterbottom. *Controversiae. Books 7–10. Suasoriae*. Vol. II. *Loeb Classical Library*. 464. Ed. E. H. Warmington. Cambridge, MA / London, UK: Harvard UP / Heinemann, 1974. 484–611. Print.
- Shakespeare, William. *As You Like It*. 2006. Ed. Juliet Dusinberre. *The Arden Shakespeare*. Eds. Richard Proudfoot, Ann Thompson, David Scott Kastan, and H.R. Woudhuysen. 3rd ed. London, UK: Bloomsbury, 2015. Print.
- *Hamlet*. 1982. Ed. Harold Jenkins. *The Arden Shakespeare*. Eds. Richard Proudfoot, Ann Thompson, and David Scott Kastan. 2nd ed. London, UK: Thomson, 2003. Print.
- *King Richard II*. 2002. Ed. Charles R. Forker. *The Arden Shakespeare*. Eds. Richard Proudfoot, Ann Thompson, David Scott Kastan, and H.R. Woudhuysen. 3rd ed. London, UK: Bloomsbury, 2015. Print.
- *King Richard III*. 1981. Ed. Anthony Hammond. *The Arden Shakespeare*. Eds. Richard Proudfoot, Ann Thompson, and David Scott Kastan. 2nd ed. London, UK: Thomson, 2002. Print.
- *Macbeth*. Eds. Sandra Clark, and Pamela Mason. *The Arden Shakespeare*. Eds. Richard Proudfoot, Ann Thompson, David Scott Kastan, and H.R. Woudhuysen. 3rd ed. London, UK: Bloomsbury, 2015. Print.
- *Measure for Measure*. Ed. Mark Eccles. *A New Variorum Edition of Shakespeare*. Eds. James G. McManaway, Richard Knowles, and Robert K. Turner Jr. New York, NY: The Modern Language Association of America, 1980. Print.
- *The Merchant of Venice*. 2010. Ed. John Drakakis. *The Arden Shakespeare*. Eds. Richard Proudfoot, Ann Thompson, David Scott Kastan, and H.R. Woudhuysen. 3rd ed. London, UK: Bloomsbury, 2013. Print.
- “The Rape of Lucrece”. *Shakespeare’s Poems. Venus and Adonis, The Rape of Lucrece and the Shorter Poems*. 2007. Eds. Katherine Duncan-Jones, and H.R. Woudhuysen. 3rd ed. *The Arden Shakespeare*. Eds. Richard Proudfoot, Ann Thompson, David Scott Kastan, and H.R. Woudhuysen. London: Bloomsbury, 2014. 231–383. Print.
- *Shakespeare’s Sonnets*. 1997. Ed. Katherine Duncan-Jones. *The Arden Shakespeare*. Eds. Richard Proudfoot, Ann Thompson, David Scott Kastan, and H.R. Woudhuysen. 3rd ed. London, UK: Methuen, 2010. Print.
- *The Tempest*. Eds. Virginia Mason Vaughan, and Alden T. Vaughan. *The Arden Shakespeare*. Eds. Richard Proudfoot, Ann Thompson, and David Scott Kastan. 3rd ed. London, UK: Thomson, 2005. Print.
- “Venus and Adonis”. *Shakespeare’s Poems. Venus and Adonis, The Rape of Lucrece and the Shorter Poems*. 2007. Eds. Katherine Duncan-Jones, and H.R. Woudhuysen. 3rd ed. *The Arden Shakespeare*. Eds. Richard Proudfoot, Ann Thompson, David Scott Kastan, and H.R. Woudhuysen. London: Bloomsbury, 2014. 125–229. Print.
- Shaw, Samuel. *Words Made Visible: Or Grammar and Rhetorick Accommodated to the Lives and Manners of Men. Represented in a Country School for the Entertainment and Edification of the Spectators*. London (at the Flying-Horse near St. Dunstons Church in Fleetstreet): Daniel Major, 1679. Print.

- Sidney, Sir Philip. “An Apologie for Poetrie. c. 1583 (printed 1595)”. *Elizabethan Critical Essays*. Ed. G. Gregory Smith. Vol. I. Oxford, UK: Clarendon P, 1904. 148–207; 382–403. Print.
- Simmel, Georg. “Zur Philosophie des Schauspielers”. *Das individuelle Gesetz. Philosophische Exkurse*. Ed. Michael Landmann. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1987. 75–95. Print.
- Sophocles. “ANTIGONH / Antigone”. Ed. and trans. by Hugh Lloyd-Jones. *Antigone. Women of Trachis. Philoctetes. Oedipus at Colonus*. 1994. Vol. II. *Loeb Classical Library*. 21. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA / London, UK: Harvard UP, 2002. 1–127. Print.
- Suetonius. *Lives of the Caesars. I–IV*. 1913. Trans. J. C. Rolfe. Ed. K. R. Bradley. *Loeb Classical Library*. 31. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. 3rd ed. Vol. I. II Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001. Print.
- Sulpicius [Sulpitius] Victor. “Sulpitii Victoris institutiones oratoriae”. *Rhetores Latini Minores. Ex codibus maximam partem primum adhibitis*. Ed. Karl [Carolus] Halm. Leipzig: Teubner, 1863. 311–352. Print.
- Tacitus, Cornelius P. “Ab Excessu Divi Augusti P. Cornelii Taciti [Libri] / The Annals. Books I–III”. Trans. John Jackson. *The Histories. Books IV–V. The Annals. Books I–III*. Eds. Clifford H. Moore, and John Jackson. Vol. III. *Loeb Classical Library*. 249. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1931. 225–643. Print.
- . “Dialogus de oratoribus / A Dialogue on Oratory”. Trans. W. Peterson, and M. Winterbottom. *Agricola. Germania. Dialogus*. 1914. Ed. M. Winterbottom. Rev. ed. Vol. I. *Loeb Classical Library*. 35. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1970. 217–347. Print.
- Terence. “Heauton Timorumenos / The Self-Tormentor”. Ed. and trans. by John Barsby. *The Woman of Andros. The Self-Tormentor. The Eunuch*. Vol. I. *Loeb Classical Library*. 22. Eds. Jeffrey Henderson, and G. P. Goold. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001. 171–303. Print.
- Theophrastus. “ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡΕΣ / Characters”. Trans. Jeffrey Rusten. *Theophrastus. Characters. Herodas. Mimes. Sophron and Other Mime Fragments*. Eds. Jeffrey Rusten, and I. C. Cunningham. *Loeb Classical Library*. 225. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2002. 1–175. Print.
- Thucydides. ΘΟΥΚΥΔΙΔΟΥ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΙ / *History of the Peloponnesian War. Books I and II*. 1919. Ed. and trans. by Charles Forster Smith. *Loeb Classical Library*. 108. Ed. G. P. Goold. Vol. I. IV Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1991. Print.
- . ΘΟΥΚΥΔΙΔΟΥ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΙ / *History of the Peloponnesian War. Books III and IV*. 1920. Ed. and trans. by Charles Forster Smith. *Loeb Classical Library*. 109. Ed. G. P. Goold. Vol. II. IV Vols. Cambridge, MA / London, UK: Harvard UP / Heinemann, 1975. Print.
- . ΘΟΥΚΥΔΙΔΟΥ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΙ / *History of the Peloponnesian War. Books V and VI*. 1921. Ed. and trans. by Charles Forster Smith. *Loeb Classical Library*. 110. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. III. IV Vols. Cambridge, MA / London, UK: Harvard UP, 2006. Print.
- Tiberius Rhetor. “XXI. ΤΙΒΕΡΙΟΥ ΡΗΤΟΡΟΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΠΑΡΑ ΔΗΜΟΣΘΕΝΕΙ ΣΧΗΜΑΤΩΝ [peri schemátōn]”. *Rhetores Graeci*. Ed. Leonhard Spengel. Vol. III. Leipzig: Teubner, 1856. 57–82. Print.
- Tryphon. “XXVIII. ΤΡΥΦΩΝΟΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΡΟΠΩΝ [peri trópon]”. *Rhetores Graeci*. Ed. Leonhard Spengel. Vol. III. Leipzig: Teubner, 1856. 189–206. Print.
- Valéry, Paul. “Sur la technique littéraire”. *Œuvres I*. Ed. Jean Hytier. *Bibliothèque de la Pléiade*. 127. Paris: Gallimard, 1957. 1785–1788. Print.
- . *Zur Theorie der Dichtkunst*. 1962. Trans. Kurt Leonhard, and Eva Rechel-Mertens. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1975. Print.
- Wilson, Thomas. *The Art of Rhetoric (1560)*. 1560 (London: Ihon Kingston). Ed. Peter E. Medine. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 1994. Print.

Secondary Literature

- Altman, Joel B. *The Tudor Play of Mind. Rhetorical Inquiry and the Development of Elizabethan Drama*. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA / London, UK: U of California P, 1978. Print.
- Amezúa y Mayo, Agustín G. de. *Cervantes, Creador De La Novela Corta Española. Introducción A La Edición Crítica Y Comentada De Las Novelas Ejemplares. Clásicos Hispánicos. Ediciones Anotadas*. Vol. II. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1958. Print.
- Asmuth, Bernhard. "Angemessenheit". *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik. Band 1: A–Bib*. Ed. Gert Ueding. Vol. 1. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*. Ed. Gert Ueding. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1992. 579–604. Print.
- . "Die Entwicklung des deutschen Schulaufsatzes aus der Rhetorik". *Rhetorik. Kritische Positionen zum Stand der Forschung*. Ed. Heinrich F. Plett. *Kritische Information*. 50. München: Fink, 1977. 276–292. Print.
- . "Drama". Trans. DS Mayfield. *Rhetoric and Drama*. Ed. DS Mayfield. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017. 179–201. Print.
<https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/books/9783110484663/9783110484663-009/9783110484663-009.xml>.
- . *Einführung in die Dramenanalyse. Sammlung Metzler*. 188. 8th ed. Stuttgart: Metzler, 2016. Print.
- Atkins, J. W. H. *Literary Criticism in Antiquity. A Sketch of its Development. Volume II. Graeco-Roman*. 1934 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP). Vol. II. II Vols. London, UK: Methuen, 1952. Print.
- Auerbach, Erich. "Figura (1938)". Trans. Jane O. Newman. *Time, History, and Literature. Selected Essays of Erich Auerbach*. 2014. Ed. James I. Porter. Princeton, NJ / Oxford, UK: Princeton UP, 2016. 65–113. Print.
- . "Figura. Neuedition des Textes von 1938". *Mimesis und Figura. Mit einer Neuauflage des "Figura"-Aufsatzes von Erich Auerbach*. Eds. Friedrich Balke, and Hanna Engelmeier. *Medien und Mimesis*. 1. Eds. Friedrich Balke, and Bernhard Siegert. Paderborn: Fink, 2016. 121–188. Print.
- . *Philologie der Weltliteratur. Sechs Versuche über Stil und Wirklichkeitswahrnehmung*. 1967. Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 1992. Print.
- . "The Philology of World Literature (1952)". Trans. Jane O. Newman. *Time, History, and Literature. Selected Essays of Erich Auerbach*. 2014. Ed. James I. Porter. Princeton, NJ / Oxford, UK: Princeton UP, 2016. 253–265. Print.
- Bakker, Mathieu de. "Herodotus". *Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature. Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative*. Volume 4. Eds. Koen De Temmerman, and Evert van Emde Boas. *Mnemosyne Supplements. Monographs on Greek and Latin Language and Literature*. 411. Ed. C. Pieper. Leiden / Boston, MA: Brill, 2018. 135–152. Print.
- . "Lysias". *Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature. Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative*. Volume 4. Eds. Koen De Temmerman, and Evert van Emde Boas. *Mnemosyne Supplements. Monographs on Greek and Latin Language and Literature*. 411. Ed. C. Pieper. Leiden / Boston, MA: Brill, 2018. 409–427. Print.
- Baldwin, Charles Sears. *Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic. Interpreted from Representative Works*. 1924. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1959. Print.

- . *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic (to 1400). Interpreted from Representative Works*. 1928. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1959. Print.
- . *Renaissance Literary Theory and Practice. Classicism in the Rhetoric and Poetic of Italy, France, and England 1400–1600*. 1939. Ed. Donald Lemen Clark. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1959. Print.
- Barner, Wilfried. *Barockrhetorik. Untersuchung zu ihren geschichtlichen Grundlagen*. 1970. 2nd ed. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2002. Print.
- Barnhart, Robert K., and Sol Steinmetz, eds. *The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology*. New York, NY: H. W. Wilson, 1988. Print.
- Baumlin, James S. "Introduction: Positioning *Ethos* in Historical and Contemporary Theory". *New Essays in Rhetorical and Critical Theory*. Eds. James S. Baumlin, and Tita French Baumlin. *SMU Studies in Composition and Rhetoric*. Ed. Gary Tate. Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist UP, 1994. xi–xxxi. Print.
- Baumlin, James S., and Tita French Baumlin. "On the Psychology of the *Pisteis*: Mapping the Terrains of Mind and Rhetoric". *New Essays in Rhetorical and Critical Theory*. Eds. James S. Baumlin, and Tita French Baumlin. *SMU Studies in Composition and Rhetoric*. Ed. Gary Tate. Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist UP, 1994. 91–112. Print.
- Beaujour, Michel. "Speculum, Method, and Self-Portrayal: Some Epistemological Problems". *Mimesis. From Mirror to Method, Augustine to Descartes*. Eds. John D. Lyons, and Stephen G. Nichols. Hanover, NH / London, UK: Dartmouth College / UP of New England, 1982. 188–196; 267n.–268n. Print.
- Bers, Victor. "Tragedy and rhetoric". *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action*. Ed. Ian Worthington. London, UK: Routledge, 1994. 176–195. Print.
- Bjørnstad, Hall. "Introduction". *Borrowed Feathers. Plagiarism and the Limits of Imitation in Early Modern Europe*. Ed. Hall Bjørnstad. Oslo: Unipub / Oslo Academic P, 2008. 5–17. Print.
- Blass, Friedrich. *Die Attische Beredsamkeit. Dritte Abteilung. Erster Abschnitt: Demosthenes*. 1877. 2nd ed. Vol. III.1. III Vols. Leipzig: Teubner, 1893. Print.
- . *Die Attische Beredsamkeit. Dritte Abteilung. Zweiter Abschnitt: Demosthenes' Genossen und Gegner*. Vol. III.2. III Vols. Leipzig: Teubner, 1880. Print.
- . *Die Attische Beredsamkeit. Erste Abteilung: Von Gorgias bis zu Lysias*. 1868. 2nd ed. Vol. I. III Vols. Leipzig: Teubner, 1887. Print.
- . *Die Attische Beredsamkeit. Zweite Abteilung: Isokrates und Isaïos*. Vol. II. III Vols. Leipzig: Teubner, 1874. Print.
- Bloemendal, Jan. "Rhetoric and Early Modern Latin Drama. The Two Tragedies by the 'Polish Pindar' Simon Simonides (1558–1629): *Castus Ioseph* and *Pentesilea*". *Rhetoric and Drama*. Ed. DS Mayfield. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017. 115–134. Print.
<https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/books/9783110484663/9783110484663-006/9783110484663-006.xml>
- . "Transfer and Integration of Latin and Vernacular Drama in the Early Modern Period. The case of Everyman, Elckerlijc, Homulus and Hecastus". *arcadia* 44.2 (2009): 274–288. Print.
- Bonner, S. F. *The Literary Treatises of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. A Study in the Development of Critical Method*. 1939. *Cambridge Classical Studies*. Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1969. Print.
- . *Roman Declamation in the Late Republic and Early Empire*. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA: U of California P, 1949. Print.
- Boriaud, Jean Yves, and Bernard Schouler. "Persona". Trans. Martin Steinrück, and Thomas

- Zinsmaier. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik. Band 6: Must–Pop*. Ed. Gert Ueding. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*. 6. Ed. Gert Ueding. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2003. 789–810. Print.
- Bornscheuer, Lothar. “Anthropologisches Argumentieren. Kritische Überlegungen zu Hans Blumenbergs ‘Anthropologische Annäherung an die Aktualität der Rhetorik’”. *Rhetorische Anthropologie. Studien zum Homo rhetoricus*. Ed. Josef Kopperschmidt. München: Fink, 2000. 99–112. Print.
- Branham, R. Bracht. *Unruly Eloquence. Lucian and the Comedy of Traditions. Revealing Antiquity*. 2. Ed. G. W. Bowersock. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1989. Print.
- Briesemeister, Dietrich. “Rhetorik und Humanismus in Spanien”. *Renaissance-Rhetorik / Renaissance Rhetoric*. Ed. Heinrich F. Plett. Berlin / New York, NY: de Gruyter, 1993. 92–106. Print.
- Brogan, T. V. F., Albert W. Halsall, and Jeffrey S. Sychterz. “Prosopopoeia”. *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry & Poetics*. Eds. Roland Greene, et al. 4th ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2012. 1120–1121. Print.
- Bruns, Ivo. *Das literarische Porträt der Griechen im fünften und vierten Jahrhundert vor Christi Geburt. Die Persönlichkeit in der Geschichtsschreibung der Alten. Untersuchungen zur Technik der antiken Historiographie*. 1896 / 1898 (Wilhelm Hertz). 2nd ed. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1961. Print.
- Bruss, Kristine S. “Persuasive *Ethopoeia* in Dionysius’s *Lysias*”. *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric* 31.1 (Winter: 2013): 34–57. Print.
- Burger, Heinz Otto. ‘*Dasein heißt eine Rolle spielen*’. *Studien zur deutschen Literaturgeschichte. Literatur als Kunst*. Eds. K. May, and W. Höllerer. München: Hanser, 1963. Print.
- . *Renaissance. Humanismus. Reformation. Deutsche Literatur im europäischen Kontext. Frankfurter Beiträge zur Germanistik*. 7. Eds. Heinz Otto Burger, and Klaus von See. Bad Homburg v.d.H. / Berlin / Zürich: Gehlen, 1969. Print.
- Burrow, Colin. *Shakespeare and Classical Antiquity. Oxford Shakespeare Topics*. Eds. Peter Holland, and Stanley Wells. Oxford, UK: Oxford UP, 2013. Print.
- Campbell, Jackson J. “Adaptation of Classical Rhetoric in Old English Literature”. *Medieval Eloquence. Studies in the Theory and Practice of Medieval Rhetoric*. Ed. James J. Murphy. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA / London, UK: U of California P, 1978. 173–197. Print.
- Caplan, Harry. “Introduction”. *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. 1954. Ed. Harry Caplan. Vol. I. *Loeb Classical Library*. 403. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2004. vii–lviii. Print.
- . *Of Eloquence. Studies in Ancient and Mediaeval Rhetoric*. Eds. Anne King, and Helen North. Ithaca, NY / London, UK: Cornell UP, 1970. Print.
- Carey, Christopher. “Commentary”. *Lysias. Selected Speeches*. 1989. Ed. Christopher Carey. *Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics*. Eds. P. E. Easterling, Philip Hardie, Richard Hunter, and E. J. Kenney. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2002. 59–224. Print.
- . “Introduction”. *Lysias. Selected Speeches*. 1989. Ed. Christopher Carey. *Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics*. Eds. P. E. Easterling, Philip Hardie, Richard Hunter, and E. J. Kenney. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2002. 1–14. Print.
- . “Rhetorical means of persuasion”. *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action*. Ed. Ian Worthington. London, UK: Routledge, 1994. 26–45. Print.
- . *Trials from Classical Athens*. 1997. London, UK / New York, NY: Routledge, 2002. Print.

- Carrithers, Michael, Steven Collins, and Steven Lukes, eds. *The category of the person. Anthropology, philosophy, history*. 1985. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1986. Print.
- Carruthers, Mary. "The concept of *ductus*, or journeying through a work of art". *Rhetoric Beyond Words. Delight and Persuasion in the Arts of the Middle Ages*. 2010. Ed. Mary Carruthers. *Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature*. 78. Ed. Alastair Minnis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2013. 190–213. Print.
- Castro García, Ricardo José. "La locura y los ladridos. El cinismo en las *Novelas Ejemplares* de Miguel de Cervantes". *Caracol 6. Dossiê "Novelas Ejemplares"* (July–Dec: 2013): 178–202. Print.
- Cave, Terence. *The Cornucopian Text. Problems of writing in the French Renaissance*. Oxford UP: Clarendon P, 1979. Print.
- . "The Mimesis of Reading in the Renaissance". *Mimesis. From Mirror to Method, Augustine to Descartes*. Eds. John D. Lyons, and Stephen G. Nichols. Hanover, NH / London, UK: Dartmouth College / UP of New England, 1982. 149–165; 263n.–264n. Print.
- Chase, Cynthia. *Decomposing Figures. Rhetorical Readings in the Romantic Tradition*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986. Print.
- Christiansen, Nancy L. "Rhetoric as Character-Fashioning: The Implications of Delivery's 'Places' in the British Renaissance *Paideia*". *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric* 15.3 (Summer: 1997): 297–334. Print.
- Clark, Donald Lemen. "The Rise and Fall of Progymnasmata in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Grammar Schools". *Speech Monographs* 19.4 (Nov: 1952): 259–263. Print.
- Compagnon, Antoine. "A Long Short Story: Montaigne's Brevity". Trans. Carla Freccero. *Montaigne: Essays in Reading*. Ed. Gérard Defaux. *Yale French Studies*. 64. Ed. Liliane Greene. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1983. 24–50. Print.
- Conley, Thomas M. *Rhetoric in the European Tradition*. New York, NY / London, UK: Longman, 1990. Print.
- Cope, E. M. *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric with Analysis Notes and Appendices*. London, UK: Macmillan, 1867. Print.
- Crane, Mary Thomas. *Framing Authority. Sayings, Self, and Society in Sixteenth-Century England*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1993. Print.
- Crane, William G. *Wit and Rhetoric in the Renaissance. The Formal Basis of Elizabethan Prose Style*. 1937 (New York, NY: Columbia UP). *Columbia University Studies in English and Comparative Literature*. 129. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1964. Print.
- Croally, N. T. *Euripidean Polemic. The Trojan Women and the function of tragedy*. 1994. *Cambridge Classical Studies*. Eds. M. F. Burnyeat, M. K. Hopkins, M. D. Reeve, and A. M. Snodgrass. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. Print.
- Currie, Bruno. "Pindar and Bacchylides". *Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature. Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative*. Volume 4. Eds. Koen De Temmerman, and Evert van Emde Boas. *Mnemosyne Supplements. Monographs on Greek and Latin Language and Literature*. 411. Ed. C. Pieper. Leiden / Boston, MA: Brill, 2018. 293–314. Print.
- Curtius, Ernst Robert. *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter*. 1948. 11th ed. Tübingen / Basel: Francke, 1993. Print.
- Davis, Natalie Zemon. "Boundaries and the Sense of Self in Sixteenth-Century France". *Reconstructing Individualism. Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought*. 1986. Eds. Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellbery. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1988. 53–63; 332n.–335n. Print.

- De Temmerman, Koen, and Evert van Emde Boas. "Character and Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature: An Introduction". *Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature. Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative. Volume 4. Mnemosyne Supplements. Monographs on Greek and Latin Language and Literature*. 411. Ed. C. Pieper. Leiden / Boston, MA: Brill, 2018. 1–23. Print.
- , eds. *Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature. Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative. Volume 4. Mnemosyne Supplements. Monographs on Greek and Latin Language and Literature*. 411. Ed. C. Pieper. Leiden / Boston, MA: Brill, 2018. Print.
- , "Epilogue". *Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature. Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative. Volume 4*. Eds. Koen De Temmerman, and Evert van Emde Boas. *Mnemosyne Supplements. Monographs on Greek and Latin Language and Literature*. 411. Ed. C. Pieper. Leiden / Boston, MA: Brill, 2018. 650–653. Print.
- , "Glossary". *Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature. Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative. Volume 4*. Eds. Koen De Temmerman, and Evert van Emde Boas. *Mnemosyne Supplements. Monographs on Greek and Latin Language and Literature*. 411. Ed. C. Pieper. Leiden / Boston, MA: Brill, 2018. XII–XVI. Print.
- Desmet, Christy. *Reading Shakespeares Characters. Rhetoric, Ethics, and Identity. Massachusetts Studies in Early Modern Culture*. Ed. Arthur F. Kinney. Amherst, MA: U of Massachusetts P, 1992. Print.
- Devries, William Levering. *Ethopoiia. A Rhetorical Study of the Types of Character in the Orations of Lysias. A Dissertation Accepted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Johns Hopkins University, February, 1892*. Baltimore, MD: John Murphy, 1892. Print.
- Dobbin, Robert F. "Commentary". *Epictetus: Discourses Book I*. 1998. Oxford: Clarendon P, 2011. 65–234. Print.
- Dobranski, Stephen B. *Readers and Authorship in Early Modern England*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2005. Print.
- Dockhorn, Klaus. "Kritische Rhetorik?". *Rhetorik. Kritische Positionen zum Stand der Forschung*. Ed. Heinrich F. Plett. *Kritische Information*. 50. München: Fink, 1977. 252–275. Print.
- , *Macht und Wirkung der Rhetorik. Vier Aufsätze zur Ideengeschichte der Vormoderne. Respublica Literaria*. 2. Eds. Joachim Dyck, and Günther List. Bad Homburg v. d. H. / Berlin / Zürich: Gehlen, 1968. Print.
- , "Rhetorica movet. Protestantischer Humanismus und karolingische Renaissance". *Rhetorik. Beiträge zu ihrer Geschichte in Deutschland vom 16.–20. Jahrhundert*. Ed. Helmut Schanze. *Fischer Athenäum Taschenbücher Literaturwissenschaft*. 2095. Frankfurt a.M.: Athenäum Fischer, 1974. 17–42. Print.
- Donaldson, Ian. *The Rapes of Lucretia: A Myth and its Transformations*. Oxford, UK: Oxford UP, 1982. Print.
- Duncan-Jones, Katherine. *Ungentle Shakespeare. Scenes From His Life. Arden Shakespeare*. Eds. Richard Proudfoot, Ann Thompson, and David Scott Kastan. London, UK: Thomson, 2001. Print.
- Duncan-Jones, Katherine, and H.R. Woudhuysen. "Introduction". *Shakespeare's Poems. Venus and Adonis, The Rape of Lucrece and the Shorter Poems*. 2007. Eds. Katherine Duncan-Jones, and H.R. Woudhuysen. 3rd ed. *The Arden Shakespeare*. Eds. Richard Proudfoot, Ann Thompson, David Scott Kastan, and H.R. Woudhuysen. London: Bloomsbury, 2014. 1–124. Print.

- Dusinberre, Juliet. "Introduction". *Shakespeare. As You Like It*. 2006. Ed. Juliet Dusinberre. 3rd ed. *The Arden Shakespeare*. Eds. Richard Proudfoot, Ann Thompson, David Scott Kastan, and H.R. Woudhuysen. London, UK: Bloomsbury, 2015. 1–142. Print.
- Eco, Umberto. *A Theory of Semiotics*. 1976. *Advances in Semiotics*. Ed. Thomas A. Sebeok. Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1979. Print.
- Eden, Kathy. "Cicero's Portion of Montaigne's Acclaim". *Brill's Companion to the Reception of Cicero*. Ed. William H.F. Altman. *Brill's Companions to Classical Reception*. 2. Ed. Kyriakos N. Demetriou. Leiden / Boston, MA: Brill, 2015. 39–55. Print.
- . *Friends Hold All Things in Common. Tradition, Intellectual Property, and the Adages of Erasmus*. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2001. Print.
- . "From the Refutation of Drama to the Drama of Refutation". *Rhetoric and Drama*. Ed. DS Mayfield. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017. 55–70. Print.
<https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/books/9783110484663/9783110484663-003/9783110484663-003.xml>
- . *Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition. Chapters in the Ancient Legacy and Its Humanist Reception*. *Yale Studies in Hermeneutics*. Ed. Joel Weinsheimer. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1997. Print.
- . "Intellectual Property and the Adages of Erasmus: *Coenobium v. Ercto non cito*". *Rhetoric and Law in Early Modern Europe*. Eds. Victoria Kahn, and Lorna Hutson. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2001. 269–284. Print.
- . "Literary Property and the Question of Style. A Prehistory". *Borrowed Feathers. Plagiarism and the Limits of Imitation in Early Modern Europe*. Ed. Hall Bjørnstad. Oslo: Unipub / Oslo Academic P, 2008. 21–38. Print.
- . "Montaigne on Style". *The Oxford Handbook of Montaigne*. Ed. Philippe Desan. *Oxford Handbooks*. Oxford, UK / New York, NY: Oxford UP, 2016. 384–396. Print.
- . *Poetic and Legal Fiction in the Aristotelian Tradition*. 1986. *Princeton Legacy Library*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2014. Print.
- . *The Renaissance Rediscovery of intimacy*. 2012. Chicago, IL: U of Chicago P, 2017. Print.
- . "Rhetoric". *The Classical Tradition*. 2010. Eds. Anthony Grafton, Glenn W. Most, and Salvatore Settis. *Harvard University Press Reference Library*. Cambridge, MA / London, UK: Belknap P of Harvard UP, 2013. 826–830. Print.
- . "Rhetoric in the Hermeneutics of Erasmus' Later Works". *Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook* 11 (1991): 88–104. Print.
- . "The Rhetorical Tradition and Augustinian Hermeneutics in *De doctrina christiana*". *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric* 8.1 (Winter: 1990): 45–63. Print.
- Elam, Keir. *Shakespeares Universe of Discourse. Language-Games in the Comedies*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1984. Print.
- Ellrod, Robert. *Montaigne and Shakespeare. The emergence of modern self-consciousness*. 2011 (*Montaigne et Shakespeare: L'émergence de la conscience moderne*. Paris: José Corti). Manchester, UK: Manchester UP, 2017. Print.
- Emlyn-Jones, Chris, and William Preddy. "Introduction to Books VI–X". *Plato. Republic. Books 6–10*. Eds. Chris Emlyn-Jones, and William Preddy. Vol. VI. *Loeb Classical Library*. 276. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA / London, UK: Harvard UP, 2013. vii–liii. Print.
- Enterline, Lynn. *The Rhetoric of the Body from Ovid to Shakespeare*. *Cambridge Studies in Renaissance Literature and Culture*. 35. Ed. Stephen Orgel. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2000. Print.

- . *Shakespeare's Schoolroom. Rhetoric, Discipline, Emotion*. Philadelphia, PA: U of Pennsylvania P, 2012. Print.
- Evans, J. D. G. *Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1977. Print.
- Feldman, Martha. "The Castrato as a Rhetorical Figure". *Rhetoric and Drama*. Ed. DS Mayfield. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017. 71–96. Print.
<https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/books/9783110484663/9783110484663-004/9783110484663-004.xml>.
- Forman, L. L. "Ethopoiia in Lysias". *The Classical Review* 10.2 (March: 1896): 105–106. Print.
- Forster Smith, Charles. "Introduction. Bibliography". *Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Books I and II*. 1919. Ed. Charles Forster Smith. Vol. I. *Loeb Classical Library*. 108. Ed. G. P. Goold. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1991. vii–xxiii. Print.
- Fortenbaugh, William, Christian Mouchel, and Franz-Hubert Robling. "Ethos". Trans. Andrea Merger, and Susan Nurmi-Schomers. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik. Band 2: Bie–Eul*. Ed. Gert Ueding. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*. 2. Ed. Gert Ueding. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1994. 1516–1543. Print.
- Foster, Edith. *Thucydides, Pericles, and Periclean Imperialism*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2010. Print.
- Fothergill-Payne, Louise. "The Jesuits as Masters of Rhetoric and Drama". *Revista Canadiense de Estudios Hispánicos* 10.3 (Spring: 1986): 375–387. Print.
- Fowler, Harold North. "Introduction to the *Phaedrus*". Trans. Harold North Fowler. *Plato. Euthyphro. Apology. Crito. Phaedo. Phaedrus*. Eds. Harold North Fowler, and W. R. M. Lamb. Vol. I. *Loeb Classical Library*. 36. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1914. 407–411. Print.
- France, Peter. *Rhetoric and Truth in France. Descartes to Diderot*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon P, 1972. Print.
- Freese, John Henry. "Introduction. Bibliography". *Aristotle. The 'Art' of Rhetoric*. 1926. Ed. John Henry Freese. Vol. XXII. *Loeb Classical Library*. 193. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2006. xi–xxxiv. Print.
- Friedrich, Hugo. *Montaigne*. 1949. 3rd ed. Tübingen / Basel: Francke, 1993. Print.
- Fuchs, Barbara. *Passing for Spain. Cervantes and the Fictions of Identity. Hispanisms*. Ed. Anne J. Cruz. Urbana, IL / Chicago, IL / Springfield, IL: U of Illinois P, 2003. Print.
- Fuhrmann, Manfred. *Die antike Rhetorik. Eine Einführung*. 4th ed. Zürich: Artemis & Winkler, 1995. Print.
- . *Die Dichtungstheorie der Antike. Aristoteles – Horaz – 'Longin'*. 1973. Ed. 2nd. *Die Literaturwissenschaft*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992. Print.
- . "Persona, ein römischer Rollenbegriff". *Identität*. 1979. Eds. Odo Marquard, and Karlheinz Stierle. 2nd ed. *Poetik und Hermeneutik*. 8. München: Fink, 1996. 83–106. Print.
- Fumaroli, Marc. "Rhetoric, Politics, and Society: From Italian Ciceronianism to French Classicism". Trans. Ruth B. York. *Renaissance Eloquence. Studies in the Theory and Practice of Renaissance Rhetoric*. Ed. James J. Murphy. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA / London, UK: U of California P, 1983. 253–273. Print.
- Gallo, Ernest. "The *Poetria nova* of Geoffrey of Vinsauf". *Medieval Eloquence. Studies in the Theory and Practice of Medieval Rhetoric*. Ed. James J. Murphy. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA / London, UK: U of California P, 1978. 68–84. Print.
- Garver, Eugene. *Aristotle's Rhetoric. An Art of Character*. Chicago, IL: U of Chicago P, 1994. Print.

- Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Essays*. 1973. 3rd ed. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2017. Print.
- Gill, Christopher. "Particulars, selves and individuals in Stoic philosophy". *Particulars in Greek Philosophy*. Ed. Robert W. Sharples. *The Seventh S. V. Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy (2007: University College London)*. Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2010. 127–145. Print.
- . "Personhood and Personality: The Four-*personae* Theory in Cicero, *de Officiis* I". *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*. Ed. Julia Annas. Vol. VI. Oxford, UK: Clarendon P, 1988. 169–199. Print.
- . "The Question of Character-Development: Plutarch and Tacitus". *The Classical Quarterly* 33.2 (1983): 469–487. Print.
- Goffman, Erving. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. 1959. New York, NY: Penguin, 1990. Print.
- Gomperz, Theodor. *Griechische Denker. Eine Geschichte der Antiken Philosophie (1. Die Anfänge. 2. Von der Metaphysik zur positiven Wissenschaft. 3. Das Zeitalter der Aufklärung)*. 1896 / 1922 (Berlin / Leipzig). Ed. Heinrich Gomperz. 4th ed. Vol. I. III Vols. Frankfurt a.M.: Eichborn, 1999. Print.
- . *Griechische Denker. Eine Geschichte der Antiken Philosophie (4. Sokrates und die Sokratiker. 5. Platon)*. 1902 / 1925 (Berlin / Leipzig). Ed. Heinrich Gomperz. 4th ed. Vol. II. III Vols. Frankfurt a.M.: Eichborn, 1999. Print.
- . *Griechische Denker. Eine Geschichte der Antiken Philosophie (6. Aristoteles und seine Nachfolger)*. 1909 / 1931 (Berlin / Leipzig). Ed. Heinrich Gomperz. 4th ed. Vol. III. III Vols. Frankfurt a.M.: Eichborn, 1999. Print.
- Gordon, Alex L. "The Ascendancy of Rhetoric and the Struggle for Poetic in Sixteenth-Century France". *Renaissance Eloquence. Studies in the Theory and Practice of Renaissance Rhetoric*. Ed. James J. Murphy. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA / London, UK: U of California P, 1983. 376–393. Print.
- Göttert, Karl-Heinz. *Einführung in die Rhetorik. Grundbegriffe – Geschichte – Rezeption*. 1991. UTB. 3rd ed. München: Fink, 1998. Print.
- Grasmück, Ernst Ludwig. "Philosophie als Trost?". *Philosophiae Consolatio / Trost der Philosophie*. Frankfurt a.M.: Insel, 1997. i–xxxiv. Print.
- Gray, Hanna H. "Renaissance Humanism: The Pursuit of Eloquence". *Journal of the History of Ideas* 24.4 (Oct–Dec: 1963): 497–514. Print.
- Green, Lawrence D. "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Renaissance Views of the Emotions". *Renaissance Rhetoric*. Ed. Peter Mack. New York, NY: St. Martin's P, 1994. 1–26. Print.
- Greenblatt, Stephen. "Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture". *Literary Theory / Renaissance Texts*. Eds. Patricia Parker, and David Quint. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986. 210–224. Print.
- . *Renaissance Self-Fashioning. From More to Shakespeare*. 1980. Chicago, IL: U of Chicago P, 2005. Print.
- . *Shakespearean Negotiations. The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England. The New Historicism: Studies in Cultural Poetics*. Ed. Stephen Greenblatt. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA: U of California P, 1988. Print.
- Greene, Thomas M. "The Flexibility of the Self in Renaissance Literature". *The Disciplines of Criticism. Essays in Literary Theory, Interpretation, and History. For René Wellek. On the occasion of his sixty-fifth birthday, August 22, 1968*. Eds. Peter Demetz, Thomas M. Greene, and Lowry Nelson Jr. New Haven, CT / London, UK: Yale UP, 1968. 241–264. Print.

- Grube, G. M. A. *The Greek and Roman Critics*. 1968 (U of Toronto P). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1995. Print.
- Hacking, Ian. "Making Up People". *Reconstructing Individualism. Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought*. 1986. Eds. Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellbery. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1988. 222–236; 347n.–348n. Print.
- Hahn, Alois. "Identität und Selbstthematization". *Selbstthematization und Selbstzeugnis: Bekenntnis und Geständnis*. Eds. Alois Hahn, and Volker Kapp. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1987. 9–24. Print.
- Hammond, Carolyn J.-B. "Introduction". *Augustine. Confessions. Books 1–8*. Ed. Carolyn J.-B. Hammond. Vol. I. *Loeb Classical Library*. 26. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2014. xiii–xl. Print.
- . "Timeline. Life of Augustine. The Wider Church and the Empire". *Augustine. Confessions. Books 1–8*. Ed. Carolyn J.-B. Hammond. Vol. I. *Loeb Classical Library*. 26. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2014. lx–lxv. Print.
- Harding, Phillip. "Comedy and rhetoric". *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action*. Ed. Ian Worthington. London, UK: Routledge, 1994. 196–221. Print.
- Hartmann, Volker. "Personifikation". *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik. Band 6: Must–Pop*. Ed. Gert Ueding. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*. 6. Ed. Gert Ueding. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2003. 810–813. Print.
- Harvey, Elizabeth D. *Ventriloquized Voices. Feminist Theory and English Renaissance Texts*. 1992. London, UK / New York, NY: Routledge, 1995. Print.
- . "Ventriloquizing Sappho, or the Lesbian Muse". *Re-Reading Sappho. Reception and Transmission*. Ed. Ellen Greene. *Classics and Contemporary Thought*. Ed. Thomas Habinek. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA: U of California P, 1996. 79–104. Print.
- Hellwig, Antje. *Untersuchungen zur Theorie der Rhetorik bei Platon und Aristoteles. Hypomnemata. Untersuchungen zur Antike und zu ihrem Nachleben*. 38. Eds. Albrecht Dihle, Hartmut Erbse, Christian Habicht, Günther Patzig, and Bruno Snell. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 1973. Print.
- Hempfer, Klaus W. "Rhetorik als Gesellschaftstheorie: Castigliones *Il libro del Cortegiano*". *Literarhistorische Begegnungen. Festschrift zum sechzigsten Geburtstag von Bernhard König*. Eds. Andreas Kablitz, and Ulrich Schulz-Buschhaus. Tübingen: Narr, 1993. 103–121. Print.
- Henderson, Judith Rice. "Erasmus on the Art of Letter-Writing". *Renaissance Eloquence. Studies in the Theory and Practice of Renaissance Rhetoric*. Ed. James J. Murphy. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA / London, UK: U of California P, 1983. 331–355. Print.
- Herrick, Marvin T. *Comic Theory in the Sixteenth Century*. 1950 (*Illinois Studies in Language and Literature*, Vol. 34, Nos. 1–2). *Illini Books*. 18. Urbana, IL: U of Illinois P, 1964. Print.
- Heudecker, Sylvia, and Jörg Wesche. "Rhetorik und Stilistik der deutschsprachigen Länder in der Zeit des Barock / Rhetoric and stylistics of the German-speaking countries in the Baroque". *Rhetorik und Stilistik / Rhetoric and Stylistics: Ein internationales Handbuch historischer und systematischer Forschung / An International Handbook of Historical and Systematic Research*. Eds. Ulla Fix, Andreas Gardt, and Joachim Knape. Vol. 1. *Handbücher zur Sprach- und Kommunikationswissenschaft / Handbooks of Linguistics and Communication Science*. 31.1. Berlin / Boston, MA: de Gruyter Mouton, 2008. 97–112. Print.

- Hirzel, Rudolf. "Der Selbstmord". *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*. 11. Eds. Albrecht Dieterich, H. Oldenberg, C. Bezold, and K. Th. Preusz. Leipzig: Teubner, 1908. 75–104; 243–284; 417–476. Print.
- . *Die Person. Begriff und Name derselben im Altertum. Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-philologische und historische Klasse*. 10. München: Verlag der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1914. Print.
- Hobbs, Angela. "On Christopher Gill on 'Particulars, selves and individuals in Stoic philosophy'". *Particulars in Greek Philosophy*. Ed. Robert W. Sharples. *The Seventh S. V. Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy (2007: University College London)*. Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2010. 146–155. Print.
- Hodkinson, Owen. "Lucian". *Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature. Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative*. Volume 4. Eds. Koen De Temmerman, and Evert van Emde Boas. *Mnemosyne Supplements. Monographs on Greek and Latin Language and Literature*. 411. Ed. C. Pieper. Leiden / Boston, MA: Brill, 2018. 542–557. Print.
- Hollis, Martin. "Of masks and men". *The category of the person. Anthropology, philosophy, history*. Eds. Michael Carrithers, Steven Collins, and Steven Lukes. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1986. 217–233. Print.
- Hutson, Lorna. "Ethopoeia, Source-Study and Legal History: A Post-Theoretical Approach to the Question of 'Character' in Shakespearean Drama". *Post-Theory. New Directions in Criticism*. Eds. Martin McQuillan, Graeme Macdonald, Robin Purves, and Stephen Thomson. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh UP, 1999. 139–160. Print.
- Jakobson, Roman. "Linguistics and Poetics". *Language in Literature*. Eds. Krystyna Pomorska, and Stephen Rudy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1987. 62–94. Print.
- Kablitz, Andreas. "Semantik und Pragmatik bei Montaigne und Nietzsche". *Textologie. Theorie und Praxis interdisziplinärer Textforschung*. Eds. Martin Endres, Axel Pichler, and Claus Zittel. Vol. 1. Berlin / Boston, MA: de Gruyter, 2017. 117–198. Print.
- Kahn, Victoria. "Humanism and the Resistance to Theory". *Literary Theory / Renaissance Texts*. Eds. Patricia Parker, and David Quint. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986. 373–396. Print.
- Kasprzyk, Dimitri. "Dio Chrysostom". *Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature. Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative*. Volume 4. Eds. Koen De Temmerman, and Evert van Emde Boas. *Mnemosyne Supplements. Monographs on Greek and Latin Language and Literature*. 411. Ed. C. Pieper. Leiden / Boston, MA: Brill, 2018. 523–541. Print.
- Kendall, Calvin B. "Bede's *Historia ecclesiastica*: The Rhetoric of Faith". *Medieval Eloquence. Studies in the Theory and Practice of Medieval Rhetoric*. Ed. James J. Murphy. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA / London, UK: U of California P, 1978. 145–172. Print.
- Kennedy, George A. *Aristotle. On Rhetoric. A Theory of Civic Discourse*. Ed. and trans. by George A. Kennedy. New York, NY / Oxford, UK: Oxford UP, 1991. Print.
- . *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1963. Print.
- . *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times*. Chapel Hill, NC: U of North Carolina P, 1980. Print.
- . *Comparative Rhetoric. An Historical and Cross-Cultural Introduction*. New York, NY / Oxford, UK: Oxford UP, 1998. Print.
- . "Introduction". *Progymnasmata. Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric*. Ed. George A. Kennedy. *Writings from the Greco-Roman World*. 10. Eds. John T. Fitzgerald, and Donald A. Russell. Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003. ix–xvi. Print.

- . *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1994. Print.
- . “Prooemion”. *Aristotle. On Rhetoric. A Theory of Civic Discourse*. Ed. George A. Kennedy. New York, NY / Oxford, UK: Oxford UP, 1991. vii–xiii. Print.
- Kibédi Varga, A. “Rhetoric, a Story or a System? A Challenge to Historians of Renaissance Rhetoric”. *Renaissance Eloquence. Studies in the Theory and Practice of Renaissance Rhetoric*. Ed. James J. Murphy. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA / London, UK: U of California P, 1983. 84–91. Print.
- King, J. E. “Introduction. Arguments”. *Cicero. Tusculan Disputations (Tusculanae disputationes)*. 1927. Ed. J. E. King. Vol. XVIII. *Loeb Classical Library*. 141. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1945. xi–xli. Print.
- Kinney, Arthur F. “Rhetoric and Fiction in Elizabethan England”. *Renaissance Eloquence. Studies in the Theory and Practice of Renaissance Rhetoric*. Ed. James J. Murphy. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA / London, UK: U of California P, 1983. 385–393. Print.
- Knappe, Joachim. *Autorenlexikon. Deutsche Rhetoren 1450–1700. Tübinger Schriften zur Renaissanceforschung und Kulturwissenschaft*. 60. Eds. Joachim Knappe, Reinhold F. Gleis, and Ulrich Pfisterer. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2017. Print.
- Knop, Déborah. “Montaigne on Rhetoric”. *The Oxford Handbook of Montaigne*. Ed. Philippe Desan. *Oxford Handbooks*. Oxford, UK / New York, NY: Oxford UP, 2016. 397–414. Print.
- Kohut, Karl. “Die spanische Poetik zwischen Rhetorik und Historiographie”. *Renaissance-Poetik / Renaissance Poetics*. Ed. Heinrich F. Plett. Berlin / New York, NY: de Gruyter, 1994. 75–93. Print.
- König, Jason. *Greek Literature in the Roman Empire. Classical World Series*. London, UK: Bristol Classical P, 2009. Print.
- Kopperschmidt, Josef. “Rhetorik als Sprachrohr einer anderen Politik: z.B. Augustin”. *Politik und Rhetorik. Funktionsmodelle politischer Rede*. Ed. Josef Kopperschmidt. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1995. 102–125. Print.
- Körte, Alfred. “XAPAKTHP [Charakter]”. *Hermes* 64 (Jan: 1929): 69–86. Print.
- Kraus, Christina Shuttleworth. “Commentary”. *Livy. Ab Vrbe Condita. Book VI*. Ed. Christina Shuttleworth Kraus. *Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics*. Eds. E. J. Kenney, and P. E. Easterling. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1994. 83–333. Print.
- Kruse, Margot. “Autorporträt und Selbstdarstellung bei Luigi Groto”. *Interpretation. Das Paradigma der Europäischen Renaissance-Literatur. Festschrift für Alfred Noyer-Weidner zum 60. Geburtstag*. Eds. Klaus W. Hempfer, and Gerhard Regn. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1983. 170–190. Print.
- Küpper, Joachim, ed. *Approaches to World Literature. WeltLiteraturen / World Literatures*. 1. Eds. Irmela Hijiya-Kirschner, Stefan Kepler-Tasaki, and Joachim Küpper. Berlin: Akademie, 2013. Print.
- . *The Cultural Net. Early Modern Drama as a Paradigm*. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2018. Print. <https://www.degruyter.com/viewbooktoc/product/486166>.
- . *Discursive Renovatio in Lope de Vega and Calderón. Studies on Spanish Baroque Drama. With an Excursus on the Evolution of Discourse in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and Mannerism*. 1990 (*Diskurs-Renovatio bei Lope de Vega und Calderón*). Tübingen: Narr. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017. Print. <https://www.degruyter.com/viewbooktoc/product/491780>.
- . *Diskurs-Renovatio bei Lope de Vega und Calderón. Untersuchungen zum spanischen Barockdrama. Mit einer Skizze zur Evolution der Diskurse in Mittelalter, Renaissance und Manierismus. Romanica Monacensia*. 32. Tübingen: Narr, 1990. Print.

- “Düstere Welt und lichte Perspektive in den Cervantinischen Novelas ejemplares”. *Konfigurationen der Macht in der Frühen Neuzeit*. Eds. Roland Galle, and Rudolf Behrens. *Neues Forum für Allgemeine und Vergleichende Literaturwissenschaft*. 6. Eds. Horst-Jürgen Gerigk, and Maria Moog-Grünewald. Heidelberg: Winter, 2000. 167–216. Print.
 - “The Early Modern European Drama and the Cultural Net: Some Basic Hypotheses”. *Theatre Cultures within Globalising Empires. Looking at Early Modern England and Spain*. Eds. Joachim Küpper, and Leonie Pawlita. Berlin / Boston, MA: de Gruyter, 2018. 1–11. Print. <https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/books/9783110536881/9783110536881-001/9783110536881-001.pdf>.
 - “Einige Bemerkungen zum Verhältnis von Geisteswissenschaften und Theorie”. *The Beauty of Theory. Zur Ästhetik und Affektökonomie von Theorien*. Eds. Joachim Küpper, Markus Rautzenberg, Mirjam Schaub, and Regine Strätling. München: Fink, 2013. 19–33. Print.
 - “Mittelalterlich Kosmische Ordnung und Rinascimentales Bewusstsein von Kontingenz. Fernando de Rojas’ *Celestina* als Inszenierung sinnfremder Faktizität (Mit Bemerkungen zu Boccaccio, Petrarca, Machiavelli und Montaigne)”. *Kontingenz*. Eds. Gerhart von Graevenitz, and Odo Marquard. *Poetik und Hermeneutik*. XVII. München: Fink, 1998. 173–223. Print.
 - “National Literatures’?”. *Poetics and Politics. Net Structures and Agencies in Early Modern Drama*. Eds. Joachim Küpper, Toni Bernhart, Jaša Drnovšek, Sven Thorsten Kilian, and Jan Mosch. Berlin / Boston, MA: de Gruyter, 2018. 19–35. Print. <https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/books/9783110536690/9783110536690-002/9783110536690-002.pdf>.
 - *Petrarca. Das Schweigen der Veritas und die Worte des Dichters*. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002. Print.
 - “Rhetoric and the Cultural Net: Transnational Agencies of Culture”. *Rhetoric and Drama*. Ed. DS Mayfield. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017. 151–175. Print. <https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/books/9783110484663/9783110484663-008/9783110484663-008.xml>.
 - “Some Remarks on World Literature”. *Approaches to World Literature*. Ed. Joachim Küpper. *WeltLiteraturen / World Literatures*. 1. Eds. Irmela Hijiya-Kirschnereit, Stefan Keppler-Tasaki, and Joachim Küpper. Berlin: Akademie, 2013. 167–176. Print.
 - “Zum Romantischen Mythos der Subjektivität. Lamartines *Invocation* und Nervals *El Desdichado*”. *Zeitschrift für französische Sprache und Literatur* 98.2 (1988): 137–165. Print.
- Küpper, Joachim, Toni Bernhart, Jaša Drnovšek, Sven Thorsten Kilian, and Jan Mosch. “Introduction. Poetics and Politics: Net Structures and Agencies in Early Modern Drama”. *Poetics and Politics. Net Structures and Agencies in Early Modern Drama*. Eds. Joachim Küpper, Toni Bernhart, Jaša Drnovšek, Sven Thorsten Kilian, and Jan Mosch. Berlin / Boston, MA: de Gruyter, 2018. 1–18. Print. <https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/books/9783110536690/9783110536690-001/9783110536690-001.pdf>.
- Küpper, Joachim, and Leonie Pawlita. “Preface”. *Theatre Cultures within Globalising Empires. Looking at Early Modern England and Spain*. Eds. Joachim Küpper, and Leonie Pawlita. Berlin / Boston, MA: de Gruyter, 2018. V–IX. Print. <https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/books/9783110536881/9783110536881-201/9783110536881-201.pdf>.

- Kustas, George L. "The Function and Evolution of Byzantine Rhetoric". *Viator* 1 (Jan: 1971): 55–73. Print.
- Lamb, W. R. M. "Introduction to the *Gorgias*". *Plato. Lysis. Symposium. Gorgias*. Ed. W. R. M. Lamb. Vol. III. *Loeb Classical Library*. 166. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1925. 249–257. Print.
- . "Preface. Select Bibliography. General Introduction. Chronological Summary". *Lysias*. 1930. Ed. W. R. M. Lamb. *Loeb Classical Library*. 244. Ed. G. P. Goold. Cambridge, MA / London, UK: Harvard UP / Heinemann, 1976. vii–xxvi. Print.
- . "XXXII. Against Diogeiton. Introduction". *Lysias*. 1930. Ed. W. R. M. Lamb. *Loeb Classical Library*. 244. Ed. G. P. Goold. Cambridge, MA / London, UK: Harvard UP / Heinemann, 1976. 656–659. Print.
- Lanham, Carol Dana. "Freshman Composition in the Early Middle Ages: Epistolography and Rhetoric before the *ars dictaminis*". *Viator* 23 (Jan: 1992): 115–134. Print.
- . "Writing Instruction from Late Antiquity to the Twelfth Century". *A Short History of Writing Instruction. From Ancient Greece to Modern America*. 1990. Ed. James J. Murphy. 2nd ed. Mahwah, NJ: Hermagoras P, 2001. 79–121. Print.
- Lausberg, Heinrich. *Elemente der literarischen Rhetorik*. 1963. 10th ed. Ismaning: Hueber, 1990. Print.
- . *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik. Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft*. 1960. 4th ed. Stuttgart: Steiner, 2008. Print.
- Leach, Elizabeth Eva. "Nature's forge and mechanical production: writing, reading and performing song". *Rhetoric Beyond Words. Delight and Persuasion in the Arts of the Middle Ages*. 2010. Ed. Mary Carruthers. *Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature*. 78. Ed. Alastair Minnis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2013. 72–95. Print.
- Lewis, C. S. *English Literature in the Sixteenth Century excluding Drama. The Completion of the Clark Lectures. Trinity College, Cambridge, 1944*. 1954. *Oxford History of English Literature*. III. Eds. F. P. Wilson, Bonamy Dobrée, and Norman Davis. Oxford, UK: Clarendon P, 1968. Print.
- Lobsien, Verena Olejniczak. "Oroonokos 'Great Mistress'. Fremdheit und Macht bei Montaigne, Shakespeare und Aphra Behn". *Konfigurationen der Macht in der Frühen Neuzeit*. Eds. Roland Galle, and Rudolf Behrens. *Neues Forum für Allgemeine und Vergleichende Literaturwissenschaft*. 6. Eds. Horst-Jürgen Gerigk, and Maria Moog-Grünwald. Heidelberg: Winter, 2000. 127–165. Print.
- López Grigera, Luisa. *La Retórica en la España del Siglo de Oro. Teoría y práctica*. 1994. *Acta Salmanticensia. Estudios Filológicos*. 255. 2nd ed. Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1995. Print.
- Mack, Peter. *A History of Renaissance Rhetoric 1380–1620. Oxford-Warburg Studies*. Eds. Charles Hope, and Ian Maclean. Oxford, UK: Oxford UP, 2011. Print.
- . *Reading and Rhetoric in Montaigne and Shakespeare*. 2010. *Warwick Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities (The WISH List)*. Eds. Jonathan Bate, Stella Bruzzi, Thomas Docherty, and Margot Finn. London, UK / New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2015. Print.
- Mansfield, Harvey C. "The Cuckold in Machiavelli's *Mandragola*". *The Comedy & Tragedy of Machiavelli. Essays on the Literary Works*. Ed. Vickie B. Sullivan. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2000. 1–29. Print.
- . *Machiavelli's New Modes and Orders. A Study of the Discourses on Livy*. 1979 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP). Chicago, IL / London, UK: U of Chicago P, 2001. Print.
- . *Machiavelli's Virtue*. Chicago, IL: U of Chicago P, 1996. Print.

- Mansfield, Harvey C., and Nathan Tarkov. "A Note on the Translation". *Machiavelli. Discourses on Livy*. Eds. Harvey C. Mansfield, and Nathan Tarkov. Chicago, IL: U of Chicago P, 1998. xlix–li. Print.
- Mareel, Samuel. "Rederijkers". *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry & Poetics*. Eds. Roland Greene, et al. 4th ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2012. 1151. Print.
- Marschall, Veronika. "Theater". *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik. Band 9: St–Z*. Ed. Gert Ueding. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*. 9. Ed. Gert Ueding. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2009. 510–528. Print.
- Maxwell, Julie. "How the Renaissance (Mis)Used Sources: The Art of Misquotation". *How To Do Things with Shakespeare. New Approaches, New Essays*. Ed. Laurie Maguire. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2008. 54–76. Print.
- Mayfield, DS. "'Against the Dog only a dog'. Talking Canines Civilizing Cynicism in Cervantes' 'coloquio de los perros' (With Tentative Remarks on the Discourse and Method of Animal Studies)". *Humanities* 6.2.28. *Special Issue Animal Narratology* (June: 2017): 1–39. <http://www.mdpi.com/2076-0787/6/2/28/pdf>.
- . *Artful Immorality – Variants of Cynicism. Machiavelli, Gracián, Diderot, Nietzsche. WeltLiteraturen / World Literatures*. 8. Eds. Irmela Hijiya-Kirschner, Stefan Keppler-Tasaki, and Joachim Küpper. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015. Print. <https://www.degruyter.com/viewbooktoc/product/457331>.
- . "Interplay with Variation: Approaching Rhetoric and Drama". *Rhetoric and Drama*. Ed. DS Mayfield. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017. 3–52. Print. <https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/books/9783110484663/9783110484663-002/9783110484663-002.xml>.
- . "Otherwise. Rhetorical Techniques of Contradiction (With Remarks on Quintilian, Augustine, Machiavelli, Shakespeare, Gracián)". *Contradiction Studies: Mapping the Field. Proceedings of the international conference held at the University of Bremen, February 9–11, 2017*. Eds. Gisela Felber, Cordula Nolte, and Ingo H. Warnke. Wiesbaden: Springer, Forthcoming. Print.
- . "Proceedings". *Rhetoric and Drama*. Ed. DS Mayfield. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017. 203–229. Print. <https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/books/9783110484663/9783110484663-010/9783110484663-010.xml>.
- . "Variants of *hypólepsis*: Rhetorical, Anthropistic, Dramatic (With Remarks on Terence, Machiavelli, Shakespeare)". *Poetics and Politics. Net Structures and Agencies in Early Modern Drama*. Eds. Joachim Küpper, Toni Bernhart, Jaša Drnovšek, Sven Thorsten Kilian, and Jan Mosch. Berlin / Boston, MA: de Gruyter, 2018. 233–274. Print. <https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/books/9783110536690/9783110536690-014/9783110536690-014.pdf>.
- McDonald, Charles Osborne. *The Rhetoric of Tragedy. Form in Stuart Drama*. Amherst, MA: U of Massachusetts P, 1966. Print.
- McGowan, Margaret M. *Montaigne's Deceits. The Art of Persuasion in the Essais*. London, UK: U of London P, 1974. Print.
- Medine, Peter E. "Introduction". *Wilson. The Art of Rhetoric (1560)*. Ed. Peter E. Medine. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 1994. 1–31. Print.
- Menke, Bettine. *Prosopopoiia. Stimme und Text bei Brentano, Hoffmann, Kleist und Kafka*. München: Fink, 2000. Print.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. *Signs*. 1960 (*Signes*. Paris: Gallimard). Ed. and trans. by Richard C.

- McCleary. *Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy*. Ed. John Wild. 3rd ed. Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1972. Print.
- Merriam-Webster (Publisher). “sermocination”. *Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary*. 11th ed. Merriam-Webster. 2008.
<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sermocination>.
- “ventriloquism”. *Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary*. 11th ed. Merriam-Webster. 2008.
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ventriloquism>.
- Meyer, Ahlrich. “Nachwort des Herausgebers”. *Blumenberg. Rigorismus der Wahrheit. ‘Moses der Ägypter’ und weitere Texte zu Freud und Arendt*. Ed. Ahlrich Meyer. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2015. 105–130. Print.
- Momigliano, A. “Marcel Mauss and the quest for the person in Greek biography and autobiography”. *The category of the person. Anthropology, philosophy, history*. Eds. Michael Carrithers, Steven Collins, and Steven Lukes. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1986. 83–92. Print.
- Monfasani, John. “The Byzantine Rhetorical Tradition and the Renaissance”. *Renaissance Eloquence. Studies in the Theory and Practice of Renaissance Rhetoric*. Ed. James J. Murphy. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA / London, UK: U of California P, 1983. 174–187. Print.
- Moos, Peter von. *Geschichte als Topik. Das rhetorische Exemplum von der Antike zur Neuzeit und die historiae im ‘Policraticus’ Johanns von Salisbury. Ordo. Studien zur Literatur und Gesellschaft des Mittelalters und der Frühen Neuzeit*. 2. Eds. Ulrich Ernst, and Christel Meier. Hildesheim / Zürich / New York, NY: Olms, 1988. Print.
- Morford, Mark P. O. “*Ethopoiia* and Character-Assassination in the *Conon* of Demosthenes”. *Mnemosyne*. Fourth Series. 19.3 (1966): 241–248. Print.
- Morgan, Kathryn. “Plato”. *Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature. Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative*. Volume 4. Eds. Koen De Temmerman, and Evert van Emde Boas. *Mnemosyne Supplements. Monographs on Greek and Latin Language and Literature*. 411. Ed. C. Pieper. Leiden / Boston, MA: Brill, 2018. 445–464. Print.
- Morgan, Morris H. “Introduction”. *Eight Orations of Lysias*. Ed. Morris H. Morgan. *College Series of Greek Authors*. Eds. John Williams White, and Thomas Day Seymour. Boston, MA: Ginn, 1897. vii–liii. Print.
- “Oration XXIV. ‘For the Cripple’. Introduction”. *Eight Orations of Lysias*. Ed. Morris H. Morgan. *College Series of Greek Authors*. Eds. John Williams White, and Thomas Day Seymour. Boston, MA: Ginn, 1897. 116–120. Print.
- “Oration XXXII. ‘Against Diog[e]iton’. Introduction”. *Eight Orations of Lysias*. Ed. Morris H. Morgan. *College Series of Greek Authors*. Eds. John Williams White, and Thomas Day Seymour. Boston, MA: Ginn, 1897. 152–156. Print.
- Most, Glenn W. “Reflecting Sappho”. *Re-Reading Sappho. Reception and Transmission*. Ed. Ellen Greene. *Classics and Contemporary Thought*. Ed. Thomas Habinek. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA: U of California P, 1996. 11–35. Print.
- Murphy, James J. “The Key Role of Habit in Roman Writing Instruction”. *A Short History of Writing Instruction. From Ancient Greece to Modern America*. 1990. Ed. James J. Murphy. 2nd ed. Mahwah, NJ: Hermagoras P, 2001. 35–78. Print.
- “One Thousand Neglected Authors: The Scope and Importance of Renaissance Rhetoric”. *Renaissance Eloquence. Studies in the Theory and Practice of Renaissance Rhetoric*. Ed. James J. Murphy. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA / London, UK: U of California P, 1983. 20–36. Print.

- . *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages. A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine to the Renaissance*. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA / London, UK: U of California P, 1974. Print.
- Nagy, Gregory. "The Crisis of Performance". *The Ends of Rhetoric. History, Theory, Practice*. Eds. John Bender, and David E. Wellbery. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1990. 43–59; 213–219. Print.
- Naschert, Guido. "Ethopoeia". *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik. Band 2: Bie–Eul*. Ed. Gert Ueding. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*. 2. Ed. Gert Ueding. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1994. 1512–1516. Print.
- Nash, Walter. *Rhetoric. The Wit of Persuasion. The Language Library*. Ed. David Crystal. Oxford, UK / Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1989. Print.
- Nédoncelle, Maurice. "Prosopon et Persona dans l'Antiquité Classique. Essai de Bilan Linguistique". *Revue des Sciences Religieuses* 22.3–4 (Jan: 1948): 277–299. Print.
- Neumann, Florian. "Nachwort". *Lipsius. De Constantia / Von der Standhaftigkeit. Lateinisch – Deutsch*. Ed. Florian Neumann. *excerpta classica*. XVI. Mainz: Dieterich, 1998. 421–446. Print.
- Neumann, Uwe. "Agonistik". *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik. Band 1: A–Bib*. Ed. Gert Ueding. Vol. 1. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*. Ed. Gert Ueding. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1992. 261–285. Print.
- Niehues-Pröbsting, Heinrich. *Der Kynismus des Diogenes und der Begriff des Zynismus*. 2nd ed. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1988. Print.
- . *Die antike Philosophie. Schrift, Schule, Lebensform. Europäische Geschichte*. Ed. Wolfgang Benz. Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 2004. Print.
- . "Ethos. Zur Rückgewinnung einer rhetorischen Fundamentalkategorie". *Rhetorische Anthropologie. Studien zum Homo rhetoricus*. Ed. Josef Kopperschmidt. München: Fink, 2000. 339–352. Print.
- . "Rhetorik und Ästhetik". *Jahrbuch Rhetorik* 18 (1999): 44–61. Print.
- . "Überredung zum Glauben". *Jahrbuch Rhetorik* 34. *Rhetorik und Religion* (Nov: 2015): 13–44. Print.
- . *Überredung zur Einsicht. Der Zusammenhang von Philosophie und Rhetorik bei Platon und in der Phänomenologie. Philosophische Abhandlungen*. 54. Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1987. Print.
- Nolting-Hauff, Ilse. "Pikaresker Roman und menippeische Satire". *Die Pluralität der Welten. Aspekte der Renaissance in der Romania*. Eds. Wolf-Dieter Stempel, and Karlheinz Stierle. *Romanistisches Kolloquium*. IV. München: Fink, 1987. 181–200. Print.
- Norden, Eduard. *Die Antike Kunstprosa vom VI. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance*. 1915 (Leipzig / Berlin). 10th ed. Vol. II. II Vols. Stuttgart / Leipzig: Teubner, 1995. Print.
- . *Die Antike Kunstprosa vom VI. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance*. 1915 (Leipzig / Berlin). 10th ed. Vol. I. II Vols. Stuttgart / Leipzig: Teubner, 1995. Print.
- Oesterreich, Peter L. *Fundamentalrhetorik. Untersuchung zu Person und Rede in der Öffentlichkeit. Paradeigmata*. 11. Hamburg: Meiner, 1990. Print.
- . "Person". *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik. Band 10: Nachträge A–Z*. Ed. Gert Ueding. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*. 10. Ed. Gert Ueding. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2012. 862–872. Print.
- . "Polypersonalität. Das *grand arcanum* starker autoinvenienter Subjektivität". *Wege moderner Rhetorikforschung. Klassische Fundamente und interdisziplinäre Entwicklung*.

- Eds. Gert Ueding, and Gregor Kalivoda. *Rhetorik-Forschungen*. 21. Eds. Joachim Dyck, and Gert Ueding. Berlin / Boston, MA: de Gruyter, 2014. 75–88. Print.
- . “Subjektivität, rhetorische”. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik. Band 10: Nachträge A–Z*. Ed. Gert Ueding. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*. 10. Ed. Gert Ueding. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2012. 1290–1301. Print.
- Olmsted, Wendy. “Invention, Emotion, and Conversion in Augustine’s *Confessions*”. *Rhetorical Invention & Religious Inquiry. New Perspectives*. Eds. Walter Jost, and Wendy Olmsted. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2000. 65–86. Print.
- Onions, C. T., G. W. S. Friedrichsen, and R. W. Burchfield, eds. *The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology*. 1966. Oxford, UK: Clarendon P, 1967. Print.
- Otter, Monika. “Vultus adest (the face helps): performance, expressivity and interiority”. *Rhetoric Beyond Words. Delight and Persuasion in the Arts of the Middle Ages*. 2010. Ed. Mary Carruthers. *Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature*. 78. Ed. Alastair Minnis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2013. 151–172. Print.
- Ottmers, Clemens, and Fabian Klotz. *Rhetorik. Sammlung Metzler*. 283. 2nd ed. Stuttgart / Weimar: Metzler, 2007. Print.
- Payr, Theresia. “Einleitung”. *Erasmus. Dialogus cui titulus Ciceronianus sive de optimo dicendi genere / Der Ciceronianer oder Der beste Stil. Ein Dialog — Adagiorum Chiliades (Adagia selecta) / Mehrere Tausend Sprichwörter und Sprichwörtliche Redensarten (Auswahl)*. 1972. Ed. Theresia Payr. 2nd ed. Vol. 7. *Ausgewählte Schriften. Acht Bände. Lateinisch und Deutsch. Sonderausgabe*. Ed. Werner Welzig. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1995. XI–LIV. Print.
- Pearson, Lionel. “Characterization in Drama and Oratory-Poetics 1450^a20”. *The Classical Quarterly* 18.1 (May: 1968): 76–83. Print.
- . *The Greek Historians of the West. Timaeus and His Predecessors. Philological Monographs of the American Philological Association*. XXXV. Ed. Timothy D. Barnes. Atlanta, GA: Scholars P / American Philological Association, 1987. Print.
- . *Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece*. 1962. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1966. Print.
- Percival, W. Keith. “Grammar and Rhetoric in the Renaissance”. *Renaissance Eloquence. Studies in the Theory and Practice of Renaissance Rhetoric*. Ed. James J. Murphy. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA / London, UK: U of California P, 1983. 303–330. Print.
- Perelman, Chaïm. *The Realm of Rhetoric*. Trans. William Kluback. Ed. Carroll C. Arnold. Notre Dame, IN: U of Notre Dame P, 1982. Print.
- Perelman, Chaïm, and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca. *The New Rhetoric. A Treatise on Argumentation*. 1958 (Presses Universitaires de France: *La Nouvelle Rhétorique: Traité de l’Argumentation*). Trans. John Wilkinson, and Purcell Weaver. Notre Dame, IN: U of Notre Dame P, 1971. Print.
- Pfister, Manfred. *Das Drama. Theorie und Analyse*. 1988. *UTB*. 11th ed. Fink: München, 2001. Print.
- Plett, Heinrich F. “EVIDENTIA. Zur Rhetorik der Präsenz in den artes der Frühen Neuzeit”. *Norm und Poesie. Zur expliziten und impliziten Poetik in der lateinischen Literatur der Frühen Neuzeit*. Eds. Beate Hintzen, and Roswitha Simons. *Frühe Neuzeit*. 178. Eds. Achim Aurnhammer, Wilhelm Kühlmann, Jan-Dirk Müller, Martin Mulsow, and Friedrich Vollhardt. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013. 255–273. Print.
- . “The Place and Function of Style in Renaissance Poetics”. *Renaissance Eloquence. Studies in the Theory and Practice of Renaissance Rhetoric*. Ed. James J. Murphy. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA / London, UK: U of California P, 1983. 356–375. Print.

- . *Rhetoric and Renaissance Culture*. Berlin / New York, NY: de Gruyter, 2004. Print.
- . “Rhetorik der Renaissance – Renaissance der Rhetorik”. *Renaissance-Rhetorik / Renaissance Rhetoric*. Ed. Heinrich F. Plett. Berlin / New York, NY: de Gruyter, 1993. 1–20. Print.
- . *Systematische Rhetorik. Konzepte und Analysen*. UTB. 2127. München: Fink, 2000. Print.
- . “*Theatrum Rhetoricum*: Schauspiel – Dichtung – Politik”. *Renaissance-Rhetorik / Renaissance Rhetoric*. Ed. Heinrich F. Plett. Berlin / New York, NY: de Gruyter, 1993. 328–368. Print.
- Prins, Yopie. “Sappho’s Afterlife in Translation”. *Re-Reading Sappho. Reception and Transmission*. Ed. Ellen Greene. *Classics and Contemporary Thought*. Ed. Thomas Habinek. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA: U of California P, 1996. 36–67. Print.
- Ptassek, Peter. “III. Die Entdeckung der rhetorischen Rationalität in der Antike”. *Macht und Meinung. Die rhetorische Konstitution der politischen Welt*. Eds. Peter Ptassek, B. Sandkaulen-Bock, Jochen Wagner, and Georg Zenkert. *Neue Studien zur Philosophie*. 5. Eds. Rüdiger Bubner, Konrad Cramer, and Reiner Wiehl. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992. 45–74. Print.
- Quiring, Björn. “Einführung”. *Theatrum Mundi. Die Metapher des Welttheaters von Shakespeare bis Beckett*. Ed. Björn Quiring. Berlin: August, 2013. 7–29. Print.
- Reiss, Timothy J. *Mirages of the Selfe. Patterns of Personhood in Ancient and Early Modern Europe*. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2003. Print.
- Rendall, Steven. “Reading Faces (Montaigne)”. *Individualität*. Eds. Manfred Frank, and Anselm Haverkamp. *Poetik und Hermeneutik*. XIII. München: Fink, 1988. 325–336. Print.
- Rico Verdú, José. *La Retórica Española de los Siglos XVI Y XVII. Anejos de Revista de Literatura*. 35. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas / Instituto ‘Miguel de Cervantes’ de Filología Hispánica, 1973. Print.
- Roberts, W. Rhys. “Introductory Essay on Dionysius as a Literary Critic”. *Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The Three Literary Letters (Ep. ad Ammaeum I, Ep. ad Pompeium, Ep. ad Ammaeum II)*. *English Translation, Facsimile, Notes, Glossary of Rhetorical and Grammatical Terms, Bibliography, and Introductory Essay on Dionysius as a Literary Critic*. Ed. W. Rhys Roberts. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1901. 1–50. Print.
- Robinson, Richard. *Plato’s Earlier Dialectic*. 1953. 2nd ed. Oxford, UK: Clarendon P, 1966. Print.
- Rood, Tim. “Thucydides”. *Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature. Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative*. Volume 4. Eds. Koen De Temmerman, and Evert van Emde Boas. *Mnemosyne Supplements. Monographs on Greek and Latin Language and Literature*. 411. Ed. C. Pieper. Leiden / Boston, MA: Brill, 2018. 153–171. Print.
- Roth, Carl Ludwig. “Was ist das ἦθος in der Alten Rhetorik?”. *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Paedagogik / Jahrbücher für Classische Philologie*. 36 (93) / 12 (1866): 855–860. Print.
- Russell, Donald A. *Criticism in Antiquity*. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA: U of California P, 1981. Print.
- . “Introduction [to Book 9]”. *Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria / The Orator’s Education. Books 9–10*. Ed. Donald A. Russell. Vol. IV. *Loeb Classical Library*. 127. Eds. Jeffrey Henderson, and G. P. Goold. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001. 3–9. Print.
- Rusten, Jeffrey. “Preface. Introduction”. *Theophrastus. Characters. Herodas. Mimes. Sophron and Other Mime Fragments*. Eds. Jeffrey Rusten, and I. C. Cunningham. *Loeb Classical Library*. 225. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2002. 3–44. Print.

- Sansone, David. *Greek Drama and the Invention of Rhetoric*. Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. Print.
- Sattler, William M. "Conceptions of *Ethos* in Ancient Rhetoric". *Speech Monographs* 14 (Jan: 1947): 55–65. Print.
- Sayce, R. A. *The Essays of Montaigne. A Critical Exploration*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972. Print.
- Schanze, Helmut. "Problems and Trends in the History of German Rhetoric to 1500". Trans. Winder McConnell. *Renaissance Eloquence. Studies in the Theory and Practice of Renaissance Rhetoric*. Ed. James J. Murphy. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA / London, UK: U of California P, 1983. 105–125. Print.
- Schulz-Buschhaus, Ulrich. *Moralistik und Poetik. Ars Rhetorica*. 8. Eds. Volker Kapp, Marc Fumaroli, Manfred Tietz, Brian Vickers, and Roger Zuber. Hamburg: LIT, 1997. Print.
- Schütrumpf, Eckart. *Die Bedeutung des Wortes ēthos in der Poetik des Aristoteles. Zetemata. Monographien zur Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*. 49. Eds. Erich Burck, and Hans Diller. München: Beck, 1970. Print.
- Schwartz, Eduard. *Ethik der Griechen*. Ed. Will Richter. Stuttgart: Koehler, 1951. Print.
- Shawcross, John T. "The Poet as Orator: One Phase of His Judicial Pose". *The Rhetoric of Renaissance Poetry. From Wyatt to Milton*. Eds. Thomas O. Sloan[e], and Raymond B. Waddington. Berkeley, CA: U of California P, 1974. 5–36. Print.
- Skinner, Quentin. *Forensic Shakespeare*. Oxford, UK: Oxford UP, 2014. Print.
- . "Hobbes on Persons, Authors and Representatives". *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes's Leviathan*. Ed. Patricia Springborg. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2007. 157–180. Print.
- . "Hobbes on Representation". *European Journal of Philosophy* 13.2 (2005): 155–184. Print.
- Sloane, Thomas O. *On the Contrary. The Protocol of Traditional Rhetoric*. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic U of America P, 1997. Print.
- . "Reading Milton Rhetorically". *Renaissance Eloquence. Studies in the Theory and Practice of Renaissance Rhetoric*. Ed. James J. Murphy. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA / London, UK: U of California P, 1983. 394–410. Print.
- . "Rhetorical Education and Two-Sided Argument". *Renaissance-Rhetorik / Renaissance Rhetoric*. Ed. Heinrich F. Plett. Berlin / New York, NY: de Gruyter, 1993. 163–178. Print.
- . "Rhetorical Selfhood in Erasmus and Milton". *A Companion to Rhetoric and Rhetorical Criticism*. 2004. Eds. W Jost, and Wendy Olmsted. *Blackwell Companions to Literature and Culture*. 22. Malden, MA / Oxford UK / Carlton, AUS: Blackwell, 2006. 112–127. Print.
- Sloane, Thomas O., and Walter Jost. "Rhetoric and Poetry". *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry & Poetics*. Eds. Roland Greene, et al. 4th ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2012. 1175–1181. Print.
- Spies, Marijke. "Between Epic and Lyric. The Genres in J.C. Scaliger's *Poetices Libri Septem*". *Renaissance-Poetik / Renaissance Poetics*. Ed. Heinrich F. Plett. Berlin / New York, NY: de Gruyter, 1994. 260–270. Print.
- Sprute, Jürgen. "Ethos als Überzeugungsmittel in der aristotelischen Rhetorik". *Rhetorik zwischen den Wissenschaften. Geschichte, System, Praxis als Problem des 'Historischen Wörterbuchs der Rhetorik'*. Ed. Gert Ueding. *Rhetorik-Forschungen*. 1. Eds. Joachim Dyck, Walter Jens, and Gert Ueding. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1991. 281–290. Print.
- Starobinski, Jean. *Montaigne in Motion*. 1982 (*Montaigne en mouvement*. Paris: Gallimard). Trans. Arthur Goldhammer. Chicago, IL / London, UK: U of Chicago P, 1985. Print.

- . *Montaigne. Denken und Existenz*. 1982 (*Montaigne en mouvement*. Paris: Gallimard). Trans. Hans-Horst Henschen. *Fischer Wissenschaft*. Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1993. Print.
- . “Remarques Critiques”. *Individualität*. Eds. Manfred Frank, and Anselm Haverkamp. *Poetik und Hermeneutik*. XIII. München: Fink, 1988. 337–344. Print.
- Stierle, Karlheinz. “Gespräch und Diskurs. Ein Versuch im Blick auf Montaigne, Descartes und Pascal”. *Das Gespräch*. Eds. Karlheinz Stierle, and Rainer Warning. *Poetik und Hermeneutik* XI. München: Fink, 1984. 297–334. Print.
- . “Was heißt Moralistik?”. *Moralistik. Explorationen und Perspektiven*. Eds. Rudolf Behrens, and Maria Moog-Grünwald. *Romanistisches Kolloquium*. XII. München: Fink, 2010. 1–22. Print.
- Stolt, Birgit. Wortkampf. *Frühneuhochdeutsche Beispiele zur Rhetorischen Praxis. Stockholmer Germanistische Forschungen*. 13. Ed. Gustav Korlén. Frankfurt a.M.: Athenäum, 1974. Print.
- Strauss, Leo. *Thoughts on Machiavelli*. 1958. Chicago, IL: U of Chicago P, 1978. Print.
- Struever, Nancy S. “Lorenzo Valla: Humanist Rhetoric and the Critique of the Classical Languages of Morality”. *Renaissance Eloquence. Studies in the Theory and Practice of Renaissance Rhetoric*. Ed. James J. Murphy. Berkeley, CA / Los Angeles, CA / London, UK: U of California P, 1983. 191–206. Print.
- Süss, Wilhelm. *Ethos. Studien zur Älteren Griechischen Rhetorik*. 1910 (Leipzig: Teubner). Aalen: Scientia, 1975. Print.
- Teuber, Bernhard. “Figuratio impotentiae. Drei Apologien der Entmächtigung bei Montaigne”. *Konfigurationen der Macht in der Frühen Neuzeit*. Eds. Roland Galle, and Rudolf Behrens. *Neues Forum für Allgemeine und Vergleichende Literaturwissenschaft*. 6. Eds. Horst-Jürgen Gerigk, and Maria Moog-Grünwald. Heidelberg: Winter, 2000. 105–126. Print.
- Thomas, Carol G., and Edward Kent Webb. “From orality to rhetoric: an intellectual transformation”. *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action*. Ed. Ian Worthington. London, UK: Routledge, 1994. 3–25. Print.
- Trimpf, Wesley. “The Ancient Hypothesis of Fiction: An Essay on the Origins of Literary Theory”. *Traditio* 27 (1971): 1–78. Print.
- . “The Meaning of Horace’s *Ut Pictura Poesis*”. *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 36 (1973): 1–34. Print.
- . *Muses of One Mind. The Literary Analysis of Experience and Its Continuity*. 1983 (Princeton UP). Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2009. Print.
- . “The Practice of Historical Interpretation and Nashe’s ‘Brightnesse Falls from the Ayre’”. *Journal of English and Germanic Philology* 66.4 (Oct. 1967): 501–518. Print.
- . “The Quality of Fiction: The Rhetorical Transmission of Literary Theory”. *Traditio* 30 (1974): 1–118. Print.
- . “Reason and the Classical Premises of Literary Decorum”. *Independent Journal of Philosophy* 5/6 (1988): 103–111. Print.
- Trüstedt, Katrin. “Novelle der Stellvertretung. Kleists ‘Michael Kohlhaas’”. *Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie* 130.4 (2011): 545–568. Print.
- . “Schiffbruch mit Zuschauer: Schmitt, Blumenberg und das Theater der Moderne”. *Shakespeare-Jahrbuch* 146 (2010): 97–112. Print.
- Usher, Stephen. “Introduction. The Text. Select Bibliography”. *Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Critical Essays*. Ed. Stephen Usher. Vol. I. *Loeb Classical Library*. 465. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1974. vii–xxxiii. Print.
- . “Lysias. Introduction”. *Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Critical Essays*. Ed. Stephen Usher.

- Vol. I. *Loeb Classical Library*. 465. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1974. 16–19. Print.
- “On Literary Composition. Introduction”. *Critical Essays*. Ed. Stephen Usher. Vol. II. *Loeb Classical Library*. 466. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1985. 3–12. Print.
- “On the Ancient Orators. Introduction”. *Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Critical Essays*. Ed. Stephen Usher. Vol. I. *Loeb Classical Library*. 465. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1974. 1–3. Print.
- Vallozza, Maddalena. “Allocutio”. Trans. Andrea Katzenberger. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik. Band 1: A–Bib*. Ed. Gert Ueding. Vol. 1. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*. Ed. Gert Ueding. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1992. 413–415. Print.
- Velázquez, Sonia. “Metaphors to Write By. Literature as Commonwealth and Words as Citizens”. *Borrowed Feathers. Plagiarism and the Limits of Imitation in Early Modern Europe*. Ed. Hall Bjørnstad. Oslo: Unipub / Oslo Academic P, 2008. 67–83. Print.
- Vickers, Brian. *The Artistry of Shakespeare’s Prose*. London, UK: Methuen, 1968. Print.
- *In Defence of Rhetoric*. 1988. Oxford, UK: Clarendon P, 1999. Print.
- “Some Reflections on the Rhetoric Textbook”. *Renaissance Rhetoric*. Ed. Peter Mack. New York, NY: St. Martin’s P, 1994. 81–102. Print.
- Vives, Juan Luis. *De ratione dicendi – lateinisch/deutsch*. 1532 [Bruges / 1782. Ed. Gregorio Mayans y Siscar. Valencia: Monfort]. Trans. Angelika Ott. Ed. Emilio Hidalgo-Serna. *Arts Rhetorica*. 5. Ed. Volker Kapp. Marburg: Hitzeroth, 1993. Print.
- Volkman, Richard. *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischer Übersicht dargestellt*. 1872. 2nd ed. Leipzig: Teubner, 1885. Print.
- Walsh, P. G. *The Roman Novel. The ‘Satyricon’ of Petronius and the ‘Metamorphoses’ of Apuleius*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1970. Print.
- Webster, T. B. L. *Art and Literature in Fourth Century Athens*. London, UK: U of London / Athlone P, 1956. Print.
- Weinberg, Bernard. “Nota Filologica. Bonciani. Lezione della prosopopea”. *Trattati di Poetica e Retorica del Cinquecento. Volume Terzo*. Ed. Bernard Weinberg. Vol. III. *Scrittori D’Italia*. Bari: Laterza, 1972. 502–503. Print.
- Weinrich, Harald. “Thales und die thrakische Magd: allseitige Schadenfreude”. *Das Komische*. Eds. Wolfgang Preisendanz, and Rainer Warning. *Poetik und Hermeneutik*. VII. München: Fink, 1976. 435–437. Print.
- Wells, Susan. *Sweet Reason: Rhetoric and the Discourses of Modernity*. Chicago, IL: U of Chicago P, 1996. Print.
- White, Hayden. *Metahistory. The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1975. Print.
- Wigham, Frank, and Wayne A. Rebhorn. “Introduction”. *Puttenham. The Art of English Poesy. A Critical Edition*. Eds. Frank Wigham, and Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca, NY / London, UK: Cornell UP, 2007. 1–87. Print.
- Winterbottom, M. “Introduction. Bibliography. A Note on Text and Translation”. *Seneca the Elder. Controversiae. Books 1–6*. Ed. M. Winterbottom. Vol. I. *Loeb Classical Library*. 463. Ed. E. H. Warmington. Cambridge, MA / London, UK: Harvard UP / Heinemann, 1974. vii–xxix. Print.
- Wisse, Jakob. *Ethos and Pathos from Aristotle to Cicero*. Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1989. Print.

Index

- Achilles 37, 50, 165, 166, 167, 175, 186
Aelius Theon 20, 32, 36, 47, 56, 138, 140, 171
Aeneas 83, 89, 142
Aeschines 28, 144, 149
Aeschylus 38, 129, 139
Aesop 29, 159, 181
Agamemnon 72, 181
Agricola, Rudolph (Rodolphus) 36, 140
Akhenaton (Echnaton) 97
Alberic of Monte Cassino 28, 151
Alcibiades 158
Alcinous (in *The Odyssey*) 166
Alcmaeon 175
Alcuin of York (Flaccus Albinus Alcuinus) 33, 54, 55
Alexander the Great 166
Altman, Joel B. 31, 41, 42, 53, 77, 78, 87, 121, 192
Alypius of Thagaste 2, 5
Amezúa y Mayo, Agustín G. de 17
Ammonius Hermiae 147, 185
Anacharsis 180
Anaxagoras 182
Anchises (in *The Aeneid*) 168
Andocides 28
Andres, Stefan 32
Andromache 86, 150
Angelo (in *Measure for Measure*) 193
Annius Lucius Setinus 170
Antigone 63, 145
Antony of Egypt (Anthony the Great of the Desert) 6
Apelt, Otto 183
Aper, Marcus 15
Aphthonius the Sophist (of Antioch) 9, 31, 32, 36, 47, 64, 87, 88, 139, 140
Appius Claudius Caecus 32, 87
Appius Claudius Crassus 167, 168, 169
Aquila Romanus 33, 138
Aquinas, Thomas 60, 97
Archidamus III (of Sparta) 94
Archilochus 144, 145
Aristides of Athens (the Just) 28
Aristides, Aelius 86, 143
Aristophanes 139, 176, 177
Aristotle 12, 15, 20, 25, 34, 39, 41, 43, 53, 56, 58, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 74, 75, 76, 82, 87, 92, 97, 98, 100, 107, 111, 112, 117, 118, 125, 129, 144, 145, 153, 155, 156, 162, 163, 172, 173, 174, 175, 179, 181, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189, 190, 197
Aristotle (ps.) 75, 111
Armenius the Pamphylian 166
Arnaut Daniel 181
Arrian 18
Artemon (of Pergamum) 151
Asmuth, Bernhard 25, 42, 140, 148, 172, 175, 198
Aspasia 13
Athanasius the Sophist 146
Athens (*pólis*, Attica) 28, 29, 86, 102, 105, 108, 114, 127, 143, 144, 157, 158, 160, 161, 171, 173, 179, 184, 188, 189
Atkins, J. W. H. 109
Atticus, Titus Pomponius 15, 92, 165
Auerbach, Erich 57, 100
Augustine of Hippo (Aurelius Augustinus) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 34, 35, 48, 97, 121, 152, 164, 165, 184, 195
Augustus Caesar 29, 34, 100

Babrius 29
Bacchylides 148
Bacon, Francis 123, 178
Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhaïlovich 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 31, 37, 44, 83, 111, 112, 123, 126, 130, 131, 149, 177, 185, 190, 198
Bakker, Mathieu de 32, 38, 69, 101, 105, 106, 110, 111, 126, 137, 145, 147, 172, 173, 174, 191
Baldwin, Charles Sears 28, 32, 40, 41, 53, 84, 86, 138, 141, 146, 155, 156, 162
Barberá y Sánchez, Juan 19, 133

- Barner, Wilfried 73, 122, 123, 150
 Barnhart, Robert K. 90
 Barthes, Roland 62
 Baumlin, James S. 34, 67, 97, 98, 121, 127, 178
 Baumlin, Tita French 178
 Bayle, Pierre 95
 Beaujour, Michel 41
 Beauvoir, Simone de 136
 Benn, Gottfried 154
 Berganza (in the “coloquio de los perros”) 17
 Bers, Victor 160
 Bjørnstad, Hall 80
 Blass, Friedrich 10, 28, 43, 44, 54, 65, 94, 99, 101, 102, 103, 105, 109, 110, 112, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 144, 145, 146, 157, 160, 161, 172, 173, 183, 184, 190, 197
 Bloemendal, Jan V, 12, 35, 61, 150, 187
 Blumenberg, Hans 3, 6, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 53, 58, 71, 74, 83, 95, 97, 104, 123, 127, 130, 136, 151, 153, 154, 156, 163, 164, 176, 177, 178, 181, 182, 185, 190, 191, 199
 Boccaccio, Giovanni 139
 Boethius 30
 Bonciani, Francesco 30
 Bonner, S. F. 1, 28, 35, 47, 49, 61, 86, 89, 100, 101, 102, 106, 110, 116, 147, 150, 160, 173, 189
 Borges, Jorge Luis 185
 Borgia, Cesare 186
 Boriaud, Jean Yves 2, 28, 43, 59, 60, 71, 74, 81, 94, 119, 124
 Bornscheuer, Lothar 160, 177
 Boscán, Juan (Joan Boscà i Almogàver) 31
 Bourdieu, Pierre 120
 Braganza (family) 17
 Branham, R. Bracht 30, 177, 179
 Bravo, Bartolomé 19, 42
 Brecht, Bertold 32
 Brentano, Clemens 27
 Briesemeister, Dietrich 128
 Bröcker, Walter 153
 Brogan, T. V. F. 27, 141
 Brown, Jane K. IV
 Bruno, Giordano 32
 Bruns, Ivo 40, 65, 101, 105, 171
 Bruss, Kristine S. 34, 50, 52, 62, 66, 70, 75, 86, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 150, 171, 184, 199
 Brutus, Lucius Junius 46, 163, 176, 182
 Brutus, Marcus Junius (the Younger) 14
 Bulephorus (in the “Ciceronianus”) 9, 198
 Burckhardt, Jacob 121, 127, 157, 158
 Burger, Heinz Otto 31, 61, 73, 122, 126, 149, 195
 Burrow, Colin 140
 Byzantium (Byzantine, Eastern Roman Empire) 9, 36, 119, 137, 140
 Caecilius of Calacte 100
 Caesar, Gaius Julius 47, 162, 165, 168, 186
 Calderón de la Barca, Pedro 73, 162
 Callicles 10
 Camillo (in *The Winter’s Tale*) 131
 Camillus, Marcus Furius 170
 Campbell, Jackson J. 45
 Campuzano (in “El casamiento engañoso”) 17
 Caplan, Harry 38, 40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 54, 99, 141, 146, 182, 197
 Capmany y Montpalán, Antonio de 19
 Carey, Christopher 66, 69, 83, 103, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 114, 115, 117, 145, 147, 148, 160, 171, 172, 173, 174, 183, 191
 “Carmen de figuris vel schematibus” (Anonymous) 40
 Carrithers, Michael 2, 97
 Carruthers, Mary 139
 Cassiodorus 77
 Cassius Severus, Titus 49
 Castiglione, Baldesar (Baldassare) 42, 127, 128, 198
 Castro García, Ricardo José 17
 Cataneus (Cattaneo), Johannes Maria (Giovanni Maria) 140
 Cato the Younger (Cato Minor) 15, 47
 Cave, Terence 9, 10, 33, 40, 98, 133, 193

- Cervantes, Miguel de IV, 8, 17, 18, 19, 30, 34, 71, 100, 119, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 148, 192, 196
- Céspedes, Baltasar de 19, 20
- Chaerephon 10
- Chapman, George 31
- Charisius 54
- Charlemagne (Charles the Great) 55
- Chase, Cynthia 27, 46
- Chaucer, Geoffrey 40, 119
- Chihaiia, Matei IV
- Christiansen, Nancy L. 32, 35, 43, 73, 79, 128, 150, 187, 195
- Cicero, Marcus Tullius 8, 9, 14, 15, 18, 19, 25, 28, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 65, 68, 70, 72, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 84, 85, 86, 92, 93, 99, 110, 113, 119, 120, 124, 125, 126, 128, 136, 139, 141, 149, 150, 155, 165, 168, 174, 175, 182, 184, 190, 195, 196, 198
- Cipión (in the “coloquio de los perros”) 17
- Clark, Donald Lemen 36, 47, 140
- Claudio (in *Measure for Measure*) 166
- Cleon 160
- Clodia 32
- Clodius Pulcher, Publius 32
- Clytemnestra 175
- Compagnon, Antoine 134
- Condillac, Étienne Bonnot de 123
- Conley, Thomas M. 35, 101, 171
- Constantine the Great 5
- Consultus Fortunatianus (C. Chirius Fortunatianus) 50, 59, 90, 142
- Cope, E. M. 42, 62, 64, 67, 111, 112, 117, 186
- Cornefert, Gabrielle V
- Corneille, Pierre 148
- Crane, Mary Thomas 120
- Crane, William G. 36, 38, 40, 43, 52, 138
- Crassus, Lucius Licinius 32, 92
- Creon 63, 145
- Croally, N. T. 160
- Currie, Bruno 68, 78, 126, 148
- Curtius, Ernst Robert 30, 45, 49, 71, 72, 73, 93, 123, 154
- Cyrus 83
- Dante Alighieri 168, 180, 181
- David (King) 168, 186
- Davis, Natalie Zemon 127, 181
- de Man, Paul 27, 46, 178
- De Temmerman, Koen 2, 7, 33, 38, 40, 60, 63, 75, 98, 99, 100, 102, 126, 130, 159, 160
- Delminio, Giulio Camillo 123
- Demetrius I of Macedon 170
- Demetrius of Phalerum 99, 109, 140, 143, 151
- Demetrius the Cynic 182
- Democritus 71, 162
- Demosthenes 10, 28, 33, 44, 54, 102, 109, 110, 143, 144
- Derrida, Jacques 120
- Descartes, René 61, 78, 97, 106, 124, 125, 153
- Desmet, Christy 36, 40
- Devries, William Levering 33, 88, 101, 103, 108, 110, 117, 118, 148, 171, 173, 191
- Diagoras of Melos 182
- Dickhaut, Kirsten IV, V
- Dido (Elissa) 32, 176
- Dinarchus 105, 115, 116
- Dio Chrysostom 75, 165, 166, 186
- Diodotus 160
- Diogeiton 171, 172, 173
- Diogenes Laertius 10, 39, 60, 164, 180, 182, 183, 190
- Diogenes the Cynic (of Sinope) 94, 149, 182
- Dion of Syracuse 143
- Dionysius of Halicarnassus 8, 10, 24, 29, 37, 49, 66, 70, 74, 75, 76, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 140, 143, 146, 147, 157, 160, 161, 171, 173, 174, 176, 185, 189, 190, 196, 197, 199
- Diotima 13
- Dobbin, Robert F. 82
- Dobranski, Stephen B. 31
- Dockhorn, Klaus 61, 64, 65, 86, 112
- Donaldson, Ian 163
- Donatus, Aelius 27, 146

- DramaNet IV, 21
 Drnovšek, Jaša IV
 Duke (in *Measure for Measure*) 193, 194
 Duncan-Jones, Katherine 16, 131, 132
 Dusinberre, Juliet 123
- Eckermann, Johann Peter 181
 Eco, Umberto 46
 Eden, Kathy V, 9, 13, 20, 35, 42, 48, 62, 63, 64, 66, 70, 73, 78, 79, 82, 105, 109, 110, 129, 138, 140, 151, 153, 172, 176, 185, 197
 El Greco (Doménikos Theotokópoulos) 32
 Elam, Keir 66, 67, 133, 172, 178
 Eliot, T. S. 180, 181
 Elizabeth I of England 119, 131, 174
 Ellege, Scott 167
 Ellis, Robert Leslie 178
 Ellrodt, Robert 96
 Emde Boas, Evert van 2, 7, 33, 38, 40, 60, 63, 75, 98, 99, 100, 102, 126, 130, 159, 160
 Emerson, Ralph Waldo 96
 Emlyn-Jones, Chris 166
 Emporius the Orator 32, 46, 59, 85, 90, 138, 192
 Enterline, Lynn 4, 16, 48, 90, 91, 140
 Ephorus of Cyme 158
 Epictetus 18, 39, 72, 73, 82
 Epicurean School 152, 191
 Er the Pamphylian 166
 Erasmus of Rotterdam, Desiderius 9, 10, 14, 18, 25, 31, 73, 119, 138, 148, 153, 195, 198
 Eriphyle 175
 Estienne, Henry 139
 Euphiletos (Euphiletus) 32, 69
 Euripides 143, 182, 197
 European Research Council (ERC) IV
 Eusebius of Caesarea 5, 148
 Evans, J. D. G. 74
- Feldman, Martha 73, 150
 Fish, Stanley 152
 Florio, John 73
- Fontane, Theodor 154
 Forman, L. L. 184
 Forster Smith, Charles 157
 Fortenbaugh, William 62, 138
 Foster, Edith 161
 Fothergill-Payne, Louise 35, 134
 Foucault, Michel 75, 76, 99, 100, 120
 Fowler, Harold North 10, 11
 Fox Morcillo, Sebastián 20
 France, Peter 149
 Fraunce, Abraham 31, 36, 142
 Freese, John Henry 34, 64, 144
 Freud, Sigmund 80
 Friede, Susanne V
 Friedrich (Frederick) II, Holy Roman Emperor 136
 Friedrich, Hugo 32, 70, 73, 176
 Fuchs, Barbara 148
 Fuhrmann, Manfred 2, 24, 29, 37, 40, 61, 70, 79, 112, 117, 118, 119, 124, 136, 148, 155
 Fumaroli, Marc 179
- Galilei, Galileo 32, 191
 Gallo, Ernest 40
 Garver, Eugene 64, 66
 Geertz, Clifford 127
 Gellius, Aulus 185
 Geoffrey of Vinsauf 31
 Gérard de Benat, François de 135
 Germanicus 163
 Gill, Christopher 2, 5, 32, 56, 62, 70, 79, 93, 98, 124, 126, 134, 155, 174
 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 3, 4, 42, 136, 153, 154, 181, 182
 Goffman, Erving 70, 74, 96, 98, 136, 155
 Gomperz, Theodor 83, 117, 130, 157, 160, 161
 Gordon, Alex L. 24, 123
 Gorgias 10, 12, 13, 14, 18, 71, 72, 95, 97, 103, 117, 144, 195
 Göttert, Karl-Heinz 30
 Gottsched, Johann Christoph 140
 Gracián, Baltasar 20, 73, 149, 184, 187, 191, 198
 Grasmück, Ernst Ludwig 30

- Gray, Hanna H. 61
 Green, Lawrence D. 184
 Greenblatt, Stephen 67, 80, 119, 121, 122,
 132
 Greene, Thomas M. 121
 Grimm, Jacob und Wilhelm 61
 Grosseteste, Robert 177
 Grube, G. M. A. 37, 65, 99, 116, 117, 129,
 142, 147, 155, 185
 Gubbini, Gaia IV
 Guevara, Antonio de 185
 Guinizzelli, Guido 180
 Gusejnov, Gasan IV

 Hacking, Ian 95, 119
 Haemon (Haimon) 63, 145
 Hahn, Alois 129
 Halliwell, Stephen 179
 Halm, Karl 33, 54, 84, 90, 104, 155
 Hamlet (Prince) 87, 141
 Hamlet the Elder (King) 87
 Hammond, Carolyn J.-B. 4, 5, 184
 Harding, Phillip 58, 101, 183
 Hartmann, Volker 28, 41, 55
 Harvey, Elizabeth D. 31, 90, 91, 178
 Heath, Douglas Denon 178
 Hector 86
 Hecuba 16, 36
 Heidegger, Martin 153
 Hein, Lena Maria V
 Helen of Troy 16, 175
 Hellwig, Antje 34, 40, 62, 63, 68, 75, 111,
 117, 144, 145, 148, 172
 Hempfer, Klaus W. 128
 Henderson, Judith Rice 9
 Henry VIII of England 51, 89
 Heracles (Hercules) 64, 87, 181
 Heraclitus 71, 197
 Hermogenes of Tarsus 32, 36, 47, 62, 86,
 87, 102, 110, 123, 132, 140, 150, 152
 Herodotus 38
 Herrick, Marvin T. 27, 36, 49, 70, 106,
 113, 139, 146
 Hesiod 39, 63
 Heudecker, Sylvia 123
 Hicks, R. D. 39

 Hippocrates 72
 Hippothoön (Hippochoüs) 41
 Hirzel, Rudolf 61, 181
 Hobbes, Thomas 78, 80, 81, 93, 111, 190
 Hobbs, Angela 126
 Hochhuth, Rolf 154
 Hodgkinson, Owen 30, 40, 90, 152, 174,
 179, 180
 Hoffmann, E. T. A. 27
 Hollis, Martin 71, 96
 Homer 31, 37, 39, 54, 60, 61, 63, 165, 166,
 179, 186
 Horace 25, 42, 46, 99, 112, 136, 155, 165,
 175
 Horatio (in *Hamlet*) 87, 141
 Horn, André V
 Hoxby, Blair IV, V
 Hubbell, H. M. 38
 Humboldt Foundation IV
 Husserl, Edmund 154, 181
 Hutson, Lorna 139
 Hyperides 43, 54
 Hypologus (in the “Ciceronianus”) 9

 Iago (in *Othello*) 122
 Isaeus 110
 Isidore of Seville 28, 40, 42, 84, 85, 136,
 138
 Isocrates 7, 41, 94, 101, 109, 110, 143,
 144, 158, 189, 190
 Iulius Rufinianus 1, 19, 30, 38, 44, 51, 85,
 89, 141, 149
 Iulius Victor, Gaius 32, 33, 42, 54, 55, 59,
 90, 142, 152

 Jakobson, Roman 76, 112
 Jean Paul (Johann Paul Friedrich Richter)
 83
 Jerome (Hieronymus) 99, 182
 Jesuits (Societas Iesu) 35, 194
 Johannes Teplensis (Johann von Tepl) 31
 John of Salisbury (Johannes
 Sarisberiensis) 22, 46, 72, 73, 77,
 138, 153, 166, 168, 177, 179
 John of Sardis 9, 47, 59, 150, 171

- Jonson, Ben 146
 Jost, Walter 139
 Jünger, Ernst 32, 154
 Justi, K. 163
- Kablitz, Andreas 96, 97
 Kafka, Franz 27
 Kahn, Victoria 128
 Kant, Immanuel 77, 82, 97, 106, 114, 124, 178
 Kasprzyk, Dimitri 75, 186
 Kendall, Calvin B. 28
 Kennedy, George A. 1, 10, 12, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 41, 47, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 86, 87, 98, 102, 108, 109, 110, 138, 144, 145, 154, 157, 160, 171, 184, 187, 191, 192
 Kibédi Varga, A. 21, 24, 61, 135
 Kilian, Sven Thorsten IV
 King, J. E. 14, 15
 Kinney, Arthur F. 139
 Kleist, Heinrich von 27
 Klotz, Fabian 93
 Knape, Joachim 31, 140
 Knop, Déborah 198
 Kohut, Karl 158, 185
 Koniaris, George L. 178
 König, Jason 18
 Kopperschmidt, Josef 6
 Korneeva, Tatiana IV
 Körte, Alfred 33, 38, 39, 72, 116
 Kranz, Walther 71, 72, 162, 197
 Kraus, Christina Shuttleworth 167, 186
 Kronios (in "Peregrinus") 152
 Kruse, Margot 132
 Küpper, Joachim III, IV, V, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 21, 23, 26, 62, 67, 100, 104, 112, 122, 131, 162, 171, 183, 186
 Kustas, George L. 9, 36, 137, 147, 151, 152, 171
- La Boétie, Étienne de 153
 Lacan, Jacques 120
 Lactantius 5
 Laelius, Gaius 168
- Lamb, W. R. M. 13, 103, 171, 173, 174
 Lambert, Johann Heinrich 32
 Lanham, Carol Dana 1, 7, 9, 32, 35, 36, 54, 55, 70, 77, 82, 84, 94, 103, 131, 150, 151, 152, 154
 Lardinois, André 46
 Latomus, Barthélémy 27
 Lausberg, Heinrich 17, 24, 26, 28, 31, 33, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 86, 88, 89, 92, 93, 102, 124, 129, 134, 140, 145, 149, 150, 158, 190
 Leach, Elizabeth Eva 31
 Lever, Ralph 8
 Lewis, C. S. 61
 Lichtenberg, Georg Christoph 190
 Lidov, Joel B. 178
 Lipsius, Justus 73, 123
 Livy (Titus Livius) 59, 83, 148, 155, 163, 164, 167, 168, 169, 170, 185, 186, 189
 Lobsien, Verena Olejniczak 77
 Longinus (ps.) 178, 197
 López Grigera, Luisa 50, 53, 55, 84, 132
 Lorich, Reinhard 140
 Louis (Luis) of Granada 31
 Lucian of Samosata 30, 40, 129, 141, 152, 174, 179, 180
 Lucilius Junior 152, 153, 165
 Lucio (in *Measure for Measure*) 193, 194
 Lucretia 16, 17, 91, 163, 164, 196, 198
 Luther, Martin 45, 116
 Lyco of Troas 54
 Lysias 10, 11, 28, 32, 40, 43, 44, 48, 49, 54, 58, 66, 69, 74, 76, 88, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 126, 130, 135, 137, 145, 147, 155, 171, 172, 173, 174, 176, 183, 184, 191, 196, 199
- M. Gallio (ps.) 142
 Machiavelli, Niccolò 22, 32, 58, 83, 97, 148, 152, 165, 167, 168, 169, 170, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 192, 198
 Mack, Peter 29, 31, 128, 193
 Macrobius 77, 166, 168, 175
 Malevole (in *The Malcontent*) 139

- Malraux, André 154
Mansfield, Harvey C. 58, 83, 149, 165,
169, 185, 188, 189
Marcellinus 158
Marcus Antonius Orator 32, 77, 78, 174
Marcus Aurelius 61, 72, 73
Mareel, Samuel 35
Marlowe, Christopher 187
Marquard, Odo 123, 153
Marschall, Veronika 123, 198
Marston, John 139
Martial 95, 152
Martianus Capella 30
Marx, Karl 156
Maternus, Curiatius 15, 179
Mauss, Marcel 2, 60, 71, 97
Maxwell, Julie 187
Mayfield, DS 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 12, 17, 18, 21,
22, 23, 25, 26, 29, 35, 42, 49, 58, 60,
61, 73, 74, 76, 82, 92, 93, 94, 96,
104, 105, 111, 114, 119, 123, 127, 128,
133, 136, 138, 141, 148, 149, 150, 152,
153, 167, 176, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187,
188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 195, 198
McDonald, Charles Osborne 31, 84, 86,
87, 139, 140
McEvelly, Thomas 178
McGowan, Margaret M. 193
Medine, Peter E. 51
Melos (Island) 157, 158, 160, 161, 188
Menander 33, 64, 78, 86, 87, 148
Mendoza (in *The Malcontent*) 139
Menippus of Gadara (the Cynic) 164, 182
Menke, Bettine 27
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 184
Meyer, Ahlrich 154
Michelet, Jules 156
Miltiades 143
Milton, John 31, 146, 165, 166, 167
Momigliano, A. 2, 97
Monfasani, John 31, 123, 140
Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de 10, 29, 32,
34, 40, 41, 58, 60, 67, 70, 72, 73, 77,
82, 95, 96, 97, 98, 109, 122, 133, 134,
152, 153, 156, 176, 184, 192, 198
Moos, Peter von 8, 22, 24, 30, 42, 46, 56,
58, 59, 71, 73, 76, 77, 89, 94, 123,
138, 153, 166, 168, 175, 177, 179, 183
More, Thomas (Morus) 31, 119
Morel, Guillaume 31
Morford, Mark P. O. 109, 110, 131, 145
Morgan, Kathryn 12, 18, 183
Morgan, Morris H. 88, 101, 103, 110, 116,
117, 118, 171, 173, 183
Mosch, Jan III
Most, Glenn W. 176
Murphy, James J. 37, 43, 44, 47, 56, 86,
119, 155, 179
Nagy, Gregory 30
Naschert, Guido 32, 33, 40, 66, 138, 140,
144, 155
Nash, Walter 31
Nashe, Thomas 31
Nédoncelle, Maurice 60, 61, 72, 78, 81,
124, 129
Neumann, Florian 73, 123
Neumann, Uwe 157
Nicholas of Cusa (Nicolaus Cusanus) 31
Nicias 118
Nicolaus the Sophist 12, 19, 26, 47, 77,
85, 148, 150, 192
Niehues-Pröbsting, Heinrich 2, 12, 34, 43,
58, 63, 64, 66, 67, 72, 82, 98, 112,
117, 147, 156, 163, 176, 177, 187, 191,
199
Nietzsche, Friedrich 59, 60, 61, 83, 96,
97, 98, 123, 149, 184
Nolting-Hauff, Ilse 192
Norden, Eduard 101, 118, 156, 157, 158,
163, 171, 183
Nosoponus (in the “Ciceronianus”) 9, 195
Núñez, Pedro Juan 19, 20
Odysseus 30, 165, 166, 167, 179, 181
Oesterreich, Peter L. 2, 31, 61, 66, 67, 77,
78, 79, 82, 111, 123, 124, 125, 126,
128, 129, 141, 163, 198
Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. 56
Olk, Claudia IV

- Olmsted, Wendy 2
 Onions, C. T. 63, 90
 Orestes 175
 Otter, Monika 71
 Ottmers, Clemens 93
 Ovid 34, 35, 46, 91, 139, 142, 186, 197
- Palamas, Gregory (Gregorios) 31
 Palinurus (in *The Aeneid*) 142
 Palladas 71
 Panurge (in *Gargantua and Pantagruel*) 148
 Parmenides 97, 176
 Patón, Bartolomé Jiménez 20
 Paul (Saul) of Tarsus 4, 5, 35, 97, 123, 124, 164, 184, 185
 Pawlita, Leonie 12
 Payr, Theresia 9
 Peacham, Henry 85
 Pearson, Lionel 34, 63, 64, 109, 110, 112, 145, 157
 Peletier du Mans, Jacques 123
 Penskaya, Elena III
 Percival, W. Keith 47
 Perelman, Chaïm 56, 89, 93, 143
 Pericles 143, 158, 160, 161
 Peripatetic School 15, 71, 92, 117
 Petrarch (Francesco Petrarca) 3, 4, 31, 99, 125
 Petronius Arbiter, Gaius 71, 72, 73
 Pfister, Manfred 149
 Phaedrus (Phaidros the Athenian) 10, 11
 Phaedrus, Gaius Iulius 29
 Philip II of Macedon 170
 Photios I of Constantinople (the Great) 10, 151
 Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni 31, 121
 Pindar 30, 148
 Plato 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 30, 63, 65, 71, 77, 83, 97, 98, 107, 111, 118, 121, 124, 129, 130, 142, 143, 144, 148, 149, 153, 159, 166, 168, 171, 174, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 186, 190, 191, 192, 193, 195
 Platonic Academy 15, 92
 Plautus, Titus Maccius 139
- Plett, Heinrich F. 26, 30, 31, 48, 87, 89, 122, 123, 128, 139, 141, 150, 174
 Plotinus 181, 186, 198
 Plutarch 33, 35, 72, 75, 76, 114, 115, 117, 134, 157, 162, 170
 Polus 10, 13
 Polybius 158
 Pompeius, Gnaeus 10, 48, 101, 143
 Pound, Ezra 180
 Preddy, William 166
 Priam 50
 Prins, Yopie 46, 98, 178
 Priscian the Grammarian 1, 19, 31, 32, 36, 45, 59, 83, 90, 141, 150
 Prospero (in *The Tempest*) 123
 Protagoras 10, 97
 Psellus, Michael (Psellos) 147
 Ptassek, Peter 21, 58, 62, 68, 74, 111, 127
 Puttonham, George 8, 30, 33, 52, 74, 89, 128, 133, 141, 177, 194
- Quintilian 1, 8, 14, 16, 25, 26, 32, 35, 36, 37, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 63, 64, 65, 77, 78, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 100, 101, 102, 107, 116, 121, 138, 141, 142, 146, 149, 150, 154, 155, 175, 176, 184, 186, 190, 196, 197, 199
 Quiring, Björn 71, 72, 73, 123
- Rabelais, François 10, 31, 148
 Rackham, H. 77
 Radboud (Radbod) of Utrecht 45
 Rainolde, Richard 36, 46
 Rebhorn, Wayne A. 8, 89, 128, 129, 177, 194
 Reiss, Timothy J. 79, 125
 Rendall, Steven 32
 Reuchlin, Johannes 195
 “Rhetorica ad Alexandrum” (Anonymous) 111
Rhetorica ad Herennium (Anonymous) 8, 19, 25, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 52, 54, 55, 57, 84, 86, 99, 139, 140, 141, 146, 174, 182, 196, 197

- Rhua, Pedro de 185
 Richard (in *Richard II*) 123
 Rico Verdú, José 19, 20, 42, 119, 133, 134
 Ritter, Joachim 25
 Robbins, Emmet I. 178
 Roberts, W. Rhys 101, 114, 116, 147, 199
 Robinson, Richard 12
 Robortello, Francesco (Robortellus) 146
 Rome (city, *imperium*) 2, 4, 9, 14, 17, 29, 35, 42, 46, 48, 49, 50, 57, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 70, 71, 76, 78, 120, 124, 127, 134, 140, 145, 152, 153, 162, 163, 165, 167, 168, 169, 172, 173, 174, 187, 196
 Rood, Tim 161
 Roscius, Quintus 51
 Roth, Carl Ludwig 64, 67, 68
 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 149
 Russell, Donald A. 16, 47, 50, 52, 54, 56, 59, 78, 102, 116, 146, 150, 186
 Rusten, Jeffrey 14, 38, 148, 155, 180
 Rutilius Lupus, Publius 54, 104, 155
 Ruyer, Raymond 93
- Sachs, Hans 195
 Sallust 155, 168, 186
 Saluste du Bartas, Guillaume de 31
 Salvati (in Galilei's *Dialog Concerning the Two Chief World Systems*) 32
 Sánchez de las Brozas, Francisco (El Brocense) 20, 55
 Sansone, David 172, 183
 Santayana, George 96
 Sappho 46, 90, 98, 102, 178
 Sartre, Jean-Paul 136
 Sattler, William M. 34, 60, 62, 63, 111, 145, 190
 Sayce, R. A. 198
 Scaliger, Julius Caesar 9, 13, 24, 33, 40, 86, 90, 138, 140, 141, 142
 Schade, Peter (Petrus Mosellanus) 31
 Schanze, Helmut 23, 61
 "schemata dianoeas" (Anonymous) 30, 33, 40, 90
 Schlauch, Margaret 45
 Schopenhauer, Adele 4
 Schopenhauer, Arthur 20, 123
- Schouler, Bernard 2, 28, 43, 59, 60, 71, 74, 81, 94, 119, 124
 Schulz-Buschhaus, Ulrich 99, 148
 Schuster, Friedlinde Käthe Lisette II
 Schuster, Friedrich Wilhelm II
 Schüttrumpf, Eckart 62, 65, 100
 Schwartz, Eduard 12, 62, 63, 65, 66, 72, 117, 128, 137
 Scipio Aemilianus (Scipio Minor) 77
 Scipio Africanus, Publius Cornelius (Scipio Maior) 17, 77
 Secundus, Julius 15
 Seneca the Elder 35, 49, 53
 Seneca, Lucius Annaeus 34, 35, 60, 87, 120, 150, 152, 153, 165, 182, 185
 Sextus Tarquinius 16, 17, 163
 Shakespeare, William IV, 8, 16, 17, 19, 25, 31, 34, 43, 57, 80, 87, 90, 91, 100, 119, 120, 122, 123, 130, 131, 132, 135, 139, 141, 164, 166, 187, 190, 193, 195, 196, 198
 Shaw, Samuel 30, 35, 194, 195
 Shawcross, John T. 150
 Sherry, Richard 27, 40, 139
 Sidney, Sir Philip 31, 83, 139, 192
 Sidonius Apollinaris 138
 Simmel, Georg 71, 74, 81, 155
 Simplicio (in Galilei's *Dialog Concerning the Two Chief World Systems*) 191
 Sinon (in "Lucrece") 198
 Skinner, Quentin 17, 53, 76, 81, 85, 93, 132
 Sloane, Thomas O. 22, 25, 43, 61, 67, 92, 130, 132, 139, 148, 151, 152, 187, 191
 Smith, John 86
 Socrates 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 59, 97, 98, 148, 166, 176, 177, 178, 181, 192, 193
 Solon (of Athens) 28, 182
 Sopatros (Rhetor) 47, 59, 86, 150, 171
 Sophocles 41, 63, 117, 145
 Sordello da Goito (Sordel de Goit) 168
 Sotion of Alexandria 182
 Southampton, 3rd Earl of (Henry Wriothesley) 131, 132
 Sparta (*pólis*, Laconia) 94, 162, 170, 171
 Spedding, James 178

- Spies, Marijke 24, 139
 Sprute, Jürgen 66, 82, 111, 144, 147
 Starobinski, Jean 72, 73
 Steinmetz, Sol 90
 Stierle, Karlheinz 149, 192
 Stoa (Stoic School) 18, 31, 39, 72, 73, 79,
 107, 124, 125, 191
 Stobaeus, Joannes 41
 Stolt, Birgit 45, 65, 116
 Strauss, Leo 58, 148, 165, 167, 168, 169,
 170, 181, 185, 186, 188, 192, 198
 Struever, Nancy S. 191
 Stuart (family) 86
 Sturm, John 52
 Suárez, Cipriano 20
 Suetonius 162
 Sulla 50
 Sulpicius Victor (Sulpitius) 50, 136, 142,
 146
 Süß, Wilhelm 11, 34, 62, 66, 67, 71, 88,
 101, 102, 104, 106, 108, 117, 145, 171,
 172
 Svenbro, Jesper 178
 Syracuse (*pólis*, Sicily) 46, 143
- Tacitus, Cornelius P. 5, 15, 18, 19, 155,
 162, 179, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 196
 Tarkov, Nathan 189
 Tasso, Torquato 31
 Terence 27, 33, 146, 149, 150
 Teuber, Bernhard 192, 193
 Thales of Miletus 185
 Themistocles 143
 Theocritus 179
 Theodorus the Atheist 182
 Theophrastus IV, 7, 14, 38, 39, 40, 78,
 101, 116, 117, 118, 140, 147, 148, 155,
 156, 180, 182, 185
 Thersites 72, 105
 Theseus 182
 Thomas, Carol G. 98
 Thucydides 59, 94, 109, 110, 111, 155, 157,
 158, 160, 161, 184, 188, 189
 Tiberius Rhetor 144, 150
 Timaeus of Locri 176
 Timaeus of Tauromenium 158
- Timon of Phlius 176
 Tocqueville, Alexis de 156
 Torquatus, Titus Manlius Imperiosus 182
 Tourneur, Cyril 139
 Trimpi, Wesley 15, 18, 20, 22, 24, 30, 31,
 34, 35, 36, 42, 51, 53, 83, 109, 129,
 157, 162, 166, 176, 186, 198
 Troy (Ilium) 165
 Trüstedt, Katrin 81, 123
 Tryphon 40
 Tudor (family) 139
 Twining, Thomas 64
- Usher, Stephen 29, 101, 106, 107, 114,
 116, 199
- Valéry, Paul 154, 163
 Valla, Lorenzo 191
 Vallozza, Maddalena 31, 32, 33
 Varro, Marcus Terentius 57, 185
 Velázquez, Sonia 132
 Velox (in *Epigrams*) 152
 Vergil (Virgil) 1, 30, 31, 32, 40, 89, 138,
 139, 142, 150, 168
 Vickers, Brian 27, 29, 35, 45, 53, 86, 118,
 131, 143, 195
 Vico, Giambattista 143
 Vives, Juan Luis 19, 20, 32, 33, 102, 111,
 119, 134, 136, 145, 148, 175, 198
 Volkmann, Richard 28, 33, 36, 43, 44, 47,
 52, 53, 54, 64, 65, 78, 94, 100, 104,
 150
 Voltaire 149
- Wagner-Egelhaaf, Martina IV
 Walsh, P. G. 72, 73
 Webb, Edward Kent 98
 Webster, T. B. L. 30, 102, 118, 190
 Weinberg, Bernard 30
 Weinrich, Harald 181
 Wellbery, David E. IV
 Wells, Susan 77
 Wesche, Jörg 123
 White, Hayden 156

Wieland, Christoph Martin 154
Wigham, Frank 8, 89, 128, 129, 177, 194
Willichius, Iodocus (Jodocus Willich) 27
Wilson, Thomas 51, 151
Winterbottom, M. 49
Wisse, Jakob 16, 62, 63, 64, 102, 107, 111,
134, 145
Wittenwiler, Heinrich von 149

Wordsworth, William 27
Woudhuysen, H. R. 16
Wyatt, Thomas 150

Xenocrates of Chalcedon 190
Xenophon (of Athens) 98, 165, 182