FROM HOSPITALITY TO GRACE

Executive Editor
Giovanni da Col

Managing Editor
Katharine Herman

Editorial Board
Carlos Fausto
Ilana Gershon
Michael Lempert
Stephan Palmié
Jonathan Parry
Joel Robbins
Danilyn Rutherford
Anne-Christine Taylor
Jason Throop

www.haubooks.com

FROM HOSPITALITY TO GRACE
A JULIAN PITT-RIVERS OMNIBUS

Edited by

Giovanni da Col and Andrew Shryock

Hau Books
Chicago

© 2017 Hau Books

Unless otherwise indicated, all rights to Julian Pitt-Rivers' work are held by
Françoise Pitt-Rivers and reproduced here with her permission.

Cover and layout design: Sheehan Moore

Typesetting: Prepress Plus (www.prepressplus.in)

ISBN: 978-0-9861325-2-0
LCCN: 2017945172

Hau Books
Chicago Distribution Center
11030 S. Langley
Chicago, IL 60628
www.haubooks.com

Hau Books is printed, marketed, and distributed by The University of Chicago Press.
www.press.uchicago.edu

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper.

Table of Contents

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi

INTRODUCTION xiii
A perfect host: Julian Pitt-Rivers and the anthropology of grace
Andrew Shryock and Giovanni da Col

PART I: **Moral frames: honor, mana, and grace** 1

CHAPTER ONE
Honor and social status in Andalusia 3

CHAPTER TWO
Mana 35

CHAPTER THREE
The place of grace in anthropology 69

CHAPTER FOUR
The malady of honor 105

PART II: **Uncertain relations: kin/friend, host/guest, male/female, and human/animal** 119

CHAPTER FIVE
The kith and the kin 121

CHAPTER SIX
Ritual kinship in the Mediterranean: Spain and the Balkans 141

CHAPTER SEVEN
The law of hospitality 163

CHAPTER EIGHT
Women and sanctuary in the Mediterranean 185

CHAPTER NINE
The paradox of friendship 199

CHAPTER TEN
Lending a hand: Neighborly cooperation in southwestern France 211

CHAPTER ELEVEN
Spiritual power in Central America: The *naguals* of Chiapas 227

PART III: **Transformative rites: sacrifice, substitution, and the sacred** 249

CHAPTER TWELVE
The sacrifice of the bull 251

CHAPTER THIRTEEN
The role of pain in rites of passage 267

CHAPTER FOURTEEN
From the love of food to the love of God 275

CHAPTER FIFTEEN
Quand nos aînés n'y seront plus 301

CHAPTER SIXTEEN
The fate of Shechem or the politics of sex 323

PART IV: **Analytics in place: concepts, theory, and method** 375

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
Contextual analysis and the locus of the model 377

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
On the word "caste" 397

CHAPTER NINETEEN
Race in Latin America: The concept of "raza" 421

CHAPTER TWENTY
Reflections on fieldwork in Spain 449

AFTERWORD
Grace and insight: The legacy of Julian Pitt-Rivers 465
Michael Herzfeld

REFERENCE LIST 473

INDEX 493

Julian Pitt-Rivers (1919–2001)

Acknowledgments

The genealogy of this project is complex, and we could not have completed it without the help of an extensive network of intellectual kith and kin. Giovanni da Col reprinted Julian Pitt-Rivers' masterpieces on hospitality and grace in the first issues of *HAU Journal*, and each generated positive response, especially from younger scholars who are less familiar with Pitt-Rivers. Renewed anthropological interest in the politics of host and guest, showcased in Candea and da Col's special issue of *JRAI*, "The Return to Hospitality" (2012), convinced us that the time was right for serious re-engagement with Pitt-Rivers. In the same year, Stéphane Gros serendipitously discovered, in the library of the Université Paris Nanterre, a collection of papers entitled "From the Love of Food to the Love of God: Essays in the Anthropology of Ritual and Religion," which Pitt-Rivers had intended to submit to the University of Chicago Press in 1992. The proposed volume consisted of eight manuscripts, including the eponymous Marett lecture, which appears in this omnibus. The collection was in sketch form, and we were curious to know if Pitt-Rivers ever made additional progress on it. In response to our inquiries at the University of Chicago Press, David Brent and Priya Nelson located a second set of manuscripts that Pitt-Rivers had submitted for preliminary assessment. They kindly agreed to cancel the contract Chicago had made with Pitt-Rivers and gave their support to the publication of this omnibus. Deborah James was no less helpful in pointing us toward Pitt-Rivers' LSE Inaugural Lecture, "Mana."

Five years (and twenty essays) later, the omnibus is here. The initial stages of production involved careful prep work on several pieces that existed in multiple

versions, were unfinished, came with extensive handwritten marginalia, or were missing dozens of citations. Sean Dowdy helped at first, but Katharine Herman heroically took over in the crucial stages, acquainting herself with its many moving parts and deftly tying together the loose ends. Justin Dyer turned his eagle eye to copyediting; Faun Rice and Jennifer Chisholm did a final round of proofing; and Sheehan Moore designed the book cover. A few senior scholars, who knew Pitt-Rivers personally, cheered us on: among them, Michael Gilsenan, Jane Schneider, and Michael Herzfeld (who honors us with his insightful afterword to the volume). Because Pitt-Rivers is nowadays something of an acquired taste among anthropologists, we cannot help imagining pleasant looks on the faces of the colleagues who introduced us to his work. During a graduate seminar in 1986, Paul Dresch sent Shryock on a forced march through *The fate of Shechem,* a book that was hard for him to fathom at the time but was later indispensable to his work on hospitality in Jordan. For da Col, it was Chris Hann, who amicably suggested that the likeness between da Col's approach to hospitality and that of Pitt-Rivers was very strong, a high compliment to a young scholar who had not read Pitt-Rivers and would find the effect transformative when he did. To all the discerning souls who pass Pitt-Rivers along in this way, we offer this omnibus as return thanks and a resource for future initiations.

Of course, reading Pitt-Rivers in English will not exhaust the insights available in his work. We are grateful to Damien Bright for his translations of four essays that appeared originally in French (Chapter 4, "The malady of honor," Chapter 12, "The sacrifice of the bull," Chapter 13, "The role of pain in rites of passage," and Chapter 15, "*Quand nos aînés n'y seront plus*"). Likewise, we thank Matthew Carey for his translation of "The paradox of friendship" (Chapter 9). Pitt-Rivers' style in English is distinctive, and often quite different from his manner in French, so creating a new voice for him in translation was no easy task. Judith Scheele helped us find good English equivalents for the occasional awkward phrase; David Frye and Ruth Behar checked the Spanish; and Françoise Pitt-Rivers, an editor of great gifts, helped us put finishing touches on the essays.

At all points along the way, Françoise Pitt-Rivers gave us much-needed support and guidance. In keeping with family tradition, she hosted us graciously in Paris, and she also gave us permission to include in the omnibus several pieces to which she now holds the rights. The project would have foundered without her thoughtful intervention. We owe her special debts, and we hope this volume will affirm our mutual commitment to the appreciation and ongoing use of her late husband's work.

INTRODUCTION

A perfect host

Julian Pitt-Rivers and the anthropology of grace

Andrew Shryock and Giovanni da Col

Mary Douglas begins her appreciation of Julian Pitt-Rivers' Andalusian ethnography with a vivid recollection of how he appeared to her when they first met at Oxford, in the late 1940s.

> He stood out from the other anthropology students in many ways. It was partly because of his striking good looks, partly his elegance, which would have distinguished him anywhere, and partly because of his princely good manners. *Debonair*—I think everyone who remembers him would agree that *debonair* was the word. (2004: 43, emphasis added)

In a similar vein, Jonathan Benthall describes Pitt-Rivers as "the most cosmopolitan British social anthropologist of his generation," and "everywhere, the odd man out."[1] Allusions to his patrician habitus are pervasive among colleagues who knew Pitt-Rivers well, and this way of portraying him is never simply

1. The words are from Benthall's obituary for Pitt-Rivers, which appeared in *The Independent*, August 24, 2001 (www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/professor-julian-pitt-rivers-9153369.html).

personal. Instead, it would seem to relate directly to his professional life, and it says important things about his approach to social analysis, in which hospitality and grace figure centrally as both objects and methods of study.

Julian Pitt-Rivers (1919–2001) was a leading figure in twentieth-century social anthropology, known best for his writings on Mediterranean societies, yet his intellectual profile resists easy characterization. To some, he was a conservative thinker drawn to village life, communal rituals, and social forms now seen as traditional (the honor complex) or morally retrograde (bullfighting). To others, he was unconventional, an analytical risk-taker who turned the anthropological gaze in new and surprising directions, making a more global stance possible for the discipline. His ethnography of a Spanish village, *The people of the Sierra* (1954), based on fieldwork conducted between 1949 and 1952, was the first study of a European people undertaken by a British social anthropologist. His Oxford advisors, Meyer Fortes and E. E. Evans Pritchard among them, thought Andalusia was not a promising object of ethnographic scrutiny; they pushed him toward Africa. Pitt-Rivers ignored their advice. Spain would be the epicenter of his work, though he engaged broadly in social anthropology, Europeanizing it in irreversible ways.

His work was exceptional from the start. *The people of the Sierra* captured both the complexity and parochialism of European village life, bringing local notions of gender, kinship, religion, and morality into crisp focus, all the while exploring the delicate patterns of evasion and noncompliance that shaped interactions between rural Andalusians and an enveloping nation-state. The book was shrouded in an air of mystery that Pitt-Rivers diligently preserved. Grazalema, the village he called Alcalà in the first edition, was a hotbed of anarchism before and during the Spanish Civil War (1936–39). Pitt-Rivers studiously avoided partisan political critique in his monograph, but it was clear that some deeper interest in revolution and anarchism, dimly visible in the text, had brought him to southern Spain. In 1971, when the second edition of *The people of the Sierra* was released, he gave a pithy assessment of it: “The whole book can be read as no more than an explication through an ethnographic example of Simmel’s great essay on secrecy and the lie” (1971: xvi).[2]

2. Pitt-Rivers is even more forthcoming in Chapter 20 of this volume, “Reflections on fieldwork in Spain,” where he reveals aspects of his research agenda that, for decades, he could not discuss in print.

Pitt-Rivers often commented on how his fieldwork, carried out under the watchful eye of Franco's dictatorial regime, was colored by suspicion, and how the villagers in Grazalema treated him generously, but always believed he was a spy. Ian Fleming (a fellow Etonian) would probably have found him suitable for the role. Pitt-Rivers was a Captain of the Royal Dragoons during the Second World War and wrote the first official regimental history of the conflict (Pitt-Rivers 1956). Immediately after the war, he became the private tutor to King Faisal II of Iraq (b. 1935), whom he met in Baghdad, and arranged the boy king's education in England. Despite his ready access to powerful people and institutions, Pitt-Rivers located most of his anthropological effort in the countryside, studying townspeople and peasants. The incongruity led to predictable speculations. Paul Dresch reports that, in his conversations with French colleagues, the professorial take on Pitt-Rivers sometimes resembled that of Spanish villagers: "An Englishman of means, once married into Hispanic aristocracy, a name in American circles, dinner guest of Parisian luminaries, now married to the French editor of *Reader's Digest*, and intrigued by *rural* Europe. . . . What *was* he [really] doing there?" (2000: 116).

This apparent misfit was replicated (and it caused equal ambivalence) in a much larger contradiction: namely, that of anthropology in Europe. What Pitt-Rivers was really doing in the French and Spanish countryside was building infrastructure for a new kind of anthropology. With the publication of *Mediterranean countrymen* (1963), he established Mediterranean studies as a dynamic field known for interdisciplinary vigor and historicism many years before those virtues were common, or even broadly claimed, among anthropologists. Later, this area of study would become notorious for its vexed relationship to boundary-marking concepts like honor, shame, patriarchy, patronage, and preferential endogamy. Pitt-Rivers contributed centrally to the formulation of these analytical motifs, taking them far beyond the realm of cultural stereotype. The larger enterprise of Mediterranean studies, now a permanent zone of intellectual production, cannot be championed or criticized without constant reference to Pitt-Rivers and his work. His disciplinary influence was at its peak in the 1970s—*The fate of Shechem* (1977) contains some of his most innovative essays—but he produced superb work into the 1990s. His last volume, edited with John Peristiany, *Honor and grace in anthropology* (1992a), was reissued in 2005.

Mediterranean studies remains a minority interest in anthropology, its influence paling in comparison to, say, Amazonian or Africanist traditions, but Pitt-Rivers was always at home in the intellectual spaces where elite anthropology

is made. He held faculty positions at the University of Chicago, the University of California at Berkeley, and the London School of Economics. His post at the École Pratique des Hautes Études came at the invitation of Claude Lévi-Strauss, who had enormous respect for him. (*The savage mind* was published by the University of Chicago Press in a series edited by Pitt-Rivers and Ernest Gellner.) His students were no less impressive. In 1974, Pitt-Rivers examined Mick Taussig's doctoral thesis at the London School of Economics. A quarter-century later, as if to repay this debt of spiritual kinship, Taussig took up two of Pitt-Rivers' enduring concerns—lying and secrecy—in *Defacement* (1999), a book that features a brilliant tribute to Pitt-Rivers disguised as a critique of the old master's handling of "public secrets." In Grazalema, Taussig concludes, ethnography and deception were necessary partners.

> For surely what is referenced here in this epiphanous encounter between north and south, between the cultivated man of letters from the north and the sun-drenched tillers of the southern soil of untruth is an uneasy acknowledgment as to a certain secret of the secret in which the south has long had the function of mirroring, in its dishonesty, the dissimulation of dissimulation in the north? (1999: 77)

It was from this "uneasy" place of knowledge production that Pitt-Rivers fashioned his unique brand of anthropology. He loomed large in the Anglo-American academy, in France, where he lived for many years, and in Spain, where his research on Andalusian culture was widely celebrated. He published, did fieldwork, and taught in all three national languages.[3]

GENEALOGIES AND COSMOLOGIES OF DISTINCTION

Throughout his career—indeed, throughout his life—Pitt-Rivers worked with and against the special reputation he inherited with his surname, which is an illustrious (and occasionally notorious) one in Britain. Lieutenant-General Augustus Lane Fox Pitt-Rivers, the ethnologist and antiquarian who founded the Pitt-Rivers Museum at Oxford in 1884, was Julian's great grandfather.

3. Superb appreciations of Pitt-Rivers' life and work are available in Velasco, Fournier, and Viana (2004) and Velasco and Caro (2015).

George Pitt-Rivers, Julian's father, owned one of the largest estates in England. He was an anthropologist as well, trained by Bronislaw Malinowski in the 1920s, but enamored of eugenics and supportive of Fascism in the 1930s; he was imprisoned during the Second World War as a national security threat.[4] In 1954, Michael Pitt-Rivers, Julian's older brother, was involved in a sex scandal that led eventually to the decriminalization of homosexuality in Britain.[5] Julian Pitt-Rivers established himself as an anthropologist adjacent to these persons and events, though he had little to say in published work about how his aristocratic upbringing influenced his outlook on things anthropological.[6] He would have considered public musings of that sort distasteful, or pointless. His status was common knowledge among his colleagues and students, as was his intense rejection of his father's political views. In one of his later essays, he noted what, to him, was axiomatic: "[T]he fieldworker's culture, upbringing and previous experience place limits upon the possibility of his knowing anything which he cannot assimilate in some way to something he knows already" (1992b: 133). This "personal factor," as he called it, determines not only what the ethnographer "observes but what conclusions he draws" (ibid.).

Pitt-Rivers was a man of privilege. He was brought up in it; it is what he knew, and it gave a noble cast to his work. We believe it would be wrong to fetishize Pitt-Rivers as a hybrid creature made up of intellectual charisma and charm, but it would be equally wrong to ignore these gifts and their role in producing a body of work marked by its subtle engagement with ideas and institutions that convey mastery, repute, distinction, and (in every sense of the word) grace. Something akin to pedigree, or genealogy, is at stake in his writings, which are often oriented toward old and authentic things. "Unlike many

4. For a full account of his life and politics, see Hart (2015).

5. Michael Pitt-Rivers' conviction on charges of homosexual indecency prompted the Wolfenden Report of 1957, which recommended the decriminalization of homosexual behavior conducted privately between consenting adults. Patrick Higgins explores the case in *Heterosexual dictatorship: Male homosexuality in post-war Britain* (1996).

6. According to Françoise Pitt-Rivers, Julian was beginning to write "retrospective anthropology" when his final illness set in. The Pitt-Rivers legacy, she says, "was very hard for Julian to live with," and the popular belief that he was extremely rich is mistaken. George Pitt-Rivers sold off much of the vast Pitt-Rivers estate, and what remained passed to Michael Pitt-Rivers, as eldest son. Julian was disinherited by his father, "from whom he did not receive a penny" (Françoise Pitt-Rivers, personal communication, September 14, 2017).

of my British colleagues," he wrote, "I am very much concerned with origins" (1977: vii).

Pitt-Rivers was unusual in the extent to which he anchored his scholarship in Abrahamic and Hellenic traditions, emphasizing their centrality to Mediterranean society as myth, history, and moral frame. He did so for intellectual and deeply personal reasons. *The fate of Shechem* (1977), for instance, grew out of his childhood puzzlement over certain difficult passages in the Bible and his adult confusion over why Lévi-Strauss (and most other anthropologists) systematically ignored the kinship systems of Mediterranean and Middle Eastern societies, in which hierarchy and endogamy flourish. His attraction to concepts such as honor, grace, hospitality, and *mana*—qualities available to all people, but associated in special ways with people of high station—was part of the sociopolitical world of class that produced his sensibilities and his scholarship. He brought into (and drew out of) anthropological thought a diverse range of ideas that, before his monumental work in Spain, were considered too European, too historical, and too complex to be treated ethnographically. This omnibus is a call to reengage with these ideas, making them available again for appreciation, critique, modification, and discerning use.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE *OMNIBUS*

Aficionados of Pitt-Rivers fall into several distinct cohorts, and the twenty essays that fill this volume were selected to please and connect as many readerships as possible. We have included most of Pitt-Rivers' "greatest hits," which focus principally on honor (Chapters 1 and 4) and hospitality (Chapter 7), concepts that fed his interest in grace and friendship (Chapters 3 and 9). His writings on kinship (Chapters 5 and 6) are represented as well, along with classic essays on ritual, especially the role of sacrifice in social reproduction and change (Chapters 12 and 14). Some of the essays are no longer popular, or never were, but they predict contemporary trends in research or speak to them in uncanny ways. Ontologists and those intrigued by animal/human relations will find useful leads in "Spiritual power in Central America" (Chapter 11), Pitt-Rivers' essay on *naguals*, the companion animals that shape the careers of witches in Chiapas. Ethnographers interested in infrastructure, both economic and material, should give close attention to "Lending a hand" (Chapter 10), a vivid account of how

mechanized farming, paved roads, and expanding electricity grids transformed patterns of sharing, and notions of solidarity, in the French countryside. Scholars of embodiment should head directly to "The role of pain in rites of passage" (Chapter 13), in which Pitt-Rivers builds a more visceral model of Van Gennep's rites of passage. Likewise, historicists and genealogists of ideas will find inspiration in Pitt-Rivers' analysis of the terms "caste" (Chapter 18) and "race" (Chapter 19), traveling concepts that continue to inform and distort ethnography wherever they find local footing.

We are especially happy to include English translations of five essays previously available only in French. "The sacrifice of the bull" (Chapter 12), a fascinating alloy of history, ethnography, and the comparative analysis of myth, was one of Pitt-Rivers' favorite essays. In English, Pitt-Rivers wrote in a straightforward, elegant style. In French, his pieces are no less sophisticated, but they are often more confidently opinionated and funny. For proof, sample the parade of wry insights on youth, generational politics, and aging in "*Quand nos aînés n'y seront plus*" (Chapter 15). Finally, we include five essays that have never been published before, the most substantial being "From the love of food to the love of god" (Chapter 14), which Pitt-Rivers gave as the 1988 Marett Lecture, and "Reflections on fieldwork in Spain" (Chapter 20), a recollection of how he did the research on which *The people of the Sierra* is based.

In bringing together this mix of old and new essays, we are not advocating for a precisely defined approach to anthropological theory or method. Like so many ethnographers trained by Evans-Pritchard at Oxford, Julian Pitt-Rivers believed fieldwork was more art than science, with no techniques or protocols that would be applicable everywhere. He was likewise averse to theoreticism, insisting instead that good theory is implicit in careful ethnographic description, another meme passed down in the lineage of Evans-Pritchard.[7] There are, however, dominant themes in Pitt-Rivers' work, and he returned to them repeatedly. Among the most pronounced of these motifs is the respect host and guest owe to each other, which Pitt-Rivers explores beautifully in what many readers consider his best essay, "The law of hospitality" (Chapter 7). This host/guest respect is reciprocal; it is a gift of acknowledgment that enables outsiders and locals to interact in a temporarily shared space. We would like to think of

7. In his own words, "the theoretical conclusions will . . . be found to be implicit in an exact and detailed description" (Evans-Pritchard 1973: 3).

this omnibus as a shared space of intellectual hospitality, in which Pitt-Rivers is our host. The perfect host is seldom encountered in real life—Pitt-Rivers wrote often of hospitality gone wrong—and the perfect guest is equally rare, but their approximations always excel at giving and receiving graciously, which is to say abundantly and with serious regard for the hospitality context itself.

The best way to interact with Pitt-Rivers' essays, we believe, is to treat them as rituals of incorporation and display in which he invites us to participate. This invitation typically comes in four guises—four recurrent trends in his work—which we have used to organize the volume into four parts.

The first, *moral frames* (Chapters 1–4), calls our attention to mediating ideas—honor, *mana*, grace, distinction—through which humans express primary social values and deal with the structural contradictions these values resolve, create, and reflect.

The second, *uncertain relations* (Chapters 5–11), emphasizes the definition, often contested and blurry, of key positions in social structure, or in social discourse. Repeatedly, Pitt-Rivers shows how concepts that exist in opposition—friend/kin, man/woman, animal/human, and guest/host—overlap in practice, or oscillate, or interact in ways that produce a space of paradox and risk, where categorizations rarely hold.

The third, *transformative rites* (Chapters 12–16), fixes on the ritual means by which paradox and risk are worked out, often in the form of sacrifice, bloodletting, and bodily marking, but always with the goal of transforming self and society re/productively.

The fourth theme, *analytics in place* (Chapters 17–20), stresses the importance of knowing social forms as they are localized in discrete contexts, both historical and contemporary, and as systems of relations that can be abstracted and objectified to allow for comparisons. Comparison, in turn, creates new forms of knowing that, Pitt-Rivers insisted, are themselves localized between and across social worlds.

As a proper guest, you should accept all four of these invitations. Each will introduce you to essential tendencies in Pitt-Rivers' thought; for that reason, we have not tried to streamline the content or factor out redundancies. As at any good feast, there will be more here than you can possibly eat, and the best dishes will be served up often and amply across all four parts of the volume. In our dual editorial role as Pitt-Rivers' guests and (in his absence) your hosts, we will try to manage this abundance by drawing your attention to what is rarest and most fortifying in the essays we have placed, as it were, on the table.

A FEAST OF ETHNOGRAPHIC THEORY

This volume contains some of Pitt-Rivers' clearest statements on theory, yet each is made with an eye toward producing sharp, effective analysis. It was analytical precision and interpretive insight that he was after, and he believed that neither could be attained without detailed attention to context, to the elucidation of social forms, and to how meanings are made in relational sets. His work was distinctive for its reliance on "community" as both an object and field of study, an orientation he believed was necessary to the study of peasant villages (Chapter 10), the historical evolution of marital and kinship practices (Chapter 16), or the development of racial formations in contemporary trans/national contexts (Chapter 19). Pitt-Rivers assumed that social life was a meeting ground of people, things, and structures that held significance, or created it. For example, his parsimonious explanation of when it is appropriate to wear the *sombrero de ala ancha*, a wide-brimmed men's hat popular in Andalusia (Chapter 17), is buttressed by an elaborate discussion of the contextual analysis of signs (his own blend of Saussure, Austin, and Evans-Pritchard), a consideration of local agropastoral economies and their gendered hierarchies, and attention to Spain's national heritage policies as they relate to regionalism and international tourism. This interpretive firepower is trained on a simple—but, it turns out, elaborately situated—article of clothing, and his ability to make sense of it, paired with a local Spaniard's ability to take it all for granted, was evidence for Pitt-Rivers that contexts had a structural reality that was simultaneously "already there" and made anew, and made differently, through analysis. In his skilled hands, contextual analysis allowed the analyst "to escape from . . . servitude to context by making context explicit," thereby achieving "a higher level of generalization" (p. 393).

Pitt-Rivers believed that human interaction is shaped by dense associations of ideas and perceptions that are unconscious, or, if they enter consciousness at all, do so in polysemous languages of ritual and symbolism that cannot be explained by "rational" exegesis, whether such explanation is offered by local actors or ethnographers. For precisely this reason, he argued, the irrational and unsaid perform work essential to community formation. In a suggestive passage from "From the love of food to the love of God" (Chapter 14), Pitt-Rivers poses the unconscious as a kind of cultural reserve, with its own ordering, which swirls around us (or "above" us) and is sometimes drawn into increasingly explicit and textually specified meanings.

> Rather than conceive of the conscious as above the unconscious—hence "sub-conscious," "sub-liminal," etc.; Freud early on gave up sub-conscious in favor of unconscious—we should invert the spatial representation and, borrowing a different idiom, consider consciousness the other way up. That which is not fully apprehended, which is "lived" without being "consciously conceived," remains "up in the air" until it can be brought down into consciousness, "put *down* in black and white," reduced from the multi-dimensional sphere of the polysemic to, literally, the black ink on a white page, where alternative meanings, inconsistencies, and logical contradictions are anathema. (p. 292)

His analysis of bullfighting is a superb example of how an ethnographer gains access to the culturally implicit. Pitt-Rivers moves from detailed accounts of the confrontation of man and bull in the ring to considerations of folkloric and mythical tropes many centuries old, all the while connecting Andalusian material to notions of gender, blood stigma, and bodily transformation found in human societies around the world (Chapter 12). His conclusions, he admits, would not make immediate sense to Andalusians. Nor should they, necessarily. The interpretive work of anthropology, he contends, is beholden to locality and is always locatable, but it also generates new ways of knowing that are more "objective," more inclusive and transcendent, because they are made of insights generated through a careful comparison of ethnographic analyses done in multiple times and places.

However one judges Pitt-Rivers as a theoretician or fieldworker, his powers as an analyst were tremendous, and they derived their potency from what he described: ideas, objects, and beliefs that are durable and compelling over time. His work is valuable for its exemplary quality as cultural history, as deep history, as a working out of tradition.[8] We can redeploy Pitt-Rivers as an animating force for a kind of anthropological inquiry that unfolds on small and large scales at once, never losing its attachment to discrete historical pathways or its explanatory potential in relation to more global contexts of similarity and difference. In a striking passage from "Women and sanctuary" (Chapter 8), for instance, he

8. Pitt-Rivers' engagement with Mediterranean cultural materials brings to mind Talal Asad's (1986) recommended approach to an anthropology of Islam: in both cases, one is dealing with a "discursive tradition," and Pitt-Rivers, ever the erudite scholar, offered a wealth of "founding texts" on which to base his analyses of moral systems, from the Old Testament to the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, from *Don Juan* to *Don Quixote*.

develops a model of post-Neolithic and preindustrial social space that, in the Mediterranean and other world regions, is ancient, generic, highly gendered, and intimately known to us. The social world of the premodern Mediterranean was, according to Pitt-Rivers, divided into (1) "the house," which is internally divided into a private sphere associated with women and dependents, and a more public space where guests can be received; (2) the areas outside the house, "the common meeting-grounds of the whole community," which are made up of similarly structured households whose members know each other and have real, continuous relations of rivalry and alliance; and (3) the "outside world" beyond the community, "from which come strangers, that is, unknown persons who, unlike the fellow-members of the community with whom relations are habitual and clearly structured, remain mysterious, their nature and their power in doubt and who derive from their strangeness a preferential relationship to the Divine" (pp. 189–90).

Each of these spaces is a cosmos unto itself, in which anthropologies of diverse sorts can unfold, and the extent to which these spaces are entirely present or gone, contemporary or historical, is less obvious than Pitt-Rivers pretends when he locates his model "prior to modern urban development" (p. 189). Concepts like "house," "community," and "outside world" are the unfinished business of anthropology; they surface and sink as notions of place, structure, duration, and belonging evolve alongside notions of mobility, agency, change, and exclusion.[9] Pitt-Rivers was modeling a world dominated by hospitality and house politics, but his key terms will inevitably be read into the present, where they are endlessly reconfigured in relation to conscious and subconscious aspects of the modern. Insofar as he was describing his own cultural tradition—the Bible and Homeric epic, as he treats them in *The fate of Shechem* (1977), are very much foundational to his own identity—he was predisposed to treat the Otherness he confronted in the past, or in a Spanish village today, in much the way members of a "premodern" Mediterranean household treated a guest from the outside world: as something mysterious, powerful, and sacred. One could argue that "honor," which Pitt-Rivers saw as a complicated and demonstrably ancient

9. As refugees and migrants enter Mediterranean countries in growing numbers, these concepts reassert their political and analytical importance. For recent works that prove the trend, see Cabot (2014), Albahari (2015), Ben-Yehoyada (2017), and Rogozen-Soltar (2017). The resurgent literature on hospitality, too, is saturated by these motifs, which are brought together in stimulating fashion by Candea and da Col (2012).

construct, occupied the place of the respected stranger in his writings. He was clearly enamored of the concept, even though it has been thoroughly pathologized by modernists, who portray it (and its darker partner, "shame") as a quality more Oriental than Occidental. In "The malady of honor" (Chapter 4), one of his last commentaries on the word, Pitt-Rivers argues that something like "honor" is found in all human societies, but that speaking conspicuously of one's honor is considered "old-fashioned" in Europe and North America today. He suggests that sentiments of shame have more staying power in contemporary Western societies, where honor is now treated as a sickness "whose symptoms show only in its absence" (p. 118), that is, when one is publicly disgraced.

What, then, of "the preferential link to the Divine" encoded in Otherness? What of the sacredness that marks persons and qualities that arrive from the margins of the social world, or (as if) from the distant past? Do these motifs still have a viable place in ethnography? Do they figure as cosmological blinders, as a politics of difference, as tools for culture-making? Pitt-Rivers answers these questions by drawing creatively, yet again, from the same discursive traditions that valorize honor, house, host, and guest. In one of his final engagements with Hellenic and Abrahamic cosmologies, "The place of grace in anthropology" (Chapter 3), he shifts his focus from what might be described today as conventional features of social structure to the spaces just beyond them, which are not empty or formless, but are full of the numinous material that is required to make social life and, he argues, bind it to sacred things.

THE UNFATHOMABLE WORLD OF GRACE

Part of Pitt-Rivers' legend is that he brought British social anthropology to Europe. In doing so, he managed simultaneously to provincialize Europe and deprovincialize ethnography, but he also accomplished something far more profound. He brought anthropology into a space between law and grace, two ideas central to European self-perceptions. He realized that the space between law and grace is one in which powerful, generative ideas are made. Law is associated with regularity, with right and wrong, with form. Grace, of its nature, is harder to define. "The only general rule," Pitt-Rivers claims, "is that grace is always something extra. . . . [I]t belongs on the register of the extraordinary (hence its association with the sacred)" (p. 72). Doing someone a favor is graceful, and a "return of grace is always expected, whether in the form of a material

manifestation (regardless of the material value of that which is returned) or merely in verbal expression" (ibid.). Hence the proliferation of "thanks" and "thank you," words that pepper our daily interactions.

Pitt-Rivers' thoughts on grace predate philosophical and anthropological inquiries about the possibility of the "free gift" (*cf.* Derrida 2000; Laidlaw 2000). For Pitt-Rivers, grace is a concept that explains all those forms of unaccountable and unexchangeable value that exist on both the social and theological planes, and that increase the value of things or transactions yet cannot be quantified, predicted, given, kept, or preserved without facing some sort of ontological limit, without risk or the prospect of loss. Grace, to use Pitt-Rivers' own words, refers to "what cannot be owed or won, specified in advance or merited" (p. 88). In different economic cosmologies, these forms go by terms such as "luck," "fortune," or even "chance" (da Col 2012). Comparing grace to Polynesian ideas of *mana*, and to hospitality everywhere, he defines it as "something over and above what is due, economically, legally, or morally; it is neither foreseeable, predictable by reasoning, nor subject to guarantee. It . . . can only be exchanged against its own kind" (p. 88).

As it was for Derrida (2000) on hospitality and Bourdieu (1977) on gifts, the foundational text that led Pitt-Rivers to his Copernican rethinking of the problem of reciprocity was Émile Benveniste's *Dictionary of Indo-European concepts and society*, in which all the essential motifs appear:

> [W]e have services without return, offerings "by grace and favor," pure acts of "grace," which are the starting points of a new kind of reciprocity. Above the normal circuit of exchange—where one gives in order to obtain—there is a second circuit, that of beneficence and gratefulness, of what is given without thought of return, of what is offered in "thankfulness." ([1969] 2016: 158)

For Pitt-Rivers, likewise, grace is never reducible to rules or requirements. The good host is grace-producing; the bad guest is an in-grate, and dis-graced. These are simple insights, but they are already too complex to be fully contained in legal structures, which diminish grace by associating it with compulsion. It is now widely understood that Mauss's *The gift* cannot be read separately from the essay on sacrifice he wrote with Hubert (Hubert and Mauss [1898] 1964). In Mauss' accounts, all gifts entail sacrifice; they contain a part of the donor, which the donor parts with. Whereas for Mauss sacrifice is a model for the gift, for Pitt-Rivers the renunciation of things given is not predicated on a cosmology

of assured returns: it is a *gambit*.[10] The linearity of direct reciprocity, or the circularity of generalized reciprocity, is replaced by nonlinear trajectories. Think non-Euclidean and quantum anthropology. The host sacrifices the space of the house to a stranger he might never see again, because God will compensate the host, someday, whether the guest can or cannot. *Dios se lo pague*, "May God repay you," say the beggar and the guest. Pitt-Rivers offers a profound insight when he argues that the expectation of reciprocity is replaced by the invention of the free gift, which can occur only in a transcendent and encompassing field of hospitality. The latter is akin to the little-understood Neapolitan tradition of *caffè sospeso* ("suspended coffee"), in which a customer orders a coffee, plus one. The serving of the plus-one—*il caffè sospeso*—is "suspended" for the sake of a future customer, who might be low on change, or even penniless. Donor and recipient will never meet. Hence, the free gift—*il caffè sospeso*—is not exactly "free." It requires the hospitality of the café where it is consumed.

But Pitt-Rivers goes further. He argues that a theory of grace has never been "treated as a concept of analytical utility in anthropology" (p. 279), an oversight he attributes to key interpretive mistakes made by the founders of economic anthropology.

> Mauss' interest in contract and its religious origin, together with his failure to recognize the existence of the concept of grace, caused him to misinterpret Malinowski's material on the Kula. This is equally true of the rest of his great essay on the gift and of the essay on sacrifice. . . . Unfortunately, Evans-Pritchard followed Mauss in thinking one could understand the theology of Nuer sacrifice, or any other, without the concept of grace. (p. 278)

Absent from the anthropologist's analytical repertoire, Pitt-Rivers contends, is a solution to the problem of exchange in which nothing (material) is given; or, more precisely, in which nothing but satisfaction or "thanks" is given. He suggests that the answer can be found in a more rigorous examination of enjoyment, pleasure, and mutual feeling.

> Not much has been done in this direction since Meyer Fortes (1969) opened the door to such a discussion with his provocative concept of "kinship amity." Yet in

10. Serendipitously, the etymology of "gambit" traces it to the Italian "*gambetto*," or tripping-up.

> the meanwhile, Émile Benveniste (1969) has shown that the etymological origin of the word "grace" is precisely an Indo-Iranian root, "gir" meaning an offering to the gods, *one that is given not in the hope of a material return, but to give pleasure.* It seems that the idea of giving pleasure, or giving thanks, has mysteriously been left out of the anthropologist's tool kit—and pleasure (like grace) is something that must always, in fact, be returned if amicable relations are to be maintained. (p. 279, added emphasis)

Cautioning that anthropologists should not apply concepts of "economic equivalence" to all forms of sacrifice, and especially to Nuer sacrifice, Pitt-Rivers criticizes Evans-Pritchard (1956) for reproducing a Maussian world of *hau* obligations, thereby eclipsing the world of *intentions* summoned by grace, whose aim is rather to "please" and "appreciate" the divinity. Nuer sacrifice to Kwoth is, for Pitt-Rivers, "an expression of friendship, respect, appreciation, love, which comes from the heart, not from a sense of obligation; as such, it is a vehicle of grace, and it can be returned, as it must be, only in the form of grace" (p. 279). With this brilliant insight, he fashions a pioneering "theory of affect" that brings kinship, economy, and cosmology into a unified interpretive frame.

The reordering Pitt-Rivers suggests in his treatment of grace is radical, and developing it further would require moving entrenched assumptions about exchange aside. At least since Hobbes, reciprocity has been posed as the founding principle of human society, and even in the softest Maussian traditions, analysis shifts quickly to modes of give-and-take that are oriented toward the calculation of equivalences, of loss and gain. For Pitt-Rivers, basic sociality is rather to be found in the noneconomic offerings of gratitude and pleasure, which are immeasurable and rooted in the exchange of favors.[11] Coupled with his insights in "The kith and the kin" (Chapter 5), an essay written as a tribute to Fortes' "principle of amity," one sees the remarkable extent to which Pitt-Rivers had already developed this alternative theory of relatedness. In key respects, it resembles Marshall Sahlins' argument that kinship is based not on an exchange of biophysical substances, but on "participation in one another's existence" (2013: 18), or "mutuality of being" (ibid.: 2).

The role of volition, of intentional and chosen action, is essential to this framework. Returning a favor, like returning a gift, might seem obligatory, but

11. Some of these implications have been examined, in relation to a theory of favors, by the contributors to *Economies of favour after socialism* (Henig and Makovicky 2017).

Pitt-Rivers, upending Mauss, asserts that nothing about either gesture is required. We must choose to respond, both to the experience of grace and to the inadequacy of law, which graceful gestures exceed. Without these willful actions, the social does not happen. It is not possible.[12] Grace is Pitt-Rivers' "floating signifier" (Lévi-Strauss [1950] 1987), yet unlike *mana* or *hau*, it cannot be possessed or transferred; it can only be *hoped for*. In this sense, grace is reminiscent of Lévi-Strauss' notion of a "supplement" or "third element" both internal and external to systems of reciprocal exchange, and to the abstract relational oppositions of language itself. This "supplement" can generate and contain the asymmetries that give speech its variability and social structures their tendency to change. Without floating signifiers, language would ossify, because the relationship between signified and signifier, uninterrupted by the accumulation of historical events and contingent knowledge, would become necessary and immutable. Lévi-Strauss believed that, without the diversity generated by a third element, even systems of reciprocal exchange (direct or generalized reciprocity) would evolve toward an ultimate balance and their constituent groups would eventually merge. The motion of exchange would meet an ontological termination. How does Lévi-Strauss solve the problem? He needed a concept to explain the persistence of logically and logistically unsustainable systems. Thus, he had to find a way to replicate the effect of a signifier with *zero symbolic value* in language—one which breeds and incorporates variation, as the words "stuff" and "thing" do in English—at the level of social institutions.[13] The result is the invention of the "zero institution," one having "no intrinsic property other than that of establishing the necessary preconditions for the existence of the social system to which they belong; their presence—in itself devoid of significance—enables the social system to exist as a whole" (Lévi-Strauss 1963: 159).

This was the central paradox to which Pitt-Rivers returned as well, and often with greater originality and panache than his Parisian friend. Human society is

---

12. This kind of philosophical puzzle, or *aporia,* is a device famously associated with Jacques Derrida. Anyone who reads his *Of hospitality* (2000) alongside Pitt-Rivers' "The law of hospitality" (Chapter 7), or their related analyses of friendship, or gifts, will wonder if they were secret admirers of each other's work.

13. "In the system of symbols which makes up any cosmology, it would just be a zero *symbolic value,* that is, a sign marking the necessity of a supplementary symbolic content over and above that which the signified already contains, which can be any value at all, provided it is still part of the available reserve, and is not already, as the phonologists say, a term in a set" (Lévi -Strauss [1950] 1987: 64).

held together by a complex array of structures and traditions. Rules, in short. But social life happens because *we constantly move beyond the limits of received forms*. We constantly alter and transcend them. More tantalizing still, we create them—or do they simply occur to us as miracles?—in a realm of excess, of gratuity, that pulls us beyond the mere reproduction, even the savvy modification, of social life. The implications are mind-bending. Consider, for example, the temporality of the gift. We know from Bourdieu (1977, 1997) that the paradox of the gift dwells in the possibility of experiencing it as *both* gratuitous and repayable. This contradiction is solved by the work of time: more precisely, by the time-lag between gift and counter-gift that enables us to perceive gifts as altruistic and keeps us from knowing, with certainty, whether a gift is ultimately gratuitous or not. Grace, however, stretches the horizon of time even further, posing *eternity* as the point of (no) return, annihilating the very element Bourdieu considers constitutive of the gift.

Similarly, Pitt-Rivers' invitation to test the limits of the social pushes us to reflect on figures who embody values antithetical to noble expenditure and the Maussian "joy of giving." Instead of keeping things now in order to give them away later, or to allow lesser gifts to circulate (*per* Weiner 1992), these agents take without giving, consume without recirculating, and transform the substances they consume for reuse in other domains entirely. Often these agents inhabit a cosmological imagination that attributes to them innate wasting powers, or exploitative natures. Because they already exist within a social structure, these agents can invade other social or vital spaces, nullifying or consuming the forms of value found there without producing different values. Examples of such figures of nullification are the parasite, the tax-evader, the free-rider, the witch, the plagiarizer, the sycophant, the hanger-on, and the usurer. In the worldview suggested by Pitt-Rivers, they would all have a necessary (and negative) relationship to grace.

As Jacques Le Goff (1990) has shown, twelfth- and thirteenth-century theological treatises offered elaborate accounts of how usury distorted a natural economy ordained by God and how this distortion could be repaired by the pure externality of grace. Because usurers sold time, an immaterial quality that could be owned only by God, their trade was characterized as a kind of theft; in short, as stealing from God. Can one legitimately harvest time, as one can reap a field of wheat? The idea of charging interest for a sum of time was deemed sinful because it was unnatural. Yet usury is essential work even in protocapitalist economies, and the medieval Church found ways to rationalize (or at least

tolerate and forgive) it. How to solve the conundrum of the theft of time? By introducing a new manipulation of time and a new space in the cosmology of the afterlife. The profit on delayed returns was cured by *creating the spatial embodiment of a time-lag*, namely Purgatory (*cf.* also Le Goff 1984). The profits generated by collecting interest could be laundered, so to speak, in Purgatory, in the afterlife, where the sin of selling time could be forgiven through *a time of penitential waiting*. The wealth amassed through delayed reciprocity was cancelled through delayed salvation. By this route, the money-lender could enter Paradise, and European capitalism could sanitize its profits, and restore its spiritual health, in the refracted space of Purgatory.

None of this reasoning would surprise Pitt-Rivers. He realized that a fraught, generative relationship between law and grace is built into Jewish, Christian, and Muslim traditions, which are heavily invested in notions of divine blessing, divinely ordained law, and a better world beyond the one we know. His anthropological sensibilities were perfected in Spain, a modern Christian society. But like Mauss, Pitt-Rivers was a skilled sampler of the ethnographic canon. Given the presence of hospitality and honor-like notions in most human societies, he assumed that ideas of grace are equally widespread.[14] Finding them requires analytical work at "the point of junction between the ideal and the real world, the sacred and the profane" (p. 103), and this analytical effort requires movement and response similar to that which animates social life. For Pitt-Rivers, this movement was always, quite literally, about relocating the analyst and what s/he analyzes. He was a connoisseur, long before it had faddish appeal, of the scalar shift. This tactic is evident in almost any essay Pitt-Rivers wrote, and it is aided and abetted by the elasticity of his key analytical concepts. Honor and grace (like house, host, and guest) can be used to interpret the granular details of Andalusian village life, or they can be analyzed in relation to class hierarchies, larger national contexts, ambient Mediterranean alternatives, their likenesses to ancient Greek and Hebrew materials, or to analogous concepts located as far afield as Inuit seasonal camps or the strong words of Tikopian chiefs.

This analytical effort took Pitt-Rivers into a space beyond existing form and content. His approach was fundamentally comparative and articulatory, but it never has the flat, accretional, contingent feel we now associate with assemblages and actor-networks. There is always a discernible hierarchy of value

14. We could argue that in so-called "fortune societies" (da Col 2012), ideas of grace suffuse the *cosmoeconomies* of everyday life.

in his work, with obvious import and moral consequences. This preference for the moral, and for moral distinction, explains the kinds of topics Pitt-Rivers gravitated toward and how he engaged with them. It also accounts for the prophetic, cautionary strands in his work. When he wrote about honor, hospitality, or friendship, he engaged in a deeply moral project. One might even say he was crafting an anthropology that allowed him to moralize, and a moral stance that supported a specific kind of anthropological reasoning.

Pitt-Rivers knew that movement between law and grace, head and heart, is necessary to produce interpretive insight. It is something that must be reenacted in analysis, not merely analyzed. It carries us, as actors and as analysts, beyond mere habitus. The gratuitous is not random for Pitt-Rivers. It has its own history of movement, and as such it can be traced in a variety of traveling concepts. Analytical movement into spaces of grace is always, according to Pitt-Rivers, *voluntary*. It is an act of will; it requires transcendence; and it does not guarantee a return. In his preface to the second edition of *The people of the Sierra* (1971), Pitt-Rivers claims that to do ethnography and to analyze ethnographic data well, the anthropologist must stake out a position neither fully within, nor fully beyond the world s/he describes, thus coming loose from prior constraints on moral imagination and acquiring, in a new space of perception, a kind of heightened sensitivity to pattern and exception. The process is aspirational, and always incomplete.

> It is never possible to detach oneself entirely from one's natal culture—what on earth should we be if it were?—the culturally homeless anthropologist cannot exist, however he rebel against his past; such an ideal is unattainable. Yet if he does not strive for objectivity placing his moral judgment in abeyance, he will fall only into pedestrian ethnocentrism. The worth of a work of social anthropology relates largely to the degree to which it achieves a genuine detachment. (1971: xxiii)

Detachment, for Pitt-Rivers, is genuine when it frees us from binding moral judgments, from our own histories and life experiences, and even from the precedents and predilections of anthropology as a discipline. In short, detachment could be said to produce an interpretive state of grace, one located in an analytical context (actually, in a kind of intellectual striving) that, like the mediatory concept of grace itself, is "evanescent and self-contradictory" (p. 98).[15]

15. In his deep-cutting critique of Pitt-Rivers' thoughts on lying, secrecy, and method, Taussig immediately perceives the religious undertones in this stance: "We note

INSIDE AND OUTSIDE AT ONCE

Pitt-Rivers insisted that "analysis" is only one location in a string of production sites that, together, make anthropology. In fine Oxford tradition, he insisted on endless movement between the ethnographer's own society, worlds defined specifically by fieldwork, and the vast body of knowledge anthropologists make available to each other for comparison.[16] In each of these locations he could produce the evanescent, self-contradictory moments of illumination that are, for the anthropologist, the equivalent of "saying grace." His observations on aging and youth culture in the societies of the global north (Chapter 15) have the clarity of vision that comes when sociological analysis is comparative and, as a result, more broadly human. His essay on honor in Andalusia (Chapter 1) is uncanny in its ability to parse out local meanings, contextualizing them within variable frames of class and gender. His essays on *mana* (Chapter 2), caste and race (Chapters 18 and 19), and ritual kinship (Chapter 6) are *tour de force* displays of comparativist reasoning, and their sublime moments come unexpectedly, when Pitt-Rivers demonstrates failures of analogical overreach and misapplication of terms, the all-too-common sins of ethnographic theory. Something like detachment is required to name these sins, and to atone for them. "Conceptions are something other than the words used to express them," he says (p. 48), a simple and marvelous observation; once a conception is defined, "we should search for its significance, not in attempting to find words in English equivalent to it, but in the associations it makes between different realms of meaning" (p. 42). And in the latter pursuit, the impossible relation between detachment and embodiment materializes, almost as a mystery.

> It is in the nature of such constructs [honor and *mana*] that they are lived in the struggle of life rather than conceived objectively and therefore while they

---

the spiritual call to self-discipline with its promise of future reward, the self-denial required by law, not the law of the state, as in Franco's Spain, but the laws of 'methodology' stipulated by social analysis in search of truth" (1999: 75).

16. This tripartite scheme, originating in the ideas of Evans-Pritchard, circulated for decades in the pedagogy of Oxford anthropology. Pocock offers the classic formulation: "It is by recognizing that he is engaged in a dialogue of three—himself, the society studied and his fellow sociologists—that the objectivity peculiar to [the ethnographer] is preserved. . . . It is clear that if he eliminates any one of the partners . . . the dialogue is broken and he falls back into the collective representations of his own or the other society" (1971: 105). The argument is remade by Pitt-Rivers in "Contextual analysis and the locus of the model" (Chapter 17).

> can only be felt from inside they cannot be known save from outside. Indeed to be lived effectively they must *not* be known objectively for they must inspire the commitment that contact with the sacred bestows and contact with the laboratory destroys. (p. 45)

Hence the need to create a space of interpretation, somewhere between life and laboratory, in which struggle, knowledge, feeling, commitment, and the sacred can be analyzed as if from inside and outside at once.

Pitt-Rivers offers us a glimpse into his making of this space in "Reflections on fieldwork in Spain" (Chapter 20), an essay that is humane and tactical in equal degree. Describing his much younger self from the vantage of old age, he paints the untrained[17] ethnographer as an even-keeled fumbler, unsure of what he is doing but willing to play along. He is suspect (a presumed spy) and welcome (an obvious guest); he is laughed at, misled, befriended, and dragged along on misadventures. Mostly, he is confused. He diligently fills his notebooks under the protection of patrons and local helpers who risked their careers and reputations to place him in Grazalema, procure municipal records for him, and coax him toward a sure knowledge of how things work. The detachment and objectivity Pitt-Rivers describes in the second preface to *The people of the Sierra* must have come many months later, over a desk in Oxford; in Grazalema, he is fully engaged, a green stranger, and (most apparent of all) English. Graceful things, in analysis or demeanor, seem far away, and hospitality, the mutual obligation of host and guest, is all that allows movement toward them.

Pitt-Rivers situates his data-gathering within a largely improvised, hard-to-manage flow of events and interactions. Figuring things out, even knowing how to ask sensible questions—about bullfighting or *compadrazgo* or healing—is a skill that emerged gradually. Judging from the anecdotes he shares in "Reflections on fieldwork in Spain," which were clearly polished for teaching and have the lingering effect of parables, we can see that the eventual state of detachment, unattainable and ideal, is a result of many delightful and humiliating mistakes. This is the abrasion, the shaking loose that leads to transformative insight. It is not always painful, but it is always unsettling, and the conclusions Pitt-Rivers

17. Pitt-Rivers received almost no training in fieldwork methods, which were treated, in the Oxford of his day, as a kind of private (if not occult) practice unique to each ethnographer and each site of fieldwork. For a fairly detailed account of what he did in Grazalema, and how, see "The value of the evidence" (Pitt-Rivers 1978).

drew about the role of pain in rites of passage (Chapter 13)—basically, that pain secures in the individual body and mind the reality of a changed social status—can perhaps be redeployed to explain the role of fieldwork in the making of anthropologists.

BENEDICTION

In his *Introduction à l'oeuvre de Marcel Mauss*, Lévi-Strauss ([1950] 1987) famously argued that Mauss was fooled by native concepts, that he missed the forest by focusing on the trees, by linking his explanation of the gift to the Maori notion of *hau*. Rather than examining exchange as a whole, Mauss split it into three parts which a good structuralist would have to reassemble in order to highlight the more fundamental human phenomenon of *circulation*. Lévi-Strauss accused Mauss of failing to perceive the underlying structural totality and phylogenetic mechanism which grounds the construct we call "gift": the endless need to exchange words, things, persons, and vital forces. Now imagine that Lévi-Strauss had written an *Introduction à l'oeuvre de Julian Pitt-Rivers* and imputed to our Englishman the same methodological blunders he ascribed to Mauss. Is Pitt-Rivers not foregrounding *grace* as a native Christian concept, thus missing the more subtle yet foundational phylogenetic element of relationality? As for the structural totality underlying the asymmetrical structures of incorporating strangers, of commensality and conviviality, of sanctuary and visitation, of sacrifice and feasting, and of so much else that is normally encompassed by the polythetic category of "hospitality"—what might this totality be? What if the universe of gratuity, of chancy offerings and returns—a sociality of gambits—were to constitute the horizons of intention and influence that define the "mysterious effectiveness of relationality," as Viveiros de Castro calls it (2009: 243)? We hope readers of this Omnibus will puzzle over these thought-experiments, which abound in Pitt-Rivers' writings.

Marilyn Strathern (1990) once noted that certain geographical regions encourage the development of particular forms of anthropological theory while discouraging others. The observation leaves us to wonder what anthropology would look like today if it had arrived in the Mediterranean and Europe sooner. How would we talk about "sociality" and "relations" if the problem of hospitality had been isolated and treated before the problem of the gift? What if grace and honor were foundational concepts, and *mana*, the *hau*, and *taboo* were

regional oddities? What if biblical and classical traditions were more often the explicit backdrop, rather than the background noise, of cultural analysis?[18] The dimensions of this alternative anthropology are not the stuff of counterfactual history. They are fully visible in the modes of ethnographic theory Pitt-Rivers perfected. This other, actually existing anthropology is thoroughly historicized and text-based; it is cosmopolitan; it is oriented toward house politics, hospitality, and the ethical complexities of host/guest relations; it is amenable to the informal and everyday as well as the institutional and complex; and, most of all, it is drawn toward transcendence, toward deferral and absent ideals, a preference that makes it attentive to the moral uncertainties—the zones of lying and truth—that accumulate in the ambiguous spaces between local experience, regional systems, and worlds that exist before and after the ones we now inhabit. It is an anthropology, we might argue, that was too late in arriving and is still not as firmly established, or as widely and competently practiced, as it should be.

Pitt-Rivers was alarmed by the likelihood that this alternative anthropology would be captivated by logics and institutions that dismiss the possibility of transcendence, an outcome that would subject the discipline to a single moral judgment, thereby preventing insights of a genuinely alternative kind. In "Contextual analysis and the locus of the model" (Chapter 17), Pitt-Rivers warns that, if anthropology falls into its own theoretical discourses, it is doomed. If it falls into the worldviews of the people it studies, merely restating or empirically documenting their case, it is doomed. If it becomes a kind of global "technocentric" expertise, enlisted in institutional strategies to organize and control difference, it is doomed (p. 396). As Euro-American socioeconomic and ethical forms have steadily pervaded the worlds studied by anthropologists—especially those characterized as "remote"[19]—the concerns of this early Europeanist anthropologist have grown ever more pressing. It is as though, writing in 1967, Pitt-Rivers foresaw the problems that would dominate anthropology from the 1980s on.

---

18. Our critique is directed at Anglophone anthropology. In France, Jean-Pierre Vernant, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, and Marcel Detienne used structuralism to develop an anthropology of the classical world, which has since been widely employed to revisit the synchronic ethnographic analysis of such long-established anthropological categories as sacrifice (Detienne and Vernant 1998).

19. In the sense intended by Ardener: "a condition not related to periphery, but to the fact that certain peripheries are by definition not properly linked to the dominant zone" ([1987] 2012: 532).

Hubert and Mauss believed that "society always pays itself with the counterfeit coin of its dreams" (1904: 127, our translation). But some transactions exceed the limits of the social. The Spanish stranger-guest summons God to pay his debts, transacting grace for hospitality, a role Pitt-Rivers was taught to play, with great skill, by his Andalusian hosts. In the pages that follow, the worldly fruits of that exchange, and its incalculable balance, are passed on to us.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank Robert Blunt, Roberte Hamayon, David Henig, Richard Irvine, Neena Mahadev, and Françoise Pitt-Rivers for their comments and generous reading.

REFERENCES

Albahari, Maurizio. 2015. *Crimes of peace: Mediterranean migrations at the world's deadliest border*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Ardener, Edwin. [1987] 2012. "'Remote areas': Some theoretical considerations." *Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory* 2 (1): 519–33.

Asad, Talal. 1986. *The idea of an anthropology of Islam*. Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies.

Ben-Yehoyada, Naor. 2017. *The Mediterranean incarnate: Region formation between Sicily and Tunisia since World War II*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Benveniste, Émile. 1969. *Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européenes*. Paris: Éditions de Minuit.

———. (1969) 2016. *Dictionary of Indo-European concepts and society*. Translated by Elizabeth Palmer. Chicago: Hau Books.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. *Outline of a theory of practice*. Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1997. "Marginalia: Some additional notes on the gift." In *The logic of the gift: Towards an ethics of generosity*, edited by A. D. Schrift, 231–41. New York: Routledge.

Cabot, Heath. 2014. *On the doorstep of Europe: Asylum and citizenship in Greece*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Candea, Matei, and Giovanni da Col. 2012. "The return to hospitality." *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* (N.S.), S1–S19.

da Col, Giovanni 2012. "Introduction: Natural philosophies of fortune—luck, vitality, and uncontrolled relatedness." In "Cosmologies of Fortune: Luck, Vitality and Uncontrolled Relatedness," edited by Giovanni da Col and Caroline Humphrey. *Social Analysis.* Special Issue 56 (1): 1-23.

Derrida, Jacques. 2000. *Of hospitality: Anne Doufourmantelle invites Jacques Derrida to respond*. Translated by Rachel Bowlby. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Detienne, Marcel, and Jean-Pierre Vernant. 1998. *The cuisine of sacrifice among the Greeks*. Translated by Paula Wissing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Douglas, Mary. 2004. "Remembering Julian Pitt-Rivers: A personal note." In *La antropología como pasión y como práctica: Ensayos in honorem Julian Pitt-Rivers*, edited by Honorio M. Velasco, Dominique Fournier, and Luis Diaz G. Viana, 43–48. Madrid: CSIC.

Dresch, Paul. 2000. "Wilderness of mirrors: Truth and Vulnerability in Middle Eastern Fieldwork." In *Anthropologists in a wider world: Essays on field research*, edited by Paul Dresch, Wendy James, and David Parkin, 109–28. Oxford: Berghahn.

Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 1956. *Nuer religion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 1973. "Some reminiscences and reflections on fieldwork." *Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford* 4 (2): 1–12.

Fortes, Meyer. 1969. *Kinship and the social order: The legacy of Lewis Henry Morgan*. London: Routledge.

Hart, Bradley. 2015. *George Pitt-Rivers and the Nazis.* London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Henig, David, and Nicolette Makovicky, eds. 2017. *Economies of favour after socialism*. London: Oxford University Press.

Higgins, Patrick. 1996. *Heterosexual dictatorship: Male homosexuality in post-war Britain.* London: Fourth Estate.

Hubert, Henri, and Marcel Mauss. (1898) 1964. *Sacrifice: its nature and functions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———. 1904. "Esquisse d'une théorie générale de la magie." *L'Année Sociologique* 7: 1–146.

Laidlaw, James. 2000. "A free gift makes no friends." *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* (N.S.) 6 (4): 617–34.

Le Goff, Jacques. 1984. *The birth of Purgatory*. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———. 1990. *Your money or your life: Economy and religion in the Middle Ages*. Translated by Patricia Ranum. New York: Zone.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1950) 1987. *Introduction to the work of Marcel Mauss*. Translated by Felicity Baker. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

———. 1963. *Structural anthropology*. Translated by Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf. New York: Basic Books.

Pitt-Rivers, Julian. 1954. *The people of the Sierra*. London: Criterion Books.

———. 1956. *The story of the Royal Dragoons, 1938–1945.* London: William Clowes & Sons.

———. 1963. *Mediterranean countrymen: Essays in the anthropology of the Mediterranean*. The Hague: Mouton.

———. 1971. *The people of the Sierra*. Second edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———. 1977. *The fate of Shechem or the politics of sex*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1978. "The value of the evidence." *Man* (N.S.) 13 (2): 319–22.

———. 1992a. *Honor and grace in anthropology*, edited by John George Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1992b. "The personal factor in fieldwork." In *Europe observed*, edited by João de Pina-Cabral and John Campbell, 133–47. London: Macmillan Press.

Pocock, D. F. 1971. *Social anthropology*. Second edition. London: Sheed & Ward.

Rogozen-Soltar, Mikaela. 2017. *Spain unmoored: Migration, conversion, and the politics of Islam*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Sahlins, Marshall. 2013. *What kinship is—and is not*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Strathern, Marilyn. 1990. "Negative strategies in Melanesia." In *Localizing strategies: Regional traditions of ethnographic writing*, edited by Richard Fardon, 204–16. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press.

Taussig, Michael. 1974. "Rural proletarianization: A social and historical enquiry into the commercialization of the southern Cauca Valley, Colombia." Ph.D. dissertation, University of London.

———. 1999. *Defacement: Public secrecy and the labor of the negative*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Velasco, Honorio M., and Carmen Caro. 2015. *De Julian a Julio y de Julio a Julian: Correspondencia entre Julio Caro Baroja y Julian Pitt-Rivers (1949–1991)*. Madrid: CISC.

Velasco, Honorio M., Dominique Fournier, and Luis Diaz G. Viana, eds. 2004. *La antropología como pasión y como práctica: Ensayos in honorem Julian Pitt-Rivers*. Madrid: CSIC.

Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo. 2009. "The gift and the given: Three nano-essays on kinship and magic." In *Kinship and beyond: The genealogical model reconsidered*, edited by Sandra Bamford and James Leach, 237–68. New York: Berghahn.

Weiner, Annette. 1992. *Inalienable possessions: The paradox of keeping-while-giving*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

PART I

Moral frames: honor, mana, and grace

CHAPTER 1

Honor and social status in Andalusia*

A certain bashfulness disguises the expression of attitudes concerning honor in our own society (perhaps because the word has acquired archaic overtones), but this is not so in the small town in the Sierra de Cádiz where I first investigated this theme (Pitt-Rivers 1961). Here questions of honor can be debated without causing embarrassment, and they loom large both in theoretical discussions regarding the propriety of conduct and also in the daily idiom of social intercourse: indeed, the honorable status of the members of the community is a matter of continual comment. Reputation is not only a matter of pride, but also of practical utility. Where free associations of a contractual kind govern the forms of cooperation and enterprise, a good name is the most valuable of assets. Moreover, the honor of a man has a legal status in Spanish, which it does not have in Anglo-Saxon law.[1] The value attached to honor can also be seen in the

---

* "Honor and Social Status in Andalusia" was published in 1977 as part of Julian Pitt-Rivers' volume, *The fate of Shechem or the politics of sex: Essays in the anthropology of the Mediterranean*, and is reproduced in this volume with permission from Cambridge University Press. An earlier version of the essay appeared in 1965 in *Honor and shame: The values of Mediterranean society*, edited by J. G. Peristiany (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson).

1. *Cf. Fuero de los Españoles* (1945) Article 4. *Cf.* also *El Cédigo Penal.* Articles 467-75 "Delicts against honor." It is also implicit in the articles against dueling (439-47) and in the concept of adultery (448-52).

custom of bargaining where intermediaries, reminiscent of seconds in a duel, are required for the successful negotiation. Attempts to damage reputation are constantly made and every quarrel which gains flame leads to imputations of acts and intentions which are totally dishonorable and which may well have nothing to do with the subject of the quarrel. The discussions of honor are not restricted to literal expression; circumlocutions are frequently used and the reputation of a person is more commonly attained by implications than by direct statements.

The girl who discussed in literal terms whether or not it was dishonoring to recognize one's own nickname (Pitt-Rivers 1961: 168) was in no way exceptional in her preoccupation to reach a clear distinction between the conduct which dishonored and that which did not, though in maintaining that she could without dishonor respond when it was mentioned in the street, she was going counter to the general opinion of the community. She herself admitted that it depended upon the nature of the nickname, since, while some nicknames, such as hers, derive from the surname of an ancestor or from a place of origin, others are unflatteringly personal. I put her thesis to the test when challenged one dark night upon the road and earned, first of all some astonished comments that I should announce myself as "the Englishman," and when I asked why I should not do so, a homily on "how we behave here." The customs of the bullring and the music hall whose heroes present themselves under the rubric of their nickname are not those of the *pueblo*. I had, in any case, overstated her thesis, for the girl denied that she would go so far as to announce herself by her nickname, and she held more conventional views regarding the other ways in which honor could be forfeited. These, as she saw them, were concerned entirely with the possibility of imputing an improper relationship with a member of the male sex.

Criticizing people behind their back is one thing and treating them with contempt to their face is quite another. This society lays great emphasis on courtesy, and when people have quarreled to the point that they are not prepared to behave with courtesy to one another, then they avoid entering each other's presence; it is recognized that the two "do not speak," and others connive in avoiding situations where they might be forced to do so. There is, however, a certain class of person to whom courtesy is commonly denied, the "shameless ones" (*los sin vergüenza*). These are people whose dishonorable reputation is established beyond all doubt through their habitual indulgence in conduct which is shameful: petty thieving, begging, and promiscuity in the case of women. They are considered to be outside the moral pale and, in this way, are associated with the gypsies who are thought to be, by nature, devoid of shame. Such persons are often

addressed directly by their nickname without the Christian name and treated with open disdain (though fear of the magical power of gypsies usually affords them a certain respect from the unsophisticated). The fact that these people are prepared to put up with such treatment confirms their status as shameless.

The mores of Andalusia, like those of peasant Greece (*cf.* Friedl 1962: 86), are indulgent towards conduct which we might regard as boastful, and the example is not lacking of one, Manuel "el Conde," who, even by their light, was regarded as somewhat overbearing. A man of short stature and unimposing physique, he was a recognized agricultural expert (*perito*), that is to say, one whose opinion could be called upon by the syndical organization. His opinion was given in fact, in not unforceful terms, upon any occasion when he thought it relevant. He was accustomed to boast of his ugliness, as though it were an embellishment to his other qualities, and to stake his claim to honor without quibbling:

> "I have not much fortune," he would say, and then, tapping his breast, "but I have within me that which is worth more than fortune, my honor."

He was also fond of interjecting a pun into the conversation when the subject of partridges was mentioned:

> "La perdí' dice usted? No, señor, no la perdí!"
> ("The partridge, you say? No, sir, I have not lost it!")

That which he has not lost is his shame, for it is common practice to allude to this word by the pronoun without pronouncing it; to "lose it" means to lose one's shame.

From Manuel's vainglorious pronouncements, two points are to be gleaned: first, the close association between the notions of honor and shame, which appear synonymous in many contexts as in these, and secondly, that this quality, once lost, is irrecoverable.

The word which I have translated as "shame" is *vergüenza* but it both carries a heavier emphasis and covers a wider range of meaning than the English equivalent. In a previous discussion of the subject[2] I have defined it as a concern for repute, both as a sentiment and also as the public recognition of that sentiment. It is what makes a person sensitive to the pressure exerted by public

2. *Op. cit*. p. 113.

opinion. In these senses it is synonymous with honor, but the sentiment also finds expression in ways which are no longer so, such as shyness, blushing, and the restraints which derive from emotional inhibition, the fear of exposing oneself to comment and criticism.

As the basis of repute, honor and shame are synonymous, since shamelessness is dishonorable; a person of good repute is taken to have both, one of evil repute is credited with neither. (This is so at least at the plebeian level, which is all we are concerned with for the moment.) As such, they are the constituents of virtue. Yet while certain virtues are common to both sexes, such as honesty, loyalty, a concern for reputation which involves avoidance of moral turpitude in general, they are not all so. For the conduct which establishes repute depends upon the status of the person referred to. This is particularly evident in the differentiation of the sexes. The honor of a man and of a woman therefore imply quite different modes of conduct. This is so in any society.[3] A woman is dishonored, loses her *vergüenza*, with the tainting of her sexual purity, but a man does not. While certain conduct is honorable for both sexes, honor = shame requires conduct in other spheres, which is exclusively a virtue of one sex or the other. It obliges a man to defend his honor and that of his family, a woman to conserve her purity. Yet the concepts of honor and shame also extend to the point where they are no longer synonymous, and at this point they lose their ethical value. Shame, no longer equivalent to honor, as shyness, blushing, and timidity is thought to be proper to women, even though it no longer constitutes virtue, while honor, no longer equivalent to shame, becomes an exclusively male attribute as the concern for precedence and the willingness to offend another man. At this point also these modes of conduct become dishonoring for the inappropriate sex: for a man, to show timidity or blush is likely to make him an object of ridicule, while a woman who takes to physical violence or attempts to usurp the male prerogative of authority or, very much more so, sexual freedom, forfeits her shame. Thus honor and shame, when they are not equivalent, are linked exclusively to one sex or the other and are opposed to one another.

There is however one further usage of the word *vergüenza* which is common to both sexes and this is in the sense of "to put to shame," literally "to give shame" (*darle vergüenza*), or speaking about oneself, to feel shame, literally, "to be given it." It derives from the concern for repute, since one who is thus concerned is more

3. Even in those which castigate with the epithet "a double standard" the sexual mores of the Latin countries.

easily put to shame than one who is not, but it is, so to speak, its negative counterpart. A person who *has vergüenza* is sensitive to his repute and therefore honorable, but if he is *given it*, he is humiliated, stripped of honor. By implication, if he had it already he would not have to be given it; and this is made clear in the usage of *darle vergüenza* to mean: to punish a child. A person who possesses *vergüenza* already does not expose himself to the risk of humiliation. In accordance with the general structure of the notion of honor explained in the first part of this essay, he is shamed (*avergonzado*) only at the point when he is forced to recognize that he has accepted humiliation. In this sense, as that which is not inherent in the person but is imposed from outside, shame is equivalent to dishonor. This explains the usage in the law of an earlier period (of which Caro Baroja speaks) of the punishment of *vergüenza pública*, the public dishonoring. Honor is the aspiration to status and the validation of status, *vergüenza*, opposed to honor, is the restraint of such aspiration (timidity) and also the recognition of the loss of status. Thus, just as honor is at the same time honor felt, honor claimed and honor paid, so *vergüenza* is dishonor imposed, accepted, and finally felt. Honor originates in the individual breast and comes to triumph in the social realm, *vergüenza* in this sense originates in the actions of others as the denial of honor, and is borne home in the individual. The concepts of honor or shame are therefore either, according to context, synonymous as virtue or contraries as precedence or humiliation.



Fig. 1

We might express the relationship between the two concepts in a diagram (see Fig. 1). It will be noted that the ethically-neutral qualities which are

exclusively honor or shame are at the same time necessary ingredients of the qualities, linked to one sex or the other, which are ethically valued and are equivalent to both honor and shame. This is so because they derive from natural qualities. Thus restraint is the natural basis of sexual purity, just as masculinity is the natural basis of authority and the defense of familial honor. The ideal of the honorable man is expressed by the word *hombría*, "manliness." It subsumes both shame and masculinity, yet it is possible to possess masculinity without shame as well, for which reason it is placed under the title of ethical neutrality. Masculinity means courage whether it is employed for moral or immoral ends. It is a term which is constantly heard in the *pueblo*, and the concept is expressed as the physical sexual quintessence of the male (*cojones*). The contrary notion is conveyed by the adjective *manso* which means both tame and also castrated. Lacking the physiological basis, the weaker sex cannot obviously be expected to possess it, and it is excluded from the demands of female honor. On the other hand, female honor is not entirely without a physiological basis also (although this is not expressed with the same linguistic clarity), in that sexual purity relates to the maidenhead. The male, therefore, both lacks the physiological basis of sexual purity and risks the implication that his masculinity is in doubt if he maintains it; it comes to mean for him, despite the teachings of religion, a, as it were, self-imposed tameness = castration, and is therefore excluded from the popular concept of male honor. The natural qualities of sexual potency or purity and the moral qualities associated with them provide the conceptual framework on which the system is constructed.

This division of labor in the aspects of honor corresponds, as the reader would guess, to the division of roles within the nuclear family. It delegates the virtue expressed in sexual purity to the females and the duty of defending female virtue to the males. The honor of a man is involved therefore in the sexual purity of his mother, wife, and daughters, and not in his own. *La mujer honrada la pierna quebrada y en casa* (the honorable woman: locked in the house with a broken leg), the ancient and still popular saying goes, indicating the difficulties which male honor faces in this connection, for once the responsibility in this matter has been delegated, the woman remains with her own responsibility alleviated. The frailty of women is the inevitable correlate of this conceptualization,[4]

4. It was a commonplace of the theatre of honor, yet its aristocratic cuckolds appear not to be much concerned with questions of responsibility. Their unfortunate women get killed, not as punishment, but because they represent a living testimony to male dishonor.

and the notion is not, perhaps, displeasing to the male who may see in it an encouragement for his hopes of sexual conquest. Thus, an honorable woman, born with the proper sentiment of shame, strives to avoid the human contacts which might expose her to dishonor; she cannot be expected to succeed in this ambition, unsupported by male authority. This fact gives justification to the usage which makes the deceived husband, not the adulterer, the object of ridicule and opprobrium according to the customs of southern Europe (and formerly, England and the whole of Europe).

I have described the symbolism of cuckoldry previously (Pitt-Rivers 1961: 116), which I summarize now as follows: the cuckold, *cabrón*, literally the billy-goat, is said to "have horns." The horns, a phallic symbol, are also the insignia of the Devil, the enemy of virtue, whose associates possess other symbols of a phallic nature, such as the broomstick upon which witches ride. Yet male sexuality is essential to the foundation of the family, as well as necessary, in its associated aspect as courage, to its defense. As well as potentially evil, it is also, when combined with shame as manliness, good. The manliness of a husband must be exerted above all in the defense of the honor of his wife on which his own depends. Therefore her adultery represents not only an infringement of his rights, but the demonstration of his failure in his duty. He has betrayed the values of the family, bringing dishonor to all the social groups who are involved reciprocally in his honor: his family and his community. His manliness is defiled, for he has fallen under the domination of the Devil and must wear his symbol as the stigma of his betrayal. The responsibility is his, not the adulterer's, for the latter was only acting in accordance with his male nature. The pander, not the libertine, is the prototype of male dishonor,[5] for the latter may be assumed to defend these values when he is called upon to do so, that is to say, when *his* honor is at stake. The transfer of the horns from the adulterer to the victim of the adultery concords with the moral indeterminacy of the quality of masculinity and the positive value of manliness.

The adulterer may not be regarded as dishonorable—and we shall see that opinions vary in this regard according to social status—but this does not save him from committing a sin in the eyes of the Church. The idea that the punishment for a breach of rights should be visited by custom on the victim, not the perpetrator, may still perhaps strike us as anomalous, but this is only if we view

5. *Cf*. the definition of *cabrón* in the *Diccionario de la Academia* (1956): "One who consents to his wife's adultery."

this as an instance of a legal mechanism, a punitive sanction, and this is not in fact the framework within which it is to be interpreted.

The code of honor derives, as has been said, from a sacred quality of persons, not from ethical or juridical provisions, and we have seen how in European history it has conflicted with the law of the Church and the law of the land. If we view the adulterer and the cuckold, not in terms of right and wrong, but in terms of sanctity or defilement, we can see why the latter, the defiled one, should be the object of contempt, not the defiler. Through his defilement he becomes ritually dangerous and the horns represent, not a punishment, but a state of desecration.[6] In contrast, the adulterer is a sinner and, technically, in Spanish law, a criminal.

We have pointed out that where the concepts of shame and honor overlap they are equivalent to virtue, but the ethics of the community are not exhausted by this category. There remain the fields of conduct which contribute little or nothing to reputation, but face only the individual conscience which, again, may not respond to all the injunctions of Catholic teaching. It is noteworthy that religion does not define adultery in the same way as urban custom nor the penal code, which exonerates *discreet* male marital infidelity by defining a husband's dalliance as adultery only if it takes place in the conjugal home or with notoriety.

Though the penal code of Spain defines offenses against honor, proceedings are instituted only at the demand of the injured party. Other than as an ideological statement, the legal provisions serve also to validate the rights of individuals whose conduct, indicted in other ways, may be justified by reference to their honor. The sanctions which maintain the code of honor in the *pueblo* are popular and are based upon the idea of ridicule, *burla*. *Burla* is the destroyer of reputation, whether it is employed by one individual against another in an act of defiance (as the Burlador de Sevilla employed it against the men and women whom it amused him to dishonor), or as a sanction exercised by the collectivity in the form of public ridicule. I have previously given a description of the institutions which exert the collective sanctions: the giving of a nickname which

6. For the Nuer of East Africa, adultery creates a state of pollution but "it is not the adulterer but the injured husband who is likely to be sick" (Evans-Pritchard 1956: 189). A parallel can be found in South Africa in the first fruit ceremonies before which it is prohibited to touch the crops. "In most South African tribes a breach of this taboo threatened ritual danger not to the transgressor, but to the leader whose right of precedence 'was stolen.'" Those who broke the taboo were nevertheless punished by the chief (Gluckman 1954: 12).

refers to a specific incident or to a particularity of conduct, the popular ballads, especially those which were formerly sung by the masked figures of the Carnival, or the institution of the *vito* (elsewhere referred to as the *cencerrada*, the charivari), with its cow-horns, bells, strings of tins, catcalls, and obscene songs.

If we examine the incidents which provoked these sanctions, we may divide them according to the nature of the transgression. Of the damaging nicknames, a few relate to economic behavior and a few to sexual behavior, though the majority ridicule a person on account of a specific incident which appealed to the collective imagination or of a physical or cultural deficiency. Some songs of Carnival publicized acts of dishonesty, but many were concerned with sexual offenses and in particular, infidelity to husband or fiancé. The marital misfortunes of shepherds, those "sailors of the wavy sierras," as Gerald Brenan has called them (1957: 48), whose long spans of absence from the *pueblo* make their wives subject to suspicion, were high among them. The justification given for singing these songs was that it was necessary to warn the husband or prospective husband of the condition of his honor, though the nature of the rhymes themselves show that this duty was undertaken with glee rather than compassion for the victim of such a betrayal. The *vitos* were aimed at publicizing scandalously, and thereby prohibiting, a living scandal.

The folklore has defined the traditional occasion for the charivari as the remarriage of a widowed person. There had once been such a *vito* in the distant past. Since the *vito* is against the law, it no longer takes place within any *pueblo* where there is a detachment of civil guards. There was one more recent case involving a young widow who had gone to live with a widower upon his parent's farm, but the majority of cases recorded, and the most violent ones, were provoked by the action of a man who was not widowed, but had abandoned his wife in order to take up with another woman (and such a woman was necessarily shameless in the popular view). He was not, that is to say, a cuckold, but an unfaithful husband. However, the nature of the proceedings and the words of the songs left no doubt that he was endowed with the symbols of the cuckold, and this fact is reinforced by the usage of the *pueblo* which applies to such a person the word *cabrón*, which to the educated means only a cuckold. In the same vein, it is significant that, following the quarrel between Manuel el Conde and the carpenter (Pitt-Rivers 1961: Ch. 10), the latter should have attacked his reputation by saying that he was cruel to his daughter, his only child, and that he intended to abandon his wife and go off with another woman, not that *his wife* had unfaithful intentions.

It would appear then that the theory of cuckoldry which we have outlined requires further explanation in order to cover this extended sense. This can be given without doing violence to that already offered.

To begin with, the *vito* is concerned uniquely with the behavior of married persons. For the plebeians, in contrast to the middle classes, the rites of the Church are not essential to marriage and many common law marriages exist. The Anarchist movement which formerly had great influence here rejected all religious teaching and ceremonies, and in spite of a certain amount of proselytizing by the Catholic Action committee, the poorer people very often do not marry until they have a child. Therefore when unmarried people set up house together they are regarded as a young married couple by the community, and it is in fact quite likely that they will get married within a year or two. On the other hand, if a person who is already considered to be married goes to live with another, not his spouse, this is, by the same logic, equivalent to bigamy, since the fact of cohabitation rather than the Church rite is the criterion of marriage.

It is accepted that young people who face opposition to their marriage from the girl's father may force the father's hand by running away to spend the night together. After this, their recognition as a married couple, their marriage for preference, is the only way in which his honor can be retrieved. There were no fewer than six such escapades during a single year. But in one of these cases the father failed to react in the expected fashion. His daughter was a minor and had fine prospects of inheritance since he was a well-to-do farmer. The young man had been employed upon the farm and hoped, so it was thought, to become through marriage its heir. The father's immediate reaction, in this case, was to have him arrested and thrown into jail on the charge of violation of a minor.

In no instance recorded in this town was the *vito* put on for a married woman who had left her husband to live with another man, though there have been cases elsewhere. It seems most improbable in a town of this size, three thousand inhabitants, that such a couple would remain in the place. Women who "go off the rails" go off them elsewhere, and thereby they justify the countryman's cherished belief in the iniquity of the city. There are, nevertheless, a number of unmarried or abandoned mothers who remain in the *pueblo* with their family.[7] Their disgrace is clearly recognized, but they are not treated as shameless. Their status is somewhat similar to that of a young widow. Their prospects of remarriage are

7. Approximately 2 percent of the children born in the period of 1940-50 have no paternity.

very poor, since the man who wished to marry such a girl would be dishonored—honor requires that one marry a virgin, since otherwise one becomes a retroactive cuckold—yet if their conduct gives no cause for scandal, they are distinguished from the loose women who come within the category of the shameless and who are sometimes designated by the word *deshonradas*, dishonored.

It is said that the *vito* would formerly have been put on for any marital infidelity in the *pueblo*, though in fact the transient adventure and the discreetly-conducted affair always appear to have escaped. This may be due, in part, to reasons of practical organization: the assemblage of young men with the equipment of horns and cowbells and the composition of the songs, all take time—and the *vito* must catch the couple together. Unlike the songs of Carnival which recount past events, the *vito* cannot relate to what is no longer happening.

There are however two categories of person who escape the *vito* altogether. These are the shameless ones and the *señoritos*, the upper class of the town. The shameless escape for the obvious reason that people who have no honor cannot be stripped of it. The *señoritos* escape because they are not part of the plebeian community, and their actions do not therefore affront its standards of conduct in the same way. It is recognized that they are different. The elderly lawyer who maintained a widow as his mistress was not thought to be a candidate for the *vito*, even though her daughter was also subsequently credited with that title, nor was a *vito* ever put on for the sake of that rich man who took as mistress the wife of a plebeian, though the latter was celebrated by the nickname of "the horn of gold." The *señoritos* did not, however, escape mention in the popular ballads. Given that the desecration symbolized by the horns relates to the dishonor of a man through his failure as a defender of his family, it follows that this carries different implications whether he is plebeian or *señorito*. The upper class husband can maintain two establishments and divide his time between them, but this is not possible for the plebeian who has neither the time nor the resources; if he takes a mistress to live with him this can only mean a rejection of his family. Therefore the word *cabrón* carries a different connotation in the plebeian community; the implications of conduct are different. The plebeian adulterer desecrates his family by taking a mistress, the *señorito* demonstrates his superior masculinity by doing so. In fact, it is common to find men of the wealthier class in the cities who maintain a second household, and though this is resented by their wives, they are not subject to general opprobrium. This was not found in any of the towns where I studied, all of them of a few thousand inhabitants only. Nevertheless, the case was reported to me, from a town of no

more than sixteen thousand inhabitants, of a man of wealth and high consideration who, childless in his marriage, maintained no fewer than three illegitimate families within the precincts of the town. His relations with these households were conducted with great discretion, though the facts were widely known, and he was never seen entering the house of one of his mistresses during the daytime. He gave his numerous sons a professional education and for this reason was regarded as a very good father and a good man.

The association of male honor with the family and the qualities necessary to defend it, rather than with the morality, religious or not, of sexual conduct does not mean that the latter has no hold upon the men of Andalusia. Yet it is curious that this aspect of Christian morality is given more weight by the plebeians (who are mostly anti-clerical and rather irreligious), than by the middle and upper classes who are pillars of the Church and often profoundly religious. There is, in fact, a plebeian preoccupation with the notion of vice which is freely applied to any form of sensual over-indulgence, in particular women and wine, and this is thought of as something approaching a monopoly of the outside world and of the rich who maintain connections with it. This view of "vice" expresses a social reality: it is only possible to escape the sanctions of popular opinion by going away. The shame which is bound up with the collective honor of the *pueblo* is juxtaposed to the shamelessness of the cities, since vice implies shamelessness. Such a view also implies that the rich are shameless, and this is quite often said. This conception of honor, associated with shame as we have seen, is similar to that of the Christian moralists whose criticism of the code of honor has been mentioned. Indeed, and in more ways than in this, the views of the *pueblo* echo those of the moralists of an earlier age.

I have defined shame in its social aspect as a sensitivity to the opinion of others and this includes, even for the *señoritos*, a consciousness of the public opinion and judgement of the whole community. One finds therefore a rather different attitude towards sexual promiscuity among the *señoritos* of the small town than among those of the cities, an attitude which expresses itself in the idea that male marital infidelity is dishonorable because it is an act of disrespect towards the wife. The husband who respects his wife is not promiscuous. I have the impression that this notion is less important in more sophisticated places.

Yet if the judgement of the *pueblo* brings its weight to bear upon the mores of its upper class, it is equally true that the influences of the outside world pervade the *pueblo*. Moreover, the "puritanism" of the *pueblo* does not suffice to obliterate a consciousness of the value of sexual conquest as a justification of

masculinity. A conflict of values is therefore implicit between the male pride which expresses itself in gallantry towards the female sex, and that which reposes upon a firm attachment to the duties of the family man. Manuel el Conde, the protagonist of honor, furnishes an illustration. At a fiesta held in the valley one of the local belles walked past him with her head high, ignoring his presence. Manuel was piqued.

"If it were not," he said, "for the ring upon this finger, I would not let that girl pass by me as she has." Manuel thus recoups upon the hypothetical level the masculinity which he sacrifices in reality to his familial honor. He eats his cake and has it, albeit in fantasy.

There is another way in which plebeian honor departs from that of the upper classes. Honor is a hereditary quality; the shame of mother is transmitted to the children and a person's lack of it may be attributed to his birth, hence the power of the insults, the most powerful of all, which relate to the purity of the mother. After this, the greatest dishonor of a man derives from the impurity of his wife. On the other hand, if his own conduct is recognized as dishonorable, then the honor of his family has no protector. Therefore, in its aspect as equivalent to shame, the nuclear family shares a common honor. The children not only inherit their shame, their own actions reflect upon that of their parents. The purity of the daughter reflects that of her mother, and thereby, the honor of her father. Her brothers, participants in a common heritage, are equally attainted by the dishonor of any member of their elementary family.

Social status is inherited primarily from the father whose patrilineal first surname a son inherits and will transmit to his descendants. The economic status of the family depends upon the father's ability to maintain or to improve its wealth. Therefore, in its aspect as right to precedence, honor derives predominantly from the father, whereas in its aspect of shame it derives predominantly from the mother. The distinction concords with the fact that precedence is something which can be gained through action—male enterprise, whereas shame cannot be gained, can only be maintained through avoiding the conduct which would destroy it—female restraint. An earlier period of Spanish history conceptualized these notions with more clarity than today as we learn from Caro Baroja's discussion of the descent of rank and purity of blood, concepts which represent quite clearly the notions of honor as precedence, and shame, respectively.[8]

---

8. "El honor que de mi padre heredé, El patrimonio mejor, Que en Valencia espejo fué, De la nobleza y valor."

The *pueblo* is envisaged as a community of equals amongst whom economic differences do not amount to differences of social class, even though they are considerable. All address their age-mates in the second person, even the employee his plebeian employer. From this community the *señoritos* are excluded; they are accorded, as a title of respect, the prefix "Don" to their Christian name which indicates their superior status, in contrast to the title "Señor" which is given to the respected members of the *pueblo* who have reached the age of retirement. The status of respected elder in a community of conceptual equals is as high as any member of the *pueblo* can normally aspire. Such positions of authority as exist between members of the *pueblo* derive from power delegated from the upper classes in a particular post, not from the quality of the person. Therefore there are no occasions when an order of precedence is ever required. The rule of "first come, first serve" governs all the contexts of ordering persons whether in the market or at the town hall. This is not so among the *señoritos* who possess a concept of social status which differentiates them from the plebeians and involves an order of ranking, however unclear the ranking order may be, and however loath they are to make it explicit in their treatment of their fellows. There are, nevertheless, degrees of deference paid according to their relative status even in the context of the *pueblo*, and there is at least one family which conserves documents from the eighteenth century to prove its superior origins. Though they mix freely in everyday life, occasions arise when it is necessary to separate the sheep from the goats, and persons whose claim to status is well-established from those whose claim is less secure: the reunions with the summer visitors (who are persons of superior status to any in the *pueblo*), the visit of an important outsider or the marriage of a daughter of a leading family. On all these occasions personal attachments to the host cut across any objective criterion of ranking, yet the ranking is clearly implied.

A situation when a stratified order of precedence was required occurred when the image of Our Lady of Fatima visited the town and places were reserved in the church for the leading citizens and their wives. This gave rise to disputes, and for understandable reasons. First of all, seating in the church is normally quite informal and irregular; the men separate from the women and stand at the back, if indeed they attend the same mass as their wives. Other religious fiestas are organized by the church brotherhood of the particular cult,

("The honor, which I inherited from my father, The best of patrimonies, Which in Valencia was a mirror, Of nobility and valor.") (de Molina 1952: 792).

but there is no value attached to the order in which a procession is followed, and *señoritos* and plebeians attend in a haphazard manner. There was no precedent which could be followed in the order of seating. On this occasion, it was decided that, since the church was likely to be crowded, seats would be reserved. Proximity to the image therefore became a criterion of precedence in an entirely novel setting. But how was it to be accorded? The question of precedence could not be decided by the mayor on the basis of official posts, as on the occasion of the governor's visit, since the privileged were to include more than the officials and his authority was irrelevant since this was a religious occasion. The reception committee which had been specially formed for the event possessed no authority to enforce their ruling, and the priest wisely preferred to have nothing to do with such details. As a result, many felt that they had not been given the honor which was their due, and a series of quarrels ensued regarding their placing, which conflicted with the spirit of the occasion.

The nearer we move to the center of national society and the higher in the hierarchy of status, the greater the importance of precedence, since the greater the number of contexts in which it is required and the greater the need for criteria by which it may be established. It follows therefore that the importance of honor = precedence increases with social status until we reach the aristocracy and the members of official organizations whose precedence is regulated by protocol, and among whom the concern for precedence is increasingly vital.

In the *pueblo*, the ideal of equality in honor reigns and precedence deriving from birth and associated with status is missing. When conflicts threaten, the personal attribute of masculinity comes to the fore to determine the preeminence of one man over another and the word *cojones* is heard. It is a term which expresses unqualified admiration for the protagonist, quite regardless whether his behavior is from other points of view admirable. It is to be noted that it is seldom used or understood in the literal sense.[9]

Physical violence is not thought to be a legitimate way to attain one's ends, yet when his rights are infringed, a man is forced to stand up for himself under pain of appearing a coward. So when violence occurs, it is characteristic that both parties believe themselves to be on the defensive, merely protecting their rightful pride. On festive occasions it is expected that people will forget their

9. Thus, in place of the symbolism of the head "standing for" the genitalia as in the Freudian interpretation, we have here a word for the genitalia being used to "stand for" the quality which is commonly expressed by an analogy with the head.

animosities and meet in a spirit of amity. Nevertheless, much wine is drunk then and fighting not uncommonly occurs among the young men, not so much as a defense of rights but as an expression of rivalry. Such an incident took place at a fiesta in the valley on the eve of St. John. It was attended by the sons of El Cateto and also by those of La Castaña against whom the former had an antipathy of long standing. Before the end of the evening, Juan el Cateto was declaiming that he had more masculinity than all the Castaños put together. In the fight which ensued between the male youth of the two families, no damage was done since the combatants were on the whole more drunk than the public to whom it fell to hold back the assailants. Such incidents serve to show how the struggle for prestige is subdued in daily life by the conception of a community of equals which ordains that a man may not humiliate another. It is not dishonoring to avoid a person with whom one has quarreled, but on the occasion of a fiesta each is entitled to think that it is the duty of the other to avoid him. This view of the town as a community of honorable men concords with the notion, expressed in the Fuero de los Españoles, that every individual has the right to honor. The competition for prestige finds its limits in the obligation to respect the pride of others, and this is true at any level of the social structure. Both the Catetos and the Castaños were criticized for their "ugly" behavior which spoiled the fiesta. There is no conception of sportsmanship which permits men to accept humiliation with dignity or to inflict it rightfully within the limits of a defined context. The existence of the sport of boxing in other countries and in Madrid, which is known thanks to the newspapers, is regarded as proof of the barbarity of foreigners and the corruption of the great city.

The collective honor of the *pueblo* is expressed in rivalry between *pueblos* which furnishes a body of rhymes in which each is epitomized by its neighbors in the most disobliging terms, implying dishonor in a rich variety of ways of which the most outspoken concern the purity of their women. The collections of folklore abound in examples. This collective honor is not usually expressed, however, in a hostile attitude towards individual outsiders. The individual stranger presents on the contrary an occasion to demonstrate the honorability of the *pueblo*, and every member becomes potentially a bearer of its honor. How the visitor is received depends upon the context in which he confronts the community. If he is recognized as a person of status, if he comes alone and with friendly intent, it is important that he be received in accordance with the principle of hospitality towards strangers; they alone can validate the collective image. Yet in order to do so the visitor must be a person worthy of respect. The higher

his status, the more important it is that he be favorably impressed, for he does honor to the *pueblo* by coming. It is above all to the visitor of the *señorito* class that the traditional courtesies of Andalusia are shown. The plebeian visitor still requires to be favorably impressed, but more suspicion attaches to his visit. He may have come for reasons which do the *pueblo* no honor; those who come to seek work are potential blacklegs; those who come for commercial reasons may have come to cheat. Both have come seeking their own interest and while they should be favorably impressed, they should also be watched. Boys who come from neighboring towns to court a girl are treated traditionally with hostility, if not actually with violence, by the young men of the *pueblo* whose collective honor is challenged by their presence.

Visitors who come in large numbers during the fiesta offer a problem; by swelling the attendance at the fiesta they do the *pueblo* honor, for the number of people who attend gives a measure to its importance, yet it may transpire that they have come with the intention of inflicting humiliation. A visiting football team, for example, does honor only so long as it is defeated, but if it wins it inflicts humiliation. If it succeeds in imposing its superiority, then it is liable to be resisted as in Ubrique where the *pueblo* defended their honor against humiliation by a more expert team from Cortes de la Frontera which scored two goals in the first five minutes, yet failed to win the match. Unprepared to submit to such treatment, the infuriated public drove the visitors off the field and out of the town in a hailstorm of stones, and their bus was sent after them to pick them up and take them away.

In all situations of challenge a man's honor is what obliges him to respond by resenting the affront, yet a challenge is something which can only be given by a conceptual equal; the force of an affront lies in the fact that it is an attempt to establish superiority over the affronted person. If this is not the case, then there is no challenge. This may be demonstrated by a fact that appeared to me at first sight curious. The farm of Pegujál has an only son and he is mentally deranged. He lives there with his widowed mother and keeps a small flock of sheep. These he takes out to pasture wherever he wishes, often beyond the frontiers of his land, in disregard of the rights of the valley. The owners or lessees of pasture may find him any day encroaching upon their property, and if any reproach is made to him he merely utters oaths and throws rocks. Encroachment upon pasture is one of the causes of quarrels in which the honor of both parties becomes involved, but in this case it is not so. His lunacy places him outside the community of normal men and he is therefore unable to affront. People take no direct steps

to restrain him and, if he turns up on their land, they shrug their shoulders. His actions cannot constitute a challenge, since he is mad.

Equally, if there is already a difference in social status between the two parties, then actions which might otherwise be an affront cease to be so. The man who has the right to authority over others does not affront them in exercising that right. It is not humiliating to obey the commands of a person entitled to give them. This fact is crucial to understanding how honor is effective in relations within the hierarchy of this society. To receive protection from someone not recognized as a superior is humiliating, but from the moment that protection is accepted, superiority is admitted, and it is no longer humiliating to serve such a person. Service and protection are the reciprocal links which hold a system of patronage together. At the same time the patron increases his prestige through the possession of clients, while the client participates in the glory of his patron. The two are linked together by a personal tie which gives each diffuse rights over the other: service when it is required, assistance when it is needed. The system is reinforced through the institution of ritual kinship and expressed in its idiom. The terms *padrino*, *apadrinar*, *compadre* (godfather, to sponsor, co-parent) have extensions far beyond the literal sense. *El que tiene padrinos se bautiza*, the saying goes. (He who has godparents gets baptized.) In the struggle for life, success depends in reality upon the ability, much less to defend one's rights against equals, than to attract the favor of the powerful.

The social class of the *señoritos* is defined by their way of life, but their prestige relates to their ability to operate a system of tacit reciprocities: to possess clients who owe them fidelity and respect, *compadres* with whom to exchange favors, and equally, patrons of whom they in their turn can demand favors, not only for themselves but for their clients. Thus they build up the reputation for beneficence which is an aspect of honor. Beneficence therefore transforms economic power into honor. Let us see, therefore, how the notion of honor relates to money.

Financial honesty (*honradez*) is associated with honor in the sense that it is dishonorable to defraud. Yet the circumstances need to be defined since to outwit is permissible, even mandatory in the context of bargaining. As one well-qualified to judge once warned me, "In your country it may be different, but here a bargain is not a bargain unless you have told forty lies." Rather than a matter of abstract principle, the obligation to deal honestly is, in fact, a personal one. You owe honesty in defined situations, as loyalty to a particular person. To persons with whom you have, or wish to form, ties, to kin, friends, or to

employers, particularly if they are also godparents; to abstract entities such as limited companies less, and to the state not at all, since these latter categories, not being persons, cannot offer the reciprocity required in the system of patronage. Within the community of the *pueblo* there is an obligation to honor one's undertakings, and complaints about those who have failed to do so both stress this as a norm of conduct and also demonstrate that it is not always obeyed. In fact, men learn whom they can trust little by little, testing each other as they go along. In the case of default, they have at least recourse to the tribunal of public opinion before whom they can impugn the reputation of the other, as well as the more cumbrous and distrusted mechanisms of the law. The tribunal of public opinion is not of much use when dealing with people from another town or from the city, and the law is less effective also, so the distrust towards outsiders seems sensible enough. For the same reason the outsider has less control over the sanctions which enforce honesty towards him.

There a tendency to presume upon the favor of a patron when he is the employer, and servants and bailiffs frequently regard it as their due to take financial advantage of their situation. For these reasons the absentee landowner, even though he turns up at harvest time, seldom avoids being cheated. *El ojo del amo engorda el caballo*. (It is the eye of the master which fattens the horse.) Moreover, persons of high social status tend to be lenient towards the peccadillos of their trusted employees as long as they "don't go too far." To be penny-pinching does not go with the ideal of aristocratic behavior.

The ability to pay is an essential part of honorific behavior, whether in the context of hospitality towards strangers, or in asserting preeminence among equals or bestowing protection upon inferiors. Paying is a privilege which goes to the man of precedence since to be paid for places a man in a situation of inferiority. Hence disputes about paying the bill which occur whenever there is no clearly defined superior who can claim the right to do so. (In such a situation a man must put up a good fight in order to defend his honor even though he may be delighted to lose.) There are barmen in establishments frequented by gentlemen of honor who have amassed a tidy fortune simply by giving way to all those who claimed the privilege of paying. The humiliation of being paid for is still very real, even though it may no longer go so far as in the days of George Borrow who tells of a nobleman who ran his friend through with his sword at the end of a drinking-bout, because the latter insisted on footing the bill.

The show of beneficence forbids one to appear grasping or concerned with money. Yet on the other hand, the man who takes no care to preserve or augment

his resources may lack the wherewithal to validate his honor on the morrow. There are many spendthrifts in the cities to whom the attraction of honorific behavior in the present outweighs their concern for the future. Such people are often more involved in display and competition with equals than in meeting their obligation to dependents.

There is no subject upon which more contradictory opinions have been put forward than "the Spanish attitude to money." They range from Don Ramón Menendez Pidal's assertion that, "it is a natural trait in the Spaniard not to allow any calculation of gains and losses to prevail over considerations of another order" (Starkie 1950: 121), to the sly jibe of Cortés that he and his companions suffered from a disease of the heart which could be cured only with gold. Foreign observers have brought their testimony to bear at both extremes, some praising the disinterestedness of the Spanish character, others, perpetrators of the Black Legend in the Spanish view, asserting the opposite. Such a contradiction can only be reconciled through an appeal to context. By translating the ideal of beneficence into the reality of behavior, we can see that it implies a concern in acquisition, on the one hand, with a view to gaining honor through disposing generously of that which has been acquired, on the other. To give a thing away one must first of all get hold of it. The same concern in acquiring honor, through the act of beneficence rather than, as in the Anglo-Saxon countries, through the fact of possession, explains these extreme views. For honor derives from the domination of persons, rather than things, and this is the goal which distinguishes the acquisitive values of Andalusia. It is, needless to say, a goal which is inimical to capitalist accumulation.

The concept of honor presents itself in a different contextual framework to the individual according to his place in the social structure, and the differing value attached to it can be explained by this. Its relation to economic and political power is not seen in the same light by those who possess such power and by those who do not. Those who have no possibility of playing the role of patron do not compete with their equals in the same terms, while their prestige relates, as we have seen, to a public opinion which recognizes virtue rather than precedence as the basis of honor.

At the same time their lives are circumscribed by a community which is a territorial unit and proximity makes the moral sanctions of the *pueblo* effective. This is not the case with the upper classes whose social superiority places their honor in a sheltered position with regard to those sanctions. Their effectiveness

varies with the size of the community, so that a distinction must be made not only between different classes but also between the community of a few thousand souls in which public opinion represents a homogeneous body of knowledge and comes to bear upon every member, and those where only the eminent are known to everyone. The urban parish possesses a certain social identity, a network of neighborly relations through which social control is exerted which likens it to a limited extent to a rural community (*cf.* Kenny 1962), yet the possibility of a relative anonymity is open to the man who moves from one district to another, and the force of public opinion is diminished when it is no longer omniscient. The diminished concern with the ethical aspect of honor in the large towns must surely be related to this fact.

The situation of the *señoritos* is also different in the two environments. In the *pueblo* they form a small group who meet each other every day and whose every action is common knowledge to the entire community. They constitute its upper class. In the city this is no longer the case; people of equivalent occupation and wealth form a middle, not an upper, class, and they accept the leadership of persons of greater wealth and wider horizons. They are therefore simultaneously less subject to the sanctions of the *pueblo* and more subject to the influence of the upper class. The *señoritos* of the small town appear fine figures at home, but when they come into the city, they shrink in stature, and seem no more than the uncouth country cousins of the urban middle class. *Señorito de pueblo* is a term of denigration in the mouths of city folk.

We must consider the honor of the aristocracy. The Andalusian aristocracy is largely dependent upon landed estates in whose administration they take a varying interest. They maintain their ancient palaces in the cities of Andalusia though many spend much of their time in Madrid. They form the nucleus of so-called "society" which includes persons of wealth or eminence who do not belong by birth to the aristocracy. This is what I refer to as the upper class. While its various elements mix freely and intermarry, a fundamental prestige attaches to birth which modifies, but does not obliterate, consideration of wealth.

The moral sanctions of the *pueblo* have only a limited importance for the middle class and none for the upper. It is no doubt a satisfaction to them to feel that they are appreciated by their dependents and admired by the populace, but their reputation looks to their equals for validation, not to their inferiors. Their lives possess far more privacy than the *pueblo*, and though they appear as public figures, their intimacy is confined to the circles of their dependents and their peer-group. Gossip indeed exists and tends to be relayed over a wide range, so

that a person of the upper class possesses a public character, but his social position is a matter of birth and wealth, and it is therefore, in a sense, impregnable to gossip. If he is disliked by his peers he may be avoided, but his honor is very rarely publicly affronted. He is dishonored only by being ostracized by his social equals.

The sanctions of honor = virtue therefore play a less conspicuous part than in the plebeian milieu, or for that matter in an earlier period of history. Those who have been ostracized have been so because of their political behavior during the Civil War or their financial unreliability, rather than their sexual behavior.[10] However, between plebeian and upper class honor there is, in addition to the difference already noted which was seen in the conception of the cuckold, a further difference. A man's sexual honor is attained not only through the purity of his womenfolk, but through his commitment to any other woman in whom he has invested his pride. The infidelity of his mistress leaves him a cuckold also. Thus on one occasion a lady of the upper classes whom gossip had credited with a clandestine lover over a number of years transferred her favors to a fresh admirer. Shortly afterwards her abandoned lover was seen lunching with her husband and the comment was made: "There go the two cuckolds!" The abandoned lover was equated with the infelicitous husband.

This usage no longer submits to the explanation which I have given of the symbolism of the horns in the plebeian community, that they stigmatize the failure to defend familial obligations. It is here the lover's honor = precedence, not his honor = shame, which is at stake for he has no rights over the woman in question. He is humiliated only in that he has lost to another the "right" to her favors,[11] the title of "*amant de titre*." The fact that this usage does not conform to the definition given above does not invalidate it. The point, precisely, was that the plebeian conception is not the same as that of the educated classes. The difference corresponds to the relative emphasis placed upon honor as deriving from virtue rather than from precedence. If the former meaning is taken as a basis, then this extended sense must be regarded as a figurative form. On the

10. In the cases of ostracism on account of sexual conduct of which I have heard, the victim was always a woman whose status was insecure from the point of view of birth.

11. This sense of the word cuckold is not, of course, unique to modern Spain. Anouilh (1949: 81) ridicules the notion of honor contained in this conception of cuckoldry by making the lover challenge the husband to a duel on the suspicion that he has seduced his own wife.

other hand, if the usage of the educated is adopted, as one who fails to assert his sexual claims, then the plebeian usage must be regarded as, in part, figurative. The two senses overlap, but they do not coincide. Both must be regarded as figurative from the point of view of the brief definition of the *Diccionario de la Academia* quoted above.[12]

The greater sexual freedom of men of the middle classes corresponds to the fact that they are less constrained by the social control of public opinion, due to their greater freedom of movement and material possibilities. But it is also influenced by the fact that, whereas in the plebeian class the woman is the financial administrator of the family—she remains in the *pueblo* when the man goes away to work and therefore she keeps the key to the family chest—in the middle class the woman has relatively less importance in the question of the financial resources of the family, since the husband is not a manual worker but an office worker, rentier, businessman, professional, or administrator. She enjoys relatively less liberty of action since she has servants who perform the tasks which take the plebeian housewife out to the fountain or the market. She is seen in public much less, spends her day in her house, or in visiting hers or her husband's female relatives or in church or occupied by church affairs. Outside her family circle she spends little time in mixed company. Her husband goes alone to the casino or the *tertulia*, the group of friends who meet habitually for conversation. The middle class wife is noticeably more restrained in behavior than the plebeian, her husband more authoritative and more jealous.

When we reach the upper classes, however, this tendency is reversed, and we find women enjoying much the same independence as in the upper classes of the other countries of Europe. They are subject to less, not more, restraint. They smoke and drink in public places frequented by their class, attend social engagements with their husbands, drive automobiles, travel alone, and exercise authority in ways which are not allowed the wives of the middle classes. All these activities imply, of course, a higher standard of living. Moreover, gossip

---

12. Another figurative form produces the word *cabronada* which according to the *Diccionario de la Academia* (1956) means: "an infamous action which is permitted against one's honor" and applies in fact to any shameful action. We might also point out that in Mexico the word *cabrón* has lost, in popular usage, all association with cuckoldry and, with this, the symbolism of the horns which is not understood outside the circle of the educated. A comparison of the values and symbolism of honor in Spain and in the New World is badly needed.

credits them with a sexual freedom which is not attributed to the wives of the middle class, and since we are concerned with honor as reputation it is gossip rather than the truth which is relevant. Nevertheless, the number who live separated from their husbands is much greater than among the middle classes, where this is very rare.

If we take the paradigm of plebeian honor and shame shown on page 7 and compare it with the values of the upper class, we can see certain significant variations. Rather than variations in the structure of the concepts, it is a matter of emphases upon their different properties. Thus it appears that shame and honor are less often synonymous with one another. Shame is above all an emotional condition which relates to a given situation in which the individual is put to shame. It can even be experienced vicariously. The word is still used as a personal quality, and one who affronts public opinion is said to have lost it, but self-respect would be a more appropriate translation here; its aspect as hereditary and natural is no longer taken literally. Children are expected to resemble their parents in character, but the shamelessness of one person does not imply that of his family.

Physical courage for the male and unwillingness to accept humiliation for both sexes, are essentials of honor, and financial honesty also, since the contrary implies, apart from everything else, a base concern in money which is unaristocratic. Honor is a question of class honor and personal precedence rather than sex which dominates the honor of the *pueblo*. Sexual conduct is a matter of conscience and is the subject of religious sanctions. It exposes a person's self-esteem rather than his honor.

Therefore a paradox confronts us which the remainder of this essay will be devoted to clarifying: those whose claim to honor is greatest, and also most dependent upon lineal descent, are most careless of their sexual honor. It is the counterpart, in the sphere of sexual behavior, of the paradox noted by Voltaire, that there is always least honor to be found surrounding the king. It is far from being particular to Spain; on the contrary, it is perhaps more marked in other countries. However, we shall restrict our consideration of it to the Spanish social scene.

An obvious explanation presents itself: the concept of honor varies from age to age and its importance appears much diminished in modern urban society. The disappearance of the duel in modern times is a testimony of this, though the existence of the duel far from sufficed to make aristocratic honor safe in the eighteenth century, and in the most recent period in which it was prevalent

it was not much concerned with the defense of sexual honor.[13] An upper class is always more amenable to foreign influence, and thereby to change, and the ideas of the twentieth century have tended towards, not only a diminution of the concern for honor, but also a greater freedom of action for the married woman. Moreover, there has been a great change in the last three decades in Spain in this regard, not only among the upper class, but among the urban middle class. The paradox might be regarded then simply as a fortuitous product of the folk-urban continuum (Redfield 1941); sexual jealousy is going out of fashion and rustic society is behind the times—an assertion for which there is some evidence, as we shall see. It is also true that the aristocracy is much more subject to foreign influence: English nannies, German foreign universities, and visits to Paris to buy clothes.

However, it appears to me from an admittedly inadequate knowledge of the historical records that the greater independence of women of the aristocracy antedates by a long way the disappearance of the duel and the influence, such as it may have been, of the movement for the emancipation of women, if indeed it is not rather a permanent feature of aristocratic society.

There is always a tendency to attribute that which one disapproves of to foreign influence and in this Spanish critics have not been exceptional, whether Don Gregorio Marañon who attributed foreign origins to Don Juan,[14] or, two centuries earlier, Fray Joseph Haro who blamed the custom of the *Chichisveo* [sic] on the Italians (Haro 1729). Father Haro, writing at the beginning of the Bourbon period was certainly correct in attributing changes in custom to foreign influence. Yet his complaints regarding the looseness of morals, in particular of the upper classes, have a very traditional ring to them. Father Haro understood the word *chichisveo* in a rather different sense to the Italian (where it means simply the person of the *cavalière servente*) as the institution of chivalrous, he thought culpable, friendship between a married person and a member

13. Carl A. Thimm (1896) gives statistics, only unfortunately for Italy, in the period of 1879-89. It is interesting however that he finds the causes distributed among politics, card games, religious discussion, and only eight percent of "serious insults" which may be taken to include sexual honor. I do not have the impression from the many duels cited by Thimm that Italy was exceptional in this regard.

14. Marañon (1942) is another writer who fails to perceive that Don Juan is a man of honor = precedence and that the theme of the play is, precisely, a critique of this theory of honor—a fact which is surely congruent with the circumstance that the author was a priest.

of the opposite sex. His explanation why the rich were the worst offenders was an economic one: that a gentleman is expected to make costly gifts in order to maintain such a friendship. Certain resources are perhaps necessary, but this does not explain why the lady's husband should accept that his wife should receive such an admirer. Economic reasons may be cited to explain why the poor did not indulge in the *chichisveo*, but not why the rich did.

If Father Haro gives a time-depth to the paradox he does not resolve it. There is no doubt that the customs of the aristocracy were changing in the early Bourbon period in this regard. Even though neither the theatre of honor, nor the picaresque satires against honor can be taken as literal testimony, they at least indicate a popular preoccupation in the earlier period. Yet the desperation of the aristocratic heroes of the theatre of honor in defending their vulnerability through women implies, unless they are all to be taken as paranoids, that their womenfolk gave them reasons for anxiety. (The fact that the women were often innocent of any infidelity scarcely detracts from the point since that is what makes the plot a tragedy.) The behavior of the protagonists implies that they were acting according to expectations which, over-optimistic or pessimistic as the case may be, had some foundation in reality: the husband that his wife might be seduced, the gallant that he might succeed in his suit. The existence of the institution of the Celestina alone implies that the danger to marital honor was a real one. Traffic lights are not found where there are no automobiles. Lope de Vega's thesis[15] that the only security of a man's honor lies in the virtue of his womenfolk, which appeals to our modern standards by its reasonableness, suggests a new approach to the problem, not that the problem did not exist.

I conclude therefore that this is only partially a modern phenomenon to be attributed to foreign influence and will try to give a more fundamental explanation.

The paradox should be rephrased in accordance with the distinctions already made: the class which possesses by most birthright honor = precedence is most vulnerable in its honor = shame. When we say "the upper class," we must distinguish between male and female honor, since the carelessness of women relates to their own reputation, while that of men to the steps which they take to cover their vulnerability through women. The obligation for men to avenge their

15. Lope makes clear in the last line of the play, *El mayor imposible,* that he thought his thesis was unlikely to be put to the test.

sexual honor is what has varied, above all, from the age in which vengeance is represented as a duty to that in which such acts of vengeance are not only effectively punished by the law but regarded in sophisticated society as barbarous and atavistic. Since the conventions of modern upper class society repudiate any means of responding overtly to such an affront (save through legal action which only aggravates the dishonor by publicizing it), there is little that a man can do about his tarnished honor other than impose the best interpretation of events he can, or cut his losses and renounce his responsibility by an act of separation.

It has already been pointed out that the upper classes are hardly susceptible to plebeian sanctions and the development of modern urban society and the segregation of classes which goes with it makes them even less so. Just as the liar is only dishonored when, impugned as a liar, he fails to vindicate his honor, so the cuckold is only dishonored when public recognition is given to the fact that "the horns have been put on him." The *pueblo* does this, and the smaller the community the more effectively; the upper class does not. Therefore the situation tends to remain ambiguous and to allow alternative interpretations.

The alternative interpretations which can be placed upon the same behavior are seen clearly in the ambiguity which surrounded the institution of the *cicisbeo*. The *cavalière servente* appears in the first instance as the guarantor of the husband's honor, who accompanies his wife on occasions when the husband is not able to do so. Since the husband allows it, *honi soit qui mal y pense*. But the sanctioned guarantee becomes, in the eyes of the skeptical, a cover-plan.[16] Whether or not this skepticism is allowed expression depends upon the status of those concerned and the social position of the critic. Father Haro, as a churchman, was in a position to voice his skepticism. In his view, the occasion is all that is needed and "*la carne hace su oficio*" (the flesh knows its business); he ridiculed the idea that such a relationship could remain innocent. (He belongs to the school of thought which maintains that female honor is only safe if the lady is locked in with a broken leg.) Yet the idea that women not subjected to male authority are a danger is a fundamental one in the writing of the moralists from the Archpriest of Talavera to Padre Haro, and it is echoed in the modern Andalusian *pueblo* (Pitt-Rivers 1961: 175). It is bound up with the fear of ungoverned female sexuality which has been an integral element of European folklore since prudent Odysseus lashed himself to the mast to escape the sirens. It is through

16. *Cf.* Stendhal (1940: 88), incidentally, followed certain Italian authors in attributing the introduction of the *cicisbeo* in Italy to the Spaniards.

their sex that women acquire power over men, and women have naturally the ambition to attain command and liberty, and they wish to invert the order of nature, attempting (even though it may involve the greatest cruelties) to "dominate men."[17] This then is the traditional way of thinking, but it is no longer that of the educated classes.

However, we must look at it from the woman's point of view. Status derived from birth is not uniquely a male attribute. A woman is granted the status of her husband, but she does not thereby forfeit that which she received by birth. Legally she retains her maiden name, merely adding her husband's to it, and she passes it on to her children as their second surname. Moreover, unlike English titles, Spanish titles pass through the female line in default of a male heir in the same degree of kinship. The result is that they frequently pass through women, changing from one patriline to another. A daughter, in default of sons, bears the title and her husband takes it by courtesy, as her consort. There is no lack of examples in the literature of anthropology of women who take on a social attribute of men, becoming substitutes for them, whether, for example, for the purpose of marrying a wife in the lineage systems of Africa, or of continuing a feud in Montenegro. Yet the point to be retained is that a Spanish woman of high birth is able to transmit her patrilineal status to her children.

Even though a woman's shame in the plebeian sense is visualized as a positive attribute, something which can be lost, it cannot be won like precedence, nor is it inherent like status. It is preserved by refraining from actions which are proper to men, and this is possible and necessary, according to the division of labor, because women are under the tutelage of men. Legal independence is a male prerogative, and a woman acquires it only when she leaves the tutelage of her father (until recently at the age of twenty-three). If she has married before then, which is commonly the case, she has already passed under the tutelage of her husband. Had she already acquired legal independence, she would lose it on marriage. Only while she is of age and un-married, or widowed, is a woman legally independent. Under such circumstances, she does not pass under the authority of her brother or sons, and the division of labor breaks down. She is obliged to take

17. Haro (1729: 12) "que las mugeres naturalmente son ambiciosas del mando y de la libertad y que quieren invertir el orden de la naturaleza, solicitando (aunque sea con la execución de las mayores crueldades) dominar a los hombres." Father Haro's appeal to the order of nature must not be taken to be no more than the ranting of a baroque Sevillian priest. It bears some relation to those universal values which were examined, for example, by Robert Hertz (1960).

legal responsibility, to act for herself and for her children in legal matters or business, and she must support them; she adopts the social role of a man.

The life expectation of women is higher than that of men and their average age at marriage is some years younger, so that, even discounting the effects of the Civil War, a considerable number of women become widows at an age when they are still active. The Andalusian widow often takes on the duties of her independence with enthusiasm and makes up for the years she has spent in subservience to the male sex.

In the beliefs of the *pueblo*, the same association is made in this case between the male role and aggressive sexual activity, and this is seen in the fact that widows are commonly believed, even in cases of apparent implausibility, to be sexually predatory upon the young men. It follows from the basic premises of thought upon this matter that a woman whose shame is not in the keeping of a man is sexually aggressive and dangerous. The association reaches its extreme representation in the figure of the witch, the unsubjected female who rides upon a broomstick to subvert the social order sanctified by religion. She is a woman who has foregone the moral qualities of her sex and become the consort of the he-goat. Both in the beliefs regarding the sexuality of widows (whose remarriage it will be remembered, is given the same treatment as the *cabrón*), and regarding the supernatural practices of witches, the same assumption is displayed: once the sexual division of labor breaks down, women become men and where this occurs there can be neither honor nor shame.

Father Haro viewed the matter in these terms and attributed the deplorable state of sexual morality which he strove to reform to the fact that the sexes were abandoning their "natural" roles in their dress and in their customs. Men were sitting on the floor like women, and women were getting up on to stools. Sodom and Gomorrah all over again! The inevitable result was the *chichisveo* in which all honor was irretrievably lost.

Another writer of the previous century had already demonstrated the thesis in a different way. La Pícara Justina tells the story of a girl who is robbed of her purity by a young man and left dishonored (de León 1912). She therefore disguises herself as a man and joins the criminal underworld. When finally she finds her betrayer and forces him to marry her (thereby restoring her honor), she reverts to female dress. The parable could not be clearer: a woman stripped of her honor becomes a man. Her honor restored, she reverts to her true sex.

The popular beliefs regarding widows and witches, the ancient churchmen, moralist and novelist, give us a clue to the interpretation of the conceptual chart,

not an ethnography. It provides the moral basis for the oppositions associated with the division of labor, so that such a chart now enables us to see coherence in the judgements passed in situations in which *honra*, *hombría*, and *vergüenza* are invoked, why the conduct which is honorable for one sex may be the opposite of that which is honorable for the other; why women who adopt male behavior prejudice their shame, while those who have abandoned their claim to shame are no longer submitted to the sanctions which control the behavior of honorable women. Such women can behave as men do, attend functions from which honorable women are excluded, and use their sexuality to dominate men, as Father Haro believed all women desired to do. Yet by the same token they also forfeit their hold upon the honor of men. It also entitles us to see the victim of the *vito* as an Odysseus who failed to make himself fast and succumbed to the sirens. It is the pollution of his status as a community member rather than his immorality which calls down the wrath of the excommunicatory rite.

We are now in a position to resolve the paradox regarding the women of the aristocracy. Not only are they free of the sanctions which enforce the plebeian code of honor, their status marks them off from the duty to respond to its precepts, not like the shameless whose failure to respond established their able status, but because by the principle of *honi soit* their honor is impregnable and does not therefore depend upon male protection. Thus the lady of the upper class can command men without inverting the social order, since her power derives from her rank, not from her sexuality. It is not humiliating for a male inferior to obey her orders. She escapes the restraints which weigh upon middle-class wives, since, whatever her conduct, she possesses status which cannot be forfeited. Her religious duty and her conscience require her to be virtuous and obey her husband, but if she does not do so, she is wicked, she is not dishonored. She cannot then be stripped of her honor and become a man in the sense in which the plebeian can, thereby threatening the "natural order," for the natural order for the aristocracy does not depend upon the same conceptualization of the division of labor and the opposition of honor and shame associated with it, and it is not therefore threatened when women escape from the tutelage of men. It has been suggested that male slaves, on account of their inferior status, lack the social personality of men. By an analogous reasoning, women of high birth are accorded, on that account, a right to the kind of pride which is a male attribute, an element of masculine honor. They do not thereby forfeit their femininity, any more than the slave acquires a feminine status through being denied a masculine one; they acquire in addition some of the moral attributes of

the male. Sexual and class status come together to qualify the rules of conduct which apply to their behavior.

I have examined the conceptions of honor which are held by different classes in Andalusia, plebeian, *señorito*, and aristocratic, and the ways in which these are modified by the fact of living in a small isolated township or a big city. Small-town plebeian honor stood at one extreme and aristocratic honor at the other. In the former, in many of its aspects, honor was allied to shame and equated with virtue; in the latter the yardstick of honor was precedence. The difference was explained, in the same manner as the difference within the *pueblo* between the honor of males or females, by the place of the individual within the social structure.

The dual nature of honor as honor aspired to and honor validated reflects the duality of the aspiration to a role and its attainment. To be dishonored is to be rejected from the role to which one aspired. "I am who I am" is answered: "You are not you think you are." The search for identity expressed in these attitudes is the search for a role and the transactions of honor are the means whereby individuals find their role within the social organization. Yet, in a complex society, the structure of common understandings, like the structure of roles, is complex; the criteria of conduct vary, and with them, the meanings attached to the concept of honor. So we can see that, on the one hand, the need for common understandings and the mechanisms of social integration (such as the acceptance of usage of the upper classes) tend to unify its conceptualization, on the other, the demands of the social structure promote differentiation.

It was suggested at the end of the first part of this essay that the confusion of the meanings honor = precedence and honor = virtue served the function of social integration by crediting the rulers with a claim to esteem and a charter to rule. But it is a function which is fulfilled only as long as the confusion is not recognized as such, and we have seen that this is far from being always the case. Once it is realized that "honor has gone to the village," there is room for polemic, a polemic which has been carried on for centuries (particularly between the Church and the aristocracy) and of which the disagreement between Montesquieu and Voltaire is only one of a whole number, one which opposed the realism of the noble jurist to the moralism of the bourgeois poet, the "is" view of honor to the "ought" view.

The social struggle is visible behind the semantic battle; in a sense, the sense which Speier suggested, it is fought out in words. The rebellion of the agrarian

masses of Andalusia was promoted by a concept which illustrates this "*señorit-ismo*"; *señorito*, the term of respect towards a member of the ruling class became extended in *señoritismo* to mean the rule of corruption and social injustice. The vocabulary of honor was subverted by the failure of the *señoritos* to satisfy the claims upon their image. The confusion broke down. But the battle over words is fought out only perhaps to start afresh as the operative pressures of social organization impose themselves and the need resurges to sanctify a new established order. The "is" becomes "ought" once more and authority is re-endowed with *mana* (*cf*. de Heusch 1962). Behind the new order of precedence and the redefined honor the same principles can be seen at work, for if, as Durkheim suggested, "the idea of force is of religious origin" (1915: 204), it is also true that the reality of force possesses the power to sanctify itself.

The conceptual systems which relate to honor provide, when each is taken in its totality and in its varied contexts, a mechanism which distributes power and determines who shall fill the roles of command and dictate the ideal image which people hold of their society. At the ultimate level of analysis, honor is the clearing-house for the conflicts in the social structure, the conciliatory nexus between the sacred and the secular, between the individual and society, and between systems of ideology and systems of action.

CHAPTER 2

Mana*

I

November the First is an appropriate choice for an Inaugural Lecture. It is called in the country in which much of my fieldwork has been done by the name "Vispera de los Difuntos"—literally "the Eve of the Dead." And I can see in my mind's eye what is happening at this very moment in some hundreds of Mexican cemeteries where parties of celebrants are repairing, burdened with sweet sticky foods and demijohns of rum, to sit upon the tombstones for the next few days and nights, strumming tipsily on their guitars, letting off rockets (and sometimes pistols too) and uttering periodically that piercing defiant drunk's cry, so uniquely Mexican, that inspired one of the finest passages in the writings of the poet Octavio Paz (1967). Such is the variety of culture that we celebrate this day in a very different manner, yet the mortal association remains.

Today I inaugurate my function as a dispenser of knowledge—and knowledge is death. What's still alive is yet to be known—a thought which reassures me when I review the uncharted areas of ignorance over which I skim in my lectures. But the "defunct ones" in the Mexican title of this day are above all the ancestors and on this basis I may perhaps be forgiven for commemorating a

---

* "Mana" was an Inaugural Lecture at the London School of Economics, delivered on November 1st, 1973 and published in 1974.

notion which held sway in anthropology from the latter half of the nineteenth century until it was finally laid to rest in 1940 by Raymond Firth—*MANA.*

The "discovery" of *mana* is commonly credited to Bishop Codrington who made it the central explanatory concept of his book, *The Melanesians.* This was published in 1891, though he was writing on the subject as much as twenty years earlier when he was quoted by Max Müller. "The word is common to the whole Pacific, said Codrington, and people have tried very hard to describe what it is in different regions" (1891: 118, n. I). In briefest form, it is a magical quality responsible for good fortune and success, and the power of chiefs. It is an attribute not only of persons but of gods, spirits or ghosts and it also adheres to certain rather special stones. The idea was taken up by Frazer and by others who asserted, moreover, that there was a negative form of it called *tapu* associated with ill-fortune and things prohibited. Thus for these authors good and bad magic were opposed in primitive thought just as good power and bad power are opposed in European thought. But Marcel Mauss, who was above all others the theoretician of *mana,* did not agree with them that *tapu* was negative *mana* (1968: 47, 156).

The glosses of *mana* whose variety Codrington had already remarked on continued to multiply, but it was generally agreed that *mana,* whatever it was, was a magical belief demonstrating the ways of thought of primitive man. The assumption with which these authors all started—that there was something particular about the thought of "primitive man" which could be opposed to the thought of "civilized man"—led on quickly to the creation of a universal category of analysis. Mauss was able to find an equivalent concept in many other parts of the world and claimed the universality of the notion (1968: 19 *et seq*.). Thus in fact the anthropologists borrowed from the peoples of the Pacific the tool they required and by the time they finished theorizing about *mana* it was doubtful whether any native of those parts really possessed such a concept.

It is easy to deride the erroneous beliefs of sixty years ago, but let us note that the quandary persists after one has finished doing so, for, if it makes little sense to expect to find our analytical categories in Melanesia, it is ethnocentric to use what our own culture provides, and if we were to deny any analogy between our own categories of thought and those of the people we study, then we could not say anything about the latter at all, save in *their* language; it would be untranslatable. Admit, then, that however unsure the methodological démarche, however unfortunate the choice of the word, the problem attacked under the tide of *mana* was a real one and the introduction of the concept represented an advance

at the time, for it was an attempt to penetrate the thought of the "natives" rather than infer their mental processes from an evaluation of their behavior.

Mana, as things turned out, fared rather less well than its supposed negative counterpart, *tapu,* which had already gained the status of a neologism in the languages of Europe as "taboo" and which remains alive in the speech of countless millions who are quite ignorant of the original connotations of the word. (By an appropriate coincidence it even became the name of a famous nightclub in Paris in the existentialist period.)

If I have chosen *mana* as my topic today it is not in the hope of resuscitating it—heaven forbid we should take to using it again!—but time marches on, trailing wayward anthropology in its wake and fifty years later I think it is possible to place the problem of *mana* in a somewhat different light and treat with the lenience of historical perspective the empirical shortcomings of those who perceived in the word the key to *magical* mentality which they opposed to their own soi-disant *rational* mentality. *They* stressed the differences rather than the similarities between primitive peoples and themselves, assuming that all those who differed from them could be classed together, and in doing so they overlooked the significance of the association between power and the sacred which they might have found, had they but looked, as well illustrated in their own history as in the disparate meanings of the word *mana.* This conjunction of semantic spheres that are usually opposed—heaven and earth, spirits and men, sacred and mundane power—is not only displayed in the materials from the Pacific, it has recently come to preoccupy a number of anthropologists in other parts of the world (de Heusch 1962). Of the anthropologists of the generation who took *mana* seriously as an analytical concept only Marcel Mauss recognized that *mana* involves principles which are to be found in our own society. But the speculations of the ancients regarding *mana* consisted almost entirely in attempts to use this word as a peg on which to hang theories already formulated by surmise regarding primitive mentality in general. When Raymond Firth published his article on the subject it was, I feel, with the intention of putting an end to these discussions by showing that serious ethnography does not support such conjectures. If he limited himself to an exact account of usages of the word in Tikopia it was evident that the same could be done elsewhere and also that, unless it were done elsewhere—and the data provided encouragement for the theorists of *mana*—there was no point in their going on about it. In brief, *mana,* the analytical concept, succumbed, dissected by the analysis of the master-ethnographer of our age.

Let us examine for a moment what Firth found the word meant in Tikopia (Firth 1967a: 174-194).[1] It meant:

---

1. Professor Firth has been so kind as to let me see some later notes from his visit in 1966 which amplify the definition, and with his permission I append these in his translation:

   Edward, Pa Rangifuri, eldest son of Ariki Tafua: 26 July 1966:

   > "The *mana* of the chief, the *manu* of the chief, the two of them go into the one idea. So, like this: if a chief is angry with an ordinary man (literally of the rear), is exceedingly angry, he will direct his speech at him. He will make his speech to be there as a sign; so it will be there for a sign to the man against whom he directed his speech, so it is his *mana;* so in speaking, his *mana* has worked on the man to be ill, or to die. Because he is the chief, the *mana* is there in him, the *manu;* the *mana* is there in him with the *manu.* So this is the idea."

   [R. Firth: "Is it true that a man will die? If a chief is angry with a man, will he die?"] Pa Rangifuri: "Formerly it used to happen, the chief would speak, and the man would then die. Now, among men nowadays, it's their backs that are bent, are bent. So, you know my grandfather, Gabriel?" [R. Firth: "My friend?"] Pa Rangifuri: "Yes. Well, he went to our orchard, over there. He observed that the areca nut had been plucked, had been stolen. So he hurried back, and came and did what is called his *mana* or his *manu*, came and took a knife, and went then and cut the huge areca trunk, and said: 'whoever stole the areca nut here, when he looks upon its frond, his back will become curved.' Well, (people) stayed, and when the present time arrived, backs have become curved." [R. Firth: "Who was the man?"] Pa Rangifuri: "The person for whom we wailed nowadays, a woman, daughter of Maipo lineage. Haven't you seen her, her back was bent? And a woman still living, daughter of Terara lineage. There, two young females, who climbed up the areca palm to pluck the nuts, but did not come and ask permission, and were stealing." [R. Firth: "So, do women climb areca palms?"] Pa Rangifuri: "They climb areca palms. Well, it's like this, he just spoke that the person might continue to live. If he had wished for him to die, he would have died. It's like that."

   Note:

   > *mana* equated with "power" by Pa Rangifuri in preliminary conversation.
   > *mana* as "power" pronounced with longer medial *a* than *mana* as "father."
   > *mana* equated with *manu.* (The ma = "with" ordinarily, at end of first paragraph = "or.")
   > *mana/manu* identified quite specifically as a property/quality of Tikopia chief, as being "in" him. (No Tikopia commoner allowed to have *mana,* though a few aliens, e.g. Melanesian Mission Bishop, Raymond Firth, allowed it in some instances.)
   > *mana* of chief associated particularly with act of speaking, with mouth and breath.
   > *mana* a mystical quality in that by its means are done/happen things not ordinarily able to be performed by human agency—e.g. giving thieves curvature of the spine.

1. Thunder, which is caused by the agitations of a spirit in the heavens.
2. Father (short for *tamana).* This appears to be a homonym—though a later note from Firth says the medial "a" is pronounced shorter.
3. For him, her or it. Also apparently a homonym.
4. Efficacious, or efficacity, the word being used both as noun and adjective.[2]

And *manu* which is explicitly stated to be an alternative form meant:

1. An animal, particularly a bird.[3]
2. Efficacious.
3. The name of a certain spirit-being resident in the heavens and forming the subject of an important myth-cycle concerning storms.

Most examples of *mana* refer to the behavior of chiefs who ensure, through their prosperity, success, and welfare, that of their people. Thanks to his relations with his ancestors and the gods, a chief controls natural fertility and the health and good fortune of his subjects, especially at fishing. *Mana* is said to be present in the hand of the chief who cures, in his lips when he implores the gods for rain or calm weather for fishing, and it also lodges in his head. It is thanks to his *mana* that he can perform spells. Commoners do not have it, but it is sometimes

Comparatively, Tikopia has only *mana ariki*, not *mana tangata*, as Maori does (did). *Mana* allowed to aliens, e.g. Bishop, Raymond Firth, does not contravene this, since they too are admitted as *ariki* for some purposes. Tikopia focus on mystical aspect of *mana* concept may be a correlate of small size of population and political system. No room for consistent, continued role of war leader of Maori type, such as Hongi Ika or Te Rauparaha.
[Note: mystical aspect of *mana* among Maori exemplified by behavior of ritual objects such as heirloom weapons, which could turn over of their own accord (*v.* Gudgeon, etc.)]

2. "Thunder was the mark of the passage of a major spirit, especially if accompanied by lightning. These were signs of the efficacy (*manu*) of religious ritual" (Firth 1970: 244). The word applies then both to a manifestation and to its cause. In the same way "singing is made to the *manu* of the Gods, all the chiefs sing to the Gods to make hither the *manu* for the land to be well" (Firth 1967b: 282). "One chief is efficacious, *manu*, in planting many yams, another is not" (Firth 1967b: 194).
3. This sense is probably not the same word since it bears here an accent on the last syllable, according to Firth's later opinion. Yet one cannot entirely discount the possibility of a semantic connection between the concept of birds and the notion of heavenly powers. This is a matter for the linguists.

possessed by priests. A chief who does not produce the desired results is *mara*. There's nothing to be done about this; it's just bad luck. But his inefficacy does not place his legitimacy in doubt, it merely detracts from his personal prestige; be loses respect, not office (Firth 1970: 37).

The gods give *mana* when they are pleased by the correct performance of ritual and dances, for dances are their chief amusement in the heavens, and for this reason great importance is attached to the function of the chief in organizing these activities. A new chief is aided in the accomplishment of his ritual duties by his peers.

Once there were two rival chiefs for the position of head of a clan and they both performed the ceremonies for the gods. One was successful and the other was not, but our inference is not confirmed that the successful one came to oust his rival, and this story told of long ago is the only record of such a situation: "actual competition for the chieftainship is almost unknown," since "the Tikopia is particularly sensitive to the reproach of being 'a person wishing to exalt himself.'" "There is no recorded case of a Tikopia chieftainship ever having been seized by force, though reference is often made in tradition to attempts to seize power as such by violence and the origin tales speak of contests to gain the office. In quasi-historical times certainly, it seems as though the combination of ritual and social sanctions for chieftainship was such that no legitimacy could be expected by such forcible seizure."

Mana is handed over to his successor by a dead chief or it may be withheld out of pique, but while still alive he teaches his heir the names of the spirits and ancestors to be invoked and how to perform the ceremonies correctly. Consequently, to have *mana* a chief must not only receive the goodwill of the gods, he must earn it by mastering the ritual skills which he does thanks to the goodwill of his predecessor who is normally his father. Succession is generational, restricted to males and hereditary in the male line. Primogeniture is the normal mode with reversion to the senior line. "The system is neither one of confused competition among candidates nor of automatic succession, but a curious system of election in which the principal role was played by competing 'king-makers' rather than by competing candidates." Succession takes place only on the death of the incumbent (Firth 1960b). Firth did not find any secular connotation of the word as "authority" or "influence" as among the Maori and elsewhere. Nevertheless, in Tikopia it can be seen to validate the position of the chief by reference to the results he is able to obtain and Firth sums up (1940) by saying that empirically it relates to material events, to chiefs as a personal

attribute, to the volition of spiritual beings and it always implies a positive value in contrast to *Mara.* "The difficulty of rendering a term such as *Mana* in translation," he says, "is *that* of comprising under one head a number of categories which *we* ordinarily separate."

Mauss, writing of the concept in general and a quarter of a century earlier, suggested that the importance of *mana* was above all social in that it conferred authority through establishing reputations: "the word *mana* designates not only the power of substances and magical acts, but also the authority of men. It also designates precious objects, the talismans of the tribe" (1968: 111). In addition he gives it as the equivalent of prestige, adding "it signifies at the same time magico-religious force *and* authority even where as in New Zealand it indicates, rather, authority and glory" (1969: 325). Tikopia, studied only subsequently by Firth, appears rather exceptional in this regard, in that *mana* does not extend into the social sphere as in most cultures of the Pacific (Firth 1970: 192), but is regarded as a part of the natural world. The tendency of systems of authority to claim a natural charter in order to secure themselves is well known: if natural, they cannot be challenged. Hence by refusing to recognize the social nature of *mana* the Tikopia do not exclude its social implications, they merely assert that the authority of chiefs cannot be questioned.

Lévi-Strauss has thrown much light on the modes of thought of primitive peoples and has shown that they differ from those of modern society not so much in themselves as in the social contexts in which they emerge and the finalities at which they aim, so that on the one hand primitive systems of classification function quite rationally within their "natural environment," while, on the other, the logic of science is to be found only within those areas of civilized life which are organized for specific ends and on a scale which is inconceivable in primitive society. Over those other areas of art, ritual, and religion the savage mind still rules, untamed by the organizational strictures of science.

But Lévi-Strauss rarely touches on the subject of political concepts and his treatment of *mana* is confined to showing how Mauss went off the rails in attempting to turn it into an analytical tool and to suggesting that it belongs to a class of concepts of which the essential nature is that they are indeterminate and have no symbolic referent at all—*"valeur symbolique zero,"* in his own words[4]—they are unknowable save by the results attributed to them, like

4. "Dans ce système de symboles que constitue toute cosmologie, ce serait simplement une *valeur symbolique zéro*, c'est à dire un signe marquant la nécessité d'un contenu

the possession of "oomph" which, he says, was credited in the United States to certain particularly attractive girls. This theory clearly bypasses the difficulty envisaged by Raymond Firth since it makes *mana* by nature undefinable and hence untranslatable.

At several points, in his essay on the gift, Mauss associates *mana* with honor. This startling insight is for me the clue to a connection with the parts of the world with which I am better acquainted. For if I can make no claim to be able to help with the difficulty of translating *mana* into English nor indeed to add anything to the anthropology of the South Seas, where I have never been, it appears to me clear from the discussions of others better qualified that *mana* is a concept of the same type as honor as I have encountered it in my fieldwork in Spain, and that we should search for its significance, not in attempting to find words in English equivalent to it, but in the associations it makes between different realms of meaning. This is what I have attempted to do with the concept of honor, the variety of whose meanings is so great that one might be tempted to dispose of the matter by simply translating it into American slang as "oomph." This was at any rate the point of view of Falstaff who said that it was "air," which seems to me very much like saying: *"valeur symbolique zéro."*

II

Except in the essay on the gift, the word "honor" is scarcely to be found in anthropological writings until about fifteen years ago when a number of my colleagues, who also worked in the Mediterranean, became interested in it.

There are several reasons for this:

The early anthropologists were obviously unwilling to concede honor to peoples they regarded as inferior, for they felt themselves to be full of honor even if they did not much reflect about what honor was.

Others must have been discouraged by the very difficulty of deciding *what* it was, for the literature on the subject is packed with polemics down to the days

symbolique supplémentaire à celui qui charge déjà le signifié, mais pouvant être une valeur quelconque à condition qu'elle fasse encore partie de la réserve disponible, et ne soit pas déjà, comme disent les phonologues, un terme de groupe." And in a footnote…"la fonction des notion de type *mana* est de s'opposer à l'absence de signification sans comporter par soi-même aucune signification particulière" (Mauss 1950: 1).

when it virtually ceased at the end of the nineteenth century to be a subject for discussion at all.

Indeed, as a topic of conversation it has become positively embarrassing, almost taboo, an observation which led Professor Peter Berger to publish a paper recently under the title "On the obsolescence of the concept of honor" (Berger 1970). In the United States, he tells us, anyone who talks about it is considered "hopelessly European." Is it not anomalous that the word with which the Declaration of Independence closes ("and our sacred honor") should have come to be considered "hopelessly European"? My perplexity only increased when I listened to the speech in which President Nixon announced the ceasefire in Vietnam. The word "honor" occurred about a dozen times. I think it is the vocabulary rather than the concept that is obsolete and obsolete only in conversation, from which it is excluded in order to be reserved for invoking the sacred values of the nation on formal occasions.

But honor is still freely discussed in the country communities of Andalusia where I worked. In attempting to grasp the concept behind the words I found it necessary to go far beyond my field-notes which presented only a fragmentary picture of the whole complex of meanings, refracted through the consciousness of country-folk who no more understood its structure than they did the syntax of the language that they spoke. The connotations they gave to the words relating to honor were significantly different from those given them by the urban middle-classes and different again from the aristocracy. Moreover, these different variants could not be explained in isolation from each other, for they reflected disagreement with regard to values, a disagreement of the greatest structural significance. In the end I found it necessary to look into the history of the concept and the way it had evolved in other European countries. If I may summarize very briefly my analysis (Pitt-Rivers 1961; 1965a).

Honor is at the same time a sentiment, a guide to action, a quality demonstrated in action and finally the public recognition of that quality. Honor felt becomes honor claimed, honor claimed becomes honor paid, and honor paid leads to the bestowal of "honors." Inversely honor withdrawn leads to humiliation and the loser of honor is finally forced to recognize his dishonor and *feel* shame. Honor is thus a nexus between aspiration and reality, between the individual and society. But that is not all: the criteria whereby honor is bestowed are not the same throughout a complex society: the court and the populace take different views. The interests of kin-group, community, profession, social class, hierarchy—in a word any social group possessed of an identity and standards of

its own—are expressed in their particular concept of honor. Hence one can see, in the polemics on the subject ever since the Renaissance, the reflection of social struggles between elements seeking to impose their standards of honor which favored their interests.

The particular code of honor specifies the qualities and failings by which honor in each instance is assessed. The code constitutes a system of values used in the appraisal of persons, who are promoted or debased in accordance with its tenets, as when honor is bestowed on a man in the Honours' List or denied by his banker to his check or accorded in their conduct towards him by those who grant him precedence or sing his praises. But values are not only standards for the evaluation of others, they are also deeply felt and the code is therefore the guide to the sentiments which spring from the most inviolable aspect of the self, the will. To have a sense of honor is to be attached to such a code.[5] It is to be noted that both these aspects were traditionally derived from God: the sense of honor through the religious conscience (the view stressed by churchmen), but equally the events in which honor is objectively demonstrated were attributed to the Divine Will. The judicial combat of the Middle Ages and later the duel settled affairs of honor by remitting them to the judgment of Destiny.

Between these two extremes of conscience and event, social life distributes honor in various ways. The monarch, in accordance with the medieval theory of monarchy, was the fount of honor and in fact the State always claims to be its arbiter. But honor derives also from moral reputation accorded by the public, from feats of arms, financial probity, fidelity in friendship, generosity in hospitality, and patronage or excellence in any branch of endeavor. But while these are all possible bases for attaining honor it is always true that it is ultimately

5. "L'honneur est proprement la considération attachée à la vertu. En morale pure, il n'y a pas d'autre honneur que l'estime méritée par l'honnêteté scrupuleuse, et le sentiment de l'honneur n'est autre que celui de a dignité même et du devoir . . . les moralistes sont généralement en défiance contre le sentiment mondain de l'honneur. Tout en avouant qu'il est tutélaire pour les natures médiocres et peut, dans un milieu délicat, les tenir à un niveau qu'elles n'atteindraient pas toutes seules; que le mépris de l'opinion ne saurait étre une vertu quand il s'appelle impudence et que l'afficher, c'est le plus souvent, avoir perdu le seul cran de sureté des caractrères, ils ajoutent: un caracrère vrai, digne de ce nom, a son honneur à lui, indépendant de l'opinion du monde, laquelle commande souvent des fautes et des sottises (*v.* Duel). Quel progrès moral eût été possible, si des consciences plus hautes et plus fières n'avaient jamais eu le courage de se mettre au-dessus de leur milieu?" (Marion 1894).

accorded in the transactions of honor which take place in the course of living and hence those who are powerful enough impose their judgment and reduce the dissidents to silence whatever their private opinion may be. So, in fact, honor always goes in the end to the big battalions and the big bank accounts. Yet it has, on account of its multifaceted nature, always to be expressed in terms of moral qualities which can still claim to be retained after all else is lost and can still therefore hope to be validated on a future occasion. Hence, while honor is always in the end the victim of events, it always claims to result from the inherent value of men; and it thereby sets the seal of necessity upon the capricious choice of Destiny, converts the facts of power into the sanctioned value of ethics, provides moral validation for the tyrant's lucky throw. For this reason, its pragmatic aspect is always obscured, save to penetrating minds like Thomas Hobbes, who preferred to ignore the moral aspect altogether and propounded what I have called "the pecking-order theory of honor."[6] But for the rest its ideological imperative only sharpens the polemic and makes each man feel certain he is right, to the point of preventing him from understanding the viewpoint of anyone else. It is in the nature of such concepts that they are lived in the struggle of life rather than conceived objectively and therefore while they can only be felt from inside they cannot be known save from outside. Indeed to be lived effectively they must *not* be known objectively for they must inspire the commitment that contact with the sacred bestows and contact with the laboratory destroys.

Hence, quite apart from the scholastic polemics regarding honor, one can see that different conceptualizations of what all are agreed must be the same thing, a unitary standard, lay the basis for struggles that are not only political and social, but moral as well for they aspire to lay down not simply what is, but what should be. Hence in the literature on honor we find the Church pitted against the nobility, the bourgeoisie against the aristocracy, the local plebeian community against the bourgeoisie and so forth. In Renaissance Spain the "Old

6. Hobbes' realism contrasts with the moralism of the ecclesiastical view of honor. It might appear that he is adopting the traditional noble view by equating honor with precedence. In fact, and as Lord Clarendon perceived, Hobbes was a dubious ally of the nobility, for in this as in other aspects of his thought, he validated the authority of the Prince only out of realism from which he derived the moral obligation of the subjects. His Leviathan, defended out of necessity, could as well be incarnated by the Protector as by the King and in neither case was its legitimacy owed to a Divine charter, which was precisely what both claimed. Hobbes' standpoint is only superficially assimilable to the aristocratic theory of honor since he denies it any validity other than that conferred by the exercise of power.

Christians" were similarly opposed to the converts, or in modern Andalusia the pueblo against the señoritos whose discrepant concepts of honor first attracted my attention to the subject.

When Don Juan, in Tirso's, the first and Spanish version of the play, proclaims that honor has left the court and fled to the village, he is voicing one of the stereotyped opinions of the day and one which satisfied the Church and the Old Christians (who were peasants) as much as it offended the nobility and the New Christians (who had achieved high positions in the new bureaucracy). Nor is it surprising to find this view put forward in the play for its author was a priest.[7] It is not usually recognized that the *Burlador de Sevilla y convidado de piedra,* as the play is called, is a polemic in favor of the ethical and ecclesiastical evaluation of honor and against the sexual and agonistic concept which is portrayed in the theatre of honor. When the Commendador finally gives Don Juan what one might call "the electric handshake" it is the concept of honor based on masculine pride that goes up in flames.[8]

---

7. The plays published under the name of Tirso de Molina were written by Fray Gabriel Tellez.

8. The sexual and agonistic concept of honor tends to be favored by upper classes whose aspirations require them to struggle for power—just as it is also favored by young men whose aspirations lead them to compete for women—and to be disfavored within plebeian communities. But it would be a mistake to regard it in general as necessarily associated with the nobility. In particular, it would be erroneous to consider Tirso's play an attack on the aristocracy even though the Church frequently figures in that period as an ally of the rural community, and a censor of noble vices. An attachment to social precedence is an evident if not the prime ingredient of the aristocratic view of honor, but Don Juan is carefully detached from this by his indifference to the values of social class manifest in the choice of the women he deceives and the men whom he thereby affronts (one royal, one noble, one plebeian, one peasant). The Comendador, in contrast, as befits the representative of royal power represents the "establishment" view of honor: defensive not aggressive, responding to challenges but not issuing them, defender of female purity not defiler of it, respectful of the teachings of the Church not a mocker of them.

   The reappearance of the Comendador as the "guest of stone" (to quote from the play's title) stresses his embodiment of eternal values in contrast to the momentary triumphs of Don Juan whose contempt for them echoes in his refrain "¡Que largo me lo fiais!" ("What a long time you give me!") and who in his bravura treats even death as a joke. The Comendador represents what honor *should* be: aristocratic, attached to the monarchy, faithful to the Church and true to his word in death as in life. Don Juan represents what it should not be: predatory and aggressive but not steadfast (he kills the Comendador when he is attempting to escape), and if he finally dies rather than climb down it is to avoid personal humiliation. His honor is egoistic, individualistic

The symbolic representation of divergent conceptions of honor was never more clearly illustrated than in the English seventeenth century when the rival parties in the civil war distinguished themselves by the length of their hair. Once the Commonwealth was over and long hair came back into fashion the cavalier conception of honor also bounced back in an exacerbated form that was not to last; sexual honor took precedence over religious scruples and financial probity, and more jokes were published about cuckoldry than in any other decade or in any other country of Europe.

The concept of honor, then, is not only a nexus between the individual and the group but, in the struggles regarding its interpretation, the clearing-house of the conflicts within the society, determining who has the right to precedence, the right to show off, the right to write the rules, the right to decide for others, the right to ignore the feelings of others. Nor should it be argued that the conflict of interpretations ceases to be a moral marker subject to the ethical logic of the culture simply because it is the focus of a social conflict. On the contrary it is the focus of a social conflict only as long as it is viewed as moral, that is to say, pertaining to a moral absolute binding upon the society as a whole. It is precisely on account of its moral nature that it is able to represent the solidarities expressed in action and provide the synthesis in the dialectic between culture and society.

I have spoken of honor in a whole number of different cultural contexts, different with regard to the countries of Europe and different with regard to historical period and it may well be asked whether I am not doing precisely what I reproached the early anthropologists with doing: plucking the notion of honor from the ethnography of Andalusia and elevating it to the rank of a universal concept? Am I suggesting, as Mauss suggested, that the *mana* of the Maori chiefs was really honor? Were I to do so I would be in difficulties at once, for

---

and situational; it is vested entirely in the present moment. If Don Juan mocks the moral honor of others ("por el honor le venci") ("I had him by his honor") he is eventually cornered by the Comendador and forced to give his hand (with the fatal consequences) under threat of showing cowardice if he refused. For cowardice is the universal antithesis of masculine honor in all its concepts. He is finally "had by his honor" just as the peasant husband was had, despite the difference between their codes.

The play can be read then within the context of the polemics of honor as an attempt to eliminate from the aristocratic concept (so often the aim of the playwriters of the epoch) its immoral elements and substitute for the pecking-order a social order resting upon the monarchy, sanctioned by the Church and deriving its legitimacy from God. Tirso's message may be summed up as saying: "the basis of honor is virtue not precedence," and in that he was typical of the ecclesiastical view of the matter.

mana has senses which cannot possibly be rendered as honor. *Mana* attaches to all sorts of objects including stones and we can hardly talk about stones having honor—though we might, stretching a point, describe them as sometimes "honoriferous" like the stone of Scone which some Scottish Nationalists a few years ago thought to possess enough *mana* to be worth removing from Westminster and taking all the way to Scotland. But there are more serious objections: *mana* is given as the cause of events—Mauss even suggested that it was in a sense an embryonic form of the concept of causality (1968: 29)—while honor is the result of events not their explanation. It explains only the motives of people's actions, not the cause of events.

In speaking of honor in the different countries and periods of European history I have already abstracted from the ethnography and established a category which does not correspond to the concept of honor in any living person's head, for it attempts to reconcile all those conflicting concepts of honor I have already referred to. Had I refused to do this I would have been forced to leave the problem at the level of the ethnography and say simply that the different countries and classes of Europe have different concepts which they call "honor" and they are not the same, nor the same as those used by their ancestors who did not agree with each other either. And we would be left with the simple, if true, statement that people use the same word in different ways and this makes it very confusing for anthropologists. We could draw no more profit from the observation than to parody a well-known definition of culture as "the body of common *mis*-understandings." I believe that there is something more to be said about the matter and that these misunderstandings are themselves understandable. But they are understandable only within the context of European culture, for there the different concepts of honor provide rival interpretations of the same social reality—which explains their diversity in the first place as well as the misunderstandings they lead to subsequently. There is no such relation between the European concepts of honor and the Pacific concepts of *mana*.

But there is a further problem. Once we admit that conceptions are something other than the words used to express them—as I insisted at the beginning—can we be sure, when dealing with honor in Europe, that we are really dealing always with the same conception?[9] To maintain this we must be able

9. This is the same problem that Firth faced in wondering whether *mana* = bird was the same as *mana* in the other senses and which appears to be answered by the linguists in the negative.

to explain the connections. And again if we use the word "honor" (as some of us have done in a collective volume on the Mediterranean), to apply to those conceptions in the Arab world which show such a striking resemblance to those of southern Europe must we not admit that we are dealing with a different conception which can be called "honor" only by analogy. I think we must. Conversely, how can we know we have covered the *whole* of the concept of honor? In practice I do not think this is so difficult, for in fieldwork one comes to recognize from repeated experience the reactions that are using a particular concept, even if they are not always expressed in the same words nor with the same implications, but it is at any rate wise to examine those other concepts which are found most close to honor on the ground. There is one which cannot be ignored for it even appears in one sense in the Oxford English Dictionary as its equivalent. This is *grace*. The negative of honor is also termed "disgrace."

Once more I find it necessary to go beyond our modern English idiom to see the notion of grace in the round, for without such a maneuver it would be difficult to see the connection between the grace said before a meal and the grace displayed in dancing. So let me take you once more to Andalusia where the word possesses many more senses than here and where in consequence the structure is more easily detected:

It is as well to remember in the first place the religious origins of this concept in the Greek "charis" (Benveniste 1969: 202) which gives us the chrism of baptism and also, subsequently, Max Weber's concept of charisma. "Gracia" in Spanish is connected with baptism not only doctrinally through its basis in the religious concept of grace but in the popular idiom, so that the word is used in old Spanish and even today in the part where I studied to mean "Christian name," i.e. the name given at baptism, and the godparents at baptism are called "parents of grace." Divine grace is bestowed through baptism on individuals whose salvation it thus assures, thanks to the will of God. By extension, all that is arbitrarily (perhaps I should say undeservedly) bestowed by God upon an individual is called grace and in particular the "gift" (as we say significantly in English) of commanding the admiration of others, hence we have grace in dancing as in English, but also grace in pleasing by appearance or verbal performance. To have wit is to have grace in the tongue and to be funny is "gracioso." In brief to do anything exceptionally, unnaturally well, is to have grace, but there is one particular gift which is attributed to an almost physical substance of grace and this is required for magical curing. To be able to cure it is necessary for a

woman to have grace in her hand. Only *women* can cure in this fashion for only they have grace in this sense. Moreover, a curer cannot demand payment for her cures because grace is a free gift and she would lose it if she charged money. In all these senses grace always comes from God.

The question of free will is central to the mystery of grace, as to the sentiment of honor, and all the heresies with regard to this dogma have hinged upon it. If the essence of honor is free-will in man, the essence of grace is the Divine will whose arbitrariness is an essential attribute of Divinity, but whose gifts to men require their cooperation, i.e., their good will.

The two concepts can be seen as similar in function: they establish a link between sacred and mundane affairs, but whereas honor emanating from the will of man is based on earth in the reality of social interaction and aspires to sanctity, grace, God's will, is founded in the sacred mystery of religion and aspires to explain events on earth. They share the same aspiration, even if they start from opposite ends: to relate the world as it should be to the world as it is. Grace stands before events as their cause while honor is rather their result. The two concepts complement each other. The monarchy is the point at which they meet: the fount of honor and the recipient of grace assured by anointing with the chrism in the rite of enthronement: *Rex dei gracia*… Congruently with this the theologians have never squabbled among themselves about honor, nor the laymen about grace. But each willingly lays claim to the other's concept. The Churchmen claim honor as a religious sentiment. The laymen make grace the social title of a duke.

The notion of free gift is central in the concept of grace, whether it is given by God or by man, and it is from this that the notion of thanks is derived which is expressed in the plural "gracias" (as in Italian and as in the grace we say at table which is an expression of thanks). It is the recognition of a bond created by acceptance of a free gift in accordance with that rule that expresses reciprocal actions by the same word. In *return* for grace you *give* grace in verbal form and it carries a serious moral implication. It is, therefore, an alternative to paying, for if you give cash you don't owe thanks. The habit of the British of thanking everybody on all possible occasions for nothing in particular without any regard for their commitments or the decorum of social relations makes them objects of mirth to the Spanish populace, in whose eyes it confirms the moral irresponsibility of the island race. (Urchins can sometimes be seen following the British tourists around imitating them by saying, between squeals of laughter, "gracias, gracias, gracias… .")

Finally, since all good fortune comes by the grace of God the word "desgracia" is used to mean misfortune and "desgraciado," rather than disgraced, means "ill-blessed" or "unfortunate."

Now, I have deliberately refused to offer honor as a *translation* of *mana* and I would refuse also to offer grace, but this is not to deny if we were to attempt to translate some of the statements of Spanish peasants into a Pacific tongue (rather than translate the so-called supernatural statements of the Melanesians into BBC English) that grace and honor are often most approximately rendered by *mana*: of grace in the hand or *mana* in the hand, the efficaciousness of the cure is the measure, whether you are in Andalusia or Oceania—even though, if you take the whole structure of both concepts, there are wide margins of difference. Yet what we *can* say is that they are concepts of the same order: they span the gulf between heaven and earth, legitimize chiefs by reference to events, explain powers and good fortune by delegation from the above, lay the seal of destiny upon the hazards of life, sacralize the powers that be, bring into the same explanatory scheme divinity and experience.

III

Perhaps I can now venture an explanation of the fact that, while Codrington and others found in the *mana* of Melanesia and of the Maori not only the source of magical thought but of political and social values, Firth found little social significance attaching to the word in Tikopia which is not used, so he says, in the sense of authority and prestige as among the Maori.

The Melanesians are nearly all matrilineal: property and descent go from mother's brother to sister's son and we find, amply documented, first of all by Codrington but by many others since him, the classic quandary of matrilineal societies: that fathers are in theory bound to transmit their goods and power to their sister's sons but in fact they generally attempt to see to the advancement of their *own* sons with whom their ties are much tenderer in sentiment if jurally less binding. The consequence is a great deal of hostility between the sons and sister's sons of any man of consequence, an extreme insecurity in the succession to the chieftainship and the need for popular support at the time of succession, and the need for subsequent validation. Indeed, in contrast to Polynesia, political authority is not commonly wielded by hereditary chiefs but rather by "big men" whose power, unsacralized by symbol and ritual, depends rather upon a

faction attached to them personally. As Marshall Sahlins (1963: 295) puts it: "Polynesian chiefs did not make their positions in society—they were installed in societal positions. In several of the islands men did struggle to office against the will and stratagems of rival aspirants. But then they came *to* power." In contrast, in Melanesia power was owed to personal qualities of command, not assigned to office and rank.

If we turn to the Maori the situation is rather different, but this was a yet more agonistic society, and its struggles centered upon competition for land. As Burridge (1969: 20) explains: "Traditional Maori sentiments of attachment to particular parcels of land, on account of their association with the ancestors, social groupings and deities, joined the living with the glories and values of the past. Through the industrious and efficient exploitation and conservation of land and its resources a man gained prosperity and prestige, made himself worthy of the ancestors, commanded respect from his fellows. Further, intimately related to gaining and losing lands were the capacities to fight and wage war successfully. These features were of prime importance in the accumulation of *mana:* that power of command over resources and other people which contained the essence of Maori integrity."[10] Yet the concept of *mana* was not unconnected with rank. "The usual leaders of war parties were high-born chiefs since their training and their rank and *mana* through seniority of birth were supposed to make them brave men and good leaders in war" (Vayda 1960: 25). But "contrary to a persistent myth, Maori chiefs did not inevitably ascend to power by virtue of their birth, but rather competed for *mana* (prestige) in warfare, feasting, political maneuvers, and polygamous matrimony" (Salmond 1973). Land, glory, and titles were what chiefs competed for and "conquering kings their *mana* take from the foes whose heads they shrink."[11]

The Tikopia are quite different from both of these. To begin with their system of descent is patrilineal so there is no rivalry for succession, no conflict, between sons and sisters' sons. The land boundaries are stable. Succession to the chieftainship is peaceful depending upon a custom of primogeniture subject to

10. For the concept of *mana* in Samoa, see Burridge (1969: 25 *et seq.*).

11. The Maori were not alone in giving such a concrete demonstration of the association of *mana* with the physical body: "Just as other Solomon islanders took the heads of slain enemies and placed them in shrines in order to acquire their *mana*, and also ate bits of their flesh to accomplish the same end, so the Choiseulese also took small strips of flesh and muscle from the calves of the legs of slain enemies, mixed them with *taro* and a bit of bush medicine and ate it. In this way they too acquired some of the enemies' *mana*" (Scheffler 1965: 253).

general consent, "semi-competitive election"; unlike so many primitive societies where political power is vested in a lineage, brothers do not attempt to murder each other *for* nor oust each other *from* the chieftainship. There is no polemic regarding authority; no one competes openly for position or power or glory or land and the four clan chiefs act in solidarity with one another. There is no overlordship of the island. The chiefs are obeyed and their authority is taken for granted to the point that they can order a man to leave the island (which is equivalent to telling him to go and drown himself) and the man does so. Heavenly and mundane power are related through practical events: thanks to the *mana* of the chief the rain comes, the crops grow, the fish come into the reef, the storm subsides. If he lacks *mana* and so fails to obtain these favors from the gods his legitimacy is not called into question.[12]

Authority never needs to be exerted because it is never lacking and it is never threatened so it is never discussed. The equation between the work of the chiefs and the work of the gods is never questioned and Firth so far connived in this equation that he was able to write a book about the former and call it the latter (Firth 1967b).[13]

This comparison has brought us back to the problem we faced in the analysis of the concept of honor which is both credited to individuals by the social system and also won by their individual exertions—both ascribed and achieved. It corresponds to the distinction between power and force.

The distinction between power and force has often been made (recently by, among others, Julien Freund[14]) and it is important here in relation to *mana*

12. Some critics might wish to attribute the absence of rivalry between potential chiefs to the fact that economically they are not differentiated from their subjects, there are no rival institutionalized groups or classes; each man, chief or commoner, works his garden and fishes like the rest. This seems to me an insufficient explanation: first of all because the societies where such rivalries are found are very often economically similar to Tikopia and secondly because political power in itself is enough to make men rivals elsewhere.

13. *Cf.* Firth 1970: 37.

14. "La force n'a rien de mystérieux, au contraire de la puissance qui est imprévisible, occulte parfois, parcequ'elle est illimitée" (Freund 1965: 116 *et seq.*). See also Friedrich (1968: 243). Having defined power as control over men and resources Friedrich differentiates political power from other types of power (e.g. within the household or family) by the fact that it is concerned with the community and he contrasts "naked force" to power based on an appeal to the political values of a society which might be called its "political culture."

though in fact it was not made by the theorists of *mana* who all, it appears to me, used the words interchangeably. "Magical force," "supernatural power," "mystical influence," were simply ways of saying the same thing. But power implies something more than force and something different. For power is what is credited to people, force is what they demonstrate. Hence power, though it may be initiated by a demonstration of force, always searches, in order to secure itself, to become legitimate, in which case it merges into authority. Authority can dispense with force as long as it is not challenged. Indeed, as Hegel pointed out, it is only exerted when it no longer exists, for to have authority is to be obeyed without the exercise of sanctions—by the free will of those who recognize it. It is their acquiescence which legitimized it in the first place. Force is used only to re-establish authority, which implies that it has become disestablished or the force would not be necessary. Authority is like honor in that it is a matter of credit and has recourse to force only when it is questioned. In the same way the duel provided a recourse to force for the man whose honor was questioned. It is significant that when the aristocratic concept of honor is replaced by the bourgeois concept the word "honor" should be extended to cover the crediting of bank checks. Financial credit, political credit, social credit, and moral credit all come together, then, in concepts like honor to provide the foundation of the social structure.

When credit is sound there is no dispute. It is an honor to obey a legitimate leader, but if he is not legitimate it is a humiliation. The distinction is determined by the moral evaluation of the situation which is expressed in these concepts whose paradoxes, with the polemic they arouse, relate to their legitimatory function: by the association they establish between the mundane and the sacred, convert force into power. We find many similar multifaceted concepts, having the same function, in Africa. They do this, not simply by giving two different referents for the same word—for example for thunder and the efficacy of chiefs, both associated with the above—but by grouping the referents in terms of values: whatever a man's honor is, it is sacred to him, whatever *mana* is, it works and it works by divine consent.

Meyer Fortes (1959) has commented on the arbitrary nature of divine power. Indeed, its essence is that it is not answerable to human reasoning, it is shrouded in mystery and for this reason the gods are frequently associated with strangers or appear in their guise, for strangers are by definition unknown and mystery is that which surpasses human understanding (Pitt-Rivers 1968b). But it has not been noted, to my knowledge, that the same principle holds good in the case

of mundane authority which aspires always to associate itself with the realm of the sacred or at least to participate in its arbitrariness. Authority means the right to decide, to be obeyed without question, without reference to the rights and wrongs as each man may see them. It demands to be delegated the power of decision and in order to be accorded this it must be institutionalized, that is, sanctioned by custom. The past experience of a society legitimates its present; the "is" of today becomes the "ought" of tomorrow. The sacralization of tradition is a matter of time, time for actual circumstances to be forgotten so that all that remains in the wisdom of the elders is the framework of institutionalized authority. The ancestors are sacred because they are the symbols of the past experience of the society. Their authority is only increased by the fact that they are no longer knowable.

So the concept of authority particular to each culture lays the foundation on which the social structure is based, delimiting what is debatable and what is not and thereby providing the framework within which political action is possible. But the concept itself is no more than the product of conditions of life in that society, so it would be equally acceptable to me to put the proposition the other way round—and say that the possibilities of political action implied by the social structure determine the particular concept of authority. The ecological framework in the widest sense including the absence of hostile neighbors and of competition for land, the stable social structure, the effective rule of succession, the sacredness of the chiefs, are all reflected, in their interaction, in the particular form that the concept of *mana* takes in Tikopia. The interaction of social and cultural factors produces, elsewhere in Oceania, a very different conjunction and with it a very different conception of *mana.*

IV

I regard this problem as central to political anthropology: the interaction of social and cultural factors; the relation between political behavior and the concepts of authority expressed in the vernacular of the society in question, by terms such as *honor, grace, mana*, and those various African expressions I have referred to—in a word, the relation between force and power. It strikes me as curious therefore that it should be entirely ignored by a recent writer on the subject. F. G. Bailey's *Stratagems and spoils* purports to be "a social anthropology of politics" as the subtitle puts it, yet there is no mention of this problem. Bailey

provides a general model for the understanding of politics by likening the struggle for ascendancy to a game with rules.

Briefly stated, the basic assumptions of this theory are the following:

1. The power game is the same everywhere in the sense that it is governed by the same principles given in advance—only the idiom in which it is played varies.

"Each culture—parliamentary elections, Welsh villages, American racketeers and the rest—has its own idiomatic set of rules which summarize its own political wisdom. Nevertheless, they have something in common, which makes it possible for us to look for the essentials of political *maneuver* (my italics) whatever be the culture.

We now ask what is meant by the word 'essentials'" (Bailey 1969:7).

I do not find the answer immediately, for Bailey continues with a sub-heading entitled "How to forecast" in which he discusses propositions connecting variables (including Mr. Harold Nicolson's smile) and from this he launches into a further section entitled "The Environment" which can hardly be considered one of the essentials of political maneuver, though it clearly includes some of the variables which must be considered in order to account for the possibilities open to political maneuvers.

It appears to me that the essentials that Bailey envisages in this book can all be included under the following titles:

a. personnel (players and teams);
b. the resources they can call on, material, social, and moral;
c. the prizes or spoils for which they compete;
d. the stratagems by which they compete—divided into fair and unfair tactics;
e. certain roles such as umpire, referee, or judge to enforce the rules and also arbitrators to reconcile parties in conflict;
f. the political field or arena. Not all members of a society enter the political arena—only those who compete for power do so—and it is possible to withdraw from it. Politics do not therefore concern everybody all the time. They do not refer to society as a whole in the sense in which social structure may be said to do so, but relate to a specific activity: power-seeking.

The rules of the game, distinguished as normative and pragmatic, state the relations between these essentials and vary from one culture to another in that they define the qualifications that are necessary in a given society in order "to occupy a political role" (Bailey 1969: 23), what prizes are thought worth competing for, what tactics are considered fair or unfair (Bailey 1969: 20), and so forth.

Despite the variation in the form which rules take every culture provides the necessary elements for the game and these can be identified without difficulty by the observer who knows what to look for, since they are always the same. Once equivalences have been thus established culture can be placed in brackets, as it were, and left on one side by political analysis. This assumption appears to me reasonable in so far as the struggle for power resembles a game and provided Bailey's rules suffice to explain what happens. After all, it is not necessary, in order to learn to play chess, to know Arabic, and understand the values of Arab culture. But is the analogy of a game adequate or misleading?

2. The prizes for which the political game is played in Bailey's theory are all forms of advantage, material and moral, including the satisfaction of wielding power and feeling superior. Honor appears in the latter connection. It is in this sense a simple paradox-free spoil whose significance is that it provides personal satisfaction to the player in default of any objective advantage. It is a residual utility invoked to fill the gap created by the recognition that material spoils and power are not enough to account for the motives of all political action. Some people are moved by self-regarding sentiments which outweigh their external interests, and taking here the opposite stance to Hobbes, Bailey calls these honor. Thus the example is given of Mr. Harold Nicolson who invoked his honor inopportunely but subsequently learned better. Honor however also appears in a second and objective sense, much more reminiscent of Hobbes as one of the prizes for which people compete:

"A prize is a value like honor, power or responsibility . . . Honor has meaning only when some people are without honor; power and wealth are got at the expense of other people. People compete only because the prizes are in short supply" (Bailey 1969: 21).

3. The players of the game are individuals, whether or not organized in teams, and in certain cases, especially in India, groups such as castes whose

> maneuvers are performed collectively since their caste status is shared by all members and the actions of one member affect the standing of the caste as a whole. Those who do not conform to the demands of the collective interest (i.e. who let the side down, to use an analogy borrowed from games) get pushed out by the other members. The rules govern the behavior of individuals or groups in their competition for the spoils. They are rules of conduct, normative and pragmatic, seen from the point of view of the actors. The word "structure" is used only in the sense of a set of rules by which an institution is regulated.

"A structure is a set of rules about behavior; these rules list the rights and duties of particular roles" (Bailey 1969: 10). And: "In the center of the complex of interconnected parts is a structure of rules about how people should interact with one another as political men. Some of these (the normative) say what is the right and proper thing to do: other rules (the pragmatic) tell you what is the effective thing to do, right or wrong. These rules are directives for the actors in a particular society; they are models of behavior for particular contexts; they are institutions; they are part of culture.

Any one item in this culture—any particular rule in the structure of political rules—is to be explained by showing that it is part of a structure. Explanation, in this sense, is putting things into context, showing that they are part of a pattern" (Bailey 1960: 16).

From the passages quoted it can be seen that the rules of behavior, both normative and pragmatic, are items of culture arranged in structures which provide the rules for the competition for power. This is played by individuals, teams, and groups who are more or less successful in this competition according to their resources, their understanding of the rules and their rationality in maneuvering within the limitations imposed by them. Stripped of their cultural idiom, these rules can be reduced to the abstract essentials of political maneuver. The stripping appears to be done by common sense, not to say rule of thumb, for nowhere does Bailey hesitate in his analysis to wonder about the meaning of behavior to the people themselves and the comparability of their concepts. The honor of Harold Nicolson is not perceived as any different from the honor *(mohoto)* of the members of the Bisipara *panchayat* or that of the Pakhtoun community of Swat, studied by Barth, where "you maintain your honor and you remove another man's honor with the least ambiguity by murdering him" (Bailey 1969: 91) but "whether we say that Pakhtouns fight for honor or for land it comes to the same

thing in the end." And it is suggested that the attempt of a low caste in Bisipara to increase their ritual purity, to maximize the kind of political credit which is symbolized in the idiom of the caste system is a struggle for a kind of honor in the local Hindu idiom (Bailey 1969: 97). The honor of the leaders of the *mafia* or *cosa nostra* (which is also referred to as the "honorable society" in its land of origin) is not mentioned, though the book was inspired, we are told at the beginning, by an interest in the *cosa nostra*. Culture is not composed of meanings, but only of the idiom in which the meanings provided by Bailey are expressed. The translators no longer betray once they have read *Stratagems and spoils*.

Unburdened of the problem of relating items of behavior to systems of thought or of relating politics to any other aspect of society Bailey is able to provide us with an interpretation of political happenings anywhere in accordance with the propositions he has devised. His demonstrations are neat, economical and easily understood, the more so since they require no effort to master the values of another culture. If I found that his explanations were sufficient I would acclaim this book as a masterpiece of synthesis, but in fact I find there are essential variables missing, those which relate to culture, and this is because of his, to my mind, unfortunate usage of the analogy of the game.

A game differs from life in that the variables are limited in number to a few, that they are all recognized from the start by the players, and no new ones can be introduced later. Moreover they are all logically related and all on the same plane. The chess-board has always only sixty-four squares and the pieces are divided into two identical sets, colored black and white, the card-pack fifty-two cards classed in four suits, always ranked in the same order. It is a reduced model of human action which uses social statuses by analogy to name the pieces or cards: kings, queens, bishops or pawns; court cards and the remainder, numbered like "other ranks" in the army. The statuses are no more than names given to pieces or cards which distinguish the rule attaching to their movements. All that it is necessary to know about a queen is that "she" moves rectilinearly and diametrically like a castle and a bishop, but not like a knight, or that "she" counts less than a king but more than a knave. Her sex is purely coincidental: she neither makes love nor gives birth. She neither rules nor opens parliament. No concept of monarchy is required to excel at either game; a chess or bridge champion can be Russian or American and could presumably be Nuer. The game is therefore a reduced model, not only in the limits placed upon the numbers of pieces and possible moves which could be simplified or complicated by the addition of further pieces or rules rather as chess is a more complicated version of

draughts, but reduced also in the sense that it excludes all variables other than those of which it is conventionally constituted and which are all relevant to its constitution. It has no relationship to place and time; it is identically the same game whether played in Iceland, Moscow, or Cincinnati, whether today or a hundred years ago and regardless of the identity of the players whose personal characteristics affect only the character of *their* "game" not of *the* game. Even on the boundaries of its limitations when cheating is "allowed"—lying in poker or in the Spanish card-game *tute* the conventional rules for conveying information to your partner by means of winks, fingers held in a certain position, and so forth, the cheating is recognized as legitimate and must not be confused with other imaginable forms of cheating not so recognized, such as picking up tricks you have not won, going to fetch additional needed cards from another pack, or tearing a card in half in order to reduce a ten to two fives. Once it has been inaugurated the game is independent of the historical circumstances which gave birth to it and ignores from then on all variables that lie outside its delineated domain. For example the game of fives was originally contrived to take advantage of a particular feature of ecclesiastical architecture, a rather cumbrous minor buttress, but fives courts constructed elsewhere have to reproduce exactly this feature not in order to buttress anything but in order to conform to the specifications of the game.

The game of football of which Bailey appears to be an enthusiast is not significantly different from those I have already mentioned. Unlike chess and bridge, though like fives, it involves physical exertion on the part of the players and this exertion is so great that the dimension of time is introduced setting a limit to the number of minutes the game lasts. (In this it is unlike the other three games.) But it is still a typical game. The field, the goalposts, and the ball all have standard measurements, the rules set limits upon the possibilities of action confining them to a few. The game is always the same, only the matches vary. The pieces, being live men, do not have to be anthropomorphized like chessmen and are named simply by terms which indicate their position in the field or their role. Thus where games are played between competitors who command inanimate teams of cards or pieces whose properties are limited to mathematical formulae which are the rules of their movement, the members of the team are humanized and represented as king, queens, knights, etc. while where they are live persons they must be dehumanized and rendered mathematical, reduced to nothing but their functions, like backs, goalkeepers, and forwards. Taken together the meaning of these representations is clear: the game effectuates a

passage from the concrete to the abstract; it isolates and simulates a certain aspect of life, that which is expressed in the notion of competition which is indeed liable to be formulated whenever goods are in short supply or the succession to a post has more than one claimant, but this notion is far from being acceptable anywhere and always, nor is it necessarily a useful concept on every occasion at the analytical level. For example, where land is available in excess of the requirements of the community it is not competed for and it has no market value. It is not, presumably, then a spoil, yet in my view it still has great political significance, since territoriality in any form is one of the bases of political grouping. It becomes a spoil only when it is competed for.

Competition can occur in any society under certain conditions, but it can hardly account for the whole of political activity since it is absent or deliberately excluded from many situations. Exchange and cooperation are also politically significant even where they are not undertaken in the cause of the power struggle. Bailey's theory of politics sees society like nature "red in tooth and claw," a view which leaves out of account the situations in which there is no competition. People compete for individual or collective advantage only where they conceive of themselves as potentially equivalent and interchangeable with their rivals. This does not appear to be the case in many instances, for example in Tikopia where, as we have seen, political power is not normally competed for, nor indeed is it open to competition at any time except at succession to the chieftainship when, according to Firth, it is only "semi-competitive" and when the stratagems employed to attain the office seem in every case given by him to have been unsuccessful. It would appear that the only sound stratagem on Tikopia is to have none and wait for greatness to be thrust upon one. One may also wonder how the theory of stratagems and spoils operates in societies where there is no greatness; either ascribed, achieved or passively received, I mean, in the acephalous societies of East Africa where there are no political offices to be filled. There is no demonstration taken from such societies, but there are references to them. In these, Bailey (1969: 35) tells us, there are no normative rules for allocating authority only pragmatic ones, but Bailey (1969) does not, as I do, deduce from this that the nature of authority in such societies is different. It can apparently in his view be reduced to the practical problem of leadership just as "moral resources" (36) can be reduced to their practical costs, and sacredness to a computable asset. There is no need to consider the nature and comparability of either authority or moral resources since all things that "come to the same thing in the end" can be equated.

Even in the modern West competition is not universally accepted as desirable or even legitimate in all circumstances. The stable pattern of landholding in certain traditional regions left little possibility for competing for land and the positions of power that could be competed for were all connected with forces outside the community, but even in the unstable and individualistic society of Andalusia where I worked myself—an agonistic society where individuals, families, communities and classes all struggled to improve their position—I often listened to the view that competition was an evil and degrading form of behavior and that men should not strive to humiliate each other, but should live in neighborly concord. Competitive sports were thought by some to be immoral and some schoolmasters forbade their charges to indulge in them in the belief that they encouraged the worst side of human nature. The lesson that I draw from this is not that there are no winners and losers, no stratagems and spoils in Andalusia—the contrary is obvious—but that the agonistic aspect occupies a different place and has different significance in each society; in Andalusia it is based upon a conflict of values and this implies that it will not suffice of itself to explain all political behavior. The notion of competition is however the foundation of modern British society, consecrated in its political thought by the notion of politics as a contest and in its social and economic life by the ideal of equality of opportunity and the principles of liberal economics. It is manifest in the love of competitive games, the examination system in education, and the moral concept of fair play. One cannot help wondering whether Bailey's love of football has not blinded him to all the other aspects of life that lie outside his "political arena" and whether his attachment to the fundamental values of his natal culture has not persuaded him that they are universally valid. The analogy of the game enables him to evade the problem of "other cultures" (including other political cultures) since games, as I have shown, though they are historically the product of cultures, are not culturally specific in themselves.

I will take only one example: a situation to which Bailey makes frequent references and to which he devotes half a chapter at the end of the book. It concerns the stratagems by which de Gaulle came to power in 1958 and those by which he subsequently put an end to the war in Algeria.

In brief résumé: an excess of political competition in the Fourth Republic had led to "immobilisme" and this made it impossible for the French government to pursue a coherent policy with regard to the rebellion in Algeria. The three possible solutions were military victory, social and economic reform, and a political settlement, but none of these could be carried through to success on

account of the competition between the players of the political game. A series of subversions and confrontations led only to hardened attitudes.

The situation therefore required an arbitrator between the forces in competition who, armed with presidential power, could in Bailey's words "take rational decisions quickly and in the general interest of the nation." De Gaulle was the most suitable man for this role. He stood for the values of order and the re-establishment of the state, and he possessed "the resource of a core of supporters in both the civil and military echelons whom he could mobilize quickly." He appeared then as "the only politician sufficiently strong and sufficiently concerned with the honor of France to hold Algeria within the nation and win the war." As things turned out he failed to attain this end and after successfully splitting the army and the settlers in Algeria, de Gaulle was able to achieve by the Evian agreement a negotiated peace with the rebels giving them command of an independent state.

Such an abridged summary of what is already a highly condensed account cannot do justice to the detail and it would be churlish to complain of the over-simplification of the facts and the neglect of what others might regard as vital considerations. But it is not the selection and interpretation of the facts that concerns me, but only the method of analysis. No one would deny that a leader of greater power than any prime minister of the Fourth Republic was required in order to end the Algerian war, but I cannot see anything in Bailey's account that justifies its claim to be anthropology. Moreover, to present de Gaulle as an arbitrator rather than a figure of authority and as simply the man best placed to fill a necessary role rather than as the creator of the role he played seems positively misleading. I well remember at the time of the peace of Evian the enraged expostulations of an acquaintance of mine, a little-known left-wing deputy from the South of France. What enraged him was not the loss of "Algerie Française," for he had frequently called for a negotiated peace, but that de Gaulle should have been able to get away with such a treaty. "If it had been me," he said—"or Mendes France, they would have strung us up from a lamp-post." He was quite right: "they" would have done so. It seems to me that if anthropology has anything to say that is not better said by political commentators about this matter, it is to explain the nature of de Gaulle's authority, the basis of his *mana* which enabled him, and him alone, to get away with the peace of Evian. In fact, it had been an essential factor in all his stratagems from the moment that his return to power in 1958 was envisaged. It was, needless to say, deeply embedded in the values of twentieth-century France.

There is a conflict, which extends throughout the social and political hierarchy down to the level of the village (where it is most visible of all) between clerical France and lay France. The conflict, though it exists at all the others, centers at that level on the persons of the curé and the schoolmaster who are the leaders of rival factions (whether they wish to be or not). This traditional conflict erupts every time the schoolchildren are sent on an outing to the seaside or the organization of the "bal du village" is discussed. There is always a pretext for discord and for stratagems such as Bailey analyzes so well. Both factions are highly patriotic and lose no opportunity to accuse the other of deficiency in this regard. If any were, to take up Bailey's inference, *in*sufficiently concerned with the honor of France it was only in the view of their opponents. However, there is one context in which the discord is forgotten and that is around the war memorial where both attend together, joined in the supreme value sacred both to clerical and lay which overrides all factionalism, France.

When de Gaulle retired from political power in 1946, following an unsuccessful plebescite, he did not retire from politics, but spent the next twelve years impacting his image as the savior of France, politically neither markedly left nor right—though of course accused of being both by contrary *extremists*—and claiming to be above politics, the receptacle of the sacred values of the nation. It was as if he had climbed on to the war memorial where he remained ready to step down one day and save France again. His followers were organized as a movement, not a political party, so that they could in fact belong to any one of a number of the central parties and a number of politicians of these parties went to consult him in his retreat in the appropriately named village of *Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises* so that he became called by the journalists "the fatherconfessor of the Fourth Republic." There he waited in austere solitude for France to need him once more. "When are you going to take action, mon Général?" asked one of his aides when people began to call for his return. "J'attends la catastrophe" was the reply.

The General's "stratagems" were based on his claim to sacred authority and he never allowed it to be publicly put in doubt, even when he was most evidently engaged in promoting the sectarian interests of his followers. Personal fidelity to him was the criterion of patriotism since he incarnated the goddess of the Phrygian bonnet. Hence the cries of "la France" in tremulous tones which spiced his speeches, and hence the gesture with raised arms extended halfway between high-diving and crucifixion.

It was against the background of this claim (which included the right to be inscrutable when ordinary politicians were required to speak plainly) that

his "stratagems" were carried out and they succeeded only on account of it. For, however contrary to the national interest the General's policy might appear to some, his *mana* defended him from the accusation of being unpatriotic since, for the general public, he could not by definition behave otherwise than in accordance with the true national cause. Since he had come down off the war memorial to save France, what he did must be saving France, even if it looked like liquidating an essential part of French territory and giving way to traitorous rebels who were not even proper Frenchmen. His honor was impregnable to accusations of that kind, which merely rebounded upon the accuser showing him to be a *mauvais Français*.

Of course Bailey does not ignore the fact that de Gaulle possessed prestige of a particular kind. Under the heading "moral teams" he discusses the spiritual or moral leadership of de Gaulle as a matter of "manipulating symbols" and suggests that control of these symbols constituted "political capital" which he conserved by denying its use to subordinates and rivals (Bailey 1969: 83). Clearly he did not prevent them from talking about the honor of France and singing the Marseillaise as the phrase taken literally would imply. I take it to mean that de Gaulle was able to claim successfully to speak for France, but this was because the public admitted his claim, not because any of his predecessors had failed to make it, and the public accorded him what he claimed because the nature of his authority was different and their assumptions and expectations with regard to him were different. The notion that symbols can be manipulated, monopolized, and denied to others is based upon the assumption that these "resources" can be treated as other resources such as economic power or control of the police. It is a denial of the necessity to recognize that charismatic leaders depend upon their ability to attract support by incarnating the desires of their followers rather than on constraining them by the threat of force or the offer of rewards; it implies a refusal to distinguish between what happens in the minds of men and what happens on the ground, between culture and society.

That the political power of General de Gaulle was different in nature from that of the other politicians of the Fourth Republic has become only more evident since his disappearance. A recent article (Raphaël 1973) describes the treatment of his tomb at Colombey. It has received within a year more than a million pilgrims, almost as many visitors as the Louvre or the Château de Versailles, but visitors inspired by different motives to those who go to visit those national monuments. Their dignity and gravity is contrasted with the curiosity of tourists and their behavior likened to that of pilgrims come to visit sacred

relics; jewels, poems to the General, and ex-votos of all sorts are deposited there. The General who understood so clearly the significance of his image had already foreseen it: "After me it will be Lourdes . . . greatness will be venerated in the form of little medallions, miniature flags, and crosses of Lorraine in marzipan" (Raphaël 1973: 346). Even so he had not perhaps foreseen the lengths to which his cult would go. The author of the article recounts how among the visitors observed was the mother of a sick child who surreptitiously drew forth her baby's foot to make contact with the cold flagstone.

The thaumaturgical powers of kings were the subject of a famous essay by Marc Bloch which this incident calls to mind, but note that kings owed this power of curing to the belief that they were divinely elect and that they exercised it while they were alive, but General de Gaulle was not credited with such capacities during his lifetime and the incident recorded was not based upon a general belief but was inspired by an individual association of ideas. Yet the fact that it could have occurred points in a simplistic manner to the nature of the General's power of which he appears to have been much more conscious than either his critics or even his supporters. Its roots were in the sacred, or, to be more precise (at the cost of neological quaintness), in the *sacrandum*, the raw state of that which awaits consecration.

Since the beginnings of anthropology the definition of the sacred has been debated and the great majority of theorists would certainly have refused to allow the term to be extended to cover the power of lay political leaders. Yet in recent times, as I have mentioned, the connection between power and the sacred has come to the fore, even if the political power of divine kingship has attracted more comment than the sacralizing power of political leadership. However from the moment that the connection is recognized it becomes difficult to distinguish between the two realms, for the possession of sanctity gives political power while political power seeks always to buttress itself by the claim to sacralization. Power of either kind depends, in order to succeed, upon the attainment of *credit* which is based upon belief. The command over men's minds and will is more lastingly effective than the exercise of sanctions over their actions and this is assured, not by a rational appeal to their understanding of practical consequences, but by an emotional appeal to their sentiment of what is right, that is to say legitimate. The credit established on the basis of such an appeal is sounder than that which rests merely upon the recognition of physical force, which is invoked in fact, as I have pointed out, only when the traditional system of authority is challenged.

The rules of power are rules of thought which lie embedded in the culture from which each traditional system of authority devolves. To place the political successes of de Gaulle in general perspective it is necessary first of all to delineate the political culture of modern France in order to see the nature of the authority he acquired which entitled him to ignore the rules of the game of politics as played in the Fourth Republic, and thence to proceed to generalization, not on the basis of individual maneuvers which can enlighten only our notions of common humanity, "l'humain du commun" (in Mauss' felicitous phrase),[15] that is to say, human nature in general, but of the nature of political authority, first of all in France, given the social structure of that country, and only ultimately relating this already generalized instance to the problem of political authority in general. Such generalizations—if they are to be anthropologically significant, and by that I mean valid on the cross-cultural dimension of politics—must concern not the universal problem of "how to win friends and influence people"[16] but, among the many characteristics of political systems, those that can be related logically to the principles of power.

Bailey has grasped at abstraction, but he has taken a shortcut and reached it prematurely, evading all the problems of comparability by taking for granted that which needed to be scrutinized: that human motives are the same everywhere. He has reached his generalizations in fact, not by abstraction but by reduction[17] and offered us a model of human behavior shorn of all anthropological

15. Bailey shows himself to be a worthy heir to the English anthropologists of whom Marcel Mauss wrote (Œuvers, I: 38): "Ils vont droit aux similitudes et ne cherchent partout que de *l'humain du commun*, en un mot, du banal. Nous nous arrêtons, au contraire, par méthode aux différences caractéristiques des milieux spéciaux; c'est à travers ces caractéristiques que nous espérons entrevoir des lois." (They go straight for resemblances and everywhere look only for that which is common to humanity, in a word banalities. We on the contrary are concerned as a matter of method with the characteristic differences between particular settings. It is via these characteristics that we hope to discover laws.)

16. The book published under this title had sold at the last count 70,000,000 copies and had been translated into 70 languages. Such a wide cross-cultural dissemination could hardly be expected of a work that did not rise above—or should one say sink below?—the peculiarities of particular system to the level of the psychic unity of mankind.

17. The distinction is admittedly not always easily made, but I would suggest that the essence of it resides in this: that whereas an abstraction is a generalization which covers the totality of the class considered (e.g. the social morphology of Georg Simmel), reduction involves selecting a factor regarded as a cause of the others.

complications, a simple exercise in ethnocentrism which shows us how one could explain political events, if the assumptions of our own culture were valid everywhere. But the whole point of anthropology is that they are not.

If power is reduced to a game its cultural foundation is lost. It may still be possible, indeed easier, to explain why X becomes Prime Minister rather than Y in situations where there is a contest for power and the "resources" are easily identified, but not why the political system should be such as it is. Bailey's method of analysis appears to me fruitful when it is a matter of explaining how Lloyd George ousted Asquith, much less so in the case of General de Gaulle where the different and conflicting concepts of power make the analogy of a game inept, and without any application that I can find in the case of Tikopia. In my view political anthropology should look at the manifestations of power in their cultural settings where their significance is given by the framework of the values of the society: at the paradoxes which enclose those legitimatory concepts such as *mana*, at institutions such as French village war memorials which signify a change of key in the application of political concepts whenever they are invoked, at the phenomenon of religious ecstasy of which Ioan Lewis has discerned the political foundations (Lewis 1971), even at the Mexican drunk's cry which Octavio Paz was able to interpret in terms of the alienation inherited from a colonial past.

The comparative study of power must embrace the whole of social life including the realm of the sacred, which is set apart from the profane by the fact that it claims a privileged position in the balance of human interaction, impervious to the logic of everyday life and endowing with authority those who are cloaked by its aura. And to possess the power that rests upon authority this aura is essential. For established authority, to be effective, must command the motives which spring from beyond the area of calculated stratagems and spoils, from the symbols that are not formulated in conscious statements by their adherents,[18] but remain for them ineffable, living, and unknown.

Bailey's (1969) view of abstraction looks to me much more like reduction not merely in his method in general but specifically when he writes: "Such a situation can only be understood by abstraction: by taking part of it at a time and blanking out the rest and then seeing whether the propositions arrived at will suit or must be modified when we look at another part" (146).

18. The refusal to formulate consciously the reasons for such an attachment was well expressed by one of the visitors to the tomb of de Gaulle: "On vient, c'est tout. Pas besoin de dire pourquoi" (Raphaël 1973).

CHAPTER 3

The place of grace in anthropology*

PROLOGUE

In the introduction to this book we observed that the word "honor" had entered anthropology only in the 1960s and we gave some considerations to account for this, to my mind curious, lacuna. The word "grace" is today in a condition somewhat comparable to "honor" in the 1960s and it is one of the aims of this essay to endow it with the recognition it deserves.

I have found only three authors who have called attention to its existence as a general anthropological concept—briefly only[1]—and none who has undertaken a detailed examination of its logic and potential usage.

---

* "The place of grace in anthropology" was first published in 1992 as a postscript to *Honour and grace in anthropology*, a volume edited by Julian Pitt-Rivers and J.G. Peristiany, and is reproduced in this volume with permission from Cambridge University Press.

1. Hertz (1960: 72); Mauss (1968: 201, 206); Lévi-Strauss (1962: 298): "Le schème du sacrifice consiste en une opération irréversible (la destruction de la victime) afin de déclencher, sur un autre plan, une opération également irréversible (l'octroi de la grâce divine), dont la nécessité résulte de la mise en communication préalable de deux 'récipients' qui ne sont pas au même niveau." Gilsenan (1973) also uses the word when explaining what *baraka* is (33, 35, 76), as do many other Islamists since Westermarck (e.g., Gellner 1973: 40): "it can mean simply 'enough', but it also means plenitude, and above all blessedness manifested among other things in

This, despite the enormous importance of a concept of this order in Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, the huge theological literature on the subject—(surely the anthropology of religion can no more ignore Western theology than the anthropology of law can ignore Western jurisprudence?)—and the fact that a large number of Christian heresies were provoked by disagreements as to the nature of grace, from the Pelagians onwards. But blindness in this matter can hardly be attributed simply to the parochialism of modern university disciplines or the social scientists' distrust of the expertise of the theologians: no anthropologist has to my knowledge asked himself whether there is anything remotely equivalent to grace among the concepts of Buddhism, Hinduism, Shintoism, or Taoism, though the sinologists have used it freely to translate the extensions of the word *fu* (in origin a sacrificial offering, but also, the return of grace, thanks), whether the problem to which the doctrines of grace tender an answer has no echo beyond the religions of the Book, let alone the peoples without writing, or whether grace can be treated as a universal concept or only as an element of Western culture, a question which I asked with regard to "honor" in the introduction to *The fate of Shechem* (Pitt-Rivers 1977).

Personal destiny, with which grace is very much concerned, looms large in the works of Evans-Pritchard, both on Zande witchcraft and on Nuer religion, yet he who favored employing Catholic theological terms as the nearest equivalents to the concepts of the Azande or the Nuer, seems never to have used the word.[2] But these are all petty reasons for astonishment in comparison with the immense importance of the derivatives of grace outside the realms of theology, in the notion of gratuity. (At least gratuity is an abstract, universal, and theoretical concept). Not only is "grace" said before and sometimes after every meal in an Oxford college, I doubt whether any Englishman can get through a single day of his life without saying "thank you" at least a hundred times. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, "Thank" is: "1) Thought (M.E.) [It comes from the same Old Teutonic root as "think"]. 2) Goodwill, graciousness, favor.

prosperity"; Rabinow (1975: 2): "the central symbol of vitality in Moroccan culture", "source of charismatic authority and cornerstone of legitimacy," "the manifestation of God's grace on earth" (25).

2. In fact, however, the Nuer word *muc* which he translates as "God's free gift in return for a sacrifice" (1956: 331) appears to correspond exactly to the sense of "divine grace" as Lévi-Strauss used it in the passage quoted in note 1, which was largely based on Evans-Pritchard's ethnography.

3) Grateful thought, gratitude. 4) Expression of the grateful acknowledgement of a benefit or favor."

Is not "thank you" in the "hundred-times-a-day" sense, simply the recognition and acceptance of a gratuitous gesture? The romance languages connect the notion rather more explicitly with grace: French, *merci*; Spanish, *gracias*; Italian, *grazie*, etc. It may be that this notion is not evoked when saying thanks because the Old Teutonic root (thank), used in casual conversation is not recognized as having anything to do with it. The romance root (*gratus*), which recalls the word "grace," is reserved for more formal occasions when gratitude may really be felt. Yet it remains an enigma that the notion of grace should have escaped the anthropologists for so long. This is only the more remarkable in view of the attention they have given, in recent decades, to the problem of reciprocity. Can one explain systems of reciprocity adequately without considering the possibility of non-reciprocity, i.e. gratuity? Reciprocity is the basis of all sociation, in the form of systems of exchange, of women and of food, of labor and services, of hospitality and of violence. Anthropologists attach importance, rightly, to the detail of personal conduct in their understanding of human relations. And are not thanks the common coinage of encounters between persons? Yet what do they imply? What is their logic? Not even Goffman nor the ethnomethodologists have told us.

This oversight might be accounted for simply by a regrettable tendency among those of a functionalist turn of mind to jump to conclusions regarding the significance of human actions on the basis of expressed intentions, without examining their mode of expression; to reduce each institution to "what it amounts to" or "what it does" in terms of practical results, ignoring its cultural roots, thinking that there is nothing more to be known about the culture of a people than what they themselves consciously recognize. Such accusations cannot be leveled at more than a minority of the profession today. That grace should have been ignored for so long is still puzzling.

It is true one does not think of theology every time one says "thank you," or wonder why the word "grace" and its derivatives have such diverse connotations in different settings: why grace is engraved on English coins (Elizabeth II REG. D.G.) as well as said before a meal, why it is used in writing to a duke as well as bestowed on the congregation at the end of Matins, why it is invoked to applaud a dancer as well as to explain the success of a politician, why it names the three pagan goddesses concerned with personal endowment as well as voluntary embellishments added to a musical score, why it is left on the café table for the

waitress as well as implored of God in the hope of salvation. One is justified in wondering whether it is still the same word or has become through the wear and tear of time a virtual homonym (Pitt-Rivers 1967a). Yet this semantic richness does not mean that there is no association between the different senses.

The meanings which a single word has in different contexts, or had in the forgotten past, are guides to the premises which underlie its daily conscious usage, but daily usage is indifferent to contradictions arising between its various senses, and leaves them to be sorted out at the level of action. (This is the case of honor also). Thus it is not necessary to analyze a word in order to know how to use it correctly.

Moreover, the implications of the concept differ from place to place; expressions of gratitude are wont to follow different rules of etiquette in different social milieux, as in different cultures, and it is only by reflecting on all potential differences that one comes to understand the concept as a whole, and I maintain that grace is a whole. Thanks can in some situations be interpreted as a reluctance to pay what the recipient expects as his due; in others, on the contrary, to thank is to recognize indebtedness and represents a promise to return the gift or service in the future. (Such cultures might be described as "Maussian," for they have already understood "the necessity to return presents," as Mauss put it in the subtitle of his great essay on the gift). But the etiquette concerning the return of gifts contains more subtleties than Mauss explained.

The only general rule that can be cited is that grace is always something extra, over and above "what counts," what is obligatory or predictable; it belongs on the register of the extraordinary (hence its association with the sacred). Nevertheless, whenever a favor has been done the return of grace is always expected, whether in the form of a material manifestation (regardless of the material value of that which is returned) or merely in verbal expression.

However, there are also conventional formulae for the acknowledgement of thanks which follow the same principle in all European languages. They consist curiously enough in denying that a favor has been done. Hence in Spanish *de nada*, in Italian *de nulla* and in French *de rien* (though this is considered undistinguished; it is more elegant to say *c'était un plaisir* or *je vous en prie* as in Italian *prego*, in German *Bitte*). In English "Don't mention it," but in American English "It was a pleasure" is the most explicit form. The denial is not in fact the denial of the sentiment which inspired the act of grace but rather that any obligation has been incurred. It is a way of asserting that the grace was real, that the favor was indeed gratuitous. It is a guarantee of the purity of the motives of the

gratifier, a way of saying (as we shall see below) you *owe* nothing for this favor, it is an act of grace. Without wishing to sound cynical, I must nevertheless point out that by, so to speak, stressing the gratuitous nature of the gesture by denying that any obligation has been incurred, it not only maintains the purity of the motives of the gratifier, it maintains his moral supremacy, which is not to be modified simply by verbal thanks but leaves him a creditor, should the occasion ever arise where a more serious return of grace is possible.

The modern tendency in England to say "thank you" when no thanks are conceivably due, almost as a pause-word when one does not know how otherwise to bring the conversation to a close, appears to me to impoverish the notion and things have gone so far that it has now become common custom in commercial airplanes to use the phrase to terminate an emission over the intercom system, indicating thereby that the unknown, unseen, uninvited speaker has finished what he had it in mind to announce and is switching off. He thinks perhaps that he is giving thanks for the attention that has been paid to his message. But little does he know it when there is an anthropologist in the cabin who responds to this proffered hypocritical gesture of grace by cursing the interruption of his reading or his snooze. (A curse is, of course, an expression of negative grace—like witchcraft as we shall later see—and on that account alone is worthy of attention.)

Such excessive use of the catch-phrase of thanks does not always ingratiate the thanker and among the simple folk of southern Europe to thank when no thanks are due was commonly regarded as "uncouth" behavior and raised suspicions as to the speaker's ability to recognize when gratitude *was* due.[3]

This devaluation of thanks, encountered in British or American airliners is, no doubt, inspired by the feeling that some attempt at sociation is due between the crew and the passengers in their charge, even if one cannot determine what: a wave of the hand or a wink suffice in some contexts to establish it, but the trouble with intercom systems is that you cannot actually see your interlocutor. Reciprocity is the essence of sociation, as has been said, whether in mechanical or organic solidarity, whether in exchanging salutations or in business and whether the return be immediate or protracted; it is, as it were, the cement that

3. An anthropologist's wife was reproved by her friends in the village where he worked for saying "thank you" too often. Did she not realize, they asked, that you don't thank friends for petty services; for to do so destroys the *confianza* which exists between friends. You should take such minor services for granted to show *confianza* (William Kavanagh, personal communication).

holds any society together, for it establishes relations between persons; once you have exchanged something, you are related. The often meaningless salutations on the path have no other function than this (Firth 1973b).

Exchange is not merely an economic fact making the division of labor possible and enabling peoples of differing ecology and cultural achievement to make their products available to each other and thus extend the potentialities of their lifestyle, it is above all a social fact, for, as a principle, it governs much more than the exchange of "useful goods" and functions: one can exchange pleasures, woes, secrets, women, insults, vengeance, hospitality, conversation, stories or songs, and above all gifts, but the economic justification for exchange is, as often as not, subsidiary or lacking altogether, even in the exchange of goods, as in those Somali marriages, studied by L.M. Lewis (1961: 139), in which camels, paid as bride-price, return as part of the bride's dowry to their original owners. Yet morally they are no longer the same camels. For something of the giver always accompanies the object exchanged, and if in the first place the camels were exchanged for the bride, in the second they testify to the rights of her kinsmen in regard to her children.

That the principle of exchange reigns over many more aspects of society than the economic has been recognized ever since Mauss' essay on the gift, and Lévi-Strauss later applied the principle to kinship and marriage, stressing the importance of the groups between whom exchange takes place. This was the point of departure for the structural study of kinship. Yet an aspect that has attracted less attention is that which determines the ways in which, and the extent to which, reciprocity is evaluated and equivalence is established. In the elementary structures of kinship there is no problem: one woman is fair exchange for another. But in other forms of exchange the degree of specificity varies; one man's labor is known in advance not to be as productive as another's, even though this can rarely be admitted openly, yet when it is a matter of exchanging goods their relative values are discussed freely. This is the basis of all bargaining and indeed of commerce itself. But this is not all: the mythology of our times assumes that agreement as to economic equivalence is the condition of all exchange, and to establish this, some kind of estimation must be made. Yet, in fact, such equivalence is necessary only if the aim is commercial, not if it is moral, for example in the field of religion, as the parable of the widow's mite made quite explicit.

There are also reciprocal relations which do not involve a contract of any sort, nor any estimation of value, for they are between participants whose interests

are solidary (in the legal sense that all responsibilities are shared and all benefits are held in common). Nothing is specified by way of a return. The nature of the relationship suffices to determine what is due and when. This is what Meyer Fortes called "kinship amity," "where there is no mine nor thine but only ours." The basic distinction between the parties involved, which is essential to the notion of commerce, is missing and in the field of reciprocity we must therefore differentiate between relations of equivalent exchange and relations of amity, between contract and benevolence, between precise commitments, entailing estimations of equivalence, and mutual aid whensoever needed.

Yet beyond the realms of kinship amity where all is held in common and without entering the field of exchange as the law defines it ("a mutual grant of equal interests, the one in consideration of the other," Blackstone in O.E.D.), it is possible to speak of the exchange of favors. Both favors and contracts involve reciprocity, but contractual reciprocity, the basis of trade, is not the same thing as the reciprocity of the heart. The latter escapes the attention of economists (and fiscal authorities, though they have introduced "gift tax" in the attempt to frustrate the evasion of other more onerous taxes). The ties of kinship or of friendship, the hidden incentive, the act of forbearance, the incalculable benefits of favorable decisions, the aim to please, evade the notice of both, for they cannot be evaluated, yet at the micro-level that concerns the anthropologist they are primordial, the very tissue of social relations, and in the end they bear fruit at the macro-level of society and distort the calculations of those who suppose they can be ignored.

Hence, for example, the problem of "corruption" in Latin America has received much comment, especially from foreign analysts who have tended to deplore it as a vice in the administration, if not in "the Latin-American character." The *mordida*, literally "the bite" (and the word is used in syndical affairs in the United States in quite the same sense) is sometimes blamed for the various ills of the Mexican economy; it is indeed quite current that those empowered by the State to give their assent to the operations which are subject to legislative control expect to be thanked for giving it, for personal relations remain personal in Mexico regardless of the legal function of the participants. This "customary expectation of the return of favors" may be reprehensible from the viewpoint of modern Anglo-Saxon values, yet what could be more natural than the principle from which the *mordida* springs: that a favor requires to be returned, and all the more imperatively when the possibility is open that it may be withdrawn if reciprocity is not forthcoming. In Mexico, as in most of the

non-European world, the values of the heart are rated higher than those of the law, and the confrontation between the two leads sometimes to anomalies, as in the case of that Governor of the State of Chiapas who ruined his political career by refusing to accept *mordidas*. Apart from the moral pretensions of his stance which were resented by those he governed, it was felt that such a man could not be trusted in personal relations. Moreover, is it not also frequently the case in Europe that the values of the heart take precedence over legal and economic considerations? The example of neighborly cooperation between small peasant farmers will be examined below. Indeed, wherever the idea of gratuity appears, contracts, calculation, and legal obligations step into the back seat and the counter-principle of grace takes over. Yet the back seat is never empty and from the moment that grace reigns over the order of the day, the clever ones start calculating the odds and exploiting the situation to their advantage. Hence it comes as no surprise to learn that there are plenty of people in Mexico who strongly resent having to give a *mordida* to an official who is already paid to do his job, yet if they are not quixotic they give it all the same. But since the servants of the state are poorly paid in Mexico it is difficult to see what advantage anyone would have in entering its service if he could not look forward to making something on the side. Thus, as things stand at present, those who require the State's services are those who pay for them. What could appear more equitable? However, applied at a higher level, of government, rather than of petty local administration, these principles produce a rather different result: the concentration of power in the hands of a political class whose existence is not recognized by the ideology of the State. Thus, behind the façade of administrative law the personal policies of the administrators reign and the values of the heart are exploited by their calculations of how to increase their fortune or their power.

There are, then, two parallel modes of conduct, ideally, even if they are not always easily distinguished, which correspond to the old opposition between the heart and the head: that which is felt and that which is known, the subjective and the objective vision of the world, the mysterious and the rational, the sacred and the profane. They are governed, respectively, by the principle of grace and by the principle of law, that is to say, predictable regularity, as well as justice and the law which impose order in human affairs—from which pardon (grace) authorizes a departure. Under the heading of "grace" it is possible to group all the phenomena that evade the conscious reasoned control of conduct.

ETYMOLOGY: THEOLOGICAL ORIGINS AND EXTENSIONS

Let us look then first of all at the notion of grace in general before dealing with its different aspects. From the Greek root *Χάρις* (Charis), we get charity, charisma, Eucharist, and so forth; from the Latin, derived from it, gracious, gratitude, congratulations, etc. The origin of the word is religious; it is a theological idea which has found various spheres of extension outside the realm of theology. Benveniste (1969: 199) traces it to an Indo-Iranian root: the Sanskrit *gir*, a song or hymn of praise or of grace, or to give thanks. He notes also that, like all other economic notions, its economic sense derives from the totality of human relations or relations with gods rather than the contrary. Gratuity is the core of the notion, that which is undertaken not in order to obtain a return but to give pleasure.

We must certainly start with the theological concept of grace, for it appears that the structure of the religious notion is able to account for the elaboration of the popular senses, though whether popular theology is derived from the reasoning of the learned or whether the latter have based their doctrines on the popular premises which they absorbed in infancy—an argument that has raged for a century with regard to other aspects of culture—is an issue that we need not raise now, but it is worth observing that, unlike honor, grace seems never to have quite forgotten its etymological roots. Without entering into the subtleties of the numerous varieties of grace and the excessively optimistic or pessimistic doctrines which have been condemned as heresy from time to time, we can give, as its starting point, the pure gratuitous gift of God.

Louis Ott (1955) defines it as "a free gift of God unmerited by men" ("un don gratuit de la part de Dieu et immérité de la part de l'homme"). According to St. Thomas Aquinas it is especially the gift of the Holy Spirit, but it is also, in the Pauline view, associated particularly with Christ whose death redeemed us from original sin. As pardon obtained through Him, it is the key to salvation.

It develops within us as a *habitus*,[4] an acquired disposition to cooperate with the will of God, and this involves human will also, upon which the will of God operates, in St. Augustine's opinion. It is a supernatural accident created in our

4. The term has been borrowed by the philosophers and, finally, by the social sciences. For its utilization in the latter, see Bourdieu (1987: 23): "a system of acquired schemas functioning practically as categories of perception and assessment or as classificatory principles as well as the organising principles of action."

nature in such a manner as to adapt it to divine life, in the Thomist doctrine. Ott, again, says (1955: 314): "The unfathomable mystery of the doctrine of grace is to be found in the intimate collaboration and reciprocal intervention of divine power and human freedom. All the controversies and heresies regarding grace have their point of departure in this." ("Dans la collaboration intime et l'intervention réciproque de la puissance divine et de la liberté humaine se trouve le mystère insondable de la doctrine de la Grâce. Toutes les controverses et hérésies relatives à la grâce ont là leur point de départ.") And (1955: 348ff.) he discusses the relations between grace and freedom.

It is clear that the discussions center upon the role of human will which is insufficient by itself to attain salvation, but which cannot be dispensed with without falling into determinism. If individual will is the essence of honor, the essence of grace is the will of God, which necessarily restricts the individual's will in some degree, but the attainment of grace can only be achieved with the cooperation of human will since God requires his beneficence to be returned; the rites of the Catholic Church require the appropriate intentions on the part of the beneficiary in order to be valid. The Catholic solution to the paradox of theodicy resides in this mysterious conjunction of the will of God and the will of man.

Grace is connected with the will in another way also, for it is associated with purity. To be "in a state of grace" is to be sinless, to be redeemed, through confession, from the state of sin into which our all too human will has led us. To be in a condition to receive grace one must be cleansed of sinfulness, not only of original sin, of which one was discharged by the grace of the Holy Spirit at baptism, but of the sins which result from a will inadequately accorded to the will of God. Yet such provisions are necessarily insufficient to assure the attainment of grace, since the will of God on which this depends is by definition arbitrary. On account of this unpredictability, grace comes in popular usage to mean good fortune, that which cannot be foreseen.

Benveniste (1969), etymologist rather than theologian, discusses grace in less mystical terms, easier to grasp for one who is not versed in theology: "The Latin words show that, in origin, the procedure consists in giving service for nothing, without reimbursement; this literally gracious or gratuitous service provokes in return the manifestation that is called 'acknowledgment'." ("Les mots latins montrent que le procès, à l'origine, consiste à rendre un service pour rien, sans contre-partie; ce service littéralement 'gracieux' provoque en retour la manifestation que nous appelons 'reconnaissance.'") And later:

> Everything that refers to economic notions is tied to much vaster representations which bring into play the totality of human relations' with divinities. Over and above the normal circuit of exchanges, that which one gives in order to obtain a counterpart, there is a second circuit, that of bounty and acknowledgment which is given without any consideration of a return of that which is offered, as an act of thanks.
>
> (Tout ce qui se rapporte à des notions économiques est lié à des représentations beaucoup plus vastes qui mettent en jeu l'ensemble des relations humaines ou des relations avec des divinités. Au-dessus du circuit normal des échanges, de ce qu'on donne pour obtenir—il y a un deuxième circuit, celui du bienfait et de la reconnaissance, ce qui est donné sans esprit de retour, de ce qui est offert pour "remercier.")

Thus he distinguishes clearly between the two "circuits" of reciprocity, that which is properly called "exchange," an interchange of interests, and that which is inspired by a generous impulse, good will, gratuity, which demands only a reciprocity of sentiment. The former, subject to contract, can be simultaneous or protracted over a specified time. The latter, an exchange of grace, is simultaneous only in the handshake or the act of embracing, and normally requires an initiatory gesture, followed by a response, as in hospitality, or the return of favors. On account of its gratuitous nature there is no need, as in contractual exchange, to determine in advance what the value of the return shall be, nor when it shall be made, since none is envisaged, even though it may be hopefully expected. Whether any is to come depends not upon mutual agreement but upon the wishes of the recipient. The word "boon" expresses the notion of gratuity better than any other in English, for it is both a prayer, a request for a favor and the favor granted, a blessing and an unpaid service, such as ploughing or shearing, for a neighbor.

Though grace is a free gift of God, unpredictable, arbitrary, and mysterious, there are nonetheless means of obtaining it: first of all through the sacraments. This is the main function of the rites of the Church, indeed of any church. Sacrifice is always an attempt to embark upon an exchange of grace with the Deity. The offering invites a return-gift of grace, the friendship of God, as it has been called. The Eucharist, the commensality of the mass, confession, prayer, and penance, the usage of "gratiferous" substances: incense, corn, wine, oil, and salt and water too, are all employed in the enterprise of obtaining grace, whether

for the salvation of the souls of the faithful or their material prosperity. But the passage of grace is never guaranteed, even by the state of grace, the purity of intentions or the correct administration of the rite, because grace is a mystery which remains in the free gift of God.

If God is the source of grace, this does not mean that humans cannot generate it, and dispense it to others. The dictionaries' lists of meanings provide an abundance of examples, which we can leave the reader to examine at his leisure. The central core remains always the notion of gratuity, on the social as on the theological plane, and the essential opposition is to that which is rational, predictable, calculated, legally or even morally obligatory, contractually binding, creating a right to reciprocity. Grace is a "free" gift, a favor, an expression of esteem, of the desire to please, a product of the arbitrary will, human or divine, an unaccountable love. Hence it is gratuitous in yet another sense: that of being not answerable to coherent reasoning, unjustifiable, as when an insult is said to be gratuitous, or when a payment is made, over and above that which is due.

Thus it ranges from the tip left on the table for the waitress to the "golden handshake" of the company director who has lost his company a fortune through his bad judgment and swollen head, obstinacy or plain idleness, but who cannot be permitted to depart unrewarded for his "long and loyal service," lest he do the company yet more damage by revealing its secrets. The tip displays the principles involved; it is called "a small gratuity" in self-consciously pompous language and this corresponds to our definition, for it is a sum paid over and above what is owed, whose amount is "left to the appreciation of the client" as it used to be put on French restaurant menus, until, in blatant contempt of the very principle of grace, it became a compulsory charge of ten, and later fifteen percent. But the principle of grace is not so easily dismissed; the attempt to rationalize the system of payment and do away with the gratuity was unsuccessful, for no sooner had the clients become used to being charged more, than the custom crept in to leave a small tip extra in order to maintain their status relationship with those who served them.

George M. Foster's essay, "The analysis of envy" (1972) attributes the tip to the need to assuage the envy which a server might be supposed to feel towards those whom he serves, rather as the envy of witches is sometimes bought off by a gesture of gratuity, and there is certainly some substance to this explanation, but as a freely chosen expression of goodwill, the tip does no more than underline the absence of a contractual obligation, the opposition between that which is owed and that which is given and hence the superior social status of the giver, sealed by this petty gesture of patronization. For, if the offer of favor between

equals awaits a return of grace, between unequals if it cannot be returned it can also mean a claim to superior status, and can thus even be resented by a person who does not wish to admit this claim.

In somewhat the same way a payment made under duress bears the opposite meaning in terms of honor to a payment made at the instigation only of the man who pays and who thus, provided it be accepted, accretes honor by his bounty. The economic result is identical in the two cases, but the social significance is the opposite. The man who is forced to pay is humiliated because he is shown to be inferior or dominated, the bountiful man demonstrates his superiority, his dominance, even though he may have been manipulated into giving his bounty. In each case the superior is the man who apparently imposes his will. Equally a gift may honor the recipient as an expression of sympathy and admiration or it may put him down if it can be interpreted to imply that he is in need of help. An excess of hospitality can humiliate as much as an insufficiency. For honor looks always up, pity, the poor relation of grace, looks down, but it is not always easy to tell which way people are looking; the same gesture can mean either homage or contempt, and it can even imply a measure of both simultaneously.

The techniques of begging illustrate this ambiguity well: they range from those who, sacrificing all shame, attempt to inspire pity by a display of their misery to those who propose a very expensive seat at a charity dinner they are professionally employed to organize. Who is helping whom? Is the donor of alms helping the beggar to stay alive, or is the recipient, of priestly caste perhaps, offering the donor the opportunity to acquire grace by becoming associated, through this act of charity, with the divinity? The ambivalence, so often encountered in the analysis of honor, as of grace, derives precisely from the possibility of giving different interpretations of the moral value attaching to an economically identical transaction. To offer a lady flowers is to pay her homage, to honor her—the donor has sacrificed to her the cost of the flowers, but she is none the richer, save in prestige—but if he offers her diamonds, she may be justified in wondering what are his intentions and whether she should accept. What exactly is the favor he hopes to receive in return?

GRACE, POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE, IN GRAZALEMA

The connotations of grace are as varied as those of honor, the more so in Spanish than in English, it appears; for this reason, and also because I have previously

examined the concept of honor in Andalusia (Pitt-Rivers 1977), I shall deal with grace as it operates in that part of Spain where its logic, thanks to its richness, can be seen more clearly. The variations in the daily use of grace, as of honor, distinguish different national cultures, and to some extent regions and classes as well, while the theological variants are matters of doctrine rather than usage and depend upon individual thinkers, cults, and heresies—and historical periods.

Let us see then how the word *gracia* is used in the everyday life of a small Andalusian town, Grazalema (Pitt-Rivers 1954), starting with its role in popular theology. It figures in the subjectivity of the townsmen and, above all, townswomen as a state of grace, forgiveness subsequent to confession, the achievement of atonement which makes a person eligible to receive divine grace through the sacraments, or in answer to prayers. It is the essence of redemption through baptism; the rite of baptism assures the entry of a newborn child into the religious, that is to say, the human community. It expunges the sin of Adam through the application of the water, the salt, and the chrism, the unguent vehicle of grace which figures also in the last rites. It establishes the tie of spiritual affinity between the god-child and the god-parents who give the child its name. A person's first name is sometimes called his *gracia*. The godparents, *padrinos*, are also called *padres de gracia*, spiritual parents or parents of the Christian name, in opposition to natural parents whose duties towards their children stand in marked contrast to those of the god-parents. The tie of spiritual affinity still exists in the popular view, with all the obligations of respect and the usage of the third person in speech between the *compadres* (parents and god-parents in relation to each other), despite the recent abolition of this tie in the dogma of the Roman Catholic (but not the Orthodox) Church (Pitt-Rivers 1976).

The grace of God is obtained through other sacraments, and prayers are offered to God and to the saints, above all to the various manifestations of the Holy Virgin, for their intercession to obtain divine favor in the form of personal advantages, cures, or miracles. Promises (*promesas*) were made to reciprocate the favor, if the prayers were answered, by wearing a robe recalling that of the image of the saint who had obtained the miracle or by performing a penance such as bearing a wooden cross, going barefoot or on knees during the processions in the celebration of Holy Week. The relationship with the saints is similar to that in Sicily described by Maria Pia Di Bella in her contribution to this volume (1992).[5]

5. All mentions of "this volume" are references to *Honor and grace in anthropology* (1992), in which this essay originally appeared. *Ed.*

Grace, like honor, is not at all the same thing for both sexes. While masculine honor is a matter of precedence in the first place and the man of honor strives to establish his name in the forefront of his group, the honor of women is rather a matter of virtue and sexual purity. The distinction is clearly marked in Sicily under the titles of "Name" and "Blood." The first is active and positive, a matter of attaining or inhering status and prestige or, in the plebeian community, the respect due to an honorable member. The second is negative and passive, a matter of avoiding any action that might stain the reputation of the family. Male honor is something to be won, increased, and defended against a rival; female honor is something to be conserved and protected from the evil tongues of the envious.

Grace is rather the reverse of masculine honor which depends upon individual will and ambition and this aligns it with female honor. In the first place women have, as it were, a prior claim to grace, not merely on religious grounds (they are more active in religious practice than men), but in the attribution of it in most of its forms. Aesthetic grace is purely feminine: men are not expected to have grace of movement, though they may dance with grace, and professional dancers are commonly assumed to be effeminate.

The *curanderas* (curers), also called *sabias* (wise women), possess an individual grace which comes to them from the saint of their devotion and enables them to cure through the grace in their hand and the performance of ritual gestures (signs of the cross on various parts of the patient's body), anointment with blessed oil, and prayers, muttered rather than declaimed because addressed to the divine powers rather than to the patient or the audience. The whole rite bears a general resemblance to baptism or to coronation, but the divinities to whom the prayers are addressed show the rite to be anything but orthodox Christianity. They include, apart from Jesus Christ and the Virgin Mary (in the manifestation which is the particular devotion of the *sabia*), the holy salt, addressed as a divine personage ("Salt, Salt, they call you salt, but I call you Holy Salt ... "), the Seven Lions, Venus, and Astarte, and others of an equally heterodox character. Aided by the holy oil, the evil leaves the patient's body and enters the arm of the curer who endures the pain for the next twenty-four hours or so.

Were a *sabia* to accept a gift of money in recompense for the cure she had performed, she would immediately lose her grace, for it belongs to God and would be withdrawn if she were to use it to obtain material gain. In return for her grace she can accept only symbols of grace, blessed candles to burn in front

of the Virgin or holy oil, for she is operating upon that second circuit in which only grace can be returned for grace.

Given the ambivalence of magical powers, a general phenomenon in anthropology, it is not surprising that the first people to be suspected of witchcraft were the *sabias*. Could they not use their grace for evil ends also? Nothing appeared more plausible, for just as cursing is the reverse of blessing, so magical damage is the reverse of magical healing. It suffices to invert the intention to produce the opposite result. Witches are commonly credited with the power to inflict damage on man or beast, to do love-magic, to foretell the future, to drive men mad, etc., in brief to operate upon the health or sentiments of their victims.

Witchcraft everywhere depends upon envy, the will to do harm. But to do harm to an enemy is quite legitimate conduct; it is part of the game to take vengeance against the man who has damaged you or your reputation in order to recuperate your honor, "restore it to a state of grace." Witchcraft, however, is the attempt to take vengeance, not openly, but by covert dishonorable means, negative grace, invoking the aid of the Devil. For this reason the curer who enjoyed the greatest popularity in Grazalema never tired of repeating that she did "nothing but the things of God" and gave every outward sign of her piety. In brief, witchcraft can here, as anywhere else moreover, be defined as a *habitus* of negative grace. Just as positive grace is opposed to reasoned empirical means of doing good, so negative grace is opposed to overt vengeance and employs the supernatural. The grace of the *sabias*, the source of their magical power, was something inherent in their bodies, like their sex. And it must be added that the female sex produces maleficent manifestations at the time of the period. Other forms of involuntary evil attributed to certain women were the Evil Eye and that quality, called *calio* in Grazalema, which makes them permanently dangerous as though they were menstruating. (A similar belief is found elsewhere in the region, though under different names, which all however recall the notion of heat: Pitt-Rivers 1954, where a more complete account is given).

Witches can in fact be of either sex, though in Grazalema their techniques are totally distinct. Women cure by their grace which comes from God and if they bewitch it is, implicitly, by a misuse of that grace which has power even when perverted to nefarious ends, rather as the black mass, by inverting the symbols, uses the powers of religion to accomplish the work of the Devil.

Men have no grace in this sense; they cure and they bewitch not by the mysterious power of grace but by techniques which are supposedly rational and depend upon knowledge (though this is not general throughout Spain; men

who cure by grace are to be found in the northern half of the country and as far south as the provinces of Alicante and Caceres). Thus apart from the practitioners of "scientific medicine," doctors and chemists, all of them men, those of folk medicine were limited to bone-setters and herbalists (the latter could also be women). The techniques of witchcraft practiced by men consisted of spells, and above all of spells to invoke the aid of the Devil through reading a book of magic. Since poltergeists were the work of the Devil, they were necessarily caused by "reading" and consequently by men only, though their victims were all women. Thus the distinction established by Evans-Pritchard between witchcraft and sorcery with regard to the ethnography of the Azande was exemplified in Grazalema, with the additional rider that witches were all, and by definition, female, while sorcerers were all male. None of the *sabias* knew how to read. Newspapers and notices on the municipal notice board were the main reading matter, that is to say, reading concerned the male sphere of relations with the administration and news of the outside world. Hence reading was an essentially male activity. News regarding the inner sphere of the community was passed by word of mouth at the fountain whither every household had to send a member every day to wash clothing if they wished to keep up with events.

Other manifestations of grace are accorded to people on different grounds. The signs of grace are various: the seventh child of a seventh child or, according to Brenan (1957: 99), the ninth child of a woman who has only male children, those born on a Friday, especially Good Friday, etc. The signs of grace are not confined to women, but they tend to reinforce its connection with the female sex: to begin with, in popular theology the source of grace was the Virgin Mary, who is announced as such in the Ave Maria. Hence all women named Maria have grace and this accounts for half the female population, for they are named after a specific manifestation of the Virgin, and are generally called, for abbreviation, only by the name of that manifestation. Hence Dolores, Carmen, Luz, Pilar, Mercedes, Milagros, Imaculada, and the place names of her appearance, Lourdes, Fatima, etc., are all in fact Maria. But in any case it is said that all women are Mary simply by virtue of their sex. Good luck is also grace, prosperity on earth as well as salvation in the hereafter, for they are all given by God. In this sense it corresponds to *baraka*, as in a number of others which the reader may have noted.

"To have grace" also refers to the possession of natural "gifts" for they too are given by God (in classical mythology they were given by the Three Graces). Grace in this sense is the power to operate upon others, pleasing or amusing

them or compelling their admiration and assent, hence it means not only grace in movement, as in English, but charm, wit, humor, a knack for something which others may not succeed in acquiring. Thus it is located in parts of the body: in facial expression, in the tongue, in the head, or in the hand. As such it is worth more than mere beauty (though beauty also is grace in the sense of being an unaccountable favor of nature) because it is more active than beauty which is passive and therefore less compelling than charm and wit. This is made clear in an Andalusian *copla* (popular verse form), put into the mouth of a highly self-confident young woman (which I translate very freely):

> Mi novio tiene una novia
> que es más bonita que yo
> Mas bonita, si, será
> Pero mas graciosa, no!
>
> My boyfriend has a girlfriend
> Who is prettier than me
> Prettier, yes, she may be
> But nothing like as much fun
> [literally: but more *graciosa*, no!]

The greater value of grace as opposed to beauty is a commonplace of the folklore, underlined in rhymes such as: "La suerte de la fea, la guapa la desea" (The luck of the plain girl, the pretty girl envies her). As charm, the power to please, it is as mysterious as religious grace, and like this it belongs to the above, as a gift of God. To lack grace in this sense is to be *pesado*, literally heavy, hence boring. As in the work of Simone Weil, weight is the antithesis of grace — which contravenes all laws including the law of gravity.

As an unpredictable boon, "the grace of God" is used to refer to sunshine in the north of Spain and to rain in the south.

It is from this general sense of grace as the power to operate upon the will of others that Max Weber derived his conception of charisma, an extraordinary power of personal leadership. He treated it "as a property attributed to great innovating personalities who disrupt traditionally and rationally-legally legitimated systems of authority and who establish, or aspire to establish, a system of authority claiming to be legitimated by the direct experience of divine grace." (Shils 1968: 386).

It should be noted, however, that Weber did not conceive of charisma, as popular usage does today, uniquely as a type of political power, but as a much more general principle of social and cultural organization related to individual freedom and innovation. A "distinctive moral fervor" lies at the root of the attachment to charismatic authority which contrasts with submissive attitudes to traditional authority and sober calculation with regard to it. The general opposition between the ordinary and rational, on the one hand, and charisma, which is the essence of grace, on the other, assimilates the latter to the sacred, but at the same time the rejection of formalized forms may inspire "a fear and hence an opposition to the sacred itself'" (Eisenstadt 1968: xviii).

But Weber recognized that charismatic and traditional authority come together, within the framework of social life, in "the routinization of charisma." In the same way the routinization imposed by the rules governing the rituals of the Church does not suffice to negate the charismatic power of their sacred origins. Hence the grace, inherent in the royal rituals described by Lafages (1992), endows a very traditional form of government with the moral fervor associated with innovative forms, but, thanks to its fundamental ambiguity, it can equally well be acquired by rebels and used against sacralized royal authority, for, as Weber stressed, charisma contains destructive as well as creative tendencies. Here we have the solution to the paradox that, despite the superlative moral value of the monarch's coronation at Reims, rebellion against the legitimized royal ruler was always possible from time to time, for no ritual can guarantee the passage of grace. This ambiguity, admirably discussed by Eisenstadt, which its opposition to rationality engenders in charisma, is all the more striking in the instance of the *baraka* acquired by the successor to the Sultanate of Morocco in Jamous' essay (1992): it is his *de facto* success in defeating his rivals in war that provides proof of the new Sultan's *baraka*, yet his charisma becomes routinized once he has succeeded to the throne. In such circumstances "the dichotomy between the charismatic and the orderly routine of social organization seems to be obliterated" (Eisenstadt 1968: xxi).

The routinization, not to say the abuse, of grace reaches its peak in the formulae of social etiquette. In Spain "Your Mercy" (*Su Merced*) was used formerly as a form of address to a person of high status, just as in English "Your Grace" is the title of a Duke or Archbishop (Pitt-Rivers 1974). Those who come immediately after the sovereign, "His Gracious Majesty," the source of all earthly grace, as of all honor (in whose gift is pardon, for he, alone, is above the law) participate, through their proximity to him, in his gracious nature. The title of

Your Grace was also used formerly to royalty itself and the association was still extant in Shakespeare's day: "to have his daughter come into grace," i.e., marry into the Royal Family (*A Winter's Tale* IV.iii).

To summarize, in the sense of benefaction, gift, demonstration of benevolence, concession, graciousness, pardon, or indulgence, grace is inspired by the notion of something over and above what is due, economically, legally, or morally; it is neither foreseeable, predictable by reasoning, nor subject to guarantee. It stands outside the system of reciprocal services. It cannot be owed or won, specified in advance or merited. Hence it can mean remission of a sin or a debt, mercy, pardon, or forgiveness and thus it is opposed to justice and the law. As gratitude it is the only return-gift that conserves the nature of the initial prestation. You cannot pay for a favor in any way or it ceases to be one, you can only thank, though on a later occasion you can demonstrate gratitude by making an equally "free" gift in return. Like hospitality, which is a manifestation of it, or like violence, its contrary, a demonstration of malevolence, it can only be exchanged against its own kind (Jamous 1981). To attempt to reply to violence by invoking the sanctions of the law is behavior not approved by the code of honor (Pitt-Rivers 1977).

Grace, then, allows of no payment, no explanation, and requires no justification. It is not just illogical, but opposed to logic, a counter-principle, unpredictable as the hand of God, "an unfathomable mystery" which stretches far beyond the confines of theology. The opposition is clear and applies in every case: grace is opposed to calculation, as chance is to the control of destiny, as the free gift is to the contract, as the heart is to the head, as the total commitment is to the limited responsibility, as thanks are to the stipulated counterpart, as the notion of community is to that of alterity, as *Gemeinschaft* is to *Gesellschaft*, as kinship amity is to political alliance, as the open check is to the audited account.

Of course accounts are kept in fact much more often than is admitted, even if they are no more precise than a vague tally of favors, made in recollection. A lady of the bourgeoisie of southwestern France remarked to intimates that she was terribly behindhand with her invitations; she "owed" God knows how many dinners! But the peasants of the same region never admit to keeping an account of the favors they have done in lending a helping hand to their neighbors, and one cannot help wondering whether it was not once so in England also, given the expressions "boon-ploughing" and "boon-shearing."

GRATUITY AS INSURANCE IN RURAL SOUTHWESTERN FRANCE

It is well-known that traditional small farmers in Europe practice a system of reciprocal service in agriculture and in general within the social life of the community. In fact there is great variety in the form this takes. The first anthropological account of such a system, in western Ireland, was given by Arensberg and Kimball (1949). "Cooring" was a relationship in which "friends" exchanged help on their farms. But the authors discovered that to be classed as a "friend" one had to have a tie of kinship. Those who had no kinsman in the community had no friend with whom to cooperate. A more recent account of another such system was provided by Sandra Ott (1981) who studied a French Basque sheep-farming village where the ties of neighborship are defined in terms not of kinship but of space. The roles of "first neighbor" and of the other "neighbors" depend upon the geographical position of their farms.

In "Magnac," the name I gave to a village in the Quercy in southwestern France, neighborly cooperation depends upon a system of undifferentiated exchange, based upon the moral principle that neighbors must help each other. When asked to lend a hand one must, if at all possible, agree to do so, and under certain conditions help may even be proposed unrequested. This helping hand is lent without payment, without any reciprocity envisaged, and if the helper is asked what he is owed, he replies "nothing at all"; he explains that he has come to lend a hand in a quite disinterested spirit, because "we must all help each other," and he adds by way of explanation the traditional phrase, "*Je ne suis pas regardant*," which might be translated as "I don't keep accounts." It is the denial that any obligation has been incurred by the recipient of the service.

But small farmers have very good memories and the less they read and write the more they depend upon them. However, to admit to keeping accounts obliterates the virtue of this good-hearted gesture, just as recognizing that the intention of a gift was to provoke a counter-gift destroys the grace conveyed by it. Accounts are for public reckoning and contractual relations only, not for the exchange of favors. Where reciprocity is governed by specific rules defining the duties of each party the equivalence of the contribution of each can easily be established, but where there are no duties, no time limit, and the partners are unspecified, they cannot. The moral imbalance remains until the helper makes a request that will balance the unmentionable debt and there is no way he can be pressured to do so. Thus prescribed exchange is opposed to

unspecified and open-ended reciprocity, just as market values and immediate reciprocity are opposed to the exchange of grace. Here we have a system of exchange of favor manifested through mutual services, rather than an exchange of services, that is to say, a demonstration of community solidarity which involves the sacrifice of immediate individual interests in favor of long-term collective ones (Bloch 1973).

The technological conditions for such a system have been explained elsewhere (Pitt-Rivers 1981b). The harvest was traditionally the occasion for the display of neighborly relations when a considerable labor force was required to service the threshing machine. The day ended with a sumptuous meal, but the introduction of the combine harvester (which requires no work-force at all and works on contract paid by the hour) put an end to this institution. Heavy capitalization has unbalanced the system of reciprocity. The one equivalence that was implicit, if not stated, was that one man's labor was as good as another's. Even if this was not always true, the difference could not become apparent, since men worked in a chain forking the sheaves, which necessarily moved at the speed of the slowest man, but today, though the loan of machinery between neighbors has perhaps increased, the day of a man with a sixty horse-power tractor is no longer the same thing as the day of a man with a horse. Nevertheless the system continues to function; the solidarity of the farming community struggles to maintain itself, the ideal remains intact.

Great prestige attaches to a good reputation as a neighbor. Everyone would like to be in credit with everybody and those who show reluctance to lend a hand when they are asked to do so soon acquire a bad reputation which is commented on by innuendo. Those who fail to return the favor done to them come to be excluded from the system altogether. Those of good repute can be sure of compliance on all sides. Thus the imbalance of favors provides the basis of an incipient system of patronage. The general opinion that so-and-so has "done much" for the community is the surest ticket for election or re-election in local politics.

But there is another factor which in a sense explains all the rest. A single family farm is particularly vulnerable to situations of crisis. If the husband breaks a leg, who is going to milk the cows now that women no longer learn to milk? If the wife goes into hospital, who is going to look after the children? The open-endedness of the system is justified ultimately as a mode of insurance. A good name as a neighbor is the most precious form of guarantee against disaster. In times of urgent need the neighbors come to offer their services. Who knows when they may not be in need of help themselves?

GRACE IN KULA: PARADOX IN FRIENDSHIP AND THE GIFT

Community solidarity in the face of common dangers and difficulties prohibits the calculation of mine and thine. Yet the gift of one's time and energy is no different in moral terms from any other gift and it is therefore also subject to the paradox of the gift which descends from the theological mystery of grace—is not the doctrine of mystery theology's answer to an insoluble paradox? It is the same paradox as that of friendship. It derives from the fact that a gift is not a gift unless it is a free gift, i.e., involving no obligation on the part of the receiver, and yet, as Mauss so well explained, it nevertheless requires to be returned. In French a gift is "offered" not "given," just as an offering to the gods is. It is an expression of esteem, an honoring gesture, and as such complete in itself, requiring only to be accepted in order to achieve its end, which is, as in sacrifice, to convert "having" into "being," the dispossession of self in favor of another; the article or service which the donor sacrifices is transformed into becoming associated with the recipient, establishing or maintaining a particular tie with him.

It cannot be made with the intention of provoking a return-gift, for then it is not a free gift. If put to calculated ends, a gift is false charity, a maneuver abusing the notion of generosity. There is then no dispossession of self; the grace does not pass. But on the other hand, if it is not made in the hope of a return of the favor shown (which can itself only be shown by a reciprocatory gesture), then it is not a true gift either, but an act of largesse, a gesture of pity or a demonstration of superiority or power over the recipient. This was what Timon of Athens failed to understand. He made the mistake of humiliating his friends by an excess of generosity and he got what he deserved. Like the code of honor in which it might be taken to figure as a clause, the gift is shot through with ambivalence; any gratuitous gesture can "mean" one thing or its contrary according to circumstances. And the interpretation remains always debatable.

The gift, unrequited, implies either that it has been accepted as the receiver's due, a repayment or a tribute to him that he deserved and which consequently requires no recompense, but only amiable thanks, or that the recipient is unable to return it because he is not up to the standard of the donor and unwilling to appear inferior through making a return of lesser value. Finally, the gift, if not actually refused, may not be recognized at all. In the first case the giver is slighted because his gift has been taken for granted; in the second case, as in the potlatch, the receiver is humiliated because he has failed to "keep his end up"; in the third case the giver is rejected, for his favor is not welcome—the receiver

does not wish to correspond, to initiate or to maintain his association with the giver. Possibly the latter was suspected of false intentions or pretentiousness in making such a gift in the first place.

If a gift is not returned the donor cannot complain, for he has placed his honor in the hands of the recipient. Were he to do so he would dishonor himself still further, for he would thereby imply that he made his gift only in order to obtain a hold on the receiver, to exploit him, to oblige him to reciprocate and in that case he deserved to be slighted.

The question of how soon the return gift should be made is also open to differing interpretations. That which is made too promptly stinks of payment, that is to say, it indicates a refusal to accept the favor as a free gift, a reluctance to remain in moral debt to a person whom you mistrust. (This over-hasty reciprocity is commonly found among persons who fear patronization by their social superiors). It may equally, if returned immediately, mean the opposite: that the receiver is so grateful that he cannot wait to express his gratitude. The longer the delay the greater the confidence shown. On the other hand, to delay the return of a favor for too long may be taken to indicate, not the desire to show confidence in the sentiments of the donor and remain in his due until a worthy occasion presents itself to reciprocate, but indifference. Just as vengeance is all the more effective—for being delayed—it is a dish that is to be served cold, so it is said—so gratitude is the more touching for having awaited the proper occasion to be expressed. But if the delay is too great the matter may appear to have been forgotten. In the meantime the receiver awaits his "revenge," as jokers sometimes say, playing on the ambivalence of the notion that the recipient can also be represented as "one down" in the competition to do favor.

In every case the interpretation depends upon the relative status of the participants, in terms of honor, power, prestige, morality, the nature of their relationship, and the customs of their milieu. In attempting to explain the paradox on which the notion of the gift is founded I have several times referred to Marcel Mauss and the reader may have noticed a certain indebtedness to his ideas at different points. However, note should be taken of the differences between our two approaches. Mauss was aware of no paradox. His aim was, briefly, to explain that, though gifts are "in theory voluntary, in fact they are given and repaid under obligation," "prestations which are in theory voluntary, disinterested and spontaneous, are in fact obligatory and interested. The form [of such exchanges] is that of the gift generously offered; but the accompanying behavior is formal pretence and social deception . . ." (1966). He demonstrated this by reference

to extra-European and historical materials, whereas I have dealt mainly, if not quite entirely, with Europe. He makes no mention of grace, and the gratuity of the gift is, for him, a sociological delusion. Thanks have no legal or material reality and they do not come into the question. I believe that the gratuity of the gift is no delusion; however much it may have been abused, it is still the essence not only of sacrifice but of everyday gestures of favor.

The concept of grace which lay at the basis of my explanation cannot be assumed to exist elsewhere, even if Mauss' essay suffices to establish that the gift corresponds to a general sociological category. The basic opposition between human attempts to foresee and control the future through calculation and a law of contract, on the one hand, and the inscrutability of the will of God, whose grace is a mystery, on the other, is missing in primitive cultures. The Christian concept of grace is above all concerned with individual salvation, from the religious point of view, and this I put forward as the root of the extended senses of the word. It might be thought to follow therefore that there is nothing like grace to be found where there is no salvation, that is to say, outside Christianity. However, we have suggested that, lacking such a fertile theological soil to grow in, a concept very similar to grace is found in Judaism (*hesed*) and in Islam (*baraka*). Reciprocity of favor, like friendship,[6] which is nothing more than this, is universal whether between man and God or between men. It is the other term of the opposition that is missing; legal contract is specific to societies that keep written records. The Indians of the Pacific coast of Canada have barely more of a juridical system than the Polynesians and Melanesians with whom Mauss was equally concerned, yet he seems to speak of both as though they had: he credits the Maori with a juridical mentality and he underlines the obligatory nature of the duty to return a gift, using the word "obligatory" in its pristine legal sense (binding by oath, promise or contract) and maintaining that this is defended by sanctions. (The sanctions that he mentions are uniquely warfare and witchcraft).

Mauss was interested in the evolution of the notion of contract whose history he had traced back to a religious origin in the oath. I cannot help suspecting that his interest in contract and his lack of a notion of grace have produced a slightly warped vision of the gift. The only sanctions that ensure the necessity to return a gift are magical, and social only in so far as the refusal to return grace

6. Any reader who might be tempted to follow those authors who have maintained that there is no friendship, only kinship, in primitive society is referred to Firth (1957 [1936]).

entails automatically negative grace and the breakdown of sociation which in primitive society leads easily, if not necessarily, to hostilities. The same is true in our own world. The slight represented by the failure to return grace provokes sentiments of resentment (malevolence) which far surpass in their virulence those which the simple evasion of contractual obligations inspires. One supports with equanimity the attempt to swindle one, especially when it fails, whatever one may think of the swindler, but one's *amour propre* is wounded by the refusal to respond to the offer of grace, for much more than material interests are at stake: one's intimate self is damaged.

Mauss wrote no ethnography himself, but he was a wonderfully perceptive reader of the field reports of others. However, his readings of those which support his essay on the gift appear to be far from unquestionable. They scarcely confirm the conclusions he drew. Whether or not to reply to the challenge represented by the potlatch is surely a voluntary decision, a matter of capacities and will, rather than an obligation. It is no more obligatory than to pick up the glove of any one who chooses to challenge you. If you refuse the challenge you may, depending upon the circumstances, lose prestige, that's all. But you do not risk losing your life. The exploitation of the principle of reciprocity in order "to fight with property," as the Kwakiutl put it, is a style of rivalry which has been recognized in our own society. In the Kwakiutl case the grace, proffered in the hospitality of the feast, conceals a negative aspect of hostility that is always lurking beneath the surface of hospitable relations. Mauss attributed this to the obligation to return the gift, and I gave a slightly different explanation in "The law of hospitality" (Pitt-Rivers 1977: chapter five). In fact, as we have seen, grace is always in danger of being changed into negative grace when the sentiments in which it abides are lacking.

The obligation to return a gift is set forth above all in the example on which Mauss founded his theory. The *hau*, "the spirit of the gift" among the Maori, demands to be returned to its initial donor, and the man who scorns this demand risks supernatural sickness or even death.

Leaving aside the criticisms that have been leveled at the interpretations of *hau* by Mauss and by others—Sahlins (1974) examines them—I note that many of the senses of this multi-faceted concept (though by no means all) are analogous with either grace, *baraka*, or *indarra*, all of which are highly varied, as we have seen. One finds in them the essence of the gift, its non-contractual nature and something like the soul of the donor contained in it. *Hau*, like grace and like *baraka*, is that which is in excess, left over or supplementary, transcending exact

reciprocity. Like *indarra*, especially, it is good fortune, fruitfulness, the power of increase, the power of Nature that makes the plants grow. And like *indarra*, it is also the wind. Moreover, it should be recalled that the demands of the *hau* are reinforced only by the sanctions of witchcraft, which it has been suggested is supernatural malevolence, negative or inverted grace. At the same time there are many senses of grace, etc., that are not given for *hau* which, like *mana*, another Maori concept (Pitt-Rivers 1974), can also reside in stones, a capacity that seems quite foreign to grace—until one considers the Stone of Scone which demanded to be returned from Westminster to Scotland a few years ago (or so some students of St. Andrews University seemed to think).

I am not pretending that *hau* can be translated as grace, *baraka*, or *indarra*, but only that it is a concept of the same order, with all the differences that are implied by the contrast between a monotheistic and a polytheistic mode of thought. But it is no good trying to explain *hau* by an analogy with our own economic (or juridicial) institutions when it is clearly closer to the religious ones that Benveniste found to be their source. One should rather take the totality of usages and search for their common qualities. Just as I have pointed to the similarity between honor and *mana*, so I can see that *hau* can be, at least in many contexts, assimilated to grace. It stands as a guardian of the second circuit, the embodiment of the abstract principle of gratuity.

I shall take for more detailed scrutiny the Kula gift-exchange of the Trobriand Islanders, not only because Mauss gives it as one of his main examples, but because it is, perhaps thanks to Malinowski, the most widely known ethnographic phenomenon in anthropological literature. In this elaborate system gifts of individual, named arm-shells and necklaces, which have no practical utility and in fact are seldom worn, circulate in opposite directions round a ring of islands over a span of several years and serve as the armature of a number of other more utilitarian exchanges and indeed of the whole system of social relations between islands.

Unlike the Nuer who, as Evans-Pritchard explained (1956: 223–24), were always cheated by Arab traders because they had no understanding of money and commercial transactions and thought they were establishing personal relations through an exchange of gifts, as in sacrifice—"a relation between persons rather than between things. It is the merchant who is bought, rather than the goods"—the Trobrianders understood trading very well, were skilled in barter and bargaining, though they had no currency, but did not confuse the counter-gift that is *owed* in payment with the ceremonial exchange of Kula. "The Kula exchange

has always to be a gift, followed by a counter-gift; it can never be a 'barter,' a direct exchange with assessment of equivalents and with haggling" (despite Mauss 1966: 187, where it is classified as "ceremonial barter"). "There must always be in the Kula two transactions, distinct in name, in nature and in time" (ibid.: 352). "There are means of soliciting, but no pressure can be employed." The valuable given in return is "under pressure of a certain obligation" but the only sanction is the partner's anger (ibid.: 353). Kula is "sharply distinguished from barter, gimwali." The equivalence of the counter-gift is never discussed, bargained about or computed (there is no standard by which this could be done anyway, ibid.: 359); it is "left to the giver and it cannot be enforced by any kind of coercion"; there is no direct means of redress, "or of putting an end to the whole transaction" (ibid.: 95, 96) nor indeed to the specific Kula-partnership. What kind of a contract is this? "Kula is never used as a medium of exchange or as measure of value," "the equivalence of the values exchanged is essential, but it must be the result of the repayer's own sense of what is due to custom and to his own dignity" (ibid.: 511).

Kula objects are offered to the spirits (including land-crabs) to make them benevolent, "to make their minds good" (ibid.: 512). The choice of which valuable to offer to a given partner is free, but the owner can be influenced by solicitory gifts of food or petty valuables, by "rites and spells, acting on the mind of a partner to make him soft, unsteady in mind, eager to give kula" (ibid.: 102). Resentment caused by disappointment at not receiving a given famous arm-shell or necklace cannot be expressed openly and directly, but it can be avenged by black magic; "many men died because of [such-and-such a necklace]" (ibid.: 359), i.e. by witchcraft.

When unable to find a suitable return-gift to offer to a partner one may make an "intermediate gift" in order to avoid the accusation of being "slow" or "hard" in Kula, but this is "a token of good faith," not, as Mauss thought, interest on an outstanding debt. The definitive proof of this, if needed, is that an equivalent return is expected for the intermediate gift (ibid.: 98). In a word, the Trobriand Islanders distinguish as clearly as Benveniste between the two circuits and in Kula there is no trace of contract, nor of sanctions other than the spoiled grace which is sorcery and the desire for vengeance which is allowed no overt expression. The bad heart of the unsatisfactory partner can be dealt with only by magical charms. The only obligation on the circuit of grace, a moral one, is the return of grace. Kula valuables are vehicles of grace like the chrism of baptism or the oil of the Holy Ampulla; they have no material utility and no value

in relation to utilities. A Kula partnership is no more contractual than the relation between blood-brothers in Africa or *compadres* in Spain or Latin America and like them it contains no possibility of annulment. A contract, on the other hand, to be valid in English law must specify its duration.

Hence one might conclude by inverting the proposition of Mauss, saying that the gift is not in theory voluntary while in fact obligatory, but in theory—according to the theory of Mauss—obligatory while in reality voluntary, for it depends uniquely upon the will of the partner; nothing is specified with regard to the return gift, what it should be or when it should be returned. The moral obligation is only to return grace and what is resented if it is not returned is not the material loss but the rejection of the donor's self. It is always the thought—look back to its etymology—that counts.

If the anthropological study of friendship was so slow to be broached it was perhaps not unconnected with the failure to recognize the importance of grace. For grace is the essence of friendship. It is defined by the theologians as "the friendship of God" and on the terrestrial plane it remains the essence of that institution, as its subsidiary vocabulary makes clear: bounty, boon, favor, gratuity, thanks, etc. Since reciprocal favor is the basis of friendship and the exchange of gifts its mark, it is no surprise that the paradox of the gift, as I have explained it, is present in friendship which, like the gift, and like honor also, possesses both a subjective aspect, that which is felt in the heart and which determines the will, the aspect that relates it to the sacred, and the objective aspect which relates it to material interests, to others and to society in general. The paradox is that, while friendship to be true should be inspired by sentiment only and disinterested, yet it must be reciprocal not only in sentiment but in material gifts and services, for sentiments must be expressed by deeds. Hence it must be disinterested in motive, but profitable all the same, since the test of a friend is that he devotes himself to your interests. Actions speak louder than words.

It is vain to attempt to split the paradox and found a typology of friendship upon its two terms, distinguishing between the "affective" and the "instrumental" types, as Eric Wolf proposed in a well-known essay, for how can the ethnographer know whose feelings are pure and whose are not? It is hard to guarantee the former in the face of the constraints of daily life, but no one admits to the latter. The distinction then rests upon a factor that is exceedingly difficult to establish. The same difficulty faces the Church in determining the validity of its rites: how to know the true intentions of the participants. But the Church at least, through the Court of the Rota, summons evidence and goes through a

judicial process before giving judgment, while each man must judge the heart of his friend for himself.

Aristotle in the *Nicomachean ethics* did better than anyone since at disentangling the two aspects, by distinguishing between friends who are useful, friends who are amusing, and friends who are loved, but on account of the paradox it is not normally made clear who is to be classed as which and it is always a disappointment to those who thought they were loved to discover that they were merely useful. Crossed lines between the two circuits always lead to trouble (Pitt-Rivers 1984b). Once more, the uncertainty of grace, one of its essential aspects in the religious sphere (and one which gives rise to the sin of presuming on the grace of God), is demonstrated in everyday social relations.

HONOR AND GRACE: THEIR MEDIATIVE FUNCTION

We have tried to encompass the totality of grace and explain the coherence of the whole concept and the relation between its different meanings. In defining a notion of such variety, it is not enough to study only the concept by itself, one must place it within sets of wider range and look for its connections with others. The one of particular interest for this book is that which forms, with grace, its title, honor, for it seems to deal with problems in the same field: the destiny of a man and his relations with other people and with God. It shares with honor the same tendency to be evanescent and self-contradictory. Sometimes the two words are almost interchangeable: you pay honor in offering grace, for it is an expression of sentiment freely willed. You expose your honor in doing so, precisely because there is no obligation to return grace unless it comes from the heart—and you are dishonored if you get a "brush-off," in which case you are justified in being offended. Hence it can be seen that exchanges of honor are very similar to exchanges of grace. To be favored or privileged is to be honored, exalted above those who are not favored. Rituals of honor are continually marking distinctions of this sort.

Grace, as a verb, underscores the similarity (O.E.D.): "To confer honor or dignity upon, do honor or credit."

Grace, like honor, is associated with power and with royalty, as we have seen. To lose power is "to fall from grace," "to be put down," "to go out of favor," "to be disgraced."

Moreover, physical contact is all important in the conveyance of both: one is dubbed a knight by a touch on the shoulder with the sovereign's sword; one ingests the host; one is "touched" by grace; the transmission of grace at baptism involves the application of blessed substances to the body of the initiate. Anointing, whether of kings or neophytes, is a ritual technique for according grace. The affront to honor is expressed by a slap on the face. The rituals of dishonor involve the physical person also: the stocks, the stripping of honorific symbols, the defilement of the head, cutting the hair, marking the body in castigation; honorific status is inscribed upon the body. All these rites relate to the person-in-himself where the will is centered.

In other contexts grace appears not similar to but complementary to honor, as in the coronation ritual analyzed by Lafages (1992): the king is inducted simultaneously as knight and bishop, temporal and spiritual leader, fount of honor, whose legitimacy is guaranteed by grace.

They can also be seen as alternative bases for renown as in Di Bella's account of the relation between Name and Blood (1992): titles to honor, on the one hand, and miracles, manifestations of divine grace, on the other. Miracles step outside the worldly hierarchy and by appealing to the principle of anti-honor achieve more than can be won in the competition for precedence.

Finally, there are those contexts in which honor is frankly opposed to grace, as for example in the sense that honor depends only upon the individual will to win, while grace depends upon the will of God and cannot be won.

Grace (OED) is "hap, luck or fortune," while honor can be saved when all else is lost by fortitude and determination; each man is guardian of his own honor, for it depends upon his will, his worth as a person, or his rank. Grace ignores moral and social qualities. It is arbitrary as the divine whim. Honor implies combat, rivalry, and triumph, while grace means peace.

The unverifiability of intentions and the state of the heart, which are necessary to both honor and grace, the paradoxes which assail both and the uncertainty of divine judgment which refuses to submit to mundane reasoning, have encouraged societies with writing to replace the reciprocity of the heart by the law of contract and provide sanctions for its enforcement. Taking reciprocity out of the field of grace detaches it from the sentiments and objectifies it, making it abstract and depersonalized. As soon as the monarchy was strong enough, it suppressed the judicial combat and took justice out of the unpredictable hands of fate, curtailing the problem of theodicy. Yet the affective side of life cannot be

obliterated. Despite their contrary aspects grace and honor remain and contribute each to the composition of the other.

When the conquistador went to America "to win honor with my lance in my hand" and at the same time to get the gold needed to support such pretensions to honor, he depended upon his own ambition, courage, toughness, and wiles, but once he had risen to eminence, power, and wealth, he had the means of dispensing grace. Only those with power can favor or pardon; you must possess a thing before you can give it away; the beggar can return grace only in the form of a blessing and the hope that God may reciprocate the gesture of charity.

But grace is closer to God than the ambition to succeed, and for that reason he who has renounced all pretension to honor by demanding (and exploiting) pity enjoys a privileged relationship with the Almighty. Grace, not honor, is the ideal enjoined by the Beatitudes. Indeed the contradiction is spectacular, the lesson clear: one must renounce one' s claim to honor as precedence if one is to attain the fellowship of the Holy Ghost, or more precisely one must invert it, adopt the counter-principle represented by the honor of women, whose sex excludes them in theory from the agonistic sphere. (The resemblance between feminine honor and grace has already been noted.) In somewhat similar vein the sacred status of priests imposes upon them the renunciation of violence and worldly ambition as well as the right to play the male role in relation to women.

One might be tempted to jump to the conclusion that this opposition between masculine honor and grace is a product of the moral revolution imposed by Christianity—this was what Nietzsche thought—yet grace is much older than Christianity and Mauss (1966: 15) had already noted the generic connection between the gods and the poor through whom they can be approached; we also know from classical Greece that Zeus was accustomed to adopt the disguise of the beggar who enjoyed his special protection. The opposition is therefore more general than its connection with Christianity. The sacred status of beggars can be found in India also.

Moreover, this apparent anomaly is not without solution. To begin with, in the logic of agon, rivalry is wedded to equality, for one must feel oneself to be the equal of one' s antagonist in order to compete, yet the test of strength aims always to destroy this equality and establish hierarchy: a victor and a vanquished (Pitt-Rivers 1960b). The latter can demand revenge "when all is lost save honor," but, theoretically at least, they can no longer issue or accept a challenge if they

are not conceived as equal. The institution of the handicap is the means of enabling them to do so, by making them equal.

However, once the hierarchy is established, the competition is over, and from that moment the man who has achieved power, preeminence, the dominant position, wishes only to legitimize it in the public consensus. His honor changes its nature and from striving to achieve precedence it becomes honor validated in the view of others, honor as virtue, recognized by his subordinates and dependents, whom he protects. This simplistic paradigm of power would have no interest if it did not correspond to a transition from agonistic honor to grace which we can detect in other circumstances. It would appear that there are in Western civilization two opposed—and ultimately complementary—registers: the first associated with honor, competition, triumph, the male sex, possession, and the profane world, and the other with peace, amity, grace, purity, renunciation, the female sex, dispossession in favor of others, and the sacred.

The ambitious man, when he has succeeded, won honor, and achieved dominance, requires that the qualities by which he has done so be confirmed and consecrated, that what he has achieved be conserved for the future. Thus he must then show qualities that are the contrary: generosity and moderation (which cannot now be taken for weakness), forbearance (his status entitles him to ignore what would once have constituted a slight), wisdom and, in order to represent the collectivity, a regard for the feelings and opinions of others. We have given examples: those old Cypriot *sophrons*, described by Peristiany (1992), whose ideal is to end up with nothing, having distributed all their possessions among their children, or the builder of the hospital described by Caro Baroja (1992), or the Sultan of Morocco who, having fought and slaughtered to win the succession, becomes a sacred figure, a man of peace, able to settle the quarrels of others in accordance with the norms of Islam, for feud and vendetta can be ended only by an appeal to the sacred which such persons represent (Jamous 1992). The *shorfa*, peace-makers of the Rif, do not enter the struggle for precedence, for they belong to sacred lineages, the guardians of the shrine which is a sanctuary.

The man of honor must in a sense convert his honor into grace and thus render himself impregnable, because legitimate, be loved by those he has defeated, make peace where once he made war, trade his *de facto* power for right, his dominance for status, his business acumen for magnanimity. He must struggle to achieve honor, but the proof that he has achieved it is that he no longer needs to struggle.

Hence that which appears at first as an anomaly if not a contradiction becomes, once viewed in the perspective of the life cycle, a relation of complementarity and in the end concordance, for, since grace is the will of God, it is by His grace that the triumphant hero received his endowment in the first place, was predestined to win. If one ends up dishonored, it was for lack of grace in the first place. Honor stands before the event; his honorable qualities produce the victor. Grace stands behind it; the will of God is revealed in the outcome. Each is therefore a precondition of the other. If you lack grace you will not attain honor, in which case you will lack the means to be gracious.

However, there are those who do not have to achieve honor and convert it into grace, for they are born with both. Louis XIV became king at the age of six and he had so much grace that he thought himself entitled to elevate his bastards over the heads of those whose kinship with him was more distant, if more conventionally respectable. As Leroy Ladurie (1992) makes clear, the Little Duke was not of that opinion! Their difference was understandable, for the royal bastard is always of ambiguous status: he has the honor attaching to his recognized descent, he was conceived by personal will, not for reasons of state, a "love-child," and he is usually his father's favorite, but he bears the stigma of illegitimacy. (Though let us remember that grace is opposed to and above the law). Therefore, royal bastards are superior in a covert, mystical sense, while being at the same time inferior, socially, to their legitimate kinsmen.

There are those also whose honor and grace is consecrated by less obvious rituals than a coronation. The administrators of modern France, former students of the Grandes Ecoles, win their honor by triumph over rivals in the entrance examination—personal excellence has replaced genealogical descent or wealth as the criterion of the elect—and thereafter, their intelligence and competence certified by their status as *normaliens*, *politechniciens*, etc., they remain, whatever they do or say, as Bourdieu explains (1992), with a kind of grace, the living embodiment of the will, not of God but of the French Republic.

Both honor and grace are mediative concepts; they interpret events in accordance with the prevailing values of society, putting the seal of legitimacy onto the established order. Together they constitute the frame of reference by which people and situations are to be judged. They are indistinguishably blended in the Basque concept of *indarra*, in which natural, cultural, and social forces come together; the life force of men, plants and the wine, the grace of the Holy Virgin, and the legitimacy of property rights in houses. Elements of

both honor and grace are found in Polynesian *mana*, and other "legitimizing concepts" can be found in the ethnographies of other parts of the world.[7] They supply the point of junction between the ideal and the real world, the sacred and the profane, culture and society.

7. For example, the concept of *mahano* (Beattie 1960) has much in common with *mana,* as noted by Balandier (1967: 119–30), who compares it with other African concepts. See also the Bouriate concept of *xeseg,* translated into Russian as "grace" in Hamayon (1987: 606–10, 620–25).

CHAPTER 4

The malady of honor*

The word "honor" (*honos* in Latin) referred originally to a Roman god of military courage. It would later describe the land grants awarded to victors in battle. This material foundation supported, over time, the development of a moral concept of extreme complexity, if not to say ambiguity.

A rich body of literature defines honor as a guide to conscience, a code of conduct, and a measure of social status. Thanks to its plural meanings, honor has caused more deaths than the plague. It has sparked more controversy than divine grace, and more quarrels than money. In recent decades, however, we have spoken less and less of honor. Anyone using the term, eminent American sociologist Peter Berger (1970) goes so far as to say, reveals himself to be "hopelessly European," irredeemably Old World.

The social sciences—whose explicit concern is human conduct and its motivations!—have paid close attention to honor only in the last quarter century. Before that, what little had been published on the subject was limited to literary histories of the concept and a few tendentious encyclopedia articles.

The reasons for this neglect—for this wariness?—can be found in problems inherent to the analysis of honor. For it is simultaneously a sentiment and an objective social fact. On the one hand, honor is a moral condition that

---

* This is a translation of "La maladie de l'honneur," which was first published in 1991 in the edited volume *L'Honneur: Image de soi ou don de soi: un ideal équivoque.*

corresponds to a person's self-image. It can inspire the boldest of actions or the refusal to act in a shameful manner, whatever the material temptations might be. On the other hand, honor is a way of representing the moral value of others: their virtue, their prestige, their status, and thus their right to precedence.

Honor motivates conduct, and it answers, in the depths of conscience, only to God. As such, it is purely individual; it depends on the individual's will. Yet honor is also collective and can be attached to a social group: a family, lineage, homeland, or any other community a person might identify with. In the eighteenth century, Mad Jack Mytton jumped his horse off a cliff to defend the honor of the gentlemen of Shropshire. Miraculously, he survived.

Moreover, honor—or at any rate the conduct it prescribes—varies according to a person's place in society. A man's honor demands courage of him, which is not required of a woman, whereas sexual purity is or, at least until recent times, was. The elements of which honor is made vary according to social class: aristocratic honor, with its military origins, differs from bourgeois or working class honor, to say nothing of distinctions across social groups, trades, communities, or regions. The sense of honor in "the honorable society," as the Sicilian Mafia likes to call itself, has little in common with the honor found among clergymen on the same island. Honor's many possible meanings are rarely given objective appraisal, however. Honor resides in a person's heart and is thus felt before it is thought of. Each person has but one notion of honor: their own. Anyone who understands honor otherwise must simply be without it!

The subjective aspects of honor must eventually come into contact with reality, for the personal sentiments manifest in our conduct will sooner or later be judged by others. When an individual has honorable aspirations, these will need to be acknowledged in the public domain: honor felt becomes honor proven, and so obtains due recognition by way of reputation, prestige, and "honors." In short, honor is the sum total of an individual's aspirations (and thus equal to his life, as is so often said). It is also the recognition given to him by others.

The process is reversed when an individual acknowledges shame. Honor's rejection—whether by way of denied precedence, rebuffed collaboration, slander, or other forms of negative prestige—is ultimately internalized by the individual, who is then forced to disavow his ambitions and admit his shame. As long as he can avoid doing so, however, there is still hope. For, much like the hero who has "lost everything but his honor," he can recoup his losses if he musters the courage and tenacity needed to secure his claim. (Inevitably, this will engender jealousy and conflict).

The problem with this idealized framework, however, is that the recognition of honor within a given society is never consistent. The sovereign, the "source of honor," and the *vox populi* do not always adopt the same criteria. To wit, the monarchy hardly shares the people's political interests, nor does it give much consideration to a person's reputation among his neighbors. Hence, it is possible, as Montesquieu observed, to be loaded down with infamy and dignities at the same time.

Conflicts generated by honor are universal. During the Middle Ages, before disputes were subject to judicial review by the State, they were settled by a pseudo-juridical procedure guaranteed by divine authority. "Trial by combat" resolved quarrels between powerful persons through a formal and ritualized contest before named witnesses—preferably the king or the royal authority. It was both a fight to the death and a trial by ordeal, for judgment was placed in the hands of God, who was trusted to decide for the just party by granting him victory over his opponent.

In one of the last such contests in France's history, Jarnac battled La Chataîgneraire before Henry II in 1547. Notwithstanding the somewhat unconventional approach taken by the author of the infamous "coup," God's judgment appeared just and received the King's assent. According to Shakespeare, however, Richard II was wrong to doubt Providence at the duel between Norfolk and Hereford. This mistrust, we well know, would have tragic consequences.

During the Renaissance, the State reclaimed from divine authority the right to adjudicate matters of violence, though not under all circumstances. In Italy first of all, a parallel legal system devoted to "affairs of honor" began to take shape. This jurisprudence concerned a specific contest, the duel, which guaranteed "satisfaction" to anyone who felt his honor had been wronged, whether he emerged victorious, wounded and therefore vanquished, or killed. Curiously, being defeated does not in itself entail dishonor. Only the man who refuses to risk his life to defend his honor can be dishonored. "Obtaining satisfaction," therefore, does not necessarily mean being right, but rather having the courage to fight. It is no longer an ordeal, but a test of courage. Both contestants obtain satisfaction when "first blood" is drawn, for, as Theophile Gautier reminds us, "the laundry of honor is bleached only with blood."

Condemned by philosophers yet favored by aristocrats and the military, the duel endured into the twentieth century despite being outlawed by an indignant Church and State. Its social logic appealed to the deepest urges of human

conduct, which neither prison nor excommunication could deter. Consider the following case: at the turn of the century, the Minister for War demoted an officer for taking to court a man who had caused him offence rather than challenging the latter to a duel. In short, the officer was demoted for not breaking the law. As far as the minister was concerned, his officer's respect for civil law was proof that the sentiment of honor had been violated.

This unofficial jurisprudence contains the very principles of honor, which can be briefly summarized as follows:

1. The essence of honor is intention. If you cheat at cards, for instance; if you commit an act of betrayal; if you refuse to take up the gauntlet thrown down before you, then you are completely dishonored, which conventionally amounts to moral death. "My life belongs to my king, my soul to God, but my honor is mine alone," says Brantôme. The opening challenge in Richard II takes up the same terms: "A traitor to my God, my king, and me!" Words alone cannot answer such an accusation: it demands action. Honor resides in the physical body, is symbolized by blood, and one therefore has no choice but to fight.
2. You do not, however, have to take on all comers. You can always deny a challenge if you do not recognize the challenger as being of equal honor to you, whether on social or moral grounds. You would humiliate yourself, moreover, by agreeing to take on an unworthy opponent. If you are sure of your honor, you can allow yourself to refuse such a challenge and, in so doing, dishonor the challenger.
3. When your honor is offended, the formal response is not the direct challenge but the "*mentis*" (you lie): "In calling me a coward, a cheat, a cuckold, or"—as was the case for Jarnac—"incestuous, you lie." Yet lying is not dishonorable in and of itself. Adults do not owe children the truth, nor do superiors their subordinates. The *mentis* therefore implies inferiority and, at the same time, a weakness of will akin to a betrayal. However, the *mentis*—and this is its practical role—also ensures that the offended party rather than the offending party has the choice of weapons. Thanks to this rule, Jarnac managed to pull off his unusual stroke, sliding beneath his opponent's shield and slicing the jugular with a dagger.

While the ruling class had a monopoly on "affairs of honor," this does not mean that the rest of society was without a sense of honor. Nowadays, popular ways

of "settling scores" may not be codified in law, but we find the same underlying principles at work in agonistic situations. In "street corner society," as in a Spanish honor play, the offended party tries not to show it, until one day he takes his revenge and restores his honor to its state of grace. In the Mafia, vengeance is a pseudo-moral duty, and "silence" (*omertá*), the refusal to reveal insider dealings, is a defining quality of masculinity. Various conceptions of honor can be found among truck drivers, attorneys, and even bankers, whose honor is staked less on power and revenge than on scrupulousness. Each professional community recognizes its rule and draws a distinction between duties owed to other members and those that govern conduct toward outsiders. In the earlier example, the Minister for War adopted criteria of honor that were consistent with his role as head of the armed forces; the Attorney General, however, would hardly have agreed with this interpretation.

It will come as no surprise that honor is bound up in the reality of power, whether it be political, military, or economic power. "Without money, honor is nothing but a malady," says Racine. These three dimensions of power are, in fact, interrelated.

Among the principles that govern political life, Montesquieu distinguished two: monarchy, which is governed by honor; and the republic, which is governed by virtue. Voltaire misunderstood Montesquieu's proposal, failing to separate the operative principle of a given political system from the moral evaluation of the conduct of persons within that system. It is true that royalty is the source of honor according to ancient historical tradition, but honor endures in a republic, just as virtu—by which Montesquieu meant "civic virtue"— can be found in a monarchy. I would rather treat both terms as "honor" and distinguish "honor = precedence" from "honor = virtue," which corresponds respectively to the social and the ethical aspects of honor. This distinction follows from the fact that, while the king or the president of the republic is indeed the wellspring of honor (he is the one who confers "honors"), a second source exists in the form of popular approval—public acknowledgment of honorable qualities. The possibility of conflict between these two criteria, precedence and virtue, is a leitmotif that stretches from El Cid to the present day, and this despite all the historical transformations in the meaning of honor that unfold from one era to the next. Without doubt, the most spectacular of these upheavals was England's Puritan Revolution.

When Cromwell spoke of an opposition between "men of honor" and "men of conscience," he considered the former in the same way Montesquieu

did—which is to say, "honor = precedence"—and he most certainly did not count himself among them. Partisans on either side of this civil war were identified by the length of their hair, a fact that is not without symbolic significance: the "Roundheads," men of conscience, had short hair; the supporters of the king, the "Cavaliers," had long hair.

After the fall of the Commonwealth and the restoration of the monarchy, long hair came back into fashion and with it, the monarchist understanding of honor. Sexual honor replaced religious scruples and financial probity. The theaters opened their doors yet again and for the ensuing decade put on comedies that almost exclusively dealt with marital deception, such as *The golden horn, A horn for cuckolds,* and *The country wife,* in which the play's hero, Mr. Horner, seduces his many conquests by spreading rumors that he is impotent and thus the model chaperone.

Honor is granted according to criteria that depend on a given community's identity as well as their particular view on the world. The approval or misgivings conjured by a person's conduct in everyday life are seed for all those notions of honor that, eventually, will be articulated by moralists and lawmakers and incorporated into social mores. Since the Renaissance, such debates portray a struggle within society between characters or classes seeking to enforce criteria that suit their own actions and interests: Church versus aristocracy, military versus merchants, city dwellers versus peasants, and so on. Bourgeois revolutions always swapped out a military idea of honor for an economic one: you no longer won it "spear in hand," like a conquistador, but "checkbook in pocket," like a Quaker.

Power is still power, whether it comes in military, legal, political, or financial form, or even, hitched to class culture and ancestral prestige, in the form of symbolic capital. But different forms of power are often interchangeable. Daughters from nouveau riche households marry into the aristocracy, bearing generous dowries destined to refurbish noble domains. Honor does not confer rights of precedence only through ceremonial rituals, but also on occasions where acknowledgment is given in hard currency. *Honor* is not just the Roman god of martial valor, but the land given as compensation to his devotees. The conquistadors set sail in search of glory, endlessly comparing themselves to Julius Caesar or Alexander the Great, yet they were also searching for gold.

Honor is always influenced by wealth and property, despite all caveats applied by churchmen. Indulging the high and mighty recognizes their symbolic

capital, yet practically speaking it would be ill advised not to do so, for power knows how to quash dissent. Material advantage, moreover, underlines inequality: hospitality, charity, and generosity are, as expressions of magnanimity, honorific. Nevertheless, the person who is honored will pay for the privilege if he fails to reciprocate. In Canada's Northwest, First Nations people took this principle to extremes during potlatch ceremonies, where largesse and the brazen destruction of property were carried out with the express intention of humiliating guests who could not rise to the challenge of one-upmanship.

Yet humiliating others is not always the purpose of material gain. Honor based on power is the backbone of clientelism: he who acknowledges his own inferiority and attaches himself to a powerful patron also shares in the latter's glory. While his enjoyment of the protection and rewards such a relation affords does at first place him in a position of inferiority to his patron, it simultaneously confirms his superiority over his equals. Lackeys are known for their arrogance the world over, and it is obviously advantageous to have friends in high places. As the Spanish proverb goes, "without a godfather, you can't get baptized." It would be wrong to assume, however, that only a hierarchical society affords such advantages: the Melanesian *"big man"* takes care of his clients as well as the *cacique* did in nineteenth century Spain, and he is just as much a bully to those who have no patron.

In the European tradition, honor is hereditary, but it is not inherited in the same way in all times and places. Honor inherited from the father is not the same as that received from the mother. This distinction is most pronounced in Southern Europe. In Sicily, for instance, you receive social prestige from your father in the form of the family "name," whereas your mother transmits "blood": in other words, the purity of untainted descent. Masculine honor is affirmative: it demands that a man assert himself and claim the precedence owed him as a result of either hereditary rank or his own exploits. Feminine honor, meanwhile, is passive: it calls not for particular exploits but rather for a woman to protect her reputation from any and all ignominy lest her children, male and female alike, inherit it. The sentiment of modesty or shame (*vergogne*, *vergüenza*) guarantees a woman's honor, whereas it does nothing for masculine honor. Andalusian women routinely say that men have no shame. In this sense, honor = precedence is masculine and honor = virtue is feminine. Hence, in keeping with this moral division of labor that maps onto a physiological and economic division of labor, men are responsible for protecting the "blood" of the family and are therefore given authority over their women.

This brings us to an explanation of what might otherwise strike the cultural outsider as passing strange: namely, that the gravest offence to a man's honor refers not to his own conduct but that of his mother, sister, or daughter, whose blood he is meant to share, or to his wife, whose loose conduct could make a cuckold of him. The domestic drama reaches a climax when the wife plays her final trump card and, turning to her husband, says: "I'll have you wearing the horns."

Hence, the greatest threat to a man's honor comes from his womenfolk, and the shortcomings of a woman's honor come from her menfolk. Women are indeed the ones who demand vengeance when the "family name" is slighted, much as they are the ones who, in the name of female solidarity, protect a fallen kinswoman by covering up her indiscretions.

The ultimate offence to honor consists of calling a man a "son of a whore," which means accusing him of being born a bastard, and thus of an immodest woman. Curiously, however, it is worth noting that while this generalization holds for Spain as well as Italy and France, the phrase itself (*hijo de puta*) is normally replaced by *hijo de la chingada* (son of a rape victim) in Mexico. In the first case, illegitimacy stems from the mother's own moral flaws; in the second, it follows from the misfortune that befell her when she was forced to do something against her will. A colorful version of the latter insult is the declaration "I am your father," which is to say: you are a son born of rape, and I know this because it was I who raped your mother. The tourist who, seated in a tavern, hears a hoarse, angry voice shouting this paternity claim across the bar would do well to dive under the table, as bullets are very likely to fly. Indeed, Octavio Paz begins his great essay on the Mexican colonial heritage, *Los Hijos de la Malinche* (1950), by analyzing this very phrase.

The other figure who represents an offence to honor is the duped husband. Two animal forms represent this character symbolically: the stag, or any other animal with horns, and the cuckoo. The first is most prevalent in the countries of Southern Europe, the second in countries of the North. Neither seems to be of great significance to the Scandinavians, while the French make use of both—"he's a cuckold, the stationmaster" goes the well-known song—though horns are a more common trope than the cuckoo.

In England, where over time the Puritan tradition appears to have outmaneuvered that of the Restoration, horns are no longer prevalent and the cuckoo (or cuckold) is generally treated with sympathy. He is apt to receive condolences rather than contempt or mockery, much to the horror of the Spanish.

It is worth noting that both symbols have a similar structure. The cuckoo is a bird that lays its eggs in another bird's nest. Yet the cuckold does not refer to the one who commits adultery, who violates the marital bond by usurping the husband's role. Rather, it describes the victim, the husband wronged. The same transposition takes place with the horns. As the mark of the Devil and thus of sin, they represent a surfeit of virility, which Mr. Horner illustrated nicely. And yet, once again, whoever wears the horns is not the guilty party, the transgressor, but rather the victim, the "innocent" husband. But of what exactly is he innocent? He is innocent of adultery insofar as, unlike whoever did the cuckolding, he did not violate the marital bond of another household. According to traditional southern European social mores, any young, virile man is not to be held responsible for the consequences of his natural virility. It is an admirable quality in itself, one that is vital for society: not only for the population's reproduction (literally speaking), but also for social order and the community's defense, whether that means a family, lineage, nation, and the like. Moreover, all positive masculine qualities such as courage, will, determination, and authority are expressed in terms that refer literally to physiology and symbolize virility in its full array. Hence, it is a man's duty to protect his wife's purity, and he is the one responsible for the horns he has been given —not as a token of his prodigious virility, but because that is precisely what he lacks. In any event, it would be wrong to approach the matter in terms of ethics or of guilt. The horns, and much less the cuckoo, are neither a punishment nor a moral reckoning. They are a sign of the state of pollution one enters when he allows himself to be deprived of his privileges, when he forsakes his duty. In a similar way, when the African chief's right to the first fruits is denied, he falls ill. The consequences of the theft affect him and not the thief. By strict analogy, in cases of adultery among the Nuer, the deceived husband is the one who suffers from the sickness that is its sign. In short, the mockery borne by the cuckold (or by the one who wears the horns) is not meant to punish a crime, but to announce a ritual state of pollution that other men of the community hope to avoid by isolating and thereby excommunicating anyone who has entered it.

Sexual honor varies greatly, not only among nations but also between social classes and communities. In Spain, a country known for placing a high value on feminine modesty, an unwed mother in the agricultural communities of the north does not in fact lose all prospects of making an honorable marriage by having a child out of wedlock. Instead, she is courted enthusiastically, for she

has both proven her fertility and gained a dowry in her role as a prospective wet nurse to a bourgeois family.

In cockney London, to take a counterexample, one readily encounters striking attitudes of feigned concern for the sexual honor of another man's sister: "Charlie, how's your sister doing?" This insult is as degrading an affront to masculine honor as "I am your father" is in Mexico.

As it happens, the divide between patrilineal social inheritance and matrilineal moral inheritance is not as clear-cut as it might first appear. By way of codified systems that vary from one country to the next, titles of nobility guarantee precedence yet do not preclude matrilineal descent—despite the fact that aristocrats are always more patrilineally inclined than those with limited pretentions to nobility. Spanish titles are passed to women when no suitably proximate male heir can be found, as do some older British titles and the British Crown. Women of high standing, in fact, always have a share of masculine honor as their birthright and this reduces the importance of their purity as well as their husband's authority over them. They are still, in a sense, "somebody" without him; they have their own precedence.

On the other hand, it is worth remembering that even in the most phallocratic of societies, and especially in southern Europe, men always have religious and ethical duties that liken them to women. And just as the sexual characteristics of the body are less marked at the beginning and end of life, so too are masculine and feminine honor.

In his major 1909 essay on the pre-eminence of the right hand, Robert Hertz draws a relationship between social values and the parts of the body that represent these values. Since then, little has been added to the discussion. I would suggest, however, that it is possible to extend Hertz's ideas beyond the simple opposition of our two hands to comprehend the body as a whole, not only its two sides but also the top and the bottom, the front and the back, the inside and the outside.

Honor on the whole seems to offer promising terrain for such an endeavor. For as we have seen, it enjoys a privileged relationship to the body and is used to symbolize its different facets. The head, the face, the organs, the limbs, the "nether regions"—each has its honorific value, whatever else it conveys in everyday speech.

For an obvious case, consider rituals of honor and dishonor, or rites of consecration and desecration. The head plays a prominent role here, whether it is

crowned or cut off. A just execution inevitably brings dishonor, and yet the means by which it is carried out will indicate whether the victim had much honor to lose. It is nobler to shed blood than to suffocate. The blade marks the victim's rank; the scaffold does not. Ways of killing, and even of committing suicide, have honorific meaning.

In traditional gestures of greeting, the hands are related to the head. They give honor when they are extended, and to refuse a hand when it is offered is to refuse the honor implied. We honor when we applaud. We dishonor when we give the finger (*le bras d'honneur*).

The genitals are the bedrock of modesty; they can be used, physically or verbally, to dishonor. Blood is pure; excrement pollutes. Yet in rising to the face, blood exceeds the control of the will (which is the very essence of honor). Blushing shows that you have honor because this involuntary reaction to shame proves you accept honor's rules of engagement, over and against your own desires. People who cannot blush, who are too thick-skinned, have little in the way of honor.

A curious inversion in the Spanish language helps explain something that would otherwise seem anomalous. *Vergüenza* is the opposite of honor in a formal sense as it consists in recognizing your dishonor. However, if you are unable to recognize your own dishonor, then you have no honor in a more profound sense, for true honor comes from within the self, from beyond the reach of conscious thought. The person who is immodest, who has no shame, therefore has no honor. In Spain, *sin vergüenza* means "son of a bitch" in common parlance, because modesty and shame are in fact passed down matrilineally. Desacralizing epithets frequently refer to the genitals, which explains why the lexicon of dishonor is laced with obscenities.

Spanish literature undoubtedly provides the most extensive analysis of the matter of honor. Golden Age theater is also known as "the theater of honor" for this is its recurring theme. Honor raises problems of conduct that must be resolved in setting after setting, each examined with such realism that we are obligated to take seriously these characters' obsession with honor. What does one do, for instance, when cuckolded by a member of the royal family? How do you avenge your honor without revealing that it has been offended? Must one lock away his wife forever in order to defend her honor? ("The honorable woman locked in the house with a broken leg," as the popular saying goes.) What value do you place on the honor of the commoner a nobleman has offended? Since the authors were all churchmen, it comes as no surprise that they tend not to

embrace an aristocratic vision of honor. Indeed, even the best of these plays, *El Burlador de Sevilla*, is a profound critique, verging on satire, of such a worldview (de Molina 1630).

Meanwhile, another form of literature challenged the very reality of honor. Picaresque novels, the most humane of which is *Don Quixote*, ridicule anyone who believes in honor. They share Falstaff's opinion: "What is that 'honor'? Air." The first work of this genre was *El Lazarillo de Tormes,* by Fernando Rojas. Lazarillo is a miserable boy whose sole concern is finding enough food to eat. He goes from one master to the next, from the merchant of indulgences to the nobleman who, no less hungry than he, sends him off to beg for his food in the street, then to the blind miser, and so on. He winds up with a pastor, living the most lavish life and in a marriage of convenience with his master's mistress, who feeds him to his heart's content. Such is the triumph of the complacent cuckold: a scathing spoof of all honor stands for.

Falstaff and Lazarillo shed light on the utter fragility of the honorific value system. One can live quite well without honor and perhaps, as the case of the pampered pet suggests, one is better off without it. Beyond the self-satisfaction it brings, honor amounts to something only to the degree that it is marketable: as such, it serves to replenish the coffers of the treasury through the sale of titles; it serves to honor a contract, earn credit, insure the legitimacy of one's children, control an intersection in "street corner society," play the boss in Andalusia or Sicily, or sponsor a cricket-club in the English countryside.

The values exhibited govern but one half of social life in any country, and not even an identifiable half, for all systems of values are systems of conflicting values. Tirso de Molina's Don Juan explains his success in Utrea by declaring: "I earned it with honor, because honor fled the court to hide in the villages." Matters of honor and anti-honor arise at every turn, and from this we can conclude that the concept's very ambiguity enables its most contradictory forms to coexist. Perhaps these contradictions are necessary to reconcile the world we live in with the world of our dreams, the ideal with our shattered expectations. Such is the "function" of ambiguity.

Is honor obsolete in Europe today, or is it simply in disguise? Is the concept of honor uniquely European, or is it universal? Without wanting to assert its universality, I believe that honor is made up of universal elements and that "something similar" can therefore be found anywhere. Marcel Mauss noted the likeness between the Polynesian concept of *mana* and our own notion of honor.

Nevertheless, considerable differences arise whenever we try to distinguish what is and is not honorable from one country to the next. To come up against this problem, there is in fact no need to look beyond Western culture.

Ever since anthropologists of the Mediterranean took an interest in honor, struck by the importance the notion receives in this part of the world, I have observed a tendency to treat honor as in some way peculiar to Mediterranean peoples—some even speak of the "Mediterranean concept of honor." In truth, we are aware of many varieties of honor: not one, but twenty, and this is nothing new. Looking further back into history, some variants even appear to contradict the Mediterranean concept of honor, whose foundational premise is the threat women pose to masculine honor. The Old Testament is filled with sexual hospitality and sacred prostitution. Yahweh was against it, yet He had the greatest difficulty getting His people to follow His instructions. The custom of temporary marriage for the visiting guest endures, at least in theory, in the Arab world to this day.

Moreover, the threat women pose to masculine honor is not limited to the Mediterranean. It was prevalent in Shakespeare's time, as noted above, and today can be found in London's working class neighborhoods. Nor do we need to search long to find a Mediterranean institution that is an exception to the (presumed) rule. Consider the *sigisbée* (male chaperone), or lady's companion, whom the husband authorizes to accompany his wife and defend her honor in his absence. According to Stendhal's *Promenades in Rome* (1829), "love rapidly takes hold" of this institution. (Mr. Horner certainly made the most of it). In Italy, marriage contracts would occasionally specify the wife's right to a chaperone, and Byron was accepted as a *sigisbée* to Teresa Guiccioli, his last love.

Speaking of one's honor is certainly an old-fashioned thing to do, and Professor Berger was right to claim as much two decades ago in the United States. He could have said the same thing about Europe. The sexual revolution freed men of their duty to protect the purity of their close female kin. We no longer ridicule cuckolds, especially not among the upper classes where they are perhaps greatest in number. Financial honor has also taken a hit. Quakers, who founded the banks of Britain, rallied to Anglicanism; accounting errors no longer send them straight to Hell. An apology (*l'amende honorable*) is not thought of today as a way of recovering from dishonor, but as a minor confession one is compelled to make.

But is honor really obsolete? Giving the finger is the standard response to brazen honks of the horn on the road. Vernacular speech has certainly preserved

its more colorful expressions for laying down a challenge. Insulting a woman (made easier today thanks to the Women's Liberation Movement) almost always entails reference to her sexual behavior, whereas shaming of this kind figures much less prominently for men. The word "honor" has been purged from our language, but not from our symbol system.

If young people no longer talk of honor, it remains in the political lexicon, consecrated in the United States by the final words of the Declaration of Independence, which commit all American citizens to the defense of "our sacred honor." The word often resurfaces, at solemn moments, in the political speeches of heads of state. Neville Chamberlain, returning from his meeting with Hitler in Munich, announced "peace with honor." When France surrendered in 1940, the foreign ministry prepared a "brief list of concessions which cannot be made without impugning [France's] honor" (Ferro 1987: 98). General de Gaulle, however, saw things differently: "accidental leaders have capitulated, giving in to panic, forgetting all honor." When Nixon announced, in a televised address, his decision to withdraw troops from Vietnam, he used the word "honor" a dozen times. And Christian Nucci, interviewed on TF1 in April 1990 (and with pronounced hostility) about the amnesty he had recently received,[1] could speak of nothing but his honor. It seems to me that such statements are the kind made most freely when they are in doubt.

Today, honor is a malady whose symptoms show only in its absence.

1. Christian Nucci, Minister of Overseas Development, gave monies intended for African aid projects to Socialist Party officials and electoral candidates in France. In 1989, he received amnesty as part of a controversial political finance reform law passed by the Socialist government of President François Mitterand.

PART II

Uncertain relations: kin/friend, host/guest, male/female, human/animal

CHAPTER 5

The kith and the kin*[1]

When Meyer Fortes felt the need to find a term to express the peculiar quality of relationships between kin, that which distinguishes them from other sorts of relationship, it appears to me significant that he should have chosen "amity." He suggests this word as the succinct rendering of the "set of normative premises . . . focused upon a general and fundamental axiom which I call the axiom of prescriptive altruism." He "ascribes it to the realm of moral values in contraposition to the realm of jural values ordered to the politico-jural domain" though, he adds, "the actualities of kinship relations and kinship behavior are compounded of elements derived from both domains" (Fortes 1969: 251).

The word "amity" scarcely occurs earlier in his work, but it may be assumed that he did not choose it carelessly, for the concept is implicit in his thinking on

* "The kith and the kin" was first published in 1973 in the edited volume *The character of kinship* and is reproduced in this volume with permission from Cambridge University Press.

1. The Shorter OED glosses the phrase *kith and kin* as follows: "*orig*. Country and kinsfolk; in later use, acquaintance and kinsfolk: now often taken as pleonastic for kinsfolk, relatives." The word "kith" we are told is obsolete or archaic except in this phrase, and we are also told that it is derived from a root that means "to know" and in later times it was occasionally confused with kin. How this confusion should have been able to occur is a matter on which it is hoped this essay will throw light. It will also be seen that Radcliffe-Brown's gloss as "neighbor" is an oversimplification.

the subject of kinship long before it appears in print.[2] I do not recall him using it in his lectures on the subject which I attended between 1948 and 1950 and my lecture notes (unsurprisingly perhaps) do not mention the word, but when I encountered it in 1970 I recognized that it was naming an idea with which I was already acquainted from his work. The axiom of prescriptive altruism is called into existence by the initial assumption that everyman, individually or in solidarity with a collectivity with which he identifies himself, seeks his own interest and advancement, be it directly or through the medium of reciprocity, immediate or deferred, direct or by some system of exchange as complex and circuitous as the Kula of the Trobriand Islanders and their neighbors. (This initial assumption is indeed a necessary condition for the formulation of the notion of reciprocity.) Where reciprocity is lacking it ceases to be true and an explanation of another order is required. This is provided by the counter-principle of "altruism," prescribed for behavior between kin.

But why "amity"? The word is derived from the French word for friendship and it does not appear to contain any sense which is not covered by its Anglo-Saxon synonym. In view of this the choice looks curious, for friendship, far from being commonly regarded as the essence of kinship is usually opposed to it, as indeed it is in the same work by Fortes himself who refers, not only to the testimony of Goody and Malinowski (1969: 63), but of the Tallensi (ibid. 63) and the Ashanti (ibid. 192) who both possess, we are told, contrasting words for kinship and friendship. The terms appear to be exclusive to one another, not only in the case of the Tallensi and the Ashanti, but also in the view of many scholars (some of whom have even supposed, despite many examples to the contrary, including the "bondfriends" of Tikopia (Firth 1967a, 1967b), that the concept of friendship is an invention of soi-disant "civilized society" which has abandoned kinship as an organizing principle). It appears, then, that Fortes has chosen to define the essence of kinship by appealing to the very concept of what it is not. To some "kinship scholars" this may look like selling the pass, but I shall argue that it offers the possibility of placing the notion of kinship in a wider framework and of escaping from the polemics concerning its relationship to physical reproduction. Indeed the necessity to do just this is evident when

2. He states that the concept was brought to his notice a dozen years earlier in the work of Peter Lawrence and he refers to the usage of the word "amity" by Burridge (1960) (Fortes 1970: 240). In fact, he had already referred to sacrifice as "both an expression and a pledge of mutual amity and dependence" (Fortes 1945: 98).

we approach the most perplexing kinship system in the annals of anthropology, that of the Eskimo, who appear to attach scant diacritical importance in their designation of their kinsmen to the facts of birth.[3]

Let me adopt what I believe to be, by implication rather than explicitly, Fortes' (1969: 239–42) standpoint, and divide social relations first of all into those of amity or the contrary and then divide these (might one say it?) "amiable" relations into kin and non-kin; it then becomes apparent that, despite the common opposition of the terms kinship and friendship, there is room for variants partaking in the properties of both, between the pole of kinship, inflexible, involuntary, immutable, established by birth and subject to the pressures of "the politico-jural domain" (in Fortes' words) and the pole of friendship, pure and simple, which is its contrary in each of these ways. All these "amiable" relations imply a moral obligation to feel—or at least to feign—sentiments which commit the individual to actions of altruism, to generosity. The moral obligation is to forego self-interest in favor of another, to sacrifice oneself *for the sake* of someone else.

A system of thought that takes the individual as its starting-point and assumes that he is motivated by self-interest, faces a difficulty in confronting the examples of behavior that is not so motivated and this difficulty has given rise in Western literature to theories of altruism, moral, religious, and psychological. We need not here go into them, for the majority of the world's cultures do *not* share the individualism of the modern West and have no need to explain what appears to them evident: that the self is not the individual self alone, but includes, according to circumstances, those with whom the self is conceived as solidary, in the first place, his kin. *Alter* then means not "all other individuals" but "all who are opposed to self, the non-amiable." We have been told that in many simple societies relations with all who are not kin are necessarily hostile. Whether we are right to believe this or not, there is no lack of examples, from equally simple societies, or institutions which create "artificial" ties of kinship on the basis of mutual agreement rather than of birth.[4] Thus, if Fortes would make

3. "When a child was adopted at birth or soon afterwards it became, socially, a true child of its adoptive parents. The kinship terms used in this case were exactly the same as those of a consanguinal relationship" (d'Anglure 1967). As the author makes clear, to give a child in adoption was an alternative to infanticide.

4. This was part of Robertson Smith's argument regarding blood-brotherhood which he believed demonstrated that kinship was originally the only effective form of social tie. See also Fortes (1969: 241).

kinship a category of amity, we must also observe, with him, that non-kin amity loves to masquerade as kinship. This leads us to the question: when is kinship artificial and when is it "true kinship"? The criterion of birth is hardly adequate everywhere, even for defining the relationship between mother and child as Smith's study of Carriacou[5] or the Eskimo, cited above, showed. From this also stems the difficulty of distinguishing analytically between the various forms of ritualized friendship and even non-ritualized friendship. The distinction between blood-brotherhood and spiritual kinship or bond-friendship depends, if not simply on the whim of the ethnographer in his choice of terms, on the particular substance or technique employed in the rite initiating a pseudo-kin relationship. But given the various connotations of blood in different cultures this criterion is clearly inappropriate for setting up a general category of institutions. How many forms of what has been called "blood-brotherhood" employ *both* the concepts of "blood" and "brotherhood"?

Though kinship, the extension of self, cannot be reduced simply to the ties established through birth and marriage, nevertheless physical reproduction furnishes everywhere the model of such extensions, for if birth is not a sufficient criterion of filial status in all societies, at least there are none in which it is not the primordial mode of ascribing it. It is also the mode of linkage between kinsmen whichever links may be recognized. This is equally so in the case of affinity which looks to relations of co-filiation in the future, even where they do not yet exist, and even where this hope is not in fact rewarded, it is nonetheless by virtue of the hypothetical child of the marriage that affinal relationships *are* what they *are* within the structure of kinship. Moreover even though affines are

5. Smith (1962: 196, 234, 270). The difficulty of distinguishing is not confined to the criteria adopted for filiation. For example, in the highlands of Chiapas the term "kermano" (my brother) is often found in use between fellow-members of the same township (sometimes also called "tribe"). The word is a Spanish loan from "hermano" (brother) and this has led a number of anthropologists to argue that this usage of a kin term demonstrates the recognition of kinship to all members of the tribe. In fact *kermano* is not a kinship term but a pseudo-kinship term introduced by the monks who used it between themselves and no doubt thought it appropriate for use between members of the religious sodalities which are the backbone of the political government of the Indian communities. This becomes plain when we observe that the term *kermano* is applied without regard for relative seniority and that the first rule of Tzeltal and Tzotzil kinship distinguishes between elder brother and younger brother; there is no "true" kin category of brother undifferentiated as to age. *Kermano* is not merely a Spanish loan in contrast to the other terms of kinship which are Maya, it is not part of the kinship system at all.

by definition allied through marriage, if the marriage is sterile their relationship does not become fully effective, for their mutual roles hinge upon their relations to the offspring. My brother-in-law is above all my child's mother's brother or my sister's child's father in any society. For this reason, a sterile marriage, though it may figure in genealogies, is never considered in a kinship diagram. "The full significance of marriage alliance lies in the kinship it creates." This remains true even though the act of sexual union is in itself a means of establishing ritual alliance, as we can see in the customs of sexual hospitality, wife exchange, or temple prostitution. Brothers-in-law who do not stand as father and mother's brother to the same child, the two families who have married their children but have no grandchildren, are allied, but one is tempted to say ritually rather than structurally, for they will never become consanguineal kin of the same person. Their relationship remains frozen at the point of departure, unproductive and immobile like the ties of ritual kinship.

The distinction between natural systems conceived by the scientist and systems of thought devised in different cultures to explain the world of experience must always be made from the start and the latter, not the former, is where the principles of kinship are to be found, but if our explanation of them is to have general validity they must be common to all cultures. Children are everywhere thought to be *of the same substance as* their parents because they are produced by them; "like breeds like" in every system of thought. How it does so varies greatly, for the necessary conditions for physical reproduction may be interpreted in many ways. Sometimes the blood is thought to be transmitted from parents to children as in our own culture. Elsewhere other bodily substances may be passed on. In lineally organized societies one may find that a different substance is thought to be acquired from either father or mother. Nonetheless this principle of the likeness of those connected biologically provides always the most impelling manifestations of what I should like to call *consubstantiality,* the prime nexus between individuals for the extension of self. This is what kinship is "made of" however the selective principles of the kinship system in question may order the classification of those who are connected in this way.

Louis Dumont (1971: 37) has opposed "a logic of substance" to "a structural logic for which each relationship is what it *is* by virtue of its place in an *ensemble*." The stress laid on the notion of substance in the concept I have devised to account for amity should not mislead the reader into thinking that my argument belongs to the former rather than the latter. The "substance" on which consubstantiality is founded is the *notion* of substance only, a notion as

far divorced from the physical scientist's concept as that of Christian consubstantiality. Indeed the consubstantial in religious thought is but one manifestation of the universal notion that possession of a common substance is the basis of a mystical bond. The very different doctrine of consubstantiation is another demonstration of the same principle.

Amity derives in the first place then from consubstantiality either through birth or through fostering: the ingestion of the mother's milk. The strongest emphasis is given to foster-motherhood in the thought of the Eskimos where it is equated with birth as the pretext for the maternal bond, but the same notion is surely present, if in a weaker form, in those societies where fostering, though not equated with full motherhood, nevertheless creates between foster children a prohibition of incest. The Koran provides the best-known example[6] but we can also point to the pervasiveness of the idea in the custom of sanctuary by which an enemy can render himself immune by touching the breast of his aggressor's mother (Pitt-Rivers 1970).

Consubstantiality can also be established by the act of love. The idea is most explicit in Christian marriage which makes the spouses "of one flesh." Conversely an unconsummated marriage is not a marriage in the eyes of the Catholic Church and the Albigensian heretics who maintained the contrary gave their supposed founders, the Bulgarians, a bad name which is with us to this day. Moreover, not only the mother's husband but in many kinship systems her illicit lover is consubstantial with her and the child is recognized as the product of their consubstantiality. Thus the status of genitor may be recognized by people who entertain quite different notions of begetting (Fortes 1970: 96–7). By this principle a Trobriand father is consubstantial with his progeny via his union with its mother regardless of whatever theory of generation the anthropologists manage to attribute to that much-glossed people. Consubstantiality within the nuclear family is thus seen to be in no way dependent upon a "correct" theory of procreation. A curious example from our own culture might be cited to demonstrate the profound roots of the idea: it is often believed in the sporting world that a thoroughbred mare will be spoiled forever for breeding purposes if she is first mounted by an ill-bred stallion. Her subsequent foals will all bear the mark of this first unworthy consubstantiality. In the same spirit I am told that the Kennel Club used to refuse to register litters of a pure-bred bitch subsequent to a mongrel litter. A more mystical idea could scarcely enter the heads of persons

6. Ch IV (Sales' translation).

concerned practically with breeding. Is it exaggerated to suggest that they have projected on to those animals which they so eagerly assimilate to the human kind the basic premise of all kinship systems? The same principle of consubstantiality through sexual union can also be invoked to explain the prohibition of incest in relation to a woman with whom a man's brother has had sexual relations in certain North American tribes, or, vice versa, the establishment of ritual kinship through wife exchange among the Eskimos, as also among the Chamars; among the Plains Indians, the use of the term "brother" between two men who have had intercourse with the same woman bears the same sense. In the first case the man's paramour has become kin (and therefore inaccessible) to his brother; in the second, two men who were not previously related become pseudo-brothers through the same channel.

The initial tie of kinship can be modified[7] or reproduced by acts of individual will. Consubstantiality can be established by other ways than by breeding as the example of blood brotherhood shows. The tie of amity can he formalized even without any demonstration of consubstantiality, but by a mystical analogy with parenthood, as in the *compadrazgo.* In brief, the reproduction of the tie of kinship appears to follow either the principle of consubstantiality or that of simulation. In the first instance the principle of consubstantiality can be invoked to explain all those forms of blood brotherhood, using the term in a loose sense, which are established through a rite involving direct exchange, as it were: the ingestion of a bodily substance of the future brother. The rite commonly involves mixing the blood of the two participants before swallowing it and often mixing it with another liquid. But this is not the only way in which such rites can function, for we also find the same bond established, indirectly as it were, through the ingestion together of a sacramental substance, solid or liquid, without any *exchange* of bodily substance. Thus blood, saliva, semen, milk, meat, fruit, vegetables, or beer can make consubstantial those who are related through no womb, vagina or breast. Moreover, this same principle is to be found in relationships in

7. From my field notes I am able to provide an example of modification in a family of small tenant-farmers in Andalusia: a dominant mother married her son to the girl who came to work for them. The child born of this marriage was taught to call her grandmother "mama" and to call her mother by her Christian name (a practice totally unknown otherwise). In effect the grandmother usurped the status of parent and turned mother and child into siblings. This case was unique in my experience in Andalusia, but the adoption of the status of parent to a grandchild appears to be very frequent among the Eskimos.

which the ritual aspects is not explicit; the exchange of food through commensality is a means of sealing friendship in many more societies than our own and I have pointed elsewhere to its importance as a rite in the integration of strangers throughout the world (Pitt-Rivers 1967b). The first social criterion of a common humanity is to be able to eat the same food, but this is no more than the weakest form of a principle which leads, via the rituals of blood-brotherhood, to the commensality involved in sacrifice and to the fellowship of the Holy Ghost. It is the multiplicity of contexts in which the notion of consubstantiality is effective that validates it in preference to more restricted explanations.

The principle of simulation can account for all the other forms of ritual kinship of which the best known is undoubtedly the *compadrazgo* of the Mediterranean and Latin America. Here ritual ties of kinship are established on an *analogy* with the nuclear family, not through consubstantiality but through a spiritual emanation, called in the case of the *compadrazgo,* "grace"—this concept is fundamental to the institution of baptism from which *compadrazgo* derives and it is seen in the popular usage of the phrase "padres de gracia" (grace parents) to refer to the god-parents.

The simulation of the Holy Nuclear Family in the institution of godparenthood has been very well brought out by Stephen Gudeman (1972). Simulation is also the principle which establishes ritual siblingship in some of the forms of bond-friendship, but the two principles of consubstantiality and simulation are anything but exclusive to one another. Indeed, it is significant that the forms of *fictive compadrazgo* often utilize the principle of consubstantiality: in northern coastal Peru it may be established through broaching together a barrel of *chicha* and in Spain there exists a fictive form initiated by the ritual ingestion of a peach with two kernels which is halved between the would-be *compadres*. Something similar is done in Mexico with a double corncob. The twinship represented by the double fruit is absorbed by the participants. The bond of brotherhood established through delivery by the same midwife—in the case of the Eskimos such a bond even establishes an incest taboo—might be interpreted in accordance with either principle: the midwife can be viewed as surrogate mother or as the person through whose hands the act of birth was accomplished.[8]

8. The analogy of Frazer's principles of magic will not have escaped the reader, and Frazer himself viewed blood-brotherhood as an example of homoeopathic magic. It is worth also pointing out that both magic and ritual kinship involve

Let us examine, then, within the realm of amity the analytical distinctions to be made.[9] The people themselves commonly distinguish between "real" kin and adopted kin; and the distinction is significant, since only the "real" kin are fully part of the kinship system. It must always be shown whether the adopted kin (and this is never in any way the case with ritual kin) accede through adoption to a status identical with a born kinsman. There are in fact few examples where this *is* the case. More usually the adopted child does *not* sever his kin-ties with his born kin and adopts those of his adopter to a limited degree in supplement to his own. Moreover, he does not necessarily become subject to the incest prohibition in relation to his adoptive siblings (though this is sometimes the case with ritual kinsmen). One of the forms of adoption in Japan is practiced precisely with the intention of marrying the adopted son to a born daughter. The Eskimo, on the other hand, appear to equate their adoptive kin to real kin in all ways and if this is so one might put it better by saying that, unlike the rest of the world (except perhaps certain corners of New Guinea), they recognize the possibility of changing "real" kin relations, rather as we, like them, recognize today the possibility of changing marital relations. Elsewhere kin status is established by birth and kin role is expected to be performed by those who have kin status. The Eskimo appear to attach less importance to birth than others and to attach much more to the fact of residence. One can understand that those who spend the winter in a warm womb made of snow, far separated spatially from their less close kinsmen, should be inclined to give priority in their evaluation of kin relationships to the facts of residence in the present over the record of origins in the past, but I would not press an ecological explanation. The evidence appears to me not yet conclusive that genuine kin-status can be acquired other than by birth or by adoption in infancy, though this has been asserted. Nonetheless we can say that in Eskimo society kin-role tends to establish kin-status rather than

associations effectuated through the two principles of which Lévi-Strauss has made such striking use: metonym and metaphor. Consubstantiality involves association through a direct line ($x = y$), simulation through a link between two relationships (x is to a as y is to b). Two blood-brothers are consubstantial, but a godfather is to a godchild spiritually as a father is to a child terrestrially.

9. *Cf.* Pitt-Rivers (1968a). It must be noted that the expressions "ritual kinship" and "pseudo-kinship" are in fact misnomers, for the relationship reproduced is not one of kinship but of the nuclear family. They are always blood-*brothers*, god-*parents*, or –*children*, but there are no blood-*cousins* or god-*uncles*, (a point which is not without significance for the theory of kinship). I shall continue to use the words ritual and pseudo-*kinship* nonetheless for the sake of convenience.

the contrary. In addition to transposing upon non-kin, through various forms of pseudo-kinship the attitudes idealized in the image of kinship, the Eskimo also make them in certain relationships kin.

Such marginal cases may be difficult to decide, for the extent of the fiction involved in adoption varies greatly. But this does not obliterate the necessity to recognize the distinction between adoptive kin and "real" kin insofar as it is distinguishable in terms of status and insofar as it is in fact distinguished by the people themselves. Adoption involves a jural fiction which is accompanied by a social fiction to a greater or lesser extent: the rights and obligations of filial status may be acquired by persons not born to the parent in default of a child to fulfil them (or in addition to the children born). The adoption is jural in the first place rather than moral and it involves no special demonstration of consubstantiality nor of mystical bonds. The adopted kinsman is a surrogate, a make-shift kinsman, born not of flesh and blood but of necessity. In all these ways he can be contrasted with the ritual kinsman whose position does not aspire to assimilate him to the literal kin. The ritual kinsman is not a *fictive* kinsman at all but a *figurative* one whose role, far from being identical with the literal kin is, rather, complementary. Thus, once the distinction between kin and pseudokin has been made we face a much more significant distinction between jural and non-jural kin. It would be misleading to name them moral kin for this would imply that literal and adoptive kinship have no moral domain and this would expel them from that of "amiable relations." Yet it is the very essence of ritual kinship that it is excluded from the jural domain. In this it partakes of the nature of friendship, a relationship founded upon sentiment not upon rights and duties.

To express it in the form of a diagram:



Fig. 2

It has not perhaps been sufficiently realized that there is a theoretical antithesis between the notions of jural and moral relations (though Fortes has done much to emphasize it).[10] They have frequently been confused and for good reasons: all those who exercise power claim that they do so in accordance with moral values and even arrogate to themselves the right to dictate what these are. No legislator can afford to admit that he does not speak for the society as a whole and represent its moral consensus, if not the will of its deities, for to do so would expose his authority to question and authority questioned is authority lost. Therefore, the tyrant's crowning glory is legitimacy and he uses all his power to attain it, for without the moral charter that it represents he cannot "sleep o' nights." Yet the moment one concerns oneself with ethnographic fact rather than political theory the different natures of law and morality become evident. Moral values are seated in the sentiments and conscience of the individual and they cannot be induced by coercion, for free will is their very essence; jural values are derived from institutions which govern relations *between* individuals. Where all are in agreement there is no need for sanctions (without which law is said not to be able to exist). Hence jural sanctions fulfil the function of transposing moral conflicts into the jural domain where they find their resolution at the level of action; they cease to be *moral* once sentiments become subjected to jural concepts of right and obligation, and the moral autonomy of the individual to the judgments of society.

The notion of friendship is founded upon sentiment, but at the same time, the sentiments of the participants must be mutual, for it is a particularistic relationship, not a general attitude. For this reason, it is said that the friend of everybody has no friend. There must be reciprocity in friendship, for failure to reciprocate in action is a denial of the reciprocity of sentiment, yet this cannot be admitted for fear of the relationship becoming jural. The only sanction in friendship is the withdrawal of sentiment, for to a friend one can have only moral commitments. If friendship is placed upon a jural basis it denies its nature: the altruism which is its foundation is revealed to be false. Lacking the sentiment of amity, it is nothing but the exploitation of an implicit right to reciprocity. The paradox of friendship lies in this: though the favors of friends must be free, they must still be reciprocated if the moral status quo is to be

10. I use the term "jural" as Fortes in the phrase "the jural domain" where the actor is the "right-and-duty-bearing person" in contrast to the moral domain in which he is the sentient being.

maintained. Hence the typology of friendship suggested by Eric Wolf (1966: 10 ff.) which would divide the institution into instrumental and expressive or emotional friendship invites confusion, for it is founded upon the unverifiable motives of the participants, who remain ever in potential doubt as to the exact nature of the sentiments which they inspire.[11] By definition all friendship must be both sentimental in inspiration and instrumental in effects, since there is no other way to demonstrate one's sentiments than through those actions which speak plainer than words. The instrumental aspect validates the affect. This much is true anywhere, though the degree to which the utility of friendship is overtly recognized or its emotional expression is thought proper varies from one culture to another and according to social circumstances; the age and sex of the participants, the number of their friends, the extent of their recognized commitment, their relative status and so forth can all be invoked in explanation of the characteristics of friendship in a given situation, but once a tally of favors is kept the amity has gone out of it and we are left with a tacit contract; the relationship is no longer simply moral but implicitly jural. The injured party can declare what is due to him and can take steps towards its recovery, exercising the sanctions which relate to reputation. But these cannot be used while the moral nature of the relationship is still accepted, for the disillusioned friend who complains that his favors have not been reciprocated destroys his own reputation by implying that he expected they should be, that he gave them only out of calculation in expectation of a return. Friendship often totters on the brink of this admission, but once it is made it cannot be retrieved and the relationship collapses, for it has been revealed that the sentiment is not mutual. For this reason it is precisely in those situations where economic cooperation is effectuated under the guise of friendship that the loudest claims to disinterestedness are heard. In the system of cooperation between neighboring farmers in the southwest of France great stress is always laid on the absence of any accounting—"je ne suis pas regardant"—but the helping hand (coup de main) of the neighbor is nonetheless a vital element in the economic system. It is operative above all in times of crisis, hence everyman would like to be in a position of credit with regards his neighbors in that system of dyadic ties that admits no accounting. It can be

11. "A man, sir, should keep his friendship in good repair," said Samuel Johnson (quoted by Jean La Fontaine, Munro Lectures, 1971) yet he did not succeed in doing so himself well enough to save Mrs. Thrale from wondering whether he came to dine with her only out of gluttony.

viewed as an insurance system and it is this which makes reckoning impossible and lays a premium on the value of goodwill. One might even say, pursuing the analogy, that the "premium" is the reputation for goodwill without which a man is unlikely to receive his neighbor's help. Such a system depends upon an approximate equivalence in economic terms of what each neighbor can put into it and it therefore breaks down with the introduction of new expensive machinery whose economic viability has to be exactly calculated.

There is a second paradox in friendship: moral equality is essential even between unequals, for the only admissible reciprocity is in sentiments. It must be accepted that *my* sentiments are of the same value as *yours* even though I cannot demonstrate them by material equivalence—"it's the thought that counts." For this reason, economic equivalence must be denied. Yet for this reason also it becomes possible to find a structure of patronage erected upon the ties of friendship between unequals: protection and influence are given in return for service and prestige, and the greater the value of protection the greater the counterprestation that can be expected in return. Thus the moral basis of the relationship frees it from economic equivalence to the advantage of the patron who gives in return for the labor which he receives only the assurance that his clients will not be victimized by others as powerful as himself. Nor is there anything surprising in the fact that ruling classes, once their position is secure, should attempt to juralize their ties with their clients and invoke legal sanctions to ensure their fidelity. Amity can be dispensed with at that point.

The difficulty inherent in moral relationships is that they depend on the state of the heart which cannot be known for sure, since sentiments can be feigned. How can the fidelity of friends be secured if they cannot be subjected to jural provisions for the reasons given above? Ritual comes into its own at this point, for it confirms social relations in their legitimacy and permanence. Appeals to divine witness, manifest in the oath, seek to shore up by supernatural sanctions that which cannot be entrusted to human justice and the analogy with literal kinship invokes the immutability attaching to consubstantiality by birth. The simulation of kinship in ritual kinship is inspired by this concern: to borrow the qualities attached to "real" kinship in order to cement a relationship initiated by nothing more than mutual agreement. It is only this which distinguishes the *blood-brother* from the bond *friend.*

There is another point: the permanence of a relationship cannot be assured by contract, for jural reciprocity is terminated by the counterprestation. Once the material account is wound up each party regains his freedom and if actions

speak plainer than words in the present they say nothing about the future. The assurance that cooperation will be maintained in the unforeseeable situations to come can only be secured by the permanence of sentiments, the attachments of the heart. Hence if moral contracts are sometimes guaranteed (at the cost of their moral nature) by jural stipulations, we also find that the participants in jural reciprocity are tempted to secure the permanence of their ties by instigating a relationship of amity; once tried the business associates become kith; trading partners ritualize their relationship and go so far in the emulation of kinship as to grant a preferential right to each other's daughters in marriage, even, going further, in another example, to recognize an incest prohibition between their children. Thus the moral and jural domains each look to the other over their antinomy for the security they lack.

Let us look more closely at the notion of reciprocity. I have shown that it is essential to the *practice* of friendship, but at the same time I have accepted Fortes' definition of amity as the axiom of prescriptive altruism, "sharing without reckoning"(Fortes 1969: 238). Since altruism might be taken to exclude reciprocity we appear to be headed for a logical contradiction. First of all, the reciprocity of amity is of the heart and instrumental reciprocities can be accepted only as manifestations of sentiment and only as long as their potential interpretation as economic transactions is disallowed.[12] But prescriptive altruism implies something more than that material equivalence cannot be admitted. It implies that there must be a genuine desire to give without wanting a return. To resolve the contradiction, we must go back to the notion of the gift.

Altruism is founded upon the concept of the unreciprocated gift, the "free gift." Gifts may be thought to be free, but they must nevertheless be repaid, for they are transactions which establish a moral relationship between donor and recipient. If they are not returned they change the nature of the relationship, hence Mauss subtitled his essay on that subject "on the necessity to return presents." We may well ask then, what is the "free gift" free of? It would appear that it is free of any jural obligation. It is an act of homage, a demonstration of the state of the heart. Something of the person of the donor accompanies the gift so that all gifts are, over and above their economic value, gifts of self, for they

12. On this point see Bourdieu (1972: 228) who refers to "la méconnaissance institutionnellement organisée et garantie qui est au principe de l'échange de dons." The whole chapter is of the greatest importance for an understanding of the notion of reciprocity.

remain morally attached to the giver. Therefore, though they are, and must be, conceived as free of obligation they create a relationship of amity which must receive recognition—(the cognate word is used in French for gratitude). The unacknowledged gift, far from honoring the recipient, humiliates the donor. The slang expression "brush off" puts graphically the refusal to accept the tie of proffered amity.

The gift might be defined then as an act of dispossession of self in favor of a person with whom a relation of amity is desired, i.e. through whom the donor wishes to extend his self. As a moral act it is first of all dispossession on the part of the donor rather than an accretion to the recipient. The use of flowers as gifts in our society makes the point tellingly: the giver may be poorer—he certainly is, these days, if he has to buy them—but the recipient is no richer. But since, excluding this example, this is likely to be the same thing in material terms, an ambiguity creeps in which renders such transactions always liable to misinterpretation. To give to someone in need (because his need is recognized) is not to honor him but to humiliate him because it is implied that he cannot reciprocate. Thus the same gesture can bear two contradictory interpretations as to its moral significance. Gifts of alms to beggars are truly free, but beggars have a special status which places them outside the network of dyadic ties, at the same time execrable and divinely sanctioned (Pitt-Rivers 1968b).

Gifts, then, can either honor or humiliate; the beggar seals his inferior status by accepting on the basis of non-reciprocity, the honored recipient gives acknowledgement and recognizes the moral bond established in this way. But on account of this ambiguity they can also be given as a challenge to reciprocate, for failure to do so entails humiliation, as in the *potlach,* where the interpretation of the initial feast as either an expression of honor or contempt is left to be decided by the response.

The act of dispossession, as Gusdorf (1948) saw, aspires to convert having into being, a material possession into a moral state, and this is the basic mechanism of the gift, as it is of sacrifice. Both aim at the establishment of a moral relationship. The recipient of a gift commits himself by accepting it to proceed to an equivalent act. The reciprocal gifts of friendship therefore pass through a moral converter, as it were, which renders their material aspect contingent. In jural reciprocity the material aspect is primary, the moral relationship is contingent. Accepting this distinction, we can see that moral reciprocity is unspecific as to equivalence, time and even in the extreme case the person from whom it is due, while jural reciprocity is the opposite and we can construct a scale

ranging from systems of purely jural to purely moral reciprocity. The immediate and direct exchanges of commerce are purely jural; the self is in no way extended through them. They require no more moral input than agreement as to the equivalence of the articles exchanged and the undertaking to abide by the rules. Systems of indirect exchange are necessarily less specific and require a greater degree of trust; social sanctions replace legal sanctions. The time lag between prestation and counter-prestation recedes into the unforeseen future.[13] When we reach undifferentiated exchange even the person who should furnish the reciprocity is unspecified. Trust is no longer a question of confidence in a specific known individual but in the rest of humanity; "do ut des" becomes "do as you would be done by," the first moral principle a child learns. It depends on nothing more than the collective acceptance of the same values. The end of the scale is reached when no return gift in any form is envisaged—at any rate this side of Paradise. A good deed is its own reward. Such abstract generosity finds little place in the simple bounded societies studied by most anthropologists but corresponds rather to universalistic religions which proclaim the *brotherhood* of all mankind. Self aspires to a universal extension. With this we find the conception of dispossession of self for its own sake, the renunciation of the world, the annihilation of personal ambition, the end of all jural engagements.

Before we reach this extreme we encounter the principle of kinship amity. The reciprocity is undifferentiated in that it requires that a member of the group shall sacrifice himself for another, that kinsmen shall respect preferential rules of conduct towards one another regardless of their individual interests. Such reciprocity as there is comes from the fact that other kinsmen do likewise. Parents are expected to sacrifice themselves for their children but they also expect that their children will do the same for theirs. The reciprocity alternates down the chain of generations, assuring that the grandparental generation will be repaid in the persons of the grandchildren to whom they are linked by that principle that Radcliffe-Brown first made clear. The system of reciprocity is not closed as in the Kula system, but open towards the future. It is no longer consciously conceived but implicit only, in the operation of a code of behavior.

If kinship's nature can be defined by the principle of amity it is not free of jural considerations. Rights and duties are distributed differentially to kinsmen because kinship is a system not a network of dyadic ties like friendship. Status within it is ascribed by birth. Siblings occupy an equivalent position within it

13. The temporal dimension of reciprocity is examined by Maurice Bloch (1973).

until they marry, but their children will not have the same consanguineal kin as they or as each other. The progress from generation to generation implies continual differentiation. Rules of succession and inheritance are required to order that which cannot be left to the manifestations of brotherly love. Those who have identical interests at birth have opposed interests by the time they are grandfathers. A revealing assertion echoes through the literature on ritual kinship: "Blood-brothers are like brothers," it is said, then comes, "in fact they are closer than real brothers." The implication is troubling for it would appear that true fraternity is found only between those who are not real brothers. Amity does not everywhere enjoin the same open-ended generosity least of all between kinsmen, who quarrel only too often in contrast to ritual kinsmen who are bound by sacred duty not to do so. But kinsmen quarrel along predictable lines. Amity, the basis of their solidarity in the face of the non-amiable, is laid in abeyance when the non-kin are forgotten and the demands of the social structure reassert themselves. Society imposes its rules, but imposes them, not on individuals as such, but on relationships. The individual is the same person throughout his life but in the course of the developmental cycle his status changes. Rites of passage mark these changes and set the seal of recognition on his changed relationship to others. But individuals are finite in contrast to the continuity of the social unit within which they live and which requires them to replace each other as they grow up, grow old and vanish. Hence one can distinguish between the person in himself, the self as individual, the seat of the sentiments, and the person in society, the "right and duty-bearing person," the *social* self. The distinction is clearly marked in the naming system of our own culture: the Christian name identifies the person in himself and distinguishes him from his siblings, the surname identifies him as a member of a social group (family or lineage). Now it is significant that while he gets his surname automatically from his parents, his Christian name is given to him in the ritual of baptism not by his parents but by his godparents. This is the occasion for initiating the ties of ritual kinship which are known as the *compadrazgo*.[14] Ritual kinship is, in every context here, opposed to real kinship. In its conceptualization it is sacred rather than profane and in the roles which it creates it is complementary not supplementary to real kinship. Moreover the amity which it imposes is recognized as

14. I have made a more detailed study of this institution and its relations to the naming systems of Europe in Pitt-Rivers, 1976. [The essay is also reproduced in this volume, Chapter 6. *Ed.*]

purer than that which links real kin precisely because it is not prescriptive. "You can refuse your *compadre* nothing," it is said, "all that is yours is his," a statement that is certainly never made about brothers in the Andalusia from which this statement comes. Despite the political uses to which it is put the relationship remains ideally, that is to say, conceptually, a *purely* moral one, untrammeled by the jural domain which regulates the affairs of the social family. It is subject only to individual will and the values of the heart.

It is significant also that it is invoked at the rites of passage of the godchild who is sponsored at each step in his progress towards adulthood by a godparent (in place of a parent) and whose individual destiny is pursued under this patronage. The godparent can be viewed then as the guardian of the individual self in opposition to the social self which is under the protection of the parents. In the Mediterranean, excluding the tribal areas, the nuclear family is the effective unit of kinship and the individual destiny of the child is to found his own nuclear family replacing that of his parents. Hence the godparents are chosen only from outside the nuclear family and are in fact frequently kinsmen. The conflict of interest between parents and children is assuaged by the role of the godparent who is *compadre* (coparent) to the parents. Thus he is a kind of spiritual affine bound to the parent like a terrestrial affine in common interest and in conflict. Indeed, it is said that *consuegros* (co-parents-in-law) are *compadres*. But whereas *consuegros* are bound in earthly rivalry in relation to their common grandchildren, the parent and godparent are concerned in different aspects of the same child and differentiated by their responsibility either material or spiritual: that is to say by their activity or inactivity within the jural domain. For this reason, though *consuegros* are said to be *compadres*, the tenor of their relationship is very different. In the tribal society of Serbia studied by Hammel the opposition to the social self must come from outside the range of kinship altogether (Pitt-Rivers 1976) and we therefore find that godparenthood is vested in a lineage which is unrelated to the parents.

The example might be taken as no more than a peculiarity of traditional Mediterranean culture were it not in so many ways reminiscent of the institutions of ritual kinship in other parts of the world. In all the contexts in which the individual destiny of the person is at stake one is liable to find the ritual kinsman in a leading role: birth, initiation and death. This is not to deny the importance of kin on such occasions but the sense of their participation is different. We have seen that the midwife is often considered as a kind of ritual kinswoman and in mortuary ceremonies the blood brother, like the godparent, comes to the fore in a

complementary role. The lineal kin are concerned with the future ancestor, while the corpse, all that remains of the person in himself, is handled by the blood-brother. (In Spain the child's coffin is commonly paid for by the godfather, rather than the father.) Now this is not always the case, but it is significant that where it is not, a similar role is frequently accorded to the non-lineal kin or to the affines. This leads me to suggest that for the purpose of examining the notion of amity, we should perhaps revise the distinction represented in the diagram on page 130 and distinguish the jural and the non-jural kin, not simply on the basis of real versus ritual kin, but of structurally stressed versus unstressed kin. The former would still include adoptive kin of whom we saw that they owe their status to the acquisition of rights and obligations within the nuclear family, while the latter would be comprised not only of the ritual kin *always* but, according to the particular social structure certain of the non-lineal kin, commonly the mother's brother in a patrilineal system, or the father in a matrilineal—and also normally the affines, the non-lineal kin of the next generation. These are the people whose amity is free of jural pressures and who are found in consequence in the role of sponsor of the individual self; at initiation ceremonies,[15] as gift-givers at the stages of advancement in a child's development, at marriages, as undertakers in mortuary rites, as peacemakers in tribal disputes. Their concern is not with the solidarity of the group but with individuals through personal attachments.

The complementarity which Fortes perceived between filiation through lineal descent and complementary filiation which comes from descent in the unstressed line (as I would put it) and gives rise to membership of no social group corresponds to the distinction between extensions of self along the lines of primary grouping, i.e. jural corporation, and extensions across these lines to persons whose amity does not derive from common membership of a social unit, from shared identity.

The complementarity is therefore not *only* between lines of filiation but, at the level of the person, between two aspects of his social relations, two *personae* of the same individual: the baby and the heir, the affine and the sibling, the bond-friend and the clansman, the blood-brother and the age-mate, the lover and the spouse, the corpse and the ancestor, the kith and the kin.

15. Examples abound in the literature on Africa. Let me mention only two. The role of the father in the initiation ceremonies of the matrilineal Ndembu (see Turner 1969) is essentially similar to that of the mother's brother in those of the patrilineal Gisu. In this connection La Fontaine (1971) speaks of the mother's brother as a patron.

CHAPTER 6

Ritual kinship in the Mediterranean: Spain and the Balkans*[1]

THE NATURE OF THE INSTITUTION

There is a large measure of homogeneity throughout the Catholic world in that institution of religious sponsorship that is commonly referred to in anthropological literature as *compadrazgo*.[2] The pretext for establishing ties through sponsorship may vary in accordance with local custom; the duties of the sponsor,

* "Ritual kinship in the Mediterranean: Spain and the Balkans" was first published in 1976 in the edited volume *Mediterranean family structures* and is reproduced in this volume with permission from Cambridge University Press.

1. With reference to E. A. Hammel (1968).

2. This is no doubt on account of its importance in Hispanic society and the volume of anthropological literature devoted to Latin America. I use the term, as others have done before me, to include the whole network of ties initiated by the sponsoring of a child at baptism, or at a subsequent religious ritual such as confirmation or marriage. Strictly speaking, of course, the relation between the sponsor and the sponsored should be referred to as *padrinazgo* and *compadrazgo* should refer only to the relationship between the spiritual and the physical parent of the same child. However, it is evident that they are interdependent and form a single system of relationships to be classed as ritual kinship, which may on occasions include the physical children of the *compadres*. To refer to this institution as spiritual affinity would imply that we were concerned only with the theological concept, whereas it is its social aspect that is the subject of this article.

both towards those he sponsors and their parents or kin, may vary also but, stretched as it may be in one direction or another to cover the exigencies of each society, the *compadrazgo* is always recognizably the same institution and its rules, despite the variations in detail from place to place, carry the same general sense. Only when it departs from its religious pretext, centered on the rite of baptism, do we find it changing its nature and, put to other uses, merging into the structure of political patronage which in colloquial Spanish has been called *compadrazgo* by analogy, or into the simple sponsorship of lay events. These fictive forms employ the idiom of *compadrazgo*, but their sense is not the same and we can no longer recognize in them the same institution; but this is hardly surprising for institutions, once placed in a changed context of ideas, commonly change their function and implications even though they may not change their form. In order, then, to examine an institution in its entirety, in all its transformations and despite its variants, we must decide which of its characteristics are essential and which are contingent; where to draw the line between the "genuine" and the "spurious" examples of it.

We take as essential to *compadrazgo* its connection with baptism (which indeed provided, historically, the pretext for its inauguration), and suggest that its fundamental sense derives from the recognition that a parent cannot stand as sponsor to his own child, that is to say, putting it in theological terms, that spiritual and physical parenthood are antithetical to one another.[3] However, once the *compadrazgo* severs its roots in the font and the *compadres* are no longer related as physical parent and sponsor of the same child, the *compadrazgo* becomes something different which may be regarded as spurious from the viewpoint of the original institution, though of course it is spurious in no other sense, nor is it for that reason any less interesting than the "genuine" form, nor any less important. But the two must be distinguished before we can attempt to explain the relation between them. Any general statement must delimit the field of data

3. The commonly repeated explanation of their differentiation, that the early Christians found it advisable to provide the neophyte with a replacement for the parent in case the latter should fall victim to the persecution, is hardly supported by the fact that infant baptism was not yet customary when the persecution ended. Saint Augustine still assumed that it was normal for a parent to sponsor his own child at baptism. The prohibition to do so was only established much later and in the course of the development of the concept of spiritual affinity, not for any practical consideration. Explanations on the basis of commonsense are to be mistrusted as much in history as in anthropology.

to which it applies and this is not a task that can be entrusted to the customs of ordinary speech which, in this case, happily class under the same rubric political skullduggery and the spiritual salvation of infants. For ordinary speech lives on analogies and abstracts a given sense from a word in order to extend it to cover phenomena which are quite different in every other sense. Already at the start spiritual kinship owed its vocabulary to physical kinship, though its nature is opposed precisely to this, and in the same way the fictive forms of *compadrazgo* borrow the vocabulary of the literal forms without admitting any adherence to the norms of ritual alliance. Thus the relationship between "political *compadres*" is essentially venal and calculated where genuine *compadrazgo* prohibits venality and calculation, while a man's fictive *comadre*, far from being sexually excluded by the incest prohibition deriving from spiritual affinity, becomes in many instances simply his illicit sexual partner. Not only in the Spanish fictive form, *comadre de carnaval*,[4] but in the colloquial usage of many cities of Latin America,[5] the *comadre* is opposed to the wife, not by the absence of sexual relations but by their illegitimacy. Hence, if the passage from physical to spiritual kinship implies a reversal of the sense of the terms, so does the further passage from ritual kinship proper to sexual, social, or political alliance. From godsib to gossip is but one letter's distance graphically, but in significance the two concepts are so different that the former is not commonly recognized as the etymological origin of the latter. If, as I have written (Pitt-Rivers 1968a), ritual kinship is what physical kinship aspires to be but, on account of its social consequences, is always prevented from becoming, so political *compadrazgo* is what ritual kinship becomes once its spiritual roots have been forgotten. It tends always, however,

---

4. The *comadre de carnaval* was the girl with whom a fictive *compadrazgo* was formed for the duration of carnival. This relationship, established for a period of authorized license, often developed after the fiesta was over into serious courtship and marriage.

5. Examples of the colloquial usage of *comadre* to mean "paramour" may be cited from popular songs:

    From Lima:

        "Compadre que a la comadre
        No se le mueve las caderas
        No es compadre de veras."

    From: Belén, Catamarca, Argentine (from field-notes of Dr. Esther Hesmitte)

        "La cabeza me duele y los ojos me arden
        De tanto menear la tipa
        De mi comadre."

to move in that direction, to "go political," for the viability of exploiting sacred ties for political advantage is so patent.

Compadrazgo's roots are embedded in Christian doctrine which validates the prohibition of sponsoring one's own child by reference to the notion of original sin transmitted in the act of physical generation and washed away by the spiritual regeneration conveyed in the rite of baptism, but the opposition nevertheless recalls the functions of blood-brotherhood and ritualized friendship in non-Christian societies which commonly prohibit the choice of ritual kinsmen from among the members of ego's lineage. It is not my intention here, however, to pursue either the doctrinal aspect of *compadrazgo* or the parallels to be found in other cultures.[6] In *compadrazgo* only the physical parents are formally excluded from the role of godparents and close kin are, on the contrary, frequently recommended for it by the edict of custom.

Sponsors are first of all required at baptism when the child is received into the Christian community and given its Christian name by the godparent who takes it from the priest at the font before returning it to its parents. Prior to baptism it was regarded as a "Moor," an animal or at any rate scarcely human. At confirmation, according to Catholic doctrine, a child also requires a sponsor, though custom often omits to attach any social importance to the godparent on this occasion or to recognize any relationship of *compadrazgo* between this sponsor and the parents. On the other hand, much importance is frequently accorded to the sponsors of a marriage, though this has never been a function recognized by Catholic doctrine, which only required witnesses with whom no spiritual affinity was ever created. Other occasions concerning the child's well-being are also in the eyes of custom pretexts for establishing relations of *compadrazgo*; curing ceremonies or the sponsorship of a festival in honor of the Infant Jesus are commonly found among these in Latin America. In all cases, however, the baptismal godparents are accorded prime importance. The godparent commonly pays for the ceremony and the baptismal godparents are expected, in addition to their supposed responsibility for the child's religious education (which in fact is not often taken seriously), to make gifts to the godchild on certain occasions specified by custom which mark its progress towards adulthood: a religious medallion to protect it from the evil eye, for example, or the first pair of shoes or long trousers, or the first long dress. Help in the education of the child is often hoped for from the godparent, but there are no further demands

6. I have examined the theoretical problems raised by these in Goody (1973).

on him once it has attained the age of marriage. Sponsorship, then, governs the passage of the individual from the family of origin to the family of orientation, a cycle initiated and terminated by the birth of children who bring a new nuclear family into existence and by doing so destroy the unity of the old one. Baptism gives social significance to the physical fact of birth and ushers the newborn member of the physical family into the community. At each stage in the child's advance towards maturity this function is echoed, for a change in the structure of the family is implied. The reiteration of the notion of sponsorship on the occasion of confirmation, its popular extension into the sponsorship of marriage, its evocation whenever rites of passage are to be performed and even the role of the godparent in a child's funerary rites—he often must pay for the coffin—rub in the essential point: godparents take the place of parents in sponsoring their charges at the crucial points where the individual destiny of the child, rather than the preservation of the familial unit into which he was born, is at issue. This is most clearly seen in the custom of those parts of Andalusia where the parents of a child enter the church neither on the occasion of its baptism nor of its marriage.

In accordance with the theory of the rites of passage a person must be separated from the unit in which he has a status before re-entering it in a changed status. During this transition he is commonly in the care of someone whose relationship to him is opposed to his ties with the members of the unit in which his status is to change. Thus, in patrilineal societies it is frequently the mother's brother who plays such a role in the rites of initiation. His concern for his sister's son is purely for the boy as a person, not as a member of a lineage to which he himself is only allied by marriage. The godparent may be said, then, to be the guardian of the child as an individual person rather than as offspring and therefore to be a kind of "anti-parent" bearing no legal or social responsibility for him, but only the religious duty of ensuring the salvation of his *individual* soul and if, as it is said to be the purpose of the institution and as occasionally occurs, the godparent replaces the parent in raising the orphaned child, it is only because the godchild's parents' nuclear family had vanished before he was old enough to depart from it by founding one of his own. The godparent replaces the parent only in providing care in order to bring him to maturity, he does not replace him socially as he would were he to adopt the child and give it his surname. The godparent, as guardian of his destiny, looks into the future to the day when his charge will become an adult, the parents, who bear responsibility for him in the present, attach him to the past and to the social structure in

which his place is granted to him by virtue of his membership of the unit they have allied themselves to create. Hence the notion that *compadrazago* is “fictive” kinship, that the godparent is a “fictive” parent (though the clerical label *propatres* has been thought to mean this), is in fact totally misleading, for it ignores the opposition between the physical and ritual (or spiritual) kinship which is the basis of that institution morphologically and historically, and the key to the understanding of the rules that govern it. The godparent is not a surrogate for the parent, but only a substitute for him in the roles from which the parent is excluded on account of his physical and social paternity and where he must be replaced by his contrary. And on the material plane the parent is only replaced by the godparent partially and exceptionally when his premature disappearance threatens the child’s chances of attaining the age at which he no longer requires a guardian: i.e. full adulthood, the point at which the role of godparent is effaced anyway. This anti-parental role is, therefore, for the anthropologist as opposed to the theologian, a function of the process of transition from one generation to the next which involves the destruction of the parental family and its replacement by the filial one, an aspect of the developmental cycle of the domestic group. In the rural society of southwestern Europe with which we are first of all concerned, the domestic group is no more than the nuclear family and the developmental cycle is uncomplicated by the requirements of the larger kinship unit. This interpretation may raise misgivings in a reader well acquainted with the literature of the *compadrazgo*, because the people themselves so often liken godparent to parent—especially in Italy, where the godfather and godmother are said to be a second father and mother (Anderson 1957: 32-53). Such statements (which are no different from those often recorded regarding blood-brotherhood) refer only to the sentiments which are thought proper in such a relationship, not to the rights and duties involved which are totally different. The constant stressing of the analogy between ritual and literal kinship in the face of the patent differences is in itself an indication of value regarding the nature of the institution of *compadrazgo*: taken in conjunction with the prohibitions attaching to that institution, it should be interpreted as a technique of exorcism, of eliminating from the consciousness of the participants the conflict of aims inherent in the opposition between literal and ritual parent whose function is precisely to assure the continuity of the individual personality through changed statuses, that is to say, the transition from one generation to the next.

The opposition between the person as an individual and as a member of a social unit—in this case, a nuclear family—is perfectly illustrated, in the naming

system of modern times, by the fact that he receives his Christian name from his godparents and his surname from his father (or in the Spanish naming system, his surnames from his father and from his mother's father). The person as a Christian soul is opposed to the person as a social cipher, an element in the system of descent. As an individual he is differentiated by his Christian name from other individuals and especially from his siblings within the family from whom he is not otherwise differentiated; as a member of that family he is identified with its other members by their common surname. In keeping with this distinction, those who depart from the world into the seclusion of a monastic order leave their surname behind in the world. The king calls people by their surname, but God knows us only by our Christian names.

The naming system of modern western Europe marks the opposition with greatest clarity perhaps, but those that preceded it were no less significant in this regard. Over-generalizing grossly, one can say that the Christian name defined the man as an individual and to this was appended a descriptive name based either upon his descent, birthplace, profession, or personal characteristics. These were the sources of the modern surname. This name, whatever it was referred to, tended in any case to be inherited by his children, for a child is first of all identified by reference to the family into which it is born before it has acquired any distinct identity of its own. Regardless, however, of whether the descriptive appellation by which he was finally known related to his personal characteristics or to those of a forebear, the child as an individual soul, named by a godparent after a saint under whose protection his destiny was placed, was distinguished from the man as he is seen by society which named him by his *social* characteristics.

It is unfortunate that there is as yet no anthropological account of the history of the naming systems of Europe, but it is significant in the context of this essay that the naming systems of eastern Europe differ from those of the West. In particular, the retention of the father's Christian name in patronymic form in addition to the surname has implications in the realm of sponsorship, for it means that the name given by godparents to the father is retained by the child as a teknonym and passes from defining the father as himself to defining the child by his place in society. It is the destiny of every individual as such to start his life with his future ahead, undetermined as to his social value, and to end it with his past behind him, institutionalized and converted into an ancestor. His individual name becomes a category name for his descendants if he is retained as the point of reference by which they are labelled, whether as their father or as the eponymous founder of the group. In eastern Europe both the immediate

forebear and the eponym are retained. The system of the Arabs appears at first sight to present an anomaly, for a man may be called "Abu" (father of) followed by the name of his son, that is to say, the son's first name provides the teknonym for the father rather than the reverse, but this is no more than an inversion of their formal naming system, used to stress affective and informal relations and its significance resides in this. The misunderstanding between Evans-Pritchard and his informants, recounted in the introduction to *The Nuer,* illustrates that, despite the difficulty of translating the nomenclature from the British to the Nuer system, both cultures recognized the distinction between individual name and collective name. The opposition between spiritual and social parenthood (represented as physical parenthood), which is given a theological explanation, in the context of Christian doctrine, is, at a higher level of abstraction, simply a manifestation of the universal structural opposition between the personal and the collective destiny of a man.

I have already mentioned certain duties of the godparent towards his charge. An attitude of beneficence is expected of him which concords well with the absence of responsibility for him in the world. The godchild owes his godparent nothing in return for his gifts which are "free gifts"—as one might expect from the bestower of spiritual grace; *padres de gracia* is one of the terms for godparents in Spanish—and they may be interpreted as manifestations of that grace which is the essence of the relationship. To undertake in any sense the guardianship of a child not one's own already implies a gratuitous goodness which looks to a reward in Heaven rather than in the here and now, and in any case the inequality of age between the participants rules out an immediate return of the godparent's favors. But when the godchild attains the age when he *might* reciprocate, the relationship lapses. He has nowhere a specific duty to care for his godparent in old age, nor to return any service for what he has received. He owes only great respect and, in certain places, the formal duty of a congratulatory visit on his godparent's feast day. The relationship is one that excludes all salacious reference and sexual union is unthinkable. Indeed, in the view of the Church, it was until recently an even more grievous sin than incest with a physical parent.

In contrast to this unilateral beneficence, the relationship between the sponsor and the parent (the *compadres*) is essentially mutual and balanced. The sponsor is always, if not the social equal, then the social superior—never the inferior, save in certain exceptional cases—yet the reciprocity is ideally complete and no detail of conduct distinguishes the spiritual from the social parent; each must call the other *compadre* and speak in the respectful third person. The equality of

mutual esteem pervades, in theory at least, the relationship between the two, even when they are related as employer and employee; indeed moral equality is opposed to, and combined with, social inequality and it is this that gives the institution its particular tenor and function in this context. The reciprocity is not, then, a matter of material calculation, but of the heart, a question of mutual trust: each must be at the other's service, ready to help whenever needed in whatever way required. You can refuse your *compadre* nothing, it is said. Such an open-ended reciprocity lends itself to exploitation, especially when the participants are not in fact equal, as the examples of its use between the owner and his peons on the *haciendas* of Latin America show. But, according to the theory of *compadrazgo*, each is committed irremediably to the other by their common concern for the child.

The complementary nature of their roles in relation to the child reposes on the Christian notion of dualism: man is both a physical and a spiritual being, therefore he requires parents of each kind. But the relationship resulting between the two kinds of parents is equivocal and this sets it aside from the normal run and gives it a sanctity which is illustrated in the combination of intimacy with extreme respect. Sex and rivalry, the prime preoccupations of ordinary life, are taboo in this relationship wherever it is taken seriously: not only are sexual relations between *compadre* and *comadre* incestuous, but sexual joking between *compadres* is excluded. To quarrel with a *compadre* is to desecrate one's self. The tie is, thus, the opposite of a juridical relationship whether contractual or statutory; it is a matter of sentiment, not of rights.

It is usual for the parents of the child to invite the person of their choice to be the sponsor, though in some places he may offer his services and even demand the role. But in either case mutual consent is essential. Moreover, one cannot envisage entering into such a relationship without an act of will on both sides, for the necessary sentiment and respect can scarcely be commanded.

The act of individual will is an essential constituent of all forms of ritual kinship, which is differentiated from literal kinship by this fact. Literal kinship is established in accordance with the kinship system without regard for the consent of the participants, and the rights and duties attaching to it are specified by custom, not dependent upon the kinsman's wishes. *Compadrazgo* is thus a relationship between two individuals and, even in those parts of Mexico where it is customarily extended to include the parents of the participants, it can be avoided if they do not choose to exchange the ritual embrace which initiates it. This voluntary aspect of the *compadrazgo* displays its association with the notion

of grace which is always connected with free will and the state of the heart. Whether grace is bestowed by the Deity or by humans it is always an emanation of the will, not the fulfilment of a statutory or contractual obligation. In this way *compadrazgo* resembles friendship, and it has rightly been described as "ritualized friendship." It differs from ordinary friendship only in that by being ritualized it is rendered irrevocable. Yet its sacred character does not always suffice to save it from the paradox of friendship: that while friends express the state of their heart in acts of favor and esteem without any thought of return—for friendship is false if entered into out of calculation—nevertheless the failure to make a return implies the absence of reciprocity in sentiment and this puts an end to the friendship. Since *compadrazgo* cannot be ended, great care is commonly taken to test the character and sentiments of the person envisaged as *compadre*, for if he proves false there is no recourse to sanctions. Hence, also, the fear of destroying the spiritual and sentimental purity of the relationship sometimes looms so large that one must expressly avoid asking favors of one's *compadre* and should even choose him from among those who live at a distance in order to escape the temptation of sullying the relationship with day-to-day concerns of utility. This point of view is commonly expressed in Italy. In other places, however, the potential material advantages are frankly exploited. It becomes sometimes the guarantee of fair dealing, and those engaged in commerce may choose their *compadres* at strategic points in the locality. Or, where the relationship is entered into by persons of different status, it may be used to guarantee the fidelity of the patron's clients; the social inferior may equally choose a *compadre* who is able to help the whole family. Honor, public support and service is traded against protection, influence and beneficence. It is to be noted that, precisely because the relationship between *compadres* is conceptually one of equality, it is effective in circumstances of factual inequality: it provides the possibility of intimacy and trust between persons whose difference of class would otherwise make this difficult. Hence, in Andalusia, for example, it became the nerve of the structure of patronage in the nineteenth century. Thus, according to social circumstances, from one society to another, and from one period to another, the *compadrazgo* varies in the use to which it is put. The relative stress laid on its spiritual nature or political potential is manifested in the rules of choice. When it is suggested that the powerful man able to afford protection should be chosen as *compadre*, or when men boast of the number of their godchildren, we are on the road to a political transformation of the institution which will take us into realms where spiritual affinity is forgotten.

However, prescriptions regarding the choice of a sponsor are sometimes much more specific than the mere recommendation to choose someone near or distant, equal or superior, with whom one might hope to cement a relationship of mutual trust and goodwill; they frequently recommend a specific kinsman.

These rules vary from place to place. In Spain they range from those areas of Andalusia where the landowner or employer is expected to "baptize" his dependent's children, to others where *compadres* are normally kinsmen. The importance attached to the institution varies also. The urban classes give it less heed than the rurals; the upper classes give it little and do not use the terms of address; and in the Levante of Spain no one gives it any importance at all.

Throughout most of rural Spain, however, the rules conform to certain general provisions:

1. Each child must have a godfather and a godmother who must be married or at least engaged to be married.
2. Each child must have different godparents from its siblings. (This rule is not always followed.)
3. Godparents must be chosen from among the closest kin outside the nuclear family: preferably the parents and siblings of the child's parents.

Additional rules which are not necessarily logically consistent with one another are found in great variety:

a. The godparents of the marriage must "baptize" the first child. Alternatively, or in addition, the godparents of baptism of a man must be chosen as the godparents of his marriage.
b. The godparents of the marriage must be the husband's *elder* brother.
c. The choice of godparents must come alternately from the husband's family and the wife's. And this rule is sometimes combined with another rule regarding the choice of Christian name: that the name is chosen from one side of the family and given to the child at baptism by godparents chosen from the other side. Thus, in the township that I studied twenty years ago[7] the rule was that the first son was given the Christian name of his father's father by his mother's parents, the second son that of his mother's father by his father's parents—and the same rule applied in the naming and sponsorship of girls:

7. For a more detailed account of the rules there see Pitt-Rivers (1958).

> the first daughter was named after father's mother, the second daughter after mother's mother, the godparents being chosen from the close kin of the opposite side to the name: uncles or married siblings of the parents.

Sometimes the grandparents (contravening rule 2 above) served a second time.

The importance accorded to grandparents is perhaps the commonest feature of the system of *compadrazgo* in Spain. Are not grandparents the "anti-parents," par excellence? Their nuclear family was broken up by the marriages of their children, but they take their revenge, as it were, in the guise of godparents to their grandchildren whose personal destinies will, under their patronage, eventually mature to break up the family which broke up theirs, and prolong their line of descent, over-reaching the time-span of the nuclear family, into the future. No longer head of a nuclear family once their children have grown up and married, they become founders of the lineage which descends from them. The principle of the alternation of generations, so evident in those kinship terminologies which possess only a single reciprocal for the grandparent-grandchild relationship comes to light in the rules of sponsorship: I am to my grandparents what I could not be to my parents, and to my grandchildren what I could not be to my children.

In an earlier analysis of the *compadrazgo* of Andalusia I laid stress on the practical function of these rules of preference in the appointment of godparents: affines become ritual kinsmen and the rules of respect and sacralized amity provide a tie of a different sort—and a direct tie—between those who are previously linked only by the fact that they are spouse's kin and kin's spouse. Moreover, the rule that the godparents should be married entails that, except in the case of the grandparents, one is a lineal kinsman and the other an affine of the child's parents. The superimposition of ritual kinship on a relationship of physical kinship may change little in the conduct of those who are accustomed from birth to speak in the second person, as indeed they continue to do (except sometimes in Latin America where brothers, or even father and son, may call each other *compadre* and speak in the third person), but the tie of *compadrazgo* between affines brings a new basis to their relationship which overlays the potential hostility between families who are otherwise linked only by marriage. Thus wives become *comadre* of their mother- and sister-in-law; those who are kin-in-law become kin-in-God, and owe each other a respect which their simple alliance through marriage does not demand. This was the practical function—the mitigation of tensions between affines—which first struck me. But to give this as the explanation of the institution rather than of the prevalence of such recommendations regarding the nomination of sponsors is to

indulge in the most uncompromising functionalism. The superimposition of spiritual kinship on the relationship of kinship by descent or alliance implies that the personal destiny of the child is opposed only to his membership of a nuclear family outside which he must fend for himself, aided or not by kinsmen whose solidarity with him cannot be taken for granted. The ambiguity of extra-familial kin ties is consecrated by the usage of the word *primo*, first cousin, to mean a person who can be fooled. Much as one would like to trust one's cousins for reasons of sentiment and allegiance to a common familial past, the pressures of the social structure, far from prescribing solidarity, promote through the division of inheritance the conflicts of interest that only the sacred bond of *compadrazgo* can palliate.

Kinship outside the nuclear family does not provide the basis of any group solidarity, but only a network of dyadic ties deriving from the sentiment of common origin and common attachments. In order to have any value it requires to be sanctioned by personal sentiment and this is validated in the *compadrazgo*, for in fact those who do not like each other waive the rule. The recommendations to invite one or other person to be sponsor are always subject to the state of heart of the persons concerned.

THE CASE OF *KUMSTVO*

The Greek Church attaches quite as much importance to sponsorship as Rome, in fact more today, since the incest prohibition between co-parents is still in force. In Greece, and in the Greek communities of the United States and elsewhere, the institution is respected and the popular belief persists that a person should not marry his spiritual sibling (i.e., the physical child of his godparent). The retention of such archaic forms can, in the first place, be attributed to the historical fact that the Eastern Churches were not affected by the restrictions to the extension of spiritual affinity imposed by the Council of Trent which abolished them in the West. In brief, the Greek Church accords much the same sense to sponsorship as the Catholic Church has done down to modern times, and the Greek world provides similar preferential rules for the choice of godparents: the same recommendation that the marriage sponsor should "baptize" the children of the marriage (not just the first child);[8] and that the baptismal

8. In Cyprus the marriage sponsors, who are numerous, "baptize" the children of the marriage in order of their importance as *Koumbaroi* of the marriage. After this they

sponsor should be sponsor at the marriage of his godchild. Indeed, the latter rule is incorporated in the blessing at baptism. "May you live to marry him," i.e. complete your charge by bringing him to full adulthood (Argenti 1949).

It appears, then, that the explanation I have given of the fundamental sense of the institution will hold as well in the Greek as in the Roman Church, despite the dogmatic differences and certain differences in family structure between the two areas. A greater importance is attached to extra-familial kinship as a rule, but the Greek kindred is bilateral even if the stress on patrilinearity is sometimes more marked than in the western Mediterranean. Moreover, the same naming system is found, by which children are named alternately after the patrilateral and matrilateral grandparents.

However, when we turn to the material from rural Serbia, presented by Hammel,[9] everything changes: the institution of *kumstvo* appears quite anomalous. The ritual requirements of the Church are accepted regretfully, it seems, and the social ties established through sponsorship are of quite another order. It is true that baptism is still preponderant as the pretext for inaugurating the ties of *kumstvo*, and sponsorship at marriage is no less important. The first haircutting of the child (incorporated in the baptism in the Greek as in the Roman Church) furnishes here a supplementary occasion to establish *kumstvo*. The attitude of respect shown to the godfather is even more marked. The degrees of spiritual affinity prohibiting marriage are more extensive and one encounters the same belief that one must avoid financial entanglements with *compadres*.

On the other hand, *kumstvo* cannot be established with any member of the *zadruga* (extended family household), the lineal kin or even the clan, nor with any matrilateral or affinal kinsman. It is inherited from one generation to the next, being treated like a good in itself. It can supposedly even be bought or acquired in exchange for something else. It is vested in the *zadruga* of the baptizer, and, if it falls into abeyance through the absence of a suitable replacement in the next generation, it is the privilege of that *zadruga* to name the successor, for, as it is said, it "belongs to them." When this right is not or cannot be exercised, or is relinquished by the *zadruga* whose sponsorship may have brought ill-fortune,

---

are called by the name *Koumbaros myrodykes* (the sponsor of the myrrh) (Peristiany 1968: 90).

9. I am grateful to Professor Hammel for his careful reading of this essay, which has enabled me to correct certain errors of interpretation of the Serbian ethnography. None the less, a fundamental difference in our interpretations remains, deriving from our different theoretical positions, as will be apparent to the reader.

and the parents are left without any indicated *kum*, the choice reverts to the domain of destiny, and the child is placed at the crossroads where the first stranger to find him is invited to be his godfather, even though he may be a Muslim or a gypsy. When a *zadruga* divides, the *kumstvo* is among the goods divided. The institution has great political importance for, apart from the sacred trust established between lineages, it may also be used to compensate a homicide or to end a feud: *kumstvo* is "given," that is to say, the role of godfather is given, to him who would otherwise be an implacable enemy. It is also given to the person to whom one owes one's life, promised in exchange for a favor, transmitted with the sale of a property, or offered to a powerful family by newcomers in the region.

The explanation of the nature of *compadrazgo* which I have given above seems to apply poorly to rural Serbian *kumstvo* in view of these facts and, since it is still the same institution from the religious standpoint, a further explanation is required of these anomalous features.

1. It does not, save in the first instance, depend upon the personal ties of the parents and the reciprocal sentiments of the *compadres*, but on the inherited right to the role.
2. It no longer fulfils the function of mitigating the tensions between affines, nor of balancing matri- and patrilateral ties, nor of ensuring the passage of the nuclear family from one generation to the next, though it is still in evidence on the occasions of the rites of passage in the godchild's career.
3. The terminology does not distinguish between godfather-godson and co-parent, but the same term is extended to all members of the *zadruge* involved. (On the other hand the southern Serbs distinguish terminologically between the physical and the spiritual co-parent, thereby mitigating the ideal reciprocity of the relationship.)

It is no longer a relationship limited to the individual destiny of the child. Indeed it is not, in operation, a relationship between individuals as such, but between *zadruge*, as Hammel shows. Is it, he asks, to be regarded as an extension to their family of a tie created between individuals, or, on the contrary, a tie between individuals by virtue of the tie between the household to which they belong? The latter is certainly the case in Serbia, for the relationship between family groups is maintained through the choice of sponsors from among their number as long as there is a child to be baptized and a baptizer, and it lapses only in default of one of these.

Even when a fresh invitation to be *kum* is issued it is clearly conceived in terms of its collective aspect. One might, however, argue that when the choice is remitted to the hand of destiny by placing the child at the crossroads, it is a negation of the collective usage of *kumstvo* and a return to a purely individual treatment of the institution. In the same vein Montesquieu's parents' choice of a beggar to be their son's godfather represents the negation of the political value of the ties of *compadrazgo* to another member of the nobility. In each case the godparent is chosen not on account of who he is, but on account of what he is not. The significance of the choice is purely negative; anyone will do, so let God decide. This appeal to the Divinity for grace through a person unknown (the stranger) or without social significance (the beggar, who was perhaps also unknown) amounts to a rejection of the political aspect of the institution and a reaffirmation of its spiritual origin. But this appeal remains in both cases the exception. The essentially collective nature of normal Serbian *kumstvo* is seen all the more clearly if it is compared with the forms of *compadrazgo* found in Latin America, which extend the term *compadre* to the ascendants, and even in rarer examples to the whole family group, for there it is always initiated by the free choice of *compadres* and there is no notion of an obligation to reproduce the tie between the same families. This is, indeed, a case of the extension of an individual tie to a whole family, but in *kumstvo* the collective aspect is primary.

For this reason, Hammel decides to explain *kumstvo* by analogy with kinship. In brief, he maintains that *kumstvo* forms a system of generalized exchange in which unilateral sponsorship can be likened to unilateral alliance. Thus the *zadruga* undertaking the duties of godparenthood (i.e. owning the *kumstvo*) is always superior in prestige to that of the godchildren, who gain prestige through the alliance in the same way as, in the hypergamic system of marriage in India, those families who give their daughters in marriage to a higher caste gain prestige through doing so. Hammel does not observe that this is always the case in the rest of the Christian world, where there is *no* notion of a collective relationship and, therefore, no possibility of a system of generalized exchange—one can hardly speak of a system of generalized exchange between nuclear families when they are those of children and their parents—and where the dogmatic reason for the superiority of the spiritual parent over the physical parent is not given. This appears to me to weaken the argument. It does not in any case invalidate his contention that the counter prestation of *kumstvo* is accrued prestige, but demonstrates only that this need not entail a system of exchange.

Viewing *kumstvo* in this way, Hammel sees it as providing the "alternative social structure," which gives the book its title. I shall not linger over what is implied by the notion of alternative social structures with regard to the definition of social structure. Can a society have more than one, and, if so, in what way are they alternative? One cannot suppose that a choice is offered to those who are dissatisfied with the ties of cognatic kinship to replace them by ties of alliance or ritual kinship. In fact, I believe Hammel means no more than that people are linked by "blood," by marriage, or by *kumstvo* (as I would put it: by grace) and that these different kinds of tie are exclusive of each other. In accordance with an ancient, and to my mind regrettable, tradition he calls each set of relations a social structure. Hammel quotes a grey-bearded informant who explained to him "we have a clanship, we have alliance, and we have *kumstvo*," and no one would deny the necessity to distinguish clearly between them; but by viewing each as a structure in itself rather than as part of a total structure, as alternatives rather than as elements in articulation, Hammel places *kumstvo* in parallel with kinship, neglecting the conceptual opposition between the two. This makes it more difficult to see clearly the nature of Serbian *kumstvo*," which appears to me to be a very good example of the exploitation for political ends (collective this time not individual) of an institution which still retains its roots in the font and whose social function depends upon this. It remains to be explained why it is so different from the *compadrazgo* of the Hispanic world.

Let me return to my original thesis regarding *compadrazgo* and reduce it to its bare essentials. Every generation sees the destruction and creation of families, and the passage of individuals from puerile to adult and from junior to senior status. This process determines that while individuals remain the same person, the units in which they are combined are replaced as they grow up, found families, grow old and disappear into the ranks of the ancestors. The rites of passage place the seal of recognition upon these changes. The affines of one generation become the cognates of the next, the people to whom I am related through my wife will be related to my son through his mother. Throughout all these changes in time the person remains the same individual and as such he is distinguishable from the person *qua* member of a collectivity; in addition to his activities as a member of a group he has other relations to which these collective allegiances are irrelevant. Moreover, in addition to his kinship with co-members of the same group he has other kinds of kin relations (giving rise to no solidary group) which are unique to him and his full siblings. All kin relations outside

the nuclear family are of this type in the bilateral systems, but not all in societies which have corporate lineages. Regardless of differences of structure, we can distinguish between ties established between persons in terms of the social units to which they belong (structurally-determined ties) and those which are conducted on the basis of mutual attachments or antipathies as persons. That these attachments or antipathies should have a structural setting does not mean that they are structurally determined and does not prevent them from being personal in the sense that they entail no necessary consequence in the field of relations between groups. The extension of the basic collectivity, therefore, determines the field within which relations are structurally defined. The ambilateral nuclear family of the Mediterranean knows no extension; it *is* the basic collectivity. The lineage system of the rural Serbs extends the basic collectivity to the level of the clan.

Now it can be observed that certain types of affective relationship are restricted to those persons who are not assimilated by the social structure. These are undertaken on the basis of a concern in the person as an individual not as a group member. The mother's brother in many patrilineal societies (or the father in matrilineal) is able to have such an attachment to his sister's son (or son) because they belong to different basic collectivities. In lineal societies certain duties concerning the personal welfare of individuals are entrusted to the non-lineal kin, and this is particularly the case in mortuary services where the disposal of the corpse, the physical person, the individual man, is undertaken by those who are opposed to the lineal kin whose concern is with the dead man's spirit and his subsequent significance as an ancestor. In other societies these duties attach to affines of whom the same can be said. In others again it is the pseudo-kinsman, especially the blood-brother, as among the Azande, to whom such a duty falls, for he is by definition the man with whom such personal ties have been formed. For this reason he can normally only be chosen from among those who are not lineal kinsmen.[10]

The society of southern Europe might appear anomalous in enjoining the choice of a close kinsman to be a pseudo-kinsman until it is recognized that, given the kinship structure, he belongs to precisely the category of kin which is

10. This is so in Serbia where, Hammel tells us, the tie was instituted in connection with the danger of death and celebrated, literally, in the cemetery. He does not mention the blood-brother in connection with mortuary ceremonies. With regard to the point made here see my essay "The kith and the kin," in Goody (1973).

opposed to the members of the structurally significant unit, the nuclear family. As has been noted, brothers and sisters are eligible only if married and therefore no longer members of it. In Serbia, where the basic social unit is an extended patrilineal and patrilocal household belonging to a patrilineage and a clan possessing a common name, a common patron saint and feast-day (*slava*), we would expect to find that the role of the baptizer should be filled from beyond the category of patrilineal kin. The matrilateral kin might seem indicated. But the matrilateral kinsmen are not without structural significance either, as Hammel points out (1968: 16). It is the mother's brother who plays a vital part in the division of the *zadruga*; unlike the mother's brother in many patrilineal societies, he is thus intimately concerned in the structural realignments of the lineage. Moreover, women have a right to inherit property even though they usually pass up their share if they have brothers; the in-marrying son-in-law is a common feature and Hammel finds "some recognition of bilaterality in all the words which designate household groups" (Hammel 1968: 28).

The personal destiny of the child is entrusted, thus, to a non-kinsman, since the relationship with kinsmen, lineal, matrilateral, and affinal (matrilateral in the next generation) is structurally significant. The "anti-parent" is not just anti-parent in the English sense of the word but "anti-*parent*" in the French sense, i.e. anti-kinsman. Yet the personal destiny of the godchild hardly appears to be the major conscious concern of the *kum*. If, as Hammel and I are agreed, *kumstvo* is effectively a relationship between collectivities rather than individuals, this is only to be expected. Nevertheless, that it may be put to political use in this way does not eliminate the ritual significance of the institution any more than does the choice of a powerful patron as *padrino* in Andalusia. The godfather, however he may have been chosen, still officiates at the rites of passage of his godchild. It is still a *ritual* relation between individuals even if it is a *political* relation between *zadruga*. It is initiated as such and it is still regarded as sacred. This is apparent in a number of ways: in the avoidance of mundane entanglements with *kum* (Hammel 1968: 90), in the power of the *kum*'s curse (Hammel 1968: 42), and in the role of the stranger chosen by hazard at the crossroads as the *padrino* who is intended to bring good fortune to his charge. The good fortune of the collectivity is first of all ensured by the survival of the individuals who compose it. Moreover, *kumstvo* is still said to be a "relationship contracted out of love and friendship" (Hammel 1968: 9). But in Serbian rural society love and friendship are none the less submitted to the pressures of group solidarity. How can sacred trust be respected among warring lineages if it is not itself vested in a collective

relationship? Yet it cannot be concluded from this that the institution is *by its nature* collective, but rather that it is put to use by the collectivities of which the social structure is composed, just as in Andalusia it is put to the shifts of the systems of patronage. In both cases its political utility depends upon the fact that the assumptions upon which it is founded controvert those of the social structure. In Andalusia the ideal equality of the institution is opposed to the inequality implicit in patronage; in Serbia the spiritual tie between individuals is opposed to the collective solidarity of the lineage. It provides not an alternative social structure, but an alternative *to* social structure.

It must be noted that the bond between godparent and godchild is absolutely irrevocable while there exists the possibility of renouncing the *kumstvo*, in the collective sense, that is, the right to become godparent. Indeed, the relationship comes to an end automatically if the family produces no sons, for on the marriage of the daughter her husband's, not her, baptismal godparent (or his replacement) will be godparent of the marriage. The collective nature of the bond of *kumstvo* is superimposed upon its individual nature by virtue of the prolongation effected by the rules of nomination to godparenthood. These rules are all found elsewhere and it is only when they are applied within the social structure of tribal Serbia that they produce the institution described by Hammel. The rule that the baptismal sponsor should be sponsor at marriage, deriving from the notion that to complete his duties he should bring his godchild to the foundation of a new nuclear family, has already been mentioned with regard to Greece, as has the converse rule that the sponsor at marriage should baptize the first child or the children. Both these rules are found in Spain also. If both rules are followed and if one adds to them a further rule also encountered in Greece: that sons replace their fathers in the role of godfather, then all the necessary elements are present in order to ensure that the *kumstwo* remains vested in a patriline (Sanders 1960: 170). Add to that the rule that all the children of a marriage have the same godparent and *kumstvo* becomes a collective relationship between lineages.

Its acquisition of a political function follows inevitably from the nature of the relations between lineages, but this by no means curtails its sacred character. On the contrary it is essential to it, for thanks to this it is able to contravene the rules of rivalry between lineages and prevent or put an end to feuds. When, by the logic of the social structure, men should fight and annihilate each other's group, *kumstvo* can be invoked to lay that logic in abeyance. Its sacredness serves not to mitigate the tensions between different nuclear families within the kin, as

in Andalusia, but between different lineages within the community. Social utility it has, deriving from its sacred nature as in certain forms of *compadrazgo* in the West, but whereas in Andalusia it is used to promote the material interests of a nuclear family by linking it to a powerful patron—and this use is also found in non-tribal Serbia—in the cases examined by Hammel for tribal Serbia it ensures political peace between lineages. In the society of classes and nuclear families it creates ties between classes or between close kin. In that of social equality and the lineage system it creates ties between lineages. But in both cases it is able to perform its function because it derives from premises other than those of the social structure, going beyond them to the dualistic nature of man and invoking the sacred, which is always exonerated from the logic of everyday life.

The institutions of complex societies must contend with many different social contexts and insofar as this contributes to their significance we must expect them to change from one place to another. I have attempted here to show how the *kumstvo*, so well described by Hammel, which appears to be very different from the *compadrazgo* of the rest of the world, is nonetheless essentially the same institution and that these differences are to be attributed much more to the social structure in which it is incorporated than to a fundamental difference in its nature.

CHAPTER 7

The law of hospitality*

PROLOGUE

In an essay entitled *The Odyssean suitors and the host-guest relationship* (1963), Professor Harry L. Levy discussed the final scene of the Odyssey and took issue with those authors who find it out of character with the spirit of the work as a whole. The apparent anomaly introduced by the unmerciful slaughter of the suitors whose faults went hardly beyond a certain absence of decorum he explained by the hypothesis of an earlier folktale in the peasant tradition which is evident elsewhere in the poem, he says. This is intertwined with the courtly tradition of the warrior princes which dominates the greater part. The ideal of courtly largesse is contrasted with the more material concerns of frugal farmers whose customs of hospitality contain a provision forbidding the guest to overstay his welcome and impoverish his host. Leaving to classical scholars the task of unravelling the origin of its elements, the anthropologist is entitled to

---

* "The law of hospitality" was published in 1977 as part of Julian Pitt-Rivers' volume, *The fate of Shechem or the politics of sex: Essays in the anthropology of the Mediterranean,* and is reproduced in this volume with permission from Cambridge University Press. An earlier version of the essay, "The stranger, the guest and the hostile host: Introduction to the study of the laws of hospitality," was published in 1968 in *Contributions to Mediterranean sociology,* a volume edited by J.G. Peristiany (Paris: Mouton).

take the story as it stands and attempt to relate it to what he can discover of the law of hospitality in general and of the code of hospitality of ancient Greece in particular. It appears to me that, regardless of any historical disparities in the sources from which it originated, the tale of the homecoming of Odysseus may take its place among those exemplary epics which provide us with a key to the principles of social conduct. Indeed, the whole work may be viewed as a study in the law of hospitality, in other words, the problem of how to deal with strangers.

I

In one of the earliest professional monographs we have, Boas (1887) describes the custom whereby the Central Eskimo tribes receive a stranger and the curious combat to which he is then challenged:

> If a stranger unknown to the inhabitants of a settlement arrives on a visit he is welcomed by the celebration of a great feast. Among the south-eastern tribes the natives arrange themselves in a row, one man standing in front of it. The stranger approaches slowly, his arms folded and his head inclined toward the right side. Then the native strikes him with all his strength on the right cheek [sic] and in his turn inclines his head awaiting the stranger's blow (*tigluiqdjung*). While this is going on the other men are playing at ball and singing (*igdlukitaqtung*). Thus they continue until one of the combatants is vanquished. The ceremonies of greeting among the western tribes are similar to those of the eastern, but in addition "boxing, wrestling and knife testing" are mentioned by travelers who have visited them. In Davis Strait and probably in all the other countries the game of "hook and crook" is always played on the arrival of a stranger (*pakijumijartung*). Two men sit down on a large skin, after having stripped the upper part of their bodies, and each tries to stretch out the bent arm of the other. These games are sometimes dangerous, as the victor has the right to kill his adversary; but generally the feast ends peaceably. The ceremonies of the western tribes in greeting a stranger are much feared by their eastern neighbors and therefore intercourse is somewhat restricted. The meaning of the duel, according to the natives themselves, is "that the two men in meeting wish to know which of them is the better man." (609)

We can hardly suggest that such a desire to measure oneself against the stranger is peculiar to people of simple social organization and dispersed settlements, as

one might at first be tempted to imagine, for the custom in spirit if not in form, is reminiscent of the age of chivalry when knights on meeting found it necessary to test the "valor" or "value" of their new acquaintance, and we may therefore surmise that it springs from something fundamental in the nature of relations with strangers, such as a necessity to evaluate them in some way or other against the standards of the community.

Take the elements of the custom:

1. The feast offered to celebrate the stranger's arrival;
2. The challenge, issued to determine the stranger's worth;
3. The forms of the combat which estimate it in terms of the strength in his right arm;
4. His possible execution if he is proved inferior; and
5. The peaceful conclusion which is generally achieved, and which we may suspect to have been the intended outcome.

We are not told how often the right to execute the defeated stranger was, in fact, exerted. It is not essential that it should ever have been, for the belief that the right existed must surely have been enough to terrify the potential visitor from the East, particularly since duels inspired by vengeance also led to the execution of the loser. The existence of the right rather than the determination to exert it is all we require in order to understand the literal significance of the institution.

At the risk of appearing to throw my comparative net too wide, I would point out that the entry of an outsider into any group is commonly the occasion for an "ordeal" of some sort, whether among British public schoolboys, freemasons or the initiates of the secret societies of Africa, but in these instances the character of the ordeal as a test of worthiness is less important than its character as an initiation rite. They might all be considered as "rites of incorporation," (van Gennep 1966 [1909]) a variety of the rites of passage through which an old status is abandoned and a new one acquired. In this case it is the status of stranger which is lost and that of community member which is gained.

The social structure of Eskimo communities is notoriously flexible, yet it can hardly be supposed that a single occasion can admit a newcomer to full membership while he is still unacquainted with the other members of the settlement—the "ordeal" of the British schoolboy lasts a whole year. The ordeal of the Eskimo would decide rather his right to remain, assuming he was either victorious or spared. Yet during the time he remained, what exactly would his

status be? The combat enables the standing of the new member to be established within the hierarchy of prestige. From then on he is known to be a better man or not than his challenger. Unfortunately, Boas tells us nothing more about the relationship which may have existed thereafter between the two men and it would be normal to assume, therefore, that it was in no way peculiar. Nevertheless, braving the bad name which speculation has rightly acquired in anthropology and on the basis of no evidence whatsoever, I should like to speculate on the relationship which subsisted between the stranger and his challenger, for such a guess would enable me to link up the Eskimo custom in this regard with that, so different in every way, of classical antiquity. The guess however does not claim to establish, but only at best to illustrate, the association between the two forms of custom which will be shown to derive from a common sociological root at a more abstract level.

Fustel de Coulanges (1895) explains that in the city of antiquity a stranger possessed no status in law nor in religion and that it was necessary for him to have a patron in order to gain the protection of the local laws and Gods. To offend the newcomer was to offend his patron since by the code of hospitality the two were allied in this way. "L'étranger se rattachait par cet intermédiaire à la cité" (de Coulanges 1895: 232). The provisions of Arab hospitality are not dissimilar in this respect; indeed, in many countries similar customs are found.

In contrast to a member of the community whose status is identifiable by reference to its norms and is recognized by everyone, the stranger is incorporated only through a personal bond with an established member; he has, as it were, no direct jural relationship with anyone else, no place within the system, no status save that of stranger (which is a kind of self-contradiction: the status of being statusless). On the other hand, in relation to his patron he possesses, however little may be known about him[1], a clearly defined status, that of guest or client, which makes any further evaluation of him unnecessary. The status of guest therefore stands midway between that of hostile stranger and that of community member. He is incorporated practically rather than morally.

The essence of the stranger is, tautologically enough, that he is unknown. He remains potentially anything: valiant or worthless, well-born, well-connected, wealthy or the contrary, and since his assertions regarding himself cannot be

1. According to Farès (1932), ancient Arab custom forbade asking the guest who he was, where he came from or where he was going (95). Similarly Odysseus was asked such questions only as he was leaving Phaeacia.

checked, he is above all not to be trusted. For this reason, the charlatan is always, must be, a stranger. In any case his social standing in his community of origin is not necessarily accepted by the people of another. For it is a matter of local pride that each community would set up its standards for itself rather than accept those which are dictated by foreigners. In this sense, every community aspires to autonomy. Therefore the status achieved in one is not directly transferable to another, nor is the status ascribed by one society necessarily recognized in another; indeed the possibility of finding an equivalent at all may very well be missing—you cannot be a Brahmin in the English countryside.[2]

The stranger therefore starts afresh as an individual insofar as he may be incorporated into the community. It must make its own evaluation of him in order to accept him. The simple logic of the Eskimo custom is apparent: lacking a wider society and a hierarchy of social status, the value of a man is no more than the literal strength in his right arm.

The problem of the treatment of the stranger includes another aspect. Does he possess the necessary knowledge of the culture of the people among whom he comes to behave correctly and make evaluations of conduct by their standards? Can he, in a word, subscribe to the rules of their culture? As a newcomer he will never know from the outset how to behave towards individual personalities, but if he knows the rules he will quickly distinguish who is who. No knowledge of persons is required of the guest who has a patron to protect him, but to fulfil the role of guest he must at least understand the conventions which relate to hospitality and which define the behavior expected of him. Hence the distinction which the Greeks made between *Xenoi*, strangers who were nevertheless Greeks, and *Barbaroi*, outlandish foreigners who spoke another language. Franz Boas does not tell us, stranger as he was to the Eskimo, that

2. Even within a single society whose communities are roughly similar in structure, an individual easily forfeits his status when away from home. The point was made tellingly by a plebeian member of the town of Alcalá; to a drunken summer visitor who attempted to patronize him he answered: "You may be Don Fulano de Tal in your own home, but here you're just sh...t" (the story is probably apocryphal; I have only the testimony of the speaker that he actually said the words). In accordance with the same notions the system of nicknames in the townships of Andalusia seldom recognizes an outsider by any identity other than the place of his origin. Only exceptionally and after many years of residence will he acquire a nickname which defines him as an individual, that is, as a member of the community. Since place of birth is what defines the essential nature of the individual, an outsider can never become totally incorporated. *Cf.* Pitt-Rivers (1954).

he was obliged to wrestle with his right arm for his life and we may assume that the ceremony to which he referred was limited to other Eskimos who were practiced in the art of such a combat and sensitive to the honor conveyed by a feast of walrus blubber, that is, to strangers capable of becoming incorporated, not "barbarians."

Let us suppose that the stranger's appearance in the community where he had neither kin nor friends constituted in itself a challenge to which the local challenger was doing in reality no more than respond in the name of his group, its self-appointed champion. He is likely therefore to be the chief or the strongest man within it, or at least one who claims to be so. It would follow that if the stranger defeats him, he is proved superior to all and this fact would entitle him to be honored by the whole community. The precedence accorded to a guest may here be paid by everyone to recognized worth. Honor is gained by all through the visit of a superior person, since in accordance with its paradoxical nature it is gained by being paid (and lost by being denied) where it is due. Moreover, it seems most improbable that the theoretical right to execute the defeated champion could be exerted where he was surrounded by his kin and the stranger was alone. On the other hand, in the instance where the stranger was defeated it seems unlikely that the right to execute him would be exerted unless he was suspected of coming with sinister covert intentions such as to avenge a blood-feud or commit a felony. Eskimos are known to change the affiliation of their community not infrequently, as Boas points out, and it hardly appears likely that this could be done only at grave mortal risk. Moreover, they do not have the reputation of a bloodthirsty people who slaughter one another for glory. On the contrary their distaste for exhibitions of anger and violence has earned them the title of "The Gentle People." Is it not likely that this right to execute the defeated stranger existed *normally* only to be waived, establishing the fact that subsequent to his defeat, he "owed his life" to his conqueror? The fact would surely find some social recognition in a kind of bond; when one has fought for one's life against someone, lost and been spared, one can hardly resume the relationship of mere acquaintances, especially in a society, like the Eskimo among so many others, where lives may be owed, avenged or commuted into payment. May I not infer that the defeated stranger became some kind of client to the man who had conquered him who became in this way responsible for him in the eyes of the community? Under such conditions his vanquisher would, in fact, have been literally responsible for his presence there, having preferred not to exert his theoretical right to kill him. The struggle, condemnation, and pardon at

the hands of his victor follow a well-known sequence of social death and rebirth into a changed status.

My guess—or is it mere fantasy?—amounts to this: the stranger who was recognized as the better man was accorded universal respect which posed no problem of his precedence within the community, whatever his subsequent relationship to his antagonist, while he who was defeated was thereafter "attached to the community by the intermediary" of his victor. Those who know the Eskimo may have views about the possible or probable existence of such a relationship which might conceivably, among a people so addicted to the notion of artificial kinship, have taken this form in the same way as war-captives are sometimes integrated into the lineage of their captors or as Dr. Birket-Smith (1959: 173) was adopted by his Eskimo host,[3] but my aim is not to make any contribution to their studies. The purpose of this imaginary ethnography, embroidering the solid work of Boas, is only to offer an exercise in the logic of social relations, the scales which one may practice before attempting to interpret the infinitely complex score of reality.[4]

II

We have dealt so far only with the social aspect of the problem posed by the stranger, unknown and perhaps unversed in the culture of the local community. The simplest solution of all—and one which was followed by many peoples while they were permitted to do so—was to refuse recognition to any person unable to claim an attachment of kinship with the tribe, that is, to treat the stranger simply as an outlaw who could be spoiled or destroyed with impunity. Such hostility towards him hardly requires an explanation since the threat which he represents to established norms and to the sanctioned order of society

3. It is significant that the officiants at rites of passage frequently establish through them relationships of ritual kinships, as for example in the instance of godparenthood.

4. I admit none the less to a certain satisfaction when it was confirmed to me by Mr. Keith Basso who was then immersed in Eskimo ethnography that there is indeed one tribe among whom the stranger, defeated in the ordeal of entry, is made the ritual kinsman of his victor. Here however the contest took the form of a wrestling match of which the object was to kick the opponents' legs away from under him. Strength in the right leg, not arm, was the measure of superiority as indeed it is among the football fans of modern society.

is patent, apart from any imagined dangers, natural or supernatural, which, in the absence of any knowledge of him, he may incarnate. Even when not suspect as a vampire or a child-stealer, the stranger is always potentially hostile. How then are we to explain that particular relationship, discussed by Professor Levy, between the stranger and Zeus? The idea that the chief of the Gods should choose to adopt such a disguise, that the most sacred of all should be allied to the outsider, must surely appear as something of an anomaly, especially to those who, following Malinowski, would expect to find in mythology a "charter" for the social system. Taken at its face value the myth appears to contradict the first principle of social organization: that every community must possess its own particular standards which are held sacred, ordained by the Gods and opposed to the customs of foreigners.

Let us examine the possible interpretations of this belief. To begin with, the stranger is also the beggar, since they both belong to the category of persons to whom hospitality is due. The fact that the God took the form of the stranger or beggar ensured the enforcement of the moral duty of hospitality upon which the free circulation of persons between Greek communities depended.[5] It may be viewed, then, as a sanction supporting a system of undifferentiated exchange: do as you would be done by; receive the stranger well so that when you travel you may be well received. Taken in this sense the myth furnishes a charter for the code of hospitality, but such a teleological explanation can hardly be held sufficient to explain the *existence* of the belief since, quite apart from any methodological strictures, a similar code of hospitality towards the stranger exists in the Arab world unsupported by any such charter and is regarded there as a *sacred* duty none the less. The notion of hospitality derives in this instance from the sacredness of the womenfolk of the household.[6] Moreover, in both the Arab (Farés 1932) and the Greek world, by dispensing hospitality honor was acquired

5. "L'humeur voyageuse et sociale des Grecs, les fêtes, les besoins du commerce et très souvent aussi les exils politiques rendent toujours l'hospitalité nécessaire dans toutes les parties du monde grec" (Daremberg and Saglio 1900: 294).

6. *Cf.* Abou-Seid (1965). So powerful is this idea that every home becomes a sanctuary guarded by the honor of the owner who is in duty bound to receive any fugitive who ask for refuge. Even his own enemy can demand sanctuary of him, and rest assured of protection against himself, since his obligation to respect the sanctity of his own home takes precedence over his right and desire for vengeance. It should be noted however that the sacredness of the home makes it a sanctuary only to the stranger, not to the fellow-member of the community. Further instances of the association between the sacred and the stranger are given by Hocart (1935).

within the community and allies outside it and considerations of personal advantage are thereby added to the general utility of the association between the stranger and the sacred. Yet they do not explain it. Granted the function of the association, the anomaly remains. For however convenient it may be in terms of the consequences to identify God with the stranger, whether as potentially the same person (Levy's little tradition) or as patron and client (Levy's great tradition), we can hardly suppose that a system of religious thought can be made to submit to anomalies uniquely for the sake of facilitating political and economic relations. Even the argument that the supreme God was the patron of all Greeks in opposition to local deities whose protection was geographically limited is insufficient, even were there no other objections to it, to account for the *priority* of the stranger in Zeus' favor and his connection with the sacred. In fact, the stranger was not necessarily Zeus, but any God in disguise.

A more complete explanation can be deduced from a general consideration of the association between divinity and the unknown. Omniscience is a divine attribute and one which is jealously guarded. The moral lessons put forward in the Book of Genesis regarding the Tree of Knowledge or the myths of Icarus or Prometheus are quite unequivocal: the Gods possess knowledge which is forbidden to mankind and are prepared to punish any attempt to encroach upon their privilege. Their ineffability is the essence of their divinity. The esoteric character of communication with them and the mystery of their presence and their will (which follows none of the standards of human conduct) are the basis of the fear which they inspire. Once comprehended they would no longer be revered. Human knowledge desecrates by rendering known (and therefore secular) that which was mysterious (and therefore sacred), by reducing to the level of the known world that which is essentially unknowable. The character of the sacred as the inversion of the secular is implicit in all mythologies, those which define the status of the Gods or those which recount the origins of the world.[7] Both types of myth set the bounds of the mortal world and, doing so, establish the gradations of proximity to the Divine in space and in time. The mortal world is confined by an inversion of that which preceded it and that which lies beyond it. For this reason, we find Gods of foreign origin in so many parts of the world and for this reason also no prophet is accepted in his own country. In the light of this general principle the association between the God and the stranger appears generic, and

7. "The first possible definition of the *sacred* is that it is the opposite of the profane" (Eliade 1959: 10).

the sacredness of hospitality and the honor which it confers *derive* not from any functional consequence of the belief but from the fact that the meeting with the stranger is a confrontation between the known world and the realms of mystery. The stranger belongs to the "extra-ordinary" world, and the mystery surrounding him allies him to the sacred[8] and makes him a suitable vehicle for the apparition of the God,[9] the revelation of a mystery. Therefore, to put it in the phrasing of the popular epigram, it was not in the least odd of God to choose the Jews, but on the contrary exactly what the anthropologist should expect of Him. The ambiguity of their status, as at the same time belonging and not belonging, within the gates yet beyond the pale, and their reputation as the possessors of cryptic knowledge, the initiates of the mysteries of finance and of precious metals, made them strangers *par excellence*, perfectly endowed to be chosen both to provide the God in the beginning and to remain thereafter as his renegade kin. For this reason, they were the "sacred of the left hand" and the natural associates of the fallen angel. That these "internalized strangers" should have served for centuries as the focus of the ambivalences of their Christian neighbors is in no way surprising; what is surprising is that psychological studies of anti-Semitism should not all start with a profile of the mythological character of Jewry.

The stranger derives his danger, like his sacredness, from his membership of the "extra-ordinary" world. If his danger is to be avoided he must either be denied admittance, chased or enticed away like evil spirits or vampires, or, if granted admittance, he must be socialized, that is to say secularized, a process which necessarily involves inversion. His transformation into the guest means therefore that, from being shunned and treated with hostility, he must be clasped to the bosom and honored and given precedence; no longer to be suborned, he must be succored; from being last, he must be first,[10] from being a person who can be freely insulted he becomes one who under no conditions can be disparaged. The inversion

8. "The sacredness of the stranger in many societies was recognized long before Van Gennep who refers to earlier discussions of this topic" (Eliade 1959: 36).

9. "Le sacré n'est pas une valeur absolue, mais une valeur qui indique des situations respectives. Un homme qui vit chez lui . . . dans le profane . . . vit dans le sacré dès qu'il part en voyage et se trouve, en qualité d'étranger, à proximité d'un camp d'inconnus" (van Gennep 1966 [1909]: 16; *cf.* also p. 36 *et sq*.).

10. The guest who is received in a house for the first time is given precedence over its habitual guests with whom a greater familiarity exists. In the same way diplomatic etiquette forbids placing a countryman of the host in the place of honor if foreigners are present.

implies a transformation from hostile stranger, *hostis*, into guest, *hospes* (or *hostis*),[11] from one whose hostile intentions are assumed to one whose hostility is laid in abeyance. The word *hostis* claims therefore as its radical sense, not the obligation to reciprocal violence, but the notion of "strangeness" which underlies this transition. The further extension to *host* is perfectly congruent, since strangeness is logically reciprocal, whether it enjoins distrust or hospitality. Both senses of the word, *l'hôte*, are conserved in French which must find other ways to distinguish between host and guest. While the behavior enjoined by the relationship is essentially reciprocal, just as gifts are, there is a difference between reciprocal hostility and reciprocal hospitality: the first is simultaneous, the second can never be. Host and guest can at no point *within the context of a single occasion* be allowed to be equal, since equality invites rivalry. Therefore, their reciprocity resides, not in an identity, but in an alteration of roles. Even the hostile hosts of the Kwakiutl observed this order. The hostility which underlies the relation of "*hôtes*" which they express so explicitly—"we fight with property" (Benedict 1952: 136)—can be vented, not in simultaneous combat, but (like the blows exchanged between the southeastern tribes of the Central Eskimo and their visitors) by turns. Reciprocity implies an alternation of roles, not an identity of roles. As Radcliffe-Brown saw in the case of avoidances and joking relationships, it is conflict which is prohibited; the laws of hospitality transpose the conflict to a level where hostilities are avoided.

This prohibition of the equality which leads to conflict applies to the beggar as well as to the guest, the one who cannot pay and the one who is not permitted to do so—is not a beggar simply one who aspires to be a guest? But if he aspires too assiduously, then his insistence implies a threat and at that point the host is liberated of all moral duty and instead of gaining honor by his charity he loses it through submitting to duress, for freedom of will is the first condition of honor, Therefore the claim of the beggar is paradoxically one which is lost if it is asserted as a right and from the moment it loses its character as suppliance, it invites hostility. By pressing his claim too hard the would-be guest destroys its basis and falls back into the role of hostile stranger.[12] By asserting his rights,

11. "D'après Servius, certains auteurs anciens employaient le mot *hostis* pour *hospes*" (Daremberg and Saglio 1900: 303). The Greek word ξένος possesses the same two senses.

12. The problem of the "sturdy beggars" in sixteenth-century England revolved around this distinction of roles. The nursery rhyme preserves the terms of the choice which they imposed on the villagers: "some gave them black bread and some gave them brown, and some gave them a big stick and beat them out of town."

he denies his status, for even though a diffuse obligation exists towards the beggar, he is not endowed with any corresponding right. He establishes his status by humiliating himself in the admission of indigence and the reciprocity which he concedes in return is on behalf of God. The customs regarding begging in Andalusia may be taken to illustrate the matter. The beggar establishes his status by the demand for assistance in the name of God (*por Dios*). Once gratified he replies: "*Dios se lo pague*" (May God repay you). "May God repay you" means "Because I cannot." Here the association between the beggar and the Deity takes on a subsidiary meaning: the axis of exchange is no longer on the mortal plane. Repayment will only be made in Heaven; there will be none on Earth. The beggar is so to speak trading in the name of God, under His protection. The name by which he is known, *pordiosero*, rubs in the point. The refusal of alms is traditionally made in a formal phrase which carries the same import: "*Vd. perdone por Dios, hermano*" (Excuse me, in God's name, Brother). The refusal to lay up store in Heaven and assume on Earth the honorific role of patron to the beggar, includes the assertion of equality with him ("brother"), since inability to do so is the only excuse for refusal valid in the eyes of God. An alternative form, "*Dios le ampare, hermano*" (May God protect you, Brother) carries the same implication: "Because I am not going to."

To beg is always and everywhere shameful for it implies a loss of personal autonomy which is the negation of honor. Hence those who are reduced to this expedient are regarded as the lowest and treated with the least respect of all the members of a community.[13] This is not the case however, when they have sacerdotal status, for then they have not been "reduced to begging;" their personal autonomy has been, not lost, but willfully renounced. A vow of poverty derives from the will and commits it; it is not the same thing as the failed aspiration to affluence. We should recognize therefore that the action of begging does not suffice by itself to define the status of a beggar; the moral basis on which the begging is undertaken must be considered. Every town in Andalusia possesses a certain number of habitual beggars. These are known persons rather than strangers and they prey upon the local population. A certain number are gypsies whose reputation for shamelessness fits them for the role of beggar. Such beggars adopt a style which makes their loss of all claim to honor patent. They cringe and display their infirmity or their misery in such a way that

13. *Cf.* Mauss (1950): "Le don non rendu rend encore inférieur celui qui l'a accepté . . ." (258); *cf.* also p.169.

no man can deny his good fortune in comparison with them and therefore his obligation to help them. But they are not the only persons who depend in fact upon charity. Andalusia is a land of large farms. Its rural proletariat live in their home town normally but go away to work either sporadically or regularly on a seasonal basis. Their lives are precarious and when necessity threatens they move forth in search of work. Frequently they find themselves away from home and without means of support, so that they are forced to depend on charity. Their style of begging is very different, however, from that of the professional beggar. They stop at the farm to ask for work and if none is offered, they expect and are prepared to ask for food to continue their journey in search for it. They are not seen begging on street corners in the towns; they do not tug the sleeve of the passerby; they do not cringe nor attempt to evoke pity and the techniques of moral blackmail practiced by the beggars are denied them by their claim to shame. They tend on the contrary to adopt a gruff and manly style to differentiate themselves from the professional beggars, for they are strangers, not beggars, and they sacrifice their shame no further than the implied (but not stated) confession of indigence. They are not referred to as *pordioseros*, for they do not invoke charity in the name of God, but simply as *pobres*, persons who in better times at home would be prepared to reciprocate charity. The distinction is made clear in a telling passage in the memoirs of Juan Belmonte. When as a novice bullfighter he travelled round the countryside with a companion, they were accustomed to stop at the farms and contrive to be fed for nothing by asking to buy ten centimes' worth of oil.

> But one morning at a farm in Utrera which today is my own, the only answer I got was a dry *Dios le ampare, hermano*.
>
> The conventional refusal to a beggar! My face fell with shame. Had I sunk to that? I was seized with a great depression and a terrible indignation against the good-for-nothing vagabond who had degraded my lust for adventure to such a level. At least the San Jacinto gang never begged its bread from door to door. If we were hungry we robbed an orchard in gay defiance of watchdogs and armed guards. (Belmonte 1937: 109)

The confusion between poor man and beggar is not commonly made, for the difference of status is usually clear from the style of begging. The distinction relates to the place of the supplicant within the social structure. "Endomendicity"

can promise no reciprocity other than through the Deity. "Exomendicity" claims to be a system of undifferentiated exchange. The giver does not contemplate finding himself one day in the position of the endomendicant, for he has shame, but he may well expect to send his son off to seek work seasonally even if a change in his fortunes, the loss of his lease previously or of his post as bailiff, do not oblige him to take to the road himself. Therefore, the response to the two types of supplicant are as different as their techniques. The honorable poor man may be received with honor (though this is not always the case); the professional beggar is treated with a disdain which the honorable man would not stomach. Moreover, the former is a witness from the outside in whose eyes the reputation of the community is at stake, the latter is merely a nuisance and a threat. The former offers the opportunity of gaining honor through the role of patron, the latter is feared for her evil tongue and, as often as not, her evil eye. For there is a final difference between them: the former is more often a man, the latter more often a woman.

Convention demands that every stranger be made a guest in Andalusia. The unincorporated stranger cannot be abided. The plebeian etiquette with regard to eating illustrates this general sentiment. The act of eating supposes a higher degree of intimacy than mere presence and to eat in front of a stranger is to offend this sentiment. His status must be changed therefore to that of guest and this is done by the formality of offering food. The diner at a wayside tavern or modest restaurant invites the new arrival with a standard phrase, the workman eating his lunch uses the same phrase to the passerby, the traveler in the third class railway carriage presses his traveling companions to share his provisions before he will begin eating.

A similar custom is found in North Africa where it has been explained in terms of the magical danger of the envy of uninvited strangers who might well be possessed of the evil eye (Ellis 1908: 17).[14]

My own experiences with regard to hospitality in the town which I have named Alcalá were not without significance. I was invited to a drink by persons of various social classes and it was not long before I was permitted to return such hospitality to members of the plebeian community and even to play the role of patron to those with whom I had formed an appropriate relationship, but I was never permitted to pay for wine we had drunk together by men of the upper

14. It might be noted that whereas the evil eye is a female attribute in Andalusia, it is also exerted by *men* across the straits.

class of the town, the *señoritos*, who insisted always on maintaining my status as a guest. (I found it necessary to search for reciprocity in other ways.) They would use various formulae to explain their refusal: "We shall all one day come to London and drink with you there. Then we shall ruin you" (laughter); or they would simply remind me that I was a foreigner and that they would be ashamed to let me pay in their town; or they would promise that next time I should be allowed to pay—a "next time" which never came. The fact that I was never allowed to return hospitality within the town was significant above all (since I was accepted as a social equal in other ways), in regard to their conception of the stranger. For I was not only a stranger to the local community but to the national community—a foreigner, and an inquisitive one at that. The threat which I embodied was represented in the belief that I was a spy, which was discarded only after months of evident ineptness in that role. While my presence was in itself honorific, my potential hostility was nevertheless very great. Therefore, I was never allowed to escape from my status as guest, where I had no rights, into that of community member where I might assert myself, make demands and criticisms and interfere in the social and political system. This long-extended hospitality for which I remain ever grateful carried the covert significance of a status barrier whereby the leaders of local society protected themselves from the threat that my strangeness represented. It was even suggested, after a minor governmental authority with whom I had had a slight altercation happened to be transferred to another town, that I was really in the pay, not of the British government, but of the Spanish government. Zeus in disguise? An ingenuous young man hastened to take advantage of his connection with me to ask for a letter of recommendation which would get him into the secret police.

The extraneous example of my own experiences does not suffice to make clear the code of hospitality. The treatment of the stranger depends very much upon his social status. A person of high status honors the whole community by his presence and must be made a guest by a leading member, if he is not to be shunned as someone too suspicious to have any contact with. In fact, he can usually find someone with whom to establish at least a tie of common friendships. Persons of lower status frequently have similar contacts. There are also those who are glad to extend the range of their friendships as a source of prestige and with a view to an eventual reciprocity. The greatest overt distrust is that shown towards the groups of young men who come through the town on their way to the plains to seek work. The fact that they come in groups and that their destination is elsewhere makes them poor candidates for any form of hospitality.

There is however one class of stranger towards whom hostility is shown, the young men who come courting a local girl. An ancient custom relates how such a visitor was received. If he were not driven away by stoning he would be captured by the local lads and ducked in the fountain. It was not clear whether this might be done more than once, but if he survived this ordeal and persevered with his suit he was allowed to do so unmolested. He was then believed to have formed an unbreakable attachment to the place through the effect of the waters. It is not difficult to see the symbolism of this custom. The water of each *pueblo* is its pride and none is so brackish that it will not be proclaimed exceptional in taste and health-giving qualities (*"una agua riquísima," "una agua muy sana,"* etc.) superior to that of all neighboring places. It is the source of the virtues of the inhabitants. The stranger who has been submitted to the ordeal of ducking survives no longer as a stranger but as a member of the community, one who has been reborn from its "source."[15] (The word used is either *pila* or *fuente*. *Pila* means both "font" and "fountain," *fuente* means both the town fountain and also "source" or "origin." The town fountain is a white-washed edifice of great social importance as a meeting-place through which gossip is diffused and it is commonly surmounted by a cross). The hostile treatment is a prelude to acceptance at a level which is not attained by the guest. By presenting himself as a suitor the visitor denies his intention to depart; on the contrary he asserts his aspiration to enter the kinship system as an affine, that is, to acquire rights in the community.

III

The law of hospitality is founded upon ambivalence. It imposes order through an appeal to the sacred, makes the unknown knowable, and replaces conflict by reciprocal honor. It does not eliminate the conflict altogether but places it in abeyance and prohibits its expression. This is true also of the avoidance and the joking relationship. But whereas the joking relationship suppresses the conflict by the prohibition to take offence, hospitality achieves the same end by the prohibition to give offence; one by forbidding respect, the other by enforcing it, or it might be put: the avoidance of respect and the avoidance of disrespect. Both

15. A recent article by Susan Tax Freeman (1980) examines in detail the symbolic value of the fountain and marks the analogy between *pila,* the baptismal font, and *pila,* the fountain.

relationships are placed outside the struggle for supremacy by a tacit agreement enjoined by custom, but, while the custom of the joking relationship invokes the desecrable and employs the language of pollution in the exchange of obscenities, the custom of hospitality invokes the sacred and involves the exchange of honor. Host and guest must pay each other honor. The host requests the honor of the guest's company—(and this is not merely a self-effacing formula: he gains honor through the number and quality of his guests). The guest is honored by the invitation. Their mutual obligations are in essence unspecific, like those between spiritual kinsmen or blood-brothers; each must accede to the desires of the other. To this extent the relationship is reciprocal. But this reciprocity does not obscure the distinction between the roles.

It is always the host who ordains, the guest who complies. The guest must be granted the place of precedence and he must eat first, but precedence is defined in relation to the host, on his right hand as a rule. (Only royalty takes the head of the table in the house of another, for the obvious reason that royalty always ordains, cannot comply.) The duty of ordering the precedence among guests is the host's responsibility and the guest who is dissatisfied with his treatment has no recourse but to retire from his role altogether by walking out. An intermediary solution was once furnished in diplomatic etiquette by the convention whereby a guest, dissatisfied with his position at table, could call attention to an error of protocol of which he was the victim by the gesture of turning his plate over and thereby making it impossible to serve him. In this way he retired from his role until the error was corrected, or at least until his protest had been registered, without showing any discourtesy to his host. To complain openly would infringe the host's prerogative in the placing of his guests, while to refuse the food would be impolite since refusal implies distaste and depreciation and amounts therefore to an insult. The Spanish peasantry, conscious of this implication, commonly uses the expression "*para no despreciarlo*" (in order not to despise it) when accepting food or drink. In this way the guest exonerates himself from the implication of being greedy or demanding and maintains that he accepts only out of respect for the host. Thus tipsy farmers down their umpteenth glass with the righteous air of obligation.

Whether it is mandatory to refuse or accept, or to refuse at first and then accept, is a particularity of custom. The logic of the law of hospitality provides a justification for either refusal or acceptance: whether honor is done best by declaring the offer of hospitality excessive (which might imply distaste) or by demonstrating it to be welcome (which risks the implication that it may be

taken for granted) is something which can only be known by reference to local convention. To gobble the peasant's lunch in the railway carriage in order not to show contempt for it is incorrect because there is no reason why he, rather than another, should play the host in such circumstances. To refuse the food he offers in his home is another matter.

The roles of host and guest have territorial limitations. A host is host only on the territory over which on a particular occasion he claims authority. Outside it he cannot maintain the role. A guest cannot be guest on ground where he has rights and responsibilities. So it is that the courtesy of showing a guest to the door or the gate both underlines a concern in his welfare as long as he is a guest, but it also defines precisely the point at which he ceases to be so, when the host is quit of his responsibility. At this point the roles lapse. The custom of the desert Arabs made this abundantly clear. Such was the sanctity of hospitality that the host's protection was assured even towards those for whom he felt enmity. To take advantage of a guest or fugitive was unthinkable. Yet hospitality bequeathed no commitment beyond the precincts of the domestic sanctuary, so his guest might become his victim the moment he stepped outside them. Hence it was the custom for the guest to leave silently and unannounced during the darkest hours of the night for fear he should be followed and struck down. The custom of the Kalingas shows by a curious variation the true nature of this sociological space defined by hospitality. When the guest of a Kalinga is a local man his host is responsible for his protection only within the confines of his property. His hurt or murder on the premises must be avenged by his host. But if the guest is a foreigner his host remains responsible for his protection throughout the entire region (Barton 1949: 83).[16] The range within which their complementary relationship holds good coincides with the territory where their mutual status is unequal. Where neither has a greater claim to authority than the other their complementarity lapses. For, while a host has rights and obligations in regard to his guest, the guest has no right other than to respect and no obligation other than to honor his host. He incurs however the right and obligation to return hospitality on a future occasion on territory where he can claim authority. The reciprocity between host and guest is thus transposed to a temporal sequence and a spatial alternation in which the roles are reversed. Only then can the covert hostility be vented in customs such as the *potlatch* where rivalry takes the form of a hospitality which is more than lavish and where failure

16. Regarding the status of strangers in Africa, see Fortes (1975).

to reciprocate spells bankruptcy. The fable of the fox and the stork provides a model of the law of hospitality and an object lesson in its exploitation: an affront which masquerades as a generous and honorific gesture cannot be resented without violating the law of hospitality, since it is the host's privilege to ordain, but it can nevertheless be avenged by a similar ploy once the tables are turned.

For the same reason that the criminal is said to define the law the essentials of the law of hospitality can best be seen in the actions which constitute its infringement. How is the law of hospitality infringed? The detail varies of course from place to place. To inquire after the health of a spouse or child may be a requirement of good manners according to one code or a *faux pas* according to another. Yet a certain general sense informs them all, entitling us to talk about the law of hospitality in the abstract in contrast to the specific codes of hospitality exemplified by different cultures. There is, so to speak, a "natural law" of hospitality deriving not from divine revelation like so many particular codes of law, but from sociological necessity.

A guest infringes the law of hospitality:

1. If he insults his host or by any show of hostility or rivalry; he must honor his host.
2. If he usurps the role of his host. He may do this by presuming upon what has not yet been offered, by "making himself at home," taking precedence, helping himself, giving orders to the dependents of his host, and so forth. If he makes claims or demands, he usurps the host's right to ordain according to his free will, even where custom lays down what he should wish to ordain. To attempt to sleep with the host's wife[17] or to refuse to do so may either of them be infractions of a code of hospitality, but be it noted that the cession of the conjugal role always depends upon the host's will, like the precedence which he cedes. His wife's favors are always his to dispose of as he wishes. To demand or take what is not offered is always a usurpation of the role of host;
3. If, on the other hand, he refuses what *is* offered he infringes the role of guest. Food and drink always have ritual value, for the ingestion together of a common substance creates a bond. Commensality is the basis of community in a whole number of contexts. Therefore, the guest is bound above all to accept food. Any refusal reflects in fact upon the host's capacity to

17. *Cf.* van Gennep (1966 [1909]: 47 et sq.)

do honor; and this is what the guest must uphold. Therefore, he may be expected to give thanks and pay compliments in order to stress that he is conscious of the honor done him. On the other hand, it may be considered "bad form" to do so since this implies that honor might not have been done and this in turn throws doubt on the host's capacity. The Victorian hostess who answered a florid compliment to her cook with the withering words: "But did you expect to have bad food in my house?" made the point effectively. Failure to know what should be taken for granted can amount to insult. Therefore, the details of codes of hospitality may be contraries, but, as in the treatment of twins or smiths in Africa, the contraries contain a common element of sociological meaning, which derives in this case from the law of hospitality.

A host infringes the law of hospitality:

1. If he insults his guest or by any show of hostility or rivalry; he must honor his guest.
2. If he fails to protect his guest or the honor of his guest. For this reason, though fellow guests have no explicit relationship, they are bound to forego hostilities, since they offend their host in the act of attacking one another. The host must defend each against the other, since both are his guests.
3. If he fails to attend to his guests, to grant them the precedence which is their due, to show concern for their needs and wishes or in general to earn the gratitude which guests should show. Failure to offer the best is to denigrate the guest. Therefore, it must always be maintained that, however far from perfect his hospitality maybe, it is the best he can do.

It will be noted that, while the first clause is the same for both parties, the second and third are complementary between host and guest. This complementarity provides the systematic basis of the institution, which reaches its full symmetry in reciprocal hospitality when the roles of host and guest are exchanged. This is never the case with hospitality to a stranger whose chance of reciprocating necessarily remains in the blue. Lacking reciprocity between individuals, hospitality to the stranger can nevertheless be viewed as a reciprocal relationship between communities. The customs relating to the stranger therefore concern the degree to which he is permitted to be incorporated into a community which is not his own, and the techniques whereby this is affected. These may be divided into

those which establish him as a permanent member of the local group and those which assume his departure in the future.

If he comes only to visit, the visit may be returned, but if he intends to remain and change his affiliation, the reciprocity between communities ceases to operate.

An "ordeal" implies permanence since its significance is essentially that it marks an irreversible passage: the element of hostility in the character of the stranger is destroyed and he is able to emerge from it in a more acceptable status. He is no longer unknown, he has been tried. He forfeits his association with the sacred and his call upon hospitality which derived from it. The passage of an ordeal entitles the stranger to remain in a new role, more nearly incorporated even if he is not granted the full status of community membership; he may still be subject to a personal bond with one of its members through affinity, artificial kinship or clientship. Yet whatever his subsequent status it provides him with a mode of permanent incorporation. Where an elaborate code of hospitality applies to the stranger and he is made a guest by the mere fact of his appearance without any "ordeal," an impermanent relationship is implied. His hostile character is not destroyed but inverted through the avoidance of disrespect. A limit is frequently set upon the time such a guest is expected to stay and, even when this is not so, it is always recognized that it is an abuse to outstay one's welcome. Thus while the mode of permanent incorporation solidifies in time, the status of guest evaporates. The one faces a potential assimilation, the other an eventual departure. While it lasts, the tenuous nature of the relationship of host and guest depends upon respecting the complementarity of their roles. Any infringement of the code of hospitality destroys the structure of roles, since it implies an incorporation which has not in fact taken place; failure to return honor or avoid disrespect entitles the person slighted in this way to relinquish his role and revert to the hostility which it suppressed. The sacred quality in the relationship is not removed, but polluted. Once they are no longer host and guest they are enemies, not strangers. Enemies *do* compete and it requires at least a tacit test of strength to determine which is the better man who will remain in possession of the field while the other takes his distance. The ordeal of the judicial combat may be appealed to so that Divine judgment may decide the matter or the struggle may be quite unformalized. The "ordeal" which failed to take place on the way in takes place on the way out. Then the antagonists can part and become strangers again, in life or in death. This is why the process of reverting from guest to stranger in the Mediterranean follows a course

reminiscent of that whereby the stranger was accepted in Eskimo society. Both represent variations on the theme of the ambivalence which underlies the law of hospitality. Both involve a combat which carries the host-guest relationship beyond that state of suspended hostility in which the exchange of honor overlays the contrast of allegiances, but beyond it in one of two directions: it may lead either to incorporation or rejection. Yet the logical foundation of the problem is the same and it is this which explains, perhaps, the similarity between Boas' ethnographical account and the last scene of the Odyssey.[18]

EPILOGUE

The feast[19] has been going on for years when the old beggar turns up. He is not, as one of the guests suspects, a god in disguise but the host. Only the old dog knows and the discovery is too much for him. The place is in disorder: the master's substance is wasting, the suitors plague his widow (who is not his widow), the guests play the host, abuse the maid-servants and plot the son's murder.

A challenge[20] is issued to a test of strength to see which guest can string the master's bow. The lady will espouse the winner, she says. Finally, when all have failed, the old beggar picks up the challenge amidst their scorn, and by the strength of his right arm triumphantly reveals his true identity. After that, of course, the slaughter begins. (How could one pardon guests who have so far usurped the role of host?) Anyway the gods see to it that no quarter be given, for it is justice which is at issue here, not sentiment. The world turns the right way up once more. Order and peace are restored.

18. In order to demonstrate the universal validity of the logic of the law of hospitality, I have deliberately taken evidence from different spheres: ritual custom, the conventions of manners, habitual practice and the inventions of the poet. It is not intended to imply that there is no difference between them and that they must not be distinguished for other purposes.

19. *Cf.* the "elements of custom" listed on page 165.

20. *Cf.* the "elements of custom" listed on page 165.

CHAPTER 8

Women and sanctuary in the Mediterranean*

> Woman is another being who lives apart and is therefore an enigmatic figure. It would be better to say she is the Enigma. She attracts and repels like men of an alien race or nationality.
> Octavio Paz, *The labyrinth of solitude*

In the previous chapter[1] I attempted to show, by reference to a proposed universal "law of hospitality," why the last scene of the Odyssey, the slaughter of the suitors, is not, as certain authors have suggested, anomalous. I was concerned with the status of the guest as an intermediary position between the hostile and mysterious outside and the interior structure of the community. The relationship between host and guest is subject to special provisions, I suggested, on account of the ambivalence pervading it which derives from the fact that it represents a

---

* "Women and sanctuary in the Mediterranean" was published in 1977 as part of Julian Pitt-Rivers' volume, *The fate of Shechem or the politics of sex: Essays in the anthropology of the Mediterranean*, and is reproduced in this volume with permission from Cambridge University Press. An earlier version of the essay appeared in 1970 in *Echanges et communications: Mélanges offerts à Claude Lévi-Strauss*, a volume edited by J. Pouillon and P. Maranda (Paris: Mouton).

1. Pitt-Rivers refers here to "The law of hospitality," which also appeared in *The fate of Shechem* (1977) and is reproduced as Chapter 7 in this volume. *Ed*.

confrontation between the internal and the external aspects of the host's social unit. My explanation was complete in itself, I believe, but it raised at one point a question that is worth examining: why is the notion of sanctuary in the Arab world connected with the sanctity of women? Sanctuary is accorded in the first place at shrines where the fugitive becomes inviolate through placing himself under the protection of the divine power to whom the shrine is dedicated, but a right to domestic sanctuary also exists for those who place themselves under the protection of the head of a household who is thereby bound to protect them as his guests. In order to claim this right the fugitive must make contact with the women of the house. Is this connection fortuitous or does it derive from some fundamental association between the status of women and the status of guests as, both of them, protected persons? The fact that in our own society we tend to treat the two in a rather similar fashion might seem to suggest that this is so, but it would be rash to jump to conclusions, since this is not the case everywhere and notably in the Arab world. It is never, in any case, on the basis of superficial resemblances in the modes of conduct that the structural equivalence of institutions can be established. I shall content myself with examining this connection in the Mediterranean and shall use once more as my point of departure that magnificent treatise on the law of hospitality which is the Odyssey.

I

Let us consider the scene in which Odysseus arrives upon the island of Phaeacia: he emerges from the sea and is soon befriended by the king's daughter, Nausicaa, who gives him clothing and counsels him how to obtain the royal protection. He then follows her to the palace and, hidden in a cloud by the watchful care of Athene, penetrates to the central hall where he finds Queen Arete whom he clasps round the knees, taking up the traditional attitude of a supplicant.

The scene has given rise to speculations.[2] Why should he have to go to the queen rather than directly to the king beside her? Was clemency more likely to come from her? Was she more effective in authority than her husband? Though she is painted as a forceful character and is said to be much honored by her husband, it is evident that the decision to grant sanctuary must come from him

2. It was also used to buttress conjectures regarding primitive matriarchy. On this point see Finley (1967: 103-114).

and we must remember that, according to many critics, Phaeacia is used by the poet as a model of the proper social order to be contrasted with the confusion Odysseus finds when he gets home. If this is so, there is something unlikely in the suggestion that here the queen wielded the power of decision over her husband, for this is not the proper distribution of authority in the society portrayed by Homer (and in any case she may be presumed to have been much younger than her husband, being his brother's daughter). The position of women was, in general, one of subjugation to male authority as it is in the Mediterranean down to the present and this is especially the case when the exterior relations of the household are in question. It appears then that here the distribution of authority is not the issue, nor is it a matter of female impressionability and that Odysseus was advised to go to the queen, not primarily on account of her individual character (though Athene makes much of her good qualities) but because this gesture was required of a supplicant according to Phaeacian custom. (Odysseus had already considered adopting such a posture when throwing himself upon Nausicaa's mercy.) It is to be noted that it is not the queen but the ancient counsellor who prompts the king to grant Odysseus hospitality. In fact we are dealing with a customary form of behavior for supplicants as standard as that which follows the gesture in the scene in question: sitting in the ashes in the hearth. To explain it we must look not to evaluations of behavior in our own society but to the moral division of labor between the sexes in the ancient Mediterranean, and in particular to that aspect of it which will explain the association between women and sanctuary.

This institution is not one which is often encountered in the modern world and where it is still to be found is in those areas where the authority of the state has yet to be exerted, for sanctuary supposes warring tribes whose strife is none the less subject to a code of rules accepted by both parties. It belongs to a world where the ethic of feud rather than written law provides the modes of offence and retaliation. Such societies have been called lawless or anarchic and they are certainly inclined to internal violence, yet their violence is subject to rules as strict as those of a sacred game. The persons to whom sanctuary is normally extended are therefore members of the same total society within which the rules are recognized, yet not members of the same social unit within it; they respect the sanctity of the same shrines within whose precincts violence is sacrilegious, yet they use violence freely in the struggle for power. The relationship between the social units which accept common norms of sanctuary is therefore similar to that between the exogamous sections of the same tribe or people who exchange

their daughters. They stand in relation to each other upon the boundary of the known world.

Abou Zeid has given us a description of the rules of sanctuary among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica who, in conformity with Arab custom, refer to it by the word *haram*, from the same root as the words for womenfolk, sacred places and that which is prohibited (1965: 7-23).[3] His account of sanctuary is essentially the same as that given by Bishr Farès (1932) in his study of the conception of honor in pre-Islamic Arabia and it should be noted that when sanctuary is offered in the house or tent of an individual, the host gains honor through affording it, since it testifies to his power to protect. Like other authors who have written about the mores of the Arabs, Abou Zeid stresses the vulnerability of men's honor through their women, but he does not explain why the penetration of the women's quarters by a stranger should not constitute a violation of the honor of the owner ("outrage à la horma" in Bourdieu's phrase), why on the contrary his honor is enhanced not desecrated by the fugitive who reaches sanctuary there.

Varied as they are throughout the world, the customs that determine the reception of the stranger all provide a means of stripping him of some degree of his strangeness in order that he may be accepted into the community as a guest. His special status accorded by the code of hospitality derives from the necessity to establish norms of behavior towards him in spite of the fact that he is as yet unknown and potentially hostile. In order that the rules of social intercourse may operate with regard to him the hostile stranger must be converted into a guest. This transformation is achieved through some ritual of incorporation which places the host and guest outside the bounds of the rivalry that governs relationships in a neutral setting. Between host and guest aggressive behavior is forbidden and any act of discourtesy defiles the honor of both. Moreover, the two are allied in the eyes of the rest of the community; the host is responsible for his guest, while the guest is dependent on his host and relates to others through him. In some societies the host may even receive blood-money in the event of the murder of a guest, but everywhere the same rule of hospitality is found: the guest submits to the authority of the host; the host extends his protection in exchange.

3. See Bourdieu's (1968) discussion of this term. Excerpts from this essay are published in English in Mary Douglas (1973). C. Staniland Wake (1888: 227) tells us of the Bedouins that "The respect paid to [women] is so great that, if a homicide can succeed in concealing his head under the sleeve of a woman and cry 'fyardh'ek,' 'under thy protection,' his safety is insured."

In the case of sanctuary, the same rule may be said to apply though it is initiated by the visitor: instead of responding to an invitation to become a guest, the fugitive imposes himself as such by adopting an attitude of submission and by claiming protection in exchange for the honor which his submission conveys. By entering the women's quarters, he tacitly renounces his power to affront. To enter them other than as a supplicant would be the gravest offense and a desecration of female purity, but a supplicant cannot affront for he throws himself upon the mercy of his host, and thereby forfeits all claim to the kind of honor by which he might impugn another man's. Having placed himself "in balk," he cannot then challenge anybody until he resumes his liberty and with it his vulnerability.

Abou Zeid points out that the greatest honor falls to the man who extends sanctuary even to his own enemy whose entry into the women's quarters in the role of supplicant offers him the opportunity of accreting honor through a display of magnanimity; but it is not merely an opportunity, it is also a sacred duty, for to violate the right to sanctuary is sacrilege, as our own language implies. In the light of modern ideas about women, enmity, and honor such provisions seem almost nonsensical. In order to find their sense, we must attempt to transpose them to a higher level of abstraction.

Let us reduce to a simple schema the internal and external relations of a household such as is still commonly found in the Mediterranean prior to modern urban development:

1. The house itself contains the inner quarters associated with the women and the intimate life of the family, and, for the purpose of receiving visits from neighbors, a hall or porch, its point of contact with the exterior. The latter part of the house, the guesthouse, is commonly forbidden to women in Arab villages and the women's quarters are forbidden to any men but close kinsmen and servants or slaves, that is to say, persons attached to the household in an inferior status. The same basic distinction is made between the interior and exterior aspects of the dwelling even when it is no more than a tent (*Cf.* Laoust 1935: 19, et seq.).
2. Outside the home are the common meeting-grounds of the whole community, composed of similar households with whom solidarity is shown in the face of external threats, who know each other's histories, marry each other's daughters and plot with and against each other in the struggle for wealth, prestige and authority within the community. Belonging to the same

community, they stand in rivalry within it where they are conceptually similar: potentially equivalent and differentiated in fact by their relative preponderance. But their differences are forgotten when, facing the exterior, they are united on the basis of collective interests in opposition to those who are conceptually different.

Just as the household is divided internally and united in relation to the exterior, so the community is either divided or united according to whether its internal or external aspect is at stake.

3. Beyond the community lies the outside world which is generally regarded as hostile, from which come strangers, that is, unknown persons who, unlike the fellow-members of the community with whom relations are habitual and clearly structured, remain mysterious, their nature and their power in doubt and who derive from their strangeness a preferential relationship with the Divine. The God of the Old Testament as well as Allah and Zeus protected strangers and the latter was also liable to appear himself in the disguise of a supplicant or beggar. Odysseus for this reason was mistaken for a god several times during his travels but by persons with whom he shared a common conception of humanity, fellow Greeks, as opposed to those with whom this natural affiliation was not shared, the sirens and the Cyclops.

Thus three main fields of social relations can be distinguished: those interior to the household, those exterior to it but interior to the community, and those that extend beyond the bounds of the community. On the axis of contact there is a progression from the private precincts where relations are intimate between members of the same household (and here is the only licit field of sexual relations), to the extraneous world with which contact is exceptional, sporadic, and subject to special provisions, if not actually hostile. Between these two lies the community. Yet we can choose a different axis, that of similarity/dissimilarity, which makes opposition possible either on the basis of community or of sex: in the first case, own community is opposed to other communities—members of the known world versus non-members, habitual versus exceptional relations—in the second, own sex is opposed to other sex within a division of labor which endows the male with authority and the female with purity and correspondingly limits the activities of women in regard to public matters which are in the hands of men. Women are expected to stay at home, since they are the repositories of male honor to be shielded from contact with males of other households which would defile them. Therefore strangers are always masculine. Through the value

attached to their purity women are endowed with sanctity of a certain kind, expressed by the notion of *haram* and associated not with any religious function but with the mysteries of sex and childbirth. Sacredness in this sense attaches in both cases to the dissimilar, whether they be of the same sex but a different community or of the same community but a different sex. The social structure enjoins the norms of behavior which reign over the theoretical space between the two, that is to say, it classifies known male persons and dictates the rules by which they may triumph over or cooperate with one another. But females stand outside this structure in that they are allotted their place within the community by virtue of their relationship to males who are responsible for them as they are for their guests. Women are therefore not merely mysterious, opposed to males upon the moral plane, but on the social plane "out of bounds," segregated and surrounded by taboos and literally, in the case of the Arabs, enclosed behind walls and veils like the tabernacle.

The essence of the notion of sanctuary is that it is a place where the "normal" rules of aggression and retaliation are laid in abeyance. Its sanctity defines it as a context apart from the idiom of normal intercourse, "out of bounds". This suspension of the rules of normal intercourse applies not only to certain places such as shrines, but to certain persons, women as has been said and also guests who, from the moment that they are accepted, become subject to special treatment. Excluded from the councils of their host and denied authority, dependent upon his wishes just as women are, the guest receives respect nonetheless, for like women he possesses the power to act upon the honor of his host. One may distinguish therefore between relations which are "in bounds" to the norms of interaction and those which are "out of bounds" because concerned with persons mysterious and honorific who occupy a special status whether they derive it from their dissimilarity of sex or of community.

The position of women in the tradition of the Mediterranean has, for all its variation, at least this constant: that they are viewed always in opposition to the world of men to which they are both essential for moral as well as practical reasons and yet contrary in terms of the values they symbolize; they embody, as it were, the counter-principle to the male-ruled society, antithetical to it and complementary, and this antithesis is illustrated in the conceptions which attach to the interior of the house or the life outside it: the wife is mistress within, the husband without. The moral division of labor of sexes relates, then, to their inverse roles within or without the house. The social order is founded upon this distinction. Hence the inversionary rites of the Mediterranean display to this

day the theme of the reversal of sexual roles: men disguise themselves as women and women are granted the symbols of public male authority and the privileges of the male sex.

The masculine principle of power and authority determines the precedence and preeminence of the households of the community, but it recognizes limits to the exploitation of advantage, as Bourdieu (1965) has shown in his analysis of the dialectic of challenge and riposte in Kabyle society. Once preeminence has been established it requires to be confirmed by magnanimity, passing thereby from the realm of fact to that of right, for the gesture of magnanimity, to be accepted as such, must be endorsed by public recognition. You can demonstrate your power to win, but your right to pardon must be recognized by others, lest your magnanimity be mistaken for weakness. The granting of sanctuary is a public display of this right to magnanimity and for this reason a means of accreting honor. Complementarily, the demonstration of submission in suppliance invokes the claim to protection. The fugitive who seeks refuge among the women, violating the taboo which surrounds them, becomes thereby himself taboo and places himself "out of bounds." If therefore the union of the outsider and the women represents a conjunction of extremes on the axis of contact, on the axis of similarity/dissimilarity the two are associated as contraries of the bounded worldly order which stands between them but is eliminated by their union in favor of the other-worldly order represented by the sacred. Failing to escape out of the masculine order, the fugitive can therefore, if he is lucky, escape *in.* Hence Athene considerately covered Odysseus with a cloud while he ran the gauntlet of entrance into the palace, for the Phaeacians were notorious not only for their hospitality but for their hostility towards strangers.

This explanation attempts no more than to sketch the values symbolized in the notion of sanctuary and offer a logical connection between them, resolving the apparent anomaly of accepting the fugitive into the women's quarters, but it might seem fanciful and contrived if it did not accord with certain general principles long recognized in anthropology concerning the relation of women to outsiders.

II

Women are associated with outsiders first of all in the custom of exogamy which appears among primitive peoples from the moment that communities attempt

to maintain structured relations with one another as opposed to the hazardous contacts between jungle bands which are not exogamous. The exchange of women provides a form of sociation which establishes a permanent structure where political ties are too frail to do so. Yet this does not imply an end to all hostilities: the connection between the exchange of women and the hostility of outsiders is sanctified for all time in the well-known refrain, "We fight with those who give us wives" or "We marry those we fight with." Indeed, behind the theory of matrimonial alliance lies the premise that those who are thus allied are defined as a group clearly enough to envisage fighting, even if they do not in fact possess sufficient autonomy to do so. This fact differentiates them again from those who live in a homogeneous society. Thus, too distant from each other, no alliance is possible; too close, it is superfluous, or putting it more exactly, the elementary structure upon which the exchange of women depends gives way to a complex structure where kinship is no longer the basis of social grouping; alliance can then only be between households or even individuals.

The custom of exogamy therefore serves to structure relations between social groups that recognize each other as different but capable of being associated. The point of my argument is not however the value of political and social ties established through the exchange of women—how frail these are is shown by the maxim—but that this exchange is also the exchange of knowledge,[4] the basis of sociation: unknown outsiders are reduced through marriage to a known element in the social universe, affines. The fact is clearly illustrated by those languages which derive the word for affine from that which means stranger, enemy or guest. Hostile these affines may remain and their hostility may be symbolized in a ritual of marriage by capture, but it is a mock-capture and asserts only that the hostility which persists is nevertheless subject to conventions recognized by both parties, like the rules of war. Once they exchange women they are sociated. There is however one area of the world which, though it is noted for being

4. The expression "carnal knowledge" retains the association between knowledge and copulation. Romantic love is said to be blind, but the marriage rules of the primitive know what they are up to. Westermarck, when he attributed the prohibition of incest to the absence of sexual desire produced by familiarity, confused the two (as well as confusing much else besides), but it is an error based upon a profound truth that many other writers have touched on in different ways: that the sexual division of labor offers a road to escape from self. It will not become clear in anthropological terms until some brave man undertakes the structural study of love.

traditionally organized in corporate and even in kin groups, refuses to exchange women: the Mediterranean.

Now it is significant that Arēte was her husband's brother's daughter. Such a type of marriage is the basic model of patrilineal endogamy and is favored still today by the Arabs. In fact, it was perhaps in former times much more extensive than today.[5] Moreover we know that the classical Greeks recognized in the institution of the *epikleros*, the brotherless daughter of a line of descent, a preferential right to marry their patrilineal kinswoman whose estate was thereby kept within the lineage—if it were not more exact to put it the other way round and say that the woman went with the estate. It seems likely then that Arēte's kinship with her husband is a structurally-significant detail; if not married strictly as an *epikleros*, she stood in relation to her husband in a similar situation, for her father, Rhexenor, had died leaving no other child. Nausicaa on the other hand, far from being married endogamously, is offered as a wife to a total stranger, Odysseus, on condition he remain upon the island. This offer is made on the night of his arrival and before he has revealed his identity (which he does only just before leaving).

One cannot help wondering about the Phaeacian marriage customs. Was patrilineal endogamy the rule for all or was it only the custom of the royalty? If in Homer's Mediterranean the king were no more than a chieftain, *primus inter pares*, rather than a sacred king, one would not expect the kingship to possess a special custom in this regard. On the other hand, the royal house of Phaeacia was descended rather closely from the gods. Whether or not the norm of patrilineal marriage was general, there is an apparent contradiction in the fact that Arēte should have been married at one extreme of the axis of contact and Nausicaa offered in marriage at the other. Was there no classificatory father's brother's son available to claim her? The text implies there was not, since no collateral branch of the family is mentioned. At the time of Odysseus' arrival she was expecting to be married to a Phaeacian as soon as her father had made up his mind which one. Is one entitled to suggest that if all were turned down in favor of the stranger none was entirely satisfactory to his way of thinking? The higher the social status of a lineage the more likely it is to be endogamous. The royal house of Phaeacia faced a quandary in the case of Nausicaa if there was

5. "Lorsque nous examinons la diffusion de ce type de mariage endogame, nous constatons qu'elle correspond à une région vaste et homogène: tout l'Ancien Monde" (Tillion 1966: 36).

no available member of the royal patriline to whom she could be given and no neighboring island with a suitable heir apparent. (Phaeacia's isolation is stressed in the text.) Odysseus furnished a possible solution to this quandary for the following reason.

To begin with marriage rules are always qualified by a rule of residence: to take *in* a son-in-law is not the same thing as giving a daughter *away*. In many patrilineal endogamous societies, an in-marrying son-in-law can take place of a son. (The French or Japanese peasantries may be quoted as examples.) The status of son-in-law can merge into that of adopted son, if indeed some ritual of adoption does not precede the marriage as in Japan. In ancient Greece sons were sometimes adopted by the fathers of future *epikleroi* to avoid the inheritance being claimed by a more distant member of the patriline, and Lacey has suggested that "... a great chieftain could obtain a following by bringing warriors into his house in order to secure their services ... often giving them wives ... Fathers of daughters gathered round them warrior sons-in-law like Priam, who had twelve sons-in-law who lived with their wives in his palace" (1968: 39). Odysseus was offered Nausicaa on account of the remarkable impression he made, according to Lacey (1968: 40), though it must be retained that the impression was made purely from appearances; he had not yet excelled in the games. If Alkinoos was concerned only in acquiring a competent warrior-son-in-law she could have been married to a Phaeacian in the same way without the risk that the remarkable impression Odysseus had made should prove false. The question remains: why was the stranger chosen?

Marriage with the stranger appears on the axis of contact to be the antithesis of an endogamous marriage, but I have already suggested that this axis possesses by itself a limited explanatory power, since it marks only the points at which the inside and the outside can be opposed. The nature of the social relations changes according to their position on the axis. Nausicaa's marriage with Odysseus would have made an alliance, not with another patriline of the Phaeacians, i.e. outside the royal lineage, but with the totally unknown, i.e. outside "outside the patriline," that is to say, outside the social structure altogether. One might say then that just as the fugitive who failed to escape *out* could escape *in*, so the Phaeacian royal family, unable to marry their daughter *inside* the field of normal competitive relations, could as the next best thing marry her outside it altogether and acquire thereby a surrogate father's brother's son for Nausicaa. For having no patriline upon the island himself he could without difficulty be accepted into that of his father-in-law. In this case outside the outside

is equivalent to inside, just as in the case of *haram* inside the inside was shown to be equivalent to outside.

This explanation rests on the possibility that the stranger could, with regard to the rule of marriage, be integrated into a system of patrilineal endogamy. Yet it leaves aside the generic nature of the connection between the stranger and the women, of which the case of Odysseus is merely a rather exceptional example which I have chosen to explain first of all in a more practical way. It should not blind us to the wider significance of offering Nausicaa in marriage to an unknown guest to whom sanctuary has been extended, a significance already suggested by the fact that she herself mistook him for a god at their first encounter.

The notion of sanctuary derives from the conjunction of the fugitive and the sacred (in either *haram*, a sacred and prohibited place, i.e. a shrine, or *harīm*, women's quarters, prohibited and therefore sacred also, if in a slightly different sense) and places the context "out of bounds" to normal reciprocation under the aegis of a principle opposed to the logic of the profane community of everyday. Yet the principle on which exogamy rests is not in essence different, but only different in the use which is made of it, whether to establish ties of sociation with an "outsider" group or to associate an individual outsider to one's own group. The principle may be stated that in either case the opposition between inside and outside is mediated through women. Exogamy denies access to the women of the community in favor of strangers who, through their conjunction with them, are established as guests, persons to whom a special code of conduct applies. Affines and guests, whether or not the conceptions are expressed in a single word, are *par excellence* the persons to whom extra-ordinary rules apply, either in the form of avoidances, joking relations or honorific behavior, all of them ways of placing a person "out of bounds."

When it is said that "we fight with those with whom we intermarry" or vice versa it is not asserted that individuals fight with their affines—the contrary is true, for in the combat between intermarrying groups a man must avoid striking his own affine—but that we, as individuals, give our daughters to members of the groups with whom we, as a collectivity, have relations of conflict. The two types of relationship, collective hostility and affinity through marriage, are the opposed aspects of an ambivalence and it is the second which qualifies the first and sets limits to it, bringing it under the control of the longer-term interests represented by the descendants who result from intermarriage.

The Arabs attempt to avoid intermarriage with those with whom they fight, conserving their women for the patriline, yet in according sanctuary in the

harīm they none the less accept, within rather than without the hearth, the principle that endows women with the power to proscribe hostility and invoke a relationship of respect. In either case, women provide the bridge with the outside, whether as wives given to outsiders or by providing a place of sanctuary for outsiders within the home. In either case the rules of profane conduct are placed in abeyance by the conjunction of the unknown with the unknowable, women.

One may note in passing that the same general area was noted in antiquity for the existence of a type of sacred prostitution whereby the girls of the community were offered before marriage and sometimes after also to strangers on the occasion of their visit to the shrine. This is no more than a variant, on the collective scale, of the syndrome of sanctuary. In either case the stranger's knowledge of women in sacred precincts operates an inversion of the normal rules of conduct. That this form of sacred prostitution should be found among endogamous peoples is surely to be expected: if women were destined to be given *away* in marriage there would seem to be little point in giving them to strangers outside marriage as well. Surely its significance is rather as a ritual inversion of a social order which ordained that women were to be kept, not given away—a gesture of recognition to that same principle which inspires exogamy by a people who have decided against foreign affines.

III

Exogamy and sanctuary are not the only forms of association with strangers established through women. There are peoples who include in their code of hospitality what has sometimes been called "sexual hospitality." Indeed, temple prostitution can be regarded as a collective form of this as Wake (1888: 158) well realized. If the acceptable stranger is everywhere offered food, he is also in some parts of the world offered more than that. Commensality, the ritual ingestion of a common substance, establishes the common nature of host and guest and creates a bond between them. The symbolic equivalence of eating and copulation appears to be universal[6] and this fact leads us to recognize the significance of such a custom as the ingestion of the stranger's essence through

6. The interpretation is reinforced by the observation that semen is in certain instances used in the place of food or blood, in the rites which effectuate the tie of blood-brotherhood (Lévi-Strauss 1966b: 105).

copulation. Once more the opposition between the inside and the outside is mediated through the female sex.

In Mediterranean sanctuary, the fugitive or stranger was not normally expected to have sexual relations with the women, yet the idea of sexual hospitality does not appear entirely foreign to the ancient Arab tradition, for Robertson Smith who did not otherwise concern himself with the connection between women and sanctuary noted (82): "It appears from Arab sources that when a man sought protection within a tribe it was natural for him to ask to be furnished with a wife, as Cais ibn Zohair did when he joined the Namir ibn Câsit" (1903: 82). He summons evidence to show moreover that some Arabs formerly practiced sexual hospitality in the form of offering the guest access to the host's wife (Smith 1903: 139, 140).

It can be seen then that if in one sense the stranger renounces his power to affront by taking sanctuary he does not renounce his masculinity in any literal sense. He removes himself from the sphere of agonistic social relations and becomes a client or dependent and therefore a person to whom the distaste for giving daughters away no longer applies and who becomes by virtue of that fact a preferential candidate for the role of son-in-law in a would-be endogamous society. The experience of Odysseus on Phaeacia runs parallel to the ancient Arab custom except that, unlike Cais ibn Zohair, he refused rather than demanded a wife, for the good reason that he did not wish to remain. Both stories hinge upon the same conception of hospitality which aspires to integrate the stranger not only temporarily through commensality but perhaps permanently through marriage. The connection between women and sanctuary in the Arab world, expressed and in a sense validated by the complex of meaning attaching to the Arabic root which gives us both words, can be seen then to be merely a particular case of the more fundamental and widespread principle concerning strangers and their integration into a community, the condition of their entry being in the first place the demonstration of their common nature through the consumption of food and the condition of their remaining being adoption as an affine into the kin group through the consummation of marriage. This principle, again, derives from the universal logic of social structure which opposes the interior and the exterior relations of a given social unit.

CHAPTER 9

The paradox of friendship*

There were, until fairly recently, very few anthropological studies of friendship. This might seem surprising, both because of the intrinsic interest the topic holds for all of us and also because of its rich theoretical potential. After all, friendship truly is the "atom of social organization"—*viz.*, the basic element beyond which it is impossible to reduce actions of welcoming or rejecting others. Friendship is the constitutive basis of all social ties for the simple reason that solidarity and cooperation cannot do without a degree of indulgence, and this is an aspect of friendly relations. It has even been suggested that in modern or peasant societies (and to a lesser extent in all societies) relations of kinship are in fact simply options that are activated when a relationship of friendship is superimposed on a pre-existing kin tie. There is no shortage of examples of the word "friend" being used to describe a kinsman, as if one could only feel friendship for cognatic relatives. Ireland is one classic example of this (*cf.* Arensberg 1934). In his study of a Mexican peasant village, Lilo Stern (1962), a student of Meyer Fortes, speaks of a "panel" of kinsmen from which one chooses one's friends, thereby activating the kin tie. One is born a potential kinsman, but only becomes a de facto kinsman by virtue of a mutual act of choice (*volonté*); and if one chooses not to become friends, then the supposed kin solidarity is more likely to lead to family

* This is a translation of "Le paradoxe de l'amitie," an unpublished paper, originally presented at the colloquium "L'Amicizia e le Amicizie" in Palermo, 1983.

disputes than cooperation. The existence of a legal kin tie can just as easily be a source of hostility as of friendship.

On the other hand, Meyer Fortes spoke of "kinship amity," which is the friendship that is the essential principle of kinship and which inspires a solidarity both of interest and of the heart. This amity excludes any form of accounting between participants: *yours* and *mine* no longer exist; there is only ours. This world of kin solidarity is contrasted with the world outside, which is governed by a legal regime that demands accounts. When, however, one considers the number of family quarrels that end up in the courts, this idea of kinship seems somewhat idealized. But if the essence of kinship is indeed friendship, how are we to explain the frequent contrast between the two terms, not only in anthropological theory, but also among natives themselves, who often see them as opposites?[1] Above all, how are we to explain that anthropologists have paid so little attention to the institution of friendship, whilst lavishing it on kinship?

One answer is that they only wanted, and only knew how, to deal with institutions that were clearly defined by the people they worked with, and so they restricted themselves to forms of friendship associated with a particular ritual: blood brotherhood, *compadrazgo*, etc. (*cf.* Pitt-Rivers 1968a). Such ties were long considered forms of "fictive" kinship—perhaps to justify anthropological interest in an otherwise neglected institution. However, as soon as one looks in detail at the forms of behavior and rights associated with these forms of ritual friendship, it becomes clear that they involve no sort of fiction and are essentially opposed to kin ties. Adoption, in contrast, can quite properly be called "fictive kinship," because it involves assimilating somebody born outside of a family to one of its members, both emotionally and legally.

The error that consisted in describing everything that wasn't natural kinship as fictive is doubtless a product of the fact that such relations almost invariably borrow their terminology from kinship, and natives themselves frequently make the link: *compadres* and blood brothers are, they say, "like brothers." But they often add (and this is what betrays them) that they are, in fact, "closer than brothers." Such statements are easily comprehensible if one considers the widespread motif of warring brothers. If these ties are closer, it is precisely *because* they are *not* brothers, share no family inheritance or duties, cannot replace one another, are not caught up in binding relations with one another's respective kin, and are simply a matter of choice (*volonté*) and mutual feeling. In short, they are

1. For the opposition between kin/friends, see Fortes (1969: passim).

relations conceived outside of the prevailing social structure that, for this very reason, better embody the ideal of fraternity than relations between true brothers, who cannot choose one another.

Besides, there is often no word in the vernacular for "friend," as Donald Cole notes of the Bedouin, who make metaphorical use of a kin term to designate a relationship of friendship. It is easy to conclude that if there's no word for a thing, then it must not exist. Friendship, it has been claimed, is an invention of civilized peoples like us; primitives lack the requisite refinement of sentiment to feel emotional attachments outside of kinship. This in turn led to the idea that kinship and friendship are mutually exclusive forms of relation: one tastes the pleasures of friendship only insofar as one has slipped the chains of kinship. In fact, there is no need to think of friendship as an institution, or give it a generic name,[2] when it is the very stuff of personal relations, and such bunkum is nigh on unforgivable when one recalls Firth's description of Tikopian sworn friends, *soa*, who express their amical affection with rare refinement (1960).

To recap, in ethnographic descriptions of friend and kinship, be the terms opposed or assimilated to one another, there is an invariable lack of an overview of the question, of what friendship is per se.

Eric Wolf set out to remedy this some twenty years ago in an essay entitled "Kinship, Friendship and Patron-Client Relations" (1966). Drawing on Ruben Reina's (1959) excellent ethnography of relations of friendship in a small Guatemalan village, Wolf establishes a typology of friendship that distinguishes between two main forms, which he calls "expressive or emotive" and "instrumental." And indeed, the contrast is clear in his comparison of emotive ties of friendship between adolescent Indians, which (without the least element of homosexuality) are affectionate to the point of exclusivity (one cannot have more than one friend), and friendly relations between Ladino (i.e., Hispanic, non-Indian) family men, petty traders, and entrepreneurs, which consist of tacit alliances of mutual help and are therefore all the more effective if they are part of a wider network of friendship: the more friends one has, the greater one's worth as a friend. It is of just such friendships that the patron client networks of "*caciquismo*" were made—networks that dominated the Hispanic world in the nineteenth century and are far from vanished today. We find these two types of friendship more or less everywhere, and Aristotle already identified them in the

2. Primitive societies rarely have a generic word for kinship in their languages either; they only have terms for specific kinship relations, such as uncle, cousin, etc.

Nicomachean ethics. Rather than explaining the difference as Wolf would have us do, however, in terms of a distinction between more or less open communities, more or less dominated by solidary forms of kinship, I think we should consider the age and social situation of the friends Reina describes, because we find both types in a wide range of societies, including our own.

The adolescent Indians are entering adult life with an as-yet unsullied amical sensibility; they are free to form personal ties as they wish, since they cannot engage in any entrepreneurial activity and have no family worries, being single and employed as agricultural laborers. Ladino family men, in contrast, have plenty of scope for entrepreneurial action, significant social and material ambitions, and numerous family worries. They nonetheless seem to set great store by the affective aspect of their friendships, which apparently is not cheapened in their eyes by its instrumental aspect. I think these examples are simply extreme cases of a general phenomenon that can be explained by the difference of age—Reina informs us that intense emotive friendship does not survive marriage—and of social situation, rather than by the type of society in question. When one is young, one thinks differently of friendship than later in life. The French bourgeoisie of yesteryear captured this idea very well by reserving the informal "tu" for childhood friends and fellow students, as if they no longer had the same emotional availability after the age of twenty-five. But this was, in fact, slightly misleading, as the use of "tu" was rather an expression of simple camaraderie than of brotherly love. It is nonetheless true that we are far more influenced by our childhood friendships, and remember them more fondly, than we do those contracted later in life. Some studies of friendship, notably those conducted by social psychologists, have examined the changing nature of friendship from the perspective of people's age (Du Bois 1974: 23-25), but the problem of the comparative dimension of ideology and the practice of friendship in different cultures, as well as the different behavioral codes they impose, however obvious they may be, still lack a clear theoretical framework. The structures of friendship have yet to be defined, just as we are still to determine whether or not it is correct to treat it "as a residual category of social structure rather than as a major social form" (Leyton 1974: 93).

I would now like to turn my attention to friendship in contemporary urban society. In order to do so, I think it important first to identify what distinguishes it from friendship among peasants and primitives on the one hand, and from that of chivalric friendship on the other. Above all, contemporary, urban varieties of friendship need to be distinguished from ritualized friendship, referred

to as *compradazgo* in the anthropological literature, on which topic there is an abundant literature. For reasons that remain to be determined (thanks perhaps to the ritual that seals the compact), all these people seem better able than we to organize their friendships clearly and in such a way as to avoid the anxiety and disappointment that seems to surround contemporary friendship, at least in Anglophone countries. An American professor of my acquaintance, who taught a course on friendship at Harvard some thirty years ago, told me how his students would speak quite openly of their amorous relations, but were immediately ill at ease when it came to discussing friendship. This is unsurprising, as modern romantic individualism only associates friendship with emotional states and neglects the duty of reciprocity present in any friendly relation, especially when it is *emotive*, as one more easily forgives its absence when it is the result of a material rather than an emotional shortfall. We are afraid of appearing calculating, but do not wish to recognize the legitimate interests of our friends. The upshot is that we have lost our compass, and disappointments multiply without our being able to identify the cause.[3] We wish to be everyman's friend without putting ourselves out for any of them. To this we can add that the ideology of universal friendship, which is, I might add, quite different from the religiously inspired notion of the Quakers (who address everybody as "friend" without distinction), seems to devalue the institution as a whole: a vague togetherness, a discount *bonhomie*, replaces the *gemeinschaft* of the antique community, which has dissipated in the face of urban life and increased spatial mobility, which make it harder to maintain effective relationships between old friends. We reject the formalism of traditional manners, which prevents the generation of instant intimacy; we introduce ourselves by our Christian names before offering our surnames, and we leave without bidding farewell. We do not wish to recognize the moral economy of friendship, so ably described by Aristotle, nor to recognize that everyman's friend is also no man's friend.

---

3. This anxiety in the face of the uncertainties of friendship in contemporary England is well illustrated by a London weekly that, some twenty years ago, used to organize a weekly literary competition. In one instance, this required of entrants that they alter a single letter of a quotation and so endow it with an entirely new meaning; the winner put forward a stanza from Coleridge's "The rime of the ancient mariner":

    "As one who on a lonely road
    Marches in fear and dread
    And having once looked back goes on
    Because he knows some fearful friend (originally FIEND)
    Doth close behind him tread"

I am not trying to downplay the importance of emotions in the study of friendship, nor to deny its emotive aspect by explaining it away in practical or materialist terms, as some of my colleagues are wont to do. No more, however, do I think that we should adopt the perspective of moralists of the European literary tradition, such as David Hume, who distinguished between "the self-interested commerce of men" and "the more generous and noble intercourse of friendship and good offices" inspired by love. The distinction turns on the disinterested nature of the friendly gesture, but this in no way prevents the repayment of (equally disinterested) services rendered. The idea of contract is present in "self-interested commerce," but not in nobler and more generous friendship.[4] The critical element here is the notion of contractual obligation, because it removes the idea of any form of responsibility outside the contractual tie; it sets a limit to the obligation by specifying it, whereas *compadrazgo* or sentimental friendship more generally generate a diffuse but total sense of responsibility. When nothing is specified, when there is no longer even a tacit contract according to local mores, then the nature of friendship and the limits of each party's obligations remain, as with tips in restaurants, "at the client's discretion." In the conceptual vacuum between different estimations of obligation, anything goes, from the most emotive to the most instrumental concept of friendship, which no longer depends on anything but individual personalities and moral sensibilities; and in this vacuum arise the unspecifiable claims and grievances that cause friendships to founder. Rather than exploring successful friendships in different societies, we ought to examine friendships gone wrong to assess the effect of different ideas of friendship.

European civilization's problems of conscience cannot provide the basis for a comparative study of the topic that would allow for the elaboration of a universal typology of friendship, and were one to attempt such an approach, it would fall prey to contradictions that are proper to the institution itself, which rests

4. "But though this self-interested commerce of man begins to take place, and to predominate in society, it does not entirely abolish the more generous and noble intercourse of friendship and good offices. I may still do services to such persons as I love, and am more particularly acquainted with, without any prospect of advantage; and they may make me a return in the same manner, without any view but that of recompensing my past services. In order, therefore, to distinguish those two different sorts of commerce, the interested and the disinterested, there is a certain form of words invented for the former, by which we bind ourselves to the performance of any action. This form of words constitutes what we call a promise" (Hume 1893: 168).

on a paradox. This paradox appears at the point of transition between the emergence of a feeling of sympathy for another and its expression in acts, between the domain of self and that of contact with the other, between the psychology and the sociology of friendship. The paradox is as follows: a friendship that is never given expression is stillborn, but how to express it except via a gesture that demonstrates a desire to please one's potential friend: that one seeks his company, finds him admirable, is ready to trouble oneself for him, to despoil oneself in his favor by means of a gift, to sacrifice oneself? The true friend is not content to express this in speech, but also in acts, because actions speak louder than words. However, the gesture of friendship demands a reciprocal counter-gesture (more or less immediately depending on the local mores), and if this counter-gesture does not come, it means that the friendship is refused and the initiator humiliated such that he will surely become an enemy. If the counter-gesture is offered within a reasonable time-frame, and matches the initiator's expectations, then a tacit agreement is reached. But if the gesture was made, in the words of Hume, "with the prospect of advantage"—i.e., with the aim of provoking the counter-gesture—or if the counter-gesture was carried out inadequately or simply to avoid problems, then the friendship appears false, because predicated on interested calculation rather than noble and generous love.

Friendship, then, must be expressed in words and especially gestures. It must be reciprocated in like fashion, but it cannot be given expression with the aim of provoking the counter-gesture, nor reciprocated out of mere convenience or with an eye to profit. If, however, the counter-gesture does not come, one can justifiably take offense. Nevertheless, the act of taking offence will likely inspire suspicion as to the disinterestedness of the initial sentiments: "if you acted out of love and 'without prospect of advantage,' why complain about not having benefited from the action?" The trap is sprung! The paradox can be summed up thusly: to defend the purity of one's sentiments one must act in (blind or hypocritical) ignorance of the consequences of one's actions! As no member of a society that recognizes this emotional logic will ever admit his friendship to be interested, the possibility of distinguishing between emotive and instrumental friendship depends on the analyst's assessment of the unconfessed inner states of his victims.

Whatever admiration the anthropologist may feel for David Hume, it is not to him but to Marcel Mauss that he must turn in this matter.

Mauss does not directly address friendship, but in his grand essay on *The gift* (1966) he nonetheless touches upon its essence, as the gift is the simplest

model of all the different forms of favor that friends may exchange. He pays great attention to the symbolic meaning of the gift and the system to which it belongs. A gift is not simply an object of more or less recognized value that one makes over, but is always a gift of oneself, as part of oneself accompanies that which is offered; this is the very meaning of the act of offering, which is not the same as giving. This is why a peasant always offers part of his production, rather than bought goods. It is also why we mind how a gift is treated: one can be insulted via one's gift. If one disposes of an object in a commercial transaction, one accepts payment without expecting thanks, but the gift opens up a line of moral credit which is part of a system of exchange that is much more than merely economic. It is a moral system rather like the exchange of women carried out in Africa or elsewhere through rules of marriage and which is often associated with a payment of livestock or even money. Anthropologists had great difficulty preventing missionaries and colonial administrators from referring to these nuptial transfers as "bride price," as if they were commercial transactions. There are, of course, economic effects, but these systems of exchange are moral and social in their inspiration, and economic only in their effects. The gift, however, always has an eye toward the counter-prestation, especially when made to somebody possessed of the power to perform a favor or hand down a judgment. This is the moral basis of the problem of corruption that seems to dominate the contemporary world and that anthropologists have only begun to investigate.

The essential aspect of the gift is its free nature, as Mr. de la Palisse would say,[5] and this is true of all gestures of friendship; friendship, like the gift that heralds it, is an exchange of grace. Just like religious grace, which is only accorded on the condition that the ritual participant truly wishes it (*volonté*), the secular grace that flows through rituals of friendship can only be realized if the donator wills it (*volonté*). And just as with religious sacrifice, the despoilment of oneself effects a conversion of having into being; one makes over the object one offers in order to become a friend. However, this free expression of friendship requires an equally free reciprocal gesture; the reciprocity of friendship is not merely material, as in a contract, but is also a reciprocal gift of oneself. Boris Oguibenine put it very well when he said "any affective tie implies reciprocity" (1998 [1985]: 189). One might add that this is invariably true, even when the reciprocity is not direct, as with parents and children, because the debt owed to

5. Mr. de la Palisse is the approximate equivalent of "Captain Obvious."

the previous generation is repaid to the next: it is a form of reciprocity open to the future, but like all reciprocities of the heart, one that is outside accountability.

Mauss's essay, though, speaks of the obligation "to give, receive, and reciprocate gifts." He does not concern himself with the problem of motivations, and rightly so, because in most human societies, amical reciprocity does not pose any problems; it is an obvious social duty rather than a question of conscience, and people are not embarrassed to admit their interest in the counter-gift. Sometimes, this is said quite explicitly. Besides, people are quite aware of the possibility that a new friend may reveal himself to be false and are thus glad of the chance to cement the relationship by means of a ritual than ensures fidelity. One takes time to study carefully the character of a future *compadre* before asking him to be godfather to one's child, because once the ritual is accomplished there is no way of annulling the rite. Thanks to the rite, the wrath of God will smite a faithless *compadre*. The blood of the brother-to-be ingested during the blood brother ritual will punish any betrayal with death. Religion or magic come to the rescue of the honor men lack. In such conditions, there are fewer reasons to appear disinterested, as the opposition between friendship of the heart and friendship of the head does not exist; the reciprocity of contract and that of sentiments sit well together; interest is not opposed to grace and amical transactions are not separated into calculating vs. diffuse because the world is not divided into distinct aspects (economic, legal, religious, moral, sentimental, etc.) each of which has its own distinct vocabulary and intellectual discipline.

Thus we see that the categories adopted by Wolf to build his typology, and prefigured in the work of Hume, reflect a crisis of friendship grown acute in twentieth century urban society, where heightened spatial and social mobility, along with significant uncertainty of community or class identity and loosened kinship ties, have thrown the individual upon his own resources—helped only by his friends.

Mauss insists on the ambiguity of the gift, as the donor's intentions are open to more than one interpretation. One can humiliate the recipient with an excessive gift, because if the expected counter-prestation exceeds his means then he is humiliated. This is the very principle of the potlatch. While the gift honors the recipient, alms crush him, as one may give out of pity, and pity is scorn's sympathetic sister. To avoid these possible implications, one must choose a gift with care. Perishable gifts are best, because they cannot carry the implication that one's friend wants for anything. One must be prepared to help, but not hurry to do so too early or too obviously. One can always offer a woman flowers, but if

one gives diamonds, she can reasonably wonder about the nature of the counter-prestation to which she subscribes by accepting them. She may well refuse them, since favors, like grace, cannot be bought. And yet, they can be rendered.

The refusal of a gift, like the refusal of a challenge (the rules surrounding gifts are as ambivalent as those surrounding honor), is a rejection of exchange, which demonstrates a rejection of association tantamount to scorn. When it is a question of honor, the same gesture can have two contradictory meanings, and in the same way, the gesture of friendship can express love just as it can express rivalry or hostility. The potlatch of the Canadian Northwest furnished Mauss with the perfect example of festivities offered out of hostility.

The ambivalence of the gift reflects the ambivalence of friendship, of which it is but a manifestation. The potlatch is a hostile variety of friendship, but the heart of the paradox, reciprocity, is still present, albeit negatively. Rather than being an expression of fellow-feeling, the invitation to a potlatch is a challenge, as the festivities are a demonstration of the host's economic might by a destruction of property in different forms. The guest of honor, for whom the potlatch is put on, is obliged to respond within a year and in like fashion, but with even greater destruction of property, or be forever dishonored.

The potential enemy hidden under the surface of friendship, like the hatred concealed in love's center, is in this case exposed for all to see, and this inverts everything: there is, of course, exchange; but the things exchanged lose their habitual meaning. The gesture that is supposed to honor the other is tacitly transformed into a locking of horns; the expression of friendship is a form of aggression; the vaunted copper is not offered to the guest, but broken and cast into the sea; oil is poured onto the flames and so wasted; the blankets supposed to keep people warm over winter are committed to fire to force the guest, knees already red from the flames, to move his chair back another few inches; the gift becomes a challenge. This is friendship reversed, transformed into a norm by the mores of a warrior people who had lost, under European aegis, the right to open combat.

This is surely an extreme example, but not a unique one. Mortal rivalry disguised as friendly festivities is not restricted to Canadian Indians. We might mention wealthy ladies of the house, or the rivalry around a card table, or the intimacy of a golf course. The exploitation of *compadrazgo* in Hispanic and Latin politics, which uses the sacred ties of the baptismal fount to bind clients, is no secret. And to give a final example drawn from a very simple society, we can cite the portrait of blood-brothership in a Kaguru myth from Central Africa

admirably recounted by Thomas O. Beidelman (1963), which calls to mind La Fontaine's fable of the fox and the stork. In this case, it depicts an eagle and a monitor-lizard, sworn blood-brothers who can therefore refuse one another nothing. The monitor-lizard asks his friend for his eaglets' down because he is cold, along with countless other inopportune demands, until the eagle finally revenges himself on the monitor-lizard by asking for his skin to protect him from the sun.

The classification of different expressions of abstract notions such as honor or friendship, or any other idea that is formulated to deal with problems of behavior in our society and is therefore part of what we might call "its popular moral philosophy," leads nowhere, for it proposes to treat as an objectively definable relationship (of, for instance, kinship) a relation that is only composed of subjective sentiments and evaluations of behavior whose objective analysis reveals inherent contradictions. What is a friend nowadays? Somebody who behaves toward me in what I deem to be a friendly manner. If his behavior alters, I may change my mind and say to him: "I was mistaken to think you were a friend".

Rituals for establishing friendship aim to objectify the relation by transforming the mutual sympathy that first inspires friendly behavior into a statutory tie that can be defined and classified. In the absence of such a tie, however, the only way to study the "atom of social organization" that is friendship is as a series of atoms—i.e., as particular cases. From an analytical perspective, there is, to return to the title of this workshop, no such thing as friendship, only friendships.

CHAPTER 10

Lending a hand: Neighborly cooperation in southwestern France*

I

The common stereotype of the French peasant pictures a wily, money-grubbing, secretive, unromantic, and humorless figure whose chief intellectual occupation consists in plotting to acquire some paltry acre that he is too tradition-minded to exploit effectively. Various authors have brought their testimony to bear on this topic, and among them are found social scientists, including (oh shame!) anthropologists. I say, "oh shame!" because the peasant stereotype derives, in fact, from the facile generalizations of urban people. It is based mainly upon their prejudices and their personal experience of strained relations with French peasants, the tenor of which is determined largely by the condescension they themselves display toward the peasants, who, naturally enough, resent it.[1] To generalize about the behavioral characteristics of peasants is a shabby exercise, even when a satisfactory definition of that elusive category has been devised,

---

* "Lending a hand: Neighborly cooperation in southwestern France" is an unpublished paper from a 1981 Oxford conference on conflict and cooperation.

1. I examined this stereotype in its application to a village in the Quercy more than twenty years ago and found it to be largely erroneous on every point (Pitt-Rivers 1960a). In a recent publication I suggested an explanation of this stereotype (1981a).

for peasants come in all shapes and colors and, even in France, there are large differences among them that nationalist ideology does its best to ignore. The emphasis on dyadic ties rather than structure is partly responsible for the conclusion reached by numerous authors, that peasants are "uncooperative." Why on earth should peasants cooperate with urban people who patronize or despise them, cheat them, conscript them, tax them, and show a marked inability to understand them? Why should peasants adopt urban middle-class norms of cooperation when they have their own ways of cooperating? It is telling that agricultural cooperatives, which government policy promotes, have been successful only in areas of relative prosperity (e.g., among wine growers) and sophistication, where peasants already think like urban people. In the area I deal with in this essay, they have had little success.

It is perhaps for these reasons that forms of neighborly cooperation have received much less attention than they deserve in Europe. Between Conrad Arensberg and Solon Kimball's (1949) study of western Ireland forty-odd years ago and Sandra Ott's (1981) book published this year, the works that have focused on customs of cooperation can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Yet among small farmers in many European countries such institutions are not only the essential factor in the micro-economics of the countryside, they are the very stuff of the network of social relations. We must assume that network specialists have been less attracted to the neighborly give-and-take among equals than to the operation of patronage in the stratified townships of southern Europe, about which a great deal has been written. A satisfactory theoretical framework must, in my opinion, find a place for both varieties of reciprocity.

Arensberg's discussion of "cooring" (cooperation and mutual assistance) is extremely insightful. He was led to insist on it by his interest in the more conventional subject of kinship, for, behind the general image of friendliness ("country people do be very friendly, they always help one another" [Arensberg 1968 (1937)]) one discovers that the word "friend" in fact means "kinsman," and those who have no kin in the neighborhood are largely cut out of the system of mutual aid. This equivocal mode of appellation is important in several ways. To begin with, in regard to kinship theory, it knocks on the head the viewpoint that maintains, in its endeavor to evade the difficulty of distinguishing between "real" and "pseudo" kinship, that any relation that employs a kinship term is one of kinship. (For if "friend" is a kinship term, where do you draw the line? If it is not, then how to explain that it refers to a relationship established through marriage or descent?)

Re-reading Arensberg's work today raises the bold and troubling question of the relationship between kinship and friendship that was posed by Meyer Fortes when he coined the phrase "kinship amity."[2] But most important for our purposes is the implication that amity is effective only with one's kin; "cooring" is not to be indulged in between any two households simply by virtue of their proximity. The ideal of generalized friendliness is limited ultimately to those who are prescribed by the system of reproduction: namely, by kinship. Thus we can place "cooring" at the pole opposite to the system of neighborship, studied by Sandra Ott and others, in which partners in cooperation are defined uniquely (are they really?) by geographic orientation. In western Ireland geography is nothing, kinship all. Yet both are systems of prescription, and they can therefore be classed together in opposition to another type of system in which there is no prescription other than to cooperate with friends of one's choice from among the members of the community.

My example is a village in the Quercy that I have called Magnac in previous writings. In this village there is a general moral duty to render service to one's neighbors, and when one is asked to lend a tool or a machine or to lend a hand, one must find a convincing excuse for refusing if one is not to be classed as a bad neighbor. Tractor accessories are lent and attached to the three-point system common to all tractors, but tractors are not lent. Machines that are fragile or that not everyone knows how to use are not lent either. So a request for help involving these things presupposes that the owner will come to do the job envisaged himself. The petrol is paid for by the beneficiary, but if the helper is asked what he is owed, he replies "nothing at all." He explains that he has come to lend a hand in a disinterested spirit, because it is a duty to do so, and if pressed to say what can be done for him in return, he replies that he has not come in order to gain any reciprocal service but simply out of the goodness of his heart, or out of a sense of neighborly duty, and he adds by way of explanation the traditional phrase: *"Je ne suis pas regardant."* To be *regardant* is to keep an eye on your own interests, to keep accounts of what is owed you. This phrase is thus the denial that any obligation has been incurred by the recipient of the service.

If neighborly help is offered in certain societies without any return, especially to a specific category of kinsman, as a show of kinship amity, most systems of interchange of labor or help are closed, or balanced, rather than open-ended. It could be maintained, as in this case, that all neighborly help entails a return

2. See my discussion of the question in Pitt-Rivers (1973).

in some form or other, be it only in accrued prestige through refusing a return. The claim to disinterested virtue is an attempt to convert having into being. The refusal to accept payment or reciprocity is a form of gift, and like the gift, it establishes a social bond. But we have known since Mauss that gifts must be returned. However sincerely one may protest that one keeps no account, memories are not short in this community of farming families. Elderly people who don't read much can usually remember what the price of piglets was twenty years ago (when money had quite a different value) or what crop they raised on what piece of land. Hence there is no need to keep accounts in order to remember whom you did a favor for and from whom you received one.

Accounts are for public reckoning only, not for oneself. It is strictly forbidden to mention previous services done or received. To do so obliterates the virtue acquired by doing or returning the service, just as the recognition that a gift was made to obtain a counter-gift destroys its social value. Impressions accumulate, nonetheless, and people with good memories know where they stand in relation to others. Aided by allusive hints, reputations accumulate also. As in blood-brotherhood and *compadrazgo*, which submit each partner to the will of the other and proclaim a community of interests that allows no accountability—you can refuse your *compadre* nothing, a stipulation that never holds between kin, be it noted—there is a certain practical logic of reciprocity[3]: if all that is mine is yours, then all that is yours is mine; if you are my neighbor, then I am yours. Whether the tie is dyadic and sacralized, or generalized and profane, the principle of quid pro quo reigns over each man's image of himself and his fellows (*cf.* Bloch 1973).

Where reciprocity is governed by specific rules that define the duties of each party within the system, there is no problem of equivalence, even though Fate may distribute unevenly the benefits of the relationship. Where mortuary services are exchanged, for example, the distribution is left to the great equalizer, Death, who cannot to be trusted to equalize the loads of different households. But in systems of unspecified duties and undifferentiated, unprescribed partners, the equivalence of services exchanged cannot be established without invoking non-material factors as well. Hence if commercial operations are based upon market values and immediate reciprocity, they are always specific in time

3. An excellent description of the balance of reciprocity in blood brotherhood and how imbalances can be redressed is contained in Beidelman's account of a Kaguru myth (1963).

and a contract without a time limit is legally invalid. Neighborly exchanges are seldom like this; they are exchanges of favor in the first place, rather than of goods. In Magnac, the moral debit established through accepting help remains until the creditor makes a request that will balance the unmentionable account, and there is no way he can be pressured to do so since the debt is not recognized.

The traditional occasion for the interchange of labor is the harvest, and in many regions harvesting is done on a scale much larger than the technical requirements of the operation make necessary. Whole villages combine, uniting their efforts, circulating as a body from one man's fields to the next. This appears never to have been the case in the Quercy, at least in recent centuries, and perhaps it is unlikely ever to be found in regions of private small holdings and unreliable climate, for the differentiation of risk is too great. Here, each property harvested its own crop. On large properties harvesting was done with the assistance of employed labor ("*moissonneurs*"); on smaller holdings, neighbors and kin pooled their labor to form a series of similar operations. In the region of Magnac there were no large exploitations, and in recent decades there were very few agricultural laborers either. Some of the larger farms (of up to fifty hectares) kept a single permanent employee.

The introduction about a century ago of machinery for beating the grain, the *batteuse*, produced technical reasons for pooling labor on a larger scale: first of all, there were only a limited number of *batteuses* in the region, and they necessarily circulated from one farm to another. If the machine works non-stop, as it must do to be economically employed, it requires a series of teams of men to service it. Each team formed a chain of men who forked the heaves into the machine and another chain who received the grain into sacks, which they stocked or emptied into the granary. Labor was recruited for this working festival, the *dépiguage*, by invitation and the day ended, in accordance with a more ancient tradition, with a harvest dinner at which the farmer's wife displayed her culinary skills to the not-uncritical palates of all those who had come to help. I was privileged to be invited to such an occasion in 1955 on a fifteen hectare farm. Although my contribution to the labor force was laughable (and very discreetly laughed at), I was served a dinner alongside some fifty others in three services, which started with *foie gras d'oie* and continued with eight further courses. Dinners like this are no longer served. Given that my digestion is twenty-six years older, I no longer regret it for myself. Restaurants on fair days no longer serve the same number of courses, either. The combine harvester that made its appearance ten or fifteen years ago has put an end to the festival of the *dépiguage*, for it requires no labor

other than the driver's and that of the owner, who must relay the grain to his barn. Moreover, paid by the hour, the driver may well finish on one property at three o'clock in the afternoon and then go on to another farm.

There are other forms of agricultural work in which two or three neighbors pool their forces and perform the same task on each of their properties in rotation. But this is not the institution of lending a hand, since the return is immediate and known to be part of the operation from the beginning. It has the advantage of sociability and overcomes the difficulty encountered when more than one man is required, as in fencing, or when more than one tractor is required. The other traditional forms of assistance are more subtle. They can be viewed as a system of credit and prestige, for there is no formal contractual obligation to return the service rendered. Indeed, as we have already seen, the notion of an obligation to do so is sternly denied.

To begin, there are small services connected with loans of agricultural machinery. Small farms require almost as much investment in machinery as larger farms, but the capital invested is much less easily redeemed, since turnover is less. Therefore, equipment that is used only a few days in the year is sometimes purchased jointly with a neighbor. In other cases a farmer borrows a piece of machinery he lacks from a neighbor. Tractors are never lent, but equipment that does not risk breaking, such as rakes, harrows, water-barrels, and planters can be lent and attached to the borrower's tractor. More delicate equipment (mowers, hay-presses, trucks to take animals to market) is used only by the owner, who will perform the "borrowed" task himself. In the old days, every farm had a pair of oxen but not everyone had a horse, and horses are more efficient than oxen for certain tasks. They are lighter, quicker, and they can be used singly with harrows and hoes (whereas oxen must be yoked in pairs). So a neighbor would sometimes be asked to come with his horse to do a day's or a half day's work. When tractors made their appearance, he might be asked to come with his tractor to do a certain job. The borrower might subsequently be asked to lend a hand when the owner of the horse or tractor needed an extra pair. No calculations are ever admitted, but it is assumed that one man's labor is worth the same as another's. This is in fact a short-term credit cycle most of the time (Bloch 1973).

The loan of material is sometimes rewarded by the gift of produce, such as a liter or two of *eau-de-vie-de-prune*, a farmyard fowl, a rabbit, or a pheasant. The people who live in the village itself (*le bourg*) sometimes ask for a load of manure for their gardens, or the transport of heavy objects, or the ploughing of a patch, and they can easily find a way to reciprocate if they are artisans, but retired

people from the city, of whom there are a small number, cannot do anything that is required by the farmer, nor can they produce anything he would appreciate. The city folk are the ones I would sometimes hear complaining that peasants are uncooperative, an opinion that fitted well with their already established prejudices (Pitt-Rivers 1960a). The wealthy farmers of the good agricultural land enter less into the system because their farms are better equipped and also because they often had a permanent employee and seldom needed an extra pair of hands. Yet they subscribe to the system and, with the exception of one person who is understandably unpopular, they are glad to lend a hand when asked, sending their *"domestique"* if they cannot go themselves. They are more often in credit than in debt in the unmentionable costing of services, and they derive a certain prestige from not being too proud to lend a hand in spite of all their hectares. There is, however, another reason for their being glad to do so.

The system shows its full potential in moments of crisis. On most farms there is only one able-bodied adult man, aided perhaps by an elderly father or a young son, but few sons stay on the land, and those who do not go away entirely usually get a job in the local market town, which has greatly expanded over the last few decades, and are available to give a hand to their father only at a weekend. Consequently if the farmer gets ill or breaks a leg, who is to milk the cows? Few wives know how to milk anymore, and even if the farm has sheep or bullocks, there are many jobs to be done that she cannot do. It is barely different when it is the wife who is disabled. At moments of crisis the neighbors come to offer their services; one will come to milk, another to spread the manure or to sow the crop, a third to sell the lambs at the market, and so forth. Help with the children is provided if the wife is ailing. Such services are invaluable in every sense, and they are also demonstrations of neighborly solidarity and moral virtue. It is evident that they cannot be paid for, and they leave behind a deep debt of gratitude. It is possible then to add to our analysis the aspect of the system as a mode of insurance. Nobody knows when he will need this neighborly help, and everyone would like to feel that he is in credit when that moment comes. Finally, there are those who are glad to feel that they have a reputation for being a good neighbor and a helpful member of the community. To have such a reputation is moreover an important asset for those who have political ambitions. And, though it might seem that the honor of being a municipal councilor of Magnac, or even its mayor, is not a prize worth even the sacrifice of the time that it involves, to those whose moral horizons are largely limited to the commune, there is none higher.

II

Such a system rests upon certain moral and economic conditions. We have seen that in order to cooperate in this manner neighbors do not have to be economically equal, but they must all be men who work the land themselves. For the *coup de main* to be returned, men must be conceptualized as equivalent, able to furnish the same service in the same time, for men in fact *exchange* their labor even if they do not admit it. If I work one day for you, I cannot expect that you will work two days for me without my incurring a debt of one day's labor. Our days are all of equal value economically because they are of equal moral value. This ceases to be the case, however, once heavy capitalization enters farming. The work done by one man with his hundred horsepower tractor and four-share plough is the equivalent of four times the work done by the other man with his thirty horsepower tractor and single share plough. (In fact, the land round Magnac is too broken and rocky for anyone to use a plough with more than one share). The economic value of the heavily capitalized farmer's day includes, in large part, the redemption of his machinery. Agricultural machinery is notorious for being economically underemployed. A hay-making machine is rarely used for more than thirty days in the year, and a potato planter even less. This greatly increases the per diem value of the use of the machine. Hence the system breaks down with unequal capitalization. Its place is taken, as has happened in Magnac, by entrepreneurs of the harvest and forestry, or by bulldozers. The operator of a bulldozer, for instance, is paid at a fixed hourly rate for the use of the machine, which takes account of capitalization and wear and tear. One hour of a bulldozer's time is worth two days of human labor and does the work of ten man-days. Money value comes in to replace the nebulous value of moral credit.

Solon Kimball long ago studied this process in the region of Detroit, and his explanation is consistent with more recent events in Magnac. However, the breakdown of the system has more than one cause and should be viewed in the totality of its social and economic context. The need for such an interchange of services has also been diminished by the motorization of the French countryside over the past thirty years. Every farming household now has a car; thirty years ago, only the cattle-merchants had cars, and there were only three tractors in the commune. The rest of the population depended upon "*vélomoteurs*" and public transport. Concomitantly with this change, the local services diminish, for if every household has somebody who goes to the local market seven miles away once a week to do the shopping, if the village blacksmith has been

replaced by the tractor garage in the town, if the children go to the *lycée* after the elementary school in the village, then the function of the local community evaporates. One of the two *épiceries* has vanished, and the other is unlikely to be replaced when its present owner retires. Deep-freezing increases the independence of each household. The scale on which services are provided for common utilities increases from a radius of five kilometers to one of fifteen kilometers or twenty, and this means that the concept of neighbor increases in range and is no longer limited to the village community. People are no longer dependent on their immediate neighbors for the interchange of favors. Where services remain, they are no longer for the commune but for the surrounding region. The baker of Magnac, notorious for his good bread, now delivers to a whole circuit of surrounding villages. The school and the post office remain, somewhat insecurely, but the Church is losing its place as the moral center of the community. The single village priest is now part of a team of priests who minister to several villages. A penumbra of dormitory villages spreads out from the market town, reaching half way to Magnac, transforming the local society. The annual *bal du village* is inundated by outsiders. A nightclub has been opened in the barn of a nearby château, which is decorated in sophisticated gloom and drowned in ear-splitting rhythmics. It is patronized not only by young people from the market town but even, on occasion, by people from the villages. Local endogamy goes by the board; the baker's daughter has a Scottish boyfriend she met in a holiday camp in Morocco. The commune ceases to be a community held together by the exchange of services, and the solidarity that underlies the system of mutual aid, insofar as it still exists, is no longer based upon a division of labor but on tradition. Durkheim imagined that the progress of society in general was always in the direction of organic solidarity and increased differentiation, but here the effect of modern economic development has been to raise the scale of differentiation from the level of the village to that of the area serviced by the market town. The villages within this domain are becoming functionally much more homogeneous. The village is actually moving from organic to mechanical solidarity.

This is perhaps the point at which to question various meanings of the word "solidarity," which, while they all contain a common element, differ considerably. The first sense of the word, dating from long before it entered the vocabulary of the social sciences, or the English language, is the legal one, from the Latin *in solidum,* an expression that appears in French in the sixteenth century. It means collective rights and responsibilities, and it later takes on the sense of a

relation between persons who are conscious of a community of shared interests. This was the meaning deployed by Durkheim to answer the question: what keeps the members of a society united? He found it could be either similarity or complementarity. In fact, this question could only be posed in a society in which people are conscious of their individuality; otherwise, the fact that people with the same social identity stick together would seem so obvious that it would require no explanation. The word comes into English only in the mid-nineteenth century, when it means unity with regard to sympathies or aspirations but also signifies joint responsibilities and rights. The original sense then was juridical, and it referred above all to economic solidarity. Durkheim adapted this to cover a wider sense, social solidarity. Today, the word is used to describe political action. It typically means standing together in unity against a hostile exterior force. It is not then a quality attaching concretely to a given community but rather the product of a given situation. The dynamics of such a conception are displayed in Evans-Pritchard's *The Nuer* (1940) in which it is explained that the level within the lineage system at which a segment shows solidarity depends upon the lineal relationship between the initiators of a conflict. The principle is not confined to the segmentary systems of East Africa, however, but is expressed in many other cultures, for example in the Arab saying: I against my brothers, my brothers and I against our cousins, my cousins and my brothers and I against the stranger.

The essence of solidarity is that it involves a sacrifice of individual interests in favor of collective ones. It frowns on the calculation of the former: there is no mine or thine, only ours. This dream of escape from individuality has haunted Western civilization for over two thousand years, and it has probably been a troubling moral issue ever since men became conscious of their individuality. The spirit of community is based on solidarity, and this explains its relation to equality (Pitt-Rivers 1960b). It is not that equality in any literal sense is essential to community, but rather that differentiation of individual interests and separate identities are antagonistic to it. To create the sentiment of community, occasions must be instituted which exorcise individual interests. By denying such interests in the neighborly *coup de main,* the members of the community assert their solidarity in the face of common dangers and difficulties. But the gift of one's time and energy is no different (in terms of moral structure) than any other gift, and it is therefore also subject to the paradox of the gift.

The paradox of the gift is a version of the paradox of friendship (Pitt-Rivers 1973). It derives from the fact that a gift is not a gift unless it is a *free* gift,

involving no obligation on the part of the receiver, and yet as Mauss so well explained, it must be returned. In French a gift is "offered," not given. It is like a sacrifice to the gods, an offering. It is an expression of esteem, a gesture of honoring. As such, the gift is complete in itself, requiring only to be accepted in order to achieve its end, which is, like sacrifice, to convert having into being, to transform the possession of an article from which the donor separates himself into something associated with the recipient. It cannot be made with the intention of provoking a return-gift or it is not a free gift but a maneuver that abuses the notion of generosity by subjecting it to calculated ends. On the other hand, if it is not made in the hope of a return of the favor (which is possible only through the a return-gift) then it was not a true gift either, but rather largesse, a gesture of pity, or a demonstration of power over the recipient. Like the code of honor of which the gift is in fact an expression, it is shot through with ambivalence; any gesture can mean one thing or its opposite according to circumstances. The interpretation is always debatable.

The gift unreciprocated implies either that it has been accepted as the receiver's due, a repayment or a tribute to him that he deserved and which consequently there is no need to return, or that the recipient is unable to return it because he is unequal in status to the giver. In the first case the giver is slighted, in the second, as in the potlatch, the receiver. If a gift is not returned, the giver cannot complain, for he has placed his honor in the hands of the recipient. If he complains he dishonors himself, for he thereby implies that he made his gift to obtain a return, to oblige the recipient to reciprocate. In that case he deserved to be slighted. If a gift is refused, it is no less a slight, for it implies that the donor's favor is not welcome.

The question of how soon the return gift should be made is also open to different interpretations. If returned immediately, it may imply that the recipient does not wish to remain in the giver's debt, or it can mean that he is so grateful that he cannot wait to express his gratitude. If too long delayed, then it implies a lack of gratitude or the desire to remain indebted to the giver until a worthy occasion presents itself for the return. Just as vengeance is all the more effective for being delayed ("*la vengeance est un plat qui se mange froid*"), so gratitude is the more touching for having awaited the proper occasion to be expressed. In the meantime the receiver awaits his "revenge." In every case the interpretation depends upon the relative status of the participants in terms of honor, power, prestige, morality. If a return gift is not accepted, it is either despised as insufficient or it suggests that the original gift was intended to humiliate.

If these principles are applied to the exchange of neighborly favors in Magnac, the system of gift or labor exchange can be seen as one of direct exchange, though its time-depth is undetermined, ranging from the immediate return-gift for some small service to a never-ending state of credit. Thanks to its indeterminacy, the system can masquerade as one of undifferentiated exchange, the highest manifestation of solidarity. At the same time it is possible, whenever social distinctions are greater, to use these exchanges to build up a system of patronage.

Magnac possesses solidarity in all the senses I have examined here. Economic solidarity, expressed through the neighborly helping hand, is in decline. Monsieur Cayla, who farms five hectares and makes ends meet as a pig-killer and by doing odd jobs, regrets *le bon vieux temps*: "In the old days, neighbors saw a lot of each other. You went to work with one lot, to harvest with another. You were together all the time. Now it's each man *chez lui* and you see nobody. You don't even know what's going on." Help in times of crisis is still generously offered, but short-term neighborly exchange is no longer what it was. Nevertheless, the spirit of community fights back to express itself in other ways.

It was traditional in the municipal elections of Magnac to allow no candidate to stand as representative of a national political party, for, as it was explained, "politics brings in discord, and we don't like that here." So no one stood for office as anything but himself, and he did not stand unless invited to do so by the mayor. In order to be invited it was necessary to be a grandfather and to possess a reasonable number of hectares. There was of course no campaigning and, because there were never more candidates than seats, election was a foregone conclusion. After the election, the supporters of the successful candidate came to erect, in front of his house, a maypole (*un mai*) some fifty feet high, a sapling whose point was left with its terminal tuft of leaves intact. About ten feet from the ground it was decorated with two crossed national flags, a wreath, and a wooden plaque announcing "*Honneur à notre élu*." The *élu* in question then offered a sumptuous dinner to his supporters. This tradition ran into opposition in 1958, as it no doubt had done at moments of transition in the past. A rival list was presented by the farmers on the poorer side of the commune, which gained a few seats, and finally a third list, called "*la liste des femmes,*" was organized by the postman, not a native of Magnac, to represent the inhabitants of the village nucleus (*le bourg*), which gained no seats at all.[4] Though municipal elections

4. A fuller account of this election is given in Pitt-Rivers (1960a).

subsequently returned in some degree to what they had been before—the young Turks of 1958, already solid family men of forty, were grandfathers of sixty by 1978—certain modifications had been incorporated: the property qualification had slipped; the carpenter, son of a tenant farmer of former times, had been elected, though he had no more than a couple of acres, and it was no longer necessary to be a grandfather, but there were no women and no non-natives in the council, except for the mayor himself, who was born fifteen miles away and had entered as a son in-law the richest farm of the commune. That he had become mayor was a tribute to his personal qualities.

In the 1978 elections a rival list of candidates was suddenly presented at the last minute. It included two women, one of them employed and not even native-born, and several persons who had no land at all. The list was organized by the son and successor of a municipal councilor of the traditional type, whose ill-health caused him to resign. He had already refused to stand in replacement of his father when invited to do so by the mayor. Only three of the opposition candidates were successful, out of eleven: the organizer and two others, both thoroughly traditional farmers of about forty. But this meant that three candidates of the mayor's list failed to get elected. One was the unpopular farmer already mentioned, and the other two were fresh candidates whom the mayor had asked to stand: one was the wife of an elderly farmer whose husband's health was too delicate for him to do so; the other was an immigrant from Paris who had owned a house in Magnac for only twelve years. As it turned out, the opposition list performed the function of correcting the mayor's whims in departing from the traditional model of municipal government.

The maypoles were duly erected for the members of the council, who offered wine to those who came to do the work or to congratulate them. But an innovation was made: in place of the individual meal offered to supporters, a collective celebration lunch was given in the cafe to which all of the two hundred and twenty-five voters were invited. The unsuccessful candidates were obliged to come to celebrate with their successful rivals. The solidarity of the community was reestablished under the aegis of the mayor and the priest.

Organic solidarity based on the exchange of labor and differentiation of function has largely been replaced by mechanical solidarity at the level of the commune. But it would be a mistake to suppose that this entailed an increase in hostility towards the immigrants. On the contrary, a great effort is made to integrate them. The collective *méchoui* (barbecue) was moved a few years ago to a date in early August so that a maximum of owners of secondary residences

could attend. The *méchoui* was originally instituted about six years ago, when the village fête made a quite unexpected profit. It was offered to the community collectively, and the attendees were invited to subscribe as they wished; a hat was passed round. They did so with such generosity that an even larger profit was cleared, which was carried forward to the following year. Today, the event has been incorporated by the *société de chasse* in replacement of its yearly dinner. There is now a fixed price for tickets, and people come from outside to participate in the clay-pigeon shoot which follows the lunch. Non-natives and visitors are welcomed with hospitable sentiments from the pulpit and in the speeches of the mayor. I should note, however, that hospitality is a technique for keeping outsiders morally outside (Pitt-Rivers 1961). Neighborly sentiments extend to the resident non-natives of the community all the more easily nowadays because more entrepreneurial services are available and they depend less on the neighborly helping hand.

Political solidarity has always been focused on the neighboring village of Cardaillac, which has been the hereditary rival of Magnac over the last thousand years. The landscape and agriculture of Cardaillac are very different since it is not, like Magnac, on the limestone plateau, but on the acid soil of the "Châtaigneraie" (also called Ségala, the land of rye, not wheat). In every period of national crisis, the two towns have been on opposite sides. In 1791, Magnac was royalist, Cardaillac revolutionary; in the seventeenth century, Magnac was Catholic and Cardaillac Protestant. The native-born historian of Magnac (who was a priest) suspected that the clergy of Cardaillac were Albigensians in the early Middle Ages. Today, Magnac votes to the right in national elections, Cardaillac to the left. But the hostility to Cardaillac seems to have abated since the days when, newly arrived in Magnac, twenty-seven years ago, I was warned in whispers, by no fewer than three separate people, to beware the people of the Ségala, of which Cardaillac is, so to speak, the local capital.

Solidarity is ever menaced by the spirit of accountancy; it dreams of a society where no one keeps score, but this is not a practical ideal these days. Its chief opponent is the modern state, whose system of taxation, its life-blood, is founded upon the opposite premise: that all men are enemies. Calculation of individual interests is essential to it, for it takes its cut of all individual transactions. Even if there is no deal but a simple altruistic donation, the gift tax assures the state its percentage. It demands its share even of the milk of human kindness. The neighbor's helping hand brings in no "value added tax," but the entrepreneur's hour does (at 17.6 percent). The state menaces the solidary local community

ideologically as well, for it endeavors to impose upon its subjects a concept of the nation as a homogeneous identity, the very opposite of the network of historically distinct villages in which the local community resides. The concept of the individual promoted by the state is one in which a citizen's primary responsibilities and attachments should be to the so-called "national community," an entity whose claim to such a title, taken in Tönnies' terms, is anything but robust.

It seems unlikely that the solidarity of the community of Magnac will endure for much longer. There is a proposal for administrative reform in France that would abolish municipalities of less than a thousand inhabitants. The "peasant mentality" on which the old solidarities were based can hardly, in any case, survive the "end of the peasants" themselves (Mendras 1967). Monsieur Cayla counts those who have not come to the annual *méchoui* and concludes, as I do on slightly different grounds, that this is a very silly world we live in.

CHAPTER 11

Spiritual power in Central America

*The naguals of Chiapas**

I

Evans-Pritchard has suggested that witchcraft and religion are alternative modes of dealing with the predicament of personal fate: the Azande blame their fellow men for their misfortunes and seek vengeance, the Nuer blame themselves and seek atonement. The distinction is one that may be made in other parts of the world, though clearly not with any great precision, since to evaluate the relative importance of religion or witchcraft is necessarily a somewhat arbitrary task. In the case of the Indians of Chiapas in southern Mexico, however, it would appear virtually impossible, for while they spend much of their lives praying, and even more working to acquire the wealth necessary to enable them to hold office in a religious sodality, their concern in witchcraft is as great as that of any people of the world. Moreover, as will be shown, the dividing line between witchcraft and religion is not easily drawn. The two fields of activity are in fact better viewed as aspects of a single conceptual system offering two courses of conduct to deal with the problem of personal fate, which may be pursued either alternatively or

* "Spiritual power in Central America" was first published in 1970 in the edited volume *Witchcraft confessions and accusations*, which was republished in 2004 by Routledge and is reproduced in this volume with permission from Taylor & Francis.

simultaneously. June Nash (1967) has suggested that a community in Chiapas may pass through a period of crisis in which the number of persons murdered as witches rises far above the norm, but even in quieter times the homicide rate is high and the victim is, in the great majority of cases, a witch. Allegations of witchcraft are continual in the daily life of the Indians.[1]

One might wonder how it can be that so many people acquire the reputation of a witch and why they are not more careful to ensure themselves against an accusation which so often leads to their violent and premature end. It has perhaps been under-stressed in writings on the subject that if a witch is sometimes to some extent a social outcast, he is far from always being so, for through the fear he inspires he may well receive more respect than a reputation for virtue would earn him. He would not, in fact, be thought so evil were he not credited with power and, as Hobbes observed,[2] to be credited with power *is* power. Those who can cure can kill, and vice versa, but to be believed capable of either entitles a person to a privileged position in comparison with ordinary mortals. Hence it is that the lure of power tempts men, in their efforts to achieve predominance, not only to claim the ability to cure, but even to court the accusation of witchcraft and to boast of having effected the destruction of their enemies. The stakes may be high, but the prize is dear.

Therefore I believe that the threat to bewitch, if not made openly as in Chiapas as the parting shot in a quarrel, is made by implication more often than ethnographers have recorded The hint of supernatural reprisals has a greater effect upon those who believe in witchcraft than a demonstration of natural force, and it provides the ambitious with a shortcut to power—a shortcut that may be

1. The main sources used in this analysis, which necessarily abridges the data and offers generalizations which are open to qualifications, are Guiteras-Holmes (1961), Hermitte (1964), and Holland (1963). Recognition is also due to the writings of those who participated in the University of Chicago's project: "Social, Cultural, and Linguistic Change in the Highlands of Chiapas," whose definite publication, superseding Vol. I of the Report, is expected in 1971. I owe a special debt of recognition to Professor June Nash who was kind enough to read this paper in draft and offer valuable comments based upon her own fieldwork in Chiapas. Her paper (1967) gives the following figures for assassinations per annum per 100,000: USA, 4-8; Mexico, 31-9; a "peaceful village of Chiapas," 36-2; and that which she studied herself, 251–2. When it is reckoned that only adult males are here eligible for accusations of witchcraft, the figures are yet more impressive.

2. "Reputation of power is power, because it draweth with it the adherence of those that need protection" (*Leviathan,* Chapter X).

taken in good faith, moreover, for those who believe in witchcraft easily believe themselves capable of it and confess to it; it is as easy to become convinced of the effective power of hate as to believe that love conquers all.

The ambivalence attaching to such power, a common feature of so-called primitive societies, is particularly acute in Chiapas, since witchcraft, so far from being an activity practiced on the margins of social life, occupies a central position among the preoccupations of the Indians and interlocks so intimately with their religion that it is not possible to discuss one without reference to the other. Spiritual power is the crux of the social system and spiritual sanctions dwarf all others in people's minds. A witch is merely someone who has misused his otherwise legitimate powers.[3] Hence, all powerful men end their lives murdered in revenge for their witchcraft or their demise is attributed to defeat in some spiritual encounter. In the Indian view they are murdered either physically *as* a witch or spiritually *by* one.

The formal courtesy of the Indians' manners, their studied claims to modesty, the ethical concerns which prompt them to practice confession and submit to whipping, their self-sacrificing response to the call of civic duty—all reflect in reverse an invisible world where power is what counts and small mercy is shown to the weak. Events on earth are entailed by actions at the celestial level where the human hierarchy is established and the fate of individuals determined. Judgments of conduct at the terrestrial level[4] are clearly formulated by the elders, and public opinion follows their lead, but in the spiritual realms events are clouded by uncertainty and regarding individual responsibilities there consensus is not easily reached on earth; it is not patent who has caused a given sickness or misfortune or whether it represents the victim's just desserts or an abuse of spiritual power. The curer's techniques of diagnosis aim precisely to resolve this point. A fine line distinguishes the licit punishment meted out by a spiritual guardian (saint, spirit, or elder of the community) from the malevolence of a

3. The instance is far from unique; *cf.* "Witches . . . are men who pervert their powers to their own selfish ends" (Middleton 1960: 32). A similar ambivalence attaches to such power among the Tiv, according to Bohannan (1958).

4. The distinction between the "terrestrial" and the "celestial" level does not exactly correspond in the analysis to that which is commonly made between the scientific and the magical or the natural and the supernatural. The Indians relate their conceptualization of events that take place in the world of dreams, or at night in the skies, to events that anyone can witness on earth. The latter are believed to be caused by the former.

witch.[5] Misfortune is the result of misdeeds which offend the spiritual powers, and no punishment can be inflicted without divine connivance, yet this ethically simplistic universe loses its logical cohesion when it is admitted that guiltless people can still suffer. Is this not proof of the existence of Evil? And where does Evil come from if not from envy, the universal inspiration of the witch? The belief in witchcraft therefore provides the exonerating clause which preserves the moral determinism of Indian religion from the hazards of life.

Spiritual power is manifest in health and success, since these are thought to result from it. Sickness and misfortune are caused by the castigation of a more powerful spirit, divine or human. The spirit is conceived as a personal vital force whose strength will determine the destiny of the individual. Spiritual power accretes with age, so that longevity alone suffices to demonstrate it in some degree; those with weak spirits do not survive since they are not capable of defending themselves at the celestial level. The spirit is represented in various ways: as heat (*k'al*), more exactly burning power than physical heat;[6] it is also figured as understanding revealed through dreams and spiritual insight—the strong spirits are those "who see how the world is." This capacity is frequently related to another criterion of spiritual strength, that of height: those who fly high see how the world is. These qualities of heat, insight, and height have significance in relation to other aspects of the conceptual world into which it is not necessary to go, but they are no more than means of representing, as the occasion demands, the relative preponderance of individuals in relation to one another. At the terrestrial

5. The witch may in fact send an evil apparition to alienate the soul from her victim through fright (*susto*), a disease of quite common occurrence not necessarily caused by a witch. A spiritual guardian does not punish in this way. Moreover, a witch may be employed to "punish" the victim by someone who does not possess sufficient spiritual power to do so directly himself. To conclude that indirect means of causing misfortune are confined to practices recognized as by nature illegitimate would be going too far, however, for an offended guardian may bring misfortune indirectly simply by neglecting to afford protection. He throws to the wolves those who do not merit his spiritual exertion on their behalf. The system of guardianship varies. In the traditional villages of the north the *principal* of the lineage is the guardian of his kinsmen, but in the Pinola where the lineage no longer has much importance it is an individual relationship. Typically, however, in this case nobody knows for sure which elder is his guardian.

6. This conception of heat must not be confused with the distinction between "hot" and "cold" foods, which is general to the Ladinos (and some Indians) of Central America, nor with heat as female sexuality, which is important in Spanish culture but normally unknown to the Indians.

level, society is governed according to a strict etiquette of precedence, expressed in the order in which men salute each other, drink, or pass in procession. The same notion of precedence rules at the spiritual level, with this difference: it is a matter of conjecture rather than conduct and observation.

The central figure in the struggle for spiritual power is the *nagual*,[7] which has been described variously in Chiapas and Guatemala as the "destiny-animal," "animal-companion," "animal-soul," "guardian-spirit," "spirit-counterpart," etc., and even, by those who have understood nothing of its nature, as "the familiar spirit." It is also recognized in Mexico north of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec as "witch" or "transforming witch," "shaman" or "pagan priest." The word is of Nahuatl origin, from the root meaning to disguise, but it is used south of the Isthmus with a somewhat different meaning. The same concept is referred to in the Mayan languages by a number of other words: *lab'* or *wayohel* in Tzeltal, *wayihel* or *chanul* in Toztzil; but *nagual* is in general use and it is also the word used by Spanish speakers. It has caused the greatest perplexity to ethnographers from earliest times. This essay aims to clarify its nature, dispel some of the misconceptions that surround it, and perhaps assist thereby in interpreting accounts of it in the historical literature. Its form varies from place to place (though perhaps not as much as the interpretations that have been applied to it). I shall be concerned with it in the ethnography of Chiapas.[8] Even within this relatively homogenous area it is subject to variations, but they all contain the essential notion of an animal which

7. Villa Rojas (1947) gives the earliest description of the *nagual* in Chiapas and one of the best.

8. The occasional references to the ethnography of Guatemala make no attempt to bring it into the theoretical framework presented here, save with regard to the general thesis that each system of belief can include details borrowed from other systems. Each must be treated as a system in its own right, and once this is admitted there is nothing anomalous in the fact that we find so much variation in other parts of the Mayan Highlands. To take only the area of Lake Atitlán: we find places where the *characoteles* (witches) are quite distinct from *zahorines* (curers), others where both are distinguished by the way they come into the world, or where the animal form of the characotel, called *tonica*, can be whatever animal he chooses, or where sorcery can be performed by the use of a magical book, as in Europe. DeVore (1968) has made a comparative study of this region, examining the question of variations.

Quite apart from the influence of the Spaniards, it must be remembered that this area had frequent and significant contact with people from north of the Isthmus before the conquest and that the Spaniards brought in a great many more in their retinue.

shares a common destiny with a man and whose life is coterminous with his. Esther Hermitte (1964) uses the apt designation "co-essence."[9]

II

The *nagual* must be classed first of all as one type of relationship between a man and an animal, comparable in some ways to the guardian animal spirit of North America and less exactly to the European witch's familiar or the animal form adopted by the European witch, but it is unlike what has been called "totemism," where a collectivity bears a special relationship to an animal species. Neither should it be likened to a "totemistic" relationship (also called "personal totemism") in which an individual "respects," in Evans-Pritchard's admirable usage, a particular species of animal, for it is a relationship between an *individual* man and an *individual* animal. A man has no tie with the other members of the species of his *nagual*, nor does possession of a *nagual* of the same species create any bond between two men or any connection between them in the eyes of others, save for the implication that their spirits are of a similar nature and strength. Moreover, the *nagual* conveys nothing about the social allegiance of its "owner" (who is often uncertain as to the species to which his *nagual* belongs); it concerns only his spiritual power, his individual moral character and destiny. In short, it defines him as an individual—like a nickname—and not as the occupant of a particular place in the social structure—like a surname. It involves no prohibition and no ritual performances, if one excepts certain techniques for divining the *nagual* of a newborn babe in certain towns of Chiapas[10] and techniques in connection with curing in Chichicastenango (Bunzel 1952: 318).

Yet if the difference between animals serves to provide the model for defining the relationship between groups of totemism—because they are "good to think" rather than "good to eat," in Lévi-Strauss's phase—it is still the difference between species that, in the case of the *nagual*, enables animals to represent the spiritual hierarchy of individual men: the eagle flies higher than the sparrow-hawk; the thunderbolt has more burning power than the whirlwind;

9. Hubert & Mauss (1902: 30) had already long ago perceived the need to distinguish between the magician's auxiliary *être complètement distinct* and his *âme extérieure*. As they explained it: in form there are two beings, in essence only one.

10. E.g., Tenejapa (Medina, n.d.); San Andrés Larraínzar (Holland 1963: 101).

the tiger is more dangerous than the horse; the dog more cunning than the raccoon. All other *naguals* have more height, heat, understanding, and power than the *pollito* (chick), who is generally produced as the frailest of all manifestations of spiritual force, the very image of vulnerability. The relations observed between natural entities provide the model for representing the relationships between men.

The *nagual* has, then, a metaphorical function in making explicit the relative spiritual power of individuals. Yet it has also a metonymical function in defining the moral character of its owner. The horse and the raccoon are peaceful beasts and it is therefore unlikely that those who have such *naguals* will be accused of witchcraft, but the tiger and the eagle are predatory and in accordance with this criterion their owners are credited with potentially maleficent intentions. Vegetarian animals are not. The attribution of a *nagual* defines therefore not only the power of the man in relation to other men, but the way he is likely to use that power. There is even a distinction made among the *naguals* that are thunderbolt (*rayo*) according to their color: the black is generally regarded as more dangerous than the green, but the colors and their significance vary from place to place.

The range of phenomena that may be *naguals* varies from one community to another. At one extreme one might place Chichicastenango where, according to Bunzel (1952: 274, 318), the list includes reptiles, mammals, birds, stone idols, and any one of a number of divinities.

At the other extreme is San Andrés Larraínzar where, Holland (1963: 102) tells us, the list is limited to five-toed animals, and, it appears later, to climatic phenomena. He also mentions what he calls "*dioses del linaje*" (lineage gods) which are the jaguar, ocelot, etc.

The flexibility of the system is evident and, given its metaphorical function, this is to be expected. It would demand more space than we have at our disposal here to examine the distribution of forms of the *nagual* in Central America, but it should be noted that the ranking *order* is always in accordance with the same principles: climatic phenomena are always superior to animals, birds are ranked according to the height at which they fly, mammals according to their relative strength. There is a notable exception in the case of the humming-bird, whose overall precedence is denoted not by height or strength, but by the divine associations of the bird. It is the Ancestor, the protector, a supremely beneficent divinity who is also represented as a small boy with a wide hat. It is therefore confused with pictures of the Niño de Atocha, who is portrayed as a child with

an elaborate headdress. The popularity of this image in Chiapas is perhaps due to this fact.[11]

The attribution of the *nagual* is in continual doubt. It is never known for certain, a matter of common knowledge like the totemic affiliation of a clansman. It is rather something to be verified and re-verified by various means: prayer, astrological calculation, augurial tests, or oneiromancy.

In some towns of Chiapas a test is used which consists of scattering ash around the house where a baby has been born in order that the footprints of its *nagual* may be identified after the first night. The test assumes that the *nagual* will mark its relationship to its newborn owner by approaching as close as possible. (This test appears to be logically contradictory to the belief, firmly asserted on other occasions, that the *nagual* and the man are born at the same moment just as they die at the same moment, but such logical implications are misplaced where only the identification of the *nagual* is at issue.) It is significant, however, that, effectively and not conceptually, such a test eliminates the higher ranks of the spiritual hierarchy as candidates for the baby's *nagual*, since they are all phenomena unable or unlikely to leave a trace around the house.

The *nagual* is in fact attributed by public opinion in accordance with the performance and reputation of the individual and it gets revised as often as the public image of the person changes. This revision is facilitated by the provision that a person of superior spiritual strength may have more than one *nagual* and the additional *naguals* come to be revealed later in life when the owner has made his mark as a person of influence. They belong, it goes almost without saying, to the higher ranks of the hierarchy. The different *naguals* of an individual are never discussed as if to make an inventory of them and only the most powerful or the most recent is mentioned, though the simple fact of having plural *naguals* implies superior spiritual strength.

The common identity between man and *nagual* implies common qualities. Hence the metonymical equation finds support and illustration in the man's personal idiosyncrasies: the man who is whirlwind has a twisting forelock rising from his brow; the man who likes green food is a horse; the greedy timid woman is a raccoon; the weakling child is a chick. An elder of Pinola exploited to good use the metonymical equivalence involved when, as was his custom when drunk

11. It is also due, no doubt, to the activities of the Dominican monks who favored the reproduction of the pictures. There was a Dominican convent at Atocha just outside Madrid.

(and Indians boast only when drunk), he used to put live coals into his mouth. He was an ambitious man and this eccentric and spectacular conduct earned him a hesitant designation as thunderbolt.

The system of attributions leans haphazardly upon the principles of magical association, but it quite ignores the logic of practical knowledge. Contradictions at this level abound: the *nagual* whose life-span is coterminous with that of its owner may well belong to a species that is known to live for only a few years; the chick grows up in a few months. Later, a supplementary *nagual* may be attributed and it is thought that the man dies only when his last *nagual* dies. It is only then that his vital force is exhausted.

The *nagual* sets a seal upon the social personality of its owner, like a sobriquet; hence, logically in terms of social relations, but not in terms of the system as it is described ideally, small children tend to have innocuous animals for *naguals*, while the dangerous animals and high-flyers are usually reserved for the mature and especially for the curers. There are, however, babies born with a *nagual* implying a strong spirit and this places them in particular danger on account of the jealousy they inspire. The recruitment of the curer is effected through the interpretation of his dreams which reveal the strength of his spirit and the nature of his *nagual*. It is not then recalled, for it is not relevant, that thirty years earlier he was divined to have been a much humbler animal. Spiritual identity relates to the man as he is in the present, not as he was in the past. It would be patently absurd to think that a timid and incompetent man was a tiger or still less a thunderbolt, nor could a man of years who had held high office in the sodalities be a harmless lizard, for the *nagual* and the person are the same being. The Indians themselves make this clear in their speech; they do not say "X has such-and-such a *nagual*" or "X's *nagual* is a tiger," but "X is a tiger." It is not a separate entity, but the same at the celestial level, and its appearance at the terrestrial level is the point of contact between the two levels. Its appearance is therefore rare and constitutes an event of "extra-ordinary" significance. It is a portent when a man sees his own *nagual* and many deny that he can ever do so. Moreover, when a man sees the *nagual* of another, he is rarely aware of it at the time, but only afterwards when it is discovered that in killing or wounding the animal he has done the same thing to the man. It is an interpretation after the facts, like all conclusions regarding witchcraft.

It is not surprising that the chief source of information regarding *naguals* should be dreams, which are thought to be glimpses of events at the spiritual level. However, dreams are not easily interpreted and it is even believed that

false dreams may be given to a person in order to deceive him or to "test his spirit." The capacity to understand the significance of dreams is credited to those with strong spirits (who see how the world is). Hence the task of forming public opinion regarding the nebulous relations at the celestial level falls to the oneiromancy of the elders—a fact that greatly reinforces their power at the terrestrial level. The other source of information is provided by the diagnostic techniques of the curers. Witchcraft is, of course, one of the major aetiological categories and the identification of the witch is often a necessary part of the curing process. A full case-history would include the identification of the *naguals* of both the aggressor and the victim, since disease on earth is the result of a defeat on the spiritual level, but since the curer is generally forbidden to reveal the identity of the witch, this source of information is not directly available to public opinion.

It is characteristic of this mode of thought that parallel explanations are not excluded. Hence while, according to the system as it has been expounded so far, disease and misfortune are the outcome of a combat between *naguals*, they can be simultaneously the result of sorcery at the terrestrial level: a witch can inject a foreign substance into the body of his victim or he can place outside his door a *palito*, a twig that has been treated magically so that the evil implanted in it will penetrate the foot of the person who steps on it. Thus the curer is not only concerned to combat at the celestial level the *nagual* of the witch responsible for the disease; he may also effect his cure by extracting the "witchcraft" from the body of the patient and stories are told of how this has been done. The man bewitched for meanness had a five-peso note injected into his throat, which caused him great discomfort; his curer successfully extracted it. The man who associated too much with Ladinos had horse hair introjected into his belly.[12] Spiritual strength still remains the effective determinant of these mundane events, but it is of interest that sorcery and witchcraft are distinguished here, not as alternative techniques operated by distinct practitioners, but only as the terrestrial and celestial aspects of the same events of a unique spiritual struggle.

Minor ailments are without celestial antecedence and can be cured by herbs or chemists' remedies. These are called in Spanish *mal de Dios* or *mal bueno* (God's evil or good evil) in contrast to *mal echado* (projected evil). Disease is also caused by loss of or damage to the soul, *ch'ulel* (Tzeltal and Tzotzil). The

12. For rather obvious historical reasons, the horse is an animal associated symbolically with Ladinos. Hence in many Indian villages Indians who own horses refuse to ride them.

ch'ulel, unlike the *nagual*, resides in the body of its owner from which it escapes at death, for it is immortal. Nevertheless, it is also confused with the *nagual*, being equally co-essential with the physical person. Hence it is said that it may be attacked and devoured by a hostile *nagual*. The two types of soul are not distinguished with conceptual clarity but only by context. As manifestations of the person they are identical, but they are opposed as the active and passive aspects of the person at the celestial level. Sometimes the *nagual* is said to be the *ch'ulel* (Guiteras-Holmes 1961: 177) and in Chamula the distinction cannot be made linguistically since the word *ch'ulel* is used for any conceptualization of the person at the celestial level. The logical contradiction between the immortality of the *ch'ulel* and the fact that it can be eaten by a hostile *nagual* and thereby cause the death of its owner was resolved by Manuel Arias (Guitaras-Holmes 1961: 227) by positing the existence of two *ch'uleles*, one of which will be eaten by the *Pukuh* (Evil, the Devil, Witchcraft) and the other will go to heaven. This belief is not recorded anywhere else and Indians are normally unaware of the necessity to make such a distinction. The idea appears to represent no more than the solution to a logical contradiction of which a thoughtful and intelligent man became aware only through his attempt to instruct his friend, the ethnographer. Have not many of us become aware of the logical implications of what we believe only at the moment when we attempt to impart our beliefs to others and realize that they are contradictory? Have we not also then had recourse to our imagination in order to overcome the contradiction?

The saints are sometimes thought to have *naguals*, though these do not figure in the case-histories of disease. St. Michael, patron saint of Pinola, and St. Andrew, patron of Larraínzar, are both said by their parishioners to have the maximum number of *naguals*, thirteen. Little more significance attaches to such statements than that these saints are spiritually the most powerful and that they are prompt to castigate those who offend them. But the patron saint is said further to be the keeper of all the *naguals* of the community and sometimes to keep them shut up in a cave in one of the sacred mountains. This role is also fulfilled by the *Anhel* or by the *Me'iltotil* in certain statements. These divinities are to some extent interchangeable with the patron saint.

The distinction between castigation and witchcraft depends upon the *right* to castigate, which is possessed not only by all the divine personalities and the ancestors, but by living elders who, as guardians and prefects, are entitled to correct their erring or disrespectful charges. Indeed, any elder is within his rights in resenting an affront upon the terrestrial level by meting out a punishment

through his spirit which will bring sickness or misfortune to the offender. (It is understandable, therefore, that threats to bewitch should be proffered at the end of a dispute: the threatener is not saying "I am a witch" but "I will punish you"—whether the punishment is legitimate or not is another matter.)

Divine permission is required before anyone can be punished and this must be given by *Diosh* (God), it is said, but the notion of God includes all Divinity and hence the saints, the Ancestor, and the guardians. The distinction between the one and the many, which poses a problem to theologians who feel the need to be logical, concerns the Indians of Chiapas not at all. Hence the anomaly that divine sanction is necessary for anyone to be punished, yet punishment can still be given illicitly, is not an anomaly to those who have not felt it necessary to define the limits of the jurisdictions of the divine personalities and to construct a universal abstract principle with regard to the exercise of divine authority. The problem of the omnipotence of God and the existence of Evil is resolved at the level of action by positing the malfeasance of a witch, identified by the consensus of the community.[13] The witch is not thought to have made a pact with the Devil and the *nagual* is not the Devil's servant, but the person himself, whose evil disposition is confirmed, like his spiritual power, only with the years. Thus the adolescent witch, frequent in the annals of European witchcraft, is unthinkable in Chiapas. For the same reason, women are rarely accused of witchcraft; they do not possess sufficient spiritual power.

Such a résumé of the role of the *nagual* in the conceptualization of the spiritual realm is far too brief to offer a complete understanding, but it suffices to show that this belief is an integral feature both of religion and of witchcraft, which are much less simply opposed than in the Christianity of Europe. The *nagual* is a means of representing individuals in the spiritual realm and of relating their fortunes to the power structure of the community; the notion of hazard is effectively eliminated and the moral cohesion of the world is maintained. The accusation of witchcraft appears precisely at the point where this moral cohesion comes under stress: where the sufferer has confessed and made amends for all possible offences, yet still suffers. It is levelled at those whose personal ambition threatens the moral ideal of the community. The personification of the *nagual* in terms of strength of spirit on the one hand and disposition on the other takes account of both the factual and the moral aspects of the system of punishment which is the basis of moral authority in the traditional communities of Chiapas.

---

13. Nash (1961) describes how this is established in Amatenango.

The flexibility of the system is such that, while consensus is constantly pending in the discussions of *naguals*, dreams, curing, witchcraft, and the causes of death and misfortune, it never receives formal recognition in a public act short of the assassination and subsequent trial of the witch (Nash 1961). The conceptual system, by virtue of the fact that it contains so many contradictions in the abstract, provides the possibility of finding a solution to any eventuality in accordance with the *ex post facto* logic of magical reasoning. In a word, the conceptual system becomes as a whole "systematic" only in the context of action, as a means of integrating events into the history of the community.

III

The description I have given overlooks the considerable variations between one community and another in Chiapas. Yet these variations are matters of detail: they do not affect the general principles of the system. Whatever the list of potential *naguals*, they are ordered in the same way and their social function is similar. As we go further afield, however, the nature of the *nagual* appears to change and the system in which it is incorporated differs. In many places in Mexico and Guatemala the *nagual* appears, not as a co-essence possessed by every individual, but as the name for those members of the community who are thought to be witches and are credited with the power to transform themselves into the shape of a given animal for the purpose of carrying out their nefarious designs. They may be the same animals, but their social function is no longer quite the same.

Foster (1944), in a justly well-known essay, attempted to sort out the cultural history of the different phenomena to which the word nagual has been applied. He found two basic types of relationship between an animal and a man:

1. There is, first, the animal into which a man can change himself, the "transforming witch." He claims this as the original sense of the word in Nahuatl.
2. There is, however, another type of relationship with an animal, referred to as the *tona*, a word meaning "fate" in Nahuatl, from which the *tonalamatl* gets its name. The *tonalamatl* was the calendar used by the Mexicans and also by the Maya for augury, divining, and determining the fate of individuals. The days of the calendar were associated with animals, and the individual received his name and his guardian animal from the day of his birth or baptism.

These two conceptions, which are found independent of one another north of the Isthmus of Tehuatepec, become confused as we go south, and the word *nagual*, where it is used, denotes a relationship with an animal which represents the individual's destiny. The *naguals* of Chiapas, described above, are an example of this type of relationship. Foster maintains that there is no evidence to support the speculations of the Abbé Brasseur de Bourbourg, and later of Brinton, who reinterpreted the accounts of the Spanish chroniclers to hypothesize the existence of a witch-cult aiming to keep alive the ancient religion—rather as Margaret Murray maintained that the witch-cult in Europe was an underground political movement based upon the survival of ancient paganism—and to organize rebellion against the Spaniards. Foster submits that the elements which enter into the conceptions of the *nagual* are traditional traits of aboriginal culture, that there was therefore no "religion of nagualism," and that the problem of nagualism was no more than the problem of the dissemination of a word. He suggests that if the word *nagual* be used at all to define a general phenomenon, it should be returned to its original meaning as the transforming witch, and that the word *tona* should be used to define the conception of the destiny-animal.

It is questionable whether it is ever wise to borrow from the ethnography the words for our technical vocabulary of anthropology,[14] though it is sometimes hard to avoid, but in this case Foster comes up against the problem that the word *nagual* is used by the people of Chiapas and Guatemala in the sense that is contrary to that which he recommends for anthropologists, and this can but lead to confusion.

The distinction between the two conceptions is essential but the reconstruction of their ancient history faces the difficulty that we possess no account written independently of the Spaniards, and our sources are limited to:

1. Pre-Columbian codices and frescoes: independent pictorial evidence in which the usage of animal disguises is patent and humans are figured in the process of transformation into monkeys, as in the mythology which persists to this day. Indeed, transformation into animals is part and parcel of the common idiom of all mythologies.
2. Accounts recorded by the ethnographers of the day, who, admirable as they were, were none the less sixteenth-century Spanish churchmen.

---

14. I have discussed the question in detail in a recent article, "On the word caste" (Pitt-Rivers 1971).

3. Accounts left by Indians who had learned to write under the direction of the missionaries.

We must admit, then, that our knowledge of the beliefs of the Indians prior to the conquest is highly speculative. Nevertheless, the previous existence of the two types of relationship to animals of which Foster speaks is generally accepted. There is nothing unlikely in the idea that the officiants who served an animal deity were thought capable of adopting the guise of the animal to which their cult was dedicated: they appear to have represented such a transformation in their vestments. On the other hand, the connection between men and animals through the calendar is firmly established. It is not hard to think of speculative explanations on the basis of the difference between Aztec and Mayan culture to account for the greater importance today of the transformer north of the Isthmus and of the destiny-animal south of it. But we must also speculate about the value of our Spanish sources, for their reports of the Indians' beliefs cannot but be influenced by their own beliefs regarding the supernatural.

The Spaniards, too, possessed a conception of the transforming witch, but, as I shall show, it was a very different kind of transformation. On the other hand, the animal co-essence is a construction that, despite the animal figures of the Zodiac, remains foreign to the tradition of European thought; even if we say we are *pisces* or *leo* we do not believe that we are a particular fish or lion. The Spaniards could understand the *nagual* only as a transforming witch whose powers were bequeathed by the Devil and who used them against Christianity. They could not understand the animal co-essence at all. Even that talented observer, Thomas Gage, who has left us an account so ably reported that we can perceive a system very similar to that which we know from contemporary Chiapas, has himself quite misinterpreted it.[15] Indeed, we may wonder to what extent the belief in the transforming witch south of the Isthmus may not be due to the influence of the missionaries. As long as witchcraft was a reality for them, the Spaniards, especially churchmen, concluded that any association between a man and an animal was the outcome of a pact with the Devil and that such associations were limited to those who had made such a pact. Bishop Nuñez de la Vega's campaign against the witches of Chiapas at the beginning of the eighteenth century was based upon the same misapprehension as Gage's

15. Thompson (1958). An analysis of Gage's account of witchcraft will be published elsewhere.

against those of Pinola and Mixco nearly a century earlier: that the possession of an animal counterpart was restricted to witches, that witches transformed themselves into their *naguals*, and that no particular significance attached to the species of the *nagual*. Whatever their understanding of the detail of Indian belief, the Spaniards failed to grasp the principles of the system of thought into which it fitted, since these were contrary to their assumptions about the nature of God, Good and Evil, and the natural and supernatural.

Nonetheless, Indian and Spanish beliefs were sufficiently close to one another to allow the detail of one to be reinterpreted by the other. Hence, if the high-flying archangels were easily able to take their place in the Indian pantheon, and "Señor Santa Cruz" could become the guardian against the Evil which comes from abroad, the protector of springs and water-holes, and the rain-maker, it is equally true that the Indian belief in the destiny-animal could, without much difficulty, be incorporated into a system which recognized only animal familiars and the ability of witches to change their shape and the shape of others through spells. Thus in Fuentes y Guzman's account of the battle of Quetzaltenango, the *nagual* of the king of the Quiché figures prominently. It attacked Alvarado during the battle in the form of an eagle and was killed by him with the thrust of a lance.[16] The king died simultaneously from an exactly similar wound. But it is to be noted that the *real* Alvarado (not his *nagual*) was attacked by the eagle at the terrestrial level and that the transformation of the king was the work of a fat female Indian sorceress. Fuentes, writing in 1690, has incorporated an Indian story into a European framework of belief. The failure of his great-great-grandfather, Bernal Diaz, to explain adequately what happened he attributes to the great chronicler's inadequate understanding of *estos encantos de Naguales*. Admitting that we can only speculate regarding the Indians' belief system at the time of their first contact with the Spaniards, in this case the battle of Quetzaltenango, it is plausible to suppose that the specifically Christian

16. " . . . procuraron (los Indios) valerse contra (los españoles) de mayores fuerzas que las humanas . . . trataron de valerse del arte de los encantos y Naguales; tomando en esta ocasión el demonio, por el rey de el Quiché, la forma de águila, sumamente crecida, y por otros de aquellos *Ahaus*, varias formas de serpientas y otras sabadijas" (". . . the Indians managed to take advantage against the Spaniards of more than human forces . . . they attempted to use the magic of spells and Naguals, the devil, as the king of the Quiché, taking on this occasion the form of an extremely large eagle and, as others of those lords, various forms of serpent and other reptiles") Fuentes y Guzman (1882: 50).

elements in such stories were the contributions of the Spaniards. The Spanish interpretation of "nagualism" hinges on the Devil, who clearly had no place in the pre-Spanish conception.[17]

Let us now examine briefly the structure of the notion of the witch in sixteenth-century Spain: he, or more usually she,[18] is one who by an act of will has turned against Christ and become the disciple of the Devil. In the terms of this pact whereby she loses her eternal soul the Devil provides her with the powers to do evil, which include the power of transformation, the power to command devils in the guise of animals, and the power to enjoy sexual relationship with demons in animal, and sometimes in human, form. Indian witchcraft, on the other hand, is simply not concerned with sex. The decorum of Indian belief, in contrast to European, is quite striking. Mention of the subject includes little more than the notion that, during intercourse, the *ch'uleles* of the participants leave the bodies of their owners and embrace. The portals of the Gothic churches depict a relationship between humans and animals that is very different from that between Indians and their *naguals*.[19]

The specific animal into which European witches transform is not important. In the missionaries' accounts we find mention of Indians who had the power to transform themselves into a jaguar, a tiger, or an eagle, etc., but the species is not regarded as significant. In Europe the power to transform is unspecific and the fairytale witch transforms herself from one animal into another in a whole series which ends sometimes by her turning herself into water and thereby trickling away from her pursuers. The relationship between witch and animal transformation is not one between a specific human and a specific animal or even species of animal, but simply *the power to transform* into more or less any *false apparition*. Consequently, the animal transformation of the European witch has no metaphorical function whatsoever, and in so far as it has

17. Correa's essay (1960), so rich and so useful from the point of view of research, which rightly insists upon the main point of the importance of the Devil in the conceptual framework of the missionary, is, alas, quite unreliable with regard to the detail of its interpretations and fails to deal with beliefs systematically.

18. The significance of the sex of the witch provides yet another dimension on which the European system differs from the Indian, but, fascinating as this is, the problem must be left on one side of this paper. One might nevertheless add that the witches among Ladinos are usually female—a fact to be explained by the difference in the moral division of labor between the two cultures.

19. See, especially, Moissac and Beaulieu-en-Dordogne.

a metonymical function this is restricted to signifying a relationship with any member of that class of animal thought to be associated with the Devil, usually through a sexual connotation: cats, goats, reptiles, bats, and toads.

The Indians believe that their animal counterparts represent ultimate reality; the Europeans condemn them as deceptions. One might do well, then, to distinguish between "transformation" and "incarnation" and reserve the latter term for the Indian *nagual*, whether represented as transformer or co-essence. In both, the man is portrayed in the semblance of an animal, but in the first the intention is to change the visible appearance for the purpose of deceiving in the Devil's cause or to adopt an unnatural form in order to attend a Sabbath in which prohibited pleasures are enjoyed. In adopting "unnatural" guise the witch demonstrates that he has ceased to be a natural human being. Having sold his soul he has become non-human. In the second case the man incarnates a specific animal and demonstrates thereby, not his loss of humanity, but his possession of a particularly powerful human nature represented by this animal, in contrast to other types of human nature indicated by other inferior animals or by the absence of any animal equivalence. It is not a question of appearance, but of being. The distinction between European transforming witch and American transformer relates to the system in which each finds its significance; that between *nagual* and transformer and *nagual* as co-essence relates only to the form in which the animal equivalence is expressed.

In considering the European beliefs with regard to transformation and animal equivalence it is worth taking into account the various forms of peasant belief which never became part of the doctrine regarding witchcraft: the vampire, the werewolf, (the *lamia* or *lutin*), and the child-stealer (*roba-niños, sacamentecas,* or *mantequero*). These are all persons whose essential nature is non-human and maleficent. Only the first two are transformers and they change their appearance on defined occasions: at night (the vampire) and when the moon is full (the werewolf), the former into a human with bat-like attributes and latter into an animal; the *lamia* is permanently half-human and half-animal (top half human, bottom half fish); only the child-stealer is never represented as an animal or with animal attributes. The forms of these different representations are fixed and invariable: all vampires have the same attributes, all werewolves the same form, etc. Yet the ease with which the form can be changed is illustrated by the curious history of the *mantequero* (literally fat-stealer, from *manteca*). The word was translated into English as mantigger or man-tiger and was pictured thereafter as a tiger with a human head.

The forms of the European maleficent agents vary: they may transform or not, and their transformations may be multiple and serial, as in the case of the witch, or unique, as in the case of the vampire; but whatever the form of their association with an animal it always denotes maleficence and opposes them to natural human beings. This is not, however, the case with the *nagual*, and if in some places *naguals* are possessed only by maleficent witches today, they can hardly have been maleficent when associated with an ancient deity, rather than the Devil. In so far as they resemble the witches of Europe this is surely due to the monks, who ended by imposing their interpretation.

It is not my intention to denigrate the importance of the distinction made by Foster and those who have followed him between the transforming witch and the destiny-animal. For purposes of historical reconstruction, it is full of significance, but I would point out that it is a matter of alternative forms within a general system which appears in most places to have retained its main lines, in spite of the confusing interpretations to which it has been subjected and the imposition of ideas of Spanish origin.

As long as the *nagual* is part of a metaphorical system—that is to say, the specific animal defines the social personality of the man in relation to other members of his community—the distinction between transformer and co-essence is a mere matter of form. If the man *is* the animal he can only be so logically either in time or in space, but not in both. If he is the same being as his *nagual* at the same time, then it must be elsewhere: in the jungle, in the cave, in the skies, but not beside him in the village or there would be two persons at the terrestrial level. On the other hand, if he transforms himself into an animal, he is the same being in the same place, but differentiated temporally. If he and his *nagual* were in the same place at the same time they would be differentiable and therefore not the same being, but associated alters such as the witch and her familiar.

Within the logic of form, the European and Indian systems make different selections. The European excludes the co-essences, for it has no simultaneous celestial realm in which to locate them; heaven is reserved for the deceased. But it can logically have and has both transforming witches and animal familiars. The Indian systems provide examples of both transformers and owners, but the nature of witchcraft (and in particular its relation to spiritual authority) is such that the familiar would be anomalous. There is no role for an associated alter at the terrestrial level.

The ethnography of Chiapas shows how frail and malleable the distinctions with regard to form are and how different forms can be accommodated

within the same system. For if the transformer and the co-essence appear to be logically incompatible, one nevertheless finds evidence of both within the same community. Of San Andrés Larraínzar, Holland (1963: 113) tells us, after giving a typical account of the *wayihel* as co-essence, that bad elders are capable of transforming themselves, and his texts contain references to transformations (e.g., 256, 257, etc.). Moreover, Hermitte, to whom we owe the most sensitive and coherent account of such a system, tells at one point the story of a famous witch who is remembered as having been shot in the act of transforming himself into a tiger so that he died half-man, half-beast, like a figure from Goya's drawings. June Nash mentions the possibility of transformation in Amatenango; but this occurs only at night. Nevertheless, the same animal co-essences are also active during the daytime, for example during a curing treatment, when that of the curer combats that of the witch, but out of the sight of men, at the celestial level. The distinction between what I have called the terrestrial and celestial levels appears, then, to be made according to whether events take place in the visible or invisible realms; at night the *naguals* are active on the earth's surface or they may be heard flying overhead—but under cover of darkness.

Both forms of belief carry the same meaning: the man and the animal are one and it is the type of animal that is significant, not whether (as in the European system) transformation occurs or not. Indeed, incompatible as they appear to *us* in terms of their conceptualization, the only difference between the transformer and the co-essential *nagual* at the level of action is that while the latter is active its owner still lies in his bed, whereas in the case of the former he is missing from it. This is something that nobody thinks of verifying, since the distinction is in no context relevant. On the other hand, in a community where only witches have any animal association, the act of transformation is full of significance. In those communities of Chiapas where mention is made of transformation it is not an essential pivot of the system of belief but merely an adjunct, a way of stressing the evil nature of those accused of witchcraft. In other communities it is the mark of a particular kind of witch who is distinguished from magical practitioners of other sorts and from possessors of a co-essence. Such is the case in Santiago el Palmar, where the ability to transform is, as in Europe, dependent upon a pact with the Devil (Saler 1964).

The possibilities of combining different elements of belief are numberless since the significance of an element depends upon its function within the total system, upon the distinctions it renders possible. Hence it is no wonder if items or belief have been transmitted from the Hispanic to the Indian system.

They have equally traveled in the other direction. Thus the Ladinos of Chiapas frequently believe that they have a destiny-animal in the jungle on whom their life depends, yet they have no concept of a spiritual hierarchy, and when they speak of permission to bewitch they refer to the belief that this is given only by the chief witch of the village, who has authority over the others. Thus, in adopting an element of belief from the Indians, the Ladinos move it from a unified cosmology which integrates Good and Evil within a single system of thought to a dualistic universe where they are opposed, no longer simply at the level of action, but dogmatically: the powers of Good are distinct from the powers of Evil and they stem from different sources. The witch is not someone who has abused his spiritual strength but one who owes it only to his renunciation of salvation, his attachment to a source alien to the order of Right. Permission to bewitch passes uniquely down the hierarchy of the Devil. Nor is it surprising that Indian beliefs should be associated with the powers of Darkness and that Indians should be credited with the most powerful witchcraft, since they are opposed by the Ladinos to the religious orthodoxy they themselves represent, however inadequately in the eyes of the Church.

It is not, therefore, just by tracing the diffusion of such items that we shall achieve the aim of historical reconstruction, but by attempting to grasp the total systems into which they have been incorporated and to see the significance of these within the society of their day.

PART III

Transformative rites: sacrifice, substitution, and the sacred

CHAPTER 12

Sacrifice of the bull*

The cult of the bull, it would seem, has existed in Mediterranean countries since ancient times. The *corrida de toros* (or "bullfight") is simply its modern, most sophisticated form and the subject of a rich body of literature in Spain. Many authors, of course, try to prove that the ceremony originated in their home region: Navarre invented the bullfight, so say the Navarrese; for the Andalusians, Andalusia did. Galicia stands alone in never claiming the honor, as the Celts of the peninsula's northwest show no interest in bullfighting. The *corrida* is, all the same, the *fiesta nacional*, and many would like the bullfight to be—despite its presence in Egypt, Knossos, the Buphonia, and Mithraism—a uniquely Spanish affair dating back to classical antiquity. The most prestigious origins, after all, are the deepest.

One author of note suggested that the source of this "most national of Spanish fiestas" was the need of the country's first inhabitants to defend themselves and their flocks from attack by wild bulls (de las Navas 1899). In their natural state, bovines are in fact docile herbivores that do not pick fights with humans and charge only when frightened. In the Paleolithic, the bull was not an aggressor but a game animal, as evidenced by the Lascaux paintings, which

* This is a translation of "Le sacrifice du taureau," which was published in 1983 in the journal *The Temps de la Réflexion* and is reproduced in this volume with permission from Gallimard.

incidentally do not depict the bull's sexual characteristics. Indeed, humans concerned themselves with the bull's reproductive capacity only after cattle had been domesticated; only then did the bull become the very token of aggressive virility. Thereafter he could be seen as an enemy, a worthy adversary in combat who could bring glory to his opponent.

Ostensibly, the bull is successor to the terrifying Tarasque, the mythical beast Saint Martha miraculously tamed (*cf.* Dumont 1951), or to the dragon depicted by Ingres, a monster that stayed beyond the city walls in exchange for the daily offering of a maiden fair and pure, until a hero appeared to conquer it and liberate the people. The dragon is ultimately sacrificed, impaled on Saint George's lance as he rides high in his stirrups, striking the very pose of a picador. All aspects of the modern bullfight are already in place, though in embryonic form: the mounted knight armed with a lance, the impaled dragon, and (more on this later) the beautiful young woman attacked by the monster. These elements—or "ritemes"—have nonetheless changed meaning over the centuries: the hero has lost his sainthood, even his heroism, to become the villain; the dragon has become a bull, a dangerous yet noble animal, acquiring an almost human guise; and the young woman is now a transvestite. Myth is transformed into rite, clash into sacrifice, external menace into glory within. But we should not get ahead of ourselves. It is enough to note, for now, that the origins of *tauromachia* should be sought in ancient mythology and not in the practical contingencies of speculative prehistory.

Tasked with symbolizing primitive Nature, the bull of the *corrida* is a domestic animal[1] that can properly fulfill its role only by undergoing a rigorous and prolonged selection process worthy of a thoroughbred horse. A naturally social creature, it must be isolated from the herd, then treated in ways that will frighten and enrage him: the very moment he steps out of the shadows and into the ring, a rosette bearing his rancher's mark is stuck into his flesh. What is truly astonishing is that a beast or two must be kept in reserve at each bullfight, lest one of the six selected bulls refuses to fight. All the better to give him the likeness of the terrifying dragon, men endow the bull with qualities he can hardly possess: the color red is supposed to incite him, and yet he is color-blind; we believe him in a permanent state of aggression, and yet he can be taught to eat out of his trainer's hand; some even contend that the bull loves to fight. We take

1. As proof of this, consider that the bull can become *asilvestrado* or "out of control"; he is then shot and killed, like the wild beast he has become.

the bull for a monstrous beast when in the wild he is a gentle grazing animal. In short, it is human culture that has made him what he seems to be upon entering the bullring: the very enemy of humanity. A veritable Minotaur, part beast and part human invention, he belongs to the world of fantasy, not to that of political economy.

The object of this study is to ascertain the symbolic meaning of the bullfight. This is the only way to make sense of what unfolds in the ring and why large crowds, which include women and children, pay dearly to attend a spectacle that should instead be repugnant to the delicate sensibilities of our day. This problem has been an intermittent concern of mine since my earliest work in Andalusia (Pitt-Rivers 1954). I felt then, rather than understood, that the bullfight was about relations between the sexes, that it cemented Andalusian social values in this regard. At the time, I defined the *corrida* as the "ritual manifestation of a defense of masculine pride," yet I had no idea how and why it served this end. Today, I believe I am in a position to answer these questions.

Bullfighting technique is complicated, and each detail plays a practical role and, by way of its symbolic value, contributes to the meaning of the rite in its totality. To the anthropologist, it is without doubt a sacrifice. A sacrifice, however, is normally a religious act. Which religion, then, are we dealing with here? Every sacrifice involves an act of exchange with a divine force—a material good exchanged for a state of grace—but what is being exchanged in this case, and between whom?

To answer, we must turn briefly to the anthropological theory of ritual, beginning with Edward Tylor, a nineteenth century founder of the discipline, for whom ritual was originally a kind of magic oriented toward achieving practical ends or obtaining favor from the gods, who were thought to bestow blessings on their followers. Over the course of human evolution, Tylor held, ritual would be replaced by morality, which is based not on magic but on reason. Tylor grew up in a Quaker family and, as we all know, Quakers have plenty of morality but hardly any ritual at all—or so they would like to believe! As radical Protestants, they railed against the pomps of Rome and awaited, in modest quietude, the unmediated word of the Holy Spirit. Tylor's theory was thus aligned very nicely with his family origins.

Like all good anthropological theories, evolutionism has not withstood the test of time, but the opposition between ritual and rationality endures in Western culture. Modern society, which considers itself rational and scientific,

downplays all talk of magical rites, lest we be equated with the archaic societies in which such rites abound. This does not keep modern people from performing countless rituals, but we do so for pseudoscientific, pseudohygienic, or seemingly practical reasons. Thus do we successfully hide from ourselves the deeper meanings of our actions.

In fact, ritual is a symbolic language that does not convey conscious reasoning. It is closer to dance than to the linguistic laboratory. Recall Isadora Duncan's rejoinder to an admirer who asked about the meaning of her dance: "If I could tell you what it meant, there would be no point in dancing it." Ritual is a language of actions rather than words, yet one that uses words like actions. An occult idiom, there is a logic to ritual that logic alone cannot discern. How do we decipher it? Victor Turner, who brilliantly analyzed rituals in Zambia (1967), contends that the meaning of symbols is never obvious to those who use them; it reveals itself only to those observing from the outside. Symbols, moreover, are always polysemic; they have many meanings. My account of the bullfight does not rule out other interpretations, and I would certainly be keen to adjust it when considering bullfights in another country or time.[2] I do not pretend to offer a general account of the Spanish bullfight since its inception in the eighteenth century. I am primarily concerned with the Andalusian *corrida* as it took place thirty years ago, at a time when I often visited the arena. It is in the nature of ritual that it can change its meaning under the guise of formal continuity with tradition. Persistence of form does not guarantee persistence of content. Still, as its meanings are transformed, a rite must retain its internal coherence, without which it risks being abandoned. My interpretation of certain details might, therefore, seem arbitrary, but it is in its totality that my analysis can best be judged.

The sacrifice takes place in a purpose-built circular arena. Once commonly the property of the church, today these bullrings generally belong to local

2. The response of the crowd vindicates this assertion: general behavior in the bullrings of Pamplona is nothing like what one finds in any Andalusian *pueblo*. Consider another example, different in time rather than location: in adapting the libretto of Bizet's *Carmen* from Mérimée's novella, Meilhac and Halevy turned "toreador"—who fights the bull on horseback—into "torero"—who fights on foot. During the forty-five years that separate the opera from the incidents that inspired Mérimée's writings, the horseman's standing in the bullring had slipped, and by 1875, when the opera was performed, it was simply unimaginable that Carmen could be seduced by a picador.

municipalities. The requisite amenities are located beneath the stands: stables and courtyards for the horses, chapel and infirmary for the *toreros*, corrals and abattoirs for the bulls. Separate entrances connect these facilities to the bullring. Boxes are set up for the president and the orchestra. Attendance is divided into two groups: general public on the "sun" side and more distinguished spectators on the "shadow" side, where seats are at a premium. In the past, a *señorito* (gentleman) on the shadow side would not remove his jacket, the mark of his social status. One dressed as formally for the bullring as one did for church, but more cheerfully: the black *mantilla* (scarf) replaced by a white one, the felt hat by the Andalusian sombrero (*de ala ancha*); ties were taken off, as they cannot be paired with the sombrero. The *callejón* (passageway) lies between the audience and the bullring. Attendants take shelter here during the fight, protected behind a wooden barrier that has several narrow openings in it, each obscured by a screen the bullfighters can slip behind to escape the bull. These are called *burladeros*, taken from the verb *burlar*, which means "to dishonor by mocking" with words, songs, or deeds. Don Juan, the *"Burlador de Sevilla,"* taunted the honorable men whose wives he seduced; he used deception to steal their prestige. The bullfighter, too, when at risk of being gored, tricks the bull (and taunts him) by slipping behind the *burladero*.

The meat of a fighting bull is of excellent quality. Originally, it was often distributed to hospitals (poor houses) and even today, during certain traditional celebrations in Castile, the gathered crowds consume it on site. Typically, the meat is auctioned off at the bullring's abattoir to local butchers, who must signal its provenance when selling it to the general public. The testicles are a delicacy prized by men who hope perhaps to take on the animal's physical or moral qualities.

The *corrida* is an integral part of the event, which is why it is always scheduled on a Sunday, on the day or during the week of a village festival. Ordinarily, smaller cities will schedule a bullfight to coincide with the feast day of their patron saint, which will probably be the only *corrida* of the year. In former times, the royal family would host a bullfight to celebrate a marriage, the visit of a distinguished guest, or a military victory. Townships would dedicate a bullfight to a saint who had answered their prayers. Likewise, prominent people would celebrate the marriage of a child and even, with a clause written into their will, their own passing.

It has often been suggested that the matador's appearance exhibits a feminine quality that undermines his claim to masculinity: the color of his costume

(*traje de luces*), which contrasts with the sober attire men wear outside the ring; the grace with which he wields his cape, especially in a country where graceful movement is a strictly feminine trait. Often overlooked, however, is the fact this pattern holds only for the first act of the bullfight. The matador discards these feminine symbols, one by one, as the fight unfolds. The flower-embroidered cape (*capote de paseo*)—whose refined needlework and sacred motifs bring to mind the ecclesiastical stole—is removed at the very outset of the bullfight and is usually slung across the barrier in front of a beautiful woman, covering up the lower half of her body. At the end of the initial procession, the *torero* holds his headpiece (*montera*) firmly in place with his spare hand and salutes the president by gently arching his chest. (The picador, on the other hand, removes his hat in salute.) The *montera* is a kind of cocked hat with two corners. Covered in ringlets, it resembles a doll's wig more than a masculine head covering. The *torero* then picks up his fighting cape (*capote de brega*[3]), crimson red on the outside and golden yellow on the inside, which he sweeps through his passes like a flamenco dancer wielding her skirt, or Marilyn Monroe atop the subway vent in the film that shot her to fame. Flamenco dance steps, conversely, recall the bullfight: where elegant cape passes such as the *chicuelinas, gaoneras, reboleras,* or *mariposas* bring swirling hems to mind, in the *bulería* sequence the flamenco dancer must maneuver her skirt like a matador does his cape when rousing the bull from his *querencía* (sanctuary). Meanwhile, the basic pass, the *veronica*, is named after its resemblance to Saint Veronica's gesture as she wiped the face of Christ with her veil.

Thus, we see that the *torero* at first has a rather ecclesiastical look, which is transformed, once the bull enters the ring, into a more feminine appearance. This is hardly surprising. The priest is a sexually ambiguous figure in Catholicism: he renounces his masculine role both by taking a vow of chastity and by refusing to respond with violence when challenged by another man. The latter, were he not a priest, would bring dishonor. This does not mean, however, that he is effeminate. Among the laity, the sexes stand opposed and are mutually exclusive, but in the sacred realm, they can be dual, and this cumulative quality denotes an increase in power. The sexual ambiguity of the matador, we shall see, is related to his role as sacrificer. The Latin verb "mactare," from which the word "matador" derives, originally meant "to immolate," that is, "to offer as a sacrifice."

3. The term *brega* means "struggle," though it is synonymous with *burla.*

The matador is scarcely to be seen during the second act of the *corrida*, when the colorful barbed sticks, or *banderillas*, are thrust into the bull's back by one of his team-members, the *banderillero*. He returns to the ring to dedicate his bull, first to the president and then to other individuals or to the spectators at large. This he does by removing his wig-like hat for the first time, nonchalantly throwing it over his shoulder. During the dedication, he tucks his sword and *muleta* beneath his left arm. The *muleta* is a sheet of red cloth; in the beginning, two centuries ago, it was white. During the third act, the *torero's* bearing differs radically. He no longer brings his two hands together to hold the cape in front of him, and the free movement of his arms allows him to strike various poses that conjure an attitude known as *garbo*: puffed up chest, majestic strides, authoritative mien. His sword never leaves his right hand. He has become a paragon of masculinity. In his feminine guise, during the first act, the bullfighter seduces and tricks the bull, *"se burla del,"* making him circle ever nearer without ever making contact; finally, after a series of passes, he delivers the bull into the picador's hands. In the third act, however, he demonstrates his *dominio*, a seemingly magical power of authority over the beast who must stand immobile or charge at the matador's pleasure. Sometimes he even takes his eyes off the approaching beast and looks toward the stands, "*miranda al publico,*" as would Litri or Manolete.

Finally, having so fatigued the bull that the latter's head hangs low, he must "enter" over the top of the horns and plant his sword in the withers, the target area, by preference deeply enough to "soak" his hands in the blood of the bull. This area is called "the cross." To pull off the strike, he must "cross himself": his left hand, holding the *muleta*, draws to the right so the bull follows with his head while the sword hand pulls up over the top. The likeness to kneeling before the altar in prayer is entirely deliberate: "those who do not cross themselves go to hell." It is the "moment of truth"; time stands still during the high points of the bullfight. Once, during one of Antonio Ordoñez' famous and interminable *veronica* passes, someone called out: "you're stopping time for us!" And we recall the lamentation of Federico Garcia Lorca: that time stopped forever, at five o'clock in the afternoon, at the precise instant of Ignacia Sanchez Mejias's *cogida*.[4] During the moment of truth, more than at any other point in the fight, the matador risks his life. It is a time of utmost peril that he must draw out to prove his bravery, his moral superiority. He demonstrates his heroism in the act

4. The *cogida* is the act of being tossed or gored by a bull.

of killing. If, to avoid danger, he fails to deliver the fatal blow properly, he is said to have "assassinated" and not killed the bull. If the matador does not manage to "immolate" his bull, then everything he has accomplished up to that point, no matter how brilliant, counts for nothing. He is totally disgraced. This shows clearly that the bullfight is not a sport but a sacrifice.

The president awards honors at the end of the fight. A good bull earns a lap of the ring, his carcass pulled by the mules that carry him off as men rise to their feet in applause. The matador might be given an ear or two, or both ears as well as the tail. He then performs a lap of the ring with his trophies in each hand and his arms held high, recalling the shape of the horns. He has become the bull!

The symbolic value of the *torero* thus undergoes two transformations: in the opening act, he is a sacrificer-priest, his procession (*paseo*) cape resembling a chasuble, who becomes a beautiful woman; by the end, he has turned into a man, a male become bull. As for the bull, he undertakes a parallel journey, but in reverse. Upon entering the sandy ring, he is an almighty monster—as far back as the Neolithic period in the Mediterranean, the bull is the very manifestation of male aggression, a symbol of generative power (de Miranda 1962). His sole aim is to thrust his horns into human flesh, for he is no longer the peaceful bovine of the Andalusian plains. The peon draws his attention, the bullfighter challenges him, makes him pass through his fluttering skirts, performs an intrepid dance with him, and then leaves the bull standing still, its energies sapped by the final *media-veronica*—the cape fans out in a circle, a wheel spreading from the man's waist as he moves away from the bull without a backwards glance, like a beautiful woman scornfully rejecting an unwanted suitor. The picador, mounted high on his towering nag, calls to the bull, brandishing the lance he will thrust into the beast. In the past, he would protect his mount by keeping the bull at a distance, but nowadays the horses wear the *peto,* protective padding introduced in 1928, so the picador waits until the bull is upon him before stabbing it with his lance. The bull strikes, trying to work his horns beneath the horse's quilted armor, which resembles, in its coloration, the *traje de lunares*, the Andalusian fiesta dress, rich in symbolism, that is associated with gypsies and flamenco dancing. In a way, these *lunares* are the very emblem of femininity (*cf.* Pitt-Rivers 1984a). Like the *traje de lunares*, the horse's frock is white with spots of red (or sometimes green) and dirty like a prostitute's dress after a *feria*. While the bull struggles to thrust its horns into the wadding, the picador turns his lance in the wound, defying the rules of the bullfight, and paying no heed to his legs, which are sheathed in steel. He epitomizes the *cabrón*, a cuckold who

offers up his wife only to punish the naïve, would-be lover who is drawn to her. An ignoble figure, the picador excites the fury of the crowd. He is pelted with insults—*cabrón, cobarde, animá*—for having violated the world's most beautiful, most noble, and most courageous beast. The roles are reversed: man is an animal, and the animal is human. The bull is still valiant and aggressive, but blood spills from his shoulder, and he begins to measure his steps.

This trial by lance reveals the victim's moral qualities, which are essential both to the bullfight and to ritual conduct: the sacrificed bull must pass its qualities on to humanity. He alternates between attacking the picador and charging the bullfighter; he pays in blood to consort with the ruffled streetwalker, then turns in vain pursuit of the feminine grace embodied by the *torero*. The plight of the bull represents the complete tragedy of the male condition in Andalusia.

The trumpet sounds; the picadors withdraw. Their role is thankless and they know it, solemnly departing the ring and refusing to meet the gaze of the crowd. Only the bull remains. A little man hails him, bearing in each hand a dart draped with cloth; he holds them aloft like a pair of horns. A combat of equals: *astas* (literally lance or dart, but also the horns of a bull) against *astas*. This time, neither courage nor weight matters, only agility. The man is more agile, sticking his *banderillas* in the bull's withers and deftly ducking out of the way. He adorns the victim, which Marcel Mauss contends is an integral part of the sacrifice: through adornment, an offering exceeds the profane and becomes sacred. The bull is shown in his full, earthly splendor during the *tercio de varas* (the first act) before being wrenched from the natural world, violated, marked, and decorated as an offering. The decoration draws attention to the area of the bull's body that will henceforth be the focal point of the ritual. The injury to the withers is, in a sense, set apart from the rest of the animal's body, rendered autonomous, crowned with festive harpoons, painful to the bull, but a source of joy to the spectators. The same procedures that ready the bull physically for slaughter also prepare him for his role as scapegoat. Because of his association with man and his consecration, the bull is equipped to carry into the realm of Death all of the inadequacies, fears, weaknesses, shortcomings, and sexual failings of men, and thus erase all they have done to disappoint women.

The trumpet sounds again. The bullfighter is now masculine; he returns and salutes the president as a man would, holding the *montera* in his right hand. Then follows a demonstration of his authority over the bull, his *dominio*. The bull, diminished, *burlado*, gives up his honor; it passes to his tamer. The subjugation of

the bull ends with his rape. His horns no longer protect him, not even in direct engagement. The steel blade, keener than a bovine penis, penetrates the target area, the vagina made by the picador on the *mons veneris* of the bull's hump. Having triumphed over death, the bullfighter watches the bull expire and, as soon as its head comes to rest on the sand, the applause breaks out, the stands bristle with white handkerchiefs—the color of Saint Veronica's veil, the original *muleta*—and the air throbs with cheering and handclaps.

The bull is violated! But so too is a taboo rooted in men's fear of female sexuality: the vagina-wound is bloody! Many traditional Andalusian beliefs refer to the threat posed by a woman indisposed: she injures the back of the animal she rides; she wilts the budding wheat; her gaze puts out coal fires (which is why a coal miner never has his lunch brought to him by a woman, but by a young girl, an old woman, or a boy instead). In Leviticus, it was already established that a woman is forbidden and considered dangerous during menstruation.

But the hero is a breaker of taboos. In this respect, he can be likened to the gods, for divinity knows no taboo. As the bullfight draws to a close, the hero proves himself willing to commit an unnatural act, the very thought of which terrifies other men. The *torero* proves his superior courage not only against the bull, but in the face of supernatural danger as well.

Here, then, is the ritual's meaning: through the representation of an exchange of sexual identities between the *torero* and the bull, and the sacrifice of the latter, who surrenders his creative powers to the victor, a transference between Humanity and Nature is accomplished. Men sacrifice the bull and receive his sexual power in return. The bull is a symbol of bestial masculinity, which is the source of male virtue among Andalusians—*manso* means "chastened" but also lacking in courage, tamed, or scorned. The bull gives his life so that men can recover the natural powers their civilized condition has denied them. Men take a kind of arrogant pride in civilization, for it distances them from nature and distinguishes them from brutes. Yet it emasculates them as well. Hence, we have come to understand Nature in contradistinction to its animal expression; what goes against nature for man could not be more natural among beasts: copulation during menstruation. It is with this taboo that Humanity sets itself apart from the animal world, though in asserting superiority over animal sexuality, humans risk losing what Nature has given them all the same: fertility. The bullfighter, acting on behalf of the crowd, lays claim to the bestial qualities he has taken from the bull; through this heroic deed, men join in the renewal of nature's power. They leave the arena not as they would the stadium after a football match

but as they would the cathedral after mass: silent or whispering, and absolved. The bond with Nature is restored.

It is restored in another sense as well. We know that the rhythms of the female libido follow those of nature more closely than we would care to admit. This periodicity, which is manifest in our dreams,[5] has been overpowered by the exigencies of Culture, which deem women untouchable precisely at the times when their body is, in a sense, most willing. The symbolic violation of this taboo returns to both sexes their natural rights. Liberated from the bonds of culture by the actions of the defecting hero who crosses over to Nature's side, men become real men again. And because these men no longer fear women, their women can likewise become real women again. They can at last bring peace to the war between the sexes in which they are despised because of their reproductive powers, coveted and thwarted because their sexuality is frightening.

It should come as no surprise that the bullfighter, the archetypal fantasy lover, readily inspires female desire. A woman once telephoned Juan Belmonte, promptly announcing that she was young, beautiful, and wished to make his acquaintance. She invited him to dinner. As the hour approached, Belmonte was playing billiards with his *banderillero* and a Mexican companion. Worried that his admirer might not be as young or beautiful as she professed to be, he asked the Mexican to introduce himself to the woman instead, and then to report back on the truth of the matter. The woman was ravishing, extremely elegant, and accompanied by another who was just a beautiful. So the men agreed that the fake Belmonte would bring the real one with him to dinner and introduce him as his *banderillero*. Under this assumed identity, the great matador failed to elicit the slightest curiosity from either woman. No matter how often he suggested that this Belmonte looked nothing like the one in the ring, nor the many photographs of him they owned, and despite his unmistakable Andalusian accent, the women spent the entire evening vying to seduce the ersatz Belmonte before the real one's very eyes. Finally, no longer able to contain his disdain, the real Belmonte left, slamming the door behind him. "And so it is," the author concludes, "that women fall in love with *toreros*" (Belmonte & Nogales 1969).

5. The first studies that disclosed these rhythms relied on the study of dreams and date back to the turn of the twentieth century.

This analysis corresponds to a model found elsewhere in the Spanish tradition; the cult of the bull is by no means peripheral to other aspects of Hispanic culture.

Alvarez de Miranda, in his study of Medieval and Renaissance legends (1962: 60-70), describes many tales of a magic bull who can turn a young girl into a man if the sign of the cross is made on his horns in just the right spot. A contemporary Hispano-Mexican fable recorded in Oaxaca, however, is more complete and relates more directly to my argument. It is the story of a young woman who is speaking through the window to her fiancé when another young man arrives and kills him. With a fatal musket shot, she avenges her betrothed but accidentally blasts one of the killer's companions at the same time, and so she must flee. To escape, she poses as a man and takes the name of Carlos. She finds work with a trader whose daughter soon falls in love with her. The merchant insists on taking Carlos as his son-in-law, and so the two must marry. On their wedding night, Carlos confesses the truth of her sexual identity to her fiancée, who decides they should keep it a secret. A few years pass, and the couple have yet to produce any children. Some begin to wonder if Carlos might not be quite as "he" seems, and so they take her to bathe in the river. Making an empty excuse, she wanders off from the group and runs into a black bull. Carlos proceeds to mock the beast (it always comes back to *burlarse*), and in the end the bull is transformed into a cow while she, Carlos, turns into a man. From that day on, the couple has many children and lives happily ever after. Elements of this tale can be found far and wide, but Alvarez de Miranda contends that sexual transformation through the mediation of a bull is specific to the Spanish tradition. According to him, the *burla*, or destruction of honor, is equivalent to death. He finds similar notions of the bull's ability to protect human fertility by its death, or its blood, in the medieval custom of the *toro nupcial*, which was practiced in Estremadure until the early twentieth century. A rope was tied around the horns of the *toro nupcial,* and it was led to the house of the fiancée, where her future husband would kill the bull after sticking into him a pair of *banderillas* she had decorated. Other versions of this custom can be found in illuminated manuscripts from the tenth century onwards and in frescos, one of which depicts the fiancée herself throwing darts at the bull from her window. Still others show the bridegroom using his beloved's wedding veil in a bullfight. All the elements of the *corrida* are here: the dangerous bull, the *banderillas*, a woman's veil, and slaughter. It would seem crucial that the bull be courageous and that its blood stain the woman's garment.

Beneath this complex set of associations, which take various forms in ancient marital customs, in legend, and in the modern bullfight, we find a subconscious reasoning governed by the logic of ritual. First of all, to acquire the virtue of another person or thing, one must destroy it. Conversely, to defend oneself from something or someone, one must imitate or interact with it. Any symbol can be deployed positively or negatively, to inflict or avert injury. The sorcerer safeguards against sorcery. To ward off the evil eye, take a glass of water and put a drop of oil in it, or an egg, both of which look like an eye. The *banderillas* are comparable to the horns of the bull, and horns defend against the devil—consider the familiar hand gesture that involves extending the index and little fingers and bending the ones in between. In the bullfight, blood guards against blood, as it does in Leviticus, which specifies that a blood sacrifice is needed to purify the contamination of menstrual blood. This logic is manifest in other cultural domains, and even in modern literature. Consider the following passage from William Faulkner's *Light in August*.

> "They all want to," he told the others. "But sometimes they can't." … "It's something that happens to them once a month." He described his idea of the physical ceremony. … He drew a picture, physical, actual … It moved them: the temporary and abject helplessness of that which tantalized and frustrated desire … That was how the boy told it, with the other five listening quietly, looking at one another … On the next Saturday Joe did not go hunting with them. … He was not three miles from home when in the late afternoon he shot a sheep. … Then he knelt, his hands in the yet warm blood of the dying beast, trembling, drymouthed, backglaring. Then he got over it, recovered. He did not forget what the boy had told him. He just accepted it. He found that he could live with it, side by side with it. … Then it was three or four years ago and he had forgotten it.

Because later, when a girl whom he believes he is about to seduce explains that she is indisposed, he doesn't understand. Faulkner continues.

> He had forgot about the shot sheep. He had lived with the fact which the older boy had told him too long now. With the slain sheep he had bought immunity from it for too long now for it to be alive. (Faulkner 1935: 151)

Joe's "private ritual" is cast in the mold of the bullfight: the danger of menstrual fluid exorcized by sacrificing a horned beast. In different forms, the fear

of female blood is widely distributed across the five continents, and the logic of ritual demands that the blood of the horned beast, an intensely sexual symbol, be chosen time and again to protect against the sexual blood of the woman. In different cultural spheres, however, this same aversion produces different reactions and interpretations.

In the Spanish tradition, it is but one term of an ambivalent relation, the other being a florid romanticism: women attract men and repulse them at the same time. They attract because they alone are pure, full of grace and goodness; they attract men as a challenge, as the mirror attracts Narcissus, yet women are also a source of pollution and erotic satisfaction. And the danger in question is not related exclusively to blood; it is also embodied in feminine grace, which can lead a man to surrender to his own sexual impulses. Unable to resist, he finds himself dominated by woman or, to be more precise, he falls once again under the woman's dominion, returning to his place of birth. At the practical level, he also fears being betrayed by a woman who, because she is his responsibility, can destroy his honor, sticking the horns on him and making him, directly or indirectly, the son of the mythical Spanish matriarch, the Great Whore. Woman is thus conceived of as simultaneously pure, good, and full of grace but also of feeble character, lascivious, and forever ready to subvert the authority of men, on which society and the family depends.

Men, by contrast, are portrayed as the seducers; yet at the same time they cannot resist the seductions of women, for this would mean walking away from a challenge. In other words, the reasons given to justify male dominance are also used to exonerate men. They are blameless in a moral sense, and in a social sense they are victorious, so it is only right that they take on their dual role as progenitor and protector of the family order (Pitt-Rivers 1983).

This attitudinal complex dates back to very old historical sources: to seventeenth century casuistry and the moral philosophy of the sixteenth century, and even to clerics of the late Middle Ages, the Archpriest of Talavera being one striking example. We can trace the roots of these ideas back to the very beginnings of Mediterranean civilization, in the tale of Circe, who turned Ulysses' companions into pigs, and even in the story of Adam, that cad, who took the apple from Eve only to blame her later for their fall from Paradise.

It remains to be seen how the bull sacrifice gave Andalusia the means to overcome contradictions that affect relations between the sexes. The *corrida de toros* is bound up with religion in many ways. A short book published recently in Seville underscores this point by arguing that the modern bullfight is a symbolic

expression of the "latent religious functions embedded deep within the pagan, idolatrous soul of our people" (Garcia-Baquero Gonzalez et al. 1980: 13). The authors substantiate their claim with reference to a curious event that occurred during the Corpus Christi festivities in Seville. The streets were covered in rosemary (*ramera*) for the Eucharistic Procession, and the spectators on their way to the bullfight spontaneously gathered up the sprigs, pinning them to their clothes so they could later celebrate their idol Curro Romero's triumph in the arena by showering him with the herb. For the authors, there is a Dionysian and pagan quality to taurine celebrations that explains the hostility of theologians. Indeed, the Church has long maintained an ambiguous if not antagonistic attitude toward the bullfight. A circular from Pope Pius V outlawed the celebration in the sixteenth century, though it failed to circulate as widely in the Iberian Peninsula as Rome would have liked! Pope Gregory XIII renewed the ban, though limiting it to the clergy. Juan de Mariana and others condemned the festival outright and unequivocally. Some have assailed it as a custom held over from Pagan, Roman, or Moorish culture, while others hold that it is contrary to religion, on the grounds that men should not risk their lives in vain.

The Church's misgivings about the bullfight, it would seem to me, are inspired by much deeper issues. The moral quality that is celebrated in the arena is *hombría,* or chivalrous manhood, and this fact is consciously acknowledged by the entire Andalusian population. Asked why they love the bullfight, they will answer: "I like to see *la hombría.*" In the same way, posters for bullfights often advertise *"el pundonoroso diestro Fulanito de Tal"* (bullfighter So-and-So, very meticulous with regard to his honor). Throughout the literature on honor from the last four centuries, a disagreement reigns between those defending an aristocratic conception of honor and those who disparage it by applying the Church's teachings on the subject, linking honor to the divine, and placing it under the control of theologians. Tirso de Molina's *Don Juan* is a polemical tract, though a satirical one, aimed at the aristocratic notion of honor, which should come as no surprise given that the author was a priest. The notion of *hombría* gives men authority over women—which the Church approves of—but it also justifies the authority of powerful lords, and above all encourages those who aspire to power to gain it by use of violence—which the Church does not approve of, especially in the matter of duels. Aristocratic honor depends on individual, personal power; it validates effective power, for honor always goes, in the final instance, to the man who attains the dominant position. From a political standpoint, we are describing what Andalusians call *"Fulanismo,"* the principle of following a

person (*Fulano*) regardless of his ideas or party. Andalusia is known for being a land of *caciquismo*, the rule of big political bosses, of patron-client networks. The image of the heroic individual to whom one can submit without humiliation because of the honor (and power) he possesses, has long dominated the political scene in Andalusia. Yet this creed is a far cry from that of the Beatitudes, which extol the negation of self rather than the quest for apotheosis. The teachings of the Gospels are not those of the ring.

Instead of emphasizing the opposition of these two moral systems, we should perhaps consider the complementarity, if not the complicity, of the sacrificial lamb and the sacrificial bull. Their rites take place on the same day, a Sunday or a feast day, one in the morning and the other in the afternoon. Women would wear black scarves to mass and white scarves to the bullfight. The men, bare-headed during mass, would don a *sombrero de ala ancha* in the afternoon, if they were feeling a bit "flamenco." The lamb is hornless; the bull has his, and they are beautiful! Religion preaches denial of self for the sake of others, abstention from earthly pleasures, the impersonal authority of the Church over that of the all-conquering hero, and the happiness of eternal life over the moment of ecstasy when time stands still. But life needs the bull. If everyone followed the code of sexual purity and self-denial, what would become of the species? If all but the wicked abstained, then the wicked would have free rein. The bull is indispensable to reproduction and the social order. And so the lamb must compromise with the bull, capturing and using him to fulfill the divine plan. This is why one heads to the ring after mass, passing from the sacred register to the profane. After self-denial comes self-renewal through redemption. Purified in a spiritual sense, we can take up arms anew and defend ourselves in everyday life. The exaltation of the Lamb of God is followed by the exaltation of the bull, the paragon of natural masculinity as made by man. The ritual of the bullfight redeems that which was sacrificed in the morning haze of mass. It celebrates the restoration of one's defenses, of the sun, of the self, all by the blood of the beast; not in the odor of sanctity but in the *odor di femine*, of perfumed flesh, of manure, of dried blood, of *manzanilla* and cigars; not to the somber tones of the church organ but to the trumpets of the *pasodoble*. Redeemed by the cross, *la Cruz*, where the phallic blade must glide over the bull's shoulders and, in the very heart of this carnal cathedral, claim the life of the beast. He dies so that life, *mortal* life, can be ours once more!

CHAPTER 13

The role of pain in rites of passage*

What is pain? Anatomists and the occasional philosopher are puzzled by this question. Only the first group are of interest to me today. I should begin by quoting a few specialists whose work I have encountered in my preliminary readings on the topic:

> "The feeling of pain is essentially a phenomenon of higher neural integration [...] an affective reaction that can adjust to multiple internal and external sensory messages and is of sufficient intensity to have effects at the *behavioral* level" (André Soulairac[1]).
>
> "A feeling of an alarm-like nature that involves neural structures in their totality, *the individual in his entirety*" (Hubert Mamo[2]).
>
> "Pain is an emotion in itself, a singular, primitive emotion, [...] the most essential one [...] The psychosomatic meaning of pain—due to its relationship with

* This is a translation of "La rôle de la douleur dans les rites de passage," an unpublished paper originally presented at the seventh Congreso internacional de estudios anthropologicos in Palermo, 1986. The original was unfinished. The version that appears here incorporates handwritten notes Pitt-Rivers left on the manuscript.

1. Lacking the exact citations for this and the following quotes, we have gathered relevant texts from these scholars concerning pain. *Cf.* Soulairac 1956, 1971. *Ed.*

2. *Cf.* Mamo 1968.

> the mind's other functions, with its 'instruments'—is truly *the foundation and the fulcrum of being in the world*." (Frederik JJ Buytendijk[3]).

In short, pain is the essence of the self. But the inverse is also true: pain is an assault on the self; pain is the anti-self. I have yet to find a physiologist who has noted this contradiction. Consider the following characterizations:

> "Pain means *the annihilation of the self* in the body of suffering" (Viktor Emil Freiherr von Gebsattel[4])
> "A cry for help from *nature imperilled*" (Rudolph von Jhering[5])
> "A vital feeling that results from the suspension of normal relations with our body […] it is a power that sends us whirling down a bottomless pit" (Helmuth Plessner[6]).

Quatri and Renault[7] speak of "the break between the individual and the world, of the *restructuring* of the subject in pain." Buytendijk, meanwhile, evokes "that most central and violent of trespasses, a brutal intervention into the deepest intimacy of our private lives." He ponders the subject's struggle to objectify his pain: "if it lasts, pain is transformed […] what changes is the extent to which the feeling penetrates *the depths of our individuality*." Only "weak painful sensations," so it seems, "can be completely objectified." Which brings us to the following conclusion: pain transforms the very self that it targets and expresses, for "it is a powerful means of *adjusting* our behavior to the diverse circumstances of life," supported by "a simultaneous sense of fear, which represents the emotional component of pain." Buytendijk is one of the few to admit the possibility that pain serves a positive function—"of sublimation as a creative defense mechanism, […] as a resource for artistic creativity"—and he recognizes the existence of "mystic ecstasy and of mystic suffering that can foster a state of bliss."

Although pain may be a source of spiritual satisfaction and even pleasure (Freud suggested that martyrs could derive enjoyment from their suffering), and

3. *Cf.* Buytendijk 1956, 1958a, 1958b, 1966.
4. *Cf.* von Gebsattel 1907, 1946, 1954, 1959a, 1959b, 1968.
5. *Cf.* von Jhering 1873, 1884, 1904 [1870], 1913 [1877, 1883].
6. *Cf.* Plessner 1923, 1928, 1961, 1964, 1970a, 1970b.
7. We were unable to find a text that matches both the authors and the subject. *Ed.*

although pain may operate as a physiological warning (a matter bitterly disputed by physicians, among whom René Leriche opposes “the false idea of pain that does good”), it remains a negative value *in everyday life*. Pain is always an unpleasant and unwanted feeling for the person who experiences it. Pain is variously put to use: as a form of aggression between individuals in a hostile relationship, as a means of domination by a tormentor, as a punishment for children and later for adults. It announces the suffering of the tortured and executed. Inflicting pain upon others is the surest way of humiliating them. Withstanding pain with indifference is proof of courage and the only way of avoiding dishonor.

We find, nonetheless, that pain is integral to numerous rites of passage that are otherwise joyous occasions. These rites are meant neither to deprive persons of their honor through humiliation, nor to inflict pain in the direct sense associated with ritual punishments. Rather, these are rites of accession to a higher status. This is the paradox I will try to resolve today.

Consider a few examples of these paradoxical rites. No doubt the most familiar are African initiation rites, which frequently include circumcision. East Africa provides quite elaborate instances: scarification of the face and torso, tooth extraction, facial piercing, and so on. Yet pain is not merely an unavoidable and regrettable accompaniment to these proceedings—as might be assumed when it comes to circumcision—instead, it is an essential component of the ritual. Salt is rubbed into wounds to ensure that they do not heal over too quickly and that scars will be clearly defined. Salt might also have a disinfectant function—I am not sure of this—but pain is certainly an indispensable part of ceremonies that welcome the latest initiates into manhood.

There is a simple, perhaps overly simple, explanation for this. In a warrior society, men must be courageous. To attain the status of adult male, a warrior of the tribe, young men must prove their courage and withstand pain without flinching. In so doing, they merit the honor of their newly-acquired status and confirm, so to speak, their effectiveness in this role. Among some tribes, there are individuals who do not feel brave enough to submit to this trial; they forgo initiation and remain in an intermediary status, never becoming an adult or earning the right to marry. However sound this explanation may be, it is unsatisfactory. For the very same tribes often practice female circumcision, which is even more painful than male circumcision, and physical courage is not a quality needed to become a woman. Moreover, similar ritual operations are conducted the world over, and not only in warrior societies. For instance, unlike in East

Africa where age dominates social organization and all initiates belong to the same age cohort, the appropriate age for circumcision in other societies frequently remains unspecified. Often boys as young as four years old and others up to the age of fifteen will undergo circumcision at the same time without necessarily constituting or belonging to a common age cohort. The only abiding rule is that boys must undertake the operation before marriage; that is to say, before becoming a man. Obviously, a more general explanation is needed.

Rites of initiation do not always consist of bloody mutilation. Initiation rituals into secret societies often include blood trials, but physical pain is not the only kind there is. Initiating new recruits into a European army does not typically entail a formal rite of passage but rather a transition period during which initiates are subjected to humiliating practices, sustained harassment, exceptional taboos, their hair is buzzed short, they are kept in their barracks for an initial period of confinement, and so forth. Recruits are set apart from both incorporated soldiers and civilians, from whose ranks they were drawn. The same social logic applies to school hazing: to make a soldier, the new recruit's civilian persona must be destroyed; to instill incoming students with an *esprit de corps*, they must be made to forget who they were before joining the school. Time and again, we discover the same complex of elements: pain, fear, struggle, harassment, taboos, and sometimes blood. Everywhere the rite of passage marks a new member's entry into a social category to which he did not previously belong. Even the ceremony performed when a stranger arrives in an Inuit community (which I have analyzed elsewhere) contains the same mixture of joy and hostility, the same ambivalence.

Does marriage, the most important rite of passage after baptisms and funerals, belong to this class of paradoxical rites? Consider the back-and-forth between representatives of both families, the symbolic abduction of the bride, the ridicule and *charivari*, and the significance given to the hymen. The fact that the latter term refers (in French) both to the rite of marriage and to the physical membrane that provides its sanguinary aspect is not simply—as the etymologists would have it—a fortuitous coincidence.

The above mentioned rituals are not the only ones in which pain is positively valued. While self-flagellation is sometimes performed during religious ceremonies, it is also used in Christian mysticism to attain a higher state of spiritual perfection. Pain purifies. Material deprivation is a sign of emancipation from Nature's demands, and not only in the Abrahamic religions. Mortification of the flesh, the disavowal of basic needs and rudimentary comforts, asceticism, celibacy, the hairshirt and the bed of nails—all are means of achieving a sacred

state, of communicating with the divine. The further one is from Nature, the closer one is to God. Could there be a correlation between the positive valuation of pain on the path to grace and its use in ceremonial contexts?

Consider the manifest relationship between the concept of identity and mutilation—especially of the genitalia, the most intimate area of the body. A person belongs to the tribe because he has been circumcised by the elders of the tribe according to the rituals of the tribe. One is not Jewish because one is circumcised, but because one has been circumcised in accordance with Judaic ritual. Half the world is circumcised, and the procedure is more or less the same everywhere, but the point of difference is plain to see when considering the ritual that initiates a previously circumcised convert into Judaism. A man cannot lose his foreskin twice, yet the successful convert must have lost it according to the Judaic ritual. The task, then, is to lose anew that which no longer exists. Shedding a single drop of blood is sufficient to make the rite valid.

I have limited our discussion thus far to the social aspects of genital symbolism. On such terms, circumcision differs very little from body painting or tattooing. Indeed, it should come as no surprise that peoples who cover up their bodies might nevertheless practice intimate tattooing. Scholars of systems of clothing know that even undergarments have their meanings.

Consider the emotionally disturbed children whose practice of genital self-mutilation inspired Bruno Bettelheim's influential monograph (1975) on symbolic wounds. In anthropological terms, their behavior reveals something that transcends his findings. One boy's desire to bleed like a woman, and his refusal to be confined to his own gender, is compellingly described by Bettelheim. Yet in a society that offers multiple ways to socially renounce one's sex, the fact that the boy displayed this decision through such a fundamental act (of cutting his own genitalia) suggests a desire not only to proclaim but to be. To have his new sex carved into his body like a covenant with Yahweh. To be as such and not only to appear as such.

My argument is drawing to a close. What is a rite of passage? It is a way of establishing a consensus, one necessary to the coherence of any society, on fundamental questions. Who am I, and who is the other? Where are we, in time and in space? Given that society is relatively stable yet the tempo of individual life requires persons to change social status, contradictions emerge between who we feel we are and who others want us to be. You might believe that you are always the same person, and in a way you are: you always have the same body,

whatever changes the years may bring; you take your scars to the grave; you inherit a personal biography. But your role in society changes, and different roles require that you learn different ways of behaving, for these do not depend on your individual character but on your position in society.

This observation recalls a distinction I have drawn elsewhere between the person-in-himself and the person-in-society. You are born because Nature says so, yet birth does not, in itself, mean social existence: you must be baptized in order to belong to the community of the living. You die because Nature runs its course, yet death does not, in itself, mean social disappearance: with a bit of luck, you will not vanish but become an ancestor. Becoming an ancestor requires a burial stone and, above all, descendants. The care with which society distinguishes natural event from commemorative rite makes it plain that society will not tolerate Nature's domination. The person-in-himself is Nature's creation, founded on a physiological base that his brain, his will, his feelings, his tastes, his joys, and his pains depend upon to constitute the individual *self*. The person-in-society is constructed by others, who cast him in a role and compel him to behave as they see fit by way of seduction, persuasion, sanctions, and laws.

These two aspects of the same person intersect but are never, and can never be, the same. The mask the onlooker sees does not fully resemble the face it hides, and yet the same word "person" applies to both (the latter's etymological origin in antiquity is not the stage actor but the theatrical mask, as Mauss has shown). Does this difference between the two hide us from ourselves? The anthropologist, nonetheless, *should* maintain the distinction in certain situations. The study of *compadrazgo*, or spiritual kinship, provides a demonstration. The ties that bind godfather to godson concern persons-in-themselves, whereas the ties that bind father to son, regardless of paternal or filial affection, are between persons-in-society, each taking on the role of paterfamilias or heir. The godfather gives the godson a first name, and the latter takes his father's surname. The first name distinguishes him as an individual within the social group that bears the same last name as his father. His friends are chosen according to his individual will, his feelings, and his tastes, but his parents are determined by the system of kinship. The godfather godfathers the person-in-himself; the father gives the person-in-society his identity. Herein lies the irreconcilable difference between the two. In all of the individual's personal relationships, what concerns the person-in-himself can be distinguished from what refers to the social structure. Hence, the friend from the kin, the lover from the husband, the child from the heir, the body of the deceased from the ancestor.

Through rites of passage, an individual moves from one social status to another: the initiate is taken out of society, detached from his former status, maintained en route in a marginal state, and ultimately reintegrated into society with his status transformed. The person-in-society has changed while the person-in-himself remains the same, with his habits, his individuality, and his past. Yet he must adjust his behavior to his new status. Indeed, for better or worse, his person-in-himself must correspond with his person-in-society.

Now, we have seen that pain detaches the sufferer from external consciousness, turning his concentration inward and reducing him to his suffering, which he cannot objectify. When he is released from the latter, he is reborn transformed and with a new identity. Physicians contend that pain brings about behavioral readjustment. And this, precisely, is what rites of passage require to effect transformation, to ensure that the person-in-himself readjusts to the demands of his new status, which is to say, to the person-in-society.

Pain, fear, and humiliation break down social personhood that feels "comfortable in its own skin" and force each of us to reconsider our sense of self, thereby paving the way for the desired readjustment. To these ends, feelings and behaviors are assisted by chemical changes in the body, which have been studied by physiologists assessing the effects of adrenaline on personality.

What is more, the memory of this pain binds the individual to his successful passage, whose price was paid in blood: he is proud of what he suffered, for he has overcome it, and so he is prouder still of what he has achieved. This is precisely what ensures his moral integration into his new status.

Cruel and humiliating rites of passage therefore possess a physiological dimension that Arnold Van Gennep overlooked, despite his firm understanding of the moral significance of all rites of passage (1966 [1909]).

CHAPTER 14

From the love of food to the love of God*

I

My title is a quotation from R.R. Marett, the leading disciple of Tylor and his successor in the first chair of anthropology at Oxford. To place the quote in context: "Whole literatures deal with the various aspects of moral culture, taken separately. Here, instead of running through the history of institutions chapter by chapter, it must suffice to insist that *the anthropologist, seeking to view the development of human life as a whole, has somehow to bring the love of food and the love of God into one moral scheme*" (Marett 1929: 41-6).

Superficially, this phrase might be taken to imply the totality enclosed between two extremes: from the most material and animal of our instincts, eating, to the most spiritual and ethereal of our ambitions, to make contact with divinity. The two poles of the human predicament: man's physical nature and his yearning to escape from it. As such, the phrase is telling. Marett was too good an anthropologist not to be aware of the paradox the proposition hides: that it is

* "From the love of food to the love of God" is based, in part, on a lecture of the same title given at Exeter College Oxford as the Marett Lecture on April 28th, 1988. Pitt-Rivers left two versions of the lecture, which he intended to publish as an essay, but neither was finished. As it appears in this volume, the essay is patched together from the two earlier versions, with incorporation of marginal notes and removal of sections of the essay that were provisional sketches.

through food that God is reached, not only in Nuerland, where men who sacrifice too often are accused of greed (Evans-Pritchard 1956), but in the symbolism of the Christian faith, where the ingestion of bread and wine establishes communion with the Deity. Physical and spiritual nourishment come together in the Eucharist. In the act of sacrifice, the *vehicle* of grace is food.

The aim of this essay is to examine the relation between the two, food and God, and the moral and symbolic values involved in *eating*. Culinary culture is (at last!) recognized as a valid field of anthropological investigation (Kuper 1977), but I am more concerned with the love of God and why it is obtained through the stomach. Nobody seems to have asked the question since Robertson Smith, whose theory of totemism, in which he found the most primitive form of sacrifice, has not withstood the arrival of serious ethnography, which revealed that the devotees of a totem do not normally, as he thought, eat it. Nor is it certain that they ever did so.

It has sometimes been asserted that the essential act of sacrifice is the consumption of the victim, or the offering of its life, or its blood, which was thought to be symbolically the same thing. But this by and large restricts the notion of sacrifice to "blood covenant," the title of a book from an earlier period by Trumbull (1885). Of course, not *all* sacrificial offerings shed blood or even *have* blood to shed, even when they are symbolical substitutes for animals that do (like the famous wild cucumbers of the Nuer, surrogates for the sacrificial oxen they personify: "take thine ox," the Nuer says, as he slices the cucumber in half). But this is not all; there are sacrifices of vegetarian food, and even sacrifices (in ancient Greece [Detienne 1979] as well as among the Piaroa of Amazonia, who must ritually convert bloody flesh obtained from the hunt into vegetable matter before consuming it [Overing Kaplan 1975]). When the sacrificial offering is a warm-blooded animal, and recognized ritually as such, its blood is not always shed; it may be liberated like the scapegoat of the Bible, loaded with the sins and impurity of the sacrificers, to be sent off into the bush, expelled thereby from the human community. Even among the Nuer, it may be spared once the ashes of its consecration have been washed off its back (Evans-Pritchard 1956). We have other examples of this second form of "bloodless sacrifice": some among the Gourmantché, studied by Michel Cartry (1976, 1978), seem to resemble the Biblical model, and the classical sacrifice of piglets to Demeter (in which they were dropped alive into the cracks that the summer sun had created in the scorched land of Greece) might be cited as another (Detienne 1979).

Now it could be imagined that this all might correspond to the distinction between expiatory (or purificatory) sacrifices, and supplicatory (or celebratory) sacrifices, as Evans-Pritchard calls them (1954), but this is not quite the case: expiatory sacrifices can be bloody too. (How dangerous it is to apply practical logic to the realm of symbols!) The essential process of sacrifice is the dispossession of self in favor of the recipient—the conversion of "having" into "being," as Gusdorf, following Jacques Maritain, put it—in order to obtain grace. Lévi-Strauss explained this in the *Pensée Sauvage*. I think the point is worth reformulating in a way that overcomes what I have long thought of as a difficulty in the explanation of sacrifice by Evans-Pritchard (1954), who followed Mauss in dividing sacrifices into two types: those which establish connection with divinity, and those which send Him away to avoid His wrath; those which make the profane sacred and those which do the contrary. In either case, however, I would maintain that sacrifice is an act of grace, whether to express thanks, to obtain from God the return of grace (in the form of supplication for favor, which is grace, or for pardon, which is also grace, as the Romance languages make quite explicit. *Gracier* means to pardon in French, and grace is given by way of indulgence or mercy in English (OED). Once this is recognized, the distinction between connection and separation becomes redundant, for communion with the deity (the fellowship of the Holy Ghost in the case of Christianity) is a state that entails automatically both the remission of sins and the divine benevolence that ensures good fortune. Or so it is piously hoped. The ritual procedure is the same in each case, Evans-Pritchard tells us, and there is no symbolic representation of the supposed separation. Moreover, to obtain pardon it is necessary to pursue contact with the divinity, who alone can give it. It appears then that "separation" is no more than the hope to escape divine reprisals. In a word, it is not Kwoth, God in the Nuer language, but Kwoth's anger that is to be avoided. It is not clear what is made profane that was formerly sacred, nor vice versa. The sacrificer enters into communion with God, and in the ritual of sacrifice there is nothing apotropaic, for it is the same whether the aim is piacular, ingratiatory, or gratificatory. If Mauss perceived such a distinction, it was surely due to his concern to discover contractual exchanges in all forms of social relations, even with divinity.

What is surprising is that Evans-Pritchard followed Mauss in this. He favored using Christian theological concepts on the grounds that, if not exactly equivalent to the Catholic ones he had come to master, they were the nearest he could find in English. He stopped short of offering "grace" as the translation

of the Nuer word "muc" (Evans-Pritchard 1956), but gives a definition which would apply as well to grace as any other term he suggested. As Evans-Pritchard stressed (1956), there is no clear line between piacular and "supplicatory/confirmatory" sacrifice; the two blend together. There is no difference in the rituals. There is no notion of a contractual obligation on the part of Kwoth, who in any case "owns" all cattle and anything else that can be used in sacrifice. There is no equivalence of value in the importance of the offering and the gravity of the sin or the seriousness of the misfortune that is engendered by it, only a vague feeling that the greater the misfortune the bigger should be the gift sacrificed in expiation of it. In any case, it depends upon the means available to the sacrificer and his state of mind. Moreover, as Evans-Pritchard explained so well, the Nuer have no understanding of contract and economic equivalence. To make a kind of economic social sense of such transactions makes no sense at all, and in applying Mauss' theory to the Nuer case, Evans-Pritchard points to all the evidence that implies that this is in no way a contractual agreement between Kwoth and his worshipper, but, to put it in my own words, a relationship of grace, essentially recalcitrant to the logic of economy and the law. It is a mystery and, as he points out, dependent upon the worshipper's intentions: that is to say, on his heart and not his jural obligations. Only intentions count, for material equivalences of value are meaningless in the context of Nuer culture.

I have explained on a previous occasion (Pitt-Rivers 1992)[1] how Mauss' interest in contract and its religious origin, together with his failure to recognize the existence of the concept of grace, caused him to misinterpret Malinowski's material on the Kula. This is equally true of the rest of his great essay on the gift and of the essay on sacrifice. The sacrifice to Kwoth stands in frank contrast to the sacrifices to spirits who do not, like Kwoth, already "own" the animals sacrificed to them, with whom it is possible to bargain and who cause misfortunes with a view to gaining prestige and material advantages in the form of receiving sacrifices. A sacrifice to Kwoth is a transaction of grace; a sacrifice to spirits, ingratiatory as it may be, is a maneuver to get them to refrain from making a nuisance of themselves. Possessing no notion of grace, Mauss was incapable of this kind of distinction. Unfortunately, Evans-Pritchard followed Mauss in thinking one could understand the theology of Nuer sacrifice, or any other, without the concept of grace.

---

1. The essay is also reproduced in this volume, Chapter 3. *Ed.*

This analysis has taken us back to anthropology's point of departure, when Tylor explained that to sacrifice was to make a gift to the Gods. Evans-Pritchard (1956) agreed: "Nuer sacrifice is clearly a gift of some sort." To risk a lapalissade, I would say that the quintessence of the gift is its gratuity and gratuity is a derivative of grace. All the social conventions that govern its practice, though they vary from one culture to another, devolve from this fact, which implies that it possesses a central logic: you cannot pay for a gift or it ceases to be one, but if you fail to give thanks for it, you give offense. It is an expression of friendship, respect, appreciation, love, which comes from the heart, not from a sense of obligation; as such, it is a vehicle of grace, and it can be returned, as it must be, only in the form of grace.

If this has not hitherto been recognized, it is only because grace has not, until now, been treated as a concept of analytical utility in anthropology. Grace is always to be obtained by sacrifice, and sacrifice is always a transaction of grace in which there is no contract, no obligation, no economic equivalence, only the mysterious economy of the heart and the will, human or divine (*Cf.* Lévi-Strauss 1962). The sacrifice requires contact, not separation, whether or not the pardoner is asked to withhold his anger. At this moment, grace is in a condition similar to that of honor twenty-five years ago. It is used in passing, at the ethnographical level, to translate Arabic words like *baraka*, but the importance of the notion of gratuity and thanks (which are both grace, also) has not even penetrated the discussion of systems of exchange. How can one claim to have dealt adequately with these systems without examining the conditions in which nothing is given in exchange? Not much has been done in this direction since Meyer Fortes (1969) opened the door to such a discussion with his provocative concept of "kinship amity." Yet in the meanwhile, Émile Benveniste (1969) has shown that the etymological origin of the word "grace" is precisely an Indo-Iranian root, "gir" meaning an offering to the gods, one that is given not in the hope of a material return, but to give pleasure. It seems that the idea of giving pleasure, or giving thanks, has mysteriously been left out of the anthropologist's tool kit—and pleasure (like grace) is something that must always, in fact, be returned if amicable relations are to be maintained. When grace is not returned, it is transformed into its negative form, which is malevolence or witchcraft (Pitt-Rivers 1992).

The example of the scapegoat raises another problem: the great majority of sacrifices do indeed involve the immolation of the victim, whose life is offered to divinity in lieu of the sacrificer's. But the scapegoat's life is not taken; the beast is

simply pushed off into the wilds, expelled from the community, returned to nature where, as an animal, he belongs. It might be suggested that, if he takes the sins of pollution back to nature, it is because they are sins attributable to man's animal nature. (But it is always dangerous to apply an elementary, binary logic to the interpretation of ritual, whose logic is more complex than that of oppositions and mathematics.) Nevertheless, it appears to me that the victim's return to nature is always an expiatory or purificatory sacrifice, even if the converse is not necessarily true.

One of the central ideas on which Robertson Smith founded his erroneous theory of totemism was that, in this earliest form of sacrifice, by consuming the flesh of their totem animal, the devotees became mystically associated with their god. If the totem is not actually eaten, however, we can see that the consumption of the offering is not an essential part of the rite. Yet here is the embryo of an idea that has not been developed as far as it might have been, for, unfortunately, though much has been written about sacrifice, the symbolic dimension of food and the significance of eating have received little attention: in fact, people are continually defined by what they eat. This is true of modern national stereotypes—"frog," "ice creamer," and the like; the inhabitants of Grazalema bore the nickname of "los pringones," the "fat-eaters," on account of the excellent quality of the hams they produced—but it is equally so in a host of other contexts. To begin with, it applies to the institution of blood-brotherhood in all its variants. Blood-brotherhood in its simplest form consists of an exchange of blood that creates a bond of mutual fidelity between those who ingest it. The Zande blood-brother's oath illustrates the magical logic of the institution: "if I am unfaithful to my brother, then let his blood, which I have drunk, kill me" (Evans-Pritchard 1933). It is not only blood, however, but semen, saliva, and any physical effluent that can be used to establish the mystical tie. The institution extends via foster-brotherhood, in which the ingestion of the milk of the same foster-mother establishes a fraternal tie, as among the Eskimo or the islanders of Carriacou in the Antilles (Smith 1962), to the ritual ingestion of any beverage or substance in common, whether or not it contains a bodily effluent of the would-be siblings. A French children's game called "Philippines" establishes twinship through the ritual sharing of a twin-stoned fruit. It is the same principle, and the idea trails away into the simple notion of commensality, the mainstay of hospitality and friendship, and from there to the mores of modern businessmen, who cannot, it seems, sign a contract on an empty stomach. In fact, it would be well for anthropologists to adopt a theological term, "consubstantial," to express the moral

tie that derives, most commonly, from becoming "of one substance" through the ingestion together of food. Does not the Anglican marriage ceremony, by a slightly different logic, also make the spouses "one flesh"?

It should be noted, moreover, that the tie between blood-brothers is very similar to that between "compadres." Both are relationships of sacred trust and respect, of *pseudo*-"kinship amity" in which "all that is mine is thine" and vice versa, a solidarity founded on the heart rather than socially defined common interests. Spiritual affinity, the basis of the *compadrazgo* ("God-brotherhood" we might call it, in English: the relationship between the father and the god-father of the same child) is established through baptism, through the grace of the Holy Spirit and the chrism, the vehicle of Grace. It is blood brotherhood through a double consubstantiality, one a spiritual bond, the other a moral bond, or, putting it another way, the affinity is explicit in baptism, implicit in blood-brotherhood. Hence it is not surprising that we find the god-brothers reinforcing their spiritual affinity by festive commensality. There are even fictive forms of *compadrazgo* in which the god-brothers establish themselves as such (in Moche, Peru, John Gillin [1945] encountered such a fictive form; it could be celebrated by the god-brothers broaching together a barrel of *chicha*). In the recent past, German students established a similar bond by drinking ritually with linked elbows and singing a song. There are a thousand rites that employ the ingestion of a common substance, food, solid, or liquid to establish a moral tie.

But food and drink are not the only paths to consubstantiation. The symbolic equivalence between eating and sexual congress has been observed in various contexts, not only in the imagery of the "vagina dentata" and in the assimilation of that feminine nether mouth that ingests the essence of the male to the mouth that literally eats food, but in the slang of various languages, which assimilate the consumption of nourishment and the consummation of love in sexual intercourse, the love of food and the love of women. Such slang expressions range from terms of endearment addressed to women ("Honey" "*Mon Chou*," etc.) to courting customs ("*passer à la casserole*" in French or "*pelando la pava*" in Spanish), which likened the process of seduction to the preparation of food, to expressions of extreme coarseness: "go eat meat" is the rudest thing that can be said in Chicago to a woman. But what is highly significant is that there is no consensus in these expressions as to whether male eats female or vice versa. Literally, of course, female would appear to eat male, as in the insect world—or in the metaphor of electric plugs or plumbing—but this is often, if not always, reversed in symbolic representations, such as the French

and Spanish examples quoted above. The insignificance of the male contribution to the physical procreation of children is compensated on the moral plane by linguistic usages or ritual procedures that demonstrate how it is really men, not women, who make the children. In language and in rite, men claim to cook or to eat their paramour, when in literal terms it is clearly the other way round. Is this due to machismo or to the fear of being eaten? Can the first to be attributed to the second? Today it is generally recognized that "vagina envy" is quite as powerful a motivation as the "penis envy" that early masochistic Freudians were so glad to discover. In brief, eating is not the only path to consubstantiation: sexual hospitality and temple prostitution employ the same principle. Sexual relations with the priestess of Aphrodite in Corinth assured, through this, the moral integration of the visiting seaman, and Herodotus recounts how the girls of Crete received their Egyptian visitors on the beach. Sexual hospitality the world over integrated the foreigner. The Old Testament is filled with it, offered not only to, but even by the Israelites, despite the continual reprobation of Yahweh. Certain Amerindian kinship systems utilize the same principle to establish a kin tie between two men who have slept with the same woman.

There are many other ways in which the symbolic value of specific foods is illustrated, quite apart from those employed in ritual, but an anecdote from my own field experience will have to suffice. When I first went to do fieldwork in Andalusia, I had already acquired a taste for corn on the cob, maize, and one day I asked to be served it. My neighbors were shocked and derided me, saying "There goes Don Julián eating the food of the pigs." Ten years later I had become very partial to the "*puchero*," the Andalusian daily stew, whose staple vegetable is the chickpea (*garbanzo*). Finding myself in Chiapas (Mexico), where these were cultivated, I asked for chickpeas. Once more, my neighbors were scandalized. Once more, they derided my uncouth attempt to establish consubstantiation with the hogs. In each case the autochthonous vegetable is for human consumption, the immigrant one for swine. In the Mediterranean, where "corn, wine, and oil" are the three sacred staples, vehicles of grace, various taboos are attached to their treatment. Even greater sacred associations are related to maize in American pre-Columbian religious tradition. So it is clear that in each case I was transgressing the moral rule that humans should strive in their daily customs and habits, including their choice of food, to display their human, not their animal, nature. (The taboo on eating chickpeas is not general throughout Mexico).

The logic of consubstantiality is simple: the exchange or sharing of a common substance or even of women can be endowed, ritually, with the power to establish a moral bond. It assimilates men with each other, as with divinity. But I have already suggested that the logic of ritual is often much more complex than this: the complexity of interpreting the symbolic value attaching to what we eat requires a chemistry all its own, whose logic is very different from that of the chemist. So the question remains: Why should communication with the divine be established through food—the most spiritual through the least? Has the opposition of animal versus spiritual been placed in abeyance for this to be possible? Are not prayers sufficient as means of communication, as the Quakers believe? They are "only words" and "actions speak louder than words." "The proof of the pudding is in the eating." The physical world is the ultimate court of appeal where ritual is concerned. What goes into your body is the truth: you are committed by it just as the Zande blood-brother is committed by the blood of his brother inside him. The sexual act, likened to food, also commits through the possibility of producing a child. Blood is inside the body and it comes out. Food goes in. Bodily substances are what commit the individual, hence the numerous alternatives to blood in the establishment of moral ties. Hence also the symbolic significance of what is perceived as being purely material. Conversely, we should consider more closely the theological notion of "substance." Who is consubstantial with whom, and how? The communicant with Christ via the body and blood ingested? God the Father and God the Son? Or, without any mystical tie that is not common to all humanity, Jesus and Mary?

II

The contribution of the late Victor Turner to the study of ritual and symbolism remains to my mind fundamental. His two most important points, set forth in his essay (1962) on the three symbols in Ndembu circumcision, were these:

1. his distinction between the "three levels" of interpretation: the "exegetic," the explanation of a rite given by the people who practice it; secondly, what we can see them doing; and finally, how this can be related to what we have already come to recognize as the values of their culture.
2. his realization that symbols are polysemous in nature, that they can have more than one meaning, even at the same time and, I would add, even

contradicting each other. The implications of this for the theory of the logic of ritual are indeed far-reaching.

The exegesis of a ritual does not give an anthropological understanding of it, for the exegesis assumes what the anthropologist wants to discover; it is based upon the assumptions of the rite itself. Let us take the same example as Turner: *circumcision*. This rite of genital mutilation is rich in symbolic significance, and it is practiced by more than half the peoples of the world. Yet there is little concordance among the various exegetical accounts people give of it. I shall limit myself to Judaic, Muslim, and modern British contexts.

1. Judaic circumcision, performed on male children only, on their eighth day of life, is a rite of great sophistication. It assures the child's collective identity as a Jew, in that circumcision is the mark of the alliance of the Jews with Yahweh, whose people they are. It also assures his individual identity, in that the child's name may not be mentioned prior to the ceremony. Its instigation and history are recounted in Holy Writ and amply dealt with in the commentaries. The exegesis is voluminous, though learned scholars do not agree as to the significance of all mentions of it. For example, the circumcision of Moses' son by Zipporah has led to diverse interpretations. The custom is thought by many scholars not to have originated among the Jews but to have been adopted by them during the period of slavery in Egypt. It has been adopted by many peoples of Africa within the last few centuries as a concomitant of conversion to Islam. It is, then, a custom that is far from autochthonous in every case.
2. Islamic circumcision. There is virtually no exegesis at all, save for occasional mentions in the commentaries, which claim that the Prophet was circumcised by the angels. (The angels need hardly have bothered, since it was already the custom among the peoples of Arabia at the time of his birth.) However, the rite is as essential for the Muslims as for the Jews. A popular saying emphasizes this: "It is your wedding day tomorrow and you are not yet circumcised," which means "You are doing everything backwards." It can be performed at any time from babyhood to marriage, commonly between four and twelve years old, but each country and period has its own custom.
3. Modern British circumcision. This is performed "for hygienic reasons" without any attempt at other kinds of exegesis. The medical justification for it was to avoid the risk of contracting phimosis, an infection of the

> prepuce. This is rare after babyhood and not very common at any age. Since tonsillitis is infinitely more current than phimosis and just as dangerous, it might seem more sensible to remove the child's tonsils rather than his foreskin, if it were judged necessary to improve upon the Creator's scheme. The origin of the adoption of this custom by the British is obscure. It might be thought to have been inspired by the desire of certain extreme Protestant sects to resemble the Israelites of the Old Testament and become a party to the alliance with Yahweh, and this was indeed the motivation in certain cases: a few among the followers of Joanna Southcott, the eighteenth century millenarian from Devonshire, had themselves circumcised for this reason, but the operation is dangerous and requires practice and medical skill so, well-advisedly, they went to Holland and had it performed there by a Jewish "mohel." Some of the Old Believers in Russia also opted for the operation. However this appears not to have been the source of the custom among the upper classes of modern Britain, who alone adopted this practice. The fact that it was never spoken of, except in whispers, until the Second World War, makes its history uncertain, but it is more than doubtful that it was due to Joanna Southcott, whose movement seems to have disappeared before there is any historical record of circumcision among the British aristocracy. Moreover, her movement never had any appeal to the British upper class, who were always Anglican or occasionally Catholic, though the Catholics did not follow this custom. The fact that circumcision was kept a virtual secret among those closest to the monarchy and little by little expanded its sphere of operation suggests that it may have started in the Royal Family.

The interest of Queen Victoria in medical matters is well known and illustrated by her passion for Florence Nightingale. Could Albert be at the origin? There are two hypotheses: Victoria was much more interested in sex than is commonly thought. Suppose that Albert had been a victim of phimosis when young and had been circumcised for that reason; she would have known about it and may well have decided that her sons, to avoid such an unpleasant eventuality, should be circumcised in good time. This was a period of "philosemitism," and she may well have thought that the Jews had the right answer (quite apart from the possibility that she knew about the rumor that Albert was in fact the son of a Jewish genitor, which would hardly have accounted for his being circumcised, but may have inclined her favorably towards traditional

Jewish custom). The medicine of the second half of the nineteenth century was not squeamish about genital mutilation; circumcision of boys was readily recommended for phimosis and was also thought to discourage masturbation, which supposedly led to premature baldness and senility. In the form of clitoridectomy, circumcision was practiced on young girls who were found to be "too highly-strung." If, then, at an earlier period circumcision was occasionally adopted by Gentiles for religious reasons, for the last century or so, the reasons have been "hygienic." This does not mean, however, that popular notions of hygiene were not influenced by a more ancient religious tradition, common to all the peoples of The Book. The physical concepts of "purity" and, even more so, of "impurity" are hard to disentangle from their moral and religious connotations: when St. Paul recommended the circumcision of the heart in preference to the circumcision of the penis, he was deliberately assimilating the two, as indeed the Judaic tradition already did, and we shall find the Ndembu making the same assimilation. The pure in heart are expected to be clean beneath the foreskin also.

Once those closest to the Royal Family knew that this practice had been adopted by them, they did the same. Very slowly it filtered down the social structure like the linguistic rules of class as Nancy Mitford (1956) has explained them. The secret was not easily given away, but it progressed and those who were physically closest knew about such matters soonest. Hence we can explain a fact brought to my notice by a friend in a position to know: that the majority of Conservative MPs were circumcised (circa 1950) whereas the majority of Labor MPs were not, but of the latter who were, most were perhaps descended from a person in domestic service to a noble household who thus was privy to the secret practice of their employers. It is entirely in accordance with the snob values of the social structure of England that class, not race, should have been inscribed in the flesh.

Social distinctions of this kind did not survive the Second World War. Once democracy had raised its head, circumcision was performed more or less automatically and without charge by the British Social Security. Some fifteen years later, however, when the Social Security needed to economize, some young doctors questioned whether circumcision was really essential to a child's health; thereafter it was performed only on request and was no longer reimbursed.

Even without considering countless other examples, it is clear that exegesis cannot be trusted to explain why such a custom is followed. A single aspect of the social situation is insufficient to account for a custom whose symbolic

significance is potentially so varied. Still, it is not without interest to examine the various theories that have been offered in explanation. An initial definition of circumcision might be: a ritual mutilation of the genitalia restricted in most societies to the male sex. This definition excludes the exegesis of modern Britain, which does not recognize the ritual nature of this practice, believing it to be a simple measure of hygiene. Yet many attempts have been made by anthropologists concerned with "primitive societies" to go beyond this rather timid position. Circumcision has been:

1. viewed as a rite of passage. This fits the example of Judaism well enough, for here it is similar in function to Christian baptism: it marks the entry into a religious (and ethnic) community. It also fits many of the African rites of circumcision, but not all, and Muslim circumcision only loosely, since it does not explicitly define membership in the Muslim community and there is no fixed age for its performance; it is stipulated only that it must precede marriage. We shall see why.
2. considered a mark of tribal identity. Here again it fits Judaism and many other cases. But the fact that it is a mark that is often if not always hidden from view and is often the same for all the neighboring tribes implies that it is more. It is essential in all cases not simply to be mutilated in this manner, but to have undergone the rite according to the tribe's ritual rules and at the hands of the tribal elders (La Fontaine 1985).
3. noted by Van Gennep (1966 [1960]) (and by the Ndembu) to consist in removing the part of the male organ that corresponds morphologically to the female organ, and vice versa. Female circumcision (clitoridectomy) removes the morphological equivalent of the penis. So it would then be a ritual to guard against the anomaly of hermaphroditism. (And we know how society abhors natural anomalies like twins, monorchids, and the like.) By assuring physically that humans are uniquely men and women, circumcision evades the possibility of one such anomaly.
4. deemed necessary in order to assure moral purity. The rudest thing you can say to an Ndembu man is: "dirt under your foreskin!" The British medical rite that refuses to recognize itself as such may well be derived from a similar, but unconscious, sentiment. In that case, circumcision is a ritual of moral purification dressed up as a "rational" belief in hygiene. Such an attribution is common in modern, soi-disant rational society: for example, when the taboo on eating pork is explained as being due to the climate of the Middle East.

> This explanation ignores all the other culinary prohibitions of the Jews on the one hand, and on the other it ignores the fact that among many peoples of the tropics, where the dangers of contracting worms from undercooked pork are infinitely greater, the pig provides the staple diet of the population. No rabbi was ever fooled by such nonsense, any more than he was by the theory that the function of circumcision is to evade the risk of phimosis, for he knows that the function of circumcision is to enter the alliance with Yahweh, and nothing else. At least, if you are Jewish; if you are Muslim, Malagasy, Ndembu, or traditionalist British upper-class, what you do it for is your affair, no matter how idiotic it looks to the rabbi. But the fact that other peoples of the world circumcise invites any rabbi who is not totally Judeo-centric to ask himself, "What's behind all this?"

Such feeble attempts at rationality do require some explanation: they derive from the nineteenth-century belief in evolution, which proclaimed that we were at the forefront of *progress* and that those who did not reason as we did were simply "retarded." When anthropologists such as Tylor, the founder of the discipline, became interested in peoples who reasoned otherwise, he tried to explain this as an example of "primitive mentality," which was incapable of grasping the rules of scientific logic and remained embedded in "magical thinking." Literal, empirically verifiable propositions were scientific; the rest was backwardness that resulted from errors in the interpretation of reality. Tylor, who was of Quaker stock, had no difficulty in recognizing that myths were the inventions of people who had no empirical knowledge of their past, but who indulged in their imagination to explain their own origins. He believed that ritual was equally the product of a primitive mentality, to be replaced by progress, by rationality and rational morality, the tenets of Quaker belief. Such premises gained command of educated and then popular thinking; as a result, the word "myth" came to mean that which is untrue, and "ritual" signified a magical practice left over from the primitive past.

When people who were not primitive in mentality, such as modern Jews, practiced bloody rituals like circumcision, it became essential to discover a "rational explanation" to justify it. Hygiene, a conglomeration of beliefs supposedly emanating from medical science, but largely composed of old folklore in fact, was exactly what was required to defend the myths and rituals of our own society. Aided by the rationality of beliefs in hygiene and by the recognition in the twentieth century of the existence of numerous rituals, religious and civil, at home, some scholars took a more lenient view of ritual.

Lagrange, for instance, proposed that circumcision was a form of sacrifice: "the sacrifice of a part to—save the whole."[2] Turner concurs, viewing it as "a sacrament," "a kind of sacrifice." With this I mostly agree, adding only that such a definition should not exclude the possibility that some of the functions enumerated above may also be present in different examples of the rite, and that different psychological motivations might be revealed in each case. Otherwise, there is no consensus across the cases, either with regard to exegesis or the need to provide any at all; regarding the age at which it should be performed, whether in infancy, childhood or early adulthood, before the first sexual congress, or upon reaching maturity in any other sense. All this is true of female circumcision as well as male. The sole feature common to all cases is that circumcision must be done before procreating a child. The Pokot of East Africa put it plainly:[3] an uncircumcised mother can give birth only to an animal or a monster. As a rite, circumcision ensures that the organ of procreation, which will produce the next generation, has been cleansed of the taint of its animal nature, purified and guarded against the degeneration of humanity into bestiality. It is a bloody sacrifice, disposing of what nature ordained in favor of a mortal condition, allied to the super-human, not to the subhuman, the exorcism of animal nature, the imposition of the human upon the natural order. Put in Lévi-Strauss' terms, it is the triumph of Culture over Nature. I believe all peoples of the world are conscious of the difference and potential opposition between these two orders, however they may formulate it.

III

Victor Turner observed that symbols have diverse meanings, but he did not explain why. This is something I think I am able to do. First of all, I would insist that, contrary to the opinion of our late colleague, Edmund Leach, rites do not *say* things. They *do* things. Though the "meaning" of a ritual can sometimes be put into words, this is rarely helpful and is often impossible. It involves a distinct kind of intellectual exercise, one even exegetes do not always feel obliged to perform. Rites certify a state of affairs that cannot be easily contested, precisely

2. Probably Pere Marie-Joseph Lagrange, the famous Dominican scholar, but Pitt-Rivers provides no additional citation here. *Ed.*

3. J.G. Peristiany, personal communication.

because it is not expressed in words. When rites employ words, as they constantly do, they employ them not simply for the purpose of communicating information. The devout Christian learns nothing by listening to Mass or Matins; he knows the words already by heart. These are pronounced, as deeds, like the action of swearing an oath. They should be heard by the united congregation. The important thing is to hear Mass or to say a prayer, hence the importance of repetition in all rituals and the indifference to pleonasm and conflicting inferences. If indeed, as Turner suggested, the symbols employed in ritual are polysemous, they can be translated into a message only at the cost of sacrificing all but a single meaning. Their equivocal senses notwithstanding, rites establish what is: the "who-how-when-what-where" of social relations. They provide, like myths, the semblance of a solution to an insoluble contradiction. They prove that a baby is no longer an animal, that it was produced by men, not by women, that the dead are not really dead, or that they are dead, and hence their vengeance need no longer be feared.

Ritual resembles dress in that both can do contradictory things at the same time. If the Highland regiments of the British army and the klephts of mountain Greece both wear a skirt, it is not to claim a reputation for female gentleness. Far from it! And, as we know from Esther Newton's study of the "dragshow" (1972), those members of the homosexual community who wear black leather and chains on the outside are the ones who wear black silk lace underwear. Such contradictory affirmations can be made because they do not depend upon writing, or even upon speech. Ritual is what is done and seen to be done. That which is done, is done, and cannot be undone, unlike words that can be retracted or said with fingers crossed. Actions speak louder than words, precisely because they do not speak.

I come to my point. There are two dominant means of communicating in ritual contexts: by sight and by sound. Sound has been partially elaborated into a code, a set of phonemic variables, which is speech. Speech can be transcribed into writing, thereby eliminating most of the paralinguistic qualifiers that permit a spoken message to be equivocal. The earliest written texts were legal codes, and law's aim is to eliminate equivocation and arbitrariness. Writing is two dimensional, whether it goes from right to left, left to right, or top to bottom. Communication by sight, however, possesses the third dimension of spatial depth in which all action takes place. What is done is done in three dimensions, which contributes simultaneously to our grasp of the total social scene. Yet our "grasp" involves selecting a version or meaning from a whole range of possible

alternatives that other persons might (not) notice. What is written down has already been reduced; it can allow only one thing to be said at a time, but by the same token the possibility of transmitting the totality of information gleaned from a quick glance, in which different persons will see many different things, is eliminated. If the symbols employed in ritual are polysemic, it is first of all thanks to their existence in space and not, or not only, in time.

The polysemia of symbols and the insufficiency of exegesis raise the problem of the consciousness of those who devise rites and participate in them. Are rituals a pure product of the unconscious? Are they knowingly composed by Church Councils or, as in Moscow formerly, by a special department of the Ministry of the Interior? If the latter, are they understood in the same way by those who perform them? There is a difference between ritual conceived as a formal message sent, as if in speech or writing, to be deciphered, with all that is implied in terms of possible errors, and ritual conceived as something that is apprehended immediately, as if on sight, without need of transliteration. In the latter case, the performers of a ritual have direct access to reality, even if it is thereafter up to them to make what sense they may of it.

In fact the logic of ritual is much closer to the logic of dreams than to any consciously formulated logic, for it accepts contradictions, ambiguity, ambivalence, duplication, pleonasm, and inversion. It is not subject to practical reasoning that is proved right or wrong by events. In ritual, nothing is right or wrong except the canon of the rite, which is correctly or incorrectly performed; it is valid according to the formalist criteria on which its efficacy depends. The discovery of the unconscious we owe largely to Freud, who, as a physician, was concerned with somatic malfunctions supposedly caused by repressions, which were themselves the result of interior conflicts in the personality of the patient. Though initially uninterested in cognition, the classical study of psychology, Freud made a most valuable contribution to our understanding of "the psychology of everyday life," but not of the modes of understanding themselves. Leaving pathology to one side, is it not evident in everyday life that there are degrees of awareness, ranging from "full consciousness" to vague impressions that can be called to consciousness, and then only incompletely, when triggered by some extraneous event? There are things one may be aware of without being fully aware of them. The spectrum of interpretations that attach to ritual appears to me to stretch from fully conscious exegesis, via the semi-conscious to the unconscious, from which of course it is not possible to exclude the notion of repression. To repress a thought, it must already exist somewhere in the mind

of the repressor. Certain rituals lend themselves to profound meanings that are quite unacceptable, even offensive, to the consciousness of those who perform them. One example is my own interpretation of the modern Spanish bullfight as a rite of exorcism that neutralizes the danger associated with female blood and female sexuality in general. Such an interpretation would not appeal to those who have resolutely repressed the fear of this danger, but it would make sense to those who are aware that the taboo attaching to the menses is more or less universal (and it would perhaps be sensible also to the Spaniards of the epoch of the Archpriest of Hita).

Rather than conceive of the conscious as above the unconscious—hence "sub-conscious," "sub-liminal," etc.; Freud early on gave up subconscious in favor of unconscious—we should invert the spatial representation and, borrowing a different idiom, consider consciousness the other way up. That which is not fully apprehended, which is "lived" without being "consciously conceived," remains "up in the air" until it can be brought down into consciousness, "put *down* in black and white," reduced from the multi-dimensional sphere of the polysemic to, literally, the black ink on a white page, where alternative meanings, inconsistencies, and logical contradictions are anathema.

In practice, the obligation to be precise is demanded more by certain forms of discourse than by others: legal decrees, practical instructions, commands, university theses, and so forth. Different obligations prevail where the intention is aesthetic or poetic, where sounds add a dimension to the significance of words. Mallarmé suggested that a poem should not be fully understood at the first reading, but an article submitted for publication in a learned journal would be unlikely to get a second reading if it followed this principle. Hence we could construct a spectrum of types of discourse of more or less logic stretching from the work of philosophers and mathematicians, toward rhyme, poetry, humor, prayers, political rhetoric, and advertising, then on to myths and ritual, and ending in "dream-time." The spectrum extends from the material to the imaginative, and its rules change as it goes. Finally, that which does not need to be communicated in speech or writing, but is perceived visibly, enjoys freedom from the constraints imposed by language. This is notably the case with ritual, which is not synonymous with magic and irrationality, as Tylor thought, but with a more fundamental human endeavor, one that has not decreased since Tylor's day, but has only changed. Ritual controls moral rather than practical reasoning. Let us not forget that, as Durkheim maintained, social systems are moral systems.

In these observations we find an explanation for the remarkable endurance of rites, which are able to survive cataclysms on the social scene because their significance, not being attached exclusively to the meaning of words, can change over time with little change in the form of the ritual. It is this fact also that assures the unity of the group that practices a rite: it need not have the same significance for every member of the group, since this meaning cannot be fully expressed in words of a practical or logical nature. In any case, rites do things. They do not say things.

IV

As an illustration of a number of points I have made, I choose the cult of the bull in contemporary Spain. It is enacted not only in the formal "corrida," or bullfight, but in several thousand "bull-festivals" that take various forms, but mostly include some kind of bull-baiting. The bovine beast is provoked to charge by challengers who brandish a piece of cloth, a garment, or anything else that comes to hand, or who run past the bull's horns, touching him on the head or on the quarters, gesticulating and shouting at him. This is called a "capea." The bull is not necessarily killed—if he is killed, he must be paid for, and the price paid by the butcher in some small-time mountain communities might not cover the outlay—but what is important is that an occasion should be provided for young men to demonstrate their valor. In the southwest of France, as in the case of the *course landaise* generally, the ideal bull has been replaced by a young cow (or in the case of the *razetteurs,* by an experienced ox). Anything with horns will do, for in the bull-ring metaphor and synecdoche run riot.

In the past, bullfights, rather different in form to what one sees in Spain today, were offered by the monarch as part of public celebrations: on the occasion of a royal marriage, in gratitude for a military victory, at the reception of a notable royal visitor. They were also offered by private individuals to celebrate marriages, and the cost was sometimes bequeathed in a will as a mortuary offering, together with provision for masses to be said for the soul of the deceased. Above all, bullfights were celebrated by communities in the fiesta of their patron saint or on the occasion of other religious festivals or fairs—the two generally went together—as they still are today.

In the formal bullfight the bulls are butchered in the bull ring slaughterhouse after they have been towed out of the ring by mules and sold next day in

the butchers' shops. The testicles are regarded as a delicacy by some gentlemen, perhaps by a reasoning that Frazer would have classified as associative magic. Formerly, the meat was often given to the hospitals; that is to say, the old peoples' home. It was probably the only meat the poor inmates would eat in the year. In certain places, (Medinaceli, Soria, etc.) bull meat is still distributed to the public during fiestas and eaten in a communal feast. This detail would, I feel, have greatly pleased Robertson Smith, the proto-consubstantialist, if only he had known about it.

Now it is quite obvious to the anthropologist that these bull-festivals are religious celebrations—sacrifices!—even though it is not at once clear in what sense and to whom the sacrifice is being made. I have explained elsewhere[4] the highly equivocal relationship between the cult of the bull and the Catholic Church of Spain. The Borgia popes, being Aragonese, insisted on introducing bullfights to Rome, but their successors, not being Spanish, took a different view. Pope Pius V issued a bull threatening with excommunication those who attended the bullfight. (The bull received scant publicity in the Iberian Peninsula.) The Seven Partidas of Don Alfonso the Wise classified as statutorily dishonorable those who fought wild beasts for money (but not those who did it for honor or for fun). It was the role of the nobility to perform in the royal bullfights, until the Bourbon kings of Spain abolished them at the beginning of the eighteenth century. A later bull of Gregory XIII reiterated the indictment of the *corrida* but in milder terms: only priests risked excommunication by attending it. Father Juan de Mariana, a very influential writer of the sixteenth century, who was also Philip II's confessor, inveighed against it, not on the grounds that it was cruel to the bulls but because humans should not risk their lives in such a barbarous manner. In the following century the great dramatists of the Golden Century, Lope, Tirso and Calderón (who were all priests) condemned bullfighting in the harshest terms. So did the liberals of the end of the nineteenth century, who foretold its rapid disappearance. Yet it is flourishing today as well as ever. It is enacted after the Mass, in the afternoon of the same day or the following day; black mantilla for the Mass, white for the corrida; church music in the gloom of the cathedral, pasodobles in the sunshine of the arena. In fact the *corrida* can be viewed as a kind of "counter-rite," mediating the conflict between the aspiration to embody the ideals of the Beatitudes and the necessity to maintain the social

4. This reference is to *Sacrifice of the Bull*, which is reproduced in Chapter 12 of this volume. *Ed.*

values of authority and order that require the opposite of meekness, between the ideal of purity and the need to reinvigorate the forces of nature, to whom this sacrifice might appear to be addressed, in a population whose religion outlawed the worship of natural forces in favor of spiritual values. In this last respect, bullfighting can be classed among what used to be called "fertility rites."

So much for the formal corrida. The concrete example I have chosen is a popular taurine festival, the Bull of the *Virgen de la Peña de la Vega* of Tordesillas, a town of some seven thousand inhabitants that stands on three knolls overlooking the River Duero in Old Castile. As always in the analysis of ritual, detail is all important, especially geographical detail. Tordesillas is on the north bank, in fairly broken country about fifty meters above the level of the river. On the far bank there is a plain of flat, sandy soil, the Vega, regularly inundated by the river until, about twenty years ago, they built a great dam to conserve the water and make it possible to put up edifices south of the river. Previously there was only one building, on a slight rise in the land, the chapel of Senor de la Vera Cruz, where prayers used to be offered for the souls of those whom the Bull of the Virgin ("el Toro-Vega") killed. The Red Cross station now stands on its site.

The ancient bridge, of great beauty, was until recently the only one for some twenty kilometers, and it carried the traffic of the main artery from Madrid to Corunna. On the top of the central knoll is the square arcaded plaza, with the town-hall and the smartest cafes, the moral heart of the community. The chapel of the Virgin, patroness of the territory and the community, but not of the town itself, stands on the south bank about five kilometers upstream of the bridge. About the same distance downstream the great river is joined by a rather miserable tributary, the Rio Zapardiel. There was formerly another chapel at this juncture.

The pilgrimage to the shrine of the Virgin takes place on the second Sunday of September, and on the following Monday evening the Toro-Vega is, or rather used to be, brought by mounted farm-hands into the town square from the corrals some five kilometers downstream from the bridge, where in the pine forest of Zapardiel he had spent the previous month. He is traditionally bought and brought there on the day of "the Virgin of August" (August 15, The Assumption of the Virgin), to be joined later by the other fighting bulls that will be immolated during the course of the celebrations. During this month the townsfolk cross the bridge in the evenings and admire, or criticize the Toro-Vega. If he is generally judged to be insufficiently big or beautiful, the mayor and the fiesta committee have to change him.

At eleven o'clock on Monday night the bull arrives with his retinue of horsemen and oxen to the temporary bull-ring (formerly to the Plaza, of course, where he was placed in a corral under the Town Hall). Then the *capea* commences. First, three or four young bulls are loosed into the ring (formerly, the Plaza) to be baited one after the other. The young, nimble, and courageous demonstrate their qualities, running at an angle in front of the animal (*cortando*, a skill requiring both speed and judgement), touching him between the horns or smacking him on the rump. This may be something of a sport for them, but it is also ritual mockery, for the man the bull chases always escapes, vaulting over the barricade that separates the ring from the stands. Then the Toro-Vega is let into the ring. He weighs as much as the three young bulls put together, and he's faster than they are. After twenty minutes or so, the Toro-Vega is retired to the corral where he spends the night.

In the morning the town is filled by some fifty thousand people. All the windows and roofs overlooking the Duero are packed with visitors from the neighboring towns, and a steady parade of lancers, some on horseback and some on foot, wends its way down through the town and over the bridge. The lances have steel blades, heirlooms from past generations, or modern innovative designs, fabricated by acetylene torches in the local garages, murderous-looking products. Some are made of wood and covered with silver paper or painted. (The fashion for dummy lances was going strong in 1985 and 1986, but it has since lapsed.)

There is a line of pennants, stuck in the ground, some five hundred yards beyond the bridge, which marks the limit before which the bull may not be struck. Beyond it he is fair game. At eleven o'clock in the morning the bull is loosed from the square to the sound of a loud report, and he courses down the barricaded streets in zigzag, accompanied by young men, the bravest ones running ahead of him while others, not quite so brave, run behind. The bull sometimes turns round and runs the other way, uphill, but mainly he runs down, past the church of Saint Antolin, patron of Tordesillas, past the convent where the image of the Virgin of Regla, patroness of the town of Tordesillas, is kept. He doubles back to the esplanade of the convent-royal palace, from which, in the Middle Ages, bulls were herded over the drop into the river below, where they were knifed by swimming matadors. The Toro Vega then charges over the bridge, past the temporary shrine to the Virgin de la Peña, put up by one of the *penas*, who came that morning in a phalanx to do homage to her, gesticulating with their staves and shouting in chorus, "*Guapa*! *Guapa*! *Guapa*!" Thus the bull escapes into nature.

He usually turns west, seeking refuge in the pine woods of Zapardiel, where he has been kept for the last month. If he reaches the Zapardiel River, he is spared and another bull must be provided at once to replace him. But no one can remember when this last happened, for after the line of pennants the lancers await him. The footmen cite him, with lance blocked by a foot in the sandy soil; the horsemen attack him from the flank, charging as in a medieval tournament. He is soon dead. A truck comes up and the body of the bull is loaded onto it, with the aid of ropes and the lances of the *torneantes*. The crowd surges round, and those with real or dummy lances dip them in the bull's blood. The parade back across the river to the plaza begins. The hero who has killed the bull is greeted with congratulations by all, and many middle-aged ladies rush to embrace him. On the tip of his lance are impaled the bull's testicles. Those who wounded him get minor trophies: the ears or the tail. Thus we can see what bourgeois decency has eliminated from the formal *corrida*. Back to the square they go, and there the hero holds court, surrounded by his fans. In the old days, the local historian told me, there was music and dancing. The dance was opened by the hero, and the girl whom he invited to dance was, as it were, the queen of the fiesta. Indeed, if a drop of blood fell onto her dress from the gruesome object on the point of his spear (which he still held while dancing), the dress was preserved, unwashed, in the treasure chest of the family as a token of her glory.

Times have changed. In 1987 the hero, a horseman, did not come back to the square at all. After re-crossing the bridge, he jumped into his car and motored off to the hospital, where his mother lay in bed, to present her with his trophy. Some said that this was wise on his part because he had not really been the one to kill the bull and there might have been an angry discussion in the square had he gone back there. In fact, there is usually a dissident group in the square who question the right of the hero to his trophy, either on the grounds that he struck the bull when it was not yet past the line of pennants, very unclearly marked, or that the lethal blow was not given by him but by someone else and he had simply been quickest to draw his knife and pinch the trophy. Yet possession is nine-tenths of the law, and nothing can really be done about it. The discussions do not become angry, merely critical, for when the bull dies, nobody can see clearly because of all the dust.

The exegeses are various. Very little can be gleaned from the young men who run round the bull in the *capea* the night before: they are showing off their skill and bravery (*cojones*, Spanish for testicles). The hero of 1986 gave a parsimonious account. "It was a tournament," he said, "and I was very lucky to kill the

bull and not the other way round." He was justifiably proud, for he was a footman, and there is great rivalry between pedestrians and mounted lancers (as in certain other bull-festivals in Valladolid and Zamora). A lady spectator, asked whether she liked this fiesta, replied: "I like it alright; I like to see the *hombría* (manliness)."

The exegesis of the priest in his sermon on the Sunday before was by far the most perceptive. He spoke of "the beast who lies hidden inside each one of us, rushing like a bull out of town, banished by the Grace of the Holy Virgin." This spiritual force was clearly, in his view, much more powerful than the six hundred and thirty kilo six year-old bovine named *Pajarito* (Dicky-Bird), who was due to perform his role two days later.

Pajarito was a superb animal, jet black with a white belly and wide-spread, baroque horns. Eduardo, the foreman of the corral of Zapardiel, had raised him from birth on a farm near the chapel of the Virgin. The bull would eat out of Eduardo's hand. Eduardo loved him like his own child, and Pajarito loved Eduardo. "This bull is very noble," he said. "The most noble animal I have ever known."

Though he had twice been the hero of the Toro-Vega, Eduardo would not ride in the tournament this year. "I won't touch that bull," he said gruffly. "Not if they were to offer me a million dollars would I hurt Pajarito." As the festival of the Virgin approached, he counted the days, saying: "*Ayyy! Pajarito!* You've only got __ days left."

ANALYSIS

This bull sacrifice combines the features of both types examined at the beginning of this essay: the bloodless and the bloody. The bull is brought to Tordesillas a month before the sacrifice to be admired and judged. He is brought from the wilds on the far side of the river into the community on the day after the pilgrimage of the Virgin. He is tested in the *capea,* a mocking ritual found in sacrifices elsewhere. He spends twelve hours, one night, in the Town Hall, the heart of the community, thus becoming a member of it (*empadronado*), and in the morning he is expelled, like the scapegoat, loaded with the sexual sins of the town, across the river into wild nature whence, in a sense, they originated.

But then we change to the other type of sacrifice. The bull is slaughtered savagely by the *torneantes*, whose vision of this ritual is quite different from

that of the priest. The public participates symbolically in the killing of the bull, putting his blood on their dummy lances. The literal murderers quarrel about the dispensation of trophies, which are parts of the bull's body. The hero who made the lethal thrust comes back to the heart of the community, bringing on the tip of his lance the symbol of the courage that will restore the social order of the town and the generative power that will ensure the procreation of another generation of Tordesillians.

CONCLUSION

The variety of the exegeses, the conscious aims and justifications, on the one hand, and the logic of this sacrifice, on the other, have been presented. The polysemia of the symbols has been displayed. But let us take a last look at the central figure, Pajarito. He is the symbol of sexual sin, of wild nature, though in fact he is not wild at all, but a human creation, of virility, of noble manliness, of fertility. He has phallic horns far more beautiful than the goat horns of the Devil. Like the Devil, the bull is black, yet he can be loved and return love like a child. He is sacrificed to the Holy Virgin, Mother of God. He is both bad and good. As an animal, he is subhuman, yet he is the means of communicating with divinity. He is food. He is sex. His passion echoes, unbeknownst to the Tordesillians, the Passion of the Savior. In the corral of Zapardiel, he is judged by the community. If only he could get back there, he would be pardoned. He enters the town in triumph, is tested and mocked, then is expelled into a rural setting ("outside the city walls"), where he is immolated. His physical essence, a kind of reproductive grace or *baraka,* is born back to assure the future, not of all mankind, but of the pueblo of Tordesillas.[5]

5. Pitt-Rivers never finished this essay. The paragraph that follows is a brief "note to self" out of which a more detailed conclusion might have been built. Even in this compressed form, however, P-R's takeaway points are clear. First, he insists that symbols are novel and traditional, fragmented and meaningful. Second, he places ritual within a larger civilizational context that sets limits on how symbols can be arranged and experienced. Third, he suggests that the small town performing these rituals is asserting a kind of moral autonomy that is valued precisely because outsiders might reject or disparage it. The bull, who is food and a way of communicating with God, is proof of all these claims. Ever the loyal student of Evans-Pritchard, who believed theoretical conclusions should be implicit in description, P-R probably looked at his final paragraph and wondered why he should say more. *Ed.*

The fragments of symbols we encounter in other contexts in Western civilization are pieced together in novel form. They give meaning to the rituals of a small town that bravely defends its right to celebrate its moral virtues in the manner its traditions dictate.

CHAPTER 15

*Quand nos aînés n'y seront plus**

Once upon a time there lived in East Africa a very warlike people called the Kipsigis. Their neighbors were the fearsome Maasai, whom they engaged in heated battle during the dry season. Their society was organized into age cohorts, as were many tribes in this part of the world, which meant that every seven years an elaborate initiation ritual, overseen by the elders, would confer warrior status upon boys aged fourteen to twenty-one. The warriors would relinquish their status seven years later upon completing their military service, in order to marry and father a family, leaving the defense of their kin, a glorious and privileged yet dangerous duty, to the next generation. During their time as warriors they did no work, they ate only meat, cows' milk fetched by others was all they drank, and every night the prettiest young women would come to visit them in the warriors' hut, where nothing, save fatherhood, was off the table. When it was time for the farewell to arms, they objected. As tradition required, they insisted that they wanted to continue to serve, despite the fact that many had already fallen to the spears of the Maasai and many of those still standing bore the scars of battle. Their protests concealed a certain measure of relief.

* This is a translation of "*Quand nos aînés n'y seront plus,*" which was first published in 1980 in the edited volume *La Sagesse et le désordre* and is reproduced in this volume with permission from Gallimard.

All of this changed with the *Pax Britannica*: raiding was henceforth effectively outlawed, yet no alarm bell rang to announce that the life of luxury these reckless fellows led was over. When their seven years were up and the elders came to make patriarchs of them, they felt themselves ill-equipped for the cares and responsibilities of fatherhood, and so they sent the elders packing. The elders ordered them to hand over their weapons, which by now were only good for impressing young women. It was no use! When the ritual season was over, they were still the tribe's warriors. The same thing happened the following year, and it looked like they would be warriors until their dying days, except that in the meantime the next generation had grown up. The latter were not fourteen to twenty-one anymore, but rather seventeen to twenty-four years of age, and they had learned how to throw the javelin as true as their elders. Yet still they held the status of children: they milked the cows, they obeyed their elders, and young women scorned them. This could not go on forever!

The following year, the would-be warriors went into hiding then attacked their own villages. They took the Maasai's place, launching spears at their idle warrior-elders until the latter renounced their privileges and relinquished their positions. The matter was resolved thanks to the elders proper, who finally managed to conduct the rite of passage. This tale has analogical value and can shed light on our present era, despite the obvious differences between East African pastoralists and ourselves.[1]

First of all, consider that the changes and uncertainties we are experiencing in France are not specific to this country: what is happening here is paralleled in England, in the United States, and in Germany. Trends ferry novel fashions and ideas from one country to the next. National and regional cultures sometimes impose limits or produce variations in detail, but I am above all struck by how similarly young people's ways of thinking have changed in the countries where I have taught since 1956 and to which the present observations apply: France, the United States, and England. The youth culture of the last two decades is not national, nor does it claim to be. National solidarity fades in relation to generational solidarity, as we shall see.

1. The classic text on the Kipsigis age cohorts is J.G. Peristiany's *The Social Institutions of the Kipsigis* (1939). For another analysis of the matter, see Eisenstadt (1956) and Balandier (1974).

The diverse perspectives on life that define our era belong to a moral climate with its own temporal unity and its own historical constraints. Simply put, conduct is judged by different criteria today than it was a quarter century ago.[2] Legitimacies have shifted. This change is sometimes described as "the crisis of authority," and its various aspects all boil down to that central idea. Phrases such as "the crisis of traditional regulations" and "the disappearing moral scaffolding" are scholarly formulas that resemble criticisms heard on every street corner, uttered by those who knew what life was like before the war.[3] These critiques, for those born later, seem altogether detached from reality. Indeed, the old have always inveighed against the young, and the latter are not entirely wrong to interpret this reaction as the eternal lament of a generation on the wane. However, careful comparison will show—whether we are right to despair or to rejoice—that not only have the rules of the game changed more radically than ever before, they have also changed direction. The very notion of "progress," once accepted without discussion as the driving force of Western society, seems to have lost its former appeal. We no longer know what we are supposed to be progressing towards.

Before attempting to explain this crisis of authority as a totality, let me enumerate its different aspects:

1. Rejection of parental authority over children, and, more generally, of the parental generation's authority over the young.
2. Rejection of the moral authority of theso-called upper classes. As Henri Mendras notes, "what's left of the bourgeoisie no longer sets the norm."
3. Rejection of male authority over women. Europeans often used to say that in the United States women reigned over men. Nothing could be further from the truth! The American Women's Liberation movement brought matters into focus. In Europe today, the ideal of sexual equality includes equality of power, and a derogatory lexicon has been devised to stigmatize those men who still believe that their sex gives them authority over women.

---

2. Translator's note: In the original, Pitt-Rivers makes reference to the edited volume in which the essay appeared, noting that the other contributions to the volume provide an account of what these "diverse perspectives on life" entail.

3. Translator's note: These phrases, notes Pitt-Rivers, are taken from other contributions to the volume in which the essay appears.

4. Rejection of traditional mores regarding sexual life. Sexual freedom is becoming dogma, and the intelligentsia's weeklies run personal ads that would once have incurred charges of flesh-peddling. Nevertheless, it is worth asking whether practice and manners follow suit. Young women used to dread being accused of having lost their virginity; today they fear the ridicule of having kept it. Virginity was once less common than we thought it was; perhaps today it is more so.[4]
5. Rejection of the State's moral authority and that of the metropolitan centers from which it flows. Hence, we see the revival of regionalist sentiment in the very regions where it appeared to be in decline.
6. Rejection of the notions of power and grandeur as measures of moral superiority: "small is beautiful." Minority rights are sacred (though difficult to define). Others have a right to be different, we say, and to seek out their own path. This attitude is inspired by a nostalgia for community, a quality missing from life in dense urban populations, and by a desire to return to nature. Sincerity and intimacy are the qualities that matter. We reject without compromise the formal and pompous. Down with all affectations of this kind! Yet as we dismiss certain styles, we invent others (the friend who bares all, the conceited egalitarian, and so on), for no sooner do we chase artifice away than it returns with a vengeance.

I have chosen to express all of these attitudes in terms of what they reject rather than what they recommend (which is often a useful method of interpretation, for something has to exist in order to be rejected whereas what we recommend only exists in our imagination). Their common ground consists in opposing what the parental generation stands for. This is not simply a matter of refusing to yield to authority, but rather of refusing to wield it. Some might once have called this being "weak-willed": we no longer want to or dare to exercise authority. But by today's standards, this preference is in keeping with the best of qualities: we must no longer disparage youth, women, or regional cultures. No one wants to assert themselves anymore. Power operates surreptitiously; it hides, because "authoritarianism = fascism." This liberalism (or resignation)

4. See, for instance, G. Gorer's, *Sex and Marriage in England Today: a Study of the Views and Experiences of the Under 45's* (1971: 30). Gorer estimates that, in spite of mass communication and a so-called "permissive" society, 63 percent of young women enter wedlock as virgins and 88 percent are virgins at the time of their engagement to the man who will become their husband.

corresponds, in the evolution of manners, to a genuine shift whose crux would appear to be the intergenerational relationship: hitherto, young people wanted to be older; they followed the previous generation's example as best they could and took up their opinions. Theirs was the status of youth, clearly defined as inferior, yet it afforded them a certain license and leniency from adults. They readily relinquished these advantages to obtain the status of full maturity, which gave them authority and respect.

Then, some twenty years ago, a change took place: instead of becoming like their elders, young people opposed them. No longer seeing themselves as "potential mature men," young people set themselves apart from those they called "old fogeys" (*croûlants*), an outdated term which nonetheless shocked parents of the time. Instead of reacting with outrage and openly criticizing the youth, as the older generations of earlier times would have done with far less excuse, the old fogeys displayed their open-mindedness (apart from a few veiled comments) by acknowledging that young people had a right to be whatever they wanted to be, even to criticize their elders. Taking pride in sympathy was the thing to do—having a youthful outlook, as it were. One did what one could to appear less old. And why not?

Ethnology depicts hundreds of societies in which, unlike the gerontocracies familiar to the general public, elders enjoy very little respect indeed. Once they cease to be physically the fittest and cannot personally take the lead in battle, they count for nothing. These are warrior societies with a very simple social structure. Native Americans (*les Indiens de l'Amérique du Nord*) offer many examples. We were perhaps on the way to becoming a society of this kind, and it would therefore have been normal for older people to hold onto their youth until the last possible moment. In fact, the post-war generation did want to remain young at all costs, often without fear of ridicule.

Yet these would-be youths were not just men holding onto the power they would forfeit by admitting they were no longer young, as would be the case in many simple societies. The analogy is misleading. For us, first of all, power is not for young people. Never has there been a time when heads of state were as old as they are today in post-war Europe, nor when so few men of power have been under the age of fifty. Student status, moreover, which often lies on the road to power, conveys no power of its own despite the promise it contains. Further, the older generation's yearning to remain young does not follow from a need to hold onto the reins of power, for in admitting their age they would not have to let them go. Rather, it follows from the individual's fear of growing old—with all

its implications of falling from grace, of humiliation and suffering—and from the fear of death itself.

This attitude is clearly reflected in how we treat the idea of death. The nineteenth century outdid itself with fine sentiments on the subject, yet by the middle of the twentieth century death was as little discussed as possible (*cf.* Gorer 1965)—especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, where the spectacular growth of the funeral industry was based on the latter's ability to relieve the bereaved of the painful burden of dealing with their own dead. Instead of emphasizing death's dramatic quality as a way of responding to it, we try to avoid it. Even the war memorial, by associating death with heroism at a precise historical moment, pushes it into the past. Likewise, in everyday life death is called "passing away" (*disparition*), an obvious euphemism yet one we had little need for prior to the twentieth century. Recently, French historians[5] have begun to break the silence surrounding death, showing that its meanings are not immutable but vary from one century to the next. Our era has chosen to send the "departed" (*disparus*) away much as children do their elders when they no longer want them around. We no longer age. We no longer die. Instead, we disappear (*disparaît*). While it is true that we are in better physical shape and die later than we used to, the key point is that we are understood to remain young far longer: we engage in youthful pursuits like sport, dance, and love well into our sixties. Lady Melbourne was almost sixty years old when she seduced the young Byron, yet she did not boast publicly about her conquest. Today, every granny has the right to lift her skirts, even if it means scandalizing the grandchildren.[6]

The youthfulness we are hooked on is not that of the Comanche warrior, but that of Peter Pan. We want to stay young. We cling to all the privileges of youth and to our self-image as young, provided we do not have to forgo the advantages of adulthood. The privileges of age have lost none of their appeal. When it comes to labor laws, they have even been strengthened. Never has the concept of "seniority" been so important to workers. We want to have it both ways. Yet this win-win comes at the expense of authority's formal qualities—its ritual powers—which leads to a loss of confidence in the soundness of authoritative decisions. We dare not impose lest we appear authoritarian, not only toward our juniors but also toward children in general. Lenient parenting, backed up by vulgar Freudianism and the pediatric advice of Dr. Spock, is grounded in the belief

5. Notably Philippe Ariès and Michel Vovelle.

6. *Cf.* "Love at Sixty" in the *Nouvel Observateur* (1974: 506).

that children need total freedom for their personalities to flourish. Margaret Mead has shown how behind this liberal attitude, often inspired by the parents' own repressive childhood experiences, lies a fear of the parenting role and our doubts about being able to perform it. We no longer know what to do. Instead of invoking tradition we look for a quick fix, or we seek the counsel of gurus like Dr. Spock, whose books sell like hotcakes. In truth, these fears and doubts only obscure our refusal to accept the responsibility that would deny us the right to identify with youth, as our children's equals. Disavowing our authority but not our power, we hope to become, in the words of Orwell, "big brother."

If the would-be youth have it both ways, then the real youth must lose out. They get neither the advantages of adulthood nor independence in their own world. They are consigned to an empty status: they are no longer adolescents and not yet young adults. This ambiguity turns them into an object of ambivalence for the older generation, who imitate but do not understand them. Young people know this. "Don't trust anyone over thirty," they used to say in the United States. Despite all that has been said about youth rights, I think it doubtful that the youth of today are given the same leeway they once enjoyed. Their elders, convinced of their own enduring youth, do not register the generational differences that would allow them to see young people as different and to acknowledge their right to be judged by other criteria, their right to discretion. The homogenization of contemporary society makes difference less acceptable, not only when it comes to class, race, and sex, but also age.

Young people express themselves in what they control: their clothes, their speech, and their food. These three facets of culture, I note in passing, are suffused with ritual; they carry a great deal of symbolic weight. To understand the evolution of the deeply held, often unconscious attitudes of young people over the last twenty years would require a meticulous inventory of developments in the above mentioned fields, which I have not attempted. I admit that my remarks are based on personal and entirely inadequate impressions. Nevertheless, I believe I can sketch the broad outline of change during this period.

In the aftermath of the war, when England was still rationing food and clothing using a coupon scheme, the latest in women's fashion caused a scandal. Young women sporting Christian Dior's "new-look," with its long, wide, fabric-hungry skirts, were occasionally assaulted in the queues found outside every grocery store. Wartime egalitarianism evaporated. The return to "normal," to peacetime conditions, meant the return to overt, economic divisions. Yet in men's

fashion, the wind was blowing in other directions. The revolt against wartime restrictions was embodied in the teddy-boys, whose style was that of the cockney street vendors who sold fruit and vegetables and worked the black market on the side, which they could do very efficiently because their only storefront was the back of a greengrocer truck. Their style was a throwback to Edwardian times (hence the moniker Teddy, a diminutive of Edward). They wore trousers gathered at the ankle and wide-lapelled drape coats. They also wore pointed shoes (winkle-pickers), which they would sometimes use as weapons in street fights. The general public did not embrace them, crafting derogatory epithets for good measure (teds and spivs), but the fashion world paid them silent homage. After a year or two, tailors on Savile Row had slimmed their trouser lines and lengthened their jackets. Liberty triumphed, whether in the women's revolt against rationing or in styles borrowed from young cockneys who flouted the authority of the Bobbies. The "natural" affinity between aristocracy and marginalized groups was illustrated yet again. That the economic power of husbands would be displayed through their wives' skirts was not particularly original either.

These fashions did not last: the "new-look" gave way to the pencil skirt, its hemline rising and falling between calf and knee, and men's trouser hems were let out once more. But the time-honored cycles of fashion were about to collapse.

I remember when I went to teach for the first time in the United States, in 1956. Students returning from military service were sporting the so-called "crew cut" hairstyle. They were attached to their "crew man" image, one of youth and virility. A particular gait, a particular style signaled the nonchalant autonomy expected of heroes returning victorious from war. What shocked me was how many of my colleagues had crew cuts, and not just the younger ones. Men forty or fifty years old, including heads of departments and deans, had the same haircut and would go skiing and surfing. They went out of their way to avoid formalities, to the point of appearing puerile at times. They acted their students' age. A few years later, the felt hat had all but vanished from the university, and men who refused to give up on shielding their bare pate from the elements looked for a less old-school headdress with which to replace this traditional symbol of the urban bourgeoisie. Campuses bristled with bright ideas: the Basque beret, caps of leather, straw, or Scottish tweed, "Sherlock Holmes" hats or Russian fur hats. One of my colleagues, not having got to Moscow, wore his wife's fox fur hat. Only the Texans remained loyal to their traditional head wear, the Stetson, which was less a marker of class than it was of Texas. In all of this, university faculty simply had a couple of years' head start on other professionals,

for whom entering fatherhood would come to present no impediment to vanity whatsoever. Aside from the fanciful hats, social mores were moving in much the same direction in England and in France. Hair and beard grew out, unconventional hairstyles cropped up, the crew cut was left to the fogeys, and the would-be youth followed suit.

The response was foreseeable yet no one saw it coming: how could young people imitate those who imitated them? How could they obey those who claimed to be their best friends? They defended themselves against this identity abuse by trying to make themselves inimitable, calling the bluff of those who still claimed to be young despite having taken the reins of power. When you wore blue jeans, you knew dad wouldn't dare copy you. He carried a paunch in the front and more behind and, besides, he could not walk into the office decked out like that. When you wore a miniskirt, it wasn't to wow the boys with the dazzling spectacle of your thighs, but because your mom's friends could not follow suit without showing off their varicose veins. When you didn't wear a bra—even before Women's Lib had turned the garment into a symbol of masculine repression—it might have given you a sense of freedom, but most of all its effect was one that a fifty-year-old woman could never pull off. Youth's first and final right is to have a youthful body!

Beginning with the Yves Saint-Laurent revolution of 1957 ("a woman is ageless," they say he said), youth set the terms of women's fashion, which major designers then took and reworked for the international ready-to-wear market. Fashion reached consumers at the same stage of development, as did artisanal confectionary put into mass production then sold in department stores and organic boutiques alike. Every attempt by young people to distinguish themselves as such was recuperated by the previous generation and by organized consumption.

Youth defended itself as best it could. Tucked in behind a hedge of buildings, a central London alleyway named Carnaby Street unleashed a fashion trend too shocking for the elders to follow. It wasn't just a way of dressing anymore, unisex or otherwise; it was a new way of living. A new kind of store surfaced, with purposefully worn-out décor and names oddly pitched in the affirmative or imperative mode: *I was Lord Kitchener's valet*, *Granny takes a trip* or *Take six*, *Give it a try*. Interactions between retailer and customer were becoming egalitarian—so long to "sir" and "madam." Here was a new "youth culture," which wanted to shock its elders and profane their sacred symbols. Girls wore t-shirts covered with writing, doubtless to draw attention to their chests but above all to break

the rules of feminine modesty. No more dropping the gaze; eyes were good for staring. Color combinations abjured by good taste were all the rage. Boys gave a disheveled twist to military uniforms of times gone by. It was all about offering yourself up as an object cum spectacle, thereby broadcasting your refusal to play the game: no more uniforms as status symbols. The national flag was a ready-made necktie for anyone who had gone without. Girls carried their groceries in plastic bags festooned with the national colors, and the Union Jack ended its career with all the other plastic bags: in the trash, brimming with household waste. Why choose this motif? It's pretty; it's showy; it's blue, white, and red! Emphasizing personal aesthetic preferences was a way of denying the sacred values of the collective or of "de-ritualizing" the flag. In New York, some Americans tried to do the same thing with the "stars and stripes." Lacking a sovereign of flesh and blood, however, the flag is especially sacred in the United States, and the police quickly quashed this attempt at high treason. Youth culture, with its distinctive variations, was spreading everywhere, across the United States and in France. London's major department stores kept pace: to acknowledge youth's triumph, they showcased its beloved styles in special displays set apart from conventional fare, because young people now had more money and would not be told how to spend it. The one kind of discrimination that youth deems legitimate, namely intergenerational difference, was thereby sanctified. Harrods', that bastion of good taste for respectable types, had a way in:[7] beneath the rafters of its neo-baroque palace, a wall of synthesized sound assaulted eardrums while bodies backlit in purple and orange groped in the dark. Incense wafted through the space, as if to mask the scent of marijuana. It was all very "with-it."

As we know, the social structure of Western countries has changed dramatically since the end of the war, which has radically affected economic conditions for the young. No matter how much more money the working class now has (provided they can find a job), the same is not true for the "leisure" class, whose university years stretch well beyond the pre-war standard. As a result, the latter begin earning a living relatively late in life and receive typically less parental assistance in the mean time. A significant increase in income tax left many parents

7. *Translator's note:* Pitt-Rivers used the English term in the text and added a footnote to point out an intended pun. In addition to meaning "entrance," he remarks, "way in" recalls the expression "weigh in" that refers both to the measuring up of a fighter or a racehorse before competition and the more general notion of entering the fray.

feeling that the State, through the very welfare system to which they were contributing so heavily, had shouldered their erstwhile responsibility of paying to prepare their children for life. Accordingly, among the most economically disadvantaged students in England were those whose well-to-do parents were meant to pay for part of their expenses, and often would not. In the United States, people would often say that earning a living was the best form of education; even if parents paid for their children's college tuition, the latter were expected to make their own pocket money during the holidays. For children, the model of the "self-made man" became a point of honor. This attitude, while contrary to the ethos of the traditional French bourgeoisie, has nonetheless been gaining greater and greater traction in France. It is certainly the case that the bourgeois *rentiers* who believed they were wealthy enough to raise a family without their children needing to work for a living have disappeared everywhere. They too now work (even if that only means managing their wealth), and they do not expect their children to go through life without some kind of salaried employment. Besides, you can't put children on your expense account, and most of them refuse to lead a traditional "bourgeois" life anyway. Even if they have the means to do so, they don't. In many ways, bourgeois youth are therefore "downwardly mobile." Working class youth, on the other hand, are largely "upwardly mobile." They have economic benefits and educational opportunities that their parents did not. The collapse of intergenerational solidarity thus responds to contrasting pressures. In the most general terms, working class children need their parents less while well-to-do children no longer receive the amounts needed to visibly maintain their former class status. Between the two, the petit bourgeois traders and crafts people remain firmly in place, safe from intergenerational strife, their children often happy to play the chip off the old block.

Hence, lifestyle differences between the classes were perhaps as significant as ever around 1960 for the over-thirties, yet far less so for the under-thirties. Bourgeois youth responded by symbolically embracing the status of the working class, or rather of a pseudo-working class. No more flagging your background through your manner of speech or way of life. Carefully mended blue jeans giving off that "used" look were *de rigueur*, though where you sewed your patches was more a matter of aesthetics than repairing wear and tear.

Blue jeans are working clothes and originated in the American Far West. They were not germane to Europe at the time young people embraced them. In large part, their popularity was due to the influence of the Western. They carry no class significance. All men in Westerns wear blue jeans except for the

city slicker (a malicious and pathetic type, and a bourgeois in every sense of the term). Jeans are truly clothes for men: they are virile, a thing of nature, of the classless society, of the open plains. No matter how good, bad, or ugly you are, whether you sport a white Stetson or a black one, you will not be a subject of contempt like the city slicker doffing his urbane felt hat. Dressing like the working class would have been tricky for many reasons. Workmen wore overalls (*les bleus de travail*) only on the job and gentrified their appearance after work. Besides, overalls indexed manual labor, and you were still proud of studying and not just working with your hands (even if you did take the occasional manual job during the holidays). The symbols of the working class were taken up only insofar as they represented the "anti-bourgeois." First and foremost, anti-bourgeois clothing means "sartorial chaos," anything "ready-to-waste" by bourgeois standards. In London, you would find ads posted in the underground that read: "Jeans: new £6.50, used £8.25." Meanwhile in Paris, somewhat hip young women from "respectable families" would sing along to that Jacques Brel ditty: "the bourgeois are just like pigs, the older they get, the dumber they get" (*les bourgeois, c'est comme des cochons, plus ça devient vieux, plus ça devient bête*). Not only did this genial formula unite in a single phrase the criteria of class and age whose overlap would spark the 1968 student uprising, it also expelled the class traitor (the parental generation) from the human community. On the language front, London's youth adopted quasi-cockney accents, whereas speaking à la-*Zazie dans le metro* took off in Paris.[8] Both styles of speech differed markedly from genuinely "proletarian" talk, yet they violated bourgeois codes of linguistic conduct nonetheless. The bourgeoisie produced by the British public school system shared a common class accent, spurned accordingly; the French bourgeoisie spoke in different regional accents, so out went the elocution and grammatical propriety upon which its self-respect relied.

8. *Translator's note*: *Zazie dans le Métro* was a 1960 French film by Louis Malle, adapted from the novel of the same name by Raymond Queneau. Zazie is a carefree teenage girl who visits her uncle in Paris while her mother is on an amorous getaway. A straight talker, brash and precocious, Zazie shows no more respect for adults than they do for youth. Upset that a labor strike means she cannot ride on the metro, she takes the city of Paris for a ride instead, bowling over taxis and tourists, street signs and street workers, dance hall bouncers and brawlers. Queneau and Malle took Zazie's play seriously, being studiously irreverent with the novelistic and filmic conventions of the time.

The great postwar expansion of higher education ushered into university amphitheaters an increasingly diverse range of students in terms of age and social class (though the majority remained drawn from the middle classes). The education system itself, however, changed only around the edges. It was still dedicated to "training men" by providing them with a general humanist education as well as an opportunity to find their path in life. English universities, where sport carried far greater prestige than it did elsewhere and than it does now, once proclaimed this as their explicit mission. Throughout the British press, students were presented as sportsmen first and foremost, and "winning" the right to wear university colors was worth more than academic excellence on the professional job market. "Doing" university confirmed class status. Aside from the obsession with ball and oar, study in France carried more or less the same meaning. In short, study has only ever been an apprenticeship for those wanting to become teachers—except for students of medicine, where the system of teaching as well as the students' response was quite different.

The beneficiaries of university expansion displayed less enthusiasm than was hoped for. A malaise set in during the 1950s, brought on by a group of students who repudiated upward social mobility. They were known as the beat generation. A few years later, an opposition movement emerged: it challenged national political priorities, especially on the question of overseas military interventions. Ultimately, this disaffection seized upon higher education itself as a way of assigning students a role within the very "class society" they rejected. Students took up an ambivalent attitude towards their own circumstances, which appeared to be going nowhere fast, even before the job market contracted. University seemed to be a holding pattern on the pathway to adulthood. The Situationists' 1966 analysis, *On the Poverty of Student Life* (Strasbourg, U.N.E.F. 1966)ended up reading like an Evelyn Waugh witticism: "prolonged study amounts to prolonging adolescence."[9]

---

9. *Translator's note*: This does not appear to be a direct quote from either Evelyn Waugh or the Situationist text, but rather Pitt-Rivers own quip on the takeaway of both texts. The line certainly evokes a key theme of Waugh's opus, particularly *Brideshead Revisited*, in which the protagonist reminisces about his Oxford days in the following terms: "I could tell him that all the wickedness of that time was like the spirit they mix with the pure grape of the Douro, heady stuff full of dark ingredients; it at once enriched and retarded the whole process of adolescence as the spirit checks the fermentation of the wine, renders it undrinkable, so that it must lie in the dark, year in, year out, until it is brought up at last fit for the table" (1993 [1945]: 39).

Nevertheless, if student activists saw their university milieu as a social vacuum, those without took a different view. Relative to young people from other social classes, students were more advanced in age yet less mature in status. Older generations criticized them while young workers and craftspeople imitated them, growing out their hair and beards while their parents (nary a would-be youth among them) flaunted their bourgeois Sunday best. What students staged, as it were, was the idleness readily associated with the former ruling class: taking long summer vacations, traveling abroad, acquiring "culture." Unlike their working class age-mates, associating with the next generation on the job did not impugn the students' status as youth. They represented the very ideal of youth, regardless of the fact that many paid their way for years before studying and others undertook employment throughout.

Youth solidarity comes before everything else. Student solidarity in the face of the university establishment means that any display of authority—even when it involves protecting the "goodies" from the "baddies," by punishing book theft and plagiarism for instance—immediately triggers a united counter-response. "Student admission," it turns out, is an outrageous idea because it represents the greatest ignominy of all: the elders' right to judge the young. In 1968, the primacy of generational solidarity took multiple forms, including the fact that the most criticized professors were not the "old farts," so overwhelmed by the situation that they had nothing to add anyway, but those who tried to lead the revolt and so immediately drew suspicion. They were thought to be acting self-interestedly, with a view to self-aggrandizement. By contrast, the labor unions, which plainly benefited from these unforeseen events, were not repudiated precisely because they made no attempt to exercise authority over students. They represented legitimate revolt, and that sufficed. During the massive march through Paris on May 13th, no students were offended by the fact that the banners they carried read "Students and Workers United," whereas none of the banners held aloft by the unionists returned this gesture of friendship by proclaiming worker solidarity with the students. Young cardholders of the CGT union nevertheless broke ranks at a later demonstration and marched alongside students. These young workers, I would suggest, confirm my theory that the fundamental driver behind these events was intergenerational struggle[10]—to say nothing of other young

10. Although, according to Alain Touraine, this very same incident discounts the explanatory power of intergenerational struggle: "The participation of young

workers who joined students on the barricades or those whose avowed enthusiasm for the student cause created internal divisions within the union movement.

During a television appearance at the height of the crisis, Georges Séguy, feigning innocence, asked: "Cohn-Bendit, who's that?" His act did not raise a single eyebrow. When I pointed this out to one of my students, he responded forlornly that it was all to be expected since the Communist party was a right wing party.[11]

Youth solidarity has its international dimension. One never criticizes someone on the basis of their nationality, for national governments are the plaything of the older generation.[12] Young people bear no responsibility for what their "nation" does. Morally speaking, they do not belong to it. The general hostility French students expressed toward the United States, that bourgeois and imperialist nation par excellence, did not entail critique of the American students they knew personally, nor did it prevent French students from wearing t-shirts emblazoned with the names of American universities (though they would have struggled to place them on a map).

Feeling rejected, young people declared solidarity with anyone on the margins, with the oppressed of the world. All-encompassing egalitarianism obliterated bygone differences. "We are all German Jews."[13] Hence, Native Americans,

---

workers, manual laborers, and employees in the demonstrations and barricades was important and grew steadily, as police arrest numbers show. But were they participating as *workers*? The diversity of professions represented would lead us to think that they joined the student action rather as *young* people. Nevertheless, this interpretation is not always sufficient. It is false in certain very clear cases, as on May 24th when, as we saw, young members of the CGT. left the union march to join the student demonstration" (Touraine 1971: 213). This conclusion comes as a surprise from an author who has otherwise drawn important attention to the role of the generational divide in the events of May 1968.

11. *Translator's note:* In 1968, Georges Séguy was the general secretary of the CGT union and a member of the central committee of the French Communist Party, while Daniel Cohn-Bendit was one of the most high-profile leaders of the student movement, referred to in the press as "Danny le Rouge" for the color of his hair and tenor of his politics.

12. This is no longer entirely the case, Jacques Lautman tells me, for third world students have boycotted French students for being French. Is this revenge for racism experienced outside of the university milieu?

13. *Translator's note:* This is a version of a well-known chant from the May 1968 uprising, which subverted attempts to malign student leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit as a revenant Karl Marx given his German citizenship and religious background.

in a manner wholly unlike that of Fenimore Cooper, supplied fashion accessories, the most conspicuous of which were the headbands needed to keep long hair under control. Not only Native Americans (*les Indiens*), but also Blacks, the working class, homosexuals, women, and any other group that fit under the title "oppressed." All discrimination was immoral, and unisex clothing was a way of renouncing discrimination between the sexes. Discriminatory signage was torn from university bathroom doors.

Unisex clothing was not a great success. Most were content simply to swap a few symbolic items with the opposite sex: men carried handbags and wore fur coats; women donned blue jeans and neckties. Hairdressers opened their doors to men and women alike. The miniskirt went out of fashion, first in favor of the gypsy skirt (*jupe gitane*) and then the peasant skirt (*jupe paysanne*). Indeed, learned elites came to judge the peasantry favorably, after having inflicted two thousand years of contempt and misery on them, and just as Henri Mendras announced the peasantry's demise![14] Young historians took more interest in the memoir of the humble farrier (*maréchal-ferrant*) than that of the noble marshal (*maréchal de France*), and sales figures for rural sagas climbed to heights once known only to the detective novel.

Beginning in 1970, Laura Ashley's style took us back to the turn of the century. One might have thought that, by embracing the look of the traditional peasantry and the colonial, racist, rent-seeking bourgeoisie in their prime, young people had thrown in their lot with tradition. But such was not the meaning of this fresh departure. Far from it! They were not reviving fashions from their parents' generation but from that of their grandparents. The principle of alternating generations, so dear to Radcliffe-Brown, can be applied anew. In brief, this theory explains that the tie that binds alternating generations (who have nothing to fear from one another) derives from the ambivalence parents feel towards their children, who give them parental status (equivalent to adulthood in many societies) yet at the same time are fated to replace them (when reaching adulthood themselves). This alliance is evident in many settings: in kinship terminology systems where a single kin term denotes grandparent and grandchild alike and is used reciprocally between the two; in the customs whereby grandparents spoil grandchildren rotten yet have no hand whatsoever in disciplining them; and

14. *Translator's note:* Pitt-Rivers is referring to sociologist Henri Mendras' controversial 1967 economic history of French agriculture, *The End of Peasantry*. Mendras edited the collection in which this essay was originally published.

through manifold symbolic practices, the enumeration of which would make for tedious reading. In our own case, we witnessed young people imitating their grandparents in order to express Oedipal hostility towards parents who refused to make way for them. Hence "*Granny*" *takes a trip*, and you were glad to be of service to Lord Kitchener, the grandfatherly figure *par excellence* who symbolized the First World War, not the Second (in which the parents of the time brought home all the glory). In order to challenge your parents, you took up a style that reminded them of the generation they challenged. Hairstyles from the turn of the century thus made a repeat appearance. Beards, which perhaps at first were mere signs of adulthood or sympathy for Cuba, came to signify, when put in relation to other elements *en vogue*, identification with grandfather's image. Once again, meaning is given through the opposition of generations, and reference to social class is secondary.

Clothing is similar to ritual insofar as both are tangible manifestations of symbolic values. They are material proof of what would remain purely hypothetical were it expressed only in words: he who wears the crown is king. The habit does not make the monk, but its loss leads surely to defrocking. Ritual legitimizes the social order. But it is the legitimacy of order that was contested in the youth uprisings and cast further into doubt by the response of the elders. It is hardly surprising that traditional rituals are now like untended graves. Why get married if being married no longer bestows adult status? (This is especially so at university, where nothing distinguishes married students from single ones: I never know if I am meant to call my students "Mrs." or "Miss.") If, as Gorer thinks, death has become a taboo subject, much as sexual relations once were, it is little wonder that no one wears mourning.[15] Gone are the black armbands from men's sleeves, and when you run into a girl dressed all in black at university, it is best not to assume she has recently lost her parents. She is probably just bewitched by the latest trend, or she is going for the witch look *tout court*. Rites of passage have grown weaker across the board. The "authorities" also subscribe to this dismantling of traditional ritual. Initiation rites in both army and school have been forgotten. We stopped, ages ago, playing "God Save the Queen" in London cinemas; audiences would no longer stand to attention but started looking for their coats and heading for the exits instead. The baptism ritual has been abridged, and ritual kinship (dubbed "spiritual" kinship in official Church

15. In France, given Catholic tradition, funeral rites are more closely adhered to than they are in England.

nomenclature), was all but done away with by Vatican II. Liturgical reform took a similar course. Cultural pilgrimage, for educational rather than ritual purposes, has replaced and is sometimes mistaken for religious pilgrimage. Outside of major State ceremonies, power hides. The powerful CEOs drive around in a mini or, for a more sporting effect, on scooters. The super rich still put on lavish displays, but only among their own kind, in secret. Ariès tells us that the funeral cult is in decline (1975: Ch. 7).

We wait for a legitimate order, and new forms of conduct emerge as we wait; they may not yet be recognizable as ritual, but they call to mind ritual forms already familiar to us. In the world of sports, crowd behavior reaches ecstatic levels but is organized spontaneously, according to normal expectations. (Individual competitiveness is disapproved of by young people, yet public competition provokes religious fervor.) Political discourse revolves around fetishes. Officialdom speaks a language that is more and more narcissistic.[16] Commensality reigns over the business world: gone are the days when you needed a head for numbers (that's what your pocket computer is for), now you need a hardy digestive tract. I know someone who set aside his ambition to become Lord Mayor of London—the honorific leader of the city's top businessmen—when he realized his stomach could not withstand it. You "demonstrate" because your moral conscience commands it, not because your interests are threatened. Hence, you do not express demands so much as opinions, and you spray these opinions on the walls around you so that your feelings are on full display, just like the public decrees of those in charge. Confrontations generate their own game rules, the point of which is to create a structure of disagreement without having to sort out the consequences.

If one acknowledges the distinction between structure and event at the heart of Lévi-Straussian structuralism, the "events of May 1968" can only be seen as a ritualized rejection of an obsolete moral structure. The symbolic meaning of the deeds of the day as well as the millenarian enthusiasm that accompanied them suggest that the stakes were not practical in the least: the goal was moral. Street clashes, especially in the first week, unfolded without any regard for tactics. They took the form of a vast collective representation designed to show that students were no longer to be treated like children. All of their demands revolved around

16. Despite his familiarity with the machinations of bureaucracy, a friend put it thus: "When a bureaucrat sends you a five-page letter, you are better off speaking with him in person to find out what he wants to say."

their right to adult status: to lead their sexual lives as they saw fit (as grown-ups do, but without their "hypocrisy" because "young people make love, adults make obscene gestures"[17]), to regulate their own affairs, among themselves, beyond the jurisdiction of the elders, to rule over their own domain. This was an autonomist movement, a declaration of the Republic of Youth. Otherwise, students demanded the right to be listened to on all subjects on which they had an opinion not shared by the previous generation—on everything, in other words.

In organizing their supporters, student union officials displayed a speed and effectiveness that took many by surprise, and police commissioner Grimaud gave them due credit for it (1977). During the first protest march held on May 7th, the boys and girls who linked arms to separate demonstrators from onlookers resembled dancers at a peasant carnival in sixteenth century Holland more than officials at a political demonstration keeping the crowd at bay, yet their organization was impeccable. For the entire month, they managed to ensure that the marches did not devolve into mass riots. Meanwhile, law enforcement feared the worst—namely, that someone might open fire—and preventing this was its overriding concern. Grimaud (bless his calm wisdom!) recalls that this risk shaped his thinking on troop deployments. He wanted to be sure that small contingents were never separated from the march, subsequently overwhelmed, and then forced into taking drastic measures to get away. Riot police therefore had to stay in formation and were forbidden from counter-maneuvering to crush their assailants. Accordingly, the warring parties appeared to strike an instant bargain over the rules of engagement for this strange battle in which neither side was playing to win. The conflict's only goal was the fight itself. As a result, hostilities would peter out or boil over at the whim of the combatants, because ultimately both sides just wanted to return home—back to the Sorbonne for the students, once the powers that be had made way for them, and back to the kitchen table for the riot police.

There was no strategy to the clashes themselves, despite all that was said in the press and in bourgeois living rooms about urban warfare specialists sent over from China. Pity the Chinese! (Grimaud, who ought to know better than anyone, showed that such stories were baseless.) The fight played out like a caricature of the Battle of Fontenoy:[18] the riot police lined up on one side—looking

---

17. *L'enragé*, 1, 2eme trimester 1968, dernière page.
18. *Translator's note:* The Battle of Fontenoy was a key moment in the War of Austrian Succession, in which the French army led by the Maréchal de Saxe barely

dark and sinister, decked out in helmets, shields, and batons—and faced intrepid boys and girls on the other—with their bicycle chains, broomsticks, trash can lids, red flags, and hair flying in the wind. One side hurled canisters of teargas, the other cobblestones. They fought on boulevards wide enough for everyone to join in, and the adjoining streets were empty except for the spectators. Neither side protected their flanks. I was like Pierre Bezukhov at Borodino (though did not take the same risks), and I wondered what would happen if the students attempted to attack the police from behind, launching cobblestones at their exposed backs.[19] Only in June did the students begin training commandos, and even then it appears they never used them for tactical ends. How could they? They had neither a command structure nor a clear objective, and strategic thinking is impossible without these preconditions.

The placement of the initial barricades exemplifies all this. Students had taken to digging up cobblestones to use as projectiles from the very first street clashes, and later used them for building barricades. On the evening of May 10th, they erected something of a fortress near Place Edmond-Rostand. Rarely has a battlefield been organized with such disregard for tactics, with such concern for symbolism—not since the Battle of Karbala, when Hussein's followers spent the night before battle digging a trench at their rear, filling it with sticks to set fire to the next morning, so they could fight with their backs to the flames. At Place Edmond-Rostand, the fences in the Jardin du Luxembourg barred the students' retreat, and they were exposed to attack from five sides. Incidentally, the only things to defend in the square were a couple of triton statues in a fountain and the glory of a poet for whom the heroic gesture was a value in and

defeated an alliance of Dutch, British, and Hanoverian troops led by the Duke of Cumberland. Pitt-Rivers appears to have chosen this reference given the somewhat ambiguous French victory and strategic choices made on the day. Unable to break through the French flanks, Cumberland decided to attack the center of the French army without protecting his own flanks. Though they broke through the French front lines, the Allied column was ultimately thwarted by repeated and relentless counter-maneuvers by the French marshal.

19. *Translator's note:* Pitt-Rivers is referencing a scene in Tolstoy's *War and Peace* in which the protagonist Bezukhov witnesses and recounts the fighting at the 1812 Battle of Borodino during the Napoleonic Wars. Borodino was an ambiguous victory for Napoleon, who won the day yet failed to decisively defeat the Russian forces, his troops decimated and exhausted before the final push to Moscow. Tolstoy's scene at Borodino reflects upon the difficulty of reporting "objectively" on such scenes of war, with Bezukhov at one point helping carry munitions for a Russian artillery position, to which Pitt-Rivers' "risk taking" aside no doubt alludes.

of itself.[20] Nevertheless, they had to be on the boulevard Saint-Michel (it was a sacred site to the "closed and basically autonomous world" that is "youth-ness"), and the riot police had cordoned the other end off. In fact, it would be inappropriate to criticize the barricades' positions in military terms, for they had no utility from that point of view.

In suggesting that the clashes of May 1968 were not driven by tactical judgment, I am not trying to denigrate the students' deeds but merely to explain their nature. Thirteen centuries after the fact, Shia Islam continues to honor the heroic martyrs of the Battle of Karbala. Battles owe their place in history to their symbolic value. May 1968 was important in this respect alone, and after fulfilling this role it was nothing but trivial unrest that subsided for lack of purpose. It will nevertheless remain an important date in the history of the West for it marks the transition from one society to another, one that will never be motivated in the same way again. It was the rite of passage of an entire generation.

Are we witnessing a "return to order" (*"rentrée dans l'ordre"*) like the one that followed the war between the age cohorts among the Kipsigis? History is always on the side of the young, but time is against them. Young people from fifteen years ago are now approaching their forties, having entered parenthood in the meantime. Men have cut their hair, Jacques Brel is dead, and Dr. Spock is disproven. Young people aren't libertines anymore; perhaps they never were, or no more so than generations gone by. Perhaps they were pretending all along, in order to upset their elders and demand the right to behave as they saw fit. Trial marriage, a sensible institution that four hundred years of missionary work in the Andes failed to eradicate, is now embraced by bourgeois parents. Consider, however, that while the household division of labor has been adjusted in some families where the mother works, its affective foundations remain the same. Universities, though disheartened, are calm, and "demonstrating," which has now become a standard form of political action, is done for concrete and specific reasons. The imagination is no longer all-powerful: the punks, who wanted to carry the cultural revolution through to the end, cut themselves off, and are

20. *Translator's note:* Edmond Rostand (1868-1918) was a French poet and playwright, best known as the author of *Cyrano de Bergerac*. The play's eponymous protagonist is a brash and outspoken man of many talents, notorious for his inveterate romanticism and unfortunate appearance. Cyrano dies fighting enemies real and imaginary, but refuses to let death take his most prized possession, his "panache."

now a trifling cult spectacle like the Buddhist monks on Oxford Street or the Boulevard Saint Germain.

This return to normal feels like the aftermath of a millenarian movement: there is certainly disappointment, but it is not easy to understand what one hoped for in the first place. Like every older generation, ours has forgotten what it was like to be young, and the youth of today do not know what life was like before May 1968. But the normal to which we have returned is not the same as before.[21] Order has been restored in the sense that public security is no longer at risk, but might this be just a lull in the storm? Should we interpret these events as a "ritual rebellion" whose cathartic effect holds our society's authoritarian order in place by releasing some of the hostile feelings it generates? If so, the ritual will need to be repeated in each generation, for the obstacles placed in youth's way have not been eliminated: jobs are harder to come by, and youth itself, as a social status, has not been given a higher value. Or was terrifying the elders sufficient? Did it transform, once and for all, something intangible yet essential to the behavior of future generations? Will the old veterans of 1968 cling to their youth at the expense of the next cohort of warriors? Will they understand their children better? It is too early to tell.

21. *Translator's note*: In the original, Pitt-Rivers makes a reference to the edited volume the essay was published in, noting that the other pieces in the book are further proof that this "new normal" has arrived.

CHAPTER 16

The fate of Shechem or the politics of sex*

PROLOGUE

I was a pious child and around the age of ten I set out upon an enterprise that I considered necessary for my salvation: to read every word of the Bible. I started at the beginning and I intended to continue until I reached the end. I had not finished the Book of Genesis before I ran into difficulties. The stories I found myself reading seemed, apart from their basic improbability, anything but edifying. I possessed no vocabulary by which to identify the behavior I encountered, but I sensed that practices such as incest, fratricide, filiocide, wife-lending, polygamy, homosexuality, and prostitution were wrong. I did not know what a "whore" was and my teachers seemed curiously incapable of explaining. Concubines, they said, were "domestic slaves," so we adapted the word "conk" for relationships of subordination in our games. I still remember the troubled amazement on the master's face when he heard me cry merrily "Smith Minor is my conk this week, next week I shall sell him and have someone else." Cheating, deceit, and treachery were rampant and seldom apparently condemned—Cain was an exception though even he ended up "protected," but Laban cheated Jacob

* "The fate of Shechem or the politics of sex" was first published in 1977 as part of Julian Pitt-Rivers' volume of the same name and is reproduced here with permission from Cambridge University Press.

and was robbed in revenge by his own daughters. The Pharaoh had Abram's wife, and Lot's daughters, spurned by the Sodomites to whom they were offered gratis, had Lot, having inebriated the old man first. It seemed positively unfair that Adam and Eve should have been cast out of Eden for such a trivial peccadillo as eating an apple off the wrong tree—in the cause of acquiring knowledge, which, as I understood it, was what I had been sent to school for. What should I conclude from such tales? They were not the moral lessons I had led myself to expect and if my faith failed to founder straight away it was only because I was convinced of the sacredness of Genesis. It was not moral truth that was being expounded, I realized, but historical truth and if God had allowed such events to occur it could only be that in His wisdom He had decided to accept the imperfection of human nature and hold in abeyance the divine message of the text. Caught upon the horns of theodicy I already faced unknowingly the problem of the relationship between events and the significance attached to them afterwards or, putting it the other way round, between the lessons of the past and the events that inspired them—the relationship between myth and history, if you will—which underlies the more strictly anthropological problems confronted in this chapter. The reader eager to know the fate of Shechem may perhaps afford to skip the next three sections.

I

The reverence with which I once treated this text has long since been replaced by the respect which an anthropologist owes it, and if there remains much that I am unable to explain I think that anthropology has helped me to make sense of much more. If, as has been suggested, it is in the first place an origin myth of an ancient Middle Eastern tribe it falls clearly within the province of anthropology and if, on the contrary, it is to be treated as history then it is hardly less so, for it is the history not only of a people of an *other* culture but of a kind of society that is only studied elsewhere by anthropologists. Indeed, it is hard to see how anybody would dare today to embark upon the study of Genesis without first equipping himself with a modicum of anthropological knowledge, for without it he has no comparative dimension in which to assess the meaning and functioning of the institutions described therein. This is not saying that I think I know more about the Bible than those who have devoted their whole life's work to its study—I know no Hebrew and my knowledge of the commentaries

is scanty, to say the least—but there are problems in the elucidation of Genesis that can only be approached from an anthropological standpoint, so I would like to think that my experience of other cultures may in some degree compensate for my ignorance and inexperience in the realm of Bible studies, and that what I have to say may nevertheless not be without interest for those who know so much more than I do.

I am not by any means the first anthropologist to be attracted by the challenge that Genesis presents. First of all, there was Frazer who found in it validation for his view of primitive mentality. His explanation of the story of the Fall of Man which opens the first volume of *Folklore in the Old Testament* remains one of the great passages in anthropological literature. He believed that symbolic values could be interpreted by reference to universal properties attaching to different objects and that these were to be discovered in myths from other parts of the world. The significance of the serpent was provided by the fact that this reptile sheds its skin and thereby appears to escape mortality, for its old life is cast off at the end of its term yet the beast lives on. The association of serpents with immortality is identified in myths from many other parts of the world. The message whose sense is inverted is another theme which Frazer found in other mythologies relating the loss of eternal life and he wove this too into his explanation of the Garden of Eden: man was cheated of eternal life by the serpent who thus acquired it. Such a method, which was typical of his epoch, ignores the discreteness of cultures assuming that it is a question of how people think and that all primitive people think alike—a highly ethnocentric supposition—and it leads to arbitrariness in argument, since one can always find similarities somewhere to justify the significance attributed to any given symbol. It also led to the endless string of examples which enabled Frazer to fill so many volumes and thereby earn for himself a reputation for scholarship among his contemporaries and the distrust of future generations of anthropologists. But Frazer is silent about the problem which concerns me, the basis of the rule of endogamy, which has come to be accepted as the first principle of Mediterranean marriage, and this is all the more extraordinary since he paid attention to the marriage of cousins in the Old Testament. Frazer's view of kinship was anything but systematic and this is perhaps the explanation, but his successors have attempted to set this right. The most eminent of these, Sir Edmund Leach, who is also Frazer's most severe critic, has offered us a very different interpretation of the Old Testament, first of all in a demonstration of structural analysis entitled, "Lévi-Strauss in the Garden of Eden" (Leach 1961a) which he

followed with a second essay "Genesis as Myth" (Leach 1969). In a third essay on the Old Testament the problem of kinship is attacked in relation to the "Legitimacy of Solomon" (Leach 1969: 25–85). Here he adopts again "an explicitly Lévi-Straussian procedure" (Leach 1969: 25) though he expresses doubts about his grasp of certain aspects of Lévi-Strauss' thought. The procedure that he employs is to identify patterns of binary oppositions constituting a structure which recurs in different places in the text of the Old Testament, transformed or inverted into a mirror-image, and which is founded upon a theme on which his analysis focuses. The theme is a major contradiction between, on the one hand, a theological dogma, the promise of the land of Palestine to the descendants of Abraham, which he thinks implies the preference for endogamy (since in order to inherit this land the Israelites must be pure in blood and in religion) and on the other "a less idealized form of tradition" constituted by the *fact* that the population of Palestine consists of a mixture of peoples intermarrying freely (Leach 1969: 31). The early chapters of the Old Testament are concerned with the question "how foreign is foreign?": from the point of view of endogamy how closely related must a spouse be for the offspring to be legitimate? The function of the text, whether myth or history, is to mediate this contradiction. "The facts and the politico-religious theories are not mutually compatible" (Leach 1969: 54) and the Biblical account produces apparent "solutions" to this fundamental contradiction (which is irresolvable in reality) by glossing it over, making Solomon appear at the same time pure in descent yet also descended from the original owners of the land of Canaan, from Esau the Edomite and from Heth the Canaanite (Leach 1969: 64). This dual, if contradictory, attribution of descent also overcomes a second logical contradiction: that the Israelites' claim to the land is founded upon the right of conquest when they have conquered it, but remains valid subsequently despite conquest by others when the land is taken from them. The ambiguous status of the northern kingdom, Israelite in origin but opposed to Judah, makes the resolution of this conflict easier, for it can be considered, according to circumstances, either as belonging to the chosen people or opposed to them.

The demonstration includes discussions of the relationship of myth and history. The document must be treated as a unity, he says, regardless of the origins of different texts. Hence "the historical portions of the Old Testament constitute a unitary myth-history which functioned as a justification for the state of Jewish society at a time when this part of the Biblical text achieved approximate canonical stability" (Leach 1969: 81) and "To assess these structures we do not

need to know how particular stories came to assume their present form nor the dates at which they were written" (Leach 1969: 33). Thus he sets out "to demonstrate the existence of structural order . . . in specifically chronological sequences of events as recorded in Biblical history" (Leach 1969: 65) and he does this by reducing the narrative from 1 Samuel (4) to 2 Kings (2) to a "pattern" and arranging it as a three-act play developing, in parallel, two themes: sex relations and political relations.

While paying tribute to the richness of observation, and the subtlety of the arguments, I have to admit firstly that I am not sure that I have followed them all correctly and secondly that this does not look to me very much like Lévi-Strauss' method, at least in its entirety, but rather more like certain aspects of it put to the service of quite different premises and aims.

To begin with, the treatment of the genealogies in the text is assumed to validate the geographical location of the tribes in accordance with the British tradition of studies, not of myth, but of social structures on the ground. (Evans-Pritchard and Peters are explicitly referred to.) This seems closer to Malinowski than to Lévi-Strauss, as indeed does the notion of the function of Solomon's legitimacy which differs from Malinowski's notion of a charter only by being founded upon a paradox which it mediates, rather than upon a direct demonstration of what it validates. Even in this respect the difference is slight for Malinowski pointed to "a special class of mythological stories which justify and account for the anomalous state of affairs" created by "a conflict of principles" when the rule "that land and authority belong to those who are literally born out of it" is endangered by the arrival of "members of a sub-clan of high rank who choose to settle down in a new locality" and who "cannot very well be resisted by the autochthons" (Malinowski 1954: 72–124). Moreover, the method of "drastically reducing" the elements of the story in order to bring the pattern into evidence (Leach 1969: 74) and permit its representation as a three-act play does not look to me like a Lévi-Straussian procedure at all, for Lévi-Strauss has always insisted on the necessity to conserve all the details of a myth, that is to say *not* to reduce it.

But the chief difficulty concerns the validity of the enterprise in the first place which Lévi-Strauss has always denied, asserting that his method cannot be applied to a document that has passed through the processes of literary editing which places it in another class, no longer the unadulterated product of the structure of mind but deformed by the constraints of social life during the epochs of its reinterpretation. In reply to Ricoeur, who suggested that his

method was applicable only to non-literate peoples but who maintained on theoretical grounds that there must be one and only one explanation of mythology, Lévi-Strauss remarked that his position was extremely prudent and *nuancée* (Lévi-Strauss 1963b: 631)[1] but his fundamental objection is that edited myths have been rehandled with a different aim in view in a different social context and therefore they have become a different intellectual operation.[2]

Leach (1969) does not appreciate the difference between pure and edited myth: "Lévi-Strauss uses a narrow definition of myth which makes it appear that the myths of contemporary Amerindians are cultural products of an entirely different kind from the mythical-historical traditions of the Jewish people in the first century B.C. My own view is that this distinction is quite artificial and that the structural analysis of myth should be equally applicable to both the time of men and the time of Gods" (114).

Leach has quite a lot to say about history in this essay, but he does not refer to Lévi-Strauss' views on this subject other than to point out that the latter views "ethnology and history as complementary but quite distinct forms of enquiry."[3] This is all the more surprising in view of the enormous importance of history in Levi-Strauss' theory from the very beginning of his work up to and throughout the *Mythologiques.* Moreover, the relation between myth and history must surely be primordial to a theory of myth since both are representations of the past. Leach (1969) lumps them together as "myth-history" (81). Lévi-Strauss sees them as different mental operations belonging to different types of society.

To sum up, then, Lévi-Strauss refuses to deal with Genesis as myth. Leach (1969) sees no reason not to; he uses what he believes to be Lévi-Strauss' method but refuses to restrict it to what he calls "myth proper" (38), i.e., the myths of simple non-literate societies uncorrupted by editors. I accept Lévi-Strauss' limitation of his method to such societies and have attempted to elaborate a rather different method for the Book of Genesis, which I believe takes account of the problem of history that Leach appears to me to evade.

---

1. The whole passage (Lévi-Strauss 1963b: 629-35) is a clear exposition of Lévi-Strauss' argument in this regard.
2. There is nonetheless a mythological residue in the Old Testament (Lévi-Strauss 1963b: 632).
3. An unfortunate editorial slip gives the wrong reference for this view which clearly comes, not as attributed, but from the Introduction to *Anthropologie Structurale* (Lévi-Strauss 1963a).

II

There are many theories of myth which I shall not go into, but I would note like Percy Cohen (1969) that they are not mutually exclusive; each can be valued for what it explains. Among British social anthropologists the influence of Malinowski's thinking on this subject was preponderant until a decade ago and, since one can distinguish several theories of myth in his work, it is worth examining what he thought were the functions of myth, for they are all related to its effects upon practical life. First of all, in *Argonauts of the Western Pacific,* he perceived that they give meaning to geographical features:[4] nature and the environment are represented and explained in the natives' minds by the stories about them which act as mnemonic devices in this way. In "Baloma, the spirits of the dead" (Malinowski 1954: 149–274), it had already been shown how myths lend authority to beliefs regarding such transcendental matters as the behavior of ghosts and a connection is thus established with mortuary customs which take account of these beliefs. Beliefs in the supernatural world provide in the *Argonauts* the authority for practical functions in relation to the organization of labor required for canoe-building or to the practices employed in fishing and gardening. He also perceived that they strengthen the morale of the natives and give them heart to face the rigors of work on land and the dangers of seafaring. By connecting myth with belief and belief with social organization Malinowski (1954) came to elaborate his final theory of myth as a charter for customs and social institutions and this he expounded in "Myth in Primitive Psychology" (93–148), together with the psychological theory already mentioned.

Malinowski distinguished between different kinds of mythical pronouncement, ranging from sacred myth via historical tale to idle tale intended only to entertain, and certainly we must recognize, not only that among the Trobrianders there are different kinds of oral literature, but that as Radin and Kroeber had already observed all cultures do not provide myths identical in character and in quantity; some are rich and some are poor in myth. But these distinctions gave rise to no further theoretical considerations and were subsequently ignored. Moreover, though Malinowski (1954) states that the way in which the

4. It is not without interest that Lévi-Strauss in his discussion with Ricoeur (Lévi-Strauss 1963b: 634) at one point invokes precisely this function of myth in order to deny that the myths of the Australian Aborigines are lacking in "kerygmatic" sense (see below, n. 10). He would appear then to look more kindly upon Malinowski's theory expressed in *Argonauts* (1922) than upon his subsequent elaborations.

natives regarded the sacred myths was very different from their attitude to the other two classes of stories (107) he was not always able to distinguish them himself, for the same story is told (103) as sacred myth that is cited in the *Argonauts* (Malinowski 1922: 307) as a fairytale.

Under Malinowski's influence it came to be accepted that myth serves the function of fixing certain values in the minds of people and acts thus as a charter which validates the social structure. This view has much in common with Durkheim's view of religion and, like it, it is not so much wrong as inadequate to explain more than one aspect of the phenomenon. This it does moreover in a rather unmethodical way since it provides no clear rules of interpretation.[5] Whatever connection comes to mind will do by way of explanation. Nor is one ever difficult to find, since, given that cultures possess a certain intellectual unity, the same concepts and assumptions appear both in the myths and in other aspects of discourse connected with daily life. Myth reinforces custom in this sense if one is sufficiently selective in the choice of myths, but it throws no fresh light on social structure which is better investigated directly and for this reason such attention as the subject received for the next generation was limited to invoking myths in illustration where appropriate rather than as in itself a worthwhile subject for study.[6] In addition, this theory of myth, unlike Malinowski's first theory, takes little heed of what a whole myth means to the people who tell it. Though he frequently insists on the importance of "the native ideas" he relates then only to particular institutions, pointing out that without an understanding of them one would misinterpret the myth. The fantasy employed in myth is left on one side unless it can be connected directly with the experience of the natives. In short it ignores all those features of myth that caused other scholars to liken it to dream whose essence is precisely as Freud showed that it should *not* be interpreted consciously by the dreamer but should convey a cryptic message that consciousness represses.

Lévi-Strauss (whose work often has Freudian undertones) produced a much more sophisticated theory of myth which brought in the factors Malinowski had ignored and provided a method for ordering the detail of myth and

5. See "The law of hospitality" in this volume (Chapter 7), where Malinowski's interpretation of myth as a social charter is considered in relation to Zeus' appearance as a beggar.

6. There is no contemporary equivalent among the British anthropologists to the study of myth in France by the school of M. Griaule and indeed the first is by Jack Goody (1972).

explaining the variation between differing versions of the same myth—a consideration which never crossed Malinowski's mind. Moreover he overcomes the difficulty that myths so often appear to be advocating the opposite of what society requires, by searching for its meaning in the structures that lie behind consciousness—"myths get thought in the minds of men, unbeknown to them."[7] But while he pays great attention to the general cultural setting and even more to the geographical setting and uses it in a far more significant way than Malinowski, he seems unconcerned with the social use of myths—how they are handled in daily life—and not much troubled by the fact that most of the myths he analyses were recorded not in the vernacular but in the language of the ethnographer. This is connected with his particular view of what the structure of myth is composed of—mythemes: simple literal elements of meaning—and his belief that myths are the product of mind unencumbered by practical restraints and, as such, closed systems of thought. What the people actually do when they're not telling myths is not *immediately* relevant, but only relevant insofar as it may oblige them to modify their thought in other ways: it affects the significance of the elements in the myth since this is never innate but "*de position,*" i.e., given by the relation of the symbol to other symbols. "A myth can perfectly well contradict ethnographical reality ... or preserve the memory of customs no longer practiced or practiced only elsewhere" (Lévi Strauss 1964: 53); its relationship to ethnographical reality, though essential to its interpretation, is not one of direct representation but rather a connection between different levels related necessarily but as totalities.

At the same time he has restricted himself almost entirely to the myths of the American Indians which appear to be different not only from those written origin myths studied by Eliade, but from those of the Trobriand Islanders. The differences between the myths of the Amerindians and those of Melanesia or Africa[8] are yet to be discussed in detail but Lévi-Strauss has produced throughout the length of his work reasons integral to the rest of his thought for not applying his method to the mythology of Western civilization and complex societies. These reasons have not been well understood. In the discussions with

7. "Nous ne prétendons donc pas montrer comment les hommes pensent dans les mythes, mais comment les mythes se pensent dans les hommes, et à leur insu" (Lévi-Strauss 1964: 20).

8. *Cf.* Luc de Heusch (1972), which causes one to wonder whether the difference has not been exaggerated by the interests and methods of the ethnographers who worked in the different continents.

Ricoeur and with Leach he explained only that once myths have been transformed into sacred texts such as the Bible, they have passed through many editorial hands and the pristine structures have been perverted beyond recognition. But he did not refer to the reasons he has given elsewhere for regarding what Leach calls "the time of Gods and the time of men" as conceptually different and requiring different modes of interpretation. He had himself given a structural analysis of the myth of Oedipus and it might be asked: if Oedipus why not Adam and Eve? But the analysis of Oedipus was offered *then* only as a demonstration of method because it was a myth already known to his readers and Lévi-Strauss (1963a) suggested at that time that "its use is probably not legitimate in this particular instance" (213). But the fact that it could be done at all implies that it could be done with other similar myths. The question remains however whether Genesis can be assimilated to the Greek myths.

Recently he has returned to the mythology of Europe and attacked the Legend of the Holy Grail.[9] It becomes evident from the account of his lectures that he is attempting an ethnological reconstruction of the original myth. That is, the structural analysis does not apply directly to the text of Chrétien de Troyes or any other of the literary accounts but is recomposed thanks to his understanding of the universal logic of myth, aided by some comparisons with certain Algonquin myths. But such far flung comparison is hardly likely to reassure his British colleagues, who already feel uncomfortable whenever Lévi-Strauss' faith in the psychic unity of mankind is pronounced for it reminds them of Tylor and Frazer. In fact, he believes that, despite this unity, the modes of thought and the rules of conduct are assembled by primitive cultures in a different way and demand therefore a different framework of interpretation. In this way he marks a distinction which his British colleagues in the main refuse and not only in the realms of myth.

The distinction between primitive and complex culture was first marked by Lévi-Strauss in his thinking on kinship where he limits himself entirely to the elementary structures maintaining that complex structures operate in quite another way. He has little more to say about the latter than that certain kinship systems are in transition toward complex structure, because they are not really operating according to his rules for elementary structures. It is highly significant

9. *Annuaire de Collège de France* 1974 and "Perceval or Parsifal," lecture delivered at the French Institute, London, 23 October 1975, in which he took up again his interpretation of the myth of Oedipus.

to me that the area of my particular concern, the Mediterranean, he has avoided even more studiously in kinship than in mythology: in the 600-odd pages of the *Elementary Structures* there is no mention of the kinship of any Mediterranean people, for he regards it as entirely complex in structure.

A similar distinction is made by Lévi-Strauss (which does not necessarily correspond to that between elementary and complex structures of kinship, but applies roughly to the same societies: simple primitive societies and complex societies such as our own) concerning the conceptualization of time, and this relates to his theory of history to which anthropologists appear like Leach to have paid scant attention.

I do not refer here to his observations on the discipline of history to be found in *Structural anthropology,* but to the way in which the past is related to the present in the thought of different cultures.

The distinction first appears in his essay "Race and History" where he distinguishes between static and cumulative history and it is spelled out in *La Pensée Sauvage* of which it forms as it were the theoretical backbone.

The conflict between diachrony and synchrony, between history and systems of classification, is fundamental and is resolved in two alternative ways by different cultures. He typifies societies as "hot" or "cold" according to whether they conceptualize their past as cumulative or static. Europe and Asia are a "totemic vacuum" because "these civilizations have chosen to explain themselves through history and this enterprise is incompatible with that which classes things and beings into closed groups," (Lévi-Strauss 1962: 308) which is the characteristic of totemic thought. He distinguishes also between strong and weak history according to the importance attached to diachrony.

Historical events play little part in Leach's work, either in the ethnographies of Burma or of Ceylon for in each he is concerned to find repetitive processes. In "Cronus and Chronos" (Leach 1961b: 124–32) he divides the many senses of Time into those that view it as cyclical and those that view it as irreversible, but though he has most interesting things to say about the former and the influence of religious dogmas in imposing it and of religious rites in establishing a means of measuring Time, the relationship between events in time which is irreversible—the main concern of historians—receives little attention. Classification is not opposed to history but encompasses it, whereas for Lévi-Strauss (1962: 307) there is a fundamental antipathy between the two. Congruently with this, when he came later to utilize Lévi-Strauss' method of establishing oppositions and mediators between them, he recognized none of the limitations by which

Lévi-Strauss confined his method and ignored his basic distinctions between history and classification, between event and structure and between action and mind. Hence he found no reason to treat myth any more than history as a closed system.

In "The Legitimacy of Solomon" the oppositions of which the structures are composed are not only between mythemes, minimal elements of meaning within the myth, but also and very often between the moral implications of the story or expressed rules of conduct taken from another book of the Old Testament. For example, the stories of Dinah and Samson[10] are said to be "opposites," that is, to have the same structure, one being the inversion of the other (Leach 1969). But this view is conditional upon accepting the implications that Leach derives from the incidents. He regards the treachery of Samson's foreign wives as the counterpart of the "dishonorableness" of the Shechemites in the story of Dinah. But why were the Shechemites dishonorable? Because their prince polluted Dinah by sleeping with her? This is to use a concept of honor which is anything but Mediterranean. Simeon and Levi take the humiliation or pollution of their sister as an affront and, unlike their father, they are prepared to respond to it. If treachery is the inferred moral value to be taken as an element of structure, then the counterpart is surely the treachery of Simeon and Levi which explains Jacob's attitude subsequently (Genesis 49:5) when they are displaced in the leadership of the Israelite tribe by their younger brother Judah. In any case neither treachery nor honorableness can be described as mythemes, for they are evaluations of conduct, not in themselves elements.

To take another example Leach states: "Lot's virtue in Sodom turns to sin afterwards and the sin is that of ignoring endogamy altogether." But Genesis does not say it was sinful of Lot to be seduced by his daughters. He did not know he had been anyway, because he was drunk at the time. He was the blameless victim of their plot to have children by him and it was entirely successful and rewarded by progeny. To claim that Lot was sinful one must have recourse to the prohibition expressed elsewhere in the Old Testament and this involves accepting that its various books have the same conceptual unity as a single myth.

This difference between the two authors with regard to structure rests upon another, the relationship between the myth and its ethnographical background: for Lévi-Strauss it is dialectical, for Leach it is direct, in the sense that the significance of the elements of a myth is given by reference to the customs and

10. See page 347 in this chapter.

values of the people in everyday life. This has been illustrated by the example of Lot's "sinfulness." It is expressed clearly in a later publication (Robey 1972: 51), where he explains:

> Any infringement of the standard conventions generates a sense of emotional shock which we experience *either* as embarrassment or as excitement. And even in a story, any reference to a transgression of taboo, however oblique, creates vicarious excitement. In this respect the myths of our own society have quite a different quality for *us* from the myths of other people. Myths everywhere make constant reference to moral offenses, but unless, as listener or reader, you share the same moral assumptions as the myth narrator, you will not be "shocked" by what he says and you will then have difficulty in picking up the message. For it is the *shock* effect of references to breaches of moral taboo which gives myth its "meaning."

What is done in the myth derives its "shock effect" from a direct comparison with what is thought to be proper in everyday life. In the same way the contradictions which run through "The Legitimacy of Solomon" depend upon the rules of behavior laid down in the prescriptive passages of the Pentateuch qualified by the anthropologists' estimation of their advantages and drawbacks. The moral rules of the society are necessary not merely in order to explain the myth as a whole but to interpret the incidents within it. The meaning of each element is given by its position in relation to the moral assumptions of the people, whereas, for Lévi-Strauss, by its position in relation to the other elements of the myth. The editors of Genesis do indeed appear to have edited the myths from which their text originated with their moral assumptions in mind, bringing their consciousness of diachrony to bear upon them in order to derive a "kerygmatic" message,[11] but this is why Lévi-Strauss regards the final product as different in nature from the myths of societies which have no editors. Hence, while I agree with Leach that moral assumptions must be considered in interpreting Genesis, it is precisely this in my view that makes it necessary to distinguish myth from history and search for a different framework of interpretation for the latter; the framework of "cold society" is no longer appropriate.

---

11. That is to say, an announcement or promise of what is to follow. The word "kérigmatique" was introduced into the discussion by Ricoeur (Lévi-Strauss 1963b: 611, 612, 616, 621, 634, 652).

The contradictions on which Leach's interpretation is founded are not between aspects of the mortal or social condition that are irresolvable in reality, but between the rules of marriage and considerations of practical policy that are resolved in fact, within the Old Testament, by the political events that are the outcomes: the violation of Yahweh's proscription of marriage alliance with foreign women does not pay, it is always followed sooner or later by disaster. But quite apart from whether the contradiction is resolvable or not and whether the solution is provided by the myth itself or not, it appears to me that *rules* of marriage and considerations of policy do not have the same theoretical status: *belief* in the religious virtue of keeping the blood pure, which entails the recommendation to marry within the faith, is one thing—it is a rule frequently violated in practice—the political advantage of marriage alliances, including the possibility of laying claim to land through them, is quite another. It is never in any case formulated as a principle in the text, but only inferred by the observer, who if he is an anthropologist knows it to be real.

Moreover, the contradiction between claiming the right to land by conquest and claiming it by virtue of previous possession is a contradiction only in moral terms depending upon the assumptions of the observer. It involves what is called "a double standard" which is a contradiction if equality is recognized as the basis of inter-tribal relations, but not if the system is defined as competitive; once there are winners and losers, and this is accepted, all standards are double in the view of those who do not accept this premise of inequality, and autochthony and conquest are merely alternative ways of validating the occupation of land to be used in pursuance of the same ethnocentric end which is the maintenance and expansion of the tribal territory. In such terms (in which reciprocity plays no part, for conquest can hardly be a reciprocal relationship) there is no contradiction involved in the ambition to keep what you have and get more at the expense of your neighbors. These are the terms which will, below, make it possible to explain the marriage customs of the Mediterranean.

Yahweh's injunctions to avoid entanglements with foreign women are plain: explicit in prescription and demonstrated by outcomes which are the result of divine anger. But the political advantages of taking foreign wives are never stated (not even in the case of Solomon's first marriage) and such marriages are represented, only when they are explicitly disapproved of by Yahweh, as lapses from fidelity. Concordantly, captured women who represent no threat to the faith are perfectly acceptable as concubines and even as wives. Deuteronomy 21:10 gives prescriptions as to the proper treatment of such women.

By constituting his structures from a mixture of what the narrative records and what the anthropologist infers from the injunctions of the laws and what his science tells him Leach appears to me to be fusing different levels of discourse and "allowing on stage" considerations that are extraneous to the narrative which, if myth it is, is no longer a closed system. In the same spirit Beaumont and Fletcher wrote into their plays commentaries from members of the public who were given seats upon the stage. By allowing the latter to become part of the plot they bridged the gap between the actors and the audience. Such a theatrical device has been tried before and since: not only Pirandello but even classical Greek tragedy went some way towards breaking down the closure of the dramatic system, the former by pushing his characters into the audience, the latter by bringing the audience, vicariously through the chorus, on stage. Both maneuvers aim to create the impression that the play is a spontaneous *event.* But this is an illusion for in fact Pirandello's actors still have their lines to learn and the Greek chorus' comments were written by Aeschylus, they were not really "audience participation." Like a conjuror's accomplice who volunteers to take a card, they guarantee the veracity of events on stage even if in so doing they betray the fact that it is after all only a performance. But the point is this: in breaking down the closure of the dramatic system they aim to take the play out of "dream-time" and make it figure in historical time. If therefore Leach treats history as though it were myth, he also in this sense treats myth as though it were history. The concept of "myth-history" enables him to do both at the same time by simply denying any distinction between the two. But by offering as an explanation of his "unitary myth-history" a function in relation to the state of Jewish society around three thousand years ago he appears to be covertly admitting a distinction between the two none the less. For once "canonical stability" has been achieved the presence of the myth is no longer to be explained as a function of the present but as a bequest from the past.

I do not complain that Leach has not followed Lévi-Strauss' method *in toto* but has adapted it and grafted it on to different premises—surely he has every right to use it as he thinks best and in an endeavor of his own choice? I regret only that he has not pointed out where he has departed from it, for he can hardly be supposed to have done so unintentionally since he has devoted a number of articles and a short book to the analysis of Lévi-Strauss' theories. To offer as an "explicitly Lévi-Straussian procedure" an analysis based upon theoretical assumptions that are the contrary of those from which Lévi-Strauss

derived his procedures will hardly lead to a better understanding of this much misinterpreted author, to say the least.

While agreeing with "The Legitimacy of Solomon" that the essential problem with which Genesis is concerned is that of endogamy and land rights, I find myself at odds with Leach at a number of points and believe that it may be helpful to summarize them briefly at the beginning so that the reader may keep an eye open for them as I progress:

1. Leach assumes that there came a moment in time when the story was fixed in writing—the "editorial present" he once called it—and this makes it possible to explain the genealogies of Genesis in terms of the relations between the tribes of Israel on the ground *at that time.* I do not believe that there was any "editorial present" in fact but a process of sifting and collating of texts and sacred oral traditions spanning many centuries.[12] The hypothesis of the editorial present therefore appears to me methodologically inappropriate since it denies the accumulation of events over time. In Lévi-Strauss' terms he treats a "hot" society as if it were "cold." I do not agree with him that myth and history can be assimilated. Moreover, he treats all the narratives of the Old Testament as a single myth, while I believe that they constitute different versions of various myths and that these must be distinguished as to how "mythical" they are. I see a progression in them which can be attributed to the ordering of the final text by the editors, and which gives them their meaning as sacred documents, a meaning quite different from that which derives from "the comparative analysis (of different versions) which makes it

12. Emile Osty and Joseph Trinquet (1973): "a slow process" (23) covering several centuries and "the composition of the Yahwist and Elohist texts dates from ninth and eighth centuries respectively but incorporated much earlier traditions known in oral or written form. It even brought together the remains of the most ancient literature of Israel which celebrated the epoch of the conquering march towards the Promised Land" (284–85). As a theoretical construction the "editorial present" creates problems from the moment that it is recognized that things may be repeated over a period of time and written down only much later. Thus the "earliest genealogies were in a source no older than the Davidic period" but "late sources might nevertheless contain early material" (Wilson 1975: 2). The fact that editors incorporate materials, not simply because they make sense to them, but because they are *there*, introduces contradictions—for example the contradictions in the genealogy of Esau noted by Wilson (1975: 200)—that remain for subsequent editors to face if they wish to draw historical conclusions.

possible to distinguish their common structure and their meaning" (Pouillon 1975: 65).

2. Leach fails to consider the Mediterranean nature of this document. There is no cultural setting; it might be from anywhere. It might be stated in counter-objection that Genesis is just as sacred for the Church of England as it is for anybody in the Mediterranean and therefore it is not a specifically Mediterranean document any longer. This would be taking an extreme functionalist and anti-historical point of view. It is worth considering only in order to raise the very interesting question of what changed significance is given to this story by the different cultural traditions which revere it. What Islam has done with it (including such thoroughgoing transformations as the replacement of Isaac by Ishmael in the story of the sacrifice) is something I am to my regret quite unable to deal with.[13] What Western Europe has done with it is touched on in consideration of the story of Onan.[14]
3. Finally and in continuation of the previous point, Leach sees nothing worthy of comment in the particular form of endogamy practiced by the Israelites; it is just endogamy as anywhere else, while I regard it as rather different from that found elsewhere and indeed I question whether we should speak of it as endogamy at all, save in the sense that the Israelites are constantly visited with the anger of Jahweh for contracting sexual liaisons with infidel women. But there is no equivalent anger reserved for Israelites who give their daughters to foreigners and in the rare instances where this appears to have occurred the matter is passed over without comment.

III

I would like to take the whole of traditional discourse whether recorded in writing by the people themselves or by the ethnographer—all that has been called myth, legend, epic, parable, exemplary tale, or even "idle tale," all holy writ, all stories that are supposed or imagined to have happened—as a field within which to make distinctions and I would first of all distinguish them according to the degree to which they express a conscious fiat, that is to say, to which the

---

13. The extent of the transformation can be seen most simply by consulting the entry "Ishmael" in the *Encyclopedia of Islam.*

14. See page 370 in this chapter.

listener or reader is aware that he is being told to do or not to do something. At one pole then one would put "pure myth," the myths of non-literate societies such as Lévi-Strauss has analyzed in the *Mythologiques,* and at the other those codes of divine injunction conveyed through the delivery of tables, the establishment of covenants or the emission of explicit moral judgments. No moral precepts are set forth in all the *Mythologiques* and the aetiological aspect of such myths, whatever custom they may appear to validate, entails no recommendation as regards behavior; the loss of immortality, the acquisition of fire or the origin of a totem are not presented as guides to action in the sense that they can be imitated by living men who might wish to evade death, make fire or change their totem. Moreover, far from setting an example which reinforces custom they frequently contravene it: among peoples who respect the rights of primogeniture younger brothers get the best of elder brothers; Asdiwal's marriages were both matrilocal though the Tsimshians marry patrilocally.[15] In contrast the sacred texts of literate societies are full of moral precept expressed in a variety of ways. They are morally charged while pure myth is morally indifferent.

Corresponding to this distinction pure myth is expressed in terms that bear little relation to "real" experience, while at the other pole a certain realism is obviously necessary if the injunction is to have any application. It is no good telling men to fly, to come to life again after being killed or to transform themselves into animals. The only sphere in which pure myth can be in any sense a guide is that of ritual, and the connection between the two has been rightly stressed ever since Robertson Smith, but ritual precisely allows no liberty of action to the participants, they do not have to decide what to do next, or what would be better. They have only to do it correctly or it is not considered to have been done at all.

The first pole might be said to relate to imagination, the latter to action. Both are placed in the past but in pure myth that past is unconnected diachronically with the present. "Once upon a time" implies only "not now"; it is not a point in time conceived as continuous down to the present, but simply a time opposed to the present, "dream-time" as certain Australian aborigines have put it and as Leach has aptly cited (Eliade 1964: 8, 18; Leach 1969: 29). We might then say that the past of pure myth is not the passed and gone, but only the "not actually happening at this moment for all to witness." It remains present in spirit in the rites which reactivate it on another plane. In millenarian prophecies it can even

15. *Cf.* "The Story of Asdiwal," translated into English in Leach (1967).

be projected into the future when the rites, so far from commemorating what happened, provoke what is expected to happen. But whether placed in the past or the future it has no perspective: it is not composed of periods *relatively* distant from the present, but of a single plane like a backdrop divorced by its very nature from the events that are represented in front of it. Experienced only in thought, its relation to temporality is different from that which is experienced in action which leaves its results behind able to be remembered but not altered. That which is done is done. But the happenings in myth can be undone or done again with the opposite result. In the absence of limitations of a practical nature pure myth resembles the dream, while mandatory myth must, if lessons regarding behavior are to be drawn from it, be placed in the context of experienced reality. The significance of the notion of a miracle is precisely that, though it occurs in such a context, it interrupts the recognized regularity of cause and effect in favor of divine intervention which has license to circumvent the rules of everyday experience and in doing so it harks back for an instant to the idiom of pure myth where there are no miracles since all is miraculous. It represents then the point of juncture between the two kinds of time and the two poles of discourse and brings to a realistic narrative of the diachronically conceived past the magical power of the free imagination, the instantaneousness of pure myth which incorporates the past into the present. Hence those nineteenth and early twentieth-century scholars who strove, in the cause of reconciling their belief in Christianity with their belief in Science, to explain the miracles of the Bible in "rational" terms, positing that the crossing of the Red Sea was able to be effected thanks to an exceptional hurricane or that Moses had a remarkable geological sense which enabled him to choose the right place to strike the rock at the critical moment, were simply desacralizing a text that their successors no longer bother to read.[16]

The field of traditional discourse I have chosen does not of course include modern "literature," but it is perhaps worth observing in parenthesis that our own secular writing varies greatly in the degree in which a fiat is explicit: from tales of fantasy to legal codes and from comic strips to political tracts. The writings of scientists and historians clearly belong, despite their apparent absence of moral injunctions, near the mandatory realistic pole, for they aim to explain

---

16. In the same spirit the myth of the origin of Rome was explained by the suggestion that Romulus and Remus were raised by a wet-nurse of the name of Lupa. Tylor (1970: 281) poured deserved scorn on the method in *Primitive culture*.

what is or was with a view to enabling men to formulate principles of behavior and those who do not themselves draw their conclusions regarding action are often accused by practically-minded persons (not without a certain irritation) of being in an "ivory tower" as though it were evident that their duty was to "provide the answers" not to day-dream. It is characteristic of the scientific outlook to believe that facts and conclusions must be separated, but why study the accounts of the Florentine bankers of the Renaissance if you do not believe that *ultimately* some profit may be drawn in terms of economic theory or of our understanding of the European past or even of human behavior in general? The realism of science is inspired by the desire to find "the answers" to the question of what to do. The place of "science fiction" in such a scheme is not without interest, for it is a literature of fantasy masquerading as a kind of science and consequently it is always placed in the indeterminate future in a time discontinuous with the present from which it is separated by some new invention such as interplanetary communication. It is "once-upon-a-time" that has yet to occur.

This scheme is not intended for the classification of myths but rather as an aid in understanding different aspects of myths that vary in the emphasis they place upon one or other end of the spectrum, that is, the degree to which their relationship to conduct is explicit. Pure myths do not concern themselves with recommendations as to behavior, while at the other end of the scale we find the code of Hammurabi, the laws of Manu, or the inscribed plates delivered by the angel of God to Joseph Smith in Ontario County, New York, in 1827. But the very fact that Smith's plates should have disappeared mysteriously, remaining ever since the object of a quest throughout the world (which includes some notable archaeological excavations by the New World Foundation) shows how the emphasis can change and incorporate elements from the other end of the spectrum. The Mormon plates, too sacred to remain tangible, have been whisked away to join the long line of sacred texts that have disappeared—a simulacrum among literate peoples of that hoard of divine injunctions whose message is lost or misconstrued that Frazer accumulated to support his interpretation of the Garden of Eden.

In any case, the relationship to conduct of even the most explicit extant code—surely this must be the Koran?—is always tenuous and dependent upon particular social situations which, in changing, pervert the meanings formerly attached to it. The mandatory pole is thus always, as it were, slipping into the obscurity of the past simply by remaining involved in a situation that is no longer operative. For each generation the explications must be renewed; the

relevance pointed out afresh. The text itself recedes into a cryptic condition where it is no longer clear nor generally agreed what the injunction enjoins. It requires commentators to rescue it and no sooner have they done so than another century of change requires a change of commentators. Time like an ever-flowing stream bears all our past away and if it is not to be lost entirely, if its connection with the present is to be maintained, scholars must continually redraw the lessons of experience. The continuum therefore represents the degree of explicitness—which is never in any case total—with which the voices of the past are made to speak. In view of this Lévi-Strauss seems justified in contending that his method of structural analysis which, as it was elaborated in the *Mythologiques,* set diachrony on one side was applicable only to the mythology of those societies that have no editors. The myths he analyses have no connection with the lessons of experience and he views them as synchronic sets in which sequence has little significance. Their meaning is more akin to the meaning of dreams in Freudian theory than to that attributed to Pharaoh's dream by Joseph who by a scheme of equivalences derived his prophecy of the impending famine.

Now it may be objected that in fact, as Stephen Hugh-Jones' (1979) ethnography shows, even the simple people of the Brazilian jungles use their myths to validate their conduct and in this sense they might be cited as charters for action. However the charter is not explicit in the myth but depends simply on the whim of the individual who, unaided by commentators and dogmas, invokes the precedent provided by myth as he sees fit and rather as literary authors once inserted references to the classics when they wished to support their views with the authority of the ancients. The use to which the myth is put in action is no guide to its structure—which might explain why Lévi-Strauss is unperturbed by the absence of such information. In fact, in its *usage* myth might be likened to the body of proverbs that European peasantries like to quote. The proverb does indeed pretend, unlike the myth, to lay down principles of conduct, advise regarding expectations, point to regularities, and can be cited to provide authority for a given course of action, but taken as a whole it is not clear what course, for the notable characteristic of a *body* of proverbs is that it recommends *all* courses of action; its lessons all contradict one another. "Out of sight, out of mind" but "absence makes the heart grow fonder." "A stitch in time saves nine" but "sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof" and "don't count your chickens before they're hatched." In a study I made of those repeated in an Andalusian village I discovered that a proverb could always be found to justify any course of action and therefore it was used only as a validation of that chosen for quite

other reasons. Moreover, the body of proverbs included many that were not applicable at all but were repeated for their alliterative charm; these appeared to have entered the popular treasury via the radio's folklore programs among other ways and came presumably from other parts of Spain where they had once been applicable. In this class were proverbs advising the month in which vines should be tilled or fruit-trees pruned which were never followed and weather proverbs quite inappropriate to the Sierra de Cadiz where I collected them. They cannot then be said to be mandatory but only at the most validatory and very often not even that. They furnish an armory of weapons not a strategy.

That proverbs should be able to be used in this way is surely due to the fact that they involve no dogma and are commented on by no professional scholars who feel it necessary to elucidate their message and draw a moral from them. Those such as Rodriguez Marín who have turned their attention to proverbs have been content to collect them as things in themselves, "gems of peasant wisdom," without ever attempting to elaborate a theory of the popular wisdom contained in them. The quality and above all the quantity was what counted for Rodriguez Marín (1926; 1930; 1934; 1941), as the titles of his compendia showed, but his gems remained unset, in a pile as it were, in which the relation between one and another was of no significance. The whole spirit of the endeavor, thoroughly in accordance with the notion of folklore, was to collect them for the aesthetic pleasure they could give to the unknown reader without any regard for what in terms of action they might imply. In the same spirit a British publisher produced in 1937 *The Bible designed to be read as literature* which presumably meant: without regard for the edification that might be derived from it, for it was "intended for all readers, of whatever belief, opinion or bringing-up." One senses that it was meant for unbelievers, and in the same way folklorists are "unbelievers" in peasant culture, viewing it from outside and with aims quite different from those who use it but do not collect it.

I trust I have convinced the reader that despite their mandatory form proverbs provide anything but a blueprint and a guide to conduct. Their purpose is rather to provide a means to ratify any event which may occur and thus strip it of its novelty and preserve society from innovation. They classify events immediately in terms of tradition and thereby place them in the timeless past of peasant wisdom "out of harm's way." They bolster in a quite illusory way by reference to a supposedly unchanging past the notion of stability to which they cling in the face of the many threats to their way of life and thereby they provide the

urban commentator who believes in progress with an excuse for complaining of peasant traditionalism and backwardness.

If the usage of myth in everyday life is not dissimilar from that of proverbs in that it provides a frame of reference within which individuals can comment on events and justify their actions, its structure and its inspiration are quite different, for it has no pretension to furnish recommendations or account for how things really work. For this reason its imagination is quite unfettered by conscious understanding of experience. Hence all the inversions of commonsense and of moral precept: animals talk, humans are transformed, fly or disappear suddenly, the gods commit incest, contend with each other, punish out of spite. That which is forbidden is not merely allowed but pays off handsomely as in those apparently immoral events I read about in Genesis forty-odd years ago. But the Book of Genesis also contains clearly enunciated rules of conduct—(even if the Ten Commandments do not appear until the next book) whose infringement is punished—especially it seems when the guilty are not Israelites. There is a general if irregular movement throughout the Old Testament from the first pole to the second, and the Israelites of later books get it in the neck for infringing the rules laid down by Yahweh.

IV

We might place the Book of Genesis at the point of transition where the age of myth begins to give way to the age of philosophy (Lévi-Strauss 1966b: 407): Its messages are hidden only too often yet sometimes they are set forth clearly in the form of commands. The stories are not simply a structure of "mythemes" mediating an insoluble contradiction, as in Lévi-Strauss' theory, an unfocussed recognition of the mortal and social condition, but they lead towards plain injunction. Not simply a wandering fantasy through the kingdom of the *id* but an attempt to enunciate a mandatory message in a language which, despite its intermittent explicitness, still owes much to the myths from which the different sources, especially the Yahwist and Elohist derived. Hence even within Genesis we find a broad spectrum of styles of thought (quite apart from the literary differences in style which enabled the scholars of the last few centuries to establish the different versions), I mean a coming-and-going between the style of "fantastic" myths of origin, the practical style of empirical reality and clear imperatives which take pride of place later in Leviticus. There is a general movement from

the former to the latter—the ages to which the patriarchs lived decrease gradually—and not without reversals such as Methuselah—but Jacob still gets to one hundred and thirty, despite the limit of one hundred and twenty set in Genesis 6:3 and Joseph reaches one hundred and ten at the end of the book. Elements of the legendary past preceding literature and law remain embedded in the narration and provide the ambiguity which is the hallmark of the sacred and the means for its professional interpreters to justify themselves. These professionals hold the power, like the priests of Delphi, to say what the Divinity ordains by his enigmatic utterances. Thus they translate from the fantastic to the realistic pole and thereby assure the continuity of their society through time by making a contemporary sense out of messages that were intended for other ears. Hence they might be called "anachronizers" in that they provide a modern gloss on legends recorded in very different times whose original sense is lost or obscured. And when they cannot find a satisfactory interpretation they can always decide that a given portion of the text is to be set on one side for technical reasons ("too manifestly apocryphal to merit serious consideration") or ignored by ordinary people as in the case of Shechem whose sad fate provides the focus of this essay. It is one of the least illustrated chapters of Genesis[17] and I have never heard it given in an Anglican lesson nor mentioned in any sermon and the commentators themselves who cannot evade their duty show by the startling variety of their comments the uncertainty that weighs upon this incident's interpretation. Indeed, Gerhard von Rad (1972) confesses that to him it seems that "ultimate scientific clarification is no longer possible" (330). After such a pronouncement from a great scholar I fear only a fool would rush in, but the gentle reader will perhaps make allowances for the innocence of the anthropologist and may even wonder, like him, whether in any case *ultimate scientific* clarification can be provided by a hermeneutic analysis.

In view of the confusion the story has caused I would do well to give a brief summary of it as it is told in Genesis 34. Jacob has just arrived with his sons in the neighborhood of Shechem, the modern Nablus, where he has bought a field and erected an altar. It was here that Abraham (Genesis 12:6) on his way to the Negueb received from Yahweh the promise that his descendants will inherit

17. Apart from Bugiardini, I have been able to trace only two other pictures and a few illustrated manuscripts. The British Museum Library contains, composed around the story, an epic poem in German of the eighteenth century and a play about Dinah by A.G. Oehlenschläger (Copenhagen, 1842), but that is all.

the land. Dinah, Jacob's only mentioned daughter, goes out to meet the local girls and gets seduced or raped[18] by Shechem, prince of the town of Shechem and son of Hamor. Hopelessly enamored of the girl, he wishes to have her for his wife and offers to pay any bride-price that is proposed if only he may marry her. He gets his father, Hamor, to go to Jacob to ask for her hand in marriage. Jacob says nothing since his sons are away with the flocks. When they return they hear about it and are very angry. Hamor proposes a contract of matrimonial exchange starting with Dinah and offering to Jacob's people, in addition to wives, the right to remain and acquire property. Jacob's sons answer cunningly that they cannot give their women to people who are not circumcised since this would be shameful for them.[19] They would only agree if all the Shechemites get circumcised. Hamor and Shechem agree and convince their people and they all get circumcised. On the third day, "when they were sore" in the King James Version, Simeon and Levi, the second and third of Dinah's six full brothers, fall upon them and slaughter all the men and the other sons of Jacob join in to capture all the women and pillage their houses. Jacob explains to Simeon and Levi that their behavior has spoiled the Israelites' public relations and they all risk now seeing the Canaanites and Perizzites uniting to outnumber and defeat them. But Simeon and Levi answer proudly: "Is our sister to be treated as a whore?" At the beginning of the next chapter Yahweh tells them to clear out quick in order to escape vengeance.

My object is to find sense in this story which perplexed me so deeply forty years ago.

How can we treat it? The obvious way, and one favored by not a few commentators, is to assume that it is "history": a regrettable event in the past of the Israelites which honesty has conserved in the sacred text, but which need not be dwelt on since it shows the patriarchs in a somewhat discreditable light as Jacob recognizes in his blessing.

But it is not the only incident of the kind and to assume that all such incidents have been preserved only out of respect for the facts is to credit the sacred text with intentions and methods that would become a modern historian but

18. "Seduced" according to King James, Hastin's *Encyclopedia* and de Vaux, "raped" according to Speiser and von Rad (and Bugiardini). The difference depends largely upon whether preference is given to the Elohist or Yahwist passages.

19. According to Osty and others the Canaanites already practiced circumcision and there are many intermarriages with them both before and after this passage, though always through Israelites taking Canaanite wives.

hardly concord with the work as a whole if indeed it can be maintained that it is a whole despite the varied origins that scholars have attributed to different sections.

Such an approach appears to me to consist in hiding from reality behind the facts, for the reality that requires explaining is the presence of this story in the founding legend of three world-wide religions. Can it seriously be maintained that the story of Shechem has been retained in preference to all the other events, creditable or discreditable, that might have been, simply because it is supposed to have happened?[20] It forms no link in a narrative that would be incomprehensible without it: Dinah is never again mentioned in the Bible, save in Genesis, 46:15, where she is numbered among those who go to Egypt (the Haggadah suggests that Asenath, wife of Joseph, was Dinah's daughter). But that is all.

This treatment reduces the book of Genesis to the level of a column of news items, which have been selected by the editor from the mists of antiquity but are only there in fact to fill the page; in other words, the historicist explanation by itself is simply a denial of any innate significance in the text. It follows then that if there is any message to be found it resides in the events themselves and this gives free range to kerygmatists of every hue who can always find in events anything they choose: the Hand of God, the national destiny or the dialectical process of history—or it leaves the reader free to reject all hermeneutic explanations and content himself with a theory of history that treats events as in themselves fortuitous or at least explicable only in terms of unpredictable conjunctions of circumstances, unknowable in themselves, which a later age puts to its uses.

If, as Edgar Morin (1959) has suggested, "history is a harlot who gives herself to the victorious soldier of fortune"[21] the event of his victory remains devoid of explanation or significance and we are forced back to interpret the text simply in terms of the social consciousness of the editors, i.e., to the position of Leach. This anti-historical mode of explanation seems plausible to an anthropologist since he assumes that culture is not an arbitrary matter and the *record* of events (as opposed to the events themselves) is part of culture, that is to say, he is committed on *a priori* grounds to search for significance in the *story,* regardless of the historical facts that may lie behind it in time. This significance is to be found in its relation to other stories and its place within the work as a whole, whereas the historicist looks for significance in the relations between events

20. *Cf.* Leach (1969: 42).

21. "L'histoire est une catin qui se donne au soudard vainqueur."

themselves regardless of how they may be related in different texts or archives. To me both positions appear unacceptable for the simple reason that each ignores the reasoning of the other whereas the problem of diachronic interpretation is precisely that it must respond both to the accumulations of culture and to its synchronic coherence. Nor is this problem new in anthropology for it was the basis half a century ago of the difference between the diffusionists and the functionalists who each failed to come to terms with the valid observations of the others. If history, as events, is essentially incoherent, like the fortuity of the soldier of fortune's triumph, it is because it is a random accumulation and if it is coherent it is because it has to be for the historian to be able to write it. Not even the chroniclers, they least of all in fact, manage to record events without any attempt at coherence.[22]

Let me start then by an overview of the Book of Genesis, bearing in mind that it is the first book of the Old Testament. The past is represented as either a recorded succession of events or as a validation of the present by reference to origins or, by the kerygmatists, both. The further we go back in time the fewer and less certain are the records and the more difficult to interpret; therefore the more the latter view predominates, until we reach a mode of thought from which consciousness of diachrony—the past as a succession of events—is missing altogether; we are in the realm of pure myth, timeless because placed at the beginning of time, *in illo tempore,* according to Eliade, when all is back to front and upside-down to prove that you can go back no further.

In the case of Genesis, the element of myth is strong as one would expect in a text explicitly concerned with origins. Especially in the early chapters the events recounted do not correspond to our experience of reality. On the contrary they resemble the origin myths of primitive peoples. In its movement from pure myth to history Genesis resembles, rather than those myths of the Middle East with which it might be thought to have an historical connection, the *Popol-Vuh.* In that great corpus of ancient Maya mythology we find the first men created from clay, the Flood, idols, and various other features reminiscent of Genesis which might be attributed to the influence of the missionaries at the time that it was first thought to have been written down but that such details are also to be found in the myths of so many other parts of the world. What distinguishes the *Popol-Vuh* from them and likens it to Genesis is that first of all it is a *single* story rather than a class of stories arranged in no order and awaiting the

22. *Cf.* Bernard Lewis (1975: 55, 61–62, 69).

ethnographer in order to become a "collection." Secondly a concern with sin which was characteristic quite as much of the pre-Columbian high civilizations of central America as of Christianity. Thirdly its concern with genealogy and finally the fact that it *progresses,* changing its style as it approaches modern times until it reaches the moment when it was written down; the royal genealogy ends, fourteen generations after the Creation, with Don Juan de Rojas and Don Juan Cortès, the contemporary hispanicized kings of the Quiché. The editorial present is dated with fair precision as 1554–58 (Recinos 1950) (though the original manuscript has disappeared). It is clear that editorial policy is not the same throughout. How could it be when the materials were so different in nature? The editors were no doubt personally acquainted with Rojas and Cortès and knew by experience what they were recording while in the earlier chapters they depended upon oral tradition of which vestiges are found in the syncretized myths which still survive to this day.

The editors who bring together such materials into a single narrative have the task above all of ordering them; they are responsible for sequence, and for concording them in some degree only, for since such materials are already sanctified by tradition, the editors cannot tamper with them freely.[23] The logic and coherence of the text—since the sacred is not required to be logical and coherent—matter less to such editors than the duty to preserve the elements in their entirety. Hence different versions of the same story are included, repeating and often contradicting each other, but necessarily placed in sequence. In the *Popol-Vuh,* as in Genesis, the creation and early development of man is not a steady flow of narrative but a series of efforts to find the solution to a problem which can be taken as resolved after that, rather as a child's exercise book shows repeated attempts to reach the right answer by the method of trial and error. Hence the diachronic ordering of the presentation, the product not only of the editorial process but of the materials themselves, betrays a hermeneutic intention.

Lévi-Strauss (1963b) speaks of "diachronic structures" as conceivable but better left aside for the moment (649). I am proposing that when the

23. "It must be stressed that late Bible editors as a rule did not tamper too much with their sources, often transmitting them in 'fossilized' form. Thus as regards *Genesis*, E.A. Speiser (1964), in particular, has shown that many of the narratives have been conveyed, untouched for generations, and included by the editors basically without change, the original meaning of the tales eluding them" (Malamat 1967).

theologians "historicized" the myths of the ancestors of Israel[24] they in a sense stood them on their end, reordering the myth's different versions that were formerly distinguished spatially into a temporal order and assembling the incidents within the original myths which once formed synchronic sets into a progressive sequence. To give an example, it is not vital to Lévi-Strauss' analysis of the story of Asdiwal whether his first marriage precedes or follows his second marriage as long as both are there;[25] the message is in the structure. But in a "historicized" myth the message is in the progression (as in cumulative history) and it is revealed by the final solution—which is authoritative because final and has therefore the power to prescribe action. If when myths die they become charters (Lévi-Strauss 1971), it would be equally true to say that when they become historicized they die, slain by the hermeneutic zeal of the commentators.

In Genesis we are offered two accounts of the creation, attributed to different sources but which the compilers thought both worthy of retention despite their discrepancy, or perhaps one would say, on account of their discrepancy for they represent quite different aspects of the Creation. The first is concerned with the physical world and the creation of men and women together as a biological species. The second starts with the creation of *man* and named places. It is homocentric and moral and recounts the origin of the sexual division of labor and its logical correlate, death. Eros implies Thanatos. Once out of Eden we are a clear stage nearer to experience. *Social* relations begin with the slaying of Abel, the pastoralist, by his agricultural brother who is punished by the loss of his sedentary way of life. Thence we proceed to the appearance of tribes and within them a certain economic division of labor: five generations after Cain we find Adam's descendants divided into those of the tent and the flocks, those of the lyre and the pipe, those of bronze and iron: shepherds, musicians, and smiths—and the rest. Then comes the Flood and humanity is off to a fresh start. This time we proceed to the division into nations at the level of the sons of Noah and relations of hegemony among them. Cultural variation is introduced with the Tower of Babel, perhaps the first glimpse of

24. *Cf.* Lévi-Strauss (1963b: 636).

25. Some critics have reproached Lévi-Strauss with paying so little attention to sequence—unlike Propp (1968). But Propp was concerned with analyzing the folktales of a hot society: Eastern Europe.

an historical event. (At any rate the Oriental Institute of Chicago displays a model of it.)

Social structure among pastoral nomads is first and foremost a matter of kinship—and kinship as a system depends upon the rules of marriage. A series of incidents presents the possible solutions to the questions: whom shall we marry? Whom shall our sisters marry? Abram takes a wife Saraï, noted for her beauty. He goes to Egypt and presents her as his sister, telling her to say so too, for he fears that if he admits her to be his wife he will be killed to get him out of the way, as Uriah the Hittite was later to be dealt with by David. Pharaoh takes her on. The adultery brings copious material advantages for Abram and Divine punishment for the Egyptian in the form of sores (a most un-Mediterranean distribution of desserts!). The deception is discovered and Abram and his wife are asked to leave unrelieved of their acquisitions. The narrative is judged by von Rad (1972) "offensive and difficult to interpret" (167). There is hitherto no serious mention of a kin relationship between Abram and Saraï. A problem is posed by the fact that Saraï is barren and getting on in years. Conscious of her failure in this respect she sends her Egyptian slave, Hagar, into Abram's bed as a proxy and Hagar gives birth to Ishmael. Pleased as Abram is by the birth of his son, the foreign and servile origins of his mother are clearly a disadvantage and her insubordination to her mistress angers Saraï. When Isaac is born to her, around the age of ninety, it is clear that *he* is the legitimate heir. Ishmael and his mother are sent off into the desert.

Despite her years Sarah (formerly Saraï) appears to have lost none of her charms and the incident with Pharaoh is repeated, this time with Abimelech, King of Guerar, who is warned by God in time to avoid the same misfortune as the Egyptian. This time Abraham (as he is now, having established the covenant with Yahweh and been circumcised) says again that Sarah *is* his sister and later he explains she is his half-sister. It is thought by learned commentators that she was his father's, Terah's, daughter by another mother and that this was an acceptable form of marriage among the Israelites of early times. Von Rad (1972: 222) maintains that marriage with a half-sister was still possible at the time of David on the grounds that Tamar (2 Samuel 13) suggests to her half-brother Amnon who is attempting to rape her that he should ask their father David to give her to him instead. Ezekiel later complains that among other sins committed by the Israelites brothers violate their half-sisters (Eziekiel 22). Others have suggested (Speiser 1964; de Vaux 1971) that she was Terah's *adoptive* daughter. But the incident is repeated once more a few chapters later when Isaac presents

his wife Rebekah to the unfortunate Abimelech as *his* sister. Now we know that Rebekah was not Isaac's sister but his father's brother's son's daughter, his patrilateral parallel cousin, the preferred marriage of many Middle Eastern peoples to this day. Abraham's assertion that Sarah was his sister would seem to be insufficient to maintain that this was literally the case. One would be tempted first of all to suspect that "sister" is being used in a classificatory sense to include patrilateral cousin in the same way as in some kinship terminologies male patrilateral cousin is called "brother." Unfortunately, there is no other evidence that this was so and the modern Middle East makes no such assimilation. However, it does not follow that "sister" cannot be used figuratively. In Genesis 24:59 Rebekah is referred to as "sister" of Bethuel's people and it was used as an honorific title for wife in ancient Egypt and indeed it appears in this sense in the Bible (Songs 4:9; 5:1–2; 10:12; Tobias 7:15; 8:4, 7:21, 10:6; and in the latter not only in address but in reference). This usage moreover is congruent with a patrilineal system in which wives become members of their husband's patriline, as Ruth's behavior illustrated so strikingly.

Whether in fact Sarah was Abraham's half-sister, adoptive sister or merely patrilineal kinswoman is vital only for the historian. I am concerned in historical events insofar as significance can be given to them and it is the essence of sacred texts that they should contain enigmas, mysteries and contradictions. It is somewhat incongruent that Sarah's place in the patrline should not be given, if indeed she was Abraham's sister, when Milcah and Iscah are recorded as Lot's sisters, though they are otherwise mentioned only in reference to the fact that Milcah marries Nahor and becomes the mother of Bethuel. If I knew for certain that the Israelites practiced brother-sister marriage at that time it would enable me to place Abraham nearer to the pole of experience, whereas if I knew the contrary I would conclude that his incestuous marriage assimilated him to the divine ancestors who so frequently indulge in incest. But the text is unclear, and the commentaries unconvincing. Placed within the context of Genesis as a whole, the significance of these stories is precisely this uncertainty as to whether sisters should be kept and married within the patriline or given away to foreigners for the sake of political advantage. Yahweh's attitude is unequivocal: they should *not* be given away at all. But the quandary is fairly represented. It is that on which Leach bases his interpretation, though he does not invoke these chapters in illustration but only later ones which are perhaps equally telling for his purposes. Accepting the importance of the quandary, there is more to be said about its presentation from my point of view, however.



Fig. 3

From the Garden of Eden onwards the book can be read as a disquisition on the relation of self to other. Eve was part of Adam in origin but the apple made them conscious of their otherness in relation to each other. Cain clearly went too far in asserting his separation from Abel. After that the questions are: how closely related must you be in order to be one people and how other must you be in order to be a spouse? Other sex? Other family? Other lineage? Other tribe? Other nation? The limits of endogamy and exogamy are debated throughout the length of Genesis. Interwoven with the three incidents regarding the sister-wife other solutions are offered. Ishmael has been borne by Hagar the Egyptian slave of Saraï—and has been disinherited. Lot has settled at Sodom and hopes to marry his daughters there and indeed up to that time the attempt to establish a rule of endogamy has not provided satisfactory results; Saraï has passed the menopause childless and laughs at the divine announcement that she is to give birth. Lot, whose wife is not mentioned as his kinswoman, has two daughters, but the temperament of the Sodomites provides a difficulty; they prefer to make advances to his male guests, the angels, and Lot's sons-in-law refuse to come away with him. Homosexuality is firmly ruled out by Divine anger. After the destruction of Sodom and the castigation of their mother's regretful glances back, the girls are stranded. Exogamy has failed and they fall back on impregnation by their father. The sister-wife story is repeated for the first time then, before Isaac is finally born. Isaac makes a correct marriage, in accordance with Abraham's wishes, to his father's brother's son's daughter who is also his father's brother's daughter's son's daughter. Esau and Jacob are born of this marriage before the third version of the sister-wife story is told. Repetitions are usually, it has been said, the result of the incorporation of different versions and the similarity of the detail certainly implies this to be the case here. In fact the first and third versions are attributed to the Yahwist source while the second is from the Elohist. But it is to be noted that they are introduced in a declining order. In the first version (Genesis 12) Pharaoh is punished with sores for the adultery; in the second (Genesis 20) Abimelech is warned by God in time to prevent him. In the third (Genesis 26) he discovers for himself on purely empirical grounds that Rebekah is Isaac's wife, and he refrains. The three versions can also be seen to represent a progression in another sense: in the first story Abram says Saraï is his sister; there is no suggestion in Genesis 12 that she is his half-sister. In Genesis 20 Abraham claims that Sarah is *really* his paternal half-sister. In Genesis 26 Isaac says simply "my sister," but we know from Genesis 24 that

Rebekah was his father's brother's son's daughter. The versions thus take us from incest to the preferred marriage of later times.

The marriages of Esau and Jacob which occupy the next few chapters form an exemplary tale: Esau marries two Hittite girls and this so annoys his mother that she organizes his replacement by Jacob as their heir. Isaac sends him off to marry his father's father's brother's son's son's daughter (who is also his mother's brother's daughter) with the injunction to avoid these Canaanite women. Esau then marries his father's brother's daughter, Ishmael's daughter, but this makes no difference to his position, because of the second-rate status of Ishmael's mother and the fact that Ishmael was disinherited. It appears to be established that the Israelites *should* marry within the Covenant, though in fact four of the founders of the twelve tribes are born to slave mothers who were not perhaps foreigners like Hagar but were acting like her as proxies for their mistress, and two tribes are descended from Joseph's Egyptian wife Asenath, daughter of Potipherah, priest of On. At this point the story of Shechem is told.

This time it is not a question of where shall the descendants of Abraham find their wives but—and this is the first instance mentioned—where shall a daughter find a husband. However, it is also a question of whom shall one's sister marry or be given to and in that sense it is the continuation and conclusion to the sister-wife stories, though curiously none of the commentators I have read considers it in this light. Abram, Abraham, and Isaac offered their sister (or patrilineal cousin) to whom they were already married to the local ruler as concubine for the sake of political safety and material advantage. Jacob hesitates to complain about the seduction (or violation) of his unmarried daughter and his sons settle the matter negatively by political means to material advantage (pillage) but at subsequent political risk. The rules of marriage are spelled out in detail in subsequent books, but it is never again implied that it might be honorable to give daughters away to foreigners—though heroic harlots serve the national interest on occasions by giving themselves away.

Old Testament commentators always face a choice, the same that I faced myself at an early age, between interpretations based upon moral precept and those based upon historical fact. Those tales that are both edifying and plausible present no difficulty: history has demonstrated Divine purpose and with luck moral truth is supported by archaeological digging. But where edification and historical plausibility do not coincide the commentators tend to accept as moral parables those stories that are implausible from a practical viewpoint granting the text the license to be allegorical and figurative, and accept as

historical truth those that provide no moral lesson. As Professor A. S. Herbert (1962) says:

> This book of Genesis gives tantalizing glimpses of this period: but we have to remember that it is not primarily a history but a teaching book. Nevertheless it gives occasional glimpses of a historical situation such as we see more fully documented in extra-Biblical material. (110)

Those stories that are both implausible and frankly unedifying, if not simply ignored or attributed to Divine arbitrariness, the privilege and proof of Divinity, can be relegated to the category of traditional folktales incorporated by editors too careless of their hermeneutical duty to perceive the uninspired origin. Whenever the phrase "traditional folktale" is used one can sense that the commentator is in difficulties, for to tell the reader that it is a folktale is a means of reassuring him that however implausible historically the incident may nonetheless be discounted from the moral viewpoint, placed in parenthesis, and no lesson need be drawn from it. Such an interpretation is frequently invoked in discussions of the "sister-wife" stories where there is full justification for avoiding a moral interpretation based upon modern values: Abraham (or Isaac) takes a cowardly and deceitful line and does extremely well in material terms as a result; all three versions stress in similar words how wealthy he becomes. Sarah (or Rebekah) lend themselves to his ploy without complaint and Yahweh punishes the victim of his deceit.

The story of Dinah is hardly easier to draw an appropriate lesson from. It is a tale of the treacherous slaughter of ingenuous hospitable neighbors whose only fault was that their prince expected the same deal as Pharaoh and Abimelech. If her sexual honor was so important what was Dinah doing when she went unchaperoned into the foreign town? Even stressing the justification of avenging rape and the need to liberate their sister, which the text taken as a whole hardly confirms, Simeon and Levi come out of it very badly, as Jacob recognizes in his will (Genesis 49:5–7), and their brothers not much better. Hence many modern commentators have recourse to a theory that one might call "tribal history expressed allegorically." Despite the fact that of the whole of Genesis this is perhaps the most graphically human story, they explain that the characters are merely personifications of tribes (Herbert 1962: 111; Von Rad 1972: 335; de Vaux 1971: 227). A tribe of Israelites, descended from Dinah and called Dinah, is immured within Shechem and eventually rescued by the tribes of Simeon and

Levi who succeed in entering the town by the deceit of a forsworn pact of alliance and liberate the men of Dinah putting the Shechemites to the sword. The tribe of Dinah replaces the girl and Shechem's sentiments go by the board. Marriage exchange, bride-price, circumcision, and the punch-line of the story ("shall our sister be treated as a whore?") become pointless and redundant embroidery and what is really being said concerns only a successful military coup. It takes a commentator as ingenious as Professor Herbert (1962: 112) to draw a moral from the story as demonstrating "the impropriety of subordinating Israelite to Canaanite culture." Such semantic impoverishment can hardly provide an adequate explanation quite apart from the anomalies that are thus introduced: if this thirteenth tribe of Israel was *rescued* why is there no further mention of it in the Bible? It disappears leaving no trace, having served its purpose which was only to enable the commentators to evade the moral implications of the story. Moreover, it is hard to imagine how the anomalous accretions have been introduced. If it is not a story about people but about tribes and not about sex but about military operations how has it been transformed in this way? "This is a mode of presentation which is unfamiliar to the modern Western mind, but normal to the mind of ancient Israel" says Herbert (1962: 111) who cites in illustration Hosea 11:1–4 in which the people of Israel are momentarily referred to as if a single person. In fact the mode is no more unfamiliar to us than referring to France as Marianne or England as John Bull; it is simply a rhetorical figure in the case of Hosea. But the notion of a rhetorical figure can hardly be blown up to explain away an entire chapter of Genesis, save for those who like the anthropologists of the late nineteenth century believe that primitive mentality is incapable of abstraction and unable to understand anything except in terms of individual personalities.

The connection between the two stories, sister-wife and Dinah, depends upon recognizing in marriage rules a moral issue, which indeed they are in most societies. The first implies that if Sarah were really sister and not wife she might legitimately have been given away to a powerful stranger. The second implies, since Dinah is really sister and only sister, that women cannot be given away at all. There is a progression therefore from the first to the second in the direction of restricting the access of foreigners to Israelite women. Moreover, there is a further progression in that this access is denied not by God or by the fear of Divine retribution on the part of the would-be adulterous monarch but by the action of Simeon and Levi, who settle the matter with their swords. The solution to the problem of exogamy, the refusal of the notion of exchange of women, comes at the point where political events are represented realistically for the first

time. Such a progression from the mode of myth to that of realism is present in the repeated version of many stories, often in much later books. A telling example is to be found in Judges 19:22–30 which reproduces the incident of Lot and the angels. But this time the visitor is human not supernatural, a Levite travelling home in fact. No miracle saves the situation and his concubine is abused and left dead on the doorstep. The outcome is a terrible war of vengeance against the Benjaminites who perpetrated this crime. Structural similarity there certainly is in such repetitions, but they are not simple transformations of the structure of the original version, they progress and always in the same direction.

The Mediterranean endogamy of historical times was reached as I have suggested previously[26] via a more ancient tradition that included sexual hospitality in various forms. In ancient Arabia the stranger was given a temporary wife while he remained with his hosts, a form of marriage that is still recognized in certain parts of modern Islam (though it is regarded, I am told, as no more than a form of transient concubinage if not simply prostitution). Temple prostitution was also practiced in many parts of the Middle East. Herodotus' account of it in Babylon, however suspect, indicates at least that prior to marriage girls were made available to visitors in a dedicated role in the shrines. The temple of Aphrodite at Corinth was a famous center among seafaring men. Herodotus also records the manner in which the girls of Crete received visitors from Egypt. Early anthropologists, aware of this tradition regarded it as evidence of an anterior state, a survival of communal marriage. Frazer—in *The Golden Bough*—explained it in terms of fertility cults. Biblical commentators are on the whole agreed that some such form of temple prostitution was practiced by the Canaanites in Old Testament times; when the Israelites went "whoring after strange gods" as, to the fury of Yahweh, they frequently did, they appear to have done so more than figuratively (2 Kings 23:7; Jeremiah 5:43; Hosea 4:14; etc.). Solomon in his old age tolerated the religions of his various foreign wives and his son Roboam whose mother was an Ammonite is explicitly stated to have introduced temple prostitution into Judah during his reign (1 Kings 14:24; 15:12; 22:47). During the Hellenization of Antiochus the temples were dedicated to Zeus and in that of Garizim temple prostitutes were installed in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants who appropriately enough happened to be the people of Shechem (2 Maccabees 6:4). In the main however

26. Pitt-Rivers is referring to his essay "Women and Sanctuary," which is reproduced in this volume in Chapter 8. *Ed.*

temple prostitution in the Old Testament was a matter of Israelites frequenting the shrines of foreign gods and it implied religious infidelity. In view of the emphasis from the story of Dinah onwards on female sexual purity and virginity at marriage it is understandable that it should less frequently be found practiced by Israelite women. The prostitutes of Israel have a shameful and profane status.

This observation is relevant to the stories we are considering, for are not Abram, Abraham and Isaac operating a form of sexual hospitality in offering their "sister" to the local ruler when they enter his territory? Sexual hospitality usually means receiving the stranger who comes alone, but if he comes with his women he can hardly be received in the same fashion. He cannot become, as it were, a temporary or momentary affine since he already has a family, but he *can* establish alliance in the other direction by offering his sister or daughter. In the light of this logic "the sister-wife problem" takes on a new significance for, if such a temporary alliance is to be practiced through the wife, she must be presented as sister, i.e., available for the exchange of hospitality by which the women of the visitors are taken in return for receiving them in the vicinity and granting them pasture. The mores of later times in the Mediterranean would condemn almost equally and in the same terms the offer of sexual access to either, but prior to Genesis 34, there is no sign of such attitudes and Genesis 20:13 implies that Abraham's behavior was customary rather than exceptional: "this is the kindness you must do me, *at every place* [my italics] to which we come, say of me, he is my brother."

This form of sexual hospitality has received little anthropological comment, yet its existence is amply testified from ethnographies of many nomadic peoples, who use their women as a means of establishing relations with the sedentary population. The gypsies are a good example or the Zapotecs of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec who make their living in the fairground business and curiously resemble gypsies in a number of ways. The women of both practice the art of seduction and at the same time endeavor to avoid literally giving their favors, for this is resented by their menfolk. Strictly endogamous in theory and placing high value on female purity, the gypsies are nonetheless ready to exploit the sexual charm of their women for the sake of political advantage. Hence they have provoked the most inexact opinions regarding their mores in the populations among whom they dwell.[27] Being by reputation shameless in that they do not

27. "The extraordinary contrast between the outsider's stereotype of the Gypsy woman and the ideal behavior expected of her by the gypsies themselves" (Okely 1975: 55)

react with visible signs of shame nor respect the rules of behavior that govern the neighborly relations of the community—they steal and cheat and lie—it is assumed that they are sexually shameless and their women's brazen behavior is taken as testimony of this. In fact, this behavior, which includes inveigling attempts to inspire pity, supernatural threats, and sexual provocation, is limited to the context of their relations with *gajé* (non-gypsies) and due to the contempt that all gypsies entertain for those who are not of their own race. It is due also to the fact that contact with the hostile locals is conducted by the women rather than the men. But within the gypsy community the women are subjected to a strict code of morals by their menfolk and are expected to show a high sense of shame. The supposed sexual shamelessness of gypsy women in the view of the *gajé* is due, first, to the different connotations and contexts of gypsy shame but above all to the fact that it is required only in relation to other gypsies. The *gajé* do not count as moral persons (Sutherland 1975). Gypsy women rarely go in for prostitution and never while they remain integrated with their people and in the countries where on occasions a sexual relationship with a *Gajo* is accepted it is not a stray liaison with peasants but a lasting one with the powerful whose patronage is extended to their kin. The nobleman's gypsy mistress was a feature of Spanish and Hungarian society where they enjoyed fame as musicians with a style of their own. Their role as entertainers brought them into contact with the upper class, but regardless of this they have always maintained better relations with the upper than with the lower classes who are the chief victims of their predations. They succeeded so well in gaining the protection of the nobility in seventeenth-century France that Colbert complained that this was the reason they could not be got rid of.[28] Those who live close to the knuckle dependent upon their more powerful sedentary neighbors cannot afford to ignore the overbearing value of political protection.

The gypsies are in many ways unique but the principles by which their customs are to be explained are not, for they derive from a social structure of a certain type, one in which nomads live in habitual contact with sedentary

---

is the subject of this essay and the author illustrates it amply. Okeley's study relates to English gypsies whose women exploit their sexual charm much less than their cousins in Spain and elsewhere, *cf.* de Heusch (1966: 39).

28. "Il a été impossible de chasser entièrement du Royaume ces voleurs par la protection qu'ils ont de tout temps trouvée et qu'ils trouve encore journellement auprès des Gentils hommes et Seigneurs justiciers qui leur donnent retraite dans leurs châteaux et Maisons ..." (quoted in de Heusch 1966: 24).

peoples of a different culture upon whom they depend, whom they despise, yet whom they fear to confront. The nomadic Somalis and Fulani in Africa, and the Guajira and Guajibo in South America are similar to the gypsies in that their women are encouraged to make contact with the sedentary townsmen, are frequently preyed upon sexually by them, and this is resented by their menfolk, unless it is advantageous to them. I conclude that the sister-wife stories depict a situation that is typical of nomadic people living in political and economic dependence upon townsmen who extort a sometimes grudgingly given sexual hospitality from their visitors in exchange for tolerating their presence.

Bearing this in mind let us return to the story of Dinah. It is an amalgam of two versions, the Elohist and the Yahwist which according to Osty are distinguishable by the text and which combine two rather different interpretations giving rise to internal inconsistencies. In the Elohist verses (1, 2a, 3b, 4, 6, 8–10, 13, 15–18, 20–5a, 25c, 27–9a) Dinah is seduced rather than raped and she returns to her people. In the Yahwist she is possessed by violence and held captive. In the first Shechem's father Hamor negotiates the pact of marriage alliance, in the second Shechem offers the bride-price himself. The verses telling of the action of Simeon and Levi and their final comment come from the Yahwist. The hesitation of Jacob whose "part in this story seems curiously ineffective" (Herbert 1962: 114) is part of the Elohist.

The difference in orientation which Osty finds between the two sources reflects the difference between a less intransigent and a more intransigent attitude towards the seduction of Dinah. Simeon and Levi do not come into the Elohist text but they set the tone for the rest of the Old Testament in regard to sexual honor: "Is our sister to be treated as a whore?", a question that might well have been asked of Abraham or Isaac.

This is the first appearance of the notion of sexual honor and it corresponds not only to the assumption of military dominance by the Israelites but also to their first attempt to abandon the nomadic way of life. For this reason, the texts referring to this period are called the "sedentarization chapters." Once they are masters of the land they no longer need to use their womenfolk for their external relations. The fate of Shechem was determined by his failure to appreciate that such nomads are liable to change their minds about the necessity to offer their women once they are strong enough to refuse them. Hamor's offer of direct marital exchange implements a conception of marriage that is no longer acceptable to the Israelites, who have learned through the hard

experience of political subordination to keep their women to themselves, once they can.[29]

V

There is much to be said of the connection between political power and sexual honor—it is a favorite theme in the literature of "anti-honor." Here I am concerned only with the effects of this connection in the realm of kinship. By making men's honor vulnerable through the sexual behavior of their women Mediterranean culture gives to sex a kind of political significance it lacks in primitive societies. The marital exchange, direct or indirect, of women between groups reflects a consciousness of social equivalence that western civilization, whether tribal or urban, has long since lost. Ever since the foundation of cities there have been differentiations of class which hinge upon the nuclear family and those who retain a pastoral way of life and a corporate organization in tribes live nonetheless in relation to the cities and under their political sway. Marriage is here an affair first and foremost of the nuclear family whatever the depth of the patriline and the future of a family in terms of power, wealth and prestige depends upon its marriages. Marriage choices thus become a function of its strategy and consequently marriage rules can no longer be phrased in general terms as the rules of a system but depend upon a given *ego* whose strategy is particular to himself. The system no longer assures equilibrium through reciprocity but dominance through accumulation for those whose strategy is successful.

However, before this point can be developed it must be asked whether what has been called Mediterranean endogamy is rightly so called, for in the strict sense a rule of endogamy would, precisely, preclude marriage as a means of political alliance between groups and therefore diminish rather than increase its political significance—or so it might be thought. But Mediterranean endogamy is, rather than a rule forbidding marriage outside a given social range, a preference for keeping daughters as close to the nuclear family as the prohibition of incest permits. Though there is a general preference for marriage within the

29. I am grateful to Mr. Ibrahim Tahir for an account of a similar incident from West Africa in which a tribe of pastoral Fulani, angered with the sexual abuse of their women by their sedentary neighbors, rose and sacked the town. The source is a Ph.D. thesis of the University of Zaria (Abubakar 1970).

patriline, the preferential right to the hand of the father's brother's daughter in the Arab world applies strictly only to the literal father's brother's daughter not to any member of the patriline (Peters 1976).

In correct usage the terms exogamy and endogamy refer to rules of marriage concerning a given social group which is either forbidden to intermarry (exogamous group) or forbidden *not* to intermarry (endogamous group), that is to say, marriage within the group is forbidden in the first case and in the second marriage is forbidden outside it. Thus they are logical contraries and as such they set either an interior or an exterior limit to valid marriage. But in application to concrete examples this does not entail that if a group is not exogamous it is endogamous nor vice versa for such reasoning would exclude the intermediary sphere between the two limits where valid marriage takes place. Even less does it justify the usage of the terms to mean the *fact* of marriage outside or inside a given group rather than the *prohibition* of the opposite. This is, alas, a frequent error in anthropological writings and it leads straight to confusion, for not only it confuses a fact of behavior and a rule of conduct, it obscures what the rules are by calling exogamous a marriage that is merely not a violation of the rule of endogamy and vice versa so that the sphere of valid marriage can be called either one thing or its contrary according to whether it is considered in relation to its interior or exterior limit. From this it is evident that a preference *for* a given marriage is not at all the same thing as a prohibition *against* its opposite, for the first takes place within a range of acceptable choices—and the notion of preference presupposes the existence of choice; the second allows no choice and therefore no possibility of preference. As long as marriages that do not respect the preference are valid there is no question of endogamy for it may be due not to the kinship system at all but to factors quite contingent to it such as economic or political advantage and the preference operates upon it only at the statistical level in the sense that more than a random number of such marriages are made because they are favored for extraneous reasons. For example it brings luck to the bride to marry in May in England, since May brides are under the special protection of the Virgin in the month of May, but October brides are no less married. The old belief may even have been materially beneficial for dietetic reasons quite apart from the grace bestowed by the Virgin's patronage, for May brides were likely to produce their first born in the spring and, on a higher than normal protein diet, to produce more milk and therefore nourish their child better. Such considerations have obviously nothing to do with the kinship system even before it is recalled that the custom is the reverse on the Continent where

May marriages are considered improper. Yet the example poses the question of how to distinguish the elements of a kinship system from extraneous pressures upon it deriving from beliefs such as those that recommend a particular month for the marriage or the preferential choice of a husband. A Spanish music-hall ditty provides the limiting case of the latter by invoking Santa Rita, the patroness of fiancées, to provide, in defiance of statistical possibility, for every girl a millionaire husband.[30] The fact that a saint is invoked in order to achieve this ideal already implies that it is not within the range of everyday choices. But the notion of preference covers a whole spectrum, from the norm to which conformity is expected by the community when practically possible or at least convenient, to the ideal attainable by an individual only in the most exceptional cases with the miraculous aid of Santa Rita. Both are preferences but the first is normal in the sense of habitual, the second is not.

The example is obviously frivolous. But when a preference is expressed for marriage between the children of two brothers and endorsed as the obligation to give your daughter in marriage, if claimed, to your brother's son it is easy to slip into the unexamined assumption that this is part of the kinship system. In fact, it may well be a matter of political or economic advantage, like the marriages of monarchs made to cement an alliance or assure the fidelity of a powerful vassal.

What has been called "Mediterranean endogamy" appears to belong to this class. In ancient Greece the right to marry the *epikleros,* the heiress of a family holding, was explicitly an economically motivated preferential marriage since, as the word implies, the bride went with the estate and such a marriage thereby guarded against the alienation of the inheritance to another patriline. But the term applied only to women who inherited property in default of a male sibling, that is to say, they could not be allowed to marry out, since having acquired the male status of property owner they were condemned to remain part of the patriline. Numbers 36 lays down an exactly similar prescription. The cousin marriage of southern Europe and parts of the Arab world can also be seen to be similarly motivated: where women have rights to a share in the inheritance of land it is advantageous to marry them rather than allow the estate to be divided. Peters has shown in the case of a Lebanese village how the land-owning class

30. "Santa Rita, Santa Rita
Cada una necesita
Un marido milionario
Para el uso de diaro."

especially control their marriages in order to control their property (Peters 1963: 176–94). Recently he has submitted the notion of *bint ʿamm* marriage to scrutiny, pointing out that this preference is much less general in the Arab world than is commonly assumed[31] and that in such instances where it is the custom it accounts for only a small number of marriages, despite the fact that ʿ*amm* may mean father-in-law as well as father's brother. The right to claim the *bint ʿamm's* hand is in no sense an obligation for the groom, but merely an option which he can waive at will. At most it may require that the girl's father must obtain his brother's son's acquiescence before giving her in marriage to someone else, and this he can probably contrive to do if he wishes.[32]

Now it would be a gross error to assume that modern Arab marriage can be taken as a model for ancient Israelite marriage even though both peoples disapproved of taking unbelievers as wives, but it is at least more reasonable to compare them rather than to accept a general notion of endogamy as covering both the Mediterranean and also the castes of India and elsewhere. For a *tendency* to marry within the patriline has quite different implications to a *prohibition* to marry outside the caste. The Israelites of the Old Testament are continually in fact taking foreign wives, especially, it appears, the kings, and captured foreign women were acceptable as wives as has been pointed out. One can hardly therefore refer to the customs of the Israelites, either their distrust of foreign women or the preference for marriage within the patriline as endogamy in the proper sense of the term.

The reason for divine disapproval of foreign wives appears to me, most unoriginally, to be the danger to the faith resulting from the introduction of women who do not belong to it by birth. Indeed, this is explicitly stated in 1 Kings 11:1–3. On the other hand, Ruth's fidelity to Yahweh and to her husband's patriline (Ruth 1:16, 3:10) entitled her to become assimilated and to be counted among the ancestors of Solomon, while Samson's wife more typically showed no such fidelity (Judges 14) and demonstrated the wisdom of the divine injunction. The preference for marriage within the tribe, clan or patriline is a separate issue to be explained by quite different considerations relating not to the unity

31. "Among all Muslim Arabs, first paternal parallel cousin marriage is permitted, among some it is a preferred form (as far as expressed sentiments go, at least), and in a few communities, exceptionally so I am sure, a man has a right to his father's brother's daughter" (Peters 1976: 61).

32. *Cf.* Cohen (1965) and Malamat (1967)

of the faith among the descendants of Abraham, the people of the Covenant, but to marriage strategy, that is to say marriage is an economic and political matter, whether or not it bears upon the problem of the faith. And this indeed it is among the ancient Israelites, the modern Muslims or even the peoples of the whole Mediterranean.

We have so far considered only the question of where to find wives; where daughters are to be given in marriage is another matter and one on which the Old Testament is curiously silent save for a very few examples. One learns of the existence of women who have married foreigners for the most part only by the mention of persons with Israelite mothers and foreign fathers. They are few in any case and their fathers are mostly men in the service of the Israelite monarch, that is to say are in-marrying sons-in-law.[33] In brief, there is no mention of daughters being given *away* to foreigners, with the single exception of Ibzan (Judges 12:9) whose thorough-going reversion to the principle of exogamy—he brought in foreign wives for his thirty sons and married his thirty daughters out—receives neither praise nor blame and provokes no recorded consequences.

The connection between masculine honor and the purity of women which makes a man vulnerable not only through his wife but through his mother, sister, or daughter, is common to all the traditional peoples of the Mediterranean and it poses a problem to the men of the nuclear family. Since they cannot impregnate their women themselves, to whom shall they give them? The fusion of honor that takes place in marriage alliance clearly inclines them to choose those who are closest and best known and who already share the collective honor of the common patriline.[34] But such a consideration applies only to the marriage of daughters not of sons. Anthropologists are accustomed to regard these as the same thing, since if daughters are not given away then sons do not receive them. But this argument only holds within a closed system of kinship in which there is not only a preference for marriage in, particularly with regard to daughters, but a prohibition on marriage out for both sexes that is to say, within a system that is truly endogamous. It does not hold at all however if marriage is a political affair in which there are winners and losers of women, more powerful and less

33. "Israelitish women also married aliens (1 Kings 7:14) but usually as it would seem, under the condition that their husbands settled in Israel (2 Samuel 11:3, 1 Chronicles 2:17)," Hastings *Encyclopedia*.

34. Only among the Slavs is the patriline exogamous, while the prohibited range extends to second cousins on both sides among the modern Greeks.

powerful, patrons and clients and social classes between which a certain mobility of families takes place, as in the Mediterranean where the agnostic quality of social relations has so forcibly struck the anthropologists who have worked there. In fact, those who have attempted to treat Mediterranean kinship as a closed system have committed the mistake of supposing that marriage necessarily involves *exchange* of women. It might be given the name "Shechem's fallacy" in honor of its first perpetrator who paid more dearly than any anthropologist for his mistake. Expressed in anthropological terms it is his error of attempting to interpret a complex structure of kinship on the basis of an assumption that is valid only within elementary structures.

From the moment that the notion of honor is attached to female purity kinship loses its basis of reciprocity and becomes political and ego-centered, a competition in which the winners are those who keep their daughters and take the women of other groups in addition, giving only their patronage in exchange. Hence from being the means of establishing sociation on a conceptually equal basis, women become the means of establishing dominance, a conception against which the egalitarian peasant community has led an unsuccessful struggle down to modern times. Their concept of honor, so different in its sexual connotations, illustrates this struggle.

Accepting the political significance of marriage within such a framework it follows that marriage strategy can be either conciliatory, defensive or aggressive. To give women in exchange for political protection and/or economic advantage involves accepting domination and profiting from its counterpart. This was Abraham's strategy. A more defensive strategy attempts to reserve its women within the group and avoid outside involvement. But the aggressive strategy aims both to deny its women to outsiders and take in their women. Simeon's and Levi's was the extreme of aggressive strategy: they took the women and children and they wiped out the men—and they did so in the name of their sexual honor. Moreover, the effect of such a strategy is of course to increase their numbers in the future and thus their political power—"sons are guns"—which in turn enables them to acquire more foreign women in exchange for their value as allies, while avoiding the risks to their honor involved in giving daughters away. Competition for women, however it may be conceptualized by the people themselves, is competition for power. On the sole condition that the sons thus produced can be maintained in patrilineal fidelity—a condition which was not always met in the Old Testament—those who receive most women expand fastest and attain a position of domination.

Such a political usage of marriage depends of course upon polygyny of one form or another, and in the age of the patriarchs Israel practiced both polygamy and concubinage. But there are dangers in an aggressive strategy and an expansive policy which are illustrated in the subsequent books of the Old Testament for, not only foreign women cannot be trusted nor can their sons—Abimelech of Judges 9 is a fair example—foreign wives lead to segmentation and the possibility of fission.[35] Yahweh whose overriding concern is religious fidelity appears to favor a defensive strategy which consists in keeping women born within the Covenant and avoiding entanglements with foreign women, a strategy which eventually led the Israelites, unlike the Muslims, to monogamy. Foreign wives are a constant source of trouble but sexual relations with foreign women also lead to infidelity and are usually punished ferociously. In Numbers 25, the Israelites appear to be offered sexual hospitality by the Moabites—so it appears to Osty (1973: 334)—and to be tempted into alliance with them. The lesson is clear. Sexual hospitality is not only not to be given, it may not be received either, not even (the text finally adds, vv. 6–8, 14–18) in the form of the Midianite Cozbi, daughter of Zur, who is brought into the Israelite camp by the Simeonite prince she has seduced.

The incident is an exact counterpart of the story of Shechem and Dinah save in the distribution of the blame and the moral lesson drawn. This time it is not the prince of the sedentary people who seduces the daughter of the visitors, but the local girl who has seduced the prince of the visiting tribe. They are both speared by Phinehas when they approach the Ark of the Covenant. Phinehas later (Genesis 31) leads an expedition against the Midianites who are all, if male, put to the sword and Moses subsequently (Genesis 31, 35) decrees that all the adult women be massacred as well. The Israelites are allowed to keep only the thirty-two thousand virgins and the children. Simeon and Levi were blamed for their intemperate action but Phinehas (25:13) went further than they and was rewarded with a hereditary high-priesthood. On account of its similarity it can be added to the story of Shechem and Dinah as an extension of the series on which it marks an ultimate progression. The defensive strategy of Yahweh is now complete. The story comes appropriately as a prelude to the final settlement of Canaan.

35. Cuisenier (1973). See also Cuisenier (1975). Bourdieu (1972: Chapter 3) gives an admirable analysis of marriage strategy among the Kabyles.

Interspersed with the account of the fate of the Midianites the problem is posed (Genesis 27) of the inheritance of the daughters of Zelophehad who died with those who were punished for their incredulity in the desert and left five daughters and no son. The rule is laid down clearly by God to Moses that the order of inheritance is to be: sons, daughters, brothers, father's brothers, patri-clan. Genesis 30, deriving the lesson from their example, ordains that heiresses must marry within their tribe to prevent land from being alienated to another tribe (30:9) and verse 11 specifies that they all married a father's brother's son. A clearer description of the *epikleros* could hardly be given. By the end of the Book of Numbers, the last narrative book of the Pentateuch (for Deuteronomy is almost entirely composed of laws), the rules of marriage appear to be established, and though they are frequently violated it is clear—save in the curious case of Ibzan cited above—that Yahweh disapproves when this occurs. It is within this framework that the story proceeds after the Pentateuch and it does so on a realistic basis: the style of myth has given way almost entirely to history. The events recorded in subsequent chapters show that the defensive strategy is the wisest in the long term. Solomon's departure from it leads to expansion and empire, but eventually to the break-up of Israel. The *interpretation* of the past validates the religion of the present at any point in time but this is not to say that the events that are thus reinterpreted had no reality in the first place.

VI

The question remains: to what extent does the Old Testament reflect history? To what extent is it myth? Biblical scholars have long recognized that it is not all equally historical throughout—compare the Garden of Eden with the reign of Solomon!—and even within the Book of Genesis, which is my concern, there is a change of tone which implies an increase in historical pretensions. Were there any events at all behind it or are the historical pretensions an illusion? Leach is prepared to treat all history as structure and thereby eliminate events altogether. (By assimilating history and myth he surely invites the question: does he believe that history also gets thought in the minds of men unbeknown to them?) But by refusing the opposition between structure and event he reduces structuralism to a method of detecting mnemonic devices, a way to see how "memorable events" were rendered memorable.

I believe that in the Old Testament, even in Genesis, events have left traces however difficult or even impossible it may be to use them to reconstruct an account of them comprehensible to modern minds. Very often the bones have been picked clean and we are left with nothing but names, as in the interminable genealogies scattered through the Pentateuch which list the forebears in the patriline but add no further information about each than that he begat somebody else about whom nothing more is known either. One could get more edification out of a telephone directory! For this reason, the attention paid to them by biblical scholars has been limited to strictly historical considerations based on the reckoning that their names have conserved clues as to the tribal movements and alliances of the past. But then of a sudden a story is told which relates an event in detail. Its original sense, that is the sense it had for those who witnessed it, is lost to the eyes of later generations and what is left of the record remains as a riddle incorporated into the comprehension of the day by generations of anachronizers who weave a thread of meaning into it for the sake of their contemporary public which is expected to be edified by it and to be able to use it to guide their conduct in the present. Take the example of Onan (Genesis 38:8–10) who refused to give children to his elder brother's widow because he wished to keep the inheritance for himself. He was punished by death, but his sin was not "onanism" but *coitus interruptus* practiced by deceit for selfish ends and contrary to custom and paternal instructions. While the institution of the levirate was understood there was no difficulty in understanding this passage, but once impregnation of a deceased brother's widow was not a duty but sexual access to her was forbidden, the possibility of misinterpreting it was greatly increased.[36] Given the obsession of the nineteenth century with masturbation, biblical authority for its prohibition was required and Onan was the best that could be found in the Bible. The belief that masturbation leads to debilitation and death found its authority in a misunderstanding of Genesis 38.

To understand the past is like understanding another culture. Bartlett's (1932) experiments of half a century ago already demonstrated how time and translation into an alien idiom deform the original sense of a text. To understand one cannot but employ the criteria of one's own life, however refined they may have been by the study of history or anthropology, but the essence of the sacred is mystery and it is not necessary to understand in order to revere sacred

36. Webster gives the original meaning as well, but the *Diccionario de la Real Academia de la Lengua Española* (1956) does not, nor does the *Oxford English Dictionary*.

texts, for their words not their meaning are what links them to the sanctity of origins and it is always permissible therefore to place a passage in hermeneutic brackets labelling it a mystery or to maintain that it is "clearly apocryphal." Hence the book of Genesis appears to me to be the product of quite a different process from those pure myths that are found in illiterate unstratified societies who have no sense of the historical past and even from those which can be sensed rather than perceived *behind* the text of the early chapters of Genesis. Rather than stories each of a piece, complete in itself and related to other such stories by no established order, those of the Old Testament are diachronically ranged, even if the order differs slightly in the different versions (Torah, Vulgate, etc.), and rather than the unreasoned product of the collective consciousness, they are the consciously reasoned constructs of individual men attempting to find in the debris of events a pervasive sense, and looking to the past for an authority to be exercised in the present. They are like coral reefs built by a process of accumulation and bearing at any given moment a relation both to the past on which they are founded and to the ecology of the ocean around them which hides their foundations from view.

What went on at Nablus some time about three and a half thousand years ago we shall never know, but the story of Dinah and Shechem records how, when the Israelites first attempted to become sedentary, they ceased to allow their women to be preyed upon by their more powerful neighbors and abandoned the custom of offering sexual hospitality in the way that went with their nomadic condition. As a result the conception of marriage they subsequently adhered to was opposed to the notion of exchange; they accepted the predatory premises regarding women of which they had themselves been the victims. This "sexual revolution" inevitably covers the whole realm of sexual relations and bequeaths to subsequent generations an evaluation of "women's favors" in terms of honor, shame, and purity.

If it may be posited that the peoples of the Middle East once practiced a system of marriage involving the exchange of women, an elementary structure of kinship like those of the great majority of the primitive peoples of the world, some such transition must have taken place and the growth of cities and the conditions of political instability such as the Old Testament describes provide circumstances favorable to the development of the kind of situation described in the story of Dinah. But there is no possibility of bringing any exterior evidence, historical or archaeological, to confirm the story, other than conceivably that the town of Shechem, such as it could have been, was sacked—and all the

towns of Palestine appear from the Old Testament record to have been sacked at one time or another. Such evidence would tell us nothing about the events which led to its destruction. The story of Dinah depicts this change in terms that correspond, not to the free fantasy of the unconscious mind, but to a real experience of events which were unlikely to have been unique—that is to say that the historical inspiration of the legend was in social history rather than in political history. The social theory implicit in Genesis' account—for there is an implicit theory in any account, ethnographical or historiographical is, briefly, for it has been elaborated throughout this essay, that sex is a political matter, a function of a system of status and power manifest in the idiom of honor. This it has been in the Mediterranean ever since and the notion of honor as fundamentally a matter of sexual behavior is a correlate of this. This is not the case, necessarily, elsewhere. The fate of Shechem then marks the transition from an elementary to a complex structure of kinship, from a closed kinship system to a system of marriage strategy dominated by political values, and the adoption by the Israelites of the concepts of honor and shame which go with that system.

EPILOGUE

It is understandable that Lévi-Strauss, now that he has come to tackle the mythology of Europe, should choose the Holy Grail rather than the Book of Genesis. The former is not holy writ and therefore it has escaped the attentions of the anachronizers: no edifying message was to be extracted from it and it has been used only in the fabrication of literary conceits—and opera. If I appear bolder, not to say foolhardy, in accepting the task the author of the *Mythologiques* refused, it is because my aspirations are in fact different and more modest. Lévi-Strauss' grasp of the logic of myth enables him to unearth the structure of the original version of the Holy Grail behind the literary accounts that have preserved it and even ultimately to give a demonstration of how it evolved down to the operas of Wagner, an exercise in diachronic structure he had judged intrepid earlier. In approaching the Book of Genesis I make no attempt to discover either the structure of the myths of origin behind it, nor like Leach the structure of the finished product, for him the King James version. I have tried only to show that the story of Shechem contains, for those who accept my premises regarding the relationship of history to myth, a meaning which is both less contrived than those given it by commentators who have

sought edification in it and less arbitrary than the interpretation that treats it simply as factual, political, history. It records in the cryptic fashion of such legends a truth about the origin of Mediterranean civilization.[37]

37. In an otherwise unpublished comment, Lévi-Strauss (1959) concludes a comparison of the theories of Barth and of Murphy and Kasdan regarding Islamic endogamy with the observation that in the preference it accords to marriage with the father's brother's daughter Muslim society introduced the historical dimension, that is to say, where women are exchanged not for other women but for political advantage, the maintenance of the lineage to which they belong depends upon marriages that either reinforce or isolate it. In this way, he says, a dialectical relation is created between marriage system and political history. He sees a connection between on the one hand the creation of diachronic consciousness with its correlative passage from "cold" to "hot" society and from myth to history and on the other the refusal to give daughters away in exchange. The fate of Shechem represents in that case not only the sexual revolution that initiated the Mediterranean concept of honor, but the starting point of the history of Mediterranean civilization itself.

PART IV

Analytics in place: concepts, theory, and method

CHAPTER 17

Contextual analysis and the locus of the model*

Radcliffe-Brown used to define social anthropology as "comparative sociology," yet the school of thought that he engendered has not been much prone to comparison. Indeed, in their revulsion from the "comparative method" of their evolutionist predecessors anthropologists of that tendency have largely avoided formal comparison and left to the "non-comparative" sociologists the duty of comparing. The definition nevertheless still has a certain validity if one recognizes that an implied comparison lies behind every ethnographic description and that the anthropologist's comparative range—that is, the range of phenomena regarded as belonging to the class under consideration and therefore relevant to a potential comparison—is wider than the sociologist's, since it includes "other cultures"[1] and traditionally primitive ones, while sociology commonly, if not always, confines itself to civilized society and operates within the framework of the values of its national culture. Social anthropology's claim to be comparative rests upon its awareness of cultural differences and its

---

* "Contextual analysis and the locus of the model" was originally an article published in 1967 in the *European Journal of Sociology* and has been reproduced in this volume with permission from Cambridge University Press.

1. Indeed, this aspect has appeared so fundamental to a recent author, J. M. Beattie (1964), that he chose the phrase as the title of his introduction to the subject.

recognition of their importance in determining the forms which social institutions can take.

Paradoxically then its parochialism in practice reflects its universal aspiration and derives not from an indifference to comparison but from a consciousness of the difficulty of establishing the categories in which this can be done. It recognizes the problem of "other cultures" only to flee from it into a cultural solipsism in which it can never truly believe. Uncertain as to where to base his premises, the anthropologist vacillates between adopting those of the people studied and accepting the promptings of his own civilization, between "relativism" and ethnocentricity. One cannot claim that social anthropology possesses a different theoretical basis to sociology, only that it is inclined to be somewhat more apprehensive in its approach to the problem of comparison which is, as Radcliffe-Brown understood, the only reason for its existence.

It is therefore in method rather than in theory that social anthropology differs from sociology, and here its contribution has been above all in the detailed analysis of the social relationships of a chosen community. This has been called the community study method, and it has given rise to the distinction between the social anthropologist's "micro-sociology" and the "macro-sociology" which takes a far greater geographical range (if a narrower field of data) and treats it statistically. Such a procedure requires the acceptance of the terms in which the data have been collected and, since they are collected by the organizations within the society itself and not by the investigator, it commits him in some degree to the premises of its self-image. Modern trends, both within the two disciplines and in the world, have broken down this simple distinction between them: social anthropologists have become concerned with complex societies, even with their own, and sociologists with the social structure of communities, and with other cultures, but a choice nevertheless remains, first of all between concentrating on communities in all their aspects rather than on a single problem throughout a whole country, and secondly between a universal perspective and one restricted to the problems of our own society. The paradox goes full cycle and resolves itself when we recognize that macro-sociology is therefore *theoretically* more ethnocentric than micro-sociology, which restricts its range only in order to enlarge its frame of reference, and includes so wide a variety of data because it refuses to accept the categories of thought used in our own society to isolate them. In practice the total social situation can only be examined in a community; a complex society can only be analyzed in its different aspects. It is my contention that the two methods should not be treated as exclusive but as complementary.

It is patently inept nowadays to study any community without reference to trends in the wider society, and this has been recognized by anthropologists ever since they turned their attention to civilization. The "primitive isolate" has had its day, theoretically as well as practically, but the methods it bequeathed, of the community study and participant observation, have still not yet exhausted their utility. So far from being "old-fashioned" (as I read recently) it appears to me that they are more than ever important in the study of the modern complex society; for, while it requires no intimate contact and detailed observation to realize that each Pacific island is socially distinct and culturally different from its neighbor, the diversity of culture and the existence of social barriers tend not to show up in the statistics. In the complex society profound cultural differences are often obscured by the belief, shared even by the people themselves in certain regards, that because they belong to a given nation they are necessarily the same as their compatriots. In the modern centralized state cultural diversities go underground to re-emerge occasionally and unexpectedly in some wildcat strike or peasant rebellion or in one of the growing number of manifestations of regional separatism. At the same time, the increased diversity of social function leads to increased cultural diversity not on a regional but on an occupational basis, as anyone knows who has had to do with coalminers. We do not need in fact to cross our national frontiers to encounter "other cultures," and the supposition of the state as a cultural unity is one which is open to qualification in more than a few ways.[2] Common textbooks in the school do not necessarily mean common understandings out of it. So the existence of cultural diversity within the national society requires that local communities be considered in their totality, for it poses within the macro-sociological whole the same problem of comparison (if on a reduced scale) as other cultures posed to the anthropologists.

For this reason, the traditional techniques of social anthropology remain just as valuable, if no longer by themselves adequate (supposing they were ever so), in the study of civilized society. The two related problems which form the title of this paper may serve as illustration. They are:

1. the role of context in the constitution of meaning on which the problem of comparison hinges, and

2. "The anthropologist's study of complex societies receives its major justification from the fact that such societies are not as well organized and tightly knit as their spokesmen would on occasion like to make people believe" E. R. Wolf (1966).

2. the differences between the conceptualizations of different people within a single society according to their status and between those of the people studied and the investigator.

Words owe their meaning to their relationship to other words within a sentence. The same is true of sounds at a more restricted level of analysis, and at a wider level it is true of theories or opinions. (For this reason political opinions are often more easily understood in terms of what they are against than of what they favor.) It is certainly true of social action, which depends upon the structure of relationships between social groups owing their solidarity to their opposition to other groups to which they are exclusive. The theory of lineage systems illustrates in the simplest way the nature of such solidarity: at any level of the structure the solidarity of a group derives from its contact with another equivalent group to which it can be opposed. But the opposition is a function of a particular context, and in a changed situation which involves a wider range of lineal kin the formerly opposed segments are able to unite in common solidarity against a genealogically more distant segment. Solidarity is not therefore an innate property of a social group but a function of its relationship to that which is conceptually excluded from it.

The universe within which oppositions may be established is determined by context, and as context changes so this universe changes and within it the potential axes of opposition. This is as true of words as of the segments of a lineage system, as a glance at any dictionary (and even more so any dictionary of synonyms and contraries) will show. Dictionaries number the various meanings of a word, arranging them in sections and subsections, and illustrate them by providing examples which show the word in its linguistic context. But when the reader comes to translate it in a given text, he must decide from what he knows or can surmise of the subject matter discussed, that is, the semantic universe of the word, which one is the appropriate sense. Without an indication of social context we cannot know whether "uncle" means the parent's sibling or the pawnbroker.

It would be tempting to be able to order the meanings of a word in terms of its fundamental meaning, and then its derived or figurative meanings, and timid attempts are made in this direction by lexicographers who, from a wealth of etymological knowledge, accord priority on the same basis as precedence is accorded among titles, that is, antiquity. But precedence does not correspond to power, and antiquated senses of a word, like impoverished noblemen who can

no longer afford to appear at court, disappear from usage and retain their precedence only in learned works of etymology, whose method recalls the *Almanach de Gotha*. Asked to assign a fundamental sense *in terms of present utility rather than antiquity*, we frequently can but "say uncle." For words which were once metaphorically related drift apart in time and become for all practical purposes homonyms, and their kinship through the Latin lexicon seems as irrelevant in daily use as the genealogical fact of a kin connection between two men called Smith who do not know that they are cousins. In practice we tend to regard as fundamental the meaning which relates to the context which strikes us as having the greatest importance—it is the meaning we think of first—and call the less important senses secondary or derivative or figurative. But the decision is arbitrary and reposes only on our view of our society, which again is related to our place in it.[3] Parent's siblings are at present of greater importance than pawnshops, but were children ever to be produced from the laboratory they might find themselves with no uncle bar the pawnbroker.

Figurative usage rests upon an analogy, but the analogy depends upon the selection of one particular property, and once the term has been transferred to a different contextual universe, its other properties become irrelevant. Hence in the instance already mentioned the significant quality of uncles in our society is that they are usually thought of as benign (though they may be wicked, alternatively) and also that they stand outside the structure of authority of the nuclear family. They are usually more affluent than their nephews, being older. Therefore they are "good for a touch," and it is uniquely this property that they share with pawnbrokers, who are not noted in other ways for their beneficence. One might in fact surmise that were our society matrilineal we should call the pawnbroker "Dad."

In the expression "saying uncle" a different property provides the basis of the analogy, and it is rather the submission which is owed by nephews which is in question. In saying uncle one recognizes one's inferior status and claims the clemency which is its counterpart: an uncle does not punish his nephews. If matrilineal, we might equally "say dad" when giving up a struggle in which we were outclassed.

3. Take, for example, the word "society": to sociologists its fundamental sense refers to the object of their study, and "society" in the sense of High Society appears as a secondary usage. But to someone who belonged to Society but knew no sociology, it would no doubt appear the other way round.

The figurative usage of kin terms commonly reposes on some such straightforward analogy between the role of kinsman and pseudo-kinsman; pseudo-uncles are avuncular, pseudo-fathers paternal, blood-brothers fraternal, yet not in every way. Blood-brothers do not belong to the same kin-group, pseudo-fathers do not procreate, and pawnbrokers charge interest on their loans. The basis of the analogy is often more obscure. Take for example the curious evocation of the father in the Mexican expression "*Soy tu padre*" (I am your father). This is a powerful insult and cannot be uttered without the expectation of ensuing violence. At first sight this may appear surprising, since the claim to paternity might be taken to be aimed to awaken filial respect in response. It has even been supposed that people who use such an expression in order to insult must be strangely lacking in paternal devotion, and it has been claimed to demonstrate the hostile quality of relations between fathers and sons. If the usage were founded on the same principle as the examples of uncle given above, it would indeed invoke the father as a punishing figure and represent a claim to the right to punish. But from my experience I would say that, *pace* the egregious example of Jesus Sanchez,[4] Mexican fathers are among the most indulgent and affectionate: they commonly delegate the role of punishing to mothers or elder sisters and seldom discipline their children at all. They are both less severe and more neglectful than, for example, the traditional Victorian middle-class father, who never gave occasion for any such analogy.

Laying aside then this simplistic and false explanation, I can provide a more satisfactory one, which reposes on the comparative dimension of social anthropology. Anthropologists have been accustomed for two decades to distinguish between the role of *pater* and *genitor*: the social father and the procreator which in certain societies are not, as in ours we expect, the same person. But, while we expect in Western civilization that social paternity should attach to physical paternity, we are aware that it does not always do so. "Fatherless children" come into the world and are recognized by an epithet which in some social *milieux* carries as much opprobrium as the Mexican expression referred to. Now, to take the specific case of Mexico, it can be seen that while, as in the rest of Europe, to be lacking in social paternity is to pertain to a shameful status, the vocabulary in which this shame is evoked takes a different form. It still operates through a reference to the mother, but lack of a father is attributed not so much to her loose morals,

4. The father in Oscar Lewis' well known compound autobiography, *The Children of Sanchez* (1961).

but to the misfortune of her rape. Where the Europeans say "son of a whore," the Mexicans say "son of the violated"—an observation which provided Octavio Paz with the theme of a brilliant essay (Paz 1950). When the Mexican bully utters his slandering claim to paternity, he is not claiming social but physical paternity and doing no more than embellish the standard insult with the implication: "I know because it was I who violated your mother." In Spain this expression is neither known nor understood, nor could it be, since the form of which it is an embellishment does not exist. Both the Spanish and Mexican insults derive from the suggestion that the victim of the insult is fatherless, but while the Spanish gives the seduction of the mother as the cause, the Mexican gives her violation. The Spanish makes it a matter of her moral character, the Mexican of her physical protection. The concept of honor includes aspects of social status, ethics, and power, but the two countries choose in this instance a different aspect as the significant one. (The reason for this difference of choice can be traced back to the difference in the values attaching to honor in the colonial rather than the metropolitan context.) Congruently with this, Mexicans do not use and often do not understand the symbolism of the horns as indicative of cuckoldry, and though they use the Spanish word for cuckold, its precise meaning has lapsed. In crossing the Atlantic it has acquired a new semantic universe, and traded marital for general significance. Hence in Mexico it is commonly used in the feminine form also, *cabrona*, a usage which strikes Spaniards as ludicrous.

One does indeed find examples in other countries of Europe of such apparently anomalous usages. To take only one which is no longer in use in England—it vanished in the eighteenth century—but still common in Spain, in a slightly different form: the use of "cozen" to mean "to deceive." To cozen someone was to deceive him, and in Spanish cousin (*primo*) is a foolish person and "to do the cousin" is to be deceived. Yet, apart from this expression, cousins are not regarded with unkindness, and royalty recognizes a kind of honorary cousinship among themselves regardless of the realities of kinship. The basis of this usage is then the ambiguity that attaches to the relationship (which was already prefigured in the wicked uncle): to claim cousinship is to claim a preferential tie, but in fact cousins are divided by their rivalry over inheritance as often as they are bound by the sentiment of common descent. The preferential tie cloaks a conflict of interests, and he who places his faith in the former is liable to become the victim of the latter.

These examples of figurative kinship illustrate a general problem in anthropology: when is kinship genuine and when is it pseudo? A great variety of such

usages are found which relate in different ways to a term we are entitled to regard as "true kinship." Some involve a fiction in which a person who does not qualify by ascription for the role of kinsman is nevertheless accorded it (e.g., adoption frequently equates the adoptive with the "true" child). In others, the role of pseudo-kinsman is clearly distinguished from that of true kin and may even in many contexts be opposed to it. Priests are called "Father," but they are not expected to provide for those who call them so or to have begotten them. The title rests not on a fiction but on an analogy. In some cases the role is ritualized and permanent, in others it is no more than a verbal convention followed only so long as the participants wish to indulge in a certain mode of reciprocal behavior that takes its tone from the kin relationship it simulates.[5] It is the nature of pseudo-kinship to utilize the idiom of kinship in order to ensure a certain type of relationship between persons who are not kin by ascription, and to leave to the context to differentiate them from those who are. It is constituted of borrowed models.[6]

Yet where are we to draw the line between the borrowed and the owned? Meanings have no proprietary right to words, as I have shown. One might define as true kinship those relations which are ascribed on the basis of descent or marriage (however the culture may define these concepts), yet the same argument can apply within as without such a realm of "true kinship." Is the mother's brother's daughter really a "mother" or merely a figurative mother like a godmother or mother superior? Malinowski was inclined to think the latter, but after all the criticism which his views have received one still cannot claim that the question is closed since it has just been reopened by Lounsbury (1964: 381, 389,

5. The practice of using kinship terminology in this way is not confined to societies such as our own, where pseudo-kin usage might be taken to reflect the decline of the utility of kinship in social relations. But such a use of kin terms is found in many primitive societies.

6. Hence when asked to explain the institution of blood-brotherhood or ritual kinship, the informant is frequently recorded as stating that blood-brothers are "like brothers" or that *compadres* are "members of the family," but it becomes evident that they are so only with regard to the quality of feeling which, it is thought, should pertain between brothers or within the family and which is all too often missing in fact. When one looks at the rights and duties of the pseudo-kinsman, rather than the sentiments he should inspire, one finds that they are quite different from those of true kinsmen. The blood-brother can the more easily be loved as a brother because he is not one. For a discussion of this point see Pitt-Rivers (1968a).

n. 24; 1965: col. LXVII, no. 5). Putting the question as I see it: Are we entitled to consider a kinship category as a single semantic entity merely because it is a single word, even though the natives recognize distinctions within it that affect their views as to the proper conduct towards the person concerned? We must surely enquire how they distinguish in those instances when the ethnographers have failed to elicit any variant form to mark the distinction verbally whenever it was needed. They do so of course by the context in the same way as we distinguish between the parent's sibling and the pawnbroker; they are both uncles, but three gold balls do not indicate a parent's sibling, and the pawnbroker does not come for Christmas. The distinction is not formalized in words; it is obvious and implicit in the context of behavior, and therefore it does not require to be distinguished linguistically. It is up to the anthropologist to make explicit when "mother" is the person who gave birth to Ego, when she is no more than a female member of his matrilateral kin, or when she is simply someone motherly. It appears to me that much of the discussion of kinship terminology and its relation to behavior revolves around the attempt to ignore the possibility that a distinction may be marked other than by language and argue, not merely that language is "in culture," but that it is identical with it;[7] "mother," it is implied, must have always the same meaning whenever it may occur, just as logicians demand that a symbol must have always the same and only one meaning. To make this assumption is to expect primitive peoples in their daily life to display the linguistic consistency which formal logic aspires to and which we make small effort to attain outside the classroom or the laboratory. Indeed our attempts at wit as well as our logical errors depend on the possibility of using the same word with different meanings. Communication is endangered not by the ambiguities of the language but by ambiguity with regard to the recognition of social

7. By treating kinship terminology and kinship behavior as two separate systems, it was possible to argue (as Radcliffe Brown and Kroeber argued) whether one determined the other or not. But from the point of view of semantics this dichotomy is spurious. On the one hand a description of kinship behavior as a system should surely include distinctions in the forms of address and reference, while on the other a description of the terminology which ignores context (and context includes the behavior of those who are present) is incomplete from the point of view of semantics, as I have shown. Should one not hope for a study of kinship semantics which would combine terminology and behavior within a single system rather than establish two separate systems, semantically incomplete parts of a single system of classification, which utilizes both linguistic and behavioral distinctions alternatively or in combination?

context. An isolated error of contextual perception is a *faux pas*: its recurrent or permanent failure is madness.[8]

The study of a semantic system involves the study of social contexts which make their contribution to meaning in accordance with a largely subliminal classification derived from the social structure. The models provided by the culture are put to use in the organization of social relations, yet they become adapted to their task. So the meaning of a conception is to be sought in the ways in which it is used "on the ground," rather than in the formal definitions which the informant may devise in response to the questioning investigator who subjects him to a novel predicament.

The limitations of formal definitions for practical purposes have been recognized even within our own culture, as Austin (1961) observed: "All the dictionary can do when we 'look up the meaning of a word' is to suggest aids to the understanding of sentences in which they occur" (24).

Austin did in fact visualize not only the dictionary's method of conveying the meaning of a word by "explaining the syntactics," that is, giving examples of sentences in which the word would be correct or incorrect, but he also envisaged "demonstrating the semantics" by placing the enquirer in situations real or imagined which such sentences might be used to describe. He regarded them as supplementary procedures and, not being concerned with anthropology, he did not point out their essential difference in this regard: the linguistic context is sufficient only if the whole semantic universe can be taken for granted, that is to say, if the inquirer is already acquainted with the structure of concepts which relate to that which is being defined and can assume, without stating them, the contextual distinctions to be made. If this is not the case, then the social context must be provided: it is not enough to explain the syntactics, the semantics must be demonstrated. This is always the predicament of the anthropologist, who must descend to the concrete instance of behavior in order to discover the use to which the natives' conceptions are put and, no longer content with stated norms, must look for them in action, distinguishing the contexts in which they occur. But unlike Austin, who limited his horizon to academic Oxford, he cannot

8. In fact many forms of mental disease do not affect the patient's capacity to handle linguistic systems. The madman may express himself well enough, and the verbal skill of paranoiacs is sometimes exceptional. It is not how he speaks but what he thinks which is faulty; his perception of reality, not how he expresses it. One can be behaviorally deranged without being linguistically so and vice versa; the system of communication suffers in either case, but not in the same way.

assume that he knows how to identify these in advance, since they belong to an "other culture."

It can be seen then that the notion of contextual analysis is simply a way of referring to what every anthropologist is taught to ask when he gets to the field: Who? How? When? Where? and the "case history method" is simply an elaboration of Austin's "demonstrating the semantics." But if I have chosen to give it this pretentious name, it is not (or not primarily) in the hope that it may thus sound new and cease to be considered "old-fashioned" but because I think there is some use in examining the theoretical justifications for proven practices and because through doing this it may be possible to be more rigorous in analyzing the answers to those questions. In fact sociologists concerned with small groups have shown more meticulousness in observing the details of context than anthropologists (Goffman 1963: 12). Yet their intentions are not quite the same since they are aimed at the problem of social interaction rather than those of the comparative study of culture; they can take their own values for granted. A classification of contexts according to time, place, personalities present and type of action would enable the anthropologist to delineate the contextual variants which correspond to variants of meaning, and thereby to transcend the limitations imposed by the natives' view of their own society. It was in fact a comparison of the contexts of insulting which led me to understand the meaning of the Mexican's claim to paternity. (In other contexts Mexicans, like Spaniards, use this same word *padre* to address priests or God and even as an adjective to describe magnitude.) Or again, it was a comparison with other contexts in which *primo* appears in Spain (quarrels and lawsuits over inheritance were high on the list) which enabled me to explain its figurative meaning.

A more precise illustration may serve to show what I mean by contextual analysis. In order to escape the specifically linguistic problems and deal solely with social context, I choose as an example the conception which attaches to an object, the wide-brimmed Andalusian hat (*sombrero de ala ancha*). Sartorial systems are also systems of communication in the sense that dress is a statement which the wearer makes about himself and which he makes in terms of the sartorial system of his land and age. Dress is particularly sensitive to context in a complex society where a varied wardrobe is economically possible: people change their clothes according to the occasion and often suffer considerable anxiety lest they should not appear to be properly dressed, well dressed or even the best dressed, lest they should be dressed the same as someone else or not the same, or lest their dress should become disarranged. It is understandable

then that dress should supply the occasion for so many errors to contextual appreciation.

The wide hat figures in almost any advertisement for sherry or flamenco music, and in foreign countries it entices the tourist to Spain, but the contexts in which it is worn are susceptible to generalization.[9] I take the situation as it existed in Andalusia *ca*. 1950. It is worn:

1. by *ganaderos*, (cattle-hands and shepherds) as everyday attire. They put over it a mackintosh (today plastic) covering in wet weather. Its wide brim protects against both sun and rain;
2. by small farmers (*rancheros*) who also have livestock and by large farmers (*labradores*) when on country business, if not all the time;
3. by cattle dealers (*corredores*) traditionally, but not in fact exclusively;
4. it is not commonly worn by agricultural laborers who prefer the beret, cap, or, in summer, straw hat, which are all less expensive, or the trilby sometimes. But bailiffs and foremen commonly wear it. Fishermen never wear a wide hat;
5. gypsies who are frequently dealers and are commonly connected with livestock in other ways;
6. flamenco singers and musicians (who are frequently gypsies), it is *de rigueur* on the stage;
7. bullfighters in offseason fights for charity, or at the *tientas* (the testing of bulls on the ranch). In the last two categories it is part of the *traje corto,* which is equestrian dress: very tight trousers and short jacket. You cannot wear equestrian dress without it;
8. *aficionados* of the *fiesta brava* (amateurs of the bullfight), especially when attending the ring or on a festive occasion;
9. women, when riding, as part of the *traje corto* or sometimes as theatrical performers in the flamenco, but not otherwise.

There are differences in the quality of the hat, which is always made of felt, but as a form it covers a wide range of social and economic classes; in fact there is no

9. I include in the term context not only time and place, but the protagonists and the tenor of their behavior (when, where, who, how), ignoring for my purposes such distinctions as e.g. W. H. Whiteley (1966: 139-157) makes between social group and social context. The social significance of a context depends upon all these factors. The classroom is a different *place* the moment the teacher's back is turned.

one so rich or so poor that he may not wear it on some occasion, but there are also many men in Andalusia who do not possess one, even though it is accepted as a symbol of the land—rather as the Texan hat is a symbol of Texas. It is an item in different outfits: part of the *traje corto* in one context, it can also be worn as everyday attire or even with a city suit as festal dress. If one could perceive no common significance attaching to it in every instance, it might be taken to be a fortuitous element in different sartorial combinations and to indicate no single conception. The different usages would then be, despite a possible common origin, "homonymous" forms (in terms of their present employment) deriving from a different basis of association with the primary form, which is no longer evoked in them today. To give an example of such homonymous forms from the realms of headgear, an Eton schoolboy, a sweep, and an undertaker all wore top hats a short time ago, but only history explains their identity in this regard. The wide hat, on the contrary, is a single conception which is used in different contexts with different connotations in evidence, but which retains always a certain semantic unity.

It is not necessary for the purposes of this demonstration to go into the historical origins of the hat in question and the evolution of its form and detail, nor the regional variations and the changes in custom with regard to its use, both of which factors are crosscut by class differences and the distinction between traditional style and modernized. I am concerned only with the general conception and with the axes of opposition by which its meaning is constituted and which can explain the, at first sight rather anomalous, contexts in which it is found. (There is, to say the least, something unexpected in the fact that the form of hat which is worn as an everyday garment by the poorest and least prestigeful countryman should be a prestige symbol in the music-hall and should be donned by the rich man only on festal occasions, but it would take an analysis of the whole social structure of Andalusia to explain this paradox entirely.) One can distinguish the following axes of opposition:

1. Rural/urban. The distinction is not easily made on the basis of residence in a land where agro-towns run to thirty and forty thousand inhabitants, but in terms of occupation it is clear. An office-worker or shop-assistant never wears a wide hat to go to work. It denotes the countryman first of all.
2. Pastoral/agricultural. Hence the association with equestrian dress represents the distinction between those who care for stock and those who till the soil. (The cowboy also is a romantic figure in the United States and,

like the wearer of the wide hat, is also associated with a particular musical style.) Shepherds do not normally go mounted in Spain, but they have the same kind of independence and responsibility as cattle-men. They also have particular songs. Anthropologists have long recognized a difference in the moral qualities of agricultural as opposed to pastoral peoples, whose war-like virtues have frequently been stressed. They have less often noted that a moral distinction persists between pastoral and agricultural occupations within civilization. The notions of personal freedom and community with wild nature are associated with pastoralism the whole length of the European tradition.

The pastoral theme in the Nativity and the whole corpus of "pastoral" literature and music have given their sanction to this association.[10] Moreover the association is based on something more than literary and religious tradition. The association between the gypsies and pastoralism relates directly to their love of freedom and refusal to take orders from anyone; as dealers, curers, artisans, etc., they find various ways of making a livelihood in connection with stock which are not available to them in agriculture. The gypsy therefore represents the spirit of personal freedom (Pitt-Rivers 1954: 186 et seq.).

3. Traditional regional attachment/modern international style. Thus you may go to a bullfight in a wide hat but not to a football match. Thus also the largest agricultural magnates tend not to wear it much. They consider themselves national not regional figures.

Given these oppositions, it is possible to explain all the contexts in which the wide hat is seen. The traditional fiesta was associated with livestock markets and was celebrated with bullfights and flamenco music. It was moreover necessary to ride in order to go on pilgrimage, which is also a festal occasion in Andalusia. In addition, it is to be noted that the possession of land is the most prestigeful form of wealth since it is associated with established riches and aristocracy, and the ownership of a ranch of fighting bulls is highly prestigeful. Hence the conception of the wide hat depends upon its association with: livestock > horsemanship + social prestige + merry-making + personal independence, and though the connotations vary according to context, they can all be traced back to this syndrome.

10. For a general discussion of the traditional stereotypes of the countryman in European literature see Caro J. Baroja (1964).

This does not mean that the shepherd, the gypsy, and the middle class *aficionado* are in any danger of being confused; there are plenty of other indicators which distinguish them (quite apart from the quality and condition of the hat itself), but it is necessary to add contextual data in order to grasp the implications of the fact that X was wearing a wide hat on a certain occasion. The correct explanation lies at the point of intersection of the dimensions of class, occupation, occasion, identification with the traditional prestige system, and personal attitude. (To put on a wide hat as festal attire implies a personal attitude and establishes expectations with regard to behavior in other ways.)

This very simplistic illustration (which must surely appear both gross and redundant to any Andalusian since, knowing the contexts in which the hat appears, he does not have to reflect in order to see its implications) may nevertheless serve my point with regard to meaning: that it is, over and above what the dictionary can convey, a function of context, and that contexts are ordered by the social structure. Any analysis of a social structure is, and has been ever since Malinowski taught the value of fieldwork, a demonstration of its semantics, a description of conceptions in terms of their contexts. But the definition of the conception is the usual aim of the ethnographer, and he rests content if he can relate it to a few exterior facts of ecological or political significance and distinguish its main connotations. The complementary procedure: to take social contexts as the focus and see how they can be classified in relation to conceptions, that is to say, as semantic universes, is less frequently and less systematically done.

To return to our example, the same context which defines the meaning of the wide hat also defines the meaning of the other conceptions present in it (which in return together affect the classification of the context). Thus the type of context which defines the wide hat as a musical performer's accoutrement also permits or imposes certain other modes of behavior which are particular to it. It is customary, for example, for the flamenco singer and the guitarist to call each other "*compadre*" (*compadres* are persons who stand in the relationship of physical and spiritual parent to the same child), but this does not in this context imply that they are really ritual kinsmen, only that they are indulging in a conventional fiction appropriate to that context, which also implies the presence of spectators and the wearing of wide hats. It has in fact a name by which the Andalusians recognize it whenever they wish to differentiate it from other contexts and denigrate it as spurious. It is called *Andalucía de pandereta* (tambourine Andalusia). The rest of Spain has frequently confused the

image of tambourine Andalusia with the custom of the country and assumed that Andalusians normally use the term *compadre* to anyone who happens to be an acquaintance.[11] This is not at all true outside the context under discussion, though one sometimes meets people who affect the style of the music hall in daily life and who thereby serve to propagate the misapprehension (which is all too understandable since the outsider's knowledge of Andalusia derives mainly from the music hall and tourist literature in the "tambourine" tradition). It is simply an error of contextual classification, like confusing the pawnbroker with the parent's sibling. Yet how much bad ethnography do we not owe to this error?

Whether it occurs in a music hall, during a fiesta, extended into daily life by the behavior of one who likes to think of himself as a gay fellow (*muy flamenco*) and to impose on to his listeners his conception of the context, or into literature, this complex of meaning constitutes a clearly recognizable style which differentiates the context from others in which the same elements may appear but bearing a quite different significance; for example, the two men may be wearing wide hats, may call each other "compadre," and one of them may sing, but this is not tambourine Andalusia: they are shepherds, true ritual kinsmen, and the singer is singing while he watches his sheep on the hillside. (Of course, if he sings well enough, he may end up in the music hall.)

Though the description of a conception requires observation of its social contexts, there is nevertheless an advantage in considering context and conception apart, for the context is part of the external reality which the observer can observe directly, while the conception can only be learned from the natives in whose head it exists. This does not mean that our ultimate aim is not to trace the relationship between the two. There is moreover another difference between context and conception: a context is in the first place a unique instance, an event, the raw material of a classification made by the unreflecting actor in the process of living or by the anthropologist in the course of his fieldwork, while a conception is a tool for classification which is applied to specific contexts.

The natives classify according to the categories of their culture by which they explain the world and determine how they should act, but the investigator reclassifies with quite a different aim in mind: that of establishing equivalences

11. Even the *Diccionario de la Lengua Española de la Real Academia* (1956) gives this impression. It remains to be added that the *compadrazgo* is a much more serious institution among rural rather than urban people and among the lower rather than the upper classes.

from one culture to another in accordance with the criteria he regards as significant for that purpose. He regards them as significant on account of the theories he entertains of how societies or cultures or human relations "work." He therefore sees implications and consistencies or inconsistencies which they do not see, and what appears reasonable to them may not seem so to him, and vice versa. His categories surpass those of the culture he studies in their comparative range, and therefore the assumptions on which they are based are of quite another order. Not concerned with knowing how *he should* act, but only how *they do*, he includes their conceptual system as part of what requires to be explained, placing their own explanations as it were "in quotes": he constructs models out of the models of those he preys on, which he breaks down and reorders for another purpose. *Their* reasoning succeeds or fails according to whether it attains a desired social response in a particular context: *his* aims to escape from its servitude to context by making context explicit and thereby achieve a universal validity at a higher level of generalization. Therefore, even though they may coincide at many points, the social anthropologists' models are essentially different from those of the natives. This difference is sometimes expressed as that between "homemade" and "observer's models," between the ethnographic and the analytical level or between the ideal (i.e., what they believe they do) and the real (what the anthropologist, assimilating reality to his own viewpoint, observes that they do). The basis of the distinction, I suggest, is to be found in the locus of the model: whether it is in the head of the actors or of the investigator. It may be argued that in either case it is located only in the head of the observer, whether he be plain ethnographer striving to recall what the natives think or whether he aspires to the interpretative role of social anthropologist. Admittedly the two roles are not easily disentangled. Nevertheless, allowing for this practical difficulty, there is a theoretical distinction which holds: in his role as ethnographer he attempts only to reproduce faithfully what goes on in the heads of the natives (the whole model is "in quotes"), whereas in his role as social anthropologist he attempts to explain it. He constructs his model not only out of what he is told by the natives, but out of his independent observations of their behavior and all that he may learn from other sources about the economics, geography, demography, or history which lie beyond the natives' ken. The first kind of model is to be judged according to its faithfulness (it can be checked by going back to the native for confirmation), its "logical" coherence is immaterial for that is his affair. The second is interpretative and responds to the reasoning of the anthropologist in conformity with the canons of his discipline. It is

required to be logical; indeed, its whole aim is to reveal a logical order behind the apparently illogical beliefs and behavior of the natives, whose contradictions can be resolved only by an appeal to distinctions of context, which it is left to the anthropologist to make explicit.

There is however another difference between the two types of model which has already been implied. The models of the native differ from those of the anthropologist in that they are centered on his own place in society, inevitably, since they are models-for-action rather than models-for-comparison. They partake of his knowledge of his society, but they also represent his aspirations. They are not only the world as he knows it, they are also the world as he would like it to be. Through his behavior he attempts to impose his view upon the social relations into which he enters, to define contexts in accordance with his wishes. I therefore apply the term "aspirational" to them in contrast to the "objective" models of the anthropologist.[12]

A further distinction imposes itself. In the view of an earlier generation of anthropologists who were content to work through a single informant and believed that they could acquire a complete account of the culture of his tribe from him, it was assumed that all the members of a simple society had an identical mental equipment which varied from one individual to another only in terms of its completeness, according to his age, experience, and powers of retention. All spoke the same language, and their culture was thought to be the same: it was learned in youth and in so far as it changed, it did so only from one generation to the next through innovation and "acculturation." This view, applied to a complex society, encounters difficulties with which the concept of "sub-culture" attempts to deal. But it is doubtful whether this notion of the uniformity of culture was ever entirely adequate. The culture of women for example is never identical with that of men; their worldview and even in a few instances their language are different also, and the models of society on which they base their behavior differ accordingly, for they relate to their status. These aspirational models are tied so closely to status that they even vary in accordance with that

12. The anthropologist's model is objective in the sense that it treats the whole of that which is studied as object; he himself stands outside his model. I do not wish to imply that the natives are incapable of objectivity in the ordinary sense. *Cf.* J. Pouillon (1966: 100-105), especially p. 104: "L'indigène—et qui n'est pas indigène?—ne comprend pas le mythe qui le charme, non par incapacité intellectuelle, mais par position; c'est aussi par position que l'ethnologue, parce qu'il en recueille d'autres et ailleurs, peut le faire."

which the same individual occupies at different times. Hence it is sometimes complained of the old that they have "forgotten what it was like to be young." Just as there are complementary roles, so there are complementary models; and the greater the diversity of the one, the greater that of the other. The division of labor is mental as well as social.

I have attempted to illustrate this thesis recently by taking the theme of honor in Andalusian society and showing how the conception varies, not only between the sexes, but also between different classes and different types and sizes of community (Pitt-Rivers 1965a).[13] The varying connotations of honor reflect the social aspirations of different groups, and conflicts of interpretation reflect social conflicts. Certain elements are common to all these notions of honor. Indeed, the people themselves are unaware that any such variation in the conception of honor exists. Each man evaluates others' honor according to his own criteria. Certain common understandings are required to ensure the necessary degree of consensus needed in order to maintain a coherent social organization, but they are common not necessarily with regard to meaning but only to the conventions of verbal usage and behavior in particular contexts. If therefore the diversity of models exists without producing chaos, it is thanks to distinctions as to context which are, as I have argued, an essential constituent of meaning. The consensus exists at a level of abstraction from which context has been eliminated. Thus, after hearing reputations torn to pieces in the back of the café and the honor of half the village damaged beyond repair, one should nonetheless not be surprised to learn from the *Fuero de los Españoles* that "every Spaniard has an inalienable right to honor"—and with this legal pronouncement for once all Spaniards would agree. The disagreements creep in at the level of context, where the abstraction must be reduced to particulars.

Anthropologists abstract also in order to construct their analytical models, but in a different endeavor. They aim to establish "objective models" in the service of scientific explanation, which is required only in a peculiar kind of context. But in fact what we take to be scientific objectivity is perhaps no more than a reflection of the aspirations of the social scientist, whose aim to bring different cultures into a single frame of reference serves ultimately the cause of international administration. The locus of the model is in his head, but does this really contain no aspiration other than the attainment of scientific truth,

13. The essay cited here, "Honor and social status in Andalusia" is also reproduced in this volume, Chapter 1. *Ed.*

whatever that may be? Can anthropology be independent of the culture of the anthropologist? Or is it itself a culture, a "cross cultural" culture defined by discipline rather than by language or nationality?

All anthropologists aspire to escape from the intellectual limitations of their national culture, and failure to do so is called ethnocentrism. But perhaps they can succeed only at the cost of becoming "techno-centric," centered in the values of an international class of professional investigators. If this, as I fear, is so, we can only hope that the values of this class correspond to the universalist task it has come into existence to fulfill, and they will certainly not do that if they abandon their concern in small communities and other cultures. There is a danger that those who restrict their view to the *micro*-level escape from their own culture only to become the victims of a comparative science of small communities which is unable to deal with the conditions of life in modern society at all. But conversely a *macro*-sociology which takes no account of the cultural variations which lie behind its quantified data is condemned to derive its analytical categories from its own backyard and find them applicable nowhere in particular.[14]

14. A draft of this paper was presented to the "Sociology and Anthropology Working Group" for the VIth World Congress of Sociology, Évian, September, 1966.

CHAPTER 18

On the word “caste”*

Science requires precise words. If comparisons, the essence of science, are to be valid, we must be able to define unambiguously what we compare (*cf*. Cohen & Nagel 1964: 32–3; for a discussion of this point in the social sciences, *cf*. ibid.; 346). Essential properties must be distinguished from appearances, as the whole history of biology or chemistry shows, and a proposition regarding a class of phenomena must apply to all possible members of it. If the social sciences fail to attain the same kind of precision as the natural sciences, it is, apart from all other excuses offered for their imprecision, due to the fact that they face a difficulty that does not beset their more exact neighbors: not content to await the ethnographer to receive a name, the data of these “inexact sciences” classify themselves according to their own whim and without regard for the convenience of the investigator or the problem of scientific taxonomy. The student is continually faced with a *fait accompli*. Whether he accepts this with good grace and sticks to the names which the people he studies have chosen to denote their experience or whether he rejects it in favor of a classification of his own devising, it remains true that his relationship to his object of study is different from that of the physical scientist, for he is dealing not merely with things, but with

* “On the word ‘caste’” was first published in *The translation of culture: Essays to E.E. Evans-Pritchard* in 1971 and is reproduced in this volume with permission from Taylor & Francis.

consciousness of things. His choice at any given point reflects the alternative between the subjective or objective view of human phenomena which he must somehow reconcile before his explanation can be counted valid.

After a long and confused struggle with this problem, anthropology has reached the point today where the need is recognized at least to distinguish clearly between categories of thought at the level of ethnography—the names which the people studied give to the social phenomena of their own society—and the analytical concepts of the discipline. It has become evident that neither by itself is adequate: if the investigator chooses to accept the "natives' view" of their own world as if it bore the credentials of science, he confines himself to a parochialism which excludes all comparison, but if he rejects it and sets out to sum up their social system on the basis of his preconceived concepts, he corrupts his data. His real task is to reorder that which they order and discover behind their ordering a more abstract order that explains it. Yet in what terms can this "higher order" be expressed? A certain penchant for verbal inventiveness has already earned anthropology the distrust of older disciplines that are content to call a spade a spade. But if it does not invent its own vocabulary then its task is doubled, for in borrowing from ordinary speech the terms it strives to make precise, it must first strip them of their everyday connotations based on the assumptions of the investigator's culture, redefine them in accordance with its general theories, and guard their semantic purity from then on against the encroachments of a spurious common sense. It is not surprising, then, that a whole generation of anthropologists sought to evade the predicament by borrowing the terms they lacked from the ethnography of some exotic region; these could, they thought, be used in analogy to define a universal category (*cf.* Evans-Pritchard 1965: 12).

Called to do service in that higher order, the customs of the Redskins or the Polynesians fulfilled their novel function for a time; at least they offered an escape from the straitjacket of our own culture, or so it appeared. But the procedure was questionable from the theoretical point of view: how could such terms serve at both levels and retain their unity? Like a hunter's trophies furnishing his home (antlers for a hat stand or hooves transformed as inkwells), they changed their meaning once they were put to new uses and it became doubtful whether they really applied any more to the institutions from which they originated. *Mana*, for example, was taken to represent a certain mode of magical thought, defined by its indifference to reason and its dependence upon the sentiments. Its worth as an analytical concept depended upon accepting the thesis that "natives"

react without using their brains, and once this was questioned it became doubtful whether even the Polynesians had "mana" in the anthropological sense. Borrowed concepts proved a poor substitute for the tools of scientific reasoning. In the end moreover, the endeavor paid off badly, for inasmuch as these new words gained acceptance they were pilfered by neighboring disciplines and endowed with connotations foreign to their anthropological sense. *Mana*, *tabu*, *fetish*, *totem*, *potlatch*[1] became the common currency of the intellectuals of the period and eventually of the journalists, so that the anthropologists found themselves, with their vocabulary corrupted, facing once more the problem of lexical purity, and facing it at a further disadvantage in that these words might no longer apply correctly even in the society that had provided them.

The problem is not merely to guard against the implications of popular usage when employing words as scientific terms. It is a question of determining the heuristic status of the words we use. To what extent are they able to carry an analytical load? The more immediately they are related to the observation of events, the less they are able to do so, since a factual description does not require that the defining characteristics of the terms used in it be specified: it is apparent what they denote to the members of the society that uses them. Yet how they may be applied elsewhere (and this must be possible if they are to be granted analytical status) is open to doubt, since equivalences between different cultures are not easily established. In order to do so it is necessary to resort to abstractions; the greater the difference between the cultures compared, the higher the level of abstraction that must be reached. Where there is no similarity at all, the ethnographic content is irrelevant, they can only be defined in terms of their structure. They no longer refer to that which is empirically recognizable but to properties which are revealed only by the application of a framework of analytical thought. Restricted to the ethnographical level, a term remains, as it were, embedded within the culture which gave it birth, but elevated to the status

1. For example, the Larousse *Dictionnaire de la Philosophie* asserts (translated into English) "the notion of 'potlatch society' is often evoked by sociologists to designate the primitive state of society where goods are exchanged directly and not through the intermediary of money." At the time of the first descriptions of the potlatch the Indians of the Northwest Coast were already using currency and the economic function of the potlatch was, not exchange, but the conversion of surplus (whale oil, blankets, slaves) into prestige. The most important objects conveyed as reciprocal gifts were heraldic coppers which were also broken, burned, and thrown into the sea. Even in the field of kinship terminology, the utility of borrowed models has been questioned: do the Crow really have a "Crow" terminology?

of a scientific concept, it falls victim to changes in fashion in anthropological theory—like *fetish*, *tabu*, *mana*, *totem*, *potlatch*, terms which have been returned today to the ethnographical level, soiled by the speculations of anthropologists who failed to perceive the real significance of the institutions to which they referred in the ethnography and elaborated false categories of analysis from them. To grasp the distinction between the two levels it is only necessary to imagine asking the informant questions framed in analytical terms or to quote the jokes, once popular in anthropological circles, concerning the educated African chief who, when consulted about tribal custom, reached for his volume of Rattray or Nadel.

Any word may be used, in fact, at any level within the hierarchy of abstractions. What is important is to respect the implications of giving it status at one level rather than another. When the same word is used simultaneously at different levels the door is open to confusion. In this regard the usage of the word "caste" in Latin America provides an object lesson. The strands of meaning that intertwine to give us the modern word *caste* can be traced with less certainty than is generally thought. "Castas," Corominas (1961) tells us, "is a word originating in the Iberian Peninsula and common to its three languages. Its source is uncertain, perhaps from the gothic KASTS, a group of animals or a brood of nestlings." He goes on to express forceful doubts about the common theory which would derive the word from the Latin CASTUS, for the sense of chastity is not found in the earliest mentions of the word.

Until the sixteenth century it referred primarily to species of animal or plant and race or lineage of men. It was closely allied with the notion of procreation, from which Covarrubias derived the missing link with the idea of chastity "... for the procreation of children it is better not to be abandoned in the venereal act for which reason the restrained and those who have little to do with women have much progeny" (1611).[2] From the notion of species, breed, or lineage it is understandable that the Portuguese should have applied it to the "castes" which they encountered in India. However, by dividing the world between the Spanish and the Portuguese, the Pope also divided the applications of the word "casta": the Spaniards found nothing in any way resembling the castes of India in the New World and in addition to using the word in what was the normal way at

2. The adjective *casto* (fem. *casta*) meaning chaste, from the Latin *castus*, appears to be a homonym, which Covarrubias was attempting to put forward as the etymology of the word *casta*.

that period to designate animal species, they applied it in the human realm to lineages or clans. Indeed, the word is still used in this sense in many parts of Latin America. In the Andes it commonly refers to the patrilineage, while the totemic matrilineal clans of the Guajira are also called *castas* to this day. In both English and French[3] the distinction between tribe and caste became clear only in the nineteenth century.

The notion of purity of descent was not essential to the word originally, so that one even finds mention of "the caste of mules," but in view of the preoccupation of the times, especially in Spain, with regard to lineage and purity of blood it is not surprising that *casta* became associated with these ideas, for pure breeding, notwithstanding the mules, was thought to be superior to cross-breeding, particularly in the human species among whom social status was derived from descent. However, the greatest elaboration of the term came in the Spanish empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when it signified above all, not the pure, but the impure, the half-breeds, that is to say, the very people who in endogamous India would be regarded as outside the system. The *castas* were people of mixed ancestry, and a pseudo-biological vocabulary was elaborated from popular zoology and the slang of the day to accord a distinct social identity to each combination of white, Indian, or Negro.[4] Inherited status was what counted, not actual color, so that anyone who could claim one-eighth or less of non-white descent was classed as white and the status of white could in any case at one period even be purchased without regard for antecedents.

The imperial legislation attempted at various times to stabilize the system by discouraging and even forbidding intermarriage between certain *castas*, but without the least success (Rosenblat 1954, II: 147, 159, 166, 167). Meanwhile the word continued to be used in the senses simply of breeding or race and with the various figurative meanings which derived from them. Given that the concept of descent occupied an important place within the social structure of the empire, and even though there existed a certain rough stratification which derived from the opposition Indian/Spanish (equivalent to primitive/civilized), it must nevertheless be stressed that the notion of breeding was never entirely coordinated with the other criteria of superiority or inferiority. The Indian nobility of the sixteenth century illustrated how the classification of rank could cross-cut that of race, and even after they disappeared from the scene and even

3. For a discussion of the terms, see Lévi-Strauss (1966a, Ch. IV).

4. *Cf.* Van den Berghe (1967: 58), see also Mörner (1967).

though the tendency for ethnic status to be assimilated to class status has on the whole increased from age to age, breeding has never been an exact coordinate of social status, but rather an alternative dimension to it, qualifying the other ones.

Once the notion of descent had ceased after Independence to have any juridical value, the *castas* were no longer distinguished within the general category of *mestizos*. Today the word *casta* is used only in its figurative senses, save in the antique local usages already mentioned which persist to indicate a lineage or clan among those who are recognized as Indians. It does not refer to any social status. This is perhaps inevitable with the rise of modern industrial society, which no longer ascribes any formal value to ancestry. Yet its demise at the ethnographical level was followed by its resurrection at the hands of the social scientists, who found their precedent nowhere in the Hispanic tradition but rather in that of English sociological literature. But for the preponderance of this it might have remained simply what it was in the vernacular. But it is found now, as in English, indicating a certain type of social distinction and applying in particular to that which divides the population of Latin America into Indian and Hispanic. This sense is quite different from that of lineage or clan or the categories of breed which were distinguished in the imperial epoch or the hierarchized occupational groups of the Hindus. It refers to no collectivity of any sort, except in so far as the entire population can be divided into two castes; a superior one, which is Hispanic, and an inferior one, which is Indian.

This usage owed its entry into Latin America to an analogy with the distinction between colored and white people in the United States[5] which in turn is owed to an analogy with the castes of India.[6] The reappearance of the term in Spanish was therefore anything but a simple revival of a usage which had fallen out of fashion but rather the invasion of a territory where the term once existed on the ethnographical level by the same word which, thanks to its sojourn on the far side of the world, had "made it" to analytical status and thereafter claimed the right to apply anywhere, even to the past where it confronts its defunct antecedents. This has occurred in historical studies of the imperial epoch or in nineteenth-century Yucatan, where the "Guerra de Castas" is commonly

5. I have discussed this analogy in detail elsewhere (Pitt-Rivers 1967b).

6. It appears to have been the fate of the New World to become confused with India, not only in the attribution of identity to its inhabitants, but in the analysis of their social structure: the sociologists of the twentieth century repeat the error of Columbus.

translated as "The Caste War" (e.g. Reed 1964). It is difficult to say what exactly this expression is intended to convey in English; if it is not simply an Anglicization of the Spanish name, it can be seen to depend on an analogy of the same type as that which beguiles the student who sets off for Polynesia hoping to find *mana* or for the northwest coast expecting "a potlatch society."

In order to assess the usage in the New World we must outline the development of the word in sociology, where *caste* evokes first and foremost the caste system of the Hindus. Here we know that the introduction of the term is owed to the Portuguese who found it appropriate to describe the hierarchy of endogamous groups of Indian society. The British simply took it over and Anglicized it, giving it a particular value based on the contrast with British institutions.[7] Yet its denotation in sociology remains unclear to this day, for while some writers take the castes to be the *varna*, the four categories of caste (this is the commonplace view), others refer to the *jati*, the effective endogamous groups, as castes; the former then refer to the *jati* as "subcastes," while for the latter the subcastes are the divisions of the *jati*. The question is further complicated by the fact that, while both *varna* and *jati* are found throughout India, they do not always correspond exactly from one area to another. The status of the equivalent groups varies from place to place and even the system varies in its connotations. It is further complicated again by the presence of groups which are marginal to the system, notably the Muslims and Christians, whose religion denies its very fundament but who are nevertheless deeply influenced by the Brahminical tradition and who present comparable characteristics that have sufficed the ethnographers of India to retain the word in regard to them. Whether rightly or wrongly, it is not for me to say.[8]

I need not go in detail into the discussions of the definition of caste and of the range of its validity, except in so far as this is necessary to decide what possibilities are open to us. A debate has been going on for years between anthropologists on this subject.[9] It hinges on whether or not the word "caste" can be used to refer to social systems other than that of the Hindus, that is to say, whether

7. According to Corominas (1961), the word existed previously in English from the same root and in the same sense as *casta*. It has, however, been supplanted by the Indian usage, and the *Oxford English Dictionary* gives the Portuguese as the etymology of the word.

8. *Cf.* Leach (1960: 1-2); Barth (1960); and a critique of this in Dumont (1966: 263-5).

9. Most recently in the pages of *Contributions to Indian Sociology*.

the concept which derives from the Indian system of social differentiation can also be used to denote other systems, and, in that case, which. The degree of extension which may be allowed the term is here the point at issue and this relates, of course, to the status of the definition given. At one extreme it is maintained that Hindu society is fundamentally different in nature from those found elsewhere and therefore caste is a purely Hindu phenomenon incommensurable with systems of social differentiation in other parts of the world. This view pays attention to the nature of the system in all its detail and chooses to regard each aspect as necessary to the definition whose intension is thus so full that its extension outside India is ruled out. Indian caste is a phenomenon *sui generis*. This is to refuse all abstraction and remain at the ethnographical level, at least with regard to the "caste system." At the other extreme India is regarded merely as one among other societies which recognize a high degree of hierarchical differentiation, and the word "caste" can therefore be employed wherever there is, in the well-known words of Alfred Kroeber, "an endogamous and hereditary subdivision of an ethnic unit occupying a position of superior or inferior rank or social esteem in comparison with other subdivisions" (Kroeber 1937). Kroeber regarded caste as a kind of class, a development from it, distinguished from other kinds of class in that its members are conscious of belonging to a recognized caste. This definition enables Kroeber to subsume under this term the common usages of the word which denote military and aristocratic castes. Indeed, he never made it clear exactly where he would have the line drawn; any stratified system is likely to be more or less consciously endogamous if it recognizes descent in both lines, and status within it will tend to be hereditary, since people normally attempt to ensure that they are succeeded by their children. Moreover, the great majority of peoples who classify themselves hierarchically recognize the fact, and the society of the United States is somewhat exceptional in its reluctance to do so consciously. Kroeber's definition can be seen, therefore, to be anything but stringent.

The views of most authors who have written on the subject lie somewhere between these two extremes and they sometimes represent an attempt at compromise between them, as, for example, when caste is first of all defined by its cultural characteristics and a worldwide validity is then claimed for it. It is not realized that a definition of caste in ethnographic terms is useless for comparison (Leach 1960: 2), if the comparative dimension is withdrawn from consideration, the result is folklore; the place of science is taken by common sense (which would not be common if it were not ethnocentric). If the concept

of caste is to be used in cross-cultural comparison, i.e., if it is to be a sociological category,[10] it must be abstracted from the detail of culture and repose on an analytical definition, not a stereotype (which is a description masquerading as a definition). Yet definitions of caste have tended to be stereotypical rather than analytic and have stressed resemblances of qualities rather than the existence of essential properties. Thus Berreman (1960: 120), though he seems aware of the difficulty, defined caste as:

> ... *a hierarchy of endogamous divisions in which membership is hereditary and permanent*. Here hierarchy includes inequality both in status and in access to goods and services. Interdependence of the subdivisions, restricted contacts among them, occupational specialization and/or a degree of cultural distinctiveness might be added as criteria, although they appear to be correlates rather than defining characteristics. This definition is perhaps best viewed as describing an ideal type at one end of a continuum along which systems of social stratification might be ranged. There can be little doubt that the systems in India and the southern United States would fall far toward the caste extreme of the continuum.

He further supported the assimilation of the two by numerous resemblances: rigid rules of avoidances; contamination through contact; enforced deference; distinct dwelling area, occupation, place of worship, and cultural behavior; powerful sanctions exercised by the superior caste who rationalize their status; great differences in power and privilege within, as well as between, castes; elaborate barriers of intercourse; low-caste dependence maintained by economic and physical sanctions; resentment of their status by the lower caste. The essential similarity lies in the fact that "the function of the rules in both cases is to maintain the caste system with institutionalized inequality as its fundamental feature."

He thus defended the application of the term to the color bar in the Deep South, stressing the similarity of attitudes found, on the one hand, between high-caste people and untouchables in an Indian village and, on the other, those which whites and Negroes adopt towards each other in the South. He suggested that the view which contrasted rather than assimilated the two fields (and therefore denied the utility of the word "caste" in the United States) was based

10. The necessary condition for an adequate definition for cross-cultural comparison is that it should be given its intension in terms of structure, not culture.

on a comparison of the Indian caste system as it is ideally described (rather than as it is) with the United States as it is known to be. It is undoubtedly true that many descriptions of Indian caste are based upon an ideal view of the system, and it is only relatively recently that detailed ethnographic descriptions have revealed the degree of discontent with which certain members of the lowest castes accept their lot and the maneuvers whereby certain low castes attempt to raise their status. Nevertheless, Berreman's assimilation of the two rests upon the comparison of both with *class* relations as they are in the ideal view of Northerners; neither in India nor in the South do the principles of American democracy apply. He assimilates the two on the basis of the fact that they both share the characteristics of any society in which there are *approved* social disparities, for these are enough to place it at that extreme of his continuum and permit it to be contrasted with the northern United States where such disparities are *disapproved*. This observation of similarities and differences is undoubtedly useful in a preliminary approach to a field of data, but a scientific definition is not constructed in this way. A random selection of resemblances must be placed in an ordered relationship and the degree to which a characteristic is present or absent (if this is part of the definition) must be susceptible to measurement. The traits indicative of this characteristic must not be selected arbitrarily. They must be related to it necessarily rather than accidentally.

Faced with the difficulty of constructing a coherent definition of caste, some authors have abandoned the search for "diagnostic features" and have remained content with qualities to be estimated by the light of common sense, returning thus to the wisdom of Kroeber, whose final summing-up of the definition was "a very rigid class system"; "Castes are closed classes" (Kroeber 1948: 276). Such a definition makes it somewhat awkward to oppose the word to "class," since it is already subsumed by it.

Long before the present debate commenced among the sociologists of India, the word "caste" had been adopted by students of race relations in the United States. Robert Park was using it in the 1920s. He defined "caste" as race relations within a single society: what were formerly racial elements became castes once they were merged together. Quoting Bouglé, he maintained that this was the essence and origin of caste in India. As such, caste relations between Negroes and whites are to be contrasted with class relations which obtain among persons of the same color. The difference between the two is not merely one of degree but of nature. It is to be noted that in regarding caste as race relations grown in, so to speak, Park differs from Kroeber, who sees them as class relations grown

out into something more rigid through self-recognition. It is not easy to see how caste, if it is a matter of color, could have been derived from class, but Kroeber was not apparently concerned with history in this instance, but rather with sociological classification. Both agreed, however, in applying the term to the color bar in the southern states and in situating caste somewhere between class and race.

There was, no doubt, a need to define a type of relationship that differed from class relations and could be opposed to it, for while there are distinctions of class among both Negroes and whites, relations between them are not of the same nature; their reciprocal attitudes respond to quite different criteria and enjoin quite different modes of conduct. Though the word used in an antique sense was already applied to the Negroes even before the Civil War, its use by social scientists was inspired by the analogy with the Hindu system. It is not obvious why it was thought necessary to borrow from the ethnography of India to refer to an institution that already possessed its own vocabulary in the ethnography of the United States, except that it was considered by Park as belonging to the class of "race relations within a single society" and in this it was similar to India, he thought. The popularity of the usage depended upon more than this, however: both "color" and "race," the terms used in the United States, were felt to be unsuitable as theoretical concepts, for they both imply that the distinction has a foundation in objective fact, and the scholars who studied the question were bent on pointing out that this is not so, that the distinction has no scientific justification but rests upon prejudices which are "undemocratic," unscientific, and iniquitous. Caste, on the other hand, was well-known to be primitive, irrational, undemocratic, and devoid of scientific justification. Moreover it was believed that enlightenment would put an end to it as, in the view of all good liberals, it would put an end to discrimination.[11] It was therefore a most satisfactory term to contrast with class, which was recognized as a legitimate institution in its American form.[12] The profound reasons for adopting it were moral rather than

11. Dollard (1949): "I believe that Americans instinctively hate the caste system and will not too long abide it." *Cf.* also Myrdal (1962: 667-9 and n. 1223).

12. American liberals have usually shown a certain ambivalence towards the question of class distinction, which is also subject to the accusation of being undemocratic. But it was above all a rigid class system such as was believed to exist in Europe that was subject to this accusation, not the fluid system of the United States, which offered equality of opportunity to every immigrant (it was believed). The ideal of the self-made man and the supposedly high degree of social mobility purified the

heuristic. It was nevertheless criticized also "because of its connotations of invariability and accommodation" (Myrdal 1962: n. 2.1222) by those writers who feared that such a usage would tend to perpetuate the system.

The distinction between color and class hinges on the notion of social mobility, for, whereas class can be changed, color cannot. This is the essential analytical distinction as well as the basis of the moral objections to the color bar of those who called it caste: the status attached to it is "hereditary and permanent" because genetically transmitted. Equality of opportunity is denied. But heredity and permanence, though they appear to be the same in India and the United States and therefore justifiably assimilable, do not in fact carry the same significance within each system and it is the characteristic of the systems that we are concerned to establish before we can assimilate them. In the Indian case it is the principle of *social descent* which determines the system (hence the recognized rule of endogamy, qualified or not by a rule of hypergamy or hypogamy); in the American case the determinant principle is *genetic transmission*, since color is what counts and those who are physically able to "pass" can do so—at the sacrifice of their familial ties. As Dumont (1966) has pointed out, hierarchy and stratification are not the same phenomenon.

Though endogamy has been stressed by almost all[13] those who wish to use the word caste to define the color-bar it is questionable whether this criterion is satisfied in the United States. Endogamy, as anthropologists normally use the word, refers to the custom of giving daughters in marriage (i.e., forming marriage alliances) within the group, whatever the group may be. Where daughters are not given but decide their marriage for themselves without thereby creating any alliance between groups of kin, it can hardly be said that endogamy is practiced, since the necessary condition for such a custom is lacking. The "endogamy" of the two North American "castes" is not a rule within a system

American class system of the moral taint of inegalitarianism. Indeed, without some stratification, there could be no social mobility; the self-made man could not exist if there were nowhere to make it to.

13. Berreman in fact drops this from a later definition (1967), in favor of the criterion of ascription by birth: "... a common means of guaranteeing this status is by prescribing endogamous marriage in the caste, and assigning the child the caste affiliation of its parents. But this method is by no means universal even in India, for caste, like kin-group affiliation, can be assigned unilineally or according to other, more complex, rules based on birth." It can be seen, then, that his objections to making endogamy an essential criterion for the definition of caste are not at all the same as my reasons for questioning whether it is met in the United States.

of marriage which restricts the alliance to a given social group, but simply the prohibition among the whites against acquiring a spouse who is colored. The writers who regard the bar to intermarriage between Negroes and whites as endogamy, rather than as an aspect of segregation, are committing the error of classifying together two phenomena that resemble each other on the level of appearances but whose nature is profoundly different. Indeed, were one to admit the term endogamy at all in modern Western society it would surely apply to marriage within a residential or occupational *group*, not within a phenotypical category. Empirically it is true that a prohibition exists in India against marrying a person of another caste, or in the United States a person of another color, and that the infringement gives rise in either case to reactions which are similar, yet the significance of this fact is sociologically nil, since it rests on a misclassification. (Its psychological significance is another matter.) For this reason I propose to name this error "the Empiricist Fallacy," since it results from a premature appeal to the "facts."[14] All that glitters is not gold, we are taught, but social scientists often seem indifferent to the lesson and to assume the utility of any classification based on a common characteristic.

The point is this: social phenomena are not isolates that can be identified independently of the system of which they are a function. They cannot be classified by accidental resemblances, but only on the basis of their relations within the society; the marriage prohibition which seems so straightforward a "fact" in both instances is on closer examination not so; its sociological nature is quite different in the two cases and the resemblance between them must be counted, as things stand at present, as contingent. Had we a general theory of marriage that covered both societies based on kinship and modern industrial society it might be possible to devise a category that would include both "facts," but while we have not it can only lead to error to do so.

To return to the social system in which this prohibition occurs; in Hindu society the individual's place is determined by the kin-group into which he is born; this is part of a subcaste and caste in whose collective status he participates. In the United States his place is determined by his appearance, which is due to his physical, not his social heritage; his status is not within a hierarchically-ordered structure of communities of known persons, but as an individual within a class

14. Reference is intended not to empiricism in the philosophical sense but to the general sense of the word empirical—"that is guided by mere experience, without knowledge of principles" (*OED*).

(in the logical sense of the word) of persons identified by their physique. For this reason, while it is possible for the same caste to have a different status from one place to another, color is everywhere the same throughout the country. Where there happens to be a statistical correlation between physical feature and caste status in India, even if it should be perfect, this is contingent to the definition of caste, just as where there happen to be communities composed of groups of kin among whom a man lives, it is not this that makes him a Negro. In fact, this is frequently the case, but Negroes are Negroes in the United States "because" they are colored, not "because" they were born and bred as such and their culture reflects the fact. Indeed, Negro style of speech, mentality, values, etc., have all been identified, but that a man may abandon them does not mean that he will not still be classed as a Negro, nor does the adoption of a Negro style of speech stop the "white Negroes" being classed as white. You cannot—to quote the most humorless joke in the literature on the colored problem—resign from the colored race, nor it might be added from the white race, but you can be expelled from your caste and reintegrated into it. The determining criterion is social allegiance in one case, physical appearance in the other, and this implies that the first is a collective status, the second an individual status. This difference reflects two quite different types of society: one structured in corporate groups, the other the open society; the one organized throughout by the principle of caste, the other inspired by the concern with individual worth. This is the basis of the distinction, fundamental in the thought of Dumont (1966: 300-1), between *Homo Hierarchicus* and *Homo Aequalis*, Western man, whose yearning for equality derives from an individualistic conception of mankind. The existence of a phenotypical distinction, determining membership of one or other of the two so-called "castes," partially parallel systems of social stratification which are prevented from fusing into one by this distinction, poses a problem for the operation of the mechanism of social mobility upon which the social system of the United States is founded and a challenge to their ideological charter. Myrdal was right to choose the word "dilemma" as the title of his study and to stress that it was above all a dilemma for white society. Caste structured Indian society down to the modern age, but color discrimination, the physiological residue of a dismounted structure, that of a servile society, persists in modern America, defining the condition under which the system of social mobility can operate: that traces of servile descent should not be displayed by the socially successful.

We have established that the absence of social mobility is the most significant factor in the definitions of caste put forward by those who wish to include

the southern United States. Moreover, there is much to be said in favor of such a criterion, since structures that permit a modification of social status have necessarily a quite different dynamic from those that do not. Whether or not this fact is sufficient to outweigh the objections to such a broad definition would depend upon the use which is made of it.

But were we to adopt this criterion there are two difficulties which must be overcome: no social structure can remain entirely stable, since change is inevitable; demographic and economic factors intervene to change the relationships of groups and individuals. There is therefore no society in which there is absolutely no social mobility at all. The attempts to improve their status of certain castes in India through what Professor Srinivas has called Sanskritization has been amply documented, though, in conformity with the distinction already made, it is collective rather than individual social mobility that is aimed at here. Indians recognize that they can only improve their status collectively, they cannot become self-made men. Are we, then, to include both types of social mobility for the purpose of our definition? If so, there may be no society where mobility is lacking. If not, the degree to which status is collective becomes crucial. And in either case how are we to measure social mobility in order to place caste in cross-cultural perspective? Is it a question of the *number* of persons (or families?) who are recognized as socially mobile? Or the *degree* to which they are mobile? The son of the private who becomes a field marshal or the son of the peasant who becomes president is so undoubtedly, but if the first only becomes sergeant major or the second only becomes a car salesman? The attempt to reduce all the social activities of a society to a single scale which would permit such relative evaluations is already problematic even before we attempt to establish cross-cultural equivalences. The same profession can be evaluated in very different ways from one place to another, and in any case its standing changes from one generation to another in the same place. We might devise a prestige scale for each society, accepting the evaluations of the members themselves (supposing that they all agreed). But having once accepted their evaluation of their own social system, how do we make it comparable with others which use different criteria? In a society where all believed that they were equal there would be no social mobility, but if in one society we justified the opinion that differentiation was less than in another, the possibility of social mobility would be less; for a little would suffice to take one from the bottom to the top of the social hierarchy. It appears not to have been noticed that there is something logically antithetical between the ideals of equality and social mobility; each presupposes

the absence of the other. And then, again, is social mobility to be measured uniquely in an upward direction? What about the downwardly socially mobile? Do they not count? What about the "*famille noble retombée en paysannerie*"? The two do not necessarily go together; for every peasant who becomes ennobled there is not necessarily a nobleman who declines, even though a total ranking order is always theoretically conceivable.

In the case of the United States, an additional factor can be invoked which goes far towards explaining the ideal of the self-made man and the attachment of the sociologists to the criterion of social mobility; the social structure of the United States has been developed for the past hundred years on the assumption that the population was constantly expanded by the immigration of foreigners, almost entirely into the lowest economic class. The result of this is that adaptation to the norms of the society which received them almost automatically involved upward social mobility, since their place in the lowest rank in American society was taken by more recent immigrants. The point could not be more clearly made than by the inscription on the Statue of Liberty: "... Give us your *poor* ..." (my italics). Had the immigrants been wealthy the system would not have worked. It is not surprising, then, that the United States should be the extreme example of the ideology, common in greater or lesser degree throughout the modern West, that regards it as a good thing for individuals to be accorded social status according to their deserts, and therefore places a positive value on social mobility. Only there was it possible theoretically for everyone to be upwardly mobile.

In view of the difficulties we face when we attempt to provide an objective measure of social mobility that may be applied cross-culturally (and the questions asked above must surely show the arbitrary decisions that are involved in the attempt), we must ask ourselves whether the broad definition of caste does not delineate a residual category that we might define from a more objective standpoint as: a caste system is any system of social differentiation not inspired by the ideology of the modern West. At any rate we shall see that it is hard to find a common set of criteria for the definition of caste that will encompass not only India and the southern United States but also Latin America.

It is often difficult to know what is intended when we encounter the word "caste" in Latin America. In Spanish the word *casta* may refer either to breeding, to a caste in the colloquial sense, to the *castas* of the colonial period, or it may mean caste as a sociological phenomenon. Yet even when it is written in English, one may wonder whether the author intends simply to Anglicize the

term at the ethnographical level in order to avoid repeating a foreign word or whether he has a more analytical purpose. In many cases, deliberately or not, he accepts the word in the widest sense and applies it to any marked social discrimination. In that case the *castas* would rightly be called "castes" and so would the modern distinction between Indians and those who are not. We must therefore examine the grounds for choosing a more or less restricted definition of the word in the light of the Latin American scene.

To begin with, this widest usage covers and even expands the sum of the senses to be found in the dictionary and the colloquial habits of| modern speech. Its range is so great that it cannot be said to have any exact intension at all and is therefore analytically useless for the same reason that other popular terms are analytically useless. It then makes little sense to say (Tumin 1952: vii):

> While the general outlines of caste systems are similar in some degree wherever they are found, it is also true that there are numerous and important differences among them. An understanding of these differences, as well as the similarities, is essential to a true knowledge of castes. *Sound and genuinely comparable* [my italics] materials from a number of different caste systems are therefore needed.

To know what can be classified as a caste system and can therefore be genuinely comparable we must have a definition and since Professor Tumin gives none, but simply asserts that in this village of Guatemala "a caste system flourishes," it is impossible to decide on logical grounds what utility might be derived from the comparison he envisages. He was accepting the fact on the authority of his teacher, Professor Gillin. More prudent authors who were struck by the degree of the social differentiation between the two elements of the population of Central America, have often nevertheless hedged their bets and spoken of "caste-like" in order to describe it.

Even though Tumin maintained in a later publication that the division into "castes" in eastern Guatemala, the site of his study, was more marked than in the west of the country (Tumin 1956: 174-5), it is evident that Kroeber's definition of caste, if it were applied with any rigor, would exclude this case, and *a fortiori* the rest of Central America. For one cannot call these categories closed where the population is largely of mixed descent and where as many informants of the superior element "would let their daughter marry into the other group" as "would disinherit a child who married out" (Tumin 1952: 239-40). That the difference in social status is very great between Indians and Ladinos no one would

question, but the only definitions of caste that would include this instance are those of Park (race relations within a single society) and of Berreman in his most recent opinion, but not his definition of 1960.

Park's definition depends upon the meaning given to "race relations," but unless one is to accept his interpretation of Bouglé and classify the castes of India as races, Hindu society must be said to be *not* a caste system (which looks anomalous in view of the history of the term, as anomalous as discovering that the Kwakiutl were not a "potlatch society"). Berreman's later definition covers it approximately,[15] but one wonders what stratified society it can be taken to exclude. Certainly not Great Britain nor the eastern United States even without considering the Negroes.

The diversity of usage is great in Latin American studies. It may be ranged as follows:

1. Those who accept the point of view of Gillin and Tumin uncritically, e.g. Reed (1964), Rosenblat (1954), and Harris (1964: 37) (though he underlines the difference between the United States and Latin America).
2. Those who accept the usage while showing signs of discomfort, either evading responsibility for it by putting it in quotes (Wagley, in Heath & Adams 1965) or by using the word "caste-like" to show that it may not really be caste though it appears similar (Wagley, etc.).
3. Those who concede the usage but prefer to use another word. Beals prefers "plural cultures," at least for Mexico, though "the term (caste) has some applicability in Peru" (Heath & Adams 1965: 350).
4. Those who would reject the word altogether, save at the ethnographical level (Colby & van den Berghe 1961, Bourricaud 1962: 65, Mörner 1967: 53).

While some writers employ the word more or less colloquially, and unreflectingly, others give it an implied analytical load and, while using it in other contexts, refuse it as a translation of the word *casta* where this applies to the castas of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Latin America. Thus Van den Berghe (1967) tells us that "they could be more accurately described as estates rather than castes." Aguirre Beltrán (1963: 76, 275) suggests that sociologically

15. "A caste system occurs where a society is made up of birth-ascribed groups which are hierarchically ordered and culturally distinct. The hierarchy entails differential evaluation, rewards and association" (Berreman 1967: 4).

considered they constitute "*una intercasta, un grupo social desheredado*," marginal men between the caste of Spaniards and that of Indians. Kubler and Fernandes, on the other hand, find the usage legitimate both in colonial and modern times, where they maintain it to be similar.

If we compare the nature of the distinction between Indians and Hispanics in Latin America with that between colors in the United States, we can see that the features which have been given most attention in justifying the similarity of the latter to Indian caste are not those which might do so in the former case. Social mobility is anything but lacking. Indeed, its extent is very impressive by any standards, especially in Mexico. At the time of Independence the Indians composed 60 percent of the total population and the other "castas," including the Spaniards, amounted altogether only to 40 percent. In 1570 they had amounted only to 13 percent (Van den Berghe 1967: 47). Today the Indians are no more than 15 percent; the Hispanics are 85 percent. Disregarding immigration and the differential rates of reproduction which would favor this tendency only before the eighteenth century, these differences are in the main due to social mobility, that is to say, to the number of persons who in one generation or more have passed from Indian to Hispanic status. One might say that in 150 years nearly half the population has been socially mobile. Let those who claim to be able to measure social mobility cross-culturally find a country with a comparable record—other than the United States, whose structure, as I have explained, is based upon the premise of universal social mobility. One can point to whole regions of Mexico which in one period or another have decided to change their ethnic identity and have done so successfully. Moreover, the two most powerful rulers of Mexico in the past century were both credited with being born Indians.

The other feature which is frequently alluded to in stressing the similarity between Hindu caste and that of the Deep South is the notion of pollution involved in contact with the inferior element. Though Indians are commonly considered dirty by Hispanics, no one is polluted by physical or even sexual contact nor by commensality, nor, in so far as it is possible to abstract ethnic status from class status, can it be said that there is any bar on intermarriage. To marry an Indian is a *mésalliance* because Indians are considered socially inferior, but cases of such intermarriage abound and are accepted. Indians are separated from Hispanics neither by religion (both believe themselves to be Catholic) nor phenotype (though Indians commonly look "Indian," they are no less Indian if they don't), but only by culture and social allegiance. Hence one finds everywhere

persons whose ethnic affiliation is uncertain since they are in transition from one status to the other. If one wished to call this distinction caste one might say that the castes of Latin America are socially mobile and non-endogamous, open and fluid rather than closed and rigid, devoid of the notion of pollution and giving rise to no segregation. But having said that what remains as the concept of caste?

Nonetheless, it should not be forgotten that there is one resemblance between Indians and the castes of India, which goes back to the original meaning of the word as "breed" or "tribe": they are organized in communities which possess collective identity (for this reason their phenotype is not a criterion of status). Moreover, there are even parts of Latin America where the different breeds are arranged hierarchically, for example in Oaxaca, where the social superiority of the Zapotecs over the Mixe or the Huave is clearly recognized. There is therefore the possibility of devising a definition of caste which would be not so all-embracing as to be useless and would yet include both the Indians and the Hindus—but North America would be excluded. However, it would face other difficulties, for if the Indians might be called castes by this definition, one could not call the Hispanics so, for they are not organized according to the same principles. In so far as racial background has significance among them, it is as individuals, and therefore phenotype takes on an importance that it does not have for Indians; it does not provide a basis for segregation, as in the United States, but merely an indicator of social status, as among the colored population of North America. Hispanic society is an open society where status is individual and therefore one can see that, following the distinction made above, Latin America is divided into a Hispanic half, which constitutes a modern national state, and a number of Indian communities, which are structured in accordance with a different principle, culturally distinct and marginal to it. Indeed, the Mexican government has founded its policy regarding the Indians on the need to "integrate" them into the national society. One might therefore question whether in the terms of Park's definition of caste we may here speak of "race relations within a single society," for except in a physical sense it is not one; Indians are not part of the social system in the way the Negroes of the United States are, so that if we accept the criterion of a caste society as a total social system, they would be classed as outcastes from it rather than castes, like the Eta of Japan or the gypsies (*cf.* Dumont 1966: 271-2). To confuse the two is to commit the Empiricist Fallacy. But this in turn poses the question of the extent of a social system. For wherever the Indians are found they make up the majority of

the population of the region, if not of the country. If, therefore, they are regarded as not part of Hispanic society, they must be considered not as outcastes, but as a social system apart. We must then conclude that in Latin America we have not two societies, but two social systems combined and economically interdependent within a single physical society.

I have outlined the theoretical difficulties involved in different attempts to provide an analytical definition of caste. Indian caste, and race relations in North America or Latin America, all involve relations of super- and subordination, but that is where their common characteristics end. Their principles of operation are different in each case and if they give rise at times to similarities of conduct, this is due to the psychological reactions of those who find themselves in a superior or inferior status. It is common psychology, not common social structure, that produces them. A comparison of social structures must be concerned with the *elements* of social structure: hierarchy, authority, power, sanctity, the division of labor, the definition and solidarity of groups, the transmission of property, the rules of descent, etc., not with approximations to a stereotype, that is to say, a particular conjunction of features which may frequently be associated in fact but have no demonstrated necessary relationship to one another. The sterility of taxonomies based on stereotypes is evident: they contain no analytical definitions but classify at the level of ethnography. The Empiricist Fallacy is a fallacy because it neglects the first *démarche* of abstraction required as a preliminary to classification.

Is it then possible to provide the word caste with an analytical definition? Dumont does so (1966: 269) "...caste exists only where this characteristic (disjunction between status and power) is present and we would like to classify under another heading all societies, even those constituted of permanent and closed status groups, which do not possess it." As a key to the nature of Indian society this criterion could not be bettered, but it does not provide a category for a taxonomy of social systems such as those who have attempted to expand the term would wish, for Dumont finds that this criterion is missing in fact outside India: Swat and even Ceylon (1966: 273) are excluded, for caste proved "non-exportable." He is left, therefore, with a class of which there is only one known member and, though this fact detracts in no way from the analysis itself, it means that comparisons can only be made outside the category, that is to say, with systems which are recognized as not being caste systems; the cross-cultural comparison of caste is not possible. Caste is synonymous with the Hindu social system within which power and status are divorced. It is *sui generis*.

My conclusion is this: if by way of analytical definitions we can find none that is acceptable between Dumont's, which applies only to India (and is therefore hardly useful for taxonomic purposes), and Berreman's, which applies to any traditional system of social differentiation (and is therefore equally useless for the opposite reason), we should perhaps abandon the hope of using *caste*, *rather than the functions of which it may be constituted*, for the purpose of cross-cultural comparison and let it rest content in a humble station at the ethnographical level where it may without contradiction—since no comparison is here demanded—be used to denote the castes of the Hindus in India (*varna* or *jati* according to the writer's choice) or in Latin America the clans of the Guajira or the lineages of the Andes, or, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the breeds which were recognized as social statuses, or in nineteenth-century Yucatan the Indian tribes, their white rulers, and their *mestizo* overseers, and so forth, but not attempt to use it in cross-cultural comparison where it leads only to confusion, for as its history shows, it is in fact, like *mana* and *tabu*, a heuristic parvenu that arrived at the analytical level only thanks to the Empiricist Fallacy.

In employing the vocabulary of a past age which approved of distinctions of status and despised "social climbers" I do not wish to imply that I myself do so—save in the case of words. For words and people are not the same. Nevertheless I may still perhaps be forgiven for borrowing the analogy of human descent in order to represent the history of the word "caste." In the place of the founding ancestor we may put the gothic root referred to by Corominas (KASTS, meaning a herd or a brood of nestlings). This produced the Iberian *casta* and the antique English usage of *caste* which predates the English occupation of India and was usually spelt without the "e" until it was Gallicized in the eighteenth century. It appears likely that the word *cast* in the sense of "throw" is of the same stock, descended from a brother of the founding ancestor; it is given as characteristically Scandinavian in origin by Skeat. There is nothing surprising in this suggestion since we have other examples of progeny being represented as a projection into the future: the Latin synonym of the verb "to cast," *jactare*, gives both "rejeton" (a child or descendant) in French (Littré, sense 3), and "ahechadura" (a clutch or nestful of chicks) in Spanish (*Diccionario de la Lengua Española de la Real Academia* 1956: 506). Once the British arrived in India they adopted the Portuguese word *casta* for the *caste* system, and this form finally returned to England and usurped the place of its cousin, the old English word *caste* which had the sense of "race, stock or breed (of men)" (*OED* 1933). The lexicographers, like hack genealogists, have validated the lineage of the usurper giving him a noble

(i.e., Latin) antecedence via the Portuguese, and exotic associations with the Hindus. From this was born the sociologists' usage whose claims to status I have examined.

Human beings are everywhere classified by their origins, however these may be conceived; the hypothetical point, geographical, genealogical, or temporal from which they are projected—might I say "cast"?—into the present determines their status in it. Hence the distinction between societies where status is ascribed and those where it is achieved requires some reformulation, for status is first of all ascribed in all societies and in all it is modifiable in some degree over time. Some accept modifications of status more willingly than others. Modern America claims to welcome them, which explains perhaps the choice of the positively valued word "achieved." But there is no such thing as status which is uniquely achieved, for every individual receives a status before he is capable of achieving anything. His culture determines the rules of ascription and also those according to which it can be modified. Such rules change, however, in response to the demands of the social structure. That the word meaning originally offspring and hence breed should have passed through such a series of transformations as the word caste shows us how wide is the range of possible interpretations that secure the transmission of status from one generation to the next.

The doctrine of purity of blood in Spain, though it had roots in the Christian notion of hereditary sin, was only elaborated in the social struggle between the "old" and the "new Christians" (Sicroff 1960). While the Iberian Peninsula was shared between three "races," defined essentially by religion, the problem of purity was hardly posed. It only became a problem with the conversions, especially of Jews to the Catholic faith and their accession to power in the burgeoning modern state of Renaissance times. This was the outcome of the transformation of a plural society which accepted its diversity into a singular one demanding ethnic unity. Logically indeed, breed can be seen as pure only in opposition to impure, i.e., "tainted," by an extraneous element of descent, not to a different breed. *Casta* became a matter of purity only when the loyalty of members of the upper class could be impugned through the implications of their heterodox antecedence.

In Asia and America the social structures were entirely different from the Iberian Peninsula and the word *casta* found fresh applications in those lands. In the sense of descent group it fitted the caste of India which also happened to entertain notions of purity and pollution, albeit very different ones from the Portuguese. In America the empire remained a plural society and the significant

categories of breed were derived, not from the orthodoxy of ancestors, but from the percentage of them who belonged to one race or another. (At the top of the social hierarchy, moreover, the Spanish rulers invoked a different principle altogether—place of birth rather than purity of descent—to maintain their exclusiveness from the colonial-born *criollos.*)

Each age and land has visited its anxieties upon the word caste, which has passed down from Covarrubias to Tumin via the nineteenth-century administrators of the Indian Empire who aspired to become a "ruling caste" and the American social scientists who reconciled their egalitarian ideals with the inequalities of status in their own country by stigmatizing the color bar as something barbarous and alien. Recognition that a word that in origin meant no more than offspring should have done so much heavy, if unrecognized, duty in the cause of one ideology or another should surely incline the anthropologist to prudence in the choice of his analytical vocabulary, especially when the transmission of status is at issue, for our deepest and least willingly admitted assumptions relate to that.

CHAPTER 19

Race in Latin America: The concept of "raza"*

I

It is well known that the attitudes of the Latin Americans towards *race* are not the same as those of the inhabitants of Europe and the United States. This observation led scholars as distinguished as Gilberto Freire and Arnold Toynbee to put forward the view that there is no "race prejudice" in Latin America, a view that has been criticized by more recent writers. In Latin America distinctions of "race" are indeed made, but not on the basis of the same premises as in North America and, though *raza* and *race* are the same word, they do not bear the same connotations in Spanish-speaking as in English-speaking countries—outside scientific circles, perhaps. "Race" is a system of classifying individuals and, as such, part of each culture, and therefore liable to vary from one to another. But what science has done with the word is another matter.

It is easy enough to smile when told that someone is of a different "raza" to his parents or even that "he used to be a Negro, but now he's white" but our smile is one of ethnocentric satisfaction and it springs from the assumption that we can allow ourselves to feel patronizing towards those who use such words

* "Race in Latin America: The concept of 'raza'" was first published as an article in 1973 in the *European Journal of Sociology* and is reproduced in this volume with permission from Cambridge University Press.

like a simpleton. This is a pleasure we can ill afford, for our own usage harbors a host of contradictions also.

The reason why it appears comic to suppose that a man can belong to a different race from his parents or change his race is that, for us today, the essence of the word is physical heredity, and therefore these usages are by definition nonsense: one cannot be of a different race to one's parents. Thanks to the work of modern geneticists, we have some fairly firm ideas about how physical heredity is transmitted. Yet this is so only since the last half century and the word *race* had already held sway for much longer in senses which owed nothing to genetics and rested upon a notion of descent that was social rather than biological.

Its etymology is a source of controversy, but its earliest English usage referred to a classification of plants, animals, or humans, which rested on nothing more than the observation that "Like begets like." Men have been aware of this, even long before they heard the word *race,* but this old adage was about all that was *generally* known about the mechanics of heredity prior to the Mendelian revival. Moreover the adage was interpreted in a somewhat different manner according to whether the classification of plants and animals or of humans was at stake. Plants and animals were classified solely by their "natural" characteristics, as *individual organisms,* and they were reproduced under human control to preserve and accentuate the desired features, eliminate the undesired. But, where it applied to humans, the *social groupings* were accepted as they existed, so the word race came to mean lineage, tribe or nation. In addition, then, to the physical features by which plants and animals were classified, humans were classified, and above all, by the other features which distinguished them in *social* life. Classification in the natural world and in the social world were not the same thing, though, obvious as this seems today, popular opinion has always tended to neglect the fact, as though it feared that its recognition would detract from the value of social classification.

It is not necessary to go into the history of the controversies which enlivened the scholarly world regarding the systems of classification of nature and the place of race in the history of anthropology. Fortunately George Stocking has applied himself to precisely this task and has pointed out that the supposedly scientific concept of race at the end of the last century contained psychological, social, and cultural terms as well as physical (Stocking 1968; 1973). It was in fact closely linked to the rather mystical notion of "the blood" not because it was believed heredity was *really* transmitted by blood, but because no alternative explanation for the transmission process was available. Much of the controversy

of that epoch in fact expressed the rival claims, to priority in the classification of human groups, of language, culture, psychological, and moral characteristics and also physical form, especially head-form. The latter criterion, which eventually conquered the field, gained its impulsion from archaeology and from the concern in the origin and evolution of the human race—or races. Since the record of the past conserved man's bones much better than anything else, these became the basis of classification and since his culture was surmised to depend upon his brain-power, the bone structure of the skull was accorded a privileged position. Thus racial taxonomies were erected on the basis of the cephalic index with little more profit in the end than the lucubrations of the phrenologists, who also thought that the shape of the head could serve as the basis for the classification of men, if in a different endeavor.

A clearer understanding of the mechanisms of descent, owed to the development of genetics in the twentieth century (in which the advances were all made through experiments with plants and animals), stressed the distinction between inheritance and environment, nature and nurture in the popular idiom, and restricted the word "race" to a classification of man and animals according to their genetic constitution. Since then the physical anthropologists have developed the notion in accordance with their own preoccupations and a number of the most distinguished have ended by dropping it altogether, preferring to talk about "gene-pools" and "population isolates." All have abandoned the idea that individuals can be classified as such in terms of their race, regardless of the population to which they belong. Emphasis is laid on frequencies and very often frequencies of invisible things like blood-groups. The physical anthropologists thus have nothing to say about the social consequences of overt differences between individuals in a miscegenated population, which is where the study of race relations started. Yet social anthropologists stand in awe of physical anthropology and are consequently embarrassed by the word *race* as it occurs in "race relations," for they feel that it is not "scientific" to use the word in this way. Yet it is still important to make "social scientific" sense of these popular usages, and Latin America is a particularly suitable field in which to do so, since the chasm between the popular and the technical usages is so very evident there.

In this regard the first step was taken by Charles Wagley (1968: 403–17) when he wryly coined the phrase "social race" to refer to the social distinctions that are made there. Faced with the dissociation between physique and culture, Latin America gives priority to the latter, not the former. Even social and economic position are enough to justify the attribution of a distinct racial

identity in certain places where, for example, an "Indian" is defined as a person who goes barefoot. It is logical, moreover, since racial identity looks to descent for its explanation, that the surname is also often invested with significance in this regard and, therefore, that those who aspire to change their race must Hispanicize their surname.

Some scholars have attempted to overcome the difficulty by using the word "ethnic" in place of "racial," to denote a cultural rather than a genetic distinction. But this device is not altogether satisfactory, for it makes "race" a matter of culture, whereas it is really a matter of social relations. Moreover, the word "ethnic" is not always used with consistency, for it also refers to color within a culturally homogeneous society, as in the West Indies. Nevertheless I shall use the expression "ethnic status," for want of anything better, to refer to the distinction between Indians and Hispanics.

Surveying, throughout the world, the variety of criteria which serve, in popular usage, to determine race, one can see that the word represents no more than a method of classifying people who are thought to be different from the speaker in their *essential nature.* It follows from this that the particular concept of race in use in a given context is the expression of a distinction inherent in the social structure, not in the phenotypical distribution of the population. People are classified in fact, not as they *might* appear to an outside, scientific, objective observer, but as they *do* appear to those who have dealings with them.

Hence the scientists who attempt, through the good offices of UNESCO, to reform popular notions regarding race and make them tally with the findings of human biology, though the nobility of their motives cannot be denied, give battle upon an ill-chosen field, which they might do better to abandon to the forces of popular opinion, recognizing that race, in this sense, is not a physical but a social concept. If, then, the word be retained at all for social scientific purposes, it would be to define social relations of a particular type, namely, those between categories of people who do not accept their common essential nature. It would then be, as it were, the contrary of the concept of "community" (as Tönnies or MacIver used it), for the acceptance of common nature is the foundation of that concept: there would be no concrete races for the social scientist, only race *relations.* The classification of races would be left to the people themselves, and only their *classification,* not *what they classify,* would be the subject of generalization. For what they classify is not physical men but total men in all the aspects in which they are apprehended: physical, cultural, and social. This suggestion is much less revolutionary than might be thought, for it does no more than accept

the implications of what has been recognized for years among those who have studied race relations: that race is in the eye of the beholder.

Phenotypical differences are given their meaning by society which finds in them only the basis for potential classification. They are no more than a part of the raw material which is submitted to a system of evaluation dictated by the social structure, and the attitudes of repulsion which attach to other races, so far from being "natural" in the sense they are said to be, relate to *nature* only as a reaction to the absence of the criteria by which the group defines its *own* nature. Thus, physical endowment, which has become for the physical anthropologist the crux of the matter, is in the popular conceptualization, no more than a means of rationalizing the response to a social situation, as when such-and-such a type of behavior is said to be "in the blood."

That two so different concepts could have become and still remain so confused is due only to certain fundamental ideas in Western culture regarding the transmission of social nature. Europe, unlike many other parts of the world, recognized descent from *both* parents as socially significant—and, in this, the popular view of descent accorded with the geneticist's. It would not have been possible to use the same word for genetic heredity and social descent in, for example, the Trobriand Islands where the formal dogma of kinship denies the father any status as genitor, nor for that matter in a society which accredits descent uniquely in the patriline; but in our tradition "blood," the mystical essence of descent, is recognized as flowing in both lines, even though the patriline is given a pre-eminence it does not get from genetics. In addition, physical and social paternity are equated in the West; the father should be also the begetter and again, were this not so, genetic descent could hardly be confused with social descent. Among the Nuer, for example, who practice the institution of "ghost marriage," social paternity could never be thought to be transmitted by "the blood." To sum up, race can only rest upon the same assumptions in the physical anthropologist's, and in the popular, senses in a society which recognizes bilateral descent and equates the *pater* and the *genitor*. The concordance may have favored the progress of genetics in the past, but in the present it obscures the fundamental difference between the two, placing the study of race relations before a quandary it seems unable to resolve.

By defining race as a purely social and relational concept, the confusion with the biological concept of race can be avoided. It is assumed simply that all societies mark at some point or other a distinction between people of the same nature as themselves and people different, in whom they cannot see themselves

portrayed and whom they do not consequently credit with a potential right to community. They are in all contexts alien. Racial difference begins at this point. But is it quite natural that it should be attributed to descent, for essential nature is everywhere thought to be derived from birth, whether parentage or place of birth is regarded as the more significant. By borrowing the word "race" from the vernacular to mean a genetically distinct population, the anthropologists sanctified the confusion between genetics and social status and validated the popular attribution.[1] Putting it crudely, they were "sold a pup" by their own culture. To be "sold a pup" is to be deceived. In the origin of the expression the deceit concerns the paternity of the purchase. The buyer thinks he has bought a well-bred dog, but as it grows up, it becomes apparent that the pup in question was the progeny of a mésalliance; he has accepted as physical paternity what is in fact only social. He thought the pup's genes were implied in its pedigree and by the time he realizes his mistake it is too late. The anthropologists thought *race* meant genetic transmission, whereas in fact this belief was merely one example of a general equation by which Western culture explained distinctions of social affiliation, despite the innumerable instances to the contrary, as transmitted with "the blood." As we know today, lineage is primarily and functionally a projection into the past (and thus a validation) of the social groupings and statuses encountered in the present. But our predecessors did not know this. They believed every genealogy they were shown to be a record of genetic transmission and accepted the word "race" at the face value of its dud pedigree.

To elaborate the point, the true genealogy of the word race can be expressed in the following manner. In its origin it denoted classes of plants, animals or humans. Plants and animals were classified according to their *physical* characteristics—since man does not have social relations with them and they have no culture; they are objects, not interlocutors. These physical characteristics were what gave them significance (as well as utility) in the eyes of men and they were observed to be transmitted hereditarily. But it was not physical properties that were determinant in the classification of men, but rather culture and behavior, for these limited the social relationships one could have with them. It was not their phenotype that determined whether they were "sociable" or

1. The skill with which a recent author has defended the unity of the traditional disparate usages—and the confusion inherent in them—cannot but excite the admiration of the scholarly. Viz. Michael Banton (1967). See also Pitt-Rivers (1970).

not, but once this had been decided, it served to distinguish them as a class. Those who look physically alike are thought to be descended from a common stock and to have the same nature. Hence phenotype, immediately perceptible, becomes an indication of the behavior which may be expected of a person. Thus the popular concept of human race can be defined as a classification according to essential nature, manifest in cultural characteristics and determined by social allegiance—which in fact commonly go together, since sociation depends upon a common understanding of norms and common expectations. But there are two subsidiary clauses to this definition owed to the genealogy of the word: (1) This nature is assumed to be acquired by physical descent and (2) to be indicated by phenotype.

The rules of genetic transmission were first observed by Mendel in the cultivation of varieties of peas and the science of genetics was later able to produce a biological explanation of the Mendelian laws. The theory was then applied to the human realm. It can be seen that this theory entirely ignores the first and operative term of the concept of human race, as I have defined it, and rests uniquely upon the subsidiary clauses which are *operative* only in the classification of animals and plants. Hence the physical anthropologists have in fact followed the same procedure as totemic societies in classifying humans *as if* they were animals or plants, a part of the natural world, with only this difference: that their attitude to nature is not the same. All societies attempt to endow their social order with a natural charter and assure the authority of their rules of conduct by assimilating them to the laws of nature[2] and, in this endeavor, nineteenth century Europe was abetted by its anthropologists who failed to recognize that the classification of the human world in terms of race followed different premises and principles than the classification of the natural world. The word in fact has been largely dropped in favor of "sub-species" in the classification of the natural world, but it sticks to human beings in the sense that was appropriate only for plants and animals. If physical anthropologists now object to the inferences which are drawn by public opinion and charlatans from the classification of humanity into physical races, they have only themselves to blame: they manufactured the arms which are turned against them. The biological classification of humanity and its social self-classification are methodologically distinct according to whether men are classified as members of the animal

2. "Toute hiérarchie sociale se prétend fondée sur la nature des choses… par là, elle s'octroie l'éternité…" (Hertz 1928: 99).

kingdom or as social beings. As part of nature, they are subject to an objective and abstract classification which remains altogether separate from the classifier. But in the popular classification of races, the classifier is himself a part of the total field of classification in that it is performed in relation to himself; its prime distinction is between those people he regards as having the same essential nature as himself and those whom he opposes to them. The classification is not, then, inspired and controlled by the demands of an objective science, but by the need to provide norms for the behavior of social groups and, since behavior is always reciprocally conditioned, in his classification of others the classifier classifies himself. For this reason I suggest for it the term "classification-in-the-act-of-living" or *classification vécue.* In confusing the two methods of classification, which one might think are easy enough to distinguish, men are obeying a social urge which we can recognize only too well: to classify other "races" *as if* they were animal, not human, i.e., exclude them from the human community. This is never better illustrated than in the example of the slave-markets of the Indies where a primitive physical anthropology was developed in order to distinguish the goods on the market: prices varied according to the provenance of the slave, for different regions were recognized to produce slaves who were more or less robust, more or less docile; they were classified as animals because they were treated as objects not people. (They had, in any case, been stripped of their social allegiances when they were enslaved, so they arrived upon the market devoid of social identity.) No people ever worried about their own place in humanity until they encountered another they could place in an inferior rank, nor considered any other superior to themselves in that regard till they had learned from others the hard facts of power. Racial distinctions are never *established* "from below," since their only object is to exclude from the human community. Thus social race, in order to fulfill its function as *classification vécue, must* be confused with physical race; its efficacy depends upon the confusion. Hence the constant appeal of racists to the testimony of physical anthropology proceeds, not from any concern with the problems of scientific taxonomy, but from the desire to endow their social attitudes with a "natural" charter, and thereby escape from any moral responsibility for them: it must pretend to an objectivity it cannot by its very nature possess. Nor is there anything exceptional in this pretention, since it is precisely what we do the whole time: endow our prejudices with the title of scientific facts. As Lévi-Strauss (1966a: 3) has put it: "Every culture tends to overestimate the objective orientation of its thought." This tendency is all too visible where race is concerned.

The result of this confusion between popular and scholarly usage is that the scholar cannot say anything with clarity about the social aspect of race. He is forced, in approaching the concrete ethnography, to use the word "Negro" to refer to persons whom he does not admit to be Negroes and to speak of race relations which are not between races at all as they are defined for him. The physical anthropologists have pre-empted the word "race" for their purposes and the social anthropologists are left with nothing to replace what the populace calls race. How are they to refer to the Negroes of America if they deny themselves the word? "Ethnic group" has been suggested as a better term than race and it has, at any rate, the advantage of escaping from the concept of physical anthropology. But, quite apart from the fact that the populace will pay little heed to what they say about ethnic groups, "ethnic group" implies a substantial classification according to the objective criteria of ethnology, that is to say by culture, not, as I have argued "races" are, a classification effected in a certain social situation by the beliefs of the people themselves regarding their essential nature; ethnic group still refers to physical persons, not their behavior and social structure. Moreover if the Indian "races" are distinguished for the most part by their culture, the same cannot be said of the Negroes who are all culturally assimilated to the Europeans from whom they are nonetheless thought to be "racially" distinct. It is not surprising then if scholars have made little theoretical progress in the discussion of race relations, since they are debarred by their usage from naming the object of their study, and hence of conceiving it clearly.

In consequence, having once explained that race relations are not to do with biological races, they can only go on to account for them in terms of culture, economics, social class, occupational group, colonialism or the psychology of prejudice, all of which do indeed enter into the discussion of race relations at one point or other, but none of which is coterminous with them. The phenomenon is broken up into aspects of other subjects and denied any unity of its own as a distinct structural feature; the specific nature of the distinction of race is suppressed and it is overlooked that the limits of social solidarity and the dynamics of social structure are no longer the same, once a distinction of race is involved. Hence the recent resurgence of autonomist movements in Europe and elsewhere which might be called ethnic renaissances (though they are in fact the transformations into "racial" problems of what were formerly matters of class or political structure) have gone almost unanalyzed for lack of a conceptual framework into which to place them.

Let us now turn to Spanish America to see how the concept of *raza* is used there. It applies to two rather different categories of people who can both be opposed to the culturally Hispanic and supposedly white rulers of those countries: the Negroes who are thought to be different racially on account of their phenotype and, above all, the Indians who are thought to be different in phenotype also but who are opposed to the Hispanics essentially on account of their culture and social status as members of Indian communities. The ways in which Indians are in fact different from Hispanics are by no means constant. The notion of race therefore hinges upon the definition of the Indian and varies accordingly, making it impossible to define Indians by their overt characteristics. This creates a difficulty not only for anthropologists but for the census-takers of those countries where an attempt is made to record the racial composition of the nation. A comprehensive view of race relations depends upon these figures, yet they are scarcely comparable from one country to another. Moreover they are hard to compare from one period to another, since the criteria of the censustakers change in accordance with what each age thinks about race, as Kubler's (1950) study of the census data of nineteenth-century Peru shows. We do not need to go so far back in order to find the problem posed, for example, in Guatemala where the criteria have varied radically within the present century.

Its census of 1940 tried to use a physical concept of race and classified the population as either Indian, Mestizo, Negro, White, or Oriental. The 1950 census-makers recognized the failure of this attempt and reverted to a simple dichotomy of *Indian* or *Ladino* (as those of Hispanic status are called in Guatemala). They placed in the latter category all those who were not Indian, including the Chinese, the Mormon missionaries, etc. The 1960 census rather logically changed the name of this category to *"non-indígena."*

In preparation for the 1950 census, an investigation was carried out with the aim of deciding how an Indian should be defined. It discovered that the overt criteria vary from one community to another. "Thus," says the prologue to the census, "if in one municipality the principal characteristic identifying a person was dress, in another this was secondary. The same might be said of language, style of living, etc. Recognizing the difficulty of formulating a definition, the instructions given to the census-takers required them to base their decisions on the social esteem in which the person was held in the place in which he was counted. In the small communities there is a certain public opinion that qualifies an individual as Indian or Ladino. For this reason the taking of the

census was entrusted, whenever possible, to members of the local community who know quite well how people are classified there."

The census thus assumed that the ethnic distinction is a purely social one, to be isolated from the various cultural phenomena to which it is attached in any particular instance. The differing bases of this social distinction are clearly revealed, since the census also gives a wealth of statistics on the number of *Indians* in each community who speak Spanish in the home (rather than an Indian language), eat wheat bread rather than tortillas, dress as Indians, wear shoes, sandals or go barefoot, go to school till what age, etc. It is possible to see from this that there is no straightforward correlation between culture and "race"—the census-makers are thus justified in their approach—and that the complexity of defining the Indian, especially in Guatemala, is great.

This is due to the nature of the Indians. Those who live in the jungle present no problem of definition, though they may be difficult to count. But the Indians who were baptized under the empire (and those of Guatemala almost all belong to this category) present a different problem, for they possess a recognized status in the national society, participate to some extent in the national economy, yet not in the national community. They are administered within the framework of the national state, yet they are *not part* of it, in the sense of participating fully in the national culture and possessing full citizenship. This difference of status is expressed in the idiom of *race.*

The concept of *raza* is also invoked, however, to mark distinctions of social status within the non-Indian sector of the population. Thus, in Central America, a person may still be said to be Indian despite the fact that he is recognized as a Ladino. Here the distinction is a purely individual qualification which affects his class standing *within* civilized society; it does not exclude him *from* it. In the same way a Ladino may also be said to be a Negro: his color implies that he is of African, i.e., of slave, descent. Thus there is a fundamental distinction to be made between *individual* racial identity within soi-disant civilized society and *collective* ethnic status attaching to a community. Indians are identified by the culture of their community, not their individual phenotype, even though there is a strong statistical correlation between phenotype and ethnic status. Hence a Ladino may be called "Indian" if he looks Indian. He is not thought to be, nor treated as though he were socially an Indian. In fact many Ladinos "look Indian." Conversely, many members of Indian communities look European, but they are no less Indian on that account, either in Hispanic or in Indian eyes. *Raza* can be seen, then, to be employed in two rather different ways: it qualifies

individual standing within Hispanic national life on the basis of phenotype but it is then only one of many indicators of social status: economic, educational, occupational, and so forth. But it also defines people as to their ethnic status without regard to phenotype, but on account of their membership of an Indian community. Hence we reach the paradox: that *raza* only refers to phenotype when it marks a social distinction among persons who are recognized to belong to the same ("civilized") *raza*; phenotype is not the criterion for distinguishing between the Indian and Hispanic *razas*.

Descent is the central notion of the popular concept of race, but in the Hispanic half of society it is *implied* by phenotype, whereas in the case of the Indians, it is asserted by social affiliation and manifest in culture. Consequently, there is only a limited difficulty for Indians, once they have learned Spanish, to change their ethnic identity and become Ladinos. If they happen to belong to a community which dresses in traditional style, they will also have to change their dress. The term *indio revestido* (redressed Indian) applies to those who have decided to change their race, but whose antecedents have not yet been forgotten.

People also change their race in the Andes, but here there is a recognized category for those who do so. They are called *cholos*: they are no longer Indians, but "civilized Indians," Hispanics who are thought to be "really" Indians. They constitute an ethnic status intermediary between the Indians and the Mestizos, for which there is no equivalent outside South America.

People have been changing their race in Spanish America ever since the sixteenth century. They have changed as individuals and also as communities, when a whole generation decides to do so in a given place. They have done so in ever-increasing numbers as the census figures of the last two centuries make clear. The ethnic division can therefore only be understood in *time* and one is tempted to say that the Indian, today, is simply the descendant of those who, for one reason and another, have not decided to change. The presence of the Indian is best explained then by the nature of his relationship to those who are *not*. This explanation concords with the social definition of race suggested above; the Indian is someone who is denied recognition as a full member of the human community, one who is thought to be naturally inferior. His status is a function of the total social structure which uses the cultural differences between Indian and Hispanic to maintain the social distinction. This is not the way anthropologists have usually viewed the matter, so let us glance at the more conventional approaches.

The anthropologists who first went to Middle America were concerned with the most traditional Indians they could find. In many cases their intention was to use the data of their investigations in the present to verify their hypotheses regarding the culture of the *ancient* peoples. They saw in every modern Indian a replica of his forbears and picked through the culture they surveyed in search of "pre-Columbian customs," which they labeled in terms of origins. This viewpoint concorded happily with the ideology of revolutionary Mexico which attached a similar value to the relics of the pre-conquest past. Thus anthropologists became very popular in that country and among those who, in neighboring countries, sympathized with its revolution.

These cultural anthropologists were not in the least preoccupied by the Indian's place in the total society, nor indeed by his social relations at all, but only by his culture. Consequently race relations received scant attention from them and, insofar as the Hispanic half of the population was taken into consideration at all, it was only in that it furnished inducements to the Indians to abandon their cultural heritage.

However, it became apparent that the Indians' culture was not simply Mayan or Aztec, but contained a whole number of aspects which could only be attributed historically to the influence of the Spanish missionaries. Their religion was a case in point, since, wildly unorthodox as it was, it nevertheless centered on the catholic hagiology and, to crown it, the Indians obstinately asserted themselves to be Catholics. Brave attempts were made to save the situation by distinguishing cultural form from the essence of culture. The Spaniards had imposed the superficial form but, underneath, the Indians were still pre-Columbians: the form of the *cofradías* was Spanish but this was only the superficial appearance in which the organization of earlier times lived on. The Catholic saints were *really* the pre-Hispanic deities in disguise. Thus they reversed the formula of those early missionaries who had been struck by the resemblances between Indian beliefs and Christianity and maintained that the Indians were not pagans but abandoned Christians fallen into error, that Quetzalcoatl was *really* St. Thomas the Apostle. For the anthropologists of the twentieth century St. Thomas was *really* Quetzalcoatl.

Nevertheless such considerations forced them to take account of cultural *change* and in accordance with their concept of culture (which covered all aspects of behavior) social change was subsumed by cultural change. External pressures there were, but cultures remained wholes in the sense that, though they lost traits or borrowed them from other cultures, they were endowed with a

dynamic of their own which was expressed in the theory of acculturation (whose founders, be it noted, were all Americanists: Linton, Herskovits, and Redfield).

Acculturation, the process of cultural change when peoples of different culture come into contact, was to be recognized by observing the passage of traits between the initial stereotypes of pre-Columbian or Hispanic culture: this trait was lost, that one acquired, though as Aguirre Beltrán (1957) has pointed out, it was not firmly decided whether loss or acquisition was the referent—whether the word "acculturation" was compounded of *ab* or of *ad.* One finds in the *Heritage of Conquest* (Tax 1952) that it is used about equally in both senses by the different contributors. The outcome of this way of thinking was the measurement of "degrees of acculturation" from the initial contact period to the present. This was accomplished according to a scale chosen by the investigator, which was arbitrary both in the choice of the traits and in the importance it attached to one aspect of culture or another. The preference of the investigator and his suppositions regarding pre-Columbian culture, therefore, determined the measurement of acculturation, so it was hardly surprising that little agreement was reached on the subject. Such arbitrariness would have mattered less if we could be sure that there was a single river of acculturation down which the Indians were travelling from their pre-Hispanic source to their integration into the ocean of the modern nation. This, however, is rather obviously not the case. One village learns Spanish but retains its traditional dress, another fails to learn Spanish but adopts Ladino clothing. A third does neither but is converted to Protestantism.

There is a further objection to the concept of acculturation: the view of history it implies is curiously unhistorical; for the vital problem in the history of culture is how the stereotypes of the cultures themselves change in time, and the stereotypes of Latin America changed very rapidly after the initial turmoil of the conquest period. Thus elements of culture which once identified the *Indians* cease to do so as soon they have been adopted by Spaniards or Ladinos, while, on the other hand, many of the cultural indices of Indian status today are in fact of sixteenth century Spanish origin and designate the Indian only because the Hispanics have dropped them. Therefore, to take ancient Aztec, Mayan, or Inca and ancient Spanish culture as yardsticks for the analysis of change in modern Latin America is like attempting to interpret the problems of modern British politics in the idiom of the Wars of the Roses. It commits the error of anachronism, or perhaps one should say, "reverse anachronism," for, rather than look at the past through twentieth-century eyes, it attempts to view the present through the spectacles of a reconstructed and largely speculative past.

The concept of culture on which "acculturation" is founded, because it fails to distinguish between culture and social relations and therefore attributes ethnic status uniquely to culture, is unable to cope with history. In fact, it suffers the same fate as the nineteenth-century concepts of race that assumed a given number of pure races and attempted to view history in terms of their mixture: it would be alright if only the original definitions remained valid throughout time, but the whole point about history is that they do not.

It is not surprising, then, that the use of the word "acculturation" has declined among anthropologists. But the way of thinking about Indians that was implied by it remained. Thus Whetten (1961), writing about Guatemala, divided the Indians into *traditional* and *transitional,* and Adams (1957), marking a finer distinction, devised three categories: *traditional, modified*, and *"Ladino-ized"*. The criteria are still cultural rather than social. Their classification rests upon the hypothesis that the degrees of cultural resemblance to the Ladinos mark the path of evolution down which the Indians are moving, at greater or lesser speed. These are the stages of "acculturation" which lead to ultimate assimilation into the Hispanic world. The Ladinos view the matter in similar terms, assuming that progress will lead to the "civilization" of the Indians and that to be civilized is to be like themselves, but if all the Indians saw it in that light, it is hard to see why they have not all changed before now.

Adams' scheme does not in fact fit even the whole of Guatemala, for the western plateau produces characteristics which are hardly to be interpreted in this way. Here the great majority of the population is Indian and there are even quite large towns where there are almost no Ladinos. Consequently there are Indians who occupy positions in the division of labor which elsewhere are the preserves of the Ladinos; dealers, shopkeepers, specialists of various sorts. There is an Indian upper-class. This is also an area where land is scarce and from which Indians go down to the coffee plantations of the lowlands to work. The proportion of Indians remained stable throughout the first half of the century until recently, because the only people who chose to become Ladinos were those who settled among the Ladinos of the coast. The Indian upper-class, powerful and respected in their communities, speaking Spanish and knowing enough about Hispanic culture to hold their own against the Ladinos, had no reason to change their status and become the despised members of a Ladino community they did not respect. Hence on the western plateau there is a paradox from the viewpoint of Whetten and Adams in the fact that the more competent in Spanish culture the Indian becomes (the more "Ladino-ized" in Adams' terms),

the less he has to gain by becoming a Ladino. Knowledge of Spanish culture gives prestige in the Indian community. It does not in that part of Guatemala make anyone socially less Indian. Hence we find a large number of ladies who speak Spanish in the home but still wear Indian dress (24 percent of Indian women in the department of Quetzaltenango, 46 in San Marcos, according to the census of 1950). These Indians are not anxious to change their status or they would not assert their Indian identity in this way, when there is no longer any cultural impediment to their changing it.

The acquisition of Ladino culture is a necessary condition for becoming a Ladino, but not a sufficient one and this can be seen most clearly in the example of Quetzaltenango, the largest city in the country after the capital, where an Indian commercial class continues to speak Quiché as well as Spanish. Its women mostly wear Indian dress and the Ladino commercial class complains bitterly that the Indians are running them out of business. Here Adams' explanation of ethnic status in terms of acculturation is as firmly contradicted as if he were to try it among the Basques. His approach is based on the unconscious assumption that Indians all want to become Ladinos. Ladinos think they do or should do, but in fact in a number of places (Zapotecs of the isthmus, Tlascalans, Tarascans, etc.), they have shown that they don't. The evaluation of ethnic status in terms of the moral inferiority of Indians is a Ladino evaluation, not an Indian one, and the anthropologist can see that the difference between the two halves of the society is not a difference of evaluation within a single system which makes the Ladinos superior and the Indians inferior, but the difference between two systems of value. The model of social mobility which inspires Adams and Whetten seems quite inadequate to explain the problems of cultural change and the crossing of the ethnic barrier.

The North American cultural anthropologists are not the only ones to feel the influence of acculturation theory. It has had a profound effect on the thinking of Mexican anthropologists. The National Indian Institute sought to reach a compromise between the conflicting demands of respect for Indian culture and the necessity for national integration and expressed this in a motto which is sometimes written large upon the walls of its premises. "To redeem the Indian is to integrate the fatherland." Like so many political mottoes this is a logical nonsense, for it maintains that Indians can become part of the national community without ceasing to be Indian, but the notion of redemption is open to fine interpretations. "Redeem," in fact, means "civilize" which to Hispanics means Hispanicize. It thus implies the same underlying suppositions as the

theory of Adams. It might seem nonetheless that this is contradictory of the indigenist ideology of the Mexican Revolution which looked to anthropology to discover the hidden treasures of the past and bring them forth to symbolize the new national neo-Aztec image, but as I have explained elsewhere, a national Indian ideology seeking a return to pre-Columbian identity does not require the existence of contemporary Indians (Pitt-Rivers 1965b). They rather prove an embarrassment to the ideologists by their presence in a socially subordinate role. The Indian identity proclaimed by *indigenismo* does not look to the modern Indian for its ideal but to an image from the past that will validate the Indian descent of the modern Mestizo. As Bourricaud (1962: 216) has put it, speaking of Peru: "*Indigenismo* is an ideology for *Mestizos*."

The notion of Indian culture has thus been overexploited by the cultural anthropologists and abused by their cousins, the national indigenists, who saw in it the means of asserting a convenient untruth: i.e., that they themselves were not *really* Hispanic, that they were free at last from the burden of their colonial past. Now that the period of enthusiasm is over, the inadequacy of this theory of culture to explain (or avoid) the realities of social status has become patent. It is therefore understandable that there have been other scholars who decided that culture was not really the crucial factor in the ethnic distinction and that it should be explained rather in social terms. With this conclusion we cannot but agree, yet it remains to be seen how successful they have been.

II

I have suggested that the two uses of the word "race," the physical and the social (assuming that we retain the word at all in scientific discourse), should be treated as quite distinct from the theoretical point of view. In practice there is frequently a close correspondence between phenotype and ethnic status, even in Latin America where the two concepts are most clearly distinguishable. Whites *tend* to look white, Mestizos *tend* to look mixed, and Indians *tend* to look Indian. This helps to maintain the image of what an Indian is and provides the basis within the Hispanic half of society for those social, rather than ethnic, distinctions which are dressed up in the guise of race. Yet the ethnic distinction still needs to be explained, even if it is not simply a matter of physique. Those anthropologists who attempted to explain it by means of the theory of

acculturation were mistaken because they subsumed social relations under the rubric of culture, and this led them into contradictions.

I am not the first to reject the cultural interpretation of the Indians. Already forty years ago Mariátegui proclaimed that the Indian problem was a socio-economic problem, depending above all on the land question, and various authors since him have offered sociological, as opposed to cultural, interpretations—among them anthropologists. There have also been cultural explanations offered by sociologists. So it is not a question of the discipline to which the authors belong, but whether they base their explanation on social or cultural considerations. There has even been a polemic in which an article by Colby and Van den Berghe, a sociologist, was criticized by Goldkind, an anthropologist, for attempting to give a cultural explanation of race relations in Chiapas (Colby and Berghe 1961: 772-92; 1964: 417-8; Borah 1954: no. 4; Goldkind 1963: 394-9): Goldkind maintained that the Indians are simply poor peasants and their values and behavior can be explained without any appeal to their Maya origins, by the fact that they are rustic while the Ladinos are urban—a contention that is very far from the facts, since the majority of the Ladinos of Chiapas are poor peasants also. If the cultural explanation is inadequate, I fear the sociological interpretation all too often falls into the reverse error, of thinking that the Indians' race relations can be accounted for *without* their culture, that the ethnic barrier is *really* a purely social matter to be explained like any other class distinction. In the extreme version of this approach it is suggested that culture is simply a "bourgeois" red herring, aimed to conceal the reality of "capitalist exploitation."

The sociological theses can be grouped roughly into two versions of which a composite account must here suffice. The first equates ethnic status with class: Indians are not a race, but simply a despised rural proletariat, kept in poverty and subjection by the Whites or Ladinos or hacienda-owners, thanks to their inability to handle the language of their rulers and the discrimination to which they are subject. The facts are *commonly* thus, but this does not make the explanation valid. Indians *are* usually poor, their average standard of living is always much lower than the average of the Hispanics on the national scale of any country of Latin America. They *are* usually rural: either peons on a hacienda or providing marginal labor for it from a nearby community or emigrating to work on a seasonal basis to supplement the inadequate resources of their eroded lands. The *majority* of Indians speak no Spanish or speak it poorly. They are commonly discriminated against and the habits of fear and submission predispose them

to avoid conflict with Hispanics and center their hopes and ambitions in their local community rather than in the Hispanic world outside it.

Yet none of these facts is true everywhere. One finds individual Indians who are quite prosperous—the 1950 census of Guatemala shows that five percent of the owners of farms of 111 acres or more are Indians. Moreover one also finds in Guatemala Ladino communities poorer than their Indian neighbors, and like them mainly subsistence farmers.

Indians are not always rural, while Hispanics frequently are. There are a number of cities with a large Indian population. In a number of countries there has been an attempt to escape from the discourtesy which the word "Indian" implies and call the Indians *campesinos* (countrymen). This has been the government policy in Bolivia ever since the Revolution. But we are there faced with the anomaly that miners have to be referred to as "countrymen," *campesinos,* even when they have nothing to do with the land at all, but simply because they speak only Quetchua. The solution to social problems seldom comes from attempts to reform popular vocabulary by law (though such attempts have been made ever since Charles III of Spain sought to solve the gypsy problem by proscribing the word *gitano*). Outlawing the word *indio* or *indito* or *indígena* does not stop the Indian from being an Indian, for euphemisms are soon known for what they are and the final result is only to complicate the lexicon. As an informant in Columbia put it soon after denying that there were any Indians in the neighborhood: "Los Indios, o, mejor dicho, los campesinos…" (The Indians, or rather, I should say, the countrymen…) A diminished discourtesy towards Indians is implied by the use of a euphemism, but that is all.

Indians are commonly the object of the Hispanics' contempt, but it is not by a long way always the case that they are discouraged from changing their status. Governments go to great efforts to "civilize" which means "Hispanicize" their Indians and one may be told proudly by the mayor of some small town: "There are no Indians here anymore. They are all civilized now." Nor does Indian status correspond to any particular role in the division of labor, nor to any specific relation to the modes of production. Most Indians are agricultural laborers. They may be collective subsistence farmers, peons, or independent peasant proprietors and as such sometimes employers. They may be artisans, and, in this capacity rather exceptionally, they can be employers of Hispanics—an Indian of Otavalo has a cloth factory in which he employs ten mestizos. They can be traders and dealers and political leaders, even upon the national scene, though it becomes doubtful in such a case whether they can still be called Indians. Just as

a member of Hispanic society can be said to be "*really* an Indian" (on account of his phenotype or antecedents), so an Indian can be said to be "*really* a mestizo" on account of his social activities. There was an Indian cacique of Chiapas who was said by others to be a Ladino disguised as an Indian and, when it is said that, for example, ex-president Cárdenas is an Indian, it is hard to know quite what is meant. Ideologically perhaps, but not culturally, nor socially, nor still less, physically.

The ethnic frontier wears thin at the fringe, but this does not detract from the significance of the fact that there are numerous examples of Indians, morally and socially integrated into their *Indian* community, participating in its culture and attached to their identity as Indians, who must none the less be defined as middle-class, whatever criterion of class is chosen. Hence those who have attempted to equate the ethnic division with a class division and explain it in economic terms face anomalies of one sort or another, wherever they go. They have committed the time-honored error of mistaking a statistical probability for a cause. Whatever ethnicity is, it is *not just class.*

Ethnic status is a *kind* of social status in the widest sense, but it differs from class status in that it also involves the notion of *race,* and to apply a framework borrowed from a society which has no ethnic status (or has a quite different concept of ethnic status such as the United States) is simply ethnocentrism.

A more perceptive view was taken by writers who admitted that Indians were distinguished by a social division, which was not just class but something of a different nature, and they called this "caste." The credentials of this word must also be examined for, like "race," it too conceals confusions.[3]

In the sixteenth century it meant species of animal or plant and hence race or lineage of men. It expressed the notion of progeny and a classification according to descent.

It is understandable therefore that the Portuguese should have used the word *casta,* given its sense of lineage or breed, to describe the castes they encountered in India. The English and French took the word over from the Portuguese, when they arrived in India, and thereafter gave the Hindus a privileged position in its denotation. However, by dividing the pagan world between the Spanish and the Portuguese, Pope Alexander also divided the destiny of the word *casta:* the Spaniards found nothing in any way resembling Hindu castes in the New World and their own conduct there hardly conduced to implanting the ideal

3. For a more detailed account of the etymology of the word, see Pitt-Rivers (1971).

of purity. They used the word, in the normal way for that period, to designate animal species and, in the human realm, lineages or clans. Indeed it is still used in these senses in Latin America to apply to the patri-lineages of the Andes or the matrilineal clans of the Guajira. The term became elaborated in the Spanish empire, moreover, in a sense yet more antithetical to that of India: it came to mean all those who were neither purely Spanish nor Indian. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it signified above all, not the pure, but the *im*pure, the half-breeds, that is to say, the very people who, in endogamous India, would be regarded as outside the caste system. The *castas* were people of mixed ancestry and a pseudo-biological vocabulary was elaborated from popular zoology and the slang of the day to accord a distinct social identity to each combination of White, Indian, or Negro. Inherited status was what counted, not actual color, so that anyone who could claim one eighth or less of non-white descent was classed as white and the status of white could in any case at one period even be purchased without regard for antecedents.

Once the notion of descent had ceased, after Independence, to have any juridical value, the *castas* were no longer distinguished within the general category of *Mestizos.* Today the word *casta* is used only in its ordinary figurative senses (save in the antique local usages already mentioned). It does not refer to any social status. Yet its demise at the ethnographical level was followed by its resurrection at the hands of the social scientists who found their precedent nowhere in the Hispanic tradition, but rather in that of English sociological literature. But for the preponderance of this, it might have remained simply what it was in the vernacular. Thus it is found now, as in English, indicating a certain type of social distinction and applying, in particular, to that which divides the population of Latin America into Indian and Hispanic. This sense is quite different to that of lineage or clan or the categories of breed which were distinguished in the imperial epoch or the hierarchized endogamous occupational groups of the Hindus. It refers to no collectivity of any sort, but simply to a division of the entire population into two statuses: a superior one which is Hispanic and an inferior one which is Indian.

This usage owed its entry into Latin America to an analogy with the distinction between colored and white people in the United States, which in turn is owed to an analogy with the castes of India. The reappearance of the term *casta* upon the Spanish scene was therefore anything but a simple revival of a usage which had fallen out of fashion there, but rather the invasion of a territory where the term once existed on the ethnographical level by the same word which, thanks to its sojourn on the far side of the world, had "made it" to analytical status.

Richard N. Adams (1957) attempted to distinguish different types of social relations which the different types of Indians had with Ladinos. He suggested rather plausibly that "traditional Indians" had a race relationship with Ladinos, that "modified Indians" had a relationship which could be called "caste-like" and that "Ladino-ized Indians" were simply distinguished by class. Thus he not only destroys the unity of the notion of ethnicity, which becomes equivalent to *either* race *or* caste *or* class, but typically he makes the type of social relations a function of the Indians' culture and dependent upon their place upon the "ladder" of acculturation. In this scheme the same "Ladinocentric" assumptions that I outlined above are visible. It looks forward to the day when the Indians, "Ladino-ized" and assimilated, will vanish into a flexible class system similar to that of the United States, from which it is hoped that "race prejudice" will be eliminated.

The society of the United States resolves the conflict between its egalitarian ideology and the fact of its material and moral inequalities by a doctrine which glorifies social mobility; the self-made man is regarded as the ideal. It was a doctrine which, until fairly recently, was favored by exceptional circumstances. The country was largely populated by immigrants who did not know English and rose in the social scale as they became Americanized and were replaced in the most menial ranks and the least esteem by fresh immigrants who abandoned their homeland penniless in search of a better living in the expanding opportunities of the United States. Thus the system offered the possibility of social mobility for all—on condition that the immigrants continued to arrive, and to arrive penniless. It would hardly have worked had the immigrants been relatively well-to-do. It is not surprising, then, that American thinkers should be particularly attached to the ideal of social mobility, since it is part of their national ethos. It is this attachment which makes the Hindu caste system repugnant to them and gives to the definition of the word "caste," in this sociological sense, its critical term: absence of social mobility or "rigidity." The other features stressed to justify the usage of the word "caste" to describe the color bar in the Deep South are: absence of intermarriage between colored and white (which they assimilate, rather rashly, to the endogamy of the Hindu castes) and the fear of pollution through intimate contact with members of a lower caste.

The ethnic distinction in Latin America (though it is also repugnant to egalitarian sentiment) is not at all the same as in the United States. In Latin America there is a great deal of ethnic mobility. There is no prohibition of intermarriage and no fear of pollution. If its social structure resembles that of India in any way, it is only in the absence of a "color bar" and, in the case of the Andes,

the possession of a hierarchy of as many as four ethnic statuses: *blanco, mestizo, cholo, indio.* These features differentiate it from the United States. It is difficult, then, to avoid the conclusion that, if the word *caste* be extended from India to North America, the same reasoning prohibits its usage in Latin America, and vice versa. The only definition of caste which will apply to India, to the Deep South and to Latin America would be a residual one: any system of social differentiation offensive to the egalitarian ideology of the modern West. It appears that the extensions rest upon no solider basis than this.

It is not always easy to know what is intended when we encounter the word *casta* in academic writings. Is it meant simply in the ethnographic sense, i.e., what the people themselves say, or is it meant to have theoretical implications? The problem is the same in English: is caste meant simply as a transliteration of *casta,* as it is used in Latin America, or does it bear an analytical load? All too often it appears that the word is introduced with no more serious intention than to utilize an analogy that comes to hand.

In view of the facile analogies which have been used in the writings on race relations in the New World, which disregard the distinctions between the cultures of the conquerors (English, Spanish, or Portuguese), between those of the conquered or subordinate (Indians or Negroes), between tribal and sedentary (high-culture) Indians, and between the nature of the colonization *and* the period in which it took place *and* the subsequent changes in social structure due to economic and demographic pressures, it is not surprising that the usage of the word *caste* in the New World should be a source of contradictions as numerous as the word *race.* Indeed the confusions to which the word *caste* lends itself resemble those to which race gives rise in that the popular usage is ever striving to be taken seriously as a scientific term; in fact it appears very often that an author has accepted the word *casta* because it appears in the ethnography and has then gone on to assume that its technical sense was implied, i.e., that there is a rigid, endogamous caste system like the Hindus. In fact, to put the matter succinctly: in identifying the Guatemalan Indians as a caste,[4] the sociologists of the twentieth century repeated the error of Columbus: arriving in Middle America they thought they had reached Asia.

How then shall we define the difference between Indians and Ladinos, if neither biological race, nor culture, nor class, nor caste are appropriate concepts? It

4. The common usage of the term owes much to Melvin Tumin (1952).

is a social distinction, but one which manifests itself in culture. It is a division in the social structure, but social structures repose always on principles embedded in culture which they put to their own ends. Therefore the distinction can be understood neither in purely social nor in purely cultural terms but in the relation between these two aspects.

When the Spaniards first encountered the Indians, the word *race* applied in every sense: population isolates, languages, cultures, and social groupings, but time has transformed its meaning by transforming the objects to which it applied. The criteria have become dispersed.

The physical criterion first multiplied its categories by crossbreeding and then dissolved in the chaotic miscegenation of the *castas*; race became a matter of inherited legal status and, after Independence, of social status. Under the Empire, the *República de Indios* remained outside and subordinate to colonial society within which the *castas* multiplied. After Independence the Indians, no longer a "Republica," were summoned to join the new nation. This meant in fact joining it in the capacity of peon. The lands of the Indians were taken over by Hispanics on a far greater scale than before in order to encourage them to do so, because their labor was needed for the new markets which opened up. (The motive was stated explicitly at times.)

Debt-peonage and the hacienda system underlined the economic aspect of ethnic status, which marked, ever more clearly, the boundaries of citizenship, the new citizenship of the new nation from which the Indians were in fact excluded. From the point of view of Hispanic society the Indians formed a pool of unskilled labor to be drawn into the orbit of civilization, as required, and to the degree necessary to fulfill their economic function.

Throughout these transformations the poles of the system remained in place, ordering the hierarchy: that which derived from Spain was above and that which was indigenous was below. Social status was justified by the attribution of descent from one *raza* or the other. But descent in anthropological terms is no more than a system whereby society accords identity to its new members. It can be physical, cultural, social or even religious in its basis, like the concept of purity of blood in sixteenth century Spain which depended on the religious orthodoxy of grandparents. In Latin America the notion of descent divides the population into those whose essential nature is thought to derive from the conquerors and those who are heirs to the natives in this regard, a connection almost as mystical as the totemic affiliation of Australian tribesmen, but none the less effective for that! The presence within the national frontiers of

people who follow a different tradition in dress and speak a different language (in fact their dress is mainly European in origin and their language is stuffed with Spanish loans) is enough to keep in place the poles between which ethnic identity is divided, even though the criteria by which it is recognized vary from context to context and from place to place. Local social structures interpret the division as they will, but the existence of the two traditions, one attached to the center of society and the function of government and the other vested in a local community opposed to it, is enough to perpetuate, in one transformation or another, the social heritage of the conquest. Hence the ethnic distinction, which appears at first sight so arbitrary, is so only to those who conceive of *races* as concrete entities, cultural or social, that is to say, defined by cultural traits or by social factors, such as economic position or occupation—rather than, as has been suggested, as relationships of a specific type which exist as a function of a total social structure, but are not reducible to either culture or class structure.

If this may be granted, then all the conflicting usages of the word *Indian* can be explained:

1. A *mestizo, ladino, racional, gente decente,* etc., in brief, Hispanic, marks the difference between himself and someone he regards as belonging to another race, i.e., of a different essential nature, by calling him an Indian; whether he dresses like one or not and whether he speaks Spanish or not, he belongs to the opposed tradition.
2. But he can also refer to someone as Indian, even though he recognizes that he belongs to the same Hispanic "race" as himself, that is, to the same tradition, if his object is to increase the social distance between the two of them, to deny their common nature. The one who is socially inferior is then said to be an Indian or "really an Indian" in spite of appearances, or "a redressed Indian." "Cholo" has this sense too and the highly variable usage of the word can equally be explained in this way. There is nothing extraordinary in this. Long before Boulainvilliers propounded it as a doctrine, the aristocracies of Europe had claimed to be different by race to the plebeians: Gothic in Spain, Frankish in France. Upper classes do indeed habitually attempt to invoke race, i.e., nature, to validate their social superiority. The invocation of race has no other sense in Latin America.
3. Finally there is the fighting insult *indio* which is heard whenever a drunken brawl becomes serious. It is aimed at the person whom one wishes to exclude from common humanity, i.e., whom one is prepared to assassinate.

If the denotata differ, the meaning is nonetheless always the same: an Indian is someone excluded from full common humanity by his *raza,* one with whom there is no *community.*

It is only to be expected that Indians do not use the same terms, nor use them in the same way. When speaking Spanish they usually refer to themselves as *naturales* (persons born in the place, natives), in somewhat the same sense as in Spain where the word is used to define a person's nature by his place of birth. When speaking an Indian language, the term they use for themselves is likely to mean something like "a true man," i.e., fully human. This is so in the Tzeltal dialect of Maya which also refers to itself as the "true speech," as opposed to Spanish, the language of the *gente de razón,* the self-styled people of reason. Thus, if the Indian is excluded from common humanity by the Hispanic, at least he returns the judgment.

"Race" can be seen, then, to be a matter of social context, and the analysis of context allows us to explain the apparent contradictions between the different denotations of words such as *indio* or *cholo.* But this is not to deny that the terms used to define ethnic status have certain permanent associations attaching to one or other of the poles.

These, however, are necessarily subject to a certain ambivalence in their evaluation. First of all, Hispanic valued, Indian devalued:

1(a) Hispanic means descended, in the mystical sense, from the conquerors, of Spanish *origin,* hence associated with the Madre Patria, as Spain is still sometimes called, the source of civilization and of Christianity. It implies "clever," "socially superior," related to the national government, politically empowered (Spanish is the language of political power), modern in orientation: oriented to the outside world and towards the future.

1(b) Indian means descended from the conquered, "native" in the sense of savage, uncivilized, pagan in origin, socially inferior, coming from the backwoods, stupid, backward, oriented away from the center, towards tradition and the past.

But without changing the association these terms can be given a contrary evaluation:

2(a) Hispanic implies foreign in origin; usurpers, oppressors, destroyers of autochthonous culture, hence ambitious, calculating, heartless, and since it also implies colonial, it can be made to mean "behind the times."

2(b) Indian, valued now instead of devalued, means native to the land, and hence the rightful owners, *naturales.* Legitimate because vested with the values of antiquity—hence the role of the *quetzal* in the imagery of Guatemalan nationalism (autochthonous bird and symbol of the Quiche kings). Sincere, honest, modest, uncalculating. In the ideology of *indigenismo,* it means politically progressive, since opposed to colonial. The attempt to present measures of land-reform as a return to the *calpul* or the *ayllu* is an obvious example.

Hispanic, whether evaluated positively or negatively, relates to the center of the nation, the capital, urban society, the function of dominance, while the concept of Indian relates to the periphery, the community, the countryside, the function of submission.

The first equation (Hispanic plus, Indian minus) goes with colonial rule, the second (Hispanic minus, Indian plus) goes with modern populism. It was the second equation which inspired the ideology of the Mexican Revolution, but the apotheosis of the Indian met with the difficulty (or perhaps it was the advantage) that there were too few Indians left and those there were, were not much interested in indigenist ideology. None of the revolutionary leaders spoke an Indian tongue and the language of power and administration continued to be Spanish. The tide was still running towards centralization, politically, economically, and culturally, at least at the national level. In fact it was precisely this development of modern popular nationalist sentiment that challenged the dominance of the ideal of things Spanish.

The tide seems to be turning today and we see everywhere a reassertion of regional sentiment, the legitimacy of the pre-eminence of the center put in doubt. Though the movement towards economic centralization continues in a certain sense, by the very nature of such a movement the division of labor between center and periphery is destroyed. Just as the economic expansion of the eighteenth century led to the rebellion of the colonies and the foundation of the modern nations of Latin America, so the economic expansion of the twentieth seems to be leading to conflict between national center and periphery, and where Indians remain, we see the new Indian middle classes emerging and yet retaining their Indian identity. The center loses its power to command emulation and middle class Indians sometimes hang on to their regional ethnic affiliation even after they have moved to the capital—like the Isthmus Zapotecs in Mexico City. Where Indians refuse to change their ethnic status after they

have acquired education in Spanish and acceded to middle class occupations, they create situations where the polarity of the social structure breaks down and a new consciousness emerges uniting Indians no longer on the basis of their community but of their region. The breach between ethnic and social status is thus consecrated. This is what appears to be happening today among the Quiche of western Guatemala, the Zapotecs of the Isthmus, the Tlascalans, the Tarascans, and the lowland Maya of Yucatán. It remains to be seen how these developments will progress and whether they will be followed by a pan-Indian Quetchua movement in the Andes. But, whatever the outcome, we are clearly approaching a point of transition where Indian identity is changing its meaning once again. Ethnicity in Latin America will be transformed.

For, once *Indian* no longer implies the opposite of the ruling class, its opposition to Hispanic can only mean opposition to the center which is everywhere Hispanic. Once Indian consciousness attaches to the region, not to a community, the possibility exists of claiming autonomy for it on the basis of its autochthonous culture and, where Indians are already found in middle class occupations, they are equipped to realize this possibility. So, I fear the maxim of the Mexican National Indian Institute, *Redimir al indio es integrar la patria,* is not only a piece of self-deception in the cause of indigenist ideology as I suggested, it is *wrong:* truly to redeem the Indian, that is, to redeem him *as* an Indian is to *dis*integrate the fatherland.[5]

5. I am grateful to Professor Kenneth Kirkwood for the invitation to lecture upon this topic in St Antony's College, Oxford, May 1969, when some of the ideas presented in this paper were first expressed.

CHAPTER 20

Reflections on fieldwork in Spain*

I

It is now forty years since *The people of the Sierra* was first published, so perhaps a retrospective glance will help the gentle reader, or the not-so-gentle one, to place the book in historical context, both as it relates to Spain and as it fits within the discipline of anthropology. "All ethnography ends by being history" as Evans-Pritchard said. This is true not only because Time perverts all facts, but also because it changes the focus of the eyes that observe them. In reality, all portraits are period pieces.

The people of the Sierra was the first attempt to apply the methods of British social anthropology to European people, for up till then anthropology was considered to be the study of "primitives," who were thought to illuminate the evolutionary path by which humans attained civilization. This was sufficient to justify the existence of the discipline. Yet the post-war generation discarded the

* "Reflections on fieldwork in Spain" is pieced together from material Pitt-Rivers intended as an epilogue to a collection of essays he was working on in 1994. It is a frank account of how and why he did fieldwork in Grazalema, the Andalusian village that was the focus of his classic monograph, *The people of the Sierra* (1954). The rough draft contains a section, very much unfinished, in which Pitt-Rivers responds to recurrent criticisms of the book. The rest, which is closer to the final form Pitt-Rivers would have been prepared to publish, is an engaging account of the conditions under which he did his research in Spain. We include the latter part here, convinced that it will be of greater interest to readers who are curious to know how a master ethnographer practiced his craft.

theories of the evolutionists in favor of a more intimate style of observation, one much closer to the reality they sought to capture—"to see the world through native eyes," in the words of Malinowski, was our aim—and the scientific pretensions of the functionalists offered the seductive illusion of a discipline that dealt in certitudes, a science not an art. It appeared evident to me and my fellow students that anthropology should deal at least as much with "civilized" as with "primitive" societies. Those of us who returned to Oxford or arrived there for the first time after the war and chose to launch ourselves into social anthropology were not looking to justify a belief in the rational superiority of Europe (a doctrine that had taken a hard knock during the past decade in our estimation), but to pursue a Science of Man, the creator of culture, of Man in Society.

That this attitude, so innocuous today, was regarded as heretical as late as 1953, is well illustrated by the history of *The people of the Sierra*. Presented as my doctoral thesis in 1953, it was examined by Evans-Pritchard and, acting as external examiner, Don Alberto Jiménez, an eminent liberal academic, born in Málaga, who had found shelter in Oxford from the turmoil of the Spanish Civil War. I was rather proud of being at that time the only anthropologist I knew of whose external examiner was a "native"—in my case, an Andalusian. When the next day Evans-Pritchard told me to take my thesis round to the director of the Clarendon Press (to which he was an advisor) on the assumption that they would surely want to publish it, I thought I had "made it." A month later a brief note from the director of the Clarendon Press informed me that this eminent institution believed anthropologists should stick to the study of primitive peoples and not trespass on the territory of the historians. This brush-off was later softened by my being accepted by George Weidenfeld, for whom I had contracted to write a travel book and who magnanimously consented to publish this monograph instead, and subsequently by the University of Chicago Press, who put out the second edition in 1971.

In fact, *The people of the Sierra* was not the first anthropological work devoted to a European people. Conrad Arensberg had published his admirable book, *The Irish countryman*, in 1937. My book did not attract much attention in anthropological circles in Britain, outside the anthropology department of Oxford, but it was very well received in the United States, where the precepts of functionalism had never really caught on. Redfield thought highly of it and invited me to come to Chicago as a visiting professor. Moreover, it was much appreciated outside anthropology in England. Gerald Brenan reviewed it very favorably, three times in different journals, and the literary critics, in general,

applauded it. Peter Quennel said that, unlike my sociological colleagues, I had "brought them back alive."

There has been a certain speculation as to why I chose Grazalema as the site for my doctoral thesis. I have not until recent years felt free to tell the whole truth, offering instead rather marginal explanations, such as the warm welcome I received when I turned up there one icy winter's day in February 1949. A more direct explanation for choosing Spain is that, during my two years in Baghdad immediately after the war, I became interested in the influence of Arab culture and of the great Jewish scholars of Omayyid Spain on mediaeval European history. Andalusia was the obvious place to explore such themes, so, knowing very little Spanish, I settled in Seville for three months in order to learn the language and locate a region to study. I had also become fascinated by the Anarchists as a student and by the agrarian anarchists of Andalusia in particular, interests I shared with Radcliffe-Brown. During my stay in Seville, I had the privilege to meet the great economic historian, Ramón Carande, who devoted a whole afternoon to discussing my project with me. He lent me his copy of Diaz del Moral's study of agrarian rebellions in the province of Córdoba, which was a rare book in those days, for, as it is easy to imagine, publications on the Anarchists were unpopular with the authorities. It was Don Ramón who explained to me that, while Andalusian anarchism was centered on the fertile plains of Córdoba and the mountains remained Catholic and traditionalist, the mountains of Cádiz and Ronda were the cradle of the anarchist movement in western Andalusia. Diaz del Moral had promised to do a second study of the province of Cádiz, but then the war came, so he was never able to do it. Would I not go to Grazalema, the site of the famous incident of the Mano Negra, a secret society called "The Black Hand," which was thought to be devoted to murdering landowners, the señoritos? Though several men were condemned for belonging to it, it was never satisfactorily established that "The Black Hand" ever existed. This was in 1884. The first agrarian rebellions had already occurred in the plains, in El Arahal and in Jérez, but thereafter the mountains became the center. To do a study that might discover an explanation for this anomaly, Don Ramón thought, would be a worthwhile project.

When I arrived in Grazalema the following summer—this was long before popular tourism to Spain had started—I was thought to be a spy. For England? For Russia and the Communists? An ingenuous boy, a goatherd by profession, scraped up an acquaintance with me in order to ask for a letter that would get him into the Secret Police. A spy, then, I was, not for the British or Russian

governments, but … for the Spanish? In brief, I was a controversial figure, but this did not prevent me from being received with every courtesy, and it in no way detracted from my lasting gratefulness to that admirable scholar and generous man, Don Ramón Carande. However, it made me doubly concerned to avoid creating difficulties for him, in case my book should give offence when it was finally published. For this reason I avoided making him in any way responsible for it as long as Franco was alive, lest he be charged with aiding an enemy of the regime. I was generally concerned to avoid compromising friends who had helped me either in Grazalema or elsewhere, so while I gave in the book all the information I regarded as relevant to my argument, I avoided passing judgements on the regime, which would have been unacceptable in some quarters. There is no mention of Franco by name, and this political agnosticism was not only a matter of personal proclivity and discretion. As I explained in the introduction to the second edition, it was also a matter of professional ethics: because one is bound to accept sympathetically the point of view of every member of the community in order to understand the whole as a cultural and social system, it is wiser to have no political commitments oneself. I think my critics (who clearly do not share this opinion) have amply validated the principle by the nature of their complaints.

I would not deny, however, that I had an interest in avoiding difficulties for my own sake. To begin with, my aim was to discover the inherent features of Andalusian culture and political behavior: the values of Andalusian society. I would expect these to be present whatever the political situation at any given moment, so Franco, while he illustrated them, was hardly their cause. Above all, I intended to continue to work on my materials from Grazalema and to expand them into a second volume devoted to the religious life of the Andalusians. Inevitably, this would involve a detailed study of the history, not only of the Church, but of Andalusian anarchism (the rebellion against the Church), with which I was acquainted from my field notes, above all from long conversations on winter's evenings in the Ribera with old men who remembered the risings in the early years of the century. To do this work seriously, it would be necessary to get accounts not only from these "informants" and from anarchist newspapers, which I knew were available in the Nettlau collection of the Institute of Social History in Amsterdam (which I visited even before I completed my thesis), but I would also have to obtain the reports of the local commander of the Civil Guard who suppressed the rebellion. These, I discovered, had all been centralized in the Ministry of the Interior in Madrid.

I did not expect Franco's rule to last more than a few years, and I thought I could afford to wait while completing my anthropological education in Chicago. I happened to be on friendly terms with a very prestigious General (who was also a literary figure, historian, and tutor to the future king), and one day in the late 1960s—the period of the "dicta-blanda" (the soft dictatorship) in opposition to the earlier period of the "dicta-dura" (the hard dictatorship)—I made so bold as to approach him and explain my problem. "Anarchists?" said the General, "What anarchists? There were no anarchists in Andalusia! You must mean the bandits!"[1] He then undertook to get me the permissions I needed to consult the archives. I have never been called an idiot in such charmingly polite terms. He came back with the news that all the archives of the Civil Guard had been burned in Madrid during the war. The Anarchists loved to burn archives, so there was nothing surprising in this; for them, archival documents were the dead hand of the past. They would be destroyed, along with all records of such unsavory institutions as the Civil Guard, when the Day of Liberty arrived.

When I arrived in Grazalema for the first time, the Civil War had ended only nine years earlier and the scars were not entirely healed. The remains of the Republican Army (the Column of Pedro López) had taken to the hills in the Sierra de Ronda, where they persisted till 1950, and those in the Alpujarras disappeared only a few years later. They survived by sequestrating wealthy men who could afford to pay a good ransom, thereby conforming to an Andalusian custom that goes back to Roman times, by getting supplies and information from country-dwellers who were sympathizers, and by procuring arms smuggled in from across the Straits of Gibraltar. There were members of the community who had lost near and dear ones on both sides, either fighting or being executed, and there were persons who refused to recognize each other because, for reasons of private vengeance or to obtain an inheritance, they had denounced a relative to the side in power.

The rising started when General Millán Astray arrived with his legionaries in a motor-boat from Morocco and took Seville almost without firing a shot. The Anarchists then took over in the pueblos of the Sierra de Ronda. A column of Anarchists came out from Ronda to Grazalema and inaugurated a new regime of collectivization according to their principles. They rationed everything and abolished money. Another column arrived from Ronda to organize the defense of Grazalema, and a man named Argolla organized the execution

1. He meant of course "for God sake don't mention the Anarchists."

of some eighteen persons: señoritos, professionals, a sacristan, and so on. At the same time, a man called "*el Cateto*" (the Hayseed) organized a column of señoritos, their womenfolk, and anyone else who was in danger of being shot, including the priest, and led them through the mountains to Jérez, which was in the hands of the Franquists. Argolla was later captured and taken back to Grazalema, where he was tried publicly, condemned for multiple murders, and garroted in keeping with Spanish law. He would make no answer to the charges except to say that it was not he, but "el Pueblo," who had condemned the people he executed. Mario Sánchez, later mayor of Grazalema in the Franquist period, wrote a paper, "How I lost my fear," in which he recounts how, as a teenager, he was taken by the executioners to the cemetery to dig graves and to witness the killing of his uncle.

When Franco's troops arrived, there was no lack of summary executions of "Reds" who were thought to have taken a part in the previous executions, or who were denounced as having done so, and who had failed to flee in time. In Grazalema two men who feared they were going to be denounced as "Reds" promptly joined the Falange, which had never existed there until Franco's troops entered the place. (Shortly before the war, José-Antonio Primo de Rivera tried to hold a meeting in Benaocaz, but the people of the pueblo ran him out of town and thereafter the Falange made no further attempt to establish itself in that stronghold of Anarchism that was the Sierra de Cádiz.) As a result, the two new converts to Falange-ism were nominated as chiefs of the new Franquist trade unions and became rather affluent. On the other hand, the only man I knew in Grazalema who had actually volunteered to fight for Franco remained poor and very disillusioned with the new regime.

II

The question of how I collected my data and what they consisted of is all the more intriguing because I was obliged to exercise a good deal of discretion, both to protect my friends and to protect my future relations with the Spanish state, whatever those were liable to be. Many of my readers refuse to recognize these necessities and have reproached me for hiding the identity of Grazalema. Now, it is obvious that if you speak of the chemist or the doctor or the town-clerk of Grazalema, since there is only one, you cannot hide the identity of the individual while revealing the identity of the town. I feel that my circumspection was

justified. In fact, as I learned only twenty years later, my friend Diego Barea, the town-clerk, was threatened with sanctions for maintaining such close relations with me—he was suspected, quite correctly, of giving me all the information and documents I asked for—but he refused to take any notice of such threats.

The way I worked was as follows: I kept first of all two notebooks. One contained my notes on general reading and on Andalusia, its history and geography, from official sources, newspapers, and all the documents, statistics, and other data I could find on the region, as well as any general information that came my way. The other notebook was my field journal, which was annotated with an indication of what was on each page. A third loose-leaf notebook was started somewhat later, when I came to realize the necessity for it. It was organized by household. In it I put down what land each owned or exploited as lessee or as share-cropper, what occupational activity each member of the household had, and all I could discover about their relationships to each other, and to other members of the pueblo, of kinship, or *compadrazgo*. This notebook also contained, in order to save repetition, cross-references to passages in the journal. Conversations were recorded in the vernacular, except when I regarded them as politically compromising, in which case I wrote them in English. I always kept this last notebook under lock and key, so that when the lieutenant of the Civil Guard came and searched my house in my absence, he never discovered it, not that it would have held much interest for him, save when I recorded (in English) opinions about the Anarchists or the Chief of State.

When I returned to Oxford after my first nine months in the field, I showed my notebooks to my supervisor, Professor Fortes, explaining why I had found it necessary to keep this third notebook. As I remember it, the conversation went like this:

Fortes: "As far as I'm concerned, you can throw the others away. This is the one that counts."

Myself: "Why didn't you tell me before I went into the field that I should keep such a notebook?"

Fortes: "Because if you couldn't work that out for yourself, you obviously weren't going to make an anthropologist."

Subsequently, I have come to feel that this line, though justifiable, was not the most economic method of training students. During the five years in which I gave the course on the epistemology of "fieldwork" at the University of Chicago,

I endeavored, at the risk of confusing the sheep and the goats, to explain the theoretical reasons why a community study should be organized more or less in the way I did it. I also discussed the question of personal relations with members of the community being studied and the difficulties likely to be encountered: how to estimate rapidly (if only approximately) the size of a field or the number of persons in a crowd or in a building; the importance of making yourself agreeable to your hosts—the scientifically-minded tend not to realize this—and how to choose your informants. The best informants are not those with the most traditional background, but people who were integrated into the community at adolescence or soon after, when they were able to grasp things consciously and to see what was different from the customs of their birth-place.

When I arrived in Grazalema, I settled into the "*fonda*," the inn where I lived all summer. The young men of señorito families were delighted to help me improve my Spanish by increasing my vocabulary to include all the really filthy slang expressions referring to sex that they could think of, and they insisted with touching attachment on my writing them all down in my notebook. Meanwhile, their elders were concerned that I should be told all about what was "*típico*" in Spain and, of course, superior to other countries in this respect; all that was típico in Andalusia and superior to other parts of Spain, and so on. Since the señorito class were few in number and mostly born elsewhere because they were civil servants or professional men or summer visitors, it was left to the pueblo (that is, the plebs) to point to the shortcomings of the inhabitants of all neighboring pueblos, a duty that was undertaken with enthusiasm by all save those few who happened to have been born elsewhere.

I was already rather tired of being told about all that was "typical" when, for the tenth time, someone launched into an explanation of the origin of the name "Grazalema": it was because the favorite wife of the Caliph of Córdoba, called "la Gran Zulema," used to come to spend the hot months in this highland retreat, just like the "veraneantes" of Jérez or Seville today. In honor of this eminent lady the name of Grazalema had been retained by popular consent. "But surely," I complained, summoning the remains of my knowledge of Arabic, if she were the favorite of the Caliph, she spoke Arabic, not Spanish, and therefore she would have been called, not la "Gran Zulema," but "Zulema la kebira." My informant was quite upset that I was not prepared to accept his etymology, and he gave me no further information. (In fact, the name given to the place derives from the name of a Berber tribe who settled thereabouts in the tenth century: "Zagrazalema".) The lesson for my students in Chicago was: "Never correct an

informant, whether his information is an obvious lie, an idiocy, or a deliberate attempt to mislead you, but check the information from a more reliable source. It is their right to tell you whatever they like. And in any case false information is just as valuable as the truth, as long as you discover it to be false and can figure out why you have been told it."

Information does not flow in only one direction. I was called upon to provide it in certain circumstances. The very pretty daughter of a señorito family from Jérez who owned a house in the pueblo was engaged to be married after the summer and there was a problem that preyed upon her mind. So she enlisted the help of an unmarried friend who was staying in the fonda, as I was. The two girls took me for a walk one evening to the outskirts of the town to pose their problem, having sworn me to secrecy: what must a girl do to ensure the fidelity of her husband? The fiancée from Jérez could not ask a married man, even if he were her uncle, for he would think she was shameless. She could not ask an unmarried young man; he would be sure to try to take advantage of the situation. She would be ashamed to ask the priest. It was not even sure that a priest would know the answer. Marital fidelity was not the forte of the señoritos of Jérez, as everybody knew. And within two years of the wedding there was sure to be a toddler round the corner whom her husband was reported to be visiting regularly, particularly if she had so far failed to produce one at home. Should she deny her favors and keep him hungry? Or make sure that his appetite was more than satisfied at home? I was known to be married, though my wife was not with me. Though English, I was perhaps not too prudish to tell the truth. Were there not things a clever girl could do that would make him so satisfied that he would not want anyone else, they wondered?

"Like what?" I asked.

"If we knew the answer, we wouldn't be asking you," they said, and giggled uproariously.

I was cornered, in a trap. It was certain that, whatever I answered, by the end of the week there would not be girl in Grazalema who would not have been told, and probably a heavily embroidered version of what I said, and the news would reach the priest before the end of the month. I would keep my promise not to tell, but I doubted that they would do so even if I'd had the sense to make them promise. So I thought about all the risks I was running in one direction or the other, and I resolved to calculate what I guessed the priest might have answered, had they had the nerve to put him, not me, on the spot. I gave them a

sermon on the power of love and the importance of purity as an essential ingredient of true love of which even today I am only slightly ashamed.

One day, when I was returning from the campo de Gibraltar, I stopped for the night in Gaucin, which was not at all as it is today: the center of a colony of ex-urbanites of various nationalities who find their proximity to Gibraltar convenient for communications with the outside world. It was winter, and since it got dark early and it was uncertain whether the road marked on the map really existed, I thought it would be excessively intrepid to attempt to reach Ronda that night. I stopped at the inn, where I was rewarded after dining by a fascinating conversation between the lady who ran the establishment and one of her clients, who appeared to have been something more than a client to her in the past, if one can judge by the tone of intimacy between them. He was a sergeant in the Civil Guard, and the subject of their debate was whether he should marry a certain girl well known to the lady of the house. I sat without moving and they forgot about me or assumed that I could not follow their conversation. After two hours of fascinated eavesdropping, the sergeant left and I retired to bed, but not to sleep, for awaiting me was a battalion of bedbugs as savage and hungry as any I had ever encountered. I fought them off for more than half an hour, but once my supply of matches had run out (and I had no torch) I declared myself licked and just lay back and offered them their fill, like the servants who were put into the guests' beds while the guests were at dinner so that the guests would not be bitten, according to Tolstoy.

In the morning I continued up the hill towards Ronda through a beautiful chestnut woods until, suddenly, a road sign announced that it was forbidden to go any further. I had done something like twenty-five miles over very rough going since leaving Gaucin. I thought they might have declared the road closed a bit earlier. Wondering why this was, I espied the cabin of a "*peón caminero.*" Evidently, it was essential to keep the road open so this servant of the state could remain in communication with the outside world. He was called "Curro," and a very charming fellow he was. After he had done his official duty in declaring the road to be closed, he was quite prepared to discuss whether it was possible to get to Ronda by continuing. He admitted that the road went on to Ronda and that it was no worse than it had been for the past twenty miles. We retired to his cabin, where he showed me his entire establishment: his fowls, his pigs, his pony, and his wife. He entertained me with a glass of wine. After that, he asked me whether I really wanted to continue on the direct route to Ronda, which was closed, and I said "yes." So he decided it would be better if he accompanied me,

not only because the road was officially closed and therefore he had no right to let me go through, but because there were one or two places where it was difficult and I would need his guidance.

"But how will you get back?" I asked.

"That's no problem," was all he would answer.

He seemed delighted by the idea of going to Ronda with me, but I noticed that, as he clambered into the car, his wife gave him a very dirty look. While we drove, the nature of our conversation gave me a clue as to his reasons for wanting to go to Ronda and also for his wife's scowl. It was all about the girls of Ronda. How wonderful they were! What grace! (which means not just physical grace but "how amusing!") What "salt!" (that is, what wit!). He reeled off a series of girls' names, but there was one called "Lola" who was the epitome of grace and salt. After a few "*copitas*" and some "*tapas*" on arrival to recover from the journey, Curro said: "Now we shall go to see Doña Eufemia."

I remember it was a wonderfully clear moonlit night. When Curro identified the house and banged the clapper on the door, it opened and out came a rather pretty, dark-haired girl who threw her arms passionately round Curro's neck. After a long embrace she turned to me and said:

"He was the father of my first child and perhaps of my second child also."

"How many children have you got?" I enquired of Lola.

"Three," she said proudly.

"And who was the father of your third child?" I asked.

And why not, since we were into the demography? Curro came forward with the answer. He raised an imaginary "*montera*" (a bullfighter's cap), pivoting on his heels in the pose of a matador dedicating his bull to the public.

"Ronda!" he said.

The house of Doña Eufemia was an "institution" in every sense of the word. The grand old whitewashed building on the outskirts of town was separated from the road by some bushes. The ground floor was a barn, where coaches were housed in the days when it had been an inn. Its social center was on the first floor, where Doña Eufemia herself held court, receiving her guests in floor-length satin. They were all male, but of different ages, and the girls mingled with the guests, who were in no way obliged to enter into greater intimacy with them than offering a glass of wine and perhaps some salacious repartee. Some of the guests were students, who wanted to be able to boast in the morning of where they had been the night before, but who had not enough money to take full advantage of all that the house had to offer. Others were elderly gentlemen,

who certainly had the means (but no longer the necessary enthusiasm) to do so. Instead, they came for the "*tertulia*," that great Spanish institution (the conversation group) that flourishes wherever two or more Spaniards get together. They sat round a table with a blanket spread over the top (and a brazier underneath in winter) discussing everything from national politics to local people, from Greta Garbo to God-knows-what. Gerald Brenan has left us an entertaining description of such a place in the Alpujarras, which seems to have been somewhat more modest. Doña Eufemia's was more grandiose, more sophisticated, and more culturally ambitious. Doña Eufemia herself was a picture of gracious hospitality, calling to mind a London hostess of the Edwardian epoch: she was a tall, handsome woman, and her long satin dress contrasted with the cotton frocks of her girls, which barely reached to their knees. On the walls of the passages one encountered, if one were to go upstairs, engravings (or were they photographs?—I can't remember) of classical ladies in dresses as long as Doña Eufemia's, leaning against an urn on the top of a broken column, gazing romantically into the air, as voluptuous as La Belle Otero herself.

That evening, after Curro, the father of Lola's first child (and perhaps also her second), had somehow disappeared along with Lola—no doubt to renew the flame of such a productive passion—I found myself deeply engaged in conversation with a gentleman of Ronda, who was determined to convince me that the bullfighting tradition of Ronda was far superior to that of either Seville or Córdoba, the two other "schools" of *toreo*. One of the girls, whose pregnancy was so far advanced that it looked as though she might give birth at any moment, plonked herself down in my lap. I was terrified: she might slide between my knees and become a mother on the spot. What would happen then? Apart from the risk that she might do herself damage or that the newborn might find this tough delivery on the tiled floor of Doña Eufemia's salon too much, I could not help worrying about the social implications of such a situation. The philoprogeniture of the Andalusians is well-documented, and was perhaps not unrelated to the situation in which I found myself that night. Not only do such girls want to have a child, preferably a daughter, for economic reasons (and because childless women receive no respect in Andalusia), but also because their charms are by no means diminished while awaiting the birth. One of my Spanish academic colleagues told me of the owner of an olive press in Córdoba who had four illegitimate families and was considered a very good man because he had given a "career" to every one of them. Would I be held responsible in some way, I wondered? Had she chosen my lap

in preference to that of the card players for some sinister, but anthropologically comprehensible motive? Would I have to be the baby's godfather? Would "Ronda" stand in for me as it had for Curro in a somewhat dissimilar role? I felt the need of a counselor, but Curro was nowhere to be seen. Indeed, I never saw him again, much to my regret.

This was not the last time I saw Doña Eufemia, however. Some six months later an English friend, Johnny, came to visit me and confessed after a bit that he had heard so much about Spanish girls that he was curious to know whether all he had heard was true. Lola would be just the job, I thought. So off we went to Doña Eufemia's. All was well. Lola was there, and Doña Eufemia introduced me to a charming young thing called "Paquita," but this is where the trouble started. By then I was very much in love and could not envisage the idea of infidelity. I excused myself to Paquita by telling the truth.

"But what's that got to do with it? Your sweetheart is in England isn't she?" Paquita said, rather crossly.

"No, she's in Spain."

"Well, anyway, she's not in Ronda."

Paquita shrugged her shoulders and appealed to Doña Eufemia.

"*Que delicado* (How delicate) he is!" she said.

I suggested that I would give her the same payment as my friend was giving Lola, without expecting the same services. But this made things much worse.

"So I'm not good enough? I'm not as ugly as all that."

I conceded that very willingly. She was one of those well-rounded Andalusian blonds with dark skin.

"Then are you a *maricón* (a "queer"), or what?"

I was trying to explain to her that she was very pretty, and that I was not a *maricón,* simply a man unprepared to violate his wedding vows. Doña Eufemia was furious with the girl for insulting one of her guests. Lola was laughing herself silly. Just then, in walked the municipal policeman, Agustín. He was accustomed, as part of his rounds, to look in around that hour for a game of cards. And this was how peace was made. I was to play with Doña Eufemia and Paquita with Agustín. Lola led her client upstairs.

The normal card game, which I had learned to play in Grazalema, was a variety of whist, with the exceptional rule that one is allowed to make facial expressions that will signal to your partner what you have in your hand. The signs can be winks or sniffs or pulling your nose or coughing or putting your tongue out, and it is up to your opponents to interpret these expressions if they can. A very

Andalusian game! But the trouble was that Agustín had a tic that resembled a wink. I had never met him before, so there was no means for me to know when he was signaling to Paquita and when it was just his tic. The reader can already foresee the disastrous ending: Doña Eufemia and I were mightily defeated, and she was anything but a good loser. We paid our losses and, drawing herself up to her full height, she addressed me portentously.

"Don Julián, you would have done better to go upstairs with Paquita, rather than stay down here *pa' joderme a mí*" (My pocket dictionary says "Joder: to copulate, to destroy, to defeat, to annoy").

I had already noticed in my readings on ethnography how easily ethnographers manage to extort from their "informants" the information they wish to receive, but so much of my experience in the field resembled the awkward situations I have just described. It is for this reason that I have always shied away from the term "informant," which seems to formalize a relationship that should above all remain informal, a matter of mutual good will. The idea of a questionnaire was anathema to me, despite the pretense of objectivity. The same questionnaire formula for every "informant" does not suffice to make all other things equal. The questions are composed by the investigator, not by his victim, whose interpretation of their relationship, the essential datum for understanding the answers, does not figure on the sheet.

After three months living in the fonda of Francisco Vásquez, I decided to move out of Grazalema. Winter was approaching, the summer visitors were packing their bags, and my fieldwork was hampered by the fact that wherever I went in the town a rabble of children followed me to observe and comment on my every move. I was hampered also by being associated inevitably with the señorito side of society, and I sensed that it was time to join the very different social setting in the country below the town, where my neighbors, about five hundred strong, were mainly the farmers of the *huertos* and the grain millers. Their mills were all officially closed, but they operated on the sly. The Corporal of the Civil Guard tipped them all off and made sure they put the seals back properly whenever the inspector visited. He wanted no trouble! As part of the arrangement, the Corporal never ran short of flour. There were also two olive mills in the valley.

So I left Grazalema to install myself in the valley called "La Ribera de Gaidoyar," about three kilometers outside town in El Huerto de San Fermín, an irrigated small-holding that I shared with a family of farmers. I lived in the

owner's apartment. The farmers were Maria "La Parrala," a nickname meaning "the flirt," a widow of powerful personality and some seventy years, her three sons, one daughter in-law, her baby, and Vicenta de la Rosa, my servant, a widow of the Civil War. These are the people to whom I am most deeply indebted for helping me understand Grazalema.

Inspired by the example of the psychoanalysts, who lay their clients down on a couch in the dark and just listen to what they have to say, I decided early on to elaborate what I then dubbed "the psycho-analytical technique," which would evade the danger of imposing my own ethnocentric suppositions onto the conversation: the victim, not the investigator, would call the tune. I would do nothing but let him talk.

Once I had decided upon the "psycho-analytic technique," there was no reason why I should not launch it as soon as possible. There was an old goatherd I knew called "Tío Bigote" (Uncle Whiskers). He had a moustache, which was not common among the pueblo plebs, and he often pastured his goats on the hillside above San Fermín. As soon as I saw him there, on a very chilly morning in January, I went out to join him, to see how he would start the conversation. I transcribe the passage from my notebook:

> 26th Jan. 10.35 Mutual greetings
> Tío Bigote: "*Vaya*! A filthy bleeding cold, a cold which skins you" (in Spanish in the original)
> 10.45 "A cold to make your balls crinkle" I wait for further comment
> 10.58 Repetition. "Even the billy goat (*el cabrito*) has them all seized up with cold.[2] He can't do a thing."
> 11.25 "The billy goat does nothing, you see. He has them all seized up with cold."
> 11.45 Tío Bigote, without further comment, takes his herd home. It is true that he has the reputation of being unsociable and a bit odd.
> 27th Jan. The psycho-analytical technique is abandoned.

2. Literally, the billy goat is "*cabrón,*" but due to the unsavory sense of "cuckold," the word is never used by shepherds. They use the word *cabrito* (kid) instead. If the word *cabrón* is pronounced in their presence, they say "*Lagarto*! *Lagarto*!" and make the conventional sign for chasing away witchcraft: fist extended with index and little finger rigid, making a pair of horns.

I realized that the psychological technique would work only with a professional chatterbox and that one has to ask questions as well as listen. But a certain wisdom remains. The best information is given to a third party when the anthropologist's presence has been forgotten. When he hears laughter, or tears, or voices raised in anger, he grabs his notebook and runs, for he knows that now he's "on to the real thing."

AFTERWORD

Grace and insight
The legacy of Julian Pitt-Rivers

Michael Herzfeld

In an aggressively anachronistic age, social and cultural anthropologists owe editors Giovanni Da Col and Andrew Shryock a debt of gratitude—indeed, of grace—for daring to resuscitate in comprehensive format and for a wider anthropological audience the work of Julian Pitt-Rivers. Pitt-Rivers' dated and sometimes obdurately moralistic style has faded from the citation charts he himself would have treated as an auditing device antithetical to the grace that was central both to his personality and to his conception of the social world. The act of recuperation is not simply that of dragging the defeated, slain, but heroic bull back for a round or two of applause in the bullring. It is a gift to the discipline, an opportunity that should also serve as a reminder of why an increasingly short bibliographical memory among anthropologists today, the tendency to seek solely outside the discipline for the roots of our thinking, should be countered with a demand for a reconsideration of trenchantly anthropological authors widely but wrongly deemed to have passed the point of utility—and, as in Pitt-Rivers' case, never to have mattered much in the global history of the field in the first place.

Pitt-Rivers himself believed that anthropology could not flourish without engagement with the wider intellectual world. While this is a salutary observation, its particular value, paradoxically (and Pitt-Rivers was an unabashed connoisseur of paradox!), lies in the realization—amply available in these pages—that someone so steeped in one of the discipline's venerable traditions, so much part of that tradition, also still has much to teach us. Pitt-Rivers was both loyal to his discipline and, to some extent, eccentric in his modes of practice. This is reflected in his language, which displays both the austere precision of his mentor E. E. Evans-Pritchard's prose and yet also the slightly flippant flavor of colloquial usage and undisguised delight in revelatory word-play.

It is also reflected in his attitude to fieldwork. His field research was unconventional in his insistence on transporting Evans-Pritchard's basic approach into a European arena, that of southern Spain. He also once told me that returning to the field after an initially brief visit was better than doing it all in one piece as a conventional year-long exercise, because the hiatus meant that on the second and subsequent visits one was now returning as a known friend rather than as that peculiarly dangerous figure so well described in his work, the stranger. Even so, in ruefully recalling his numerous early embarrassments in fieldwork, he articulates the extraordinary dependence of every fieldworker on being able to survive and learn from the missteps that are a core component of ethnographic research, the surest route to cross-cultural understanding. His pursuit of method was enmeshed in its own object of study and exploited the awareness of that entailment. This, in short, was reflexivity *avant la lettre*.

Ah yes, French.... To readers who do not share the circumstance of growing up in a world where compulsory French classes at school reflected a widely upheld European hierarchy of value, or who have not been privileged to share his lifelong access to French society, Pitt-Rivers' habit of frequently employing Gallicisms may seem merely irritating. Unreflexive cosmopolitanism of a certain class and age it may be; pretentious, however, it was not. Rather, it reflected an awareness that a bilingual perspective on the European world that Pitt-Rivers had deliberately chosen to study would enrich understanding of the current usages at the core of his research, especially as Spanish and French belonged to the same language family and could often be traced to common roots in Latin.

Etymological agility was thus a somewhat taken-for-granted skill in Pitt-Rivers' background and approach, one that actually served him remarkably well (especially in his exploration of the vagaries of "caste" and "race") and allowed him to illustrate the rather inchoate but nevertheless powerful historical pull of

concepts that were already part and parcel of the anthropologist's own cultural background. He was also appropriately severe in his insistence on the relevance of linguistic mastery to the intellectually responsible conduct of fieldwork. For him, that was a technical requirement and one on which he stood firm. He was a stickler for careful and consistent scholarship in other respects as well. He poured scorn on scholars like Edmund Leach, who in his view read biblical texts selectively and with a perspective that would have made no sense to religious practitioners. In his frequent appeals to Romance etymology, on the other hand, he himself sometimes skated on more speculative ice; for a readership that he could assume would largely share his classical erudition, these moments were intended to illustrate specific meanings or suggest possible connections rather than to offer decisive proofs of common historical origins.

Pitt-Rivers carried forward many of the features of antecedent thinkers even in respect of positions that he explicitly rejected. Thus, while he would contemptuously dismiss some claims as "functionalist" (clearly a negative term in his vocabulary), there is more than a hint of teleology in his frequent use of the word "function." Often, however, this word served simply as a description of a relationship acknowledged in the tradition under discussion, as when he treats the Jewish rite of male circumcision as an affirmation of the Covenant. If there is teleology here, it is, so to speak, an "emic" teleology, one grounded in a respect for local theological concepts he felt was lacking in other prominent scholars. His sense of "function" most commonly appears to mean "use to which the members of society put the given institution," as in the telling phrase that ritual kinship "is able to perform its function because it derives from premises other than those of the social structure, going beyond them to the dualistic nature of man and invoking the sacred, which is always exonerated from the logic of everyday life" ("Ritual kinship in the Mediterranean," Chapter 6, page 161). That phrase inverts the utilitarian teleology of the true functionalist, refusing to reduce the sacred to a "scientific" explanation—a style of argument to which Pitt-Rivers expressed unequivocal aversion.

Pitt-Rivers displayed a lurking fascination with the eclecticism—notably in respect of biblical and exotic parallels—of such survivalist writers as J. G. Frazer, whose name nonetheless appears in his writings as the symbol and essence of the unacceptable ethnocentrism of the Victorian era. But Pitt-Rivers' interest in such matters was methodologically more rigorous than that of such predecessors. In a spirit reminiscent of Giambattista Vico (an apparent influence on Evans-Pritchard via the work of philosopher of history

R. G. Collingwood), he wanted to show how the names of social institutions carried the history of their development in their etymological traces—in what, in another connection, J. L. Austin (1971 [1956–57]: 99–100) called "trailing clouds of etymology." There is some irony in this echo of Austin in Pitt-Rivers, who dismissed Austin's understanding of context as confined to the social life of Oxford academics. Pitt-Rivers himself frequently deployed such etymological traces against what he called the "Empiricist Fallacy," using it to show that other scholars had ignored potentially significant historical linkages. He thereby drew a clear demarcation between empirical research, which he endorsed and performed, and empiricist claims to factuality that failed to account for the role of interpretation in the generation of new knowledge. Austin, with his surprisingly anthropological sensibility and especially his capacity to acknowledge the social nature of claims about emotional inner states and personal motives (an awareness comparable to Pitt-Rivers' own), would surely have agreed with this outlook.

Pitt-Rivers did not single-handedly create the Mediterraneanist canon in British social anthropology, but, because he was less averse to theoretical jousting than his contemporary J. K. Campbell, he emerged early on as its dominant architect. Campbell, a man of equal grace but almost painful shyness and modesty, preferred to allow the theoretical subtlety of his own thinking to emerge for his readers in his rich historical and ethnographic analyses (see Herzfeld 2008). Pitt-Rivers was a more social animal and was more willing to generalize, and even to apply his insights to understanding and contextualizing such events as the student uprisings of 1968. The essay on friendship, while couched in terms of voluntary generosity and the grace it confers, concludes with a rare instance of his refusal to generalize a concept to the level of theory; but, even here, he manages to extract significant theoretical interest from the grace that both enables and springs from the voluntary generosity that true friends show each other. Overall, he aimed for a more ambitiously comparative and theoretical role than did Campbell, as is evident from the title of *Mediterranean countrymen: Essays in the social anthropology of the Mediterranean* (Pitt-Rivers 1963). That he was not disinclined to displaying a broader-based theoretical virtuosity, moreover, is evident in *The fate of Shechem and the politics of sex* (Pitt-Rivers 1977)—a title that showcases a Pitt-Rivers willing to engage in a little public bravura. Campbell's influence, by contrast, rests almost entirely on his brilliant ethnography, *Honour, family, and patronage* (Campbell 1964), a work written, like *The people of the Sierra* (Pitt-Rivers 1954), in the Evans-Pritchardian idiom, and,

although published ten years later than Pitt-Rivers' ethnography, arguably more faithful to the structure and argument of *The Nuer* (Evans-Pritchard 1940).

As a single work, Campbell's may thus have been a stronger model, and his remarkable array of doctoral students (of whom this writer is one) in two disciplines assured its author's ideas a substantial and lasting impact. Pitt-Rivers cast his authorial net more widely, but perhaps with less consistent depth. This is not to accuse him of superficiality; few ethnographers could maintain for long the standard of insight displayed in, for example, his analysis of the Andalusian bullfight and its dramatization of gender and power. The essays in this volume illustrate both the occasional limitations and yet also the astonishingly broad relevance and frequent shocks of unexpected revelation that his approach still produces.

We are now at a moment when, especially with the rise of Europeanist anthropology in North America and the growing strength of local anthropologies in the circum-Mediterranean lands, the recovery of this body of work will make us more fully understand why, the obvious weaknesses of "Mediterraneanism" notwithstanding, the tradition of anthropological research in the Mediterranean brings an important corrective to the persistent exoticism of the discipline (see Ben-Yehoyada 2014; Herzfeld 2014). Sometimes, to be sure, Pitt-Rivers' characterizations of the area seemed facile and old-fashioned, the voice of a residually evolutionist scholar attempting to explain the historical emergence of what he was culturally and socially disposed to view as true civilization: "By making men's honor vulnerable through the sexual behavior of their women Mediterranean culture gives to sex a kind of political significance it lacks in primitive societies" ("The fate of Shechem," Chapter 16, page 362). In "Women and sanctuary," he remarks, with what looks like unapologetic exceptionalism (and with all the gender bias of the orthodox structuralist), that "there is ... one area of the world which, though it is noted for being traditionally organized in corporate and even in kin groups, refuses to exchange women: the Mediterranean." Elsewhere, however, a broader vision seems to take over. In "The malady of honor," for example, he explicitly recognized in the gender relations of Shakespeare's London a sexual logic similar to what he had described for the Mediterranean. His thoughts on fieldwork in Central America and his reflections on the France he knew so well as a resident similarly show him carrying his Spanish-based insights into other, albeit cognate, territories.

He was in that regard a comparativist in the best Evans-Pritchardian tradition, beating the master at his own game by demonstrating, as did Campbell,

that the Africanist model, appropriately modified, could work wonders both conceptually and stylistically in Europe. He was convinced, as he tells us, that every ethnographic description was of necessity always also an act of comparison; and he clearly found revelation in bringing already implicit comparisons into sharp focus. Moreover, as we see in his exploration of east African notions of honor and the uses of pain, he was willing to venture into unfamiliar territory for comparative purposes. In that spirit, he might today have offered, for example, a compelling account of current politics in Thailand, where legal institutions are partially derived from European models, through his insight that *lèse-majesté* represents an affront to an honor that cannot afford to accept any slight.

Pitt-Rivers was also a great deal subtler in his management of concepts like "honor" than some of the Mediterraneanist enthusiasts who came after him. He saw that this concept could not be read through the definitional framework of state or canon law; an adulterer might be guilty in both of those courts, but not in the court of agonistic male sociality. Despite this common grounding in social rather than legal institutions, Pitt-Rivers clearly acknowledged that honor, like the *mana* and *hau* that so captivated earlier comparativists such as Marcel Mauss, did not have a consistent meaning in all situations and all places. In his essay on caste, he made it very clear that the careless interchange of vocabulary—"caste" being the case in point—had already significantly weakened anthropology's analytical capacity by investing local terms from around the world with generalized meanings that were then further undermined by their absorption into everyday English usage. He excoriated others who, like F. G. Bailey, were in his view guilty of universalizing such concepts as well as the political motives that were claimed to animate their relevance to particular situations.

His distaste for universalism was matched by his enthusiasm for regional specificity. The terrain between the two is treacherous, and sometimes his attempts to navigate between them seem to rely on special pleading. A tendency to reify and overgeneralize the concept of honor is nevertheless alleviated in his writings by his close attention to the social contexts of its use. In particular, he focused on the effects of the refraction of honor through class differences, especially in respect of its impact on the conduct of gender relations; and, notably in his path-breaking treatment of hospitality, he was adept at showing how religious doctrine was both defied and incorporated by social rules and values, an approach that highlighted what he saw as the distinctive features of Mediterranean society. That indeed meant rejecting universalism in favor, as in his discussion of Inuit hospitality, of more limited but intellectually more defensible

and nuanced comparisons with other region-specific phenomena in sometimes far-flung parts of the world.

Nonetheless, his insistent search for evidence of a shared Mediterranean culture may have somewhat obscured these important modulations, making it difficult to perceive in his work the implicit critique of reductive arguments about the Mediterranean that at times it appears to contain—although, to be sure, at other moments he seems to conflate local cultural specificities in a reified view of Mediterranean culture. He was, in any event, fully aware of the difficulty that the temptation to generalize posed to analysis; it was a difficulty that exemplified what he saw (notably in the closing words of his essay on "Contextual analysis and the locus of the model," Chapter 17) as an unavoidable tension between microlevel ethnography and macrosociology.

Despite his passion for promoting the anthropological study of the Mediterranean, his stage was not the narrow one of "area studies" alone; he had much broader goals. The *Zeitgeist* of his era did not make it easy for a Europeanist to break into the Africanist-dominated world of British anthropological theory making, even if that was the tradition in which he had been trained. But no man of honor (for it is clear that in much of his analysis he is musing on his own values and predilections) would have refused the challenge. Pitt-Rivers must have been aware that he was playing in a privileged space in which such unconventional challenges to the existing disciplinary power structure would not be lightly received. But he was also unusually well equipped to mount them, endowed as he was with recognizable advantages of social background and intellectual pedigree.

He certainly knew how to give as good as he got. Some of his superficially trivial digs at the British establishment were laden with theoretical implications that he would have found it distasteful to spell out but that he was willing to convey through the well-styled, wry wit that was so much a part of his social environment—the kind of irony that Rosaldo (1986) so deprecated in Evans-Pritchard, but that Pitt-Rivers turned on his own society to devastating effect:

> I am told that the Kennel Club used to refuse to register litters of a pure-bred bitch subsequent to a mongrel litter. A more mystical idea could scarcely enter the heads of persons concerned practically with breeding. Is it exaggerated to suggest that they have projected on to those animals which they so eagerly assimilate to the human kind the basic premise of all kinship systems? ("The kith and the kin," Chapter 5)

Aficionados of debates about nature and nurture will surely appreciate that telling quip for a long time to come.

Thanks to the editors of this volume, moreover, Pitt-Rivers' richly endowed ripostes to the doubters and critics—his own supervisor among them—can now be enjoyed to the full. Far from being an antiquarian curiosity, as its period-specific style might initially suggest, his work is resonant with implications for the anthropology we practice today and for the "very silly world we live in," as Pitt-Rivers caustically called it ("Lending a hand," Chapter 10, page 225). "Solidarity," he remarked (ibid.), "is ever menaced by the spirit of accountancy; it dreams of a society where no one keeps score, but this is not a practical ideal these days." While Pitt-Rivers was thinking specifically of taxation, his remarks speak eloquently to what Marilyn Strathern (2000) and others have identified as the "audit culture" that threatens, along with neoliberal managerialism, to dismember what is left of true sociality today. He would also presumably have been delighted to note how solidarity, as movements in Greece in particular attest, has begun to fight back (Rakopoulos 2016).

This collection is indeed an act of grace. The *gracias* we consequently owe the editors must be a renewed engagement with the splendidly challenging insights that Julian Pitt-Rivers brought to our wayward but resilient discipline. A world that seems even sillier than when he left it most assuredly needs the eccentric sanity and clarity of perception he bequeathed to us in these writings.

References

Abou-Seid, Ahmed. 1965. "Honour and shame among the Bedouins of Egypt." In *Honour and shame: The values of Mediterranean society*, edited by J.G. Peristiany, 245–259. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Abubakar, Sa'ad. 1970. "The Emirate of Fombina, 1809-1903: The attempts of a politically segmented people to establish and maintain centralized forum of Government." PhD diss., Ph. D, Thesis, Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University.

Adams, Richard N. 1957. *Cultural surveys of Panama, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador*. Washington: Pan American Sanitary Bureau.

Aguirre Beltran, Gonzalo. 1963. *Medcina y Magia*. Mexico: I.N.I.

———. 1967. *Regiones de Refugio*, Mexico: I.N.I.

Albahari, Maurizio. 2015. *Crimes of Peace: Mediterranean Migrations at the World's Deadliest Border*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Alvarez de Miranda, Angel. 1962. *Ritos y juegos del toro*, Madrid: Taurus.

Anderson, Gallatin. 1957. "Il Comparragio: the Italian Godparenthood Complex," in *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 13, 1.

Anouilh, Jean. 1949. *Ardèle ou la Marguerite*. Paris: La Table Ronde.

Ardener, Edwin. 1989. "Remote Areas," in *The Voice of Prophecy and Other Essays*, ed. Malcolm Chapman. New York: Basil Blackwell.

Arensberg, Conrad. 1934. "A study of rural life in Ireland as determined by the functions and morphology of the family." PhD thesis, Harvard University.

———. 1968 [1937]. *The Irish Countryman*. New York: American Museum Science Books/Natural History Press.

Arensberg, Conrad and Solon Kimball. 1949. *Family and community in western Ireland*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Argenti, Philip P. and H. J. Rose. 1949. *The Folklore of Chios*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Aristotle. 2009. *The Nicomachean ethics*. Oxford's World Classics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Asad, Talal. 1986. *The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam*. Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies.

Austin, J.L. 1961. *Philosophical papers*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

———. 1971 [1956–57]. "A plea for excuses." In *Philosophy and linguistics*, edited by Colin Lyas, 79–101. London: Macmillan.

Bailey, F. G. 1969. *Stratagems and spoils: A social anthropology of politics*. New York: Schocken Books.

Balandier, Georges. 1967. *Anthropologie politique*. Paris: Presses Universitaires De France.

———. 1974. *Anthropo-logiques*, Paris: P.U.F.

Banton, Michael. 1967. *Race Relations*. London: Tavistock Publications.

Baroja, Caro J. 1964. "The Country and the City: an examination of some ancient commonplaces" in J. Pitt-Rivers (ed.), *Mediterranean Countrymen*. The Hague: Mouton & Co.

———. 1992. "Religion, world views, social classes, and honor during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Spain" In *Honor and Grace in Anthropology,* Peristiany, John George, and Julian Pitt-Rivers eds. Vol. 76. Cambridge University Press.

Barth, Fredrik. 1960. "The System of Social Stratification in Swat, North Pakistan." In Leach, E. R. (ed.) *Aspects of Caste in South India, Ceylon and Northwest Pakistan*. Cambridge Papers in Social Anthropology No. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bartlett, Frederic. 1932. *Remembering, a study in experimental and social psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barton, Roy Franklin. 1949. *The Kalingas*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bateson, Gregory. 1972. "Style, Grace and Information in Primitive Art." In *Steps to an ecology of mind; Collected essays in anthropology, psychiatry, evolution, and epistemology*. New York: Ballantine Books.

Beattie, John M. 1960. "On the Nyoro concept of mahano." *African Studies*. 19 (3): 145–50.

———. 1964. *Other Cultures*. London: Free Press.

Beidelman, Thomas O. 1963. "The blood covenant and the concept of blood in ukaguru." *Africa* 33: 321-342.

Beltrán, Gonzalo Aguirre. 1957. *El proceso de aculturación*. México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Dirección General de Publicaciones.

Belmonte, Juan and Manuel Chaves Nogales. 1937. *Juan Belmonte, killer of bulls. The autobiography of a matador*. New York: The Book League of America.

Ben-Yehoyada, Naor. 2014. "Transnational political cosmology: A central Mediterranean example." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56: 870–901.

———. 2017. *The Mediterranean Incarnate: Region Formation between Sicily and Tunisia since World War II*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Benedict, Ruth. 1952. *Patterns of culture*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Benveniste, Émile. 1969. *Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes*. Paris: Éditions de Minuit.

Berger, Peter. 1970. "On the obsolescence of the concept of honor." *European Journal of Sociology* 11 (2): 339–47.

Berreman, G. D. 1960. "Caste in India and the U.S." *American Journal of Sociology* 66: 120.

———. 1967. Stratification, Pluralism and Interaction, A Comparative Analysis of Caste. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bettelheim, Bruno. 1975. *Les blessures symboliques: essai d'interpretation des rites d'initiation. Trad. de l'anglais par Claude Monod. Suivi d'une discussion par Andre Green et Jean Pouillon*. Paris: Gallimard.

Birket-Smith, Kaj. 1959. *The Eskimos*. London: Methuen.

Bloch, Maurice. 1973. "The long term and the short term: the economic and political significance of the morality of kinship." In *The character of kinship*, edited by L. Goody, 75–87. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Boas, Franz. 1887. *The central eskimo*. Washington: Government Printing Office.

Bohannan, Paul. 1958. "Extra-processual events in Tiv political institutions." *American Anthropologist* 60: 1–12.

Borah, Woodrow. 1954. "Race and class in Mexico." *Pacific Historical Review* 23 (4): 331-342.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1965. "The Sentiment of Honour in Kabyle Society" in J. G. Peristiany (ed.) *Honour and Shame*.

———. 1968. "La maison kabyle ou le monde renversé," J. Pouillon and P. Maranda (eds.) *Echanges et Communications: Mélanges offerts à Claude Lévi-Strauss à l'occasion de son 60ème anniversaire*, 2 vols. Paris.

———. 1972. *Esquisse d'une théorie de la Pratique*. Geneva: Droz.

———. 1987. *Choses dites*. Paris: Éditions de Minuit.

———. 1992. "Rites as acts of institution" In *Honor and Grace in Anthropology,* Peristiany, John George, and Julian Pitt-Rivers eds. Vol. 76. Cambridge University Press.

Bourricaud, François. 1962. *Changements à Puno.* Paris: Institut des Hautes Etudes de l'Amerique Latine.

Brenan, Gerald. 1957. *South from Granada*. London: Penguin.

Bryson, F. R. 1935. *The point of honour in sixteenth century Italy: an aspect of the life of a gentleman*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bunzel, Ruth. 1952. *Chichicastenango, a Guatemalan Village.* Locust Valley: J.J. Augstin.

Burridge, Kenelm. 1969. *New heaven, new earth*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Buytendijk, Frederik Jacobus Johannes. 1956. *Allgemeine Theorie der menschlichen Haltung und Bewegung*. Springer.

———. 1958a. *Das Menschliche: Weg zu seinem Verständnis*. Stuttgart: Koehler.

———. 1958b. *Mensch und Tier: Ein Beitrag zur vergleichenden Psychologie*. Hamburg: Rowohlt.

———. 1966. *Psychologie des Romans*. Salzburg: Otto Müller.

Buytendijk, Frederik Jacobus Johannes, and Helmuth Plassner. 1935. *Die physiologische Erklärung des Verhaltens. Eine Kritik an der Theorie Pawlows*. Leiden: Brill.

Cabot, Heath. 2014. *On the Doorstep of Europe: Asylum and Citizenship in Greece*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Campbell, J. K. 1964. *Honour, family, and patronage: A study of institutions and moral values in a Greek mountain community*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Candea, Matei and Giovanni da Col. 2012. "The Return to Hospitality." *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S)*, S1-S-19.

Cartry, Michel. 1976. "Le statut de l'animal dans le système sacrificiel des Gourmantché (Haute-Volta)," pt 1, in Systèmes de pensée en Afrique noire, cahier 2, Le sacrifice I, CNRS, Paris, 141-175.

———. 1978. "Le statut de l'animal dans le système sacrificiel des Gourmantché," pt 2, in Systèmes de pensée en Afrique noire, cahier 3, Le sacrifice II, CNRS, Paris, 17-58.

Castro, Americo. 1937. *Cinco ensayos sobre Don Juan*, Santiago de Chile: Cultura.

Catedra, Maria. 1981. *Death as a cultural process*. Ph.D. Thesis, Penn University.

———. 1988. *La Muerte y otros mundos*. Madrid: Jucar Universidad.

Codrington, R.H., 1891. *The Melanesians: studies in their anthropology and folklore.* Vol. 9, No. 1. Clarendon Press.

Cohen, Abner. 1965. *Arab border villages in Israel*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Cohen, Morris and Nagel, Ernest. 1964 (reprinted). *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method*. London: Simon Publications.

Cohen, Percy Saul. 1969. "Theories of myth." *Man* 4: 337–54.

Cohn, Norman. 1957. *The pursuit of the millennium*. London: Secker and Warburg.

Colby, Benjamin N. and Pierre Van den Berghe. 1961. "Ethnic relations in southeastern Mexico." *American Anthropologist* 63 (4): 772-792.

———. 1964. "Reply to Goldkind's Critique of 'Ethnic Relations in Southeastern Mexico.'" *American Anthropologist* 66 (2): 417-418.

Cole, Donald. 1982. "Tribal and non-tribal structures among the Bedouin of Saudi Arabia." *Al-Abhath* 30: 77–94.

Corominas, John. 1961. *Breve diccionario etimológico de la lengua castelana*. Madrid: Gredos.

Correa, Gustavo. 1960. "El Espírita del mal en Guatemala." In *Nativism and Syncretism*, edited by Donald E. Thompson, New Orleans: Middle American Research Institute.

Covarrubias Horozco, Sebastian de. 1611. *Tesoro de la lengua castelana o española*. Madrid.

Cuisenier, Jean. 1975. *Économie et parenté: leurs affinités de structure dans le domaine turc et dans le domaine arabe*. Paris: Mouton.

———. 1976. "Family units and kinship ties in the structure of Maghreb societies." In *Kinship and modernization in Mediterranean society*, edited by J.G. Peristiany. Rome: American Universities Field Staff.

d'Anglure, Bernard Saladin. 1967. *L'organisation sociale traditionnelle des Esquimaux de Kangirsujuaaq (Nouveau-Québec)*. Vol. 17. Université Laval.

Daremberg, Charles and Edm Saglio. 1900. *Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines*. Paris: Hachette.

De Coulanges, Fustel. 1895. *La cité antique*. Paris: Hachette et cie.

de Heusch, Luc. 1962. "Pour une dialectique de la Sacralité du pouvoir" in Heusch (ed.) *Le Pouvoir et le Sacré.* Brussels.

de Heusch, Luc. (ed.). 1962. *Le pouvoir et le sacré*. Brussels: Free University of Brussels.

———. 1965. *A la découverte des Tsiganes. Une expédition de reconnaissance. 1961.* Bruxelles: Éditions de l'Institut de sociologie.

———. 1972. *Le roi ivre ou l'origine de l'état*. Paris: Gallimard.

de las Navas, Conde. 1899. *El Espectaculo mas nacional*, Madrid.

de León, Andrés Pérez. 1912. *La Pícara Justina.* Madrid: Editorial Castalia, S.A.

de Molina, Tirso. 1630. *El Burlador de Sevilla y Convidado de Piedra*. Jornada Tercera, lines 641-5.

———. 1952. "La Villana de Vallecas" *Obras Dramaticas* Vol. 2. Madrid.

De Vaux, Roland. 1971. *Histoire ancienne d'Israel*. Paris: Lecoffre.

Derrida, Jacques. 2000. *Of Hospitality*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Detienne, Marcel. 1979. *La Cuisine du Sacrifice en Pays Grec*. Paris, Editions Gallimard.

Devore, Paul. 1968. *Conceptions of Sorcery and witchcraft in the region of Lake Atitlán, department of Sololá, Guatemala*. M.A. thesis, Chicago: University of Chicago.

Di Bella, Maria Pia. 1992. "Name, Blood, and Miracles: the claims to renown in traditional Sicily Name, blood, and miracles: the claims to renown in traditional Sicily" In *Honor and Grace in Anthropology,* Peristiany, John George, and Julian Pitt-Rivers eds. Vol. 76. Cambridge University Press.

Dictionnarie de la Philosophie. 1964. Paris: Larousse.

Diccionario de la Lengua Española de la Real Academia, 18th ed. 1956. Madrid.

Dollard, John. 1949. *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*. New York: Harper. 3rd ed, New York: Doubleday (Anchor), 1957.

Douglas, Mary. 2004. "Remembering Julian Pitt-Rivers. A Personal Note," in *La antropología como pasión y como práctica: ensayos in honorem Julian Pitt-Rivers*, eds. Honorio M. Velasco, Dominique Fournier, and Luis Diaz G. Viana, pgs. 43-48. Madrid: CSIC.

Du Bois, Cora. 1974."The gratuitous act: An introduction to the comparative study of friendship patterns." In *The compact: Selected dimensions of friendship*, edited by Elliott Leyton, 15–32. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Dumont, Louis. 1951. *La Tarasque,* Paris: Gallimard.

———. 1967. *Homo Hierarchicus; essai sur le système des castes*. Paris: Gallimard.

Durkheim, Emile. 1915. *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* trs. J. W. Swain. London: Free Press.

Eisenstadt, Shmuel. N. 1956. *From generation to generation.* Glecoe: Routledge.

———. 1968. Preface to Weber's *On Charisma and Institution Building.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Eliade, Mircea. 1959. *The sacred and the profane*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.

———. 1964. *Myth and reality*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Ellis, Havelock. 1908. *The soul of Spain*. London: Archibald Constable.

Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 1933. "Zande Blood-brotherhood," *Africa* VI, no. 4.

———. 1937. *Witchcraft, oracles and magic among the Azande*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 1940. *The Nuer: A description of the mode of livelihood and political institutions of a Nilotic people*. Vol. 940. Oxford: Claredon Press.

———. 1954. "The meaning of sacrifice among the Nuer," the Henry Myer lecture, JRAI vol. 84, Part I.

———. 1956. *Nuer religion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 1965. *Theories of Primitive Religion*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

———. 1973. "Some Reminiscences and Reflections on Fieldwork." *Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford* 4/2: 1-12.

Faguet, Emile. 1902. *La Politique comparée de Montesquieu, Rousseau et Voltaire*. Paris: Ulan Press.

Farès, Bichr. 1932. *L'honneur chez les Arabes avant l'Islam*. Paris: Libraire d'Ammérique et d'Orient adrien-maisonneuve.

Faulkner, William. 1932. *Light in August.* New York: Smith & Haas.

Fernandes, Florestan. 1967. The Weight of the Past. *Daedalus* (Spring).

Ferro, Marc. 1987. *Pétain*. Paris: Fayard.

Finley, M. I. 1967. *The World of Odysseus*. London.

Firth, Raymond. 1940. The analysis of mana: an empirical approach. *The Journal of the Polynesian Society*, 49.4 (196), pp. 483-510.

———. [1936] 1957. *We, the Tikopia*. London: Allen and Unwin.

———. 1960a."A Polynesian aristocrat." In *In the Company of Man*, edited by Joseph Bartholomew Casagrande, 1–40. New York: Harper.

———. 1960b. "Succession to Chieftainship in Tikopia." *Oceania* 30 (3): 161–80.

———. 1967a. *Tikopia ritual and belief.* London: George Allen & Unwin.

———. 1967b. *The work of the gods in Tikopia*. London: Athlone Press.

———. 1970. *Rank and religion in Tikopia: A study in Polynesian paganism and conversion to Christianity*. London: George Allen & Unwin.

———. 1973a. "Bond-friendship in Tikopia." In *Custom is king: Essays in honour of R. R. Marett*, edited by Dudley Buxton, 229–327. London: Aldine.

———. 1973b. “Bodily symbols of greeting and parting.” In *R. Firth, Symbols Public and Private*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Fortes, Meyer. 1959. *Oedipus and Job in west African religion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1969. *Kinship and the social order: The legacy of Lewis Henry Morgan*. London: Routledge.

———. 1975. “Strangers.” In *Studies in African social anthropology*, edited by Meyer Fortes and Sheila Patterson . London: Academic Press.

Foster, George M. 1944. “Nagualism in Mexico and Guartemala.” *Acta Americana* 2 (1,2): 85–103.

———. 1960. *Culture and conquest: America’s Spanish heritage*. New York: Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research.

———. 1972. “The analysis of envy.” *Current Anthropology* 13 (2): 165–86.

Freeman, Susan Tax. 1980. “The ‘Municipios’ of Northern Spain: A View from the Fountain,” *Currents in Anthropology: Essays in Honor of Sol Tax* 3: 161.

Freund, Julien. 1965. *Qu’est-ce que la politique*. Paris: Seuil.

Friedl, Ernestine. 1962. *Vastlika: a village in modern Greece.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Friedrich, Paul. 1968. “The legitimacy of a cacique.” In *Local level politics: Social and cultural perspectives,* edited by Marc J. Swartz. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company.

Fuentes y Guzman, F.A. 1882. *Historia de Guatemala o recordiación Florida*. Madrid: L. Navarro.

Garcia-Baquero Gonzalez, Antonio, Pedro Romero de Solis, and Ignacio Vazquez Parladé. 1980. *Sevilla y la Fiesta de Toros*, Séville: Biblioteca de Ternas Sevillanos.

Gellner, Ernest. 1973. “Concepts and society.” In *Cause and meaning in the social sciences*, London: Routledge>

Gillin, John. 1945. *Moche, a Peruvian Coastal Community*. Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press.

Gilsenan, Michael. 1973. *Saint and Sufi in modern Egypt: An essay in the sociology of religion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gluckman, Max. 1952. *Rituals of rebellion in south-east Africa*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Goffman, Erving. 1956a. “Deference and demeanour,” *American Anthropologist.*

———. 1956b. *The presentation of self in everyday life* (Edinburgh). (1956).

———. 1963. *Behavior in Public Places: notes on the social organization of gatherings*. New York: The Free Press.

Goldkind, Victor. 1963. "Ethnic relations in Southeastern Mexico: A methodological note." *American Anthropologist* 65 (2): 394-399.

Goody, Jack. 1972. *Myth of the bagre*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

———. (ed). 1973. *The character of kinship*. London: Cambridge University Press.

Gorer, Geoffrey. 1965. *Death, grief and mourning in contemporary Britain*, London: Cresset Press.

———. 1971. *Sex and marriage in England today: a study of the views and experiences of the under 45's*. Nashville: Nelson Publishing.

Grimaud, Maurice. 1977. *En mai, fais ce qu'il te plait*, Paris: Stock.

Guiteras-Holmes, Calixta. 1961. *The perils of the soul*. New York: Free Press.

Gusdorf, Georges. 1948. *L'Expérience humaine du sacrifice*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Hamayon, Roberte. 1987. *La chasse à l'âme, le chamanisme sibérien à partir de l'exemple bouriate*. Doctoral thesis: Université de Paris.

Hammel, E. A. 1968. *Alternative Social Structures and Ritual Relations*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Haro, Joseph. 1729. *El Chichisveo impugnado por el R.P.* Fr. Seville.

Harris, Marvin. 1964. *Patterns of Race in the Americas*. New York: Walker.

Hart, Bradley. 2015. *George Pitt-Rivers and the Nazis.* London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Heath, D. B. & R. N. Adams (eds.) 1965. *Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America: a Reader in the Social Anthropology of Middle and South America and the Caribbean*. New York: Random House.

Herbert, Arthur. 1962. *Abraham and his heirs*. London: SCM Press.

Hermitte, M. Esther. 1964. *Supernatural power and social control in a modern Mayan village*. Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago.

Hertz, Robert. 1909. "La prééminence de la main droite: étude sur la polarité religieuse." *Revue Philosophique* 68: 553–80.

———. 1928. *Mélanges de sociologie religieuse et de folklore*. Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France.

———. 1960 [1909]. *The Preeminence of the Right Hand in Death and the Right Hand*. London: Routledge.

Herzfeld, Michael. 2008. "The ethnographer as theorist: John Campbell and the power of detail." In *Networks of power in modern Greece: Essays in honour of John Campbell*, edited by Mark Mazower, 147–68. London: Hurst.

———. 2014. "Po-mo Med." In *A companion to Mediterranean History*, edited by Peregrine Horden and Sharon Kinoshita, 122–36. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell.

Higgins, Patrick. 1996. *Heterosexual Dictatorship: Male Homosexuality in Post-War Britain.* London: Fourth Estate.

Hobbes, Thomas. 1651. *Leviathan.*

Hocart, A.M. 1935. *The life-giving myth.* London: Routledge.

Holland, William. 1963. *Medicina maya en los altos de Chiapas*. Mexico: Instituto Nacional Indigenista.

Hooker, T. 1741. *An essay on honour.* London.

Hubert, Henri and Marcel Mauss. 1902–3. *Théorie générale de la magie*. Paris: Annés Sociologique.

Hugh-Jones, Stephen. 1979. *The palm and the Pleiades: initiation and cosmology in Northwest Amazonia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hume, David. 1893. *A treaty of morals*. Boston: Ginn.

Jamous, Raymond. 1981. *Honneur et baraka: les structures traditionnelles dans le Rif.* Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme.

———. 1992. "From the death of men to the peace of God: violence and peace-making in the Rif" In *Honor and Grace in Anthropology,* Peristiany, John George, and Julian Pitt-Rivers eds. Vol. 76. Cambridge University Press.

Kenny, Michael. 1962. *A Spanish Tapestry.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Kroeber, A. L. 1948. *Anthropology*, 2nd ed. New York: Harcourt Brace.

———. 1937. Caste. *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. New York: Macmillan.

Kubler, George. 1950. *The Indian caste of Peru, 1795-1940: A population study based upon tax records and census reports.* Washington: United States Government Printing Office.

Kuper, Jessica. 1977. *The Anthropologist's cookbook*, London: Routledge.

Lacey, W. K. 1968. *The Family in Classical Greece*. London: Thames and Hudson.

La Fontaine, Jean. 1985. *Initiation*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Ladurie, Emmanuel Leroy. 1992. "The court surrounds the King: Louis XIV, the Palatine Princess, and Saint-Simon" In *Honor and Grace in Anthropology,* Peristiany, John George, and Julian Pitt-Rivers eds. Vol. 76. Cambridge University Press.

Lafages, Catherine. 1992. "Royalty and Ritual in the Middle Ages: Coronation and Funerary Rites in France" In *Honor and Grace in Anthropology,* Peristiany, John George, and Julian Pitt-Rivers eds. Vol. 76, Cambridge University Press.

Laoust, E. 1935. *L'Habitation chez les transhumants de Maroc Central.* Paris: Librarie Larose.

Leach, Edmund. 1958. "Magical hair." *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* 88.2: 147-164.

———. 1960. Introduction: What Should We Mean by Caste? In Leach, E. R. (ed.) *Aspects of Caste in South India, Ceylon, and Northwest Pakistan.* Cambridge Papers in Social Anthropology. No. 2. Cambridge.

———. 1961a. "Division of anthropology: Lévi-Strauss in the garden of eden: An examination of some recent developments in the analysis of myth." *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences* 23 (4): 386–96.

———. 1961b. *Rethinking anthropology*. London: Athlone Press.

——— (ed.). 1967. *The structural study of myth and totemism*. London: Tavistock Publications.

———. 1969. *Genesis as myth and other essays*. London: Cape.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1955. *Tristes tropiques*. Paris: Plon.

———. 1959. "Systèmes de parenté" in *Entretiens interdisciplinaires sur les sociétés musulmanes*. Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes. Paris.

———. 1962. *La pensée sauvage* (translated as The Savage Mind). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———. 1963a. *Structural anthropology*. London: Basic Books.

———. 1963b. "Responses a quelques questions." *Esprit* (November 1963): 628–35.

———. 1964. *Le cru et le cuit*. Paris: Plon.

———. 1966a. *The Savage Mind*. London: Weildenfeld and Nicholson, Ltd.

———. 1966b. *Du miel aux cendres*. Paris: Plon.

———. 1971. "Comment meurent les mythes." In *Science et conscience de la société (mélanges en l'honneur de Raymon Aron)*, edited by Jean-Claude Casanova. Paris: Calmann-Lévy.

Levy, Harry L. 1963 "The Odyssean suitors and the host-guest relationship." In *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, vol. 94, pp. 145-153. Johns Hopkins University Press, American Philological Association.

Lewis, Bernard. 1975. *History remembered, recovered, invented*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lewis, Ioan M. 1961. *A pastoral democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 1971. *Ecstatic religion: An anthropological study of spirit possession and shamanism*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Lewis, Oscar. 1961. *The Children of Sanchez: autobiography of a Mexican family*. New York: Vintage Books.

Leyton, Elliott, [ed.] 1974. *The compact: Selected dimensions of friendship*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Lounsbury, Floyd. 1964. "A Formal Account of the Crow, and Omaha-Type Kinship Terminologies" in W. H. Goodenough (ed.), *Explorations in Cultural Anthropology.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

———. 1965. "Another View of the Trobriand Kinship Categories" in E. A. Hammel (ed.), *Formal Semantic Analysis*. American Anthropologist Special Publication. col. LXVII, no 5.

Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1922. *Argonauts of the western pacific*. London: Routledge.

———. 1954. *Magic, science and religion and other essays*. New York: Doubleday.

Malamat, Abraham. 1967. "The legitimacy of Solomon—Some structural aspects of old testament history." European Journal of Sociology 8 (1): 165–67.

Mamo, Hubert. 1968. *La douleur: Aspects physiologiques, physio-pathologiques et incidences thérapeutiques*, vol. 14 of *Les cahiers Baillière*. Paris:J. B. Baillière et fils.

Marett, Robert Ranulph. 1929. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 14th Ed, Vol 2, s.v. "Anthropology." London. pp. 41–46.

Marín, Francisco Rodríguez. 1926. *Mas de 21,000 refránes castellanos.* Madrid: Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas y Museos.

———. 1930. *12,600 refránes mas*. Madrid.

———. 1934. *6,666 refránes de mi ultima rebusca.* Madrid: C. Bermejo Impresor.

———. 1941. *Todavia 10,700 refránes mas no registrados por el maestro correas.* Madrid: Prensa Española.

Marion, H. 1894. *La Grande Encyclopédie*. Volume 20. Paris.

Mauss, Marcel. Mauss, Marcel. 1924. "Essai sur le Don. Forme et Raison de l'échange dans les sociétés primitives" in *Année Sociologique, second série*. Reprinted in Marcel, Mauss. 1950. *Sociologie et Anthopologie*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 145-284.

———. 1950. *Sociologie et anthropologie*. Paris: University Press of France.

———. 1966. *The gift*. London: Cohen & West.

———. 1968. *Oeuvres, vol. l, Les Fonctions sociales du sacré*. Paris: Editions de Minuit. Medina, Andrés. No date. Unpublished monograph of Tenejapa.

———. 1969. *Oeuvres, vol. III, Cohésion sociale et divisions de la sociologie*. Paris: Editions de Minuit. Medina, Andrés. No date. Unpublished monograph of Tenejapa.

Mendras, Henri. 1967. *La fin des paysans: changement et innovations dans les sociétés rurales françises*. Paris: Colin.

Middleton, John. 1960. *Lugbara religion*. London: Oxford University Press.

Mitford, Nancy. 1956. ed. *Noblesse oblige: an enquiry into the identifiable characteristics of the English aristocracy*. New York: Harper.

Montesquieu. 1958. "Esprit des Lois," *Oeuvres* Vol. 2. Paris.

Morin, Edgar. 1959. *Autocritique.* Paris: Seuill.

Mörner, Magnus. 1967. *Race Mixture in the History of Latin America*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Myrdal, Gunnar. 1962. *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*. New York: Harper.

Nash, June. 1967. Death as a Way of Life. *American Anthropologist* 69: 455-470.

Nash, Manning. 1961. Witchcraft as a social process in a Tzeltal community. *America Indigena* 20.

Newton, Esther. 1972. Mother Camp: Female Impersonators in America, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Okely, Judith. 1975. "Gypsy women: models in conflict". *Perceiving Women*: 55-86.

Osty, Emile and Joseph Trinquet. 1973. *La Bible*. Paris: Seuil.

Ott, Louis. 1955. *Précis de théologie dogmatique*. Paris: Editions Savator.

Ott, Sandra. 1981. *The circle of mountains: A basque shepherding community*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

———. 1992. "Indarra: some reflections on a Basque concept"In *Honor and Grace in Anthropology,* Peristiany, John George, and Julian Pitt-Rivers eds. Vol. 76. Cambridge University Press.

Oguibenine, Boris. 1998 [1985]. "The cooking of poetic words." In *Essays on Vedic and Indo-European culture*, 167–98. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers.

Overing Kaplan, Joanna. 1975. *The Piaroa, a People of the Orinoco Basin*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Oxford English Dictionary, The. 1933. Oxford: Clarendon.

Parker, A. A. 1957. *The Approach to the Spanish Drama of the Golden Age.* London: Hispanic & Luso-Brazilian Councils.

Paz, Octavio. 1967. *El laberinto de la Soledad*. London: Allen Lane, the Penguin Press.

Peristiany, John G. *The social institutions of the Kipsigis*, London: Humanities Press.

———. 1966. "Honor and shame in a Cypriot highland village." In *Honour and shame: The values of Mediterranean society*, 171–90. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

———. 1968. *Contributions to Mediterranean Sociology*, Mouton.

———. 1992. "The Sophron - a secular saint? Wisdom and the wise in a Cypriot community" In *Honor and Grace in Anthropology,* Peristiany, John George, and Julian Pitt-Rivers eds. Vol. 76. Cambridge University Press.

Peristiany, John George, and Julian Pitt-Rivers. 1992. *Honor and grace in anthropology*. Vol. 76. Cambridge University Press.

Peters, Emry. 1963. *Aspects of rank and status among Muslims in a Lebanese village*. Paris: Moulton.

———. 1976. "Aspects of affinity in a Lebanese Maronite village." In *Mediterranean Family Structures*, edited by J.G. Peristiany, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Philippe, Ariès. 1975. *Essais sur l'histoire de la mort en Occident du Moyen Âge à nos jours.* Paris: Seuil.

Pidal, Ramón Menaéndez. 1950. *The Spaniards in their History* trs. Walter Starkie. New York: Hollis & Carter.

Pitt-Rivers, Julian. 1954. *The people of the sierra*. London: Criterion Books.

———. 1958. "Ritual Kinship and the Family in Andalusia", in *Bulletin of the New York Academy of Sciences*, Series II., Vol. 20, March.

———. 1960a. "Social Class in a French Village." *Anthropological Quarterly* 33 (1): 1-13.

———. 1960b. "The Egalitarian society." In *Actes du colloque international d'Ethnologie*. 1(2). Paris.

———. 1961. *The people of the sierra*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———. 1963. *Mediterranean countrymen: Essays in the social anthropology of the Mediterranean*. The Hague: Mouton.

———. 1965a. "Honour and Social Status" in J. G. Peristiany (ed.), *Honour And Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*. London.

———. 1965b. "Who are the Indians?" *Encounter* 25 (3): 41–49.

———. 1967a. “Contextual analysis or the locus of the model”. In *European Journal of Sociology*.

———. 1967b. Race, Color, and Class in Central America and the Andes. *Daedalus* (Spring).

———. 1968a. “Pseudo-kinship” in *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, New York: Crowell Collier & Macmillan.

———. 1968b. “The Stranger, the Guest and the Hostile Host; introduction to the Law of Hospitality.” In *Contributions to Mediterranean sociology*, edited by J.G. Peristiany. Paris: Mouton.

———. 1970. “Race Relations as a Science: A Review of Michael Banton’s ‘Race Relations.’” *Race & Class* 11 (3): 335–42.

———. 1971. “On the word ‘caste.’” In *The translation of culture: Essays in honor of Evans-Pritchard*, edited by T.O. Beidelman. London: Tavistock Press.

———. 1973. “The Kith and the Kin.” In *The character of kinship*, edited by Jack Goody London: Cambridge University Press. 89-105.

———. 1974. *Mana: An inaugural lecture*. London: London School of Economics and Political Science.

———. 1976. “Ritual kinship in the Mediterranean: Spain and the Balkans”. In *Mediterranean family structures*, 317–34, edited by J. G. Peristiany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1977. *The Fate of Shechem or the politics of sex*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1981a. “Centre et Periphérie, la Plaine et la Montagne,” *Colloque franco-espagnol sur l’Espace Montagnard*. Madrid.

———. 1981b. *Lending a hand*. Oxford conference on conflict and cooperation (unpublished)

———. 1983. *Anthropologie de l’honneur; la mésaventure de Sichem*, Paris: Le Svcomore.

———. 1984a. “De lumière et de lunes: Analyses de deux vêtements andalous de connotation festive in Vêtement et sociétés. 2.(Actes du colloque national CNRS Vers une anthropologie du vêtement, Paris, mars 1981).” *Ethnographie (L’) Paris* 80, no. 92-93-94: 245-254.

———. 1984b. Le paradoxe de l’amitié, Paris: Actes du Colloque de Palerme.

———. 1985. La revanche du rituel dans l’Europe contemporaine, in Annuaire de l’Ecole Pratique des hautes Etudes. 17(5) 5th section, vol. XVII, reprinted in Les Temps modernes, 1987.

———. 1992. “Postscript: the place of grace in anthropology” In *Honor and Grace in Anthropology,* Peristiany, John George, and Julian Pitt-Rivers eds. Vol. 76. Cambridge University Press.

———. 1992b. “The Personal Factor in Fieldwork,” in *Europe Observed*, eds. João de Pina-Cabral and John Campbell, pgs. 133-147. London: Macmillan Press.

Plessner, Helmuth. 1923. *Die Einheit der Sinne. Grundlinien einer Ästhesiologie des Geistes*, Bonn: Friedrich Cohen.

———. 1928. *Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie*. Berlin / Leipzig.

———. 1961. “Conditio humana.” In *Vorgeschichte – Frühe Hochkulturen*, vol. 1 of *Propyläen Weltgeschichte. Eine Universalgeschichte*, by Alfred Heuß, Golo Mann, and Auguste Nitschke, 33-86. Frankfurt am Mein: Ullstein.

———. 1964. “On human expression.” In *Phenomenology: Pure and applied. The first Lexington Conference*, edited by Erwin W. Straus, 63-74. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

———. 1970a. “Anthropologie der Sinne.” In *Philosophische Anthropologie: Lachen und Weinen. Das Lächeln. Anthropologie der Sinne.* S. Fischer.

———. 1970b. *Laughing and crying: A study of the limits of human behaviour*. Translated by James Spencer Churchill & Marjorie Grene. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Pouillon, Jean. 1966. L’analyse des mythes, *L’Homme*, VI.

———. 1975. *Fétiches sans fétichisme*. Paris: Maspero.

Propp, Vladamir. 1968. *Morphology of the folk-tale*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Rabinow, Paul. 1975. *Symbolic domination: Cultural form and historical change in Morocco*. Chicago University of Chicago Press.

Rakopoulos, Theodoros. 2016. “Solidarity: The egalitarian tensions of a bridge-concept.” *Social Anthropology* 24: 142–51.

Raphaël, Freddy. 1973. “Le Pélerinage a Colombey.” *Cahiers Internationaux De Sociologie* 55: 339–56.

Recinos, Adrian. 1950. *Popol vuh, the sacred book of the ancient Quiché Maya.* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Redfield, Robert. 1941. *The Folk Culture of Yucatán*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Reed, Nelson. 1964. *The Caste War of Yucatan*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Reina, Ruben. 1959. "Two patterns of friendship in a Guatemalan community." *American Anthropologist* 61: 44–50.

Robey, David (ed.). 1972. *Structuralism: An introduction*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Rogozen-Soltar, Mikaela. 2017. *Spain Unmoored: Migration, Conversion, and the Politics of Islam*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Rojas, Fernando. 1554. *El Lazarillo de Tormes* [published as anonymous]. Madrid.

Rosaldo, Renato. 1986. "From the door of his tent: The fieldworker and the inquisitor." In *Writing culture: The poetics and politics of ethnography*, edited by James Clifford and George E. Marcus, 77–97. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rosenblat, Angel. 1954. *La población indigena y el mestizaje en América*. Vol II. Buenos Aires: Editorial Nova.

Sahlins, Marshall. 1958. *Social stratification in Polynesia*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

———. 1963. "Poor Man, Rich Man, Big-Man, Chief: Political Types in Melanesia and Polynesia." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 5 (3): 285–303.

———. 1974. "The spirit of the gift". In *Stone age economics*, 168–83. London: Tavistock Publications.

Saler, Benson. 1964. "Nagual, witch and sorcerer in a Quiché village." *Ethnology* 3: 305–28.

Salmond, Anne. 1973. *Mana makes the man: A look at Maori oratory and politics.* London: Academic Press. Unpublished manuscript.

Sanders, Irwin T. 1960. *Rainbow in the Rock: the People of Rural Greece*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Scheffler, Harold. 1965. *Choiseul island social structure*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Shils, Edward. 1968. "Charisma". In *International encyclopedia of the social sciences*. 1(II). New York: Macmillan and Free Press.

Sicroff, Albert A. 1960. *Les Controverses des statuts de puerté de sang en Espagne de XV au XVII siècle*. Paris: P.U.F.

Simmel, G. 1950. *Sociology of Simmel* translated by Kurt Wolf. New York: The Free Press.

Smith, M.G. 1962. *Kinship and community in Carriacou*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Smith, W. Robertson. 1903. *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Soulairac, André. 1956. *Les bases physiologiques de la conscience: conférence faite au Palais de la Découverte le 10 mars 1956*, Vol. 22, Series A in *Conférences du Palais de la Découverte*. Paris: Palais de la Découverte.

———. 1956. 1971. *Les mécanismes de la douleur*. Paris: Roussell-UCAF.

Speier, Hans. 1952. "Honor and social structure" in *Social Order and the Risks of War* (New York) pp. 36-52.

Speiser, E.A. 1964. *Genesis*. New York: Doubleday.

Stendhal. 1829. *Promenades dans Rome.* Paris: Delaunay.

———. 1940. "L'amour s'empara bien vite de l'usage des sigisbées." *Promenades dans Rome* (Paris) vol. 3.

Stern, Lilo. 1962. "An ethnography of Chiapilla, Chiapas." Microfilm collection of manuscripts on American Indian cultural anthropology. Unknown Binding.

Stocking, George. 1968. *Race, culture and evolution: Essays in the history of anthropology*. New York: Free Press.

———. 1973. *The Nineteenth Century Concept of Race*.

———. Stocking, George W. 1994. "The Turn-of-the-Century Concept of Race." MODERNISM/modernity 1, no.1. 4-16. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Strasbourg, U.N.E.F., 1966. On the Poverty of Student Life: considered in its economic, political, psychological, sexual, and particularly intellectual aspects, and a modest proposal for its remedy.

Strathern, Marilyn, ed. 2000. *Audit culture: Anthropological studies in accountability, ethics, and the academy*. London: Routledge.

Sutherland, Anne. 1975. *Gypsies: The hidden Americans*. London: Tavistock Publications.

Tax, Sol (ed.). 1952. *Heritage of Conquest.* Glencoe: The Free Press.

Thimm, Carl A. 1896. *Fencing and Duelling*. London: Pelican Publishing Company.

Thompson, J. Eric S. (ed.). 1958. *Thomas Gage's travels in the new world*. Normal: University of Oklahoma Press.

Tillion, G. 1966. *Le Harem et les Cousins*. Paris: Editions du Seuil.

Touraine, Alain. 1971. *The May Movement: Revolt and Reform*, trans. Leonard Mayhew. New York: Random House.

Trumbull, Henry Clay. 1885. *The Blood Covenant*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Tumin, Melvin. 1952. *Caste in a peasant society: A case-study in the dynamics of caste*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 1956. Cultura, casta y clase en Guatemala. *Integración Social en Guatemala*. (Seminario de Integ. Soc.)

Turner, Victor. 1962. "Three Symbols of Passage in Ndembu Circumcision Ritual: an Interpretation." In *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations*, Max Gluckman, ed: 124-173. Manchester University Press.

———. 1967. *The forest of symbols: Aspects of Ndembu ritual*. Vol. 101. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Tylor, Edward. 1970. *Primitive culture: The origins of culture*. Gloucester, MA: Harper.

Van den Berghe, Pierre. 1967. *Race and Racism*. New York: Wiley.

Van Gennep, Arnold. 1966 [1909, 1960]. *Les rites de passage.* Paris: Nourry. Transl. by Monika B. Vizedom and Gabrielle L. Caffee. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Vayda, Andrew Peter. 1960. *Māori warfare*. Wellington: Polynesian Society.

Villa Rojas, Alfonso. 1947. "Kinship and nagualism in a Tzeltal community." *American Anthropologist* 49: 578–87.

Voltaire. 1774. *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie: Honneur.* Tome 3. Geneva.

von Gebsattel, Viktor Emil. 1907. *Bemerkungen zur Psychologie der Gefühlsirradiation.* Dissertation. In: *Archiv für Psychologie.* Band 10. Leipzig: W. Engelmann.

———. 1946. "Sigmund Freud und die Seelenheilkunde der Gegenwart." *Medizinische Klinik* 41.

———. 1954. *Prolegomena einer medizinischen Anthropologie: Ausgewählte Aufsätze.* Berlin: Springer.

———. 1959a. *Das Menschenbild der Seelenheilkunde. Drei Vorlesungen zur Kritik des dynamischen Psychologismus.* Stuttgart: Hippokrates-Verlag.

———. 1959b. *Gedanken zu einer anthropologischen Psychotherapie*, vol. 3 of *Handbuch der Neurosenlehre und Psychotherapie*, edited by Viktor Emil Frankl, Viktor Emil von Gebsattel, and Johannes Heinrich Schultz. München: Urban and Schwarzenberg.

———. 1968. *Imago hominis. Beiträge zu einer personalen Anthropologie.* Salzburg: Otto Müller.

von Jhering, Rudolph. 1872. *Der Kampf ums Recht: Zum hundertsten Totesjahr des Autors herausgegeben von Felix Ermacora*. Vienna: G. J. Manz'schen Buchhandlung.

———. 1873. *Jurisprudenz des täglichen Lebens: Eine Sammlung von leichten an Vorfälle des gewöhnlichen Lebens anknüpfenden Rechtsfragen*. Jena: Mauke.

———. 1877, 1883. *Der Zweck im Recht*, 2 vols. Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel.

———. 1884. *Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudenz: Eine Weihnachtsgabe für das juristische Publikum.* Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel.

———. 1904. *Law in daily life: A collection of legal questions connected with the ordinary events of everyday life*. Translated by Henry Goudy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

von Rad, Gerhard. 1972. *Genesis*. London: SCM Press.

Wagley, Charles. 1968. *The Latin American tradition.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Wake, C. Staniland. 1888. *Serpent Worship and Other Essays*. London.

Waugh, Evelyn. 1993 [1945]. *Brideshead Revisited.* Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.

Weber, Max. 1968. *On charisma and institution building*, with Preface by S. N. Eisenstadt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Weil, Simone. 1948. *La pesanteur et la grâce*. Paris: Plon.

Whetten, Nathan. 1961. *Guatemala, the land and the people*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Whiteley, W. H. 1966. "Social Anthropology, Meaning and Linguistics," *Man*, I.

Wilson, Robert R. 1975. *Genealogy and history in the Old Testament: a study of the form and function of the Old Testament genealogies in their Near Eastern context*. Ph.D. thesis. New Haven: Yale University.

Wolf, Eric R. 1965. "Systems of patronage and friendship". In *The anthropology of complex societies 1–2*, edited by Michael Banton. London: Tavistock Publications.

———. 1966. "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-client Relation in Complex Societies" in M. Banton (ed.), *The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies*. New York: Frederik A. Praeger.

Index

A

adoption, 123–124, 127, 129, 130, 139, 145, 169, 195, 198, 200, 285, 352, 353, 373, 384, 410
affines/affinal relationships, 124
Algeria, 62, 63
altruism, 121–123, 131, 134
American South/Deep South, 405–407, 411–412, 415, 442–443
amity (Fortes' "kinship amity"), 18, 75, 88, 101, 121–127, 129, 131–137, 139, 152, 200, 213, 279, 281
Andalusia, 29, 31, 86, 111, 254–255, 258, 260–261, 265, 343, 387, 449–450, 452, 461–462, 469
  Sierra de Cádiz, 3, 344, 454
  Sierra de Ronda, 453
  Grazalema, 82, 84–85, 280, 449, 451–454, 456–457, 461–463
  el Arahal, 451
  Jérez, 451, 454, 456–457
  Seville, 264–265, 451, 453, 456, 460
  Córdoba, 451, 456, 460
Asdiwal, 340, 351
Ashanti, 122
augury, 239
authority, 6, 8, 9, 16, 17, 20, 25, 29, 30, 34, 40, 41, 45, 51, 53–55, 61, 63–68, 70, 86, 87, 107, 111, 113, 114, 131, 177, 180, 186–192, 238, 245, 247, 257, 259, 264–266, 295, 303–308, 314, 327, 329, 343, 371, 372, 381, 413, 417, 427
  male authority, 6–9, 25, 29, 30, 41, 111, 113–114, 187, 190, 192, 264–265, 303
  upper class authority, 25, 303
  viz. *mana*, 40–41, 51, 53–55, 63
  sacred/divine/spiritual authority, 64, 87, 107, 238, 245, 247, 257, 265–266, 371
  political authority, 51, 67, 131, 187, 304, 329
  charismatic authority, 70, 87
  viz. hospitality, 180, 188, 191
  moral authority, 238, 303–304
  crisis of authority, 303–304
  and myth, 327, 329, 343
Azande, 70, 85, 158, 227
Aztec, 241, 433, 434, 437

B

Bailey, F.G., 55–65, 67, 68, 470

banderillero, 257, 261
baptism, 20, 49, 78, 82, 83, 96, 99, 111, 128, 137, 141, 142, 144, 145, 151, 153–155, 159–160, 178, 208, 239, 270, 272, 281, 287, 317, 431
baraka, 69, 85, 87, 93–95, 279, 299
Baroja, Caro J., 7, 15, 101, 390
Beattie, J.M., 103, 377
begging, 4, 81, 100, 116, 135, 156, 170, 173–176, 184, 190, 330
beneficence, 20–22, 78, 148, 150, 213, 233, 313, 381
Benveniste, Émile, 49, 77, 78, 95, 96, 279
Berger, Peter, 43, 105, 117
Berreman, G.D., 405, 406, 408, 414, 418
Bisipara, 58, 59
Bloch, Maurice, 66, 90, 136, 214, 216
blood-brother, 133, 139, 158, 280, 283, 384
Boas, Franz, 164, 166–169, 184
bullfights, 175, 251–266, 292–295, 388, 390, 459–460, 469
  corrida, 251–255, 257, 262, 264, 293–295, 297
burla, 10, 46, 116, 255–257, 259, 262
Burlador de Sevilla, 10, 46, 116, 255
Burma, 333

C

cabrón/a, 9, 11, 13, 25, 31, 258, 259, 383, 463
campesinos, 439
capea, 293, 296–298
Carnival, 11, 13, 143, 319
Carriacou, 124, 280
case-history method, 236–237, 387
caste, 57–59, 400–420
  subcaste, 403, 409
  jati, 403, 418
  varna, 403, 418
  hypergamy, 156, 408
  hypogamy, 408
Ceylon, 333, 417
Chamars, 127
charis, 49, 77
charity, 77, 81, 91, 100, 111, 173, 175, 388
Choiseulese, 52
Christianity, 5, 14, 16, 46, 49, 70, 82, 83, 93, 100, 126–127, 137, 142, 144, 147–149, 151, 156, 172, 203, 238, 241–243, 270, 276–277, 287, 290, 341, 350, 403, 419, 433, 446
  Christian name, 5, 16, 49, 82, 127, 137, 144, 147, 151, 203
  the Church (Catholic, Greek, Roman), 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 33, 45–47, 79, 87, 97, 145, 148, 154, 219, 247, 254, 265, 266, 296, 339, 452
ch'ulel, 236–237, 243
circumcision, 352
  (East) African, 269–270, 289
  Judaism, 271, 284, 286–288, 347, 352, 358, 467
  Islam, 284, 287–288
  British, 284–288
  Ndembu, 283, 286–288
clientelism, 20, 80, 111, 133, 150, 166, 169, 171, 183, 198, 201, 204, 208, 266, 368, 458, 461, 463
  patron-client relationships, 201, 266, 368
clitoridectomy, 269, 286, 287, 289, 358
clothing styles, 27, 31, 144, 234, 255, 257–259, 265, 271, 290, 293, 297, 302, 307–312, 316–317, 387–390, 410, 430–439, 445–446, 460
  traditional Indian/Spanish, 31, 144, 234, 255, 258–259, 265, 293, 297, 387–390, 430–439, 445–446, 460
  French, 27, 257, 309–310
  Western/American, 302, 307–312, 316–317, 410

cofradías, 433
comadre, 143, 149, 152
commensality, 79, 128, 181, 197, 198, 280, 281, 318, 415
community study method, 88, 378–379, 424, 456
compadrazgo, 127, 128, 137, 141–144, 146, 149, 150, 152, 153, 155–157, 161, 200, 204, 208, 214, 272, 281, 392, 455
compadre, 20, 82, 97, 128, 138, 141–143, 148–152, 154–156, 200, 207, 214, 281, 384, 391–392
comparative method, 58, 67–68, 103, 156, 165, 201–202, 204, 231–232, 263, 303, 324, 332, 335, 338, 366, 374, 377–379, 382, 387, 393, 394, 396–397, 399, 403–406, 411, 413, 415, 417–418, 430, 468–471
confianza, 73
consubstantial fluids, 125–128, 263, 280
  consubstantial(ity), 125–130, 133, 280–281, 283, 294
  menstruation, 260, 263–264, 292
  blood, 97, 108, 111–112, 115, 123–125, 127–129, 133, 137–139, 144, 146, 157–158, 168, 179, 197, 200, 207–209, 214, 257, 260, 262–264, 266, 270–271, 273, 276–277, 280–281, 283, 288–289, 297–299, 326? 382, 384, 425–426
  saliva, 280
  semen, 127, 197, 280, 296
  milk, 126–127, 217, 224, 280, 301–302
consuegros, 138
cooring, 89, 212, 213
corruption (political), 18, 34, 75, 206
criollos, 420

D

debt, 72, 88, 89, 92, 96, 206, 215, 217, 218, 221, 444
de Gaulle, Charles, 62–68, 118
deshonradas, 13
devil, 9, 84, 85, 113, 237, 238, 241–247, 263, 299
diachrony, 333, 335, 340–341, 343, 349–350, 372–374
Don Juan, 27, 46, 47, 116, 255, 265
Dumont, Louis, 125, 252, 403, 408, 410, 416–418
Durkheim, Émile, 34, 219, 220, 292, 330

E

El Cid, 109
endogamy, 194–198, 219, 325, 326, 334, 338, 339, 355, 359, 360, 363–367, 374, 401, 403–405, 408, 409, 441–443
endomendicity, 175, 176
epikleros, 126–129, 194, 365, 370
Eskimo, 123, 124, 126–130, 164–169, 173, 184, 280
etiquette, 72, 87, 172, 176, 179, 231
Evans-Pritchard, E.E., 10, 70, 85, 95, 148, 220, 227, 232, 276–280, 299, 327, 397, 398, 449, 450, 466, 467, 469, 471
exomendicity, 176

F

fetish, 318, 399, 400
Firth, Raymond, 36–42, 48, 51, 53, 61, 74, 93, 122, 201
Fortes, Meyer, 54, 75, 121–123, 126, 131, 134, 139, 180, 199, 200, 213, 279, 455
France, 91, 122, 135, 159, 173, 195, 202, 218–219, 221, 270, 277, 280–281, 306, 309–313, 315–317, 319–321, 401, 418, 440, 466
  French peasantry, 88, 195, 211–212, 217, 225, 316
  Magnac, 89, 213, 215, 217–219, 225

Franco, Fransisco, 452–454
Frazer, James, 36, 128, 294, 325, 332, 342, 359, 467
Freud, Sigmund, 17, 268, 282, 291, 292, 306, 330, 343
friendship, 20, 27, 28, 44, 67, 73, 75, 79, 89, 91, 93, 97–98, 111, 119, 122–124, 128, 130–136, 144, 150, 159, 168, 177, 199–209, 212–213, 220, 237, 279, 280, 309, 314, 452, 454–455, 466, 468
    bond-friend(ship), 122, 124, 128, 133, 139

G

gift, 28, 50, 85–89, 144, 148, 173
    free gift, 50, 70, 77, 79–80, 88, 91, 92, 134, 148, 220–221
    counter-gift, 89, 95–96, 207, 214
    paradox of the gift, 91, 97, 220
    return-gift, 72, 79, 88, 91, 92, 93–94, 96–97, 136, 221–222
    gift tax, 75, 224
    reciprocal gift, 135, 399
    gift of God, 77, 79–80, 86–87
    gift-exchange, 95, 97
godparent(s), 128, 129, 144–148, 155–156, 160, 169
    godfather, 20, 111, 129, 139, 146, 151, 154–156, 159–160, 207, 272, 281, 461
    godmother, 146, 151, 384
    godchild, 82, 129, 138, 144–145, 148, 150, 154–156, 159–160, 272
gossip, 23–26, 143, 178
Gourmantché, 276
grace, 1, 49–51, 55, 69–73, 76–91, 93–103, 105, 109, 128, 148, 150, 156, 157, 206–208, 253, 256, 259, 264, 271, 276–279, 281, 282, 298, 299, 306, 364, 397, 459, 465, 468, 472
    and friendship, 79, 91, 97, 150, 206–207, 279, 281, 468
    and sacrifice, 70, 253, 277–279
    as good fortune, 78, 85, 99
    as salvation, 85
    as a gift/giving grace, 49–50, 70, 72–73, 77, 79–80, 91, 93–94, 98, 148, 150, 206, 279, 281
    as an honorary title, 50, 87–88
    disgrace, 12, 49, 51, 98, 258
    divine grace, 49–51, 69, 70, 77–80, 82–86, 99–100, 102, 105, 150, 156, 277, 298, 364
    exchange of grace, 50, 70, 72–73, 79, 81, 83–84, 90–91, 94, 96–98, 100, 206, 277–279
    feminine grace, 50, 82–86, 100–101, 256, 259, 264, 298, 364, 459–560
    gracia, 49, 50, 71, 82, 128, 148, 472
    gracioso, 49
    gratuity, 23, 70–73, 76–80, 88–93, 95, 97, 135, 148, 174, 177, 182, 217, 221, 223, 277–279, 293, 297, 324, 391
    in a "state of grace", 78, 80, 82, 84, 109, 253
    in Christianity, 49–51, 70, 77–80, 82–87, 93, 97–102, 128, 148, 150, 156, 271, 276–277, 281, 298, 364
    in E.E. Evans-Pritchard's work, 70, 276–279
    in Émile Benveniste's work, 77–78, 96, 279
    in England, 49, 71–73, 81, 87–88, 364
    "falling from grace", 306
    in Marcel Mauss' work, 72, 91, 93–97, 100, 277–278
    in Spain, 49, 71–72, 81–87, 97, 109, 128, 148, 150, 256, 258–259, 264, 281, 298–299, 456, 459–460
    negative grace, 73, 84, 94–95, 279
    padres de gracia, 49, 82, 128, 148, 281

physical/aesthetic grace, 49, 83, 85–86, 256, 459
receiving grace, 50, 72, 78, 81–82, 277
reciprocal grace, 49–50, 70, 72–73, 79, 87, 89–91, 93–94, 96–99, 277, 279
"saying grace," grace as prayer, 49–50, 70
viz. honor, 1, 12, 31–34, 49–51, 55, 69, 70, 72, 77, 78, 81–84, 87, 88, 91, 92, 95, 97–103, 105, 109, 135, 150, 174, 176, 182, 207, 208, 217, 221, 259, 264, 279
viz. *mana*, 51, 55, 63, 65, 68, 95, 103
Greece, 5, 49, 77, 100, 153–154, 160, 164, 167, 170–171, 173, 190, 194, 195, 276, 290, 332, 337, 359, 365, 367, 472
Crete, 282, 359
Corinth, 282, 359
Guajira, 362, 401, 418, 441
Guatemala, 201, 231, 239, 240, 413, 430, 431, 435, 436, 439, 443, 447–448
gypsies, 4, 5, 155, 174, 258, 316, 360–362, 388, 390–391, 416, 439

H

hacienda system, 149, 438, 444
Hammel, E.A., 138, 141, 154–161
haram, 188, 191, 196
Haro, Joseph, 27–32
hau, 94, 95, 470
hermano, 124, 174, 175
hesed, 93
Hinduism, 59, 70, 402–404, 407, 409, 414–419, 440–443
Hobbes, Thomas, 45, 57, 228
hombría, 8, 32, 265, 298
honi soit, 29, 32
honor, 1, 3, 4, 7–29, 31–34, 42–51, 53–55, 57–59, 63–65, 69, 70, 72, 77, 78, 81–84, 87, 88, 91, 92, 95, 97–103, 105–118, 135, 144, 150, 168, 170, 172–174, 176–184, 188–192, 196, 207–209, 217, 221, 251, 255–256, 259, 262, 264–266, 269, 279, 294, 311, 321, 334, 353, 356, 357, 362, 363, 367, 368, 372–374, 383, 395, 456, 469–471
avenging honor, 31, 100–101, 107–108, 112, 115
bestowing honor, 43, 258
claiming honor, 43, 101, 251
code of honor, 10, 14, 32, 44, 88, 91, 221
dueling, 3–4, 24, 26–27, 44, 54, 107–108, 164–165, 265
familial honor, 8–16, 111–112, 367–368, 373
hierarchy of honor, 22–24
honor=precedence, 17, 24, 27–28, 33, 45, 47, 83, 106, 109–111
honor=virtue, 10, 24, 28, 32–33, 47, 101, 106, 109, 111
in England, 3, 22, 47, 109–110, 112, 114, 469
in Italy, 83, 105–107, 110–112, 116–117, 150
in Shakespeare, 88, 117, 469
in Spain, 3–33, 42, 45–47, 82, 87, 109, 111–117, 255–256, 258–259, 262, 264–266, 294, 361, 383, 395, 469
masculinity, 8–9, 32, 46–47, 83, 100–101, 106, 111–112, 114, 117, 188, 190, 256, 259, 363, 367, 469
pecking order theory of honor, 45, 47
prestige, 18, 20, 22, 23, 40, 41, 51, 52, 65, 81, 83, 90, 92, 94, 106, 110, 111, 133, 156, 166, 177, 189, 214, 216, 217, 221, 251, 255, 278, 313, 363, 389–391, 399, 411, 436
public dishonoring, 4, 7, 29, 98–99, 115, 262

right to honor, 3, 18, 99, 114, 395
sexual honor, 6, 8, 12–14, 24, 26, 27, 29, 31–32, 47, 50, 83, 106, 110, 113, 114, 117, 357, 362, 363, 367–368, 372–373
viz. law, 88, 107–108
viz. money, 20–22, 26, 50, 54, 81, 105, 109–111, 117, 294, 311
viz. shame, 3–10, 13–15, 24–26, 28, 31–33, 43, 81, 106, 111, 115, 176, 372, 373
viz. status, 3, 6–7, 9, 12, 15–21, 24, 26, 29, 30, 32, 33, 57–59, 81, 83, 87, 92, 99–102, 105, 106, 114, 135, 150, 172, 174, 176, 177, 180, 183, 186, 188, 189, 191, 221, 255, 269, 311, 356, 383, 395, 440, 441, 444
viz. valor, 15, 16, 110, 165, 293

honradez, 8, 20

hospitality, 18, 21, 44, 71, 74, 79, 81, 88, 94, 111, 117, 125, 163, 164, 166, 167, 170, 172, 173, 176–188, 192, 197, 198, 224, 280, 282, 330, 357, 359, 360, 362, 369, 372, 460, 470
and marriage, 74, 117, 125, 372
and strangers, 18, 21, 170, 172, 177, 182–182, 192, 197–198, 360
and women, 170, 187, 192, 197–198, 360, 369, 372
in the Bible, 117, 282, 357, 360, 369, 372
in the Odyssey, 163–164, 167, 170, 173, 185–187, 192, 198, 330
law of hospitality, the, 94, 163, 164, 166, 170, 177–179, 181–186, 188–189, 197, 330
reciprocal hospitality, 71, 74, 79, 94, 173, 177, 180, 182
sexual hospitality, 117, 125, 181, 197, 198, 282, 359, 360, 362, 369, 372
viz. commensality, 79, 176–177, 181, 197, 198, 280
viz. hosting, 163, 167, 173, 179–182, 184–185, 187–188, 198, 360
viz. protection, 21, 166–167, 170, 180, 186–189, 192, 198

Huave, 416

Hume, David, 204, 205, 207

I

Iberian Peninsula, 265, 294, 400, 419

immigration, 223, 282, 407, 412, 415, 442

indarra, 94, 95, 102

India (Swat), 57–58, 100, 156, 366, 400–420, 440–443

indigenismo, 394, 430, 437, 439, 444, 447–448

individualism, 7, 10, 18, 22, 26, 33–34, 43, 46–47, 49, 53, 57–58, 61–62, 66–67, 78, 82–83, 87, 90, 93, 95, 99, 106, 122–123, 125, 127, 131, 136–139, 145–149, 155–160, 167, 182, 187–188, 193, 196, 203–204, 207, 220, 223–225, 229–230, 232–234, 238–240, 257, 265–269, 271–273, 283–284, 293, 305, 318, 343, 345, 358, 365, 372, 394–395, 409–412, 416, 419, 421–423, 430–432, 439, 454

Islam, 69–70, 93, 101, 155, 188, 284, 287–288, 321, 339, 359, 366–367, 369, 374, 403
Koran, 126, 342

J

Judaism, 70, 93, 172, 271, 282, 284–288, 315, 326, 328, 334, 337–339, 345, 347, 351–353, 356–360, 362, 367–367, 369–370, 372–373, 419, 451, 467
Judah, 326, 334, 354, 359
Torah/Old Testament, 117, 190, 282, 285, 325–326, 328, 334, 336, 338, 345, 349, 356, 359–360, 362, 366–373

K

Kabyle, 192, 369
Kaguru, 208, 214
Kalingas, 180
kermano, 124
kinship, 20, 30, 74, 75, 88, 89, 93, 102, 121–130, 133, 134, 136–138, 141, 143, 146, 149, 152–154, 156–158, 169, 178, 183, 193, 194, 199–202, 207, 209, 212, 213, 272, 279, 281, 282, 316, 317, 325, 326, 332, 333, 352, 353, 363–365, 367, 368, 372, 373, 381, 383–385, 399, 409, 425, 455, 467, 471
 ritual kinship, 20, 125, 127–130, 133, 137–139, 141, 143, 146, 149, 152, 157, 169, 317, 384, 391–392, 467
 kin(-group), 43, 121–125, 127, 129–130, 137–139, 142, 144, 146, 151–154, 158–161, 168, 172, 194, 198, 212–215, 272, 301, 316, 352, 361, 380–382, 384–285, 408–410, 469, 471
 kins-men/women, 74, 89, 102, 112, 117, 121, 123–124, 129–130, 136–138, 144, 149, 151–154, 158–159, 169, 179, 189, 194, 199, 213, 230, 353, 355, 382, 384, 391–392
 kinship amity, 75, 88, 124, 136, 200–201, 212–213, 279, 281
 behavior v. terminology, 121–123, 136, 152, 155, 200, 209, 316, 353, 363–364, 373, 384–386, 391, 393, 399
 consanguinal v. consubstantial, 123, 125–130, 133, 137, 280–281, 283
 pseudokinship/figurative kinship, 124, 127, 129–130, 158, 212, 281, 382–384
Kipsigis, 301, 302, 321
Kroeber, A.L., 329, 385, 404, 406, 407, 413
Kula system, 95–97, 122, 136, 278
kumstvo, 153–157, 159–161
Kwakiutl, 94, 173, 414

L

Leach, Edmund, 289, 325–328, 332–340, 348, 353, 370, 373, 403, 404, 467
Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 41, 69, 70, 74, 129, 185, 197, 232, 277, 279, 289, 318, 325–335, 337, 338, 340, 343, 345, 350, 351, 373, 374, 401, 428
lineage systems, 26, 30, 38, 53, 101, 106, 113, 125, 137–139, 144–145, 152, 154–155, 158–161, 169, 194–195, 220, 230, 355, 374, 380, 400–402, 408, 418, 422, 426, 440–441
 patrilineage, 15, 30, 52, 114, 139, 145, 158–159, 194–196, 353, 356, 368, 401, 441
 matrilineage, 51, 114–115, 139, 158, 381, 401, 441
loyalty, 6, 7, 20, 80, 419

M

Maasai, 301, 302
Malagasy, 288
Malinowski, Bronislaw, 95, 122, 170, 278, 327, 329–331, 384, 391, 450
mana, 1, 34–42, 47, 48, 51–55, 63, 65, 68, 95, 103, 116, 398–400, 403, 418, 470
manso, 8, 260
Manuel el Conde, 5, 11, 15
Maori, 39, 40, 47, 51, 52, 93–95
Marett, Robert Ranulph, 275
marriage (alliances), 11–14, 16, 23, 27, 30–31, 74, 88, 110, 113, 116, 117, 124–127, 129, 134, 137, 139, 141, 143–145, 151–154, 156, 157, 159–160, 189, 193–198, 202, 206, 212, 255, 262, 269–270, 281, 284–285, 287, 293, 301, 304, 317, 321, 325, 326,

336, 340, 347, 351–353, 355, 356, 358–360, 362–370, 372–374, 384, 401, 408, 409, 413, 415, 425–426, 442, 457–458

Mauss, Marcel, 36, 37, 41, 42, 47, 48, 67, 69, 72, 74, 91–97, 100, 116, 134, 174, 205, 207, 208, 214, 221, 232, 259, 272, 277, 278, 470

Mayan, 124, 231, 239, 241, 349, 433, 434, 438, 446, 448

mentis, 108

mestizos, 402, 418, 430, 432, 437, 439–441, 443, 445

Mexico, 25, 35, 68, 75, 76, 112, 114, 128, 149, 199, 227, 228, 231, 239, 261–262, 282, 382, 383, 387, 414–416, 433, 436–437, 447–448

  Chiapas, 76, 124, 227–229, 231–232, 234, 238–241, 245–247, 282, 438, 440

  Yucatán, 402, 418, 448

  Oaxaca, 262, 416

Mixe, 416

Montenegro, 30

Montesquieu, 33, 107, 109, 156

mordida, 75, 76

N

nagual, 231–246

Ndembu, 139, 283, 286–288

neighbors, 18–19, 23, 55, 62, 76, 79, 88–90, 107, 117, 121–122, 132–133, 164, 172, 178, 189, 195, 211–220, 222, 224, 282, 287, 296, 301, 336, 346, 357, 361, 363, 372, 379, 397, 399, 433, 439, 456, 462

Nuer, 10, 59, 70, 95, 113, 148, 220, 227, 276–279, 425, 469

O

oaths, 19, 93, 133, 280, 290

Odysseus, 29, 32, 163–164, 166, 184–187, 190, 192, 194–196, 198

OED, 99, 121, 277, 409, 418

omertá, 109

oneiromancy, 234, 236

P

Pacific Islands, 36–37, 41, 48, 51, 329, 379

  Tikopia, 37–41, 51–53, 55, 61, 68, 122, 201

  New Guinea, 129

  Melanesia, 36, 38, 51–52, 93, 111, 331

  Polynesia, 51–52, 93, 103, 116, 398–399, 403

  Solomon Islands, 52

  Trobiand Islands, 95– 96, 122, 126, 329, 331, 425

paganism, 71, 231, 240, 265, 433, 440, 446

pain, 17, 83, 259, 267–273, 306, 470

Pakhtoun, 58

pastoralism, 19, 302, 351–352, 360, 363, 389, 390, 463

patronage, 20, 21, 44, 90, 111, 133, 138–139, 142, 150, 152, 159, 160–161, 166–167, 171, 174, 176, 201, 212, 219, 222, 237, 266, 295, 361, 364, 368, 468

  patron saint, 159, 237, 255, 293, 295–296, 365

Pegujál, 19

Peru, 128, 281, 414, 430, 437

Piaroa (Amazonia), 276

pobres, 175

Pokot, 289

political power (sacralizing of), 22, 51, 53, 55, 61, 64–67, 87, 115, 152, 214, 341, 363, 368, 446

  see "political authority"

Popol-Vuh, 349, 350

pordioseros, 174–175

potlatch, 91, 94, 111, 180, 207, 208, 221, 399, 400, 403, 414
pueblo, 4, 8, 10–14, 16–19, 21–23, 25, 26, 29, 31, 33, 46, 178, 254, 299, 453–457, 463
purity, 6, 8, 14–15, 18, 24, 31, 44, 46, 59, 72, 73, 78, 80, 83, 101, 106, 111, 113, 114, 117, 138, 150, 189–191, 205, 266, 270, 286, 287, 289, 295, 360, 367, 368, 372, 398, 399, 401, 419, 420, 441, 444, 458
  sexual purity, 6–8, 83, 106, 252, 266, 360
  impurity, 15, 272, 401, 419, 441
  purity of blood, 15, 111, 115, 263, 326, 336, 401, 419, 435, 441, 444, 471
  female purity, 46, 83, 113–114, 117, 189–191, 252, 263–264, 360, 367–368
  ritual purity, 59, 277, 280, 291, 295

Q

Quakers, 110, 117, 203, 253, 283, 288
Quiché, 242, 350, 436, 447, 448

R

race, 50, 185, 286, 307, 333, 361, 400, 401, 406, 407, 410, 414, 416–418, 420–433, 435, 437, 438, 440, 442–446, 466
  racism, 315–316, 428
  hierarchy, 17, 20, 43, 64, 99–101, 111, 166–167, 229, 232, 234, 247, 400, 402–405, 408–411, 414–416, 420, 427, 441, 443–444, 466
Radcliffe-Brown, A.R., 121, 136, 173, 316, 377, 378, 451
raza, 421, 430–432, 444, 446
reciprocity, 9, 20–21, 50, 71, 73–75, 78–80, 82, 88–95, 97, 99–100, 111, 122, 131–136, 148–150, 152, 155, 173–183, 196, 203, 205–208, 212–214, 216, 221, 316, 336, 363
respect, 5, 14, 16, 18, 20, 26, 34, 40, 46, 52, 82, 83, 102, 108, 136, 148, 149, 152–154, 154, 159, 166, 169, 170, 174, 178–180, 183, 187, 188, 191, 197, 228, 232, 279, 281, 305, 310, 312, 324, 340, 347, 361, 364, 382, 400, 435, 436, 460
  disrespect, 14, 174, 178, 183, 237, 312, 435
rites of passage, 32, 124, 137–139, 145, 155, 157, 159, 165, 169, 197, 207, 267, 269–273, 280–282, 287–295, 302, 317, 321, 333, 340–341, 467
  Church rites, 12, 78–80, 82–83, 97, 142, 144–145, 207, 317

S

sabia, 83–85
sacred prostitution, 15, 81, 229, 266, 289–290
sacrifice, 15, 69, 70, 79, 81, 90, 91, 93, 95, 122, 123, 128, 135, 136, 175, 205, 206, 217, 220, 221, 229, 249, 251–254, 256, 258–260, 263, 264, 266, 276–280, 289–290, 294, 295, 298, 299, 339, 408
Sahlins, Marshall, 52, 94
sanctuary, 101, 126, 170, 180, 185–189, 191, 192, 196–198, 256, 359, 469
scandal, 11, 13, 307
self-mutilation, 271
señoritos, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19–20, 23, 33–34, 46, 177, 255, 451, 454, 456–457, 462
Serbian peasantry, 154–161
Seven Partidas, 294
sexual conduct, 3, 6–9, 11, 14, 24–27, 29–33, 46–47, 59, 83–85, 106, 110, 113–114, 117–118, 125, 127, 143, 148–149, 163, 185, 190, 192–193, 197–198, 230, 243, 256, 259–262, 264,

266, 281–283, 285, 289, 303–304, 317, 319, 323, 327, 339, 357–363, 368–369, 371–374, 415, 468–469
shame, 3–10, 14, 15, 24–26, 28, 30–33, 43, 81, 106, 111, 115, 174–177, 176, 211, 347, 360–361, 372, 373, 382. 457–458
  shameless, 4–7, 11–14, 26, 32, 174, 360–361, 457
social consensus, 101, 131, 229, 238–239, 271, 281, 289, 395
social mobility, 125, 207, 311, 313, 368, 407, 408, 410–412, 415–416, 436, 442
social stratification, 16, 212, 372, 405, 408, 410, 414
  Indian v Spanish, 401
  India (Swat), 404–405, 414
  USA, 404–405, 408, 414
solidarity, 47, 53, 73, 90, 91, 112, 122, 137, 139, 153, 159, 160, 189, 199, 200, 217, 219, 220, 222–225, 281, 302, 311, 314, 315, 380, 417, 429, 472
sombrero de ala ancha, 255, 266, 387
South African tribes, 10
spiritual power, 227, 229–233, 238
sportsmanship, 18
Stocking, George, 422
synchrony, 333, 343, 349, 351

T

tabu/taboo, 10, 37, 43, 128, 149, 191–192, 260–261, 270, 282, 287, 292, 317, 335, 399, 400, 418
Tallensi, 122
Tarascans, 436, 448
tertulia, 25, 460
theory of totemism, 232, 234, 276, 280, 333, 340, 399–401, 427, 444
típico, 456
Tlascalans, 436, 448
Turner, Victor, 139, 254, 283, 284, 289, 290
Tylor, Edward, 253, 275, 279, 288, 292, 332, 341
Tzeltal, 124, 231, 236, 446
Tzotzil, 124, 236

V

vergüenza, 4–7, 32, 111, 115
vito/cencerrada/the charivari, 11–13, 32, 270
volonté, 199, 200, 206
Voltaire, 26, 33, 109

W

West Indies, 424
witchcraft, 9, 31, 70, 73, 80, 84, 85, 93, 95, 96, 227–233, 235–247, 243–247, 279, 463
Wolf, Eric, 97, 132, 201, 202, 207, 379

Z

zadruga, 154–156, 159
Zapotecs, 360, 416, 436, 447, 448

HAU Books is committed to publishing the most distinguished texts in classic and advanced anthropological theory. The titles aim to situate ethnography as the prime heuristic of anthropology, and return it to the forefront of conceptual developments in the discipline. HAU Books is sponsored by some of the world's most distinguished anthropology departments and research institutions, and releases its titles in both print editions and open-access formats.

www.haubooks.com

Supported by

Hau-N. E. T.

Network of Ethnographic Theory

University of Aarhus – EPICENTER (DK)
University of Amsterdam (NL)
Australian National University – Library (AU)
University of Bergen (NO)
Brown University (US)
California Institute of Integral Studies (US)
University of Campinas (BR)
University of Canterbury (NZ)
University College London (UK)
University of Cologne – The Global South Studies Centre (DE)
and City Library of Cologne (DE)
University of Colorado Boulder Libraries (US)
Cornell University (US)
University of Edinburgh (UK)
The Graduate Institute – Geneva Library (CH)
University of Groningen (NL)
Harvard University (US)
The Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg (RU)
Humboldt University of Berlin (DE)
Indiana University Library (US)
Johns Hopkins University (US)
University of Kent (UK)
Lafayette College Library (US)
London School of Economics and Political Science (UK)
Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon (PL)
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (DE)
University of Manchester (UK)
The University of Manchester Library (UK)
Max-Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic
Diversity at Göttingen (DE)
Musée de Quai Branly (FR)
Museu Nacional – UFRJ (BR)
Norwegian Museum of Cultural History (NO)
University of Oslo (NO)
University of Oslo Library (NO)
Princeton University (US)
University of Rochester (US)
SOAS, University of London (UK)
University of Sydney (AU)
University of Toronto Libraries (CA)

www.haujournal.org/haunet