

THE HERITAGE OF ARUNG PALAKKA

VERHANDELINGEN
VAN HET KONINKLIJK INSTITUUT
VOOR TAAL-, LAND- EN VOLKENKUNDE

91

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THE HERITAGE OF
ARUNG PALAKKA

A HISTORY OF SOUTH SULAWESI (CELEBES)
IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY



THE HAGUE – MARTINUS NIJHOFF 1981

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ISBN 90.247.2463.5

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

During the years that I have been researching and writing this book, I have become indebted to many institutions and individuals, all of whom have in their own way contributed to its completion. In the first place, I would like to thank the Department of Pacific and Southeast Asian History at The Australian National University which made it possible for me to conduct research in South Sulawesi in 1974-5, and which gave me other assistance in subsequent years. Dr. Anthony Reid and Professor Gavan Daws were especially supportive, and to them I am grateful. To the ever-helpful staff of the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde in Leiden, the Algemeen Rijksarchief in The Hague, and the Eastern Manuscripts Section of Leiden University Library, I again owe a debt for their cheerful efficiency which made the task of using the sources so much less onerous than it could have been. My thanks also to George Miller and Anne Todd of the Menzies Library in The Australian National University for the hours spent obtaining, cataloguing, and organizing the books and manuscripts from South Sulawesi and The Netherlands which were so essential for this study.

In South Sulawesi there were many who assisted me in providing information, housing, and companionship which made the life of a researcher a most pleasant one. I would like to thank the family of Colonel Mustari Talli for their generosity and kindness during my entire stay at Ujung Pandang. It made adjusting to Bugis-Makassar life so much easier and more enjoyable than I could have hoped. I would also like to express my appreciation to the following people for their hospitality and assistance in my research: Drs. Dharmawan M.R. in Mandar, Hajjah Muddarijah in Wajo, the family of the late Andi Pangerang Opu Tosinilele in Luwu, Drs. M. Idris Arief in Sinjai, Hamzah Daeng Tompo in Goa, and Andi Mappasissi in Bone. Without their help it would have been impossible for me to obtain some of the sources from these areas. In Ujung Pandang itself I benefitted greatly from discussions with Professor Andi Zainal Abidin and Andi Hasan Machmud which deepened my understanding of Bugis history and culture. Many others also willing

ly spent their precious time recounting the history of their area and discussing with me various aspects of South Sulawesi society. To all of them, my deepest thanks.

During my research in South Sulawesi, I had the exceptionally good fortune of studying with three gifted and inspiring teachers. The first was the late Haji La Side Daeng Tapala who toiled patiently to provide me with a sound foundation in Bugis language and culture and the history of South Sulawesi. Only after a period under his direction did I dare venture out to read Bugis manuscripts on my own with my trusty Matthes' Bugis-Dutch dictionary under my arm. During the later stages of research, I studied with a remarkable individual: the late Andi Pangerang Opu Tosinilele of Belopa, Luwu. His deep knowledge of old Bugis literature and of customs and traditions long forgotten by the society was to me a source of constant wonder. The contents of the manuscripts we read together proved in the end to be less valuable than the exegesis provided by this learned gentleman. His death only about eighteen months after my departure was a great loss to me personally, as well as to South Sulawesi scholarship. My third teacher was Abdurrahim Daeng Mone, undoubtedly the leading scholar of Makassar language and culture in South Sulawesi today. His patience as a language teacher and intimate understanding of Makassar sources enabled me to use Makassar material much sooner than I expected. With his ever critical eye over my shoulder, I was able to read a number of Makassar manuscripts which gave some balance to the Bugis accounts. To these my three great teachers, my heartfelt thanks.

In Holland the late Professor Dr. A. A. Cense was helpful in the various stages of writing, his profound knowledge of South Sulawesi enabling him to clarify numerous obscure points regarding its history and culture. I only hope that the present study will be worthy of his own high standards of scholarship. Another Dutch scholar to whom I am deeply indebted is Dr. J. Noorduyn. His detailed comments saved me from committing a number of embarrassing errors and demonstrated yet again his mastery of Bugis-Makassar sources.

Several colleagues working in the exclusive fraternity of South Sulawesi studies have also been helpful with comments over the years. My thanks to Dr. Heather Sutherland, Dr. Shelly Errington, and Dr. Campbell Macknight for their useful criticism and for their interest. It is hoped that this book will assist them in their own research.

When I look back over the years from the beginning of my interest in South Sulawesi to the present, there are two people to whom I am

especially grateful: Mr. H. J. Koerts and Dr. Barbara Watson Andaya. The former produced the initial spark which inspired this study, and the latter helped sustain the interest that brought it to completion.

To Dr. Phillip Thomas, Royce Wiles, David Fausett, Boenphet Phantaboualoy and especially James Reckner, my sincere appreciation for preparing the manuscript for publication. Finally my thanks to Caroline Phillips for drawing the maps.

June, 1980

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A NOTE ON THE SPELLING, NOTES AND MAPS

Indonesian spelling has been used for all South Sulawesi place names and for apanage titles. For example, Luwu is used instead of the Bugis Luwu' or the Makassar Luu', and Karaeng Sumanna instead of Karaeng Sumanna'. However, the neutral vowel *ə* is used in Bugis words and names to distinguish it from the vowel *e*.

In the notes there are frequent references to "KA". This stands for "Koloniaal Archief", the Colonial Archives of the Dutch East India Company housed in the Algemeen Rijksarchief in The Hague. The KA references are cited in full in the bibliography under "Unpublished Manuscripts", section A. The notation "L-1, L-2, etc." refers to South Sulawesi *lontara*' sources which are listed under "Unpublished Manuscripts", section B.

The large fold-out map has been re-drawn from an original Dutch East India Company map dated 1693 and listed in the map section of the Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, as VEL nr. 1293 (Leupe 1867: 192). The original is extremely detailed and consequently only those names used in the text and certain important landmarks have been reproduced. The sketches of Fort Rotterdam and Environs and of Cenrana have been re-drawn from 17th century originals (no precise date is given) kept in the Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, VEL nr. 1309 and nr. 1306, respectively (Leupe 1867:194-5). In the sketch of the Makassar fortresses along the harbour of Makassar in 1666-9, there are three fortresses with question-marks beside their names: Baro'boso, Mariso, and Garassi. The location of these fortresses is from an M.A. thesis written by a South Sulawesi student using oral traditions in the Makassar area (Abdul Rauf 1974:116). The other fortresses are mentioned in the archival sources dealing with the Makassar War of 1666-9 and are listed in the 1693 map, VEL nr. 1293, in the Algemeen Rijksarchief in The Hague.

ABBREVIATIONS

BKI	Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (van Nederlandsch-Indië)
Bingkisan	Bingkisan, Yayasan Kebudayaan Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara, Ujung Pandang, Indonesia
Dagh-Register	Dagh-Register gehouden in 't Casteel Batavia van 't passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlands Indië, 1624-82, Batavia 1887, etc.
IG	De Indische Gids
JMBRAS	Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
JSEAS	Journal of Southeast Asian Studies
KA	Koloniaal Archief (Colonial Archives)
OB	Overgekomen Brieven (Incoming Letters from Batavia)
O.U.P.	Oxford University Press
TBG	Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde
VKI	Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde
VBG	Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen
VOC	Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (United Dutch East India Company)

INTRODUCTION

The 17th century was a remarkable period in the history of South Sulawesi. Nowhere are the pervasive changes that were to occur better exemplified than in the speed with which many local rulers and their subjects were converted to Islam. Islam's success in the initial two decades of that century was due principally to the first Moslem ruler of the kingdom of Goa who believed it his religious duty to bring this new faith to his neighbours, by conquest if necessary. After subduing the most powerful of its opponents, the kingdom of Bone, Goa went on to become the foremost power in South Sulawesi. For the first time in recorded history there was one state which could claim overlordship throughout the whole peninsula. Goa, however, never undertook the subjugation of Luwu, a kingdom which had once dominated the area, had been the first to embrace Islam, and the first to support Goa's goal of spreading this religion to other lands.

Once Goa had brought most of South Sulawesi under its sway, its rulers sent armies abroad as far west as Lombok and as far east as the Aru-Kei Islands. By the middle of the 17th century Goa had become one of the most powerful and extensive empires in the history of the archipelago. So legendary were Goa's might and riches that the people of Eastern Indonesia could hardly believe the audacity of the Dutch East India Company in daring to mount a challenge to its authority. But it was the unexpected alliance between the Company and the Bugis enemies of Goa which was to bring the latter's glorious period to an abrupt and violent end. In 1669 Sombaopu, Goa's heavily fortified royal citadel and the symbol of its greatness, fell to the enemy. Even before the pillaging had ceased news of this victory was spreading rapidly throughout neighbouring kingdoms, proclaiming the rise of a new star, Arung Palakka, who was destined to inherit the Goa empire. For the rest of the 17th century the triumphant Bugis from Bone and Soppeng were to dominate affairs in Sulawesi.

Today many Makassar people still remember the overthrow of Goa's power with some bitterness. They claim that a truly "Indonesian"

empire had been betrayed by another “Indonesian” group, leaving the Dutch, the “colonialists”, as the ultimate victors. This line of reasoning was especially dominant after Indonesia obtained its independence from the Dutch following a bitter revolution in the years 1945-50. Bugis and Makassar alike debated the merits of Goa’s Sultan Hasanuddin and Bone-Soppeng’s Arung Palakka as true “national heroes” of Indonesia. Although there were some who rightly deplored applying contemporary standards to evaluate activities in the 17th century, the emotions evoked by nationalism were not easily assuaged. Arung Palakka and the Bugis had allied with the Company against “fellow Indonesians” and were therefore considered “traitors” to the new Republic of Indonesia. Long after the cooling of revolutionary fervour the debate has continued, still influencing local politics and the naming of streets and even the capital of South Sulawesi. As long as the knowledge of this significant period of South Sulawesi history remains imperfectly known, there appears little hope that the controversy will ever be stilled.

Although some local histories dealing with events in the second half of the 17th century have been compiled in Indonesian, they are often written from the perspective of one particular kingdom or area (Abdurrazak 1965, 1967, 1967/8, 1968, 1969a, 1969b, 1970; Sanusi 1967; Zainal Abidin 1969; Mahmud Nuhung 1974; Tangdilintin 1974; Fihri 1947). They are therefore regionally-centred and rarely look at the implications for the whole of South Sulawesi. Because of persisting local pride, no doubt a heritage of the nature of early political units in the area, there is a widespread reluctance to encroach on another state’s affairs. When this attitude also influences the writing of history, it is unlikely that any one local historian would dare draw up a general history which would entail choices between conflicting versions. If such a history were to be written it would have to come from an outsider because his motives would be less suspect and his claims to impartiality more convincing. It was this consideration, most of all, which motivated the writing of this book. By introducing much hitherto unknown material from the Dutch East India Company records to the study of South Sulawesi, the present author hopes to build on and expand the historical groundwork already laid by local scholars. Both written and oral South Sulawesi sources have also been consulted so that a broad perspective could be adopted before assaying any statements regarding the significance of events.

During the course of research for this book, an interesting theme began to emerge: the manner in which a local Indonesian prince was able

to use the Dutch presence to institute far-reaching innovations in his society. It became apparent that, while the Company's initial involvement with South Sulawesi had required some military action, its subsequent activities were often limited to that of arbiter in local disputes. Yet its approval was an essential element without which no local prince could exercise authority confidently. The reputation of the Company helped to sustain its position and that of anyone fortunate or clever enough to become linked with it. Arung Palakka's repeated references throughout his life to this link served a dual purpose: it reaffirmed his continuing devotion and loyalty to the Company, while reminding the people of South Sulawesi of the weapon which he could wield if necessary to maintain power. Bearing the Company's trust as a right, Arung Palakka was able to introduce changes with little real opposition from within South Sulawesi. The Company has often been blamed for radical innovations in Malay-Indonesian societies, but as this study shows, in South Sulawesi at least the initiative clearly came from a local ruler. Only research in other areas influenced by the Company's presence will demonstrate whether or not the South Sulawesi experience was unique.

A secondary but nonetheless important reason for this study was to examine the roots of the large scale emigrations from South Sulawesi in the second half of the 17th century. So important were these movements of people that they caused major political and demographic changes throughout the archipelago. The phenomenon, however, has usually been studied from the point of view of the area in which the South Sulawesi refugees settled or attempted to settle. As a result their motives and deeds are often described in unflattering terms, a characterization which has unfortunately been incorporated in general history books on Indonesia and Malaysia. Since there appears such a glaring discrepancy between these accounts and what is known about the people of South Sulawesi in their homeland, an attempt has been made in this study to see the refugees within the context of events in South Sulawesi. Only by this means can there be a fair basis upon which to judge their activities abroad.

There are two principal sources for this study. The first is the contemporary records of the Dutch East India Company housed in the General State Archives in The Hague. The nature of these sources has already been adequately discussed in previous works (Ricklefs 1974:xvi-xviii; L. Y. Andaya 1975:13-15; B. W. Andaya 1979:4-6). What is worth repeating, however, is the varying quality of the reports which were sent by the Dutch governor or president from Fort Rotterdam in Makassar to

the Governor-General and the Council of the Indies in Batavia. Admiral Cornelis Speelman was only in South Sulawesi for a brief period from 1667 to 1669, but the amount of material which he compiled about the area far surpassed that of many of his successors with much longer tenures of office. His monumental *Notitie*, which was left as a final report for his successor, amounts to 646 folio pages and provides a brief but comprehensive account of the history of South Sulawesi up to his time. This work became the most valuable source of information for all subsequent heads of Fort Rotterdam and later historians. In addition to his *Notitie*, Speelman wrote detailed reports during the course of the Makassar War which made it possible to reconstruct much of what occurred. F. W. Stapel used these reports to write a thesis on the war but did not go beyond the signing of the Bungaya treaty in 1667 (Stapel 1922). Stapel's work, *Het Bongaais Verdrag*, is cited frequently in this book for the early period of the Makassar War since both he and the present author had consulted the same Company documents. Any additional points left unmentioned by Stapel are provided with the full archival reference. After Speelman's departure from Sulawesi in October 1669, the reports from his successors never attained the same depth of coverage and varied considerably in quality and length. The historian, therefore, is frequently at the mercy of his informants and must be particularly attuned to the different interests and styles of individual Company officials. A large, detailed report may not necessarily indicate great and significant activity; by the same token, it cannot be assumed that a terse note signifies that nothing of importance had occurred. Only after one has had the opportunity to examine a variety of documents over a fairly extensive period do some of these reports finally begin to shed light on events they describe.

One other point about these contemporary Dutch records deserves to be reiterated. Among the masses of Company material dealing specifically with Company matters are the precious documents containing letters, speeches, and comments made by local rulers and nobles. Unfortunately, very rarely is the original provided and one has to remain content with translations. Even in translation these accounts are invaluable since they are one of the few contemporary records which describe what and how the local leaders thought, said, and acted in different situations. While the other Company reports are useful in providing a chronological framework of developments in South Sulawesi, only by examining these special documents can one understand the tensions, the conflicts, and the concerns of the local leaders.

The second type of source material is the local South Sulawesi accounts, indispensable because of the variety of information they provide. Scholars who have studied Bugis and Makassar *lontara'* – chronicles, dairies and notebooks – have been struck by their frankness and accuracy (Kern 1948; Cense 1951; Noorduyn 1965; Zainal Abidin 1971). In this present study the *Diary of the Kings of Goa and Tallo* (Ligtvoet 1880) proved especially useful for dates and personal relations which were often confused or unmentioned in the Company reports. The *Diary of Arung Palakka* (L-31) was valuable if only in allowing the historian a rare and occasional glimpse into the personal life of the man. The chronicles of the Bugis and Makassar kingdoms provided a basis for reconstructing the early origins of the South Sulawesi states and their history prior to the arrival of the Dutch. But they were equally useful in determining the concerns of the ruling classes.

There are other written documents which appear to have been originally oral traditions. Folktales, folk etymology, local traditions, short historical episodes, observations on a specific event – all form a part of these documents. They, together with stories still remembered by the community, provide vital clues for the understanding of obscure references in Dutch records and the local chronicles. More important, however, is their representation of how events affected a specific area or group. In general, therefore, the South Sulawesi sources impart a depth of meaning to the mass of undifferentiated information contained in the contemporary records of the Dutch East India Company.

In using these sources the historian should bear in mind several considerations. Firstly, the *lontara'* are sometimes written in indecipherable script and contain many obscure references and archaic words now known only to a mere handful of people, mostly elderly. Long periods of consultation and discussion are frequently necessary in order to grasp the meaning of particular passages; yet the connotations may still remain elusive. Secondly, none of the existing documents dates from the 17th century and many have been recopied and edited several times since they were first compiled. In the absence of philological studies for many of these *lontara'* sources, it is difficult to establish dates of origin or interpolations. Fortunately, a few Portuguese accounts in the 16th century and the Company records of the 17th century can serve as some form of control. In comparing the European and South Sulawesi accounts, the general outlines of major developments appear similar in both.

One striking feature of these indigenous sources is their general

agreement on what actually occurred in certain important events in South Sulawesi. Although the documents are not identical, the inclusion of distinctive details about individual areas does not distort the essential line of the narrative. One could perhaps argue, as some local historians have done, that the few documents which survived the turmoil of the revolution and rebellion periods in South Sulawesi (1945-65) formed the basis of later copies. Yet copyists apparently did not seize this opportunity to emphasize the role of their own areas. Since the history of South Sulawesi is not the preserve of any one group, only the most brazen individual would deliberately tamper with the known facts or generally accepted interpretation.

Finally, one must emphasize that the South Sulawesi sources are an integral part of the local culture. Simply to juxtapose them with Dutch accounts does scant justice to either. This study hopes to demonstrate that an understanding of the manner in which Bugis and Makassar people viewed their world is essential if the Company records are to be fully exploited. South Sulawesi accounts, for example, often explain and justify a deed in terms of a well-known concept in the society. It is only necessary to mention the concept to evoke a series of images in the minds of the society concerning the causes, the effects, and the traditionally sanctioned responses relating to this concept. *Siri'* was one such concept, meaning both "shame" and "self-worth". Without appreciating all the implications of the term, a straightforward Dutch translation of a Bugis or Makassar letter by a Company official can easily be misinterpreted or considered irrelevant.

Another example of the manner in which a knowledge of South Sulawesi society or its sources could inform Dutch records are the conventions surrounding treaty-making. South Sulawesi treaty-making traditions have their corresponding codes of behaviour and accepted phraseology which declare a kingdom's particular position in a hierarchy of states. The Dutch often received letters from local rulers stating that they had been "reminded" of a former treaty by another lord or that they were like a "child" to the Company. These were important declarations suggesting a recognition of shifts in political power in the area and requiring a specific response. But such vital cultural communication can go undetected by a historian with only a passing interest in or knowledge of Bugis-Makassar society.

Since the history of the last half of the 17th century is dominated by and often revolves around Arung Palakka, he becomes the focus of the

present study. Chapter I attempts to explain certain political and cultural features in South Sulawesi society and the particular historical circumstances which help elucidate the principal events of this period. The culmination of the rivalry between Goa and Bone and the increasing tensions between the Dutch East India Company and Goa which contributed directly to the Makassar War are the subjects of Chapter II. In Chapter III the war is described in some detail for a specific reason. Even in our own time, this war continues to evoke an emotional response among the people of South Sulawesi and has consequently spawned a number of myths and misconceptions. Only by attempting to determine what the realities of the war were can many of these be discredited. Furthermore, the war underscored certain features which proved significant in later years, such as the reckless bravery of Arung Palakka which came to characterize his fighting style and made him a legend in his own time; the serious rifts between the peace and war factions within the Goa-Tallo courts which led later to defections of some of the most prominent leaders of these kingdoms; and the complex alliances of Bugis and Makassar kingdoms on both sides which belie the later simplistic picture of a war fought between the Bugis people and the Dutch on one side, and the Makassar people on the other. By establishing as precisely as one can, given the limitations of the sources, what exactly happened in the Makassar War, one can at last begin to discuss its implications with less emotion and more rationality.

In November 1667 the Treaty of Bungaya was signed by the major belligerents in a premature attempt to end the war. The treaty and its meaning and significance to the parties involved are discussed in Chapter IV. This discussion is essential to explain, in Chapter V, why and how in later years the treaty was seen as a justification for seemingly provocative acts by both the Company and South Sulawesi states. It also further accentuates the great care taken in this society to observe the inviolability of all states, no matter how small and unimportant.

Chapters VI and VII examine the manner in which Arung Palakka and the Company consolidated their power and arranged a mutually acceptable division of authority, with the former the dominant partner in the internal affairs and the latter in the external affairs of South Sulawesi. So successful was this arrangement that the traditional avenues of protest within the society became ineffective and contributed to a major outflow of people from South Sulawesi. The story of these refugees is examined in Chapter VIII in order to understand the cause of their flight, their motivations abroad, and their significance in terms of

the political developments within South Sulawesi. Because of their numbers and their well-earned reputations as warriors, these refugees posed a real threat, not only to vulnerable kingdoms in the archipelago, but also to the stability of South Sulawesi itself. Their defeat in Java in 1679 ended the last real challenge from these enemies to the joint overlordship established by Arung Palakka and the Company.

While this relationship in general appeared well and flourishing, there were periods of tension between Arung Palakka and the various Dutch governors and presidents based in Fort Rotterdam. Arung Palakka became prey to doubts about his status with the Company and therefore suspected any other local ruler who appeared to have its favour. This suspicion led to a tragic episode related in Chapter IX: the assassination on Arung Palakka's orders of one of his staunchest supporters, Arung Bakkě Todani. Yet Arung Palakka was willing to take such a drastic step, not simply to protect his position, but also to assure that his heirs would be unopposed in bringing to fruition many of Arung Palakka's dreams. No South Sulawesi ruler ever again challenged Arung Palakka's authority. Chapters X and XI describe how Arung Palakka proceeded to exercise almost total control over all other states in South Sulawesi. He was not beyond using cajolery, intimidation, and, ultimately, force to obtain his way. The culmination of his efforts was the remarkable display of unity and respect shown to him by the assembled armies of South Sulawesi in 1695, less than a year before his death.

Chapter XII is a sequel to the story of Arung Palakka's monumental efforts to create a united South Sulawesi ruled by his family. A loose political unity of the whole of South Sulawesi responsive to one lord had been achieved by the time of his death in 1696. His successor, La Patau, continued to rule unchallenged as supreme overlord, thanks to the foresight and care exercised by Arung Palakka in establishing firmly the precedents of power and authority associated with this position. Although none of La Patau's children was ever to exercise such widespread influence again, they and their descendants came to rule all the major kingdoms in South Sulawesi up into the 20th century. A political unity may not have been achieved by Arung Palakka's successors, but a precedent of united action had been established and reinforced by close blood links among the major royal families. Of all that Arung Palakka achieved in his long and eventful lifetime, this was perhaps his greatest accomplishment. It was a heritage worthy of the man.

CHAPTER I

STATE AND SOCIETY IN SOUTH SULAWESI IN THE 17th CENTURY

Events in South Sulawesi (see Maps 1 and 2) in the 17th century can only be properly appreciated through an understanding of certain cultural features which determined the nature of political control. One of the most basic of these features is the existence of four major ethnic (*suku*) groups within South Sulawesi: the Bugis, Makassar, Toraja, and Mandar peoples (see Map 3). The largest group is the Bugis who occupy almost the entire eastern half and part of the western half of the southwest peninsula of Sulawesi. The Makassar people are the next largest in population and are found in the western and southern areas of the peninsula. Next in size numerically are the Sa'dan Toraja people who are found mainly in the mountain areas in the north bordering the Bugis state of Luwu in the east and Mandar in the west.¹ Finally, there are the Mandar people who occupy the coastal and mountain areas of the north-western part of the peninsula. They can be divided into two groups: those who live in the mountain settlements known collectively as the *Pitu Ulunna Salo'*, who are ethnically Toraja, and those who live on the coast under the title of their confederation, *Pitu Babana Binanga*.

Since the Bugis and Makassar peoples from early times occupied the most fertile agricultural lands on the peninsula and had access to some of the most favourable harbour sites, they became numerically and politically the dominant *suku*. The Mandar and Toraja peoples were often the victims of the ambitions of Bugis or Makassar rulers and were drawn mercilessly into the maelstrom of lowland politics. By the 17th century the struggle for hegemony between the Bugis kingdom of Bone and the Makassar kingdom of Goa grew in intensity and threatened to envelope the whole of South Sulawesi. As the various states responded to pressures from both Bone and Goa and made their commitments, it became apparent that *suku* considerations had played only a minor part in their decisions. For example, the Bugis states of Wajo, Luwu, Bulo-Bulo, Lamatti, and Raja became allies of Goa, while the Makassar area of Turatea came to support Arung Palakka in the Makassar War of 1666-9. The *Pitu Babana Binanga* of Mandar was one of the staunchest allies of

Goa in the war and proved a great asset in the fighting. It was able to avoid the harsh retribution of Arung Palakka after the war because of its ability to use its inhospitable mountainous terrain in the interior as a refuge against invading armies. The Toraja people played no active role in the war, except for some who may have been part of the Datu Luwu's armies. The fall of Sombaopu in 1669 ending the Makassar War was not, therefore, a victory of one *suku* over another, but of one alliance of states composed of different *suku* over another.

There is another feature of South Sulawesi society which assumes prominence in 17th century events. It is the strength and cohesiveness of the local communities which form the basic political units in the land. Even though these communities may have become in time part of larger kingdoms, the confederative nature of these kingdoms reflects the enduring importance of the individual units. To explain the reason for the strength of these communities, one has to examine local traditions concerning their origins.

The most elaborate and coherent representation of the beginnings of South Sulawesi society is found in the remarkable Bugis epic from Luwu known as the *I La Galigo*.² In this epic gods rule in the Upper- and Underworld. One day the principal god, Patotoe, "The Determiner of Fate", convenes the Council of the gods and obtains approval to send Patotoe's son Batara Guru to rule the earth. We Nyilitimo', the daughter of the chief god of the Underworld, is sent to earth "rising up from the foam of the sea" to become Batara Guru's companion. They marry, and they and their offspring rule in Luwu. Then one day the last of this godly race return to their original homelands. There is a second coming of the godrulers but they too later return. With the disappearance of the second set of godrulers, the *I La Galigo* epic comes to an "end".³

Nothing is said explicitly in the *I La Galigo* of how mankind came to populate the earth. When the godrulers arrive, there are already people living on the earth. There is, however, an oral tradition which follows the universally known story of the flood and a new beginning. In this tale the world was once covered with water except for a few mountain peaks. On these peaks lived groups of people. As the water receded the people began to build rafts and eventually made contact with people on the other peaks. They soon built houses of *atap* (a type of palm frond) and wood and began living in communities. When Patotoe and his wife saw that the earth was populated but without anyone to govern it, they convened the Council of the gods to discuss the matter. It was agreed that the gods should send their offspring to the earth so that the people

would be able “to pay devotion to the Upperworld and respect to the Underworld”. From this point onward until the disappearance of the godrulers from the earth, the story is similar to that in the *I La Galigo* (Makkaraka 1967:16-17; Borahima 1971:29).⁴

What this oral tale neglects to mention is the existence, according to prevailing traditions from both Bugis and Makassar areas, of objects known as *gaukěng* (Bugis)/*gaukang* (Makassar). This object was an important factor in the formation of early Bugis-Makassar settlements and was accorded great veneration as a guardian spirit of a particular community. The *gaukěng* was anything with an unusual shape or with peculiar characteristics; it could be a dried-out fruit-pit, a stump, or an old plough, but more often than not it was simply a stone. It was believed that some time in the distant past some member of the community discovered this sacred object, and the people then provided a dwelling, servants, fields, and ponds for the upkeep of both the *gaukěng* and its finder. The finder then became the spiritual and secular leader of the community as spokesman for the *gaukěng*. This was the beginning, according to these oral sources, of the leaders of the *gaukěng* communities.

Although there is almost no discussion of the origins of the *gaukěng* or of its significance, much can be learned from similar examples elsewhere in Southeast Asia. While the belief in tutelary deities immanent in stones is found throughout Southeast Asia, India, and China, one of the clearest expositions of this was made by a French scholar, Paul Mus, describing these sacred stones in Champa in present-day Central Vietnam. Champa is the name of a kingdom peopled by an Indonesian race who developed an impressive civilization between the 9th and 14th centuries. According to Mus the Chams believed that the Lord of the Soil, embodying the life-giving energies of the earth, was present in these stones. These stones were not representations, but the actual Lord of the Soil made manifest to mankind. Since the Lord of the Soil was incapable of communicating with mankind in this form, it was necessary to have an intermediary between mankind and the god. The individual who became the intermediary was elevated by his fellowmen to become spiritual and temporal head of the community because of his role as spokesman for the Lord of the Soil. These sacred stones in Champa appear to have similar origins, functions and significance as the *gaukěng* in South Sulawesi. It is very likely that they are part of the same phenomenon mentioned by Mus as being present throughout Monsoon Asia (Mus

1975:7-15).⁵

The oral traditions in South Sulawesi appear to be even more explicit than those in Champa concerning the role of these sacred stones in the evolution of organized settlements. According to these traditions, the original *gaukěng* communities in South Sulawesi in time began to expand. The area originally within the spiritual domain of the *gaukěng*, which then defined that community's boundaries, became no longer sufficient to provide for the needs of the group. Offshoots from the mother communities were established, each with its own *gaukěng*. These new communities were considered to be the "children" of the original "mother" *gaukěng* community, and their *gaukěng* were considered "helpers" of the original *gaukěng*. There were many of these *gaukěng* community complexes throughout South Sulawesi, and before long they began to impinge upon each other and disputes began arising, especially over land and water rights. Force was often used to solve a dispute because there was no other mediating mechanism available to settle inter-*gaukěng* community quarrels. According to oral tradition, at this stage of the development of South Sulawesi communities appeared the *Tomanurung* (Bugis)/*Tumanurung* (Makassar), i.e. "He/She who descended [from the Upperworld]".

Without referring specifically to the *I La Galigo*, the later Bugis-Makassar oral and written traditions link the last known episode of this epic with the coming of the *Tomanurung*. Once the second set of godrulers disappears from the earth, as described in the "final" episode of the *I La Galigo*, there follows a period of seven (some say seventy-seven) generations when mankind is without a ruler. This period is characterized in tradition by an especially graphic description of man being like fish, with the larger and stronger consuming the smaller and weaker.⁶ In desperation the people appeal to the gods to send a ruler to earth once again so peace and order can be restored. Their pleas are answered and a *Tomanurung* appears among the people in some isolated spot. According to traditions from various kingdoms, at first the *Tomanurung* hesitates in accepting the people's offer to be their ruler. Only when certain guarantees are made acknowledging his special position does the *Tomanurung* finally relent. The position of the people is safeguarded by the retention of the leaders of the communities in a special council to advise the ruler in the affairs of state and to maintain the customs of the land. The council, therefore, becomes the repository of the community's traditions and customs which precede in time and importance the later *Tomanurung* figure.⁷

The organization of the communities into mini-states with a ruler and an advisory council to assure the smooth functioning of society was merely the first step toward larger state units. Soon different states combined willingly or through force to form larger units for a variety of reasons but mainly for defence. The loose nature of these confederations was retained even when they expanded into powerful kingdoms. The alternative was a forced centralization which required greater expertise, enforcement capability, and wealth than any of the aspiring overlords in South Sulawesi possessed until the coming to power in the late 17th century of Arung Palakka La Tēnritatta, the focus of this present study. What one found instead in kingdoms such as Luwu, Bone, Wajo, and Goa, was an administrative superstructure with an overlord dominating a host of substructures under “sub” rulers. There was minimal interference of the “supra” state in the internal affairs of the “sub” states. But the ability of the overlord to enforce his will if necessary because of the easy accessibility of these “subkingdoms” made such a union possible. The confederation of these substates into “kingdoms” was never conceived as a permanent arrangement and was characterized by a fluidity of political allegiances. If a subkingdom believed that its self-interests were not served by remaining with its present confederation, it could try to establish a new arrangement with another confederation. Such options were available especially to the more powerful of the subkingdoms, as was demonstrated by the frequent changes of allegiance of the areas between Wajo and Bone in the wars of these two kingdoms in the 16th and 17th centuries (Noorduyn 1955:216; Andaya 1978:285).

While the geographical accessibility of the Bugis-Makassar areas made confederation easier and perhaps necessary, the natural barriers separating the groups in the Mandar and Toraja lands made the formation of large kingdoms there difficult to justify and maintain. The two major Mandar confederations fought as often against one another as with each other against a common enemy. The state of Balannipa was the most powerful in the coastal confederation and frequently succeeded in enforcing its will on the others in the 17th century. As a result the Dutch and the Bugis and Makassar kingdoms often spoke of Balannipa's ruler as the *Maradia* (ruler of) Mandar, even though he was really the *primus inter pares* and merely the Maradia Balannipa. Little is known about the mountain states of Mandar since they rarely impinged on the general stream of South Sulawesi affairs. Dutch, Bugis, and Makassar sources simply refer to withdrawal of the Downriver Mandar population to the mountains in times of invasion. But there is no mention of any

active participation of the Upriver Mandar Confederation in any historical incidents. Downriver Mandar sources claim that in the 16th century there was a defensive alliance between these two Mandar Confederations (Abdul Rauf 1974:13). So little is known about the history of the Upriver Mandar states that there is even disagreement as to which seven states belonged to the confederation (Mangoli 1973:30-1).⁸

The Toraja communities in general had the most difficulty in eking out a living in their mountainous region. Every available flat land was utilized and some of the hills were terraced to grow rice. Nevertheless, there was never enough food to support a large population.⁹ Travel between the communities was slow and cumbersome because of the rugged terrain. The physical isolation of the individual communities and the small concentrations of population lessened the necessity or the desire for permanent political confederations as occurred in the Bugis and Makassar lands. Instead, what evolved in the Toraja areas was a loose union of individual communities as in Mandar which acted jointly when this was necessary but which never submitted to an overarching authority. There was one relatively powerful Toraja confederation called the *Tallulembangna*, "The Three Boats", consisting of Sangalla, Makkale, and Mengkendek. It had a common ancestor, and each member of the confederation was ruled by a *puang* (lord). But this confederation was clearly an exception with a more complex *adat* structure than most other Toraja communities (Nooy-Palm 1975:64). In the 17th and early 18th centuries the Sa'dan Toraja communities acted as one people to fight the Bugis invasions. But once the threat was over they returned to their individual areas and dissolved the union. The Toraja traditions do not talk of any attempt by a Toraja leader to try to unite all of the Toraja communities politically.¹⁰ It must have been obvious to all Toraja leaders that to attempt to rule as one kingdom the various scattered communities, some in most inaccessible areas, was unrealistic and impractical.

The difference between the political organization which evolved in the Mandar-Toraja areas and those in the Bugis-Makassar areas was principally one of degree. The individual communities among the Mandar-Toraja never became so closely confederated that they consented to acknowledge a single overlord as the principal political authority. Among the Bugis and Makassar, on the other hand, the *gaukëng* communities developed into political unions, or kingdoms, with an acknowledged overlord. This overlord became the principal ruler among a host of petty lords who were leaders of their respective extended *gaukëng*

communities or principalities. Once these principalities had been peaceably or forcibly incorporated into a confederation or kingdom, they relinquished to it their rights to make war and to conduct external affairs with another state. What they did retain, however, were their rights to choose their own rulers and to preserve their traditional customs (*adat*) and processes of law (*bicara*). Yet they did not have the freedom of action as did their Toraja and Mandar counterparts, and the difference was highlighted by a rigid code of interstate relationships which was valid both for the principalities *vis à vis* their confederation/kingdom as between kingdoms.

The unique practice in the past of allowing all principalities the right to preserve the most basic and necessary ingredients which make up a state arose because of the respect for the original guardian spirit of the community, the *gaukěng*. Since the local prince was considered to be a *Tomanurung* and hence “white-blooded”¹¹ or of the race of gods, and since he was believed to be governing on behalf of the *gaukěng*, it was generally feared that any attempt by an outsider to replace him would cause a calamity in the land. Insofar as *adat* and the *bicara* were concerned, they were customary practices evolved over time in the relationship of the *gaukěng* and the community, and so any outside interference with these *gaukěng*-based institutions was courting the wrath of the local Lord of the Soil. This belief helped to preserve the basic political units which developed from the *gaukěng* communities. It was the sacred origins of these individual political units ruled by an *arung* (Bugis), *karaeng* (Makassar), *maradia*, etc., which accounted for their cohesiveness, their unique identity, and hence their strength in South Sulawesi society. Only by being aware of the nature of these states, can one properly appraise Arung Palakka’s efforts to forge a unity throughout South Sulawesi of all these fiercely independent and diverse groups.

One particular cultural feature assumes great importance in the history of South Sulawesi in the latter half of the 17th century: the concepts of *siri’* and *pěsse* (Bugis)/*pacce* (Makassar). *Siri’* is a concept which embraces the idea of self-worth and shame. There is no contradiction in these terms, for a sense of shame implies a conception by an individual of his own self-worth from which arises his dignity. There are, however, two different ways of referring to *siri’*. It is used in one sense to indicate that someone had been made *siri’*, ashamed. The act of making someone feel shame is the act of denying that person his own conception of his self-worth and self-respect. In such circumstances the person who has

been made *siri'* is expected to take measures to restore his sullied self-image by seeking satisfaction from the offending party. The stigma attached to a person who is without *siri'*, self-worth or dignity, is so great that a person will sacrifice his own life in the attempt to remove the shame and restore his self-respect. There is a saying in Bugis that it is better to die in defence of *siri'* (*mate ri siri'na*) than to be with no *siri'* at all (*mate siri'*). Society's prescriptions of proper responses open to one who is made *siri'* compelled individuals such as Arung Palakka to undertake acts which appeared to an outsider to be irrational, foolhardy, and even suicidal.

Pěsse/pacce refers specifically to the belief in the spiritual unity of all individuals within a particular community. The origin of this concept and the basis of its strength may be traced to the *gaukěng*. Every community was identified with a *gaukěng* whose spiritual authority extended over a specific, circumscribed area. From the very beginning of the formation of a community, therefore, a spiritual bond existed among the members based upon their identification with a particular *gaukěng* and their shared belief of its protective powers over the community.

The concept of *pěsse/pacce* bears a number of similarities with the idea of *siri'*. *Pěsse/pacce* on the ordinary level means "a pain", but it also has another definition of "commiseration, empathy with one's fellow men". In *pěsse/pacce*, as with *siri'*, the apparent contradictory meanings for one term are mere illusions which in reality subtly convey a whole, unified idea.¹² The empathy one feels for a compatriot in distress is expressed as an emotion of pain because one shares the problem in spirit. It is this emotion of *pěsse/pacce* which binds a Bugis or a Makassar individual to his homeland even after long exile and which serves as a stimulus for him to return to his original spiritual community. An individual can also express *pěsse/pacce* for his community which is suffering although he himself is not directly affected. As with *siri'* the emotions of empathy and commiseration or *pěsse/pacce* require action to remove the cause of distress.

These two concepts are indeed closely related. It is the act of *siri'* against a person which creates the situation of *pěsse/pacce*. The pressure of the community's *pěsse/pacce* for an individual who has been made *siri'*, or ashamed, forces that person to take steps which the community has established as proper procedure in such situations. One finds confirmation of such social pressure in sayings such as "to die a death of *siri'* is to die a death of sugar and coconut milk" (*mate rigollai, mate risan-tanng*).¹³ This attitude is noted in the records of the Dutch East India

Company where the South Sulawesi allies of the Company demanded satisfaction from Goa for some “shame” it had caused them. “Without satisfaction”, said these allies, “we would no longer be among the living but among the dead and would be considered to be people without feeling (*ongeoelige menschen*)”.¹⁴ From the context it is likely that the Dutch words *ongeoelige menschen* were intended as a translation of the Bugis-Makassar idea of people without *siri*, without self-respect, and hence without feeling. The recognition by the Bugis and Makassar people of the essential unity of these two concepts is seen in the following sayings:

“If it is not *siri*’ which makes us, the Makassar people, one, then it is *pacce* (Ikambe mangkasaraka, punna tasiri’, paceseng nipabbulo sibatannang).”

“If there is no longer *siri*’ among us, Bugis, at least there is certain to be *pässe* (ia sempugikku, rekkua de’na siri’na ěngka mēssa pēssena).”

What these sayings express is the belief that, if it is not *siri*’, it will be *pässe/pacce*, or *vice-versa*, which will remind the individual of his place in the community for they are basically part of a single idea.

These cultural features, then, are essential for an understanding of events in South Sulawesi in the 17th century. But as vital is a knowledge of the character of the major South Sulawesi kingdoms and the historical circumstances which led to a change in the traditional patterns of control. The most profitable way to attempt to understand this background is to begin with Luwu, the first major historical kingdom known in South Sulawesi and regarded by most as the cradle of Bugis civilization.

There is still some controversy concerning the precise period of Luwu’s dominance. One source speculates that Luwu’s heyday began in the 10th century (Braam-Morris 1889:546), and a local scholar claims that the great Bugis epic poem, *I La Galigo*, was created in Luwu at its height of power sometime in the 9th century.¹⁵ Although the beginning of Luwu’s supremacy is still in dispute, Luwu was considered to be a major power by the beginning of the 16th century. Why Luwu should have been the first of the confederations/kingdoms to evolve in Sulawesi is difficult to explain. The centre of ancient Luwu is said to have been the coastal region between Wotu and Malili (Esser 1961:385). Local historians, strongly influenced by the tales of the *I La Galigo*, tend to place the earliest capitals of Luwu in the vicinity of the Cerekang River. Again

following the *I La Galigo* traditions, these historians speak of an “iron mountain” in this area, which at present is also the site of a large nickel deposit centred in Malili. From ancient times iron was obtained near Lake Matano in the southeast of Central Sulawesi which at one time belonged to Luwu. The Cerekang is the second largest of numerous rivers which dissect the mountainous Luwu region. Although the Cerekang has silted up considerably over the centuries, even in the 19th century large *perahu* were still capable of sailing upriver for several days without difficulty. The only flatlands in Luwu are encountered along the north and northwest coasts on the Gulf of Bone where they extend a few kilometres inland. Much of the land along the coast is marshy and is submerged at high tide (Braam-Morris 1889:501-2).

The site of an early Luwu capital near the Cerekang River would have not only exploited the scarce flatlands in Luwu but would also have availed itself of a natural waterway to the interior. If local traditions are accurate with regard to an “iron mountain”, perhaps in the vicinity of Lake Matano, the Cerekang River would have provided an ideal way to transport any heavy load downriver to the capital on the coast. In an earlier period the possession of this metal would have been a significant factor in warfare and in the development of trade between Luwu and the outside areas. The iron from the Luwu and Toraja areas is said to be heavily mixed with nickel, a mixture considered by Javanese to be ideal for the making of their krisses. Java itself produces no iron and would have been dependent on imports of that metal for the manufacture of krisses, weapons regarded with great reverence among many Malay-Indonesian groups in the archipelago. In the *Nāgarakērtāgama*, a 13th century text from the kingdom of Majapahit, Luwu is mentioned as one of Majapahit’s dependencies. While there is no unanimity among scholars whether Majapahit did exercise overlordship over the territories claimed to be its vassals in the *Nāgarakērtāgama*, the fact that Luwu is among the “vassals” mentioned indicates that Java was aware of this area of South Sulawesi (Pigeaud 1960, III:17). It would not be difficult to assume, therefore, that Luwu would have found a ready market for its iron in Majapahit. The wealth from this iron trade and the access to ideas from the advanced civilization of Majapahit may have provided the basis for Luwu’s early ascendancy in South Sulawesi.

Luwu’s ties with the outside world were not limited to Java. Sawerigading, the most famous of Luwu’s godrulers of the *I La Galigo*, is said to have travelled extensively to areas which have been identified with Ternate, Bima, Java, and the Coromandel Coast in India (Eerdmans

n.d.:51; Kern 1954). A maritime code of the kingdom of Melaka dating from about the middle of the 15th century mentions traders from South Sulawesi sailing to Sumbawa, Singapore, Johor, Melaka, Perak, Aceh, and Timor (Patunru 1969:10; Winstedt 1945:25-26).

Whatever may have been the cause of its rise as a kingdom, Luwu is generally acknowledged as the first of the Bugis-Makassar civilizations to emerge in South Sulawesi.¹⁶ Unfortunately, little is known about early Luwu history. Any reconstruction of Luwu's distant past rests almost solely upon the evidence of the *I La Galigo*, and this evidence itself is spotty and difficult to corroborate. The epic ends with the return of the last godrulers, Simpurutoja and Lëtte Parëppa, to the Underworld. After a period of chaos following the disappearance of the godrulers in Luwu, a *Tomanurung* named Simpurusiang descends to earth and re-establishes order. He marries Patiangjala, and begets a son called Anakaji, who becomes the progenitor of the kings of Luwu (Eerdmans n.d. (a):53-56; Matthes 1864:527-530).

During Luwu's period of ascendancy in South Sulawesi, from perhaps the 10th to the 16th centuries, there was another major kingdom in the west coast of the peninsula known as Siang. Siang first appears in European sources in a Portuguese map dating from about 1540. Mamuju (Mandar), Siang, Tallo, and Garassi on the west coast of Sulawesi were also known to Portuguese cartographers. According to a 16th century Portuguese account, Goa had been subjugated by Tallo, and Tallo in turn recognized Siang as "larger" and more powerful than itself. Apparently local oral traditions from the area which was formerly known as Siang (Pangkajene Kepulauan) retain this viewpoint. The valuable archaeological finds in the area of Siang seem to be further evidence that it may have been an important kingdom on the west coast of South Sulawesi prior to the rise of Tallo and Goa (Pelras 1973:54). In 1542 a Portuguese trader, Antonio de Paiva, first came to Siang before proceeding northward to central Sulawesi to obtain sandalwood. When he returned in 1544, he stopped in three places: Suppa, Siang, and Goa (Pelras 1973:41). Paiva commented that Goa was a large city "which had once been a vassal of Siang, but not any longer" (Pelras 1973:47). Another Portuguese observer, Manoel Pinto, estimated in 1545 that Siang had a population of about 40,000. Its ruler was so supremely confident of the resources of his state that he offered to supply the entire food requirements of the kingdom of Melaka (Pelras 1973:53).

Pelras has suggested from a preliminary investigation of both European and local sources that Siang was an important commercial and

most likely political centre between the 14th and 16th centuries. Its influence may have extended over the whole west coast from the area of present-day LimaeAjattapparēng all the way to the south to the borders of the Makassar kingdoms of Goa and Tallo. But by the middle of the 16th century Siang was eclipsed by the new rising power on the west coast, the kingdom of Goa. An alliance between Goa and Tallo against Siang finally brought about its demise and oblivion sometime in the late 16th century (Pelras 1977:252-5).

An interesting picture emerges concerning the exercise of political power from early times in South Sulawesi. During the period of the formation of the confederations among the Bugis-Makassar people, there were apparently two parallel and separate political developments. Siang dominated the west coast while Luwu remained supreme on the east coast of South Sulawesi. These developments were governed principally by geographic factors. The east and west coasts of the southwest peninsula area of Sulawesi are effectively cut off from one another by mountain ranges with an average elevation of over 1,500 metres. The only sizeable opening in this mountain barrier is a central depression from the area of Sinjai on the southeast coast to the mouth of the Sa'dan River on the northwest coast. The southern part is mainly a relatively narrow corridor of the Walēnnæ valley, but to the north the floor widens and is occupied by marshes and shallow lakes, the largest being Lake Tempe and Lake Sidenreng. The Walēnnæ River empties into Lake Tempe from the south, and another branch, the Cenrana River, follows a narrow valley through the hills and out the sea in the Gulf of Bone. North of the lakes is a low watershed area between the lake basin and the Rappang River and other streams flowing west, which then gives way to a marshy coastal plain extending northward from Pare-Pare. From Pare-Pare southward is the western range of mountains which runs parallel to the west coast for about 192 kilometres to the southern tip of the peninsula (Allied 1943:No. 80, 78-80).

Luwu, in its southward expansion, simply followed the most accessible route. It went south along the coastline to the mouth of the Cenrana River, then moved to the interior of Wajo and Soppeng via the Walēnnæ, and finally turned south again along the coast to Bone. Wajo and Soppeng openly acknowledge in their tradition their earlier dependence on Luwu. A tale widely known in Wajo is that of a Luwu princess and Bone prince who become the ancestors of the people of Wajo (Noorduyn 1955:32-33). In Soppeng it is said that some time in the past a representative of the Luwu rulers used to come periodically to see that

the country was governed well (Ghalib, n.d.: unpag.). Only later when these areas had acknowledged Luwu's suzerainty did Luwu then contemplate extending its conquest westward to the lands of the Limae Ajattapparəng.

The mountain chain had proved to be somewhat of a barrier to both Luwu's and Siang's political ambitions. But perhaps a more crucial reason for the peaceful co-existence of these two overlords in this early period was the fact that the peninsula still allowed for expansion into two natural spheres of influence. This state of affairs, however, could not last since it was merely a stage in the yet uncompleted process of incorporation of smaller and weaker states into larger confederations. Political expansion had at first followed geographical lines of least resistance. But it was only a matter of time before the two competing powers began to encroach into each other's spheres of influence because of the rapidly shrinking frontiers of South Sulawesi.

The power balance on the east coast began changing during the reign of *Datu* (Ruler of) Luwu, Rajadewa or Dewaraja Datu Kelali' Tosangər-rəng, who ruled sometime in the late 15th and early 16th centuries. This was reflected in Luwu's changing attitude toward Wajo. Rajadewa gave Larompong, Malluse and Salo to Wajo to increase the latter's territories and make possible a more equitable alliance between the two kingdoms. Nevertheless, the true status of both kingdoms was never in doubt since in all matters Luwu was to be considered the elder brother and Wajo the younger (Noorduyn 1955:68; Zainal Abidin 1979:81-2). Previously treaties between Luwu and Wajo had been specifically worded to indicate a relationship of a parent to a child, hence demonstrating Wajo's vassal status to Luwu. The new alliance was phrased in terms of one between "brothers", a significant difference in status which reflected both Wajo's growing power *vis à vis* Luwu, as well as Luwu's recognition of its need for allies to maintain its position as the acknowledged power in the area. Luwu was aware of Wajo's potential power through trade via the Cenrana River, which flows through the heartland of Wajo and into the Bay of Bone. Luwu's rulers later established one of their residences on the Cenrana River with the intention, one suspects, of monitoring and benefitting from the growing trade between Wajo and the outside world.

Rajadewa's hitherto elusive wish of making Sidenreng a vassal of Luwu encouraged him to make these concessions to Wajo. Sidenreng was on the border of the spheres of influence of Luwu and Siang, lying within the central depression which is the only major natural opening between the mountain ranges separating the east from the west coasts. In

the 16th century a Portuguese described Sidenreng as “a large and famous city at a well-navigated lake, which is surrounded on all sides by populous places” (Tiele 1880, IV:423). It is not surprising, therefore, to note that in the late 15th and early 16th centuries, Sidenreng became a target for Luwu’s ambitious rulers whose primary field of conquest had been previously limited to their southeastern Bugis neighbours. According to a Wajo chronicle, Luwu had attacked Sidenreng twice but had been unsuccessful both times. In a third campaign Sidenreng was finally forced to surrender to a combined attack of Wajo by land and Luwu by sea. Luwu had had long experience on the sea through its trade with the outside world, while Wajo in this period was still a predominantly inland principality whose trade was handled by its Luwu overlord. Wajo’s later reputation as a seafaring kingdom had to await the demise of its overlord.

A year after defeating Sidenreng, Rajadewa attacked Bone over a quarrel he had with the *Arumpone* (Lord of Bone) La Tĕnnisukki’. He landed his troops to the south of Cĕllu where he established his base. In the battle which ensued, Rajadewa and the Luwu forces were put to flight. The Arumpone ordered that Rajadewa not be killed, and so he was allowed to escape with twenty of his men. In the battle the red *payung* (umbrella), the royal standard of Luwu, was captured by Bone. The defeat was followed by a treaty called *Polo Malelae di Unnyi*, or “The Breaking of Weapons (i.e. the “Peace”) at Unnyi” (Noorduyn 1955:69-70; Zainal Abidin *Ibid.*, 85). This victory, which occurred sometime toward the end of the 15th or the beginning of the 16th century, ushered in a period when Bone replaced Luwu as the foremost power in the eastern half of the peninsula.

The kingdom of Bone had developed from a central core of seven communities. They were Ujung, Tibojong, Ta, Tanete Riattang, Tanete Riawang, Ponceng, and Macege, which originally formed a union called *Kawĕrrang*, a term used in Bugis to designate a bundle of rice stalks tied together. Each of the communities retained its leader, a *Matoa*, *Daeng Kalula*, or *Mado*, and continued to maintain control over its own affairs. All of the heads formed a general council called the *Matoa Pitu*, the “Seven Elders” which served as a deliberative body for the general welfare of the *Kawĕrrang*. When other communities later joined the original seven communities to form the kingdom of Bone, the appellation *Kawĕrrang* to refer to the core area was changed to the now more appropriate *Watampone*, literally the “trunk or body of Bone”, indica-

ting the centre of Bone (Abu Hamid 1974:17-19; Matthes 1874: 628-9).

The Bone Chronicle begins the story of the kingdom at the point where the *I La Galigo* ends. It describes the period before the coming of the *Tomanurung* as a time of chaos which lasted for seven generations. Only after the descent of the *Tomanurung*, who is asked to be ruler in Bone, is order finally restored. The establishing of the *Tomanurung* ruler in Bone is accompanied by the formation of an Advisory Council, the *Aruppitu* ("The Seven Lords"), composed of the principal leaders of the seven original communities. Land regulation and inheritance laws are promulgated at the same time to ensure the stability of relations within the community (Matthes 1864, vol. 1:465-68).¹⁷ Subsequent rulers are said to have laid the foundations for a prosperous economy. The third ruler of Bone, La Waliwu Karampelua, is praised for his industry in increasing the lands under cultivation and for his knowledge of affairs in his kingdom (Matthes 1864, vol. 1:471-2; Bakkers 1866: 176-7).

The first Bone king mentioned in the Chronicle who had any relations with the other major South Sulawesi kingdoms was La Tēnrisukki'. He ruled sometime toward the end of the 15th or the beginning of the 16th century. As mentioned earlier, it was he who successfully repulsed an invasion by Luwu under Rajadewa Datu Kelali'. During the reign of La Tēnrisukki's son and successor La Wulio Botee, Luwu again invaded Bone and was once more defeated. Bone then obtained Goa's help against Luwu's principal ally, Wajo, but the alliance was an unaccustomed interference by Goa in the struggle for hegemony in the eastern half of the peninsula, and Goa later withdrew to contemplate its own hopes for dominance in the west (Matthes 1864:478; Bakkers 1866:180-2).

The Makassar kingdom of Goa developed in a similar fashion to Bone. In the beginning there were nine communities, known as the *Bate Salapang* (Nine Banners), which later became the centre of the Goa kingdom: Tombolo, Lakiung, Parang-parang, Data, Agangjene, Saumata, Bissei, Sero, and Kalli.¹⁸ Through various forceful and peaceful measures other communities joined the nine to form the kingdom of Goa. Although the Goa Chronicle itself begins with a *Tumanurung* as founder of Goa's royal house, other Makassar traditions mention four men who preceded the coming of the *Tumanurung*, the first two being Batara Guru and his brother (Abdurrazak 1969b:1). Even among the

Makassar people the fame of the *I La Galigo* and the prestige attached to the legendary period of Luwu's history were sufficiently great to merit an attempt to demonstrate their links to that kingdom. Little else but the names of these legendary figures is known. After their disappearance, the nine core communities chose a leader known as the *Paccalla* to regulate the affairs of the various communities. Conflicts within the communities and threats from neighbouring areas finally convinced the nine communities and the *Paccalla* to seek a ruler. According to the Goa traditions, a female *Tumanurung* descended to earth after a period of confusion and restored order to the land (Abdurrazak 1969b:1-2). She and her husband, Karaeng Bayo, came to rule Goa. In subsequent years Tallo became so closely associated with Goa that it was said that these two kingdoms had "two rulers but one people (*rua karaeng nase're ata*)" (Abdurrazak 1969b:2-9; Abdurrahim 1974:11).

There is little about the early kings in the Goa Chronicle until the ascension of the ninth *Karaeng* (Lord of) Goa, Tumapa'risi' Kallonna, who ruled sometime in the early 16th century. At this time one of the Portuguese visitors to South Sulawesi commented that "the region which particularly bears the name Makassar is very small" (Tiele 1880, IV:424). Through a drastic reorganization of the kingdom, Tumapa'risi' Kallonna transformed the Makassar area from a loose confederation of communities into the well-knit and unified state of Goa. He arranged the union of Goa and Tallo and sealed it with an oath which declared that whosoever attempted to make one oppose the other (*ampasiewai*) would be punished by god (*Dewata*). A code of law and regulations for warfare were promulgated, and a system of collection of taxes and customs instituted under a *Syahbandar* to finance the kingdom. So warmly was this king remembered in the Goa Chronicle that his reign is praised as a time when the harvests were good and the fish-catch plentiful, the conventional Chronicle description to indicate a successful ruler (Abdurrahim n.d.:19-21; Abdurrazak 1969b:11). In a number of successful military campaigns, this Goa ruler subdued his neighbouring states, including Siang, and created a pattern of imperial ambitions which were emulated by subsequent Goa rulers in the 16th and 17th centuries (Abdurrahim n.d.:22). The laconic almost disinterested account of Goa's significant victory over Siang which altered the power relationships on the west coast of the peninsula is typical of the style of this Chronicle. Although Bone is also listed among the conquests of Tumapa'risi' Kallonna, a later entry attributes his successor Tunipalangga (?1546-1565) with this feat.¹⁹

Tunipalangga is remembered for a number of remarkable achievements. They are listed in the Goa Chronicle in the following order:

- (1) He conquered or made vassals of Bajeng, Lengkesse, Polombangkeng, Lamuru, Soppeng, various small states on Bone's border, Bulo-Bulo, Raja, Lamatti, the mountain states behind Maros, Wajo, Suppa, Sawitto, Alitta, Duri, Panaikang, Bulukumba and other southern states, and the mountain provinces in the south.
- (2) He was the first to bring the people of Sawitto, Suppa, and Bacukiki to Goa.
- (3) He created the office of *Tumakkajanang*.
- (4) He created the post of *Tumailalang* to handle the internal administration of the kingdom, leaving the *Syahbandar* free to deal exclusively with Goa's external trade.
- (5) He established an official system of weights and measures.
- (6) He was first to have cannons arranged in the large fortress.
- (7) He was the first of the Makassar people to manufacture bullets, mix gold alloy, and make bricks.
- (8) He was the first to build a brick wall around the settlements of Goa and Sombaopu.
- (9) He was the ruler to whom foreigners (Malays) under the Anakhoda Bonang came to seek residence in Makassar.
- (10) He was the first to make the large shield smaller, shorten the staff of the spear (*batakang*), and make Palembang bullets.
- (11) He was the first ruler to demand heavy corvée labour from his people.
- (12) He was a brilliant strategist in war, a hard worker, resourceful, rich and very brave (Abdurrahim n.d.:23-30).

It is generally believed by local historians that innovations in Goa's entire governmental structure sometime in the 16th century enabled that kingdom to subdue its neighbours and become the dominant power in South Sulawesi. But a close reading of the Goa Chronicle raises an equally, if not more, plausible explanation for Goa's superiority. Goa's conquests, especially of Siang and Suppa, provided the manpower, expertise, and motivation to transform Goa into the most efficient and highly organized kingdom in the area. Since there is no reason to believe that the citing of Tunipalangga's achievements followed a precise chronological sequence, a slight rearranging of their order may suggest the manner in which Goa became pre-eminent in South Sulawesi.

One of Tunipalangga's accomplishments was to make the traditional

large shield smaller and to shorten the staff of the long Makassar spear. These changes replaced the old, unwieldy weapons and greatly increased the manoeuvrability of the Goa warrior. Since Tunipalangga is also praised for being a brilliant strategist and an exceptionally brave warrior, the combination of better and more manoeuvrable weapons with a fearless and intelligent commander would have given Goa the necessary advantage to overcome its rivals. After the conquest of Suppa, Sawitto, and the port of Bacukiki, which were once part of or subject to Siang, people from these areas were brought to Goa. Why only these people are mentioned specifically as having been brought back to Goa of all the subjugated areas may be explained by the importance of Bacukiki as the port city in the 15th and 16th centuries serving the rich agricultural hinterland of Suppa and Sidenreng. The Portuguese missionaries who arrived in the early 16th century were sufficiently aware of the importance of the ruler of Suppa to seek his conversion to Christianity. As a trading port it attracted many of the Malays who left Melaka after its conquest by the Portuguese in 1511. Tunipalangga's wars against Suppa, Sawitto, and Bacukiki may have been the final stages of the incorporation of areas formerly dominated by Siang. Many of those brought to Makassar by Tunipalangga could very well have been the Malay traders who were established principally at the port of Bacukiki. This would explain the reference in the Goa Chronicle to large numbers of Malays being allowed to settle in Makassar during the reign of Tunipalangga. The importance which the Goa rulers attached to the Malay community because of their long experience and well-established international trading ties can be seen in Tunijallo's decision to build a mosque for the Malay traders "so that they would stay permanently" (Abdurrahim n.d.:50).

Goa was still a minor state during the heyday of the Melaka kingdom in the 15th and early 16th centuries. The latter kingdom had developed a sophisticated international entrepot with facilities for the repairing and refitting of ships and the storage of trade goods, a fixed system of weights and measures, fixed customs duties, coinage, a specific administration to handle quarrels and complaints of the various trading groups at Melaka, and a regular governing body with a good judicial system to provide legal security. All of these factors contributed to the enhancement of trade at this world-famous city (Meilink 1962:40). A hallmark of Melaka's status as an entrepot, and indeed an essential prerequisite of all ports seeking this distinction, was its ability to guarantee the security of trade within its borders (Andaya 1975: *passim*). After Melaka was captured

by the Portuguese in 1511, many Malay traders at first followed their ruler in his peregrinations in search of a capital. But the continual harassment and degradations of the Portuguese made any trade difficult and often precarious, and so many Malay traders dispersed to other kingdoms where trade could be conducted peacefully and profitably, where the traders could again be assured of protection by the host ruler. Many Malays went east to Sulawesi and appeared to have settled in the major west coast kingdom at that time, i.e. Siang – with its close dependency or ally, Suppa – before moving to Makassar.

When the Malays arrived in Makassar they asked four guarantees from Tunipalangga:

- (1) Their land would not be trespassed upon arbitrarily.
- (2) Their homes would be inviolable from arbitrary entry.
- (3) Their homes would not be *nigayang* (a Makassar practice whereby in dividing the family, the freedom of an uneven numbered child was bought for a certain sum of money to prevent him or her from being absorbed into the royal household).
- (4) They would be exempt from *nirappung* (a Makassar practice whereby the ruler claimed the right to seize all the property of a criminal).

Tunipalangga not only guaranteed these rights but further assured the Malays with the words: “When my waterbuffalo is tired, I bring it down to play in a waterhole; when its load is heavy, I lighten it. How much more would I do the same for my fellowman. I ask only that you commit no murder in my kingdom without my knowledge” (Abdurrahim n.d.: 27). Thus began a long history of profitable cooperation between the Malay community in Makassar and the rulers of Goa.

When one examines Tunipalangga’s achievements as mentioned in the Goa Chronicle, one can see certain practices which had already become commonplace in the western half of the Indonesian archipelago. Their appearance in South Sulawesi may have been a result of the growing influence of Malays and Portuguese in Makassar. Tunipalangga established an official system of weights and measures and created a new post of *Tumailalang* to deal with internal affairs. The *Syahbandar* was thus freed to devote himself entirely to the rapidly expanding foreign trade in the port of Makassar. The demands of the burgeoning international trading community, from the creation of new areas of settlement within Makassar for the different groups to the establishment of an efficient network of goods and services necessary to support this trade, required a radical restructuring of government. Here again one suspects

that the experience and expertise of the newly-arrived Malays and local officials who had served the kingdoms of Siang and Suppa may have been used. For the first time a *Tumakkajananngang Ana'bura'ne* is appointed whose principal responsibility was to oversee some forty different local groups fulfilling specific duties. Among these groups were those in charge of building merchant ships and warships, others to make weapons of war, a third to handle woven goods, another to make all types of ornaments, including those from gold and silver, and a fifth to build houses (Abdurrahim 1974:33). To carry out these functions, as well as to increase the quantities of rice, fish, and other comestibles to support this population growth in the port city, there was a greater demand on the labour of the local people. As the Goa Chronicle itself admits: "Only after he [Tunipalangga] became ruler did the people begin to do very heavy corvée labour" (Abdurrahim n.d.:30).

From Tunipalangga's reign onward Goa harnessed its whole society to take full advantage of the international trade which had been diverted from ports north of Makassar. As the Malay kingdoms on either side of the Straits of Melaka had demonstrated in earlier centuries, international trade could only be attracted to a particular port because of the advantages it offered over others (Wolters 1967:247-9). To retain the trade these advantages had to be maintained and force used to prevent the rise of rival ports. Makassar became the source of wealth and strength of the Goa kingdom, and all other activity in the kingdom was organized to uphold its position as an important international entrepot. Tunipalangga had envisioned very early on that it was international trade which would make Goa great, and it was this vision which continued to motivate Goa's rulers and guide their responses to events in the following centuries.

By the middle of the 16th century, Bone in the east and Goa in the west had slowly replaced the two older kingdoms as major powers in their respective spheres. South Sulawesi had grown rapidly, and the mountain chain separating the eastern and western halves was no longer an effective barrier to any ambitious kingdom. The limits of political expansion on either side of the mountains had been reached, and now rulers of both major kingdoms cast their sights upon the whole of South Sulawesi as a possible field of conquest. Thus began a series of wars between Goa and Bone to determine which was the superior power. But the traditions of three centuries of the existence of two separate overlords on the two halves of the peninsula served for a time to moderate ambitions. Despite

intermittent warfare between Goa and Bone in the 16th century, neither went so far as to incorporate the other into its own kingdom.

Under Tunipalangga, Goa's conquests eventually reached the amorphous borderline between Goa's and Bone's respective spheres of influence. When the states of Bulo-Bulo, Lamatti, and Raja in present-day Sinjai decided to switch their allegiance from Goa to Bone, a collision between these latter two kingdoms was unavoidable. In the war that soon followed, Bone preserved its sovereignty but was forced to relinquish these disputed areas to Goa and to recognize the Tangka River as its southern boundary. But the ambitious Tunipalangga remained unsatisfied with this triumph, and in 1563 he invaded Bone with the aid of Luwu, Soppeng, Wajo, and Sidenreng. In the battle of Cěllu, Tunipalangga was wounded and forced to abandon the campaign. Two years later he resumed the war with Bone, but after seven days he returned to Goa and died shortly thereafter in 1565 (Eerdmans n.d. (b): 10-11; Abdurrahim n.d.:29). His successor, Tunibatta, marched to Bone to continue the war only twenty-three days after being installed. His troops were routed at Bukaka, and he was later captured and beheaded at Campa (Noorduyn 1955:81).

The ignominious defeat of Goa in 1565 halted for a time its rapid rise to power. Bone under its ruler La Těnrirawe had proven more than a match for Goa, and now Bone hoped to re-establish the traditional demarcation between an eastern and western overlord in South Sulawesi. A few days after Tunibatta's death, Bone forced Goa to agree to a renewal of the Treaty of Calěppa to which Bone added the following demands:

- (1) All areas between Walěnnae River to the west and Ulawěng to the north were to be surrendered by Goa to Bone as conquests.
- (2) The Tangka River was to serve as the boundary between Bone and Goa, with the area north of the river to be included in Bone and that to the south to Goa.
- (3) Cenrana was to become part of Bone since it had been conquered by Bone under La Těnriskuski' from Rajadewa of Luwu.

These dictated terms known in the Goa Chronicle as the "Treaty in the North of Bone" (*Kana-kanaya iwarakanna Bone*) were accepted by Karaeng Tallo, who was *Tuma'bicara-butta* (Chief Minister of) Goa, and by the new Karaeng Goa, Tunijallo', nephew of Tunibatta (Abdurrahim n.d.:39-40; Abdurrazak 1969b:15).

Tunijallo' was not unknown to Bone. As a young man he had committed some indiscretion and had fled to Bone to escape the anger of his

father-in-law, Tunipalangga. During the two years that Tunijallo' lived in Bone, he became a favourite of Arumpone La Tënrirawe. It is said that while in exile he was twice wounded by poison darts, which indicated that he had participated in wars on the side of Bone (Abdurrahim n.d.:40-1). Although Tunijallo' may have been at first grateful to Bone and may even have owed his position as Karaeng Goa to La Tënrirawe, it slowly became apparent to him that it would be difficult to reconcile his gratitude to Bone with the duties toward his own kingdom. In the beginning he avoided any confrontation with Bone by concentrating on strengthening Goa's links with the outside world. Through his Moslem Malay trading contacts, Tunijallo' established diplomatic ties with the rulers of Johor, Patani, Balambangan, Banjar, and the Moluccas (Abdurrahim n.d.:50-1). In 1580 Sultan Baabullah of Ternate reputedly visited Tunijallo' and offered him an alliance "against his enemies" if he would adopt Islam, but Tunijallo' refused (De Clercq 1890:154; Valentijn 1724, I:208). The rejection of Sultan Baabullah's offer was probably prompted by Tunijallo's fear that Ternate would use religion as a way of exerting undue influence over Goa since Ternate's empire now extended as far west as the island of Selayar which was literally on Goa's doorsteps.

Although Tunijallo' may not have felt strong enough to confront Bone militarily, Goa's growing strength caused Bone grave concern even after the Treaty of Calëppa. Bone encouraged Wajo and Soppeng to enter into a defensive alliance to deter any aggression from Goa. As in an earlier agreement between Luwu and Wajo, the parties involved made the traditional symbolic gesture of creating equality by the redistribution of land from the larger to the smaller ally. In this way each party could willingly subscribe without loss of face to an agreement among "brothers", that is one based on equality. Nevertheless, the relative strengths of the three kingdoms could not be ignored, and a satisfactory formula was evolved in which Bone was to be considered the elder, Wajo the middle and Soppeng the younger brother. This alliance came to be known as the *Tëllumpocco*, or "The Three Powers" (Noorduyn 1955: 251-2).²⁰

At the time of the Tëllumpocco agreement in 1582, both Wajo and Soppeng acknowledged a form of subordinate relationship to Goa. After Luwu's defeat on the battlefield against Goa under Tumapa'risi' Kallonna, it was forced to relinquish its overlordship over Wajo to its victor. Wajo later rose against Goa, but was easily defeated and immediately punished by being degraded to a status of "slave" of Goa

(Noorduyn 1955:73-6). Soppeng, too, fell victim to Goa's might. At Lamogo in Soppeng La Pawiseang Pëtta Puang ri Samang, Datu (ruler of) Soppeng, and Tunipalangga, Karaeng Goa, entered into an agreement which clearly proclaimed Goa's superiority. With Goa's renewal of the Treaty of Calëppa, however, Wajo and Soppeng were freed of Goa's overlordship and placed under Bone's rightful sphere of influence. In the new Treaty of Timurung of 1582 which created the Tëllumpocco, Bone was ready to raise these vassal kingdoms to the status of equal partners in order to obtain their full support against any further Goa aggression.

Goa was provoked rather than intimidated by this development, and Wajo became a victim of another Goa invasion in 1583. This time, however, Wajo succeeded in repulsing the invaders with the help of Bone and Soppeng. It was obvious to Tunijallo' and his nobles that the principal obstacle to Goa's expansion was Bone, and that without Bone none of the other states in the eastern half of the peninsula would dare resist Goa. And so in 1585 Goa sent an army against Bone, but for some reason left unexplained in Goa's Chronicle, the army withdrew before crossing the border. Another Goa invasion in 1588 was repulsed after seven months of warfare. Unsuccessful against Bone, Tunijallo' sent an army against Wajo in 1590, but while en route he was murdered by one of his own subjects.²¹ The Tëllumpocco had succeeded for the time being in removing the danger from Goa.

The death of Arumpone La Tënrirawe in 1584 and Tunijallo' in 1590 ended the Bone-Goa wars for the remainder of the 16th century. Both Bone and Goa were too occupied with internal dissension arising from the cruel and arbitrary practices of the new Arumpone La Ica and the new Karaeng Goa Tunipassulu'. So oppressive was La Ica's rule that his own relatives and nobles plotted his murder, though the enormity of the crime of regicide against the white-blooded descendants of the *Tomanurung* was not lost on the conspirators. One of them offered to posterity the explanation that "in our present situation the best course is to dethrone the ruler of Bone, even though to do so is to contravene customary laws and practices (*adat*)". After eleven years on the throne, La Ica was murdered on the stairs of his residence and became known as *Matinroe ri Adenenna*, or "He who passed away on the stairs" (Sejarah Bone n.d.:67; Eerdmans n.d. (b):13-14). Goa fared little better with Tunipassulu' who came to the throne in 1590. He proved to be such an arbitrary ruler that his people and many foreigners fled the land. After only three years as ruler, he was forced to abdicate (Abdurrazak 1969b: 18-9).

The respite which the smaller kingdoms in South Sulawesi enjoyed free from the depredations of the two overlords Bone and Goa soon ended as order was gradually restored in both lands. In the beginning of the 17th century Bone was ruled by a queen, We Tënrituppu. Her presence on the throne reflected the will of Bone's principal nobles to avoid yet another overly-ambitious and headstrong king. We Tënrituppu was aware of the difficulty of being a female ruler and was therefore quick to remind her advisory council that mutual dependence was essential for a successful kingdom. "Most importantly", she told her councillors, "remember that I am a queen". She now raised the status of her councillors by changing their original appellation from *Matoa Pitu* (The Seven Elders) to the *Aruppiu* (The Seven Lords) and then entrusted them with the task of increasing the land under cultivation and to conduct themselves in a way which would not cause people to belittle Bone (Sejarah Bone n.d.:106).

Bone's nobles may have been able to appoint a queen as a remedy for the recent turmoil within the kingdom, but they could do nothing to prevent an upheaval caused externally by ambitious Goa and Tallo rulers. When Tunipassulu' was dethroned in Goa, he was replaced in 1593 by his seven-year old brother I Manga'rangi Daeng Manrabbia who later became the first Moslem ruler of Goa with the title of Sultan Alauddin (Tumenanga ri Gaukanna 1593-1639). I Mallingkaang, better known as Karaeng Matoaya, "the old Karaeng", of Tallo served as regent to the young Goa ruler.²² He was only eighteen years old when he was given the task of administering the affairs of Goa for its new seven year old ruler. But at eighteen he was already an experienced commander and an accomplished administrator. At twelve years of age he was entrusted with the command of a part of the Goa army, and by the time he was sixteen he bore the responsibility of organizing the kingdom for corvée duties. After having served as regent and *Tuma'bicara-butta* for two years, he then succeeded his brother as Karaeng Tallo (Abdurrahim 1974:15; Abdurrahim n.d.:56). He was by then recognized as a senior statesman and the effective ruler of the kingdoms of Goa and Tallo. His becoming a Moslem in 1605 soon led to the conversion to Islam of Karaeng Goa I Manga'rangi and that of the Makassar people of Goa and Tallo two years later (Noorduyn 1955:93; Abdurrahim n.d.:56-7).

Karaeng Matoaya's decision to embrace Islam had important repercussions not only on the personal lives of the people but also on the nature of

future political alignments in South Sulawesi. Islam provided Goa with the extra impetus and force necessary to overcome Bone and make Goa the undisputed overlord in South Sulawesi.²³ According to certain sources, which appear suspiciously to have been inserted after the successful Islamization of South Sulawesi, Goa made the following agreement with the other rulers prior to the introduction of Islam: “Whoever finds a better way is required to inform the other rulers who have entered into this agreement” (Sejarah Bone n.d.:104; Abdurrazak 1969b:20). The Arabic *ṭarīq* and *ṭarīqa* [pl. *ṭuruq*], meaning “a way”, is the term used for the Sufi path or a mystical method or school of guidance for traversing this path (Trimingham 1971:312). While it appears certain that what both Bone and Goa were discussing was a better “religious” way, the 17th century chronicler(s) may have also wanted to indicate subtly that Sufism was what was being debated. Goa’s subsequent wars against its neighbours were therefore justified in terms of attempting to inform the other rulers that Islam, especially Sufi Islam, was “a better way”.

Goa at first called upon Bone and Soppeng to embrace Islam, but they both refused. According to one source Soppeng replied by sending back a spool of cotton and a spinning wheel (Noorduyn 1955:94-5), a traditional taunt to one’s masculinity. Goa then attacked Soppeng through Sawitto in 1608 beginning what became known as the “Islamic Wars” (*musu’ asëllënnge* in Bugis, *bundu’ kasallannga* in Makassar). At Pakenya the Goa troops were defeated by the Tëllumpocco after a three day battle and forced to withdraw. Three months later Goa launched a second attack, this time against Wajo. As had happened in the past, some of Wajo’s vassals (*palili’*), such as Akkotengëng, Kera, and Sakuli, abandoned Wajo for what they believed to be the stronger power. But once again the Tëllumpocco held firm and defeated the Goa forces (Noorduyn 1955:95).

As the first Moslem kingdom in South Sulawesi, Luwu became allied with Goa for religious as well as political reasons.²⁴ Luwu besieged Peneki in Wajo but was repulsed after five days. Despite the Tëllumpocco’s initial successes, however, Goa was relentless in its new role as the defender of Islam and finally succeeded in 1609 in forcing Sidenreng to embrace this new religion. After this victory the other Bugis kingdoms followed in relatively quick order: Soppeng also in 1609, Wajo in 1610, and finally Bone in 1611. Bone’s ruler La Tënrirua had urged his people to avoid war with Goa and to accept Islam, but so unfavourably was his suggestion received that the Bone people not only rejected it but the

Arumpone as well. The new Arumpone, the Arung Timurung La Tënripale, led Bone's forces against Goa but was forced to surrender. In accordance with South Sulawesi treaty traditions, Goa made no attempt to reinstate La Tënrirua as Arumpone even though he had wanted to make peace, but retained Bone's choice La Tënrripale (Abdurrazak 1969:20-1; Abdurrahim 1974:15-6; Noorduyn 1955:95-8).

Islam added a new dimension in traditional politics in South Sulawesi. It helped the Goa-Tallo rulers transform the old rivalry with their Bugis neighbours into crusades against the *kafir* (unbelievers). In addition to believing in the rectitude of their cause, they now had the further advantage of being able to appeal for assistance from powerful Moslem rulers both in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago and beyond. Ternate had been quick to give military assistance to the Sultans of Magindanao, Buayan, and Sulu in the southern Philippines, and in 1580 it had purportedly offered aid to Goa against its enemies if it were to embrace Islam (Majul 1973:115-7; Morga 1868:59, 190-1, 225-6; Valentijn 1724, I:208). It is likely that the Moslem rulers from nearby lands would have heeded a request from Goa for military aid in the same way that Goa extended its assistance a few decades later to Moslem Sulu in the latter's fight against the Spaniards (Majul 1973:85). But military assistance was merely one of the benefits which Goa now enjoyed as part of the Moslem world. It became a part of the community of Islam (*ummat*) and thereby associated spiritually with the prestigious and fabulous Moslem courts of Rum (Turkey) and Mogul India, and nearer to home, to Aceh, the rising power in western Indonesia. In material terms Goa prospered by becoming yet another link in an impressive trading network consisting of the Moslem kingdoms throughout the Malay-Indonesian archipelago, India, and the Middle East. While Goa rulers had always been sympathetic to the Moslem traders, only now were they to become an active and accepted part of the system in which the port of Makassar was to play an important role.

Other changes also ensued throughout South Sulawesi with the adoption of Islam. The traditional advisory council of nobles, such as the *Aruppitu* in Bone and the *Bate Salapang* in Goa, was now to be balanced by a religious council called *sarat*. The *kali*, who was chief Islamic official in the kingdom and adviser to the ruler in Islamic matters, occupied a position and status in religious affairs equivalent to that held by the *Tumailalang* in Goa and the *Tomarilalëng* in Bone as principal advisers to their respective rulers in secular affairs. An important contribution of Islam to the traditional political structure in South Sulawesi was the

overt recognition of the ruler as the religious leader of the kingdom. Although the South Sulawesi rulers had always been associated with the gods and were thus believed to have “white blood”, only with Islam was there an open avowal, instead of merely a tacit recognition, of the ruler as the religious leader of his people, the “Shadow of God upon Earth” (Bagley 1964:45-6). Through the official network of Islam, which extended from the Sultan and the *kali* in the court to the *guru* or teacher in the smallest hamlet, the basic tenets of Islam were propagated throughout the land along with the belief in the ruler as God’s representative on earth (Makarausu Amansjah 1969:38-40; Bakkers 1866:99). The existing ties between ruler and subject were considerably strengthened by Islam which stressed the primacy of the ruler as religious leader of the land and his role in defending the Islamic faith. The new Moslem Sultan could now appeal to his people on the basis of both his secular and religious status in the society.

Karaeng Matoaya assiduously fulfilled his role as defender of the faith by forcing neighbouring kingdoms to embrace Islam. The Tallo Chronicle describes him as “the very first ruler who swore on the Koran and the Sudang [Goa’s state sword and a part of Goa’s regalia]”. In this typically succinct South Sulawesi style, the chronicler captures the essence of Karaeng Matoaya’s policy of using all available resources to achieve superiority in South Sulawesi, from Islamic spiritual forces to the pre-Islamic powers immanent in the state regalia. After subduing a kingdom in these Islamic Wars, continues the Chronicle, he did not take booty, seize the warflags, nor ask for the *sabbu kati*.²⁵ Political conquest had ridden on the back of Islam, and once Islamization had been accomplished Karaeng Matoaya was reluctant, for reasons of religious conviction or political sagacity, to apply the old formula which provided certain “rights” to a conqueror, such as reaping the rewards of conquest.

That Islam may not have been the only motivation for Karaeng Matoaya’s Islamic Wars in South Sulawesi seems plausible because his conquests did not end here. Under his and Karaeng Goa I Manga’rangi’s rule, Goa quickly became an extensive and greatly feared empire in Eastern Indonesia. In the first three decades of the 17th century, Goa’s conquests extended throughout most of Sulawesi, east coast Borneo, as far west as Lombok and as far east as the Aru-Kei islands. Only Luwu retained its independence, having arranged a successful royal marriage alliance with Goa and having perspicaciously sided with Goa as a fellow Moslem kingdom in the Islamic Wars of the early 17th century (Noor-

duyn 1955: 113).

Signs of Goa's power were evident everywhere. Walls were built around Ujung Pandang, Pa'nakkukang and Ujung Tana, and carved gates installed at Sombaopu, the fortified town which contained the residence of the Karaeng Goa. According to the Tallo Chronicle, Karaeng Matoaya was the first ruler to encourage the building of forts from bricks, the digging of canals, the reinforcing of the masts of the *banawa*²⁶ with planks, the construction of warships known as *bilu'* and galleys with large iron spikes, and the manufacture of small guns, cannons, and gunpowder. During his reign both gold and tin money were minted to deal with the increased commerce which Goa now enjoyed. In addition to the continuing presence of the Portuguese in Makassar, the English, the Danes, the Dutch, and the French soon arrived to establish trading posts in Makassar. So prosperous did Goa and Tallo become that the Tallo Chronicle honoured Karaeng Matoaya with the greatest praise in the conventional chronicle fashion: "During Karaeng Matoaya's rule the rice harvests, the fish-catch, and production of *ballo'*²⁷ were all successful, and the young which were nurtured grew fruitful." He is said to have been liked by traders, his vassal lords, his siblings, his relatives, the princes (*anak-karaeng*),²⁸ the *Tumailalang*,²⁹ and the people. His achievements are meticulously enumerated ranging from his skill in carving to that of performing Moluccan dances. Intelligence, bravery, honesty, and friendliness are but a few of a long list of qualities attributed to his ruler. But the decisive factor which established his virtue in the eyes of the chronicler was his faithful performance of his religious duties. As if in substantiation of all the virtuous qualities previously mentioned, the chronicler ends triumphantly with the words: "It is also this ruler who once dreamed seeing himself drinking the water of *Syurga* [Heaven]" (Abdurrahim 1974:17-9).

Due to the long reigns of Karaeng Matoaya and Sultan Alauddin, measures they adopted to deal with specific problems acquired the force of established practice within Goa and its dependencies. When Karaeng Matoaya was asked to settle a personal dispute between Arung Matoa Wajo³⁰ and his brother, he was reluctant to arbitrate for fear of interfering in questions of customary law in Wajo. But after he had made a decision on this matter, others with rival claims to thrones or complaints against another ruler began to wend their way to his court in Bontoala to seek a final judgement (Noorduyn 1955:108, 114). Those who had become Arung Matoa by the grace of the Goa rulers came to show their gratitude by open and sometimes flamboyant demonstrations of loyalty.

Five months after Topassaunge (?1627-8) was chosen as Arung Matoa Wajo, he heard that Sultan Alauddin was preparing for a punitive expedition against Butung. To demonstrate his loyalty he hurried to Makassar and offered to guard Goa in the absence of its ruler. Sultan Alauddin at first protested saying that there was no provision for such action in their treaty. While admitting that this was so, Topassaunge nevertheless persisted saying that his request should be regarded as a service from one who is considered to be a "relative". By employing a well-known term in interstate relations to indicate an alliance. Topassaunge wished to demonstrate his faithfulness to such an agreement. Sultan Alauddin finally relented and assigned him Pa'nakkukang as his temporary residence, where he remained until the Goa forces returned three months later (Noorduyn 1955:10). Dating from this period Wajo remained fiercely loyal to Goa. In 1669 Arung Matoa Wajo La Těnrilai Tosěnnğěng (1658-1670) and his men stubbornly refused to surrender to the Dutch and the Bugis and continued to swear their allegiance to Sultan Hasanuddin despite the latter's own announcement of the imminent fall of Sombaopu (L-4: unpag.).

It was Karaeng Matoaya and Sultan Alauddin's ability to appease their Bugis neighbours and acquire their confidence that was a major factor in the absence of any major conflicts within South Sulawesi for the remaining period of their rule. They meticulously observed the proprieties of traditional interstate relations. Instead of ravaging the conquered lands and collecting the *sabbu kati*, Karaeng Matoaya and Sultan Alauddin left everything untouched. In 1624 Sultan Alauddin urged the Těllumpocco kingdoms to preserve their unity (*masseua-tauenngi*), to leave to Goa any enemies from overseas, and to take up arms only against those who wished to destroy Islam (Noorduyn 1955:110). What was being encouraged was not the disbandment but the continuance of a Bugis alliance which, after all, was created specifically to oppose Goa. In return for this concession Goa hoped to obtain the Těllumpocco's agreement to allow Goa to deal with any external threat, or, in other words, to be fully responsible for foreign relations. Since Goa was in control of the port city of Makassar and had inherited a thriving international trade from Suppa and Siang, it was understandable that Sultan Alauddin considered any relations with the outside world to be more relevant to Goa than to the three Bugis kingdoms. Furthermore, Goa felt confident in being able to manage any external threat as long as the Bugis were quiescent and not attempting to undermine Goa. The Těllumpocco, in agreeing to surrender its rights over external affairs to

Goa ostensibly in exchange for a guarantee of its continuing existence, was in fact acknowledging Goa's overlordship. But this traditional form of acknowledgement was solicited in such a way that the Tëllumpocco's pride was preserved. Nevertheless, Goa had now introduced a state of affairs which henceforth became the norm: the recognition of one overlord for both the eastern and western halves of South Sulawesi. It was a new idea which was fostered in the first four decades of the 17th century through the cautious and prudent policies of these two Goa-Tallo rulers.

In the minds of the Makassar people the lives of Karaeng Matoaya and Sultan Alauddin are so intertwined that it is not surprising that the Goa Chronicle mentions their death in the very same sentence: "986 days after Karaeng Matoaya left us, we were also left by Tumenanga ri Gaukanna [Karaeng Goa I Manga'rangi Sultan Alauddin]" (Rahim n.d.:65). At the time of the death of Sultan Alauddin in 1639 Goa had achieved a feat of conquest unmatched by any previous kingdom in Sulawesi. Wishing to demonstrate Goa's superior position in the Indonesian world, the chronicler lists only Aceh and Mataram, the two most powerful kingdoms in the western half of the Indonesian archipelago in the 17th century, as "friends" (*ma'belabela*) of Goa; all others are specifically noted as conquests (Abdurrahim n.d.:65). The chronicler attributes to Sultan Alauddin the honour and prestige of being the first Goa ruler to enter into a relationship of friendship with these two powerful kingdoms.

The twin-kingdoms of Goa and Tallo were blessed by another dynamic pair of rulers who consolidated the gains of their predecessors and led their kingdoms successfully through a difficult period of external relations: Karaeng Goa I Mannuntungi Sultan Malikkusaid and Karaeng Pattinngaloang of Tallo. The former is described in the Goa Chronicle as a ruler "who never experienced plague, a serious war, or a major disaster". No greater praise could have been lavished on a ruler, for the absence of any major disaster was, after all, a sign of the approval of the gods. In speaking of Goa's external affairs, the Chronicle asserts that Sultan Malikkusaid was "friendly" with the [Spanish] Governor of Manila, the [Portuguese] Viceroy of Goa [on the Indian subcontinent], the [English] President of Kling, the Maharaja of Masulipatnam, the monarchs of England, Portugal, and Spain, and the Mufti of Mekka. Goa no longer considered itself a minor insular kingdom but one whose horizons extended throughout the world as a result of Islam and international trade. Only a selected few rulers were considered to be of equal status to merit "friendship" with the now proud and self-confident

Goa.³¹ The Chronicle continues Karaeng Goa's list of virtues by saying that though he was powerful, he treated the people with humanity and was greatly loved by them. But the chronicler also adds the interesting comment that “. . . the princes [*anakkaraeng*], for example the *Tumailalang*, loved the Tumenanga ri Gaukanna [Karaeng Goa I Manga'rangi Sultan Alauddin] more”. He was also praised for being able to write the Arabic and Makassar languages well (Abdurrahim n.d.:69-70).

Sultan Malikkusaid's intellectual skills, however, were far surpassed by Karaeng Matoaya's son, Karaeng Pattinngaloang. He was said to be not only fluent in Portuguese, Spanish, Latin, English, French, and Arabic, but also conversant with the literature of these languages (La Side 1968:27). A Jesuit visitor to Makassar, Alexandre de Rhodes, spoke of Karaeng Pattinngaloang as

. . . a very wise and rational man . . . He has read with great interest all the histories of our kings of Europe. He always has our books in his hand, and particularly those dealing with mathematics, of which he is well versed. He also has such a great passion for every aspect of this science that he works at it day and night . . . To hear him speak without seeing him one would have taken him to be a native Portuguese because he speaks this language with as much fluency as those in Lisbon . . .

Karaeng Pattinngaloang's library of European books was considered to be of an excellent standard, and he also had a collection of maps and globes (Rhodes 1653, III:34-8). He exhibited an insatiable desire to learn more about the new exciting world into which Goa had entered in order to satisfy his own curiosity and, one suspects, to uncover the key which would make Goa the equal of these European nations. To achieve the latter goal, Goa could no longer tolerate the seemingly chronic warfare within South Sulawesi. Any conflict jeopardized Goa's ability to harness its resources in the attempt to attain the status and strength of European kingdoms. This may have been one of the principal motivations underlying Goa's decision to assume the role of sole overlord in South Sulawesi with the greatest vigour. The first major test of Goa's assumption of its new role arose in Bone.

In 1640 Arumpone La Ma'darëmmëng, who had succeeded La Tënrípale in 1630, enforced a stricter version of Islam in his kingdom than had previously been known (Eerdmans n.d. (b):18). He issued an edict forbidding anyone in his kingdom to keep or use slaves who were not born into slavery. All non-hereditary slaves were ordered freed or given wages for their labour. There was great opposition from the nobles led by La Ma'darëmmëng's own mother, Datu Pattiro We Tënrisol-

reng. She openly rejected her son's brand of Islam as being too strict and difficult and expressed a preference for the kind of Islam favoured by the royal families of Goa and Tallo (Speelman 1670:728r). The type of Islam popular in the Makassar courts was the mystical Sufi doctrine. The esoteric doctrines of Sufism had a congenial reception in South Sulawesi because of their basic compatibility with the local pre-Islamic belief structure. No excessive or unfamiliar demands were made by this doctrine which tolerated many differing routes on the path to salvation (Trimingham 1971:2-3). Although the new sect introduced by La Ma'darëmmëng is nowhere mentioned in any of the local sources, any one of the more orthodox branches of Islam would have made much more rigorous demands on the people's religious beliefs than Sufism.³²

Datu Pattiro and many of the Bone nobles finally fled Bone to seek redress from the rulers in Goa. Goa's prestige as the kingdom which brought Islam to the other South Sulawesi kingdoms, except for Luwu, and its indisputable position as the most powerful kingdom in South Sulawesi made it a logical choice as a protector. At first Goa's leaders simply followed these developments with mild concern, but this concern quickly turned to alarm when La Ma'darëmmëng sought to export his specific brand of Islam by force to Wajo, Soppeng, Massepe, Sawitto, and Bacukiki. It was no longer merely a question of religion but that of political hegemony which finally spurred Goa to act. One of the principal chronicles of Wajo openly attributes a secular motivation to La Ma'darëmmëng's attack on Wajo. According to this source, La Ma'darëmmëng first accused the people of Peneki in Wajo of committing many arbitrary acts against Bone before he proceeded to burn and pillage Peneki with the permission of Wajo's Arung Matoa. The latter, however, complained that he had approved punishing, not pillaging, of Peneki and demanded that all goods seized from Peneki be returned. La Ma'darëmmëng's justification was that only goods from those who had borne arms against him and the Arung Matoa had been seized. The Arung Matoa rejected this excuse and so war began between Wajo and Bone (L-3:281-2).

As was the case during the Islamic Wars a few decades earlier, this conflict between Wajo and Bone had both religious and temporal overtones. While religious zeal may have been La Ma'darëmmëng's principal motivation, Bone's neighbours interpreted these moves in terms of traditional political rivalries. Karaeng Goa Sultan Malikkusaid responded quickly to these events and sent an envoy with a letter to La Ma'darëmmëng. In it La Ma'darëmmëng was asked to explain whether

his acts were based on the commands of the Prophet Muhammad, on an old *adat*, or on his own whim. If either of the first two reasons was the basis for his actions, then Goa would like to be informed of this. But if he had acted solely on whim, then it was clearly unacceptable (Noorduyn 1955:116-7; Abdurrazak 1969b:32-3). When La Ma'darëmmëng failed to reply, Goa made preparations for war (Eerdmans n.d. (b):19). On 8 October 1643 Goa, assisted by Wajo and Soppeng, attacked Bone at Passempë and forced La Ma'darëmmëng and his brother La Tënriaji Tosenrima to flee to Larompong in Luwu. According to a recent study, the reasons which Goa presented for attacking Bone were "to defend a mother against her child (i.e., the Datu Pattiro against her son La Ma'darëmmëng) and to preserve public order which had been disturbed by La Ma'darëmmëng in his act of freeing the slaves" (Sejarah Bone n.d.:122).

Following the defeat of Bone, Karaeng Patinggaloang asked the *Aruppitu* to choose a ruler to replace La Ma'darëmmëng. After five days of deliberation the *Aruppitu* reported: "We have searched for someone among the descendants of the rulers of Bone whom we consider capable of reviving this land of Bone, but there is no one. Therefore, we would be grateful (*kiparapa'maiki*) if we could have the Karaeng [Goa] as ruler of Bone." Both Karaeng Goa and later Karaeng Patinggaloang refused the *Aruppitu's* offer to become Arumpone. In refusing, Karaeng Patinggaloang explained: "The *adat* is that if we choose a ruler, the people of Bone may not interfere. If the people of Bone choose a ruler, we too, may not interfere . . ." Therefore, a Bone noble, Tobala', was made the leader in Bone in November 1643 and responsible to a Makassar lord, Karaeng Sumanna (Abdurrahim n.d.:71).

There is disagreement between the Makassar and Bugis sources as to the position to which Tobala' was appointed. According to the two principal Makassar language sources of this period, Tobala' was appointed as *kali*, or the principal Islamic figure in a kingdom (Abdurrahim n.d.:71; Ligtvoet 1880:16). But all the Bugis sources state specifically that Tobala' was made a *jënnang* or regent. According to a recent study by a team of Bugis local historians, Karaeng Sumanna was made a viceroy (*Raja Muda*) of Bone while [Tobala'] Arung Tanete Riawang [a member of the *Aruppitu*] was made a *jënnang* (Sejarah Bone n.d.:123). The difference is more apparent than real. The Sultan and the *kali* were often closely related in Bugis-Makassar kingdoms because of the mutually reinforcing role which these two offices played. The Islamic Sultan was considered to be "The Shadow of God upon Earth", and

therefore his greatness and position were exalted by the religious officials throughout the land to the smallest hamlet. The *kali*, being the spiritual head of the Islamic organization in a kingdom, became a valued ally of the Sultan. In return for the *kali*'s loyalty, the Sultan lent his military and political strength to defend the religion. From early on the value of a faithful *kali* was considered as important to a successful kingdom as a good Sultan. It may very well be that Goa's ruler appointed Tobala' as a *kali* because it was the *adat* that Goa and Bone not interfere in the selection of each other's rulers. By appointing a religious head Goa avoided transgressing *adat* while forcing the new *kali* by virtue of his duties to support the secular head of Bone, who was the Makassar lord, Karaeng Sumanna. Since Tobala' was one of the *Arupitu*, the Arumpone's "secular" advisory council, the people and leaders of Bone viewed him simply as a regent, a political head, appointed by the Goa ruler (as must have surely been intended), hence the Bugis references to his being appointed a "regent".

When the defeated Arumpone La Ma'darëmmëng was forcibly brought to Goa from his exile in Luwu, his brother La Tënriaji Tosenrima returned secretly to Bone and quickly raised an army against Goa. Upon receiving word of this development, Karaeng Goa again assembled his troops and called upon Datu Soppeng, Arung Matoa Wajo, and Datu Luwu to participate in subduing Bone. Karaeng Cenrana was placed at the head of the expedition which went by sea to Salangketo and then marched overland against Bone. In this second battle of Passempë in 1644, Bone was once again vanquished by a vastly superior army. The principal Bone leaders, La Tënriaji Tosenrima, Arung Kung, and Daeng Pabila, were all taken prisoner and brought back to Goa. Since Tobala' had remained neutral in the war, he was allowed to retain his position in Bone. Goa reasserted its overlordship over Bone and reduced its "vassal" to the status of "slave" of Goa. All privileges which Bone had hitherto enjoyed were withdrawn and the entire country placed at the service of Goa. To prevent any further rebellion in Bone, all the nobles were forcibly exiled to Goa (Speelman 1670:728v; Sejarah Bone n.d.:124).

After this victory, Karaeng Goa, Arung Matoa Wajo, and Datu Luwu met at the Baruga Buliya and renewed the Treaty of Topaceddo, which is known in Bugis as the "Singkërru' Patolae". The Bone prisoners were divided equally among the three, but Wajo refused its share saying that Bone and Wajo were one land (L-18:47).³³ Nevertheless, Wajo did not forego the opportunity of recovering areas from Bone which it con-

sidered its own, such as Timurung, Amali, Mampu, Sailong, Bunne, and Pammana (L-13:285-6).

The sadness and apprehension accompanying Bone's defeat at Passempě in 1644 is captured in the few shocked phrases used by a Bugis chronicler to introduce this tragic event: "Now will be related the defeat of Passempě, the complete smashing of the incense-holder, the total enslavement of the land of Bone by Goa." For the next two decades Bone was ruled by a regent appointed by Karaeng Goa. This single factor, explains this chronicler, accounts for the pitiable condition of the people of Bone, many of whom came to perform services for the people of Wajo without compensation (L-3:285-6). Without a ruler the government in Bone could no longer ensure the people's livelihood nor protect them from oppressive acts by neighbouring lands. Goa's decision to appoint a *kali*/regent instead of retaining the vanquished ruler or another member of the local royal family as a vassal lord as was customary, created a bitterness toward Goa which surfaced in a dramatic way some twenty years later.

It was in these times that a remarkable individual, Arung Palakka La Těnritatta, arose to become the champion of the oppressed Bugis of Bone and Soppeng. When or where he was born is still a matter of debate, though it is generally accepted that he was born about 1635 in the village of Lamatta in the area of Mario ri Wawo in Soppeng. As a child he was known as La Těnritatta, "He who cannot be struck". A variant version of his name which is sometimes advanced is La Tenritata, "He who is not governed [by anyone]" (Sultan 1968:104). He received the title Datu Mario ri Wawo from his mother and was generally known by this name until his later youth. When he was growing up as a youth in the Goa court, he acquired the name Daeng Serang. As a young man having brought his people safely back home from their forced labour in Makassar, he was presented with the title Arung Palakka, "Lord of Palakka", which later came to indicate the heir-designate of the kingdom of Bone. It is by this name that he is referred to throughout this book since it is the name by which he is best known in Western sources and among the South Sulawesi people today. Because of his well-known oath uttered in exile to leave his hair uncut until he had freed his people from Goa's yoke, he also acquired the nickname Pětta Malampee Gěmmě'na, the "Long-Haired Prince". During the Makassar War and thereafter he was provided with yet another appellation to accord with his accomplishments, Tounru' or Toappatunru', "The Conquerer". In

1672 he became Arumpone, Lord of Bone, and took the Arabic title, Sultan Sa'aduddin. Finally, at his death he was given the posthumous name, *Matinroe ri Bontoala*, or "He who passed away at Bontoala".

Arung Palakka was more than just another brave leader. He represented the essence of the struggle of the vast majority of the Bone and Soppeng people against the oppression they were suffering at the hands of Goa. His *siri*' and *pěsse* became those of his people and provided the principal motivation in the struggle against Goa. Of equal importance was Arung Palakka's personal magnetism which became identified with *upě*', good fortune. Therefore, not only his leadership but his very person came to be formidable weapons available to Bone, the stronger of the two Bugis kingdoms, in its struggle against Goa for political hegemony in South Sulawesi.

But in the first half of the 17th century, little of this challenge from Bone was yet evident. Goa's remarkable rulers of the previous fifty years had laid the foundations for a strong and prosperous Goa. In the 16th century, innovations in traditional weaponry had greatly strengthened Goa and helped make it a major power in the area. Its supremacy was soon established with its conquest of Siang and Suppa (with its port of Bacukiki), the major trading and political centres on the west coast. Rather than destroying these centres, the Goa leaders used their expertise and manpower in developing the port of Makassar into an international entrepot. The determination with which Goa's leaders undertook this task is underlined by their decision to restructure the economy and administration of the kingdom to cater to the needs of international trade at Makassar.

By the middle of the 17th century the thriving portcity of Makassar had become a brilliant testimony to the foresight of Goa's rulers. The wealth from international trade was instrumental in assuring Goa the reputation of being the indisputable overlord in South Sulawesi and in many areas beyond its shores. Goa appeared invincible as ships carrying trade goods and emissaries appeared in Makassar bearing witness to the greatness of Goa. If its leaders at that time had been warned of the dangers of the growing number of European ships in the Eastern waters, they probably would have pointed out how the Europeans, too, brought wealth to Goa. But Goa's success had to be achieved at the price of earning the antagonism of the Bugis people of Bone and Soppeng and acquiring the jealousy of economic competitors in the region. The combination of these two factors were ultimately to bring about the downfall of the proud kingdom of Goa.

CHAPTER II

ROAD TO CONFLICT

When Sultan Hasanuddin became Karaeng Goa in 1653 and Karaeng Karunrung Tuma'bicara-butta a year later, they inherited a mighty kingdom with a flourishing international trade at Makassar. This was the legacy of their grandfathers, Sultan Alauddin Tumenanga ri Gaukanna and Karaeng Matoaya Tumammalianga ri Timoro', and their fathers, Sultan Malikkusaid Tumenanga ri Papambatuna and Karaeng Pattin-galoang Tumenanga ri Bontobiraeng. By the third generation of this highly effective combination of Goa-Tallo rulers, the struggle for political ascendancy in South Sulawesi had ended with Goa triumphant. There seemed nothing on the horizon which could threaten the position of Goa as the leading political and economic power in the eastern half of the Indonesian archipelago. So invincible did Goa appear to any outside observer that when a large Dutch fleet with an army of several thousand men appeared a little over a decade and a half later to attack Makassar, neither the Dutch nor anyone in the Eastern Indonesian area believed that their success was assured. But Goa's days of supremacy were coming to an end as a result of an unforeseen alliance of the Dutch East India Company and Arung Palakka and most of the Bone and Soppeng Bugis.

In the early days of the Company in Indonesian waters, more curiosity than enmity characterized its relations with Goa. But when the Company learned that the port of Makassar was "a very well-situated place to sail to and from the Moluccas", it quickly realized the importance of the area in terms of the Company's then primary interest in spices. At the invitation of Sultan Alauddin of Goa, a Dutch factor was stationed in Makassar in 1601 principally to serve Dutch ships putting in to Makassar for fresh supplies and other requirements on the way to the Spice Islands. From early on the Company attempted to enlist Goa's help in attacking the Company's enemies in Makassar, but Sultan Alauddin refused to be involved. He explained simply: "My land is open to all nations." Throughout the first half of the 17th century, the Company continually attempted to convince various Karaeng Goa to restrict trade,

but each time it was rebuked with homilies, such as: “God has made the earth and the sea and has divided the earth among men and given the sea in common to all” (Stapel 1922:9-14). Sultan Hasanuddin, too, bristled at the Dutch suggestion that Goa limit its trade. He told the Dutch that God created the world “so that all mankind could have the enjoyment thereof, or are you of the opinion that God has reserved these islands, so removed from your nation, for your trade alone” (Stapel 1922:62). The opposing stances of Goa’s rulers and the Company were maintained despite the change of actors throughout the 17th century.

The tendency of both Western and Indonesian scholars has been to accept the statements of Goa’s rulers at face value and declare that there were two conflicting views of trade between Goa and the Company. Yet the theory of a *mare liberum*, freedom of the seas, espoused by the Goa rulers and many other Asian nations in the 16th and 17th centuries, did not exclude the practice of the strongest power in the region imposing its will on those weaker states which had “free” access and use of the sea. Where these two powers did fundamentally differ was in the significance of this “monopoly” in their separate frames of reference. The Company was invested with quasi-sovereign powers by the government of the United Provinces of The Netherlands, but it remained a basically economic body whose primary reason for existence was to increase the profit of its shareholders. To monopolize any product was an acknowledged economic manoeuvre which was in this period considered to be a favourable means of maximizing profit. Monopoly was an economic measure pure and simple. The kingdom of Goa, on the other hand, was not principally an economic organization but viewed its economic activities as subordinate to the more important political considerations. Once a political arrangement had been reached with regard to the status of one state to another, then all else, including all economic arrangements, had to be adjusted to reflect this status.

The Karaeng Goa seriously believed in a *mare liberum*, but one which would properly reflect the political status of those lands bordering the sea. Fleets from Goa were sent way beyond the shores of Sulawesi as far east as the Aru Islands and west to Selaparang in Lombok in order to reinforce Goa’s political overlordship. As part of this overlord-vassal relationship, Goa received the right to one-tenth of whatever products were produced by these vassal states (*palili*). In accordance with traditions in South Sulawesi, by the first half of the 17th century Goa had the right to demand tribute in the form of local products from any of its vassal areas. Any other state which attempted to obtain these products

could be regarded as a challenge to Goa's own political status. Retaining the products of vassal areas in the Moluccas was seen not as a "monopolistic" economic practice, but as a natural concomitant of a political relationship. Any challenge to this economic right could only be interpreted as a challenge to its political status. When the Company continued to insist on a monopoly in the Moluccas, Goa had little option but to see it as a political threat and prepare to deal with it as such.

Relations between Goa and the Company since the beginning of the 17th century had been adumbrated by their rivalry for control of the spice trade. Various unfortunate incidents involving shipwrecked Dutch ships on Makassar's shores had led to a further deterioration of the situation. When the Company presented a draft treaty for the perusal of the Goa court, Sultan Hasanuddin was outraged at the effrontery of the clauses. Through his envoy, Karaeng Popo and Karaeng Bantaeng, he presented the following reply:

. . . With regard to your request [to Goa] not to war with Ternate, Bacan, and Tidore without your knowledge, they have their own people; let them send them here with their requests . . . You forbid me to sail my ships to these lands [enumerated here] . . . Do you mean that God had reserved for your trade alone those islands located so far away from your nation? . . . I only request that you leave unmolested and in peace the inhabitants of Ceram and Buru, as well as my ships which bear my flag and pass in whatever waters you come across them . . . Insofar as your building on Menado is concerned, you have shown by this how much belief and trust one can place on your nation. Since we are at peace and you have placed your fortifications on my land, all the more reason why you should demolish them . . . if we were to accept peace on the conditions which have been previously read, it would be more fitting to have war (KA 119b:838r-840r).

The unusually strong words contained in this reply reflected Goa's determination to preserve the life-blood of the kingdom: the international trade at the port of Makassar. Once Tunipalangga (c. 1546-1565) had made the conscious decision to create an international entrepot at Makassar with the help of Malays, Portuguese, and experienced traders from Bacukiki, Goa was set on a course which profoundly affected its entire way of life. To create the conditions for a successful entrepot, Goa's government and society were transformed to foster this new creation. Tunipalangga's vision was rewarded by the growth of Makassar as a major trading port in the Indonesian archipelago by the late 16th century. Concomitant with this new status were lofty ambitions and a wealth from international trade to make them possible. Goa could

now maintain its position within Sulawesi and even obtain vassal states abroad, a feat which would have been unthinkable had it continued with a basically agricultural subsistence economy insulated from the outside world. Sultan Hasanuddin, as his predecessors had done before him, harshly rejected any Dutch proposal which threatened to undermine Goa's new position of respect. Its court entertained vassal envoys from neighbouring areas, and its armies received into their ranks soldiers from such far-off lands as Ternate and Banda (KA 1123d:400v). And with aplomb the Goa government welcomed as appropriate a request from the powerful Susuhunan of Mataram that "one or two daughters" of the Goa royal house become his wife (KA 1119a:778v-778r).

The exhilarating sense of power enjoyed by Goa provided little hope that the Company could obtain many of the commercial advantages it sought from Goa, short of war. Sultan Hasanuddin, too, was aware that his reply had left the Dutch with few alternatives. One evening in February 1660 upon leaving the mosque he summoned to his side the regent appointed to rule in Bone, Tobala'. He told Tobala' that he should prove Bone a worthy nation and go with 1,000 men to keep a good watch in those areas behind Makassar lands to report any attempts by the Dutch to unite with the Bugis (KA 1122a:230r). Vassal kingdoms were also ordered to send men to Makassar to prepare for the expected armed confrontation between the Company and Goa. On 4 March 1660 some 3,200 Bugis and Turatea men arrived in Makassar under various Makassar leaders: Karaeng Katapang with 900 Bugis; Karaeng Cenrana with 700 Bugis from Bone; Karaeng Sumanna with 500 men (area unspecified); Karaeng Kutenga with 500 men from Turatea; 159 Bugis from Wajo; and 200 Bugis from Luwu under Datu Luwu (KA 1122b:245r). Among those summoned to Makassar in June 1660 to help build fortifications were the Bugis from Wajo, Soppeng, and Bone (Stapel 1922:65-6).

The Company had earlier feared that an alliance among three of the most powerful kingdoms in the archipelago at the time – Banten, Mataram, and Goa – would be turned against the Dutch. But the revolts in Bone and Mandar in 1659 made the Company confident that Goa would not undertake any grandiose plans which would add the Company to its enemies (KA 1119e:809r). Also encouraging were correspondence received in Menado from the Mandar rebels and a report from a Company envoy to the Goa court. The envoy, Willem Bastingsh, mentioned that some of the Goa nobles had complained of the brutality of their ruler, Sultan Hasanuddin. Some were ready to betray him if Goa were attacked

(KA 1119d:822v-823v). The Company was further heartened by news that Goa's mercenary Banda troops were ready to assist the Company in any attack on Makassar (KA 1123a:380v). With such favourable reports the Company believed its chances of success had greatly improved, and it was right. The Company expedition of 1660 against Goa proved a resounding success. The Dutch forces occupied the Goa fort Pa'nakkukang, stocked it with supplies for five months, and left four heavily-armed ships and two sloops in Makassar harbour to guard it (Stapel 1922:65-6).

According to Speelman's *Notitie*, Sultan Hasanuddin blamed Karaeng Sumanna for Goa's defeat at the hands of the Dutch. As punishment for this humiliation, Sultan Hasanuddin transferred Karaeng Sumanna's authority over Bone to Karaeng Karunrung. In his new official capacity Karaeng Karunrung summoned 10,000 Bugis to dig a large canal cutting off the Dutch in Fort Pa'nakkukang from the Goa mainland. The Bugis, under their leaders Tobala', Daeng Pabila, Arung Kaju, Arung Palakka, Arung Maruangen and others, refused to do this labour and fled back to their homeland (Speelman 1670:730v). The date of their flight is recorded in the Diary of the Kings of Goa and Tallo as having occurred on 7 August 1660 (Ligtvoet 1880:118). Once safely in their homelands the Bugis obtained the much needed time to organize and arm themselves because of Goa's concern with the continuing presence of the Dutch in Fort Pa'nakkukang. According to "Binsje" Ali, a spy of the Dutch, a Goa army under Karaeng Popo was sent ostensibly to put down the rebellion, but in fact to go only as far as Bantaeng and then return. Karaeng Popo, Sultan Hasanuddin, Karaeng Karunrung, and some of the *Bate Salapang* with several thousand men would then attempt to retake Pa'nakkukang from the Dutch. But when one of the Dutch ships unexpectedly returned to Makassar for repairs, Sultan Hasanuddin quickly abandoned these plans. He ordered Karaeng Popo to go to Batavia and postponed any further punitive expeditions against the Bugis until November or December (KA 1123b:387r-389r). In the meantime Sultan Hasanuddin took the precaution of isolating the Dutch forces in Pa'nakkukang and strengthening his own defences. Along the shore beginning from the northern corner of the bay to the Garassi River, the Makassar forces planted mantraps, breastworks, and some sixty-six cannons. All the houses between the ruler's fortress at Sombaopu to the Garassi River were pulled down and a strong fort with fifteen cannons erected directly opposite the Dutch guardpost. Further pressure was applied against the occupation by Dutch forces when

Sultan Hasanuddin fined anyone who sold rice to the Dutch. The lack of rice and the outbreak of serious illness among the Dutch caused by contaminated drinking water slowly sapped the strength of the 520 Europeans in Pa'nakkukang (ibid.:387v-390r).

The only relief which came to the beleaguered garrison was news of the continuing rebellion of Goa's vassals, especially the Bugis. Sultan Hasanuddin was forced to send another expedition of Makassar and Banda troops under Karaeng Tallo, Karaeng Karunrung, and Karaeng Sumanna to deal with the rebellion in Bone (KA 1123c:394v). Although the outcome of this expedition is nowhere mentioned in either Dutch or Bugis-Makassar records, the Bugis who had fled from Makassar to their homelands had now assembled a sufficiently large army to cause Goa grave concern. In the beginning of October the fighting between the Makassar and Bugis armies had led to heavy casualties on both sides. Karaeng Karunrung, Karaeng Sumanna, and Kaicili' Kalimata continued operations in Bone, while Karaeng Tallo returned to Goa on 29 September 1660 to report progress of the campaign to Sultan Hasanuddin. It was said that Kaicili' Kalimata had departed himself well, and if it had not been for his bravery, Karaeng Karunrung would have fallen into the hands of the Bugis. Despite the high Bugis casualties, the outcome of the battle was still uncertain, and two of the Company's spies reported that the Bugis had fought bravely despite their relatively small numbers. At three different times Sultan Hasanuddin was forced to send more men into battle. These reinforcements were composed mainly of troops from Mandar, which had only recently been pacified by Goa, augmented by those from Ternate, Banda, and the Makassar Malays (KA 1123d:400r-v). The Bugis fought bravely against great odds, but they were finally defeated. Sometime on the 6th or 7th of October, the Dutch in Pa'nakkukang heard the firing of muskets and cannons by the returning Makassar troops to announce their victory over the Bugis (KA 1123e:406r-v).

Little did the Dutch realize that this event would be later cited by local historians as marking the beginning of a new era dominated by one of the most remarkable figures in the history of South Sulawesi, Arung Palakka. So spectacular was his reversal of fortune from a vanquished rebel Bugis leader to overlord of South Sulawesi within a space of ten years that he became a legend in his own day. This legend has made it difficult to distinguish fact from myth, especially in the early years of his life. According to local sources, Arung Palakka arose from the tradi-

tional elite but was not of a particularly important family. His father was La Pottobune Arung Tana Tenga, a lord of a tiny principality in Soppeng, and his mother was Datu Mario ri Wawo We Tĕnrisui, granddaughter of Arumpone La Tĕnrirua Sultan Adam who in 1611 became the first Moslem ruler of Bone. According to Bugis folk tradition, Arung Palakka was eleven years old when he and his family were brought as hostages to live in Goa after the second battle of Passempĕ in 1644. They had the great fortune of being made to serve the Tuma'bicara-butta Goa Karaeng Pattinngaloang who was a kind master. The latter took an immediate liking to Arung Palakka and taught him all that was proper in the upbringing of a prince. Arung Palakka was also honoured with the post of bearer of the betelbox for Karaeng Pattinngaloang. Since Arung Palakka's presence was required at all important ceremonial occasions, he became familiar with and greatly impressed by the sight of large numbers of foreign envoys coming to pay their respects to the powerful Karaeng Goa. As he grew up he became a favourite among his peers and elders because of his superior skill in the use of arms and in *raga*, a game once regarded with the greatest of respect by participants and onlookers alike.¹ The fact that Arung Palakka's skill in the *raga* was so exceptional (even supernatural when recited by village storytellers) demonstrated to any South Sulawesi observer his superior spiritual strength and purity of intentions.

Despite his increasing involvement with the Goa court and his friendships with the Makassar youths, *siri'* and *pĕsse* would not let him forget that he was a son of an exiled Bugis prince and that many of his people were suffering under Goa's overlordship. There were many like himself who had been brought to Goa as prisoners of war and divided among the victorious Goa nobles. In 1660 there was an order from Karaeng Karunrung, who replaced his father Karaeng Pattinngaloang as Tuma'bicarabutta Goa in 1654, to the regent of Bone, Tobala', to bring 10,000 men from Bone by July to help dig ditches along a defence perimeter on the coastline of Makassar harbour from the southernmost fortress of Barombong to the northernmost fortress of Ujung Tana. To meet the quota, young and old alike were dragged along and forced-marched across rugged terrain and high mountains to Makassar. Upon arrival they were divided into groups and made to shift for themselves as best they could. The combination of harsh deprivation at the labour camps and cruelty of the guards led to a rapid depletion of the ranks of workers either through illness or desertions. So serious was the problem of desertion that Karaeng Karunrung in exasperation finally ordered all

the Bone and Soppeng princes to work alongside the common people and be held responsible for desertions in their groups. For the ordinary Bugis their sense of *siri'* was now doubly offended by the ignominy of having their lords made to do menial tasks on the same level as themselves. It was no longer merely a question of individual *siri'* brought about through the humiliation of being forced to labour for the Makassar people, but the *siri'* of the whole Bugis nation of which the Bugis lords were the tangible symbols. A welling of the emotion of *pěsse* among the Bugis *corvée* labourers greeted the presence of their leaders in their midst and transformed a difficult situation into an unbearable outrage. In addition to creating a focus for Bugis sympathy and action, the Goa overlords unwittingly provided the hitherto docile Bugis workers with leaders, thus combining the necessary ingredients for a revolt which soon followed.

Among the Bugis lords who were summoned to perform these duties was Arung Palakka. He suffered the cruelty of the guards toward his people until one day a Bugis labourer tried to escape but was caught and beaten before Arung Palakka's very eyes. This incident finally encouraged him to plot actively with the other leaders to help the Bugis escape to their homeland. The day chosen for the revolt was a harvest festival holiday when most of the Makassar people and guards had gone to Tallo for the celebrations. On a prescribed signal the Bugis workers overcame the few remaining guards and fled back to the safety of the Bugis lands. The principal leaders of the rebellion which followed were Arung Palakka and the Bone regent appointed by Goa, Tobala'. When the Goa leaders heard of the rebellion, they pursued the Bugis but explained that they were principally seeking Tobala', "who had risen in revolt against Goa" (La Side 1971:I, 75-99). The Goa leaders held Tobala' responsible for all the Bugis because he had been installed by Goa as their regent and now he had failed in his duty. For this he, more than any other Bugis leader, was to pay the consequences for the rebellion.

Tobala' and the other Bugis leaders invited Datu Soppeng and some of his principal officials to a meeting in Mampu to discuss a possible alliance between Bone and Soppeng. During the talks Arung Mampu urged his son Datu Soppeng La Těnribali not to be overhasty in allying with Bone, for Goa had never forced its *adat* nor its laws upon Soppeng. Ever since the Agreement at Lamogo between Soppeng and Goa, the latter had adhered to its terms which guaranteed that "each would have his own regalia and each would rule his own land without one being subject to the other" (L-1:11). Despite this warning, Datu Soppeng was

persuaded to ally with Bone by the most prominent of his nobles, Arung Bila and Arung Palakka. Both these men believed that only by honouring the Treaty of Timurung of 1582 and by “tying our *sarung* up to our knees”² would Bone and Soppeng be able to defeat Goa. Despite Arung Mampu’s protestations, Datu Soppeng and Arung Bila agreed on behalf of Soppeng to an alliance with Bone in 1660 which became known as the *Pincara Lopie ri Atappang* (The Treaty of “The Raft at Atappang”) (L-1:11-15).³ Datu Soppeng had some reservations about the treaty and warned that there may yet be friction in the future between Bone and Soppeng if the following occurred: (1) Bone and Soppeng were given the victory by God and the two lands became free, and then Bone became so strong that it could disregard the agreement and act in defiance of Soppeng’s *adat* and traditions; (2) Bone and Soppeng were unable “to lift themselves up” and make themselves free (L-3:289-290).

The nature of political relationships within South Sulawesi kingdoms precluded the possibility of a ruler representing the wishes of the whole kingdom without the consent of a powerful balancing force, the Advisory Council. When Datu Soppeng returned to his kingdoms and announced the treaty with Bone, there were many among his nobles who opposed it saying, “How can we renounce our treaty with Goa when it has never broken the treaty [of Lamogo] nor forced Soppeng to accept another’s *adat*”. They advised against angering Goa, “for if Goa can subjugate Bone, which is strong, how much easier can it do the same to those who are weak”. By agreeing with Bone, they pointed out, Soppeng had broken the Treaty of Lamogo with Goa (L-1:16). They warned that failure to adhere to the treaty would be breaking the terms made by their ancestors Pëtta Puang ri Samang at Lamogo and later renewed by Puatta Polepue. Equally fearsome was the oath by Matinroe ri Tanana who swore, “Let no seed of rulers arise if we break the treaty.” One of the nobles who favoured allying with Bone confidently declared, “It will be an easy matter, gentlemen (*tautongěng* – men of good birth). We will veil ourselves with our shields, spears, and daggers and beat them back with no concern for our own safety.” Angrily one of the *tautongěng* replied:

“What is this about veiling ourselves with our shields, and this about separating our heads from our shoulders, and of fighting with no care for one’s safety, and of having God direct spears at our breasts – Soppeng would be destroyed! First Soppeng, then Tobala’. Bone is asking us to open our coffins and still you say it is good to get into them by breaking our agreement with Karaeng Goa!”

With this argument the nobles and *tautongĕng* rejected the *Pincara Lopie ri Atappang*.

Arung Bila and Arung Palakka were unable to persuade the others to consent to the treaty, and so two different policies were adopted by Soppeng toward the impending conflict between Bone and Goa. Part of Soppeng, led by Datu Soppeng, Arung Bila, and Arung Palakka, renounced any previous alliances with Goa and pledged themselves to help Bone on the basis of the Tĕllumpocco alliance concluded at Timurung. The other half of Soppeng rejected all pleas of an alliance with Bone. Instead, they decided to honour Soppeng's treaty with Goa at Lamogo because Goa had never violated it and Soppeng was in no position "to be the first to abandon the treaty with the Karaeng [Goa]" (L-3:290).

Both Soppeng factions had justified their actions in terms of a former treaty without attempting to declare that one superseded the other. What mattered was the ability of both groups to rely upon the spiritual sanction of their ancestors in their adherence to one or the other of these treaties. Soppeng, being the smallest of the major Bugis-Makassar kingdoms, was often caught in the middle of some war between its larger neighbours. Its very smallness is highlighted in the Timurung treaty forming the Tĕllumpocco when both Wajo and Bone contributed territory to Soppeng so it could stand with the others on the level of "brothers", though still a "younger brother". In 1660 it was again faced with a now familiar situation of being squeezed by the two most powerful kingdoms in the area. The pressure from both Bone and Goa would have been intense and would have made compromise between the two groups in Soppeng difficult. But in view of the long experience which Soppeng had had in such delicate diplomatic situations, the decision to support both Bone and Goa was perhaps the most satisfactory formula to assure its continuing survival no matter what the outcome of the struggle between those two rival kingdoms.

Once Tobala' and the Bone nobles and Datu Soppeng La Tĕnribali and his Soppeng lords had agreed to the *Pincara Lopie ri Atappang*, they invited Wajo to join once again in reviving the moribund Tĕllumpocco. Arung Matoa Wajo La Tĕnrilai Tosenngĕng declined the invitation by saying that while it was true that all three had agreed to be one at Timurung, Wajo could not abandon its treaty with Goa because Wajo was truly "a slave of the Karaeng". For La Tĕnrilai and the people of Wajo, their more recent experiences with Goa were far better than those with her powerful neighbour Bone. Not only had there been continuous

trouble with Bone over territorial boundaries, but both kingdoms had often been embroiled in disputes arising from an accepted but nevertheless frustrating practice of vassal states frequently switching allegiance from a weaker to a stronger kingdom. Furthermore, in the most recent memory of the Wajo people, it was Bone under Arumpone La Ma'darëmmëng, not Goa, which had invaded its land. Relations with Goa, on the other hand, had been comparatively friendly, with La Tënrilai even being honoured with marriage to the daughter of Sultan Hasanuddin (L-4:Section 23, unpag.). Although Wajo had also suffered the wrath of Goa and had once been subjected to a "slave" to "master" relationship with Goa, it had long since earned its new status of "ally" of Goa by participating faithfully in Goa's wars and by assuming responsibilities reserved only for the most trusted vassal. For Wajo it was a choice between an alliance with Bone, at the moment a somewhat disorganized and harried kingdom with whom it had had fairly stormy relations in the recent past, and with Goa, still the most powerful force in East Indonesia with whom Wajo had enjoyed most favourable treatment. La Tënrilai's decision to reject the Tëllumpocco and to support Goa was a foregone conclusion.

When Bone's leaders learned that Goa was preparing to invade Bone, they immediately despatched the *bila-bila musu*⁴ to Soppeng directing it to bring its men to Matango in seven days. From Matango the Soppeng troops marched to Lamuru. After they had set up camp, a messenger arrived with a letter from Karaeng Goa Sultan Hasanuddin to Arung Bila, although its contents were clearly intended for the ears of Datu Soppeng and his troops. The message read:

. . . Return to your village. Eat your good food and drink water which you savour. You are standing on the summit. Let only the leeches drink your blood and God possess your soul when the time is due, for there is no quarrel between us. I am pursuing the fugitive Tobala' because he has defied Goa.⁵ I will pursue him and destroy him.

In reply Arung Bila informed Karaeng Goa that Soppeng's troops were already at the border and ready to help their ally Bone in accordance with their agreement at Timurung, for ". . . our friendship, with Bone is as strong as that" (L-3:294; L-1:18-9).

The first battle occurred on the plains of Suling, which lies between Cenrana and Lamuru, the second in the vicinity of Matango naar Bengo in Bone, and the third around Labai in the mountains near Lamuru.⁶ The first two battles ended with heavy Bugis losses, and all but two of Soppeng's warflags were captured by the Makassar troops. The third

battle appeared indecisive as both sides withdrew from the battlefield. But before the end of the day the Bugis somehow succeeded in besieging the Makassar forces and placing them in great danger. Meanwhile Daeng Ago had gone with a considerable Makassar army and 200 Malay riflemen to Padang-Padang, Massepe, and finally to Pammana in Wajo. Acting on Goa's orders, Wajo and the second Goa army attacked and burned Soppeng, thus succeeding in Goa's intentions of drawing away Soppeng's troops from the bulk of the Bugis forces. Datu Soppeng and his army returned to save their homeland, but they arrived exhausted and were easily defeated by the fresh Wajo and Goa troops. The Bone warriors fought on alone but were soon overwhelmed near Ulawěng and forced to flee to the mountains in Mampu. At the foot of the mountains the Bugis were again defeated and retreated first to Jaling and finally to Watampone. At Watampone the Bugis forces were decisively beaten, and Arung Palakka fled to safety with a few of his followers to a mountain called Macinni, some four kilometres from Watampone. After holding out for twenty days, Arung Palakka approached Karaeng Sumanna, presented the *sompa-warani*⁷ and said: "Our war with the Karaeng [Goa] is over. Go home, and I will follow later. I am not yet finished with the war with my *seajing* ["brother" or "ally", i.e. Wajo]" (L-1:21).

Karaeng Sumanna's reply is not given in the sources, but it must have been one of peace since the fighting ceased. Arung Palakka gathered a Bone-Soppeng force to attack Wajo without the help, according to one Bugis source, of a single Soppeng lord (L-3:297).⁸ With this hastily assembled army, Arung Palakka attacked and defeated the Wajo forces under Arung Matoa La Těnrilai Tosenngěng at Sarasa and again in Wajo's capital. Many surrendered to Arung Palakka, and the remainder under their Arung Matoa sought refuge in Kera and Maiwa. Makassar reinforcements for Wajo were also put to flight near Paria. From Wajo Arung Palakka marched his men through Massepe to Bacukiki and camped in the neighbourhood of Lisu, east of Tanete.

It was at the time that Arung Palakka and his men were at Lisu that the important negotiations between Goa and the Dutch East India Company were being concluded. According to Speelman's *Notitie*, the negotiations ended in mid-August 1660, and were followed by the evacuation of Fort Pa'nakkukang by the Dutch forces. Speelman claims that at Lisu Arung Palakka's army grew to a formidable 10,000 men from Bone, 7,000 men from Soppeng, plus others from Wajo (Speelman 1669:731v). But even this army was no match for the forces which Goa

was now able to send against it. The Bugis records present a detailed account of the Goa campaign against Arung Palakka. Part of Goa's army came through Bulo-Bulo and Lamatti to attack Bone from the south, while the rest went to Tanete to enter Soppeng through Lamuru. The Wajo troops who had fled to Maiwa with Arung Matoa La Tēnri lai Tosengngēng went south to Sidenreng so they could attack Soppeng from the north. To meet this threat Arung Palakka divided his forces with one moving to Bone's southern borders and the other under his command remaining in Lisu to meet the Goa army coming from Tanete. At Lisu the Wajo forces arrived from the north at a critical juncture and swung the battle in Goa's favour. On the other front Goa brought its forces through Sinjai and forced the Bone troops to retreat to Salomekko. The latter made a stand at Bulu Cina fighting three long days and nights in an attempt to prevent an invasion of Bone. A stalemate seemed to have been reached when word arrived that Arung Palakka's situation in Lisu was serious. As soon as this news was known, many of the troops from Palakka and elsewhere in Bone abandoned the fight at Bulu Cina and went west to help Arung Palakka. When they arrived the battle and the rebellion had already been lost. Arung Palakka gathered the remnants of his men and told them:

. . . My parents and my family are in Bone. Go and seek that which is good for the country because I cannot see a way to better the welfare of the land of Bone on this island. There is no hope in opposing Goa now that we are defeated and Goa's troops are everywhere (L-1:22; L-3:295).

Arung Palakka fled Lisu with a handful of followers and hid among the large boulders⁹ at Maruala, south of Lisu. The people of Tanete kept Arung Palakka's hiding place a secret and brought him and his followers food and water at night "because they remembered the agreement once made between Karaeng Tanete La Mammula Daeng Lempa' and Datu Mario La Makkatērru" (L-1:23-5; L-3:295).¹⁰ But soon the Pabbicara Tanete sent word to Arung Palakka that he had to leave that very night since Goa's troops had already arrived in Lisu. With the help of the Topaluda¹¹ and a stormy night, they escaped and arrived at Uwaempēllēng. At this spot Arung Palakka's uncle, Babae, urged his nephew to flee Umpungēng while he and seven others delayed the pursuing Makassar troops. All seven of them, including Arung Palakka's foster father (*patarana*),¹² agreed to sacrifice their lives to allow Arung Palakka time to reach the safety of the hills in Umpungēng. This noble gesture was the supreme expression of *pēsse* toward one's fellow man. In

a parting salute of loyalty to their lord Arung Palakka Datu Mario, one of the men performed the *aru*, the oath of allegiance,¹³ saying: “We will run amok among them. Let the people of Goa know that the people of Mario are also men no less than they” (Sejarah Bone n.d.:135).

At the foot of a banyan tree (*ajuaru*) in Polelolo to the east of Umpungĕng, a vow was made by Arung Palakka, Arung Bila Daeng Mabela, Arung Appanang, and Datu Citta that they would not lay down their task of freeing their lands from Goa oppression and that they would sail away together to Java.¹⁴ Having escaped his pursuers at Umpungĕng, Arung Palakka continued onward and went to see Datu Soppeng La Tĕnribali to inform him of his decision to leave Sulawesi. Arung Palakka explained that “there was no place for him in the land of the Bugis and both Bone and Soppeng had been defeated and could no longer carry on the fight”. He then revealed his decision to “look for someone who could better the welfare of Bone and Soppeng” (L-1:24).¹⁵ Arung Palakka explained that he was taking with him the Arung Appanang, his nephew the Arung Bila, and his brother-in-law the Datu Citta. For his journey Arung Palakka received 100 catties (or about 60 kilos) of gold from La Tĕnribali and from West Soppeng, but only two catties from his home district of Mario ri Wawo. There was no gold from East Soppeng because it had been stripped bare by the marauding Makassar troops (L-1:24; L-3:298).

After Arung Palakka departed, Arung Bila, Arung Appanang, and Datu Citta arrived in the evening to pay their respects and to take leave of Datu Soppeng.¹⁶ Arung Bila informed Datu Soppeng that they could only find 100 people from Soppeng to take with them into exile because the rest had gone with Arung Belo Ama’na We Dima to Leta. As a final word of advice to the three princes, Datu Soppeng said: “No matter what happens, do not become separated from one another nor leave Arung Palakka. Even if you should go to the ends of the earth (literally, “bump your head on the edge of the heavens”), do not return to the land of the Bugis until you have found someone who can oppose Karaeng Goa.” The three then took some gold and departed (L-1:25; L-3:299).

Ten days later Goa and Wajo attacked Soppeng in search of the fugitive princes. Datu Soppeng hurriedly gathered his wives and children and waited in the royal residence, La Mangile. When Arung Bĕrru’ ri Lau’ heard that Karaeng Goa intended to have Datu Soppeng beheaded, he quickly brought 400 of his men to Soppeng and placed them at the foot of the palace stairs. At first Karaeng Katapang wanted to force his way despite the presence of the men from Bĕrru’ ri Lau’, but Karaeng

Karunrung urged caution. The latter suggested instead that Datu Soppeng give himself up peaceably and go with them to Makassar. Only if this offer were refused were they to use force. Datu Soppeng surrendered, but before he could be brought to Goa, news arrived that Arung Palakka was in Bone at Palëtte preparing to sail away. An army consisting of men from Goa, Wajo, and Lamuru was sent immediately to Bone to try to prevent Arung Palakka's departure. With the help of some of the people of Bone, a number of Arung Palakka's followers were captured at Cempalagi. Arung Palakka, however, managed to escape and sail safely away to Butung. Having failed to capture their principal prey, the Goa forces returned to Soppeng to escort Datu Soppeng, his family, Soppeng's flags (Bakka' and La Pianyarang) and regalia to Goa and exile in Sanrangang (L-1:25; L-3:299-300; L-4: unpag.; Sejarah Bone n.d.:136).

According to Bugis oral traditions, before Arung Palakka embarked at Palëtte he made a vow that if he should return safely to his homeland and succeed in freeing his people from bondage, he would offer as thanksgiving: (1) *sokko'* (cooked glutinous rice wrapped with coconut leaves in small squares) stacked as high as the hill in Cempalagi; (2) 100 water buffaloes with gold-tipped horns; and (3) the heart of a royal person from Goa. He then tied a knot (*singkërru*) with the tendrils of a tree growing by the seashore to signify the making of the vow and said that only when he had completed his vow would he untie the knot. With these words he stepped onto the sand and into his boat which carried him away from his homeland to an unknown future. According to Dutch and Makassar sources, the flight of Arung Palakka, his family, and a few followers to the island of Butung occurred sometime at the end of 1660 or the beginning of 1661.¹⁷

With the departure of the last rebel Bugis leaders, Goa turned its attention to its problems with the Dutch East India Company. Treaty negotiations were in progress in Batavia, and the Goa court waited with some anxiety for news of their outcome. On 13 October 1660 the Dutch ship *Postillion* arrived in Makassar from Batavia carrying the Company Commissioners Zacharias Wagenaer and Jacob Cauw. They brought the treaty signed by representatives of the Company in Batavia and by Karaeng Popo on behalf of Karaeng Goa Sultan Hasanuddin (KA 1123c:402r). When the Commissioners asked when they could bring their letters to Sultan Hasanuddin in Sombaopu, they were told: "The king sends these gifts [two young buffaloes, some rice, and coconuts] in

welcome and wishes to ask when you will be returning his fort [Pa'nakkukang]" (KA 1123f:416r).

While this cool reception was not totally unexpected, evidence of a renewal of Goa's defences so soon after the recent hostilities was disturbing to the Dutch envoys. Everyday they could see the Makassar people and their vassals busily erecting more and more defensive walls, as well as large palisades, along the Garassi River between the English lodge and the Portuguese quarters. There were new defences constructed near Pa'nakkukang, all along Sombaopu and the Portuguese quarters, and between the Portuguese quarters and Goa's northernmost fort, Ujung Tana (KA 1126a:527r). Although in Article 12 of the treaty signed between Goa and the Company on 2 December 1660 Goa had agreed to force the Portuguese to leave and forbid others of their compatriots from settling within its borders (Heeres 1931c:173), there was little indication by September 1661 that any such move was being undertaken (KA 1126c:577). By the end of 1661 no progress had been made in implementing the 1660 treaty, and instead more and more fortifications were being built. It was said that the entire harbour area had been fortified and that great quantities of gunpowder were being prepared throughout the kingdom. In addition some 12-1500 boats were said to be in readiness in various areas. There seemed little doubt in the minds of the Dutch officials in Makassar that sometime in the near future war again would break out between Goa and the Company (KA 1130:280).

The rumour that Sultan Hasanuddin had summoned all of his vassals and allies to Makassar seemed to be substantiated by the great numbers of people coming to Makassar every day from all sides. In early November a large force composed of men from Goa's vassal kingdoms of Bima, Sumbawa, and Butung arrived in Makassar. Although the Dutch were told that they had been summoned to help quell the Bugis rebellion, the presence of such large numbers of armed men in Makassar did little to allay Dutch fears (KA 1123f:416r). What caused the Dutch even greater anxiety was a council held by Sultan Hasanuddin and all of his nobles on 31 October 1660. After the nobles had given their oath of allegiance, Sultan Hasanuddin had presented each one of the nobles a banner with his seal (KA 1123e:408v). Fear that this ceremony was a prelude to a renewal of the war preyed upon the already uneasy minds of the Dutch. It was widely-known that Karaeng Karunrung favoured war with the Dutch, and it was rumoured that Karaeng Sumanna, formerly a friend of the Company, was similarly inclined (KA 1123f:416r). Both of

these men were among the most powerful figures in Goa whose advice carried considerable weight in the kingdom.

What the Dutch were unaware of was the fact that Goa's defences were being erected as much as a precaution against a rumoured Butung-Bugis-Ternate invasion as against a possible renewal of hostilities with the Dutch. Goa, once considered invincible by neighbouring lands, had been humiliated by its recent set-back against the Company. Under these circumstances, Goa's government accepted as highly credible the news that its enemies were planning to take advantage of Goa's temporary weakness to launch a joint attack. Pressures on the Goa government resulted in open rifts which first came to the notice of the Dutch in August 1661. It was said that Tuma'bicara-butta Karaeng Sumanna threatened to step down from his office. Immediately upon his announcement four of the *Bate Salapang* – the *Gallarang* Manngasa, Tombong, Bontomanang, and Saumata – also threatened to go with him (KA 1126b:551r-v). Except for this brief observation the Dutch sources are silent about this trouble until three years later when the lines of division in the Goa government again became apparent. In May 1664 the Dutch reported that a large dispute had erupted between two of the most powerful individuals in the kingdom, Karaeng Karunrung and Karaeng Tallo. It was even reported that fighting had taken place between the two parties (Stapel 1922:78). In this dispute Karaeng Tallo was supported by Karaeng Sumanna who, according to a Dutch envoy to the Goa court in 1663, deeply hated Karaeng Karunrung (KA 1137:957-8). Although Sultan Hasanuddin favoured Karaeng Karunrung, the other two *karaeng*, supported by all the other nobles, succeeded in having Karaeng Karunrung exiled on 26 May 1664 and all of his goods confiscated, much to the disrepute of the ruler. The forced exile did not end the division in the kingdom because Karaeng Karunrung later returned and many of the old wounds were reopened. This was a dangerous situation which later proved fatal in Goa's war against the Company in 1666-9 (KA 1137:960-1; Ligtvoet 1880:122).

The Company was glad to see the demise of Karaeng Karunrung, although it held itself completely neutral in the dispute. With the removal of Karaeng Karunrung from the stage, the Dutch hoped for an upsurge in trade. It used to be Karaeng Karunrung's practice to have all the goods delivered to him for less than the price for which they were bought. No ship, no matter to whom it belonged, was allowed to leave without handing over at least one-third of its hold to him. Even if these traders did not find a good market in Makassar, they still had to supply

Karaeng Karunrung with whatever goods he desired and then pay the costs themselves. This made Karaeng Karunrung much disliked among the traders. But now Karunrung was abandoned by everyone including his servants, and his considerable wealth stolen from all sides. Sultan Hasanuddin was still greatly inclined toward Karaeng Karunrung but could do nothing to help him since Karaeng Tallo had posted an armed guard around Karaeng Karunrung. But once the Goa leaders had decided to exile Karaeng Karunrung, they became obsessed with the fear that Karaeng Karunrung would settle in Batavia and join the refugee Bugis leaders to attack Goa (KA 1137:961-9). Toward the end of 1664 the Company wrote to Goa to reassure it that Karaeng Karunrung had not arrived in Batavia (Stapel 1922:80).

With the crisis in the Goa government resolved for the time being, Sultan Hasanuddin sought to reassert Goa's authority which had been so severely shaken in the last years. He sent a large fleet to the Sula Islands to make them acknowledge Goa's suzerainty and not that of their traditional overlord, Ternate. In addition the fleet was instructed to stop at Butung to punish the ruler there for harbouring Arung Palakka and the other refugee Bugis princes. Unbeknownst to Goa the Dutch East India Company had decided at about the same time to send its fleet to Makassar to demonstrate its power and authority in the area. While Goa, nicknamed "the Cock of the East" by the Dutch, and the Company struck defiant poses, they both hoped to avoid conflict. Unfortunately, misunderstanding over jurisdiction of shipwrecked property made war between these two powers seem more and more inevitable.

In 1662 the Dutch ship *De Walvis* foundered in Makassar waters and sixteen of its cannons plus other goods were seized by the followers of Karaeng Tallo and Karaeng Sumanna. Later the Company demanded the return of the cannons, but this request was refused by Karaeng Sumanna who replied that "since he had fished them out of the sea, they now belonged to him". Although Karaeng Sumanna later returned half of the cannons, this was only accomplished after long negotiations and important concessions by the Dutch.¹⁸ More serious was the case of the Dutch ship *Leeuwin* which became shipwrecked on one of the Don Duango Islands off the coast of Makassar on the night of 24 December 1664. What angered the Dutch was Sultan Hasanuddin's refusal to allow them to send a boat to the wreck. Instead, so it was rumoured, he himself sent his people to rescue the moneychest and bring it back to Makassar (KA 1143b:159). The rumour proved true, and Dutch black *daalders* which had been kept in the chest began circulating (KA 1143c:653).

Such practices were perfectly acceptable according to South Sulawesi custom. A common saying was “The remains of the waves belong to the portion of the sword of the finder” (Bugis: “Sisana bombang, tawana Sinangke”) (Eerdmans: n.d.(a):10). For the Dutch, however, the seizure of their shipwrecked property was nothing less than piracy.

Verspreeet, the head of the Dutch post in Makassar, failed to gain permission to go to the wreck. In desperation he sent the Assistant Merchant Cornelis Kuyff and fourteen men to the island to investigate without obtaining a stamp of approval from the Goa ruler. Kuyff and all his men were murdered on the island. When news of the murder reached Makassar, Verspreeet placed all the Company’s goods and money on two Dutch ships for safekeeping. He then went to Karaeng Sumanna to inquire about this affair. Karaeng Sumanna promised to investigate the matter and a week later sent 528 *rijksdaalders* to Verspreeet in payment for the murders (Stapel 1922:82-3). While this may have been an acceptable local way of appeasing the aggrieved party, to the Dutch it was an appalling gesture, and Verspreeet flatly refused to accept the money. Karaeng Sumanna was well aware of the dangerous game which the Goa government was playing with the Dutch, and so he hoped to ease the tension by bringing the supposed perpetrators of the deed to Verspreeet and by promising to put them to death. Verspreeet remained unmoved by this letter and demanded that Karaeng Sumanna himself come and make a public announcement of these intentions. When this demand was ignored, Verspreeet and the entire Dutch post in Makassar sailed away to Batavia on 23 June 1665 (Stapel 1922:83). After the departure of the Dutch, Sultan Hasanuddin told a Dutch burger from Ambon that he did not want war, but “if the Dutch wish to be the first to start one, then let them do as they please” (Stapel 1922:84).

Despite the deteriorating relations between Goa and the Company, the latter was not yet ready for a confrontation in 1665. The Governor-General and Council of the Indies in Batavia decided on 20 November 1665 to send a mission to Goa “in order to remove the impression that we are coming to war with her again” (Stapel 1922:84-5; Dagh-Register 1665:351, 441). But Gerwits, the special Company envoy from Batavia, was not even allowed into Makassar and had to continue on to Ambon. What may have prompted such an ignominious treatment of the envoy was credence given by Goa leaders to rumours circulating in Makassar. According to these rumours, most likely spread by English merchants whose nation was at war with The Netherlands in Europe, the English had seized seventy to eighty of the Company’s ships; Batavia was

suffering from a serious lack of provisions; the Company had lost a lot of people through the plague and other illnesses and consequently had to recruit natives into its service; Banda had fallen to the English and Batavia was soon to follow; and The Netherlands was tightly blockaded by the English and so no help could be sent to The Indies (KA 1148a: 504).

Perhaps it was these rumours which convinced Goa that the time was ripe to reassert its authority in Eastern Indonesia. In April 1666 the Syahbandar Daeng Makkule of Goa returned home after two months away on a mission to Butung. He was part of a fleet which was sent to the Sula Islands to force them to accept Goa's suzerainty (KA 1148b:511). The Sula Islands, Banggai, and Tambuku were the targets of the first Goa fleet. It was rumoured that a second fleet of 300 boats was now being prepared for another expedition aimed this time principally at Butung and Ternate (Stapel 1922:86). The English, Portuguese, and Indian Moslem traders in Makassar told Commissioner Johan van Wesenhagen, who had arrived in Makassar on April 1666, that the reason for the first expedition was to assert Goa's suzerainty over lands which were being contested by the ruler of Ternate. Among these were Muna, Banggai, Lampute, and Gorontalo. On this expedition the fleet had also attacked Ambon and Butung but had been unable to conquer them. This was the reason another expedition was now being planned (KA 1148b: 514). Many of these areas had been seized from Ternate by the powerful Goa rulers in the first half of the 17th century, and now Sultan Hasanuddin wanted to reaffirm Goa's overlordship over the lands which he had inherited from his forebears.

Despite Goa's increasing military activities aimed at re-establishing its superiority over all others in East Indonesia, the Company remained committed to preserving the peace with Goa. Commissioner van Wesenhagen was sent to Makassar to "seek satisfaction" from Goa for the Dutch murders. From the beginning his task proved difficult because of express order from the Goa government that none of its subjects was to speak to him without its approval. It was a common practice for Dutch missions to gather information in the street or marketplace while formal negotiations were in progress in the court. This unusual measure reflected the Goa government's concern for security and protocol. To have divulged any information to the enemy could prove costly, and so warning one's populace against speaking to any foreigner was an understandable move. A stronger motivation for this measure than the Dutch

realized was the concern for protocol. They had angered Sultan Hasanuddin by their precipitate departure in June 1665 without the customary courteous leave-taking, and so this was a way of registering his displeasure toward the Dutch. Nevertheless, the mission was received with the treatment accorded a major ruler. A small boy seated on a throne received the letter from Batavia and was then borne away to Sultan Hasanuddin accompanied by much singing and shouting. Sultan Hasanuddin was seated in the reception room, and at his side were Karaeng Lengkesse, Katappa, Popo, and Karunrung, plus the two *Syahbandar*.¹⁹ The Dutch envoys were shown to their seats, and then the letter was opened and read aloud. They then presented the ruler with four small cases of rosewater, which he distributed among his nobles. In return Sultan Hasanuddin gave the envoys on their departure ten to twelve coconuts and two bundles of sugar cane (KA 1148b:518-9).

In this mission van Wesenhagen learned from a Makassar source that Sultan Hasanuddin would be inclined toward peace with the Dutch if the latter would condone his occupation of the lands under dispute with the Sultan of Ternate and return the rebel Bugis leaders who had fled from Butung to Batavia. Sultan Hasanuddin explained that he would never have had to maintain his rights to these lands in question if Ternate had not attacked the "Makassar" territory of Pancana [Muna]. Insofar as the Bugis were concerned, he would be pleased if they were sent to exile in Ceylon but he would never condone their presence in Batavia (KA 1148b:521).

Goa's enmity toward Ternate was of a recent date. In the first half of the 17th century, Goa's energetic rulers had extended their conquests through much of the territory in Eastern Indonesia which had once recognized the overlordship of Ternate. In the treaty signed between the Company and Goa in Batavia on 19 August 1660, Goa was forced to acknowledge that Butung (Article 1) and Menado (Article 2) belonged to Sultan Mandar Syah of Ternate (Heeres 1931b:171). This treaty, as was shown above, was subsequently ignored by Sultan Hasanuddin who continued to have pretensions over these lands. On 12 October 1665 a Goa fleet of 10,662 boats was sent to the Sula Islands and returned in triumph on 17th March the following year (Ligtvoet 1880:124). When van Wesenhagen spoke to the ruler of Butung on 1 April 1666, the latter told him that the Makassar fleet had seized some 5,000 Sula Islanders and was planning to attack Butung at the end of the Moslem fasting month. To meet this attack Butung was busily preparing its defences (KA 1148b:529). But Butung was not the only target. According to a

Makassar source, the *bila-bila bundu*, or war summons, were issued on 4 July 1666 for an expedition to Ambon and the Moluccas (Ligtvoet 1880:125). Goa had also apparently contacted Sultan Syarifuddin of Tidore, to plot the defeat of his arch-enemy, Sultan Mandar Syah. Sometime in March 1666 a Makassar embassy headed by Kare Mangalle and Kare Njampa came with letters for the rulers of both Tidore and Ternate. In addition to this formal embassy, Sultan Hasanuddin and Kaicili' Kalimata delivered a secret message to the ruler of Tidore, but its contents were not revealed to the Dutch (KA 1148b:531). Kaicili' Kalimata was an influential voice in the Goa court urging war with Ternate. After an abortive attempt to topple his brother Sultan Mandar Syah from the Ternate throne, he now hoped to accomplish this with the help of Goa (Ligtvoet 1880:115; Stapel 1922:86).

Goa's other continuing concern was the Bugis. The Bugis rebel leaders under Arung Palakka had succeeded in escaping first to Butung and then, with Dutch help, to Batavia. The frequent correspondence between Goa and Batavia requesting the return of the Bugis to South Sulawesi or their exile to Ceylon reflected Goa's awareness of the danger these few Bugis leaders could pose in the future. Far from being an irrational fear, it was based on an accurate assessment of the situation in South Sulawesi. Even the Sultan of Butung was able to tell van Wesenhagen on the latter's visit to that island in April 1666 that ". . . Arung Palakka was so greatly esteemed in the Makassar lands that . . . his assistance would be sufficient to cause most of the Bugis lands to fall away [from Goa]" (KA 1148b:534). Even an alliance between the Bugis and Ternate could not be dismissed. There were Bugis refugees who had fled to Ternate seeking assistance against Goa. When van Wesenhagen arrived in Ternate in the middle of 1666, two of the Bugis leaders, Daeng Pabila and Arung Maruangen, came and spoke to him. They told him that if the Company were to come to Makassar to war with Goa, the Bugis people would rise up and assist it. But if it did not come to their aid, then the Bugis would be totally destroyed. This is the reason, they explained, that the Bugis wanted to be completely certain of the Company's resolution to pursue such a war before they took any action (KA 1148b:532).

The Bugis in Batavia, meanwhile, were kept fit and in a state of readiness by Arung Palakka, as much for reasons of morale as to prepare them for the hoped for war against Goa. The first hazardous but exciting years of exile on Butung within easy reach of Goa's fleets gave way to a period of inactivity and desuetude of exile in Batavia. To preserve a

sense of purpose and unity among his followers, now called "Toangke" or "People of Angke", after the Angke River which flowed through the Bugis settlement in Batavia, Arung Palakka enforced a rigid code of conduct. He discouraged his people from seeking wages elsewhere and forced them to farm and fish in order to be economically self-sufficient. Yet even this strict discipline was allowed to lapse on occasion, such as when a Toangke hired himself out to a Dutchman so Daeng Talele, Arung Palakka's wife, would have enough food to eat (L-6:72). When the Company sought Arung Palakka's assistance in a military campaign against Minangkabau "rebels" in west coast Sumatra, he eagerly assented. For him this was an opportunity to provide a worthwhile goal for his restless Toangke. But the more important reason for Arung Palakka was to demonstrate Bugis fighting skills, for one of the vague promises made by the Company leaders was the possibility of a war against Goa if this mission proved successful.

On 30 August 1666 six companies of soldiers arrived in Padang in west coast Sumatra from Batavia, of which two each were composed of Ambon soldiers under Captain Joncker and the Toangke under Arung Palakka. The Bugis troops were in the vanguard in the attack on Pau in September. In the battle the Bugis cut off the enemy's escape route through the mountains, and some 200-300 Minangkabau were killed. Arung Palakka himself took some seven heads. When the Dutch troops arrived, they found that he and the Bugis had seized a mountain position and some 3,000 Minangkabau and their cattle. The Bugis soon abandoned their well-situated defences and descended singing and shouting. The seven Minangkabau heads taken by Arung Palakka were given to the Dutch who took and displayed them atop spikes in revenge for a mutilated Dutch body left on a stake in Pau.

Arung Palakka continued to distinguish himself in this campaign, and the Bugis in general acquitted themselves well and accounted for at least 200 of the 350 Minangkabau dead in the battle for Pau. So valiant and well-known did Arung Palakka become in this campaign that after the victory in Ulakan, the people there made him "King of Ulakan (Raja Ulakan)". From Ulakan the battle against troops from Aceh, which was overlord over the west coast Minangkabau areas, continued along the coast to Pariaman, where again the Company's forces were victorious. This time Captain Joncker was made Lord of Pariaman (KA 1149: 2186, 2192-9). With the successful conclusion of the campaign in west coast Sumatra, the Company's leaders were convinced that Arung Palakka and the Toangke would be useful if there were to be a war

against Goa. Arung Palakka had managed to create exactly the impression he had hoped, for he had made known that his intention in Sumatra was to “make his name blossom in this war” (KA 1149:2192).

The Company seemed resigned to the fact that hostilities with Goa in the future were unavoidable. When commissioner van Wesenhagen’s mission to the Goa court in April 1666 had failed to “obtain satisfaction” for the murder of the Dutchmen, the Company had as good reason as any to take some type of punitive action. Whatever the ostensible reason for such action, the true cause was the incompatibility of Goa’s political and the Company’s economic interests. The question of what should be done was discussed at great length by the Company’s Council of the Indies on 5 October 1666 amidst a feeling of euphoria over the victory in west coast Sumatra. It was finally decided to send a strong fleet under the command of Johan van Dam, who had led the successful attack on Makassar in 1660. When he excused himself because he was due for home leave, Governor-General Maetsuycker then personally nominated Cornelis Janszoon Speelman. Although the latter had been suspended from service by the Company for allegedly engaging in private trading some years back, the choice was approved unanimously by the Council (Stapel 1936:34-5).

On 2 November 1666 the Council of the Indies in Batavia passed a resolution that the expedition to Makassar and to the Eastern Quarters should proceed in order to demonstrate how quickly they in Batavia could be in war-readiness, but also “to announce the war to the Makassar people” (Stapel 1922:89). This burst of enthusiasm fanned by the recent victory in Sumatra was later revised by a more sober reassessment of the situation. Judging by the *Instructions* presented to Speelman by the Governor-General and the Council of the Indies dated 23 November 1666, it was apparent that the Company’s leaders in Batavia still hoped for a peaceful settlement of their quarrels with Goa. Upon arrival in Makassar, Speelman was instructed to be prepared to receive any messengers from Goa asking for peace, for “we are not willing to see it [the situation] go to extremes as long as it can be avoided”. A brief letter was then to be sent with these messengers to the government of Goa. It would inform Goa that the Company intended “to seek revenge on the land and the subjects of Makassar” if no immediate reparations and satisfaction were given for the “evil and unfair” acts committed against the Company, the ruler of Ternate, and other allies. Should Goa not send anyone to the fleet, then Speelman was

to prepare to send this message with one or two of the Makassar prisoners (Stapel 1922:196-7).

While hoping for a peaceful settlement in the Company's favour, the Governor-General and the Council were not averse to using force to demonstrate the Company's might. Speelman was instructed to land the native soldiers under Arung Palakka and Captain Jonckers at various places on the way to Tanakeke. They were to cause as much havoc as possible among the Makassar people because "they are the most able in raids, not being as heavily-armed as our people". A group of Dutch soldiers with muskets was to remain in reserve behind the native troops to cover any retreat. That the authorities in Batavia only intended limited fighting is apparent from the precise orders to Speelman that no one was to proceed inland. If no mutually satisfactory agreement were reached, and the raids had already occurred, then Speelman was to proceed to Butung. Here he was to hold a general council to decide how best to fight the enemy both in and outside Sulawesi. On Arung Palakka's recommendation, some of the Bugis were to be allowed to remain on Butung to prepare their trip to Bugis country while Speelman continued eastward to Ternate, Ambon, and elsewhere. If, after returning from his mission to the east, there was to be war with Goa, Speelman was to send the fleet to the city and forts of Makassar. The east monsoon would allow him to come close to the city and cause great damage with the guns of the fleet. He was to destroy any ship in the roadstead except those belonging to the Portuguese, Danish, and French, which would be allowed to sail away once any contraband goods on board had been confiscated. All of this should continue for three or four days to make the Makassar forces believe that the Company intended to land and storm the city, although such a step should be avoided. Instead, various parties on small boats were to be sent at all hours of the night to cause havoc on land supported by the guns of the ships. In this way so much damage would be caused to the enemy that they would be forced to make peace. If, despite all, the enemy still remained unmoved and indisposed to negotiate, then Speelman was to return to Batavia with the entire fleet. Speelman was explicitly forbidden to land or attack the well-defended port city of Makassar since this was regarded as too hazardous an undertaking (Stapel 1936:2-3, 10-1, 25-6, 32, 34-6, 197-8, 214, 216).

These instructions were explicit and precise. With a less headstrong and ambitious leader than Speelman the expedition may have ended differently. Speelman had first come out to the Indies in the Company's

service when he was seventeen years old. In 1648 after only three years in the Company, he was promoted to Bookkeeper (*Boekhouder*) and the following year to Assistant Merchant (*Onderkoopman*). He rose quickly to Merchant (*Koopman*), then to Bookkeeper General (*Boekhouder-Generaal*). Finally in Januari 1663 he was appointed as Governor of Coromandel, an important Company post in southern India. Although two years later he was dismissed from his post for allegedly participating in illicit private trading, in October 1666 he was given the important post as “Superintendent, Admiral, Commander and Commissioner to the Eastern Quarters [i.e., the Moluccas and Banda]” (Stapel 1936:35). He had proved to be a capable official and had risen in the ranks of the Company by his own merit. Despite his re-instatement by the Company after his dismissal from Coromandel, and the confidence shown in him by the Governor-General and the Council of the Indies in this delicate mission to the Eastern Quarters, Speelman would have felt the necessity of proving that this trust was not misplaced. It was perhaps Speelman’s desire to vindicate his name which led him to “reinterpret” his instructions and decide to launch an all-out war against Goa. If glory were to be gained, it had to be on this mission.

Both Speelman and Arung Palakka had enormous personal stakes involved in the expedition. For Speelman nothing short of a brilliant victory would redeem his good name which had been so humiliatingly sullied over a minor incident. For Arung Palakka any victory would be sufficient to remove the heavy burden of knowing that his *siri* – his sense of self-respect and honour – was dead, killed by the Makassar overlords of Goa. Only by restoring his and his people’s *siri* would they once again be able to hold their heads high in South Sulawesi. The opportunity had arrived, and Arung Palakka and his people were willing to risk death to regain their *siri*. They realized that it was better to die in defence of one’s *siri* (*mate ri siri’na*) than to live without it (*mate siri*). Did not the words of the elders stress that to die in these circumstances would be “to die a death of sugar and coconut milk (*mate rigollai, mate risantange*)?” And so Arung Palakka and his Bugis and Speelman began the journey which was to determine their fate and that of the whole of South Sulawesi.

The year 1666 marked a turning point in the fortunes of the kingdom of Goa. After a long struggle with its Bugis archrival Bone, Goa had finally achieved victory in the beginning of the 17th century and had rapidly consolidated its status as a major power in South Sulawesi and in neighbouring lands. But in the background of this period of consolida-

tion loomed the increasingly menacing presence of the Dutch East India Company and the growing restiveness of the Bone and Soppeng Bugis under Goa's overlordship. These two forces, in their desire to undermine the power of the kingdom of Goa, were soon seeking each other's cooperation for what appeared a formidable undertaking.

The Company was interested in South Sulawesi affairs only insofar as they impinged on its principal concern: the spices of the Moluccas. To obtain these spices, however, it was forced to contend with Goa's rapidly expanding empire which in the early 17th century had already made its presence felt in the Moluccas. While the Company's ultimate aim in the Moluccas was economic, to control the spices which were a valuable part of its trade, it clashed violently with Goa's political goal of being recognized as overlord. The conflict over the interpretation of the meaning of "freedom of the seas" demonstrated the essence of the struggle between the Company and Goa. To enforce an economic monopoly the Company had to control the sealanes; but for Goa to accept the Company's restrictions was tantamount to relinquishing its sovereign powers and its pretensions to overlordship in the area. By the middle of the 17th century this basic irreconcilable difference between two ambitious powers boded ill for their future relations.

Goa's position at home appeared secure, but there was already stirrings of discontent among the Bugis vassal states encouraged by the Company's capture of the Makassar fort Pa'nakkukang in 1660. By the end of that year the Bone and Soppeng Bugis led by some intrepid leaders, among whom was Arung Palakka, revolted against Goa's overlordship but were brutally quashed. There was an attempt by the Dutch to contact the Bugis, but this effort came too late. Although the Bugis were subdued the successful flight of Arung Palakka and a few other Bugis leaders to Batavia posed a delicate problem for Goa. To allow the rebellious Bugis leadership to maintain contact with their people was dangerous and a source of continuing unrest in South Sulawesi. But to obtain their return Goa had to rely on the good graces of the Company. With the state of affairs between the Company and Goa being cool even in the best of times, there was little hope that the former would intercede on Goa's behalf. On the contrary, the Company saw the presence of Arung Palakka and his Toangke as performing a useful role in case of war with Goa. The opportunity for an alliance with the Bugis had been lost in 1660, but the Company did not intend to repeat that oversight in 1666.

A major factor in Dutch favour in 1666 was the projection of the

private battles of Arung Palakka and Admiral Speelman into the conflict which enveloped the Company and the whole of South Sulawesi. Both of these proud and determined leaders had suffered what they considered injustices and were willing to sacrifice much to redeem their good name. In Arung Palakka's case, moreover, the honour of his people was also at stake investing his efforts with the aura of a sacred task. Both these men had been thrust together by the Company's leaders in Batavia at a critical juncture in their lives. Their cooperation proved crucial in shaping the circumstances of their mission and accelerating the confrontation between the Company, the Bone-Soppeng Bugis, and Goa which became known as the Makassar War.

CHAPTER III

THE MAKASSAR WAR

On the morning of 24 November 1666 the Company expedition to Makassar and the Eastern Quarters set sail under the command of Admiral Cornelis Janszoon Speelman. The fleet consisted of the admiralship *Tertholen*, and twenty other vessels carrying some 1,870 people, among whom were 818 Dutch sailors, 578 Dutch soldiers, and 395 native troops. The principal native soldiers were from Ambon under Captain Joncker and the Bugis under Arung Palakka and Arung Belo Tosa'děng (Stapel 1922:97-9).¹

The fleet arrived near Tanakeke on 17 December 1666 and appeared before Makassar on the 19th. The next day Speelman, in accordance with his instructions, sent a letter wrapped with white satin cloth and tied with a red silk cord to the Karaeng Goa in Makassar. It announced the Company's demands for "prompt reparation and satisfaction" as well as its intentions "with the grace of God to wreak vengeance with violence" if the demands were refused. A captured Bajau² was entrusted with the delivery of the letter. On the way to shore with the messenger, the Dutch noticed a boat bearing a flag of truce approaching, and so they turned back to see what message the envoys brought. The boat contained two important Goa noblemen and two interpreters, who were brought to Speelman on the *Tertholen*. They brought 1,056 gold *mas* as payment for the murder of the Dutchmen on one of the Don Duango Islands and 1,435 *coprijksdaalders* which had been fished out of the shipwrecked *Leeuwin*, but no other message.³ Speelman immediately informed them that Dutch blood could only be repaid in blood and not in money. When Speelman then attempted to have these messengers deliver his letter, they refused, saying that on pain of death they were ordered to deliver the money and do nothing more (KA 1155a:21r).

During the course of the meeting, Arung Palakka, his uncle Daeng Mattoana, and Arung Belo entered the cabin. Arung Palakka was dressed as a Dutch officer with a gold medallion around his neck given to him by the Company for his services in the west coast Sumatra campaign. The other two wore scarlet over their copper armour. All three looked so

fierce that they caused the Goa envoys great fright. The reaction of the envoys was understandable since it had been generally believed in Makassar that Arung Palakka had been killed in Sumatra (Stapel 1922: 101, n.2). But instead here he was, as though risen from the dead, “bringing” this vast Dutch armada to wreak vengeance on Goa. This image was soon to spread throughout South Sulawesi causing shock and dismay among the Goa people and great rejoicing among many Bone and Soppeng Bugis. So spectacular was his sudden appearance after so many years of exile that people began to believe in his *upè’*, his fortune, or that peculiar quality inherent in those destined for greatness. The sight of his person or even the belief of his presence in an area was sufficient to create a great psychological uplift among his people. This factor was soon evident to Speelman who began to take specific steps to protect Arung Palakka and thus preserve perhaps the expedition’s best guarantee of success. For the moment, however, Speelman bided his time.

On 21st December the Dutch envoy returned from the Goa court with a reply from Sultan Hasanuddin. Because of the failure of the reply to explain satisfactorily a number of charges made by the Company against Goa, and because of the manner in which the letter was delivered (unexplained in the sources), Speelman and his council concluded that Goa had felt no compunction or humility regarding their deeds toward the Company. After Goa’s envoys had been allowed to return home, Speelman ordered the entire Dutch fleet to move within about 1½ kilometres of the Makassar forts. The *Tertholen* commenced the bombardment of the city by the fleet which was solely intended to intimidate the Goa government.

While a bombardment of Makassar was in Speelman’s *Instructions*, a land attack on the city was not. Shortly after the expedition had left Batavia and was lying off the coast of Java on 28th November, Speelman had made known to his officers that the aim of the expedition was to protect the Company’s allies and to seek out the enemy and by raids and attacks “to cause him every possible damage and harm” (Macleod 1900:1270). Nevertheless, he firmly believed that an all-out war against Goa on this expedition was desirable. First of all, he had evaluated reports coming from various quarters and was convinced, or ready to be convinced, that “not only the king and the nobles, but also the common man [in Makassar] were so astounded by the unexpected arrival of this fleet that, in the opinion of the Bugis, if one could resolve to attack, without much doubt a reasonable amount of success could be expected”.

Secondly, Speelman had received reassuring reports from his two most important native allies on the expedition, Arung Palakka and Captain Joncker, that the Goa court and the surrounding areas were incapable of resisting an attacking land or naval force. In addition Arung Palakka claimed that as soon as the Datu Soppeng realized that they were attacking, he and some 800 to 1,000 of his men would enter the conflict on their side. Captain Joncker added his voice to those in favour of an attack by speculating that the exiled Ternate prince, Kaicili' Kalimata, and his Ternate followers would also abandon the Makassar forces as soon as the tide turned against the latter (KA 1159a:494v-495r).

As the Dutch and their native allies would later discover to their dismay, the Makassar troops were firmly entrenched in a series of fortresses equipped with cannons all along the harbour. Insofar as the support from Datu Soppeng was concerned, his projected help was a chimera conjured up by Arung Palakka. Datu Soppeng was in exile and under surveillance by Makassar troops in the small village of Sarangang. He was in no position to mount any attack nor had any sizeable numbers of men with him. There were Bugis who had fled from the enemy to join Arung Palakka, and so the latter would have known of the true state of affairs in South Sulawesi. It was to Arung Palakka's advantage, however, to encourage Speelman to attack and involve the Company in the war which could prove highly advantageous for the Bugis. This was the opportunity for which Arung Palakka and his Toangke had waited six years, and Arung Palakka would have been foolish not to have used any means at his disposal to bring about the invasion. Arung Palakka need not have worried unduly, for Speelman was already convinced that he should attack Goa. In December 1666, even before his overwhelming victory over the Makassar forces on Butung, he had already prepared his case to Batavia for an all-out war against Goa (KA 1159a:494v-495r).

Speelman postponed any immediate military action since the west monsoon was about to begin and would make any land campaign hazardous against the well-entrenched and well-armed enemy forces. And so he ordered his fleet to proceed southward in accordance with his instructions (Stapel 1922:101-2). As the fleet sailed down the coast, Speelman sent landing parties to burn and destroy villages and ricefields. There was some resistance, especially when the parties moved inland, but there were no major engagements until the fleet reached Bantaeng (Stapel 1922:103-4; KA 1155a:21r). Bantaeng greatly impressed Speelman who described it as a large prosperous city no less striking than

Batavia with houses on the average larger and more attractive than those in Makassar. In a fierce battle for Bantaeng on 25 November the Makassar forces were put to flight and the entire region around Bantaeng, “being the hereditary lands of the king [of Goa] and one of the most important ricebowls of Makassar”, laid waste. One thousand houses in the city of Bantaeng, thirty to forty villages, and about 100 boats in the harbour carrying some 6,000 tons of rice were set aflame (Stapel 1936:36; Stapel 1922:104-5; Macleod 1900:1271).

News of the destruction of Bantaeng spread quickly through South Sulawesi causing panic among Goa’s allies and a guarded optimism among the Bone-Soppeng people. Secret messengers from Arung Palakka arrived in Bone informing the people of the intentions of the fleet and the necessity of being prepared for some major enterprise. Arung Palakka urged the Bugis to be patient for a little while longer since the time was not right for an attack (Stapel 1922:105).

From Bantaeng the fleet sailed southward to Selayar, and then to Butung where it found a Goa army of 15,000 men under the command of Karaeng Bontomarannu besieging the island. A month before, a Goa fleet consisting of 450 ships with provisions for seven months had arrived on Butung’s shores and had begun a protracted siege. With the Dutch fleet safely anchored off the southern end of the straits, Speelman went with a number of smaller boats to shore where he attacked the Makassar forces. He then directed some of the Dutch ships to areas where they could fire on enemy positions. On the way they came upon a Makassar camp which reacted in an unexpected fashion toward the ship. Three men approached and demanded that Arung Palakka show himself to them. When Arung Palakka appeared, these men, now joined by many others, began jumping up and down on the beach and some began to cry (Stapel 1922:106-7; Macleod 1900:1271). Arung Palakka was rowed ashore, and as soon as he landed, it was obvious that he knew many of the men on the beach. The first three men drew out their krisses and performed the *aru* before Arung Palakka. Others flocked to Arung Palakka so that by nightfall the number had grown to some 300 men. Since there was evidence that more Bugis intended to come, Arung Palakka asked Speelman’s permission to remain on shore overnight among his people so that his trust and confidence in them would encourage others to desert the Makassar forces. Speelman raised no objections because he had been impressed by the sincerity of those who had already joined Arung Palakka. By the morning of 2 January 1667 the number of Bugis with Arung Palakka had grown to 500, and many others were

reported on their way to join him (KA 1159b:496v-497r). The final count at the end of the day was 1,500 Bugis (Stapel 1922:107).

The most that the Company had hoped from Arung Palakka was success in creating confusion among the Makassar forces through sporadic and scattered Bugis opposition during the campaign. Neither the Company nor Speelman realized the depth of emotion involved in the Bone-Soppeng versus Goa-Tallo rivalry. Arung Palakka's spectacular "return from the dead" with a powerful armada was the stuff of which legends are made. From this early stage of the campaign Arung Palakka became transformed in the eyes of the Bugis people into a "special" person, someone who was blessed with *upě*. As long as Arung Palakka was there to lead them, they believed their fight for freedom and self-respect would end in victory. The person of Arung Palakka, therefore, became a talisman for the Bugis people in their war against Goa. Speelman was now firmly convinced of Arung Palakka's importance for the success of the expedition and assigned him a special bodyguard of Dutch soldiers.

Signs that Makassar resistance was collapsing appeared by the beginning of the new year 1667. On 2nd January one of the principal leaders of the Goa expedition against Butung, the Maradia Balannipa, offered to place himself under Arung Palakka, which was followed the next day by a request for a ceasefire by the Commander-in-Chief of the entire Goa fleet, Karaeng Bontomarannu. On 4th January, Karaeng Bontomarannu, Sultan Bima and the Opu Cėnning Luwu, on behalf of the Goa forces, surrendered to Speelman. Of the original Makassar expedition, some 5,000 forcefully-conscripted Bugis joined Arung Palakka, and another 5,500 Makassar and allied troops were disarmed and placed on a small island between Muna and Butung which Speelman re-christened, "Conqueror's Island". At first the Mandar soldiers were accorded special treatment because their leader, the Maradia Balannipa, had agreed to join Arung Palakka's forces. Speelman approved this arrangement since he understood that the Mandar fighting men were "truly some of the most fearsome troops among the Makassar forces, possessing many guns, perfect marksmen, and excellent [poison] darts-men". In accordance with Arung Palakka's request, Speelman had all arms and flags of the Mandar troops seized and ordered half of the men sent to Gorontalo and the other half to join Arung Palakka (KA 1159c: 501r-v). Despite all the signs and professions of loyalty, the Maradia Balannipa escaped one evening with two boats under the cover of darkness. Because of this treachery the remaining Mandar nobles and

their 800 men were condemned to the same fate as the Makassar prisoners. Of the 5,500 prisoners taken by the Dutch and Arung Palakka, 400 were made slaves and the rest were left to die on "Conqueror's Island". Among the war booty seized were 195 pennants, of which fifty were sent to Batavia, and a large quantity and variety of weapons. Of the boats captured, 200 were destroyed, thirty divided among the ruler of Butung and his nobles, ten of the best given to Arung Palakka and eighty-six, which were Bugis boats, attached to Arung Palakka's force. Also seized were 800 tons of "very beautiful white rice" (Stapel 1922:109-112; KA 1155a:26r; Macleod 1900:1271-2).

Speelman sent three copies of a letter announcing his victory on Butung to Batavia, for he hoped for a speedy approval of his request to attack Makassar itself. In the meantime Arung Palakka and the young fifteen year old Datu Luwu, who now decided to turn against Goa,⁴ sent messages to their people to await the right moment to attack the Makassar troops. Speelman calculated that toward June 1667 when he returned from the Eastern Quarters, the Bugis should be psychologically and physically prepared for a war against Goa. For this venture Speelman asked Batavia that the following be sent: all the soldiers that Batavia could spare, two or three capable sloops with good commanders, 30,000 lbs. of gunpowder, and some good skippers, surgeons, and constables. He also proposed to bring back from the Eastern Quarters for the war against Goa a number of native troops from Ternate, Tidore, the Sula Islands, and Tahulandang. So real was Speelman's vision of victory in Makassar that he believed it to be especially "ordained" for him. He deliberately informed Batavia that the destruction of Bantaeng occurred on Christmas Day and the victory in Butung on New Years Day, though the latter event had in fact occurred on 4 January 1667. But to Speelman the coincidence of special days and these victories was meaningful and augured well for his most important task: the defeat of Goa (Stapel 1922:108-114).

Batavia was unimpressed. On 15 April 1667 the Supreme Government sent a message instructing Speelman to do as much damage to the enemy as he could, but that "the Netherlands force shall not be jeopardized by being sent inland, and even less by attacking the castles and forts of the city, unless this task through favourable circumstances may be accomplished by the Bugis and other native auxiliaries" (Stapel 1922:126-7). By the time this decision by Batavia had been reached, Speelman had already advanced his plans for the attack on the kingdom of Goa.

Speelman's mission, judging from his own reports, was proceeding smoothly. On 31 January 1667 he signed a treaty of friendship with the ruler of Butung and, after a short delay, sailed off with the fleet to the Eastern Quarters. The Bugis and Arung Palakka remained behind to assist in removing any pockets of Makassar resistance in Butung. More importantly for the morale of the Bugis, Arung Palakka was permitted in the meantime to send his specially-picked men to Bone to prepare the people for an armed uprising against Goa. The hope was for a Bugis revolt to coincide with a full-scale Dutch-Bugis attack on Goa after the return of the Dutch fleet from the Eastern Quarters. This hope was nurtured by the continuing arrival of boatloads of Bugis from Bone to join Arung Palakka at Butung or at Tibore on Muna. They confidently asserted that possession of guns was the only advantage which the Makassar troops had over the Bugis (KA 1155c:58r).

In Goa the report of the debacle in Butung at the hands of the Company and Arung Palakka greatly worried the court. Sultan Hasanuddin and various members of the *Bate Salapang* wanted immediate peace, but they were over-ruled by others who declared themselves ready to defend Goa to the last. One of the most determined advocates of war was Karaeng Popo who was quoted as saying: "I have already once sworn a peace with the Dutch. Not as long as I live shall I again make and break a peace [with them]." And, "If it must be that we become slaves of the Dutch, there will be time enough when we are no longer capable of offering any resistance." Once the court had decided to fight, the most illustrious of the Makassar leaders were entrusted with the defence of the kingdom (Stapel 1922:134, 150; KA 1727:207v). Daeng Tulolo, Sultan Hasanuddin's brother, was given an army of 3,000 men to strengthen Bantaeng; the Sultan himself and Karaeng Tallo were to oversee the defences of the royal citadel of Sombaopu; Karaeng Lengkesa was placed in charge of fortifications in the Portuguese quarters; Karaeng Bontosunggu, brother of the Tuma'bicara-butta Karaeng Karunrung, was made commander of the fort at Ujung Pandang; and Karaeng Popo assumed the task of defending Pa'nak-kukang (Stapel 1922:125). All the Makassar women and children were brought to the interior of Goa, while the men remained behind and swore to defend their homes and forts or die in the attempt (KA 1159f: 650v).

Emotions were running high in both Goa and Bone, but Arung Palakka and his Bugis had been told by Speelman to wait until his return from the Eastern Quarters before beginning any major hostilities. Impa-

tience and pressures from Bone and Soppeng to begin the campaign finally overcame all other considerations held by Arung Palakka. He therefore ordered Arung Belo and Arung Kaju to take 2,000 men to Bone. When this army landed in Sulawesi, it quickly learned that Goa had restored La Ma'darëmmëng as Arumpone in February 1667 after twenty years in exile. In addition he had been showered with various titles of honour and informed that he would not be considered a subject but an equal, a "brother". Once again he was provided with a state sword, a royal umbrella, and the other appurtenances of kingship. Although it was clearly Goa's intention to gain the support or at least neutralize Bone in the war with the Company and Arung Palakka, La Ma'darëmmëng told Arung Belo and Arung Kaju that he would be ruler to his people until the return of Arung Palakka (KA 1155b:28r-v).

The arrival of Arung Belo and Arung Kaju was greeted with a spontaneous outburst of joy among the Bugis of Bone and Soppeng. The harsh suppression of the 1660 revolt which had led to the flight of many of the Bugis leaders had left an indelible mark on the self-confidence and morale of the Bugis people. From the depths of depression they had been given cause for hope by the almost miraculous reappearance of their leaders, long thought dead in a foreign land.⁵ Whatever may have been the original intentions of Arung Belo and Arung Kaju, they soon found themselves leading a rebellion in May, much earlier than had been planned by either Speelman or Arung Palakka. They succeeded in raising an army, but they were opposed by a well-armed Makassar force under Karaeng Tallo and Karaeng Lengkesè. It is believed that La Ma'darëmmëng had first informed Karaeng Goa of the arrival of the secret Bugis force in Bone but was later persuaded by his son, Arung Timurung La Pakkokoe, to oppose Goa. In this battle the Goa army defeated the Bugis even though it suffered greater casualties. The remainder of Bone's army, the majority of its nobles, and its ruler then fled to safety in Luwu (Stapel 1922:129-30; Ligtvoet 1880:126-7).

Speelman, meanwhile, concluded his mission to the Eastern Quarters, after having recruited the best soldiers from that region so that "arriving in Makassar well-equipped, they [i.e. the Dutch and the Bugis] would have the greatest chance of success". For this expedition Speelman also accepted Sultan Ternate's offer to contribute a number of his war canoes for the war against Goa. On 19 June 1667 Speelman returned to Butung accompanied by the ruler of Ternate. A week later the fleet set sail toward Sulawesi and Makassar, toward an encounter which was to determine the destiny of Speelman, Arung Palakka, and the people of

South Sulawesi (Stapel 1922:120-1, 126-7; KA 1159d:511v).

When the fleet reached the Sulawesi coast, Speelman received dispiriting news of the abortive Bugis uprising in Bone in May and of the disappearance of Arung Palakka during the crossing from the island of Kambaena. Arung Palakka and the Bugis fleet had set sail in the morning from Kambaena, two days before the departure of the Dutch fleet. They had barely left the island when they ran into a severe storm with heavy rain and high waves. Despite Arung Palakka's efforts to keep the boats together, they were scattered in all directions with each boat trying desperately to keep afloat. Captain Christian Poleman, who was accompanying Arung Palakka on a Dutch yacht, tried to stay within sight of Arung Palakka's boat which was dangerously overloaded with people. Finally, however, the winds and seas separated them, and Poleman landed near the settlement of Kassi without a clue as to Arung Palakka's whereabouts. Poleman began cruising along the coast and eventually came ashore near Bira where he saw a large number of boats. Some of the people on shore first began to approach Poleman menacingly with shields and swords but were called off by their leader. The latter then came forward to assure Poleman that his village had never had any enmities with anyone and that it was favourably inclined to the Company. If Arung Palakka were to appear, they would march under his banner. He suggested that arms be given to them immediately so that they would be ready when Arung Palakka arrived. But Poleman wisely declined with the explanation that such requests should be directed to Speelman himself.

Poleman learned from this self-appointed spokesman of the group that he had been born in this area but had been a slave of a Señor "Craengeel" and had sailed with Vlaming in the Ambon wars. He also claimed to have participated in private trade in Batavia and elsewhere for his master, and that for his good services he had been made a freeman. After gaining his freedom, he had returned to settle at this place with his father. He told Poleman that news had reached his village of Arung Kaju and Arung Belo's arrival in Bone in May and of their defeat by a Makassar army. While most of Bone's leaders, including Arumpone La Ma'darëmmëng, had escaped to Luwu, some 200 of Bone's nobles had been killed and their wives and children forcibly brought to Goa. It was said that various pregnant women who could not keep up the pace of the forced march were sliced open and left to die on the roadside. With the retreating army was Arung Palakka's uncle, "Raja Mapane",⁶ who led the burning of Wajo, Goa's principal ally, as

the army marched to Luwu's borders. Fearful of just such an event Goa's leaders had taken the precaution of sending 3-400 men to Tosora. With these reinforcements Tosora withstood the Bugis attack and was able to escape destruction. The Bugis army then continued northward to Luwu where it was joined by men from Luwu, Bone, Kera, and Toraja to form a force estimated at about 18,000 men. They were now in Luwu awaiting orders from Arung Palakka.

Although the story could not be verified, this informant stressed that the people in the area believed this to be true. What he himself had investigated and could mention confidently was the presence of a strong Makassar force of 1,500 men at Kalakongkong River and another large army of 5-6,000 men at Bantaeng. At the latter place the Makassar troops had built several forts knowing full well that as long as Bantaeng, the largest and most prosperous city in the south, was unconquered, no local lord in the area would dare ally with the Company or Arung Palakka. Poleman then asked whether the people of Bone and other Bugis would support the Company even without Arung Palakka. The reply was cautious but indicated that it was unlikely. The reason was the fear that the Company would again conclude peace with Goa and abandon the Bugis to a more miserable and intolerable fate than ever before. On the other hand, he believed that if Arung Palakka were to appear with the Company fleets, he would be joined by sufficient numbers to defeat Goa no matter how formidable its armies.

Poleman recalled that in Butung a similar sentiment was expressed by those Bugis who escaped from the Makassar expedition to join Arung Palakka. They, too, feared that the Company would abandon them to a horrible fate at the hands of the Makassar overlords despite all manner of assurance by Speelman. A victory without Arung Palakka was unthinkable to the Bugis because they feared that without a powerful leader a situation such as that in 1660 would once again prevail. Despite the Company's successes against Goa in 1660, it later abandoned its conquests and allowed Goa to regain everything it had temporarily lost. The Company had always appeared to the Bugis and Makassar people as an ephemeral presence in South Sulawesi. Unless there was a native leader and army capable of restraining a vengeful Goa, no Bugis would dare rise in rebellion in support of the Company. Poleman wrote to Speelman expressing his belief that Arung Palakka's presence was essential for any victory in the forthcoming campaign. His letter simply reinforced the view already long-held by Speelman himself (KA 1159k: 640r-642v).⁷

Arung Palakka, therefore, was a vital component in Speelman's strategy to humble the powerful kingdom of Goa. The decision to invade Goa was contrary to Batavia's orders, and so Speelman was all the more concerned that this expedition succeed and succeed brilliantly. Arung Palakka was no longer merely an informant on the state of affairs in South Sulawesi and a minor sideshow to keep Goa from concentrating its total force against the Company's expedition. With every encounter Speelman became increasingly aware of Arung Palakka's role as a symbol of Bugis pride and resistance to Goa. If Arung Palakka were killed, Speelman feared that the entire Bugis resistance would crumble. The mere presence of this leader engendered such enthusiasm from among his people that Speelman admitted to Batavia that he would never have believed that "his [Arung Palakka's] esteem and power among the people would be so great" (KA 1159e:646r, 665r). What Arung Palakka presented to his people was a man who, in the Bugis or South Sulawesi cultural context, had risen from the dead by taking action to restore his *siri*'. It was his example which challenged the other Bone-Soppeng Bugis to rise and restore their *siri*' as a nation.

To Speelman's great relief Poleman found Arung Palakka alive and well at Kassi. Despite being dispirited by their recent experiences, the Bugis quickly rallied at the sight of the Dutch. Attention was again devoted to their primary objective of obtaining an army from Bone. Since Arung Palakka was convinced that there would be no volunteers unless he appeared personally in Bone, Poleman decided to accompany him there to assure his safety. Speelman had already given Poleman prior instructions to take twenty Dutch soldiers and two fieldguns on the march to Bone (Macleod 1900:1276). Before departing Arung Palakka informed Arung Amali, who had been left in command of the Bugis troops in Speelman's camp, that he was going to Bone to raise an army. He also added that he would make certain that Arung Amali's wife was brought safely out of Bone. This personal note of concern was not unexpected, for Speelman had observed that Arung Amali was "a modest man of very great prestige and held in great respect by Arung Palakka" (Stapel 1922:132-3). In view of these developments, Speelman consulted the Bugis leaders Arung Amali and Arung Cibalu and decided to go to Makassar and await Arung Palakka and the Bone troops there (KA 1159h:649r-650r).

Except for the few letters by Poleman, who accompanied Arung Palakka on the march, the Dutch sources are silent about the movement of the Bugis in their homeland during the early stages of the war. The

Bugis *lontara'*, on the other hand, supply an interesting commentary on the war with their own particular concerns. According to these *lontara'*, while Arung Palakka was in Bone assembling an army, three of the Soppeng nobles in this group – Arung Bila, Arung Appanang, and Arung Belo – asked permission to go to Soppeng. They told Arung Palakka that they wanted to return home “to see who is still faithful and still honours him”. Arung Palakka agreed to this mission and told them that he would await their return before proceeding to attack Goa. The three Soppeng nobles spent the night at Goa-Goa, and the next morning were informed that the ruler of Sawitto and his soldiers had been burning and killing in Soppeng for the last five days and were now billeted in the main mosque. At daybreak the next day these three nobles with thirty hand-picked men entered the mosque by a ruse and began a great slaughter of the Sawitto men. The ruler of Sawitto managed to escape, but more than 100 heads were taken by the people of Soppeng. In an *aru* ceremony at the marketplace the people of Soppeng offered their oath of allegiance to their lords while dancing with the heads of the enemy in their hands. All available Soppeng men were then assembled and prepared for the march to Pattiro to join Arung Palakka and the Bone army.

On the way the Soppeng forces spent the night at Goa-Goa to allow time for others of their countrymen to join them. While they waited, the three Soppeng nobles agreed to send a message to Arung Palakka to ask him to speak to the leaders of Bone about their agreement at Attappang. According to Soppeng, Bone had broken its agreement when it assisted Goa in the 1660 Bugis revolt, and now Soppeng wanted an assurance that this would not happen again in any future war against Goa.⁸ When the message was brought to Arung Palakka, he sent Arung Cibalu⁹ to East Bone, West Bone, Central Bone, and to the core area of Bone.¹⁰ The messenger had been dispatched to the four natural divisions which had later become part of the larger confederation of states known as the kingdom of Bone. Even in the 17th century the awareness of the separate groups within the confederation was strong. It was imperative for anyone hoping to gain the support of a kingdom to make separate overtures to the various groups, as happened here as well as in the debate preceding the treaty of Attappang. These groups swore before Arung Cibalu that they would uphold the Treaty of Attappang if Arung Palakka would lead them, and that they would do nothing which would cause Arung Palakka to flee his homeland for the second time. The next day all of Bone and its vassals (*Bone lili' passeajingëng*) came with their

banners to Pattiro. Arung Palakka was there with Bone's royal standard, the "golden umbrella (*pajumpulawěng*)", and the Soppeng army with *La Panyannya*, the banner of West Soppeng. The two principal Soppeng flags, Bakka' and La Piannyarang, were absent because they were with the exiled Datu Soppeng La Těnribali in Goa (L-4: unpag., section 23). The Lords of Bone, Soppeng, and the Toangke then swore to uphold the Treaty of Attappang with the drinking of *ballo*'.¹¹

It was agreed to divide the Bugis forces, with the Soppeng army under Arung Bila, Arung Belo, and Arung Appanang going to Barru to attack Goa from the north, while Arung Palakka with the Bone forces struck from the south. Those who had been with Arung Palakka in Batavia now reaffirmed the agreement which they had made in Batavia on the banks of the Angke River:

If, with the blessings of God (*Dewata*), we return to our Bugis homeland (*tana ugi*) to fight Goa, and if we should be given the victory by God, our firm friendship will not be undone. You, the people of Angke (*Toangke*) will be protected and favoured up to your third cousins (*sappowek-katěllu*') (L-1:33; L-4: unpag., section 23; L-7:28).¹²

Then each important noble in order of importance began in turn to jump up and down with kris unsheathed to *manngaru* before Arung Palakka. The first to *manngaru* was Arung Bila who shouted: "Watch me later, Lord, a man who will not retreat nor be surrounded in the field of battle. If I should be struck down, then evil would befall the land, this is clear! . . ." In similar fashion each of the nobles and Toangke swore their oath of allegiance to Arung Palakka (L-1:33).

Since Bulu-Bulu and Lamatti, two of Bone's vassal states to the south, had fought alongside Goa, it was decided to send Daeng Ma to "remind" (*naingěrrangi*) them of their agreement with Bone. Daeng Ma told Arung Lamatti and the Gěllarěng Bulu-Bulu: "Remember your agreement that when Arung Palakka comes you would quickly sit with us and follow him". Arung Lamatti replied: "We remember our agreement, but you were defeated by the people of Makassar. Now Karaeng Batu Pute and Karaeng Mawajang [Majawang in L-3 and I Mangkawe in L-4] are waiting at Binamu to attack Bone." In this brief exchange of words, the *lontara*' writer lucidly conveys to his reader/listener the constant changes of political alignments which were necessary to accord with the shifts in power. A highly formalized set of words and acts were employed to determine what particular relationship was mutually satisfactory to two kingdoms. Once the formula was proclaimed and enacted, the result was plain to all involved. In this case the Soppeng Bugis on behalf of

Arung Palakka wished to re-establish a former lord-vassal relationship with Bulo-Bulo and Lamatti. But the latter states rejected this overture because they were not convinced that real power had shifted away from Goa to Arung Palakka. At this early stage of the war, it was a prudent move but one which invited an attack from Bone.

When Bone's armies approached, they were met by the leader of the Lamatti *bissu*¹³, who was a very old woman (*makkunrai ridi*) in red, borne on a palanquin followed by some 100 female *bissu* (*core-core*) swinging weaving "swords" or beaters (*walida*) and chanting (*mēm-mang*). As they moved in front of Bone's troops, they were fired upon but seemingly no one was hurt. They then went east marching towards Soppeng's men who fired at them but found their weapons equally ineffectual against the *bissu*. The latter marched once more toward the Bone forces before returning to Lamatti (L-1:33-4; L-3:309; L-4: unpag., section 23). In the first major battle which took place south of Salomekko, fifty Soppeng and 100 Pattiro heads were taken by the Makassar forces. For three days the battle raged, but finally Soppeng and Bone were forced to return to Pattiro. Three days later the Bone and Soppeng troops again attacked Lamatti early in the morning. During the fighting a Dutch ship under Captain Poleman unexpectedly appeared in search of Arung Palakka bringing with it thirty soldiers and cannons.¹⁴ The Dutch joined the Bone-Soppeng Bugis armies and cannonaded the Makassar positions. In a final battle on the banks of the Tangka River, the Makassar troops were defeated and forced to flee by boat to safety in Goa. All of their forts and armaments were seized by the victorious Bugis, and Bulo-Bulo, Lamatti, and the rest of the *pattalimpoe*¹⁵ were compelled to surrender. After this victory Arung Palakka ordered the Soppeng nobles to take their troops and go north to Barru as had been originally decided in council (L-1:35; L-3:310; L-4: unpag., section 23).

While the Bugis sources then describe the campaign in the north in great detail, it is the contemporary Dutch accounts which provide information on the progress of the main body of the expedition under Speelman. On 7th July the expedition landed in Bantaeng and seized it despite the muddy terrain and the well-defended fortifications. Speelman had estimated that there were about 7,000 Makassar troops in the battle for Bantaeng under the command of Karaeng Layo, Karaeng Bontomanompo and Karaeng Bangkala. Karaeng Bangkala was decapitated in the fighting and one of the other three commanders was seriously wounded. The Makassar stockades in the vicinity of Bantaeng were

taken one by one, and when the last was threatened, the Makassar troops simply abandoned the fight and fled back to Makassar. From Bantaeng the expedition proceeded to Turatea, where several raids took places, and then to the Makassar roadstead on 13th July, on the very same day that Arung Palakka and his army began their march to Bantaeng from Pattiro (Stapel 1922:131-8).

When Arung Palakka and his men set off, they were joined by Arung Belo, Arung Kaju, and Daeng Mattoana with those of their following who had survived the abortive Bone uprising in May. Beside these, however, only a “rather sober” number of Bugis appeared, much to the disappointment of Captain Poleman. As the army marched forward to Bantaeng, it was fortunately swelled by recruits all along the route until it numbered some 6-7,000 men. When the army reached Bantaeng, there arrived the welcome news that another 4,000 Bugis had already crossed the Tangka River and were coming to join Arung Palakka. Poleman wanted to continue northward immediately, but Arung Palakka advised him to wait until there were further instructions from Speelman. In any case, he argued, the men were too exhausted by their long difficult march to begin at once on another one. Poleman allowed himself to be persuaded because he considered Arung Palakka to be “an industrious and sensible person” (KA 1159:655v).

A letter from Speelman soon arrived urging Arung Palakka and Poleman to proceed to Turatea. On the march the Bugis were intercepted at the Binuang River by some 6,000 well-armed Makassar troops who were later reinforced by another 1,000 men. Beleaguered on all sides and suffering from lack of food, water, and ammunition, the Bugis army appealed to Speelman for relief either through a diversionary attack on a Makassar stronghold or through a shipment of much-needed guns (KA 1159:658r-660r; L-5:152). Help sent by boat was delayed by contrary winds and had to be diverted to about 3½ kilometres south of Galesong. At Galesong, much to everyone’s surprise, appeared Arung Palakka, Poleman, and some Bugis who had left the main Bugis army of 8,000 men at Turatea under Arung Belo and Arung Kaju to try to reach Speelman. The Dutch personally led by Speelman attacked the Makassar positions at Galesong, while the Bugis army confronted yet another large Makassar army at Turatea. With their ammunition quickly dwindling, the Bugis asked for aid, which was sent immediately by Speelman on a fast sloop. On board one of the ships was Arung Palakka who intended to bring the entire Bugis army from Turatea to Galesong. On their arrival Arung Palakka succeeded in reaching the principal

fortification being held by his men and the Dutch. That evening he led an attack to drive back the Makassar troops from the three fortifications closest to the Bugis camp. The next day the boarding of the entire army of about 6,000 men took place only a stone's throw from the Makassar encampment. The mission was a total success, and on 15th August, the last of the Bugis army arrived in Galesong. With these reinforcements the total native troops fighting with the Dutch now numbered 10,000 men, of whom 7,000 were Bugis. Opposing them were some 30,000 troops, 10,000 of whom arrived from Turatea under Karaeng Lengkesse, Karaeng Karunrung and Maradia Balanippa, and another 5,000 from Bulo-Bulo.

Galesong was the last major fortified settlement blocking the advance toward Makassar itself. The outcome of the battle at Galesong, while not decisive in itself, was bound to have a significant psychological impact in the fight for the most important prize, Makassar. All of the principal Goa dignitaries, headed by Sultan Hasanuddin himself, were in Galesong. Arung Palakka once again proved to be an invaluable, if at times reckless, ally. A daring plan was devised for the capture of Galesong. Some 100 Bugis were to be shown a way into the enemy's stronghold by a deserter from the Makassar side. Outside, Arung Palakka and 1,500 men were to wait for a sign from this "reconnaissance party" and then launch a full attack. That evening Speelman was informed that Arung Palakka himself had joined Arung Belo and Arung Kaju to lead the vanguard into Galesong. Fearful of the consequences of such a foolhardy risk, Speelman immediately went ashore to supervise the operations personally. Speelman was only too aware of what Arung Palakka's death would mean to the morale of the Bugis and the fate of the entire expedition. Through illness the Dutch forces had been decimated so that barely 250 men were able to bear arms. Only if the war went well and Arung Palakka were still there as their leader could Speelman ever hope to gain more vitally needed Bugis reinforcements in the final battle for Makassar. For this reason Speelman felt justified in risking his own life in leading the rescue party. At three in the morning singing and shooting could be heard from within the fortified city, but not the agreed upon signal for attack. Only later did a messenger arrive saying that Arung Palakka needed help desperately. Reinforcements arrived just in time to beat back a Makassar attack. Fighting continued from six in the morning till midday, and resumed again at five in the afternoon. Finally, the Makassar troops retired, and Arung Palakka and the Dutch claimed victory.

Although Arung Palakka's oftentimes rash acts of bravery worried Speelman, he could not deny the great value of having Arung Palakka as an ally for psychological and military reasons. In the Galesong campaign, for example, he proved an inexhaustible fighter, leading his Bugis in daytime assaults on the enemy's forts and night-time raids against their villages and encampments. The Makassar forces finally abandoned their fortifications in Galesong at the end of August to retire to Makassar for the final crucial battle of the war. A much more confident Speelman and Bugis army now marched northward to Barombong, the southernmost of a series of heavily-armed and well-defended fortifications along the shoreline of Makassar harbour (Stapel 1922:140-150; L-5:152-6; Macleod 1900:1278-1282).

All along the coast a few hours travel north and south of Galesong where the two armies had fought, the picture was one of destruction. Houses and whole villages had been burned to the ground, and coconut, sago, and pinang trees had either been cut down or their crowns chopped off. But one policy which both the Bugis and Makassar forces followed strictly was the prevention of the wanton destruction of the paddy fields. To the victor belonged the rice harvest, as happened when Galesong fell to the Bugis and Dutch armies. The importance of rice as the principal source of sustenance has produced a number of traditional practices which accord great reverence to the goddess of rice. The people of South Sulawesi have much too great a respect for the goddess to have dared to anger her by destroying rice crops. So violent is the temper of this goddess that special harvesting knives are made small enough to be concealed in the palm of the hands in order not to give offence to this deity. In a Makassar village tale about the Makassar War, the *Sinrili'na Kappala' Tallumbatua* (SKT), even the extreme gravity of the war does not over-ride the importance of maintaining the rice-fields:

If there are three men in one household, one is to be sent to war and two are to plant rice. If there are two men in one household, one is to go to war and one is to plant rice. If there is but one man in the household, do not send him immediately to war. Only if it is absolutely necessary should he be sent (L-32:123).

The Makassar warriors echo a similar sentiment in this tale by declaring that "It is better to die by the shedding of blood than to die of starvation." No matter how fierce the battle, they always return to camp at sundown where the women have cooked rice ready for them (L-32:144-5). Wars are won and lost, but life goes on, and life for the Bugis and Makassar people is rice. It was this belief which made it possible for the

victorious Bugis-Dutch forces at Galesong to harvest the ricefields and gather over a hundred waterbuffaloes to provide provisions for the whole army for about fifteen days (Macleod 1900:1282).

On 3 September 1667 the Dutch fleet arrived at the village of Batu-Batu, about 500 metres south of Barombong (see Map 4). Breastworks had been erected throughout the length of this defence perimeter from Barombong in the south to Tallo in the north. The Dutch and Bugis were able to land a force to the south of the Aeng River under the cover of cannonfire from the ships. This force quickly established a fortified area for the other landings. As soon as a landing place had been secured and the ships safely anchored, the remaining troops at Galesong were sent for and the last fortifications there destroyed. The main Makassar force was encamped in the woods on the high ground overlooking the village. There were two forward posts, one on the low ground between the hill and the coast, and the other on the beach north of the Aeng rivermouth. Arung Palakka led the assault on the post on the beach, and with the timely help of his Dutch bodyguards forced the withdrawal of the Makassar troops by the evening of 11th September. The other forward post fell quickly, and work immediately began on an assault barricade for the battle against the main Makassar camp. Progress was slow because of the continual harassment of the Makassar warriors.

But battle was finally joined on 17th September. The Bugis under Arung Palakka, strengthened by forty Ternate soldiers armed with muskets, formed the first line of assault followed by two Dutch companies under Poleman. Speelman had also sent an ensign with two of the best Dutch bodyguards to protect Arung Palakka. As they moved forward, the Makassar troops sallied forth from their fortification to meet the attack. When the Makassar side began firing their cannons, the Butung and Ternate men broke and ran. The Dutch soldiers managed to hold the line and force the Makassar troops back. It was then the latter's turn to flee back to safety pursued by the Bugis. The battle was indecisive, and the Makassar forces braced themselves for yet another attack.

The Makassar defences proved very strong and withstood successfully several fierce attacks by the Dutch-Bugis forces. A stalemate seemed to have been reached with both sides safely ensconced behind their defences and unable to make much progress against the other. Meanwhile the approach of the west monsoon promised to hinder any campaign along the west coast because of its strong winds and rains. It was therefore decided to abandon the fruitless battle for Batu-Batu and simply to leave a Bugis force to check the activities of the Makassar

defenders. But even this plan appeared in jeopardy when a spy arrived in the camp and created pandemonium among the Bugis by saying that 300 *perahu* lay ready in the Tallo River to transport half the Makassar army to attack Bone. A large Makassar army was to go by sea to Pare-Pare, then overland to Alitta and Lake Tempe. From here it was to be divided, with a part going to Wajo to repel the invasion from Luwu and the other to attack Bone. The Bugis under Arung Palakka began wailing at the thought of the fate awaiting their families. With great emotion they drew their krisses and swore that they would trust one another and never abandon each other until death. The Bugis leaders suggested various desperate plans to prevent the invasion of their land, all of which were vetoed by Speelman. The anxiety of the Bugis was allayed somewhat with reports that, though the Makassar expedition to Bone would proceed, it consisted of only 1,000 men under Karaeng Garassi. Furthermore, Speelman promised to station several Dutch ships at the mouth of the Tallo River to prevent the Makassar ships from sailing. The Bugis, however, continued to harass Speelman for a firmer commitment to the Bugis, and so Speelman finally promised that if it were necessary he would send the entire expedition to Bone. With this statement, “all the Bugis wept with joy”, and Bugis morale was restored (Stapel 1922: 159-160, 166; KA 1156a:728v-729r).

Shortly after this incident further bad news arrived, this time from Batavia. Because of the state of war existing between The Netherlands and England, Batavia believed it too risky to send more than 250-300 of the 1,000 men reinforcements requested by Speelman. The only favourable news reaching the Dutch-Bugis camp at this time was the arrival of a *perahu* sent from Arung Appanang who reported the arrival of his 5,000 man army some thirty kilometres from Makassar. He requested guns and ammunition which were immediately sent. Three days later the same *perahu* returned with further news that a 20,000 man army under the Bone prince Daeng Pabila had invaded from Luwu, and now Arung Appanang wished to know whether he should first return to the interior to aid the invasion and then return to Makassar or whether he should remain operating where he was. Although Arung Palakka thought the former suggestion the most feasible, Speelman and his council decided that it would be better for Arung Appanang to continue his activities in the north so that the enemy would have to deal with several fronts.¹⁶

While the Dutch sources mention little about the activities of Arung Appanang and his army, the Bugis *lontara* treat their role in great detail. Upon arrival at Barru the three Soppeng nobles – Arung Bila, Arung

Appanang, and Arung Belo¹⁷ – “reminded” the Karaeng Tanete of their agreement that “Tanete is on the inside and Soppeng on the outside” (*Tanete pole Soppeng su*), indicating that the two kingdoms were one (Matthes 1874: 662). As one kingdom, therefore, they told Karaeng Tanete that it was only proper that Tanete come to Soppeng’s aid against Goa. Arung Palakka asked the three lords to convey this message to the Karaeng Tanete: “Even if you remain behind and do not participate [in this attack], I still consider you my brother because I am indebted to you.”¹⁸ Karaeng Tanete replied that he remembered *Tanete pole Soppeng su*, but he first wished to free himself from the agreement with Karaeng Goa. He then despatched two messengers to Goa to explain his dilemma. When the messengers returned, they brought the message from Karaeng Karunrung that if Tanete joined the Bugis, it would be put to the torch and would be like a *lesung*.¹⁹ Such a threat was not taken lightly in view of the fearful vengeance which Goa was known to wreak upon those states which had betrayed its trust. Moreover, the belief was still current in South Sulawesi that once peace was agreed upon, the Dutch would leave as they had in the past and abandon the native peoples to the mercy of Goa (Stapel 1922:130). Caught between the demands of the Bugis and the Makassar leaders, Karaeng Tanete cleverly suggested that a mock battle take place in which the Soppeng princes would be victorious while Goa would be appeased by Tanete’s resistance. In the mock battle some houses were burned and a few non-Sulawesi slaves killed, and so Tanete “surrendered”.

From Tanete the Soppeng troops moved to Balusu, Madello, and then to Nepo where the three Soppeng princes uttered the familiar words to Arung Nepo to indicate Nepo’s obligations as a vassal to Soppeng: “Remember your treaty with Soppeng at the time of Islamization. Child, remember your father and mother in Soppeng and join us in attacking Goa.” Arung Nepo replied: “You go first and we will follow. I will also bring Suppa along with me.” From Nepo the Soppeng troops proceeded southward and fought a battle with Arung Běrru ri Aja’ who saw no opportunity to abandon Goa. At sundown after the first day of battle, Běrru ri Aja’ received a message from Karaeng Goa saying: “O, Běrru, look out for your own welfare because your mother, Goa, cannot provide you with protection. The Bone troops are now in Bantaeng.” And so Běrru ri Aja’ surrendered. Arung Běrru ri Aja’ swore the oath of allegiance to the Bugis which was solemnized by his drinking *ballo* stirred with La Selatu, the state sword of Appanang. This treaty establishing the vassalage of Běrru ri Aja’ was announced with the words:

“. . . the Bugis wind will blow the leaf of the people of Běrru ri Aja’.” The Soppeng army then continued its triumphal march toward Makassar defeating Cilellang, Manggalung, Kaluku, Mara, Labakkang, Lombas-sang, Bungoro, Barasa, Siang, and various other small areas. All of the defeated lords were made to swear their allegiance to the Bugis and drink *ballo’* stirred with the state sword of Appanang. At Siang a messenger arrived from Arung Palakka saying, “Do not leave the people of Siang and Barassa in their land but make them board the Dutch ships which will take them to Binamu.” It was proclaimed that those who remained and their descendants would become the hereditary slaves of the lords of Bone and Soppeng. With the war on the west coast over and negotiations with Barasa and Siang completed, the three Soppeng princes sailed to Binamu to join Arung Palakka (L-1:34-41; L-3:310-4; L-4: unpag.; L-6:24-6; L-7:24-8).

Dutch contemporary reports indicate that the Bugis army in the north never did arrive at Binamu as mentioned in the Bugis sources. This discrepancy may be explained by the primary concern of the *lontara’* not in the accuracy of detail of the campaign but in the significance of the campaign in the realignment of the hierarchy of states in South Sulawesi. Each of the rulers of the kingdoms along the west coast is “reminded” of a prior relationship with Bone-Soppeng, which had lain in abeyance during Goa’s period of strength, and now urged to re-establish it in view of the shift of power. Those who heeded the reminder escaped and confirmed their status of child to Bone-Soppeng’s mother and father; others which did not were forced to accept a relationship of slave to master. Běrru ri Aja’ was unsure of the actual power claimed for Bone-Soppeng by these three princes and therefore cautiously approached their overlord Goa. Only upon learning that Goa was no longer capable of affording it protection, which was a basic responsibility of an overlord, did Běrru ri Aja’ decide to accept the terms of its new overlord. Throughout the accounts what is mentioned is a catalogue of new interstate relationships which were being forged as a consequence of the general recognition by South Sulawesi states that a new overlord had now replaced Goa. Even before the fall of Sombaopu, most states had already assessed the situation and made the necessary treaty adjustments in accordance with the new era. The movement of the Bugis army in the northern front is thus regarded in the Bugis *lontara’*, not as a narration of a war, but as a political-diplomatic campaign reaffirming the superiority of the new Bone-Soppeng forces under Arung Palakka.

The weakened state of the Dutch contingent of the expedition through sickness, the fierce tenacity of the Makassar forces, and the reluctance and inability of Batavia to provide sufficient reinforcements, forced Speelman and his war council to consider the possibility of postponing the conquest of Makassar. They could enter immediately into peace negotiations with Goa, but the time seemed inappropriate and could be interpreted as weakness. Speelman believed that to make peace under these circumstances would only create an impression of weakness and result in a peace “of small voice and sober trust”. Arung Palakka argued that the Bugis lands would be lost if the present campaign were not pursued to a final victory. He urged that a show of force and determination be made by a Bugis attack, backed up by the Dutch, on one of the major Makassar fortifications at Pa'nakkukang or Ujung Pandang. But if Speelman and the Council were inclined toward peace, Arung Palakka requested permission to return to Bone. With Dutch support he hoped to maintain himself and his followers for one or two years until the Company was better prepared to pursue the war. Speelman and the Council were favourably disposed to Arung Palakka's suggestion of an attack on a major Makassar fortification since they had earlier received new orders from Batavia dated 6 September 1667 that the war must continue. Batavia expressed concern that . . . “the Bugis, or rather Bone's allies (who on your [Speelman's] word and written assurance have taken up arms and risen in rebellion against the king of Makassar) should not be abandoned and thus doomed to utmost misery and slavery” (Stapel 1922:161-5).

The conspicuous failure of the expedition to gain any conclusive victories in Makassar worried Speelman. But to the Bugis fighting men the fact that they were now besieging the Makassar enemy in the very fortifications that they had been forced to build was a major triumph in itself. They were unaware of the gloom in the commanders' camp, and all they could see was the stream of Bugis leaving the Makassar side to join their beloved Arung Palakka. One sign that they interpreted as highly auspicious was Arung Palakka's daring attempt to rescue Datu Soppeng La Tėnribali. On the evening of 9 October 1667 Arung Palakka went with 500 specially-picked men to Sanrangang, a small village in the mountains of Goa where the Datu Soppeng, three of his wives, and a large retinue were living in exile under heavy guard. The surprise raid was not totally successful since Datu Soppeng himself was not among the 387 men, women and children that Arung Palakka brought back with him (Stapel 1922:166-7; Macleod 1900:1285; KA 1156b:739v).

The boldness of Arung Palakka's rescue attempt so captured the imagination of the Bugis that this episode was commemorated in a florid poetic eulogy to Arung Palakka written in the court of Bone:

. . . Thus spake the ruler [Arung Palakka]: "I have just met and come to an agreement with the Noble [Arung] Belo that it would be best to cause confusion among the enemy. We can then advance, push them back, and hence restore the land of the one great Lord of Soppeng [Batara Tungkě'na Soppeng]. Either he [the ruler of Goa] will dance with his [Datu Soppeng's] head²⁰ or this able Datu [Soppeng] will be rescued and rule once again with each new day. We will then be able to proceed with this war to the death with the one great Lord of Goa [Batara Tungkě'na Goa]."

This was agreed upon by all the warriors on the battlefield. The sun had not yet set and was still visible in the west when all the troops of the one great Lord of Bone [Batara Tungkě'na Bone, i.e. Arung Palakka] set forth together without turning back. The enemy did not leave their rows of forts in order to follow them through the countryside. They went directly toward the place inhabited by the one great Lord of Soppeng. Upon arrival they attacked in rows and those who were on the side and the young, adolescent noble Lords [of Soppeng], these jewels of the royal house, were taken. And with the blessings of the Creator [Toparampu-rampue, a pre-Islamic creator-figure], the guards grew weak and could not carry their spears. On grabbing their spears, they were astonished to see that in a flash these young noble Lords had been spirited away by the [Bugis] bodyguards who placed them within ivory palanquins, shaded by the golden umbrella [of Bone], and whisked them away home to their noble land (L-3:83-4).

Although this incident is recounted in the Company archives as just one of many episodes of the war, to the Bugis it was a stirring account of the bravery of the Bugis, and especially of their lord Arung Palakka, in their war to restore their *siri*' and their freedom.

A major breakthrough in the fighting came when two Dutch companies defeated the Makassar forces in a great battle on 26th October and pursued them to the very walls of the royal citadel, Sombaopu. There was great consternation among the Makassar warriors and only darkness prevented any further pursuit by the Dutch. That same evening the Dutch discovered that the Makassar force in its flight had abandoned the last fortification south of Batu-Batu. Now that the Dutch had pierced what the Makassar defenders had once considered a near impenetrable defence system of fortifications, both Speelman and Arung Palakka considered this the right psychological moment to offer peace to Goa. On 29 October 1667 a letter was sent to Sultan Hasanuddin offering peace in return for "reasonable satisfaction" for the Company and its

allies. The letter, according to the Bugis envoys to the Goa court, “caused deep reflection” among the assembled nobles. Finally a reply was formulated asking for a three-day ceasefire to consider peace, which was granted (Stapel 1922:168-9; Macleod 1900:1286).

On 1st November there arrived a strongly-worded letter from the Goa leaders. They professed ignorance of what was expected of them since they had punished the district responsible for the murder of the Dutchmen and had, moreover, offered payment for the loss of lives. In addition they had returned all the coins found on the ship-wrecked Dutch sloop, the *Leeuwin*. They were bemused by Speelman’s rejection of these concessions, for they genuinely believed that once the Company’s honour had been restored the Dutch would go away as in 1666. Only now was it becoming apparent that the Company would not be satisfied with anything less than a complete and utter surrender of Goa’s control over the international trade in the port of Makassar. Goa’s fears were borne out by the reply from the Dutch War Council listing its demand accompanied by a threat to resume fighting if no response were received from Goa by six that evening. This ultimatum was written with the knowledge that there was to be a major defection from the Goa camp. Arung Palakka had met with Karaeng Layo and Karaeng Bangkala of Turatea and had assured them of Speelman’s promise of the Company’s “protection” in return for their allegiance. He had then presented each of them with a gold kris and a gold silk cloth (Stapel 1922:170-1; Macleod 1900:1287).

In discussing this event the Dutch reports use such terms as “betrayal”, and “treachery” to characterise the action of these two *karaeng*. Yet what was occurring was another example of a South Sulawesi state reassessing the power situation and adjusting its interstate relationships. Once it became obvious to Karaeng Layo and Karaeng Bangkala that real power had shifted from Goa to the Company and the Bugis, they came to offer fealty to the new overlords and request “protection”. In return these vassal lords were honoured with krisses and cloths in the traditional fashion as confirmation of the new relationship and for services rendered to their new overlords. The presentation of the kris and the “robe of honour”, therefore, was in reward for a faithful deed to the overlord and as an acknowledgement of a new interstate relationship and not, as it would appear by the bald description in Dutch sources, as a bribe to effect a treasonous act.

According to the arrangements made between Arung Palakka and the two *karaeng*, an attack was to be made on the evening of 2nd November

on the fortification under the *karaeng*'s command near Aeng. Once the attack began the two *karaeng* would flee with their men back to their homeland in Turatea. The Dutch would then send a ship with envoys to gain the trust of the people and return within seven or eight days with some 5,000 armed men. The plan proceeded smoothly and the fort was captured by the Dutch and Bugis. When the news reached the Goa court, there was anger and dismay at the decision of the two *karaeng* to abandon Goa. At first there was a clamour to send 3,000 Makassar troops to force Turatea to recognize Goa's overlordship, but wiser voices prevailed and it was decided to retain the men in Makassar. Unbeknownst to the court another prominent figure in Makassar, the exiled Ternate prince, Kaicili' Kalimata, had also communicated secretly with the enemy. He expressed regret at aiding Goa and asked for a reconciliation with his brother, Sultan Mandar Syah of Ternate, now allied with the Company. But after a brief correspondence between Speelman and Kaicili' Kalimata, nothing more was heard from the latter (Stapel 1922: 171-2, 176; Macleod 1900:1287).

The effort to bring the two sides to negotiate the peace proceeded by fits and starts. On the evening of 6th November Speelman and Arung Palakka both participated in a reconnaissance mission which accomplished little more than setting ablaze some of the areas closest to the strong fortification of Barombong. The following day some Goa envoys brought seven bags of rials-of-eight amounting to 3,394 rials²¹ and a letter asking for another three-day ceasefire. The reason for this request soon became clear. One of the men who came over to the Dutch side reported that Karaeng Layo and Bangkala had burned a district called Pallengu near the home area of Karaeng Lengkesse. The latter was therefore planning to leave that very day with troops to deal with this threat. Accepting the veracity of this report Speelman sent help immediately to Turatea and at the same time lodged a protest to Goa saying Karaeng Lengkesse's action was against the ceasefire. The next day more Makassar envoys arrived to explain that Karaeng Lengkesse had not departed on the expedition as was reported but lay sick in bed. Now they requested a ten-day ceasefire covering the whole of Sulawesi, which was clearly intended to halt the fighting in Wajo, Goa's hard-pressed ally. In such a matter of importance, Speelman decided not only to convene the Dutch War Council, but also Arung Palakka and his most important men, as well as the commanders of the Ternate and Butung forces. They discussed the request at great length and agreed only to a three-day ceasefire, which Goa's leaders reluctantly

accepted (Stapel 1922:174-6; Macleod 1900:1288; KA 1157:322r).

Before the third day of the ceasefire had passed, Karaeng Lengkesa and Karaeng Bontosunggu were given authority by Sultan Hasanuddin to approach the Dutch and offer to reaffirm the treaty signed between Goa and the Company in Batavia in 1660 and to ask for an extension of the ceasefire. At the same time they told Arung Palakka that they wanted to “restore” the 1611 treaty of Tamalate between Goa and Bone and would like to have him live in Goa. As gifts they brought fifty bundles of gold *mas* for Speelman and twenty for Arung Palakka, with each bundle containing 160 gold pieces. Arung Palakka declined the request for a separate peace on the grounds that he was now an ally and “under the protection” of the Company, hence indicating his subservient status to the Company. Instead, he referred all negotiations to Speelman who recommended that Sultan Hasanuddin himself attend the negotiations so that a settlement could be arrived at more quickly. It was suggested that both parties come unarmed to a nearby village on 13th November (Stapel 1922:176-7; Macleod 1900:1288-99; KA 1157:322r-v).

The Makassar offer of peace may have also been hastened by news that 6,000 men from Turatea under Karaeng Layo and Bangkala had arrived south of Batu-Batu on 11th November. To create a favourable impression and perhaps to hasten Goa’s attendance at a peace conference, Speelman greeted the two *karaeng* with great ceremony. He went with a company of Dutch soldiers as bodyguards and all the Bugis nobles to meet them. Under a tree a treaty was signed and the oath of loyalty given with drawn krisses accompanied by the beating of drums. Speelman noted that there was great bitterness shown toward the Makassar people by these men from Turatea (Stapel 1922:177-8; Macleod 1900:1288; KA 1157:323r). But again this may have only been the traditional *aru* in which each person expressed anger and hate toward the enemy and loyalty and love toward his lord in a hyperbolic formula. These Turatea lords had seen the decline of Goa’s strength and were now seeking protection with the new power. Areas all around Goa were now beginning to abandon Goa and cast their fortunes with the new lords. Even in the Makassar ranks defection was becoming more and more frequent.

Negotiations for peace were begun on 13 November 1667 in a small village near Barombong called Bungaya. There was little doubt in the Dutch-Bugis camp that the Goa government would agree to end the fighting. The war appeared to have been won through the sheer deter-

mination and magnetism of both Admiral Speelman and Arung Palakka. Both these men had embarked on a hazardous undertaking to vindicate their reputations among their people. Speelman's impressive rise to power from humble circumstances had been threatened by a supposed lapse of good judgement. To regain his status, so difficult to attain had he remained in the home country, he had to achieve some spectacular success to please his superiors in the Company. It was this principal consideration which drove him to pursue the Goa enemy until victory was assured. His most important weapon was Arung Palakka, an exiled Bugis prince living in Batavia, whose inclusion in the expedition was intended mainly to harass the enemy. At the beginning of the expedition neither Speelman nor the Company leaders could have foreseen the value of Arung Palakka in the forthcoming campaign. But Arung Palakka's grievance was not only a personal one, but one shared by his people the Bugis from Bone and Soppeng. He became a symbol to his people in the fight to restore *siri* and resuscitate the bond of *pěsse* throughout the whole community. These factors proved decisive in the victories of the Dutch-Bugis forces over Goa and its allies in the war. What now remained was to establish a viable peace through the Bungaya treaty. But it was on the treaty and its significance in general to both the Dutch and the South Sulawesi kingdoms that the peace faltered.

CHAPTER IV

THE TREATY

On the morning of 13 November 1667, Speelman sent Dutch and native troops to the outer defenceworks, where he and a few other Dutchmen, Arung Palakka, Sultan Mandar Syah of Ternate and various other native lords were gathered. A large open audience hall was being erected on one side of the village of Bungaya, but contrary to the agreement some Makassar troops under Karaeng Lengkese had occupied the field directly behind it. Sultan Hasanuddin himself waited in front ringed with a sizeable group of armed men. Speelman refused to go to the hall until the Makassar troops were removed, and although some of the troops were then subsequently withdrawn, a sufficiently large number remained to cause Speelman to take the precaution of bringing with him two companies of Dutch soldiers plus some Bugis. All the various lords, except Karaeng Tallo who was ill, were there with Sultan Hasanuddin. The latter said something to his interpreter who then came over and brought the message to Speelman. Since this procedure promised to be time-consuming and tedious, Speelman proposed that “since the entire [Goa] government understood Malay and a greater part also knew Portuguese, that one would understand the other better *tête à tête* and so cut the negotiating time by half”. Sultan Hasanuddin agreed, and so Karaeng Karunrung assumed the role as negotiator since he was the most capable in the use of the Portuguese language. And so it was in Portuguese that Speelman, on behalf of the Company, and Karaeng Karunrung, on behalf of the Makassar kingdoms of Goa-Tallo, negotiated the peace settlement (Stapel 1922:179).

Speelman began by making known the Company’s twenty-six demands, which were in abbreviated form:

1. Respect the two previous treaties [of 1660] made with Jacob Cau in Makassar and Karaeng Popo in Batavia.
2. Return promptly all Dutchmen who in the past and recently had fled to Makassar.
3. Return all the remaining cannons, equipment, etc., from the *Leeuwin* and *Walvisch* still in Makassar.

4. Bring to justice those responsible for the murders occurring here and there.
5. Give security for the debts still outstanding to the Company.
6. Free and remove any overlordship over the lands of the Bugis, the Company's allies.
7. Surrender to the Company and its allies all land won by the sword in this war.
8. Free and remove Goa's overlordship over Turatea, etc.
9. Pay restitution for the damage caused to the people and goods of the Sultan of Ternate in Sula, evacuate all the land which His Highness had occupied for a long time, and also pay compensation for fifteen cannons and smaller arms taken from Sula.
10. Pay compensation for the pillaging in the latest expedition to Butung.
11. Relinquish control over Bima and place it at the disposal of the Company.
12. Limit navigation of the Makassar people and their demands for ship's passes.
13. Deny trade rights in Makassar to all European nationalities for now and all time.
14. Reserve exclusively for the Company the trade in cloth and Chinese wares.
15. Destroy all Makassar fortifications except for Sombaopu.
16. Abandon jurisdiction over the northern fort, Ujung Pandang, to the Company and refrain from interfering any more with those who come to live there.
17. Allow toll-free trade for the Company.
18. Build no new fortifications without the approval of the Company.
19. Pay compensation to the Company for damages to its property as a result of the war.
20. Surrender the Sultan Bima and his "accomplices".
21. Surrender Karaeng Bontomarannu.
22. Make legal in Makassar both large and small Dutch coinage.
23. Abandon without direct or indirect aid Wajo, Bulu-Bulu, and Mandar, whose lands have committed misdeeds against the Company.
24. Pay the Company a fine of 1,500 slaves or their equivalent value.
25. The Company would, for its part, demonstrate its aid and friendship to the Makassar people and its allies.
26. Goa should send prominent men from its government to Batavia with Speelman in order to request confirmation of this treaty from the Lord Governor-General and, if he should so desire, these men are to reside in Batavia as hostages.

Other less important matters were to be left for the actual negotiations (Stapel 1922:179-181; KA 1157a:324v-325r).

There was a noticeable stir among the Makassar envoys while these demands were being read aloud. When the murmurings died down, the

Makassar delegates asked for time, a few days, to consider these demands. Speelman was reluctant to add yet another delay to the proceedings, but he finally relented and allowed one day. During the course of the negotiations Speelman noted how the Makassar delegation was uncommonly friendly toward Arung Palakka and Arung Kaju, while totally ignoring the Sultan Ternate and the nobles of Butung.¹

An incident occurred toward the end of the meeting which could have had serious consequences. Some of the Makassar nobles wanted their men to move back and so ordered them to do so by hitting them with sticks. This caused a minor panic with some falling and others reaching for their weapons. According to Speelman, it was his and Sultan Hasanuddin's coolheadedness which saved the situation (Stapel 1922: 181; KA 1157a:325r-v). But the author of the *Sya'ir Perang Mengkasar* accused Speelman of scurrying away to safety while Arung Palakka and Sultan Hasanuddin calmed the crowd (Skinner 1963:178-9).

On the evening of the 14th Goa's delegation reappeared saying that it had been empowered to discuss some of the twenty-six points further. One of the points which it wanted to discuss was the *Leeuwin*. The delegates claimed that there were no more cannons to be found, and that all 4,000 *rijksdaalders* which had been recovered from that ship had already been returned. The ship's equipment had been given to Verspreet, who had kept the best of it and sold or presented the rest as gifts to some of the Makassar nobles. With regard to the *Walvisch*, no more than sixteen cannons could be found. Half of these had been returned to the Company and the other half given to Sultan Hasanuddin for a price of 4,000 Spanish rials with the approval of Commissioner Cau. On the fourth demand, the delegates said that three of the accused murderers had been delivered to Verspreet and the others would follow when found. Insofar as the fifth demand was concerned, Sultan Hasanuddin would not be held responsible for any "bad debts" contracted by his subjects with the Company. Point nineteen, concerning the payment of war damages, was rejected outright as being contrary to any customs of war. Sultan Hasanuddin said he would be able to deliver 1,000 instead of the demanded 1,500 slaves, but at the earliest in the following monsoon and on the condition that payment be made also in money or cannon. In Makassar the average price for a slave was estimated to be about forty gold *mas*. The other points were either unmentioned or only revised slightly (Stapel 1922:181-2).

While the negotiations were in progress, a Makassar noble of great stature in the Goa kingdom (whose name was left unmentioned by

Speelman for security reasons), approached Arung Kaju to arrange a meeting with Arung Palakka. Thus on the night of the 14th this noble came as far as the outer defence perimeters of the Dutch camp to speak to Arung Palakka. He explained that he wanted to be friends with the Company, and that he and all of his following intended to abandon Sultan Hasanuddin if the latter did not give full satisfaction to the Company. Speelman was especially pleased by this report because in this noble's following were two or three well-known people who were considered among the bravest of the Makassar leaders. A desertion of such magnitude was bound to demoralize the enemy camp and hasten their acceptance of the Company's peace terms (KA 1157a:329r). The Goa court had been divided from the beginning over whether to resist the Dutch or to arrive at some accommodation. When the war began going badly for Goa, the "peace" faction reasserted itself and took a daring gamble in seeking an end to the war. Because of grave risks involved, Speelman took the extraordinary precaution of leaving these individuals unnamed in his missive to Batavia. Only during the second outbreak of fighting in 1668 did it become clear that one of those ready to join the Company was an influential member of the Goa court, the Tumailalang, Karaeng Lengkesse, brother of Arung Palakka's wife, Daeng Talele.

How unsuspecting the Goa government was of Karaeng Lengkesse's intentions is seen by his selection with Karaeng Bontosunggu as envoys with full powers to conduct negotiations with the Company on the following morning. They asked pardon for Karaeng Bontomarannu and returned Speelman's kris and gun which Karaeng Bontomarannu had taken with him when he escaped from the Dutch at Galesong. As a fine for him Sultan Hasanuddin presented Speelman with 176 gold *mas*. Insofar as Sultan Bima was concerned, the delegates informed Speelman that Goa was unable to surrender him because he had escaped and was still being sought. Speelman objected to granting a pardon for Karaeng Bontomarannu, and after long deliberations his view appeared to have been adopted. Later in the day news arrived that Sultan Bima and some of his followers had been apprehended and were staying with Karaeng Bontomarannu for safe-keeping. On departing the envoys asked to be pardoned for "having forgotten" to return the Dutch deserters. When Speelman brought up the question of the war indemnity, the envoys replied that payment of such a sum was out of the question. Speelman then moderated his demand saying that they should pay at least some of it. But no agreement was reached on this point (Stapel 1922:182-3).

This rather piece-meal and hasty Makassar process of satisfying the

Company's demands continued on 16th November when two Dutch deserters were surrendered to the Company. On the 17th Sultan Bima and a few of his subjects were being delivered to the Dutch, but much to the apparent distress of the Makassar envoys, the Bima prisoners and their guards disappeared. The envoys promised to recapture them and bring them dead or alive to the Company. Then they asked that the treaty be signed that very day as they were empowered to do so and had brought the royal seals. However, the Dutch were not at all inclined to sign a treaty before all their demands were met. Furthermore, they wanted Sultan Hasanuddin and his council to be present for the placing of the seal on the treaty document. An ultimatum was given to Goa that either all the demands were met by the following evening or negotiations would be discontinued (Stapel 1922:183-4).

Early the next morning, on 18th November, a large number of Bugis men, women and children with all their belongings poured out from the Makassar side down to the Dutch camps. But throughout the rest of the morning there was no sign of Sultan Hasanuddin or his nobles. Finally Speelman and one of his aides, Du Pon, left their fortified camp and headed toward Sombaopu. They informed some Makassar nobles that Sultan Hasanuddin was being awaited for the negotiations. Hearing this, the nobles appeared upset and complained that in Europe it was certainly not the custom to have the king himself do the negotiating. To spare Sultan Hasanuddin this task they proposed that all the nobles come on his behalf and leave him the duty of later applying his seal to the treaty. But Speelman would not be persuaded, and he delegated Du Pon to enter Sombaopu to tell the Goa government that without the ruler the negotiations would be terminated. In an attempt to make Speelman soften his attitude the nobles offered him a gold chain worth some 200 *rijksdaalders* while making excuses for their ruler. Only then did they reveal Sultan Hasanuddin's fear of being made prisoner by the Dutch for allowing Sultan Bima to escape. Speelman denied that this was his intention, and with that returned with Du Pon to the Dutch camp (Stapel 1922:184-5).

Sometime between two and three o'clock in the afternoon, Sultan Hasanuddin arrived in person to participate in the treaty talks and was given an appropriate welcome "in the official Makassar fashion". In view of the inability of the Goa government to fulfill some of the Company's demands, Speelman insisted on the inclusion of three new articles. The first was to deal with the Company trumpeter Willem Willemse who had fled to the English. The latter refused to reveal his

hiding-place, alleging that he was an Englishman since he was born in Delft in The Netherlands of English parents. To punish the English, Speelman demanded a new article 27, in which they would be considered as enemies in enemy territory and their goods confiscated. A new article 28 amplified articles 20 and 21 by requiring Sultan Hasanuddin to deliver both Sultan Bima and Karaeng Bontomarannu to the Company within ten days or surrender their eldest sons as hostages. Article 19, which was the Company's demand for an indemnity estimated by Speelman at 400,000 rials, was totally rejected by Goa. A compromise was finally reached in the form of article 29 which modified the amount of the war damages to 250,000 *rijksdaalders*, equivalent to 100,000 rials, to be paid over a period of five successive monsoons. Once these last few difficulties were overcome, the drafting of the final version and the signing and sealing of the peace treaty took place, sworn on the Koran by the Moslem participants, and on the Bible by the Christians. Karaeng Tallo was ill and unable to participate in the ceremony, but on 25th November he too set his name and seal to the treaty made on 18 November 1667. The Goa government promised to have Fort Ujung Pandang evacuated the next day to prepare it for Dutch occupation (Stapel 1922:169, 182, 183, 185-6).²

That evening Karaeng Lengkesa and his sons paid a visit to Speelman to receive his assurances of support and favour for their secret commitment to the Company. As a sign of appreciation Speelman presented each of them with a golden *allegia*³ and other gifts (KA 1157a:329r-v). This magnanimous gesture revealed Speelman's uncontained elation at the outcome of events. In a letter to Batavia he announced the great "Victory and Peace" which had been gained at the cost of only eighty Dutch dead (though many more perished through illness). He attributed this success to the fact that the naval and land forces were kept together in the campaign. The Makassar leaders themselves admitted later that they had not expected the Dutch and the Bugis to be able to prolong the war beyond the end of October (Stapel 1922:186). The approach of the west monsoon was expected to hinder the Dutch-Bugis expedition already debilitated by sickness and sagging morale. But circumstances unexpectedly turned in their favour and the war appeared to be won. To Speelman it was a sweet victory which would help re-establish himself in the eyes of the Company leaders. It was indeed the beginning of a rapid rise in his career which culminated in his becoming Governor-General of the Dutch East India Company in November 1681 (van Rhede van der Kloot 1891:65).

The day after the signing of the Treaty of Bungaya, Sultan Hasanuddin prevented the English from fleeing and asked Speelman to post his own men to guard the English lodge. Thus began the confiscation of English goods and the removal of the English and the Portuguese from Makassar. Although in the 1660 treaty with the Company Goa had agreed to prevent these nations from settling in the kingdom, there had been little attempt to enforce this provision. With the Dutch now ensconced in Makassar itself, they undertook to enforce this and all the articles of the new treaty.

On the 20th Du Pon went to see Karaeng Karunrung concerning the takeover of the Makassar fortification Ujung Pandang, but Karaeng Karunrung was nowhere to be found. Instead Karaeng Lengkesa had to give permission to the Dutch to occupy it. The Dutch arrived in the fort the next day to find that every house within it had been removed, despite a stipulation in the treaty that the fort be surrendered in good order. To appease the Dutch Sultan Hasanuddin had two wooden houses built and brought into the fort. The fortification Ujung Pandang was later officially renamed Fort Rotterdam in honour of Speelman's birthplace (Stapel 1922:187-9).

After the formal peace was signed, it was Speelman who began laying the foundations for permanent Dutch control, or at least an important influence, in the affairs of South Sulawesi. One of his most significant recommendations was to create a deterrent to Goa by providing Arung Palakka and his followers with guns and ammunition and eventually to make Arung Palakka the ruler of Bone. For the moment Bantaeng was to be given to him as his place of residence, "a place so well situated for incoming and outgoing vessels to the East that it would be both an envy and an obstacle to the Makassar folk". In this statement Speelman was fully cognizant of the basis of Goa's wealth and power. If Arung Palakka were successful in attracting the international trade away from Makassar to Bantaeng, the Company would have little cause to worry about a resurgence of Goa as an economic rival. Speelman's statement further reveals the Company's chief objective in the Makassar war: to destroy Goa's ability to challenge the Company's trading hegemony in the area. South Sulawesi as an area of profitable trade was a minor consideration. With a dependable ally in Bantaeng undermining the basis of Goa's power, the Company would have considered its mission here to have been successful.

While the plans to create a deterrent to Goa were laudable, they could only be implemented once all effective Makassar opposition had been

removed. In a missive to Batavia announcing the victory, Speelman warned, "Whether this solemnly sworn peace is sincerely meant by the Makassar people, we will suspend our judgement." (Stapel 1922:189-191; KA 1157a:339r-v, 1340r). Speelman's concern over the "sincerity" of the Makassar people in implementing the Bungaya treaty presaged one of the most contentious issues which came to plague all future Dutch-South Sulawesi relations: the meaning and intent of the Bungaya treaty or any treaty signed between a Western power and a South Sulawesi kingdom.

When the Dutch, the Bugis and the Makassar delegates first came to Bungaya to discuss terms of a peace treaty on 13 November 1667, each side approached the negotiations with its own conception of what the "treaty" meant in terms of the total framework of interstate relations, as well as the mutual rights and obligations incumbent on all parties involved. The Dutch party, under Cornelis Speelman, was governed by a so-called "international law" which had its origins in the Roman juridical system. It was only developed as a science in the 16th century and was dominated by the legal minds of Western Europe. Insofar as the relations between East and West prior to the 19th century were concerned, the sovereignty of Asian rulers and communities was recognized and the law of reciprocity prevailed.⁴ The recognition of the law of reciprocity may have been acceptable as a form of diplomatic relations, but it proved inadequate to bridge the basic philosophical differences which governed treaty-making procedures between a Western European power and a South Sulawesi one.

The importance of the treaty concept in South Sulawesi society is shown by the various words which may be used to signify the Western notion of a treaty.⁵ The very nature of these words indicates that the written treaty was basically an oral document transcribed on paper. Even after many of these treaties were copied on *lontara'* and later on paper, the ritual-like repetition of certain phrases was maintained evoking the atmosphere of a not too distant past when the oral word stood alone, pre-eminent. The introduction of the written treaty in no way undermined the oral agreement but was seen simply as an extension of the latter. Understandably, therefore, the word most commonly used for entering into a treaty arrangement is *makkuluada* (*ma'ulukana* in Makassar), which means "to give one's word of honour". The act of giving one's word of honour is equated with the word "treaty". Closely related to *makkuluada* are the words *mattarooda*, which again has the

connotation of giving one's word of honour or of agreeing to something, and *ewai ada*, "to uphold or support one's word". Another term widely used in the chronicles for an agreement or treaty is *sitëlli'* (*sitalli'* in Makassar). This word literally means "to swear mutual oaths", and appears to be stronger than *ma'janci* (*a'janji* in Makassar), "to promise", which is also used to signify a treaty agreement between two parties. Finally, there is the word *cěppa* (*cappa* in Makassar), which is only infrequently encountered in manuscripts but which is the term used for the famous Bungaya Treaty of 1667. It means literally "to take part in something" or "to participate in the doing of something". Only the word *cěppa* appears to have no element of obligation imposed on the contracting parties who merely express a wish "to participate". The following translation of a Bugis sentence in one of the chronicles nicely captures the fine distinctions in the various words which are often translated as "treaties": "We will not abandon our sworn word of honour ("akkuluadangěmměng") to participate in (*cěppa*) that which we have promised to one another ("assijancing")" (L-1:14).

The "treaty" is reinforced by a curse, *tanro* (*tunra* in Makassar). In situations where a ruler agrees voluntarily or through coercion to recognize another as his overlord, the latter forces the vassal ruler to drink *ballo'* stirred with the overlord's kris or sword of state. While the vassal drinks the *ballo'*, the overlord utters the following curse: "If you should break your word, may your descendants never rise in the eye of the needle." The "needle" is an allusion to leadership, hence kingship, since it is the needle which "leads" the thread. In this curse, which is an excellent example of the South Sulawesi penchant for allusions, a vassal ruler is threatened with extinction of his dynasty if he should break his word. The stirring of the *ballo'* with a kris or sword belonging to the regalia of the overlord is believed to imbue the drink with the powers of this object. Anyone breaking his word is endangered by the supernatural forces immanent in these sacred instruments of state. Another curse which is often invoked by the Bugis rulers is: "May you be swept away like rubbish by the One God (*Dewata seuae*) if you break your word" (L-3: 289).

An alternative form of swearing an oath as a sanctioning force in a treaty is the *mallamumpatu*, or the burying of the stone. After the formal declaration of the terms of the treaty, a solemn oath is intoned at the end with the words: "If anyone should break this agreement, may the ground upon which he lives break into bits like porcelain and be smashed into pieces like an egg." Each ruler then takes a stone and throws it to the

ground smashing an egg. The ceremony ends with the burying of the stone (Noorduyn 1955:252; Fihl 1947:12).

The *Dewata seuae*, or the One God, is called upon to witness the swearing of oaths to punish those who break them (Noorduyn 1955: 110-1). These oaths are greatly feared since they are made binding on present as well as future generations. Because of the great importance which the Bugis and Makassar people attach to the survival of their line (Andaya 1976:16), oaths were regarded with the gravest respect.

All treaties in South Sulawesi have a definite structure. They begin with a preamble which quickly establishes the relationship between the contracting states. It is followed by the actual terms of the treaty itself which are subdivided into a guarantee of sovereignty through non-interference in internal affairs and an expression of mutual assistance and cooperation. The third part proclaims that the treaty will be upheld not only by those present but by all future generations. All the proceedings then end with the swearing of an oath.

In the opening of every treaty, the precise relationship of the contracting parties is declared in purely conventional terms. It is an easily recognizable formula which conveys to the parties involved the entire set of rights and obligations which are attached to their relationship. It was superfluous to mention particular details which were already implied in the conventional phrases and in the established relationship. A treaty of equality begins with the words: "We are brothers, equally great, with none above and none below. We are slaves only to the *Dewata*. We will not force one to submit to the other. We will walk together with arms swinging freely, equal in walking, equal in sitting." Only then are the more traditional terms of the treaty pronounced. In a treaty of inequality, the subordinate relationship of mother and child or master to slave is established by the words "I speak, you assent"; or, "I am the wind and you are the leaves"; or, "I am the needle and you are the thread". Each of these phrases declares the willingness of the child/slave to follow the mother/master in everything.

After the proper relationship of the contracting parties is decided by these all-important prefatory formulas, there then follows a recitation of the ritual-like "terms". The most important aspect of the treaty is the guarantee of sovereignty and mutual respect through non-interference in the internal affairs of the contracting states. This guarantee of sovereignty is expressed in the following way: neither will uproot the other's plants; neither will plant on the other's territory; neither will cut down the other's woods; neither will pass judgement on the other's traditional

laws; neither will interfere with the other's processes of law (*bicara*); neither will destroy the other's regalia; each will expand outward and not inward against the other; neither will take part in the other's division of children.⁶ Neither will make the other do what he does not want to do; and each will determine his own life without outside interference. Mutual respect is expressed in such phrases as: I will consider you large not small; fat not thin; good not evil; good of hearing not deaf; and good of sight not blind.

The second principal element in a treaty is the expression of mutual assistance: neither will practice deception toward the other; each will trust the other in speech; each will remind the other when in error; neither will contrive wars against the other; whosoever brings a false message to the other will be trampled to death by water buffaloes (*tedong*); if one should fall, the other would help him up; if one should be drowning, the other would save him; if one should be washed away, the other would bring him to shore; if one should covet the other's goods, he should be mindful; neither will hide the other's goods in his own house; neither will retain the other's refugees or wrong-doers; each will return the other's property found on the way; each will refrain from buying the other's slaves. Together they will cross the bridge and walk the narrow path, and together share fortune and misfortune, life and death.

Once the traditional terms are recited, the treaty is made binding upon the present generation and upon all generations to come. The words recall perhaps some earlier now forgotten ritual which accompanied all oath-giving: "Fire will not burn it [i.e. the treaty] away, nor disaster in the land take it away. No dead person will be able to take it away with him [i.e., the death of those who agreed to the treaty will not dissolve it]. Even if the Heaven should fall and the Underworld sink away, the treaty will not be undone." The treaty is then solemnized with the swearing of an oath while drinking *ballo*' stirred with the sword or kris of state or while smashing an egg with a stone and then burying the stone.⁷

The treaties in South Sulawesi clearly classify the status of the participating parties with no possibility of ambiguity in the relationship. Among the Bugis the term *asseajingěng*, which may be translated as "brotherhood", refers generally to any alliance except that which is characterized as being between master and slave. At the very top of the *asseajingěng* hierarchy is the alliance of full equality, or an alliance of brothers who are "equally great" (*mappadaworoane senrajae*). More common are the alliances of brothers of unequal rank, where the more

powerful is called the older brother (*kaka'*) and the weaker member the younger brother (*anri'*). In the treaty concluded by the Bugis states of Bone, Wajo, and Soppeng at Timurung in the 16th century, Bone is considered to be the eldest, Wajo the middle, and Soppeng the younger brother (*uluai Bone ana'-tēngai Wajo' paccucunngi Soppeng*) (Noorduyn 1955:190). Land was given to Soppeng by both Bone and Wajo to raise it to the status of “brother” to the others. A similar case occurred when another Bugis state Luwu gave land to Wajo so that the latter could properly be called a brother. In both instances the weakest or weaker member of the alliance had expressed reluctance in the beginning to agreeing to any brotherly relationship. Instead, it had requested that it be treated as a child to a mother since it felt that this was the relationship which was most appropriate and best mirrored their respective positions in the hierarchy of states (Noorduyn 1955:190, 250).

Below the status of *padaworoane*, or brothers, is that of mother (*ina*) and favoured child (*ana' makēssing* or *ana' malē'bi*). In this relationship the overlord grants his vassal a more favourable status than the others in recognition of his performance of some unique service for the overlord. Sometimes special dress appropriate to well-born individuals (*todeceng*) is granted as a mark of favour. In 1667 Arung Palakka and Admiral Speelman presented the rulers of the Tēllumpidange (Turatea) with fine raiments as a sign of special honour for their decision to join the Bugis-Dutch forces against their former overlord, Goa (L-1:48).⁸ When the ruler of Gilirēng sacrificed his life for his overlord, the ruler of Wajo, the latter promoted Gilirēng from a status of slave (*ata*) to that of favoured child of Wajo (Noorduyn 1955:238). According to Bugis sources, both Bone and Soppeng were taken as a child (*ala ana'*) by the Company after the Makassar war of 1666-9 and became favoured children (*ana' malē'bi*) with a mother (*akkeina*) and a father (*akkeama*) in the Company (L-1:65).

The status of mother to child is a vassal relationship created either through force or mutual consent. In the latter case a state seeks “protection” (*ppa'daoi*) from another and thereby gains a more favourable vassalage position than a conquered state. Nevertheless, the state which is granted protection is still below that of a favoured child.

On the very bottom of the hierarchy of interstate relationship is that between a master (*puang*) and a slave (*ata*). A vassal state which wars against its overlord and is defeated loses its former status and is degraded to a position of slave to its overlord. While in this relationship the slave state is supposedly at the total mercy of the master, in reality it continues

to retain its own rulers, *adat*, and *bicara*. When the Toraja were defeated by Arung Palakka in the late 17th century, they were considered to be “slaves” of Bone. Nevertheless, the terms of the treaty guaranteed the basic sovereignty of the Toraja: “Keep the land which is your land, the rocks which are your rocks, the rivers which are your rivers, the grass which is your grass, the water which is your water, the water buffaloes which are your water buffaloes, the *ipo*⁹ which is your *ipo*, the weapons which are your weapons, the *adat* which is your *adat*, and the *bicara* which is your *bicara*” (L-1:125). Even a “slave” state in South Sulawesi treaty traditions retains its identity and its self-esteem.

The spiritual element of the treaties was once as important as the political to South Sulawesi states. After a treaty was concluded between two powers, it was copied and preserved among the regalia (Cense 1951: 47).¹⁰ The entire corpus of treaties became a kind of palladium of the state for it was the repository of sacred words solemnly sworn by generations of rulers. In the same way that a ruler went to his ancestral altar (*palakka attoriolong*) to implore his ancestors to help cure his personal illness (Matthes 1943:510, 517-8), he consulted the treaties for guidance from the ancestors on the proper conduct and preservation of the state. To swear to uphold or renew a treaty involved past, present, and future generations and was not a matter entered into lightly. He never rejected a treaty unless agreed upon by all parties since it would have meant repudiating his ancestors; he merely allowed it to be superseded by another or to fall into abeyance until circumstances again brought it into prominence.

Local sources as well as contemporary Dutch reports show the intricate arguments used by South Sulawesi rulers to demonstrate that there was no rejection of a former treaty despite a change of alliance. A cynical modern-day Western observer may be tempted to see everything in terms of *Realpolitik*, but then he is a product of his culture and of an age which encourages secularism and praises “rationality”. A South Sulawesi ruler prior to the 20th century was also a product of his culture and his time, and while he was mindful of the secular world, he was equally if not more responsive to the spiritual one. The words and oaths of the ancestors contained in the treaties became a moral and supernatural sanction which sustained all interstate relations and guaranteed a degree of stability in the affairs of the area.

Once a treaty had been agreed upon, it remained a permanent agreement which could be resurrected and renewed or allowed to recede into the background in face of other superior political and spiritual forces.

These enduring sacred documents were made but once. All subsequent agreements are referred to in the records as “renewals” (*ribarui*) of the original treaty and are essentially a recognition and affirmation by one state of a new political and spiritual status of another. The treaties, oaths, and the whole treaty-making procedure were part of a continuing process of reassessment of political and spiritual affiliations to assure the establishment of a hierarchy of states which accurately reflected the power situation in South Sulawesi.

The idea of treaties, not as an instrument of oppression but as a means of establishing proper and peaceful relations with other states in the diplomatic sphere, was comprehensible in South Sulawesi because it resembled the concept of *siri*’ in the sphere of personal relations (see Chapter I). To possess *siri*’ is to know oneself and one’s ancestors, or in other words, to know one’s status and place in one’s society (Errington 1976:3).¹¹ As with *siri*’, the treaty’s efficacy lay in the universal acceptance in South Sulawesi of its legitimate function in preserving harmony in the society. With the establishment of a hierarchy of states through individual treaties, a particular state could easily seek “protection” (*ppa’daoi*) and avoid unnecessary conflict. In one of the Bugis *lontara*’, a ruler advises his troops “not to be excessive in fighting so that later negotiations would be easier” (L-1:51). Neither conquest of territory nor control of a substantial population was the primary aim of warfare among South Sulawesi states, but the search for recognition of one’s proper place in the interstate hierarchy.¹² Treaties thus became the accepted form in which this hierarchy was expressed and understood by all participants.

When a state believed that its treaty with another had been rejected, it regarded it as a rejection of the solemnly-sworn words of the ancestor who sponsored the original treaty. The status and self-respect of the state were considered to have been impugned, and the only course of action was to defend the treaty. If satisfaction were not forthcoming through peaceful means, that is through negotiation of a “renewal” of the treaty, then the other alternative was to fight to defend one’s belief in one’s status in the hierarchy of states.

The constant alignment and realignment of vassal states from one overlord to another was an expected phenomenon which was a result of an on-going process by which each state sought its proper level within the interstate hierarchy. In an episode recounted in the chronicles, one of the Bugis states realizes that its ally has been defeated and sends the following message to its vanquished “elder brother”: “We are like birds

sitting on a tree. When the tree falls, we leave it and go in search of a large tree where we can settle” (Noorduyn 1955:216). When Goa was on the verge of defeat in 1667, it sent a message to its “child”, the ruler of Barru, saying: “Go home and seek your own welfare because Goa is hardpressed and can no longer provide you the wings under which you can shelter” (L-1:37). The responsibility of the “elder brother” or the “mother/master” is to spread her/his wings of protection over the “younger brother” or “child/slave”. But when this protection can no longer be given, then the weaker is expected to look after his own welfare. On the other hand, the responsibility of a child or younger brother was relatively light and is described simply in the homilies: “No child would deceive his mother”, and “How could someone wish evil on his brother” (Noorduyn 1955:174, 224). Oftentimes a rising power would begin the process of reassessment by sending envoys to erstwhile allies and vassals “reminding” (*innğerrang*) them of former treaties. This was the point at which each ruler was forced to make the decision which would determine his state’s status in the area.¹³ What may appear to an outsider to be an irreverent disregard of treaties and oaths among the South Sulawesi leaders in fact demonstrates their subtle understanding of the function of both in assuring the political as well as spiritual welfare of their states.

With the appearance of the Dutch in the 17th century, a new concept of treaties and treaty-making was introduced to South Sulawesi. As was common with the Portuguese before them, the Dutch usually came armed with a draft treaty whenever negotiating with a native state. The draft provisions were carefully drawn up in the main Dutch East India Company headquarters in Batavia. It was the envoy’s job to explain the draft treaty to the local ruler, who then ordered to have it translated into Malay or into one of the local languages. When the translation was made, the ruler went over the points with his chief advisers insisting on the inclusion or exclusion of certain articles. Both parties later met and discussed their various points, and some accommodation was usually reached. The Company envoy and the native ruler then signed and sealed the Dutch and local language versions of the treaty. An oath sworn on the Bible and the Koran ended the treaty ceremonies. According to Western European treaty practices at the time, once a treaty text had been formulated in the language of the parties concerned and had been signed and sealed, the provisions contained therein were considered to be binding on all signatories. The written treaty with its

carefully worded articles became for the Company the legal weapon with which it justified its claims not only to the native rulers, but more importantly, to its European rivals in the Indonesian area.

Although the Company did not send any trained jurists to Indonesia until the 18th century, two of its leading officials in the 17th century, Cornelius Speelman and E. Padtbrugge were sufficiently versed in the legal implications of a treaty to know what rights they were acquiring for the Company at the expense of the native state (Alders 1955:111-2). The Company, furthermore, was not unaware of the existence of local treaty traditions in South Sulawesi, for it actually did become party to treaties which were formulated in the local fashion. On the few occasions that the Company submitted to the South Sulawesi treaty-making methods, it did so because of weakness or because the native states were too insignificant to pose any danger to the Company's interests.¹⁴

Such instances, however, were exceptional and there is little indication that any effort was made to understand the whole intent of local treaties. Almost the entire corpus of treaties between the Company and South Sulawesi states was framed in the Western European tradition of treaty-making with little or no attempt to accommodate local practices. This fundamental difference in cultural attitudes toward the treaty accounted for much of the misunderstanding and distrust which arose between the Company and the South Sulawesi states in the 17th and 18th centuries. Contrary to the Western European conception of treaties, the local states viewed the treaty not in its individual parts but as a total document. To them the treaty represented an open declaration of a shift in the spiritual and political power relationships in the area. When circumstances demanded it, the ruler felt free to re-examine his alternatives and to make the necessary realignments to reflect the new power situation and his state's position within it. Even those states which concluded what later scholars called "defensive" treaties were pre-occupied first of all in establishing the proper relationship between themselves as "brothers". Once this relationship was determined, each party understood what its traditional rights and obligations were. Even to categorize a treaty as "defensive" was superfluous since all treaties contained within themselves the element of mutual assistance and cooperation.

The treaties between the Company and the native states were, furthermore, almost always basically commercial with the foremost aim being the acquisition and protection of trading advantages for the Company. Such a treaty whose central concern was trade was totally alien to

the concept of treaties in South Sulawesi. While certain phrases within the native treaty formula contained references to economic practices, these were clearly subordinate and incidental to the primary interest of agreeing upon one's proper place in the hierarchy of states. When a South Sulawesi ruler was presented with a typical Dutch draft treaty full of intricate details about conditions of trade, he would often raise objections to those which were particularly outrageous but regarded the commercial aspect of the treaty as redundant. He entered into a treaty believing that once the diplomatic relationship between the two contracting parties had been established, all things would find their proper place according to well-known traditional practices. It was considered unnecessary to pore painstakingly over the commercial items in the treaty since it was expected that both parties would seek economic measures which would be of mutual benefit and which would not compromise each other's sovereign rights. What was deemed all important was sovereignty with the inalienable rights of a state to its own ruler, *adat* and *bicara*. But to the Company the commercial aspects of the treaty received priority in any negotiations, and it was willing to concede much to acquire certain economic advantages.

The "treaty" became a barometer of the state of relations existing between the Company and a South Sulawesi kingdom. Each could justify its activities based on its own conception of the treaty sanctioned either by international law or by custom. The inability or disinclination of either party to acknowledge the other's understanding of the treaty was often symptomatic of a deeper dissatisfaction with the relationship in general. As soon as one party began citing the treaty against the other, it was a sign to both that a re-examination of attitudes was clearly overdue. When the Bungaya Treaty was signed on 18 November 1667, both the Company and Goa did so based on their own unique treaty conceptions. The subsequent continuing demands made by the Company were considered to be excessive and inappropriate by Goa. When the Company refused to moderate its demands, the Goa leaders felt justified in resuming a war which they in any case believed to have been terminated prematurely through treachery.

CHAPTER V

THE UNFINISHED WAR

Even at the time of the signing of the Bungaya treaty on 18 November 1667, Speelman expressed his reservations about the efficacy of such a document to maintain the peace: “. . . we still have so little trust in the Makassar government; it is as if we were still at war, although outwardly they show us every courtesy and affection” (Stapel 1922:191). When a copy of the treaty in Malay was shown to the Sultan of Banten, he remarked that those in Makassar had promised more than could and would be fulfilled (Macleod 1900:1290). A portent of things to come was the appointment of Karaeng Karunrung to replace Karaeng Suman-na as *Tuma'bicara-butta* some three days before the convening of the Bungaya negotiations.

Karaeng Karunrung was characterized by Speelman as “someone who could be little trusted, long disinclined toward the Company, inordinately proud and aggressive . . .” Speelman, therefore, treated as pure deception Karaeng Karunrung's complaint to Arung Palakka that he had fallen out of favour with Sultan Hasanuddin (KA 1157a:330v). Yet later events did prove the existence of grave rifts within the Goa court as accusations and counter-accusations flowed freely from the pro- and anti-war factions in the aftermath of the fighting. The defeat of the once mighty kingdom of Goa, however, had one positive outcome: it united both factions in their anger and despair at the despoiling of their land. Their authority had been undermined, and they remained powerless to prevent the recently-freed captive peoples from joining the victorious Bugis, Turatea, Butung and Ternate troops in the general pillage (KA 1157a:327v, 330r, 339v). With anguish the Goa leaders also witnessed the seizure of areas traditionally under Makassar control. The fortification of Ujung Pandang was surrendered to the Dutch, as well as Galesong, the west coast from Popo in the south to Barombong in the north, and Bantaeng with all its rich ricefields (KA 1157a:340r). Even the hope that the Dutch would leave after the treaty soon faded as signs of a permanent occupation of the Ujung Pandang fort by the Dutch became evident.

But despite the gloom pervading the Goa government, Karaeng Karunrung refused to accept the situation and began to re-establish ties with Goa's wartime allies. Goa's principal support continued to be the Makassar Malays whose livelihood was now threatened by the Dutch presence in Makassar. Appeals were also made directly to the people of Bangkala and Layo, whose rulers had joined Arung Palakka and the Company during the war, to the other lords of Turatea, and to the rulers of Bantaeng, Bulukumba, "Badjiuy" (?), and Luwu. Outside Sulawesi, the kingdoms of Bima and Sumbawa indicated that they were strongly in favour of an alliance with Goa. Even Arumpone La Ma'darëmmëng appeared to have been swayed by promises that if Bone came to Goa's help, it would be considered a "brother" of Goa. Both the Company and Arung Palakka suspected that La Ma'darëmmëng was planning to withhold any declaration of support for either side until he was certain how the war was progressing (KA 1157b: 359r-360v; KA 1157c:387r-v; KA 1157d:397r; Macleod 1900:1291).

Neither the Company nor Arung Palakka viewed any renewal of hostilities with Goa with any great trepidation. On the contrary they had been enheartened by friendly overtures from both Karaeng Tallo and Karaeng Lengkesè which demonstrated the grave rifts within the enemy camp (KA 1157a:332r; KA 1157b:359r, 360r). In view of these developments Speelman found it "more desirable to have an outbreak [of fighting] than to maintain a peace which has been so sinfully transgressed by the evil deeds and machinations of [Karaeng] Karunrung" (KA 1157b:359r). On the night of 13 April 1668 the English lodge was set on fire and the Dutch ships began to shell Sombaopu. At the same time Arung Palakka led a Bugis attack on Kampong Melayu, the Malay Quarter between Sombaopu and Fort Rotterdam. In this fresh round of fighting the Bugis exhibited an uncharacteristic lack of courage which almost cost Arung Palakka his life. While Arung Palakka was trying to make his way out under cover of darkness, the light from a burning house revealed him to the enemy and he was shot in the arm. He fell and was immediately deserted by all his men except for his bodyguards who dragged him away to safety (KA 1157b:362v; Macleod 1900:1291).

There were a few more battles in April which the Dutch claimed as victories, but the reality was more a stalemate. The Makassar forces began raising defence works opposite Fort Rotterdam, and Speelman was obliged to keep his now greatly diminished Dutch garrison of 503 men, of whom 175 were incapacitated as a result of sickness or wounds, safely within the fort until the requested reinforcements of 500 men

arrived from Batavia (Macleod 1900:1291). To the north of Makassar, Bugis and Makassar forces met in battle with no decisive encounters. On 4th May some Makassar troops poured out in a fierce and furious attack against the Bugis and Dutch camp. The fighting continued throughout the day and night with the Makassar troops receiving constant reinforcements from the rear. Finally the attack subsided with the Makassar side suffering some forty dead and 100 wounded in the fighting. The Dutch lost one dead and five wounded, and the Bugis three dead and forty-five wounded. After this spate of fighting, quiet descended on the battlefield for the next four or five days (KA 1157e:373v).

What the Dutch considered to be even more effective against Goa's forces than the actual pitched battles was the bombardment of the enemy's positions and blockade of Makassar harbour. Goa's supply of rice and salt was affected, and no fish could be caught since no fishing boats dared venture out. Only buffalo meat was still available. The Dutch and the Bugis knew that Sombaopu was filled with people, including women and children and Portuguese, and that their blockade and bombardments were surely wreaking havoc among the defenders. Both the Sultan's residence and the mosque had holes made by the rough cannonballs of the ships' guns (KA 1157e:374r). A Makassar tale, the *Sinrili'na Kappala' Tallumbatua* (SKT), has a description of the blockade and the cannonading which perhaps reflects an early folk memory of the event.¹ This tale emphasizes the unceasing falling of cannonballs into the Makassar warriors' position and the rapidly dwindling supplies of food. Finally the situation becomes so critical that the warriors declare: "It is better to die by the shedding of blood than by hunger" (L-32:145). The picture presented is of fewer ricefields being planted, the inability of the fishing boats to go to sea, and finally the great hunger felt by the Makassar warriors. These were the main reasons, according to the SKT, for the defeat of the Makassar people (L-32:144-5, *passim*).

In this war Speelman relied almost wholly upon native troops, especially the Bugis, and only allowed the twenty-three Dutch bodyguards assigned to Arung Palakka to do any fighting. To protect Arung Palakka another 100 experienced Ternate soldiers with guns accompanied him in all of his battles (KA 1157e:381v). Since the Bugis believed that Arung Palakka possessed *upě*. Speelman considered Arung Palakka's safety to be strategically vital for continued effective Bugis participation in the war. His very defiance of all danger in battle, though considered foolhardy by the Dutch, served to accentuate his 'invulnerability' to his followers. In a fierce two hour battle on 17 May 1668 between the Bugis

and the Makassar troops, Arung Palakka was discovered in the thick of the fighting, which again drew Speelman's criticism that he was exposing himself needlessly. And yet Speelman conceded that his presence contributed greatly to the courage of the Bugis (KA 1157f:381r). A legend had already sprung up around Arung Palakka, and as long as he was there among the Bugis warriors, seemingly oblivious and invulnerable to the enemy's guns and krisses, the Bugis could believe in their own invincibility. He was already accorded greater respect than any other Bugis leader because of his support from the Company and his bravery which far outshone any other Bugis lord (KA 1157f:386v).²

But even with Arung Palakka, the performance of the Bugis in the battlefield tried Speelman's patience. Unlike the unreserved praise he lavished on the Bugis in the fighting before the Bungaya Treaty, he now wrote to Batavia that "we do not consider it advisable nor trust our Bugis to undertake anything of importance without some Dutch support". In describing a two-hour battle between Bugis and Makassar forces in the middle of May, Speelman, while expressing disapproval of Arung Palakka's taking unnecessary risks, praised his bravery. Speelman recognized that it was his daring feats in battle which boosted the courage of the Bugis, "which, to our sorrow, is very small" (KA 1157c:381r). This criticism of the Bugis contribution to the war was again reflected in Speelman's decision to ask the Sultan of Butung to send 800 to 1,000 labourers immediately since "no work can be expected from the Bugis" (KA 1157c:388v, 391r). "The Bugis" that Speelman referred to were the motley, oftentimes undisciplined troops whose obvious desire for the fruits of war contrasted sharply with the singular purpose motivating Arung Palakka and the Toangke. As long as Arung Palakka or his trusted lieutenants led the fighting, some semblance of order was maintained. On most occasions, however, after the battle the Bugis conducted their own personal campaign of pillage and harassment of the Makassar people. These relentless forays into Makassar lands were seen by the Makassar people as a foretaste of the fate which awaited them if they lost the war. They thus became even more determined to resist. The fortifications of Sombaopu and Tallo were strengthened and the defenders of Tallo reinforced by another 100 Makassar and 300 Wajo warriors (KA 1157c:392r).

The war took an unexpected turn with the outbreak of an epidemic in Makassar between April and July 1668. While one later Dutch source mentions a "terrible fever epidemic" (Macleod 1900:1292), both the *Diary of the Kings of Goa and Tallo* (Ligtvoet 1880:127) and contempo-

rary Dutch sources (KA 1157g:431r-v) speak unmistakably of a “plague”. The disease took a particularly heavy toll among the already weakened Dutch garrison. In May 100 Dutchmen died, in June 125, and in July 135. Speelman himself contracted the fever, but he recovered by going out to sea to escape the epidemic on land. The Bugis forces within Makassar itself also suffered severely with some 2,000 out of a total of 4,000 men ill at the end of July. Among the Makassar people, too, the losses caused by the epidemic became apparent. In Sombaopu the Dutch counted about seventy-three people being buried in one day, and in Tallo the death toll was about twenty a day. But by 16th July no new sickness was reported among the Dutch, and it was felt that the epidemic was over (Macleod 1900:1292-3; KA 1157h:424r).

Because of the debilitating effects of the disease in both camps, fighting was limited in the months of May and June to a few skirmishes in the ricefields. But the struggle within the Goa court between the “war” and “peace” factions continued unabated, the epidemic notwithstanding. On 25th May a messenger with a retinue of twelve men appeared in the Dutch camp with a message for Arung Palakka from their lord, Karaeng Lengkese. The letter was written on behalf of Karaeng Tallo:

. . . I have not committed any misdeed against the Admiral [Speelman], nor have I been in the least harmed by him. I have not been able to keep Karaeng Popo out of it [i.e., out of becoming involved in the war] because I am powerless. But we who are brothers, since there has been a brotherhood for many years between the two lands of Bone and Makassar, let us set aside all hate and live once again as brothers (KA 1157c: 385v).

Karaeng Lengkese framed his message in the traditional South Sulawesi fashion in seeking reconciliation and a “renewal” of former treaty ties of “brotherhood”. Being Arung Palakka’s brother-in-law, Karaeng Lengkese’s stand for peace was naturally suspect in the Goa court. He finally fled Goa and sought protection with Karaeng Tallo (KA 1157h:409v). Although the ties between Goa and Tallo were very close and could indeed be characterized as a twin-kingdom, there were nevertheless still two principal and natural centres of power: one with Karaeng Goa and the other with Karaeng Tallo.

Arung Palakka consulted with his nobles and then sent this reply to Karaeng Lengkese. They would all be very happy to have peace and calm in the land. Insofar as the old treaty between Bone and Goa was concerned, it had been broken and “forgotten” by both sides. But if they

faithfully upheld the treaty recently concluded at Bungaya, then there would no longer be any problems between the two (KA 1157c:386r). This reply was also couched in traditional terms and clarified the relationships between Bone and Goa. The blame was not laid at the footsteps of either kingdom, but instead *together* they had “broken” and “forgotten” the treaty. What was stressed was the fact that the abandonment of the treaty was a joint decision, thereby avoiding mutual recriminations and spiritual retribution which usually accompanied a “broken” treaty. In place of the old treaty they urged the Makassar leaders to adopt the Bungaya treaty in the same manner as other previous South Sulawesi treaties.

When Arung Palakka brought Karaeng Lengkesè's letter to Speelman, the latter immediately suspected a plot by Karaeng Karunrung to drive a wedge between Arung Palakka and the Dutch (KA 1157c:386r). Speelman ignored, or possibly found incredulous, rumours of secret meetings between certain Makassar nobles and Arung Palakka during the war. While he reported to Batavia all talk of factions and power struggles within the Goa court, he himself appeared to have discounted the possibility of one of the factions secretly approaching Arung Palakka. But the bitterness within the Goa court which increased with each setback in the battlefield severely strained relations between the factions. In peacetime divergent opinions were tolerated; in war such opinions bred suspicion and even open conflict. The tension in the Goa court had become so intolerable that the faction led by Karaeng Tallo had decided to approach Arung Palakka directly in hopes of ending the war quickly before the Makassar kingdoms were irreparably destroyed. Karaeng Tallo's peaceful intentions were later confirmed by his sister, wife of Kaicili' Kalimata. She told the Dutch that at about 14th June Sultan Hasanuddin and Karaeng Karunrung had come personally to confer with Karaeng Tallo about making peace with the Company. According to her account, Karaeng Tallo had told them that he wanted to have peace in the land again. Sultan Hasanuddin then was reported to have said that if a reconciliation were to be effected with the Company, he would consider it sacred and unbreakable (KA 1157d:398v-399r). However, no agreement appeared to have been reached by the two factions, and Karaeng Tallo, Lengkesè, and Agangnionjo (Tanete) soon declared their neutrality in the fighting. Karaeng Tallo's fear of reprisals made him seek Dutch protection which came in the form of a personal bodyguard of five Europeans and sixty Ternate soldiers and two ships to guard the mouth of the Tallo River (Macleod 1900:1291).

The Dutch-Bugis forces were further buoyed by news of reinforcements being sent from Batavia and by the arrival of the long-awaited Bone allies at Segeri. The Bone troops had burned Segeri, which had remained loyal to Goa, killing 100 defenders and taking another forty prisoner. Tosa'děng, son of Datu Soppeng, was sent with 230 of his trusted men, of which 120 were equipped with muskets, lead and gunpowder, on Dutch ships to join this Bone force. Three days prior to their departure, Goa sent reinforcements to Segeri and burned Lipukasi. The ships which had brought the Bone troops withdrew for fear that some of the areas which had been recently taken would again support Goa. With the opportune arrival of Tosa'děng and Bugis reinforcements, the various areas which had been vacillating finally joined the Bugis despite the presence of the Makassar troops with their 100 musketeers. Although Karaeng Tanete came to side with Arung Palakka, his son joined Goa with his father's knowledge and perhaps even with his blessings.³

When the Dutch ships returned to Makassar, they brought a message from Tosa'děng that on 20th June the allies had seized three Makassar forts under the command of Karaeng Paranggi and had taken sixty heads. They were now planning to cross over the mountains to attack Bulo-Bulo. After the victory Karaeng Tanete presented Tosa'děng with thirty taels or 980 gold *mas* which had been sent to him by Sultan Hasanuddin to gain his loyalty. But fear of the Bugis had convinced him to reject this offer and present it instead to Tosa'děng. Signs of Goa's attempts to prop up its sagging alliances with riches now that it could no longer do it with force were evident also in Selayar. Various Makassar envoys had been sent to the island with gifts and promises to the Selayar lords to prevent them from joining the Bugis and the Dutch (KA 1157d: 398r; Macleod 1900:1293). But the obvious superiority of the Bugis-Dutch alliance provided a much more convincing argument to rulers that Goa no longer had the military, political, or spiritual support to maintain its position of supremacy in South Sulawesi. There were signs of its decline, and many of the kingdoms began readjusting their positions in the local hierarchy of states in relation to the rise of this new power.

The arrival of Bone troops and their victories in Segeri, so close to Goa's borders, had a sobering effect on the Goa government. At its request a three-day ceasefire was arranged on 14 July 1668 so that it could consult its allies about a general peace. When the time expired, it again asked and was granted another four to five days extension. The lack of any sign of progress annoyed the Dutch who finally decided in council on the 20th to reject all further Makassar "frivolous pretexts" for

continuing the ceasefire and to refuse to receive any more letters from the Goa government. Although the ceasefire had begun on a hopeful note, the Dutch became aware of a growing intransigence among Goa's leaders. Speelman attributed much of this change of attitude to the influence of Karaeng Karunrung. He even believed a rumour that Karaeng Karunrung had once said Makassar would never be right again until the Christians had been removed (KA 1157h:409r).

On the 18th two messengers arrived from Timurung bringing letters from Arumpone La Ma'darëmmëng and his son Daeng Pabila. The contents of these letters revealed one of the principal reasons for Goa's new hostile attitude. La Ma'darëmmëng had sent two or three separate missions to Arung Matoa Wajo La Tënrilai Tosenngëng asking him to observe their mutual treaty. These approaches were rejected by La Tënrilai in favour of the appeals made by Sultan Hasanuddin through two separate missions. In these letters from Goa, Sultan Hasanuddin explained that without Wajo's help his kingdom would be in a lamentable state. He urged Wajo to attack Soppeng in order to draw the Bone troops away from Segeri and surrounding areas and hence relieve the pressure on Goa's troops. Faced with two rival powers urging Wajo to remember its treaty obligations to each of them, La Tënrilai made his assessment and decided that Wajo's welfare lay with Goa. Despite his decision to support Goa, he was unable to prevent two of Wajo's areas, Timurung and Pammana, from joining Bone (KA 1157h:415v-416r). But when Goa forces came to support Wajo, Pammana once again reverted to its former relationship with Wajo (KA 1157g:435r). Some of the more powerful political units or principalities had disagreed with the kingdom's assessment of where the true political power lay and had decided to take an independent course of action to preserve their own interests.

In addition to Wajo's continuing loyalty to Goa, Bulo-Bulo sent 1,000 men to Makassar, and Mandar promised to carry on the war in the north. At about 20th July news reached Makassar that the Mandar forces had arrived by ship at Pare-Pare and were planning to build a fort there. The local Bugis succeeded in frustrating this attempt, and so the Mandar forces of about 1,000 men, among whom was Karaeng Bontomarannu, went to Lero, on the tip of the peninsula jutting into the bay, to continue their harassment (KA 1157h:416r-v).

The Mandar venture typified the sporadic nature of the fighting which occurred in the early months after the resumption of the war. The first major confrontation came on 5th August when Makassar troops feigned

a movement to Tallo and then turned toward Arung Palakka's stronghold at Bontoala. Some twenty-five to thirty "banners", indicating units under a particular *karaeng*, besieged Bontoala and established themselves in a hamlet to the east of it. An advanced guard of 300 to 400 men coming from Tallo engaged the Bugis and Dutch, and the battle went on with varying intensity until midday. Karaeng Layo informed the Dutch that the Makassar troops were planning a massive attack that same day and so the Dutch passed the information on to Arung Palakka with instructions that he should do nothing until he received further word from Fort Rotterdam. Unable to countenance the presence of Makassar units in the woods so close to Bontoala, Arung Palakka ignored his instruction and sortied out with some hand-picked men. The Makassar troops offered little resistance and retreated, pursued by Arung Palakka and his men for about half the distance of the field before the latter returned to their fortification. Some time later Arung Palakka and his men again attacked some Makassar groups in the open fields, but this time they found themselves in the woods surrounded by the enemy. From all sides came the Makassar warriors, including the various units which had previously been on the other side of Bontoala. It had been a well-planned ambush, and if it had not been for some 300 reinforcements sent from Fort Rotterdam to distract the Makassar attack, Arung Palakka would have been killed. The Ternate musketeers who had been assigned by Speelman to protect Arung Palakka maintained a steady stream of fire into the Makassar ranks and succeeded in extricating Arung Palakka and his men from the woods. Later when Speelman reproached Arung Palakka for having taken such a risk, the latter replied that he had not suspected such tactics from the enemy and that in the future he would not contravene orders. But Speelman was not all convinced that Arung Palakka would become more manageable despite these words. In a letter to Batavia he characterized Arung Palakka as someone who was too much his own boss and most cunning when he acted compulsively upon seeing anyone he loved wounded or in danger (KA 1157g:431r-432r; Macleod 1900:1293).

Throughout the day the Makassar forces spread out into the areas east, north, and south of Fort Rotterdam. Only the sea to the west was open to the Dutch. To Speelman's annoyance the Makassar troops re-occupied many of the fortified positions which should have been destroyed in compliance with the provisions of the Bungaya Treaty. The expected attack finally came, and it was an ambitious one aimed at Fort Rotterdam itself. Some 1,000 men were involved in the first assault,

mainly Malays and men from Wajo. Eventually they were forced to retreat, dragging their wounded away with them. They were heard to complain bitterly about the cowardice of the Makassar warriors who had not participated in the fighting and had no wish to do so (KA 1157g: 431v). Although the Makassar fighting men were admired by the Dutch and greatly feared by the Bugis, the deep division in the Goa government concerning not only the conduct but also the continuance of the war affected the resolve of the fighting men. Unlike in the beginning of the war when differences of opinion had not been allowed to hamper the war effort, now the differences had been too great to ignore. The Makassar Malays had fought loyally for the ruler of Goa, and they expected as much from the Makassar people. They were understandably bitter when they believed that the Makassar leaders were contemplating surrendering to the enemy. This bitterness, mentioned in Company reports at the time, is reflected in a Makassar manuscript of unknown provenance written by Makassar Malays concerning their history in South Sulawesi (L-24:4). The Wajo people, too, recall the brave and loyal response of their Arung Matoa La Těnrilai Tosenngěng. When he was informed by Sultan Hasanuddin that Sombaopu had fallen and that Wajo should now look after its own welfare, “. . . tears came into La Těnrilai’s eyes, his upper arm became tense as he pressed down upon the handle of his keris and said: ‘Ten thousand men from Wajo accompanied me here [to Makassar]. Let them all die before Goa is taken (L-4: unpag., section 23).’” These sentiments of loyalty from both the people of Wajo and from the Malays were so deeply felt at the time that they were commemorated in later reconstructions of this war.

Goa’s successful campaigns in the interior were a marked contrast to the difficulties it faced against Arung Palakka and the Dutch in the west. The Makassar forces under Syahbandar Daeng Makkulle⁴, joined by a thousand men from Wajo and Lamuru, marched through Soppeng burning as they went. There was no Bugis army in Soppeng and so the people fled to Tanete and Segeri where the Bugis troops were gathered under Arung Belo Tosa’děng. The latter had under his command an estimated 2,000 men from Soppeng with 180 guns plus another 1,000 men from Bone with eighty muskets. He urged the Dutch to send a ship to lie off the coast as a deterrent against any Makassar attack from the rear while he brought his men into battle. Without this ship he was afraid to leave behind the women and children since the Mandar forces still present at Lero could come by sea and attack their position. He complained of the

faint-heartedness of Daeng Memang, commander of the Bone troops at Soppeng's border, whose timidity had resulted in so much bloodshed among the people of Soppeng. In view of this he requested that a new commander be placed over the Bone troops. One of the princes from Soppeng who was among the refugees reported that the Wajo troops had not touched a single area in Bone, and that Daeng Pabila had remained at Timurung and had in no way "inconvenienced" his Bone troops to protect Soppeng. Confirmation of this report came from Karaeng Tanete and Datu Soppeng who had fled to safety to Palakka in Bone. They described the destruction of all the lowlands of Soppeng to the very foot of the mountains (KA 1157g: 434r-v).⁵ Relations between Soppeng and Bone were becoming strained, but the sheer magnetism of Arung Palakka, who could fortunately claim origins from both Bone and Soppeng, was sufficient to convince these two Bugis allies to bury their differences and reunite for their important task of humbling Goa.

The Dutch acted immediately upon Tosa'děng's request for a ship. The very next morning the *Meliskerk* was sent to Tanete to remain offshore and later to transport the Soppeng troops to a specified place in Maros. Maros had earlier warmly welcomed a Bugis delegation and expressed its readiness to join the allies against its overlord Goa. In a meeting with five of the most important men in Maros, the delegation was assured that if the Bugis were to land at a designated place, the Maros forces would join them. Their only request was that the Bugis refrain from plundering their land (KA 1157g:433v-435v).

On 11th and 12th August, Goa troops in Makassar came out of their fortifications mainly to taunt the Bugis and the Dutch. Meanwhile they had despatched a sizeable army northward where it was divided with one half proceeding to Maros and the other to Siang. So vital was Maros considered by the Goa government that the elite bodyguard of Sultan Hasanuddin, one of the Sultan's sons, and the best part of the Malays were included in this expedition. At Siang the Makassar forces attacked with great fury on 12th August with cannons and smaller guns but were defeated with a loss of sixty-five heads "plus the bodies on the battlefield with their heads still on". In Maros the Makassar forces were also forced to retreat by 14th August. Some 5,000 Bugis then marched on to Goa while another 2,000 remained behind to safeguard their victory in Maros. Arung Palakka was justifiably pleased with the performance of his Bugis. He told Speelman that "this was what made soldiers out of men and once a Bugis became a soldier he scorns all enemies and danger". To encourage similar efforts among their allies, the Dutch

praised and rewarded the Bugis leaders involved in the victories (KA 1157g:435r-436v; Macleod 1900:1294).

The Bugis success in Siang and Maros made a strong impression on Turatea, which now promised to side with the allies. But when only about 150 men came to join the Dutch and their allies by mid-October, there arose a general scepticism about Turatea's sincerity. Sultan Hasanuddin, meanwhile, sent Karaeng Ballo and Karaeng Laikang to Turatea to bring Goa's vacillating erstwhile ally back to its camp. But such efforts proved futile since it was generally acknowledged that the war was going badly for Goa, and rumours were rife that the Makassar forces were already considering either fighting and dying at their posts or fleeing to the mountains. Sultan Hasanuddin, so it was rumoured, wanted peace, but Karaeng Karunrung supported by the Malays urged continued resistance. The Malays were to have said quite bluntly: "When we can no longer do anymore nor defend ourselves then is it time enough to seek peace" (KA 1157i:440v-443v).

On 12 October 1668 the Dutch-Bugis forces defeated the Goa army in a large battle in Makassar. This victory, which Speelman believed could have been the decisive engagement of the war if the Dutch-Bugis side had pursued their advantage, was marred by the death in battle of Arung Belo Tosa'děng. He was the eldest and the most beloved son of Datu Soppeng La Těnribali and a close companion of Arung Palakka. Speelman paid tribute to his bravery in his inimitable fashion: "This prince was among the most valiant among the Bugis, but careless, negligent, and undisciplined" (KA 1157i:442r). Tosa'děng's death was a severe blow to Bugis morale, but its political impact in South Sulawesi was not to surface until two decades later when the question of the succession to the Soppeng throne arose. On this occasion even in death Tosa'děng was to render his services to Arung Palakka.

Arung Belo' Tosa'děng captured the imagination of the Bugis and Makassar people because of his daring exploits and his faithfulness to Arung Palakka. In the *Sinrili'na Kappala' Tallumbatua*, Arung Belo is depicted as the younger brother of Arung Palakka, both of whom are made to be Goa princes. Toward the end of this tale, Arung Belo is killed by the Makassar warriors because of his role in aiding Arung Palakka in a war against their father, the ruler of Goa (L-32:148). In the Bugis communities to this day, tales abound of Arung Palakka and the faithful Arung Belo.

To add to the gloom pervading the allied camps, by the end of October 265 of a total of 557 Dutch soldiers lay ill in Fort Rotterdam. Without

further substantial Dutch troops to bolster the Bugis units, Speelman was not at all confident that they could maintain their positions. The Makassar forces burned all boats and houses up to the square fronting onto the Dutch lodge and were using the Chinese stone houses during the day to harass the Dutch and the Bugis. Speelman now requested more “force and power” from Batavia so he could bring the war to a successful end. Only with more aid did he believe it possible to dislodge the Malays “who with their firearms, have forcefully maintained the devotion of the people”. With the removal of the Malays and Karaeng Karunrung, Speelman predicted that peace would finally come to Makassar. Batavia, meanwhile, strongly urged Speelman to resume negotiations for peace with Goa. (KA 1157i:440v-441v, 445v-446r; Macleod 1900:1294).

Speelman’s assessment of the situation appeared to be borne out by reports from people fleeing from the Goa court. They claimed that Karaeng Karunrung had prevented any attempts by Sultan Hasanuddin and other leaders in the government to make peace. Affairs in Goa had reached such a state, so they said, that Karaeng Karunrung was now the sole power governing the kingdom with the title of “Raja Tua” (lit., old king; viceroy).⁶ He no longer consulted anyone and did whatsoever he pleased. Violently opposed to Karaeng Karunrung was Karaeng Tallo who wanted peace but now had little influence in the government. He himself was being watched and controlled by Daeng “Marouppa”, a supporter of Karaeng Karunrung. Despite earlier reports of the fierce antagonism of the Malays toward the Dutch, Speelman attempted to drive a wedge between the Malays and the Makassar leaders but discovered not with any great surprise that the Malays were “even more bitter enemies of the Company than the Makassar people themselves” (KA 1157j:450r, 455r-v).

Speelman reluctantly implemented orders from Batavia to resume peace negotiations on 6 November 1668. Goa however, used the period of the negotiations to reaffirm its ties with its former allies. On 16th November it unilaterally terminated the talks and four days later launched a successful offensive north of Makassar, recapturing from the Bugis the areas of Maros, Labakkang, Siang, Barru, Segeri, and some other territories lost earlier in the war. The Dutch did not credit this victory to the cunning or bravery of the Makassar forces but preferred to comfort Batavia that “the negligence and accursed timidity of the Bugis” were responsible for the debacle. Dutch reinforcements to Maros and Turatea succeeded in helping the Bugis regain the lost territory, but

Labakkang remained in Makassar hands (KA 1161a:618v-619r).

The changing fortunes of the war highlighted one crucial point that, while Sombaopu remained as a symbol of Goa's greatness, the Makassar forces would not surrender. The presence of Sultan Hasanuddin and the court within Sombaopu's walls served as a focus of loyalty to the widely-scattered Makassar forces. As long as it remained unviolated, the people believed all was right in the kingdom. It is significant that when the Bugis *lontara*' talk about the defeat of Goa, they speak of the fall of Sombaopu.⁷ With full awareness of the significance of Sombaopu, Speelman had prepared for the final assault on that royal citadel. He moved his main headquarters from Fort Rotterdam to a new fortification called *Majennang* on the shore, and later in May 1669 to another newly-constructed fort named *Jacatra* on the banks of the Garassi River (Macleod 1900:1294).

With the end of the west monsoon, the Dutch-Bugis forces launched several successful attacks on 14 and 15 April 1669 and drove off all Makassar resistance north of Sombaopu. The Bugis sensed the impending defeat of Goa and carried on nightly raids for plunder with impunity into Makassar territory. By the end of April some 150 people, mostly women and children, had been seized from Goa, along with about 400 buffaloes. The Makassar people taken by the Bugis were starving and in a miserable state with only animal hide to clothe their naked bodies. The Dutch blockade at sea, the conquest of many of the Makassar rice-growing areas, and the continual Bugis raids into Goa were having a serious effect on food supplies to Goa and its allies. On Selayar half the population of that island had already succumbed to hunger. The people were reduced to eating leaves, banana trunks, mango pits, and rice chaff. Those who still had some strength cut down sago palms to make sago. The same situation prevailed in many of the Makassar-held areas. From prisoners and fugitives came reports that large numbers of the Makassar people had been killed by gunfire, but an even greater number had died of hunger and sickness. Believing that the end of the war was near, many of the Makassar Malays had already fled to Mandar, Pasir, Bima, and elsewhere (KA 1157:452v; KA 1161a:620r-622r). The time had come, and both sides were now poised for the final battle of Sombaopu.

In preparation for the assault on the heavily-fortified citadel, Speelman had a tunnel dug secretly under one of the walls where the attack was to take place. When the tunnel was completed, Speelman had a great feast prepared to which he invited all the friendly lords and nobles with

their families. The feast began on 11th June and lasted till the morning of the 13th. On that day with great secrecy the tunnel was filled with gunpowder and then sealed until the attack was sounded. The night before, the traditional South Sulawesi oath-giving ceremonies were held as was customary before a major battle. All the Bugis warriors had risen separately and in groups as large as a hundred to *manngaru*. They sprang up and shouted their allegiance to their leader and the Dutch: "With tears in their eyes and with krisses unsheathed . . . they swore to defeat Sombaopu or die." For the battle of Sombaopu it was originally estimated that there would be 1,200 to 1,500 Bugis, 461 men from Ternate, Tidore, Bacan, Butung, and Pampanga (from northern Luzon in the Philippines), and 111 Dutchmen. A close count later showed that there were more like 2,000 Bugis and 572 others, including eighty-three Dutch soldiers and eleven Dutch sailors. The Bugis were divided by Speelman into six separate companies. Among those who were with Arung Palakka were Arung Kaju, Arung Mampu, Daeng Malewa, and some Makassar nobles. The Bugis under Arung Palakka were instructed to go with a strong force to clear the eastern side of Sombaopu from all Makassar defenders and to attack and burn Tana-Tana and Bontokeke.⁸ The others, meanwhile, were to attempt to breach Sombaopu's walls. Three small Dutch ships and a sloop were to sail up the Garassi River and attack Sombaopu from the south (KA 1161b:633v-638v; Macleod 1900:1294-5).

The assault began at about 6 p.m. on 14 June 1669 with the igniting of the explosives placed in the secret tunnel. The blast created a breach about 27½ metres wide in one of Sombaopu's 3½ metres thick red brick walls. As soon as the Makassar defenders realized what had happened, some twenty-five warriors jumped through the breach to beat back the first attackers, while others began erecting wooden stakes to shut off the hole. At first the Dutch fortification *Jacatra* aimed its guns at this activity, but Speelman soon had it stopped so that the attack could be resumed. While Speelman gathered his forces, Sombaopu was reinforced by Makassar troops arriving from Goa under Karaeng Karunrung.

The next evening battle was joined with even greater fury than the day before, as is graphically related in one of Speelman's reports:

They [the Sombaopu defenders] fought with fire and stones; they defended themselves with spears; they surged forward strongly pushing against one another, and with bamboos they seized the muzzles of the guns and muskets so that these had to be freed by using swords and daggers. There was no lack of arrows and poison darts; firepots flew

unceasingly back and forth, and many of our own were heaved back by the enemy not without causing damage. It hailed musketballs on both sides, and the cannons directed their thunderous fire continually into the breach. Grenades from heavy mortars were also fired and made as favourable an impression as could be desired. All of this brought forth such wonderful music that it was difficult to know, to believe, that it had been such a terrible night, whose sounds even old soldiers perhaps in Europe itself could not often have heard. From our side there were no less than 5-6,000 pounds of gunpowder used on land alone, and some 30,000 musketballs fired, in addition to 200 firepots and sixty to seventy grenades. There had not been the least break, and only between 2 and 3 a.m. did the enemy, who had gathered a strong force within, take a short breathing spell. But not a quarter-hour had gone by when it began again with even greater ferocity than before . . . at about 4 o'clock they stormed out in a great wrath, and notwithstanding the continuous cannon fire into the breach, a group came out from the flanks . . . and the battle continued until morning but Sombaopu remained in the hands of the Makassar forces (KA 1161b:639r-v).

Although Speelman was convinced that Sombaopu would fall, he declared that nothing like this had ever happened before in the Makassar lands, and he had never believed that the enemy would offer as much opposition as it did. He called it "the heaviest encounter we have ever had during the entire existence of his commission". By midday of 17th June the attackers had suffered fifty dead and sixty-eight wounded, among whom were several Dutch and native officers. On the 19th it began to rain, and it rained for six whole days. By the evening of the 22nd, Arung Palakka grew restless and decided to take action. He led his Bugis plus some Bacan and Ambon soldiers under Arung Bakkë to enter the breach in the wall, which had been barricaded by the Makassar defenders. After some fierce fighting the Makassar warriors abandoned the breach, and streamed the Bugis and their allies. Despite the rain the Bugis set aflame as much as they could, thereby forcing the Makassar forces to retreat from the eastern and western bastions of the citadel and to re-establish their defences at the southern half of Sombaopu. One of the cannons named *Anak Mangkasar* (Child of Makassar), which was the pride of the defenders, was heaved over the side of the northwestern bastion during the retreat. As the Dutch-Bugis army advanced from the west, word arrived that Sombaopu had been abandoned, and the Makassar forces had fled to Goa and to the Garassi River. Sultan Hasanuddin had not wanted to leave so quickly but the flames, fanned by a strong northwesterly wind, had finally persuaded him to go. Though many of the Makassar forces escaped when the Bugis entered the breach,

Karaeng Karunrung remained in the palace surrounded by his followers who, with drawn krisses, defied anyone to enter. All those in the mosque had been driven out, and only the Malay wife of Datu Soppeng, all of her children, and some eighty of her retinue remained. Among her children was the eldest boy who had often boasted that Sultan Hasanuddin had promised to make him ruler of Soppeng when the war was won. He had even sworn that he would bring his father's (Datu Soppeng's) and Arung Palakka's heads to Sultan Hasanuddin's feet or die in the attempt (KA 1161b:664r-645v; Macleod 1900:1295-6).

Confusion reigned after the fall of Sombaopu, and pillaging was rampant. Speelman estimated that no less than 7-8,000 Bugis were on the move seizing booty, and he was convinced that the only authority they responded to was threats from their own leaders. By the time Speelman and Arung Palakka arrived at the Sultan's residence it had already been stripped bare. There were two Bugis sitting in the courtyard examining their booty. When they saw Arung Palakka, they immediately offered him what they had assembled. Arung Palakka refused and the men resumed their division of the spoils (KA 1161b:648v). Although Speelman was quick to condemn what appeared to him to be wanton, even frenetic, pillaging by the Bugis, he did note that the Bugis continued to respond to their leaders. The two Bugis dividing the spoils in the Sultan's courtyard had not lost all sense of discipline but were merely conducting themselves in an acceptable manner in South Sulawesi warfare. They understood that the first choice of any booty was reserved to their lord, and so when Arung Palakka appeared they offered him what they had assembled. Arung Palakka's concern that his men receive what was entitled to them in warfare was made evident to Speelman from early on. After the signing of the Bungaya Treaty in November 1667, Arung Palakka was rewarded by a number of valuable gifts by the Company. During the celebrations that evening he divided these gifts among his nobles and then distributed some 800 *rijksdaalders* borrowed from the Company among his best people (KA 1157a:323v). Arung Palakka's ability to fulfil his obligations to those serving him would have been a contributing factor to his rapidly growing army and steadily rising fame as a leader with *upě'*.

Speelman, however, viewed the plundering with great distaste and ordered all the booty to be gathered in one spot and guarded with armed men. Since Speelman was acknowledged as the Supreme Commander of the allies, Arung Palakka reluctantly agreed to this unexpected development. Later he approached Speelman to ask permission for his people to

continue looting since it was his responsibility as leader to allow his men to reap the benefits of warfare, as would have been expected of the enemy had he been victorious. There was no moral judgement implied in the act of looting after or even during a battle, for this was an expected norm. The hope for booty was a strong immediate incentive for native troops in warfare and a major reason for the tendency of native battles to transform quickly into individual raiding parties. Each leader was expected to provide his men with the opportunity for material rewards in the fighting, and even more so if these rewards were in the form of enemy property. Speelman, however, was unwilling to subscribe to this traditional South Sulawesi practice, and he remarked that "his [Arung Palakka's] discretion in such things is very small" (KA 1161b:649r).

The amount of goods seized was enormous. Every Bugis appeared to be weighted down with booty, with the most sought-after items being porcelain and copperwork. Even a warehouse full of goods guarded by Daeng Manompo', a trusted follower of Arung Palakka, was pillaged. To keep his word with Speelman, Arung Palakka sent Arung Kaju with some of the Toangke to recover the goods. They returned the plundered items which were immediately placed under the personal supervision of these loyal Toangke. Only a fire prevented the Bugis from seizing more booty, but throughout it all Speelman noted that no one had as little as Arung Palakka (KA 1161b:649r-652r).

After the conquest of Sombaopu the Dutch made certain that it would never again be used as a major fortification. All the guns found on the ramparts were thrown down and the walls facing northward and seaward and the sea bastions were destroyed. The amount of weapons captured by the Dutch gives some notion of Goa's arsenal. There were thirty-three cannons weighing about 46,000 lbs and eleven weighing about 24,000 lbs, 145 small guns, eighty-three gun chambers, two stone-throwers, sixty muskets, twenty-three arquebuses, 127 barrels of muskets, and some 8,483 bullets (Macleod 1900:1296-7). It was this impressive array of Sombaopu's firepower so effectively employed which made the conquest of this citadel one of the most difficult campaigns the Company had ever undertaken in the East.

Five days before the fall of Sombaopu, Sultan Hasanuddin abdicated in favour of his son I Mappasomba ("to conquer") because it was believed that the new ruler with his propitious name would change the course of the war (KA 1161b:658v). Others, however, claimed that since Sultan Hasanuddin realized that the defeat of the kingdom was unavoidable, he

decided to remove himself from the government and thus be dissociated from the defeat (KA 1161b:660r). Sultan Hasanuddin had ruled Goa when it was still the most powerful and widely-respected kingdom in all of Eastern Indonesia. Having reigned in the time of Goa's greatness, he refused to be remembered as the ruler who also presided over its destruction.

With the economic and political demise of Goa, Bone emerged as the leading kingdom in South Sulawesi. The Makassar War is therefore treated in Bugis sources as a high point in Bone's history when the kingdom regained its honour. These sources recall the humiliation of the years from 1643 to 1667 when Bone was without a ruler, a situation not lightly forgotten by these historically-conscious Bugis-Makassar peoples. The word translated as "chronicle" in English means literally "The Story of the Ancestors" (in Bugis *attoriolong* and in Makassar *patturioloang*), the ancestors being the former rulers of the kingdom. One reason for the writing of these stories, says one Makassar chronicler, is so that others may not despise them for having no rulers (Abdurrahim & Wolhoff n.d.:9). It is, therefore, with pride that the Bone sources describe how their people won a great victory over Goa with the help of the Dutch and regained their rulers and their *siri'*. The Dutch appear as secondary players in the rivalry between Bone and Goa which extended over a century and culminated in the Makassar War of 1666-9.

Those Bone-Soppeng leaders most responsible for the victory entered a pantheon of heroes whose names and exploits were preserved by village storytellers and whose attributed sayings became enshrined among those of the sages of old in court documents. The Toangke, the faithful followers of Arung Palakka who had shared his long exile, were honoured by the community with a special status which persisted into the 20th century.⁹ Arung Belo Tosa'dëng, the closest companion of Arung Palakka, is recalled with fondness in Bone-Soppeng sources and is made a son of Karaeng Goa and brother of Arung Palakka in a Makassar village tale (L-32:15). But the greatest praise is reserved for Arung Palakka who is apotheosized by the Bone-Soppeng people for what was considered a miraculous deed. So powerful had Goa been in the 17th century that many in South Sulawesi scoffed at the idea of a Dutch military expedition pitted against that mighty kingdom. Yet the Dutch dared to test their strength against Goa, the "fighting cock of the East", and emerged victorious. The shock and incomprehension among the South Sulawesi peoples which accompanied the successes of the Dutch were cushioned by a comforting explanation that the victory was attri-

butable to one man and his *upě*'. That man was Arung Palakka. And so the legend grew even during Arung Palakka's lifetime, thus contributing to the efficacy of his overlordship in South Sulawesi.

But Arung Palakka did not reign alone; he shared both honour and authority with the Dutch East India Company. The latter added a new element and greater complexity to the affairs of the island. With the Company now established as a permanent power in South Sulawesi, the politics of the area became ineluctably entwined in the Company's wider strategic considerations beyond Sulawesi's shores. In the past a South Sulawesi ruler with pretensions to overlordship could perhaps contemplate an alliance with the rulers of Mataram, Banten, or Aceh. Now that the Company had become a potential ally, such considerations as wars in Europe or wars in the Asian countries where the major Company factories were located, had also become relevant. It was soon apparent that, he who was best able to assess the Company's concerns and to avail himself of the Company's good wishes and even military power when necessary, would be able to rise above all others. The Makassar War had made the Company a power *in*, but not *of*, South Sulawesi. It was this subtle difference which Arung Palakka recognized and manipulated to create one of the most successful overlordships in the history of the area.

CHAPTER VI

THE NEW OVERLORDS

The fall of Sombaopu on 24 June 1669 symbolized to many people in South Sulawesi the beginning of a new era in the affairs of the peninsula. Goa, once considered invincible by Christians and Moslems alike, lay shattered and powerless before its new conquerors: the Dutch East India Company and Arung Palakka. The unexpected overwhelming support which Arung Palakka received from the Bone and Soppeng people combined with the firepower of the Dutch proved too strong even for the mighty Goa armies. It was readily conceded by both the Dutch and the Bugis leaders that without the other, neither would have been able to achieve such startling success. Even after the fall of Sombaopu the new overlords relied heavily upon one another, believing that any weakness in one would have disastrous consequences on the other. It was this concern which helped preserve the alliance through some difficult periods in the 17th century and enabled Arung Palakka to become the most powerful prince in South Sulawesi.

For both the Company and Arung Palakka the highest priority now that the fighting had ended was the reaffirmation of the Bungaya Treaty. For the Company the treaty was a legal document, according to European "International" Law, which would justify its newly acquired privileges in the area to powers both within and outside South Sulawesi. But for Arung Palakka the treaty was a symbolic document which, according to South Sulawesi treaty practices, confirmed the new hierarchy of power on the island. The first of the defeated kingdoms to reaffirm the treaty was Tallo on 15 July 1669, followed by Goa on 27 July 1669. There had been a delay in Goa because of the illness of the new Karaeng Goa I Mappasomba Sultan Amir Hamzah. But finally on 27th July he arrived in Fort Rotterdam accompanied by Karaeng Popo, Karaeng Bisei, Karaeng Galesong, Karaeng Ballo, Karaeng Mandalle, Karaeng Laikang, Gallarang Manngasa Kare Tumpa, Karaeng Sanrabone, as well as five *gallarang* from Sanrabone. As with other previous delegations from different South Sulawesi states, they lay down their weapons, swore on the Koran, and made an oath which was solemnized

by the drinking of water stirred with a kris (KA 1161c:693v).

The formal submission of Goa and Tallo was an important, though merely the first, step in re-establishing the authority of the new overlords. There still remained the defiant allies of Goa and Tallo who were theoretically still at war with the Company and Arung Palakka. On 1 August 1669, a little over a month after the fall of Sombaopu, Wajo and Lamuru went into battle against the Dutch and Arung Palakka at Tanete and were decisively defeated. Speelman, believing that this battle would have convinced all former allies of the futility of further resistance, sent an envoy with a letter on 29th August offering Wajo pardon for its role in the war. But the envoy was barred from crossing the Cenrana River into Wajo (KA 1161c:695r-v). Only after several months did Wajo finally agree to accept a letter from the Company (KA 1166b:1043v). The situation, however, remained unchanged. It was reported that the young Karaeng Goa, Sultan Amir Hamzah, had sent Karaeng Jarannika to Wajo to encourage its people to continue to resist and to prevent any movement of Bone Bugis through Wajo. Despite its recent reaffirmation of the Bungaya Treaty, Goa was said to have even offered assistance to Wajo (KA 1166c:1047r-v).

Throughout the first half of 1670 Wajo continued to ignore or defy any demands by the Company and Arung Palakka to surrender. Finally, on 7th August Arung Palakka led his Bugis army from Bontoala northward to Tanete, then overland eastward to Bone. He had chosen this new route, instead of following the traditional one northward to Bacukiki and Pare-Pare and then eastward to Wajo, because he believed it to be quicker and easier. A rendezvous had been arranged with the Bugis forces from Bone and Luwu before the planned coordinated invasion of Wajo. But before undertaking the formidable task of besieging the walled capital city of Tosora in Wajo, the army proceeded to the principality of Lamuru to punish it for its former support of Goa.

Lamuru was typical of a number of principalities large and small in South Sulawesi in aligning itself with whichever kingdom it considered to be most powerful. It had assessed the political situation and had become an ally of Goa in the 17th century. The unexpected arrival of the Company fleet in 1666, and the even more unforeseen explosion of fervour exhibited by the Company's Bugis allies flocking to Arung Palakka's banners, had drastically changed the political situation almost overnight. Lamuru had had little time to make the necessary assessment and adjustment to the new situation. Now it was too late as the triumphant Bugis armies under Arung Palakka marched to Lamuru seeking as

much enrichment from, as punishment of, a vanquished foe. At the approach of the invading army, Datu Lamuru fled to safety to the mountains where he remained while his land was stripped and burned. Eventually he abandoned his mountain redoubt and surrendered to Arung Palakka. After swearing allegiance to Arung Palakka, Datu Lamuru brought his 3,000 man army to join the military expedition against Wajo. While Lamuru's voluntary surrender saved it from being levied the traditional fine (*sěbbu kati*) by the conquering army, it did not prevent looting and the forcible seizure of the inhabitants. What prevented a total devastation of the countryside was Lamuru's decision to make Arung Palakka the Datu Lamuru on the death of the present aged Datu. Such an arrangement was not contrary to the customs of Lamuru, for there existed an old agreement among the principalities of Bengo, Mario, and Lamuru in Soppeng that if there were no qualified candidates for ruler in any of these states, they would be sought from the other two. Since Arung Palakka was also Datu Mario, he became theoretically eligible to rule in Lamuru if there were no qualified successors to the Lamuru throne (KA 1171a:738r). Arung Palakka was later able to arrange matters to show that there was no one fit to succeed in Lamuru and therefore prepare the way for his election.

When news of the victory in Lamuru and the approach of a large Bugis army reached Wajo, the principalities of Pammana and Peneki quickly changed allegiances. They abandoned their overlord Wajo and joined Arung Palakka, swelling his army still further to about 40,000 men. As the army marched through Wajo, it met little resistance since many of the people had already fled to take refuge in Tosora. What remained of the settlements was pillaged and set to the torch. The march had been uneventful, but the real task was soon apparent when the army arrived at the well-fortified and well-supplied town of Tosora. A direct assault on the high walls was quickly rejected for the more practical and safer siege, even though it was reliably reported that there were sufficient supplies and weapons stockpiled in Tosora to last for some time. In the beginning there was sporadic fighting whenever there was a sally from Tosora, but otherwise there were no pitched battles. The siege, however, began to have an effect as the defenders, with no relief in sight, were subject to constant pressure from the besieging forces. On 2nd October five outer fortifications of Tosora had to be abandoned. Twice when Wajo troops ventured out into the battlefield they were soundly beaten and sent scattering back to the fortress. Arung Palakka now appeared confident that Wajo's leaders would ask for peace since he was aware that food was

now becoming scarce in Tosora. His forces, on the other hand, were being supplied by Dutch ships laden with rice from Bone and appeared capable of maintaining the siege indefinitely (KA 1166d:1052r-v; KA 1166e:1077r).

One explanation for Wajo's continued defiance came to light when several letters from Karaeng Karunrung to Wajo's leaders were intercepted. In these letters Karaeng Karunrung had urged Wajo to maintain its resistance to Arung Palakka and the Dutch. Similar professions of support came from Mandar which promised to come down from the north and attack Alitta, Bacukiki, and other areas under Arung Bakkë Todani, a leader held in great esteem by Arung Palakka. The attack was intended to divert men from the Wajo campaign and thereby weaken the siege of Tosora. To discourage such a plan, the Dutch sent ships to lie off Bacukiki ready to assist in repelling any attack from Mandar (KA 1171a:736v). While these letters from Goa and Mandar may have encouraged those besieged in Tosora, what had perhaps stiffened their resolve even more was fear of retribution from Arung Palakka. Wajo had rejected the traditional offer from Bone and Soppeng for a renewal of the Tëllumpocco treaty and had instead favoured their treaty with Goa. The fierce, almost fanatic, resistance of the Wajo defenders is noted in both the contemporary Dutch reports and in later Bugis chronicles from Wajo and Soppeng (L-1:66; L-3:323).

On 1 December 1670 after a three-month siege Arung Palakka and his army succeeded in capturing Tosora. During this period there were times when Arung Palakka despaired of ever being able to storm Tosora's heavily-defended walls. Regular arrivals of Dutch boats bringing both food and arms helped maintain the morale of the Bugis army throughout the long siege. What finally broke the stalemate were the Dutch cannons which slowly wore down the walls and the resolve of the defenders. Tosora's fall marked the end of all large-scale organized resistance in Wajo. On 23 December 1670 the whole government of Wajo, composed of the new Arung Matoa La Palili Tomalu Puanna Gëlla,¹ Ranrëng Tua, Ranrëng Talotëng, Arung Bettempola, plus other lesser lords, arrived in Fort Rotterdam. In a formal ceremony of surrender, the Wajo lords delivered their weapons to the Company's representative in Fort Rotterdam, President Maximilian de Jong. They then signed the Bungaya Treaty, and swore on the Koran to uphold it, and finally drank water stirred with a kris to demonstrate the seriousness with which the oath was made (KA 1171e:736v-737r).

According to the Dutch version of the treaty, the principal articles were:

1. The Wajo people, in accordance with the customs of the land, had fallen as prizes to the Company as a result of war. They, however, would be allowed to remain on the land, which was now a fief (*leen*)² of the Company.
2. On the death of an Arung Matoa, no new one would be chosen by the three electors [the Tëllulimpo, i.e., the lords of Tua, Talotëng, and Bettempola] and the people of Wajo without the approval and agreement of the Company.
3. All fortifications and fortified areas would be destroyed and new ones built only with the permission of the Company.
4. Wajo would not admit any Europeans or Indian nations (including Malays), nor receive any envoys or missions from them.
5. The people of Wajo would not be permitted to sail anywhere except to Bali, along the Java coast to Batavia, and Kalimantan, without obtaining a pass from the Company's representative in Fort Rotterdam. If any Wajo boats should be found at sea or anywhere outside the harbours without a pass they would be treated as enemies.
6. If any European official or subject of the Company should flee to Wajo, he should be returned immediately to the Chief Merchant of the Company in Fort Rotterdam.
7. Wajo is bound by everything to which the Makassar people agreed after the conquest of Sombaopu [See Chapter IV].
8. The Wajo people are to pay 52,000 *rijksdaalders* to the Company over four monsoon periods in gold, silver, or jewels (Heeres 1931d:426-430).

Wajo was made to pay a war indemnity of 52,000 *rijksdaalders* or 104,000 *mas*. In partial payment Wajo presented Arung Palakka with some gold and slaves amounting to 7,800 *mas* which Arung Palakka then delivered to the Company (KA 1171a:737v). When a Dutch envoy Laurens Vosch went to Wajo on 4 June 1671 to collect more of the indemnity, he was given only 700 *rijksdaalders*. The Wajo government claimed that it was unable to obtain any more from the impoverished people who had been plundered during the war and were even now daily harassed and robbed by outsiders (KA 1171b:737v). Wajo's *lontara*' describe this period as one of great suffering for the people. When the Bugis army began its invasion, all of Wajo's *palili*' north of the Walënnæ River went over to Bone, and only half of Gilirëng and half of Belawa remained faithful to Wajo (Noorduyn 1955:277).³

The fall of Tosora left many areas of Wajo vulnerable to the rapacity of Bone's armies. Examples cited by *lontara*' sources convey the humiliation and oppression suffered by the defeated people of Wajo. If a person from Bone took a fancy to anything belonging to someone from Wajo, he would simply seize it without compensation. If a Wajo man

were fishing and were ordered by someone from Bone to take him across Lake Tempe to Sidenreng, he had to do so without delay. If the former were to ask permission first to obtain food from home for the journey, he would be boxed in the ears. If he were to resist, he would be bound, and if he were to fight back, he would be killed. No one in Wajo was permitted to have metal implements of any kind, and so hoes (*sube*) were made from bones of the water buffalo (*tedong*). So intolerable did the situation become and so difficult to obtain redress from any source that many people of Wajo fled to Ujung Pandang, Sumbawa, Donggala (Central Sulawesi), Pasir (East Kalimantan), Johor, and elsewhere in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago (L-3:334-5, 343). Finally, in desperation Wajo appealed to its erstwhile enemy, the Dutch East India Company. The Company had successfully waged war against Goa and its allies, but once victory was attained, it had appeared content to oversee its affairs in the area from Fort Rotterdam. Unlike the Bone Bugis or Arung Palakka, the Company seemed unconcerned with the actual internal affairs of South Sulawesi kingdoms as long as there were no major upheavals to disrupt Company trade. This disinterested element of the new foreign overlord appeared at least a hope of more impartiality than would have been expected from Arung Palakka. An appeal, therefore, was made by Wajo to the Company leaders in Fort Rotterdam to restrain the excesses committed by Bone against its people. But it soon became apparent to the Dutch that winning a war was far less complex and difficult than establishing the peace. Despite Dutch admonitions to Arumpone and other Bone leaders to restrain their people, there was little change in the situation. The Dutch were finally forced to ask Arung Palakka to use his considerable influence among the Bugis to prevent further harassment of the Wajo people (KA 1171b:775r).

This was to be a recurrent pattern in the effective dual overlordship of the Company and Arung Palakka for the next quarter-century. The Company was principally occupied with the port of Makassar and its environs since it was here that international trade occurred and here that Fort Rotterdam maintained its links with the rest of the vast Asian trading network of the Company. Its field of vision was outward toward the sea, and it was content to relinquish control on land to Arung Palakka. The latter, on the other hand, while openly acknowledging the authority of the Company as "Lord of the Sea and Navigation" (Consideration 1708:2), regarded Makassar, the international trade, and the Company, as simply means toward establishing a respected and enduring overlordship *within* South Sulawesi. The complementary aims of these

two new overlords, plus the special expertise which each brought to his specific area of control, usually proved to be an effective and workable combination.

The discretionary powers allowed to either overlord in his special area of interest became apparent in the case of Wajo's complaint. The Company had conveyed this problem to Bone, but when nothing was accomplished it simply delegated the task to Arung Palakka. While the Company may have hoped for some solution, it refrained from dictating what course of action Arung Palakka should follow. The latter viewed the situation differently from the Company and therefore took steps which he believed most appropriate within the framework of asserting an effective overlordship within South Sulawesi. He, as much as the other victorious Bugis leaders, felt that Wajo had rejected all avenues to peace and now had to suffer the consequences. Arung Palakka himself was making certain that Wajo would never regain its former wealth through trade. He seized the mouth of the Cenrana River, which was Wajo's only access to the sea, and he made Timurung and Pitumpanua, the two areas bounded by this river, part of Bone (Staden ten Brink 1884:116). It was a period remembered with great bitterness by the Wajo people and made later "emancipation" in the early 18th century by Arung Sengkang all the more exciting and glorious. An almost identical situation existed in Wajo at that time as prevailed in Bone and Soppeng in the mid-17th century. The basic similarity of the reasons for Arung Palakka's and Arung Sengkang's flight from South Sulawesi and their role in the liberation of their homeland is striking and explains why they are both still considered to be legends in South Sulawesi (Noorduyn 1953:144-152; Zainal Abidin bin Farid 1975:1-31).

The one remaining ally of Goa left unpunished was Mandar. Many of the leading members of the Malay and Makassar community had fled northward to Mandar seeking what they realized could only be temporary refuge (KA 1171b:776r). Fortunately, international trade and Islam had increased contact and provided a commonality of interests in the whole Malay-Indonesian world, thus facilitating the movement and adaptation of people from one part of the archipelago to another. These refugees could therefore leave Sulawesi, seek protection from another Moslem lord, and adapt quite readily to a foreign but hospitable land. The Dutch began to fear that the continuing stream of people fleeing abroad from Mandar could in time prove a menace. Their large numbers were a threat to the weak coastal kingdoms in the archipelago and were an ever-ready source of manpower for those preying on

inter-island shipping for personal profit, adventure, or political revenge. While this concern may have been the Company's principal reason for advocating action against Mandar, for Arung Palakka it was Mandar's defiance of his authority as overlord in South Sulawesi.

On 6 October 1671 a combined Dutch-Bugis military expedition left Makassar for Mandar. In the two months prior to the expedition, Arung Palakka had gone to Bone and succeeded in obtaining its promise to dispatch troops to meet the contingent from Makassar at Bacukiki at a prearranged date. Earlier Arung Palakka had confidently boasted to President de Jong that his appearance in Bone, Wajo, and the Ajattaparēng states would be sufficient to assure their loyalty in the war against Mandar. As it happened there was little need for such widespread support since the campaign was short and mostly unopposed. All the settlements and orchards in Balannipa, Majene, Bukko, Campalagian, and Binuang were burned or destroyed, but the people had already fled to safety in the mountains. These were tactics traditionally employed by the Mandar kingdoms to assure survival against a superior invading force, and survival in the eyes of the Mandar people was success. Although the Mandar lords agreed to make peace, it was a vulnerable peace subject to the whims of the Mandar rulers. When the Dutch-Bugis forces returned to Makassar from Mandar on 16 November 1671, they were greeted as conquerors. Conquerors they were, but only for the moment and at the sufferance of the fickle Mandar lords (KA 1171b: 775r-776r; KA 1171c:793r; KA 1177a:1167r-v).

With Goa's principal allies subdued the two overlords indulged in ceremonies to profess their steadfast loyalty and friendship to one another. Theirs had proved a formidable alliance and for this fact alone there was cause for rejoicing in both camps. On 20 May 1672 Arung Palakka and his most trusted lieutenant, Arung Bakkē Todani, were presented with letters and various tokens of honour from the Company leaders in Batavia. Among the gifts which were delivered to Arung Palakka amidst great pomp and ceremony was a gold medallion on which were engraved the words: "A token of honour for the high-born courageous king of Palakka, Pattiro, Mario, Bantaeng, and Lamuru sent to him in Makassar in commemoration of the War of Tondio and Mandar in the year past 1672." As soon as President de Jong had delivered the message from Batavia praising Arung Palakka and Arung Bakkē Todani for their fidelity to the Company, both of these men arose and with drawn krisses *manngaru* before the huge crowd gathered in Bontoala, swearing allegiance to the Company. So impressed was de

Jong by this spontaneous display of loyalty that he assured Batavia in his next missive that there was every reason to believe in the sincerity of the oath. Letters and gifts from the Company were also sent to Bone to those who had participated in the Mandar campaign (KA 1177b:1197v-1198v; Bakkers 1866:191-2).

The new overlords were able to demonstrate not only their readiness to reward loyalty but also their ability to punish opposition. Goa was warned that any flouting of the Company's regulations governing trade and navigation would be dealt with severely. Any Makassar boat found on the high seas without a Company pass would be attacked and its occupants enslaved (KA 1177b:1198v). Goa and its allies were further required to contribute manpower and supplies for the rebuilding and remodelling of Fort Rotterdam (see Maps 5 and 6). Although the Makassar people were to work alongside the Bugis and other allies of the Company in this project, the mortification of these former overlords was apparent to all in South Sulawesi. Arung Palakka would have been well aware of the significance of this arrangement when he suggested it to the Company (KA 1177c:1208r-v). The recent memory of Goa's overseers directing Bugis forced labour to erect defence fortifications along Makassar's shoreline and of the proud Makassar fortress of Ujung Pandang now being converted to Fort Rotterdam by the Dutch would have made this demand for Makassar labour an especially painful and humiliating one for Goa.

The renovations of Fort Rotterdam were, in fact, the first formal test of the new authority of Arung Palakka and the Company. All the rulers of South Sulawesi, except for the Toraja, were summoned by Arung Palakka to bring men and provisions to Makassar for the renovations. Eager to prove their loyalty, these rulers responded with an enthusiasm which sent streams of men and supplies into Makassar. Despite Arung Palakka's protests that he was merely in the service of the Company, the local rulers were all too aware that it was he who interpreted the affairs in South Sulawesi for the Company. Since he had the Company's trust, he could decide the fate of any of the kingdoms. Such a message would not have been lost to the princes sensitively attuned to the most delicate shifts of political power. This was part of South Sulawesi statecraft, and they responded to the new power situation as confidently as they had done in the past to guarantee survival of their kingdoms.

There was one conspicuous absence in Fort Rotterdam. When Dutch envoys went to Bone and requested Arumpone La Ma'darëmmëng's

presence in Makassar, he pleaded illness and promised to send in his place his sons Daeng Memang and Daeng Tojeng. He was quick to assure the envoys, however, that he simply wanted to conduct himself in a manner which would meet with the approval of Arung Palakka and Datu Soppeng La Těnribali (KA 1177c:1203v-1204r). This assurance revealed La Ma'darěmměng's fears that his equivocal stance in the Makassar War and the reluctance with which he had despatched a small token force in the Mandar campaign would have prejudiced Arung Palakka and Datu Soppeng against him. These latter two Bugis rulers had remained steadfast throughout in their opposition against Goa, and now they stood in judgement of all those who were less than totally committed to the Dutch-Bugis side in the war. As worrisome to La Ma'darěmměng was the real possibility that Arung Palakka, with the backing of the Company, would seize the throne of Bone. Arung Palakka's mother was We Těnrissui, daughter of Arumpone La Těnrirua Sultan Adam Matinroe ri Bantaeng (1607-1608), and so he had some claim to the throne (L-26:19). Although Arung Palakka was lord of Pattiro, Palětte, and Palakka in Bone, Mario in Soppeng, as well as lord of the Company's lands of Bantaeng and Bontoala, he lacked any real power base in any of the major kingdoms in South Sulawesi. He had been able to harness the explosive energies of the Bugis people in a vengeful war against Goa, but victory had ironically weakened his appeal as the people returned to their respective homes and lords. It was no secret that Arung Palakka desired, indeed required, a base upon which he could exercise an independent and respected authority. Without such a base Arung Palakka was rootless, but even more damaging, merely existing on the largesse and sufferance of the Company. Arung Palakka as Arumpone would have been welcome to the Dutch, for a powerful and friendly Bone would be useful in maintaining the peace in South Sulawesi. All of these considerations may have convinced La Ma'darěmměng that his failure to appear in Makassar, while damaging to his standing with the new overlords, at least postponed for a time any attempt to remove him from the throne in his absence.

Even before the work on Fort Rotterdam had been completed, the authority of the new overlords was again put on trial. On the morning of 2 July 1672 Arung Palakka informed the Dutch that three of his court maidens (*dayang*) were missing. He had immediately suspected a Goa plot and had sent some of his men to see if they were being held against their wishes. Although there was no trace of the missing *dayang*, it was rumoured that they had been brought first to Karaeng Karunrung and

then spirited away to Mandar. Even before the rumours could be verified, Arung Palakka seized upon this incident to remonstrate with the Company. He claimed that this was the second such outrage perpetrated by Karaeng Karunrung in the latter's efforts to discredit Arung Palakka and hence undermine his authority among the people of South Sulawesi. In a visit to Bone sometime in the first half of 1672, two of Arung Palakka's secondary wives had been molested and then carried off by Karaeng Masepe, supposedly at the instigation of Karaeng Karunrung. Until now Arung Palakka had held his tongue but could no longer remain silent in face of this further humiliation. He informed the Dutch that he preferred death to a life of shame (KA 1177b:1204v-1205r). The humiliation would have been even more searing because the attack on Arung Palakka's wives and court maidens were a taunt to Arung Palakka's manhood. It would not have been difficult for anyone in South Sulawesi to detect the subtle insult to Arung Palakka's virility since it was common knowledge that he was childless. To a society where the quantity of children was regarded both as a guarantee of security in one's old age and a measure of one's manliness, such an insult even if only imagined by Arung Palakka was an intolerable situation. To have accepted this humiliation, which would have meant existence in the community without *siri'* or self-respect, would have been tantamount to ostracism and ridicule by his fellowmen. The only reason Arung Palakka had refrained from seeking immediate action to remove his shame when the first heinous crime had been committed in Bone was because he was then a guest of the Arumpone. When the second insult occurred there was now little reason not to respond to the challenge. Once among his own supporters in Makassar, Arung Palakka could proceed in planning revenge knowing full well that the Dutch would now be receptive to a request for assistance to re-establish Arung Palakka's credibility among the people of South Sulawesi. Arung Palakka had served the Dutch well, and it was to the latter's benefit to see that his authority remained undiminished. At the moment, however, Fort Rotterdam was reluctant to take any firm action because of Batavia's instructions to avoid any other costly wars in South Sulawesi (KA 1177c:1206r-1207v). It simply issued a stern message to Goa to account for Arung Palakka's missing women. So serious was the situation that Karaeng Goa Sultan Amir Hamzah and Karaeng Karunrung themselves led the Goa delegation to Fort Rotterdam to discuss the affair with the Dutch. They thanked the Dutch for their "fatherly advice" and promised to send a message immediately to Mandar to seek the whereabouts of Arung Palakka's

women. When the Goa messenger returned, however, he brought no word of the women (KA 1177c:1205v, 1207v).

Arung Palakka was clearly upset by Fort Rotterdam's failure to take any action against Goa. To show his displeasure, which became customary in later years, he left Bontoala to go to Bone in September 1672. While in Bone he fulfilled a vow which he and his Toangke had made while in exile. Together they had sworn never to cut their hair until they had succeeded in freeing their compatriots from Goa's tyranny. Since that vow was made, Arung Palakka's hair remained uncut thus earning him the nickname by which he is most widely-known among the Bugis and Makassar people: Pëtta Malampee Gëmmë'na or "The Long-Haired Prince". The prestige and influence which Arung Palakka now wielded were apparent by the presence at the hair-cutting ceremony of large numbers of people of all ranks and *suku* (KA 1177d:1226r).

It was during Arung Palakka's presence in Bone that he was chosen to be Arumponne in preference to La Ma'darëmmëng's own son, Arung Timurung La Pakkokoe. The latter was understandably upset by the decision and attempted to nullify Arung Palakka's election with the connivance of a number of important nobles from Bone and Goa. When he failed to have the election reversed, he knew that his life was in danger and so he fled to Wajo and then to Mandar. At Mandar he was joined by Karaeng Massepe with 2,000 men, and together they marched to Enrekang hoping to find safety in the mountains. While ensconced in his mountain refuge, Arung Timurung despatched envoys to Bone, Tanete, Bacukiki, Sawitto, and a number of other areas on the west coast to seek allies. In an intercepted letter addressed to the Bone nobles, Arung Timurung had written:

Warm greetings to all of you who are bound to me! On the 22nd day of Haji (9 April) I will go with Karaeng Massepe to Rappang and there unite with our friends from Ajattapparëng and Toraja. My request to you is that we begin this enterprise together. If I begin and you do not, you will then be cutting my throat . . . Our work will begin on 22 Haji . . . If you will not join us, then you will be our enemy. I earnestly beseech you to make every effort to become involved so that it would contribute to the welfare of your land, and by your compassion⁴ for us, we would be able to live (KA 1184e:300v-302v).

Much to the anger of Arung Palakka and the Company, La Ma'darëmmëng had also apparently condoned, if not encouraged, his sons Arung Timurung and Daeng Pabila, Bone's Punggawa (Commander-in-Chief of Bone's armies in wartime), in this hazardous enterprise.

In a letter to his son Arung Timurung, La Ma'darëmmëng had advised:

Do not be hasty in overthrowing [Arung Palakka] because those in Bone wish no ill and also would not be happy to see any ill befall the land. Furthermore, there is no one here who wishes to heed them [i.e. those in favour of Arung Timurung] and therefore they await your coming. It would be best if you come to a firm agreement with your friends there [in Ajattapparëng and Toraja], and you and all of our friends there strengthen yourselves and go to unite with the ruler of Goa . . . You can also go to Wajo and Luwu, and if you are united with them all, you can then all begin to work together. I and all those who are with me advise and hope that, when you leave there and go to Barru, you secure it by force so that it would willingly join us. If you should find Datu Soppeng there, you could announce to him that it would be best that he be mindful of the fact that what one has, the other would not take away, but that each would maintain and keep that which belongs to him.⁵ It would be best if you went to borrow gold from the ruler of Goa, as well as from the ruler of Lamuru and the ruler of Luwu so that with it you can give the nobles [of Bone] a taste of it . . . I have but three sons: the ruler of Luwu, the ruler of Wajo, and Tounru' [i.e. Arung Palakka]. The last has forgotten the treaty, and this is the reason that he bothers us. And this is the reason, my son, for my desire to love and be loved by Luwu since he [Datu Luwu] has not neglected, in this time of our inconvenience, to come and visit me. He is still mindful of the oaths which we had both made when we both buried the stone [i.e. entered into a treaty arrangement] (KA 1184f:297r-298r).⁶

Letters had also been sent by Karaeng Goa Sultan Amir Hamzah and Karaeng Karunrung. Through gifts and promises they had not only incited Karaeng Massepe Daeng Mannabe but had also suborned Daeng Pabila of Bone (KA 1184c:232r-v). The most incriminating evidence of Goa's encouragement of Karaeng Massepe was a letter written to him by Karaeng Karunrung dated 11 Shawal 1083 (31 January 1673):

Should God give you the strength, it would be good for you to begin first so that we thereby may gain praise. These enemies have become weak, and all of their friends (so I hear) have become embittered toward them (KA 1184d:296v).

To deal with this threat, which had the active encouragement of the leaders of Goa and Bone, Arung Palakka ordered his most trusted Toangke, Arung Bakkë Todani, to send an army against Arung Timurung. What appeared to be a relatively simple campaign ended in disaster for Arung Bakkë's army, and he was forced to ask help from Arung Palakka. This defeat could not be ignored because Arung Timurung's challenge to Arung Palakka's authority was being closely watched by the people of South Sulawesi. Failure or even a sign of

weakness could result in further outbreaks of trouble, and so Arung Palakka decided to take command of a new expedition against the combined forces of Arung Timurung and Karaeng Massepe. *Bila-bila musu'* were sent to Bone, Wajo, and Pammana to assemble on 27th April for the expedition to Enrekang. Men were then ordered to Sawitto and to Enrekang to seize the mountain passes. To assist in this campaign, the Dutch sent a ship with ammunition for the Bugis army and ten Dutch soldiers under the command of a sergeant as requested by Arung Palakka (KA 1184b:218v; KA 1184a:192v-194r). On 5 May 1673 news reached Fort Rotterdam that Arung Palakka had arrived in Sawitto from Tanete and Soppeng and had taken command of an army of 20,000 men. With this large army Arung Palakka easily defeated Arung Timurung and his Mander allies at Massepe.

Karaeng Massepe and the survivors of his army fled to Maiwa on a mountain with good natural defences to await any further attacks. There were occasional skirmishes between the two sides, but there appeared little hope for the besieged who had only a limited supply of food and water. To draw away men from the siege Mandar sent forty large ships to raid along the west coast in the vicinity of Bacukiki and Tanete. Despite these diversionary tactics, the defending forces at Maiwa were overwhelmed. Karaeng Massepe, Arung Timurung, and the ruler of Maiwa managed to escape, but the ruler of Maiwa was later taken prisoner. The area which had rebelled against the authority of Arung Bakkë was fined 5,500 gold pieces, of which Arung Palakka kept 3,500. He distributed this amount to all those who had fought well and to some others who had participated in the fighting. The other 2,000 he gave to the Company. Arung Timurung soon surrendered and sent a gold kris and three gold armllets as sign of his submission.⁷ Only Karaeng Massepe and his brothers eluded capture for a while and attempted to escape into the Toraja lands. They gave the ruler of Duri various gifts in hopes of a safe passage through his land. After receiving the gifts, the ruler of Duri then refused the request for fear of antagonizing Arung Palakka and the Company. With these hopes of escape to Toraja dashed, Karaeng Massepe and his followers remained in the forests but were eventually killed or taken prisoner. The heads of Karaeng Massepe and his brother were sent to Arung Palakka, together with two of Arung Palakka's kidnapped wives (KA 1184c:231r-232r). By Arung Palakka's and Datu Soppeng's orders the Punggawa Daeng Pabila was put to death. Arung Timurung was brought to Ujung Pandang and placed under Arung Palakka's supervision. His marriage to Arung Palakka's sister We

Mappolobombang Da Upi may have played a part in his relatively light punishment. Only La Ma'darëmmëng remained untouched in Bone despite his role in the whole affair (KA 1184c:232r-v; KA 1184g:234v-235r). Although La Ma'darëmmëng had abdicated, his former position as Arumponé was sufficient to provide him with the sanctity of kingship among his people. Any harsh measures taken against him would have aroused hostility and jeopardized Arung Palakka's already insecure position in that kingdom. Finally, Arung Palakka strongly recommended to the Goa government that Karaeng Karunrung, Karaeng Jarannika, and Gallarang Manngasa be removed from any positions of authority. As in the case of La Ma'darëmmëng, however, nothing was done about Karaeng Goa Sultan Amir Hamzah. The Goa plotters had merely encouraged but had not actively participated in the rebellion, and so Arung Palakka and the Company were content merely to recommend punishment and to leave its implementation to the Goa government itself (KA 1184g:235r).

With the rebellion over and with no further sign of opposition to the new overlords, Arung Palakka was free to devote himself again to the task of re-establishing order in the land. He resumed the task begun earlier of rebuilding dikes and restoring the ricefields which had been destroyed or neglected during the long years of warfare. Since the fighting had occurred mainly on the plains where the ricefields were located, there had been wide-scale destruction of the dikes, the grain, and the water buffaloes used for ploughing. In the years 1670-2 Arung Palakka was principally concerned with the ricefields in Maros and Bantaeng, the two territories which had been presented to him by the Company as "fiefs" for his loyalty (KA 1177d:1226r, *passim*). It was at this time, according to Bugis sources, that some of the Toangke were given land in Maros and Segeri, areas originally settled by the Makassar people (L-6:71-2; L-21:121-2).

While seeking to restore rice-growing, Arung Palakka was equally diligent in confirming the new hierarchy of states which arose in the aftermath of the war. The rebellion by Arung Timurung and Karaeng Massepe had demonstrated once again the fluidity of alliances in South Sulawesi. It was now Arung Palakka's task to establish the new hierarchy of power in the area and to restore harmony, especially in Bone which had been badly shaken by the conflict of loyalties during the rebellion. His friendship with Datu Soppeng La Tënribaldi was reaffirmed by his marriage in Barru to the latter's daughter, We Adda Matinroe ri

Madello.⁸ At the wedding ceremony in Barru, envoys from Duri and Toraja were present to offer their respects to Arung Palakka. Special treatment was accorded to the representatives of the Langi' Toraja, who controlled the most important mountains above Mandar, because they had steadfastly refused all attempts by Mandar to enlist their help against Arung Palakka. But their refusal to bow to Mandar pressure had been achieved at a price, and they now sought Arung Palakka's help to avenge their ruler killed by the Mandar folk for alleged collaboration with Arung Palakka. To prove their loyalty, the Langi' Toraja pledged to send their children to Arung Palakka as hostages. The Mandar states, secure in the belief that their mountains would always provide refuge, remained openly defiant to both Arung Palakka and the Company. They refused to surrender anyone fleeing from Arung Palakka and the Dutch, and they ignored Dutch demands that Mandar navigation be restricted. In view of these circumstances Governor Harthouwer in Fort Rotterdam felt it necessary to have Arung Palakka and the other South Sulawesi allies send yet another punitive expedition against Mandar. For the first time Arung Palakka believed that such a campaign had a chance of success. In the past the Mandar people had simply melted into the mountains without a trace at the approach of an enemy force. But now that the Langi' Toraja had openly declared their enmity toward Mandar, the traditional escape route seemed in jeopardy. Arung Palakka urged the Company to take this opportunity to strike and end Mandar's continuing belligerence (KA 1184h:260r-261r; KA 1191a:652r-653r).

On 31 October 1673 the various South Sulawesi lords and nobles led by Arung Palakka assembled at Fort Rotterdam and performed the *aru*, swearing allegiance to one another and to the Company. They then boarded the Dutch ships which brought them on 3rd November at an agreed rendezvous at the Sa'dan River where the troops which travelled overland had already gathered. Rain and bad weather hampered operations, but on the 19th the invading army inflicted a decisive defeat on the smaller Mandar forces. Another Mandar stand in the foothills again resulted in a rout, and now all Mandar survivors vanished into the high mountains. The expected Langi' Toraja assistance never materialized, and so this campaign, like others before it, had to be content with victory on the battlefield and the destruction of the Mandar countryside without submission of the Mandar people or their leaders. As in previous campaigns against Mandar, the orchards, animals, and villages were destroyed. Mandar also suffered the loss of four or five of their most important princes, including Daeng Rirole, the brother of the Maradia

Balannipa. The systematic destruction of the fields, orchards, and the animals in Mandar caused severe hardship and famine throughout the land. Bugis and Makassar refugees who had fled to Mandar now moved north to Mamuju and Kaili to escape the hunger and the long arm of Arung Palakka (KA 1191a:652r-655r).

Unlike Arung Palakka's relations with Mandar, those with Goa gradually improved after the Arung Timurung-Karaeng Massepe rebellion. On 1 February 1674 Karaeng Goa Sultan Amir Hamzah informed Arung Palakka that the latter's kidnapped court maidens were being held by a certain Makassar bandit chief in the mountains behind Goa and Galesong. To demonstrate his good intentions, Sultan Amir Hamzah himself volunteered to head a Makassar force to join those of Arung Palakka to attack the bandit's hideaway in the hills. The expedition was successful and all three of Arung Palakka's court maidens were rescued. The bandit leader escaped, but 150 of his band, including women and children, were captured and returned to their former homes (KA 1191a: 657v-659v).⁹ The satisfactory conclusion of the *dayang* affair served to draw Arung Palakka and Sultan Amir Hamzah even closer together. The Dutch noted with misgivings the frequent visits to Bontoala by Sultan Amir Hamzah, although they were somewhat reassured by Arung Palakka's negligence in returning the courtesy. Fort Rotterdam assured Batavia that they would attempt to prevent too strong a friendship developing between these two powerful rulers. What concerned the Company was a possible link between the growing reconciliation between Arung Palakka and the Goa leaders and the failure of Sultan Amir Hamzah to make the customary visit to Fort Rotterdam. As in the past the Company lay the blame for these developments on the now old, sickly, and practically immobile Karaeng Karunrung. So powerful an influence did Karaeng Karunrung exert in the past that it was difficult for the Company to imagine anyone else as cunning and as motivated as he in removing all influence of the Company in South Sulawesi.

There was, nevertheless, an increasing distrust of Arung Palakka's motives since he wielded enormous power in the area. When Goa was clearly the enemy, the Company had whole-heartedly supported Arung Palakka. In the Makassar War of 1666-9, the strong comradeship between Arung Palakka and Admiral Speelman had sustained the alliance. With Speelman's departure at the end of 1669, his successor Maximiliaan de Jong grew increasingly dependent upon Arung Palakka's advice on South Sulawesi affairs because of his own inexperience in the area. Arung Palakka was therefore able to consolidate his

already strong position with Fort Rotterdam as its principal adviser and confidant in South Sulawesi. He became the intermediary between Fort Rotterdam and the local lords and used his role to determine who should be favoured with an audience. Furthermore, in the beginning he was often asked by the Dutch to serve as interpreter since he could speak both Bugis and Makassar and could then translate into Malay for the Dutch. These two important functions gave Arung Palakka access to any information which passed between the Dutch and a local lord. But more important, this position of confidence with the Dutch enhanced Arung Palakka's stature and hence influence among the rulers and people of South Sulawesi.

So successful had Arung Palakka been in acquiring power that by late 1672 he was chosen as Arumpone to replace La Ma'darëmmëng who had abdicated. Ironically, it was Arung Palakka's new power base in Bone, at first welcomed by Fort Rotterdam as strengthening a most dependable ally, which came to arouse fears concerning Arung Palakka's ambitions. A powerful Bone kingdom under Arung Palakka was seen as much a potential danger to the Company as a resurrected Goa. There were some in Fort Rotterdam who recommended actively forestalling any attempts by the Bone and Goa kingdoms to form an alliance (KA 1177c:1208r; KA 1184a:192v-193r; KA 1191a:695v-668v).

Fort Rotterdam's cautious attitude revealed a basic lack of understanding of what the victory in the Makassar War meant to Arung Palakka. In Bugis and Makassar sources the story of Arung Palakka's flight from Sulawesi is explained in a poignant fashion in terms of *siri*'. In the Makassar tale, *Sinrili'na Kappala' Tallumbatua*, Arung Palakka is depicted as a prince of Goa who is wronged by his father, the ruler, and hence seeks power which would remove his shame and restore his self-respect. The Bugis *lontara*' and folktales emphasize Arung Palakka's intense distress which grows into shame upon seeing the suffering of his people working as slaves for the Makassar overlords. His act of rebellion against the Makassar oppressors, therefore, is seen as being motivated by his desire to free his people and remove their shame. In both the Bugis and Makassar accounts, it is the "Kompani", i.e. the Dutch East India Company, which helps Arung Palakka in removing his and his people's shame and in restoring their self-respect (L. Y. Andaya 1980). Contemporary Dutch reports comment on Arung Palakka's emotional expressions of loyalty to the Company with an undertone of suspicion regarding their sincerity. Yet Arung Palakka was behaving like

any other respectable member of his society toward the person or persons responsible for restoring his *siri*'. So intense is the sense of obligation in South Sulawesi that it was this theme which was retained by both the Makassar and Bugis people when reciting the story of Arung Palakka who conquered Goa with the help of the "Kompani".

Despite the Company's misgivings about Arung Palakka's growing power, it recognized the value of maintaining his friendship. Together they had subdued Goa and all of its allies by the middle of the 1670s. The acts leading to their joint overlordship had been grand, culminating in the spectacular victories over Sombaopu and Tosora. An understanding had even been reached in which the Company assumed control over decisions on trade and external affairs, while Arung Palakka guaranteed the smooth functioning of internal affairs. This arrangement suited both overlords admirably, but it had yet to be put to the test in the bleak, somewhat unglamorous task of dealing with the day to day problems of South Sulawesi.

CHAPTER VII

TRIALS OF OVERLORDSHIP

By 1674 peace finally seemed to have been achieved in South Sulawesi. Goa had been so thoroughly ravaged by the victorious army of the Bugis and their allies that its inhabitants had been reduced to great poverty and suffering. The Goa leaders pleaded with the Dutch for assistance since they no longer had any source of income. Since the time of Tunipalangga (1546?-1565) the Goa rulers had reorganized the kingdom to cater to the demands of international trade. The greatly increased revenue which began to fill the coffers of the royal treasury in subsequent years vindicated Tunipalangga's vision of transforming Makassar into a truly international entrepot and Goa into the foremost power in South Sulawesi. When the Company seized Makassar and declared it its own territory by right of conquest, they dealt an almost fatal blow to this international trade and principal source of revenue for Goa. At first the latter attempted to persuade the Dutch to restore its international trade so that its leaders could regain lost revenues. The Company, however, refused to soften its policies since it was the wealth from this trade which had transformed Goa into a power so dangerous to the Company's interests in Eastern Indonesia. The Company replied simply: "Return and till your lands" (KA 1191a:661r). The Company's advice, simple and forthright, was to Goa the death-knell to its ambitions and a regression to an earlier period of anonymity in the area. This was a demoralizing time for the Goa court, and any opposition to the Company and Arung Palakka from this quarter seemed remote indeed.

No major conflicts loomed in the horizon for the new overlords, but there were the minor intra-kingdom squabbles which could provide the spark to ignite yet another destructive war. In Luwu the nobles had deposed their ruler, Daeng Massuro *Matinroe ri Tompotikka'*, and replaced him with Daeng Mattuju, whose mother was Karaeng Tamasongo, daughter of Karaeng Sumanna, the former *Tuma'bicara-butta* Goa. Daeng Massuro had fled to Duri and then to Bone, from which place he sent a letter to Arung Palakka requesting that his grievances be heard at Fort Rotterdam. He expressed his belief that Arung Palakka

and the Company would find a satisfactory resolution to this problem in Luwu (KA 1191b:661v-662r).

The Council (*Hadat*) of Luwu accused the deposed ruler of being insincere and a false ally and friend of the Company for the following reasons:

- (1) He had not implemented the Bungaya treaty.
- (2) He had let his uncle, the former Opu Cénning, escape to Java instead of delivering him to the Dutch.
- (3) During his reign he had never once come to Fort Rotterdam.
- (4) He had no consideration for the government of Luwu, and through negligence had allowed the kingdom to deteriorate (KA 1191c:680v-681r).

The first three reasons were simply a preamble to demonstrate the guilt of the former Datu Luwu toward the Company. Only in the fourth reason was the source of the conflict revealed. The *Hadat*, however, was realistic enough to realize that the Company and Arung Palakka would most likely condone the *Hadat's fait accompli* if it could be shown to be in their best interests. Since the present state of affairs in Luwu was not displeasing to either Arung Palakka or the Company, no immediate action was taken. The exiled Datu Luwu, who was characterized as having a mild disposition, remained in Makassar mainly in the company of Arung Palakka. Reprieved for the moment, the new Datu Luwu Daeng Mattuju was eager to gain the favour of the new powers and thus brought his army to join Arung Palakka in yet another campaign against Mandar (KA 1191d:727v).

Mandar had never been totally pacified, and its periodic outbursts of defiance were more an irritant than a real threat to the overlords. Nevertheless, Mandar at its worst could provide an alternative port for international trade and a refuge for the Company's and Arung Palakka's enemies. It was therefore necessary to mount an expedition from time to time to prevent the situation in Mandar from becoming too uncomfortable for either overlord. In this new campaign the Company would have been content to leave well enough alone, but it was Arung Palakka who urged another attack on Mandar. The most that the Dutch in Fort Rotterdam could do was to persuade Arung Palakka to postpone the campaign until September, so that an investigation could be made on Arung Palakka's complaint (KA 1191e:702v-703r).

Unwilling to sit idly by until the Company made its decision, Arung Palakka decided to take matters into his own hands. On 21 August 1674 he returned from a trip to Bone and Soppeng bringing word that these

two allies were prepared to come with a large force to attack Mandar. The Company now could find few real objections to the campaign, and so a resolution was passed by the Council in Fort Rotterdam on 29th August to send one ship and two sloops to carry ammunition and other supplies to Arung Palakka and the allies. On 10th September, just before the expedition set sail, envoys from the Mandar states of Binuang, Kaluwa, and Parampuang appeared in Makassar. In the presence of Arung Palakka, the various local allies, and the Company officials, the envoys conveyed the message that their rulers and nobles wanted to ask forgiveness. They also reported the imminent arrival of envoys from the other Mandar states of Sendana, Balannipa, and Majene bearing a similar message.¹ It was agreed that in twelve days time all the Mandar rulers and nobles were to meet at an agreed spot on the Sa'dan River to announce their formal surrender (KA 1191f:714r-715r). Arung Palakka was to represent the allies in accepting the surrender and in persuading Mandar's leaders to come to Makassar to declare their loyalty (KA 1191g:712r). On 23rd September all the Mandar rulers appeared at the location agreed upon, except for the ruler of Sendana who was ill and had sent a representative in his place. In a brief but emotional ceremony the Mandar leaders swore before Arung Palakka, Arung Bakkĕ, and the Company's representative Nicholas Pleun, to maintain a firm and unbreakable peace with Arung Palakka and the Company. Arung Palakka rose and in reply asked that these rulers truly demonstrate their good intentions by going to Fort Rotterdam and swearing to uphold the Bungaya treaty. There was no objection to this proposal, and so the Mandar leaders proceeded to Makassar. On 11 October 1674 they swore on the Koran in the presence of Arung Palakka, Arung Bakkĕ, and all the allies, to uphold all the articles of the Bungaya treaty (KA 1191h:719v-720r).

The signing of the Bungaya treaty by the Mandar rulers was a personal triumph for Arung Palakka. While the Company was willing to tolerate Mandar's activities rather than expend yet more funds on another war, Mandar's open defiance was a jarring reminder to Arung Palakka that his war with Goa's principal allies was not yet over. Furthermore, Mandar's increasing independence posed a threat to Arung Palakka's future plans. As long as there remained one kingdom or confederation of kingdoms which could defy his wishes, it would be difficult to prevent others from doing the same. Any attempt to weld all the disparate kingdoms of South Sulawesi into one unit responsive to his wishes was impossible as long as Mandar remained outside the Bungaya treaty. It

was for these reasons that Arung Palakka had insisted, despite the Company's reluctance, to send an expedition against Mandar. Much to his credit, the news of the impending invasion was sufficient to compel obedience from Mandar. Although Arung Palakka realized that a permanent state of peace with Mandar would not be achieved merely by swearing to uphold the Bungaya treaty, he considered it important to demonstrate his power and authority while he was still being appraised as an overlord by the South Sulawesi states. Had he failed to subdue the Mandar leaders or even failed to convince them to come to Makassar, he would have found his prestige diminished and his ability to control affairs in the area considerably weakened. But he had succeeded, and his overlordship seemed secure. Ironically, it was not his enemies but his allies, the Dutch, who came to pose the most serious threat to his position.

In late October 1674 President Harthouwer had written to Batavia from Fort Rotterdam that affairs in South Sulawesi were peaceful (KA 1191d:727v). Little did he realize that events were then unfolding which would severely test the alliance between Arung Palakka and the Company. On 24 October 1674 three Dutch soldiers were walking in the Bugis Quarter (*Kampung Bugis*) in Makassar when they found the tunic and a lock of hair belonging to a missing comrade. They immediately concluded that he had been murdered and went to question his native concubine who, it was rumoured, belonged to the interpreter of Datu Soppeng La Tēnribali. When they questioned her, she admitted having spoken to the missing soldier some months before. She also volunteered the information that a boyservant had told her that their master, the interpreter Syarif, had killed the soldier. Both Syarif and his boyservant were then summoned by a Dutch official to report everything they knew of the missing Dutchman. The boy explained how one morning in July he had gone with his master to the shore and met this Dutchman who was having an affair with the woman who belonged to his master. He had watched the two men go into the woods, and a few moments later he had seen the Dutchman fall to the ground. His master had then returned with a bloody kris and made him swear not to mention the incident to anyone.

Arung Palakka was disturbed to learn of the whole affair because the interpreter Syarif was held in high regard by his father-in-law, the Datu Soppeng. Eager to learn the circumstances of the incident in greater detail, Arung Palakka had asked Harthouwer to send Syarif to him at Bontoala. But Harthouwer refused to release Syarif from Dutch custody and instead asked Arung Palakka to come to Fort Rotterdam to question

the accused. Arung Amali, Karaeng Lengkesse, and various other important nobles were delegated by Arung Palakka to go to Fort Rotterdam to conduct an investigation. When they were told the above story, they requested forgiveness for Syarif but Harthouwer was adamant in his decision to try the accused according to Dutch law. Somewhat taken aback by the vehemence of Harthouwer's stance, the delegation reminded him that the Company had not been especially rigorous in pursuing justice when it released the Dutch Captain Jan Fransen even though he had killed three Bugis in Maros for no apparent reason. In that case the Bugis leaders had allowed this travesty of justice to pass without demanding satisfaction. These arguments and further entreaties failed to move Harthouwer, and so the delegation returned to Bontoala. On 12 November 1674 Arung Palakka left Bontoala and went to Bone, unwilling to tolerate any further indignities at the hands of Harthouwer. Relations between Arung Palakka and Harthouwer reached a breaking point when news reached Bone in February 1675 that Syarif had admitted to the crime under torture and had been executed. Arung Palakka was now even more determined than ever to remain in Bone rather than be humiliated in Makassar (KA 1200a:183v-185v).

Arung Palakka's absence from Makassar was a worry to the Company. While he was in Bontoala it was possible to learn what he was planning and to consult him whenever any local crisis arose. Now that he was in Bone, he was safe from the eyes of the Company and could even be plotting against it. Furthermore, Arung Palakka had been relegated the task of maintaining peace and order in South Sulawesi because of his knowledge of local affairs. The Company felt ill-prepared to deal with local problems by itself, and moreover its own impact would have been lessened because of the news which would have quickly spread of the rift between the Company and Arung Palakka. Arung Palakka had become essential for the peace of South Sulawesi and the peace of mind of the Company, and so a special Dutch delegation was sent to Bone in April 1675 to persuade Arung Palakka to return to Makassar and to discuss his grievances with Harthouwer.

While in Bone the Company envoys were summoned to the residence of Daeng Talele, the Makassar wife of Arung Palakka and sister of Karaeng Lengkesse. This was to be the first of many private interviews which Daeng Talele was to have over the years with Company officials. On numerous occasions in later years, they came to seek her help in healing a breach caused by either an overzealous Dutch governor or president in Fort Rotterdam and/or by a proud and sensitive Arung

Palakka. In 1675 Daeng Talele was respected as Arung Palakka's principal wife, but her value had yet to be discovered by the Company. When she told the Dutch envoys in Bone that Arung Palakka had been treated with discourtesy and should be shown civility and "royal kindness" by Harthouwer, they agreed to convey this message. To emphasize her point, she described how distraught Arung Palakka had been on his arrival in Bone from Bontoala and how he had summoned his nobles and drawn up a list of grievances against Harthouwer. With this knowledge the Dutch envoys were able to assure Arung Palakka that they would speak to Harthouwer about his grievances. They also succeeded in dissuading Arung Palakka from going to Batavia to seek redress directly from the Supreme Government of the Company (KA 1200c:210v-211r).

On 23 May 1675 Arung Palakka returned to Makassar accompanied by a large retinue of princes and kings from Bone, Soppeng, and other kingdoms. But it was not until 28th May that he sent envoys to Harthouwer to ask for an audience. This unprecedented delay would not have escaped the notice of the Dutch nor those who understood the studied traditional signs of displeasure among Sulawesi rulers. Nevertheless, the audience was granted for 5 o'clock that very same day. When the time drew near, Arung Palakka and his principal nobles arrived at Fort Rotterdam with a following of about a thousand men. The presence of so many rulers in Arung Palakka's entourage from Bone, and now the thousand-men retinue, bore eloquent witness to Arung Palakka's immense authority and prestige among his fellow rulers and the people of South Sulawesi. The days when Arung Palakka and his Toangke had been merely a useful contingent of a Company-led operation against Goa were long gone. He was now an equal partner in the overlordship of South Sulawesi created by the Makassar War, and it behove the Company to regard him as such. The meeting between Harthouwer and Arung Palakka was therefore observed with great interest by local rulers constantly alert to every subtle shift in political power.

During the audience Arung Palakka presented Harthouwer with a list of promises which had been given to Bone and Soppeng by Speelman but subsequently ignored by his successors. They were in brief:

- (1) They would be able to maintain their rights according to the laws of the land.
- (2) There would be no distinction made between themselves and those of Butung and Ternate.
- (3) The Company would have no rights over their slaves nor pawn them

without their knowledge.

- (4) No slaves would appear against them in court since this practice contravenes the laws of the land (KA 1196a:160v-161v; KA 1200a:194r).

These grievances could not be resolved immediately, and so in the next few days Harthouwer and other Company officials made several visits to Bontoala in an attempt to allay Arung Palakka's suspicions toward Harthouwer. Mollified by the courtesy shown him by these visits, Arung Palakka conceded that the Company ". . . by right of conquest and treaty had obtained overlordship and supreme power [and] by right of sovereignty could properly dispose of internal and external navigation and levy tithes and tolls on the country's fruits and lands". What grieved Arung Palakka was the ignominy of a staunch ally of the Company having to request a pass to sail to certain destinations. Such a policy became even more intolerable when Arung Palakka learned that foreigners could trade in Makassar without passes. The Company had its wider interests to consider in seeking to establish order and predictability in the trading lanes of the archipelago. But to Arung Palakka this policy was not only incomprehensible but also unjust (KA 1196a:161v-165r).

Harthouwer bore the brunt of Arung Palakka's displeasure because it was he who had to implement policies established in Batavia. He and his successors' principal misfortune was in being the representative of the Company attempting to maintain a dual overlordship with as powerful a personality as Arung Palakka. It is instructive that Arung Palakka's relations with every Dutch governor or president appointed to Fort Rotterdam began with great hopes for successful cooperation and then gradually deteriorated to a point where only the removal of the Company's representative could resolve the crisis. The difficulty was compounded by Arung Palakka's conception of the "Company" as being virtually beyond reproach in Batavia. Whatever he, Arung Palakka, desired the Company would provide. Was it not the Company which had enabled him to regain his *siri'* and even a kingdom? And was it not the Company which had sent him gifts of a golden umbrella, a gold chain, and golden medallions to show their love for him? To the Company he owed his life, and he remained faithful to this belief till the day he died. There were times when he felt betrayed by Batavia, but in the end he was always vindicated in his belief. The governor or president in Fort Rotterdam was merely an employee of the Company and as culpable as any man. The Company, however, was undefiled. It was this conceptual

dichotomy of the Company which allowed Arung Palakka in one breath to speak of a Dutch governor or president with great acerbity, and in another to extol the virtues of Batavia. Even at the height of his dispute with Harthouwer, Arung Palakka was therefore able to respond enthusiastically to a request from Batavia for aid in maintaining the peace on the island of Sumbawa.

The Company was gravely concerned at the disorder created by large numbers of Makassar refugees roving through Sumbawa. To remove these refugees from the kingdoms of Bima and Sumbawa the Company needed at least 5-6,000 Bugis soldiers from Arung Palakka (KA 1200a: 175r-177r). On 2 June 1675 Arung Palakka appeared in Fort Rotterdam to take leave to organize his ships and men for the expedition. He had earlier explained that the expedition could not sail from Sulawesi before August or September because of the monsoon winds. In June and July there was a very strong southeasterly which made any sailing in those waters hazardous. The expeditions would then have to leave Sumbawa before the heavy rainstorms and strong winds which began in December or January. Any delay would force the expedition to remain until February or the beginning of March before attempting the journey home. He further suggested that if the Makassar refugees were not found in Sumbawa that the expedition be allowed to continue onward, even to the coast of Java, until they were found and destroyed (KA 1196a:167r-168r; KA 1200d:211r).

These roving bands of Makassar, Bugis, and Mandar refugees had already terrorized areas of east coast Borneo and were now firmly ensconced in Sumbawa. What Arung Palakka feared most of all was that the success of these refugees would encourage the Makassar people either to join their brethren overseas and add to their menace, or, equally unpalatable, to make the Makassar people on Sulawesi more defiant and aggressive toward Arung Palakka and the Company. These fears spurred Arung Palakka to urge firm immediate action against the Makassar refugees before the situation became unmanageable.

When the Assistant Merchant Paulus de Bocq was sent to investigate affairs on the island of Sumbawa, he reported on 18 June 1675 that there were no Makassar refugees in Bima. He had noted, however, large numbers of them under a Daeng Mamanga at Ende in Flores and under Daeng Tulolo on the western part of the island of Sumbawa (see Map 7) at Alas, Utan, Cerang, and Taliwang (KA 1200e:213r). By October of that year the numbers of Makassar refugees in the kingdom of Sumbawa seemed to have increased dramatically, and they were beginning to exert

an undue influence in its affairs. The former ruler of Sumbawa, Karaeng Mas Goa, had been forced to abdicate and flee into exile by his Council of Nobles in the beginning of 1675 (KA 1201a:1851v). In September of that same year rumours reached the Dutch that Makassar refugees under Daeng Tulolo had brought Karaeng Mas Goa's nephew from Banjarmasin to rule in Sumbawa (KA 1200f:223r). Arung Palakka had initially expressed a willingness to assist the Company in Sumbawa, but he soon became preoccupied with a matter of greater importance to him.

Andries Bogaart, Governor and Director of Banda, arrived in Makassar with specific instructions from Batavia to investigate the claims made by Arung Palakka on behalf of Bone and Soppeng in May 1675 (KA 1208a:516r). A meeting was arranged between Bogaart and Arung Palakka for 1st February. On the appointed day Arung Palakka, accompanied by the chief Bugis princes and Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali, appeared in the gardens of Fort Rotterdam and was greeted by Bogaart himself. After *sirih*² was served and mutual greetings exchanged, Arung Palakka arose and presented the same complaints to Bogaart that he had made to Harthouwer the year before. Except for the difference in wording in Bogaart's report to Batavia, the points were the same:

1. All those in South Sulawesi who had fought alongside the Dutch would continue to maintain their own laws and customs.
2. They would be shown the same high regard and esteem as those of Ternate and Butung.
3. No one would have the right over their slaves without their knowledge.
4. Their slaves would not be permitted to pawn themselves off to the Dutch without their knowledge and consent.
5. Their slaves would not be allowed to appear in court against them.

Bogaart had been well-briefed on the situation and had prepared a reply which covered each of the points raised by Arung Palakka. With regard to the first point, Bogaart denied that the Company had undermined the laws and customs of the Bugis. As for the second point Bogaart again rejected any suggestion that the Company had shown favouritism toward Butung and Ternate. Whatever differences which existed in the Company's restrictive navigational policy toward South Sulawesi and toward Butung and Ternate was a result not of favouritism but of varying local circumstances. The third, fourth, and fifth points were unchallenged, and Bogaart agreed on behalf of the Company to see

that they were implemented immediately (KA 1208a:518r-519r; KA 1209a:160r-161r).

With this problem apparently settled to the satisfaction of both sides, Bogaart proceeded to confront Arung Palakka with certain disturbing rumours which had reached the ears of the Dutch. Arung Palakka confirmed the rumour that an envoy from Selayar had come to Bone. The purpose of the visit, however, was not to join Arung Palakka in a campaign against the Company, as had been feared by the Dutch, but to ask Arung Palakka for permission for Selayar to re-establish its former vassal relationship with Goa. This request had been denied because Selayar was once under Ternate's suzerainty. Another rumour of a visit to Bone by Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali was also confirmed by Arung Palakka. The explanation for the visit revealed Arung Palakka's predicament in attempting to satisfy the demands of both *siri'* and overlordship:

. . . the entertaining of Goa's ruler and nobles in Bone and the general fellowship with them had only occurred because of a great need and in order to cover a deep shame. Four years ago Goa nobles deceived me and kidnapped my wives, which was the greatest indignity that has ever been done to me. At the time I wanted to seek revenge on Goa, but the late [President] de Jong frustrated my intentions by advising that I write to Batavia about this. I did just that humbly requesting from the Noble Lords [i.e. the Supreme Government in Batavia] that I be allowed to wreak vengeance on Goa in order that my shame may be *covered*. To this day my request has not been granted. And so I must mix with those of Goa in apparent friendship because if the allies knew that I had not obtained approval from the Noble Lords to take revenge on Goa, my shame and scandal would be even greater. This is the reason that I must pretend to be friends with them . . . But if the Noble Lords were to allow me to avenge myself, today at this very hour I would show what is in my heart for their [Makassar people's] treachery is not unknown to me (Emphasis added).

Nevertheless, Arung Palakka assured Bogaart that as long as he lived, he would not disturb the general peace and welfare in this land (KA 1208a:520r-521r).

The Company had already anticipated Arung Palakka's complaints and for this reason had despatched Bogaart, a skilled and highly-placed Company official, to find some solution to the slowly deteriorating relations between Arung Palakka and the Company. Furthermore, the usually parsimonious Company had adjudged the situation of sufficient gravity to warrant a somewhat extravagant display of generosity to demonstrate its esteem for Arung Palakka. Arung Palakka and Daeng

Talele were presented with the following gifts with a total value of 750 guilders:

- 1 large diamond ring weighing 7 carats, worth 400 guilders
- 1 small diamond ring, worth 100 guilders
- 1 diamond set in a gold brooch, worth 200 guilders
- 1 Surat material with gold threads, worth 30 guilders
- other cloths, worth 20 guilders
- TOTAL WORTH: 750 GUILDERS (KA 1208a:521v).

These gifts and the conciliatory approach of Batavia's special envoy did much to appease Arung Palakka. With all South Sulawesi, as well as Butung and Ternate, witness to these gestures by the Company, Arung Palakka regained his lost prestige and strengthened his political influence in the area. There were few now who doubted that in any serious confrontation with Arung Palakka the latter would be able to enlist the full support of the Company.

During the talks Bogaart attempted to uncover the underlying cause of Arung Palakka's discontent with the Company. It was then that the whole sordid affair involving the Soppeng interpreter Syarif was mentioned by Arung Palakka. When he had heard of Syarif's arrest for the alleged murder of a Dutchman, Arung Palakka had appealed to President Harthouwer to have Syarif sent to Bontoala for questioning or, failing that, have Arung Palakka himself visit Syarif in his cell in Fort Rotterdam. These appeals were rejected by Harthouwer, and Syarif was subjected to the contemporary European practice of acquiring evidence through torture. Syarif's death had caused Arung Palakka great grief and anger. From that day forward whenever Arung Palakka and his allies had business with Fort Rotterdam they consulted the second Chief Merchant Dubbeldekop rather than President Harthouwer. Enough had been said to convince Bogaart to forbid Harthouwer from interfering any more in Arung Palakka's affairs. Arung Palakka was too valuable an ally to be alienated because of personal differences with a Company official. Bogaart therefore recommended that Harthouwer be removed as quickly as possible so that real contact could again be re-established with Arung Palakka and the Bugis (KA 1209b:220v-222v).

While Bogaart was ready to concede much on behalf of the Company in return for Arung Palakka's goodwill, he was nevertheless apprehensive at the latter's increasing political influence in South Sulawesi. The nobles of Tanete had recently deposed their ruler with prior knowledge of Arung Palakka and then quickly sought his protection once the act had been done. In the beginning of 1675 a war broke out between two

principalities in the north, Leta and Enrekang. The Dutch in Fort Rotterdam were told that Enrekang was being manipulated by Soppeng and Pammana as a way of indirectly attacking Arung Bakkě who had jurisdiction over Leta. What troubled the Company was the suspicion, later substantiated, that Arung Palakka had suggested these measure to Soppeng and Pammana. The Company was not surprised when the ruler of Enrekang later fled to Bone to seek Arung Palakka's protection (KA 1200b:168r). The whole incident was resolved when Arung Palakka simply declared that his regents would govern Leta and Enrekang and forbade any further interference in their affairs by Arung Bakkě. Arung Palakka was performing his peace-keeping activities so effectively that now Bogaart conveyed his dismay to Batavia that perhaps Arung Palakka was becoming too successful for the well-being of the Company itself (KA 1209b:223v-224r).

One matter raised by Arung Palakka in his talks with Bogaart was the interpretation of two articles of the Bungaya treaty. Having been reared in the local treaty-making traditions, Arung Palakka believed that the distinction between the conquered and the conquerors should be explicit in the terms of the document. Yet it appeared that Speelman had given rights to land to some of the enemy which did not rightfully belong to them. Arung Palakka requested an investigation to see whether other such injustices were being committed against the victorious allies. The other incomprehensible measure adopted by the Company through the vehicle of the treaty was the requirement of passes for native shipping, whether friend or foe. Nevertheless, Arung Palakka evinced a willingness to comply with this demand were it not for the difficulty facing Bugis ships from Bone attempting to go to Makassar to receive passes during the west monsoon. To overcome this obstacle he suggested that he be empowered to issue these passes from Bone itself. Bogaart was sympathetic to the problem of the passes, but he knew that conceding this power to Arung Palakka would make the Company's task of regulating navigational activities in and around South Sulawesi waters doubly difficult. Bogaart politely refused Arung Palakka's request and recommended instead that he either send someone overland to obtain the passes or else allow a Dutch post to be established in Bone for that purpose. Arung Palakka quickly rejected the second alternative but agreed to consider the first. Nevertheless, he insisted that Bogaart write to Batavia regarding his suggestion of issuing his own passes in Bone (KA 1209b:225r-226v).

Arung Palakka's rejection of the idea of a Dutch post in Bone was

inspired by fear of Dutch interference in his affairs. A permanent Dutch post in the heart of Bone would restrict his activities, and temporary separation had already proved to be an effective way of gaining Batavia's attention. In any open disagreement with the Dutch in Fort Rotterdam, he could retire to Bone and await their entreaties to return. The Dutch envoys invariably arrived with messages of conciliation since Arung Palakka had become indispensable for the maintenance of peace in South Sulawesi. More importantly, however, was the refuge which Bone offered away from the eyes and ears of the Dutch where he could implement many of his plans for creating an empire which would be ruled by, or at least responsive to, himself and his descendants.

The Dutch were aware of Arung Palakka's ambitions and had already concluded that Arung Palakka's request for his own stamp was part of his goal of acquiring control of all the native trade of South Sulawesi. Toward this end, they contended, he had moved his official residence to Cenrana, a spot close to the mouth of the Cenrana River with a harbour which could accommodate large ships (see Map 8). The Dutch feared that from Cenrana the Bugis could sail undetected to Butung and elsewhere, not only for ordinary trade but also for the precious spices from the Moluccas (KA 1209b:226v). With the building of a fortress on an island in the bend of the river, Arung Palakka was able to tax and control all traffic to and from the interior of Wajo and Soppeng.

During Bogaart's stay in Makassar, he was told how some of Arung Palakka's women had been scandalized by three Makassar lords while in Bone. Upon Arung Palakka's return to Bontoala, he had sent a messenger immediately to Karaeng Karunrung demanding that the perpetrators of the crime be punished. To prevent their flight Arung Palakka had all boats on the Tallo River seized and brought to Bontoala, and all oars and masts removed from boats found in the Garassi and Sanrabone Rivers (KA 1208a:522r-v). According to the version of the incident recounted by Arung Palakka, the year previously he had been host in Bone to a Goa delegation when several of its members had abused their status as guests by having illicit sexual relations with his women. Heading the list of offenders was Sultan Mohammad Ali himself who had an affair with Daeng Talele's niece. The others were Karaeng Lambengi, son of Karaeng Lengkesi, and Daeng Mamara, son of Karaeng Popo, hence two young nobles from prominent Goa families. So upsetting had this news been to Arung Palakka that he could neither rest nor have any pleasure in food or drink. Since these Goa lords had been his guests,

there was little that could be done at the time. Nevertheless, he was determined to seek vengeance and had brought back with him to Bontoala a large army composed of Bone and Soppeng warriors. This army was marched right up to the borders of Goa causing great consternation in that kingdom. Then Arung Palakka demanded the surrender of Karaeng Lambengi and Daeng Mamara as a condition for the withdrawal of the Bugis army. As for Sultan Mohammad Ali, he was to deliver his wife either to Arung Palakka or to Fort Rotterdam for safekeeping while he was tried. If it were found that he had not committed any sexual offence, then his wife would be returned untouched. But if it were proved otherwise, then Arung Palakka would exchange his "soiled" woman for Sultan Mohammad Ali's wife (KA 1208a:522v-523v). To Arung Palakka the enormity of the crime demanded a fitting punishment, and what could be more appropriate than to have a punishment which not only "covered" his shame but also subjected the guilty party to the agonies which he himself had undergone. To the people of South Sulawesi, justice would have been done and Arung Palakka could justifiably occupy his former position of prestige and power.

Twice in as many years Arung Palakka suffered the demeaning experience involving his women at the hands of some Goa nobles. In 1674 his *dayang*, court ladies, had been kidnapped, and in 1675 his own wives molested by some of the highest personages in the kingdom of Goa. There were certainly many in South Sulawesi who sensed a conspiracy, a cruel and effective weapon with which to attack Arung Palakka where guns and spears had failed. It was well-known that Arung Palakka had no children, a fact which must have been a source of anguish to him, especially in a society where the size of a family is often equated with virility. Yet all Sulawesi recognized Arung Palakka's great bravery in the battlefield. These "contradictory" features of Arung Palakka's character were successfully reconciled in village folktales which may have been current during Arung Palakka's lifetime. According to these tales Arung Palakka's extraordinary manliness prevented any woman from withstanding him long enough to receive his seed.³

Goa's oblique attack on Arung Palakka was readily recognizable by the people of South Sulawesi as a taunt to his manhood. To ignore it was to court ridicule and invite further challenge to his authority. Yet to resolve the problem through force would risk losing any Company support since it was averse to becoming embroiled in another costly war in South Sulawesi. Arung Palakka was therefore willing to offer Goa a way, albeit an unpleasant one, to avoid conflict. He made this offer in a

personal letter to Karaeng Karunrung:

... I beseech my older brother [Karaeng Karunrung] and my father, the Gallarang Manngasa [one of the *Bate Salapang*], that you commiserate with me and seriously consider in what manner I should cover my shame without bringing destruction to Goa. I also pray to God Almighty that He may preserve me from bringing suffering to those innocent. I also am not inclined to shed the blood of the king [of Goa], unless he himself is inclined to this. The king has not sought to shed my blood but has solely caused me such shame which is unbearable. This is the reason that I have demanded his house and that which is in it, meaning by that his wife, for it is well known among the Bone people that the king of Bone's [i.e. Arung Palakka's] house and that within it [i.e. his women] have been violated by the king [of Goa]. It is because of this that these differences have arisen. And the reason I am demanding his house, as I have said, is so that when the allied brothers who commiserate with me arrive here, it can be such that I can say to them, the war, that is the quarrels, is ended because the king of Goa, having once violated my house, now sees his house, that is his women, under me. In this way my shame will be covered. This, then, is the way and the means by which Goa can remain unscathed (KA 1208a:572r-v).

In this letter the essence of the quarrel between Arung Palakka and Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali is stated in a purely South Sulawesi idiom. The latter had brought *siri'*, shame, upon Arung Palakka by violating his women. Arung Palakka, therefore, appealed to two powerful Makassar leaders in terms of *pässe/pacce*, commiseration, in order to enlist their help in "covering" his shame. The only way this *siri'* could be "covered" was to have Sultan Mohammad Ali experience the same humiliation to which he had been subjected.

When Arung Palakka sent two of his most trusted men to Karaeng Karunrung to deliver the letter, Karaeng Karunrung disclosed his fall from favour. Then two slaves of Karaeng Lekobodong, son of Karaeng Lengkesse, came to inform Arung Palakka that Sultan Mohammad Ali had removed Karaeng Karunrung from his office and replaced him with Karaeng Lambengi, one of those who had committed the crime against Arung Palakka. Karaeng Karunrung had been stripped of all his possessions and servants except five old women and had been accusingly told to "go wherever Arung Palakka allows you". His conciliatory attitude toward Arung Palakka had brought nothing but abuse and suspicion from the younger members of the Goa government. The final humiliation was confiscation of his goods and property after his many years of loyal service to Goa (KA 1208a:530v).

Arung Palakka saw little alternative now but to issue an ultimatum to

the Goa government. When his letter was read aloud in the Goa court, there was a great uproar among those present. Some arose, unsheathed their swords, and swore an oath of undying allegiance to Sultan Mohammad Ali. They pledged never to tolerate the deliverance of his wife to Arung Palakka or to the Dutch. Although rumours were rife of an impending attack on Arung Palakka's residence at Bontoala by Makassar armed groups, nothing happened. Then on 10 March 1675 Karaeng Jarannikka, Bone, and Mangajene, a younger brother of Sultan Mohammad Ali, appeared in Fort Rotterdam to ask the Company on behalf of the Goa government to mediate in the quarrels between Goa and Arung Palakka. They admitted that some of their people, including the Sultan, had committed wrongs against Arung Palakka, and they sincerely hoped that the Company would take the gold which they had brought and present it to Arung Palakka in compensation for their crimes. When the Dutch asked what Goa would do if Arung Palakka refused the gold, the messengers replied that Goa would ask the Company to mediate and would then accept its judgement (KA 1208a: 524r-v).

The Goa government knew that the Company was the only power in South Sulawesi which could exercise any moderating influence on Arung Palakka. So strong was Arung Palakka's sense of moral indebtedness that he repeatedly emphasized both in public and in private that his life belonged to the Company. The Goa leaders had shrewdly calculated the importance of this moral debt to Arung Palakka and were rewarded by a relenting of his attitude. Arung Palakka agreed to withdraw his demands for Sultan Mohammad Ali's wife in return for Goa's promise to pay in full its outstanding war indemnity to the Company. Insofar as the two other offenders were concerned, Arung Palakka remained adamant in his demand for their delivery.

Arung Palakka's concession was welcomed, but it was apparently far less than what had been expected. On 13th March the Goa government informed the Dutch that Karaeng Lambengi and Daeng Mamara could nowhere be found. Furthermore, it explained that it could not repay the outstanding debt of 201,612 ⁵/₈ *rijksdaalders* which it still owed the Company. The failure of the Goa government to concede a single point annoyed the Company officials who had succeeded in obtaining what they considered a significant concession from Arung Palakka. They now told the Goa leaders that the Company would no longer become directly involved and suggested that Goa send envoys to Arung Palakka at Bontoala to discuss the matter further. But when the Company officials

saw with what dread the Goa government regarded this suggestion, they offered to accompany any Goa delegation to Bontoala (KA 1208a: 526r-527v).

No Goa delegation ever appeared at Bontoala. On 21st March Arung Palakka appeared at Fort Rotterdam in a great rage. Notwithstanding the clear impression of fear which the Dutch detected among the members of the Goa government when Arung Palakka was mentioned, there was no lack of courage when Sultan Mohammad Ali marched with 500 Makassar warriors, a hundred of whom were clad in chain-mail armour, up to the very walls of Bontoala. The force was divided into three groups: one under the personal command of the Sultan, another under Karaeng Jarannikka, and the third under the old Karaeng Popo. From the walls of Fort Rotterdam Dutch observers had seen the Makassar warriors marching quickly from Goa along the woods toward Bontoala. According to Arung Palakka, they came to "within a musket shot" of Bontoala's walls, stayed there "as long as it takes one to chew *sirih*", and then left without trying to make any contact (KA 1208a:528r-530v).

Arung Palakka ordered his Bugis troops already camped near Goa's borders to move forward to prevent any traffic between Goa and the outside world. But he also issued strict instructions that no harm should come to man or beast, for ". . . he was not inclined to shed innocent blood and may the God in heaven punish him if he should seek anything more than to bring the criminals before the allies to be tried". He reiterated emphatically that his only concern was to punish those who had brought him this shame and asked the Company to support him. The Dutch officials in Fort Rotterdam attempted to dissuade Arung Palakka from any action until word was received from Batavia, but Arung Palakka was no longer prepared to remain silent and inactive in his humiliation. He told the Dutch bluntly that if no approval were given to his plans, he would return the golden chain and the red silk umbrella which had been presented to him by the Company in 1672 for his loyal services. If he were to be released from his oath of loyalty to the Company, he and his followers would wreak vengeance upon Goa and then leave Sulawesi and roam the seas (KA 1208a:530v, 533v-534r).

It was this threat which convinced the Company that this time there could be no compromise. Arung Palakka had succumbed at first to Dutch pressure and moderated his original demands on Goa. However, this move had not brought a solution and instead had emboldened the Goa government to send troops to Bontoala. To have remained silent any longer after such a defiant challenge would have undermined Arung

Palakka's reputation considerably within South Sulawesi. So important was it for Arung Palakka to maintain his *siri*, his self-respect, that he was willing to arouse the displeasure of the Company and perhaps lose everything he had gained with its help in order to safeguard it. It was not merely a bluff but was a response which was perfectly comprehensible and even expected by his society. The Dutch finally conceded, for they realized that Arung Palakka's desperate threats were potentially of greater danger to the Company than a blockade of Goa (KA 1208a:534r).

Arung Palakka's army was reinforced by more troops from Bone under the command of Arung Mampu and Daeng Memang. Prior to marching into battle the Bugis forces assembled and marched past Fort Rotterdam accompanied by the beating of drums and the playing of local instruments. Arung Palakka, mounted on a horse, wore around his neck two large gold chains with medallions which had been presented to him by the Company. With this army of 3,000 armed men, Arung Palakka began a new war against Goa in the early months of 1676. A string of stockades marked the progress of the invading army into Goa. The rapid advance, however, very nearly caused Arung Palakka's death. After the building of the second stockade, he left a small force to man it and then went to seek a suitable site for the third. In the meantime the Makassar troops seized the second stockade and waited for Arung Palakka's return. Had it not been for Arung Bakkě's shouting a warning at the last moment, Arung Palakka would have been killed by Makassar shots as was his companion, Datu Pammana. But this was a minor incident in a war which lacked the ferocity which had characterized the Makassar War of 1666-9. There were the occasional skirmish and desultory attacks on the enemy's stockades, but there appeared little doubt that it would only be a matter of time before Goa would have to concede defeat. In one of the battles the Goa side had been encouraged by news that Arung Palakka had been wounded. A large Makassar attack was launched hoping to capitalize on Arung Palakka's disability, but it failed to penetrate the Bugis defences. There seemed little point in continuing a war of attrition with the Bugis, and so the Goa government appealed to the Company to mediate a peace (KA 1208a:535r-536v).

On 13 May 1676 the Dutch arranged a meeting between Arung Palakka and Karaeng Goa. A bamboo meeting place was built midway between the opposing stockades, and there the two belligerents met at 10:00 a.m. on the 13th. The following points were agreed upon:

1. Karaeng Goa would pay Arung Palakka a fine of 10,000 *mas* or its equivalent value in guns, slaves, and other goods. Half of this amount was to be paid within two days, at which time the armies of the allies would be removed from Goa. The other half would be delivered in six weeks.
2. Sultan Mohammad Ali and the Goa government would deliver to the Company Karaeng Lambengi to be banished to whichever spot chosen by the Company. His wife would also be surrendered to Arung Palakka.
3. Sultan Mohammad Ali and the Goa government would deliver to the Company guns and other firearms found in Goa in accordance with the Bungaya treaty of 1669.
4. Sultan Mohammad Ali and the Goa government would destroy the walls around the royal settlement in Goa which they had re-erected by simply placing the loose red stones on top of each other. They would also destroy the stockades which were evacuated by the allies (KA 1208a:556r; KA 1208b:558v-559v).

Karaeng Lambengi was brought to Fort Rotterdam as requested, the walls of Goa were destroyed, and two large cannons were surrendered to the Company. But these were minor concessions which did little to appease Arung Palakka. Neither he nor his family would accept these “token gestures” by Goa, he explained to the Dutch, because no amount of money would redeem his shame and the blood shed by Karaeng Goa. Only if the Company were to ask Arung Palakka to accept this settlement would he agree to do so out of his life-long loyalty to the Company. Dubbeldekop told Batavia that he did not doubt that Arung Palakka would abide by the agreement, “for His Highness [Arung Palakka] is well aware what his great numbers of Bugis would amount to without the might of the Company fighting beside them”. Had it not been for the assistance provided by Arung Bakkě and the Mandar warriors in the latest war with Goa, Dubbeldekop was convinced that the Bugis forces would have been “badly beleaguered on all sides” (KA 1208b:560r-v; KA 1209c:240v-241r). It was difficult for Dubbeldekop or any of the Company officials to believe that any local leader would obey the Company except for purely selfish reasons. Despite Arung Palakka’s persistent and consistent expressions and acts of loyalty toward the Company, he was not totally trusted. Yet Arung Palakka’s behaviour was dictated by accepted custom in South Sulawesi. He was morally bound to the Company, for to do less would have been interpreted by the people of South Sulawesi as an ungrateful act against those responsible for restoring his *siri*’ and hence his life.

Having agreed to end the short war which began on 29 March and

ended on 13 May 1676, Arung Palakka now attempted to fulfil the Company's requests to limit the Bugis rampage through the Makassar countryside. But the victorious Bugis armies marching home could not be restrained and great damage was caused in Maros, one of the Company's principal suppliers of rice. Because of marauding Bugis, the roads leading to Goa became unsafe. Arung Palakka finally threatened to make examples of those caught endangering traffic on these roads.

All of these measures were undertaken by Arung Palakka as part of his obligations to the Company, but he was unhappy that the Company had asked him to end all hostilities before he had obtained satisfaction from Goa. To show his disapproval of the Company's decision, Arung Palakka left Bontoala to return to the security of his own kingdom. His plans to return to his newly-built capital in Cenrana caused the Company some concern because of his state of mind. His wife Daeng Talele and two of his most trusted members in the Bone government, Arung Tanete La Ompo and Arung Maruangen, tried to dissuade Arung Palakka from going for they feared that once in Bone Arung Palakka would believe slanderous remarks about the Company. There were always some Bone and Soppeng nobles eager to incite Arung Palakka against the Company as had occurred that previous year (KA 1208c:565v-567r).

Arung Palakka could not be dissuaded. Despite his moral debt to the Company, he believed himself to have been grievously wronged by the Dutch. They had obtained a judgement from the South Sulawesi allies which allowed Goa to escape lightly from the heinous crime committed against him. On his return to Cenrana he expressed his discontent by telling the Dutch that he was sending envoys to Batavia to return the red umbrella and medals which the Company had presented to him in 1672. He explained that "he was not worthy to have these since *he was as one dead as long as he was not able to avenge himself against those in Goa*" (Emphasis added. KA 1208d:586r). Karaeng Goa, Sultan Ali and his companions had caused him *siri*', and by being frustrated in this attempt to remove his shame, he was still in the state of *mate siri*', or having his self-respect dead in the eyes of the community. Although he blamed the Dutch officials in Fort Rotterdam for this state of affairs, he never forgot that it was the Company which had once "restored his life". Therefore, the only effective weapon he had was to make the Company aware of his dissatisfaction and to make it obvious that he was as necessary to the Company as the Company was to him. In these first few stormy years of joint overlordship, both parties were constantly probing and testing the true intentions of the other. But no matter how bitter the relations

became between some Company officials in Fort Rotterdam and Arung Palakka throughout the 17th century, the missives to Batavia written by the governor or president of the Company post in Fort Rotterdam often contained assurances from Arung Palakka that “as long as he lived he would sacrifice his life to the Company who had made him great and powerful” (KA 1208d:561v *passim*).

Having the Company as an ally had, of course, considerable political and military advantages for Arung Palakka. The Company desired peace, or more precisely the cessation of wars, because it wished to safeguard its position in Makassar as another link in the Company’s entire Asian network. Arung Palakka, on the other hand, hoped for a peace which would politically acknowledge his status as an overlord in South Sulawesi. Their differing expectations of the general peace which was being sought explained the Company’s willingness after the Bungaya treaty of 1667 to agree to establish quick settlements with the South Sulawesi states which often proved ephemeral. But Arung Palakka brooded, schemed, and only consented to those points in the Dutch-drafted treaties which furthered his political goal. As long as they both sought and acquired their separate but compatible versions of peace, they could cooperate comfortably with each other.

The large numbers of kingdoms in South Sulawesi had now come to acknowledge and be responsive to the wishes of Arung Palakka and the Company. Arung Palakka continued to act on behalf of the Company, but it was not long before the South Sulawesi states realized that it was Arung Palakka, rather than the Company, who affected their lives more directly and permanently. The Company was seen as a trader with an instinct for profit and a field of operation which extended beyond the South Sulawesi shores. Arung Palakka, however, was born of local aristocracy with dreams and plans rooted firmly in South Sulawesi soil. It quickly became apparent to all that it was Arung Palakka and not the Company who would determine the survival or demise of any local lord. The measure of Arung Palakka’s growing responsibility for the “peace” sought by the Company and himself in South Sulawesi is reflected in his dominant role in resolving local crises. There was no question of a major threat to his position, only the insidious undermining of his authority which demanded a firm but fair response. Arung Palakka was being evaluated as an overlord by his fellow rulers, and it was this knowledge which encouraged him to consider any crisis, no matter how minor, to be worthy of his full attention.

When Arung Palakka issued a general call for labourers from all states to help build Fort Rotterdam, the tiny mountain villages of Cenrana, Lempo, and Camba near Maros refused to comply. The people had decided instead to flee to the safety of the mountains saying that they would continue to recognize Goa as their overlord. The reason for their action was soon revealed. The Bugis had ravaged their lands unmercifully during their march to and from the war in Goa, and so there was little inclination to acknowledge Arung Palakka's or the Company's overlordship. A further cause of discontent was a result of action instigated by Arung Palakka's own lords, Arung Pattiro and Arung Kaju, who had been appointed co-regents in the principality of Camba. Their jealousy of one another and maneuvering for power had caused the local people to despair of any proper rule under Arung Palakka (KA 1208e: 573v-575r).

A more serious crisis occurred in Luwu. After the deposed Datu Luwu, Daeng Massuro Matinroe ri Tompotikka', had been invested as Arung Larompong with the blessings of Arung Palakka and the new Datu Luwu Daeng Mattuju, affairs in Luwu appeared at first to have been resolved to everyone's satisfaction. Then sometime in June or early July 1676, the new Datu Luwu chased Daeng Massuro out of Larompong and completely destroyed his residence. Daeng Mattuju had only agreed to establish Daeng Massuro at Larompong in the first place because of Arung Palakka's pressure. But once he had consolidated his position within Luwu, Daeng Mattuju began a campaign "to remove the heavy burden imposed by the people of Bone and take Bone and Cenrana either peacefully or by force". In preparation for this campaign, so it was reported, Daeng Mattuju had sent swords to various areas asking them to join in the attack against Bone or face the wrath of Luwu. These areas had returned the sword and instead had sent their envoys to Cenrana to seek help from Arung Palakka. One of the states which had been approached by Daeng Mattuju was Wajo. The Arung Matoa Wajo informed Arung Palakka of this approach and reassured the latter that he would remain loyal. But he warned Arung Palakka that Luwu's troops were planning to march on Peneki in Wajo within five days (KA 1208f:397). Upon receiving this letter Arung Palakka immediately sent Arung Mampu to Peneki at the head of 1,000 men. It was hoped that this show of strength would be sufficient to deter any further ambitions of Daeng Mattuju. Arung Palakka was assured that, if the situation deteriorated into war, his former enemies would not come to Luwu's aid. Neither Wajo nor Mandar dared join Luwu, and although Goa had given

clandestine encouragement it was still recovering from its recent defeat at the hands of the Bugis. As a precaution, nevertheless, the Company and Arung Palakka decided to have a force ready to prevent some of the young warriors of Goa from going as individuals to help Luwu (KA 1208g:424-6; KA 1208e: 578v-580r).

On 31st September Arung Palakka left Cenrana by sea for Siwa with 10,000 men from the various South Sulawesi allies, while another 20,000 under the command of Daeng Memang went by land. Luwu's troops were encamped in the north not far from Siwa and consisted of 4,000 men from Luwu and 10,000 from Toraja. They were divided into three with one group at sea under Datu Luwu Daeng Mattuju himself, another on land under the Datu's brother, Opu Balirante, and the third also on land under another of Datu Luwu's brothers, Daeng Mattola. The Bone army under Daeng Memang arrived in Luwu first and took Sampano, the southernmost district of Larompong. Five Luwu princes came over to the side of the former Datu Luwu, Daeng Massuro, who was with Daeng Memang's army. They reported that there was great consternation among the people of Luwu who had sent away their wives and children to the mountains for safety. These princes were convinced that the people would come and join Daeng Massuro as soon as they realized he had returned. With this in mind Arung Palakka made Daeng Massuro march with the army. As soon as the Luwu defenders saw the Bugis army approaching, they abandoned their posts and fled back to Larompong. Larompong itself was defended by 500 Luwu troops under Daeng Mattola, but at the approach of the allied army they fled without a fight. The people of Larompong flocked to the allied camp to seek "protection" from Daeng Massuro and to offer their allegiance to him as Datu Luwu. From the village of Larompong Arung Palakka went with his army by river northward and destroyed Cimpu, the northernmost settlement in the principality of Larompong. The progress of the allied army was very rapid after Cimpu, and by the beginning of October 1676 preparations were made for the final assault on Warĕ, the royal capital of Luwu. At midday Arung Palakka went to reconnoitre with fifty or sixty of his bravest men. They were ambushed by some 2-300 Luwu warriors, but although hopelessly outnumbered Arung Palakka and his men soon put the ambushers to flight and took twenty heads. It was reported that Arung Teko had conducted himself with great courage and was rewarded by Arung Palakka with a gold-threaded robe.

On 11 October 1676 the allied forces occupied three stockades built about a half mile from Warĕ. While they were busily erecting stockades,

a Toraja ruler named Suso (?) offered his army to Arung Palakka in the battle for Warě. Arung Palakka welcomed the Toraja ruler as an ally and also presented him with a robe of honour and a gold chain. A further cause for rejoicing was the timely arrival of three Dutch sloops with forty Dutch soldiers. The battle began on 13th October when the Luwu army launched its attack. Despite the initial advantage of surprise, the Luwu army was decisively defeated. Datu Luwu Daeng Mattuju and his brothers Daeng Mattola and Opu Balirante escaped into the jungle accompanied by fifty or sixty of their followers. In pursuit were some 1,000 warriors with specific instructions to deliver all the women and children of these refugee princes into Arung Palakka's hands. The fugitives successfully eluded their pursuers for a time but were eventually captured sometime in November. Opu Balirante gained a pardon from Arung Palakka because of his willingness to divulge everything that had occurred in Luwu which had led to the war. The other two royal captives were delivered to the Dutch and imprisoned in Fort Rotterdam to await exile. The only other resistance came from a stockade with about 100 defenders under Daeng Malino, one of the principal leaders in Daeng Mattuju's government. But they too soon surrendered for fear of Arung Palakka's wrath. Daeng Malino "asked forgiveness for the inhabitants of Luwu since they were not to blame for the war but had been compelled to participate as subjects [of Datu Luwu]".

Arung Palakka stipulated the following conditions for any peace with Luwu:

1. Daeng Massuro with 5-600 [Bone] Bugis be allowed to enter Luwu to take possession of the kingdom.
2. The Luwu people again accept Daeng Massuro as their ruler.
3. All those from Wajo and other areas who had fought alongside Luwu be delivered to their rulers and made slaves.

These conditions were accepted on 13 October 1676 officially ending the war. It was also later agreed that Luwu would pay the Company 100 *taels* of gold for breach of the Bungaya treaty. With peace once again restored in Luwu, all the Toraja rulers and nobles came to pay homage to the new Datu Luwu Daeng Massuro Matinroe ri Tompotikka' (KA 1209d:269r-v; KA 1214a:293; KA 1216a:87, 117-8; KA 1216b:36-7; KA 1216c:131-141).

The information which Opu Balirante furnished Arung Palakka proved damaging to Karaeng Tanete. Although he had been installed as ruler of Tanete with the blessing and assistance of Arung Palakka only some six months before, he was reluctant to obey the summons from

Arung Palakka to join the allied expedition against Luwu. He pleaded illness and sent his son instead as commander over a small contingent from Tanete. Because of his less than enthusiastic response to the war, it was rumoured that he would have joined the Luwu camp if the war had turned against the allies (KA 1216a:93-4). Another ruler who came under suspicion was Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali because of his correspondence with Daeng Mattuju. According to one of the letters presented to Arung Palakka by Daeng Mattuju's wife, Sultan Mohammad Ali had incited Luwu to action by assuring it that "all of the people north of Goa as far as Tanete and south of Goa as far as Bulo-Bulo were friends of the house of Goa". In this somewhat oblique fashion he implied that Goa and its numerous allies would come to Luwu's support when the time came.

On 22 January 1677 Karaeng Karunrung was summoned to Fort Rotterdam to vouch for the authenticity of this letter from Sultan Mohammad Ali. He verified that it was written with the Sultan's own hand and stamped with his own seal. Karaeng Karunrung was clearly dismayed at this disclosure and said regretfully that had he been still in government such a thing would never have happened. As long as the Sultan and his young supporters dominated the Goa government there would be no end to the troubles with Goa. Karaeng Sanrabone, brother of the Sultan, echoed Karaeng Karunrung's sentiments and even volunteered the information that he himself had seen the letter. He recommended that Goa's Council, the *Bate Salapang*, be summoned to consider deposing the Sultan "since he had so faithlessly broken the solemnly-sworn treaty" (KA 1216a:104-5). Both Karaeng Sanrabone and Karaeng Karunrung had grievances with the Sultan and stood to gain if he were deposed. Their evidence, however, was only one of a number of others in the past which demonstrated the Sultan's unrelenting efforts to destroy the authority of Arung Palakka and the Company in South Sulawesi.

Through Dutch pressure the 1676 war between Arung Palakka and Goa had ended prematurely without resolving the basic causes of the conflict. The failure of Goa to provide real satisfaction to Arung Palakka for the scandal involving his women, and the openly unrepentant attitude of Sultan Mohammad Ali toward this incident, were a continuing source of *siri'* to Arung Palakka. The Company had wanted peace, and it appeared convinced that forcing the belligerents to agree to a peace treaty was sufficient. To have attempted to obtain solutions to some of the difficult issues underlying the tension between Arung

Palakka and Goa would have required more time and effort than the Company believed necessary. As a result the Company supervised another short-lived peace marked by yet another “peace treaty”. The animosity between Arung Palakka and Sultan Mohammad Ali continued unabated despite the 1676 peace, and evidence of the latter’s complicity in Luwu’s decision to wage war on Arung Palakka dangerously accentuated this feeling.

The arrival of a number of rulers to Arung Palakka’s residence at Bontoala convinced the Goa government that a new war was likely. A Goa delegation was therefore sent to Fort Rotterdam on 5 April 1677. It was headed by Daeng Mangappa, brother of Sultan Mohammad Ali, and Karaeng Bone, son of Karaeng Karunrung, to ask the Dutch whether there was any truth to the rumour that Arung Palakka intended to make war on Goa. If there were to be a war, Goa requested only that the Company refrain from providing Arung Palakka with men or ammunition. Despite Goa’s previous defeats at the hands of Arung Palakka, it believed this to be due mainly to the support of the Dutch. Apparently the Dutch were of a similar mind and thus worded their reply cautiously in order not to antagonize Goa nor encourage any new outbreak of fighting. They told the Goa delegation that they had heard no rumours of war, but if there should be one, they would act “in accordance with what fairness and duty demanded at the time” (KA 1216a:107-8).

Goa’s apprehensions were well-founded. On 7th April Arung Palakka appeared in Fort Rotterdam and presented the Dutch with a list of grievances against Goa on behalf of the allies:

1. One of the Makassar subjects had maliciously murdered a Dutchman, and though the Goa government knew who the murderer was, it had not been willing to surrender him to the Company.
2. Goa had sent a mission to Banten to buy guns and ammunitions without the Company’s permission.
3. Goa was conducting a regular correspondence with the Makassar refugees at Demang in Java and elsewhere who have brought obstruction, damage, and ruin to the Company’s allies.
4. Goa had retained and hidden runaway slaves from Ujung Pandang which was now under the Company’s jurisdiction.
5. Goa had promised to deliver the bandit Kare Jaga [who had abducted one of Arung Palakka’s court maidens] to the Company, but nothing had been done.
6. Goa had promised the Company to destroy the fortifications in the kingdom but instead had strengthened them.
7. Goa had promised to deliver all the large guns to the Company but instead had hidden them or sold them to the Malays.

8. Goa had encouraged Luwu to take arms against the Company and then had provided it with weapons.
9. Goa had provided weapons to Camba [which had rebelled against Arung Palakka and the Company].
10. Goa had encouraged the Company's subjects in Cenrana [behind Maros] to rebel and had supported them with guns and ammunition.
11. Goa had continued to retain in Goa, unjustly and unlawfully, a large number of Bugis, people from Turatea and other Company allies, and those who were now Company subjects as a result of conquest.

Because of this treatment by Goa, the allies demand satisfaction. "*If we must suffer such shame without longing for satisfaction, we would no longer be considered among the living but among the dead and unfeeling people.* We, therefore, have decided that Karaeng Goa [Sultan Mohamad Ali] and all the princes who at present remain with him should be delivered to the Company, if not peaceably, then by force" (Emphasis added. KA 1217a:228r-v).

This document, which reflected as much Arung Palakka's as the allies' sentiments, is couched in terms of "shame" or *siri*, perhaps the most compelling force throughout Arung Palakka's life. The impact of *siri* is usually confined to a small number of people, but because of Arung Palakka's position of power the whole of South Sulawesi became embroiled in his *siri* affairs. Arung Palakka had succeeded in accruing so much power within the short period of a decade that with supreme aplomb he equated his interests with those of the South Sulawesi allies and the Company. In Arung Palakka's later correspondence with the Company, the *siri* which he suffered at the hands of Goa became transformed into the *siri* of the allies involving the credibility of the Company's status as Lord Protector (*beschermheer*), of its South Sulawesi allies. The allies under Arung Palakka's direction told the Company officials in Fort Rotterdam that if the Company did nothing to bring justice in this affair of *siri*, they would also sit idly by if the Company were ever brought shame in the future. Under this type of pressure the Council in Fort Rotterdam met and agreed to provide ammunition and 120 Dutch soldiers under Nicholas Pleun to support the allies in another war against Goa.

The situation in Makassar deteriorated even further when a Makassar prince, Karaeng Mamu, was murdered by some Bugis in Bontoala on the evening of 8th April. When asked about the killing, Arung Palakka tersely replied that he had warned Karaeng Mamu to stay away from Bontoala during these highly tense times. On the following morning Karaeng Jarannikka came to Bontoala with some 3-400 armed men to get the body, but it had already been taken by Arung Teko the previous

evening and buried at Tallo. The tension was so great that Arung Palakka considered it prudent to dispose of the body quietly at night and avoid an emotional confrontation which could lead to violence when the Goa delegation arrived. Nevertheless, feelings on both sides were so inflamed that it became obvious to all that any hope for a reconciliation had been dashed. On 17th April the allies under Arung Palakka marched their armies as far as Tallo. They camped there while awaiting a reply from Goa's *Bate Salapang* to the following letter from Fort Rotterdam:

. . . With this you are informed that for some time Karaeng Goa [Sultan Mohammad Ali] with some of his evil Council members have not neglected, contrary to their word and sworn oath, to disturb most faithlessly the general quiet and peace among the allies of this island . . . They have made Datu Luwu take up arms against the Company's allies and their lands by promising him assistance and weapons. In the same way they were able to make the people of Camba and Cenrana rebel and abandon the Company . . . In order that in the future Karaeng Goa and his Council members take greater care not to break the sworn treaty so lightly, we have decided to inform the regents [Bate Salapang] of Goa of this . . . so that they may be delivered immediately into our hands. The Company is authorized to do this in accordance with the treaty with Karaeng Tallo and the Lord Admiral Cornelis Speelman agreed upon on 9 March 1668, and with Karaeng Goa and his lords on 27 July. Karaeng Goa, Jarannikka, Bone, Ballo', and Bontomanompo had all accepted and sworn to the treaty. In order that the people of Goa, who are innocent, should not come to feel the shame which the above-mentioned five people as faithless, venomous individuals have deserved, they should be handed over and no bodily harm will be done to them . . . otherwise it would be necessary to get them from Goa dead or alive (KA 1216d:82-4).

The letter was not delivered to the *Bate Salapang* but intercepted by Sultan Mohammad Ali. He read the letter and then sent the messenger back without a reply. The murder of Karaeng Mamu, eulogised in a 1669 court panegyric as one of the bravest of Makassar warriors (Skinner 1963:169, 205, 211, 213), had aroused the anger of the Goa people. To have ignored this feeling and capitulated would have brought about the Sultan's own downfall. If he had to lose his throne, what more glorious way was there then in defence of his land? There was no need for words; his message was clearly understood by the allies who now began the task of erecting blockades for the impending war (KA 1216a:108-112).

The next five or six days were quiet except for a brief skirmish on a hill. The trophies of the battle – thirty heads and three standards – were sent

to the Dutch by Arung Palakka as a sign of victory. Unlike previous wars between Arung Palakka and Goa, this time there were several prominent Makassar lords who openly sided with Arung Palakka. Karaeng Sanrabone disliked his brother Sultan Mohammad Ali and harboured an ill-concealed ambition to succeed to the Goa throne. He had brought some of his best warriors to fight for Arung Palakka. There were also Karaeng Lengcese (Arung Palakka's brother-in-law), Karaeng Bontosunggu (Karaeng Karunrung's brother), and Daeng Malewa (the new Karaeng Galesong), although their loyalties were somewhat suspect because it was known they still maintained contact with Karaeng Jaranikka and other nobles in Goa (KA 1216a:113, 125).

The war was typical of many South Sulawesi wars with the occasional battle without any great casualties on either side. There were also the usual harrowing incidents involving Arung Palakka, such as the evening when he miraculously escaped with only three flesh wounds after strolling around the Bugis defence perimeters unarmed and without a bodyguard. Finally on 24th May a major attack was launched against Goa and "came within a pistol shot" of succeeding (KA 1216e:147). The allies were now in possession of Goa's walls "from the Bisei Gate to the Karunrung Gate", and their stockades were established far within Goa territory. With victory within reach Arung Palakka decided to call a conference on 15th June to discuss the final moves in the war. Among those present were Paulus de Bocq (who was acting head of Fort Rotterdam after the death from illness of President Dubbeldekop on 18 May 1677) and Arung Palakka's Makassar allies Karaeng Sanrabone, Lengcese, and Bontosunggu. De Bocq suggested that these Makassar lords contact their friends within Goa to encourage them to join the allies and thus "prevent the complete devastation of the land and the poor inhabitants". The three Makassar lords agreed to carry out de Bocq's proposal but first expressed a wish to consult the ailing but still highly-respected Karaeng Karunrung in Tallo (KA 1216f:158).

Goa asked for a ceasefire on 19 June 1677, but not to discuss terms of a surrender. Instead, it demanded that the Company either force the allies to withdraw from Goa or remove its men and cannons to Fort Rotterdam so that the allies would have to fight Goa alone. The tone of the letter revealed a confidence in the Goa fighting men and a contempt for those of the Company's allies, an attitude which had also been expressed privately by some of the Company officials in Fort Rotterdam. Partly because of this, and partly because of the necessity of demonstrating the Company's loyalty to the allies, the Dutch rejected Goa's

demands. They explained that they would do nothing until “satisfaction had been given to the Honourable Company for the humiliation it had suffered because of their [the Goa people’s] frequent contraventions and transgressions of their agreement”. That same evening Goa envoys returned with another message:

. . . Karaeng Goa [Sultan Mohammad Ali] and the other leaders are aware that they had contravened many of the points of the sworn treaty. They ask that they be forgiven by the Company and not be made to suffer any unbearable punishments. They are also willing to follow the demands of the Company in the following way. Karaeng Goa, Ballo’, Jarannikka, Bone, and Bontomanompo would be removed from the Goa government and a new ruler chosen. These lords would be allowed to remain in Goa or whichever place of their choosing and not become part of any government. Secondly, they would surrender all cannons and large guns which are dug up and brought to them. In accordance with Article 18 of the Bungaya treaty, they would return all people living within Goa to their rightful lord as indicated by the allies. Finally, as they had promised in the past year, they would deliver the bandit [Kare] Jaga to the Company dead or alive. All those of our inhabitants who had fled and claimed Goa as their homeland are presently being retained.

Later that evening, however, a personal message from Sultan Mohammad Ali himself arrived stating emphatically that he had no intention whatsoever of fulfilling the points made in the earlier letter from Goa. The struggle between the peace and war factions in the Goa court was growing more open and bitter as the war drew closer to the heart of Goa. The seriousness of the rift was soon demonstrated when several Goa nobles from the peace faction fleeing to join Arung Palakka were caught and put to death. According to later eyewitnesses from Goa, the killings had caused great commotion among both the common people and the nobles in that kingdom (KA 1216g:167-171, 174-5).

Despite the tenacity of Goa’s defenders, the lack of food, water and other supplies was taking its toll. On 18 July 1677 the allies gained control of the plains in Goa and proceeded to burn and loot the conquered areas as was customary in local warfare. A wind blew up the following day which fanned the flames causing widespread destruction throughout Goa. So fierce was the blaze that whatever provisions which the Makassar forces may have stored were destroyed. Karaeng Ballo’ and 3-400 men tried to slip away and, so it was rumoured, join the bandit groups under Kare Jaga in the mountains. This small band was intercepted by Bugis forces under Arung Mario, and in the ensuing fight Karaeng Ballo’ was wounded. Karaeng Jarannikka asked and was given

pardon, and so he, his family, and fifty of his warriors were placed under Karaeng Sanrabone's jurisdiction. All further resistance was quickly squashed and peace was soon declared in Goa (KA 1216h:185-6).

After this victory the Company demanded that Sultan Mohammad Ali and his supporters be removed from the Goa government and Karaeng Sanrabone be made ruler of Goa. This demand provoked an angry response from the Sultan who reminded the Company that he had been made ruler not through money or intrigue but through legitimate means as a result of his royal birth and of being chosen by the princes, the local leaders (*gallarang*), and the heads of the *Bate Salapang*. He was subject to their will alone, and if it were their wish that he submit then he would do so willingly. But his was the final proud and defiant gesture of a ruler attempting to retrieve honour from defeat. A few days later Kare Takku' and the interpreter Kare Gappa came to the Dutch and the allies with a message from the nobles in Goa. They declared their willingness to accept the Company's demands and only asked that their wives, children and maidens not be taken from them by the Bugis. They also agreed to accept the following Company's conditions for peace:

1. Karaeng Goa [Sultan Mohammad Ali] abdicate and his place be filled by [his brother] Karaeng Sanrabone. Karaeng Goa also be punished by the Company for having broken the treaty.
2. Goa surrender all its cannons and large guns to the Company.
3. Goa return all runaway slaves belonging to the Dutch and those living among them [i.e., the people of Goa].
4. Goa allow all those from Bone, Soppeng, Mandar, and Luwu held illegally in Goa to return home.

They then promised to come to Fort Rotterdam to install a new ruler. Since the danger posed by marauding Bugis was still great, they also requested that a Dutch bodyguard accompany them from Goa to Fort Rotterdam. The Company therefore sent a contingent of some thirty Dutch soldiers to Goa to assure them a safe passage. On the morning of 27 July 1677 the members of the Goa government arrived at Karaeng Sanrabone's residence bearing the *Sudang*, a sword which was one of the most revered objects in Goa, the royal umbrella, and the rest of Goa's regalia. In the presence of Arung Palakka, Datu Luwu, Maradia Balan-nipa, Karaeng Karunrung, Karaeng Lengcese, Arung Maruangen, Arung Amali Gëllarëng Tosawa, Daeng Matoaya, Karaeng Jarannikka, and the Dutch Captain Nicholas Pleun, the regalia was ceremonially presented to Karaeng Sanrabone as the new Karaeng Goa. The installation of Karaeng Sanrabone as Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil

[Tumenanga ri Lakiung] marked the formal end of the war. All stockades built by Goa and the allies were destroyed, and both armies dispersed to their respective homes (KA 1216h:187-192).

When Jacob Cops arrived in Makassar in January 1678 as the new Company president in Fort Rotterdam, he was impressed by the authority wielded by Arung Palakka. It was the latter who, in keeping with earlier practices, had summoned the various South Sulawesi princes to appear in Fort Rotterdam to welcome President Cops and to hold a great feast in his honour. Cops wrote to Batavia: "Among all of the Company's allies, without exception, Arung Palakka has been cloaked with the Company's mantle of respect and thereby obtained great prestige and power". Arung Palakka was well aware of his privileged position. He proudly displayed to the assembled South Sulawesi lords the personal gifts which he and his wife Daeng Talele had received from the Company as further affirmation of his favoured status (KA 1224a:242-3). He was astute enough to realize that as long as both he and the Company needed one another their positions in South Sulawesi would be secure.

The large gathering of lords in Makassar to celebrate Cop's appointment provided an opportunity for the young Datu Soppeng Towesa to seek a private meeting with this new Company official. When the old Datu Soppeng La Tēnribali died on 19 August 1676, his son Towesa succeeded him despite grave reservations expressed by Arung Palakka. Had La Tēnribali's eldest and favourite son Arung Belo Tosa'dēng been alive, he would certainly have been proclaimed Datu Soppeng with Arung Palakka's blessings. Tosa'dēng had been a Toangke and had been one of Arung Palakka's closest companions in exile. He was killed at Sambung Jawa in Makassar in 1669 in the closing days of the Makassar War, much to the grief of his father and Arung Palakka. Another son, Towesa, was therefore chosen to become Datu Soppeng, but neither the Dutch nor Arung Palakka were particularly pleased with the choice. Dubbeldekop wrote on 4 September 1676 that Towesa was

. . . not the smartest there is. Yes, often he is no better than mad. His father said before his death that if his son should become unfit to rule through weakness of mind, then Arung Palakka should take control of the government on the strength of his marriage [to Datu Soppeng's daughter We Adda] and his Soppeng royal blood. And should this prince [Towesa] from that time onward be sufficiently incapable of taking the reigns of government, then Arung Palakka should, if it so pleased him, take over the Soppeng government . . . He [Arung Palakka] should then run the government of Soppeng in the name of his brother-in-law [Towesa] (KA 1208h : 591v).

Perhaps foreseeing the problems which could arise with a weak ruler in Soppeng, the old Datu Soppeng La Těnribali had provided Arung Palakka with virtually a free hand to interfere in that kingdom's affairs.

During the secret meeting between Datu Soppeng Towesa and Cops, the former complained of Arung Palakka's high-handedness in Soppeng. He also felt it necessary at the very outset to present his side of the story to dispel any malicious rumours current throughout South Sulawesi about his state of mind:

. . . He [Arung Palakka] says that I am mad! He has married my sister [We Adda] and taken all the gold that she had received from my father. When she was in Bone, someone with a musket went under the house in which she was living and fired a bullet upward through the floor where she was standing.⁴ She had become so alarmed that she left Palakka and went back to Soppeng, where she still is. Now my brother-in-law [Arung Palakka] has just recently taken away my gold. Everyone knows that my father was the king who possessed the richest amount of gold.⁵ We do not even have that now, and still that is not enough; he now wants to seize my state. This is the reason that I have come to the president [Cops] so that he will take me under his protection.

Cops attempted to reassure Towesa that there was no plot and that Arung Palakka had only been appointed guardian because Towesa was still young at the time of his installation. Such a feeble explanation did not satisfy Towesa and simply made Cops appear an accomplice in light of Arung Palakka's subsequent actions.

When Arung Palakka was informed by his omnipresent spies that Datu Soppeng Towesa had avoided the "proper" channels and had spoken directly to Cops, he immediately sent Arung Amali Gěllarěng Tosawa to Towesa to seek an explanation. Towesa told Arung Amali that he had merely discussed lands under dispute between Soppeng and Arung Bakkě. Arung Palakka was apparently unconvinced, for a few days later Towesa reappeared in Fort Rotterdam greatly upset by the fact that Arung Palakka had ordered all the Soppeng princes (*anaka-rung*) to abandon Towesa. He also claimed that Arung Palakka had sought his wife [We Adda]'s approval to depose her brother Towesa as Datu Soppeng (KA 1224a : 84-99; KA 1227a : 198r).

To defend his own reputation and establish his credibility with the newly-arrived President Cops, Arung Palakka went personally to Fort Rotterdam. In their meeting Cops confronted Arung Palakka with the accusations made by Towesa. Cops appeared to have been convinced that something was afoot since Towesa, ruler of a major kingdom, had

come to Fort Rotterdam with a pathetic retinue of four slaves. Towesa himself had expressed his humiliation that, though born a king, he had to sneak into Fort Rotterdam without the pomp and ceremony befitting his status. In a moment of grief and anger he had said to Cops: “Who would want to depose me? God, the Lord, has made me ruler and no one can deprive me of this.” He no longer desired to return to Soppeng unless the *anakarung* held him in higher regard than they had in the past: “They do not respect me, and they laugh at me. That, I cannot bear.” In the present circumstances he preferred remaining under the Company’s protection in Fort Rotterdam. Despite Arung Palakka’s efforts to portray Towesa as dim-witted⁶ Cops detected little of this madness in Towesa during their conversations together. Towesa’s somewhat erratic behaviour, so Cops believed, was directly attributable to his youth and pampering from his late father (KA 1227a:198v-201r). Cops was in sympathy with Towesa and began to suspect Arung Palakka’s motives in wanting Towesa deposed. An incident which occurred a few days later appeared to confirm his suspicions about Arung Palakka.

A trusted slave whom Towesa had inherited from his mother was seized by Arung Palakka’s people and krissed outside Bontoala. Fearing for his own life, Towesa requested and was granted protection by the Company. Cops’ spies reported that Arung Palakka had ordered the brothers Arung Mampu, Arung Maruangen, and Arung Teko to go that evening as the moon was rising to seize Towesa and bring him to Soppeng. Although Cops did not wish to become embroiled in local dynastic quarrels, he did consent to grant asylum to Towesa. The reasons which Cops gave to Batavia to justify this decision were:

1. Towesa’s father Datu Söppeng [La Těnribali] had been one of the oldest and most important allies of the Company.
2. Arung Palakka’s treatment of Towesa was displeasing and contributed to this sorry state of affairs.
3. No other ally would be able to trust us any longer if protection were refused.

Towesa was billeted for the night in the house of Jan Japon, the Company’s interpreter, with guards stationed outside. Later that same evening one of Towesa’s secondary wives came to report that when the moon rose that night, men acting on Arung Palakka’s orders had entered Towesa’s residence. Discovering that he and his wife were no longer there, they stripped the house of everything, including the pots and pans (KA 1227a:202v).

When Arung Palakka learned that Towesa had fled to the Dutch, he

sent envoys to Fort Rotterdam asking that Towesa be released so that “his crazy whims would not cause misfortune to the Company”. Arung Palakka reminded Cops that he had been made guardian over Towesa by the latter’s own father before his death, and that he, Arung Palakka, treated him no differently from his own “son”, La Patau. The Dutch in Fort Rotterdam considered this comparison to be rather odd since Towesa was about twenty-one years old, married to the daughter of Datu Pammana, and had a three year old son, whereas La Patau, Arung Palakka’s nephew, was merely five years old (KA 1224a:114). Perhaps Arung Palakka had intended the analogy of Towesa with a five-year old child. But all the psychological abuse of Towesa did not accomplish his downfall but had instead complicated matters because of his being granted asylum by the Company. Arung Palakka now decided to propose Towesa’s sister and his wife We Adda as the new Datu Soppeng. Although she had initially refused to cooperate in this plan while her brother was still alive, pressure was brought to bear and she finally relented. Her decision to become Datu Soppeng caused Towesa great anguish, and he was reported by the Dutch to have practically retreated from any contact with the outside world. Except for the rare occasion when he went on the hunt with a group, he remained quietly in the Fort. When some local leaders came to speak to him in the Fort, he said not a word except “yes” (KA 1227b:243r-v; KA 1236a:453v-454r). Cops described Towesa as a pathetic figure living in exile in the Fort: “A mad person Datu Soppeng [Towesa] certainly is not, nor is he clever. While he has been here, he has remained very quiet and has no more than forty *rijksdaalders* worth of clothes and money . . .” (KA 1227c:252v).

Towesa was not the only ruler who had hoped for support from the new President Cops against the increasing political encroachments of Arung Palakka. A few months after Cops’ arrival in January 1678, the Arung Matoa and the nobles of Wajo appeared in Fort Rotterdam to complain about the ill-treatment of Wajo at the hands of the people of Bone. They reported that Arung Palakka had seized some of Wajo’s territories on the basis, so he claimed, of the 1670 treaty signed after the defeat of Wajo at Tosora. These areas were Pammana, Timurung, Wage, Totinco, Wugi, and Sengkang (half of which remained under Wajo). To these general grievances were added those of Arung Peneki who had been deposed by Arung Palakka in favour of the latter’s nephew, La Patau. Cops consulted the 1670 treaty and informed the Wajo delegations that there was no mention of any cession of Wajo land to Arung Palakka. While assuring the Wajo lords that he would seek the return of

these lands and some solution to their grievances, he encouraged them to speak to Arung Palakka once more (KA 1224b:191-2, 198-9, 208; KA 1227a:199r-v; KA 1236b:392v-397v).

The problems between Wajo and Bone were not as easily resolved as Cops had hoped. When Arung Matoa Wajo was again in Fort Rotterdam a year later, Cops inquired about the situation in Wajo. Arung Matoa Wajo merely placed one hand over his mouth and moved another across his throat to indicate that if he said anything he would lose his life. He then said: "It would not help since Arumpone [i.e. Arung Palakka] and the Company are one, and everything that Arumpone does is approved [by the Company]. The people of Wajo should see everything clearly in perspective since they were defeated by Arumpone [i.e. Arung Palakka] and thereby considered as his slaves" (KA 1236b:392r-v).

The Arung Matoa Wajo's view that the Company and Arung Palakka were one was not an unusual belief among the people of South Sulawesi. It was deliberately cultivated by Arung Palakka himself as a very basic element in his policy of maintaining his authority as the local overlord. But when Cops was presented with this long-held assumption within South Sulawesi of the inseparable unity of the Company and Arung Palakka, he quickly disabused Arung Matoa Wajo of this idea. Cops explained that it was a grave error to believe that anything that Arung Palakka did met the approval of the Company. The people of Wajo were neither slaves of Arung Palakka nor of the people of Bone, but true subjects and people of the Company. When Cops learned that Wajo did not have a copy of the 1670 treaty, he had the treaty brought out and read aloud to prove that Wajo was obligated to no one but the Company. According to Article 1 of the treaty signed by the Company and its allies with Wajo on 23 December 1670, Wajo had become a vassal of the Company alone. Article 8 required Wajo to pay the Company's war costs, but not those of Arung Palakka since he was merely one of the Company's commanders. In times of peace Arumpone [Arung Palakka] was an ally of the Company, as were Datu Soppeng, Arung Ajattappareng, Datu Luwu, Maradia Mandar [Balannipa], Karaeng Goa, etc. Cops pointed out to Arung Matoa Wajo that as a subject of the Company, he should have reported all oppressive acts committed against Wajo by Bone.

Encouraged by these words, the Wajo delegation returned a few days later with a list of complaints against Bone. They said that about 3,000 of their people with their buffaloes and their goods had been seized and taken to Bone. Wajo traders who had the misfortune of being caught in

Luwu in 1676 during the Bone-Luwu war were made slaves of Bone. In fact anyone from Wajo that Arung Palakka found outside of Wajo was made a slave. After this war many Wajo smiths, carpenters, and various other skilled workers with their wives and children were forced to move to Bone. Perhaps the most painful of all was to watch as Wajo was dismembered after the 1670 war.

Cops expressed his sympathy for the Wajo people. Yet for the moment he and the Council had agreed that prudence was perhaps the best policy to adopt. Arung Palakka was busily engaged at this time in preparations for sending Bugis troops to Java to help the Company, and any attempt to reprimand him or any mention of the reprehensible deeds of his people in Wajo could have jeopardized the entire expedition. The Dutch were content to register their concern about the situation in Wajo to the four commanders of the Bone forces: Arung Sawalaba, Arung Mampu, Datu Mario, and Datu Lamuru (KA 1236b:392v-397v). Soon after the departure of Arung Palakka and the allied expedition to Java on 1 October 1679, Arung Matoa Wajo demanded that Bone return all the people and property seized from Wajo. The Bone leaders refused and said that they could do nothing as long as Arung Palakka was away. And here the matter rested (KA 1236c:436v).

The problems in Soppeng and Wajo did not pose as great a danger to Arung Palakka's authority as that in Goa. The 1677 war had removed Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali and his advisers from the government, but they remained within Sulawesi and continued to provide a focus for opposition. At the time of Cops' arrival in January 1678, Sultan Mohammad Ali had been deposed and was living in a house owned by Kaicili' Kalimata in Vlaardingen, one of the quarters under Company's jurisdiction near Fort Rotterdam. But when Arung Palakka returned to live in Bontoala from Bone, Sultan Mohammad Ali began to realize how exposed his living quarters were and how vulnerable he was to attack by Arung Palakka's men. He and his followers began sleeping during the day and maintaining a watch at night. Despite these precautions, some men with chainmail armour succeeded in getting under Sultan Mohammad Ali's house in an attempt to assassinate him by thrusting their spears upward through the floorboards. He no longer felt secure in Vlaardingen and thus asked and was granted permission to live in Fort Rotterdam (KA 1227a:204r-v).

There was little doubt in the minds of the Company officials as to who had instigated the assassination attempt. They had received reliable

reports that sometime in early 1677, or late 1676, Arung Palakka, Karaeng Karunrung, and Karaeng Sanrabone (the present Karaeng Goa) had made a solemn pact to destroy Sultan Mohammad Ali. This pact, so it was reported, had been renewed at Bontoala some eight or ten days before the assassination attempt. When the Dutch asked Karaeng Bone, Ballo', and Bontomanompo about this secret agreement, they admitted to knowing about its occurrence about eighteen months previously. At the time, so reported these *karaeng*, Arung Palakka had been displeased with the Company's lack of resolve toward Goa and had said that he was inclined to part ways with the Company. He had turned to Karaeng Sanrabone and had said that if Karaeng Sanrabone and his *anak-karaeng* and Makassar followers were to join him in a war against Sultan Mohammad Ali and were to be victorious, Arung Palakka would make Karaeng Sanrabone ruler of Goa. What had been promised to Karaeng Karunrung was not known, but he once demanded that the people of Maros, Segeri, Siang, Labakkang, Bungoro, Galesong, Wajo, and some others, be placed under his jurisdiction "as had been intended by Arung Palakka" (KA 1227a:138-9, 199r, 204r).

After Goa's defeat in 1677, Karaeng Sanrabone and Karaeng Karunrung were duly rewarded with the positions of Karaeng Goa and *Tuma'bicara-butta*, respectively. But neither leaders gained the support of the people because of their close association with Arung Palakka. If war were again to break out with Goa, there was every indication that the Goa people would abandon these two lords and give their loyalty to the deposed Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali (KA 1227a:204v; KA 1224a:122). At the very outset of his reign Karaeng Sanrabone, now Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil [Tumenanga ri Lakiung], had two distinct disadvantages insofar as the Goa people were concerned: he was associated with Sanrabone, an area outside the heartland of Goa,⁷ and with Arung Palakka, a sworn enemy of the Goa people. His was therefore a most formidable task in attempting to gain the confidence and loyalty of his subjects.

The people of Goa registered their disapproval of the new Karaeng Goa in the traditional manner by seeking to serve another lord in a different land. Most fled to other Makassar areas such as Tallo, but many also sought refuge in the lands of their enemies, the Company and the Bugis. There were others, including most members of the former Goa government, who sought to remain with the previous Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali in Makassar under the Company's jurisdiction. The reasons which the Goa people gave the Dutch for leaving their

homes were because of the destruction of their land and the fear of marauding Bugis (KA 1216c:197-8).

Immediately after the 1677 war it is true that security within Goa was precarious, but a similar situation had existed after every war which Goa had fought against Arung Palakka and the Company. What was different after the 1677 war, however, was the lack of confidence among the Goa people in the ability and willingness of Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil to protect them against marauders. In short they had already prejudged the new Karaeng Goa and expected the very worst for their kingdom. From court pedagogical works to village folktales the people would have been inculcated with the belief that the ruler's personal conduct would be reflected in the state of the kingdom. An honest ruler means that the land will be free from disaster, the people will multiply, and the ricefields will be fertile. But a ruler who is deceitful will be responsible for unending suffering throughout the land as epidemics rage among the people and rains and droughts destroy the rice seedlings (Mattulada 1975:122-3, 148,9; Matthes 1883a:249, 258). So fearful were the people of the consequences of having a bad ruler on the throne that the exodus from Goa continued unabated. In desperation and with great humiliation Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil was finally forced to seek Arung Palakka's assistance since he no longer had any people to look after his food, water, clothes, and horses (KA 1227a:198v).

While the initial distrust of Sultan Abdul Jalil, coupled with the turmoil of the immediate post-war days, were certainly important factors for the outflow of people from Goa, Sultan Abdul Jalil's own personal conduct or misconduct confirmed the dire predictions of alarmists within the kingdom. A *gallarang* from Sanrabone told the Dutch that in his land Sultan Abdul Jalil had "applied neither law nor lawfulness". So contemptuous was he of the laws of the land that no *gallarang* dared submit a legal petition. Everything in the land was being allowed to go to rack and ruin. Those who had served well were overlooked and those unqualified put in their place. Such an extreme picture seemed to the Dutch to be contradictory to the well-established reputation of Sultan Abdul Jalil's good nature and of a populous Sanrabone. The *gallarang* agreed that this may have been so in the past but things had changed completely since Sultan Abdul Jalil had become good friends with Karaeng Karunrung and Arung Palakka (KA 1236b:404r).

The pressure from the exiled Goa nobles for the removal of Karaeng Karunrung as *Tuma'bicara-butta Goa* became so great that Cops decided to seek Arung Palakka's advice. On 26 April 1678 Arung Palakka

arrived in Fort Rotterdam for the meeting accompanied by Arung Maruangen, his closest adviser in the *Aruppitu*, Arung Amali Gëllarëng Tosawa, who now also held the position of Arung Tanete Matoa, Arung Mampu, Arung Teko, various other Bugis princes, as well as the Makassar lords Karaeng Lengkese and the new Karaeng Galesong, Daeng Malewa. Cops explained the problem of the growing Goa refugee community in Makassar whose loyalty to the deposed Sultan Mohammad Ali was causing considerable strain on the Company. One of their demands was the removal of Karaeng Karunrung as *Tuma'bicara-butta Goa* because it was he who was "the cause of the disasters" which had befallen the kingdom. In an ultimatum the exiled Goa government told Sultan Abdul Jalil that he had to choose either Karaeng Karunrung or the *anak karaeng*, *gallarang*, *Bate Salapang*, and subjects of Goa. Cops had been sympathetic to this ultimatum and had reminded Sultan Abdul Jalil of Article 11 of a resolution which had been adopted on 9 November 1668 by Speelman, Arung Palakka, the rulers of Ternate, Soppeng, etc. According to this Article, it had been resolved that Karaeng Karunrung, as punishment for his misdeeds, be removed from government and be sent to Makassar unless he humbled himself before the Company, sought permission to remain there, and agreed never to interfere directly or indirectly with the Goa government. Despite Cops' citing of a "legal" point to convince Sultan Abdul Jalil, the latter remained adamant in his refusal to remove Karaeng Karunrung from his government. Cops now requested the help of Arung Palakka and the allies to solve this impasse between the two Goa governments.

Arung Palakka appeared touched by this request. He turned to Cops and said:

. . . We of Bone are deeply grateful that you have done us the honour of communicating this weighty matter to us, for this is a case which most properly deserves to be discussed by us.

Arung Palakka now sent Arung Teko back to Bontoala to bring the book in which were kept all the treaties and every letter sent by the Company to Arung Palakka.⁸ When the book was brought, Arung Palakka read everything that the Company had written to him about Karaeng Karunrung's misdeeds. As Arung Palakka saw it, there would be problems if Karaeng Karunrung were dismissed from his office as *Tuma'bicara-butta Goa* and exiled to Batavia. Karaeng Karunrung's daughter, married to Karaeng Tallo, would certainly accompany him, as would Karaeng Karunrung's trusted uncle Karaeng Popo and his followers, and Karaeng Karunrung's brother Karaeng Bontosunggu and

his people, and many others. What had to be considered, therefore, was whether it was worse to lose those who had already left Sultan Abdul Jalil, or those who would leave with Karaeng Karunrung. Arung Palakka interjected at this point that the Makassar people had still not paid their indemnity to the Company, but Cops assured him that this was not a primary concern since “it is obvious that they are poor and scattered about”. Arung Palakka then suggested that the Goa princes who were now under the Company’s jurisdiction should be told to return home. If more problems should arise, he himself would intervene and severely punish those responsible, even if it were the ruler of Goa himself (KA 1227a:214r-216r).

Despite Arung Palakka’s advice, when he was away in Java campaigning on behalf of the Company, Karaeng Karunrung did lose his position. Although the Company had said he could live anywhere he wished, it was believed that he would not remain long in Tallo because of the great ill-will he had engendered among the nobles and *gallarang* there. As self-proclaimed regent of his young son-in-law, Karaeng Tallo, he had exercised too much power for the liking of the local people. Another alternative proposed by the Dutch as a possible place of refuge was on the south side of Fort Rotterdam where Karaeng Lengese himself had settled (KA 1227c:254v). But Karaeng Karunrung decided instead to seek his fortunes abroad. With 200 followers on nine boats, he went from Tallo to Mandar for a few days and then straight on to Pasir in eastern Kalimantan. Halfway to Pasir lack of drinking water and strong winds finally forced the fleet to return to Binuang in Mandar. Karaeng Karunrung then took a boat and thirty men to Barru, from which place he asked the Dutch for permission to return to Tallo. Permission was granted, and Karaeng Karunrung once again settled quietly in Tallo. But the original fears which had prompted him to leave had not diminished, and he later requested permission to live near Fort Rotterdam (KA 1235e:125-7).

The opposition to Sultan Abdul Jalil was centred around the former Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali who had been given protection in Fort Rotterdam on 7 March 1677. On 19th April he was joined by some important members of his former government – Karaeng Ballo’, Bone and Bontomanompo – as well as many of the *anak-karaeng* and half of the *bate-bate* and *gallarang* (KA 1224a:167). It was this exiled Goa government which subjected Sultan Abdul Jalil’s already battered pride to further blows by presenting him with the following list of grievances:

1. We find it unbearable to have to go hither and yon without any secure place where we can settle.
2. You cast aspersions on our honour with foul language.
3. You mistrust us.
4. You believe all false tongues which scatter much poison about us and come to bring you untruths.
5. You imagine evil things daily of us though no evil is intended, or [you imagine] something which approximates the truth.
6. You pretend in our presence and slander us in our absence.
7. You make us do unbearable court duties.
8. You oppress our people and they suffer at the hands of your foremen (*mandur*) who rob them in their poverty-stricken circumstances.
9. You demand improper services from the princes (*anakkaraeng*) themselves.
10. You sell freemen and retain those not free who do not belong to you.
11. You use us and our children at night and by day. Even in bad weather you use us to serve as guards and to cut firewood.
12. You make our wives and daughters [whenever you so desire] serve against their will in your wife's retinue, although it has not been the custom of old to follow the queen to Tana Kongkong [Bantaeng] and to Pare[-Pare].
13. You demand more and longer water bamboos . . . or more money than is our duty to pay as a fine for something inconsequential.
14. If we gravely affront you for a minor reason, you refuse to let us visit your residence, even though we humble ourselves without bearing weapons.
15. We are threatened with death and accused of being traitors to our land whenever we appear at Ujung Pandang [under the Company's control] for our own interests.
16. We are blamed for a service badly performed by others.
17. On pain of death we are forbidden to speak to the former ruler Karaeng Bisei [Sultan Mohammad Ali], notwithstanding the articles [of peace of 1677], the fact that he is now in the Company's hands, that you are his brother, and that we have no other lords but you and him.
18. You turn away the ruler of Ternate's envoys whenever they come to collect the indemnity [for the 1666-9 war], and instead send them to us and expect us to pay it.
19. You pretend that we have resolved that, as long as Karaeng Bisei is not raised again to any office, we would not dress in accordance with our status or custom.
20. You will not allow us to go to seek the necessities of life.
21. You ridicule us daily in a very humiliating fashion.
22. You seek reasons daily to vent your anger on us.
23. You accuse us of secretly corresponding with Karaeng Bisei and the Company.

In view of the above, if you should solemnly swear in the presence of the [Goa] nobles in the Fort [Rotterdam] to abdicate, we will again heed you (KA 1227a:211r-212v).

What had been solemnly pronounced in the *Rapang*, a Makassar “Mirror of Kings”, was coming to pass:

. . . The ruler asks his advisers, ‘What are the signs that a great land will die?’ The adviser answers, ‘There are five: A ruler does not want to be reminded; secondly, there are no able, skilled people (*tau manngasseng*) in the great land; thirdly, the judges (*gallarang mabbicara*) take bribes; fourthly, there are many arbitrary acts in the great land; and fifthly, the ruling lord does not love his servants’ (Matthes 1883a:253).

All these points appeared to the people of Goa to have been transgressed, particularly that special relationship of “love” which ideally existed between a ruler and his subjects.

The first complaint in the letter from the Goa nobles focusses upon the very *raison d’être* of a ruler, to provide a secure place for his subjects so that they, and hence he, would prosper. Since Sultan Abdul Jalil was unable to provide his people with security within the kingdom, he had failed in his basic duty as a ruler. The following complaints numbered 2 to 16, 18, 20-22 could have come directly from the *Rapang* with its admonitions concerning good and bad rulers. Sultan Abdul Jalil’s behaviour coincided with the symptoms of a bad ruler as mentioned in the *Rapang*. It would be surprising if the authors of this list of grievances were not aware of the similarity of the charges which they were bringing against their ruler and the signs of a bad ruler in the *Rapang*. By deliberately drawing this comparison, they would also have issued an unmistakable warning to Sultan Abdul Jalil that if he persisted in his ways, he too might be destroyed as were the evil rulers in the *Rapang*. The rest of the complaints, numbers 17, 19 and 23, deal specifically with the deposed Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali.

It was no secret that Sultan Mohammad Ali still had the love and loyalty of the vast majority of the Goa people. To prevent him from continuing to rule from his place of exile, in complete defiance of the Company and its allies and to the humiliation of the new Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil, Goa subjects were forbidden on pain of death to communicate with him. Although Sultan Abdul Jalil had undergone the traditional installation ceremonies in becoming Karaeng Goa, many deplored the fact that Arung Palakka had played a decisive role in his election contrary to accepted South Sulawesi interstate practice. The Goa Chronicle, too, had explicitly condemned interference in the choice of rulers between the kingdoms of Bone and Goa, the two most powerful states in the area in the 16th and 17th centuries (Abdurrahim n.d.:71). Since the hallowed *adat* had been invoked against Sultan Abdul Jalil,

even the investiture performed with complete propriety was subject to question. As long as this ambiguity remained, the people of Goa could to some extent justify their continued loyalty to Sultan Mohammad Ali.

The Goa government in exile refused to adjust to its new circumstances but sought ways of returning to power, including an appeal to Batavia. In a letter received in Batavia on 23 April 1678 the exiled Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali informed the Company's leaders that "all the most important individuals in Goa, namely Karaeng Ballo' [head of the *Bate Salapang*], Bone [son of Karaeng Karunrung], Bontomanompo, the *gallarang*, the *Bate Salapang*, and all of their followers have left their ruler and fled to seek protection from the Company purely because of the unbearable government of Karaeng Karunrung and the new ruler [Sultan Abdul Jalil]" (KA 1227d:221r). Having argued in this letter to Batavia for the continuing legitimacy of the Goa government in exile, it now approached Sultan Abdul Jalil to persuade him to relinquish his rights to the regalia, a gesture which was tantamount to renouncing any claims to the throne. The letter to Sultan Abdul Jalil read:

. . . We Makassar folk living in Ujung Pandang have met, agreed, and resolved (since we have heard three or four times that you wished to return the crown [*sic*, *Sudang*, the state sword]⁹ and the regalia belonging to Goa) to send a *gallarang* so that he may receive them from your hand. In this way you will have performed a good and worthy deed for the Makassar people. We will then be willing to resume residence once again in Goa (KA 1235a:100).

As long as Sultan Abdul Jalil continued to keep the regalia at his residence in Sanrabone, the exiled Goa government was powerless to choose another ruler. The offer made to Sultan Abdul Jalil in return for the *Sudang* and the regalia was therefore a tempting one. He would again be shown the respect he had had as Karaeng Sanrabone instead of suffering the humiliation of ruling over an empty land. The massive outflow of people was in itself a damning commentary on his reign and a source of ridicule among his fellow rulers. But Sultan Abdul Jalil refused to surrender his throne. In a strongly worded reply, he wrote:

. . . You demand from me the *Sudang* and the regalia belonging to the kingdom of Goa and say that they should be used for the best welfare of our land. I would gladly see that we benefit together. But at the time that Goa was conquered, you did not consent to give me the crown [*sic*, *Sudang*] and regalia, but it was the Arumpone [Arung Palakka] and the lords of the Company who placed them in my hand. Furthermore, on his departure [for Java] the Arumpone did not instruct me to return the *Sudang* and the other royal regalia to you if you came to demand them.

Only when the Arumpone returns and he and the Company instruct me to do so would I then obey their commands (KA 1235b:101).

Taken aback by Sultan Abdul Jalil's refusal to return the regalia and his seemingly abject submission to the will of Arung Palakka and the Company, the exiled Goa nobles decided to send another much more forceful letter:

. . . Why do you say that we should wait to receive the *Sudang* and the regalia from you until the Arumpone's return and until he and the Company recommend it? Why did you seek such a pretext? At the time that Goa was conquered, the Arumpone did not take the crown [*sic*] and regalia from our hands and place them in yours, but we brought them to you on your orders. Therefore, we now demand that they be returned to our envoy. If you refuse to do so but wish to await the return of the Arumpone, you will have demonstrated through this that you have no other intention but to make us slaves. We already have been made to understand that you had wanted to surrender the regalia to the Bugis. If you are in no way inclined to give them to us, we will declare ourselves completely free people who will acknowledge no one but the Company as our sole lord.

We understand that you wish to leave the land. Do not do this, but instead give us the crown [*sic*] and the regalia so that they would redound to your and our advantage (KA 1235c:101-2).

The Goa nobles were obviously in a quandary. While they had employed the most dire threat to any ruler – the loss of his people – they were uncertain whether they really wanted to become subjects of their erstwhile enemy, the Company. They had few options available to them if they wished to remain in South Sulawesi. Sultan Abdul Jalil, on the other hand, was little worried by the threat for he felt secure in his possession of the regalia and his belief of support from Arung Palakka. His final letter to the Goa nobles exudes this confidence:

. . . It has been customary among our forefathers never to depose rulers except for two reasons, to wit: if they were mad, or if they possessed no belief or religion. Furthermore, since we have entered into the Treaty of Bungaya, those [rulers] who do not fulfill it [the treaty] may also be deposed. Since none of these three charges can be made against me, I am not resolved to hand over the regalia. You say that I want to flee the land, and I say that I have never entertained such a thought (KA 1235d:103).

The possession of the *Sudang* and the Goa regalia were a potent weapon in Sultan Abdul Jalil's hands. So reverently were these objects regarded that it has been suggested that they, rather than the person of the king, were the true rulers of a kingdom (Abu Hamid 1965:138; Kooreman 1883:186). As long as he retained the regalia Sultan Abdul

Jalil was cloaked with legitimacy despite arguments of irregularities in his selection as Karaeng Goa. He had also earlier taken the precaution of reaffirming his loyalty to Arung Palakka. According to Karaeng Mangalle, who was with his brother Sultan Abdul Jalil at Bontoala, the latter had said to Arung Palakka: “O, father, three more princes have fled to Ujung Pandang. What shall I become? A king without people. It is best if I surrender the crown [*sic, Sudang*] to you, for I leave myself entirely in your hands. Wherever you go I shall always be at your side, whether it be in Bugis [Soppeng], Bone or Luwu” (KA 1227a:221v-222r).

President Cops and the Dutch Council in Fort Rotterdam were uneasy about the growing influence of Arung Palakka, especially in the kingdom of Goa. After Speelman’s departure from Makassar in 1669, a policy of maintaining a balance of power between Arung Palakka and Goa had evolved. Even at this early stage of the Company’s permanent presence in Makassar, astute Dutch officials had foreseen a time when the Company’s favoured ally would become a potential threat to its interests in South Sulawesi. The powerful kingdom of Goa with its history of enmity toward Bone appeared the logical choice to cultivate as a counterweight to Arung Palakka. But after the 1677 war the new Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil had become so dependent upon Arung Palakka that to all intents and purposes Goa had become Bone’s vassal. Though Goa had failed to provide a balance to Arung Palakka, the policy itself was not abandoned. There began a new search for a power to assume the brief role that Goa had played *vis à vis* Arung Palakka.

The need for some control over Arung Palakka’s activities became a matter of great urgency to the Company officials in Fort Rotterdam. In a letter to Batavia they described with dismay the deteriorating situation in South Sulawesi:

... the numerous insults which the allies of the Company had to bear at the hands of the *anakarung*¹⁰ of Soppeng and Bone with the connivance and even the order, so they say, of Arung Palakka, make him a figure of great hate among all the allies. He governs so much like a sovereign ruler over this whole land that many say that they cannot long remain here and that there are those who are just waiting and hoping that some change would come (KA 1224a:123).

These officials even recommended that the deposed Sultan Mohammad Ali be sent to Batavia to provide a focus for Makassar refugees abroad in opposition to Arung Palakka. Krisses had already been sent to Sultan Mohammad Ali by the Makassar refugees to demonstrate their loyalty

and readiness to fight for him. To convince Batavia that Goa no longer was the fearsome enemy that the Company had fought in the 1666-9 Makassar War, they stressed that in 1677 Goa had warred with Arung Palakka but not with the Company (KA 1224a:126, 128).

The desire of President Cops and his Council to undermine Arung Palakka's strong influence in South Sulawesi led them to offer encouragement to Sultan Mohammad Ali living in exile in Fort Rotterdam. The latter, therefore, wrote to Karaeng Galesong and Daeng Tulolo, two of the most powerful refugee Makassar leaders abroad telling them to return home. Cops had assured him that they would have a place to settle in Ujung Pandang as well as land in Maros for their upkeep (KA 1224c: 181). In reply these two leaders reported that the Makassar refugees scattered throughout the area, including some 2,000 in Ayutthaya and many others in Aceh and Palembang, were willing to return and live under the protection of the Company. They emphasized, however, that they would not tolerate the overlordship of Arung Palakka (KA 1224b : 219).

Despite this encouraging news there was no noticeable increase in the numbers of returning Makassar refugees. But the flood of people leaving Goa to seek a home in the Company's lands continued unabated. By mid-1679 the Dutch estimated that living within the shadows of Fort Rotterdam were some 600 Makassar nobles, of which 300 had seen experience in the wars against Arung Palakka and the Company. The Dutch were convinced that they would eventually join the vast majority of their compatriots in Java and only the lack of boats had prevented their immediate departure. Including men, women, children, and slaves, there were an estimated 3,000 Makassar people living in Ujung Pandang (KA 1235f:89). How serious this continuing outflow of people was had become painfully apparent in Sultan Abdul Jalil's attempt to assemble his subjects to participate in the Company's campaign against the Makassar refugees on Java. As was customary in wartime Sultan Abdul Jalil had sent out the *bila-bila* setting out the time and place that the warriors were to gather. To his great humiliation only sixteen people appeared, of whom seven were nobles. The rest had apparently fled to give their allegiance to Sultan Mohammad Ali at Fort Rotterdam (KA 1227b:223r).

Cops and the Council were of mixed minds over the deluge of Goa people seeking protection from the Company. There was the fear, which was of particular concern to Batavia, that these folk would seek to join the refugee bands outside Sulawesi and further jeopardize trade in the

archipelago. Yet the prospects of a strong Goa government coalescing around Sultan Mohammad Ali as a counterforce to Arung Palakka could only become a reality through the continuing influx of people into Makassar. Since events within South Sulawesi were of more immediate concern to Cops and his Council, they were more inclined to seeing the second possibility occurring and hence took no steps to stem the refugee flow.

The growing numbers of favours which Cops and his Council began bestowing on Sultan Mohammad Ali did not go unnoticed by Arung Palakka. The fact that Sultan Mohammad Ali had not been adequately punished by the Company for his role in the 1677 war had angered Arung Palakka. But to add insult to injury, the Company had then offered him an asylum within Fort Rotterdam. From his place of protected exile, he had been able to conduct himself as if he were still the Karaeng Goa. It became an almost impossible task for his successor, Sultan Abdul Jalil, to govern a kingdom whose loyalty remained with the former ruler. As long as Sultan Mohammad Ali remained alive and well within reach of the Goa people, the new Karaeng Goa would remain ruler in name only. This reasoning was apparent not only to Arung Palakka, but also to Sultan Mohammad Ali who now took extraordinary precautions for his safety. Only once did he dare venture out from the Fort, and then only with Dutch bodyguards, to visit his sister and some Makassar nobles who were living on the south side of Fort Rotterdam (KA 1224d:305).

The already strained relations between Cops and Arung Palakka reached a critical point as communications between Fort Rotterdam and Bontoala grew noticeably fewer. Fortunately, Arung Palakka's wife Daeng Talele intervened and succeeded in defusing the highly dangerous situation. This was a role which she came to play admirably throughout Arung Palakka's reign and during part of La Patau's (1696-1714). It was her ability to recognize the danger signs and her influence with Arung Palakka and La Patau which were responsible for preserving the alliance between Bone and the Company through some difficult periods in the 17th and 18th centuries. On this particular occasion she merely voiced what Cops had long suspected: Arung Palakka would not condone the presence of his enemy enjoying the Company's protection in Fort Rotterdam. A meeting was arranged between Cops and Arung Palakka to discuss the matter, but it began on an ominous note. Arung Palakka informed Cops that Sultan Mohammad Ali had planned "not a human but a beastly undertaking" to have Arung Palakka assassinated

with a poison dart at the hands of a Mandar prisoner-of-war. After Cops had assured Arung Palakka that the matter would be investigated, he turned the conversation to the matter of Sultan Mohammad Ali's continued residence in Fort Rotterdam. He explained that he had given the Sultan protection because his life was in danger. As an example Cops cited the case where some Bugis had set fire to the house where the Sultan and his wife were living. If Captain Pleun had not killed one of the Bugis attackers and his men not broken through a ring of Bugis warriors surrounding the house, both Sultan Mohammad Ali and his wife would have burned to death (KA 1227c:249r-v). Despite this explanation Arung Palakka made it clear that he and Sultan Mohammad Ali could not live peaceably on the same island. If the latter were to remain in Sulawesi, then Arung Palakka requested that Cops provide him a ship or give him permission to sail with his own boats to Batavia (KA 1224d:305).

Even while expressing his displeasure at the granting of asylum to Sultan Mohammad Ali, Arung Palakka's annoyance was not aimed at the Company as such, but to the various individuals who represented it in South Sulawesi. Arung Palakka was ready to leave South Sulawesi if Sultan Mohammad Ali were allowed to remain, but he would go to Batavia as a faithful friend of the Company. The Company could do no wrong since it was the Company which had restored the *siri*' of Arung Palakka and the Bugis nation. Once when the Company was particularly hard-pressed to obtain rice for Batavia, Arung Palakka sent about 100 tons (fifty *last*) from Bone. The Company had offered to pay for this rice but Arung Palakka had refused saying:

. . . This gift of the fifty *last* rice last year [1677] was but a small token of gratitude to the Company for helping the people of Bone attain their freedom. If it had not been for the Company, they would have been enslaved (KA 1227c:251r).

Arung Palakka never ceased to remind the Company, more particularly the Supreme Government in Batavia, that he would never turn against the Company which had "restored his life" and freed his people. Although there were Company representatives in Fort Rotterdam who were suspicious of Arung Palakka's motives and activities, Arung Palakka never undertook any deliberate campaign to destroy the Company once he was in power. Whenever Arung Palakka had any quarrel with the Dutch, he regarded it as a misunderstanding between himself and an official but never the Company. When differences threatened to become crises, Arung Palakka always appealed to the Company in

Batavia, and he was almost always vindicated, thus further reinforcing his image of the Company as a powerful, virtuous entity represented at times by weak and unscrupulous officials such as those found in Fort Rotterdam. Interestingly enough the Bugis chroniclers to this day retain this image in referring to the “Kompani” in Batavia in a vague way, quite apart and separate from the “Belanda” (= Dutch) with whom the Bugis came in contact. Arung Palakka’s displeasure at discovering that Sultan Mohammad Ali had been granted asylum in Fort Rotterdam was seen as Cops’ personal decision and not that of the Company. Arung Palakka, therefore, decided to appeal directly to the “Kompani” for a final judgement on the matter. The response from Batavia confirmed Arung Palakka’s belief that Cops, or any other Dutch official with whom he came in conflict, did not represent the true sentiments of the Company. In June Fort Rotterdam sent word that a ship was now at Bima and on its way to take Sultan Mohammad Ali and his family to exile. On 15 September 1678 Sultan Mohammad Ali and his family were finally taken on board a Dutch ship, the *Haesenburgh*, which brought them to Batavia (KA 1227e:270r).

Batavia had adjudged the concerns of the Company as a whole to be more important than those of Fort Rotterdam. Arung Palakka was being asked to raise an army to help the Company against its enemies on Java. If his position at home were to be dangerously strengthened as a result of the decision to exile Sultan Mohammad Ali, then Batavia considered the risk to be well taken. As the years progressed Batavia began to rely more and more upon Arung Palakka as the Company’s policeman in the archipelago. Unwilling to jeopardize this useful arrangement Batavia consistently over-ruled any attempt by Fort Rotterdam to curb Arung Palakka’s power at home and thus helped create perhaps the most powerful ruler in the history of South Sulawesi.

Arung Palakka now proceeded with greater conviction than before to organize an expedition to fight alongside Speelman and the Company in Java against the Makassar refugees. Large numbers of native boats were built along the northwest and southwest coasts of the Bay of Bone to supplement the four Dutch ships sent to carry the South Sulawesi troops to Java. By October some 1,000 Bugis from Bone and Soppeng had already arrived in Makassar for the expedition (KA 1227c:280r-v). Finally on 6 October 1678 the first Bugis contingent left for Java (KA 1227f:286v). In June of the following year another large South Sulawesi army was assembled at Makassar to be sent to Java under the personal command of Arung Palakka himself. On the day of departure Arung

Palakka appeared in full view of the assembled nobles wearing the gold chain and medallion which had been presented to him in 1672 by the Company. He approached President Cops and told him that he was going to war in the service of the Company. His only request was that Cops respect his interests and be the guardian of his heritage. And with that he took his leave and boarded the Dutch ship which was to take him to Java (KA 1236d:380v-381r).

Arung Palakka was still unsure of how much authority he could command while absent on Java. By calling Cops the guardian of his heritage in front of the South Sulawesi nobles, he hoped to impress upon them that the Dutch would act on his behalf to meet any threat to his interests. To forestall any squabbles among his own followers, he had also carefully demarcated different spheres of authority. Daeng Memang, son of the former Arumpone La Ma'darëmmëng, was placed in charge of Maros; Arung Maruangen of Bulukumba; and Arung Taneta Matoa (Arung Amali Gëllarëng Tosawa) and Arung Teko of Bone (KA 1224d:309-310). The position of "Supreme Commander" was to be held by Arung Cibalu (KA 1235g:30). Arung Belo was to oversee affairs in Soppeng, while Datu Mario was instructed to assist Towesa's sister, We Adda Datu ri Watu, with the governing of Soppeng (KA 1236e:332r). To all of his regents Arung Palakka had left explicit instructions that they were not to do anything during his absence without the express approval of President Cops in Fort Rotterdam (KA 1236d:380v).

At long last Arung Palakka had the opportunity to destroy the last remnants of Makassar resistance to his rule. Although he had been instrumental in the downfall of Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali, the latter continued to be revered by his people. The new Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil owed his position to Arung Palakka but wielded little real power since he was being abandoned by his people in droves seeking to offer their allegiance to their old Karaeng Goa. At the height of this exodus there was an excitement running through the exile community in Makassar that the time was quickly approaching when they would be able to regain their lost kingdom. Rumours of fleets of Makassar refugees returning home to free their land from oppression grew daily and nurtured hopes of a spectacular undertaking approximating Arung Palakka's feat a decade earlier. As long as these Makassar refugees continued to roam the lands and the seas throughout the Malay-Indonesian archipelago with impunity, the Makassar people at home could believe in this dream. Only with the destruction of the refugees could this

myth be finally put to rest and the Company and Arung Palakka succeed in establishing their “peace”.

When Arung Palakka embarked for Java in October 1678, he could look back on the most recent events in South Sulawesi with great satisfaction. There had been severe trials involving wars with Mandar, Luwu, and Goa, and personal battles of wills with Presidents Harthouwer and Cops and with Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali Tumenanga ri Jakattara. But Arung Palakka emerged from these trials with his prestige enhanced and power greatly increased. Through an effective mix of threats and blandishments, he had succeeded in systematically removing all opposition to his overlordship. The Company, the other partner in this joint overlordship, found itself in a dilemma of its own making. Having acquiesced in Arung Palakka’s assumption of leadership of internal affairs in South Sulawesi the Company had been rewarded with the desired peace and predictability so vital to trade. And yet with leadership came power, and the Company began to fear that perhaps one day it would find itself opposed by this newly-found might.

Perspicacious officials at Fort Rotterdam had earlier foreseen the dangers and had therefore pursued a surreptitious policy of maintaining a balance between Arung Palakka and the kingdom of Goa. With the defeat of Goa in the 1677 war and the election of a new Karaeng Goa responsive to Arung Palakka, this policy proved no longer suitable and a search for a new balancing force was begun. Meanwhile, however, Batavia was encouraged by Arung Palakka’s frequent and fervent expressions of loyalty to the Company. When he proved amenable to requests for military aid against the Company’s enemies, Batavia was reassured that the old formula governing the joint overlordship – i.e., the Company to deal with trade and external affairs and Arung Palakka with internal affairs – was succeeding. Once Batavia was satisfied that Arung Palakka had accepted implicitly the Company’s right to call upon his services in fulfillment of its part of the formula, it too began to exercise great discretion in matters dealing with the intra-kingdom disputes, regarding them as rightfully the preserve of Arung Palakka. The joint overlordship had been buffeted by a number of serious crises in the 1670’s, but it had survived and become so much the stronger for them. Batavia had supported Arung Palakka’s measures in South Sulawesi, and now it was Arung Palakka’s turn to reciprocate in the serious “external” problem facing the Company, that of the Makassar refugees on Java.

CHAPTER VIII

THE REFUGEES

The fall of Sombaopu in 1669 was a significant event for the Makassar people. It marked not merely the end of “the war” against the Company and Arung Palakka, but also the end of an era when the name Goa was synonymous with power and supremacy. It is noteworthy that the Tallo Chronicle ends in 1641 after the death of one of its greatest rulers, while that of Goa lists rulers into the early 17th century, but has no commentary on the rulers after the death of Sultan Hasanuddin on 12 June 1670 (Abdurrahim and Wolhoff n.d.; Abdurrahim and Borahima 1975). The great period of Makassar history came to a close in 1669, and it was as if all the scribes realized this and put their pointed lontar writing instruments away. To these scribes whose task was to list the genealogies and deeds of the rulers for the edification of the royal progeny (Abdurrahim and Wolhoff n.d.:9), a defeat in war was recorded as just one of a number of events in the past. Other wars besides that of 1669 had been fought and lost by Goa but still recorded in the Chronicle. Yet the 1666-9 Makassar War, culminating in the destruction of Sombaopu, is not even mentioned.

It was the scribes of the victorious Bugis who succeeded in capturing the essence of the spiritual debacle in Goa by speaking simply of “the fall of Sombaopu” when recalling the events of the war. In using this phrase they were not merely referring to the actual event itself but alluding to a whole world which had collapsed. Sombaopu had been the citadel of the Goa rulers and symbolized the almost legendary might of this Makassar kingdom. There was no kingdom in the entire region of Eastern Indonesia which believed that Goa would ever fall. Such belief was recorded by Europeans in the area and is echoed in a Makassar folktale recalling this great past. And yet Goa proved to be vulnerable in every way. Its armies and navies were destroyed, but more painful and ignominious still was the betrayal of some of its own leaders in this great war.

At the start of hostilities there had been two major factions within the Goa government reflecting basically the degree of commitment to the war. As the years passed and the situation for Goa began to seem

increasingly desperate, the original division in the government became more extreme and attitudes were transformed into deeds. By 1669 there were Makassar nobles actively fighting on the side of Arung Palakka and the Company. This betrayal poisoned the atmosphere within Goa and Tallo in the post-war years and hindered the formation of an effective government which could provide the badly needed leadership for a demoralized people. Moreover, whatever goodwill created by a post-war government in Goa was quickly destroyed in being forced to satisfy the victors' incessant demands for *corvée* labour from its people. Having been for so long a respected and feared people, it was humiliating to be summoned to work alongside their former vassals in such tasks as strengthening Fort Rotterdam, destroying all Makassar and allied fortifications built in the war, and for various other building programmes in and around Makassar. With Arung Palakka occupying the ancestral home of Karaeng Pattinngaloang and Karaeng Karunrung at Bontoala, and with the Dutch securely ensconced in the former Makassar fortification Ujung Pandang, the Makassar people felt constrained and at the mercy of these conquering powers. Rampaging Bugis added to the torment as they wrought havoc on the Makassar people and countryside. The final insult was the impunity with which Arung Palakka interfered in the affairs of their kingdom. After the death of Sultan Hasanuddin in 1670 and the ineffectual government of Sultan Amir Hamzah Tumamalianga ri Allu' (1670-1674), many important Makassar princes and nobles, no longer willing to tolerate the scorn and contempt of their conquerors, fled with their followers to various parts of the archipelago even as far as Ayutthaya.

In late 1670 the total destruction of Tosora and the systematic razing of the Wajo countryside added to the growing stream of refugees leaving South Sulawesi. The Wajo migration immediately after 1670 appeared to have been on a larger scale than that from the Makassar lands and caused noticeable demographic changes within South Sulawesi and neighbouring islands (L-3:324; Noorduyn 1955:124).

To leave one's land to escape an oppressive or uncaring government is a familiar feature in South Sulawesi society to the present day. In the past individuals had several options: they could go with their families to a neighbouring community and place themselves under another lord; or they could flee to the periphery of society into wild areas unclaimed by other settlers; or they could join groups "outside the law", groups operating within their own created system of behaviour. There were certain major differences in the migrations which occurred on a large

scale in the late 17th century. They were often led by royalty or high nobles, which meant that their following was often very large. In South Sulawesi men of any consequence accumulated followers among his close relatives, his subjects, his slaves, and any other individuals bound by the "patron-client" relationship (Chabot 1950:15-6; Kooreman 1883, Vi:352). Moreover, the greater influence exercised throughout South Sulawesi by the overlords in the 17th century made the traditional manner of escape hazardous. Wherever these refugees chose to go in South Sulawesi, the long arm of the overlord could reach them. The only real escape was to seek a new lord overseas who would be willing to give them land and a livelihood in return for loyal manpower. While these migrations had occurred earlier in the century during Goa's overlordship, they increased considerably during the turmoil of the late 17th century.

The groups migrating overseas were often so vast that their fleets were likened to floating cities. The numbers and the mobility of these refugees in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago introduced an element of instability in the area. The sudden appearance of these fleets of armed men aroused terror in the local populations which were often incapable of repelling these newcomers. Those kingdoms which were larger and more confident provided them with homes in return for assistance against enemies. But they quickly found that once these groups became established in one place, it was almost impossible to dislodge them. In the end the unwelcome refugees either used force or threat of force to retain their position. If they left, they sought revenge by causing great havoc within the kingdom. Some of the refugees were fortunate in becoming successful kingmakers and even marrying into the local royal families, but they were a rare minority.¹

Among the most famous of the Makassar refugee leaders in the 17th century were Karaeng Tallo Sultan Harunarraysid Tumenanga ri Lampana; Karaeng Galesong, a son of Sultan Hasanuddin; Daeng Mangappa, the brother of Karaeng Tallo; Karaeng Bontomarannu, the *Tuma'bicara-butta Goa* and son of Karaeng Sumanna; and Daeng Tulolo, an uncle of Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali. Of the five Karaeng Bontomarannu was the first to flee from the Company and Arung Palakka. He had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the ill-fated Makassar punitive expedition which left to attack Butung in November 1666. After the utter devastation of the fleet by Speelman's forces, Karaeng Bontomarannu surrendered to Speelman. Speelman later became friendly with Karaeng Bontomarannu and even presented him

with a finely-worked gun and a golden kris. Once Speelman's confidence had been won, Karaeng Bontomarannu was allowed to go ashore at Galesong. But this was precisely what Karaeng Bontomarannu had hoped, and he seized this opportunity to make his escape (Stapel 1922: 141). When the Bungaya treaty was signed on 18 November 1667, one of the articles required Goa to surrender Karaeng Bontomarannu to the allies. Before this could be done, Karaeng Bontomarannu "disappeared" and emerged later in Mandar in the company of Goa's ally (KA 1157k:416v). In 1671 the Dutch sent an envoy to Mandar with the instruction that if Karaeng Bontomarannu and Opu Cėnning, or Crown Prince, of Luwu were found in Sendana they should be told of their pardon by the Company. But both the Opu Cėnning and Karaeng Bontomarannu were nowhere to be found (KA 1171d:757v). This Opu Cėnning was a nephew of Karaeng Bontomarannu and was only fifteen years old when he sailed on the Makassar fleet to Butung. He was captured and sent by Speelman to Batavia from which place he escaped to Banten in November 1668. Toward the end of that year or early the next he returned to Makassar via Semarang (De Graaf 1962:65). He too sought refuge in Mandar once again in the company of his uncle, Karaeng Bontomarannu. It appears that they left sometime in early or mid-1671, for in mid-August 1671 a certain Karaeng Kassi'jala arrived in Japara saying that he was awaiting Karaeng Bontomarannu and Opu Cėnning so that they could sail together to Banten (Dagh-Register 1670-1:406). On 19th August Karaeng Bontomarannu arrived in Banten with 800 people on three boats and a large junk (Dagh-Register 1670-1:404) and was joined at about mid-September by the Opu Cėnning and his wives and some 300 followers (Dagh-Register 1670-1:420).

The arrival of these distinguished refugees in Banten was apparently at the invitation of its ruler. They were straightaway given permission to live there and provided with an area to settle close to his residence in Pontang, "on the east side of the large marketplace" (Dagh-Register 1670-1:416). They were quickly joined by other groups of Makassar refugees under their leaders. Among these was a certain Kare Mamu who promised the Sultan of Banten that by the beginning of the east monsoon he would be able to provide him with 3,000 warriors from both Makassar and East Java (Dagh-Register 1672:53). Such a promise was appealing to the leaders of Banten who were dismayed at Goa's defeat, for they were certain that the Company intended the same fate for their own kingdom.

At first the mutual needs of the Makassar guests and their patron lord assured a satisfactory arrangement in the land. Difficulties soon occurred, however, over the Sultan's right to take any woman belonging to his subjects. When he attempted to apply the same standards to the Makassar refugees, he met an entirely different response. Karaeng Bontomarannu's son was killed attempting to reclaim his wife from the Sultan's palace, and other Makassar noblemen contemplated desperate action against the Sultan for seizing their wives. Unable to tolerate this and other forms of harassment from the Banten community, Karaeng Bontomarannu and his large following finally left for East Java where they had been invited to settle by Mataram's Adipati Anom (Crown Prince). Karaeng Bontomarannu had earlier asked the Susuhunan for permission to settle in Mataram but the request had been refused. Whether the refusal reflected Mataram's fear of the power of the Makassar refugees or its unwillingness to grant certain conditions for settlement is not known. The Adipati Anom, however, was so eager to strengthen his following that he welcomed them with open arms and gave them land in his apanage areas in East Java (De Graaf 1962:66-7, 69-70).

One of Karaeng Bontomarannu's chief companions was Daeng Mangappa who had followed his brother, Karaeng Tallo, into exile. After the death of Karaeng Tallo on the island of Sumbawa on 16 June 1673 Daeng Mangappa and Karaeng Galesong "returned to Bali and bought a piece of land on which to settle" (KA 1191i:742r). But Dutch reports mention nothing about their experiences on Bali. On 9 November 1674 Daeng Mangappa appeared in Banten at the head of a fleet of nineteen boats and 7-800 followers. Karaeng Galesong was not with this group and may have gone to east coast Java. The reason which Daeng Mangappa gave for going to Banten was to buy gunpowder and weapons. He intended to attack the kingdom of Bima whose ruler, so it was said, had ordered Karaeng Tallo's body to be exhumed and burned (De Graaf 1962:75-6; Dagh-Register 1675:339-340). Daeng Mangappa was to go from Banten to meet Karaeng Bontomarannu in Balambangan in East Java and then proceed to Bima where they were to join Karaeng Jarannikka for the attack. But these plans never materialized. Daeng Mangappa remained in Banten, and his sister married the chief minister of that kingdom. The Sultan of Banten disapproved of this second influx of Makassar refugees and wanted them to leave his kingdom. However, the Chief Minister Kiai Arya Mangunjaya prevailed upon him to moderate his demands. And so Daeng Mangappa and his followers remained

in Banten and learned to tolerate suspicion, fines, and even laws which allowed anyone in Banten to kill any Makassar person found in the streets at nights. But what they never learned to accept was the Sultan's behaviour toward their women. They, too, finally abandoned Banten toward the end of April 1675 to join Karaeng Bontomarannu, Karaeng Galesong, and Daeng Tulolo in east coast Java (Dagh-Register 1675: 12, 14-5, 93-4, 104, 117).

Any hopes that these Makassar princes may have had of persuading Banten to assist them militarily to regain power in South Sulawesi quickly vanished. Rather than face the ignominy of living under an overlord who showed scant respect for them, they preferred to seek a home free from the demands of any local lord.² The particular area chosen, Demung, was suitable in more than one respect. It was an area in East Java which was a no man's land between the jurisdiction of the Adipati Anom of Mataram and Trunajaya of Madura (De Graaf 1962: 86). Equally important, the Makassar leaders were ideally located to seek help from either or both of these leaders who had already indicated an interest in the military potential of the refugees. Arung Palakka had demonstrated how patience, persistence, and good fortune had finally succeeded in gaining a powerful ally who had helped free his land. With this example in mind these Makassar leaders were willing to emulate Arung Palakka, even to the extent of fighting other rulers' wars in order ultimately to obtain military support for the reconquest of South Sulawesi.

A hopeful beginning toward this goal was made with the arrangement of marriage between Karaeng Galesong and Trunajaya's niece. The Adipati Anom of Mataram, however, had now become reconciled with his father, the Susuhunan, and saw no further need to court the refugees. But the loss to the Makassar leaders of a potential ally was more than compensated by the urgency with which Trunajaya, the Adipati Anom's erstwhile ally, now sought the assistance of the refugees in his bid to become ruler of Mataram. Before the marriage could take place, Trunajaya asked as a condition that the Makassar forces participate in an attack on Gresik and Surabaya, cities subject to the Adipati Anom. Thus began a series of successful campaigns along the coastal areas of East Java. By the end of 1675 their conquests included Gresik, Surabaya, all the areas between these two cities, as well as the four strong and well-populated ports of Pasuruhan, Pajarakan, Gombang, and Gerongan. With the Makassar warriors having lived up to their reputation,

Trunajaya was more than pleased to present his niece in marriage to Karaeng Galesong in the fall of 1675 (De Graaf 1962:70, 85-8).

With the growing danger posed to the Mataram throne by the alliance of the Makassar refugees and Trunajaya, the Susuhunan appealed to the Company for help. In a series of hard-fought battles in May, June, and July 1676, the Makassar refugees were forced out of most of the cities they had conquered but not without severe losses to the Javanese-Dutch armies. Karaeng Galesong escaped from Panarukan with eighty boats and sought safety in Madura. The alliance between the Makassar refugees and Trunajaya was reaffirmed in August or September 1676 when Trunajaya took the title of Panembahan Madu Retna and Karaeng Galesong that of Adipati Anom (De Graaf 1962:104-110). In accepting the foreign title of Adipati Anom (Crown Prince, Raja Muda), Karaeng Galesong symbolically declared the intention of the Makassar refugees to champion the cause of the Panembahan, Trunajaya. Several decades later a refugee Bugis prince was also declared Raja Muda in the Malay kingdom of Johor. But the Raja Mudaship under this Bugis prince and his successors differed in two crucial aspects from that in the past: it did not provide the incumbent with any rights to the throne, and it assumed much greater powers than ever held by previous office-holders (L.Y. Andaya 1975:295, *passim*). Though little is known about the arrangements between Karaeng Galesong and Trunajaya, the former may have interpreted his appointment in the same light as his compatriot in Johor was to do some years later. Karaeng Galesong and his followers had made their commitment to Trunajaya, for they hoped that in time he in turn would lend his might to their cause.

While Karaeng Galesong and his people had found a sanctuary in Madura, the other Makassar groups under Daeng Mangappa and Karaeng Bontomarannu remained at Demung. Captain Christofel Poleman, who had fought in the Makassar War of 1666-9, led a successful expedition against the refugee strongholds in East Java in the beginning of September 1676. Only Madura eluded him because he lacked the 700 Europeans or 1-2,000 native troops he considered necessary to invade that island (De Graaf 1962:112-4). As long as Madura offered a safe haven and the Company was unwilling to establish a permanent military post in East Java, the Makassar refugees were able to operate with impunity in the waters and along the coasts and islands of East Java. Despite Poleman's claims to have "crippled the strength of the Makassar [refugees]", at the end of September 1676 Karaeng Galesong crossed over to Java from Madura to form a 9,000 man army from Java, Madura,

and Makassar. At Gegodog this army decisively defeated a much larger force under the Adipati Anom of Mataram. It was later claimed that the Adipati Anom had only feigned battle against the enemy (De Graaf 1962:123-5).

After the victory at Gegodog the armies under Trunajaya and Karaeng Galesong proceeded westward, and by January 1677 had conquered all the ports along the north coast of Java as far west as Ceribon. They failed to capture Japara because of some quarrel between the Madura and Makassar forces in the beginning of December 1676 which resulted in the latter's withdrawal from the besieged city and their return to Demung (De Graaf 1962:133-5). According to one report from Ceribon the differences had arisen because of the continuing raids, looting, and insufferable conduct of the Makassar troops who had even demanded that the cities of Gresik and Surabaya be given to them as recompense for their assistance. Trunajaya had been so angered by their behaviour that he had four of the most important Makassar leaders, all from Tallo, killed. Among those reported killed was Daeng Mangappa (Dagh-Register 1677:109-112).

In view of known reasons for previous Makassar participation in what were essentially Trunajaya's campaigns, it would have been unlikely that they would have demanded cities for themselves. Raiding and looting were very much part of native wars and would not have been the exclusive preserve of the Makassar forces, as can be seen from Dutch reports of the behaviour of the Java troops in these wars (De Graaf 1962:*passim*). A more likely reason may be found in Trunajaya's own explanation to the Dutch of his quarrels with the Makassar lords. Whenever Karaeng Galesong visited the royal capital in Madura, Trunajaya honoured him with a horse and an umbrella, which were the traditional signs of respect shown to royal guests. In the last visit, however, Karaeng Galesong had refused to leave his boat and had simply demanded that his wife, Trunajaya's niece, be brought to him. When Trunajaya showed his disapproval at the lack of respect shown his niece by this action, Karaeng Galesong threatened to get her by force. To avoid conflict Trunajaya relented and sent several officials to accompany his niece to her husband. Karaeng Galesong then killed some of the officials, thus causing a rift between the two allies (De Graaf 1962:135-6). The familiar theme of women trouble appeared again to have been the cause of this serious quarrel between the Makassar refugees and their host lord.

Fighting between Trunajaya and the Makassar refugees broke out in

mid-January 1677 without any decisive victories by either side. Trunajaya was too occupied on Java at the moment to concentrate his forces against the Makassar troops. Karaeng Galesong and his followers were therefore able to continue to operate successfully from east Madura, while Karaeng Tulolo with a force of 200 Makassar men and 1,000 Malays under a certain Datu Louadin cruised successfully on the western part of the island.³ The situation in general, nevertheless, was most discouraging for the refugees. Having lost their one last ally among the Indonesian kingdoms, the Makassar refugees saw their hope of attempting an invasion of Makassar quickly dissipating. But their disagreement with Trunajaya did not make them any more favourably inclined toward the Company. Speelman had hoped to obtain an assurance of neutrality from the refugees in his campaign against Trunajaya but to no avail (De Graaf 1962:136-7, 173-4). The refugees, now forced out of Demung because of the hostilities between Trunajaya and the Company, sought more secure bases mainly in Sumbawa and in Pulau Laut off the coast of Banjarmasin. The Dutch heard that among their leaders, Karaeng Bontomarannu had died of illness, Karaeng Galesong was cruising between Madura and Java, Opu Cënning Luwu was preparing to avenge the treachery of the people of Banjarmasin, and Daeng Tulolo was based on the island of Kangean with a considerable force (KA 1216g:178-9). A later report traced Karaeng Galesong and 800 of his followers to Kakaper in East Java where they had built a seemingly impregnable fortification along a river. It was bounded by an island on one side and a swamp on the other, with the only access being through the swamp by means of a narrow path about two and a half metres wide (KA 1218: 1896r-1895v). Yet the purely defensive nature of this fortification underlined the difficulties which they, too, were facing from hostile elements all around them.

The situation of the Makassar people in Goa was equally grim. They had been defeated by Arung Palakka and the Dutch at the end of July 1677 for the third time since 1666. What distinguished this war from the others was the strength and persistence of rumours that the Makassar refugees were all planning to return to save their beleaguered land. These rumours proved baseless but provided a continuing hope to the Makassar people in Sulawesi and possibly helped prolong the war. As long as large numbers of well-armed Makassar refugees remained abroad, peace in South Sulawesi was threatened. Arung Palakka was especially conscious of this since it was he, more than the Dutch, who was attuned to the subtle and swift changes of attitudes among the local

population highly prone to rumours. On 14 August 1677 he requested and was granted permission by the Council in Fort Rotterdam to send the Bugis Arung Teko and the Makassar Karaeng Jarannikka to ask all Bugis and Makassar refugees on Flores, Sumbawa, and other areas to return to their homeland (KA 1217b:218v-219r).

The mission proved unsuccessful because many did not wish to face the uncertainty of their fate in South Sulawesi. They had heard rumours that if they were to return, 1/3 of them would be made slaves, with 1/3 going to the Company, another 1/3 to the Bugis and the final 1/3 to the Makassar people under Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil (KA 1227g:261r). Moreover, the basic cause of their flight from Sulawesi had not been removed. Arung Palakka was in 1677 even stronger and less compromising than before. Both Daeng Tulolo and Karaeng Galesong explained that they would not return because they found Arung Palakka's overlordship unbearable. They quickly added that the Makassar refugees in Ayutthaya, eastern Indonesia, Palembang, and Aceh would prefer living "under the favour and the protection of the Company" (KA 1224b:219-220). What they proposed was the right to acknowledge only the Company as their overlord because they accused Arung Palakka of being the prime instigator of many of the policies which had contributed to the present degradation of the Makassar people. But as long as Arung Palakka continued to receive the trust of the Company, they saw little reason for returning since there would be no improvement for the Makassar people. Even the assurance from President Cops of the Company's protection and land in Maros for their livelihood failed to persuade them to return (KA 1227b:241r-242r). The mission to recall the refugees, therefore, ended in failure.

There seemed no other alternative left to Arung Palakka and the Company but to use force to compel the refugees to return. These refugees constituted an unstable element within the area. They cast their lots with one or another faction within a particular kingdom, thereby creating unnatural and transitory governments which survived at the pleasure of the refugees. Such arrangements bred resentment in the local populace and the eventual expulsion of the refugees. They were then cast adrift once again seeking a home and an ally and making every ambitious leader in a kingdom vulnerable to the attractions of such a powerful group of armed warriors. And so the process repeated itself. There were cases of refugees successfully settling within an area, but the vast majority roamed the seas from one kingdom to another disrupting the normal processes of trade and government throughout the Malay-

Indonesian archipelago. The activities of the refugees were anathema to the Company which depended upon peaceful conditions for the conduct of its trade. For Arung Palakka the large numbers of Makassar refugees abroad posed a potential threat to his position in South Sulawesi and served as a painful reminder that his war against the Makassar leaders was not yet finished. Once again the aims of the Company and Arung Palakka converged making the joint expedition against the Makassar refugees on Java of equal importance to both allies.

In May 1678 Arung Palakka decided to go to Java himself to lead the South Sulawesi forces. From Bontoala he sent his trusted Arung Amali Gëllarëng Tosawa to Bone and surrounding areas to prepare forty to sixty large boats to sail to Bantaeng within two months. Arung Palakka was reported to have asked for “volunteers” from Bone and Soppeng for the expedition to avoid the impression that he was *ordering* the allies to go to Java (KA 1224b:187-8, 220). Nevertheless, when 626 mountain folk from Bone arrived on twenty-one boats in Makassar, Arung Cibalu explained that they had been ordered by Arung Palakka to come “on pain of death and the confiscation of all their goods and children” (KA 1236f:380v).

The first contingent of 1,500 Bugis arrived in Surabaya toward the end of 1678. On 8th December these Bugis troops left Surabaya, sloshed through rain and mud to arrive on the 13th at a village about a day and a half away from Kakaper (KA 1238b:1756v-7r). The Makassar refugees under Karaeng Galesong were gathered in strength at Kakaper to which which place Daeng Tulolo and his followers had also gone from Sumbawa sometime at the end of August 1678 (KA 1227e:278v). Even before the fighting began, the Bugis army was somewhat incapacitated by illness (KA 1238a:1834v). Fortunately, more South Sulawesi reinforcements under the personal command of Arung Palakka left for Java at the end of June 1679. Poleman eagerly awaited Arung Palakka’s arrival to instil discipline and morale among the Bugis troops. They had been decimated and debilitated by sickness, and a great gloom pervaded the Bugis camps through lack of activity (KA 1238c:1883r-1884v).

As soon as Arung Palakka arrived in Batavia, he despatched two messengers to the Bugis under Captain Fransen Holsteyn in East Java ordering them to meet him at Surabaya. These messengers were also given 2,000 *rijksdaalders* to buy horses and bring them for Arung Palakka and his men since most wore heavy chainmail armour (*baju rantai*) and could only travel easily by horseback (KA 1238d:1900r-v).

The slow progress of the ships carrying Arung Palakka and the Bugis reinforcements from Batavia to East Java became so exasperating for Arung Palakka that he and his wife Daeng Talele and her ladies-in-waiting and a small following left their Dutch ship and travelled overland. Fear for their safety made the Dutch send out boats immediately to search for them. They were found at Pamanukan with all the Bugis boats, including some just recently arrived from Makassar. After a Dutch word of admonition to Arung Palakka, the Dutch and Bugis ships set sail on the evening of 25 July 1679 and arrived at Indramayu on the 28th. The Javanese regent's son greeted Arung Palakka and presented him with three water buffaloes, twenty sacks of rice, and other gifts. That evening the fleet continued onward to Tegal, Semarang, Japara, Gresik, and finally arrived in Surabaya on 19th August (KA 1238e:1904r-1908v; KA 1238f:1912r; KA 1238g:1923r-v).

Arung Palakka and his Bugis established their fortifications diagonally opposite the Dutch camp on the other side of the river at Soha. When Arung Palakka came to see the Dutch commanders, he expressed his satisfaction that they had even built houses for himself and his retinue in the Makassar style (i.e. on stilts), much to the delight of his wife Daeng Talele. The hospitality of the Dutch was in great contrast to the treatment accorded Arung Palakka by the Java folk. When Arung Palakka asked them for horses, they brought twelve which were generously described as "not being the best". Chided for this discourtesy, they left and returned with a few more "run-down and worn-out" mounts, claiming that nothing better was available. The Bugis had to be satisfied with this, and so the army set off on 23rd August while the supplies were transported by boat. A few days later the expedition arrived at the refugee stronghold at Kakaper. Some of the refugees soon came to ask for peace and were brought before a meeting of the War Council. The Dutch Commandant Jacob Couper commented that during the meeting, Arung Palakka deferred to the Dutch on everything. With Arung Palakka's approval, the War Council decided to send a message to the refugee forces at Kakaper saying that if they wished to surrender, they should send a fully authorized envoy to the Dutch within three days. On 30th August nine envoys arrived, among whom was Daeng Tulolo. They asked for forgiveness and expressed their willingness to submit to the Company. After the audience the envoys were presented with gifts suggested by Arung Palakka himself (KA 1238g:1924v-1929v).

In this campaign in Java, Arung Palakka assumed a decidedly secondary role to the Company. He was here as an ally of the Company,

assisting the latter to administer the “external affairs” of South Sulawesi. The Makassar refugees were still considered by Arung Palakka as a South Sulawesi problem since their presence abroad in large numbers constituted a threat to the stability of South Sulawesi. As long as the kingdom of Goa continued to believe in a future deliverance by these refugees, opposition to Arung Palakka and the Company would remain strong. Arung Palakka had therefore summoned the allies to assist the Company, not as mercenaries to fight the Company’s war, but as partners in the joint enterprise of ruling South Sulawesi. The expedition was seen by Arung Palakka, and appeared to have been conveyed to him by the Company, as a war against the Makassar refugees, not against Trunajaya.

The arrival of the Makassar envoys from Kakaper asking for peace appeared to be an auspicious beginning to the campaign. But nothing resulted from the talks, and preparations continued for an assault on the refugee stronghold. The Bugis army now stood at 3,000 able-bodied soldiers, and another boatload of reinforcements was expected to arrive from Makassar within a short time. Arung Palakka’s personal body-guard of sixty Bugis warriors arrived from Surabaya to augment the Dutch guards who had been assigned by the Company specifically to guard Arung Palakka’s life. The next day the whole army was brought within about one and a half kilometres from Kakaper, with the Bugis under Arung Palakka camped about fifteen minutes away from the Dutch. Arung Palakka and 200 men rode for two hours that evening as far east as the village of Galate (?) looking for a passage into the well-defended fortress at Kakaper. Captain Jonckers and his Ambon troops had taken the same route the previous day and had returned without success. Arung Palakka and his men were more fortunate and found the narrow strip of dry land which was the only access through the swamp and thick reeds leading to the fortification. Preparations were then made for an assault through this narrow path.

An attempt by Captain Jonckers and some Bugis to erect a gun battery across from the fortification had to be abandoned because of heavy gunfire from the Makassar forces. Leading some 2-300 Bugis soldiers, Arung Palakka tried to swim across but was soon attacked by about 400 Makassar warriors.⁴ His Bugis managed to repel the attackers, and Arung Palakka was able to deliver to the Dutch that evening the heads of four Makassar soldiers and a banner which he himself had taken in the fighting. In another action Arung Palakka and his men captured a Makassar gun emplacement but lost forty Bugis. Arung Palakka’s per-

sonal participation in the fighting and in sharing in the most menial tasks demanded of his men, caused the Dutch some concern for his health and safety. They considered his well-being to be essential for any discipline and continued effectiveness of the Bugis warriors, for even with his presence as a moderating influence, the campaign was characterized by frequent Bugis raiding and looting of the surrounding countryside (KA 1238:1974r-1980v).

On 21 October 1679 Kakaper fell to the combined allied forces with remarkably little resistance from the refugees. When the allies entered the fortification, there were some 2,000 women and children but very few men. Some 180 bodies were found, but most of the men had succeeded in escaping. Since Karaeng Galesong was not among the dead, Arung Palakka quickly assembled 300 men and went to look for him. To many of the Bugis the fighting was over, and so even those chosen by Arung Palakka to accompany him began disappearing to get booty. Only sixty of the original 300 Bugis were still with Arung Palakka when he encountered a hostile force of Madura troops and was forced to go back. Arung Palakka returned to camp in a great rage and immediately summoned all the Bugis leaders. He berated them for their behaviour and asked whether they still wanted him as their ruler. With tears in their eyes, the leaders asked Arung Palakka for forgiveness and swore that in all future circumstances they would remain at Arung Palakka's side to the death (KA 1238i:2010v-2011r; KA 1238j:1998r).

The profession of loyalty by Arung Palakka's men was sorely needed because of the difficulty in maintaining discipline among the 6,000 Bugis troops on Java. Arung Palakka had promised the Dutch that he would remain until peace was restored, but the capture of Kakaper had been interpreted by many of the South Sulawesi troops as the end of the fighting and the start of the acquiring of the spoils of war. With the renewed support from his leaders Arung Palakka could now assure the Dutch that he would pursue Karaeng Galesong "until he gets grey and is forced to eat the leaves of trees, for as long as the Makassar people remained on Java, the honour in the conquest of Kakaper would not be complete" (KA 1238i:2012r-2013r, 2015r, 2018v). His task was made easier by Karaeng Galesong's own desire to reach an accommodation with Arung Palakka "and by that means be freed from the people of Madura". Once this was accomplished Karaeng Galesong promised to return to Makassar. But before any definite arrangements could be made, Karaeng Galesong died from illness on 21 November 1679 (KA 1240a:2613v-2614r). Before his death Karaeng Galesong had desig-

nated his sixteen or seventeen year old son, Karaeng Mamampang, as his successor to avoid a "succession" dispute among the refugees. Karaeng Mamampang followed the wishes of his father and persuaded his men to go to Surabaya for embarkation to Makassar. Some 120 of them eventually appeared in Surabaya, and another 8-900, including some Wajo refugees, were expected to follow. However, the majority of the refugees refused to capitulate and joined their erstwhile Madura ally, Trunajaya (KA 1240b:2620r).

Arung Palakka had made his promise to the Company, and he kept it. Although Makassar resistance had been broken, there were still many small groups fighting separately or alongside Trunajaya. At Kalisturan, at the foot of the mountains at Malang, the Bugis forces found fifty hungry Makassar men, women, and children. They claimed that another 300 of them were in the mountains but were prevented from coming down to surrender because the pass at the holy mountain of Rarata was blocked by Madura forces. The following morning the Bugis seized the Madura stockade at Rarata by surprise, forcing the Madura garrison to flee still higher up the mountain. The Madura troops retreated to the second line of defence, which was two bamboo stockades opposite one another and separated by a stream which effectively blocked any passage up or down the mountain. Instead of attempting what would have been a costly frontal attack on these stockades, Arung Palakka went with a group of men to see whether there was a way to attack from behind. Meanwhile the Dutch Captain van Vliet came down the mountainside with his Bugis and attacked unexpectedly from above, scattering the defenders who then fled on horseback. The Bugis pursued them for almost two hours and came upon a large camp of Makassar and Madura forces. The Dutch arrived soon after, but before an attack could be launched, rain began falling and a dark mist descended. By the time the Bugis and Dutch arrived at the camp at Ngantang the following day, the enemy had fled except for four Makassar nobles and some 300 men, women, and children. They told Arung Palakka that there were still another 1,500 Makassar folk, excluding women and children, who were up in the mountains.

At a mountain called Kunjangan the Dutch and the Bugis laid a siege hoping to starve out the Makassar and Madura defenders. After some time a certain Temenggong Wirapaksa came down with a white flag to Arung Palakka saying that he had been sent directly to Arung Palakka by his lord Trunajaya. Arung Palakka told him, "Come, let us go below to the [Dutch] Commander where you can present your message." But

the Temenggong refused, saying that the message was not for the Commander but for Arung Palakka himself. Arung Palakka's reply expressed his understanding of his role in the whole conflict: "I have made no war against the Sultan [i.e., Trunajaya] and can therefore make no peace with him. I am here in the name of the Company and conduct myself in accordance with the wishes of the Commander." Arung Palakka saw his role here as a supportive one, assisting the Company in its function as a South Sulawesi overlord dealing with Makassar refugees. His quarrel was not with Trunajaya but with the refugees, and as long as they remained in Java his task would be incomplete. However, there was no question of his providing the leadership in this campaign since this was the concern of the Company in its role as overlord in South Sulawesi dealing with external affairs. The Company had provided a similar support to Arung Palakka in his wars against the South Sulawesi kingdoms, and it had not presumed to dictate how Arung Palakka was to conduct the internal affairs of South Sulawesi. While no specific agreement had been included in writing, both Arung Palakka and the Company had evolved an understanding of these spheres of influence which became more and more accepted procedure over the years.

Having failed to gain Arung Palakka's favour, Trunajaya's envoy returned to the mountains. The Dutch then let the Makassar refugees in Trunajaya's camp know that if they surrendered they would be treated well. But if they refused, they would be destroyed. Some 2,500 decided to accept the offer and came down from their mountain strongholds on 15th December. The size of the group greatly astonished the Dutch who considered themselves fortunate that the refugees had decided to surrender instead of fight. Abandoned by his Makassar allies, Trunajaya escaped through a thorny scrub forest behind the fortifications and fled to Pugar (KA 1240b:2620v-2623r). During the last days of Trunajaya's resistance there were only about twenty-five to thirty Makassar refugees still with him. But they, too, were soon to share the fate of their compatriots when Trunajaya was finally captured on 25 December 1679 (KA 1240c:2652r; KA 1240d:2640v).

Peace on Java had been achieved, and so Arung Palakka began making preparations to return home with a clear conscience. He had performed his duty to his ally faithfully and with great valour, but he was aware of the danger of prolonging his stay on Java. There had been a number of unpleasant confrontations between his Bugis and the local people, and his own relations with the Susuhunan of Mataram were decidedly

strained. He had foreseen the problem but could do little to restrain an army of 6,000 once the fighting had ended. What he feared occurred with frightening regularity, with the Bugis seizing not only property but also the local people as slaves (KA 1238i:2012r-v; KA 1240c:2654r).

The terror with which the local villagers regarded the marauding Bugis troops in the aftermath of the war was also reflected in the relationship between their respective rulers. In the early days of the war, the Susuhunan of Mataram had made no effort to conceal his contempt for Arung Palakka and his Bugis by sending him a number of old, worn-out horses. Despite this demeaning treatment, Arung Palakka was ready to oblige when the Susuhunan requested a purple Makassar headgear (*pasapu putara*) and a beautiful Makassar woman as gifts after the fall of Kakaper. The Susuhunan spent two nights with the woman and then sent her and the headgear back. In an accompanying message Arung Palakka was told that the woman was too small (the Susuhunan preferred stronger women), and that he would not wear the headgear. The insult could not be ignored, and so Arung Palakka went quietly to the Dutch Commander Couper and told him that he was going to see the Susuhunan at Wirasaba "to restore order". The Susuhunan realized what the consequences of his actions would be and had already fled upriver on two *konting*, with his nobles preparing to follow. Fortunately for the Susuhunan, Commander Couper succeeded in making Arung Palakka abandon any plans he had to avenge this insult (KA 1238i:2013v-102014r).

The quarrels between the Susuhunan and Arung Palakka grew steadily worse. While the Dutch attributed the inexperience of the Susuhunan as a factor in this affair, they recognized that the main reasons for the antagonism stemmed from the stealing, burning, and murdering carried out by the Bugis against the Susuhunan's subjects. Arung Palakka, too, was aware that there was little hope of reconciliation with the Susuhunan as long as the Bugis remained on Java and continued their depredations (KA 1240b:2614r-v). To the great credit of the Dutch, they succeeded in effecting some truce between the two rulers. In a ceremony the Susuhunan thanked Arung Palakka for his help and the latter reciprocated with the appropriate courteous replies, thus demonstrating to the world that their quarrels were at an end (KA 1249a:2044v). The truce lasted a month. A new quarrel arose concerning a woman that the Susuhunan had presented to Arung Palakka prior to the battle of Kakaper. After her disappearance, Arung Palakka was told that she had taken refuge in the Susuhunan's court. When Arung Palakka approached the

Susuhunan, the latter ordered a search and the woman was found in his court at Sidayu. Though the Susuhunan swore that he had no knowledge of this, Arung Palakka refused to believe him. And with this incident ended any further talk of peace and brotherhood between these two rulers (KA 1249b:2059r).

On 18 February 1680 the Dutch Commander Couper and the Chief Merchant Jeremias van Vliet came on board *'t Goedt Begin* to say farewell to Arung Palakka. Arung Palakka asked Couper and van Vliet to convey his greetings and the following message to the Supreme Government of the Company in Batavia: "Whenever the Company needed his service, it need but order it, for he was obligated as long as he lived to repay its inestimable favour in restoring him as a free ruler after his exile from his homeland." Arung Palakka was sincere in his declarations because his life had been restored to him through the redemption of his *siri'* by the Company. But the obligations of Arung Palakka the individual had to be reconciled with those of Arung Palakka the overlord. While reminding the Company that his presence in Java was in response to his moral debt, he was quick to emphasize that he was also here to fulfil his role as one of the joint overlords in South Sulawesi. He had come to Java to fulfil both a private and a public responsibility to the Company, and this he had done admirably.

In addition to the *'t Goedt Begin* and another Dutch ship *Marken*, there were 207 native boats which left Surabaya for Makassar on 19 February 1680. In these native boats were members of Arung Palakka's army as well as those Makassar refugees who were being repatriated:

Bugis	5334 people on 139 boats
Makassar	3019 people on 51 boats
Wajo	714 people on 17 boats

TOTAL 9059 people on 207 boats (KA 1249c:2074r)

On board the *'t Goedt Begin* were Arung Palakka, his family, 455 of his subjects, and some 216 Makassar refugees, while the *Marken* carried 130 refugees and sixteen Bugis (KA 1249d:2115v-2116r). With such a large fleet, it was difficult to maintain control over individual boats. To minimize piracy Arung Palakka appointed his four most important and dependable nobles – Arung Kaju, Arung Maruangen, Arung Macege, and Arung Ujung – to be responsible in preventing the Bugis and Makassar people from raiding the kingdom of Bima on the island of Sumbawa. They were also entrusted with the task of seeking a guarantee

from the rulers of the kingdoms of Bima and Sumbawa that they would forbid all Bugis or Makassar refugees from settling in their lands (KA 1249d:2117r).

On 13 March 1680 *'t Goedt Begin* arrived in Makassar after an uneventful trip. Paulus de Bocq, second in command in Fort Rotterdam, and the Syahbandar François Prins came on board to welcome Arung Palakka. They accompanied him to shore with the firing of cannon, and when he left Fort Rotterdam an hour later to return home to Bontoala, he was again honoured by a cannonade (KA 1249d:2118r-v). A few days later Arung Palakka presented to President Cops, as the Company's representative in South Sulawesi, the Makassar and Wajo refugees taken prisoner in Java. With this presentation Arung Palakka discharged his final duties to the Company both as a joint overlord and as an indebted friend in the whole affair. Cops later sent these refugees back to their homelands and to their rightful lords (KA 1248a:345v-346r).

The long, hard road for the refugees had ended where it had begun. They had left Sulawesi because they were unwilling to accept the political and social changes which had been forced upon them by Arung Palakka, the Dutch, and some of their own leaders. For some, especially from Wajo and Goa, leaving Sulawesi was not a "flight" but a calculated move to seek allies abroad for a reconquest of their homelands. Arung Palakka's example was fresh in their minds as they sought sanctuary from various rulers in Banten, Mataram, Madura, Jambi, Palembang, Aceh, Johor, and even Ayutthaya (Siam). As they lent their experienced and formidable fighters to do their host rulers' bidding, they harboured the hope and at times were perhaps even encouraged in the belief that these rulers would some day offer their resources for a military expedition to South Sulawesi. These refugees saw their ultimate aim as a reconquest of their lands with arms and men from sympathetic rulers abroad. This goal dominated all their activities and united the many disparate groups of refugees.

In 1679 in East Java alone there appeared to have been, at a conservative estimate, about 4,000 of them roaming around the area. With such a large group of refugees, it is a wonder that so little actual piracy for private gain seemed to have occurred. Many of the attacks by the refugees on settlements and boats in and around Java appeared to have occurred under the orders of a local patron lord (De Graaf 1962:80-2, 87-8). Unfortunately for the refugees, their services to their patron lords did not produce the desired effect. No offer of assistance was forth-

coming, and the demands upon the refugees became more and more oppressive. One of the most offensive in the eyes of these South Sulawesi refugees was the demand for their womenfolk to gratify their local lords. On this issue the refugees quarreled and became alienated first with the Sultan of Banten and later with Trunajaya, thus irreparably damaging any hopes of obtaining assistance from these two powerful princes for a reconquest of Goa and Wajo.

After the defeat of the refugees at Kakaper in 1679, the vast majority of them were repatriated to Sulawesi. There were, however, some groups which fled further westward to seek protection and assistance from other lords. Among these were the elusive Daeng Tulolo, Daeng Mangika (a son of Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali), and Daeng Mangappa, whose death was reported by the Dutch in April 1677 but who turned up in Palembang with Daeng Mangika in 1680 (*Dagh-Register* 1677:109; *Dagh-Register* 1680:544). But they no longer believed that they could muster sufficient support from any ruler to be able to defeat the now seemingly invincible combination of Arung Palakka and the Company. Instead, they devoted their energies to obtaining an area to settle under their own lords without arbitrary interference from the local rulers, as occurred in Jambi under Daeng Mangika (L.Y. Andaya 1975:120). The only future they could now reasonably expect was a life in exile free from the oppressions they had suffered in South Sulawesi. Whatever hope they may still have entertained of a triumphant return to Sulawesi was forever extinguished at Kakaper in 1679.

By destroying the large concentrations of Makassar refugees on Java, Arung Palakka and the Company snapped the one remaining thread of hope which had helped the Makassar courts to retain a posture of pride and defiance despite their frequent humiliating setbacks. From this time forward the Makassar kingdoms offered little or no opposition to Arung Palakka's overlordship in South Sulawesi. The only serious challenge to arise during the remainder of Arung Palakka's rule came not from the traditional Makassar enemy but from Arung Palakka's own camp.

CHAPTER IX

CHALLENGE FROM WITHIN

Upon Arung Palakka's triumphal return from Java, it appeared that all effective opposition to his and the Company's supremacy in South Sulawesi had been removed. Arung Palakka was realistic enough, however, to realize that much of his success was due to his unique relationship with the Company. While occasional misunderstandings had arisen between Arung Palakka and the Dutch representatives in Fort Rotterdam, Batavia never allowed these to reach a state which would endanger their alliance. Their outward demonstration of unity of purpose impressed and overawed South Sulawesi and made their joint overlordship effective.

The Company's consistent policy of openly or tacitly supporting Arung Palakka by word or deed in any local dispute, regardless of its own attitudes, served to demoralize any opposition to Arung Palakka. It was soon apparent to and accepted by the leaders of South Sulawesi that the Company would defer to Arung Palakka on all local matters. With Goa's leaders effectively bridled after 1679, there was no one outside Arung Palakka's own camp with sufficient prestige and following to mount any serious challenge to his position. Arung Palakka came to be regarded as the supreme arbiter in the affairs of South Sulawesi.

Having attained such a powerful position, Arung Palakka began to regard it as part of his legacy to be bequeathed to his descendants. He had experienced so much suffering and bloodshed in his rise to power that he was determined that his accomplishments were not to be undone after his death. Although he had previously mentioned a possible successor, it was only after his return from Java in 1680 that he felt an urgent need to announce his heir to the world. One of the factors which precipitated this decision was an illness caused in Java which did not seriously incapacitate him at first but which persisted as a reminder of his advancing years. Another was the fear of ambitious South Sulawesi leaders who were only too happy to seize power after his death.

Although Arung Palakka had no children of his own, he had earlier begun the process of grooming his nephew, La Patau, son of his eldest

sister We Mappolobombang Da Upi and Arumpone La Ma'darēm-mēng's son La Pakkokoe Arung Timurung, as his successor. After his return from Java, Arung Palakka informed the Dutch that he was now inclined to establish La Patau as ruler in Bone as quickly as possible (KA 1248b:365r). He was aware that there would be opposition from his own allies, especially from Arung Bakkě Todani, who had been one of his closest companions in exile. But the fact that Arung Bakkě was held in such high regard with the Company now served to condemn him in the eyes of Arung Palakka. The latter's suspicions of Arung Bakkě's ambitions were fed by rumours that he hoped to succeed the childless Arung Palakka. What appeared to lend credence to these rumours was Arung Bakkě's increasing familiarity with the Company, as well as his growing influence in the prosperous and well-placed Ajattapparēng. The lands of the Ajattapparēng include fertile rice-growing plains around Lake Sidenreng and occupy a particularly strategic location. The mountain chain which separates the hinterlands of the west coast from the southern end of the peninsula tapers off at Suppa and breaks off precisely at Alitta, thus making this area "the passageway toward the fertile Bugis plains" (Pelras 1977:239-240).

By 1677 Arung Bakkě was acknowledged as the leading figure within the Ajattapparēng. It is perhaps because of the power that he exercised at this time that later scribes anachronistically presented him with the titles of Adatuatta Sidenreng, Datu Sawitto, Datu Suppa, Arung Alitta and Arung Rappēng, thus implying that he had become the single ruler of the Limae Ajattapparēng (The Five [states] West of the Lake).¹ Although a local historian claims that these five states first formed this confederation in the fifteenth century², Speelman's *Notitie* dating from 1670 indicates that there were many more states in the confederation than five (Speelman 1670). What is indisputable, however, was the authority exercised by Arung Bakkě in the confederation.

The Company valued the friendship of Arung Bakkě and always regarded him, as did most of South Sulawesi, as Arung Palakka's most trusted lieutenant. When Lamuru was conquered in 1670, the Company presented it as a fief to both Arung Palakka and Arung Bakkě. After the conquest of Tosora in 1670, the Company sent greetings and congratulations not only to Arung Palakka but to Arung Bakkě as well. To bind both of these leaders closer to the Company, President de Jong in Fort Rotterdam recommended to Batavia that the Company honour Arung Palakka with 2/3 and Arung Bakkě with 1/3 of the 5,500 *mas* indemnity paid by the vanquished ruler of Belawa (KA 1171b:775r-v). It was these

two lords who were also singled out by the Company for medals and commendation in 1672 for their loyalty (KA 1177b:1197v-1198r). When the Mandar rulers surrendered in 1674, they swore an oath of allegiance before the Company representative, Arung Palakka, and Arung Bakkě (KA 1191h:719v). Up to 1674 Arung Palakka was still too preoccupied with the more immediate problems of Luwu, Goa, and the Makassar refugees to be concerned greatly with Arung Bakkě's growing intimacy with the Dutch. But the first signs of disaffection between these two lords occurred over the problem of jurisdiction over Enrekang.

As principal ruler of Ajattapparěng Arung Bakkě claimed that he was entitled, according to *adat*, to both Leta and Enrekang. The ruler of Enrekang, however, refused to submit to Arung Bakkě, and later demonstrated that, according to Enrekang's treaty with the Company of 20 April 1671, Enrekang had become an independent land and ally of the Company. Furthermore, he argued, Enrekang had never been subject to Arung Bakkě nor his ancestors (KA 1227b:238r). When war broke out between Enrekang and Leta, the ruler of Enrekang refused to heed the Company's summons to appear in Fort Rotterdam. Instead it sought Arung Palakka's mediation. To the dismay of Arung Bakkě, Arung Palakka ruled in favour of the ruler of Enrekang. This decision was the first clear indication to the Dutch that there was some ill-feeling between Arung Palakka and Arung Bakkě. But any local lord would have been aware that something was amiss when the ruler of Enrekang was actively encouraged by Soppeng and Pammana to reject Arung Bakkě's overlordship. These latter two states were closely attuned to the affairs of the Bone court and would never have acted without obtaining either an explicit or implicit approval from Arung Palakka. Soppeng resented the fact that it had to surrender several districts to Ajattapparěng, and Datu Pammana was jealous of Arung Bakkě's growing power which had resulted in the deposing of a close ally, the Datu Sawitto Totanre (KA 1200a:181r-182r; KA 1209e:193v). The Datu Sawitto had refused to acknowledge that his land was subject to Ajattapparěng, and so he had been deposed by Arung Bakkě. The latter justified his action to the Company by accusing Datu Sawitto of having succeeded to the datuship without the Company's knowledge (KA 1191a:654v). The Company accepted Arung Bakkě's explanations and approved his rights to Sawitto, quite oblivious to the subtle political manoeuvres occurring between Arung Palakka and Arung Bakkě or to its own practice of refraining from interfering directly in the internal affairs of

South Sulawesi without first consulting Arung Palakka (KA 1191d: 727v).

If Arung Palakka had been distressed at the Company's decision to support Arung Bakkě over Sawitto, his behaviour over the next few months did in no way betray this. On the contrary he seemed in good spirits in September 1675 at Bacukiki when he attended the ceremonial clipping of Arung Bakkě's hair. He, Arung Palakka, and the other Toangke had vowed not to cut their hair until their lands were freed from Makassar overlordship (Matthes 1875:95; KA 1196b:174r-v).³ According to the Company's representative at the celebrations, Arung Bakkě provided a feast "the likes of which, according to everyone there, had never been seen in Makassar, Mandar, Luwu, Bone, or the entire Sulawesi" (KA 1196b:174r-v). Such a display of wealth and the extravagant praise of the guests could not have been especially pleasing to Arung Palakka whose own hair-cutting ceremony two years before was a modest affair in comparison. But Arung Palakka did not let his displeasure show and continued to delegate duties to Arung Bakkě commensurate with his favoured status. It was Arung Bakkě who was entrusted with the delicate task of krissing Arung Palakka's women who had been indiscreet in their relations with Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali and with some of his nobles (KA 1208i:566v). But even the Dutch began to discern a change in the relationship between Arung Palakka and Arung Bakkě. They rightfully diagnosed the problem to be Arung Palakka's resentment in having to share with another South Sulawesi ruler his position of honour with the Company (KA 1208a: 543v).

For a while in 1676 there was a real threat of an open rift between Arung Palakka and Arung Bakkě over the latter's claim to territory in the north. Arung Palakka and Datu Soppeng La Těnribali sent envoys to Arung Bakkě to urge him to refrain from interfering in the affairs of Enrekang, even though the general allies had previously approved Arung Bakkě's jurisdiction over that district. They also warned Arung Bakkě to desist in any of his pretensions over the areas in dispute with Soppeng, among which were Kiru-Kiru, Balusu, and Maiwa, and proposed that regents be established over these places. Arung Bakkě refused to comply with these demands and sent the envoys back with a message that in such matters he was not subject to the wishes of Arung Palakka or Datu Soppeng, but to the Company alone (KA 1209b: 223v). This reply revealed where Arung Bakkě's ultimate loyalty lay and further aroused Arung Palakka's suspicions that Arung Bakkě intended to displace him as the Company's favourite and as joint overlord in South

Sulawesi. Reports that Arung Bakkě's son had been warmly received and feted in Batavia did nothing to allay Arung Palakka's fears (KA 1224a:85).

At the feast held in honour of the arrival of President Cops in Makassar in January 1678, many sighed in relief to see Arung Palakka and Arung Bakkě engaging in amiable conversation. But a day or two later, when Arung Bakkě attempted to deliver a gift personally to Arung Palakka, he was rebuffed and his gift of a slave woman rejected. Arung Palakka simply told him: "It was the President who made us eat and drink together". At Cop's suggestion Arung Bakkě again tried to see Arung Palakka, but he was treated like a total stranger. A further attempt to send Arung Bakkě's interpreter to see Arung Palakka was equally unsuccessful. He was stopped at the gate by Arung Palakka's men who said that none of Arung Bakkě's people would be allowed to enter.

Meanwhile, news reached Fort Rotterdam that Arung Palakka had sent the Bone *Aruppitu* to meet the leaders of Soppeng to discuss the disputed areas claimed by both Soppeng and Arung Bakkě. At this meeting the delegates, clearly reflecting the wishes of Arung Palakka, declared their willingness to war with Arung Bakkě rather than surrender these areas. The Dutch were placed in the unenviable position of attempting to mediate between their two most faithful allies without appearing to favour one or the other. Yet if they were to implement their policy of maintaining some balance to Arung Palakka's power in South Sulawesi they had perforce to assist the weaker Arung Bakkě. Therefore, they assured him of assistance while advising him to return to Ajattapparěng and be on his guard (KA 1224a:86-9). Three Dutch ships were ordered to bring Arung Bakkě to Bacukiki, from which port he only had to travel a short distance overland to return home. News soon reached Arung Palakka that some type of arrangement was being made between Arung Bakkě and the Company. To prevent the further spread of damaging rumours about the Company's involvement, Cops explained that no Dutch soldiers were being stationed at Ajattapparěng and of the three ships setting sail northward, only one was to bring Arung Bakkě home (KA 1227a:200v). Despite this explanation, the very fact that the Company had put one of its ships at Arung Bakkě's disposal was proof enough for Arung Palakka of the Company's inordinate affection for Arung Bakkě.

Another factor which contributed to the animosity between Arung Palakka and Arung Bakkě was the break-up of the marriage between

the latter and Arung Palakka's sister, We Těnrigrang.⁴ Their separation, unfortunately, had been especially acrimonious, and she had left him to go and live in Palakka in Bone (KA 1227a:195v). Her presence in Bone only served to remind Arung Palakka of his quarrel with Arung Bakkě. Once when she was visiting her brother in Bontoala Arung Bakkě attempted to send messengers to her, but Arung Palakka turned them away saying that anything their lord Arung Bakkě had to say should be said to him (KA 1224b:190). There were many of Arung Palakka's followers, especially the Toangke, who were particularly grieved by this quarrel. They urged Arung Bakkě to make a conciliatory gesture toward Arung Palakka by seeking a solution to his marital problems with We Těnrigrang. On Arung Amali's advice Arung Bakkě and some of his nobles made a special visit to Cenrana to speak to her, but she refused all entreaties to return. Following this rejection Arung Bakkě made no further efforts to effect a reconciliation with We Těnrigrang or with Arung Palakka. In defiance of all, he married a princess from the royal house of Sawitto (KA 1235f:87).

In this quarrel Arung Bakkě was aware that his well-being depended upon the support of the Company, although he was the acknowledged leader of the rich and potentially powerful Ajattapparěng confederation. A few centuries earlier it had been well-served by the port of Bacukiki which had been the gateway to the international trade and wealth which flowed to the Ajattapparěng states. In the middle of the 16th century the Ajattapparěng had witnessed the beginning of a decline as a result of a Goa invasion and the removal to Makassar of many of the foreigners and skilled personnel associated with the international trade at Bacukiki and Suppa. The transformation of Makassar into an international entrepot resulted in the demise of Bacukiki as a principal port and the loss of a principal revenue-earner for the Ajattapparěng. Nevertheless, its rich rice-growing areas, substantial population, and strategic location governing the entrances into the Bugis and Makassar rice-bowls in the south had always provided the ingredients for a powerful kingdom. Any ruler with ambitions for overlordship of the whole of South Sulawesi eventually had to contend with the possibility of a serious challenge arising from the Ajattapparěng. It was this challenge posed by Arung Bakkě to Arung Palakka's overlordship which the Bugis sources regard as the basic cause of the conflict between these two men (La Side 1968:29; L-1:149).

Since the differences between Arung Palakka and Arung Bakkě were generally known, Towesa, who became Datu Soppeng in 1678, sought to

gain Arung Bakkě's support for his own quarrels with Arung Palakka. Arung Bakkě, however, acted with circumspection and refused to accompany Datu Soppeng to Fort Rotterdam for fear of further arousing Arung Palakka's jealousy and ire (KA 1235f:85). Arung Bakkě charted a careful course, avoiding any incriminating alliances which were ineffectual and likely to be regarded as provocative, while cultivating the one ally that mattered. When in mid-1679 the Company asked Arung Bakkě whether he would be willing to go to Java with his men if his services were needed against the Makassar refugees, Arung Bakkě replied effusively:

. . . The Raja Tamparang [i.e., Arung Bakkě] is like a white linen cloth upon which the Company can write whatsoever it wishes. If the Company says it shall be white, white it shall be; if it says it shall be black, then black it shall be. Raja Tamparang's life and well-being depend upon the Company. What it commands him to do, that will he do. He himself would go with 1,000 men, including rulers and princes⁵ all from his choicest and best people (KA 1235f:88).

At the end of September Arung Bakkě left Makassar and promised to return within two months with the promised 1,000 men (KA 1236a:455v). But before Arung Bakkě could assemble an army and return to Makassar, news arrived of the victory of Arung Palakka and the Company over the Makassar refugees at Kakaper on 21 October 1679 (KA 1238i:2010v-2011r).

Although Arung Bakkě could not share in the glory of the successful Java campaign, his sincere intentions toward the Company were not forgotten. The Company urged Arung Bakkě to go to Bontoala in October 1680 to welcome Arung Palakka back from Java with the hope that there could be some reconciliation between the two. To the delight of the Company, Arung Bakkě was received in a friendly fashion, and Arung Palakka even brought out some guns and other souvenirs from Java to show him. Relations between them appeared to have improved during the two or three visits which Arung Bakkě made to Bontoala, but on 2nd December Arung Bakkě arrived before President Cops in Fort Rotterdam visibly upset. He recounted how Toala', a son of Arung Palakka's now deceased elder brother Arung Tana Tennga, had grievously insulted him. He had demanded that Arung Bakkě repay a gambling debt of 350 gold *mas*. Having been so affronted in public, Arung Bakkě believed that his continued presence in Makassar would only provide a target for abuse by Arung Palakka and his followers. He requested permission to return home since his own *anakarung* would no

longer tolerate these attacks on the dignity of their prince and were ready to retaliate.

Cops must have known the real cause of the insult to Arung Bakkě, but nevertheless he berated Arung Bakkě for being remiss in repaying his debt. On the other hand, Cops also saw the truth to Arung Bakkě's fears and so encouraged Arung Bakkě's *anakarung* to return home. However, he asked Arung Bakkě to delay his departure awhile until the problem of the succession to Sawitto could be settled to the satisfaction of all, or at least of the Company. The former Datu Sawitto Totanre had been deposed by his subjects because of his bad government. The logical successor was Arung Bakkě, and so Cops had suggested this to Arung Palakka earlier. This suggestion had obviously displeased Arung Palakka, and he had curtly replied that nothing should be done until the deposed Totanre arrived in Makassar to present his version of events. Nevertheless, Cops again raised the question of Arung Bakkě's rights to the Sawitto throne with Arung Palakka. This time Arung Palakka agreed and also assured the Company that he wanted no quarrels with Arung Bakkě. To prove his good intentions toward Arung Bakkě he was planning to honour him with a visit. What appeared to be a return to friendly relations between Arung Palakka and Arung Bakkě was soon discovered to be a mere ruse. Arung Palakka had already approved a well-planned attempt to assassinate Arung Bakkě (KA 1257a:377v).

On 9th December 1680 a messenger from Arung Bakkě arrived in Fort Rotterdam with ominous news for Cops. It was being said that Arung Palakka had commissioned the nephew of one of his nobles to kill Arung Bakkě. Another rumour, equally disturbing, was that Arung Palakka would openly challenge Arung Bakkě's authority in Sawitto. He planned to return to his Bone residence at Cenrana and then summon the people of Sawitto to him. If Arung Bakkě were to evince any opposition whatsoever, he would be attacked. Karaeng Karunrung, who was supposedly there when this conversation took place, had asked Arung Palakka what he would do should the Company support Arung Bakkě. He had answered, so went the rumours, that "he would do to the Company what he would do to Arung Bakkě" (KA 1257a:379r-v). While the Dutch were accustomed to hearing rumours of every sort, the danger of open conflict between Arung Palakka and Arung Bakkě forced them to take this report of Arung Palakka's plans seriously. There was, therefore, some tension in the air when Arung Palakka came to visit Cops toward the end of the month. The news which Cops had to convey

to Arung Palakka did little to lighten the atmosphere. Batavia declared that Sawitto was an independent state as a result of having remained faithful to the Company in the Makassar War. Further research into the background of Arung Bakkě had also shown that he was next in line as Datu Sawitto (KA 1257a:379v). While this news must have been disappointing to Arung Palakka, he showed no sign of this. He even agreed that it was best for Arung Bakkě to return home since it was the rice-planting season. But Arung Palakka's accommodating manner belied the sinister plans for destroying Arung Bakkě that had already been set in motion.

On 9 January 1681 Arung Palakka sent a messenger to inform Cops and the Council in Fort Rotterdam that he was returning to Bone via Ajattapparěng to demonstrate that he harboured no ill-will toward Arung Bakkě. But the next day the Dutch received word that Karaeng Bone, Bontomanompo, Pommalikang, Beroanging, and Mangalle had accompanied Arung Palakka with four boatloads of armed men to attack Arung Bakkě. They were to be joined later by others under the Kare Mandalika, the Gallarang Manngasa of Goa. Arung Bakkě's wife, who was living in Makassar, had also come to the Dutch to say that she was certain that Arung Palakka was going to Ajattapparěng to war with her husband. Most of the people who had been left with her by Arung Palakka had been recalled and had gone north with him. The same day the Gugugu of Butung, Kaicili' La Manimpa, said that he and his nephew Karaeng Rappocinni had been summoned to Bontoala by Arung Palakka two days before. They were told that he was going to Sawitto "to make the people of Sawitto *mindful*, and to war with them if they refuse to heed their ancient laws and customs" (Emphasis added; KA 1257a: 380v-381v). In the traditional manner Arung Palakka had declared his justification before undertaking any action against Arung Bakkě and his subjects. They had refused to be "reminded", i.e. to acknowledge that Arung Palakka was the overlord. Their failure to heed their "ancient laws and customs" was simply a formula by which a ruler or a people accused of disregarding the power realities within South Sulawesi was equated with one contravening the laws and customs of the land. Arung Bakkě had dared to challenge Arung Palakka, and for this he was being accused according to a prescribed formula familiar to all in South Sulawesi.

The Company interpreter Jan Japon returned to the Fort after talking to the widow of Kaicili' Kalimata. According to this widow, there had been a gathering at Bontoala at which Karaeng Karunrung, Karaeng

Rappocinni, Arung Ujung Bulu (the Arung Běrru'), Karaeng Tallo, Karaeng Sanrabone, Karaeng Lengkesse, Daeng Malewa, and most of the Goa *anak-karaeng* were present. They had come to swear allegiance to Arung Palakka and had then left with him to go to war with Arung Bakkě in Ajattapparěng. It had been agreed, so it was said, that if the Company were to provide assistance to Arung Bakkě, the Company would be considered an enemy. Arung Palakka had originally intended to have Arung Bakkě killed within Fort Rotterdam itself, but Karaeng Karunrung had dissuaded him from this plan. Prior to his departure, Arung Palakka had supposedly announced: "This will now cost my life or that of Raja Tamparang [i.e. Arung Bakkě]'s." Realizing the gravity of the situation, the Council in Fort Rotterdam met on 16th January to discuss the situation but no decision was taken. The next day it was reported that war had broken out between Arung Palakka and Arung Bakkě (KA 1257a:380v-383r).

The Company's worst fears were confirmed. Jan Japon reported on 24 January 1681 that Arung Bakkě, his son Daeng Memang, and some of his followers had fled from Ajattapparěng and had sought safety in Mandar. After leaving Makassar Arung Palakka had sent his army to Nepo, whose ruler was Arung Bakkě's nephew and his most trusted friend. When Arung Bakkě was told that Arung Palakka was coming to war with him, he summoned his vassal rulers of Palanro, Marappa, Suppa, Sawitto, Bulu Cenrana, plus various others, but none came. Finding himself without an army, Arung Bakkě fled with his son and a few followers toward Mandar. On Arung Palakka's orders the deposed Sawitto ruler, Totanre, and his people went in pursuit. They overtook the fugitives, and one of Totanre's men on horseback dressed in chain-mail armour narrowly missed spearing Arung Bakkě. But the latter and his followers managed to escape and were thought to be headed either to the Toraja mountains or to Alitta, whose ruler was Daeng Memang's father-in-law. Arung Teko and Daeng Rioso, the former Maradia Balannipa, were also sent in pursuit but they spent their time mainly in plundering the countryside.

While going through Suppa, the ruler of that land gave Arung Bakkě a horse to make his flight easier. For this act of kindness, he was later put to death by Arung Palakka. Arung Bakkě then fled to Binuang in Mandar where he was treated well by the ruler. News of Arung Bakkě's safe arrival in Mandar displeased Arung Palakka. Although Mandar had been repeatedly invaded and forced to acknowledge the overlordship of Arung Palakka and the Company, it had never been submissive. It was

with great care, therefore, that Arung Palakka approached the Mandar leaders with gifts of Makassar shirts, twenty ribbons and twenty belts, and a request that Arung Bakkě be surrendered to him dead or alive. In return Arung Palakka promised to prevent Daeng Rioso from re-establishing his authority over Balannipa, a promise which was highly attractive to the Mandar people who had suffered so much from the pretensions of the former Maradia. Arung Palakka further promised that all those still serving Daeng Rioso would be surrendered to the Mandar people.

Despite these attractive promises and the ill-disguised threats if Mandar continued to harbour Arung Bakkě, the leaders of Mandar refused to be intimidated. Instead, they informed President Cops that they were bringing Arung Bakkě to Fort Rotterdam. Cops sent a ship to assure Arung Bakkě's safe journey to Makassar, but it had to turn back because of contrary winds and bad weather. By the time it was possible to make another attempt, Arung Palakka had already gained knowledge of these plans and had sent another mission to Mandar. This time he brought so much pressure to bear upon the Mandar leaders that they finally succumbed and agreed to move Arung Bakkě and his followers to the island of Salemo across from Segeri. Arung Bakkě was persuaded by his hosts that the move to Salemo was for his own safety. But when he arrived on the island, he found waiting for him a Wajo follower of Arung Palakka called Tobutu with several men armed with chainmail armour and swords. Realizing it was a trap Arung Bakkě tried to resist but was quickly killed. His son Daeng Memang fought desperately but eventually he too was cut down. On 13 February 1681 Arung Palakka was presented with the head of Arung Bakkě as proof of the success of the mission. The head was then sent back to be buried with the rest of Arung Bakkě's remains alongside his son (KA 1257a:384r-385v).

In anticipation of these events, Arung Palakka had sent the following letter to President Cops on 30th January:

. . . With this letter Arumpone [i.e. Arung Palakka] wishes to tell the President in the Fort that we are returning from Tamparang [Ajattaparəng] where we have *reminded* the people there of their ancient laws and customs which have been in use since time immemorial. It was because one of them had forgotten these customs that I have been involved in the conflict . . . I have acted for the peace and welfare of the land and for love of the Company's alliance (emphasis added; KA 1257a:383v).

This historical episode is treated with pathos by Bone sources, recognizing that Arung Bakkě had once been a Toangke and a favourite of Arung Palakka's. They recount how malicious insinuations of Arung

Bakkě's ambitions toward overlordship finally convince Arung Palakka to take action. Arung Bakkě flees to the mountains in Nepo intending to hide until he can gain Arung Palakka's pardon. Failing that, he is determined to leave Sulawesi until there is a change in the situation. These plans, however, are quickly dashed by the speed and ferocity of the attacks by Arung Palakka's men which force Arung Bakkě and his followers to move upward to Galinkang. Under the command of Arung Tanete, the pursuing army is divided into a Bone half under its banner the Pětta Semparaja and a Soppeng half under its banner the Pětta Bakka. One group is made to approach Arung Bakkě's defences from the south on the Nepo road, while the other attacks from the north. Not even halfway up the mountain they are forced to retreat with heavy losses from the hail of stones thrown by the defenders. The failure of the attack leads to the dismissal of Arung Tanete as Commander-in-Chief and his replacement by the Tomarilalěng Bone, Toappaliweng, and the Sulledatu Soppeng, Toappaujung. Arung Palakka promises Toappaliwěng the office of *Makkědangetana* in Bone for himself and his descendants if he is successful. Datu Soppeng makes a similar promise to make Toappaujung and his descendants *Sulledatu* in Soppeng. These new commanders are urged by their respective rulers to bring fame (*tanreangi birittana*) to Bone and Soppeng. A quick victory is sought, for a prolonged war would bring ridicule to these two kingdoms.

The first move of the new commanders is to unite the divided army and to attack together from the north. Since both the south and the east lead to Soppeng, it is thought unlikely that Arung Bakkě would flee into the arms of his pursuers. As the army moves upward, stones begin to rain down but this time the army is not deterred. Arung Bakkě and his men are eventually forced to abandon their positions. They flee to Tebbas-sěng and then westward to Mandar. By some ruse the Mandar people seize Arung Bakkě and bring him to Salemo where he is strangled on 11 February 1681. He is known to this day as "Our Lord who passed away in Salemo" (*Adatuatta Matinroe ri Salemo*). Three days after Arung Bakkě's flight from Galinkang, Arung Nepo, Arung Kiru-Kiru, and Arung Cěppaga appear before Arung Palakka and Datu Soppeng. The first two are accused and found guilty of providing shelter to Arung Bakkě. As punishment the land of Batu Pute, upon which ground the Pětta Samparaja has flown, is surrendered by Nepo to Arung Palakka who then grants it in perpetuity to Toappaliwěng and his descendants. Kiru-Kiru cedes Tana Siddo, the land upon which the Pětta Bakka has been planted, to Datu Soppeng who awards it to Toappaujung and his

descendants (L-1:149-154; La Side 1968a:(15)27-30; (16)7-13, 16).

As is the nature of South Sulawesi sources, the account of the quarrel between Arung Palakka and Arung Bakkě emphasizes much more than just the unfolding of a particular event. Treasonous behaviour, real or imagined, is the justification for Arung Bakkě's death, but the episode itself becomes the framework for establishing the legitimacy of a particular practice within society. What has been legitimized is the right of the descendants of the 17th century *Tomarilalěng* of Bone, Toappaliweng, to hold the office of Makkědangetana⁶ and of the descendants of Toappaujung to inherit the office of Sullelatu in Soppeng.

The manner in which Arung Palakka resolved this long rivalry with Arung Bakkě stunned and impressed both the South Sulawesi leaders as well as the Company. There were those who knew that the Company had intended to provide refuge for Arung Bakkě and now believed that an open conflict between Arung Palakka and the Company was imminent. It was this kind of reasoning which produced rumours that Arung Palakka had sent his envoys on twenty boats to the kingdoms of Bima, Sumbawa, and neighbouring areas to tell them to be prepared to come to his assistance (KA 1257a:390r-393v). To the great relief of many, not the least of whom was Arung Palakka himself, a letter from Batavia arrived not to condemn Arung Palakka for the death of Arung Bakkě, but to praise him for his role in the Java campaign against the Makassar refugees. Realizing that its good relations with Arung Palakka could be endangered, the Company exercised admirable discretion in these days after Arung Bakkě's death. When Ploen was sent by Fort Rotterdam to Bontoala, he was especially solicitous about Arung Palakka's health, inquiring about his difficulty in breathing because of a growth in his nose. Only after Arung Palakka appeared relaxed and reassured of the Company's sincere concern for his well-being did Ploen broach the subject of Arung Bakkě's death. Arung Palakka explained that Arung Bakkě had committed numerous misdeeds against him, as had been verified by a Dutchman in Batavia. Without attempting to argue or condemn, Ploen simply reiterated the Company's desire to promote Arung Palakka's best interests. A few days later Ploen returned with two Dutch surgeons to treat Arung Palakka (KA 1257a:394v-395v).

The Company had been disturbed by the news of Arung Bakkě, but it had been presented with a *fait accompli*. Realizing the futility and even the danger of remonstrating with Arung Palakka, the Company had adopted instead a prudent approach of reaffirming its faith in him. The Company was naturally upset at the loss of a staunch ally in South

Sulawesi, yet it was also relieved. The dangerous enmity between Arung Palakka and Arung Bakkě had ended quickly and effectively without a destructive war which would have been inimical to the Company's interests. While there was still hope for a reconciliation between their two most faithful allies in South Sulawesi, the Company had been untiring in its efforts to find a solution. But now that the problem had been resolved, the Company had accepted it and resumed its cultivation of Arung Palakka as its most useful and powerful friend in South Sulawesi.

Arung Palakka was pleased at the Company's continuing display of affection toward him. It not only reaffirmed his favoured status with the Company but also increased his prestige and authority in South Sulawesi. Nevertheless, the death of his old companion Arung Bakkě disturbed him greatly. On one of Daeng Talele's frequent visits to Fort Rotterdam, she remarked how her husband had spent many sleepless nights thinking of Arung Bakkě's death. In discussing the final campaign against Arung Bakkě, she professed to total ignorance of Arung Palakka's intentions. She had apparently been brought along on the expedition to allay any suspicions that it was intended as anything else but a normal journey to Bone via the northern route. Only when they arrived at Batu Pute in the north did the weapons become visible and Arung Palakka's plans become clear. Prior to the assault against Arung Bakkě, a meeting was held with some of the Makassar leaders from Kampong Baru and with those nobles who had deserted Arung Bakkě to plan their course of action. However, Daeng Talele never learned the outcome of this meeting because she was immediately sent home to Bontoala. Only when she arrived back in Bontoala did she hear of Arung Bakkě's fate. When Arung Palakka returned, she castigated him for this deed "which had robbed him of one of his own hands". She reminded him how "as is sufficiently well-known to all in this land of Sulawesi" Arung Bakkě had remained faithful to him even when he was in "a humble and miserable state", as a refugee from Makassar domination (KA 1257a:417v).

The Arung Bakkě affair demonstrated even more strikingly than before how powerful Arung Palakka had become. Only a few months before it had been difficult to conceive of anyone as well-placed for protection and favour as Arung Bakkě. He was honoured by the Company and respected and loved by Arung Palakka. But his "fatal flaw" was the challenge, real or imaginary, that he posed to Arung Palakka's dreams for South Sulawesi. Arung Palakka had sacrificed much to attain his

position of power, and he now believed that he had gained the right to dispose of his accomplishments as he saw fit. The whole of South Sulawesi was now within his political ambit, and he did not flinch at the prospects of ruling it or in preparing his successors to undertake such a seemingly formidable task. Toward this end he had begun the unofficial grooming of his young nephew, La Patau, to continue his work after his death.

Arung Bakkě's misfortune was his devotion to the Company. So vital an ingredient was the Company in Arung Palakka's formula for overlordship that anyone who deflected its favour or attention from him could only be regarded as a threat. Arung Palakka may not have felt that his own immediate position was in jeopardy, but he feared for the future of his own dreams for South Sulawesi. La Patau was only a young boy and no match for the experienced and politically astute Arung Bakkě. It was, therefore, as much to save his future hopes for South Sulawesi, as it was to safeguard his own position, that Arung Palakka had finally decided to move decisively against Arung Bakkě.

Throughout this whole affair the Company had been very cautious. But in the final analysis it had adjudged the friendship with Arung Palakka of greater value than the life of the faithful but less useful friend. Arung Palakka had demonstrated his ability to maintain order in South Sulawesi and had displayed convincingly in Java his readiness to back his professions of loyalty to the Company with deeds. Furthermore, he was ruler of the most populous and powerful of the Company's Bugis allies. This fact was not regarded lightly by the Company whose survival in many areas depended upon the good will of local rulers. In the beginning the Company was willing to provide protection to Arung Bakkě, but it never lost sight of its priorities. Ultimately it was Arung Palakka who really mattered to the Company, and no person or thing was too valuable to be sacrificed toward the preservation of this friendship. This was one of the important messages which emerged from the whole affair. Another was the readiness of Arung Palakka to use ruthless methods to safeguard his privileged position in South Sulawesi and to preserve it for his descendants. If he had shown no compunction in destroying a trusted friend and companion-in-exile, how much more implacable would he be to those with whom he had no emotional bonds? From this time onward Arung Palakka was greatly feared, even among the most powerful rulers on the island (KA 1257c:460v). The example of Arung Bakkě had made an indelible impression on the minds of the local people and removed any lingering doubts concerning Arung Palakka's authority as supreme overlord in South Sulawesi.

CHAPTER X

SECURING THE SUCCESSION

The Arung Bakkë affair highlighted the danger of leaving Arung Palakka's succession unannounced and therefore subject to speculation and rumour. To forestall any challenges to his position and quash any intrigue inspired by the knowledge that he had no natural heirs, Arung Palakka now decided that it was time to declare to the world his chosen successor. The infirmity caused by a blockage in his nose persisted, reminding him daily that his time was running short. There was still much that had to be done before he could rest assured that his legacy would not be squandered after his death. To this task Arung Palakka now devoted his attention.

The first priority was the formal announcement of La Patau as his official successor in all his various duties. La Patau was descended from a long distinguished line. His father was La Pakkokoe Toangkone Tad-dampali, with the apanage titles of Arung Timurung, Arung Ugi, and Ranrëng Tua, and his grandfather was Arumpone La Ma'darëmmëng Matinroe ri Bukaka. La Patau's mother was Arung Palakka's sister We Mappolobombang Da Upi whose maternal grandfather was Arumpone La Tënrirua Matinroe ri Bantaeng (Abd. Razak 1968:5-6). When it was discovered in 1675 that Arung Timurung La Pakkokoe had secretly abetted the plans of Karaeng Massepe La Suni¹, We Mappolobombang took their son La Patau and went to live in Bontoala with her brother, Arung Palakka. Arung Timurung's attempts at reconciliation were reportedly rebuffed by We Mappolobombang who openly declared that she did not want a husband "who had abandoned his own country to join the enemies of the Company" (KA 1200a:186r). She trusted no one and took full charge of the upbringing of her then three year old son, La Patau. Apparently she was well-suited for the task, for a Dutch contemporary characterized her as "a generous woman and the most intelligent of all her sisters" (KA 1196c:39r).

For the greater part of his early life La Patau was raised by his strong-willed mother under the tutelage of his uncle, Arung Palakka. From very early on it appeared that Arung Palakka took special care in

the education of his nephew, grooming him for a position of great importance. Having had no children of his own, he was dependent upon his four sisters to provide him with an heir. How La Patau came to be selected as Arung Palakka's heir is told in a brief entertaining folktale recorded in a *lontara*'. This tale also cleverly encapsulates the major problem of Arung Palakka's legitimacy to the Bone throne and how it was resolved.

One day Arung Palakka heard Arung Timurung La Pakkokoe singing the following song: "Vacate the vast palace which is never struck by the sun, you who wears the *sarung* in a way in which it should not be worn." Arung Palakka or any Bugis of that time would have easily understood that the "vast palace which is never struck by the sun" refers to the spot occupied by the Arumpone shaded by the Golden Umbrella (*Pajumpulawěng*) of Bone, and that "*sarung*" is a reference to the robes of royalty which had been "improperly" assumed. It was common knowledge that Arung Timurung hoped to become Arumpone and believed he had prior claims to that title. He was the son of the last Arumpone La Ma'darěmměng, and the direct grandson through the male line of Arumpone La Těnrirua Matinroe ri Bantaeng. Arung Palakka, on the other hand, was only related to the Bone royal house through his maternal grandfather, Arumpone La Těnrirua Matinroe ri Bantaeng. Arung Palakka was well aware of this, and so in this folktale he does not castigate Arung Timurung but replies: "Do not be angry, elder brother, for your song is just. Rest assured that I will marry you to my younger sister, the Ma'danrěng Palakka [We Mappolobombang]." From this marriage comes La Patau who is named as Arung Palakka's successor (L-4: section 24, unpag.). In this way, this folktale demonstrates how Arung Palakka is able to overcome opposition to his election as Arumpone and how he later restores legitimacy in the office of Arumpone by designating La Patau as his successor.

As with many folktales the historical sequence is not scrupulously maintained because it is the theme which is more important. Historically, the marriage between We Mappolobombang and Arung Timurung La Pakkokoe occurred on 16 May 1671, and their son La Patau was born on 3 November 1672 (Ligtvoet 1880:134, 136). According to one source it was on the day of La Patau's birth that Arung Palakka was installed as Arumpone (Bakkers.1866:162).² It was unlikely, therefore, that Arung Palakka had given his sister in marriage to Arung Timurung to appease him for his loss of a throne. If it were true that the birth of La Patau and the installation of Arung Palakka had occurred on the same

day, then the tale takes on a new significance. This tale may be alluding in its own folk wisdom to the fact that Arung Palakka must have promised Arung Timurung, in return for his acquiescence, that La Patau would eventually succeed Arung Palakka and return the throne of Bone to Arung Timurung's line. Arung Timurung was no fool and could see that he had little recourse but to accept whatever Arung Palakka had to offer. There may also have been a hope that after Arung Palakka's death, he, Arung Timurung, could assume the powers as regent to his young son or as ruler in his own right.

The formal proclamation of La Patau as heir was but the first step. Arung Palakka still had to obtain support for his choice, a task made difficult by those among his own following who believed themselves more entitled to this position. The recent Arung Bakkě affair had clearly demonstrated the dangers which could arise from individual leaders with a strong base of support. Some of Arung Palakka's most trusted lieutenants, such as Arung Amali Gėllarėng Tosawa, had learned to manipulate power to their own advantage. In 1675 Arung Palakka had punished Arung Amali for abuse of power, although he was later reinstated (KA 1196a:169v; KA 1236g:425v). Arung Amali was a distinguished nobleman, greatly respected, and with wide support in Bone. In July 1667 Speelman noted the importance of Arung Amali as a leader of the Bugis: . . . [He is] a venerable and modest old man of very high repute. Arung Palakka holds him in great respect and refers to him as grandfather and in fact depends principally on him in the governing of the people (KA 1155d:34r).

Arung Amali, like Arung Bakkě, would have considered himself the logical and legitimate heir to all that Arung Palakka had created in South Sulawesi.

But Arung Palakka himself was aware that neither Arung Bakkě, nor Arung Amali, nor even his own chosen successor, would be able to inherit his authority at the moment because of the personal nature of his power. He had gained a body of faithful followers, the Toangke, whose allegiance and devotion had been forged through common experiences in warfare and exile. Theirs was a personal loyalty to Arung Palakka as an individual, and not as Arumpone. There were also large numbers of Bugis, Makassar, and Mandar refugees who had fled to the Company's lands mainly in and around Makassar. Since they were fleeing exactions from their own lords, they came to be included among those under Arung Palakka's jurisdiction acting as the overlord concerned with internal affairs of South Sulawesi. Many of these refugees were willing,

indeed often even happy, to receive Arung Palakka's protection because of his reputation as a powerful lord and as a favoured ally of the Company. These refugees, too, would not automatically transfer their allegiance to just any successor to Arung Palakka. Naming a successor was quickly done, but assuring that the successor would indeed become the heir to all that Arung Palakka possessed required much more time and preparation. If La Patau were ever to accomplish some of Arung Palakka's unfinished plans for South Sulawesi, he would have to be assured the same power and authority which his uncle had wielded before him. It was a major undertaking, and one which Arung Palakka was well-placed to perform.

The plan to win support for La Patau began with his formal announcement as heir to Arung Palakka. In October 1681 the South Sulawesi rulers were summoned to Arung Palakka's royal residence in Cenrana to attend a feast celebrating the announcement. At these festivities was a Dutchman, Gabriel Nacken, who reported a conversation he had had with Arung Palakka. When the latter was told that Speelman had been appointed Governor-General of the Company, he was very pleased and remarked that "he would not have missed hearing this news for all the gold in the world". Speelman had always been considered a friend, and it was now hoped that his new position of authority would benefit South Sulawesi. As pleasing to Arung Palakka was confirmation from Nacken that the former Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali (Karaeng Bisei Tumenanga ri Jakattara) had died in Batavia [on 15 March 1681]. Emboldened by his role as the bearer of good news, Nacken asked Arung Palakka why he had now decided to announce his successor. Arung Palakka replied:

. . . I am growing more and more sickly every day, and it is apparent that I shall not live much longer. To prevent all my lands from being divided, I have summoned all the princes here to elect my sister [We Mappolo-bombang]'s son, La Patau, as Arung Palakka [heir to the Bone throne]. That is the reason they [the South Sulawesi rulers] are all here. Once the fasting month is over, he [La Patau] will be circumcized. (Pointing to La Patau) I hope that the Company will maintain him after my death. I have built this fort so that he may live here and be freed from troubles if they do not wish to acknowledge him [as successor] after my death, and also principally so that each prince [*anakarung*] would have a place to build a house to live in without any harm coming to his wives and children . . . (KA 1265a:333r-334r).

The fort which Arung Palakka referred to was ninety metres on each side and built on an island in a bend of the Cenrana River. Each ruler was

asked to contribute labour to build one section of this fort which was to have walls $3\frac{3}{4}$ metres high, with a thickness of $7\frac{1}{2}$ metres on the bottom and more than two metres on the top. It was Arung Palakka's wish that it be as large as the fortress in Batavia. The fort was completed in a time of only three months and during this period rumours flew fast and furiously about Arung Palakka's intentions for building such a large fortification. The Dutch were relieved to learn through Nacken that the fort was not as menacing as they believed and that it had been intended as a safe residence for La Patau and his family (KA 1257d:447r). Arung Palakka was doing everything to assure that his nephew La Patau became heir to all that he had built or acquired. Nevertheless, he was well aware that despite all he could do there was no guarantee that La Patau would be able to maintain power. All he could reasonably hope for was that his preparations were successful in sustaining La Patau in the early years of his reign until he was capable of asserting his own power.

Although the task was a difficult one, by 1681 Arung Palakka had already gone a long way toward achieving this aim. During Arung Palakka's absence on Java in 1679-1680, Cops took the opportunity to assess Arung Palakka's influence on the affairs of South Sulawesi. His conclusions were predictable, but the extent of Arung Palakka's authority must have given the Company cause for reflection. In Goa power was in the hands of Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil and Tuma'bicarabutta Karaeng Karunrung, both of whom had cooperated with Arung Palakka in the 1677 war and had been subsequently rewarded with these high offices. On Dutch advice Sultan Abdul Jalil had at first gone to live in Goa, but the danger to his life was so great that he quickly decided to settle within range of his protectors, the Company and Arung Palakka. He established his place of residence to the north of Fort Rotterdam on the coast near Ujung Tana, where Karaeng Karunrung too had gone after abandoning Goa a few weeks before (KA 1248b:358v). Both Sultan Abdul Jalil and Karaeng Karunrung were now almost totally dependent upon Arung Palakka's continuing goodwill for their survival.

Wajo, too, had been emasculated by Bone's relentless demands which had led to a dismembering of territories and denuding of population along Bone's borders. Moreover, Arung Palakka's decision to establish his official residence at Cenrana, near the mouth of the Cenrana River, had major economic repercussions for Wajo. The Cenrana River was the major artery and the principal communications link between the interior states of Soppeng and Wajo and the sea. By building his capital at Cenrana and establishing a fortress on an island in a bend of the river,

Arung Palakka was able to control all riverine traffic. Wajo's prosperity, therefore, was dependent upon the goodwill of Arung Palakka. Soppeng was as vulnerable as Wajo to the economic pressure which was Arung Palakka's to wield. But it was even more directly responsive to Arung Palakka's wishes because he had been specifically requested by the late Datu Soppeng La Těnribali to oversee the activities of the young and inexperienced Datu Soppeng Towesa. When the latter had attempted to assert his independence he was removed from power by Arung Palakka and replaced by his sister and Arung Palakka's wife We Adda Datu ri Watu (Matinroe ri Maděllo). Mandar was quiescent, having been threatened with the forceful return of the much-maligned and feared ex-Maradia Balannipa, Daeng Rioso. It was the prospects of having once again to suffer the indignities at the hands of Daeng Rioso which had earlier convinced the Mandar rulers to bow to Arung Palakka's demands for the surrender of Arung Bakkě. Arung Palakka's ability to influence affairs in that fiercely independent confederation of states in Mandar was an excellent measure of his now well-established and acknowledged authority in South Sulawesi. Many areas once responsive to Goa now transferred their allegiance to Arung Palakka. On the southwest coast of the peninsula, in the area of Bira, the people continued to make boats for their overlord, although now it was for Arung Palakka instead of the Karaeng Goa.³ In the two highly productive rice areas of Maros and Bulukumba, the border states between the Bone and Goa spheres of influence which Speelman considered "Company's territories" (Eerdmans n.d.(a):202), Arung Palakka appropriated most of the best lands and encouraged his followers to settle there. By this means he was able to exercise an authority over these areas which no other Bone ruler had been able to do in the past. Cops concluded his assessment of Arung Palakka's power with an observation which had now become common knowledge within South Sulawesi: "... the quiet, peace and war here depend solely upon one head, that of the ruler of Bone [i.e. Arung Palakka]" (KA 1236c:436v-446v).

One reason for Arung Palakka's power, the Dutch observed ruefully, was "because he is held in respect and honour by the Company". Even the proximity of Bontoala to Fort Rotterdam was interpreted by the local people as a sign of the close relations between Arung Palakka and the Dutch. With the death of Arung Bakkě there was no other local lord who shared Arung Palakka's unique position as the intermediary between the Company and the kingdoms of South Sulawesi. It was he who summoned the South Sulawesi lords to greet a new president for

Fort Rotterdam or an envoy from Batavia. Upon arrival of any important Company official in Makassar it was Arung Palakka who formally introduced him to the local rulers or to their emissaries. Arung Palakka's intermediary role, however, was not limited to matters of protocol. It extended also to the practice of screening which of the local people were "worthy" of approaching the Company officials personally. Those fortunate enough to be granted an interview were never foolish enough to voice any grievances against Arung Palakka. His spies were everywhere hindering any true dialogue between a local ruler or noble and a Company official and making the Company more and more dependent upon Arung Palakka as a source of information on South Sulawesi affairs (KA 1248b:356v-357r). Occupying such an enviable position of influence with both the Company and the local lords, Arung Palakka could now use it to gain support for his chosen heir.

Although by 1681 Arung Palakka appeared invincible, there were signs which indicated that assuring La Patau's future would still be fraught with difficulties. The outward quiet and subservience of Goa, for example, belied its tensions and resentment which threatened to erupt yet again into violence. While Sultan Abdul Jalil and Karaeng Karunrung could be relied upon to remain faithful since their well-being and position depended upon it, little else in Goa was predictable. Sultan Abdul Jalil and Karaeng Karunrung continued to maintain their residence outside Goa, leaving the kingdom without a focal point around which the people could rally. Moreover, there was a great reluctance among the people to remain in the old royal capital in Goa because of the belief that a settlement once destroyed by man or nature was ill-fated. Many abandoned the capital and roamed the area leaderless, poor, but fiercely proud. They were ripe for exploitation by a strong, dynamic individual, and these very fears became a source of instability in Arung Palakka's relations with Goa (KA 1248b:358v).

Sultan Abdul Jalil himself contributed to these volatile state of affairs. He sent Karaeng Jarannikka to tell the other leaders of his government living in Goa that Arung Palakka had ordered them to go voluntarily to Sultan Abdul Jalil's new residence in Makassar or be compelled to do so by force. What later came to light was that this had been Sultan Abdul Jalil's own scheme, without Arung Palakka's prior knowledge. The scheme had been further embellished by Karaeng Jarannikka to obtain the desired effect. This latest deception further alienated Sultan Abdul Jalil from his subjects. They began packing their belongings and with great emotion declared their readiness to live under their enemies,

Arung Palakka and the Bugis, rather than continue to remain under their own ruler. The Dutch had previously allowed many of them to settle around Fort Rotterdam to prevent them from leaving South Sulawesi to join their compatriots in Java. The danger from the refugees was no longer of any major concern, but the practice of providing land for settlement of Makassar refugees from Goa and Tallo within the Company's lands continued. Ironically, Sultan Abdul Jalil's scheme had succeeded in bringing his people to Makassar, but only to have them transfer their allegiance to Arung Palakka and the Dutch (KA 1248b: 358v-359r).

The unwavering opposition of the Goa people toward Sultan Abdul Jalil had been sustained by an almost fanatic devotion to the deposed Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali. He had exemplified everything to the Goa people that the present ruler lacked. He had led his people against their oppressors, the Company and Arung Palakka, and had attempted to restore the self-respect and glory of Goa. Even when he was deposed, he had continued to be a symbol of the former pride of the kingdom. It was not unbeknownst to either the Company or to Arung Palakka that one of the principal stumbling blocks to acceptance of the new Goa ruler was the existence of Sultan Mohammad Ali as a separate locus of loyalty. The presence of their former lord in Fort Rotterdam in apparent harmony with the Dutch had once bred a hope that perhaps a new alliance could be forged which would restore Goa's former power in the area. These hopes had been heightened by a noticeable estrangement between Arung Palakka and the Dutch over the protection being given by the Company to Sultan Mohammad Ali. To avoid Arung Palakka's spies, Cops had held his meetings with Sultan Mohammad Ali at nights after the Fort's gates were closed. Despite these precautions Arung Palakka had learned of these meetings and had accused Cops of harbouring "tender feelings" toward Sultan Mohammad Ali (KA 1248b:359v). But the Supreme Government in Batavia once again had responded favourably to Arung Palakka's appeals and had ordered Sultan Mohammad Ali's removal to Batavia. By this decision the Company not only salvaged its good relations with Arung Palakka, but also dealt a severe blow to the belief held by many Goa people that a reconciliation with the Company and a resurgence of their former glory were imminent. And with the death of Sultan Mohammad Ali in Batavia shortly thereafter in March 1681, any lingering hopes that they still had for a revitalized Goa were laid to rest with their beloved ruler.

No one could replace Sultan Mohammad Ali Tumenanga ri Jakattara

in the affection of the Goa people in this period of Goa's spiritual desolation. Those who were unable to feign devotion to the new Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil fled to the protection of the Company. The Company, though a former enemy, was at least less demanding an overlord and was not a constant reminder of betrayal and the depths to which the kingdom had fallen. Before long Arung Palakka came to Fort Rotterdam to complain about the continuing influx of Goa inhabitants into the Company's lands, especially into Kampong Baru in Makassar. He urged that more of an effort be made to encourage them to serve Sultan Abdul Jalil (KA 1248c:392v). Through Arung Palakka's pressure on the Makassar refugees in Kampong Baru and on Sultan Abdul Jalil, a *modus vivendi* was finally effected. Sultan Abdul Jalil promised to pardon their misdeeds and to restore their former positions if they returned to Goa and served him. At a special ceremony these Makassar refugees laid down their krisses before Sultan Abdul Jalil, who then ordered that they be taken up again in his service. The principal Moslem official in Bontoala gave a prayer of thanks and expressed the hope that Sultan Abdul Jalil would receive these his subjects in such a way that the other Makassar refugees in the kingdoms of Sumbawa, Bima, and elsewhere would return to their homeland. And so in the early months of 1683 many of the Makassar people in Kampong Baru returned home to offer their allegiance to Sultan Abdul Jalil. Nevertheless, there remained an underlying tension within the kingdom (KA 1274a:461v-462v).

In Wajo, as in Goa, the outward exterior of calm cloaked a potentially dangerous situation. Arung Palakka's policy of economic and political strangulation of Wajo had become too successful. Sometime in mid-1680 some 4-5,000 people from Wajo under Arung Mampu arrived in Bontoala to inform Arung Palakka that they had deposed Arung Matoa Wajo La Palili because he had become blind. In his place they had elected a Bone lord, Arung Mampu La Pariwusi, whose wife was from Wajo. Although Arung Palakka declared that the election was Wajo's own affair, he was obviously concerned at this new development. Through his own policy Wajo had been so weakened that it had become a prey to the victorious Bone Bugis and an attractive political arena for his own ambitious nobles. News of the election of a Bone prince as Arung Matoa Wajo was not unexpected, but it was nevertheless displeasing to Arung Palakka. Equally disturbing was the choice of Arung Mampu as Arung Matoa Wajo since he was from a powerful Bone family which could become a threat to Arung Palakka or to La Patau. Arung Palakka was already wary of the growing influence of Arung Mampu's

brothers, all of whom, so it was said, harboured royal ambitions (KA 1248b:365r, 367v).

After informing Arung Palakka of the election, the Wajo delegation proceeded to Fort Rotterdam to convey this news to the Dutch. Predictably, the Dutch cited the 1670 treaty as a basis for their disapproval. According to Articles 1 and 2 of this treaty, Wajo was forbidden to choose a new Arung Matoa without first obtaining the Company's approval. When the Malay version of the treaty was retrieved and read aloud, the Wajo envoys acknowledged that this was indeed what they had agreed. But, they were quick to add, it was also their custom to elect a new Arung Matoa immediately after the old Arung Matoa had been deposed. Removing an Arung Matoa was justified by Wajo's customary laws in the following circumstances: (1) if the Arung Matoa should wish to abdicate; (2) if the people no longer want the Arung Matoa; and (3) if the old Arung Matoa is dead. There was, therefore, a basis in custom for their action. But this explanation was rejected out of hand by the Company officials as being no longer relevant since they claimed that Wajo had lost all of its former privileges after its defeat in 1670 (KA 1248b:375v-376v). Such an argument was considered incomprehensibly harsh by the Wajo delegation because it contravened the South Sulawesi conception of proper interstate relationships. Even a state which was considered to be a "slave" to another was allowed to retain certain basic privileges, among which were the rights to choose its own ruler and to maintain its customary laws. In the end, however, the Company officials relented and accepted the election of the new Arung Matoa Wajo (KA 1248b:394r). Behind the Dutch opposition was also the suspicion that Arung Palakka was instrumental in having a Bone Bugis elected to tighten his grip on Wajo. They were highly sceptical that any Arung Matoa Wajo could have been chosen without Arung Palakka's approval. When the opportunity arose they asked Arung Palakka if a precedent existed for choosing an Arung Matoa Wajo from Bone. He claimed that nothing like this had happened before and that he and the people of Bone were unhappy about this choice. Only then did the Dutch begin to suspect that Arung Mampu himself must have engineered his own election (KA 1248b:393v-394r).

Although the appointment of a Bone prince was opposed by many in Wajo (KA 1257a:402v), the feared oppression never occurred. Instead, all depredations by Bone against the Wajo people came to an abrupt halt. Few in Bone dared risk the wrath of Arung Mampu and his family who were some of the most powerful and influential individuals in the

whole of South Sulawesi. Wajo, now a part of the territory in control of Arung Mampu's family, was thus protected and given the stability which it had lost in 1670. The principalities of Pammana, Mampu, Amali, and Timurung were once again incorporated into Wajo. Peace and security were re-established in Wajo but not without some cost to the nature of Wajo society. Arung Mampu invested the formerly sober office of Arung Matoa with the paraphernalia of kingship more in keeping with kingdoms such as Bone and Goa than with the "elective monarchy" of Wajo. He borrowed the institutions of the royal umbrella (*pajung*), the three royal drums (*gěnrang těllu*), and the royal dance (*pajaga*), all of which were considered essential for royalty in Bone (L-3:341, 343; L-4 : section 25, unpag.). These external changes to the office of Arung Matoa Wajo reflected the increased power now being exercised by its new incumbent. Arung Palakka followed these developments with some concern because of the potential challenge which could arise from a revitalized Wajo under an influential Bone prince. On the other hand, the new Arung Matoa Wajo could bring stability to the land and remove any sources of friction with Bone.

In Mandar, an area which had never been totally subjugated by Arung Palakka and the Company, peace was always a most fragile state. When Daeng Rioso was still Maradia Balannipa, Arung Palakka depended upon his loyalty to influence the other Mandar rulers to maintain the peace. But he was regarded by his fellow Mandar rulers as overly ambitious with the aim of making all of Mandar subservient to his wishes. One Mandar source states that he ignored the advice of the *Pitu Babana Binanga* and actually warred with one of these states because he desired its ruler's wife (Interview Darwis 1974). His intrigues and arbitrary acts finally became so unbearable that he was toppled from power. On 23 November 1680 the new Maradia Balannipa, Daeng Mabani, accompanied by the other Mandar rulers, arrived in Fort Rotterdam. They informed the Dutch that the people of Balannipa had deposed their ruler, Daeng Rioso, and had chosen in his place with the advice and approval of the other Mandar rulers the old deposed Maradia Balannipa, Daeng Mabani. The reason given for Daeng Rioso's downfall was his failure to adhere to the laws and customs of the land (KA 1257a:386r).⁴

Confronted once again with a *fait accompli* by a local kingdom, the Company officials sought comfort and direction from a familiar refuge: the treaty. The Dutch Council met to read the Company's treaty with Mandar dated 10 October 1674. Unlike Wajo's treaty, this one only

required the Mandar rulers to inform the Company about the selection of their rulers. They were relieved to be able to acknowledge the election of the new Maradia Balannipa without any unpleasantness. But Arung Palakka was obviously displeased by the deposing of Daeng Rioso and reminded the Dutch of his services to the Company. He had been the only Mandar ruler to contribute troops to the allied campaigns against Luwu in 1676 and against Goa in 1677. Arung Palakka advised the officials to withhold recognition until the new Maradia Balannipa demonstrated his loyalty to the Company and to Arung Palakka. If he proved truculent, there was always the possibility of reinstating Daeng Rioso who was now in Bontoala with a number of his followers. To prevent Arung Palakka from using this threat, Daeng Mabani agreed to respect his wishes (KA 1257a:387r).

Daeng Mabani was called upon to prove his loyalty to Arung Palakka much sooner than he would have wished. When Arung Bakkě escaped from Galinkang to seek safety in Mandar in January 1681, Arung Palakka demanded that the Mandar rulers surrender him to the allies. Rather than deliver Arung Bakkě to a certain death, the Mandar rulers had at first contacted the Dutch in Fort Rotterdam and had even proposed to bring Arung Bakkě to Makassar. Although the Mandar down-river states in the past had managed to use the inaccessible mountainous terrain behind them as a refuge against invading armies, this manner of escape seemed no longer feasible with Arung Palakka's new weapon, Daeng Rioso. With Arung Palakka's support and blessing Daeng Rioso could regain his former position of strength in Mandar and wreak a fearful vengeance upon those responsible for his fall from power. There was too much to lose and too little to gain by protecting Arung Bakkě, and so he was sacrificed for the general good of the Mandar Confederation. Arung Palakka remained true to his word by preventing Daeng Rioso from undertaking any hostile action against Mandar and by surrendering a number of his followers to the Mandar leaders (KA 1257a:385r). Daeng Rioso, seeing himself betrayed by his former patron, adopted a desperate plan to seize power in Balannipa with his remaining eighty men. However, they were intercepted in the Toraja highlands and destroyed. Daeng Rioso himself was strangled and his head delivered to the new Maradia Balannipa, Daeng Mabani (KA 1265b:341r). Daeng Rioso, like Arung Bakkě, had been sacrificed to achieve Arung Palakka's supreme goal: a peaceful and united South Sulawesi responsive to his and his successor's wishes. Mandar had seen the ruthless power which Arung Palakka could wield so effectively when challenged, and it never

again during Arung Palakka's lifetime deemed anything worth arousing his fearsome wrath.

The next area of concern to Arung Palakka was the growing numbers of Bugis and Makassar people living in or around the Company's territories. The enmity between the people of Goa and those of Bone and Soppeng persisted in their new homes. Fear of trouble caused Arung Palakka to appoint local regents to maintain control. Through these regents he hoped to establish a familiar and responsible authority which could deal with any crisis, especially after his death. In the most important area around Fort Rotterdam, Arung Amali was appointed regent until his fall from favour. On 1 March 1681 Arung Tanete La Ompo appeared in Fort Rotterdam to announce that he was replacing Arung Amali as regent. He explained that he had been commissioned by Arung Palakka to remain in the Fort to assist the Company in its performance of its duties, as well as to represent its interests with Arung Palakka. If any trouble were to arise between the Makassar and the Bugis people, he was to consult the Company as in the past and regulate affairs in accordance with the customs of the land. To stress the importance of his commission, he explained to the Dutch:

. . . We in Bone now live in peace and have been freed from the slavery of the Makassar people. . . . We are stupid people and our king [Arung Palakka] alone has wisdom. As long as he lives everything will be fine, but once he dies difficulties can be expected (KA 1257a:396r-v).

These words expressed the concern of both Arung Palakka and his closest advisers that adequate preparations be made to prevent a disintegration of the political arrangements after Arung Palakka's death. This institution of a regent over the local people within or near the Company's territories proved highly successful and established a precedent pleasing to Arung Palakka. Before any local individual, whether from these lands in proximity to Fort Rotterdam or from the interior kingdoms, wished to see the Dutch in Fort Rotterdam, he reported first to Arung Palakka's personally-appointed regent (KA 1257d:448v). The regent's authority was being acknowledged, which bode well for Arung Palakka's plans for a smooth transition of power to his chosen heir.

A vital ingredient in insuring La Patau's succession was the continuing good-will of the Company. But even this was being endangered by the personal animosity which existed between Arung Palakka and the Company's representative in Fort Rotterdam, President Cops. Arung Palakka told Gabriel Nacken, who was present at Cenrana

toward the end of 1681 to celebrate the announcement of La Patau as heir:

. . . As long as Cops is in Makassar, I will not go to the Fort. But if a commissioner or another president should come, then I will immediately return. I cannot go with a good heart because Cops has greatly affronted me. I wish that there were someone else in his place, such as the late [President] de Jong, so that I can go to the Fort with great pleasure (KA 1265a:333r).

A few days later at a royal banquet, while enjoying the newly-installed water fountains turned on for the pleasure of the guests, Arung Palakka and Nacken continued their previous discussion of Cops. Arung Palakka told Nacken:

. . . Do you know that Cops has written many evil things about me to Batavia? He accused me of wanting to war with the Company, a thought which had never entered my head. He assumes this just because I have had this fortress built. I ask you to look at the fortress so that you can report to the Lord [Governor-] General. Now, is *that* a fortress with which to war with the Company? . . . What would move me to war with the Company? What more could I be than what I already am? That my well-being is dependent solely upon the Company is sufficiently known, and I know that not one of the princes is subject to me out of love but only out of respect. If I were to begin a war against the Company, I would quickly obtain as many enemies as there are hairs on my head. Yes, it would be the greatest stupidity imaginable . . . Who else but the Company has given us our freedom? And he who has established us in majesty and honour could just as quickly dash us to the ground as had happened to many others. But Cops, out of pure evil and bitterness, writes all manner of bad things about me to Batavia. This is the reason that I cannot have any ordinary intercourse with him as I have had with the other gentlemen and residents [in Fort Rotterdam]. I wish that there were another president so that we can live in love and unity (KA 1265a:332r-334v).

Arung Palakka's conversations with Nacken indicate that he was perfectly aware that the Company was responsible for his good fortune. Being acquainted with South Sulawesi's fluid political alignments, Arung Palakka realized that it would have been suicidal even to contemplate war with the Company. He, along with the rest of South Sulawesi, knew that his power stemmed basically from his favoured position with the Company. This was the reason that Arung Palakka considered Cops to be a danger to him. Cops had chosen to interpret Arung Palakka's attack on Arung Bakkě as the beginning of a general change of attitude toward the Company and had written reports in this vein to Batavia. But far from wishing to war with the Company, Arung Palakka had sought

instead to rehabilitate himself in its eyes for a deed which he realized would incur its displeasure. He had taken a calculated risk in destroying Arung Bakkě and his son. They had become well-respected and beloved by the Company officials both in Makassar and Batavia. When Arung Bakkě's son went to Batavia, he was accorded such preferential treatment that it became a frequent topic of gossip in South Sulawesi. Since the Company was the mainstay of Arung Palakka's (and hopefully his successors') power, Arung Palakka considered it worth jeopardizing his friendship with the Company to eliminate dangerous rivals for the Company's affection and favours. Significantly, both Arung Bakkě and his son were killed, although exile could have been prescribed for Arung Bakkě's son whose "sins" would not have been anywhere as great as those of his father. With surprisingly little reaction from the Company to the death of Arung Bakkě and his son, Arung Palakka correctly assumed that the Company would forgive his deed as long as Cops refrained from interfering.

Cops continued to warn Batavia of Arung Palakka's growing power. Arung Palakka was now forty-nine years old, and Cops expressed concern that when his life had "run its course" his successor would be incapable of maintaining control over affairs in South Sulawesi (KA 1274a:456v; KA 1265a:342v). What Cops underestimated was Arung Palakka's fierce determination to see the whole of South Sulawesi governed by his family. This dream hinged crucially upon his chosen heir's ability to maintain his position and authority during the first critical years of his rule. Arung Palakka was as aware as Cops that the unnatural unity of the South Sulawesi kingdoms was created basically through Arung Palakka's sheer power and reputation. If this unity were to continue after his death, he would have to anticipate the difficulties his heir would face and to assure that none would be so formidable as to destroy him and Arung Palakka's dreams. South Sulawesi and the Company had to be prepared to receive La Patau as Arung Palakka's successor. Even such persistent critics as Cops had to be silenced or at least rendered innocuous in order to assure the success of Arung Palakka's plans. Fortunately, Arung Palakka and Batavia saw a mutual advantage in maintaining their close alliance, and in the end critics such as Cops were sacrificed for the general welfare of these two powers.

The only group remaining in South Sulawesi which lay outside Arung Palakka's sphere of influence was the Sa'dan Toraja, or the Southern Toraja.⁵ Although there were several strong confederations of Toraja

groups, such as the Tallu Lembangnga consisting of Sangalla, Mengken-dek, and Makale, these Toraja communities were basically small, independent, and individualistic. In times of crises these communities would usually band together for their own safety, but they could as easily regard their inter-community enmities more dangerous than an outside invader. Located in the mountainous region of the north of the south-west peninsula of Sulawesi, these Toraja communities were generally isolated from the other South Sulawesi groups. With the exception of Luwu, where the Toraja outnumbered the Bugis population, there was only very infrequent trading contact with the non-Toraja world. Quarrels arose frequently on the border areas of the Toraja regions because of raids on animals and human beings perpetrated by both the Toraja and their neighbours. While the Toraja groups were never sufficiently united to have posed any real political threat to Arung Palakka, they were capable of ignoring Arung Palakka's attempts to maintain, if not peace, at least a predictability in the affairs of South Sulawesi. When Sawitto, Batu Lappa, and Enrekang complained to Arung Palakka of raids by the Toraja of Leta, Arung Palakka organized a punitive expedition consisting of troops from Bone, Soppeng, Wajo, Tanete, Pammana, Barru, Goa, Tallo, Ajattapparəng, and Mandar. Leta was overwhelmed and many of the Toraja brought back as slaves (KA 1265c:353r-v).

The impressive display of a united South Sulawesi enforcing "Arung Palakka's peace" was gratifying indeed and encouraged Arung Palakka to extend his control to the rest of Southern Toraja. On 8 August 1683 Arung Palakka, Arung Mario, and Arung Tanete La Ompo came to Fort Rotterdam to request a small Dutch force. As had been the practice on previous occasions, Fort Rotterdam consented to send twelve soldiers, two corporals, and an ensign to accompany Arung Palakka. The reasons for the campaign were soon revealed to the Dutch. Arung Palakka hoped to make an example of the Toraja for affronting the Datu Luwu and other allies and for harbouring "riffraff". But perhaps an even greater incentive to Arung Palakka was to subdue these people who defiantly boasted that, though Arung Palakka had conquered Leta and Enrekang, he had not conquered them (KA 1274b:484v-485v). While Arung Palakka was concerned at Toraja harassment of Luwu and of some of the other states now under his "protection", there was a further inducement. The condition which Datu Luwu had imposed for his consent to his daughter's marriage to La Patau was Arung Palakka's participation in a war against the Toraja. Moreover, for Arung Palakka there was the challenge of subduing the Toraja which had always seemed

to have appealed to Bugis and Makassar rulers (KA 1265d:362r).

On 16 August 1683 a Dutch sloop carrying Arung Palakka plus an escort of fifteen European soldiers left Makassar to go to Bone where the army was to assemble for the expedition against the Toraja. When the various contingents from the different states had arrived, they formed the joint allied army which marched overland and arrived in the heart of Toraja country on 20th September. The Toraja had had ample warning of the approach of the army and had fled to the safety of the mountains. That evening some of the Toraja warriors descended from their mountain retreat and sneaked into the camps of the allied troops killing some twenty soldiers and escaping with their weapons. Despite the success of the previous night's raid, at daybreak several Toraja chieftains came to say that they wanted peace. A peace was subsequently agreed upon between these chieftains and the allies, and as silently and mysteriously as they had appeared they vanished into the mountains. One of them had earlier told Arung Palakka of a secret passage into the fortified mountain position of the Toraja, but when the invading army arrived, it found the entire place abandoned except for 2,000 water buffaloes, some sheaves of rice, and seven people. On 25th September the army found another 500 men, women, and children, but no Toraja warriors.

The deeper the expedition penetrated into the Toraja countryside, the more difficult it became. The first real battle came on the 26th when the Toraja suffered about 100 killed and saw another 300 taken prisoner. The Bugis and Makassar allies also received heavy losses in that battle. From 28th September to 8th October the allies marched through Liangbatu, Batta, and the Tallu Lembangna inflicting and receiving heavy casualties. In one campaign alone on 5th October, Arung Palakka claimed to have lost 500 of his best people by gunfire and another 100 by mantraps. Even within their fortifications the allied troops were harassed by the Toraja. Some 200 men wounded by the mantraps who had been left to recuperate in a fort were found dead the next day from poison darts. When La Patau sent 200 of his men to the mountains to obtain rice, 116 of them were killed. Hendrik Geerkens, one of Arung Palakka's Dutch bodyguards, told the Company officials later in private that the campaign had been difficult and Arung Palakka had taken great risks. By night and early morning Arung Palakka would go out alone reconnoitring to see whether a road was safe. Twice poison darts just barely missed him, with one passing between his legs and the other landing right in front of his feet. News of Arung Palakka's dangerous

exploits did not surprise the Dutch officials, for similar reports had been made in previous campaigns in which Arung Palakka had participated.

On 10th October there finally appeared to be a chance of a ceasefire between the two warring groups. At midday some Toraja descended from the hills leading a very old, blind woman who they said was a queen. She announced that many of the Toraja desired peace, and so the following day the army marched to Liangbatu to make peace on her homegrounds. A few days later this queen, accompanied by a number of other Toraja rulers, came to make peace bearing the traditional gifts of submission: cloth, krisses, and a young girl. Other Toraja chieftains also descended from their mountain strongholds to make peace and promised to deliver 1,000 *gantang* (3,125 kilogrammes) rice and 1,000 water buffaloes. The areas which submitted to Arung Palakka were a place called "Laia", and the Tallu Lembangnga. According to reports reaching the Dutch, of an allied army of some 50,000 men which had gone on the expedition to Toraja, there were 780 dead, including 130 of La Patau's best men. Although the Makassar contingent claimed that the toll was much higher, their estimate would have also included those who had died from disease and accidents. Of the 600 Toraja slaves brought back to Makassar, Arung Palakka kept only a few for himself and divided the others among Sultan Abdul Jalil of Goa, Karaeng Karunrung, Karaeng Tallo, and the other rulers who had participated in the war (KA 1289a:32-8; KA 1274c:511r; KA 1289b:36; KA 1292a:283v).⁶

The invasion made a lasting impression on the Toraja people and is still commemorated in their oral traditions. According to one source, the Bugis invasion of Toraja was a result of one party in a civil war in Toraja requesting military assistance from Luwu. The Datu Luwu then invited Arung Palakka to intercede on its side, thus involving the whole of South Sulawesi in the conflict (Interview Parinding 1975). Other sources simply cite the bad behaviour of the Bugis on their journey through the Toraja lands which finally forced the Toraja to take measures to repel them (Interview Sarungallo 1975). When reports reached the Toraja areas of the arrival of a large Bugis army, representatives from the Toraja communities – some 120 of them according to one report (Interview Parinding 1975) – met and agreed to form a defence alliance.⁷ This alliance appeared to have had two centres, one in the area of Rantepao and the other in the area of Makale. When news of the Bugis invasion arrived, representatives of the Toraja groups in the Rantepao area met at Gandang atop a mountain called Sarira in Kesu, Rantepao. There was

one area which did not send a representative to this war council: Karunanga. After the gathered representatives had decided upon the alliance, the *Untula' Buntunna Bone*, a tailless pig (*bai pokke'*) was slaughtered and the following oath intoned before the meat was divided among those present:

. . . Whoever refuses to enter into this agreement will be stabbed by the hairs of this pig. You people of Karunanga, from this day onward you will be killed with the spear (*pobongsorang doke*) by all the groups in the Toraja lands.

After the meeting preparations were made for the defence of Toraja. Fortifications were built all along the Sarira mountain, in the middle of which waited the Toraja army. To reach the Toraja, the Bugis troops were forced to ascend in single file, giving the Toraja a chance to count them. Each enemy soldier was noted by dropping a pebble into a large Toraja hat (*palo*). The number of pebbles filled seven of these large hats. In the fighting which followed there were many Bugis soldiers who survived but surrendered after their leaders were killed. After this great victory over the Bugis, a large evening fair was held. The Toraja troops then dispersed to their respective homes and the Bugis prisoners were repatriated (Interview Sarungallo 1975).

In the Makale area, all the representatives of the Toraja met at Bokko in Sangalla when they learned of Arung Palakka's plan to invade their lands. These representatives agreed that everyone without exception should participate in the war. Whoever refused to participate was threatened with slavery after the war. One of the tactics which they adopted was to dig holes for traps.⁸ They also built bridges with the ends cut so that any heavy weight would bring them down. Another tactic which they employed was to sneak into the allied camps at night, cover the Bugis horses with the hair of the Aren palm tree, and then set them alight to cause panic in the camps. This last tactic was used successfully to rout the enemy thereby giving the Toraja a complete victory. According to a Makale source, in this war two areas in Rantepao did not participate in the fighting: Karunanga and Karre. Although they had been at the general meeting, they did not send their people to fight. The rest of the Toraja communities agreed that, if any group lost its chieftain or nobles in warfare, it could go and seize anyone from either of these villages to be slaughtered as sacrifice in the burial ceremonies. These people were tied to large stones and speared, hence the name *pobongsorang doke* meaning "target of the spear". This practice only ended officially in 1905 (Interview Linting 1975).

Both the Toraja and the Bugis sources remember this as a great victory for their respective sides. Although Arung Palakka claimed a victory, and treaties of submission were signed by some Toraja chieftains, the allied troops sustained heavy losses and could not impose its will on the Toraja as a whole. Expeditions against them continued throughout Arung Palakka's lifetime and that of his successor, La Patau. While the large allied army may not have brought the total victory that Arung Palakka had desired, it caused such large-scale devastation to the countryside that Toraja was effectively neutralized for some time. By this expedition Arung Palakka had also acquired in return a firm promise from Datu Luwu that La Patau would marry his daughter, and that the offspring of this marriage would become the next ruler in Luwu. This promise itself was worth the long and costly expedition to the mountainous "wilds" of the Toraja lands.

There were several other campaigns to Toraja in later years, but they never reached the magnitude of the invasion of 1683. In 1686 the Toraja in Enrekang refused to pay the promised indemnity to Arung Palakka and therefore suffered an invasion from an allied punitive expedition of 3,000 men. The outcome was predictable, with the expedition returning victorious with 964 slaves and the Toraja groups made submissive for a time (KA 1317a:188r). Problems with one or another Toraja group kept flaring up, and Arung Palakka continued to enforce his demands by despatching troops, as occurred in Duri and Baroko in 1687, Awang in 1688-9, and another troublesome area in Toraja in 1694. (KA 1326a:271v-272r; KA 1342a:134r; KA 1350a:517v; KA 1446a:689r). But never again during Arung Palakka's lifetime did the Toraja unite as one people as occurred in 1683. His ability to forge a powerful fighting force from all the disparate and often warring states of South Sulawesi had been demonstrated to good effect in the Toraja campaign, much to the awe of the Toraja people. In subsequent years there were difficulties with various Toraja communities but they were easily resolved with the first sign of displeasure from Arung Palakka. Toraja, like the rest of South Sulawesi, had become responsive to the wishes of Arung Palakka.

In a thorough and systematic fashion Arung Palakka had dealt with the problems which he believed could jeopardize the successful transition of power to La Patau. The choice of La Patau as heir was not unopposed. However, Arung Palakka managed to overcome all objections, including those of Arung Timurung and Arung Amali, two with perhaps the greatest claims to Arung Palakka's position and power. Those areas

which were expected to become a source of trouble for La Patau were as effectively silenced. In Goa the people's confidence in their leaders was undermined leading to distrust, flight, and ironically, a plea for protection from the very source of their misfortune: Arung Palakka. Wajo was not only shackled economically by the establishment of Arung Palakka's residence and fort on the Cenrana River, the main access to the vital international trade, but also politically by having a Bone prince as its Arung Matoa. While Arung Palakka distrusted the increased power of the Arung Mampu family, the election of this Bone prince as Arung Matoa Wajo assured stability in that land. Mandar had witnessed the ruthlessness with which Arung Palakka had treated a former Maradia Balannipa and was unwilling to risk arousing his wrath again for any minor reason. Another source of potential danger to Arung Palakka's heir was the mixed communities of Bugis and Makassar people living in the Company's territories. By appointing regents over these communities, Arung Palakka succeeded in establishing a precedent of authority and order emanating from his position as the pre-eminent local lord in South Sulawesi.

These successes, however, were being blighted by President Cops' efforts to discredit Arung Palakka in the eyes of the Company. But Batavia quickly reacted to Arung Palakka's protests and adjudged his friendship too valuable to be jeopardized by any Company official. Having weathered this minor crisis, the only other source of danger in the horizon, remote though the possibility, was the Toraja. For Arung Palakka, as it had been for Goa before him, the Toraja appeared a challenge, an untamed frontier where the actual campaign itself was rewarding whatever the final outcome. Though both the allies and the Toraja claimed victory, the Toraja campaign of 1683 was fruitful in one important respect: it demonstrated to the Toraja, as other campaigns had done so effectively to the rest of South Sulawesi, that Arung Palakka commanded the power to enforce his role as overlord. As overlord, therefore, he demanded allegiance to himself and to whomever he decided to appoint as his successor. This message was clear, and it now remained for Arung Palakka to insure that this message became incontestable through a gradual but thorough acceptance of his political order in South Sulawesi.

CHAPTER XI

THE PEACE OF ARUNG PALAKKA

The successful conclusion of the Toraja war in 1683 brought the whole of South Sulawesi under Arung Palakka's peace. Yet his authority was incomplete because of the curious position of the Company. The unofficial demarcation of power between the two overlords was complicated by the fact that the Company had become a landholder in South Sulawesi. When Admiral Speelman completed his duties in Makassar in 1669, he left a long and detailed report for his successor concerning the areas which were acquired by the Company through conquest. It was this report which became the basis of a number of Company claims to territory which threatened to jeopardize Arung Palakka's control of internal affairs on the island.

Armed with this report, the Company quickly laid claim to those lands previously in dispute with local rulers. This unilateral action was based on Speelman's interpretation of Western European ideas of international law concerning "rights of conquest" and by Article 20 of the Bungaya treaty. He had therefore pronounced that "the rulers of Goa and Tallo have no rights over a single foot of land outside their gates" (KA 1342b:113r). Powerless to contest the Company's claims, the rulers of Goa and Tallo pleaded for the usufruct of these lands since their greatly diminished landholdings were insufficient to provide the basic necessities of their courts (KA 1342b:113r-v). When Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil requested a clarification of his actual lands, he was told that, based upon Speelman's report, the only land which he owned was his apanage land of Sanrabone (KA 1342c:163r).

The Goa and Tallo rulers refused to acknowledge the Company's claims and persisted in their demands for their former lands, especially the rich rice-growing areas of Polombangkeng and Maros, which had supplied these two kingdoms with large quantities of rice prior to 1669. Karaeng Tallo's request for the restitution of his lands included an area so extensive that Arung Palakka considered it to be both "impertinent and ludicrous" (KA 1406a:703v). These lands which Karaeng Tallo claimed were those of Tallo of a former day when it was at the height of

its power, rather than the grim reality of the present Tallo of 208 families with only 300 able-bodied men capable of bearing arms (KA 1406a: 704r-705r). To settle this troublesome boundary question with the Makassar rulers, Batavia ordered a map to be drawn showing the lands which the Makassar people occupied, those which belonged to the Company, and the lands formerly owned by the present Karaeng Tallo and his forefathers.¹

In contrast to the straitened circumstances of the rulers of Goa and Tallo because of their greatly reduced territories, the Company enjoyed the benefits of having appropriated some of the richest ricelands from these two kingdoms. By following the local practice of demanding 1/10 of all produce as an acknowledgement of overlordship, the Company was able to receive the following quantities of rice from only six of its “territories”:

Maros	43,938 <i>gantang</i>
Barru	5,954 <i>gantang</i>
Siang	8,748 <i>gantang</i>
Bungoro	2,714 <i>gantang</i>
Labakkang	7,898 <i>gantang</i>
Segeri	22,896 <i>gantang</i> (KA 1371:163)

According to Speelman’s report, the Company was one of the largest landowners in South Sulawesi. Its lands included Bantaeng, Bira, Polombangkeng, Galesong, Batu-Batu, Aeng, Barombong, Pa’nakukang, the whole of Makassar, and areas of Bulukumba and the west coast from Maros to Segeri (Speelman 1670:15-28; Eerdmans n.d.(a):202). Although Bantaeng fell to the Company as spoils of war, it was presented as an apanage to Arung Palakka and his lawful male descendants because Arung Palakka had been “one of the most important instruments through which the business of Makassar was brought to such a desired end” (Bakkers 1866:200).

As soon as it became obvious that the Company intended to remain in their newly-won territories, these enclaves became a refuge for all discontented elements in neighbouring states. The Company’s scattered outposts in South Sulawesi reported frequent movements into their lands of local people claiming to be Company’s subject. In 1693, for example, there were some 9,194 recorded as subjects, but the next year that number had climbed to 11,770 (KA 1446b:699r). The Dutch boasted that the reason for the influx of people was the relative lightness of the tribute and services which the Company demanded (KA 1387a: 549r-v). While this may have been one of the contributing factors, there

was another more important reason for the flight. The refugees were principally from Goa, Tallo, Bulukumba, and Layo and had left to avoid serving a ruler they did not respect.

Goa's ruler, Sultan Abdul Jalil, had served Arung Palakka well and had been rewarded with the crown of Goa. The Makassar people never forgave his treachery and preferred living under the Dutch and the Bugis. Insofar as Tallo was concerned, its ruler had become a degenerate who spent most of his time smoking opium. His inattention to government led many of his people to seek a better ruler elsewhere. The ruler of Bulukumba, too, was accused of mistreating his people because they had at first shown a preference to a rival contender to the throne. In Layo it was the accession of an unpopular ruler which resulted in an exodus of large numbers of people wishing to settle within the Company's territories (KA 1342c:156r-v).

The Company's lands became regarded as an ideal refuge, not only because the demands may have been light, but because the Company could provide protection and security. These last two qualities had been sadly absent from large numbers of areas for the greater part of the 17th century. As long as one did not antagonize Arung Palakka or become a fugitive from his justice, one could expect to be unmolested under the Company's protection. The Company was thus incorporated into the well-established South Sulawesi practice of fleeing one's land to avoid serving an unjust or oppressive ruler. There are frequent admonitions in the Bugis *Latoa* and the Makassar *Rapang* (books presenting the wisdom of the ages and serving as a guide to good government for court princes) for a ruler to be good and just to his people or lose them and hence lose his principal source of prosperity and livelihood.

But while these refugees may have indeed found a kind master in the Company, they quickly found the disadvantages of having not one but two overlords to satisfy. In addition to the Company's demands for tribute, they had to fulfil those of Arung Palakka as well. For example, Arung Palakka was allowed the usufruct of those lands Speelman claimed for the Company, such as Bantaeng, various areas in Maros, Segeri, Bungoro, and Siang, which were some of the best rice-growing areas in South Sulawesi. The Company also discovered that other areas in Maros not designated for Arung Palakka's use were nevertheless sending rice to him (KA 1248b:369r-370v, 387v). On one occasion Arung Palakka asked the Company's subjects in Cenrana (in the mountains near Maros), Galesong, and Polombangkeng to deliver a certain quantity of wood to him and the traditional boatbuilders of Bira to build

his boats (KA 1350b:544v). Other areas which the Company claimed by right of conquest were similarly forced by Arung Palakka to recognize him as their lord. He demanded and they complied by performing certain duties, delivering their traditional tribute, and summoning their men for war expeditions (KA 1274a:463r, *passim*). Polombangkeng, Kanrepepe (Tanakeke[?]), and Galesong were clearly established as Company territory after 1669, but when Arung Palakka was assembling an army against Toraja in 1683, these areas were summoned by Arung Palakka to contribute men for this expedition (KA 1289b:40). This summons was a prerogative of an overlord toward a vassal, and it was unquestioningly obeyed.

In Bulukumba the Company was forced to delimit its boundaries based on Speelman's report because of the likelihood of disputes with the belligerent local ruler. One of the areas claimed by the Company was Gantarang, one of the best rice-growing lands in Bulukumba. Karaeng Gantarang protested that he was an independent lord who recognized Arung Palakka's overlordship. After a close study of Speelman's report, it was discovered that he was indeed a free lord (KA 1289c:71). The other lands in Bulukumba claimed by the Company proved to be some of the most fertile in the area (KA 1326b:291v-292r). Although the Company had taken such pains to delineate its lands in Bulukumba, Arung Palakka considered them as much his as the Company's and continued to demand their services (KA 1350b:544v). In some other Company lands, such as the small mountain states behind Maros, President Cops had at one time openly declared that Arung Palakka could collect his 1/10 tribute (KA 1326c:228r). Later, however, rulers of these mountain states had protested to Cops and only agreed to deliver timber to the Company if they did not have to do the same for Arung Palakka (KA 1274a:463r-v).

The mounting protests from the Company's subjects at having to satisfy two overlords forced Cops to be more circumspect in openly encouraging Arung Palakka and his principal leaders to demand tribute in the Company's lands. When Arung Tanete La Ompo had attempted on behalf of Arung Palakka to obtain bamboo from the Company's subjects, Cops politely refused him. He explained to Arung Tanete that "the kings and princes are never more jealous over the point of jurisdiction, that he who levies the tithe must be the lord of the land" (KA 1289b:37). But it was precisely this point which Arung Palakka was intent on making. Except for the areas around Fort Rotterdam itself, where the Company's presence was visible and real, its other territories

saw almost no sign of its overlordship. There were Company posts in the more important territories of Maros and Bulukumba, but these were mere handfuls of men who made little or no impact on the lives of the people. The small European presence in South Sulawesi made it impossible for the Company to maintain anything but token garrisons, and these only in the most important areas. Arung Palakka, on the other hand, delegated various areas, including many in the Company's territories, as apanages of his most trusted followers. The latter were then responsible for assuring the smooth delivery of tributary goods and services whenever required. Arung Palakka's representatives in the Company's lands served as his eyes and ears and were essential for the proper implementation of his policies. Since the Company relied so heavily upon Arung Palakka as a final arbiter in native affairs, these representatives assumed great importance in the Company's lands. There evolved, therefore, a type of parallel government within the Company's lands: that of the Company, which was the distant overlord content simply to receive tribute; and that of Arung Palakka, with representatives on the spot exercising all the prerogatives of overlordship.

The tributary goods which went to Arung Palakka were later sold and bartered by Arung Palakka's own men trading in areas restricted by the Company. Even Arung Palakka's wife, Daeng Talele, was said to be involved in what the Company termed "illicit" trade. Although Company officials in Fort Rotterdam attempted to enforce Article 7 of the Bungaya treaty, which listed prohibited areas of trade, there was little hope of preventing any trade conducted on behalf of Arung Palakka (KA 1303a:147v). Arung Palakka himself had attempted to obtain the right to issue passes on behalf of the Company from his base in Cenrana. This request had been refused outright because of the well-founded fear that such a practice would provide ample opportunity for the Bugis to evade any Company trading restrictions. Cenrana was far enough away from Makassar to afford an ideal place to carry on what the Company considered "clandestine", as well as "legitimate", trading activities. Batavia instructed Fort Rotterdam in frank terms what it should be doing with regard to the Bugis encroachment on the Company's "sphere of influence":

. . . the Bugis who wish to trade overseas must continue to be obliged to come to Fort [Rotterdam] to obtain their passes, without which they will be punished without further ado for having broken the treaty. The intention is to turn them away from navigation and to foster the fulfil-

ment of their inclination to agriculture, with which they were raised since their birth (KA 1342b:114v).

Without the power to issue passes, Arung Palakka was unable to divert many foreign traders from Makassar to Cenrana. Although Cenrana never became an important economic centre, it was an ideal political capital for Arung Palakka. It fulfilled admirably its function of controlling Wajo's trade and hence its economic independence, which was an important consideration especially after the accession of Arung Mampu as the Arung Matoa Wajo in 1679. Furthermore, Cenrana's location allowed Arung Palakka to act free from the constraints of the powerful *Aruppitu* in the heart of Bone. Cenrana, therefore, had its advantages as a capital, but it never fulfilled Arung Palakka's hopes that it would rival Makassar as an important entrepot.

To have achieved such an economic status for Cenrana would have been a great triumph, but it was not an important priority for Arung Palakka. What mattered more was a South Sulawesi at peace responsive to his wishes and to those of his heirs. After Goa's defeat in 1669 Arung Palakka had systematically planned his route to power. Among his most successful weapons was the use of marriage diplomacy. Since he had no children of his own, he used his sisters in judicious marriage alliances which proved politically advantageous to him. The eldest of his sisters, We Mappolobombang Da Upi, married Arung Timurung La Pakkokoe, son of Arumpone La Ma'darëmmëng. This marriage was intended to appease Arung Timurung and to obtain support for Arung Palakka's later accession to the Bone throne (See Chapter X). Another of Arung Palakka's sisters, We Tënrilekkë' (We Tënrembang in L-4, Section 24, unpag.) Da Emba, was given in marriage first to Datu Luwu Tomalagu and later to Karaeng Tanete La Mappajanci (L-26:19). Although Luwu's heyday had long passed, it remained a relatively powerful kingdom whose support was necessary for any individual with pretensions toward supreme overlordship in South Sulawesi. Arung Palakka was well aware of this and used his influence to obtain this favourable match. Furthermore, Tanete had proved to be a faithful ally in the past and this marriage was intended to cement this bond. A third sister, We Tënrigirang Da Ompo, married Arung Bakkë Todani, a close friend and companion-in-exile of Arung Palakka's. The early trust which Arung Palakka placed in Arung Bakkë made this arrangement of marriage one of love, to bind Arung Bakkë even closer to Arung Palakka, as well as one of political expediency. As a member of one of the most important families in the Ajattapparëng, Arung Bakkë

exercised influence over a strategic and potentially powerful area.

Through these carefully arranged marriages, Arung Palakka was able to secure allies in the early years when his position was still insecure. He pursued the same policy to win support for La Patau. He arranged matches between La Patau and the daughters of the rulers of Luwu, Goa, and to one of the most powerful families in Bone. A unique feature of these marriage arrangements was the agreement that the first-born of the union would rule in the mother's homeland. By this means Arung Palakka hoped to guarantee continuing support for himself and his successors from the particular kingdoms or families involved. The survival of his blood to rule in the most powerful kingdoms in South Sulawesi depended upon the success of this policy.

By the early 1680's all South Sulawesi acknowledged the overlordship of the Company and Arung Palakka. There were a few occasions when force or a threat of force had to be used against Toraja and Mandar. Elsewhere no local ruler or government dared undertake any major initiative without obtaining prior approval from Arung Palakka. So completely did he dominate affairs in South Sulawesi, even within the Company areas, that his pronouncements were often sufficient to resolve any conflict or difference of opinions within a kingdom or between kingdoms. No one dared contradict him for fear of sharing a similar fate as Arung Bakkě. By the mid-1680s Arung Palakka's authority as overlord was firmly-rooted. His important concern now was to assure that, after his death, the precedents of power he established as overlord would be sufficient to sustain his successor, La Patau. An opportunity to demonstrate the powers of overlordship arose in an incident in Lampoko, Soppeng, involving the Datu Soppeng Towesa.

In late September or early October 1690 the Dutch learned that Arung Palakka, accompanied by the Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil, Karaeng Tallo, and a number of important nobles, had gone to Soppeng to seize the lord of Lampoko. A few days before Arung Palakka had demanded that Arung Lampoko return a certain slave, but instead of complying the latter had defiantly given the slave to the son of Arung Běrru. Arung Lampoko refused to surrender the slave because "he could not submit all of his subjects to be destroyed in this manner" (KA 1386a:14). This open rejection of Arung Palakka's authority would have been intolerable in the best of circumstances. But when it originated from a favourite of Datu Soppeng Towesa, with whom Arung Palakka had already clashed over rights to the Soppeng throne, an

example had to be made of Arung Lampoko as a warning to Datu Soppeng and to any others foolish enough to challenge Arung Palakka's authority.

The Company attempted to prevent bloodshed by sending two of its officials in early October to try to intercept Arung Palakka's men before they reached Lampoko. At Tanete they were told that some eleven days before Datu Soppeng, Arung Lampoko, and some of the Soppeng *gëllarëng* had gone to Gantarang in the mountains on a deer hunt. They were also told that Anreguru Tojumaat had gone to Lampoko with a large number of Arung Palakka's soldiers and had seized the inhabitants, their krisses, buffaloes, and other possessions. When the two Dutchmen arrived in Lampoko, they found that this report was true. Tojumaat's explanation for his behaviour was that he was merely obeying orders. If Arung Lampoko had been there, he too would have been seized and brought to Arung Palakka. Although the Dutch argued that Soppeng was a Company ally and that Bone's troops should be removed from Soppeng, Tojumaat refused saying that he dared not oppose Arung Palakka's orders. Realizing the futility of further argument, the Dutch decided to go to Segeri to speak directly to Arung Palakka.

On 7th October they arrived in Segeri and found Arung Palakka with the rulers of Goa, Tallo, and Tanete with their nobles. When the Dutch officials were brought to Arung Palakka, they complained to him about the attack on an ally, Lampoko. This action, they reminded Arung Palakka, was in grave breach of the Bungaya treaty which states specifically that all conflicts between rulers and nobles must be resolved by the Company in the presence of the allies. If any further action were taken against Lampoko, Batavia would be notified. This warning aroused Arung Palakka's anger. Not only had they dared threaten him in front of his subjects, but they had also invoked the treaty to question the division of responsibilities which Arung Palakka had evolved with other Company officials in the past. Batavia, too, had acquiesced in Arung Palakka's authority over internal affairs in South Sulawesi, and so these remarks by the Dutch messengers appeared brazen and provocative. Arung Palakka accused President Hartsink of continuing to listen to the Chief Merchant Prins. The latter had earlier earned Arung Palakka's ire by advising Hartsink to forbid the Company's subjects from performing services for Arung Palakka while they were needed by the Company. While such a recommendation appeared reasonable to Hartsink, it went counter to Arung Palakka's established custom condoned by earlier

Company presidents in Fort Rotterdam and by Batavia. “And so now”, continued Arung Palakka, “the Company also wants to draw the people of Soppeng to itself so that Arung Palakka will have no one since everyone will be under the Company”. In Bone he was free to command, and, if necessary, to punish his people “as was also the case with the people of Soppeng if they commit any wrong toward me since there can be no distinction made between Soppeng and Bone or Bone and Soppeng”. He explained that, if Datu Soppeng were in Bone and some people in Bone were to commit a wrong against him, then Datu Soppeng could punish them since there was no difference between Soppeng and Bone. If there were anyone who dared to say otherwise, he would have him killed “even if he were his own child, La Patau”.

When the Dutch asked Arung Palakka whether he had spoken to Arung Lampoko, he replied that he had. On 7th October he had summoned both Arung Lampoko and Datu Soppeng to the Segeri mountains. He had asked Datu Soppeng whether what had occurred in Lampoko had been done with his knowledge. Datu Soppeng denied having played any part in this, and so Arung Palakka directed the full force of his anger at Arung Lampoko. He had Arung Lampoko’s lips sliced off for having uttered offensive words against Arung Palakka and then had him chased into the forest like a wild animal. Without a word of remorse Arung Palakka told the Dutch envoys that what he had done was “nothing more than what was right and just”. It was later discovered that the person who had been assigned the task of punishing Arung Lampoko was the very same individual who some years back had been used to execute Arung Bakkě Todani (KA 1386:2-9). By using the same executioner, Arung Palakka was making certain that no one failed to see the warning that whoever dared defy Arung Palakka would not long remain inviolable. If the memory of Arung Bakkě had grown dim over the years, the frightful punishment of Arung Lampoko once again served as a reminder of the power which was still Arung Palakka’s to wield.

The immediate result of the Lampoko incident was to limit the authority of both Datu Soppeng and his wife Karaeng Langelo, sister of Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil. The people of Soppeng disliked Karaeng Langelo because she demanded more from them than their own princes. After the Lampoko incident, however, she became much more moderate in her activities. Datu Soppeng himself became ruler in name only and was rendered powerless by his own sister and former wife of Arung Palakka, We Adda Datu ri Watu, and by the Soppeng nobles and *gëllarëng* (KA 1387a:543v-544r). By Arung Palakka’s swift moves

to punish what he believed to constitute acts of *lèse majesté*, he removed any doubt that he was the supreme overlord in the area. This incident further consolidated Arung Palakka's position within South Sulawesi bringing a step closer his hopes for an untroubled transition of power to La Patatau.

While Arung Palakka was successful in reasserting his authority, his methods earned the reproof of the Company. His experience in the Arung Bakkë affair made him wary of undertaking any major expedition without the explicit, or at least implicit, approval of the Company. But when he asked his fellow rulers and nobles whether he should broach this matter of his quarrel with Datu Soppeng with the Company, he was advised that they could handle the whole affair without its help (KA 1386b:8). The unexpected arrival of the Dutch envoys in Segeri with their threats convinced Arung Palakka that President Hartsink and the Chief Merchant Prins, both of whom Arung Palakka believed had long shown little affection for him, would now use this incident to discredit him in the eyes of the Supreme Government in Batavia. Relations between Arung Palakka and these two Dutch officials became so strained that Batavia sent a special commissioner to Makassar to try to mediate in their quarrel.

Commissioner Dirk de Haas arrived in Makassar harbour in the evening of 5 June 1691. His initial meetings with Arung Palakka were especially pleasant, and he remarked that Arung Palakka's behaviour had been irreproachable ever since the departure of Hartsink to Batavia on 12 October 1690, immediately after the Lampoko incident (KA 1387b:27). After a month of private talks and general meetings with Arung Palakka and the allies, de Haas filed his "Report on the findings of the Makassar Commission focussing principally upon the investigation of the differences which have arisen between the Honourable Company and the Arumpone with the general allies . . ." A lesser concern of the Commission was to determine what should be done with the request by Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil and the Makassar people for the return of Syaikh Yusuf whom the Dutch had exiled to Ceylon.

From his investigations de Haas learned that Arung Palakka's quarrels with President Hartsink could be traced directly to four causes: (1) the refusal by Hartsink in 1688 to grant Arung Palakka's wife Daeng Talele the lands of Lange-Lange in Bulukumba; (2) the refusal by Hartsink in 1690 to allow thirty Bulukumba subjects of the Company to work for Arung Palakka for a brief period; (3) the refusal of Arung

Palakka to honour Hartsink with a visit on the latter's request; and (4) the attempt by Hartsink to prevent Arung Palakka from taking revenge for the insult done to him by Datu Soppeng through Arung Lampoko. De Haas discussed each of these points in turn with the hope of explaining to Arung Palakka and the allies the reasons for Hartsink's actions.

Insofar as Lange-Lange was concerned, it was beyond Hartsink's power to grant since only Batavia could decide the disposal of Company's lands. De Haas suggested that Arung Palakka himself write directly to Batavia to make his request known. With regard to the second point de Haas explained that the decision had been made by Batavia. In his report, however, he emphasized that on previous occasions Arung Palakka had been allowed to use the Company's subjects for his own projects. Only when Hartsink wrote to Batavia recommending that the Bulukumba subjects be exempt from serving Arung Palakka did Batavia issue an order to that effect. Batavia clearly relied on the advice of the official closest to any situation, and so de Haas simply implied to Batavia that Hartsink was not altogether inculpable insofar as the quarrel was concerned. On the third point Arung Palakka expressed regret that he was too ill to come to the Fort. Although de Haas had learned from various sources that Arung Palakka had spent that day fishing at the seashore, he discreetly omitted any mention of this. Finally, on the recent trouble in Lampoko, Arung Palakka told de Haas that he had acted without the Company's knowledge because the Company had no lawful right there. These lands were his inheritance through birth and marriage. Arung Palakka ended his case by stating with great emotion that he would certainly have left the Company's service and retired to Bone if Hartsink had not been removed from Fort Rotterdam (KA 1387c:578r-580r).

The success of de Haas' mission was assured because of Arung Palakka's basic attitude toward Batavia. Throughout his dealings with the Company, Arung Palakka had often expressed displeasure with Company officials in Fort Rotterdam. His criticism, however, was directed at what he considered attempts by these officials to misrepresent him to Batavia or to misinterpret Batavia's intentions toward him. In any conflict with a Company official, Arung Palakka threatened to write to Batavia to learn the "real" truth and, if all else failed, to go and live in Batavia. The inability of some of the officials in Makassar to appreciate the heavy moral obligation which Arung Palakka felt toward the Company made them believe the occasional rumour that Arung Palakka was planning to turn against the Company. In both word and deed Arung

Palakka continually demonstrated his readiness to give his life to the Company for having “covered” his shame and “restored his life”. So well-known was Arung Palakka’s sense of debt to the Company that it was one of the major themes found in a Makassar folktale about Arung Palakka and the Makassar War of 1666-9 (L.Y. Andaya 1980). Arung Palakka even swore before de Haas never to abandon his trust in the Company “to which he pledged his body and soul” (KA 1387c:580v). In the eyes of his society, to have gone against the Company which was responsible for his life would have been a serious crime indeed. When Arung Palakka criticized a Dutch official, it was never meant as a criticism of the Company, as can readily be seen in the numerous missives written by different Company representatives at Fort Rotterdam to Batavia throughout Arung Palakka’s life. Arung Palakka was not unaware that his supreme position in South Sulawesi was being maintained because of the continuing support of the Company. But to believe that this more practical, political reason for embracing the Company was Arung Palakka’s principal consideration is to adopt a highly cynical view of past events, but even more seriously, to disregard a culturally important motivating factor for Arung Palakka’s deeds.

During de Haas’ investigations in Makassar, he voiced an opinion which was unspoken but generally acknowledged by the Company officials both in Fort Rotterdam and Batavia. He wrote that, “the whole land of Celebes [Sulawesi] is so large that the Company would only be able to control it at extraordinarily high costs, and among the allies are many powers who, without such an eminent servant [as Arung Palakka], would be difficult to restrain”. Therefore, he concluded:

. . . It would not be doing a disservice [to the Company] if Arung Palakka were granted this or that minor request, such as a piece of land or the use of the services which he requires of our subjects, etc., since it is he who maintains the loyalty of each of the allies to the Company. By so doing [the Company] will be able to obtain good services from him not only in this but in other cases and circumstances. His disposition is dependent upon honour and pride; if he were not obstructed in these matters by granting to him things of little importance, as now a piece of land or the service of the Company’s subjects . . . and especially [if he were] not opposed in the management of the government of his own lands, mainly Bone and Soppeng, I believe that he will do his utmost to serve the Company with great vigour (KA 1387c:580v-581v).

De Haas proved an ideal representative for Batavia because he always placed the activities in South Sulawesi within the framework of the Company’s wider interests. He pinpointed the singlemost important

contribution of Arung Palakka: the ability to control the activities of the South Sulawesi people at home and abroad. To obtain this service, de Haas argued, the Company could afford to grant the relatively minor demands of Arung Palakka. Once de Haas had concluded that the points of dispute were of minor consequence and that maintaining Arung Palakka's support was of paramount concern to the Company, then he suggested that every effort be made to encourage Arung Palakka's special devotion to the Company. The question of Arung Palakka's honour and pride were central to these differences, and so de Haas recommended that nothing be done which could be interpreted as compromising these values. Even the matter of Arung Palakka's influence in the selection of the rulers in Soppeng, Luwu, and in the Mandar kingdom of Parapuang, de Haas chose to ignore for the greater good of the Company-Arung Palakka relationship. In recent times Arung Palakka had acted on behalf of the Company by bringing Datu Soppeng Towesa and his nobles to answer for their misconduct, by sending men to Mandar to investigate and frustrate "smuggling" there, by despatching envoys to Bima to mediate in the hostilities between the kingdoms of Sumbawa, and by applying pressure on the ruler of Sumbawa to prevent the escape of a large number of South Sulawesi refugees now in that kingdom. Arung Palakka's success in these missions was due to the fact that "his orders were not only venerated but also effectively implemented" (KA 1387c:582r-583v). These examples, de Haas concluded, were sufficient to see the wisdom of removing anything which could cause Arung Palakka any dissatisfaction with the Company.

The second major problem which de Haas was sent to investigate was the matter of the return of Syaikh Yusuf to Makassar. Syaikh Yusuf had left Makassar many years before and had spent most of his life in Mekka. On his return he was invited to remain at Bañten to be the adviser to Sultan Agung. When the latter was overthrown by his son Sultan Haji with Company assistance in 1683, Syaikh Yusuf was exiled to Ceylon. The movement for the return of Syaikh Yusuf to Makassar had begun in the court of Goa and had the whole-hearted support of Arung Palakka's wife, Daeng Talele, who was herself a Goa princess. On 11 May 1689 Sultan Abdul Jalil, Daeng Talele, and all the important Makassar nobles came to Fort Rotterdam to speak to President Hartsink. They brought with them 2,000 *rijksdaalders* which had been donated by both commoners and nobles alike to make it possible for Syaikh Yusuf to return to Makassar from Ceylon. Without first consulting Batavia, Hartsink agreed to this request. This decision, according to Hartsink, "caused

such excessive joy which is difficult to describe, and each of them came to the President and gave him his hand and embraced him, including the queens of Bone and Goa” (KA 1350c:510r-511v). Hartsink then tried to persuade Batavia to approve his compulsive act of generosity by warning that otherwise “there would be hatred erupting into widespread turmoil”. If Batavia did not intend to repatriate Syaikh Yusuf, then Hartsink advised that the Goa representative bearing the request for Syaikh Yusuf’s return be retained until reinforcements could be sent to Fort Rotterdam. No help could be expected in Makassar “because the request had come from the common man, and the masses in Makassar hold this same Syaikh in such great love and awe as though he were a second Muhammad”. Yet Hartsink was also able to recognize that the return of Syaikh Yusuf could lead to trouble if he should ever recall the harsh treatment he had received at the hands of the Company (KA 1350c:512r-v).

While Hartsink had painted a picture of all Makassar wanting the return of Syaikh Yusuf, de Haas found comfort in the fact that Arung Palakka declined to lend his support to the request. Although Daeng Talele had contributed 600 *rijksdaalders* for the Syaikh’s return, Arung Palakka remained adamant in his opposition. He explained that he was a servant of the Company which would make his advocating the return of the Company’s enemy highly improper. Further investigation revealed that even if all the Makassar people were to oppose the Company over the Syaikh Yusuf issue, there would not be any real danger since Arung Palakka and the other allies would come to its assistance (KA 1387c: 584r-586r). Armed with this information Batavia could rest assured that there was no reason to act immediately upon the request by the Makassar delegations.

What caused Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil to ask for Syaikh Yusuf’s return in 1689 is unclear. The explanation he gave to de Haas in 1691 was “because he [Syaikh Yusuf] was of his line, he and his father having had the title of *gallarang* in the kingdom of Tallo. His mother was married to the old ruler of Goa [Sultan Hasanuddin] so that this Syaikh, Karaeng Bisei [Sultan Mohammad Ali Tumenanga ri Jakattara] who died in Batavia, and he were all true and lawful brothers” (KA 1387c: 583v).² His request was couched in terms of brotherly concern, but the true reason was probably the hope that Syaikh Yusuf, who was now considered a living saint by the Makassar people, could perhaps infuse a strong sense of unity and hope once again in the demoralized Makassar lands. A few years later the situation had changed little, and the Dutch

governor noted the deep despair of the Makassar people in a poignant description of something he had witnessed in Goa:

. . . They [the Makassar people] have a very sad song which is usually performed by eight to ten young women in men's clothing, but beautifully dressed in old finery, dancing with guns and swords. The close of each verse ends in Malay with these words of lamentation: "Kompania sudah [me-]rusak Makassar" (The Company had destroyed Makassar). This is what the elders listen to with rapt attention and with sighs and tears, and what the youth are being nurtured on in great bitterness and aversion toward our state (KA 1458c:23).

This gloom and despair³ had perhaps been the reason for the Goa court wanting the return of Syaikh Yusuf. Because of his great prestige among the Makassar people, his presence among them would have been sufficient to instill a renewed sense of pride in their lives. But a more pragmatic reason for initiating demands for Syaikh Yusuf's return, according to one Goa nobleman, was to provide an ideal cover for a Goa delegation to deliver Goa's complaints to Batavia without arousing Arung Palakka's suspicions (Consideratiën 1708:7). Once the Company had received Arung Palakka's promise of support over the Syaikh Yusuf issue, it confidently rejected the Makassar pleas for the return of this Moslem saint. The turmoil which Hartsink had predicted never occurred, and all Makassar agitation for Syaikh Yusuf's return quickly subsided.

During de Haas' mission in Makassar he called a meeting to provide an opportunity for all of the Company allies to air their grievances. It was during this meeting held on 9 July 1691 that he was able to witness the great influence and virtually unchallenged position which Arung Palakka had among the local rulers. All the rulers of South Sulawesi were present except for those of Soppeng and Bulukumba. The ruler of Bulukumba was away hunting when the messenger arrived summoning him, and so he did not learn of the meeting in time. The envoy to Soppeng did succeed in delivering the summons to Datu Soppeng Towesa, but when the latter and his wife attempted to leave, they were stopped at the border. The Datu Soppeng's sister, We Adda Datu ri Watu, ordered all the Soppeng subjects in the retinue to return home on pain of death. Since We Adda had been given authority by Arung Palakka to "oversee" affairs in Soppeng, there was no one who dared disobey her. And so Datu Soppeng Towesa was unable to continue his journey to Makassar to attend the general meeting. Although there were suspicions that Arung Palakka preferred not having the quarrelsome

Datu Soppeng raising complaints about his condition, Arung Palakka denied vehemently that he had any responsibility for this act (KA 1387d:603r-v, 611r).

In the beginning of the meeting de Haas had the Bungaya treaty read and then asked if there were any grievances. The only ones to reply were the rulers of Goa and Tallo who wished to have certain lands restored to them. Since no other ruler wished to speak, de Haas asked then if they would all abide by the articles of the treaty. Most of the lesser allies, beginning with Wajo, answered that they would, “as long as the Arumpone [Arung Palakka] himself did so”. When de Haas asked if they would still do what Arumpone did if he went against the treaty and were punished, they did not answer and just remained silent. At this moment Arung Palakka arose and protested that he was one of the most important of all the allies but nevertheless a servant of the Company. He asked de Haas if he, Arung Palakka, had ever opposed the treaty which had just been read or had ever misused or abused it in serving the Company. De Haas acknowledged that he had not, and Arung Palakka continued:

. . . If in my conduct I had committed a misdeed against the Company, then certainly you [i.e. the Company and the other allies] could not support me and I would certainly be punished or deposed. I am certain that, as a consequence, you would place your feet on my neck and strongly bring about my downfall.

These words, according to de Haas, made such an impression on the gathered allies that everyone lowered his gaze, not daring to look up. The only other notable occurrence at this meeting was Arung Palakka’s open condemnation of Karaeng Lengkese for refusing to accompany the general allies on the expedition to Lampoko. He recommended that such people deserved to be punished for being “such liars who are accustomed against all truth and generosity to lie to the Company”. De Haas succeeded in calming Arung Palakka so that the meeting could end without any drastic measures being taken against old Karaeng Lengkese (KA 1387c:588v-592r).

Throughout the proceedings Arung Palakka’s total domination of the other allies was clearly evident. Even when Arung Palakka professed his willingness to have them “place their feet on his neck” if he should commit a disservice to the Company, there was none among the local lords bold enough to raise his eyes from the floor for fear of being suspected by Arung Palakka of acquiescence with the suggestion. The allies had seen the examples of Arung Bakkě and Arung Lampoko and were not so imprudent as to give Arung Palakka any cause for suspicion.

So powerful had Arung Palakka become that a public castigation of Karaeng Lengkesse was sufficient to send the latter scurrying to the Dutch in Fort Rotterdam for protection. No one was beyond the reach of Arung Palakka in South Sulawesi unless he were kept safe within the walls of Fort Rotterdam itself.

De Haas' report of the power of Arung Palakka merely confirmed the findings of previous Company officials. There could no longer be any doubt of the wisdom of de Haas' suggestion that the Company concede to Arung Palakka the small requests which had little significance to the Company. By this means it would receive in return the valuable friendship and loyalty of Arung Palakka, and through him, the compliance of the whole of South Sulawesi. The Company was to adopt this suggestion and was duly rewarded with peace in South Sulawesi made possible by Arung Palakka.

The only major threat to peace and the good relations between Arung Palakka and the Company for the remainder of the 17th century came not from South Sulawesi itself but from Sumbawa, an area outside South Sulawesi but within its sphere of influence. It was first drawn into the political orbit of South Sulawesi in the beginning of the 17th century. Between 1618 and 1623 Goa extended its conquests eastward and absorbed all the tiny kingdoms in western Sumbawa, which then became the kingdom of Sumbawa. Bima was conquered some years later in 1633, and the kingdoms of Tambora, Sanggar, and Dompu fell soon thereafter. After the signing of the Bungaya treaty in 1667, the Company deposed the rulers of Bima, Dompu, Sanggar, and Tambora and exiled them to the Moluccas for their assistance to Goa (Nusa Tenggara Barat 1977/78:51-3). In their place were installed rulers who appeared to be friendly to Arung Palakka and the Company. But it soon became apparent that the links with Goa remained strong. Instead of being docile and submissive, these new rulers grew more and more independent as a result of support from the people who approved their rulers' blood ties with Makassar royalty. The ruler of the kingdom of Bima married the daughter of Karaeng Lengkesse, and the ruler of the kingdom of Sumbawa married the sister of Karaeng Tallo (KA 1292b:260r). Marital ties were also forged among the lower princes and nobles. On one occasion in 1685 the ruler of Bima complained that all the Makassar princesses had been recalled to Makassar and had been accompanied by their princely Bima husbands. What upset the ruler of Bima was not the flight of these Makassar princesses but that of their husbands who held

important offices in his kingdom (KA 1303b:123v). While Arung Palakka and the Company had forced the Sumbawa kingdoms to acknowledge their overlordship, they were unable to undo immediately the deep relationships established through more than a half century of intermarriages among the royalty of Sumbawa and Makassar.

Of all the Sumbawa kingdoms only Dompu appeared to have genuinely welcomed Arung Palakka and the Company as overlords and become acknowledged as a faithful ally (Nusa Tenggara Barat 1967/78:53). With the approval of Batavia, the ruler of Dompu even received “robes of honour” from Arung Palakka in 1685 for his service against the Makassar refugees on Sumbawa (KA 1303c:138r). It was therefore with some alarm that the Company and Arung Palakka learned in 1693 that the queen of Dompu had been murdered. The rulers of Dompu and Bima each accused the other of the deed, and the seriousness of the crime was aggravated by the fact that the murdered queen was from the Goa royal house. A meeting of all the allies was called on 19 May 1693 to discuss the problem (KA 1425a:572r-v). The rulers of Bima and Dompu were summoned by President Prins to Makassar and given compounds for their retainers. The ruler of Bima was assigned a place among the people of Galesong just behind Kampong Baru, while the ruler of Dompu was given an area in the Company’s “Grote Tuin” (Large Garden) at the Mandar Syah redoubt (KA 1425b:588r). The Company had decided to provide protection to both these rulers, but especially for the ruler of Bima, since some secret letters intercepted by the Dutch revealed that Arung Palakka believed the ruler of Bima to be guilty. Prins was apparently as convinced of this ruler’s innocence and hoped to prevent his being condemned by the allies (Eerdmans n.d.(a):53).

At the general meeting of the allies, only four witnesses could be found to speak in defence of the ruler of Bima, and he was found guilty by the allies. Prins was displeased by this verdict and asked whether the judgement of the allies should be considered as final. Visibly annoyed by this interjection, Arung Palakka remarked that the Dutch would certainly not have raised any objection if the verdict had been in their favour! Prins asked for time to confer with Batavia since this was the first time ever that the general allies had not agreed with the Company on a major issue. This suggestion only upset Arung Palakka more, and he told Prins that if Batavia were to decide the matter, then no meeting should have been called. No matter how much Prins tried to explain his position, Arung Palakka remained unmollified. Prins, like Hartsink before him, refused to accept the fact that Arung Palakka considered himself the

final arbiter in native affairs. Fearing for the life of the ruler of Bima, Prins decided to move him and his family into Fort Rotterdam. This confirmed Arung Palakka's suspicions that Prins intended to thwart the allies and allow the ruler of Bima to escape unpunished (KA 1425c: 617r-620r).

Another incident which angered Arung Palakka was the attempt by two of Bima's chief ministers to have Fort Rotterdam forward to Batavia three sealed letters from themselves and their ruler. Word of this quickly reached Arung Palakka who saw this as an act of great impertinence. He let it be known that it was clearly against their laws and customs to allow someone like the ruler of Bima, who in the presence of all the allies had been convicted of the murder of the queen of Dompu, to send letters declaring his innocence to the Supreme Government in Batavia. If those in Bima wanted to present material in defence of their ruler, then it should have been presented during the general meeting. Arung Palakka wanted to have the seals broken and the letters read, for he suspected that the letters may have implied that the ruler of Dompu, his principal ally on the island of Sumbawa, was involved in the murder of his wife. The request was refused on the basis that it was against the "Company's old laws and customs". The almost mocking quality of the reply merely reinforced Arung Palakka's dislike of the Company officials in Fort Rotterdam and especially of President Prins (KA 1425d:629r-630v). As in the past when Arung Palakka felt aggrieved by his treatment at the hands of the Company representatives in Fort Rotterdam, he made immediate plans to return to Cenrana. Before his departure he sent a letter remonstrating with the Company on behalf of himself and the allies over the interference of President Prins in the proceedings to determine the murderer of the queen of Dompu (KA 1425d:635r-v).

The letter from Arung Palakka and the allies to Batavia dated 31 October 1693 outlined the recent occurrences in the Dompu affair as they understood them. According to their version of events, it was Prins who had first suggested that a meeting of all the allies be held to determine whether the ruler of Bima or that of Dompu was responsible for the murder of the latter's wife. There were twenty-one rulers representing the allies who met on the 19th and the 26th of August. They decided that the ruler of Bima was guilty of the murder by employing the following criteria to determine guilt:

1. to be seen [in the act] by others;
2. to have one's act seen by others; and
3. to have one's words heard [while committing the act] by others.

All of these factors were demonstrated by the Dompou witnesses to establish the guilt of the ruler of Bima. When those from Bima present at the meeting were called by Prins, they did not deny the charges. They merely said that on the night of the murder the ruler of Bima was asleep on his boat. Insofar as permitting the ruler of Bima to send letters to Batavia after being convicted by the allies, the letter went on to say that never in the period of six presidents in Fort Rotterdam had such a thing occurred without the allies' prior knowledge and approval. The letter then concluded:

. . . We allies have agreed unanimously to avenge the murder as long as this does not countermand the resolutions of the Honourable Company. The fact that our heads are still attached to our bodies, that we have been able to regain our freedom, and that we still are in possession of our kingdoms is primarily because we have not countermanded the orders and resolutions of the Honourable Company (KA 1425e:678v-681r).

Even while declaring their intention of avenging the murder of the queen of Dompou, they were careful to express their continuing loyalty and indebtedness to the Company for their present good fortune.

This reaffirmation of loyalty was considered especially warranted since relations with Fort Rotterdam had deteriorated considerably. Arung Palakka had been distressed by Prins' comment that it would take two or three years to assemble enough evidence to settle the matter. By traditional criteria the ruler of Bima had already been adjudged guilty, but now Prins was ignoring this judgement (KA 1425f:675v-676r). Although Prins had hoped to prevent the ruler of Bima from being punished by the allies who had prejudged his guilt, his stand on the issue further aggravated his already strained relations with Arung Palakka. In a personal letter to Batavia, whose contents were made known to Prins, Arung Palakka protested at Prins' handling of the whole affair:

1. If someone were to plot evil against Arung Palakka, then he [Arung Palakka] should be free to kill that person before the latter killed him . . .
2. If this first [alternative] were not granted, then he [Arung Palakka] should be allowed to go to Batavia "to end his life there as the Company's subject" . . .
3. If neither of the two points were to be approved, then he should be permitted to go and establish his domicile in Bone, "where he would continue to remain a servant of the Company".

If none of these were granted, Arung Palakka warned that nothing good should be expected from him. Despite Arung Palakka's threats, Prins later reported that he was able to dissuade him from taking any drastic

action (KA 1425d:636r-v). Judging from the tone of Arung Palakka's "ultimatum", he merely wished to express his dissatisfaction with Prins in a dramatic manner. He was careful to affirm his loyalty to the Company, even to the point of suggesting that he go to Batavia, to "end his life as a Company subject". He confidently assumed that, as in the past, he would be vindicated by the Company.

On 4 March 1694 President Prins died (KA 1446f:604r). His death eased somewhat the disquiet of the Dutch caused by the deteriorating relations between Prins and Arung Palakka. Nevertheless, reports of people from all quarters being summoned to Cenrana by Arung Palakka were disturbing. A letter from the Company's representative in Bulukumba arrived in Fort Rotterdam stating that much of the Company's lands in Bulukumba had gone unploughed and unsown because many of the Bugis who worked the land were leaving daily for Bone. A trusted native servant of another Dutch official learned from his friends in his home in Mario, Soppeng, that there and elsewhere the people had been ordered by Arung Palakka to be ready to come with their weapons when summoned. Preparations were in progress, so it was reported, for an army of 30,000 men consisting of the Bone Bugis and other allies (with the exception of Maros) to go to Fort Rotterdam to demand that the Dutch surrender the ruler of Bima. If the Dutch officials were to refuse, the ruler of Bima would be seized by force. A trustworthy informant reported that Arung Palakka's messengers had also ordered those of Wajo, Luwu, and Mandar to gather at Cenrana. Similar war summons were delivered to the princes living in the neighbourhood of Fort Rotterdam, and they and their entire families had obeyed. There were still some who remained behind but who intended to follow later because Arung Palakka threatened that those who refused to heed his call would be "sold to buy gunpowder and lead" (KA 1446g:634r-635r).

To determine the truth of these reports and to seek some accommodation with Arung Palakka, the Dutch Council in Fort Rotterdam resolved to send a mission to Cenrana in June 1694. From the very outset Arung Palakka's hostile attitude toward the mission was apparent. The envoy Berghuysen was told that his small knowledge of the Dompu affair could only bring the Company into disrepute. Arung Palakka then went on to claim that, though he and Batavia enjoyed a mutual affection and had each other's interests at heart, there were those who wished to destroy this relationship. When pressed for further information, he revealed that the Dutch *Syahbandar* Joannes Junius and his followers were intent on discrediting Arung Palakka and the allies by

proving the innocence of the ruler of Bima. In all the long years that he had served the Company, Arung Palakka complained, never before had he seen anything so regrettable and disagreeable. What he intended to do now was simply to wait for the new president to re-examine his grievance (KA 1446c:636v-638v; KA 1458a:36-8).

Despite Arung Palakka's initial antagonism toward Berghuysen, the latter remained undaunted. He presented the latest Dutch findings on the murder of the queen of Dompou which he thought would please Arung Palakka. According to the latest evidence, it was the ruler of Tambora who had arranged the murder. The queen of Dompou had apparently insulted the ruler of Tambora by claiming that his subjects were really subjects of Dompou (KA 1446d:639r-v). There had been some justification for the queen's allegations since Tambora was once a part of the kingdom of Dompou. During the Company's troubles with the Sumbawa kingdoms in 1674, the people of Tambora were the first to submit to the Company. As a result they were made an independent kingdom by the Company (KA 1458b:114).

Arung Palakka, however, rejected the accusation that the ruler of Tambora was responsible for the queen of Dompou's murder:

. . . It is impossible that such a brave man (as the ruler of Tambora is), of whom one can only expect good, would commit such a wrong and evil deed. But such a thing could be expected of those of Bima or Dompou, since they are evil-natured people . . . (KA 1458a:39).

He was clearly disappointed by the news of the involvement of Tambora in the whole affair:

. . . I am most amazed at what I hear. You [the Company] came here and restored life to Bone, which had almost been destroyed. For this I can never repay you with money or goods, for God will repay you. However, the kings of Bima and Dompou⁴ have committed a great crime with which they have tried to befoul the other [i.e. the king of Tambora] by looking for a third party. God is my witness, I have never conducted myself in any way or advocated anything but that which was in accordance with our present laws and customs (KA 1446c:639v).

Having made so little progress in his talks with Arung Palakka, Berghuysen attempted the next day to take his leave to return to Makassar. But Arung Palakka would not allow him to depart until he had heard an account of the two general meetings of the allies in 1693. While it was being read, a Dutch member of the mission noted that Arung Palakka's facial expressions gradually changed. When the reading was over, Arung Palakka burst out:

. . . There, now you have heard the truth of what had taken place in the two meetings. The president [Prins] promised me in the presence of my interpreter Lessang (who also confirmed this) that his letter to the Supreme Government of India [i.e. the Company leaders in Batavia] would agree completely with mine. But now I learn that the president has not only misled me but has also given the Honoured Lords [of Batavia] reason to doubt me or consider me a liar.

This outburst was followed by a flood of tears, and it was a half hour later before he was again able to speak:

. . . Do not be amazed to see me crying like this. My heart is full indeed with pent-up emotions. I, who have reached such an old age and have always been held in high regard by the Company, must now in my old days bear the name of a liar. For this I can only thank the president, who is now dead. Now I have become of no use to the Company because of this censure. I intend, therefore, not to assist any more in the deliberations of the officials in the Fort, but to let them govern this land of Makassar as they think fit . . . Upon arrival at the Fort, do not forget above all to report everything you have seen and heard me say (KA 1446d:640v-641r).

If there were any threat implicit in Arung Palakka's words to the Dutch mission, it was his decision to let the Company run its own affairs on the island without the benefit of his counsel. Since the Dutch presence was limited principally to Makassar, with Fort Rotterdam at its hub, and to posts consisting of a few soldiers scattered throughout the Company's lands, the Dutch relied upon Arung Palakka to keep them informed on local developments. The unofficial division of responsibilities of overlordship between the Company and Arung Palakka had also resulted in Arung Palakka's almost sole control over internal matters of South Sulawesi. Without his authority, there was little hope that the Company could effectively establish and maintain the peace among the various kingdoms. When Commissioner de Haas was in Makassar, he recognized the value of Arung Palakka in preserving order and stability in South Sulawesi. He recommended, therefore, that all minor requests from Arung Palakka should be granted to assure his continuing loyalty to the Company.

Renewed troubles in Sumbawa and the need to send a punitive expedition strengthened Batavia's determination to remove the source of friction in its relations with Arung Palakka. The arrival in Makassar of Governor Isaacq van Thije as the replacement for the late President François Prins on 22 January 1695 provided the opportunity to resolve

the deadlock in the Dompou affair. A Dutch mission was again sent to Cenrana, this time under Lieutenant Pieter Scipion. Arung Palakka again voiced his complaints, but it was his wife Daeng Talele who made the stronger impression on the mission. She berated the Dutch for not having taken appropriate action against the ruler of Bima, whom she had raised as a child:

. . . If we merely wished to slander him with this murder, then you could say we are unfair. But the kings of Goa and Tallo with all their nobles know very well that he is the cause of it [the murder of the queen of Dompou]. Why should we wish to blame him for something if it were not true? He is of our own flesh and blood (KA 1458c:5-6).

Despite the protestations by Arung Palakka and Daeng Talele, they were genuinely pleased by the announcement of the arrival of the new governor in Fort Rotterdam. They now hoped that cordial relations with Fort Rotterdam would be re-established thus paving the way for a satisfactory resolution of the problems in Sumbawa.

On 7 March 1695 twelve Bugis lords, the most important of whom was La Patau, appeared in Fort Rotterdam accompanied by some sixty princes to welcome Governor van Thije. They were greeted at the Land Gate of the Fort and conducted through a row of soldiers to the governor's residence. Van Thije met the delegation on the steps and brought them to the anteroom where greetings were exchanged. They all sat around a table and conversed politely while *sirih*, tea, and sweetmeats were served. La Patau then rose and after uttering the required formalities said that he hoped that van Thije would be "the instrument by which all the evil in the land would be purified and that he would work toward the establishment of unity and harmony between the Company and the kingdom of Bone". Having been so graciously welcomed, van Thije was further enheartened by a letter from Arung Palakka later that month stating that though his illness had worsened he would return to Bontoala (KA 1458c:37-42).

On 9th June Arung Palakka arrived in Bontoala and began preparations for a proper welcome for the new governor. Although he was tired from his long journey and was lame on his right side, he was in high spirits and still strongly aware of proprieties. When the governor's wife sent two Dutch ladies on her behalf to Bontoala to welcome Daeng Talele, Arung Palakka was upset and was reported to have said to his wife: "It is different insofar as you are concerned. You are healthy, and it is not proper that the governor's wife should come to you. You yourself should go first to the Fort". It was gestures such as these which caused van Thije

to write to Batavia that Arung Palakka's inward affection for the Company "streams through as bright as sunlight" (KA 1458d:69-78).

The extent to which Arung Palakka was prepared to go to win the affection of the new governor was evident in his sending five palanquins, each borne by eight men, with a retinue of princes to the Fort to bring the governor, his wife, and their party to Bontoala. This was a sign of special favour which had never before been accorded to a Company official in Fort Rotterdam. At Bontoala the Dutch guests were regaled and even given the signal honour of being served personally by Arung Palakka's second wife, Karaeng Laikang. A return visit to Fort Rotterdam was made by Arung Palakka and his principal wife, Daeng Talele, on 24th June to commemorate the victory over Sombaopu in 1669. In accordance with the Company's official procedures for receiving any important local lord, Arung Palakka and Daeng Talele were met by various officials on behalf of the governor at the Land Gate and conducted through a row of honour guards to the governor's residence. Upon arrival at the steps of the residence, the palanquin top was removed and Arung Palakka and Daeng Talele welcomed with the firing of eleven cannon-shots from the ramparts of the Fort. Once the welcome formalities were over, it quickly became apparent that what lay behind the overwhelming display of affection and friendship for van Thije and the Company was a belief that everything would now be set aright.

There was little surprise, therefore, when Arung Palakka raised the issue of the Dompu affair. Van Thije suspected that the only reason that the rulers of South Sulawesi had become so intimately involved in the affairs of Sumbawa was that the queen of Dompu and her son by a previous marriage were of Makassar royalty (KA 1458c:12-13). Since the marriage of La Patau to I Mariama, daughter of Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil, the ties between the royal houses of Bone and Goa had become much closer. A number of subsequent marriages between the noble and princely classes of Bone and Goa had reinforced these ties, causing van Thije to lament the fact that the much heralded "balance" between these two kingdoms established by the Bungaya treaty was now in shambles. But he did go on to say:

. . . it is consoling that this balance has tipped to the right side, to a ruler who considers his greatest fame to be that of having served the Company faithfully for thirty years, and who also regards the benefits he enjoys, all the possessions he has, and his life itself to be due to the Company. Therefore, he and also most of the [Bone court] nobles demonstrate an extraordinarily intimate and passionate, if not feigned, affection for the

Company . . . As long as the Arumpone [Arung Palakka] lives, one need fear no defection or estrangement (KA 1458c:6-14).

Van Thije recognized the importance of Arung Palakka to the Company and had therefore prepared to discuss the issue of the queen of Dompu's murder. He ordered letters written by the Company officials in Fort Rotterdam to Batavia concerning this affair to be read aloud for Arung Palakka's benefit. In one of these letters Chief Merchant Schenkenburg spoke of "the sadness being experienced by Arung Palakka". When Arung Palakka heard these words, tears came to his eyes and he thanked Schenkenburg for writing to Batavia so faithfully about this affair. He added that not only he but the entire people of Bone were thankful. Having said this, he offered his hand to Schenkenburg. The emotional atmosphere of the proceedings and the heartfelt pleas made by Arung Palakka convinced van Thije that the situation could not remain as it was. He wrote immediately to Batavia urging that "the quarrel" between the Company and Arung Palakka be settled as soon as possible to remove any future difficulties arising because of this affair (KA 1458d:78-84).

Finally on 1 July 1695 the Dompu problem was resolved. Van Thije accepted the judgement of the local allies based on the laws of the land that the ruler of Bima was guilty of the murder of his aunt, the queen of Dompu. He was therefore sentenced to exile in Batavia. Once the decision was made known, there was great rejoicing. Daeng Talele herself came to van Thije to tell him that "Bone had almost been strangled, but the governor had set it free". In the euphoric atmosphere of the celebration dinner which followed, Arung Palakka ate well despite his illness and made a number of toasts to the Company, to the leaders of the Company, and to the kingdom of Bone (KA 1458e:89-94).

With the Dompu affair finally settled, van Thije now approached Arung Palakka for assistance in new troubles faced by the Company in Sumbawa. The whole island of Sumbawa had become embroiled in a war which had been instigated by the ruler of Tambora at the end of 1694. Most of the villages of Bima, Dompu, and Pekat had been destroyed in the ruler of Tambora's attempt to make himself master of the whole island. Even though the kingdoms of Bima, Dompu, and Sumbawa could field a joint force 10 to 1 in their favour against Tambora, they were too demoralized and intimidated to put up any effective resistance without the Company's military support (KA 1458f:17-24). And so a small Dutch contingent was sent to Sumbawa, but it made little difference in

the situation. In May 1695 it too came under attack by Tambora in its own fortification in Bima. The Company now looked once again to Arung Palakka for assistance against its enemies (KA 1458d:55-9, 69).

On 21st July van Thije went to Bontoala to discuss this matter with Arung Palakka. He was greeted with all the formalities accorded a royal visitor. About thirty metres from the entrance of Arung Palakka's residence, van Thije was met by Arung Tanete Malolo and Arung Tanete Matoa and conducted up the stairs. He was welcomed at the top of the stairs by Daeng Talele, who then brought him to Arung Palakka. The latter was already sitting on a chair which had been placed on a carpet. Van Thije was placed at the honoured position to the right of Arung Palakka and to the left of Daeng Talele. In front of them on mats sat Arung Palakka's four most important advisers, Arung Tanete Malolo, Arung Tanete Matoa, Arung Meru, and Arung Tanete [Karaeng Agangnionjo].⁵ The lesser princes and nobles sat about ten metres further back. *Sirih* was served, and then news about the latest developments in the war in Sumbawa were discussed. Arung Palakka and his four advisers criticized the people on the island of Sumbawa, especially those of Bima, as "a mendacious and fickle people upon whom one could not depend". They urged that the whole matter be investigated since the ruler of Tambora would not have undertaken such drastic measures without good cause. Van Thije explained that the Dutch had tried to discover the cause, but they could only conclude that the whole thing was due to "the proud, uneasy, and arrogant nature of the ruler of Tambora" (KA 1458b:109-115). But Arung Palakka was not satisfied with this explanation and sent his own envoy to the ruler of Tambora to discuss the matter. He told van Thije that he would wait till the return of his envoy before making a definite decision on sending South Sulawesi fighting men to Sumbawa (KA 1458g:134-5).

Despite Arung Palakka's initial caution, he eventually decided to assist the Company. He was upset to hear that there was a high attrition rate among the Dutch soldiers through illness in the Sumbawa campaign. He blamed the sad state of affairs to the cowardice of the Company's allies on that island and promised to send about 250 men immediately to assist the Dutch forces. The only thing he asked of the Dutch was that they supply these men with bullets and gunpowder, which were in short supply among the Bugis. He assured the Dutch that as soon as his boats at Cenrana were ready, more people would be sent. As the interpreter turned to leave, Arung Palakka called him back and said to him in a weak voice and with tears in his eyes: "Say to my son, the governor, that there

are still more allies with people, weapons, and boats'' (KA 1458h:169).

Because of Arung Palakka's illness, La Patau was made head of the Bone expedition. Arung Tosiada and Anreguru Tojumaat, two of Arung Palakka's most prominent warriors, were made field commanders of the 2,000 Bone troops. Arung Palakka later reported to van Thije that the other allies, especially Goa, Soppeng, Luwu, and Mandar, were also preparing their ships and men to go to Sumbawa. As van Thije explained to Batavia, these large numbers of men were unnecessary for the war on Sumbawa, but these allies had wished to demonstrate their loyalty by following Arung Palakka's example. Arung Palakka, too, had been placed in a delicate position. Though he realized that these troops from the allies would not be needed, he dared not refuse them for fear of conveying an impression of disfavour toward these rulers (KA 1458h:170-1).

Final preparations were made for the oath-giving ceremony, or the *aru*, prior to the embarkation of the allied forces for Sumbawa. Slightly to the east of the redoubt Mandar Syah, a covered pavilion was built some forty metres long and ten metres wide. Carpets and rattan mats were placed on the floor and various expensive canopies were hung from the ceiling. The ceremony took place on 14 September 1695 and was described in fascinating detail by van Thije:

In accordance with the agreement made on the previous day, the principal Queen Putri [i.e. Princess] Daeng Talele, accompanied by the interpreter Karre Lessang, entered the Fort at 6:30 in the morning to get the governor, his wife, and their party. When they arrived at the covered pavilion, they saw before them the entire field of Bontoala covered with armed folk, which at a guess consisted of some 25,000 men, arranged in such good order and rows, such as one could see in an army in Europe formed in battle order, under a multitude of banners, pennants, and standards attached to poles the length of pikes. It provided a pleasant sight. The army of Bone, consisting of about 12,000 men representing the *corps du bataille*, stood facing west or toward the covered pavilion. The Makassar force, about 3,000 men strong, formed the left wing facing the north. But most of it was composed of people from Bone under Tosappewali, the eldest son of Arung Palakka [i.e. La Patau] and appointed to the same office.⁶ The general allies of Mandar, Soppeng, Luwu, Barru, Wajo, Toraja, and others formed the right wing and faced the south. At the very least they were estimated at 10,000 men.

The Golden Umbrella (*Pajumpulawëng*), representing the standard of Bone and decked with a stitched cover hung with gold chains, was brought to the army by the cavalry, which consisted of two standards each with 126 men all provided with yellow saddles and *banju rantai* or

new chainmail armour and armed with decorated lances. They then went and fetched the Arumpone [Arung Palakka] from Bontoala. His Highness sat on an ordinary palanquin accompanied by the ruler of Goa, the second queen [of Arung Palakka] Karaeng Laikang, and a large contingent of queens, princesses, and court maidens, all elegantly adorned with gold chains and armlets, and also splendid trousers with gold cloth, *bodidaars* (?), *moirras*⁷, *allegia*⁸ and similar type cloths, with fine white and thin trailing transparent cloth over it. Upon His Highness's arrival at the pavilion, the respective armies were ordered to come closer until they came to about twenty metres from the pavilion enclosing it from the front and on both sides. After this was done, the various kings and princes who stood before their troops were told in the name of the Arumpone by his interpreter, Karre Lessang, accompanied by the Company's interpreter Jan Ferdinandus, that their paramount chief, the governor, had appeared in the pavilion to receive their oaths of loyalty to the Company. Therefore, they could approach in an orderly manner and do their *kanjar* in turn. This word *kanjar* means the act which they normally employ according to local usage to present their highest testimony of loyalty.⁹ The most important among them came forth modestly with shield and lance to the pavilion. Then they threw the shields down and stuck their lances into the ground. Having tied two weapons to the hip, namely a kris, or a short dagger, and a sword, they quickly unsheathed the latter, it being the larger, and sprang up into the air with passion and fury as if in a mad frenzy declaring with total earnestness in between shouts and springs into the air that they would remain faithful to the Company and would live or die with it. Each one of them said whatever came into his mouth, according to his own language and intentions, the one longer than the other. It appears that it would not be possible for them to express such thoughts if their ecstasy vanished and they were sober. But everything comes out all right with its meaning. Having performed this, they then picked up their weapons and modestly returned to their positions.

The order of swearing before the governor at the pavilion was the Arung Palakka [La Patau]'s two sons, aged seven and five . . ., which young princes wearing arms, chainmail armour, golden helmets, and the double weapons (kris and sword) performed their task beautifully. The first who began the act was the Somba ri Goa [Sultan Abdul Jalil], who jumped down from the pavilion and, after having completed his duty, went back up again and sat down on the carpet beside the governor . . . Then Karaeng Bontosunggu, alias Raja Tua [*Tuma'bicara-butta*], the second in the kingdom of Goa; then came Arung Palakka [La Patau], Karaeng Agangnionjo [Karaeng Tanete], Arung Meru, Arung Teko, Arung Tosiada, Anreguru Tojumaat [all Bone nobles]; and then the Makassar ones Karaeng Lekobodong, Karaeng Mangalle, Karaeng Jarannikka (the field commander); then the other kings and princes of Bone and then of Goa. There were some who did the *kanjar* twice, once for themselves, and once for the place which they controlled through inheritance or marriage.¹⁰

There then followed the princes of the allies such as Mandar, Soppeng, Luwu, Ajattapparəng, Sawitto, Layo, etc., and those of Wajo and Toraja closed the procession. This ceremony lasted about three hours. Although the Arumpone was very weak and in pain, he received the *kanjar* from those of Bone and Goa and the most important of the other allies in his open palanquin, now sitting and now lying, but throughout it all weeping tears of joy. No longer able to bear it, he left the Somba ri Goa and the Arung Tanete Matoa in his place and took leave from the governor. He was borne back to Bontoala accompanied by his second queen, his bodyguards, and the cavalry.

Extraordinarily splendid was the entire spectacle, and those of Bone shone above all the others. The large majority wore golden helmets, as well as krisses, swords, lances and spears. Arung Palakka [La Patau]'s helmet had about six to eight pounds of gold set with diamonds and rubies. He wore around his neck outside his splendid chainmail armour bordered with beaten gold a large gold chain with the medallion which had been presented to his uncle the Arumpone [Arung Palakka] by the Company in 1672, along with the medallion for His Highness's heroic deeds in Pariaman in 1666. Many wore silk stockings of various colours but without shoes. There were also many among the allies wearing helmets with two golden horns sticking out, and helmets which represented buffaloes with white horses' tails hanging behind.

Those of Wajo and Toraja, being the poorest and humblest among the allies, were also nicely dressed. Most of them wore around their heads bunches of black feathers two handspans high and around their necks strands of wild boar's teeth strung together. There were those among them who with their wild and beautiful capers made the spectators laugh.¹¹

The most important kings swore their oath of loyalty while the cymbals (*tatabuang*)¹², the clarinets¹³, and the gongs played, and the bystanders clapped their hands to the beat and the sound of the music.¹⁴ The troops under the command of the person completing his oath of loyalty then fired their guns. Others of less prominence gave their oaths two by two, and sometimes even three or four at a time. But this cost the life of one of the Bulukumba princes unluckily struck under his left breast by his nephew who was jumping around with his sword. He [the prince] was in such a frenetic state that he was not aware of it until he was returning to his people and fell down bloodied and gave up the ghost.

Many of the troops in the Bone regiment were neatly outfitted. There was one whole company mounted with golden helmets, swords, and krisses. Nine large companies, each with 150 men, had special uniforms. There were three in red, three in yellow, and three in red-yellow. His Highness's bodyguard was also in yellow with chainmail armour and golden helmets, part of them furnished with lances and shields and all with firelock and with double rounds of ammunition.

The soldiers were then dismissed and went off in order . . . The South Sulawesi nobles and the Dutch were then feasted. At the end Arung Palakka sent his interpreter Karre Lessang to the gathering with the

message that “he had now achieved what he had long sought, the joyful renewal and confirmation of the marriage between the Honourable Company and the allies” (KA 1458h:171-9).

This impressive spectacle was a convincing demonstration of loyalty to the Company. But more important it was a glowing tribute to Arung Palakka’s efforts to unite the peoples of South Sulawesi under his banner. He viewed the proceedings with intense emotion because for him this was the finest manifestation of the fruits of thirty years labour. During this period he had succeeded in maintaining the confidence and alliance of the Company – if not always with the Company’s representatives in Fort Rotterdam, then at least with the Company’s leaders in Batavia. The belief that the Company would intervene if necessary to maintain Arung Palakka’s position was widely-held throughout South Sulawesi, thereby contributing further to his image of invincibility. He could influence the choice of rulers in various kingdoms with impunity and appeared capable now of compelling the acceptance of his own chosen heir. But Arung Palakka was only too aware that the nature of his support could not easily be transmitted to his successor. His *upě* and the Toangke were two personal sources of power which could not be re-created for the benefit of anyone else. Another was the legend which grew around his war exploits which enhanced his prestige and hence his influence among the people of South Sulawesi. A further cause for concern was La Patau’s own capabilities. In private the Dutch had considered him to be “unsuitable to govern since he is foolish, cruel, lecherous, and niggardly . . .” (KA 1469a:58).

Faced with such difficulties, Arung Palakka realized that much had to be done before his death to assure the survival of not only La Patau but also of all of his dreams for the future course of South Sulawesi. The creation of a “family bond” among the kingdoms of Bone, Goa, Luwu, and Soppeng was a major step in the right direction. Another achievement was the development of La Patau’s image as a warrior. In 1683 La Patau was made commander of the allied expedition to Toraja and was again awarded this honour for the campaign in Sumbawa in 1695. Though La Patau acquitted himself adequately, his exploits were not those to excite mythmakers. Nevertheless, he had proved to be competent and capable of leading his armies. Another significant victory was gaining the approval and support of the Company. With the outbreak of war in Sumbawa at the end of 1694, and the problems faced by the Company in re-establishing its authority there, all minor differences

which had marred the good relations between Arung Palakka and the Company were set aside. The Company needed Bugis troops, and Arung Palakka complied. As in the past these Bugis troops were to prove invaluable, reminding the Company of its need to preserve such a profitable arrangement with Arung Palakka's heir. The Company came quickly to the realization that La Patau, like Arung Palakka before him, was an essential part of its own security in the archipelago. Finally, the local lords and people had to be convinced of La Patau's ability to keep the peace. Toward this end Arung Palakka had created a precedent of power and authority exercised by a single local overlord with the blessings and support of the Company. It was this precedent which established a style of governance familiar to South Sulawesi, hence enabling La Patau to rule as effectively as his great predecessor. By 1695 Arung Palakka could rest assured that most of the difficulties facing La Patau's succession had been surmounted.

Though beset with a recurring illness which had crippled his right side, Arung Palakka continued to amaze the Dutch doctors by recovering from several seemingly fatal attacks. It was as though he had willed himself against death until he was satisfied that he had done everything in his power to assure the safe and successful transition of his successor. Van Thije described Arung Palakka in late August 1695 as "an old secretive man who occupies himself with trifles of little importance while lending his ears to sycophants; and from his deathbed he rules with such authority and is obeyed without opposition as ever a sovereign could wish to do, not only over his lawful subjects but also over the alleged allies" (KA 1458c:61). But after the satisfying display of his authority in the oath-giving ceremony of all the allies in September 1695, Arung Palakka must have decided that his work was done. While all around him was feverish activity in preparation for the expedition to Sumbawa, Arung Palakka occupied himself with something totally different. On his orders an unusually large pavilion was erected in Goa expressly, so it was said, to have the "castrated or scandalous young men of Goa"¹⁵ dance, sing, and pray for the restoration of his health. This and other types of ceremonies became daily occurrences in Bontoala. Sometimes Moslem religious officials dressed in straw sacks would come and pray at Arung Palakka's bedside and hang written magical formulas above his head. For this and other local curative practices, Arung Palakka expended a great deal of money. Once he had to ask Daeng Talele to go to Fort Rotterdam to pawn a gold chain weighing some 37½ taels in order for him to buy medicines (KA 1458i:62).¹⁶

Despite treatment by both the Company doctors and the native ones, there was no improvement in Arung Palakka. His diary in the last year and a half of his life is principally a record of his deteriorating condition. For example the first three entries in January 1695 are:

3 January 1695: My illness is very severe.

8 January 1695: At six (o'clock) I was very ill.

21 January 1695: I am beginning to feel a strong pain in my stomach (L-31:58v).

The beginning of the end seemed to have arrived a year later where, under the date 12 January 1696 in his diary, were the words: "I have begun to swell up". Then under 6 April 1696 is the simple entry: "Torisompae ["He who is given obeisance", the title by which Arung Palakka was also known] Matinroe ri Bontoala ["He who had passed away (lit. "slept") in Bontoala", which is Arung Palakka's posthumous title] had departed [this world] at 12:00 [noon]" (L-31:59v).

Contemporary notes made by Governor van Thije in Fort Rotterdam provide a fuller account of Arung Palakka's death. In the early morning of Friday, 6 April 1696, rumours spread throughout the area that Arung Palakka, who was critically ill in bed, had died. The Company's interpreter recently returned from Bontoala brought this news to van Thije which he himself had already heard from the Gëllarëng Sancerrë', Arung Palakka's regent in Bontoala. However at 9:00 a.m. Arung Palakka's own interpreter Karre Lessang arrived in Fort Rotterdam saying that Arung Palakka was alive but in a very bad way. At 10:30 a.m. he again returned requesting in the names of the rulers of Goa and Luwu that the governor send his chief surgeon to feel Arung Palakka's pulse. Two Dutch doctors and an interpreter went immediately to Arung Palakka's bedside and returned shortly after 11:00 a.m. with the report that the end was very near. Finally about midday Karre Lessang came once again to Fort Rotterdam and said in Malay with great emotion and with tears in his eyes: "*Tuan punya bapak sudah hilang* (Your father has departed)." Arung Palakka, he said, had died at 11:30 that morning. At 4:00 p.m. that same afternoon some envoys again came to van Thije to say that the nobles of the land intended to bury Arung Palakka's body at 7:00 the next morning in Goa by the graves of the old kings. This burial place had been designated by Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil even though Arung Palakka was not of the Makassar royal family (KA 1469b:68-72). Since custom dictated that a deceased ruler could not be removed from his residence until his successor was chosen, La Patau was immediately elected by the *Aruppitu*. The next morning a Bone delega-

tion went to inform the Dutch of the new Arumpone while preparations went ahead for Arung Palakka's burial.

Final arrangements were being made even before the official Bone delegation had gone to the Fort. At 6:30 in the morning van Thije sent three official representatives of the Company with some sixty-two men on horseback to Bontoala to participate in the funeral procession. The body was brought from the royal residence to the bier, with the greater part of the way covered with white linen. The body itself was wrapped from head to foot with linen and placed on top of the bier. It was then covered with all manner of beautiful cloths. At the top of the bier was La Patau surrounded by court maidens with fans and Moslem officials all weeping and shouting. In the background tolled the bells which began at 7:00 in the morning and continued for two hours. As the procession went by one of Fort Rotterdam's redoubts, seven shots were fired, and later when it passed the Fort itself, another seventeen cannon shots went off in salute. The bier was borne by a large number of people who took turns carrying the load because of the difficulty in walking on the muddy roads. Behind the bier came the Dutch cavalry at the head of which were the Company officials, the Kapitan China, and various others, including some Company personnel who volunteered for the procession out of curiosity. At about 11:00 a.m. the procession entered the burial grounds in Goa. The body was then laid in a coffin and placed in a hole cut in the side of the grave. The hole was blocked up by a wooden plank and the grave filled with dirt. Ten white umbrellas were placed around the grave. With the firing of three salvos by the Dutch brigade, the ceremony ended (KA 1469c:73-4).

The death of Arung Palakka did not mean the demise of his policies. He had instituted wide-ranging changes in South Sulawesi society which were to have repercussions within the society for generations to come. It was during his long lifetime that a mutually beneficial arrangement was developed between Bone and the Company. Arung Palakka assumed responsibilities over internal affairs while the Company concerned itself with trade and the external relations of the island. By this arrangement the Company profitted by having Arung Palakka willingly contribute his troops to assist in wars in Java and Sumbawa where the South Sulawesi connection could be established. In return the Company discreetly avoided direct interference with Arung Palakka's governance of South Sulawesi. This policy assured Arung Palakka and his successors of unquestioned dominance within South Sulawesi long after his death.

From his position of strength, Arung Palakka was able to arrange judicious marriages for his heir La Patau and thereby fulfil a long-held ambition of having the whole of South Sulawesi ruled by members of his own family. To this day local rulers aspire to link their names to La Patau as the first genuine, full-blooded royalty in South Sulawesi from whom all later royal lines are descended. Although the kingdoms remained proudly separate, the rulers were now related so intimately that the ruler of one often could justifiably become the ruler of another kingdom. The close blood relationships among the royal families helped ameliorate the enmities among their peoples and prevented ever again the intense hatred which characterized the relationships between the Bugis of Bone and Soppeng and the Makassar people of Goa and Tallo, especially during the Makassar War of 1666-9. Arung Palakka had achieved what no other ruler before him had done: a unity of South Sulawesi ruled in effect by one royal family. If Arung Palakka had done nothing else during his lifetime, this accomplishment would have ensured his place as one of the greatest rulers in the history of South Sulawesi. No greater praise could have been given to him than that of a *lontara*' scribe who wrote:

Arung Palakka obeyed the laws strictly, supported the *adat*, established a strong and trustworthy government, was true to his promise and fair in his behaviour. Thus the crops and the animals flourished . . . Under Arung Palakka there was no confusion, the people were safe and secure (L-1:78-9).

CHAPTER XII

THE LEGACY

On 18th April at midday a delegation consisting of six of the most prominent *Aruppitu* of Bone and the Bontoala regent Gëllarëng Sancerrë' came to Fort Rotterdam. It informed Governor van Thije that the *Aruppitu* had elected La Patau as Arumpone in conformity with the wishes of their late ruler, Arung Palakka. Van Thije acknowledged the announcement and told the delegation he would inform Batavia so that approval could be granted. This reply was received coldly, and the spokesman for the delegation said tersely: "We had not come to consult about the matter of the election, but merely to inform you of it." Van Thije recognized the futility and even danger of attempting to thwart the choice of the Bone *Aruppitu*, and so he and the Dutch Council in Fort Rotterdam gave their approval to the election. Since they had countermanded a direct order from Batavia dated 29 February 1696 to seek its approval for the election of a new Arumpone, they told Batavia of their decision with the following explanation:

. . . the Company, as a result of its treaties, especially that of Bungaya, is no more than one ally, although it is considered the head, and is not empowered nor qualified to vote for a king, even less to disapprove of an election – and especially this one (KA 1469a:58-62).

There was nothing that Batavia could do but accept the decision, but it feared nevertheless that no one, even Arung Palakka's own hand-picked successor, would be able to maintain the same peace and security in South Sulawesi that had been achieved by Arung Palakka during his lifetime.

When van Thije explained that Batavia's orders had been issued solely with the interests of Bone and its alliance with the Company at heart, the delegation appeared pacified. It then responded graciously with the words: "We will always acknowledge the friendship of the Company, for we have been released from bondage and made free by the Honourable Company." With the initial misunderstanding now forgotten, van Thije informed the delegation of Arung Palakka's "Last Will and Testament" which had been found among some of the secretary's papers. It had been

written in both Bugis and Malay and then translated into Dutch. The date of the document was uncertain, but it was thought to have been made more than twenty years before because it was written in the hand of a former secretary, Willem Bastinck, who left Makassar in 1676. On 18 May 1686, during the presidency of Willem Hartsink, Arung Palakka's "Last Will and Testament" was brought out and again authenticated. Another copy was made the following day and authorized with the seal of the Arumponne [Arung Palakka] in the Malay and Bugis scripts. The only alteration in the will since the re-authentication in 1686 was the cession to Arung Palakka's niece, the present wife of Datu Luwu's eldest son, the area of Pattiro in Bone, which, together with the village Babuae, had been originally willed to one of Arung Palakka's sisters. Since there were no other changes which anyone was aware of, the entire document was read aloud to the Bone delegation:

If the merciful hand of God Almighty should kindly pass his rightful judgement upon me, which is irreversible, and deprive me of this life, no one has the right, nor the power, to administer my wife [Daeng Talele], house and estate except the Honourable Company, which is closer to her, except for Goa and myself. And to the Company she is like one free born. Furthermore, she has placed all her trust in me. Therefore, I would wish that no one will interfere with her after my death except the Company.

With regard to my golden umbrella, two large gold chains and medallions, and the gold kris La Suni studded with diamonds, it is my wish that they be given to the President residing in Fort Rotterdam in Makassar to be dispensed with according to his wishes, whether to be sent to Batavia to remain as my memorial to the Company or to be presented to the person who succeeds to my position (KA 1469d:67).¹

Now there still remains Bantaeng and Lamuru, as well as my other smaller items – household effects and clothes, gold, silver, jewels, etc. All of these have come to me solely from the Company. But I propose that after my death these be considered as having been "consumed", for if these above-mentioned gifts, in a manner of speaking, had been food, they would certainly have been consumed; and were they clothes, they would have also certainly been worn out. Therefore, I say that all of it belongs to Daeng Talele and is her very own. It may please her to share these things with Daeng Marannu [Karaeng Laikang, daughter of Karaeng Bontomarannu, Arung Palakka's second wife], but she is not obliged to do so.

With regard to Pattiro and Babuae, being two communities which have come to me through inheritance, after my death they will have to choose a lord from among my four sisters. Whoever they choose shall have the inheritance of the two areas as her own. No one is entitled to these possessions except one of my four sisters who belong to the family

of my grandfather who died at Bantaeng [Arumpone La Těnrirua, Matinroe ri Bantaeng] whose inheritance has come down to me.

The settlement of Amali, which has come to me through the death of Arung Amali La Sekati, will again return to whomever among the family of Arung Amali La Sekati most entitled to it. They [the people of Amali] will then accept him as their king.

There now remain some settlements in Bone which were conquered by force when I was in command on behalf of the Company. They are Pattampidange, Ata Lamuru, Bulo-Bulo, along with their appendages and dependencies. These, therefore, are to be placed at the Company's disposition. As I have said, I had jurisdiction over these places only on behalf of the Company. Therefore, if God Almighty should be so kind as to visit me with death, no one except the Company will be able to exercise this overlordship.

The Last Will and Testament was dated 18 May 1686 and signed by Nicholaas Blom, Secretary. Impressed on it was a black seal with the words in Arabic characters saying, "This seal is the signature of Arumpone or Sultan Sa'aduddin [Arung Palakka's Arabic title]" (KA 1469e: 75-81).² The document precisely encapsulated Arung Palakka's credo during the thirty years which he influenced affairs in South Sulawesi.

Contrary to the Company's expectations, the transition of power from Arung Palakka to La Patau was a peaceful one. In a tone of incredulity mixed with relief, the Council at Fort Rotterdam sent this secret report to Batavia on 17 July 1696:

. . . The Bone court . . . since the death of the old king [Arung Palakka] and succession of the new [La Patau] has conducted itself in an extraordinarily peaceful fashion. To this day not the least opposition has been heard from either the electors [the *Aruppitu*], the lesser nobles, or the allies. Furthermore, the young king lately known as La Patau, more recently called Arung Palakka, and now with the title of Arumpone, is sufficiently well-established on the throne because he has followed the advice of the Governor [van Thije] and shown himself to be polite and amicable. He has especially availed himself of the advice of his uncle [Arung Palakka]'s old and experienced councillors and nobles of the land (KA 1469f:83-4).

Arung Palakka had done his work well and enabled La Patau to inherit his power and authority with no serious opposition within South Sulawesi.

In other significant ways Arung Palakka had left his legacy to South Sulawesi. Through his long overlordship he was able to overcome the centrifugal forces inherent in the traditional political units. In the past the strength of the individual *Tomanurung* and *gaukěng* traditions had preserved the uniqueness and the political independence of a large

number of small states in South Sulawesi. While they continued to retain their separate entities, as evidenced by the elaborate treaty ceremonies reaffirming their basic rights to choice of ruler, customs, and processes of law, they were no longer immune to Arung Palakka's encroachments on these privileges. He had developed a special relationship of trust and support with the powerful Dutch East India Company which in time became translated into an implicit division of power in South Sulawesi. Arung Palakka was thus able to use his influence effectively among the local states because they believed that the Company would ultimately support Arung Palakka if he were challenged by any individual or state. The Company's feeble protests at the ignominious assassination of Arung Bakkè Todani, one of its strongest supporters in South Sulawesi, highlighted its commitment to Arung Palakka. This message was never lost to the people of South Sulawesi. Therefore, while Arung Palakka was circumspect in outwardly respecting the basic privileges of a state, he had but to indicate his pleasure to assure the election of a friendly or trustworthy ruler or the adoption or rejection of a particular course of action. By the end of the 17th century the whole of South Sulawesi came to act as one body, as was so impressively demonstrated by the oath-giving ceremony of the local armies in Makassar in 1695. Arung Palakka had arrested the particularistic tendencies of local states and forced them to share his dream of a united South Sulawesi. But in the process of achieving this goal, Arung Palakka had been the direct and indirect cause of the flight of many thousands from the island seeking refuge from his power. These refugee groups came to exert great and continuing influence on many kingdoms throughout the Malay-Indonesian archipelago and Siam. Arung Palakka was now forced to extend the political vision of the South Sulawesi overlord to embrace whatever lands his people had gone to begin new lives.

In a period of thirty years Arung Palakka had welded a unity among the South Sulawesi states, established in effect a single royal family linked by blood to his successor La Patau, and created the conditions whereby many South Sulawesi princes and their followers were forced to seek homes abroad with lasting consequences for the history of the area. This was the heritage which Arung Palakka bequeathed not only to South Sulawesi but to the whole of the Malay-Indonesian archipelago.

APPENDIX A

**RULERS OF THE MAJOR KINGDOMS IN SOUTH SULAWESI
IN THE 17TH CENTURY**

GOA (Karaeng Goa)

14. Sultan Alauddin Tumenanga ri Gaukanna (1593-1639)
 15. Sultan Malikussaid Tumenanga ri Papambatuna (1639-1653)
 16. Sultan Hasanuddin Tumenanga ri Balla'pangkana (1653-1669)
 17. Sultan Amir Hamzah Tumammalianga ri Allu' (1669-1674)
 18. Sultan Mohammad Ali (Karaeng Bisei) Tumenanga ri Jakattara (1674-1677)
 19. Sultan Abdul Jalil (Karaeng Sanrabone) Tumenanga ri Lakiung (1677-1709)
- (Principal sources Abdurrazak 1969b; Koloniaal Archief (KA))

BONE (Arumpone)

10. We Tënrituppu Matinroe ri Sidenreng (1590-c. 1606)
 11. La Tënrihua Matinroe ri Bantaeng (1607-1608)
 12. La Tënripale Matinroe ri Tëllo (1608-1626)
 13. La Ma'darëmmëng Matinroe ri Bukaka (1626-1643)
 14. Tobala', Arung Tanete Riawang, made regent by Goa (1643-1660)
 15. La Ma'darëmmëng Matinroe ri Bukaka (1667-1672)
 16. La Tënritatta (Arung Palakka) Matinroe ri Bontoala' (1672-1696)
 17. La Patau Matinroe ri Nagaulëng (1696-1714)
- (Principal sources Bakkers 1866; Matthes 1864; Koloniaal Archief (KA))

WAJO (Arung Matoa Wajo)

14. La Mangkace' (c. 1567-c. 1607)
15. La Sangkuru (c. 1607-c. 1610)
16. La Mappepulu (c. 1612-c. 1616)
17. La Samalewa (c. 1616-c. 1621)
18. La Pakallongi (c. 1621-1626)
19. Topassaunngge (c. 1627-1628)
20. La Pakallongi (1628-1636)

21. To Udamang Matinroe ri Batana (1636-1639)
 22. La Isigajang Matinroe ri Patilla (1639-1643)
 23. La Makkaraka Matinroe ri Panngaranna (1643-1648)
 24. La Tëmmasongé' (1648-1651)
 25. La Parëmma' Matinroe ri Passirinna (1651-1658)
 26. La Tënriilai (1658-1670)
 27. La Palili (1670-1679)
 28. La Pariusi Matinroe ri Bulu'na (1679-1699)
 29. La Tënrisëssu' (1699-1702)
- (Principal source Abdurrazak 1965)

SOPPENG (Datu Soppeng)

14. Beowe (reigning at the time of the defeat of Soppeng by Goa in 1609 in the Islamic Wars) (c. 1609-c. 1659)
 15. La Tënribali Matinroe ri Datunna (c. 1659-1676)
 16. Towesa Matinroe ri Salassana (c. 1676-1691)
 17. We Adda Matinroe ri Madëllo (1691-1705)
 18. Towesa Matinroe ri Salassana (1705-1707)
- (Principal sources Matthes 1864; Koloniaal Archief (KA); genealogy owned by Datu Ghalib in Ujung Pandang)

LUWU (Datu Luwu/Pajung ri Luwu)

14. Sultan Muhammad Waliyu Musahiruddin Matinroe ri Waré' (Late 16th century-early 17th century)
 15. Sultan Abdullah Muhidin Matinroe ri Malangke (early 17th century-1637)
 16. Sultan Ahmad Nazaruddin Matinroe ri Goa (1637-1662)
 17. Sultan Mohammad Muhidin, Daeng Massuro, Matinroe ri Tompo-tikka' (1662-end 1675?)
 18. Daeng Mattuju (end 1675?-Sept. 1676)
 19. Sultan Mohammad Muhidin, Daeng Massuro, Matinroe ri Tompo-tikka' (1676-1704)
- (Principal sources Matthes 1864; Braam-Morris 1889; Koloniaal Archief (KA))

APPENDIX B

THE BUNGAYA TREATY OF 18 NOVEMBER 1667 *

1. The treaty signed between Karaeng Popo, plenipotentiary of the government in Makassar [Goa] and the Governor-General and Council of the Indies in Batavia on 19 August 1660 and that between the Makassar government and Jacob Cau as Commissioner of the Company on 2 December 1660 shall be observed.
2. All European officials and subjects of the Company who have fled recently or in the past and still live in and around Makassar shall be delivered to the Admiral [Speelman] without delay.
3. All remaining ship equipment, cannons, specie, and other goods which had been taken from the *Walvisch* at Selayar and the *Leeuwin* on Don Duango shall be returned to the Company.
4. All those persons found guilty of the murder of various Dutchmen in different places shall receive prompt and appropriate justice before the Dutch Resident.
5. The king and nobles of Makassar shall pay the indemnity and all debts still owing to the Company by the next season at the latest.
6. All Portuguese and English shall be expelled from Makassar territory and never again be admitted to live here or carry on trade. No European nation will be allowed to enter or conduct trade in Makassar.
7. The Company alone shall have free trade and commerce in Makassar. No "Indian" nations, whether "Moors" [Indian Muslims], Javanese, Malays, Acehnese, or Siamese shall be allowed to bring to market any Coromandel, Surat, Persian, or Bengal cloths and wares or any Chinese goods since only the Company will be allowed to do this. All offenders shall be punished and have their goods confiscated by the Company.
8. The Company shall be exempt from all import and export tolls and duties.
9. The government and subjects of Makassar may not sail anywhere but to Bali, the Java coast, Jakarta, Banten, Jambi, Palembang, Johor, and Borneo and must obtain passes from the Dutch Commander here. Those without passes shall be considered as enemies and shall be treated as such. No ships shall be sent to Bima, Solor, Timor, etc., anywhere east of the Hook of Lasso, north or east of

* This is an abridged translation of the treaty as cited in Stapel 1922: 237-247.

- Borneo, Mindanao or the islands in the vicinity, on pain of forfeiting both life and goods.
10. All fortifications along the coastline of Makassar shall be destroyed: Barombong, Pa'nakkukang, Garassi, Mariso, Boro'boso. Only Sombaopu may be allowed to remain standing for the king.
 11. The Ujung Pandang fort shall be delivered to the Company in good order, along with the village and land belonging to it.
 12. Dutch coinage such as those used in Batavia shall be valid in Makassar.
 13. The king and nobles shall send the value of 1,000 men and women slaves, reckoned at 2½ taels or 40 Makassar gold *mas* each, to Batavia. Half shall be sent in June and the rest in the following season at the latest.
 14. The king and nobles of Makassar shall henceforth not interfere in the land of Bima and its territories.
 15. The Raja Bima and Karaeng Bontomarannu shall be delivered to the Company for punishment.
 16. All those taken from the Sultan of Butung in the last Makassar attack shall be returned. Compensation shall be paid for those who have since died or are unable to be returned.
 17. To the king of Ternate shall also be restored all those people taken from the Sula Islands and some cannons and guns. Goa shall abandon all pretensions to overlordship over the islands of Selayar and Pansiano [Muna], the whole east coast of Celebes from Menado to Pansiano, the Banggai and Gapi Islands and others on the same coast, and the lands between Mandar and Menado, which in the past have belonged to the crown of Ternate.
 18. Goa shall renounce all overlordship over the lands of the Bugis and Luwu. The old king of Soppeng [La Tënribali] and all his lands and people shall be set free, as well as other Bugis lords held prisoner in Makassar territory and women and children still held by the ruler of Goa.
 19. The kings of Layo, Bangkala, and the whole of Turatea and Bajing and their lands shall be acknowledged as free.
 20. All lands conquered by the Company and its allies, from Bulu-Bulu to Turatea, and from Turatea to Bungaya, shall remain Company lands by right of conquest.
 21. The lands of Wajo, Bulu-Bulu, and Mandar shall be abandoned by the Goa government which shall never again assist them with people, weapons, etc.
 22. All Bugis and Turatea men who have married Makassar women, and all Makassar men who have married Bugis or Turatea women, may keep their wives. Henceforth, any Makassar person hoping to live with the Bugis or Turatea people, or any Bugis or Turatea person hoping to live with the Makassar people, may only do so with the permission of the lawful lord and king concerned.
 23. The Goa government shall keep its land closed to all other nations [except the Dutch]. It shall also come to the Company's assistance

- against its enemies in and around Makassar.
24. There shall be friendship and an alliance of the kings and nobles of Makassar and the kings of Ternate, Tidore, Bacan, Butung, Bugis [Bone], Soppeng, Luwu, Turatea, Layo, Bajing, Bima, and other lords and rulers who in the future may request to enter this alliance.
 25. In any dispute between the allies, the Captain of the Dutchmen [i.e. the president or governor of Fort Rotterdam] shall be asked to mediate. If one party should disregard the mediation, then shall the general allies take appropriate action.
 26. When this peace treaty is signed, sworn, and sealed, then shall the king and nobles of Makassar send two important lords with the Admiral [Speelman] to Batavia to present the treaty to the Governor-General and Council of the Indies. If the treaty should be approved, the Governor-General may hold two important princes as hostages as long as he sees fit.
 27. Further to Article 6, the English and all their goods in Makassar shall be brought to Batavia.
 28. Further to Article 15, if the Raja Bima and Karaeng Bontomarranu should not be found alive or dead within ten days, then the sons of these two lords shall be held as security.
 29. The Goa government shall pay an indemnity of 250,000 *rijksdaalders* in five successive seasons, whether in cannons, goods, gold, silver, or jewels.
 30. The king of Makassar and his nobles, the Admiral on behalf of the Company, and all the kings and princes included in his alliance swore, signed, and sealed the treaty in the name of the Holy Lord on Friday, 18 November 1667.

GLOSSARY

- adat*: customs, traditions, common practices.
- alcatif*: a carpet with a long pile.
- allegia/allegae/alachae*: striped piece goods made of cotton and silk in Gujerat and of cotton in Coromandel.
- anakarung/anakkaraeng*: “princes”, born of a ruler and his royal or non-royal wives.
- aru*: oath-giving ceremony in which the person jumps up with kris or sword in hand and swears his loyalty to his lord.
- Arumpon*: Ruler/Lord of Bone.
- arung*: Bugis for lord, ruler.
- Aruppitu*: “The Seven Lords”, the name of the Advisory Council in Bone and successor to the *Matoa Pitu*.
- atap*: palm-frond used for roof-thatching.
- bahar*: from the Sanskrit *bhara*, “a load”. A weight used in large trading transactions varying according to the goods being weighed and the area where it is being used. In the Indonesian area it is often estimated to be about three *picul* or about 170 kilogrammes.
- ballo'*: fermented drink made from the aren palm, the lontar palm, or the nipa palm.
- banawa*: a kind of ship used to transport cattle and horses.
- bate-bate*: a Makassar prince, ruler of a small area or principality.
- Bate Salapang*: “The Nine Banners”, the name of the Advisory Council in Goa.
- bicara*: processes of law.
- bilu'*: a type of warship.
- bissu*: pre-Islamic holy men and women revered in Bugis-Makassar communities as being intermediaries between the spirit world and the world of man.
- catty*: measure of weight about 600 grammes.
- core-core*: female *bissu*.
- Daeng Kalula*: one of the early titles of a community head in Bone.
- Datu*: ruler; title used by the rulers of Soppeng and Luwu.

- Dewata*: general name for the pre-Islamic deity.
- gantang*: 3½ kilogrammes.
- gaukěng/gaukang*: sacred objects around which the original Bugis-Makassar communities formed. They are considered to be the palladium of the community.
- gěllarěng/gallarang*: head of a village or an area.
- Hadat*: Advisory Council.
- I La Galigo*: earliest known Bugis epic originating from Luwu.
- jennang*: regent.
- kafir*: “unbeliever [in the faith of Islam]”.
- kali*: chief Islamic official in a kingdom or state.
- kanjar/kannjara*: dancing with drawn swords or krisses and swearing the oath in the *aru* ceremony.
- karaeng*: Makassar for lord, ruler.
- kawěrang*: literally, a bundle of rice stalks tied together. Term used to designate the original union of seven states which came to form the core of the kingdom of Bone.
- konting*: a native fishing boat.
- kris*: a native dagger.
- last*: a Dutch *last* was about two tons or about 2,000 kilogrammes.
- Latoa*: a Bugis “Mirror of Kings” representing the wisdom of the ages and serving as a guide to good government.
- lesung*: a hollowed-out log where the rice ears are pounded to remove the husk.
- Mado*: one of the early titles of a community head in Bone.
- Makkědangetana*: “Spokesman of the Land”, the most important official position in the kingdom of Bone next to the ruler, often likened to a prime minister.
- Maradia*: ruler; title used by the ruler of Balannipa in Mandar.
- mas*: a small gold coin; also a weight equal to 1/16 of a tael.
- Matoa Pitu*: “The Seven Elders”, the name of the first Advisory Council in Bone, predecessor of the *Aruppitu*.
- Paccalla*: an early official of the original nine communities in Goa chosen to regulate affairs of the group prior to the establishment of the institution of the Karaeng (Lord/Ruler of) Goa.
- Pajumpulawěng*: “The Golden Umbrella”, state symbol of Bone.
- palili*: vassal state.
- perahu*: boat.
- pěsse/pacce*: commiseration; a Bugis-Makassar concept of empathy with the members of one’s community.

- Pitu Babana Binanga*: “Seven Estuary [States]”, the confederation of downriver Mandar states.
- Pitu Ulunna Salo*’: “Seven Upriver [States]”, the confederation of upriver Mandar states.
- Punggawa*: title of the Commander-in-Chief of Bone’s armies in wartime.
- raga*: a rattan ball; a game in which skill is measured by how long and how well a player can keep the rattan ball in the air. In early times there was an entire ritual attending the learning and the playing of this sport of princes. Skill was then a measure of spiritual strength.
- Rapang*: a Makassar “Mirror of Kings” representing the wisdom of the ages and serving as a guide to good government.
- rial* or *rial-of-eight*: a Spanish silver coin imported into Asia by the Dutch and English. Its value varied but it was worth about 2½ Dutch guilders.
- rijksdaalder*: silver-coin of The Netherlands and some other northern European countries varying in value but worth about 2½ Dutch guilders.
- sarat*: Islamic religious council.
- sarung*: “robe”; loose cloth worn around the waist like a skirt of varying length depending upon how large a knot is made at the waist.
- sěbbu/sabbu kati*: literally, “a thousand catties [of gold]”, but any specific sum of money or its value in goods demanded by one party from another as a condition for peace.
- siri*’: a concept in Bugis-Makassar society embracing the idea of both self-worth and shame.
- sirih*: betel leaf prepared for chewing with areca-nut, gambier, and lime.
- Sudang*: Goa’s state sword and one of the most important objects of Goa’s regalia.
- Sulledatu*: “Replacement for the Datu”, hence the title used by the person who replaces or who would replace the ruler of Soppeng should he be deposed.
- suku*: tribe, ethnic group.
- Syahbandar*: official in charge of international trade and affairs occurring in the ports of a kingdom.
- Syurga*: Heaven.
- tael*: trade name of a Chinese ounce worth about 1/16 of a catty (see under *catty*).

- Tautongĕng*: men of good birth but not high nobility.
- Tomanurung/Tumanurung*: “He/She who descended [from the Upperworld]”. Upperworldly figures who descend to earth and become the first rulers of the early Bugis-Makassar kingdoms.
- Tomarilalĕng Malolo* (in Bone)/*Tumailalang Lolo* (in Goa): an official whose principal function was to serve as an intermediary between the ruler and his chief minister on one hand and the Advisory Council on the other in attempting to resolve difficulties in implementing policy.
- Tomarilalĕng Matoa* (in Bone)/*Tumailalang Toa* (in Goa): head of the Advisory Council and the principal intermediary between the people via the Council and the ruler and his chief minister.
- Tuma’bicara-butta*: “Spokesman of the Land”, the most important official position in the kingdom of Goa, often likened to a prime minister.
- Tumakkajanangng Ana’bura’ne*: title of a Goa official in charge of overseeing the work of a number of local groups assigned specific tasks.
- ummat*: the community of Islam.
- upĕ*: “good fortune”; special quality attached to individuals destined for greatness.
- windu*: cycle of eight years.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

- 1 The Sa'dan Toraja belong to the South Toraja group, often referred to as Tae' Toraja. Ethnographically, the term Toraja is used generally to refer to the non-Islamic groups living in Central and South Sulawesi and divided into the East Toraja, West Toraja, and South Toraja groups. Despite being classified as one ethnic group, there is a great diversity among these three groups in language, religion, social stratification, house-building, agriculture, weaving techniques, etc. (Nooy-Palm 1975: 53).
- 2 From an examination of all fragments of the *I La Galigo* in Europe and Indonesia, R. A. Kern estimates that this work would contain between 6,000 and 8,000 pages, making it one of the largest epic poems in world literature (Kern 1954: v).
- 3 Since there is a strong likelihood that the *I La Galigo* was an open-ended epic tale, one perhaps should not use a word such as "end" to indicate what is possibly only the last extant tale known to us. So little research has been done on collecting the tales of this epic that one should perhaps wait for more conclusive evidence before suggesting any definite concluding section of the *I La Galigo*. The late Haji Andi Pangerang Opu Tosinilele of Belopa, Luwu, said that his family possessed a "large number" of volumes of the *I La Galigo* prior to Kahar Muzakkar's rebellion (1950-1963). As a result of the destruction of those years only about forty volumes remained (personal communication, April, 1975).
- 4 Borahima obtained this story from Watampone, the capital of Bone. When I was there collecting information on tales of the origin of society in South Sulawesi, there was only one person who told me this story. He was a devout Moslem who even tried to deny the existence of *bissu*, pre-Islamic religious men who still fulfil a function in present-day South Sulawesi. There is a possibility that the story of the flood may have been borrowed from Islamic traditions, which would not have been unknown to this person.
- 5 Among the Maloh in the upper reaches of the Kapuas River in West Kalimantan, certain stones are regarded with great veneration and as receptacles of a spirit or power. In one of the villages, the powers of the stone are said to be capable, through ritual action, of providing "a successful rice harvest, a period of rain-free, flood-free weather during the ripening and harvesting months, and more general benefits of health, good fortune, fertility, prosperity and formerly, success in war" (King 1975: 112-3).
- 6 The Bugis reads: *Sianre-anre bale taue*, which means literally "the people are like fish eating one another". This is a metaphor mentioned in ancient Indian literature as the concept of *matsyanyaya*, or the "logic of the fish". According to ancient Indian ideas of the Cycle of Ages, man will degenerate at the end of a cycle and lose his sense of natural duty. Since there will be no rulers, and a society without a king cannot be viable, the "logic of the fish", or the Western equivalent of the "law of the jungle", will then prevail (Lingat 1973:207).
- 7 There are variations in the story of how much authority was conceded to the *Tomanurung* in the beginning, all of which reflects the relative strength of the councils *vis à vis* their *Tomanurung* rulers. One of the most interesting of the *Tomanurung* stories is from Bone where the *Tomanurung* is said to have appeared in an open field

- standing on a flat stone. It is tempting to see in this story an attempt to show that the gods of both the Upper- and Underworld (stone; Deity of the Soil) are responsible for presenting the *Tomanurung* to the people. There are also traditions of the *Totompo*, "He/She who arose [from the Underworld]", which are not as common as those of the *Tomanurung* but nevertheless exist, suggesting a stronger role of the Underworld in the people's beliefs than usually admitted (Noorduyn 1955: 47-8; Pelras 1971, I: 177).
- 8 The states which all agree on are Aralle, Mambi, Rantebulahan, Matanga, and Tabang. There is no agreement as to which of the last three states formed part of the seven: Tu'bi, Bambang, and Tabulahan.
 - 9 With the rapid growth of population in the Toraja areas in the 20th century, many Toraja were forced to seek a livelihood in the city of Makassar and elsewhere in Indonesia.
 - 10 This statement is based on interviews with Toraja historians in 1974-5, on an unpublished manuscript on Toraja history and culture by Sarungallo' Pareng Kesu, and on L. T. Tangdilintin's *Toraja dan Kebudayaananya*, Ujung Padang, 1974.
 - 11 Royalty was said to have blood the colour of the milky sap of the *takku'* (Bugis)/ *tangkulu'* (Makassar) tree, hence indicating its heavenly origin.
 - 12 One is reminded of the same contradictions which Western scholars used to "discover" with delight in Javanese dualisms of right-left, light-dark, good-evil. Yet these dualisms are seen as unities without any religious connotations. These concepts of right-left, lightness-darkness, good-evil, are two sides of the same coin and are regarded as essential to each other and part of the very fabric of life. See Rassers 1959.
 - 13 Personal communication, Dr Shelley Errington.
 - 14 See KA 1217a, fol. 228v, concerning some complaints about the Goa government.
 - 15 Personal communication, Professor Zainal Abidin bin Farid, 1975.
 - 16 While the chronicles of the Makassar kingdoms of Goa and Talló do not indicate any direct relationship between their kingdoms and Luwu, Makassar oral traditions trace Goa's past to a ruler named "Batara Guru" who, according to the *I La Galigo*, is the first godruler of Luwu. The people of Selayar also claim Luwu as their original homeland and still use the noble title *Opu*, which is a Luwu title. See Noorduyn 1955: 47, quoting H. E. D. Engelhard, "Mededeelingen over het eiland Saleijer", *BKI* 32 (1864), p. 399.
 - 17 In Bugis these measures are called *ma'polo leteng*, "breaking of the bridge" (Sultan Kasim 1970:17). The origin of this term can perhaps be traced to the decision taken by the gods, as recounted in the *I La Galigo*, to remove the rainbow which served as a bridge between heaven and earth after the second set of godrulers left the earth (Matthes 1885 in van den Brink 1943:379).
 - 18 In later years the nine members changed from time to time and only Tombolo, Data, and Saumata remained part of the original *Bate Salapang* (Mukhlis 1975:60-1).
 - 19 This latter statement appears more acceptable since Goa under Tuma'parisi' Kallonna allied with Bone against the greater threat posed by Luwu. See Abdurrazak 1969b: 18-23.
 - 20 Matthes defines the Bugis word *bocco* as "column (of soldiers)". But in the Makassar dictionary he compares *bocco* with another Makassar word, *tumpu*, meaning "fighting force" or "army". He prefers, therefore, to translate the word loosely as "power" (Matthes 1874:193-4; Matthes 1859:180, 286). The last Ranrëng Tua of Wajo, Haji Andi' Ninnong, explained that *bocco* meant "the highest one; the one with no equal" (Lineton 1975:92). "Tëllumpocco" could therefore perhaps also be translated as "The Incomparable Three".
 - 21 It was common practice among Bugis-Makassar chroniclers to give a posthumous name to a ruler to describe how or where he died. For example, Tunijallo', means "he who was killed by an amok".
 - 22 His personal name was I Mallinggaang and his honorific I Daeng Mannyonri'. He also

- had the territorial titles of Karaeng ri Kanjilo, Karaeng Segeri, Karaeng Barombong, Karaeng Data, Karaeng Allu, and various others. After the "Islamic Wars" ended in 1611, he was given the title "Karaeng Matoaya", by which name he is best known among the Makassar people. See Abdurrahim 1974:15; Abdurrazak 1969b:18.
- 23 Some features of Islamization which may have added to Goa's strength. See L. Y. Andaya 1976 unpublished paper, "Kingship and Adat Rivalry in Bugis-Makassar Society".
 - 24 According to a Bone Chronicle, Luwu adopted Islam a year before Goa (Matthes 1864, I:529). The Tallo Chronicle implies that Luwu may have already been Moslem by the time of the Islamic Wars by saying that Karaeng Matoaya Islamized all the Bugis lands except Luwu (Abdurrahim 1974:15).
 - 25 Literally, this term means "a thousand catties (of gold)", but it came to mean any specific sum of money or its value in goods demanded by one party from another as a condition for peace (Matthes 1864:546; Abdurrahim 1974:16).
 - 26 A kind of ship used to transport cattle and horses.
 - 27 A fermented drink made from either the aren palm, the lontar palm, or the nipa palm.
 - 28 *Anakkaraeng* (Makassar)/*Anakarung* (Bugis) means literally "princes". They are the offspring of a royal father and royal or commoner wife. Their penchant for oppressing various members of their own community, let alone those of vassal states, was notorious. The Bugis version of a "Mirror of Kings", the *Latoa*, advises the ruler to be certain to bridle the activities of the *anakarung* (Mattulada 1975:154-5; 172-3; 275-7). They were generally dependent for their livelihood on the royal bounty. For a study of the general phenomenon of such groups in Malay-Indonesian society, see B. W. Andaya 1976:162-186.
 - 29 In later times there were two *Tumailalang* posts: *Tumailalang Toa* or the elder *Tumailalang*, and the *Tumailalang Lolo*, or the younger *Tumailalang*. There is no indication from contemporary Dutch sources that there was this division in the 17th century, though this may be explained by the fact that the Dutch would have had little to do with the *Tumailalang Lolo*. His principal function was to serve as an intermediary between the ruler and his chief minister, the *Tuma'bicara-butta*, on the one hand and the *Bate Salapang* on the other in attempting to resolve difficulties in implementing policy. The *Tumailalang Toa* was the more important figure who was the head of the *Bate Salapang* and hence the chief intermediary between the people, via the *Bate Salapang*, and the ruler and *Tuma'bicara-butta* (Mukhlis 1971:83-4).
 - 30 Although contemporary Dutch sources tend to equate the authority of Wajo's Arung Matoa with that of rulers of other major kingdoms, the Arung Matoa was much less secure. He was nominated by a body of Wajo lords known as the "Forty Lords" (*Arung Pattappulo*) and ultimately chosen by the Arung Bettempola. This latter lord and the Ranrëng Tua and Ranrëng Talotënreng were hereditary positions with great prestige and power in Wajo, but it was the Arung Bettempola who was clearly the *primus inter pares* (See Abdurrazak 1964:16-20; Noorduyn 1955:39-40; Zainal Abidin bin Farid 1971:163).
 - 31 In the *Nāgarakērtāgama*, the ruler of Majapahit also designates as "friends" only those considered to be his equal (Pigeaud 1960, III:16-9).
 - 32 The Sufi doctrine was well-known among Goa court members. In 1667 Encik Amin, a scribe from the Makassar-Malay community employed in the Goa court, wrote a panegyric to the Makassar ruler and nobles which exhibited a knowledge of the kind of Sufi ideas which were associated with the Aceh Sufi mystic poets (Skinner 1963:23). Syaikh Yusuf, a 17th century Moslem saint, greatly revered by the Bugis and Makassar people, was a well-known Sufi mystic who was related to the Goa royal house (Cense 1950:51).
 - 33 This gracious act is often cited by pro-Wajo local historians as proof of the "democratic" character of Wajo society which abhorred slavery of one's fellowman. It

is tempting to see this as a later interpolation by a Wajo chronicler to urge moderation on the part of Bone rulers in the late 17th and early 18th centuries who held the fate of Wajo in their hands.

CHAPTER II

- 1 In a *raga* (a rotan ball) game, the *raga* is tossed in the air and kept there by the participants by using any part of the body but the hands. Skill is measured by how well and how long a participant can keep the ball in the air. Special ceremony attended the teaching of the *raga* game by a master (*guru pa'raga*), and purity of heart and mind were prerequisites for skill in this spiritual exercise/game (Abdurrachman 1967: 16-7).
- 2 There are many ways of tying a *sarung* to serve different purposes. When a man ties his *sarung* up high so that the bottom edge touches his knees, he usually intends to do hard labour and thus does not want the *sarung* to hinder his movements.
- 3 The name was chosen because in the Bugis areas a raft is usually built by tying individual logs together. The word "raft" would conjure up the image of individual units forming one entity, hence a union or alliance.
- 4 A strip from a leaf of a lontar palm (*Borassus flabelliformis*) on which certain number of knots are tied to indicate the number of days before a war would begin. It is usually sent to an ally or to a vassal to summon him to war within a certain number of days. A failure to respond to these summons did not go unpunished (Matthes 1874:211).
- 5 The term used for "defy" is *lariangi ba'ba'na*, which means literally "to run away with the whip", hence indicating an act of defiance. In another manuscript the term is clearly used to refer to a group of kingdoms rejecting Goa's overlordship (L-17:1).
- 6 According to Speelman's *Notitie*, the Bugis were waiting with a sizeable force to meet the enemy. There were 10,000 men under Arung Palakka at Mampu, another 10,000 men under Arung Kaju, Arung Maruangen, Arung Awo, and Arung Balieng, and a further 8,000 under Arung Mario. Datu Soppeng La Těnribali brought additional men to Arung Palakka, swelling the latter's force to about 20,000 (Speelman 1670:731r).
- 7 This is a gesture with the left hand extended outward offering peace and the right hand placed on the hilt of the kris signifying a willingness to war if necessary (Matthes 1874: 702).
- 8 This appears to be an early manifestation of Arung Palakka's *upě'*, or "fortune", which attracted the direct loyalty of the Bugis people. They seemed to flock to his banner of their own accord and not as a result of orders from their local lords.
- 9 The term used is *parěllěsempatua*, which means the opening in the rocks. What is probably meant here is not actually caves, but the cracks and spaces between large boulders which can afford hiding places for a man.
- 10 In L-3:295 Datu Mario is given the title of Karaeng Eje and Karaeng Tanete the "daeng" name of Leppo(?).
- 11 Literally, "those who pound the rice stalks to separate the ears from the stalk".
- 12 "Patarana" refers to the husband of the woman who nurses a royal or noble-born child. In Bugis-Makassar society the nursemaid and her husband become a type of foster parents toward whom the child feels a strong bond, sometimes even stronger than that toward his own natural parents.
- 13 In performing the *aru*, or *to manngaru*, a warrior jumps up with kris in hand declaring his total devotion and loyalty to his lord, often in bombastic and sometimes incomprehensible words.
- 14 All the manuscripts say "Java", but this is a general term used by the Bugis and Makassar people to indicate anything foreign. Subsequent events indicate that in the beginning Java was not their ultimate destination.
- 15 In a manuscript from Soppeng, Arung Palakka's words are more bitter and scathing toward Bone: "I have no place to live in the land of the Bugis because the people of

Bone are not sincere/firm/faithful (*matētē*) and no longer want to fight.” And of the question of the amount of gold which Arung Palakka was able to collect for his trip to Java, this manuscript says that only twenty catties of gold was from Mario ri Wawo and none from Bone (L-3:298).

- 16 In an unpublished manuscript of the history of Bone, the three princes mentioned are Arung Bila, Arung Appanang, and Arung Belo, not Datu Citta (Sejarah Bone n.d.: 136). The reason for the omission of Datu Citta from Bone sources may have been because of the circumstances of Datu Citta's death in later years. Datu Citta of the Bugis sources was Arung Bakkē Todani who was married to one of Arung Palakka's sisters. The later rivalry between Arung Palakka and Arung Bakkē resulted in the latter's death under very ignoble circumstances which Arung Palakka, his descendants, and the court of Bone may have wished to forget. For the story of the rivalry and subsequent murder of Arung Bakkē see Chapter 9.
- 17 Speelman says the flight occurred in the beginning of 1661 (Speelman 1670:761v), but the Diary of the Kings of Goa and Tallo records the date as 25 December 1660 (Ligtvoet 1880:119).
- 18 For greater detail on this incident, see Stapel 1922:74-7.
- 19 Karaeng Karunrung had returned from exile and was once again in favour in the Goa court (Stapel 1922:85).

CHAPTER III

- 1 In the Dutch sources the Arung Belo Tosa'dēng is referred to as “de radja van Soping”, “the king of Soppeng”. He was actually a son of the Datu Soppeng La Tēnribali Matinroe ri Datunna who was living in exile in Sanrangang.
- 2 Among the Makassar people the Bajau are known as *Turije'ne'* or “water people”. They appeared to have served the Goa court as rowers, seafighters, and envoys, in the same way that the *Orang Laut* (lit., the seapeople) in the western half of the Indonesian archipelago seemed to have served the Malay kingdoms. See Speelman 1926: unpag. and Andaya 1975: 50-1 *passim*.
- 3 A *mas* was a small gold coin. There were a number of different types of *rijksdaalders* circulating in this period. This particular *coprijksdaalder* may refer to a head (*cop*) struck on one or both sides of the coin.
- 4 Contrary to popular belief, the “Datu Luwu” who went to Butung was not Daeng Massuro Matinroe ri Tompotikka', but his half-brother by the daughter of Karaeng Sumanna, Daeng Mattuju (Ligtvoet 1878:49).
- 5 The excitement of the time is captured in a Bugis *lontara*'s depiction of the arrival of Arung Palakka at Pattiro and his welcome by the multitudes who instantly recognized his *upē'* (Undang-Undang 1914:119). It was this *upē'* which overcame all barriers and made the people follow Arung Palakka and believe in his destiny. The manner of Arung Palakka's return and his remarkable achievements established a cultural-historical pattern which came to characterize later events in South Sulawesi. The Makassar refugees after 1667 and 1669 left with similar hopes of returning with an ally powerful enough to free their homeland. Although they were unsuccessful, the precedent had been established by Arung Palakka. Arung Sengkang La Ma'dukēlleng's story almost directly parallels that of Arung Palakka, and he, too, is considered to be an “unusual” figure in South Sulawesi history. A more recent figure with the same pattern is that of Kahar Muzakkar. See L. Y. Andaya 1977.
- 6 This may have been the “Daeng Mattoana” mentioned by Speelman as Arung Palakka's maternal uncle who accompanied Arung Palakka into exile (*Notitie* 1670: 709r).
- 7 A shortened version of this account can also be found in Stapel 1922:129-130 and in Macleod 1900:1275-7.
- 8 According to Bugis sources, after the main rebellion had been suppressed Makassar,

Wajo, and Bone troops intercepted Arung Palakka and his followers at Palëtte on the Bay of Bone. Several of Arung Palakka's followers were killed, but Arung Palakka and most of his men succeeded in escaping by boat to Butung (L-1:27; L-3:300; L-4: unpag., section 23).

- 9 According to contemporary Dutch sources, Arung Cilaku was with Speelman at this time.
- 10 The core area or *lalë'bata*, literally, "within the walls", refers to the main settlement of the kingdom where the ruler resided.
- 11 Although L-1 says the Treaty of Pappolong, the previous statements indicate that the Treaty of Attappang was meant. This is also confirmed in L-3:307 and L-4: unpag., section 23, where only the Treaty of Attappang is mentioned.
- 12 It was a common practice in Bugis and Makassar society for a ruler to reward or punish a whole family, even up to third cousins, for a particular deed of one individual in the family. For example, after Bone's unsuccessful revolt against Goa in 1660, forty members up to third cousins belonging to the family of Tobala', who had been placed as regent in Bone by Goa's leaders in 1643, were said to have been put to death (L-1:27).
- 13 Pre-Islamic holy men and women who are considered to contain within themselves both the female and male elements. They were especially revered as being intermediaries between the spirit world and the community. In the past they received royal patronage and were keepers of the regalia. For a discussion on the *bissu*, see B. F. Matthes 1872.
- 14 These Bugis accounts are corroborated in the Dutch sources where thirty Dutch soldiers and two cannons were brought by Captain Poleman to join Arung Palakka. However, Poleman arrived at Kassi, not Lamatti. See Stapel 1922:133.
- 15 The "four districts" in present-day Sinjai include Bulo-Bulo, Lamatti, Balannipa, and Raja.
- 16 Macleod (1922:1285) only mentions the first alternative, but Stapel's account (1922: 156) of the suggestions offered by Arung Appanang is more accurate.
- 17 The Bugis sources say that the Arung Belo was among the three Soppeng princes leading the northern Bugis attack, and yet the Dutch sources say that he was with Arung Palakka in Makassar at this time.
- 18 The mention of indebtedness is perhaps a reference to the time he was in the caves of Maruala and was helped by Tanete to escape from Makassar pursuers (L-3:295).
- 19 A *lesung* is a hollowed-out log where the rice is pounded, hence what Karaeng Karunrung threatened Tanete was a pounding such as that given to a *lesung*.
- 20 This refers to a Bugis-Makassar practice of taking the head of an enemy and "dancing" with it in the *aru* upon offering it to one's lord.
- 21 A rial or rial-of-eight was a Spanish silver coin imported into Asia by the Dutch and the English. Its value depended partly on the weight and fineness of the individual coin, and partly on supply and demand. It normally was worth about 2½ Dutch guilders.

CHAPTER IV

- 1 Stapel 1922:181 mentions that the individual intended here was not the Sultan Ternate, but the Raja Turatea, which he interpreted to mean Karaeng Layo since in previous references in the Dutch records a copyist had written "Ternate" instead of "Turatea" (KA 1157a:323v). But in this case it appears that it is the Sultan Ternate which is intended since he did play a prominent role in the negotiations. See also the *Sya'ir Perang Mengkasar's* reference to the Sultan Ternate's presence in Bungaya (Skinner 1963:179; KA 1157a:325r).
- 2 One should note that the sequence of the draft treaty articles discussed here do not correspond to those in the final treaty document reproduced in Stapel 1922:237-247.
- 3 *Allegia=alegie=allegaes*, may be related to *alachae*, piece goods from Gujerat usually striped of mixed cotton and silk. Those from Coromandel were made of cotton and

- either red and white or blue and white.
- 4 After the establishment of colonial rule in many parts of the world by Western European or American powers, the writers of international law began to deny sovereignty to Eastern rulers and their communities. Anand 1962:383, 385, 1386.
 - 5 While the following discussion is based principally on the records of the Bugis, who are the numerically dominant group in South Sulawesi, these observations may be applied generally to the other major ethnic groups in the area.
 - 6 This reference is probably to the practice of dividing the children born of a slave and a freeman.
 - 7 The terms of the treaties were taken from a number of Bugis manuscripts, especially from L-4, L-28, the Makassar *Sedjarah Goa* edited by Abdurrahim and Wolhoff, and a Makassar contract signed between Bantaeng and the Dutch East India Company in Matthes 1883: 217-220.
 - 8 This was a widespread practice in the Malay world, and frequent references can be found in the *Sejarah Melayu*.
 - 9 A tree, the *Antiaris toxicaria* Lesch, from which a sap is extracted to make a poison used for blow darts and arrows.
 - 10 In South Sulawesi the written word is treated with great reverence. Many written documents are preserved as sacred heirlooms which can only be exhibited after a proper appeasement of the guardian spirits. A similar attitude among the Javanese is described in Berg 1938:14ff.
 - 11 This belief is not peculiar to South Sulawesi but may be found in many parts of the Malay-Indonesian world. An interesting discussion of a similar concept called *maratabat* among the Maranao people of southern Philippines is found in Saber 1974: 219-224.
 - 12 In this regard South Sulawesi appeared to be different from powerful mainland Southeast Asian states where it was common practice for the victor to transport a subject population to his own realm to augment his power. For an interesting study of manpower in the late Ayutthaya and early Bangkok period, see Rabibhadana 1969.
 - 13 An interesting example of this process is described in one of the Bugis chronicles where Bone remembered its treaty with Goa and forsook that with Soppeng, only to do a complete turnabout some years later when Goa was clearly on the decline. See L-28: 32ii.
 - 14 On 28 December 1655 the Company's envoy was instructed by his superiors in Batavia to make peace with the Makassar rulers of Goa and Tallo at any cost. The resulting document clearly demonstrates the influence of local treaty-making traditions. While the framework of the treaty is borrowed from the Western European practice of including each new subject in separate numbered articles, the contents read like a typical South Sulawesi treaty. It begins: ". . . the Governor-General [of the Company] wants to make peace and is a great and strong man, whereas we are so much smaller and weaker. Would we make peace if no misdeeds were committed against our subjects?" (Heeres 131a:82). But the traditional formula is inverted so as to leave no doubt whatsoever in the minds of the native signatories that they were not vassals of the Company: (Article 6) The enemies of the Company shall not be the enemies of these rulers; (Article 7) If these rulers should have a quarrel with any state "below the winds", the Company will not interfere. Only in Article 8 does the treaty again revert to the precision of a European document but with the important difference that it is made in the form of a request rather than a provision. In this article the Company *asks* these rulers to prevent their subjects from going to certain proscribed areas. Although the Company has no right to such a request in traditional practice, it is not rejected outright but left unresolved (Heeres 1931a:82-4).

In a treaty between the Company and four minor states in South Sulawesi on December 1671, the rulers of the four states promise to uphold their treaty with the

Company by swearing on the Koran, making an oath, and drinking *ballo'* – all in the traditional fashion. They agree to recognize the Company as their overlord, take the Company's friends as their friends and the Company's enemies as their enemies, provide the same royal services to the Company as they had performed for the ruler of Goa, and give a small number of slaves to the Company (Heeres 1931d:441-2). All of these terms were in the traditional South Sulawesi treaty idiom, including the symbolic presentation of slaves to demonstrate one's submission to an overlord Noorduyn 1955: 176, 202, *passim*).

CHAPTER V

- 1 Although it is not known when this folktale was first recited, its preciseness concerning the factors contributing to Goa's defeat could argue for either a time of origin close to the events which it describes, or a faithful retention of detail in the folk memory of the Makassar people over several centuries. The written text of the tale was made from a performance by a *pasinrili'*, a storyteller, in the 1930s (personal communication A. A. Cense, 27 December 1975).
- 2 So impelling an impact did Arung Palakka make in South Sulawesi that in time he even became transformed into a Makassar hero whose association with the Dutch was justified because he sought to avenge a personal insult by his father, the ruler of Goa. For a discussion of this transformation of Arung Palakka from a Bugis to a Makassar hero, see L. Y. Andaya 1980.
- 3 This was a common way of "hedging one's bets". During the long and destructive Kahar Muzakkar rebellion in South Sulawesi between 1950-1963, many families had one son fighting for the rebels and one for the government. Some have openly explained this as a conscious policy of families to ensure the preservation of their property.
- 4 According to contemporary Dutch sources Syahbandar Daeng Makkulle had also commanded a small Goa fleet which had been sent against Butung sometime in April or May 1666 (KA 1148b:511).
- 5 One of the Bugis chronicles from Soppeng describes the desolation in Soppeng where no human being but only wild pigs and deer could be found. In this episode Bone's betrayal is blamed for the sad fate of Soppeng, and many of the nobles urge Arung Palakka to be cautious in once again entwining the fortunes of Soppeng with those of Bone. Although this particular incident is placed a short time after the landing of Bugis troops in Bone in 1666, it may very well have referred to this particular event mentioned in 1668. See L-1:30.
- 6 The Dutch records state unequivocally "radja toua". Whether the Tumailalang Toa was intended is not known. When some Bugis princes seized power in Johor in the early 18th century, two posts which they created with distinctive South Sulawesi connotations were "Raja Muda" and "Raja Tua". These two offices were considered the chief advisers to the ruler (L. Y. Andaya 1975:295-6).
- 7 Neither the chronicle of Goa nor of Tallo speaks of Goa's defeat. The former merely presents a list of rulers and their descendants from the period of Sultan Hasanuddin until Sultan Abdul Jalil (d. 1709), and no indication is given that a war was even fought. See Abdurrahim and Wolhof n.d.: 74-8. The Tallo Chronicle ends in the middle of the 17th century at the height of Makassar power in South Sulawesi, as if regarding what followed as unworthy of mention. See Abdurrahim and Borahima 1975:320; L-4: unpag.; L-17:65 etc.
- 8 These two villages are not mentioned in a 1693 map of the area. Since the Makassar people, as many other Indonesian groups, consider any site struck by a disaster as inauspicious, it is unlikely that these two villages would have been reoccupied.
- 9 During the coronation of the Arumpone in 1931, descendants of the Toangke were given a prominent place in the procession. See Cense 1931:4.

CHAPTER VI

- 1 La Těnrilai Tosenngěng was accidentally blown up by gunpowder in the defence of Tosora (L-1:67; L-3:325).
- 2 A Bugis version of the treaty appears to give a direct translation of *leen* or *leenman* in the Dutch version. It refers to the people of Wajo as being *toinrěng*, literally “vassals”, of the Company (L-3:331-4). A more common word for “vassal” in interstate relations among South Sulawesi states is *palili*. It appears, therefore, that Wajo may have been simply given a draft treaty which was translated literally into Bugis without any proper attention to local treaty conventions.
- 3 Pammana is listed along with Gilirěng and Belawa as siding with Wajo in L-3:324.
- 4 The Bugis word would have been *pěsse*. See Chapter I for a discussion of this concept in Bugis-Makassar society.
- 5 These are traditional phrases of a South Sulawesi “treaty”. What is being suggested here is to have Soppeng “reminded” of its treaty with Bone. See Chapter IV.
- 6 For a discussion of the significance of burying the stone in a treaty, see Chapter IV.
- 7 This was the traditional manner of submitting to a conqueror. For other examples, see Noorduy 1955:168-171, 172-3, *passim*.
- 8 Arung Palakka’s wife at first continued to live in Barru and refused to go to Bontoala to join Arung Palakka because she considered it “too difficult and unpleasant” (KA 1191a:656v).
- 9 While no mention is made of the status of the members of this band, there would have been slaves, commoners, and ordinary criminals seeking safety from traditional society and norms in “outlaw” groups in the hills. These “outlaw” groups were not uncommon, and it was to prevent their growth that there was such strict provision in interstate treaties for the return of runaway slaves. While the economic loss to their masters was a factor in attempting to destroy these bands, the loss of prestige of a ruler was perhaps as, if not more, important a reason for condemning the existence of these groups. The rise of this alternative authority was an unpleasant reminder to a local lord that he had somehow failed to provide prosperity and protection to his people, two crucial determinants of a good ruler in South Sulawesi traditions. See L. Y. Andaya 1975:120-1.

CHAPTER VII

- 1 There is no mention of a seventh state in the Dutch contemporary accounts. It is difficult to know whether there were only six states within the Mandar confederation at this time or if the Company reports omitted to name the seventh.
- 2 Betel leaf prepared for chewing with areca-nut, gambier, and lime.
- 3 Most of the informants I spoke to in 1974-5 in South Sulawesi gave this explanation for Arung Palakka’s inability to have any children.
- 4 A more common way prior to the introduction of firearms was to stick a kris or spear through the floor to kill someone in a house. Since South Sulawesi houses were built on stilts, this method of killing one’s enemy was popular and very effective.
- 5 Bugis *lontara*’ support this contention. When Arung Palakka and three of his companions, all important nobles from Soppeng, decided to leave Sulawesi to escape from the Makassar people, they came to Datu Soppeng to ask for gold. According to one source Arung Palakka was given 100 catties of gold by the Datu Soppeng (L-1:24).
- 6 Since Towesa had lost an eye from smallpox, he would have been considered by people to be unwhole and hence not fit to become ruler. Cops himself commented upon Towesa’s unbecoming behaviour which, coupled with the loss of an eye, made him an easy figure of attack and abuse by his enemies.
- 7 Sanrabone had only become part of the Goa empire after its conquest by Tumapa’risi’ Kallonna in the 16th century. Since then, however, its royal family had intermarried with the Goa rulers and had become intricately enmeshed with the fortunes of Goa. One of Sultan Hasanuddin’s wives was I Peta’ Daeng Nisali, the daughter of Karaeng

Banjuanjara from Sanrabone, and the offspring of this marriage was I Mappadulung Daeng Mattimung Karaeng Campagaya. After the death of Karaeng Banjuanjara, the Sanrabone Council appointed I Mappadulung Daeng Mattimung as Karaeng Sanrabone. After ten years as Karaeng Sanrabone, he was made ruler of Goa with the title of Sultan Abdul Jalil (Abdurrazak 1970:55-6).

- 8 None of these original letters and treaties has been found, although certain sections of treaties and selected phrases from letters may have been incorporated into some of the extant *lontara*'.
- 9 According to Makassar traditions, there were two lords who came from the east during the time of Goa's *Tumanurung*. One was Karaeng Bayo, who married the *Tumanurung*, and the other was Lakipadada. The latter had a sword called the *Sudang* which became an important part of Goa's regalia (Matthes 1883a:210).
- 10 The Dutch actually reads *bastert kinderen* (bastard children). This seems to define the *anakarung*, literally "princes", who are usually offspring of a royal father and any one of his wives not necessarily of royal birth.

CHAPTER VIII

- 1 The most spectacular examples of South Sulawesi refugee successes abroad are in Malaysia. Many contemporary royal families on the Malay peninsula have Bugis blood dating from the period of Bugis involvement in the Malay world in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. See L. Y. Andaya 1975.
- 2 A similar experience of Bugis refugees in the Malay world in the early 18th century led to their settlement in a thinly populated and lightly governed territory belonging to the kingdom of Johor. This area later became the Sultanate of Selangor ruled by a Bugis dynasty. See L. Y. Andaya 1975; B. W. Andaya 1979.
- 3 This large Malay force was part of the following of a certain Minangkabau leader who was known as Ibn Iskandar. For a discussion of his activities in the late 17th century, see Kathirithamby-Wells 1970.
- 4 It was to this river crossing that Arung Palakka later attributed the beginning of a certain growth in his nose which was to cause him such suffering and anxiety until his death.

CHAPTER IX

- 1 The Tempe, Sidenreng, and Crocodile Lakes once formed a single body of water known as the "Tapparëng Karaja" or the "Great Lake" (Pelras 1977:242; see also the reproduced 1693 fold-out map of South Sulawesi).
- 2 According to this historian, in the 15th century there was a meeting held in a village called Ajattapparëng in Suppa of the Addaong Sidenreng La Pateddungi, the Addatuang Sawitto La Paleteyange, the Datu Suppa La Makkariwie, and the Arung Rappëng, who was also the Arung Alitta, La Pakkollongi. In this meeting they agreed to form the Limae Ajattapparëng (Burhanuddin 1974:42-3, 57).
- 3 The Bugis and Makassar people, like many other societies, believe that a person's power resides in all parts of the body. When a person's hair or nails are cut, a part of the person's power is detached from the body, hence weakening that person (Kruijt 1914: 233). By making this vow Arung Palakka and his companions had symbolically declared their intention of devoting their entire strength and energy toward their goal.
- 4 La Side 1968a: 28 mentions that the name of Arung Palakka's sister who married Arung Bakkë Todani was We Kecumpurëng Da Ompo. This version is repeated by Abdurrazak 1968:48 who gives the name as We Kacimpurang Daompo. But a recently compiled history of Bone (in press), written by a committee, of which La Side was a part, says her name was We Tënrigrirang. I have come across no other source which confirms one or the other version or which gives a third reading. Because the history of Bone is more recent and includes La Side among its contributors, I have assumed that

he agreed that We Tënrigirang was the name of the sister who married Arung Bakkë Todani.

- 5 Arung Bakkë would have been thinking in terms of the Bugis words *arung* and *anakarung*. *Arung* refers to any ruler, whether from a major kingdom or a small principality, with its own head and regalia. The *anakarung* were all those even only vaguely related to the ruler who were found in great numbers in and around the court.
- 6 Despite Arung Palakka's long enmity toward the Goa government, he was sufficiently impressed by Goa to have borrowed several Makassar titles and made them into Bone titles. The office of *Makkëdangetana* was the direct translation of the Goa office of *Tuma'bicara-butta*, meaning "Spokesman of the Land". It was a powerful position second only to that of the ruler. The honorific title for the Karaeng Goa, *Tunisombaya*, meaning "He who is given obeisance", was borrowed by Arung Palakka for his own use. He is the only Bone ruler who is referred to as *Torisompae*, which is the Bugis translation of *Tunisombaya*. The position of *Tomarilälëng* is also a direct equivalent of the Goa office of *Tumailalang*. The position of *Tomarilälëng* in Bone appears for the first time during Arung Palakka's reign. One source attributes Arung Palakka with the establishment of the offices of *Makkëdangetana*, *Tomarilälëng Matoa*, *Tomarilälëng Malolo*, and *Ma'danrëng* (Undang-undang Bone 1914:181-2).

CHAPTER X

- 1 Karaeng Masseur La Suni had been accused of various things, the most serious of which were attempting to seize the throne of Bone and abducting one of Arung Palakka's concubines, I Sarampa. He was ordered seized and beheaded by Arung Palakka. This incident occurred in 1673 and became a much discussed and romanticized episode. A colourful version of this story is found in La Side 1968b:(11)18-22; (12)22-23.
- 2 Bakkers is the only source which dates the installation of Arung Palakka as Arumpone. Although the *Diary of the Kings of Goa and Tallo* mentions La Patau's birth, it omits any mention of Arung Palakka's installation. Contemporary Dutch sources indicate that Arung Palakka became ruler of Bone sometime toward the end of 1672, but without giving a specific date. Perhaps Arung Palakka himself was aware that his action would not be received well by his allies and therefore dispensed with any ostentatious celebrations which would have drawn attention to it.
- 3 The fame of the Bira and Ara people as boatbuilders is evident to this day. They explain that their skill as boatbuilders was acquired by their forefathers in the distant past when they reconstructed the wrecked boat which had once carried the legendary god-ruler of the *I La Galigo*, Sawerigading. See Pelly 1975:9-10.
- 4 Mandar traditions speak of this period as one in which the unity of the Confederation had been destroyed (Interviews Darwis 1974).
- 5 This group is also known as the Tae' Toraja, although the latter name is generally shunned by the people themselves as being derogatory. The Southern Toraja groups live within South Sulawesi proper, whereas the Northern Toraja and Western Toraja occupy the areas of Central Sulawesi. (Nooy-Palm 1975:55 and 1979:6-7).
- 6 The above account of the allied expedition into Toraja was taken principally from KA 1289a:32-8, which is a diary of Hendrik Geerkens, one of the Dutch soldiers who served as Arung Palakka's bodyguard on this campaign.
- 7 It was called "Topada Tindo Tomisa Panngimpi", meaning literally, "Sleeping together and having one dream", to indicate the unity of purpose of the Toraja communities. The motto "Misa kada dipotuo, pantan kada dipomate" was adopted, which translated freely is the Toraja equivalent of "United we stand, divided we fall". The movement itself was given a name "Untula' Buntunna Bone", which means "Repel the Strength of Bone" (Tangdilintin 1974:37). Another way in which this period is referred to among the Toraja is "Ullangda' Tosendana Bonga", from

“ullangda” meaning “to repel”; Tosendana, meaning “people of Sendana”; and “bonga”, a spotted pink and black water buffalo (highly valued among the Toraja, hence referring here to a “great man”). Although this informant indicated that the “Tosendana” were the people from Sendana in Mandar (Interview Linting 1975), “Sendana” has a variant spelling and pronunciation which is “Cenrana”. It appears much more plausible to interpret the whole phrase “Tosendana Bonga” to mean “the great man of Cenrana”, which would only have referred to Arung Palakka. In view of the events this appellation for the period is intended to relate, this interpretation appears more convincing.

- 8 This would have been the “mantraps” referred to in Dutch reports which caused numerous casualties among the allied troops in this campaign.

CHAPTER XI

- 1 The map was finally completed in 1693 and is listed in the map collection of the General State Archives in The Hague as Leupe 1293.
- 2 A. A. Cense notes that on his mother’s side Syaikh Yusuf would have been the brother of Karaeng Bisei Sultan Mohammad Ali (reign dates 1674-7) and Sultan Abdul Jalil (r.d. 1677-1709). However, Cense finds this difficult to accept since Karaeng Bisei was born in 1654, Sultan Abdul Jalil in 1652, and Syaikh Yusuf c. 1626 (Cense 1950: 51-2). It is interesting, nevertheless, that this relationship was openly acknowledged by Sultan Abdul Jalil himself in 1691. A contemporary Dutch report dated 13 January 1690 states bluntly that Syaikh Yusuf was from “a family of *gallarang*, although from the lowest type” (Consideratiën 1708:7).
- 3 However, a village tale of a later date dealing with the Makassar War of 1666-9 transforms this defeatism and exudes a striking optimism among the Makassar common people (Andaya 1980). The process of selective memory, which is a mechanism of survival and adaptation in many non-literate and semi-literate societies, had also occurred in Makassar society sometime between 1695 and 1936, when the village tale was first recorded. For a discussion of the selective memory process and its function in non-literate and semi-literate societies, see Goody and Watt 1968:30-4.
- 4 There is nothing in the sources which implicates the ruler of Dompu, but apparently some new evidence must have come to light to incriminate the formerly trustworthy ally of the Company and Arung Palakka.
- 5 From the curious reference here of the Arung Tanete Matoa and the Arung Tanete Malolo being among Arung Palakka’s chief advisers, it appears that perhaps these were the titles used interchangeably during Arung Palakka’s reign with *Tomarilalēng Matoa* and *Tomarilalēng Malolo*. The former’s task was to serve as the mediator between the ruler and the *Aruppitu* while the latter’s principal preoccupation was with the continuing good relations between the ruler and the vassal areas. A Bugis manuscript recopied in the 20th century but of a much earlier period mentions the *Tomarilalēng Matoa* and *Tomarilalēng Malolo* during a military campaign in the late 17th century (L-1:77-8).
Another possibility is that the Arung Tanete Malolo and Arung Tanete Matoa may refer to two members of the *Aruppitu*: the Arung Tanete Riatang and the Arung Tanete Riawang, or the Arung Tanete of the South and the Arung Tanete of the North. There is no indication, however, that one was designated “young” (*malolo*) and the other “old” (*matoa*).
- 6 This was the son born of the marriage between La Patau and I Mariama, daughter of Sultan Abdul Jalil of Goa. According to the terms agreed upon by both parties in the marriage, the first born would rule in the kingdom of the mother. Tosappewali, therefore, became the crown-prince of Goa, hence the comment that he was appointed to the same office as Arung Palakka, which was the Bone title for crown prince to the Bone throne. After 1672, when Arung Palakka La Tēnitatta became Arumponne, he

- began to be referred to in Dutch sources as “Arumpone”. The title “Arung Palakka” is retained throughout this work to refer to La Tĕnritatta to avoid confusion.
- 7 “Moirras” is probably “Morees”, one of the categories of cotton cloth woven on the Coromandel Coast. The traditional centre of manufacture was Masulipatnam. This cloth was usually of excellent quality and in great demand in Europe.
 - 8 See footnote 3, Chapter IV.
 - 9 The ceremony itself is called the *aru*, and *kanjar* (*kannjara* in Makassar), simply refers to the performance of the *aru*, that is the dancing and swearing with drawn swords and krisses.
 - 10 For example, Arung Teko did the *kanjar* for himself and for Tanete as the Karaeng Tanete, a title he had inherited through marriage.
 - 11 Van Thije must be referring to the Toraja since this description accords much more with what we know of Toraja ceremonial dress than that of the people of Wajo.
 - 12 *Tatabuang* is found more in Ambon and is properly a set of twelve or more copper cymbals (van der Crab 1878:464). What is meant here is simply various metal instruments which are struck together to make music or to ward off evil spirits, depending upon the purpose of the ceremony.
 - 13 These “clarinets” are known as *pui-pui*, a single reed instrument.
 - 14 It was important that the music be played continuously while the oath is being delivered, all of which contribute to a hypnotic and frenetic atmosphere. While watching a modern-day version of a *kanjar* performed at a royal wedding in Maros in March 1973, I was told that there have been incidents of a person in the midst of a *kanjar* running amok because the music had stopped, causing him *siri*.
 - 15 The Dutch reads “de gelubde of schandjongens van Goa” (KA 1458i:62). What is most likely meant here is the *bissu*, who were pre-Islamic religious figures who continued to perform their functions even after the coming of Islam. The male *bissu* frequently exhibited female traits and are often homosexuals. There is no evidence that these male *bissu* were ever castrated, and so the more figurative meaning was probably intended by van Thije.
 - 16 In his own diary Arung Palakka records this one fact carefully under the date 26 March 1695 where he says that he sent a gold chain weighing three catties [48 taels] to the governór (L-31:58v).

CHAPTER XII

- 1 Governor van Thije decided to return all of these to the new Arumpone, La Patau.
- 2 The *Diary of the Kings of Goa and Tallo* mentions under the date 26 November 1677 that Arung Palakka was praised by this title in a Friday sermon (see Ligvoet 1880:144). It is not known whether this is the first time he had taken this title or whether he had been known by it since becoming Arumpone in 1672.

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KA 1149, OB 1666. Verspreet in Westcoast Sumatra to Batavia, 27 October 1666.
KA 1155a, OB 1668. Speelman in Makassar to Batavia, 24 January 1667.
KA 1155b, OB 1668. Report by the Commander of the flute, *'t Velt-hoen*, to Batavia, 16 April 1667.
KA 1155c, OB 1668. Speelman in Makassar to Batavia, 18 August 1667.
KA 1155d, *Ibid.*, 15 July 1667.
KA 1156a, OB 1668. Speelman in Makassar to Batavia, 8 October 1667.
KA 1156b, *Ibid.*, 12 October 1667.
KA 1157a, OB 1669. Speelman in Makassar to Batavia, 1 December 1667.
KA 1157b, *Ibid.*, 30 April 1668.
KA 1157c, *Ibid.*, 31 May 1668.
KA 1157d, *Ibid.*, 28 June 1668.
KA 1157e, *Ibid.*, 16 May 1668.
KA 1157f, *Ibid.*, 21 May 1668.
KA 1157g, *Ibid.*, 19 August 1668.
KA 1157h. Private letter from Speelman in Makassar to Batavia, 31 July 1668.
KA 1157i. Speelman in Makassar to Batavia, 14 October 1668.
KA 1157j, *Ibid.*, 24 October 1668.
KA 1157k, *Ibid.*, 31 July 1668.
KA 1159a, OB 1670. Resolutions from Speelman to Batavia, 21 December 1666.
KA 1159b, OB 1670. Speelman's Daily Register, 1 and 2 January 1667.
KA 1159c, *Ibid.*, 8 January 1667.
KA 1159d, *Ibid.*, 12 March 1667.
KA 1159e, *Ibid.*, 5 July 1667.
KA 1159f, *Ibid.*, 13 July 1667.
KA 1159g, *Ibid.*, 31 July 1667.
KA 1159h, *Ibid.*, 10 July 1667.
KA 1159i, *Ibid.*, 29 July 1667.
KA 1159k, *Ibid.*, 3 July 1667.

- KA 1161a, OB 1670. Speelman in Makassar to Batavia, 23 April 1669.
KA 1161b, *Ibid.*, 9 July 1669.
KA 1161c, OB 1670. Private letter from Speelman in Makassar to Batavia, 18 September 1669.
KA 1166a, OB 1671. Notitie voor de opperhoofden tot Makassar . . . tot Batavia overgelevert, 16 February 1670.
KA 1166b, OB 1671. M. de Jong in Makassar to Batavia, 7 June 1670.
KA 1166c, *Ibid.*, 15 July 1670.
KA 1166d, *Ibid.*, 19 September 1670.
KA 1166e, *Ibid.*, 16 October 1670.
KA 1171a, OB 1672. M. de Jong in Makassar to Batavia, 10 April 1671.
KA 1171b, *Ibid.*, 24 August 1671.
KA 1171c, *Ibid.*, 11 October 1671.
KA 1171d, OB 1672. Report by Laurens Vos on Mission to Mandar, 17 April 1671.
KA 1177a, OB 1673. De Jong in Makassar to Batavia, 14 April 1672.
KA 1177b, *Ibid.*, 17 June 1672.
KA 1177c, *Ibid.*, 8 September 1672.
KA 1177d, *Ibid.*, 23 November 1672.
KA 1184a, OB 1674. Harthouwer in Makassar to Batavia, 5 May 1673.
KA 1184b, OB 1674. Report of de Bocq on his Mission to Tanete, 25 February 1673.
KA 1184c, OB 1674. Harthouwer in Makassar to Batavia, 21 June 1673.
KA 1184d, OB 1674. Translated Makassar letter from Karaeng Karunrung to Karaeng Masepe Daeng Mannabe, dated 11 Shawal 1083 (31 January 1673).
KA 1184e, OB 1674. Translated Bugis letter from Arung Timurung to all the nobles of Bone, dated 22 Haji (9 April 1673).
KA 1184f, OB 1674. Translated Bugis letter from Arumpone [La Ma'darëmmëng] to his son Arung Timurung: no date (but sometime in mid 1673).
KA 1184g, *Ibid.*, 29 June 1673.
KA 1184h, *Ibid.*, 23 October 1673.
KA 1191a, OB 1675. Harthouwer in Makassar to Batavia, 17 May 1674.
KA 1191b, *Ibid.*, 16 May 1674.
KA 1191c, *Ibid.*, 29 June 1674.
KA 1191d, *Ibid.*, 20 October 1674.
KA 1191e, *Ibid.*, 16 August 1674.
KA 1191f, *Ibid.*, 14 September 1674.
KA 1191g, OB 1675. Instructions for Captain Frans van Geyl on his

mission to the Sa'dan River, 11 September 1674.

KA 1191h, OB 1675. Harthouwer in Makassar to Batavia, 13 October 1674.

KA 1191i, OB 1675. Report by Captain Jan Fransz from Sumbawa to Batavia, 23 September 1674.

KA 1196a, OB 1676. Secret Missive from Harthouwer in Makassar to Batavia, 24 September 1675.

KA 1196b, OB 1676. Report from van Dalen in Bone to Harthouwer in Makassar, 4 September 1675.

KA 1196c, OB 1676. General Missives from Governor-General Maetsuycker et al. to Amsterdam, 23 November 1675.

KA 1200a, OB 1676. Harthouwer in Makassar to Batavia, 31 May 1675.

KA 1200b, *Ibid.*, 26 April 1675.

KA 1200c, OB 1675. Daily Register of Envoys Prins and Pleun on their mission to Bone, 31 May 1675.

KA 1200d, *Ibid.*, 19 April-12 May 1675.

KA 1200e, OB 1676. De Bocq in Bima to Harthouwer in Makassar, 18 June 1675.

KA 1200f, *Ibid.*, 5 September 1675.

KA 1201a, OB 1676. Harthouwer in Makassar to Cornput in Ternate, 13 March 1675.

KA 1208a, OB 1677. Dubbeldekop in Makassar to Batavia, 30 April 1676.

KA 1208b, *Ibid.*, 15 May 1676.

KA 1208c, OB 1677. Daily Register at Fort Rotterdam, under date 15 May 1677.

KA 1208d, OB 1677. Dubbeldekop in Makassar to Batavia, 11 August 1676.

KA 1208e, *Ibid.*, 28 July 1676.

KA 1208g, OB 1677. Report by Bisson, Bastinck, Dubbeldekop in Cenrana to Batavia, 15 July 1676.

KA 1208h, OB 1677. Dubbeldekop in Makassar to Batavia, 4 September 1676.

KA 1209a, OB 1677. Dubbeldekop in Makassar to Batavia, 30 April 1676.

KA 1209b, OB 1677. Bogaart in Makassar to Batavia, 9 May 1676.

KA 1209c, OB 1677. Daily Register at Fort Rotterdam, under date 13 May 1676.

KA 1209d, OB 1677. Dubbeldekop in Makassar to Batavia, 7 October 1676.

KA 1209e, OB 1677. Memorial from Harthouwer to Dubbeldekop in Makassar, 4 March 1676.

- KA 1214a, OB 1678. Dubbeldekop in Makassar to Batavia, 9 February 1677.
- KA 1216a, OB 1678. Dubbeldekop in Makassar to Batavia, 27 April 1677.
- KA 1216b, *Ibid.*, 3 November 1676.
- KA 1216c, OB 1678. Daily Register of François Prins in Luwu to Batavia, under dates from 1 September 1676 to 4 November 1676.
- KA 1216d, OB 1678. Letter from Dubbeldekop and Council in Fort Rotterdam to Regents (*Bate Salapang*) of Goa, 19 April 1677.
- KA 1216e, OB 1678. De Bocq in Makassar to Batavia, 25 May 1677.
- KA 1216f, *Ibid.*, 16 June 1677.
- KA 1216g, *Ibid.*, 16 July 1677.
- KA 1216h, *Ibid.*, 30 July 1677.
- KA 1216i, *Ibid.*, 5 August 1677.
- KA 1217a, OB 1678. Manifesto from Arung Palakka on behalf of the Allies to the President and Council in Fort Rotterdam, 8 April 1677.
- KA 1217b, OB 1678. Council in Fort Rotterdam to Batavia, 11 October 1677.
- KA 1218, OB 1678. Japara Register, Report of a Malay Nakhoda Subang from Kakaper to Batavia, 10 August 1677.
- KA 1224a, OB 1679. Council in Makassar to Batavia, 27 April 1678.
- KA 1224b, OB 1679. Cops in Makassar to Batavia, 31 May 1678.
- KA 1224c, OB 1679. Letter from Karaeng Bisei [Sultan Ali] to Daeng Tulolo, 22 May 1678.
- KA 1224d, OB 1679. Cops in Makassar to Batavia, 2 July 1678.
- KA 1227a, OB 1679. Cops in Makassar to Batavia, 27 April 1678.
- KA 1227b, *Ibid.*, 31 May 1678.
- KA 1227c, *Ibid.*, 2 July 1678.
- KA 1227d, OB 1679. Letter from Karaeng Bisei [Sultan Ali] to the Supreme Government of the Company in Batavia, received 23 April 1678.
- KA 1227e, OB 1679. Cops in Makassar to Batavia, 6 October 1678.
- KA 1227f, *Ibid.*, 25 October 1678.
- KA 1227g, OB 1679. Report by Adraen van Dalen to Makassar on his Mission to Bima, Dompu, and Sumbawa, 22 July 1678.
- KA 1235a, OB 1680. Letter from Karaeng Bone, Ballo', Bontomanompo, etc. to Karaeng Sanrabone [Sultan Abdul Jalil], written on 28 October 1678.
- KA 1235b, OB 1680. Letter from Karaeng Sanrabone [Sultan Abdul Jalil] to the Goa Nobles. No date (sometime in late October 1678).
- KA 1235c, OB 1680. Letter from Karaeng Bone, Ballo', Bontomanompo, etc. to Karaeng Sanrabone [Sultan Abdul Jalil], dated 30 October 1678.

- KA 1235d, OB 1680. Letter from Karaeng Sanrabone [Sultan Abdul Jalil] to the Goa Nobles, no date (sometime in late October or early November 1678).
- KA 1235e, OB 1680. Cops in Makassar to Batavia, 26 May 1679.
- KA 1235f, *Ibid.*, 15 May 1679.
- KA 1235g, OB 1680. Cops in Makassar to de Bocq in Bulukumba, 3 December 1678.
- KA 1236a, OB 1680. Cops in Makassar to Batavia, 19 September 1679.
- KA 1236b, *Ibid.*, 20 July 1679.
- KA 1236c, *Ibid.*, 9 October 1679.
- KA 1236d, *Ibid.*, 27 June 1679.
- KA 1236e, *Ibid.*, 15 May 1679.
- KA 1236f, *Ibid.*, 27 June 1679.
- KA 1236g, *Ibid.*, 25 August 1679.
- KA 1238a, OB 1680. East Coast Java Register, Poleman in Surabaya to Batavia, 5 May 1678.
- KA 1238b, OB 1680. East Coast Java Register, Hurdt in Surabaya to Marchier in Japara, 29 June 1679.
- KA 1238c, OB 1680. East Coast Java Register, Poleman at Soha to Batavia, 2 July 1679.
- KA 1238d, OB 1680. East Coast Java Register, van Vliet at Soha to Batavia, 3 August 1679.
- KA 1238e, OB 1680. East Coast Java Register, Couper at Semarang to Batavia, 7 August 1679.
- KA 1238f, OB 1680. East Coast Java Register, Bartelsz in Japara to Batavia, 22 August 1679.
- KA 1238g, OB 1680. East Coast Java Register, Couper with army at Soha to Batavia, 6 September 1679.
- KA 1238h, OB 1680. East Coast Java Register, Couper with army at Kakaper to Batavia, 15 October 1679.
- KA 1238i, *Ibid.*, 13 November 1679.
- KA 1238j, OB 1680. East Coast Java Register, Grinnell at Tegal to Batavia, 2 and 4 November 1679.
- KA 1240a, OB 1680. East Coast Java Register, Bastinck in Surabaya to Batavia, 3 December 1679.
- KA 1240b, OB 1680. East Coast Java Register, Couper with army at Ngantang to Batavia, 16 December 1679.
- KA 1240c, OB 1680. East Coast Java Register, Couper at Ngantang to Marchier in Surabaya, 8 January 1680.
- KA 1240d, OB 1680. East Coast Java Register, Bastinck in Surabaya to Batavia, 12 January 1680.
- KA 1248a, OB 1681. Cops in Makassar to Batavia, 2 May 1680.
- KA 1248b, *Ibid.*, 15 September 1680.

- KA 1248c, *Ibid.*, 29 October 1680.
KA 1249a, OB 1681. East Coast Java Register, Couper at Surabaya to Batavia, 12 January 1680.
KA 1249b, *Ibid.*, 13 March 1680.
KA 1249c, OB 1681. East Coast Java Register, List of Ships, no date.
KA 1249d, OB 1681. East Coast Java Register, Report by Bastinck and van Jonas accompanying Arung Palakka from Surabaya to Makassar, 30 May 1680.
KA 1257a, OB 1682. Cops in Makassar to Batavia, 21 April 1681.
KA 1257b, OB 1682. Prins in Makassar to Batavia, 9 March 1681.
KA 1257c, OB 1682. Cops in Makassar to Batavia, 3 November 1681.
KA 1257d, *Ibid.*, 13 October 1681.
KA 1265a, OB 1683. Report of the Dutch burger Gabriel Nacken on his visit to Cenrana, Bone, 29 October 1681.
KA 1265b, OB 1683. Cops in Makassar to Batavia, 30 June 1682.
KA 1265c, *Ibid.*, 15 August 1682.
KA 1274a, OB 1684. Cops in Makassar to Batavia, 29 May 1683.
KA 1274b, *Ibid.*, 11 August 1683.
KA 1274c, *Ibid.*, 24 October 1683.
KA 1289a, OB 1684. Diary of Hendrik Geerkens on the Toraja campaign, 4 November 1683.
KA 1289b, OB 1685. Cops in Makassar to Batavia, 22 November 1683.
KA 1289c, *Ibid.*, 24 April 1684.
KA 1292a, OB 1684. Cops in Makassar to Batavia, 22 November 1683.
KA 1292b, *Ibid.*, 21 July 1685.
KA 1303a, OB 1686. Secret Missive from Hartsink in Makassar to Batavia, 16 October 1685.
KA 1303b, OB 1686. Van Dalen in Sumbawa to Makassar, 22 May 1685.
KA 1303c, OB 1686. Hartsink in Makassar to Batavia, 27 September 1685.
KA 1317a, OB 1687. Hartsink in Makassar to Batavia, 6 May 1686.
KA 1326a, OB 1688. Hartsink in Makassar to Batavia, 6 August 1687.
KA 1326b, *Ibid.*, 23 October 1687.
KA 1326c, *Ibid.*, 31 May 1687.
KA 1342a, OB 1689. Hartsink in Makassar to Batavia, 27 April 1688.
KA 1342b, *Ibid.*, 11 May 1688.
KA 1342c, *Ibid.*, 30 August 1688.
KA 1350a, OB 1690. Separate Missive from Hartsink in Makassar to Batavia, 6 June 1689.
KA 1350b, OB 1690. Hartsink in Makassar to Batavia, 19 October 1689.

- KA 1350c, *Ibid.*, 18 May 1689.
- KA 1371a, OB 1691. Hartsink in Makassar to Batavia, 27 July 1690.
- KA 1386a, OB 1692. Hartsink in Makassar to Batavia, 12 October 1690.
- KA 1386b, OB 1692. Report by Hendrik Caas to Lt. Libertus Pelt on their mission to Lampoko and Arung Palakka, 8 October 1690.
- KA 1387a, OB 1692. Prins in Makassar to Batavia, 5 April 1691.
- KA 1387b, OB 1692. Prins in Makassar to Batavia, 20 October 1690.
- KA 1387c, OB 1692. Report by Commissioner Dirk de Haas on his mission to Makassar, 21 July 1691.
- KA 1387d, OB 1692. Report of Sgt. Jacob Steenbergen on his mission to Soppeng, 21 July 1691.
- KA 1406a, OB 1693. Prins in Makassar to Batavia, 15 August 1692.
- KA 1425a, OB 1694. Prins in Makassar to Batavia, 15 June 1693.
- KA 1425b, *Ibid.*, 7 July 1693.
- KA 1425c, *Ibid.*, 30 August 1693.
- KA 1425d, *Ibid.*, 2 October 1693.
- KA 1425e, OB 1694. Letter from Arung Palakka and Allies in Makassar to the Supreme Government in Batavia, dated 31 October 1693.
- KA 1425f, OB 1694. Letter from Arung Palakka and Daeng Talele to Batavia, dated 31 October 1693.
- KA 1446a, OB 1695. Schenckenberg in Makassar to Batavia, 26 September 1694.
- KA 1446b, *Ibid.*, 18 October 1694.
- KA 1446c, OB 1695. Report by Berghuysen on his mission to Cenrana, Bone, 25 June 1694.
- KA 1446d, OB 1695. Report by Junius on his mission to Cenrana, Bone, 25 June 1694.
- KA 1446e, OB 1695. Schenckenberg in Makassar to Batavia, 26 August 1694.
- KA 1446f, OB 1695. Council of Makassar to Batavia, 12 March 1694.
- KA 1446g, OB 1695. Secret Missive from the Provisional Head Matthaeus Schenckenberg, 3 July 1694.
- KA 1458a, OB 1695. Report by Berghuysen on his mission to Cenrana, Bone, under date 21 December 1694.
- KA 1458b, OB 1695. Van Thije in Makassar to Batavia, 26 July 1695.
- KA 1458c, OB 1695. Secret Missive from van Thije in Makassar to Batavia, 28 May 1695.
- KA 1458d, OB 1695. Van Thije in Makassar to Batavia, 30 June 1695.
- KA 1458e, *Ibid.*, 2 July 1695.
- KA 1458f, *Ibid.*, 20 May 1695.
- KA 1458g, *Ibid.*, 27 August 1695.

- KA 1458h, *Ibid.*, 23 September 1695.
 KA 1469a, OB 1697. Secret Resolution of the Council in Fort Rotterdam to Batavia, 10 April 1696.
 KA 1469b, OB 1697. Extracts from the minutes of Governor van Thije in the Secret and Separate Missives, under date 6 April 1696.
 KA 1469c, *Ibid.*, under date 7 April 1696.
 KA 1469d, OB 1697. Resolution of the Dutch Council of Makassar in the Secret and Separate Letters to Batavia, 18 April 1696.
 KA 1469e, OB 1697. Minutes of Governor van Thije in Secret and Separate Letters to Batavia, under date 17 April 1696.
 KA 1469f, OB 1697. Secret Resolution of the Dutch Council in Makassar in the Secret and Separate Letters to Batavia, 17 July 1696.

B. South Sulawesi Lontara'

- L-1 Lontara'na H. A. Sumangerukka, ex-Patola Wajo. Owned by H. A. Pancaitana, ex-Datu Pattojo.
 L-2 Lontara' owned by H. A. Pancaitana, ex-Datu Pattojo.
 L-3 Lontara'na Wajo, owned by Prof. Mr. Andi Zainal Abidin, No. 273, vols. 15-16-17.
 L-4 Lontara' Sukku'na Tana Wajo. Owned by Andi Makkaraka, compiled by La Sangaji Puanna La Sengngeng, Arung Bettempola (of the 18th century). (According to Professor Zainal Abidin b. Farid, the original of this *lontara'* was composed by the Arung Bettempola at the behest of Arung Matoa La Mappajung Puanna Salowong (1764-1767). All the *lontara'* available in Wajo at the time were compared, along with hundreds of others from different areas, and the resulting work is now known as the *Lontara'na Sukku'na Tana Wajo'*, or the *Complete Chronicles of the Land of Wajo*. Succeeding generations added information on to the chronicle bringing the story up to the end of the 19th century. See Zainal Abidin bin Farid 1971: 163-4.)
 L-5 Nederlands Bijbelgenootschap Collection, No. 99. In University of Leiden Library, Eastern Manuscripts Division. Leiden.
 L-6 Old Catalogue Yayasan 104, New Catalogue Yayasan 35. Yayasan Kebudayaan Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara, or YKSST. Benteng Ujung Pandang. Copied from a *lontara'* from Arung Bettempola.
 L-7 Old Catalogue Yayasan 187, New catalogue Yayasan 35. YKSST, Benteng Ujung Pandang. Copied from *lontara'* Ambo' Enre' Soppeng.
 L-8 Old Catalogue Yayasan 138. YKSST, Benteng Ujung Pandang. Copied from *lontara'* Salengke.
 L-9 Old Catalogue Yayasan 147, YKSST, Benteng Ujung Pandang.
 L-10 Old Catalogue Yayasan 201, YKSST, Benteng Ujung Pandang. Copied from *lontara'* Arung Soreang.

- L-11 *Lontara'* copied or owned by Haji Sunusi Soppeng. Copy of original located in Menzies Library, Australian National University. 3 vols.
- L-12 *Lontara'*, entitled “Attoriolonng ri Lamuru, Soppeng, Luwu’, Wajo’ ”, owned by Andi Soemanga Roekka, former Datu Pattojo.
- L-13 *Lontara’na Ranrëng Tua*. Owned by Datu Ninong, Sengkang, Wajo.
- L-14 Old Catalogue Yayasan 204, New Catalogue Yayasan 134. YKSST, Benteng Ujung Pandang.
- L-15 *Lontara'* owned by Darmawan. Ujung Pandang.
- L-16 Old Catalogue Yayasan 188, New Catalogue Yayasan 74(?). Copied from a *lontara'* owned by Arung Bila. YKSST, Benteng Ujung Pandang.
- L-17 Old Catalogue Yayasan 90. YKSST, Benteng Ujung Pandang.
- L-18 Old Catalogue Yayasan 101. Original owned by Andi Pang-erang Opu Tosinilele. Belopa, Luwu.
- L-19 Old Catalogue Yayasan 68. Original owned by Andi Pang-erang Opu Tosinilele. Belopa, Luwu.
- L-20 *Lontara'* owned by Datu Hassan Machmud. Ujung Pandang.
- L-21 Nederlands Bijbelgenootschap Collection, No. 100. University of Leiden Library, Eastern Manuscript Section. Leiden.
- L-22 Old Catalogue Yayasan 222, New Catalogue Yayasan 52. Copied from *lontara'* Arung Bërru’. YKSST, Benteng Ujung Pandang.
- L-23 Old Catalogue Yayasan 273, with title *Lontara Wadjo*, “Musu’na Arung Palakka”. YKSST, Benteng Ujung Pandang.
- L-24 Old Catalogue Yayasan 200a, New Catalogue Yayasan 139, copied from a *lontara'* belonging to I Mappa. YKSST, Benteng Ujung Pandang.
- L-25 Old Catalogue Yayasan 223, New Catalogue Yayasan 6, copied from *lontara'* Sulledatu Soppeng (Andi Wana). YKSST, Benteng Ujung Pandang.
- L-26 Old Catalogue Yayasan 174, New Catalogue Yayasan 3. “Berbagai ceritera tentang raja-raja di tanah Bugis”, YKSST, Benteng Ujung Pandang.
- L-27 Nederlands Bijbelgenootschap Collection No. 18. University of Leiden Library, Eastern Manuscripts Division. Leiden.
- L-28 *Lontara'* from Bulo-Bulo, copied by I Paliwëngi Daeng Mangata in Sinjai. 3 vols.
- L-29 Old Catalogue Yayasan 113, copied from Maradia Campa-lagiang. YKSST, Benteng Ujung Pandang.
- L-30 K.B.G. 123 vt. Museum Nasional, Jakarta.
- L-31 Bugis Manuscript 1. India Office Library, London.

L-32 *Sinrili'na Kappala' Tallumbatua*, copied and owned by Abdurrahim Daeng Mone. Ujung Pandang.

L-33 Nederlands Bijbelgenootschap Collection No. 183. University of Leiden Library, Eastern Manuscripts Division. Leiden.

L-34 Nederlands Bijbelgenootschap Collection No. 208. University of Leiden Library, Eastern Manuscripts Division. Leiden.

C. *South Sulawesi Tales, Legends, Folkstories by Informants*

(In the text of the book, informants are referred to by name, preceded by the word "Interview", for example, Interview La Hali, etc.)

1. Informant: La Hali
Age: ca. 75
Occupation: ex-police, Bone
Place: Pattirosompě, Bone
Date: 10 September 1974
2. Informant: Andi Pangerang Opu Tosinilele
Age: 66 years
Occupation: Pensioned, former Pabbicara Hadat Luwu
Place: Ujung Pandang
Date: 6 May 1975
3. Informant: Hamzah Daeng Tompo
Age: ca. 57
Occupation: ex-District Head, Borongloe
Place: Kampung Bontote'ne, Desa Borongloe, Goa
Date: 11 April 1975
4. Informant: Pětta Mani (aunt of Andi Mappasissi)
Age: ca. 100
Occupation: Housewife
Place: Watampone
Date: 11 October 1974
5. Informant: Andi Parenrengi
Age: ca. 80
Occupation: Subdistrict Chief of Galung (retired)
Place: Lajjoa, Soppeng
Date: 30 September 1974
6. Informant: Andi Parěllellei
Age: 50's
Occupation: ex-Assistant Village Head, Pattojo
Place: Pattojo, Soppeng
Date: 30 September 1974
7. Informant: La Palawa
Age: ca. 100
Occupation: Farmer

- Place: Watang Soppeng
Date: 29 September 1974
8. Informant: La Habbe
Age: 110 years
Occupation: Farmer
Place: Watang Soppeng
Date: 2 October 1974
 9. Informant: Andi Palloge
Age: 50's
Place: Ujung Pandang
Date: 15 August 1974
 10. Informant: Andi Panrenrengi, son of Andi Mappanyuki
Place: Ujung Pandang
Date: 7 August 1974
 11. Informant: Rahim Hamid
Occupation: Head English Department, Universitas Hasanuddin
Place: Ujung Pandang
Date: 1 August 1974
 12. Informant: Wife of Rahim Hamid
Occupation: Schoolteacher
Place: Ujung Pandang
Date: 1 August 1974
 13. Informant: Andi Parabba
Place: Ujung Pandang
Date: 9 August 1974
 14. Informant: Andi Rukka
Age: ca. 62
Occupation: Judge in an Islamic Court
Place: Ujung Pandang
Date: 27 March 1975
 15. Informant: A. Ahmad Pëtta Longi
Age: ca. 100
Occupation: ex-Village Head, Wanreng
Location: Cina, Bone
Date: 11 October 1979
 16. Informant: Paiwa Pëtta Solo
Age: ca. 70
Occupation: Farmer
Location: Pattirosompě
Date: 10 September 1974
 17. Informant: Andi Paliheng, Daeng Mangatta
Age: 50 years
Occupation: Farmer
Location: Sinjai
Date: 13 December 1974

18. Informant: I Pipa
Age: ca. 83 years
Occupation: Storyteller to Datu Pattiro
Place: Lajjoa, Soppeng
Date: 1 October 1974
19. Informant: Andi Pananrang
Age: Late 50's
Occupation: ex-District Head
Place: Takkalalla
Date: 30 September 1974
20. Informant: Andi Muhammad Nur
Age: Late 40's
Occupation: Contractor
Place: Takkalalla
Date: 30 September 1974
21. Informant: F. K. Sarungallo
Age: 63 years
Occupation: Chairman of Research into Custom and Culture,
Toraja Church
Place: Kete, Rantepao
Date: 4 May 1975
22. Informant: Pendeta Y. Linting
Age: ca. 60 years
Occupation: Minister of the Toraja Church
Place: Ujung Pandang
Date: 13 April 1975
23. Informant: C. Parinding
Occupation: Retired civil servant
Place: Ujung Pandang
Date: 8 May 1975
24. Informant: Darwis Hamsah
Occupation: Self-employed, researcher
Place: Polewali
Date: 21 October 1974

D. Theses and Other Manuscripts

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
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
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
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
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
Map 2. South Sulawesi.




Map 3. Principal Areas in South and Southeast Sulawesi.




Map. 4. Line of Makassar Fortresses during the Makassar War 1666-9.




Map 5. Fort Rotterdam and Environs, 17th Century.



Map 6. Detailed Map of Fort Rotterdam, 17th Century.



Map 7. Kingdoms in Sumbawa and Lombok in the 17th Century.



Map 8. Cenrana, Bone, 17th Century.

