

# The Integration of Descendants of Migrants from Turkey in Stockholm

*The TIES Study in Sweden*

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*Edited by  
Charles Westin*

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*Charles Westin*



# 1 Introduction

*Charles Westin, Alireza Behtoui, Constanza Vera Larrucea,  
Ali Osman*

This report is the result of a study about descendants of migrants from Turkey in Sweden as part of an international research project entitled 'Integration of the European Second Generation' (TIES). The objective of the project is to investigate the integration process of the descendants of migrants from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia and Morocco in various fields, including education, the labour market, social relations and identity formation in eight European countries. Studies in this area, irrespective of whether they are national or international, qualitative or quantitative, often erroneously treat migrants and their descendants as a homogenous category. In this study the heterogeneity of the target category emerges both in analysis and interpretation. The heterogeneity of 'migrants' and their descendants is often made invisible, a trend that is even more noticeable in international comparative studies than in one-country studies (Cruel & Heering 2008; Cruel, Schneider & Lelie 2012).

TIES is one of the first systematic cross-national studies of descendants of migrants from one country with similar starting positions. The International Comparative Studies of Ethnocultural Youth (ICSEY) project studied the integration of migrant and minority youth aged thirteen to eighteen years in a range of West European countries, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA (Berry, Phinney, Sam & Vedder 2006; Sam & Berry 2006). The TIES survey focuses on an older age category. The Swedish TIES study focuses on a single category, the descendants of migrants from Turkey. The majority of migrants from Turkey came to the TIES partner countries as labour migrants in the 1960s. This focus allows us to compare one of the largest groups of descendants of migrants in several European countries.

In order to facilitate comparison between the various countries studied in the project, a common questionnaire was devised to elicit comparable empirical data in the partner countries. Data were collected through an interview-based common questionnaire. Each structured face-to-face interview lasted approximately one hour. It is, however, important to stress that the questionnaire was slightly modified in each of the partner countries to meet the special conditions and interests of the different countries. The TIES survey, with its comprehensive questionnaire covering different

domains of young people's lives, contains information not available in register data.

The empirical context of the TIES project included the following countries and cities: France (Paris and Strasbourg), Germany (Berlin and Frankfurt), Spain (Madrid and Barcelona), Austria (Vienna and Linz), the Netherlands (Amsterdam and Rotterdam), Switzerland (Zurich and Basle) and Sweden (Stockholm). Thus, large cities rather than countries have been the primary focus of data collection. In almost all large cities, the focus has been on the situation for young descendants of migrants from Turkey. For the purpose of comparison, a reference group comprised of young adults of native parentage from the specific city has also been included.

Although all these countries are European welfare states, they represent different types of welfare models. Sweden, for example, is characterised by strong state commitment and involvement in the welfare regime (the Scandinavian welfare model), which provides and guarantees its citizens a safety net in terms of income in comparison with the 'continental' welfare model of France and Spain (Esping-Andersen 2002), which is less efficient than the Scandinavian model in dealing with social exclusion. Esping-Andersen sees Spain and other Southern European countries as significant variants of the 'continental' model. France's welfare provisions (e.g. support for families, pre-school provision, etc.) are more similar to those of Scandinavia than those of Spain.

In addition, all these countries have different political structures vis-à-vis migration and the incorporation of migrants. These different institutional frameworks relate, among other things, to the reception and inclusion of migrants, and thus make up contextual differences in the TIES partner countries. This is evident, for example, at the institutional level, in how educational systems are organised in the participating countries. It is assumed (as will be made evident later in the project's theoretical perspective) that this has an impact on the performance of the descendants of migrants in the different TIES partner countries. Furthermore, all the partner countries have different labour migration histories, although all the partner countries had relatively large labour inflows from Turkey until the labour migration policy was annulled in virtually all countries in question. Yet migration from Turkey (as evident in chapter 2) did not stop with the annulment of labour migration to Sweden, but continued in different forms, namely through family reunion and asylum seeking. It is noteworthy that the socioeconomic background of the latest group diverges radically from that of the previous migrants (see chapter 2).

## A note on our terminology

Several terminological issues need to be sorted out before presenting and analysing the empirical data. These issues are mainly about how we refer to the respondents participating in this study. Basically, we would like to clarify four central points:

- 1 the concept of generation;
- 2 the question of age;
- 3 the issue of ethnicity;
- 4 the migration perspective.

All four points pertain to how we refer to and attribute categories when clustering our respondents in statistical analyses and presentations.

### Generations

The Swedish TIES project studies the descendants of migrants from Turkey. The TIES consortium uses the term 'second generation'. We have opted to use the general term 'descendants of migrants from Turkey' because we consider this to be the most appropriate, correct and neutral categorisation. There are three main reasons why we reject the TIES 'second generation' terminology.

First, these children were born in Sweden. It is therefore logically erroneous to ascribe migrant status to them. They have no personal first-hand experience of migration. If the term 'generation' should be employed at all, the correct classification would be 'first-generation descendants (of migrants)'. It would therefore not be wrong in logical terms to refer to their children as 'second-generation descendants (of migrants)'.

Second, different definitions of 'second generation', i.e. the descendants of migrants, have been used in earlier research carried out in Sweden. In the 1970s the term 'second generation' included all children born in Sweden and those who migrated before twelve years of age. Therefore, it is not possible to compare the results over time since the target group is not the same. Today, the 'second generation' migrants as understood in the TIES project are found within the category of 'young people of migrant background'. Although this is the politically correct term, it is not the most appropriate one because it also includes young people born abroad. In our opinion, the conceptualisation of the '1.5 generation' to refer to preschool children who migrated with their parents is a very dubious metaphor.

Third, and most importantly, in Sweden the terminology alluding to 'second-generation migrants' is *politically* incorrect. Migrant organisations,

who were highly critical of this terminology, which was widely used by practitioners and researchers alike up until the mid-1990s, drew attention to it, saying: passing on 'migrant status' to generations born in the country is in effect to cement a socio-political division in society. It is politically wrong to set these young people apart from their peers. Today it is generally accepted by all practitioners, researchers and politicians (with the possible exception of the nationalist Sweden Democrats party) that to refer to children of migrant parents as 'second-generation migrants' is to prolong migrant status unnecessarily, and thus to render integration more difficult. While we do need to carry out research on the situation for the descendants of migrants in order to facilitate full civic incorporation in society, as researchers we need to be aware of the disadvantageous consequences of uncritically using problematic 'scientific' conceptualisations.

### **Age, life-course classification and methodological grouping**

The survey examines the status of descendants of migrants from Turkey between the ages of eighteen and 35 years. This means that the respondents were adults when they answered the questionnaire. Obviously they were young adults, although the oldest respondents were on the threshold of middle age. Occasionally we refer to the respondents as 'children' in certain questions and passages of the text that clearly pertain to childhood experiences. A more impersonal, perhaps technical term is offspring, which we do not use. We have settled on 'descendant' as the most appropriate and neutral term.

This group, or to be precise this age category (eighteen to 35), is compared in the survey analyses with a similar category of young people of the same age span of native Swedish parentage. This second group may be understood in terms of classical research design as a 'control group'. In effect, it is a comparison group. We have settled on the term 'reference group'. When we cluster data on the respondents who are descendants of migrants we speak of the 'target group'. In all our tables target group data are presented in columns to the left and reference group data in columns to the right.

### **Ethnicity**

Our sample consists of an equal number of respondents who are descendants of migrants from Turkey and respondents of native Swedish parentage. Obviously the comparison of target and reference groups involves an ethnic dimension. However, the problem we face is that respondents belonging to

the target group embrace three different ethnicities – ethnic Turks, Kurds and Syriacs (Syriani/Assyrian Suryoyo-speaking Christians) – which are linked to highly different migration histories. The parents of these respondents were all born in Turkey, but they are not all of Turkish ethnicity. A majority of the Kurds and Syriacs have Swedish citizenship today. We avoid the adjective Turkish, except in passages where it is quite clear that it refers to the community of ethnic Turks. Ethnicity is not registered in the Swedish census data. Sampling is done by information that is registered: country of birth, parents' country of birth, former citizenship, and present citizenship. In the sampling procedure there is no way we can single out people of ethnic Turkish background or origin. We have informed the TIES consortium about this methodological issue. We do not know if other receiving countries with large populations of migrants and their descendants with a background in Turkey face the same problem. One of our principal findings, however, is that the young people in our target group experience very different avenues to integration related to their particular ethnic origin as Turks, Kurds or Syriacs.

### **Migration and migrants**

The term 'immigrant', which in its Swedish form reads *invandrare*, was introduced into official and legal terminology in the late 1960s, replacing the earlier legal term 'foreigner'. Initially a term with a welcoming positive touch to it, the term 'immigrant' has since acquired a negative ring. It is gradually being shifted out of official (legal, political, demographic, etc.) terminology. Moreover, the term immigrant presents the perspective of the receiving country, referring to persons coming 'in' to settle. Similarly, the term 'emigrant' represents the perspective of the country that is left. We have chosen to use the neutral and more general terms of migration and migrants.

We are aware that we are departing from the terminology recommended by the TIES consortium, in particular when it comes to the 'second generation' concept. However, this project was financed by the Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research. We are abiding by the Council's ethical rules in not using politically incorrect terminology.

### **Integration or incorporation?**

Integration is a concept that appears in the discourse on migrant incorporation. Several understandings exist, some more sociological in nature, others more in the field of social psychology.



1. In its most general sense, integration pertains to the relationship between a whole and its parts. Integration is said to prevail when the parts are in accord with the whole. Within sociology the relationship between the whole (of society) and its parts is referred to as *social cohesion*. Integration as social cohesion has been studied not only with regard to society as a whole, but also with regard to clearly defined sections of society – for instance, social groups, institutions, organisations, etc.

Classical sociologists were concerned with the issue of social cohesion. Durkheim's (1984) famous analysis of mechanical and organic solidarity was precisely about this issue. Integration in this sociological sense is a property of the social system as a whole (usually society) and not of its individual parts (individual persons or groups). It is a systemic (and hence relational) property. Society (or some subsystem under scrutiny) – not its parts – is more or less (well) integrated. The concept of integration also has a supranational usage, as when the EU discusses European integration in the sense of both cohesion and *harmonisation* of laws, regulations and practices.

2. Another understanding of the societal concept of integration focuses on the *participation* of cultural and ethnic minorities and persons of migrant origin in various crucial public domains of mainstream society, such as the educational system, the labour market, political institutions, etc. (Diaz 1993), without pressure to suppress, conceal or abandon deeply felt personal convictions and ways of being in one's personal and private life. This is in contrast to the concept of assimilation, which combines participation in the public sphere with adjustment to, acceptance of and identification with the dominant cultural values and norms of society, thus affecting central beliefs and mores of one's private life.

Berry (1992), a Canadian social psychologist, proposed a matrix defined by two dimensions of identification – identifying with majority culture or not, and identifying with minority culture or not. Integration is defined as identification with both majority and minority culture. In Berry's model assimilation is about identifying only with majority culture, while separation pertains to identification with the minority culture. Berry described the category corresponding to non-identification with both options as marginalisation. Berry's operationalisation of this conceptual model has proven to be very useful for empirical analyses.

A similar but more sociological model places the emphasis on participation rather than on identification. Integration corresponds to participation in crucial domains of both majority and minority culture, assimilation is about participation mainly in majority culture, while participation that is mainly confined to minority culture is termed segregation. The fourth

alternative – non-participation in both of the main options – is tentatively referred to as creolisation of culture, a mixing of cultural forms, from which a new, syncretic blend of culture develops.

3. A slightly different sociological approach is found in Gordon's (1964) model of the assimilation process through which migrants gradually extend their participation to new spheres of mainstream society. Economic integration is achieved through participation in the workforce, which is the domain of integration that migrants usually encounter first. Language integration may follow, when a migrant learns to manage the requirements of everyday life in the language of mainstream society. Social integration, implying that the migrant socialises across ethnic and cultural boundaries and participates in informal networks and organisations, usually requires some proficiency in the language of the dominant society. Political integration implies participation in political life, for example acquiring party membership, voting in elections, and for some, nomination as candidates for election. This presupposes participation in social networks. Active political participation usually implies that the person concerned has been naturalised as a citizen of the country. Residential integration is when one's dwellings are not determined by ethnic or cultural conditions, that is when discriminatory mechanisms on the housing market are not decisive, or in other words, when residential segregation does not apply. Family integration applies when marriage does not follow strictly ethnic or cultural ties, that is to say when we have exogamy. When family integration is achieved as the last domain of integration in a long process, Gordon refers to this as assimilation.

As we see, the same words are given somewhat different meanings according to the various models describing the process of migrants' incorporation in a host society. This makes for conceptual confusion, particularly with regard to the concept of integration. For instance, a cultural and ethnic minority existing as a relatively isolated and autonomous enclave in society may be well integrated in itself (according to the interpretation of integration as cohesion of a whole with its parts) but nevertheless lack participation in such domains of mainstream society as its economy, working life and political institutions. The Amish, to illustrate this point, form a community that is well-integrated within itself, while having scant participation in and interaction with American mainstream society. So a segregated community may be an integrated community. It all depends on the level of analysis.

One solution to this conceptual problem is to say *social cohesion* when this is the issue at stake, or *participation* if that is what one is interested in, or *identification* if one is examining individual attitudes, and so forth, rather

than employ the highly ambiguous concept of integration. These other concepts have the advantage of being closer to empirical operationalisation than the concept of integration. If, by integration, we mean the general process of incorporating migrants and their descendants into mainstream society, we would prefer to use the concept of *incorporation*. It is less ambiguous than integration as a sociological conception. To incorporate is 'to take into or include as part of a mass or whole; to combine or unite into one body or whole; blend; mix' (Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary of the English Language). However, as the international research project and the TIES network includes the word 'integration' in its name (Integration of the European Second Generation), we have maintained the word in the title of this report. When we refer to 'integration' in the text it is usually in the sense of 'incorporation'.

### The TIES project in Sweden

In the Swedish questionnaire, the following issues were added to elicit knowledge about interesting problems that had been exposed by researchers in the past when studying the descendants of migrants from Turkey. We specifically included questions on the respondents' perception of their health status, trust in the institutions of Swedish society, and the feeling of belonging to different 'ethnic groups'. The questionnaire was also constructed to take into consideration the variation in institutional arrangements in the field of education. Compared to the other TIES partner countries, the Swedish study had the smallest sample. Our study surveyed 500 people (250 descendants of migrants from Turkey and 250 descendants of native parentage). The decision to focus only on descendants of migrants from Turkey residing in Stockholm was due to the economic constraints inherent in the approved project budget from the funding research council.

In a preceding paragraph we mentioned the methodological problem that we faced due to the fact that by no means all of the people in our sample are ethnic Turks. This is related to the fact that ethnicity is not included as a category in the Swedish census. We had to define our sampling frame as persons born in Turkey, or persons whose parents were born in Turkey. Sweden has had a considerable refugee migration of Kurds who originated in several countries (Iran, Iraq and Syria, but predominantly in Turkey). Sweden has also had a significant chain migration of Syriani/Assyrian migrants from Lebanon and Syria and, above all, South-eastern Turkey. This latter group is Syrian Orthodox Christian and speaks Suryoyo. We refer to this group as Syriacs.

The migration histories of ethnic Turks, Kurds and Syriacs differ. Places of principal settlement in Sweden differ. Views on the Turkish state and its policies differ. Languages differ. Religions differ. We have reason to hypothesise that identities will also differ between these groups, and that patterns of integration will evolve differently for the three groups. In chapter 6 we have made use of this unique opportunity to present a more accurate picture of identities and integration using decomposed data available to us for the three ethnic categories of migrants from Turkey and their descendants.

The actual data collection for the study was carried out by the Swedish National Bureau of Statistics (Statistics Sweden – SCB). The advantage of commissioning the SCB is that it administers the total Population Register and therefore has access to reliable, up-to-date census data. It also has trained and experienced interviewers. The sample focused on persons aged 18–35 years living in Stockholm County and included persons born in Sweden to parents who were born in Turkey (1) and persons born in Sweden to Swedish-born parents (2). First, 250 persons from both groups were selected randomly from the Swedish Population Register (RTB) and the interviewers started to contact the interviewees. Due to the low response rate (43 per cent in all), a second sample was drawn, including 2,250 persons from population 1 and 750 persons from population 2; the difference between the groups was due to differences in the response rate. The earlier sample was excluded to avoid the same persons being selected twice. Once a total of 250 interviews in each population had been conducted the data collection was terminated.

Despite the fact that the response rate in this survey was low, the TIES data were still valuable in providing a thorough description of the outcomes of descendants of migrants from Turkey in the educational system and in the labour market as well as their experience of Swedish society in comparison with the reference group of people of native parentage. Statistics Sweden computed weighted data for this sample to compensate for non-response, which blew up the sample to population size. Our estimations are based on both weighted and unweighted data. We have compared these results and reported the differences in the text. Using unweighted data in some of the estimations give different point estimates than weighted data, but the signs are the same without exception. Weighted data were used for the analyses in chapter 7.

In order to assess the reliability of the TIES data, we compared the TIES sample and an administrative dataset, STATIV, which included the *entire* population living in Sweden at the time of the TIES interviews. From STATIV, we selected all people living in the County of Stockholm between the ages of eighteen and 35 years with both parents born either in Turkey or in Sweden, i.e. identical to the sample frame in the TIES survey.

This comparison revealed differences between the TIES sample and the administrative register, STATIV. Compared to STATIV, the respondents in the TIES interviews are older, the proportion of women is somewhat higher and the parents' educational level is also somewhat higher. The large differences in educational levels between the respondents in the TIES sample and the STATIV register are of great concern. Individuals in TIES survey are more highly educated than those from the register data of STATIV. For example, the rate of those with primary school as their highest educational level in STATIV is roughly twice that of the TIES respondents. Consequently the TIES sample seems to be a positive selection of individuals.

There are many explanations for the discrepancies between the two datasets. Regarding age and gender, the differences between the datasets probably reflect what has been observed in other surveys, i.e. that men have a lower response rate than women, and young people have a lower response rate than older people. When it comes to education, the discrepancies between the datasets are probably a combination of higher response rates among those with a higher level of education and imprecise information from the respondents in the interviews. For example, it is possible that a respondent might have described an unfinished programme at university as tertiary education, while the registers only include completed courses. It is therefore important to bear in mind that the following empirical chapters describe young men and women who are both older and more highly educated than the population (the sampling frame) from which they were selected.

## **Theories of incorporation of descendants of migrants**

The incorporation of descendants of migrants in North America and North-western European countries has attracted much scholarly attention during recent decades. Some scholars argue that the descendants of migrants from non-European countries have great difficulties in assimilating due to their cultural distance, lower level of education and lack of job skills (see, for example, Borjas 1999). This is the prevalent discourse when media report on the situation of descendants of non-European migrants. Empirical results from various studies conducted in both the US and Europe do not confirm this fear and show that despite different incorporation trajectories, they are, by and large, well-integrated into these societies (see, for example, Portes & Rumbaut 2001; Alba & Nee 2003; Crul & Schneider 2010; Crul et al. 2012; Portes & Fernandez-Kelly 2008).

In a more optimistic scenario, other scholars contend that, similar to earlier waves of migration, the new cohort of descendants of migrants will assimilate into the social mainstream. Such a process occurs when they integrate into the common values, practices and language of their new countries (Alba & Nee 1997). These theories emphasise that the outcomes for the assimilation of descendants of new migrants will be diversified, that is, they are likely to become incorporated into the middle and working classes; some, however, will be incorporated into the most marginalised sections of the population in the new environment. But this process, with different options, will produce similar results to those of the descendants of earlier European migrants, that is, a transition into the mainstream. This is because the challenges confronting these young people today are not radically different from those of earlier cohorts (Waldinger & Perlmann 1998).

The last type of theory in this field is known as 'segmented assimilation'. According to this theory, a majority of the descendants of migrants achieve either middle class or working class status, depending on, among other things, their socioeconomic background (the education and occupational position of their parents), how government policy, civil society and 'public opinion' are positive or indifferent towards them, and the historical background of their ethnic minority community. However, a smaller section among these young people with a migrant background is at risk of joining the 'urban underclass' in Western societies. This path is labelled by Portes & Rumbaut (2001) as *downward assimilation*. Indications of this path include early school dropout, unemployment, poverty, criminality and imprisonment. According to this theory, such a career is more probable today than previously because of the harsher climate facing migrants from non-European countries, reduction of labour market opportunities for migrants and their descendants due to the restructuring of the labour market in the West and the successive weakening of welfare institutions in Western countries, which are creating a permanent poor underclass. Difficulties in finding a way to become incorporated in mainstream societies direct these young people to the formation of an 'oppositional culture' (Zhou 1997).

How can we describe the incorporation of descendants of migrants from Turkey in Swedish society, based on the empirical results of the Swedish TIES project and in relation to the aforementioned theories? In the following, we briefly present the results of different chapters in this report to determine which of the above-mentioned hypotheses come closest to our results.

This report contains mainly descriptive findings on the main topics of the Swedish TIES survey. More complex and comparative analyses of each

topic will be published on the basis of TIES data. The limitations of data in this survey highlight the need for further research in this field in order to shed more light on the integration of descendants of migrants in European countries.

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## 2 Historical and demographic considerations

*Constanza Vera Larrucea*

This chapter provides some basic information about migration from Turkey to Sweden, and situates it in Sweden's immigration history and integration policies. The Swedish case shows certain differences in migratory trends when compared to other European countries represented in this study. Such differences are likely to have affected the characteristics of the migrants from Turkey and their descendants. In order to enable our understanding of the data presented in the coming chapters, some basic information about the target group will be presented here. Demographic data about age, marital status, household position and citizenship will be introduced so as to give a general overview of the demographic characteristics of the respondents' parents.

### **Sweden: the country of reception**

Sweden has never been an ethnically homogenous nation-state (Westin 2006). Recognised small ethnic minorities include the Sami and Finnish speakers in Tornedalen. These two groups, as well as later migrants from Finland, Jews and the Roma people, are recognised as national minorities. Since the early post-war period, Swedish migration policy has been characterised by the expectation that most migrants will remain in Sweden and become citizens someday, as is reflected in the Nordic agreements regarding the free movement of Nordic citizens. In the 1960s, the expansion of Swedish industry demanded manpower that could not be satisfied by the domestic workforce alone. Trade unions accepted that industry had to recruit foreign labour. Although the recruitment of foreign labour turned out to be expensive for employers, later economic analyses show that in the 1950s through to the early 1970s it was beneficial to industry and to Swedish society as a whole (Ekberg 2009).

It was necessary to set up language courses and interpreter services. This recruitment differed from the continental guest-worker model. Finland was the main source of foreign recruited manpower, but Sweden also recruited workers from Southern and South-eastern Europe. A recruitment office

was opened in Ankara. In time, labour migration from Turkey turned into chain migration, as social contacts through family and local networks were more efficient than recruitment campaigns organised by the Swedish authorities. The government cooperated closely with the Swedish trade union confederation and both parties agreed that foreign workers were to enjoy the same wage levels and rights as Swedes, including access to unemployment benefits. Thus Sweden did not set up a guest worker programme like Germany in order to meet labour demands (Westin 2006).

An increasing number of migrants entered Sweden in the 1960s by their own means, encouraged by the availability of low-skill jobs. As long as people found jobs, integration did not seem to be a problem. For many years the authorities were more or less unaware of the rapidly growing flows in the early 1960s. However, all this had changed by 1967. Legal provisions that already existed under migration law were applied consistently to slow down and reduce migration. Although Sweden officially stopped labour migration from non-Nordic countries in 1972, migration was far from over. Family reunification involving the wives and children of those who had arrived in Sweden during the previous decade increased the number of foreign-born persons in Sweden. In the 1970s, Sweden started to receive refugees from the Middle East and South America.

In the 1980s tens of thousands of people, in particular from the Middle East, the Horn of Africa and Eastern Europe, arrived in Sweden seeking asylum. In the 1990s, the collapse of the former Republic of Yugoslavia resulted in the arrival of over 100,000 refugees. At the end of the decade, refugees from the Middle East and Africa were still arriving. Today, more than 12 per cent of Sweden's inhabitants were born outside the country and close to 20 per cent of the total population is considered to have a 'foreign background', that is, to have at least one parent born abroad.

Before 1974, Sweden had no official policy for the resettlement and incorporation of migrants into Swedish society. The increasing number of non-Nordic migrants prompted parliament to draw up an integration policy based on three main principles: equality, freedom of choice and partnership. Equality implied the right of migrants as individual citizens to enjoy the same rights to healthcare, housing, social benefits and schooling as native citizens. Freedom of choice entitled migrants to decide whether they wished to assimilate or maintain their distinct native culture (Westin 2006). The principle of partnership implied public support for a multiplicity of new cultures in the country provided that they were situated within a framework of democratic core values and norms. These principles were translated into special policies for migrants and their children, entitling them to special

education, including home language classes, social and financial support for migrant associations and support for family reunification.

Some researchers (Akpınar 1988; Ålund 1997) contend that this policy placed emphasis on differences by creating a discourse that defined migrants in terms of their culture. Children of migrant background starting school had different curricula from children of native Swedish parentage. The integration programme, however, did not function adequately after the arrival of large numbers of non-European migrants, who were mostly refugees. In 1985, a new integration policy called 'The All-Sweden Strategy' was introduced, which focused on language and vocational training, housing, and municipal responsibility for implementing these measures. The result of this programme, however, was the generation of social welfare dependency and segregation (Westin 2006). The integration programme was reformulated once again in the 1990s, still guided by the same three principles, but now framing the concept of diversity within the message that integration was to be regarded as a reciprocal process between migrants and Swedes. The new programme allowed migrants to decide on their place of residence in order to avoid the segregation caused by the previous programme. However, things did not work out as planned and segregation is still prevalent among people of foreign descent.

The emphasis on cultural difference was changed in a government bill entitled *From immigration policy to integration policy* which was drawn up in 1997. Its point of departure was to consider Swedish society as ethnically and culturally diverse. This understanding became the basis for measures taken at every societal level and sector where integration was implemented. Individuals were considered as equals and encouraged to support themselves and take an active part in society. Integration was regarded as a process occurring at both individual and community levels. An important change resulting from this policy was the establishment of the Swedish Integration Board. Integration policy was thus separated politically and organisationally from migration policy. The Integration Board had the ambition to permeate all policy areas. Despite these efforts, substantial disparities between people of Swedish and migrant origin continued to persist. Segregation, unemployment and discrimination were all problem areas associated with non-European migrants.

The Integration Board was abolished after the election of a centre-right government in 2006. Some of its functions were taken over directly by municipalities and others by the Board of Migration. The Ministry for Integration and Gender Equality became responsible for most of the national regulations pertaining to integration and gender policy. Equality was

understood to be something broader than merely an expression of respect for the different ethnicities living in Sweden. Most policies implemented by the new government are designed to encourage people to participate in the workforce, to reduce unemployment and to counteract discrimination in recruitment and at the workplace.

## Migration from Turkey to Sweden

Sweden signed an agreement with Turkey in the early 1960s on labour market recruitment. Turkish labour was first recruited by the Swedish Employment Agency through its office in Ankara. This soon proved to be unnecessary because most migratory movements were the result of social contacts. Chain migration from Turkey to Sweden was so extensive that today a majority of the ethnic Turks in Sweden are not only from the same region, but from the same town, Kulu, in the province of Konya in central Anatolia. Many of these migrants were of peasant origin, some with knowledge of traditional crafts (Westin 2002). People from Ankara and other provinces also migrated to Sweden, mostly through social contacts. They had a higher socioeconomic position than the majority of migrants from rural areas.

The men who had arrived on their own in the 1960s brought their wives and children to Sweden in the 1970s. This migratory movement was made possible by laws facilitating the family reunification of migrants already settled in the country. Turks were never labelled as 'guest workers'. This facilitated their integration into Swedish society, which meant a very different opportunity structure from that experienced by migrants to other European countries. Language courses were set up and paid for by employers in cooperation with the city council. As the Labour Organisation stipulated, migrant workers were not to be treated differently from national workers. They were to enjoy the same duties and benefits. That is why the responsibility for their incorporation was partly placed on employers. All this changed, however, when the introduction of the integration policies ushered in a shift to more active state intervention.

By the end of the 1970s, Sweden started to receive Kurdish refugees from Iran, Iraq and above all from Turkey. Syriacs, the name used to denote people of Assyrian or Syriani origin, constituted another ethnic group accepted by Sweden as refugees. They came not only from Turkey, but also from Syria and Lebanon and sought asylum in Sweden on the grounds of religious persecution. In Turkey, they represented a trading class (Björklund 1981).

In Sweden, some members of this group emphasised their Syrian Orthodox identity, while others insisted on being recognised under the name of Assyrians. Both Kurds and Syriacs suffered as a result of the nationalist homogenisation policy originally initiated by Atatürk's regime, which aimed to transform Turkey into a secular, homogeneous nation-state that did not recognise ethnic, cultural or religious diversity. Turkish was the only accepted language, and aggressive secularisation made these minorities feel persecuted. The permanent call to do military service – aggravated by the conflict with Greece in 1975 – acted as a push factor that led these minorities to claim asylum in other countries.

Initially, the Swedish authorities were unaware of the ethnic heterogeneity of migrants originating in Turkey. In the 1970s, however, it became evident that different communities existed among migrants from Turkey, comprised of ethnic Turks, Kurds and Syriacs. These groups speak different languages, have different religions (despite the fact that both the majority of the Kurdish and ethnic Turkish populations are Muslim), came from different regions in Turkey and belong to historically different nations. Official Swedish statistics, however, treat them as one group. This is because current regulations only recognise citizenship, country of origin and parents' country of origin as legitimate categories for census data on migrants.

Svanberg (1988) estimated the ethnic distribution of migrants from Turkey in Sweden. He concluded that Syriacs represent half of the migrants from Turkey while the remainder is equally divided between ethnic Turks and Kurds. Meanwhile, Westin estimates that migrants from Turkey are divided equally between ethnic Turks, Kurds and Syriacs (Westin 2003). Clearly, there is no certainty about the ethnic distribution of these migrants in Sweden. Authors such as Akpınar (1998) and Svanberg (1988) find it difficult to analyse this group due to the lack of a clear-cut ethnic division. Although official Swedish statistics do not allow us to group people by ethnic origin, the TIES survey in Sweden has adopted the principle that this is admissible with the consent of the person being interviewed. Since these groups differ with regard to religion, language and traditions, a legitimate research question is whether they also differ with respect to patterns of integration.

The Syriac community in Sweden embraces the Assyrian and Syriani communities. These communities differ in their religious orientation and in terms of self-categorisation. They present themselves as separate communities, but in terms of external categorisation, they have been referred to as one community – *Assyrian-Syriani*. Although most

literature reiterates the view that Syriacs arrived as refugees from Turkey, a study by Björklund (1982) shows that far from all suffered persecution at the time of migration. Some were already settled in Beirut before arriving in Sweden. The Assyrians also followed a pattern of chain migration. A majority were from the Tur'abdin region in Turkey. As in the rest of Turkey, migration from the province of Midyat started with the recruitment of guest workers in the early 1960s. Labour migration and subsequent family reunification almost emptied the area. Upon arrival in Sweden, they were dispersed to cities in central Sweden, but community cohesion led them to resettle in Södertälje, a city not far from Stockholm. Members of the extended family started to migrate to Sweden without work permits, claiming that they were refugees. By the mid-1970s, the local authorities felt concerned about the lack of funds for social assistance to these newcomers. Today, Syriacs in Södertälje represent about one-fourth of the city's population.

The first group of Kurds migrated from Konya, the region from which most ethnic Turks in Sweden originate. As Sunni Muslims, Kurds share the same religion as ethnic Turks. The group from 'Turkish Kurdistan' migrated to Sweden under different circumstances. A first wave arrived in the 1960s along with the ethnic Turks in response to labour force recruitment. A second wave came after the military coup in 1971 and following the coup in 1980 (Turan 1984). Some Kurds also entered Sweden through the laws allowing family reunification in the 1970s. They were recognised as refugees and their cause attracted widespread attention in Sweden. Media, government and activists were interested in the Kurdish cause, and voiced concern for this oppressed group without a country.

Some researchers contend that rural Kurds experienced a cultural shock upon arrival from a semi-feudal, patriarchal and authoritarian society to modern, industrialised Sweden where values and gender roles appeared to be diffused. Adjusting to Swedish conditions proved to be especially difficult for Kurds who had arrived as refugees (Turan 1984; Dogan 1998; Kakabaveh 2007). The first generation of Kurdish women endured hard living conditions in Sweden. Most were illiterate and only had experience of domestic labour (Dogan 1998). The literature about this group emphasises how difficult it is to determine the exact number of Kurds based on classification of country of birth rather than ethnicity. This is why most studies about Kurdish settlement only give approximations.

Studies of ethnic Turkish migrants in Sweden have covered different aspects of their integration: cultural values (Engelbrektsson 1992), political

attitudes (Alpay 1980), childhood and adolescence (Yazgan 1983; Yazgan 1993), housing (Özüekren 1992) and integration and language (Narrowe 1998). Studies of neighbourhood and housing report that people from Turkey are mainly resident in peripheral areas of Stockholm such as Rinkeby, Tensta, Fittja and Södertälje, places characterised by a high proportion of migrant inhabitants. From 1960, migrants from Turkey began to organise in federal associations, sometimes with the support of the Swedish authorities. Today, 'Turks' are the tenth largest migrant group in Sweden (Swedish Bureau of Statistics, SCB). They are located mostly in the Stockholm area, but also in Gothenburg and Malmö and have diverse kinds of organisations and ethnic associations throughout the country. More information pertaining to demographic characteristics is given later in this chapter.

Studies about the descendants of migrants from Turkey have focused on the struggle between traditional modes of living and new alternatives prevalent in Swedish society. Research has covered all of the ethnic groups mentioned here, but mainly focuses on ethnic Turks. These studies show that children from big cities in Turkey tend to be more successful in their process of integration into Swedish society. The reports ascribes this to the fact that their parents are more 'open minded' than parents from rural areas where traditional views predominate. Yazgan described 'second-generation' *Turkish boys* (1983) and *girls* (1993). Her analysis centred on the effect of the children's background. She found that there are common aspects that apply to youngsters, such as the preservation of their parents' culture. In terms of education and employment, a higher social status was achieved by those who came from or had lived for some time in cities; whereas those from rural districts (the vast majority) experienced a more difficult process of integration. In general, studies about integration into Swedish society show a contrast between those from urban areas and those from rural areas. The individuals from urban areas proved to be much more receptive to Swedish values, while the majority of families from rural areas tried to maintain the social structure and traditions that they had lived with in Turkey.

Other studies highlight the descendants' social mobility (Eyrumulu 1992), impacts on identity (Berg 1994) and language (Narrowe 1998). Studies show that children are influenced by their parents' experience when developing identity and school careers. Parents who intended to return to Turkey did not have much incentive and sometimes did not even allow their children to pursue higher education because it was considered unnecessary. For Kurds and Syriacs, Turkey was an inhospitable country



to return to, and they were supposedly more willing to integrate into Swedish society.

Some researchers have tried to take another approach and study groups on the basis of ethnicity instead of parents' country of birth. Virta & Westin (1999) collected data on adolescents with migrant backgrounds in Sweden as part of an international comparative study of ethno-cultural youth. According to the results, ethnic Turkish youth, especially young women, seem to benefit from the Swedish model of integration. Family relations and proficiency in Swedish prove to have had a great impact on the integrative attitude assumed by youngsters during their school years. However, descendants of Kurds showed adaptation problems related to their behaviour at school. Lack of proficiency in Swedish was among the variables that made the schooling period difficult for them. This study provides a good example of how a correct categorisation of ethnic groups delivers different results for groups from the same country.

## Demographic characteristics

Finland, the former Yugoslavia and Iraq are the three most important sending countries for migrants in the Stockholm region. 22.3 per cent of the inhabitants in Stockholm were born outside Sweden (SCB/USK 2008). When their descendants are included, the percentage of persons with a foreign background rises to 28.1. This is considerably higher than the national average of 13.4 per cent. Stockholm represents a multicultural environment. The city is populated by migrant groups representing a large range of religions and cultures. Today, migrants born in Turkey represent only 2.6 per cent of the total population in Stockholm with a foreign background.

Since 2005, the SCB has defined the Stockholm metropolitan area as one continuous conurbation, which includes all but one of the municipalities in Stockholm County and the city of Södertälje. More than one-fifth of Sweden's total population resides in this region. Stockholm County is one of the statistical national areas according to the nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics within the EU (NUTS:SE). Of the 38,158 migrants from Turkey in Sweden, 51 per cent live in Stockholm County (2007 USK/SCB). However, this figure does not include the descendants of migrants from Turkey, who total 4,270 in Stockholm County (2007 USK/SCB).

The age distribution of the TIES respondents by gender for target and reference groups is given in table 2.1.

**Table 2.1 Age distribution, by parents’ country of birth and gender (in %). Target group = descendants of migrants from Turkey; reference group = young people of Swedish origin**

Age	Target group		Reference group	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
18-24	40.9	38.9	30.7	31.4
25-29	36.6	38.0	28.0	28.6
30-36	22.4	23.0	41.4	40.1
N	124	127	123	127

Each group presents a relatively homogeneous distribution across gender. The table shows that respondents with a background in Turkey are on average younger than the reference group. The mean age of respondents with parents from Turkey is 25.7 years, while that of the reference group is 28.03.

**Marital status**

One of the greatest differences between the target and reference groups pertains to marital status. 81.6 per cent of the respondents of Swedish parentage declared themselves to be single and only 15.2 per cent were married, while 58.3 per cent of the descendants of migrants from Turkey were single and 39.5 per cent were married. Although the sample is not representative and does not therefore allow for generalisations, the data indicate that people belonging to the target group tend to marry at a younger age than people in the reference group.

**Table 2.2 Marital status for target and reference groups (in %)**

	Target group	Reference group	Total
Married	39.5	15.2	15.7
Single	58.3	81.6	81.1
Divorced	2.3	3.2	3.2
Total	100	100	100
N	251	251	501

In both groups Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

## Household size and position

Although this report does not consider the issue of housing and neighbourhood, housing position might be tackled as an interesting demographic indicator for the age group considered in the TIES Survey. The young adults are in a phase of their lives when they usually become independent from their parents and start having a family of their own. Leaving one's parental home reflects people's life choices at this stage of their lives. Demographic changes as well as changes in young people's educational and socioeconomic situations will influence opportunities for having a household of one's own. However, due to economic, family and cultural reasons, as well as the lack of easily available housing in the Stockholm metropolitan area, young people tend to stay in their parental home longer than otherwise expected.

Nevertheless, the TIES respondents in Stockholm who have started living on their own are relatively young. What is most interesting is the difference between the two study groups of the percentage of people who have left the parental home. 64.5 per cent of the reference group had left their childhood (i.e. parental) home to live on their own at the time of the survey. The mean age for leaving home was 19.3 years. By contrast, only 23 per cent of the target group respondents had moved from their parental home. For them, the mean age was 21.2 years.

**Table 2.3 Respondents having left their parental home, target and reference groups (in %)**

	Target group	Reference group	Total
Yes	23.0	64.5	63.5
No	77.0	35.5	36.5
Total	100	100	100
N	251	251	501

In both groups Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

The reasons given for leaving home differ between the groups. For those of Swedish parentage the most commonly stated reasons for moving out were to study (33.6 per cent) and to live on one's own (35 per cent). The main reason to leave home for those with family origins in Turkey was marriage (46.4 per cent).

For those who had left their parental home at the time of the survey, there are strong differences between the study groups with regard to the

time in their lives as well the reasons for leaving. This might be due to factors associated with the different ancestry of the groups. However, these results should be interpreted with caution. Several factors, such as the housing shortage in Stockholm, will have had a decisive effect on the stage at which young people had the opportunity to leave the parental home.

**Table 2.4** Reasons for leaving the parental home (in %)

	Target group	Reference group
Marriage	46.4	0
Living together	7.7	13.8
Living independently	17.2	35.0
Studies	16.8	33.6
Work	3.2	6.3
Not getting on with parents	3.3	1.5
Other reasons	5.5	9.8
Total	100	100
N	251	250

In both groups Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

## Demographic characteristics of the parents

Following our sample design, all respondents included in the target group have both parents born in Turkey. Similarly, both parents of respondents entered in the reference group were born in Sweden. Practically all respondents have both parents alive. However, the parents' marital situation varies between the groups. Most parents from Turkey are or have been married to each other (97.1 per cent). With regard to the reference group, 84.3 per cent of the parents are or were once married. The same tendency is seen in the stability of the parents' relationship, in which a larger percentage (87.5 per cent) of the parents from Turkey is still married compared to the parents of the reference group (67.8 per cent).

### Region of birth

The parents of our target group came to Sweden from different Turkish provinces. However, two cities stand out. The majority of ethnic Turks are from the Konya region of central Anatolia, with the city of Kulu as the main point of emigration. This region is mainly populated by ethnic

Turks, but also by some Kurds. The province of Mardin, also showing a high sending frequency, was the place from which people of Syriac background migrated. It is important to note that respondents were asked about their parents' childhood place of residence, not the region in which they were born.

**Table 2.5** Parents' province of origin (in %)

	<b>Father</b>	<b>Mother</b>
Ankara	4.9	5.0
Istanbul	7.6	9.3
Konya	37.5	38.6
Diyarbakir	5.5	5.0
Mardin	14.6	14.1
Sakarya	2.7	3.1
Bolu	2.3	1.2
Nevsehir	2.4	2.0
Other provinces in Turkey	16.0	12.5
Provinces in Sweden	2.9	3.2
Other country	0.4	0.0
Don't know	3.2	6.0
Total	100	100
N	251	251

For both cases - Mother and Father - Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

## **Ethnicity**

One important characteristic of the migration from Turkey to Sweden is its ethnic heterogeneity. Previous inquiries regarding the heterogeneity of migrants from Turkey could be partly disentangled by accounting for the migrants' ethnicity.

The respondents were asked about the ethnic identification of both parents, which table 2.6 shows is quite homogeneous.

There is hardly any intermarriage between the ethnic groups, but we found that the majority of parents belong to the ethnic Turkish group. Around 14 per cent of the respondents declare that they have parents of Kurdish origin and almost a quarter of the respondents are of Syriac origin, which represents a considerable part of the sample.

**Table 2.6** Parents' ethnicity (self-identification) (in %)

	<b>Father</b>	<b>Mother</b>
Turkish	59.8	59.5
Kurdish	14.0	14.6
Syriac	23.1	23.6
Other	2.8	2.8
Don't know	0.4	0.4
Total	100	100
N	251	251

For both cases - Mother and Father - Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

## Migration history

The following table presents the parents' age at the time of their migration to Sweden.

**Table 2.7** Parents' age of migration to Sweden

<b>Age</b>	<b>Father</b>	<b>Cumulative</b>	<b>Mother</b>	<b>Cumulative</b>
0-12	8.1	8.1	7.8	7.7
13-18	23.8	31.9	37.9	45.7
19-24	36.6	63.5	30.8	76.5
25-29	16.3	79.8	11.6	88.0
30-34	8.2	88.0	2.7	90.7
35-39	1.9	89.9	0.8	91.5
40-44	0.9	90.8	0.4	91.9
45-49	0.4	91.2	0	91.9
≥ 50	0	91.2	0	91.9
Missing	8.8	100	8.1	100
N	251		251	
Mean age	21		19	

For both cases - Mother and Father - Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

Most parents migrated to Sweden at a young age. The mean for both father and mother is lower than 22 years. Half the number of mothers were in Sweden by the time they were nineteen years old and about 80 per cent of the fathers had migrated before they were 30 years old.

**Table 2.8** Parents' reasons to migrate to Sweden (in %)

	<b>Father</b>	<b>Cumulative</b>	<b>Mother</b>	<b>Cumulative</b>
Family reunification	34.5	34.5	71.0	71.0
Work	34.1	68.6	5.1	76.1
Studies	2.1	70.7	0.4	76.5
Asylum/refuge	16.2	86.9	10.4	86.9
Other reasons	9.5	96.4	10.4	97.3
Don't know	3.6	100	2.7	100
Total	100		100	
N	251		251	

For both cases - Mother and Father - Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

One third of the respondents' fathers migrated for reasons of work. Almost the same share came to Sweden on the grounds of family reunification and 16.2 per cent came seeking asylum. Among those claiming family reunification, marriage was the most frequent reason for migrating. As many as 71 per cent of the mothers migrated due to family reunification causes and only a small share (5.1 per cent) did so as formal labour migrants. This confirms what other studies of labour migration have found; that is, it has primarily been a male phenomenon. However, in this case only a third of the respondents' fathers might be considered to be labour migrants. This represents an important finding with regard to a population traditionally considered to be labour migrants in Europe. Their children's integration can no longer be seen only as a consequence of large-scale labour migration to Sweden.

The percentage of refugees is considerable, but not as large as most literature suggests. Checking by ethnicity, the results are as follows:

**Table 2.9** Parents' reasons to migrate, by ethnic groups (in %)

	<b>Ethnic Turks</b>		<b>Kurds</b>		<b>Syriacs</b>	
	<b>Father</b>	<b>Mother</b>	<b>Father</b>	<b>Mother</b>	<b>Father</b>	<b>Mother</b>
Family reunification	45.1	81.0	28.7	83.3	11.5	38.1
Work	40.7	6.8	37.3	0	15.6	3.3
Studies	2.0	0	6.1	2.6	0	0
Asylum/refuge	0	0	22.4	2.6	56.6	42.2
Other reasons	9.5	10.8	2.7	8.2	13.0	11.7
Don't know	2.7	1.4	2.7	2.7	3.3	4.7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	148	148	35	35	60	60

For both cases - Mother and Father - Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level.

When our data are cross-checked by group, we find that a considerable number of fathers of (ethnic) Turkish or Kurdish origin migrated to Sweden for work. With regard to people of ethnic Turkish origin, the main reason for migration was family reunification, probably as a consequence of parents or husbands/wives who were labour migrants. The great majority of the mothers of Turkish and Kurdish origin moved to Sweden within the framework of the entitlement to family reunification. Refuge/asylum is a relevant cause of migration for Kurdish fathers. The case of the Syrians, however, is very different. Only a minority of the fathers and mothers claim to have come for work reasons. Most of them arrived as refugees or asylum seekers. A considerable number of mothers came through family reunification.

## Citizenship

For our analysis of integration, it is crucial to establish the legal status of the target group. Citizenship implies recognition and acceptance of an individual as a member of the State with the rights and duties that this implies. Swedish legislation is moving towards a liberal model of citizenship, although there is still an inclination towards the principle of *ius sanguinis*, typically linked to a communitarian citizenship regime. Those who acquired citizenship by birth are individuals who have at least one parent naturalised as Swedish. However, it is also possible to acquire citizenship on the grounds of residence. People born abroad may apply for Swedish citizenship after five years of permanent residence without a criminal record. 78.9 per cent of the respondents' mothers and 79.4 per cent of the fathers have acquired Swedish citizenship. Dual citizenship is accepted by both Sweden and Turkey. Unfortunately, however, we have no general information regarding Turkish citizenship within the migrant population with origins in Turkey. But in the case of the respondents, their citizenship status is as follows:

**Table 2.10** Citizenship position (in %)

Only Swedish	40.0
Only Turkish	1.0
Dual citizenship	54.5
Other	1.6
No answer	3.0
N	251



57 per cent of respondents in possession of Swedish citizenship received it at birth and 43 per cent acquired it through naturalisation. There were only three cases of respondents without Swedish citizenship. Therefore, the vast majority of respondents have been legally incorporated into the Swedish State. The liberal Swedish regime has officially allowed dual citizenship since 2002, when the new Citizenship Act came into effect. In the case of Turkey, dual citizenship is also allowed.

**Table 2.11** Grounds for citizenship acquisition (in %)

At birth	57.0
Through naturalisation	43.0

A majority of the TIES respondents in Stockholm possess dual citizenship. However, 40 per cent of the respondents have Swedish citizenship only, after having given up their legal ties with Turkey. This step could be relevant not only for their integration, but also for their transnational activities. Considering the ethnic composition of migration from Turkey, refugees of Kurdish and Syriac origin might have been deprived of their previous Turkish citizenship, and therefore unable to pass it on to their children born in Sweden. The fact is that most of the children automatically gained Swedish citizenship at birth, which could only be possible if the parents were either already naturalised or stateless. In general terms, being a Swedish citizen does not mean being radically different from a 'permanent resident'. In formal terms, the most important right gained by this is the right to vote in national elections.

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# 3 Educational achievement

*Alireza Behtoui*

## Introduction

Three types of theories explain social or 'ethnic' group differences and inequalities in educational achievements. The *first* type of theory argues that the difference in educational achievement is the consequence of general social class inequality in society (Mayer 2001). According to this theory, the educational differences in countries like Sweden are likely to be lower than in countries with larger class differences. The *second* type of theory underlines the importance of economic development (modernisation) for reducing educational differences and argues that the importance of socioeconomic background as the principal explanatory factor is declining, and that in developed north-western countries, ascribed factors (such as social class background, race, ethnicity and gender) become less important over time. The *third* type of theory emphasises the organisation of the educational system and argues that 'social selection inherent in high tracked systems is biased towards privileged groups' (Marks 2005: 485). In this case, school reforms in Sweden, which reduced educational differentiation, should reduce inequality in the educational achievement of children of different social groups.

Sweden is an interesting case because historically, in contrast to the situation in countries in Central and Southern Europe, migrants in Sweden have not been 'guest workers' or irregular residents. They have enjoyed full and equal access to the welfare system and more than 70 per cent hold Swedish citizenship (Schierup, Hansen & Castles 2006: 195).

## The educational system in Sweden

The school system in Sweden is organised into two levels. The first level includes nine years of compulsory basic education for all children aged 7-16. After completing the first level, almost all young people continue their studies in upper secondary school. Although upper secondary school (usually three years) is not compulsory, about 98 per cent of young people attend it (Broady & Gustafsson 2000: 7).

Upper secondary school offers seventeen national programmes and is divided mainly between: a) programmes which prepare students to enter university

studies and b) programmes which are vocationally oriented. Alongside the national programmes, there is also an ‘individual introduction programme’ for pupils who have failed to complete courses in primary school. Its goal is to give these young people the opportunity to transfer to a national programme.

### Earlier Swedish studies

Previous Swedish research comparing educational achievements of children of native parentage and children of migrants shows that the latter generally achieve a lower educational level. The differences in educational achievement, however, tend to decrease substantially when one controls for parents’ education and social background (see, for example, Similä 1994; Erikson & Jonsson 1993; Arai, Schröder & Vilhelmsson 2000; Österberg 2000; Dryler 2001; Behtoui 2004; Behtoui 2006).

The following chapter presents results in the field of education for the TIES survey in Sweden. As mentioned in chapter 1, the educational level of the TIES respondents is higher than the level given in the STATIV database, which includes the *entire* population living in Stockholm at the time of the TIES interviews. This ‘positive selection’ of individuals in the TIES data is particularly noticeable for children of migrants from Turkey. It is important to bear this bias in mind when reading this chapter.

### Entry into school and primary school

Segregation in schools emanating from both social class and ‘ethnicity’ impacts negatively on the educational outcomes of disadvantaged social groups (Rosigno, Tomaskovic-Devey & Crowley 2006). The TIES data provide information about how Swedish schools were ‘ethnically’ segregated when these respondents attended primary school. Table 3.1 compares school segregation at primary school level for target and reference groups by respondents’ age. As the results show, in general more than three out of four young persons with a background in Turkey have studied at schools where the percentage of descendants of all migrant categories has been higher than 50, while three out of four pupils of native origin (the reference group) attended schools with virtually no pupils of migrant origin.

Is it possible to conclude from these data that school segregation has changed over time? Differences between the three age groups in our data are modest, but statistically significant, which indicates a tendency for increasing segregation to hit younger groups.

**Table 3.1 School segregation at primary school level, by age for target and reference groups (in %)**

	Target group			Reference group		
	18-24	25-29	30-36	18-24	25-29	30-36
Almost none	15.8	8.9	23.6	57.5	73.9	86.3
25%	12.4	29.0	23.0	25.7	26.1	7.3
50%	33.0	30.9	21.2	13.0	0	3.7
75%	21.8	18.9	14.4	3.1	0	1.0
Almost all	16.9	12.3	14.9	8.0	0	1.0
Don't know	0	0	1.8	0	0	0.6

Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 1% level

Repeating a class in primary school is taken as an indicator of problematic school achievement. Pupils from the target group had a slightly higher rate of repeating than reference group pupils. Differences between males and females were insignificant.

**Table 3.2 Repeating primary school class, by gender for target and reference groups (in %)**

	Target group		Reference group	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
No	91.9	91.7	97.2	96.2
Yes	8.1	8.3	2.8	8.3

The percentage of respondents who spent more than three months abroad during primary school is quite small. As one would expect, this category is somewhat higher for the target group than for the reference group. There were no significant gender differences.

**Table 3.3 Having spent more than three months abroad during the primary school period (in %)**

Age	Target group	Reference group
18-24	5.0	1.4
25-29	9.3	0
30-36	9.8	0.7

The overwhelming majority of young people constituting our sample had completed their compulsory school period. Only two individuals (1 per cent) in the reference group and five individuals in the target group (2 per cent) had not been able to qualify for a leaving certificate from primary school.

The percentage of young people who received advice about continuing their education upon completion of compulsory education is roughly the same for the target group and the reference group (69 and 72 per cent respectively).

## Secondary education

After having completed compulsory education, 95.5 per cent (235 individuals) of the target group and 97 per cent (241 individuals) of the reference group continued to pursue secondary school education. In our sample, 7 per cent (sixteen individuals) of the target group and 6 per cent (fourteen individuals) of the reference group are still studying at secondary school level.

The 'ethnic' composition of secondary schools attended by young people with a migrant background differs radically from the situation at schools attended by respondents from the reference group. More than 60 per cent of the pupils from the first group attended schools where at least half of the school population had a migrant background, while less than 16 per cent of pupils with native parents attended such schools. Over time, there seems to have been an increase in the concentration of descendants of migrants from Turkey in schools with a higher number of pupils of migrant descent (the younger cohort of descendants of migrants from Turkey more frequently attended schools with other pupils of migrant origin). This trend seems to be quite the opposite for the reference group.

**Table 3.4 Segregation at secondary school level, by age for target and reference groups (in %)**

	Target group			Reference group		
	18-24	25-29	30-36	18-24	25-29	30-36
Almost none	11.3	9.6	9.8	22.6	51.4	56.0
25%	17.2	29.9	35.1	45.1	35.5	26.6
50%	41.5	35.8	36.3	26.2	11.1	14.0
75%	24.8	19.7	13.8	6.2	0	14.0
Almost all	5.3	3.7	4.9	0	0	0
Don't know	0	1.3	0	0	2	0

Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 1% level

The rate of pupils repeating classes in secondary school is slightly higher than for primary school for all groups. Differences between the groups in this respect are insignificant, as shown in table 3.5.

To examine the impact of school segregation on the educational achievements of young people in our study, we ran a regression model with educational attainments of the respondents (measured as years in education) as outcome and degree of segregation as independent variable. The result demonstrates that there is a significant and positive association between a lower degree of segregation and higher educational achievements, i.e. pupils in non-segregated schools performed much better than those in segregated schools (unstandardised coefficients [B] for the variable 'less segregated school' is 0.39 with significance at 1 per cent level).

**Table 3.5 Repeating classes (secondary school) for target and reference groups (in %)**

	<b>Target group</b>	<b>Reference group</b>
Never	88.6	93.3
Once	10.6	6.7
More than once	0.4	0
No answer	0.4	0

Among the young people in our sample, approximately 14 per cent (35 individuals) of the target group and 11 per cent (28 individuals) of the reference group were still enrolled in some form of education, which most likely is explained by the fact that the first group is younger on average.

The educational level achieved by individuals in our sample who are no longer in the educational system is shown in table 3.6.

**Table 3.6 Highest educational level, by gender for target and reference groups (in %)**

	<b>Target group</b>		<b>Reference group</b>	
	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>
Primary school	18.4	13.0	8.2	5.3
Secondary school	50.4	50.3	38.8	33.5
University (> 3 years)	16.3	19.3	17.1	21.1
University Bachelor	2.0	5.7	7.7	13.0
University Master	10.3	9.2	25.8	26.2
PhD	1.6	0.7	0.5	1.0
Other / unknown	0.9	1.8	2.0	0



## Experiences at school

In our survey there were questions about the respondents' experiences during their educational years. To begin with they were asked about whether they had received any assistance in school (in the form of special courses or extra tutorial hours) and outside school (in the form of homework coaching). The results, presented in table 3.7, show that a minority of respondents reported that they had received help. There are no significant differences between the two groups for school tutoring. For target and reference groups approximately 12.6 and 16 per cent, respectively, of the pupils received coaching outside school.

**Table 3.7 Remedial tutoring or homework coaching during secondary school (in %)**

	Target group	Reference group
Remedial tutoring	4.0	4.3
Homework coaching	16.0	12.6

Table 3.8 provides information about relationships of respondents with their teachers and other pupils in secondary school. They answered the question about the extent to which they agreed with five statements about these relationships. Overall, it seems that they got on with their teachers (91 and 95 per cent, respectively, said 'totally agree' or 'agree'). The reference group was somewhat more positive, but the difference is not statistically significant.

Concerning relationships with other pupils, 96.2 per cent belonging to the target group and 95.5 per cent of the reference group reported that they got along with other pupils ('totally agree' or 'agree').

Approximately 79.4 per cent of the target group and 84 per cent of the reference group reported that their teachers really listened to what they had to say. The differences between the groups, in this respect, are not statistically significant.

Finally, 74 per cent of the target group and 78 per cent of the reference group reported that they received help from teachers when needed. To sum up, a large majority of the target group confirmed that they felt as welcome at secondary schools as pupils of native origin.

**Table 3.8 Relations with teachers and other students, for target and reference groups**

		<b>Target group</b>	<b>Reference group</b>
Got along with teachers	Totally agree	62.7	66.5
	Agree	28.5	28.1
	Neutral	3.9	2.4
	Don't agree	4.0	2.6
	Totally disagree	0.8	0.4
Got along with other pupils	Totally agree	72.6	64.1
	Agree	23.6	30.8
	Neutral	2.9	1.6
	Don't agree	0.8	2.8
	Totally disagree	0	0.6
Most teachers really listened	Totally agree	47.2	40.7
	Agree	32.1	42.6
	Neutral	11.6	9.7
	Don't agree	6.0	5.7
	Totally disagree	3.0	1.3
Teachers provided extra help when needed	Totally agree	46.3	48.4
	Agree	28.2	28.4
	Neutral	14.8	14.6
	Don't agree	6.0	4.2
	Totally disagree	4.6	4.4

Between-group differences are not statistically significant

When asked about whether they had friends of native parentage during secondary school, we found that the reference group often had friends of the same background while a majority of the target group had no, few or only some friends of native parentage (see table 3.9).

**Table 3.9 Number of friends of native parentage, for target and reference groups (in %)**

	<b>Target group</b>	<b>Reference group</b>
Majority	22.3	79.1
Many	20.9	12.5
Some	21.2	3.6
Few	19.9	0.6
None	9.0	0
Don't know	6.7	4.3

Respondents were also asked if they had close friends in secondary school that did not complete this level. Approximately 31 per cent of the target group and 25 per cent of reference group had close friends without complete secondary school-level credentials at the time of the survey.

As shown by cross-national research (Portes & Rumbaut 2001; Shavit & Blossfeld 1993), parents and the resources provided by parents play a crucial role in shaping the educational expectations and achievements of young people. It has been demonstrated that relationships between social background and educational achievement have remained relatively stable in most Western societies, not because they are a natural given, but because the mechanisms that reproduce them are firmly rooted in these societies. Swedish studies confirm these results (Erikson and Jonsson 1996:12). To take an example, despite the educational reforms of the 1970s, we see still a clear distinction in educational achievement between young people of different class backgrounds. Thus, differences in education and social status between migrant and native parents are likely to influence school performance. One important factor to consider in this context is the educational level of the parents. Table 3.10 shows the mean years of education for both the fathers and mothers of our respondents in the two groups.

**Table 3.10 Years of education, father and mother, for target and reference groups (standard deviations in parentheses)**

	<b>Target group</b>	<b>Reference group</b>
Father	8.1 (3.9)	13 (2.9)
N	246	237
Mother	7.1 (4.47)	13.1 (2.7)
N	253	241

The means tests indicate a significant difference between groups at the 1% level

The differences in educational levels for parents are also reflected in the number of books in the parental home (another indication of cultural capital). As shown by table 3.11, approximately 68 per cent of reference group respondents had more than 100 books at home compared with only 23 per cent of the target group.

**Table 3.11** Number of books available at the parental home, for target and reference groups (in %)

	Target group	Reference group
< 10	17.7	4.2
10-25	25.1	3.5
26-50	18.4	4.7
51-100	15.3	20.1
100>	22.7	67.6
Don't know	0.8	0
N	238	244

Approx. Sig. test regarding differences between categories in two groups indicates a significant difference at the 5% level (using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis)

In response to the question about having a quiet space at home in which to do homework, 86 per cent of the target group and 92 per cent of the reference group answered yes.

Note that the mean difference of highest educational level for older siblings between target group and reference group does not show the same considerable gap that we found for parents' education (See table 3.12). Even though there are differences between these two means, the gap is rather small.

**Table 3.12** Years of education, older siblings (in %, standard deviations in parentheses)

	Target group	Reference group
Older siblings	13.1 (1.4)	13.6 (1.5)

To summarise this section, we used the educational attainments of the respondents, measured as years of education, as an outcome and estimated a linear regression. This way, we assessed the impact of various characteristics of the respondents on their educational achievements. The estimates are presented in table 3.13. In keeping with previous studies, we found that educational capital of family members has a positive impact on the educational achievements of the respondents. Due to the wide age range of respondents in this study, we found that older respondents had a higher level of education, as expected. Being male, rather than female, was associated with a slightly lower level of

education. In the last model, migrant background was added to the control variables, which did not show any significant effect. In other words, after controlling for family background, age and gender, there is no significant difference between the target group and reference group regarding educational achievement. This result is in accordance with findings in previous studies.

**Table 3.13** Years of education, OLS regression, unstandardised (b) and standardised (Beta) coefficients

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Father's education	0.03***	0.05	0.09***	0.15	0.09***	0.15
Mother's education	0.02***	0.03	0.01***	0.02	0.01***	0.02
Older siblings highest education	0.37***	0.25	0.31***	0.21	0.31***	0.21
Gender (male)			-0.04***	-0.01	-0.04***	-0.01
Age			0.13***	0.31	0.13***	0.31
Migrant background ( <i>descendants of natives ref.</i> )					-0.05	-0.01
R <sup>2</sup> adj.	0.083		0.173		0.173	

\*\*\* denotes significance at the 1% level, \*\* at the 5% level and \* at the 10% level

## The parental home and support

Our respondents were asked to describe the importance of their immediate support circle (mother, father, teacher, peers and older siblings) during their years at secondary school. Table 3.14 shows that women from both groups generally felt that the people close to them were important for their education. Compared to descendants of natives, those born to migrants from Turkey admitted, to a greater extent, that their parents, older siblings, teachers and peers were important for their education. The gap was most evident when they talked about the role of older siblings. Mothers and teachers, respectively, seem to have been most important for target group respondents. For reference group respondents, mothers and teachers were equally important along with fathers, peers and older siblings.

**Table 3.14** The role of the immediate support group during secondary school, for target and reference groups (in %)

	Target group		Reference group	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
<i>Mother</i>				
Not important at all	11.6	6.8	9.5	11.5
Not important	6.3	1.7	13.8	6.5
Little importance	13.2	8.5	33.9	19.9
Important	30.5	33.6	27.6	42.1
Very important	36.6	49.4	14.7	18.9
Don't know	1.8	0	0.5	1
<i>Father</i>				
Not important at all	12.6	12.0	15.9	19.5
Not important	3.8	4.2	8.1	8.0
Little importance	13.5	10.3	27.2	17.0
Important	29.2	28.8	29.9	33.0
Very important	35.4	42.1	17.3	20.1
Don't know	5.5	2.6	1.6	1.3
<i>Teacher</i>				
Not important at all	8.8	6.7	3.8	6.0
Not important	11.2	2.6	6.6	6.1
Little importance	19.7	15.1	25.2	24.7
Important	32.5	39.0	50.7	37.6
Very important	27.9	36.7	11.2	25.6
Don't know	0	0	2.6	0
<i>Peers</i>				
Not important at all	22.4	6.8	17.1	7.8
Not important	18.1	8.5	15.2	5.3
Little importance	25.4	21.6	37.0	33.1
Important	21.6	44.6	26.2	40.6
Very important	11.6	17.7	4.1	13.3
Don't know	1.0	0.8	0.5	0
<i>Older siblings</i>				
Not important at all	28.1	22.0	44.4	35.4
Not important	16.2	9.9	23.7	26.0
Little importance	16.8	18.9	20.4	24.4
Important	27.0	28.2	9.8	10.5
Very important	9.1	20.9	0	2.8
Don't know	2.8	0	1.7	1.0

Parental involvement in children's education can take many forms. Specifically, we asked the respondents if their parents had checked how much time they spent on homework, if parents had discussed education and schooling with them at home or if parents had been in touch with their teachers during the school period.

**Table 3.15** Involvement of parents in education, for target and reference groups (in %)

	Target group		Reference group	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
<i>My parents checked how much time I spent on homework</i>				
Very often	7.1	7.6	4.0	1.8
Often	19.9	10.5	12.3	9.9
Sometimes	20.8	22.2	16.0	11.0
Not often	22.5	27.6	23.4	27.8
Never	44.4	49.5	29.7	32.0
<i>My parents talked with me about school and studies</i>				
Very often	19.9	23.1	11.9	17.2
Often	38.9	40.3	32.1	42.6
Sometimes	29.6	19.7	42.3	32.3
Not often	9.8	12.8	10.1	5.7
Never	1.7	3.4	3.7	2.2
<i>My parents met with or talked to my teachers</i>				
Very often	1.9	4.0	1.0	0
Often	10.7	5.7	8.0	2.8
Sometimes	33.7	34.4	22.0	27.5
Not often	37.3	30.8	50.9	43.9
Never	16.7	25.1	18.1	24.8
<i>My parents helped me with my homework</i>				
Very often	1.8	1.7	2.6	5.9
Often	7.9	6.7	5.9	11.5
Sometimes	14.8	25.0	40.9	35.3
Not often	21.4	22.4	21.2	33.7
Never	54.1	44.1	29.4	13.6
<i>My parents let me do household chores or look after siblings</i>				
Very often	0	5.9	5.2	7.0
Often	10.0	17.7	25.0	20.4
Sometimes	18.4	30.9	36.8	43.5
Not often	25.6	21.8	22.6	13.7
Never	45.9	23.8	10.5	15.3

The results provided in table 3.15 indicate that compared to parents of native origin, migrant parents often spent more time checking their children's homework, talking with their children about school and studies, and meeting with or talking to teachers. This is probably because migrant parents (in spite of their lower educational levels) have higher expectations regarding their children's educational achievements (Rumbaut & Portes 2001). In contrast, migrants from Turkey, compared to people of native origin, could not give their children any practical help with their homework, most likely due to their lower educational level (see table 3.10).

Finally, the target group (both males and females), perceived that they were obliged to partake in household work (do household chores or look after siblings) to a lesser extent than the reference group. For girls, these results gainsay 'common-sense' perceptions about migrant groups and their expectations of the education of girls. Females in the target group answered 'very often' or 'often' about their involvement in household chores to a lesser extent than those in the reference group when they were in secondary school.

## Conclusions

The educational level of the target group respondents is generally lower than that of the reference group. This seems to be plausible because the educational levels and labour market status of the parents of target group respondents are considerably lower than those of the reference group parents.

After controlling for the educational level of parents and older siblings as well as for their own age and gender, there are no further significant differences between the target and reference groups as regards educational achievement. In other words, the gap between the target and the reference group is explained by the fact that they have different socioeconomic backgrounds and belong to different age groups.

An important additional issue which seems to have had an impact on the educational outcome for the target group, despite these parents' higher expectations and extra involvement in helping with homework, etc., is segregation of schools with regard to both class background and 'ethnicity'. As indicated above, the percentage of pupils of migrant background who studied in segregated schools (normally of lower educational quality) is considerably higher than that of pupils of native parentage.



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## 4 Social capital

*Alireza Behtoui*

### Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to shed light on the social relations (friendship, partnership) maintained by descendants of migrants from Turkey in comparison with young people of native origin. We begin with a description of the 'ethnic' character and educational patterns of friendship in secondary school and current friendship. A descriptive overview of the findings on the marriage pattern of young descendants of migrants and of young people of native origin is given in the next section.

Research on young people of migrant descent in European countries shows that when human-capital characteristics are controlled for, the descendants of migrant groups are (a) less likely to be regularly employed, and (b) have less annual income from labour than those with native parents (see, for example, Silberman, Alba & Fournier 2007; Behtoui 2006a; Crul & Vermeulen 2003). These young people were born and raised in North-western European societies and went through the educational systems of those societies. If the differences in educational attainment between the descendants of migrants and young people of native origin cannot explain the inferior position of the former, how then do we explain it? The concept of *social capital*, which has only fairly recently been applied to this field, has proven to be relevant and useful in explaining unequal access to information and influence in the job attainment process.

Access to social capital gives people connections to individuals in their network with economic and cultural capital, who have the means to assist with advice, further connections, information, loans, and so on (Bourdieu 2001: 103). Bourdieu underlines that the *full* economic and social *rewards* from education in the labour market depend on *social capital*, which is *inherited* (1998). When one enjoys strong educational credentials with which one can potentially obtain a high-status job, but is oneself not born and raised in a group of higher social standing, and therefore may lack the 'right' contacts, one does not obtain a full return on one's investment in education (Bourdieu 1998). As an example Bourdieu cites 'a law graduate who, for lack of social capital, becomes a community cultural worker' (Bourdieu 1984: 50). Bourdieu contends that 'Educational qualifications never function perfectly as currency. They are never entirely separable from their holders:

their value rises in proportion to the value of their bearer, especially in the least rigid areas of social structure' (Bourdieu 2001: 110).

To summarise, social capital (resources embedded in one's network of relations) can play a vital role in determining an individual's social position. Social capital, like other forms of capital, is synonymous with *power*. Thus, the social background or initial position of an individual, in short his or her history, plays a crucial role in providing access to social capital (similar to economic and cultural capital): the higher the position of the individual in the social hierarchy, the more social capital that the individual possesses.

Previous research about people with a migrant background suggests that access to social capital (resources embedded in social networks) depends on the history of the minority group in question, and its position within the hierarchical social space (Portes & Rumbaut 2001; Behtoui 2006). Lin (2004) suggests that the social networks of disadvantaged 'racial' and 'ethnic' groups provide less access to information and influence. If social capital consists of the resources embedded in an individual's networks, and if people of native parentage and members of disadvantaged migrant groups have typically different resources, then contacts with people of native parentage generate a different form of social capital compared with contacts with stigmatised migrants. Unequal treatment of members of subordinated minority groups on the basis of 'ethnic status' restricts their opportunities in both formal and informal interactions, that is, friendship relations, communal relationships (residential localities), membership of informal groups, kinship relations (marriage and family), market relations (trade), education and organised politics. This, in turn, restricts access to social capital for members of these groups.

To make the outcomes of the process of racial/ethnic stigmatisation more transparent, Loury (2002: 95) singles out two kinds of behaviour in relation to racially/ethnically stigmatised groups: discrimination in *contract*, which denotes the unequal treatment of individuals on the basis of race/ethnicity in formal transactions (for example, in the labour market), and discrimination in *contact*, which means the unequal treatment of persons on the basis of race/ethnicity within the contexts of informal private spheres of life (for example, friendship or partnership). Discrimination in contact, as Loury (2002: 99) suggests, has extremely destructive consequences for a racially/ethnically stigmatised group, because it affects 'individual social mobility and intergenerational status transmission'. Hitherto empirical work on racial/ethnic inequality by Swedish social scientists has focused almost entirely on the differential treatment of individuals on the basis of race/ethnicity in *formal market transactions*. Less attention has been paid to the underlying social processes that lead to inequalities because of discrimination in

informal relationships, and to how such discrimination leads to segregated social networks and affects individuals' labour market outcomes.

In this section a migrant background is defined as having parents born outside of Sweden. We single out two different regions of origin: north-western countries (NW), defined as North-west Europe and North America, and countries outside North-west Europe and North America (ONW), which account for the rest of the world.<sup>1</sup> This distinction is based on findings from earlier Swedish studies, which show that migrants from ONW countries often live in stigmatised neighbourhoods, are concentrated in inferior parts of the labour market and run a high risk of exposure to discrimination. Swedish discourse members of the ONW group are generally denoted as 'immigrants', explicitly radicalised subordinate groups, based on phenotypical and culturalised attributes (Behtoui & Neergaard 2009).

### Ethnic and educational character of friendship

Respondents were asked questions about their three best friends during the years of secondary school and at the time of the survey. The aim of these questions was to compare the two situations and to measure possible changes during the intermediate years of the respondents' lives. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the 'ethnic background' and 'class position' of one's friends at these two different points in time. Educational attainment is used to indicate the socioeconomic position.

**Table 4.1** Three best friends in secondary school, 'ethnicity' and education, by education for target and reference groups (in %)

	First friend		Second friend		Third friend	
	Target	Reference	Target	Reference	Target	Reference
<i>Friend's ethnicity</i>						
Swedish	24.7	75.3	18.2	65.7	53.2	14.3
North West European	1.2	3.5	2.7	4.5	1.9	2.7
Other (ONW)	58.4	7.6	55.6	8.0	40.4	6.6
No friend	15.7	13.6	24.5	21.8	43.4	37.5

<sup>1</sup> Countries defined as NW in this study are: the six founding member states of the EU, the UK, and the Nordic countries. Other 'Western countries' are Japan, Canada, Australia and the US. The rest of the world is defined as ONW. For a detailed discussion on stigmatised migrants from ONW countries, see Behtoui (2006b).

	First friend		Second friend		Third friend	
	Target	Reference	Target	Reference	Target	Reference
<i>Friend's education</i>						
Primary school	3.7	0.7	4.4	2.8	1.3	1.9
Secondary school	56.6	43.9	47.6	36.4	37.8	30.7
University	22.7	39.4	22.1	36.7	16.7	28.2
No friend, don't know	16.9	16.1	25.9	24.1	44.2	39.1

Significant difference between groups at the 1% level (based on chi-square approximation)

As the answers indicate, an overwhelming majority of best friends of the members of our reference group (young people with native parents) are themselves of native origin, both during the secondary school period and at the time of the survey. The majority of the best friends of descendants of migrants from Turkey, on the other hand, are descendants of ONW migrants. Only 25 per cent of the young people with a background in Turkey have friends of native origin. The same results demonstrate that the 'ethnic' composition of friendship for our respondents has hardly changed over time, even though we observe somewhat more friendship with members of one's own 'ethnic' group at the present time than during the secondary school period.

**Table 4.2** Three current best friends, 'ethnicity' and education, by education for target and reference groups (in %)

	First friend		Second friend		Third friend	
	Target	Reference	Target	Reference	Target	Reference
<i>Friend's ethnicity</i>						
Swedish	25.2	85.9	20.4	68.8	10.4	46.6
North West European	1.9	2.8	1.9	1.3	1.9	2.4
Other (ONW)	63.6	5.2	52.6	6.5	38.8	6.3
No friend	9.3	6.2	25.2	23.2	48.9	44.7
<i>Friend's education</i>						
Primary school	8.5	9.7	8.5	7.7	5.0	3.4
Secondary school	53.0	40.5	45.3	33.4	30.8	23.0
University	27.0	41.6	18.9	35.2	14.4	27.4
No friend, don't know	11.4	8.3	26.9	23.8	49.7	46.2

Significant difference between groups at the 1% level (based on chi-square approximation)

As expected, the educational background of best friends also differs for the two groups. Respondents of native origin have friends with higher levels of educational achievement, which reflects their higher socioeconomic position. Approximately 25 per cent of the friends of descendants of migrants from Turkey have a university degree, while almost 45 per cent of those of native origin have a best friend with tertiary education.

The 'ethnic' composition of friendship that we observed in young people in our survey was also confirmed through another question: 'How many of your friends had/have a native background during the secondary school period and now?'

**Table 4.3** Number of friends with native background at two different points in time (in %)

	Friends at secondary school		Current friends	
	Target	Reference	Target	Reference
Don't know	6.7	4.3	0.4	0
None	9.0	0	14.9	0
Very few	19.9	0.6	22.8	1.4
Some	21.2	3.6	22.4	2.4
Many	20.9	12.5	20.8	14.7
Most	22.3	79.1	18.6	81.4

Significant difference between groups (but not between two periods) at the 1% level (based on chi-square)

Another important way to accumulate social capital is by active membership in voluntary associations. As Stoloff, Glanville & Bienenstock (1999) put it, activity in associations is assumed to be an important pathway to contact with people who have valuable resources.

We provided respondents with a list of civic organisations and asked them to state which ones they had participated in over the past year. Table 4.4 gives an overview of the rate of participation for young people in both groups in these organisations.

It is well-established through previous research that people in the lower socioeconomic strata of society generally have a lower participation rate in voluntary associations and partake less in political life than those belonging to the middle and upper social classes. Since young people with parents from Turkey are more often found in lower socioeconomic strata compared to those of native origin, we assume that they are less likely to be affiliated with and to participate actively in formal organisations. Our results clearly indicate a

lower participation rate for young people with backgrounds in Turkey than for young people of native origin in all kinds of civic organisations, with the exception of organisations catering for young people of migrant origin.

**Table 4.4** Rate of participation in social organisations for target and reference groups (in %)

	Target group	Reference group
Sports club	18.6	32.0
Student union	5.3	10.5
Religious organisation	5.1	6.7
Party/political organisation	1.6	4.5
Cultural/artistic organisation	4.5	11.3
Trade union	2.0	6.3
Women's organisation	2.0	4.1
Young migrant organisation	16.8	0.8
Social organisation against discrimination	1.6	0.7
Third world relief organisation	0.4	3.1
Environmental association	0.4	3.2
Human rights organisation	2.3	4.3
Professional association	3.1	6.5
Parents organisation	1.2	6.6
Other organisation	1.1	10.3
No active membership	57.5	38.6

All between-groups' differences are significant at the 1% level (based on chi-square)

The data from our survey show that 38.6 per cent of the young people of native origin compared to 57.5 per cent of young people with migrant backgrounds were not members of any organisations. However, we need to control for education and class position to distinguish the impact of social class from the impact of 'ethnicity' regarding participation in civic organisations. In the absence of such a control, the results are likely to suggest less participation by minority groups as a consequence of a 'cultural deficit' (Foley & Edwards 1999). Even the participation rate for people on the lowest rungs of the social hierarchy should not be considered as an 'aggregate individual choice' but rather as 'deeper structural factors', including the nature of the organisations themselves (Arneil 2006). In addition, we should consider the fact that the descendants of migrants from Turkey in this survey are younger than the respondents of native origin. Age differences may affect the rate of participation in social organisations.

## Partners

The choice of partner by descendants of migrants is a much debated topic (see, for example, Deveaux 2006). In our sample, 43 per cent of the respondents with a native Swedish background and 55 per cent of those with a background in Turkey do not have a partner. The difference between the groups is most likely due to the younger age structure of the respondents with a background in Turkey. In our sample, the mean age of descendants of natives is approximately 28 years while for descendants of migrants from Turkey it is 25.7 years.

The 'ethnic' origin of the partner of respondents in our survey is given in table 4.5. As the table shows, slightly more than 86 per cent of the respondents of native origin have a partner of native Swedish origin compared to about 18 per cent for descendants of migrants from Turkey. Furthermore, some 6 per cent of the reference group have partners with an ONW background (including a background in Turkey), while this rate is around 80 per cent for descendants of migrants from Turkey.

Even more striking is the fact that approximately 72 per cent of the descendants of migrants from Turkey (who have lived their entire life in Sweden) are married to spouses who are either migrants who came to Sweden to marry (45.8 per cent) or who, like themselves, are descendants of migrants from Turkey (26.1 per cent). Mortensen (2006) reports still higher figures for Denmark.

**Table 4.5 'Ethnicity' of partner (for those who have a partner), by gender (in %)**

	Target group			Reference group		
	Male	Female	All	Male	Female	All
SW	14.9	20.5	17.8	83.8	88.2	86.4
NW1	0	0	0	0.9	3.4	2.4
TR1	40.8	50.3	45.8	0	0	0
Other ONW1	1.6	5.3	3.5	0	5.0	2.9
NW2	2.0	1.9	2.0	8.8	2.7	5.2
TR2	32.4	20.5	26.1	0	0.8	0.4
Other ONW2	8.3	1.5	4.7	6.5	0	2.7

a) SW = native born, with two native-born parents; TR1 = marriage migrants from Turkey and TR2 = children of Turkish migrants; NW1 = migrants from 'North-western Europe and North America', and NW2 = descendants of NW; ONW1 are migrants from 'outside North-western Europe and North American countries', and ONW2 are their descendants.

b) All between-group differences are significant at the 1% level.



Table 4.6 provides insight into the age differences between spouses for respondents with a partner. From previous research we know that males are generally older than their partner when they start the partnership (see Behtoui 2010). As seen from table 4.6, the mean age differences between partners are almost the same for the target group and reference group.

**Table 4.6 Mean age differences between partners (for those who have a partner), by gender**

	Target group		Reference group	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Mean age difference between partners <sup>a</sup>	2.0	-2.2	1.2	-2.6
Standard deviation	2.7	2.7	3.2	3.8
Median education years difference between partners <sup>b</sup>	0.54	0.38	-0.35	0.56
Standard deviation	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.3
N	54	56	61	80

- a) Positive values indicate respondent being older than partner, negative values indicate respondent being younger than partner.
- b) Positive values indicate respondent has more education years than partner, negative values indicate respondent has fewer education years than partner.
- a) All between-group differences are significant at the 1% level.

We tested the ‘assortative mating by education’ hypothesis, i.e. the assumption that people have a partner with a similar educational level. We translated the educational level of individuals and their partners into years of education. As shown in table 4.6, men and women born in Sweden with a family background in Turkey have more years of education than their partner, while women with native backgrounds have a higher educational level than their partners, in contrast to men of the same group who have a lower educational level than their partners. The results confirm educational homogamy among the respondents in our survey, though the level of educational homogamy differs slightly between the two groups.

Finally, table 4.7 provides an overview of the labour market situation for the partners of the respondents of our survey. Approximately 84 per cent of the male partners of women of native parentage have a job or run their own businesses; the corresponding figure for partners of the descendants of migrants from Turkey is approximately 92 per cent. Among those holding a job, male partners run their own business more often than the partners

of respondents of native parentage. The majority of male partners of respondents of native parentage are full-time students who do not have a job.

Female partners of respondents of native parentage, on the other hand, have a higher rate of employment (77.5 per cent) compared to the female partners of descendants of migrants from Turkey (61.5 per cent). The majority of the female partners of descendants of migrants from Turkey are full-time students who do not have a job.

**Table 4.7** Current labour market situation of the partner (for those who have a partner), by gender for target and reference groups (in %; numbers in parentheses)

	Target group		Reference group	
	Male partner	Female partner	Male partner	Female partner
Has one or more paid jobs	64.4 (36)	61.5 (33)	72.1 (59)	76.6 (47)
Has own business with employees	18.6 (11)	0 -	6.8 (5)	0 -
Has own business, no employees	9.2 (5)	0 -	4.9 (4)	0.9 (1)
Studies full time	0 -	20.0 (11)	12.5 (9)	4.6 (3)
Works and studies	0 -	1.9 (1)	3.8 (3)	7.9 (4)
Unemployed, not looking for a job	1.9 (1)	5.2 (3)	0 -	0 -
Looking after children and family <sup>a</sup>	0 -	7.6 (4)	0 -	4.5 (3)
Sick/disabled	0 -	1.9 (1)	0 -	0 -
Other	5.8 (3)	1.9 (1)	0 -	5.4 (3)
N	56	54	80	61

a) Among our respondents there are only three individuals with native backgrounds and one with a Turkish background who have children.

## Summary and discussion

As this chapter shows,

- a) An overwhelming majority of the best friends of the members of young people of native parentage are themselves of native origin, both during the secondary school period and at the time of the survey. The majority

- of the best friends of descendants of migrants from Turkey, on the other hand, are descendants of ONW migrants. Only 25 per cent of the young people with a background in Turkey have friends of native origin.
- b) We find a lower representation of young people with backgrounds in Turkey, in comparison with those of native origin, in almost all kinds of civic and political organisations.
  - c) Approximately 86 per cent of the respondents of native origin have a partner of native origin compared to about 18 per cent of descendants of migrants from Turkey. On the other hand, approximately 6 per cent of the reference group have partners with an ONW background (including Turkey), while the corresponding figure for descendants of migrants from Turkey is approximately 80 per cent.

If social capital consists of (a) those potential resources that are provided by an individual's parents, relatives, partner, friends and acquaintances, and (b) those contacts that are available through their membership of formal and informal organisations and groups, we conclude that the young people in our sample with backgrounds in Turkey have access to less social capital compared to those of native origin. Access to social capital provides young people with connections to individuals in their network who enjoy substantial economic and cultural capital, and are therefore in a position to assist with advice, further connections, information, loans, and so on.

To return to the question posed at the outset of this chapter, we maintain that in the same way that social capital enables young people from dominant (majority) groups to optimise the benefits from their educational credentials in the labour market and reproduce in some way the positions held by their parents, restricted access to social capital limits the opportunities for the descendants of migrants in the educational process and in the labour market. Social capital intensifies the effect of social origin and the education that goes with it. Consequently, social capital is an important factor that excludes individuals or groups without the 'right' contacts from access to other types of resources, and that reinforces existing hierarchical structures of society as well as the distinct power positions of different social groups. Nonetheless, it is also important to remember that, despite the exclusionary practices of mainstream organisations of dominant groups, when subordinated groups begin to organise themselves and become agents in the field of civic associations, they start (through building social capital among other things) to challenge the basic premises of the current balance of power.

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# 5 Perceptions of discrimination

*Alireza Behtoui*

## Introduction

This chapter presents our findings from the survey on the subject of discrimination, i.e. when members of the target group and members of the reference group responded to questions about ‘inter-ethnic-group’ relations in Sweden.

Studies in the field of perceiving discrimination distinguish between how individuals from subordinate groups (for example, women or stigmatised migrant groups) express their *personal* experiences of discrimination on the one hand, and their views about discrimination directed at their *group* on the other, and emphasise a discrepancy between views about *personal* discrimination and those about *group* discrimination (see, for example, Taylor, Ruggiero & Wright 1991).

## Personal experiences of discrimination

Table 5.1 presents respondents’ *personal* experiences of discrimination in response to the question: ‘Have you ever experienced hostility or unfair treatment towards you because of your origin or background?’ 26.6 per cent of the respondents with a migrant background compared to 4.2 per cent of those of native origin reported that they have personally experienced discrimination either frequently and regularly or occasionally. Among the descendants of migrants, we found that more males than females have experienced discrimination, but the difference is not statistically significant.

**Table 5.1** Personal experiences of discrimination for target and reference groups (in %)

	Target group	Reference group
Frequently	2.8	0
Regularly	6.5	1.3
Occasionally	16.4	2.9
Rarely	27.5	7.5
Never	45.9	88.3
Missing	0.9	0

Significant difference between groups at the 1% level (Asymp. Sig. 2-sided)

We also asked the respondents about particular situations in which they have personally experienced discrimination: 1) in the neighbourhoods where they live, 2) while going out (to discotheques, clubs or restaurants), and 3) in encounters with the police. Table 5.2 shows that the descendants of migrants have experienced discrimination more frequently when they go out and in encounters with the police than in their own neighbourhood. Compared to young women with migrant backgrounds, young men with the same background more often reported personal experiences of discrimination. Experience of unfair treatment in one's neighbourhood is not as common because young people with backgrounds in Turkey mainly live in the segregated neighbourhoods of Stockholm.

**Table 5.2** Three situations of experiencing personal discrimination (in %)

	Target group		Reference group	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
<i>Going out</i>				
Frequently	12.0	0	0	0
Regularly	14.4	0.8	0	0
Occasionally	13.5	7.8	3.6	3.1
Rarely	14.5	10.6	5.7	3.1
Never	40.8	76.4	90.8	92.4
Not applicable	4.7	4.3	0	1.4
<i>Encounters with the police</i>				
Frequently	4.1	0	0	0
Regularly	8.4	0.7	0	0
Occasionally	11.5	1.6	1.0	0
Rarely	12.5	3.2	0.9	0.5
Never	40.9	50.4	78.9	60.7
Not applicable	22.6	44.2	19.2	38.8
<i>In my neighbourhood</i>				
Frequently	0.8	0	0	0
Regularly	1.6	1.5	0	0
Occasionally	1.8	3.2	0	1.8
Rarely	11.1	8.7	1.4	1.6
Never	83.9	85.9	98.6	96.6
Not applicable	0.8	0.8	0	0

Significant difference between groups at the 1 % level (Asymp. Sig. 2-sided)

## Discrimination against migrants as groups

To capture people's perceptions of discrimination against migrants as *groups* (as opposed to personal experiences), all respondents were asked: 'In general, how often do you think that the following groups experience hostility or unfair treatment because of their origin or background in Sweden: a) Muslims, b) people with dark skin, and c) Turks?'

As indicated in table 5.3, about 66 per cent of the descendants of migrants from Turkey and 61 per cent of the native respondents believe that 'Muslims' are frequently or regularly subject to discrimination in Sweden. The same figures for 'people with dark skin' are 66 and 50 per cent, respectively, and for 'Turks' 41 and 43 per cent. Consistent with findings from earlier studies (See Behtoui and Neergaard 2009), these results support the view that the perception of discrimination against migrants as *groups* are widely shared by both migrants and natives.

It is interesting that young people in this survey rate discrimination of 'Muslims' considerably higher than discrimination of 'Turks' as a group. Smith (1977) argues that at a specific point in time public opinion about how a group in a society is treated is formed by the given state of the political field (discourses, debates), research results and media dissemination.

Furthermore, if we compare perceived discrimination at a personal level (table 5.1) with perceived discrimination at a group level (table 5.3), we find that descendants of migrants from Turkey perceive discrimination directed at their own group as occurring more frequently than discrimination hitting them personally. This is in accordance with findings in previous studies. In other words, there is a discrepancy between views on *personal* and *group* discrimination. The reason, as explained by earlier studies (Taylor, Ruggiero and Wright 1991), is that members of dominated groups downplay their personal experiences of discrimination in order to defend themselves against it. Acknowledging that you are personally a victim implies that 'others do not like or accept you' (Ruggiero 1999: 534), while minimising personal experiences of discrimination allows these individuals to believe that 'they have control over the outcomes they receive' (*ibid.*).

This discrepancy between views on *personal* discrimination and those on *group* discrimination highlights how members of subordinate groups minimise (or even sometimes deny) their personal experiences of discrimination as distinct from the discrimination experiences of their group (Taylor, Ruggiero & Wright 1991: 48; Taylor & Moghaddam 1994; Ruggiero 1999). In other words, they perceive discrimination against their own group to be more frequent than discrimination against themselves personally.



**Table 5.3** Three groups in Sweden that are perceived to be discriminated against (in %)

	Target group		Reference group	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
<i>Muslims</i>				
Frequently	22.9	24.2	6.6	18.8
Regularly	39.8	44.5	44.3	52.6
Occasionally	24.5	19.2	41.7	28.1
Rarely	8.4	7.8	5.0	0
Never	4.4	4.4	2.5	0.5
<i>People with dark skin</i>				
Frequently	17.5	27.4	9.0	10.2
Regularly	49.9	36.9	32.5	48.4
Occasionally	25.6	22.5	45.9	35.0
Rarely	5.2	8.0	11.5	5.9
Never	1.8	5.2	1.1	0.5
<i>Turks</i>				
Frequently	10.0	3.5	0.5	4.9
Regularly	32.6	36.9	30.0	50.1
Occasionally	36.4	38.9	56.1	41.3
Rarely	15.0	11.1	10.9	2.2
Never	5.9	9.6	2.5	1.6

Significant difference between groups at the 1% level (Asymp. Sig. 2-sided)

We asked our respondents the following question: ‘How often would you say that people of Turkish origin in Sweden experience hostility or unfair treatment because of their origin or background in situations like looking for a job, when going out or at discotheques, cafés/restaurants, in their neighbourhoods, in encounters with the police, at the workplace and at school?’ Perception of discrimination in these situations was measured on a 6-point scale (frequently, regularly, occasionally, rarely, never, and don’t know).

The results presented in table 5.4 show that more than 40 per cent of our respondents believe that persons with a background in Turkey frequently or regularly experience discrimination when looking for a job. It is interesting to note that respondents of native origin believe that discrimination against ‘Turks’ occurs in such situations to a greater extent than respondents who are descendants of migrants from Turkey.

Two other important situations concerning instances of discrimination are when ‘going out’ and in encounters with the police. Only about 15 per cent of respondents believe that discrimination against ‘Turks’ occurs at work or in school.

**Table 5.4** The situations in which Turks as a group are perceived to be 'frequently' or 'regularly' discriminated against (in %)

	Target group		Reference group	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
<i>Going out</i>				
Frequently	14.9	7.8	4.9	4.2
Regularly	32.9	21.7	29.5	33.5
Occasionally	18.4	31.3	40.1	38.7
Rarely	15.4	20.8	13.7	9.0
Never	9.7	12.5	4.0	2.9
Don't know missing	8.7	5.9	7.8	11.7
<i>Looking for a job</i>				
Frequently	10.0	8.5	7.5	11.8
Regularly	32.3	34.7	41.3	51.7
Occasionally	21.1	31.3	30.1	21.0
Rarely	15.5	10.1	10.3	3.0
Never	7.0	8.9	2.6	3.0
Don't know missing	14.2	6.6	8.4	9.4
<i>Encounters with police</i>				
Frequently	3.3	2.1	1.4	1.0
Regularly	17.8	15.4	16.6	27.7
Occasionally	19.0	23.3	35.9	34.6
Rarely	24.0	15.7	24.6	10.6
Never	21.4	27.6	11.4	3.8
Don't know missing	14.5	15.9	10.1	22.3
<i>At school</i>				
Frequently	0.8	5.7	0.9	0
Regularly	11.6	13.2	6.8	22.2
Occasionally	24.7	35.9	40.6	42.3
Rarely	37.4	20.8	33.7	11.3
Never	16.8	17.9	7.5	8.1
Don't know missing	8.8	6.5	10.4	16.2
<i>At the workplace</i>				
Frequently	0.8	2.4	0	0.9
Regularly	10.7	14.7	12.9	18.0
Occasionally	27.1	38.3	37.7	41.4
Rarely	32.2	19.2	29.7	16.2
Never	15.0	13.9	7.1	5.6
Don't know missing	14.2	11.5	12.6	17.9

	Target group		Reference group	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
<i>In my neighbourhood</i>				
Frequently	0.8	0	0	0
Regularly	3.2	4.7	2.8	3.3
Occasionally	4.0	8.3	10.6	15.0
Rarely	27.8	23.7	26.2	21.9
Never	55.5	55.5	43.3	38.0
Don't know missing	8.8	7.9	17.2	21.3

Significant difference between groups at the 1% level (Asymp. Sig. 2-sided)

### Who is most convinced of discrimination against migrants?

To analyse how perceived discrimination varies across different categories of migrants, there are two competing theoretical perspectives. The first, known as *assimilation* theory, suggests that as individuals with migrant backgrounds gradually adapt to the values, norms and culture of the host society they acquire a more positive attitude towards the new society, and as they advance economically, they become more acceptable to those of native parentage and hence, experience less discrimination (Gordon 1961; Gordon 1964). The second perspective, known as *consciousness* theory, suggests that as individuals with migrant backgrounds become more familiar with the new society and the real economic position of migrants, increase their language proficiency and attain higher educational qualifications, they become more aware of discrimination and more critical of the new society (Portes 1984; Portes, Parker & Cobas 1980).

It is possible to apply these same theories to the descendants of migrants. In this case, we assume that according to the predictions stemming from the *assimilation* perspective, descendants of migrants from Turkey with higher educational attainments (compared to those with lower education), a job (compared to those who do not have a job), and who participate in civic organisations (compared to those who do not participate), tend to have lower levels of perception of group discrimination. On the other hand, taking *consciousness* theory as our point of departure, we assume that migrants with higher educational attainments and a higher rate of participation in the labour market and in civic organisations are more critical of discrimination against migrants.

To examine these two competing theories, an outcome variable labelled 'perceived discrimination' was constructed. This dummy variable assumes

the value of 1 when respondents answer that people with a Turkish background frequently or regularly experience hostility or unfair treatment because of their origin or background when looking for a job, in encounters with the police, when going out, in the work place, at school and in their neighbourhood; otherwise it takes the value of 0.

From our data set, a series of background variables was selected including: gender (male = 1), years of education for respondents, years of education for parents, a dummy variable (participate) which indicates whether individuals have been active members in civic organisations, and finally a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when the respondent has a job; otherwise the value of 0.

The dependent variable 'perceived discrimination' was regressed on all the aforementioned control variables. Only the descendants of migrants are included in this estimate.

**Table 5.5** Logistic estimate results for perceived discrimination, odds ratio, only descendants of migrants included

	S.E	Exp (b)
Gender (male)	.062	1.302***
Has a job	.007	1.709***
Education years, individual	.059	1.128***
Parent's years of education	.014	1.024***
Participate Civic org.	.058	1.118**

\*\*\* denotes significance at the 1% level and \*\* at the 5% level.

Our logistic regression analysis (presented in table 5.5) indicates that young males are more likely than young females with a background in Turkey to perceive that 'Turks' are hard hit by discrimination. In contrast to the predictions stemming from the *assimilation* perspective, our findings are that those with higher educational attainments, those whose parents have higher levels of education, those who have a job and those who participate in civic organisations, tend to have higher levels of awareness of abstract discrimination. In other words, those who are more familiar with Swedish society tend to adopt a stronger position on the prevalence of discrimination against Turkish migrants in the aforementioned situations, which is in accordance with the results expected from the *consciousness* perspective.

## Summary and discussion

This chapter looked at how discrimination against migrants in Sweden is perceived both by descendants of migrants from Turkey and by people of native Swedish parentage.

The first part dealt with young people's personal experiences of discrimination. Our results show that approximately 27 per cent of these young people of migrant background report that they have personally experienced discrimination frequently, regularly or occasionally. The results also indicate that descendants of migrants tend to experience discrimination more frequently when they go out and in encounters with the police than in their own neighbourhood.

The second part compared the extent to which the descendants of migrants and native respondents perceive discrimination against stigmatised migrant groups, such as 'Muslims', 'people with dark skin' and 'Turks'. Our results indicate that more than 60 per cent of the respondents of both categories agree that Muslims are frequently or regularly subject to discrimination in Sweden. The same figures for categories 'people with dark skin' and 'Turks' was about 58 and 42 per cent respectively. It deserves to be mentioned that respondents of native origin tend to adopt a stronger position on the prevalence of discrimination against stigmatised migrant groups than respondents of migrant background. These results are also in accordance with previous findings that members of stigmatised groups tend to perceive discrimination against their group more frequently than discrimination against themselves personally.

The final part of this chapter was about how perceived discrimination varies across different categories of migrants. Two theoretical perspectives (the *assimilation* and the *consciousness* perspectives) were compared. Our data conform better to the outcomes predicted by the *consciousness* perspective than to outcomes within the scope of the *assimilation* perspective, that is, descendants of migrants who are satisfactorily integrated are more critical of discrimination against migrants than those who are less well integrated.

The findings of this chapter highlight the need for further theoretical refinement and for continued empirical research. Issues that need further investigation include the extent to which perceptions of discrimination are shaped by general discursive factors, or in other words, how an opinion (general social discourses) about discrimination against stigmatised groups is formed in society. Furthermore, our study highlights the need to conduct studies on the perception of discrimination, which would allow for comparison between opinions of migrants and their descendants in the same survey in order to be able to compare the generational differences.

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## 6 Identity: Belonging, language and transnationalism

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This chapter takes a closer look at various circumstances associated with identity manifestations of descendants of migrants. Having a migrant background affects one's identity in various ways. One's roots – which are characterised by emotional attachments to both one's parents' country of birth and one's own country of birth – are not static, and it is possible to combine these varied aspects of one's identity. However, the boundaries between these multiple belongings may become blurred in everyday experience. The TIES questionnaire was specifically designed to enable analysis of multiple belongings. Our questions look for categorical identities, which refer to *quasi groups* (Freedman 1976). This is a concept similar to that of 'imagined communities', which Anderson (1993) introduced in his treatise on nations and nationality, and to Bauman's concept of 'dream communities' defined by gender, class and nation (Bauman 1995).

Identity is a problematic concept. Its various theoretical meanings are a function of the discipline in question, the context and the thematic. One understanding of identity, often brought to the fore in ethnic studies, concerns the evanescent product of multiple and competing discourses of self. Social identity is regarded as being in a constant flux and socially determined (Butler 1990; Young 1997). In such an understanding, identity reflects the unstable, negotiable and multiple nature of the contemporary 'self' (Brubaker & Cooper 2000: 8). This use of identity has been criticised for giving the concept a weak and ambiguous meaning. The conception of an 'identity crisis' (Erikson 1968; Gleason 1983) engenders a compound of significances associated with the concept. According to Brubaker & Cooper (2000), a strong conception of identity would imply strong notions of group boundedness and homogeneity because '[t]hey imply high degrees of groupness, and identity or sameness among group members, a sharp distinctiveness from non-members, and a clear boundary between inside and outside' (Brubaker & Cooper 2000: 10). Such a strong concept of identity is extremely difficult to apply in multicultural contexts, in which the existence of many different groups and the blurred boundaries between them render it difficult to define specific collective identities. It is necessary to use more adequate analytical concepts in order to avoid an unstable conception of identity while still including contemporary



group dynamics. One such concept is 'belonging'. The emotionally laden sense of belonging is intimately connected with collective identities. The experiences of descendants of migrants illustrate the blurred boundaries of group belonging with attachment to two or more groups.

In spite of the generally variable nature of identity, some social identities may still be characterised as being relatively stable in the post-modern world with its socially defined norms, customs and expectations. Interaction presupposes a choice between available alternatives to gain identity (Kellner 1992: 142). Everyday routines reflect the way in which people express their identity. Language is part of this logic, especially for descendants of migrants who have access to at least two language options.

A third element associated with identity, which is discussed in this chapter, is about transnational practices. Transnationalism may be studied by looking at social, economic and political cross-border activities, which are all strongly linked to identity. Transnational connections affect migrants with regard to the construction, maintenance and negotiation of collective identities. This has bearing on the culture and identity of descendants of migrants (Vertovec 2010: 576). To what extent do people living in Stockholm with parents born in Turkey maintain their bonds with Turkey? In this chapter, the transnational engagement of migrants' descendants will be problematised from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.

Finally, this chapter looks specifically at the importance of ethnicity to our respondents. The sense of belonging, language practices and transnationalism require a deeper examination of specific features that characterise different ethnic origins. In order to provide a more accurate picture of the elements associated with identity, we will present decomposed data for the categories of ethnic Turks, Kurds and Syrians.

## **Sense of belonging**

Belonging to a certain group or community does not necessarily mean being identified with it. One may feel such a belonging quite independently of one's identification within one or several communities. Belonging as we understand it is something that is earned by the individual. What makes the term appropriate to this study is that it can be used in the plural, suggesting that an individual may have many different attachments (Sicakkan & Lithman 2005: 27).

The TIES questions about belonging to different categories made it possible for us to analyse emotional dimensions. We based these questions on the assumption that multiple belongings constitute a large part of the

identity of young people with a migrant background. The ethno-national categories of belonging that apply here are Swedish, Turkish, Kurdish, Syriac and European. These are supplemented by the religious categories of Muslim, Protestant and Syrian Orthodox.

### Swedish belonging

Earlier studies show that a gap is usually found between migrants and their descendants with regard to their sense of attachment to a Swedish identity. In the 1970s and 1980s researchers defined 'second generation' as not only including migrants' descendants born in Sweden, but also children who had migrated to the country prior to adolescence. Even if these studies do not define the term of 'second generation' as it is defined according to the TIES conceptualisation, they deliver important precedents to explain current trends in terms of identity.

According to Lithman (1987), migrants' descendants present certain embeddedness within Swedish culture. 'Sweden and in particular Swedishness have penetrated the second generation to an unusually high degree' (Lithman 1987: 16). However, this does not automatically translate into a positive outcome for integration. Lithman's results rather show that it creates confusion about cultures, especially when it comes to language. Language confusion has a negative effect on school achievement, leading to the subsequent frustration and isolation of these young people.

What is the situation twenty years later? Do the descendants of Turkish migrants feel affiliated with the Swedes as a group? It is important to clarify that this question does not ask about the respondents' personal identification as Swedish, but enquires about the feeling of belonging to the Swedish people. It is pertinent to look first at the overall results for our target group compared to the reference group before analysing these results by ethnic group.

**Table 6.1** Sense of belonging to the Swedish group (in %)

<b>Belonging to Swedish group</b>	<b>Target group</b>	<b>Reference group</b>
Very strongly	10.3	48.0
Strongly	31.7	38.8
Neither strongly nor weakly	36.9	11.9
Weakly	10.3	0
Very weakly	4.4	0
Not at all	6.4	0.8
Missing	0	0.5

<b>Belonging to Swedish group</b>	<b>Target group</b>	<b>Reference group</b>
Total	100	100
N	251	250

Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

Descendants of migrants from Turkey feel that they belong to the Swedish group to a lesser extent than respondents of native parentage. The target group is over-represented in the category 'Neither strongly nor weakly', showing a neutral attitude to the Swedish group. 21.1 per cent of respondents with parents born in Turkey felt little or no sense of belonging to the Swedish group.

However, when we control for ethnicity our data show that this aspect impacts on the sense of belonging to ethno-national categories. Different ethnic groups not only represent different cultures; in many cases they also represent different religions, languages and causes of migration. All these factors affect the relationship that these young people develop with the national community.

**Table 6.2 Belonging to the Swedish community, by ethnic group (in %)**

	<b>Ethnic Turks</b>	<b>Kurds</b>	<b>Syriacs</b>	<b>Others</b>
Very strongly	10.1	2.7	14.9	16.4
Strongly	28.3	47.4	30.6	26.3
Neither strongly nor weakly	35.6	29.4	44.7	42.9
Weakly	11.2	14.7	6.5	0
Very weakly	5.5	2.7	3.3	0
Not at all	9.4	3.0	0	12.5
Total	100	100	100	100
N	148	35	60	7

Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

In a previous Swedish study of migrants' descendants, Similä (1986) showed that youngsters of ethnic Turkish origin felt more Turkish than Swedish, with 25 per cent identifying themselves as in-between these categories.

The reduced incidence of the weakest categories of belonging – for all groups, but especially for Syriacs and Kurds – shows that a change has taken place since the study was conducted in 1986 by Similä. People of Kurdish origin feel that they belong to the category 'Swedish' to a greater extent than ethnic Turks do, while Syriacs place themselves in an intermediate position. Their parents' migration history offers them a new perspective on the national community in Sweden.

Kurds and Syriacs have a stronger sense of belonging to the Swedish category. This may partly be explained as a consequence of their parents' past as refugees. Sweden became a safe haven for people with no country to return to. Feeling a sense of belonging to a country that had welcomed their parents seems more logical for these groups than for ethnic Turks who came to the country to work and save money. Still, almost 40 per cent of respondents with an ethnic Turkish background felt that they belong either 'very strongly' or 'strongly' to Sweden. Taken as a whole, the group showed a lesser sense of belonging to the Swedish category in comparison with respondents with a Swedish background. However, the reverse was found regarding their sense of belonging to the city of Stockholm.

### Belonging to Stockholm

Stockholm is a multicultural city. Many ethnic groups share their daily lives, mostly in satellite towns on the outskirts of the city. While the respondents with parents from Turkey were born in Stockholm, a significant share of the respondents with a Swedish background were born and raised in other parts of Sweden.

**Table 6.3** Identifying as Stockholmers (in %)

Identifying as Stockholmers	
Very strongly	20.8
Strongly	28.2
Neither strongly nor weakly	28.1
Weakly	9.2
Very weakly	3.2
Not at all	10.5
Missing	0
Total	100
N	250

Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

Young respondents with a migrant background feel themselves to be part of the community in Stockholm to a greater extent than those with a Swedish background. Yet, the same respondents felt a lower sense of belonging to Sweden. The city appears to be a more important source of identification to them than the country.

## Ethnic belonging

If we compare the TIES results with Similä's findings from 1987 – even though the questions are not exactly the same – young descendants of migrants from Turkey seem to identify more closely with the Swedish category than they did twenty years ago.

**Table 6.4 Turkish belonging (in %)**

Identifying with the Turkish community	
Very strongly	20.1
Strongly	28.1
Neither strongly nor weakly	19.0
Weakly	5.5
Very weakly	1.7
Not at all	18.8
Missing	6.8
Total	100
N	251

Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

At first glance, the feeling of belonging to the Turkish community – without specifying ethnic origin – does not seem particularly strong, as 18.8 per cent of the respondents chose the option 'Not at all'. Due to the ethnic heterogeneity of the migration from Turkey to Sweden we need to control for ethnicity. Here, it is important to bear in mind the original phrasing of the question put to the respondents: *'To what extent do you feel that you belong to the following group: Turks?'*

**Table 6.5 Belonging to the Turkish group, by ethnicity (in %)**

	Ethnic Turks	Kurds	Syriacs
Very strongly	32.3	0	3.3
Neither strongly nor weakly	22.5	22.5	6.6
Weakly	3.3	13.7	6.7
Very weakly	0	6.0	2.0
Not at all	2.0	25.4	57.4
Missing	0	20.7	16.8
Total	100	100	100
N	148	35	60

Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

Respondents of Kurdish origin do not feel a sense of belonging to the Turkish group. We need to mention here that some Kurds came to Sweden as labour migrants and later migrants came through the entitlement to family reunification. Kulu, the town from which most of our respondents' parents came, was also the home of the first Kurds arriving in Sweden. In the case of the Syriacs, belonging to the Turkish community does not seem to be an issue at all. Most likely this affects other variables pertaining to identity.

For respondents from a Kurdish or Syriac background, the sense of belonging to their own ethnic community is presented in table 6.6:

**Table 6.6** Belonging to the Kurdish and Syriani groups for Kurds and Syriacs respectively (in %)

	Kurds	Syriacs
Very strongly	17.4	43.1
Strongly	39.6	31.6
Neither strongly nor weakly	17.8	13.4
Weakly	14.1	5.1
Very weakly	5.2	1.7
Not at all	5.9	5.1
Total	100	100
N	35	60

Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

These two groups present a higher sense of belonging to their own ethnic origin than to Turks as an overall category. Syriacs feel a stronger sense of belonging to the Syriani/Assyrian ethnic category than ethnic Turks or Kurds feel with regard to being Turkish or Kurdish. This is yet another reason why we need to be particularly cautious about drawing general conclusions about the group with a background in Turkey.

### European belonging

TIES respondents were also asked about their sense of belonging to the *European* category. Looking at both the target and the reference group, we find a relatively strong sense of belonging to Europe. Respondents, independent of their origin, declared that they belong – to a similar extent – to the category of Europeans.

**Table 6.7 European belonging (in %)**

	<b>Target group</b>	<b>Reference group</b>
Very strongly	14.5	14.4
Strongly	32.2	39.5
Neither strongly nor weakly	27.0	25.9
Weakly	11.3	10.0
Very weakly	2.0	3.0
Not at all	11.4	7.1
Don't know/no answer	1.6	0
Total	100	100
N	251	250

Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

## Religiosity

The level of religiosity differs among TIES respondents with regard to the number of people who have been raised in a particular faith and who maintain their religious affiliation. 71.7 per cent of the respondents with origins in Turkey declared that they had faith in a religion, whereas only 12.4 per cent of the reference group answered that they were religious. Considering the small sample in the case of the reference group, the figures in table 6.8 should be interpreted with caution.

**Table 6.8 Religious upbringing (in %)**

	<b>Target group</b>	<b>Reference group</b>
Catholic	0.6	4.8
Protestant	0	88.1
Orthodox	35.7	0
Other Christian	0	4.8
Sunni	59.2	0
Shia	1.9	0
Other Muslim	2.5	0
Jewish	0	2.4
Total	100	100
N (% of total)	157 (62.5%)	42 (16.8%)

Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

The ethnic heterogeneity of descendants of migrants from Turkey implies that the different religions should be given due consideration when analysing religiosity. Ethnic Turks and Kurds share a Sunni Muslim faith while the people of Syriac origin are Syrian Orthodox Christians.

An important aspect to be taken into account is the difference between one's current religious affiliation and one's religious upbringing. Many more respondents belonging to the target group than to the reference group had had a religious upbringing, 157 and 42, respectively, representing 62.5 per cent and 16.8 per cent of the total. Presumably, having religious parents explains part, but not all, of the effect.

**Table 6.9** Current religious affiliation (in %)

	<b>Target group</b>	<b>Reference group</b>
Catholic	0	0
Protestant	0	75.7
Orthodox	29.9	0
Other Christian	0	16.3
Sunni	63.9	5.5
Shia	1.9	0
Other Muslim	4.4	0
Jewish	0	2.5
Total	100	100
N (% of total)	171 (68 %)	25 (10 %)

Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

When comparing the tables for religious upbringing and current religious affiliation, we find that slightly more respondents in the target group consider themselves to be religious as young adults in comparison with the situation when they were growing up than in the reference group. It appears that quite a few young people turn to religion to find a community to belong to or in the hope of gaining recognition as individuals.

The results regarding religious belonging for the Sunni Muslim and Christian Orthodox categories are presented in tables 6.10 and 6.11.



**Table 6.10 Sense of Muslim belonging or identification (in %)**

	<b>Target group excluding Syrians</b>
Very strongly	33.7
Strongly	47.0
Neither strongly nor weakly	14.0
Weakly	3.7
Very weakly	3.1
Not at all	10.5
Don't know/ no answer (?)	3.7
Total	100
N	190

Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

Over 80 per cent of the respondents whose parents were born in Turkey – with an ethnic Turkish or Kurdish background – answered that they feel a ‘strong’ or ‘very strong’ sense of belonging to the Muslim community. It is important to contextualise this group in multicultural Sweden, which not only allows for the existence of other religions, but also supports them. Although public opinion is not fully open towards Islam, there is general acceptance of Muslims practising their faith in Sweden, in contrast to the situation in other European countries such as France and Switzerland. The issue of the veil is debated, but it does not cause the same polemic as in other European countries.

**Table 6.11 Sense of belonging to the Syrian Orthodox Church (and community) (in %)**

	<b>Target group – Syrians</b>
Very strongly	55.1
Strongly	31.6
Neither strongly nor weakly	8.5
Weakly	1.6
Very weakly	0
Not at all	1.7
Don't know/ no answer (?)	1.6
Total	100
N	60

Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

Respondents of Syriac origin answered that they belong to the Syrian Orthodox Church. They demonstrate a very strong feeling of being one with the Syrian Orthodox community. As mentioned in a previous chapter, religion is one of the main features that makes the Syriac group a cohesive community. At the same time, it is an aspect that differentiates them from other migrants from Turkey. In this case, it can be seen that their descendants have maintained their affiliation with the religious community and congregation.

## Language

It is a widely held opinion that proficiency in a specific common language is essential for the maintenance of group identity (Edwards, 1985). However, some recent studies point out the inadequacy of analysing linguistic practice by taking identity as an explanatory concept (Pavlenko & Blackledge 2004: 4). Language plays a crucial role in the process of individual identity construction and group identity. Language choice in a multicultural environment thus becomes an issue of identity, but it is also a response to the choices, stimuli and debates within this context with regard to everyday practices and identity construction. Language use, maintenance and change should therefore be analysed within the context in which these processes develop.

Descendants of migrants from Turkey in this study learnt Swedish at school at an early age. Therefore, they were able to master the language far better than their parents. This is a consequence of the 1974 integration policy based on the principles of equality, freedom of choice and partnership. The principle of 'freedom of choice' implied that children of migrants enjoyed the right to 'choose' their 'cultural' affiliation either by having instruction in Swedish or in their parents' language, the 'home' language. For some researchers (Akpınar 1988; Ålund 1997) this policy emphasised differences, creating a pervasive discourse that defined migrants in terms of their culture. Children with a migrant background entering school had a different curriculum from children of native Swedish parentage. Home language classes implied that all subjects of the curriculum during the first school years could be taught in the pupil's mother tongue. Due to the age of the TIES respondents, it is conceivable that many started the Swedish school system being taught in their parents' language. The home-language lessons became a confusing situation for children in terms of identity and their place in Swedish society. Narroze (1998) is critical of this programme

in which children were confused regarding the language they needed to prioritise and she shows that the home language programme did not improve their situation in the labour market later in life.

Up until 2000 there was no legal document stating that Swedish is the country's official language. Knowledge of Swedish was not linked to citizenship acquisition. Official integration policy did not impose a language clause on migrants who sought naturalisation, in contrast to the assimilation policies implemented in many other European countries. Nevertheless, pupils, whatever their origin, need to demonstrate their proficiency in Swedish in order to qualify for upper secondary school where the curriculum is designed for Swedish speakers. What then is the role of the Swedish language in the lives of the respondents? To what extent do they use a language other than Swedish to express themselves in family life? The following tables try to answer these questions.

### First language(s) and language use self-evaluation

88 per cent of respondents with origins in Turkey declared that they were raised with the Swedish language. Most of these respondents were also raised with some other language, Turkish being most frequently mentioned (73.7 per cent), followed by Suryoyo (15.1 per cent). The result of the bilingual environment in which our informants grew up was evident in their ability to speak, read and write two languages as adults.

The informants were asked to evaluate their current knowledge of Swedish. Most respondents declared that they have an excellent command of Swedish in speaking (71.3 per cent), reading (77.3 per cent) and writing (76.5 per cent).

**Table 6.12** Self-perception of Swedish language proficiency. Valid and cumulative %

	Speaking		Reading		Writing	
	valid	cumulative	valid	cumulative	valid	cumulative
Bad	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not so good	0	0	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Good	7.9	7.9	6.8	7.2	10.0	10.4
Very good	21.3	29.2	16.2	23.4	13.6	24.0
Excellent	70.5	99.7	76.3	99.7	75.6	99.6
Don't know	0.3	100	0.3	100	0.4	100
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	251		251		251	

No statistics are computed because one of the variables (origin = Turkish) is a constant

The positive evaluations that respondents made of their proficiency in Swedish show that they feel relatively at ease using the national, although not official, state language. This is an interesting result, considering that these young people have mastered at least one other language, their home language.

**Table 6.13 Self-perception of Turkish/Kurdish/Suryoyo language proficiency. Valid and cumulative %**

	Speaking		Reading		Writing	
	valid	cumulative	valid	cumulative	valid	cumulative
Not good at all	1.5	1.5	14.0	14.0	15.1	15.1
Bad	2.1	3.6	6.2	20.2	9.4	24.5
Not so good	5.8	9.4	11.9	32.1	12.4	36.9
Good	38.2	47.6	32.7	64.8	29.4	66.3
Very good	28.3	75.9	16.7	81.5	16.6	82.9
Excellent	22.9	98.8	17.4	98.9	15.4	98.3
Don't know	1.2	100	1.1	100	1.7	100
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	251		251		251	

No statistics are computed because one of the variables (origin = Turkish) is a constant

Overall, the respondents considered themselves to be more proficient in Swedish than in their parents' language – the so-called 'home language'. However, we should not conclude from this that a language shift is underway as the respondents still actively use their home language. We may need to change our ideas about their self-perceived proficiency in Swedish being better than their self-perceived proficiency in Turkish, Kurdish or Suryoyo, when we control for ethnic identification.

According to a survey carried out by Lange in 1995 (Lange 1996), young people in Sweden with a Turkish background use their home language more often than other ethnic groups in what he called the 'intimate sphere' – at home, with family and close friends – but use it much less for writing. Our data support the interpretation that Turkish language use may turn into an 'oral tradition', in the sense that the language is used mostly in oral communication and passed on down the generations through everyday communication rather than formal training.

For our respondents, the results by ethnic group, beginning with oral proficiency, are as follows:

**Table 6.14** Self-perception of oral proficiency of Turkish/Kurdish/Suryoyo language (in %)

	<b>Ethnic Turks</b>	<b>Kurds</b>	<b>Syriacs</b>
Not good at all	0.7	2.9	1.3
Bad	0.7	0	5.5
Not so good	5.7	6.1	6.8
Good	33.9	51.2	41.6
Very good	31.0	28.3	22.0
Excellent	28.1	9.1	19.2
Don't know	0	2.4	3.6
Total	100	100	100
N	148	35	60

Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

The majority of the respondents declare that they have an 'excellent'/'very good' or 'good' knowledge of their parents' language. However, they rate their writing skills less highly than their oral abilities. Self-declared skills in writing one's parental language are higher for the group of ethnic Turkish origin than for respondents of Kurdish and Syriac origin.

**Table 6.15** Self-perception of writing proficiency of Turkish/Kurdish/Suryoyo language (in %)

	<b>Ethnic Turks</b>	<b>Kurds</b>	<b>Syriacs</b>
Not good at all	1.4	23.4	40.1
Bad	6.1	17.8	14.1
Not so good	8.0	19.7	21.0
Good	36.7	25.0	14.3
Very good	23.9	11.8	0
Excellent	23.9	0	5.0
Don't know	0	2.4	3.6
Total	100	100	100
N	148	35	60

Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

A large percentage of the respondents of Syriac and Kurdish origin regard themselves as having a weak knowledge of their parents' language, especially in writing. This seems to reaffirm the supposition that in most cases one's home language represents an oral tradition. Nevertheless, children

of ethnic Turks still think of themselves as being reasonably proficient in writing Turkish. This could be due to the policy of *Hemspråk* – home language training – which was available for ethnic Turks, but not for Kurds or Syrians with origins in Turkey, due to the early misunderstanding of ‘Turks’ as a homogenous group. The Syrians did not use their parents’ original language in everyday social intercourse to the same degree as ethnic Turks, indicating that they were less interested in learning Suryoyo formally, and were maintaining the language only through oral practice.

### Use of language

After this brief analysis of the mastery of two languages, we need to look at people’s usage of these languages. Our respondents were asked which language they use when talking to their parents, siblings and friends. The most interesting aspects were found when controlling for ethnicity and therefore the tables will be presented for the three main ethnic groups separately.

**Table 6.16** Language used when talking to friends, by ethnic group (in %)

	<b>Ethnic Turks</b>	<b>Kurds</b>	<b>Syriacs</b>
Mostly Swedish	53.1	74.2	76.6
More Swedish than Turkish/Kurdish/Suryoyo	22.6	5.7	11.5
More Turkish/Kurdish/Suryoyo than Swedish	17.2	6.0	6.7
Mostly Turkish/Kurdish/Suryoyo	7.1	2.7	3.6
Neither Turkish/Kurdish/Suryoyo nor Swedish	0	2.7	1.7
Don’t know	0	8.6	0
Total	100	100	100
N	148	35	60

Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

The dissimilarities between these groups suggest that descendants of ethnic Turks have more fellow ethnics as friends than those of Kurdish and Syriac origin. However, these data may also be interpreted to mean that one’s friends may be fellow ethnics, but that one usually speaks Swedish with them. In both cases, young ethnic Turks seem to use Turkish somewhat more often when speaking to friends than the other two groups use their respective parental languages.

In all groups, although to a different extent, the majority of the respondents maintain friendships ‘in Swedish’. This shows that they prefer to speak

in Swedish rather than in the language inherited from their parents. For a more complete picture regarding the friendships of the respondents in Stockholm, see chapter 4 on social capital.

We need to bear in mind that these young people usually live in multicultural settings, sharing the same space with people of a variety of ethnic origins, who do not share the same parental language. Swedish is therefore the primary – and usually the only – language in which they can communicate with each other.

Looking at the same questions in relation to the language used when talking to parents, the results are as follows:

**Table 6.17 Language used when talking to father (in %)**

	<b>Ethnic Turks</b>	<b>Kurds</b>	<b>Syriacs</b>
Mostly Swedish	6.1	22.7	30.9
More Swedish than Turkish/Kurdish/Suryoyo	5.3	10.8	8.8
More Turkish/Kurdish/Suryoyo than Swedish	20.9	11.1	16.8
Mostly Turkish/Kurdish/Suryoyo	54.4	25.9	26.6
Neither Turkish/Kurdish/Suryoyo nor Swedish	0	18.2	10.1
Don't know	13.2	12.3	6.7
Total	100	100	100
N	148	35	60

Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

**Table 6.18 Language used when talking to mother (in %)**

	<b>Ethnic Turks</b>	<b>Kurds</b>	<b>Syriacs</b>
Mostly Swedish	8.1	22.7	23.0
More Swedish than Turkish/Kurdish/Suryoyo	4.9	13.6	10.7
More Turkish/Kurdish/Suryoyo than Swedish	23.6	11.1	18.6
Mostly Turkish/Kurdish/Suryoyo	60.1	28.7	16.6
Neither Turkish/Kurdish/Suryoyo nor Swedish	0	15.5	12.9
Don't know	3.4	8.5	8.2
Total	100	100	100
N	148	35	60

Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

The majority of our respondents with an ethnic Turkish background use Turkish when communicating with their parents. This is not the case for Kurds or Syriacs, who are more divided between speaking Swedish and

Kurdish or Suryoyo, respectively. Therefore, language maintenance is more characteristic of ethnic Turks than of the other groups. The following table describing language use among siblings provides additional support for the suggested explanation of the previous results.

**Table 6.19** Language used when talking to brothers and sisters (in %)

	<b>Ethnic Turks</b>	<b>Kurds</b>	<b>Syriacs</b>
Mostly Swedish	28.0	60.7	68.6
More Swedish than Turkish/Kurdish/Suryoyo	30.7	18.0	12.8
More Turkish/Kurdish/Suryoyo than Swedish	24.8	6.5	6.9
Mostly Turkish/Kurdish/Suryoyo	14.7	2.8	8.0
Neither Turkish/Kurdish/Suryoyo nor Swedish	0	6.2	1.7
Don't know	1.9	5.7	1.9
Total	100	100	100
N	148	35	60

Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

The preference for 'Mostly Swedish' for respondents of Syriac and Kurdish origin shows a clear preference for the official language and a lower maintenance of their parental ethnic language. In this respect, they differ largely from their Turkish counterparts. Even if their own social environment is a part of the multilingual society, many respondents prefer to use the official language with siblings and friends, following a very different pattern from the group of ethnic Turks descending from Turkish migrants who continue to use their parents' language. However, in all groups there is a tendency to switch to Swedish in friendships and when talking to brothers and sisters. The 'home language' is precisely that: a language used at home. Young people of ethnic Turkish ancestry, however, speak Turkish at home and Swedish outside their home to a much larger extent than the other groups, who incorporate Swedish even in the intimate sphere of their lives.

## **Transnational practices**

In order to analyse transnational practices, it is necessary to measure relationships between the descendants of migrants from Turkey for all three ethnic groups and with Turkey itself. As stated in the migration history chapter, parents' hopes to return to Turkey may determine their children's behaviour in Swedish society. Parents aiming to go back were



more conservative about values and norms and were more in touch with traditions in Turkey than those who did not contemplate any such plans. This could imply that strong transnational ties have developed. Studies about the descendants' transnational links with their parents' homeland report that such links are generally weaker than for the parents (Lee 2008; Runblom 2000; Levitt & Waters 2002; Vertovec 2009). Sometimes people become engaged in transnational practices at specific life stages (Levitt 2002). Recent research mentions a broad variety of transnational patterns among different groups (Kasinitz, Waters, Mollenkopf & Anil 2002). Of all the questions included in our survey, five were designed to capture the transnational practices of the target group: visits, watching Turkish TV, use of the Internet for information about Turkey, investments, and transfers of money to Turkey.

The practice that occurs with the highest incidence is visiting Turkey. Respondents were also asked how often they visit their parents' country. The mean is four times during the past five years, most commonly for vacations (78.7 per cent) and to visit family (55.4 per cent). Other motives were to study (0.8 per cent) and for business (1.5 per cent). Watching Turkish TV is relatively common (40 per cent). On the other hand, using the Internet to keep in touch with the Turkish world is much less common (15.2 per cent).

**Table 6.20 Transnational practices: forms of contact (in %)**

	<b>Share of respondents</b>
Have visited Turkey during the past 5 years	84.5
Watch Turkish-speaking TV	40.0
Use the Internet for information about Turkey	15.2
Invest money in Turkey	2.0
Send money to Turkey	23.9
N	250

Investments in Turkey are very rare, whereas sending money was mentioned by almost one-fourth of the respondents. 23.9 per cent declared that they had sent money to Turkey. 75.7 per cent said that the amount sent was less than 5,000 Swedish Kronor (SEK), equivalent at the time of the survey to slightly less than 500 euros. Furthermore, 13.5 per cent of the respondents said that between 5,000 and 10,000 Swedish Kronor had been sent. Most of those who answered the question (less than a quarter of the respondents) did not send more than 1,000 euros. This implies that the economic remittances sent by descendants of migrants from Turkey are not very substantial.

Here, however, we need to bear in mind that the respondents were between eighteen and 35 years old. Most of the respondents were still studying, or only just starting their careers at the time of the interview. Therefore, they were not really in an economic position to send or invest money in Turkey regularly. Nevertheless, a significant percentage of them were sending money to family, friends and charitable organisations in Turkey.

**Table 6.21 Transnational practices: size of remittances (in %)**

	Share of respondents
< 5 000 SEK	75.7
5 000-10 000 SEK	13.5
10 000-20 000 SEK	2.0
> 20 000 SEK	7.0
Don't know/no answer	1.8
N	250

Even if there are some indications of transnationalism, they are not strong enough to suggest that descendants of migrants from Turkey living in Stockholm have close contact with their parents' country of birth. So far, transnationalism is not particularly evident among young people born in Sweden with origins in Turkey. However, this may change when we control for ethnicity. The TIES indicators were planned to measure how people think about transnationalism in terms of a homogeneous group.

Referring back to the chapter on parents' ethnicities and causes of migration, we found strong reasons to believe that there are different kinds of bonds with Turkey among this group of young people. Such bonds proved to be low for the overall study group. However, if we control for ethnic belonging, the situation looks quite different.

**Table 6.22 Transnational practices, by ethnicity (in %)**

	Ethnic Turks	Kurds	Syriacs
Have visited Turkey during the past 5 years	95.9	91.8	54.2
Watch Turkish-speaking TV	54.1	37.9	7.3
Use the Internet for information about Turkey	25.8	9.0	10.7
Invest money in Turkey	2.1	0	1.3
Send money to Turkey	32.8	20.1	4.8

95.9 per cent of the respondents with an ethnic Turkish background declared that they had visited Turkey during the past five years, and 91.8 per cent of those of Kurdish origin had also done so. The great majority of these groups stay in touch with their parents' country through visits. Syrians, however, showed a much lower frequency of visits to Turkey (54.2 per cent), which is hardly surprising considering their parents' migration history. Watching Turkish-speaking television had a higher frequency for the young people of ethnic Turkish ancestry. The use of the Internet for information about Turkey was also more frequent for the descendants of ethnic Turks. As shown in the section on language, the descendants of migrants relate to their parents' culture quite differently, which we contend is highly influenced by ethnicity. Language differences probably explain the varying interest in Turkish speaking TV and Internet sites, which would be less interesting to Syrians (Suryoyo speakers) and Kurds than to Turkish-speaking ethnic Turks.

When asked, *'Do you intend to live in Turkey in the future?'* more than half of the respondents declared that they would 'certainly not' do so, while 25.3 per cent declared that they would 'possibly' live there. Respondents whose parents came to Sweden as refugees do not consider living in Turkey an option.

**Table 6.23** Desire to live in Turkey (in %)

	<b>Ethnic Turks</b>	<b>Kurds</b>	<b>Syriacs</b>	<b>Total</b>
Certainly not	48.9	45.6	89.3	57.6
Possibly	28.8	32.0	9.2	25.3
Likely	13.0	8.3	0	9.3
Certainly	6.1	6.1	0	4.5
Don't know/no answer	3.3	8.0	1.5	3.4
Total	100	100	100	100
N	148	35	60	

Pearson Chi-Square test shows Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at the 0.1% level

The desire to live in Turkey is extremely low for respondents with a Syrian background. It seems to be more of an option for descendants of Kurds and ethnic Turks. Nevertheless, half of the group does not consider the possibility of ever living in their parents' homeland.

## Concluding remarks

People whose parents had migrated from Turkey to Sweden face multiple choices in everyday life when forming their identities. Our data show that they are individuals with multiple belongings – although in different ways and to varying extents. The results, in terms of belonging, language and transnationalism, show that young people with parents from Turkey seem to incorporate both their parents' culture and the national culture into their everyday lives. In terms of belonging, they manifest – with different intensities – belonging to their ethnic group as well as to Sweden, and to an even higher extent to Stockholm. The importance of this non-national category is similar among both respondents with a background in Turkey and those of native Swedish origin.

The target group in Sweden enjoys an affiliation with their parents' culture, but variations can be perceived between different aspects – belonging, language and transnationalism – and also between ethnic groups. Although further statistical analysis is required to draw definite conclusions regarding the role and effect of ethnicity on their personal identities, we find a clear difference between ethnic groups with regard to the prevalence of certain behaviours, which are associated with Turkey and Sweden to a greater or lesser extent. Respondents with an ethnic Turkish origin appear to be more embedded in their parents' culture than those of Syriac or Kurdish origin.

Religion plays a role in the life of those who are Sunni Muslims. Our results indicate that there is growth in terms of religiosity from their upbringing to their present life. The majority of the respondents declared that they have strong feelings of belonging to their religious community. Syriacs felt a strong sense of belonging to the Syrian Orthodox Church, which is one of the elements that distinguishes the Syriac community in Sweden from the other communities with origins in Turkey, and this sense of belonging helps them to maintain cohesion as a community.

In the case of people of Syriac and Kurdish descent, proficiency in and use of Swedish in everyday speech has a negative effect on proficiency in their 'home language'. This is in marked contrast to their ethnic Turkish counterparts. The use of their parents' languages – Turkish, Kurdish and Suryoyo – is most common in the intimate sphere, when talking to parents. This incidence is higher for ethnic Turks than for the other groups, who seem to incorporate the Swedish language into their intimate sphere. This is confirmed by the high incidence of the national language for all groups. Two conclusions may be drawn from these results. First, language choice

seems to be defined by ethnicity. And second, language maintenance seems to diminish for the first generation of descendants. Even if Swedish has not officially been declared as the national language in Sweden, it is the language of the majority and our results show that people with origins in Turkey prioritise Swedish in their daily lives. They evaluate themselves as being more proficient in the national language than in Turkish, Kurdish or Suryoyo. Kurds and Syriacs showed a lower proficiency in their respective home languages than ethnic Turks.

Indicators of transnationalism do not seem to be particularly high, which was unexpected considering the large diaspora that surrounds people with an origin in Turkey. The descendants of Syriacs are notably less in contact with Turkey than respondents of ethnic Turkish or Kurdish origin. The migration history of their parents may provide a possible explanation for this outcome. Due to their previous experiences as a minority in Turkey, Syriacs do not maintain much contact with the region from which their parents emigrated. This may be explained by the fact that very few Syriacs remain in the region and do not form a sufficiently strong network for those living in Europe with their descendants. Young people visit their parents' country, but according to our data, less than once a year and mostly for vacations. Although they stay in touch with family and friends, when confronted with the option of living in Turkey, almost half declared that they 'certainly will not' do so.

The descendants of ethnic Turks and Kurds are willing to consider this option, but only as a possibility. This question revealed the extent to which these young people feel at home in Sweden. In contrast to their parents, they do not strongly hope or wish to 'return' to Turkey. Finally, it is important to note that in all the indicators related to identity, people of ethnic Turkish origin seem to be closer to their Turkish side, sometimes with striking differences in respect to other groups. Presenting these results only by the parents' country of birth would have produced an inaccurate picture of the group, especially in terms of identity, which has been proven to be extremely sensitive to ethnicity.

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# 7 The labour market

*Lena Schröder*

## Background

### The Swedish labour market


In this chapter we will take a closer look at the situation for young people entering the labour market over the past fifteen years. This period shows large fluctuations in the general state of the labour market, as reflected in employment and unemployment levels.

Up until the 1990s, unemployment rates among the adult population seldom rose above 2 per cent of the labour force, while youth unemployment was approximately twice as high. At the beginning of the 1990s, however, the Swedish economy was hit by a severe crisis. In spite of extensive labour market programmes, unemployment rose to levels not seen since the 1930s and youth unemployment skyrocketed.

Figure 7.1 shows the unemployment rate for people above the age of twenty in the labour force. The reason for choosing this age span is that most people under twenty are studying and are therefore not part of the labour force (see chapter 3 on education). In 1993, youth unemployment peaked at a level of slightly above 18 per cent of the work force, and the same level almost reoccurred in 2006.

The 1990s crisis had a more severe impact on migrants than on people of native origin (Arai & Vilhemsson 2004; Vogel, Hjerm & Johansson 2002; Nekby 2003; Integrationsverket 2006). Migrants are generally more vulnerable to downturns in the business cycle than people of native origin, but this situation was also due to a restructuring of the economy, whereby more than 500,000 jobs were lost in the manufacturing sector. At the end of the 1980s, the manufacturing sector employed almost 30 per cent of native-born men and more than 40 per cent of foreign-born men. Since then this percentage has been declining continuously, especially for the foreign-born population. In 2004, only around 24 per cent of employed men (native or foreign-born) worked in the manufacturing sector. The same decline also applied to women, albeit to a lesser extent. By the end of the 1980s, 12 per cent of native-born women and 22 per cent of foreign-born women worked in the manufacturing sector. These shares have declined to approximately 9 per cent of employed women



**Figure 7.1** Unemployment in % of the labour force, ages 20-24 and 25-64, 1963-2008

Source: Statistics Sweden, Labour Force Surveys, own computations

\* There was a reform in the LFS in 2005 resulting in higher unemployment rates than previous years.

(native and foreign-born). Foreign-born men and women are thus no longer heavily over-represented in the manufacturing industry. The decline of employment in the manufacturing sector has been partially compensated for by increasing numbers of individuals working in the private and public service sectors. Both the absolute and relative employment rates for migrants, however, are still lower than prior to the crisis (Integrationsverket 2006).

Considering the importance of these general conditions on the labour market for both young people and migrants, it follows that they are of the utmost significance for young descendants of migrants entering the labour market.

The young people in this study were between eighteen and 36 years old when they were interviewed in 2007. This means that many of those belonging to the oldest age brackets entered the labour market during the crisis in the early 1990s and many of the younger respondents when youth unemployment peaked again in 2006. Those in between entered the labour market when it was in a somewhat more favourable situation.

## Previous research

A considerable amount of research regarding the labour market situation for descendants of migrants has been carried out in Sweden. For many years the results showed no labour market differences between the descendants of migrants and those with native parents when differences in parents' education and socioeconomic position were controlled for. These results reflect the fact that up until quite recently the descendants of migrants in the labour force were largely born to labour migrants, the majority of whom had come to Sweden from Finland and Southern Europe to work in the manufacturing industry in the 1960s and 1970s. The labour market situation for the descendants of these labour migrants resembles that of other young people from a working-class background.

After the oil crisis and the subsequent industrial downturn in the mid-1970s, refugees and their families became the main source of immigration. In the 1970s and 1980s, refugee migration stemmed mainly from countries in Latin America, the Middle East and Africa, while in the 1990s refugee migration from the former Yugoslavia dominated. The descendants of these migrants have now reached the age when they are entering the labour market.

Several recent studies show that young descendants of migrants from non-European countries who are born in Sweden encounter greater difficulties in the labour market than other young people. Most of these studies compare people with the same educational level in the Swedish school system. Moreover, some studies include grades in the Swedish language and the socioeconomic position and education of parents in the general comparisons they make. The labour market disadvantages for children of migrants from non-European countries can therefore not entirely be explained by differences in education, command of Swedish, or one's parents' education or position in the labour market. Several authors interpret these results as indications of discrimination in the labour market (Arai, Schröder & R. Vilhemsson 2000; Lundh, Bennich-Björkman, Ohlsson, Pedersen & Rooth 2002; Vilhemsson 2002; Österberg 2000; Behtoui 2006; Hammarstedt & Palme 2006; Nekby, Vilhelmsson & Özcan 2008).

The existence of labour market discrimination against young jobseekers with parents born in Africa or in the Middle East (young men in particular) has been confirmed in several field experiments (see Schröder 2007 for an overview).

An important question is whether the labour market disadvantages for the descendants of migrants from non-European countries apply to

young people at all educational levels. Only one study (Nekby et al. 2008) has directly addressed this question and it found no wage or employment differences for young people with tertiary education, regardless of whether their parents were born in Sweden or in a non-European country.

### **The labour market situation in Stockholm for descendants of migrants from Turkey and of natives**

The following description of the labour market situation is based on the TIES dataset and it refers to the state of affairs in Stockholm in 2007. As stated in the introduction, the TIES sample differs in certain essential respects from the population as a whole. Consequently, the data presented in this chapter should be considered merely as a description of a group of young people who are older and have considerably more years of education than the population average from which they were sampled.

As in preceding chapters, young people with parents born in Turkey, our target group,<sup>1</sup> are compared to a group consisting of young people with parents born in Sweden, our reference group.

As seen from Figure 7.1, unemployment was high in Sweden during the years when the interviews were conducted, and this probably affected the target group to a greater extent than the reference group with regard to employment prospects. There are, however, several additional factors that influence the labour market situation of young people.

The transition from school to work is a drawn-out process in Sweden. For many young people their first years in the labour market are characterised by periods of temporary jobs interspersed by spells of unemployment, labour market programmes and studies of various kinds. Age is therefore an important factor for labour market outcomes. The age span in the dataset is rather broad and covers young people in the age range of 18–36 years of age. For the eldest, almost eighteen years have passed since they graduated from upper secondary school, the average age for graduating being nineteen years, while the youngest are at an age when they are typically about to complete upper secondary school. Considering that the target group is

1 A majority of the group with parents born in Turkey have parents of Turkish ethnicity (60 per cent), but there are substantial minorities whose parents have Syriac (24 per cent) or Kurdish (14 per cent) ethnicity (see chapter 2).

considerably younger than the reference group, we need to differentiate the presentation for three different age brackets: 18-24, 25-29, and 30-36.<sup>2</sup>

Another important factor affecting people's position in the labour market is gender. The distribution of gender for the target group resembles that of the reference group. It cannot be taken for granted, however, that the gender differences in the labour market are the same for both groups, as demonstrated in studies conducted in other countries (Van Ours & Veenman 2004; Crul & Heering 2008 for the Netherlands; Timmerman, Vanderwaeren & Crul 2003 for Belgium). Thus the presentation also needs to be disaggregated by gender.

**Table 7.1** Distribution of age categories and mean age (in %)

	Target group			Reference group		
	distribution	mean age	sd	distribution	mean age	sd
18-24	39.9	21.1	1.9	31.0	21.0	2.1
25-29	37.3	26.9	1.5	28.3	27.2	1.2
30-36	22.8	21.7	1.7	40.7	32.7	1.7
Total	100			100		

The purpose of this presentation is to illustrate possible labour market differences between the target group and the reference group. The way in which the labour market is segmented by age and gender necessitates a disaggregation on parents' country of birth as well as on gender and age. This makes for twelve different categories, i.e. two countries of birth of parents\* three age categories \* two genders.<sup>3</sup>

### Employment and non-employment

The description of the respondents' position in the labour market draws on their main activity at the time of the interview. As seen in table 7.2, the main activities are employment, studies and unemployment, but there are considerable differences between the age brackets. It is by no means evident which of these activities should be judged to be a successful labour

2 The age differences mainly show up in a greater number of respondents with parents born in Turkey who belong to the age bracket 18-24 and a greater number in the age bracket 30-36 for the comparison group. Within each age bracket, the differences between the target group and the reference group are much smaller than between the age brackets.

3 With the necessary disaggregation, the number of observations in each cell will be very small and in most cases tests of statistical significance are meaningless. The statistical significance will instead be tested with logistic regression.

market situation. Employment in itself cannot unequivocally be considered a success criterion for young people in the age span of eighteen to 36 years. In a life course perspective, studies might generate more beneficial rewards in terms of better wages, higher social status and other qualities associated with work. This is particularly relevant for the younger age groups.

Another way of describing the labour market situation for young people is to calculate the NEET rate. This indicator is frequently used by the OECD and encompasses those who are Neither in Education, Employment nor Training. The employment and NEET rates are used in our analysis as categories for successful and problematic labour market outcomes, respectively.

An important issue is about those who are not working. It appears that young people in the target group are unemployed to a much greater extent than those in the reference group, at least in the younger age brackets. Taking care of children and family is a more frequent undertaking among young women with parents born in Turkey than among young women with a native Swedish background. Women in the two youngest age brackets of the target group are studying to the same extent as their counterparts in the reference group. Among young men, however, a notable difference is apparent when it comes to studies, with considerably lower participation in studies among young men in the target group than among young men in the reference group (see chapter 3).

**Table 7.2 Main activity at time of interview, by gender and age (in %)\***

	Female respondents							
	Target group				Reference group			
	18-24	25-29	30-36	Total	18-24	25-29	30-36	Total
One or more jobs	30.9	69.2	63.1	52.9	44.2	66.8	77.3	63.9
Entrepreneur, business	1.9	0	6.6	2.3	3.1	4.1	6.3	4.7
Part-time studies & job	16.0	0	3.2	7.0	11.6	6.2	2.5	6.4
Apprentice	0	0	0	0	3.4	0	0	1.1
Unemployed	13.9	9.0	9.7	11.1	6.0	4.9	3.6	4.7
Taking care of home & family	2.1	6.1	10.3	5.5	0	2.4	5.8	3.0
Full-time studies	27.8	15.6	6.9	18.3	28.8	15.5	0	13.5
Other	7.3	0	0	2.9	2.8	0	4.5	2.7
n	51	45	31	126	36	33	58	127
N	1 141	1 115	677	2 933	44 090	40 373	56 274	140 737

	Male respondents							
	Target group				Reference group			
	18-24	25-29	30-36	Total	18-24	25-29	30-36	Total
One or more jobs	51.1	76.0	77.4	66.1	32.9	70.8	78.3	62.3
Entrepreneur, business	5.8	14.9	16.1	11.5	0	4.2	16.0	7.8
Part-time studies & job	7.3	2.5	3.7	4.7	17.0	6.2	2.4	7.9
Apprentice	0	0	0	0	2.8	0	0	0.9
Unemployed	10.1	2.5	0	5.0	3.2	3.9	0	2.1
Taking care of home & family	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Full-time studies	17.8	4.3	2.9	9.5	31.4	11.0	1.2	13.2
Ill or disabled	1.9	0	0	0.8	0	3.9	0	1.1
Military service	2.0	0	0	0.8	2.8	0	0	0.9
Other	3.9	0	0	1.6	9.7	0	0	3.8
n	51	43	30	124	33	32	58	123
N	1 142	1 019	629	2 790	41 239	37 685	55 752	134 766

n = number of observations in the data, N = number of observations using the weight variable statistics Sweden has computed to compensate for non-response, which also blows up the sample to population size. The distribution in different activities is based on weighted data in this and all other tables and figures in the chapter.

## Employment



We have brought rates for employment and self-employment together into one category. Given the above-mentioned disaggregation, the number of observations in each cell is only between 22 and 50, which means that the results must be interpreted with caution.<sup>4</sup>

Figure 7.2, however, reveals the expected age pattern, i.e. employment levels are higher for older age brackets than for younger ones. This holds true for both men and women and for both the target group and the reference group.

For all age brackets we find that women in the target group are employed to a lesser extent than women in the reference group. In the case of men, the employment rates are higher for the target group in the younger age brackets and equal in the oldest age bracket. This might partly reflect a higher participation in tertiary education among the men in the reference group.

<sup>4</sup> Employment can also be analysed in STATIV, an administrative database that includes the entire population. Although the TIES and the STATIV data differ in their definition of employment, the results from STATIV are rather similar to those from TIES.

**Figure 7.2** Employed and self-employed at time of interview, by age and gender  
(in %)




**The NEET rate**

The NEET rate shows the proportion of young people who are neither working nor investing in a future labour market career by either studying or training.<sup>5</sup> In the weighted data, 487 (16.7 per cent) young women and 162 (5.8 per cent) young men from the target group are included in this category. The corresponding figures for the reference group are 10,884 (7.8 per cent) women and 4,262 (3.2 per cent) men.

Figure 7.3 specifies the differences in the NEET rate among young people of the target group and reference group. The NEET rate for target group women is approximately 10 percentage points higher than for the women in the reference group.


For both groups, the NEET rate is higher for women than for men, particularly in the older age brackets. None of the men in the oldest age brackets are ‘neither working nor studying’, i.e. the NEET rate is zero. Among the younger men, the NEET rate is higher for those of the target group in the age bracket 18-24 and higher for those in the reference group in the age bracket 25-29.

**Figure 7.3 NEET rate at time of interview, by age and gender (in %)**



5 The NEET rate is composed of the answers ‘unpaid work in the family company’, ‘unemployment’, ‘taking care of children and family’ and ‘sick/handicapped’ to the question of the main activity at the time of interview.





### Statistical significance and the importance of other background factors

Logistic regressions are estimated in order to test whether the differences between the target group and the reference group are statistically significant (see chapter 3 for more information). The results are shaky and dependent on how the weight variable<sup>6</sup> in our data is treated. The estimates are presented in the Appendix.

Starting with the chance of becoming employed or self-employed, our data show that the differences between the target group and reference group are not statistically significant for aggregated gender data (table 7.A1).

A higher level of education substantially increases the chance of being employed and appears to reduce slightly differences between the target group and reference group. Furthermore, increasing age has a positive impact on employment. Our data show that age and educational level are

6 Using unweighted data gives different point estimates than when using weights, but the signs are the same without exception. Using the weight variable from Statistics Sweden, which blows up the sample to population size, makes all estimates statistically significant. Computing a weight variable that does not blow up the sample to population size (dividing the weight variable with its mean value), means that most estimates are not statistically significant; see Tables 7.A1-7.A3 in the Appendix.

positively correlated, since the estimates for the educational variables are substantially reduced when age variables are introduced in the model. Including parents' education and employment status does not substantially alter these estimates.

Analysing male and female respondents separately reduces the number of observations by 50 per cent, but it does give some additional tentative information. In the case of female respondents (table 7.A2), the estimate for the target group is negative and highly significant in the unweighted models until parental variables are introduced. Education as well as age has a large and positive impact on the chances of being employed, but the estimates for belonging to the target group are not substantially changed.

The estimates for male respondents point to another picture (table 7.A3). For respondents with parents born in Turkey, i.e. members of the target group, the estimate is positive, although never significant. Age has a huge positive impact and seems to be more important than university education.

Logistic regression of the NEET rate (table 7.A4) gives positive and significant estimates for the target group in all the unweighted models until variables on parents' education and labour market position are introduced. Educational level and age do not seem to have the same importance as when the dependent variable is defined as the chance of being employed.

Considering the limited number of observations in our dataset and the role of the weight variables, it is inadvisable to draw definite conclusions from this analysis. However, one highly tentative conclusion could be that differences in employment levels between those of the target group and the reference group are statistically significant for women, but not for men. Another, still tentative, conclusion is that the observed differences can hardly be explained by differences in age, education, parents' education or employment status.

The risk of not being in employment, education or training (NEET) points to a somewhat different scenario. Both men and women in the target group seem to have a higher risk of being 'neither in employment, education nor training'.

### **Job mobility and type of employment**

Job mobility was high for the 379 respondents of our sample who were employed at the time of the interview. Approximately 25 per cent of the respondents were currently employed in their first job. There were only

minor differences between the target group and the reference group, and likewise, there were no substantial differences between female and male respondents. Naturally, respondents in the older age brackets had changed jobs more frequently.

Our data indicate the presence of differences pertaining to the sector of the labour market in which respondents were employed (see table 7.A3). In the older age brackets, women in the target group work in the trade/service and health/care sectors to a greater extent than women from the reference group. In the oldest age bracket, 70 per cent of the women of the target group work in these two sectors as compared to less than 40 per cent of the women in the reference group.

Men in the youngest age brackets were most frequently found working in the trade/service sector. This applies to both the target group and the reference group. In the oldest age brackets, however, more than 36 per cent of the target group are working in the trade and service sector, compared to only 27 per cent of the reference group.

**Table 7.3** Distribution of jobs at time of interview across industrial sectors, by gender and age (in %)

	Female respondents					
	Target group			Reference group		
	18-24	25-29	30-36	18-24	25-29	30-36
Manufacturing	4	3	14	5	6	16
Trade and service	63	49	33	69	40	23
Government, education	4	5	11	0	7	33
Health and care	24	36	38	23	32	15
Other	4	7	4	3	16	12


	Male respondents					
	Target group			Reference group		
	18-24	25-29	30-36	18-24	25-29	30-36
Manufacturing	33	36	32	18	60	44
Trade and service	49	36	36	71	15	27
Government, education	8	5	19	6	17	16
Health and care	9	10	4	6	0	3
Other	0	12	10	0	8	9


There are obvious differences in the quality of the jobs (Figure 7.4). Responses to the question of whether one considers oneself to be under or overqualified for one's current job, in view of one's educational qualifications, show that more than one third of the men in the target group consider themselves to be overqualified, compared to one fifth of the reference group. Differences between men in the target group and in the reference group are most obvious in the oldest age brackets.

Young women in the target group consider themselves to be overqualified to a greater extent than those in the reference group in all age brackets.

One's hourly wage serves as another indicator of how qualified one's job is (Table 7.4). A drawback in our dataset is that it does not allow us to calculate the hourly wage; however, we have data about the monthly wage, which reflects both the number of hours worked and the hourly wage. Regardless of whether the explanation is the hours worked or remuneration, the monthly wage is lower for women in the target group for the older age brackets. For men, the differences between the target group and the reference group do not show any clear pattern.

**Figure 7.4** 'Do you consider yourself overqualified in your current job?' Percentage answering YES





### Statistical significance<sup>7</sup>

A logistic regression shows that the probability of stating that you have a job according to your qualifications is reduced if your parents are born in Turkey and no other factors are taken into consideration (i.e. no other variables in the model). The result remains statistically significant and changes only marginally when the individuals' age, educational level and parents' education and socioeconomic position are introduced into the model.

When it comes to the likelihood of enjoying a high wage,<sup>8</sup> our data point to a different pattern. Having parents born in Turkey reduces one's prospects of earning a high wage. Controlling for differences in gender, age, education, and parents' education and socioeconomic position, however, rules out statistical significance for the estimate, i.e. the outcome seems to depend on differences in background factors.

<sup>7</sup> The estimates can be requested from the author.

<sup>8</sup> A high monthly wage could either be a result of a high hourly wage or of working many hours.

**Table 7.4** Monthly wage after taxes at time of interview, by gender (in %)<sup>9</sup>

	Female respondents					
	Target group			Reference group		
	18-24	25-29	30-36	18-24	25-29	30-36
Low wage	84	53	47	83	38	23
Medium wage	12	37	26	17	46	33
High wage	4	9	27	0	15	44

	Male respondents					
	Target group			Reference group		
	18-24	25-29	30-36	18-24	25-29	30-36
Low wage	68	30	19	89	33	15
Medium wage	24	31	27	9	33	31
High wage	8	39	54	3	33	54

## Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to determine whether there are differences in the labour market between young people in the target group with parents born in Turkey and a reference group whose parents were born in Sweden. The data on which our results are based do not reflect the population from which it is sampled, but a group that is older and more highly educated than the population. The number of observations in our data is limited, which implies serious limitations to drawing inferences from our results.

The labour market may be described as being structured along several dimensions, whereby gender, age and education are of great importance. This means that several factors other than the parents' country of birth have to be taken into consideration.

When it comes to employment, our data show that women in the target group are employed to a lesser extent than women in the reference group. However, there seems to be no significant differences between men in the target group and the reference group.

<sup>9</sup> The wage categories are monthly income after tax reductions:

low = 1-15,000 SEK  
 medium = 15,001-20,000 SEK  
 high = > 20,000 SEK  
 100 SEK is approx. 10 EURO.

The possibility of being neither in employment nor in education or training (NEET) outlines a somewhat different picture. Both men and women with parents born in Turkey seem to run a higher risk of not being in employment, education or training.

Neither differences in educational level, age, nor parents' education and employment status seem to explain the differences in employment and NEET rates between the target group and the reference group.

Another finding is that young labour market entrants tend to start their careers in similar kinds of jobs, irrespective of where their parents were born, i.e. in jobs in the trade/service sector and manufacturing industry for young men and in trade/service and health/care for young women. These jobs are either low paid or the working hours are few. Those belonging to the oldest age brackets in the target group seem to have remained in these jobs, while those in the reference group have moved on to other sectors and to work that is more in line with their qualifications. This could be a consequence of the higher educational level of those in the reference group, but the data provide no support for this explanation when it comes to having a job below one's qualifications. The differences in monthly wages, however, seem to be explained by differences in education (see chapter 3 for differences in education and chapter 4 for differences in access to social capital).

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## Appendix





Table 7.A2 Odds ratios for being employed or self-employed; women

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	no weight	w 1	no weight	w 1	no weight	w 1	no weight	w 1
parents Turkey	<b>0.49</b>	<b>0.55</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>0.56</b>	<b>0.53</b>	<b>0.58</b>	0.63	<b>0.63</b>
Education:								
upper sec			<b>4.76</b>	<b>11.26</b>	<b>4.17</b>	<b>7.79</b>	<b>4.38</b>	<b>9.16</b>
short univ			1.44	<b>3.99</b>	1.53	<b>2.86</b>	1.49	<b>2.92</b>
long univ			<b>3.4</b>	<b>7.05</b>	2.32	<b>3.35</b>	2.17	<b>2.85</b>
Age:								
25-29					1.99	<b>1.96</b>	1.96	<b>2.19</b>
30-36					<b>2.98</b>	<b>3.53</b>	<b>3.53</b>	<b>3.88</b>
Parents variables included					yes	yes	yes	yes

**bold and italic** = significant at the 1% level

**bold** = significant at the 5% level

*italic* = significant at the 10% level

xxx = significance level is less than 50%

Reference levels = parents born in Sweden, female, less than upper secondary education, age 18-24.

Parent variables are mother working when respondent was 15 years old, father working when respondent was 15 years old, mother's and father's educational level at time of interview.

w1 = weight calculated by Statistics Sweden, compensating for non-response and increasing the sample to population size

w 2 = w1 divided by its mean value

Table 7.A3 Odds ratios for being employed or self-employed; men

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	no weight	w 1	no weight	w 1	no weight	w 1	no weight	w 1
parents Turkey	xxx	<b>1.31</b>	1.39	<b>1.52</b>	1.78	<b>2.12</b>	1.53	<b>2.32</b>
Education:								
upper sec			<b>4.85</b>	<b>10.34</b>	<b>3.08</b>	<b>8.11</b>	<b>2.53</b>	<b>7.87</b>
short univ			<b>2.89</b>	<b>3.76</b>	xxx	<b>0.94</b>	xxx	<b>1.08</b>
Long univ			<b>7.34</b>	<b>6.64</b>	xxx	<b>0.81</b>	xxx	<b>0.91</b>
Age:								
25-29					<b>6.91</b>	<b>10.78</b>	<b>5.92</b>	<b>7.07</b>
30-36					<b>26.16</b>	<b>55.92</b>	<b>26.85</b>	<b>53.59</b>
					yes	yes	yes	Yes

**bold and italic** = significant at the 1% level

**bold** = significant at the 5% level

*italic* = significant at the 10% level

xxx = significance level is less than 50%

Reference levels = parents born in Sweden, female, less than upper secondary education, age 18-24.

Parent variables are mother working when respondent was 15 years old, father working when respondent was 15 years old, mother's and father's educational level at time of interview.

w1 = weight calculated by Statistics Sweden, compensating for non-response and increasing the sample to population size

w 2 = w1 divided by its mean value

Table 7.A4 Odds ratios for being neither employed nor in education or training (NEET); men and women

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	no weight	w 1	no weight	w 1	no weight	w 1	no weight	w 1	no weight	w 1
parents Turkey	<b>2.10</b>	2.18	2.15	2.21	2.1	2.81	2.07	2.69	1.59	5.03
Male			<b>0.29</b>	<b>0.39</b>	<b>0.27</b>	<b>0.34</b>	<b>0.27</b>	<b>0.38</b>	<b>0.29</b>	<b>0.41</b>
Education:										
upper sec					0.42	<b>0.16</b>	0.43	<b>0.16</b>	0.43	<b>0.14</b>
short univ					0.64	<b>0.59</b>	0.64	0.56	0.64	<b>0.52</b>
long univ					0.54	<b>0.92</b>	0.57	xxx	0.65	<b>0.79</b>
Age:										
25-29							xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
30-36							xxx	<b>0.86</b>	0.72	<b>0.86</b>
parent variables included							yes	yes	yes	yes

**bold and italic** = significant at the 1% level

**bold** = significant at the 5% level

*italic* = significant at the 10% level

xxx = significance level is less than 50%

Reference levels = parents born in Sweden, female, less than upper secondary education, age 18-24.

Parent variables are mother working when respondent was 15 years old, father working when respondent was 15 years old, mother's and father's educational level at time of interview.

w1 = weight calculated by Statistics Sweden, compensating for non-response and increasing the sample to population size

w 2 = w1 divided by its mean value



## 8 Conclusions

*Alireza Behtoui*

### Findings of the Swedish TIES project

Earlier Swedish research indicates widespread exclusionary attitudes and discriminatory treatment of people of migrant backgrounds from countries outside North-western Europe and North America (Mella & Palm 2007; Arai & Thoursie 2007). In line with these previous findings, chapter 5 on 'perceptions of discrimination' in this report indicates a tough climate facing those who are categorised as 'Muslims'. After 9-11, these attitudes seem to have turned into overt hostility. The TIES data provide information about how Swedish schools were segregated during the period in which the respondents attended primary school. More than three out of four young people with a background in Turkey studied in schools where the share of children of migrants was more than 50 per cent, while about three out of four native children (the reference group) attended schools with almost no children of migrant background.

Over time, from the primary school to the secondary school period, there seems to have been an increase in the concentration of children of migrants from Turkey in schools with a higher number of young people with migrant backgrounds. The trend seems to be the opposite for the reference group. Whereas more than 60 per cent of the children of migrants from Turkey attended schools where at least half of the school population had a migrant background, less than 16 per cent of children of native parentage attended such schools (see chapter 3 on education).

The pattern of social relations and interaction of the descendants of migrants from Turkey shows that an overwhelming percentage of respondents reported that they socialised (their best friends) with descendants of non-Western migrants in and outside of the educational context. Only one in four reported having friends who were members of the reference group. The results also show that descendants of migrants from Turkey were less able to become involved in civic and political organisations compared to the reference group. In addition, an overwhelming number of descendants of migrants from Turkey have a partner with a non-Western migrant background.

The same pattern holds true for members of the reference group, who tend to live with a partner from their own group. In this regard our analysis

paints a picture of a low level of social interaction or relations between the descendants of migrants from Turkey and persons of native origin (the reference group). This eventuality can be understood as a consequence of discrimination *in contact*, as Loury (2002) labels it. Discrimination in contact is the unequal treatment of persons on the basis of race/ethnicity in contexts related to the more informal and private spheres of life (for example, friendship or partnership).

As an individual person, one always stands in relation to different social groups, e.g., a family, a peer group, a broader religious community or a nation, to each of which one may be a 'member'. To construct one's own unique identity one needs input from these various social groups and their shared identities (Jenkins 2008). Bourdieu (2005) suggests that one's unique *habitus* is the product of an internalisation of dispositions to act in and to perceive social reality, which is transmitted to the individual by others. Such internalisation occurs when an individual is socialised into the cultural schemes, routines and dispositions common for and shared by members of different social groups (Jenkins 2008). As a consequence, an individual can identify strongly with a specific group, which to some extent also stimulates the act of differentiating oneself and one's group from others (*ibid.*). Identification with a specific group logically entails identification with the specific forms of capital representative for this group. In brief, one of the most characteristic features of social reality is that individuals are part of and can rely upon different social networks which are crucial for both identity construction and achieving specific goals.

When descendants of migrants from Turkey live their lives in segregated suburban neighbourhoods and attend segregated schools, they are not in a position to join in and socialise with children of native parentage. Their friends will mainly be the children of non-Western migrants both within and outside of the educational context. Hence it is hardly surprising that an overwhelming number of them meet a partner with a non-native background. In addition, as our results demonstrate, they are involved in civic and political organisations to a lesser extent than their peers in the majority group. To sum up, the descendants of migrants from Turkey are rarely in a position to socialise in majority culture, become a part of social networks involving young people of majority origin, or to identify themselves with this larger group.

All these processes affect their identification with the country they are living in. This may be why they feel a weaker sense of belonging to the Swedish group than respondents of native parentage (see chapter 6).

What is the long-term effect of such attitudes and treatment on the performance of descendants of migrants from Turkey in education and the labour market? Before presenting these results, we need to stress that the majority of migrants from Turkey came to Sweden during the 1960s labour recruitment drive to take jobs that were no longer considered desirable by workers of native descent. The majority of these migrants came from rural areas and therefore had low educational levels on average. Considering this fact, the empirical findings presented in chapter 3 show that after controlling for respondents' socioeconomic background and age, the educational performance of descendants of migrants from Turkey is almost the same as that of the reference group. The results of the survey confirm the findings of previous international and Swedish studies of educational performance.

The relatively successful educational performance of young people with a background in Turkey must be considered as a positive result. Despite highly segregated schools and the perception of widespread discriminatory attitudes, these young people have been able to avoid 'downward assimilation' and becoming demotivated regarding educational achievement. Undoubtedly this is partly due to the expectations of and support from parents and older siblings during their school years (see chapter 3).

The results of the survey regarding the labour market performance of our respondents are presented in chapter 7. When it comes to being in employment, the results indicate that female respondents with parents born in Turkey are employed to a lesser extent than those in the reference group. However, there seem to be no significant differences between male respondents with parents born in Turkey and those in the reference group. Furthermore, both male and female respondents whose parents were born in Turkey seem to face a higher risk of dissociation from the labour market though (being neither in employment, education nor training). Another tendency is that young people with a migrant background in Turkey hold the same labour market thought position as their parents do (or did) – that is, working in the trade/service sector and manufacturing industry for young men and trade/service and health/care for young women. Jobs are either low-paid or the working hours are few.

The results of this survey confirm the findings of previous studies, which show that young people with roots in non-European countries encounter greater difficulties in the labour market than those of native origin. According to these studies, labour market disadvantages for descendants of migrants from non-European countries cannot be entirely explained by differences in education, command of the Swedish language or their parents' education or position in the labour market (Arai, Schröder & Vilhemsson



2000; Vilhemsson 2002; Österberg 2000; Behtoui 2004, 2006; Hammarstedt & Palme 2006; Nekby, Vilhelmsson & Özcan. 2008).

Our point of departure was to study systematically descendants of migrants from one country who had had a similar start in life. However, reality is often more complicated than designed research models. Migrants from Turkey and their descendants in Sweden have developed different kinds of community and feelings of belonging. They identify themselves in the survey as Turkish, Kurdish or Syriac (Syriani/Assyrian), although this latter categorisation or sense of ethnic belonging is controversial. The Syriani/Assyrian community is divided on the issue of how to identify themselves (see chapter 6). Our survey did not include questions about how these communities are organised, what resources were pooled by these collectives for young people and which kinds of support were provided by these communities.

Regarding the sense of belonging to Stockholm, i.e. the neighbourhood and city in which one grew up, the results presented in chapter 6 show that there is no significant difference between descendants of migrants and descendants of native parentage. Young people of migrant origin, however, disclose a weaker sense of belonging to Sweden than young people of native origin. Further examination shows that paradoxically, a weaker sense of belonging is likely to be more prevalent among those who have been through higher education and those who have jobs in the labour market. The same tendency is observed in chapter 5 (perceptions of discrimination), which shows that descendants of migrants who are more integrated according to our criteria are more critical of discrimination against migrants.

### **Unequal treatment, downward assimilation and the Swedish welfare regime**

In this book we have sought to analyse the incorporation of descendants of migrants from Turkey into Swedish society. We have done this through an examination of this group's educational achievements, labour market outcomes and patterns of social relations. We have compared the performance of the target group (respondents who are descendants of migrants from Turkey) with that of the reference group (respondents whose parents are native-born). We also examined perceptions of discrimination and the sense of belonging felt by descendants of migrants from Turkey.

In our introductory chapter we presented the 'segmented assimilation theory', which predicts that the majority of descendants of migrants achieve

either middle-class or working-class status, but that some are at risk of ending up with 'those at the bottom of society, a new rainbow underclass' (Portes & Rumbaut 2001: 45). This path, which Portes, Fernández-Kelly & Haller (2005) label '*downward* assimilation', is a more likely eventuality for those whose stigmatised migrant background is a 'mark of subordination'. The descendants of migrants from Turkey represent an interesting case for testing the validity of this theory in Sweden. Parents of this group, like the descendants of Mexican migrants in the United States, only had a few years of schooling and had acquired only limited urban cultural skills. In the public eye they are assumed to be 'Muslims' who, according to Vermeulen (2010: 1220), 'are at the bottom of the "ethno-racial" hierarchy in Europe'.

Indicators of this '*downward* assimilation' are, among other things, leaving school at a young age, long-term unemployment, poverty, criminality and incarceration. Such a life story is more likely to occur today than some years back, because of the harsher climate that migrants from non-Western countries ('non-whites') encounter, the decrease in job opportunities for migrants and their descendants consequential to the restructuring of the labour market and the continuous undermining of welfare institutions, which has created a large 'underclass' in many Western-European countries. Accordingly, doing well at school is perceived as 'acting white' and as a sign of 'being disloyal to one's group' (Portes & Rumbaut 2001: 60).

Stepick & Stepick (2010: 1150) contend that this theory 'could apply to the children of immigrants in any country, but it was developed specifically in reference to the US children of immigrants who arrived after 1965'. The segmented assimilation theory, developed mainly by American scholars, has therefore been employed by some researchers to look more closely at the integration of descendants of migrants in Western European countries (Vermeulen 2010; Silberman, Alba and Fournier 2007). The main focus in these studies is on 'the theory's two alternative "modes of incorporation": *downward* assimilation, and *upward* mobility' (Thomson and Crul 2007: 1032). More precisely, the main question in the European context has not been *how* some descendants of migrants are assimilated into the 'underclass', but *whether* the process happens at all (Vermeulen 2010: 1218).

On the other hand, Wacquant (2008) maintains that social marginality of migrants and their descendants in the old immigration countries of North-western Europe differs radically from the ghettos of the US, and therefore this notion of downward assimilation is not straightforwardly applicable to the European context. This distinction is first and foremost a consequence of the traditionally small and weak welfare regime of US society in comparison to the more developed welfare regimes established

in European countries. As Schierup et al. (2006) mention, despite the many problems they face, inhabitants of disadvantaged neighbourhoods in major European cities with a large share of people of migrant background still have access to social security services and are entitled to education, health care and labour market programmes, in contrast to the isolated inhabitants of the 'hyper-ghettos' in the US.

The Swedish case presents a migration policy that differs from policies pursued by other European states. In contrast to the situation in Central and Southern Europe, migrants in Sweden have historically not been treated as 'guest workers'. The migration policy is characterised by the expectation that migrants will become citizens someday. Currently more than 75 per cent of the foreign-born residents are Swedish citizens (Schierup, Hansen and Castles 2006: 195). The Swedish welfare regime is often considered to be the most highly developed of its kind and on the whole it has been successful in handling poverty, at least up until the beginning of 1990s (Esping-Andersen 1996). Migrants have at the same time enjoyed full access to the Swedish welfare system (Schierup, Hansen & Castles 2006).

The results of this report make it clear that:

The educational level of the descendants of migrants from Turkey is generally lower than that of their native peers. However, once variables pertaining to the socioeconomic background of individuals are controlled for, the significant differences between the two groups regarding educational achievements disappear. In other words, descendants of migrants have achieved the same educational goals as young people of the majority group given the same class background.

The descendants of migrants from Turkey studied in segregated (in terms of class and migrant background) schools and neighbourhoods. Consequently, they have experienced segregated friendship networks during their school years. But their parents' ambition, higher expectations and extra exertion have compensated for the negative effects of segregation.

Both male and female respondents with parents born in Turkey seem to have a higher probability of being located in occupational categories: 'unemployment', 'taking care of children and family' and 'sick/handicapped'. On the other hand, when we study those who have a labour market status not known to us (not employed or in education, not looking for jobs or doing military service, not on parental leave), we observe that after controlling for age, education and class background there are no significant differences between the target group and those with a native background (Behtoui 2012).

Another tendency is for descendants of migrants from Turkey to hold the same labour market position as their parents previously held. That is, young men find jobs in the trade/service sector and manufacturing industry while young women find employment in trade/service and health care. These jobs are in low-wage occupations and usually the paid working hours are few. The target group respondents consider themselves overqualified for their current job to a greater extent than respondents in the reference group. Our results confirm the findings of previous studies which show that despite similar educational achievements, descendants of migrants from non-European countries have not been able to find a position in the labour market on a par with their peers of native descent. This implies that unequal treatment of young people with migrant backgrounds is present in the Swedish labour market (Behtoui 2013).

The question we must now ask ourselves, on the basis of our findings, is whether we should conclude that descendants of migrants from Turkey are in a process of social exclusion and the formation of an 'underclass' in Sweden.

The points of departure for our analysis are different political structures vis-à-vis migrants and their inclusion in mainstream society, and differences in the institutional framework relating to the reception and incorporation of migrants in the TIES partner countries (also see Crul, Schneider & Lelie 2012).

As previous research shows, dismantling the welfare state, deregulating the labour market, destroying traditional forms of social solidarity (including trade unions) are not yet as far-reaching in Sweden as elsewhere, especially in the English-speaking world (see, for example, Harvey (2005: 115). Despite the latest negative developments, people (including migrants and their descendants) remain broadly attached to the welfare structure. In contrast to the traditionally small American welfare system, the more elaborate Swedish welfare regime and strong presence of public intervention have restrained (even if not wholly prevented) the marginalisation of people at the lowest levels of the social hierarchy. By and large, thanks to the institutions of a large and relatively robust welfare state, the more regulated labour market and still powerful trade unions, people situated on the lowest rungs of the social hierarchy enjoy a certain degree of social security and relative material welfare.

The 'downward assimilation' hitting some sections of the population of descendants of migrants in the American metropolis does not seem to apply to descendants of migrants from Turkey in Sweden. They do not form a distinct 'migrant underclass', at least not yet. Inequalities have certainly increased in Sweden during the last few years but other problems such as racialised poverty, long-term unemployment, low salaried jobs, and

criminality are still rather limited in Sweden compared to the situation in the US and in several other EU member states. Nevertheless, 'the current situation is exceedingly ambiguous' (Schierup et al. 2006: 229).

Having said this, however, we should not underestimate the real stigmatisation and discrimination hitting descendants of migrants in both schools and the labour market in Sweden. Unequal treatment hampers social mobility. It is more difficult for these young people (compared to those of native origin) to achieve a social status corresponding to their skills and merits. Achieving the same level of education as people of native origin and being incorporated into the labour market does not automatically mean that the descendants of migrants from Turkey are accepted and treated as social equals. The notion of 'subordinate inclusion' is a more appropriate portrayal of the specificities of incorporating migrants and their children in Sweden. 'Subordinate inclusion' characterises a situation in which stigmatised migrant groups are included in the institutional system in general, but placed in subordinate positions in all spheres of life, from education to the labour market, and from the marriage market to friendship and neighbourhood relations (Mulinari 2008).

Certain limitations restrict the generality of the findings of this report. First of all, our analysis includes only young, native-born people of foreign parentage (referred to in TIES terminology as the 'second generation'). The literature in this field shows that young people who are born abroad and migrate at an early age tend to be more at risk (Thomson & Crul 2007: 1033). Secondly, this case study includes only the descendants of people who migrated from Turkey from the 1960s through to the 1980s. For a more comprehensive account of the incorporation of the descendants of migrants in Sweden, we should study the outcomes of other migrant groups who came later and who have been the target of more widespread prejudice, for example the descendants of migrants from Somalia who arrived in the early 1990s. Another important limitation of our cross-sectional data is that it is not possible to follow the young people in this study over time. More longitudinal research is needed to see how the process of integration in Sweden evolves over time.

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