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# Paradoxes of Social Capital

*A Multi-Generational Study of  
Moroccans in London*

MYRIAM CHERTI

AMSTERDAM UNIVERSITY PRESS

## Paradoxes of Social Capital

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*Dedicated to my parents,  
Latifa and Mohammed*



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# 1 Introduction

Regardless of their particularities, past studies of immigrant offspring have taken for granted their foreseeable total 'integration' into the host society. This predicted process, however, is neither as simple nor inevitable as was originally envisioned. Instead, and as seen in many West European countries, there is a growing phenomenon of fragmented or dual communities, characterised by social exclusion, spatial segregation and, in many cases, mounting urban violence (e.g. the Oldham, Bradford and Burnley riots in 2001 and the Paris riots in 2005). These 'cities-within-cities' are often sustained by the operation of *solidarity* and *trust*, which create valuable *support networks* and unique economic opportunities for immigrants, as well as creating 'guarded' areas for the second generation. These communities can be perceived to depend on their [ethnic] social capital: a concept associated particularly with Pierre Bourdieu (1986), James Coleman (1988, 1990) and Robert Putnam (1993a, b, 1995, 2000) that broadly refers to social networks, the reciprocities that arise from them and the value of these for the achievement of mutual goals. Paradoxically, however, this same 'resource' that seems to be responsible for their segregation, and even exclusion from mainstream society in the first place, is also considered to be their main asset towards achieving 'integration'.

So far, community, civil society and social capital have become the central themes of the community cohesion discourse both nationally and internationally. In the British context, social capital has come to the forefront of the government agenda, and across various departments. Over the past few years this interest has generated a significant amount of cross-departmental research, statistics and policy initiatives.<sup>1</sup> An emphasis on two particular types of social capital – 'bonding' or the inward-looking reinforcing of bonds *within* groups, and 'bridging' *between* different groups/communities (Putnam 2000) – seems to be the desired solution. A number of policy initiatives attest that social capital is in the vanguard of the government agenda with the purpose of enhancing community cohesion (Jochum, Pratten & Wilding 2005).

The emergence of a new policy agenda utilising the concepts of 'civil renewal' and 'social capital' has included the Cabinet Office's introduction of discussion papers on the subject of social capital in 2002; the

Prime Minister's Strategy Unit's report *Ethnic Minorities in the Labour Market* in March 2003, where social capital was proclaimed as one of the prerequisites for addressing disadvantage in the workplace; and the Home Secretary's declared intention of making civil renewal 'the centrepiece of the government's reform agenda' in June 2003.

Some of these initiatives, as Goulbourne and Solomos (2003) suggest, can be perceived as part of a natural drive towards equality for all in a multicultural society, active participation within communities and social cohesion as expressed by so many state policy initiatives, particularly since the mid-1990s in Britain. Social capital as a conceptual tool to tackle social exclusion and create more social cohesion has been part of a wider government rhetoric (see for example reports on urban disturbances in northern England, Home Office 2001a, b). Goulbourne and Solomos (2003) also argue that, whilst the government does not have 'a social capital strategy', notions derived from social capital thinking inform discussions about neighbourhood renewal, family, community and citizenship, amongst others. These are all conceived in terms of *collective social action* and it may be argued that, particularly within the context of a multicultural society, the notion of social capital is attractive. It is not surprising, therefore, to see that even the Commission for Race Equality (CRE)<sup>2</sup> has also embraced the concept: '[the] work has important implications for the CRE's integration agenda [...] It may be the case that social capital has a role to play in providing a means of measuring integration' ([www.cre.gov.uk/research/itt\\_socialcapital.html](http://www.cre.gov.uk/research/itt_socialcapital.html)).

Yet is social capital really the missing link in achieving community cohesion? At what level can social capital become a causal factor for social cohesion, and at what level does it become an obstacle to integration, leading to ghettoisation and exclusion? Finally, can social cohesion be maintained without challenging the ethos of the multiculturalist discourse?

In this introductory chapter I shall, firstly, state the purpose of this research and outline the key research questions posited; secondly, explain the reasoning behind choosing social capital as an analytical framework and Moroccans in London as a case study; and finally, provide an outline of the book structure.

## 1.1 Purpose of the study

The purpose of this study is to examine the robustness of social capital as an analytical tool in explaining the differing patterns of 'integration' amongst the Moroccan community in London, including 'integration' across generations. This contextual study of social capital considers

also how structural factors impact on the way in which Moroccans *sustain* and *access* social capital in diverse ways.

The aims of the study are:

- to reconstruct some of the key elements of the experience of Moroccan migration to London;
- to explore whether social capital access, distribution and usage differ across generations;
- to examine how social capital operates as a resource and/or a liability at the levels of family, community, migrant associations and schools;
- to assess and highlight the possible pitfalls of the emphasis on social capital in the British policy context, with particular focus on migrant associations and schools;
- to investigate the applicability of American paradigms in the study of second-generation migrants to the British context.

The four key research questions formulated around these aims are as follows:

1. Can social capital be of added value in explaining the various 'integration' patterns across the Moroccan community in London?
  - Are there any variations between levels of 'integration' in families living in North Kensington, where the majority of Moroccans live, and other London boroughs?
  - Is the lack of visibility and influence of Moroccan migrant associations an indicator of low 'bridging' social capital?
  - Can social capital explain low educational achievement amongst second- and third-generation Moroccans? Or can educational achievement be interpreted in terms of a low level of social capital within the families and communities?
  - How do younger members of the Moroccan community – second and third generation – articulate their sense of identity, and what are the main determinants influencing it?
2. Can the existence of social capital amongst immigrants paradoxically increase social exclusion within the host society?
  - Is the specific migration experience of Moroccans in London – particularly the first generation – an indicator of a predominant type of social capital (i.e. 'bonding') that exists within the community?

- Is social capital an intrinsically positive ‘asset’ that contributes to social inclusion and ultimately promotes social cohesion? Or do different types of social capital (i.e. bonding and bridging) lead to dissimilar results?
  - Are Moroccan migrant associations playing an active role in bridging, or in widening the gap between migrant communities and the host society?
3. How do policy initiatives, both national and local, influence the *role* of social capital amongst migrant communities?
  4. To what extent is the large body of research on the second generation in America applicable to the British context?
    - Can concepts such as ‘segmented assimilation’, which foresees the second generation assimilating into three different segments of American society instead of the relatively uniform ‘mainstream’, be applicable to the British context?

## 1.2 Justification for the study

### 1.2.1 *The choice of social capital as an analytical framework*

Although there is a fast-growing literature on social capital and its alleged beneficial effects in various fields, social, economic and political, only a limited amount of this literature explores the relationship between ethnicity and social capital (Goulbourne & Solomos 2003). Most of the empirical research that has incorporated the two concepts (social capital and ethnicity) was conducted in America (Bankston & Zhou 1995; Portes 1987; Portes & Sensenbrenner 1993; Sun 1998; Zhou 1997a; Zhou & Bankston 1998). Interestingly, Tariq Modood (2004) argues that this work resonates with earlier British anthropological approaches which conceptualise ethnicity as a ‘resource’. Using social capital as an analytical tool draws attention away from the classical factors (physical, financial and human capital) affecting the ‘integration’ of immigrants and their families. Unlike ethnicity, the concept of social capital can highlight the internal dynamics as well as relational/external factors that influence the ‘integration’ process. Social capital as a resource, according to Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993), is directly proportional to the strength of outside discrimination and inversely proportional to the available options outside the community. What happens on the outside must be balanced, however, with the resources available in the ethnic community itself.

The abundance of research in the American context is due to the nature of the American tradition of inquiry into racial and ethnic identity and solidarity as applied to the field of family studies, which sets out questions that may be quantified or measured by widely acceptable empirical norms. Hence, there are questions about a wide range of issues to do with ethnicity, family and social capital, such as education, employment and residence (Bianchi & Robinson 1997; Driessen 2001). The same degree of attention has not been evident in Britain; although a few attempts were made primarily in the field of education (see, for example, Lauglo 2000; Modood 2004).

On a policy level, however, a similar interest by policymakers in American and British contexts has taken place. Ade Kearns (2003) suggests that the critical role attributed to social capital in the regeneration of deprived areas, and the building of community cohesion in British cities fit nicely with New Labour's so-called 'Third Way' politics. This, according to Giddens (2000), is about steering a middle ground between highly statist policies and neo-liberal free-market policies. Third Way politics supports the notion that self-help activities undertaken within existing market and governmental structures are the way forward for disadvantaged groups and communities.

Kearns (2003) further argues that the government's role is to remove the barriers to *self-help*, be they lack of skills or fear of crime. This approach avoids the issues of *structural inequalities* and redistribution of power and resources, since the ethos is to 'help others to help themselves', to such an extent that almost anyone and everyone can be creative and achieve success, given the opportunity. Those who oppose the authoritarian implications of the communitarian approach to Third Way policies nevertheless offer a creative and optimistic alternative that markets and communities, financial and *social capital*, 'should be harnessed' to 'make us better off, put us more in charge of our lives and make us better able to look after ourselves' (Leadbeater 1999: 16). The government thus should help communities to 'harness' social capital resources, but it does not have to (re)distribute resources. Hence, rather than rely upon state intervention, Kearns (2003) further argues that Third Way politics involves greater use of the private, *voluntary* and *community sectors* in the delivery of services and the creation of partnerships and networks based on trust between the state, businesses, voluntary and public sectors. With this approach, not only does the role of the state *change*, but so too does the role of the citizen, with a much stronger emphasis upon the 'responsible and responsive individual – the notion of the developmental self, and the idea that through help and education people can improve' (Richards & Smith 2002: 237).

The social capital concept, therefore, is perfectly compatible with New Labour's Third Way philosophy. In addition, since social capital is

a 'resource', and social inclusion policy aims to foster individual, family and community assets (financial, psychological, social and cultural) (Oppenheim 1998), the government can be seen to be having a positive impact, giving communities an 'opportunity' simply by enabling them to realise their social capital resources. Hence, the language of 'realising social capital assets' is much more compatible with New Labour's perspective on deprivation than its earlier 'combating social exclusion' agenda. Furthermore, compared with eradicating social exclusion, social capital is a hazier target which is even less easy to measure, thereby making it more difficult for critics to hold the government to account for inadequate progress (Kearns 2003).

Although specific public policy initiatives now associate social capital with improved levels of social cohesion, and thus consider the dual relationship between ethnicity and social capital, fewer of these debates have taken place within British academic circles. It is imperative to develop a wider UK contextualised knowledge in order to fill this research gap, followed by an adequate analysis that permits the development of appropriate policy and practice initiatives.

I believe that using social capital as an analytical tool in this research will enable us to understand the patterns of marginalisation, segregation and exclusion of migrant communities better than would a human or a financial capital perspective. By taking a new and more critical look at the opportunities and problems faced by migrant populations in their socio-economic contexts, we may have to derive different conclusions about the practical relevance of the theoretical framework, in this case social capital, and its effect on social institutions and individual actors. Using the lens of social capital might help us to discover interesting new insights for social policy design.

### 1.2.2 *The choice of Moroccans in London as the study group*

The nature of the Moroccan migration experience to the UK offers a perfect illustration of social capital in action. Because it was non-structured through bilateral agreements, as was the case with other European countries (France, the Netherlands and Belgium), Moroccan migration to the UK has relied primarily on networks of friends and relatives, thereby creating an intriguing case of chain migration.

Basing this study on the Moroccan community living in London was challenging because of the scarcity of academic research on this community. The choice of the case study has been determined by several factors. The Moroccan community living in London has some unique historical links in terms of migration flows compared to Moroccan communities living in other European countries. Specifically, the majority of its members originate from the northern part of Morocco,

which used to be called before independence ‘Spanish Morocco’. Palpable economic and social differences between the North and the rest of Morocco have often translated into feelings of ‘exclusion’ amongst its inhabitants. Some of these feelings were brought with those who migrated to the UK. Chain migration has caused a large number of Moroccans to be settled in an area of West London called ‘Portobello’ which, interestingly, was occupied by a predominantly Spanish community. More than 60 per cent of Moroccans who migrated to the UK live in West London. This settlement has contributed to the creation of a dense network of ethnic associations that could be interpreted in terms of a high level of social capital.

### 1.3 Book structure

The second chapter maps the theoretical framework of this research. It starts by giving a brief overview of existing paradigms in the study of migration in general and the second generation in particular. A major part of this chapter, however, is dedicated to a thorough overview of the concept of social capital, its origins, theoretical developments, components and typology as well as how it is being used in the study of migration. The final part of the chapter defines the concept of social exclusion, and then establishes links between it, social capital and ethnicity.

The methodology adopted for this research is discussed in Chapter 3. It has been based on two main types of data – primary and secondary. I used a multi-method approach consisting of oral history, semi-structured interviews, in-depth interviews and fieldnotes. This chapter discusses (a) the rationale behind choosing each specific method, (b) sampling and (c) the analysis of the data gathered by each method. The chapter also highlights the key challenges faced during the collection of the data and how they have been addressed.

The fourth chapter traces the historical process of Moroccan migration and settlement in Britain and London in particular. Because of the significant lack of secondary resources on the Moroccan community, two types of data were used to build an information platform: first, life history accounts of men and women living across the capital; and second, semi-structured interviews with individuals who have been involved with the Moroccan community in London. These two methods generated sufficient data to reconstruct the main phases of this migration experience and some of its key socio-economic characteristics.

Chapter 5 builds a more thorough discussion of the Moroccan community in London and highlights its specificities across two generations. Based on in-depth interviews with 24 families, this chapter as-

esses the levels and nature of social capital present within them. The four chosen social capital indicators, namely social networks, reciprocity, levels of trust and civic engagement, are discussed separately and then compared across the two generations, and where appropriate across families based in different parts of London.

Pursuing the discussion of how social capital operates at a micro level – amongst individuals and within families – Chapter 6 extends the debate to a meso level by focusing on Moroccan migrant associations. Based on a profiling of ten Moroccan community groups/organisations, the chapter maps out the various networks that these associations have developed, the partnerships they have, and the influence on decision-making that they exercise at local and national levels and in relation to the home country. This exercise will help in assessing to what extent these organisations are moving from ‘bonding’ to ‘bridging’ and ‘linking’ social capital.

The last two empirical chapters of the book focus particularly on second- and third-generation Moroccans. Chapter 7 highlights the relationship between social capital and the educational attainment of second- and third-generation Moroccans in London. It focuses specifically on the influence of social capital on differential educational attainments amongst Moroccan children, which in turn sustain social and economic stratification as well as forms of social exclusion.

Chapter 8 adopts a different and innovative approach to the analysis of social capital amongst second- and third-generation Moroccans. Focusing particularly on their identity, the chapter concentrates on the utilitarian function of social capital as a social norm, where patterns of behaviour are expected of individuals within the family, ethnic, religious and national contexts in order to ensure a level of *inclusion* and membership within these ‘groups’. The second part of the chapter assesses the applicability of the concept of ‘segmented assimilation’ to the case of the younger generation of Moroccans. I propose an alternative model, ‘transversal adaptation’, where processes of inclusion and exclusion of the younger generation are viewed as fluid and continuous processes.

The concluding chapter profiles key findings of the study, based on the main research questions. It evaluates the robustness of social capital as an analytical framework, puts forward some policy implications and suggests avenues for future research.

## 2 Theoretical overview

### 2.1 Introduction

Different theories have been developed to explain the process of 'integration' or 'assimilation' of immigrants and their offspring into the host society. However, the relevance of these theories in this century has become questionable as most advanced societies are experiencing difficulties in their attempts to integrate the 'newly arrived' guests, foreigners and refugees into their historically established structure.

This chapter is divided into three main parts. It starts by referring briefly to some classical and contemporary paradigms for the study of international migration in general and the 'integration' of the second generation in particular. The second part gives an overview of the concept of social capital, its origins, and components, how it is related to other types of capital and how it is being used in the study of migration. The final part will define the concept of social exclusion, and then establish links between this, social capital and ethnicity.

### 2.2 Classical and 'contemporary' migration paradigms

#### 2.2.1 *The classical assimilationist approach*

Classical migration countries serve as a basis for theoretical models and research paradigms used in the study of ethnicity in the context of international migration. Often reference is made to America in which, despite its image as a pluralistic society, the main theoretical perspectives have assumed a need for it to be a mono-cultural nation state. Sociological approaches to immigrant adaptation or 'integration' into the mainstream society through assimilation, grounded in the concept of nationalism, have assumed the necessity of *cultural homogeneity* for the maintenance of national stability. Inherent in this logic is the assumption that cultural values and civic loyalties to the state are synonymous (Wilpert 1989).

In order to become successfully 'integrated' into the host society, immigrants have often been expected to change their cultural values to match those of their new environment. *Assimilation* and *acculturation*

have been the concepts most frequently employed in this context. Assimilation generally implies the total dissolution of the immigrant/ethnic groups into the majority society. First theorised in Park's (1914) race relations cycle, it was considered to be an inevitable process beginning with contact and followed by accommodation and assimilation, which meant different degrees of absorption of the dominant culture. The concept of 'acculturation' was introduced into migration studies from cultural anthropology. The most commonly accepted definition is the one introduced by Redfield, Linton & Herskovits (1936): the phenomenon which results when groups of individuals from different cultures come into contact, transforming the original patterns of one or both groups. Acculturation is often perceived as a one-way process instead of two-way, as initially suggested (Wilpert 1989).

Classical assimilationists such as Park (1928) and Stonequist (1937) argued that migration leads to a situation of the 'marginal man', in which immigrants are pulled in the direction of the host culture but drawn back by the culture of their origin. This painful bipolar process, as Park (1928) saw it, entails a natural race relations cycle of contact, competition and accommodation. Impacted by biotic forces (impersonal competition) and social forces (communication and cooperation), diverse immigrant groups from underprivileged backgrounds are expected to eventually abandon their old ways of life and completely 'melt' into the mainstream through residential integration and occupational mobility in a sequence of succeeding generations (Zhou 1997b).

Whilst Park (1928) believed in the natural process leading to the reduction of social and cultural heterogeneity and neglected structural constraints, Warner and Srole (1945) concentrated on institutional factors as the main determinants of the rate of assimilation of migrants. They claimed that, although differences in social status and economic opportunity based on culture and language will disappear over the course of several generations, the social mobility of readily identifiable minority groups is likely to be confined within racial-caste boundaries. Skin colour, language of origin and religion were identified as key factors in influencing the level of assimilation. Warner and Srole therefore make a significant departure from the Parkian tradition by introducing the distinction between *internal* group characteristics and *external* institutional factors in explaining the pace of assimilation (Zhou 1997b).

Gordon (1964) took these ideas further and provided a typology of assimilation ranging from cultural, structural, marital, identificational, attitude-receptional, behaviour-receptional, to civic assimilation. In Gordon's view, immigrants begin their adaptation to the new country through cultural assimilation, or acculturation. The latter is considered the top priority on the agenda of immigrant adjustment. However, Gordon argued that acculturation does not automatically lead to other

forms of assimilation; it may take place and continue indefinitely, even when no other type of assimilation occurs. Structural assimilation, in contrast, is the 'keystone of the arch of assimilation' that will inevitably lead to other stages of assimilation. Gordon anticipated that ethnic group characteristics will cease to exist as the individual passes through the stages of assimilation (Gordon 1964: 81). The common assumption from the classical assimilationist standpoint is that distinctive ethnic traits such as old cultural ways, native languages or ethnic enclaves are sources of disadvantage (Child 1943; Warner & Srole 1945; Wirth 1925). Although these disadvantages negatively affect the assimilation process, these effects are believed to dissipate in subsequent generations.

The applicability of classical assimilation theory was put into question, particularly in the 1960s, with the arrival of non-European immigrant groups in America. As Min Zhou (1997b) points out, several anomalies were revealed. The first concerns persistent ethnic differences across generations. Recent studies in America (Karo & Tienda 1995; Suárez-Orozco & Suárez-Orozco 1995) have exposed an opposite pattern: the longer the residence, the more maladaptive the outcomes, whether measured in terms of school performance, aspirations or behaviour, and regardless of immigrant groups. Landale and Oropesa (1995) found that disadvantages were reproduced rather than diminished in poor immigrant families who had lived a longer time in the US. Studies on intergenerational mobility (see Becker 1963; Goffman 1963) have also revealed divergent rather than convergent outcomes, suggesting that early and insignificant differentials in advantage result in substantial differences in educational and occupational mobility in later years. Another anomaly is what Gans (1992) describes as the '*the second generation decline*'. Gans notes three possible scenarios for today's new second generation: education-driven mobility; succession-driven mobility; and niche improvement. He observes that a significant number of the children of poor, especially dark-skinned, immigrants faced multiple risks of being trapped in permanent poverty in an era of stagnant economic growth. Gans anticipated a grim prospect for the children of the less fortunate, who must confront high rates of unemployment, crime, alcoholism, drug use, and other pathologies associated with poverty and the frustration of rising expectation. Perlmann and Waldinger (1997) called this phenomenon '*the second generation revolt*'. They relate the causes of such a revolt to two types of factor. First, what they named 'exogenous factors', such as racial discrimination, declining economic opportunities, and exposure to the adversarial outlook of native-born youths; and second, 'endogenous factors' which are inherent in the immigration process, including pre-migration class standing and the size and nature of immigrant inflows.

These discrepancies immediately call into question the applicability of the classical assimilation path, invoking heated theoretical controversies and the development of alternative frameworks. Gans (1992) asserts that immigrants construct their own acculturation and assimilation in response to environmental pressures. Schools, peers and the media exert powerful influences on the second generation. He further argues that, because of exposure, these children are likely to develop different expectations of life in the host country to those of their parents. Nevertheless, he considers that these divergent patterns are only temporary handicaps on the road to eventual assimilation. Alba and Nee (1997) consider some of the diverse outcomes of immigration, as noted above, simply as the differences in the pace of assimilation and ascribe them to variations in pre-migration as well as post-migration human capital characteristics, spatial distribution, co-ethnic populations, group size, and continual mass migration. Despite inter-group variations, Alba and Nee predict that, with enough time, contemporary immigrants will become assimilated into the middle class through intermarriage, residential integration and occupational mobility.

### *2.2.2 European approaches: from adaptation to ethnicity*

Contemporary European versions of these classical paradigms are represented in the works of Hoffmann-Nowotny (1973) in Switzerland and Esser (1980) in Germany. Both authors are concerned with the question of adaptation into the receiving society. Esser (1980) formed an approach of methodological individualism, drawing on Gordon (1964), where he aims to measure assimilation in its cognitive, structural, social and identificational dimensions. Hoffmann-Nowotny (1973) on the other hand uses acculturation and assimilation as synonyms. He assumes that the societal dimension determines the cultural processes (that is, acculturation), which becomes a prerequisite for absorption or, as he states, integration. Acculturation is more dependent on the opportunities for integration than the other way around (Wilpert 1989).

By the 1960s theoretical models for the study of immigrant adaptation to the receiving society had already become less common in both France and the UK, as they were challenged by dramatic upheavals occurring in their relations as colonial powers. The focus was on the totality of the migratory phenomenon, the causes of international migration, the individual and collective histories of migrants, their social and cultural origins and the relation between the countries of origin and settlement (Morokvasic 1984; Oriol 1978). In the UK particularly, studies about the political economy of race relations (Hall 1980; Rex 1973, 1986) and the social anthropology of ethnicity (Saifullah Khan 1976,

1982) made important contributions to an understanding of the inter-relationship between structure and culture, and the significance of cultural origins and specific historical experiences in informing choices and interpreting events in the new surroundings. This shift in interpretive frameworks of migration studies, from a focus on adaptation and acculturation to an interest in the persistence of ethnicity, was closely related to the post-colonial period. It is also at that point in time that ethnic identity became, in itself, a legitimate field of study (Wilpert 1989).

### 2.2.3 *The multicultural approach*

Multiculturalists strongly reject the assimilationist assumption of a unified cultural core in the receiving country (see Faist 2000a; Grillo 1998). The UK and the Netherlands, along with Sweden, have often been cited as the prototype of how immigrants can be successfully integrated without having to deny their cultural heritage. According to Joppke (1998), multiculturalism is not only a rejection of assimilation; it also challenges a fundamental principle of the nation-state: the congruence of political and cultural boundaries.

There is a wide literature on the subject of multiculturalism (see, for example, Favell 1998; Gutmann 1994; Kymlicka 1995; Modood 2007; Parekh 2000) which, as Stephen Castles (2000: 5) puts it, is centred around the idea of not only discarding the myth of homogeneous and mono-cultural nation-states but also 'recognizing rights to cultural maintenance and community formation, and linking these to social equality and protection from discrimination'.

Steven Vertovec (1998, 2001a) points out that multiculturalism is associated with various discourses, institutional frameworks and policies that invoke the term in rather different ways. This element of haziness in its conceptualisation and use has made it subject to numerous criticisms (cf. Baumann 1999). Ralph Grillo (1998) outlines six commonly identified problems with multicultural theory and practice: (1) multiculturalism's implicit essentialism; (2) the system of categorisation which underpins it; (3) the form that multicultural politics takes; (4) the ritualisation of ethnicity often associated with it; (5) the elision of race (and class) that it appears to entail; and (6) the attack on the 'common core' which it represents. 'Many of these criticisms', Grillo (1998: 195) rightly observes, 'stem from a focus on "culture"'. Vertovec further notes that 'culture' is 'a kind of package (often talked of as migrants' "cultural baggage") of collective behavioural-moral-aesthetic traits and "customs", rather mysteriously transmitted between generations' (Vertovec 1996: 51).

At first the promoting of multiculturalism led to some remarkable success, but this policy element has lost some of its significance over the past decade or so, particularly in the Netherlands and the UK. The teaching of mother-tongue language and the presence of faith schools, amongst others, have been blamed for reinforcing ghettoisation. In the American context, as Min Zhou (1997b) puts it, the multicultural perspective has been criticised for being unable to answer the questions of 'second-generation decline' and 'second-generation revolt', whilst ways that people construct their own acculturation and assimilation have been understudied.

The assimilationists and the multiculturalists have thus approached similar issues from different standpoints. *Assimilationists* focus on the changes in cultural patterns that a new environment can bring about, and they describe how immigrants and their succeeding generations gradually move away from the old country's ways. The *multiculturalists* recognise that original immigrant cultural patterns constantly reshape and reinvent themselves as an indispensable part of the host society, and thus may never completely disappear.

#### 2.2.4 'Contemporary' approaches to the study of migration

##### 2.2.4.1 *Segmented assimilation*

The issue of divergent destinies, particularly for the second generation, needs further study. Published evidence, especially in America (Alba & Nee 1997; Bankston & Zhou 1997; Farley & Alba 2002; Gans 1992; Perlmann & Waldinger 1997; Portes & Rumbaut 1996a, 2001; Waldinger & Feliciano 2004; Zhou & Bankston 1998), suggests that the processes of adaptation and assimilation amongst new immigrants are unlike those of earlier European immigrants. It also suggests that theories of assimilation developed in response to earlier waves of immigration in the late nineteenth/early twentieth century are no longer adequate for understanding the experiences of 'new' immigrants (Xie & Greenman 2005).

Immigrants' adaptation was no longer seen as a bipolar process but, instead, as a *segmented process*. Gans (1992) outlines several distinct trajectories that the children of the new immigrants, or the 'new second generation', can follow. These paths include downward as well as upward mobility among the possible outcomes. Further developing these ideas as a critique of classical assimilation theory, Portes and Zhou (1993) propose the theory of 'segmented assimilation'. They delineate three possible paths of assimilation that immigrants may take:

- the time-honoured upward mobility pattern, dictating acculturation and economic integration into the normative structures of the middle class;
- the downward-mobility pattern, in the opposite direction, dictates the acculturation and parallel integration into the underclass;
- economic integration into middle-class America, with lagged acculturation and deliberate preservation of immigrant communities' values and solidarity. This level, also called 'selective acculturation' (Portes & Rumbaut 2001: 54), is seen as the deliberate preservation of the immigrant community's culture and values, accompanied by economic integration.

Portes and Rumbaut (2001) further expand segmented assimilation theory by identifying the factors that influence these distinct outcomes. They identify human capital, modes of incorporation into the host society and family structure as the relevant background factors that shape the experience of the first generation. These, in turn, affect the relationship between the type of acculturation experienced by immigrant parents and the type experienced by their children. Portes and Rumbaut view this relationship as central to the outcomes of the second generation. They believe that the relationship between parents' and children's acculturation is important because it influences the family and community resources available to support children, who confront numerous challenges in adapting to life in the host society. Some of these challenges are posed by the communities that receive present-day immigrants. The continuing tendency of immigrant families to settle in poor neighbourhoods means that immigrant children must frequently attend poorly performing, under-funded, and highly segregated inner-city schools (Suárez-Orozco & Suárez-Orozco 1995; Waldinger 2001). The environment they encounter in such schools is thought to put adolescents at higher risk of acculturating into the 'oppositional youth culture' or 'adversarial outlooks' found among their native minority peers (Hirschman 2001; Portes & Rumbaut 2001; Portes & Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997a, b). This culture discourages school engagement, and is seen as affecting adolescents' chances for upward mobility. Under these circumstances, the segmented assimilation approach asserts that maintaining the culture of origin can have a protective effect for immigrant children. The immigrant community may be able to reinforce the achievement-related and behavioural norms that parents try to teach their children, and thus help adolescents avoid the pitfalls of poor neighbourhoods. If adolescents assimilate too fully into the surrounding social environment, however, they may experience dissonant acculturation and lose access to the social and cultural resources of the ethnic community. Therefore, the segmented assimilation framework

would predict that, in disadvantaged contexts, the third level of assimilation (that of limited or lagged acculturation accompanied by economic assimilation) would be most beneficial (Xie & Greenman 2005).

Segmented assimilation can be viewed as a *middle-range theory* that concerns why different patterns of adaptation emerge amongst contemporary immigrants, and how these patterns lead to the destinies of convergence or divergence. It provides an insightful, and in some sense necessary, perspective on the experiences of today's immigrants and their children; however it also suffers from interpretational ambiguity which results in operational imprecision. This theory will be discussed further in Chapter 8 of this book, where its applicability to the empirical findings of this research is tested.

#### 2.2.4.2 *Transnationalism*

In the last decade or so, 'transnationalism' has emerged as a new approach to the study of migration, which accentuates the attachments migrants maintain to people, traditions and movements located outside the boundaries of the nation-state in which they reside (see for instance Glick Schiller, Basch & Blanc-Szanton 1992; Portes, Guarnizo & Landolt 1999; Smith & Guarnizo 1998; Vertovec 2001b; Vertovec & Cohen 1999). An essential element of transnationalism is the multiplicity of involvements that transmigrants sustain in both home and host countries. Transmigrants take actions, make decisions and develop subjectivities and identities embedded in networks of relationships that connect them simultaneously to two or more nation-states. Maintaining and nurturing multiple ties with countries of origin enables immigrants to create new transnational social and cultural spaces for themselves (Faist 2000b). Many immigrants in Europe remain citizens of their country of origin but, beyond formal citizenship, immigrants engage in multiple public spheres across national borders in their social practice (Ehrkamp & Leitner 2003).

Immigrants are perceived as increasingly engaging in processes of identity reconstruction that 'cut across fixed notions of belonging' (Dwyer 2000: 475). To depict attachments and identifications that span borders, scholars have described transnational identities as diasporic (Anthias 1998, 2001; Cohen 1997). Others conceive the dispersal of migrants across the world in terms of 'ethnoscapes' that allow for new forms of identification and start to replace nation-states as geographical areas of identification, arguing that identities and belonging are becoming increasingly de-territorialised (Appadurai 1996).

As Aksoy and Robins (1997) suggest, new mass media such as satellite TV are instrumental in reinforcing newly emerging cultural identities; they provide migrants with sources of identification and reference that stretch beyond the national and local contexts of their old and new

homes. Scholars also often juxtapose transnational and local levels because relations to the place of origin form an important component in immigrants' everyday lives (Vertovec 2001b). Some argue that everyday life itself becomes transnational rather than being located only at the local level (Campbell 1996). Others find that immigrants' transnational cultural and social fields prevent them from adapting to their new places of residence, and therefore present transnational and local ties as mutually exclusive (Faist 2000b). For example, Smith (2001) suggests that transnational practices of some sending states intended to foster attachment to the home country such as granting dual citizenship to citizens abroad, prevent migrants from adapting or assimilating to the new place of residence. This type of dichotomisation and how it can prevent 'integration' has been the subject of much research (Appadurai 1996; Smith 2001). However, the extent to which transnational ties and practices influence local lives and identities, especially in relation to the host society, has not received much scholarly interest. Such dichotomies, as Ehrkamp (2005) points out, are problematic because they overly simplify complex processes of identity construction, assimilation and adaptation. Claims that assimilation is not even an option for contemporary migrants need to be questioned (Nagel 2001). Instead, Kivisto (2003: 19) argues that 'transnational immigration and assimilation/incorporation ... need to be seen as interrelated'. Similarly, Anthias (2001: 633) insists that immigrants' identities and belonging need to be considered as enactments that do 'not entail fixity or permanence'. Conceptualising migrants' identities as constantly negotiated in relation to multiple societies and places enables us to think beyond dichotomies and mutually exclusive notions of local and transnational ties, and to recognise immigrants as agents who are able to forge their belonging and multiple attachments (Ehrkamp 2005).

Despite the abundance of literature on transnational communities, research on second-generation, and particularly third-generation, transnationalism has only gained importance during the past few years (for example, Kasinitz, Waters, Mollenkopf & Merih 2002; Levitt 2002; Levitt & Waters 2002; Smith 2002; Vickerman 2002; Wessendorf 2005). Only recently have researchers started to incorporate a transnational perspective into the analysis of the second generation; they have focused on three areas. First, they examine different factors leading to transnational activities, such as race, class, and life-course. Second, they look at the varieties and characteristics of transnational involvement, such as political transnational engagement, or economic activities like sending remittances. Third, they examine the impact of transnationalism on integration processes in the host country or, in other words, the interrelationship of transnationalism and assimilation (Wessendorf 2005).

The concept of transnationalism is therefore particularly important in my analysis of how first-, second- and third-generation Moroccans maintain their transnational links, named in this research also as ‘cross-country’ networks, with their countries of origin and how these impact on the building up and nurturing of new links in the host society.

### 2.3 A social capital approach

Many definitions have been given of the concept of social capital. Justifiable confusion about what constitutes ‘social capital’ has been exacerbated by the different words used to refer to the term. These range from social energy, community spirit, social bonds, civic virtue, community networks, social ozone, extended friendships, community life, social resources, informal and formal networks, good neighbourliness and social glue (Office of National Statistics 2001). Within these terms there are different conceptualisations, depending on the theoretical background, which contribute to conceptual confusion.

Research undoubtedly correlates high social capital, in the form of social trust and associational networks, with a multiplicity of desirable policy outcomes. Putnam (2000: 23) argues that social capital has ‘forceful, even quantifiable effects on many different aspects of our lives’ and it is more than ‘warm, cuddly feelings or frissons of community pride’. These quantifiable effects include lower crime rates (Halpern 1999a; Putnam 2000), better health (Wilkinson 1996), improved longevity (Putnam 2000), better educational achievement (Coleman 1988), greater levels of income equality (Wilkinson 1996), improved child welfare and lower rates of child abuse (Cote & Healy 2001), less corrupt and more effective government (Putnam 1995) and enhanced economic achievement through increased trust and lower transaction costs (Fukuyama 1995). The cumulative effect of this research indicates that the well-connected are more likely to be ‘housed, healthy, hired and happy’ (Woolcock 2001: 12).

In this section I will start by tracing the conceptual history of ‘social capital’ and reviewing the main theoretical developments, drawing on the work of Bourdieu (1980), Coleman (1988, 1990), Fukuyama (1995, 2000), Portes (1998), Putnam (1993a, b, 1995, 2000, 2007) and Woolcock (2001). I will then discuss how social capital compares with other forms of capital; identify its determinants at micro, meso and macro levels, its characteristics and typology; explain how it can be operationalised and measured; and finally give my own definition of the concept and how I shall be using it as an analytical tool in this research.

### 2.3.1 *Theoretical development*

According to Woolcock and Narayan (2000), social capital has an intellectual history in the social sciences that dates back more than 90 years. It was first used by Lyda J. Hanifan in explaining the importance of community participation in enhancing school performance. Hanifan (1916: 130) invoked the concept of social capital, describing it as

[Those] tangible substances [that] count for most in the daily lives of people: namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit ... If [an individual comes] into contact with his neighbor, and they with other neighbors, there will be an accumulation of social capital, which may immediately satisfy his social needs and which may bear a social potentiality sufficient to the substantial improvement of living conditions in the whole community.

Portes (1998) also suggests that the concept behind social capital is nothing new in sociological terms. He points to the work of Durkheim (1933) and his emphasis on being connected in a community as 'an antidote to anomie and self destruction'. More recently the value of social capital was identified by Bourdieu (1980, 1997) and given a clear theoretical framework by Coleman (1988, 1990), who was the first to subject the concept to empirical scrutiny and develop ways of operationalising it for research purposes (Baron, Field & Schuller 2000: 8). However, it is now most commonly associated with Putnam (1993a, b, 1995, 2000).

Four theorists who have contributed substantially to the conceptualisation of social capital are Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman, Robert Putnam and Alejandro Portes. Their formulations of the concept will be discussed separately, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses. In his essay on 'The forms of capital', Bourdieu (1997) posits a unitary capital which 'can present itself in three fundamental guises' (1997: 47): economic, cultural and social. He defines it as 'The aggregate of the cultural or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition'. These relationships, he argues, 'provide each of its members with the backing of collectively-owned capital' (Bourdieu 1997: 51). For Bourdieu, as well as for Baron et al. (2000), social capital is neither reducible to economic or cultural capital, nor independent of them, but acts as a multiplier for the other two forms, while being created and maintained by the conversion of economic and cultural capital in the 'unceasing effort of sociability'. Bour-

dieu reserves primacy for economic capital, and as the home to which all accumulation eventually returns. However, despite the primacy of the economic, Bourdieu dwells heavily in his empirical and theoretical work on 'symbolic' capital. His use of the concept of 'capital' indicates a non-reductionist, materialist reading of culture, while his study of the transformation of the different forms of capital promises a dynamic, holistic analysis. In Bourdieu's conceptualisation, the use of the concept of capital is often metaphorical rather than analytically disciplined. What further weakens his formulation of social capital is the difficulty of operationalising it (Baron et al. 2000).

For Coleman (1988, 1990), social capital was significant primarily as a way of understanding the relationship between educational achievement and social inequality. He defines it by its function, not as a single entity but as 'a variety of different entities having characteristics in common: they all consist of some aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure' (Coleman 1990: 302). Developing his argument further, he refers to it as 'the set of resources that inhere in family relations and in community social organisation and that are useful for the cognitive and social development of a child or young person' (Coleman 1990: 300). Unlike Bourdieu, however, Coleman saw the creation of social capital as a largely *unintentional* process, which he defined mainly in *functional terms*. Baron et al. (2000) suggest that to define social phenomena in terms of their outcome is to confound the antecedent with the consequent. It is possible that different antecedents can lead to the same outcome, or that the same antecedent can have different outcomes under different conditions. Also, trust may not necessarily be an outcome of networking. Coleman's conceptualisation is impaired by his assumption of unidirectional micro-macro causation. But which comes first, trust or social networks? Similarly, Portes (1998) identified a number of weaknesses in Coleman's work, accusing him of using a rather vague definition that 'opened the way for re-labelling a number of different and even contradictory processes as social capital' (Portes 1998: 5). In particular, Portes wished to draw a clear line between membership of social structures on the one hand – which might be defined as social capital – and the resources acquired through such membership on the other (Baron et al. 2000).

A third key writer on social capital is the American political scientist Robert Putnam. He offers a succinct definition of social capital as '*networks, norms, and trust* – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives' (Putnam 1996: 66). Putnam started his social capital career analysing local government in Italy. Halpern (1999a) suggests that *Making Democracy Work* firmly located Putnam on the social capital map by identifying the 'vibrancy of asso-

ciational life' as a critical component in effective local government. He found that areas with low social capital (measured by the above-mentioned associational life and level of trust) were ruled by the most unsuccessful governments and demonstrated greater inefficiency and corruption. However, areas with high levels of social trust were ruled by successful regional governments. His pioneering work in Italy led to work in America in 1995 on the 'strange disappearance' of social capital. In *Bowling Alone* (2000), Putnam presented evidence based on comparison of US states. Where there was more social capital (as shown by indicators of association membership, trust, organised altruism and charitable giving), schools worked better, children watched less TV, violent crime was rarer, health was better, tolerance was higher and there was more equality. He uses the emotive image of a once highly associational activity (bowling), which used to be organised in leagues, being reduced to Americans bowling alone.

One of the main differences between Putnam and his predecessors is that, whereas Coleman and Bourdieu consider social capital an attribute of the individual, Putnam has developed it as an attribute of communities (Baron et al. 2000). However, Portes and Landolt (1996) point out that collective social capital is a resource available through social networks, the resources that some individuals claim come at the expense of others. Hence, social capital for some implies social exclusion for others. Arguably this misrepresents Putnam's argument, which is rather that there are socially significant externalities arising from horizontal associations (which cut across dense but segregated networks). Putnam's conceptualisation of social capital has been widely criticised, particularly before he published *Bowling Alone* (2000), as he seems to overlook the 'dark side' of social capital (see Arneil 2006; Portes 1998). Another criticism pointed out by Baron et al. (2000) is that he conflates *means* and *ends*, so that it is unclear whether high levels of social capital constitute a desirable end-state where people interact trustfully and morally, or a way of achieving a good society which may be characterised in a different way. Putnam, like Coleman, has been criticised for functionalism and for failing to address issues of power and conflict. He rejects this, and in recent times has made strong claims for an intrinsic and universal link between social capital and egalitarian policies.

Overall, Putnam (2000) has significantly shifted his position. He now acknowledges the 'dark side' of social capital, accepting that it may have *negative consequences*, both externally – for society at large – and internally – for the members of the network. Putnam has also shifted his emphasis from trust to reciprocity. Thus, he acknowledges that people may have high trust levels and yet be socially inactive or even antisocial. Conversely, people may have good reasons to be un-

trusting and yet make a major contribution to building social capital, for example through civic projects in areas of high criminality. But overall, trustworthiness 'lubricates social life'. It promotes the kinds of interaction that reinforce norms of generalised reciprocity (Baron et al. 2000).

Alejandro Portes offers a more finely-grained and comprehensive conceptualisation of the origins and nature of social capital. Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993: 1323) define social capital as 'those expectations for action within a collectivity that affect the economic goals and goal-seeking behaviour of its members, even if these expectations are not oriented towards the economic sphere'. Portes' (1998) review of the literature comes from a more sociological tradition. He adds two important points: first, he suggests that distinctions need to be made, to avoid tautology, between the possessors of social capital, the resources of social capital and the resources that are being claimed through the deployment of social capital. Second, he develops the possible negative consequences of social capital as the exclusion of outsiders; excessive claims of group membership; the restriction of individual autonomy; and self-perpetuating opposition to the social mainstream (Baron et al. 2000).

Portes and Sensenbrenner's (1993) definition of the four sources of social capital is particularly valuable. The first, *value introjection*, prompts individuals to behave in ways other than naked greed; such behaviour then becomes appropriable by others, or by the collectivity as a *resource*. The second source of social capital arises from *reciprocity transactions* and consists of the accumulation of 'chits' based on previous good deeds to others, backed by the norm of reciprocity. The third source of social capital, *bounded solidarity*, focuses on situational circumstances that can lead to the emergence of principled, group-oriented behaviour, quite apart from an early value introjection. The weapon of the working class in this struggle is precisely its internal solidarity, born out of a common awareness of capitalist exploitation. As a source of social capital, bounded solidarity does not arise out of the introjection of established values or from individual reciprocity exchange, but out of the situational *reaction* of a class of people faced with common adversities. If sufficiently strong, this emergent sentiment will lead to the observance of norms of mutual support, appropriable by individuals as a resource for their own pursuits. Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) then name the fourth source of social capital as *enforceable trust*. It is captured in Weber's (1922) classic distinction between formal and substantive rationality in market transactions. Formal rationality is associated with transactions based on universal norms and open exchange; substantive rationality involves particularistic obligations in monopolies or semi-monopolies benefiting a particu-

lar group. Social capital is generated by individual members' disciplined compliance with group expectations. However, the motivating force in this case is not value convictions, but the *anticipation of utilities* associated with 'good standing' in a particular collectivity. As with reciprocity exchanges, the predominant orientation is utilitarian, except that the actor's behaviour is not oriented to a particular other, but to the web of social networks of the entire community.

Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) then argue that, whilst the first two types are the core of entire schools of sociological thought, the last two have been less theorised. Both depend on a heightened sense of community and hence have the greatest affinity with the experience of immigrant groups. It is the particular circumstances of 'foreignness' that often explain the rise of these latter two types of social capital among immigrants. Bounded solidarity is limited to members of a particular group who find themselves affected by common events in particular time and space: bounded solidarity according to them is compatible with Marx's (1894) description of the rise of class-consciousness; this mechanism depends on an emergent sentiment of 'we-ness' among those confronting a similar difficult situation. The fundamental characteristic of this source of social capital is that it does not depend on its enforceability, but on the moral imperative felt by individuals to behave in a certain way. In this sense, it is akin to value introjection, except that it represents the emergent product of a particular situation (Portes & Sensenbrenner 1993).

Of the four conceptualisations of social capital discussed above, Portes' (1998) formulation is the most valuable, for at least two reasons. First, he has elaborated differences in the characteristics of social ties amongst individuals, explaining these differences as an outcome of the differing characteristics of the social network, and as an outcome of the degree or type of embeddedness in a network. Second, he has exemplified different types of motivation behind the structuration of social capital and hence avoided the unidirectional rational choice explanation offered by Coleman. Although each of the four conceptualisations have their own limitations, reference will be made to each of them throughout this research as some are more useful than others for the analysis of social capital at different levels (e.g. voluntary organisations, schools).

### 2.3.2 *Social capital in relation to other forms of capital*

There has been some controversy about the use of the term 'capital' in the social capital context, with its implication that there is a stock of social capital assets on which returns are earned. This is directly analogous to the controversy over the term 'human capital', and the re-

sponse is much the same. Classical analyses of capital as financial, physical and in terms of other tangible assets neglect the value – even in narrow economic terms – that lies in social networks and shared values that facilitate cooperation between actors, just as they neglect the importance of knowledge and skills (Aldridge, Halpern & Fitzpatrick 2002). In this section, I shall refer briefly to ways that social capital relates to and differs from other types of capital, particularly human and cultural.

Cultural capital has been considered as an aspect of human capital, something that an individual can accumulate over time through talent, skills, training and exposure to cultural activity (Matarasso 1999). However, Gould (2001) considers cultural capital as a form of social capital, meaning that, when a community gathers to share culturally (through celebrations, rites and intercultural dialogue), it is enhancing its relationships, partnerships and networks.

Human capital comprises individual skills based on abilities, education and training. In *Bowling Alone*, Putnam (2000: 19) notes that human capital refers to individuals whereas, for him, social capital refers to connections amongst individuals and the social networks and the norms of reciprocity that arise from them. Coleman (1988) suggests that, like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, but it can be depleted if it is not renewed. In addition, Putnam suggests that the more people work together the more social capital is produced, and the less people work together the more community stocks of social capital will deplete (Cooper, Arber, Fee & Ginn 1999). Baron et al. (2000) clearly summarise the differences between human capital and social capital in Table 2.1.

**Table 2.1** *Human capital compared to social capital*

	<i>Human capital</i>	<i>Social capital</i>
<i>Focus</i>	Individual	Relationships
<i>Measures</i>	Duration Qualifications	Membership/participation Trust levels
<i>Outcomes</i>	Direct: income, productivity Indirect: health, civic activity	Social cohesion Economic achievement More social capital
<i>Model</i>	Linear	Interactive/circular
<i>Policy</i>	Skilling, accessibility and rates of return	Citizenship, capacity building and empowerment

*Source:* Baron et al. (2000)

### 2.3.3 *Relations of trust in social capital*

Trust looms large in the debate about social capital. Some consider trust as its outcome (Woolcock 2001), others view it as a component of the shared values which constitute social capital; some consider it to be both (Cote & Healy 2001). Pretty and Ward (2001) suggest that trust is reinforced by sanctions which may be applied to those who defy social norms or fail in their social responsibilities. Trust is often categorised into two types: firstly, that which we have in individuals we know, and secondly, that which we have in individuals we do not know. In Putnam's terms this is *thick* and *thin* trust. Whilst the former is viewed as a property of intimate social networks, the latter is seen as generalised trust in other community members (Office of National Statistics 2001).

Kenneth Newton (1999) elaborates further on this trust dichotomy by tracing it back to what he named Durkheimian and de Tocqueville models. He claims that 'thick' trust, which he relates to the Durkheimian model, is the essential ingredient of mechanical solidarity, which is generated by intensive and daily contacts between people, often of the same tribe, class, ethnic group or local community origin. Groups, communities or tribes of this kind are not only socially homogeneous, but they tend to be isolated. As a result, social control is also powerful. Thick trust in communities of this kind is generated and sustained by a tight and intensive network of social interaction, and by the sorts of social sanction which work best in small isolated communities; 'closure', is Coleman's term (Coleman 1988). The classic analyses of such types of society are offered by Durkheim in his account of mechanical solidarity. Newton (1999) then relates 'thin' trust to the de Tocqueville model of civic virtue. He asserts that modern society does not generate the 'thick' trust of mechanical solidarity, but the 'thin' trust of organic solidarity. Thin trust is the product of weak ties which, according to Granovetter's celebrated article (1973), constitute the strong enduring basis for social integration in modern large-scale society (Newton 1999). Such a dichotomisation has been criticised, however, for being one-dimensional. Sixsmith, Boneham and Goldring (2001) found that trust was more dynamic than this dichotomy implies and challenge what they view as Putnam's unitary notion of trust, as their research reveals trust to be more multi-dimensional.

### 2.3.4 *Networks in social capital*

Networks represent another critical component in social capital theory. *Social network analysis* underlines the relationship among social entities and the patterns and implications of these relationships. The main argument advanced by social network analysis is that actors and actions

are to be perceived as *interdependent* rather than dependent, and that the *relational ties* between actors are channels for the transfer or flow of material and non-material resources. The relational types to be investigated include transactions, communications, instrumental relations, sentiment, authority/power and kinship (Knoke & Kuklinski 1991: 177). Scott (1991: 3) refers to this relational data as 'the contacts, ties and connections, the group attachments which relate one agent to another and so cannot be reduced to the properties of the individual agents themselves'. Relational data, Scott argues, are handled by network analysis, in contrast to attribute data for which discrete variable analysis is appropriate. This line of argument validates the idea that social capital is not an attribute of individuals but a function of relationships between agents and between social institutions (Baron et al. 2000).

Ronald Burt's (1997, 1998, 2001) conceptualisation of 'structural holes' makes an explicit bridge between networks and social capital. He asserts that 'The structural hole argument defines social capital in terms of the information and control advantages of being the broker in relations between people otherwise disconnected in the social structure' (Burt 1997: 340). Burt's key insight, notably in his empirical work on managers in large organisations, is that people gain advantages by exploiting informational gaps in the formal organisational structure. One of the merits of Burt's work is the way it explores the differential values of networks, and relates these to social variables such as gender. He observes from his empirical data that, for women, smaller networks are more effective than large ones, and he seeks to explain this. He concludes that the explanation lies not in the density of their networks, but in their hierarchical location. It is women with networks that connect them to senior levels in the hierarchy, as distinct from those with networks that are close but horizontal, who benefit from higher rates of promotion (Burt 1998). Clearly this kind of analysis deals with the instrumental types of relationship, and focuses on individual benefits in a way that does not sit easily with the wider civic benefits claimed for other forms of social capital; social capital as merely a career asset would have less general appeal than the wider conception (Baron et al. 2000: 21). Burt (2001) developed those ideas further in an article where he compares network 'closure' advanced by James Coleman (1990) to 'structural holes' theory. In this article he claims that *cross-cutting* between groups opens up economic opportunities to those belonging to less powerful or excluded groups. They also build social cohesion, a critical element in social stability and economic welfare over any extended period. He then concludes that 'while brokerage across structural holes is the source of added value, closure can be critical to realising the value buried in the structural holes' (Burt 2001: 52).

### 2.3.5 *Typology of social capital*

The most common distinction established when discussing social capital is between *bridging*, *bonding* and *linking*. Before publishing *Bowling Alone*, Putnam (2000) did not differentiate between the possible types of social capital. Now, Putnam suggests that *bonding* social capital (*exclusive*) refers to relations amongst relatively homogenous groups such as family members and close friends and is similar to the notion of strong ties; these ties, he explains, are good for ‘getting by’. He lists examples of bonding social capital as being ethnic fraternal organisations and church-based women’s reading groups. Bridging (inclusive) social capital, on the other hand, refers to relations with distant friends, associates and colleagues. It is characterised by weaker, less dense but more cross-cutting ties (‘social oil’). Putnam (2000) lists examples of these as being civil rights movements and ecumenical religious organisations. These ties tend to be weaker and more diverse but more important in ‘getting ahead’. Putnam’s idea of bridging social capital is not new. In fact, Granovetter’s (1973) ‘Strength of Weak Ties’ argument also suggests that weak ties were an important resource in making possible mobility opportunities.

Although the issue of bridging social capital has been discussed primarily in relation to the connection between poor and affluent communities, four types of bridging ties have been identified by Warren, Saegert and Thompson (2001), each important in its own right. First of all, within a poor/excluded community itself, there is a need to consider *bridging across different forms of social capital*. Even a small, geographically defined community has many different institutions and networks within it. One cannot assume that one form – for example, a mosque community – can speak for the whole. Moreover, different community institutions often do not cooperate with each other and can sometimes be in open conflict.

The second type that Warren et al. (2001) identified is *bridging between different low-income communities or neighbourhoods*. They argue that poor and excluded communities do not always, or even normally, cooperate with each other in the development and pursuit of initiatives that would be of mutual benefit. In fact, neighbourhoods are often divided against each other, for complex historical reasons related to different interests and identities. These divisions are particularly acute when they fall along racial or ethnic lines, and they often lead to competition between neighbourhoods and racially defined communities for limited resources or economic opportunities.

The third type of bridging is the one most commonly discussed, although seldom practised: *forging connections between the poor and more affluent communities*. Scholars have explored the importance of bridging

ties for the socio-economic advancement of individuals and families (see, for example, Briggs 1998). At the community level, bridging social capital can help build allies for strategies to combat deprivation and social exclusion (Warren et al. 2001).

*Connecting people and communities nationally* is the fourth identified type of bridging social capital. Building social capital at the local level is a necessary part of any strategy for combating deprivation, since local roots provide intimate knowledge, trust and a respect for the diverse needs of communities. Community is not limited to the local level, nor should it be. Yet most community-building efforts with strong local roots lack much national coherence (Warren et al. 2001).

Besides bonding and bridging, Woolcock (2001) identified a third type that he named *linking* social capital – characterised by connections between those with differing levels of power or social status, e.g. links between the political elite and the general public or between individuals from different social classes. Linking social capital also includes the capacity to leverage resources, ideas and information from formal institutions beyond the community.

### 2.3.6 *Measuring social capital*

Sixsmith et al. (2001) suggest that much of the existing literature has been based on secondary analyses of datasets not primarily established for social capital. How then is social capital measured? By measuring a phenomenon which is typified by abstract human relations such as trust, obligations and reciprocity in a way which, whilst remaining true to their complexities, reduces the level of abstraction and permits practical responses to be developed.

In contrast to the emerging need to develop new measures of social capital for the policy context are the theoretical arguments over whether or not social capital can be measured at all. Commentators like Portes (1998) would consider that social capital defies measurement in any meaningful way. Portes and Landolt (1996) assert that collective social capital cannot simply be the sum of individual social capital. Baron et al. (2000: 28) also make the point that social capital has been aggregated across different levels and that its validity depends on its contextualisation. They comment that adding up the number of people who belong to organisations indicates little about the strength of social capital if it is not accompanied by information on what people do as members. Others, however, like Fukuyama (1999), consider that it is possible that complex social phenomena can be defined through proxies, but he concedes that ‘measurement of the total stock of co-operative social relationships based on norms of honesty and reciprocity is not a trivial task’ (1999: 23).

Despite the relatively short-lived theorising of social capital, a clear orthodoxy has emerged regarding methods of measurement. The main influences upon this body of work have been the political scientists Robert Putnam (2000) and Francis Fukuyama (1995, 1999). Putnam utilises data from the General Social Survey (for the United States) and the World Values Survey in tandem with voter turnout, newspaper readership and time-budget surveys. Also in the US, the National Commission on Civic Renewal has used existing data such as divorce rates and levels of crime as indicators of social capital deficit, avoiding the problem of measuring social capital at all. Fukuyama (1995, 1999) adopts a combination of these approaches for the purpose of his analysis.

Cote and Healy (2001) on the other hand suggest that measures of social capital should be as comprehensive as possible in their coverage of key dimensions (networks, values and norms), and balanced between the *attitudinal/subjective* and the *behavioural*. Such measures should be related to the cultural context in which the behaviour or attitudes are being measured. The *cultural specificity* of social capital was also raised by Robinson (1997) in his work on social capital from a Maori perspective. In this he highlights that the Maori concept of social capital stresses the importance of extended family relationships, as these are the basis of all other relationships. This has implications for international measures of social capital (Office of National Statistics 2001).

*Social trust* has been used in many studies as a means of measuring levels of social capital. Halpern (1999b) suggests that there is a need for a simple, 'quick and dirty' measure, and this can be solved in the systematic measuring of social trust. He considers it easy to measure, and to be associated with more policy-relevant outcomes than traditional measures of voluntary activity and association membership. The World Values Survey asked questions on trust in 1981, 1991 and 1996 and there are tables comparing recorded trust in different countries (Office of National Statistics 2001). However, Baron et al. (2000: 26) suggest that the practice of using single questions about trust and linking them to broad measures of a nation's economic performance is an example of poor social capital measurement.


To avoid the use of one social capital indicator, others like Paldam and Svendsen (2004) chose to combine trust along with membership in civic organisations and civic participation as an alternative qualitative measurement of social capital (see also Svendsen & Svendsen 2004). Yet, perhaps the central component in any valid approach to the measurement of social capital is the nature of the data used. The use of non-original data results in an interpretation which is defined as much by what is easily available as by any valid notion of what the con-

cept 'social capital' actually represents. With this in mind, a suggested first step in the creation of a new way to measure social capital would be the creation of an original database of theoretically informed indicators of social capital for a given locale. Roberts and Roche (2001) claim that the use of a questionnaire survey would ensure that a wide spatial coverage was achievable. A 'productivity' factor could also be built into the survey, asking respondents about their perceptions of beneficial aspects of social capital. Although this assessment would be subjective, it would prove a critical link between social capital as a measurable entity and as a resource to be fostered and used for the good of communities.

### 2.3.7 *My working definition of social capital*

From earlier discussions, social capital seems sufficiently general to encompass most uses of the term in the recent sociological literature. By its very generality, the concept encompasses such a plurality of situations as to make its empirical application difficult. Thus, for this study it is important that I give my own definition of the concept and how I will be using it as an analytical tool in the different levels of the research.

I believe that the main components of social capital, as shown in Figure 2.1, are social networks and relationships, social support and control, and shared obligations; these components together create social norms within the network which 'regulate' interactions within the same network. The trust element is incorporated in all the levels of social norms and oscillates, depending on the type of network and the



**Figure 2.1** *Main components in social capital*

nature of the relationship developed within the network. Another way of reconciling social capital costs and benefits is to recognise that it is *multi-dimensional*, that different combinations of these above-mentioned dimensions might yield different outcomes.

## 2.4 Ethnicity, social capital and social exclusion: conceptual links

Key concepts in ethnicity and social capital are: reciprocity, bounded solidarity, and enforceable trust (Portes & Sensenbrenner 1993). These characteristics have both positive and negative implications for group members. Ethnicity, like class, is a social construct, which impacts on how we are brought up to believe and behave. It serves simultaneously as a way to bind some people together while keeping others apart. In this section I will elaborate on how the three concepts, ethnicity, social capital and social exclusion, can offer an enhanced explanation of intricate dynamics behind the various 'integration' patterns of the Moroccan community in London.

### 2.4.1 *Defining social exclusion*

Social capital can explain social exclusion, because the same ties that bind also exclude. Thus, the non-overlapping nature of social networks of different social groups results in unequal opportunities to participate. Some groups can be rich in social capital and yet experience extreme poverty. This would be justified by academics like Narayan (1999) and Putnam (2000), by the 'bonding' and 'bridging' nature of social capital. Putnam now gives considerable emphasis to the tension between these two forms of social capital. Before I elaborate more on how social capital may contribute to the social exclusion of certain communities, there is a need to define the term.

The term social exclusion is usually attributed to René Lenoir, who published *Les Exclus: Un Français sur Dix* in 1974. The *exclus*, according to Lenoir, were those excluded from employment-based social security systems. The term gained popularity in France during the 1980s. It was used to refer to various types of social disadvantage, related to new social problems that arose: unemployment, ghettoisation and fundamental changes in family life (Cannan 1997). The social exclusion approach seeks to understand the inter-relationship between poverty, productive employment and social integration. The approach can be applied in various ways, which in turn lead to different policy conclusions. Silver (1994, 1995) argues that the different approaches to social exclusion are grounded in different paradigms of citizenship and

social integration labelled as 'solidarity', 'specialisation' and 'monopoly'. The definitions depend in particular on the ways in which social integration has been conceptualised. Choosing one of the definitions therefore means 'accepting the theoretical and ideological baggage associated with it' (Silver 1994).

A *solidarity* model sees society as a 'moral community' with a core of shared values and rights, and interprets exclusion as the rupture of the social ties, a failure of the relationship between the society and the individual. The solidarity paradigm, dominant in France, draws on the philosophy of Rousseau. In this tradition, the poor, the unemployed and ethnic minorities are defined as outsiders. National solidarity implies political rights and duties.

The *specialisation* model sees exclusion as resulting from individual behaviours and exchanges. Individuals may exclude themselves by their choices, may be excluded because of patterns of interests or contractual relationships amongst other actors, or their exclusion may occur as a result of discrimination, market failures or unforced rights. The specialisation paradigm is dominant in the US, and contested in the UK. This interpretation of social exclusion draws on Hobbes. According to liberal-individualistic theories, individuals are able to move across boundaries of social differentiation and economic divisions of labour. Liberal models of citizenship emphasise the contractual exchange of rights and obligations. In this paradigm, exclusion reflects discrimination, the drawing of group distinctions that denies individuals full access to or participation in exchange or interaction.

The third model, *monopoly*, views society as hierarchical, with different groups controlling barriers and restricting access to occupations, cultural resources, goods and services. It is influential in Britain and many Northern European countries, and it draws heavily on Weber. It views the social order as coercive, imposed through hierarchical power relations. Exclusion is defined as a consequence of the formation of group monopolies. Powerful groups restrict the access of outsiders through social closure, whilst labour market segmentation draws boundaries of exclusion. However, unlike in the specialisation paradigm, group distinctions and inequality overlap. Inequality is mitigated by social democratic citizenship, which entails full participation in the community.

These paradigms as formulated by Hilary Silver (1994) are very useful to contextualise and understand debates about deprivation. But they are of course a schematic representation of national traditions. In practice, however, these three models overlap, and most analysts or policy-makers will be influenced by aspects of different traditions. These differences, de Haan (1998) points out, are not only of theoretical interest: concepts of deprivation influence policies that combat deprivation.

The difference between a British liberal tradition and the French tradition seems crucial. Not only are there large intellectual differences, but also political ones (Evans, Paugam & Prelis 1995: 16–17). In Britain during the 1980s the debate focused on reducing state intervention and creating incentives for individuals, whilst in France the opposite was the case and the state tried to take a more active role, to *integrate* its citizens.

Social exclusion remains a concept, and the discourse emphasises that it is a way of looking at society. De Haan (1998) claims that it is crucial that people can be – and usually are – excluded in some areas (or dimensions), and included in others. The central definition of the notion of social exclusion stresses the *process* through which people are being deprived, taking the debate beyond descriptions of people's situation. De Haan (1998) explains that, though definitions of social exclusion differ from one country to another, they have three characteristics in common that separate it from other concepts:

1. Social exclusion is defined as the opposite of social integration, which reflects the perceived importance of being part of society, being integrated.
2. It is a multi-dimensional concept. It refers to exclusion (deprivation) in the economic, social and political spheres. It goes beyond the analysis of resource allocation mechanisms and includes power relations, agency, culture and social identity.
3. Social exclusion can refer to a state or situation, but it also refers to processes, and to the mechanisms by which people are excluded. The focus is on the institutions that enable and constrain human interaction.

In the British context, social exclusion has become central to British policies and debates. The most recent debate has been strongly informed by the Labour government, with a much stronger emphasis on inequality and improving social services. These debates culminated in the government's initiative to establish an inter-departmental Social Exclusion Unit ([www.socialexclusionunit.gov.uk](http://www.socialexclusionunit.gov.uk)) in 1997, which probably represents an attempt to bring issues of deprivation in the UK onto the agenda of the various government departments rather than a new approach to poverty. The Social Exclusion Unit defines social exclusion as:

A shorthand term for what can happen when people or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime, bad health and family breakdown ([www.socialexclusionunit.gov.uk](http://www.socialexclusionunit.gov.uk)).

They add that research suggests that people most at risk of becoming socially excluded are likely to belong to particular groups in society, or experience particular life circumstances, often in combination:

Key risk factors include: low income; family conflict; being in care; school problems; being an ex-prisoner; being from an ethnic minority; living in a deprived neighbourhood in urban and rural areas; mental health problems, age and disability ([www.socialexclusionunit.gov.uk](http://www.socialexclusionunit.gov.uk)).

In general, the British usage of the notion of social exclusion remains strongly rooted in Anglo-Saxon liberal individualism – whereas the French notion is based more strongly in a national solidarity paradigm. Despite British adoption of the French notion, British social policy debates suggest the strong influence of US models of welfare reforms.

But is this concept useful in studying ethnic inequality? Glenn Loury (2000) responds positively to this question and states that inequality and conflict between groups entail not just *economic* but also, and centrally, sociological and political factors. He then claims that conventional economic discrimination against minority groups is rarely the primary source of group disparities. Moreover, methods to fight such discrimination have little power to reduce the economic gap between groups. Given the information asymmetry between employers and enforcement agents, there are limits to how aggressive anti-discrimination policy can be before significant efficiency costs arise (Coate & Loury 1993). If the concern is economic inequality between groups, then looking mainly through the lens of wage and price discrimination is unlikely to bring the problem into focus. Loury (2000) then rejects the idea of society in which we are atomistic individuals, pursuing our paths to the best of our abilities given the opportunities available in the market-place. He claims this to be an incomplete view of how society works. Instead, he contends that we are all embedded in a complex web of associations, networks and contacts: '[W]e live in families, we belong to communities, and we are members of collectivities of one kind or another. We are influenced by these associations from the day we are born. Our development – what and who we are and become – is nourished by these associations' (2000: 243). These links play a detrimental role in the individual's development, particularly that of young people who are embedded in a social network of peers whose values might not always affirm positive behaviour. These young people do not choose their peers; in a way they inherit these associations as a result of where they live, what social group they belong to, and so on (Loury 2000).

The concept of social exclusion can be valuable for various reasons. De Haan (1998) points out two. First, the concept focuses on the *multi-dimensional* character of deprivation. Poor people usually suffer from multiple disadvantages related to, for instance, work insecurity, income, gender and ethnicity. Second, the concept focuses on processes, mechanisms and institutions that exclude people. It may take us beyond static descriptions of situations of deprivation, and focus on the causes and mechanisms that lead to these situations. In short, the concept of social exclusion provides a useful framework for understanding the interconnectedness of life circumstances, social categorisations and social problems. Social exclusion may be experienced by individuals and by groups or communities, and it has become a driver for policy development and service delivery at both levels. Interventions are as varied as the social problems they are designed to deal with, but they implicitly rely on the participation and involvement of individuals, groups and communities towards achieving social inclusion *for themselves* (Sullivan 2002).

#### 2.4.2 *Social capital and ethnicity, or ethnicity 'as' social capital?*

Social capital and ethnicity are concepts that focus on the collective and the social as opposed to the individual and autonomous (Reynolds 2004). Equally, both concepts reinforce notions of 'collective rights, responsibilities or obligations' that can be 'mobilised towards collective social action' (Goulbourne & Solomos 2003: 332). Like ethnicity, social capital is a contested concept that is difficult to operationalise in research and policy settings (Molyneux 2001). However, the conceptualisation of ethnicity as a source of social capital or 'as' social capital, is fairly new, and has been applied primarily in the American context to a number of empirical analyses (Bankston & Zhou 1995; Portes 1987; Portes & Sensenbrenner 1993; Sun 1998; Zhou 1997a, b; Zhou & Bankston 1998). The majority of this research draws on Coleman's theorising of social capital and how it contributes to differential educational outcomes. This body of research is, however, not widely cited in the UK (Modood 2004). For this reason reference to American case studies and literature will be made throughout this volume.

There is virtually no mention of ethnicity in the work of the three key social capital theorists, Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam. As Tracey Reynolds (2004) points out, debates within the race relations field do not overtly refer to the concept of social capital, although the key tenets of the concept are strongly ingrained within race policy discussions. Equally, public policy issues of race and ethnic identity are implicated in social capital debates. Although the work of Coleman does not di-

rectly refer to ethnicity, key theorists both in the UK and in the US have adopted his argument in comparing family inter-generational social mobility across diverse minority ethnic groups (see Berthoud 1999; Dench 1996). Goulbourne and Solomos (2003) make an explicit reference to ethnicity as a source of social capital by suggesting that 'a key assumption that informs much of the work in race relations analysis has been that some groups are better equipped than others to draw upon family, kinship and communal resources' (2003: 333).

Bourdieu's theoretical approach is also relevant in understanding how subordinate groups might seek to raise their socio-economic status by investing in other types of capital other than the economic (Bourdieu 1997). As Tariq Modood (2004) points out, Bourdieu's work raises the possibility that families lacking in economic capital may be able to use other capitals to achieve their educational aims and goals. This other resource could be perceived as social or cultural capitals embedded within a specific social network. His work also offers a theoretical framework for making links between the wider social structure, power and ideology, and illustrates how those with financial capital can convert it into educational qualifications and then back again.

Although Bourdieu and Coleman's conceptualisations of social capital could be of relevance in addressing ethnicity, Portes and Sensenbrenner's (1993) and later Min Zhou's (1997b) frameworks are much more pertinent in establishing the links between social capital and ethnicity. Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) suggest that immigrants' solidarity, in the form of social capital, possesses two analytically distinct elements. First, a common cultural memory brought from the home country which comprises the customs, mores and language through which immigrants define themselves and communicate with others; and second, an emergent sentiment of 'we-ness' prompted by the experience of being lumped together, defined in derogatory terms, and subjected to the same discrimination by the host society. They further argue that the combination of these elements transforms immigrant groups into ethnic communities relatively quickly. To the extent that the first element represents a continuation of cultural practices learned in the home country, it can be called *linear ethnicity*; whilst the second represents an emergent product of the experience of immigration, and may be labelled *reactive ethnicity*. They then suggest that, for the second generation, these two elements of solidarity have very different consequences. Reactive ethnicity has many points in common with the experience of other subjugated minorities, which underlies the emergence of an adversarial stance amongst their youth; whilst linear ethnicity gives rise to an entirely different outlook based on the partial recreation of institutions brought from the home country. The emer-

gence of immigrant schools, restaurants, shops and financial institutions patterned on the mode of the old country reinforces the first-generation stance in two ways: first, by creating a social environment that validates its norms and values; second, by creating opportunities within the immigrant community that are absent on the outside (Portes & Sensenbrenner 1993).

In a similar vein, the work of Bankston and Zhou (1997, 2002) and Zhou (1992, 1997a, b) uses social capital theory to understand the academic achievements of Asian Americans, focusing on case studies of Chinatown in New York and recent Vietnamese migrants to the US. This body of research highlights how immigrants' social capital, in the form of community support networks, serves as a positive resource for outstanding academic achievement and upward social mobility. This explanation is embedded in what Zhou refers to as key elements of the 'ethnic enclave'. She argues that parents and members from the ethnic community create a strong norm that positively encourages the younger generation's school achievement and upward social mobility. These norms and the community members' involvement in the various ethnic institutions bind families and individuals to an interlocking network of ethnic relations that in return create a form of ethnic social capital.

Two effective distinctions of social capital were made by Bankston and Zhou (2002); these are 'intergenerational closure' and 'norms enforcement'. The former is similar to Coleman's notion of 'closure', where parents keep a tight network of their children's friends, so that the network of parents and that of the children involve many of the same families. The latter, 'norms enforcement', is related to 'intergenerational closure' by enforcing the existing positive norms within the same network. However, as Tariq Modood (2004) suggests, Min Zhou's (1992, 2005) conceptualisation of ethnic ties, norms and community organisations as a form of social capital has a few limitations. First, her work is situated within an American context of the study of immigrant social integration, exclusion and mobility which tends to compare the Asian 'model minorities' with longer-established groups like African-Americans which have not achieved social mobility, whilst ignoring more complex structural constraints that these unsuccessful groups have faced. Second, Zhou refers to the pressures on young people from intense parental and community expectation and scrutiny which, as she admits, can lead to 'intense intergenerational conflict, rebellious behaviour, withdrawal from school, and alienation from the networks which are supposed to help' (Zhou 2005: 33). Interestingly, she notes that the young people concentrate on particular subjects, 'science and engineering because their families want them to do so ... [yet] when graduating from college they often lack the type of networks that facili-

tate their job placement and occupational mobility' (Zhou 2005: 34). This observation leads us to consider the possible role of social capital as a mechanism for reinforcing (possible) 'exclusion' from the mainstream society.

#### 2.4.3 *Immigration networks of support and control or reinforcement of 'social exclusion'?*

Close-knit migrant communities such as the one described by Zhou and her colleagues provide an effective form of social support inherent in the particular social relations within the ethnic community. The younger generation is constantly reminded to behave according to the norm set by the community. Zhou and Bankston (1994) also suggest – based on their case study of Vietnamese youth in New Orleans – that conformity to traditional family values and behavioural standards requires a high level of family integration into a community that reinforces these values and standards. The outcomes of adaptation, therefore, depend on how immigrant children fit into their own ethnic community, or into their local environment if such an ethnic community is absent, and how their ethnic community or local environment fit into the larger host society. Zhou and Bankston (1994) also argue that the importance of accepting prescribed norms and values and the need for cultivating social relationships depend largely on the opportunities offered to immigrants in the host country. They further argue that the *community* provides a *context* in which social capital is formed. The adult society surrounding a family can reinforce familial support and direction, mediating between individual families and the larger social setting. Immigrant children and parents often interact with one another in immigrant communities. If patterns of interaction are contained within a tightly-knit ethnic community, these children and parents are likely to share their similar experiences with other children and parents. In this way, the community can create a *buffer zone* to ease the tension between individual self-fulfilment and family commitment. The community can also serve to moderate original cultural patterns, legitimise re-established values and norms, and *enforce* consistent standards. Conformity to the expectations of the family and the ethnic community therefore provides individuals with resources of support and direction. If ethnic communities are interpreted in terms of social capital, community-based support systems and positive cultural orientations can provide an adaptive advantage for immigrants and their offspring. However, this mechanism is never stagnant; it constantly accommodates changes in the process of immigration (Zhou 1997b).

Membership in any group can have varied outcomes depending on the degree of group involvement. If norms, values and social relationships within an ethnic group influence the adaptation of group members, the influence logically depends on the extent to which individuals hold the norms and values and participate in the social relationships. Hence, participation in social relationships and conformity to group norms and values are interconnected; the more individuals associate with a particular group, the greater the normative conformity to behavioural standards and expectations prescribed by the group (Zhou & Bankston 1994). Nevertheless, ethnic communities can, conceivably, hinder the adaptation of young members of immigrant groups. Richard Rodriguez (1983), in his memoir *Hunger for Memory*, maintains that his own success has depended on his leaving his Spanish-speaking neighbourhood behind.

Just as families promote value consensus amongst their younger members, they also promote behavioural conformity. What is considered bad or good is clearly specified and closely monitored by these networks. The community is watchful and ever-vigilant (Nash 1992), providing effective *social control* on individual families and the younger generation alike. Both parents and children are constantly observed and judged by others under 'a community microscope' (Nash 1992).

Ethnic solidarity may be perceived as social integration into a particular ethnic group, or across ethnic groups; for instance, the second-generation Maghrebins, more commonly known as *Beurs*,<sup>1</sup> 'integrate' and identify with their neighbourhood/*cit * rather than with France or Morocco. Ethnic social integration therefore creates a form of social capital that enables an immigrant family to receive ongoing support and direction from other families and from the religious and social associations of the ethnic group. Consequently, community standards are established and reinforced amongst group members, especially amongst younger members who may otherwise experience a process of downward assimilation.

As Narayan (1999) points out, social groups and networks only work by including some and excluding others. The challenge therefore in using the two concepts of social capital and exclusion is to differentiate between exclusion which is voluntary, and exclusion which is involuntary or coercive – based on criteria such as age, race, ethnic group, gender, location, class or income. Both concepts implicitly raise the question of power differentials, although this was mostly absent from the early social capital debate as it evolved in the US. Social capital can explain much social exclusion, because 'the ties that bind may also turn into ties that blind' (Powell & Smith-Doerr 1994). The non-overlapping nature of the social networks of different social groups results in unequal opportunity to participate. Those who belong to social networks

which already have access to resource allocation decisions of the state or the private sector (jobs, location of industry) are much more likely to continue to be included in societal processes than those who do not have such access.

Putnam's (2000: 22) distinction between bonding and bridging social capital is particularly relevant here. Bonding relationships are perceived as 'inward looking' and tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups; bridging fosters inclusiveness. If bonding social capital reinforces in-group identities then it might be seen as an 'unsocial' (Levi 1996) type of social capital in relation to the group beyond the immediate circle of friends and relatives. It may also set 'us' against people who are different. Who we associate with may tell a lot about our willingness to trust people who are different from ourselves (Uslaner & Dekker 2001). Unless loose ties are accompanied by high expectations of reciprocity, the least-advantaged groups will be subject to even greater marginalisation. Attention to the differentiated nature of social capital, and its overlapping but distinctive relationship to other resources, is therefore necessary (Baron et al. 2000), both on micro and macro community levels; particularly in contexts where public policies may (un)intentionally create and consolidate social divisions rather than healing them. Examples might include regeneration programmes that focus on building social capital within disadvantaged neighbourhoods, thereby intensifying their separation from the outside world, rather than building bridging ties that allow access to externally controlled resources.

## 2.5 Summing up

This chapter has explored some of the theoretical themes that underlie the research problems addressed by this study. The conceptual links between ethnicity, social capital and social exclusion that I have outlined in this chapter may help to provide a means of understanding how patterns of social relations within ethnic groups may affect adaptation/integration to a host society. Beyond this we can say that the investigation of social capital as a form of social integration can offer new ways of understanding some of the oldest issues in sociology.

In this chapter I did not intend to present a fixed theoretical framework that guided my fieldwork and analysis of the empirical findings. Rather, there has been a two-way relationship between the empirical and theoretical aspects of the study: as the process of data collection and analysis progressed, I constantly reviewed the theoretical assumptions. The conclusions reached on the basis of the fieldwork presented in subsequent chapters both follow from and feed into the theoretical

concerns which have been considered here. But before my main empirical chapters are presented, I need to review my methodological stances; this is the subject of the next chapter.



## 3 Methodology

### 3.1 Introduction

This study adopts a multi-research approach using *triangulation* of various research methods (Burgess 1995). The different methods of investigation include oral history, semi-structured interviews, in-depth semi-structured interviews, organisational profiling based on questionnaires, and personal fieldnotes. The purpose of this chapter is first to discuss the various research methods chosen and the rationale behind using each specific method; and second, to highlight the main challenges faced whilst conducting this research and, where applicable, the ways in which they have been addressed.

### 3.2 The research methods chosen

Moroccan migration to Western Europe has been the subject of much research, especially in France and the Netherlands, which are the first and second countries of destination for Moroccans. However, very little academic research exists on Moroccan migration to the UK, although the main waves of migration to the UK, France and the Netherlands started in roughly the same period – from the early 1960s into the 1970s. The absence of secondary resources on the Moroccans living in the UK in general, and in London in particular, was the primary challenge for this research, which made me resort to a variety of research methods in an attempt to address some of the existing research gaps while meeting the aims of this study.

As an empirical study, my research involved the collection and analysis of a set of primary qualitative data on the Moroccan community in London, with a focus on the second generation. Although I am aware of the limitations of qualitative research techniques (e.g. generalisation of findings, gaining access to the field, ethical issues), qualitative methods are most appropriate for this study as they respond to the research needs of collecting in-depth data about the community under study in a specific neighbourhood setting. ‘The first principle of qualitative analysis’, according to Lofland (1971), is that the researcher should under-

stand that ‘in order to capture the participants “in their own terms” one must learn their analytic ordering of the world, their categories for rendering explicable and coherent the flux of raw reality’ (1971: 7).

### 3.2.1 *Oral history*

The first set of data I collected consists of 30 life-history testimonies with first-generation men and women who came to Britain in the 1960s. This method has been used to ‘reconstruct’ a lost migration history and some of its key events. The oral history approach is valuable not only in capturing the living memory of the first-generation Moroccan migrants and highlighting their personal experiences, but also in revealing aspects of their lives that could not have been depicted through other research methods.

Oral history has been variously defined, and the name has been used to describe a number of different activities. For the purpose of this research, oral history is defined as information transmitted orally, in a personal exchange, of a kind likely to be of historical or long-term value (Seldon & Pappworth 1983). Oral history is used here to challenge the top-down approach of researchers speaking on behalf of the community. Oral testimonies are vivid, personal and direct and their use is an acknowledgement that individual people’s perceptions are equally as valuable as more traditionally accepted methods of gaining understanding of their societies and priorities (Thompson 1988). Indeed, oral history, in the case of Moroccan migration to the UK, can provide completely new information about areas of the past which is unavailable from documentary evidence in written sources.

The lack of written sources on this migration experience is due to various factors, some of which have been expressed by Ghada Karmi:

The Moroccan community in Britain represents a fascinating subject for study, yet not so easy was the task of studying Moroccans in London, and previous workers had abandoned the attempt. They were reported to be an inward looking, isolated and suspicious community, fearful of authority and largely inaccessible (1991: 7).

By adopting an oral history approach I attempt to ‘reconstruct’ part of this recent ‘missing’ Moroccan migration history. Personal testimonies in this context offer a powerful and unique insight into the lives of Moroccan migrants which are not necessarily apparent from the qualitative evidence of individual interviews. As Alistair Thomson (1999: 28) puts it, oral testimony and other forms of life stories demonstrate ‘the complexity of the actual processes of migration and show how

these policies and patterns are played out through the lives and relationships of individual migrants, families and communities'. Personal testimonies also reveal the intricate interplay of factors and influences which contribute to migration and settlement, which also include the complex transformations that the migrant group has witnessed both 'externally' (in the relation to the host society) and 'internally' (as individuals and across generations). Oral history in the context of this study is a key tool for reinstating a sense of self-worth and capturing some unique personal memories of a generation of elders who often feel their lives are of no interest, marginalised and excluded by both the host society and their country of origin.

### 3.2.2 *Complementary semi-structured interviews*

After completing 30 life stories with first-generation Moroccans, I needed to investigate further aspects of the Moroccan migration experience, particularly in relation to their achieved levels in educational and occupational mobility as well as how their experiences have been perceived by the 'other'. Although the oral testimonies were extremely valuable in providing me with the personal trajectories of first-generation Moroccans, they represented a one-sided perspective of how the community settled, and I realised that it would be equally valuable to see how the community is perceived by its own members, as well as by others who are involved with the community but are not necessarily Moroccan. I therefore conducted 45 complementary semi-structured interviews with community workers, youth workers, local councillors and MPs, schoolteachers and others.

This set of interviews gave me a more thorough picture of how the Moroccan community identifies itself and also how it is perceived by 'others'. Although these interviews provided me with rich qualitative data on the Moroccan community in London, they could not compensate for the lack of quantitative data, which I believe needs to be provided by large-scale surveys beyond the scope of this research.

### 3.2.3 *Measuring social capital: in-depth semi-structured interviews*

The core of this research is based on a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews with 24 selected Moroccan families across the capital, where first-, second- and third-generation individuals are interviewed within the same household (Appendix A has details on the profiles of the families). This method was chosen to indicate how social capital operated within households and across generations.

Measuring social capital has always presented a challenge, as noted in Chapter Two. However, social capital may be perceived as a set of

networks of social relations which are characterised by norms of trust and reciprocity. Combined, it is these elements that sustain civil society and which enable people to act for mutual benefit (Lochner, Kawachi & Kennedy 1999); it is 'the quality of social relationships between individuals that affects their capacity to address and resolve problems they face in common' (Stewart-Weeks & Richardson 1998: 2). Nadel (1957) suggests that conceptualising social relations as networks enables us to identify their *structure* (for example, whether people know one another, and the nature of their relationship) as well as their *content* (for example, flows of goods and services between people, as well as norms governing such exchanges). Network analysis is appropriate for the study of relational data and social networks as it focuses upon the contacts, ties, connections, group attachments and meetings which relate one actor to another and cannot be reduced to the properties or attributes of individual agents (Scott 1991: 3). Indeed, classical social network analysis in sociology and anthropology is in many ways concerned with aspects of networks which are necessary to understand social capital, and it forms a rich reference for the study of networks in social capital research. Networks may be understood as the 'structural' elements of social capital. The 'content' of these networks in social capital terms refers to norms of trust and reciprocity which operate within these structures. Means of measuring norms of trust and reciprocity are less-well developed than are measures of the structural characteristics of networks. Measuring norms involves the study of cultures within particular networks, rather than the properties of individuals within those networks (Stone 2001).

Social capital at the household level in this research is measured by four main indicators: first, parental and children's networks, divided into three types (cross-country networks, in-country networks, and family networks); second, levels of reciprocity that exist between family members, neighbours and colleagues; third, levels of trust that individuals have in members of their community living in the host country, levels of trust in members living in Morocco and levels of trust in non-community members in the host country; whilst the fourth indicator is the level of civic participation, measured by voting, newspaper readership, and involvement in voluntary organisations. Two interview schedules, fairly similar, were designed for conducting the interviews, one for the head of household and another for the children (see Appendices B and C for the interview guidelines). In designing these schedules, I developed some of the questions myself, whilst others were based on existing social capital research questionnaires (Baum, Palmer, Modra, Murray & Bush 2000; Hughes, Bellamy & Black 2000; Kreuter, Young & Lezin 1999; Onyx & Bullen 2000; Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls 1997; Stewart-Weeks & Richardson 1998).

### 3.2.4 *Complementary independent interviews with third-generation Moroccans*

An additional set of 12 interviews, which I refer to as ‘independent interviews’, coded as (Ind.), were conducted with third-generation Moroccans. In a few of the selected families I was able to interview some third-generation Moroccans. However, the quality of the interviews was sometimes weak, for two reasons. First, the majority were very young (7 to 10 years old); and the presence of their parents in the same room sometimes restricted or influenced their answers. Instead, I attended two youth centres (The Moroccan Community Welfare Group and Lancaster Youth Centres) as well as a Saturday supplementary school for three weeks. This allowed me not only to observe how young people interact and behave on a fairly ‘neutral’ ground away from the family, but also helped me to establish a trust relationship that allowed them to come forward and talk to me. This method raised issues in relation to child protection; occasionally I was refused permission to interview children. But in general my approach with the children was to first tell them briefly about the kind of questions that I was asking, and then wait for them to volunteer to be interviewed.

### 3.2.5 *Profiling of community organisations: questionnaires and participant observation*

To further a multi-level analysis whereby social capital is assessed at various levels within the community, profiling of ten Moroccan organisations in London was made. Social capital and its types (bonding, bridging and linking) were assessed using four main indicators: first, the typology of the organisation; second, community involvement and pro-activity; third, members’ ability to influence decision-making; and fourth, connections and partnerships. The organisational profiles were used to produce a broad picture of ways in which structural social capital operates within the Moroccan community and across the wider society.

A short questionnaire was designed and distributed to the organisations (see Appendix D). The questionnaire was designed partly with reference to the Social Capital Assessment Tool developed by Krishna and Shrader (1999). However, because of the low response rate, I chose as an alternative approach either to conduct semi-structured interviews with the organisations’ representatives or to fill in part of the questionnaire myself, as I am familiar with at least five of the selected organisations through my full-time position as a community development worker with the Migrant and Refugee Communities Forum, and

then send it back to them for alterations. This remedial solution proved in the end to be the most effective.

### 3.2.6 *Fieldwork notes*

From the time when I physically joined the Moroccan 'community' in North Kensington in April 2002, I have kept a personal diary. My notes correspond to what Burgess (1981, 1982) called *substantive field notes*, as they consist of a continuous record of the situations in which I became involved and are predominantly descriptive. These field notes included physical descriptions of situations and informants, accounts of events based on conversations that I had with members of the community, and personal reflections on my work interactions with Moroccan voluntary organisations. In addition, I have tried, as often as possible, to write down my personal impressions after the interview has been conducted, in order to highlight some aspects from the interview that were not necessarily obvious from the answers of the interviewee.

These field notes were particularly valuable in giving me a real insight into the different dynamics that exist within the community: for example how individuals deal with the 'authorities', whether local authorities like the council, or even funding institutions; and how those relationships and networks are cultivated and sustained. Such data could never have been obtained through questionnaires or interviews; it is longitudinal and could only be captured through observation over a long period of time.

## 3.3 **Sampling**

The main reason behind my choice of locating the bulk of my fieldwork in North West London<sup>1</sup> has been influenced by the large presence of Moroccans in this part of the capital, estimated to be about 8,000. The choice of this particular site enabled me to explore in a more systematic way the social environment as well as other diverse factors, including social capital, influencing the inclusion/exclusion patterns of this specific community. Whilst a comparative study of two communities would have undoubtedly led to some interesting findings, I felt that an in-depth investigation within a single community would produce a wealth of material that would be sufficient for the purpose of analysis, especially given the time and budgetary constraints.

### 3.3.1 *Oral history interviews and semi-structured interviews*

For the collection of the oral history testimonies, the selection of interviewees was influenced primarily by my physical presence and personal knowledge of individuals within the community. In order to ensure a gender balance, I approached female interviewees at the local mosque which has a 50+ elderly group that meets twice a week. A *snowballing method* was also used for interviews with individuals outside the Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. They were mostly relatives and friends of those whom I interviewed initially.

The other set of 45 semi-structured interviews, conducted with the various informants, adopted a target-oriented selection of interviewees depending on the area where I needed supplementary information – for instance, housing, education, social services, and so on. I contacted the majority of my informants directly – without intermediaries – after drawing up a list of areas on which I required further information, but a degree of snowballing took place, particularly in relation to getting the right informants for each area.

### 3.3.2 *Household interviews*

The core of this research project was semi-structured interviews with a sample of 24 families, where heads of household were interviewed as well as children. Although fourteen of the families interviewed were from West London, especially the boroughs of Kensington and Chelsea and of Westminster, ten families were also selected from South, East and North London. These interviews are sequenced, distributed and coded as follows:<sup>2</sup>

- fourteen families from North Kensington: F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F16, F17, F18, F20, F23;
- four families from South London: F10, F14, F21, F2;
- four families from East London: F11, F12, F13, F15; and
- two families from North London: F19, F24.

This geographical sampling strategy was done in order to test the results of the data obtained from families based in West London and verify to what extent they were representative of other members of the Moroccan community based in other London boroughs. The selection of the families was quite similar to that of the oral history interviewees, which is through a personal knowledge of some of the families as well as recommendations from other interviewees through a snowballing method. Other families were selected with the help of the local mosque, as well as local Moroccan voluntary organisations. This last sam-

pling method was mostly used for families living in other parts of London.

### 3.3.3 *The Moroccan voluntary organisations*

The selection of ten Moroccan organisations was based on my familiarity with the voluntary sector in London in general, and the various Moroccan organisations operating across the capital, in particular. Although the majority (seven) of the selected community groups are based in West London, one organisation was chosen from East London, another one in central London and the last, though based in the capital, operates mostly on a 'virtual' basis. This selection was made in order to provide a broad typology of Moroccan migrant associations and investigate how the different types of network operate, depending on the nature as well as the location of each organisation.

### 3.3.4 *Sampling and social capital*

The sampling process for this research as a whole relied heavily on snowballing. This technique depends on the researcher's knowledge of a social situation (Burgess 1995) and, as Coleman (1958) indicates, it follows the pattern of social relations in a particular setting and therefore the population in the sample is recruited by building on existing contacts, networks and trust relationships. Indeed the researcher has to get involved in established social networks based on mutual obligations and trust before being able to tap into these networks (Morrow 2001); this is particularly relevant when negotiating access to a relatively closed group (Bryman 2002) such as the Moroccan community in North Kensington.

The researcher's knowledge and ability to negotiate the group norms and practices indicate two key points in relation to social capital. First, researchers' ability to use *their* 'bonding' and 'bridging' types of social capital (Reynolds 2004) – in this case, my working relationship with Moroccan associations as well as my physical presence within the community – facilitates the process of building these types of social capital. Second, the researcher's ability to draw on the *informants'* social capital (Zontini 2004); for instance, often interviewees agree to be interviewed as a 'favour' or indeed to 'reciprocate' a favour to the individual(s) by whom I was referred.

### 3.4 Analysis

#### 3.4.1 *Oral history material*

For the analysis of the oral history material, a thematic montage of extracts is used, where several interview extracts represent the various phases of Moroccan migration, from motivations to migrate, arrivals, first impressions, settlement, and then the challenges of 'integration'. Building this multidimensional picture by using typical life stories allows the stories to be used more effectively in constructing a broader historical interpretation of the Moroccan migration experience. This reconstructive mode of analysis is adopted here, instead of a narrative approach, simply because it remains closer to the most characteristic method in published oral history. As Paul Thompson (1988) explains, it also remains close to the 'ethnosociological' approach for which Daniel Bertaux (1997) argues in his *Les Récits de Vie*. The aim is to use life-story interviews to reconstruct in detail how social contexts or elements operate and evolve within a specific community.

Trevor Lummis (1998) suggests that structuring data collected from a rather homogenous group of views can be valuable on at least two levels. First, it shows that a small sample of interviewees can display impressive correlation with wider historical trends. Second, the structured evidence can unveil differentiations in behaviour and attitudes which are not necessarily apparent from individual interviews. Adopting a thematic montage for this study, through basic data restructuring, was necessary because of the absence of written documentation. When there is no written evidence, oral history plays a crucial role in historical reconstruction (Lummis 1998), as has been the case here for Moroccan migrants to the UK, or could be the case for other 'invisible' groups or communities.

#### 3.4.2 *Analysis of the rest of the data*

In the analysis of the remaining data, different approaches have been used. A multi-level analysis of social capital is established, revealing how the systems of social capital map components, structure and environment directly onto micro, meso and macro levels of analysis. This multi-level social capital analysis was adopted to shift the analytical focus from the behaviour of individual agents to the pattern of relations between agents, social units and institutions.

All the collected data, the transcripts of the 151 interviewees,<sup>3</sup> in addition to the ten questionnaires profiling community organisations, produced over 1,000 pages, and have been manually processed. This process was extremely lengthy and time-consuming. Careful consideration was given to qualitative data management before, during and after the

data collection, to make the best use of resources. However, often a range of problems is associated with studies based on qualitative work, in relation to how the data should be analysed. The fieldwork produces a bulk of data which is unwieldy and disorganised. Where semi-structured interviewing was used, the findings do have more shape than, for example, field notes accumulated through observation. An important advantage of what McCracken calls the 'long interview' is, he points out, the fact that it produces data that are 'both abundant and manageable' (1988: 65). Nevertheless the interview transcripts are inevitably extremely long and un-standardised. The analysis of qualitative data is thus necessarily an ongoing task and not a specific stage within the research process. Analysis, according to Hammersley and Atkinson, 'begins in the pre-fieldwork phase, in the formulation and clarification of research problems, and continues into the process of writing up' (1983: 174).

In this study, the analysis of the data took place over an extended period of time, and involved the constant reformulation of my ideas with reference to the gradually expanding set of empirical data. General and specific themes slowly emerged from what I was hearing from my interviewees and through my ongoing involvement with the community as a whole, which had to be eventually incorporated and refined as empirical material increased and was carefully ordered and categorised. At the household level, an analysis was developed based on the different social capital indicators mentioned above (networks, trust, reciprocity, and civic engagement). For each of these indicators a comparison was drawn between the first and the second generations, as well as across families located in different parts of the capital.

As for the meso level, the data collected through the detailed questionnaire distributed to ten Moroccan migrant associations, along with field notes collected from my daily work with these organisations as a community development worker, enabled me to produce a comparable index across these organisations. With this index I attempted to demonstrate to what extent the organisations succeeded in decreasing social boundaries between their local communities and the host society, thereby scaling up levels of bonding social capital to bridging and linking social capital.

Finally, analysis at the macro level, which mainly refers to the institutional context in which the Moroccan community lives and where migrant associations operate, has been constructed mainly from secondary resources, namely government policy papers (e.g. Neighbourhood Renewal, Community Cohesion), local government reports and academic discussion and literature. This level of analysis is imperative in order to identify and contextualise the underpinning factors that influence the level of 'integration' of migrant communities. Macro-social

structures which include obstacles to full participation in society seem to be the central force causing the propensity to seek and create social capital in the ethnic community as opposed to the larger society. Some of these obstacles, for instance, include: the immigrant condition; cultural differences; the racial factor; and national or international events that might shape public attitudes. For instance, children who live in disadvantaged neighbourhoods suffer from an unequal distribution of educational resources, which seriously inhibits their chances in life, trapping them in isolation and exclusion from the mainstream institutions, thus further diminishing their chances for upward mobility.

### **3.5 Research challenges**

#### *3.5.1 Representation*

Conducting this research has engendered a variety of challenges at various levels. The first one relates to this study's endeavour to compensate for the lack of secondary resources through qualitative research. Qualitative research necessarily focuses on a small sample of individuals or a small group, so the findings usually cannot be said to be representative of the whole population. Although there is truth in that, I would argue that, even if the results of this research might not represent all the members of the Moroccan community due to their diversity, they certainly represent to a large extent the views, opinions and attitudes of the majority of Moroccans living in West London.

Related to this is the somewhat contentious use of the term 'community' throughout this book to refer to Moroccans living in London. Using this term is by no means an attempt to homogenise all the different Moroccan migrants in London or in the UK. It is used mainly for practical reasons, to refer to the presence of a significant number of Moroccans of a roughly similar background in West London who migrated in the late 1960s or early 1970s. The term 'community' also resonates with the British context, where reference is made to the various ethnic groups as 'communities'.

#### *3.5.2 Trust*

The in-depth nature of my research, which involved not only extensive fieldwork but also ongoing involvement with members of the community, has contributed to a closer-than-usual relationship between the researcher and the subjects with whom trust relationships have been cultivated. The fact that I am Moroccan was an added advantage, as it helped to enhance this trust relationship which has been extremely valuable in conducting the fieldwork. Establishing the trust relationship

was not instantaneous, however. It took me more than a year to build some basic trust levels, nurtured through my full-time employment within the community. Often my interviewees would ask me where I originated from in Morocco. Some would overtly express their disappointment when they realised that I was not from Larache, or Northern Morocco for that matter, but from Rabat; and not a second-generation but 'a new migrant'. Initially, I was often referred to as the Moroccan from '*Dakhilia*' (the interior of Morocco), which also has a pejorative meaning of 'Ministry of the Interior', hence an association with authority and power. This highlights not just the geographical and regional divide between the North and the South but also an implicit reference to the unequal distribution of life opportunities that relate back to the historical contexts of the two regions. Therefore, there was constantly an underlying assumption that not originating from the North of Morocco meant that I was more 'privileged'.

The issue of trust and regionalism, with all that it entails, could partly explain why very little research has been conducted on the Moroccan community in Britain, which has often been described as 'suspicious', 'fearful of authority' and in many ways 'inaccessible'. Once I was told by a woman who, after asking me whether I was Moroccan, then asked 'Why do you want to interview me then? You are Moroccan yourself so you must know how it is to live here in London'.

This brings me to my status as a researcher. Perhaps I could best describe myself as a *semi-outsider* in the first year, when I joined the community, and now as a *semi-insider*, after spending over four years within the same community; instead of a complete insider (i.e. a second-generation from West London). My changing status resonates with Naples' assertion that being an 'insider' or 'outsider' is not a fixed experience or position; rather these experiences are contextual and shifting (Naples 1996: 140). This oscillating status undoubtedly had both advantages and disadvantages. For instance, it enabled me to discuss some matters more freely with my interviewees – both parents and children – without worrying that what was said would somehow get back to their parents or other members of the community.

Another problem that I alluded to earlier is parental suspicion. Interviewing members of the same family, often in the same home setting, was not always unproblematic. On certain occasions when I did conduct interviews in homes, the atmosphere was strained because of the presence of the parents. In some cases, I chose not to ask certain questions due to their sensitivity. It was interesting to notice how vocal children were, depending on the interview setting. The presence of parents during the interview was not always unconstructive; in some instances it was quite revealing, as the parent and the child would engage in con-

versations that would divulge the nature of their relationship more than an open-ended question.

### 3.5.3 *Positionality and subjectivity*

There are clear advantages in researching one's own ethnic group, for instance being able to speak the language, relate to the cultural norms and practices of the researched group and so on. In my case, it certainly facilitated the process of 'accessing' a community which has often been described as inaccessible, and provided me with a unique perspective on some of the key underpinning issues within the community. I often had the impression that some people were more willing to talk to me because I was Moroccan and, because of that, thought that I was in a better position to understand their experiences. Additionally, notwithstanding problems I encountered, it was clear to me that, had I been a young male rather than a female researcher, it would have been more of an uphill struggle.

The majority of the interviewees, particularly the elderly men, had a fatherly attitude. For them my research was perceived as 'non-threatening' for two reasons: first, it was just part of my studies for a university degree, so I was often treated as the 'student' instead of a 'researcher'; and second, for them being Moroccan implied that I could not possibly take an overly critical stand about 'my community'. The attitude of the elderly women, however, was slightly different. They often were the most suspicious because they knew less about me and my work within the community. For example, after I finished interviewing Mrs. A.S., she told me that next time it would be me who would be interviewed, as I knew a lot about her life and she did not know about mine.

There are further limitations in researching one's own ethnic group, associated particularly with the power relationship between the interviewer and interviewees. As Zontini (2004) points out, the interviewees could feel under scrutiny from an interviewer who they perceive to share similar cultural values and who can assess or even 'judge' their behaviour against specific norms. This could lead the interviewees and even the interviewer to consciously or subconsciously *alter* their positions on issues related to family, politics and religion. For the interviewer this could raise ethical issues, where the researcher could highlight a specific ethnic identification whilst downplaying another. In some cases, I found myself in similar situations, though not consciously engaging in this process, but genuinely wanting to create a rapport with the interviewee based on commonalities rather than differences.

Researching one's own ethnic group also might have led sometimes to subjective factors interfering with both the interpretation of the data

and the actions and statements of the interviewees. In the process of analysis of my data, in particular, I often had to stop and rethink my interpretation in order to avoid further 'stigmatising' the community. In fact, being too close to the subject of my research created additional challenges. There was one specific incident where I found it intensely difficult to reconcile my role as a 'researcher' and that of the 'member of the Moroccan community' who is expected to be more proactive and not just an observer. I went to interview the two daughters of Family 16, where the mother is Moroccan and the father Afro-Caribbean. Unfortunately, when I got to the house to interview them, they had a big argument with their mother. As I came in, their mother Mrs. Z. immediately started telling me about the argument that she had with her two daughters. Mrs. Z was in tears, feeling completely disheartened; she was even contemplating the idea of leaving the house for good. I tried my best to calm her down, but she just seemed too angry to listen. She felt helpless and ashamed of losing control, and more so in front of another Moroccan. I did not want to take sides, although she expected me to do so. In this specific example, the boundary between the 'researcher' and the 'member of the community', who is expected to serve as a mediator and perhaps even as an example for the two daughters, was certainly blurred.

#### 3.5.4 *Translation and transcription*

The majority of the interviews conducted with the first-generation Moroccans were in Moroccan Arabic (*Darija*), which presented another challenge for this research, as all of these interviews had then to be translated into English. Part of the authenticity of the expressions and meanings conveyed in Arabic was lost in the translation process. However, being Moroccan myself helped a great deal in grasping a large part of the meanings conveyed, which I have tried to put into the simplest English possible. The main drawback of this process is that some of the quotes come across as simplistic and repetitive. I have tried my best, however, not to bring any alterations to the main ideas that they tried to communicate. The translation of the interviews into English also meant that the exact context of where and when interviewees code-switch from Arabic to English, Spanish or French is hidden, despite conforming to a full transcription of all the borrowed terms into these other languages. The transcription process of the interviews with second- and third-generation informants was less problematic, since no translation was involved and cases of code-switching were fully transcribed throughout all the interviews.

### **3.6 Summing up**

In this chapter I have outlined the main methodological thrust used in this research, by describing the various methods adopted as well as the purpose behind using them. Since this research could be considered as a pioneering study of the Moroccan community in London, it was necessary to gather as much information as possible on the community to compensate for the lack of other documentary sources. The conclusions of this study inevitably have various limitations arising out of the general nature of qualitative and interview-based research, difficulties associated with the analysis of qualitative data, and the particularities of the case under study. Despite this, the choice of the methods used to measure some of the social capital indicators offers a new light on how this broad theoretical concept can be operationalised in a community setting.



## 4 Moroccan migration to Britain/London: a historical overview

### 4.1 Introduction

The Moroccan migration experience to Britain dates back to at least the nineteenth century (Halliday 1992; Hayes 1905). In fact there is a long standing Moroccan-British relationship that goes back to the thirteenth century (Belmahi 2006; Rogers 1990), reflecting deeply rooted economic and diplomatic relations between the two countries. However, this migratory movement remains one of the most 'invisible' and least researched in Western Europe. Yet a walk down Golborne Road in London, commonly known as 'little Morocco', reveals Moroccan-owned cafés, restaurants, grocery stores, mosques, supplementary schools and community organisations; all testify the presence of a thriving Moroccan community. Paradoxically, however, this community remains officially and statistically invisible. An estimate of the size of the Moroccan community at present living in Britain is not available, although some unofficial sources suggest the figure of 65,000 to 70,000. The issue of the invisibility of certain migrant groups in Britain relates to the empirical overlap between ethnicity and race, exemplified by the identity question posed by the British Office of National Statistics in the 1991 and 2001 censuses, which collapses ethnic, racial and national identities (Goulbourne 2001).

The census table gives the number of UK residents by their place of birth. However, it is impossible to reach an estimate of the number of UK-born Moroccans, because second- and third-generation migrants born in the UK are grouped together as 'born in the UK'. Researchers are thus faced with a real challenge in reaching a conclusive picture regarding the number of Moroccans and their geographical distribution in Britain. An article on the Arab communities of Britain published in *The Economist* in 1988 states that half a million Arabs were then living in Britain, including 90,000-120,000 Egyptians, making this the largest Arab community, followed by 100,000 Iraqis, 50,000 Moroccans, 20,000 Palestinians and 20,000 Lebanese (cited in Al-Rasheed 1991). Although the article is silent on the sources of these estimates, it appears to give a more realistic picture than official statistics regarding

the number of Arabs in Britain in general, and Moroccans in particular.

The inadequacy of the national census, coupled with the scattered statistics of other government departments and guesswork by migrants' voluntary organisations, confirm that the Arab community in general, and the Moroccan community in Britain in particular, remain *veiled* as far as policymakers are concerned. Their invisibility demonstrates an underlying problem facing most Arab migrant workers. Invisibility at this level means non-recognition of their presence and an absence of commitment to their interests, grievances and problems. However, this statistical invisibility cannot hide the reality of established migrant communities in this country (see Al-Rasheed 1991, 1996).

This chapter aims to reconstruct a lost Moroccan migration history to Britain, and specifically to London. I discuss its dynamics, from the nineteenth century to the more recent migration that started in the early 1960s. Relying mainly on life stories of first-generation Moroccan men and women, a thematic montage of extracts is then used to represent the recent Moroccan migration, including motivations to migrate, settlement itself, and the challenges of integration.

## 4.2 Early historical perspective

Morocco is generally associated with the French colonial empire, much less with the British one. However, historical and diplomatic links with Britain date back to at least 1213 AD, when King John of England dispatched envoys to seek the support of Mohammed El-Nasir, Morocco's fourth Almohad ruler (see Belmahi 2001; Rogers 1990). Northern Morocco was partly controlled by Britain from 1662 to 1684, and Tangier was part of Princess Catherine of Braganza's dowry when she married Charles II (de La Veronne 1972). According to Nabil Matar (1999) the occupation of Tangier in 1662 brought Britons their first colonial challenge in the land of Islam. Having had some experience in North America, Britons found themselves forging a different colonial strategy, and modulating it in light of financial, military and administrative expediency.

The first Moroccan migrants to Britain were merchants trading in silverware and textiles from Fes (Halliday 1992). During the nineteenth century, as English cotton goods entered Morocco via Gibraltar and Tangier, Fasi merchants began to settle in urban centres such as London, Liverpool and Manchester in England, and Cardiff in Wales. The precise date is unclear, but one source gives the first Fasi arrivals as the 1830s<sup>1</sup>. Louis Hayes (1905) claims that in the last decade of the nineteenth century over a dozen Moroccan families lived in Manche-

ster, in a community of about 150 persons at its height.<sup>2</sup> Hayes described this community in the 1840s impressionistically:

[...]as you passed along the business streets of the City, you would suddenly come in sight of some white turbaned individual, whose gay Eastern dress appeared in such strong contrast to the sombre hues of the attire of all those about him. At first the sight of one of these men in Moorish garb was a very uncommon occurrence, and people would stand and smile as one of them passed along. But now they have ceased to be a wonder, and so they go to do their business in their usual quiet way, and make their purchases at the shops without more than perhaps a casual glance from the passers by [...] Most of these Moors seemed to learn English almost as quickly as they changed their footgear [...] Taken as a whole, these Moors were a thoughtful, peaceable, kindly and sociable set of men. Mohammedans by faith, one could not but admire and respect them for their strict observance of all that their religion enjoyed (1905: 205-212).

It was known in Fez that these 'Manchester Moroccans' had a special building, known as 'the office', from which their business was carried out, and this is confirmed by an interesting article from the local press in 1936, which describes the community. The informant according to Halliday (1992) was probably a Mr Jones, an Englishman who spoke Moroccan Arabic and who worked for them as an adviser from offices in Market Street. This report's title summarises the main features by which the community was known: 'Special Wives Bought in Slave Market; Wore Red Fez; Always had Umbrellas; Never in Court' (see Appendix E for the full newspaper article).

The Moroccan community of Manchester dissipated in the interwar period, when the competition from Japanese goods prevented the export of Lancashire textiles to Morocco. In 1936 the community returned to Morocco and apparently adopted Moroccan citizenship when the country became independent twenty years later. As the *Manchester City News* (2 October 1936) put it: 'Apart from the considerable material loss to the city, Manchester has lost a body of good citizens who, while retaining all their oriental customs and attributes, built up for themselves a reputation second to none for honest dealing and clean living'. A few members of the community did remain in Manchester: the family of Bin Sikri, who anglicised their name to Sicree, became solicitors (Halliday 1992). However, the majority were probably reabsorbed into the home country's population. Abd al-Majid Benjelloun, who lived until his teenage years in Manchester, reported in *Fi At -Toufoula* 'In the Childhood', his autobiography, that in Morocco, Manche-

ster, pronounced *manitshistir*, retained a mythic association, while some goods brought from Britain – such as machine-made carpets and teapots from Sheffield – were specially valued (Benjelloun 2005; see also Halliday 1992).

Although the majority of Moroccans who settled in Manchester were Muslims, a small minority of early migrants were Sephardic Jews (Halliday 1992). Moroccans, according to Lydia Collins (2006), were among the pioneers in Manchester where they made up a sizeable proportion of the Sephardic community in its early years. Their trade exchanges with Britain had started even earlier. Armand Levy (1995) writes that the city of Mogador, now known as Essaouira, came under British influence at the end of the eighteenth century. At that time, English merchants started to trade with Moroccan Jews in Mogador, exchanging Argan oil and Arabic gum for English cloth and silverware. By the end of the century a Protestant mission settled in Mogador and started teaching English to Jewish people, who subsequently developed a fascination for the ‘English thing’. By then, a few young Jews had gone to England to work in the textile factories in Birmingham and London or to set up businesses. Most Jewish traders sent their sons at the age of around sixteen to London, Manchester or Birmingham, to learn new skills and make a fortune. The majority of them stayed in England. Jews from Mogador, like Jews from other cities in Morocco, shared a desire to maintain strong links with the past, preserving religious customs and culinary traditions specific to their home towns in Morocco.

Some Moroccan Jewish figures have been prominent in British history: Hore-Belisha was one of them. He was Minister of Transport from 1934 to 1937; he introduced the driving test for motorists and the flashing lights at pedestrian crossings known as Belisha beacons. He was later Secretary of State for War from 1937 to 1940 and Minister of National Insurance in 1945. Another prominent figure was Don Judah Benoleil,<sup>3</sup> an influential merchant and banker. He was also Moroccan and Austrian Consul at Gibraltar, and played a vital role in diplomatic and financial negotiations. As a leader of the Jewish community, he was sometimes called ‘King of Gibraltar’ or ‘King of the Jews’ (Collins 2006).

Moroccan Jewish migration witnessed a second phase that started in 1956 after the Suez battle, and reached its peak in 1961 when President Jamal Abdel Nasser visited Morocco and the Moroccan Jews ‘feared’ a change of policy. Therefore, many ‘unskilled’ Jews left for Israel, whilst more educated ones emigrated to France, Canada, England and the US. A second generation of Moroccan Jews, mostly economic migrants, then re-migrated from Israel to England. It is estimated that

there are 2,000 Moroccan Jews in London alone, mostly based in North London, in the Golders Green area.

### 4.3 A recent history of Moroccan migration to Britain/London

The first Moroccan immigrants to Britain in the mid-postwar period are believed to have been acrobats from Tangier who worked in a circus. However, in the late 1960s a significant migration started when Moroccan workers, mostly Muslims, came to Britain, hired predominantly by Spanish nationals, to work in the service industries such as hotels and small businesses that prospered in the climate of economic growth during this period. This recent history of Moroccan migration to Britain has been particularly under-documented.

My interviews indicate that Moroccan migration to Britain can be split into *four* phases.

- The *first* started in the 1960s and consisted of unskilled workers, mostly from northern Morocco – specifically the Jbala region, especially Larache, Tetouan, Tangier and the surrounding areas, with a smaller community from Meknes and Oujda. The majority of these immigrants settled in cities such as London and Edinburgh, with smaller concentrations in towns like Slough, St Albans, Crawley and Trowbridge.
- The *second* phase, family reunification, followed from the early 1970s onwards.
- The *third* phase started in the 1980s, and was made up of young semi-skilled professionals and entrepreneurs, mostly from Casablanca and other larger cities.
- The *fourth* and most recent migration wave started in the early 1990s with the emigration of highly skilled Moroccan professionals, both from Morocco itself and from France. Many of these recent immigrants currently work in the finance sector in London.

The first phase of Moroccan migration, which remains the most significant in terms of numbers, was an individual initiative, encouraged by *social networks* of friends and relatives. This illustrates one of the first distinctive traits of Moroccan migration to Britain in contrast to other Western European countries such as France, the Netherlands or Belgium where bilateral agreements were made to facilitate labour movement. Family ties and social networks – in other words social capital – thus played a key part in shaping the migration of many individuals who came to Britain in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Villages such as Beni Garfat, Beni Arouss, Sahel and Smata, from which a large

number of Moroccans migrated, are part of the municipality of Larache, so most migrants would say that they were from Larache.

In London, a significant number of Moroccans settled in North Kensington, in the borough of Kensington and Chelsea. The boroughs of Westminster, Hammersmith, Lambeth and Croydon also have a sizeable presence of Moroccans.

## 4.4 The main phase of Moroccan migration to Britain

### 4.4.1 *Motivations for migration to Britain*

Like other migrations to Western Europe in the 1970s, Moroccan migration to Britain was mainly a labour migration, influenced by the traditional push and pull factors. Mainly economic reasons, and in one interviewee's words, the attraction of 'Eldorado', convinced a number of Moroccans to migrate to Britain.

I was happy, working as a waiter, and I was quite well known in my small town [Larache]. I was also happy in my family, surrounded by my friends etc, but because I was very young, full of energy, impressed by people who came back from Europe [...] I was, like, brainwashed, because all my thinking and dreaming were to travel to Europe. Immigration at that time [1960s] was through government rules and regulations through labour exchange. I chose a different way, an *independent* one [...] (Hajj Abdessamad).

I was born in Larache. I came to London in the 1970s, like everybody else attracted by the idea of London and Great Britain as the 'Eldorado'. The big illusion in a way! When I was in Larache, I heard from friends about some recruiting agencies that were looking for people to go and work in the catering sector, so I went ahead and wrote to one of those recruiting agencies (Hajj Mohammed).

This international migration was often preceded by an internal migration from neighbouring villages to Tangier or Larache: either for educational purposes – in this case going to secondary school – or searching for work, as the villages relied mostly on precarious agriculture.

I was born in Beni Garfat, about 32 km from Larache. My father was with the Spanish military and in 1936 he came back to Larache. He had land in the region of Larache, and I stayed looking after it with my brothers while he was in Spain. When I got

married, I decided to go to Larache and look for a job there. But when I learnt about the possibility of emigrating abroad, as I used to hear about it when we were in cafés etc., I thought of going to France, but there was a tough selection [medical selection], people who had money and gave bribes managed to go but those who didn't stayed. But anyway, it wasn't meant to happen, so I came to Britain instead (Hajj Ahmad S).

For others the migration to Britain was preceded by a short stay of one to two years either in Gibraltar or Spain. Most of those migrants were attracted by the close proximity to Morocco, a prior knowledge of Spanish in the case of many from the north, and the absence of visa requirements at that time for Moroccans willing to live in Spain. However, the similarity of conditions in Spain, added to the start of diplomatic tensions in 1975 between the two countries, convinced many to migrate to Britain:

I only had my passport at that time, we didn't need anything to get to Spain, they used to welcome people, and work used to be quite available. I wasn't speaking Spanish before, I learnt it there. It was quite difficult at the time, we couldn't even get accommodation, and we used to sleep in the field. I used to work in a factory. I spent there about three years [...] In 1975 we had the problem of Western Sahara so I decided to come back to Morocco and then apply for a work permit to come to England (Hajj Ali).

A key specificity of Moroccan migration to Britain, compared to other European countries, is the large number of women who came as independent migrants in the early 1970s. Most were single, widows, divorcees or female heads of households planning to support their families back in Morocco. The following quote from one of these independent female migrants, Hajja Zohra, in her early seventies at the time of the interview, gives some more specific but typical details:

I arrived in England 35 years ago. In Morocco I used to work as a couturier. The reason for me coming over here was a girl called Lalla Aicha, a good friend of mine, who encouraged me to come [...] At that time there were many people from my home town Larache who were contracted to work in England. I didn't have any children and my husband had died, so I decided to go there as well. I was told that England is a prosperous country [...] there were a lot of women who came on their own like me in the early 1970s. They looked for jobs, and then brought their

husbands over. While those who came here single, they got married here. They were from different parts of Morocco but mostly the north of Morocco: Tangier, Lakssar Lakbir, Larache.

Hajja Menana, another independent female migrant from Larache, who was encouraged by colleagues to look for a job in London, says:

[...] because *everyone* was going there at that time, most of my work colleagues went to London. Some of them came before the 1960s, they obtained *contrados* [contracts]. When I realised that everyone was leaving, my brother came to me and asked me 'Why not leave as well?', especially as he knew some other people who were going, and who could help me [...] so I said 'Why not!' My husband died before I came to London, I had two daughters, one of them died and the other joined me later [...] as you know, it's difficult to manage when you are a widow, have two children and your parents are unable to help...My brother encouraged me though to leave, they used to call it Britannia not London. He told me that there is work there etc., so I said 'Why not? If you are happy with me leaving, then that's fine by me'.

For some women it was a daring move to make at the time, and had to be justified by the promise to help the family back in Morocco; for others the main motivation for leaving the country was to escape a forced marriage.

I was born in Meknes, I lived there until the age of fourteen, I went to school until primary school, and then my parents took me out of school under the excuse that girls didn't have to study so I learnt sewing instead [...] Because I didn't have the chance to study in Morocco, my parents planned to get me married at the age of fourteen, unfortunately the person I was engaged to had an accident [...] So I came to London in 1971 to stay with some relatives who helped me come over here, and then get a work contract. So one of the reasons why I ended up leaving was to forget about those hard times (Amina).

The above quotes reflect an earlier feminisation of migration, as opposed to what is commonly believed to have happened only through the channel of family reunification. Furthermore, unlike Moroccan women immigrants elsewhere in Europe, those in Britain play a major role in the economic life of the family. In many cases, they came first with work permits, and their spouses and children joined them later.

Often they were both pioneers of migration and the main breadwinners, as A.D, a Community Development Worker in London, states:

This community is not a typical example of a patriarchal community. It was the women that carried all the burden of the family, the majority of them were breadwinners; yet this is rarely acknowledged.

Many young Moroccan women go from Britain to get married in Morocco, but unfortunately a lot of them are used by men as a classical means to enter Britain.

I've known some young girls who had to drop out from University, look for a job to rent a flat, and furnish it etc, so that they can bring over their husband. Once they bring him over and after two years or so, the husband divorces her, even worse sometimes, he would even refuse to divorce her and keep on blackmailing her [...] (Hajja Kaddouj 2).

Increasingly restrictive immigration rules from the early 1970s encouraged many to bring their families over from Morocco, transforming what was originally a temporary economic migration into longer-term settlement. Family reunification started from the mid-1970s onwards.

I was born in Larache, I grew up there until the age of seventeen, and then I got married and came over to England. My husband came to England in the 1970s. I joined him in 1983 [...] of course it was fine with me to come here [...] *Anyway we are all supposed to follow our husbands isn't it?* While I was with my parents I couldn't go anywhere, so I was quite eager to leave the country and discover new places (Fatima).

Family reunion is often believed to be the main channel through which women came to join their partners; the migration literature often portrays women as having no other choice but to join their husbands in a 'passive' manner, as Fatima states. However, some of my interviewees made it clear that women played a proactive role in choosing their future partners, depending on where they were based:

Before coming to England to join my husband in 1973, I had received many marriage proposals from people living in other areas of Morocco and abroad, therefore, the idea of living away from home was not new to me [...] but I was quite particular about which country I will end up in. London sounded quite ex-

citing to me at the time, so I accepted the marriage proposal [...] I was very happy to leave! (Zohra).

#### 4.4.2 *Immigration channels*

As mentioned earlier, Moroccan migration to Britain has not been *structured* through bilateral agreements, but shaped mainly by social networks of friends and relatives. The following experiences demonstrate how migrants managed to ‘make’ it to England:

At that time, the person who wanted to immigrate to England had first to buy an address of a recruiting agency, then one had to go to Melilla to pay a small fee so that a work contract was sent to him [...] I contacted Castano and Guilbert recruiting agencies, both based in London and asked them to send me a work contract. I had then to pay a small fee to get my contract. The challenge at the time was how to pay for the fee. I had to go to Melilla *illegally* [without a passport] to pay for that fee. I waited until it was dark to get there, and then till it was dark to leave again (Hajj Mohammed).

In a Spanish newspaper, I saw an advert which said that England was offering jobs as waiters, cooks, and domestic chambermaids for foreign people. That was a great opportunity for me to apply for one of those jobs and travel to England. I did apply through a British Continental Agency in New Bond Street in London. I paid for the work permit in a bank in Ceuta. Once they received the money, they forwarded me the work permit [as a waiter] (Hajj Abdessamad).

Since Moroccan migration to Britain was unregulated by any government schemes, anyone who wanted to emigrate had only to write to one of the recruiting agencies, pay for the work permit and then receive a conditional contract to work in Britain (see Appendix F for a sample work permit). Three main agencies – all based at Oxford Circus/Piccadilly – played a key role in recruiting Moroccan workers. The Mascot Agency recruited workers from Meknes especially to work in Crawley and West London. Guilbert and Castano recruited many workers from the north of Morocco, especially Larache region, to work throughout London. Interviewees also stated that some individuals based in Larache facilitated communication between recruiting agencies and potential migrants:

There was a Spanish guy called Garcia who used to live in Larache who spoke Arabic, and he used to interpret for people. He used to give people addresses of recruiting agencies here in England, he sometimes wrote to people on their behalf so that they could get work permits (Hajj Ali).

#### 4.4.3 *Arriving in the UK: first impressions*

For most of my interviewees, coming to Britain was not simply a trip to a new country; it was a new beginning, evoked as one of their most vivid recollections; they often gave the exact date of their arrival.

On 14 May 1967, I went to Tangier airport accompanied by my family [wife, mother and children]. Minutes before my departure, all my family started crying as it was the first time that one member of the family would travel abroad [...] It was a very emotional day. When I arrived in Heathrow Airport, the feeling of being a stranger had replaced that of happiness (Abdu).

At Heathrow Airport they had to face their first challenge, the immigration officers:

I wasn't sure whether I would be allowed in the UK, because at that time they used to send back a lot of people [...] I came to England on 25 May 1970 by plane, I left on a Saturday, to avoid a Jewish guy who was working at the customs, and who had a reputation of deporting back people [...] (*laughs*) Unfortunately, he was there, I gave him all my papers and he tore one of them, I thought then that he will send me back, as my friends warned me that if he does that then it means that he will deport you. He then told me to go ahead [...] I didn't know what to do then, the airport was very big, I didn't speak any English and I felt totally helpless. I didn't know where to go or what to do, because of language I couldn't do much. I only managed with few Spanish words that I knew [...] I hated London the first time (Ahmad S).

Beyond the immigration officers, the second challenge they had to face was the cold weather:

My first memories of London were of a cold and a dark place. I remember when I got to Victoria Station I wanted to get a drink to warm up so I asked for a tea. When I was served, only then

did I realise that I was in England as it wasn't the mint tea I was used to back home! (Hajj Mohammed).

The first impression of London for many was a positive one that often surpassed their expectations:

The day was very short at the time. The lights were on day and night, since it was very dark. English people were very trustworthy, they used to welcome people, and help them. They were quite amazed to see foreigners around [...] for me it was quite exiting to be here, we had the freedom to do whatever we wanted. I used to dream a lot about London before coming here and to be honest when I came here I wasn't disappointed at all [...] or maybe a little because I've always pictured London as the city of fog, and the day I came I was surprised not to find any (*laughs*) [...] (Naima).

#### 4.4.4 *The language barrier*

The most important challenge that Moroccans were faced with once they arrived in Britain was the language barrier. Since the majority originated from the north of Morocco, which was a Spanish colony (part of it still is), most of them were already fluent in Spanish, which helped a few of them to communicate in their work place.

As for language and communication, no one was speaking Arabic, most of my communication was in Spanish with Spanish people, and a little Italian, because of course my English was very poor [...] (Hajj Abdessamad).

Their fluency in Spanish influenced, to some extent, their choice of jobs. This was the case for Hajja Zohra who, after spending more than 35 years in the UK, still speaks very little English. The only way she managed was through having Spanish employers all the time.

I was about 32 years old when I first came to England. I didn't speak any English; in fact I still speak very little English now [...] I only know two or three words in English: Good morning; how are you? And thank you (*laughs*) [...] but I always managed to get jobs where there were Spanish speakers, and since I'm fluent in Spanish I never had any problems communicating with them. I learned Spanish in Morocco, since they were living with us so we learned it from them. They also learnt a bit of Arabic from us [...] I only managed because I keep myself out of trou-

ble! As the saying goes 'If you don't hit you don't need to escape'. I just like to stay in peace [...] I used to do my job properly.

Others purposefully started by learning Spanish first, and then English, as they thought it was a more functional way to communicate with the community where they lived.

Before learning English, I began to learn Spanish, from the Spanish community around me, as I was living around Portobello area. My GP was Spanish, as were many people in the area I lived in, therefore I found learning Spanish to be more useful than English (Zohra A).

In other cases, living and working around other Moroccans made it unnecessary for them to learn English:

We didn't learn English; we came here and started working with other Moroccans. I worked at the Hilton Hotel for 21 years. Since I came here I've been around Moroccans all the time so I didn't feel the need to learn English. Those who worked in other places, even if they were illiterate, managed to learn some English. At my place of work we were about 30 or 40 Moroccans, so we were speaking in Arabic all the time of course! (Ahmad S).

Although for a few Moroccan migrants language was not a serious issue, especially for those who had been in higher education, for the majority the language barrier was a serious obstacle to communication and they managed only by using sign language until they started taking English classes:

It was very difficult. I didn't even know when my days off were, because they used to have a rota and those who didn't know how to read used to work seven days, and were paid for five. I often did that, my supervisor used to communicate with me through sign language and ask me to go to sleep; I used to interpret it as if they didn't like my work [...] but then after that I went to college to learn English. In fact, later on I was able to work as an interpreter (Amina).

Some experiences with the language barrier were even traumatic, as illustrated by the case of Hajja Menana:

Once I took the train to go to the pigeon's place [Trafalgar Square] and send a letter home, as they didn't hear from me for

one month; but I didn't know where the train was taking me. I was lost for two days, I couldn't eat, or sleep, I was terrified. I was in a police station, they asked me where I was living but I didn't know, and couldn't communicate with them in English.

#### 4.4.5 *To stay or to leave?*

Moving to a new country and having to deal with a new culture, language, job, and all the challenges they entail, as well as leaving behind family, friends and the comfort of their own homes, made many genuinely consider going back to Morocco; for some almost as soon as they reached their destination:

When I got to Royston, it was very dark and cold [...] I was thinking the next day I will get the train back home as I couldn't imagine myself living in a country like this. The people who came with me begged me to stay with them. I stayed in Royston for four months then I asked for a holiday to go back home (Reda).

The 'Eldorado' picture faded as they came to realise that life in Morocco was not so bad after all:

At that time, I started thinking seriously about returning to my own country. Life in Morocco was not as hard as in a foreign country. In my country, after finishing work, I could shower, have a meal and go out with friends, which was not the case at that hotel I used to work in. Also, in my country living with my family, I had never thought about shopping, cooking, washing, cleaning clothes, ironing [...] I thought that travelling or living abroad would be the same as in my country with the advantage of earning a lot of money and having an easier life, but that was not the case unfortunately [...] (Abdu).

The pressure of supporting their families back in Morocco, combined with the fear of losing face if they returned after a short period of time, convinced many of them to stay.

I was really struggling in my new life abroad, no advice neither from friends nor from family [...] my family was only happy about my job, since I was the only sponsor for my large family. I did not realise that until I travelled abroad. I spent hours and hours thinking about re-grouping the family, it was really an emotional period. Each day, the same story, thinking about the

family, thinking about going back to Morocco [...] at the same time, I was constantly wondering 'If I return back, what my friends will say about me?' I was thinking that my friends in Morocco would tell me that 'they' kicked me out of England or that I was not able to find a job (Abdu).

Similarly, it was Zohra's fear of failure and determination to overcome the hurdles of her new life that made her stay:

On arriving in England, I was very excited; however after a few weeks, I felt extremely lonely and isolated. The environment I found in England was a great contrast to the large family make-up I was accustomed to [...] in the early days, I would cry myself to sleep most nights. But my determination did not allow me to give up and return back to Morocco (Zohra A).

Some were determined to go back but did not know how to do it; most of them could not save up enough for a return ticket. Some interviewees described how they would go to a policeman in the street and give him their passport hoping that they would be deported back, whilst others thought that if they went to the Moroccan consulate and gave them their passports then they would be sent back home. This only indicates the perception that they had at the time of the authorities, as well as their understanding of the function of a passport:

After few days, I started regretting my whole decision about coming over here, I didn't have a good job, I was quite miserable, not speaking English, missing my family etc. I used to be quite happy back home with my family, children, had a good job etc. While I was thinking about all that, a guy from Tangier came to me and asked me where I was from, I then asked him where the Moroccan Embassy was so that I could give them my passport and then go back home. He told me that he went through the same experience like everybody else, when he was kicked out once from the place he was living. He had to spend the night in Hyde Park Corner [...] He then told me that he would help me look for a place etc. And that's what he did. After that difficult time, I was able to help other friends and relatives to come here with their families (Ahmad S).

## 4.5 Making a new life in Britain

In the early 1970s the Moroccan community was relatively small; at that time there were no community centres, or even a mosque, for Moroccans. However, for those based in London, most of whom already knew each other back home, Piccadilly Circus and Trafalgar Square used to be their meeting points. They would usually gather to help each other write letters, meet friends, exchange news about Morocco and welcome those who had just arrived.

Over the years, Moroccans strove hard to establish their own religious and social facilities – chiefly mosques, Koranic and Arabic classes for the younger generation, and community meeting-places. In London alone there are now more than fifteen Moroccan community organisations catering for the needs of their local communities by providing advice and support in accessing services, especially to the first generation, which still remains relatively isolated because of the language barrier and lack of knowledge of how the system works. The majority came with very low qualifications. The recent 2001 Census data<sup>4</sup> still reflect this picture amongst the 16-74 years age group. The data reveal that 48.2 per cent of Moroccans who live in London have no qualifications, 29 per cent have lower-level qualifications and only 22.2 per cent have higher-level ones (London Authority Data Management and Analysis Group 2005). The relatively low educational and skill levels have served to relegate Moroccans to the margins of British mainstream society, a position from which they find it difficult to move. The most obvious factor that has contributed to this isolation in comparison with other ethnic minority groups is the fact that the main minority groups in Britain have come from ex-colonies within the British Empire. They partly avoided the combined language and culture barriers, and most importantly they had already experienced the nature of British administrative practice in their own countries.

For Moroccans in Britain, and the far smaller communities of Algerians and Tunisians, there has been no such common ground. The North African experience in Britain has been very different from that in France, Belgium or Spain, where there was, at least, some common language and familiarity with the system. This is less the case with other major Moroccan communities in Europe, in the Netherlands and Italy. However, in the case of the Netherlands, the migration was managed through specific labour recruitment arrangements and was quite large-scale; in Italy, where migration has been more informal, there is at least some vaguely common 'Mediterranean' cultural and climatic similarity. However, for Moroccans in Britain, they have had no real understanding of the way British administration and society work. Moreover, most local authority representatives have had little comprehen-

sion of the nature, background, culture or needs of Moroccan migrants, even though – as has often been the case – they have been anxious to help. In a report on the Moroccan community prepared by The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (1994), concerns were expressed about the language barrier and the insufficient translation and interpretation facilities, which restricted Moroccans' ability to fully utilise the borough's services.

#### 4.5.1 *Employment*

The work experience of most Moroccan migrants who came to Britain in the late 1960s was limited to the hotel and catering industries, for which they were granted work permits. The work permits restricted the types of job they could take for four years, and their limited skills and lack of English caused them to take the lowest-paid jobs, providing little scope for career mobility. Because of the language barrier most were unaware of their rights and entitlements.

I came to London after I obtained a work contract. I used to work in a school that issued me with the work permit. I stayed with them for about a year then I went to the Royal Free Hospital until it closed down. Then I was asked to go and work in Swiss Cottage. I refused, and managed to get a job in King's Cross Hospital until I finished my four years and obtained my indefinite leave to remain in the country, and I was *free to choose* which job to go for. After that, I learnt how to drive and was distributing cakes and things, but then I thought that was more of a male job, so I looked for another job in an Italian restaurant, and remained there until I retired (Menana).

I worked in Mayfair, because I knew Spanish it was quite easy for me to understand Italian too [...] I was working there with an Italian Chef, I worked with him for about a year and when he left I took his place and became Chef. I stayed in that position for six years. Again the wages weren't too good so I looked for another job. During all of my job experience, I worked mostly with Spanish, Italian and French people, I didn't work with English people that much. The Italians used to pay quite well and they also allowed you to work a double shift, and obviously I could understand better what they were saying. This wasn't the case with English people, plus you only had one shift during day time [...] (Ali).

The networks of friends and relatives that encouraged migrants to come to Britain also assisted several of them in their job search. The Hilton Hotel in West London was known for recruiting a large number of Moroccans. Because of the rather severe shortage of labour at the time, employers sometimes even gave incentives to their employees to recruit more people in certain fields. However, most often it was feelings of *solidarity* between members of the Moroccan community that encouraged them to stand by each other.

At that time whoever managed to get another person to work in the same company he or she will get a bonus. So every one of us was trying to get more and more friends working in the same place, as they almost gave a guarantee for work (Mustapha).

I used to bring a lot of other Moroccans girls that I met here and ask my boss to give them a job as they were my sisters [...] to such an extent that one day she asked me how many sisters I had (*laughs*) (Menana).

Many Moroccan families faced problems with childminding, because in most households both parents were working. Their only choice was to work different shifts; for example, the mother working from 8am to 4pm and the father from 4pm to 1am. Those who could not find different shifts, found themselves in real dilemmas, either having to leave older children to look after the younger ones, which was often the case, or leaving the children in Morocco with their grandparents (see Elbaja 1978).

Low-income jobs and very little scope for career mobility often created a 'benefits and poverty trap', in the sense that people would prefer to remain on benefits (mainly housing benefit) rather than be in a full-time job.

I have started working full-time [...] But the problem here is that once you start working full-time you don't benefit from any help. All the money that you get is taken back. You have to pay for rent, medicine, council tax etc. and this doesn't encourage a lot of people to work full-time. Now with my husband's salary we are really struggling [...] this year we couldn't even go to Morocco (Fatima 1).

After spending fifteen to twenty years in physically very demanding jobs, many Moroccans had to leave work for health reasons, leading several to fall into the other aspect of the 'benefits and poverty trap', whereby they are relying on both income support and housing benefit.

According to a Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) survey on Fighting Unemployment in North Kensington, participants do feel that a benefits-poverty trap exists; many believe that the only available jobs are low-paid.

By the time you pay the rent and your Council Tax and your fares and lunches, sometimes it doesn't work out mathematically. If you have no qualifications and you are going out to work for £100 a week and you are getting £150 on Income Support or whatever it is, then it just doesn't add up [...] Anything that earns me more than what is coming in, fair enough, but unless I can earn more there is no point (cited in MORI Social Research 1999).

The current picture, according to the 2001 Census data, still reveals a lower employment rate (48.6 per cent) amongst Moroccans aged between 16 and 74, as compared to the capital's average (66.6 per cent) (London Authority Data Management and Analysis Group 2005). There is, however, a slight diversification of the employment sectors due partly to the entry of the younger generation to the job market, and the subsequent migration of semi-skilled and skilled migrants from the 1980s onwards. The hotel and catering industries are still taking the lead with 23.7 per cent (see Table 4.1).

**Table 4.1** *Employment of Moroccans in London by industry sector*

<i>Industry</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Manufacturing and primary (agriculture, fishing and utilities)	6.3
Construction	2.6
Wholesale and retail trade	14.6
Hotels and restaurants	23.7
Transport, storage and communications	9.9
Financial intermediation	4.5
Real estate; renting and business activities	13.9
Public administration and defence; social security	2.8
Education	6.1
Health and social work	8.3
Other	7.2

*Source:* London Authority Data Management and Analysis Group 2005 (based on UK 2001 Census)

#### 4.5.2 *Housing*

The great majority, who originate from the north of Morocco, have ended up living in an equally specific part of London, in close proximity

mity to each other. Golborne Road in North Kensington is commonly known now as 'little Morocco'. The half century following the Second World War saw the Golborne area almost completely demolished and rebuilt. Its population changed in the same period. Two communities, the Spanish and the Portuguese, began to settle in the area in the 1950s and 1960s. However, many of them moved away from North Kensington in the 1970s and 1980s; some were re-housed in other parts of London, while others returned home as democracies were re-established in Spain and Portugal. During the same period, Moroccans started to settle in the area (Borkwood 2002).

The 1991 census results indicated that North Kensington is one of the most deprived areas in the RBKC. According to the 1998 Index of Local Deprivation<sup>5</sup>, the borough ranks 63<sup>rd</sup> out of 354 local authorities in England. Golborne, more specifically, ranks 78<sup>th</sup> out of 8,616 wards in England. Its index of 14.04 placed it among the 1 per cent most deprived wards nationally (MORI 2000). It is no surprise, therefore, to hear such a statement from Hajja Zohra:

When I first came to London, I knew that there were very few Moroccans, not as many as now. Portobello was empty at the time, now they call it *Colleto*, which is a slum area in Larache.

Moroccans, like many other black and ethnic minorities, encountered various problems in acquiring suitable accommodation – from landlords requesting excessive rents to unsanitary conditions and houses in disrepair. In many local authorities, Council accommodation was not available to recently arrived black and ethnic minorities at the time. Thus many Moroccan men and childless couples, who initially came over by themselves, were restricted to bed-sits and houses in multiple occupations with shared amenities; so the arrival of their families resulted in severe overcrowding. Once again it was through *personal connections* that Moroccans learned of cheap accommodation in North Kensington:

I knew that most Moroccans were living here because rent was relatively cheap and they encouraged their friends who joined also to rent in the same area [...] I remember there was one guy called Zapata, he lived in Portobello, he used to look for private rent for people, because obviously a Moroccan at that time could only communicate in Spanish. Even though not all Moroccans at the time spoke Spanish but they would take a friend who spoke Spanish [...] (Ali).

I used to live in Victoria, I had one room, and when I decided to bring my children over, I had to look for another place. So I asked other Moroccans, and they advised me to look for accommodation in Ladbrooke Grove, as there was a large Moroccan community there. I rented privately from an Afro-Caribbean guy for a while and one day he asked me to leave because my kids were too noisy. I then went to the Council and asked them for help, who then gave me a council house (Ahmad S).

During the late 1970s, when several parts of North Kensington were developed by the Greater London Council, many Moroccans were rehoused into public sector accommodation (Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea 1994). My interviews made it clear that many Moroccan families who were living outside Kensington and Chelsea had to move into the area not necessarily because they chose to but because they were granted council houses in the borough.

I first lived in Lancaster Rd [Ladbrooke Grove area], then between 1974 and 1976, I lived in Finsbury Park, Victoria, and then Paddington. From 1976 until now I've been living in Harrow Road. The reason why I ended up in the same area is because I was given housing there [...] (Med 1).

It was through work that I met Moroccans and the English they put us in this little *village* in here. They were the ones who used to give accommodation here. Like in my case, I used to live near Victoria station then I came to this little village here, got a place and brought my children (Hajja Khadouj).

Overcrowding continued to be a major issue, especially because it is customary that, within Moroccan families having children, boys and girls stay with their families until they are married. The Council tried on several occasions to overcome this problem by offering housing outside the borough, but very few families accepted the offer, not wanting to be uprooted from the community that they have been part of for the last twenty to 25 years.

Although there are a few negative things about being here, the advantages outnumber the drawbacks. My daughter, for example, begs me not to move out from here, although I was given the chance to move to a bigger place, but I had to turn it down (Naima).

No, I need to see my sisters, speak to them etc; at least they are there to help in time of need. Even though we are hard on each other but most of time when we need them they are there to help. Why would I chose a big house and isolate myself? The mosque is here and I need to be in this area (Menana).

A strong sense of belonging to the area and to the local community has been the main factor that has discouraged several families from leaving the area. Many families described their need to be in close proximity to each other, and also the need for their children to grow up in an area where there is a large presence of Muslims.

#### 4.5.3 *Negotiating a Muslim space*

The two mosques in North Kensington, Golborne Road mosque and *Al Manar*, also known as the Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre, constitute focal points for the Moroccan community.

I don't want to leave this area. For me it would be impossible to live somewhere away from the Muslim or Moroccan community. I prefer my children to grow up in a Muslim environment. We are lucky to live not too far from the mosque. I come to the mosque every day. My children come here as well [...] (Fatima 1).

The first mosque is the oldest; it was established through individual initiative by private donations from members of the Moroccan community and opened for prayers in 1980. Before the building was converted into a mosque, it was a grocery shop. It took about a year to get the planning permission to convert the building into a mosque, conditional on them keeping a shop on the front façade, which is now a Moroccan travel agency. The mosque occupies the basement and the top floors and has a total capacity of 170 worshippers, 70 in the basement and another 100 on the top floors. There is no women's section in the mosque; however, they are allowed to pray there on an exceptional basis during *Eid* and the holy month of Ramadan. The second mosque, *Al Manar*, which is often referred to as 'the big mosque', was established through the initiative of the local Muslim community, especially the Moroccan one, living in the North Kensington area. Following ten years of planning and fund-raising, *Al Manar* was completed and opened in 2001 by the Prince of Wales. Some would argue that the Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre is not strictly a mosque, but it is similar to other institutions and centres and can provide prayer facilities for up to 3,000 worshippers at one time. The building now provides a wide range of social, educational, training, cultural and religious facil-

ities for Muslims of all national backgrounds who live in North Kensington and the surrounding areas. Most importantly, this mosque has given the opportunity to Moroccan women to attend prayers and classes and to socialise.

Interestingly, there is a generational divide between the two mosques. The one in Golborne Road is mostly attended by first-generation Moroccans; while *Al Manar* is visited by second-generation Moroccans as well as other Muslims from different ethnic and social backgrounds, including new converts. The facilities that exist in the second mosque, such as IT and language training, also explain why it is more appealing to the younger generation.

A key indicator of the expansion of the Moroccan and Muslim community in North Kensington area is the flourishing of *halal* businesses. In the 1970s, I was told that there was only one *halal* butcher, owned by a Pakistani, in the Portobello area and another *halal* butcher in Westbourne Grove. Now there are more than five *halal* butchers in Golborne Road alone. The growing demand for Muslim produce in the area, triggered by the growth of the Muslim community, has encouraged a number of individuals, especially Moroccans, to open new restaurants and other businesses in the neighbourhood. The two mosques have also had a positive impact on businesses in the area, as explained by the owner of 'Marrakech', a *halal* butcher. He stated that 'For Friday prayers people come from different parts of London and they usually end up walking down Golborne Road, where it's convenient to do their shopping too'.

#### 4.6 Transnational lives and local identities

Before the economic recession of the 1980s, many Moroccan migrants had anticipated that, after working in Britain for a few years, they would return to Morocco in prosperity. This has not been the case for many individuals and their families, as many have been totally dependent on their salaries to make ends meet. Moreover, many Moroccans have children of school age and the negative effects of disrupting their schooling have influenced their decision not to return to Morocco until after their children have completed their education. Therefore, the first generation lives on the extended dream of returning 'home' and spending the rest of their days there. They have worked hard to raise their families in the UK, even living in deprivation in order to save enough money to build a home in Morocco for their later years; unfortunately this dream of return never touches the shore.

We feel that we have no history, we have no background, we are just struggling to survive here or there, but in the end we are everywhere! The community is *floating* [...] with our community we always think that we are not staying here and we hold on to that dream of going home for good one day [...] but things are changing back home too, and the truth is that we won't fit in there either, so we remain stuck in time (*silence*) waiting (Has-san).

This quote beautifully summarises many of the elements of the dilemma lived by many members of the Moroccan community living in London. This cherished 'dream of return' often remains as such; it never goes beyond that stage. It is not unique to the Moroccan community; it has been widely discussed in the migration literature (see, for example, the pioneering study by Anwar 1979). Over the years, members of the Moroccan community have become deeply rooted in their local communities and have developed a stronger sense of belonging compared to when they first came to London. Saida explains how she perceives this change.

Things have changed a lot in this area, we feel quite at home now, especially after they built the mosque [...] I've lived here since 1973 [...] It's like living in my own country, it's only because of our extended family that we go back home. I've lived half of my adult life here. I came here aged 22 and now I'm 53 [...] I feel safe and my children feel safe too. I can't see them living anywhere else. I know this area very well, I know the people.

Saida's statement illustrates the strong security that North Kensington provides for its Moroccan residents. The local place, rather than the larger British host society, becomes a point of attachment, and it is this particular neighbourhood, with its other Moroccan immigrants, where she feels comfortable and wants to live. In fact, the majority of Moroccans have developed a 'dual sense of belonging' to both Morocco and England. Improved means of communication and transport combined with the growth of the Moroccan community in the area where they live have played an essential role in nurturing those feelings.

[...] now life has become '*equal*' because now with all the mosques in the area for me it has become just the same, Morocco is just the same as England, actually now life here is even better than in Morocco. Although, I love my country and it's my home country [...] but like in Morocco I wouldn't feel safe to go to the

mosque for the morning prayers. I like going back to Morocco for the summer holidays, to stay there for three months or so [...] Now Morocco is just the same as here, I don't feel any difference as before when I first came here (Ahmad S).

Various oral testimonies make it clear that 'little Morocco' in North Kensington has become the place of reference of Moroccans in London. It is a physical reflection of how this diasporic community has re-appropriated this space and made it their own. It also mirrors the intricate linkages that they have constructed between 'material places' and 'cultural production' (Ehrkamp 2005) to shape this local neighbourhood space and enable them to negotiate their multiple belongings. The process of *production* and *appropriation* of new places is a key theme in the literature on transnational migration (Guarnizo & Smith 1998). Social processes and relations do not only create places in a material sense, but also meanings that people attach to places, evoking a sense of place (Massey 1994).

With the passage of time most first-generation Moroccans living in London have become more realistic about their eventual return to Morocco. Undeniably, they are haunted by a fear of 'returning back in a box', but the majority of my interviewees admitted that they cannot imagine themselves returning back to Morocco and living there on their own, away from their children and grandchildren.

To be honest I want both, Morocco is my home country but here I have my kids and family, I've made *my roots here*...I can't leave my family and live on my own in Morocco. I've lived here for 33 years and my children go back to Morocco at least once a year, I go at least twice a year now that I'm retired (Ahmad S).

The reluctance to return to Morocco for good is often mixed with the fear of not 'integrating' within Moroccan society, which they believe has evolved a lot since they left. Many also admit that they are very much aware of their newly gained status in Morocco as 'Marocains Résidents à l'Étranger' or MRE; they claim that the only reason why they are welcomed with open arms is because of their regular remittances.

Now we have our roots here, when we go back to Morocco we are guests, we are in our home country yet we are seen as *foreigners*. Here we are foreigners and there we are foreigners too. People back in Morocco have *changed* [...] ideally we would like to go there, and spend about six months there, and six months here, but we are scared. We don't think we can relate to people the same as before (Saida).

First-generation Moroccans are also preoccupied by some of the inconveniences associated with living there in their old age. The absence of a social security agreement between the two countries discourages many Moroccan elderly people from returning home. The high cost of medical care in Morocco means that any Moroccan who has gone back may have to spend a large part of his/her pension on medical expenses, and even live their last days in destitution.

If I go to Morocco there is no medical coverage for me like here, even if I pay there I won't get the same service [...] We love our country, it's our mother country, but we would like things to improve there (Ali).

For many migrants, the main factor inhibiting the realisation of the dream of return is the fear of seeing the ideal vision of home collapsing. Morocco is the home that encapsulates their roots, heritage, history and past: in other words, the main reference given to their children and grandchildren. Although they make regular visits to Morocco, they seem to prefer to cling to the ideas of the past, and maintain a romanticised view of the home country.

#### **4.7 Strengths and weaknesses of the Moroccan community living in London**

In this last section I will discuss briefly some perceived strengths and weaknesses of the Moroccan community living in London, as described by local government officials, community workers and other individuals involved either directly or indirectly with this community. The purpose of the section is to complement the migrant-centred picture drawn earlier in the chapter, in order to enhance our understanding of some of the characteristics, and specificities, of the Moroccan community in London.

##### *4.7.1 Self-containment and solidarity*

The main strengths of the Moroccan community in London are seen as its self-containment, its *mutual support networks* and its ability to face up to difficulties of migration and displacement. These assets can be interpreted as a high level of 'bonding' social capital. The community was described in a report by the Community Relations Section at the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (1994: 4) '[...] to a large extent, the Moroccan community is self contained and looks within its

realms to deal with problems through mutual support'. This was further confirmed in an interview with Councillor Paget-Brown:

My perception of the Moroccan community is that it's quite stable within itself [...] I would say that, apart from being the largest community in North Kensington, it is also one of the most self-contained, particularly in terms of the first and second generation. I guess the older generation particularly are more self-contained still than many of the other Black and Minority Ethnic groups in the borough.

The geographical concentration of Moroccans in North Kensington has made it easier for individuals to support and help each other. This has been both an asset and a liability for members of the community, especially on a generational level; as Amina puts it, referring to other Moroccans: '*ghadi ymadghouk ma ghadish y sartouk!*' 'They will chew you but not swallow you!' Despite tensions between members of the community, its strength as a whole resides in its sense of solidarity, some of which has been culturally embedded within its members. The best example is the concept of '*darat*',<sup>6</sup> a practice that is strongly embedded within Moroccan culture, which relies on trust, reciprocity and group solidarity as well as the existence of a self-reliant group of friends.

Here in Ladbroke Grove there are two groups, there are also others in Edgware Road, and Hackney. To take part in this you have to bring £3,000 and two women, and each of these two women need to bring two others, so when it's your turn you get £21,000 and the £3,000 that you gave initially, so in total you get £24,000. The problem is where can you get people who would participate in this? If you have a lot of friends they enable you to take part; however, my problem is that most of my friends are already part of it (Amina).

The concept of '*darat*', however, is frowned upon by some members of the community, as they see it as '*haram*' in the sense that individuals get 'interest' on the money that they have invested initially without making any effort to earn it.

The numerous Moroccan community organisations in London, as well as self-help groups like supplementary schools, can reflect the willingness of individuals to help and support each other, especially in areas where mainstream services have failed to respond to the needs of the community. The director of one organisation in North Kensington explains:

Because in those years, the mid-1980s, the Moroccan community was present but was going through a major identity crisis. So I used to come to this area just briefly but then between 1990 and 1992, I came back to the area and I started to meet up with young people in the mosque, we used to discuss the problems of the community, we were also discussing ways of helping the community out, as I believe this is a duty that any Moroccan has towards his community. The community was seriously lacking role models and supportive institutions in the area (Abdulali).

The group solidarity within the Moroccan community resides also in its informal day-to-day means of assisting and supporting each other in times of crisis and celebration.

If someone dies here we try and collect money to send him back home [...] but since 11 September people are less willing to collect money for fear of being accused of something. We used to send money to charities back in Morocco [...] If someone came here and had nowhere to go we would let him stay in the mosque for few days, now we can't let people stay in the mosque. No one told us not to, but we just want to stay away from troubles as we got scared of what was happening (Ahmad S).

This group solidarity is strengthened in times of crisis, as was the case at the time of an earthquake in Morocco in February 2004. An impressive mobilisation of the Moroccan community took place, from individual donations to the organisation of a fund-raising concert by one of the Moroccan community organisations in East London.

#### 4.7.2 *Self-containment and disengagement from the mainstream*

'Self-contained' or 'inward-looking' are two terms that often came up when I asked interviewees to describe the Moroccan community in London. The first has positive connotations that reflect group solidarity; the second refers to a conscious decision of the community to withdraw, distance and disengage itself from the mainstream. As Angela Bell, the director of the Consortium of Supplementary Schools, points out:

I feel that there are very strong and good networks of friendships and support within the first generation. And I think that is an enormous strength. I think also that there is always that

goodwill to do something good for the children. [But] one of the problems has been too much inward-looking.

This tendency for the community to become 'inward-looking' has been described by Omar, a Community Development Worker, as a reactive attitude rather than a self-exclusionary choice.

If these people choose to remain in close-knit communities, and not wanting anything to do with the UK, I understand it, I don't support it because it's bad for the community. But at the end of the day I don't blame them because they have been forced to do that. These communities are not necessarily comfortable within themselves, but it's just that if you are in dire straits people are willing to help. Because, if you are having problems and you go to the local government to seek help, no one wants to know [...] Sometimes we find the community divided because of stupid issues, but generally it provides that safety-net, the help and the support, even sometimes financial support, so people don't have to go to banks to get money to set up businesses.

Becoming a 'close-knit' community, at least for Moroccans who live in North Kensington, was almost inevitable because of their low literacy levels and lack of knowledge of how the British system operates. Many felt unable to engage with the host country as they lacked the intellectual tools to *decode* the system. Hussein, a Moroccan social worker, further elaborates:

When we came to this country everything was alien to us, we had no association with anything British. So you can imagine when individuals came they found themselves very isolated, and obviously when you feel isolated the only way to feel safer is near your own people. So North Kensington became the first port of call. Because the first Moroccans who came here settled in North Kensington, because of cheap rent, partly because it is near the centre of London, and partly also because there was a Spanish community [...] Obviously there were also problems with communication, not just in terms of language, but also because people [Moroccans] used to live very individualistic lives. You were used to find very small groups who came from the same village or town sticking together and suffering in silence. There were people who were sacked from their jobs for no obvious reason, while others were being very poorly paid, yet people coped with that thinking that they are here as foreigners and

whatever they were earning was okay since their ultimate aim was to go back to Morocco.

Inherent feelings of 'exclusion', brought by some members of the Moroccan community who came from the north, have contributed, with other structural factors, to further isolation from the mainstream. Historically, the north has always been 'distanced' from the rest of Morocco: not only is it linguistically and socially different but, most importantly, it has been economically disadvantaged. As Aisling Byrne, a former director of a Moroccan voluntary organisation, explains:

Laache is quite disadvantaged in lots of ways. The community from which they come has been weakened by being disadvantaged, and this feeling of weakness has been carried over into their life in the UK, so that after 30 years there is a sense that the community here hasn't achieved a lot.

This sense of 'non-achievement' – which is not entirely true – has haunted the Moroccan community living in North Kensington for years. However, if one contemplates individual cases, there have been quite a few success stories. But those who have thrived are not visible, either because they are not involved with the community, or because they have made a conscious decision to physically distance themselves from the community for various reasons. As Aisling explains:

It's those who stayed that are the problem, often it's the older people who are caught in badly-paid unskilled jobs. The same was true of a lot of guys: they work in restaurants as cooks and they are stuck in that, and that's hard because they are the majority. That's why you see in the evening a lot of guys hanging around because they have done early shifts [...] it's socialising after doing an early shift at work. But it's important to understand that otherwise the community gets labelled. If you break it down there are a lot of successful people but they kind of just disappear and go and do their stuff, so you don't know that they were there. They kind of breezed in, did their stuff and left. Probably a lot of people never came back. The trouble is, those people who stayed in and have this dependency on community work and organisations, they give the whole community a reputation of dependency, especially to statutory agencies. That's how the Moroccan community gets labelled. If there was some statistical research done, which will be good to have, it will show that there are a lot more positive success stories than we are aware of.

The 'non-achievement' syndrome is further reinforced when members of the Moroccan community compare themselves to other Moroccan communities living in Western Europe, especially Belgium, where there are several Moroccan Members of Parliament and Ministers. They tend to forget that the dynamics of migration to Britain are very different from those of Belgium. Although the latter witnessed a labour migration, a significant number of professionals and students also settled and were able to engage more effectively with the national institutions.

#### 4.7.3 *Strong sense of identity*

The strength of the Moroccan community is inherent in its strong sense of identity. It is also a community perceived to be capable of 'down-rooting' two or three identities at the same time, and sometimes even more. When the late King Hassan II came to the UK in 1987, he reiterated this view by reminding all Moroccans that it was their duty to participate fully in the country they lived in and, since they are all considered to be ambassadors of their country, it was also their duty to represent their country to the best of their ability.

I think there is a strong sense of identity there, as being Muslim/Moroccan, which is good. The Moroccan sense of identity is much stronger than I've seen in other communities, and I think there are good reasons for that [...] There is a lot of goodwill, they wanted good facilities, they wanted a good future for their children, although probably the majority were not sure about how to go about that, but that was very important to galvanise the support [...] Those amongst the community who have had education and experience [...] they were able to respond to the community's needs in terms of support, but unfortunately this is a small group (Abdulkarim Khalil).

You have some Moroccans who are very proud of being Moroccan, go there very regularly, hope to spend all days there, but on the other hand they are completely cut off from the British society (Karen Buck MP).

Islam has also been perceived by many as a strength in bringing people together and helping to preserve their identities, although sometimes it is also seen as one of the factors that contributes to the creation of 'closely-knit' communities. As a counter-example, the case of Moroccan Jews was often given as a worthy model to follow. The late King Hassan II said the Moroccan Muslims needed to follow in the

footsteps of their Moroccan Jewish compatriots. This was further confirmed to me by the Moroccan Ambassador to Britain, Mohammed Belmahi:

It's also interesting to compare the religious background of Moroccans living in the UK. Although the majority are of Muslim background there is a minority of Moroccan Jews who came here at the same time and who integrated quite well in British society. Some of the factors that helped could be the '*structure d'accueil*' of the Jewish community, the strong solidarity that exists between them and those who are in higher positions.

Similarly Fawzi, the Moroccan Imam of the mosque, reasserted that view by saying:

If you look at the Jewish community here they are much better organised, they have schools, private transport, and they don't compromise their religious beliefs and values. It's almost impossible to find a Jew who doesn't speak Hebrew. We should take them as an example to follow.

But to what extent is this difference a reality? Although my research focuses mainly on Moroccan Muslims in London, I also interviewed some Moroccan Jews to check whether this anecdotal evidence does translate into practice, or was just a mere perception of 'others.' To my queries S.A., a Moroccan Jew, replied:

Our strength is in our *homogeneity*, the belief in our culture, the belief in our faith; the family is also our strength; although I cannot guarantee that it would continue, because of intermarriage [...] Of course, the majority of Moroccan Jews live within a Jewish community so they might be Iranian, Iraqi, French etc. Those who go to university also intermarry with English Jews. But our weakness is our lack of understanding and willingness to understand the host culture. We integrate with the Jewish community, those who have imposed themselves. *If you ask me how many non-Jews I have as friends I could easily tell you none.* I have acquaintances but not friends; whether I socialise with their families, no I doubt it [...] I would say that the children are more integrated, as they are going to school and university. Probably the same way as Moroccan Muslims have integrated. The only thing is that the second generation that intermarry with non-Jews is helping with the fragmentation of the family [...] which is a very negative thing.

I wanted to know whether, according to S.A.'s knowledge of both the Moroccan Muslim and Jewish communities living in London, he perceives one as better integrated than the other:

Moroccan Jews have captured the way of dealing with the British; if you want to call that integration [...] They know their rights and duties [...] Whether integrated or not I don't know [...] the human being in general has the ability to blend with the surrounding, call it self-preservation if you want, yes probably.

I then inquired about the level of solidarity amongst Moroccan Jews and whether it is distinctly higher than that of Moroccan Muslims. S. A. replied:

Solidarity yes, but I will not call it necessarily solidarity. There are a lot of Jewish institutions, but I would say without hesitation that there is Jewish self-preservation. When you talk about the main influx of Jews, the main immigration of Jews started in 1870 from Russia, Germany. At that time there was no national health, social security, so people had to rely on each other. What happened and doesn't exist any more, there used to be entrepreneurs who used to make a lot of money and opened hospitals, restaurants [...] So if you want to call this solidarity, then yes, maybe, but you have that in the Muslim world as well.

This interview with S.A. confirmed that Moroccan Jews are as determined to preserve their Moroccan Jewish identity as Moroccan Muslims are. I wonder whether Moroccan Jews are more able to adapt to their new environment rather than completely assimilate, giving the impression that they are more integrated within their host society. After all, it appears that their level of intermarriage and the heterogeneity of their friendship networks are no higher than those of Moroccan Muslims.

#### 4.7.4 *Fragmentation, regionalism and lack of leadership*

Although there are high levels of solidarity within the Moroccan community living in London, it is also criticised for its fragmentation, lack of unity and the presence of a high level of regionalism amongst its members, a regionalism often attributed to colonialism, when Morocco was divided between the French and the Spanish. This regionalism apparently increases the level of fragmentation between the different sections of the London Moroccan community, which seems to be more pronounced here than in other communities in Europe. Some of it

could be related to chronological factors in the Moroccan migration, as most of those who came in the 1970s originate from the north, whilst newcomers mostly originate from central Morocco. The more recent migration mostly comprises university graduates and professionals who, sometimes, feed into some of these community tensions due to clashes of opinion and attitude.

Here in North Kensington, the majority of Moroccans come from Larache, and they all know each other quite well. When someone from a different part of Morocco comes, he/she is immediately noticed. There were people who came from Meknes, Oujda, Casablanca, Fes who tried to integrate within the community but found it quite challenging [...] The impact of colonialism stayed with the Moroccan migrant communities here in this country and even in other countries. In Belgium you find associations for Jbala, Riafa and others (Reda).

This regionalism goes beyond the north-south divide to the extent of becoming more about tribalism:

[...] it goes even beyond that to the extent that the north of Morocco, especially Jbala has different tribes (Beni Garfat, Beni Arouss, Anjra, Sumata) [...] For instance in Larache there are tribes that are from Jabal and others that are from Awamra that is considered as *aroubia* [countryside] and you find between them there are these kind of tensions and frictions (Abdulali).

This regionalism or tribalism within the Moroccan community is a main obstacle to reaching a unified voice that represents the needs and concerns of its members in North Kensington. Quite often, this argument becomes a pretext for not dealing with the community and addressing some of its concerns and grievances, especially in terms of funding projects designed for the Moroccan community in North Kensington:

Going back to my early days as an MP I had several groups coming to see me. I had no handle of who speaks on behalf of whom, and I'm conscious of the fact that there are some tensions within the Moroccan community like any other community; it's not necessarily a Moroccan characteristic, it is a social one. Nonetheless, I've always found that the Moroccan community wasn't getting the attention and resources that it deserved because there is a little bit too much of this community politics

going on and it's not very healthy for the community (Karen Buck MP).

However, is it the absence of these completely diverse community organisations or their presence that should be of concern? Their presence is an indicator of the existence of an active community, willing to bring change and to address the needs of its various sections. It is naïve to believe that any migrant group, once settled in a host country, will intuitively merge together, overlooking their different strands, religious, political, or others. Councillor Judith Blakeman comments:

If you transplanted all of the people [white English] who live in North Kensington into different countries, you would still have the same divisions as theirs [Moroccans], so you cannot expect the incoming communities to be a homogenous whole, and treat them with less humanity than you would expect of your own community.

#### **4.8 Summing up**

This chapter has provided a brief historical and social overview of Moroccan migration to Britain in general, and specifically to London. It has sketched some of the main specificities of this migration and its key phases, as experienced by the first generation of Moroccans who settled in London as well as external and internal community informants. Some of these unique characteristics can be summarised in three points. First, we are dealing with a non-structured migratory movement which relied primarily on networks of friends and relatives. This is clearly manifested by the striking geographical patterning from the country of origin to the host country; hence the large concentration of those who originated from the northern part of Morocco (Larache region) in West London, those from Meknes in Crawley and those from Oujda in Trowbridge. Second, the same networks influenced significantly the socio-economic mobility of a considerable number of Moroccan families, particularly those who settled in North West London, who ended up working in the service industries. Third, the substantial number of independent female migrants in the early 1970s is symptomatic of an early feminisation of migration. This challenges common wisdom in the migration literature, which portrays women migrating as 'objects' of family reunification, having no other choice but to join their husbands. In fact, in the case of Moroccan migration to England, many wives came first with work permits, and were joined later by their spouses and children. In this chapter a short reference was also

made to how social capital has influenced this specific migration experience and settlement. The following chapter will provide a more thorough assessment of social capital across the first and second generations of Moroccans in London.

## 5 Social capital across two generations

### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter examines in more depth the Moroccan community living in London. Its aim is to assess the nature and utility of social capital within each generation, and how it serves as either an asset or a liability in the process of 'integration'. Twenty-four families were selected from across the capital: fourteen from North-West London, especially the North Kensington area (F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F16, F17, F18, F20, F23); four families from South London (F10, F14, F21, F22); four from East London (F11, F12, F13, F15); and two from North London (F19, F24).

As previously discussed in Chapter 3, social capital is measured in this study through four main indicators. The first, *social networks*, is categorised into: 1) cross-country or transnational networks; 2) in-country networks; and 3) family networks. The second indicator is *reciprocity* at the level of these three networks. The third social capital indicator, *trust*, is measured at three levels: 1) trust in Moroccans living in London; 2) trust in Moroccans living in Morocco; and 3) trust in non-Moroccans in London. The final indicator of social capital, *civic engagement*, which can also be looked at as an 'outcome' of social capital, is measured through: 1) community involvement; 2) voting, and involvement with local authorities; 3) newspaper readership; and 4) membership in organisations. The final indicator is developed further in Chapter 6; the analysis of ten Moroccan voluntary organisations is elaborated in order to assess their roles as catalysts for creating a *bridging* type of social capital instead of merely maintaining a bonding type.

This chapter looks at the four different indicators separately across the different generations living in various parts of the capital. Although the indicators are analysed as separate entities, in fact they are all inter-related; social networks are the 'structural' elements of social capital, whilst trust and reciprocity are seen as the 'content' of these networks in social capital terms.

Before analysing levels of social capital within the selected households, it is important to get a brief general overview of the background of the families: please refer to Appendix A for this. Some relevant de-

mographic information on these families could be mentioned here: nine out of the 24 households are of a mixed marriage, four first-generation and five second-generation. In seven out of 24 families, women are the head of the household.

## 5.2 Networks

### 5.2.1 *Cross-country and transnational networks*

Morocco exemplifies the new kinds of transnational connection referred to by Portes and his colleagues (1999). The relative proximity of Morocco to England, the availability of cheap and frequent flights, and the recent proliferation of new media services and communications links, are developments that are now enabling Moroccans living in England to travel across cultural spaces. The following section discusses how transnational ties and practices – looked at mainly in terms of mobilities and TV consumption (or ‘virtual networks’) – are approached and used by different generations of Moroccans living in London.

#### 5.2.1.1 *Physical networks*

Except for a small minority from my sample, the majority of interviewees, whether first-, second- or third-generation, all go back to Morocco at least once a year; it has become a normal part of being a ‘Moroccan living abroad’. When I asked Soufiane (14), a third-generation Moroccan, where he lives, he replied very spontaneously, ‘My name is Soufiane, I was born in London, I live here ten months a year, and two months in Morocco during the summer time’. His statement not only reflects a shared sense of belonging to both London and Morocco but has also become almost an intrinsic part of how he identifies himself. Similarly, Sulayman, a 12-year-old third-generation, cannot imagine spending the summer holidays away from Morocco; he explains:

I cannot imagine spending the summer in this country, when it gets to about June, I feel like I don't like this country anymore. But then when I go to Morocco and stay there for a month and two weeks then I say, I don't like this country, I want to come back here. *When I'm there, I want to come here and when I'm here I want to go there!* (Sulayman, Male, 12-Ind. 3<sup>rd</sup> G)

For the first generation, the yearly visits to Morocco consist of an essential trip to see the part of their immediate family who stayed at home. This ‘summer ritual’ is also an essential medium through which parents attempt not only to instil in their children a love for Morocco,

but also to transmit the ‘Moroccan identity’ to their offspring, as Mustapha affirms in the following testimony:

Any Moroccan will not be able to forget his country [...] In our case, the first generation, there is no risk that we forget our country of origin, our efforts are concentrated towards the second and third generations that might risk to forget about Morocco, that’s why we end up going there almost every year (Mustapha, Male, 61- F6-F).

The second and third generations’ trip back to Morocco has become a medium for constructing a new, shared identity with other Moroccans living abroad. The *regularity* of the trip and the *length* of stay for some of the interviewees is almost an indicator of their ‘Moroccanness’. Many were surprised that I asked them whether they go back to Morocco, almost as if I was doubting their degree of ‘Moroccanness’; nevertheless, for them, going to Morocco means going back to the home town of their parents, where most of the extended family lives. Only a few of the interviewees, when they go back, travel around the country and visit other cities. For nearly everyone, the definition of Morocco is closely associated with the home town of both parents, as the place they know best.

For a small minority, it is not entirely a positive experience that they look forward to; it is rather *a must* because the whole family is going and they have to accompany them.

I hated it, I didn’t mind Casablanca because it was modern and there were things to do but we always had to go to the *Rif* and the people there [...] I don’t know if it’s the mentality or the culture or just the fact that it’s more cut off than Casablanca, but you know you can’t walk down the street without getting hassled. I just felt suffocated and claustrophobic. There was one period where I didn’t leave the house in *Silwen* for about three weeks. I was very, very bored [...] (Samia, Female, 29-F24-C1).

In Larache, the young generation of Moroccans’ circle of friendship is often limited to relatives – often cousins – or local neighbours, who *sometimes* happen to be the same neighbours in London, especially in the case of families who live in North Kensington.

Well, I’m from Larache so everyone here is from Larache, so like it’s normally yeah my friends from here. Coz they all live next to me. It’s like I walk out, Smail lives over there, Yasmine lives over there [...] It’s the same, like almost the same difference be-

tween my house and my friends' houses here [Ladbroke Grove] is the same there [Larache] [...] and the beach, there's only one beach in Larache, so we usually end up together, but my cousins are normally with me *fil Magrib* [in Morocco]. They're cousins so we are with other Moroccans as well (Amira, Female, 16-F5-C2).

However, when they do manage to expand their circle of friends, it is often with other second- or third-generation Moroccans living abroad, especially in the Netherlands. This affinity is created mostly because young Dutch Moroccans can communicate in English whilst, for instance, young French Moroccans find this difficult.

I don't have friends from Morocco, I have friends from all over Europe, because they all go down during the summer [...] I have friends from France, I have cousins from Holland, family in Spain. My best friend is in Holland, he lives right next to me in Larache, we go to the beach and do stuff together, I've known him since I was small (Soufiane, Male, 14-Ind. 3<sup>rd</sup> G).

Nah, I don't like French [*French-Moroccans*] guys. [Why?] I don't know, I just grew up that way [...] I can handle Holland guys, they speak English. French guys, they get on my nerves basically with their little look, I can't handle French guys. I don't know why, to this day I don't like them [...] they're just backwards, you get me? (Zakaria, Male, 23-F9-C2).

Whilst transnational mobility for the first generation is intended to harness existing family and friendship networks, the younger generation approach it differently. It gives them the opportunity to build friendships that are not physically bounded only to Morocco; rather they develop new friendships with other Moroccans living abroad, with whom they have more in common than other Moroccans of their age. What is enjoyed most by the younger generation of British Moroccans when they go to Morocco is the 'freedom' that they are granted: a freedom that they are unable to enjoy in London, as their lives are limited to school and home, and any other extra-curricular activities are closely monitored by parents, or to some extent 'the community'. This freedom in Morocco is a reflection not only of the *trust* that parents have in other Moroccans and in the local neighbourhoods, but it is also a reflection of an increased trust in their children themselves, as Moroccan communities living abroad are often seen by those in Morocco to adopt a more conservative attitude towards their children.

For the first generation, maintaining the umbilical cord between England and Morocco through frequent visits is part of the process of

nurturing a sense of belonging to the country of origin. It is also a way of fostering their existing social capital and building new foundations for it, at least as far as the younger generation is concerned. This sense of solidarity is activated in times of crisis, as was the case in February 2004 after the earthquake in Al Huceima, in the north of Morocco.

#### 5.2.1.2 'Virtual' networks

The availability of mass media and communication technologies (mobile phones in particular) enables local immigrants to enact transnational ties with Morocco and with friends and families there. Through Moroccan satellite channels, Moroccan migrants are able to routinely synchronise contact with everyday life and events in Morocco. Through these technologies, Moroccans living in different parts of the globe can transcend the distance that has separated the so-called 'Moroccan diaspora' around the world from their 'communities of origin'. In the frame of diasporic cultural studies (Aksoy & Robins 2002), satellite TV is about the maintenance of 'at-a-distance ties' – the supposed capacity of transnational media to connect migrant communities back to the cultural space of their 'homeland'. This 'diasporic media' provides new means to promote *transnational bonding*, and thereby sustain (ethnic, national or religious) identities and cultures across distant spaces.

In almost all the families I visited in London, the TV set was switched on at all times and tuned to Moroccan channels, indicating that Morocco is present and plays a role throughout immigrants' everyday life. The extent to which these identities and cultures at-a-distance are sustained differs from one generation to another. For the first generation, satellite TV offers a chance to maintain their identification with the 'homeland', as an important medium for overcoming the experience of cultural separation.

(Do you watch Moroccan TV?) Yes, all the time [...] it's thanks to Moroccan TV that we now feel as if we are living in Morocco and now [...] we are able to keep up and follow events not only in Morocco but across the world [...]The bridge between us and Morocco has become much stronger and the distance much shorter (Majid, Male, 62-F5-F).

Watching satellite TV allows Majid to 'be' in Morocco without physically being there. Television thus becomes a substitute for travelling to Morocco, and a remedy for homesickness. The experienced or imagined 'home' country is no longer just a memory in immigrants' minds and narratives; it is present and part of their everyday lives. These new media services not only increase the feelings of proximity to the 'homeland' by strengthening bonds of belonging, but also, im-

portantly, foster a sense of *civic engagement*. My fieldwork data revealed that families who were watching satellite channels, both Moroccan and Arabic, were more politically aware of the general situation at 'home', and more involved with 'home politics'. For example, several individuals took part in a demonstration in London, outside Westminster, to campaign for the release of Moroccan prisoners-of-war held in Tindouf in Western Sahara. Watching satellite TV is therefore more than just the passive consumption of 'home', as Aksoy & Robins (2000) suggest. Transnational Moroccan TV is intricately linked to political identities as one of the many complex negotiations of local and transnational lives and social relations engaged in by immigrants. Moroccan satellite television allows first-generation viewers not only to be informed of what is happening in their home country, but also to feel part of that society, and able to bring in their own contribution. On English TV, there is very little representation of them as an integral part of society, and their association with it or willingness to follow its programmes is kept to a minimum. Not all first-generation Moroccans, however, identify with Moroccan satellite TV, as some judge it 'too Westernised' in relation to Islamic values, or 'not Moroccan enough'. Zohra explains:

To be truthful I'm very limited in what I watch. There are some programmes that I don't like to watch. There are some things I don't consider as Moroccan. I like to watch traditional Moroccan cultural programmes [...] I try to teach this to my children most of the time, I prefer watching *Iqraa*, *Al Jazeera* and *Al Arabia* (Zohra, Female, 38-F17-M).

Predictably, there is a generational divide in terms of TV viewing in general, where the first generation feel more comfortable following Moroccan TV programmes, whilst the younger generation is more inclined to watch English TV. A factor contributing to this generational divide is mastery of the Arabic language. The second generation clearly finds it difficult to understand classical Arabic, or even to relate to any of the programmes shown on Moroccan or other Arabic channels.


I wouldn't waste my time watching game shows and stuff like that [...] I don't like it to be honest [...] I don't understand them most of the time. They're a *different world to us* [...] So what can I possibly see from this Moroccan channel, what is it going to offer me? See Morocco, see my brothers in Morocco. They just look like people I see every day here Zakaria (Male, 23-F9-C2).

Those of the second generation who do watch Moroccan TV are either seeking pure entertainment, so watch music concerts, or are searching

to get an insight into ‘typical’ Moroccan life, and attempt to achieve that through watching Moroccan films and soap operas.

I like the Moroccan comedy and I like to watch all the movies. Why? Because it shows you *the real life* in Morocco [...] those programmes about *normal* Moroccan life, but I don’t enjoy the news, I find it boring (Assia, Female, 41-F20-M).

I have schematically set out the set patterns in TV viewing across the two generations in Figure 5.1. The first generation, when they watch English TV, are looking for programmes on the ‘typical’ English life-style, ‘real-life’ things, whilst the younger generation, when they watch Moroccan TV, are also searching for representation of ‘*normal Moroccan life*’. The TV is used by the two generations as a way of complementing or enhancing their understanding of the other’s culture. In many ways, Moroccan satellite TV counterbalances more conservative and out-of-date perceptions and attitudes. Transnational TV can sometimes serve as a valuable ‘corrective’ medium for archaic migrant attitudes, especially concerning the way they are bringing up their children. Moroccan audiences look to the ordinariness of Moroccan television. Like any other viewers of broadcast television, they want ‘the familiar – familiar sights, familiar faces, familiar voices’, as Thomas Elsaesser (1994: 7) puts it; ‘television that respects and knows who they are, where they are, and what time it is’. Television, both national and transnational, is used by members of the Moroccan community as an ‘integration’ mechanism in both their country of origin and their host society. It is used to update their understanding of how the two national mentalities are evolving in order to be able to deal with them, by looking for the ‘real’ in the ‘fiction’.



**Figure 5.1** *The use of TV across the first and second generations of Moroccans*

## 5.2.2 *In-country networks*

### 5.2.2.1 *The neighbourhood – 'I'm a real Portobeller!'*

The *neighbourhood* represents the context in which social relations take place. Over the years, individuals across generations have developed local social networks, which are often their main source of mutual help and support. This section maps out local community and neighbourhood networks in which social capital operates. The first set of questions on neighbourhood connections looks at the length of stay of interviewees and their willingness to move from or stay in the area where they live. A comparison is drawn between families in North Kensington and those in other areas in London. The information elicited by these questions does not give a precise, quantifiable description of the stock of social capital in either locality. What interview accounts do provide, however, is an indication of the overall culture of cooperation in a local area as well as the degree to which a person is connected to his or her local community.

Families who live in North Kensington were asked if, given the choice, they would move outside the area they currently live in. The majority were reluctant to do so, as the following quotes from Soumaya, a first-generation woman, and Rashid, a second-generation man, illustrate:

No, I can't move out from this area, I have everything I need here plus there are a lot of Moroccans and other Muslims in the area [...] I don't want to feel isolated in another area. I was given a bigger house in a different area, but I refused to take it. The market is near me, the mosque, everything [...] It's also important for my children to grow up in such an area. I have two of my children who are wearing *Nikab*<sup>1</sup> and I don't want them to have problems (Soumaya).

No I wouldn't. I don't know what it is, this is *home*...very strange... most of my *social networks* are based here, my friends and colleagues are here, but if I have to move, I wouldn't want to move outside W9 or W10. I wouldn't move out too far, as long as I can always come back [...] partly because of the Moroccan community. I don't know what it is but I wouldn't leave this area (Rashid, Male, 30-F3-C1).

The first generation's reasons for choosing to stay in the same area are related to safety, as described by Soumaya, as well as the practicality of having the local mosque and the market nearby; therefore it is difficult for her to imagine herself living in another part of London. Rashid,

however, refers explicitly to his *social network*, made up of his friends and colleagues in the area. Both of them have developed connections in relation to their local community, whilst Soumaya refers to it as what makes her and her children feel safe, Rashid sees the area clearly as his own 'home' and prefers not to uproot himself from it.

It is seen as essential for the younger-generation Moroccans living in North Kensington to likewise maintain links that they have developed within their local community, which in turn create a sense of 'home'. Some interviewees, especially amongst the second generation, identify themselves in relation to their local neighbourhood as a 'Portobeller' or a 'Grove girl or boy', referring to Portobello and Ladbroke Grove. This not only reflects a strong sense of belonging to the geographical location of their local community, because of their existing friends and family networks, but also echoes the extent to which it is important for them to be part of a 'Moroccanised' local community, as first Mostafa and then Kawtar put it.

I am a real Portobeller!! [...] since I was born in the area, I went to Bevington School just off Golborne Road. I can't imagine living anywhere else. It's really hard; I can't imagine living anywhere else [...] I've got my mum and dad who live up the road (*laughs*). My sister lives to my right and my brother still lives with my mum and dad (Mostafa, Male, 32-F9-C1).

No I wouldn't like to move out from here because when you walk down Golborne Road, it is like walking down a street in Morocco, there are Moroccan shops ... everything ... it's a well-known area [...] I've lived here fifteen, sixteen years. I don't live exactly in Golborne, I live in Latimer but still it's the same thing. It's still Moroccanised. It doesn't have that many Moroccans but it still feels like Golborne anyway (Kawtar, Female, 16-F1-C2).

For some, the degree to which their local community is 'Moroccanised' determines how much it feels like 'home'. Amal, a 20-year-old university student, explains that she would move to Ladbroke Grove instead of Latimer Road, which is only one stop away by train.

I would like to move to Ladbroke Grove, because Latimer Road is quite different [...] it's not really Moroccanised like in Ladbroke Grove [...] but it's a nice area [...] I wouldn't go to an area where there are no Moroccans, because I need to know at least someone there from my country [...] I also feel safe in this area

[...] I know them, and it feels a bit like Morocco [...] this is my home (Amal, Female, 20-F18-C1).

For others it is the sense of 'community' that is most attractive in North Kensington: a 'community' made up of family members who live in the vicinity, friends, neighbours, or sometimes the presence of other Moroccans and Muslims in the area. They all contribute together to creating the sense of 'community' and a feeling of being at home.

I wouldn't move out from this area, because I have too many memories here and I feel that this is my *community* [...] I like the fact that there are a lot of Muslims here, because in special days like *Eid*, even though you are not in an Islamic country where everyone is celebrating *Eid* at the same time, it still feels good, and you really appreciate the presence of other Muslims in the area. I built my roots here and I have my family here, and if I pick up and go off somewhere else I would have to start from scratch [...] (Naima, Female, 36-Ind. 2<sup>nd</sup> G).

Similarly, Houda, who currently lives in East London, explains that during religious festivals she feels isolated whilst, she assumes, those who live in Ladbroke Grove 'feel' everything because there is a shared spirit and atmosphere of celebration.

I would like to move near; like in Ladbroke Grove where there are more Moroccans [...] Everybody knows everybody and they visit each other. You feel *Eid*, you feel Ramadan, and you celebrate things that Muslims celebrate, but around here it's different, its mostly white people that live around here, apart from my next-door neighbour who's Pakistani. I would prefer to live in a Moroccan area [...] I don't think you would ever feel lonely (Houda, Female, 26-F12-C2).

The selected families who live in other parts of London have developed a sense of belonging to the area where they live, but not necessarily a shared sense of 'community'. The networks that they have developed are very heterogeneous, as Sofia explains here:

There is no kind of sense of community here really, this feels like home yeah but there is no community [...] I would never however consider going to Ladbroke Grove. I just think it's again a bit claustrophobic [...] I am comfortable with being an outsider, whereas there I would not be, I would fit perfectly in that com-

munity, my parents came in the sixties, my story is the same as every story there (Sofia, Female, 37-F10-C1).

Whilst Sofia appreciates being different in the area where she lives and not ‘melting’ into the crowd, others like Hanane feared the opposite. It was not just the Moroccan presence in North Kensington that was important for her, but also the Muslim one, and the fear of standing out in a ‘white’ area explains her attachment to the neighbourhood she lives in.

You don’t want to be somewhere where you are alienated [...] You want to stay somewhere where there is a community, where you know people and you have something in common with them. Yeah, there is a *masjid* [*mosque*] around here, a school around here, Muslims around here. You know, kids won’t feel isolated, especially now, the bad image about Muslims everywhere. To go and live somewhere where there are no Muslims you will be like....the black sheep (*laughs*) (Hanane, Female, 32-F7-C1).

Sometimes fears like those of Hanane have been justified, especially following the events of 9/11 and 07/07, where there was a substantial increase in hate crimes and physical or verbal abuse against Muslims. Living in an area where there is a majority of Muslims can help to enhance a sense of safety. The ‘community’ is often seen as a reliable source of protection, almost like an extended family, that looks after its members. Many parents’ willingness to stay in the North Kensington area is motivated by the feeling of safety in a neighbourhood where there is a majority of Muslims and Moroccans. Having the children growing up in a Moroccan environment is important for a parent, as Hajj Abdellah explains below. For him it is essential to have other individuals check and monitor the behaviour of his children; having a ‘closed network’ will enable the younger generation to behave within the ‘norm’ set by the community:

I’ve never moved away from Westminster [...] I’ve lived here since 1974 until now in the same accommodation [...] they [the council] have sent me several letters in the past offering me alternative accommodation, but I refused. I cannot live so far away from the Moroccan community, I don’t want my kids to mix with the rest, I don’t have the energy to look after them all the time [...] One has to check the kids’ behaviour (Hajj Abdellah, Male, 62-F3-F).

He believes strongly in this shared responsibility between members of the Moroccan community and often tries, in a spirit of goodwill, to correct other Moroccan children's behaviour by talking to them. However, his good intentions can often be interpreted differently, as his daughter explained to me:

I was walking with my father the other day and some kids were being naughty, and my dad doesn't know these children, so I said 'Dad, leave them, you've got good intentions but they will tell you it's none of your business'. Because where my dad grew up they were allowed to tell each other's children off because they were looking out for the community, and they still think they have to look out for the community. And I said to him 'Dad times have changed it's not like that anymore' and he was sad because he said times have gone bad (Selma, Female, 25-F3-C2).

The son of Hajj Abdellah came up with a similar argument but pointed out a possible negative impact on having other members of the community monitoring each other's behaviour.

The positive thing of living around Moroccans is keeping your identity and your culture, and I guess most of them are Muslim, so it keeps you on the right track. The negatives, how should I put it ... I don't know, as a community I think we tend to be quite low on ambitions and aspirations so it's quite easy to fall into that sort of way of thinking and not remain ambitious and positive (Rashid, Male, 30-F3-C1).

Although there may be positive aspects to living in a close-knit community, in terms of solidarity, feeling a sense of 'home' away from 'home', especially during religious festivals and so on, there are also drawbacks to having a small community in a geographically defined area. One is that the community builds very few networks outside its geographical boundaries – or 'bridging' social capital – especially as far as the first generation is concerned; this results in the building of a safety-net, and even a degree of over-dependence on other members of the community. The presence of other Moroccans helps in monitoring the behaviour of members of the community, not just the younger generation, but this norm can be 'intrusive' to individual freedom, leading sometimes to rebellion by the young people, that sometimes translates into anti-social behaviour.

I used to hear how there was a lot of that going on and people saying, 'Oh I saw that person's daughter', and there was a stage

when the second generations although they were older they rebelled quite badly at one stage, but since then things have calmed down quite a lot [...] I think quite a few things happened in quite a few families and people aren't willing to point the finger anymore because they have got their own problems to deal with. But there was a stage when the girls dropped from being the respectable family girls to them, you know hitting their late teens and doing things, but now everyone has kind of settled down [...] people kept saying 'Why are you talking about my daughter when your daughter does this and that?', and people just kept pointing fingers at each other (Selma, Female, 25-F3-C2).

This monitoring of children's behaviour is commonly known within a close-knit community setting as 'gossiping'. There are two types of gossiping, the one where people talk and point the finger; and the other, which I would refer to as 'proactive gossiping', where a member of the community goes to the parents to inform them about their child's bad behaviour, or what they perceive as bad behaviour.

Now if I walk with Sabrina down the street and she's smoking, I'm smoking by association, for no reason in the Moroccan eye, '*Ah bint flan shoufta ket kemi*' ['I saw the daughter of x smoking'] when I never had nothing. I really can't hack that coz there's just too much of it going around [...] You can't do nothing without someone seeing you or you getting caught or something ... Yeah coz even at school it's like that, I mean even if I walk into a classroom and sit next to a boy, the *Maghribi* in our class will be like, 'Watch when I see your brother. Watch when I see your brother and tell him you're talking to a boy' (Amira, Female, 16-F5-C2).

Members of the community, particularly the younger ones, are constantly conscious of the effects of their behaviour and on how it might/will be perceived by other people living within the same community. This 'norm' within the community derives from different sources; a major part stems from willingness to preserve Moroccan culture and tradition in order to avoid individuals being totally assimilated within the 'Western' culture, or experience what Min Zhou (1997b) refers to as a process of 'downward assimilation'. 'Ethnic solidarity', taken to the extreme, which can also be referred to as 'bonding' social capital, often leads to an increased level of 'exclusion' and, in some cases, to the creation of a new sub-culture for younger generations. As Alejandro Portes explains (1998), restriction on individual freedom and a downward le-

velling of norms eventually lead to situations where group solidarity is cemented by a common experience of adversity and opposition to mainstream society. The resulting downward levelling of norms operates to keep the numbers of a subjugated group in place, and force the more ambitious to escape from it. A more detailed discussion on this will follow in Chapter 7.

#### 5.2.2.2 *Neighbours*

Putnam's (1995) study of American life, *'Bowling Alone'*, distinguishes between types of social networks likely to support social capital. He identified neighbourhood networks – or 'good neighbourliness' – as promoting social capital. This section examines the types of network that Moroccan families maintain with their neighbours, and the participation and exchange of favours that take place between them as indicators of social capital, as norms of trust and reciprocity are essential for the functioning of neighbours' networks. Families, especially parents, were also asked to compare to what extent their relationship with their neighbours in London is different to that in Morocco.

Maintaining a good relationship with neighbours is strongly embedded in Moroccan culture. In Islam there has always been a strong reference to the neighbours and how important it is to maintain good relationships with them.

On my left, there is a Moroccan family, and on the right there is a black woman from the West Indies, If they need anything, they just come and ask, I sometimes shop for them if I'm going shopping [...] In Islam we have always been asked to look after our neighbours to such an extent that people feared that the neighbour will also have a right of inheritance. But apart from religion this is how we are expected to behave as proper citizens anyway (Hajj Abdellah, Male, 62-F3-F).

The relationships that Moroccan families have with their neighbours fall into two categories. First, the 'standard' relationship with neighbours relies on mutual respect and an occasional exchange of favours, whilst making sure that there are clearly-drawn boundaries of non-interference in each other's private matters.

I don't have any Moroccan neighbours, I have English, Portuguese, Spanish but we keep our distance. We respect each other...if we need help or they need help we don't hesitate to ask for it. I've lived in this area for the last 30 years and we've never had any problems with them [...] When the children were young

they used to play with the neighbour's children...normal (Mustapha, Male, 61-F6-F).

In the second category, some Moroccan families develop very close relationships with their neighbours, where there is regular and mutual support, and where the neighbours almost become members of the family, as described in the following quote by Ali:

We have a very good relationship with our English neighbours... I've known them since 1990 and we are like a family, they come to visit and we go and visit them too. Our child's neighbour spends a lot of time at our place until they take her back asleep, she now says *Bismillah* before she eats, and she takes off her shoes before she comes in. Her parents are quite happy with it [...] Sometimes I bring shopping and by the time I call my kids to bring it up our neighbour's kids, some of them English, would take it up instead [...] I treat them like my own children. Sometimes I go and buy sweets and fruits and I will give it to our neighbours too. And our neighbours would *reciprocate* that too. If they need help they will call me and the same goes to me...*I feel that I'm in Morocco* [...] Anyway, in Islam they always say 'the neighbour before the house' and it just shows how important it is to keep a good relationship with the neighbours (Ali, Male, 64-F1-F).

Although sometimes relationships between some Moroccan families can develop a level of closeness and familiarity similar to those that usually develops in Morocco, my interviewees always expressed some nostalgia when asked about the nature of their relationship with their neighbours in London. For many it will never reach the level of conviviality and closeness of those in Morocco.

The relationship with our neighbours, I would describe it as respectable. No, here in our block of flats where we live our people are private, we don't go around knocking on people's doors like they do in Morocco, asking for sugar. No, no, no we don't have that. If the next-door neighbour was to knock on our door then we know it was something important, that's the way we see it, and that's how they would think of it [...] (Safae, Female, 17-F16-C1).

It was clear from the interviews that, no matter how mixed the neighbourhoods are, the relationship between Moroccan families and their neighbours is often ruled by high levels of respect and reciprocity.

Norms of reciprocity between neighbours will be further developed in the following section.

### 5.2.2.3 *Friends*

Networks of friends constitute the second most important source of social capital after the family. The heterogeneity of the networks of friends that individuals have influences the level of trust within networks, which translates into 'generalised trust' of strangers overall. The effect of heterogeneity upon social capital remains open empirically, given recent contradictory empirical findings; recent research has included claims that heterogeneity increases social capital and other outcomes (Grootaert 1998), as well as claims that homogenous networks are most conducive to social capital (Portney & Berry 1997; Sampson et al. 1997).

When members of the first generation were asked about the nationality of their closest friends, almost 95 per cent said that they were Moroccan, although the majority still had acquaintances of different ethnic backgrounds, as Majid explains:

I've worked with London Transport for nine years and I have friends of various nationalities, especially Irish, but my closest friends are Moroccan [...] it wasn't a choice but it just happened. I can't see an English person becoming a close friend, I don't see English people like that (Majid, Male, 62-F5-F).

This was also the case for individuals who were not living in areas of London where there was a large Moroccan community, as was the case for Malika who lives in South London:

I want to keep work relationships separate from my social life. I've been working with a lot of English people. Almost every fortnight I have people coming to my house, Moroccan ladies [...] I tend to invite people, because I want to keep in contact, the unfortunate thing is that we tend to keep in touch with Moroccan friends, but not our children. When they were young, it was much easier, we were bringing up our children together, but now it's different (Malika, Female, 51-F22-M).

As was discussed previously, networks of friends played a key role in the migration project of many Moroccans. Naturally, networks of friends continued to provide mutual support in looking for jobs or accommodation.

Most of my friends are Moroccans. When I first started working, I helped ten of my friends get jobs at the same hotel where I used to work, because I was the first one to start there [...] we've also managed to find accommodation for each other, we used to save a certain amount of money each month and give it to one person and so on and so forth (Hajj Abdellah, Male, 62-F3-F).

This is an excellent illustration of how social capital operates on the ground within 'closed' circles of friends. Although there is a clear advantage in helping one another to secure a job, the downside is a decreased likelihood of individuals finding jobs in other fields.

The second generation's networks of friends were more heterogeneous, although still a relatively large number – about 70 per cent – had mainly Moroccan friends. For many, a pattern develops as they grow older: at first they try to have friends from other ethnic backgrounds, but the older they get, the more they find themselves drawn into friendships with Moroccans.

From school and university I had a lot of African, Egyptian friends. But one thing I figured out as I got older was that as you get older you tend to go back to your roots and try and refine your identity, but I don't know if that was a conscious thing, but you tend to drift back to the Moroccan community [...] Now my closest friends are Moroccan, without a shadow of a doubt about 95 per cent Moroccan; I feel I can rely on them (Rashid, Male, 30-F3-C1).

The tendency for many young second-generation Moroccans to develop more friendships with other Moroccans, rather than with English people for instance, also relates to cultural factors and affinities. Young Moroccans are also more likely to develop close friendships with people from other ethnic backgrounds, mainly Afro-Caribbean and Asian, since there are some shared cultural values and a common social position as sons and daughters of immigrants.

My best friends are Moroccan, if I have a family problem I'd go to my Moroccan friends because their family is the same as mine. If it was a school problem I'd go to any of my friends, but if it's family you'd have to go to my Moroccan friends, because they would understand exactly what I'm talking about. You don't have to explain and explain [...] (Kawatar, Female, 16-F1-C2).

At various times in my life I had African, Asian friends, I didn't have many close English friends; I just don't think they under-

stand where you're coming from. Like an African person whether Christian or Muslim will understand you have to respect your parents, and what they say goes. Whereas an English person would say 'If you're not happy with what your parents are doing then move out, you're 18 it's OK'. Whereas a Nigerian Christian would say 'What do you mean you're going to move out? Your parents are going to kill you' [...] I have tried in the past [*to have English friends*] but it never worked out (Samia, Female, 29-F24-C1).

About 30 per cent of the second generation said their friendships did not include Moroccans; predictably, the majority were living in areas of London where they were less likely to go to school with Moroccans or have them as neighbours.

Most of my friends are actually Mediterranean. My closest friends are Spanish; French...um...I've got one half Chinese, half English. An English person as well, we're close friends. Who else? Um that's about it ...I've never had Moroccan friends...because we didn't live in an area where there were Moroccans, so there was never an opportunity to meet Moroccans (Assia, Female, 43-F10-C2).

We've never lived in Ladbroke Grove or Kensington or anything like that. So my closest friends have been mainly English. I've never really had any really good Moroccan friends. I was made to be friends with Moroccan children when I was younger, but I never really liked them, never talked to them, and never trusted them. They were always too rough for me. My best friend, who's been my best friend since I was seven, is an English guy. All my best friends are English actually and even when I was at school they were English with the exception of a few Afro-Caribbeans. Other than that, I guess it explains my mind-set, it's very English, very, very English [...] (Hamza, Male, 33-F23-C1).

The families' geographical location clearly had a significant impact on the heterogeneity of the friendship networks developed by the second generation. It seems not so much of an obstacle for members of the first generation who, despite living far from the Moroccan community, always felt the need to 'reconnect' themselves to other Moroccans. The cyclic development amongst the second generation, however, starts when they develop heterogeneous networks of friends; later on in their lives they find themselves drawn back to developing closer friendships

with other Moroccans. This indicator of their identity development is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.

### 5.2.3 *Family networks*

This section focuses on the role of family networks in generating social capital amongst their members. In his analysis of the role of social capital in the creation of human capital, Coleman (1988) focuses on parent-child relations, using measures of the physical presence of adults in a household and attention given by adults to children as empirical indicators of such relations. The 'strength' of family relations is measured using a ratio of parents to children. Coleman's approach deliberately measures the place and make-up of the family network. However, using the ratio of parents to children in a household as a measure of social capital is questionable, as no account is made of relationship quality, for example through measures of norms of trust or reciprocity (Stone 2001). Networks of family members or kin who reside outside the household have received less attention in studies of social capital than families within the household (although intergenerational social support is itself the focus of considerable study; see for example Finch 1989; Finch & Mason 1993; Millward 1999; Short 1996).

Amongst studies that have measured family social capital, I found Hofferth, Boisjoly and Duncan (1995) to be the most pertinent, as their investigations focus specifically upon social capital between different kinship households, indicated in transfers of time and money. Kinship networks are identified and measured indirectly by asking about a family's 'stock of' and 'investment in' social capital in the following categories: time stock, money stock, time investments and money investments (Appendices B and C).

I had to drop several questions which asked about the level of reciprocity between parents and children after my first interviews because, for my interviewees, I was asking the obvious. Additionally, assessing the strength of 'strong ties', embodied in family ties, was difficult in the context of this research, since I was asking parents and children to determine the degree and frequency of support that they get from each other. After the first two interviews, I realised that these questions posed unforeseen ethical dilemmas for both the interviewees and myself. I therefore decided to use a more generic approach, asking about support in case of emergency or need of financial assistance.

Overall, family ties came across as the strongest in terms of provision of support, especially across generations. When respondents were asked who they would contact in case of emergency, or if they needed money, the majority said that they would contact their immediate family first.

Because the one thing that we've got is, what we call the nuclear family, *al hamduliallah al fitra* [instinct] and we see that, we relate with that...the family ties are very strong within Moroccan families, you understand...for *Al Mgharba* [Moroccans] this is standard, and why, because this is through religion and like everybody *kaytih ala rasu* [falls on this head], you understand... so where does he go back to, he goes back to his family and what keeps his family together is religion [...] (Rashid, Male, 28-Ind. 2<sup>nd</sup> G).

A relative definitely, either my mum, or my dad, there's my wife's sister across the road, so it just happens that my family is very close around my house, so I could almost open the window and shout for them (Rashid, Male, 30-F3-C1).

In the first quote, Rashid referred to religion as a key factor that keeps Moroccan families together, in the sense that children are expected to look after their parents and vice versa. It was therefore natural for many to seek help from their immediate or extended family in case of emergency. Seeking the help of a friend or a neighbour was rarely mentioned. However, depending on the type of emergency, many of my interviewees had a logical order of relatives to contact; if the emergency is acute then the mother or father is contacted; then the siblings. The friends come at the next level, especially in situations where the parents or the family are not supposed to be aware of the type of emergency.

In case of emergency I would call my mum (*laughs*). Then my brother, if there was anything I'd call my brother. He would be the first; he would be the one you could rely on (Hanane, Female, 32-F7-C1).

It depends on the emergency, suppose I hurt myself it will be my parents, but if something I can't share with my parents then I would go to a friend (Amal, Female, 20-F18-C1).

A similar pattern emerged when individuals were asked where they could ask for money if they needed it. The immediate family came first, followed by friends.

I would go to my mother rather than my father because he would just ask too many questions, or I would go to my grand-

mother who would just give me the money...but I try not to ask anyone (Amal, Female, 20-F18-C1).

Again, depending on what the money is for [...] we're quite close, well not close, I suppose that's what happens when you come to a foreign country and you kind of hang on to each other. You kind of become too close [...] it's not always healthy but you're stuck together in a way, you stick together. Yeah, so if I need something I'm more likely to call my family but again it depends (Sofia, Female, 37-F10-C1).

Overall, family networks proved to be the most reliable source of social capital; in times of emergency or need of resources, family was the primary source of help and support in most cases. The density of these networks differs according to the closeness, both physical and emotional, of the family members.

### 5.3 Reciprocity

Reciprocity is the process of exchange within a social relationship whereby 'goods and services' (meaning exchange of any kind) given by one party are repaid to that party by the party who received them. Reciprocal relations are governed by *norms*, such that parties to the exchange understand the *social contract* they have entered into. Norms of reciprocity vary according to network type. Finch and Mason (1993), for example, show that reciprocity amongst family and kin is an ongoing process which may take many years to realise, and that the norm of reciprocity within family and kinship groupings enables uneven levels of exchange, delayed exchange and indirect exchanges (favours for others) to occur (Stone 2001).

Measuring reciprocity is more challenging than defining it. Of the four indicators of social capital within the Moroccan community, reciprocity was the most difficult to measure and qualify, as several aspects of it are seen as common-sense instilled in each person through culture and religion.

#### 5.3.1 Culture of reciprocity

In order to learn about the level of culture of reciprocity which shapes the norm of reciprocity and associated cultural values with the Moroccan community, I referred to Krishna and Shrader's (1999) household questionnaire. Drawing on this, I asked the following question: 'If a community project does not directly benefit you but has benefits for

others in the neighbourhood, then do you think you would contribute time and money for this project?' The majority of the interviewees responded positively.

Yes, I would still help, even though I don't have any benefit from it. That's what we need. Islam needs to be like that. We need to help each other, even though it won't benefit you, you have to benefit others (Hanane, Female, 20-F6-C1).

While some interviewees related the question to religion, others thought it was more related to civil duties of individuals and obligations to go with the majority.

Well sometimes. For example, we had free parking, now we pay £100 a year, obviously this is not good for me but people used to come from outside the area to park their car so in the long run it's good for the area, so we agreed. Sometimes you have to compromise. This is life (Abdul, Male, 45-F17-F).

Although most interviewees were willing to support projects that would not benefit them directly, people were inclined to provide financial support to projects, rather than time.

It depends what the project is. If the project was to help alleviate poverty, then yes...or for the environment, I'd support it. Usually I support things financially because I don't have much time (Samia, Female, 29-F24-C1).

The above examples relate mostly to the study of the local community, highlighting the cultural norms of family or social networks, but they do not give an indication of individuals' willingness to help each other out. Therefore, another question was asked, adapted from the study of Onyx and Bullen (2000), about the extent to which they agreed with the following statement: 'Some say that by helping others, you help yourself in the long run'. In a similar pattern to the previous question, several interviewees agreed with this 'motto', primarily from a religious perspective.

Religion always affects your common-sense because it's a way of life. And our religion always says we must help others. If you help others you will be repaid. Helping some could reward you financially and emotionally (Abdul, Male, 45-F17-F).

In our religion the general benefit always needs to precede the personal one, priority has always been to the group [...] When

we established the supplementary school, it wasn't for me, it was for the general benefit so that after I die the work continues (Ali, Male, 64-F1-F).

Some believed that helping others is a future investment that individuals make to enable them, their families, or other people in general, to reap its benefits.

Oh that's absolutely true. By helping others you are helping yourself in the long run because whatever services you are creating, whatever ... you know ... things you are putting into the community if you don't benefit from it directly, someone you know or close to you will benefit from them. Or be it in the future (Fadi, Male, 30-F12-C1).

Yeah, because it is in a sense how you treat others because what goes around comes around really, so if you treat people well, then you'll be treated well, it's kind of like a domino effect [...] *it's give and take*, if you do something for people, they will do something for you. You very *rarely* find someone doing something for you and you have never done something for them (Hanan, Female, 32-F7-C1).

Others were more sceptical about this statement, and preferred to invert it. They believed that before individuals can help other people they needed to help themselves first:

I think by helping yourself, you help others. I think it's the other way around, I think it's better to help yourself then you can help others, if you have issues then you can't help others. I'm a bit cynical about statements like that; I don't mean to sound funny (Sofia, Female, 37-F10-C1).

This variation is an indirect measure of a norm of reciprocity; it may still prove, however, to be a useful indicator of an overall norm, as it provides a sense of the general values held by an individual in relation to the norm of reciprocity.

### 5.3.2 *Reciprocal behaviour*

In order to measure reciprocal behaviour, which focuses upon the behavioural outcome of a norm of reciprocity, and to investigate specifically reciprocal exchanges between individuals, I asked questions on neighbours' reciprocal exchanges, looking at the frequency, type and

quality of them. Reciprocity levels between neighbours were often described as 'normal' in the sense that exchanges of favours were called upon in case of need, regardless of what ethnic background they were, as Hanane's quote illustrates:

Our neighbour, she's English [...] We were brought up with her, but she's old now, she doesn't have any children. We used to go around all the time, she's there, if she needs anything she gives us a call. She's a nice lady...She says we are a part of her family, she doesn't have one (Hanane, Female, 32-F7-C1).

It was not surprising to note that levels of reciprocity were different between neighbours in London and Morocco, but it was also clear that the frequency of reciprocity between neighbours in London has decreased over time.

In my other place, I had a Bengali neighbour, she was nice. She used to come to my place and I go to hers [...] I think it would be nice if it was like the olden days. When my mum lived in the other place, my mum had neighbours that if we came home from school and she wasn't in they'd take us in, give us biscuits until my parents come. You can't do that these days [*Why?*] People are just scared these days to trust anyone [...] It's the media, you know about terrorism and drugs. Stuff like that. It would be nice to go back to the old days (Noura, Female, 36-F15-C1).

In Putnam's (2000) terms, this decreased level of reciprocity between neighbours is a clear indication of the 'decline of social capital', as levels of trust have decreased within communities.

### 5.3.3 *Benefits of network participation*

Following a series of questions about the structure of the networks in which respondents participate, interviewees were asked about their motivations for network participation, and the benefits they get from it. The reasons given to explain motivation for participating in a network included wanting to learn, wanting to feel useful, or simply personal satisfaction. The most recurrent reason given, however, was a *sense of obligation or duty* towards the community and willingness to make a difference.

When I'm helping out in the community it's more for the sake of the community. I have this opinion that Moroccans have not

done as well as they could have, so I'm trying to do things to make it better (Selma, Female, 25-F3-C2).

We tried to start up a programme for year 7, you know new-comers. The reason that made me go for it was not only the experience, but I knew how I felt when I didn't know anyone. It was tough [...] I guess it was the determination to help and make a difference to someone else's life because I knew how it felt myself [...] (Kawatar, Female, 16-F1-C2).

The benefits of being involved in such networks were numerous, and included forging new friendships, getting emotional support, and giving a sense of purpose to their lives.

The benefits are plenty, like seeking friendship, seeking love. Seeking things you obviously love to discuss with somebody that is not a member of your family, do you understand? Maybe seeking as well advice from them, you know the older they are the more experience they have as well (Houda, Female, 26-F12-C2).

Asking about the motivations for and benefits of participation reveals whether participation in social networks is due to a norm of reciprocity, such as a sense of obligation to reciprocate, or a motivation to act for the common good; these can be used as indicators of a norm of reciprocity.

#### 5.4 Trust

Coleman's (1988) explanation demonstrates that norms of trust and reciprocity are themselves closely related conceptually and empirically. Trust, according to Fukuyama (1995: 26), is 'the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that community'. Misztal (1996) expands upon the relationship between norms of reciprocity and the generation and maintenance of trust: 'norms of generalised reciprocity and networks of civic engagement encourage social trust and co-operation because they reduce incentives to defect, reduce uncertainty and provide models for future co-operation' (1996: 177).

Despite receiving considerable attention in the social capital literature, norms governing social relations have received little rigorous empirical exploration in social capital research to date. Norms of trust and reciprocity have often been investigated in social capital research by

measuring the behavioural *outcomes* of these norms, rather than the norms themselves (or individuals' perceptions of these norms). However, since social capital comprises norms of trust and reciprocity across a range of networks, they, or at least the ways in which they and associated behaviours are manifest, tend to vary across different network types. In this research, I categorised them into three different types. First, there is trust based on distant networks; I asked interviewees, on a scale of 1 to 5, how much trust they have in Moroccans living in Morocco. Second, I considered trust based on in-country networks, in other words trust of friendship groups and neighbours; I asked the same question but in relation to Moroccans living in London. For the third type, also based on in-country networks, interviewees are asked to rank their level of trust of non-Moroccans in London, also under the category of generalised trust. The results obtained are summarised in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, reflecting the mean results across the two generations and across the four geographical sites. The mean has been calculated by first getting a percentage of the obtained value (from 1 to 5) from each respondent, then adding all the values up and dividing the total by number of responses. Although I am aware of the limitations of quantifying trust in such a mechanistic way, I believe that there is still value in adopting this approach as it offers a more effective comparative tool than a question based on a qualitative measurement.

In the literature (see Putnam & Feldstein 2003; Tilly 2005), great attention has been paid to the study of the generalised trust of strangers, and to civic or institutional trust – both of which are typically measured through attitudinal items. In order to measure the importance of networks in influencing norms of trust, a fourth question was asked which was not based on established networks and refers to a generalised trust in strangers; interviewees were asked about the degree of acceptance if a complete stranger moved into their neighbourhood.

#### 5.4.1 *Moroccans in London*

Table 5.1 represents the levels of trust that first and second generations have in Moroccans living in London, in north, south, east and west

**Table 5.1** *Mean levels of trust in Moroccans in London*

	North Kensington (West)	South London	East London	North London
1 <sup>st</sup> generation	60	20	40	50
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	50	40	50	20

parts of London. It was predictable to find high levels of trust in the North Kensington area across the two generations, as there is a large Moroccan community living there and the majority have chosen to live in the area.

I wouldn't trust a person automatically because he/she is Moroccan [...] I would have to get to know them before I trust them, but overall I would trust Moroccans here more than Moroccans living in Morocco, because here everyone is like you, they wouldn't necessarily try to take advantage of you as in Morocco [...] Like I've suffered Ramadan on my own, been sick on my own, so has the other person (Hanane, Female, 32-F7-Ct).

Not all Moroccans living in North Kensington have a high level of trust in Moroccans in London. Regionalism played a role here; those who originated from the north of Morocco had low levels of trust in those who originated from central Morocco and vice versa, as Zohra, who is originally from Casablanca, discusses below:

I realised they had this view that people were put in groups depending on where they came from. I didn't understand that at first because I lived in Morocco and I didn't know this. I knew people from all over Morocco and we were very good with each other, we lived as good neighbours. I could say I would trust the ones in Morocco and not the ones living here. I think this may be the reason why I try to stay away from Moroccans in London, I don't hate them but I like to keep away (Zohra, Female, 38-F17-M).

It was equally predictable to find that levels of trust amongst the first generation living in South London are the lowest, as several of them, though not all, are part of the growing Moroccan middle class who have decided to distance themselves from the rest of the community living in North Kensington. Interestingly, the second generation's level of trust is higher than that of the first. This could be partly explained by their identity development stage that makes them more inclined towards wanting to forge new friendships with Moroccans, as discussed above.

#### 5.4.2 *Moroccans living in Morocco*

Table 5.2 represents levels of trust in Moroccans living in Morocco. The levels of trust amongst the second generation in all four parts of London are relatively the same, lower than the first generation, with the ex-

**Table 5.2** *Mean levels of trust in Moroccans living in Morocco*

	North Kensington (West)	South London	East London	North London
1 <sup>st</sup> generation	50	20	80	60
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	40	40	50	40

ception of Moroccans living in South London. One possible interpretation for this discrepancy is the level of social capital maintained by the first generation with Moroccans living back home. To build trust there is a need for a physical presence and long-term interaction, which most of the second generation did not have the opportunity to develop.

I've never lived there ... no, I think I trust the people here more than I trust the people in Morocco. Because here they have lived isolated, they know what it's like, they need the support. In Morocco they are so used to everybody being Moroccan, they never felt isolated...Whereas here they have been isolated from their family and they are all alone here and so they need the support from their local community, they need it (Hanane, Female, 32-F7-C1).

I can't trust Moroccans in Morocco; you know if you show them money then they'll be happy. If you don't show them money then they'll stab you in the back including your family [...] That's why now the first generation have had enough of Morocco, because of that, because you let someone stay in your house and then five years later it becomes his own (Mohammed, Male, 31-Ind. 2<sup>nd</sup> G).

The interviews clearly reflect overall that the second generation was more conscious of the differentiated treatment they get from Moroccans living in Morocco. They are less blinded by the romanticised view that other members of the first generation have about their compatriots back home.

#### 5.4.3 *Levels of trust in 'non-Moroccans' in London and generalised trust in 'strangers'*

Table 5.3 illustrates the difference in trust that the two generations have in 'non-Moroccans' in London. The lowest level of trust is seen amongst the first generation living in North Kensington, whilst the highest across generations is amongst Moroccans living in South London. One likely explanation of this discrepancy is that the more hetero-

**Table 5.3** Mean levels of trust in 'non-Moroccans' in London

	North Kensington (West)	South London	East London	North London
1 <sup>st</sup> generation	35	80	60	60
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	50	80	40	60

geneous the networks individuals have, the higher their trust levels are. Interestingly, a large majority of the second generation found it difficult to quantify the level of trust that they have in 'non-Moroccans'. Although initially they felt that their level of trust was higher than they would have in Moroccans living in Morocco, they found themselves unable to quantify it.

I'd probably trust them more...Funny that I'd trust an Englishman more than I'd trust a Moroccan man...Actually I'd have to put a question mark on that question because I haven't had that much experience [...] (Mostafa, Male, 32-F9-C1).

Related to generalised trust in strangers, interviewees were asked how trusting they would be if a complete stranger moved into their neighbourhood. Overall, most interviewees expressed willingness to welcome the person and not judge people without knowing them.

When somebody moves in, within two or three days we go and knock on the house and say 'Hello, where are you from? I live in house number x etc'. So we get to meet each other and they don't feel lonely (Houda, Female, 26-F12-C2).

Social trust of a generalised kind does not necessarily need to relate to a specific network or community, although, as the above replies demonstrate, it is possible to minimise ambiguity in measures of generalised trust by defining the parameters in which trust is being investigated (for example in the neighbourhood, city or country). However, understanding how one type of trust relates to another remains a critical question which demands further empirical investigation. Putnam's most recent article (2007) attempts to address this issue through a new study from a survey that he directed among residents in 41 US communities. Residents were sorted into the four principal categories used by the US Census: black, white, Hispanic and Asian. They were asked how much they trusted their neighbours and those of each racial category, and questioned about a long list of civic attitudes and practices, including their views on local government, their involvement in community projects, and their friendships. What emerged in more di-

verse communities was a bleak picture of civic desolation, affecting everything from political engagement to the state of social ties. Putnam, however, argues that this is only a short-term ‘downside of diversity’ as low trust levels – ‘even of one’s own race’ – are replaced in the long run when ‘successful immigrant societies have overcome such fragmentation by creating new, cross-cutting forms of social solidarity and more encompassing identities’ (2007: 137). Once again, Putnam makes very little reference in his study to the ‘class’ issue. Other contextual factors, specific to where the communities reside, have also been overlooked. One could argue that populations in very diverse cities might find themselves more confined to interacting within the boundaries of select groups of people (e.g. ethnic and other self-identifying groups). Thus, those in more homogeneous cities might have a wider range of social networks and not be isolated into various in-groups.

## 5.5 Civic engagement

This last section of the chapter addresses the fourth indicator of social capital listed in the introduction. Civic engagement is divided here into four categories:

- community involvement (informal, personal social relations);
- membership in an organisation (formal group-based membership);
- voting (public engagement); and
- newspaper readership (public engagement and cultural participation).

Similar to the way in which the last social capital indicator was examined, levels of civic engagement are compared across generations and by location of Moroccans in the capital.

### 5.5.1 *Community involvement*

Interviewees were asked about their level of personal (informal) involvement with their local communities, involving unpaid work that would benefit other individuals rather than their immediate family, i.e. visiting an elderly or sick person, or participating in a local event. Table 5.4 compares the level of community involvement across generations in the four parts of London. It is not surprising to find that members of the Moroccan community living in North Kensington show the highest level of community involvement, even amongst the second

**Table 5.4** *Levels of community involvement amongst Moroccans in London*

		North Kensington (West)	South London	East London	North London
1 <sup>st</sup> generation	Average	H: 6 M: 6 L: 2	H: 0 M: 2 L: 2	H: 0 M: 2 L: 2	H: 0 M: 2 L: 0
	Distribution per family	F1H, F2H, F3H, F4H, F5H, F6H, F7M, F8M, F9M, F16L, F17M, F18M, F20M, F23L	F10L, F14L, F21M, F22M	F11L, F12M, F13M, F15L,	F19M, F24M
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	Average	H: 4 M: 7 L: 3	H: 0 M: 1 L: 2	H: 0 M: 2 L: 2	H: 0 M: 1 M: 1
	Distribution per family	F1M, F2H, F3M, F4H, F5M, F6M, F7H, F8L, F9M, F16L, F17M, F18H, F20M, F23L	F10L, F14L, F21M, F22L	F11L, F12M, F13L, F15M	F19L, F24M

H = high; M = medium; L = low

generation. This is an indication that social capital is activated to compensate, to some extent, the lack of other forms of formal support. It is clear that members of ethnic minorities can respond to needs by establishing group solidarity. The sense of 'community' in North Kensington can also be seen as a trigger for shared responsibility towards its members, where norms of reciprocity dominate.

Yes, I do help people, I also help in the mosque cleaning and fixing things [...] I help my neighbours out if they need something to be fixed etc. There was a neighbour that I didn't know once and she asked me for help and she was quite surprised that I accepted to fix things for her without asking for money (Mohammed, Male, 63-F2-F).

Especially amongst families in North Kensington, the more the parents were involved with their local communities, the higher the level of involvement of their children. Some members of the second generation, however, found themselves under pressure from their parents to continuously engage with all the various community activities.

My dad, he makes me involved in everything [...] sometimes he's like *zidi* [go ahead], I have to be involved in a lot of things coz he makes me. Like he makes me go to supplementary school,

when there's something to do with Morocco he makes me go. When there's a demonstration, he makes me go, like he really wants me to be Moroccan and I am really Moroccan, and I support his ideas whatever but I prefer to keep a distance sometimes (Hassiba, Female, 26-F5-C2).

For many parents, having their children actively involved with their local Moroccan community is a way of reinforcing their sense of Moroccan identity. Moreover, it facilitates their access to existing support networks, for instance access to free supplementary school classes.

### 5.5.2 *Membership in organisations*

In *Bowling Alone*, Putnam (2000) used membership rates in a range of types of organisations as indicators of levels of social capital. These associations included: parent-teacher organisations; women's groups; Scouts; Red Cross, Lions clubs; service on a committee of a local organisation; work for a political party; and membership of a support group. He also reported the growth of another form of network – associational membership – often involving little or no face-to-face contact, which he concluded was indicative of depleting stocks of social capital. Putnam's analysis has been widely criticised, however, for failing to take account of changing patterns of civic engagement, and for perceiving new ways of engagement (for example the growth of associational memberships) through a nostalgic lens and attaching negative judgements to them (see for example Pollitt 1999; Skocpol 1999). Despite these criticisms, measuring the extent to which people are attached to formally constituted social groups of one kind or another is a method frequently employed for the measure of group-based relations in social capital research.

From Table 5.5 it is evident that the formal involvement of Moroccans in organisations is heavily concentrated in the North Kensington area, mostly through educational groups and other Moroccan organisations. It is surprising, however, to note that the engagement of other Moroccans, living mostly in South and North London, is non-existent. In North Kensington, Moroccan community members mobilise in order to compensate for weak provision or an absence of services (i.e. translation services, educational support classes) or to reinforce an existing group identity. The great majority of Moroccans who live in West London are very keen to pass on their 'heritage' to their children, and to instil in their children Islamic values, as Mohammed argues in the following quote:

**Table 5.5** *Type of membership in organisations amongst Moroccans in London*

	North Kensington (West)	South London	East London	North London
1 <sup>st</sup> generation	F1 (MVO, MO, M, E); F2 (MO, M); F3 (MO); F5 (MO); F6 (MO, MVO); F7 (MO,M); F8 (MO, MVO, SO); F16 (MO); F17 (SO)			
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	F1 (E); F2 (E); F3 (MO, E, S); F4 (MO); F5 (MO, E); F6 (E); F7 (M, E); F18 (E, MSC); F23 (MSC, IO)		F12 (MSC, M); F15 (E)	

MSC: Mainstream socio-cultural organisation

MO: Moroccan organisation

MVO: Mainstream voluntary organisation

SO: Sports organisation

E: Educational organisation (Moroccan)

M: Mosque

IO: International organisation

Yes, I'm helping out and for me it's a way also to help my country, not only Moroccans who live here. It's a duty for us to teach these young people religion and love for their country, so that they can learn how to behave with other people, keep them away from drugs etc. By filling up their time, they won't get into trouble (Mohammed, Male, 63-F2-F).

It is the absence of sufficient and adequate services that mobilises members of the Moroccan community to create and tap into immigrants' social capital. Moroccans with a different social status living in other parts of the capital have access to a 'mainstream' type of social capital. Two further hypotheses might explain the differentiated pattern of Moroccans' involvement in membership organisations. First, that individuals become involved in a group, association or community – that is, go beyond simple membership – if they perceive that doing so gives them access to a resource for the pursuit of certain valued goals. It also implies that, for immigrants, social capital appears to be more easily available within their community than in the larger society. Among many of them, the perception of being in the same condition in a new social, cultural and institutional environment seems to foster a sense of constituting 'a community of fate'. This sense is reinforced when the immigrant does not know the language of the host country. The second hypothesis is that the difficulty of accessing social capital in the larger community – because of prejudice, hostility or institutional barriers – leads members to search out social capital within their own minority community. The propensity to seek social capital in the 'eth-

nic enclave' tends to be greatest amongst immigrants who face serious problems of adaptation and amongst members of minorities who encounter barriers to their full participation in the institutions of the larger society.

### 5.5.3 *Voting and involvement with the local authorities*

These two items, the first of which is a more explicit measure of political participation than the second, inform our understanding of an individual's political pro-activity and awareness. The extent of engagement that individuals or families have with governmental institutions such as the local authorities, and with MPs and local councillors, is also indicative of 'institutional trust'. The purpose of the questions is also to demonstrate how 'institutional networks' are mapped, using items about citizen interaction.

As shown in Table 5.6, sixteen out of eighteen first-generation members who had the right to vote, did so. Only two abstained. This distribution suggests a positive indication of civic engagement. It might also be interpreted, in some cases, as a consequence of fear of the 'authorities' and a willingness to behave as law-abiding citizens so as not to attract any attention. Overall, however, many of my interviewees were conscious of the importance of voting and how it can help them to be more engaged in their local neighbourhoods and gain some form of representation in this country. Others, like Ali, who is also a member of the Labour Party, see involvement as a form of long-term investment in the future of the local community as well as that of their children.

The benefits of the community, because we need to be involved for the benefit of our children [...] (Ali, Male, 64-F1-F).

**Table 5.6** *Voting patterns amongst Moroccans in London*

	<i>North Kensington (West)</i>	<i>South London</i>	<i>East London</i>	<i>North London</i>
1 <sup>st</sup> generation	F1 (V, M); F2 (V); F3 (V); F5 (V, M); F6 (V); F7 (A); F8 (V); F16 (V); F17 (V); F20 (V)	F14 (V); F22 (V)	F12 (A); F13 (V); F15 (V)	F19 (V); F24 (V)
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	F2 (V); F3 (V/V); F4 (V); F6 (A); F7 (V); F9 (V/A); F16 (V); F18 (V); F23 (A)	F10 (A); F14 (A)	F12 (V, A); F13 (V); F15 (V)	F19 (V); F24 (V)

V: votes, A: abstained, M: member of a political party

Yes, I vote in England, the next one is on the 10<sup>th</sup> of June; the day after tomorrow [...] I try to tell all my friends to make sure they vote too. I believe we must vote in order to *have a voice* in this country (Zohra, Female, 38-F17-M).

As for the second generation, thirteen out of nineteen who have reached the age to vote, voted in the last general and local elections, and six abstained. The rate of abstainers is higher amongst the second generation than the first. Their interpretation of their voting rights is clearly different from that of their parents. Those who have voted are very conscious of the importance of their vote and choose very carefully who to give it to, which reflects a high level of political awareness.

Yeah, I make sure I vote now [...] When the Conservatives were in power I used to always vote for Labour but now I make sure the Conservatives don't get my vote, I vote Liberal Democrat. I don't understand their policies and stuff like that but it's either that or I don't vote. I make sure I vote because they say every vote counts [...] next time *inshallah* I'm going to vote Respect (Noura, Female, 36-F15-C1).

The current international events, especially the war on Iraq, have made several members of the second generation become very selective in who they vote for. But the lack of political parties representing their interests makes it a very difficult choice, as Samia explains:

Yes, I've only been able to vote twice as there have only been two general elections since I've been eligible to vote. And I voted in the local elections. But at the moment I'm a bit disillusioned, I don't know who to vote for. It's quite difficult, so now in the local election, I just look at the manifesto and see what suits me. I look at local issues, council tax and the congestion charge. Before I used to think about foreign policy but now everybody seems to have the same agenda (Samia, Female, 29-F24-C1).

This shift of focus from foreign policy to domestic policy can be interpreted as a renewed interest in their local neighbourhoods, and a reinforcement of their local sense of belonging, as well as disenchantment with foreign policy developments. A feeling of disillusionment certainly prevailed amongst all of those who abstained from voting. They felt that the whole process of voting is pointless, as it will not make any difference, especially as far as foreign policy is concerned. Moreover, unlike the first generation who are sometimes scared of the con-

sequences of not voting, the second generation are confident about their choice of not voting.

Quite a few years ago I think, I remember my mum used to scare me, 'If you don't vote, you will get a £400 fine', and I'd say, 'Don't worry, I'll pay it!' (Mohammed, Male, 31-Ind. 2<sup>nd</sup> G).

This last quote by Mohammed highlights the two opposed voting attitudes held by members of the Moroccan community. Whilst the first generation perceives voting as a *duty* and to some extent an indication of their loyalty to this country, the second generation sees voting largely as a *right* that they cannot be forced to change into a *duty*. In general, however, it was the absence of candidates who represented them and their needs that was the main factor discouraging young Moroccans from voting. This was put strongly by Zakaria, who feels that the lack of representation of Moroccans, and Arabs in general, makes the political arena a purely 'white' domain.

Nah, there's no point in me voting in this country [...] Yeah, because of the candidates and the people in general, I believe *it's their country*, it's white people's country! I haven't seen one Arab politician, Moroccan Arab politician yeah having any say, anything, so what's the point in me voting. What I'll waste my time walking down to Barlby Road to put a piece of paper in so that that guy can give me a congestion zone later! Or something silly like that [...] they're all the same anyway, they all add taxes and that, you know what I'm saying? I'm not really a voter, that's pointless for me, I can't see someone I'd vote for basically (Zakaria, Male, 23-F9-C2).

The last quote seemed to illustrate perfectly a disengaged young second-generation Moroccan; however, Zakaria insisted that his refusal to vote is not because he does not feel he belongs to this country, and argued instead that it is purely a question of lack of representation amongst candidates. Interestingly, amongst those who abstained from voting there was an army officer, who arguably could embody the highest level of civic engagement. Yet, his reasons for not voting are also valid:

I don't vote, not out of laziness or any disagreement with any one party. Some of it is to do with my job, there's no rule that you can't vote for any particular party but my philosophy is that *I'm an instrument of the state* and it doesn't matter who's in charge because at the end of the day I'll still do whatever the

government of the day says ... If tomorrow we woke up and for some reason all the Labour government were assassinated and the Tories were in power, I'd still do what the Tories told me to do anyway, my job is not in the British army for the Labour government today, its whoever's in power at the time... (Hamza, Male, 33-F23-C1).

In terms of individuals' knowledge of, and interaction with, the local authorities – mainly local MPs and the council – the highest level of involvement was amongst Moroccans living in the North Kensington area. In South and North London, none of the interviewees even knew the name of their local MP. The two main reasons why many families in North Kensington contacted their MP were for housing or access to secondary school for their children. This confirms earlier findings about levels of community participation and involvement, either in formal or informal mechanisms. Putnam's (1993a) premise that the existence of social capital within a specific community systematically leads to more political participation cannot be applicable in the case under study. The findings in this section clearly demonstrate that there are more complex factors involved in the decision of individuals to vote or to be more politically involved in general.

#### 5.5.4 *Newspaper readership*

In *Bowling Alone*, Putnam (2000) asserts that newspaper readership remains 'a mark of substantial civic engagement', as often newspaper readers are older, more educated and more rooted in their communities. In other words, the more informed a population, the better they can participate in political and social life. Putnam's research seems to suggest that higher newspaper readership equates with both quantitative and qualitative increases in political participation due to the resultant civic literacy. It is believed that informed individuals can better identify the effects of policy options upon their own interests and those of others in their community.

With respect to newspaper readership, both Arabic and English, almost one third of the first-generation Moroccans claimed to read newspapers on a regular basis (see Table 5.7 for details). It is not surprising, however, that the majority read Arabic newspapers. The fact that there is not such a high readership level could be explained by two factors: first, the high level of illiteracy amongst first-generation Moroccans, and second, the fact that the majority mentioned a preference to get their news updates from TV. Since that is the case for many first-generation Moroccans, one wonders if newspaper reading is associated with high social capital: what about the impact of television? Many of

**Table 5.7** *Newspaper readership amongst Moroccans in London*

	<i>North Kensington (West)</i>	<i>South London</i>	<i>East London</i>	<i>North London</i>
1 <sup>st</sup> generation	F1 (A); F6 (A); F8 (A, BS); F17 (T); F20 (A)	F22 (BS, A)	F12 (A,T)	F19 (A, BS)
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	F1 (M); F4 (BS); F7 (BS); F9 (BS); F16 (T); F18 (BS); F23 (BS)	F10 (BS, IN, A); F14 (BS)	F12 (IN, A); F15 (BS)	F24 (BS)

T: Tabloids; A: Arabic newspapers; M: Metro; IN: Internet newspapers; BS: Broadsheet newspapers

my interviewees who do not read newspapers claim they have no need to as they watch television. But according to American research, TV viewing equates with low social capital (Putnam 1995). Indeed, Putnam indicts increased TV viewing as the main cause for the decline in social capital. Television, he argues, destroys social capital by taking time away from civic engagement and by making viewers less trustful of the world outside their homes.

The newspaper usage of the second generation is higher (almost 50 per cent) and more diverse, from tabloids to broadsheets and the Internet, except for two interviewees who read Arabic newspapers on a semi-regular basis. Their choice of newspaper also differs according to age and educational level. The older they get, the more critical they become of certain types of newspapers such as the tabloids. Newspaper readership can be considered as an instance of cultural participation, and reading a newspaper is a more straightforward form of information processing than various other cultural activities. Similarly, and as research has shown (see, for example, Chan and Goldthorpe 2004, 2006), the choice of newspaper, especially English newspapers, could reveal individuals' attained status.

## 5.6 Summing up

This chapter has assessed and juxtaposed levels of social capital that exist among first- and second-generation Moroccans in London. Where appropriate, comparison was also made between members of the Moroccan community living in different parts of the capital. Although the various indicators used to measure social capital have been operationalised and analysed separately, they are all mutually inclusive. The overall picture reveals that the dense formal and informal networks within

areas of high spatial concentration of Moroccan residents, such as West London, imply the presence of a high level of *bonding*, and to a degree, *bridging* social capital. These dense networks were less visible in other parts of London, particularly in the south and north of the capital, where the selected families are of more affluent backgrounds.

The findings could also signify that social capital – in the form of formal and informal civic engagement – is often responsive to existing needs and reactive to gaps in mainstream provisions within these communities, instead of what Putnam (1995) argues as being the inscriptive nature of some communities and not others. One could therefore argue that it is not the absence of social capital within the Moroccan community living in West London that contributes to their social exclusion; it is rather the presence of barriers to accessing mainstream services in the larger society that creates an impetus to search for social capital in the minority community. This could potentially lead to reinforcing such a pattern across generations, to the extent that barriers to accessing mainstream networks remain unaddressed, and are maintained or accentuated instead by the propensity to pursue collective action on an ethnic basis.



## 6 A meso-level analysis of social capital: Moroccan organisations in action

### 6.1 Introduction

This chapter further assesses social capital within the Moroccan community living in London. It does so at a meso level, focusing particularly on voluntary and community organisation. The creation and renewal of social capital are seen as intimately tied up with the voluntary sector (Putnam 1993a, 2000), including ethnic associations (cf. Fennema & Tillie 1999; Tillie 2004). I profile ten Moroccan community groups/organisations to evaluate their role as incubators for the transformation of 'bonding' to 'bridging' and 'linking' social capital. The different types of social capital were assessed by four main indicators: first, the typology of the organisation; second, community involvement and pro-activity; third, effectiveness and ability to influence decision making; and fourth, connections and partnerships. This focus differs from the existing literature on at least three analytical levels: first, it avoids one-dimensional speculation that membership in voluntary/ethnic associations leads to greater *trust*, and hence greater political participation amongst immigrants (Fennema & Tillie 1999, 2001); second, it categorises migrant associations instead of treating them as a homogeneous core (Hamidi 2005); and third, it avoids analysing them in isolation from their *local* and national contexts.

This chapter also discusses the policy framework and the local context in which these organisations operate. The 'New Labour' government has fallen under the charm of the newly rediscovered concept of social capital; this fascination translates into various policies aimed at harnessing social capital within communities to promote higher social and community cohesion. A detailed profiling of the ten selected associations is given, followed by a discussion of their social capital indicators. The chapter ends with a brief overview of institutional and organisational challenges faced by Moroccan migrant associations.

## 6.2 The meso level of social capital

Social capital can exist both as a classic 'public good' for local communities, with positive spillover effects in neighbourhoods, or as a 'private good' that individuals use to promote their own interests. Looking at social capital at a meso level, the level of the voluntary sector must be based on an understanding of social capital as both private and public goods, as it has an edifying impact on community building at the local level. The vibrancy of associational life, according to analysts such as Putnam (1993a) and Fukuyama (1995), is positively correlated with the stocks of social capital a society possesses; the higher the stock the greater the vibrancy, and vice versa. The accumulation of social capital, and through it the creation of stronger civil society, is seen as a way to strengthen local communities, reduce social exclusion, increase political participation, foster innovation and reduce poverty (Chanan 2002).

Voluntary and community organisations are seen as incubators of values, civic attitudes and styles of organising based on mutual aid and co-operation (Putnam 1993a). They assume an activist and instrumental role: intended as participatory organisations that facilitate social connections and co-operation, through repeated interactions they engender trust, friendship and mutual aid among members (Anheier & Kendall 2000). For many political scientists (Cohen 2001; Savage, Tampubolon & Warde 2004), social capital, especially in the form of associations and informal affiliations, is the building block of civil society.<sup>1</sup> Through their formal and informal activity, residents learn lessons of reciprocity and trust, build networks that can be used to tackle local problems, and develop skills and resources that can be deployed in formal political institutions. The main advantage of the incubator approach is the dynamic focus on unanticipated consequences of trust, and its cross-cutting cultural applicability. A key disadvantage, however, is that it is unclear on vertical and non-face-to-face cases of trust; and it neglects power relations (Anheier & Kendall 2000).

The correlation between associational vitality and good government has been criticised as over-simplistic (Tarrow 1996; see also Berman 1997; Harriss 1997). The argument that voluntary associations create social trust, which spills over into political trust and higher political participation amongst immigrants, has also been criticised (Jacobs, Phalet & Swyngedouw 2004; Togeby 2004). First, associational activity may actually be a response to poor governmental performance. As Berman (1997: 569-570) argues: 'A flourishing civil society under these circumstances [i.e. "poor government"] signals government and institutional failure and bodes ill for political stability and democracy'. More generally, the activities of political institutions or other agencies might help or hinder the creation of social capital.

In general, Putnam (1993a) seems to neglect the role of public authorities in the *creation* and *destruction* of social capital. In his work on Italian regions, Putnam perceives 'the character of the region's associational incapacity, but with no responsibility for producing it' (Tarrow 1996: 395). As Maloney, Smith and Stoker (2000) suggest, public authorities are deeply implicated in the forms and activities of voluntary associations, whether in terms of the institutions they create or the resources they provide to encourage participation. Putnam's understanding of the challenge of governing in modern complex societies is also problematic, failing to engage with the wide-ranging debate about a shift from government to governance (Stoker 1998). The emerging pattern of governance concerns *partnerships* and *networks*, to which the key is the interrelationship between a range of voluntary, private and public bodies. Elected governments remain significant actors, but they have to collaborate with other organisations to achieve their goals. In short, institutions in civil society, including ethnic organisations, do not simply underwrite the capacity for good government; they are incorporated into the process of governing (Maloney et al. 2000).

The main fear concerning this shift is that the role of organisations that are defined as non-service providers (e.g. grassroots organisations and self-help groups) will be neglected and that only those that directly improve the outcomes of government policy will be supported; the shift is already occurring in the British context through the promotion of commissioning by voluntary organisations. By focusing on and encouraging the greater involvement of voluntary and community organisations in public service delivery, it has been argued (cf. Deakin 2001) that government is reducing the space available to civil society and failing to recognise its wider role (Jochum et al. 2005).

Clearly the complex forms of interaction between public bodies and institutions of civil society have not received the attention they deserve. Thus a wider and more contextual perspective on social capital is needed; not only to focus on numbers and activities of voluntary associations but also to take into account their relationship with political institutions. Some approaches in the social capital debate imply that influence flows only in one direction – civil society to state – rather than reciprocally. As Tarrow (1996) points out, Putnam generally perceives the nature of the state as an exogenous factor, neglecting the role of political structures and institutions in shaping the context of associational activity and hence the creation of social capital.

### 6.3 Contextual framework: central and local government policies

Before assessing the nature of social capital that Moroccan associations generate, we need to consider the context, both national and local, in which these organisations operate. In recent years the British government has established several frameworks for the development of regional, local and community-driven governance structures, which provide an enabling framework for social capital. New Labour's modernisation agenda focuses more sharply on community involvement principles in planning and public decision-making forums. The National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal lays out a comprehensive 'joined-up' strategy for tackling poverty, recognising the role of voluntary and community groups as active agents of social change. It also affirms that people should no longer be considered mainly as beneficiaries of development; they are now brought into the forefront in various ways, making the decisions about their neighbourhoods through various mechanisms (e.g. Local Strategic Partnerships – LSPs).<sup>2</sup>

#### 6.3.1 Central government initiatives

A number of longer-term developments in social policy have affected the way social capital has been taken up in local communities. The first relates to a reformed relationship between the voluntary sector and statutory bodies delivering services. This change took place at two levels. First, voluntary organisations shifted from the margins to the centre of social policy, whereby they are increasingly taking responsibility for delivering mainstream services that were previously provided by public bodies. Second, residents' involvement and participation have increased, as citizens or beneficiaries, in meeting local government goals, while significant aspects of the state apparatus have also been rolled back as part of a broader reform of public management structures in the 1980s (Begum 2003).<sup>3</sup>

As Jochum et al. (2005) point out, the call for civil renewal in Britain and in other Western societies is based on the assumption that citizens are increasingly disengaged from public life. Political participation is at an all-time low; falling public trust in institutions and declining membership of political parties are causes for concern. The challenge is to re-engage citizens in decisions that affect their lives and the life of their community; restore trust in political and state institutions; and promote social cohesion and social inclusion. The solution is seen in giving citizens more opportunity to participate in decision-making, and to promote the skills and support they need to do this. To illustrate further how the government policy agenda on 'civil renewal' is articu-

lated, I will discuss the three main components of the government's civil renewal agenda: *active citizenship*, *strengthened communities*, and *partnership in meeting public needs*.<sup>4</sup> These are, of course, all inter-related but artificially separated for the purpose of clarity.

*Active citizenship* primarily concerns individuals participating in the decisions that shape the lives and the well-being of their communities. It includes self-determination coupled with the values of mutuality and solidarity, and views its role as removing barriers to participation through the following means: '*citizenship education*' in schools, and also education and training initiatives for adults; '*volunteering*';<sup>5</sup> and '*civic participation*' which covers engagement with state institutions (Jochum et al. 2005).<sup>6</sup>

The '*strengthened communities*' policy item stems from the idea that community groups, networks and relationships are part of strong and vibrant communities, and build social capital that is an 'invaluable resource' for tackling community challenges. The government aims to strengthen communities through three other means. First, '*community development*' is achieved through building community capacity and effective community action, as well as asset ownership to help sustain community activity. Second, '*community cohesion*' reflects the belief that strong communities can be exclusive; therefore the building of links between groups of different backgrounds, in other words building 'bridging' social capital, is needed to increase understanding and mutual respect, and ensure a sense of common purpose.<sup>7</sup> The third means, '*community safety*', is believed to be essential to the building of strong, cohesive and active communities. Reducing crime and tackling drugs and anti-social behaviour, including securing borders and managing migration, are ways to help build confident communities and contribute to greater levels of community cohesion (Jochum et al. 2005).

*Partnership in meeting public needs* aims to improve the quality and responsiveness of public service provision in line with users' and citizens' needs and expectations. It has two dimensions: '*user involvement*' and '*co-delivery*'. Through 'user involvement', citizens can now express their views and engage in local decision-making. Consultation, used to inform service and policy development, has become a key to increasing user involvement. To implement 'co-delivery', government is increasingly interested in *contracting*<sup>8</sup> with voluntary and community organisations to deliver specific services. In 1998, the Compact was established and developed by the Home Office and the voluntary and community sector, to govern relations between the sector and the state (Jochum et al. 2005).<sup>9</sup>

Through these three policy streams, social capital clearly can be and is being used to promote objectives of participation and community involvement that are fundamental to many government regeneration in-

initiatives. This renewed focus on community involvement is part of systematic efforts to establish greater links between the community and the state. However, do these new government orientations have the desired effect? How do they affect migrant communities and associations?

### 6.3.2 *Local government initiatives*

Having described some of the general government policy initiatives promoting community engagement, I now briefly discuss some of these policy streams, implemented at the local level of the Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. Neighbourhood Renewal is the most recent scheme; however, its impact has not yet been fully measured. Therefore, an example of an older regeneration scheme, City Challenge, is provided instead, as it is believed to have had a more direct impact on the Moroccan community in North Kensington.

In 1992, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea won a £37.5 million bid under the Department of the Environment's City Challenge programme to undertake a 5-year regeneration activity in four of the borough's most deprived wards in North Kensington. From this, two projects, the Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre (MCHC) and the Moroccan Enterprise and Training Centre (METC), were developed, and impacted directly on the Moroccan community living in North Kensington.

The first project was already at the development stage, having started as a 'small' local initiative by members of the Moroccan community to meet the need for a larger mosque to accommodate the growing Muslim community in the area. They had started fundraising for the project, by collecting donations both locally and from abroad, when the City Challenge scheme began. The RBKC and City Challenge provided the site, site infrastructure and approximately £0.5 million towards the capital and revenue expenditure. Donors provided approximately £4 million for building the Centre and a further £1 million for the *Waqf* (Endowment Fund) (Gailani 2000). At the beginning it was estimated to cost £2 million, but finally cost £6 million. The building now provides a wide range of social, educational, training, cultural and religious facilities for Muslims of all national backgrounds who live in North Kensington and the surrounding areas. The project is an example of successful *partnership* between different stakeholders, confirming that an initiative done in collaboration with the direct beneficiaries is likely to thrive.

The second project, the Moroccan Enterprise and Training Centre (METC), was another outcome of the City Challenge scheme in RBKC. It was developed to meet the training needs of Moroccans living in

North Kensington, who were displaying high rates of unemployment. However, no meaningful consultation with its members took place before its implementation. Instead, the project was developed as an 'independent' sub-project of Kensington and Chelsea College. There was a small consultative board with members from the Moroccan community, but individuals did not feel capable of making any significant change to an already-set agenda. To this day people are sceptical about whether it has made any difference to the lives of Moroccans in the area.

METC got £200,000 a year or something. What did it achieve? How many people went into jobs? We simply don't know [...] It was a posh centre, but when the project ended and it was empty for a while the College took back the centre. In terms of benefiting the different community groups in the area, I would say that it was not a progressive policy they had, in the end it just maintained the status quo (A.B.).

Fawaz Zeidan, the director of the Arabic Speaking Information and Advice Centre, also feels that the project did not benefit as many Moroccans as it was aimed to do.

It lasted for five years, there was a lot of money, but again very few Moroccans benefited from the training, and a lot of those who benefited were non-Moroccans from outside the area. And of course funding ended and they couldn't continue the project [...] there were attempts but I don't think they were big enough to meet the needs of the community [...] Similar courses were offered by both METC and the College, and people were wondering why they should go to METC instead of the College.

Arguably, the METC project failed to attain its objectives and rejuvenate the skills of Moroccan residents in the area, for several reasons. First, the project was established as a top-down, 'one-off' initiative without meaningful consultation with the beneficiaries to assess what type of project was most needed within the community. Second, although the project was aimed at the Moroccan community, it duplicated existing courses. And third, the project had no proper exit strategy, or handing over whereby members of the community take charge of the project.

## 6.4 An overview of the selected organisations

Ten organisations were selected from across London to reflect the diversity within Moroccan migrant associations. Seven of these organisations are based in West London, and my employment within the voluntary sector enabled me not only to work with them but also to get a better insight into some of their internal operational dynamics. As for the other three organisations, one is a *Widadia* (*Amicale*) in East London, following a similar activity agenda as the other *Widadias* in West London. The other two organisations represent a different type of ‘migrant’ association that I consider relevant to highlight. Table 6.1 provides a detailed profile of each of these organisations. Names of organisations have been replaced with alphabetical letters for confidentiality; they are described as Organisations A to J.

### 6.4.1 A profile and typology of the organisations

In London, I identified five broad types of Moroccan association: first, the *Widadias*; second, small self-help associations, usually with an educational focus; third, welfare associations; fourth, philanthropic ‘elitist’ organisations; and fifth, associations of students and professionals. In the ensuing analysis, these will be referred to as Type 1 to Type 5 organisations respectively. The growing number of Moroccan associations in London has triggered a lot of interest, if not concern, especially amongst RBKC Council representatives, who up till now do not understand why there are so many organisations.

#### 6.4.1.1 Type 1: *Widadias*

The root of the word *Widadia*<sup>10</sup> comes from *Wid*, meaning ‘amicability’, and *Ikhae*, meaning ‘brotherhood’. The Moroccan government established the first *Widadias* in Europe, mainly in France, Belgium and the Netherlands, to counter the opposition movement abroad and to exert influence over its citizens. The chair of one of the London *Widadias* points out:

When the Moroccan government allowed for the establishment of *Widadias* and organisations in the late 1970s, after the Green March, these *Widadias* were established in order to bring the community together and protect the interest of the Moroccan community both in Morocco and the host country. That was the aim of these associations; they played the role of a bridge between the home country and the community (Mustapha, Chair of Organisation A).

**Table 6.1** Background and types of organisation

Org establishment	Date of establishment	Status	Main objectives	Main activities	Catchment area	Users	Language	
Type 1	A	1979	C/C	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preservation of Moroccan identity</li> <li>• Lobbying for rights of Moroccans in London to Moroccan government/administration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Celebration of religious and national festivals</li> <li>• Advocacy</li> </ul>	London-wide, focus on Westminster area	Moroccans	Arabic
	B	1978	C/C	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preservation of Moroccan identity through Arabic classes, sports activities and cultural events</li> <li>• Advocacy on behalf of members of the Moroccan community for better access to mainstream services</li> <li>• Lobbying for rights of Moroccans in London to the Moroccan government/ administration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Celebration of religious and national festivals</li> <li>• Running an Arabic school</li> <li>• Advocacy</li> <li>• Interpreting services</li> <li>• Sports activities</li> </ul>	London-wide, focus on East London area	Moroccans / other Arabic speakers, mostly from North Africa	Arabic/ English
Type 1	C	1978	C/C, R/C	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preservation of Moroccan identity through Arabic classes, sports activities and cultural events</li> <li>• Advocacy on behalf of members of the Moroccan community for better access to mainstream services</li> <li>• Lobbying for rights of Moroccans in London to the Moroccan government/ administration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Running evening classes for children in curriculum subjects and Arabic</li> <li>• Organising leisure activities for children – outings, sports sessions</li> <li>• Running Arabic and English classes for adults</li> <li>• Referrals to mainstream services</li> <li>• Celebration of religious and national festivals</li> </ul>	London-wide, focus on West London area	Moroccans / other Arabic speakers of a Muslim background	Arabic/ English

<i>Org</i>	<i>Date of establishment</i>	<i>Status</i>	<i>Main objectives</i>	<i>Main activities</i>	<i>Catchment area</i>	<i>Users</i>	<i>Language</i>
D	1991	C/C	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To advocate on behalf of members of the Moroccan community to improve access to mainstream services</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Referrals to mainstream services</li> <li>Organising of social events and gatherings for the elderly</li> <li>Celebration of religious festivals</li> </ul>	London-wide, focus on West London area	Moroccans of all ages	Arabic
E	1994	C/C, RC 1995	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To cater for the social and educational needs and general welfare of Moroccan youth</li> <li>To help maintain their progress and motivation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Run evening and weekend classes in curriculum subjects and Arabic</li> <li>Sports activities and outings</li> <li>Round tables and forum discussions</li> <li>Celebration of religious festivals</li> </ul>	West London	Moroccans aged 8–25	English/Arabic
F	1986	C/C, RC 1992, CLG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To promote health and education amongst Moroccan and Arabic-speaking women and their families</li> <li>To relieve social pressures amongst these women with the object of improving their conditions of life</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Advice and referrals</li> <li>Youth Club</li> <li>Elderly outreach</li> <li>English and Arabic classes</li> <li>Social and recreational activities</li> </ul>	London-wide, focus on West London area	Moroccans and Arabic-speaking women of all ages	English/Arabic
G	1994	C/C/, RC 1995	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Advance and improve educational level of young Moroccans</li> <li>Relief of poverty, sickness and distress by provision of information, advice and counselling services</li> <li>Provide recreational or leisure-time activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Advice and referrals</li> <li>Youth activities, through a youth club open six days a week / sport activities</li> <li>Evening support classes</li> <li>Training courses</li> <li>Other leisure activities – camps, field trips</li> </ul>	London-wide, focus on West London area	Moroccans aged 5–22	English/Arabic

Org Date of establishment	Status	Main objectives	Main activities	Catchment area	Users	Language
H 1986	C/C, RC1992	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support Moroccan and other Arabic-speaking individuals in the provision of information, advice, guidance and counselling</li> <li>To improve educational levels of young people</li> <li>To foster knowledge of Morocco in the UK</li> <li>To develop commercial and economic links between the two countries</li> <li>To develop cultural exchanges</li> <li>To encourage social contact in the UK between nationals of the two countries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Welfare advice</li> <li>Interpreting services</li> <li>Saturday supplementary school</li> <li>Elderly outreach work</li> <li>Cultural and leisure activities</li> <li>Organise social and cultural events</li> <li>To organise fundraising events for Moroccan charitable institutions</li> </ul>	London-wide, focus on residents of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea	Moroccans and other Arabic speakers of all ages	Arabic–English
I 1975	C/C, RC 2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To foster knowledge of Morocco in the UK</li> <li>To develop commercial and economic links between the two countries</li> <li>To develop cultural exchanges</li> <li>To encourage social contact in the UK between nationals of the two countries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Organise social and cultural events</li> <li>To organise fundraising events for Moroccan charitable institutions</li> </ul>	UK–Morocco	Moroccans and non-Moroccans	French–English–Arabic
J 2006	Branch of an R/C in France	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To further charitable needs including the relief of poverty, sickness and old age of people living in Morocco</li> <li>To create a network of Moroccan students, graduates and professionals in London, mainly in the finance sector</li> <li>Provide information and guidance for new Moroccan students</li> <li>Provide a virtual forum for discussion</li> <li>To develop cultural exchanges</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Organising social networking events</li> <li>Exchange of information via the internet and on a face-to-face basis</li> </ul>	Morocco–France–UK	Mostly Moroccans but open to other French speakers	French–English

C/C: Constituted charity; R/C: Registered charity; CLG: Company Limited by Guarantee

Although the ethos of the *Widadias* remains the same as in most other European countries, the setting up of the first *Widadias* in the UK was not actually a government initiative. When I interviewed the founder of the first *Widadia* in the UK, he explained to me that it was during a trip to the Netherlands in the late 1970s that he got the idea.

In 1977 I went to Holland to visit some friends in Tilburg, I visited their *Widadia*, and I saw what they were doing. I came back with this idea, discussed it with some friends and then we set up the *Widadia* [...] At that time we were four or five organisations. But we in the *Widadias* wanted to keep ourselves separate from the other organisations because we thought that Morocco was going to help us (Muhcine).

As Anja van Heelsum (2002) suggests, based on her research on Moroccan organisations in the Netherlands, although on paper *Widadias* were indeed meant to help Moroccans abroad to develop social and cultural activities, they often appear to have functioned as a control apparatus of the Moroccan government. This opinion is confirmed in a quote from Sofia, a second-generation Moroccan, who explains:

There's so much suspicion surrounding the *Widadias*, if you ask anyone on the street, they'll say they're there to spy for the Embassy, nothing more, nothing less. I've never seen good come out of the *Widadias* other than those occasional national celebrations, I've seen nothing constructive come out of the *Widadias*, I have no faith in them (Sofia, Female, 37-F10-C1).

Organisations A, B and C come under the *Widadia* category, although Organisation C has 'evolved' over time towards responding to the growing needs of community members, and especially its youth. The other two organisations still focus on reinforcing links with the country of origin by organising National-Day celebrations and so on. The case of the UK/London might be exceptional, but what I have witnessed is that these organisations are not 'intimidated' in the least by the Moroccan authorities. During the four years that I have spent observing and working with some *Widadias*, I have seen them do their best to defend the rights of members of the community who experienced cases of abuse from the Moroccan administration, by writing open letters to the Moroccan press and 'naming and shaming' individuals or local Moroccan authorities. Although initially there was a degree of 'close monitoring' of members of the Moroccan community, and there still is to some extent, the *Widadia* representatives did shift power relations between the community and the authorities. Now that they have lost their sym-

bolic ‘power’ over the community, they are using it constructively for their benefit *vis-à-vis* the Moroccan authorities.

#### 6.4.1.2 *Type 2: small, informal or formal self-help associations*

Associations D and E listed in Table 6.1 are mainly focused on welfare issues of first- and second-generation Moroccans living in London. The first is a ‘self-serving’ type of organisation that is financially independent and focuses mainly on assisting its members and non-members, mostly Moroccans, to access mainstream services. According to the chair of the organisation, financial independence is vital to its development:

The organisation doesn’t get any external funding, we mostly rely on donations. We believe that external funding impedes the organisation’s development (Ahmed, chair of Organisation D).

Remarkably, this organisation has existed now for about fifteen years, informally (i.e. it is not formally registered as a charity), and without any external sources of funding, yet it has been able to effectively support its members in numerous ways.

Organisation E is also a self-help group based in North Kensington, but with registered charity status. Although it was set up to run various activities, its main focus is on meeting the educational needs of the second and third generations. It is renowned in the area as one of the most successful Moroccan supplementary schools. In the North Kensington area there are more than five supplementary schools teaching mainstream curriculum subjects and Arabic and religious studies. Three of these operate under the guidance of the North Kensington Consortium of Supplementary Schools.<sup>11</sup>

Supplementary schools, like any other self-help group, start on a very small scale. For instance, two or three parents get together and start running support classes for their children ‘informally’ in their front room; then, as the group gets bigger, they move on to rent a room or use a community centre. The parents typically meet and start developing a bit more of the curriculum and style of working with children. In most parts of the country they do this in isolation. In fact, a supplementary school can remain completely private, with no external funding, run only by volunteers. Organisation E developed in this fashion; however, having a growing number of students, it started looking for outside sources of funding but kept a degree of independence. According to Angela Bell, the director of the North Kensington Consortium of Supplementary Schools:

[...] it was always much more religious, a break-away group and wouldn't accept teachers from the Moroccan government. They are very independent, they were associated very closely with their premises which was Golborne Youth Centre and there were a couple of youth workers who were instrumental in making sure that everything went quite smoothly [...] it was seen as a completely Moroccan establishment.

Although most supplementary schools are closely associated with the teaching of the mother-tongue language, examples such as the one run by Organisation E prove the contrary. They also help the children to raise their educational achievement through the provision of support with curriculum subjects. Their role will be further discussed in Chapter 7.

#### 6.4.1.3 *Type 3: welfare associations*

Organisations F, G and H fall into this category. They are primarily focused on the improvement of the legal position and living conditions of Moroccan migrants, and concentrate fully on meeting their various needs. Through the years they have positioned themselves well within the community, and also in relation to mainstream services, as advocates for the benefit of both the Moroccan community and other Arabic-speaking communities.

Organisation H resulted from the first significant joint initiative between different Moroccan community organisations at the time (1986) and the Notting Hill Social Council.<sup>12</sup> They initially developed as a sub-committee of the Social Council; after the first re-elections the committee became an independent organisation, with a membership of around 500 at the time. The aims and objectives of the organisation were to secure full access to services and resources and to develop outreach work broadening the involvement and participation of the Moroccan community in various activities. According to one of its founders, the main idea was:

[...] to set up the organisation to serve as a custodian to any future Moroccan project [...] We also wanted to show them [*the Council*] that we were *integrated enough* by telling them what we thought was best for our community [...] We requested a centre that is open to the members of this community so that they can come here and get a service, speaking their own language, in a friendly way [...] *money was not our business* (Muhcine).

In fact, since 1991, the organisation has benefited from full funding from the RBKC Council. Although it was initially set up to serve the

needs of the Moroccan community in the Borough, the growing number of other Arabic speakers in the area put the organisation under pressure to serve them as well. The Council also required the organisation to open its doors to all users, otherwise it threatened to stop funding it. This decision, according to Councillor David Campion, had the effect of 'a psychological loss for the Moroccan community' as, for over 10 years it had been a landmark in the borough, which acknowledged the presence of Moroccans by fully subsidising the running of the centre. Cllr Paget Brown explains further why the borough was itself under pressure to financially support an organisation that was open to all.

[...] the Council believes that spending tax-payers' money is to provide advice to all the residents in the borough whatever their origin or ethnicity, we should provide advice, and we do, we have six advice agencies, scattered around the borough [...] What I was worried about is that one of our advice agencies, because of the name-board outside, was only giving advice to the Moroccan community, and it seems that's wrong, because the Moroccan community is part of the wider neighbourhood, there are other Arabic speakers that should get advice from them. If we leave it only for Moroccans then we ought to support a Somali advice agency etc....and we can't do that, because to my mind this will reinforce differences and not encourage integration (Cllr Paget Brown).

Organisation F was initially part of the project of setting up organisation H. However, because of ideological differences over gender issues, Organisation F established itself as an independent organisation focusing mainly on meeting the needs of Moroccan and other Arabic-speaking women in the borough.

Organisation G was set up in 1995 to address the issues of the second generation in terms of educational and religious guidance, as well as recreational activities. Over the years, it has responded in an exemplary way to the various needs of Moroccan and Muslim youth in the area.

#### 6.4.1.4 *Type 4: philanthropic 'elitist' organisations*

Organisation I is a type of association that aims to reinforce ties between Britain and Morocco. It was set up more than 30 years ago by a retired British diplomat in Morocco, to foster knowledge of Morocco in the UK, develop tourism and cultural exchanges, and encourage social contact in the UK between nationals of the two countries. Over the years the organisation has held several events with the purpose of raising funds for Moroccan charitable organisations in Morocco. Organisa-

tion I is one of the most 'elitist' charitable Moroccan institutions. Most its members are former or current diplomats in the UK and Morocco, Moroccan businessmen and entrepreneurs, and a very small minority of successful Moroccans born and bred in the UK. Although membership is 'open', very few of the Moroccan organisations mentioned above know of its existence. In many ways, Organisation I is a typical example of the closed 'old boy' network.

#### 6.4.1.5 *Type 5: students' and professionals' associations*

This is a new type of Moroccan association, and Organisation J fits into this category. Its existence reflects the more recent skilled migration from Morocco and France, more specifically the *fourth wave* of Moroccan migration mentioned in Chapter 4. Organisation J was recently founded by graduates and professionals in London, working especially in the finance sector. It aims to build a network for sharing information and guidance for new Moroccan students as well as provide a virtual forum for discussion and cultural exchange. Like the previous type of association, this one aims to organise events for the benefit of charities in Morocco. Members of this organisation have very little, if any, contact with either the Moroccan community or the voluntary sector in London. In fact, it is a branch of an association of students and graduates from France. Its membership is largely confined to middle- and upper-middle-class Moroccans, French and French-Moroccans living in London.

The common denominator between these five types of organisation, whether they are serving working-class or middle- and upper-class 'Moroccan migrants', is that they consider it important nowadays to organise activities on Moroccan cultural issues, which include the celebration of Ramadan, *Eid al Fitr*, and other national festivals. This proves that the oldest aims of organisations, and a typical target of migrant organisations in general through the last 40 years (van Heelsum 2002), have not changed over time or across social class. They might have been approached and delivered differently, but in essence they have remained the same.

#### 6.4.2 *Organisational capacity*

The organisational capacity of voluntary associations varies tremendously and this greatly affects their capacity to participate, meet the needs of users and, most importantly, influence decision-makers in mainstream society. Two main factors determine the organisational capacity of voluntary associations – financial and human resources. This helps to indicate how intertwined is the relationship between financial, human and social capital.

#### 6.4.2.1 *Financial resources*

Table 6.2 provides a summary of the range and sources of funding for each of the organisations studied. Respondents, with the exception of Organisations I and G, believed that the competitive nature of funding, both locally and nationally, has forced smaller organisations to operate on a thin line of survival. They found it very challenging to secure core funding, and equally difficult to get project funding; even when they did get it, they struggled to cover their running costs. Although most organisations had a business plan, they did not have a long-term funding strategy; most of their fundraising was *ad hoc* and reactive. As Hali-ma Begum (2003) puts it, this situation seems to be destroying social capital – by appearing to reward the formal action that takes place in professionalised settings and by depressing people’s spontaneous action in less professionalised settings. Many respondents of small and large organisations expressed concern about their freedom to campaign and influence while accepting funding from the government. Partly for this reason, some organisations such as D prefer not to receive any funding from any sources and rely instead only on members’ donations.

They give you money and give a lot of conditions they wanted to do this work and that work, which makes it impossible for you to get even 3,000 pounds to run a small project. Sometimes they even belittle you because you haven’t done anything [...] so you *lose your confidence* in doing anything. It’s always ‘them’ putting pressure on the communities (Ahmad, Chair of Organisation D).

This situation was also confirmed by Cllr Pat Mason:

There are many organisations, even ones which I sit on, which are forced to do things they don’t want to because the funders say ‘We will give you this money if you do this’. But I mean they have to decide whether they can accept that or there will be separation like there was in Oldham [...].

Funders’ criticism of community organisations may be connected to government priorities in relation to service delivery. The paradox here is that increased funding to community organisations raises the issue of independence, and can thereby damage the spontaneity of social capital. For example, small self-help groups such as supplementary schools have to be part of the Consortium in order to manage to run their project. Although it is a safe option for them, it halts the natural development of the group and builds a certain dependency.

Table 6.2 Organisational capacity

Org nationality	Number of full-time staff	Number of part-time staff	Number of volunteers	Office	IT	Main sources of information	Average gross income per year	Main funding sources	
								Membership donations	Local authorities national
A 6 Moroccan	0	0	3 Moroccan	None/had an office in the past	No	Local newsletters and the consulate	£3,000–5,000	Yes	No
B 12 Moroccan	0	1 Moroccan	3 Mixed	None	No	Local newsletters and the consulate	£8,000–10,000	Yes	No
C 7 Moroccan	0	5 mixed	3 mixed	Yes	Yes + website	Local and national newsletters, reports and the consulate	£20,000–25,000	Yes	Yes
D 11 Moroccan	0	0	7 Moroccan	No	No	Cafés, mosques	£3,000–5,000	Yes	No
E 13 Moroccan	0	7 mixed	7	Yes	Yes	Local mailings and newsletters	£25,000–30,000	Yes	Yes
F 9 Moroccan	2 Moroccan	3 Moroccan	4 Moroccan	Yes	Yes + website	Local and national mailing lists and newsletters	£130,000–140,000	Yes	Yes
G 7 Moroccan	2 Moroccan	2 Moroccan	8 mixed	Yes + youth club	Yes + website	Local and national mailing lists and newsletters	£115,00–125,000	Yes	Yes
H 11 mixed, majority Moroccan	3 mixed	9 Moroccan	6 mixed	Yes	Yes + website	Local and national mailing lists and newsletters	£160,000–170,000	No	Yes, mainly
I 6 mixed	0	0	4 mixed	Yes	Yes + website	Local, national and international mailing lists etc.	Accounts not available	Yes, mainly	No
J 10 mixed	0	0	10 mixed	No	Yes + website	Local, national and international mailing lists etc.	Accounts not available	Yes, mainly	No

\* This does not necessarily mean external volunteers; they are often members of the Management Committee who volunteer to oversee the day-to-day running of the organisation's activities.

Other organisations, like H, which has been fully funded by Kensington and Chelsea Council for over ten years, face a different dilemma. Not only do they become dependent on the Council's funding; they also become a 'token community organisation' responding to all the needs of Moroccans in the area. Whether the organisation is adopting a progressive or a non-progressive community development approach to its users does not really matter, as long as it is serving the government-identified *needs* of the community. As Aisling Byrne, a former director of a Moroccan organisation explains:

Through the years, not only did these funders support non-progressive community groups, but they also helped maintain the status quo within the community, hence stopping the community from moving forward. It almost seems as though the Moroccan community, in North Kensington especially, has not changed over the last twenty years.

Funding is important not only for the existence of voluntary and community organisations, but also for maintaining the independence of the sector. Currently, an increasing number of Moroccan organisations are taking advantage of the government's policy objective of public service delivery; however, some organisations feel that it is to the detriment of other more pressing concerns defined by the community.

#### 6.4.2.2 *Human capital*

The number of part-time and full-time paid staff in each organisation can be a sound indicator of its organisational capacity. Nevertheless, as is often the case with community organisations, there is an over-reliance on volunteers for the day-to-day running of activities. Table 6.2 confirms that most of the small organisations rely on their Management Committee members to ensure the overall running of the organisation. The main factors behind this are in relation to financial resources, which prevent them from recruiting part-time or full-time workers; and the internal dynamics of the organisation, whereby its founders prefer to keep control and are afraid to delegate to other members or volunteers.

The ethnic diversity of the Management Committee in each organisation is arguably another indicator of good governance. Frequently, in small organisations such as A, B and D, which have a majority of Moroccans on the governing board, an air of suspicion arises, especially from the funders' perspective; they often assume that the organisation is a 'family business' and lacks accountability, which might not necessarily be the case. My experience in dealing with several Moroccan organisations (A-H) has taught me that a board of trustees that is com-

posed of Moroccans only is a strong mark of the *identity* of the organisation more than anything else. They are more concerned about losing a further inch of their *independence* by having an *external agenda* imposed on them, than about showing their annual accounts. As registered charities, most of them have to submit all the necessary documentation and make it public under charity law.

What was most striking in working with these organisations was the lack of involvement of members from the second generation. In fact, unlike other European countries where second-generation-led organisations have reached a significant number (cf. Ghayat 1997; van Heelsum 2002; Wihtol de Wenden 1994), this is still not the case in London. The view of most second-generation Moroccans is that, in many of the organisations in North Kensington, especially those led by the first generation, ‘community leaders’ or ‘gatekeepers’ are maintaining a traditional agenda for and on behalf of the community.

I think these organisations do not act as facilitators but act as the gatekeepers of the community [...] ‘To get through to communities, you have to go through us, we’re the way into the community’... they don’t facilitate, they don’t encourage people to become self-sufficient; they help them to become dependent on the organisation [...] (Fadi, Male, 30-F10-C3).

The involvement of second-generation members in Moroccan organisations is therefore very low. Their involvement would require that they either embrace the norm and conform to the set agenda, or challenge the status quo. The majority choose neither and stay away.

I think there’s a sense of resolution that nothing is ever gonna go right, so the best thing to do is get out of there [...] I mean I must admit, I’m not successful or anything, but I wouldn’t want to work with any of the *Widadias* or help with the supplementary schools in there, because there’s so much politics going on [...] So if you’re gonna go down there with the intention of doing any constructive work, you’re gonna have to fight the community leaders and that’s gonna be a long battle, and it isn’t gonna be won very easily. So, unless you have the time, energy and determination, it’s not worth going (Sofia, Female, 37-F10-C1).

Sofia speaks for many of the second generation who were interviewed. However, because Type 1 organisations are the most prevalent in the North Kensington area, it gives a distorted picture to younger members of how most Moroccan organisations operate. Type 3 organisations, at least Organisations F and G, do offer an alternative, healthier option of

community work, but a limited number of second-generation Moroccans get involved, mostly as users. Those who have ventured to work for one of the Type 3 organisations found the experience both challenging and enriching.

I thought yeah I want to do this because *this is who I am* [...] It was a mixed experience. It was an experience full of successes as well as failures. I'm quite happy with it, but at the same time I wasn't able to achieve everything I wanted to when I first started. For a number of reasons... lack of funding etc. But um... yeah...on the whole it was a good experience for me because it gave me a good understanding of...um...the voluntary sector in this country [...] I think I've learnt from it a lot more than what I've given (Fadi, Male, 30-12-C1).

The limited skills and low literacy rate amongst organisations of Type 1, and to some extent Type 2, limit their capacity and lessen their efficiency. Operating on a voluntary basis does not encourage them to improve their skills and knowledge, so they become easy targets for criticism as well as a reflection of the vulnerabilities of the community. These organisations in a sense become a mirror image of the Moroccan migrant community as a whole and give it its identity; yet in reality, associations and organised public events are not the primary expression of the migrants' transnational identity, but of informal practices of their everyday life.

## 6.5 Assessing social capital within Moroccan organisations

The preceding account dealt with the typology of Moroccan organisations in London, describing the activities they run and their organisational capacity. This section will develop social capital indicators further, drawing on a pragmatic model offered by MacGillivray and Walker (2000) who distinguish between various indicators on a meso or *formal level* (Table 6.3). The three identified indicators are: (a) community involvement and pro-activity, (b) effectiveness and ability to influence decision-making, (c) networks and partnerships. The indicators are interrelated, but separated here for the sake of clarity. These three indicators have to be examined in the light of the typology and organisational capacity of each organisation, as these have a direct impact on its capacity to move from 'bonding' to 'bridging' and 'linking' social capital.

**Table 6.3** *Matrix of social capital components*

<i>Type of capital</i>	<i>Social (informal)</i>	<i>Social (formal)</i>
Type of trust	Trust in each other	Trust in organisations
Components	Level of trust	Number of organisations
	Norms	Services provided
	Reciprocity	Effectiveness
	Networks and connections	Community involvement
		Networks and partnerships

Source: MacGillivray and Walker (2000)

### 6.5.1 *Community involvement and pro-activity*

There is a considerable amount of volunteering that takes place within the Moroccan community through mosques, supplementary schools, mentoring projects and self-help groups. However, much of this volunteering is not documented, and appears linked to the informal voluntary sector. Volunteering within the Moroccan community seems driven by individuals responding to gaps in the services, or helping out so that projects and initiatives do not collapse. As Begum (2003) suggests, volunteers are often critical in sustaining much-needed projects at the grass-roots level, but there is a shortage of funds for their training and development.

The tendency, especially amongst activists within small organisations, of not delegating to other members of the Management Committee or volunteers, puts pressure on a small number of individuals. Sometimes acting in an individual capacity rather than representing an interest group can become unhealthy, and be perceived as ‘gate-keeping’ the community. Little is done to encourage other people to become involved in key networks and consultative structures, causing networks to become highly vulnerable to fracture from staff turnover or ‘drop-out’. More importantly, many respondents felt that this process keeps the involvement of new people to a minimum. Interviewees were concerned that, within the community sector, the ‘community leaders’ had the effect of holding back new and younger community activists.

‘Community involvement’, according to Muhcine, a founder of one of the first Moroccan associations in London, provided proof that the ‘community’ was integrated into the system. He explains:

[...] there was a point where I said that the Moroccan community needs professionals. There are two ways of getting into the system; the first one is through the professional way, while the second one is through political participation. In terms of the professional way, I thought that was the most appropriate at the time,

because we had to build and create the environment and also to set up the system in place.

The community recalled several instances of collective action and mobilisation over a common cause. The creation of the Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre was a recurring example. This success story exemplifies the nature and scale of collective action that can take place within the community, when there is a strong common cause. Despite all their differences, members of the Moroccan community and all the different parties collaborated in the planning, fundraising and building of the Centre.

Notwithstanding several examples of success stories of collective action within the Moroccan community, people were generally pessimistic about each other's willingness to contribute to addressing collective problems. Many respondents felt that most people held an individualistic outlook, and assumed that people are either unreliable or lack the capacity to organise, lobby and influence the local authorities. A range of barriers prevented people from acting together over collective problems – these included language barriers, low literacy levels, and a lack of confidence and self-esteem, which stops people from vocalising their concerns. This was particularly the case for organisations of Types 1 and 2.

More than one project has been hi-jacked from the community, for example the Spanish college was offered to the community, because local authorities wanted to help the community. It used to be ours, the Spanish used to have one room. We had the ground floor, the first floor and the second floor. We used to gather ten pence from members of the community to organise events and things [...] If we kept on that level we would have had a much bigger institution for Moroccans, but there was a conflict between some organisations and they ended up missing that opportunity [...] Unfortunately there are no pressure groups within the community, and those who were capable ended up giving up because of tensions between individuals etc. (Abdulali, Community Development Worker).

In North Kensington, the poverty and disadvantage existing in the area impacted on much of the voluntary and community activity there, including work by Moroccan organisations, in response to social needs as well as reacting to a gap in service delivery. This is particularly the case for Organisations F, G and H, which were created to respond to the welfare needs of the community that were unmet by mainstream services. For example, Organisation G had to mobilise and offer a ser-

vice to tackle the problem of substance misuse in the area. Rashid, a Youth Worker, elaborates on their initiative:

They've done a lot of work in this area and they've changed people's lives, literally [...] The approach that they use is by encouraging young people to go back to religion works [...] To tackle this problem is not easy. The good thing also about this organisation is that they teach young people how to behave properly and offer the youth an alternative youth centre that matches with their religious and cultural background.

### 6.5.2 *Effectiveness and ability to influence decision-making*

The capacity for community representatives to participate in formal decision-making structures is an important indicator of the stocks of *bridging* and *linking* social capital in communities. This social capital indicator functions as an internal check on the democratic culture within the voluntary organisation itself, and allows individuals representing the community and voluntary sector to vet public decisions taken by external agencies (Begum 2003).

Within Organisations A to G, attitudes towards the local authorities ranged from general mistrust of local government, to political cynicism and a lack of confidence in the Council's commitment to creating a working partnership with the local community and voluntary sector. In some cases, this scepticism was founded upon past disappointments in dealings with the Council, regarding either financial support of organisations or the solving of issues, especially in relation to community safety in the neighbourhood. Many smaller organisations complained that the Council cherry-picked certain projects to fund and blocked others' opportunities to develop. These perceptions demonstrate the dark side of social capital and the potential for some groups to lock out others that are less connected to political structures. However, the local authorities were deeply committed, at the level of rhetoric at least, to the voluntary and community sectors.


Some organisations, especially from Types 1 and 2, felt that they did not wish to engage in influencing decision-making, as they were preoccupied with providing basic services to their users and had very little time to think outside this role. These organisations, which are especially restricted by funding, find it difficult to justify time spent lobbying and campaigning. However, organisations from Type 3 had a modest lobbying repertoire through which they have managed to influence decision-making, especially at the level of the local authorities.

De Graaf's (1987) diagram on the 'controlled, influenced and appreciated environment of NGOs' is particularly useful in this context. De

Graaf situates the typical NGO within three concentric circles of ever-decreasing control (see Figure 6.1). The first contains the internal factors that can be largely controlled, such as staffing, budgeting, planning specific activities, setting objectives or choosing an organisational structure. The second encapsulates the NGO's wider relationships, which can be influenced or changed through active processes of persuasion, lobbying, patronage, cooption and collaboration. These include, for instance, elements of government policy. The third contains relationships which can usually only be appreciated or understood by the NGO, such as wider political structures, the macro-economic system, the technological environment and the international context.

As Lewis (2003) argues, the value of this framework is that it shows the ways in which NGO management is both strategic and flexible, as a combination of purposive action in support of development and high responsiveness to opportunities and constraints in the wider environment. NGOs can both seek out opportunities to influence change, and react to shifts in wider economic and political processes. However, it is important to mention that the organisation's level of *influence* is also directly proportional to its level of *control* over internal organisational capacity.

**Figure 6.1** *Controlled, influenced and appreciated environments of NGOs*



Source: De Graaf (1987)

### 6.5.3 *Connections and partnerships*

Most of the organisations studied, in various degrees, have diverse links with other local, regional as well as international (mostly Moroccan) institutions, as Table 6.4 shows. This table and Figure 6.2 also illustrate the heterogeneity of networks through which organisations have developed various ties, which vary according to the type of organisation. Some networks are narrowly conceived (for example, Organisation D); their connections and networks with other agencies are not dense and overlapping, suggesting weak bridging social capital between the sectors. Other networks, however, especially those of Organisations F and G, are multi-spatial. Whilst residents constructed a narrow territorial identity based on locality/place, their involvement with other local groups showed links with external agencies such as statutory authorities and regional networks. In most organisations (A to H), membership and volunteering are connected to a strong sense of place and a desire to get involved in the 'local community'.

In general, working relations between the local authority and larger organisations were better than with grassroots organisations, or the so-called hard-to-reach groups. The links between grass-roots organisations and regional agencies in some cases also required strengthening. Partnership amongst the small organisations was uneven and patchy, and relied on deliberate attempts by key individuals from the organisation to facilitate involvement of local groups with each other. The smaller groups, such as D and E, were comparatively very isolated and unconnected to wider services and provision.

There were a few attempts in North Kensington to address this issue, especially through the National Neighbourhood Renewal programme, which brought a dense network to the area, and encouraged partnership-working, led by neighbourhood facilitation teams. This initiative has increased contact between local authorities and the community and voluntary sector. The Community Empowerment Fund (via NRF funding), which has now stopped, was a critical source of funding which smaller groups could access. However, as a member of the NRF grant panel, I observed that the majority of applications received from small community groups, including Moroccan groups, in Kensington and Chelsea were for small project costs essentially focused on service delivery. Although the fund had a specific small grant named 'Networks and Partnerships' rarely were any applications received under that category. Despite the fact that groups were constantly encouraged to apply, the majority did not, as they often perceived it as less important than keeping the activities of the organisation running. Another factor that discouraged small community organisations from embarking on partnership venture work was the issue of *trust*:

**Table 6.4** Networks and partnerships

Org	Partnership work at the neighbourhood level	Partnership work with other ethnic community groups	Partnership work with organisations at the national level	Participation in influencing decision making			International networks with Morocco	Other international networks
				Local		International (Morocco)		
				National	International			
A	Mainly with other Moroccan organisations	None	None	Yes	None	Yes	None	
B	Mainly with other Moroccan organisations	None	None	Yes	None	Yes	None	
C	Moroccan organisations, members of two umbrella organisations and a supplementary school consortium	Yes	Yes	Yes	None	Yes	None	
D	Mainly with other Moroccan organisations	None	None	Yes	None	Yes	None	
E	Mainly with other Moroccan organisations. Members of a supplementary school consortium	Yes	None	Yes	None	None	None	
F	Local authorities, Golborne United, Sure Start, other local support agencies	Yes	Yes, NHS Primary Care Trust	Yes	None	Yes	None	
G	Local authorities, Golborne United, Sure Start, other local support agencies	Yes	Yes	Yes	None	Yes	None	
H	Local authorities, Housing associations	Yes	No	Yes	None	Yes	None	
I	N/A	N/A	Yes, mainly businesses	No	Yes	Yes	None	




Figure 6.2 A tentative mapping-out of the different positioning and networks of Moroccan organisations

In terms of partnership projects it's difficult for us to trust others, we can hardly trust each other let alone other communities, especially now after 9/11. But when we enter in partnership with other groups, we get involved with the idea of learning from others and getting a bigger picture about what is happening around [...] (Ali, Chair of Organisation D).

The informal networks of small self-help groups that are non-registered charities provided a useful source of support to individuals. These informal sociability and care networks were considered to be an important but *invisible* stock of social capital. In the North Kensington area, a stronger stress on informal networks is related to a comparatively stronger reliance on informal ties of sociability and mutual aid in the absence of formally structured voluntary organisations. Participation in community events, sports, and meeting people in community centres to chat and interact were considered by many to be the main benefits of involvement in voluntary organisations. As Halima Begum (2003) points out, whilst invisible social capital is of the utmost importance to levels of social capital within neighbourhoods, it is difficult to *measure* or even find a currency that demonstrates its value in terms of formal civic renewal strategies.

Organisations such as F, G and H, which succeeded in developing dense and overlapping networks with other ethnic organisations and statutory sector agencies, have done so partly as a natural process of the organisation's growth, which enabled the development of such networks and *partnerships*. The nature of the partnerships, however, in most cases tends to be 'formalised' through funding contracts, whereby the organisation has to meet a number of conditions. The relationship is a *top-down* one, strictly that of a funder to the funded project. Furthermore, the ethnic heterogeneity of networks and beneficiaries of these organisations, as discussed above, has not always been systematic.

From a social capital perspective, bridging and bonding social capital in ethnically homogenous groups appears to be positively related. There is therefore no foundation for policies that attempt to limit bonding (i.e. trying to prevent people from setting up their own cultural associations) on the grounds that this prevents them from reaching a level of bridging social capital to the majority or mainstream society. Instead, bonding social capital serves as a precursor to bridging as well as occurring alongside it (Begum 2003).

The other types of network that have been highlighted in Table 6.4 and Figure 6.2, such as those established by 'elitist'-type Organisations J and I, are mostly of a transnational nature and have very few connec-

tions to other Moroccan organisations in London. In the case of Organisation I, which has existed for more than 30 years, one can argue that, although it has had no difficulties in reaching a significant level of bridging and linking social capital, both nationally and internationally, its level of bonding social capital is almost non-existent in relation to working-class Moroccan migrants. The most logical explanation to this trend is that it is a *class*-related issue, and bonding levels only happen amongst 'like-minded' people. However, from an ethnicity perspective, members from Organisation I might be integrated within the mainstream society but, in relation to members of the rest of the Moroccan community, they are excluded and perhaps they are excluding themselves too. This highlights the fact that it is equally relevant to emphasise the reverse order of bonding, bridging and linking social capital, and that whilst it is important to reach the last two types, unless the first type is attained a degree of exclusion will occur.

Organisation J was added at a later stage of the research, in order to highlight a new trend within the Moroccan community in London. This organisation is similar to I, at least in terms of its (non-)relationship to other members of the Moroccan community; however, part of its uniqueness is its 'virtual' nature. Whiteley (1999: 30-31) has hypothesised that social capital can, or may be generated 'by membership of "imaginary [or abstract] communities", that is communities with which individuals identify, but which they never actually interact with on a face-to-face basis'. Imaginary communities are large and geographically dispersed, and individuals within them can socially interact only with a very small fraction of the group. In spite of this 'social barrier', Maloney (1999: 116) argues that 'individuals within these groups can develop very strong levels of group identification: "joining like-minded people" in pursuit of a cause may develop a sense of "community" or belonging. Membership of these groups may not be as detrimental to the generation of social capital as the Putnam/Tocqueville model suggests'. As Organisation J has only recently been founded (January 2006), the contribution that this type of membership association can bring to social capital, and its impact on its beneficiaries, will need further investigation.

The networks and capacities of all ten associations differ according to their type, revealing different levels of bonding, bridging and linking social capital in relation to the Moroccan community, the host society and the country of origin. Moroccan community organisations in West London, especially amongst Types 1 and 2, display strong bonding social capital, but this is divorced, to a certain degree, both from 'bridging' networks and from 'linking' relationships to mainstream agencies and organisations.

Type 3 organisations do exhibit strong levels of bonding as well as bridging social capital, although the bridging is often induced by outside pressures, especially from funders. A more meaningful partnership needs to take place between these types of organisation and mainstream ones, which acknowledges their contribution as planners and service-delivery partners, rather than beneficiaries of funding that constantly need to justify their existence.

Type 4 and 5 organisations present excellent levels of bridging and linking, but weak levels of bonding in relation to the Moroccan community. A reverse scaling-up process of social-capital-building needs to take place in this context, whereby an exchange of expertise between the two extremes of migrant associations can strengthen reciprocal returns. Type 4 and 5 organisations could become even more efficient in their charitable ventures in Morocco if they were involved with Moroccan associations and the voluntary sector in general in London. Similarly, Moroccan associations in North Kensington, for example, could benefit by learning more about how to organise large-scale fundraising events that could help them in achieving their objectives.

6.5.4 Summary

Based on the four indicators, Table 6.5 tentatively maps out how effective the ten organisations are in scaling up or ‘down-scaling’ – in the case of organisations of Types 4 and 5 – levels of social capital. The findings in this section confirm that voluntary organisations, regardless of their typology, are an important source of bridging and linking capi-

**Table 6.5** Bonding, bridging and linking social capital amongst the five types of Moroccan organisation

Organisational type	Bonding		Bridging		Linking	
	MC	HS	HS	IM	HS	IM
Type 1 <i>Widadias</i>	High	Low	Low	High	Low	Medium
Type 2 <i>Self-help groups</i>	Low	Low	Medium	Low	Low	Low
Type 3 <i>Welfare associations</i>	High	Low	Medium	Medium	Low	Low
Type 4 <i>Philanthropic organisations</i>	Low	Low	Medium	High	High	High
Type 5 <i>Students and professional organisations</i>	Low	Medium	Medium	High	Medium	Medium

MC: Moroccan community; HS: Host society; IM: Institutions in Morocco

■ High    ■ Medium    □ Low

tal for migrant communities, since one of the sector's key functions is to connect individuals to other local groups and organisations and, most importantly, to 'official' decision-making structures, although this is not always systematic. In general, BME voluntary and community organisations are expected to serve as a 'cultural bridge' (Saegert, Thompson & Warren 2001) which has many functions, the first of which is creating a safe space in which migrant communities acquire the socio-cultural capital needed to link with mainstream-dominant institutions. The 'cultural bridge' enables marginalised members of society to rephrase the unfamiliar codes of the culture of power. It also serves as a means to deploy personal and collective social capital in order to gain access to the networks of targeted mainstream-dominant institutions; and to integrate and affirm community cultural values, resources and rights. As Saegert et al. (2001) argue, the biases of public institutions demand that ethnic minorities acquire the cultural cues and knowledge of the culture of power, but bridging institutions must also acknowledge the cultural assets of minority communities to gain their trust and forge constructive alliances.


## **6.6 Ongoing challenges faced by Moroccan organisations**

This last section of the chapter analyses the obstacles that Moroccan organisations face which greatly influence their ability to serve effectively as vehicles for bridging and linking social capital.

### *6.6.1 Long-term sustainability and organisational capacity*

The first challenge is long-term sustainability, which is closely linked to the organisational capacity of each organisation. As discussed above, this factor is intimately linked to financial and human resources; although these two are not the only factors affecting the sustainability of organisations, they play a significant role. In fact, as Mike Hudson (1996) points out (see Figure 6.3), organisations have a life cycle which they pass through in stages. Developing from one stage to the next is often a time of revolution and stress. Approaching change in this manner helps trustees and staff to put the opportunities and issues they face in a broader context. It helps people to understand that their problems are not unique and insoluble. It enables people to explain behaviour in terms of a model, making it easier to identify the actions needed to move the organisation to its next stage of development.

From my experience, many organisations that are committed to change and development are conservative when it comes to changing themselves. Sometimes people who have been with the organisation for

**Figure 6.3** *Organisation life-cycle*

Source: Hudson (1996)

a long time find it difficult to see new ways of structuring it. In other situations, people who are committed to the cause cannot find the time to deal with organisational restructuring. This means that many organisations are operating with systems that are long past their 'use-by' date. For example, as an organisation gets bigger, consensus-style management, where everyone has a say in everything, becomes unworkable, and so does the idea that one person can co-ordinate every activity.

Strengthening the capacity of these organisations, commonly known as 'capacity-building', can be a means to ensure their long-term sustainability. However, capacity-building should not be applied from a narrow perspective, whereby organisations are supported in securing financial resources only. Capacity-building from a social capital perspective should help in embedding a culture of participation in the relationship between the state and the voluntary and community sectors; and between the voluntary sector and smaller community-based organisations. The culture of 'funding dependency' needs to be challenged to enable community-based organisations to grow and evolve so that they can support their respective communities more constructively.

The policies around North Kensington have been so far to give people small amounts of money to do things but it creates a cul-

ture of dependency, so what happens is that those people keep on coming back. You give them £1,000, 'What is it you want to do? Take kids on outings, take kids away. Here, here's £500, go and do it'. You think 'Wow, they're giving me money', you go and do it but you have to come back again, you knock on the door 'Can I have another £500? I need to do an *Eid* party?' That's the problem (Fadi, Male, 30-F12-C1).

As Halima Begum (2003) explains, government should build the capacity of both the voluntary and community sector to engage with the public sector in an informed way. Resources need to be made available to enable community representatives to network locally and regionally, to share experiences and findings with each other. Increasingly, local groups are under pressure to work in partnership to obtain funding, through which they stand to gain strength in solidarity and numbers. Availability of knowledge on service providers around a similar issue, together with community networks for information flow, enable groups to identify windows of opportunity for building new relationships and intervening in policy debates. The capacity for local organisations to engage with decision-making opportunities through voluntary-sector channels is underdeveloped. From a social capital perspective, the real challenge for building stronger communities is less the choice of particular outputs (such as policy interventions or targeted programmes for social capital formation) than the need to develop new governance models that encourage community involvement, dialogue and active participation.

### 6.6.2 *Lack of leadership*

Leadership within the Moroccan community, especially in West London, is impeded by several factors. 'Community politics', which refers to 'fragmentation' within the community caused by conflicts of interest as well as regionalism, is one of them. Although the majority of interviewees felt that it was the major factor to holding the community back, others felt that it was a healthy sign of a 'dynamic community', as Mourad, Coordinator of Organisation H, explains:

Without community politics there is no community; there should be, there will be community politics, there are obviously negative aspects to it but on the other hand the community is *moving*, it's alive, there are frustrations, but without this kind of interest there will be no community. Communities should celebrate the diversity within it, negative, positive, white, black [...] this is when you have a dynamic movement.

Others, however, feel that this community dynamic has been mainly triggered by conflicts of interest as well as historical factors:

There are personal as well as historical reasons. In the 1970s there were several organisations that were operating within the community and that were playing a huge role in widening the gap by playing the role of the watchdogs over the community, hence perpetuating the same old mentality of the *Maghzen* [authorities] in Morocco. In the 1990s, however, we have witnessed the growth of new organisations, apart from the *Widadias*, that play a more active role within the community (Hassan, Coordinator of Organisation G).

Mourad's idea of a 'moving' or evolving community echoes, to some extent, Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie's idea that 'to have undemocratic ethnic organisations is better for the democratic process than to have no organisations at all'. According to them, 'even in authoritative organisations people learn to solve the dilemmas inherent in collective action [...] this enables people to attain social goals that would be unattainable without collective effort' (1999: 723).

As discussed earlier, *Widadias* in many countries in Europe created strong divisions and raised levels of suspicion within members of Moroccan communities. Although this type of organisation has lost credibility and whatever 'powers' it had, it still deters members of the second generation from being involved more actively, since any type of Moroccan association, in their eyes, encapsulates a *Widadia* type of organisation.

The problem is that these organisations, led by first-generation Moroccans, most of them are semi-illiterate or illiterate and those ones are in the vanguard [...] These people do not want to step down or involve the second generation with them [...] this led to the younger generations losing trust in the older generation. They say that these old people are just monopolising everything, and don't want them to take part in the community progress, and they are a hindrance in the development of the community as a whole [...] It is not only a conflict of interest, the main conflict is between the first and second generations (Ilias, Community Development Worker).

Muhcine further explains:

Up to now we have tried to encourage young people to be involved because for that centre [Organisation H] to be saved we

need to have a younger Management Committee. But they find it difficult [...] because there is like a clan there [...] so obviously young people don't want to be involved in all of that.

'Community politics' is also a reflection of lack of leadership and common purpose. The issue of representation often comes to the surface when leadership is mentioned. Unfortunately, so far leadership is limited to what is referred to in the community as 'self-appointed leaders'.

What we need is to be united towards one goal, one vision; we don't have that at the moment. What we've got, as they say, are too many chiefs and not many Indians. Everyone wants to be the head but no-one is willing to follow anyone, so what you end up with is one person thinking 'I am the leader' but there's no-one behind, leader of who? Who do you lead? I think that's the problem [...] All I know is there is a need for proper leadership, and there is a need for people to take a responsibility for their own future and their own actions, and that is not happening at the moment (Fadi, Male, 30-F12-C1).

Attempts were made in the past to create a 'representative' umbrella organisation, regrouping all the organisations in London. However, those attempts failed, and many felt that it was due to internal divisions as well as a lack of overall guidance, both from local authorities and from Moroccan government representatives (the consulate), on how to proceed.

I feel that there is a lack of support from the home country. There is a lack of support, even 'racism' at the level of the consulate [...] The government can't help the organisations but the organisations can help members of the Moroccan community (Majid).

However, according to the current Moroccan Ambassador, Mohammed Belmahi, change needs to come from within. Since the majority of Moroccans who live here have British nationality, the Moroccan consulate or embassy cannot interfere or impose change. Although leadership is a process that takes its own natural pace, it could be catalysed if local agencies can help to build a wide range of flexible routes into formal structures in local governance, recognise the diversity of leadership styles in local communities, and use traditional leadership styles, with fewer facilitation models. Amidst all the claims that the community is 'stagnant', change is happening but at a very slow pace:

I wish that new leadership takes place in the community, leadership in terms of people who know the system and who have strategic thinking to ensure that the community finds its way forward. The movement is very slow but I think it will happen [...] change within any community is very slow as you need to create a new generation, a new culture and a new kind of commitment. There is conflict but there is also continuity; the new leadership should not exclude the first generation but instead should work with them (Mourad, Coordinator of Organisation H).

## 6.7 Summing up

This chapter has tried to investigate the role of the voluntary sector in promoting social capital in local communities. The organisations selected have illustrated the various roles of voluntary action in and through community and voluntary organisations. There are two distinct normative roles for the voluntary sector; in the first, voluntary organisations provide the first stepping-stones for individuals to get involved in voluntary action; in the second, voluntary organisations also provide a mechanism and route into power and decision-making structures (Locke, Sampson & Shepherd 2000). In other words, the voluntary sector expands horizontal ties and then builds vertical ones. As Chanan (2003) argues, the passage from horizontal to vertical participation is neither automatic nor compulsory; but effective vertical participation is more difficult to achieve without the social connectedness that horizontal participation encourages.

The chapter's findings have shown that Moroccan organisations had the potential to generate bridging social capital. Their capacity to do so depended on their objectives, range of members/users, and approaches. Bridging social capital was greater in organisations that provided services/activities for people of different backgrounds or in organisations that engaged in collaborative working, such as F, G and H. Those catering for a homogeneous group of members/users or working in relative isolation were better at developing bonding social capital (A, B and D). Linking social capital also depended on organisational objectives, processes and practices. Some of the organisations unquestionably contributed to reducing the distance between powerful institutions and people. They often acted as advocates, representing the interests of their members/users and, like Organisation G, putting pressure on government bodies to solve specific issues. Although the organisations achieved some success in building bridging and linking social capital, at the same time they also stressed the challenges that this involved. Bridging social capital raised internal issues around diversity

and inclusiveness; linking social capital raised issues around legitimacy, representativeness and accountability (Jochum et al. 2005). It therefore seems clear that a contextualised approach that is sensitive to the formal and informal aspects of relations between actors, and recognises the reciprocity that exists between civil society and the state, is crucial to gaining a fuller understanding of issues such as the generation, maintenance and destruction of social capital (Maloney et al. 2000).

Unlike Putnam, Lisa Sullivan contends that, though social capital in poor and disadvantaged communities is underdeveloped – as it is amongst young black residents in urban America – there still exists ample activity illustrating the social organisation and community affiliations of this marginalised generation. She writes:

[...] my activism and organizing experience in central cities suggest that informal associational life is alive and well – especially among the poor and young. While Putnam may have observed a general decline in citizen participation in traditional social and civic associations, a significant number of citizens from the inner city are creating and participating in vibrant informal networks of twenty-first-century associational life (Sullivan 1997: 235).

Sullivan argues that there is no absence of social capital in poor black communities; however black politicians and traditional leaders consumed with the process of formal incorporation have largely ignored the trust and social networks at work in these communities and amongst this generation. She notes, ‘Alienated from mainstream American politics and public liberal organizations, their social capital has gone underutilized, underdeveloped, and ignored in the late twentieth century’ (1997: 237). Indeed, social capital is integral to the survival and progress of poor and marginalised communities. The problem is not the absence of social capital in poor communities, but the fact that social capital is being required to compensate for a lack of other resources in so many areas that it cannot work effectively (Saegert, Thompson, Engle & Sargent 1999). In the absence of traditional participatory avenues, young and poor community members may be creating new political and social formations that are *invisible* to social scientists looking for social capital in all the old places (national datasets) and in all the traditional forms. Researchers therefore need to shift their gaze to new, youth-oriented social spaces and social forms in order to uncover these new forms of social capital.

## 7 Education, social capital and ‘integration’

### 7.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the relationship between social capital and the educational attainment of second- and third-generation Moroccans in London, especially its effect on children’s differential access to educational qualifications. The lens of social capital will show how educational attainment is affected, beyond the classical interpretations of achievement mainly associated with human, cultural and financial capital brought by the parents, as well as the ‘context of the reception’ (Rumbaut 1995: 49). The chapter first briefly discusses the possible links between education and social capital, drawing on extant literature. It then examines the main educational channels used by second- and third-generation Moroccans in London, and underlines factors influencing parents’ choice of schools. After a brief overview of the educational achievement of Moroccan children, it analyses how social capital, in some cases, can reinforce social exclusion amongst young Moroccans, instead of overcoming it.

### 7.2 Education and social capital: the links

Educational sociologists and policymakers are interested in social capital as an analytical tool to link the ‘micro process’ of school life, including school ethos and parental attitudes, with macro-scale economic and social structures. Social capital links these two sets of factors, since aspirations are communicated through social networks (Aldridge et al. 2002). Pamela Munn (2000) argues that this linking may over-emphasise the school as the *cure-all* for economic and social problems, and divert attention from the underlying causes of these problems.

The idea of social capital now plays an important role in helping to explain educational attainment (Coleman 1988, 1994; Modood 2004; Portes 1998; Rumbaut 1995; Zhou 1997b; Zhou and Bankston 1998). For Coleman, the concept of social capital complements that of human capital; human capital arises when individuals can draw on ‘the set of resources that inhere in family relations and in community social orga-

nisation and that ... can constitute an important advantage for children and adolescents in the development of their human capital' (1994: 300). This conclusion directs attention to such 'soft' variables as social networks and values, rather than focusing primarily upon the 'hard' variables underlying human capital thinking.

Focusing on the effect of social capital in creating human capital, in the family and in the community, Coleman (1988) argues that family background influences educational achievement, first through financial capital – school materials, a place to study at home – and secondly through human capital – parental levels of education and influence on the child's cognitive environment. To this Coleman adds social capital: the relationship between parents and children, particularly the amount of effort parents put directly into their children's learning. At the community level, social capital involves parents' reinforcement of each other's norms, and their relations with community institutions, which affect the likelihood of children dropping out of school. Where households move frequently and social interchange between adult community members is low, social capital is likely to be low, even if financial and human capital levels are high. This may explain why Catholic and Baptist schools in poor but relatively stable neighbourhoods often outperform many private schools: 'The choice of private school for many of these parents is an individualistic one and, although they back their children with extensive human capital, they send their children to school denuded of social capital' (Coleman 1988: 114).

Higher expectations of teachers in Catholic schools in regard to behaviour and academic performance, according to Coleman, helps children from poor families attain higher grades than comparable children in state schools. In highlighting social networks' effect on children's achievement, Coleman suggests that school ethos or school culture may explain differences in attainment among schools (see also Mortimore, Sammons, Stoll, Lewis & Ecob 1988; Sammons, Thomas & Mortimore 1997). Catholic schools are believed to create a climate in which pupils are expected to *achieve*, by promoting a sense of pupils' individual worth and value through faith, uniting home, school and the school community in a shared moral purpose. Non-denominational schools lack a shared religion on which to construct social capital and so, in poor communities, have to work harder to raise expectations amongst pupils and parents than many Catholic schools. Coleman (1988) demonstrates that a positive school ethos compensates for disadvantaged pupils' lack of social capital outside school, at least relating to attainment (see also Munn 2000).

Burt (2001) points out two main weaknesses to Coleman's argument. First, 'not dropping out of school' may not be a productive performance criterion for estimating social capital effects, as 'drop out' may be dri-

ven by factors different from those that determine variation at the other end of the performance continuum, the 'stay-in-school-and-do-well' end. Second, brokerage may play a role in Coleman's argument. Constraint from parents and teachers has positive long-term consequences for children, forcing them to focus on their education. However, it is not clear whether this is social capital of the child or its parents.

Factors explaining differences in levels of educational achievement are summarised by three trends. The first is human capital theory concerning the education of parents. According to this view, children's educational performance is related to their families' human capital endowments (Borjas 1989, 1990). Second, Coleman's social capital theory emphasises the importance of 'closure' in a community for strengthening parental control and facilitating parental guidance. The third theory emphasises community differences that transcend the family's immediate social context; and 'modes of incorporation' of immigrants have enduring effects on their patterns of adaptation. Modes of incorporation, determined by governmental policy and public perceptions, interact with immigrants' outlooks and aspirations, producing diverse ethnic communities (Mahler 1995; Massey 1987; Portes & Rumbaut 1996b). These communities condition their members' attitudes concerning the future, what is achievable in the host society, and mutual solidarity. Children born into these different circumstances benefit or suffer accordingly. The adaptation of an immigrant community creates common patterns of advantage or disadvantage for its members (Portes & MacLeod 1999).

The three alternative predictions are summarised in Table 7.1. All are based on assumed heterogeneity of origins and educational achievement. According to Portes and MacLeod, social capital is measured by three corresponding indicators. *Intact family* is defined as children with both biological parents present in the household, reflecting the empha-

**Table 7.1** *Perspectives on educational achievement in the second generation*

	<i>I</i>	<i>II</i>	<i>III</i>
<i>Hypotheses:</i>	<i>Human capital</i>	<i>Social capital</i>	<i>Modes of incorporation</i>
	Group differences are due to educational, linguistic and skill endowment. Once these factors are controlled, initial nationality effects will disappear.	Group differences are due to family structure and parental networks. Once these factors are controlled, initial nationality effects will disappear.	Group differences are due to the context of reception and subsequent history of each immigrant community and will not disappear after controlling for individual and family factors.

*Source:* Portes and MacLeod (1999)

sis placed by the literature on the value of unbroken families (Zhou & Bankston 1994). *Parental networks* is measured by an interval-level variable representing the number of parents of a child's friends known to his/her parents, corresponding to Coleman's definition of 'closure' as a form of social capital. The third variable is measured by the *frequency of parent-child interaction on school matters, parents' activities in school, and parental rules on homework*. This is a more proximate indicator of social capital, corresponding to the actual efforts by parents to further their children's schooling.

Portes and MacLeod demonstrate that the notion of resilient community effects is related to nationality coefficients as well as settlement patterns. Positive outcomes linked to Chinese and Korean origins, and negative ones associated with a Mexican background, are consistent with modes of incorporation and settlement patterns of these groups. This study revealed that, next to families, *schools* are the most important institutional contexts for the young. Portes and MacLeod argue that immigrant groups seek a niche in American society through choice of schools to send their children. This interpretation does not contradict the hypothesis of modes of incorporation, but fleshes it out by suggesting the actual path through which common group experiences translate into outcomes.

Not only parental education or social networks, but an immigrant group's entire experience influence its children's education. Individual immigrants' human and social capital are important, as is the *structural context* that determines their course. Governmental policies and discrimination against certain groups cause these groups to remain and settle under conditions of disadvantage, which reproduces educational and social handicaps for generations. These handicaps may lead, as a self-fulfilling prophecy, to the very pathologies of which the earlier immigrants were groundlessly accused. As the number of immigrants is on the increase, the patterns of incorporation of today's arrivals seem to be playing an increasingly decisive role in the future ethnic make-up of the host country and the extent to which newcomers help neutralise or, on the contrary, exacerbate existing inequalities and conflicts amongst its ethnic populations (Portes & MacLeod 1999).

### 7.3 Educational channels

The choice of educational channels is influenced by various factors. The most obvious one is the socio-economic status of the family, which limits the choice of school to the neighbourhood where they live. Other parents opt for different educational channels, namely faith schools, in-

dependent schools, or even sending their children back to Morocco for schooling.

### 7.3.1 Mainstream schools

Holland Park Community School is attended by a large number of Moroccan children who live in the Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. Unofficial sources estimate that, in the mid-1990s, over half the pupils were of Moroccan origin out of a total of 1,500 students. The number has decreased over the last few years, but is still substantial. The school has a very diverse ethnic mix from a wide area of West London; about a fifth of the school are known to be from white UK backgrounds, a fifth are from Black British, African and Caribbean backgrounds, and about 10 per cent are Asian or Asian British. About one student in six is from a refugee family, mostly from Somalia or the former Yugoslavia. The Ofsted report makes no direct reference to Moroccans, who fall under the category of 'any other ethnic group'. Just over half the students have English as an additional language and about a tenth are at an early stage of learning English. The main languages other than English are Arabic, Somali and Albanian. Students come from a wide range of backgrounds, with a much higher than average proportion being entitled to free school meals. About a fifth of the pupils have special educational needs – mainly emotional and behavioural difficulties and severe or moderate learning difficulties. Attainment on entry is below average (Ofsted 2003).

The report described Holland Park as an *improving* school which, overall, is providing a satisfactory education. Though standards are well below average in Year 9, they improve as students move through the school. They are substantially below average at GCSE and remain below average, but less so, at A level. The contribution of students from different cultures and faiths is described as a strong feature of the school. Table 7.2 shows the standards achieved by students at the end of Year 11 and Sixth-Form students at the end of Year 13, based on average point scores in GCSE and A-/AS-level examinations. The results in-

**Table 7.2** Educational standards at Holland Park School

	Compared with				Key
	All schools		Similar schools		
Performance in:	2000	2001	2002	2002	
GCSE examinations	D	E	D	B	Well above average A Above average B Average C Below average D Well below average E
A-/AS-levels	D	D	N/A	N/A	

Source: Ofsted Inspection Report of Holland Park School, April 2003

dicade rather poor progress. Achievement overall was unsatisfactory (Ofsted 2003).

North Westminster Community School is also attended by a large number of Moroccan students. It has a capacity of almost 2,000 students from a very wide range of ethnic backgrounds, including 8 per cent of UK white heritage. Very high percentages (66 per cent) of students speak English as an additional language (EAL), and many are native speakers of Arabic, Bengali, Portuguese or Farsi. Nearly a third of students are from refugee or asylum-seeker families: over 25 per cent have identified special educational needs (SEN), and students eligible for free school meals are 53 per cent. The school serves an area with significant levels of social deprivation. Incoming students' levels of attainment are well below the national average (Ofsted 2001). According to the same Ofsted report, this is 'a complex school' that serves communities with wide ethnic diversity. The school is also described as an inclusive, harmonious and tolerant multicultural community. Standards in national tests and examinations are low, but are clearly improving. GCSE attainment targets for 2001 were not met, but were higher and more challenging than in 2000. 'North Westminster Community School is an improving school that is giving satisfactory value for money' (Ofsted 2001). Table 7.3 shows the standards achieved by students at the end of Year 11 and Sixth-Form students at the end of Year 13 based on average point scores in GCSE and A-/AS-level examinations. Although well below the national average, it is above the average of similar schools (Ofsted 2001). In June 2005 Westminster City Council decided to create two new academies (Paddington Academy and Westminster Academy) to replace North Westminster Community School from September 2006.<sup>1</sup>

**Table 7.3** *Educational standards at North Westminster Community School*

Performance in:	Compared with				Key
	All schools		Similar schools		
	1999	2000	2001	2001	
GCSE examinations	E	E	E	B	Well above average A Above average B Average C Below average D Well below average E
A-/AS-levels	D	E	D	N/A	

### 7.3.2 Faith schools

An increasing number of parents, especially second-generation Moroccans, prefer to send their children to faith schools, either Muslim or

Catholic. They believe that they provide a better educational foundation for the children and teach them about discipline whilst increasing their confidence and self-esteem. Second-generation Moroccans who have experienced mainstream schools in West London mostly believe that these schools did not give them the level of education they were expecting. Rashid, a Youth Worker, explains:

[...] the education system is no good [...] like my close friends, they are taking their kids to private schools, like Islamia, the Lebanese school up in Central London, the Saudi Arabian School, and they are paying for private tuition [...] Because they themselves got no education, they know that they can't send their children to public (i.e. state) schools. They know what kind of education they will get, so *Al hamdulillah* they are giving their children a chance.

Two schools were popular amongst sampled families that chose a faith school for their children, Islamia Primary School and St Mary's Primary School. However, faith schools, especially Muslim ones, have been subject to much criticism lately. After the July bombings, these schools were accused of becoming the 'breeding ground for terrorism', working against social cohesion. Ofsted Chief David Bell stated that there is 'evidence that Muslim schools are not preparing young people for life in British society'.<sup>2</sup>

In an article entitled 'Religious Schools Abode of Islam', published by *The Economist* on 13 August 2005: 26, it was claimed that:

[...] around 25,000 of the more than 500,000 Muslim children in Britain ... are educated in the country's 100-odd Muslim schools. The five that have joined the state sector since Labour came to power in 1997 are wildly popular: the first to do so, Islamia Primary School in London, admits 30 children a year and has another 2,500 on its waiting list ... the government ... feels that the way to keep Muslim schools *moderate* is to bring them into the heavily regulated state sector ... Although they won't have to teach the national curriculum, they will have to show that they provide reasonable standards of teaching and accommodation, teach mainly in the English language and ensure that students gain a detailed understanding of British laws, customs and culture.

It is partly true that Muslim schools ingrain segregation in British cities, especially in the north of the country. However, the country's roughly 7,000 Christian state schools can create equally strong barriers

to integration. In many places with large Muslim populations, most non-Muslim children go to Church schools, leaving secular schools to become Muslim by default. On 22 February 2006, to counterbalance the denigration of faith schools, leaders of all faiths signed a joint statement<sup>3</sup> to teach pupils about other religions as well as their own. The joint statement with the Department for Education and Skills states that pupils in faith schools should be taught ‘an awareness of the tenets of other faiths’. They say they are committed to following the government’s National Framework on Religious Education, to ‘enable pupils to develop respect for and sensitivity to others, and enable pupils to combat prejudice’.<sup>4</sup>

Islamia Primary School in Brent, the first state-funded Muslim school, is a co-educational, multi-ethnic, multilingual primary school. According to the latest report by Ofsted (November 2005):

Madrassa Islamia School provides a sound education for its pupils. It is a happy school where pupils are encouraged to develop a caring attitude to others. The pupils’ personal development is promoted effectively through the school’s religious ethos. The quality of teaching is good and the curriculum is broad, balanced and relevant. Pupils make good progress. Assessment of pupils’ work has improved, and this contributes to rising standards as pupils progress through the school.

The report gave no comparison with achievement at other independent schools, but feedback from different sources is that children attain better results compared to other primary schools in West London.

St Mary’s RC Primary School is another school where Moroccan parents opt to send their children. It is a Catholic school, with a 10 per cent allocation for non-Catholic pupils. The parents believe that the quality of education is superior, but some have concerns about its spiritual effect.

[...] everything has consequences. The school my children go to is Catholic, and sometimes we worry whether it will influence the children on a spiritual level [...] We teach our children about Islam at home, but the difference is still there. This is a price we have to pay if we want our kids to have a good education (Abdul, Fr7-F).

Similarly, Fatima believes that sending her children to a Catholic school was best because there is no good state primary school where they live.

[...] the school that my children were in initially was like a zoo... there was no organisation or discipline, no uniforms or homework. The school they are in now is very safe, they have uniforms, and they are given homework. There is a form of organisation. Every Friday the children attend the Church, however Muslim children do not have to, so every Friday Muslim parents have to collect their children half an hour early. That's all. I am not against the Church, they have their faith and I have mine and I am trying to teach my children to respect others [...] There isn't much equal opportunities regarding the way they celebrate Christmas and Easter and they ignore both our *Eids*.

The quality of education at St Mary's is indeed superior to other schools; the latest Ofsted report (March 2002) described the school as a very effective school with some excellent features. Its successful leadership, combined with consistently good-quality teaching, was seen to deliver a very good education for its culturally diverse community. This school has 419 pupils. Over half are learning English as an additional language. The largest ethnic groups are Black Caribbean, African and other black cultures. The main languages are Portuguese and Tagalog, and some Arabic, Spanish and Polish. Over a third of the pupils are eligible for free school meals. Table 7.4 shows the standards achieved by pupils at the end of Year 6, based on average point scores in National Curriculum tests. This is an impressive set of results, particularly in view of the high number of pupils, almost one third, who are learning English as an additional language. The school monitors pupils' work to ensure high standards are sustained. Pupils are well motivated and there is no evidence of any groups of pupils underachieving (Ofsted 2002).

**Table 7.4** *Educational standards at St Mary's Catholic Primary School*

	<i>Compared with</i>				Key
	<i>All schools</i>			<i>Similar schools</i>	
Performance in:	1999	2000	2001	2001	
English	B	B	B	A*	Very high A*
Mathematics	A	B	A	A	Well above average A
Science	A*	C	A	A	Above average B
					Average C
					Below average D
					Well below average E

Source: Ofsted Inspection Report of St Mary's Catholic Primary School, March 2002

### 7.3.3 *Independent schools*

'Disbelief' in the British mainstream educational system, especially amongst second-generation Moroccans who have experienced it, is encouraging them to place their children in private schools. In this section, two schools, King Fahd Academy and Lycée Charles de Gaulle, represent another alternative educational route for some Moroccan children. The first school is, however, more popular than the second.

King Fahd Academy (KFA) was established in 1985 to provide schooling for the children of Saudi diplomats in London. Through the years it has attracted a growing number of other children of Arab background. It has over 700 students, including not only children of diplomats from upper- and middle-class backgrounds, but also children of refugees and families with low income or on benefit. It is a fee-paying school but parents are only asked to make a contribution of about £1,000 a year. Just over 10 per cent of the children are of Moroccan origin. The Academy offers a complete education, from kindergarten through to university entrance. It is comprised of four schools, and girls and boys are taught separately. There is a strong focus on teaching Arabic and Islamic studies, which is part of the Saudi curriculum, but the school does not classify itself as a faith school. Originally, the British and the Saudi curricula were taught side by side; however in 1999 the school began a phased removal of the British curriculum.

At the time when I interviewed the KFA Deputy Director, May 2004, he explained to me that the British section had already started shrinking and that there were about 30 per cent (250) of students registered in the British section and a little over 70 per cent at the Saudi section. As the school was initially destined mainly for the children of Saudi diplomats who were returning to Saudi, students registered at the Saudi section obtained a 'Saudi Learning Certificate' after their twelfth year. This certificate is slightly higher than a GCSE but lower than an A level. Hence, students holding this certificate cannot go directly to British universities, as they do not recognise the certificate. Students will need an access or a foundation course to be able to go for higher education. The main problem, however, is that not all parents are fully aware of this. In fact, while I was interviewing the Deputy Director, a very angry father came in, complaining, as he could not believe that his child would not be able to go to a British university.

Dr Nasim Butt, a former KFA teacher and Ofsted inspector, has stated that the school's curriculum is no longer appropriate for British children. 'As a teacher and an inspector of faith schools, I am interested in personal development and producing individuals who reflect deeply, self-evaluate and make a contribution to society [...] A Saudi

education is not going to create individuals who make that kind of contribution in a free society.'

The experiences of children who have attended the school are mixed, especially between those who attended it in its early days and those who joined the school after the British curriculum began to be abolished.

[...] it was really good. I think I was there for the best ten years that they had because I left at a time when they were changing the head and changing the system... it was really good at the time (Yassine, Male, 24-F19-C1).

Mostafa, another second-generation, who also attended KFA in the same period, thought highly of the school:

From Holland Park School to King Fahd Academy, I was like What! (*laughs*) It's like a big jump, and it's not just dealing with guys I used to hang around with on the estate or whatever, I was stuck with like, diplomats' sons, Arab/Middle East diplomats' sons like that. That was a bit of a roller coaster for me (*laughs*). I think that really did sort of play a major role in my life [...] (Mostafa, Male, 32-F9-C1).

The opposite experience was described by third-generation Moroccans who could only have access to the Saudi curriculum.

I really hate my school, it's KFA, I'm even embarrassed to say it, King Fahd Academy [...] I really hate it. My dream come true will be to leave it ... Basically, it's a Muslim Arabic school. I'm in the Arabic school, I study Arabic but I don't think I study enough things. I don't study much, I just go there to waste my time. We study both English and Arabic, but we do more of Arabic and I think I'm just wasting my time, because I don't learn anything. I don't like the teachers there as well and they don't like me... I'm just wasting my Mum and Dad's money since it's a private school (Soufiane, Male, 14-Ind. 3<sup>rd</sup> G).

When I asked him whether he told his parents about how unhappy he was with the school, Soufiane said they did not believe him. The experience of Soufiane's parents with mainstream schools made them lose trust in the educational system. They thought a private school would certainly be better. Although in some respects this reflects a positive change, where parents are willing to invest more – financially speaking – in their children's education, nevertheless their choice does

not necessarily best match their children's needs. Sulayman, another third-generation Moroccan, feels that his parents have made an enormous mistake by placing him in KFA. He says:

Arabic is not gonna help me when I get older, because I live in Britain, you know. I'm not learning nothing [...] so it's like I've been wasting my time for the last five years. I'm going to find my GCSEs very hard because I haven't studied a lot of English (Sulayman, Male, 12-Ind. 3<sup>rd</sup> G).

A small minority of Moroccans, including three families interviewed, have placed their children in the Lycée Charles de Gaulle; in the British section, however. Some of these families moved to England whilst their children were far advanced in their education in Morocco, as was the case of Houda and her brother.

When I first came here, because Morocco's second language is French, my dad obviously had to put me in Charles De Gaulle in South Kensington. I did all ...you know my studies there to the equivalent of GCSEs in this country [...] (Houda, Female, 26-F12-C2).

The latest Ofsted report (March 2006) states that the school provides very good teaching opportunities for all pupils to achieve according to their ability. They are motivated to work hard, concentrate well in lessons and achieve high standards. The school has no pupils with special educational needs. The report adds:

The British section prides itself on the bilingualism and biculturalism of its pupils. There are pupils from many cultural and religious backgrounds, all of whom mix well together. Both French and British cultural traditions are studied and a wide range of cultural visits further enhances this aspect of pupils' development.

#### 7.3.4 *Schooling in Morocco*

An increasing number of parents, especially amongst first-generation Moroccans, are sending their children back to Morocco to be educated. Usually they decide this in response to the experiences of their older children with the mainstream educational system. Therefore, it is often the youngest in the family who is sent back to school in Morocco. Parents believe that this is the only way their children will get a good edu-

education, as well as learn how to behave in a culturally and religiously acceptable way.

When children are educated in Morocco they are better off than when they study here. Now you can't even speak to your own children because you are constantly threatened by the social services. I have two children, one is 22 and the other is fifteen. They've both studied in Morocco and then I brought them back here. Because the Moroccan education, you won't find it abroad especially the Islamic one. Also when they grow up in Morocco they keep that strong link to the country. When they came here they couldn't wait to go back to Morocco for the holidays (Reda).

Children who went to school in Morocco faced major difficulties in adjusting back in England, especially on a language level. Most of them had to lose at least one year in their schooling.

I went to Morocco for a year when I was ten, but I didn't like it. I went to school there. When I came back, I didn't know a word of English, so I had to start from the beginning. I was in Year 4 before I went to Morocco and when I got back they put me in Year 1 because I didn't know English (Mohammed, Male, 14-Ind. 3<sup>rd</sup> G.).

Parents believe that this is a growing trend amongst Moroccan families, both in England and in France.

I would rather take my kids to Morocco, where they can learn good manners, learn how to respect other people, and learn how to appreciate life in general ... Because people here they take everything for granted [...] it worked for me, I came here after studying in Morocco, I worked hard, and I made it. My brother was in France, when his kids reached a certain age, he packed up his things and went back to Morocco. He didn't want to bring up his kids in France ... a lot of my family members who were in France with high status jobs decided to go back to Morocco. I would advise parents to take up their kids and raise them back in Morocco. Because the quality of education you get back in Morocco you wouldn't get it here. It is solid, it teaches you Arabic, French, English...etc. While here, you learn not to appreciate what you have, which is very sad [...] (Omar, university lecturer).

Schooling in Morocco takes three forms. First, when children are sent back on their own, usually it is the younger ones and they stay at a boarding school (there is a newly established schooling scheme run by *La Banque Populaire*). Second, the child or children would go and stay with members of their extended family while attending school; while thirdly, in other families one of the parents would go and stay with the child in Morocco during his/her school years, as was the case with Thami, mentioned earlier.

### 7.3.5 *Supplementary schools*

For their children to get a good education and learn Arabic, the majority of Moroccan families resort to an old remedial solution, which is a supplementary school. Placing their children in such 'schools' is believed to allow them both to improve their children's educational level (through the homework club) and to reinforce their sense of identity (through Arabic and Islamic studies). Supplementary schools are very common in West London and other parts of London. Almost 80 per cent of all the families interviewed take their children to a supplementary school either at the weekends or on weekdays. These schools are increasingly playing a significant role in improving the educational level of children and passing on the first generation's heritage and culture to the younger members of the community.

The strong emphasis of some of these schools on teaching children Arabic and Islamic studies has been supported over the years by the Moroccan government, not only in England but in Europe in general. A number of trained teachers, according to the size of the community, are sent and paid by the Moroccan government. England benefits from six teachers who have been working in supplementary schools for over twenty years. The teachers, however, are often criticised by members of the community for their outdated teaching methods and lack of fluency in English.

We need people to speak to our children in their language, not a well-spoken person who is not even able to reach out to the first generation...The Moroccan government sends us people who speak French while none of us does and at the same time they are unable to speak to us in our mentality (Ali, Male, 64-F1-F).

To meet the growing need for Arabic teachers, as the six sponsored teachers were not enough for the large community, volunteer teachers from the community started to run classes too. Their teaching methods were much closer to what the children were used to and they could engage better with the pupils. However, despite all the efforts made to

improve the teaching methods and content of classes, these classes are often discouraged by mainstream schools.

I know that a lot of mainstream schools see the Moroccan community as a very inward looking one. I know that at Bevington School you will hear the serious disapproval, a real resentment about the fact that the children go and learn Arabic for a couple of hours every night. They disapprove thoroughly of that. Now for years children locally have gone to the Spanish school and nobody said anything. But with Moroccans it's different [...] (Angela Bell, Director of the North Kensington Consortium of Supplementary Schools).

Within the supplementary schools the support classes in English, Maths, Science and GCSE are equally not encouraged by mainstream schools, as Angela Bell explains; they are seen as a form of 'cheating':

In many cases, there is deliberately no contact with mainstream schools and parents wouldn't even tell mainstream schools that I'm giving my child extra classes. They see it as cheating, whereas in fact it's not. I think what is really powerful is when you are teaching about language and community, your faith and beside it giving your children support with school work there is that *bridge between the two cultures* [...] Now, to what extent that is clear to the children, I'm not always sure.

The benefits of the supplementary schools are certainly appreciated by the students who attend them. It helps them get individual support with their homework, which their parents are not always able to provide, and helps them improve their spoken and written Arabic.

I go to Arabic school from Monday to Friday and then I go to another one on Saturday [...] The one I go to from Monday to Friday I've been going to for seven to eight years, I go regularly. I do my Arabic work, they help me with my French, Spanish, English, anything I want... It does help; especially when you've got exams coming up and you've the pressure of GCSEs. It does help to be able to turn to a teacher to help you. In school there's only one teacher and she's got how many people? (Kawatar, Female, 16-F1-C2).

The positive impact that these supplementary schools have on Moroccan children is appreciated by the director of the North Kensington

Consortium of Supplementary Schools, Angela Bell, who monitors their progress very closely.

Our GCSE work has shown that children gain from supplementary schools because they are being taught by members of their own community, and therefore they feel valued and it also plays a mentoring role...they do a lot of fantastic work. That spectrum of supplementary schools is encouraging everybody to keep on going and to have children coming as frequently as they can later on.

Regardless of all the criticism they receive, supplementary schools serve, in many ways, as a non-conflicting cultural space for second- and third-generation Moroccans. They can call on other co-ethnics for educational support and offer a space where children recover a sense of worth and an improved understanding of some of the components of their culture.

#### **7.4 An overview of the second generation's educational attainment**

Assessing the level of educational achievement of Moroccan children is complex for at least two reasons. First, there is no agreement on what is meant by student achievement, often contested in the education literature (see for example McGivney 1996); second, there is a lack of statistical data on how well Moroccan children are doing at school. I choose therefore to define 'achievement' as 'success'. Due to lack of statistical data, I based my analysis on my research sample, feedback from teachers and a commissioned study by a Moroccan organisation that looked at the achievement of Moroccan and other Arabic-speaking children in four secondary schools in the Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. In terms of educational achievement, a distinction needs to be made amongst different members of the second generation, specifically between the 'one and a half generation'<sup>5</sup> born in Morocco, who came to England at a young age, and the second generation born and bred in England.

Overall, my research sample shows a positive level of achievement, reflected in career choices and the level of education of both the 1.5- and the second-generation Moroccans (see Table 7.5). Many have reached a fairly good level of education and secured worthy job positions. However, it is difficult to reach a conclusive picture because of the absence of statistics. According to the sample, a slight discrepancy is seen between the second- generation and the '1.5-generation' Moroc-

**Table 7.5** *A profile of the educational level and career choices of second-generation Moroccans in London*

<i>Family</i>	<i>Country of birth</i>	<i>Sex</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Employment</i>
1 C-1	UK	M	High school	N/A
1 C-2	UK	F	High school	N/A
2 C-1	UK	F	University graduate	Trainee accountant
2 C-2	UK	F	High school	N/A
3 C-1	UK	M	University graduate	Community Development Worker
3 C-2	UK	F	University graduate	Teacher
4 C-1	UK	F	Did not finish high school	Senior staff with British Transport
4 C-2	Born in M, came to UK at 13	M	Did not finish high school	Housewife
5 C-1	UK	F	College graduate	Receptionist for a Moroccan org.
5 C-2	UK	F	High school	N/A
6 C-1	UK	F	University/Law	N/A
6 C-2	UK	F	High school	N/A
7 C-1	UK	F	University graduate	Former university lecturer, currently unemployed
8 C-1	UK	F	High school	N/A
9 C-1	UK	M	College graduate	Works in the media sector
9 C-2	UK	M	College graduate	Works part-time in the media sector
10 C-1	Born in M, came to UK at 15	F	University graduate	Works with the NHS
10 C-2	Born in M, came to UK at 24	F	University graduate	Counsellor
10 C-3	Born in M, came to UK at 13	F	University graduate	Works in the finance sector
11 C-1	UK	F	High school	N/A
12 C-1	Born in M, came to UK at 16	M	University graduate	Community Development Worker
12 C-2	Born in M, came to UK at 11	F	High school graduate	Housewife
13 C-1	UK	M	High school in Morocco	N/A
14 C-1	UK	F	High school	N/A
15 C-1	Born in M, came to UK at 4	F	College graduate	Housewife/ volunteering with the local supplementary school
16 C-1	UK	F	High school	N/A

<i>Family</i>	<i>Country of birth</i>	<i>Sex</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Employment</i>
<b>16 C-2</b>	UK	F	High school	N/A
<b>17 C-1</b>	UK	M	High school	N/A
<b>17 C-2</b>	UK	F	Primary school	N/A
<b>17 C-3</b>	UK	M	Primary school	N/A
<b>18 C-1</b>	UK	F	University student	N/A
<b>18 C-2</b>	UK	F	College	N/A
<b>18 C-3</b>	UK	F	High school	N/A
<b>19 C-1</b>	UK	M	University graduate	N/A
<b>20 C-1</b>	UK	M	High school	N/A
<b>20 C-2</b>	UK	M	Primary school	N/A
<b>20 C-3</b>	UK	F	Primary school	N/A
<b>21 C-1</b>	UK	M	Primary	N/A
<b>22 C-1</b>	UK	M	High school	N/A
<b>23 C-1</b>	UK	M	Military college	Works for the Army
<b>24 C-1</b>	UK	F	University graduate	Trainee solicitor
<b>Naima Ind. 2G</b>	Born in M, came to UK at 14	F	University graduate	Social worker
<b>Najat Ind. 2G</b>	UK	F	College graduate	Works for an architect firm
<b>Med Ind. 2G</b>	Born in UK, to M. at 6 months, back to UK aged 13	M	PhD holder	Currently unemployed
<b>Rashid Ind. 2G</b>	UK	M	College graduate	Youth Worker

cans. Whilst the former seem to face some difficulties and overall exhibit a lower aspirational level, the latter seem to display a stronger educational background and more eagerness to learn, with higher career aspirations. Omar, a university lecturer, confirms this observation.

What I've noticed is that the ones who have done some basic education back home, as opposed to the ones that were born and bred in the UK, have as a primary objective to be educated and achieve something, they are eager to know and learn, whereas the ones that were born here are lagging behind, and not as motivated for studies, a bit like other British kids because the educational system is exactly the same, so the ideology or the outlook of life is exactly the same [...] There are a lot of chances and compromises, sometimes it has a counter-effect as well, where they know that they will have another chance in terms of behaviour again and again. So it becomes a pattern.

In the last ten years, concerns about the educational achievement of Moroccan children were raised by several local Moroccan community organisations, some local schools and the Community Educational Department at the RBKC. The Department identified educational underachievement as a major concern in the Moroccan community. In 1999, in response to these concerns, the Al-Hasaniya Moroccan Women's Centre initiated an educational development project. This involved group discussions with parents, community consultations with various community representatives and liaising with local secondary schools. A survey disseminated detailed questionnaires in English and Arabic to over 1,000 children and their parents. In all, 376 children, fewer than 50 per cent, completed questionnaires. The target group of the research included all Arab children, but Moroccan children, as the largest national group, were analysed separately. The proportion of Moroccan students in each school varies considerably, from a maximum of 47 per cent at one school to a minimum of 13 per cent at another. Table 7.6 gives some indicative figures of comparable rates of exclusion of Moroccan and other Arabic pupils in the four selected schools.

Once out of school, evidence suggests (Gillborn 1997) that many excluded children do not return to school: a survey of exclusions done in the early 1990s showed that fewer than one in three permanently-excluded children ever returned to mainstream schools; the majority went to special units. Exclusion from school is the most serious sanction a school can use in response to disruptive behaviour. In the most serious cases, exclusion can be permanent and alternative education arrangements have to be made. Exclusion from school is thus highly salient to social exclusion. Attainment is retarded repeatedly or is at risk for long periods, and so is progression to further and higher education or to employment. Moreover, feelings of low self-esteem, stupidity and rejection can be engendered. A number of studies in the US have shown the association between these feelings, aggressive behaviour, and youth crime (see Goleman 1996: 234-237). Exclusion can also cause stress in families, adding to other stresses being experienced such as poverty, bad housing and illness (Cohen & Hughes, with Ashworth & Blair 1994; Commission for Racial Equality 1996).

**Table 7.6** *Percentages of exclusion amongst Moroccan and Arab students*

	<i>Moroccans</i>	<i>Other Arabs</i>
School 1	23	13
School 2	20	21
School 3	0	31
School 4	20	4

*Source:* Al Hasaniya Moroccan Women's Centre Report (1999)

North Westminster Community School analysed students' exam results for two years, and found that Moroccan boys underachieve compared to Moroccan girls and other Arab groups (Hicken 1997). For instance, the Year 11 average exam score for Moroccan boys was 18.6 (against a school average of 24.5) compared to 31.5 for Moroccan girls (school average 29.6). Two possible explanations exist for this gender difference in achievement: peer pressure on boys not to study within schools, and secondly, parents' tendency to be more protective of girls. A.D., a Community Development Worker, gave another explanation:

[...] that's maybe because of the mothers ... they do a lot of work and the girls feel that they have to achieve not to stay at home and do the work, so they have to have a better life and get better jobs. That's positive; because people see the future for girls in the community.

It was often reported that Moroccan children cause concern to schools because of their behaviour rather than their academic achievement. Abdulah Trevathan, head teacher of Islamia Primary School, has noticed this pattern amongst Moroccan children.

We find that one of the major problems for Moroccan children is a behavioural one ... They are quite robust, quite easily prone to physicality...the robust behaviour comes with a lot of confidence as well, so emotionally they are very strong, which is good.

Reda, a Connexion Advice Worker at Holland Park School, explained that the background from which these pupils come affects their behaviour.

One group of kids who come to this school come from quite deprived areas around Ladbroke Grove and Latimer. They are quite challenging kids. They come from tough backgrounds and have a lot of problems engaging positively with the education system. They are not achieving as much as they should be, the help that they are getting is quite good. We've got in this school an inclusion project. But some of these kids even with the support they get from here, their problems are much deeper [...].

Amongst Moroccans who are now studying, an increasing differentiation in educational careers is taking place. A small group is gaining access to higher professional and university education, whilst another group does not get past secondary and lower-vocational education. Be-

tween these two extremes there is a large group of youth who graduate from higher levels of vocational and college education. Whilst the first group is able to secure important positions within different sectors of the economy, the second and third groups face difficulties in accessing the job market and often experience significant levels of unemployment.

## **7.5 Factors influencing the educational attainment of Moroccan children**

A variety of explanations have been advanced for differential levels of achievement between majority and minority pupils, and between different groups of minority pupils. I chose to focus on three main factors that I believe are the most influential: education policies and provision; parental support; and social incorporation and youth oppositional culture.

### *7.5.1 Education policies and provision*

Market principles were introduced into the education system in the UK in 1988. As Sally Tomlinson (1997) points out, the policy of market principles in education, based on parental 'choice' of schools, has created competition between schools, fuelled by the annual publication of raw scores of public examination results, and rewarding schools by a funding formula for the numbers of pupils they attract. In this educational climate, values of competition, individualism and separation have become important; social justice and equity less so. Social class differences enable privileged 'choosers' to discriminate between schools, evaluate teachers and avoid schools with negative characteristics. These largely white middle-class parents have the cultural capital and the educational knowledge to 'win' in the local schools market (Ball, Bowe & Gewirtz 1996). 'Semi-skilled choosers' are mainly working-class parents who want to engage with the market but lack the skills and knowledge to 'succeed'. 'Disconnected choosers' are almost entirely working-class parents, attached to their local area, who settle for the nearest comprehensive school (Gewirtz, Ball & Bowe 1995: 183). The competitive market situation in the UK encourages schools to reject socially and educationally vulnerable students and to meet the perceived needs of the middle class (Tomlinson 1997).

As David Gillborn (1997: 345) argues, 'Education policy has adopted a largely de-racialised discourse such that a concern with ethnic inequalities of achievement and opportunity has been effectively removed from the policy agenda'. Analysing education reforms of the late 1980s

and early 1990s, Gillborn (1997: 358) concludes that they 'have done little to improve the levels of achievement amongst BME students. In some areas, the scale of BME/White inequality has increased'. It is important, Gillborn argues, 'to keep sight of ethnic diversity as a major field of ideological and political struggle, where apparently de-racialised reforms can serve to increase existing divisions and inequalities'.

The urban schools that most ethnic minority students attended from the 1960s to the 1990s were never intended to prepare students for higher-level academic work. The under-resourcing, high staff turnover and low expectations of teachers in urban schools create disadvantages for minority students (Rutter & Madge 1976; Tomlinson 1983). Although educational policies in the 1960s encouraged local authorities to draw indices of deprivation and provide extra resources for disadvantaged areas, the programmes which resulted tended to define ethnic minorities as part of the problem – one criterion for disadvantage being the actual presence of minorities (Tomlinson 1997).

Access to good mainstream schools has always been a challenge for Moroccan parents. This is why many parents end up choosing alternative educational channels for their children. For many parents the challenge is to find a secondary school in Kensington and Chelsea. Table 7.7 highlights the low number of secondary schools in RBKC compared with other London boroughs. This shortage in mainstream secondary schools is compensated by the highest number of independent schools in central London.

Although many parents assume their inability to secure a place for their children in secondary schools as a purely logistical issue, they sometimes start to wonder whether there are other underlying factors, as Fatima 2 explains.

**Table 7.7** School distribution in seven London boroughs in 2003/2004

	<i>Secondary</i>		<i>Special</i>		<i>Independent</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	Schools	Pupils	Schools	Pupils	Schools	Pupils	Schools	Pupils
Camden	9	9,601	3	229	6	2,592	18	12,422
Islington	9	7,783	3	265	1	254	13	8,302
<b>RBKC</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3,752</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>6,289</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>10,111</b>
Lambeth	10	7,400	5	455	2	876	17	8,731
Southwark	15	10,914	4	302	4	3,724	23	14,940
Wandsworth	11	11,106	7	570	6	3,642	24	15,318
Westminster	8	8,298	2	144	11	4,201	21	12,643
<b>Central London</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>58,854</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>2,035</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>21,578</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>82,467</b>

Source: DfES (2004)

Primary school is not a problem but secondary school is a real problem. Can you imagine in one school 33 pupils couldn't find a place in a secondary school? It's mostly Muslim pupils who have problems [...] so it makes you wonder as to what led them to change their policies, does it have anything to do with 9/11? Or is it just a coincidence? I wrote to the Town Hall etc. but their reply was that I'm not the only one who is facing this problem. I got to the point where my child was two weeks delayed because she couldn't find a place.

Not being able to find a good school for their children, some parents even contemplated the idea of keeping them at home.

At some point we were even considering keeping our daughters at home. Some parents are not really concerned about the quality of schools, they just want to secure their children a place in any school but we are not, we want good schools for our children (Amina).

Securing a place in primary schools, mainly Catholic or Muslim, can be equally challenging:

I had a problem, my children's school; St. Luke's has a good reputation. I have two children there and I needed my third child to get a place there but they told me there was no place. I said how come both of his siblings attend that school and he doesn't have priority, they told me I do not have priority because it is a Catholic school, the priority gets given to Catholics and members of the Church. I got angry and contacted the MP and she was very helpful. Then my son was given a place (Zohra, Female, 38-F17-M).

The Local Education Authority (LEA) does not collect data classified by ethnic background on how many pupils are not successful in applying to attend local schools. Therefore it is difficult to generalise that Moroccan parents are disproportionately unsuccessful in securing places for their children in local schools, especially secondary ones.

Although the one-and-a-half generation did achieve relatively better than the second generation, at least according to my research sample, the educational provision that they received when they first came was not always the one that best matched their needs.

So, things like Maths and Science I was doing really well because it was just the same thing but things like Language, Eng-

lish Language and Literature, I was doing really badly [...] their answer to that was to have a Special Needs Group. But yeah back then I don't think teachers had a proper understanding of what a person not speaking much English meant (Sofia, Female, 37-F10-C1).

The support and provision for the one-and-a-half generation influences their achievement as well as their level of confidence. Students like Sofia and her siblings had a fairly good basis in other subjects and language was their only obstacle; therefore, once their English improved they had no difficulty in going for higher education. The experiences of other children, however, can be different; some are placed in Special Needs groups, based on a wrong assessment, and remain in the group for most of their educational years. A low expectation level on the part of the teacher, combined with a flawed judgement, can greatly affect the educational attainment of a child.

### 7.5.2 *Parental support*

Here *support* refers to both financial help, determined by socio-economic factors, and educational assistance. The influence of family income, parental occupation and family structure has been analysed in both the educational and social stratification literature (see Schmid 2001). Children whose parents are better educated, make more money, have higher-status jobs, and live in two-parent families tend to attain higher levels of education than do other children. Human capital theory interprets the correlation between higher SES (Socio-Economic Standards) and educational achievement in a slightly different way. According to this perspective, parents make choices about how much time and other resources to invest in their children on the basis of their objectives, resources and constraints (Haveman & Wolfe 1994). These investment decisions affect the student's taste for education (preference) and cognitive skills (human capital), which in turn affect their educational success (Schmid 2001).

Ethnic minority parents, Moroccan parents in this case, are no exception. They have often borne the brunt of explanations for their children's educational achievements that are couched in terms of economic, cultural or intellectual deficiencies, family structures, language spoken, or lack of involvement in education. When it comes to parents' involvement, according to the research sample, the majority of parents said that they attended school meetings on a regular basis.

Yes, always because that's the most important thing. How could my children be in school and I do not take interest in how well

they are doing! [...] I need to follow up my children's education. I speak to the teachers to take care of my children as if they were her own...I try my best to stay involved in my children's education...(Ali, Male, 64-F1-F).

Yes I did. I didn't know much in the beginning, like how to fill in any paperwork etc. My husband would do that. My friend's daughter used to fill in forms for me...I used to go even when I didn't understand sometimes much; I would still go and listen (Saida, Female, 56-F7-M).

The primary initial aim of families who came in the late 1960s and early 1970s was to save some money and then return to Morocco. Often both parents would be working, leaving the eldest sibling to look after the younger ones.

Yes, most of the people who came here come from a rather poor background so they did their best to save some money and build a house back home but in the process they've lost quite a lot. What happened to us is that we've exchanged our children for money (Ali, Male, 64-F1-F).

Ali also gave another poignant testimony where he said that:

From our experience, the second generation has been conquered by the other. When I say that *our children are conquered by the 'other'* I don't just refer to the English, Middle Eastern or other cultures [...] We are often blamed for not doing enough for our children...how? We were struggling to get a decent living for us and our children; now that we have managed to achieve that, our children have already grown old.

This 'other' to which Ali referred could have layered meanings: first, the parents' dream of returning to Morocco made them focus more on money-making than on bringing up the children. Second, their children have appropriated another culture that is not Moroccan. And finally, it could indicate the British system's interference in the way the parents want to bring up their children, especially in terms of discipline. Back in Morocco, children's education and upbringing are the parents' responsibility and no-one has the right to interfere, whilst in England, the parents are under constant scrutiny from schools, social workers and so on.

When the first generation came here, Asian or North African, when they wanted to bring up their children the way they were brought up back home, that produced highly qualified people who have their status in society, they [the government] thought that it wasn't good enough [...] which doesn't make sense [...] you are a parent and they strip you of your right as a parent ... to push your son or daughter as much as possible. Then at the end of the day, when that son or daughter turns out to be a criminal, then it's your problem! It's a vicious circle! (Mohammed, Male, 63-F2-F).

The 'other' could also well be interpreted as the communication and generation gap between the parents and the children. To start with, the children's Arabic is poor and the parents' English is poorer, which leads to frustrations on both sides and halts communication channels. Secondly, parents and children find it difficult to relate to each other's environment, which leads to further widening of the gap.

[...] the kids are in school, after that they meet their friends so there is different input from different sources and then you go home...some are lucky to have their parents helping them, others are not that lucky... Parents should be able to speak to their children about everything and relate to them, in such a way that they don't have to go and ask for advice on specific things from other people who could mislead them, and by this the gap between the parent and the child is widened (Abdel, North Westminster School).

It is often fear on the part of the children that discourages them from talking to their parents. Cultural factors could contribute to that fear on the part of the children; however, as Reda explains, quite often the parents are themselves uninformed about many of the aspects of 'English life' that their children are exposed to.

From my experience, my parents didn't talk to me about things like drugs, sex etc. I had to learn them for myself. They taught me things that I need to know about my culture, they taught me things about religion, they taught me about rights and wrongs, *but they weren't equipped enough to educate me about life in England*, because for them English is not their first language, they couldn't even speak English...all they could do is encourage me and hope that I'll do well... they worked in quite tough jobs to provide me with a better future than they had ... so I feel that it's only fair if I could make them a bit proud and achieve some-

thing and not go down the road of not doing anything with my life... There are a lot of kids who don't appreciate the opportunities they have. There are a lot of parents who are good parents, but I just don't think they've got the skills in this society, maybe back in Morocco it's different but here it's a lot more difficult! (Reda, Holland Park School).

Moroccan parents, despite their generally low educational level, still have very high expectations for their children. They might not have the skills to support their children with their homework, but they certainly try to help with the means they have, as Ahmad explains.

I was very eager to make sure that they get the right education, because I didn't get the chance to get one. And thank God they not only got the right education but their children too went into higher education. My granddaughter is now a lawyer [...] It makes me sad though to see other Moroccan kids who are struggling.

Although educational underachievement is often directly related to the parents' low educational levels, the research sample revealed that this was not always the case. In fact, there was no direct correlation between the professional background of the heads of households and their children's achievement, which only means that, in relation to parental support, their level of aspiration has a bigger impact on their children's attainment than their own educational level (see Table 7.8).

### 7.5.3 *Social incorporation and youth oppositional culture*

Portes and MacLeod (1996) and Zhou and Bankston (1998) redefined the socio-cultural theory of the second generation's 'integration' by emphasising the importance of social incorporation and the context of reception in the United States. Zhou and Bankston, for example, argue that children who remain close to their families' culture do better than those who acculturate more rapidly. Similarly, Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco (1995), comparing recent Mexican immigrants with US-born Mexican immigrants, found that the former achieved more at school than the latter partly because of their 'dual frame of reference'. Dual orientation enabled them to contrast their previous lives before migration with their current lives and believe that their new lives were markedly better than the lives they left behind. But children who were born and brought up in the US, and had no dual frame of reference, did not believe that their current status was better. Instead, they saw themselves as marginalised in comparison with the 'dominant culture'. The study concluded that Mexican youths in Mexico and recent Mexican immi-

**Table 7.8** A comparative table of the professional background of parents and the educational level and career choices of their children

Family	Occupation of the head of household	Country of birth of the child	Age	Sex	Education	Employment
1 C-1	Retired/used to be a kitchen chef	UK	14	M	High school	N/A
1 C-2		UK	16	F	High school	N/A
2 C-1	Retired/used to be a kitchen chef	UK	27	F	University graduate	Working as a trainee accountant
2 C-2		UK	15	F	High school	N/A
3 C-1	Retired/used to work in a hotel	UK	30	M	University graduate	Community Development
3 C-2		UK	25	F	University graduate	Worker
4 C-1	Dead/used to work in a hotel	UK	32	F	Did not finish high school	Working as a teacher in a faith school
4 C-2		Born in M, came to UK at 13	42	M	Did not finish high school	British Transport Housewife
5 C-1	Retired/ worked with London Transport	UK	26	F	College graduate	Receptionist at a Moroccan Org.
5 C-2		UK	16	F	High school	N/A
6 C-1	Retired/used to work as a kitchen chef	UK	20	F	University student	N/A
6 C-2		UK	17	F	High school	N/A
7 C-1	Retired/used to work as a cook	UK	32	F	University graduate	Former university lecturer, currently unemployed
8 C-1	Housewife but husband is an accountant/Egyptian	UK	15	F	High school	N/A
9 C-1	Retired/used to work as a kitchen chef	UK	32	M	College graduate	Works in the media sector
9 C-2		UK	23	M	College graduate	Works part-time in the media sector
10 C-1	Retired/used to work as a kitchen chef in a hotel	Born in M, came to UK at 15	37	F	University graduate	Works with the NHS
10 C-2		Born in M, came to UK at 24	43	F	University graduate	Counsellor
10 C-3		Born in M, came to UK at 13	31	F	University graduate/Business	Works in the finance sector
11 C-1	Interpreter	UK	15	F	High school	N/A
12 C-1	Owner of a Moroccan travel agency	Born in M, came to UK at 16	30	M	University graduate	Community Development
12 C-2		Born in M, came to UK at 11	26	F	High school graduate	Worker
13 C-1	Retired/ used to be a cook	UK	16	M	High school in Morocco	Housewife
						N/A

<i>Family</i>	<i>Occupation of the head of household</i>	<i>Country of birth of the child</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Sex</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Employment</i>
14 C-1	Owner of a restaurant/ not working at the moment	UK	15	F	High school	N/A
15 C-1	Retired/worked in a hotel	Born in M, came to UK at 4	36	F	College graduate	Housewife/Volunteering with the local supplementary school
16 C-1	A cook	UK	17	F	High school	N/A
16 C-2		UK	16	F	High school	N/A
17 C-1	PE teacher	UK	14	M	High school	N/A
17 C-2		UK	10	F	Primary school	N/A
17 C-3		UK	9	M	Primary school	N/A
18 C-1	Retired/ used to work in a hotel	UK	20	F	University student	N/A
18 C-2		UK	18	F	College	N/A
18 C-3		UK	17	F	High school	N/A
19 C-1	Works for a travel agency	UK	24	M	University graduate	N/A
20 C-1	Runs a private business	UK	15	M	High school	N/A
20 C-2		UK	11	M	Primary school	N/A
20 C-3		UK	9	F	Primary school	N/A
21 C-1	A cook	UK	11	M	Primary	N/A
22 C-1	Runs interpreting agency	UK	14	M	High school	N/A
23 C-1	Works with children with learning difficulties	UK	33	M	Military academy	Works for the Army
24 C-1	Runs a private business	UK	29	F	University graduate	Trainee solicitor
Ind 2G Naima	Worked as a cook in a hospital	Born in M, came to UK at 14	36	F	University graduate	Social worker
Ind 2G Najat	Worked in agriculture	UK	35	F	College graduate	Works for an architect' firm
Ind 2G Med	Worked as a cook	Born in UK, taken to M at 6 months; back to UK aged 13	31	M	PhD holder	Currently unemployed
Ind 2G Rashid	Retired/used to work as a kitchen chef	UK	28	M	College graduate	Youth Worker

grants are more achievement-oriented than second-generation Mexicans and white American adolescents (Schmid 2001).

Achievement, therefore, is not just about financial and human capital; it is also about the significance of the cultural context within which it takes place. An inclusive cultural frame of reference for the child's 'identity' allows the bridging between two cultures to occur as a natural process. Whilst some children are able to adopt a pragmatic outlook in which two sets of values, or cultural identities, can coexist side by side in one personality, others do not succeed in reconciling the two, and sometimes even end up rejecting both. To deal with feelings of exclusion and discrimination, they seek an existing 'hybrid' cultural space, or construct their own, in which they would feel accepted. The first signs of rejection of the mainstream culture are often expressed as anti-social behaviour, as a demarcating sign of *difference*. This form of youth frustration and rebellion may be diffused through healthy channels such as fashion or art, especially music – Rap music, Hip-hop or other urban music genres. In other cases this 'oppositional' or 'adversarial' attitude finds its niche in an existing self-destructive youth subculture, where drugs are used and individuals have to show allegiance to the group by becoming part of a gang. Many working-class whites also display attitudes and behaviours that are often associated with a 'self-destructive', 'oppositional' culture. Drug use and drug dealing, the devaluing of formal education, the use of violence, strong peer group orientation, and disrespect for formal authority are common amongst young native whites too. Depending on the ethnic neighbourhood networks into which the migrant community is embedded, the children will be influenced by neighbourhood youth activity, *especially* in cases when parental supervision is weak. Some studies (see, for example, Sewell 1997; Youdell 2003) have shown that BME under-attainment is the direct consequence of growing up in deprivation.

In North Kensington, substance misuse reached its height in the late 1980s, where the area became a niche for drug users and dealers. Although the scale of the problem has decreased, it still persists in the area.

All Saints Road was a famous road for drug dealers etc. and in the early 1990s slowly, these drug dealers started moving down to Golborne Road. What made things worse is the closure of the mosque in the area, and it became a dead area, not like now ... the youth had nowhere to go so they were just hanging out in the street... when we saw the gravity of the problem we got in touch with the Youth Offender's Team and we managed to get a place where we organised activities for the youth etc. (Abdulali, Community Development Worker).

According to a report commissioned by Golborne United SRB, in one consultation session, attended by twelve teenagers (Moroccans and whites) aged 13–17, most of them had tried drugs; the reason given was peer pressure or pure boredom. They all felt that drugs were not a problem for them. In fact, many of them believed that cannabis should be legalised, as in the Netherlands. Interestingly, in this focus discussion many white teenagers felt that they were part of the Moroccan community:

[...] we feel we are part of a Moroccan community also...If we get seen smoking by some Moroccan adult they tell our mums and we get licks, so there is a community (Community Consultation Group 1999).

In another consultation report conducted by the Moroccan Community Welfare Group (MCWG) (1999) and commissioned by Golborne United SRB, many young Moroccan males felt that they were wrongly labelled trouble-makers and drug dealers by the local police, who were reported to be constantly stopping them for no apparent reason. Many of the participants in the focus group felt that they were being discriminated against. The group felt that, although there was racial discrimination against the Moroccan community amongst institutions and some residents, racial harassment was not much of an issue. One 19-year-old Moroccan participant said: 'They don't harass us because there are so many of us. I know the Eritreans and Bengalis get problems because there are less of them' (MCWG 1999).

In a questionnaire distributed to users by another Moroccan organisation (The Moroccan Information and Advice Centre), where they were asked to identify factors leading some of the youth into substance misuse, one user commented that 'Moroccan kids feel the pressure to live up to the reputation of producing the best *hashish* in the world'. When I asked Rashid, a Youth Worker, about how true the statement was, he replied:

That's true! ...the Moroccan guys that I used to hang out with, it was just one of those things, that made you bad. It just came like Moroccan *hashish* is the best in the world, Jamaican smoke their weed, Moroccan smoke their hash; it's the same thing. So you just get into that cycle. If you go to Golborne Road, that's the biggest thing in this community, because there are not enough places, youth clubs....

A lack of youth clubs, peer-group pressure, wanting to be accepted, these are a few of the many factors that lead some teenage Moroccans into drugs.

I smoked *hashish* before I smoked a cigarette (*laughs*) and yes it was with a Moroccan. And I can say it's like this stereotype that does stick. And there is so much of the stuff out there! There is this temptation for the youth going for it...English people go for ecstasy, even the young ones; there is always this culture of drugs, so with us it was *hashish* ... and again I have to say it isn't that bad if only it was just *hashish* (Mostafa, Male, 32-F9-C1).

To what extent is it justifiable for schools to allow students to attend classes when they have used drugs? When I asked a teacher in one of the secondary schools in North Kensington, his reply was:

I can't talk on behalf of the teachers, but I know that there are policies for when students come to the classroom stoned...you have to call their parents to come and collect them. It's quite hard because a lot of the teachers are not sure how to deal with that type of behaviour. Like I can spot a kid if he's stoned, from the smell, from the lips ... because I've had the experience of working with kids who are heavy users, some of the teachers are not from that background, they are more from a middle-class background, so they haven't had that experience. This is a big comprehensive school that has so many different kids; a lot of them come from that type of background. I can't say that it doesn't happen but it does ... (R.B).

In such cases, when the teachers are not able to monitor the behaviour of students, especially when they are using drugs, and therefore cannot inform their parents, the student's behaviour can only deteriorate and ultimately his/her schooling is seriously affected.

#### 7.5.4 Summary

This section of the chapter has attempted to draw attention to some of the factors influencing the educational achievement of Moroccan students. No single factor contributes to school attainment. In fact, external and internal factors influence achievement to varying degrees. As Figure 7.1 illustrates, these factors can either complement each other in a positive way, or leave room for others to compensate in their absence. Therefore, a combination of positive internal and external factors would contribute to positive outcomes; however, in the case of im-

balance, the child would (un)consciously draw on other sources to reach an equilibrium. However, what the child might consider as a balancing force might, in some cases, reinforce the imbalance. For example, if the child is unable to receive the support or encouragement from family or from his/her school, then he/she would seek it from the street and community.


## 7.6 Education, social exclusion and social capital

Research in the UK suggests that ethnic and racial segregation is exacerbated by parental choice of schools. It appears that 'choice' is offering white parents a legitimate means of avoiding schools with intakes of ethnic minority students (Tomlinson 1997). From the 1960s, government intentions, fuelled by assimilationist ideologies, aimed at preventing the concentration of ethnic minorities in urban schools and to 'spread the children' (Department for Education and Science 1965). White parental pressure influenced dispersal policies and both parents and governors took the view that migrant and bilingual children could lower standards in schools (Department for Education and Science 1971). Dispersal policies proved impossible to sustain and residential segregation, as minorities clustered in particular areas, ensured that schools in those areas became 'high minority', or so-called 'black schools'.

As Sally Tomlinson (1997) suggests, parents who, before the market reforms, were offering covert reasons for school preference which would not violate the 1976 Race Relations Act, are now overtly able to choose schools with few or no ethnic minority students. The market encourages ethnic segregation. In the schools marketplace, some students are regarded as 'valuable commodities' or desirable customers; others are undesirable. Students who are valued above others are those with a high measured ability level, who are motivated and have supportive parents. It was therefore apparent and acknowledged that 'choice' legislation would increase ethnic and white school segregation. Minority students now bear additional market burdens; they are likely to be regarded as undesirable, attending 'failing' schools with severely reduced budgets.

The schools attended by the majority of Moroccans in Kensington and Chelsea would fit the description of 'black schools'. The experiences of many of the interviewees also reinforce this idea, even in the case of those who attended schools in other parts of London.

The school was a bit of a nightmare. It was one of the worst schools in London, it used to be called Big Shipping... It was up



**Figure 7.1** *Internal and external factors affecting school achievement*

from Brixton, Tulse Hill, we used to live there and we used to go to that school. There was a lot of bullying going on in that school and I remember because it's this Arab pride thing, of course you're not gonna let someone jump in front of you in the queue or push you around kind of thing, so we were always in trouble me and my brother and my sister. I think from my year only about three people went on to further education and I think from my brother's year there were about two and then after that it got a bit violent. People started coming in with guns and knives so in the end they ended up closing it (Sofia, Female, 37-F10-C1).

In Sofia's school, there were not as many Moroccans; however, for some of the schools in Kensington and Chelsea, where there are many Moroccan pupils, the dynamics within the school are different. Moroccan pupils feel very confident in the school, and even claim it as their 'own'. There is also a high level of solidarity, what could be described as a bonding type of social capital, between them.

I would say that the school used to have a lot of Moroccan kids but it's decreasing a bit, there were a lot more in the past. I'm not sure why the number has decreased ... maybe it's a generation thing. But yes, there was definitely that culture here that it's 'our school', we are in control and ... looking after each other which I think was good. Whenever there was a conflict going on there was always Moroccans against some other cultures...so

they were looking after each other, especially when it came to things like bullying, I think that was quite good (Reda, Connexions Personal Adviser).

It is understandable that parents would send their children to a school where there are some other Moroccan pupils, to make sure that they are 'looked after'. It was also a natural choice for parents who had several children; it made obvious sense if all the siblings attended the same school.

I went there, well I was young, my dad took me there, but I liked it. It has got the best facilities in Kensington and Chelsea, a swimming pool and everything and also because all the Moroccans live next to me. So, when I went there I knew everyone and all the older boys and everyone would be like 'If anyone says anything to you come and tell me and I'll sort them out'. So, I'd tell my brother's friends and my sister's friends and everyone... no one could dare to bully me ... No one ever, I'd be just like 'I'm Abdul's sister' and they'd be like 'Ok fine...' But if you weren't Moroccan it was hard to fit in ... Like when my dad thought of Holland Park, he thought I would be looked after (Amira, Female, 16-F5-C2).

Similarly, Zakaria felt the large presence of Moroccan kids in his school almost 'colonised it'.

School had a big part in my life, that's where it kind of messed me up... in North Westminster there were a lot of Moroccans there ... it was a good thing because of that, we kind of colonised the school, well not colonised but like ... there were a lot of us there... It's true we had our own group ... everybody knew who we were ... (Zakaria, Male, 23-F9-C2).

Despite feeling protected by the presence of other Moroccans in the school, many interviewees acknowledged its low quality of educational provision. The majority also are unwilling in the future to send their children to the same school, as Amira explains.

[...] now a lot of the younger children starting school, ten and eleven are normally part of the third generation ... I would never ever dream of sending my kids to Holland Park ... because I know what it's like, it's a rough school and you come out with hardly any GCSEs unless you really work hard ... Now most sec-

ond-generation parents choose not to send kids there now (Amira, Female, 16-F5-C2).

Teachers' expectations, as suggested by James Coleman (1988, 1994), play a major role in children's educational attainment. In the case of Catholic schools, the high level of expectation on the part of the teachers, which is a form of social capital between the teachers and the pupils, raises the level of achievement of students. However, the opposite is true in the case of Moroccan students where, in a number of schools, their teachers' expectations are very low. In a few cases they even make it explicit to the child, and in return the pupil internalises feelings of failure, as the following quote illustrates:

Yes, I've been excluded before...my teachers they say I don't equal nothing...but basically they are right, because it's true, I'm not learning nothing, I'm not enjoying my time so I'm not letting them enjoy their time...So I give them a hard time and I'm not ashamed to say it (Soufiane, Male, 14-Ind. 3<sup>rd</sup> G).

As Sivanandan (1994) points out, exclusion is seldom the measure of a child's capacity to learn; it is an indication, instead, of the teacher's refusal to be challenged. And, in an educational system which puts a premium not on the 'educability' of the child but on the price of its education, the challenge to the teacher is the financial cost of keeping it in school, not the human cost of keeping it out. When, in addition, educability itself is prejudiced in terms of a social stereotype which associates 'black' with 'problem', the exclusion of the black child becomes practically automatic. Conversely, Sivanandan (1994) argues, it is precisely because black children are already excluded, more than others, from most aspects of social life that they need to be included, more than others, in the educational life of the school.

Although it is undeniable that many Moroccan students have ambitions, their labelling as 'under-achievers' affects them when they encounter a non-supportive attitude amongst school personnel.

I don't know if they still do it but at the age of fifteen there's a Careers' Advisor you go to see and they tell you what you should do. I went in and she said to me I should go into catering, obviously it must've been a Moroccan thing, this woman must've known the Moroccan community or something and I just couldn't understand why she said that and I went and saw this hotel. I did do catering throughout university and my school and things; I was waitressing and all sorts of things. It's actually quite bad because I said I wanted to do Law and she kind of al-

most laughed because no one from that school was gonna go and do Law (Sofia, Female, 37-F10-C1).

Sofia followed her ambition despite the lack of school support, but she remains one of the few exceptional students who had the confidence to persevere and reach their set goal. Other students felt that they were not pressurised enough by their teachers, reflecting indifference towards them and towards their future. As Amira argues, employing a nice line in street vernacular, better results could be obtained if the school staff had a stricter attitude towards students.

It's the kind of school where they don't really pressurise you [...] I could easily go to school with no bag, no pen, no paper, walk in, go into the gardens, smoke a spliff, come back out, take a drink to the toilets, go into my class lagged, pissed, they don't really do nothing ... the worst they do is tell your parents but half the children in school parents know that they do all that, that they drink and blaze and whatever. They don't really keep a lock down on everyone and even if you have got it off the root, they don't help you [...] It's the school's fault as well because they don't teach us enough about society (Amira, Female, 16-F5-C2).

When children are exposed to such an environment, their aspirations are inevitably affected. The lack of positive role models in the school and community setting can also be a key contributor to demotivation and poor school performance. At the level of the community, success stories evaporate quickly as people move out of the area once their socio-economic conditions have improved; in some cases they would never associate with members of the Moroccan community in West London in the first place.

They could be born here, in this area and they get their BSc or MSc and say 'Well, I don't feel comfortable in this area and I don't want friends of mine to know that I'm part of this society' and they just leave [...] I myself was told in the past 'You don't want to get involved with the community because they will just drag you down', when you try and be a role model for them they look at you as one excluded example [...] maybe you had a chance (Omar, university lecturer).

Similarly, as Naima argues, it is not the lack of success stories within the Moroccan community as a whole; it is rather their invisibility within the Moroccan community in West London that gives a negative image of the low level of achievement amongst its members.

I know there are a lot of educated Moroccans living in the UK and they are there because they have studied, but because they are spread out, the community does not get that positive impression [...] It could've helped not just success in education but overall in all the problems life brings because there are cultural clashes, identity clash questions, to have some-one to look up to (Naima, Female, 36-Ind. 2<sup>nd</sup> G).

Arguably, however, the low educational level of the parents, combined with their perseverance in securing a fairly good living standard for their children, can be a motivating factor in itself for the children, as they will be doing their best in order to try and improve their situation. However, for a number of children it is just a de-motivating factor, as Omar argues.

Those who were born here, their parents have been doing sometimes petty jobs because of their educational level, and then they don't give them that enthusiasm. There are very few examples within the Moroccan community where the kids can look up to them and say 'Yes, I want to be like my neighbour'. For what I've noticed, up till the age of fifteen, seventeen, they just end up in the streets like most people (Omar, university lecturer).

Aspects of 'downward assimilation' described by Portes and Landolt (1996) can occur through association of children of immigrants from one community with those from other migrant communities who are experiencing the same process of downward levelling of norms. It would be untrue to say that second-generation Moroccans living in London are all experiencing a process of downward assimilation; however, for a small section living in North Kensington, this is the case. Part of the reason leading to this is peer pressure, which is on boys rather than girls.

I'm a girl so all the older boys would just look out for me in the school, but if I was a boy, I would be with them. I would've been dragged in, I would've started smoking, I would've started drinking, I would've been by the time I was twelve doing little errands, take this bit of pox here, take this Hashish and by the time I turned into a fifteen-year-old boy, I would've known every route every trick in the book so I could get my own stuff and start selling it (Amira, Female, 16-F5-C2).

Pressure, yeah...everyone at school wants to be the guy... Some people just fall into it, even though they don't want it. Like I said, first day I hit school I have a fight. That's not normal. I just walk into school, I'm just a young kid, you know what I mean? I'm a young kid, a normal kid, you don't really do that sort of things there. It's like it just went on from there. Your life just falls into place; you don't choose your life [...] (Zakaria, Male, 23-F9-C2).

Inside and outside the school context, some young second-generation Moroccans tend to associate with or even aspire to join the strongest group, and in this case the Afro-Caribbean group is the largest and the most established in the area. The solidarity between some young Afro-Caribbeans and Moroccans is triggered by various factors.

West Indians are with us, we're together...I don't know you know, it's just like they've come as well like us, they're outsiders. Pakistanis are outsiders as well but they've come to hold their ground, work and make something. Whereas us and blacks are just wasted basically... they just look for support from *Mgharba* [Moroccans] and we look for support from them. It's the culture as well, it's like we've got totally different cultures but we've got a *culture* that's the thing. Like they've got their way of their upbringing and we've got our way of our upbringing and we can respect each other... historically we all come from Africa so *we have to be the same* (Amira, Female, 16-F5-C2).

To some extent this could explain why many young Moroccans are imitating the dress code of Afro-Caribbeans. Amira explains aspects of this dress code.

It's a statement. It's a statement coz around here for boys they have to *survive* and to survive they have to be tugged out. Like gangsters, tugged out ... Like for example the jeans up to here, that's a sign of jail, because in jail they don't have belts so their jeans are always loose. That's a sign that I'm a gangster basically, 'I've been in jail no one can mess with me' kind of thing, they have to have that point of life kind of thing. All these little things, just little signs in it, like the Avirex jackets their big massive leather jackets with the Avirex on the back. I tried my brother's on, I thought I was gonna drop, it's so heavy. It's just a sign, if you've got an Avirex jacket that's it oh my God you're a gangster, that's it ... like every little thing they do, it's just a little sign. I'm there no one can mess with me and especially these days,

I'm talking about my brothers generally who are older than me. Boys my age and a bit younger have got crews now.

She then goes on to explain that the more recent trend in her area as well as at school is the formation of young gangs.

You know like a ship, a crew. They've actually got their crews, their gangs. They've got proper gangs; you know like the Americans, it really started to be like that. There's Cop Killer Hot Squad, Cold Hearted, Xrated, Soul Survivors, just bare names but no one sees it ... No one takes much notice of the crews now because they're just *young at school*, walking about but I know once they hit eighteen, they hate each other now, in school they're sitting there always cussing each other and fighting. By the time they hit eighteen and they'll know they've got access to guns, weapons, it'll be just like we're in America with gang fights and shootings, but no one sees it now, I can see it because I'm friends with these people, I know how strongly they feel about their crew. Like, a boy Louis, another boy in his crew got beaten up, the whole crew would go after that boy, they all stick together like a gang. So, this is the new generation how it started, they're all in little groups and it's just Moroccans and blacks [...].

Social isolation and deprivation have contributed to the rise of this 'oppositional culture' amongst young people who feel neither totally integrated into their respective communities, nor part of the mainstream host society. The gang symbolises the social space and defines the spatial boundaries to which these young people belong. It also provides a support network and protection for its members. Their psychological survival is channelled through their rejection of a middle-class way of life and their opposition to any form of authority, including school.

I was told that it is a new trend for young Moroccans to belong to ethnically mixed gangs. In the past they used to have their own, where a group of teenagers would look after each other, and most importantly they would defend their local area as their own 'territory'.

I'm not going to lie to you, I'm looking at it from my view, what happened to us...I was born in this area, there are about 30, 40 maybe 50 of us, probably more than that, that are the same age. We hanged around together; you know what I'm saying? The good thing about it, we all knew each other. The bad thing was that we were too close, we knew too much about each other. It could lead to conflicts but at the end of the day it was OK. *It was*

*a closed thing*; basically no one could mess around with us... when we were young, nobody could mess around with us in this area. It was tight, I could go anywhere, do any thing. Only thing you had to worry about was the police... Yeah, we went to school together. At different schools we used to see each other, I used to go and check up at different schools...It was like the mafia (*laughs*). It was like that sort of state...But a younger version obviously, we are talking...amateur things (Zakaria, Male, 23-F9-C2).

The empirical evidence provided above illustrates the impact that urban segregation has on migrant communities. The concentration of low-income communities has inevitable consequences for the people who live in these locales, and particularly the younger generation. As Min Zhou (1997b) suggests, neighbourhoods directly affect the choice of schools, which become a mirror of the economic and social conditions in the neighbourhood. Moreover, students in schools shape one another's attitudes and expectations. In a disruptive urban environment, caught between rising hopes and shrinking opportunities, young members of ethnic minorities become increasingly sceptical about school achievement as a path to upward mobility, and respond with resentment towards adult middle-class society and rejection of mobility goals. Zhou (1997b) further argues that, while there is a strong anti-intellectual streak in American youth culture at all socio-economic levels, the rejection of academic pursuits is especially intense in minority schools, where many students identify teachers and school administrators with oppressive authority, doubt their future entry into the middle class, and rebel against learning.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, a sizeable proportion of today's second-generation Moroccans in London live in poor neighbourhoods and go to underprivileged schools dominated by other minority students. These schools provide poor learning environments and are often dangerous places. Because students in school shape one another's attitudes and expectations, the oppositional culture damages the educational outcomes of many Moroccan children. Therefore, one could argue that the building up of networks by the second generation at different levels (school, neighbourhood etc.) has a direct impact on the aspirations of these children and on their 'integration' within the host society.

Portes and MacLeod (1999) suggest that some young people do better than others because they have the 'unbroken' support of two-parent families. Similarly, it may be argued that children who have two *working* parents lack support and direction and therefore are likely to show problems in developing constructive habits and in school performance.

My evidence supports neither of these explanations at the level of the individual family. Moreover, parents' education has no significant effect on the children's achievement, as was shown in Table 7.8. Educational under-achievement, however, can be linked to the presence of social capital that actively encourages truancy and discourages achievement. Similarly, social networks can be powerful channels through which unhealthy behaviour, such as smoking and drug taking, is transmitted.

As Field, Schuller and Baron (2000) contend, Coleman (1988) wrongly downplayed ways that social capital can underpin social hierarchies and create new sources of inequality. He also over-emphasised primary connections such as kinship, and under-rated secondary connections such as social networks and civic engagement. The downside of social capital as embodied in such networks was not addressed by Coleman, especially how it may act to constrain and limit individuals.

The literature on schooling has rarely acknowledged the effects of inequalities in the distribution of social capital (but see Foley & Edwards 1997: 677). Studies by Stanton-Salazar and Dornbush (1995) on Mexican-origin students in US high schools have suggested a flaw in Coleman's formulation. They found that the level of association between social capital and a student's grades and aspirations was generally positive, but relatively weak. They attribute this to the *nature* of the social capital available to Mexican-origin students, which may transmit some types of information highly effectively, but is relatively poor at providing information on college admission or school qualifications. They further argue that Coleman's work overplayed 'the "role-modelling" and "cheer-leading" influences of significant others' (1995: 116-119). Coleman also over-valued 'close networks'. He praised 'intergenerational closure' in particular, referring to the extent to which all parties – children, parents, community leaders, teachers – were communicating regularly and effectively with one another (Coleman 1988). However, intergenerational closure may also be a powerful force for conservatism, perceived by actors as inhibiting rather than facilitating their development. In certain circumstances, intergenerational closure can, as discussed earlier, support 'downward levelling pressures' (Portes & Landolt 1996).

## 7.7 Summing up

Applying the concept of social capital to schools as part of the explanation for under-achievement has revealed the importance of family networks, school and out-of-school cultures. Addressing school under-achievement from this multiple perspective helps to explain school-level achievement as well as link the types of social capital to social struc-

tures. Social capital can engender and solidify different values within a school setting, which encourage under-achievement and truancy rather than attainment.

Policymakers' expectations about the role of schools can be over-exaggerated, just as community organisations are expected to bridge the gap between migrant communities and the host society. Schools are treated as vehicles that contribute effectively to social inclusion, whereas in some cases they may simply reproduce existing social inequalities, as illustrated by the phenomenon of so-called 'black schools'. In order to address social inequalities, more holistic and coherent policies need to be developed to target the root causes of poverty within deprived communities, instead of developing supposedly sophisticated models of school improvement aimed at helping underprivileged children to raise their levels of attainment.

Finally, as Pamela Munn (2000) suggests, the potential danger in the current fascination with the concept of social capital is that it focuses attention too firmly on the school as a vehicle for combating social disadvantage. The more we understand about how schools reproduce social and economic structures, the more tempted policymakers may be to focus on them as the cure-all for society's ills, charged with raising levels of attainment, inculcating moral values and educating children for active citizenship.



## 8 'Integration': Which identities? Whose social norms?

### 8.1 Introduction

This chapter concentrates on the underpinning meanings and functions of social capital. It highlights its utilitarian function as a *social norm*, by determining patterns of behaviour from individuals within family, ethnic, religious and national contexts. I argue that society in general creates many *normative* and unwritten rules, leading to the construction of various subconscious and implicit *social contracts* that bind individuals together. 'Memberships' within the different groups are continuously negotiated and redefined by individuals who, throughout their lives, experience varying and often parallel levels of inclusion and exclusion.

The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first discusses the elements that construct the 'identity' of second- and third-generation Moroccans. The second section examines the notion of norms of inclusion and exclusion amongst the younger generation at the level of the ethnic community, the religious community and national contexts – with reference to both Morocco and Britain. The last section critiques the concept of *segmented assimilation*, suggesting an alternative perspective that views the varying degrees of inclusion and exclusion of the younger generation as a fluid and continuous process of *transversal adaptation*. This new perspective better captures individuals' *horizontal* circulation across the various above-mentioned societal norms, mainly in terms of identity positioning, as well as *vertical* socio-economic mobility movement. I begin with a very brief sketch of existing frameworks for approaching 'identity'.

### 8.2 Social identities, ethnic identities and social capital: the links

The debate on social and ethnic identities is diffuse, and draws on diverse academic and other influences. For space reasons, I do not outline the major issues involved, but instead attempt to establish the

links between these two concepts and the main theoretical framework of this research – that is, social capital.

Most studies in (social) psychology treat ethnic identity as part of a *social identity* or a self-concept derived from an individual's knowledge of his or her 'membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership' (Tajfel 1981: 255). According to the social psychologist Tajfel (1978), *cognitive, evaluative, or emotional* attachment to an ethnic group may increase the sense of belonging to that group. This theory approaches identity dynamically, emphasising 'the complex dialectical relationship between social identity and social settings' (Cairns 1982: 283). Tajfel (1978) treats the individual's social identity not as a fixed component of his or her life, or as necessarily the essential and defining aspect of the individual. Rather, an individual's self-concept comprises many varying self-images which 'can be constructed as falling along a continuum, with individualising characteristics at the personal extreme, and social categorical characteristics at the social extreme' (Abraham & Hogg 1990: 4). The salience of social identity varies from situation to situation: in some cases, an individual's actions are primarily shaped by membership of any one of the social groups to which he or she belongs; in others behaviour is determined by personal characteristics (Jacobson 1998).

*Ethnic identity* can also be conceptualised as consisting of two aspects: *internal* and *external* identity (Isajiw 1990). The former refers to the dimensions of self-perception mentioned by Tajfel; the latter to observable social and cultural behaviours such as language usage, media preference, friendship patterns and spousal choice. The external indicators of ethnicity overlap with the cultural and social assimilation stages of immigrant adaptation proposed by Gordon (1964). Assimilation here is perceived as the abandonment of cultural and social ethnic characteristics and also the progression in the individual's socio-economic status and relationship to a non-ethnic 'mainstream' community.

The 'boundary' approach pioneered by Barth (1969) is particularly helpful for exploring the links between social identities, ethnic identities and social capital. Barth argues that ethnic groups should be regarded not as isolated and distinct cultural units, but must be understood as having evolved within a wider context of social relations. He rejects the analysis of ethnicity as 'a world of separate peoples, each with their culture and each organised in a society which can legitimately be isolated for description as an island to itself'. He adds:

Categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and information, but do entail social processes

of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing participation and membership in the course of individual life histories (1969: 10–11).

The boundary approach helps to explain why the younger generation of Moroccans' religious, ethnic and national identities emerge and take shape through the meeting, mixing and opposing of cultures, values and lifestyles. As Talai (1989) points out, the concept does not reveal the *meanings* that membership of an ethnic community has for its members. The concept of boundaries assumes that different boundaries define forms of social identity, and any one social identity is shaped by a set of boundaries (Jacobson 1998). Each set of boundaries provides a range of definitions, which vary in their degree of exclusivity, the precise criteria upon which they are based, and in the groups or subgroups upholding the criteria. As Ronald Cohen observes, Barth's concept of ethnic boundaries is only useful if ethnicity is understood to arise through 'a series of nesting dichotomisations of inclusiveness and exclusiveness' (1978: 387).

Social capital inevitably leads to the formation of shared obligations that create *social norms* within the network which help 'regulate' interactions between individuals. It therefore provides the social and cultural contexts for understanding identities within these boundaries. Jessica Jacobson (1998) offers a valuable categorisation of the four key boundaries that influence the identity positioning of the second generation; these are: the parental, ethnic, religious and boundaries of 'Britishness'. Though pertinent, this categorisation takes for granted the existence of a degree of homogeneity within each level. Adopting part of her conceptualisation, however, I have devised four levels of social norm:

- *Family Social Norms* (FSN): family members, especially the parents, influence and reinforce perceived family *norms*, which are also shaped by faith and ethnic communities' standards of behaviour.
- *Ethnic Social Norms* (ESN): first-generation migrants reconstruct and redefine cultural traditions and social behaviours brought from the country of origin which they expect members of the ethnic group, especially the younger ones, to abide by. The reconstructed norms may not correspond fully to those in the country of origin; rather it is the elders' definition of what is acceptable and what is not.
- *Religious Social Norms* (RSN): the encounter between members of the ethnic group and other British Muslims triggers a redefinition of religious social norms brought from the country of origin. Members filter and distinguish between the *religious* and the *cultural*, and ultimately define common religious social norms that govern the

sense of identity, as well as feelings of solidarity and membership that go beyond geographical localities and ethnic boundaries.

- *National Social Norms* (NSN): these are defined both *internally*, by the family and the ethnic group, and *externally* according to norms which, for example, include definitions of citizenship.

Although NSN are viewed, especially in terms of identity positioning, mainly in relation to the host country and conceptions of ‘Britishness’, reference shall also be made to the country of origin and conceptions of ‘Moroccanness’. On both levels, NSN are not treated here as a homogenous core; they are used instead to highlight patterns of *inclusion* and *exclusion* according to the younger generation’s conceptualisation of them.

This proposed typology comprises more than one norm at each level. For example, first-generation Moroccans’ ESN is multifaceted. Some members want to preserve a narrow and strict ethnic definition of ‘Moroccanness’, largely based on their perception from Northern Morocco; hence there are certain expectations of behaving in a ‘Moroccan’ way. Other members of the same ethnic group, especially the younger generation, have a wider definition of ‘Moroccanness’ and might use it interchangeably with being ‘Arab’ or ‘Muslim’.

Individuals engage with these four norms *simultaneously*. Their engagement is not always spontaneous or systematic based on *innate membership*, for example being born a Muslim or Moroccan. I believe that the younger generation of Moroccans, and to some extent the first generation, engage in a continuous *subconscious* process whereby they (a) decode, (b) incorporate and reject, and (c) respond and participate in the four types of social norm, constructing and negotiating their implicit *social contracts* at the four levels continuously. The ‘terms and conditions’ of this implicit social contract are constantly re-negotiated and re-defined.

These processes of *engagement* with/or *disengagement* from social norms depend not only on the personal will of individuals, but also on the capacity of the ‘other’ (members of the ethnic group or the host society mainly) to accept the level and the nature of individuals’ responsiveness, in this case *participation*. For example, France’s rejection of the RSN, by virtue of being a secular country, plays a key role in the exclusion of Muslim pupils from participating fully in schools. The French NSN is not necessarily unable to *decode* this RSN; however, it chooses to reject it. Arguably, Muslims’ non-response to the host-society NSN contributes to their own exclusion.

### 8.3 Elements of 'identity'

Five identity variables are discussed in this section: (1) self-identities, (2) sense of belonging, (3) religiosity, (4) language practices and (5) marriage patterns. These encapsulate some key elements that construct the 'identity' of the younger-generation Moroccans in London. In all, 37 second-generation and eight third-generation Moroccans were interviewed within the 24-family sample. A further twelve random third-generation youth were also interviewed, making 57 younger-generation interviewees in all. Tables 8.1 and 8.2 summarise three of the five chosen variables: self-identities, sense of belonging and marriage patterns. The responses are not to be treated at face value, as these *elements of identity* are believed to be fluid, temporal and changeable according to time, location and audience. Nevertheless, they still show how the younger-generation Moroccans position themselves in relation to *ethnic*, *religious* and *national* parameters, whilst continuously negotiating their multifaceted identities.

#### 8.3.1 *Self-identities*

Tables 8.1 and 8.2 reveal the diverse identity choices referred to by the second- and third-generation Moroccans. It is clear that the parameters of nationality, ethnicity and religion largely influence their self-identification. These young people could be said therefore to have 'identity options', a term used initially by Rex and Josephides (1987) in referring to the situation of second-generation British Asians.

Many interviewees (22 out of 57) identified themselves as British-Moroccans. For some, being British-Moroccan is just another way of saying they are a second- or a third-generation Moroccan, as Kawtar explains:

On the cultural basis I'm a British-Moroccan, because I was born here, Moroccan because of my parents and my upbringing. The British part is only because I was born here ... I guess the Moroccan part takes a greater half. I mean *I'm only British because I was born here* but everything I do, the way I dress, the way I eat, what I watch, is Moroccanised, apart from TV I guess (Kawtar, Female, 16-F1-C2).

Others are less clear about what being a British-Moroccan means. For them, choosing this identity option is often a 'practical' response to inquisitive individuals like me.

I'm a British-Moroccan I suppose ... I really don't know how to identify myself ... I really don't know, so when someone asks me, 'Where are you from?' I say, 'I'm Moroccan', but obviously by the way I am and the way I speak they can tell that I was born here or came here from a very early age. So, I just stick to, 'I'm Moroccan, I'm British-Moroccan' (Amira, Female, 16-F5-C2).

Other interviewees, ten out of 57, stressed their sense of belonging derived from their membership of a Muslim community by identifying themselves first as Muslims. Categories emerged such as Muslim, Muslim-Moroccan born in Britain, Muslim-Arab, Muslim-Arab-Moroccan or other hyphenated identities such as Muslim-Jamaican-Moroccan. These definitions, as Jacobson argues (1998), imply that religious, ethnic and national identities are both multi-dimensional and interpretative. The Muslim identity is often, though not always, a *reactive ethnic consciousness* of second- and third-generation Moroccans, especially following international events such as the conflict in the Middle East, 11 September 2001,<sup>1</sup> and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This religious awareness is also connected with their experiences and expectations of racial and Islamophobic discrimination. These factors combined have in some cases strengthened feelings of solidarity towards fellow-Muslims, both in Britain and overseas, reinforcing both renewed religious awareness and a sense of religious identity.

I have always identified myself as a Muslim but since 9/11 my belief in Islam has got stronger [...] About two or three years ago I would never say to them 'I'm Muslim' because we were only friends, but now I say things like 'How about coming with me to the mosque?' and stuff like that. I'm not forcing them; I am trying to help them (Safae, Female, 16-F16-C1).

Seven of the 57 interviewees claimed that it was important to distinguish themselves from Moroccan-Muslims and preferred to associate themselves with the wider Muslim community in Britain. Their self-definition incorporates their knowledge, values and feelings as British citizens.

If you had asked me a few years ago I would have said Moroccan but now I would say Muslim first, British-Muslim [...] Being brought up in this country I feel more British than Moroccan. If I went to live in Morocco, I probably would have nothing in common with anybody there. I have more in common with a

British-Muslim than a Moroccan-Muslim. I would say I am a British-Muslim (Hanane, Female, 32-F7-C1).

Only three interviewees reject any type of ethnic categorisation. They feel that religion is a more meaningful source of identity than ethnic origin or, for that matter, nationality; while patriotism is positive, 'nationalism' is *haram* (forbidden):

I'm an Arab-Muslim ...It is haram to be of a nationality... Nationalism came after colonialism across the world, which created borders (Mohammed, Male, 31-Ind. 2<sup>nd</sup>G).

I'm a Muslim and that's the main thing for me...British Moroccan Muslim. It's just these different names that separate people and I don't believe in that because as a Muslim this is my way of life, not that I'm yellow or white (Amal, Female, 20-F18-C1).

The place of birth made a great deal of difference in the identity selected (see Table 8.1). Three out of eight from the 1.5 generation identified themselves as Moroccan. Surprisingly however, three of the twelve third generation identified themselves as Moroccan too (see Table 8.2). One possible explanation is that, because of their young age, they are still in the process of reconciling between their Moroccan and British cultures. Or perhaps their parents, who at the same age were struggling to figure out where they belonged, want to avoid the same experience for their children, and therefore do their best to instil a stronger sense of Moroccan identity in them.

I'm Moroccan; I wouldn't even say British really...A Moroccan who came here at a very young age and been brought up here but I'm still Moroccan, I'm not British. I might have a British passport but that doesn't make me English [...] *I'm me*. I wouldn't say I'm more British or more Moroccan, *I'm me* (Assia, Female, 31-F10-C3).

I'm 100 per cent Moroccan, I can't say I'm British but because I wasn't born here. I'm a Moroccan-Muslim. Even in my driving licence they don't write Muslim or British they write Moroccan. It wasn't like this before ... (Kenza, Female, 45-F14-M).

Those from the second generation who chose to identify themselves as Moroccan or as a hyphenated Moroccan, also correlate Moroccan identity with the Muslim one.

**Table 8.1** *Self-identity, sense of belonging and choice of spouse of the younger-generation Moroccans*

Family	Country of birth of the child	Age	Sex	Education	Self-definition	Where is home?	Choice of spouse or future spouse
1 C-1	UK	14	M	High school	British-Moroccan	London	F: Moroccan
1 C-2	UK	1	F	High school	Muslim first/ British-Moroccan by culture	London	F: Muslim
2 C-1	UK	27	F	University graduate	British Moroccan	London and Morocco	C: Moroccan (England)
2 C-2	UK	15	F	High school			F: Muslim
3 C-1	UK	30	M	University graduate	Moroccan Muslim Born in Britain	Morocco	C: Moroccan (M)
3 C-2	UK	25	F	University graduate	Before Moroccan now Muslim	Morocco and London	F: Moroccan
4 C-1	UK	32	F	Did not finish high school	British-Moroccan	London	C: Moroccan (England)
4 C-2	Born in M, came to UK at 13	42	M	Did not finish high school	Muslim- Moroccan-British	Morocco	C: Moroccan (M)
5 C-1	UK	26	F	College graduate	Moroccan	Nowhere	C: Ghanaian
5 C-2	UK	16	F	High school	British	Nowhere	F: Muslim not necessarily Moroccan
6 C-1	UK	20	F	University graduate	British-Moroccan	London	F: Muslim
6 C-2	UK	17	F	High school	Muslim	London and Morocco	F: Muslim
7 C-1	UK	32	F	University graduate	British-Muslim	London/ Ladbroke Grove	C: Moroccan (England)

Family	Country of birth of the child	Age	Sex	Education	Self-definition	Where is home?	Choice of spouse or future spouse
8 C-1	UK	15	F	High school	British-Muslim (Mother Moroccan / father Egyptian)	London	F: Muslim not necessarily Moroccan
9 C-1	UK	32	M	College graduate	Muslim/British-Moroccan	Portobello/ London	C: Moroccan (M)
9 C-2	UK	23	M	College graduate	Muslim/Moroccan bred in London	Ladbroke Grove/ London	F: No preference
10 C-1	Born in M, came to UK at 15	37	F	University graduate	Moroccan	London	C: Afro-Caribbean
10 C-2	Born in M, came to UK at 24	43	F	University graduate	Moroccan-Spanish-British	Spain	C: Spanish
10 C-3	Born in M, came to UK at 13	31	F	University graduate	British-Moroccan	London	C: Moroccan (E)
11 C-1	UK	15	F	High school	British-Moroccan	London	F: Muslim
12 C-1	Born in M, came to UK at 16	30	M	University graduate	Muslim-Arab-Moroccan	London	C: Indian
12 C-2	Born in M, came to UK at 11	26	F	High school graduate	Moroccan	Morocco	C: Moroccan (M)
13 C-1	UK	16	M	High school in Morocco	British-Moroccan	London and Morocco	F: Muslim
14 C-1	UK	15	F	High school	British-Egyptian-Muslim	South London	F: Muslim
15 C-1	Born in M, came to UK at 4	36	F	College graduate	Muslim-Moroccan	East London	C: Moroccan (M)

<i>Family</i>	<i>Country of birth of the child</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Sex</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Self-definition</i>	<i>Where is home?</i>	<i>Choice of spouse or future spouse</i>
16 C-1	UK	17	F	High school 16	Muslim/ Jamaican/ Moroccan	London	F: Muslim
16 C-2	UK	16	F	High school 14	English/British	London	F: Not African nor English, maybe Moroccan from Europe F: ?
17 C-1	UK	14	M	High school	British-Moroccan	London and Morocco	F: ?
17 C-2	UK	10	F	Primary school	British-Moroccan	London and Morocco	F: ?
17 C-3	UK	9	M	Primary school	-	London and Morocco	F: ?
18 C-1	UK	20	F	University student	British/ Moroccan- Muslim	London and Morocco	F: Muslim
18 C-2	UK	18	F	High school	Muslim/ Moroccan sometimes British-Moroccan	London and Morocco	F: Muslim
18 C-3	UK	17	F	College	British-Moroccan	London and Morocco	F: Muslim
19 C-1	UK	24	M	University graduate	British-Muslim	London	F: Muslim
20 C-1	UK	15	M	High school	Moroccan in London, English outside	London	F: ?
20 C-2	UK	11	M	Primary school	Same	London	F: ?

Family	Country of birth of the child	Age	Sex	Education	Self-definition	Where is home?	Choice of spouse or future spouse
20 C-3	UK	9	F	Primary school	Same	London	F:?
21 C-1	UK	11	M	Primary	British-Moroccan	London	F:?
22 C-1	UK	14	M	High school	British-Moroccan; English outside London	England	F: Moroccan (E)
23 C-1	UK	33	M	Military college	English-Moroccan	Nowhere	P: English, C: Moroccan (England)
24 C-1	UK	29	F	University graduate	British	London	C: Moroccan (England)
Ind 2G Naima	Born in M, came to UK at 14	36	F	University graduate	Moroccan	London-Morocco	C: Moroccan (M)
Ind 2G Hayat	UK	35	F	College graduate	British-Moroccan	London	P: Pakistani
Ind 2G Med	Born in UK, taken to M at 6 months, back to UK aged 13	31	M	PhD holder	Muslim-Arab	No where	C: Moroccan (M)
Ind 2G Rashid	UK	28	M	College graduate	British	London	F: Moroccan (E)

P: Past; C: Current; F: Future; M: Morocco; E: Europe; Ind: Independent; 2G: Second-generation; 3G: Third-generation

**Table 8.2** *Self-identity, sense of belonging and choice of spouse according to twelve 'independent' third-generation Moroccans*

<i>Name</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Sex</i>	<i>Self-definition</i>	<i>Sense of belonging</i>	<i>Marriage preference</i>
Annass 1	10	M	Moroccan	Morocco	Moroccan
Mohammed Adam	14	M	British-Arab-Muslim	London	Moroccan
Mohammed 1	10	M	Muslim-British-Moroccan	London	Moroccan
Mohammed 2	14	M	Moroccan	London	Moroccan-English
Soufinane	14	M	British-Moroccan	London	Moroccan-English
Zakaria	13	M	Moroccan-British	Morocco	Muslim
Sulayman	12	M	British-Moroccan	Morocco	Moroccan-English
Wassim	12	M	Moroccan	Morocco-Larache	Moroccan-English
Ilias	15	M	British-Moroccan	Morocco	Muslim
Annass 2	14	M	British-Moroccan	London	Muslim
Turia	14	F	Muslim-British-Moroccan	London	Moroccan-English
Najlae	16	F	Moroccan-Muslim	London and Morocco	Muslim

Well, I always associate Moroccan as being Muslim, because it is part of our tradition, the way we are brought up is around Islam, do you understand? (Hassiba, Female, 26-F5-C1).

I see myself as a Moroccan-Muslim born in Britain. I guess to the average English person it doesn't matter; I would just say a Muslim born here ... (Rashid, Male, 30-F3-C1).

Members of the third generation who classify themselves as Moroccan also associate Moroccan with Muslim identity, affirming their minority status, and sense of exclusion from 'Britishness'.

I'm a Moroccan-Muslim; I don't classify myself as British, even though I was born here and hold a British passport...that's just the way I am. Because at the end of the day to *them* we will always remain foreigners (Ilias, Male, 15-Ind. 3<sup>nd</sup>G).

Three interviewees amongst the second generation identified themselves as 'British', mainly in terms of citizenship. They also referred to citizenship when asked if they had ever experienced discrimination or rejection. Those who had not experienced it said that they held a British passport and therefore should not be discriminated against. Their legal incorporation into the system, as British citizens, is used as a mechanism to resist rejection or racism.

I do feel British here, I feel 100 per cent British. I don't see myself as different from a white person [...] I've got a different culture at home, but *I've got the same rights everyone else has got and, apart from the stupid racism here and there, I'm cool* (Amira, Female, 16-F5-C2).

Others, like Rashid, associate 'Britishness' with the legal definition: their ability to participate as citizens, relate to the culture, and speak the language.

I'm British, because I grew up here, I'm a British citizen, *I pay taxes, I work here*. This is where I live, this is where I grew up [...] How could I call myself Moroccan when I don't even know what the social structure is like, it's a very big problem. I'm very proud of being of Moroccan descent, but I can't call myself Moroccan [...] (Rashid, Male, 28-Ind. 2<sup>nd</sup> G).

He then goes on to give this beautiful analogy of how he perceives Morocco and England.

I believe that if you were born into a family at a very young age and you don't know your parents, then they automatically become your parents. Why? Because they take care of you, the way your biological parents will do ... So that's the same thing with me, I was born here, I've taken so much that I can't say that I'm from somewhere else...*Inshallah* I might go back there [to Morocco] one day, because it's a beautiful country...but *at heart I'm British*.

For others being 'British' means a 'British-Muslim'.

When people ask me where I'm from, I say I'm British, not English, but British ...Then I just say my parents are Moroccan, I'm lucky to have had parents who came to this country as opposed to going to France, to Belgium or Spain, because in this country *I feel to say that you're British also encapsulates your religion*. So I can say *I'm British and a Muslim in one word*. They are mutually inclusive, if you can see what I mean (Samia, Female, 29-F24-C1).

There were several other hyphenated identities, especially amongst children of mixed marriages or those married to non-Moroccans, including British-Egyptian-Muslim; Moroccan-Spanish-British; Muslim-Jamaican-Moroccan; or even a pan-ethnic option such as Moroccan-

Arab. Children of a mixed marriage find it even more difficult to name their multiple identities

I'm not just Moroccan; I'm all these kind of cultures. I lived in Spain and I feel myself I'm Spanish because my children are half Spanish and this is the culture as well... I'd be a combination. As I said that multicultural identity I got, that's Moroccan, Spanish and British...I wouldn't be able to prioritise (Souad, Female, 43-F10-C2).

I always identify myself as an Arab first...um...before Moroccan but I'm Muslim before I'm Arab, do you see what I mean? In my application forms on ethnic origin, I always put Moroccan-Arab. Because I know I'm Moroccan-Arab, I'm not Berber [...] Also I chose to marry...um... an Asian woman [...] I'm belonging to the wider community (Fadi, Male, 30-F12-C1).

To reinforce the idea of fluid and changeable identities according to time and context, some explained that this process of what could be named 'identity-switching' mostly took place on holidays, or when they were asked in England where they come from.

Moroccan full stop...if they ask me in Morocco, I would say English...but if they ask me in France I would still say English...if they ask me where nobody knows me I would say Moroccan (Ossama, Male, 15-F20-C2).

I say that I'm Muslim and I'm Moroccan [...] like in school, if they ask me where I'm from I would say I'm British-Moroccan... when I'm in Morocco I say that I'm from London although most of the time they guess it from my *darija* [Moroccan colloquial Arabic] (Fatima, Female, 17-F18-C3).

### 8.3.2. Locating 'home' or the sense of belonging

As discussed in Chapter 5, the strong in-country networks that the younger generation have forged significantly influence their sense of belonging. Of the 57 second- and third-generation interviewees, 31 stated, without any degree of hesitation, that their 'home' is London, or their local neighbourhoods, calling themselves a 'Portobeller' or a 'Grove girl or boy'. For those who live in North Kensington, particularly, this geographical location reflects their local attachments in their narratives and expression of identity. Perceiving London as their 'home' is only natural since it is their place of birth.

London...my home is where I was born I guess. Only because... if they said to me 'Where is home?' I'd say 'London' because that's where I live. Home is where my family is, so London. My neighbourhood is my home because it's always been there since I was born (Kawatar, Female 16-F1-C2).

Home is England, yeah I was born here [...] what makes home is people, it's the people the atmosphere. If you have grown up in a place where you are used to and you move to another place you are going to want to go back (Marwa, Female, 16-F16-C2).

Many acknowledge an affinity with Morocco as their parents' place of origin, but it is difficult for them to see it as their 'home'.

Well my home is Ladbroke Grove, I do feel at home in London you know, because I was brought up in London. *London's my block*. But then again I go to Morocco and I feel at home there too you know. But I feel more at home here (Zakaria, Male, 23-F9-C2).

My home is here, London, the area where I live [...] In terms of where I go to relax, where I work, where I live my life...um...it's in Kensal Green, Queen's Park, it's not in Morocco. I could never live in Morocco [...] What makes home is family, area and also where you've grown up, memories, what you are used to, because that shapes how you live. Living in London is what makes me today (Samia, Female, 29-F24-C1).

Even those who were born in Morocco and came here at a young age, like Sofia, who joined her parents when she was 13, could not identify their home as Morocco as most of their life had been spent in London.

This is home for me definitely. It's kind of a mechanical thing; logistically this is where I fit in. But I think in Morocco, you have a sense of surreal thing, it's almost like you're part of the earth and the sky [...] it's where your roots are, almost in an organic way. Yeah so logistically I fit in here and it would be a nightmare for me to go and live in Morocco. I don't think I could do it but, the minute I go there, there's something about the air that's actually quite familiar. I don't actually feel I miss Morocco, my life is here (Sofia, Female, 37-F10-C1).

Thirteen interviewees expressed a dual sense of belonging to both England/London and Morocco. One is from the one-and-a-half generation, seven are second-generation and five are from the third generation. Not surprisingly these same interviewees identified themselves as British-Moroccans or Muslims first and foremost. For them a dual sense of belonging complements the way they identify themselves.

Here, but sometimes I feel that it's both here and Morocco, but I think it's more here than in Morocco, because when I'm going there I don't say that I'm going home, I say I'm going on holiday [...] I would say it's 75 per cent here and 25 per cent Morocco (Soundouss, Female, 15-F2-C2).

Home will be my house, but then again I would think of Morocco as my home too. I think home is a lot of places to me, home with my friends. It's the sense of security; it's a lot to do with the location as well. Latimer Road is my home. It's 90 per cent here and about 10 per cent Assilah (Amal, Female, 20-F18-C1).

Seven expressed a strong sense of belonging to Morocco. Only one is from the one-and-a-half generation, two are second-generation, and surprisingly four are from the third generation. Those who joined their parents understandably still feel that Morocco is their real home.

I'll tell you what we're like...we're like this little seed that, even though you bring it from home and plant it here, but the origin of the seed is still back from Morocco. So no matter what you do, even to our children [...] you're always from Morocco and that will never change. We will never say 'That's my home', never because it's not. You never feel it's your home. It's like you bring these plants from all over the world and you plant them but they still originate from other places (Houda, Female, 26-F12-C2).

Those from the second generation who associate 'home' with Morocco display strong religious values and feel that as devout Muslims they are perceived as 'outsiders', whilst in Morocco they do not 'stand out' as much.

I think you feel this is your home as in where you live and your social network, but you *still feel as an outsider* in terms of faith and culture, but when you are in Morocco, you do feel yeah I am going back home where your home is, but you still feel as yeah that's where the values you aspire to originate from. So if

you say you're going home then you're physically going home but your *inner self feels Moroccan*. When you're going out, you might think you're not Moroccan, then you look around at the people you are with then you don't seem to stand out (Rashid, Male, 30-F3-C1).

Being born and brought up in London, Rashid has not always felt home was Morocco. The change occurred after his teenage years.

Home was definitely here before [...] as a teenager it was a bit of both but you begin to relate more as you grow older to your country of origin, so you have more of a link but as you reach your kind of twenties Morocco becomes your home, home.

As for those in the third generation who consider 'Morocco' their 'home', one could argue that their conception of it has a degree of *sur-realism*, or as Najale calls it, the 'ultimate home'. Like some from the second generation, they understand 'home' as the place where they would not 'stand out' and there are no contradictions between how they feel and act.

I would say here, but for me *Morocco is really the ultimate home...* when I go to Morocco that's when I feel *the real me...* like here you have to put on a face for everyone [...] but there I can just be myself [...] when I go there it's like I don't want to come back... and when you reach there it's like, I'm actually here...and every year it's the same feeling, I'm home, where I'm originally from (Najlae, Female, 16-Ind. 3<sup>rd</sup> G).

Four interviewees from the second generation felt that they belonged neither to Morocco nor to England. Theirs was a feeling of 'in-betweenness'; however, unlike what Homi Bhabha (1994) suggests, this is not a fixed state of being, but an ongoing process of constant redefining and reinterpreting of their sense of belonging.

Where is home? Umm...I don't feel at home nowhere and that's the God's honest truth. I feel at home when I'm at home. I know you mean country. I don't feel England is my country especially with all this stuff going on. I certainly don't feel at home in Morocco. I don't fit in *al magharib*. I always have to say I'm from London in order for them to know I'm not like them. And it's the same here (Hassiba, Female, 26-F5-C1).

As the younger generation get older, their definition of 'home' becomes clearer, especially in relation to Morocco, which acquires a more 'mythical' status. Although the majority would still express a deep attachment to their parents' country of origin, they cannot imagine living there.

Definitely, this is home for me. Don't feel at home in Morocco at all. Umm...even though I came when I was sixteen...The place where I lived in Morocco, and the place where I was born, is no longer in existence, so I don't have that link anyway where I can go back and think I used to play here. No, it's all gone ... Morocco is just a nice dream in my head now, it's a place ... it's a place I think about a lot, it's the ideal in my head...but I could never live in Morocco. Although I could reasonably see myself going there and back for the rest of my life, even when my family are long gone I'll still go back (Fadi, Male, 30-F12-C1).

Fadi will still maintain strong ties with Morocco by travelling there every year; however, those ties embody a more symbolic nature than those that his parents have developed and nurtured through the years.

### 8.3.3 *Religiosity*

This following section will focus on two main points. First, how Islam is lived by younger members of the Moroccan community, as opposed to their parents (elaborated further in a subsequent section of the chapter dealing with religious social norms); and second, how members of the younger generation feel about bringing up their children as Muslims in Britain.

Although no direct question was asked on individuals' levels of religious practice, interviewees expressed in different ways the role that Islam played in their lives. For example, their usage of religious expressions in the interviews, or their dress code (especially in the case of women – of the 30 female interviewees, fifteen wear the Islamic headscarf, or *hijab*), can indicate levels of religiosity, and this was further confirmed when interviewees were asked how they want to bring up their children in the future. Almost all respondents named proper Islamic teachings as a priority.

Unlike their parents, the second and third generation do not take their status as Muslims for granted. Religion for them not only provides guidance, but is vital to their processes of identity construction.

They've experienced a void in religious and spiritual guidance. These young people are going through so many different crises;

they need to identify with someone. They are told that they are Muslims and Moroccans. They tend to identify more with the Muslim identity (A.D, Community Development Worker).

Fawzi, a Moroccan Imam in North Kensington, also sensed a religious *void* amongst the younger generation.

When I first approached the community, mid 1980s, I found that it was poor in terms of factors that could help them in preserving Moroccan traditions and values and extend the links between the young generations and the Moroccan and Islamic culture.

For many, the absence of *clear* religious guidance from their parents triggered their interest in learning more about Islam and a desire to go back to the sources of religion (*Quran* and *Sunnah*),<sup>2</sup> instead of basing their beliefs on mere *cultural practices* that they inherited from their parents.

I'm Muslim but there was no actual heritage of Islam in us [...] We just do cultural things and nothing more [...] *I was taught Islam in a cultural way*, something passed on from one generation to another. We would like to know more (Rashid, Male, 32 F4-C2).

Our parents, our grandparents have always prayed but at the same time they gossip a lot. Their perception of Islam was limited [...] you pray and that's it, I'll beat you up if you don't pray ... 'I'll beat you up if you don't fast', but the values of Islam, the basics of Islam you know, the reason why Islam came was never taught to us (Mohammed, Male, 31-Ind. 2<sup>nd</sup> G).

The events of 9/11 also contributed indirectly to the eagerness of the younger generation to separate their national, ethnic and religious identities. For many, there was a subsidiary compulsion; triggered by government responses and the media, they also felt compelled to make a choice and even prioritise which part of their identities mattered most, primarily the British or the Muslim.

What happened recently also made these young people think about where they belong, they've been *forced to draw a line*. Am I British or Moroccan-Muslim? Where do I fit in? (Muna, Female, 28-Ind. 2<sup>nd</sup> G).

9/11 has been a big shock and usually shocks produce fear and automatically the person goes back to his past...This has led them [the younger generation] to search within themselves and reflect on the environment they live in. I think that 9/11 has led all Muslims, orthodox and unorthodox, to reflect back and learn more about Islam (Fawzi, Imam).

Parents from the younger generation want to assist their children in learning more about Islam as a religion and way of life, to fill the religious void that several of them experienced whilst growing up. They believe that, if their children are brought up on stronger religious foundations from an early age, they will feel more confident about themselves as British-Muslims. They would then be able to strike a better balance between faith and notions of citizenship, which should be complementary and not conflicting with each other.

I was brought up with no or *very little religious values at all*. Um... my dad isn't religious you know, so I had no religious upbringing at all. I discovered it later. It was a late discovery for me and I would like my children to have it from the beginning...to have a bit more knowledge...I'll send them to learn Arabic. I'll send them to learn *Quran* if there is a possibility...I'd like them to have the knowledge I have now at a younger age. I would like them to feel *comfortable about who they are* and their religion, be educated about it in the right way (Fadi, Male, 30-12-C1).

Yes, I want to teach my children more, because my parents, my mum is illiterate, English and Arabic ... I want to teach them *religion not just from a cultural perspective* but also *as a way of life*, educate them so that it's the biggest factor in their lives and mine (Amal, Female, 20-F18-C1).

#### 8.3.4 Language practices

Minority language may be a significant indicator of how individuals relate to their culture of origin. It can also reflect the extent to which the younger generation responds to family and ethnic social norms. The vast majority of interviewees speak a mixture of English and Moroccan Arabic or *darija* (instead of Arabic, which for them refers to classical Arabic) within the home; talking mostly in *darija* with their parents, and English with their siblings. Moroccan children, like children from other minority language communities, display language shifts in conversation especially within the family setting. Commonly parents speak

to their children in *darija*, but the children are likely to reply in English.

Quotes in this volume, especially from the younger generation, reveal the linguistic fusion. Typical young Londoners' colloquialisms are tightly intertwined with specifically Muslim or Moroccan phrases. This code switching, or what Samia, one of my interviewees, calls 'Arabish', happens so spontaneously that they are not even aware of it.

I call it *Arabish* because I'm actually not aware of when I'm speaking Arabic and when I'm speaking English. I tend to mix the two. But I'd say mostly, 70 per cent of the time it's English [...] (Samia, Female, 29-F24-C1).

Another interesting common feature amongst the younger generation is their tendency to anglicise Arabic words by adding an 'ing' form; for example, *sally-ing* (praying). As Mohammed (F1-C1) explained, 'For me those words have become part of the English vocabulary': a compromise between the two languages whereby they adopt Arabic words whilst preserving an English sound to ensure a form of 'consistency'. It is fascinating, too, that the parents started using these anglicised words to improve their communication with their children.

The degree of commitment to *darija* Arabic varies from family to family and individual to individual. Many young 'British-Moroccans' strongly support the maintenance of Arabic for literary and religious uses and are actively transmitting Moroccan Arabic as the language of primary socialisation to their children. In some families there is almost a ban on English at home to ensure passing on the language to their children.

English language is in their blood, they were born in this country, which is a foreign country, the country which we are living happily in, but I still have to look after my language, culture and religion with my children... So I try to plant as much of that into my children's upbringing as possible...but we are not English we are Muslim, Moroccans and Arabs and I am proud of it and want to teach this to my children (Zohra, Female, 38-F17-M).

Although a large number of second-generation Moroccans attend supplementary school to learn Arabic at a young age, most find it difficult to maintain fluency in standard Arabic. The vast majority are fluent in Moroccan Arabic but unable to read or write standard Arabic.

I used to go to school but I forgot it, I stopped at the age of thirteen or fourteen, but I want to go back and learn Arabic because

that's a key objective in my life...but it's just a matter of finding the time ... (Amal, Female, 20-F18-C1).

For many parents and future parents the Arabic language is intimately intertwined with Islam. Teaching their children Arabic is a way of ensuring that they will be able to practise their faith fully.

They go to Arabic school on Saturday...they teach them Arabic through play. They teach them also some *Soras* [chapters] from Koran but the way they do it they get jigsaw puzzles, so they'd get a whole *Aya* [verse] in jigsaw puzzles...they would kind of do art work and that's how they'd learn a different letter each week. I talk to them in Arabic so they're kind of fluent in Arabic, in Moroccan not Arabic (Sofia, Female, 37-F10-C1).

It was interesting to notice also that, even in the case of some of the second generation whose parents were lenient about speaking Arabic at home, their children are adopting the opposite attitude, as Sofia again illustrates:

I'm actually going backwards because I do want my children to learn Arabic and I want to learn Arabic myself because I've lost most of it. Actually most of my conversations now with my brothers and sisters, except the older ones I think, you'll find I'll speak to them in Arabic and they'll respond in English.

### 8.3.5 *Marriage patterns*

The choice of spouse can be a significant indicator of the responsiveness of the second and third generation to social norms (family, ethnic, religious and national). My findings in this section indicate that family/ethnic and religious social norms are the most influential. Seventeen of those who were interviewed are married, twelve of them to Moroccans (six from Morocco, five from England, one from Europe). The rate of mixed marriage in the sample remains quite low: only six have married 'out' (Ghanaian, Spanish, Afro-Caribbean, Indian, English and Pakistani). As for those who are not married, ten preferred to be married to Moroccans, preferably from England or Europe, *not from Morocco*. The vast majority however, nineteen interviewees, preferred to marry a Muslim, regardless of his/her ethnic background. In this section, I will explore briefly the reasoning behind the choice of spouse or future partner.

In the first group of respondents who have a preference for having a 'Moroccan' partner, the influence of parents is very strong. To illustrate

this, I present two quotes, one from a father and the other from his daughter, who were interviewed separately, to compare their lines of thinking.

I can only relate to a Moroccan and even my children can only relate to Moroccans ...there are several people who got married to people from other nationalities but they are facing difficulties since they have to face different cultures...Because you don't only marry a person, *you get involved with another family* with its own habits and traditions...There was someone who asked for my daughter's hand who is from the Emirates but I refused (Hajj Abdellah, Male, 62-F3-F).

I've got no problem with marrying a non-Moroccan, I have friends who have married non-Moroccans and it doesn't really bother me, but my preference is a Moroccan, if someone was to come to me I wouldn't say no because they were non-Moroccan, but I would still prefer a Moroccan. ...because one day I want to go back and live in Morocco whether forever or for a short time... it's something I want to experience and be able to say that I am Moroccan (Selma, Female, 25-F3-C2).

Although the father was adamant that he will not let his children marry non-Moroccans, the daughter seemed open to the idea of marrying one. However, the more she contemplated the idea, the more inclined she became towards adopting her father's choice. She was particularly concerned about sacrifices she would have to make if her future partner were not from the same nationality, since this might compromise her dream of going back to Morocco.

Marrying a Moroccan was seen by many interviewees as a way of preserving identity, values and lifestyle. However, having a non-Moroccan partner was perceived by some as a source of 'confusion' to the children, as Najlae explains.

As long as he's Muslim...although I would prefer if he's Moroccan because I can see my little sister (eleven years old), she's a bit lost because she tries to mix up with Pakistanis but she is more into the Moroccan side because she is closer to my Mum... (Najlae, Female, 16-Ind. 3G).

Having a Moroccan partner is not always an uncomplicated choice. In the 1980s many second-generation women married men from Morocco. Many fell into the 'visa geeza' trap, and were used by the husbands as the means to migrate to England. Quite often these marriages did

not last for more than three years, the time required for the husband to get his indefinite leave to remain in the country. The wife, who by this time had children, was then repudiated by the husband.<sup>3</sup>

Not a Moroccan from Morocco, definitely not! I would prefer a Moroccan from England [...] Because I've seen lots of people hurt by it ... they just take the passport then leave and I know you're meant to trust them...but it's hard to trust if you know that happened to your cousin... so I want a Moroccan that is English at least! (Turia, Female, 14-Ind. 3<sup>rd</sup> G).

The vast majority of interviewees declared that their future partner has to be Muslim; for them nationality or ethnic background were irrelevant. Interestingly this perception was held by parents and children regardless of their gender although, according to Islam, men can marry into different faiths, but women cannot. For a Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim, the future husband would have to convert to Islam.

I've got two brothers younger than me, and I always give them advice. They can marry a non-Moroccan but they *can't marry a non-Muslim*. I hope when they grow up they will take that advice (Noura, Female, 36-F15-C1).

As long as she's Muslim I don't mind. It doesn't matter where she's from, as long as she's Muslim ...or she wants to convert then it doesn't bother me. As long as he [her son] loves her and thinks she's the right woman (Houda, Female, 26-F12-C2).

This attitude of many members of the second and third generations confirms the significant role of *religious social norms* in the lives of the younger generation. It also confirms that the attitudes of the younger generation are drifting away from the narrow definition of *family* or *ethnic social norms* that many of the first generation hold. This is a potential source of disagreement between the older and the younger generations.

A small group from the sample were either in a mixed couple or willing to marry from outside their faith and ethnic background. For them the family social norms still play a considerable role, mixed with a degree of influence from the national social norm. In one family, which had the highest level of mixed marriages, the father made a conscious effort to bring up his children as 'Europeans', as I was told by one of his daughters.

Yes, yes, we are international (*laughs*), I've got my sister married to an Egyptian, the other one married to an Irish, the other one to a Dominican; I'm married to a Spanish. The other married to a Dutch [...] Out of ten children only two are married to Moroccans (Souad, Female, 43-F10-C2).

Other parents believe in the strong natural bond that they have developed with their children. They are flexible about their children's choice of future partners, and remain confident that it will be still a choice that would meet some of the family social norms.

I would prefer if they are Moroccan but [...] I don't mind who they end up with, at the end of the day it's their choice and when they get to a certain age they will be old enough to choose themselves, but if you have that bond with your children from when they are younger, it will affect their choice for the better. As long as the person is good I don't mind (Abdul, Male, 45-F17-F).

Overall, the opinions that I collected about the different indicators of identity orientation of second- and third-generation Moroccans vary according to age, amongst other factors. Rashid's quote perfectly illustrates the filtering and selection processes the younger generation experience in their choice of future partners.

You see you go through *stages in your life*: when you're young, you play and learn; then you go to secondary school and college, and you try to *work out who you are* as a person, then you find out who you are, then you want to settle down and get married. From my experience, I used to always think that it wasn't important to marry somebody from your own ethnic background or religion [...] Then you say it's very important to marry someone from the same mentality; then you go and say no you want to marry someone from the same religion no matter who they are, then you go from there to culture; so I think I'm at that stage where I'm thinking that it might have to be Moroccan (Rashid, Male, 28-Ind. 2<sup>nd</sup> G).

#### 8.4 'Integrating' according to whose norms?

Individuals relate, conform and respond to family, ethnic, religious and national social norms, differently and to varying degrees. These next sections explore how second- and third-generation Moroccans relate to these various norms, as Moroccans, Muslims and British citizens.

### 8.4.1 Family and ethnic social norms

Although their components are slightly different, I discuss family and ethnic social norms jointly as the two are tightly interwoven, especially in the case of the Moroccan community in North Kensington. For the first generation, 'loyalty' to the minority appears to be a commitment to the traditional lifestyle and values of its members. For the younger generation, these 'community norms' are most clearly manifest in 'restrictions' arising from parental expectations regarding appropriate standards of behaviour for members of the community. Members of the Moroccan community are always conscious of how their behaviour is perceived by others living within the same community. This norm largely stems from a wish to preserve a Moroccan character, culture and traditions, in order to avoid total assimilation within 'Western' culture. However, the components of this Moroccan culture are often no longer representative of Morocco today.

If you go down to Ladbroke Grove and hear what people [the older generation] talk about, you wouldn't find that in Morocco. That's their way of latching on to something that doesn't represent what Morocco is like at the moment, it represents how Morocco was thirty years ago [...] People tell me in Morocco they go to Internet cafés and women go to cafés and things, whereas here it's still taboo, whereas in Morocco it's not even seen as an issue [...] Well, the idea is that we've got to hold on to what we've got so when we go back ... we'll just fit in perfectly. They don't realise that things move in Morocco (Sofia, Female, 37-F10-C1).

This ethnic social norm held by community elders also serves as a cultural reference, in terms of behaviour, to the younger generation that will mark them out – to themselves, other members of the community and outsiders – as 'Moroccans'. The ways in which the second and third generations maintain those definitions of 'Moroccanness' differ significantly from the ways of their parents, as they import new meanings into older concepts.

The second generation have *their own Moroccan culture* to the one of the older generation [...] Their Moroccan culture is a new Moroccan culture, it is mixed with the English culture, but the older generation have their strict Moroccan culture if you can understand what I'm saying [...] When a person grows up you pick different cultures from different people, different habits from different people (Kawtar, Female, 16-F1-C2).

This 'restrictive community norm', held by some members of the Moroccan community, especially elders, significantly influences the cultural values passed on to the younger generations. Some respondents – mostly female – spoke about being subject to this 'social control'. Particular discrepancy is noticeable regarding children's upbringing. The younger generations have difficulty in relating to it.

I've got the Moroccan culture at home which is alright coz I'm used to it but it's kinda mad coz you go outside, then you go home and it's *like two different worlds*. Like in Morocco, when we go out, my dad's like, 'Be home from the beach at seven o'clock', that would be fine because everyone's *Maghribi*, everyone's got that culture where their dad tells them to be home at a certain times. But here, say I'm going to a party, my dad will be, like, 'Come home at ten o'clock' and I'd be like, 'Ten o'clock? The party *starts* at ten o'clock!' They can't do that here, they bring us up wrong definitely, I reckon so. I would never be like that with my children (Amira, Female, 16-F5-C2).

Some respondents, particularly female, believe that a number of Moroccan parents are less concerned with their children's actual behaviour than with the need for their children to be seen to be behaving well. For instance, in a few cases, girls were advised by their parents to go to universities in London instead of moving out from home.

My interviews revealed *four* categories of Moroccan family. The first type lives within 'the Moroccan community' and has to abide by the 'norm' and behave accordingly. Samia's parents fall into this first category:

When I went to university I had arguments with my parents. Why? Because they were afraid about what other people were going to think. Like I've had problems in the past and it's always been about *nass* [people] [...] a substantial amount of the actions that parents take is because of *nass* and what they're going to say (Samia, Female, 29-F24-C1).

Whilst her parents managed in the end to allow her to go to university outside London, other families are stricter, caring more about what people would say than about the family members' interests. Mostafa, a second-generation, asked his wife to stop her English classes, because he could not handle the gossiping.

She used to learn in Ladbroke Grove...but there was too much of gossiping ...yeah...I just took her out of there. I said forget it because there was too much gossiping and stuff like that [...] So, I'm planning to find...for example, if there is a Mosque and they do Arabic and English lessons, so I thought it would be good for her to go there and stuff [...] At the mosque they give the same service, but at least with the mosque it's a bit more conservative, they behave a bit more with the gossip (Mostafa, Male, 32-F9-C1).

The second family type lives within the Moroccan community but keeps its distance, not getting very involved, and especially making sure that their children do not mix much with other Moroccan children. Zohra's husband is in that category; although he is in touch with Moroccan community members in Ladbroke Grove, he prevents his wife from establishing community networks, saying that it was for her own good.

When I came here not knowing anything about England, my husband said to me I was free to go wherever I wish, however he did not want me to go to Portobello/ Ladbroke Grove area... he told me there were many problems and bad things. After a while I realised he was right. I had a Muslim English friend who started telling me stories about Moroccans in Ladbroke Grove and the bad things that went on (Zohra, Female, 38-F17-M).

The third family type leaves the area, having experienced the 'restrictive community norm'. They have often challenged the norm somehow and feel that they no longer fit in within the 'community'. Hassiba explains why they chose to distance themselves:

[...] they're excluded from the community because they've either married someone they shouldn't have or they've got a certain image that the people here don't like, so they don't fit in [...] A few have taken their kids out, taken them to private school, and moved to the outskirts (Hassiba, Female, 26-F5-C1).

The last type has refused to be part of the 'community' in the first place and made a conscious decision not to live in the area. Hayat fits perfectly within this category.

The reason would be a lot of people would interfere with your life [...] And for me to live around them I couldn't interact with

them because I am more British than Moroccan. And say I was to get married to a Moroccan and he asks me to wear *Hijab* I would not. 'Sorry, you married me for what you saw [...] But if that is what you wanted then why marry me?' So it would be kind of hard. I wouldn't mind a few Moroccans here and there but that's too much. People are gossiping about you and stuff (Hayat, Female, 35-2<sup>nd</sup> Ind).

Some aspects of the ethnic social norms can strongly influence community dynamics, especially regarding the second generation's 'integration' patterns. As Zhou and Bankston argue (1994), because the norms of individual families stem from the ethnic community and are supported by it, the behaviour expected of children by parents and others is essentially the same; suggesting that young people receive little behavioural competition from the wider community when the social world of the family is restricted to the closed and highly interconnected circles of the ethnic group. The community's continual vigilance provides effective social control on individual families and the younger generation. If a child drops out of school, or if a boy gets involved with into a gang, he or she brings shame not only to him or herself, but also to the family.

#### 8.4.2 *Religious social norms*

Emile Durkheim (1954) emphasised the function that religion performs for social order. He defined religions as sets of beliefs and practices relating to the sacred realm which express and reinforce the *social ties* that *bind individuals* and communities together. Religious social norms are therefore embodied in social ties. Although religious and ethnic social norms are closely interwoven, we need to distinguish between the two, primarily because the younger generation treat 'Muslim' and 'ethnic' identity as separate entities. Here I examine the way in which the younger generation is challenging the definition of religious social norms held amongst the first generation by distinguishing between religion and what they perceive as a by-product of Moroccan culture. I then examine how this process is creating a degree of 'exclusion' for the younger generation in relation to the Moroccan community and/or their 'inclusion' in the British Muslim 'community' and the global Muslim *umma*.<sup>4</sup>

Jessica Jacobson (1998) notes two ways in which religion and ethnicity are differentiated based on two related understandings of ethnic identity. The first is a perception of ethnic identity as an attachment to a set of traditions or customs of non-religious origin associated with the minority group. This view claims that the universal applicability of

religious teachings should be distinguished from the limited relevance or usefulness of 'culture'. The assumption is that, while religious commitment expresses acceptance of absolute truths, recorded in the *Qur'an* and the *Sunnah*, ethnic identity is mere loyalty to customs and traditions brought by the older generation to Britain. The second means of distinguishing religion from ethnicity is based on a perception of ethnic identity in terms of national origins or descent. Thus, while ethnic identity (or self-identification as, for example, Arab or Moroccan) denotes attachment to a country or region of origin, one's religious identity as a Muslim signifies belonging to a global community and commitment to a set of doctrines asserting the equality of believers across boundaries of race and nationality.

Many younger-generation Moroccans approach religion in a *different way* to their parents: they separate 'culture' and 'traditions' from 'religion' or Islamic teachings. As Nielsen (1984) asserts, encounters between Muslims of different ethnicity lead to reassessment within of what is understood as truly 'Islamic' and what is perceived as 'tradition'. One element in this process, Nielsen argues, is the growing tendency for young people to reject customs from overseas that their parents have sought to establish in their British homes.

I try and forget the culture thing. My focus is more on Islam... we have inherited so many non-religious traditions from our parents...I'm trying to avoid that with my children (Assia, Female, 41-F20-M).

The celebration of *Eid el Mawlid*, the birth of the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) illustrates these divergent approaches to religion, and clashes of opinion between the old and younger generation. The first generation claims that it is a key religious celebration, but several members from the younger generation refuse to celebrate it, calling it a '*bid'aa*' or human invention. Dr. Abdulkarim Khalil, Director of the Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre (MCHC), considers these variances of opinion as natural and almost inevitable.

I'm afraid this is not unique to the Moroccan community, it's not going to be unique to British Muslims and it's not going to be unique to our elders [...] People will need just to accept that there are issues among Muslims where we have to agree to differ and have to accept each other on those bases. And actually Muslim scholars said many years ago that when there is a difference of opinion in any matter then there is no condemnation of which way you choose [...] we just have to promote understanding and a sort of accommodation.

The attitude of some of the younger generation towards Islam not only challenges the definition of 'Moroccan Islam', but extends the boundaries of what they perceive as their inherited faith to the actual environment where they live, and even beyond; they view their faith in relation to their British context and extend their membership to the British Muslim 'community' as well as the wider *umma*. For example, one of my informants from the first generation was disheartened on seeing younger male members dressed in a non-Moroccan way. He said 'What's wrong with our national dress [*djelaba*], why are they dressed up in an Afghani style? Do they think that it is more Islamic? I don't understand why they are rejecting our *Moroccan Islam*?' This attitude has led to a few inter-generational clashes.

Some young people who chose the religious lifestyle, and learnt about religion in a right way...um...then discovered that they were criticised by the elders in the community because their ways are now different, you know ... because the people who came here have that very minimal knowledge of Islam [...] these young people now have learnt something new and feel that by practising whatever they believe in, the elders feel that they're challenged and do not want them. You hear of instances where people have been pushed away from attending the small mosque [Golborne Rd mosque] because of their practices (Fadi, Male, 30-12-C1).

Islam, according to the younger generation, gives a religious identity that bridges ethnic and national affiliations. Although this attitude has always been an intrinsic part of the faith, it has dissipated gradually into the diverse national contexts of Muslims across the globe.

The first generation always tend to be a bit more traditional, and they resist opening to other things. While the younger generation is different, they are brought up in a different environment, they are more open to current issues and concerns and they also want to do something about the global situation that concerns all Muslims and the Muslims in the UK. So obviously there is a huge gap between the two generations in understanding, approach and outlook to what Islam is and Muslim communities are about. The question is how to manage this gap [...] so that this inter-generational tension doesn't translate into serious frictions (Abdelkarim Khalil, Director of MCHC).

These frictions between the old and the new generations are manifested in varying forms.

You see a bunch of young Moroccans who re-embraced Islam through k7s and they think that if you don't do it this way then you are not a good Muslim, or you are not a Muslim at all, which is totally wrong (Ismail, Youth Worker).

In the field there were people from various religious groups preaching. This created more tension as they are wondering who is telling the truth. The consequences of which are that we have now a chunk of the community that don't speak to each other [...] Some people think that they know better and it creates a lot of tension. The Moroccan government should try and help with this. They shouldn't send us people who don't speak English, or who are ignorant in religion (A.D, Community Development Worker).

Very significantly, in this last quote the first generation envisage a solution to the inter-generational gap. The informant explicitly refers to language and communication barriers as reasons why the younger generation cannot relate to 'Moroccan Islam'. He believes that a reverse process is still possible if the Moroccan government intervenes by sending the right interlocutors. Some of the younger generation, however, were eager to have Imams trained in the British context.

[...] even recently there has been talks from the government level that we need more Imams who were trained here ... I think it's a brilliant idea. Because you've got British-born Muslims that have very British sets of ideas just like the non-Muslim next door [...] As an Imam you are not supposed to only deal with issues to do with prayers, you need somebody to help you with other aspects of day-to-day life (Rashid, Male, 30-F3-C1).

Not all members of the younger generation are actively involved in challenging the religious social norms within the Moroccan community. Some experience high peer pressure, in various forms with differing levels of impact. Peer pressure can sometimes be revealed in a sense of shame induced when others oppose the set norm.

From my personal experience, I don't fit into the British English way of life. Even if I did fit into that, I don't want that life, and I don't fit in the Muslim, Moroccan way of life, so for me I'm looked down upon by both sides [...] so yes you are looked down

upon by those in your religion who you do associate yourself with because I don't cover my hair, I do dress up in a Westernised way ... So I'm looked down upon by my people but I'm also in the English setting (Muna, Youth Worker).

### 8.4.3 National social norms

My argument in this section consists of two parts. The first concerns the younger generation's expectations about fitting into the norms in the country of origin (Morocco), and how 'non-conformity' leads to instances of 'exclusion'. The second section explores in more depth the various norms in the country of residence (Britain) to which these young people have to respond, highlighting multiple levels of *inclusion* and *exclusion*.

#### 8.4.3.1 Country-of-origin context

The expectations of the younger generation to conform to the norms of Morocco, especially in terms of language, behaviour or attitudes, are significant here. Language is fundamental in their 'integration' in this context, referred to by many interviewees as the main obstacle to their acceptance as 'Moroccans'. They are often referred to colloquially as *w'lad el kharij* (children from abroad). The parents are very conscious of this and speak of it with a sense of sadness. They feel that their children are experiencing alienation, due to lack of language fluency, similar to what they themselves experience in England.

I'm very careful to maintain speaking in Arabic at home, so that the children can practice their Arabic and not lose it [...] so that once they go back to Morocco they can speak to their family members in Arabic and *not feel excluded* (Mustapha, Male, 61-F6-F).

Although you find that they [his children] are concerned about Morocco... when they go there, they don't really *integrate* with Moroccan kids...because of the language, they are ashamed to speak in their broken Arabic so they feel quite awkward (Ali, Male, 64-F1-F).

Whilst some of the younger generation are conscious of this lack and comfortable with it, for others it provokes real alienation or anxiety.

Because I stay with my family...sometimes they say 'Oh *w'lad al kharij*' or they'll laugh because we get our words mixed up, but then again we laugh at them, we say you're less modernised, we

retaliate in our own way, 'Oh you've got lots to learn'. It's all friendly, it's never serious ... (Kawatar, Female, 16-F1-C2).

I *don't fit in* Morocco because of the way I speak Arabic...and when I get something wrong, I have to say that I'm English, if I don't then I'm considered as stupid or something like that (Hamza, Male, 14-F22-C1).

'Fitting in' as a second- or third-generation Moroccan is never a straightforward process. Apart from language fluency, and responsiveness to traditions and social norms, expectations differ according to each gender. Hamza (F23-C1) and Samia (F24-C1) revealed some of these expectations in the following conversation they had after I asked them whether it is easier to be *accepted* as 'Moroccan' or 'British'.

*Hamza:* For a boy you'd find it much harder to convince people you're Moroccan than to convince them that you're British, definitely. There's a certain expectation, even if you go to Morocco, there's a certain expectation of what your life is like and what your behaviour is like because you live in Britain or were born in Britain. That works both ways. Older Moroccan people, first-generation immigrants, other peoples' parents all expect you to behave in an English way when you're here. Then when you go to Morocco everyone presumes that you are English anyway, so then what's the point? You might as well pretend to be British anyway!

*Samia:* With girls the expectation is that *you act like a Moroccan woman and then when you go to Morocco the expectation is the same*. You even entertain the idea that you'll act like an English girl, God forbid! Don't even contemplate it.

*Hamza:* That's why I think its easier being a boy. Straight away there's an assumption that you'll act English.

*Samia:* They almost encourage it.

*Hamza:* I don't think I've ever been encouraged to.

*Samia:* But you're expected to.

*Hamza:* But the pressure's still the same. To be able to perform in a certain way. *The legacy of all second-generation immigrants is that they've all had to live a lie. For their parents, or for family back-*

*ground, or for the rest of the Moroccan community... If you can't say to your next-door neighbour or family that your child is a true-blue Moroccan. That they are going to marry a Moroccan, have wonderful children who speak two languages and they're going to have a lovely house, and they're going to be educated and they're going to have all the things that are good about Britain, you're going to guarantee that they are not going to lose any of their heritage. That's a lot of pressure to put on a young person. A lot of pressure and people always fall by the wayside because their families' expectations are unrealistic or they put too much pressure on themselves.*

The above discussion captures magnificently some of the national and family norms that require the individual to act or 'perform' in a certain way in various contexts. The discrepancy between the levels of expectation for men and women is congruent with the religious norms, where men are allowed to marry non-Muslims whilst women are not. There is an underlying assumption that if women start acting 'English' there will be less religious conservatism, reflecting negatively on the parents. Being *accepted*, or being perceived as *integrated* either in the Moroccan or British contexts, does not depend only on the individual's willingness to engage with the norm, but also depends on individuals' expectations about the meaning of being 'Moroccan' or for that matter 'British'.

*I've always wanted to go and live in Morocco, but when I am in Morocco and someone asks me, I say I'm English because they don't classify me as Moroccan ... Yeah they can always tell even if I dress as a Moroccan [...] I find that when I am in Morocco I act more English because I'm quite particular about certain things (Selma, Female, 25-F3-C2).*

Being always obliged to conform to a dictated norm either in Morocco or Britain, some of the younger generation prefer to maintain their status as 'foreigners' in both settings.

*I'm comfortable being a foreigner, you get to a stage where being an outsider becomes quite comfortable [...] Whereas here I'm different, I've got used to being different, and I'm proud of being different. Whilst there I'm the same as everyone else, I have a Moroccan name, a Moroccan surname, I wear a *Jelaba*, I wear a scarf, my kids speak Arabic, I'm just the same as the next person and it is quite claustrophobic. It is quite claustrophobic because you become comfortable being a foreigner, being an outsider, you take comfort in that (Sofia, Female, 37-F10-C1).*

#### 8.4.3.2 Country-of-residence context

'Fitting in' according to the norm in the country of residence depends on several variables. Alba and Nee (2003) identify three. First, *socio-economic status* is assumed to increase the likelihood of identifying with the nation of residence as life becomes materially better; second, *social engagement with the mainstream culture* is expected to increase once the individual has developed social and familial relationships with the host country; and third, *political and civic participation* reflect an acceptance of national symbols, institutions and tangible involvement in the community. These three indicators are believed to contribute most to the integration or exclusion of immigrants in general. Whilst socio-economic outcomes clearly affect one's identification with society, the perception and experience of discrimination are more important for identity than socio-economic status.

This section of the analysis complements previous discussions from Chapters 5 and 7, which referred to levels of civic engagement of the second generation, and their socio-economic status mainly in relation to educational and professional attainments. The focus here is on how individuals believe they are *conforming* to the national norm – that is, whether their participation is perceived as sufficient for them to be considered 'British citizens', or whether there are other underlying factors influencing their perceived conformity to the national social norm. The findings here are extensive and vary from one personal experience to another; they cannot all be analysed. Instead I focus on three main points: first, whether members of the younger generation feel the need to 'integrate', or whether it is irrelevant because they were born and brought up in London; second, their own perceptions and experiences of rejection or discrimination; and third, how international events such as 9/11 and, more recently, 7/7 have affected them and their awareness of being 'integrated' or not.<sup>5</sup>

In response to the question 'Do you need to 'integrate' as a second- or third-generation Moroccan?', almost half the interviewees made reference to their legal status as British citizens. As Marwa (F16-C2) affirms 'I have a passport and I have a right to be here!' This kind of belonging to British society is *official* but not necessarily meaningful. 'Integration', according to some, is not only being able to fit into an agreed and fixed definition of 'Britishness'; it is more about *the degree of acceptance* of individuals and their contributions as part of a community or society as a whole.

I used to pride myself that I'm *the picture of integration*. I'm the perfect example, I'm in the army and *you can't get much more British than that*. But the truth is the guy that became the bus driver is just as integrated. The guy that owns the shop is just as

integrated, they all have a role to perform, a function. *It's about whether they're accepted in that community in that function* (Hamza, Male, 33-F23-C1).

For several interviewees, 'integration' is a dubious concept, as for them it means conforming to a stern depiction of 'Britishness' that does not correspond to their way of life.

Yeah I am integrated to a certain extent, [but] of course, there are certain things that stop me from fully integrating. I don't go to the pub on a Friday night. So, there are some things that I can't do but it doesn't make me feel less integrated (Sofia, Female, 37-F10-C1).

Being born in the country and knowing the system are all that is needed to achieve a degree of 'integration', according to some of the younger generation. In fact, for them achieving 'integration' in the Moroccan context is more far-fetched than conforming to the national norm in the British context.

Just because my parents didn't come from here it doesn't mean I am not British. Everyone chooses how they live. I chose to be Moroccan and they can choose whoever they want to be but *I'm still British*. In Morocco you feel different because you're not from there; you don't know all the customs ... *You don't know what's expected of you*. Here you know what's expected of you, you know the routine, and you know everything (Kawatar, Female, 16-F1-C2).

Other, mostly older interviewees, have experienced the need to conform to a certain image of 'Britishness'.

Maybe in the past *I was ignorant towards the side of being foreign or anything* ... Yes, I was born here but if an Englishman sees me he's not going to think that I was born here...even if I was born here, *he's not going to see me as one of his people*...this is the problem we have, we don't break that barrier properly (Rashid, Male, 32-F4-C2).

Some of the younger generation's reflections led to discussion of *experiences of discrimination* encountered at some point in their lives. This subject clearly raises issues of 'race' and racism – concepts which are highly contested within sociology and which I decided not to focus upon in this research. A number of interviewees felt that living in Lon-

don put less pressure on them to conform to a specific norm. London was described as having a unique context compared to other places in the UK. Its multicultural nature makes the degree of overt discrimination much lower than in other locations across the country, especially the North. Living in parts of London with a large Moroccan or Muslim population was described by some as giving ‘immunity’ from racism.

Even if I was born here when I go to Essex where my uncle lives, it’s such a large white community, when I go to that area; I really feel excluded and out of place, and so uncomfortable (Amal, Female, 20-F18-C1).

Maybe if I lived in a different area of London then probably I would experience discrimination...like my cousin she feels a bit excluded where she lives because there are a lot of British people and always look at her as if she’s a foreigner, but because I live here and there are so many Moroccans and there is so much mixture, the British are hardly here anymore (Najlae, Female, 16-Ind. 3<sup>rd</sup> G).

Almost half of the interviewees explicitly mentioned their feelings that they, or Muslims in general, are not accepted as fully ‘British’ for various reasons. They felt that this rejection has particularly escalated following recent international events, whereby Muslims are incessantly referred to as ‘terrorists’.

*Muslims are becoming the new Blacks!* What I mean by that is what used to happen in the late 1970s, early 1980s, especially in this country, where you had big headlines that say things like ‘6ft Black Man Robbing blah, blah, blah’ and what that headline did in a lot of people’s heads, especially white English is it made every single man who was Black and 6ft dangerous [...] That’s exactly what’s happening to Muslims today. You see the headlines ‘Muslim Youngsters in Bomb Attack’ or whatever and that makes all young Muslims into one category (Fadi, Male, 30-12-C1).

One aspect of racism discussed in some depth by several interviewees was the tendency, perhaps increasingly prevalent, for prejudice and discrimination to be expressed covertly. Some clearly find ‘subtle racism’ especially disconcerting precisely because it is hard to detect.

People throw sarcastic comments in the street but I see them more as the victims of the media, I try to give people a lot of the

benefit of the doubt. Usually people who are racist don't show it, they usually show you a different front. While the people who throw sarcastic comments they are usually not dangerous. Racism and discrimination, 90 per cent of it you can't prove [...] Unless someone attacks you explicitly as a Muslim you don't know if it's racism (Rashid, Male, 30-F3-C1).

Here all forms of racism are a lot more subtle [...] In France, it's kind of there, in your face whereas here, it's incredibly subtle so you can never quite grasp it. It could be just a look or the way someone smiles at you, but it is just as bad if not worse because you don't know how it's slippery (Selma, Female, 25-F10-C3).

The younger generation have, however, experienced many instances of overt racism, especially amongst women wearing the *hijab*. One symbolic and poignant example was given by Zohra:

I remember about three years ago we went to the park and my husband went to play football with his friends and me and my children stayed where we were, my son picked up the England flag and a couple of teenagers came up and said to him 'That's not your flag' and my son said 'Yes it is'. I said to her 'Are you English? Well so am I', but deep down I know we are not ... we have black hair and are Muslim and we are not originally from England and I will never forget it. This was even before 11 September (38-F17-M).

Examples cited in the interviews suggest that at least two types of attitude have been developed by the second and third generations in reaction to racism and overt discrimination. One group adopts a degree of acceptance of exclusion from British society, and internalises feelings of rejection; the other ignores all types of racist attitude and refuses to be 'excluded'.

If you are wearing the *hijab* you are labelled aren't you?! But before I wore the *hijab* they didn't know where I came from, whether I was Spanish or from Cyprus...they usually thought I was Spanish. But now when you wear the *hijab* you are labelled and looked at ... My husband keeps telling me let's go somewhere else and live (Hanane, Female, 32-F7-C1).

I've got my rights and as long as I've got a British passport, *I'm British even if other people don't perceive me as such...* I don't give a

damn about what other people say... I have never ever given anyone the opportunity to exclude me (Fadi, Male, 14-F22-C1).

The events of 9/11 and, more recently, 7/7 have significantly impacted on the levels of trust between different members of British society, as well as Moroccans, and national institutions representing the state. In a way, the 'terms and conditions' of the implicit social contract that binds individuals and the state, have changed. One expression encapsulates this *break in the social contract* – Tony Blair's famous phrase, right after the 7/7 attacks, 'The rules of the game have changed!' Hence there is a growing feeling amongst young Moroccans that, as members of an ethnic minority, their rights within British society, and their status as citizens, are precarious. The interviewees were asked their opinion regarding the latest legislation against terrorism. Some expressed some doubt about the rights that they still have as British citizens, since they are no longer protected by their legal status and could well be deported to their country of origin.

I feel that, as a British citizen, I will get as much rights as any other one. Although now there is a chance that *if you are a dual citizen then that could be used against you*, you can be deported back to your country of origin, and that came up after 7/7...but generally speaking I feel that institutions do listen to me (Rashid, Male, 30-F3-C1).

To a large extent the change in legislation reflects a breach in *trust* between the two parties (citizens and the state).

I can understand their insecurities, their fears and why they are constantly checking whether people are loyal to this country, because suddenly they've realised that this is not a foreign organisation, these are people who grew up with us and then threatened us. These are people with whom we are living, it could be somebody in the tube, in the market...those are people who are the product of the system. *It's almost as if you can't trust anybody now, there is that sense of fear and mistrust*. Now you have to identify in which camp you are, you can't be a bit of both ... I feel that as a British Muslim I'll be mistrusted as well now because the bombers were British Muslims (Selma, Female, 25-F3-C2).

Some interviewees felt that the impact of 7/7 *was less intense* than they had imagined. On a local level, especially, it was felt that British people were too conscious about their behaviour towards Muslims. 'Political correctness' therefore governed interactions with Muslims.

People even go out of their way to say to you 'It must be quite hard for you...we support you...' Sometimes it's a bit too much and it comes across as very fake, sometimes you could even feel that they have that apologetic look...You have the police that was outside the mosque for months until about recently, almost to say that we are here to protect you and help you. So there was a lot of support in general. People don't want to be seen as being politically incorrect and racist (Rashid, Male, 30-F3-C1).

Moreover, 9/11 was described as a turning point for most Muslims around the globe, bringing a major change to their lifestyle. The overall impacts of 9/11 and 7/7 on the Muslim community were felt especially in the way in which individuals display and practice their faith on a day-to-day basis. The climate of fear is therefore not only felt amongst non-Muslims, but among Muslims as well. Being constantly under the spotlight made many reluctant to go as far as changing people's negative perception of Islam. Several prefer now to keep a very low profile and just practise their faith quietly.

### 8.5 'Segmented assimilation' or 'transversal adaptation'?

Section 8.4 referred to complexities related to the 'integration' of the second- and third-generation Moroccans in London according to the various social norms, indicating that predictions of how members of the younger generation will 'integrate' can only be highly debatable. A theory that has gained substantial influence in this field is 'segmented assimilation', advanced by Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou (1993) in their seminal article. This is supported by the more recent appearance of Portes and Rumbaut's landmark study, *Legacies* (2001), based on a longitudinal survey of immigrant children in Florida and California, as well as by *Ethnicities* (Rumbaut & Portes 2001), a companion volume on individual ethnic groups. This conceptual framework has successfully challenged other classical paradigms of integration, yet it, too, has limitations.

This final part of the chapter first assesses the relevance of the concept of segmented assimilation to the case of younger-generation Moroccans in London, and then puts forward an alternative perspective, what I call 'transversal adaptation', for viewing their adaptation.

### 8.5.1 *Segmented assimilation*

As mentioned in Chapter 2, Portes and Zhou (1993) observed that, instead of a relatively uniform ‘mainstream’ whose mores and prejudices dictate a common path of integration, today several distinct forms of adaptation are likely to occur. The first consists of growing acculturation and parallel integration into the white middle class. The second leads straight in the opposite direction, to permanent poverty and assimilation to the underclass. And the third associates rapid economic advancement with the deliberate preservation of the immigrant community’s values and tight solidarity. Segmented assimilation, as a middle-range theory, highlights the different patterns of adaptation that emerge among contemporary immigrants, and how these patterns lead to destinies of convergence or divergence.

As Waldinger and Feliciano (2003) assert, the hypothesis of segmented assimilation yields a *distinctive prediction*: as specified by Portes and Rumbaut (2001: 59), the children of peasant and working-class immigrants are at risk of ‘downward assimilation.’ In this ‘alternative path’, immigrant offspring face the prospect of dropping from their parents’ modest starting position into ‘a new rainbow underclass ... at the bottom of society’ (2001: 45). Despite being deeply influential, segmented assimilation theory has received substantial criticism, which I will summarise in four points.

*First*, the prediction of downward mobility of children of immigrants whose parents are in low-skilled jobs does not always materialise. Moreover, as Alba and Nee (2003) and Farley and Alba (2002) have argued, the fact that the parents begin at the very bottom of the occupational ladder makes upward – not downward – mobility the more likely outcome. Farley and Alba (2002) further argue that, while second-generation people from migrant labour groups do not possess the educational attainment of native-born whites, their schooling performance and professional attainment represent significant advances compared to the first generation.

*Second*, Portes and Zhou (1993) claim that exposure to the ways of America’s native minorities negatively affects the child. This argument and its conclusions are questionable, since as Waldinger and Feliciano (2003) and Waters (2002) point out, the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey includes only the children of the foreign-born and therefore cannot distinguish between the elements specific to second-generation youth and those shared by their native-born counterparts. Besides, greater exposure to discrimination is a source of second-generation vulnerability, whilst institutional factors may generate an equalising effect (Kasinitz et al. 2002). Coming of age in the aftermath of the civil rights movement, the options open to today’s immigrant off-


spring benefit from the minority rights revolution (Skrentny 2003) and its impact on the institutionalisation of ethnicity.

*Third*, proponents of segmented assimilation argue that downward assimilation leads to an expansion of what they refer to as a 'rainbow' underclass. This argument is problematic in several ways. First, as Waldinger and Feliciano (2003) argue, the 'underclass' is a contestable concept, whose origins in the world of media and politics should caution us to use it in inverted commas. Who comprise it, and according to which criteria, appear unclear in the segmented assimilation argument. A better term, Jencks (1992) has suggested, might be 'underclasses', each distinguished from the other by such traits as gender or low schooling, or tenuous relationship to the labour market. In stratificational terms, the 'underclass' seems peculiar, as it lacks a clear positional referent (Waldinger & Feliciano 2003). For the sake of clarity, it is enough to say that the 'underclass' is, as William Wilson (1996) argues, what emerges *when work disappears*. The segmented assimilation hypothesis takes this perspective as a point of departure, assuming that it will cause a 'trickle-down' effect in the second generation because of the absence of employment amongst their elders. Members of the younger generation might be associated with the so-called 'underclass' at some point in their lives, partly due to place of residence, school attended and so on; however, one cannot argue that these are permanent associations and predict on that basis a life-long pattern of downward assimilation.

*Fourth*, although segmented assimilation theorists use the term 'selective acculturation' to describe how individuals and families retain certain cultural values and practices whilst also engaging in selected mainstream practices of the host society (Portes & Rumbaut 2001), these actors are still believed to belong intrinsically to one of the three identified categories. This signals an incongruity in the segmented assimilation argument which, on the one hand, predicts fixity in how individuals assimilate in the host society, whilst at the same time advancing a notion of 'selective acculturation'. 'Acculturation' itself, here, is an ambiguous concept, since its original meaning is a complete rejection of the culture and any other association with the country of origin.

### 8.5.2 'Transversal adaptation'

The notion of *fixity* in adaptation patterns of the second generation in the segmented assimilation theory is one of its key limitations. The levels of 'integration' and 'exclusion' in relation to the host society of members of the second generation in a lifetime are far too asymmetrical to be confined to one of the three options proposed by the segmented assimilation argument. The life trajectories from my research sam-



**Figure 8.1** *Transversal adaptation processes*

ple suggest that individuals can be incorporated into one of the three levels identified by the segmented assimilation theory at one stage of their lives, then move to another at a later age. This could be perceived as a *transversal adaptation* process, whereby individuals *transverse* or *cross* the three levels (see Figure 8.1.). Unlike the segmented assimilation argument, transversal adaptation is not fixed or stratified, but circular and continuous. The argument developed below is original and even seminal, but readily accepts the need for further empirical investigation to test the validity of the transversal adaptation argument.

Several factors can trigger circulation across the three levels. My research identifies three main sets of *catalysts*:

- socio-economic factors: i.e. place of residence, schooling, employment;
- personal life transitions: i.e. age, marriage, birth of children;
- '*forces majeures*'<sup>6</sup> such as 9/11.

These three types of catalyst do not operate independently; for instance, one of the socio-economic factors such as schooling may not be the only factor that induces the process of transversal adaptation for one particular individual; rather, as I shall demonstrate below, a combination of factors often contributes to this process.

Segmented assimilation or adaptation of the second generation in general cannot be assessed from a mainly socio-economic perspective reflecting upward or downward mobility. Other factors of a more 'mutable' nature, mainly in relation to identity, could also play a significant role in influencing the adaptation avenues offered to the second generation. Two sets of indicators have been identified: first, '*semi-fixed*' *adaptation determinants*, socio-economic in nature (place of residence, education, employment); and second, '*mutable*' *adaptation determinants*, such as self-identity and level of religiosity. The assertion here is that

the movement across the three levels is influenced not only by the classical 'integration' indicators, but by an amalgamation of various determinants. Therefore, the 'semi-fixed' and 'mutable' adaptation determinants are mutually inclusive.

Examples from the life trajectories of six selected second-generation respondents demonstrate how they have traversed the three levels proposed by the segmented assimilation theory and which catalysts played a key role in their passage from one level to another. The first two examples, Rashid and Zakaria, both illustrate a movement from level 3 to level 2 identified by the segmented assimilation argument (Figure 8.1). The life trajectories of these two individuals are dissimilar, but what they share is the willingness to draw on their ethnic resources and associate with their values, whilst previously avoiding any type of association with them, especially in their early teenage years. The youngest in the family, Rashid was not an easy child. He often got into trouble at school and his overall performance was rather poor.

I went to boarding school...because I was being bullied by teachers and not given the right amount of attention ... I ended up fighting with the teacher and those things were affecting me and the social worker helped me go to the boarding school which was much better (Male, 32-F4-C2).

Going to boarding school, one of the catalysts that triggered change in Rashid's life, positively affected one of the '*semi-fixed*' adaptation determinants, in this case education, which in turn led to improving his chances of upward mobility. The second catalyst, a personal life transition which influenced his '*mutable*' adaptation determinants, was the death of his father.

My father's death also had a huge impact on me but also on the whole family...but me individually I will say that seeing him pass away, you have to think that I'm going to be there one day, I don't know when, it could be tomorrow...and I had to stop doing ignorant things and silly things ... I wasn't always practising my religion but I always respected my religion. With my family, we didn't all pray at that time but we always used to fast.

These two catalysts had a significant effect on Rashid's life. According to segmented assimilation predictions, based on Rashid's performance at school, his place of residence and his parents' socio-economic status, Rashid would have certainly ended up staying within the ranks of the 'underclass' (level 3). There were few indicators in his teenage years that he would become the person he is now: a senior staff member

with London Transport, running a supplementary school for Moroccan and Muslim children and being actively involved in various projects within his local community.

Zakaria also experienced a move from level 3 to level 2 – the ‘under-classes’ to ‘integration at the level of the migrant community’ – after his teenage years. According to his life trajectory, he projected conventional signs of deviant behaviour: petty crimes, drug use and poor school performance amongst others. In other words, all the indicators which match a classical downward assimilation process. When I interviewed him, however, he was 22 years old and working as a graphic designer for one of the Arabic satellite channels in London.

I'm still rolling ... But I'm trying to calm down. If you had met me a couple of years ago, I wouldn't have come here. I wouldn't be having this conversation with you; you know what I'm saying? (*laughs*) I'm getting better *Alhamdulillah*...I see myself as a success story. Yeah, I reckon I'm a success story... when I was younger I started smoking, and it went pear-shaped. And *alhamdulillah*, it all flipped over. Now I got myself a job I can see myself doing better ... *I'm out of the blocks*. If you would have seen me two years ago, you would have seen me sitting on a bench smoking all day, week day, all day out. Figuring out how I'm going to make money. But *hamdulillah* I've got skills, I can do graphics now ... (Zakaria, Male, 23-F9-C2).

In the case of Zakaria, the catalyst that triggered change in his life was growing out of his teenage years, which corresponds to the second set of catalysts: *personal life transitions*. Projecting himself in the future as a father and a husband, whilst he was still involved in petty crimes, gave him the will to change his way of life.

I can easily say to myself 'I'll go and sell drugs'. I know how to sell drugs, I probably can if I wanted to but I don't. Because I see myself tired with this cat and mouse thing with the police, it started to piss me off [...] But *I'm older now*, I need to have a wife. I can't be walking down the road with a wife and have the police stopping me and harassing me and coming into my house. What's my son going to think when he sees his dad in trouble with the police? I'd rather him say 'My dad's a graphic designer; he works for the news etc'.

Zakaria's case also demonstrates *transversal adaptation* from a level of downward assimilation to 'integration at the level of the immigrant community'. His involvement with the Moroccan community is, how-

ever, different to that of Rashid, who started showing strong participation within the community. Zakaria on the other hand drew on some of his networks within the Moroccan community to secure a job, becoming primarily a *beneficiary* instead of a *contributor*, as was the case of Rashid.

The other common 'movement' amongst the second generation, especially those who live away from the eyes of members of the Moroccan community, is from 'acculturation' (level 1) to 'integration at the level of the immigrant community' (level 2). The trajectories of Sofia and Hayat illustrate this transversal process.

Sofia was brought up in a very 'European' way by her parents, especially her father. Both Sofia and her nine siblings were raised to 'assimilate', virtually denigrating their own cultural and religious values.

My dad has this delusion that he's European, [*that*] he's not Moroccan, and I think this is where we picked this up from. So, yeah he always wanted us in mini-skirts and living completely European and having nothing to do with Morocco [...] I think he's quite traumatised ... the fact that I'd want to wear a scarf or be Moroccan or marry a Moroccan, for him it's blasphemy... So, it's quite different especially living in South London and having a dad I think who's more European than Moroccan by any standards. You tend to forget because you're not surrounded by any Moroccans at all but there comes a time when you start thinking, it's kind of you're *running away* and then you go down to Morocco and you're kind of completely traumatised because you're not at ease there, because you don't feel you fit in... but you can never fit in here either. It's like you don't fit in there or here (Sofia, Female, 37-F10-C1).

In her teenage years, Sofia was content to be 'invisible'. For a few years, she 'avoided Moroccans like the plague', as she told me once. An 'irrational fear of Moroccans and anything to do with Morocco', she added. It was only when she finished university that she started reflecting on who she was and who she wanted to be. The state of being 'invisible' in the eyes of others became intolerable to her.

I have blue eyes and my skin is fairish; nobody could say I was Moroccan or Arab and it was a real issue for me, because *I actually wanted to be something*. I knew I was Moroccan, there was no getting away from it, but there was nothing about me that was Moroccan. It was actually quite sad because I couldn't identify with anything that was Moroccan, nothing at all, so I had to do something basically; I just felt I had to.

Sofia went through several phases in her life in an attempt to capture the essence of that 'Moroccan thing'. She started by finding a job with a Moroccan organisation in London where she worked for five years. 'I went to work in [organisation x] just to say this is my start, I have to actually plunge in, to find out what it is'. Having made a conscious decision to work with members of the Moroccan community, whom she had previously avoided for such a long time, has enabled Sofia to gain membership and access resources within the community, becoming, therefore, both a contributor and a beneficiary. This was not sufficient, however, for Sofia to reconcile with her Moroccan identity. She then decided to wear the headscarf in a further attempt to reject the image of the European person that she had often portrayed, and capture the Moroccan one instead.

The funny thing is you learn that wearing a scarf or having a certain mannerism doesn't make you Moroccan or not. That wasn't really the issue, and that's what came across, my image, I thought if my image looked Moroccan, I could actually capture that Moroccan thing that I've been looking for or been missing, but it doesn't actually work like that. You're just trying to muddle what you've been through.

The subsequent personal life transition for Sofia had greater impact on her identity than altering her external image. She decided to have a Moroccan husband. She portrayed him as her 'safe passport' that would enable her to get a wider and more meaningful access to that 'Moroccan thing'. Sofia's marriage, and to a larger extent the birth of her three children, were the main catalysts for her transversal adaptation process. Her 'acculturation' experience in her teenage years was a necessary phase that made her who she is today. She explained, 'There's this *transition type of period*, and I think you have to go through that to come out the other end and think, I'm Moroccan, I'm proud, I'm different'.

Hayat's life trajectory also corresponds to a transition from level 1 to level 2, but her path is different to Sofia's experience, as she only recently endeavoured to achieve her 'integration within the Moroccan community'. Hayat was brought up on the outskirts of London with her three siblings and, though her parents did not make a conscious effort to bring her up in a typical 'European' way, as Sofia's parents did, they were rather lenient at the start about raising her in a typical 'Moroccan' way.

At one point I actually thought we were part of the Christian faith, because we went to Sunday school. And when I told my

mum she flipped and I thought hang on a sec I have been going there but then you tell me I am not a Christian and they never really told me about Islam so it was only then that she began taking me to the mosque and making us learn Arabic (Hayat, Female, 35-Ind. 2<sup>nd</sup> G).

Being left without clear spiritual guidance in their youth was not inconsequential. In fact, Hayat's younger sister converted to Catholicism in her teenage years yet she would still act – to this day, I was told – as a Muslim in front of her parents. Hayat instead preferred for years to identify herself as a 'secular Muslim' and differentiate herself from other Moroccan Muslims. Getting married to her college classmate, who was of Pakistani origin, triggered the first changes in Hayat's rather 'acculturated' way of life. The birth of her two daughters, however, had an even greater impact. Having a Pakistani husband unconsciously made her more eager to rebuild that bridge with her origins, to be able to 'transfer' her Moroccan identity, that she had suppressed for so long, to her children.

I am not sure there was something that triggered it off or whether it was just a *phase*. Possibly it might have been the kids who got inquisitive and triggered it off, I really have no idea. I'm 35 now and it's only these recent years that I have been trying to get myself more involved into the Moroccan community. I see myself as a British Moroccan but I don't see myself as *your typical Moroccan* ... It is only now that I have been establishing a root for myself. I find it sad that I can't communicate in Moroccan and in Arabic with my children and would like to make up for it while they are still young.

Hayat did not and probably will not 'integrate' within the Moroccan community in a similar pattern to Sofia. Her degree of involvement is *reactionary* to her mixed marriage and her children's birth. Her association with the Moroccan community remains that of a beneficiary rather than a contributor who is actively participating in reasserting and reinforcing a certain 'Moroccan identity' within the community.

Hamza and Samia represent another type of transversal movement across the three levels. Their life trajectories reflect a circulation from level 2 to level 1, then back to level 2. What they have in common is that both were brought up by their parents to be 'Moroccan' and not to 'acculturate', as they both did in their youth. Hamza is an army officer; although he grew up in North-West London not far from the Ladbroke Grove area, his involvement with the Moroccan community was rather limited compared to that of his parents, who were active members,

especially through associative work. Hamza's early encounters and experiences with discrimination and racism at school in his teenage years had a strong effect on his self-esteem and sense of identity.

I remember coming home from school crying and my parents contemplating changing my name just to make me feel better. All my friends know me as Mo. They'll still address me as Hamza, or Mohammed in front of my family but in public they know me as Mo. At work they know me as Mo... when I was growing up there was pressure to integrate, there was pressure...I wished I was a different colour, obviously with a different name. I remember I was told I couldn't go to Scouts, it was obviously a racist view at the time, because I didn't want to go to the Church thing they had at the time, and I was told everybody goes to the Church and if I didn't want to go then you can't be part of the group. So when I was younger there was definitely pressure to be more integrated (Hamza, Male, 33-F23-C1).

Opting for a military career could be interpreted as his way of reinforcing his 'integration' within British society. Besides Hamza's career choices, his choices of friends, and later of his wife, were influenced by the same motivations. However, as he grew older he realised that those choices were not sufficient for him or for 'others' to be perceived as fully integrated.

As I got older, there were times when I wished that I was more accepted but no matter how hard I tried, it just wasn't enough. If I tried to go out and be a typical young man and drink and party and have girlfriends and all that, I still felt it wasn't enough to convince everyone I was still part of the gang. So after a while I stopped ... It's harder when you're younger. Much, much harder...Yeah, you reach a *point of exhaustion* actually. You reach a point where you don't want to fight with yourself and you just think people are going to have to accept you for your differences ... what can you do?

Several catalysts in Hamza's life made him reach the stage of not wanting to prove to others that he was 'integrated', and of accepting the *dor-mant* Moroccan segment of his identity.

My biggest turning points were my divorce, my second marriage, and the death of my dad. This is after three years thinking about it because one [his marriage to an English woman] confirmed that I was something I wasn't, and one confirmed I was

something that I was [his marriage to a Moroccan woman] and you can guess which ones are which. My dad passing away also confirmed that I really wanted to be able to go to my grave knowing that I hadn't denied my children or my family or my family back in Morocco any...any claim to my life...

The other turning point mentioned by Hamza was 9/11 and its aftermath, and particularly the way it affected his working relationship.

If it wasn't for the fact that I have a British Army ID card I am sure that I'd have been arrested by now by somebody. Up until about seven years ago I didn't have a problem with travelling around the world on my own. Obviously now people are more aware of an Arab-looking man travelling on his own. So in terms of recent events, especially recently because Moroccans seem to come up in the frame for a lot of things, and there's a lot of leg-pulling at work. If I'm away from my desk for more than an hour somebody thinks I've gone to plant a bomb. Obviously they're only joking but it shows how much more aware they are. But in terms of my own personal experience it certainly got more interesting. Hard in terms of travel obviously ... Yeah, I'm certainly more prepared to tell people that I'm Moroccan, or of Moroccan heritage and bring it into a conversation much earlier whereas before if it never came up I'd be happy but *now I'd like it to come up* to have the opportunity to explain it all...To have the opportunity to highlight the fact that I am Moroccan. But that's about as far as it goes, I'm not prepared to grow a beard, you know or start sitting down in Finsbury Park or anything.

Reflecting on part of Hamza's life trajectory, different catalysts, of all three types (socio-economic factors, personal life transitions and '*forces majeures*'), have affected his life, and altered his place in relation to the three levels of segmented assimilation. Perhaps 'personal life transition' factors have had the most significant impact on the way he currently positions himself in relation to the Moroccan community and British society. However, as in the case of Hayat, Hamza is still maintaining an ambivalent position in relation to the Moroccan community and how responsive he wants to be to its norms.

Aspirations for the future...they're very English, surprisingly...I want them [his children] to be able to go back to Morocco and be in a situation where I could quite happily sit there and live a life if I wanted to. I don't, but if I wanted to. But if I didn't do

that and I had a very English retirement and had a little cottage in the country and had children that went to boarding school and a garden and I went to a country club and played golf, I'd be happy with that as well. So those are my aspirations for the future.

Samia's life trajectory is quite similar to Hamza's. She grew up in West London, went to the same school as the majority of Moroccans in the area, had strong ties within the Moroccan community, and so on. However, in her teenage years she started to sense the pressure of being a 'Moroccan girl' and having to conform to the imposed ethnic social norms that it entailed. Not wanting to succumb to all those pressures, she left home in her early twenties; a decision that created enormous distress to her family, as she was seen by many as a 'rebel'. At university, she made every effort to dissociate herself from anything to do with her Moroccan identity. Surprisingly, when I first met Samia, in her late twenties, she was working for one of the local Moroccan associations. In fact, she took a career break to immerse herself into voluntary work within the same community that she had escaped from only few years earlier. This experience that she went through was, according to her, a *normal pattern* for several of the second generation.

This pattern does exist and the reason it exists is because in general you go through the teenage years trying to fit in. Then you mature up and you begin to accept yourself for what you are and you embrace it. Whether you're looking at it from a cultural perspective or a physical perspective, from a racial perspective or a sexual orientation perspective, the fact is whether you're gay, straight, black, white, Moroccan, religious, atheist, whatever, you go through your teenage years with an identity crisis. We all go through it. You mature up and most of the time you accept who you are and most of the time you just get tired of fighting. Early teens, late twenties, actually mid- to late twenties I was like, 'Yeah, I'm Moroccan, I'm Muslim and I'm going to *stop trying to impress people*, if people don't like it then tough'. I think that goes for everyone not just Moroccans (Samia, Female, 29-F24-C1).

Samia's repositioning at level 2 was strongly influenced by her growing older, which is clearly reflected in the quote below.

If you'd have asked me this question ten years ago I would have said yes I would bring them [her children] up completely different. Now I think the way my parents brought me up is really good. There are a few things I'd change but that's because my


kids will be brought up in a different time and different era. So I can't fault my parents on how they brought me up at all.

Other factors, however, such as 9/11, have also served as a catalyst in re-affirming her Moroccan identity.

I've never been one to accuse anyone of racism or any prejudice or to identify anything towards me. I've never really experienced it before but after 11 September I really felt it. It was nothing direct but it was always underhand, always. I feel it at work sometimes. I've felt it in relationships with the people I've met and the questions they've asked. But it's made me want to talk about my background even more, and I want them to ask me questions because the more questions I can answer and the more I can demonstrate to people, you know, being Muslim and being Arab isn't what they perceive, then the better I feel ... I've always been proud. I've never denied my faith. I've always made a positive effort to assert it since 11 September, definitely.

Samia's and Hamza's life trajectories so far have shown two occurrences of repositioning in relation to the three levels of segmented assimilation. These two cases reaffirm that the projections made by this model do not always materialise, as more complex factors within each individual life trajectory challenge such longitudinal predictions.

Even the processes of (re)positioning, or transversal adaptation, that the second generation undergoes through a lifetime are neither entirely exact nor timeless, as the last two cases clearly demonstrated. The repositioning of members of the second generation in relation to the three levels can be seen as even more stratified within each level. Therefore, for instance, Sofia and Hayat both moved from level 1 to level 2; however, each has adopted a different role in relation to their in-



**Figure 8.2** *Transversal adaptation processes of internal and external (re)positioning*

volvement within the Moroccan community, as either a beneficiary or a contributor. Their (re)positioning *within* and *across* the different levels is therefore subject to continuous change, as shown in Figure 8.2. The kinds of identity that young people invest in and the forms of strategy and tactic they engage with are largely dependent on the resources on which they are able to draw (Thomson & Holland 2004). Whilst these resources are highly structured, there is no clear line between the individual and the social in their operation. The family is perhaps the most important functional resource for young people, where economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital are transmitted through parenting practices, practical support, social networks and aspirations (Bell 2001a, b). These resources are also likely to facilitate social reproduction. Attempts at achieving social mobility require young people to (re) negotiate the resources at their disposal. This process might involve rejecting the forms of adulthood they see around them, dissociating them from the values of their family and wider community, and propelling themselves into uncharted territory (Ball, Maguire & Macrae 2000; Thomson, Henderson & Holland 2003). As Bertaux and Thompson note, 'Most people take the structure they see as given and circulate within it, filling a space; but a significant minority contribute to the momentum of change by either creating new spaces within the old structures or by moving on' (1997: 23).

## 8.6 Summing up

The discussion in this chapter has taken the debate on social capital a step further by treating it as a social norm that regulates individual and community interactions. Treating it in this way has highlighted the complex webs of 'integration' and 'exclusion' that younger-generation Moroccans experience. The chapter has also confirmed that the very concept of 'identity' is multifaceted and difficult to elucidate. Many social theorists are today disputing the validity of 'essentialising' notions of identity based, for example, on ethnicity or nationality. Many of my interviewees suggested that they themselves feel that the process of identity formation and reconstruction is necessarily open-ended.

The transversal adaptation argument reiterates, in a sense, the fact that it is only through a longitudinal approach of 'integration', where new opportunities and constraints emerge, structured by the temporal flow of the life trajectories through factors such as physical maturation, the ageing of others, leaving school or access to age-related rights and responsibilities, that one can have a more plausible approach to the different adaptation processes of the second generation.

## 9 Conclusions

Throughout this volume, social capital has been addressed in different contexts, thereby highlighting the multiplicity of how the concept is operationalised and activated. The empirical findings have re-emphasised the *multidimensional* nature and functions of social capital at the level of family, community, voluntary organisations, schools and society as a whole. The research started with the premise that social capital – especially the bonding type – developed by first-generation Moroccans could explain, firstly, why a significant section of this generation remains still very isolated and disengaged from the mainstream society; and secondly, why *some* of these characteristics persist amongst the younger generation too. The empirical evidence of my research, however, revealed a much more complex picture.

The ‘reconstructive’ historical approach adopted in Chapter 4 referred briefly to the role that social capital played in the migration and settlement processes of Moroccans in Britain, and London more specifically. The strong family and friendship networks, along with high solidarity levels amongst the first generation, explain to a large extent how several families who originated from the northern part of Morocco ended up settling in similar parts of London. These same networks continued to provide an unbroken source of mutual support, especially in searching for employment. However, because of the restricted mastery of language and skills, these closed friendship and family networks provided a *safety-net* for their members, thereby decreasing their likelihood of upward socio-economic mobility. Therefore, given the importance of informal networks, differences in access to social capital between the social classes have operated to reinforce rather than reduce social exclusion and inequalities of opportunity.

Chapter 5 assessed the levels of social capital across generations using four main indicators: social networks, reciprocity, trust and civic engagement. The findings from this chapter revealed that, although there is a high level of bonding social capital amongst the first generation, which translates into the common perception of the community as being ‘self-contained’ and whose social norms serve essentially as a control mechanism to monitor the behaviour of the younger members within the community, this bonding type of social capital can also be

perceived as a 'self-preservation' mechanism preventing the younger generation from experiencing a downward assimilation process. Viewed in those terms, this validates part of the initial research hypothesis, where high levels of internal bonds contribute to a degree of exclusion in relation to the host society. In fact, this view corresponds to similar research conducted by Alejandro Portes (1998), who claimed that strong bonds inhibit individual freedom and lead to situations in which group solidarity is cemented by a common experience of adversity and opposition to mainstream society. In such circumstances the younger generation living within the community is directly influenced by being subjugated by the group norm; and often the more ambitious are forced to break away from the group.

The paradoxical findings in this chapter, however, are that the degree of civic engagement, which is often interpreted in the literature on social capital as one of its *outcomes* (see Putnam 1995), proved to be distinctly high amongst Moroccans (both first- and second-generation) living in North Kensington – a predominantly deprived area – as opposed to those living in other more affluent boroughs in London. Despite the small size of the research sample, these results reveal two key points. First, they partially contradict Putnam's argument that high civic engagement within communities leads to higher levels of inclusion. If this line of argument is followed, then the low levels of civic engagement amongst the middle-class Moroccan families should be interpreted as a higher level of exclusion. Second, the findings prove instead that social capital is activated as a reactive, self-help measure to compensate for gaps in mainstream service provision. The propensity of creating and tapping into immigrants' social capital as a resource could be interpreted as the difficulty of accessing social capital in the larger community – because of prejudice, hostility and/or institutional barriers. Therefore, individuals become involved in a group, association or community – that is, go beyond simple membership – if they perceive that doing so allows them access to a resource for the pursuit of certain valued goals. This also implies that, for immigrants, social capital appears to be more easily available within their community than in the larger society, leading to the conclusion that social exclusion can be a precursor of social capital, and not, as Putnam (1995) argues, entirely an indicator of low stocks of social capital.

This argument was further developed in Chapter 6, where the analysis of social capital was taken to a meso level, assessing the role that voluntary organisations perform in scaling up social capital from bonding to bridging and linking types. What this chapter confirms is that the majority of Moroccan community organisations were created and continue to operate primarily to respond to the local needs of their community. The concentration of the majority of these organisations in

North Kensington also validates the previous assumption about the *re-active* nature of social capital.

The profiling of the ten associations revealed a multifaceted picture of how these organisations maintain varying levels of bonding, bridging and linking social capital in relation to the Moroccan community, the host society and the country of origin. Assessing the different types of social capital was determined by four main indicators: first, the typology of the organisation; second, community involvement and pro-activity; third, effectiveness and ability to influence decision making; and fourth, connections and partnerships.

The findings in Chapter 6 contradict to a certain degree my initial assumption that the majority of Moroccan organisations, regardless of their typology, serve primarily as mediums to reinforce existing bonds within the migrant community by responding to their needs, and 'voluntarily' avoid building partnerships with other institutions from the host society. Although some types of organisation, Type 1 particularly, fall into this line of thinking, all the other types of organisation exhibit divergent levels of bridging social capital. Organisations of Type 3 establish these bridges as part of their natural organisational growth cycles, as opposed to external pressures experienced by smaller organisations of Types 1 and 2. In their case, the nature of the established bridges is often of a top-down nature, formalised either through funding contracts, service agreements or mere pressure to reflect a degree of transparency and accountability. Bridging social capital developed under such circumstances is bound to dissolve after a short period, as it does not allow for the solidification of the internal bonds that would eventually serve as a precursor for bridging social capital to occur alongside. On the other hand, organisations of Types 4 and 5 display excellent levels of bridging and linking, but weak levels of bonding in relation to the Moroccan community. A reverse scaling-up process of social capital building could be potentially beneficial as it would generate an exchange of expertise between the two extremes of migrant association and would in the long run consolidate reciprocal returns.

All this confirmed that not only does social capital exist and operate in various forms within the Moroccan community groups and organisations, but also that these associations play a critical role on two levels. First, as intermediaries and '*cultural bridges*', connecting individuals to other local groups, organisations and mainstream institutions; and second, as '*partners*' in service provision. It is this particular role that is not aptly recognised and supported in order to allow for a sustainable type of bridging and linking social capital to naturally occur.

The last two main chapters of this book focused particularly on the second and third generations. Chapter 7 investigated the relevance of social capital in explaining the differing degrees of the younger genera-

tion's educational achievement. It started from the premise advanced by James Coleman (1988), that higher educational achievement is primarily explained in social capital terms; where he underlined the importance of 'closure' in a community for strengthening parental control and facilitating parental guidance. This is an appealing hypothesis, not least because it diverts attention to such 'soft' variables as social networks and values, rather than focusing primarily upon 'hard' variables such as 'modes of incorporation' (Portes & MacLeod 1999) and 'human capital' theory (Borjas 1989, 1990). The empirical findings reveal that the latter has less bearing than 'modes of incorporation' and 'social capital' hypotheses alike. Both theories can help in explaining the persistence of social hierarchies and how in fact they can create new sources of inequalities. Educational under-achievement can justifiably be linked to the presence of social capital that actively promotes truancy and discourages achievement. Furthermore, using a social capital perspective as part of the explanation for the differentiated school attainment has enabled me to portray a multi-layered approach which assesses the importance of family networks, school and out-of-school cultures alike, linking these to existing social structures.

The key findings of Chapter 7 can be summarised in three points. First, contrary to the general assumption that the low educational level of parents is the key determinant in explaining under-achievement amongst Moroccan children, the empirical findings proved that the schools attended, the school and the out-of-school 'cultures' played an even more significant role. Second, 'closure', presented by Coleman (1988) as an intrinsically positive medium for reinforcing educational outcomes, has paradoxical results and can also be a powerful force for conservatism, inhibiting rather than facilitating development. As was amply discussed, this 'closure' can support a downward levelling of norms and encourage truancy instead of school achievement. Third, accounts from the younger generation revealed a growing disbelief in the mainstream educational system, which is reflected in their selection of alternative educational channels for their children.

Chapter 8, which focused mainly on the identity of younger-generation Moroccans, took a different angle on the analysis of social capital, viewing it primarily as a *social norm* that generates other social capital indicators (networks, trust and reciprocity). Conceptualising social capital in this way makes it possible to map out how individuals perceive their membership and respond to the various social norms (family, ethnic, religious and national) around them. I assert that 'memberships' within these groups are continuously negotiated and redefined by individuals who, throughout their lives, experience varying and often parallel levels of inclusion and exclusion.

This line of argument was developed further by assessing the validity and applicability of the ‘segmented assimilation’ model to second-generation Moroccans. ‘Transversal adaptation’ was then presented as an original and alternative perspective, whereby the second generation is believed to experience an ongoing adaptation process influenced by three main catalysts: socio-economic factors, personal life transitions and ‘*forces majeures*’. These factors, individually or combined, influence the adaptation process of the second generation. The main argument advanced here is that the projections made by the segmented assimilation theory do not always materialise, as there are more complex factors within each individual life trajectory that challenge those longitudinal predictions for second-generation integration.

## 9.1 How useful is social capital as an analytical framework?

Using social capital as an analytical framework for this research has enabled me to identify a number of strengths as well as weaknesses in the concept. Some of these features are also confirmation of what other academic research has established.

### 9.1.1 *The strengths of social capital*

One of social capital’s key merits is the way in which it shifts the focus of analysis from the behaviour of individual agents to the pattern of relations between agents, social units and institutions. In other words, its uniqueness is its *relational* aspect (Portes 1998). Additionally, as Baron et al. (2000) point out, social capital can be used blandly in a functionalist way. Closely linked with this is the merit of social capital developing out of empirical research of diverse kinds to act as a link between micro, meso and macro levels of analysis. Social theory has long struggled with the problem of the relationship between individual and small-group and social-structural events. Often this has been resolved by the simple celebration of one to the exclusion or reduction of the other (Baron et al. 2000).

Using social capital as an analytical tool also brings the *social context* of the immigrant community under study to the forefront, reinforcing the idea that different dynamics may be at work for different sets of immigrants. Those who have sufficient human or financial capital may find the process of ‘integration’ to the host country advantageous. However, as this study and other academic research has shown (see Zhou & Bankston 1994), when immigrants lack individual resources, they tend to find themselves in relatively undesirable neighbourhoods whereby ethnicity itself becomes their *resource*; indeed, it may be the only re-

source available. Treating ethnicity as a resource within a specific context suggests that social integration, one of the classic ideas in sociology, offers a way of conceptualising how ethnicity can provide social capital. In providing children with the habits and skills for socio-economic advancement, families do not exist in isolation; they are directed by the entire community, and they rely on the community's reinforcement. Children are linked to their communities directly, as well as through their families, so that both direct ethnic links and ethnic links through the family result in a greater sense of identification with the ethnic community, although those who are closely linked to the community receive both greater *support* and *control* (Zhou & Bankston 1994).

Being a multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary concept, social capital has enabled me to consult and use material from a variety of fields, according to its applicability to my research needs. Overall, the profusion of social capital literature has proved that sustained discussions between various disciplines in social sciences are possible and at times beneficial. A further key merit of social capital as a concept is that it re-inserts issues of *value* into the heart of social scientific discourse; terms such as *trust*, *sharing* and *community* are central to it. These may make technicians uncomfortable, but they directly generate questions about the assumptions concerning human behaviour on which analysis and policy are based (Baron et al. 2000).

Using the lens of social capital has helped to bring to light some of its *paradoxical outcomes*, mainly in relation to educational attainment and norms of behaviour. As discussed earlier, social capital may facilitate educational attainment and raise the level of aspirations; however, depending on the contexts – school and out-of-school – it could also produce the opposite effect. Similarly, social capital may help to promote norms or values that discourage criminal behaviour. By strengthening community ties, social capital may provide sanctions against those who transgress accepted norms of behaviour, e.g. through shaming or interventions by neighbours in the precursors of crime, such as truancy. Within criminology, this is sometimes known as ‘social control theory’ – social networks and bonds to mainstream society are what prevent people from offending – and has been impressively demonstrated by longitudinal studies at both the individual and neighbourhood levels (Aldridge et al. 2002). However, as shown in this research, peer pressure could produce the reverse effect. Hence, whether strong ties serve as a beneficial support or not depends on the group concerned, and presumably on the norms that prevail in these groups. Social capital, like social regulation more generally, raises the question of the purpose it serves. This purpose depends on the kinds of belief and

normative pattern which prevail in a group and on the effective enforcement of the norms.

### 9.1.2 *The limitations of social capital*

Social capital is an attractive idea and its alleged positive outcomes are often considered intuitive and automatic. However, because it is hard to encapsulate in a single sentence, and because its measurements continue to defy simple quantification, debates regarding its conceptualisation continue. In fact, the lack of its conceptual clarity has contributed to over-versatility. Moreover, part of the diversity inherent in current usages of social capital can be traced to an uncertainty about the status, real or metaphorical, being claimed for the 'capital', as the essence of social networks is that they are built up for reasons other than their economic value to the participants (Baron et al. 2000).

One of the key limitations of the concept is its pretence of *aggregation*. Criticisms of Putnam's work focus on the lack of theoretical specificity in the link between social units, from the individual through the household, community organisation or sector, to the nation. What is even more difficult is the assumption sometimes made that social capital can simply be aggregated up across these levels. This alerts us to the danger of building up in this way. It is evident that the validity of social capital depends critically on its *contextualisation*, and it takes significantly different colours according to these different contexts (Baron et al. 2000). It is for this particular reason that social capital has been operationalised in this research very differently according to the focal issue. Such qualitative differences make it very hard, perhaps impossible, to aggregate up results from enquiries made at the different levels.

Related to *aggregation* is *causation* between social capital's different indicators, particularly between trust and civic engagement. Social ties may increase trust, but you may need trust to begin with to generate civic involvement. Instead of assuming that civic engagement and trust are part of the same general syndrome, what we should do, as Uslaner and Dekker (2001) suggest, is to step back and examine how they might – or might not – be linked to each other. Does civic engagement lead to trust? Are all types of social tie equally good at generating trust? And do we need trust to generate civic engagement in the first place? In fact, it is unclear whether most types of social interaction can produce trust. And some forms of social tie may even inhibit the development of a cooperative spirit. Rosenblum (1998: 48) is sceptical of the argument that we are likely to trust people when we interact with them: "There is the tendency to adopt a simplistic "transmission belt" model of civil society, which says that the beneficial formative effects of

association spill over from one sphere to another... The “transmission belt” model is simplistic as a general dynamic’.

There is both a theoretical and an empirical difficulty with the argument that our social connections lead us to trust other people. And both problems centre on the simple fact that the vast majority of our social interactions, especially the informal ones, involve people very much like ourselves; such interactions provide little opportunity to develop trust in people who are different from ourselves. It should not be surprising that neither group membership nor more informal social ties boost trust in people we do not know (Uslaner & Dekker 2001). Putnam (2000) would argue that this variation is due to the bonding and bridging types of social capital; the former is more likely to generate trust in others than the latter.

This brings the discussion to the *bonding/bridging* categorisation itself. Though functional, viewing social capital performance as closely linked with these two main types can be limiting since there is an underlying positive association with bridging, and a negative one with bonding. My research findings, however, demonstrate that a clear line between these two types of social capital cannot be drawn so easily. For example, although several Moroccan community associations practice a bridging type of social capital, their level of inclusion within the mainstream society (i.e. their capacity to influence decision-making) remains limited as there are more compound structural factors influencing their full participation at various levels.

Finally, social capital is also criticised for its *circularity*, being used both as the explanans and the explanandum. The classical example is in relation to school performance, where better educational performance is taken as evidence of ‘better’ social capital. Another example is in relation to social cohesion, and as a descriptor for that same phenomenon. As Alejandro Portes explains: ‘As a property of communities and nations rather than individuals, social capital is simultaneously a *cause* and an *effect* [...] Cities that are well governed and moving ahead economically do so because they have high social capital; poorer cities lack this civic virtue’ (Portes 1998: 16, emphasis added). Causations such as these are often empirically poorly substantiated and indeed hazardous, particularly when adopted on a policy level.

## 9.2 Some policy implications

*Circularity* being one of the limitations of social capital brings us to the challenges that many current governments, including the British one, face in adopting this framework. Policymakers run the risk of over-social-capitalising policies, where solutions based on current social capital

approaches are substituting service provision and adequate infrastructure. The call for higher social capital as a means to increase the levels of social cohesion within British society has to be approached with caution. Barriers to access to mainstream networks need to be addressed first, in order to give the role to members of ethnic minorities to choose amongst the various ethnic and host society's institutions, formal organisations and social networks (Baureiss 1982: 71). This will then contribute to the openness of the social environment that will facilitate in its turn the creation of bridging social capital. Such a framework, that includes the mechanisms for the dissemination of diverse values that reflect the different components of British society, will then contribute to the development of trust, social reciprocity and mutual obligation, that is to say, to the creation of a 'mainstream' social capital. Although there are several initiatives that could be adopted to achieve this, I shall put forward *three* main policy recommendations.

*First*, create and reinforce existing '*cultural bridging*' (Lopez & Stack 2001) mechanisms, which consists of helping individuals and families in developing a bicultural<sup>1</sup> orientation that facilitates effective use of social capital to link with mainstream institutions (Schneider 1998). '*Cultural bridging*' has implications on both schools and migrant associations. In relation to schools, and as Stanton-Salazar (1997) observes, it is crucially important to develop ties with institutional actors such as teachers who can help minority students decode the culture of power and gain access to institutional resources. He asserts that distrust and detachment are institutionalised 'between child and institutional agents, between family and community and school' (1997: 17). He further argues that the ability to resist the harmful effects of the devaluation of one's cultural background depends on 'simultaneous embeddedness in family and community networks of support'. The most effective linking to mainstream institutions necessitates both socialisation into the culture of power and maintenance of the cultural and social capital within the community. A similar bicultural approach could be applied to migrant associations. As Anne Schneider (1998) puts it, community-based organisations can act as trusted bridges between the recipients of government services and the wider community. However, *cultural bridging* cannot ensure the development of social assets in collective action. Therefore, in order to overcome the collective-level barriers, social capital must be translated into political capital (Stone 1998).

*Second*, foster *civic-capacity synergy*, which is also perceived as synergy between civil society and government institutions (Stone 1998; Woolcock 1998). The idea is to move towards the transformation of social capital into political capital, and towards public institutions that respond to the needs of marginalised communities (Lopez & Stack

2001). The concept addresses the need to use social assets to build coalitions that can change existing power arrangements. Synergy then needs to be balanced with a degree of autonomy and integrity on the part of public institutions (Woolcock 1998). Evans (1992, 1995, 1996), one of the primary contributors to this view, concludes that synergy between government and citizen action is based on *complementarity* and *embeddedness*. Complementarity refers to mutually supportive relations between public and private actors and is exemplified in legal frameworks that protect rights of association to facilitate exchanges amongst community-based associations and business groups. Embeddedness refers to the nature and extent of the ties connecting citizens and public officials (Woolcock & Narayan 2000). Essentially, this approach works only where the actions of public officials are simultaneously bound by performance-oriented organisational environments that are competent, coherent and credible.

The synergy view suggests three central tasks for theorists, researchers and policymakers: to identify the nature and extent of a community's social relationships and formal institutions, and the interaction between them; to develop institutional strategies based on these social relations, particularly the extent of bonding and bridging social capital; and to determine how the positive manifestations of social capital - cooperation, trust and institutional efficiency - can offset sectarianism, isolationism and corruption (Woolcock & Narayan 2000). Put another way, the challenge is to transform situations where a community's social capital substitutes for weak, hostile or indifferent formal institutions into ones in which both realms complement one another. However, as Lopez and Stack (2001) argue, embeddedness shines the light on a social foundation for synergy but may not be sufficient to articulate all the obstacles that stand in the way. Here the concept of *civic capacity* comes into play (Stone 1998; Henig, Hula, Orr & Pedescleaux 1999). Stone (1998) uses the term 'civic capacity' to describe cross-sector mobilisation and coalitions of stakeholders that can effectively press the agenda for change by establishing a new equation that supports and sustain reforms.

*Third*, harness *cultural citizenship* (Ong 1999; Rosaldo 1997) which will assist in targeting conditions that maintain barriers and deprivation for urban and migrant communities in general. Conceptual work in the area of 'cultural citizenship' offers us an alternative perspective to better comprehend cultural processes that result in community building and in political claims raised by marginalised groups on the broader society (Flores & Benmayor 1997: 15). It is also an important basis for all forms of social capital that certain types of cultural citizenship strengthen bonds between community members, build bridges between low-income communities and affluent groups, and facilitate

the synergy of civil and civic institutions on the local and national levels (Lopez & Stack 2001). Redefining cultural citizenship more inclusively is crucial if we hope to change the negative impact of cultural-racial politics on social capital in the country.

### 9.3 Areas for future research

This research has examined a number of matters, both on empirical and theoretical levels, some of which need further in-depth investigation. Here, I will briefly outline some of the areas that would be worth exploring in future research.

The first and most evident research area that would need further study is the Moroccan migration experience to Britain. Although the present study has pioneered investigation on the subject, the empirical findings are limited to London only and cover a specific type of migration that started in the 1960s. There is a significant lack of data on the various dynamics that shaped Moroccan migration to Britain as a whole. Larger-scale research that would highlight the various facets of this migration and how it has evolved both historically and socially would be beneficial in gaining a better understanding of some of the challenges that this community is currently facing.

It is important that I concede here, as I do elsewhere in this book, that the necessarily limited empirical scope of this study means that my accounts provide only a partial view of what a broad section of the Moroccan community in Britain is experiencing. A multi-sited study of Moroccans living in other parts of Britain (e.g. Edinburgh, Trowbridge and Crawley) would indicate if the cross-generational patterns found in this study are taking place amongst other sections of the community elsewhere.

As a structural feature of communities, social capital is fundamentally rooted in the cultural traditions and institutional forms of those communities, as well as in the physical spaces that they occupy. Additionally, the national context influences, to a great extent, social capital formation and utility. A cross-country comparative study would be able to highlight these differences on micro, meso and macro levels. The two most eligible countries in which to pinpoint these discrepancies would be France and the Netherlands, as they represent two divergent state ideologies towards migration (assimilationist versus multicultural). The Belgian case would also be important in terms of completing the trio of long-experience European countries of Moroccan immigration; whilst Spain and Italy, where Moroccan migration has become quantitatively important over the past twenty years or so, would be interesting to study as examples of non-policy on the part of the state to-

wards immigrants. This variance, along with other differences associated with the particularities of Moroccan migration to these countries, would certainly affect social capital formation and above all the dynamics of the network's construction, changes and evolution.

Finally, the transversal adaptation model developed on the basis of my empirical findings is necessarily preliminary and speculative. However, I believe that within its limitations it allows for the application of my findings to a wider population than just second-generation Moroccans. Comparative and further in-depth studies would have to be undertaken in order to develop this approach further and to consider its applicability.

To conclude, much of what this study has considered is undoubtedly of direct relevance to wider debates about the relevance of the social capital framework and its application to ethnicity. I hope that the framework developed here can act as the basis of further and more broadly-based empirical work, which will have a bearing not just on studies of British-Moroccans, but also on analyses of the adaptation patterns of other ethnic and religious minorities in Britain.

# Notes

## Chapter 1

- 1 The Office of National Statistics (ONS) ([www.statistics.gov.uk/socialcapital](http://www.statistics.gov.uk/socialcapital)), Department of Health ([www.doh.gov.uk/pdfs/healthrptsocialcapital.pdf](http://www.doh.gov.uk/pdfs/healthrptsocialcapital.pdf)), and Department for Education and Skills (DfES) ([www.dfee.gov.uk/research/query.cfm?cat=3](http://www.dfee.gov.uk/research/query.cfm?cat=3)) are all carrying out research to measure and analyse the impact of various aspects of social capital. Outside government there are several established research programmes in health, civic participation and democracy (Office of National Statistics 2001).
- 2 Since October 2007, CRE has merged with the Disability Rights Commission (DRC) and Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) and is now formally known as the Equality and Human Right Commission (EHRC).

## Chapter 2

- 1 The word '*beur*' was initially adopted as a self-designation by young Parisians of *Margrebi* origin in the late 1970s. It is the partial contraction and the reversal of the word *Arabe*, which often carries pejorative connotations of lower status and/or is used to denote them as foreign.

## Chapter 3

- 1 This includes the two boroughs of Kensington and Chelsea and of Westminster.
- 2 In the interviewees' quotes, additional coding was made: F stands for both 'family' and 'father'; C for 'child', and M for 'mother'. So for example F1-C1 stands for Family 1, Child 1.
- 3 They include 30 life-history testimonies, 45 semi-structured interviews with informants on the Moroccan community, nineteen interviews with heads of household, 45 interviews with second- and third-generation children from the same households and twelve random interviews with third-generation children aged 10 to 16.

## Chapter 4

- 1 Albert Hourani gives the 1830s, while the first Moroccan house listed in Scholes is that of Isaac Pariente, 1847, cited in Halliday (1992).
- 2 Hayes (1905: 209) gives several names of these traders: Luarzazi, Elofer, Benquiran, Lehlul, Benabdslam, Benassi, Benani, Guessus, Lushi, Meecoe, Bombar, Larashe,

Benmassoud. From Fasi sources cited by le Tourneau we have the names of at least seven: Ben Khalef, Mehdhel ben A'sit, El Hajj bin Naser bin Nani, Si Mohammed Qe-sous bin Bou Bakr, Ahmed bin Jelloul, Si Mohammad Felloul, Si Abdel Ghani Kabbaj (Le Tourneau 1949: 446).

- 3 The meaning of the name is uncertain: 'ben' means 'son', and Laredo in *Les Noms des Juifs du Maroc* has suggested that 'oleil' may be derived from Allal, a diminutive of the name *Abdallah*, or from *alil*, an Arabic word meaning 'infirm' (Collins 2006).
- 4 The 2001 Census data estimate the number of Moroccans living in London to be 7,904. This is certainly a low estimate due to the factors mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Reference to these data is made still because they provides informative demographic and social indicators about the community.
- 5 The 1998 Index of Local Deprivation uses a number of indicators from the 1991 Census to highlight relative levels of deprivation. Scores of zero are the national (England) norm. A positive score indicates relatively high levels of deprivation and a negative score low levels. Most areas of the country have negative scores, showing that deprivation is concentrated within a few areas.
- 6 *Darat* literally means 'rotating' amongst a group of individuals, for social or financial self-help purposes. Socially, '*darat*' is when a group of people, say eight, have a weekly get-together, and every week one would invite the rest of the group, until they get invited by all eight people, and then start again. *Darat* can also operate as a financial self-help group, where an individual would join the group with a specific financial capital but on the condition that they bring two other individuals who would also join in with the same amount of money. When it is their turn to benefit from their initial investment, they get their money back as well as the contribution of other members in the group. Therefore, the continuity of the self-help group depends on how many new members join in.

## Chapter 5

- 1 '*Nikab*', also known as '*burka*', is full Islamic dress where the face is also covered.

## Chapter 6

- 1 Alexis de Tocqueville wrote on American democracy more than 100 years ago, notably in his classic *Democracy in America* (1969 [1835]). Through associations and associating, de Tocqueville believed, citizens would learn not only the skills required for effective political participation, but also the social control he perceived as necessary if democracy was to function under citizen control. Civic engagement, he thought, benefited the populace not only by bringing able participants into the public arena but also by generating stability amongst citizens who knew their appropriate role in the collective unit.
- 2 Neighbourhood renewal at the local level is the responsibility of the LSPs. The Community Empowerment Fund was set up as an additional source of funding to enable the looser networks of voluntary, community and faith groups to actively participate in these LSPs. The Community Empowerment Network of the LSP remains an important mechanism by which weaker networks can contribute to what is typically a 'top-down' process of local regeneration (cf. Neighbourhood Renewal Unit 2001).

- 3 The slogan 'active citizenship', coined in the early 1980s, and now actively embraced by the Home Office, encourages individuals to invest volunteer time in their communities.
- 4 There are other new policy orientations initiated by other government departments, namely the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, the Department of Health and the Department of Education and Skills.
- 5 The government aims to raise the level of community participation and volunteering in both voluntary and community organisations and mainstream services by 5 per cent by 2006. The Russell Commission (co-launched by David Blunkett and Gordon Brown, looking at innovative ways of encouraging volunteering amongst young people), is one of several initiatives that the government is putting in place to achieve this ambitious target.
- 6 The Civil Renewal Unit, in partnership with the Local Government Association and the Society for Local Authority Chief Executives, has launched the Civic Pioneer scheme, aimed at local authorities that are actively committed to the principles and ethos of community engagement.
- 7 Currently, three units within the Home Office are contributing to the promotion of community cohesion - the Community Cohesion Unit, the Race Equality Unit and the Faith Communities Unit.
- 8 'Commissioning' is now the new common term.
- 9 As a result of the Treasury's review of the voluntary and community sector's role in public services delivery, the Active Communities Unit has been given £93m to implement the recommendations of the Cross-Cutting Review, £80m of which was allocated for infrastructure development. Another outcome of the review was the creation of Future Builders, a £125m capital investment fund to assist the sector in public service delivery work.
- 10 It is interesting to note that the name *Widadia* has been used in the UK context instead of the name *Amicale*, which to some extent reflects the rejection of the French post-colonial influence by the UK-based Moroccan community.
- 11 The North Kensington Consortium of Supplementary Schools was set up in 1998 and has eleven members from various other BME communities. Full members of the Consortium benefit from small amounts of funding as well as overall support in running supplementary classes, whilst members of the 'Partnership of supplementary schools' only get advice on how to meet adequate teaching standards.
- 12 Notting Hill Social Council is currently known as the Kensington and Chelsea Social Council or KCSC. It was formed in April 2002 following the merger of Chelsea Social Council and Notting Hill Social Council. Notting Hill Social Council was originally formed in the late 1950s in the aftermath of the social disturbances in the area and Chelsea Social Council was established in 1968 to meet local needs.

## Chapter 7

- 1 [www.westminster.gov.uk/educationandlearning/schoolsandcolleges](http://www.westminster.gov.uk/educationandlearning/schoolsandcolleges)
- 2 Source: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/4180845.stm>
- 3 See the following link for further details: [www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-2052978\\_1,00.html](http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-2052978_1,00.html)
- 4 Source: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/4739458.stm>
- 5 Source: [www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main)
- 6 The term was first used by Ruben Rumbaut (1994); it was also labelled the '1.5 generation'.

## Chapter 8

- 1 All the fieldwork interviews were conducted after the events of 9/11.
- 2 *Sunnah* means literally 'a path or way, a manner of life'. It is composed of the collection of recorded words and actions of the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) and most of what he said or did throughout his lifetime.
- 3 This was prior to the change in the Family Code (2003), at a time when a husband could divorce his wife without her consent.
- 4 The Muslim 'community' which transcends both history and nations.
- 5 Only four follow-up interviews were conducted after the events of 7 July 2005 in London.
- 6 I am grateful to Nora Hussein for suggesting this term.

## Chapter 9

- 1 The term is adopted here, despite its limitations, to refer to the duality of power that exists between minority and mainstream 'cultures'.

# **Paradoxes of Social Capital**

A Multi-Generational Study of Moroccans in London

**Appendices A-F**

## Appendix A Profile of the selected families

Family number	Occupation of head of household	No. of children	No. of children interviewed	Place of origin in Morocco	Came to UK	Place of residence in UK	Other comments
F1	Retired/was kitchen chef	10	2	Larache/Sebti Beni Gharfat	1975	North Kensington/Latimer Road	Had cousin who came first in 1970
F2	Retired/was kitchen chef	9	2	Larache/Sebti Beni Gharfat	1970	North Kensington/Ladbroke Grove	
F3	Retired/worked in hotel	5	2	Larache/Sebti Beni Gharfat	1970	North Kensington/Queen's Park	
F4	Deceased/ worked in hotel	6	2	Larache	1971	North Kensington/Shepherd's Bush	Had brother who came first in 1969
F5	Retired/worked for London Transport	6	2	Larache/Shlihat Shirat	1969	North Kensington/Ladbroke Grove	Brought two brothers over after he came
F6	Retired/was kitchen chef	5	2	Larache/Beni Arouss	1970	North Kensington/Harrow Road	
F7	Retired/was a cook	4	1	Tetouan	1973	North Kensington/Ladbroke Grove	Sister came in 1960; helped husband get work permit
F8	Housewife; husband accountant	3	12	Fes	1989	North Kensington/Golborne Road	Sister already settled in London
F9	Retired/was kitchen chef	3	4, but one is F14	Tangier	1970	North Kensington/Ladbroke Grove	
F10	Retired/was kitchen chef in hotel	10, joined at diff. stages	1	Mother from Tangier, Father from Rif	1974	South London/Pimlico	Father worked in Gibraltar in 1960; brother came in 1965
F11	Interpreter	2	2	Casablanca	1983	East London/Brixton	Brother lived in London before she came

F12	Owner of travel agency	2	1	Rabat	1992	East London/ Barking	Did not choose to come to UK; was transferred
F13	Retired/was a cook	3	1	Meknes	1972	East London/ Elephant and Castle	
F14	Restaurant owner	4	1	Tangier	1979	South London/ Pimlico	Egyptian husband
F15	Retired/worked in hotel	8	1	Larache/Sebt Beni Gharfat	1970	East London/ Stepney Green	Left five children in Morocco for one year when first came to UK
F16	Cook	3	2	Born Casablanca, lived Tangier	1986	North Kensington/ Ladbroke Grove	Before coming to UK, lived in Spain, worked in Saudi Arabia
F17	PE teacher	3	3	Casablanca	1987	North Kensington/ Queen's Park	
F18	Retired/worked in hotel	5	3	Larache/Sahil/ Tshar Al Jadid	1972	North Kensington/ Latimer Road	
F19	Works for travel agency	1	1	Casablanca	1973	St John's Wood	Independent female migrant
F20	Runs private business	3	3	Meknes	1987	North Kensington/ Portobello Road	
F21	Cook	2	1	Casablanca	1983	South London/ Pimlico	Married to, then divorced from an Irishman
F22	Runs interpreting agency	4	1	Larache	1971	South London/ South Ealing	
F23	Works with children with learning difficulties	4	1	Tangier	1972	West London/ East Acton	
F24	Runs private business	3	1	Oujda	1971	North London/ Kensal Rise	

## **Appendix B Interview schedule for the head of the household**

### **A. Personal details**

- 1 Gender: Male Female
- 2 Age in years:
- 3 Place of birth:
- 4 Family status: Married Divorced Widowed
- 5 Number of children:  
Their age:  
Their occupation or educational level:
- 6 Employment:
- 7 Educational level:
- 8 Accommodation: Private Council house Rented

### **B. Cross-country networks**

- 1 Could you tell me what types of link you are maintaining with your country of origin? How often do you call 'home'? How often do you go 'home'?
- 2 How many hours a week roughly do you watch national TV? What are your favourite programmes?
- 3 Do you have satellite TV? If yes, which channels do you often watch?
- 4 How many hours a week do you watch Moroccan channels? What are your favourite programmes?

### **C. In-country networks**

- 1 Why did you decide to live in this area? How long have you lived here?
- 2 If you were given the choice to move from this area, would you leave it?
- 3 How many of your relatives live in this area?
- 4 How many of your relatives live in London in general?

- 5 Could you describe the relationship that you have with your neighbours?
- 6 Thinking about your neighbours in this area, about how many people would you say you know personally?
- 7 Do you feel safe in this area where you are living?
- 8 Could you tell me what the *positive* and *negative* things are about living in an area where there are a lot of Moroccans?
- 9 Does your local community feel like home?
- 10 Do you have any English/British friends?
- 11 What nationality do most of your friends have?
- 12 Do you get help from friends when you need it?
- 13 If you were caring for a child and needed to go out for a while, would you ask a neighbour to help?
- 14 Have you attended a local community event in the past six months (e.g. a wedding)
- 15 Do you enjoy living among people of different lifestyles?

#### **D. Family networks**

- 1 How involved are you with you children's studies?
- 2 Time stock: suppose there was a serious emergency in your household. Is there a friend or relative living nearby whom you could call on to spend some time helping out? If yes, would that be a relative?
- 3 Money stock: suppose in an emergency you needed several hundred pounds more than you had available or could borrow from an institution. Would you ask either a friend or a relative for it? If yes, is the person you would ask a relative?
- 4 Time investments: people sometimes have emergencies and need help from others – either time or money. In the last five years have you (or has anyone living with you) spent a lot of time helping either a relative or friend in an emergency? If yes, was the person you helped a relative of yours/anybody who lives there?
- 5 Money investments: in the last five years have you helped a friend or relative in an emergency by giving or loaning them several hundred pounds or more? If yes, was the person you helped a relative?

#### **E. Reciprocity**

- 1 If a community project does not directly benefit you but has benefits for others in the neighbourhood, then do you think you would contribute *time* for this project?

- 2 If a community project does not directly benefit you but has benefits for others in the neighbourhood, then do you think you would contribute *money* for this project?
- 3 Some say that by helping others, you help yourself in the long run. Do you agree?
- 4 How often do you borrow things and exchange favours with your neighbours? (often to never)
- 5 Within the past year, how often have you and your neighbour helped each other with small tasks, such as repair work or grocery shopping?
- 6 Do you provide your own adult children with emotional support or advice?
- 7 Do you help your adult children financially if they need it?
- 8 Do you provide your adult children with any practical support?
- 9 Do your adult children provide you with any emotional support or advice?
- 10 Do your adult children help you financially if you need it?
- 11 Do your adult children provide you with any practical support?
- 12 Thinking of the different associations, groups and activities you are involved in, what sort of reasons can you think of that got you involved in the first place?
- 13 When you think of the different types of connection you have with people (family, friends, neighbours, groups and associations), what do you think you get out of those connections? What are the benefits for you? Reasons some people have given include:
  - A feeling of solidarity/community/security
  - Getting things done
  - Need for specific service or help
  - Friendship
  - Someone to rely on
  - Gives me something to do with my life
  - Want to make a contribution to my community (a sense of obligation)
  - Mixing with people interested in similar hobbies, etc.
- 14 Do any of these things fit you?

## F. Trust

- 1 On a scale of 1 to 5, how much would you say you trust Moroccan people living here?
- 2 On a scale of 1 to 5, how much would you say you trust Moroccan people living in Morocco?

- 3 On a scale of 1 to 5, how much would you say you trust non-Moroccans living here?
- 4 If a stranger moves into your street, would he/she be accepted by the neighbours?

### **G. Civic participation**

- 1 Have you, in the past year, done any of these things, unpaid, in your neighbourhood (don't include things you've done for close relatives)?
  - Visiting an elderly or sick person
  - Doing shopping for someone
  - Decorating, or any kind of home or car repairs for someone
  - Baby-sitting or caring for children
  - Looking after a pet for someone
  - Giving advice about something or helping with letters or form-filling
  - Improving the environment, such as picking up litter or sweeping the pavement
  - Is there anything else you've done for someone in your neighbourhood as a whole?
- 2 Do you read national/ international newspapers? If yes, which ones?
- 3 How much are you involved in the schools of your children (e.g. as a member of the PTA or a school governor etc)?
- 4 How involved are you with your local mosque?
- 5 Did you vote in the last local and/or national elections? If not, why not?
- 6 Are you a member of any local voluntary organisation (e.g. a sports, crafts or social club)?
- 7 Are you on a management or organising committee for any local group or organisation?
- 8 In the past three years, have you ever joined a local community action to deal with an emergency?
- 9 In the past three years, have you ever taken part in a local community project?
- 10 Have you ever been part of a project to organise a new service in your area?
- 11 If you were looking for a new job, what would you do?
  - Go to the job centre
  - Ask family
  - Ask friends

- Look at 'help wanted' advertisements
  - Approach different employers asking if they had work
  - Try to find work in another city
  - Offer a present or payment to manager to give me job
  - Don't know
- 12 In the last twelve months, have you, or has anyone in your family living here, ever contacted a government official about some need or problem concerning the community as a whole?
- No, not in the last twelve months
  - Yes, the local MP
  - Yes, some other state government official
  - Yes, the local councillor or other local government official
- 13 In the last twelve months, have you, or has anyone in your family living here, ever contacted a government official to seek help with a personal problem you or your family had [multiple responses]?
- No, not in the last twelve months
  - Yes, the local MP
  - Yes, some other state government official
  - Yes, the local councillor or other local government official

## H. Identity

- 1 If someone asked you 'Where is home for you now?' what would you say? ... Why? Has that changed over time?
- 2 What do you think changes that sense of where 'home' is?
- 3 In terms of that 'sense of home' or where you belong, how important are: parents, brothers, sisters, etc; your partner, children (if relevant); friends; your work mates (including professional links where relevant); the people you play sport with, hobby and related clubs/associations and community groups you are part of; the local shops and services; doctor, dentist, hairdresser, etc.
- 4 How do you identify yourself?
- 5 How did current international events, i.e. 11 September, affect the way you identify yourself? Do you think that has affected the way other people identify you?
- 6 What language is spoken at home?
- 7 How do you preserve the Moroccan/Muslim identity within your family and pass it on to your children?
- 8 Do you prefer your children to have Moroccan friends or do you not mind what nationality their friends have?
- 9 Do you prefer your children to marry a Moroccan or do you not mind what nationality their future husband or wife has?
- 10 Are you planning to go back to Morocco for good? Why?

**I. Integration/exclusion**

- 1 What do you understand by being 'integrated' within British society?
- 2 Do you feel 'integrated' within British society? If not, why not?
- 3 Do you feel 'excluded' from British society? If yes, why?
- 4 Do you feel that your children are integrated within British society? If not, why not?

## Appendix C Interview schedule for the children

### A. Personal details

- 1 Gender:                    Male                    Female
- 2 Age in years:
- 3 Place of birth:
- 4 Age when immigrated to the UK:
- 5 Family status:        Single        Married        Divorced        Widowed
- 6 Number of children:  
  Their age:  
  Their occupation or educational level:
- 7 Employment:
- 8 Educational level:

### B. Cross-country networks

- 1 Could you tell me what types of link you are maintaining with your country of origin? How often do you go? Do you always go with your family or do you go on your own?
- 2 Apart from your relatives who live in Morocco, do you have any friends there?
- 3 Are those friends Moroccans living in Morocco or are they Moroccans living in other European countries?
- 4 When you go back to Morocco for the holidays, do you find yourself mostly with people from London (e.g. neighbours, friends from school) or not necessarily?
- 5 How many hours a week roughly do you watch national TV? What are your favourite programmes?
- 6 Do you have satellite TV at home? If yes, which channels do you often watch?
- 7 How many hours a week do you watch Moroccan channels? What are your favourite programmes?

### C. In-country networks

- 1 How long have you lived in this area?
- 2 If you were given the choice to move from this area, would you leave it? Why?
- 3 How many of your relatives live in this area?
- 4 Could you describe the relationship that you have with your neighbours?
- 5 Do you feel safe in the area where you live?
- 6 Does your local community feel like 'home'?
- 7 Could you tell me what the *positive* and *negative* things are about living in an area where there are a lot of Moroccans?
- 8 Do you have any English/British friends?
- 9 What nationality are your closest friends?
- 10 Do you get help from friends when you need it?
- 11 Do you think that there are enough role models within the Moroccan community?
- 12 Have you attended a local community event in the past six months (e.g. a wedding)?
- 13 Do you enjoy living among people of different life-styles?

### D. Family networks

- 1 Time stock: suppose there was a serious emergency in your household. Is there a friend or relative living nearby whom you could call on to spend some time helping out? If yes, would that be a relative?
- 2 Money stock: suppose in an emergency you needed several hundred pounds more than you had available or could borrow from an institution. Would you ask either a friend or a relative for it? If yes, is the person you would ask a relative?
- 3 Time investments: people sometimes have emergencies and need help from others – either time or money. In the last five years have you (or has anyone living with you) spent a lot of time helping either a relative or a friend in an emergency? If yes, was the person you helped a relative of yours/anybody who lives there?
- 4 Money investments: in the last five years have you helped a friend or relative in an emergency by giving or loaning them several hundred pounds or more? If yes, was the person you helped a relative?

## E. Reciprocity

- 1 If a community project does not directly benefit you but has benefits for others in the neighbourhood, then do you think you would contribute *time* for this project?
- 2 If a community project does not directly benefit you but has benefits for others in the neighbourhood, then do you think you would contribute *money* for this project?
- 3 Some say that by helping others, you help yourself in the long run. Do you agree?
- 4 How often do you borrow things and exchange favours with your neighbours (often to never)?
- 5 Within the past year, how often have you and your neighbour helped each other with small tasks, such as repair work or grocery shopping?
- 6 Do you provide your parents with emotional support or advice?
- 7 Do you help your parents financially if they need it?
- 8 Do you provide your parents with any practical support?
- 9 Do your parents provide you with any emotional support or advice?
- 10 Do your parents help you financially if you need it?
- 11 Do your parents provide you with any practical support?
- 12 Thinking of the different associations, groups and activities you are involved in, what sorts of reason can you think of that got you involved in the first place?
- 13 When you think of the different types of connection you have with people (family, friends, neighbours, groups and associations), what do you think you get out of those connections? What are the benefits for you? Reasons some people have given us include:
  - A feeling of solidarity/community/security
  - Getting things done
  - Need for specific service or help
  - Friendship
  - Someone to rely on
  - Gives me something to do with my life
  - Want to make a contribution to my community (a sense of obligation)
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- 14 Do any of these things fit you?

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- 1 On a scale of 1 to 5, how much would you say you trust Moroccan people living here?
- 2 On a scale of 1 to 5, how much would you say you trust Moroccan people living in Morocco?
- 3 On a scale of 1 to 5, how much would you say you trust non-Moroccans living here?
- 4 If a stranger moves into your street, would he/she be accepted by the neighbours?

**G. Civic engagement**

- 1 Have you, in the past year, done any of these things, unpaid, in your neighbourhood (don't include things you've done for close relatives)?
  - Visiting an elderly or sick person
  - Doing shopping for someone
  - Decorating, or any kind of home or car repairs for someone
  - Baby-sitting or caring for children
  - Looking after a pet for someone
  - Giving advice about something or helping with letters or form-filling
  - Improving the environment, such as picking up litter or sweeping the pavement
  - Is there anything else you've done for someone in your neighbourhood as a whole?
- 2 Do you read national/ international newspapers? If yes, which ones?
- 3 How involved are you with your local community?
- 4 How involved are you with your local mosque?
- 5 Did you vote in the last local and/or national elections? If not, why not?
- 6 Are you a member of any local voluntary organisation (e.g. a sports or social club)?
- 7 Are you on a management or organising committee for any local group or organisation?
- 8 In the past three years, have you ever joined a local community action to deal with an emergency?
- 9 In the past three years, have you ever taken part in a local community project?

- 10 Have you ever been part of a project to organise a new service in your area?
- 11 In the last twelve months, have you, or has anyone in your family living here, ever contacted a government official about some need or problem concerning the community as a whole?
- No, not in the last twelve months
  - Yes, the local MP
  - Yes, some other state government official
  - Yes, the local councillor or other local government official
- 12 In the last twelve months, have you, or has anyone in your family living here, ever contacted a government official to seek help with a personal problem you or your family had [multiple responses]?
- No, not in the last twelve months
  - Yes, the local MP
  - Yes, some other state government official
  - Yes, the local councillor or other local government official

## H. Identity

- 1 If someone asked you 'Where is home for you now?' what would you say? Why? Has that changed over time?
- 2 What changes that sense of where 'home' is?
- 3 In terms of that 'sense of home' or where you belong, how important are: parents, brothers, sisters, etc; your partner, children (if relevant); friends; your work mates (including professional links where relevant); the people you play sport with, hobby and related clubs/associations and community groups you are part of; the local shops and services: doctor, dentist, hairdresser, etc.
- 4 How do you identify yourself?
- 5 What does Morocco represent for you (i.e. the country from where my parents originate /the country I originate from/a wonderful country to spend the summer holidays...)?
- 6 What language do you speak with your parents at home?
- 7 What language do you speak with your brothers and sisters at home?
- 8 How fluent are you in Arabic (spoken, written)?
- 9 How did current international events, i.e. 11 September, affect the way you identify yourself? Do you think that has affected the way other people identify you?

- 10 How do you preserve your Moroccan/Muslim identity? How do you think you will be passing it on to your future children?
- 11 Would you prefer to marry a Moroccan/man or woman, or do you not mind what nationality your future partner has?

### **I. Integration/exclusion**

- 1 What does it mean to you to be 'integrated' in this society?
- 2 Do you feel 'integrated' within British society? If not, why not?
- 3 Did you ever feel 'excluded' from British society? If yes, why?
- 4 Did you ever feel 'excluded' from Moroccan society? If yes, why?
- 5 Do you think that your children will be more integrated than you within British society? Why?
- 6 What are your aspirations for the future (educationally and professionally)?

## **Appendix D Profile of community organisations**

**Name of organisation:**

**Contact:**

### **1. Background to the organisation**

- How was your organisation created? Who was the most responsible for its creation (e.g. government mandate, community decision or others)?

### **2. Key aims of the organisation**

### **3. Broad objectives**

### **4. Users**

- Who are your main users?
- Could you tell me about the people involved in your organisation? How did they become involved?

### **5. Language**

### **6. Areas of work**

- a) What are the services that you provide?
- b) Do you offer specific services to the Moroccan community? If so, what are they?

### **7. What is the level and type of contact your organisation has with the Moroccan community and how is the contact maintained, e.g. do you use interpreters?**

### **8. From your contact with the Moroccan community, what do you feel their main needs are in relation to the following areas?**

- Education and training
- Employment and business
- Health and social welfare
- Housing
- Community safety

**9. What are the perceived barriers facing the Moroccan community in accessing the following areas:**

- Education and Training
- Employment and Business
- Health and Social Welfare
- Housing
- Community Safety

**10. Organisational structure (e.g. organisational chart)**

**11. Do you employ Moroccan staff or use Moroccan volunteers? If so, how many and in what capacity?**

**12. Is your management committee mainly composed of Moroccans? If not, what other nationalities do they have?**

**13. Organisational needs**

**14. Institutional linkages**

- a) Roughly how many projects have you completed in partnership with other organisations (other voluntary organisations/statutory sector etc.) since you have started?
- b) Who are your major partners?
- c) How would you characterise your organisation's relationship with other community organisations? When do you feel the need to establish collaboration/links with them?
- d) Do you have links with organisations outside the neighbourhood? With which ones? What is the nature of those links?
- e) Do you feel sufficiently informed about other organisations' programmes and activities? What are your sources of information?
- f) Have you attempted to organise or work with other organisations to achieve a mutually beneficial goal? (*Describe activities.*) Is this a common strategy among organisations in this neighbourhood? (*Probe as to reasons why or why not.*)

- g) Could you describe your relationship with the government? Have you had experience in trying to get government assistance? What was your experience? Which level of government do you find most co-operative (local, national)? Has the government made particular requests on your organisation?
- h) Is your organisation linked to any government programme? Which government programme(s) is your organisation involved with? Why those particular programmes? What sort of role does your organisation play in the programme? Are there certain characteristics of these programmes which make it easier for your organisation to work with?
- i) Do you feel sufficiently informed about government programmes and activities? What are your sources of information?
- j) Have you attempted to give inputs to the government? What were the circumstances? What have been the results? What kinds of challenge did you have to deal with? (*Probe for any role in planning, operation and maintenance of government-sponsored services.*)
- k) Has your organisation been invited to participate in any of the various government development planning processes? What do you think about these planning mechanisms?
- l) In general, how do you assess your organisation's actual influence on government decision-making at the borough level?

# Appendix E

DEPARTMENT OR LIBRARY		MANCHESTER PUBLIC LIBRARY	
Classification	Author	Subject	Source and Date
964			Mf. CITY NEWS. 2 October 1936

## Picturesque Moroccan Colony Leaves Manchester

### SPECIAL WIVES BOUGHT IN SLAVE MARKETS

Wore Red Fez ; Always Had Umbrellas ; Never in Court

"City News" Special

THE complete loss to Japan by Manchester of the Moroccan trade has now resulted in the final evacuation of the picturesque little Moroccan colony which has existed for over sixty years in Rusholme.

Apart from the considerable material loss to the city, Manchester has lost a body of good citizens who, while retaining all their Oriental customs and attributes, built up for themselves a reputation second to none for honest dealing and clean living.

A Manchester merchant who had close connections with the Colony for over forty years told the "City News" this week that they had all been sorry to go, and had left only because forced to by the fact that Japanese competition had cut the business from under their feet.

#### CHEPSTOW HOUSE CENTRE

He gave some interesting details of the Moroccans, who conducted all their business foreign correspondence from their homes, in Arabic.

"This community was well known in the locality by the wearing of the red Fez, with which was worn a huge overcoat which covered the native dress and invariably also was carried an umbrella," he said.

"The womenfolk — mostly black women, some of whom had been previously purchased in the slave market, married and brought to England, as it was considered 'infra dig' to bring one of the real white wives to England, in a short time mastered the language, much quicker than their lords and masters.

"Having borne a large family, many of the children born in Manchester enjoy British nationality, and although returned to their native city of Fez (Morocco), other generations born in Morocco claim by right British nationality, of which they are very proud and value its privileges, although they may never probably see the country, which through accident of birth they claim, and which will be enjoyed for generations to come. The British Consul at Fez has records of these numerous British subjects. These privileges are unfortunately lost to the female sex when they marry.

merchants out of court. Despite enormous business they did in the it is not within memory that they had recourse to the Assizes.

"I feel that I have lost some friends," the speaker told the "News." "I remember many times kind hospitality which I enjoyed. Cheon consisted of many highly spiced dishes, followed by Oriental sweets and a quantity of fruit. Green tea served with mint helped to digest the unusually heavy meal. Of course, food was only set to the men, the womenfolk having meals separately, and what appeared most odd was that the dishes that went back were those intended for the womenfolk."

"The habits of this Moroccan Colony in Manchester were not unusual, except that one of the gentlemen undertook to see that the meat was provided in accordance with Mohammedan rights. A butcher in Rusholme had the monopoly of supplying Welsh lamb, having in his yard a small abattoir, and each morning this gentleman proceeded with the killing of the required number of sheep.

"This same gentleman also led them to prayers every Friday, the service of which was held in a house in Parkfield-street.

"Their offices in the city were mostly in the building known as Chepstow House, at 32, Oxford-street, and many readers will no doubt remember the following names: Canoon, Elhadjwy, Maddani Tazi, Lazarak, Guesus, Benabdellah, Benchooron, Benquiran and Boyed."

#### UNWANTED DISHES FOR THE WOMEN

These Moroccans enjoyed a name second to none for honesty and good citizenship, he added. One of its members, well remembered for his perfect speaking of English, was looked upon as their chief adviser, and was the means of settling many differences which arose in business. When any merchant had recourse to legal advice, there was an old-established firm in King-street (Messrs. Atkinson, Saunders and Co.), who can be termed to have been the official solicitors for the Moroccan merchants, and the late Mr. Seville, a partner of the firm, always managed to keep the Moroccan

# Appendix F

EM

## PERMIT

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT  
AND PRODUCTIVITY,  
FOREIGN LABOUR SECTION,  
EBURY BRIDGE HOUSE,  
EBURY BRIDGE ROAD,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

**THE ALIENS ORDER 1953 Article 4(1)(b)**

FLS 1/4/52/16

Permit	Date of issue	Period covered by permit
le 75682	11 JUNE 1970	<u>TWELVE</u> months from the date of landing in the United Kingdom

Employer's name and address

**THE EGG AND I  
HAYMARKET RESTAURANTS LTD  
23 HAYMARKET  
LONDON SW 1**

Tel. No. 839 7383

b. Unless otherwise stated the wage offered by the employer is liable to deductions for National Insurance and, if appropriate, Income Tax.

Alien's name, etc.

Surname [REDACTED]  
 Other names [REDACTED]  
 Date of birth 1949 *o s. l. l.*  
 Sex MALE *8. 7. 12*  
 Nationality MOROCCAN  
 Employment ASSISTANT COOK  
 885/-/33

NO. 75682

### CONDITIONS GOVERNING THE ISSUE OF THIS PERMIT

Voir Dessous. Siehe Rückseite. Vea al dorso. Vedi pagina seguente.

1. This permit does not constitute any obligation upon the Immigration Officer to give the above-named alien leave to land in the United Kingdom. The alien will be required to satisfy the Immigration Officer on arrival that he (or she) can comply with the provisions of the Aliens Order 1953, which may include a medical inspection.
2. This permit together with a valid passport (not an identity card) must be produced to the Immigration Officer at the port of arrival in the United Kingdom. Hereafter it should be carefully preserved by the alien for production at any time to the competent authorities.
3. This permit may be used only by the alien named thereon. If an unauthorised person amends the particulars upon the permit it will thereby be rendered invalid.
4. This permit is valid only for the particular employment for which it is issued and not for employment of another kind or with another employer.
5. The alien during the period of stay in the United Kingdom is subject to the restrictions, and must conform

to the requirements, of the Aliens Order 1953. If the permit is for a period of more than three months, the alien will be required to register with the Police and should produce two photographs and this permit for this purpose. He/she is, therefore, advised to obtain two extra copies of any photograph taken for passport purposes

6. This permit ceases to be valid if not produced to the Immigration Officer at the port of arrival in the United Kingdom within three months after the date of issue.

7. If during his/her period of permitted stay the alien goes abroad for short periods, he/she should carry this permit and show it to the Immigration Officer on return to this country.

8. If it is desired to employ the alien beyond the terminal date of the period for which the alien has been granted leave to land by the Immigration Officer, application should be made by the employer about one month before such date to the Under-Secretary of State, Home Office, 271-7 High Holborn, London, W.C.1, marking the envelope in the bottom left-hand corner "D.E.P. Permit". The alien's passport and Police Certificate of Registration should be forwarded with the application.

Signed on behalf of the Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity



After its number and date of issue have been noted, this permit of six pages should be sent intact by the employer to the alien who should be warned that he/she MUST produce it, together with a valid passport (not an identity card), to the Immigration Officer at the port of arrival, otherwise he/she will not be permitted to land.

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