**IMISCOE Research Series**

Ov Cristian Norocel Anders Hellström Martin Bak Jørgensen *Editors*

Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe

**IMISCOE Research Series**

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Ov Cristian Norocel • Anders Hellström Martin Bak Jørgensen Editors

# Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe

*Editors* Ov Cristian Norocel Institut de Sociologie Université Libre de Bruxelles Brussels, Belgium

Department of Gender Studies Lund University Lund, Sweden

Martin Bak Jørgensen Department of Culture and Learning Aalborg University Aalborg, Denmark

Anders Hellström Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare Malmö University Malmö, Sweden

ISSN 2364-4087 ISSN 2364-4095 (electronic) IMISCOE Research Series ISBN 978-3-030-41693-5 ISBN 978-3-030-41694-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41694-2

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020. This book is an open access publication.

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# **Acknowledgments**

We take this opportunity to acknowledge that this edited volume is the product of a sustained collective effort, which was made possible by the generous help and support of many scholars and institutions. Most importantly, we are thankful to the authors who have agreed to join us on this intellectual journey and contributed diligently with their work over the course of this publishing project that stretched a bit over 3 years. Equally important, we are thankful to the dedicated members of the IMISCOE Editorial Committee for believing in our project and helping us to better focus and structure our arguments through their comments and those from the invited reviewers. The first chapter drafts of this edited book were presented in a book symposium at the Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare (MIM) in Malmö (November 2017), which benefited from IMISCOE seed funding and the generous support of MIM. We then had the chance to discuss further the advanced chapter drafts at various panels in IMISCOE general conference in Rotterdam (June 2017) and Malmö (June 2019). The open-access version of this book was made possible through Ov Cristian Norocel's funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement No. 750076; Anders Hellström's financial support from MIM, Malmö University; and Martin Bak Jørgensen's funding from Aalborg University. Last but not least, the empirical research related to the chapter by Carlo Ruzza was supported by the Italian "Project of Relevant National Interest" grant 2015-40102915.

# **Contents**



# **About the Editors and Contributors**

# **Editors**

**Ov Cristian Norocel** (Lund University, Sweden, and Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium) (DrSocSci in Political Science) is Associate Senior Lecturer in the Department of Gender Studies (Sweden) and previously Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow in the Institute of Sociology (Belgium). His research is centered on the fields of intersectional analyses of political radicalism and extremism and nationalism and citizenship issues across Europe. He has published in such international journals as *Critical Social Policy*, *European Journal of Women's Studies*, *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, *International Journal of Communication*, *NORA: Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Studies*, *Norma: International Journal for Masculinity Studies*, and *Problems of Post-Communism*. Email: cristian.norocel@ genus.lu.se

**Anders Hellström** (Malmö University, Sweden) (PhD Political Science) is Senior Lecturer in the Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare (MIM). Research interests include identity politics, European integration, discourse theory, political philosophy, populism, nationalism, European nationalism, national self-images, politics of multiculturalism, and border-making processes. He has published widely in such academic journals as *Government and Opposition, Journal of International Migration and Integration*, and *Ethnicities*. His most recent monograph is *Trust Us: Reproducing the Nation and the Scandinavian Nationalist parties*, published by Berghahn Books in 2016. Email: anders.hellstrom@mau.se

**Martin Bak Jørgensen** (Aalborg University, Denmark) (PhD in Migration Studies) is Associate Professor affiliated with the research group DEMOS (Democracy, Migration and Movements). His research encompasses the fields of sociology, political sociology, and political science. His topics of focus include welfare, discrimination and inequality, migration, social movements, and new mobilizations against fiscal austerity across Scandinavia as well as in Germany and Spain. His most recent publication is co-written with Ó.G. Agustín: *Solidarity and the 'Refugee Crisis' in Europe* (2019, Palgrave McMillan). Email: martinjo@ hum.aau.dk

# **Contributors**

**Alexandra Ana** (Scuola Normale Superiore, Italy) finished her PhD in Political Science and Sociology in Florence, with a thesis on comparative feminist movements, under the supervision of Donatella della Porta. Her current research interests include gender and sexuality; social movements, particularly the right to housing movement and the feminist movement; labor precarity; and migration. She is currently teaching sociology, with a focus on gender and urban sociology at Sciences Po. Her last article "Precarious Locations: Feminist Co-optation and Strategies of Resistance in the Neoliberal Age," published in 2018 in *Praktyka Teoretyczna*, analyzes the process of co-optation of social movements. Email: alexandra.ana@sns.it

**Radu Cinpoeş** (Kingston University London, UK) is Head of the Department of Politics and Associate Professor in Politics, Human Rights, and International Relations. Growing out of his interest in nationalism and the politics of exclusion, his research has recently focused on two complementary directions: migration, mobility, and refugee issues, on the one hand, and issues concerning discrimination and intolerance, on the other. He has published on the extreme right, nationalism, European identity, and Romanian politics. He has published one monograph: *Nationalism and Identity in Romania: A History of Extreme Politics from the Birth of the State to EU Accession* (I.B. Tauris, 2010). His recent work are chapters included in *Post-Communist Romania at 25: Linking Past, Present, and Future* (Eds. L. Stan and D. Vancea) (2015, Rowman & Littlefield) and in *Transforming the Transformation? The Radical Right in the Political Process in East Central Europe* (Ed. M. Minkenberg) (2015, Routledge). His current research project investigates agential reflexive mediation of structural conditionings and the role of social networks in the context of transnational mobility. Email: radu.cinpoes@kingston.ac.uk

**Emil Edenborg** (Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Sweden) is Postdoctoral Researcher of the Program of Global Politics and Security at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and a Senior Lecturer at Stockholm University. In 2016, he finished his PhD in the Department of Political Science at Lund University on the topic of gender, belonging, and visibility in contemporary Russia. During his doctoral studies, he was a Visiting Researcher at Moscow State University and at UC Berkeley. His research broadly concerns gender and sexual politics, and LGBTQ issues in particular, in relation to nationalism and populism, in the context of Russia and the post-Soviet space, as well as in the Nordic countries. His publications include *Politics of Visibility and Belonging: From Russia´s "Homosexual*  *Propaganda" Laws to the Ukraine War* (2017, Routledge) and articles published in *GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies*, *Political Geography*, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, *Geopolitics*, *Postcolonial Studies*, *Sexuality & Culture*, *East European Politics*, and *International Journal of Cultural Studies*. Email: emil. edenborg@ui.se

**Camilla Haavisto** (University of Helsinki, Finland) (DrPolSci) works as University Lecturer in Communication in the Swedish School of Social Science. She has recently finished her Academy of Finland project "Anti-racism Under Pressure: Social Movements, NGOs and Their Mediated Claims-Making in Finland." Her research interests include antiracist organizing, claims-making of ethnic and cultural minorities, circulation processes in hybrid media systems, and the role of media for conflict resolution. She is also increasingly interested in how datafication processes connect to inequality. She has previously been a Postdoctoral Scholar at McGill University in Montreal and Visiting Scholar at Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare. Her latest publications have been published in *Critical Arts: A Journal of South-North Cultural and Media Studies* and *Forum for Development Studies*. She has also contributed to the volume *Racialization, Racism, and Anti-Racism in the Nordic Countries* (Ed. P. Hervik) (2018, Palgrave McMillan). Email: camila.haavisto@helsinki.fi

**Katherine Kondor** (University of Huddersfield, UK) is PhD Researcher in Criminology and a Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right. Her research is focused on far-right social movements, collective action, and online radicalization, with a particular interest in methods of radicalization and pathways to activism. Email: katherine.kondor@hud.ac.uk

**Larisa Lara-Guerrero** (University Paris Diderot, France, and University of Liège, Belgium) is PhD Candidate in the field of Migration and Political Sciences, under the joint supervision, and a Fellow at the Institut Convergences Migrations. She studied International Relations at the Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education in Mexico and at the Paris Institute of Political Studies as an undergraduate. She completed Master of Sciences in Migration Studies from the University of Oxford and Master of Arts in Conflict, Security, and Development from King's College London. Her research focuses on emigration policies, the role of diasporas in conflict zones, and political transnationalism. She has published in several academic journals and in political analysis magazines in Mexico. Email: larisavlara@ gmail.com

**Mark Littler** (University of Huddersfield, UK) is Senior Lecturer in Criminology. He was previously a Lecturer in Criminology at the University of Hull and a Postdoctoral Research Scholar at the University of Oxford's Blackfriars Hall. His research focus is on online radicalization and extremism. He has published in such journals as *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, *Journal of*  *Language and Politics*, and *The Journal of Political Criminology*. Email: m.littler@ hud.ac.uk

**Anita Nissen** (Aalborg University, Denmark) is PhD Fellow in European Studies and affiliated with the Aalborg Center for European Studies (ACEuS). Her research encompasses the fields of political sociology and political science. Her topics of focus include far-right politics, social movements and political parties, Europeanization, and Euroscepticism, specifically focusing on two transnational far-right coalitions, Fortress Europe and Generation Identity. Email: nissen\_anita@ hotmail.com

**Daniel Rosengren Olsen** (Aalborg University, Denmark) is a PhD Fellow working at the Institute of Communication and Psychology at Aalborg University. His research areas include qualitative methods, study environments, social movements, civil society, and political studies. His primary areas of study are Danish CSO activity during the contemporary years of migration, the Danish refugee solidarity movement, learning in social movements, and academic writing practices. Email: rosengren@hum.aau.dk

**Selcen Öner** (Bahçeşehir University, Turkey) is currently working as Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations. She finished her PhD at Marmara University, EU Institute, Department of EU Politics and International Relations. Her research interests are Turkey-EU relations, European identity, populism and radical right in European politics, migration, and asylum policy of the EU. She was a Lecturer at Jean Monnet Module on "Justice Freedom and Security in the EU" (2013–2014) and the Coordinator of this module (2014–2015). She was also a Visiting Professor at LUISS University in Rome in fall semester 2018 and had been a Visiting Scholar at Free University of Brussels (Institute for European Studies), University of Aalborg, Free University of Berlin (The Transformative Power of Europe-FP7 Project), and IBEI, Pompeu Fabra University. She has published *Turkey and the European Union: The Question of European Identity* (2011, Lexington) and several book chapters and articles. Email: selcen.oner@eas.bau.edu.tr

**Andreas Önnerfors** (University of Gothenburg, Sweden) is Associate Professor in the History of Sciences and Ideas and has a teaching record in Political Thought and Intellectual History. His research interests are in the rhetoric and semantics of the political discourse of the contemporary European far right as well as enlightenment culture, particularly cosmopolitan sociability, science, and the press and their implications for modernity. He has published articles on PEGIDA, conspiracy theories and secret societies, and their cultural history. He is Author of *Freemasonry: A Very Short Introduction* (2017, Oxford University Press) and Coeditor (together with K. Steiner) of *Expressions of Radicalization: Global Politics, Processes and*  *Practices* (2018, Palgrave McMillan) and regularly contributes to Swedish media. Email: andreas.onnerfors@lir.gu.se

**Gokay Özerim** (Yaşar University, Turkey) is a Member of the International Relations Department and Director of the European Union Research Center. His main academic fields are international migration, security, and European integration process. He is graduated from the Department of International Relations at Dokuz Eylul University and has his PhD on European Studies. He was awarded by the Chevening Scholarship of the UK Government in 2010 and carried out a part of his PhD research in the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford. In 2014, he has been in the Institute of European Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, as a Marie Curie Visiting Scholar. He has been also working in several European Union-funded projects and delivering trainings on intercultural learning, youth participation, social responsibility, and project management since 2005. He was awarded a Jean Monnet Module in 2016 and Jean Monnet Chair on migration in 2019 by the European Commission. He was Management Committee Member of the COST action "Populist Political Communication in Europe." Email: gokay.ozerim@yasar.edu.tr

**Katarina Pettersson** (University of Helsinki, Finland) (PhD in Social Psychology) is University Lecturer in Social Psychology at the Swedish School of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki. Her main research projects have focused on nationalist and radical right political rhetoric, political hate speech, and political communication and persuasion in the online sphere. Her interests have included how politicians draw upon various social identities (e.g., ethnicity, nationality, gender) in their discourse and what societal implications this discourse may have. In her work, she has combined various discourse analytical and narrative approaches with visual rhetorical methods in order to study the multimodal forms that online (political) communication takes. She has published extensively on these topics in international peer-reviewed journals such as *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *European Journal of Women's Studies*, *Discourse & Society*, and *Qualitative Research in Psychology*. Email: katarina.pettersson@helsinki.fi

**Carlo Ruzza** (University of Trento, Italy) (PhD Harvard) is Professor of Political Sociology. He teaches courses on European Studies and Political Sociology. He has previously taught at the University of Leicester where he was Professor of Political Sociology until 2012, at the University of Essex, and at the University of Surrey and was a Jean Monnet Fellow at the European Institute in Florence. He has written broadly on social movements, civil society organizations, human rights, populism, and right-wing parties. He is especially interested in processes of institutionalization of social movements at EU level and has studied peace movements, environmental movements, ethno-nationalist movements, and EU-level public interest associations. Email: carlo.ruzza@unitn.it

**Mahama Tawat** (Higher School of Economics, the Russian Federation, and Malmö University, Sweden) (PhD in Political Science) is Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Administration in the Department of Sociology and Research Associate at the Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare (MIM). His research focus on Nordic countries' immigrant cultural policies; EU immigration policy with its multilateral partners, Turkey and the African Union; and new public management. He has published in such peer-reviewed journals as *East European Politics*, *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, and *Governance*.

**María Vivas-Romero** (University of Maastricht, the Netherlands, and University of Liège, Belgium) earned her PhD in Political and Social Sciences at the University of Liège, Belgium. Her PhD dissertation explored the repertoires practices through which Peruvian and Colombian migrant domestic workers in the city of Brussels access global social protection arrangements. Her fieldwork took place in the city of Brussels as well in the cities abroad in which the migrant domestic workers she followed negotiated their access to social protection: Lima-Chimbote (Peru) and Bogota-Medellin (Colombia). Her current research interests are migration and family studies as well as the reproduction of global gender, race, and class inequalities in access to social protection. Her publications in scientific journals reflect her interest in multi-sited ethnographic approaches and intersectional and postcolonial feminist approaches. Email: m.vivasromero@maastrichtuniversity.nl

# **Chapter 1 Nostalgia and Hope: Narrative Master Frames Across Contemporary Europe**

**Anders Hellström, Ov Cristian Norocel, and Martin Bak Jørgensen**

# **1.1 Intersections Between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe**

After the fall of the Berlin wall and the subsequent disbanding of various state socialist regimes across the former Eastern Bloc, which marked the end of the Cold War, there was a certain sense of optimism shared by most European societies concerning a peaceful and prosperous future. Among scholars, while some representatives of traditional approaches to world politics and international relations failed to predict the end of the Cold War, others were enthusiastic about what seemingly was the definitive victory of democracy and the market economy. The situation was paradoxical—both a source of optimism and uncertainty. What was still left to fight for? Had we reached the famous "end of history" (Fukuyama 1992), marking the final victory of market capitalism and liberal democracy, and thus, the advent of a post-ideological world order? Soon enough, one such promise—that of enjoying the benefits of free movement from one country to another—was enshrined into the Maastricht Treaty of the European Union.

A. Hellström

Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare, Malmö University, Malmö, Sweden e-mail: anders.hellstrom@mau.se

O. C. Norocel (\*) Institut de Sociologie, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium

Department of Gender Studies, Lund University, Lund, Sweden e-mail: cristian.norocel@ulb.ac.be

M. B. Jørgensen Department of Culture and Learning, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark e-mail: martinjo@cgs.aau.dk

O. C. Norocel et al. (eds.), *Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41694-2\_1

Some three decades later, everything seems radically different: "Europe as an idea, as an identity and as a political project, seems incapable of practices of solidarity and care; in other words, Europe is suffering from a crisis of solidarity." (Martinsson and Mulinari 2018, p. 159). This has deepened the existing crisis of legitimacy, pushing the EU project of peace, prosperity, and integration farther away from the grim reality on the ground (Agustín and Jørgensen 2018; Trenz et al. 2015; Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2015). The failure to address the forced displacement of millions of people, and above all, the lack of solidarity was too obvious to ignore, or as UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon remarked "We are facing the biggest refugee and displacement crisis of our time. Above all, this is not just a crisis of numbers; it is also a crisis of solidarity. […] We must respond to a monumental crisis with monumental solidarity" (UN 2016). Today, it seems that the initial euphoric optimism has vanished without much of a trace. To grasp this complex situation, we argue that there is an imperious need to sharpen and update the conceptual scaffolding that is generally employed to examine the intersecting politics of culture, welfare, and migration across Europe, which are part of the "liquid modernity" of contemporary late capitalism (Bauman 2012).

# **1.2 Conceptual Setting**

Upon closer look, the apparent triumph of the market economy paved the way for profound changes in the European welfare states. They not only entailed a dramatic transformation of the conditions of, and the means of, access to welfare provision but also involved a retraction of citizenship as well (Schierup et al. 2006). In turn, this triggered an exacerbation of welfare chauvinist appeals, the escalation of securitization fears, and the increased discrimination of migrants (be they regular or irregular) and their offspring (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990; Betz and Johnson 2004; Dikeç 2007; Conversi 2014; Keskinen et al. 2016; Norocel 2017; Ruzza 2009). These developments have been accompanied by the continuous transfer of authority from the national level to transnational bodies like the EU and the increasing dominance of the executive in national politics (Sassen 2006; Trenz et al. 2015; Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2015), which brought closure to established political channels for civil society influence (Standing 2011).

The reaction to these changes manifested in two distinct ways. First, Europe has experienced the growing presence of right-wing populist parties, which were accompanied by a wave of manifestations of extremism and xenophobia. Anchored in the nostalgic longing for an ethnically homogenous past that never quite existed, these retrogressive forces have emphasized the importance of making and policing racialized, classed, and gendered borders as a means to identify and protect the native majority's allegedly proprietary right to welfare (Bevelander and Wodak 2019; Norocel 2016; Wekker 2016). Secondly, and in contrast to the first reaction, Europe has witnessed the coalescence of transnational and transethnic justice movements across civil society and the forging of new alliances between migrant networks and organizations, NGOs, precarious workers and students, and in some cases, labor unions (Martinsson and Mulinari 2018; Ruzza 2009; Schierup et al. 2017).

To make sense of the complex dynamic between these opposing trends, we suggest approaching it from the perspective of the competing master frames of *nostalgia* and *hope*. The chapters compiled in the present volume expand our knowledge on how politics are conducted by investigating political projects which, taken together, "re-imagine and/or change established modes of doing politics" (Zienkowski 2019, p. 132) and thus provide multiple entry points to how these master frames are interpreted in practice.

Illustrating this point is the slow democratic decay across Europe, which accompanied the access to power of right-wing populist and anti-immigration parties, and, in several less consolidated democracies, even the descent into authoritarianism (Bevelander and Wodak 2019, p. 31). Indeed, it seems that "the populist zeitgeist" (Mudde 2004) has attained a position of hegemony across Europe and elsewhere around the world, and even more so today than when Mudde wrote his article. Whereas scholarship in the field has treated right-wing populism as a normal pathology of democratic societies, it has now become a pathological normalcy (see Akkerman et al. 2016; Hellström and Bevelander 2018; Minkenberg 2017; Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017; Rydgren 2018). Indeed, as right-wing populist parties supporting anti-immigration attitudes have made significant inroads into the politics, researchers now argue that this marks no less than a fascitization of the mainstream (Bevelander and Wodak 2019). Examples are not difficult to find across Europe. For instance, the Alliance of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Alliance (*Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége–Magyar Polgári Szövetség*, Fidesz) under the leadership of Viktor Orbán embarked on a dramatic volte-face, disregarding the founding principles of liberal democracy in order to create their vision of "illiberal democracy" in Hungary. Free and government-critical media, independent and non-politicized judiciary, and autonomous universities that defend critical knowledge have all come under attack with dire consequences. These developments are mirrored by similar power grabs in Poland at the hands of the ruling Law and Justice Party (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, PiS). Authoritarian reactions are coupled with legislative measures aimed at providing a veneer of social justice narrowly reserved to the native majorities. Similar efforts were undertaken in Italy by the (Northern) League (*Lega (Nord)*, LN) and Matteo Salvini during their brief spell as junior governmental partners in the aftermath of 2018 parliamentary elections. While Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the interior affairs, Salvini pursued hardline measures to abolish essential forms of protection for migrants, which were justified by the imperative to safeguard the Italian way of life. With this in mind, it is easy to become pessimistic.

This notwithstanding, we argue that, while indeed all these retrogressive advances have become more brazen, we are witnessing a concurrent coalescence of the progressive forces. Just to name a few examples, in Greece, the extreme-right antiimmigration party Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή) lost parliamentary representation in the 2019 national elections after five consecutive elections that resulted in the party sending between 21 and 17 representatives to the Hellenic parliament. By the same measure, the much-discussed ascendency of the Alternative for Germany (*Alternative für Deutschland*, AfD), which was foreseen after the AfD entered the German federal parliament in 2017 for the first time, failed to materialize. In turn, it was the Greens (*Die Grünen*) that made substantive gains in the 2019 European parliamentary elections, signaling the emergence of a "green wave" of progressive politics across Europe. Put differently, European societies are not on a dystopian path, at least not unequivocally.

Rather, we argue that politics—understood as the partial fixation of meaning in the antagonistic field of the political (Mouffe 2000, pp. 125–128)—are a site of struggle for competing forces, whose agendas are underpinned by the narrative master frames of nostalgia and hope. Consequently, various forms of political mobilization attempt to alter existing political and social hierarchies, either in a retrogressive or more progressive direction.

Hope for a progressive and enlightened future finds itself in an uneasy coexistence and fragile equilibrium with a strong nostalgic attachment to a time of great things past. If nostalgia often strives to restore the polity in question as it once was, the latter is its polar opposite—it is associated with progressive ideals and optimistic, forward-looking visions. Nostalgia also has a visionary aspect, despite it being oriented in the past rather than the future. Nostalgia provides something to people to cling on to and promises to restore the glory of days past. Nostalgia and hope are experienced on a daily basis, connecting local practices and transnational loyalties. Some people long for essentialist and stereotyped identities as a means to make sense of, and slow down, the all-too-rapid changes in contemporary societies (Berliner 2018, p. 11). In this case, and often finding support in right-wing politics, it is a "restorative nostalgia" after a monocultural, racially homogeneous, and neatly defined collection of separate European societies that appeals (Boym 2001; Wekker 2016). It foretells that one ought to protect "our welfare" and "our (traditional) culture" from outside ("them") and overly permissive insiders who put the internal cohesion of "our society" at risk. At the other end, putting their hope into a forwardlooking vision, people generally embrace a perspective that welcomes increasingly diverse and tolerant European societies, albeit one needs to be aware of the temptation that progress is inevitable (Snyder 2018, p. 7). In other words, hope represents an emotional glue that enables the crystallization of counter-hegemonic agendas among social movements and different organizations and creates the intellectual opening for "understanding that societies and our societal positions are possible to transform and that society as well as individual identities can emerge in a different way" (Martinsson and Mulinari 2018, p. 14).

A telling example is with Greece, where the most severe episode of the economic crisis was shortly followed by the most tangible manifestations of the refugee (reception) crisis (Dalakoglou and Agelopoulos 2018). Indeed, the social mobilization and the everyday practices protesting the draconic fiscal austerity measures dictated by the so-called Troika (the EU Commission; the European Central Bank; and the International Monetary Fund) led to the emergence of Syriza (Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς) as a political alternative to an incompetent and backward-looking political class. On cultural matters, the Syriza-led government pushed through the legal recognition of same-sex unions and the right to change legal gender despite vehement opposition from the conservative forces led by the Greek Orthodox Church and violence from the extreme right. The same grassroots forces showed solidarity with the plight of those seeking refuge in Europe. This notwithstanding, Syriza's inability—or unwillingness—to successfully challenge the Troika's austerity push led to an impasse and can be held up as yet another example of the shortcomings of "movementist" politics in achieving sustainable changes (Badiou 2018). In turn, it paved the way to a return to power of center-right New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία), as the party won a majority in the 2019 parliamentary elections. This comes to show that the trajectories of nostalgia and hope are not fixed.

To better articulate the nostalgia and hope dichotomy at a theoretical level, we suggest a closer look at the conceptual construct of *heartland* (Taggart 2000, pp. 95–98). The concept entails "the positive aspects of everyday life" and is at the same time a construction of an ideal world, one which is constructed retrospectively—a vision derived from the past and projected onto the present. As such, the heartland represents a claim to a common spiritual foundation, which creates a sense of belonging to an allegedly culturally homogeneous population (Betz and Johnson 2004, p. 320; Hellström 2016, p. 66). Importantly, this nostalgia is manifested in a rather vicarious manner (Berliner 2018, pp. 19–20), in the sense that it need not build on personal stories and first-hand experiences but rather crystallizes under the effect of larger narratives of what represents the specificity of our respective communities. Certain narratives that distinguish "our nation" from others are iterated on a daily basis. Appeals to a particular homeland nurture a sense of deep community between "the virtuous people" that share a proprietary right to their lands, which is founded on the belief of a long-lasting and continuous past. These appeals are marked by deep skepticism—or at times, outright opposition—to extending these rights to those who are perceived as "unworthy newcomers". These narratives may be based for example on such "civic virtues" as gender equality and tolerance, though underpinned by the tacit conviction that these newcomers—particularly Muslims—are not sufficiently accustomed to and full-heartedly embracing "our ways". Such reasoning is often paired with ideas of unbridgeable differences that separate the "native us" from "migrant them" on the basis of a distinct genealogical ethnic descent. In extremis, this opens for an identitarian logic of "ethnopluralist" difference which recasts the racist distinctions of racial biology into insurmountable cultural distinctiveness, which privileges "our culture" as both separate and, importantly, discreetly better than "their culture". This logic is intimately connected to the French New Right (*nouvelle droite*) and the emergence of cultural racism (Taguieff 1990). In our view, *nostalgia is a master frame underpinned by these narratives of cultural difference*, which are expressed with varying degrees of intensity, as detailed above.

*Hope is the opposite master frame, which is often associated with movements that build their identity around progressive narratives that embrace solidarity and diversity*. In this context, the solution is an active accommodation to new differences of welcoming the aforementioned "migrant them" rather than disbarring them. New solidarity practices and political alternatives take different forms across

Europe, such as the civil society *Venligboerne* in Denmark; the feminist and queer collectivity mobilizing against both Greek traditionalist homophobic patriarchy and neoliberal austerity mantra in Athens; or the institutionalization of solidarity in the Refugee Plan in Barcelona (Agustín and Jørgensen 2018; Athanasiou 2018). Southern Europe, and particularly Greece and Spain, have become social laboratories for experimenting with new forms of participation pointing to material manifestations of hope through concrete practices (Agustín and Briziarelli 2018; Dalakoglou and Agelopoulos 2018). What all these have in common is a visionary orientation towards a shared future, which builds on the crystallization of a new societal culture, rather than a consistent political tactics—a future to come that has "meaning (as possibility), but no predetermined direction, for it can end either in hope or disaster" (de Sousa Santos 2004, p. 26). Consequently, in order to locate these gusts of hope, scholarly attention must move beyond mere analyses of political competition among parties and enter the realms of civil society mobilization on local, national, and transnational European, and global levels of community making.

# **1.3 Interdisciplinary Contributions**

The present volume has an interdisciplinary profile, making significant contributions to migration studies as well as scholarship on right-wing populism, extremeright activism, feminist mobilizations, and other social movements. A point of departure for this volume is the assumption that the narratives constructing our collective identities (i.e. the shared experience of ourselves in contact and contrast to the alterity) are not arbitrary and rarely innocent and consequently shape the process of formulating and implementing the politics of migration of the polity in question. We operationalize these narratives around the master frames of nostalgia and hope. They provide the discursive context wherein societies articulate the manner in which politics are done and who are deemed as legitimate political subjects.

From this perspective, the chapters in this volume expand their attention beyond the institutionalized forms of doing politics, dealing with the political mobilization of civil society actors. The chapters offer a diverse range of empirical contributions, ranging from Sweden and Finland in its northernmost corners of Europe to Poland and Romania in the east and Italy in the south. They critically examine the junction between the politics of culture, welfare, and migration across the continent that are not only embedded in specific national contexts but also transnational in a comparative perspective by examining transnational mobilizations and global cities.

In the aftermath of the 2008 economic and financial crises, the heated debates concerning the financial and moral implications of bank bailouts, growing unemployment, and the apparent victory of the fiscal austerity mantra were clear signs of a reactivation of the socio-economic cleavage and the politics of welfare pertaining to it. At the same time, migration and what later came to be labelled the 2015 "European refugee (reception) crisis", gave rise to passionate discussions about controlling migration flows, demographic anxieties, and demands for preserving national cultures (Agustín and Jørgensen 2018), thereby widening the focus to politics of (national) culture and migration. As several contributions in the present volume show, these calls for protecting national specificity are often tinged by more or less discrete xenophobia, and in some cases, by outright racism. Notwithstanding this, on a more abstract level, both issues of welfare and (national) culture concern national identity in the context of contemporary migration patterns: how a people defines their collective identity, what bounds of solidarity among its members are valued, and how they describe themselves as different from others.

Another important contribution of the present volume is the articulation of a gender perspective on the narrative use of said master frames. For instance, several chapters widen the focus of scholarship on right-wing populist parties and extremeright mobilization by delving further into how gender is employed strategically to do ideological work. On the one hand, particularly in Northern and Western Europe, the right-wing populist parties formally acknowledge gender equality provisions and incorporate these into their welfare chauvinist appeals as a means to distinguish between allegedly emancipated natives and deeply patriarchal migrants (Farris 2017; Norocel 2017). On the other hand, the extreme right mobilization vehemently opposes women's emancipation and nostalgically calls for a return to a traditional gender hierarchy, which posits women as frail and in need of defense from the menacing figure of the male (Muslim) migrant. This notwithstanding, other chapters highlight the importance of feminist mobilization in bringing about a "politics of intersectional hope" (Martinsson and Mulinari 2018), which builds bridges between anarcho-feminism, queer and Roma feminism and engages in struggles for social justice. The following section discusses more in detail the organizational logic of the present volume and provides brief explanations of each chapter's focus and key findings.

# **1.4 Disposition of the Book**

The present book is a collection of chapters that are organized around three internally coherent thematic parts. The chapters may be read as standalone pieces of research. They employ both comparative and single case studies to address different perspectives, and by means of various methodological approaches, the manner in which the master frames of nostalgia and hope are articulated in the politics of culture, welfare, and migration. The chapters may just as well be read as constitutive contributions of the aforementioned parts, which deal thematically with right-wing populist party politics across Europe (Part I), with an articulation of politics beyond party politics either by means of retrogressive mobilization (Part II) or emancipatory initiatives (Part III).

# *1.4.1 Part I: Right-Wing Populist Party Politics Across Europe*

The chapters collected in this part examine right-wing populist party politics across Europe. They illustrate how the articulation of right-wing populist politics relies on and is undergirded by the master frame of nostalgia. Particularly important in this context seems to be the manner in which the online strategies of individual party members attach onto the wider political narratives in the areas of party-political competition. The chapters in this part display a diverse array of qualitative methodological approaches that examine a variety of empirical material (such as political debates, social media and blog entries, party documents and party leaders' interviews during election campaigns), with the analyses focused mainly on the aftermath of the 2015 refugee (reception) crisis.

These chapters provide both in-depth single case studies (Finland) of the way right-wing populist politicians discursively deflect accusations of racism against Muslims as well as comparative analyses of how discourses on national culture, immigration, and the welfare state are articulated. These chapters either analyze national differences in a seemingly common regional context (Denmark and Sweden), map out diverse positions and electoral strategies for acceding to political prominence (Poland, Hungary, and Romania), or investigate how entire countries or their diaspora in Europe are instrumentalized as culturally polarizing issues (in the UK, Austria, and Germany). The key argument of these chapters is that, across Europe, right-wing populist parties successfully politicize both issues of national identity and welfare provision and consequently pressure, with varying degrees of success from one context to another, the mainstream parties into altering their standing on these matters.

Examining two socio-economically similar North European countries such as Denmark and Sweden, Anders Hellström and Mahama Tawat evidence in Chap. 2 how discourses on immigration, culture, and the welfare state are articulated differently. Studying a combination of both conventional political discourses and the blogosphere in the two countries, Hellström and Tawat show that the mainstream political discourse, as well as in the blogosphere in Denmark, gained increased recognition in a wider public for ideas and policies based on cultural incommensurability on the eve of the 2015 refugee (reception) crisis, whereby cultural diversity was depicted as incompatible with social cohesion and a threat to the Danish welfare system. By contrast, the mainstream political discourses in Sweden consistently associate cultural issues with redistributive policies, although the debate was highly polarized. The rhetoric around immigration, culture, and welfare varied according to ideological lines along the left-right cleavage. Nevertheless, in the blogosphere, welfare chauvinism and opposition to multiculturalism seem as strong as in Denmark, particularly among right-wing populist supporters.

Nevertheless, also in the North European context, Katarina Pettersson explores in Chap. 3 how Finnish right-wing populist politicians discursively deflect accusations of racism against Muslims. Pettersson undertakes a discursive psychological analysis of selected politicians' Facebook profiles and identifies four ways of

denying accusations of racism: first, by constructing the racist statements as mere accounts of indisputable facts and common-sense; second, by providing personal narratives and ontological gerrymandering which act as "proof" of their non-racist disposition; third, by moving the discussion from issues about race to matters of cultural threats; and fourth, by reversing racism onto their political antagonist. Pettersson evidences that in their discursive denial of racist hate speech against Muslims, the analyzed Finnish politicians relied more on cultural arguments than on welfare chauvinism. More clearly, these discourses employed nostalgic references to Finnish national identity, people and values, and appeals to save them by resisting the alleged cultural threat that Islam represents.

Concentrating on the Central and Eastern European context in Chap. 4, Radu Cinpoeş and Ov Cristian Norocel add complexity to the discussion concerning the interplay between national identity ideals and welfare chauvinist appeals. Cinpoeş and Norocel provide a comparative framework that maps out the various positions right-wing populist parties occupy in mainstream politics in the region, selecting Poland, Hungary, and Romania as their case studies. They examine the official discourses of key right-wing populist parties in the chosen countries from the beginning of 2015 onwards. Cinpoeş and Norocel offer a convincing analysis of the various electoral strategies of these parties, which were employed with varying degrees of success, that juxtapose cultural protectionist appeals to welfare chauvinist proposals. In so doing, they shed light on the particularities of the culture and welfare nexus in the Central and Eastern European context.

Taking a slightly different approach, in Chap. 5, Gokay Özerim and Selcen Öner scrutinize and compare how Turkey as a potential EU Member State, and the presence of Turks as a significant ethnic minority group in Europe, was instrumentalized politically. Özerim and Öner analyze how Turkey and the Turkish diaspora in Europe are constructed as a culturally polarizing issue as part of a larger right-wing populist preoccupation with "cultural security" matters. For this purpose, they examine three cases. The first concerns the "Vote Leave" campaign part of the Brexit referendum in the UK; the second is constituted by the instrumentalization of Turkish immigrants and Turkey's EU membership bid in Austrian domestic politics; and the third pertains to the German domestic political debates in the aftermath of the 2015 European refugee (reception) crisis and its impact onto the Turkish community in the country.

# *1.4.2 Part II: Retrogressive Mobilizations Outside the Political Arena*

The chapters gathered in this part map out the different manners and actors, and the various settings in which retrogressive ideals are juxtaposed in diverse combinations nostalgia for past/imagined ethnic homogeneity, belief in immutable national identities, and "post-welfare melancholia" (Pallas 2011). These chapters concentrate on transnational developments (Europe-wide), as well as several national settings (Sweden, Hungary, and Germany). They use a diverse array of qualitative methodological approaches to examine various empirics (such as social media posts, nationwide daily newspapers, nationalist symbols, in-depth interviews, and mobilizing anthems). In so doing, they provide both a birds-eye view and a more granular perspective concerning the various forms that the retrogressive mobilization outside the political arena may take. Put differently, the main argument of this part is that outside the political arena there are certain segments of society that both reverberate to and shape right-wing populist discourses that are underpinned by conceptions of monolithic and exclusive national identity and welfare chauvinism.

Examining the transnational cooperation framework of the European youth movement Generation Identity (GI), Anita Nissen evidences in Chap. 6 how different national GI chapters constructed and assigned protagonist and antagonist identities in the context of the 2015 refugee (reception) crisis. Nissen exposes the ethno-pluralist conception of society onto which the GI bases its understanding of "identity"; this is tied to the imperatives of ensuring ethnic segregation and a nostalgic yearning for a time of European ethnic homogeneity. Consequently, the movement's endeavor to "return to the future" is to be achieved by confronting today's Universalist and egalitarian principles as well as alleged "mass-immigration" and Islamization. Nissen unveils how strategies such as highlighting the negative consequence of particularly Muslim third-country immigration and questioning the truthfulness of the migrants' and refugees' residence claims are employed in the effort to return Europe to its imaginary ethnically homogeneous roots.

Concentrating on the Swedish context, in Chap. 7 Emil Edenborg uses the debates about sexual violence, immigration, and gender equality—in the wake of reports about large-scale sexual harassment during the New Year's Eve celebrations in Cologne and at a summer festival in Stockholm—to examine critically the relation between welfare and culture in Sweden. Analyzing both newspapers' reporting and the party leaders' speeches pertaining to these events, Edenborg argues persuasively that the circulation of the "migrants' sexual violence" trope engendered a bordering practice, implicitly or explicitly supporting the stricter border regime introduced in November 2015. The idea of "endangered gender equality" was part of a securitization process whereby immigration was portrayed as an existential threat to the Swedish welfare model, which effectively closed off the possibility to argue for a return to previously more generous asylum policies.

Focusing on Hungary, a country where welfare chauvinism and anti-immigrant rhetoric is a mainstay of the public debate, Katherine Kondor and Mark Littler examine in Chap. 8 the uses of nostalgia in the construction of national identity for the purpose of far-right organizing. Kondor and Littler scrutinize several Hungarian organizations, both from the more traditional far-right movement and the Hungarian chapter of the Generation Identity network, with their heavily anti-immigration rhetoric. To grasp the politics of culture at work among various Hungarian far-right organizations, she analyzes both the identities of these organizations as well as indepth interviews with far-right activists. Kondor and Littler argue that what these far-right organizations have in common is a nostalgic longing for a time when Hungarians were "pure", before interaction and integration with their European neighbors. This nostalgia is simultaneously mixed with the seemingly contradictory belief in the importance of Christianity and Christian values in the construction of Hungarianness.

Concentrating in turn on the German context, Andreas Önnerfors scrutinizes in Chap. 9 how important a role the sentiments of nostalgia and melancholia play in retrogressive mobilization, particularly in the case of PEGIDA. Departing from the theoretical discussion concerning "retrotopia" (Bauman 2017) and "post-welfare nostalgia" (Pallas 2011), Önnerfors argues for an interpretive framework with the potential to inform cultural nationalism studies. From this perspective, Önnerfors discusses PEGIDA's organizational development and its ideological fuzziness, which then are used to examine two illustrative examples of PEGIDA's retrotopian performance of culture. This allows Önnerfors to address the normative conflict between civil society agency as beneficial for democracy and the rise of retrogressive forces among certain sections of society that espouse "unwanted" values from a detached vantage point.

# *1.4.3 Part III: Emancipatory Initiatives Mobilizing Beyond Politics*

The chapters reunited in this part engage in various ways to what we call "politics of hope". Politics of hope describe a symbolic move beyond party politics to focus on emancipatory initiatives from below, or to be more precise, those initiatives in civil society that deal with contentious politics revolving around the nexus of welfare and culture. These chapters concentrate on several national settings (Denmark, Finland, and Romania) as well as on "global cities" (Brussels). They do so by employing several methodological approaches, such as mixed-methods, in-depth interviews and ethnography as well as discourse analysis. The chapters offer various answers to the question of how to promote progressive politics when the sphere of party politics in a certain country is seemingly restrictive. The chapters in this part identify diverse forms of praxis across Europe. In other words, the key argument in this part is that civil society is emerging as a new political subject with claims for a progressive renegotiation of citizenship that denounces welfare chauvinism and narrow cultural retrenchment.

Focusing on the Danish context, in Chap. 10, Martin Bak Jørgensen and Daniel Rosengren Olsen analyze the development of civil society organizations (CSO), which move beyond "politics of fear" (Wodak 2015). Their analysis is set against the backdrop of a political climate built on crisis scenarios and "There is No Alternative" (TINA) politics. The chosen case study is the Danish CSO *Venligboerne*, which has carved out a space for itself in the contemporary Danish social landscape as an interlocutor amidst the broad spectrum of organizations that constitute the refugee solidarity movements (Toubøl 2017). Jørgensen and Rosengren Olsen argue compellingly that *Venligboerne*'s position in this context may be best understood as a transitional space of learning between the various positions offered by the array of organizations within the network.

Using the Finnish context to examine how the concept of civil society is reinterpreted, in Chap. 11, Camilla Haavisto analyzes the "Right to Live" collective. Consisting of Iraqi and Afghan asylum seekers and their allies, the collective protested unjust asylum processes and deportations in the center of Finnish capital city day and night for more than six months in 2017. During these protests, the collective recast the culture of gratefulness that asylum seekers in Finland traditionally have adhered to and stretched the understanding of who and what constitutes civil society. Haavisto scrutinizes the strategies used by the collective for gaining voice, visibility, and legitimacy as information sources or experts in the public sphere. She highlights the main obstacles that hinder protesting asylum seekers from being understood, contrasting the "right to be understood" (Husband 1996) with the "impossibility" of political activism led by asylum seekers (Nyers 2003).

Employing the Romanian context as an example of ongoing developments in Central and Eastern Europe, in Chap. 12, Alexandra Ana maps out the use of hope as a master frame in crystallizing support for the rising "street feminism" (Ana 2017), in opposition to the NGO-ized feminism of previous decade (Guenther 2011). NGO-ized feminism marked women's withdrawal from politics and witnessed their engagement in competition for scarce resources and the adoption of a women's empowerment discourse that was permeated by individualism and neoliberal free-market assumptions. In opposition to that, street feminism is contentious and disruptive in its form, intersectional in its stance, and engages concomitantly in different struggles for social justice, articulating an anti-capitalist critique. Ana argues persuasively that in the context of the successive financial and refugee (reception) crises, street feminism contours a politics of intersectional hope through a process of bridge-building and solidarity among forcibly evicted persons, feminist NGOs, anarchist groupings, Roma feminism, anti-racist organizations, and refugees.

In Chap. 13, with a "global city" like Brussels as their backdrop, Larisa Lara-Guerrero and María Vivas-Romero examine Latin American migrants as active civic agents participating in transnational social movement that create, transform, and exploit transnational networks in both their homelands and their hostland. Because of their emigration experience, migrants accumulate political and cultural knowledge, symbols, and have become aware of varying practices in the different settings they are active in. Lara-Guerrero and Vivas-Romero analyze how social remittances shape the way migrants develop their political and cultural repertoires of contention, constitute their social identities, and influence their political behavior, and illustrate their ideological stances and norms that are shaped by the multiple cities they have lived in. Their main finding is that Latin American migrants defend their political struggles and ideals by successfully developing and sustaining transnational fields of social and political mobilization.

Last but not least, by way of conclusion, in Chap. 14, Carlo Ruzza concentrates on the civil society formations and activities in the European political environment, arguing that we are witnessing a redefinition of the long-established ethos of inclusionary civil society groups. Certain moralized ideational constructs such as "community", "belonging", and "solidarity", which have traditionally been associated with a cosmopolitan and tolerant conception of the role of civil society, are undergoing a process of redefinition. In this context, an individualistic, nationalist, exclusionary, and socially conservative conception of civil society is emerging. Ruzza frames the contrast between these rival images of civil society as a movement–counter movement dynamic that opposes a right-wing populist and an antipopulist block. He interprets these with reference to studies of "civil" and "uncivil" society, and provides a typology of their roles and values, making useful connections between the other chapters in the present volume.

# **1.5 Conclusions**

With this volume, we offer empirical contemporary examples of how the contours of the political terrain shift in accordance with processes of societal formation in contemporary "liquid modernity" (Bauman 2012). The refugee (reception) crisis in late 2015 exposed emerging conflict lines in domestic as well as EU politics, reverberating among both societal actors arguing against immigration and those with a more positive view. The volume illustrates how parties, social movements and civil society organizations articulate their political agenda and societal endeavors by means of the narrative master frames of nostalgia and hope.

There is no readymade response to how European societies could or should act in the aftermath of these crises. The much referred-to common person in the street may well vent their frustration against elites in various contexts, but who they "really" are, and what they ultimately wish for, is contingent upon each national context and Europe as a whole. This does not by any means imply the end of ideology, as the classical ideologies are still very much alive. Conversely, these polarizing developments breed ideological battles between progressive forces and retrogressive counter-mobilizations at the intersection between the politics of culture, welfare, and migration.

On this matter, we deem that the 2015 refugee (reception) crisis serves as a turning point, and this requires a serious refinement and even profound redefinition of the analytical instruments needed for studying contemporary European societies. The focus of the present book is thus not only to what extent or if, but most importantly, how the politics of migration affect community-building in the twenty-first century. Political engagement is taking different forms of expression beyond the conventional means of doing politics and to understand the web of entanglements of the politics of culture, welfare and migration, researchers must venture past ordinary approaches to party politics and traditional cleavage structures (such as culture and welfare) and consider other types of social mobilization as well. The present volume takes a first step in this direction. Individually, the collected chapters explore how the master frames of either nostalgia or hope uphold these. To finish this introductory chapter by means of a metaphor, while acknowledging that the nostalgic winds blow into the sails of right-wing populist parties and retrogressive movements, our analyses also provide compelling evidence that these inauspicious gusts are accompanied by winds of hope brought about by vigorous emancipatory mobilizations across Europe.

# **References**


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# **Part I Right-Wing Populist Party Politics Across Europe**

# **Chapter 2 Trouble in the Homeland: How Cultural Identity and Welfare Politics Merge in Contemporary Danish and Swedish Politics**

**Anders Hellström and Mahama Tawat**

# **2.1 Introduction**

The welfare systems of Denmark and Sweden contain many similar socio-economic features. According to Esping-Andersen (1990), they are ideal examples of Social Democracy, with universal access to welfare provisions, the absence of stratification, a high level of decommodification or the extent of welfare provisions in relation to previous earnings during periods of employment, and with corporatist agreements between trade unions, employers, and the state. However, Denmark and Sweden espouse two distinctively different discourses on immigration and integration. The aim of this chapter is to analyze the conventional discourses at the intersection of welfare, culture, and immigration and determine how they are reflected in different opinion communities. Specifically, we ask what meanings are embedded in the different political discourses. What is acceptable to say in one context may not necessarily be the case in another, as the borders of what is considered normality differ.

We draw from the work of Anthropologist Claudia Strauss (2012), whose relevant book, *Making Sense of Public Opinion*, shows how discourses disseminated in opinion communities are built around distinctive cultural schemas. In other words, they are "simplified understandings" (Strauss, p. 17) about the historical heritage of the nation—of what immigrants are like, how they behave, what preferences they

A. Hellström (\*)

Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare, Malmö University, Malmö, Sweden e-mail: anders.hellstrom@mau.se

M. Tawat Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russian Federation

Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare, Malmö University, Malmö, Sweden

O. C. Norocel et al. (eds.), *Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41694-2\_2

have, and how they comprehend gender relations. Our empirical materials are drawn from the government policy strategy, "Culture for All: Culture in the Whole Country" (*Kultur for alle: Kultur i hele landet*), the Cultural Canon (*Kultur Kanon*), and the Danish Canon (*Danmark Kanon*) as well as the parliamentary debate on the government bill in Sweden called Culture for All (*Kultur för alla*). In Denmark, decision-making in cultural policy rests upon the incumbent government and is not routinely debated in parliament; thus, the formats of our selected materials differ.

In addition to examining the aforementioned empirical materials, we explore the Facebook community of Martin Henriksen, who is a high-ranking official of the right-wing populist Danish People's Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*, DF) and was an elected member of parliament (Folketing) for the Danish People's Party between 2005 and 2019. In the Swedish case, we examine the blog community of Therese Borg, a prominent member of the anti-immigration, right-wing populist party, Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*, SD). Borg was a member of the municipal council of Klippan, a small town in southern Sweden, and is a member of the party's executive committee. The chapter proceeds as follows: The following section gives a background to the development of political discourses on immigration in Denmark and in Sweden. Section two elaborates on the conceptual framework, while section three gives an analysis of the policy arena in Denmark and Sweden. This is followed by an analysis of the blogospheres in Denmark and Sweden.

# *2.1.1 Background*

At the end of the nineteenth century, Sweden and Denmark were countries of emigration primarily to North America. However, the extent of this emigration was far less in Denmark than in Sweden, where it is estimated that approximately one-fifth of the population emigrated to the United States in the late decades of the nineteenth century (Hellström 2016: 34). In 1930, Sweden became a country of net immigration far earlier than Denmark. Also, after the Second World War, with a booming economy and gaping labor shortages in their industries, labor migrants became the main component of immigration in both countries. However, with a decline in economic and industrial growth and the outbreak of the Oil Crisis, Sweden and Denmark stopped labor immigration respectively in 1972 and 1973. Thereafter, the two countries witnessed the progressive increase in the number of refugees and their families fleeing conflict or dictatorships from Eastern Europe, certain parts of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The numbers peaked during the Iran–Iraq wars in the 1980s, the wars in former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, and Kosovo in the late 1990s.

The recent peak in 2016 is related to the Syrian conflict that, in the summer 2015, forced more than one million refugees to seek abode in Europe, mainly Germany and Sweden. In contrast to Denmark—which, in the 1990s and most notably the early 2000s, moved with many other European countries toward the implementation of stricter policies regarding immigration, integration, and citizenship—Sweden went in the opposite direction.

Swedish exceptionalism ended on 12 November 2015, when the government enacted temporary border and ID controls between Denmark and Sweden to stem the influx of Syrian refugees. On 24 November of the same year, the government proposed a temporary law that would give all successful asylum seekers temporary rather than permanent residency. The legislation officially came into effect on 20 July 2016, and Sweden thereby lowered its standards to the EU level (Bevelander and Hellström 2019). Today, the proportion of immigrants in the Swedish population in 2019 was is 19,6% (SCB 2019), whereas in Denmark, the corresponding figure is 13% (Statistik Denmark 2019).

# **2.2 Multiculturalism in the Welfare State**

Sweden adopted multiculturalism as its official policy in the early 1970s. Its first state cultural policy and first immigrant integration policy, which were passed respectively in 1974 and 1975, made the preservation and promotion of immigrants' cultures an unequivocal matter of state policy. Defining culture in the anthropological sense, as "a way of life, including traditions, food, religion, language," (Puri 2004, p. 24),1 it was argued that immigrants' home cultures were necessary not only for their well-being but also for enriching Swedish society. Since then, these policies have been reproduced more or less in the same terms. In contrast, Denmark did not adopt such policy, although the government at that time and its successors were aware of the developments in neighboring Sweden and of the legal requirement to inform if not consult each other on policy development (Tawat 2017). However, it was not until 2006, with the official adoption of a Culture Canon highlighting the main elements of Danish culture with which immigrants were encouraged to get acquainted, that an official policy was formulated.

Given that welfare permeates every aspect of social life as a contract of rights and obligations bestowed upon citizens from cradle to grave, it has become part of the national self-image and central to cultural policy regarding immigrants. As Hellström et al. write in the introduction to this volume, welfare policies are embedded in cultural notions of how the national community should be crafted and by whom. Nevertheless, attitudes vary among the population regarding immigration. These range from welfare chauvinism (i.e. welfare for the natives) to welfare for all, which includes the appraisal of multiculturalism.

Welfare chauvinistic claims argue that multicultural policies have negative effects on the welfare state (see Norocel 2016; Schierup et al. 2006). The first effect is "crowding-out" which consists of laying focus, energy and time on "soft" issues such as the numerical representation of minorities instead of "hard issues" such as

<sup>1</sup>The other definition of *culture* is aesthetics comprising arts, cinema, library, and theatre.

economic redistribution (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, pp. 10–11). Whereas immigrants may benefit more from having equal opportunities as a result of structural change. The second effect is "corroding", where it is assumed that ethnocultural diversity undermines trust and solidarity (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, p. 11). As such, citizens are less likely to contribute to welfare schemes if they perceive that the beneficiary is not "one of them" but rather an immigrant or from a historic minority. In the same vein, it is argued that because most welfare arrangements result from reparations to historical injustices, they lead to a "politics of identity" or "politics of grievance" which undermines trust between groups. The third effect is "misdiagnosing". It is alleged that the problem of minorities is "economic marginalization not cultural misrecognition" and policies that are based on culture are inadequate to solve problems that are structural in nature (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, p. 13). For instance, multicultural education cannot alter wage differences between natives and immigrants. In our empirical analysis, we investigate the narratives around these themes in the parliamentary arena and in online communities.

# **2.3 Political and Media Narratives**

A conventional discourse synthetizes and rationalizes all the various expressions on a particular issue reflected on the group and national levels (Strauss 2012). Hellström and Nilsson refer to these as rhetorical figures (2010, p. 56). However, people sometimes hold on to a repertoire of contradicting views and positions that do not necessarily follow congruent ideological lines or logical reasoning. As Pettersson explains, individuals do not identify with a congruent set of identity positions throughout life but rather often adopt contradictory points of identification. Class background, social milieu, formative experiences, gender, and ethnic affiliations spin a complex tapestry of identities (2017, pp. 35–36). From these data, one can find two types of discourse:

• Discourses from the policy arena.

In the Danish case, we examine the content of Culture for All (*Kultur for alle*), a policy enacted on 2 December 2009 by Culture Minister Carina Christensen (2008–2010), the Danish Cultural Canon published in 2006 by Brian Mikkelsen, Culture Minister for Denmark from 2001–2008 and the Danish Canon formulated by Bertel Haarder, Culture Minister from 2015 to 2016. As stated, the Danish mode of policymaking has often consisted of speeches to the Danish parliament (*Folketing*) or public statements. Some ministers launched elaborate policy projects, but these were not always debated in the parliament. In the Swedish case, we analyze the debate on the government bill, Culture for All (*Kultur för alla*), which has the same title as its Danish equivalent examined previously and which was held on 23 February 2017.

Katarina Pettersson (2017, pp. 40–44) explains that blogging is an essential technique for promoting nationalist and anti-immigration ideas:

Blog entries provide useful insights into the rhetoric used by representatives of antiimmigrant parties, their followers, and other audiences. The opportunities to comment on the posts enable interaction and foster political mobilization. Together, these claims constitute a particular opinion community. Claims are delivered in the form of emotionally engaging stories or narratives through vivid powerful images.

The blog community serves as a platform for the dissemination of ideas and political participation by means of the collaborative and interactive features (Pettersson 2017, p. 10). In the communication, the position of mediator (such as journalists) connecting the sender and the receiver is eradicated (Hellström 2016, pp. 69–74). Mazzoleni and Bracciale (2018) have shown that mainstream policy claims and the mode of communication are disseminated in social media.

We study posts by Martin Henriksen of the Danish People's Party (DF) and Therese Borg from the Sweden Democrats (SD), including the comments made by their followers on matters pertaining to culture and welfare. Martin Henriksen of the DF is a member of the executive committee of his party. He was the DF representative on Immigration and Integration, and representative for the Danish minority in the German region of Schleswig-Holstein, which was lost in the aftermath of the 1864 Danish–German war. He has been a member of corresponding select committees when he was member of the *Folketing*. His Facebook page2 has a significant number of active followers, and he oftentimes engages in discussions with them. Therese Borg is a member of the SD party executive board and holds a chair in the local municipal council in Klippan, a town situated in the south of Sweden (although she recently stepped down from this post). She published frequently on her blog,3 and during the analyzed period, she was a chairperson on the party's national board. Her opinions and views are meaningful because they represent a bridge between the official politics of the SD and the views held by its sympathizers. We searched three sections on Borg's blog page associated with welfare issues. Each section included a number of replies from the public. These were Work/Unemployment Insurance Fund/Social Assistance (*Arbete*/*A-Kassa*/*Försörjningsstöd*) (five replies); Health, Medical Treatment and Patient Safety (*Hälso- och sjukvård, patientsäkerhet*) (20 replies); and Culture and Leisure (*Kultur och fritid*) (30 replies). In total, there were 635 blog entries.

<sup>2</sup> https://www.facebook.com/Martin-Henriksen-1604502423155684/

<sup>3</sup> https://thereseborg.wordpress.com/

# **2.4 Analysis of the Policy Discourse in Denmark**

The policy discourse in Denmark on multiculturalism in the welfare state has been marked by criticism of its corroding effects more than its crowding out and misdiagnosing effects. That is, multiculturalism causes fragmentation and thus poses a threat to social cohesion and the sustainability of the welfare system. Following the center-right liberal-conservative victory in the November 2001 Danish general elections, the new liberal Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, appointed Brian Mikkelsen, from the conservative Party as Minister in charge of Culture. One of Mikkelsen's first actions was to lay down the Cultural Development Fund, set up by the Social Liberal Party in 2002. It was the only public institution that aimed to fund immigrants' cultural productions, although it was largely unsuccessful in achieving this goal. The institution's budget of DKK 5 million was re-allocated (Danish Ministry of Culture 2002). Then in 2006, Mikkelsen gathered seven committees headed by a lead expert and coordinated by Professor Jørn Lund with the purpose of formulating a canon of Danish culture (Kultur Ministeriet 2010). The canon was said to represent Danish culture. Its goals were to "serve as a compass showing the directions and milestones in Denmark's long and complex cultural history; serve as a platform for discussion and debate; provide reference points and awareness of what is special about Danes and Denmark in an ever more globalized world; and strengthen the sense of community by showing key parts of our common historical possessions"4 (Duelund 2009). Four months later at the Conservative Party annual conference, he returned to his initial argument that multiculturalism has corroding effects on the society that follows from immigration flows from Muslim countries "…when immigrants from Muslim countries refuse to recognize the Danish culture and European norms. In the midst of our own country, it is becoming a parallel society in which minorities practice their medieval norms and undemocratic ways of thinking" (Mikkelsen 2005).

The speech stirred strong reactions amongst the public. Lund asked for a clarification, and two members of the canon-drafting committee threatened to resign (Andersen 2005). The topic of what distinguishes Danish culture in relation to "Muslim culture" became a topic of controversy, and many felt the need to engage in critical dialogue with him. The newspaper *Politiken* quoted him as saying that "Yes, [Danish culture] is better. Yes. I am a declared opponent of value relativism because I think something is better than another" (Andersen 2005). A month later, in an interview to the newspaper *Berlingske Tidende*, he fully reinstated his claim that the canon was part of the fight to preserve Danish culture (Petersen 2006).

Published in 2006, the final canon project consisted of 96 items. Each of the following sectors was represented by 12 works: art, architecture, photography, design, sculpture, film, literature, and theatre. There were 24 works in the music sector, among which 12 were classical music pieces and 12 were popular music pieces. A Canon for children's culture was unveiled as well. A special website (www.kulturkanon.kum.

<sup>4</sup> https://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/compendium-topics.php?aid=149

dk), a booklet, and teaching materials on the Canon were made available in schools and public libraries. None of these works was authored by a non-Western immigrant or anyone who embodied the immigrant experience. The only work which referred to non-Western culture was Aladdin and the Wonderful Lamp (*Aladdin, eller den forunderlige lampe*), a portrait of Aladdin dating from 1805 and made by the artist Adam Oehlenschläger (1779–1850). The Canon well illustrates the discursive context in which the contemporary rhetoric on immigration is framed and is an example of the politics of assimilation (Banting and Kymlicka 2006). The conventional discourse encompasses the view that *Danish culture is unique and reflects a unique people*.

Since the initial policy change initiated by Mikkelsen, there has been remarkable continuity in Danish policy and politics, as shown by two of the ministerial policies that followed. The conventional discourse is thus to *enable assimilation*. However, this continuity has not been fluid but rather incremental in nature. Carina Christensen, a Conservative People's Party (*Det Konservative Folkeparti*, K) minister in charge of culture between 2008 and 2010 sought with her policy program Culture for All (*Kultur for alle*) published on 2 December 2009 to widen access to the Cultural Canon produced by Mikkelsen. A former culture spokesperson for her party between 2001 and 2005, Christensen wrote in the foreword of the policy document that:

There is a threat to cohesion in our community if we do not uphold a picture of our common history and cultural heritage; if we only have a uniform picture of the world that surrounds us; if we lose the desire and the ability to speak sensibly with those who we disagree with – yes we can. Democracy and community will not survive in the long run. But when we know our culture and cultural heritage in its diversity, it is the opposite that occurs. (Christiansen 2009, p. 4)

Another rhetorical element underpinning this conventional discourse emphasizes the uniqueness of Danish culture in a turbulent world. In insecure times, facing globalization, the national culture is not only needed, it must also *be safeguarded and made available to all Danes. New Danes (immigrants) must also adhere to it*.

The second policy program, the Denmark Canon published on 12 December 2016 by Bertel Haarder (2015–2016), a former Minister for Refugees, Immigrants and Integration (2001–2005) for the center-right Liberal Party added a social welfare dimension and arguably a bottom-up perspective. With much sophistry, it set out with the question, "Which social values, traditions or movements that have shaped us in Denmark will you carry through to tomorrow's society?" This question aimed "to raise awareness about the historical and cultural social values, traditions and events that have particularly shaped society and people in Denmark" (www. danmarkskanon.dk).

From the responses offered by 2425 respondents, ten main values ranked by order of importance were identified: (1) the welfare society; (2) Freedom, namely individual freedom; (3) trust; (4) equality before the law; (5) gender equality; (6) the Danish language; (7) associations and voluntary work; (8) liberality/tolerance; (9) hygge "a special way of being together in a relaxing, nice atmosphere"; and (10) Christian heritage or "charity and the Protestant thoughts about the importance of work, the personal responsibility and the equality of all people to God". An information campaign was launched in relation to this, which included roundtable

discussions at festivals as well as on radio and TV programs and an online digital platform called Denmark Canon (www.danmarkskanon.dk; #Dkkanon).

Clearly, if one understands these policies as not only continuous but also incremental as it appears, it appears that, similarly to Sweden, the welfare state ranks highest in the world of Danish politicians. Regarding this link between the Danish welfare system and Danish culture and the alleged threats that globalization and immigration pose to its sustainability, the national culture and not multiculturalism is viewed as the ferment needed for its preservation. Consequently, this national culture must be reactivated and broadly diffused. National culture here is coterminous with national identity. The latter is considered as a pillar for cohesion that is essential for the (sustainability) of the welfare system. As the Denmark Canon website states, "The purpose of the canon is also to make it clearer what creates our national identity and cohesion" (www.danmarkskanon.dk). As shown herein, this policy development is used and followed by the mainstream parties in Denmark. In other words, the rhetoric of the DF is embedded in mainstream political discourse in Denmark, whereas in the Sweden, the views of SD stir up emotions and are heavily challenged by the other parliamentary parties, as detailed in the following section.

# **2.5 Analysis of the Policy Discourse in Sweden**

The parliamentary debate on the policy proposal, Culture for All (*Kultur för alla*), took place in the Swedish parliament on 23 February 2017. In this debate, representatives from all the parties in parliament participated with 32 contributions to the debate. In general, the speakers did not tackle culture in abstract ways but rather focused on practical matters. In the initial phase of the debate, culture was connoted with art, museums, and classical music. Thereafter, it shifted to values, heritage, and traditions. The conventional discourse identified was that *culture is an engine for the society's development, and welfare sustainability but is removed from citizens' day-to-day concerns.*

In the first statement, Marie-Louise Rönnemark from the governing Social Democratic Party (*Socialdemokratiska arbetarparti*, SAP) held up culture as the engine of society. Rossana Dinamarca from the Left Party (*Vänsterpartiet*, V) emphasized the importance of having a national culture that represents all the people living in Sweden today. The way into "culture" for her was through diverse avenues, such as, via hip-hop and not merely through official channels such as classical music. Patriarchal structures, class divisions, and structural racism inhibit people from sharing a common national culture made up of various currents. In her view, culture is about democracy, and the "free market" cannot guarantee a "culture for all". Conversely, the representative of the Liberal Party (*Liberalerna*, L), Bengt Eliasson, made the point that the state should not decide what culture is or should be on a local level.

This notwithstanding, the intersection between culture and welfare became apparent when Aron Emilsson, the SD speaker for religious matters and the preservation of national heritage took the floor. In his statements, he linked culture to society at large and not solely to practical matters. In line with his party's position, he suggested a cultural canon inspired by Denmark: "If Denmark can do it so can we". He further remarked that "There are five Nordic countries, which have a lot in common. We share the same cultural sphere". In this statement, culture is not merely "crowded out" as a soft issue. Immigration was seen as not only problematic because it increases competition for immigrants on the lower end of the labor market, but also, in this debate, as foremost associated with corroding effects, although this position was opposed by the other parties' representatives.

Marie-Louise Rönnmark (SAP) explained that culture knows no boundaries, and it is despicable to only grant ethnic Swedes free entrance to libraries, museums, and invite them to a joint discussion on what comprises Swedish values. Niclas Malmberg from the Green Party (*Miljöpartiet de gröna*, MP) remarked that when "Old Swedish" is prioritized, you risk neglecting all the important international influences that have shaped who we are. Per Lodenius, spokesperson for the Centre Party (*Centerpartiet*, C) on cultural affairs, emphasized that culture is an important aspect of social life and a stimulus for civic participation. Lars-Axel Nordell from the Christian Democratic Party (*Kristdemokraterna*, KD) stated that culture is a meeting point for organizations and individuals in civil society.

The views of political representatives diverged along the left/right ideological spectrum on the connotations of culture, how much influence the state should have on local cultural practices, and what culture should be. However, everyone (except the representative from the right-wing populist SD) agreed that cultural policies should be reflective of all the diverse layers of the population in Sweden, including immigrants, and not only, those residing in the urban areas, for example. The conventional discourse is thus to *facilitate integration among diverse parts of the people living in Sweden*. The intersection between welfare and culture gave way to more abstract discussions about how social cohesion can best be fostered, especially in insecure times, and how unity in terms of a common identity and history must be emphasized. The discussion of the Danish cultural canon mooted by the SD representative became the focus of deliberations. This is also reflected in the blogosphere, as analyzed in the following sections.

# **2.6 Analysis of the Blogosphere in Denmark**

Martin Henriksen's Facebook page has a high "view rate". It has a significant number of followers (26,412 as of 10 July 2019) and "Likes" (25,699 as of 10 July 2019). From the launch of his page on 15 July 2015 until 11 July 2019, he wrote eight posts on welfare, which our search with the keyword "*velfærd*" uncovered. Each of his posts has had no less than 200 "likes" and none had gone unanswered. Their lines of argumentation reveal strong similarities with Therese Borg's blog (see next section). The conventional discourse – that Denmark cannot afford multiculturalism – exalts welfare chauvinism. Immigration is viewed as a zero-sum game for the welfare state, notably for its financial sustainability and pensioners' well-being. In one post from 16 March 2017, Henriksen writes that:

DF's policy works! In the election campaign, we promised to work to tighten up the asylum system so that we get fewer asylum seekers to the country – and thus can spend more money on welfare instead. Last year, far fewer asylum seekers came to Denmark than expected, and thus there are now DKK 400 million more in the treasury, which can be used for welfare, among other things. We are continuing the fight to implement more *udlændingestramninger* so that we can get asylum numbers much lower and more money for welfare. Just like we promised before the election. Do you agree with DF that Denmark needs far more immigration restrictions and a strengthened and permanent border control so that we can get more money for welfare?5

In another post drawn from his opinion piece in the newspaper *Berlinske Tidende* (Henriksen 08 November 2017) with the title "*Drop snakken om velfærd vs skattelettelser – her er det vigtige spørgsmål!*" (Drop talk about welfare vs tax cuts – here's the important question!), Henriksen writes that immigration is the biggest threat to the welfare system. Alongside many grievances, he cites a report from the Ministry of Finance according to which non-Western immigration has cost DKK 33 billion in 2014.6 The most popular reaction among readers is that of A.D. (anonymized) with 41 replies. It deals with the introduction halal food in "*dagis*" (nursery schools). A.D. writes:

that we, as Danes, have to forego our culture to take care of Muslims and therefore we are happy to remove pork in the institutions. It is simply absurd that such a religion should dictate what is right and wrong in Denmark. Totally absurd and more absurd it becomes when Christians are more or less forced to eat food blessed in the name of an idol. It's called idolatry.7

In an image that Henriksen posted on his Facebook profile on 31 May 2017, it is stated that stopping asylum will release enough money to increase old-age pension by DKK 11000 (about € 1474). Henriksen's argument is that it is not possible to both fund the welfare state for pensioners and cater to immigrants' needs.8

Conversely, as we found out in the study of Swedish politicians' conventional discourses, which we discussed in the previous section, issues concerning the welfare state are dissociated from those of multiculturalism. Multicultural policy, discourse, and even its adverse effects mentioned before are not discussed. Multiculturalism is a non-starter. For example, in another image featuring Henriksen

<sup>5</sup> https://www.facebook.com/pg/Martin-Henriksen-1604502423155684/posts/?ref=page\_internal <sup>6</sup> https://www.facebook.com/pg/Martin-Henriksen-1604502423155684/posts/?ref=page\_internal

<sup>7</sup> https://www.facebook.com/1604502423155684/photos/a.1607823059490287/ 2138790309726890/?type=3&theater

<sup>8</sup> https://www.facebook.com/1604502423155684/photos/a.1622432261362700/ 2297663740506212/?type=3&theater

posted on 03 September 2018, [Muslim] immigrants are urged to "throw away the [Muslim] scarf and join Denmark". It is accompanied by the following text:

Danish People's Party has launched a new nationwide campaign. The Danish People's Party would like people with an immigrant background to become part of Denmark. *but it requires personal effort to adopt Danish culture and join the society.* It has always been so. Agree? Please share.9

The same image was used in a subsequent post from 1 May 2019 in which Henriksen wrote:

In the latest edition of Sports Illustrated there is a woman wearing the Muslim scarf. It rightly creates a lot of debate. Read the following: https://ekstrabladet.dk/nationen/megasmuk-muslimsk-model-skaber-debat-jeg-forstaar-det-ikke/7615648. Unfortunately, there is still a good reason to make sure that the Muslim scarf does not belong in neither a Western nor Danish context. It's a totalitarian, misogynist and actually also a symbol of hostility against men. It is simply incompatible with Danish culture and the world heritage that Denmark rests on. Agree? Please share.10

Unlike other posts, there was a strong pushback by visitors against this post. Most reactions oppose Henriksen's statement with an equally harsh tone. They defend the freedom of women to choose what to wear and relate the idea to totalitarianism, fascism, and even Nazism. The DF is accused of focusing on an issue of little importance.11 This indicates the presence of a growing counter-movement to radical ideas in the Danish blogosphere.

# **2.7 Analysis of the Blogosphere in Sweden**

The welfare state requires cultural conformism to distribute resources evenly in the population, indicative of the *corroding* effects of migration. In one entry on a recent proposal on enhancing social cohesion in the local community, it is apparent that Therese Borg and the SD would like to enhance the integration of citizens in the national community. The ambition is hampered by the fact that the society cannot guarantee support for its native citizens, and the non-natives are either culturally alienated or alienated in terms of welfare (or both) from the rest of the society12 (Borg 09 November 2011). According to her, the reason is "mass immigration". Native pensioners and the poor should be helped before we help "the others"; hence, we need to maintain stable welfare institutions in the national community.

<sup>9</sup> https://www.facebook.com/1604502423155684/photos/a.1607823059490287/ 2138790309726890/?type=3&theater

<sup>10</sup> https://www.facebook.com/1604502423155684/photos/a.1607823059490287/ 2282498652022721/?type=3&theater

<sup>11</sup> https://www.facebook.com/1604502423155684/photos/a.1607823059490287/ 2282498652022721/?type=3&theater

<sup>12</sup> https://thereseborg.wordpress.com/2011/11/09/som-man-fragar-far-man-svar/

In the lines of argumentation, the conventional discourse is that *natives should be helped first (pensioners and the poor)*. The SD has brought this to the forefront of politics many times. In Borg's view, many are waking up, albeit slowly, to the notion that they had been clinging on to idealistic dreams13 (Borg 12 June 2011). Immigration costs the society more money than it is actually worth. In order to maintain trust in the welfare institutions, society cannot sponsor divergent cultural practices. In a discussion on boys' circumcision, associations are made between other cultures and the mistreatment of boys. In a blog entry comment, B.A. (anonymized) says, "this hatred cannot be ignored, neither can the violence. In our roughest city districts such as Rosengård, Rinkeby, and Lövgärdet, Bagdad-style gang culture is alive"14 (Borg 22 November 2011).

The alleged crisis of the welfare state is a recurrent topic. Statements are made about local health center closures, while those higher up in the hierarchy misuse money. Many blog posts are concerned with welfare cuts, criticizing welfare money being spent on illegal immigrants instead. Poor students (who are deemed most deserving of help) are pitted against illegal immigrants (who are deemed not entitled to welfare privileges). Much space is devoted by Borg to the SD proposal for estimating the costs of multiculturalism. The conventional discourse is that *We cannot afford multiculturalism*. The differences between cultures are explicit with those who comment on her blog, while the actual blog entries communicate the same message in line with the basic tenets of neo-racism but with slightly less vigor (Hellström 2016).

Other common themes in her blog entries are sexual harassment and healthcare. Typically, these are reports on doctors of immigrant background who offend their female patients15 (Borg 30 July 2011). Concerns are voiced regarding the lack of efficient communication between the immigrant doctor and the native patient16 (Borg 17 May 2011; see also Edenborg Chap. 7, in this volume). The argument is that the immigrants lack proper language training. The political claim being made in that blog post is that more native doctors should be employed or trained. Such examples are taken as a proof that the natives and the immigrants cling to different gender ideologies. In another blog post, Borg stresses the need to encourage immigrant girls to play soccer. Replies by her readers cite, more explicitly, cultural differences as the reason for their low participation rate17 (Borg 14 March 2012).

In her view, multiculturalism represents the opposite of solidarity and joint values. Instead of multiculturalism, Swedes must learn to appreciate their own culture. The conventional discourse is that "*Culture should be for everyone and not divided* 

<sup>13</sup> https://thereseborg.wordpress.com/2011/06/12/over-50-av-invandrarna-ar-beroendeav-socialbidrag/

<sup>14</sup> https://thereseborg.wordpress.com/2011/11/22/motion-om-omskarelse-av-pojkar/

<sup>15</sup>https://thereseborg.wordpress.com/2011/07/30/interpellationsdebatt-med-anledning-av-en-lakares-sexuellaovergrepp-mot-patienter/

<sup>16</sup> https://thereseborg.wordpress.com/2011/05/17/tre-nya-motioner-inlamnade-i-landstinget/

<sup>17</sup> https://thereseborg.wordpress.com/2012/03/14/invandrarflickors-laga-deltagandebehover-utredas/

*among different sections in society, rather it must be framed as one national culture*". Governmental policies are harshly criticized. It is alleged that Sweden is run by a coalition of bourgeois parties with an elitist view on culture. Instead of provocative art, cultural politics should be about cherishing what native culture has created through generations and what the common man appreciates18 (Borg 9 November 2011).

Several blog posts are about the exhibition "Thou Ancient, Thou Free", the de facto Swedish national anthem (*Du gamla du fria*), concerning Swedish culture, curated by the Eskilstuna Museum. In this discussion, the most prevalent opinion was that celebrating midsummer is more Swedish than celebrating Ramadan. Borg suggested that most of the Swedish population agrees on this point19 (Borg 25 February 2011). The conventional discourse thus says that "*Our common cultural heritage is important to recognize*".

# **2.8 Conclusions**

Our analysis has revealed that the discourses on immigration, culture, and welfare and their embedded meanings in Denmark and Sweden share some similarities, and certainly, some important differences as well. They are similar in that they both emphasize the importance of culture for societal cohesion and the sustainability of the welfare state in insecure times. However, they differ in that assimilation is a mainstream policy in Denmark but not to the same extent in Sweden, as illustrated in the following Table 2.1.

To argue for assimilation is accepted wisdom in Denmark, while in Sweden, the focal point is on multiculturalism. The borders of normality are not the same. Politicians in Sweden have been preoccupied with practical concerns regarding dayto-day access to cultural goods. Although they show concern about the negative effects of social fragmentation, this is to a lesser extent than their Danish counterparts. While in Denmark, ethnocultural diversity is seen as antithetic to social cohesion across the political landscape, in Sweden, opinions vary along ideological lines. However, when the refugee crisis struck in autumn 2015, Sweden's immigration policy became more restrictive and less generous: Border controls on the Öresund Bridge were introduced and asylum rights were lowered to the EU minimal requirements (Law 2016: 752). Nevertheless, this has not dented Sweden's reputation as a generous country for refugees, alongside Germany. This is because, although Sweden has restricted its immigration policy, it has not changed its integration policy to a significant extent and the changes are not seen on the ground.

The conventional discourse among established parties in Denmark is accentuated in the blogosphere. Online strategies correlate with mainstream policies; for

<sup>18</sup> https://thereseborg.wordpress.com/2011/11/09/som-man-fragar-far-man-svar/

<sup>19</sup> https://thereseborg.wordpress.com/2011/02/25/du-gamla-du-fria/


**Table 2.1** Summary of conventional discourses

example, the argument that society cannot afford multiculturalism is explicit and sometimes expressed in vulgar terms. Also, the claim that the promotion of ethnocultural diversity can counter patriarchy or racism is ridiculed. The same goes for the recognition of minority groups' rights. Conversely, these expressions rest on the notion of a fixed national heritage in need of urgent preservation, and the revalorization of the national culture is considered a powerful response. This is manifest in the implementation of cultural and normative canons, and similar expressions are found in the Swedish blogosphere. However, our examination shows that what is tacitly agreed upon in mainstream Danish politics is widely contested in Swedish politics. Only time will reveal the right and probable path ahead.

# **References**

Andersen, C. (2005, 28 September). Kanon-medlemmer truer med at gå. *Politiken*. http://politiken. dk/kultur/ECE124540/kanon-medlemmer-truer-med-at-gaa/. Accessed 28 Mar 2018.


**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **Chapter 3 The Discursive Denial of Racism by Finnish Populist Radical Right Politicians Accused of Anti-Muslim Hate-Speech**

**Katarina Pettersson**

# **3.1 Introduction**

The European Union has experienced turbulent times lately: it is being abandoned by Britain, one of its members since 1973; it has received more than one million refugees and asylum-seekers from war-laden countries in the Middle-East and Africa; and it has experienced multiple attacks of brutal terrorism. Concomitantly, so-called "established" political parties have seen their positions threatened by radical right wing political parties that have managed to appeal to the electorates with promises of a return to a nostalgic past of national and cultural unity and safety.

This chapter will look at one consequence of these happenings by delving into the context of Finland, in Europe's Northeastern corner. The background of this study may be traced back to the autumn of 2015 when, due to the "refugee crisis", Finland received more than 32,000 asylum-applications – a number ten times greater than during previous years. Like elsewhere in Europe, the Finnish public and political debate hardened, and hate-speech and hate-related crime rates rose with more than 50% during that year (Tihveräinen 2015). In the majority of cases, the hatred was directed at a particular group: Muslims.

Unlike many other European countries Finland, however, did not see a sudden rise in electoral support for populist radical right parties. The reason is simple: it had already happened. The Finns Party (*Perussuomalaiset*/*Sannfinländarna*) had risen from a marginal to a major political actor already through their remarkable triumph in the Finnish 2011 parliamentary elections. The success continued in the subsequent 2015 elections, when the party entered the national government for the first

K. Pettersson (\*)

Swedish School of Social Science, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland e-mail: Katarina.pettersson@helsinki.fi

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2020 35

O. C. Norocel et al. (eds.), *Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41694-2\_3

time. Thus, and even though the Finns Party had and still would manage to harden the Finnish asylum-policy, the party was regarded responsible for the management of the 2015 crisis, and consequently saw its voters abandon it.

The Finns Party was never a unanimously xenophobic party, but rather, it was divided into two camps. Its "moderate" faction, led by the party's popular and charismatic leader Timo Soini, carried on the legacy of its predecessor the Finnish Rural Party (*Suomen maaseudun puolue*/*Finlands landsbygdsparti*), claiming to stand up for the "vulnerable", ordinary people. Its more radical faction, championed by the internationally (in)famous Jussi Halla-aho, was outspokenly hostile towards immigration and multiculturalism in general, and the influence of Islam, in particular, and set a "return" to a homogeneous nation-state at the forefront of the party's agenda. In June 2017 the Finns Party elected Halla-aho as party-leader, with the consequence that the party split into two: the Halla-aho-led Finns Party, on the one hand, and the "Soini-faithful" Blue Future (*Sininen tulevaisuus*/*Blå framtid*), on the other.

During the twenty-first century, members of Halla-aho's faction of the Finns Party have been involved in racist scandals, and many have been charged and convicted of criminal hate-speech against Muslims (Finnish Broadcasting Company 2017). The Finns Party leadership had long been in an uncomfortable position in terms of how to handle such cases: on the one hand, it had to maintain its distance from racist crimes, but on the other, it had to keep satisfied the significant proportion of its supporters that voted precisely for the party's radical members (Horsti 2015). When responding to accusations of racism in the media, the party displayed an ambivalent stance on racism, combining submissive and confrontational strategies, thus striving to please their moderate as well as their radical voters (Hatakka et al. 2017; Norocel et al. 2018).

The present chapter approaches the intriguing position of the Finns Party (at the time it was still one unified party) and racist hate-speech, by looking at how three of its members who were prosecuted for hate-speech against Muslims during the "refugee crisis" accounted for their actions. Analyzing the Facebook-accounts of these politicians, this chapter asks whether and how they sought to deny that they had incited to racial hatred. In so doing, it pays special attention to the ways in which the concepts of hope and nostalgia, on the one hand, and arguments related to Finnish culture and welfare, on the other, are used as discursive resources in these accounts.

# **3.2 The Denial of Racism in Radical Right Political Rhetoric**

Social scientific research has paid considerable attention to the topic of discursive denials of racism. In her analyses of a television interview with the Austrian radical right Freedom Party leader H. C. Strache's talk about an anti-Semitic caricature he had posted on his Facebook page, Ruth Wodak (2015) identified four strategies whereby Strache sought to deny that his post was anti-Semitic. These ways of racism-denial involved, first, the argument that since he had Israeli friends of his own, he cannot be anti-Semitic; second, the shifting of blame to others through claims that someone else had distorted the original caricature; third, an "act-denial", that is, the denial that the caricature actually contained visible references to Jews; and fourth, that the accusations against him were actually the product of a witchhunt on behalf of a conspiracy of political antagonists. As Wodak shows, these strategies fulfilled their purpose efficiently, as they distracted attention away from the topic of anti-Semitism, and as Strache was, in the end, freed of charges.

Research on anti-immigration political rhetoric in various country-contexts has identified rhetorical strategies that aim to protect the speaker from charges of holding racist views (see, Augoustinos and Every 2007; Billig 1988; Capdevila and Callaghan 2008). Because of societal taboos against blatant expressions of prejudice (Billig 1988), politicians are forced to come up with means of formulating views that are hostile towards ethnic or cultural minorities in ways that nevertheless allow the speakers to appear rational and non-biased.

As the example of Strache illustrates, self-defensive discursive strategies (van Dijk 1993) that protect the speaker from accusations of holding racist views are of crucial importance in the context of politics, where arguments are expressed precisely in order for the speaker to come across as trustworthy and informed, and for the sake of persuading potential voters. A classic rhetorical strategy is to disclaim racism by preceding negative views against immigrants or minorities with statements like "I am not racist, but…" (van Dijk 1992). As research for example in the UK (Goodman and Johnson 2014; Wood and Finlay 2008), France (van Dijk 1993) and Sweden and Finland (Sakki and Pettersson 2016) has shown, such denials of racism may become by further extension *reversals* thereof (van Dijk 1993). This entails that the speaker accuses immigrants and minorities of racism towards the majority population; or political antagonists – typically left-wingers – of having abandoned "the people" in favor of multicultural agendas, thus de facto succumbing to racism towards this people. Not only does such talk allow the speakers to deny and reverse racism, but also to rhetorically position themselves as "protectors" of and speaking on behalf of this "forsaken people", and providing them hope amidst the alleged threats of multiculturalism and immigrants.

Further self-defensive discursive strategies include those that seek to give a "factual", objective connotation to the given arguments. This can be done, for example, through *empiricist discourse* (Potter 1996) that establishes the nature of a claim as based upon external facts, rather than (potentially biased) personal convictions. Radical right politicians oftentimes refer to "common-sense knowledge" (Billig 1987; Capdevila and Callaghan 2008; Lynn and Lea 2003), to external "facts" and prevailing consensus (Augoustinos et al. 2002; Potter 1996; Verkuyten 2001), or to factors unrelated to issues of race and ethnicity, such as economic ones (Augoustinos et al. 1999) when justifying negative stances towards immigrants and ethnic minorities. Resistance to immigration may, for example, be warranted by depicting immigrants and asylum-seekers as entailing an excessive strain on society or exploiting the welfare system (see, Cinpoeş and Norocel Chap. 4, Hellström and Tawat Chap. 2 in this volume; Hellström and Pettersson 2020; Mudde 2007; Pettersson 2017).

Another central feature of contemporary radical right political rhetoric is its *deracialization* (Augoustinos and Every 2007), that is, the discursive removal of notions of race from this rhetoric. In such talk, rather than attributing positive versus negative features to different groups of people based upon their race, discriminatory practices towards immigrants or minorities can be warranted through arguments related to *the nation* (Reicher and Hopkins 2001; Wodak and van Dijk 2000) or to *cultural differences* (Every and Augoustinos 2007; Richardson and Colombo 2014; Verkuyten 2013). The speaker may appeal to the protection of national borders and preservation of a national identity of "the people" (van Dijk 1993; Wodak and van Dijk 2000) in order to justify restrictions on immigration and asylum-seeking. As is discussed throughout this book, such nationalist political rhetoric has surged in Europe since the 2015 refugee (reception) crisis.

Discourses where notions of race are replaced with references to *cultural* incompatibilities are illustrative of contemporary anti-Islamic discourse, where a juxtaposition is created between the "liberal, tolerant and democratic" Western, Christian or European cultures, on the one hand, and the "oppressive, intolerant and authoritarian" Islam, on the other. Such *cultural essentialist* discourse implies that since these differences are inherent, *essential* characteristics of cultures, they cannot be overcome, thus the co-existence of Western and Islamic values is by default impossible (Verkuyten 2013). This kind of talk allows the speakers to dodge accusations of racism or intolerance, first, because they may thus place themselves as explicit defenders of benevolent, liberal values (Wetherell and Potter 1992), and second, because criticism is directed at an abstract target: at Islam as a culture and ideology, not at individual Muslims (Richardson and Colombo 2014; Verkuyten 2013; Wood and Finlay 2008).

Taken together, the self-defensive discursive strategies described above, and the replacement of notions of race with talk of national protection and cultural differences, serve to construct the speaker as informed, logical and unbiased, and immigrants and asylum-seekers as deviant, inferior and/or undeserving Others (Capdevila and Callaghan 2008; van Dijk 1993). To further consolidate this positive selfpresentation, the speakers may present themselves as representing "the common people" (Mudde 2007; Pettersson 2017; Rapley 1998), protecting them and their rights from external (or internal) threats. As discussed above, the "other", that is, political antagonists, in turn, becomes accused of racism and elitism, and of having abandoned the nation and its "rightful" people in favor of immigrants and nefarious multicultural projects (see also Nissen, Chap. 6 in this volume). Such "us and them" constructions and switching of the racist label may serve particularly efficiently to portray the self as virtuous and the other as evil.

The majority of discursive work on radical right and racist political rhetoric has focused on its occurrence on party websites, in political speeches and programs, and traditional media outlets such as newspapers or television. Although the list of exceptions is growing (Burke and Goodman 2012; Pettersson and Sakki 2017) there is still a shortage of discursive research exploring radical right discourse within the sphere of the social media. Given the importance that this sphere has played for the electoral fortunes of the radical right, not least in the Nordic region (Hatakka 2017; Horsti 2015; Keskinen 2013) this is a topic that arguably needs attention. Utilizing radical right politicians' writings in the social media as empirical material entails

distinct benefits: unlike in the case of interviews, this sort of "naturally occurring" material allows the researcher to analyze discourse that the politicians have produced independently, without the involvement of journalists or researchers (Potter and Hepburn 2005). Studying politicians' writings in social media channels also makes it possible to analyze discourse that connects the politicians with their readership, and that thus constitutes an important vehicle for politicians to engage presumptive voters into political participation and debate (Baumer et al. 2011; Pettersson 2017).

This chapter aims to build upon the stream of research outlined above by exploring the ways in which three Finns Party politicians prosecuted for hate-speech against Muslims seek in their Facebook accounts to deny their guilt of racist hatred. A further aim is to relate the Finnish populist radical right politicians' strategies of denying racism towards Muslims to previous research findings, especially those of Wodak (2015) regarding the Austrian radical right party leader's denials of anti-Semitism, hoping that such a comparison may inform us about the context and typespecific versus global character of racism denials.

The chapter approaches the topic relying on work in critical discursive psychology (CDP) (Edley 2001; Wetherell 1998). The approach has its roots in the social constructionist paradigm (Burr 2003; Gergen 2009), which views reality as continuously constructed by human beings in social contexts and through social practices. CDP is a research approach that draws inspiration from both discursive (Potter and Wetherell 1987) and rhetorical (Billig 1987) psychology. CDP views the concept of discourse as a production of its historical and societal contexts (Edley 2001), as well as of its particular argumentative context, that is, it pays attention to the alternative views that the discourse is arguing against (Billig 1987). Moreover, the perspective takes into account the social and political consequences that the discursive patterns might have (Wetherell 1998). Thus, CDP allows for the critical examination of discourse at both an immediate argumentative and a broader societal level. I find the approach particularly useful for the purposes of the present study: to explore the rhetorical means whereby the Finns Party politicians accused of racist hate-speech sought to deny these accusations, and, finally, what these denials aimed to achieve in a social and political sense.

# *3.2.1 The Present Cases*

The Finnish constitution does not recognize hate-speech as such as a criminal act, but persons found guilty of incitement to racial hatred or breach of the sanctity of religion may be punished with a fine or prison sentence of up to 2 years, and 6 months, respectively (Finnish Criminal Code Chapter 11, Sections 10–11). At the time of writing, since 2004 forty-two people had been charged with such criminal hate-speech (Finnish Broadcasting Company 2017). Six of these, that is, one in seven, had been members of the Finns Party. This chapter explores three such cases that received massive public and media attention: those of Terhi Kiemunki, Teuvo Hakkarainen and Sebastian Tynkkynen. Terhi Kiemunki was at the time of her case head of the Finns Party local branch in Tampere, Finland's third biggest city, and assistant to a party Member of Parliament (MP). Kiemunki had already been publicly criticized because of her blog-writing comparing Muslim girls to witches. Hakkarainen is an MP, well known for his radical statements and involvement in racist scandals. In turn, Tynkkynen is the (now former) president of the Finns Party Youth organization, a very active and similarly radical political debater, who has become known not only for his severe criticism of Islam, but also for his vocal disapproval of the Finns Party's previous leadership.1

The three politicians were charged for their writings about Muslims in the social media – on Facebook in the case of Hakkarainen and Tynkkynen, and in her blog in the case of Kiemunki. Hakkarainen and Tynkkynen wrote their statements in July 2016, shortly after the terrorist attack in Nice, where a man of North-African origin drove a truck into a crowd, killing 86 people. Hakkarainen was charged with incitement to racial hatred because of his writings claiming: "not all Muslims are terrorists, but all terrorists are Muslim". Tynkkynen had compared the prophet Mohammed to a monster and called for the "return-mill" to start turning and removing all Muslims from Finland. The court found him guilty incitement to racial hatred and breach of the sanctity of religion. Kiemunki had been sentenced for incitement to racial hatred because of her blog-entry written in March 2016, where she had drawn an image of a future Finland where women and children are raped, "heathens" killed and mosques erected because of an Islamic invasion. None of the three politicians were expelled from the Finns Party because of their sentences,2 despite the thenparty-leader Timo Soini's earlier promise that this would be the fate of any member who engages in racist activities.

# *3.2.2 Material and Method*

The material for this study consists of Facebook-entries by Kiemunki, Hakkarainen and Tynkkynen during the months following their statements that had rendered them convicted of criminal hate-speech. The time-period stretches from March 2016 to February 2017, covering the time preceding, during, and following the politicians' trials. I selected the accounts for analysis on the basis that they involved the topic of hate-speech, racism and/or the politicians' individual cases, ending up with 38 accounts. Given the study's critical discursive psychological approach that combines both "micro" and "macro" perspectives on discourse, I went beyond the

<sup>1</sup> In the 2019 Finnish national parliamentary elections, Tynkkynen gained a seat in parliament. Later that year, he was again prosecuted for incitement to racial hatred.

<sup>2</sup> In February 2017, well after her involvement in the racist scandals, Kiemunki was expelled from the Finns Party, officially because of her "unclear financial affairs". However, Kiemunki continued her political activities in the party at local level. Tynkkynen and Hakkarainen have remained within Halla-aho's Finns Party since the party split in June 2017.

material when conducting my analyses, taking into account the potential counterarguments that the politicians sought to argue against in their discourse (Billig 1987).

My analytical procedure involved three distinct, yet intertwined stages (see: Sakki and Pettersson 2016). First, I thoroughly read the material multiple times in order to identify the *consistency* and *variability* within and between accounts in the material (Potter and Wetherell 1987). In accordance with my research interest, the patterns I sought for were the ways in which the politicians talked about racism in their Facebook-accounts. I paid special attention to the accounts wherein the politicians constructed their own positions vis-à-vis racism, distancing themselves from it. Second, I set out to explore in detail how these different versions of racist hatespeech and the concomitant denials thereof were constructed. Here, I relied on the analytical toolkit of discursive (Potter 1996; Potter and Wetherell 1987) and rhetorical (Billig 1987, 1988) psychology, striving to identify the discursive and rhetorical strategies that the politicians utilized in their denials of racism. Third, acknowledging that individuals in general – and politicians in particular – strive with their rhetoric to achieve certain actions (Billig 1987; Potter 1996), I analyzed the Facebook-accounts as part of their argumentative contexts. This entailed taking into account the broader social and political debate that the accounts sought to participate in, and importantly, what counter-positions they sought to refute. This stage involved the critical evaluation of what the politicians' discourse about racism might achieve in a social and political sense.

# **3.3 Analysis: Four Ways of Denying Racist Hatred**

Through my analyses of the politicians' Facebook accounts I identified four dominant ways in which the speakers sought to defend themselves against accusations of racist hate-speech. Through providing illustrative examples, I aim in the detailed analyses below to demonstrate the intricate rhetorical ways in which the politicians accomplished these self-defenses.

# *3.3.1 Empiricist Discourse: "Facts, Common Sense"*

The first way in which the politicians sought to deny that their statements about Muslims had been racist was to describe them, not as personal opinions, but as undisputable "facts", as in the first two extracts below wherein Kiemunki (explicitly) and Tynkkynen (implicitly) discuss their respective cases:

#### **Extract 3.1: Kiemunki, 28 November 2016**

1 2 3 4 Next Thursday the District Court will give its view on whether this text is criminal hate-speech. If the District Court sees that it is, I will take the matter to the Court of Appeal. During these current times, each of you can think about: can the truth be condemned?

#### **Extract 3.2: Tynkkynen, 24 January 2017**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 In Finland serious security-problems and the warranted concerns they cause among the citizens are dealt with through empty words, by encouraging children to denounce their parents' wrong kind of talk, and by bringing FB-accounts to court. That is not the right way. It is an untenable way, where the true problem is ignored and thereafter censored. Now I won't speak of those true problems, because the nice-speech network has been intelligent enough to manage to define a price and criminal label for the expression of opinions. Next time I have money I will talk about

10 those real problems that should be dealt with.

In both extracts above, the speakers exploit what Potter (1996) has called an *empiricist repertoire*: they present their claims as based upon objectively and collectively recognized matter-of-facts, rather than on any personal, potentially biased opinions. In Extract 3.1, the speaker uses *factual language*, maintaining that her writings had merely stated the truth (line 4). This claim is phrased in the form of a rhetorical question directed at the readership, which in the present context allows the politician's discursive self-defense to become co-constructed together with the readers. As has been shown elsewhere (Pettersson and Sakki 2017; Sakki and Pettersson 2016) this kind of collaborative talk is a specific affordance of the social media (e.g., blogs and Facebook) that allows politicians to increase a sense of mutual understanding and togetherness with the readership.

Extract 3.2 was written by Tynkkynen after he had received his sentence. He constructs his writings as statements of "true problems". Through consensual formulations (1–2) he depicts these problems as widely recognized concerns among the Finnish people, warranting why they should be discussed and dealt with. Tynkkynen accuses the "nice-speech network",3 that is, those who support his sentence, of having done their utmost to silence voices of truth like his own (7–10), thus constructing these antagonists as unjust and himself as unjustly treated. Furthermore, we can see that Tynkkynen uses his sentence (a fine) as a self-defensive discursive tool: through an ironic and martyred tone, he concludes that he cannot this time afford to comment upon the "true problems"; that is, the alleged threat that Muslims

<sup>3</sup> In Finnish, the word "kivapuhe" is an anagram of the word for hate-speech, "vihapuhe". This word was launched by the Finnish police as part of their campaign to combat hate-speech and is here ironically referred to by Tynkkynen.

entail to Finland (9–10), a formulation that consolidates his position as an innocent martyr and truth-teller.

To summarize, in displaying the politicians' statements as mere descriptions of undisputable facts and common-sense (Billig 1987), the empiricist repertoire in Extracts 3.1 and 3.2 above protects the politicians from charges of holding prejudiced views, and thus, serve to deny that the writings reveal any racist intentions. Put differently, it creates the impression that their sentences had been highly unwarranted.

# *3.3.2 Narrative and Gerrymandering the Terrain: "Own Black Friends"*

A second way in which the politicians sought to distance themselves from racism was by referring to their own black friends. This discourse echoes that demonstrated by Wodak (2015) in her analyses of Strache's denials of anti-Semitism, as illustrated in Extract 3.3 below:

#### **Extract 3.3: Tynkkynen, 30 September 2016**


In this extract, the politician discusses his upcoming trial, and accounts for his motivations for the statements about Muslims for which he was sentenced. Earlier in the Facebook-entry from which this extract derives, Tynkkynen had mentioned his own bisexuality, an identity he often makes explicit when publicly warranting his suspicion of Islamic ideology that, according to Tynkkynen, entails a lethal danger to sexual minority members. In the present context, indeed, through constructing his own previous statements against Muslims as the worries of a vulnerable minority-group member (1–2), such statements seem much better founded. Further, Tynkkynen chooses to refer to his own black friend as "living proof" of the impossibility of him being racist: a racist person could not, the reasoning goes, have black friends of his own. The extract above provides an illustrative example of how racism can be denied through a personal narrative that strategically *gerrymanders the discursive terrain* (Potter 1996), that is, that carefully selects which aspects of the self to emphasize and which ones to leave out in order to draw attention away from the topic of hate-speech against Muslims. In this way, Tynkkynen is able to construct his statements as the legitimate worries of a threatened minority-member with a multiracial friend group, not those of a radical right politician that actively resists the presence of Muslims in Finland.

# *3.3.3 Discursive Deracialization: Talk About Culture and the Nation*

In line with what research on the discursive deracialization of radical right political rhetoric has shown, contemporary Islamophobic statements are typically warranted through depicting Islam and Christian or "Western" values as inherently incompatible (Verkuyten 2013). Indeed, the politicians in the present study exploited such talk of cultural differences in order to warrant their anti-Muslim views, as illustrated in Extracts 3.4 and 3.5 below:

#### **Extract 3.4: Hakkarainen, 20 December 2016**

1 Islamists don't accept the festivities of us infidels. This is again an


#### **Extract 3.5: Tynkkynen, 14 October 2016**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Hate-speech and incitement or not, one cannot keep silent about these things [referring to a case in which a man of Iraqi origin was suspected of rape of a Finnish woman]. I'll bombard, until I hit. In some countries, a woman's life is not worth as much as a man's. Here in Oulu [speaker's home city] our women become the victims of the horrendous multicultural experiment. Islam and respect for women fit very poorly together.

In Extracts 3.4 and 3.5 above, the speakers draw an image of Islam as not only incompatible with, but in fact threatening to "our way of life", due to its implied inherent violent (Extract 3.4) and misogynist (Extract 3.5) nature. Extract 3.4 was written shortly after the terrorist attack in Berlin in December 2016, when a man of Tunisian origin drove a truck into a Christmas market, killing twelve people. The speaker uses this example to justify his claim that critique of Islam must be allowed. In this extract – as in the statement that caused his sentence – Hakkarainen smoothly places radical Islamists and Muslims in the same category. This serves to homogenize the violent behavior of terrorists to represent a threat posed by the entire Muslim community, thus discursively warranting and deracializing criticism of the latter group (Sakki and Pettersson 2016; Wood and Finlay 2008). Moreover, and resembling Extract 3.1 above, the speaker uses a rhetorical question (3) through which the meaning of the message becomes constructed together with his readership (Sakki and Pettersson 2016).

The speaker in Extract 3.5, in turn, uses another classic version of cultural essentialist discourse: he claims that Islam is inherently oppressive of women, and should therefore be resisted (see also Edenborg, Chap. 7 in this volume). The speaker makes use of metaphorical language, emphasizing that regardless of the personal risk involved (1), he will continue his "bombardment" of Islam (3) in order to

protect "our" women from the dangers of multiculturalism, expressed through the extreme-case formulation (Pomerantz 1986) "horrendous". As previous research (Mols and Jetten 2014) has shown, metaphors of struggle and battle between liberal, democratic values, on the one hand, and authoritarian ones, on the other, may serve to create an air of urgency and threat, emphasizing the need to protect the vulnerable in-group from the dangerous out-group. In this way, the politician manages to present himself as a true and brave defendant of women's rights; in contrast to Islam, and implicitly, in contrast to those who favor multiculturalism (Keskinen 2013). This leads me to the final way in which the politicians in this study sought to deny racism: through reversing it.

# *3.3.4 The Reversal of Racism*

As Teun van Dijk (1993) has proposed, perhaps the strongest way of denying racism is to "reverse" it by accusing "the other" of racism. An illustrative example of such discourse is provided in Extract 3.6 below by Kiemunki:

#### **Extract 3.6: Kiemunki, 23 November 2016**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 What makes a person become as full of hatred and bad feelings as the so-called "anti-racists" and the "tolerant" seem to be? Someday, when I have time, I will make a collage of texts that I myself would call hatespeech. It has never occurred to me to use such language about anyone, and I hope these people won't be met with hatred, because they rather need instant help to get rid of their tormenting emotions and misanthropy.

In the extract above, in order to remove her guilt of racist hate-speech, Kiemunki refers to cases that, in her own view, fulfil the criteria of such speech. Stating that she will make a collage of these statements (3–4), Kiemunki makes a discursive maximization (Potter 1996), implying that these accusations exist *en masse*. Through a contrast structure (Gill 2000/2010) between such and her own language (4–6) the politician manages to construct herself as truly innocent, in contrast to the "opponents of racism" and the "tolerant" that, ergo, are practicing racist hate-speech on a regular basis. In the context of (radical right) politics the strategy of reversing racism is especially powerful, as it removes the racist label commonly attached to the politician's own party and instead attaches it to their political opponents, whose alleged "anti-racism" thus becomes discursively rebutted (Sakki and Pettersson 2016).

Before finishing with some concluding remarks, let us turn to one final example, written by the same politician as in Extract 3.6 above. As we shall see, the extract below provides a conglomerate of the ways of denying racism outlined above, and adds further dimensions to them:

#### **Extract 3.7: Kiemunki, 20 August 2016**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Those living in the red-green bubble and calling themselves tolerant label people racist when they imagine that they don't tolerate or that they even hate every person who has even a partial foreign background or darker skin-color. Maybe such people exist, but I have not met a single one. For most people, including myself, it is a matter of (a) an intolerant and oppressive religion and culture that I don't want to get power, (b) young men who invade the country on false and wrong grounds, and ruthlessly abuse our social system, demanding and complaining, (c) the financial situation of our country and the fact that we cannot even take care of our own weakest ones, and instead take debts that coming generations will pay, and that we now use to provide a living for impostors who leave the truly distressed – children, elderly people and women – in the midst of war, (d) the Europe-wide securitythreat, terrorism, violent criminality and rapes.

The speaker in Extract 3.7 begins her statement with a powerful reversal of racism (van Dijk 1993), wherein she accuses the "allegedly tolerant people", metaphorically living in a red-green bubble (line 1) of irrationality (line 2) and anti-white hatred and discrimination (see Nissen, Chap. 6 in this volume; Sakki and Pettersson 2016; Wood and Finlay 2008). The politician implicitly includes herself in this victimized category, whose innocence she insists upon by emphasizing that she has never even met a racist person (4). In what follows, the politician discursively denies racism through cultural essentialist arguments (5–6) (Verkuyten 2013) and categorical generalizations (Every and Augoustinos 2007) about Muslims (7–9) and Islam entailing a threat to Finnish and European security (13–14). Further, the speaker draws upon a common stereotype in radical right discourse, referring to immigrants and asylum-seekers as a homogeneous category of "bogus" young men, who are only here to exploit the system (Norocel et al. 2018; Pettersson and Sakki 2017).

An explicit juxtaposition is made between "our people", the vulnerable, and these "external intruders", who are acting as parasites upon the Finnish welfare system and economic resources that, the politician contends, should be reserved for the Finnish people alone. Such welfare-chauvinist stances are indeed a common feature of radical right discourse (see Cinpoeş and Norocel Chap. 4, Hellström and Tawat Chap. 2 in this volume; Mudde 2007; Norocel 2016; Sakki and Pettersson 2016) that allows the politicians to position themselves as speaking "on behalf of the people", thus downplaying racist intentions when proposing discriminatory practices against "outsiders". The speaker presents her arguments in the pseudoscientific form of an abcd-list, and as widely shared (5), allowing her to come across as reasonable and informed (Potter 1996). Throughout this extract, the vast use of extreme-case formulations (Pomerantz 1986) such as "even hate every person" (3) and "ruthlessly abuse" (8), a rhetorically powerful dichotomy is created between the allegedly vulnerable, honest and non-racist "us", the Finns, on the one hand, and "them", political antagonists, on the other, who by engaging in anti-white racism and sanctioning the intrusion of the "dangerous and oppressive" Islam into Finland, entails the true threat to the Finnish nation and its people. Having thus removed the racist label and attached it to her antagonists, the politician is able to claim the position of the true protector of the Finnish people and identity.

# **3.4 Conclusions**

As demonstrated in the above analyses of the three Finns Party politicians' Facebook-entries, these politicians went through extensive rhetorical work in order to deny their guilt of racist hate-speech against Muslims. The analysis showed that the politicians did so in four distinct ways: first, through constructing their statements as the mere displaying of undisputable facts and common-sense (Billig 1987); second, through personal narratives and ontological gerrymandering (Potter 1996) that acted as "proof" of the politician's non-racist disposition; third, through transferring the discussion from issues about race to concern matters of cultural threats (Verkuyten 2013); and, fourth, through reversing racism to the politicians' political antagonists (van Dijk 1993). As Extract 3.7 showed, these strategies of racism denial were by no means isolated patterns, but could intermingle in the politicians' discourse, and be further strengthened by economic (Augoustinos et al. 1999) and welfare-chauvinist arguments (Mudde 2007; Norocel 2016).

As in particular Extracts 3.1 and 3.4 above illustrated, the specific context of the social media, in this case Facebook, allows the politicians to express these denials in ways in which they become the joint accomplishment of the politician and the readership. Allowing the readers to reach the conclusion about the politicians' innocence creates an air of mutual understanding, and functions in a powerful way to produce a sense of "us", the non-racist, against "them", who falsely accuse "us" of racism (Sakki and Pettersson 2016).

An interesting finding of the present study is that the denials of anti-Muslim hate-speech studied here bear notable similarities to the denials of anti-Semitism in the Austrian context (Wodak 2015). Specifically, the Finns Party politicians' accounts of their own black friends, and of their trials being nothing less than witchhunts against them by their political opponents, echoed the rhetoric of the Austrian radical right party leader. Nevertheless, my findings also highlighted aspects that were not salient in Strache's denials of anti-Semitism, such as the vast use of an empiricist repertoire (Potter 1996) and of culturally essentialist arguments. Taken together, these findings indicate that the discursive denial of racism may very well have a transnational character, regardless of the target of this racism. Yet, it also does seem to vary as a function of this target, and importantly, of the specific argumentative context in which the denial takes place.

My analysis also indicates that the Finnish politicians' discursive denial of racist hate-speech against Muslims was primarily warranted through nostalgic references to Finnish national identity, people and values; and claims that the hope of saving these rests on resisting the cultural threat posed by Islam. This finding is in line with previous research that has highlighted the centrality of cultural essentialist arguments in contemporary anti-Islamic (political) discourse (Richardson and Colombo 2014; Verkuyten 2013; Wood and Finlay 2008). Nonetheless, as the final Extract 3.7 demonstrated, such appeals could very well be intertwined with arguments about protecting the Finnish welfare system against intruding and undeserving "others" (Sakki and Pettersson 2016). It may be that denials of anti-Muslim hate-speech could rely more strongly on blending culture and welfare protectionist arguments for instance in the context of Sweden, where the notion of the "people's home" – the Swedish welfare-model – is even more heavily intertwined with constructions of an essential "Swedishness" in radical right political rhetoric (Hellström and Pettersson 2020; Hellström and Tawat, Chap. 2 in this volume; Norocel 2016; Norocel et al. 2018). Along with the comparison between the present study and that of Wodak (2015) in the Austrian setting, this chapter is a reminder of the importance of examining political discourse that aims to warrant antagonistic juxtapositions between "us" and "them" in their specific social and historical context. Only in this manner may we unpack political talk whose potentially harmful consequences are concealed under veils of anti-racist rhetorical formulations.

# **References**


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# **Chapter 4 Nostalgic Nationalism, Welfare Chauvinism, and Migration Anxieties in Central and Eastern Europe**

**Radu Cinpoeş and Ov Cristian Norocel**

# **4.1 Introduction**

Right-wing populist parties across Europe made significant inroads into main stream politics in the past couple of decades, to the point that they are actively involved in setting the political agenda in several countries (the Brexit vote in the UK, and the election of Donald Trump in the US are but two such surprising examples in this respect). Within this context, increased attention is given to the economic dimension. This is not a new aspect in the study of right-wing populism, the role played by uneven socio-economic development being highlighted by scholars conceptualizing the effects of modernization on the rise of right-wing populism (Minkenberg 2000). Nonetheless, what recent research has evidenced is a clearer understanding that a new phenomenon labelled "welfare chauvinism" has entered the language and practice of right-wing populist parties. Thus, nationalist values are promoted to derive a preferential distribution of welfare s provision, which is exclusionary on ethnic and racial grounds (see Derks 2006; Mudde 2007; Norocel 2016). In North and Western Europe, this phenomenon manifests through an ethno-centric protectionist discursive framework that highlights the need to differentiate between the "more deserving" people, which are conceived as belonging to the ethnic majority, and the undeserving "others", those who exploit the welfare system, the "scroungers", etc. – particularly immigrants who do not belong to the national group. (This is not to say that more nuanced differentiations do not exist within the

R. Cinpoeş (\*)

O. C. Norocel Institut de Sociologie, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium

Department of Gender Studies, Lund University, Lund, Sweden e-mail: cristian.norocel@genus.lu.se

© The Author(s) 2020 51

School of Law, Social and Behavioral Studies, Kingston University London, London, UK e-mail: Radu.Cinpoes@kingston.ac.uk

O. C. Norocel et al. (eds.), *Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41694-2\_4

in-group; an analysis of these distinctions, however, is beyond the scope of this study, see Keskinen et al. 2016).

Central and Eastern Europe is to a certain extent different in the way right-wing populist discourses approach the issue of welfare chauvinism, inasmuch as it displays an idiosyncratic pattern. The fall of the Berlin Wall, which symbolically marked the Soviet Union losing its grip onto the region, opened the opportunity for the accession process into the European Union (EU). This demanded of countries in the region to move past their "communist legacy" (and the welfare principles it engendered), embrace economic "shock therapy" as an expedient means to adapt to market economy, and unquestionably follow neoliberal dogma. These steps were presented as part of a symbolic "return to Europe" from a previously exterior position to the European construction, thereby confirming and consolidating these countries' national identities as European. This notwithstanding, the countries in the region are primarily countries of emigration, not in small part due to the aforesaid economic upheavals, whose citizens that emigrated westwards have consistently been subjected to right-wing populist abuse in relation to welfare (among other things) in the countries they immigrated. Instead of seeing the emergence of some sense of empathy for those forced to rely on the safety net of welfare provision, a similarly welfare chauvinistic discourse as in North and Western Europe has developed in Central and Eastern Europe, operating largely on the same basis of ethnocultural distinctions between the in-group and out-group. The main difference lies in the fact that oftentimes the out-group is formed of ethnic minorities who, due to their membership in a particular community (e.g. the Roma), were traditionally deemed to have a lesser status in relation to the ethnic majority in the respective national context. A recent addition are discriminatory discursive practices targeting immigrants (including based on welfare) that started to appear since 2015 in the context of the refugee (reception) crisis stemming out of the Syrian conflict (Mavelli and Wilson 2016).

It is on this basis, of difference and of alignment of right-wing populist discourse in Central and Eastern Europe with phenomena in North and Western Europe that our attention is focused on the previously underexplored phenomena of welfare chauvinism and emerging politics of migration in Central and Eastern Europe. Put simply, this chapter is set to examine the interplay between ideas of national culture, as cues for national specificity, and welfare chauvinist proposals, aimed at restricting welfare provision to a narrowly defined ethnic group, in the context of emerging restrictive migration policies in right-wing populist discourses in Central and Eastern Europe. For this purpose, we suggest a comparative framework to account for the various positions that such parties occupy in national politics in the region. Our analysis deals with the case of a right-wing populist party as the main governing force, such as the Law and Justice Party (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, hereinafter PiS) in Poland; the case of a right-wing populist party as a key opposition force, such as the Movement for a Better Hungary (*Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom*, Jobbik) in Hungary; and thirdly, the case of an unsuccessful right-wing populist party, such as the United Romania Party (*Partidul România Unită*, PRU) in Romania. Our qualitative analysis draws on official discourses, reflective of the various political strategies to acquiring power, as articulated by these parties. We chose 2015 as a starting point for data collection because it marks the beginning of what has come to be referred to as the "European refugee crisis" by politicians, media, and researchers alike. As such, we aim to map out the various party strategies employed, which juxtapose appeals to protecting the cultural specificity of the ethnic majorities in each country and welfare chauvinist proposals, and consequently shed light onto the culture, welfare, and migration nexus in the Central and Eastern European context.

This chapter is structured in five sections. After some methodological clarifications of our approach to the empirical material, the following section provides a theoretical discussion that situates the concept of welfare chauvinism in the context of the economic concerns exacerbated by the ongoing global economic crisis, which started in 2008. These concerns were incorporated in a particular way by radicalright populist parties, drawing on claims about a racially and ethnonationally homogenous "people", pitted against un-deserving "others" (be them ethnic minorities or migrants). The chapter discusses then the three cases in the context of historically embedded nationalist discourses, which facilitate this incorporation of welfare chauvinist appeals. The following section examines the political discourses of each of the three parties (PiS, Jobbik, and PRU). It focuses primarily on the portrayal of minorities as racially and culturally different groups that fail to share the values and work ethics of the "authentic people" represented by the ethnic majorities in each country, and to advance proposals that restrict access to welfare provision on such basis. In the final part, the study draws together these findings and concludes by suggesting that welfare chauvinism provides right-wing populist parties with an additional dimension for exclusion. It also highlights the fact that in Central and Eastern Europe, besides the exclusion of migrants on these grounds which is an aspect of more recent date (primarily emerged in the context of the recent refugee reception crisis), there exists another level of exclusions, unlike in North and Western Europe, directed at those who constitute the internal "others".

# *4.1.1 Methodological Notes*

We argue that the post-communist context provides a solid basis for construct equivalence in this cross-national comparison (on construct equivalence, see van de Vijver and Leung 1997; Moors 2004). In fact, it is precisely the difference between the parties listed above in terms of their relevance in their respective political systems that determined their selection. When judged according to the now classic differentiation of parties according to their relevance in determining a party system (Sartori 2005), we argue, PiS and Jobbik fit into the category of *relevant parties*. In turn, at least for the time being, PRU rather fits within the *irrelevant party* category.

Keeping with this classification of parties in terms of their size, and more importantly political strength, PiS can arguably be considered an appropriate illustration of a right-wing populist party whose relevance is granted and enforced by its

*governing* or *coalition potential* (Sartori 2005, pp. 107–108). PiS has consolidated its position in Polish politics in the aftermath of 2005 parliamentary elections that positioned the party in the first place (26.99% of the votes) and crafted a governing coalition with other right of center and conservative political forces that appealed to "the anxieties of transition" (Stanley 2016, p. 110). These parties were the agrarianpopulist and nationalist Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (*Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej*, SO) (11.41%) and traditionalist and right-wing nationalist League of Polish Families (*Liga Polskich Rodzin*, LPR) (7.97%). The coalition agreement addressed four key areas: reforming the state; designing a firmer foreign policy; pursuing a moral and cultural rejuvenation; and enforcing a more socially sensitive economic policy (Stanley 2016, p. 119). After a setback in the 2011 elections, PiS returned to power following the 2015 elections (37.58%), securing a majority in the Polish parliament. It secured its position as the largest party in the 2019 elections (43.59%), but lost control of the chambers.

In turn, Jobbik fits another criterion that positions the party as a relevant political force in Hungarian politics, namely its *blackmail potential*. This refers to the party's potential to change the tactics or direction of party competition within a given polity (Sartori 2005, p. 108). Founded in early 2000s, Jobbik contested the first national elections in 2006 as part of the MIÉP-Jobbik Third Way Alliance of Parties (*MIÉP– Jobbik a Harmadik Út*). The results were disappointing (2.2%), and Jobbik left the alliance. The following election cycles witnessed the significant improvement of Jobbik's electoral fortunes. The party became the third political force in the aftermath of 2010 elections (14.47%) and consolidated further its position after the 2014 elections (20.22%). After these elections, Jobbik became the main opposition force in part because of the center left's political implosion (Ádám and Bozóki 2016, pp. 130–135). This position was confirmed in the aftermath of 2018 elections, the party becoming the second largest parliamentary party (19.06%). This notwithstanding, the size itself was not the most important aspect for selecting Jobbik as a case of relevance. Rather, it is the party's ability to influence the ideological positioning, strategies, and direction of the main governing force, namely the Alliance of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Alliance (*Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége– Magyar Polgári Szövetség*, Fidesz). Indeed, there seems to be a rather ambivalent relationship between the two parties, both in terms of how Fidesz is presenting itself as the only political actor capable to prevent the right-wing populists to accede to power, but also in the manner in which Fidesz attempts to hamper Jobbik's electoral growth by adopting growingly radical and conservative stances. At the same time, Jobbik claims to move towards "modern conservatism," and a more centrist position (*néppártosodás*) (Bustikova and Guasti 2017; Norocel et al. 2017; Norocel and Szabó 2019; Pirro 2015; Pytlas and Kossack 2015).

Finally, the PRU falls into the category of *irrelevant parties*, having failed to secure representation in the Romanian parliament in the 2016 elections and in the European Parliament in the 2019 elections. Based on these performances, the party is unlikely to enhance its position any time soon. It is, nonetheless, reflective of the "phoenix populist" tendencies visible in Romania, whereby right-wing populist parties tend to reemerge periodically in a partially renewed form (Soare and Tufiş 2019).

The inclusion of the three parties in the analysis aims to offer broad spectrum examination of the potential welfare-chauvinist narratives have in exploiting fertile right-wing populist grounds in different political contexts, and function as a platform for consolidation in the case of successful political parties (PiS and Jobbik), and for entering the political arena in the case of smaller newly-formed parties (PRU).

This contribution draws on data drawn from party programs and manifestos, and from public statements made in electoral contexts by prominent members of the parties by means of a qualitative approach embedded in Political Discourse Theory (PDT) (Glynos and Howarth 2007; Howarth 2000; Howarth et al. 2016). The main focus is on the construction of the minorities as ethno-nationally and racially different as a basis for justifying the need for restrictive welfare policies targeting these groups. The analysis identifies the similar patterns of exclusion that characterize the strategies and discourses employed by the three parties in order to articulate successfully the nationalist and welfare nexus.

# **4.2 Conceptual Discussion: Nationalism and Welfare Chauvinism**

This chapter is concerned with the modern articulation of right-wing populist ideology, which employs nationalism as the central tenet for group membership, highlighting the congruence between demos and nation. The latter is presented as ethnically and culturally homogenous, and the idea of belonging is expressed through "radicalizing criteria of inclusion and exclusion", which pit the in-group against the out-group (Minkenberg 2017, p. 14). Concerning the basis for nationalist mobilization, we draw upon modernization theory, which highlights in its explanatory framework for social change the role of transition from agrarian to industrial societies, from dynastic to popular rule, and the growing importance of individual autonomy and of rational thought. These prompted significant transformations with regards to social organization and made it possible for people to "imagine" themselves as part of larger, national communities (Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983). In this context, right-wing populist ideology is associated with "the right turn". Already an intrinsic part of nationalist ideology (derived from its inherently exclusionary articulation of the nation), the "radicalized notion of national homogeneity" informs the right-wing populist drive towards a nostalgic and romanticized notion of regained national grandeur, traditional family values, intertwined with propensity to rigidly hierarchical and authoritarian charismatic male leadership (Minkenberg 2017, pp. 13–16; Norocel 2013, pp. 164–178).

While these elements are useful in explaining the emergence of right-wing populist ideology within the context of contemporary rejuvenation of nationalist fervor, to understand its mobilizing power it is necessary to add another aspect: that of economic cleavages generated by late modernity. Rapid and uneven social transformations, accompanied by the cyclicity of crises, all constitutive elements of unleashed globalization, lead to large groups being left out as social and economic losers out of these processes. It is these people that are likely to be mobilized by the radicalizing criteria of inclusion and exclusion highlighted above (Loch and Norocel 2015; Minkenberg 2000, 2015).

The growing importance of these economic elements in the right-wing populist ideology has increasingly attracted scholarly attention more recently. Earlier research on public opinion toward immigration reform in the US (Citrin et al. 1997), for instance, had already evidenced high level of support for policies that conditioned welfare provision for immigrants upon criteria to do with length of residency in the country. In the European context, then, research pointed out the nexus between the integration of European Union (EU) social security system, and national welfare policies (Martinsen 2005). The prohibition on discriminating against EU member states citizens in national welfare policy has become a bone of contention for those political forces conceiving of welfare provision as the proprietary right of the nation, whereby ethno-cultural and racializing criteria determine in-group membership. This enabled framing increasingly aggressive anti-immigration stances in economic terms, militating for preferential if not exclusive access to welfare provision for the in-group, which is conceptually labelled welfare chauvinism.

*Welfare chauvinism*, as a specific tenet of right-wing populist ideology in Europe (though it has permeated the vocabulary of mainstream parties as well), has gained saliency in the context of 2008 global financial crisis, and became exacerbated by the 2015 "refugee (reception) crisis" (Keskinen 2016; Loch and Norocel 2015; Norocel 2016). This notwithstanding, the use of welfare chauvinist appeals by right-wing populist parties has so far been mainly researched in North and Western European countries. This is partly understandable for two reasons. First, these countries have higher immigration levels, and the exclusionary rhetoric focusing on welfare matters becomes politically expedient, as racialized out-groups are easier to scapegoat. Second, as it is the case particularly in Northern Europe, the welfare system is an important marker of national identity, which makes it a preferred target of right-wing populist parties (Hellström 2016; Keskinen 2016; Norocel 2016; see also Hellström and Tawat Chap. 2, and Pettersson Chap. 3, in this volume).

# **4.3 Markers of National Identity and Belonging in Poland, Hungary and Romania**

This section provides an overview of the central themes in the wider nationalist discourses, which facilitate right-wing populist mobilization. What characterizes all three cases, we argue, is the master frame of nostalgia underpinned by fantasmatic restorative nationalism, which demands a return to an alleged state of moral purity of nationhood that can only be attained by means of safeguarding the ethnic and cultural purity of the nation.

In Poland, the basis of nationalist discourse is formed by a nostalgic reinterpretation of Polish identity, which adds a mythological layer to historical events. This is not necessarily expressed through overt references to a homeland with clearly definable boundaries. Instead, the homeland is invested a symbolic value, which enabled the Polish nation to survive through periods of statelessness during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and later the WWII devastations. The emphasis is thus put on the link between Polish ethnic identity and Catholicism, distilled in the figure of "Pole-Catholic" (*Polak-katolik*), for long perceived as a means to overcome "the absence of 'national' territorial boundaries and political sovereignty" (Zubrzycki 2014, p. 204).

The Pole-Catholic served to confirm the ethnic superiority of Poles in interwar Poland, particularly in relation to the Jewish population, and to justify statesanctioned anti-Semitism. In the aftermath of WWII, which witnessed genocide and ethnic cleansing, the borders of Poland shifted once more, though the country was then characterized by a much greater ethnic homogeneity than before. In the new context, the Pole-Catholic came to epitomize the authenticity and legitimacy of ethnic Poles as opposed to the illegitimate Soviet-groomed elites. The role played by the Catholic Church in opposing the Soviet-backed regime entrenched its position as a key component of the ethno-cultural landscape that defines Polish national identity (Stanley 2016, p. 112).

In the post-1989 context, the initially jubilant rediscovery of the European aspect of Polish identity, and the pursuit of EU membership have been gradually replaced in recent years by a critical and outright reactionary stance towards "Brussels", a shorthand for the complex EU institutional architecture. The Pole-Catholic came to play a key role in the right-wing populist discourse of PiS, opposing a highly moral and ethnically pure popular majority to a Western-oriented liberal elite that enforced Brussels "corrosive influence" onto the Polish nation.

In Hungary, nostalgic nationalism pertains to both territorial contours, and membership in the Hungarian nation. With regards to the former, the territorial loses Hungary sustained following the Treaty of Trianon (1920) remain a recurring theme in everyday manifestations of nationalism (Korkut 2012). The contours of "Greater Hungary", marking the borders of the Kingdom of Hungary within the Austrian-Hungary Monarchy before WWI, are now a rather ubiquitous occurrence on car stickers, something that just a few years ago would have been frowned upon (Molnár 2016, p. 174). The Hungarian irredentism linked to the territorial losses in the aftermath of WWI is also reading and reinterpreting historical episodes in a mythological key. This aims to provide a sense of historical continuity and greatness despite Hungarian defeat. This is reinforced though such symbols as the mythological bird of prey omnipresent on coats of arms and monuments (*turul*), and the red and white stripes of the House of Árpád, the first dynastic rulers of the Kingdom of Hungary.

Closely linked to the territorial issue, the second aspect of the restorative dimension of Hungarian nationalism concerns the notion of kin-state responsibility towards the recognition and protection of the cultural identity of Hungarian minorities that in the post-Trianon context found themselves outside Hungarian borders. Indeed, significant Hungarian minorities are present in the neighboring countries, particularly in Romania, Slovakia, Croatia, and Serbia (Ádám and Bozóki 2016; Korkut 2012; Loch and Norocel 2015; Udrea 2014).

The nostalgic revisionist-revivalist issue, which incorporates both the physical territorial aspect, and membership into the ethno-cultural nation irrespective of the borders, is accompanied by a religious grounding for belonging in the traditional Christian Churches, namely the Catholic Church and the Hungarian Calvinist Church. This combination brings about another central marker of the articulation of Hungarian national identity: fantasmatic anti-modernism. This manifests specifically in anti-EU feelings and more broadly in the belief that Hungary needs to turn its back on Europe's decadence, and instead recover its former glory, a view which is shared by both Fidesz and Jobbik (Ádám and Bozóki 2016; Krekó and Mayer 2015; see also Kondor and Littler Chap. 8, in this volume).

Finally, in Romania, nostalgic nationalism appears to be highly resilient, although the right-wing populist forces have been on retreat the past decade (Cinpoeş 2010, 2015; Norocel 2013; Norocel et al. 2017; Szabó et al. 2019). The history is read in a mythological key with regard to Romanian language, origins and ancestry, continuity over the territory, and Christian Orthodox tradition. These, in turn, articulate the sense of cultural specificity along which the Romanian ethnic majority is structured and position against "other" ethic communities (particularly the Roma, the Jews, and the Hungarian minority). The strength of the nationalist discourse is enhanced by its successful use, rehearsal, and transmission over time by very different political actors: from early nationalists of the nineteenth century, interwar fascists, Ceauşescu dictatorial regime, through the post-1989 context (Cinpoeş 2010, 2015).

Much like in the case of Hungary, the ethnic and cultural continuity, which draws its strength from religious tradition, and the promise of territorial aggrandizement constitute key elements in the Romanian nationalist discourse. Unlike Hungary, however, Romania emerged as a net beneficiary from the WWI, with its territory nearly doubled in size compared to the start of the war. The short-lived existence of Greater Romania, incorporating besides the Old Kingdom the historical regions inhabited by Romanians (Transylvania, Bessarabia, and Bukovina) remains the zenith of Romanian nationalism (Cinpoeş 2010). The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, and the subsequent annexation of several territories by Soviet Union represent the equivalent of the Treaty of Trianon for the Romanian nationalist discourse, and its key argument for modern irredentist claims towards the Republic of Moldova. Similar to Hungary, Romania has a kin-state approach towards ethnic Romanians in the neighboring states.

Within the post-1989 context, EU membership was presented as the country's "rightful return to Europe". It built on a selective reading of the nationalist project, which emphasized Romanian representing "an island of Latinity in the East", and Romanians being "steadfast defenders of the European borders". This notwithstanding, in the aftermath of 2007 EU accession, and particularly with the onset of 2008 financial crisis, Euroscepticism was fueled by growing unease regarding what was perceived as subordination to, and economic dependency on "Brussels", and other international institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund). Like in Poland and Hungary, in Romania too the appeals to rediscover national pride, underpinned by history, tradition, and Christianity, and restore "traditional Romanian moral values" (focused on the traditional heterosexual family) constitute the core elements of anti-EU mobilization.

# **4.4 Right-Wing Populist Parties, National Identity, Welfare Chauvinism, and Migration Anxieties**

This section examines the discourses of selected right-wing populist parties to flesh out in what manner they exploit the interplay between ethno-cultural articulations of the national community, and appeals for preferential, if not exclusive access to welfare provision based on national belonging. There are two main issues at stake here. First, while welfare chauvinism is not a new phenomenon, it is less clear whether there is some degree of alignment of Central and Eastern European rightwing populist discourses, and those in North and Western Europe, given the diverging migration contexts of these regions. Second, looking closer at the level of consistency between the three cases, this reflects the varying party strategies for including welfare chauvinism in their discourses for acquiring power.

Among the most successful right-wing populist parties in the region, PiS polled 37.58% of the votes the 2015 Polish parliamentary elections, becoming the governing party. A significant part of PiS electoral success appears to be due to its social and economic program, which envisioned several welfare policies that appealed both to its working-class support base and more widely. It included among others, a VAT rate cut, a pro-natalist tax rebate based on the number of children in the family, and a general opposition to cuts on public spending.

Internally-focused welfare chauvinism is not articulated, since the country's ethnic homogeneity, with nearly 95% ethnic Poles and no other ethnic group exceeding 1% of the population, makes scapegoating an internal group on ethnic grounds rather difficult. As a result, the right-wing populist exclusionary discourse is directed against an exterior "other", which is somewhat paradoxical given that Poland took in thousands of Chechen refuges of Islamic faith in the past two decades (Bustikova and Guasti 2017, p. 171). In the context of the 2015 refugee crisis, PiS positioned itself in the starkest opposition to the EU resettlement quota proposal, both in the run-up to the 2016 elections and subsequently. Used as an electoral asset in its campaign, PiS channelized the anger at the outgoing liberal government, which had agreed to the refugee quotas, increasing its support among center-right voters who feared the social and economic costs of taking in refugees (Bustikova and Guasti 2017, p. 172; see also Stanley 2016, p. 123).

A quasi-apocalyptic fantasmatic logic (Glynos and Howarth 2007; Howarth et al. 2016) was employed by high ranked PiS politicians in addressing the refugee matter. Displaying overtly racist tones it positioned people fleeing violence and conflict in a position of fundamental difference to the Polish, and Europeans more broadly. PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński, for example, warned against the health threat that refugees represent, carrying "very dangerous diseases long absent from Europe" besides "all sorts of parasites and protozoa, which […] while not dangerous in the organisms of these people, could be dangerous here" (Cienski 2015). Consequently, upon winning elections, PiS reneged on the previous government's promise to take in refugees. The justifications officially provided conflated, as in Hungary, security concerns with emerging expressions of welfare chauvinism.

Articulating the new political line, then-Prime Minister Beata Szydło stated in an unequivocal manner that the Polish government's main responsibility is "to ensure the security of our fellow citizens" from the apparent threat posited by "thousands of migrants who come here only to improve their living conditions", and amongst whom allegedly "there are also terrorists" (DW 2016). Referring to people seeking refuge as "migrants" signals a suspicious skepticism towards their "true" intentions: either freeloading onto or bringing terror to their unware hosts. In this context, we argue, PiS makes use of welfare chauvinism to consolidate Pole-Catholic nationalist discourse and add new layers to the metaphorical depiction of Poland as "Christ of Nations" (*Polska Chrystusem Narodów*), which emphasizes "Poland's suffering at the hands of other countries and its redemptive rebirth." (Stanley 2016, p. 119).

Jobbik, in turn, polled 19.06% of the votes in the 2018 Hungarian parliamentary elections and secured its position as the largest opposition party. Besides its outspoken anti-Semitism, Jobbik has a well-documented anti-Roma rhetoric (Ádám and Bozóki 2016; Korkut 2012; Loch and Norocel 2015; Montgomery 2015). Jobbik's policy section concerning the status of ethnic minorities in Hungary deals almost exclusively with the Roma, solely referred to by their derogative appellation Gypsies (*cigány*). Moreover, the "jobs instead of benefits" welfare policy is expressly tied to the Roma. Despite the positive framing, which argues that "the real interest of the Gypsy community lies in a rapid social integration rather than affirmative action, the benefits of which the Gypsy community cannot really utilize in its current situation", the policy is clear in its discriminatory interpretation to access to welfare provision, specifically targeting Roma and identifying them as criminals leading lives "incompatible with the law" (Jobbik n.d.). This attitude is echoed in the party's electoral program, which allocated a whole section to the issue of "Hungarian-Gypsy coexistence" (Jobbik 2014, pp. 30–31). Even more so, the same electoral program reveals an anxious fantasmatic logic (Glynos and Howarth 2007; Howarth et al. 2016) pertaining to the failing birth rate of ethnic Hungarians, juxtaposed to the "explosive increase of Gypsy population", which is intensely discussed in the section addressing Jobbik's demographic policy (Jobbik 2014, p. 28).

If Jobbik had previously employed pro-Islam rhetoric to make its anti-Semitism more palatable, with the onset of the refugee (reception) crisis in 2015 the party turned on its heels. While Islam as a state religion was praised in the Middle Eastern context as a counterforce to Israel, it became problematic as the religious affiliation of people seeking to cross the Hungarian borders (Thorleifsson 2017, p. 324). Consequently, Islamophobia gained a prominent role in Jobbik's discourse, often justified by the alleged security threat the refugees pose, either in terms of terrorist

activity, criminal behavior, or harassment of the Hungarian population. As the refugee crisis unfolded, Jobbik articulated a distinctive welfare chauvinist perspective, exploiting social anxieties in deprived working-class towns and poor rural areas. It argued about the potentially negative impact that the costs of integrating the refugees could have onto access to welfare provision by disadvantaged ethnic Hungarians, reminding that "also Hungarians are poor". In this regard, Jobbik replicated Fidezs' anti-immigration discourse by juxtaposing cultural nationalist and economic arguments "thus catering to multiple audiences, from those fearing labor competition to those fearing cultural contamination" (Thorleifsson 2017, p. 326).

By far the weakest in terms of electoral performance, in the 2016 Romanian parliamentary elections PRU polled 2.79% for the Lower Chamber, and 2.95% for the Senate. These results were well under the electoral threshold. In turn, the established right-wing populist party emphatically named Greater Romania Party (*Partidul România Mare*, PRM) had just lost its long-serving leader in 2015. Without him, PRM polled even less than PRU (1.04%, respectively 1.18%), so entering a right-wing populist alliance under PRU leadership seems a final attempt at maintaining political relevance. Ideologically, PRU defines itself as a nationalist party, whose aim is to "regain Romania for Romanians".

Its egalitarian economic policy is somewhat reminiscent of that of PRM, particularly regarding its selective egalitarianism (Norocel 2013). The envisaged welfare reform seems to be based on an exclusionary approach to the national community. Indeed, despite this apparent concern with inequality and poverty, the PRU leader Cristian Diaconu expressed derogative views about people receiving unemployment benefits. His stance echoes strongly with the wider negative connotations that large segments of the right-leaning younger, urban population associate to welfare provision. Particularly the term referring to a recipient welfare provision as a (socially) assisted (person) (*asistat*) is used as a slur, with the implicit suggestion that such people are lazy, unwilling to work, and generally a burden onto the hardworking taxpayers.

In Diaconu's use of "the assisted (people)", it pertains the Roma, solely referred to as Gypsies (*ţigani*). Employing the fantasmatic logic in a negative key (Glynos and Howarth 2007; Howarth et al. 2016), Diaconu argued their fundamental difference from the ethnic majority: "Perhaps Romanians have had enough of these assisted [people], whose only illness is not wanting to work, of these minorities who want to rule the country, to have a state within a state". Making reference to a period of oppression that ethnic Romanians experienced under the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy as a lower status populace, Diaconu then added "now we are heading to a similar situation, but this time we have the Gypsies [to oppress us]" (Tudor 2015).

In preparation for the 2016 elections, PRU launched a 10-point electoral manifesto that began by promising to increase the minimum wage, and among others, included protectionist economic promises (such as subsidies restricted to "Romanian companies", and defense of "Romanian capital" against excessive state control) (Tudor 2016). This reflected the wider cleavage in Romanian politics. This pitted the center-left, which promised fiscal and welfare reforms aimed at alleviating poverty and reducing inequality, against the conservative center-right and neoliberal newcomers, which maintained the line of fiscal restraint and stimulation of capital that was agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the aftermath of 2008 economic crisis. As such, while formally proclaiming a preoccupation for welfare issues, PRU positioned itself against those socially most vulnerable, adding a racializing aspect to their depiction, and embraced welfare chauvinism.

In a similar manner, although Romania was not on the European migratory route, PRU denounced the EU solidarity agreement arguing against "colonizing Romania with refugees" (Tudor 2016). The fantasmatic logic of Romania being "colonized" by refugees was taken to an extreme by Diaconu who argued that "being an EU Member State […] does not entail an obligation for us to become either an Asian state, or an African state, and most definitely not a Muslim state." (BZI 2015) Welfare chauvinist arguments were added to this, as "Romania cannot afford waves of immigrants from Africa and Asia", and warned that "no one has the right to push these dangerous immigrants down our throats, because we lack both the resources and capacity to integrate them, particularly as they are themselves against it" (BZI 2015).

# **4.5 Conclusions**

This chapter explored the interplay between claims of national culture and ethnic specificity, and welfare chauvinist appeals in the right-wing populist discourses in Central and Eastern Europe. It analyzed three right-wing populist parties, considering their relevance in their respective party system (PiS, Jobbik, and PRU). The similarities in the discursive articulations of national identity and belonging in the three countries, which appeal to such aspects as history, tradition, territorial continuity, and religion, and are positioned against such globalizing forces as the EU (a trend that, by and large, characterize the entire region) (Ádám and Bozóki 2016; Bustikova and Guasti 2017; Stanley 2016) were matched to a large extent by similarities in the way welfare chauvinism is integrated in the rhetoric of right-wing populist parties.

Despite being countries of emigration, which have not experienced directly a substantial immigrant presence (with the recent exception of the sudden surge of the migrant population in Hungary), all three cases display incipient patterns of welfare chauvinism directed at external "others" understood in an apocalyptic fantasmatic logic: the immigrant communities are depicted as "soon to be flooding," "deceitful parasites" that pose a threat to, and require the protection of the national/religious specificity of the "people". In this sense, the cases show an alignment with patterns of exclusion that characterize North and Western Europe (Keskinen 2016; Hellström 2016; Norocel 2016). These similarities notwithstanding, the case of Jobbik and PRU also reveals what can potentially constitute a Central and Eastern European specificity. While welfare chauvinism targeting external "others" appears to be a recent phenomenon, the one directed at the "other within", at the ethnic minorities (predominantly the Roma), constitutes a historical aspect that has much salience in

the rhetoric of right-wing populist parties. Welfare chauvinism adds a new dimension to the thinly-veiled xenophobia, and widespread demographic anxieties concerning the relationship between national ethnic majorities and historical ethnic minorities in these countries. On this matter, PiS can be considered an exception to this regional pattern, largely due to Poland's much more homogenous population, which precludes the clear identification of an internal scapegoat.

Finally, despite the different degrees of electoral success the three parties in terms display two interrelated points emerge. In terms of the snapshot picture, it may appear that the culture-welfare nexus provides a stronger mobilizing ground for right-wing populism in Poland and Hungary than in Romania. In terms of the broader picture, however, the fact that a newly established party such as the PRU was able to immediately latch onto this type of discourse shows its potential to be employed more successfully by newly emerging populist parties, or by established parties positioned closer to the mainstream. Together, these dimensions show the potential strength these issues have to be exploited effectively in the region (despite the current uneven electoral success).

# **References**


Sartori, G. (2005). *Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis*. Colchester: ECPR Press.


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# **Chapter 5 What Makes Turkey and Turkish Immigrants a Cultural Polarization Issue in Europe? Evidence from European Right-Wing Populist Politics**

**Gokay Özerim and Selcen Öner**

# **5.1 Introduction**

Turkey first expressed its intention to become a member of the European Union (EU) in 1959 by applying to the European Economic Community. Subsequently, it signed the Association Agreement with the EU in 1963, applied for full membership in 1987, and completed the Customs Union process in 1996. It was officially recognized as a candidate country for EU membership at the Helsinki Summit of 1999, and the membership negotiations were initiated in 2005. In spite of Turkey's long history of candidacy to EU membership, intense trade relations with European countries, and the presence of Turks as one of the largest minority ethnic groups in Europe, Turkey and Turkish immigrants have still been instrumentalized as politically polarizing issues in European societies. Turkish immigration to European countries continued to increase even after the shocks of the Oil Crisis in the 1970s, in particular, through family reunification. However, while trade and economic relations have intensified, culture and identity issues remain a challenge in EU-Turkey relations. The recent financial and "refugee (reception) crisis" that the European continent witnessed have deepened these challenges. Consequently, Turkish presence in Europe, compatibility of Turkish identity to European identity, Turkey's "Europeanness" and EU membership process have been re-questioned by some actors, mostly by the ones that aim to revitalize the nostalgia of "pure Europeanness" by scapegoating "others" through exploiting economic, social, and cultural anxieties.

G. Özerim (\*)

S. Öner

Department of International Relations, Yaşar University, Izmir, Turkey e-mail: gokay.ozerim@yasar.edu.tr

Department of Political Science and International Relations, Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul, Turkey e-mail: selcen.oner@eas.bau.edu.tr

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2020 67

O. C. Norocel et al. (eds.), *Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41694-2\_5

In this regard, the interplay between politics of culture, welfare, and migration, which are the key focus of the present volume, were employed in the discourse of the populist actors in Europe as a tool for framing and excluding Turkish immigrants and Turkey. On the one hand, as Neumann (1998) underlines, the "otherness" of Turks has been an identifying element of Europeanness for long. On the other hand, Turkey has long been perceived as a "bridge country", particularly in the 2000s and after Turkey was given an official candidate status. Turkey has been framed as an important neighbor and a crucial partner for the EU (Öner 2011). However, the "otherness" was brought again onto the political agenda of several European countries by the latest series of crises.

This chapter provides a comparative analysis of this instrumentalization process in European politics by asking how Turkish immigrants and Turkey are presented as a culturally polarizing issue within the framework of "cultural security" (Guild 2005; Tardif 2002). It addresses cultural elements of "Turco-skeptic" policies in European right-wing populist parties' discourse. A descriptive analysis based on three specific cases is performed, and its findings lend support to our claims about the existence of anxieties due to cultural security concerns in European right-wing policies, and helps us identify the cultural elements within these policies. The material selection, which the descriptive analysis is built on, is more ad-hoc based than systematically conducted. However, the emphasis is put on the speeches of the leading political actors within the related political processes and campaigns, campaign posters and party broadcasts in the conventional media are used as the resources for materials. The selected cases are assessed within a historical framework, also by referring to the previous discourses and policies of the major political actors in each of them. The first case is the Brexit referendum process in the United Kingdom (UK), specifically the Vote Leave campaign. The second case is the instrumentalization of Turkish immigrants and Turkey's accession to the EU in Austrian domestic politics particularly after the "refugee (reception) crisis" and during the campaign for the 2016 Austrian Presidential elections. The third case is the instrumentalization of Turkish immigrants and Turkey's accession to the EU in German politics, particularly the rise of Alternative for Germany (*Alternative für Deutschland*, AfD), and its entrance into German federal parliament in the aftermath of 2017 elections.

These cases are analyzed within the framework of the nexus between Turks in Europe and European cultural cleavages. This is done by focusing on what sort of cultural arguments regarding Turkey appear in political discourses, the underlying cultural elements of these actors' discourse on Turkish immigrants, and the culturalhistorical reasons for the success of these discourses in each selected case, and their crucial influence on the domestic politics of various European countries. Meanwhile, the "cultural security" theme is presented as the theoretical background of the study.

# **5.2 Cultural Security as an Instrument of Right-Wing Populism**

Against this background, seeking the traces of cultural security in the Turco-skeptic discourse of European right-wing populist parties may provide valuable insights on the instrumentalization of Turkish migrants for the sake of voter mobilization. "Cultural security" can be defined as the "protection of original values (such as tradition, language, religion, customs, etc.) and characteristics of a society against existing conditions and potential threats" (Tardif 2002). Guild investigates the use and influence of culture as a security theme by asking this important question: "What is the link between culture and identity in terms of 'nationality' and 'sovereignty'?" (Guild 2005, p.101). Building on this, one can also ask whether culture and identity are the tools, or symbols of national sovereignty. The answer to these questions also plays a decisive role in the framing of immigrants in contemporary European host societies. From a cultural point of view, the answer to this question by right-wing populist parties seems to be "yes, absolutely". More importantly, these parties limit the notion of culture to the "indigenous" citizens of their country and classify it as an "entity" that has already reached its highest point, which consequently need not be enlarged or expanded anymore (see, Cinpoeş and Norocel, Chap. 4; Hellström and Tawat, Chap. 2 in this volume). This protectionist perception of culture frames migrants as a threat to cultural security.

For many right-wing populist parties, the "native" citizens of a country are accepted as the sole originators, and rightful owners of the country's culture. Accordingly, culture must have a specific definition, and it should be isolated from "foreign" elements. This perception directly plays to the "cultural security" theme and frames migrants as a threat to the host country's "local culture", and the lifestyle of "native" citizens. In this respect, the anti-immigration discourse of these parties promotes the idea that migrant populations will in time destroy the homogeneous and unique structure of national culture. In response, right-wing populist parties advocate for restrictive regulations against migration, and demonize those policies promoting multiculturalism and the integration of migrants (Williams 2006, p. 70). They do not only defend the national culture of the host country. Rather, they also refer to European culture when claiming the necessity of protecting it from the "raid of foreigners" and waves of globalization (Betz 2001, p. 394). Based on these exclusivist and identity-based policies, they fuse the concepts of non-citizens and "others" (Kaya 2009, p. 9).

Berezin defines modern nation-states as a marriage of culture and structure, which resembles a two-atom molecule, bounded by "territorial consolidation" on the one hand, and "cultural consolidation" on the other (Berezin 2009, pp. 53–54). In light of Berezin's example, the issue of cultural security can also be considered the definition of the state in Weberian terms. According to Weber, the political community is a phenomenon that is shaped around ethnic pride, feelings of similarity, and common group beliefs stemming from the same culture and solidarity (Berezin 2009, p. 52). This definition necessitates "cultural consolidation" as a core value of the modern state. The discourse based on "cultural security", which mostly addresses these "core values", may find a stronger public response than one might expect. Anti-immigration discourses drawing on cultural security concerns do not manifest themselves only in calls to reduce, or halt migration. They also aim to shape the policies and practices of integration for those who have already immigrated. However, the efforts of right-wing populist parties stem from the ambition to protect the national language as a critical element of culture rather than from a desire to support the integration of immigrants.

Eventually, the distinction between "us" and "them" creates symbolic boundaries in addition to existing boundaries. There can be symbolic boundaries within social identity, as well as physical boundaries between countries, and in fact, these boundaries are created using a set of sub-themes, such as religion and language (Bail 2008). Apart from this, liberal values such as LGBT rights, equality between women and men, and other freedoms are also regarded as part of European culture, and immigrants are portrayed as a threat to these values (Hellström 2016; Norocel 2017). Accordingly, these values must be protected. This discourse of right-wing populist parties is framed alongside religious differences, and as a result, "othering by religion" is an important element of cultural security discourse. Consequently, *Islamophobia* comprises a significant component of anti-immigration sentiment and "nativism" in Europe, which also makes it a tool of populist discourse. From this point of view, anti-Islamism functions as a significant mobilizer for right-wing populist party voters.

# **5.3 The Turkish Community in Europe and Cultural Cleavages**

Turkish immigrants and co-ethnic Turks in Europe constitute one of the major elements of the relationship between Turkey and Europe. After the end of World War II, Turkish immigrants provided an essential labor contribution to the reconstruction of European economies. The Turkish government signed bilateral recruitment agreements with Germany in 1961, the Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium in 1964, France in 1965, and with Sweden in 1967. These bilateral agreements, which were initially framed as temporary "guest worker" schemes, unexpectedly resulted in many permanent stays. Consequently, nearly 800,000 Turks became citizens in the host country in which they worked, and Turkish immigrants and their families became "the largest group of non-nationals resident in the EU" (İçduygu 2011, p. 9). Even as European countries were focusing on more restrictive immigration policies following the Oil Crisis of 1973, family reunification allowed for continued Turkish migration into Europe. In addition to labor migration, the conflicts of the 1970s and the 1980 military coup in Turkey added increasing numbers of Turkish asylum seekers to the picture (Sirkeci and Esipova 2013, p. 3). As a result, around 5.5 million Turks live in West European countries, mainly in Germany, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland and Austria (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018).

In the meantime, "Turco-skepticism" has become a political card for the new wave of right-wing populism in Europe. Some researchers argue that, for a number of reasons Turkey has become a flash point for the rising xenophobic movements in Europe after the 2000s. One of the most prominent reasons seems to be the "existence of a large cohort of Turkish population" in Europe (Kirişçi 2003, p. 79). Right-wing populist parties using neo-nationalist and anti-immigrant discourse are on the rise in almost all the European countries, which have received Turkish immigrants as part of guest worker schemes in the 1960s and 1970s. The existence of Turkish immigrant communities in European countries, and particularly their integration problems are generally considered as one of the main reasons for the development of Turco-skepticism in Europe (European Commission 2016, p. 3).

However, it should be noted that the Turkish community in Europe originated primarily from economic immigration rather than asylum seeking. As a result, the "economic burden" and "welfare" based anti-immigrant discourse used by European right-wing populist parties does not have a strong base, as Turkish immigrants actually contributed positively to the economies of many of European host societies. In fact, the Central and Eastern enlargements of the EU invalidate the economic arguments against Turkey's EU membership, due to the relatively poor economic conditions of these countries at the time they gained membership (Bozdaglioglu 2004, p. 93). As a result, culture and identity-based arguments have become important for Turkey's EU accession process, and for the presence of Turkish communities across Europe. Therefore, contrary to general wisdom, major themes of European Turcoskeptic rhetoric rely not on economic anxieties but on cultural cleavages that are fueled by a wide spectrum of arguments. Although religious differences are one of the factors underlying these cultural arguments, the instrumentalization of Turkish immigrants by right-wing populist parties is not limited to this subtheme. It also draws on a fear of threats to the liberal values of Europe, democracy and the lifestyle of European countries.

These cultural cleavages overshadow even economic anxieties and have become an agenda item in the contemporary political debates of European countries. This effect is not limited to countries with a high number of immigrants of Turkish origin, such as Germany and Austria. Similar debates were observed in the UK during the Brexit referendum campaign, despite the fact that the UK has fewer Turkish immigrants and has had a relatively positive stance towards Turkey's EU membership for many years. Turkey's potential EU membership appears to be one of the most prominent sources of identity and culture-based opposition to Turks (Yilmaz 2007, p. 293). It is worthwhile to note that while opposition to Turkey's EU membership has many sociological, geographical, historical, and political grounds in Europe, the debates on the triangle of culture, religion, and identity are remarkably fraught even in the countries that have been hosting large numbers of Turkish immigrants for decades. However, the history of contact between Turks and Europeans is not limited to post World War II labor migration and EU accession process. That

history extends to the previous relations with the Ottoman Empire, whereby Turks were framed as the "other" in European imagery (Bozdaglioglu 2004, p. 93).

# *5.3.1 Case 1: Vote Leave "Playing the Turkish Card" for Brexit*

Turkish migration to the UK began in the late 1960s and continued during the early 1970s due to labor migration. Following the war in Cyprus in 1974, Turkish-Cypriots began to immigrate in significant numbers and the population of Turkishborn immigrants in the UK increased (Küçükcan 1999, p. 61). After the 1980 military intervention in Turkey, the UK became one of the main destinations for Turkish asylum seekers, in addition to a continued inflow of economic migrants. According to the statistics (Office for National Statistics 2017), there were around 73,000 Turks in the UK. In terms of population density, Turks are not among the top five countries with the largest "overseas born population resident in the UK". However, Turkey and Turkish identity constituted one of the hot-button points in the Vote Leave Campaign of the June 2016 referendum.

The hostile rhetoric used throughout the campaign centered primarily on Turkey's possible EU membership by asking voters whether they want to be in an EU that includes Turkey. The question was imbibed with fear mongering and misinformation. For example, the Vote Leave block released a campaign poster bearing only the line, "Turkey (population 76 million) is joining the EU". The implication was that Turkey's accession would lead to mass migration to the UK and might result in increased security challenges in the EU. One of the prominent figures of the Vote Leave campaign, Penny Mordaunt, former British Armed Forces Minister, and recently Minister of State at the Department for Work and Pensions, claimed that Britain would be "unable to stop Turkey joining the EU". She claimed, "a million Turks could potentially come to the UK within eight years of joining, a scale of migration that would run the risk of enabling murderers, terrorists, and kidnappers to enter the country" (*BBC* 2016). Former UK Independence Party (UKIP) leader Nigel Farage, another important figure of the Leave Campaign, supported this discourse, stating, "the referendum is very quickly becoming a vote on whether we want to be in a political union with Turkey, which would open our borders to millions of Turks with all the security risks that would bring" (Wheeler and Giannangeli 2016).

UKIP also released a broadcast titled "The risks of staying in the EU: No. 1- Turkey joins in 2020?" The video claims that "as many as 15 million migrants could leave for Europe within the first 10 years of EU membership". The video includes arguments emphasizing that only 3% of Turkish landmass is in Europe, while the rest is in Asia, and that a possible EU membership would make Turkey the most populous country in the EU, thereby allowing it supreme power in the EU institutions and decision-making. Finally, it asserts that with Turkey's membership, the EU would become a neighbor to Iraq, Iran, and Syria. In fact, these are all wellknown and popular arguments of opponents to Turkey's EU membership (Müftüler-Bac 1998; Gerhards and Hans 2011). However, the broadcast also addresses freedom of press, women's rights, the fact that rates of violence against women in Turkey are above the European average, the prevalence of marriage at an early age, and the decline of the Christian population in the country. In particular, a strong emphasis on Islam and the Muslim majority in Turkey was present prominently in UKIP's Vote Leave Campaign. The mainstream media accused the party of "baseless scaremongering" many times during the Brexit campaign, as its discourse promoted a disguised but deeply rooted Islamophobia (Mason 2016).

Liberal values and freedoms were framed as part of European and British culture, as frequently seen throughout populist discourse that use the "cultural security" theme. However, in the case of the Vote Leave campaigns, the idea of a "high level of criminality among Turkish citizens" was integrated into this theme. Instead of using only cultural themes, terrorism and crime were embedded into the discourse, which presented Turkey and Turkish immigrants as a threat to national security (Boffey and Helm 2016). The cultural security-based campaign of Vote Leave was noted in the British media. The Independent, a popular daily newspaper in the UK, published an article titled "Vote Leave: Stop offending Turkish people to further your own agenda". The piece criticized another popular daily newspaper, the Express, for intentionally using the image "of a woman in a burqa fashioned from the EU flag" while reporting on a survey, which claimed that Turkey's EU membership would encourage a third of Britons to vote for leaving the EU (Wheeler and Giannangeli 2016).

In addition, part of the Vote Leave campaign discourse presented Turkey as part of a possible Balkan enlargement. It was claimed "a vote of stay would allow people from Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey to immigrate to UK freely when they join the EU soon" (Lister 2016). As such, the theme of cultural security morphed into a matter of "internal security" (Mandacı and Özerim 2013). Such a stance was built on misinformation or manufactured information, since the UK was not even within the Schengen area agreement, which makes a rapid and an uncontrolled mass migration from any of these potential new EU member countries almost impossible.

UKIP also shared videos of David Cameron, who had previously defended Turkey's EU membership bid. However, Cameron's stance in favor of Turkey's EU membership was keeping with the traditional stance of the British government, which has been one of the strongest advocates for membership for many years. Regardless, right-wing populist rhetoric instrumentalized Turks and Turkish identity in order to disseminate fear, mobilize voters, and strengthen its anti-establishment stance against traditional British politics. Moreover, Boris Johnson, who had targeted Turkey's potential EU membership during the Vote Leave campaigns, declared in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum that he would support Turkey's EU bid. This is but an example of the hypocrisy of right-wing populist politicians, who instrumentalized certain issues for short-term purposes.

# *5.3.2 Case 2: Instrumentalization of Turkey and Turkish Immigrants in Austrian Politics*

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, assimilation has been the major strategy for cultural and linguistic minorities in Austria. These groups, including Turkish immigrants, remain marginalized and segregated, and even the third-generations tend to have higher unemployment rates, lower wages, and less educational success than Austrians on average. Moreover, the rise of right-wing populism in Austria has influenced negatively immigration policies (Wets 2006, pp. 92–93).

The main narrative about Turkey in Austria is a typical example of a cultural "other". The Ottoman sieges of Vienna in 1529 and 1683 are two crucial events that are reported in Austrian history textbooks (Gavenda 2017). These historical references about Ottoman Empire have been used frequently in Austrian domestic politics. Another crucial theme is immigration, especially with regards to Turkey-EU relations. In the early 1960s, more workers were required to meet the demands of a growing economy. From the beginning of 1960s until the mid-1970s, guest workers were recruited mainly from Turkey and former Yugoslavia. The bilateral agreement between Turkey and Austria regulating short-term immigration of Turkish workers was signed in 1964. By the early 1970s it became clear that the Turkish community's presence had become permanent. Indeed, the largest groups of non-EU foreigners in Austria are the nationals from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey. Turks are often represented as the least integrated group of immigrants (Wets 2006, pp. 85–89). In 2017, it was estimated that the number of Austrian residents of Turkish origin was of around 260,000 (Gavenda 2017).

Even previously, there were particularly high levels of skepticism about Turkey's EU membership, especially in Austria and Germany, where there are large numbers of Turkish immigrants. Before the financial crisis and the Brexit referendum, Turkey's EU membership had been used frequently for domestic political gains before the elections, especially by right-wing populist parties, as well as by mainstream parties, such as the Christian Democrats (Yabancı 2016). The survival of a European culture against the threat posed by the "Muslim other" is a recurring theme in right-wing populist rhetoric (Ajanovic et al. 2016, p. 143).

More recently, Austria opposed a revitalization of membership talks between Turkey and the EU and even called for their suspension. In November 2016, all six parties from the federal parliament issued a joint statement that condemned the human rights situation in Turkey and called on the EU to suspend the negotiations. Former foreign minister, currently the Chancellor Sebastian Kurz demanded a freeze to accession negotiations at the EU Council meeting, though this call was not supported by the foreign ministers of most of the other member states (Gavenda 2017).

As a distinctive example, the right-wing populist party "Freedom Party of Austria" (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, FPÖ) claims that the living standards for Austrian citizens are in need of protection, and that immigrants who are unwilling to integrate should be forced to leave the country (Dennison and Pardijs 2016, p. 7). But this stance has a longer history. Already in the 2005 campaign for the municipal

elections in Vienna, the FPÖ electoral slogan was "Vienna must not become Istanbul" (Gavenda 2017). In recent decades, the FPÖ pioneered many rhetorical strategies of populist movements across Europe and also played a "key role in casting Islam as an existential threat to European identity and values", which has crucially influenced its German counterpart, the Alternative for Germany (*Alternative für Deutschland*, AfD) (*Politico* 2016). "Catholic Austria, which fought back two Ottoman sieges during the Hapsburg Empire, was again under assault" FPÖ claimed in response to the refugee (reception) crisis, and the terrorist threats facing Europe in the last few years (*Politico* 2016).

In the aftermath of the refugee (reception) crisis, FPÖ positioned itself as a protector of Austria's heritage and borders against the influx of immigrants. FPÖ sees a lack of solidarity and unity between EU Member States as the main cause of the series of crisis (financial, Euro-zone, and humanitarian) that have recently shaken the EU. Moreover, FPÖ perceives the "refugee deal" between Turkey and the EU as a disaster since it is against any alignment of the EU with Turkey (Dennison and Pardijs 2016, p.7). This is by no means a singular position; Sebastian Kurz, while still minister of foreign affairs stated that "it is crucial that we do not surrender to Turkey or become dependent on them. Europe has to protect its own borders" (Siebenhaar and Stehle 2016). This notwithstanding, the Austrian government stated its commitment to the refugee deal.

In the Austrian presidential elections in December 2016, the FPÖ candidate, Norbert Hofer gained a plurality of votes, coming in first with about 35% of the votes in the first round (Vieten and Poynting 2016, p. 534). During the presidential election campaign, he promised to take Austria out of the EU if Turkey is allowed to join (Agerholm 2016). He was narrowly defeated in the run-up, which was in part influenced by the public reaction to the refugee (reception) crisis; the one to win the presidential race was Alexander Van der Bellen, from the Greens. For the first time Austria witnessed a second round of the presidential elections, and now a president coming from outside the two dominating political forces, the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats (*Politico* 2016).

In 2017 parliamentary elections, the Christian Democrats, rebranded as the new People's Party (*Die neue Volkspartei*) won 31.5% of the votes under the leadership of Sebastian Kurz. It formed a coalition with FPÖ, which aimed to limit immigration; to decrease welfare benefits to non-Austrians; and to prevent the influence of political Islam (*New York Times* 2016). Thus, Austria became one of the few West European countries to have a right-wing populist party in a governing coalition in power. As such, it seems Austria's policy towards Turkey's EU membership bid would remain skeptical for the foreseeable future. In addition, Turkish immigrants and Turkey's accession process may continue to be used in political confrontations as a culturally polarizing issue particularly before elections, by both center-right and especially by right-wing populist parties.

# *5.3.3 Case 3: Instrumentalization of Turkey and Turkish Immigrants in German Politics and the Rise of AfD*

Germany, as the main destination country for many Syrians coming through Turkey and Greece, has experienced first-hand the effect of the refugee (reception) crisis. Consequently, one of the main themes in German politics, especially in recent years, has been immigration. Turkish immigrants are the largest minority group in Germany. Germany signed a bilateral recruitment agreement with Turkey on 30 October 1961 because of the shortages in its labor market. Although the recruitment of guest workers was initially intended to be temporary, Turkish immigrants have become a permanent component of German society. However, despite a long history of immigration, Germany insisted on not being a country of immigration (Senay 2017).

The recent refugee (reception) crisis has been one of the most important issues to influence German politics recently, and it has revealed deep divisions within German society. Chancellor Angela Merkel stated at the end of August 2015 that there were no limits to the number of refugees Germany would accept; her famous phrase was "we can handle this". Moreover, Germany was the pioneering country, which pushed for the solidarity principle across the EU for sharing the burden of accommodating all the incoming refugees. However, this system would not function because of the resistance of several countries. On 19 September 2016, Merkel admitted that errors had been made with regard to the refugee policy. In the aftermath of the crisis, Germany made significant investments for integrating immigrants in German society, and in May 2016 the government agreed on a new integration law.

At the Congress of the Bavarian-based Christian Social Union (*Christlich-Soziale Union*, CSU) in September 2016, there was a demand for a clear change of "Berlin's asylum politics". There were requests for introducing an upper limit of 200,000 asylum seekers per year; the abolition of dual citizenship (which had been introduced in order to better integrate Turkish immigrants); and the immediate deportation of immigrants with rejected asylum applications. In addition, a permanent federal ban on the burka, and the development of a general law to limit immigration were listed among the main requests for further cooperation between CSU and Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (*Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands*, CDU) for the period between October 2016 up to fall 2017, when federal elections were held.

The radical right National Democratic Party (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, NPD) had a marginal influence contained to the sub-federal level, while the AfD, which was established in 2013, had a surprising ascension into German politics in the aftermath of the economic and refugee (reception) crises, even entering the federal parliament after the 2017 elections. AfD was founded as a single issue-party focused on opposing the Euro and the Eurozone bailouts, but in 2015, after a split, the party's new leader transformed it into an anti-immigration and anti-Islam party (Dennison and Pardijs 2016, p.17). AfD exhibits ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and nativism, which is a combination of xenophobia and ethnic nationalism and it claims that the "homogeneous nation" is under threat (Schelter et al. 2016, pp. 440–441). AfD also shares some similar concerns against immigration with PEGIDA (*Patriotische Europäer Gegen Islamisierung des Abendlandes*, see Önnerfors, Chap. 9 in this volume), which would gather popular support, especially in Dresden, in late 2014 and early 2015 as a radical right and xenophobic social movement. While German mainstream parties condemned PEGIDA for its xenophobia and Islamophobia, AfD views PEGIDA more favorably. AfD's main "others" are the Muslim refugees and immigrants. Illustratively, during the AfD campaign for the Berlin state parliament, campaign placards were printed in both Russian and Polish, besides German. However, there were no posters in Turkish, despite that Turks are the largest minority group in Berlin (Zeller 2016). Some of its leading politicians, such as Alexander Gauland, expressed racist opinions about Germans of foreign origin (Benedikter and Karolewski 2016, pp. 425–426). AfD's slogan is "Asylum Requires Borders – Red Card for Merkel"; it perceives the refugee (reception) crisis and the subsequent integration of immigrants and refugees as the biggest threat facing Europe.

In the aftermath of economic and financial crises of the Eurozone, which were followed shortly by the European refugee (reception) crisis, Germany's leadership role within the EU has become stronger, and Germany wields crucial influence in defining strategic relations with Turkey (Turhan 2016, p. 29). In this context, AfD opposes Turkey's EU membership bid because of ethno-cultural differences (Grimm 2015, p. 273). The AfD policy towards Turkey's EU membership was made explicit in the party program for the 2014 EU parliamentary elections. It advocated, "first consolidation, then expansion: EU accession negotiations with Turkey are to be stopped. The accession of additional countries requires their fulfillment of all entry criteria". In the field of immigration and asylum policy, it was emphasized that: "Immigration to gain free access to the German social systems must be prevented […]" (AfD Party Program 2014). More recently, the AfD's policy platform reads "Islam does not belong to Germany" and calls for a ban on the construction of mosques (*New York Times* 2016), declaring Islam incompatible with German culture (*Sky News* 2017).

The attitude towards Turkish immigrants seems to be ambivalent (Senay 2017). On the one hand, Wolfgang Kaschuba, the director of the Berlin Institute for Integration and Migration Research, argues "the new [Syrian] migrants occupy the outermost position of the German social order while those with an immigrant background, who have already been in Germany for a long time move to the center" (Kaschuba in Senay 2017). As a result, the recent refugee (reception) crisis has contributed to intensified exchanges between the Turkish minority and the German majority. Moreover, it has increased the need of German authorities to cooperate with the Turkish minority on this matter. On the other hand, this "crisis" has led to rising anti-immigrant sentiments and discourses, which have negative implications for the German Turks as well. The Cologne sexual assaults on New Year's Eve in December 2015 (see also Edenborg, Chap. 7 in this volume) were particularly potent in triggering a highly controversial debate about refugees, as well as Islamic culture more broadly, with wider negative implications for Germany's Muslim population, including the Turkish minority (Senay 2017).

Turkish immigrants and Turkey's EU membership bid have been a popular debate in German domestic politics for many years, in particular due to the discourse and politics of CDU and CSU. Following the same path, the AfD instrumentalized problems associated with refugees and emphasized the cultural security theme in its discourse with regard to the incoming refugees, the integration of the Turkish minority in Germany, and Turkey's EU membership. This approach has proven successful even in ensuring AfD's entrance into the German federal parliament.

# **5.4 Conclusions**

Socio-economic turbulences like financial and economic crises, and forced migration create a favorable environment for the rise of right-wing populist parties (Dudasova 2016, p. 327). In this context, adopting a stance against Turkey's EU membership, and the presence of Turkish immigrants in Europe can be observed as one of the remarkable arguments of these parties to strengthen their roles by galvanizing support. This notwithstanding, many right-wing populist parties do not have yet a significant presence in their respective parliaments. However, they may influence mainstream parties' discourses and policies, particularly related to politics of migration (Akkerman 2018). For instance, UKIP won only one seat in the May 2015 elections but its populist rhetoric has nonetheless triggered anti-immigrant and anti-EU sentiments in the UK, which eventually determined the Conservatives to call for the Brexit referendum (Inglehart and Norris 2016, p. 6). Therefore, the discourse of these parties against Turkey and Turkish immigrants may bring long lasting side effects beyond mobilizing their voters at election time or for referendums.

As this chapter unveiled, right-wing populist actors in Europe resort to the use of Turkish migrants and Turkey (in particular, its EU membership process) as an "othering" element and culturally polarizing issue within European societies, by employing the theme of cultural security. In the case of Germany, Turkey's EU membership process and the existence of Turkish minority in the country have been frequently used in domestic politics by CDU for many years. However, after the financial crisis and the refugee (reception) crisis, AfD started to employ these elements more strongly as a culturally polarizing issue and promoted them as part of cultural security threats, which contributed to its rise and entrance to German federal parliament. In fact, AfD became the first right-wing populist party with a radical agenda to enter the federal parliament after the World War II. Similarly, these elements have been intensively used also in Austrian right-wing politics for several years. FPÖ, which became the junior partner in the coalition government after 2017, has been using them more strongly as a culturally polarizing issue in recent years, especially with the rise of refugee (reception) crisis-based populism in Europe.

The Brexit referendum in the UK is a distinctive case. It shows that political actors may combine the cultural security theme with other issues, such as criminalization and alleged mass migration, to strengthen their discourse and to mobilize more voters. The instrumentalization of Turks is not unexpected in German and Austrian right-wing politics since there have been already high levels of skepticism towards Turkey's EU membership in these countries and they have significant Turkish communities too. However, Vote Leave campaign and the Brexit process overall showed that right-wing populist discourse may instrumentalize Turkey and Turks as a cultural security issue even in a country, which is relatively more supportive of Turkey's EU membership and which does not have a remarkable Turkish immigrant community experience. Meanwhile, the resurgence of negative discourse on immigrants and refugees, as observed in the cases of Austria and Germany, maintain and even strengthen the cultural boundaries separating the Turkish immigrants from their host European societies. Such a stance may prove to have a negative impact on the long run, not only by slowing down and endangering the integration process of Turkish immigrants but also by preventing social cohesion in European societies.

# **References**


**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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# **Part II Retrogressive Mobilizations Outside the Political Arena**

# **Chapter 6 The Trans-European Mobilization of "Generation Identity"**

**Anita Nissen**

# **6.1 Introduction**

On October 20, 2012, 70 activists from the new right youth organization Generation Identity (*Génération Identitaire*, GI) rallied on the roof of a newly constructed mosque in the French town of Poitiers. Mobilizing near the historical grounds where Charles Martell's army had fought off the Ottomans in 732, the activists evoked the imagery of a protracted conflict between Christian Europe and its Muslim other. In a similar register of battle, GI France's YouTube video posted a few months prior, entitled "Declaration of War" (*Déclaration de Guerre*),1 showed the French activists urgently describing the hardships of European youth, betrayed by the ideals of the generation of 1968 and its embrace of multiculturalism. The video quickly spread across Europe, and within a few months, GI Facebook groups appeared in several other European countries, where far-right activists adopted both the group's logo and view of the world (Eckes 2016; Bruns et al. 2017).

At the time of writing, national GI groups exist in 12 European countries. Among these, the French, Austrian, and German groups are by far the most active in terms of street activism, strategy, and intra-organizational communication and integration (Bruns et al. 2017). On the transnational level, the GI network assembles under a set of overarching concepts, aiming at the preservation of a *European* identity against the threat of a foreign "invasion". Within the common framework, however, the groups mobilize autonomously at the domestic level. Since the movement's establishment in 2012, domestic activities have been combined with joint transnational events, including European campaigns, transnational demonstrations, the

<sup>1</sup>The video with English subtitles: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kqybsUqkOWs

A. Nissen (\*)

Department of Politics and Society, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark e-mail: nissen\_anita@hotmail.com

O. C. Norocel et al. (eds.), *Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41694-2\_6

annual Summer University in France2 (with European participation since 2014), various cross-national seminars and exchanges, and most famously, the 2017 "Defend Europe" boats mission in the Mediterranean.

Despite different domestic grievances, constraints, identifications, and historical trajectories, the GI activists have managed to construct and maintain a common identity as members of a distinctly *European* community. This chapter explores GI at the level of transnational movement activism, using frame analysis to interpret how they achieve a common European identity through the attribution of protagonist and antagonist positions in the midst of the allegedly on-going "Great Replacement". Transnational identity construction appears rather paradoxical in relation to far-right nationalists, making it a rarely explored far-right phenomenon (see Zúquete 2015). The chapter aims at closing this empirical gap, by explaining how the GI groups expand the borders of the "heartland" to the entire European continent (Taggart 2004), while simultaneously emphasizing their own national identities. At the same time, the chapter focuses on the GI groups' expressions of anti-liberal sentiments during the "refugee crisis", framed in the form of blame attributions regarding the mainstream politicians' lack of protection of the European welfare and culture. The GI activists jointly construct a conservative and protectionist "us" in juxtaposition to a progressive and social-liberal "them," with the hope of sowing public distrust in policies promoting multiculturalism, and, in the long term, claiming societal hegemony. To further this goal, they forge a transnational alliance around the safeguarding of the European culture, identity, and welfare provisions. Hence, the analysis will show that the various GI groups present themselves as the last bastion in the defense of Europe, fighting simultaneously against Muslim "others" and European proponents of liberalist ideals. While they present the prior as an "invading" force, they villainize the latter for permitting the pending societal rupture and combat them at the meta-political level.

# *6.1.1 Framing Transnational Collective Identities*

In social movement studies, there is much debate about the conceptualization of "collective identity" (Flescher Fominaya 2010). Most scholars agree that some determining characteristics need to be present in order to foster a group's cohesion and ability to act in unison (Melucci 1995). This creation of a collective sense of "we"-ness also forms a basis for collective action, and acts as a way to organize loyalties. Movement organizers must then create a group consciousness by constructing an identity around which the activists can unite (Tilly 2005). These shared attributes do not emerge naturally from movements. Instead, movement activists

<sup>2</sup>GI France and The Identitarians (*Les Identitaires*, BI's new name since August 2016) organize the Summer University. It involves seminars around new right ideology, communication strategies, and combat training (for a detailed account, see Bouron 2014).

must strategically frame their understandings of self and of the "other", in order to make them both communicable.

The concept of framing refers to "an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's present or past environments" (Snow and Benford 1992, p. 137). Movement entrepreneurs frequently employ "collective action frames" as a means to garner support and "to demobilize antagonists" (Snow and Benford 1988, p. 198). These collective action frames perform three "core framing tasks", a diagnostic (what is wrong), prognostic (what should be done about it), and motivational action (why people should act) (Snow and Benford 1988, p. 198).

Hunt et al. (1994) combine the concepts of framing and collective identity in the concept of "identity field". Identity fields have three dimensions: protagonists, antagonists and audiences. The "protagonist" identity field consists of the "we" that advocates, sympathizes with, or benefits from the movement's overall values, ambitions and strategies. It also involves claims about the movement and its actors, allies, and constituents. The antagonist field, on the other hand, is comprised of the "culpable agents" for a given problem, which "are viewed as having 'caused' or exacerbated the problem" and which are ascribed with "traits and motives" for these actions (Hunt et al. 1994, p. 191). Thus, protagonist and antagonist fields relate to the general diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames.

# *6.1.2 Data Collection*

The chapter draws on material from GI groups in France (*Génération Identitaire*), Austria (*Identitäre Bewegung Österreich*), Germany (*Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland*), Italy (*Generazione Identitaria*), the Czech Republic (*Generace Identity*), Hungary (*Identitás Generáció*) and Slovenia (*Generacija Identitete*). These represent some of the most active GI groups in the period under scrutiny (2015–2017).3 The primary data consists of written materials from the individual groups' webpages and Facebook accounts,4 produced in relation to protests against their political opponents.5 The relevant Facebook posts were identified via a keyword search of protest terms in the seven national GI groups' Facebook posts in the

<sup>3</sup>Even though GI Hungary and GI Slovenia both only started protest activities in 2016. For a closer look at GI Hungary, see Kondor and Littler, Chap. 8 in this volume.

<sup>4</sup> In April 2018, when writing this chapter, the Facebook accounts of the GI groups were still accessible. However, in June 2018, Facebook decided to shut down all GI-related pages across Europe (for details, see Bailey 2018). This chapter will still refer to the date of the Facebook-posts cited. Please contact the author if you are interested in consulting the exact post-dataset (retrieved using NetVizz).

<sup>5</sup>Please contact the author for more information about the protest event data.

period 2015–2017 (involving 6322 posts in total).6 The protest data was collected via the method of protest event analysis (see Hutter 2014 for more on this approach), and includes data on both regular protest events (such as demonstrations, bannerdrops, campaigns, street theatre performances, solidarity actions, etc.) and transnational GI meetings and conferences. As the focus in this chapter is upon the *transnational* construction of identity, only the protest events with a transnational aspect have been included. For this chapter's purposes, this involves protest events or meetings involving the participation of several national GI groups, and events or activities that have diffused from one national GI group to more than two others. Secondary sources consisting of previous scholarly contributions on their activities, history, and viewpoints are also included, particularly in the first two sections, which focus on *Generation Identity* as a movement, and its conception of "identity".7

# **6.2 Introducing Generation Identity: New Right Counter-Culture with Left-Wing Means**

GI France was created as the youth branch of the French new right political association Identity Block (*Bloc Identitaire*, BI) (created in 2002), which has its antecedents in Radical Unity (*Unité Radicale*), a neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic organization disbanded by the French authorities (Winkler 2017). Identity Block is "known for its radical positions vis-à-vis immigration, Islam, and for its defense of the European civilization and the Europeans" (François 2009), a legacy GI has continued. Inspired by the work of left-wing intellectual Antonio Gramsci, both BI and GI aim to change the discourse in the pre-political and cultural space, in order to attain cultural hegemony (Eckes 2016). Consequently, GI utilizes a professional communication strategy, especially on social media, where the activists combine pop cultural symbolism with radical viewpoints (Weiß 2017). Heavily inspired by the Italian neo-Fascist movement *CasaPound*, GI's action repertoire also draws heavily on the activities of left-wing movements (Bruns et al. 2017), including meeting interruptions, bannerdrops, and site occupations. This unconventional strategy of public space penetration requires only a small number of activists, while the choices of place, timing, and banner statements often still lead to high media coverage.

In terms of GI's ideology, the movement largely draws on the work of French, German and Italian "new right" actors, especially the German Conservative Revolution (*Konservative Revolution*) of the 1920s, and the French Research and Study Group for European Civilization (*Groupement de recherche et d'études pour la civilisation européenne*, or GRECE), formed in 1968. The post-World War II new

<sup>6</sup>The 6322 posts are divided accordingly amongst the national GI groups: GI France (1508 posts); GI Austria (1186); GI Germany (1677); GI Italy (1241); GI Czech Republic (291); and GI Hungary (419). In the latter two cases, it was only possible to retrieve data from August 2016 and September 2016 respectively, while GI Slovenia's Facebook account was blocked at the time of data retrieval.

<sup>7</sup>The author has translated the quotes that were not originally in English.

right seeks respectability by strongly rejecting fascism and nationalism. It attempts to create a counter-discourse to the 1968 generation by appropriating exactly these actors' strategies and claims to a right-wing discourse of ethnic homogeneity and "discrimination against all things 'foreign'" (Minkenberg 2000, pp. 179–180). The political current has inspired several of today's far-right parties (Minkenberg 2000). As the following section shows, the GI's conception of "identity" draws heavily on the "new right" understandings of the term.

# **6.3 Identity: Regional, National and European-But Not Egalitarian**

In order to understand GI's protagonist and antagonist identity construction, one must first grasp how the transnational movement perceives the concept of "identity". The GI activists see their identity and culture as consisting of three interdependent layers: the regional, national, and European, and use the image of a matryoshka to explain this view. You cannot be German without also being e.g. Bavarian and European, and you cannot be European without a corresponding national and regional identity. Yet, merely being a citizen of a European country is not sufficient to make you truly European (Robert in Weiß 2017, p. 105).

According to GI, the "pure" European identities are currently under threat from multiculturalism, egalitarianism, and individualism, leading to the autochthonous population experiencing an existential crisis (Willinger 2013). In GI's interpretation, individualism has replaced social bonds and communitarian ties, creating autochthonous Europeans deprived of roots and identity, and thus suffering decline, loss and alienation. This reading is based on the new right understanding that humans are "lost and unsettled without community, fixed structures and hierarchies" (Bruns et al. 2017, p. 226). Against individualism, GI demands the return to a collective, communitarian, and heritage-based human "we" built on national ancestry. Accordingly, GI hopes for a societal return to the origins, as they "discovered that [they] have roots and ancestors–and thus a future" (Morgan 2013, p. 10). In this reading, the world should consist of separate, ethnically homogenous communities, clearing the way for a "bright future of the past" (Weiß 2017, p. 99). The GI activists thus wish to restore the "world as it 'was'" (Taggart 2004, p. 274), by re-establishing the imaginary ethnically "pure" societies of the past, which have been corrupted by foreign influences, especially globalization, and third-country immigration. As the GI Manifesto states: "We are the rightful heirs to this continent, and we will not give up our inheritance" (Willinger 2013, p. 38).

GI's wish to protect the European civilizational identity against "foreign" influences is based on the notion of "ethnopluralism". Along similar lines as Huntington's (1993) argument, the movement considers the world's different civilizations too distinct to live side by side peacefully, and they are instead destined to wage war against each other. This forms the basis for GI's statement that "We are the generation of ethnic fracture, of the total failure of integration, the generation of forced crossbreeding" (Morgan 2013, p. 9). The argument draws on the French new right intellectual Alain de Benoist's aforementioned term *ethnopluralism*. He argues that ethnically and culturally heterogeneous people are hierarchically equal, yet, they cannot coexist in the same geographical space, without this leading to ethnic conflict. At its core, the concept aims to strengthen natural borders, producing a global apartheid of ethnically segregated states, as the only way to ensure ethnic diversity is through the geographical segregation of cultures (Minkenberg 2000). GI in this way understands identity as ethnocultural and organic, as culture and identity are considered static, essentialist and nativist (Mense 2017). The argument is then only a linguistic turn away from explicit racism, as the term "race" solely has been replaced by "culture", thereby upholding the differentialist racism (Eckes 2016) and totalitarian worldview of the past (Mense 2017). This ethnic distinction mainly targets one particular "other", namely Islam and its adherents, who are considered the greatest visible threat currently facing the identity and culture of Europe's autochthonous population.

While GI maintains that there are regional and national distinctions between the autochthonous European populations, the activists consider all to belong to the same overarching cultural sphere. In the new right conception, the Europeans are bound by a "community of fate", entailing a predestined need to defend the continent together (Bruns et al. 2017, p. 236). This makes the GI activists believe that a pan-European alliance is the best means to protect their identity and civilization. Yet, the further characterization of this "European civilization" is remarkably vague, as the description does not reach much beyond shared cultural and traditional traits. The three-layered identity-conception permits the groups to place their focus differently in terms of regionalism, nationalism and Europeanism. The Austrian and German GI groups for instance emphasize the *völkisch* nationalism, while the French and Italian groups mainly focus on the regions and Europe (Bruns et al. 2017).

Despite differences between the various GI groups, they unite around the assertion that the battle against mass-immigration and "Islamization" (i.e. the gradual take-over of Muslim law and culture in Europe) "is the battle of our generation" (GI Austria 2017). Consequently, while the GI groups also mobilize against other identity-related issues, such as LGBT and gender policies, Muslim immigration is the main object of their joint mobilization. As will be shown in the following frame analysis, this became particularly evident during the so-called refugee crisis, where all the groups united around the call of defending Europe against the third-country immigrants and refugees.

# **6.4 "Defend Europe": GI and the European "Refugee Crisis"**

All of the national GI groups under study increased their mobilization frequencies during the pan-European refugee (reception) crisis (2015–2017),8 albeit to varied extents, with GI Germany, GI Austria, and GI France by far organizing the most protest actions in their respective countries. Moreover, except for the larger focus on refugees and asylum seekers in the 2015–2017 period, the overarching collective action frames remained similar to the ones employed since the creation of GI France in 2012. GI France was already rather active on the streets from 2013 onwards, and especially GI Austria and GI Germany strongly increased their protest actions in the 2015–2017 period. GI Hungary and GI Slovenia, on the other hand, only began carrying out protest actions in 2016, while GI Czech Republic and GI Italy have struggled more to organize their own protest actions, mainly due to limited resources. In terms of protest forms, all GI groups mainly carried out demonstrative protests, most commonly in the form of banner-drops. Building occupations and disruptions of meetings have been recurring confrontational protest tactics, but before 2015, it was mainly GI France that employed confrontational protest forms to express its demands. Yet, from 2015 onwards, GI Austria and GI Germany also carried out numerous blockades of roads and entrances to buildings, such as refugee and migrant centers, and, in this way, radicalized their mobilization substantially.

Moreover, in the 2015–2017 period, Eastern and Western European groups joined forces at several transnational events, including numerous border protests, the 2016 "Summer of Resistance" demonstrations in Paris, Vienna, and Berlin, street theatre performances against terrorism and Islamist violence, and "solidarity actions" for the autochthonous European population. The following section goes through GI's four diagnoses in relation to these protests, namely that the refugees and immigrants pose a threat in cultural, demographic, economic, and security terms.9 This analysis also examines the movement's antagonist and protagonist identity constructions.

<sup>8</sup>While the refugee (reception) crisis was at its height in 2015–2016, many of the national and EU-responses to the situation were either only taking shape, or further developed during 2017, just as the migrant routes continued to be a topic of heated debate throughout that year.

<sup>9</sup>Other European radical and extreme right populist movements and parties also commonly voice these four frames (see Lazaridis and Campani 2017).

# *6.4.1 Cultural Threat: Loss of "European Identity" Through Islamization*

Unsurprisingly, all GI groups strongly voice the frame of *cultural threat*. GI fears the erosion of a culturally and biologically based European identity through Muslim immigration and alleged Islamization, due to the conviction that the communitarian and homogenous "we" is in danger of disappearing through the mass-immigration of civilizational "others". This view was expressed cohesively at GI's 2016 "Summer of Resistance" demonstrations in Paris, Vienna, and Berlin. The French demonstration, "This is Our Home" (*On est chez nous*), was joined by German and Austrian GI activists, and it was organized to "show our determination to continue living on our land according to our laws, our values, in the respect of our identity".10 Similarly, in Vienna, at the annual European GI protest, this time under the motto "Defend Europe", GI Austria demanded the "unconditional protection of the European culture and tradition" (GI Austria 2016).

To curb the cultural threat, GI suggests closing the borders, and promotes a process of remigration. The call for so-called "remigration" of third-country immigrants is a term GI France has adopted from BI, referring to the (forced) returning of third-country immigrants to their home countries. As argued by Aftenberger (2017), this is merely a rewriting of the neo-Nazi calls for "Foreigners out" (*Ausländer raus*). At the protest events, the "remigration" demand is mainly directed towards "illegal" and "criminal" immigrants, as well as "economic refugees". Yet, in reality, it relates to all third-country immigrants, as, in the words of GI Germany, there should be "a demographic tendency change towards remigration" (GI Germany n.d.-b).

# *6.4.2 Demographic Threat: Fearing the Great Replacement*

The *demographic threat* frame revolves around the conviction that Europe is currently undergoing a *Great Replacement* process. Adopting Renaud Camus'11 concept, GI argues that the European autochthonous population is gradually being "repressed and replaced" by non-European immigrants, due to the combination of falling birth rates, and the "growth of Islamic parallel societies and massimmigration" (GI Germany n.d.-a). Particularly in Western Europe, activists fear becoming minorities in their own country within a few decades, and in this way turning into "the Indians of Europe" (Morgan 2013, p. 33). In reference to Eastern Europe, activists argue that once the West is "full", the East will follow.12 This

<sup>10</sup>GI France Facebook post 15.5.2016. Accessed 25 Apr 2018.

<sup>11</sup>He published the book The Replacement of People (*Le Changement de people*) in 2013, outlining what he argued to be the ongoing Europe-wide "phenomenon".

<sup>12</sup>Speech by Jean-David Cattin, delivered at a GI Czech Republic meeting in 2014: https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=JEdfEHCcPRo. Accessed 25 Apr 2018.

diagnosis is closely interlinked with the cultural threat outlined above, and it led the GI national groups to organize numerous protest events, such as the "Stop the Great Replacement" demonstration in Vienna in June 2015, which included GI activists from across Europe.13 Moreover, as part of the 2016 "Summer of Resistance" protests, GI Germany organized an "Uprising against the Injustice" (*Aufstand gegen das Unrecht*), stating that "We are in the frontline against the self-abolition14 and the Great Replacement" (GI Germany 2016c). Here, particularly GI Germany's wordchoice of "self-abolition" points to the existential threat that the non-European immigrants pose, and which should motivate people to act.

# *6.4.3 Economic Threat: Welfare for "Our Own People First"*

Considering the economic threat, GI aligns with the welfare chauvinist frame shared by several radical right parties (see: Cinpoeş and Norocel, Chap. 4; Hellström and Tawat, Chap. 2 in the present volume) and considers third-country immigrants detrimental to the various European social systems (Morgan 2013). Yet, very similar to neo-fascist parties and organizations, such as *Golden Dawn* (Greece), *Hogar Social* (Spain) and *CasaPound* (Italy), the majority of the national GI groups take this welfare-protectionist stance to a further extreme through their so-called "Generation Solidarity", or "Patriotic Solidarity" actions. They are based on the same claims as those of the radical right–that the migrants are offered better social benefits than the socially vulnerable autochthonous Europeans, who are considered "left behind" by the national governments and civil society organizations. Yet, by adhering to a sort of "ethnicized socialism" (François 2009), GI frames these direct social actions (cf. Castelli Gattinara and Froio 2016) as an instance of explicit anti-national racism (e.g. anti-French, anti-Italian), and carries out acts of resistance. Activists have, for instance, organized charity and assistance drives exclusively targeting "autochthonous" groups of socioeconomically vulnerable individuals. In France, some of the local groups give donations and serve pork soup to the homeless every winter with the slogan "Ours before the others". GI Austria similarly helps the people "who are let down by politics", by providing the homeless with goulash soup (thus containing pork).15 GI Italy and GI Czech Republic, on the other hand, collect donations for national citizens, while GI Hungary and GI Germany distribute food to the poor.

<sup>13</sup>GI Austria Facebook post 6.6.2015. Accessed 25 Apr 2018.

<sup>14</sup>A reference to the 2010 book Germany Abolishes Itself (*Deutschland schafft sich ab*) by Thilo Sarrazin, a previous member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD).

<sup>15</sup>GI Austria Facebook post 8.10.2015. Accessed 25 Apr 2018.

# *6.4.4 Security Threat: Terrorists, Islamists and Criminal Immigrants*

The *security threat* frame is based on the ethnopluralist premise that culturally distinct people cannot live in the same geographical place without this leading to ethnic strife, conflicts, and violence (instigated by the non-autochthonous residents). GI France has expressed this since 2012, carrying out several campaigns against criminal immigrants (the so-called "riff-raff"), who they accuse of acting violently against the autochthonous population, and GI Austria and GI Italy have conducted similar actions. During the refugee crisis, GI France's blockade of the entrance to Calais in March 2016 (Dearden 2016), and GI Austria and GI Germany's second border protest in Freilassing in January 2016 both highlighted the violent nature of refugees and immigrants. Referring to the events on New Year's Eve in Cologne, GI Germany even referred to the "hundreds of thousands of criminals", which the open borders had "flushed" into the country (GI Germany 2016a).

The rise in Islamist terrorist attacks on European soil in the period of 2015–2016 added to the saliency of the security frame. One of the more explicit ways of demonstrating the dangerous nature of Islamist terrorists was through public performances of imitated terrorist attacks and/or ISIS killings. This particular type of protest event began in Austria in December 2015,16 and spread over to Prague (GI Germany 2016b), several German cities (see GI Germany 2017), and Budapest (GI Hungary 2017a). Some of the numerous border protests that took place in the period from June 2015–March 2016 also revolved around the protection against Islamist terrorists and/or criminal immigrants. Moreover, in both February 2016 and November 2017, GI France planned to organize a transnational demonstration against terrorism, the first in Molenbeek, in Brussels region (entitled "Expulsion of the terrorists"), and the second in Paris ("Facing Terrorists: Defend Europe!"). However, both of these demonstrations were forbidden by the authorities, due to fears of violence erupting between GI activists and counter-demonstrators. The most commonly voiced prognosis for the terrorist threat is again the return of the Muslim immigrants to their countries of origin ("remigration"), and the reinforcement of the national and/or EU borders.

As has become visible from the analysis above, GI's transnational protest activities during the refugee crisis were largely framed around the matter of safeguarding the European civilizational identity against non-European refugees and immigrants. The over-arching diagnostic frame identified by the various GI groups was that *Muslim mass-immigration poses a threat to the European autochthonous population*, which is further divisible into cultural, demographic, economic, and security threat dimensions. While there are of course differences between the frames employed by the various GI groups, all of these frames are intrinsically linked. Moreover, at their core, they all lead to the same conclusion: Due to the existential

<sup>16</sup> ISIS-Enthauptung mitten in WIEN | Mariahilfer Straße 21.12.2015 (YouTube). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WwRV2bYGa5E. Accessed 25 Apr 2018.

threat that Muslim immigrants pose to the European autochthonous population, there should be no Muslim immigrants or refugees in Europe.

# **6.5 Protagonist Identity: A Fighting Community in the Defense of European Civilization**

At its foundation in 2013, GI presented itself as a "fighting community" on its website (Morgan 2013, p. 12). The GI groups preserve this sentiment in their frequent references to masculine warriors and portrayals of themselves as heroic knights, who will come to the rescue of Europe (Weiß 2017). While women should preferably play the role of "traditional homemakers", the movement maintains a masculinity ideal based on classical conceptions of the heterosexual, strong, warrior-like men (Blum 2017, p. 329). This, for instance, becomes visible in the frequent depictions of, and participation in, combat sports, as both the male and female activists are offered combat skills training, for instance at GI camps or conferences (cf. Blum 2017; Bruns et al. 2017). At the annual Summer Universities in France, the participants even wear the same clothes, symbolizing uniformity and order (Dupin 2017). The use of these symbols, practices, and frames should be seen in relation with GI France's ambition "to prevent the civil war" in Europe (GI France leader, Pierre Larti cited in Dupin 2017, p. 45). The movement furthers this aim through its selfpresentation as "the barricade upon which our youth are mounting in order to fight for their identity" (Morgan 2013, p. 12). GI thereby conjures an apocalyptic sentiment, portraying itself as the last bastion in the defense of the autochthonous ethnically "pure" European population, fighting against egalitarianism, Islam, and mass immigration.

Besides the attributes outlined above, much of the group's identity work revolves around historical war references, starting with the movement's logo, the Greek letter *Lambda*, which refers to the shields of the outnumbered Spartan soldiers as depicted in the movie *300*. As stated by a member of GI Czech Republic, the *Lambda* should be seen as "a symbol of determination and resilience" (GI Czech Republic 2015). This aligns with the frequent references to the shared history of battling Islam as a joint European venture. Through the "embellishment and reconstitution of relevant aspects of the past" (Hunt et al. 1994, p. 195), GI employs the glorification of the European past for a dual purpose. The movement provides a pan-European narrative for the ongoing battle against the culturally foreign oppressor, but also grounds this narrative in actual historical occurrences. GI France's frequent mention of Charles Martel and his Poitiers victory is one example among many others, as each GI group refers to its own country's historical figures and events. Historical battles are also discussed at the transnational GI level, for instance at the 2016 Summer University, which was entitled "From Covadonga to Calais", in reference to the site of the first Christian victory over the Islamic Umuyyad Caliphate on the Iberian Peninsula in 722 AD.

The symbolic "battle frame" also becomes visible through demonstrations, processions, and other protest events commemorating historical European victories over the Ottomans. As examples, GI Hungary and GI Austria respectively organized a commemorative procession in the autumn of 2017, with participation by GI activists from abroad. Both marches referred to battles, where armies of European soldiers had fought off the Ottomans (Battle of Buda in 1686, and Battle of Vienna in 1683 respectively) (GI Hungary 2017b; GI Austria 2017). GI's highlighting of these battles can be considered allusions to a European "mythical Golden Age", where the continent "allegedly experienced unity and glory, fullness and greatness" (Forchtner 2016, p. 275), a period to which Europe should return.

Moreover, as the victories in these battles not only led to the liberation of the country in which the clash took place, but also several other states, the defense of Europe is not only a national matter. Rather, it becomes a pan-European project, as "if one state falls, the next ones will follow". As mentioned earlier, GI also employs this way of framing the situation when explaining the Eastern European GI group's strong mobilization against Islam, despite the comparatively low numbers of Muslim residents in that part of Europe.17 These pan-European framings of battling Islam should be seen in connection with GI's call for a so-called Reconquista of Europe, i.e. the reconquering of the continent from the Muslim "invaders",18 either to be perceived "metaphorically or more concrete…" (Les Identitaires n.d.). While the concrete is rather self-explanatory, the metaphorical sense refers to the battle for cultural hegemony, where GI is up against the proponents of today's prevalent leftliberal societal discourse.

# **6.6 Antagonist Identities: The European Political Leadership, Pro-migrant Actors, and Muslim Immigrants**

While GI frames immigrants as the most acute threat to the maintenance of European identity, the movement identifies national, and in some cases European, governments and the left-wing elite as the main culprits. The main antagonists, in other words, are those actors who, in their appeals to pluralism and egalitarianism, do not counter third-country immigration to Europe. They thus come in conflict with GI's cause of preserving, or returning to, a Europe that is homogeneously 'pure'. Particularly the *economic threat* diagnosis is very strongly blamed on the national politicians and pro-migrant and -minority organizations–proponents of pluralism

<sup>17</sup>See for instance the video of Jean-David Cattin's speech at a GI Czech Republic meeting in 2014: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JEdfEHCcPRo. Accessed 25 Apr 2018.

<sup>18</sup> In 2001, Faye introduced the term "Reconquista" in his call for a defense against the Muslim "colonization of Europe" (Weiß 2017). It derives from Spanish and Portuguese and refers to the reconquering of the Muslim kingdoms by the Christians on the Iberian Peninsula.

and human rights. GI portrays these actors as lacking compassion for the autochthonous population, who they see as being sidelined in favor of the foreign "other". Moreover, GI also very clearly villainized pro-migrant and pro-refugee actors during the so-called "Defend Europe" mission in the Mediterranean in 2017. The "mission" consisted of GI activists from Italy, France, Austria, and Germany, who set out in a boat to monitor the rescue missions at sea to ensure that they complied with the regulations. This was targeted at pro-migrant NGOs, which were accused of "human trafficking" and endangering the lives of the refugees (for an account of the "mission", see Oppenheim 2017). Reversely, the GI activists attempted to frame themselves as the *true* humanitarians, unlike the NGOs, which were acting "under the guise of humanitarian rescue operations" (GI Germany n.d.-c).

At the same time, the national governments of particularly the Western European GI groups' states were heavily criticized for their way of dealing with the refugee (reception) crisis, especially in terms of policy responses to the "open borders". Each of the border protests for instance targeted the national, or European, politicians for their irresponsible conduct, their lacking response, or their total loss of control of the refugee situation. Particularly the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, was blamed for her decision to keep the borders open, while especially Viktor Orbán was highlighted as the "good example" for devising policies to restrict further immigration, and in this way became "widely admired in all of Western Europe" for his patriotic conduct (Sellner 2017).

This strategy of blaming the politicians or pro-migrant actors has several purposes. For one, it allows GI "to construct migrants, refugees or Muslims as problems, without explicitly naming them as such" (Lehner 2017, p. 150). Yet, more importantly, the villainization of the liberal actors' responses is in reality an adoption of the "decade-old" extreme right motif of constructing "a left-wing, antinational hegemony" (Aftenberger 2017, p. 218). Hence, by drawing attention to its "unpatriotic" political opponents, who allegedly act against the will of the people, GI attempts to further its own ambition of reclaiming the cultural hegemony of society.

Finally, the third-country immigrants and refugees are also strongly antagonized, albeit not always directly. Besides the allegations of Muslims "Islamizing" European societies, and generally being predisposed to violence, the GI activists also villainized the immigrants and refugees in more implicit ways. One of these was by continuously employing terms questioning the refugees and immigrants' claims for residence in Europe. This delegitimization was done by putting inverted commas around the term refugee (i.e. "refugee"), by referring to them as "economic refugees" (*Wirtschaftsflüchlinge*), or generally as "illegal" or "clandestine". The strategy strongly antagonizes the refugees, as they are attributed with the immoral agenda of false residence claims. Moreover, this discourse strongly objectifies the immigrants, as the actual agency primarily is given to the political elites of European society.

# **6.7 Conclusions**

This chapter analyzed the European new right youth movement *Generation Identity*'s construction of a pan-European collective identity. The analysis revealed that despite the national contextual and organizational differences between the various GI groups, they still agree upon, and jointly mobilize around, a shared conception of "identity", based on ethno-pluralist principles. The movement thus hopes for a future return to an imagined past, where Europe will consist of ethnically homogenous communities, all belonging to the European cultural sphere. In order to begin attaining this goal, the GI activists develop a two-tiered transnational collective identity based on both a civilizational adherence (European) and type of movement (self-ascribed "fighting community"), making them able to carry out transnational protest events together. They thus portray themselves as the last protectors of Europe, heroically coming to the defense of the European autochthonous population, whose communitarian identity is endangered by egalitarianism and liberal values.

GI considers the national governments and the proponents of pluralist policies the main antagonists. The organization expresses this by pointing to the faulty, or lacking, policy proposals and actions carried out by these actors, plus their unfair treatment of the European autochthonous populations. This is not only a means to gain support for GI's immediate cause of curbing third-country immigration to Europe, but also for its main ambition of reclaiming the cultural hegemony within society. It is thus the Muslim "others", who are framed as the main threat, and around which most of the mobilization takes place, while the blame is mainly attributed to the European elites. The Muslim immigrants are depicted as culturally foreign, criminal "invaders", whose presence in Europe is to the detriment of especially the most vulnerable European autochthonous citizens, and who do not have a legal basis for their residence claims. To combat this threat, the GI activists symbolically defend the European borders (through border protests and blockades), but also attempt to give the European populations violent wake-up calls about the dangerous nature of the Muslim immigrants and draw attention to the age-old history of Europe battling Islam. In this way, the "othering" of the Muslim immigrants serves the dual purpose of creating discursive barriers between the homogenous European "us" and the foreign "other", while also acting as an instrument to target the liberal elite.

**Acknowledgements** A special thank you to Måns Ljungstedt from COSMOS – The Centre of Social Movement Studies at Scuola Normale Superiore in Florence, Italy for his valuable comments and editing assistance.

# **References**

Aftenberger, I. (2017). Die 'Identitäre' Beseitigung der andere. In J. Goetz, J. M. Sedlacek, & A. Winkler (Eds.), *Untergangster des Abendlandes* (pp. 203–227). Hamburg: Marta Press.

Bailey, J. (2018, June 21). Far-right group Generation Identity have been banned from Facebook across Europe. *iNews*. https://inews.co.uk/news/generation-identity-banned-facebook/. Accessed 6 Sept 2018.


**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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# **Chapter 7 Endangered Swedish Values: Immigration, Gender Equality, and "Migrants' Sexual Violence"**

**Emil Edenborg**

# **7.1 Introduction**

When Donald Trump motivated building a wall on the US southern border by the need to protect the country from Mexican rapists, not only did he reiterate a centuries-old racist mythology of sexually violent brown men; his statement also points at how the contemporary frenzy for strengthening borders is fueled by racial and sexual anxieties. Pointing at the role of nostalgia, Wendy Brown (2010) argues that the passion for walls we are currently witnessing across the world reflects a masculinist fantasy of restoring sovereignty and protective capacities in the face of uncontrolled outsiders threatening to invade the pure, feminized national body.

After reports of several hundred cases of sexual assault against women in Cologne on New Years' Eve 2015, attacks which the German police said were committed by mostly "young men of North African and Middle Eastern origin", the trope of "migrants' sexual violence" became a key focus in European debates, functioning as a "recited truth" that produces social facts through narrativization and repetition across contexts (Lentin and Titley 2011, p. 21). Ideas that had for long circulated in far-right discourse entered mainstream public spheres to an unprecedented extent. In Sweden too, the events sparked debate. Five days after the reports from Cologne, it was revealed that during the summers of 2014 and 2015, there had been many incidents of sexual harassment at a Swedish music festival arranged in Kungsträdgården in central Stockholm. According to the newspaper *Dagens Nyheter*, these events had not been reported to the media by the police due to fears of fueling anti-immigration sentiments, as many of the assaults were, the internal

E. Edenborg (\*)

Global Politics and Security Program, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden e-mail: emil.edenborg@ui.se

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2020 101

O. C. Norocel et al. (eds.), *Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41694-2\_7

police reports said, committed by "so called refugee youths primarily from Afghanistan" (Wierup and Bouvin 2016).

This chapter examines representations of "migrants' sexual violence" in Swedish media reporting and political debates in the wake of these events, focusing on the supposed relation between immigration and gender equality. Whereas the actual events in Cologne and Kungsträdgården were unrelated (at least in any immediate sense), complex and differed in many ways, a starting point here is that in the Swedish context during early 2016, they formed the background to one single media event. Andreas Hepp and Nick Couldry define media events as "certain situated, thickened, centering performances of mediated communication that are focused on a thematic core, cross different media products and reach a wide and diverse multiplicity of audiences and participants" (2010, p. 12). Thus, the focus of this chapter is the discursive function of the "migrants' sexual violence" trope in the Swedish public sphere in the aftermath of Cologne and Kungsträdgården. On a theoretical level, by drawing on poststructural and feminist literature on borders, I examine in what specific ways gendered, sexualized and racialized boundary-making underwrites border regimes.

In Sweden, national identity has for decades been tied to the idea that the Swedish welfare model has created a unique society based on equality, solidarity and modernism. Gender equality policies such as paid parental leave, individual taxation and free abortion (all introduced in the 1970s) are regarded as cornerstones of the Swedish welfare model, and Swedish politicians commonly describe the country as "the most gender equal country in the world" (Towns 2002). The "feminist foreign policy" introduced in 2014 thus continues a history of positioning Sweden as an international forerunner in gender equality (Agius and Edenborg 2019). In addition, a "generous" refugee policy has been seen as an external face of the Swedish welfare regime (together with foreign aid policy, which is of less relevance to this chapter). The rhetoric of Sweden as exceptionally gender equal and exceptionally welcoming to refugees have both been criticized by feminists and others, for glossing over circumstances that contradict the image of Sweden as a progressive ideal (Martinsson et al. 2016; Mulinari 2016; Norocel 2017). From another angle, the idea of refugee reception as a component of the Swedish welfare model has been challenged by "welfare chauvinist" ideas, arguing that immigration undermines social protection of Swedish citizens (Norocel 2016; see also Hellström and Tawat, Chap. 2 in this volume). Arguably, the notion of Sweden as a liberal ideal in asylum policy was dealt a blow in November 2015, when the social democratic-green government made a turnabout on immigration, reintroducing border controls to Schengen countries and restricting the rules for admitting asylum-seekers down to minimum EU levels, a move described by the Swedish Migration Board as a necessary "breathing space" after Sweden had received 80.000 asylum-seekers during the two preceding months (Åberg 2015). Whereas historically, the notions of being "women-friendly", and "refugee-friendly" have often functioned together to bolster a narrative of the Swedish welfare model as uniquely progressive, the Cologne events were sometimes interpreted as illustrating a conflict between the two. This points to a broader tendency in European politics, where immigration is increasingly portrayed as endangering women's rights, what Sara Farris (2017) describes as "femonationalism".

I argue that in Sweden, the discursive circulation of the "migrants' sexual violence" trope constituted a bordering practice (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2012), retrospectively confirming (implicitly or explicitly) the necessity of the stricter border regime. The idea of endangered gender equality was an important part of a securitization process whereby immigration from countries supposedly characterized by patriarchal cultures was portrayed as an existential threat to the Swedish welfare model. This process has contributed to closing off possibilities to argue for a return to previous, less strict, border policies. Theoretically, the results show how gendered, sexual, and racial dichotomies–in this case of a progressive, modern, and decidedly Swedish gender order imagined as threatened by foreign masculinities– perform a key role in reproducing inside/outside distinctions that underwrite contemporary border regimes, thus illustrating how certain borders may condition the possibility of other borders (Walker 2010, p. 6). Returning to the master frames of this book, the narrative about immigrants bringing patriarchal "un-Swedish values", and thus endangering Swedish gender equality, indicate that gendered notions of culture and welfare, and the emotional registers of nostalgia, hope, and in this case also fear, which are produced when these are deemed threatened, are crucial to understanding how border and migration policies are sustained and justified. The chapter shows that not only are welfare matters always enmeshed with issues pertaining to culture (see Hellström et al., Chap. 1 in this volume); ideas of gender are at the heart of both, in this case even structuring their relation by providing a template for what is perceived as necessary to protect and from whom.

# *7.1.1 Notes on Methodology*

In a qualitative content analysis of selected texts, I identify recurrent themes and use these as starting points for a critical discussion. The first (and most extensive) part of the analysis examines media reporting about the Cologne and Kungsträdgården events in four Swedish newspapers. The sources included were the morning papers *Dagens Nyheter* (DN, liberal independent) and *Svenska Dagbladet* (SvD, conservative independent), and the tabloids *Aftonbladet* (social-democratic independent) and *Expressen* (liberal independent). They all have a national outreach, and are among the most read daily newspapers in Sweden, and together give a rather comprehensive picture of mainstream discourse. With the help of the media archive Retriever, I collected all articles mentioning either the word Cologne ("Köln"), or "Kungsträdgården" during January and February 2016, including news articles, opeds, and debate articles. Articles whose use of these terms was unrelated to the events in question were removed.

Given the aims of the chapter, the analysis concentrates on articles where sexual harassment was mentioned in connection to multiculturalism, refugees, integration, ethno-cultural explanations, or anti-immigration attitudes (whether the link was


**Table 7.1** Synthetic presentation of collected empirical material for part I

reaffirmed or, as was sometimes the case, repudiated). Such connections were made in 155 of the 223 articles, i.e. in slightly more than two thirds (see Table 7.1). Based on thematic grouping, four distinct (albeit overlapping) storylines were identified and analyzed in relation to ongoing discussions in border studies literature. The remaining 68 articles that made no such reference discussed the events either without explaining them, or in terms of men's sexual violence, class, or some other factor. That the latter articles were not analyzed in detail clearly represents a bias, but given that the chapter does not aim to give a "full picture" of Swedish media reporting but rather to specifically analyze discourses on migration and gender equality in the wake of these events, this should not compromise the validity of the results. While I do not systematically compare different types of material or different types of media, but rather seek to identify what storylines were present in the media reporting as a whole, through-out the analysis it is clarified in what type of material (op-ed, news article etc.) and media outlet the individual quotes were found.

The second (and shorter) part looks at how Swedish party leaders in their 2016 speeches in Almedalen, an annual highly publicized political event, focused on "Swedish values" in relation to immigration and gender equality. It examines the extent to which the "migrant's sexual violence" trope by now functioned as a point of reference to suggest that immigration had caused a conflict of values between "Swedish" and "foreign" views on women. The analysis is based on party leaders' speeches during Almedalen 2016, accessed primarily via the parties' own webpages.

# **7.2 Borders, Emotions, and Gender**

The chapter draws on critical theories of borders, geopolitical boundary-making and regimes of mobility. Three interrelated points from this literature are particularly important: (1) that borders are continually performed in the everyday; (2) the role of emotions in such bordering practices, and (3) that border regimes are gendered and sexualized.

The first point, a key idea in so called Critical Border Studies, is that borders, rather than simply territorial dividing lines, can be studied as processes or "bordering practices", denoting activities which have the effect of constituting, sustaining

or modifying borders (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2012). Inspired by Étienne Balibar's idea that "borders are everywhere" (2004), many border researchers understand bordering as a dispersed practice taking place not only at the geographical limits of the state but also in the everyday. Through processes of ongoing "borderwork" (Rumford 2012), or "everyday bordering" (Yuval-Davis et al. 2018) borders are inscribed at various sites within and between states, by various actors, with dramatically different consequences for different people. Moreover, bordering involves an inside-looking demarcation of the nation, and the idea that its core values are imperiled by outsiders, legitimizing those measures deemed necessary to protect the inside from the outside (Parker and Adler-Nissen 2012). Walls and borders, Brown (2010) argues, not only protect but produce the content of the societies they delineate. By promising to protect populations from outsiders endangering "our way of life", they simultaneously define the meaning of that "way of life", nostalgically envisioning what risks being taken away or what has already been lost.

Secondly, as Brown hints at, emotions such as hope, nostalgia, love and hatred play a crucial role in the everyday production of borders. Feminist geographers have explored the affective underpinnings of geopolitical boundary-making, stressing for example how fear creates borders (Pain 2009). Sara Ahmed (2014) argues that the circulation of emotions has a constitutive effect, creating the surfaces and borders that allow us to distinguish between inside and outside. For example, the experience of pain when an object touches or penetrates the skin allows us to experience the boundedness of the body itself: "it is through this violation that I feel the border in the first place" (Ahmed 2014, p. 27). When applied to the collective body, this suggests that the crossing of a border, while indicating the penetrability of the community, simultaneously reproduces the community and reminds us of its existence (Butler and Spivak 2010).

Thirdly, the inside/outside delineations that underwrite bordering practices are imbued with ideas of gender: indeed, "bordering practices are […] made possible by certain operating logics that are always already both highly gendered and racialized", since "particular regimes of mobility and immobility are only imaginable, implementable and sustainable because they tap into and reify prior assumptions about gender, race, class" (Basham and Vaughan-Williams 2013, pp. 524, 510).

In recent years, immigration and multiculturalism are increasingly being portrayed as in conflict with a putatively Western gender order (Edenborg and Jungar forthcoming). Lentin and Titley (2011) identify what they call a reshaping of racism in Western Europe, whereby racialized exclusion is supported by discourses of liberalism, attacking the "illiberalism" of Muslim minorities. Gender is central to this narrative, as women's and LGBTQ rights are imagined as a national or European property endangered by immigration. Sara Farris' (2017) notion of "femonationalism" refers to how nationalists, certain feminists, and neoliberals are converging around the idea that Muslim males constitute a threat to Western societies, due to their oppressive treatment of women. Lentin and Titley, as well as Farris, associate these discourses with a neoliberal logic that replaces the addressing of economic inequalities and structural injustices with talk of "incompatible values", and "cultural conflict". The current tendency, as Brown puts it, to "sneak liberalism into a civilizational discourse" serves to legitimize control and violence against those populations identified as illiberal, without tainting the liberal identity of the states performing those actions (Brown 2006, p. 8, p. 179). As discussed later, the idea of a national or Western progressive gender order endangered by racialized Others not only externalizes patriarchy as a foreign problem, but serves the concrete political purpose of whitewashing increasingly illiberal border regimes (Edenborg 2018).

# **7.3 Media Representations of "Migrants' Sexual Violence"**

# *7.3.1 The Invention of a Media Cover-Up*

The first reports of the Cologne events appeared in Swedish press on 6 January 2016. In its first article, *Dagens Nyheter* wrote about "mass sexual harassments" involving around 1000 men, citing information from German police that the "perpetrators are supposed to be young men from North Africa and the Middle East" (Lund and Sundberg 2016). *Expressen*, *Aftonbladet*, and *Svenska Dagbladet*, already in their initial news coverage, mentioned the ethnic origin of the suspected perpetrators (Järkstig 2016; Larsson 2016; *SvD* 2016). Nonetheless, it was repeatedly claimed in Swedish press that the involvement of migrants in the events was silenced. A *Dagens Nyheter* op-ed on 8 January entitled "Silence is not gold" mentioned the German police's and media's "unusually long wait" before reporting about the events, and the fact that the first article about the events on Swedish Television's webpage had had the headline "Disorder in Cologne", as indications of media silencing: "There is sometimes a tendency among the media to be extra careful with news risking to 'strike against vulnerable groups' (…) To be silent or to mumble is a big betrayal of the victims of the crime" (*DN* 2016).

The debate about media silencing intensified further after the reports from Kungsträdgården. According to *Dagens Nyheter*, which was the first newspaper to report about the case, during the most recent "We are STHLM"-festivals in 2014 and 2015, there had been a large number of incidents of sexual harassment of young women and girls. While only around ten formal charges had been filed–it had been difficult to identify the perpetrators as the attacks were made in the crowds–during 2015 the police had identified a group of 50 suspected men, described in an internal police report as "so-called refugee youth, primarily from Afghanistan" and 200 young men had been removed from the festival. However, in their press reports the police had stated that there had been "relatively few crimes and apprehensions in relation to the number of visitors". A head of police admitted that the police had acted improperly in not reporting the Kungsträdgården incidents to the media, saying that "we sometimes do not dare to tell it like it is because we believe it will benefit the Sweden Democrats" (Wierup and Bouvin 2016).

For some, the aftermath of Cologne and to a greater extent Kungsträdgården were indicative of a general reluctance to discuss problems associated with immigration. An *Expressen* op-ed described Sweden as a "culture of denial", with "a long history of sweeping serious problems connected to values and immigration under the rug" (Kronqvist 2016a). A Norwegian professor of International Migration, interviewed in *Dagens Nyheter*, described the Swedish debate climate as "anxious" and "so afraid to speak of difficult questions that one does not even dare to take up and discuss different possible reasons for criminal actions" (Letmark 2016).

The characterization of Sweden as a particularly "politically correct" country where uncomfortable views on immigration cannot be expressed is a long-standing theme in Swedish far-right fringe media as well as in neighboring countries, where Sweden is often used as a warning example. However, the idea that the truth of immigration is silenced is not specific to descriptions of Sweden but a recurring narrative across Europe. Studying immigration and integration debates in different countries, Lentin and Titley (2011) show that insistent calls for "honesty, maturity and openness"–always taken to mean a more skeptical approach to immigration–is a constant feature of this genre. The fact that the debates, for all their popularity and intensity, are never held to be sufficiently "open", point at a paradox: "always ongoing, they are never *really* happening" (2011, p. 128). Lentin and Titley suggest that such debates are never felt to be satisfactorily open because their function is mainly ritualic. Immigration and integration debates, they argue, are "screens for the projection of profound and emotionally involving questions about social and national futures" (2011, p. 129), whereby the figure of the immigrant functions to temporarily compress anxieties, but the discussions never fully capture or reduce these anxieties, nor provide any political possibilities for their resolution.

# *7.3.2 Immigration, Cultural Conflict and Gender Equality*

A recurrent idea in the Cologne and Kungsträdgården reporting was that immigration meant that patriarchal attitudes were imported from countries where oppression of women was widespread. A *Svenska Dagbladet* op-ed argued that: "This is where we need to start: there is a denigrating view on women in several of these countries and as people have moved to Europe, this has also become a concern for us" (Ivanov 2016). In an analysis piece in *Dagens Nyheter* by a crime reporter, it was asked if the Cologne events marked the beginning of a new wave of sex crimes and an "attack on Western gender equality" (Wierup 2016). An *Expressen* op-ed argued that a debate on "values and views on women connected to immigration" was needed: "As wrong as it is to overgeneralize about all individuals in a group, it is equally naïve to think that all who come to Sweden become good feminists as soon as they pass the Öresund Bridge" (Kronqvist 2016a). The framing of Cologne as representing a gendered clash of cultures recurred in debates across Europe (Wodak 2018).

Those who argued that a cultural conflict was the main explanation for the attacks in Cologne and Kungsträdgården differed in how they described this conflict. In a debate article in *Svenska Dagbladet*, a philosophy professor highlighted archaic tribal cultures seeing women as "prey to take advantage of" (Bauhn 2016). Others stressed, with varying emphasis, the importance of cultural and religious norms in countries of origin as a key factor behind the attacks, contrasting these norms to the values about gender equality supposedly prevalent in Sweden. In a debate article in *Expressen*, a well-known theologian wrote that she refused to "sacrifice the freedom of her daughter and all other women", describing the home countries of the Cologne attackers as

…countries with an extremely patriarchal morality. It is countries where the values fundamentally differ from ours. Women are ascribed lower value than men–and women regarded as sexually active are whores (…) Values are persistent, they take time to change, but we have done a good job in Sweden. Sweden is a relatively gender equal country. There are problems, not least with sexual violence, but we have come a good bit on the way. Other cultures have other values and norms about male, female and sexuality. This must be discussed, substantially, not trivialized and relativized (Heberlein 2016).

The discussion about immigration and "Swedish values", to which I return to later in this chapter, illustrates what Mahmood Mamdani describes as a "culturalization of politics": the reduction of conflict to culture in a way that conflates religion, ethnicity, culture, race, and sexual norms into a tangible essence that is assumed to explain the actions of its members, glossing over political economy, history, and global relations. Liberal societies, Mamdani argues (2004, p. 18), think of themselves as masters of culture whereas "premodern" societies are seen as merely passive conduits of culture.

The framing of Cologne and Kungsträdgården as primarily a problem of cultural conflict was challenged by feminists highlighting the omnipresence of sexual violence across cultures (Fahl 2016; Wirtén 2016). Similarly, some argued that the focus on immigration led to the neglect of women's own experiences of sexual violence, lamenting that the events were being kidnapped by political forces who had never before cared about gender equality or women's safety (Björkman 2016; Pettersson 2016). While the latter representations offered important counterarguments challenging the anti-immigrant interpretation of Cologne and Kungsträdgården, when considered from the perspective of Sara Ahmed's ideas of the cultural politics of emotions, their significance become more complex to estimate. According to Ahmed, emotions have a "sticky" effect as they move between figures, the characteristics of one figure being transferred or displaced onto the other. When figures are put in proximity to each other, even though the connection is not explicitly articulated or is explicitly repudiated, such sticky associations may still be created. When those links have become established, open allegations become unnecessary; as Ahmed puts it "the undeclared history sticks" (2014, p. 47). In our case, the repeated placement of "sexual violence" in proximity to the figure of "male migrant"–also in those cases the link was denied–had a similar dynamic, sticking the two figures together with the effect that the supposed link (as later shown) became intuitive and unnecessary to spell out.

# *7.3.3 "Migrants' Sexual Violence" as Motivating a More Restrictive Border Regime*

On several occasions, the reports of migrants harassing women in public spaces were used to argue for concrete changes in migration policy. The political reactions in Germany after the Cologne events provided a backdrop for such discussions. An *Aftonbladet* news columnist described Cologne as a potential "watershed" in immigration debates in Germany and the rest of Europe, leading to what was called a "turning of thumbscrews", such as the Merkel government's proposals to expel asylum-seekers who commit crimes, and restrict the right for refugees to decide their location of residence. Alluding to the Swedish government's turnabout on immigration in November 2015, it was said that: "Sweden has already pulled the emergency brake. There is an increased risk that Germany will do the same to drastically decrease the refugee inflow" (Hansson 2016).

Several political parties in Sweden explicitly took the events as an argument for a further tightened border regime. Interviewed in *Expressen*, the party secretary of the Sweden Democrats argued that "the events in Kungsträdgården make more and more people aware of the effects of the outrageous immigration policy that has been pursued by the other parties" (Svensson 2016b). In a debate article in *Svenska Dagbladet*, the Christian Democrats, referring to Cologne and Kungsträdgården, proposed that asylum-seekers who commit sex crimes should have their asylum applications rejected and quickly deported, and that it should be easier to deport also sex offenders who have residence permit in Sweden (Busch Thor and Carlson 2016). A *Svenska Dagbladet* op-ed described proposals to expel asylum-seekers who "do not respect the bodily integrity of women", as a welcome reevaluation of the right to asylum, arguing that the Geneva Convention should be abandoned in favor of a quota system, which would not only decrease the number of deaths in the Mediterranean, but also make it possible to prioritize women and children before young men (Lönnqvist 2016).

Also noting the over-representation of young men among asylum-seekers, an *Expressen* op-ed cited the American political scientist Valerie Hudson's argument that immigration is creating a male surplus in Europe comparable to China's, which according to her leads to higher crime rates and more violence. Arguing that Sweden's migration policy could hardly be called feminist, the op-ed pointed at several possible solutions such as focusing on quota refugees instead of asylumseekers, and prioritizing women and children (Kronqvist 2016b).

Wendy Brown (2006) argues that civilizational rhetoric designating certain populations as violent and barbaric functions to gloss over or legitimize liberal states' own violation of international liberal norms in its treatment of such populations. As seen here, Cologne and Kungsträdgården were interpreted as constituting evidence that certain illiberal measures–aimed at keeping out or expelling people who do not respect the freedom of women–were not only compatible with the liberal state, but necessary to protect it from illiberal incursions.

# *7.3.4 The Pedagogy at the Border and the "Good Refugee Man"*

Borders (widely understood) have a doubly constitutive effect, producing both the subjectivities of bodies "at the border", and of the societies they are meant to protect (Brambilla 2015; Brown 2010). Nowhere was this duality clearer than in the repeated calls for "sex education" of migrant men. In the previously mentioned debate article, the Christian Democrats, in addition to calling for deportation of asylum-seeking sex offenders, stressed the importance that migrants are informed about which rights and obligations are prevalent in Sweden:

People who seek protection in our country, who have been welcomed here and can take part of our resources for their sustenance, must know that even if women in Sweden dress in another way, move around in society without male company, go to concerts and maybe drink alcohol, they are not legitimate targets of sexual attacks (Busch Thor and Carlson 2016).

When interviewed in *Aftonbladet*, the minister of interior and the minister of gender equality, both social democrats, also stressed the importance of informing migrants about "issues of gender equality, openness and sexuality", while admitting that the problem of sexual harassment did not arrive with refugees, but has for long been a domestic problem in Sweden (Nordström 2016). A news article in *Svenska Dagbladet* entitled "Swedish views on women on the schedule" (Thurfjell 2016) described the task of high schools to educate newly arrived pupils in what was called "Swedish values, including the view on women". Some boys and girls taking part in the classes were interviewed, one of them saying that the differences between Sweden and the Middle East concerning gender had at first come as a shock to him, but after a few months he adapted. However, the interviewed kids all expressed worries about all refugee men being seen as potential sex offenders, one boy describing how people chose not to sit next to him on the subway after the Cologne events.

The newspaper interviews with migrant boys and men taking part in sex education point at a recurrent pattern in the reporting: efforts to identify and showcase the figure of the "good refugee man", characterized as a someone who denounces the oppressive views on women prevalent in his country of origin, and affirms his commitment to the gender equality norms of his host country. An *Expressen* columnist argued that the best way to educate migrant men was to take help from the majority of migrant men who "quickly accepted one of Sweden's fundamental rules: men and women are equal, and no woman should be the target of any form of sexual harassment", continuing that "[t]heir words will weigh heavily. Like a father raising a son" (Cristiansson 2016).

According to several researchers, the foregrounding of gender equality and sexual rights in integration programs, a shift that took place during the first decade of the twenty-first century throughout Western Europe, serves not only to delineate "good" from "bad" diversity by defining the right (i.e. gender equal) kind of migrant subject, but is also itself part of producing the national identity of the host society (Farris 2017; Lentin and Titley 2011). By depicting migrant subjects as possible to include only to the extent that they renounce the oppressive views on women of their home country in favor of the gender equal values of the new country, the nation is reimagined as a progressive, modern, and always superior community in contrast to the "backwards" and "static" non-European cultures. Integration, Lentin and Titley argue (2011, pp. 204–206), has become a border practice working beyond and inside the territorial border, a way of securing that inside the national home, invited guests must learn the house rules or be removed. However, whereas the literature has primarily pointed at the centrality of migrant women in such integration measures–studying efforts to "emancipate" migrant women by reeducating them into national/European models of femininity (Farris 2017, p. 103)–the measures that were called for after Cologne and Kungsträdgården targeted primarily migrant men. This suggests the emergence of a second figure of good diversity, next to the emancipated migrant woman: namely the "gender equal migrant man", who by embracing the gender equal culture of their host country, is conditionally included while also reproducing the geopolitical imaginary of the national/European border as a boundary between oppression and freedom.

# **7.4 "Swedish Values" in Almedalen**

During 2016, the notion of "Swedish values" became a key word in national politics, discussed in terms of how immigration had supposedly resulted in a conflict of values. This section examines how the trope of "migrants' sexual violence" functioned as a point of reference to frame this conflict in gendered and sexualized terms, as a cultural clash between "Swedish" and "Middle-Eastern" views on women. I analyze how the idea of "Swedish values" was discussed in the party leaders' speeches during the so called "Almedalen week" (*Almedalsveckan*) in July 2016. Every year this event, described by Maria Wendt (2012) as a "political spectacle", is organized on the island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea. The highlights of the week are the party leaders' speeches (each party is traditionally assigned its own day) and the political proposals and signals made in Almedalen receive extensive media attention (Norocel 2017).

Prior to the 2016 Almedalen week, the social-democratic prime minister Stefan Löfvén, in an debate article in *Aftonbladet*, wrote that: "It must be clear what rules apply in Sweden and what values should permeate our society", describing Sweden as "a modern and free country where justice, egalitarianism and gender equality are central values" (Löfvén 2016). In this vein, the party leaders in their Almedalen speeches, most of which focused on immigration, integration, and national identity, referred in one way or another to the idea of "Swedish values" and charged the term with gendered meanings. Löfvén defended the turnabout on asylum policy in November 2015: "No country can handle the challenge [of refugees] alone. Therefore, Sweden has introduced a temporary law to make fewer come to Sweden". Addressing integration, the prime minister lamented what he called "islands of inequality and insecurity that have emerged in Sweden", and called for a stop to

"religious extremists wielding power over the public space, deciding where women should be or how they dress" (Löfvén 2016). Annie Lööf, leader of the liberal Center party, also spoke of "values that should not be accepted in society", specifically mentioning genital mutilation and "honor violence" (Lööf 2016).

In three of the speeches, the issue of sexual violence against women in public spaces was explicitly mentioned to illustrate how immigration was endangering Swedish gender equality. Neither of the speeches focused exclusively on sexual violence and immigration, but those passages were rather salient and among the most cited in media reporting about the speeches (see Stiernstedt 2016; Svensson 2016a). Anna Kinberg Batra, leader of the Conservative party, spoke about harassment of girls during music festivals and suggested that, in addition to prolonging the sentences for sexual harassment, it should be easier to deport sex criminals who are not Swedish citizens (Kinberg Batra 2016). Ebba Busch Thor, leader of the Christian Democrats, said that when "women cannot go to festivals without fearing sexual harassment" it is a sign of a "deep crisis of values" (Busch Thor 2016). Jimmy Åkesson, leader of the far-right Sweden Democrats described Sweden as a society "where women, girls, young girls, children cannot be out in public spaces without the risk of sexual attacks". In addition, he argued that we cannot "[d]eny the existence of fundamental Swedish norms and values", among them "a Swedish way of relating to (…) gender relations" (Åkesson 2016).

The identification of gender equality as a Swedish core value is not just descriptive but also performative in bringing forward a specific idea of Swedishness. This is reminiscent of the practice described by historian Eric Hobsbawm (1983) as "invention of tradition", whereby certain elements are selectively chosen and combined (and others ignored) to form what is claimed to be a matter-of-factly, historically rooted national essence. Importantly, the association between gender equality and Swedish national identity, which came across in several of the Almedalen speeches, draws on the "gender exceptionalist" idea of Sweden as the most womanfriendly country in the world, a discourse which has been examined and critiqued by feminists (Martinsson et al. 2016; Towns 2002). At least since the 1970s, gender equality, a progressive welfare model, and sometimes modernity as such, have been portrayed as markers of Swedishness. However, to identify oneself as embodying modernity is not a neutral act but invested with specific articulations of power and superiority. Or as Judith Butler put it, "power relies on a certain taken-for-granted notion of historical progress to legitimate itself as the ultimately modern achievement" (2008, p. 21). Whereas in the first decades of the twentieth century, ideas of Swedes as the purest among the white race, defined against internal Others such as Sami, Jews, and Roma were heavily influential, in the post-1945 era this racial exceptionalism was succeeded by narratives of Sweden as the most modern among nations. Feminist and postcolonial researchers have argued that this narrative still carries racial and geopolitical connotations, as the idea of the Swedish welfare state as exceptionally progressive continues to be understood in opposition to various Others understood as belonging to less egalitarian and less modern cultures, a role increasingly ascribed to immigrants (Hübinette and Lundström 2011; Mulinari 2016; Norocel 2017). There are obvious similarities to how feminist discourses

have been mobilized for anti-immigrant purposes in other European countries as well, presenting repressive policies that especially target Muslims as progressive measures aimed to protect and liberate women (Farris 2017). As the analysis of the Almedalen speeches showed, after Cologne and Kungsträdgården, the theme of migrants' sexual violence in public spaces functioned as an explicit or implicit point of reference supporting the idea that "Swedish values" of gender equality were endangered by immigration.

This form of securitization, depicting immigration as an existential threat to welfare and particularly the "national" gender order, is not just a rhetorical figure, but a bordering practice with real world effects. As mentioned earlier, bordering involves an inside-looking demarcation of the nation, and the idea that its core values and ways of living are imperiled by dangerous outsiders, legitimizing those measures deemed necessary to protect the inside from the outside (Parker and Adler-Nissen 2012). I suggest that the idea of Swedish gender equality being under attack by misogynist immigrants functioned as an implicit or explicit confirmation that the restrictive border regime introduced in 2015 was necessary. The discursive connection or "sticky association" between sexual violence and migrant men that was produced by media reports on Cologne and Kungsträdgården, most likely contributed to closing off the possibilities to argue for a return to previous, less restrictive, asylum policies, and delegitimized arguments for lifting the Swedish border controls to EU, although all these measures had been presented as merely a temporary "breathing space" (as of March 2020, most of these measures are still in force). Whereas during the last decades, the self-image as "progressive" has arguably made mainstream Swedish discourse less receptive to certain bordering discourses (leaning on overt racism or grandiose patriotism), gender exceptionalism, widely shared across the political spectrum, provided a fertile ground to exploit for legitimating the shift to more restrictive border policies.

# **7.5 Conclusions**

In light of the 2017–2018 MeToo movement, which showed with devastating clarity how male sexual violence against women permeate societies across cultures, classes, and professions, the debates after Cologne and Kungsträdgården stand out in the way sexual violence was so often ethnicized and culturalized, associated to migrant men and immigration more broadly. While such a framing was not new or surprising, but rather consistent with longstanding Orientalist narratives, this chapter has shown how the trope of "migrants' sexual violence", by tapping into Swedish gender exceptionalism, contributed to a securitizing narrative portraying the Swedish welfare model in general, and gender equality in particular, as endangered by patriarchal immigrant cultures. The media analysis showed that the reports of "migrants' sexual violence" were represented as (1) indicative of how media silenced problems associated with immigration; (2) as a result of a cultural clash between irreconcilable "Swedish" and "Middle-Eastern" views of women; (3) as

evidence of the necessity of stricter immigration policies; and (4) as demonstrating the need for sex education of newly arrived immigrants. While comparison between the different types of material or the different media outlets is outside the scope of investigation, it is clear that the most explicit arguments were made in debate articles and in op-eds in right-wing newspapers (in this case *Expressen* and *Svenska Dagbladet*). However, also "neutral" news reporting as well as opinion pieces in the left-wing or liberal outlets made references to the idea of immigration as a threat to Swedish gender equality, if in some cases to repudiate that there was such a link. The analysis of party leaders' speeches in Almedalen showed further how the gendered notion of "Swedish values", partly by using "migrants' sexual violence" as a point of reference, functioned to simultaneously portray immigration as a threat to "our way of life" and to define the meaning of that specific way of life. Theoretically, the chapter contributes to border studies by mapping specific ways in which bordering practices are made possible by gendered and racialized boundary constructs, as well as how re-bordering, by drawing on liberal and egalitarian discourses, comes to appear more appetizing even in self-proclaimed progressive societies.

# **References**

# *Media Sources and Speeches*


Bauhn, P. (2016, January 15). Kvinnor som lovliga byten. *SvD*, p. 14.


# *Literature*


117 7 Endangered Swedish Values: Immigration, Gender Equality, and "Migrants' Sexual…

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# **Chapter 8 Invented Nostalgia: The Search for Identity Among the Hungarian Far-Right**

**Katherine Kondor and Mark Littler**

# **8.1 Introduction**

While nostalgia is not necessarily an aspect of all forms of nationalism, most contemporary groups share a preoccupation with the past, adopting a retrospective view of the world that harks back to a forgotten "golden age" for their nation. For some, as in the United Kingdom, this can evoke Empire and narratives of social and political dominance (Gottlieb and Linehan 2003); while in other nations nostalgic nationalism may focus on identity, and the idealization of a past in which nation-states contained only one people bound by common ethnic roots and cultural practices. The resulting diversity of organizations and ideologies that may be considered nationalist – and even nostalgic nationalist – is vast, a fact attested to by the variety of chapters in this volume. However, in the context of some groups and organizations, most notably those in Hungary, the past plays a particularly significant role in shaping political outlooks. The complexity of the Hungarian far-right is well documented, with their commemoration of several key periods in the country's history and their foregrounding of the importance of Hungary's Christian traditions and beliefs argued to set them apart from the experience in many other countries (Bartlett et al. 2012). Moreover, Hungary has a particularly broad range of groups operating within this space, with far-right organizations combining different time-periods to create and shape their own particular forms of nostalgia, framing identities in diverse ways that create a fractured and complex nationalist milieu. Alongside this,

K. Kondor (\*)

M. Littler Department of Behavioural and Social Sciences, University of Huddersfield, Huddersfield, UK e-mail: m.littler@hud.ac.uk

© The Author(s) 2020 119

School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK e-mail: k.a.kondor@lboro.ac.uk

O. C. Norocel et al. (eds.), *Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41694-2\_8

government-sponsored ideas of nostalgic nationalism contribute to a challenging, if often obfuscated, ideological landscape, supporting attitudes and ideas of the farright within the broader populous. It is against this backdrop that this chapter seeks to position its consideration of nostalgic nationalism in Hungary.

Using both an analysis of symbols and qualitative interviews to explore the role of nostalgia in shaping the ideology of members of the Hungarian Defense Movement (*Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom*), this chapter is structured in six sections. In the first, several important concepts are outlined for clarification, with a description of the methodological approach employed specified in the following paragraphs. Subsequently the attitudes and values characteristic of the Hungarian nationalist movement are discussed to provide a basis for understanding their mobilization. The fourth section provides an overview the current landscape of the major organizations in the Hungarian far-right movement alongside evidence of their use of nostalgia and the politics of national identity. The penultimate section presents empirical data from semi-structured interviews to provide a better understanding of nostalgic nationalism and the politics of national identity in Hungary. Finally, conflicts that emerge in the formation of Hungarian nationalist identity are discussed before a conclusion offering suggestions for future research and an overview of the limitations of this study.

# *8.1.1 On Nostalgic Nationalism*

Nationalism can be viewed as an ideology that helps to create and maintain identity for an individual or group or create a unity between the people of one population (Smith 1995). It can be understood as an organizing political principle that places high importance on national homogenization and gives priority to national values and interests with the aim of achieving some collective goal. Moreover, it can also be seen to describe an affection toward one's nation, as crafting a sense of belonging to a particular group with a supposed common origin, and as instilling a desire to keep the nation pure (Dekker et al. 2003). Alongside this, ethno-nationalism can be seen as a further sub-genus of nationalism, viewing the nation as a community of descent whose members are related by fictive kinship ties to supposedly common ancestors, embracing myths of origin, nativist history, folk culture, and a populist political philosophy (Smith 1995, 2001). This type of nationalism is often seen in post-independence movements, irredentist movements, and "pan" nationalisms, and is a key characteristic of contemporary nationalist discourse in Hungary.

The word nostalgia has its roots in two Greek words: *nostos*, meaning a return home, and *algos*, meaning pain and longing. The meaning of the term nostalgia originally indicated a feeling of homesickness and longing for place, but over time was expanded to include a temporal aspect directed towards the past. As a result it has come to imply a special type of memory, the pain having been removed; it implies a longing for an idealized past, which does not, or never did, exist (Goulding 1999). It can be personal, or grounded in the collective memory of a larger group. It

can even, curiously, be for a time and place that an individual or collective never experienced first-hand. When combined with nationalism, it can be defined as a longing for a heartland when the nation was still theoretically homogenous (see Hellström et al., Chap. 1, in this volume). This can create a sense of belonging and, as in the case of Hungary, the sense of identity that is so desperately sought by many in the far-right.

Nostalgic nationalism is related to ethno-nationalism in many ways, but the two are not synonymous: the former is based on the idea of fictive kinship ties and the collective memory of ethnic and national groups, as with ethno-nationalism. However, in placing its emphasis on a homogenous nation, and in looking to the past for the establishment and maintenance of identity, it differs in a key respect. Accepting this distinction this chapter will explore these ideas through the lens of various organizations that comprise the broad Hungarian far-right "movement", here taken to refer to the entire nationalist network in Hungary. It is not the goal of this chapter to discuss all organizations on the Hungarian far-right, of which there are many; rather, the focus here is to explore and map the evidence of nostalgic nationalism in the attitudes and characteristics of several key organizations.

# *8.1.2 Methodology and Data Collection*

This chapter employs two distinct approaches. The first offers a discussion of the main aspects of Hungarian history in order to set a basis for further analysis and provide an overview of the characteristics of Hungarian nostalgic nationalism. The main far-right organizations in Hungary are reviewed and discussed from the perspective of nostalgic nationalism, considering how they present and embody their experience of the past, and how the past influences their outlook, attitudes, and ideology. To gain an understanding of identity this section will employ an analysis of symbols. Symbols are widely under-stood as key markers of group outlook, aiding in communication (Firth 1973) in a way which is both subjective and objective; some are always identified in the same way by different people, while others evoke emotion associated with a situation (Edelman 1985). The latter type can induce "patriotic pride, anxieties, remembrances of past glories or humiliations" (Edelman 1985, p. 6). National symbolism may thus have great political power and evoke may emotional expression of national identification, allegiance, and self-sacrifice (Schatz and Lavine 2007); it often elicits claims to a specific history and sovereignty and highlights the distinctive nature of the nation (Elgenius 2011). National symbols may also place emphasis on a nation's historical past in a way that can then be glorified, romanticized, and mythologized (Schatz and Lavine 2007). Their use far-right organizations can thus allow them to project their image to their own group members, as well as to others outside the organization, giving their ideology shape and form (Breuilly 1993). Particularly in the political context, such symbols are selected and combined to provoke emotions and to refer to specific ideas (Mach 1993).

The second part of the chapter presents the results of a series of interviews with members of the Hungarian Defense Movement in early 2018. The transcripts of three respondents are used, with their personal data anonymized, presented as Respondent 1, 2, and respectively 3. The interviews were conducted via Skype-out call and lasted about 20–30 min each. They were conducted in Hungarian, and they were later transcribed and coded in Hungarian, with key quotes translated into English1 . While this is a comparably small sample size, and is thus limited in terms of both its validity and reliability, these are to date the only scholarly interviews conducted with members of this organization, and provide an unfiltered view of the thoughts and emotions of group members.

# **8.2 The Roots of Nostalgic Nationalism in Hungary**

Hungarian national identity seems to be something of a puzzle, combining veneration for ancient pagan ancestors with strong Christian beliefs. To resolve this contradiction, it is important to understand the country's turbulent history, and in particular, the important role played by external domination and occupation in shaping the national psyche. This section provides a brief overview of the country's history up to the twentieth century, as a way of offering a frame of reference for understanding nostalgic nationalism in contemporary Hungary.

One important period for Hungarian nationalism, and especially nostalgic nationalism, is the settlement of the nomadic Magyar tribes in the Carpathian basin around 895 C.E. According to historical sources the Magyars arrived in a group of seven tribes, said to be led by a chieftain named Árpád; they were originally a nomadic Asiatic people who were not Christian, but had a shamanistic system of beliefs lead by a *táltos* (similar to a shaman). The nomadic Magyars fashioned their facial hair in a distinctive manner, wore the *dolmány* (a special long coat worn by men), and a *tarsoly* (sabretache). Their use of spiritual flora and fauna symbolism, proficiency in archery, and the importance attached to equestrian culture are all seemingly crucial elements of Hungarian "tradition-guarding" (*hagyományőrzés*) culture. This is widespread within the Hungarian far-right movement, and indeed in the wider population, even among those not engaged in politics. This seeming rejection of modernism may be understood as part of a belief that modernity has erased the "true" national identity of Hungary.

A key belief among those involved in Hungarian nationalism is the idea that the original Hungarians, the Magyar people, came from the East and hence have more genetic and cultural ties to Eastern people than to Europeans. This idea is known as pan-Turanism, a term that stems from the Iranian term *turan* referring to a region of

<sup>1</sup>The focus of the interviews was mainly the respondents' involvement in the organization: the origins of their nationalist feelings, how they became involved with the organization, and their activities in it. In addition to this information, respondents often discussed their views on the history of the Hungarian people and their ideas about Hungarian national identity.

Central Asia; which may be seen as a form of Orientalism in pursuit of national identity formation. This serves to differentiate the Hungarians from their mostly Slavic neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe, and positions them as ethnically Asian. Pan-Turanism is emphasized by many who engage in Hungarian traditionguarding and has ultimately culminated in the biennial *Kurultáj* festival. Meaning a gathering of tribes, the event invites representatives from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, and many other countries. Visitors can watch horse shows, learn about Shamanism, attend lectures on the archaeology and culture of the Conquering Period, and often attend a concert by one of Hungary's nationalist rock bands, such as *Kárpátia* (Carpathia) and *Ismerős Arcok* (Familiar Faces).

As the Magyar people held onto their own spiritual beliefs, they were Christianized only at a later stage, following the creation of the Kingdom of Hungary in the year 1000. The following several centuries saw many outside cultures and invading forces enter the borders of modern Hungary. Indeed, even if the Hungarian people ever were ethnically homogenous, they were not so for long: Hungary was invaded and depopulated by the Mongols in 1241 (Engel 2001) and the Ottomans in 1526 (Simon 1998), following which waves of immigration saw people from Russia, Austria, Italy, Germany, and France. As a result, ethnic Hungarians only made up 35% of the total population in 1786. This shift is key to understanding the contradiction of Hungarian nostalgic nationalism and the desire for Hungarian "purity".

Under the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy, formed in 1867, Hungarian art, literature, and society flourished, enjoying a "golden age" that lasted until the end of the First World War. The founding of an Austrian federal republic in late 1918 marked the end of the Austro-Hungarian empire, with the Hungarian part of the dual monarchy dismantled and shared among its diverse populations: Hungarians, but also Slovaks, Romanians, Germans, Croats, Serbs, and Ruthenians (Molnár 2001). After the Treaty of Trianon was signed on June 4, 1920, Hungary went from a population of 18 million to a small country of just less than eight million (Hajdú and Nagy 1990). In the process, Hungary had lost about two-thirds of its territories and three-fifths of its inhabitants and was now "the most nationally aggrieved state in all of Europe" (Payne 1980, p. 110).

Indeed, denunciation of the Treaty of Trianon and anti-Habsburg sentiments are at the core of much of Hungarian far-right ideology. For many Hungarians, and especially for supporters of the far-right, the treaty of Trianon represents the splitting of the heartland; much of Hungarian nostalgic nationalism seeks to a desire to reunite this homeland, however unfeasible it may be at present. Hungary's pre-Trianon borders are referred to as "Greater Hungary" by nationalist supporters, with the very concept of "Greater Hungary" symbolizing the reunification of all ethnic Hungarians from once-Hungarian lands. It is also commonly represented physically by the image of present-day Hungary set within the pre-Trianon borders of the country, which often appears on decals, jewelry, and clothing. In another incarnation, it appears as a chant used by many far-right groups: "Down with Trianon!" (*Vesszen Trianon!*). As a result much Hungarian nationalist nostalgia ends around the time of the Treaty of Trianon, though some (often more extreme) organizations (for example, *Pax Hungarica*, the Hungarian Guard, and some skinhead

organizations) have also drawn on the symbols of the Hungarian national socialism, and in particular the Arrow Cross. This is, however, relatively rare among Hungarian far-right organizations.

A few other key attitudes are prominent within the Hungarian nationalist movement. One of the central characteristics of the Hungarian far-right is its anti-Roma outlook, which is a recurring trope throughout much of Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, the term "gypsy criminality" (*cigánybűnözés*) was revived by Jobbik (Juhász 2010) and many do indeed believe that the Roma are biologically programmed to be criminals. In far-right ideology, the Roma are not seen as being part of the original Hungarian nation, hence ideas of nostalgic nationalism can often imply a return to a time before their arrival in Hungary2 .

The far-right in Hungary, more generally, is also concerned with issues surrounding the traditional family. These ideas about traditional family are most often encompassed in the idea of "European Christian values" and ideals. While not representing ideas of nostalgia *per se*, they do show how far-right organizations embody an extreme Christian identity and, as discussed below, stand in contrast to the idea of the pre-Christian "true" Hungarian. These extreme "Christian" values are often translated into homophobia, which is common in the far-right movement and is also quite frequently witnessed in state-run media. For example, the staging of the musical Billy Elliot was cancelled in Budapest for promoting "gay propaganda" (Wootson 2018). In another case, the far-right Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement attempted to disrupt the Budapest gay pride event in the summer of 2018, embedding themselves at the center of the pride parade with a large banner reading "Sin cannot be the object of pride" (HVIM 2018).

As described above, Hungary's turbulent history raises many questions about the country's ethnic and cultural "purity". There are many periods in Hungary's history that are important for understanding both national and nationalist identity, such as the time of the Hungarian conquests, the Christian Árpád dynasty, the "golden age" of Austro-Hungary, and the trauma caused by the Treaty of Trianon. The next section discusses the landscape of the Hungarian far-right movement, and the types of nostalgic nationalisms that are encountered in several key organizations.

# **8.3 A Discussion of Nostalgia and the Politics of National Identity Among Hungarian Far-Right Organizations**

There can be no discussion of the far-right in Hungary without a consideration of the main Hungarian right-wing populist party: the Movement for a Better Hungary (*Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom*, Jobbik). Originally founded in 2003 with close links to the nationalist movements, and paramilitary organizations (Kyriazi

<sup>2</sup> It is unknown as to exactly when the Roma people arrived in Europe, but it is thought to be as early as the twelfth century.

2015), Jobbik entered the political scene by joining forces with the anti-Semitic Hungarian Justice and Life Party (*Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja*, MIÉP), and together they received 2.2% of vote in the 2006 elections. This initial difficulty notwithstanding, Jobbik's support grew over the following years, eventually rising to 14.47% of the vote in the 2010 parliamentary elections. This number increased further to 20.22% in 2014, by which time their ideology had become openly antiliberal and anti-EU, with homophobic, anti-Semitic, and anti-Roma rhetoric also growing in prominence (Bartlett et al. 2012; Holdsworth and Kondor 2017). Following the 2014 national elections, Jobbik attempted to change their image, and adopt a "softer" and more moderate tone with the party's then-leader, Gábor Vona, described his new vision for Jobbik as a "modern conservative party" (Thorpe

2016). This image change did not succeed as well as Jobbik had hoped; in the 2018 Hungarian national elections they achieved only 19.06% of the vote and 26 seats in parliament (see Loch and Norocel 2015, pp. 263–265; Cinpoeş and Norocel, Chap. 4 in this volume, for a further discussion of Jobbik). Although their electoral support was somewhat reduced, Jobbik became the second largest party in the Hungarian parliament, and the only real opposition party to the current government. However, immediately following the election, Vona kept his promise to his party: if they lost the election, he would step down. His resignation sparked a split in the party, and several members left in June 2018 to form a new radical nationalist political party named Our Homeland Movement (*Mi Hazánk Mozgalom*). The new party is chaired by László Toroczkai, the founder of the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement, who has openly expressed a desire for a "white" Hungary (ECHO TV 2018).

Alongside this, the main party of the current Hungarian far-right governmental coalition, the Alliance of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Alliance (*Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége–Magyar Polgári Szövetség*, Fidesz), was founded in 1988 as an anti-communist party. Led by Viktor Orbán, the party has radically changed its politics since its foundation. In the past, the party has been described as a "mainstream conservative party with radical right policies" (Mudde 2015). Now, however, it has been argued in policy and media communities that Fidesz are firmly situated on the far-right (Heijmans 2019). In the period after Fidesz's election in 2010 and up until their second (consecutive term) re-election in 2014, Fidesz effectively turned Hungary into "a culture within which racist speech and prohibited far-right paramilitary activities are tolerated" (Fekete 2016, p. 40). The most striking and long lasting of their campaigns was the campaign against migrants, sparked by the migrant crisis of 2015, when images of refugee men, women, and children at the Budapest Keleti train station were used as propaganda by the government. The government also proceeded to place anti-migrant billboards around the country and flood the news media with anti-immigrant rhetoric. This anti-immigrant campaign intensified again before the 2018 elections, but suddenly softened in its aftermath. Additionally, in 2017 Fidesz began a campaign, which may be deemed anti-Semitic, against the Jewish Hungarian-American philanthropist George Soros. This has included the attempted closure, and now expulsion of the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest, and anti-Soros billboards around the country. While there is a tendency in scholarship to focus on Jobbik, as they are indeed a populist

far-right party, Fidesz has now seemingly occupied Jobbik's space in Hungarian politics and now sets the nationalist undertones in Hungary's government and people.

Fidesz won the 2018 Hungarian elections by a landslide, securing 49.3% of the vote and 133 of the 199 seats in the Hungarian parliament. In doing so they have managed to decimate the opposition and make Hungary dangerously close to a single-party state. They have managed to do this through creating a state monopoly on the media, especially in rural areas, and through large-scale anti-migrant and anti-Soros propaganda campaigns deployed nationally. Hours after their election win Fidesz announced plans to enact a "Stop Soros" bill, a campaign clearly intended to crack down on NGOs, critical intelligentsia, and other opponents to Fidesz's rule. Prior to the elections, Fidesz announced that they had created a list of 2000 "Soros agents", of which 200 names were published in the pro-Fidesz *Figyelő* magazine immediately following the April 2018 elections. On this list were people working for various humanitarian NGOs in Hungary and academics at CEU in Budapest. In June of 2018, the "Stop Soros" bill was approved in parliament, effectively criminalizing any act or organization, which helps refugees in Hungary. More recently, kindergartens are to teach "Christian culture" and "strengthen national identity," beginning in September of 2018 (Dull 2018). Fidesz has now outlawed gender studies programs in Hungary, and it is leading a campaign to convince women to birth more children.

The landscape of Hungarian nationalism is quite broad. However, it can be divided into three main groups of organizations: political movements, social movement organizations, and fringe movements. The political movement has been previously described here; it is constituted by the various political parties that can be situated on the far right, namely Jobbik, Fidesz, and the newly founded Our Homeland movement. The second group reunites those larger organizations that may have a political affiliation, but do not take part in politics directly; this group includes organizations like the Hungarian Guard, the newly formed National Legion, and the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement. The last group includes the fringe organizations with smaller membership numbers, including chapters of international skinhead organizations. Several of the more prominent far-right organizations are presented here as examples of the different forms of nostalgic nationalism; all organizations presented below can be considered under the second category of groups, as they are not directly in the political sphere and are the mainstream organizations of the Hungarian far-right.

In Hungary, a prominent symbol used by the far-right is the Árpád Flag, originally the flag of the first Hungarian dynasty, which consists of alternating red and white horizontal stripes. Revived by the national socialist Arrow Cross Movement (*Nyilaskeresztes Párt – Hungarista Mozgalom*) in the 1930s, the flag was banned by the Soviets less than two decades later. After the end of Soviet influence in Hungary, however, the flag witnessed a rebirth in the Hungarian nationalist movement. Other noticeable symbols of Hungarian nationalist movement supporters are the wearing of a *tarsoly*, the use of ancient Hungarian runic writing, and the image of *turul* (a mythical ancient Magyar bird). It is worth noting that other important national symbols to the Hungarian people, which originate in the more recent history have not been adopted by the Hungarian nationalist movement. For instance, the raven with a ring in its beak as a sign of King Matthias Corvinus (r. 1458–1490), one of the most highly regarded Hungarian kings, has not been appropriated.

As highlighted above, one of the most prominent attitudes characterizing Hungarian nationalist movements is irredentism and concern around the Treaty of Trianon, presenting a nostalgia for a time when all ethnic Hungarians were part of the same state. Self-identifying as a radical youth nationalist movement, the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement (*Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom*, HVIM) was founded on 21 April 2001 by László Toroczkai. The organization is decidedly irredentist, their name being an homage to the sixty-four counties constituting the Kingdom of Hungary, as part of Austria-Hungary dual monarchy. HVIM have their main seat in Szeged, which lies in Csongrád county, as the organization believes this area to be the center of Hungary. The Csongrád county, which lies in southern Hungary, is believed to be the site of the original Blood Oath, which according to legend was the official pact between the seven Magyar tribes. This is also the birthplace of Sándor Rózsa, a highwayman and outlaw who led his own company into battle in the 1848 Hungarian Revolution. HVIM's symbolism and identity are obvious, both from their online presence and their name.

The Outlaw Army (*Betyársereg*), which was formed in 2008, have the somewhat threatening motto of "Don't hurt Hungarians, or else!" (N*e bánstd a magyart, mert pórul jársz!*). The leader of the Outlaw Army, Zsolt Tyirityán, is one of the most well-known figures in the Hungarian far-right movement. The organization asserts that they are a loose alliance of self-organized clans, which abide to the traditions of Eurasian civilizations. They profess to disregard the laws of the state in favor of following the ancient laws of the Hungarian plains (*puszta*); they compare themselves to the outlaws of the past, arguing that they have been forced to act outside of the law by contemporary political and state structures. Their logo is a skull wearing the same hat, and in in the same orientation, as the well-known image of the famous Hungarian outlaw Sándor Rózsa. The Outlaw Army has close ties to several of the other prominent far-right organizations in Hungary, including the new Our Homeland party (for example, Plankog 2019).

Looking back to the twentieth century is the New Hungarian Guard Movement (*Új Magyar Gárda Mozgalom*), formed in 2009 after the original Hungarian Guard Movement was dissolved, 3-weeks prior. The initial Hungarian Guard Movement was founded in 2007 with 56 members, a number chosen to commemorate the 1956 revolution (LeBoer 2008). The new organization is now split into local chapters, perhaps strategically so, in order to avoid a repeated dissolution. According to the New Hungarian Guard's old website which has now been removed, the organization's tenets include trust in God, and their actions must abide by the ancient rights of freedom, and ancient traditions. Their main goal is to protect the Hungarian state, and the interests of the Hungarian nation, but it is unclear as to how they attempt to achieve this. The organization has also revitalized symbols of the national socialist Arrow Cross regime, using the red-and-white striped Árpád flag in their emblem and wearing a uniform consisting of black boots, black pants, black military

waistcoats, white shirts, and a black cap emblazoned with the Árpád stripes (Holdsworth and Kondor 2017).

Finally, and perhaps most puzzling in terms of identity, is the Hungarian Defense Movement (*Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom*). The organization was formed in October of 2014 after the dissolution of the organization For a Better Future Hungarian Self-Defense (*Szebb Jövőért Magyar Önvédelem*), originally created after the disbanding of the Hungarian Guard discussed above. Outwardly, the Hungarian Defense Movement promotes an image of a helpful family- and community-oriented organization, which seeks to protect the Hungarian people, organizing food and clothing drives, depicting families along with children on their Facebook page, and organizing family-friendly events. The Hungarian Defense Movement has one of the largest support bases in the Hungarian nationalist movement with over 5500 supporters on Facebook. The organization regularly patrols the streets in areas with high concentrations of Roma and are openly anti-Roma. Among the organizations in the Hungarian nationalist movement, the Hungarian Defense Movement has the least obvious representations of nostalgic nationalism. In order to further explore these ideas in an organization, which outwardly does not show any obvious identity of nostalgic nationalism, interviews with its members are analyzed in the following section.

Presenting a nationalist identity that is new to the Hungarian nationalist movement is the Identitarian movement, which has also appeared in Hungary with two separate and unrelated organizations. The short-lived *Identitesz* was created in September 2015 at a University in Budapest, originally titled the Conservative Student Society. The organization was led by László Balázs and claimed to build a "new right". *Identitesz* has since dissolved, after announcing its intent to become a political party. It ultimately joined forces with the Outlaw Army. On 8 July 2017, the two organizations formed a coalition movement called Strength and Devotion (*Erő és Elszántság*), at which time Balázs resigned as the leader of *Identitesz*.

*Identitesz* was often confused with the Hungarian branch of the Generation Identity movement (*Identitás Generáció*) (for a wider European analysis of Generation Identity, see Nissen, Chap. 6 in this volume). The Hungarian Generation Identity was formed in 2014, and seemingly in 2017 had about 100 members (Kulcsár and Halász 2017). Along a different line from the more traditional nationalist organizations in Hungary, Generation Identity deem important to protect both the European and Hungarian identity, namely from the threats of migration and Islam. They claim to not have any issues with any one particular group of people, Muslims included, but to be against the "Islamization" of Europe. They are concerned with the supposed replacement of European peoples by migrants and refugees and subscribe to ethnopluralist views. Their actions around Budapest have included displaying large banners in public areas, with such slogans as "Islamization kills!" (Dezse 2017) and commemorating the Siege of Buda on 2 September 1686. The siege originally marked a defeat of the Ottoman forces, but now is framed to represent the freeing of Hungarians from Islam. This organization epitomizes a particularly curious case for studying Hungarian national identity. They are, indeed, a part of a much larger network whereby all subscribe to the ideals of ethnopluralism and are against Islamization. However, they are also focused on specifically Hungarian issues, among them the idea of bringing back Hungary's "glorious days". At a closer look of their online activities, some of these issues become clearer. For instance, its leader Ábel Bódi complained that the main issue in contemporary European societies is that the youth no longer have a true identity; and argued that youth should be proud of their national identity and heritage (Sellner 2017). While referring to the "Hungarian golden age" of some 150 years ago, the organization is at the same time looking toward the future, proclaiming its goal to "making Hungary more European" (Sellner 2017). Bódi has been open about his Austrian-Hungarian ancestry and his desire to recreate the union of the two countries. Of all the organizations, Generation Identity is the only one to present a distinctive desire to recreate the past.

Apparent in the ideology of each organizations is the idea that they are the protectors of the Hungarian people and the country borders; that they belong to a retrogressive mobilization that will bring Hungary back to the time they see as the country's "golden age". HVIM seeks to restore the borders of Greater Hungary, the Hungarian Guard looks to the twentieth century, the Outlaw Army venerates the time of outlaws, and Generation Identity looks to the time of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy, and the defeat of Otto-man/Muslim forces.

# **8.4 Discussions with Hungarian Nationalists**

Four distinct themes emerged when discussing questions of Hungarian national identity and nostalgia. First, the importance of Magyar ancestors and the conquering period of the Carpathian Basin. Second, the importance of Christianity and Hungarians as a Christian people. Third, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the "golden age" of the Hungarian intelligentsia. Finally, the idea of Hungarians as victims, both in terms of the effects of the Trianon Treaty, and in the sense that the history of Hungarian people was in some way stolen, leaving a need to regain and rebuild Hungarian national identity.

Interview participants frequently alluded to the culture of the ancient Hungarians. One respondent discussed learning about the Conquering Period in school, and even remembered the feelings of national pride they had as a child:

In school we learned about the ancient Hungarians, the ancestors, like Lehel, Emese, Attila, and Árpád, and I was filled with pride that we have more than a one-thousand-year-old history, and I have these types of ancestors. (Respondent 1)

This is significant when considering the new kindergarten curriculum instituted by the Fidesz government, in which they aim to "strengthen national identity" (Dull 2018). Orbán's government has repeatedly emphasized control over the educational curriculum in Hungary, aiming to reform the education system and country in their nationalist and Christian image (McKenzie 2019). Another respondent, when discussing the aims of the organization stated that:

…with us [the Hungarian Defense Movement] the emphasis is rather on bringing back the old Hungarian values and living by them. (Respondent 2)

What these values are remains unclear, as is whether these values would be those of the nomadic Magyars or the later Christian Medieval Hungarians.

There was a strong emphasis on Christian beliefs from all respondents, with one saying "God bless you" at the end of the interview (Respondent 2). One participant was particularly vocal in articulating the role of religion; this respondent, speaking about the organization, said they "believe in the unity of the Holy Crown" (Respondent 1) and "in Christian teachings" (Respondent 1). When pressed, they further stressed the importance of Christian values to the organization:

Yes, well, for example, umm, coexistence with Christian beliefs and umm, teachings. And whether this is going to church, or the compliance with the Hungarian Believe in One motto (*Magyar Hiszekegy*<sup>3</sup> ). We take a vow each year before the Holy Crown in order to renew our oath, and live by this oath as much as possible. (Respondent 1).

This notwithstanding, at times it became apparent that even the participant was struggling to reconcile idealization of the nomadic pagan Magyars and Christianity. Respondents would not deny the Hungarian peoples' pagan Magyar past, but would find ways to explain how this past suits a European Christian image:

Well, if we really look into our history, Hungarians have always, always been a spiritually Christian people, even though they did not technically belong to the Catholic Church. (Respondent 1)

This suggests a fascinating blurring of national and historical identity, blending the two separate periods of the nation's history to create an imagined nostalgia.

One participant spoke about Hungarians as a nation who contributed much to the world and the furthering of society. They were proud of their country, which they openly discussed:

We know that we're a nation who left a mark on the world, multiple times, even the world wars, from inventions to grammar, our language, our talents. (Respondent 3)

This participant rejected the idea that the Hungarians were conquered and defeated throughout history:

What they taught me way back in elementary school, that they just defeated us everywhere, we lost everywhere, and, and that we were slaves, or I don't know what, that is truly stupid. (Respondent 3)

They unfortunately did not clarify which particular instances were incorrectly taught in school. This idea connects with the process of national identity formation and recreation that is seemingly happening among those in the Hungarian far-right, potentially obfuscating history in order for their nation to not seem weak. Despite this, all respondents spoke, at times, of the Hungarian people and the country of

<sup>3</sup>Magyar Hiszekegy is a poem written in 1920 by Szeréna Sziklay, wife of General Elemér Papp-Váry, for a competition run by an anti-Trianon movement: "I believe in one God, I believe in one home, I believe in God's eternal truth, I believe in Hungary's resurrection. Amen."

Hungary as victims, with particular mentioned made of the injustice of the treaty of Trianon. One respondent emphasized how unfairly the Hungarian people were treated:

Not one nation in the world has had something done to them like what was done to the Hungarians with Trianon. (Respondent 2)

Another set Trianon in the context of Hungary as a holy country:

…for the country of the Holy Crown to be together again, which they separated during Trianon. (Respondent 1)

Other participants spoke of the victimization of Hungarian people in terms of national identity, with one noting:

…and then there's our national identity, our past, our history, which they took from us. (Respondent 3)

And

…this Hungarian national identity needs to be preserved, it must be rebuilt. (Respondent 3)

It seems as though this perceived victimization serves to justify the views and attitudes held by far-right supporters.

Results of these interviews demonstrates that there are not clear ideological and identity-based lines between the organizations in the Hungarian far-right movement. Indeed, members of one organization can cover a spectrum of attitudes and beliefs. This, however, is likely more apparent among members of the Hungarian Defense Movement as the organization is not as strongly ideologically-motivated as others. Another point that becomes clear is that most organizations in the mainstream Hungarian far-right movement embody nostalgic nationalism to some degree, with it often being central to the ideology of the organization. These interviews have also demonstrated a mixture between a nostalgia for the time of the ancient Magyars and the later Christian medieval Hungarian periods, which presents a perplexing formula for nationalist identity as well as an explicit desire to reclaim that identity.

# **8.5 Conclusions: National Identity in Conflict**

This chapter explores several concepts surrounding the nostalgia connected to nationalism in Hungary. One of the main periods of Hungarian history used symbolically by traditional Hungarian nationalist organizations is the time of the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian Basin, leading to a pan-Turanism that seeks identity outside Europe. No less influential is the period of conversion to Christianity, with many in the Hungarian far-right promoting the idea of a Christian Europe, and a Christian Hungary. Greater than both, however, is the single most important historical event to the Hungarian nationalist movement: the Treaty of Trianon.

Taking a closer look at the attitudes and beliefs circulating within the Hungarian nationalist movement, and at the history of the country, reveals a few paradoxes. First, the idea of a "pure" Hungarian people cannot exist in a country that has witnessed so many and varied waves of de- and re-population. Second, the conflict between the culture and ancestry of pagan Magyars cannot easily be reconciled with the idea of Hungarians as a Christian people. Indeed, despite the protestations of interview respondents, it is clear that elevating both is an exercise in cognitive dissonance. While this is not uncommon amongst nationalist groups elsewhere – for example, in Italy, Scandinavia, and Russia (see: Laurelle 2008; François and Godwin 2008) – its prominence in the discourse of Hungarian groups is, perhaps, somewhat unusual.

While the results of a comparably small qualitative study prevent the drawing of unambiguous conclusions, the findings of analysis presented in this chapter suggest that Hungarian nationalist nostalgia is often complex, contested, and at odds with itself. Groups and individuals can construct their own national and historical identities by piecing together and blending ideas from several periods of their nation's history, creating compound identities that make the Hungarian far-right less a cohesive movement and more a mass of groups in temporary and fluctuating allegiance, willing to work with or against each other on an issue by issue basis. Further research is clearly necessary to explore these issues in more detail, and in particular to ascertain whether the findings of these interviews are replicated in respect of other groups. If this is the case, it may have clear implications for both existing scholarship, foregrounding the importance of imagination and nostalgia in shaping the ideology and outlook of far-right groups, and counter-extremism policy, highlighting the possibility for education, and greater historical literacy, to contest and challenge the drivers of engagement in far-right groups. However, the extent to which the Hungarian state – under the leadership of a far-right party – is willing to engage in such action remains to be seen.

# **References**


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# **Chapter 9 "Retrotopia" as a Retrogressive Force in the German PEGIDA-Movement**

**Andreas Önnerfors**

# **9.1 Retrotopia as a Retrogressive Force**

One of the key concerns of the political movement coined the "European New Right" (ENR) is to engage in a "metapolitical" struggle related to issues of soft politics such as concepts, history and culture (Salzborn 2016, pp. 38, 45–46). The aim is to relabel political ideas dating back to the rise of interwar fascism in new linguistic framings, to engage in politics of remembrance and memory relativizing the negative impact of fascist politics in Europe and to monopolize a definition of European identity in an exclusionary culture war against internal "traitors" and external enemies. A long-term goal of metapolitical struggle is to achieve an agendasetting prerogative of interpretation on these topics. Thus, it comes as no surprise that contemporary populist movements on the right fringes across Europe exploit the potentials of new linguistic framings as well as of memory and identity politics in order to mobilize popular support.

One particular element of this strategy is to utilize the potential of "retrotopian longing". Zygmunt Bauman argues in his last book *Retrotopia* (2017) that larger and larger segments of Western electorates, or more ambiguously "the people", share a sense of being left behind, abandoned, ignored (not "listened to") and made redundant. This demise is blamed on internal traditional political elites, the "mainstream media" and foreign foes in narratives frequently saturated with elaborate theories of conspiracy and high treason. Furthermore, people flock to tribal mentalities, encapsulating societal discourse within mutually exclusive and mutually hostile filter bubbles and echo chambers. To this toxic mix are added a dramatic privatization of violence, stimulating copycat behavior, and an almost

A. Önnerfors (\*)

Department of Department of Literature, History of Ideas, and Religion, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden e-mail: andreas.onnerfors@lir.gu.se

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2020 135

O. C. Norocel et al. (eds.), *Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41694-2\_9

insurmountable and increasing cleavage between rich and poor. "Retrotopia", Bauman explains, is the outcome of a dramatic U-turn in the public mindset: "from investing public hopes of improvement in the uncertain and ever-too-obviously untrustworthy future, to re-investing them in the vaguely remembered past, valued for its assumed stability and so trustworthiness" (Bauman 2017, p. 6). With other words, progress is equated with the past. What happens in this state, according to Bauman, is that nostalgia and melancholia have turned into a part of a cultural politics of emotions. In the eternal trade-off between freedom and security, people are drawn back to Hobbes and increasingly authoritarian modes of politics, which leads to a "rehabilitation of the tribal model of community" (Bauman 2017, p. 9).

Tribalization is intimately linked to the exclusionary campfires of cultural memory politics. Since the present is perceived as an alienated foreign country and the future appears as an almost certain apocalypse, the only consolation is offered by culture, heritage and tradition. Politics of historical memory have, however, only one principal aim: "the justification of the entitlement of the group (called 'nation') to territorially delineated political sovereignty" leading to neo-nationalist constructions of identity (Bauman 2017, p. 62). What contemporary politicians of anger exploit is a crisis of identity and income which has fomented the "anger of the excluded and abandoned", a recipe for the global success of populism (Bauman 2017, p. 69). Bauman's *Retrotopia* is a refreshing contribution to studying the intersections between culture, welfare, and migration. As compelling his argument might appear, the retrotopian model remains, however, currently under-theorized and is in need of further theoretical development and empirical studies that confirm its basic hypotheses.

Thus, in this chapter I will propose that the rise of the German PEGIDA (The Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of Europe) since 2014, a "right wingmovement of indignation" (Vorländer et al. 2016, p. 139) can be related to the political exploitation of resentment, nostalgia, and melancholia in large segments of the electorate, sustained by the recent and drastic increase of migration. Moreover, PEGIDA's alliance with the radical right party Alternative for Germany (*Alternative für Deutschland*, AfD), entering the German national parliament *Bundestag* in autumn 2017 (as well as continuing massive electoral support leading up to multiple state elections in 2019), demonstrates the political impact of these developments, propelled by massive mobilization in which online and offline activism reinforce each other (Salzborn 2016). I will argue that cultural manifestations in general and German politics of historical memory in particular are an integrated part of the metapolitical strategy of PEGIDA since 2014. In line with Sara Ahmed and her concept of a "cultural politics of emotion" (2014; see also Edenborg, Chap. 7 in this volume) the affective power of emotions in politics is discussed.

Drawing from my own and other previous qualitative and quantitative studies of PEGIDA in the form of a meta-analysis (up to, but not including the Chemnitz riots in 2018 and described below), I outline initially the performative style of the movement and its activism offline and online. This performative style sets the stage for multitude of cultural expressions out of which I have chosen to focus on the discursive content of two representative examples. The "PEGIDA-hymn" and its lyrics discussed below communicates a form of programmatic self-styling of the movement, whereas the other example on a more culturally complex and intricate level aims at exclusion. In 2017, PEGIDA engaged with Holocaust-remembrance as a particular German trope of memory politics enabling the movement to rhetorically exclude the "Muslim Other" from a shared German burden of the past.

# **9.2 Post-welfare (N)ostalgia**

For the eastern part of Germany (and the post-communist "East" at large), a particular political sentiment has even received its own label, ostalgia (*Ostalgie*), a wordplay with and conflation of "nostalgia" and the German word *Ost* for the cardinal point "East", which recent scholarship describes it as "motivated amnesia": "postcommunist merciful forgetting, selective nostalgia, 'ostalgia', 'retroutopia'" (Klicperova-Baker and Kosta 2017, pp. 99–111). PEGIDA originated in Dresden, Saxony and it is likewise in the former GDR the AfD at the occasion of federal elections in 2017 has received its largest support, in some constituencies surpassing 30% of the votes.1 But it would be misguided to believe that this particular form of nostalgia (as a political sentiment to exploit) is limited to the eastern parts of Germany. Clear pockets of high support for AfD are also located in Western Germany and the party at the time of writing contests the Social Democrats as the second largest political force. These phenomena demonstrate that the idea of that "something" is lost which has to be reclaimed, restored and 'made great again' has arrived in core segments of Western electorates. While "ostalgia" mainly serves as an explanation in the political psychology of post-communist countries, it could likewise be argued that "reversed ostalgia" (or another term that awaits to be coined) was/is observable in Western Germany as well, the imagined and still existing socalled "wall in people's heads" that paradoxically unites Germans across the country. For the "West" in general we might characterize this mood as an irrational longing for an ideal bipolar pre-1989 world order, where the capitalist and liberal "West" (while under the impending existential threat of nuclear Armageddon) not yet had to be confronted with to engage with the complex challenges of south-east and eastern Europe nation-building, the implications of EU eastern enlargement, the contemporary rise of neo-authoritarian and post-democratic rule in Hungary, Poland, and Russia and definitely not the contemporary shared burden of global conflict. In this state of growing unrest, it is the AfD as a traditional party that has developed the largest momentum in Germany as a whole and exploiting sentiments

<sup>1</sup>For an overview, see http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundestagswahl-2017-alle-ergebnisse-im-ueberblick-a-1167247.html. Accessed 8 Dec 2017; more details: https://www. bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/2017/ergebnisse.html. Accessed 8 Dec 2017. Results for state elections in Brandenburg, (AfD, 23.5%) and Saxony (AfD, 27.5%) in 2019, see https://www. spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/die-ergebnisse-aus-brandenburg-und-sachsen-die-grafikena-1284812.html. Accessed 9 September 2019.

of resentment. Originally established in 2013 with the aim to question and to reduce public spending (particularly on EU-level) and to push for libertarian reforms of fiscal policy, the party has since assumed a far more ethno-nationalist program and is now the largest opposition party in the German parliament. During 2018, calls have been made to put the party under scrutiny of the German secret service, known as the Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*, BfV). At the same time, contacts between the former head of BfV, Maaßen and the AfD and his downplaying of evidence of racism during the Chemnitz-riots in August and September 2018 have led to a fundamental crisis in German interior politics. Following the murder of "Daniel H." by immigrants, the city in Saxony (during the DDR renamed as Karl-Marx-Stadt) turned for several weeks into a battle ground of radical right mobilization during which innocent foreigners were chased through the streets. Chemnitz marks a turning point in the violent radicalization of different German right-wing actors and created significant momentum by uniting outright neo-Nazis, right-wing hooligans, AfD and PEGIDA under one umbrella (Perrigo 2018; *Spiegel* 2018).

From its outset in 2014, PEGIDA never aimed to become a strict political organization, but rather to explore traditional social network and street activism in combination with online-presence as its main field of activity and profile in combination with a fuzzy ideological profile (Önnerfors 2017, pp. 174–175). The stronghold of PEGIDA is still Eastern Germany, although some sister organizations also were established in Western Germany and other countries such as the UK and even as far as Canada. PEGIDA is best understood as a "brand" of political style rather than a pattern of political organization. On the level of political preferences and interpersonal contacts, there is however no doubt that PEGIDA and AfD have developed affinities and synergies, for instance when in 2015 jointly launching the identitarian internet platform einprozent.de (Önnerfors forthcoming 2020; see also Nissen Chap. 6, and Kondor and Littler Chap. 8, in this volume). These mutual contacts have been developed since and the magnitude of far-right protest in Chemnitz in autumn 2018 has been explained against the background of significant synergies in the milieu. I have covered the rise and development of PEGIDA extensively elsewhere (Önnerfors 2019: pp. 173–200).

In his book "Whiteness in Swedish motion picture 1989–2010" (*Vithet i svensk spelfilm*), the film scholar, critic, and writer Hynek Pallas (2011) develops the concept of "post-welfare nostalgia", a term that aptly describes the dynamics also at play in Germany. Pallas determines a point in time when postindustrial society changes profoundly due to an experienced loss of welfare (Pallas 2011, p. 87). This process can also be located in what Hanspeter Kriesi has identified as a new structural conflict in which "globalization 'losers' are opposed to globalization 'winners'", also in cultural terms (Kriesi 2014, p. 369). Bauman speaks in this context about a "sadness of deprivation" (2017, p. 93). Hübinette and Lundström (2011) argue that there is a "double-binding force" that unites two sides of white mourning. In the first case, racism is evoked as a melancholic reaction towards an experienced loss of a racially homogeneous society. In the other case, it is the collapse of the image of a morally superior country (through parliamentary success of right-wing populist parties) that causes anxieties, panic and denial among anti-racists and feminists. As opposed as these positions might appear on a political level, they both paradoxically nurture the idea of two varieties of white supremacy that now appear lost, an "unspeakable melancholia filled with limitless pain" (Hübinette and Lundström 2011, pp. 46, 49–50). Unfortunately, the authors do not explore melancholia and the emotional dimensions of loss (or pain) as analytical categories further (see Ahmed 2014). It is here Pallas' concept of "post-welfare nostalgia" offers a broader approach, based upon British scholarship on post-imperial, "lossof-empire" nostalgia and in particular Paul Gilroy's (2004, pp. 97–104,107–116,125–132) writings on the pathology of postcolonial melancholia trapped between un-confronted shame, willful amnesia and manic re-performance of former glory. This is similar to what Taggart has coined the imagined heartland: "a construction of an ideal world but unlike utopian conceptions, it is constructed retrospectively from the past–it is in essence a past-derived vision projected onto the present as that which has been lost" (Taggart 2004, p. 274; see also Wodak 2015, p. 40). The dream of omnipotence collapsed with the dismantling of the British empire which created a sense of deprivation among core segments of the (predominantly white) electorate facing new realities such as multiculturalism, migration, the dissolution of national sovereignty and what are perceived as civilizational conflicts (in Huntington's terms) or, in Pallas terms what we witness is a "lower European middle-class self-construction as losers in a new social hierarchy" (Pallas 2011, p. 134).

Society after 9/11 and the erosion of social welfare as a consequence of neoconservative politics and multiple financial crises created mutual alienation and processes of "populist demarcations" (Pallas 2011, p. 89). These developments "provide with answers upon the question why Western societies react upon de-industrialization and growing unemployment with racism and sentiments directed against immigrants and borders closing around the nostalgic perception of what a nation essentially is constituted of" (Pallas 2011, p. 98).

Pallas makes clear that there are problems comparing countries like Sweden to Britain, or other colonial powers in this regard. In the Swedish case, he argues, there is a more homogeneous form of "nostalgic gaze around lost solidarity in the discourse concerning welfare-society and *folkhemmet* [my Italics; the particular Swedish 19th-century concept of a socially equal and culturally uniform 'People's Home']" (Pallas 2011, p. 90; see: Norocel 2016; Hellström and Tawat, Chap. 2 in this volume; Önnerfors forthcoming 2020). Still, Pallas concedes that mechanisms of national melancholy can be studied through the (measurable) rise of racism and critique against politics of multiculturalism and diversity even in a broader European framework. It is here PEGIDA as a successful social movement represents a telling case. In a state of post-welfare, European "mourning collectives [are] collectively disoriented in environments they once upon a time took for granted, but where they don't feel at home any longer […]. Since the idea of a people is so fundamental in European nation-building, a 'loss'–or changes–of it create collective emotions; nostalgia, melancholy" (Pallas 2011, p. 148). The German political "loss of empire" on a global scale can be dated back to several instances: to the military defeat of 1918 (together with sustained vivid myths of the injustice of Versailles peace treaty), a general loss of superiority to the defeat of 1945 (paired with the incapacity to mourn atrocities and dictatorial repression) and a persistent feeling of resentment and inferiority in parts of Germany due to the collapse of the GDR in 1989 (and reversed feelings in the former West). Hence, there might be different layers of mourning, memory, amnesia, and selective cultural re-performances of former glory at play, which complicate a straightforward application of Pallas' theories about a consistent post-welfare nostalgia to the German case.

However, by linking these theoretical approaches, I suggest an interpretative framework focusing on resentment, nostalgia, and melancholia as contemporary expressions of cultural politics of emotion. This interpretative framework has the potential to inform culturalist approaches to nationalism studies at the crossroads of (the perceived loss of) redistributive justice as a political good and migration as a perceived political threat. In the "liquid modern" status of an imagined perpetual crisis, decline of welfare and societal cohesion, what is understood as culture is used to express "retrotopian" and exclusionary identity-concepts which paradoxically are perceived as progressive since promoting fundamental political change (Bauman 2017). As Bauman argues in his introduction titled "The Age of Nostalgia", contemporary political visions are not focused on the future but on a "lost/stolen/abandoned yet undead past" (Bauman 2017, p. 10). It is this unspecific longing for the past (that never was) as future that movements like PEGIDA successfully have been able to mobilize and to channel into diverse civil society agency online and offline.

# **9.3 The Performative Style of PEGIDA**

Recent research defines the performative style of contemporary populist politics as "the repertoires of embodied, symbolically mediated performance made to audiences that are used to create and navigate the fields of power that comprise the political, stretching from the domain of government through to everyday life" (Moffitt 2016, pp. 28–29). Political style has three key features: "appeal to 'the people' versus 'the elite'; 'bad manners'; and crisis, breakdown or threat" (Moffitt 2016, p. 29; Önnerfors 2019). Ruth Wodak has instead highlighted (2015) that contemporary right-wing populism, although displaying a "diffuse political style" and employing "performance strategies", agglomerates around a core of ideological positions such as a revisionist view of history, anti-intellectualism or pseudoemancipatory positions (claimed approval of human rights or gender equality) aimed at exclusionary denigration of political enemies. Analyzing PEGIDA from a performative perspective reveals how cultural elements are used to create a backdrop and repertoire for the promotion of ideas. First, one can interpret the city of Dresden, where PEGIDA assembles its supporters, as a stage. Completely wiped out as a living city after allied (not so entirely proportional) bombing in the final months of the Second World War, Dresden became a part of the Soviet occupation zone, eventually of the German Democratic Republic and only slowly recovered

from wartime damage to restore its glory as "Florence of the North". Dresden came into the spotlight again just at the end of the GDR, when thousands marched against ruling communist nomenclature under the motto "We are the people!", contributing vigorously to the pressure that eventually would lead to the fall of the Berlin wall and the entire militarized border to the West. By reclaiming the motto of the GDRcitizenship movement and one of its iconic places, PEGIDA consciously ties into a symbolic history and a cultural geography of resistance.

As a rule, the events in Dresden consisted of three parts: (1) a stationary opening rally followed by (2) the "evening walk" as such, concluded by (3) a final stationary rally. At the beginning and end of each event, speeches and addresses were presented. A particular dynamic frequently developed between speaker and audience, whereby the latter interjected sentences and passages of the speeches with a variety of chants like "We are the people", "Media-Liars" (*Lügenpresse*) and surprisingly frequent (and in English) "Ami, go home!" (Vorländer et al. 2016, p. 49). These chants would require a separate study, since they assume the function of ritualized and extremely condensed narrative tropes with the aim to display acclaim for and comment positions expressed by the speaker. These occasions, also documented on numerous videos posted on the PEGIDA-Facebook page and on its YouTubechannel, might be possible to compare with a typical way of ritual interaction between speaker and audience at party conventions and mass rallies of the GDR. Party press such as the *Neues Deutschland* almost prescriptively inserted a standard hyphen into the accounts of different rallies almost like retrospective stage directions (*Starker, lang anhaltender Beifall, Sprechchöre* – Forceful, long lasting applause, chants). And of course, the peaceful revolution of 1989 was replete of significant chants. During the rallies and walks, a huge number of banners and signboards with different (and sometimes conflicting) slogans were exhibited. These can be interpreted as an important element of PEGIDA self-design and re-affirmation of positions expressed in writing, speeches or chants. (Vorländer et al. 2016, pp. 50–51) Finally yet importantly, Pegidistas carried various flags that increasingly assumed meaning. Apart from the German, national flags of Israel, France, Ukraine and most notably Russia have been displayed as well as German regional flags either from existing or defunct periods of German history and *lambda*-banners from the Identitarian movement.

Particularly charged is the intensified usage of the so-called "Wirmer"-flag, referring to a new national flag designed during resistance against the Hitler-regime and appropriated by the German "new right" where it has undergone a reinterpretation. This flag arranges the German colors black-red-gold in a fashion similar to the Norwegian. It has become a symbol of PEGIDA, insinuating that the current political system of Germany can be paralleled to a totalitarian state and that supporting the movement is to be seen as an act of resistance – a powerful trope of victimperpetrator-reversal in the German radical right (Vorländer et al. 2016, pp. 51–52; Wodak 2015, p. 4) As a closing ritual during the final rally, participants raised their mobile phone flashlights or lighteners "to let the politicians see daylight", followed (and in the light season) substituted by singing the German national anthem

(Vorländer et al. 2016, p. 47). "The truth is out there" and "the politicians are blind" to see this–the topos of "political correctness" is performed in live action.

On the website of PEGIDA, a particular PEGIDA-hymn2 (4′18″) with the title Together we are strong (*Gemeinsam sind wir stark*) can be downloaded. It is in use since autumn 2015 (PEGIDA 2020). The hymn has no (official) lyrics, instead the voices are produced by a humming men's choir set to an orchestra. Starting from a rather gloomy mood in the beginning, the music changes its character to become positive and impressive, finishing off in a heroic upbeat sentiment accompanied by ringing bells. The tune is best described as some sort of soundtrack or a hymn creating sense of community and strength for a football supporter club. It underlines the performative character of PEGIDA's events, as well as the movement's roots in and close ties to the hooligan and football supporter (sub-)culture of Dresden.

Apparently, the lack of lyrics prompted one of PEGIDA's supporters to write a text that is set to some form of *sprechgesang* and published on YouTube on a channel created by the anonymous profile *Tolkewitzer* (named after a part of Dresden). The channel (followed by 233 people) has 33 videos, most of them displaying clear support for PEGIDA, AfD and the Identitarian movement.3 In material like this, through the lens of cultural performance, it is possible to study the overlap between PEGIDA as a political social grassroots movement on the street, AfD as the organized parliamentary branch and Identitarianism as ideological unifying superstructure of the ENR. The PEGIDA-hymn (published in February 2016) is performed by a male voice with the name "Alfred Schnabel" who cannot be identified clearly. A huge number of YouTube-videos under his name are non-professional folk ballads about local places and events composed for the occasion. However, the PEGIDAhymn with its lyrics (not officially endorsed by PEGIDA) stands clearly out with almost 55,000 views (Table 9.1).

The lyrics represent typical ideas circulating in the PEGIDA word cloud: Islamization drives European patriots to rise, it is a duty for the Germans to protect their country. However, there are also internal enemies, the state, the economic system and religion who steal the prospects of future generations and do not care about their own people. For the sake of Europe and Germany, it is time to throw Islam out of the country, PEGIDA shows the way. "Resistance is a holy duty", taking to the streets is to make it visible. What unites German patriots is the future, freedom, democracy and language. These are existential values worth fighting for against the enemy. It is a duty to protect the native land, the 'will of the people' must be displayed. Whereas we can interpret the milieu around PEGIDA as an expression of the performance of cultural positions born out the idea of resistance against the ruling "system", PEGIDA capitalizes also on foreign policy events transformed to meaning and decodable only in a specifically German context. This emerged in

<sup>2</sup> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t-efB\_nJnAU. Accessed 17 Dec 2017.

<sup>3</sup> https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCBwEW7OqfILfxP1k7JRf61g/videos. Accessed 9 Sep 2019.


**Table 9.1** The unofficial PEGIDA-hymn

plain daylight when at the end of 2017 it was announced that the USA was to move its Israeli embassy.

# **9.4 German** *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* **as a Cultural Argument Against the Absolute Muslim Other**

On December 6, 2017 Donald Trump declared that the USA aims to move its embassy to Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in a recognition of a 1980 Israeli decision (condemned by UNSC resolution 478 and others) that Jerusalem represents the united capital of Israel. Trump's decision sparked an immediate global reaction in which infuriated segments of Muslim minorities in Western countries displayed appalling anti-Semitic sentiments and engaged in unmotivated attacks against Israeli or Jewish establishments (Dreher 2017; *FAZ* 2017). As much as anti-Semitism and violent attacks rightly were condemned, it is noteworthy that the critique against these acts were appropriated as a cultural argument against the absolute Muslim other.

Six days after Trump's declaration to move the embassy, PEGIDA Dresden posted a text on its website and disseminated it in a newsletter titled "The infinite anti-Semitism [*Judenhass*, literally "hatred of Jews"] of the Muslims"4 (PEGIDA 2020, all translations by the author). The newsletter has all typographic attributes of angry social media postings that have inundated divisive political discourse over the last five years: nouns and phrases written in capital letters and quotation marks, some of them neologisms, "bad manners", and a rakish style in expressions (Madisson 2016, pp. 14–15, 38; Moffitt 2016, pp. 28–29) coupled with casual denigrating satire. The readers of the newsletter are called "friends" and thus included in an imaginary "we". First, PEGIDA apologizes for quoting a survey carried out by the popular tabloid *Bild-zeitung* in Neukölln (a part of Berlin, "completely lost to Muslim parallel societies"). This excuse must be understood in the context of PEGIDA's general condemnation of German "system" or "mainstream media" as "liars", an argument that is reiterated later on. In any case the survey "confirm[s] our opinion about Muslims and their dangerous fascistic ideology". The newsletter goes on: "Hatred against the Jews, which we since decades have tried to oust from Germany has returned to our country through uncontrolled mass-immigration and failed – be-cause of IMPOSSIBLE – integration".

The newsletter then states that Germany since decades has been engaged in addressing the country's anti-Semitism, presumably referring to (but not explicitly mentioning) the atrocities carried out between 1933 and 1945. *Judenhass* has now returned to "our country" due to migration, and the impossible task of convincing migrants to embrace the German mindset of weeding out anti-Semitism and fascism. It is the "Muslims" that are suspected of harboring a "dangerous fascistic ideology". The political establishment and "the press" are accused of "noisy silence", relativizing and excusing the events that have unfolded (in the protests against Trump's decision). "Riotous assemblies of Palestinian terrorists" are trivialized– instead a platform is offered to the *Judenhasser* to disseminate their hate speech. Indeed, the Muslim's "complete and *Judenhass*" is allegedly suppressed by their "Taqiyya" (the presumed praxis of intentional lying) "until enough enemies of the Jews are in the country and they can finally attack". It is a difficult task to inform voters that those "illegally immigration skilled personnel [ironic reference to the welcoming attitude towards migrants by the German industry] and other Muslim migrants […] are responsible for Germany's slide back to a very dark chapter of our history". Apart from the wrongly "vilified" AfD that openly condemned Muslim *Judenhass*, the "green-left-wing-fascist players of politics to the traitors of the people (*Volksverräter*) in CDU and SPD [German conservatives and social democrats]" – are accused of not daring to address the issue. The newsletter warns about the confusing situation, whereby "neo-fascist anti-fascists" denounce "courageous citizens (who are opposed to the new anti-Semitism of the Muslims) as 'Nazis' or 'racists'". As such, the media is accused of lying by omission, not being true on hard facts and ignoring the Muslims' despicable attitudes against Jews. The authors of

<sup>4</sup> *Islam heisst Frieden – oder doch Gewalt und Judenhass?* www.pegida.de. Accessed 17 Dec 2017.

the newsletter then declare: "Friends, it is time to reveal the name of those who are responsible for the situation in our country! It is neither Trump, Putin nor Netanyahu, nor the 'evil right' or imaginary 'Nazis'–NO, it is Muslims who act out their century-old *Judenhass* in the middle of Germany."

The newsletter's message is complex to unpack. Its rhetoric abounds in recurring tropes circulating in PEGIDA-discourse as part of its performative style, expressed both on an explicit and implicit level. First, the narrative of the newsletter is constructed around the image of Muslims as a monolithic collective "Other" holding fixed ideological positions (which they intentionally lie about), isolated socially from the German majority culture (the newsletter's "we") in parallel societies. This is exemplified by "their" century-old hatred of Jews, as expressed during the Jerusalem embassy-protests. Whereas Germany and Germans are allegedly engaged in confronting their anti-Semitism since decades (and embrace guilt for the Holocaust), the backwardness of (mass-immigrated) Muslims in this regard is regarded as a proof of the impossibility of cultural integration into the German society, or rather partake in the memory politics constitutive for exclusionary German national identity-formation. Not mentioned explicitly, however, the next step of the argument would be to accuse these "Others" of Holocaust-denial, a punishable offence under German law. It is the political and media establishments who are to blame that Muslim *Judenhass* is not treated in an appropriate manner, but intentionally diminished and excused. Any suspiciously anti-Semitic positions by the "rightwing" (AfD and allies) would in turn have met with a forceful backlash. In fact, it is the Muslims who are responsible for dragging Germany back to darker chapters of its history. At a number of occasions, PEGIDA makes clear who the "real" fascists are: both anti-fascists, the Left and the Green parties, but above all Muslims. This follows a recurring line of thought in the PEGIDA-context. In the introduction to an insider-account of PEGIDA I have treated elsewhere (Önnerfors 2018, p. 105), I distinguish a blame game: who rightly is to be branded as a Nazi or fascist and on which grounds?

This blame game can be interpreted as representative for a selective cultural politics of memory in Germany–no one wants to be associated openly with the political regime of 1933–1945, because such an association simply is a cultural taboo (with the exception of blunt neo-Nazism, see: Wodak 2015, p. 97, 99–100). To attach the attribute of fascism and anti-Semitism to Muslims may be seen as to emotionally project the worst imaginable German shame upon the stranger, namely the shame for the extinction of millions of Jews during Nazi rule. However, not explicitly mentioning 1933–1945 and its atrocities at all might also be explained as a conscious and selective form of willful amnesia (Gilroy 2004), unconfronted shame or a specifically German "incapacity to mourn" (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich 1984). Yet, there is a term even for this psychological operation in a particular German identityformation, namely *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* – coming to terms with its past through various strategies (Bieberstein 2016, pp. 902–919). This cultural argument of melancholia is at play in the newsletter's rhetoric. According to PEGDIA, for decades Germans have been working to eradicate their anti-Semitism, but through the mass-arrival of the Muslim "Other" there is a tangible risk for the country being

thrown back to an episode in the past (1933–1945), no one desires to return to nor has the capacity to mourn in an appropriate way. The diffuse strategy of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* is such a constitutive feature of cultural Germanness that it leaves no room for any expressions of anti-Semitism, and by extension the inherent *Judenhass* of Muslims is impossible to integrate. The rhetoric of PEGIDA in this case is an example of "calculated ambivalence" reinforcing Manichaean divisions (Wodak 2015, pp. 54, 67). Arguments conventionally associated with the radical right now are projected upon the Muslim "Other" as a proof of their inability to adopt a German identity, in particular, and the presumed Judeo-Christian cultural heritage of Europe, in general. This makes it possible to construct "scapegoats by shifting blame" (Wodak 2015, p. 67). PEGIDA elaborates a variation of the *Iudeus ex machina*-strategy, whereby pretended support for Jews, and Holocaust remembrance are "functionalized for political ends" (Wodak 2015, p. 101).

# **9.5 Retrotopian Performance of Culture as a Retrogressive Force**

The politics of resentment at play in the German PEGIDA-movement appears to be linked to a perceived loss of redistributive justice, in combination with a likewise perceived state of powerlessness and deprivation, created by allegedly changed priorities of resource allocation and detachment of representative decision-making, receiving existential urgency through the European migration crisis and blamed on ruling elites of the "system" in politics and media. What can be witnessed in these imaginaries of welfare-decline is the simultaneous rise of culture as an answer upon larger insecurities and fears related to identity-formation, and processes of identification. The link between "class politics" in which these concepts of loss are exploited and have contributed to the growth of the radical right have (Bornschier and Kriesi 2012, pp. 10–30; Kitschelt 2012, pp. 224–251).

The fuzzy and performative style of politics that characterizes PEGIDA and its allies (Önnerfors 2017, pp. 159–175) allows for the redefinition of conservatism as a seemingly progressive force, particularly in the mobilization of civil society agency online and offline. Since its rise in 2014, PEGIDA has gained considerable momentum as a political movement, contributing to the shift rightwards of the mainstream political discourse in Germany. With the AfD entering the German *Bundestag* in autumn 2017 (as well as several state parliaments with double digit electoral support), and the dramatic developments unfolding thereafter, the German political landscape has experienced a significant and potentially game-changing shakeup that aligns it partially with the solidification of neo-authoritarian and illiberal democracy in central and eastern Europe (see, Cinpoeş and Norocel Chap. 4, and Kondor and Littler Chap. 8, in this volume). These developments have been spearheaded by the retrotopian performance of culture as a retrogressive force that has contributed to the mobilization of civil society agency online and offline.

147

Whereas it is difficult to estimate the overall impact of cultural performances such as the PEGIDA-hymn, it is one example of how political positions of the ENR are mediatized and integrated into the online hyper-media environment. The PEGIDA reaction upon events unfolding following the declared move of the US-embassy demonstrate that the new populist right in Germany is at pains to distance itself from any anti-Semitism, and instead forcefully ascribes it to "immigrant Muslims" with the purpose of continued exclusion. Furthermore, by not being able to share a particular German sentiment towards the past, *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, the "Other" cannot be integrated into German culture and its shared identity. PEGIDA provided the organizational framework and sufficient ideological fuzziness to continuously mobilize tens of thousands of people to gather on the streets of Germany, and at the same time to connect on social media, two processes mutually reinforcing one other. While the normative expectations of the role of civil society engagement for democratization and participatory inclusiveness are high and underscored by some researchers (Putnam et al. 1993), others have recently observed that the ENR hijacks typical features of anti-globalization, anti-EU or national justice movements (Bar-On 2014; Salzborn 2016). As previously stated, PEGIDA has been labelled a "populist right-wing movement of indignation" (Vorländer et al. 2016), which highlights the fact that many organizational elements and objects of protest are prevalent across the political spectrum such as in the southern European "indignados"-movements. A recently published a book about PEGIDA had the subtitle "the dirty side of civil society?" (Geiges et al. 2015), and elaborated on the apparent paradox that established socio-political institutions embrace the concept of an active civil society, one the one hand, but on the other, do not tolerate activities contrary to the values that are favored (see also Ruzza, Chap. 14 in this volume). Sahoo (2014, 2018) has pointed out a similar situation in India, where the Hindu nationalist organization RSS engages in typical civil society agency but acts for exclusionary Hindu nativist supremacism and against ethnic and religious minorities. Is it possible to understand the contemporary development as the emergence of an "uncivil society" on a global level? Who defines which values are to be protected and by whom? For the supporters of PEGIDA, it is clear that the future lies in the past, retrotopia is a driving force for retrogressive political change of the existing order.

# **References**

Ahmed, S. (2014). *The cultural politics of emotion* (2nd ed.). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Bar-On, T. (2014). The French new right: Neither left nor right? *Journal for the Study of Radicalism, 8*(1), 1–44.

Bauman, Z. (2017). *Retrotopia*. Cambridge: Polity.

Bieberstein, A. (2016). Not a German past to be reckoned with: Negotiating migrant subjectivities between Vergangenheitsbewältigung and the nationalization of history. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 22*, 902–919.


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# **Part III Emancipatory Initiatives Mobilizing Beyond Politics**

# **Chapter 10 Challenging Misconceptions: Danish Civil Society in Times of Crisis**

**Martin Bak Jørgensen and Daniel Rosengren Olsen**

# **10.1 Understanding Crises in the Danish Context**

The stability of global capitalism has been challenged successively since the turn of the last millennium. It was initiated by the burst of the "dot.com bubble", massive demonstrations against the current globalization regime (the anti-globalization movements, see Graeber 2002) and the shocking images of the World Trade Center in flames.1 Not long after these events, the entire system of global finance came tumbling down during the "Financial Crisis" that brought the entire machinery to a grinding halt and demanded enormous amounts of "quantitative easing" to resume operations. In the European context, the financial crisis precipitated several further crises, including a range of "debt crisis" (Greece, Italy, Malta, etc.) potential and eventual "Exits" (Greece, UK), and eventually a crisis of the entire European Unionization project, concomitant with the "refugee crisis" mounting as a consequence of the Syrian civil war – and, not to forget; the burgeoning climate crisis.

This leads us to one of the larger questions of contemporary social movements. The "traditional stance" on social movements, with point of departure in Marxian class analyses, were challenges with the emergence of "New Social Movements"

M. B. Jørgensen (\*)

D. R. Olsen

<sup>1</sup>While symbolic of many things, the Twin Towers were the iconic symbols of world commerce; a pride of the Trading City of New York, thus their destruction may be interpreted as symbolic representation of an attack on the entire global capitalist system, and equally indicative of the system's instability and fragility when faced with shocks (see also Beck's [2006] analyses in this regard).

Department of Culture and Learning, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark e-mail: martinjo@hum.aau.dk

Department of Communication and Psychology, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark e-mail: rosengren@hum.aau.dk

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2020 153

O. C. Norocel et al. (eds.), *Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41694-2\_10

(NSM) in the late twentieth century, which questions the central concept of Marxian analysis that "capital", "labor", and "class" could remain undifferentiated and function as the major frame of social movement and class-based resistance to capitalist exploitation (Dubet 1994; Offe 1985; Welton 1993). The change has often been structurally identified with a shift to "post-industrialization" in Western societies, starting from the early 1960s. The NSMs are structurally seen as aligned with middle-class citizens rather than the lower classes and oriented towards personal and cultural change (lifestyles and identities) rather than formal policy changes or "regime changes" as in the classical Marxist revolutionary theory (Melucci 1980).

The emergence has led to a series of debates over theoretical accuracy in terms of description, but equally in the normative implications of the various approaches to social movement analysis. A current schism centers on the left's "abandonment of the poor" in favor of the NSM concern with "the personal" rather than with the plight of the underclasses, which may have provided an important impetus for the realignment between nationalists, conservatives, and the lower classes (Piketty 2018; Jørgensen 2016). Importantly, the NSMs of the right (Generation Identity, the "ALT-Right", Fortress Europe, etc.) illustrate the diversity and complexity of the field of the identity-oriented new movements and the cleavages between their outlooks on future trajectories.

Taking the contemporary situation into consideration, it is perhaps not too surprising that people may find the situation perplexing and consequently that we see a plethora of initiatives pointing in different directions. In this article, however, we focus on the confluence between a contemporary Danish NSM, *Venligboerne*, and their position within the larger "refugee solidarity movement". Using Alan Sears' concept *infrastructures of dissent*, we argue that the contemporary situation requires a diverse range of social movement activity, relying on both traditional and "new" approaches to social movement development and "political praxes", ranging from protest activity to everyday engagements with repressed subjectivities ("everyday activism"). We attempt to illustrate how *Venligboerne* provide a "piece" in the complex puzzle of contemporary social movement activity in the area of migration, and how we can view their emphasis on "identity and lifestyle" as supportive of the larger movements rather than a hindrance.

# *10.1.1 Research Approach*

Inspired by the notion of *infrastructure of dissent*, we analyze our case, *Venligboerne*, from two distinct angles: Firstly, by attempting to disseminate how this particular CSO has differentiated itself from other organizations in the field, and secondly, by analyzing the organization as a community of learning. The study relies on a mixed-methods approach to data collection based on participatory research, interviews and secondary data collection. It is a qualitative, exploratory study which aims to describe and understand this particular CSO in a specific context rather than aiming to build invariant models for social movements (Tilly 1995, p. 1596).

Our research is situated in the Danish context during the peak of the refugee (reception) crisis (2015–2018), focusing on the relationship between the organizational characteristics, and the context of events in which the organization found itself. We have opted for a mix of descriptive approaches covering both participation (online and offline), as well as the collection of secondary data from various sources such as newspapers and online forums. We have more actively engaged with the refugee solidarity network as well, from which we have also been able to acquire information and insights into the overall movement (albeit from a partial perspective).

We chose *Venligboerne* as a case for several reasons. Primarily because of the movement's emergence in relation to the refugee (reception) crisis and its popularity, having mobilized more than 150,000 members in the extensive range of Facebook groups (Toubøl 2015), which earned the movement national recognition and presence across the country. The case is also significant because of its distinct approach that has differentiated *Venligboerne* from other CSOs in the refugee solidarity movement. Additionally, the initiative differs from most other CSOs within the refugee solidarity network; relying on an "a political" approach, heterogeneous activities, informal organization, and other characteristics, which, we argue, have allowed the movement to situate itself as a an important "mediator" within the very diverse range of organizations that make up the refugee solidarity network (Fenger-Grøndahl 2016; Nygaard 2017; Toubøl 2017).

# **10.2 Civil Society and Infrastructures of Dissent**

We understand dissent as "… social and political questioning (not just […] mere critique or a need for palliative reforms), […] undoing consensus and rendering excluded actors and struggles visible" (Jørgensen and Agustín 2015, p. 14). From this view, dissent assumes relevance as experiences opposed to a dominant order to render new actors, struggles and ways of organizing visible. Dissent commonly evokes mental imaginaries of militant forms of action; however, we see dissent also as the everyday forms of resistance and politics taking place in the "refugees welcome" movement as well as the development of practices of sharing, caring and learning.

In his book *The Next New Left*, Alan Sears (2014) coins the notion *infrastructures of dissent*. Such infrastructures, according to him, provide social movements with four essential capacities: collective memory; collective dreams; collective learning; and capacity for solidarity. Sears argues that "[i]nfrastructures of dissent can be defined as the means through which activists develop political communities capable of learning, communicating and mobilizing together" and continues by arguing that infrastructures of dissent "[are] a crucial feature of popular mobilization, providing

the basic connections that underlie even apparently spontaneous protest actions" (Sears 2014, p. 2). Hence, when we analyze *Venligboerne*, we seek to identify how the organization provides the organizational infrastructure needed to support various forms of dissent.

In the context of this volume, we view dissent as intricately related to the "hope" for a better future beyond the bleak political situation that Europe (and hereby Denmark) has found itself in. It is a rejection of both the apathy and the pernicious ethnocentric nostalgias of contemporary nationalistic ideologies. Hope for a better future is not merely a positive outlook on things as in a naïve optimism that "everything will be alright". To the contrary, hope indicates a belief in the value and expediency of activities in the present: that a better future can be created with actions implemented today. Hope, in this sense, is also required to combat lethargy, pessimism, and even resignation to the reigning ideological powers. In this regard, we see infrastructures of dissent as channels for a politics of hope. Sears argues infrastructures of dissent "enable people to develop collective dreams, to envision a better world, which provides a tremendous motivator and important moral compass" (Sears 2014, p. 18).

In Sears' framework, the infrastructure of dissent entails the capacity for solidarity as an integral component. Following Rick Fantasia, Sears does not regard solidarity as an automatic reaction to injustice, but rather something that must be cultivated (Sears 2014, p. 21). In other words, while individuals may sympathize intuitively with say refugees, organizational infrastructures are required to enable solidarity as effective praxis. Hence sympathy will not be useful if it is not translated into practical action. We regard solidarity as a relational practice; solidarity is contentious; emerges strongly in moments or conjunctures; is generative of political subjectivities and collective identities; entails alliance building among diverse actors; is inventive of new imaginaries; is situated in space and time (Agustín and Jørgensen 2016, 2019). In this chapter, we focus especially on the aspect of alliance building, which we understand in relation to Sears' capacity for solidarity. Alliance building is a crucial aspect of solidarity. The heterogeneity of political actors can only converge in a complex social composition if they manage to identify the diverse oppressive effects of the dominant order. This plurality generates a relation of solidarity that benefits all parties as the possibility of challenging the system is enhanced. Thus, solidarity becomes a driving force in promoting social change from civil society (Agustín and Jørgensen 2016). Solidarity cannot precede political actors nor can political actors impose their identities or interests upon others. Hence, when considering alliances between civil society and immigrants, the question is not identitarian but about how different political actors converge in ongoing social struggles to undo political closure (Agustín and Jørgensen 2016).

Following this approach, the activities undertaken in civil society are predicated on a consolidation of the differences that emerge within civil society itself. Conflictual situations cannot be reduced to "the state versus its others" but are equally present within civil society and must be resolved through other means of settlement (or the state will prove itself an inescapable necessity). This corresponds to the conceptualization of fluid relations between state and civil society, and underscores the importance of developing appropriate ways of solving such disputes without resorting to state interference or other means of force. Accordingly, we do not view civil society as a unitary constellation, but as a bricolage of various elements that at times come together as one, but at other times fragment in a range of different positions. Civil society, as such, has both propitious and deleterious components (Carothers 1999) but cannot be viewed as a uniform or integrated entity. In spite of this diversity and adversity, the objective is to advance better ways of living as communities and societies; mitigating means of oppression, violence, inequality, etc. Employing the idea of infrastructure of dissent makes it possible to analyze the contours of politics of hope articulated here.

# **10.3** *Venligboerne***: A Brief Summary**

The *Venligbo* movement began in April 2013, with a local initiative to improve the wellbeing of residents in the small town of Hjørring in northern Jutland, Denmark. The founder, Merete Bonde Pilgaard, saw kindness and hospitality as a way to transform people's lives in a positive direction, not only because it would be nice if people were friendlier to one another, but because, she argued, being friendly to others is also transformative for the person that changes her own outlook on the world. She argued that when people stopped thinking in negative terms about others, criticizing and problematizing other people's identities, actions, beliefs, etc., they became happier themselves (*TV2Nord* 2017). Kindness, curiosity and respect for diversity constitute the ideological foundation of the *Venligbo* movement. These values are also supplemented by the advice to meet the other face-to-face, to tell and listen to stories and take the time to be with the other person. In a very simple formulation, Merete Pilgaard states that her mission with the organization was to "train people in staying kind, even when others are not being kind" (Mortensen and Lumholt 2018). Beyond these values, we can observe how the initial ideas have branched into a wide range of activities that characterize the movement today:


even seeking out others that are different from oneself to possibly find stories that are different from one's own.

The movement has been characterized as a reinvigorated wave of Danish NSMs that has followed in the wake of the great recession. These initiatives are in many ways similar to the NSMs of the late twentieth century, but after a period of hiatus, Danish society has seen an increasing focus and emphasis on these new citizendriven initiatives (Regeringen 2014), which are often promoted as precursors of future societal arrangements (Lumholt 2019; Mortensen and Lumholt 2018; Regeringen 2010).

Although the movement focuses on everyday encounters between people, the numerous *Venligbo* Facebook groups have become an important vehicle for the spread of the movement, with each municipal faction usually creating their own online forum as subgroups under the overall movement, and many other groups for the organization of specific activities such as donations, discussions or local activities. While Facebook organizing is not unusual for social movements and civil society organizations, it is, however, relevant to observe that the groups have mostly been used for internal organizational and activity coordination with most of the groups being "closed" to non-members (i.e. not used for promoting ideas, policies, agendas, and so on). Besides the Facebook groups, several other initiatives have also been launched such as *Venligbo* cafés that have been established and run entirely by volunteers, festive events (such as *Café Venlig På Tværs* in Aalborg), help with learning Danish and translations, help to find work, fundraisers, and much more.

# *10.3.1 Organizational Structure*

The *Venligbo* movement features traits of both formal and informal organizational structure; however, the general structure of the movement is much closer to informal social movement organization (SMO) than formal movement organization (Staggenborg 1988; Willems and Jegger 2012). The movement has no formal leadership, and founder of the movement Merete Bonde Pilgaard has rarely challenged the conduct of local factions, albeit some controversy has existed around the interpretation of the movement values. There is no centralized control or bureaucratized decision-making process and no formalized divisions of labor, although many of the factions do establish some degrees of formalization to handle organizational management on an everyday basis. Especially larger projects such as the *Venligbo* cafés, funds, events, and so on, have necessitated some degree of organizational formalization. However, this formalization is only attributable to subunits of the movement, not to movement-level organization and functioning. Neither does it apply to most movement organizing, which is primarily effectuated through ad hoc problem solving. The overall organizational management centers on the value foundation of the movement and a small "daily management board", "Friendly Guides" (*Venligboerne* n.d.). This form of social movement organization is broadly similar to the "new social movements" (NSM) theories emphasizing identity and personal transformations as the primary guide for movement activities (Fominaya 2010; Offe 1985). This informal, value-based approach to movement organizing has been a fecund ground for initiatives that are based on the underlying movement values and which accord with the movements' overall identity, but which are not "caused" or predetermined by these identity formulations. This organizational form has supported the innovative character of civil society and provided possibilities for individuals to express themselves and act in creative ways.

Initially, there were no attempts to create an institutionalized way of governing the adherence to the organizational value foundation. However, in the spring of 2015, Pilgaard initiated the "Friendly Guides" to administer the rapid expansion of the movement and its subunits, which illustrates, perhaps, the most prominent change towards formalization on behalf of the overall movement. Importantly, this expansion escalated as the *Venligbo* idea was combined with helping refugees in the spring of 2015 when the many refugees fleeing Syria began to reach Denmark. Pilgaard met with Mads Nygaard who, at the time, worked in the newly reopened Asylum Center in Hjørring. They agreed that the *Venligbo* ideology would be a good idea.

The "hands-off approach" was also challenged during a conflict in 2016 over the approach to politics within the movement and by a deviant local group on the island Fyn that had adopted the name *Venligboerne*, but which most other factions agreed was not operating in accordance with the movement's identity, values, or goals (Fenger-Grøndahl 2016). However, in spite of the general agreement against this particular Facebook group, the incident did spark a persistent internal debate around organizational leadership, management, and general principles, which created fault lines between various positions within the movement, and which, to some extent, remain unresolved.

# *10.3.2 Network, Alliances and the Refugee Solidarity Movement*

The *Venligbo* movement has extensive links within the Danish refugee solidarity movement and beyond (Agustín and Jørgensen 2019). These links (collaborations, strategies, and ideological alliances) and practices of solidarity are part of the larger infrastructure of dissent which has been the basis for the ongoing solidarity mobilizations spanning the entirety of the refugee solidarity movement. This infrastructure is comprised of solidarity practices and networks of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s (Agustín and Jørgensen 2019; Toubøl 2015), to which *Venligboerne* adds a relatively new component. The development of the refugee solidarity movement in the past has not been as extensive as the scope we witness today, and it may be argued that this is the first time in contemporary history that Denmark has experienced the emergence of a loosely affiliated, countrywide network mobilizing around issues of migration, nationality, and migration policies. Nevertheless, the prior experiences and infrastructures partake in the shaping of the collective memory and praxes and guide the building up of the network today.

The existing network consists of a range of different organizations and initiatives that vary between highly formalized and occasionally state-aligned initiatives (i.e. NGOs such as Danish Refugee Council and Danish Red Cross) to local and highly informal networks that are further removed from the state apparatus and, in some cases, opposed to the state (i.e. anarchist groupings). Politics can be a highly divisive aspect in this regard, even when we consider a relatively aligned range of actors (i.e. the refugee solidarity movement as a whole), that may create cleavages between individuals or groups because their ideological backgrounds, identities, worldviews, repertories of contention, and so on, are incongruent. Some, for instance, might see NGOs as inefficient giants squandering money on expensive staff and PR campaigns, while others may see the direct-action tactics of small political initiatives as "deviant". What we want to emphasize, however, is the possibility of cooperation with a very broad variety of initiatives, as illustrated by *Venligboerne*, creating new alliances between many different organizations, likely, but not exclusively, as a consequence of their "apolitical approach" to everyday activism ("apolitical" understood as non-Party affiliation and avowedly not policy-oriented). This cooperation has augmented the infrastructures of dissent and provided new avenues for activist entrance to the refugee solidarity movement (Rutland 2013; Toubøl 2017).

Within the network, *Venligboerne* connect with numerous types of organizations and initiatives: from municipalities and local political parties to NGOs, political movements, and everything in between. These connections exist, not only through member overlaps but also through collaborations and mutual support in various activities. Thus, in spite of a great diversity within the overall network, *Venligboerne* have been able to position themselves as a significant node with connections permeating broadly across the entire network. This is significant to illustrating the diversity of the network actors and the need for "linking" between organizations that might otherwise not cooperate. Our proposition here is that *Venligboerne* occupy exactly this position as a linking organization between the range of actors in the overall movement.

It may be argued that this position has emerged as a consequence of interactions between *Venligboerne* and the existing refugee solidarity movement, rather than being merely a strategic self-positioning. The movement itself has certainly developed because of its contact with other organizations and individuals in the refugee solidarity movement, not least has this been an impetus for the divide between the "political" and "non-political" factions of the movement. Pilgaard has definitely never articulated a strategy for the movement in terms of its alignment with other organizations or individuals within the broader refugee solidarity movement. Such considerations were only articulated as the movement began to grow, and more politically engaged activists emerged as prominent voices from "inside" the *Venligbo* movement.

While refugees and the cooperation with new citizens play a large and important role in *Venligboerne*, the scope of the movement's activities is much wider. Thus, for instance, we also see a close cooperation with other civil society organizations such as *Næstehjælperne* (helping your next one, as in the person in your proximity) or *Sabaah* to help respectively the jobless or the LGBT communities of ethnic minorities. The collaboration with *Næstehjælperne* provides an illustrative example of how solidarity shapes alliance building by identifying commonalities and common struggles. *Næstehjælperne* have organized a network for "reform-stricken" people. Many of the organization's members are themselves affected by the new labor market and social policy reforms that have tightened legislation on social services and compensations for people out of work. Within *Næstehjælperne*, people help one another and together oppose the recent reforms, particularly focusing on how the contemporary legislation forces people with reduced capacities to work. They also seek to bridge the gap between "the working people" and the "nonworking people" (on social benefits or compensations) because a consequence of the current neo-liberal turn has been a stigmatization of people outside the labor market. *Næstehjælperne* and *Venligboerne* connect struggles through not seeing migrants and refugees as competitors for social services, but as people who are equally deserving of social rights (Thomsen and Jørgensen 2013). Returning to *Venligboerne*, if we look at the mantra of the CSO "to meet others with curiosity and respect", this outlook underlies the elementary praxes of the organization: the engagement with the other in a constructive and non-prejudiced way, regardless of who the other is.

The "linking" between diverse groups of the refugee solidarity network, and even with organizations from many other areas, is important in terms of the general political landscapes as well, since it creates possibilities for broader alliances between a range of actors, movements, and groups along the same lines that Offe (1985) discusses as an important question for NSM and their alliances with the traditional left-right political spectrum. This can be seen in the contemporary labor market debates and refugee policies, in which refugees are commonly portrayed as "stealing the jobs of the autochthonous population", or worse still: the welfare (Jørgensen and Thomsen 2016). It is politically expedient for nationalists and conservatives to convince unemployed and underemployed workers that refugees are the cause of their predicaments. Consequently, from a progressive perspective, the building of alliances between these groups is a necessary step to avoid collusion between conservatives, precarious workers and various factions of nationalists. Whether such alliances are established as explicitly party-political alliances or through informal civil society collaborations, activities or events is not of great import, since the development of infrastructures of dissent takes both time and a broad variety of initiatives.

# *10.3.3 Civil Society and Communities of Learning*

In various movements, for instance self-help movements or religious movements, the target of the movement is not an external entity that is asked to "deliver changes" but rather the members of the movement itself. Consequently, these movements are more "inward-looking" and focus on their own practices, activities, and so on, rather than looking to an external entity (i.e. the state) to ask for change. Some researchers have criticized these forms of movements (particularly the self-help movements), arguing that they are "retreating from democratic participation" or lacking in terms of engagement with the wider society (Baumann 1999; Marcello and Perucci 2000). However, other scholars see more potential for these kinds of groups to play a part in the general public sphere and democratic life (Anheier 2004; Giddens 1991; Welton 1993). Looking at *Venligboerne*, we argue there is a positive consequence of such participation and involvement in the CSO work.

Primarily, the movement addresses an interpersonal issue. If we return to the three central pillars of the organization (kindness, curiosity, and respect for diversity), these constitute the central framing of the movement and identify its primary targets and methods. The core pillars address different sides of the same problematic: meeting the other, whoever this person may be. In some cases, the other is a Dane, in other cases a refugee. Following the logic of *Venligboerne*, this categorical distinction essentially makes no difference as to how one should relate to the other. However, if we reverse the logic of the three pillars, we see that the issue all three pillars address is a deficiency in how we engage with the other: a lack of curiosity, a lack of respect, and a lack of friendliness. Instead, we often meet others with suspicion or negativity: we talk "behind their backs", and we do not trust their actions and initiatives (*TV2Nord* 2017). Pilgaard argues that by changing this negative approach to others, we will improve not only their lives, but also our own. Consequently, the movement promises betterment through self-improvement or "lifestyle changes", and the central tenet of the movement is the members' own struggle to improve the way they meet the other, whoever the other is. However, while this orientation appears as an inward gaze, the consequence is not a distancing, or isolation, from the rest of society, the result is rather the opposite; a stronger connection with the larger society and, more importantly, areas of society that have been either marginalized, suppressed or isolated (refugees but also recipients of social support and other stigmatized groups such as the LGBT+ community). Sears argues that the infrastructure of dissent provides avenues for collective learning to help people develop an understanding of how the world works and how it might be changed (2014). Moreover, collective learning provides the means for developing a profound political culture, which we, in the context of this book, link to the idea of a politics of hope: *hope cultivated and driven through communities of learning*.

Welton (1993) views new social movements (NSM) as sites of adult learning, arguing that these movements are particularly well-suited sites for such activities, and that we should view the NSMs as spaces for learning about new subjectivities, social justice, solidarities, civic engagement, and personal relations to a wider

society (Kilgore 1999). This includes the cultivation of emancipatory praxes, and in spite of the espoused "individualism" of NSMs, Welton argues that introspection and personal fulfillment "cannot be separated from collective action" (Welton 1993). The personal engagement with the other thus becomes a "first step" towards renewal of political imagination and accompanying praxes of dissent.

In a Deweyan sense, this learning process is based on the educational content of experiential and cooperative engagement with as broad and diverse a variety of social life as possible (Dewey 1916). In the case of *Venligboerne* (and similar organizations), we see how CSOs can contribute constructively to supporting engagement between groups that may otherwise tend to be isolated from each other, even if they are geographically situated close together. As in Dewey's experiential learning, the organization facilitates a personal encounter and experience with a social reality that may otherwise seem distant or unrelated to the individual, thus allowing for people of different groups to explore commonalities of oppression and for new solidarities to emerge. We must also note that besides the case of refugees, the SO supports a broad range of interaction between people from all walks of life in shared endeavors to solve everyday problems and establish collective projects and visions for the future, which is exemplary of the Deweyan ideal of social development and captured in his distinction of great societies from great communities (Dewey 1938).

The negative case (usually the result of a prolonged voluntary or involuntary separation between groups) can be exemplified with youth criminality, gangs, social control, racist organizations, and the like, which are all examples of collusions around other social objectives and through other forms of organization. These are examples of social learning and civil society organization all the same, but we see how they are not examples of positive forms of collective organization. They do not contribute to the development of good sense because they are isolated from most of society, because they do not collaborate with others, because their values are exclusionary, and because their practices are mostly self-serving.

The daily engagement with others helps to develop new, shared imaginations and collective visions for a different future than the hegemonic discourses of contemporary society, which have been borne by the politics of fear (outlined by Hellström et al., Chap. 1 in this volume). Instead of pandering to these xenophobic discourses, *Venligboerne* provide a space for challenging contemporary nostalgias and fears through an open engagement with the "Other"; experiment with the possibilities for conviviality, collaboration, and solidarity. Thus, this example illustrates how hope can be cultivated, even in dire situations such as during the compounding crises that Europe faced following the great recession.

When we relate these observations to the contemporary Danish society, an important insight can be gleaned from the chosen case that may shed some light on Dewey's somewhat forgotten insight of democracy and education. His educational approach reminds us that a politics for democracy must be founded on an organizational approach that supports a broad and diverse engagement between different forms of life (Dewey 1916). Civil society's qualities rest on the normative insight that they should be conducive to such activity that widens and extends the interaction between all citizens as far as possible, and at the same time do so in a way that emphasizes egalitarianism and mutualism, as in the case of *Venligboerne* (see also Freire 1970). In times of crisis, this function becomes particularly pertinent: the cultivation of hope and development of collective imagination and ideas (Haiven and Khasnabish 2016) are crucial to the infrastructures of dissent and collective abilities to challenge ideological hegemonies and political closures. Similarly, we may also point to the importance of individual agency and empowerment, which is also part of the development of alternative politics. While class-based movements emphasize the political power of a collective group in unison, NSMs tend to emphasize the power of the individual to promote an active self-invested participation in political problems. Both approaches are integral to solving many of the complex problems faced in times of great challenges and uncertainty.

# *10.3.4 Infrastructure of Dissent in Times of Change and Insecurity*

Learning in social movements has been addressed from a variety of perspectives, but in this chapter we want to primarily connect it with the idea of infrastructures of dissent in a time of large-scale changes and insecurity. As we mentioned in the introduction, the world economy and global capitalist system tremble; the twentieth century global political order is reversing; nationalism, ethnocentrism, and various nostalgias are on the rise along with rampant inequality. But what are the perspectives for contemporary progressive social movements?

Thinking in terms of *infrastructures of dissent* is useful to move beyond the traditional perspectives of class-based social movements that easily overlook both the diversity of political subjectivities as well as the necessity for developing intraorganizational collaboration, trust, resource sharing, planning, visions, and much more. The case of *Venligboerne*, we hope, illustrates how a CSO may appropriately position itself, not necessarily in the forefront of protest, yet still at the heart of progressive development.

To "learn", in this respect, is not associated with the formalized idea of didactic curricula and teaching methods, but can be understood with Alain Touraine's theory of the subject (Dubet 1994; Rutland 2013) emphasizing the movement of the individual through social space as a process of "work on the self", meaning an individual development, which is not reducible to some "knowledge of facts", but which includes emotions, ideas, visions, ideology, resources and subjectivity, shaping the individual's sense of self in social space though without giving up the recognition of a social space that equally influences the movement of the individual.

This view is important to avoid fracturing among progressives and to strengthen alliances between different groups (such as refugees, workers, the jobless, etc.), to establish spaces of social learning and development which together constitute the infrastructures of dissent that may constitute the support needed for progressive forces of the twenty-first century.

# **10.4 Conclusions**

The Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch wrote about utopia and hope in the first part of the twentieth century. He rejected the cultural pessimism of his peers (for instance Adorno) and insisted on the transformative power of political action by the working class and the new social movements. A particularly compelling statement stemming from *The Principle of Hope* (a three-volume piece) written between 1938 and 1947 goes: "The most tragic form of loss isn't the loss of security; it's the loss of the capacity to imagine that things could be different" (here from the 1986 edition). Although not carrying the same optimism as Bloch, Sears also expresses hope of political transformation (in his case for the reinvigoration of the left). Hope is action, and action for him is located within the framework of the infrastructure of dissent. This provides the means to develop the capacity to make connections and develop knowledge out of collective experience and to enhance the ability to work strategically as mobilizations evolve (Sears 2014, p. 6). He argues that individuals learn rapidly, but that it takes a collective effort and an infrastructure to "develop a big picture perspective on issues and to envision a better world worth fighting for" (Sears 2014, p. 6).

In our analysis of *Venligboerne*, the space for the civil society organization is expanded beyond a space for political protest. The solidarity work and the welcoming culture form part of a broader infrastructure of dissent. *Venligboerne* can be viewed as a community of collective learning, which is particularly pertinent at a time when refugees, migrants, and Muslims have been cast as the culprits of Europe's contemporary ailments. Here we see how learning becomes crucial for enacting everyday progressive politics. The movement's contributions are not merely protest actions against escalating political repression, but also an educational process focused on a renewed understanding of the other, whether the other is a refugee, unemployed, Muslim, migrant, or simply another Dane. Such learning processes are important in order to reorient the contemporary cultural trajectory that is moving us towards increasingly xenophobic, hierarchical, and self-centered outlooks on the world. While protest activity of course plays a part in the same direction, it is important to recognize the work of culturally oriented social activity that supports the protest activity by providing an open space for adult learning, and thus forms part of the infrastructures of dissent that enable contemporary formations of transformative alliances and possibilities for a reinvigoration of utopian politics of hope: the ability to collectively imagine better futures with space for a diverse range of subjectivities.

The experiential dimension of discovering possibilities of co-existence, shared ideas, possibilities for shared projects and cooperation, exchange and integration between different groups are all central aspects in understanding *Venligboerne*. From our analysis of *Venligboerne*, we argue that the organizational form in combination with the organizational goals provide a pertinent example of such a space for adult learning, which supports both engagement and interaction with a broad range of social organizations (Dewey 1916).

Rather than focusing on the success or failure of such an approach (Haiven and Khasnabish 2016), it makes sense to view the praxis itself as a model for civil society activity. While the case here is obviously neither exclusive nor uniform, the point is less about a specific variety or type but about a general approach. While *Venligboerne* as a case provide a significant ensemble which we can learn much from, they should not be seen as the only possible configuration of such a CSO. In conclusion, in our work to improve on the social cohesion, solidarity, collaboration and general welfare of our societies, perhaps the most important issue is not to overlook the importance of everyday activism and adult learning as dimensions of CSO praxis and as parts of broader infrastructures of dissent.

# **References**


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# **Chapter 11 "Impossible" Activism and the Right to Be Understood: The Emergent Refugee Rights Movement in Finland**

**Camilla Haavisto**

# **11.1 Introduction**

The breaking down of the Finnish political consensus culture (Nieminen 2010), together with a hybridization of the communicative space (Chadwick 2013) and the electoral successes of The Finns Party since 2008, has created a new environment in Finland for debates on refugee-related matters. In these debates, anti-immigration arguments are presented not only by the candidates of The Finns Party, but a range of politicians from across the political spectrum (Horsti and Nikunen 2013). This applies to face-to-face debates, legacy media and social media alike. Particularly on social networking sites (SNS), the voices of "White, angry welfare protectionists" have grown loud. These voices are backed up by claims that are more moderate in tone, and together they both echo and construct collective imaginaries of welfare nostalgia and threat. In the threat imaginaries, Finland is envisioned as an innocent and rational State under siege from a chaotic, ethnically diverse and hostile world. (Pettersson 2017; Pyrhönen 2017; Schierup et al. 2018, and Hellström et al., Chap. 1 in this volume).

In this communication environment, there is little mediated space for asylum seekers and refugees to come to the forefront with their views and experiences of how the State respects their right to seek protection, evaluates security in their former homeland, and balances between dichotomies and conflicting principles such as safety vs. risk, human rights vs. control, threat/burden vs. asset.

One tactic for asylum seekers to increase their ability to be heard in public is to organize demonstrations in central urban spots or in connection with asylum

C. Haavisto (\*)

Swedish School of Social Science, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland e-mail: camilla.haavisto@helsinki.fi

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2020 169

O. C. Norocel et al. (eds.), *Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41694-2\_11

centers. Accordingly, the Right to Live demonstration1 was initiated on 10 February 2017 in central Helsinki with the main purpose of creating awareness around refugee rights and deportation practices upheld by the State. This occurred in the aftermath of political protests led by asylum seekers in Berlin, Vienna, Cairo, New York and elsewhere in the world. As internationally, also in Helsinki, the form of the demonstration was a sit-in demonstration, or protest camp in Gavin Brown et al.'s (2018) and Anna Feigenbaum et al.'s (2014) conceptualization. The demonstration, which lasted over the winter, spring and summer, until 17 September, was debated on various online forums, often in relation to a migration-critical counter demonstration initiated on the same urban spot by demonstrators who held opposite socio cultural values and political agendas to the asylum seekers and their allies, namely migration criticism, welfare nostalgia and so-called Euroscepticism.

Examining how and by whom the Right to Live demonstration was discussed in public, I explore in this chapter how, if at all, spontaneously formed social engagement groups led by asylum seekers and Finnish allies manage to direct the public debate over refugee rights towards increased humanitarianism, justice in the asylum process and awareness of the security situation in regions of war and conflict. This is done in a theoretical framework built around the paradoxical relation between the "right to be understood" (Husband 1996) and "impossible activism" (Nyers 2003). While, according to Charles Husband (1996, 2009), marginalized collectives should ideally have "the right to be understood" as a so-called third generation human right, in practice, not all have the opportunity to become political subjects who can make claims on welfare services, security and protection. In the context of migrant protests, this argument appears to be particularly true, as shown in studies by Ilker Ataç (2016), Jouni Häkli et al. (2017), Sara de Jong and Ilker Ataç (2017), Peter Nyers (2003), Carolina Moulin and Peter Nyers (2007).

In contrast to many of the international sit in-demonstrations, such as the one organized outside the offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Cairo in 2005 (Moulin and Nyers 2007), the Right to Live demonstration was a joint endeavor of migrant protesters from Iraq and Afghanistan and their Finnish allies. How, if at all, the multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, open and collaborative nature of the endeavor came to influence how claims of increased humanitarianism and refugee rights came to be circulated and heard in the communication environment, and how, if at all, they came to empower a public discourse of hope rather than nostalgia, is discussed further in this chapter.

<sup>1</sup>The Right to Live demonstration is not be confused with a US-based movement on reproductive rights with nearly the same name. The two initiatives are unrelated.

# **11.2 From Grateful Refugee to Political Subject**

To understand the significance of a sit-in demonstration led by migrant protesters and their allies in the context of Finland, one must relate the protest to certain fluctuations taking place in contemporary civil society with regard to anti-racist activism, refugee rights and anti-deportation movements. There are four phenomena that require a brief overview.

First, due to the center-right Government's (PM Juha Sipilä 2015–2019) tightened asylum policies, it seems that the significance of traditional top-down led NGOs is diminishing while the role of spontaneous network type of initiatives (*Peli Poikki* – Enough is Enough demonstration), and groups formed ad hoc in online environments is increasing (e.g., We see You and Refugee Hospitality Club Finland). This phenomenon may be influenced by the Finnish Government's funding cuts to so-called humanitarian NGOs (*Yle* 2015, July 9), but this is not the whole reason, since broader phenomena, such as the digitalization of our everyday lives and an increased tendency for citizens to "bypass" the state and to mistrust elites leading to new social movements (Offe 1984), also play a role.

Although not a new phenomenon, this is still a noteworthy trend, since Finland has traditionally been the "promised land" of NGOs, and as in the other Nordic countries, the state and civil society have been and are still closely related today (Haggrén et al. 2005; Luhtakallio 2012). Hence, in Alana Lentin's (2004) theorizing of anti-racist activism as existing along a continuum of proximity-to-distance from the public political culture of the nation-state (Rawls 1993 [2005]), most Finnish civic refugee rights and anti-racist movements have traditionally been in line with the public political culture.

Second, in Finland, although the founding of Antifa Finland in 1992 marked the beginning of a more spontaneous and confrontational agency in the field of refugee rights and antiracism, street politics is a marginal phenomenon in comparison to Sweden or France, for example (see: Pries and Brink Pinto 2013, and Jämte 2013 for Swedish NGOs and movements against racism; Luhtakallio 2012 for Finnish civil society at large; Seikkula 2019, and Alemanji and Mafi 2018 for mainstream types of anti-racist agency in Finnish civil society). However, the organizing of antimigrant collectives to patrol the streets in the midst of the intensified entry of asylum seekers to Finland in 2015–2016, as well as a few deportation cases that evoked great public furore, have lately given rise to an increased number of street-level engagements for increased refugee rights both in the capital area and elsewhere.

Third, today, when a large part of the communication practices of refugee rights groups and spontaneously organized collectives take place on social networking sites, new challenges are emerging. These sites, platforms and forums are crucial for the organizing of campaigns and events, and at the same time, because much of this activity takes place on social networking sites, they are vulnerable to fake profiles, trolling and hate (see: Gustafsson 2019, May 15 for a contemporary court case against 24 people convicted for defamation).

Four, it is noteworthy that in Finnish street politics for migrant rights, there are few participants from migrant groups that arrived in the country decades ago, from e.g. Chile or Somalia, which contributes to a White ambiance at many demonstrations. The modest participation of migrants and refugees in larger protest movements in Finland may relate to a collective feeling of gratitude for the right to enter one of the most politically stable countries in the world, for tax funded allowances, for services such as refuge, food, medical care, and language training (Yijälä and Nyman 2017, p. 83; Kokkonen 2010). These feelings of gratitude may be mixed with guilt and also frustration at having to feel and show gratitude towards something as abstract as a State. Perhaps it is the "obligation of gratitude" (Ong et al. 2015), as experienced by self and others, rather than gratitude in itself that affects the willingness of migrants living in Finland to enroll in great numbers in protest movements.

However, recently, Finnish activists have become more aware of their lack of legitimacy to speak up about certain refugee related matters, and as is argued in this chapter, there is a new type of more prominent migrant figure that emerges in and through self-expression2 – one who demands visibility, voice, rights, and fairness when it comes to how the State, anti-migration collectives and their allies relate to matters of representation, ethnicity, and race.

# **11.3 Towards Becoming Understood**

To envision the refugee in this strong position, as a political subject, someone who has a legitimate voice that is heard by elites and others, is a controversial suggestion. Peter Nyers (2003) has introduced the concept of "impossible activism" when referring to the political self-organizing of asylum seekers, refugees, non-status residents. He means that such activism tends to reveal problems as well as new ways of thinking and acting politically. Questions rising are: who is to be protected; who will do the protecting; who represents those in need of protection; can the endangered3 speak for themselves; what are the possibilities and constraints that (dis) allow political activism by non- or quasi-citizens? (Nyers 2003, p. 1071) He states, "Not surprisingly, representatives of the sovereign order display a striking anxiety whenever the abject foreigner takes on the status of a political activist engaged

<sup>2</sup>Asylum seekers in Finland have been engaged in direct political advocacy also before 2017, although these actions have received only little attention from the legacy media (Horsti and Pellander 2018).

<sup>3</sup>There are plenty of notions used for queries about if, when and how endangered, vulnerable, minoritized, or racialized individuals and collectives get to speak up about issues concerning them. Spivak (1996 [1985], p. 214) talks about the subaltern, Nyers (2003, p. 1073) about the abject foreigner, Chouliaraki (2013) and Eide (2017) about vulnerable others. As I see it, vulnerability is a "productive position, condition, or state that does something", something more than a "lamentable condition from which subjects should be defended, rescued or liberated" (The Engaging Vulnerability-project 2016). See also Dancus, Hyvönen & Karlsson (2020).

in acts of self-determination (e.g., stopping his/her deportation)." (Nyers 2003, p. 1078).

This anxiety, I suggest, carries certain consequences for the preparedness and willingness of political elites, journalists, and other key figures in the public debate to understand the process of asylum from the point of view of the protesting asylum seeker – sometimes perhaps more a subconscious than conscious position, other times as a means of doing nationalistic politics.

A theoretical notion that challenges the nationalistic and nostalgic collective imaginaries of an ethno-nationalistically united "we", is Charles Husband's (1996, 2009) concept of the "right to be understood". According to Husband, following the principle of the right to be understood means to actively seek to comprehend minorities. For Husband (2009, p. 141), the right to be understood is a collective right within what can be envisioned as the "third generation human rights", i.e., collective rights that go beyond the mere civil and social. In my reading of Husband, this "right" is intended to balance the share of rights and obligations in the communicative space so that the right to free speech would not rule out moral obligations, such as a willingness to listen to social groups in vulnerable positions in society. Following Iris Marion Young, Husband (1998, pp. 139–140) calls for an active state that guarantees equity of participation through the creation of state institutions capable of advancing mechanisms and processes to aid understanding across boundaries such as ethnicity, culture, and religion. At the core of the theoretical idea lies the ideal of the state being able to nurture solidarity towards vulnerable social groups. This, according to Husband (1996, p. 4), requires a moral sensibility which underpins a reflexive self-consciousness in regard to in-group values, that is, who "we" are and what is important to "us", and a recognition of solidarity with minorities.

Not all "minorities" are citizens, which brings us back to Nyers (2003; Moulin and Nyers 2007) and the question on whether asylum seekers, as abject4 foreigners with a variety of legal statuses, can be expected to have collective rights in the field of communication, particularly when it comes to self-expression and a respectful and imaginative recognition of their political claims? And if so, can the State and its institutions be expected to be those "who understand" them and engage with their claims? My answer is yes. According to article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), everybody is guaranteed the right to seek and enjoy asylum in other countries. Subsequent regional human rights instruments have elaborated on this right, which in practice means that asylum seekers have the right to appeal decisions by migration authorities to a court. Legal and political decision-making cannot be fully detached from the mediated discourses as media, through agenda setting (McCombs 2005) and mediatization (Hepp et al. 2015), influence the ideological context in which the decisions are made, and also are influenced by these ideological contexts. Accordingly, as I see it, asylum seekers also have the right to self-expression in the public debate in which elites and citizens share information,

<sup>4</sup>The abject is someone who is cast-out, discarded, and rejected (Nyers 2003, p. 1073).

debate over moral and ethical questions and – in an ideal democracy – also scrutinize policies and decisions made by national and supranational institutions.

# **11.4 Material and Method**

This chapter creates a synthesis of three different sets of empirical material5 : interviews with protesting asylum seekers and their allies, analysis of legacy media, and big data analytics from Facebook. The first set of data consists of interviews with 19 protesting asylum seekers and their allies; the second set consists of 57 news articles in legacy media covering 13 news articles on the *Yle* web-site (the national broadcasting company), 16 in *Helsingin Sanomat* (the main Finnish-language national paper), 6 in *Hufvudstadsbladet* (the main Swedish-language national paper), 10 in *Iltalehti* (evening paper), and 12 in *Turun Sanomat* (regional paper). The third set consists of 3643 postings and comments published in Facebook groups between February 2017 and June 2017.

The in-depth interviews with activists, both asylum seekers and their Finnish allies, and the legacy media content have been analyzed using close reading (Lentricchia and DuBois 2003) in Atlas.ti. The big data material was collected from the Facebook API by means of a custom-built tool (https://github.com/HIIT/hybrasomeloader, see Nelimarkka et al. 2018) and the material has been analyzed using close reading and computational methods, such as link analysis. The material was collected before Facebook implemented new regulations, forbidding data from public groups from being collected without the consent of the group administrator. Despite this, with regard to research ethics, I do not refer to individuals and I do not use direct quotes from the big data.

The four pro-migration groups analyzed on Facebook are: "We see You", a community with 8800 followers, "Stop Deportations", a community organization with over 14,000 followers, *Rasmus-valtakunnallinen rasismin ja muukalaisvastaisuuden verkosto* (Rasmus – the national network against racism and xenophobia), a group with over 16,000 members, and "Refugee Hospitality Club", a group with 14,000 members. The four anti-migration sites on Facebook examined are *Minun Suomeni on sinivalkonen* (My Finland is blue and white), a group with over 4400 members, *Suomi Ensin-foorumi* (Finland First Forum), a public group with over 4400 members, *Rajat Kiinni-kansanliike* (The civic movement Close the Borders), a public group with more than 9900 members and *Maahanmuuttokriittiset* (The migration critics), a group with more than 5100 members as of 2018.

<sup>5</sup>The empirical material was obtained by the Academy of Finland project Anti-racism under pressure: Social movements, NGOs and the mediated claims-making (2013–2016/2018) in collaboration with the Academy of Finland consortia Racisms and public communications in the hybrid media environment (HYBRA) (2016–2019). The help of my research assistants, Juho Pääkkönen and Erna Bodström, has been crucial in the collection and organizing of the empirical material.

I roughly categorize these groups into pro-migration and anti-migration groups in order to grasp general trends in the debate but it must be kept in mind that the groups within the two categories are not identical in character. For example, Rasmus contains more comments on a much broader register for and against migration than the three other groups in the pro-migration category. *Maahanmuuttokriittiset* (The migration critics), again, contains more respectful and dialogical commenting than the three other groups in the anti-migration category.

# **11.5 The Reasons to Protest and the Formation of the Camp**

After the arrival of an all-time record of 20,485 Iraqi and 5214 Afghan asylum seekers in 2015 (Migri 2015), the Government6 implemented an amendment to the Aliens Act (HE 2/2016 vp), stating that after 16 May 2016, if a person does not meet the requirements for asylum or subsidiary protection, Finland can no longer grant the person humanitarian protection.7

At the same time, Finnish immigration officials revised their security assessments for Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. They stated that it was safe for nationals to return to their home countries, making it more difficult for asylum seekers from these countries to receive residence permits in Finland (Migri 2016). During spring 2017, there was also well-grounded information about at least one case in which a man was deported against his will, despite not having received a final decision regarding his asylum application (*Svenska Yle* 2017, February 20). In addition, during the same spring, inaccurate decision making in the asylum administration also began to be documented by persons other than human rights activists. According to the Finnish Migration Service – a government agency under the Ministry of the Interior – 4% of all negative decisions come back to the Migration Service from the Administrative Court because of an erroneous handling of the case by the Migration Service, whereas in 2015, the proportion was only 0.2% (Rämö 2017).

To protest against these alleged wrong-doings by the Finnish state, on February 12th, 2017, a few migrants with connections to the refugee rights activist network, the Free Movement Network (founded in 2006), formed an ad hoc sit-in demonstration that soon started to attract more participants.

<sup>6</sup> In May 2015, The Finns Party joined Finland's coalition government for the first time after finishing second in the national elections, ushering a move away from pro-immigration and pro-EU policy. During spring 2017, the party split into two groups, The Finns Party, led by Jussi Halla-aho, and a group initially called the "New Alternative" and later the "Blue Reform". The latter continued as part of PM Juha Sipilä's center-right government until the parliamentary elections in 2019.

<sup>7</sup>The amendment meets the minimum requirements set by the Refugee Convention (1951) but still tightens the rules around asylum as before May 2016, it was possible according to § 88 in the Aliens Act (HE 2/2016 vp) to grant protection on humanitarian grounds to a person even if he/she did not meet the requirements set out by § 87 and § 88 in the Aliens Act.

The sit-in demonstration was originally planned to be a brief publicity-attracting event, but it was prolonged day by day without a clear decision or plan for how to proceed. Tents and sleeping bags were brought in to the initial central spot of the demo by Finnish supporters who had heard about the demonstration in social media or through their affiliation with the Free Movement Network.

Many informants, migrants and allies alike, speak of the formation of the sit-in demonstration as "chaotic", and a continuous and tiresome struggle with city authorities and political opponents (the migrant-critical counter-demonstration) for their pure right to exist. Despite this "survival mode" and harsh winter climate, political claims became refined as a collaboration between the three subgroups (Iraqis, Afghans, and Finns) and distributed online on various forums. Leaflets were printed, meetings with decision-makers and supporters were organized, press releases sent out, and the tent area was kept clean in order to avoid dirtiness being used as justification for the Police to evict the area – the last, a demanding task in a spot where no infrastructure such as heat, water, toiletry or garbage services are provided for. Taking care of these tasks was possible as the collective transformed from a loose network of strangers into a close circle of friends. Both migrant protesters and their allies soon started referring to their collective as the "Demo family".

# *11.5.1 Who Represents Whom?*

An important feature of the "Demo family" was a continuous discussion over representation. Some of the allies had expertise in public relations and, also because of their much-needed skills in Finnish (and Swedish, in order to serve the Swedishlanguage media in Finland), PR tasks were mainly planned by the allies. However, in situations where journalists or politicians visited the protest site, the allies systematically guided the visitors towards the migrant protestors. For the collective, it was important that the sit-in demonstration in public was presented as a migrant endeavor. For this reason, the initial unofficial connection to the Free Movement Network was also often silenced and research interview questions that related to leadership or the choice of spokespersons were often answered cryptically. The Finnish allies were, for example, told to chair weekly meetings because the Finnish way of having meetings was appreciated by all, not because they would be in charge.

Most of the internal conflicts, such as difficult personal relations, or worsened group relations between the Arabic speakers and the Dari speakers, were also intentionally overlooked by the migrants and the Finnish allies alike in order to keep the ideal of a non-hierarchical and democratic organization alive (see: Laaksonen et al. forthcoming for more on how authority within the organization was formed). In practice, however, there were people within the collective who played the roles of leaders, spokespersons, and representatives for others. Various power positions were constructed via everyday activities (for example, carrying water to the camp was a low-status task, cooking high-status, etc.), but power positions were also constructed through social media actions that could both exclude and include.

It was much easier for the migrant protestors to talk about their role as representatives for asylum seekers outside the demonstration site than about issues relating to internal leadership and group relations. Many of the migrant protestors saw themselves as representatives of families and children residing far from the capital area, and of people whose skills in English were insufficient to follow currents and undercurrents in policy-making. Some of the migrant protestors had launched and now administrated active social media networks to better reach these groups and individuals. Information on upcoming deportations or bad conditions at certain reception centers could be shared via these sites and other networks managed by the migrant protestors. The administrators of these sites claim that they have become known persons within their communities – persons who "bring hope" to desperate individuals and families who deal with negative asylum decisions and struggle with the authorities. Hence, the migrant protestors administrating popular demo-related Facebook groups in Arabic and Dari seem to have become important nodes for transmitting various kinds of grassroots information from reception centers in the provinces to Finnish pro-migration activists, and vice versa.

# *11.5.2 Law, Order, and Security in Legacy Media*

Another factor contributing to the cumulative burden of the sit-in demonstration was the constant feeling of claims being misinterpreted or neglected by legacy media. In the established news media, the Right to Live demonstration was discussed mostly in relation to the anti-migration counter-demonstration. Together the two sit-in demonstrations were framed as a problem – a problem of law and order in the city center, and a potential provocation to more serious security-related threats. What kinds of threats, from whom, directed where, and how the Police knew about these threats was left unclear, despite the fact that representatives for the Police had earlier stated that "everything has worked out well with the Right to Live demonstration" (*Finnish News Agency STT* 2018, 26 June). The claims put forward by the migrant protestors of brutal and systematic violence in regions to which former asylum seekers were deported from Finland, and claims of severe problems within the migration administration, were left aside by journalists in their stories on the demonstration. Instead, the responsibility to explain in legacy media what really happened on site was handed to the Police. In fact, the situation was persistently framed by journalists as a matter of law and order, leaving no room to clarify why the asylum seekers were protesting. In the interviews, the migrant protestors expressed sentiments of having been betrayed by the journalists. Migrant protestors claimed in the research interviews that they got to argue their case freely when interviewed by journalists, but, once the story came out, only a brief "nonsense quote" had been published instead of all the political claims that they had put forward.

The framing of the issue as a case of law, order and security on the expense of human rights perspectives, echoes prior studies on news on migration (Benson 2013). However, what distinguishes the reporting on the Right to Live-demonstration from migration news in general is the exceptionally strong polarization of migrants and so-called immigrant critics, and the focus on rather mundane concerns, such as littering in urban space, rather than on, for example, controlling migration flows and demographic anxieties (see Hellström et al., Chap. 1 in this volume). Concerning polarization, what we see here is that the emerging migrants' rights movement led by migrants and their allies in Finland was so persistently presented through a polarized angle that it seems difficult to break even in situations where polarity cannot be seen on the field. For example, in reporting on a regional support demonstration in the city of Kotka where anti-migrant activists were not present, their very absence became a point of emphasis. In other words, instead of being allowed to form claims relating to the actual pro-asylum agendas, organizers were quoted on how relieved they were that the atmosphere was peaceful and no counter-demonstrators were present (Pisto 2017, March 11).

# *11.5.3 Human Rights and Welfare in Social Media*

Issues of law, order and security are emphasized on Facebook as well, but the perspective taken is very different depending on the site concerned. On the promigration sites, the broader circle of sympathizers with the migrants' demonstration who mainly identify as "native" Finns, center the discussion on the disturbance and harassment from the immigrant critical counter-demonstration. Rumors about Neo-Nazi "raids" on the site of the demonstration were discussed on these pro-migration sites and security measures contemplated (for example, a child-friendly pro-migrant event was planned with the aid of staff from the neighboring ice-skating rink but can celled last-minute for alleged security reasons). The Police's lack of interest in coming to the site when asylum seekers made telephone calls in order to get protection from the immigrant critics were also discussed by the broader circle of sympathizers.

Despite the discussion about harassment, trouble and security risks, the predominant frame for discussion in the pro-migration groups was that of human rights. This is particularly true in posts by supporters of the demonstration who identify as "native" Finns. Particularly at the beginning of the demonstration, when migrant children and families spent time at the tent, this frame dominated the discussion. This frame was constructed by strong criticism towards the Finnish Migration Service, political elites, and the center-right Government of PM Juha Sipilä.

In this setting, the role of debaters who self-identify as asylum seeker is threefold. First, the migrant protestors and asylum seekers are "fact providers" who post visual and textual material from foreign sites in order to show proof of the current safety situation in Afghanistan and Iraq. The content circulated is often in Arabic and contains pictures showing brutality. Although this kind of content does not necessarily translate well into culturally Finnish mindsets, the claims formed in relation to the material tend to be powerful (e.g., "Baghdad is not safe. Don't send me back there!"). Second, the migrant debaters are the "experience experts" who in affect-laden posts and by using online translation tools or rudimentary Finnish, express a variety of feelings, ranging from wary hope to extreme frustration for their difficult and uncertain situation. And third, they are "help-seekers" who through these forums appeal for help for various personal problems, mostly relating to legal issues and/or health. Call-outs for help were also sent out by "native" supporters who volunteered with document translation, housing, employment, or visits to authorities. These appeals from both migrants and volunteers were on most occasions met with expressions of solidarity, and many times also with advice leading to a solution. Hence, on a micro-level, these groups function as "networked communities of support" that challenge the so-called "crisis of solidarity" (see Hellström et al., Chap. 1 in this volume).

On the contrary, on the so-called anti-migration sites, the tone of voice was hateful and one can barely speak of actual debate on the issue of deportation; rather there was a collective bashing of asylum seekers, migrants, their supporters, authorities, and the legacy media. The established news media were alleged to be in conspiracy with other powerful parties in order to hide the "real" problems and consequences of migration in general and Islam in particular (see: Pyrhönen 2017).

In these outbursts, commentators often brought up welfare issues. The underlying logic in these comments was that Finns are hardworking taxpayers who have to fund the slackness of migrants and to pay for them to be deported from "their holidays". The accusations were harsh, sometimes containing death threats or referring to a need for a "mass cleansing". What is interesting is that welfare nostalgia here functioned as some sort of justification for threats and ill wishes. The logic beneath this followed a pattern of "them" being here to use "our" welfare services and "our" tax money, which "they", according to the so-called migration critics, had no right to (see: Horsti and Nikunen 2013; Pettersson 2017; Pyrhönen 2017, for similar conclusions on social media discourses on migration politics).

What makes the welfare discourse particularly interesting in this case is that it was used both by parties supporting the anti-deportation movement and those opposing it, but for opposite goals. In the pro-migration sites, reference was made to the rapidly declining nativity in Finland and the potential of asylum seekers, as future taxpayers, to contribute to maintaining the Finnish welfare system. As typical in social media bubbles, a link analysis shows that these two understandings rarely met. This non-dialogical communicative agency around deportation also contained features of strong simplification as there were few attempts/opportunities to give the key notions, such as "welfare" or "human rights" a precise, deeper and contextbound meaning. The lack of precision and contextualization of these three key notions in popular debate risks watering down claims for and against deportation, and may obstruct the refugees' opportunities to be understood.

# **11.6 Strategies and Obstacles for Being Understood**

In the context of the theme of this volume, this chapter has examined some of the difficulties that contemporary humanitarian engagements in civil society face in a socio-cultural and economic climate where security, cultural protectionism, and neoliberal governability direct the media debate away from hopeful visions of humanitarianism, unity and global solidarity. Standing at the nexus of the right to be understood (Husband 2009) and the "impossibility" of political protest led by noncitizens (Nyers 2003), the aim of this chapter has been to provide a better understanding of whether asylum seekers involved in political protest manage to influence public debates on the core socio-cultural values in society, and if so, to examine the ways in which this influence works and the forms that it takes.

Drawing on a cross-reading of the three data sets (interviews with migrant protestors and their allies, legacy media content, and analyses of eight Facebookgroups), I have shown how issues of representation are difficult to overcome even when collectives explicitly strive to create a movement without hierarchies; how the legacy media frames complex issues on State responsibility, human rights principles, and the nature of democracy in terms of law and order in urban space; and how arguments on asylum and migration put forward by political opposites do not meet in social media.

The issue of representability, which in relation to the communication environment is illuminated by the stepping aside of the Finnish allies in public in favor of the asylum seekers and the sweeping under the carpet of disagreements, even ruptured relations, between ethnic groups, to me resembles more a strategy for being understood than an organizational problem. It seems that the collective, knowingly or semi-knowingly, essentialized themselves into a community of "asylum seekers", instead of e.g., Afghans and Iraqis and Finns – hence engaging in a sort of "strategic essentialism", in Gayatri Spivak's terms (1996 [1985]).

What this means on a general level is that the protestors seem to have provisionally accepted a common identity category in order to pursue a chosen political goal. Elisabeth Eide (2017) and others, even Spivak herself, dispute the notion of strategic essentialism and the ways in which the notion has been used. Perhaps, one could, as Eide (2017, 76) proposes between the lines, talk about a "standardizing of their public image" instead. By putting forward a "standardized public image", the group identity of the protestors was simplified and collectivized in order to achieve certain objectives, in this case for their claims on faults and injustices in the asylum system not only to be voiced in public but also listened to, understood and applied in both policy and administrative practice.

Unfortunately, as I have argued, the journalistic framing of the demonstration as an issue predominantly threatening urban order and the security of Finns, and the lack of dialogue, precision and respect for the "vulnerable other" in online milieus are hindering the migrants' efforts to be understood.

One can interpret the media focus on law and order in urban space as symbolic of how the State regains manageability over migration. Where manageability of migration is a lost game, perhaps primarily in the minds of welfare nostalgics, and in media discourses with an overblown crisis rhetoric, here, at a safe spot, not along State borders but in the middle of the city, around a few tents and portable toilets, manageability is symbolically regained.

Nyers (2003, p. 1090) has said, "[t]o be a refugee, to be political—is considerably difficult, if not impossible since radical takings of foreigners are always at risk of being deflected and absorbed by the non-democratic re-takings of sovereign power for the purposes of national and international (re)foundings." While the Right to Live-demonstration received recognition by Ministers who visited the camp and elite politicians who publicly supported their claims, the migrant protestors were unsuccessful in defining the conditions of this recognition, at least during and immediately after the protest.

By no means does the biased legacy media representation mean that the endeavors of the collective have been wasted. The protestors have created spaces where information exchange can occur in online media run by supporters of their cause. Through these multi-ethnic networks, activists, allies and supporters of the cause can seek evidence, map authority wrongdoings, and learn from one another (see: Jørgensen and Olsen, Chap. 10 in this volume). By doing so, they create a pool of invaluable, accumulated and grounded knowledge that draws on experience and expertise in Finnish laws and administration culture, but also on the transnational competencies so necessary to make sense of such complex phenomena as international migration movements and policies. These networks may have the potential to change policy and facilitate not only migrant voices but also majority and elite understandings of the asylum process and the security situation in the Greater Middle-East. So far, however, this is only an endeavor in the making.

# **References**


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# **Chapter 12 Hope as Master Frame in Feminist Mobilization: Between Liberal NGOization and Radical-Intersectional Street Politics**

**Alexandra Ana**

# **12.1 Introduction**

Scholars argue for a paradigm shift regarding social movements' claims for justice, from redistribution towards recognition, the later dominating the last decades. Today's struggles and claims on social justice are divided between redistribution – aiming at a just sharing of resources and welfare, and recognition of a different standpoint, based on ethnical, racial, sexual orientation or gender components (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 7). To inquire about the cultural replacing the material or identity replacing class is inadequate since it confines recognition to identity politics and ignores the dynamic relationship between redistribution claims and challenges to misrecognition (Hobson 2003, p. 1). The equitable distribution of economic resources is associated with the remedy of racial, gender, sexuality, or citizenship related subordination and this nexus becomes more obvious today, in the context of a growing politics of social exclusion, supported by technocratic, neoliberal arguments. The fall of communism, the free-market ideology, and the ascendance of identity politics played an important role in downgrading redistribution claims when recognition demands were increasingly predominant (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 8). Nonetheless, the 2008 financial crisis and the 2015 refugee (reception) crisis opened the opportunity to bring back class into public debates, affirming the necessity to bridge between recognition and redistribution claims.

In Romania, feminist activists and scholars agree about the feminization of poverty and that certain groups of women face multiple obstacles to enter the labor market, to earn a decent income. Feminists also agree that societies depend on the care work of women – unrecognized, unpaid or low paid, flexible, in formal and informal markets. They agree as well that deprivation and poverty are related to

A. Ana (\*)

Department of Political Science and Sociology, Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence, Italy e-mail: alexandra.ana@sns.it

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2020 185

O. C. Norocel et al. (eds.), *Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41694-2\_12

social rights and entitlements or the lack of, threatened during the economic crisis. Austerity measures around the world gave rise to protests to which feminists aligned (*feministas indignadas* in Spain). In Romania, the 2012 anti-austerity mobilizations had a visible, strong feminist component, divided nevertheless between those who challenged the democracy-liberal-market consensus and those who supported it (Ana 2017).

The anti-communist backlash in public debates informs about the discursive opportunity structure during post-communism and the possibilities for subversive movements, with progressive narratives, such as the feminist one, to engage with a critique, not just of welfare state retrenchment, but of the welfare chauvinism and neoliberal capitalism that split people between the meritorious contributors and the non-worthy–migrant, Roma, the poor1 .

While feminist scholars criticized neoliberal globalization (Jaggar 2005), neoliberal policies, arguing for welfare measures to support dependency work and as a matter of justice for women (Fraser 1994), some Romanian feminist scholars argued that in post-communist countries, welfare policies are detrimental for women (Miroiu 2004a, b). During the first decades of post-communism, when the anticommunist backlash was at its apogee, the feminist movement debuted as an intellectual-elitist endeavor, constituted within a mainstream liberal philosophy (Molocea 2015). It soon became NGO-ized, in the context of privatization and deregulation and acting sometimes as a substitute for the retreating welfare provisions that already represented a space for women paid and unpaid labor and feminist struggles (Bernal and Grewal 2014, p. 9). It followed the path of other social movements in Eastern Europe–of an early institutionalization within the process of democratization, under the influence of funds available to NGOs (Della Porta and Diani 2006, p. 246). The democratization and free-market discourse, coupled with the integration within supranational structures, inhibited criticism towards hegemonic institutions that advocated global scale marketization and liberalization, but which nevertheless developed in parallel, in an underground scene. Feminist autonomous groups organized around political and cultural activities, supporting an antiauthoritarian, anti-fascist, no borders, and anti-capitalist discourse. Due to the anti-left backlash, to threats from the extreme-right and to police repression2 , they remained in the underground, thus less visible in the public discourse.

The late 2000s financial crisis and the 2015 refugee (reception) crisis opened a discursive window of opportunity (Koopmans and Statham 1999) where class, economic inequalities, and poverty began to penetrate the liberal right-wing curtain that aggressively promoted privatization and deregulation, delegitimizing the use of welfare provisions, by deepening the cleavage between the worthy and non-worthy.

An intersectional politics of hope started to contour from feminist positions, through a three-dimensional process of bridge-building at the level of: (1) discourse,

<sup>1</sup>See, http://artapolitica.ro/2018/07/17/denuntarea-indezirabililor-noul-civism-timisorean/

<sup>2</sup>See, https://activewatch.ro/ro/freeex/reactie-rapida/6-ani-de-la-summit-ul-nato-la-bucuresti-jandarmeriagasita-vinovata-pentru-abuzuri-asupra-cetatenilor-dar-lasata-nepedepsita

between redistribution and recognition; culture and welfare; class and gender and ethnicity; (2) movements, within the feminist movement and across movements, between white feminist NGOs, Roma feminist organizations and informal, queer and radical-left collectives, the housing movement, engaging politically in a process of solidarity with forcibly evicted persons, migrant workers, and refugees; (3) repertoires of action, between contentious actions and more institutionalized forms of political interventions. Many if the actors who occasioned these bridge-building processes were feminist activists, with overlapping membership who acted as brokers (Diani 2013).

To address the question of an intersectional politics of hope, questioning neoliberal capitalism and welfare chauvinism, addressing the role of class analysis within contemporary feminist movement discourses and strategies in post-communist Romania, I draw on Nancy Fraser's "perspectival dualism" model and on interviews and participant observation conducted in June 2015 and between January and August 2016 as part of my Phd thesis research. I conducted 44 interviews in Bucharest, Cluj, and Sibiu that lasted between 30 min and almost 3 h.

# **12.2 Recognition, Redistribution, and Power Struggles**

Today's struggles and claims on social justice are divided between those concerning redistribution that aim at a more just distribution of resources and welfare and those regarding recognition of various groups and individual standpoints, based on ethnical, racial, sexual orientation or gender components (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 7). Recognition and redistribution demands are frequently analyzed disjointedly. For example, within the feminism movement, claims for redistribution as a remedy to masculine domination are often disconnected from those for recognition of gender difference, revealing the wider trend of dissociating cultural politics from social politics, the politics of difference from the politics of equality (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 7). To view recognition and redistribution, as disconnected, artificial antitheses is misleading.

To enlighten about the antithetical construction of recognition and redistribution, Fraser reconstructs the paradigms associated with them, as categories of interconnected assumptions about the causes of injustice and its antidotes that inform today's social movements (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 11). Related to maldistribution, class structure refers to the societal institutionalization of the economic mechanisms that systematically exclude some people from access to resources and opportunities to participate as equal partners in social life (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 49). Related to misrecognition, status order indicates the institutionalization of patterns of cultural value that deny some members of society the recognition needed to participate on a par in social interactions (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 49). However, as redistribution and recognition are intertwined, class and status order concomitantly affect access and participation of individuals on a par in society. Consequently, claims for redistribution have effects on recognition and claims for recognition impact distribution, giving rise to intended or unintended effects. For example, social welfare creates and ranks various subject positions or stigmatize and devaluate certain beneficiaries (Fraser and Honneth 2003, pp. 64–65). They have a complex expressive dimension by the fact that they contain in themselves interpretations of the value and meaning of activities such as "childrearing" versus "wage-earning" and constitute subject positions, such as "welfare mothers" or "taxpayers", affecting both the identities and the economic position of social actors (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 67). Benefits that specifically target the poor are a direct redistributive form of social welfare that tend to stigmatize its beneficiaries, by distinguishing them from "tax-payers" and "wage-earners", adding the insult of misrecognition to the harm of deprivation (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 68). Likewise, proposals to remedy androcentric evaluative patterns may have economic effects on the targeted recipients (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 65). For example, campaigns against prostitution aiming to improve women's status might have negative effects on the economic position of the sex-workers (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 69).

To avoid obscuring identity forms of economic injustice or the economic effects of identity struggles, rather than lining up identity politics with recognition and class politics with redistribution, social movements should claim both recognition for categories of personhood and redistribution of material resources, as they both foster parity of participation and achievement of social justice (Fraser and Honneth 2003, pp. 11–12; Gal 2003, p. 93). "Perspectival dualism" allows transgressing the distinctions between the economic and cultural dimensions of society, showing how redistribution and recognition are intertwined, collide and affect each other, without reducing one of them to the other or constructing irreducible oppositions between the cultural and economic dimensions of society.

Arguing that class and status are not the only dimensions of injustice, some researchers consider that power injustices and struggles over power include within them oases of recognition or redistribution, but are not reducible to them (Ferree and Gamson 2003, p. 35). They complement the "perspectival dualism" model with the power dimension analyzed both as autonomy, reflecting the individual level of self-determination, and as authority referring to the actual participation in decisions at societal level, revealing the relational attribute of power, politically crucial regarding the relation between community and individuals (Ferree and Gamson 2003, pp. 36–37).

Perspectival dualism's understanding of recognition and redistribution as two joint dimensions of social justice opens the possibility to disentangle the intricate relationship between different subordination systems making the target of social movements, such as class exploitation, and patriarchal and racial oppression. It allows engaging with the critiques of feminist movement's cooption by neoliberal global capitalism. The interdependence between recognition and redistribution struggles becomes even more obvious in the context of the financial and refugee (reception) crisis. While the first one brought to the forefront redistribution issues, the second revealed the intricacy between recognition and redistribution related to whom is recognized as worthy and entitled to resources and whom not. Claims for social security are entwined with the reactionary scapegoating, whereby certain people are not included in the redistribution scheme, being portrayed as undeserving. There is a potential that bottom-up emancipatory initiatives foster solidarity and bridge between recognition and redistribution demands, between culture and welfare as two intertwined dimensions of social justice.

# **12.3 Class and Gender During Post-communist Transition**

In Romania, class analysis missed for decades, due to a strong anti-communist backlash, following the collapse of the state-socialist regime, both as a research category and as discursive practice. Politico-economic liberalism became the heteronomous intellectual framework, whereby libertarianism, neoliberalism and neoconservatism developed unabated. Ideas associated with the left were rejected, class analysis was pushed to the margins, feminist discourses denigrated, and anti-racist organizing hindered by racist violence and discursive racialization in the build-up process of the ethnic Other, intensively targeting the Roma, but also the Hungarian minority.

During post-communism, many Romanians left the country to work abroad, becoming in 2009 the second biggest group of non-nationals living in other EU member states (Publications Office of the European Union. 2011). Their preferred destination countries were Italy and Spain, despite restrictive measures (Andrén and Roman 2016, p. 253). In 2010, Romanian migrants constituted the largest foreign group in Italy and the second largest in Spain (Andrén and Roman 2016, p. 254). During visa liberalization and shortly after EU accession, more Romanian women migrated to Italy than men (Mara 2012, p. 5). However, among Romanian officials, there was no explicit commitment regarding migration politics, aside from inflammatory discourses and campaigns against the internal Other. The increased negative media coverage of Romanian migrants in Italy and Spain, contributed to growing anti-immigrant sentiments in both countries, and exploded with the "Mailat case" in Italy that triggered violent attacks on Romanian Roma and non-Roma. As a response, through a process marketization of Othering, aiming to prevent the othering of non-Roma Romanians by Western Europeans, the Romanian government conducted a highly expensive nation branding campaign in Italy and Spain, based on a racialized construction of Romani alterity (Kaneva and Popescu 2014).

In the aftermath of the 2015 refugee (reception) crisis, a more detailed discussion about migration emerged in the public debates. While hosting approximately 2.475 refugees, Romania was not a choice for transit or staying for refugees (Iacob et al. 2016). However, the Romanian president together with other state officials showed fierce opposition to the EU refugee quotas3 . The extreme-right party *Noua Dreaptã* organized a protest to ask for the rejection of refugee quotas, framed as solidarity

<sup>3</sup> https://www.mediafax.ro/politic/analiza-consiliul-jai-analizeaza-propunerile-ce-privindimigrantii-romania-respinge-cotele-obligatorii-14710768

with Bataclan attacks in Paris4 . Support for refugees and opposition to xenophobic and racist discourses came from radical left, anarchist, queer and feminist activists that organized actions of protest, such as a flash mob in front of the Hungarian Embassy in Bucharest against Orbán's policy to build a fence to bar refugees and solidarity actions to collect goods for refugees and migrants, bridging with international pro-refugees movements5 .

During post-communism, public intellectuals, as part of the new elite were a conservative group, with neoliberal affinities, opposing left discourses and promoting a "preventive antifeminism" within the dominant debates, since other forms of activism, from marginalized positions were considered "subversive and incompatible with the paramount national, ethno-religious concerns" (Roman 2001, p. 63). Civic involvement was considered minimal, due to state mistrust and lack of awareness of democratic contractual rights (Pasti et al. 1997, p. 181), reinforcing a conservative attitude in women as political subjects (Miroiu and Popescu 1999). Other scholars question these diagnoses and explain that there is a gap between normative assumptions and experiences of inequality (Magyari 2006, p. 119), as well as academics' unquestioned privilege and complicity with power and institutions (Lovin 2013, p. 196). Likewise, others argue that, at the end of 2000s, class was rediscovered within academic and public discourses. This was a result of Western capitalism's crisis, which intensified during the financial crisis, and the build-up of a network of transnational young scholars, journalists and civil society actors, making the political opposition to the neoliberal consensus (Ban 2015, p. 640). While the latter dominated the first two decades of transition, informing about the confined possibilities for subversive movements, to engage with class and a critique of neoliberalism, during the recent years, the left-wing oasis opposing the liberalconservative politics, became more visible (Ban 2015, p. 641).

Much of the criticism of welfare state and the hostility towards egalitarian politics is triggered by a fear of dependency of an omnipotent providential state rooted in the communist epoch, which might interfere in individuals' private life (Gheaus 2008, pp. 198–199). How does the argument of a welfare state being detrimental to women in post-communist context unfold? While before communism women where dependent on men, during communism they were integrated into the public sphere (Magyari et al. 2001), with political rights – although unusable in practice in a oneparty system, with access to the labor market and equal pay – although employed in light industries, less prestigious, with lower salaries. Social entitlements, universal and equal access to education were ensured, subsidized by the state. However, while officially women's emancipation was part of the communist program, in practice it was more of a castle in the air rather than a brass tack, with multiple burdens for women, from public work, household and childrearing, to the 1966 criminalization

<sup>4</sup> https://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/circa-40-persoane-cer-premieruluui-respinga-cotele-obligatoriiimigranti-romania-treptele-tnb-ciolos-responsabil-act-terorism-1\_564c9d147d919ed50e591999/ index.html

<sup>5</sup> https://www.facebook.com/events/1734002970161537/?active\_tab=about; https://www.facebook.com/events/492008561177998/

of abortion, and the lack of contraceptives that brought hardships for women (Bucur 1994; Roman 2001; Teampău 2007).

After 1989, the profound restructuring of the workforce unveiled national scale contradictions, when governmental reforms privileged male dominated heavy industries, exposed to a slower process of liberalization, compared to female dominated light industry, which was the first to be privatized. Many women were employed in the private market, paying taxes to the state, and in underpaid low prestige state sectors. Men occupied positions in prestigious state sectors and heavy industry, earning more. The state support of heavy industries and the privatization of light industries allowed for welfare products for men to be paid from women's taxes, working in the private sector (Miroiu 2004a). The resources of the welfare state came from "market women's taxes" and were redistributed to "state men" (Miroiu 2004a, p. 246). Therefore, Miroiu (2004a, p. 278) argues that the reciprocal support between feminism and liberalism is an emancipatory project, indispensable in post-communist Romania.

The economic liberalism and minimal welfare state favored by Miroiu, would only serve the economic success and autonomy of a certain category of women at the expense of underprivileged women and other vulnerable groups, ignoring those women in the informal grey economy, by privatization and left without social protection or welfare benefits. In the wider region, Emigh et al. (2001, p. 29) show that while women might have had some advantages on the labor market, due to the historical legacies of socialism, Roma people and Roma women were disadvantaged and the racialization and feminization of poverty contributed to the development of an "underclass" inhibiting the elimination of absolute poverty. Those women who found new opportunities in the capitalist market economy were those privileged enough in terms of status or educational background (Emigh et al. 2001; Ghodsee 2005).

Gender equality was not a priority for transition governments, unless related to EU accession (Massino and Popa 2015, p. 171), expressed through legislative and public policies endeavors to comply with the *acquis communautaire*, considered an import process, labeled "room service" feminism, superficial since the Romanian society did not have the foundation for it (Miroiu 2004b). Likewise, Bucur (1994, p. 225) explained that during communism, women were given rights before they "could read and write – before they would even understand the meaning of voting rights" without engaging in a "conscious fight and organized movement", curtailing those efforts of feminist groups to create spaces of resistance and alternative discourses and to improve legislation and policies. This was the context and the manner in which during the first decades of post-communist regime: liberal feminism instituted itself as the mainstream form of feminism; class and a critique of political economy were ousted from the public discourse; and racism contributed to the depoliticization of the socioeconomic aspects of Roma marginalization (Vincze in Gheorghe et al. 2018).

Critiques of the first wave of transition's liberal feminism argue that these are simple causation models that contribute to constrict women's agencies and conflate subjectivities to victimization, passivity, and false-consciousness (Lovin 2013, p. 196). During post-communism, the widespread support for neoliberal policies and the reticence towards the state deepened the existing dependencies for women, creating new ones, both unjust. The double-earner/double-carer model or universal caregiver model (Gornick and Meyers 2003, p. 3), or the caregiver parity model (Fraser 1994) start from the premise of nuclear families, corresponding to Western reality, while in post-communist countries different generations might still live together and child-care is provided within the family (Gheaus 2008, p. 193). The gap between the existing gender equality legislation and its implementation widened through lack of enforcement and deficiencies in application. Moreover, the economic crisis and the anti-austerity measures – some of the severest in EU (Stoicu 2012), translated into cuts in welfare provisions and state salaries. This is to be understood in the context of rising of neo-conservatism and ethno-nationalism in the years following the crisis, inflamed during the refugee crisis by state officials' opposition to the refugee quotas and the extreme right's xenophobic anti-migrants discourse.

# **12.4 Feminism After 1989: Between NGO-ization and Street Movement**

The fall of the communist regimes, the EU accession along with the shift in social movement theory during the 1990s towards cultural approaches exposed scholars to different understandings of the dynamics of contestation and social and political activism. Most of the literature on post-communist feminism in Central and Eastern Europe described activism as transactional, professionalized and lacking potential for broad political mobilization (Petrova and Tarrow 2007; Císař and Vráblíková 2013), using conventional tactics of influence, being NGO-ized (Grünberg 2000). The financial dependency on foreign resources (Grünberg 2000; Gal 2003) studded the NGO-ization hypothesis and turned scholars to the effects of EU funding on NGOs (Roth 2007) and activists' mobilization at international level (Císař and Vráblíková 2010). While these accounts frame a hostile picture of activism in the region, recent research (Jakobsson and Saxonberg 2013) challenge the NGO-ization diagnosis, emphasizing the variety of mobilizations, groups, and repertoires (Regulska and Grabowska 2008; Vlad 2015; Lovin 2013). In Romania, the anticommunist backlash contributed to consolidate the liberal feminism as the mainstream form, while obscuring the contributions on the one hand of queer feminist informal groups associated with the anarcho-punk scene that produced an antiauthoritarian, anti-fascist, no borders, and anti-capitalist discourse that remained mostly in the underground, and on the other hand of feminist Roma groups trapped in tensions either within the anti-racist Roma movement or the liberal NGO-ized feminism (Vlad 2015, pp. 98–99).

Roma feminist groups and autonomous, informal collectives, targeting different yet overlapping manifestations of oppression and showing a steady commitment to various forms of protest have not only coexisted with the NGO-ized feminism, but engaged in synergetic actions, as the latter moved towards more confrontational tactics and inclusive, intersectional politics. The deepening of the economic crisis, accompanied by a rise of nationalism, racism, and xenophobia (ECRI 2011) gave rise to attacks that served as a catalyst for cooperation, occasioning a bridge-building between anarcho-queer, Roma, and liberal NGO-ized feminisms. These tensions and external threats proved necessary for the crystallization of a more inclusive politics of hope, from intersectional positions, emphasizing class exploitation, the racialization of poverty, the oppression of sexual minorities, or housing issues. They favored bridging between recognition and redistribution, between culture and welfare as intertwined dimensions of justice that affect each other in practice and need to be addressed together.

In Romania, during the first decades of post-socialism, feminism developed in four directions. First, in academia, gender studies became institutionalized at the end of the 90s, with the first state subsidized gender studies programs built-up at the National School of Political Science and Public Administration (SNSPA) in Bucharest, created a few years after dispersed courses of feminist theory organized around the Feminist Analysis Society AnA that did research and published the feminist studies journal *AnAlize* (Miroiu 2010, p. 587). In 2000, another gender studies Masters Studies was created in Cluj at Babes-Bolyai University and, in 2004, in Timisoara. While the gender program in Bucharest adopted a liberal social stratification and NGO-ized feminist approach to research, the gender studies MA in Cluj integrated class and ethnicity from an intersectional feminist perspective, under the influence of neo-Marxism.

Second, although gender equality was not a priority at the level of formal official politics, gender equality and non-discrimination bodies were created to comply with the *acquis communautaire* during EU pre-accession. This opened the possibility of collaboration with feminist NGOs that could participate in policy-making, in the area of gender equality, non-discrimination, and violence against women. The search for legitimacy, to be recognized as official partners by the state, further pushed NGOs towards formalization and professionalization, supported by the availability of funds, from international and European donors. Dependency on financial resources charged NGOs with more bureaucratic work, leaving them with fewer resources for unpredictable, reactive actions. This faced them with charges of depoliticization and demobilization.

Lastly, queer feminist self-managed collectives crystalized on the anarcho-punk scene, combining political, and cultural activities around zine production, reading circles, concerts, and protests and Roma feminism developed bringing to the forefront the reality of intersectional oppressions through theatre or grassroots and community organizing. The Food not bombs chapter in Cluj organized an autonomous market, Ladyfest Romania was organized in Timisoara in 20056 and in Bucharest in

<sup>6</sup> https://fia.pimienta.org/05/cd/en/festival.html

2007 together with a Take Back the Night March7 , anti-NATO protests were organized in 2008 that were severely repressed by the police8 . In efforts to bridge between class, gender, and ethnicity, Eniko Vincze engaged in contesting the forced evictions and relocations in Cluj affecting mostly the Roma and organizing with the evicted communities to fight for housing rights. In Bucharest, *Giuvlipen*, the Roma queer feminist theatre company addressed arranged under-age marriages, lack of access to education, mental illness, and Roma LGBTQIA issues9 and *E-Romnja* organization developed projects towards the involvement and consolidation of the Roma women position in Romanian society10.

# **12.5 Intersectional Emancipatory Struggles and Street Feminism**

During the recent years, an intersectional politics of hope consolidates, through three bridge-building processes, fostered by feminist activists who acted as brokers – position facilitated by their overlapping membership in formal organizations, informal collectives and movements. They bridged at the level of movements – between movements and within the feminist movement; at the level of repertoires of action – between contentious and institutionalized tactics; and at the level of discourses – between recognition and redistribution claims, culture and welfare, repoliticizing class along with gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation. The emergence of these interrelated processes was facilitated by the discursive opportunity opened by the financial and refugee (reception) crises.

First, within the movement, the process of bridge-building between different feminisms involved collaboration between feminist NGOs and newer feminist Roma organizations, through joint projects, targeting women's emancipation at grassroots level, between queer self-managed feminist groups and queer Roma feminist activists, in the political-artistic sphere or at the level of contentious mobilizations. The role of activists with overlapping membership, who acted as bridge-builders, was crucial. For example, while working together at *Agentia Impreună* – an organization fighting for Roma's rights, two feminist activists nurtured the idea of contributing to the bridge-building between the Roma and the feminist movement through common grounds, one of which was violence against women11. One of the two activists was also a member of *Filia* (organization that initially worked on gender studies from a more liberal perspective) and together with her colleague from *Agentia Impreună* and activists from the feminist association

<sup>7</sup> https://fia.pimienta.org/weblog/?p=223

<sup>8</sup> https://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2008/04/395456.html

<sup>9</sup> https://www.piqd.com/global-finds/giuvlipen-the-romanian-feminist-roma-theatre-company

<sup>10</sup> http://e-romnja.ro/misiune/

<sup>11</sup>A.F. 1 – Filia.

*Front* co-organized the 2011 protest for the introduction of the protection order for the victims of domestic violence12. Subsequently, both activists left *Agentia Impreună*. One of them became the president of *Filia*. The other founded the Roma feminist organization *E-Romnja*. Together they developed the project "*Phenja* – violence does not have color" on preventing and combating violence against women that aims to build initiative groups of Roma and non-Roma women based on some common experiences, politicizing class inequalities and poverty, while accounting both for the gendered and ethicized differences in experiencing violence and economic inequalities13.

Still at the level of bridging within and with other movements, *Macaz–Teatru Bar Coop* – as a space and collective that aimed to develop and promote a politically engaged theatre repertoire, by supporting projects that critically analyze the contemporary socio-political dynamics and retell the local history from liberating positions14, played a crucial role at bridge-building between movements and collectives, including those working from a feminist perspective. Some members of the queer feminist collective *Dysnomia* were as well part of *Macaz*, where they held some of the collective's meetings or launched their first feminist zine. The Roma queer feminist theatre company *Giuvlipen* played some of their plays at *Macaz*, among which *Gadjo Dildo* or *Cine a omorât-o pe Szomna Grancsa*15.

Another point of bridging is related to the right to housing struggle, where activists from *Frontul Comun pentru Dreptul la Locuire* (FCDL) were also members of *Dysnomia* collective and of *Macaz*, where they organized several encounters. FCDL also worked with *E-Romnja* and *Desire Foundation* that developed the campaign *Căși sociale ACUM!* [Social housing NOW!], against ghettoization in Patarât (a neighborhood in Cluj), and organized several street protests in different localities to reclaim housing justice for Roma, especially those belonging to the impoverished working class16. Involved in the Roma, feminist and, more recently, housing movement, the founder of *E-Romnja*, contributed to bridge between the different movements, acting as a broker. Challengingly, she recalls the difficulties to convince feminist organizations to work on evictions, in a context in which the dominant feminism was not explicitly anti-racist (Gheorghe in Gheorghe et al. 2018). Ultimately, *Centrul Parteneriat pentru Egalitate* (CPE) collaborated with FCDL17 and members of *Front* and participated at the anti-evictions protests. Explaining their intersectional strategy, one of the members of FCDL, also a member of *Dysnomia* collective, mentions:

<sup>12</sup> http://www.ziare.com/stiri/proteste/protest-fata-de-violenta-asupra-femeilor-vineri-la-palatulpar-lamentului-1135139. Accessed 14 Jul 2019.

<sup>13</sup>A.F. 1 – Filia; http://e-romnja.ro/e-romnja/projects\_in\_progressdetailed\_romani.html. Accessed 5 Sep 2019.

<sup>14</sup> https://www.macazcoop.ro/about-us-1. Accessed 5 Sep 2019.

<sup>15</sup> https://www.facebook.com/pg/giuvlipen/events/?ref=page\_internal; http://artapolitica. ro/2017/05/09/dreptate-pentru-szomna-grancsa/

<sup>16</sup> https://www.desire-ro.eu/?p=3116. Accessed 3 Sep 2019.

<sup>17</sup>C.C. – CPE.

For us, political mobilization is very important, not charity, not paternalism, not representation. These are fundamental principles because I come from this anarchist area, you know? We cannot say that we have equal relationships (with the evicted people from the Common Front) because we are not equal, we are not the same, we know. But the relationship must be fair, just and transparent and non-invasive from our part (…) I mean, we're educated differently, meaning that I have more privileges (…) There is an inherent class tension in these things that is very important and I'm not going to pretend that it does not exist. For example, there is a fundamental skepticism, important and cool, a suspicion from the working class and Roma in the same class towards non-Roma who are more privileged.

Second, bridge-building between contentious repertoires of action, more specific to queer feminist anarchist groups and institutionalized tactics that dominated the interventions of mainstream liberal feminist NGOs culminated during the organization of Slutwalk Bucharest in 2011. How the proximity between the two occurred? Some feminists, previously involved in the organization of LadyFest participated at the creation of the radical left project of Alternative Library18 and, in 2010, started organizing feminist reading sessions, which became consolidated and known as the Feminist Reading Group. The Alternative Library offered many feminist titles and was an alternative to Filia Centre's Library – the only one on gender studies in Bucharest. Activists from Front Association started to mingle with those from the Reading Group with whom they found ideological proximity and out of this encounter, the project of organizing Slutwalk Bucharest grew. Slutwalk Bucharest was a moment of coagulation between queer feminist collectives and feminist NGOs that started to meet in the courtyard of Alternative Library to organize the march, write banners and brainstorm about slogans19. As processes of intra-movement bridgebuilding started, of convergence and familiarization among different feminisms, bringing about a knowledge exchange process in terms of discourses, organizational practices, and tactical repertoires. It involved contamination regarding protest tactics, non-hierarchical organizing and consensual decision-making. It also included discursive contamination, bringing at the forefront a critique of capitalism and the anti-racist struggle interlinked with gender, but not reducible to one another.

The process of bridging between institutional tactics specific to NGOs and grassroots activism in communities is also illustrated by the founder of *E-Romnja*, explains that while working in organizations for Roma rights, where she coordinated gender related projects, she distanced herself from Roma women, because the organizational strategies favored dialogue mostly with formal official institutions. When she realized that being decoupled from Roma women, she is not aware of their perspectives and experiences, she decided to go back to the grassroots, work with women in community development, "speaking about water, electricity and tampons" (Gheorghe in Gheorghe et al. 2018, p. 122). To this end, she founded *E-Romnja* (Gheorghe in Gheorghe et al. 2018, p. 122).

<sup>18</sup>From dissatisfaction with the police violence during the NATO summit in 2008, a few years later the project of the Alternative Library was born.

<sup>19</sup> IT Front, Bucharest; CP Front, Bucharest; AP Accept, Biblioteca Alternativa Bucharest.

Third, bridge-building at the level of discourse and the discursive contamination were occasioned by these collective action encounters and enhanced by the role of activists with overlapping membership, who acted as brokers. This allowed for a re-politicization of class along with gender and ethnicity, fostering the debut of an intersectional politics of hope from working class, anti-racist, feminist positions. It was out of the societal tensions revealed during these collective action processes that discursive contamination emerged. For example, activists remember that anticapitalist messages and some "racist slippages" provoked heated discussions20, during the organization of Slutwalk:

It was a moment of hope for me, when the Slutwalk was organized, though after it faded away. I have learned that there are other groups that have feminist concerns, with other nuances and other directions but for me it was important that there was this moment when we did something together and we talked (…) with all the differences and with all the quarrels. I do not know if you remember the anti-capitalist banner? It was a panic with an anticapitalist message, and people began to worry. It triggered a little reaction and tension and eventually the banner existed and walked through the march21.

For some institutionalized feminist organizations such as *Filia*, Slutwalk was antisystem and conveyed a too radical message22. Its then president did not want to associate *Filia* with Slutwalk, arguing that it would look bad on the organization's CV and they risk losing potential funding23. However, she agreed that *Filia* members participate individually at the organization of Slutwalk, but without any affiliation mentioned. A class discourse or a political economy critique was inexistent in *Filia* until contact with the anarcho-queer feminism of the Reading Group and later the Feminist Centre Sofia Nadejde (CFSN)24. One of *Filia*'s leaders mentions about this process of contamination:

No, in Filia, I did not feel that there was a discourse about capitalism, neoliberalism, until there was contact with the informal feminist groups, mostly the girls from CFSN. Let's be serious, until then I did not feel that there was a discourse on capitalism or neoliberalism in Filia; I did not hear these words in my life. (…) It's okay that it started then, but it did not exist before. So it was a matter of influence from my point of view25.

There was a similar resistance to integrate a feminist anti-racist perspective by some of the core institutions for gender studies or mainstream feminist organizations. Carmen Gheorghe from *E-Romnja* recalls that initially, when she attended the Master's Programme in Gender Studies at SNSPA "Roma women or Muslim women were spoken about as if they were aliens, meaning that they were distant women, women who are forced to marry and wear veils" (Gheorghe in Gheorghe,

<sup>20</sup>B.T. Biblioteca Alternativa, R. 1 – Front, S.P. – ACCEPT, Biblioteca Alternativa.

<sup>21</sup>B.T. Biblioteca Alternativa.

<sup>22</sup>V.A. – Front.

<sup>23</sup>V.A. – Front.

<sup>24</sup>A.F. 1 – Filia.

<sup>25</sup>A.F. 1 – Filia.

et al. 2018, p. 116). Subsequently, she managed to bring discussions about structural inequalities and privileges, contributing to change the mainstream liberal feminist discourse (Gheorghe in Gheorghe, et al. 2018, p. 116). As *Filia* was created initially to support the gender studies master, their feminist perspectives were blind to class and ethnicity at first and only later on changed, through turnover and transformations within the organization and through discursive contamination occasioned by brokers and collective action encounters.

Bridge-building and contamination at discursive level between the political economy and the cultural ideologies that serve to justify exploitation and domination continued after Slutwalk, through different protest actions. For example, feminist activists influenced and challenged the dynamics of the winter 2012 protests (Ana 2017). They coalized to resist and stand against racism, xenophobia, sexism, and homophobia manifested during episodes of racist violence towards Roma protesters and anti-abortion promotion (Ana 2017, p. 1487). The feminist group in the University Square had ideological differences of which activists were conscious from the Slutwalk march. Feminists mostly associated with the Alternative Library, conveyed anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, and anti-authoritarian messages, radically positioning against international corporations, police and state repression, while feminists coming from NGOs expressed more liberal and democratic positions framed in terms of women's rights as citizens and taxpayers.

Through collective action encounters, the tensions within the feminist movement, between a liberal feminism, that became mainstream, NGO-ized, and with initial difficulties in integrating class, ethnicity, sexuality, an anarcho-queer feminism trying to organize outside the dominant structures, and a Roma feminism organizing both in NGOs and informal collectives brought to the surface social tensions that were wiped out in the context of anti-communist backlash and of the promise of individual success in democracy and free-market economy. Out of these tensions and with the role played by brokers through overlapping membership in different movements, was born the possibility of bridging within and between movements towards building a more intersectional politics of hope, in which recognition and redistribution claims that target different yet overlapping oppressions and injustices are addressed together.

The subsequent refugee (reception) crisis, brought slight visibility to the immigration issue. In the context of the establishment of EU quotas for refugees and of the construction of the neoliberal order, shaped by marketization and enacted by racism (Vincze 2014), it was anarchist, queer, and feminist activists that proposed solidarity with refugees to counter-act government's opposition towards quotas and extreme right anti-refugees propaganda. The Community Centre *Claca* organized solidarity actions with immigrant workers from outside Europe, including actions to commemorate those who died at the gates of Europe26 or actions to collect goods for

<sup>26</sup> https://centrulclaca.wordpress.com/2015/04/29/in-aceeasi-barca-solidaritate-est-europeanacu-muncitorii-imigranti-din-afara-europei-vineri-1-mai-ora-19-00/

refugees in the neighboring countries27– subsequently organized at *Macaz*. Claca also politicized the exploitation of Romanian migrant workers in Europe, as for example the case of construction workers of a mall in Berlin – subsequently called the "mall of shame" who were not paid for their work28. *Macaz* staged theatre plays that politicized the issue of migration and refugees among which the documentary theatre play *Nu ne-am nascut la locul potrivit* (We were not born in the right place) that blends the life stories of five people's refugee experience in Romania, with fragments from the guide on how to get Romanian citizenship for foreign citizens29. For these groups, feminism and intersectionality are part of their political method of action and organizing in in order to address the multiple and interrelated relations of domination in which sexism, racism, homophobia, are used to justify and support capitalist exploitation of certain groups in the society.

# **12.6 Conclusions**

The economic crisis opened a discursive window of opportunity, bringing about a process of bridge-building and intra-movement socialization between different groups, involving a shift from a politics of blind hope characterizing liberal NGOized feminism, towards a politics of intersectional hope targeting overlapping oppressions. This move included a transfer and contamination by contentious practices and intersectional perspectives where class, ethnicity, and sexuality were as important as gender, with anti-capitalist, anti-fascist ideas and discourses, critical towards privatization and deregulation, opposing oppressive extreme-right discourses, including welfare chauvinism. The process of bridge-building was accompanied by a shift towards more confrontational tactics challenging the diagnosis of apathic, transactional civils society in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe.

# **References**

Ana, A. (2017). The role of the feminist movement participation during the winter 2012 mobilizations in Romania. *Europe-Asia Studies, 69*(9), 137–162.

Andrén, D., & Roman, M. (2016). Should I stay or should I go? Romanian migrants during transition and enlargements. In M. Kahanec & K. Zimmermann (Eds.), *Labor migration, EU enlargement, and the great recession* (pp. 247–269). Berlin: Springer.

Ban, C. (2015). Beyond anticommunism: The fragility of class analysis in Romania. *East European Politics and Societies, 29*(3), 640–650.

<sup>27</sup> https://centrulclaca.wordpress.com/

<sup>28</sup> https://centrulclaca.wordpress.com/2014/12/01/mall-ul-din-berlin-o-poveste-despre-exploatarecu-muncitori-romani/

<sup>29</sup> http://artapolitica.ro/2014/11/17/nu-ne-am-nascut-in-locul-potrivit-despre-refugiu-sineapartenenta/


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# **Chapter 13 Latin American Transnational Political Engagement: Steering Civic Movements and Cultural Repertoires from the Global City of Brussels**

**Larisa Lara-Guerrero and María Vivas-Romero**

# **13.1 Introduction**

Social scientists have a growing interest in how and why migrants are creating, transforming, and exploiting transnational networks to engage in political movements in both their home and host countries. In this regard, migration scholarship has contributed to understand different geographical spaces and actors involved in transnational political movements (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003); determining the profile of migrants participating and organizing political transnational activities (Guarnizo et al. 2003; Lafleur 2013) and studying the migrant's political integration and participation in the host country (Martiniello 2006).

One of the main criticisms of these approaches, however, is that migration scholars often focus on the political interests and opportunities available to migrants at a national scale. Indeed, Glick Schiller and Cağlar (2011, p. 69) argued that cities are a better scale of analysis to unpack migrant practices, patterns of organization, and strategies of participation. Building on this idea, our aim is to answer the following questions in this chapter: how do global cities shape transnational fields of social mobilization? What is the nexus between the transnational fields of social

L. Lara-Guerrero (\*)

M. Vivas-Romero Centre for Ethnic and Migration Studies, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium

UM Platform for Research Ethics and Integrity, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands e-mail: m.vivasromero@maastrichtuniversity.nl

© The Author(s) 2020 203

Research Unit of Migration and Society (URMIS), University Paris Diderot Paris, Paris, France

Centre for Ethnic and Migration Studies, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium e-mail: larisavlara@gmail.com

O. C. Norocel et al. (eds.), *Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41694-2\_13

mobilization and access to welfare states? How do cultural exchanges shape transnational social movements and civic initiatives?

Theoretically, in this chapter we introduce a spatial level of analysis to elucidate the dynamics of migrant social movements organized in global cities. By focusing on the city of Brussels, this article analyzes the impact of global cities in shaping the capacity and desire of Latin American migrants of engaging in political movements. Empirically, this chapter presents two case studies where Latin Americans living in Brussels engage in political transnational activities to change their living conditions, both in their host and home cities. The life stories narrated in this chapter highlight how cultural traditions, symbols, and practices from cultural repertoires enable minorities (Faist 2000) to become members of the civil society in Belgium.

In order to operationalize the practices used by migrants to construct transnational social fields of protest, we base our analysis on the concept of social remittances, coined by Peggy Levitt (1998, p. 927). This concept refers to the ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow between receiving and sending communities (Faist 2008; Levitt 1998; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011). In addition, social remittances capture the feelings of nostalgia and hope, which were introduced as catalyzers of political movements in the introduction to this volume. Social remittances have a direct impact on the way migrants organize a range of transnational activities, such as collective initiatives, development projects, or political elections (Collyer 2014; Lafleur 2011; Morales and Giugni 2011). Indeed, the mobile and malleable nature of social remittances (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2016) creates social, political, and cultural capital that migrants exploit in the city where they live.

In this chapter, we demonstrate that migrants accumulate political and cultural knowledge, symbols, and practices as a result of their emigration experience. Most particularly, we argue that social remittances shape the way migrants: (1) develop their political and cultural repertoires of contention; (2) constitute their social identities and networks, influencing their political behavior; and (3) embody the ideologies, ideas, and norms of their homeland, while being influenced by the multiple cities in which they have lived. In sum, social remittances aim to trace social interactions and networks sustained between, at least, two cities, that determine migrant's attitudes, behavior, and rationales.

In what follows, we first explain the importance of considering the concept of global city as the unit of analysis to study the composition and dynamics of the social fields of transnational political mobilization. This part underlines the impact of the global city's positionality and the economic, socio-cultural, and political factors available within them, which structure the opportunities for migrants to engage in transnational political movements. In the second part, we present the specificities of Brussels as a Global City and as a key arena for protests. In the third and fourth parts of this chapter, we examine two main areas of politics, which have been of interest to Latin American migrants in Brussels. The first example introduces the advocacy efforts of protest that Latin Americans have made in relation to the Belgian welfare state and their access to social protection, whereas the second example focuses on the efforts made by Latin Americans to spur political changes in their home countries.

In this chapter we present evidence collected through ethnographic work, including biographical interviews and participant observation (Bayard De Volo 2009). The ethnographic approach is a useful method for uncovering the processes, meanings, emotions, and interests that sustain and motivate social groups to engage in political activism (Herbert 2000). Moreover, ethnography allows researchers to study populations, whose voices are not well represented in the dominant discourse (Bayard De Volo 2009, p. 227).

# **13.2 Scaling Transnational Fields of Mobilization from a Global City**

Glick Schiller and Cağlar (2008) define social fields as "networks of networks that may be locally situated or extend nationally or transnationally". Thus, transnational social fields are conceived as multidimensional matrices of interactions, which transcend geographical boundaries and distances (Bermudez 2010; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Based on this definition, we conceptualize transnational fields of mobilization as social fields in which the exchanges, interactions, and resources exploited have the purpose to challenge and reorient political and social structures. As a result, we conceive transnational social fields of mobilization as multidimensional spaces where migrants: (1) find political opportunities, cultural capital, and resources to protest and organize civic movements; (2) develop networks and strategies of contention; (3) feed their ideologies, sense of belonging, and grievances; and (4) boost their motivations and evaluate the outcomes of their political engagement (Tilly and Tarrow 2007; Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2010). In other words, transnational fields of mobilization are abstract spaces where migrants exchange information, ideas, skills, and resources to engage and coordinate transnational political and social protests. However, it is important to recognize that these spaces are physically sustained and fed by active members of the civil society, mostly living in cities. As a result, cities act as nodes where the signals and interactions originate, arrive, and transform.

The dynamics and opportunities available in cities vary depending on their density, local infrastructure, economy, and global positionality (Glick Schiller and Cağlar 2011). Therefore, urbanists and geographers distinguish between cities and global cities. Global cities are dense urban clusters characterized by wealth disparities, a shrinking middle class, immigration, and slum production, uneven access to services and the creation of private spaces and networks (Curtis 2011). Indeed, these strategic territories have some particularities that influence their role as centers of transnational fields of mobilization.

The first particularity of global cities is its abundant economic, political, social, and cultural capital. The combination of historical and opportunity factors makes global cities poles of attraction for migrants, international actors, governments, and nationals from smaller cities (Glick Schiller and Cağlar 2011, p. 69). Consequently, global cities become highly dense multicultural spaces, where people interact by navigating multiple social codes and exploiting varied political resources.

The second particularity of global cities, directly affecting the transnational fields of social mobilization, is its positionality in the international regime. Global cities are dense hubs of information, communication, and competition (Sassen 2005). However, not all global cities are equally dynamic and powerful on an international level. Global cities are hierarchically classified, in relation to the level of their capital flow, political symbolism, and legitimacy in the international regime.

The third relevant element to consider unpacking the nexus between transnational social fields of mobilization and global cities is the repertoires of contention and forms of political protest. Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 183) argue that repertoires and strategies of protest change from state to state. On the same line, but rescaling the level of analysis to cities, it is possible to argue that the politics of contention and strategies of political protest vary from one global city to another. Indeed, the local context, traditions of contention, and availability of opportunities for protest are unique to each global city. Finally, by rescaling the study of migration to the city level, we aim to contribute to the better understanding of the nexus between local dynamics, local political opportunities, and transnational political movements. In the next sections, we provide further details on each of these characteristics, in order to understand how Brussels, as a global city, can have a predominant role in migrant transnational activism, both in the receiving and sending societies.

# *13.2.1 Brussels the Global City*

According to Smith (2005), the practices of engagement of individuals must be contextualized in translocal settings. The interviewees in this study are based in the global city of Brussels. Brussels is a multicultural, officially bilingual city according to Article 4 of the Belgian constitution (Dutch, French), situated in Belgium, a multi-layered federal state, and an immigrant nation with a colonial past. Brussels is a core city in terms of communication, technology, and as principal seat of different international and European institutions. Brussels is one of Europe's and Belgium's most diverse cities, with regard to nationalities1 . In Brussels (*Brussel* in Dutch; *Bruxelles* in French), competing communitarian (Flemish-French) monocultural structures coexist in a pluri-ethnic urban setting, each governing the arts, the cultural sector, and immigration and integration policies from within separate government bodies (Adam and Martiniello 2013). Moreover, it currently holds

<sup>1</sup> In 2016, 411,000 of Brussels' residents where non-Belgians, 23% of them where EU citizens and 12% came from a third country (Hermia and Sierens 2017, p. 2). In 2016, 182 nationalities were represented in Brussels (*BISA* 2017).

44.5% of the total foreigner population in Belgium (Lafleur and Marfouk 2017, p. 30). The city embodies the challenges and possibilities that come with diversity in a modern urban center with over one million inhabitants (Walravens 2015).

In this context, migrants face both predicaments and opportunities to become politically active. In Brussels, the laws of settling and admission that affect migrants' political participation are set by the Federal Belgian state, whereas the programs for the integration and emancipation of ethno-cultural minorities are governed separately by the French and Dutch-speaking communities (European Commission 2013) 2 . Traditionally, the perception of migrants in Brussels has been affected by historical international and internal mobilities, the increasing life expectancies, and declining fertility rates, among the so-called native (*autochthone*) population (Adam and Martiniello 2013; Costanzo and Zibouh 2013), as well as different Walloon and Flemish ideologies. The Walloon influence in Brussels, with the support of the French-speaking community commission (COCOF), has remained *laissez-faire*, while the Flemish community has become more interventionist. However, both sides have adopted assimilationist initiatives that include mandatory integration courses as prerequisite for naturalization3 (Adam and Martiniello 2013). The European Union mottos of integration and social cohesion for all third country nationals have also influenced these policies (Adam and Martiniello 2013).

Historically, in Belgium, migrants have been considered as temporary visitors, whose mobility is guided by various economic and social reasons and shaped by governmental institutions (Martiniello and Rea 2003). For instance, the closure of the coalmine employment programs in the 1950s, and later in the 1970s, the guest worker programs led to the theoretical closure of borders and family reunification laws (Martiniello and Florence 2005)4 . However, Belgium has continued to be an immigrant country, now with a more diverse foreign population. Latin Americans are part of a small recent minority with several profiles, varying from those that arrived in the 1970s and 1980s as political refugees, to more recent migrants that arrived for economic reasons in the late 2000s, along with a new category of onward migrants that have arrived from other European southern countries, where they had settled before (Vivas-Romero 2017). In terms of gender, women represent 60% of Latin Americans officially registered in Belgium (DEMO 2015).

The Belgian popular discourse has often ignored the role of migrants, both culturally and politically in urban centers (Martiniello and Rea 2003). However, the 9/11 attacks in the US triggered feelings of insecurity and fear of the "other" that forced cultural and political authorities to publicly debate the participation of ethnic

<sup>2</sup>With the creation of the Brussels Capital Region, the French Community Commission (*Commission Communautaire Francaise*, COCOF) and the Flemish Community Commission (*Vlaams Gemeenschapscomissie*, VGC) became the designated authorities over integration policies and programs in the city.

<sup>3</sup>See, http://www.allrights.be/node/491. Accessed 5 Nov 2019.

<sup>4</sup>Historically, in spite of the government's attempt to persuade certain immigrants to return to their country of origins, immigrants and their offspring remained in Belgium, in fact the official ban to recruit new qualified foreign workers was not successful either.

minorities in the city's cultural and political life (Martiniello 2013). Thus, migrants and non-migrants lead their political activism on to challenging but stimulating grounds.

Our interviewees have not been immune from the aforementioned context; however, they have challenged their countries of origin and of destination by contesting exclusionary or assimilationist policies. Migrants were in fact even more prompted to participate politically, as welfare policies became a tool to control migration. A clear example of this was the case of Southern European migrants, who according to Lafleur and Mescoli (2018), were obliged to provide proofs of their financial stability and their non-dependence on the Belgian welfare state in order to reside in Belgium. When migrants face these policies, they become active from within their different positions in the city. Some migrants are what Martiniello (2004) has described as full citizens with full political and economic rights. Evidently, the spaces for protest and engagement are large, but sometimes these spaces are affected by the ethnicity, gender, or social class of migrants. Others are categorized as denizens with certain political and social rights at a city level (Martiniello 2004), but lacking the rights to vote in federal or European elections, as well as access to supranational EU rights (Martiniello 2000). In the least privileged position are "margizens", with barely any political or social rights. They do not have a set migratory status and can only access healthcare in Brussels in case of an emergency. According to Faist (2001), migrants' loyalty, levels of political participation, and engagement increase as they advance in their status in the welfare state as political subjects.

# *13.2.2 Methods*

The data we present in this chapter is drawn from two doctoral projects conducted in the city of Brussels. The first project consists of a multi-sited ethnography investigating the global social protection arrangements of migrant domestic workers. Through participant observation and life story interviews, this project collected data of the coping strategies of 15 women followed for over 35 months. The interviewees were selected through an analytical sample technique, according to their gender roles, race (women from the Andean region with multiple ethnic origins), class, education level, religion, and generational standpoints. Although their political engagement was not the first object of study, it became a parallel aim as the women in the study became conscious of their inclusion in the welfare state–or lack of thereof–and decided to engage in the political arena of the city.

The second project examines the transnational political participation of Mexican migrants in the city of Brussels. Similarly, the researcher followed 24 migrants engaged in social and political movements for 26 months. The semi-structured interviews conducted with these key informants were complemented with participant observation at 42 events organized by Mexican migrants including: political demonstrations, music rehearsals, charity concerts, gastronomic and artistic festivals, political debates, and film screenings. Through the detailed observation of these events, it was possible to identify the dynamics catalyzing and sustaining extra-territorial political activities. Furthermore, it was possible to identify the personal motivations, feelings of hope and nostalgia, and expectations of Mexican migrants, that create transnational fields of social protest.

Both cases use ethnography and participant observation. These methods allow following, in real time, the processes migrants have to go through in order to engage in politics in their home and host societies (Herbert 2000). Additionally, the life story interviews helped us to see, at a micro-level of experience, how migrants relate their experiences to macro-structures of opportunities and constraints.

In the past months, we examined the data from both research projects and found patterns of political mobilization that Latin American migrants use to challenge the welfare state and the political systems in their host city (Brussels), and in the cities of their countries of origin. By focusing on their social remittances, particularly the transfer of information, ideas, skills, and resources, we identified that the transnational social fields of mobilization deployed by Latin American in Brussels, are directly influenced by the personal experiences, political behavior, ideologies, rationales, nostalgia, and social capital migrants have accumulated throughout their lifetime, prior to their migration and since their arrival in their host society.

The following sections present two examples of how Latin American migrants living in Brussels have created their own transnational fields of social mobilization. These cases show that Latin Americans base their transnational fields of social mobilization on the availability of capacities and opportunities manifested in a continuum between in Brussels and their home cities.

# **13.3 Challenging One's Place in the Belgian Welfare State: From the Global City of Brussels**

Juana is a political refugee who arrived in Brussels in the early 1980s. She began her political engagement as a young woman, when she became involved in political activism to protest against the political violence in her country of origin. Juana comes from Peru, a familial welfare state, where citizens mostly rely on informal networks of support to obtain private social protection resources (Martinez-Franzoni 2008). Historically, women like Juana, who come from indigenous origins have suffered the deficiencies of governments, which have not always provided them with spaces for protest. In this sense, in the words of Rivera herself (2013), the Peruvian state has very few citizens with full political rights. The latter are, in the most part, only male and live in the country's biggest cities. Juana, thus filled with nostalgia, often praised the Belgian state:

Obviously, the system has its weakness but the social system they [Belgians] have is unique. And you know it once you know the laws, when you know institutions well enough. I mean everything the social system gives you [….] Nowhere else will you find a system like here. (Juana, migrant domestic worker, Brussels, 21 Oct 2014)

Although, Belgium's welfare system has slightly changed over the years, it progressively transformed Juana's identity, from being a woman without rights in Peru, to a citizen in Brussels. This identity shift allowed Juana to acquire ideas, skills, and resources she needed to establish new forms of political participation. As Juana and other interviewees mentioned: "In Peru we were nothing. Here you learn how to be a citizen" (Brussels, 21 Oct 2014). Migrant women's citizenship in Belgium is also used to send civic social remittances to their countries of origin and to reclaim their citizenship status there as well (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2016). Nonetheless, as Belgium began to experience the aftermath of the global financial meltdown in 2008, the interviewees' idea of Brussels as an inclusive city was put to the test. In this context Brussels, the global city, became the epicenter from which they protested for the rights they thought they were losing on this side of the Atlantic, as well as for those they never had in their homelands.

In this challenging context, they used transcultural capital to protest against the austerity measures imposed on the Belgian welfare state (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2016). Migrants shared the hope that in a nearby future the Belgian welfare state would become an inclusive system for all. Building from their shared collective hope for a new future, along with a nostalgia for their activist days in their countries of origin, migrants took the streets to protest. At the Women's Day demonstration in 2016, traditional Huaylas Andean dancing from their ancestors' region became the social remittance through which migrants delivered their message. On the day of the event, various women from migrant and non-migrant backgrounds joined the Peruvian women to protest at the Brussels Central Station Square. By doing so, they managed to share cultural and civic social remittances (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2016). To their own surprise, a former Belgian socialist Prime Minister joined their dance and listened to their message. This Women's Day protest was not an isolated event. Other interviewees like Alejandra, a Colombian woman in her late 50s, have spread other repertoires of conflict or political social remittances (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2016), such as public petitions and community actions, either physically in Brussels or through new media and technology. Such social remittances challenge the place of migrants, mostly newcomers, in the city's welfare state while also taking into account the violent conflict in their country of origin:

We get together to raise money to help those in need here and abroad. We get together to raise funds but also to give people a collective consciousness. They need to realize that what's political is economic. So, they are not simply "economic migrants". Violent conflicts [in Colombia or elsewhere] are associated with economic ones and so on. I informally help those coming from Colombia, but also, those coming from Syria, for example. I make no differences. Lately, I have also been helping Latino migrants coming from Spain after the crisis. […]. I lead them to the right kind of lawyers, so they won't lose, for example, the unemployment benefits they brought from Spain. I give them a house to stay in when they need it. I also go out to protest but this is where the real kind of battle is. (Alejandra, migrant domestic worker, Brussels, 21 Oct 2014)

Alejandra's activism goes back to her teenage years as a rural teacher in several communities affected by violent conflicts in Colombia in the 1990s. In Brussels, it was hard for her to find her place, and she found it once she began being politically engaged, to challenge who she was both in her new city and in the country she left behind. Nonetheless, Alejandra's own place in the Belgian welfare state has been challenged by the austerity measures on the health sector.

Other interviewees such as Laura, have chosen formal political structures such as political parties to set up their platforms for protest. Contrary to Juana and Alejandra, Laura had never engaged in politics before. She came to Brussels as a young *au-pair* at 16 years old. The precarious situation in her own city was what later turned her into a politically engaged Belgian citizen. As Laura wanted to advance in the political scene in Brussels, she encountered that her particular identity of "Andean woman" represented a challenge if she wished to be accepted by those with a migrant background in Brussels, whether Latin Americans or not. As a candidate for commune elections in 2012, she implemented a repertoire of contention but was challenged by her ethnicity:

We wanted the community to win. It wasn't a personal battle, at least not for me. Even Moroccans and Africans also voted for me. It wasn't easy for us to get a place in the party. They usually use foreigners to show the diversity of the city. […]. You know they need you because of your particular profile. I fit the profile: migrant woman, divorcee, etc. I mean, other women would identify themselves with me. I did not win. I'm a replacement and they only call me when someone is sick at the Parliament. I got the letter from the Parliament, though, and to me it was a big achievement. Maybe other Belgians wouldn't see this as important, but I do. The community won. […] We won a political space. I have seen documents in the party or in the Parliament, where they don't want to make certain rights universal, and we fight for that, for the inclusion of everyone, not just *Latinos*… Now that everyone is losing rights that should be universal, it's important for us to have a voice there. (Laura, social worker and former care worker, Brussels, 21 Oct 2014)

As these repertoires of contention function through various types of social remittances, the interviewees see a possibility to use their transnational social networks and their leftist ideologies to expand their actions abroad:

Researcher: Alejandra, but where do you see your actions having more of a weight? Alejandra: I'm an inhabitant of this planet. I fight for a fair and real socialist society. I can keep fighting for social justice from here or there. 'It doesn't matter where one dies, but where one fights' I live by these words, from a famous Colombian duo in the 1980s Ana and Jaime. (Alejandra, former migrant domestic worker, Facebook, 10 May 2017)

Behind the social remittances transmitted by these interviewees, regardless of whether efforts are directed towards changing their inclusion in the political and welfare structures of their sending or receiving societies, there is a guiding transnational social justice script (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2016). This script revolves around a street feminism that is a common form of recognition of the difficulties that are particular to their condition as migrant women or men, with a certain ethnic background, class, and gender in the country of destination. In the following section we will explore how these repertoires of contention, social networks, identities, and ideologies are transposed to challenge the interviewees conditions in the social and political structures they left behind in their countries of origin.

# **13.4 Constructing a Transnational Field of Mobilization from Brussels: Mexican Migrants Engaging to Change the Political System in their Homeland**

This section presents the impact of social remittances on the construction of transnational fields of mobilization in the case of Mexican migrants living in Brussels. The life stories narrated in this part show that Mexican migrants use political opportunities and exploit the economic and social capital available in Brussels to organize their transnational political movements. However, it is essential to recognize that their political behavior is deeply influenced, on the one hand, by their previous anchored experiences, emotions, and political ideologies before arriving in Brussels. On the other hand, the relations and exchanges they sustain with the people back in their hometown determines, to a certain extent, the form and strength of their transnational fields of political mobilization. In short, it is argued that through the international exchange of information, ideas, skills, and resources Mexican migrants have been able to sustain and engage in the politics of their homeland from Brussels.

Ernesto, a 30-year-old man from the south of Mexico, moved to Belgium in 2011. Before settling in Belgium, Ernesto participated in political and social movements back in his town of origin. As a teenager, he travelled to Chiapas to work for 3 months at one of the independent bodies of the Autonomous Communities of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation, where he helped in the installation of a telecommunication system.

In Brussels, Ernesto participates in three different types of political and social activities. First, he supports a local NGO, whose aim is to protect mine workers against human rights abuses in the south of Mexico. Despite the distance, he has helped the organization setup their website: "Even if I am here, I am still there" (Ernesto, IT professional, Brussels, 25 Aug 2017). Ernesto does not trust Mexican authorities; that is why he also participates in demonstrations and political events to express his dissatisfaction with the Mexican political system. He organized a small committee with several Mexican friends he met in other political gatherings. This group of Mexicans has been invited several times to conferences organized by European civil groups to raise awareness about the violence and corruption permeating many aspects of the Mexican society. Finally, Ernesto and his friends have organized private dinners to raise funds for the victims of the violence in Mexico.

Overall, Ernesto's transnational political activism relies on his previous political experiences back in Mexico; his political awareness and desire to engage in Mexican political protests from abroad; and the social and economic capital at his disposal in Brussels. In addition, since Ernesto is in constant communication with his family in Oaxaca, who regularly informs him about the urgent necessities of their hometown, they give him ideas on which specific actors to support from abroad. For instance, they suggested him to help a specific group of women, in the aftermath of an earthquake that affected his hometown in 2017.

Raúl, a Mexican in his late thirties, arrived in Belgium in 2012. Since then, he has worked as a construction worker, a production assistant in music festivals, and as a salesperson in a chocolate store in Brussels. Raúl has been interested in politics since he was a teenager living in Mexico City, where he participated in demonstrations to defend political prisoners and the victims of the numerous crimes.

Since he came to Brussels, he calls his mother every week to catch up and talk about politics: "My parents have always been interested in Mexican politics. We have always talked about social and political issues back home." (Raúl, Master's student, 13 Oct 2017). His political awareness and will to participate in Mexican politics have been translocated to Belgium. His desire to denounce the Mexican government from abroad is fed by the discussions that he has with his relatives, by the Mexican newspapers he reads every day, by the memories he has of his hometown, and by a sense of moral obligation along with the hope to transform his country of origin.

In September 2014, Raúl immediately reacted to denounce the kidnapping of 43 students in Ayotzinapa. This case became very symbolic to denounce the lack of rule of law in Mexico, the inability of the police agents to protect its citizens, and the inefficiency of Mexican authorities to conduct investigations and persecute abuses against civilians (González Villareal 2015). In response to this incident, Raúl called his only Mexican friend in Brussels to protest: "I called my friend to organize something. I wanted to do something, even if it was on my own. I made some banners to denounce what had happened in Mexico. I wanted to go to the Brussels Stock Exchange to protest. My friend gave me the number of two other Mexicans and protested together" (Raúl, Master's student, 13 Oct 2017).

Raúl's immediate reaction to protest could be understood by the moral shock he underwent, when he first learned about the missing students of Ayotzinapa. He chose to protest on the stairs of the Brussels Stock Exchange because of their symbolism and tradition, hosting other demonstrations. After the political gathering, Raúl met other Mexicans, with whom he remained in contact and organized demonstrations at the Mexican Embassy and the European Parliament.

Raúl's decision to engage in homeland politics from abroad was directly influenced by the social remittances he frequently sustains between Brussels and Mexico City. He found out about the case of Ayotzinapa only after reading an online Mexican newspaper. After hearing that people in Mexico City gathered around the Monument to Independence to protest for Ayotzinapa, he decided to demonstrate in a symbolic place in Brussels, as a result. In fact, he adapted a specific strategy of mobilization embedded in Mexico to the Belgian context.

Another example of this is the case of Ana, a Mexican singer and actress who left Mexico 23 years ago. In Mexico, she participated in political protests to support the indigenous communities and denounce several cases of corruption by Mexican officials. Since she moved to Europe, Ana has never forgotten her homeland. She is continuously exchanging information, ideas, and resources with members of the Mexican society to engage in political movements despite being abroad. Her network of personal and professional contacts, both in Mexico and Brussels, has allowed her to organize political demonstrations, lobbying campaigns, and even accommodate a Mexican family fleeing the wave of violence affecting Veracruz.

As a professional singer, Ana believes to be in a privileged position to protest against the Mexican authorities and denounce their failure to protect the civilian population. Ana uses her music and singing to raise awareness in her performances: "I have to use music and singing to denounce. If I remain silent, I become part of them (the Mexican authorities) […]. The stage is an undeniable space to denounce." (Ana, singer, 05 May 2017). Ana has managed to align her profession with her political struggle in order to create original and artistic forms of protest. For instance, she makes her own interpretation of traditional Mexican songs, by changing the original lyrics to political messages, aiming to denounce human rights violations and crimes happening in Mexico. Singing traditional songs is important for Ana because it constitutes her social identity and enables her to deliver a political message using symbolic Mexican songs, connecting her to the audience through feelings of nostalgia.

In conclusion, Ana portrays Brussels as a key place to build a transnational field of social mobilization due to its positionality in the European political scene. She believes that the political opportunities available in Brussels are very important for denouncing Mexican injustices in Europe: "You can do more for Mexico from here (Brussels), than from there (Mexico)." (Ana, singer, 05 May 2017) Through her personal networks, profession, cultural repertoire, and political beliefs, Ana has managed to find political and economic channels to set up transnational strategies to engage in Mexican politics from Brussels.

# **13.5 Conclusions**

This chapter has presented several examples that illustrate how Latin American migrants living in Brussels engage in political movements in Belgium to challenge their inclusion in the welfare and political systems of their countries of origin and destination. The data shows that these migrants have managed to develop and sustain transnational fields of social and political mobilization to defend their political struggles and ideals from Brussels' influence and also, become active members of the civil society. Indeed, Latin American migrants have managed to create emancipatory initiatives "of hope and nostalgia" to denounce their disagreement with the current social and welfare systems, in both their places of origin and residence.

First, we recognized the relevance of portraying Brussels as a global city, since it is a place where Latin American migrants have found social, economic, and political capital to develop their own strategies of political engagement. The two case studies presented demonstrate that the specific characteristics of Brussels, its political weight in Europe, and its diversity, create an environment where migrants have managed to find economic and political opportunities to engage in political activities. Secondly, we used the concept of "social remittances" to operationalize the exchanges made and sustained over time between Latin American migrants and people from their hometowns. These flowing ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital (Levitt 1998) have a direct impact on the shape and duration of the political engagement of Latin American migrants living in Brussels. Through social remittances, migrants remain emotionally attached to their hometowns and they receive first-hand information that triggers their will to participate in political activities. Furthermore, the members of their homeland societies can provide migrants with specific ideas, skills, and resources to protest about a specific injustice or help a particular social project in their home country.

Thirdly, this chapter emphasizes the personal characteristics, ideas, experiences, and subjectivity of migrants that shaped their strategies and repertoires of political engagement. The life stories we present in this chapter stress the role of personal ideologies, cultural capital, beliefs, emotions, and motivations triggering and developing transnational fields of political engagement. As a result, the accumulated life experiences, political values, profession, and personal networks determine the feasibility and longevity of transnational political movements. These transnational political movements are a counteraction against exclusion in, at least, two countries, and might have the potential to challenge the place of migrants in political and welfare systems.

By focusing on the transfer of information, ideas, skills, and resources between Latin-American migrants living in Brussels and their respective homelands, in this chapter, we showed that feelings of hope, nostalgia, and homeland attachment trigger and shape migrants' strategies for political and social mobilization. Indeed, through these transfers and feelings, migrants feel morally obliged and inspired to become active members of the civil society and advocate for better social conditions in two different welfare states.

# **References**


González Villareal, R. (2015). *Ayotzinapa. La rabia y la esperanza*. Mexico: Editorial Terracota.


*rights and political participation* (IMISCOE reports) (pp. 83–112). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.


**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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# **Part IV Epilogue**

# **Chapter 14 Civil Society Between Populism and Anti-populism**

**Carlo Ruzza**

# **14.1 Introduction**

Civil society groups polarize opinions in normative terms. Most people see the majority of civil society groups as a positive force in society. They value their activities on behalf of specific groups of citizens and appreciate their role in improving democratic life through their educational, informational, and deliberative activities. However, certain associations, such as anti-immigrant vigilante groups, racist groups, or more generally exclusionary groups focus on opposing a political enemy defined in ethnic, religious, or political terms. They justify their actions by asserting that they are defending other social constituencies that need protection, which they often identify as a victimized national majority. There are, in other words, at least two rival conceptions of the functions of civil society, which are frequently articulated through concepts of "good" and "evil", or "civilized" and "uncivilized". Each one of these rival conceptions claims a "high ground" of legitimate involvement and seeks to demonize the other. In the current political culture, torn between a populist and an anti-populist bloc, it is necessary to clarify the contribution of civil society to a "good society" and to document the strategies, discourses, and actions that help or hinder this goal. In this chapter, after articulating the political impact of the categories of good and evil and their implications for civil society, I formulate a typology of "bad civil society" groups and relate it to the findings of some of the other chapters in the present volume.

Regardless of rival claims, not all social and political formations and the associations related to them are equally likely to be perceived as good or evil. Right-wing populist parties are more likely to polarize opinions about the values of their activities. That is, their speeches, their electoral manifestos, their civil society

C. Ruzza (\*)

School of International Studies, University of Trento, Trento, Italy e-mail: carlo.ruzza@unitn.it

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2020 221

O. C. Norocel et al. (eds.), *Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41694-2\_14

organizations, and their forms of political participation. A type of action that polarizes opinion in normative terms are their associational activities. These encompass the formation and support offered to a variety of civil society groups aimed at advocacy, service delivery, and cultural interventions in the public sphere.

The contest between right-wing populist parties and their opponents is often fought out in the public sphere by employing the categories of good and evil. The concepts of "good" and "evil" do not have wide currency in the social sciences. However, the social and political implications of these concepts are important, as shown by analyses of political discourse. Of interest here are those political discourses pertaining to matters of culture, welfare, and migration. They are important as recurring elements of political discourse in many different political and social arenas and as normative concepts that decision makers mobilize to provide resources and legitimacy to civil society organizations. Voters and debates in the public sphere often argue their competing viewpoints by employing the categories of good and evil; they evaluate policies using these categories, and they often evaluate political parties, social movements, or associations in similar ways.

It is important to identify what a good civil society is, and what it is not, as a vibrant and effective civil society is only viable if the state provides the resources and the regulatory framework that enables its operations. Thus, criteria to formulate regulatory frameworks that benefit one or another type of associations are controversial. Different normative conceptions lead for instance to different levels of resources donated to civil society, different levels of governance at which funding is distributed, different specifications of criteria for access to state resources, such as processes of accreditation and checks to ensure compliance with constitutional standards. In other words, the different normative conceptions of civil society which are dominant in different systems of thought produce different configurations of civil society organizations and result in different functions attributed to civil society organizations (Chambers and Kymlicka 2002). There is a relation between the configuration of the population of civil society organizations, the structure of the state, and the prevalent ways of regulating them (Warren 2001). For this reason, it is important that there is clarity on the appropriateness of state policies toward civil society, and that, for instance, unconstitutional organizations are discouraged, such as those that should be classified as "evil" civil society. This debate is particularly relevant after the right-wing populist successes of recent years and the often asserted imperative to "protect" communities, which translates into narrow understandings of national culture, welfare chauvinism, and restrictive migration policies.

These successes point to at least a partial colonization of civil society by the values of right-wing populism. This amounts to a cultural shift, which is sometimes described as the "populist moment" with reference to previous populist moments, but also to an understanding of civil society not as merely a set of organized groups. Rather, civil society enacts a cultural space in which individuals and a wider variety of organizations, such as the media, and activities taking place in the blogosphere, reflect distinct and widespread populist views (Goodwyn 1978; Mouffe 2005). Thus, I refer to "civil society" both in the meaning of an aggregate of non-governmental organizations and institutions that manifest interests, which are also known as "associational ecologies", and as individuals in a society which are independent of the government (Warren 2001). In the first meaning, I include political groups with roots in civil society. These include also right-wing populist parties, which can be considered as movement-parties due to their contentious repertoires, and connections to distinct associational ecologies (Ruzza 2010; Ruzza 2017). I then consider radical right parties, associations, and movements under the same umbrella of radical right civil society formations (on the concept of movementparty, see: Rucht and Neidhardt 2002).

# **14.2 "Protecting" Communities**

As frequently utilized conceptual categories, "good" and "evil" are labels that are often central to debates within political formations, and more generally in the public sphere. In the rhetoric of extremist groups "doing good" might mean protecting a community from perceived threats–no matter if the community is not cohesive, or even not socially meaningful, such as the community of "the whites", and no matter if the asserted perceived threat is a political fabrication. They then might purport to pursue the good of society, even if this view is not often shared by relevant segments of the population. Nonetheless, to pursue their ideology, they might form associations, which through political violence, or other forms of intimidation might objectively exert a negative impact on the lives of certain groups of citizens for the supposed benefit of other groups. Here I am referring to a set of associational activities characterized by discursively exclusionist, undemocratic, or violent features.

An example from Italy illustrates the contemporary relevance of this debate. For the last few years, civil society-sponsored vessels helped to salvage migrants attempting to reach the Italian coasts using small boats to cross the Mediterranean Sea. These ships would routinely rescue migrants' boats from stormy international waters and take them to the Italian shores where they could apply for refugee status. These activities were generally labeled as "good" by Italian public opinion, until in 2018 a new populist government took power, reuniting the anti-establishment populist Five Star Movement (*Movimento 5 Stelle*, M5S) and right-wing populist League (*Lega*, L). The new government, inspired by nationalist law and order values, and an emphasis on security, sought to redefine the activities of rescue operations in negative terms. Pro-migrant NGOs operating at sea came to be redefined as "merchants of death" as in the views of the new government their operations incited other migrants to attempt the same voyage, which caused hundreds of failed attempts by would-be asylum seekers, and numerous drownings. Rescuing migrants was then supposedly motivated by NGOs-vessels trying to support the business of likeminded NGOs groups seeking to acquire state funds to house the migrants they had rescued. Thus, the "good" pro-migrant civil society was redefined in the eyes of the populist government as a "bad" civil society. A change of migration and refugees policy in a more restrictive direction had already been effected in 2017 by the then minister of interior Minniti during the previous center-left government. It included a decree to accelerate the assessment of asylum claims by refugees and a new "code of conduct" for NGOs operating at sea (Minniti 2017). However, this reversal of framing, in turn, legitimated the closure of all Italian harbors to NGOs-vessels, and further legitimated their indictment for illegal entry when they attempted to land. This policy reversal was met with overwhelming support by the Italian public opinion. On the other hand, the vigilante groups that inspected poor urban areas at night, which the progressive NGOs had denounced for harassing minorities, came to be redefined by the winning populist parties as providing security to a victimized population, supposedly terrified by an increasing number of violent aggression, rapes, and robberies by illegal migrants. These two examples show the relevance of the categories of good and evil civil society.

Here below I clarify the criteria for what can be appropriately defined as bad civil society. A related concept, which has also been utilized to describe the same phenomenon, is "uncivil society", which is often used to describe the right-wing populist discourse in the social media, and also more broadly the discourse of violent non-state actors (Krzyzanowski and Ledin 2017). Thus, a different definition of "bad civil society" is "uncivil society" which is equally characterized in normative terms–here we will use these terms interchangeably. "Uncivil" as "lacking civility" implies a specification of why certain types of associations are "bad" and also, therefore, implies a vision of the good society, which is based on the acquisition of civility as a positive value, or at least a vision of a "civilizing process", in which associations play a causal role (Elias 2000; van Iterson et al. 1984). With particular reference to organizations connected to the political right, I examine in the following the factors that have made civil society relevant for political actors and point to a relation of mutual dependence between the associational world and political movements and parties. In this context, I focus on a relationship of mutual dependence between the social and the political sphere–a relation, which develops even when most observers would classify certain civil society activities as uncivil.

# **14.3 "Bad" Civil Society, But Bad for Whom?**

The previous example of vigilante groups, which different actors considered alternatively good or bad, points to the co-existence of two different concepts of goodness, which however differ in one key respect. To the extent that the security of one part of the population–the majority, or what certain actors identify as the mainstream in a partisan way–requires the social control or worse, the upsetting of another part–for instance, the migrant population–the concept of civil society is in principle exclusionary. In other words, the concept of good is pursued by focusing on only a section of the population. The second is inclusionary, as it conceptualizes any interference with the personal integrity of any part of the population as negative for the entire population. From this example, I argue that there is a conflict between two rival visions. One is espoused by right-wing populist parties, which is exemplified by the vision entrenched in the victory of Trump in the 2016 US elections and its "America first!" slogan. The other reflects the cosmopolitan vision of civil society as a "civilizing" factor, which was dominant in the classic literature on civil society and more recently in the second wave of civil society studies that shaped the field from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s (Cohen and Arato 1992; Keane 1999). These two visions point to a struggle for meaning, and for legitimate social practices in an era that is characterized by the success of populist parties throughout Europe.

A contest is taking place in the public arena in which specific parties' activities, civil society groups, and social movements are evaluated for their social value. The role of intermediary associations–that is, associations with political purposes, which are also rooted in civil society, is often particularly controversial. These encompass a variety of civil society groups aimed at activities of advocacy, service delivery and cultural interventions in the public sphere. A contest is taking place between exclusionary associations and other public-interest associations for the legitimate appropriation of the label of "goodness".

Right-wing populist movements and parties are still an electoral minority, ranging around a 15% of the vote in several countries, but their cultural framings have had a significant impact as a consequence of the financial crisis of 2008 and the "refugee reception crisis" of 2015 and the following years (Rea et al. 2019; Trenz et al. 2015). Populist voters express concern for personal security, economic security, values of cultural protectionism, and hostility towards migrants (Rooduijn 2018). The contrast between progressive inclusionary associations and exclusionary ones is marking the political climate of contemporary Europe and amounts to a struggle between a populist and an anti-populist bloc, which on the contrary articulates values of cosmopolitanism, tolerance, and social inclusion.

As the literature on right-wing populism points out, the populist bloc is characterized by a set of distinctive cultural features, which are used to define populism. Briefly, they include the assertion of a vertical split between people and elites, the belief in an essentially homogeneous "people", which is betrayed by self-serving and corrupt elites. They are characterized by forms of enemy-thinking rooted in anti-universalist practices justified as a legitimate defense of an aggrieved but supposedly virtuous part of the population. In their forms of political participation, they opt for anti-system action repertoires. In their political choices, they prefer to rely on charismatic leadership, whose unquestioned authority is seen as a way of bypassing of checks and balances of liberal democracy, thereby creating a symbolic link between the leader and its "people", and thus addressing the corruption of political elites. They typically assert the unquestioned values of nativism and nationalism as a source of inspiration for public policy (Gidron and Bonikowski 2013). In contemporary Europe, it also notably includes strong Euroscepticism. Because of its frequent use of unconventional action repertoires, its roots in civil society and the alternative policy vision it espouses, populism can be characterized as a social movement (Aslanidis 2016). It is opposed by an anti-populism movement, which is occasionally also determined, but in several ways still searching for responses to the populist challenge.

Populism and anti-populism are then more than purely political phenomena. They are different from ideologies formulated by parties born in Parliaments and confined to political elites. They might as well be utilized, defined, and redefined by elites in different social and political locations, but they are embedded in their respective societies. Their parties of reference have roots in communities. This is the reason why the political challenge of right-wing populism in its espousing of "uncivility" is novel and difficult. It is also difficult because "uncivility" is shaped and expressed differently in different political contexts. It is a chameleon-like behavior, which is a trade-mark ideological trait of populist formations, as several empirical studies have shown (Mazzoleni and Ruzza 2018; Taggart 2000). As two fields of actors and ideational constructs compete for legitimacy, supporters and resources, both populism and anti-populism shape and modify their messages according to emerging opportunities, and in doing so both populism and antipopulism can profit from the indeterminacy of their ideational systems of reference. For this reason, populism and anti-populism need to be seen as aspects of civil society with a different understanding of ethical behavior. In the following, I focus explicitly on the populist type.

# **14.4 The Features of Uncivil Society**

While, as noted, the emergence of right-wing bad civil society organizations has been interpreted as a worrying indicator of more general social problems, discussions of the organizational forms and ethical nature of these organizations are much less frequent in the literature. This is partly because two key issues–the definitional issue of the boundaries of ethically unacceptable behavior, and the issue of moral agency–are dependent on views of what is a good society, which analysts of comparative politics working on the extreme right rarely tackle. However, to properly conceptualize the role of uncivil society, it is necessary to examine at least briefly the concepts of the good and the bad society, and then the good and the bad civil society.

Given the limited space available, here I conceptualize concisely the good society as a society that ensures a basic set of needs essential for human development. This approach to the good society is distinct from deontological and consequentialist conceptions, and is more closely related to approaches based on virtue ethics– approaches that conceptualize the good society as societies in which humans can flourish, and their well-being is maximized (Swanton 2005). As noted by Draper and Ramsay (2011), approaches differ in how easily the main conceptions of the good society allow for empirical comparisons of societies. In terms of clarity and comparative qualities, they utilize the "capability approach" as an approach related to virtue ethics (Nussbaum 2000). In particular, they suggest Nussbaum's and Sen's concepts of the good life as optimal in this respect (Draper and Ramsay 2011; Nussbaum 2000; Sen 1999). As posited by Sen, at a minimum, a good society is a society that addresses the need for physical safety, access to the means to formulate informed decisions on peoples' lives, and for civil and political rights. Using these standards, I argue that the extreme-right civil society can be classified as "bad civil society". This is because unlike the good civil society it does not foster the general human needs posited by Sen. The reasons bad civil society does not address the above-mentioned human needs become clear after I discuss why the rest of civil society does, which it is then conceptualized as the "good civil society".

"Civil society", before the arrival of right-wing populist civil society associations, has often been associated with the good society. Civil society has been seen to promote a good society by engendering certain key qualities, such as the ones discussed by Sen (1999), but not only those. Different authors stress different aspects according to their conceptions of the good society. One key virtue that is often emphasized is the conceptualization of civil society as a training ground for developing social trust. I posit that at least an element of social trust is a necessary precondition for the enjoyment of the sense of safety, which Sen considers necessary for humans to flourish. Trust is also connected to issues of rights, as the enjoyment of rights is in turn based on sufficient inter-individual trust to protect individuals from violations perceived or actual of their political and social rights (Misztal 1996; Taylor-Gooby 2000). Similarly, Putnam has singled out the civic virtue of generalized reciprocity as an outcome of involvement in associational activities, and again reciprocity is often based on trust (Putnam 2000). This is of course not the case of associations based on "enemy politics"–a definitional aspect of bad civil society, which are therefore an intrinsically different type of civil society.

Other aspects connected to full-fledged visions of the good life differ markedly from left to right and relate to virtues that different systems of thought consider essential and entrenched in their ethical views of civil society (Chambers and Kymlicka 2002). For instance, the right and the left differ in their promotion of egalitarianism, self-reliance, deliberating skills, or caring communities (Ruzza 2011). Similarly, fundamental differences in the role of associations characterize the currently dominant political visions of liberal minimalism, conventional representation, and participatory democracy, and each of these visions is oriented by different principles (Fung 2003). Nonetheless, while there are differences of emphasis among philosophical conceptions of positive values, there are nonetheless shared values, such as the ones mentioned above, and there are disvalues that can also be shared by several political conceptions.

# *14.4.1 A Typology of Bad Civil Society*

To sum up, the associational activities of groups belonging to bad civil or uncivil society are morally evil because they deny on several accounts the human needs for physical safety, access to the means to formulate informed decisions on peoples' lives, and for civil and political rights. They can be classified in a set of distinctive

types, which consist of (1) Nazium-type bad civil society; (2) fanatical bad civil society (3) bad communitarianism; (4) banal bad civil society. As previously mentioned, not all right-wing populist-inspired civil society groups are uncivil. Some are mainly bonding and not bridging associations. However, this typology is helpful in putting together some of the case studies presented in this volume.

A "bad civil society" or an "uncivil society" is then a civil society which, unlike other types of civil society, cannot conceivably be said to foster either generalized trust or the positive values shared by other political conceptions. Alternatively, more stringently, it is a civil society that engenders the opposite of a good society, that is, a society marked by disvalues–negative values that all ethical worldviews despise, such as the promotion of racial discrimination. In this respect, it is often cited what in philosophy is sometimes known with sad irony as the "reduction *ad Nazium*" (Benn 1998). At the Nuremberg trial, it has been noted that no accuser defended their actions of torture and murder with reference to a moral theory of any sort (Rosanvallon 2006). This case is then often used to argue against moral relativist defenses and in favor of the postulation of an objective evil (Benn 1998). The practices of the Nazis can be conceptualized as the **negation of human development and thriving**. By examples such as this, it has been argued that there is such a thing as objective wickedness, defined as intentionally doing acts that are wrong (Midgley 1984). In the words of a classic work of ethics on this topic:

We need to grasp clearly how appallingly human beings sometimes behave. Moreover, we must see that we cannot always shift responsibility for that behavior off onto an abstraction called 'culture'. (Culture, after all, is made by people.) There have to be natural motives present in humans which make cruelty and related vices possible. (Midgley 1984: XI)

In our case, one can, for instance, classify as objectively evil the instances of right-wing skin-heads physical aggressions against migrants to inflict bodily harm. I characterize as a distinctive type of bad civil society the instances of unjustified and unexplained aggression–we shall call it the "Nazium-type bad civil society" (1). This category is illustrated by the extreme violence and destruction perpetrated on civil populations by armed gangs in the context of local wars, which has been noted for instance both in European and in African contexts (Nzau 2017). In several of these cases, extreme violence is perpetrated by armed gangs without clear ideologies and finalities.

With reference to the work of Koehn, it is possible to identify another category of evil civil society. Her category of "**evil as fanatical impiety**", illustrated with the case of the right-wing terrorist Timothy McVeigh is particularly interesting as it typifies, in the extreme, right-wing acts of aggression of right-wing vigilantes groups, such as in the case of aggressions motivated by fanatical zeal against minorities youth perceived as criminals, even when this perception is hardly justified (Koehn 2005, p. 207). She presents this case as one of "Fanaticism as the Unreasonable Repudiation of Reason" (Koehn 2005, p. 216). In a context such as this–fanatical right-wing extremism–the fundamental needs postulated by Sen (1999) are violated, such as needs for individual physical integrity, as well as civil rights as rights to mental integrity, life and safety, and as protection from discrimination on grounds such as race or national origin. I call this type "fanatical bad civil society" (2). This category is illustrated for instance by the actions of Anders B. Breivik whose fanaticism has overridden all considerations for the lives of his victims (Hemmingby and Bjørgo 2016).

However, there are other types of activities of "bad civil society" groups inspired by **identity-based associations**, which have an objective exclusionary impact on the part of communities that are labelled as undesirable, "inassimilable" or marginalized and derided, without overt aggression. These associations take an ascriptivebased concept of communitarianism as their implicit philosophy. They idealize like-minded communities, which are defined in ethnic or racial terms to which they also often attribute distinctive identities and distinctive character traits. One can consider for instance the activities of associations that do not admit members from racial minorities and engage in activities in the public sphere that border with what has been defined as "hate speech". In this case, the range of approaches has varied more widely, and the border between ethical and unethical behavior is debated. What are the practices of "identity building" for some, are instances of discrimination for others (Gilbert 2010). In this respect, it is well-known that following the example of the French *Nouvelle Droite*, the modern European extreme-right has appropriated the identity-based language of the new social movements of the eighties to argue for exclusionist practices (Fella and Ruzza 2012; Lloyd 1998). While these uses have been stigmatized and condemned for their instrumentality, equivalent identity-strengthening practices acting in the framework of a politics of cultural identity have been endorsed by philosophers from a range of traditions, and particularly by communitarian scholars (Gilbert 2010, p. 11).

On the other hand, attacks against the glorification of many forms of politics of cultural identity have also been prominent in recent years (Barry 2001). Critics are not only focusing on the impact of excluded communities, but more generally on the conception of community that several defenders of the politics of identity endorse. There is in several of these conceptions an inability to recognize the fluidity of identities, and the constraining character on individuals that a strong defense of communities' cultures engenders. This leads some scholars to argue that "cultural identity is in several respects morally pernicious" (Gilbert 2010, p. 14). I characterize this type as "bad communitarianism" (3). The literature shows how some of these uncivil society groups organized around societal divisions often attempt to operate as alternatives to the state, oppose liberal democracy and liberal-legal processes and engage in unruly behavior, including violence and criminality (Wallis 2019). A "bad communitarianism" turn propagated by right-wing populist formations has been evidenced in the normalization of anti-pluralist views across many European public spheres in recent years (Krzyzanowski and Ledin 2017). This has particularly been noted in some Central and Eastern European countries (Bustikova and Guasti 2017).

However, rather than adopting a blanket negative connotation for all identitybased exclusionist groups, it is more appropriate to focus on the actual practices that the political pursuit of identity can generate. In this respect, it is useful to review the

actual associational practices of right-wing groups and the motivations behind these practices.

In addition to evil acts perpetrated intentionally by right-wing groups, if one also includes the broader category of exclusionary identity politics one also needs to consider (d) **evil acts done not intentionally** but in other ways, for instance out of carelessness for the consequences. We are referring to a carelessness that could be for instance rooted in the differential attribution of the category of humanity to "friends" and "enemies". In this respect, there are several useful typologies available in the literature of evil acts committed out of mindless disregard for their consequences, or because of prioritizing the obedience to orders, or instrumental pursuit such as career choice, which result in evil consequences, or from the unreflective assumption of a cultural framework of "politics of the enemy". One can think in this respect of Arendt's well-known category of the banality of evil (Arendt 2006). Mindless and careless evil can be perpetrated not only by single individuals, but by groups of individuals as well, such as in the instance of public derision of migrants, or religious groups by groups of insensitive individuals. I call this type of evil civil society "banal bad civil society" (4). I list in this category criminal gangs whose interest in acquiring resources legitimates corrupt practices that have negative consequences for society. This category of "uncivil society" has been identified in the literature on several developing countries that show the mindless behavior of local organized actors and the negative consequences it produces (Caiani et al. 2012; Hainsworth 2008). It has also been shown in the dealings between international "respectable" commercial and political actors in developing contexts, which unintentionally legitimate and encourage corrupt practices and produce negative societal consequences (Cooley et al. 2018).

# **14.5 European Uncivil Civil Society**

Considering the sections of this volume on the right-wing populist and retrogressive mobilization, one feature that emerges from several chapters is the extent to which the contest between the populist and the anti-populist bloc compete and sometimes interact in the public sphere results in a merger of traditional national values, and new populist ones. For instance, in the chapter by Anders Hellström and Mahama Tawat we see how multiculturalism is now defined as "unaffordable"–a change that has occurred in recent years, showing the diffusion of the values of populist groups, in both Sweden and Denmark. However, on other issues the two cases differ, revealing how traditional openness to refugees remains noticeable in Sweden. The chapter by Emil Edenborg also points to the way right-wing populism is enabled by connecting its xenophobic values to perceived national specificities, such as strong Swedish concern for gender equality, and therefore promoting an ethnopluralist mind frame and a securitizing narrative. It is useful to point out that the changed image of multiculturalism is still quite recent. As late as 2011, Europeans debated the then-controversial assertion by political leaders such as the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the UK Prime Minister David Cameron, and later by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy, that "multiculturalism has failed".

The previously proposed typology offers some additional means to organize the findings from the previous book chapters. The formations which are most clearly identifiable as evil based on the criteria previously listed belong to the first type–the xenophobic groups. Xenophobic organizations and particularly racist organizations, situate themselves at the boundary between legal and semi-legal action or accept the price of illegality, with the organizational costs that this implies. Groups of skinheads illustrate the **Nazium-type** of sheer wickedness (Midgley 1984). However, in the field of racist groups, one also finds examples of a different type of evil civil society: these are organized groups, which unlike the often uneducated and angry "globalization losers" of the skin-head sort are organized.

In the second category of our typology, extreme-right civil society groups illustrate the "**fanatical bad civil society**" type. These tend to prevail in organized militant right-wing groups. Several countries manifest a clear distinction between a right-wing populism, which while despising the institutions of liberal democracy takes part in elections and an extreme right, which acts outside of parliaments and is generally more radical and not infrequently staffed by fanatical activists. In this category, one would also have to count the fanatical online communities of which Breivik was a member. Although no chapters in this book focus on their activities, there is a wide literature on them in Europe that point to their relevance and to their fanatical use of violence (Caiani et al. 2012; Hainsworth 2008).

Several chapters in this volume illustrate the positions of parties that express what we have defined as **bad communitarianism**. They are particularly relevant in the current European context, including the chapter by Radu Cinpoeş and Ov Cristian Norocel where xenophobic remarks are routine in the political communication of the parties examined. This category includes committed nationalists. It refers to groups whose main concern is (national) territory. The protection, glorification, and asserted homogeneity of their territories of reference is a constitutive trait of most types of nationalism, which inspires most organized mobilization. In contemporary Europe, there is an old tradition of civic-nationalism that attempts to interpret nationalism in non-exclusivist terms, for instance by setting relatively open criteria for membership. These include, for instance the Basque and the Catalan nationalisms, but there are also cases of movements that merge the nationalist frame and the xenophobic exclusionary fame, such as the Italian League and the Belgian *Vlaams Belang*, and thus situate themselves in the uncivil society category. The chapter by Gokay Özerim and Selcen Öner clearly illustrates the exclusivist nationalism of political dynamics occurred in Brexit and in the Austrian cases, and shows the "othering" or "enemy politics"-role that Turkey has played in the political life of these countries. Communitarian nationalists also include those civil society groups that articulate the vertical dimension of people against the elites. This is a dimension that has produced a set of important movements and parties. The anti-elite narrative recurs in most European populist formations. Euroscepticism is pervasive in all European populisms and is particularly well illustrated by the UK case study.

The **banal bad civil society** is a type of civil society that emerges out of the naturalization and institutionalization of xenophobic values and is more likely to be expressed at the individual level in countries where right-wing populist parties have been successful and have institutionalized their views in state policies. Not surprisingly, the colonization of political culture by the populist bloc is stronger in countries with populist governments, such as shown in the chapter by Radu Cinpoeş and Ov Cristian Norocel with reference to Poland and Hungary. This is also the case of Italy, where in 2018 the majority supported strongly the previously mentioned antiimmigrant policies of their populist government. The Central and Eastern European cases and the Italian case also show how governmental rhetoric can counter the spirit of tolerance and protection of human rights that their countries' membership in the EU should protect. All these cases, as well as the Finnish case examined by Katarina Pettersson, point to the "normalization" of xenophobia (Norocel 2017). Government positions on such controversial issues as migration and refugee policies are presented as sensible, factual, and thus uncontroversial. Frequently there is a tendency to favor a "culturalist" framing, whereby a natural pride in one's cultural heritage or a feeling of nostalgia are the preferred ways to neutralize and communicate the harsh policies marginalizing migrants. More generally, nostalgia, but also connected emotions are frequently and intentionally mobilized by right-wing populist and extreme right formations as evidenced in the chapter by Katherine Kondor and Mark Littler with reference to the Hungarian case. Similarly, the emotional glorification of an imaginary past emerges centrally in the chapter on Generation Identity by Anita Nissen. The importance of nostalgia also comes forth clearly in the work of Andreas Önnerfors in his chapter on Pegida. These findings point to the importance of studying the role of emotions in the politics of uncivil society.

# **14.6 By Way of Conclusion**

This chapter has discussed the distinctive features of populist civil society in contemporary Europe and offered a systematization of this political environment by anchoring it with examples from the contributions in the present volume. This notwithstanding, we should not forget or dismiss the flourishing of a civil society that consolidates the anti-populist block. Indeed, this volume presents a multifaceted array of **emancipatory initiatives from below**, which denounce and forcefully oppose welfare chauvinism and narrow cultural retrenchment around national ethnic majorities. These take various forms, such as the analysis of the Danish *Venligboerne* by Martin Bak Jørgensen and Daniel Rosengren Olsen, which illustrates how a civil society actor decisively move beyond fear and nostalgia as a master frame and provides a transitional space for learning. At the same time, the boundaries of the civil society itself are questioned, as illustrated by Camilla Haavisto in her analysis of the "Right to Live" collective in Finland. In this case, Iraqi and Afghan asylum seekers recast the culture of gratefulness towards the host country that asylum-seekers were previously expected to subscribe to, and attempt to present themselves as a collective with its own voice, visibility, and legitimacy in the public sphere. There is hope even in the Central and Eastern European context, as Alexandra Ana shows in her analysis of an emerging "street feminism", which contours a politics of intersectional hope by way of bridge-building and solidarity among such diverse groups as forcibly evicted persons, feminist NGOs, anarchist groups, and Roma feminist and anti-racist organizations, and refugees. Last but not least, Larisa Lara-Guerrero and María Vivas-Romero evidence how Latin American migrants in Brussels are actively involved into a transnational social movement, which creates, transforms, and employ the transnational networks in both their homelands and the host land.

To conclude by returning to the two conceptual master frames that underpin the present volume, at the moment feelings of nostalgia are skillfully used to ensure the increase the visibility of uncivil society elements in European societies. This is nonetheless accompanied and counteracted by vigorous anti-populist emancipatory mobilizations, which instill hope in cosmopolitan visions of Europe.

# **References**

Arendt, H. (2006). *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil*. London: Penguin.


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