



EDITED BY  
JACOB BLANC AND  
FREDERICO FREITAS

FOREWORD BY ZEPHYR FRANK

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# BIG WATER

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THE MAKING OF THE BORDERLANDS  
BETWEEN BRAZIL, ARGENTINA,  
AND PARAGUAY

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and FREDERICO FREITAS  
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*The Making of the Borderlands Between Brazil,  
Argentina, and Paraguay*



THE UNIVERSITY OF  
ARIZONA PRESS  
TUCSON



The University of Arizona Press  
www.uapress.arizona.edu

© 2018 by The Arizona Board of Regents  
Open-access edition published 2020

ISBN-13: 978-0-8165-3714-3 (cloth)  
ISBN-13: 978-0-8165-4173-7 (open-access e-book)



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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Blanc, Jacob, editor. | Freitas, Frederico, editor. | Frank, Zephyr L., 1970– writer of foreword.

Title: Big water : the making of the borderlands between Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay / edited by Jacob Blanc and Frederico Freitas.

Other titles: Big water (2018)

Description: Tucson : The University of Arizona Press, 2018. | Foreword by Zephyr Frank. | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2017042837 | ISBN 9780816537143 (cloth : alk. paper)

Subjects: LCSH: Tri-Border Area (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay)—Historiography.

Classification: LCC F2217 .B54 2018 | DDC 981/.62—dc23 LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2017042837>



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# FOREWORD

ZEPHYR FRANK

**T**HIS REMARKABLE VOLUME marks a decisive stage in the broad historiography of the Triple Frontier region. Where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet, a transnational story can now be told across scales of time and space. The authors of these essays attend to the full scope of the Triple Frontier region by writing its history in diverse temporal and spatial registers. Throughout the volume, this means an engagement with local, regional, national, and transnational scales. The unit of the nation-state is not wished away, but it is put in proper perspective and related to other dimensions of historical experience. This alone makes *Big Water* a critical intervention in a literature that has for too long tended to take the nation as a primary unit of analysis even when the space and time in question manifestly fail to conform to the borders and laws of particular states (or empires). Yet the frame is not merely situated around a relentless emphasis on the transnational or transimperial. This, too, would have been a limitation.

If the national circumscribes and distorts through the narrative of nations and stories of the origins and development of sovereignties and national political cultures, the transnational can occlude the provincial, the local, and the idiosyncratic and autonomous modes of operating and structures of feeling in the borderlands. Everything is not explained by an abstract “Atlantic World.” Between nations and worlds, then, we come to see the region of the Triple Frontier as borderlands. Even this frame, which we can take as the state of the art in the North American historiography, has limits. Thus, *Big Water*: a cohesive

volume of essays that seeks to balance these historical scales and explore the processes and conflicts that made and remade the Triple Frontier.

There is no doubting the importance of the Triple Frontier region. As a site of major interimperial and international conflict and, more recently, of integration and collaboration, it is a nexus for critical events and processes in the history of South America. Before the arrival of European colonizers, it was home to one of the densest populations of native peoples in South America. Despite the depredations of empires and nations, these peoples abide and continue to play a significant role in the culture of the Triple Frontier. Their story is told in the essays collected in this volume. The colonial era is explored in two essays that emphasize indigenous actors in relation to imperial projects of territorial expansion in the borderlands. These opening essays draw attention to the mobility of native and colonial people and the complex economic and political networks that emerged through their interaction. The theme of movement and interaction is picked up and developed in further essays covering the national era, indicating the deep and abiding consequences of this early period in structuring the modes of life and struggle in the borderlands.

A few essays in this volume also tap into local histories to show the limits of central state sovereignty in a postcolonial context. In these chapters, we come to see how nations sought to consolidate territorial control through local agents and private colonization schemes. By the end of the nineteenth century, they added conservation to their repertoire, beginning to designate natural reserves and map out, if not implement, the idea of national parks. These national projects, at scale, changed the landscape by introducing new settlers, building new towns, and initiating more intensive resource extraction that led to changes in relations of production and a significant degree of deforestation. The borderlands thereby became imbued with a new set of institutions and actors, such as colonization companies and interior ministries, that nonetheless engaged with and overlaid older structures and practices. In this sense, the borderlands exhibited a fractured chronotope. Neither time nor space was dominated by the nation. Power remained dispersed, violence was endemic, and local actors opted in and out of national systems and continued to cross borders and knit together the Triple Frontier as a borderland.

The story is carried forward into the era of massive state-sponsored infrastructure projects. In this new era of mega hydroelectric installations and concrete bridges and highways, the Triple Frontier moved decisively from a peripheral to a central place in the national and transnational projects of the

1970s and beyond. In this volume, we learn about the origins and development of the Itaipu hydroelectric complex and how echoes of the Paraguayan War reverberated in conflicts over contested border regions in the planning stages of the dam. We also learn about Paraguay's pivot toward Brazil as a key economic and political partner in the 1970s and 1980s. Bridges across rivers transformed the Triple Frontier and with it the older patterns of economic life in places like Asunción, where fluvial ties to Argentina weakened and terrestrial connections to Brazil flourished. In this sense, infrastructure not only integrated actors in the Triple Frontier through projects such as dam building but also reoriented the whole space of the region through highways, trucks, and buses.

The late postcolonial era also witnessed the persistence of colonial themes such as mobility and border crossing in the lives of native peoples. Moreover, the twentieth century brought about the return of the Jesuit-Guarani Missions as a locus of cultural activity under the auspices of national patrimony and World Heritage sites. Here, then, the past and present continue their unending conversation. The Triple Frontier now—peopled with settlers, largely deforested, its rivers behind high dams, part of a transnational economic zone (Mercosul/sur), home to national parks, and crisscrossed by highways and bridges—remains also a place of historical memory and contemporary alterity in the wandering paths of the Guarani.

Common themes and concepts weave these essays together into a broader argument about the Triple Frontier. To begin with, the subject of indigenous history is treated throughout the volume without the declensionist sentimentality that sometimes colors studies of native peoples. Great losses are tallied, to be sure, but the agency and adaptability of the region's original inhabitants remain at the forefront of the analysis. This sensibility also shapes the volume's treatment of environmental history. Understanding changes in the landscape and human-environment interaction over the long run as a series of struggles, adaptations, misunderstandings, and appropriations rather than as a linear process of domination and decline helps move the literature forward into promising new pathways for analysis. The temporal and spatial scope of the essays helps illuminate the ways in which historical patterns shift and complicate the kinds of stories that are too often told in isolation. This attention to time and space also brings to the surface themes of interconnection and movement in the borderlands. Histories based on post hoc national boundaries begin to dissolve in this approach, bringing the best tendencies of the broader international literature on borderlands to bear on the unique circumstances of the Triple Frontier.



Taken as a whole, *Big Water* asks readers to rethink relationships between the distant past and the contemporary world, to consider the space of the borderlands as defined more by movement and exchange than lines drawn on maps, and to see a region holistically, embedded in a system of empires and then nation-states but possessed of its own distinctive patterns and logics.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

IN ALL ACADEMIC WORK, but perhaps most acutely in an edited volume, “thank yous” cannot be distributed widely enough. Our first acknowledgment goes to all of the book’s contributing authors. Coordinating twelve scholars from four countries is never an easy task, yet everyone’s professionalism and good nature made our work as editors a genuine pleasure. The book’s transnational and transthematic scope is no accident but rather a reflection of the diverse nationalities and fields of expertise brought to bear by the authors. Collaboration can often be a buzzword meant to gesture to a sense of collegiality, yet in the case of this volume, innovative scholarship was made possible precisely through the collaborative work of scholars from across Latin American and the United States. We thank all our authors for their hard work and their commitment to the project.

We also extend a sincere *agradecimiento* to Carlos Gómez Florentín, our friend and colleague who was instrumental in the conception and early stages of making this book a reality. Although outside responsibilities eventually forced Carlos to step away from being the third coeditor of *Big Water*, his conceptual contributions and knowledge of Paraguayan historiography helped give the book its structure. Chris Boyer similarly helped shepherd our project from a loose idea to a book manuscript. During coffee breaks at the 2014 SOLCHA environmental history conference in Argentina, Chris graciously dispensed advice on putting together an edited volume, and in the months that followed

he gave feedback on our initial prospectus. He also helped point us toward the University of Arizona Press, where we found an ideal publishing home for *Big Water*. Scott de Herrera and Kristen Buckles were never anything but kind, and as all good editors should be, they managed to be both accommodating and demanding at the same time.

*Jacob Blanc and Frederico Freitas*

2017

# BIG WATER




FIGURE I.1 Triple Frontier area ca. 2010. Map by Frederico Freitas.

# INTRODUCTION

JACOB BLANC AND FREDERICO FREITAS

IN DECEMBER 1975, a group of government employees and state troopers arrived at the confluence of the Ocoí and Paraná Rivers in western Brazil to remove squatters from a public land tract. The area, located in a forested stretch at the Brazilian border with Paraguay, had been expropriated in 1971 by a Brazilian federal agency—the Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (INCRA; National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform)—to receive white Brazilian settlers evicted from a nearby national park. According to INCRA officials, the area had been occupied two months earlier by a group of “invaders” in cahoots with local sawmill owners whose goal was to “steal lumber” from federal lands. With the backup of state police, the INCRA agents entered the area, arrested some of its dwellers, seized their fishing and logging tools, and burned their makeshift homes to the ground. After “clearing the area,” INCRA installed gates on the dirt roads and deployed guards to prevent the return of the “illegal loggers.” In his report, INCRA agent Carlos Antônio Letti informed that they successfully removed all “squatters” except “for six families of Paraguayan Indians,” whom they allowed to remain in the area.<sup>1</sup>

At first glance, the removal of people from a federal piece of land perhaps seems unremarkable. After all, the repeating pattern of rural displacement is found globally throughout the twentieth century. Yet the case at Ocoí is more than just an example of peasants being kicked out by government forces. Rather,



it exemplifies the underlying themes that for nearly five hundred years have shaped the borderland region that extends along the upper Río de la Plata basin between current-day northeastern Argentina, southwestern Brazil, and Eastern Paraguay. *Big Water* is devoted to the historical dynamics of this hydraulic borderland, known in modern South America as the Triple Frontier (*la Triple Frontera* in Spanish, *a Tríplice Fronteira* in Portuguese). Its title borrows from the translated meaning of “Iguazú/Iguaçu,” the Tupi-Guarani name given to one of the region’s most dramatic geological features, the Iguazú Falls. The region’s water courses—most notably the Paraná River and its tributary, the Iguazú—serve as the tangible demarcation lines of the otherwise invisible political borders (see fig. 1.1).

The 1975 conflict at the banks of one of these rivers, the mighty Paraná, brings to the fore several themes that have helped make the Triple Frontier one of the more important and historically dynamic border regions in all of the Americas. The first is the uncertain nationality ascribed to the “Paraguayan Indians” who had been left behind in the federal estate by the INCRA employees. Although depicted as Paraguayan—and thus foreign—in the land agency’s report, the members of the small Indian community would fight for land and communal rights in the following years as members of the Brazilian polity. Marginalized from both countries, they were, in fact, Avá-Guarani, part of the larger Guarani population that has lived in the upper Plata basin since before the arrival of the first Europeans in the sixteenth century. Historically extremely mobile, the Guarani have a culture centered on the search for a mythical “land without evil,” the *Yvy Maraey*. Five hundred years of contact with Euro-American society has led Guarani groups to switch back and forth between sedentariness and nomadism. Beginning in the seventeenth century, the Guarani were brought onto the Jesuit missions that dotted this borderland region, where they had their imperial allegiance questioned by Portuguese and Spanish colonial administrators. Centuries later, by depicting as “foreign” a small group of Avá living in Brazil, INCRA officials reproduced the deeply rooted taxonomy that revived anxieties over the colonial and national affiliation of the Guarani at the frontier.<sup>2</sup>

The accelerated colonization of the Triple Frontier area is another crucial feature in the background of this eviction case. Although inhabited by a population of indigenous descent for most of the colonial era, it was not until the mid-twentieth century that an intensive colonization process swept through the borderland. Beginning in the 1950s, settlers from other areas of Brazil and Europe, lured by the promise of cheap and fertile land and bountiful natural

resources (e.g., water, yerba mate, timber), started to move into this area. The rapid arrival of new rural migrants throughout the Triple Frontier led to a parallel increase in agrarian conflicts on all three sides of the border. The Avá-Guarani living at the banks of the Paraná, for example, resided in an area that had been expropriated in 1971 by the Brazilian federal government to harbor a population of white settlers removed from the Iguazu National Park. For years Brazilian federal agencies ignored the presence of the Avá in the area. But the rise of large-scale development initiatives in the 1970s and 1980s—particularly hydroelectric dam projects—brought to the fore the need to relocate not only the white settlers but also the Avá-Guarani families and other impoverished farming communities.

These sorts of localized conflicts had predominated in the region long before the Triple Frontier was officially split into three discrete national territories. Upon the arrival of Europeans in South America, the banks of the Paraná River were turned into a buffer area disputed by the Portuguese and Spanish crowns as Jesuit missionaries and royal authorities vied for control of the lands, resources, and peoples of the region. The creation of the nation-states of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay—and the official demarcation of the Triple Frontier as such—opened a new era of competition in the region. From military outposts throughout the nineteenth century to national parks in the early twentieth century and culminating in the megainfrastructure plans of the late twentieth century, the Triple Frontier has always been targeted by projects designed to increase state control over this hydraulic borderland. In the 1970s and 1980s, the history of state interventions culminated in the construction of Itaipu Dam by the military dictatorships ruling Brazil and Paraguay. The dam, which was the world's largest hydroelectric facility by the time of its completion in 1991, radically transformed the natural, economic, and social landscapes of the Triple Frontier. Not only did Itaipu help solidify a new geopolitical landscape in the Southern Cone—in which Brazil supplanted Argentina as the region's major power—but also the mobilization of displaced farmers in both Brazil and Paraguay showcased new forms of rural-based opposition in an era of authoritarian military regimes. While Itaipu was certainly the apex of state investment in the Triple Frontier, the broader logics behind the dam have continued in subsequent decades. In the 1990s and early 2000s, governments of various political leanings throughout the Southern Cone passed laws and encouraged new commercial ventures that helped make the Triple Frontier the heart of Mercosur, the new economic market created in 1991 with the ostensible goal of eliminating regional rivalry

through trade integration. Yet the veneer of regional cooperation obfuscates a complicated reality of government and popular forces maneuvering between and among themselves to defend competing visions of progress in this tri-border area.

This book explores four centuries of the overlapping histories of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay and the colonies that preceded them. From the world of the Jesuit reductions in the early seventeenth century to the accelerated flows of capital and goods of contemporary trade agreements, this region has been fundamental to the development not only of each nation but of the Southern Cone and South America more generally. Although historians from each of these three countries have tended to construct narratives that stop at their respective borders, we call for a reinterpretation that goes beyond the material and conceptual boundaries of the Triple Frontier. In doing so, this book helps transcend nation-centered blind spots and approach new understandings of how space and society have developed throughout Latin America.

Running along the shores of the upper Paraná and Uruguay Rivers and made up of nearly five hundred thousand square kilometers (an area similar to present-day Spain), this area has been the site of some of the most dynamic—and least studied—developments in Latin America. For over four hundred years the region has undergone tremendous alterations to its social and environmental landscapes. A borderland *par excellence*, in pre-Columbian and colonial times the region was the heart of the “Guarani country,” an extensive network of indigenous communities that at its peak stretched from the western edge of São Paulo state to the north of Argentina’s Corrientes Province. In the seventeenth century, Jesuit missionaries established a presence in a region located geographically, politically, and culturally at the fringes of both the Spanish and Portuguese empires.

In the national period, this borderland would become a pivotal arena of the War of Triple Alliance (1864–1870), one of the largest military conflicts in the Americas in the nineteenth century, second only to the American Civil War. With over four hundred thousand casualties, the war brought profound implications to the countries involved. In Brazil, the conscription of slaves and free blacks in the frontlines contributed to the strengthening of the country’s antislavery movement, which culminated with the abolition in 1888. The war also helped to galvanize a new military elite in the country’s army, whose members carried out the coup that ended almost seven decades of monarchy in 1889. It was after the war that Brazil rose as the main regional power within South

America. Argentina had a long history of internecine conflict between provinces, and the war served to coalesce power around Buenos Aires allowing the emergence of the country as a unified nation-state. This outcome of the war, therefore, helped to lay the ground for the great Argentine economic leap of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Paraguay, however, emerged from the war in far greater disarray, with the death of a substantial sector of its population (the estimates vary widely, from 7 to 60 percent) and the destruction of much of the country.<sup>3</sup>

In the second half of the twentieth century, this borderland went from a forgotten periphery to a core region receiving much of the efforts of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay in modernization and nation building. With the construction of the Itaipu Dam, the region witnessed the establishment of a new regime of energy production that reshaped the relations between all three partners, served as a launching pad for the green revolution in Brazil and Paraguay, became the gravitational center for a newly created common economic market, and was the target of progressive visions of national parks and environmental management. Yet it is misleading to think about the Triple Frontier populations as mere receptors of national domination. The agency and creativity of the peoples living in the borderland ensure their role as protagonists in the creation of space and the ongoing construction of the landscape. In this volume, therefore, the attempts by nation-states to increase their presence along the border is reconciled with the realities of how these projects were experienced, contested, and shaped on the ground.

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The essays compiled in this volume achieve a double outcome: they complicate traditional frontier histories, and they balance the excessive weight given to empires, nations, and territorial expansion in such accounts. In particular, the transnational approach employed in these chapters enables the overcoming of stagnant comparisons between national cases. More than simply highlighting the limitations of national narratives, conceptualizing the Triple Frontier as a borderland draws our attention to the specificities of crossroads. By focusing on the uniquely overlapping character of the Triple Frontier, the chapters presented here emphasize a space that would otherwise remain at the periphery of national histories. This is important not only because it unearths the history of a frontier that has been insufficiently studied but even more so for the priority

it gives to the groups that carved out their own lives within the contact zones between the Spanish and Portuguese empires and, beginning in the nineteenth century, three distinct national polities.

There are many triple frontiers in South America, but only the area between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay is widely known as *the* Triple Frontier in the continent.<sup>4</sup> Its importance derives from its position as a contested crossroads of the Spanish and Portuguese empires and its central role in the constitution of their successor nation-states. The establishment of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay in the nineteenth century did little to reduce territorial disputes in the borderland; if anything, competing claims to the river basin and its adjacent lands have been one of the most constant features in the nearly two-hundred-year relationship between the three nations.<sup>5</sup> While national governments maneuvered for geopolitical control in the Triple Frontier, groups of people moved into and across the borderland itself, changing the social and natural landscape from one generation to the next. These transformations accelerated in the 1950s, when the region served as a new frontier for agricultural settlement that serviced some of South America's most populous and industrial areas. Farmlands in the Triple Frontier were fertile, cheap, and connected through the Río de la Plata basin to large population centers such as São Paulo (upriver) and Buenos Aires (downriver). The opening of highways in the mid-1950s amplified the connection between the interior borderland and the populous Atlantic Seaboard. In the 1970s the Triple Frontier also witnessed a mass migration into Paraguay of Brazilian citizens known as *brasiguayos* who eventually accounted for 60 percent of Eastern Paraguay and nearly 10 percent of Paraguay's entire population.<sup>6</sup> The rise of *brasiguayos* emerged in tandem with the growth of soybean production, and the Triple Frontier has since become the center of the South American soy belt.<sup>7</sup> By the end of the century the borderlands had evolved into one of the biggest nodes of commercial activity on the continent. As noted by anthropologist Christine Folch, the borderland is unique in that it forces scholars of Argentina and Brazil—the two great powers of South America—to reorient inwardly, toward their landlocked borders rather than out to their port cities.

As a theme, the Triple Frontier constitutes a blind spot for historians of Latin America. There are many important studies published on different aspects of this area—from the Jesuit missions to the Paraguayan War to the building of Itaipu—but historians have abstained from defining the region as a historiographical field in its own right.<sup>8</sup> One of the goals of this volume is to address this issue by framing the Triple Frontier as a historical borderland. To

be sure, the history of borderlands has a long tradition in scholarship on colonial North America.<sup>9</sup> Recently, a boom of works centered in the national period has exposed the contradictions of the processes of border construction performed by the inheritor American and Mexican states.<sup>10</sup> However, this perspective has yet to be adopted by historians of the rest of Latin America.<sup>11</sup> This is particularly problematic in the case of Argentine and Brazilian historiography, which also have a strong tradition of studying the frontier but have failed to engage in a borderland-inspired revision of these contested areas.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, scholars have yet to fully place the border populations of such intermediary spaces at the center of the historical narrative. By reconciling nation-centered visions of territorial conquest and border creation with a focus on the local, we are able to reconceive of borderland peoples as more than mere receptors of national domination. Local groups must be seen as creative protagonists in the ongoing construction of borders.

This volume, therefore, intends to define the study of the South American Triple Frontier as a new area of historical scholarship. While seeking to break new scholarly ground, the breadth of topics presented in the following chapters simultaneously engages with other established fields. From environmental history to indigenous and peasant studies and spanning the history of modernization and state building, the contributions here offer a new framework for understanding the peoples, spaces, and ideas that have helped make the Triple Frontier a landscape of dynamic and far-reaching change. As such, the book is organized in four primary themes: adaptation, environment, belonging, and development.

First, the volume explores the question of adaptation by tracing the experience of Guarani Indians in the borderlands of the Spanish and Portuguese colonial empires. The arrival of Iberian conquerors—and the Jesuit missionaries who soon followed—triggered the unprecedented challenge of how to maintain a local sense of cultural and social resilience in the face of dramatic change. Adaptation as a historical process was by no means the sole product of colonialism; the indigenous groups had moved throughout the borderlands long before the arrival of Europeans, always engaging with and adapting the region's numerous social and physical landscapes. Nonetheless, the stakes of these adaptive qualities were greatly magnified under the mantle of colonialism: territorial encroachment, population loss, religious incursions, and slaving expeditions were among the many pressures placed on Guarani life. Yet these events never fully defined the Guarani. Rather, communities proved adept at



navigating the ever-changing realities of colonial life to not only preserve key components of their cultural identity but also to actually help establish the contours of how colonialism itself developed throughout the region. Understanding the role of adaptation in the colonial period is doubly important for tracing the social and political dynamics that would later coalesce in the establishment of three distinct nation-states.

Second, *Big Water* introduces a new transnational setting to Latin American environmental history.<sup>13</sup> Most of the scholarship published in English deals with Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Central America. Only a handful of works exist on Argentina—none of which focus on the Triple Frontier borderlands—and an environmental history monograph has yet to be published on Paraguay.<sup>14</sup> Brazil has attracted most of the attention from environmental historians working in South America; the declensionist narratives on Amazonia and the Atlantic Forest have been particularly alluring. The foundational work of Brazilian environmental history, for example—Warren Dean’s *With Broadax and Firebrand*—chronicles the destruction of the Atlantic Forest, the biome that originally extended all the way from Brazil’s northeast to northern Argentina and Eastern Paraguay, covering most of the area that is the focus of this volume.<sup>15</sup> Yet Dean’s analysis stopped at the border, blaming Luso-Brazilians for environmental devastation despite the clear transnational span of the Atlantic Forest. This volume avoids the trap of projecting a teleological national essence onto nature by documenting the interaction between humans and the environment in a borderland setting.

Third, the idea of belonging calls attention to how nation-states are constructed and who is seen as legitimate and thus worthy of inclusion. In the context of a complex border region, the question of belonging helps explore how certain communities are allowed entry into a national polity—with its contingent rights of citizenship and culture—while others are excluded, marginalized, or in the case of indigenous groups, often sanitized as an artificial monument to a country’s romanticized heritage. To the extent that scholars have written about belonging in the Triple Frontier zone, they have tended to focus on the Guarani Indians during the colonial period and their relationships within and between the Jesuit missions and European empires.<sup>16</sup> There have been few attempts to transpose this approach to other chronologies. By writing the history of belonging in this region with a multicentury perspective, *Big Water* helps to remove the periodization blinders that prevent scholars from finding commonalities between the colonial and national periods.<sup>17</sup>

Finally, the theme of development stands as perhaps the Triple Frontier's most defining feature of the past century. *Big Water* charts the often-contradictory attempts to nationalize border territories through the implementation of massive infrastructure projects. The dawn of the Republican regime in Brazil saw the first timid experiment of direct state intervention at this borderland with the establishment of the military colony of Foz do Iguaçu in 1889. In the 1930s, the governments of Argentina and Brazil furthered their engagement with border development, this time utilizing the establishment of national parks at the binational Iguazú Falls to channel investment into the area. Beginning in the 1950s state intervention at the Triple Frontier area grew exponentially as national governments began to build roads in the area, settlers and urban migrants arrived en masse, towns evolved into booming cities, and the region became a hub of intense commercial activity. Especially pivotal was the role of state-sponsored development projects such as the Itaipu hydroelectric dam. Unlike the major infrastructure initiatives that have dominated international headlines in the past decade—including the Belo Monte and Hidro-Aysén dams in Brazil and Chile, respectively—Itaipu's was built on the actual border between Brazil and Paraguay under the pretense of an equal partnership. These qualities demand that scholars look not only at the effect of development on surrounding communities but also at how neighboring governments use megaprojects as a vehicle for amassing geopolitical power. As such, this volume engages with recent scholarship on other nation-building state interventions in Latin America while giving particular attention to how the implications of these projects can extend transnationally.<sup>18</sup>

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*Big Water* comprises four sections that trace, respectively, the book's core ideas of adaptation, environment, belonging, and development. The choice to forgo a more traditional, chronological sequence of chapters is a strategic one. A thematic focus helps emphasize the continuity of historical and cultural dynamics that formed *before* the official formation of a distinct tri-border zone. By organizing the volume by theme, we encourage readers to rethink the Triple Frontier not only beyond the static boundaries of a given nation-state but also beyond the linear chronologies deeply conscribed in the histories of the nations themselves. Our goal is that the chapters of this volume offer enduring and original terrain to reimagine the spatial and temporal borders of the Triple Frontier.

The two chapters in section I reveal the adaptation of indigenous groups navigating the spaces between the Spanish and Portuguese colonial empires. Shawn Austin chronicles the early colonial history of the Triple Frontier by showing how the region functioned as the geographic and symbolic frontier between the Spanish and Portuguese crowns. Although the two colonial powers were initially linked by trade and patronage networks, the competition over natives soon turned the region into a highly contested space of imperial conflict. In these interactions, Spanish colonials (*Guaiireños*), Paulistas from Portuguese São Paulo, and Jesuit missionaries all vied for control of the bodies, labor, and souls of the local native communities. Austin inverts the traditional narrative of conquest and conversion to show that the Guarani natives were mobile and adaptable in the face of Iberian coercion and ultimately played important roles in carving the socioeconomic landscapes of the region's colonial period.

One of the outcomes of the displacement of the indigenous people by Luso-Brazilian raiders was the migration into the Jesuit missions located farther south in the borderland area. This is the object of Guillermo Wilde's chapter, which is an attempt to understand how disruption helped consolidate two overlapping experiences of territoriality. The first lends itself to the construction of an identity rooted in the physical organization of the mission towns themselves, what the author calls an "ethnogenesis." The second relates to the wider regional sense of space held by the Guarani Indians that inhabited the missions; although many indigenous communities spent time in the Jesuit reductions, they still maintained a wider communal mobility that brought them into contact not only with other missions and colonial institutions but also with defectors, Afro-descendent communities, and "heathen" Indians. Exploring the dual identities of territory connected to the Jesuit missions and their environs enables a deeper understanding of how spatial and social networks were constructed throughout the region before the advent of national boundaries.

Section II offers two key examples of where the environmental history of the area's forests, rivers, and societies can only be understood in a broader transnational context. One of the most dramatic changes in the history of the Triple Frontier was the transformation of landscape from forest to farmland. This is documented in Eunice Nodari's chapter on the colonization projects of German Brazilians in the first half of the twentieth century. As shown by Nodari, thousands of families of European Brazilians slowly migrated westward, first to the western sections of the Brazilian states of Santa Catarina and Paraná, then to the Argentine province of Misiones, and finally, to Eastern Paraguay.

This decades-long transnational migration process transformed an area of subtropical forest, part of the Atlantic Forest biome, into farmland. Settlers were attracted by logging opportunities and cheap and fertile land. Still, as Nodari points out, the newcomers reproduced the same predatory methods of clearing land and farming that they had practiced in their home state, Rio Grande do Sul. The result was a scenario of environment degradation with depleted forests, eroded topsoil, and silted rivers.

Frederico Freitas continues this analysis of environmental landscapes by charting the establishment of protected areas in the Triple Frontier. In his chapter on the creation of the Iguazú National Park, Freitas shows how protected areas were used as tools for the nationalization of border zones. The park, created in 1934 to protect the Argentine side of the famous Iguazú Falls, deviated from the national park models of the time by promoting settler colonization inside its territory. National park proponents in Argentina viewed Iguazú as both a way to prevent the degradation of natural features and a tool to promote the development of the border zone. From the 1930s to the 1960s, the Argentine national park agency sold real estate for prospective settlers inside national park lands and implemented public services for the park-controlled town of Puerto Iguazú. The case of the Iguazú National Park demonstrates how in the first half of the twentieth century, countries in the Southern Cone understood national parks, along with military outposts, as part of a viable strategy to take control of borderlands.

In section III readers are introduced to the notion of belonging with three chapters that explore how seemingly peripheral populations have navigated the contours of inclusion and exclusion across the national polities of the Triple Frontier. Michael Kenneth Huner looks at the everyday dynamics of frontier life in Paraguay's postcolonial society. Focusing on the border town of Villa de Salvador, Huner traces the story of a local caudillo named Casimiro Uriarte to show that although scholars have traditionally emphasized the role of powerful despots in the capital city of Asunción, eighteenth-century Paraguay continued to be defined by a series of overlapping sovereignties at the local level. Far from the reach of Asunción, frontier spaces such as Salvador were built—and fragmented—by the exchanges, partnerships, and vendettas between local power brokers like Uriarte. Although the Paraguayan government attempted to maintain its presence and legitimacy along the frontier, the stories of caudillos, priests, school teachers, and other actors show that despite the establishment of an independent nation-state in 1811, power and influence remained moored

less in an attachment to a central nation and more to a constantly changing set of local realities.

In the following chapter, Daryle Williams centers his analysis on how cultural patrimony of colonial origin was appropriated and monumentalized by different actors in twentieth-century Brazil and Argentina. He chronicles the dispute to restore and attribute meaning to the remains of the seventeenth-century Jesuit reductions of the upper Plata basin. These are the same missions depicted in chapter 2 of this volume but two centuries after their heyday. In the 1930s the governments of Brazil and Argentina started to present the mission ruins—whose locations put them on different sides of the new national borders—as strictly national monuments. As tourism grew, different groups came forward to link the missions to different regional identities and jockeyed to exert local control over the archaeological sites. In the late twentieth century a new interpretation emerged at an international scale, with claims to the universality of the missions vis-à-vis a UNESCO World Heritage site title. Finally, in their latest development, the missions became a symbolic axis for the new transnational integration around the common market Mercosur—three of the union's four core members, Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, all harbored mission ruins.

Evaldo Mendes da Silva opens the last chapter of section III—the most present oriented in the entire volume—with a chapter on the spatial mobility of Guarani peoples in the Triple Frontier. At the border zone, the Guarani form a network of communities whose members are in constant transboundary motion. For these indigenous groups, wandering is a way of life that derives from their own perception of space; it is through walking that they exercise their own humanity. However, the Guarani walk a land in rapid transformation whose farmlands, cities, and newcomers pose challenges and opportunities to their way of life. On the one hand, the development of border infrastructure such as highways, bridges, and bus lines facilitate their wanderings. On the other hand, tighter border controls impose a hurdle to the movement of individuals without papers and little national affiliation. In the end, Silva reveals the radical opposition between a sedentary, Western space of predefined routes and the nomadic flat space of the Guarani, where paths are constantly being retraced.

The fourth and final thematic section focuses on development, going from the early 1960s climate of authoritarian dictatorships and continuing through the neoliberal landscapes of the twenty-first century. Jacob Blanc looks at how the race to build hydroelectric dams on the Paraná River served to fundamentally alter the geopolitical landscape of the entire Southern Cone. Beginning in the

1960s, Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina all vied to harness the river's untapped potential, and Brazil's ability to outmaneuver its neighbors helped launch its rise as one of Latin America's most powerful nations. At a time when all three countries were ruled by military regimes, long-standing conflicts over the boundary lines of the Paraná borderlands reemerged in the Cold War climate of development and modernization. More than just providing the geopolitical background for what would become a wave of global megadams, this history sheds lights on the meanings of political and natural borders and the relationships between Latin American dictatorships.

The next chapter continues to chart the developmentalist shift that transformed the Triple Frontier borderland into the geopolitical center of the Plata basin. Bridget Chesterton studies the significance of the Friendship Bridge that was built over the Paraná River in 1965 to connect the Paraguayan city of Puerto Stroessner with the Brazilian town of Foz do Iguaçu. Although Paraguay's main ally throughout the twentieth century had been Argentina (its neighbor to the west), development projects like the bridge showed Asunción's changing allegiance to Brazil (its neighbor to the east). This shift reflected both the personal attachments of Paraguay's dictator Alfredo Stroessner and the emerging landscape of the Southern Cone wherein Brazil, and no longer Argentina, was seen as the region's new political and financial leader. Chesterton argues that this geopolitical reorientation had profound effects on the social and cultural identity of Asunción and its citizens.

With the return to democratic rule in 1989, the city of Puerto Stroessner was officially renamed Ciudad del Este. In her study of the city, Christine Folch demonstrates how borderland zones such as the Triple Frontier can be understood as places where economic integration can assume multiple and competing forms. In the 1970s and 1980s Ciudad del Este thrived under a special economic regime, but this experience later overlapped and was partially superseded by a new and larger economic integration. Folch examines the differences between these two experiences. The first integration, a binational one, was the creation of a free-trade zone that turned Ciudad del Este into a major hub of commerce in South America and connected Paraguay to the larger Brazilian economy. The second, a supranational one, was the creation of Mercosur, which undermined the old free-trade zone and led to a waning of trade and a search for other forms of commercial activities.

Finally, a conclusion from Graciela Silvestri establishes a dialogue between the reflection about nation in the intellectual tradition of Argentina, Brazil, and



Paraguay and the geographical, social, and cultural ambiguity posited by the Triple Frontier. Much like how borderland peoples have traversed—and in the process, reshaped—the Triple Frontier, so too have ideas flowed freely and dynamically throughout the region. Especially given the history of warfare and conflict in the borderlands, Silvestri's arguments about the embedded relationships of literature, nation, power, and space serve as a fitting close to the volume as a whole.

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For over four hundred years, the Triple Frontier has served as one of the most dynamic and influential spaces in Latin America. More than just the intersection of three nations, the Triple Frontier has evolved as a borderland in the truest sense of the word. Attempts by colonial and national governments to control the lands and people of the region have been matched in equal measure by the actions and worldviews of the local inhabitants themselves. These conflicts over how to demarcate and develop the frontier's natural and social landscapes have yielded a borderland whose influence extends throughout the region and beyond.

## NOTES

1. "Relatório das atividades desenvolvidas pela equipe de fiscalização e controle da Área de Reserva Florestal do PIC-OCOÍ," December 17, 1975, Dossiê PIC-OCOÍ, INCRA PR Archives, Curitiba, 1974–1978; "Terras sob policiamento," *Estado do Paraná*, December 24, 1975; "Desapropriação de terras no Sul provoca clima de tensão," *Jornal do Brasil*, January 5, 1976; Edgard de Assis Carvalho and Conselho Indigenista Missionário–Sul, *Avá-Guarani do Ocoí-Jacutingá: Município de Foz do Iguaçu–PR* (Curitiba: Conselho Indigenista Missionário / CIMI Regional Sul, 1981), Museu do Índio.
2. Hélène Clastres, *The Land-Without-Evil: Tupí-Guaraní Prophetism* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995); Sílvio Coelho dos Santos and Anelise Nacke, "La Usina Hidroeléctrica Binacional Itaipú y los indios de Ocoí," in *La antropología brasileña contemporánea: Contribuciones para un diálogo latinoamericano*, ed. Alejandro Grimson et al. (Buenos Aires: Prometeo, 2004); Curt Nimuendajú, ed., *Mapa etno-histórico de Curt Nimuendajú* (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1981); Evaldo Mendes Silva, "Folhas ao vento: a micromobilidade de grupos Mbya e Nhandéva (Guarani) na Tríplice Fronteira" (PhD diss., Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, 2007); Sarah Iurkiv Gomes Tibes Ribeiro, "O Horizonte é a terra: Manipulação da identidade e construção do ser entre os Guarani no Oeste do Paraná (1977–1997)" (PhD diss., Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, 2002).

3. Francisco Doratioto, *Maldita guerra: Nova história da Guerra do Paraguai* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003); Thomas Whigham, *The Paraguayan War* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002); Thomas Whigham and Potthast Barbara, "Refining the Numbers: A Response to Reber and Kleinpenning," *Latin American Research Review* 37, no. 3 (2002): 143–48; Vera Blinn Reber, "Comment on 'The Paraguayan Rosetta Stone,'" *Latin American Research Review* 37, no. 3 (2002): 129–36; Jan M. G. Kleinpenning, "Strong Reservations About 'New Insights into the Demographics of the Paraguayan War,'" *Latin American Research Review* 37, no. 3 (2002): 137–42.
4. Modern South America harbors a few other locations trisected by the borders of Brazil and two other Spanish American countries. Worthy of note are the Brazilian-Colombian-Peruvian triple frontier in the upper Amazon River and the Brazilian-Argentine-Uruguayan border at the confluence of the Uruguay and Quaraí Rivers. None of them, however, is capable of rivaling the Triple Frontier in historical relevance as a focal point for territorial intervention and nation-state building.
5. Between the 1850s and the 1890s, e.g., Argentina and Brazil disputed a 3.5-million-hectare territory located between the southern banks of the Iguazú River and the northern banks of the Uruguay River. The dispute over the area in question was resolved in 1895 with the arbitration of the U.S. president Grover Cleveland, who sided with Brazil in recognizing the area as part of the Brazilian territory. See Bradford Burns, *The Unwritten Alliance, Rio Branco and Brazilian-American Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).
6. Most estimates of the number of Brazilians living in Paraguay fall between four hundred thousand and five hundred thousand. A commonly cited number is 459,147 from a 2002 report by the Brazilian Ministry of Exterior Relations. See José José Lindomar C. Albuquerque, *A dinâmica das fronteiras: Os brasiguaios na fronteira entre o Brasil e o Paraguai* (São Paulo: Annablume, 2010), 59.
7. The three countries were responsible for over 45 percent of the world's production in 2012. See data on soybean production at Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, <http://faostat.fao.org/>.
8. The only recent work on the Triple Frontier area available in English is a sensationalist book on the region written for high school students: Daniel K. Lewis, *A South American Frontier: The Tri-Border Region* (New York: Chelsea House, 2006). On the academic side, Lorenza Macagno and her colleagues have published a volume on the Triple Frontier available only in Spanish and Portuguese. Moreover, it has an anthropological and sociological approach that focuses exclusively on the present: Lorenzo Macagno, Silvia Montenegro, and Verónica Giménez Béliveau, *A Tríplice Fronteira: Espaços nacionais e dinâmicas locais* (Curitiba: Editora da Universidade Federal do Paraná, 2011).
9. The pioneer of borderlands history was Herbert Eugene Bolton, who in the 1920s proposed the study of the North American "Spanish borderlands" as a way to decenter the Turnerian narrative of the expansion and closing of the American frontier. See David J. Weber, "The Spanish Borderlands: Historiography Redux,"

- History Teacher* 39, no. 1 (November 2005): 43–56. One of Bolton's disciples, David J. Weber, expanded borderlands history by shifting the focus onto the peoples living these intermediary spaces. See David J. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009).
10. There are many recent examples of studies of the Mexican American borderlands in the national period: Casey Walsh, *Building the Borderlands: A Transnational History of Irrigated Cotton Along the Mexico-Texas Border* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008); Rachel St. John, *Line In the Sand: A History of the Western U.S.-Mexico Border* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011); Omar S. Valerio-Jiménez, *River of Hope: Forging Identity and Nation In the Rio Grande Borderlands* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013); Geraldo L. Cadava, *Standing on Common Ground: The Making of a Sunbelt Borderland* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).
  11. The recent book by Michael E. Donoghue on Panama is one the few examples of approaching a region in modern Latin America as an imperial borderland. See Michael E. Donoghue, *Borderland on the Isthmus: Race, Culture, and the Struggle for the Canal Zone* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014). Although looking less at a particular region than at the idea of frontiers in Latin America more broadly, two classic works are Alistair Hennesy, *The Frontier in Latin American History* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978), and David Weber and Jane M. Rausch, eds., *Where Cultures Meet: Frontiers in Latin American History* (Wilmington, DE: Jaguar Books, 1994).
  12. It is beyond the scope of this proposal to review the vast and well-known literature on the Argentine and Brazilian frontiers. However, it is worth noting a volume from the late 1990s that compares Northern Mexico with the Río de la Plata basin, which includes three chapters where the Triple Frontier area is studied within the framework of the Spanish empire: Donna J. Guy and Thomas E. Sheridan, *Contested Ground: Comparative Frontiers on the Northern and Southern Edges of the Spanish Empire* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998). Another exception to this trend is the recent work by Tamar Herzog, which explores the legal disputes behind the changes in the Hispanic-Portuguese borders in both Europe and South America. Although not in dialogue with the borderlands literature, Herzog deconstructs the nation-state inspired narratives of border creation in contested regions like the Amazon and Paraná basins. Tamar Herzog, *Frontiers of Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).
  13. Mark Carey, "Latin American Environmental History: Current Trends, Interdisciplinary Insights, and Future Directions," *Environmental History* 14, no. 2 (April 1, 2009): 221–52.
  14. On Argentine environmental history, see Antonio Elio Brailovsky and Dina Foguelman, *Memoria verde: Historia ecológica de la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Ed. Sudamericana, 1992); Adrián Gustavo Zarrilli, "Capitalism, Ecology and Agrarian Expansion in the Pampean Region, 1890–1950," *Environment and History* 6, no. 4 (2001): 561–83; John Soluri, "Seals and Seal Hunters Along the Patagonian

- Littoral, 1780–1960,” in *Centering Animals: Writing Animals into Latin American History*, ed. Martha Few and Zeb Totorici (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013); Eric D. Carter, *Enemy in the Blood: Malaria, Environment, and Development in Argentina* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2012).
15. Warren Dean, *With Broadax and Firebrand: The Destruction of the Brazilian Atlantic Forest* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
  16. See Barbara Ganson, *The Guaraní Under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata* (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2003); Guillermo Wilde, *Religión y poder en las Misiones Guaraníes* (Buenos Aires: Editorial SB, 2009); Julia J. S. Sarreal, *The Guaraní and Their Missions* (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2014).
  17. Recent volumes that employ a *longue durée* approach include Steven Topik, Carlos Marichal, and Zephyr L. Frank, *From Silver to Cocaine: Latin American Commodity Chains and the Building of the World Economy, 1500–2000* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006); Shawn William Miller, *An Environmental History of Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
  18. Examples of scholarship on grand projects and nation-building intervention in Latin America are Seth Garfield, *In Search of the Amazon: Brazil, the United States, and the Nature of a Region* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013); Oliver J. Dinius, *Brazil’s Steel City: Developmentalism, Strategic Power, and Industrial Relations In Volta Redonda, 1941–1964* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011); Joel Wolfe, *Autos and Progress: The Brazilian Search for Modernity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Todd A. Diacon, *Stringing Together a Nation: Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon and the Construction of a Modern Brazil, 1906–1930* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004). The literature on major infrastructure initiatives implemented by the United States in Latin America is also relevant here. See Julie Greene, *The Canal Builders: Making America’s Empire at the Panama Canal* (New York: Penguin Press, 2009); Greg Grandin, *Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford’s Forgotten Jungle City* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2009).

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# PART I

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## ADAPTATION





# 1

## EMBODIED BORDERLAND

Colonial Guairá, 1570s–1630s

SHAWN MICHAEL AUSTIN

**B**ETWEEN 1628 AND 1640 in the Guairá and Tapé regions of Spanish Paraguay, slavers from São Paulo and thousands of Native auxiliaries captured tens of thousands of Guarani from their villages and reductions and transferred them over six hundred kilometers to the São Paulo plateau, where they were made to serve as slaves on haciendas. Paulista slavers who led expeditions to the *sertão*, or Brazilian frontier, came to be known in the twentieth century as *bandeirantes* (bearers of the flag) and their expeditions as *bandeiras*. The raids on Guairá, the eastern limits of Spanish Paraguay, resulted in the enslavement of approximately thirty-three thousand Guarani from 1628 to 1632 alone.<sup>1</sup> This was one of the most destructive slave operations to occur on South American soil.<sup>2</sup>

Working from a Portuguese or Atlantic perspective, several excellent works examine Paulista slavers and explain the socioeconomic factors and ideological justifications behind Indian slavery. Most notably, John Monteiro's classic *Negros da terra* employs civil documentation from São Paulo to elucidate the social practice of the *bandeiras* and Indian slavery in the São Paulo plateau.<sup>3</sup> Many scholars have argued that Spaniards and Portuguese alike enslaved Indians, leaving us with a narrative that flattens colonials, casting them as the antagonists and the Jesuits as the heroes.<sup>4</sup> Historians writing from nationalist (Brazilian or Paraguayan) positions absolve frontiersmen from any wrongdoing or credit them with performing the morally ambiguous work of "clearing the

path” for civilization.<sup>5</sup> While recent ethnohistorical research has helped to elucidate Guarani attitudes toward Jesuit evangelization, what remains unclear are Spanish, Portuguese, Jesuit, and indigenous attitudes as they interacted with one another.<sup>6</sup> In this chapter, I place indigenous actors in the context of a dynamic imperial borderland. I contend that a borderland framework helps to clarify behaviors and provides nuance to a narrative that has been shaped by nationalist imperatives. By triangulating Portuguese- and Spanish-language sources along with Jesuit records, I suggest that what constituted borders for colonials in the region were indigenous bodies and souls. Many Natives exploited the constantly shifting territorial boundaries (i.e., the migration of their own communities in and out of colonial jurisdictions) to seek material and social benefits. Seeing borders as mobile bodies of indigenous communities helps clarify colonial activities in the region and narrate the buildup to the 1628 *bandeira* that devastated the Guairá.

Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron’s frontier/borderland framework is useful for analyzing Guairá because it provides for multiple and conflicting sources of power and colonial relations. These authors define *frontier* as a “meeting place of peoples in which geographic and cultural borders were not clearly defined.” Intercultural mixing and accommodation marked interethnic relations, not outright conquest. A borderland constitutes the “contested boundaries between colonial domains.”<sup>7</sup> According to this definition, Guairá was simultaneously a frontier and a borderland. From 1570 to the 1630s, Spanish Guairá was a space of intense intercultural exchange evidenced by the emergence of a variety of transcultural institutions, practices, and actors. While the two small Spanish cities of the region—Villa Rica (100 *vecinos* or citizens) and Ciudad Real (50 *vecinos*)—wielded significant power over several Guarani communities, the majority of the region’s Natives were claimed as colonial subjects in word only. That the tiny Spanish population survived in Guairá was a result of transcultural patterns of interethnic alliance. The lack of clear Spanish domination over the Guarani marks the region as a frontier, and intense transimperial exchange and conflict between Spaniards and Portuguese mark it as a borderland. Spanish Guairá (delineated by the Piquiri, Paraná, Paranapanema, and Tibagi Rivers) was at the geographic center of the *Big Water* region. The rivers of Guairá—flowing from east to west and into the Río de la Plata basin—served as highways of commerce and mobility and facilitated the economic and social exchanges between Spanish, Portuguese, and indigenous domains. What further facilitated interimperial exchange was the fact that the Portuguese and Castilian crowns

were united during the period under study (1580–1640). The official boundary between the two imperial realms, the Tordesillas demarcation line of 1494, was all but ignored.

As with most borderlands, political identities on the Spanish Portuguese borderland got mixed up, making it difficult to distinguish between distinct imperial subjects and priorities. Nonetheless, Spanish and Portuguese colonial frameworks for Indian labor remained distinct. To provide for more nuance in discussing the identities and goals of colonials in the region, I use three basic categories: (1) Guaireños, who were *vecinos* of the two major Spanish cities of Guairá; (2) Paulistas, who were *vecinos* of São Paulo; and (3) Jesuit priests. Even though the Jesuit mission enterprise in Guairá was aligned with Spanish imperial goals, its particular evangelical mission and corporate aspirations often placed it at odds with Guaireño interests.<sup>8</sup>

Tamar Herzog argues that local interests and actors, not crown officials and royal armies, defined Spanish-Portuguese borderlands throughout the Atlantic world. In this chapter I describe how the activities of the borderland “agents”—Natives, mestizos, encomenderos, slavers, priests—who lived in contested communities experienced and contributed to the process of enacting territories.<sup>9</sup> Natives in Guairá sought autonomy, protection, and economic gain even as colonials sought to territorialize their communities. The principal objects of colonial ambitions were indigenous bodies and souls, not geographic territories. The claims of sovereignty I document in Guairá correspond to some of Lauren Benton’s findings. In her work *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900*, Benton argues that subjecthood was portable and that colonial “agents” generated sovereignty through geographic corridors such as rivers.<sup>10</sup> I contend that colonials in Guairá generated sovereignty not only through corridors but through indigenous bodies. Unlike the contestants for colonial domains in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century British, French, and Spanish North America, colonials in Guairá did not define political boundaries as spatial territories. Instead, mobile Native communities and the juridico-spiritual assertions that colonials made on them marked boundaries for colonials. Guaireños, Paulistas, and Jesuits each made specific claims on which bodies they had the right to enslave, demand labor from, or claim as spiritual subjects. Some of these claims were based on perceived ethnic differences, but Guarani communities were often on the move in and out of colonial jurisdictions, thereby confounding colonial claims. Like unmoored and mobile buoys in open water, boundaries between the Spanish and Portuguese realms




FIGURE 1.1 Settlements in the Spanish Guairá in the seventeenth century. Map by Frederico Freitas.

in Guairá were Guarani communities whose alliances or subjectivities were in a state of flux due to colonial pressures and the opportunities they sought out. Guairá was home to a large concentration of Tupi-Guarani peoples, organized in small villages of anywhere from one hundred to one thousand individuals. It was estimated that around 160,000 to 200,000 Natives inhabited the region.<sup>11</sup> Hal Langfur's definition of a frontier as a region "remote to settled society but central to indigenous peoples" is certainly apropos in this context.<sup>12</sup>

## IMPERIAL AGENTS

The origins of Guairá as a colonial frontier and borderland must take into account three colonial powers: Portuguese São Paulo, Spanish Guairá, and the evangelical reduction enterprise.

### SÃO PAULO

Few Portuguese ventured to the São Paulo *planalto* in the decades following Pedro Álvares Cabral's discovery of Brazil in 1500. It was difficult to access from the coast, from which it is separated by a mountain range. Efforts to colonize the region began only after the 1532 arrival of the first Portuguese governor-general, Afonso de Sousa. In 1553 the Vila de Santo Andre da Borda do Campo was established, followed shortly by the founding of a Jesuit college in 1554. In the 1550s Jesuit and settler interests clashed, leading the governor-general Mem de Sá to initiate in 1560 *aldeias d'el rei*, or Indian villages of the king. Jesuits administered the *aldeias*, but Paulistas used them for their labor needs. Throughout the sixteenth century, Paulista settlers took on Indian concubines and referred to their Indian allies as kin and friends. Paulistas of mixed Native and Portuguese parentage were abundant. Spaniards referred to them as *mamelucos*, the Portuguese counterpart to *mestizo*. Priests and settlers alike gifted copious amounts of iron tools to establish relations with Natives. Paulistas exploited conflicts between indigenous groups and enslaved captives taken in war.

São Paulo remained a poor colonial backwater dependent almost entirely on Indian labor. Tupi-Guarani groups dominated the region, but there were also Jê speakers in the vicinity.<sup>13</sup> Paulistas applied a variety of ethnonyms to identify the Natives they encountered, but they came to call Indians with whom they had the most reciprocal relationship *Tupí*. Over the years, kinship linkages faded and

were replaced with outright slavery. As the population of São Paulo grew in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and market factors increased the profitability of production, Paulistas ventured into Spanish Guairá to acquire more labor hands for their farms and ranches.<sup>14</sup>

### SPANISH GUAIRÁ

Spanish colonization of Guairá began in the 1550s. After the governor distributed the first *encomienda* grants in Asunción, he enticed those not fortunate enough to receive them to seek new territories for conquest. The two main poles of Spanish power in Guairá were in the towns of Ciudad Real and Villa Rica. Santiago de Xérez was founded to the north, but it was even more isolated and sparsely populated than the former two towns. There was very little immigration to Guairá and perhaps more attrition; by the 1620s, there were around fifty Spanish *vecinos* in Ciudad Real and one hundred in Villa Rica.<sup>15</sup> Of the Guaireños, the Jesuit provincial, Nicolás Durán said,

They are not familiar with money, they have no stores nor merchants, and among them they have no officials of mechanical arts. None leave for Spain nor any other part because they have nothing to leave in. They do not concern themselves with affairs in Spain or Flanders. They eat nothing but cassava cakes; they have no cattle or sheep; the meat that they rarely eat is from chickens or pigs or sometimes from tapir when they catch them in the mountains or rivers. . . . They have no ambition or desire to achieve honor in this life or to extol their lineage because the highest office that they can aspire to is *alcalde*. And so with this they live in peace, content with sustaining themselves day to day on vegetables and fish from the river.<sup>16</sup>

While Durán's patronizing tone is unmistakable, there is no disputing the provincial nature of this corner of Paraguay. By the seventeenth century, most of the settlers of Guairá were creoles or mestizos, and most had very little contact with the church. In describing his firsthand account of Guairá to the crown, one governor remarked, "These, your subjects, have lived as barbarians these last ninety years. Their houses are like those of gypsies."<sup>17</sup>

Following established practices in Asunción, colonials who immigrated to Guairá hoped to acquire Indian servants and *corvée* laborers under the *encomienda* system. In Paraguay, the *encomienda* was a system of assigning

extended families or villages to a meritorious Spaniard (encomendero), giving him or her the right to use the Indian community for productive tasks.<sup>18</sup> Spanish officials molded the legal framework of encomienda around Spanish-Guarani relations, which were rooted in Guarani kinship. From the beginning, Spaniards offered Guarani iron tools in exchange for provisions. Moreover, Guarani chieftains (called caciques or *principales*) offered Spaniards female concubines who lived with Spaniards permanently and provided essential services, such as farming and domestic work. Sometimes Spaniards' gifts were large enough that a cacique would give not only female wives but would also require her male relatives to serve the Spaniard. Through these exchanges Spaniards became kin to the Guarani and even employed the Guarani terminology of kinship, being called *toyayá*, or brothers-in-law (*cuñados* in Spanish), to their cacique kin. This *cuñadasgo*, as the settlers called it, was a crucial element of interethnic relations and the encomienda. Through these political and affinal networks, Spaniards acquired personal servants who lived in their homes and access to corvée labor living in pueblos. By 1620, nine Guarani villages were subject to the encomendos in Villa Rica.<sup>19</sup>

If kinship was the cultural pillar of Spanish-Guarani relations, then the gifting of iron tools was the material pillar. Guaireños needed a steady supply of iron tools. Luckily for them, shortly after their settlement in the region they discovered raw iron ore in what Guaireños called the Campos de Coraça Berá.<sup>20</sup> Soon locals were producing iron tools for gifting, especially *cuñas*, or ax heads. These tools became critical to Spanish-Native relations in Guairá and the Río del la Plata generally. Colonials, both conquistadors and priests, relied on the gifting of iron tools to initiate and sustain peaceful relations with Natives. The introduction of European iron tools produced a virtual iron revolution among Natives in lowland South America. For the Tupi-Guarani, iron tools became essential for clearing land for farm plots, for building homes, for creating defensive palisades for the villages, and for use as trade items.<sup>21</sup> Reflecting on the importance of iron tools for interethnic relations, the Jesuit father Diego González noted that "one can win a lineage of Indians with an ax head," implying that a priest or conquistador could gain the alliance of a cacique and, therefore, access to a Guarani extended family unit. González noted that the ax became the essential tool for Guarani when preparing their garden plots, linking the production of foodstuffs to this colonial commodity.<sup>22</sup> Iron tools became so central to the political economy that officials in Ciudad Real and Villa Rica made them the official currency, setting specific values for each iron object.



When an encomendero sought a female personal servant, he approached the cacique with an offer of material goods (iron tools or clothing), and the cacique might have negotiated for better terms and attempted to determine which of his kin went with the encomendero. Guarani social groups were relatively small, and most encomenderos possessed multiple lineage groups, each with its own cacique. This required that encomenderos negotiate with each individual cacique. In the earliest years, Spaniards recognized several important regional Guarani *principales* (Tayaobá, Araberá, Yaguaracuré, and Macaçu) who possessed kinship ties with several villages. These had the potential political power to raise war parties against Spaniards.<sup>23</sup>

As Spaniards put greater pressures on Guarani communities for personal servants, Guarani either responded with violence or withdrew from Spaniards' reach. Spaniards, therefore, frequently organized military campaigns to subdue rebellious or migrating communities, and these expeditions were always bolstered by scores of Guarani allies. In the aftermath of skirmishes, Spaniards often took women and children as captives and used them as personal servants. They legitimated this practice under the laws of "just war." An anonymous Jesuit priest in 1620 succinctly described how relationships of kinship could descend into violence: "after the Indians saw that the Spanish did not treat them like brothers-in-law and kin but like servants, they began to withdraw, not wanting to serve the Spaniard."<sup>24</sup>

Kinship, gifting of iron tools, and violence animated the region, setting already semimobile peoples on the move, either pulling them closer to Spanish centers or repelling them. In 1630, an encomendero named Francisco de Vallejos provided his opinion that the Spanish presence in the region was very fragile: "these Indians . . . were not reduced, or baptized, or conquered, nor did they pay the labor draft of right and obligation; rather, it was service of their own free will in exchange for payment [of *cuñas*]."<sup>25</sup> The migrations in and out of colonial jurisdictions and the heavy reliance on gifting and kinship placed Guaireños in a position of weakness.

## NASCENT BORDERLAND ECONOMY

Before discussing priestly imperial agents, I will describe the emergence of the regional economy. Much of the Guarani's service to Spaniards was related to small-scale agricultural production for regional barter and subsistence. Ambitious *vecinos*, however, applied their tributaries to yerba production, which was

gaining in importance from around 1600 to 1630. An indigenous tea, yerba mate became a regional commodity in the sixteenth century. By at least 1616, the tea was being shipped from Paraguay across the Andes to Chile and Peru. By the 1620s and 1630s, yerba had a strong consumer base in cities such as Lima, Cusco, and Potosí. Guairá was strategically located near the wild yerba groves of Mbaracayú, which lay to the west of the Paraná.

The rising importance of yerba caught the eyes of crown officials. A newly appointed governor, don Luis Céspedes Xeria, arrived in Guairá in September of 1628. After surveying the economic landscape, one of his primary goals was to systematize and regulate the yerba trade.<sup>26</sup> Céspedes Xeria referred to the wild yerba groves as “mines,” thus allowing him to claim the groves of wild trees as subterranean and therefore subject them to the royal *quinto*. A *mita*-like system was imposed on the yerba trade, and individuals who hoped to “mine” the yerba were required to obtain a lease from the crown through the governor.<sup>27</sup> On the question of labor, the new governor sided with encomenderos against the Jesuits, arguing that the nascent economy was best left in the hands of colonists, not priests. Defining trees as mines in order to tax and regulate them was also part of the crown’s strategy to block Portuguese from accessing the silver wealth of the Andes. These strategies for creating sovereignty in Guairá represent the first of many attempts by subsequent modern states to control and regulate the resources of the Triple Frontier.

The center of the yerba trade was Mbaracayú. It was remote, and its lack of development ensured that it was never anything more than a small port village. Locals disliked their existence there to such an extent that they referred to the town as a “purgatory.”<sup>28</sup> Before the *bandeiras*, a significant portion of the labor to harvest and process the yerba was provided by encomienda Indians from Guairá. The biggest financial winners in the yerba trade were the traders from Asunción, Santa Fe, and Corrientes. The producers in Mbaracayú and Guairá remained poor and were forced to sell cheap. The trade in yerba drew a number of Paulistas to the region who managed gangs of yerba laborers and supplied the region with black slaves and other miscellaneous materials or foodstuffs. In 1629, Céspedes Xeria found twenty-two Paulistas in Mbaracayú out of a total of around 100–150 *vecinos*.<sup>29</sup> In Villa Rica there was a similar ratio, with seventeen Paulistas out of a total of one hundred *vecinos*.<sup>30</sup> This Paulista minority had significant social ties to the region. Of the twenty-two Paulistas in Mbaracayú, three were married and two were betrothed to women in Asunción. One declared that his wife was Portuguese but lived in Asunción; two had wives

in Mbaracayú; three in Villa Rica; five were bachelors; and four claimed their wives were in São Paulo.

As the first governor to come to Guairá, Céspedes Xeria's visit signaled that Paraguay finally had a viable export product in yerba mate. Céspedes Xeria was also the first governor to come to Paraguay through São Paulo, and he used his trip to Brazil to enhance his social networks (see fig. 1.2). As a freshly minted governor, Céspedes Xeria employed his new social prestige to contract an illustrious marriage to doña Victoria de Sá, niece of the infamous governor Martim de Sá and cousin to Salvador de Sá, governor of Rio de Janeiro. He also bought several plantations in the *planalto*, which were worked by Guarani slaves.<sup>31</sup> Céspedes Xeria's interest in Guairá represented the growing economic opportunities of the Guairá borderlands as well as the growing need for mediation between encomenderos and the increasingly powerful Jesuits.

#### CATHOLIC EVANGELIZATION: FRANCISCANS AND JESUITS

The first priests to arrive in Guairá were Franciscans. Eighteenth-century sources indicate that the priests established two reductions in 1580, Pacuyu and Curumiai, but extant contemporary records from Guairá do not mention them. There were stretches of years when no Franciscan was present in the region. Contradictions in the scant sources about Franciscan activities make it difficult to tease out their influence there. The peripatetic presence of Franciscans in Guairá is best explained by their focus on the Asunción region. Overwhelmed with their work with almost twenty reductions founded in the Asunción region, Franciscans made Guairá less of a priority.<sup>32</sup>

Christian evangelization in Guairá began a second phase in 1609 with the arrival of Jesuit priests. Given the incomplete nature of the conquest in Guairá, the Spanish governor, Hernando Arias de Saavedra, petitioned the crown to allow Jesuits to begin establishing reductions in the region. A champion of the Jesuits, Saavedra hoped that they would create larger populations of sedentary Guarani. Between 1609 and 1628, Jesuits oversaw the construction of some fifteen reductions in Guairá.

The arrival of Jesuits in Guairá initiated a dramatic shift in the region's political landscape. Whereas the Franciscans had worked closely with encomenderos to establish villages, Jesuits sought greater autonomy and resisted the encomienda. Franciscans had worked with Guarani communities in close proximity to Villa Rica and Ciudad Real. The Jesuits, by contrast, pushed east into




FIGURE 1.2 Map drawn up under the direction of Governor Céspedes Xeria detailing his voyage from São Paulo, Brazil, to the cities of Ciudad Real and Villa Rica in Guairá. Courtesy Archivo General de Indias, Buenos Aires, Mapas y Planos, 17.

territories where encomenderos had fewer kinship networks, thereby pushing the Spanish colonial presence into communities Paulistas claimed. Part of the broader political context is that the Jesuits entered Guairá during a moment of intense debate about the legality of the *encomienda* in Paraguay. To the benefit of the Jesuits, in 1611, *audiencia* judge don Francisco de Alfaro arrived in Asunción and issued a series of reforms in Paraguay that sought to severely restrict encomenderos' claims on tributaries. A friend of the Jesuits and father to a Jesuit priest who would work in Paraguay, Alfaro exempted from *encomienda* service all Jesuit missions that formed independently of *encomendero* pueblos. Magnus Mörner suggests that it was this exemption that lured Guarani to join the missions.<sup>33</sup> While there is probably some merit to this argument, it also ignores other factors that contributed to the success of the Jesuit missions, including transcultural methods of preaching and the borderland dynamics that made missions protective institutions from Paulistas and *encomendero* claims.

The work of establishing reductions must be understood as a mutual project directed not solely by priests but also by Guarani caciques.<sup>34</sup> If *encomendero-tovayá* employed the Guarani codes of kinship to gain access to Guarani communities, then Jesuit activities borrowed Guarani codes of shamanism in order to acquire converts. Guarani perceived Jesuits as *karaí*, or itinerant shaman, and competed with them for Guarani followers. A shaman moved between spiritual and temporal realms or from the forest to the village, ordered economic and political activities, healed the sick, led the community in rituals, and competed with other shaman. Jesuits recognized different levels of shamanic power and tried to outdo them in spiritual contests.<sup>35</sup> Shamans' recognition of Jesuit spiritual power and engagement with them as competitors gave Jesuits legitimacy among Guarani communities. As Jesuits gained the trust of specific caciques, they began creating reductions, often initiated within a preexisting Guarani village. As new groups joined the community, space was made, and the reduction expanded. Caciques made explicit choices to enter or exit reductions, which marks this space as a frontier. Each reduction featured a wooden palisade or stone wall, suggesting that just like traditional Tupi-Guarani villages, they provided protection. As *bandeirante* raids became more frequent after 1610, Guarani found strength in numbers and in the Jesuits assistance to repel enemies—besides their sermons on heavenly protection and salvation, the Jesuits provisioned mission Guarani with firearms.<sup>36</sup>

Spanish and Jesuit approaches to Guarani differed in many ways but were identical when it came to reciprocity: both gifted copious amounts of iron

tools.<sup>37</sup> The importance of axes for building reduction palisades, churches, and lodges cannot be overstated. While the Jesuits often denied that they gave gifts to initiate and maintain peaceful relations with Guarani—claiming that because Spaniards used gifting so frequently it cheapened the interethnic relationship—it is clear that they used this method as frequently as the Spaniards did. In fact, there is evidence that Jesuits employed mission Indians in the iron mines at Campo de Coraçy Berá.<sup>38</sup>

Jesuit activities in the region upset any balance that existed between Guaireños, Paulistas, and Guarani. With the offering of firearms, protection in numbers, and the allure of Jesuit spiritual power, many Guarani fled their *encomiendas* and moved into Jesuit reductions. The location of the Jesuit missions put them closer to São Paulo, and this instigated flight from Paulista *aldeias* to the Jesuit reductions in Guairá. By pushing the embodied border between the Spanish and Portuguese realms closer to São Paulo, the Jesuits elevated the level of competition for Indians in the region.

## MAKING CLAIMS, DEFINING BORDERS

Excellent historical work on the Tapé region around the southern Paraná and the Uruguay Rivers in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries describes the many treaties, geopolitical factors, and local actors that made that space a dynamic Spanish Portuguese borderland.<sup>39</sup> Generally, the borderland conflicts in Guairá do not fit these models. While the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas provided a vague demarcation of imperial territories, local officials on either side largely ignored it. For Paulistas, territorial boundaries meant little; the primary goal was to find slaves (and potentially mineral wealth). The tiny population of Guaireños also sought labor, but they pursued it through the *encomienda-cuñadasgo* system, not enslavement en masse. The Jesuits, for their part, sought to create fixed communities free of the *encomienda* and safeguarded from Paulista enslavement. What complicated all of these local goals was that from 1580 to 1640 the Spanish and Portuguese crowns were united. Following the death of the last heir of the Portuguese Aviz dynasty in 1578, a war of succession determined that Philip II would become the ruler of the two kingdoms. Although Philip prohibited free interimperial trade and communication, there was little stopping the networks that already existed. Locals during this period used the farce of political unification to justify generating and extending exchange between subjects of the two kingdoms.



By the early seventeenth century, officials in Asunción hoped that Guairá would forge commercial networks with São Paulo and vice versa. In 1604, lieutenant governor Antonio de Añasco, the highest local officer in Guairá, ordered that locals open a road to São Paulo. Paulista officials authorized the same action.<sup>40</sup> Local officials estimated that the distance from Villa Rica to São Paulo was 120 leagues (one league is around three miles) on boat and another twenty on foot. One year later, a *vecino* of Villa Rica, Francisco Benítez, loaded up with trade items and made his way to São Paulo. There he married the daughter of a Paulista *vecino*, Joseph Camargo.<sup>41</sup> Paulista traders brought to Guairá goods of all kinds from Brazil, including African slaves from Guinea.<sup>42</sup> In 1607, the governor of Paraguay, Hernando Arias de Saavedra, encouraged such networks and trade between the two regions. Saavedra asked the crown for a license for Guaireños to contract with Portuguese in São Paulo to “subdue” or “pacify” the land and reduce the Indians, adding that Paulistas had offered their services in the past.<sup>43</sup> This proposal, written in 1607, before the arrival of the Jesuits, confirms the tenuous Spanish presence in Guairá and, in the context of the rise of yerba mate, the desperation of local officials to secure a fixed labor source. Of course Saavedra’s proposal was never enacted, and despite the close ties between São Paulo and Guairá, some marked differences in how colonials in the borderland legally defined Indians shaped later conflicts.

Guaireño encomenderos employed the juridical tools of conquest, especially the *padrón*, or census, to claim Indian communities. Censuses recorded the names of the caciques (and sometimes the names and ages of all members of a community) assigned to a specific encomendero and were an attempt at keeping encomienda units whole and distinct. These acts of recording/claiming and then distributing tributaries to an encomendero could be arbitrary. In 1630, after Guairá had been all but deserted, Captain Francisco Vallejos (cited above) provided a rather bleak account of Spanish dominion in Guairá. After explaining that Spaniards essentially bought Indian personal servants with axes, he noted that local officials decided to “distribute (*encomendar*) the Indian villages, gathering information through their caciques about their location in relation to rivers and how many fires each village possessed, without ever having seen them. And with this confused knowledge they counted, distributed, and gave out the *encomiendas*.”<sup>44</sup> Humbled by the destruction of the region, this Guaireño admitted that the encomienda was not a system of colonial subjugation but rather a system of reciprocity. When Jesuit reductions began attracting former encomienda Indians to their communities, encomenderos responded by

demanding the return of their Indians to their original villages. They used official censuses as their primary juridical tool.

For their part, Jesuits made jurisdictional claims on indigenous bodies based on the status of their souls. They asked whether or not an Indian had been baptized before associating with a Jesuit reduction. Early Spanish American law charged encomenderos with evangelizing encomienda Indians, so according to Jesuit logic, if Indians had not been baptized they were not *encomendados*. This contest over the juridical status of Indians is evident in the following episode. In November of 1628, Governor Céspedes Xeria, who we will remember sided with encomenderos, sent Captain Francisco Romero to all the Jesuit reductions to conduct an inspection and specifically to verify the status of the Indians the Jesuits claimed. Romero was instructed to identify Indians who were subject to encomenderos. Moreover, if he found Tupis or Mbiobes, these belonged to Paulistas and were to be returned to Villa Rica, where they would be transferred to São Paulo. As Romero conducted the census in San Francisco Javier, one of the newest reductions, father Francisco de Ortega had asked the Indians if they preferred to submit themselves to royal authority as opposed to encomenderos. Legally, this implied that they were blank political slates, coming under imperial subjectivity for the first time and therefore nullifying any encomendero or Paulista claims. Romero told the priest to stop this “ruse” and argued that Indians could not be presented as crown subjects anew. He accused the Jesuits of harboring *encomendados*. The priest retorted that “you cannot *encomendar* unbaptized Indians (*infielos*), and if they were found in this state, their status as *encomendados* would be null and void.”<sup>45</sup> For the Jesuits, then, defending their claim on Indians was a matter of determining whether they were baptized. Encomenderos, by contrast, employed censuses and lineages that linked tributaries to *encomienda* pueblos and therefore tributary status.

Paulistas had very different approaches to Indian labor. John Monteiro has shown that *bandeiras* were not colonizing activities along the lines of territorial expansion; rather, they were “depopulating” activities,<sup>46</sup> and “virtually every aspect of the formation of São Paulo during its first two centuries was tied in some fundamental way to the expropriation, exploitation, and destruction of indigenous populations.”<sup>47</sup> Paulistas, unlike Guaireños, fully embraced Indian slavery, and the language they employed reflects the institutionalization of slavery: “Expressions such as *peças do gentio de terra* (Native heathen pieces) or *negros da terra* (Native blacks) paralleled the terms *peças do gentio da Guiné* (Guinea pieces) or *negros da Guiné* (Guinea blacks), which designated African slaves.”<sup>48</sup>



The ideological correlation between African chattel slavery and Indian slavery is striking and markedly different than *encomienda* in Spanish America generally and in Guairá particularly.

Paulistas' methods and institutional structures of Indian enslavement developed gradually over the course of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, growing out of small-scale "trade and raid" campaigns, which involved engaging Natives at trading sites and then surrounding and shackling them. All of these expeditions were mounted by teams assembled by individual Paulistas or groups of Paulistas and were not regulated by the crown, although many local crown officials encouraged or even invested in the *bandeiras*, especially the city council.<sup>49</sup> These efforts evolved into massive slaving expeditions, culminating in the largest *bandeiras*, the campaigns of 1628–1632 and 1635–1637. All *bandeiras* included Natives whose motives for participating as "ethnic soldiers" covered a spectrum of coercion. Some went willingly as hired agents motivated by inter-ethnic rivalries while others were conscripts. Many of these had only recently become slaves.<sup>50</sup>

Paulistas first targeted Carijó, or Guarani who inhabited a region Paulistas called the Sertão dos Patos and the Sertão dos Carijós. This latter region included Spanish Guairá and was home to various Tupi-Guarani speaking groups as well as nomadic Jê speakers. Because Guairá was only a forty-to-sixty-day march from São Paulo, it soon became the principal destination for Paulista slavers. The expeditions to the *sertão* became so frequent that *bandeirantes* began planting crops along the routes to the slaving territories.<sup>51</sup> To the east and north of Spanish Guairá, in the Paranapanema Valley, Paulistas encountered two groups, the Tememinó and the Tupinaé. Some of these the Paulistas enslaved, others were settled in *aldeias*, or Jesuit-controlled villages. Paulistas and Guaireños often used the ethnonym Tupi when referring to Tememinó. The Tememinó/Tupi were enemies of the Guarani, and this probably explains why they made up a large portion of the auxiliary warriors in *bandeiras* to Guairá.

The next section examines the effects of the arrival of *bandeiras* in Guairá, the first of which was in the year 1611. In that year, around thirty Paulistas and a large number of Tupi attacked a Guarani pueblo, but a militia from Ciudad Real defended it. Apparently the captain of the *bandeira* carried a commission from the Portuguese governor granting permission to enslave Indians. Unconvinced, the Guaireños engaged the *bandeira* and prevailed in taking five hundred Guarani from the slavers. Importantly, they sent these Guarani to Jesuit reductions, indicating that Guarani and Guaireños alike saw the reductions as

places of refuge from slavers.<sup>52</sup> After this year, with the looming threat posed by *bandeiras*, Guaireños became more careful about which Indians pertained to which colonial power. Guaireños and Paulistas seemed to agree that Tupi and Mbiobe Indians belonged to São Paulo. As we saw earlier, when governor Céspedes Xeria arrived, he ordered any Jesuit or encomendero who found Tupi or Mbiobe in their communities to return them to São Paulo via Ciudad Real.<sup>53</sup> As the Jesuits pushed eastward and created reductions closer to São Paulo, the ethnic groups designated for each colonial group were mixed together in the missions, setting the stage for increased Paulista aggression and jurisdictional disputes.

## BORDERLAND FLUX

The Jesuit provincial Fray Diego de Torres said that Guairá was the “last corner of the earth, the most distant place from human commerce.”<sup>54</sup> Indeed, Guairá, was far removed from major colonial centers of commerce and production, and yet transatlantic commerce had a strong pull on Guairá, motivating Paulistas to enslave thousands of Natives. Luís Felipe de Alencastro’s analysis of African and Indian slave labor in colonial Brazil demonstrates how deeply the Paulista *bandeiras* were embedded in Atlantic dynamics. When the Dutch invaded and occupied Portugal’s colonial holdings in the 1620s and 1630s, the Portuguese African slave trade fell sharply: 150 thousand Africans from 1600–1625 dropped to 50 thousand Africans from 1625–1650. The decline in slave imports in the Brazilian northeast caused the intensification of the traffic of Indians throughout the colony.<sup>55</sup> In 1625 and 1628 respectively, slavers in Pernambuco and Bahia went on slaving expeditions, and as a result the trade in Indian slaves surpassed the trade in Africans during the 1625–1650 period.

Until John Monteiro’s *Negros da terra*, most historians assumed that Indian slaves from the south were being shipped to the northeast, but he shows that the majority of Indians were used in the wheat fields, plantations, and trade networks around São Paulo.<sup>56</sup> Alencastro confirms Monteiro’s argument but adds that there was a causal relationship between the Atlantic African trade and the *bandeiras* to Guairá-Tapé.<sup>57</sup> During the Dutch-Portuguese wars, the price of African slaves in Brazil doubled, making Indian slaves a necessary alternative. São Paulo became the breadbasket for the northeast, supplying Rio de Janeiro and Bahia with supplies for military activities against the Dutch. The markets

of the northeast imported all kinds of goods from the São Paulo plateau. Nearly all of the sweat and toil for this production was indigenous.<sup>58</sup>

This economic and Atlantic paradigm is crucial for understanding the *bandeiras*, but the picture is incomplete without a sociopolitical perspective from the borderland itself. Some Natives in Guairá were able to exploit the borderland flux or the confusion of jurisdictions by moving from one colonial jurisdiction to another or outside of it completely. With the arrival of the Jesuits in 1609, Indian communities shifted their allegiances to whichever group—Guaiireños, Jesuits, and Paulistas—could best benefit them. Guaiireños used words like “rebellion” (*alzado*) and “commotion” (*alboroto*) to describe Native activities, but these words implied many things. There were several violent rebellions against Spanish-Jesuit power during this period, but officials documented a plethora of other activities, including migration from one reduction to another and warfare between Native groups.

In 1612, a *vecino* named Bartolomé de Torales documented one episode of migration. Torales led a robust militia including Indian allies to attempt to recapture a group of nine hundred Guarani led by thirteen caciques who had abandoned their pueblos. Torales caught up with them and forced three hundred back to the Ciudad Real area. Two hundred fled into the forests under the leadership of a great *karaí*, or shaman. Importantly, five caciques with an untold number of followers moved to São Paulo and were guided by a Paulista named Sebastián Preto, who “took them with pure gifting,” suggesting that he convinced them to relocate with the offer of iron tools.<sup>59</sup> Others followed a shaman to some untold destination. Torales indicated that at least a part of this fleeing group was relocating to a new Jesuit reduction. This episode reflects the new dynamism that existed in the region after the arrival of the Jesuits. As the Jesuits established reductions in the territory between Spanish Guairá and São Paulo, Native groups had more choices about which colonial power they might interact with. Simultaneously, Guarani shamans in competition with Jesuits represented yet another force that put people in motion.

The Jesuits’ influence in the region also drew the ire of Paulistas whose slaves or servants fled to the reductions. In 1619, a Paulista named Manoel Preto (brother to Sebastián, mentioned above) traveled to the cabildo of Ciudad Real with some twenty soldiers. He came representing the *vecinos* of São Paulo to reclaim “many Indians” who had fled to Guairá from plantations in São Paulo. He lashed out at the Jesuits in the new reductions of Pirapó and Nuestra Señora de Loreto for receiving Indians who were not theirs and breaking canon law

by keeping Indians who were married in the *aldeias* of Pirapó (São Paulo) from returning to their spouses.<sup>60</sup> The Ciudad Real cabildo gave Preto permission to go to the reductions and take the Indians he claimed were his. There could have been a variety of reasons why the cabildo ceded to Preto's demands, but I want to emphasize the logic employed by Preto and confirmed by the cabildo, which was that "Tupi and Temimino" Indians belonged to Paulistas. The particular logic active in the official document was that of embodied borders: each imperial power had rights to ethnic groups, and when these ethnic bodies relocated they could reclaim them.

In mid-January 1620 Preto was in the reductions of San Loreto de Pirapó and Ypaunbuçu to request the return of Tupi and Tememino. The Jesuits refused, and Preto threatened violence. When the caciques were asked to confirm Preto's claims that they were married in São Paulo, they stated that they had been married in the reductions, lending weight to the Jesuit's position. In a scene that could have come from the pages of a wild west novel, Preto and his soldiers, enraged by the Natives' and Jesuits' firm stance, fired their weapons in the air and threatened to return with more soldiers and destroy the reductions. Preto left for São Paulo with only a handful of Indians from the reductions. His words would prove to be prophetic, as he would lead one of the biggest columns during the 1628 *bandeira*.

In the years after the 1623 *bandeira*, six new Jesuit reductions were established, suggesting that many Guarani joined Jesuits to build reductions for the protection they offered.<sup>61</sup> By September 1628, when Céspedes Xeria arrived, the situation for Guaireños was dire. Guarani throughout the region were abandoning their encomienda pueblos because of internal conflicts, the pull of Jesuit reductions, and the threat of *bandeiras*.

Céspedes Xeria attempted to use his clout as governor and his supplies of gift items to try to regain some Natives' allegiance and impose some kind of calm amid the shifting allegiances and migrations he found in Guairá. He called a meeting with two powerful *principales*, Tayaobá and Maendí, who had relocated their communities to a Jesuit reduction. The two caciques initially ignored the governor's invitation but finally agreed to see him in Villa Rica. As Tayaobá and Maendí traveled to meet the governor, their Jesuit priest accompanied them but did not command them. The governor received the caciques with much pomp and circumstance, including a gun salute, banquet, and many gifts (presumably ax heads). The special treatment that these caciques received stands in stark contrast to the "capture and return" approach detailed above and

suggests that Spanish officials understood the political landscape and made strategic decisions about which caciques required diplomacy and which a heavy hand. Guaireños were optimistic that Tayaobá and Maendí would return to pay tribute under the *encomienda*, but it appears that Tayaobá and Maendí were playing Jesuits and Guaireños off each other to acquire more gifts or beneficial arrangements for their communities.<sup>62</sup>

Before he came to Guairá in 1628, Céspedes Xeria had learned of the impending *bandeira* because he had observed its organization in São Paulo and had even traveled with one of the columns up to a certain point.<sup>63</sup> Céspedes Xeria made no moves to stop it because according to the embodied borders logic, Paulistas had every right to claim certain categories of Indians. Céspedes Xeria instructed the Guaireños that if the Paulistas came into the reductions to take reduced Indians, they were to arm themselves, assemble friendly Indian warriors, and “die fighting.”<sup>64</sup> He also ordered that if the *bandeirantes* were to attack the reductions, the lieutenant governor was to bring all reduced Indians to Villa Rica so as to better protect them. He added, however, that if the Paulistas came to take *indios infieles* or unbaptized gentiles, Guaireños were to leave them alone. The order that Tupi and Tememino Indians were to be returned to Paulistas also remained in force.

Columns of the *bandeira* finally arrived in late 1628. When the attacks on the reductions began, the lieutenant governor moved to congregate all Indians to Villa Rica. Jesuit Ruiz de Montoya suspected that Guaireños were trying to enslave the Indians, and so he forced his way through Villa Rica and led the exodus of thousands of Indians south into the Paraná region. Scholars working from the Paulista perspective suggest that Guaireños and Céspedes Xeria were in cahoots with Paulista slavers.<sup>65</sup> No doubt some Guaireños were, but given Céspedes Xeria’s orders and Spanish records indicating that Guaireños engaged in combat with *bandeiras*, it is a dubitable claim that there was a general agreement between Spanish Guairá and São Paulo over Indian enslavement.<sup>66</sup> Thanks to Jesuit litigation, Céspedes Xeria lost his governorship and was charged by the *audiencia* of colluding with the slavers.<sup>67</sup>

All told, the 1628 *bandeira* destroyed thirteen reductions and enslaved thousands of Natives. Two Jesuit reductions survived but migrated to the southern Paraná region. In 1641, at the battle of Mbororé, an armed Guarani-Jesuit army routed a *bandeira*, dealing a devastating blow to Paulista confidence. Thereafter, Paulistas mounted much smaller and more nimble expeditions. When gold was

discovered in Minas Gerais in the 1690s, Paulistas shifted their attention away from slaving to this new source of wealth.

After the attacks, Ciudad Real and Santiago de Xérez were abandoned and Villa Rica relocated to the west of the Paraná River. Several other *bandeiras* attacked Paraguay, including a devastating raid in 1676, which forced the migration of thousands of Indians south from Itatín (north of Asunción to the east of the Paraguay River). Efforts to reclaim Guairá were not attempted until the eighteenth century when Spanish officials established the fort of Curuguaty just to the west of the Paraná in order to stop the advance of Portuguese settlement. A contraband trade grew up in Curuguaty and the nearby Portuguese fort of Ygatimi until the Spanish governor ordered the militia to destroy Ygatimi in 1777.<sup>68</sup> This and other borderland disputes in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries reflected modern goals related to the demarcation and defense of imperial and national territories.

## CONCLUSIONS

In the absence of strong regal motives and imperial identities among Guaireños and Paulistas, colonial boundaries were literally mobile Native communities. The competing yet partially overlapping colonial goals and actors coupled with the existence of indigenous political conflict created political flux. Indigenous bodies constituted jurisdictional borders, and since those borders were mobile, they were impossible to fix. Paulistas used this borderland logic to legitimate their enslavement of the entire region's inhabitants. Along with brute force and the gifting of iron tools, Paulistas employed the embodied borders logic of possession shared by Guaireños as well as the gifting of iron tools. Scholars have repeatedly argued that all colonials in the region were enslaving Indians, but I contend that the legal framework of the *encomienda* and its melding with Guarani kinship practices shaped Guaireños' actions. Guaireños did not simply follow São Paulo's lead when it came to colonial practice but instead shaped their colonial presence around trade in iron tools and political kinship.

A borderlands framework reveals a lacuna in the historiography: Native perspectives on their experiences as "ethnic soldiers." Neil Whitehead and Brian Ferguson define ethnic soldiers as troops inflicting violence under the influence or control of state agents. This paradigm could be applied to Guairá and the

Paulista *bandeiras*, but the lack of a “state” makes this framing less useful.<sup>69</sup> With loosely organized columns of *bandeiras* and highly autonomous auxiliaries, Laura Matthew and Michel Oudijk’s concept of “Indian conquistadors” poses important questions. These authors argue that the conquests of Mesoamerica were more culturally Mesoamerican than Castilian and that the conquests took on sociocultural meanings beyond the interest of the Spanish conquistadors.<sup>70</sup> This perspective challenges us to consider, for example, the political and cultural meaning *bandeiras* possessed for Tupi warriors who participated in them either willingly or unwillingly. What meaning, for example, did taking a captive in these expeditions have for a Tupi-Guarani warrior if he was not allowed to consume his captive?

Many Native participants in the *bandeiras*, however, were impressed into militia columns organized by their Paulista masters or were hired out. Soldiering on Spanish Portuguese borderlands was thus part of their new enslaved experience. One such soldier, named Pablo, was a second-generation slave born to Guarani parents who had belonged to a Jesuit reduction in the vicinity of Villa Rica when the Paulistas came in 1628. His parents were forcefully taken to São Paulo as slaves, and it was there that Pablo was born. Later, as a young man, he and his uncle were conscripted into a *bandeira* that went to Paraguay. Pablo and his uncle escaped their overseer and fled to Villa Rica, then Mbaracayú, then the Asunción region, where Pablo was assigned by a city official to an encomendero. Apparently unhappy with his situation, Pablo moved to Caazapá, a Franciscan pueblo subject to encomenderos. Pablo’s experiences reflect the borderland dynamics of Eastern Paraguay and provide a social portrait of a small number of Indians who survived the *bandeira* ordeal and forged a new life for themselves in Spanish Paraguay. Their movements highlight Natives’ use of porous borderlands to seek a better life.<sup>71</sup>

As the birthplace of the Jesuit enterprise in Paraguay, Guairá deserves close scrutiny. This analysis has shown that the Jesuit reductions emerged out of a relationship of tension and mixed cooperation between Spaniards, priests, Paulistas, and Guarani leaders. By emphasizing Native agency and internal conflict, the reductions appear more prominently as strategic communities that Guarani used to navigate the political and social transformation brought about by the various goals of Jesuits, Guaireños, Paulistas, and other indigenous groups. Employing a frontier/borderlands framework highlights the many factors influencing Guarani communities’ actions and adds nuance to a narrative of conquest and conversion that has traditionally favored conquistadors, pathfinders, and priests.



## NOTES

1. The estimates range widely; I have used a conservative estimate. For discussion of these numbers, see John M. Monteiro, *Negros da terra: Índios e bandeirantes nas origens de São Paulo* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1994), 74, and Luiz Felipe de Alencastro, *O trato dos viventes: Formação do Brasil no Atlântico Sul, séculos XVI e XVII* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2000), 192.
2. Alencastro, *O trato dos viventes*, 194. The scholarship on Indian slavery in Ibero-America is thin. See Nancy E. van Deusen, *Global Índios: The Indigenous Struggle for Justice in Sixteenth-Century Spain* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 2. For Central America, see William L. Sherman, *Forced Native Labor in Sixteenth-Century Central America* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), 82.
3. See also Alencastro, *O trato dos viventes*, and Alida C. Metcalf, *Go-Betweens and the Colonization of Brazil, 1500–1600* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005).
4. See Magnus Mörner, *The Political and Economic Activities of the Jesuits in the La Plata Region: The Hapsburg Era* (Stockholm: Victor Pettersons Bokindustri Aktiebolag, 1953), 74, 90; Juan Carlos Garavaglia, *Mercado interno y economía colonial* (México: Grijalbo, 1983), 126; Branislava Susnik, *Una visión socio-anropológica del Paraguay, XVI-1/2 XVII* (Asunción: Museo Etnográfico Andrés Barbero, 1993).
5. For Paraguay, see Carlos Ernesto Romero Jensen, *El Guairá, caída y éxodo* (Asunción: Academia Paraguaya de la Historia, 2009); Efraím Cardozo, *El Paraguay colonial: Las raíces de la nacionalidad* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Nizza, 1959). For a hagiographic portrait of the Franciscans, see Fr. José Luis Salas, “Villa Rica y los Franciscanos: Memoria de cuatro siglos caminando juntos,” *Historia Paraguaya* 42 (2002): 79–122.
6. Guillermo Wilde, *Religión y poder en las misiones de Guaraníes* (Buenos Aires: Editorial SB, 2009), chap. 2.
7. Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History,” *American Historical Review* 104 (1999): 814–41.
8. John Leddy Phelan’s decentralization thesis helps to explain how these multiple interests could coexist. John Leddy Phelan, “Authority and Flexibility in the Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy,” *Administrative Science Quarterly* 5 (June 1960): 47–65.
9. Tamar Herzog, *Frontiers of Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).
10. Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
11. Ruy Díaz de Guzman noted that Governor Irala took count of the population of Guairá in the 1550s and found 40,000 *fuegos*, a term denoting the smallest kin units in a Guaraní longhouse. If each “fire” represented a unit of four, the total population was around 160,000. Ruy Díaz de Guzmán, *La Argentina, historia del descubrimiento, conquista, y población del Río de la Plata*, ed. Enrique de Gandia (Madrid: Historia 16, 1986), chap. 3.



12. Hal Langfur, *The Forbidden Lands: Colonial Identity, Frontier Violence, and the Persistence of Brazil's Eastern Indians, 1750–1830* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 5.
13. Metcalf, *Go-Betweens*, 110–12; John M. Monteiro, “From Indian to Slave: Forced Native Labour and Colonial Society in São Paulo During the Seventeenth Century,” *Slavery and Abolition* 9, no. 2 (1988): 105–27; Monteiro, *Negros da terra*; Laima Mesgravis, “De bandeirante a fazendeiro: Aspectos da vida social e econômica em São Paulo colonial,” in *História da cidade de São Paulo: A cidade colonial*, ed. Paula Porta (São Paulo: Editora Paz e Terra, 2004); John M. Monteiro, “Dos Campos de Piratininga ao Morro da Saudade: a presença indígena na História de São Paulo,” in *História da cidade de São Paulo: A cidade colonial*, ed. Paula Porta (São Paulo: Editora Paz e Terra, 2004).
14. The literature on *bandeirantes* is too extensive to review here. A few brief mentions will have to suffice. The most important and recent works are Monteiro, *Negros da terra*, and Alencastro, *O trato dos viventes*. See also Richard M. Morse, ed., *The Bandeirantes: The Historical Role of the Brazilian Pathfinders* (New York: Knopf, 1965); and John Hemming, *Red Gold: The Conquest of the Brazilian Indians* (London: Macmillan, 1978). Morse attempts to bring the Brazilian “pathfinder” into the realm of frontier heroes familiar to the North Americas. Hemming’s work *Red Gold* is a classic that sought to center on indigenous peoples in Brazil’s history, but it consistently reifies Natives as either docile or bellicose. When discussing the *bandeiras* in Paraguay, Hemming relies almost entirely on Jesuit sources.
15. Romero Jensen, *El Guairá*, 55.
16. Nicolás Durán, Carta anua, November 12, 1628, cited in *Jesuitas e bandeirantes no Guairá (1549–1640)*, ed. Jaime Cortesão and Pedro de Angelis (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Nacional, Divisão de Obras Raras e Publicações, 1951), 212.
17. Céspedes Xeria to crown, 1628, cited in Romero Jensen, *El Guairá*, 89–90.
18. For a revisionist perspective on the encomienda in Paraguay, see chap. 8 of Dorothy Jane Tuer, “Tigers and Crosses: The Transcultural Dynamics of Spanish-Guarani Relations in the Río de la Plata: 1516–1580” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2011), and Shawn Michael Austin, “Guarani Kinship and the Encomienda Community in Colonial Paraguay, Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries,” *Colonial Latin American Review* 24, no. 4 (2015): 545–71.
19. Antonio Ruíz de Montoya, *Conquista espiritual hecho por los religiosos de la Compañía de Jesus en las provincias de Paraguay, Parana, Uruguay y Tape*, ed. Ernesto J. A. Maeder (Rosario: Equipo Difusor de Estudios de Historia Iberoamericana, 1989 [1639]), chap. 37.
20. Rodrigo Ortiz Melgarejo’s report on the Jesuit reductions, 1629, cited in Romero Jensen, *El Guairá*, 163–65.
21. For a discussion of the influence of iron tools, see Charles C. Mann, 1491: *New Revelations of the Americas Before Columbus* (New York: Knopf, 2005), 298–99.
22. Fray Diego Gonzalez, Carta anua, 1611, cited in *Iglesia: Cartas anuas de la provincia del Paraguay, Chile y Tucumán, de la Compañía de Jesús*, vol. 19, ed. Emilio Ravignani

- and Carlos Leonhardt (Buenos Aires: Talleres S.A. Casa Jacobo Peuser, 1927), 128–29. For evidence of Jesuit reliance on the gifting of iron tools, see Ruíz de Montoya, *Conquista espiritual*, chap. 45. For Guaireño observations about the centrality of iron, see Romero Jensen, *El Guairá*, 55.
23. Rodrigo Ortiz Melgarejo's report on the Jesuit reductions, 1629, cited in Romero Jensen, *El Guairá*, 163–65; Archivo Nacional de Asunción (hereafter ANA), Sección Historia (hereafter SH), 1577, vol. 11, no. 7.
  24. Anonymous Jesuit report, 1620, cited in Cortesão and de Angelis, *Jesuitas e bandeirantes*, 167–68.
  25. Declaration of Captain Francisco de Vallejos, October 25, 1630, cited in Romero Jensen, *El Guairá*, 33.
  26. Mörner, *Political and Economic Activities*, 89; Garavaglia, *Mercado*, 67.
  27. Garavaglia, *Mercado*, 325. Archivo General de Indias (hereafter AGI), Charcas, 1662, vol. 148 B.
  28. Cabildo of Mbaracayú to Asunción, March 10, 1612, ANA, Civil y Judicial (hereafter CJ), vol. 1599, no. 6.
  29. *Anais do museu paulista: história e cultura material 2* (1922): 183–87.
  30. Garavaglia, *Mercado*, 124.
  31. Alencastro, *O trato dos viventes*, 203.
  32. See Salas, "Villa Rica."
  33. Mörner, *Political and Economic Activities*, 72, 74.
  34. On Jesuit activities in Guairá, see Mörner, *Political and Economic Activities*; Arno Alvarez Kern, *Missões: Uma utopia política* (Porto Alegre: Mercado Aberto, 1982); Wilde, *Religión y poder*.
  35. An excellent essay on the transcultural elements of Jesuit preaching is Dorothy Jane Tuer, "Old Bones and Beautiful Words: The Spiritual Contestation Between Shaman and Jesuit in the Guaraní Missions," in *Colonial Saints: Discovering the Holy in the Americas, 1500–1800*, ed. Allan Greer and Jodi Bilinkoff (New York: Routledge, 2002), 87–89. For the classic work on Franciscan preaching, see Louis Necker, *Indios Guaraníes y chamanes franciscanos: Las primeras reducciones del Paraguay, 1580–1800* (Asunción: Centro de Estudios Antropológicos, Universidad Católica, 1990). An essential primary source is Montoya's *Conquista espiritual*.
  36. Romero Jensen, *El Guairá*, 91, 95, 237; Mörner, *Political and Economic Activities*, 74.
  37. Wilde, *Religión y poder*, 94–97; Montoya, *Conquista espiritual*, 90, 98.
  38. Captain Felipe Romero's inspection of the San Pablo reduction, November 13, 1628, cited in Romero Jensen, *El Guairá*, 120.
  39. See Eduardo Neumann, "Fronteira e identidade: Confrontos Luso-Guarani na Banda Oriental, 1680–1757," *Revista Complutense de Historia de America* 26 (2000): 67–92; Mercedes Avellaneda and Lía Quarleri, "Las milicias Guaraníes en el Paraguay y Río de la Plata: Alcances y limitaciones (1649–1756)," *Estudios Ibero-Americanos* 33, no. 1 (2007): 109–32; Lía Quarleri, *Rebelión y guerra en las fronteras del Plata: Guaraníes, jesuitas, e imperios coloniales* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2009); Elisa Frühauf García, *As diversas formas de ser índio: Políticas*

- indígenas e políticas indigenistas no extremo sul da América Portuguesa* (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, 2009); Jeffrey A. Erbig Jr., "Borderline Offerings: Tolderías and Mapmakers in the Eighteenth-Century Río de la Plata," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 96, no. 3 (August 2016): 445–80.
40. Romero Jensen, *El Guairá*, 69.
  41. *Ibid.*, 54.
  42. Lieutenant Governor, Diego de Teba, official inspection of Guairá, AGI, 1607, Contaduría, vol. 1690, no. 13.
  43. Letter to Crown, May 5, 1607, in *Hernandarias, criollo asunceño: Estudio preliminar, cronología anotada y ordenamiento de cartas y memoriales al rey Felipe III y al Consejo de Indias, 1600–1625*, ed. Walter Rela Hernandarias (Montevideo: Embajada de la República del Paraguay, 2001), 110.
  44. Deposition of Captain Francisco Vallejos, October 25, 1630, cited in Romero Jensen, *El Guairá*, 33.
  45. Capt. Francisco Romern's *visita* of San Francisco Javier, November 28, 1628, cited in Romero Jensen, *El Guairá*, 123.
  46. Monteiro, *Negros da terra*, 8.
  47. Monteiro, "From Indian to Slave," 105.
  48. *Ibid.*, 114.
  49. The social organization of the *bandeiras* is detailed in Monteiro, *Negros da terra*. On crown support for *bandeiras*, see Alencastro, *O trato dos viventes*, 192.
  50. Monteiro, *Negros da terra*, 89. On ethnic soldiering, see R. Brian Ferguson and Neil L. Whitehead, "The Violent Edge of Empire," in *War in the Tribal Zone: Expanding States and Indigenous Warfare*, ed. R. Brian Ferguson and Neil L. Whitehead (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 2002), 21.
  51. Monteiro, *Negros da terra*, 91.
  52. Mörner, *Political and Economic Activities*, 66, and Romero Jensen, *El Guairá*, 188.
  53. Capt. Felipe Romero's proclamation in the Jesuit reductions, November 1628, cited in Romero Jensen, *El Guairá*, 123.
  54. Fray Diego de Torres, Carta anua, 1614, in Ravnigani and Leonhardt, *Iglesia: Cartas anuas*, 302.
  55. Alencastro, *O trato dos viventes*, 191.
  56. Monteiro, *Negros da terra*, 77.
  57. Alencastro, *O trato dos viventes*, 194, 362–63.
  58. *Ibid.*, 198.
  59. Bartolomé Torales to the governor, December 15, 1612, cited in Romero Jensen, *El Guairá*, 189.
  60. ANA, CJ, December 11, 1619, vol. 2183, no. 6, fol. 112r. This unusual document contains petitions in Portuguese from Preto, in his hand. A special thanks to Jeffrey Erbig with the transcription and translation.
  61. Romero Jensen, *El Guairá*, 43.
  62. *Ibid.*, 149–53. For comparative cases, see Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), and Garcia, *As diversas formas*.

63. Monteiro, *Negros da terra*, 72.
64. Céspedes Xeria to the lieutenant governor, 1629, cited in Romero Jensen, *El Guairá*, 180–81.
65. Monteiro, Alencastro, and Herzog all reach a similar conclusion. Romero Jensen demonstrates that while there were Guaireños who supported Paulistas, many defended *encomendados* and mission Indian populations. Romero Jensen, *El Guairá*, 221–31.
66. *Ibid.*, 221–22.
67. *Ibid.* and Mörner, *Political and Economic Activities*, 91.
68. Herib Caballero Campos, “La frontera del Paraguay en el siglo XVIII: Relaciones y disputas entre Curuguaty e Igatemi” (paper presented at the Río de la Plata Workshop, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, February 22, 2014).
69. Ferguson and Whitehead, *War in the Tribal Zone*, 18.
70. Laura E. Matthew and Michel R. Oudijk, eds., *Indian Conquistadors: Indigenous Allies in the Conquest of Mesoamerica* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007).
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## 2

# JESUIT MISSIONS AND THE GUARANI ETHNOGENESIS

Political Interactions, Indigenous Actors,  
and Regional Networks on the Southern Frontier  
of the Iberian Empires

GUILLERMO WILDE

**T**HE TERRITORIAL BOUNDARY established after the War of the Triple Alliance (1864–1870) entrenched a new regional reality ideologically marked by the presence of nation-states. The new national borders have since had a profound influence on the construction of historiographic perspectives on the region's colonial past, often reproducing chronological, geographic, and social oversights that inhibit a fuller understanding of the complexity of this history. The Triple Frontier, as we conceive it today, is the outcome of a *longue durée* historical process that would have been difficult to foreshadow in the context of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

In this chapter I reconstruct the colonial history of this region through the study of the social, economic, and political dynamics embedded in this territory through the Jesuit missions. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Jesuits established a presence on the southern frontier of the South American domains of Spain and Portugal. At the borders of the two empires, they erected a series of mission towns with the goal of converting local indigenous groups to Christianity. Also known as “reductions” (*reducciones*), the missions served to integrate the indigenous populations into a labor regime that would produce colonial tribute and help control the vast territory under dispute between the two European powers.<sup>1</sup> The Jesuit reductions sought to homogenize the indigenous population by imposing a uniform way of life based on urban colonial institutions and by standardizing a common language, Guarani. The



demographic growth of the missions was remarkable, surpassing 100,000 people by the end of the seventeenth century. Moreover, the missions actively participated in the regional networks connecting the River Plate basin, Tucumán, and colonial Paraguay.<sup>2</sup>

The missions were part of an extended network of Jesuit establishments that also contained schools and residences in cities. In regions such as Paraguay, it is possible to distinguish different types of connections in this network between (1) reductions in the same region or in remote regions, which ensured their mutual assistance; (2) reductions and cities, mainly through trade networks; (3) schools and residences in different cities (e.g., Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Asunción, Santiago de Chile); (4) both sides of the Atlantic through the circulation of special envoys to Madrid, Lisbon, and Rome. Missionaries circulated through different establishments to avoid occupying the same office or even staying in the same place for long periods. Periodically, selected priests were sent as procurators to the European courts in order to achieve the favor of monarchs, recruit new missionaries, and inform the general of the order on the needs of the Jesuit province.<sup>3</sup>

In spite of this general picture, traditionally the missions have been considered as spaces isolated and disconnected from the rest of the region's colonial circuits. Moreover, Indians were conceived as passive objects of colonial domination. With the emergence of a nationalist historiography in the nineteenth century, the history of the missions was fragmented along the national boundaries of present-day Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil. On top of that, church history generally emphasized the role of missionaries and ecclesial institutions in the evangelization process, leaving aside indigenous agency and perspectives. Recent studies have challenged these interpretations by emphasizing the regional integration and the role of indigenous groups both by showing how local populations were more than mere objects of economic and social oppression and also by countering idyllic visions of missions as utopias where unpolluted Christian ideals met indigenous traditions in a perfect symbiosis.<sup>4</sup> To bring to the foreground the larger significance of the Jesuit missions, I will resituate them within the region's wider dynamics. This approach focuses not only on the colonizing actions of the priests and the Spanish crown but more importantly, it explores how indigenous groups were active participants in these same processes.

For more than 150 years, the Jesuit missions contributed to the reconfiguration of the region's political, economic, and social landscapes. The study of this



long-term process allows for the examination of two contradictory tendencies. The first is the creation of a new identity rooted in the organization of the mission towns, what I am calling an ethnogenesis. This identity was a result of the reconstitution of a territory fragmented by the effect of colonization. This singular new space was both shaped by the colonial Spanish institutions and urban nuclei put in place and the appropriation the indigenous population made of them. In contrast to the potentially homogenizing dynamic of the mission territory, a second trend was linked to a wider communal mobility. This latter aspect emerged from the diverse social composition of the indigenous populations and the ambiguity of ethnic frontiers in the region. These seemingly contradictory trends—a specific mission identity and a diverse regional one—reveal two complementary indigenous conceptions about the territoriality of the missions. On the one hand, they were established spaces of stable political institutions such as town councils and the church. On the other hand, they were also sites of fluid population networks that stretched far away from urban centers and brought indigenous groups into contact with a wide array of actors including defectors from the missions, Afro-descendent communities, and “heathen” Indians. Occasionally, the missions also incorporated and absorbed these social linkages into their own internal dynamics.

Following the duality of this argument, this chapter is divided into two parts. The first reconstructs the ethnogenetic process of how the missions were formed in distinct historical stages. The second centers on the mechanisms through which the internal heterogeneity of the missions was produced, placing particular emphasis on the indigenous strategies of interactions with and representations of space and territoriality.

## THE HOMOGENIZATION OF MISSIONS AND ETHNOGENESIS

The missions’ structure was based on the residential and linguistic segregation of an ensemble of indigenous populations from throughout the region. These different groups were relocated within the missions and administered with relative political and economic autonomy from the Spanish crown. A lack of historical documents from this period has meant that through the present day, very little is known about the broader sweep of this history. Yet the combination of what evidence is available allows for an understanding of the missions’ history as a

prolonged process of ethnogenesis: the confluence of demographic, political, legal, territorial, linguistic, and economic factors that contributed to the creation of new ethnic realities.<sup>5</sup> The policy of reductions destructured indigenous society through the use of spatial circumscription to new territorial unities—the missions—and ethnic taxonomy. As such, this policy managed to create an idea of homogenous indigenous identity based on what was left of the indigenous groups' diverse linguistic and cultural traits.<sup>6</sup> Although there is little evidence to elucidate the exact details of these internal dynamics—and to cast light on the role of indigenous populations in these processes—it is clear that many groups did not survive the physical toll that pervaded the missions, and the subjected population suffered a continuous process of social, territorial, and ethnic reconstitution.

The missions represented a new stage in a process of territorial reorganization that had begun decades earlier with the establishment of institutions such as the *encomienda*, administrated by both *encomenderos* and Franciscan priests. When the Spaniards came into contact with indigenous groups at the start of the sixteenth century, they established a series of local and regional alliances that facilitated, among other aspects, the exchange and circulation of goods and indigenous women.<sup>7</sup> Around 1530, Europeans—aided by the collaboration of certain local populations—explored new regions and soon founded towns and cities such as Asunción, Ciudad Real, Villa Rica, and Jerez de la Frontera. In the final decades of the sixteenth century, two European religious orders, the Franciscans and the Jesuits, established a definitive presence in what was then Paraguay and helped create the first *pueblos de indios* (villages of Indians). On the one hand, the villages created by the Franciscan order were deeply integrated into the wider and older network of *encomiendas* in Paraguay. The *pueblos* founded by the Jesuits, on the other hand, gradually established their own system, which extracted indigenous labor and paid direct tributes to the Spanish crown, preventing the intervention of the *encomenderos*.<sup>8</sup> This helped the Jesuit reductions to gain a heightened level of political autonomy and economic self-sufficiency.

The Jesuits explored a vast tract of land between the regions of Guairá, Itatín, Paraná, and Tapé, where more than seventy *reducción* villages were established. Some became long-term settlements, while others had fleeting existences (fig. 1.1). Effectively, the majority of the missions founded by the Jesuits in the first half of the seventeenth century were destroyed by *bandeirantes*, bands of slavers from São Paulo who captured indigenous people to perform forced labor

on the Brazilian coast. Other determining factors of these early demographic changes were waves of epidemics brought by European colonizers and also the invasion of hostile indigenous groups broadly referred to as “heathens” (*infieles*) at the time. Beginning in the 1630s, the Jesuits transferred most of the reduced indigenous population from the Guairá, Itatín, Acaray-Iguazú, and Tapé regions away from the *bandeirantes*, to southern areas around the Paraná and Uruguay Rivers. These migrations disrupted regional populations and forced them to reconstruct themselves in new regions. This pattern of population and territorial shifts meant that by the end of the seventeenth century, the majority of mission populations came from distant regions, about four hundred kilometers away from the new location (fig. 2.1).<sup>9</sup>

The incorporated populations were assimilated into mission life under the same economic, political, and linguistic standard marking the start of a process of “mission ethnogenesis” and profound territorial reconfiguration.<sup>10</sup> This was the result of bringing together dispersed populations who, having accepted a Christian life, now lived in villages with a defined urban structure, spoke a common language—the Guarani of the missions—and followed a uniform religious schedule.<sup>11</sup> Although contemporary letters and Jesuit chronicles describe a diversity of indigenous groups who spoke a wide range of languages, the process of *reducción* tended to impose a cultural and linguistic homogenization.<sup>12</sup> In the eighteenth century, and after several rehearsals, the urban structure of mission towns was settled permanently. It was constituted by a central plaza surrounded by lines of houses of the same size. On one of the sides of the plaza was located the church, the cemetery, the college, and the artisans’ workshops.

Many of the classic ethnohistories of the Guarani focus on the existence of extensive indigenous sociopolitical structures represented by big regional leaders at the time of contact with Spaniards.<sup>13</sup> Yet the evidence indicates that the influence of indigenous leaders did not extend beyond the territorial limits of the local group; the dimensions of large houses, or *malocas*, were occasionally mistaken to be entire villages or small towns. The Jesuit Van Suerck noted that “in every house there is a chief, what the Spanish call ‘caciques’ and the Indians call ‘the big one.’ Aside from his name, in him there is no grandness whatsoever, as his authority over his subjects is almost nonexistent.” According to Van Suerck, between one hundred and two hundred Indians lived in the houses, not counting women and children. He also observed that most women tended to marry men of the same indigenous groups. The references made by Van Suerck to the local group were very imprecise. He appears to only allude to the domain




FIGURE 2.1 Settlements along the Uruguay and Paraná Rivers in the eighteenth century. Map by Frederico Freitas.

of the houses (or habitation structures) that “are separated between them by a space of one league and sometimes by one or many days journey.”<sup>14</sup> Among the Jesuits’ main tasks was to minimize the distances between families and eliminate the isolation of houses in order to cluster together the largest number of Indians in one site. The initial phase of indigenous demographic fragmentation occurred when the chiefs of families or of *teyyj* were incorporated into the mission reductions. Family leaders were then rebranded as “caciques,” and the members of their specific chiefdom (*cacicazgo*) were also conferred with the title of *mboya*, a term that alluded to the members of the *cacicazgo* subordinated to the cacique. While prehispanic families could include more than two hundred people, the *cacicazgos* incorporated to the missions rarely surpassed one hundred members, an indication that the missions’ social organization radically fragmented the prehispanic units.

All of the indigenous population living in the missions was distributed into *cacicazgos* of different sizes. The *cacicazgo* was the basic social, political, and economic unit of organization and the basis for the organization of missions’ territoriality.<sup>15</sup> Caciques determined the urban structure of the Jesuit villages and the surrounding comarca. The Jesuit Anton Sepp wrote in the early eighteenth century that during harvest season it was the caciques who received donkeys and bulls to assign them to specific “vassals” for the necessary work.<sup>16</sup> Decades later, a colonial official explained how the lands were distributed. He observed that “the Indians themselves have no land as property.” Rather, it was “each *cacicazgo*” that had discretion over the lands surrounding the villages where the cacique and the other chiefdom members had their crop fields.<sup>17</sup> According to the same source, at least as early as the eighteenth century all *cacicazgos* contained “barns or lines of houses of equal size and proportion, with tiled roofs and alleys on all sides for the transit of people.”<sup>18</sup> The rows of houses corresponded to the number of *mboyas* belonging to each *cacicazgo*.

Occasionally, the *cacicazgos* were fragmented for a variety of reasons that included death in the family, adoption, banishment, evasion, marriage, and migration, among other factors. A Jesuit named Escandón referred, for example, to the indigenous traditions of marriage, childcare, and breastfeeding that determined the residential distribution between different families and even across different villages.<sup>19</sup> The 1750s Guarani War, triggered by the Treaty of Madrid, was especially devastating for the Guarani population, disrupting the system of *cacicazgos*. A high number of indigenous soldiers lost their lives, and the war led to the relocation of the local population to other villages, which lasted at least

until the suppression of the treaty in 1761. In spite of these traumatic events, the system of *cacicazgos* continued to be an important element in the organization of the region's territoriality after the Jesuits' expulsion. The persistence of *cacicazgos* over time was ensured through the establishment of mechanisms for succession that were often a source of conflict between the Indians. While the Jesuits established a scheme of succession based on blood and primogeniture, a section of the indigenous population tried to manipulate the decision on the succession in favor of existing political networks or interests for social promotion.<sup>20</sup>

Beyond these internal disputes it is clear that the caciques collaborated with the missionaries in the missions' government. The caciques were incorporated into local councils (*cabildos*), militias, and church posts. The imposition of a new bureaucratic administration also resulted in the incorporation of new technologies. Writing was one of them. A large number of manuscripts have been discovered that indicate that the skill of writing was important in the missions' daily life and that its practice was widespread among the members of the indigenous elite. Writing was an unknown technology for the Indians inhabiting the area before European invasion. But the Indians appropriated it after just a few decades. Some members of the indigenous elite, such as the secretaries of the council, musicians, and fellows of the brotherhoods (*cofradías*), were known for their writing abilities. Indians not only produced bureaucratic texts but also doctrinal and theological ones, some of which were published using the missions' printing press.<sup>21</sup> Two remarkable examples are the books *Sermones y ejemplos* and *Explicación del catecismo*, written by cacique and musician Nicolas Yapuguay. The Indians also produced historical documents such as diaries of military campaigns. Writing was for them not only a tool of communication but also a source of social and political prestige, especially during times of political crisis.<sup>22</sup>

Despite a series of vicissitudes—including invasions, desertions, pillage, disease, and forced relocation—by the dawn of the eighteenth century the missions had managed to implement a relatively autonomous and uniform economic and political system. Stability translated into a rapid demographic growth. Toward the end of the seventeenth century, the missions already harbored more than 50 percent of the population of the River Plate basin, counting some 67,000 inhabitants distributed among twenty-two towns. By the 1730s, that number nearly doubled to 140,000 people living in thirty towns.<sup>23</sup>

The first stage in establishing a mission consisted of removing Indians from their forest villages—preferably by means of persuasion—to resettle them in new locations where they would be instructed in Christian doctrine, organized

according to an urban layout and logic of economic production, and taxed for tribute to the Spanish crown. In the often violent colonial context of the era, this radical change to the indigenous way of life sometimes offered a sense of protection if not actual survival for communities that were otherwise threatened by institutions such as the *encomienda* and the regional slave trade.<sup>24</sup> Yet living in a mission did not always guarantee safety. Almost immediately after the first of the missions was founded in Guairá in 1610, they experienced a wave of attacks from *bandeirantes* that lasted over three decades. The missions in Itatín were ransacked in 1632, while the reductions of Uruguay and Tapé were invaded numerous times between 1636 and 1641. Some of the missions' original inhabitants died in these attacks, and others were relocated to areas that were less exposed to outside dangers. Although these assaults continued through the end of the seventeenth century, they largely subsided after 1641 when recently formed armed Guarani militias defeated the Luso-Brazilian slavers in the famous battle of Mbororé.<sup>25</sup>

Between the 1640s and the 1690s, the territory of the missions was contained to the most part to the area of modern-day Argentine Mesopotamia, which comprises the present-day Argentine provinces of Misiones, Entre Ríos, and Corrientes. During this time, indigenous groups fleeing the invaded regions of the Paraná and Uruguay Rivers comprised most of the population of the missions. These migrations toward Jesuit reductions were led by caciques who often were able to absorb multiple communities en route to the missions. Historical documents inform us about the approximate size of indigenous migratory groups. In the village of Itapúa, the governor Lariz wrote that a cacique named Anton Tacaro appeared with ninety Indians who had left the Tape region after a *bandeirante* attack.<sup>26</sup> Of the original forty Jesuit villages, only twenty-two—of which sixteen were relocated from the zones of Iguazú, Guairá, Itatín, and Uruguay—remained toward the end of the seventeenth century. The majority of the reduction Indians had been relocated to their respective missions, and very few lived in their region of origin. Of the twenty missions in the zones of the Paraná and Uruguay Rivers, for example, only six contained indigenous groups from the immediate surrounding area.<sup>27</sup> The constant migrations of indigenous communities meant that even if most of the missions clustered in close proximity, their inhabitants hailed from regions across and beyond the area we recognize today as the Triple Frontier. Moreover, many of the reductions were themselves mobile because the threat of outside attack led to the relocation of entire mission communities. This was due in part to the invasions by *bandeirantes* and “hostile” Indians and also to disease outbreaks. Over the

course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, illnesses such as smallpox, tertian fever, and measles reduced the region's indigenous population by as much as 50 percent. The Jesuits often relocated missions to new sites chosen for their sanitary qualities to accommodate increasingly larger reduction populations or for better access to water and other natural resources.<sup>28</sup>

Between approximately 1690 and 1730, the missions and their dwellers began to expand toward the eastern shores of the Uruguay River, where seven new mission towns were established. The Jesuits transferred many indigenous inhabitants from other reductions to these new locations. Due in large measure to the introduction of cattle ranching on the new settlements, this became one of the most prosperous periods for the Jesuit missions, both in terms of productive output and population size, which passed the mark of 140,000 people.

The final phase of the missions, however, was marked by a profound demographic crisis, with a drop in indigenous population of nearly a half by the 1740s. There were many reasons for this decline. Among the most important was the series of epidemics that ravaged numerous villages; evidence suggests that 18,733 Guarani mission inhabitants died of measles in 1733 alone, and another thirty thousand perished of smallpox between 1738 and 1739.<sup>29</sup> Another factor in the demographic shift was the role of Guarani militias in helping put down regional uprisings, such as the prolonged "revolt of the *comuneros*" in the city of Asunción or the capture of the Portuguese river port of Colônia do Sacramento. Scholars calculate that nearly twelve thousand Guarani militiamen collaborated with the military expeditions formed against the *comunero* revolt in 1724 and again in 1733–1735, which is to say that more than a third of the active male indigenous population was deployed away from their home regions to fight in faraway conflicts.<sup>30</sup>

A series of letters from Jesuit chroniclers written in this period indicate that between the final decades of the seventeenth century and the middle of the eighteenth century, the colonial governorships of Buenos Aires and Asunción employed Guarani militias on seventy occasions, conscripting around forty thousand men. Many of the indigenous soldiers were used to defend the Spanish cities and their surrounding agricultural lands against attacks from both the Guaycuru Indians and Portuguese colonial troops. The Guarani militias also helped construct and repair buildings and churches and aided in escorting the colonial governor, the delivery of cattle and provisions, and the manning of lookout posts.<sup>31</sup>

After the crisis of the 1730s, the Guarani population began to recover, although the territorial reach of the missions never expanded much farther. Two decades later, however, the reductions along the eastern shores of the Uruguay



River suffered from a violent conflict that came to be known as the “Guarani War,” in which seven eastern villages confronted a mixed Portuguese and Spanish colonial army. The Treaty of 1750 had stipulated that Portugal cede to Spain the port of Colônia do Sacramento in the Río de la Plata in exchange for a portion of the territory of the Jesuit Province in Paraguay. Seven indigenous villages refused to follow colonial Spain’s relocation order and staged an armed resistance from 1754 to 1756. The conflict between the Guarani militias and the combined armies of both the Spanish and Portuguese crowns resulted in the death of over fifteen hundred Indians. The defeat of the indigenous uprising was followed by a forced resettlement in 1757 of the seven villages onto twenty-one different locations on the opposite side of the Uruguay River.<sup>32</sup>

In 1761 the previous treaty between Spain and Portugal was annulled, and the indigenous population was allowed to return to their original lands. But by that time, many Indians had opted to continue migrating even farther. A fair number of the Indians eventually settled in the *aldeias* of the Portuguese-controlled area of current-day Rio Grande do Sul. The *aldeias* were mission-styled towns directly controlled by the Portuguese crown. One of these indigenous towns, Aldeia dos Anjos (“the village of angels”) was established in 1762 in an area close to present-day Porto Alegre with thirty-five hundred inhabitants who had previously lived in the Jesuit missions some four hundred kilometers west. The violent conflicts and inter-Iberian tensions also facilitated migration away from the reductions and toward the disputed Banda Oriental—future Uruguay. Far from the influence of colonial powers, independent indigenous communities could be formed more easily, as exemplified by the foundation of the Las Viboras settlement in 1758.<sup>33</sup>

In the aftermath of the Jesuits’ expulsion (1768), other religious orders (Franciscans, Mercedarians, and Dominicans) were sent to the Guarani communities in order to safeguard the spiritual well-being of the Indians without interfering in the economy of local towns—the latter task having been designated as the purview of newly designated Spanish colonial administrators. Although the social and political organization of the missions persisted with few alterations, the post-Jesuit period witnessed a rapid economic collapse. This, in turn, caused new demographic crises and the gradual assimilation of the reduction Indians into the surrounding rural populations.<sup>34</sup> The reshuffling of local hierarchies resulted in immediate conflicts as the relatively stable economic order of the Jesuit era quickly disappeared. The deteriorating economic climate pushed a large portion of the Guarani away from the missions in search of employment,

both into the surrounding countryside and in towns and cities much farther away. Health epidemics also continued to ravage local communities even after the expulsion of the Jesuits, adding to the accelerated disbursement and disintegration of the mission populations throughout the region.

## HETEROGENEITY AND MOBILITY

The missions were conceived of as spaces to bring together groups of divergent geographic, cultural, and linguistic origins. Although this goal was intended to foster a long-term sense of communal stability, it often produced the opposite effect as the deeply rooted differences ultimately helped fracture the mission experiment. The sought-after homogenization proved to be an illusion as many groups clung to their own forms of autonomous organization and identity and refused to conform to the reduction structure.

Even the groups that did accept cohabitation in the missions were resistant to integration with other indigenous communities, as they tended to coalesce in their own “neighborhoods,” which granted them a degree of independence. These neighborhoods had a hierarchy system derived from the *cacicazgos* present in them. Importance, for example, derived from spatial proximity to the main plaza. Such a hierarchy also manifested in the order the *cacicazgos* appeared in the periodical census of the villages.<sup>35</sup> More research needs to be done to determine the exact logic underlying the division of chiefdoms, districts, and neighborhoods within a given mission village. This will allow future scholars to better understand the internal structures of missions while also retracing the migration patterns that led specific communities to settle on particular reductions.

Heterogeneity in the missions partially resulted from the incorporation of indigenous populations that had not accepted Christianity, which were called “heathen” (*infeles*) in the documents. These groups were brought into the mission fold both by peaceful and coerced methods. In both cases, it was often the mission Indians who did the actual work of bringing in the heathens, either through persuasion or physical violence. One example comes from the Jesuit village of Yapeyú in the meridional zone, where the mission Indians were tasked with incorporating the “heathen” Charrúa and Minuanes communities. The latter group was a problem because of its habit of raiding the reduction to steal cattle. Other cases, such as the village of Jesús in the northern reaches

of the Triple Frontier, indicate that the missions also attempted to integrate entire preexisting chiefdoms.<sup>36</sup> Jesuit accounts frequently describe expeditions formed by indigenous members of Christian fraternities (*congregaciones*) to heathen country to convince infidels to accept Christianity. Sometimes they brought those Indians by force to the missions to learn the basics of civil life and devotion.<sup>37</sup>

Despite the Jesuits' attempts to implement and maintain a sense of homogenized order, the indigenous groups were largely able to maintain their own forms of internal ethnic and political diversity over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This was especially evident in the persistence of linguistic variation within the missions in spite of the attempts to establish the use of a universal Guaraní language.<sup>38</sup> At a general level, the missions imposed the main aspects of colonial urbanization through the creation of municipalities and church institutions. In turn, they were appropriated by Indians who, at a local level, kept a certain degree of heterogeneity and autonomy associated with the organization of basic social units such as *cacicazgos* and nuclear families.

The primary difficulty in overseeing the missions was the need to regulate and control these forms of ethnic and social diversity. Failing to do so could lead to conflicts within the reductions and hinder the possibility of creating new kinship networks. As one Jesuit letter observes,

They make frequent excursions from these same villages to the surrounding infidels, such as the Guañanas that live north along the Paraná River; and those in the fields near the Uruguay River of the Guenao nation; and those who live among the forests even farther north of the village of Jesús of the Gualchaqui nation; and those who live in the forests between the Paraguay and Paraná Rivers of the Tobatí nation, to where, for reasons given by my superiors in the month of October last year, I dispatched two of my subjects, even though the recently converted inhabitants near the Paraná and Uruguay are not that great, so that they can form a new village, the numbers of those who receive Christ our Father do not cease to grow almost every year, especially in the Gualchaqui and Guañana nations. . . . I myself brought to the village of Jesús eighteen people and six more from the upper Paraná; years later, they have brought others from the same [location]; many more have been added to the body of the Guañana nation, and there has not been a lack of the Guenoas, who have joined with those of San Francisco de Borja, Concepción, San Xavier, and San Nicolás; of the Charrúas and also the Guenoas with the Yapeyú.<sup>39</sup>

The above quote is proof of the ethnic heterogeneity that lay at the core of mission territoriality, the result of the continuous interactions that mission Indians maintained with the dwellers of the surroundings and the occasional incorporation of nonconverted Indians (*infieles*) to the missions. These relations penetrated the internal and external realities of the missions, spaces that the Jesuits were incapable of entirely regulating.<sup>40</sup> Documents from the end of the eighteenth century make frequent reference to these connections. For example, in September of 1770 a group of “heathen” Caingúa Indians “from the jungle” arrived in the estancia of San Javier near the Jesuit mission of Jesús guided by a cacique named Guirabo. They brought a bow and six arrows as a gift for the Indian taking care of the estancia, who immediately repaid the honor with an iron ax. The Indians came from an area known as Biraitagua and were known for their clandestine incursions into the yerba mate fields in the region. On this occasion, it appears that they wanted to gain information about the nearby Jesús mission and to find out whether it had axes, machetes, fabric, and other items that they needed. The caretaker informed the Caingúa that they could find all they required in the Jesús mission provided that they voluntarily went to live with the Jesuits and their families. Before leaving—claiming that they had to return to take care of their crop fields at home—the Caingúa lamented that the mission was too far away and that they had relatives living there that they would have liked to see. They then told the Indian caretaker that the woods harbored more Indians than in the entire Province of Paraná and that they would soon return with their wives and children. They also promised that upon their return they would bring a “little Guayaqui Indian” as a present chosen from among those that they had captured “as slaves.”<sup>41</sup>

We do not know exactly how the above saga concluded, but the story is revealing nonetheless of how indigenous groups at the time could see the missions as a space of potential personal gain. The inverse situation also occurred, with mission Indians obtaining distinct and complementary advantages beyond the walls of the reductions by interacting with surrounding “heathens.” What we do know is that many Indians remained outside of the Jesuit missions for extended periods of time working on agricultural fields or yerba mate gathering. These forays allowed mission Indians to gain intimate knowledge of the vast areas surrounding the missions—the rainforest, the countryside, the commercial routes, the flows of water, and all manner of geographic markers. Mission Indians also managed to establish relationships with a wide array of indigenous and nonindigenous actors throughout the region.

One of the central places for interaction was the estancias, grazing fields, and other types of cattle-ranching establishments under the control and supervision of certain missions. Indians used to spend long periods of time there, which allowed them to develop a relatively autonomous social life. These establishments covered the basic economic needs of workers and their families, and in many cases they also had chapels for liturgical activity. These spaces allowed maintenance of the basic aspects of daily life in a mission at the same time that they provided for a more fluid contact with the nonindigenous population and access to information on the general situation in the region.

The missions experienced occasional disputes over control of territory and resources, requiring the update of agreements and the organization of expeditions. However, these initiatives were not enough to prevent a prolonged state of litigation between missions for territorial control. Each mission claimed its territorial autonomy. The disputes initiated during the Jesuit period continued after their expulsion. In 1769 Yapeyú confronted La Cruz for control of a “mountain.” Shortly after, new disputes emerged between San Nicolas and San Jose and Trinidad and Jesús. Later, the Jesuit Segismundo Asperger denounced the Indians of mission San Borja for trying to expand their land and livestock at the expense of the San Nicolas mission. As a post-Jesuit official notices, disputes derived from the ambiguous way boundaries were set. He wrote that the lands were not distributed among individuals. The owner was the mission. Some villages had received titles from judges, others from governors, but some had no actual deed. The mission town of Yapeyú, for example, claimed a huge territory over the Uruguay River but had no title confirming its possessions. Yapeyú’s territorial claims were based solely on a map from an inventory for the Jesuit Jaime Mascaro produced at the time of the expulsion.<sup>42</sup> In fact, the Jesuits had been mediators in the conflicts between mission towns over the control of lands. They defended the rights of the missions they represented and were particularly interested in recording, with the assistance of the Indians, all the information about the land use and communication between relevant locations.

The confection of maps—a skill that, like writing, was taught by Jesuit priests—served as an important tool for indigenous leaders still living in missions to articulate and make demands regarding their territorial rights.<sup>43</sup> Indigenous maps are an especially illuminating resource because they allow us to visualize Native representations of territory. These documents show in great detail the characteristics of the wide spaces of indigenous mobility, depicting roads, rivers, water sources, chapels, and a variety of sites that were fundamental to indigenous life in the countryside. It is interesting to note that these maps did

not necessarily constitute accurate visual representations in terms of geography and topography. Instead, they depicted a sense of territorial dimensions based on the practical nature of the landscapes, showing only the features related to their everyday life, such as communication and commercial routes (both rivers and on land) and the networks between villages. As such, these maps demonstrate a conception of space in which there is no clear differentiation between the internal and external dimensions of the missions. Rather than functioning as a distinct and autonomous area, missions belonged to a larger web in which the urban nuclei of Jesuit reductions was just one small part of an entire constellation of sites that held social, economic, and symbolic meanings for the region's indigenous populations. These maps not only exhibited mission Indians' knowledge of space but also provided clues about the traditional uses and circuits associated with that knowledge.

After the Jesuits expulsion, both writing and cartography persisted among Indians as autonomous practices that allowed for communicating directly with the colonial administration. Indigenous leaders were aware of changes in the government and used their skills and technical knowledge to redefine positions of power in the new map of relations. By accurately recording events and registering spatial marks, indigenous leaders contributed to the forging of community identity, the construction of power, and the consolidation of social memory.

## CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have described the formation of the Jesuit missions in Paraguay as a two-stage process. First, indigenous populations were fragmented and forced to relocate to the reductions. This initial step then opened the path for a territorial and social restructuring based on a new model of village life that was imposed on mission Indians. Compared with the social organization of other indigenous communities in the same region (such as those controlled by the *encomenderos* and the Franciscan priests), the core difference was the relative political and economic autonomy enabled by life in the missions. At various moments, the formation of a mission-based identity resulted from the exception of the *encomienda* system, residential segregation, a degree of economic self-sufficiency, self-rule, and the intensity of religious life and customs. This did not, however, imply the creation of an isolated, homogenous, and fixed territorial and conceptual space. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the missions were defined by a dynamic sense of heterogeneity throughout their entire existence. Above all,

this ethnic, social, and geographic complexity was nourished in the interactions that the missions' indigenous populations maintained with the surrounding comarca. This continued to be the dynamic even after the Jesuits' expulsion.

## NOTES

1. Tamar Herzog, *Frontiers of Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).
2. Magnus Mörner, *Actividades políticas y económicas de los jesuitas en el Río de la Plata* (Buenos Aires: Hyspamérica, 1985); Juan Carlos Garavaglia, *Mercado interno y economía colonial: Tres siglos de la yerba mate* (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1983).
3. On the structure of the Jesuit order in Paraguay and the way it took its decisions in so extended and faraway territory, see Fabian Fechner, "Las tierras incógnitas de la administración jesuita: Toma de decisiones, gremios consultivos y evolución de normas," *Histórica* 38 (2014): 11–42.
4. For a synthesis of the Guaraní ethnohistory, see Guillermo Wilde, *Religión y poder en las misiones de Guaraníes* (Buenos Aires: Editorial SB, 2009); Branislava Susnik, *Los aborígenes del Paraguay*, vol. 2, *Etnohistoria de los Guaraníes: Epoca colonial* (Asunción: Museo Etnográfico "Andrés Barbero," 1979–80); Barbara Ganson, *The Guaraní Under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003); Magnus Mörner, *Local Communities and Actors in Latin America's Past* (Stockholm: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1994).
5. For a definition of the concept of ethnogenesis, see Jonathan Hill, *History, Power, and Identity: Ethnogenesis in the Americas, 1492–1992* (Iowa: University of Iowa Press, 1996), 1. See also Stuart Schwartz and Frank Salomon, "New Peoples and New Kinds of People: Adaptations, Readjustment, and Ethnogenesis in South American Indigenous Societies (Colonial Era)," in *The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas*, vol. 3, *South America*, ed. Frank Salomon and Stuart B. Schwartz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 443–501.
6. On colonial classifications, see Christophe Giudicelli, *Fronteras movedizas: Clasificaciones coloniales y dinámicas socioculturales en las fronteras americanas* (Mexico City: Centro de Estudios Mexicanos y Centroamericanos / El Colegio de Michoacán, 2010), and Guillermo Wilde, "Entre las tipologías políticas y los procesos sociales: Elementos para el análisis de liderazgos indígenas en una frontera colonial," *Revista Anos* 90, no. 19 (34): 19–54.
7. Florencia Roulet, *La resistencia de los Guaraní del Paraguay a la conquista española (1537–1556)* (Posadas: Editorial Universitaria, 1993); Shawn M. Austin, "Guaraní Kinship and the Encomienda Community in Colonial Paraguay, Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries," *Colonial Latin American Review* 24, no. 4 (2015): 545–71.
8. In an early stage the Jesuit missions were subjected to the encomienda system. On this, see Ernesto Maeder, "Las encomiendas en las misiones jesuíticas," *Folia histórica del Nordeste* 6 (1984): 119–137. On the activity of the Franciscans, see especially the work by Louis Necker, *Indios Guaraníes y chamanes franciscanos: Las primeras reducciones del Paraguay (1580–1800)* (Asunción: CEADUC, 1990). For a



- comparison between the Franciscan and the Jesuit systems, see Juan Carlos Garavaglia, *Economía, sociedad y regiones* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones de la Flor, 1987).
9. Ernesto Maeder, "La población de las misiones de Guaraníes (1641–1682): Reubicación de los pueblos y consecuencias demográficas," *Estudios Iberoamericanos* 15, no. 1 (1989): 49–68.
  10. Jonathan Hill defines ethnogenesis as "a creative adaptation to a general history of violent changes—including demographic collapse, forced relocations, enslavement, ethnic soldiering, ethnocide, and genocide—imposed during the historical expansion of colonial and national states in the Americas." Hill, *History, Power, and Identity*, 1.
  11. The first systematic attempts of reduction took place in Peru under Viceroy Francisco de Toledo, specially sent by the king to reorganize the South American territory. Toledo created many reductions, entrusting the supervision of some of them to the Jesuits. Among these was the well-known José de Acosta, author of the mission manual *Procuranda Indorum Salute* and *Natural and Moral History of the Indies*. Toledo previously had the collaboration of Juan de Matienzo, judge of the Audiencia of Charcas, in the definition of the population and urban parameters of the reductions. These included the selection of proper places, the intervention of indigenous leaders, and the use of land for public use. On the evolution of colonial urbanism, see Ramón Gutiérrez, *Arquitectura y urbanismo en Iberoamérica* (Madrid: Ediciones Cátedra, 1983). On the policy of *reducciones*, see Jeremy Ravi Mumford, "Vertical Empire: The General Resettlement of Indians in the Colonial Andes" (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012); Akira Saito and Claudia Rosas Lauro, eds., *Reducciones: La concentración forzada de las poblaciones indígenas en el Virreinato del Perú* (Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2017).
  12. Bartomeu Melià, *La lengua Guaraní del Paraguay: Historia, sociedad y literatura* (Madrid: Editorial MAPFRE, 1992); Guillermo Wilde, "De las crónicas jesuíticas a las 'etnografías estatales': Realidades y ficciones del orden misional en las fronteras ibéricas," *Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos*, <http://nuevomundo.revues.org/62238>.
  13. See especially Susnik, *Los aborígenes*.
  14. Guillermo Furlong, *Justo Van Suerck y su carta sobre Buenos Aires (1629)* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Theoria, 1963), 85.
  15. According to late accounts, such as that of Jesuit Escandón, the *cacicazgos* generally had between twenty and thirty caciques. Escandón writes, "Estos con todos los de su parcialidad tienen alrededor del pueblo sus tierras determinadas en qué sembrar, más o menos, según son mayores o menores las parcialidades o cacicazgos, y dentro de aquel término cada cual tiene su pedazo o pedazos de terreno, en que sembrar su maíz, sus batatas, mandiocas, legumbres etc. de suerte que, no por falta de tierra, dejará de sembrar lo que quisiere, sin tener que ir a buscar terreno a la jurisdicción o como jurisdicción de otra parcialidad. Estas tierras de labor, como todas las demás de la jurisdicción de cada pueblo son todas del común del mismo pueblo, y ningún particular tiene más que el usufructo de ellas, y así no se las venden unos a otros.



- Y lo mismo sucede con las casas en que viven en el pueblo, en el cual también hay su género de división de cacicazgos, y en una o dos calles de él vive un cacique con los de su parcialidad; y en otra u otras calles vive otro con los de la suya: pero todas estas casas las hace, y si es menester las compone y reedifica si se arruinan, el común del pueblo.” Guillermo Furlong, *Juan Escandón y su carta a Burriel (1760)* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Theoria, 1965), 108.
16. Guillermo Furlong, *Antonio Sepp, S. J. y su “gobierno temporal” (1732)* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Theoria, 1962), 116.
  17. Julio C. González, “Un informe del gobernador de misiones, don Francisco Bruno de Zavala, sobre el estado de los treinta pueblos,” *Boletín del Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas* 25, no. 85–88 (1941): 159–87.
  18. *Ibid.*, 162.
  19. Furlong, *Juan Escandón*, 103, 110–11.
  20. For details on indigenous disputes on power and succession, see Guillermo Wilde, “Prestigio indígena y nobleza peninsular: La invención de linajes Guaraníes en las misiones del Paraguay,” *Jahrbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas* 43 (2006): 119–45.
  21. On the activity of the mission printing press, see Guillermo Wilde, “Adaptaciones y apropiaciones en una cultura textual de frontera: Impresos misionales del Paraguay jesuítico,” *Revista História Unisinos* 18, no. 2 (2014): 270–86.
  22. On indigenous writing, see the pioneer book by Eduardo Neumann, *Letra de indio: cultura escrita, comunicação e memória indígena nas reduções do Paraguai* (São Bernardo do Campo: Nhanduti, 2015). Most of the known indigenous manuscripts were produced in the eighteenth century, but accounts indicate that writing practices were introduced in a very early phase in the missions, probably in the first half of the seventeenth century.
  23. On the demography of the missions, see Ernesto Maeder and Alfredo Bolsi, “La población de las misiones Guaraníes entre 1702 y 1767,” *Estudios Paraguayos* 2, no. 1 (1974): 111–137; Ernesto Maeder and Alfredo Bolsi, “Evolución y características de la población Guaraní de las misiones jesuíticas, 1671–1767,” *Historiografía: Revista del Instituto de Estudios historiográficos* 2 (1976): 113–150; Massimo Livi-Bacci and Ernesto J. Maeder, “The Missions of Paraguay: The Demography of an Experiment,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 35, no. 2 (2004): 185–224; Robert Jackson, “Una mirada a los patrones demográficos de las misiones jesuíticas,” *Frnteras de la Historia* 9 (2004): 129–78; “The Population and Vital Rates of the Jesuit Missions of Paraguay, 1700–1767,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 38, no. 3 (2008): 401–31; Carmen Martínez Martín, “El Padrón de Larrazábal en las misiones del Paraguay (1772),” *Revista Complutense de Historia de América* 29 (2003): 25–50.
  24. David Sweet, “The Ibero-American Frontier Mission in Native American History,” in *The New Latin American Mission History*, ed. E. Langer and R. H. Jackson (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1995).
  25. The figures about the Indians captured by the *bandeirantes* are not clear. They oscillate between 30,000 and 190,000 people according to different authors. On this, the classical studies by Hemming are not sufficiently updated. John Hemming, *Red*

- Gold: The Conquest of the Brazilian Indians, 1500–1760* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978). For a revision, see John Monteiro, *Negros da Terra: Índios e bandeirantes nas origens de São Paulo* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1994).
26. Jacinto Lariz, “Autos de la visita de las reducciones del Paraná y Uruguay,” *Revista del Archivo General de Buenos Aires* 2 (1870).
  27. Of the ten reductions of the Paraná River region, only three had a population native to the area—San Ignacio Guazú, Encarnación de Itapúa, and Corpus Christi. The population of the other seven came from the Guairá, Ijuí, and Tapé, regions that had been constantly attacked by *bandeirantes*. Of the ten reductions of the Uruguay River area, only three harbored local Indian groups—Concepción, Yapeyú, and San Francisco Javier. The other seven reductions had population not only from Ijuí and Tapé but also from Iguazú and Ibicuy. See Maeder, “La población.”
  28. Epidemics ravaged the missions constantly. Even though not all of them had the same effect, the incidence of this factor in the missionary demography is striking throughout the history of Jesuit presence. Specialized bibliography registers the following years of epidemics: 1613, 1614–1615, 1617, 1618–1620, 1627–1629, 1628–1632, 1634–1638, 1640, 1661, 1667, 1695, 1700, 1718, 1733–1734, 1735–1736, 1738–1740, 1749, and 1764–1765. See reference in note 13.
  29. Maeder and Bolsi, “Evolución y características,” 130.
  30. Mercedes Avellaneda, *Guaraníes, criollos y jesuitas: Luchas de poder en las revoluciones comuneras del Paraguay, siglos XVII y XVIII* (Asunción: Editorial Tiempo de Historia, 2014).
  31. Pedro Omar Svriz Wucherer, “Jesuitas, Guaraníes y armas: Milicias Guaraníes frente a los indios del Gran Chaco,” *História Unisinos* 15, no. 2 (2011): 281–93.
  32. For demographic information about this relocation see Maeder and Bolsi, “La población.”
  33. Wilde, *Religión y poder*.
  34. On the missions after the Jesuit’s *expulsión*, see Ernesto Maeder, *Misiones del Paraguay: Conflictos y disolución de la sociedad Guaraní (1768–1850)*, Colección realidades americanas 11 (Madrid: Editorial MAPFRE, 1992); Julia Sarreal, *The Guaraní and Their Missions: A Socioeconomic History* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014); Wilde, *Religión y poder*.
  35. Norberto Levinton, “Las estancias de Nuestra Señora de los Reyes de Yapeyú: Tenencia de la tierra por uso cotidiano, acuerdo interétnico y derecho natural (Misiones Jesuíticas del Paraguay),” *Revista complutense de historia de América* 31 (2005): 33–51; Kazuhiza Takeda “Cambio y continuidad del liderazgo indígena en el cacicazgo y en la milicia de las misiones jesuíticas: Análisis cualitativos de las listas de indios Guaraníes,” *Tellus* 12, no. 23 (2012): 59–79.
  36. Guillermo Furlong, *Manuel Querini S. J. y sus “Informes al rey” 1747–1750* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Theoria, 1967); *Bernardo de Nudorffer y su “Novena Parte” (1760)* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Theoria, 1971).
  37. Jesuit Muriel writes, “todos los años por lo regular salen los neophitos á mission, una vez solos, otra vez acompañados de algun missionero.” Guillermo Furlong,

- Domingo Muriel, S. J. y su relación de las misiones (1766)* (Buenos Aires: Librería del Plata S.R.L., 1955), 151.
38. Franz Obermeier, and Leonardo Cerno, "Nuevos aportes de la lingüística para la investigación de documentos jesuíticos del siglo XVIII," *Folia Histórica del Nordeste* 26 (2013): 33–56.
  39. Quoted by Francisco Machón, *La reducción de Guayanas del Alto Paraná San Francisco de Paula* (Jardín de América, Misiones: Ed. del autor, 1996), 18.
  40. On the interactions between *indios infieles* and reduced Indians, see Elisa F. Garcia, *As diversas formas de ser índio: Políticas indígenas e políticas indigenistas no extremo sul da América portuguesa* (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, 2009); Diego Bracco, *Charrúas, Guenoas y Guaraníes, interacción y destrucción: Indígenas en el Río de la Plata* (Montevideo: Linardi y Risso, 2004); Guillermo Wilde, "Orden y ambigüedad en la formación territorial del Río de la Plata a fines del siglo XVIII," *Horizontes Antropológicos* 19 (2003): 105–135.
  41. "Carta de Juan de la Granja y Alvarez a Francisco Bruno de Zavala. Reducción de Jesús, 14 de septiembre de 1770," Sala IX.18.5.1, Archivo General de la Nación, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
  42. González, "Un informe," 171.
  43. Artur H. F. Barcelos, "El saber cartográfico indígena entre los Guaraníes de las misiones jesuíticas," in *Saberes de la conversión: Jesuitas, indígenas e imperios coloniales en las fronteras de la cristiandad*, ed. Guillermo Wilde (Buenos Aires: Editorial SB, 2011).

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# PART II

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## ENVIRONMENT





# 3

## CROSSING BORDERS

### Immigration and Transformation of Landscapes in Misiones Province, Argentina, and Southern Brazil

EUNICE SUELI NODARI

IN THIS CHAPTER I compare the historical process of landscape transformation in the west of the state of Santa Catarina, Brazil, and in the province of Misiones, Argentina. These are regions that both harbor sections of the Atlantic Forest biome, which presents varied vegetation cover of temperate deciduous forest and mixed ombrophyllus forest and experienced a nearly identical colonization process by German Brazilians. Between the 1910s and the 1960s, this colonization process based on private colonies occurred at the same time at the two sides of the border. I focus on a colony in the far west of Santa Catarina, at the border with Argentina, and on two colonies in Misiones, near the border with Paraguay. The comparison of the chosen colonies brings to light transboundary similarities and differences regarding the desired type of settler as projected by these different colonization projects and the environmental changes caused by them.

To have a better understanding of the areas where the settlement of European immigrants and their descendants occurred—that is, inside the forests—it is necessary to first offer a brief description of the two types of forest formations present in the region: the mixed ombrophyllus forest and the temperate deciduous forest. Both are part of the Atlantic Forest biome, the *Mata Atlântica*, which stretches for over three thousand kilometers along Brazil's Atlantic Seaboard from the northern state of Rio Grande do Norte to the southern state of




FIGURE 3.1 Original forest cover and locations at the Argentine Brazilian border, ca. 1950s. Map by Frederico Freitas.

Rio Grande do Sul. The biome reaches inland into Eastern Paraguay and the province of Misiones in northeastern Argentina, and it also advances narrowly along the coast into Uruguay. The Atlantic Forest has an extremely diverse and unique mix of vegetation and forest types.<sup>1</sup>

The mixed ombrophylus forest (MOF), also known as Araucaria forest or Brazilian pine forest, originally occupied around 250,000 square kilometers distributed through the states of Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul; some smaller areas in the south of São Paulo and in the Mantiqueira Mountains; a few other isolated spots in Minas Gerais; and areas in the province of Misiones, Argentina. The MOF is characterized by a rich floristic mixture made up of the Australasian (*Drymis*, *Araucaria*) and Afro-Asian (*Podocarpus*) genera with a landscape strongly marked by the predominance of the Brazilian pine (*Araucaria angustifolia*) in the upper stratum. There were also other species, such as the imbuia (*Ocotea porosa*), the canela lageana (*Ocotea pulchella*), the yerba mate (*Ilex paraguariensis*), the butia palm (*Butia eriostachya*), and the bracinga (*Mimosa scabrella*), among several others.<sup>2</sup>

The temperate deciduous forest (TDF) was known by the settlers as *mata branca* (white woods) in order to distinguish it from the *mata preta* (black woods, i.e., the MOF), where Brazilian pines were found. The TDF comprises the forests of the middle and upper portions of the Uruguay Valley, most of the south mountain range of Serra Geral, and scattered areas of the Jacuí, Ijuí, and Ibicuí River basins, reaching an area of approximately forty-seven thousand square kilometers. The upper Uruguay forest (UUF), as it was called by Rambo, is an extension of the thriving forest of the Paraná River and advances into the Argentine province of Misiones. The UUF is separated from the forests of the Iguazu River Valley by pine wood formations, the latter stretching from the Fartura and Capanema Mountains into Misiones.<sup>3</sup>

The Misionera forest (Selva Misionera), also called Paranaense forest, currently covers an area of twelve thousand square kilometers in the province of Misiones. The forest is divided in two zones: the mixed forests, also known as *selva misionera*, *zona de monte* (hilly zone), or *bosques* (woods); and the fields, also known as *zona de campo* (fields zone). Mixed forest groves are an extension of the Brazilian and Paraguayan forests and like them present high floristic diversity with over two hundred tree species in three strata.

It is worth mentioning that although not the focus of this chapter, indigenous peoples were also present in the area before colonization. The two forests had harbored indigenous peoples for centuries, providing them with native

Brazilian pine fruits, game, and domesticated species such as maize, beans, and cassava. As the process of colonization advanced alongside the Uruguay River, it generated a series of significant conflicts.<sup>4</sup> Both the state government and private companies considered it good business to sell vacant land to European immigrants, but they failed to take into account the indigenous peoples and the peasants who lived on these lands.

In addition to indigenous peoples, this area also harbored a social group called *caboclo*, formed by the contact between Indians and European settlers, especially the Portuguese.<sup>5</sup> Recent scholars have dedicated their studies to recover the history of these peasants who were largely forgotten in the earlier literature on colonization.<sup>6</sup>

The history of the two regions under study has many aspects in common starting with the fact that the borders between Brazil and Argentina were a motive of dispute between the two countries. The international competition for the land in the west of Santa Catarina and Paraná involved a long dispute between Argentina and Brazil, which came to be known as the “Question of Palmas” or “Question of Misiones.” On September 7, 1889, after years of negotiation, the two countries signed a treaty in Buenos Aires accepting the arbitration of U.S. president Grover Cleveland to settle the dispute. On February 5, 1895, Cleveland announced his decision, establishing “the boundary line by the Peperý (also called Peperý-guaçu) and Santo Antonio Rivers, i.e., the rivers that Brazil had proved in documents.”<sup>7</sup> This agreement granted Brazil a territory of 30,621 square kilometers. Part of the same border area in Brazil was also a matter of dispute between the states of Paraná and Santa Catarina. After several legal arguments, an agreement was achieved between the two states, and the disputed area was bifurcated, forming the western sections of Paraná and Santa Catarina. The signing of these two agreements, an international and a national one, created the conditions for a rapid colonization process.<sup>8</sup>

## THE ROLE OF THE COLONIZING COMPANIES

For the most part, the colonization process in this border area of Brazil was handed to private colonizing companies. Many companies had received land grants from the federal government as compensation for building highways or railroads, and they sold the public land to third parties or directly to settlers. The largest company to operate in southern Brazil was the Brazil Development

and Colonization Company, which in many cases ended up selling part of their land to other companies, such as the Volksverein für die Deutschen Katholiken in Rio Grande do Sul (People's Association for the German Catholics in Rio Grande do Sul).<sup>9</sup>

Of the companies responsible for establishing colonies of German Brazilians, I will examine two in this chapter. The first, in Misiones, Argentina, is the Compañía Colonizadora Alto Paraná (Upper Paraná Colonization Company), later named Compañía Eldorado, Colonización y Explotación de Bosques Limitada (Eldorado Company, Colonization and Forestry Ltd.). The second is the aforementioned Volksverein für die Deutschen Katholiken in Rio Grande do Sul, which also operated in western Santa Catarina in Brazil.

These colonies had as their primary mentors the Jesuit priest Max von Lassberg and the civil engineer Carlos Culmey,<sup>10</sup> who had worked together in the early 1900s to create the colonies of Serro Azul (now Cerro Largo) and Santo Cristo in Rio Grande do Sul.<sup>11</sup> Max von Lassberg was a German national who served as a priest in Rio Grande do Sul and was one of the founders of the colony of Porto Novo.<sup>12</sup> Carlos Culmey was an associate director of projects in Misiones who, after retirement had returned to his native Germany. In 1926 he accepted an invitation from the Companhia Territorial Sul Brasil (Territorial Company South Brazil) to oversee the colonization of the company's lands in the west of Santa Catarina.<sup>13</sup> At that time, these two leading characters were considered *patres colonorum*, that is, "parents of the settlers" or "founding heroes" for the new colonies.<sup>14</sup>

The colonizing model adopted for the frontier areas in both countries was the same method used in Rio Grande do Sul, from where most settlers originally migrated. The so-called old colonies in Rio Grande do Sul were first established in 1824 with the foundation of the colony of São Leopoldo followed by colonies in São Sebastião do Caí, Montenegro, Lajeado, Estrela, Taquara, and Santa Cruz, all of which were settled by German immigrants. When their German descendants opted to migrate to the west of Santa Catarina in Brazil and to the province of Misiones in Argentina, they tried to recreate their cultural practices in the new location. The colonizing companies supported this. The most efficient way to bring settlers to the new colonization projects involved recruiting prospective settlers from the old colonies of Rio Grande do Sul. To attract settlers, the colonization companies used newspaper ads and reports, annual almanacs, posters pasted at strategic points, flyers, books, and, especially, colonization agents.<sup>15</sup>

The two most demanding companies in terms of the ethnic composition and religious beliefs of their settlers were the *Volkverein für die Deutschen Katholiken* in Rio Grande do Sul, which obviously only allowed the settlement of German Catholics in their lands, and the *Sul Brasil* (Territorial Company South Brazil), whose colonies were separated by distinct ethnic and religious beliefs. The same model that had been implemented in previous years in Rio Grande do Sul was forwarded by Culmey and von Lassberg in Misiones, Argentina. This type of division by ethnic composition and religious beliefs contributed to the creation and maintenance of specific sociocultural practices characteristic of these groups. It helped define an ethnic culture that generated solidarity within the group and that isolated them from internal and external tensions.<sup>16</sup>

The main technique used by colonization agents involved the persuasion of a particular family member, which then triggered a family migration stream. Through interviews carried out with these people, it was observed that once they got to know the place, they ended up bringing other family members. Given the land fragmentation and high property prices prevailing in Rio Grande do Sul, families with many children were the preferred targets of the colonizing companies. In the west of Santa Catarina and in Misiones, it was possible for settlers to purchase several pieces of affordable land, allowing family members to live in adjacent plots. It was important that members of the same family stay together, since in colonies and small towns extended families constituted the social and economic unit and thus produced goods for household consumption and for the market. Some settlers were originally single and would later return to their region of origin to bring a girlfriend or fiancée whom they had left behind. Generally, marriage between settlers would observe the same boundaries based on ethnic composition and religious beliefs that were enforced by the companies.

A large number of children was the norm among German Brazilian families, for they meant more hands to work in the fields. Women with many children inevitably faced a double burden of “house and field work.” This fact of life was confirmed by an interviewee who had lived in Itapiranga since 1927: “I got married, and I would spend the whole day in the field, I cleaned the house in the meantime at noon. We would never think about resting, and every other year I had a child. I have ten children.”<sup>17</sup>

A similar situation was found in the colony of Puerto Rico, Misiones. According to historian Maria Cecilia Gallero, settlers considered children to be assets. Regardless of age, children contributed to farm working. Gallero writes

that one of her interviewees, another mother of ten children, explained that “even the smaller ones have their obligations: taking care of the small animals, feeding the pigs cassava, and also helping to hoe.”<sup>18</sup>

### AGRICULTURAL BACKGROUND: “PREDATOR CULTIVATION”

Studies on agricultural systems are scarce in Brazil. Leo Waibel, a German geographer, was a pioneer in this regard, and he described the cropping systems of German farmers in Brazil in the late 1940s. According to him, three agricultural systems, or stages, were practiced in frontier areas of southern Brazil. He called the “primitive land rotation system” the initial phase of agriculture practiced in forest areas. They practiced *coivara*—the indigenous slash-and-burn technique—to grow subsistence crops, combining that with the raising of pigs. Mercantile exchanges were few, and transactions were done with a single local merchant. In the second stage, when most forest land had been cleared and wagon roads had been built, trade was more active, and production increased and specialized. They also practiced an “improved land rotation system.” However, soil fertilization did not occur, which led to soil exhaustion after only a few years. The exhausted land—or the land about to be exhausted—was left fallow to naturally recover its fertility. The third stage, the “crop rotation system combined with livestock,” was barely used because of limitations imposed by the small size of rural plots. According to Waibel, the few people who reached this stage “became prosperous settlers.”<sup>19</sup>

Colonies linked to German immigration in Rio Grande do Sul had since the 1900s the help of the Bauernverein zur Beförderung der Einheimischen Produktion (Association of Rio Grande do Sul Farmers for the Promotion of Local Production). The Bauernverein held meetings where settlers discussed issues relevant to the daily routine of a family farm: soil cultivation, organic fertilizing, reforestation, forest burning, rational livestocking, and the establishment of small manufactures, all aiming at the self-sustenance of the region.<sup>20</sup>

However, this association did not last. In 1912, the Catholics left the association and founded the Volksverein in the Catholic Congress in the city of Venancio Aires, Rio Grande do Sul.<sup>21</sup> It is remarkable that despite all the information available about improving farming techniques, information that circulated both in the Bauernverein and during Catholic Congresses (which were annual



meetings with great participation of the community), settlers continued to follow a model of cultivation that in most of the cases proved to be unsustainable.

The agricultural cultivation practiced by the German immigrants in Rio Grande do Sul ended up being used in the new colonies with some adjustment based on experience over the years. What follows is a quick description of the main crops and methods used. This section is intended to describe—and not to justify—the predatory cultivation methods adopted in colonies old and new.

The main products grown since the early days of colonization were common beans, maize, cassava, sugarcane, squash, potato, wheat, and rye. Although beans brought higher profit, maize was more popular among the German colonies and was considered the “queen of useful plants,” because every part of the plant is useful. A major income source for German settlers was tobacco cultivation, also practiced in Germany. Rare were the farms on which tobacco was not cultivated. Since 1865 the colony of Santa Cruz do Sul was considered the largest producer of tobacco leaf, and most of the settlers who migrated to Misiones and Itaipiranga were from this region.<sup>22</sup> Similar to Rio Grande do Sul in the nineteenth century, tobacco cultivation accompanied migrants in the transition to the new colonies because it was a known crop that could yield quick profit.

According to the analysis of historian André C. Werle, the Catholic Congress held in Brazil widely discussed the relationship of immigrants with the environment and the way of conducting agriculture. Werle explains that “burnings, reforestation, crop rotation, crop pests control, green manure, erosion, careful water cleaning, and other issues involving the formation of farmer organizations and the structuring of small farms were recurrent topics.” Werle further observes that to describe the harmful farming methods, discussants used the German term *raubbau*—“predatory cultivation.”<sup>23</sup>

In a lecture at the Catholic Congress of 1905 (held in Harmonia, Rio Grande do Sul), the Jesuit priest Max von Lassberg warned that “colonies do not exhaust themselves, they are exhausted” mainly “because outdated methods are used.”<sup>24</sup> Werle lists the working methods considered outdated and problematic: “the burnings (which occurred after each harvest to clear the land and eliminate weeds); the indiscriminate deforestation, mainly from the hillsides; the lack of fertilizing; and the absence of crop rotation.”<sup>25</sup> In order to combat this predatory cultivation, the adoption of several new working methods and cultivation techniques was suggested. The first Congresses recurrently focused on three essential points: tree planting, fertilizing, and crop rotation.<sup>26</sup> Unfortunately,

this “predatory cultivation,” with minor changes, continued to be practiced in the new colonies of western Santa Catarina and Misiones.

## TARGET LANDS

Itapiranga is located in western Santa Catarina, Brazil, while the colonies of Puerto Rico and Montecarlo are situated in the region of the upper Paraná valley, in Misiones, Argentina. The mesoregion west of Santa Catarina is an area of 27,303.5 square kilometers with the following boundaries: to the west, the Republic of Argentina; to the south, the State of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil; to the north, the State of Paraná, Brazil; and to the east, the mesoregions north of Santa Catarina and Serrana. The economic development of western Santa Catarina was directly related to agriculture and livestock. This region was characterized in the past by the predominance of small family units of diversified agricultural production. Migration of German Brazilians occurred in the whole region but with higher concentration in the far west, as in the case of Itapiranga.

The colony of Porto Novo (later called Itapiranga) covered an area of 583.98 square kilometers and was located between the Macuco and Pepery-Guaçu Rivers. To the south, it bordered the Uruguay River (Rio Grande do Sul); to the east, Porto Feliz (later Mondai); and to the west, the Pepery-Guaçu River, which also marks the border with Argentina. Currently, its original area comprises the municipalities of Itapiranga, Tunápolis, and São João do Oeste. It presented an undulating landscape with few areas of flat land. Agriculture in such a landscape demanded much manual work, especially in the early years of the colonization project, because of the lack of equipment. The region presents a subtropical climate with rainfall in all seasons of the year, floods, and prolonged droughts. The soil is of great fertility, but it exhausts after a few harvests, requiring chemical and/or organic fertilizing.<sup>27</sup>

In 1932, Carl Middeldorf wrote a brochure describing Itapiranga (see fig. 3.2) as a beautiful and prosperous colony. The purpose of the brochure, written in German, was to attract German settlers and their descendants. Middeldorf compared the new colony to Europe, writing that “the colony of the Uruguay River appears to the visitor’s eyes as a true picture of Wonderland. . . . With great scenic charm, this colonial kingdom extends from the banks of the Uruguay River to the small rivers [penetrating] into the forest. All of them flow into the Uruguay River, which, similar to the Rhine River [in Europe], dominates



FIGURE 3.2 Colony of Porto Novo (Itapiranga) and the Uruguay River, in 1937. Courtesy Itapiranga Museum.

and protects this flourishing land. Old memories of rural landscapes of the regions of the Rhine and Moselle arise when observing the river, the land, and the forest.”<sup>28</sup>

The planning of the colony of Porto Novo (Itapiranga) took a decade (1916–1926) to be completed, almost the same time as the colonies of Misiones. However, its execution took longer. Colonization began in 1926 with the arrival of the first German Brazilians, but by 1935, the priest responsible for the register book of the Itapiranga parish still described the existence of “large areas to be conquered [with] extensive virgin forests on fertile lands. There were few lands the settlers’ mighty arms have cleared or have begun to clear.”<sup>29</sup>

The province of Misiones is located in the northeast of Argentina. To the west it borders Paraguay, separated by the Paraná River; to the east, north, and south it borders Brazil, separated by the Iguacu, Santo Antonio, Peperý-Guaçu, and Uruguay Rivers as well as twenty kilometers of land boundaries. Its area is approximately 30,719 square kilometers, representing only 1.1 percent of the Argentine territory. Misiones can be divided in several natural regions, and the region discussed here is located in the upper Paraná valley. This valley presents moderate rolling hills that gradually rise from Santa Ana to Puerto Iguazú and a subtropical climate.<sup>30</sup> German Brazilians had scattered throughout the province of Misiones, but the highest concentration occurred in the colony of

Puerto Rico. Currently, Puerto Rico belongs to the Department of Libertador General San Martín, and its original area was divided into three municipalities because of the emancipation of Capioví and Ruiz de Montoya.<sup>31</sup> Puerto Rico is located at the banks of the Paraná River and borders the municipality of Capioví to the south, the municipality of Garuhape to the north and east, and Paraguay to the west.

The Misiones colonization project was carried out by the colonizing company created by Carlos Culmey and partners with the trade name of *Compañía Colonizadora Alto Paraná* (Upper Paraná Colonization Company), founded on May 2, 1919.<sup>32</sup> The first colony founded by the company was Puerto Rico in late 1919, which only received Catholic settlers. In 1920 another one, Montecarlo, was founded for Lutheran settlers.

In the period 1919–1924, under the direction of Carlos Culmey, about 12 percent of the plots of Puerto Rico were traded. According to Gallero, this percentage may be considered high, since in a few years the central plots of the main routes were occupied. However, this was a problem for investors because many settlers failed to pay off the plots within the allotted time.<sup>33</sup> In 1924, after several changes (such as the retirement of Carlos Culmey) the colonizing company responsible for the colonization process changed its name to *Compañía Eldorado, Colonización y Explotación de Bosques Limitada* (Eldorado Company, Colonization and Forestry Ltd.).

According to data published by *Compañía Colonizadora Alto Paraná*, 160 families had already been established in the colonies of Puerto Rico and Montecarlo in 1922. The *Crónica de la Comunidad Católica de Puerto Rico* indicates that at the end of February 1922, eighty-seven families were living in the colony with a larger number of single people and a total of approximately five hundred inhabitants. The same source brings light to a model of frontier exploration adopted by many German Brazilian families: “first, they would send their older unmarried children to open a clearing in the forest and prepare the first shelter for the family upon arrival.”<sup>34</sup>

## SETTLEMENT OF COLONIES

Land was divided into small plots not very different from the plots of the former colonies in Rio Grande do Sul. According to the colonizing companies, twenty-five hectares was enough for a family to settle and thrive. Thus, small communities were established and often called *lines* or *picadas* (in German,

*Gemeinde*). The socioeconomic structure implemented in the colonies, which were set up in small communities with a church and a school, helped in the community integration. The different communities were distributed in such a way that all of them had access to water (river or stream) and a road. Within the communities, most of the settlers ended up erecting their facilities (house, pigsties, stables) close to rivers to have easy access to water. This occupation of riverbanks contributed to the destruction of riparian vegetation, increasing the erosion and the silting of rivers.<sup>35</sup>

Developing the plots followed various steps, the first of which was to fell a section of the forest. This task was the most difficult for settlers who lacked external help, experience, and proper tools.<sup>36</sup> Once the vegetation was removed, “it was allowed to dry for four to six weeks and then burned in several places on the first clear day.”<sup>37</sup> Logs, roots, and stumps were included in the burning. After that, settlers would remove the weeds and use the land for crops. After harvesting, they would clear the land by hoeing or plowing and burning. In this way, they continued the predatory model of cultivation of their parents and grandparents. Settlers usually managed to clear and plant one or two hectares in the first year. If hardwood trees had not yet been removed or reserved by the colonizing company, plot owners were allowed to exploit them. The land was largely exhausted within a few years. Settlers did not practice crop rotation, they did not attempt to prevent erosion, and only from time to time would they use manure or straw.<sup>38</sup>

Concerns regarding forest preservation were not part of the planning of colonial leaders. In a report published in 1940 in the *Skf Paulusblatt* magazine, a prevailing opinion at the time is expressed:

There, where 1,412 courageous pioneers agreed to fight against the virgin forest, the forest will be defeated soon. There, where some time ago the terrain was dominated by giant trees, which lifted their branches to the sky, today, either maize spreads out in the fields, or tobacco spreads its broad leaves, or the farmer burns his new garden.<sup>39</sup>

## DEFORESTATION

Clearing the forest was part of the colonization process, and along with the settlers, sawmills were soon installed. They tended to belong to people or groups

that had worked in the logging industry in Rio Grande do Sul. Timber export to Argentina was already a business in Rio Grande do Sul and even in parts of the west of Santa Catarina. Logging was an objective from the outset as colonization companies expected part of their profits to come from the exploitation of forest resources. Thus, they set up sawmills, opened roads in locations of interest to them, and organized the transportation of timber.

Logging in the far west, which is characteristic of small logging companies, began in the 1930s; it increased in the following decades and rapidly intensified in the 1960s. From the 1960s on there was the technification of the sector with the introduction of the band saw mill powered by electricity. The logging sector continued to grow until the end of the 1980s, which was the period of highest deforestation.<sup>40</sup> Logging, which was practiced with simple axes and handsaws, was one of the few industries in the region, and settlers felled the forest to clear land for agriculture. They provided timber and received, in turn, lumber from colonization companies to build their homes or other agricultural facilities. Because of the low technical conditions of extraction at the beginning of colonization (transportation and the processing of logs), yields were low, and much forest resource was wasted. In addition, after the felling, the remaining forest resources were burned or left on the ground to deteriorate.

Sawing was carried out using what the loggers called a woodpecker saw, and it was powered by waterwheel or steam tank (also known as a traction engine). Loggers only exploited trees 40 centimeters or more in diameter with straight and healthy trunks and high value logging species.<sup>41</sup>

Transportation initially relied on animal traction, but beginning in the 1940s transportation to places with passable roads began in trucks (see fig. 3.3). In the photograph in figure 3.3, rural farms appear in full expansion, with parts of the temperate deciduous forest in the background.

The diaries of Maria Rohde show aspects of daily life in the Itapiranga colony during the years from 1920 to 1940 that helps us to understand the logging extraction process and transportation to the main consumer market in Argentina:

Currently, the colony carries out its own timber trade. Since the region is already colonized and cultivated to its last frontier, it is possible to see the monstrous wealth of these forests' woods. Many settlers today, after building their houses, facilities and sheds with wood taken from their land, can also sell "beautiful logs" and get extra money from it.<sup>42</sup>



FIGURE 3.3 Wood transportation and landscape in Itapiranga, 1940s. Courtesy Itapiranga Museum.

The situation was no different in Misiones, where logging was the main economic activity from the beginning of the twentieth century up to the 1960s. Timber exploitation was made possible by the existence of large extensions of primary forests, abundant labor, and transportation through the Paraná River mainly through the banks inside the territory.<sup>43</sup> Also in Misiones, the process of deforestation increased in the 1940s, and in addition to animal traction to transport timber, the truck was introduced thus allowing faster transportation to the Paraná River, where the transportation to Argentina occurred.<sup>44</sup> The arrival of timber industries and sawmills increased the pressure on the forest. Similar to the west of Santa Catarina, the sawmills in the province of Misiones were small and low tech despite the large number of these companies there.

### SMALL FARMERS

In general, the settlers in the first two decades of colonization worked practically with family subsistence farming, producing primarily for home consumption and marketing the few surpluses. The main crops were maize, cassava, and



common beans. Puerto Rico and Montecarlo cultivated the same crops in addition to yerba mate. In his book *Pioneer Settlement in Northeast Argentina*, Eidt highlights the importance of cassava, and in his view, it was “the easiest food crop to plant and had the dual advantage of producing its tubers even in poor soil and of not rotting if left undisturbed in the ground.”<sup>45</sup>

For Jungblut, the traditional agriculture practiced by the settlers can be characterized in general terms. According to the author, lands were naturally fertile, which initially generated good harvests. The settlers worked with tools that required great physical effort—such as a hoe, sickle, horse-drawn plow, manual machine for cereal crops, wagon—and they usually had an oxen yoke and a horse. Swine production was also part of the daily life of family farming. Lard was produced on the farm, and farmers reared lard pigs of the *speckschwein* breed. In the case of Itapiranga, for many years, the binomial tobacco and lard was the backbone of the economy in the region.<sup>46</sup> According to Franzen, there was a surge in swine production in the late 1940s—with the emergence of industrial slaughterhouses in São Paulo, which bought pigs for slaughter—to supply consumer growth. To serve the consumer market, there was also the need to improve the genetic stock of pigs. The expansion of the regional pig husbandry in the 1960s was responsible for the creation of the industrial slaughterhouse Sociedade Anônima Frigorífico de Itapiranga (SAFRITA).<sup>47</sup> Most shareholders were merchants from Itapiranga.

The first cash crop planted in Itapiranga and Montecarlo was tobacco, which provided income within one year. Kentucky, Maryland, and Criollo Misionero were some of the principal stands planted. In the 1960s, there were approximately 10,000 hectares of small plots cultivated, and at that time Misiones produced nearly one-fourth of the Argentine tobacco crop.<sup>48</sup> For certain observers, tobacco presented numerous advantages such as being very good to plant in newly deforested land. Moreover, it could be planted with hand tools and held the promise of high yields in only a few years’ time.<sup>49</sup>

Tobacco cultivation in Itapiranga, Puerto Rico, and Montecarlo was supported by tobacco industries. According to Jungblut, Volksverein made an agreement with the tobacco companies from Rio Grande do Sul that provided a technician to instruct the farmers. This technician began his activities in late 1929, hoping that there would be good harvests in 1930–1931. He visited almost all of the 360 existing farms. With the result obtained from the first harvest in 1931, tobacco became the second largest income source for the settlers. Greenhouse tobacco was slowly phased out after the 1950s as the easier to manage



burley tobacco grew in popularity. In the 1970s and 1980s, Itapiranga saw the modernization of tobacco production through the introduction of other crop varieties and of fertilizers, pesticides, and tobacco sheds.<sup>50</sup>

In relation to Misiones, Gallero discusses the cultivation and purchase of tobacco in the period between 1930 and 1946 in the colony of Puerto Rico highlighting the role of tobacco producers and the Johann Company, the colony's largest company of tobacco classification, purchase, and storage (*acopiadores* in Spanish). Working together with farmers was indispensable for commercial development, as this was the first step to link production with processing and consumption centers. According to Gallero, in 1943 there were thirty-two traders and one tobacco factory in Misiones. As Misiones reached the highest number of tobacco farmers with a total of 9,569 producers, it represented almost 62% of the national farmers, according to the Department of Economics and Control.<sup>51</sup>

The involvement of settlers in the yerba mate industry is a topic rarely addressed in Brazilian historiography. In a 2013 doctoral dissertation, Gerhardt deconstructs the idea that the extraction of yerba mate was not part of the daily life of the colonies. The author points out that in some forest areas there was plenty of yerba mate, as in Santa Cruz do Sul, and since the decade of 1880, it was listed as one of the main products exported by the colony.<sup>52</sup> From that region German Brazilians migrated to the new colonies in Santa Catarina and Misiones.

Yerba mate appeared in Volksverein advertisements. Yet there are no studies or data showing the importance or even the existence of large amounts of yerba mate trees in Itapiranga. However, other sources indicate that the extraction of yerba mate in western areas was an important source of income.<sup>53</sup>

Unlike in Itapiranga, yerba mate was one of the main products in the colonies of Misiones. According to Gerhardt, advertising material for *Compañía Eldorado*, written in German, presented yerba mate as a crop that produced results from the third year after planting and gave increasing yields in subsequent years. Settlers were nonetheless subject to market prices controlled by businessmen in the yerba mate sector.<sup>54</sup>

When analyzing the data on the production of yerba mate in Puerto Rico and Montecarlo, Gallero found a substantial difference in the numbers of yerba mate plants found on the two colonies. While Puerto Rico had 4,396 plants, Montecarlo had a total of 28,876 plants. The author explains that this is related to the agrarian landscape, making it clear that German Brazilian settlers did

not practice yerba monoculture, and if they did, it was only on a small scale. One of the explanations for this, again according to Gallero, is the culture of these immigrants. Since in Brazil mate was harvested from natural yerba mate groves, settlers did not have expertise in this type of cultivation. Another negative aspect is that the economic return of yerba mate would take longer than that of other cultures—around five years for the first harvest.<sup>55</sup>

### AGRIBUSINESS IN WESTERN SANTA CATARINA, BRAZIL, AND THE REFORESTATION INDUSTRY IN MISIONES, ARGENTINA

The continuation of predatory cultivation methods in the two regions generated similar problems, but settlers in diverse places adopted different solutions. New alternatives were sought to cope with soil exhaustion and the reduction of forests. With the impoverishment of the population, many opted to migrate to the cities, especially larger centers, where they were employed in the secondary and tertiary sectors. Others migrated to other regions, opening up new agricultural fronts in central and northern Brazil as well as Paraguay, continuing the environment exploitation model with no worries regarding preservation. However, statistics show that most of the settlers ended up adopting new agricultural models and remained on their small farms with various crops. Still others joined the swine and chicken agribusiness, as in western Santa Catarina, or they opted for reforestation with exotic trees for the pulp industry, as in Misiones.

According to Rambo, capitalist penetration in the countryside began in the 1960s with the first agribusiness industry in the region of western Santa Catarina: SAFRITA. This was intensified in the 1970s with the subordination of agricultural work through production contracts.<sup>56</sup>

The change from traditional farming to market agriculture, in the case of Itaipiranga's adoption of an agro-industrial model, also brought sweeping changes to the region's environment. With vertical integration, in which the farmer was forced to follow the technological package developed by the agribusiness companies, pesticides and chemical fertilizers became ubiquitous.

Reforestation in Misiones, according to Mastrangelo, was already happening in the late 1940s, including the cultivation of *Araucaria angustifolia* (Brazilian pine) in Eldorado by Celulosa Argentina S.A. and Porto Libertad. Following reforestation for commercial purposes, small and medium owners used the

cultivation of Brazilian pine to serve as a forest curtain for tung crops<sup>57</sup> and as “an alternative to the failure of intensification of yerba mate plantations.”<sup>58</sup>

The project to produce pulp in Misiones began in 1949 through studies carried out by engineers from Celulosa Argentina S.A. A factory was then established in Puerto Piray in 1956. Moreover, according to Mastrangelo, there was a progressive increase in reforestation with resinous pine. The change to this type of monoculture tree occurred in 1960, when it reached almost five times more than the first area planted with this species—from 219 hectares in 1959 to 911.6 hectares in 1950. Furthermore, in 1967 almost all reforestation areas were carried out with *Pinus* species.<sup>59</sup>

## FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The two regions addressed in this chapter received German Brazilian immigrants in the same historical period. This process has caused drastic changes in the occupied landscape. Yet both western Santa Catarina and the Misiones Province received other ethnic groups as well from throughout Latin America and Asia. This broader influx also contributed to the rural and urban change of the original landscape. The current scenario is characterized by multifaceted landscapes where the continuous forests that existed at the beginning of colonization are now highly fragmented. Only a few small stretches of the original forest still remain.

Misiones now contains a mix of native forests as well as four main types of land use: modern agriculture, forest plantations, mixed use (i.e., subsistence agriculture), and pastures. Agriculture relies mainly on perennial crops such as yerba mate and tung, and Misiones is the largest producer of yerba mate in Argentina. Forest plantations are mainly grown with *Pinus* and *Eucalyptus*. Between 1973 and 2006, “the area of forest plantations increased from 1 to 11% of the province, replacing native forests, agriculture and pasture, partly due to government subsidies.” Mixed use (i.e., subsistence agriculture) continues to be seen on small familiar units that grow tobacco and maize. These small farmers are subject to economic insecurity “because they do not have easy access to the market, credit, or other economic incentives, as have large producers, which uses their land for intensive agriculture or plantations.”<sup>60</sup>

Today, western Santa Catarina’s resulting anthropic landscape can be classified as follows: small fragments of forest; large areas of soybean monoculture;

*Pinus* and *Eucalyptus* plantations; agro-industries, notably pig and poultry husbandry; and small farmers relying on various modes of economic survival. The major remnants of forests are concentrated in three areas of permanent preservation: Parque Nacional das Araucarias (National Park of the Araucarias), Estação Ecológica da Mata Preta (Black Forest Ecological Station), and Parque Estadual Fritz Plaumann (Fritz Plaumann State Park).

The pursuit of economic success in the region has defined the territorial and environmental setting of western Santa Catarina. The imposed continuous changes were incremented by the dynamism and concentration of the agribusiness sector. The agro-industrial integration model adopted in western Santa Catarina was responsible for most of the growing socioeconomic and environmental problems. Among its negative consequences were regional economic concentration, exclusion of small family pig farmers, pollution of water by pig manure, and the regional and rural exodus, especially of young people. The predominance of monocultures such as soybeans, in addition to maize and beans, with little regard to the recovery of the soil and the lack of legally binding relocation policies of pig manure have all contributed to pervasive soil exhaustion.

The migration process has continued into new agricultural frontiers, taking with it the long-standing model of predatory production. With new technologies, however, forests are affected at an increasing rate, and agro-industry as a whole concentrates primarily on commodity monocultures and livestock.

Currently, the Atlantic Forest biome of southeastern Brazil and northeastern Argentina is one of the most threatened and diverse ecosystems in the world. As seen throughout this chapter, the endangered condition of this forest is to a large degree the result of the early colonization model adopted in the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Paraná, in Brazil, and in the province of Misiones.

## NOTES

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# 4

## ARGENTINIZING THE BORDER

Conservation and Colonization in  
Iguazú National Park, 1890s–1950s

FREDERICO FREITAS

### INTRODUCTION

After the Paraguayan War (1864–1870), the border between Argentina and Brazil became a source of tension as the two countries disputed a 3.5-million-hectare swath between the Iguazú and Uruguay Rivers. The conflict was finally resolved in 1895 with the arbitration of U.S. president Grover Cleveland. But the vision of a border alarmingly open to foreign influences continued to inform the ways in which politicians, visitors, and the military in the two countries saw the region in the following years.<sup>1</sup>

Iguazú Falls, shared by Argentina and Brazil, was one of the most sensitive spots along the border. The 2.7-kilometer-wide system of waterfalls on the Iguazú River became the focal point of a dispute between the two countries over the hegemony at the borderlands (see fig. 4.1). In 1889 the Brazilian Empire decided to establish an army outpost and agrarian colony on its side of the border just twenty kilometers from the falls. The Brazilian *Colônia Militar da Foz do Iguaçu* (Military Colony of the Mouth of the Iguazú) eventually gave rise to the city of Foz do Iguaçu, which became a municipality in 1914. But before that, the founding of the colony sparked a “national park arms race” around Iguazú Falls when Edmundo de Barros, an army lieutenant stationed at the outpost in the 1890s, decided to nail a sign on a big tree, four kilometers from the falls, with the inscription “National Park, March 1897.”<sup>2</sup>



FIGURE 4.1 Iguazú Falls, Argentine banks, ca. 1954. Courtesy Archivo General de la Nación, Dpto. Doc. Fotográficos. Buenos Aires, Argentina, Caja 3064, 43156-43157.

Although such a national park existed only in the mind of the Brazilian lieutenant, it was nonetheless a presage of three different developments that would occur simultaneously on both sides of the border. First, state officials from both countries adopted (and adapted) national park policy as an instrument for pushing greater federal investment in the frontier zone. Second, Iguazú Falls—with its massive scale, growing number of visitors, and binational ownership—was construed as a prime target for the national park plans of local and federal officials in Argentina and Brazil. Third, in the 1930s the military and politicians in both countries started calling for the nationalization of the frontier against the excessive influence of foreigners coming from across the border. This in turn influenced park proponents to shape national park policy for colonization purposes.

These three developments happened concomitantly on both sides of the border. However, in this chapter I focus solely on Argentina, the country that offered the most extreme case of using national park policy for border colonization goals. In this chapter, therefore, I analyze the territorial motivations behind the creation of Iguazú National Park in 1934 in the Argentine territory of Misiones along the border with Brazil.<sup>3</sup> It is true that the park owed much

of its creation to the adoption, by park proponents, of international ideas about environmental conservation. Yet territorial concerns at national and local levels proved to be even more decisive in legitimating the establishment of the park. The choice of the binational Iguazú Falls as the site for a national park was part of the move by Argentine officials to use protected areas to control borderlands. By bringing economic development to and territorial domination over a sparsely populated border zone, the proponents of Iguazú National Park aimed to integrate a distant periphery into the rest of the country. To Argentine politicians and high-ranking officials, national park policy fit into their desire to promote the nationalization of a borderland seen as underdeveloped and too susceptible to foreign influences. A park would guarantee their share of control of a symbolic landmark (Iguazú Falls), promote regional development through tourism, and put forward colonization projects along the country's international borders.

## PLANNING A NATIONAL PARK FOR THE BORDER

By the turn of the century, a 200-kilometer band of subtropical forests separated Iguazú Falls from the population centers of South America's Atlantic coast. Argentine firms dotted the area, exploiting timber and wild yerba mate with a predominantly indigenous and mestizo labor force working under a system of debt bondage. The mighty Paraná connected this borderland to Buenos Aires, and a small number of wealthy visitors had started using returning yerba mate ships for an upriver tour to the mythical falls. Once at the mouth of the Iguazú, visitors from Buenos Aires were forced to disembark on the Brazilian side because of the lack of infrastructure in Argentina.

One of these visitors was Juan José Lanusse, governor of the Territory of Misiones (1895–1905), which contained the Argentine side of Iguazú Falls. Lanusse visited the falls in 1898 with family and friends as guests of Nuñez y Gibaja, an Argentine steamboat and logging company. Like other visitors at the time, the party had to trek through Brazil to reach the falls, thus seeing them from inside the “national park” created by the Brazilian lieutenant Barros. Astonished by the scenic view of the falls, Lanusse devised a plan to bring tourists from Buenos Aires, located 1,700 kilometers downriver. His vision included the creation of a regular steamboat service to the area and a dirt road cutting through the forest to the Argentine side of the falls. Furthermore, drawing from the example of the “national park” established by Barros in Brazil, Lanusse lobbied the Argentine

government for the creation of a national park at the Argentine side of the falls. For this he passed in 1902 a provincial decree that set aside the lands around the falls for the creation of a park.<sup>4</sup>

Convinced by the validity of Lanusse's proposal, minister of the interior Joaquín V. González commissioned French landscape designer Charles Thays to design a plan for an Argentine national park around the falls. Since 1891 Thays was the director of the Buenos Aires Office for Parks and Walkways, and as such he was responsible for designing many of the city's Paris-inspired boulevards and plazas as well as the city's zoo and botanical garden. In April 1902 Thays and his team disembarked in Iguazú for a two-month stay in which they surveyed the Argentine side of the falls and designed a plan for the future national park. Thays was not only impressed by the falls but also by the Avenida Aguirre, the still unfinished road commissioned by Lanusse that connected the modest port at the mouth of the Iguazú to the cataracts upriver. Awed by the 20-meter-wide dirt road cutting through the dense jungle, Thays expanded it into a grid of walkways and roads in the plan he presented to the Ministry of the Interior (see fig. 4.2). His idea for a park in Iguazú was based on the same principles of ordered and Cartesian nature present in the French-inspired parks and plazas he had designed in Buenos Aires.<sup>5</sup>

National park ideas gained momentum throughout Argentina during this period. A year after Lanusse lobbied president Julio A. Roca for the establishment of a national park in northern Argentina, the famous explorer Francisco P. Moreno returned eight thousand hectares of public land he had been granted around Lake Nahuel Huapi for the creation of a "natural park" in the south.<sup>6</sup> In 1908, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock delimited the tracts for the creation of the national park in Nahuel Huapi while Congress passed the Territory Development Act, which gave the federal government powers to dispose public land and build railroads in Patagonia.<sup>7</sup> In 1909, a group of northern congressmen led by deputy Marcial Candiotti and senator Valentino Virasoro protested the exclusion of the Territory of Misiones from the 1908 Territory Development Act and drafted a bill for the development of the northern territory. The new law, passed in September 1909, provided for the creation of a railroad connecting the falls to the rest of the country. More importantly, it also provided for the purchase—or if that was impossible, the expropriation—of a seventy-five-thousand-hectare tract of land at the border with Brazil for the creation of a national park to facilitate visitation to the falls and a military colony like the one Brazil had established on its side twenty years before.<sup>8</sup>




FIGURE 4.2 Plan for a national park on the Argentine bank of Iguazú Falls by Charles Thays, 1902. Courtesy Charles Thays, "Saltos del Iguazú, Plano de Trazado General e Instalaciones Varias, Projectado por Carlos Thays" [map] (Buenos Aires: Ministerio del Interior, 1902), as collected in "Ciudad de Buenos Aires: Vistas de Algunos de sus Paseos Antigos, 1870-1889," Archivo Dirección General Patrimonio e Instituto Histórico.



The new 1909 law situated the military colony and the national park on the border with Brazil as the mainstay for the development of Misiones. The plan presented by Thays in 1902 required revision to incorporate the new demands of border colonization introduced by the 1909 law. This time it was the Ministry of Agriculture that commissioned Thays in 1911 to update his project for Iguazú National Park, and the architect presented his new plan along with a detailed explanation to Minister Adolfo Mujica in 1912 (see fig. 4.3). In the new plan, Thays pointed out that a lush subtropical forest still surrounded the falls. The intervention of the federal government, therefore, was needed to avert industrial and commercial development such as the one that had spoiled the U.S.-Canadian Niagara Falls. But Thays was not himself an enemy of development, as his plan for the expanded twenty-five-thousand-hectare reserve reveals. It included a railroad, a new town, a military colony (larger than the one established in Brazil in the 1890s), highways, farms, hotels, and a casino. For Thays, all this development could not only be harmonized to match the natural beauty of the falls and the surrounding forest but in fact it would improve it. To him, the difference between his plan for Iguazú and the uncontrolled development of the Niagara Falls was the planner's mind, who was positioned to improve nature to better suit human needs without spoiling it.<sup>9</sup>

However, the contradiction between development and conservation did not go unnoticed by Thays's contemporaries. His main critic was Paul Groussac, a traveler, writer, and literary critic who, like Thays himself, was also a Frenchman living in Buenos Aires. After visiting the falls, Groussac argued that if Thays's plan were ever implemented it would reproduce the systematic degradation of the natural scenery created by tourism experienced in places such as the Swiss Alps. For Groussac, the project bore the "incongruity between the term 'virgin forest' and the barbarisms of [the proposed] boulevards, plazas, casinos, etc."<sup>10</sup>

## THE CREATION OF THE PARK

The Argentine side of Iguazú Falls was privately owned by Domingo Ayarragaray, an Uruguayan-born entrepreneur from Buenos Aires who had acquired the seventy-five-thousand-hectare estate surrounding the falls in 1907. Although the 1909 federal law provided for the government purchase or eminent domain of the estate, little had been done since then. Ayarragaray, in turn, built a hotel near the falls and improved the infrastructure to cater to the intermittent stream of wealthy visitors coming from Buenos Aires and abroad.<sup>11</sup>



FIGURE 4.3 Plan for a national park on the Argentine bank of Iguazú Falls by Charles Thays, 1911. Courtesy Carlos Thays, *Parque Reserva del Iguazú: Plano de trazado general* (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Agricultura, 1911), Biblioteca Nacional de la República Argentina.



The development of this incipient tourism industry rekindled the Argentine government's decision to purchase the area. In 1926, the Ministry of Agriculture commissioned agriculture engineer Franco A. Devoto and forest technician Máximo Rothkugel to survey the Ayarragaray estate and assess its market value in preparation for its nationalization or purchase by the state. Their report exposes the contradiction between conservation and colonization that dominated Argentine environmental policy up to the 1950s. On the one hand, Devoto and Rothkugel dismissed Thays's plans for a park modeled after the plazas of Buenos Aires, arguing that tourists arriving in the new national park sought experience with a forest in its "natural state," not the "combed and perfumed" nature of the urban parks. All interventions should, therefore, be subtle, avoiding the introduction of alien species (the few existent would be extirpated), reforesting man-made clearings, and using rustic materials like wood and stone in the buildings.<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, their report emphasized, in geopolitical and racial terms, the need to create a military colony similar to the one founded in Brazil in the 1890s.

For the two engineers, the founding of a military colony would create the conditions for the "Argentinization" of the borderland. Northern Misiones already had a few other colonies, but these were mostly made up of Brazilian settlers, and the lack of Argentines impeded their cultural assimilation. Although they valued the "racial purity" of these settlers—the majority descended from Germans who immigrated to southern Brazil eighty years before—Devoto and Rothkugel despised their Brazilian "creole culture" and their material poverty. They criticized the Brazilian settlers for abandoning "the work ethic" that characterized their Teutonic forefathers. Another problem was the close-knit nature of the German Brazilian communities, for their inwardness kept them isolated from the rest of Argentina. Using the indigenous Guarani or the mixed population already present in this border region for a state-sponsored colony was out of the question for the two engineers from Buenos Aires. Colonization, like tourism, should focus on whites only. They believed a new colony should harbor people from different European backgrounds to avoid the brewing of a group identity that could hamper a national one. The colony's goal was to transform white immigrants into Argentines.<sup>13</sup>

The Argentine government purchased the seventy-five-thousand-hectare estate, along with the hotel and other properties, through an agreement between the ministries of agriculture, interior, war, and finance on March 12, 1928, paying three million pesos to Ayarragaray's inheritors. Although the land had been turned public, the creation of the Parque Nacional del Norte—as the project

was called in the 1920s—still required congressional approval and the establishment of a government agency in charge of implementing it. The initial failure in creating another national park, the Parque Nacional del Sud in Nahuel Huapi, served as a lesson for national park proponents in Argentina. This latter park was established by a presidential decree in 1922 in the lands donated by Francisco P. Moreno in 1903 in Patagonia, but due to the lack of institutional support, it existed mostly on paper until 1934. The years following the purchase of the Ayarragaray estate in 1928 were especially turbulent in Argentina, with a military coup and the two-year interregnum of fascist-leaning General Uriburu (1930–1932). It was only after the rise to power of General Augustin P. Justo in 1932 that the national park in Iguazú would be created.<sup>14</sup>

In the meantime, the Argentine army took control of the estate until a final decision was made. The military maintained a small garrison with sixteen troops and exploited, through a concessionaire, the groves of wild yerba mate inside the estate. The hotel by the falls, which now was state owned, was also operating through a concessionaire, the Dodero Company. The Argentine army authorized people living in the estate to temporarily plant fruit trees in existent clearings and to cut firewood for personal consumption, but commercial logging as it had been previously practiced was strictly prohibited. Army officials understood that their mission was to keep the estate free of any significant intervention until the definitive boundaries between the area of the military colony and the national park were set.<sup>15</sup>

Since the early 1900s, the push for the creation of this national park in northern Argentina was accompanied by similar developments in the southern part of the country. In the 1930s, the combination of these two separate national park projects gave the final push for the passing of the 1934 national park law that created the Iguazú and Nahuel Huapi national parks and the Argentine national park agency. In the beginning of the decade, a group of Argentine businessmen and politicians with real estate interests in northern Patagonia led by Luis Ortiz Basualdo and Exequiel Bustillo started lobbying for the creation of a national park commission by the government. Their goal was to rekindle interest in the national park in Nahuel Huapi in the south and use it to promote infrastructure works and develop tourism around Bariloche. But their knowledge of national parks and conservation was fairly limited. Basualdo first introduced Bustillo to the theme as a strategy to restart stalled state investment in southern Argentina. It was an unlikely combination of conservation policy and real estate development. Yet these members of the Buenos Aires elite, with family, friendship, and

business ties to the conservative groups in power since 1930, adopted national park policy as a strategy to bring development to Patagonia.<sup>16</sup>

In 1931 the government established a new Parque Nacional del Sud commission (a first commission had existed from 1924 to 1925), and in 1933, the new commission was expanded and renamed simply Comisión de Parques Nacionales (National Parks Commission), now with Bustillo at its head. More importantly, the commission incorporated the creation of Iguazú National Park among its responsibilities. The commission's main focus was on Nahuel Huapi and Patagonia in the south, and its members were only superficially invested in Iguazú and the northern part of the country. However, they wanted to ensure a legacy of functional national parks, and the inclusion of Iguazú, a national park in advanced stages of implementation, meant greater institutionalization of national parks as policy. They wanted to avoid the fate of past isolated initiatives that focused solely on the creation of Nahuel Huapi as a park and overlooked the institutional structure to support it. The inclusion of Iguazú in the responsibilities of the new commission also responded to the general demand among politicians and the military for using national parks as a tool for the development and nationalization of border zones, a discourse quickly adopted by the members of the national park commission. This was made clear in the 1933 presidential decree expanding the commission that stated, in its seventh article, that national parks located on international boundaries had the mission to "develop a policy of nationalization of borders."<sup>17</sup>

The personal connections of national park commission members with the Argentine political ruling class facilitated the passage of the bill in 1934.<sup>18</sup> Socialist senator Alfredo Lorenzo Palacios presented the only objection: the revision of an article requiring all employees in border national parks be born Argentines. Palacios objected that even for senators such as himself, nationality was not required for sworn office. Senator Cruz Vera, who presented the bill, explained that the planned national parks were located in border areas "flooded with foreigners" and the article was meant to "Argentinize" the border.<sup>19</sup> Despite his candor in explaining the geopolitical reasoning behind national park creation, the article was removed, and the bill was finally approved into law. Law 12103, also known as the National Park Act, established the legal framework for the Argentine national park system. The 1934 act not only created the first two national parks in the country, but also established a national park agency, the División de Parques Nacionales (DPN; National Parks Division). One of the main tasks of the new agency was the nationalization of border regions and the

development of settlements. For this, the National Park Act provided the DPN with the powers to dispose public land within parks and reservations. The agency could grant temporary permits for tenants or sell public land in areas reserved for real estate development inside national parks. The DPN's mission was to set the location of new population centers, plan street grids, build urban infrastructure, and sell urban and rural lots of public land within a five-thousand-hectare limit. In sum, the national park policy in Argentina expected to conciliate the contradictory goals of preservation, public use, and urban development.<sup>20</sup>

For Bustillo and the other members of the DPN, passing a national park law proved to be easier than convincing other sectors of the state to comply with the new legislation and recognize the powers of the new national park agency. The army, which had assumed control of the Ayarragaray estate after its acquisition in 1928 and was required to hand over the area to the DPN in 1934, resisted for seven years before finally transferring the area to the national park agency in 1941 (see fig. 4.4). Anticipating this sort of resistance, in July 1935 Bustillo sent General Alonso Baldrich, then one of the directors of the DPN, to take official possession of the Campo Nacional del Iguazú (Iguazú National Camp), as the military called the estate after 1928. The army handed over to the agency the hotel and other properties inside the estate but not the control of the land. In August a presidential decree stipulated that of the estate's seventy-five thousand hectares, twenty thousand would be kept by the army and fifty-five thousand would be transferred to the DPN as a national park. A final boundary between the two areas was to be defined by an agreement between the national park agency and the army.<sup>21</sup>

Setting those boundaries proved to be difficult, as it required the armed forces to accept transferring their sovereignty over a sensitive border area to a new agency whose members had yet to prove their seriousness. The minister of war, General Manuel A. Rodríguez, purposefully delayed the delimitation as a way to postpone the transfer of the area to the DPN. Rodríguez believed the estate and its infrastructure were too important to be given to a "commission created by some politicians' whim" that "could disappear or be substituted by another commission with different ideas."<sup>22</sup> In the following years, he and his successors at the Ministry of War continued making vague promises to delimit the boundaries without doing much to advance the matter.<sup>23</sup>

The position of the military started to change by the end of the decade mainly due to their own failure in bringing settlers to populate the border. In a 1939 memo General Martin Gras, army chief of staff to Minister of War Carlos Marquez, recognized the army's failure in establishing a military colony "to




FIGURE 4.4 Iguazú National Park, Argentina, in 1941. Map by Frederico Freitas.

settle an Argentine population in the region to cooperate with the armed forces deployed at the border.” Gras blamed the region’s subtropical forests for their failure in attracting settlers from the temperate pampas to populate the area.<sup>24</sup>

Another important development was the initial success of the DPN in intervening on the borderland. Five years after its creation, the DPN had already proved its capabilities not only with the extensive infrastructure it had developed in the Nahuel Huapi National Park but also in the improvement of the properties in Iguazú. Starting in 1935, the agency had renovated the hotel, built pathways and trails by the falls, installed piers at three different points along the Iguazú River, initiated the construction of a thousand-meter-long grass landing strip near the falls, and finished the construction of the park headquarters. It became clear that the DPN’s plan to develop the border through tourism and colonization could succeed where the military had failed.<sup>25</sup>

At the beginning of 1939, the Ministry of War, through its engineering department, initiated the demarcation of the boundary between national park and military camp. The boundaries were defined, and the army passed over the control of the estate to the DPN through a presidential decree in September 1941. The decree designated five hundred hectares of public land inside the national park to be sold to private parties for colonization; the rest of the land, both in the park and in the army area, would remain public.<sup>26</sup>

Behind the infrastructure developed by the DPN in Iguazú was a philosophy that subordinated conservation to colonization. Bustillo recognized that “national park” as an idea lacked a clear doctrine and common principles shared across the board. To him, the lack of an international consensus on national park norms freed him to envision an “eclectic” view of parks as catalysts for border development. He understood tourism would inevitably demand intervention and development in protected areas. He also questioned the existence of “unspoiled” natural spaces as defended by park proponents at the time. In his mind the development, colonization, and conservation of national parks should go hand in hand. To Bustillo there was no point in maintaining a park unspoiled if it posed a threat to sovereignty or brought harm to the economy.<sup>27</sup>

## A TOWN FOR THE PARK

After the 1943 military coup in Argentina, Bustillo became politically isolated and resigned in the following year from his position as director of the DPN.<sup>28</sup>

His resignation and the later rise of Perón to power brought important changes to the national park policy in Iguazú, among them, greater investment in developing an urban center inside the national park. The area initially designated for settler colonization comprised a five-thousand-hectare zone in the northwest limits of the national park, where a hamlet called Puerto Aguirre was located (see fig. 4.5). The location was where tourists from Buenos Aires disembarked to visit the falls. The plan to transform the humble hamlet into a thriving frontier town was part of the national park agency's program since the park was gazetted in 1934. Yet despite a couple of infrastructure works initiated before 1944, much of the investment in Iguazú was hindered by Bustillo's greater engagement in the national parks in Patagonia. After his resignation the Argentine national park agency finally started parceling land and selling lots in the hamlet to prospective Argentine settlers, as provided by the 1934 national park law.<sup>29</sup>

The hamlet—which had its name changed from Puerto Aguirre to Puerto Iguazú in 1943—also started receiving greater federal investment channeled through the national park agency.<sup>30</sup> A major intervention was the opening of a hospital and the campaign to eradicate malaria in the region. In 1945 the Argentine national park agency started building the hospital and sent a physician to deal with the malaria problem in the region. The disease was a major complication for the development of the border zone, and the construction of a hospital in Puerto Iguazú would attend not only to tourists and park personnel but also to the entire population of northern Misiones. Between February and March of 1946, an outbreak was successfully contained thanks to the action of the national park agency, army doctors, and foreign physicians from Paraguay and Brazil.<sup>31</sup> The national park administration coordinated a response to the outbreak, providing doctors with transportation to distant areas and establishing a temporary clinic to tend to the local population. The hospital would only be finished after the containment of the outbreak, but once inaugurated, the local population would no longer have to procure medical treatment in Foz de Iguazú, dispelling the concerns of many in the government about the excessive dependence on neighboring countries. The hospital was finished in October 1946 and occupied a two-story building with thirty beds, a surgery room, a laboratory, and a pharmacy (see fig. 4.6). The park also worked to improve the sanitation of the future town by moving its planned center to higher ground, farther from the mosquito-infested zones by the Iguazú River. Much of the new area was occupied by second-growth vegetation, and the park administration took measures to clear it of its underbrush.<sup>32</sup> A provisional water system was



FIGURE 4.5 Planning of Puerto Iguazú, c. 1950. Map by Frederico Freitas.

implemented to tap water from a nearby creek, and the first set of streets in Puerto Iguazú was also provided with sewage systems. The campaign against malaria continued in the following years, with periodical DDT spraying of areas that contained the *Anopheles* mosquito. The campaign was so successful that in 1948, just two years after the outbreak, no new cases of malaria were registered.<sup>33</sup>

The first plan elaborated by the national park agency for the new town was presented in terms of a sanitary intervention on the small population already living in the area. Embedded in the national park investment in Puerto Iguazú was the desire to transform the border population into model Argentine citizens.





Medicos brasileños, paraguayos y argentinos, que con la colaboración de los franceses, lucharon contra el Boreas. Foto 62

Frente del Hospital construido en Puerto Iguazú por la Administración General a comienzos de 1946. Fue responsabilidad de la Dirección de Salud Pública que lo administraba. Foto 61

Preparando los alimentos que se suministran diariamente a todos los enfermos internados en el Hospital, controlado y del Puerto Iguazú, cuando lo estudian, estudiando a principios de 1946. Foto 63



EL MEJORAMIENTO SANITARIO Y EL "STANDARD" ALIMENTICIO DE LA POBLACION CONSTITUYERON LAS PREOCCUPACIONES DEL AÑO EN EL IGUAZÚ

Vista de conjunto del moderno Hospital, con el Hospital de la "Standard" construido por la Administración General, en el año 1946. Foto 64

En la Granja Experimental, con la que se facilitó a los turistas la compra de los productos de la granja, se consiguieron las soluciones de la alimentación del personal. Foto 65

Niños de la Escuela de Puerto Iguazú, esperando para ser vacunados, en ocasión del buen momento de 1946. Foto 67

Los accidentes controlados en 1946 para facilitar a los turistas la compra de los productos de la granja, se consiguieron las soluciones de la alimentación del personal. Foto 65

Avés de corral en la Granja Experimental, las establecidas por la Administración General en el "Standard" construido por la Administración General, en el año 1946. Foto 65

FIGURE 4.6 Iguazú National Park Hospital, 1947. "The improvement of sanitary and food standards constituted last year's main concerns in Iguazú." Courtesy Napoleon A. Irusta, Administración de Parques Nacionales y Turismo, Memoria correspondiente al año 1946 (Buenos Aires: Administración de Parques Nacionales y Turismo, 1947).

Continuing with a policy of universal education inaugurated in Argentina in the 1870s by Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, the national park agency established a first primary school in the 1930s in Puerto Iguazú and a second one in the late 1940s near the falls. Along with an education, the schools provided children with meals, clothes, shoes, and books. It was also the desire of park directors to oversee minute details of settlers' life and mores. Besides requiring all children to attend school, park authorities also pressured settlers in Puerto Iguazú to formalize cohabitation through civil marriage—a civil registry office was established by the Argentine national park agency in 1945.<sup>34</sup>

Settlers interested in moving to the region had to apply and be approved by the national park agency before purchasing any land. Initially the requirements for new applicants were strict, and of the seventy-two requests filed in 1947, fifty-three were rejected.<sup>35</sup> The agency intended to occupy the border with a population of entrepreneurial Argentine-born settlers, but many applicants failed to meet such criteria, whether because they were foreigners, poor, or failed to constitute a legally sanctioned nuclear family. And yet these were the people attracted to Puerto Iguazú by the job opportunities in tourism and construction, and their lack of legal access to land did not impede them from occupying the many unsupervised stretches of woodlands still available in the town. Concerned with the growing problem of “undesired settlers and squatters,” the agency initially threatened to resort to “judicial action and the use of force” to evict them.<sup>36</sup> However, the chronic situation of labor shortage went a great way toward convincing park authorities of finding a place in Puerto Iguazú for these unqualified migrants.<sup>37</sup>

By 1950 Puerto Iguazú was a booming town. A road connecting the park with the rest of the country, the National Highway 12, had been opened two years earlier. A daily bus line linked Iguazú to Posadas, and a stream of cars, buses, and trucks started reaching the park.<sup>38</sup> The agency began to build a new three-hundred-bed hotel in the town center to cater to the growing influx of tourists. Several new buildings sprung up across Puerto Iguazú, and the agency issued permits for the operation of various new business. Because building was expensive—materials and specialized labor had to be brought from other areas—and access to permits was limited, a housing shortage took root in Puerto Iguazú. Private property building also had to compete for labor and materials with the construction of urban infrastructure by the national park: in 1950 alone, besides the new hotel, the national park agency also opened several new streets, concluded earthworks in dozens of urban and semirural lots in the

town, and built fifteen houses for park personnel as well as several warehouses, shops, and offices. All this development was, in the end, the result of policies pushed forward by a national park agency.<sup>39</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Iguazú National Park fomented experimental ways of promoting territorial occupation, leading to a protected area that diverged from the prevailing national park models of the time. The 1934 national park law had provided for the parceling and selling of sections of national park land for the development of border settlements, and from the 1940s to the 1960s, the Iguazú National Park administration engaged in promoting the settlement of Puerto Iguazú. Argentine national park proponents consciously deviated from their initial inspiration from the U.S. national park system, conceiving parks such as Iguazú (adjacent to Brazil) and Nahuel Huapi (adjacent to Chile) as tools for the colonization and occupation of borderlands. The colonization mission of Iguazú National Park was no accident, as it was already present in the first plans designed by Thays in 1902 and 1911. Since the beginning, national parks in Argentina had as part of their mission the development of population centers and the establishment of infrastructure for dwellers inside park boundaries. The goal was to attract settlers to nationalize a borderland deemed dangerously open to foreign influences, and the newcomers should fit into a model of Argentine citizen put forward by park proponents and government employees.

This citizenship ideal initially relied on a racialized vision of settlers as being of European descent (or even actually European). Later, the racial overtones of this ideal were put aside, but park officials continued to count on an influx of patriotic settlers to lead the process of border nationalization. In the view of many, settlers in Puerto Iguazú should be Argentine, Christian, and legally married—foreigners were excluded, especially those coming from neighboring Brazil and Paraguay. This set a bar too high for a colonization policy applied to a porous borderland region with a tradition of transborder settlement. Park officials, therefore, had to compromise and accept settlers who failed to meet their requirements. This tension between the mandate of border nationalization and the realities taking root in the borderland slowly abated in the following years, as the national park agency steered its focus from colonization to a stricter view of conservation in the 1960s. In 1970 the Argentine national park agency

emancipated Puerto Iguazú and retraced the boundaries of the park to exclude the area of the town. It was the end of a policy of border colonization that had guided the park administration for thirty-six years.

Until the 1930s, the Argentine state had lagged behind its international rivals in the race to control territory and nationalize borders. The establishment of Iguazú National Park in 1934 was an attempt to reverse that trend and to reassert Argentina's power in the region. Argentina created one of its first national parks both to control its side of the magnificent Iguazú Falls and as a response to the earlier creation of a military colony across the border in Brazil. The park was conceived as a means to take possession and occupy a borderland that, in the eyes of the Argentine leaders, was threatened by cross boundary influences. For more than three decades this combination of conservation ideas and geopolitical thinking guided the enviro-territorial policies employed in Iguazú National Park, helping to shape broader ideas of territory and nationhood throughout the country.

## NOTES

1. Bradford Burns, *The Unwritten Alliance: Rio Branco and Brazilian-American Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966); Ing. Norberto B. Cobos (Asesor Permanente de la Dirección Soberanía Territorial), "Historia y demarcación del límite entre la República Argentina y Brasil, años 1454 a 1927," 1951, Caja AH0010, Documento 26, Archivo Histórico de Cancillería, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto; José Cândido da Silva Muricy, *À Foz do Iguassu: Ligeira descrição de uma viagem feita de Guarapuava à Colônia da Foz do Iguassu em novembro de 1892* (Curitiba: Imprensa Paranaense Jesuino Lopes, 1896).
2. Carlos Burmeister, *Memoria sobre el territorio de Misiones, por el naturalista viajero* (Buenos Aires: J. Peuser, 1899), 21–22; Silveira Netto, *Do Guairá aos Saltos do Iguassú*, 2nd ed. (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1939), 161–63, 171–75; Cezar Karpinski, "Navegação, cataratas e hidrelétricas discursos e representações sobre o Rio Iguaçú, 1853–1969" (PhD diss., Federal University of Santa Catarina, 2011), 166, 186.
3. The word *Iguazú* derives from a Tupi-Guarani root meaning "big water" and is spelled in several different ways in the documents—Iguaçu, Iguassú, Iguazu, and Iguazú. In this article, I chose to keep the Spanish *Iguazú*.
4. *Crónica de los gobernantes de Misiones* (Posadas, Argentina: Centro de Investigación y Promoción Científico-Cultural, Instituto Superior del Profesorado "Antonio Ruiz de Montoya," 1979); Emilio B. Morales, *Hacia el Iguazú: Cataratas y ruinas* (Buenos Aires: J. Peuser, 1914), 44–45; *Iguazú: Cataratas y ruinas* (Buenos Aires: Talleres Gráficos Argentinos L. J. Rosso, 1929), 111–15; Florencio de Basaldúa, *Pasado, presente, porvenir del Territorio Nacional de Misiones* (La Plata, 1901); Manuel Bernárdez, *De Buenos Aires al Iguazú: Crónicas de un viaje periodístico a Corrientes y*

- Misiones*, 2nd ed., ed. Luis de Bocard, P. Benjamín Serrano, and Francisco Feuil-liand (Buenos Aires: Impr. de “La Nación,” 1901); Santiago Pusso, *Viajes por mi tierra: Al Iguazú, a Nahuel Huapí, por las costas del sur* (Barcelona: Casa Editorial Maucci, 1912).
5. Carlos Thays, “La excursión de Mr. Thays a Iguazú,” *Caras y Caretas*, March 31, 1902; “El Iguazú,” *La Prensa*, September 10, 1902; Carlos Thays, “Saltos del Iguazú plano de trazado general e instalaciones várias proyectados por Carlos Thays, 1902,” in *Ciudad de Buenos Aires, vistas de algunos de sus paseos antiguos 1870–1889*, Archivo Dirección General Patrimonio e Instituto Histórico; Morales, *Hacia el Iguazú*, 88–90; Sonia Berjman and Ramón Gutiérrez, *Patrimonio cultural y patrimonio natural: La arquitectura en los parques nacionales Nahuel, Huapí e Iguazú (hasta 1950)* (Resistencia, Argentina: Editorial del Instituto Argentino de Investigaciones de Historia de la Arquitectura y del Urbanismo, 1988); J. P. Daughton, “When Argentina Was ‘French’: Rethinking Cultural Politics and European Imperialism in Belle-Époque Buenos Aires,” *Journal of Modern History* 80, no. 4 (December 1, 2008): 831–64.
  6. The Argentine government officially accepted the donation in 1904 in a presidential decree reserving the returned land to a future “national park.” See Argentina, Law 4192, “Acordando al Señor Francisco P. Moreno como recompensa por sus servicios veinticinco leguas de campos fiscales,” August 11, 1903; Francisco P. Moreno to Wenceslao Escalante, “Carta de donación,” November 6, 1903, in Administración de Parques Nacionales, *Documentos de la Biblioteca Francisco P. Moreno*, vol. 2 (Buenos Aires: Administración de Parques Nacionales, 2013).
  7. Ministerio de Agricultura e Ganadería, Expediente 5-I-1908, “Decreto de Reserva de Lotes de Nahuel Haupi para Parque Nacional,” January 17, 1908, *Documentos de la Biblioteca Francisco P. Moreno*, vol. 2 (Buenos Aires: Administración de Parques Nacionales, 2013); Argentina, Law 5559, “Fomento de los Territorios Nacionales,” September 11, 1908.
  8. Argentina, Law 6712, “Comprendiendo en la ley número 5559 al territorio de Misiones,” September 29, 1909; “Fomento de Misiones: September 22, 1909,” in *Diário de Sesiones de la Cámara de los Diputados, Año 1909*, vol. 2 (Buenos Aires: Congreso Nacional, 1909), 771–72, 731–34; Morales, *Hacia el Iguazú*, 88–90; Graciela Silvestri, *El lugar común: Una historia de las figuras de paisaje en el Río de la Plata* (Buenos Aires: Edhasa, 2011), 360–61; Frederico Freitas, “As viagens de Francisco Moreno: Visões da natureza e construção da nação no extremo sul argentino 1873–1903,” *Angelus novus* 1 (August 2010): 115–43.
  9. Carlos Thays, *Parque Reserva del Iguazú: Plano de trazado general* (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Agricultura, 1911), Biblioteca Nacional de la República Argentina; “Parque Nacional del Iguazú: Informe elevado al Superior Gobierno Nacional,” in *Carlos Thays: Sus escritos sobre jardines y paisajes*, ed. Sonia Berjman (Buenos Aires: Ciudad Argentina, 2002), 323–63; Carlos Thays, “Les forêts naturelles de la République Argentine, Congrès Forestier International de Paris, Paris, 1913,” in Berjman, *Carlos Thays*, 357–58.

10. Paul Groussac, *El viaje intelectual: Impresiones de naturaleza y arte, segunda série* (Buenos Aires: Simurg, 2005), 230–235.
11. Morales, *Iguazú: Cataratas y ruinas*; Alberto Carlos Muello, *Misiones: Las cataratas del Iguazú, el Alto Paraná y el cultivo de la yerba mate* (Buenos Aires: J. Peuser, 1930); Franco E. Devoto and Máximo Rothkugel, “Informe sobre los bosques del Parque Nacional del Iguazú,” *Boletín del Ministerio de Agricultura de la Nación* 37, no. 1–4 (1935): 128–225.
12. Devoto and Rothkugel, “Informe sobre los bosques,” 173–75.
13. *Ibid.*, 177–91.
14. Muello, *Misiones*, 62–64, 136–39, 155; Ministerio de Agricultura to Administración General de Parques Nacionales y Turismo, Expediente 4132, year 1952, with excerpts from Comisión Pro-Parque Nacional del Sud to Ministerio de Agricultura, Expediente 9758, year 1933, 61–66, Archivo Administración de Parques Nacionales; Argentina, Decree, “Creación del Parque Nacional del Sud,” April 8, 1922, in Administración de Parques Nacionales, *Documentos de la Biblioteca Perito Moreno* 2 (January 2013): 7–8; Emilio Frey, “Parque Nacional del Sur: Reglamentación Provisoria,” January 1, 1928, in Administración de Parques Nacionales, *Documentos de la Biblioteca Perito Moreno* 2 (January 2013): 9.
15. Ministerio de Agricultura to Administración General de Parques Nacionales y Turismo, Expediente 4132, year 1952, with excerpts from Comisión Pro-Parque Nacional del Sud to Ministerio de Agricultura, Expediente 9758, year 1933, Archivo Administración de Parques Nacionales.
16. Exequiel Bustillo, *El despertar de Bariloche: Una estrategia patagónica* (Buenos Aires: Editorial y Librería Goncourt, 1968), 10–30.
17. Bustillo, *El despertar de Bariloche*, 10–30, 87–91. Argentina, Decree 33192, “La Comisión Pro-Parque Nacional del Sud, se designará en adelante ‘Comisión de Parques Nacionales,’” December 20, 1933, in Argentina, *Boletín Oficial* 2 (January 17, 1934): 580–81; Eduardo Miguel Bessera, “Políticas de Estado en la Norpatagonia Andina: Parques Nacionales, desarrollo turístico y consolidación de la frontera; El caso de San Carlos de Bariloche (1934–1955)” (MA thesis, National University of Comahue, 2008), 46–47; Eugenia Scarzanella, “Las bellezas naturales y la nación: Los parques nacionales en Argentina en la primera mitad del siglo XX,” *Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe* 76 (2002): 5–21.
18. In his memoir, Bustillo gives details on the passing of the bill. The senate commission designated to examine and approve the bill was not invested in advancing the matter, so Bustillo used his extensive network of family and personal connections to put things in motion and collect a majority of signatures to bring the bill to a vote. One of the senators in the commission, Antonio Santamaria, was Bustillo’s wife’s uncle. His brother, Jose Maria, was a deputy in the chamber. He also used his contacts in the press to lobby. He asked editor friends in *La Prensa* and *La Nación* to write editorials in support of the bill. Bustillo, *El despertar de Bariloche*, 107–8.
19. “II - Creación de la ‘Dirección de Parques Nacionales,’” in *Diario de sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores, - periodo ordinario, vol. II: 1º a 30 de Septiembre 1934*, 53<sup>a</sup>



- Reunión, cont. de la 26<sup>o</sup> Sesión ord. (Buenos Aires: Honorable Senado de La Nación, 1935), 722–30; “105 – Dirección de Parques Nacionales, Orden del día número 131,” *Diario de sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados, sesiones ordinarias, Tomo VI: Septiembre 21 a Septiembre 30*, Reunión num. 58 (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Congreso Nacional, 1935), 1017.
20. Argentina, Law 12103, “Ley de Parques Nacionales,” September 29, 1934.
  21. General Alonso Baldrich to Dirección de Parques Nacionales, Expediente 0535, year 1935, “Informe sobre toma de posesión del Parque Nacional del Iguazú,” Archivo Administración de Parques Nacionales; Argentina, Decree 64974, August 8, 1935.
  22. Manuel A. Rodríguez to Carlos Acuña, February 14, 1935, Exequiel Bustillo papers, Legajo 7, no. 3349, Archivo General de la Nación.
  23. Manuel A. Rodríguez to Exequiel Bustillo, March 7, 1935, and Carlos A. Gomez to Exequiel Bustillo, January 26, 1935, Exequiel Bustillo papers, Legajo 7, no. 3349, Archivo General de la Nación.
  24. Martin Gras to Carlos Marquez, May 5, 1939, in Dirección de Parques Nacionales, Expediente 0439, year 1939, “Medida Puerto Aguirre/PNI,” 13–15, Archivo Administración de Parques Nacionales.
  25. Dirección de Parques Nacionales, *Memoria correspondiente al año 1936* (Buenos Aires: Dirección de Parques Nacionales, 1937), 51–52; *Memoria correspondiente al año 1937* (Buenos Aires: Dirección de Parques Nacionales, 1938), 145; *Memoria correspondiente al año 1938* (Buenos Aires: Dirección de Parques Nacionales, 1939), 104; *Memoria correspondiente al año 1939* (Buenos Aires: Dirección de Parques Nacionales, 1940), 13.
  26. Dirección de Parques Nacionales, Expediente 0434, year 1939, “Medida Puerto Aguirre/PNI,” 16–43, 60, 79–80, Archivo Administración de Parques Nacionales; Argentina, Decree 100133, “Fijándose los límites del Parque Nacional del Iguazú y excluyendo del dominio público 500 Hs., para el trazado del pueblo Puerto Aguirre,” September 18, 1941.
  27. Bustillo, *El despertar de Bariloche*, 361–76.
  28. After Bustillo, the national park agency changed its name eleven times, reflecting the instability that characterized the Argentine political life since the 1940s. To avoid introducing different acronyms, I will refer to the inheritor agencies as “Argentine national park agency” hereafter.
  29. Ivan Romaro to Dirección de Parques Nacionales, “E/Informe de obras ejecutadas en el Parque Nacional de Iguazú en el mes de Noviembre y Diciembre de 1938,” Expediente 0712, year 1939, Archivo Administración de Parques Nacionales; Sección Técnica to Dirección de Parques Nacionales, “Elev. Presupuesto Ref. Trazado y Loteo para Viviendas, Granjas y Chacras en Puerto Aguirre,” Expediente 2718, year 1939, Archivo Administración de Parques Nacionales; José Gorgues (retired Iguazú National Park employee), in discussion with the author, August 2014.
  30. The town, which originally was called Puerto Aguirre, was renamed Puerto Iguazú in 1943, but between 1951 and 1955 it had its name changed to Puerto Eva Perón. After 1955, it went back to being known as Puerto Iguazú.

31. By that time the military outpost founded by the Brazilian government across the border had developed into the thriving frontier town of Foz do Iguacu, there was a hospital and an airstrip.
32. Administración de Parques Nacionales y Turismo, *Memoria correspondiente al año 1945* (Buenos Aires: Administración de Parques Nacionales y Turismo, 1946), 5–9.
33. Administración de Parques Nacionales y Turismo, *Memoria correspondiente al año 1946* (Buenos Aires: Administración de Parques Nacionales y Turismo, 1947), 13, 101; *Memoria correspondiente al año 1947* (Buenos Aires: Administración de Parques Nacionales y Turismo, 1948), 75; *Memoria correspondiente al año 1948* (Buenos Aires: Administración de Parques Nacionales y Turismo, 1949), 21–22.
34. Administración de Parques Nacionales y Turismo, *Memoria correspondiente al año 1948*, 23; *Memoria correspondiente al año 1946*, 14–15.
35. Administración de Parques Nacionales y Turismo, *Memoria correspondiente al año 1947*, 71.
36. Administración de Parques Nacionales y Turismo, *Memoria correspondiente al año 1945*, 43, 54–55.
37. One of the biggest difficulties faced by the national park agency was finding skilled labor in the region. Workers had first to be taught how to use wheelbarrows, shovels, helmets, and explosives, which took a long time and created delays. Accidents were frequent, and in two occasions workers had to be tended by the Brazilian doctor from Foz do Iguacu. José Gorgues (retired Iguazú National Park employee), in discussion with the author, August 2014; Ivan Romaro to Dirección de Parques Nacionales, “E/ Informe de obras ejecutadas en el Parque Nacional de Iguazú”; Administración de Parques Nacionales y Turismo, *Memoria correspondiente al año 1946*, 109.
38. Administración de Parques Nacionales y Turismo, *Memoria correspondiente al año 1948*, 23.
39. Administración de Parques Nacionales y Turismo, *Memoria correspondiente al año 1949* (Buenos Aires: Administración de Parques Nacionales y Turismo, 1950), 109–110, 116, 120.

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# PART III

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BELONGING



# 5

## A DEVILISH PRANK, A DODGY CAUDILLO, AND THE TORTURED PRODUCTION OF POSTCOLONIAL SOVEREIGNTY IN THE BORDERLANDS OF LÓPEZ-ERA PARAGUAY

MICHAEL KENNETH HUNER

**W**E CAN ONLY imagine the rage behind the eyes of Casimiro Uriarte when he stared into those of his accusers. Certainly he considered the men not his equal. One was even in his employ and had seized the opportunity to escape a debt, humiliate a patron, and serve the interests of a new master. The allegations were grave in the political climate of the early months of 1863. Barely five months had passed since the death of a president and the proclamation of his successor, with discontent still swirling in a district with men that had dared to raise questions. Uriarte stood accused of voicing seditious sentiments against the ruling family that retained its grip on the presidency and, from the perspective of some, was also running the country into the ground. He faced the humiliation of arrest in the jail of his resident Villa de Concepción before facing his accusers in a trial overseen by the sitting military commandant of the pueblo, Francisco Isidoro Resquín, as his judge.<sup>1</sup> By that time, it was late April 1863, and Uriarte probably could not have imagined a downfall so complete at the instigation of a peon so humble.

Uriarte had faced political reverses before, but the machinations usually came from men of more wealth and influence, and some measure of revenge could often be had. He knew that the district of Concepción was a rowdy, frontier place, with its brazen yerba producers and their large estancias teeming with cattle. For that reason he had sought for a time, years before, to consolidate his own wealth and forge his own influence in reaches even more precarious and

wild in the Villa de Salvador (see fig. I.1 in the introduction). He had once rode proud and roughshod as a caudillo of the more marginal pueblo, enjoying the prestige of elected office and presuming that he could command the support of a president. Those—he might have reflected in April 1863—were his glory days. Meanwhile, he also probably evinced a grudging amusement at the fickleness of fortune within an environment that had long allowed people and nature to spurn those who presumed to tame and rule them.

In this chapter I follow the events of such distant places and forgotten ruffians in the wild northern reaches of mid-nineteenth-century Paraguay. Examining them challenges conventional understandings of the country's early postcolonial past. Historians have long located the political history of nineteenth-century Paraguay in the actions of powerful despots who allegedly projected an almost unbroken radius of state sovereignty and personalized rule from their seat of power in Asunción.<sup>2</sup> Few studies have considered the limitations of the despots' power.<sup>3</sup> Fewer still have taken full account of how the territory's frontier reality produced significant degrees of fragmented, contested, and overlapping sovereignties at the local level, especially in areas well removed from the capital. Indeed, much of the countryside, despite the fictions of national borders and territoriality, remained very much "middle ground" well into the nineteenth century and beyond.<sup>4</sup> These were borderlands, and it was precisely along the wide margins of this frontier society where the reproduction of postcolonial state sovereignty could still be won or lost and took on its rawest form. Such a place was the Villa de Salvador.

Salvador was the ultimate frontier town in a frontier society. It was the northernmost reach of Paraguayan settlement along the Río Paraguay. Caught in the midst of enveloping wilderness, central state authority could be as diffuse as the haze of burning wood in the air. It was a rough place with a lawless reputation, and it occupied the long-contested overlap of free indigenous domains, imperial Brazilian encroachments, and the settler presence of *paraguayos*. Here formal vestures of state authority—military command, clerical authority, electoral politics, the capacity to put pen to paper—worked in tandem with more informal exercises of power—a favor withheld or given, a flogging—to build the influence of men. And here the likes of priests and caudillo-like officials fought over local command of authority, state resources, and the control of labor. The fights proved turbulent and enduring precisely because the ruling López regimes (that of Carlos Antonio, 1840–1862, and that of Francisco Solano, 1862–1870) depended on such caudillos to project the fragmented power of the

postcolonial state over the land. Meanwhile, the likes of indigenous chieftains, ex-convicts, peasant women, and peons also entered the frays looking to take advantage.

Within a historiography mostly concerned with the political center then, in this chapter I provide a needed vantage point of postcolonial state formation in mid-nineteenth-century Paraguay from the extensive margins. While mediums like official correspondence, civic fiestas, and public prayers could cast a distant aura of nationhood and patriarchal authority centered in a single autocratic leader from Asunción, the dynamics of fragmented state sovereignty consistent with colonial times persisted, and local actors fought for influence and profited as a result. For, again, the López regimes necessarily allowed clients in the countryside to build their own fiefdoms of wealth and power to sustain the premise of state rule, and subalterns relished in exploiting the open spaces and cracks in power found therein.

## THE FRAGMENTED SOVEREIGNTY OF THE NORTHERN REACHES

The Villa de Salvador was a place that brought many risks and rewards. Its original settlement early in the nineteenth century was the result of a still tenuous postcolonial Hispanic-creole settler advance. At that time the gains of creole settlement overall in the northern reaches of Paraguay were still precarious. The districts of Concepción and San Pedro had emerged as hubs of the frontier-born yerba mate production in the late-colonial boom years following their founding during the late 1700s. But historical experience in the colonial province had taught that the typical predations of the frontier could reverse these gains. For the first two centuries of the colonial rule in the province, attempts to settle the reaches north of the Río Jejuy met routine reversals at the hands of autonomous indigenous peoples. That is, for two centuries, autonomous groups had been winning the wars of conquests there. Moreover, the economic disruptions of independence brought a precipitous decline in the yerba trade, and a deteriorating economy threatened any pretensions of permanence for settlements in the northern reaches. If anything, the advance of creole settlement via commercial expansion in the north was stunted by the 1820s.<sup>5</sup>

The original settlement of Salvador illustrated the potential reverses and dangers at hand. Even before its formal severance from the Spanish colonial

empire, an increasingly strident provincial government had ordered in 1812 the settlement of the area under the premise of forming an added rampart of “civilization” on a threatened northern frontier. In doing so, it manifested a crude if persistent colonial racial logic. The government mandated a settlement exclusively of free blacks created on the same communal basis as colonial-era Indian pueblos. Dozens of black residents of the Dominican cattle estate of Tavapy moved northward with the promise of land and supplies. The free black colony of Tevego, as the village was first known, did not last. It was abandoned several years later under the constant pressure of frontier attacks and internal dissension.<sup>6</sup>

Decades later, during the 1840s, after the long autocratic regime of Dr. José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia, a new administration under Carlos Antonio López re-founded the settlement Villa del Divino Salvador. The settlement served once again as a frontier bulwark, and substantial numbers of free blacks returned. But the López regime made it principally a destination of internal exile for convicted criminals.<sup>7</sup> By the late 1840s, in a time of renewed export trade based in yerba production from the northern reaches, Salvador saw its own prospects rise. Laborers from the Villa regularly traveled south to work the yerba fields around Concepción and San Pedro, either clandestinely or with the sanction of a required internal passport.<sup>8</sup> Even so, Salvador had few yerba fields in its environs and few, if any, yerba merchants and producers. External commerce there centered mostly on the extraction of building materials—timber, stones, palm branches, and bamboo stalks—from forests and creek beds, usually sent downriver to Concepción, the capital, or elsewhere.<sup>9</sup> Cattle also roamed the forest pathways and riverside pastures as agents of settlement expansion.<sup>10</sup> The state established the largest herds and ranches in the area, with animals soon numbering in the thousands. A growing collection of modest ranchers, still just a fraction of the total population, held smaller herds of livestock of usually twenty to thirty animals.<sup>11</sup>

The majority of residents managed lives of itinerant labor and subsistence survival. Work in the yerba fields familiarized men with the regular attacks of unconquered indigenous peoples. So did the obligation to post regular militia duty, manning dangerous pickets among forests as far north as the Río Apá. Meanwhile women tended to the household plots, while larger fields often fell victim to neglect, pests, and heavy rains. Labor was always in short supply.<sup>12</sup> As one longtime resident commented, settlers hesitated to expand their small plots and rustic homesteads. They retained the “fear, insecurity, and apprehension”

burned into their minds by “those great assaults and massacres of their people seen with their own eyes, committed by the savages.”<sup>13</sup> The persistent threat of encroachments by imperial Brazilian settlers added to the brunt of the wilderness’ violent predations.

The village of Salvador thus sat enmeshed among unfixed domains and conflicting territorial claims and the haunts of forest peoples. For centuries, the story in the province was not one of persistent Hispanic-creole advance but reversal, and the short history of Tevego/Salvador bore this out. In these tenuous reaches the sitting president of the republic needed clients who could cast their own aura of personalized authority. Casimiro Uriarte was one who fit the bill and who perceived opportunity in the poverty and the danger. Probably sometime in 1847–1848 he secured appointment from Carlos Antonio López as commandant of Salvador. As a Concepción rancher and slave owner who made regular visits in cattle drives to Asunción, Uriarte was known in the capital as a power broker of the northern reaches.<sup>14</sup> In Concepción, however, he stood on the cusp of the local economic elite. In a society where livestock holdings were a standard measurement of wealth, his riches paled in comparison to those of rivals.<sup>15</sup> But he could be a veritable giant in Salvador. This was a place for him to build political influence and wealth.

Uriarte had built his wealth along the fringes of settlement around Concepción and understood bitter frontier realities. He was in his late forties by mid-century and grew up with a colonial province making the uneasy transition to postcolonial nationhood. He knew that some experiences, especially in Salvador, would remain persistently familiar, as when during his boyhood people of the province still professed loyalty to a distant Spanish king.<sup>16</sup> For as military commandant of Salvador, Uriarte engaged in military affairs. And it was the “Portuguese and Indian infidels,” as he termed them, who inflicted regular attacks. With command of some thirty regular soldiers along with those residents pulled onto militia duty, he often spent days if not weeks in the bush charting new outposts or leading punitive expeditions. He planned ambushes against hostile indigenous groups rumored to be camping at certain locations—freely exploiting indigenous guerrilla tactics—only to encounter camps already abandoned and burned.<sup>17</sup> Consistent with old colonial realities in postcolonial times, imperial Brazilian settlers were still termed “Portuguese,” and autonomous indigenous peoples were still defined by their condition as religious outcasts.

Uriarte knew that control over untamed forests, riverbeds, and hillsides proved ephemeral. To lay foundations of his authority in Salvador, he too needed



liaisons among the unsubjected peoples of the forests. Commerce was one way to extend these connections. Over the course of 1849 Uriarte further developed trade with a tribal grouping that in exchange for cattle supplied firearms and horses, items in short supply in the village. He conducted exchanges on behalf of the state in such barter, acquiring in one instance three firearms for each head of cattle and, in another, three horses for a young calf. At the same time he also negotiated acquisitions for himself and bought guns and other supplies for his estancia. Residents, too, engaged in this trade and gathered to meet the “Indian infidels” on the outskirts of the village to work out their own deals.<sup>18</sup> The trade met material demands while building certain tactical alliances, and Uriarte came to rely on bonds established with one indigenous chieftain: Cacique Rubio.

Rubio was the leader of a tribal grouping of perhaps dozens of kin. His group guarded the autonomy of the forests but perceived advantages in regular engagement with Paraguayan settlers. The Hispanicized name by which Uriarte knew Rubio suggested the syncretic, creolized character of his people.<sup>19</sup> He and kinsmen were frequent visitors to Salvador, where they probably proffered goods while dealing with the commandant in his headquarters. Rubio shared information about the whereabouts of other free indigenous clans in these encounters. Uriarte used the meetings to cement loyalties and extend patronage. For example, in January 1849, Uriarte advanced a request from Cacique Rubio to the president for a pair of trousers and a dress coat for the chieftain’s personal use. Rubio understood the prestige to be gained from fine textiles among his people, and Uriarte sought the cultivation of a personal client and an ally of the state. To sweeten the request, the commandant also conveyed to the president his belief that Rubio was “inclined to Religion.” Whenever Mass was said while he was in the Villa, Rubio attended, standing at the door of the church and imitating the movements of the congregants.<sup>20</sup>

Cacique Rubio also understood the necessary liaisons and gestures of this unstable landscape where religious inclinations still communicated political loyalties. It is noteworthy that indirectly through the missives of Uriarte, the cacique had the ear of a postcolonial president and could expect that this chief in Asunción was listening, carefully. The activities and movements of unsubjected forest peoples were a regular focus of the written reports issued by subordinate officials from throughout the interior and sent to the president. The president’s own written ordinances in response show that he followed these reports closely and with occasional ethnographic flair. By all means he considered most unsubjected indigenous peoples in the provincial orbit duplicitous “savages,” but he

lent close attention to the complicated tangle of deals with different leaders and tribal groupings as he understood them.<sup>21</sup> The attention reflected how critical these interactions still were for the very projection of sovereignty by the postcolonial Paraguayan state. This state had inherited the late-colonial penchant for new political imagining, with its fixation on borders and pretended rule over a contiguous stretch of defined “national” territory. Political realities, as imposed by autonomous indigenous peoples, nonetheless conformed to older models of sovereignty where pockets of Hispanic-creole settlement in the province radiated social and political control outward into the hinterlands only to have it dilute and dissipate, sometimes quickly, in the overgrowth of the untamed *monte* and overlap with the proclaimed domains of unaffiliated peoples and other postcolonial powers.<sup>22</sup> In the north, the villas of Concepción, San Pedro, and now Salvador were crucial radial points of state presence and control. And there, quite simply, the very wealth of the Paraguayan state and its emergent provincial elite depended on an herb extracted from such contested domains of the unsubjugated *monte*, and the cooperation and the labor of free indigenous groups were necessary to keep the yerba mate and the money flowing. Moreover, their cooperation was also necessary to help plug a regular flow of deserters and runaways and check the advances of Brazilian settlers and the disruptions of other indigenous groups.<sup>23</sup> That is, they were needed to help project the fiction of fixed borders and territorial sovereignty that their very presence disrupted. And back in Salvador, Cacique Rubio had succinctly communicated this political reality to the president, via Uriarte, with his request for a coat and trousers.

## THE WORKINGS OF LOCAL POLITICS

Men like Uriarte were on the frontlines of such critical frontier interactions and were doubly conscious of obligations owed to a political patron in Asunción and the exercise of power closer to home. Local authority in this environment hung on reinforcing knots of formal public office, personal bravado, and the informal vertical webs of clientelism.<sup>24</sup> Meanwhile, potential rivals who could encroach on and undermine one’s claim to power circulated both near and far.

Cacique Rubio was just one client among many that Uriarte cultivated around Salvador. Uriarte’s position as *estanciero* and slave owner had supplied him a handful of dependent laborers back in Concepción that through cajolery, promises, and protection could be convinced to do his will. But his position

as commandant in Salvador now gave him access to another pool of potential dependents. Convicts were channeled to labor on his estancia. Men serving militia duty could be put to work building a larger house for, say, a prominent local friend promising loyalty or for a lover.<sup>25</sup> Public work drafts also lent Uriarte additional manpower for cattle drives or to cut bamboo stalks to sell back to the state. He could commit an orphan, cattle rustler, or wayward woman to work in the homes of other acquaintances for future favors and considerations.<sup>26</sup> He also managed the resources of the state-owned estancia and its livestock. Few would question his lending of state-owned oxen out to a friend in the villa. Slaughtering a calf from the state herds for a party thrown for the peons working the state estancia would only serve to build the bonds of gratitude back to his person.<sup>27</sup>

Uriarte also did not shy away from violence to show he was the boss in town. Leading a punitive expedition into the bush commanded the respect of men, but so did, back in Salvador, the wielding of the lash. The distribution of floggings was part of the personalized, patriarchal exercise of public office that had their deliberate parallels in the routine violence of Hispanic-creole households. No doubt that Uriarte resorted to having dependent workers whipped on his own estancia in Concepción for perceived infractions. In Salvador, the exercise of his official duties included such displays as well. The whipping post of the public plaza stood with the parish church and the commandant headquarters as symbols of state justice and sovereignty. More than once, following the judicial rulings of the president himself, Uriarte had recaptured penal deserters bound to the post and oversaw the application of dozens of lashes—“sharply given” as the commandant himself had notarized—on the backs of men.<sup>28</sup> Uriarte also enjoyed formal discretion to use the post to flog other troublemakers on his own, such as cattle rustlers, gamblers, and drunks.<sup>29</sup> This discretion could extend to personal affairs. It was reported that once in 1851 Uriarte had the young *parda* woman Ramona Romero brought before him in his headquarters, forced her to lie stretched across the floor, and whipped her twenty-five times in the presence of a gathered audience. He cared nothing that Romero was several months pregnant. She allegedly had an ongoing row with Uriarte’s rumored lover in town.<sup>30</sup> This violent public ritual of racialized misogyny, however extrajudicial the application, only fed the aura of formal sanction of his command in its overlap with official practice. He also made clear in the act that his clients in the villa were not to be harassed.

Judicial authority was a crucial dimension of Uriarte’s command. Yet so much occurred outside the purview of written acts or proceedings, such as the flogging

of Ramona Romero. In addition, the regular business of issuing and receiving the written internal passports required of anyone traveling outside their legal residence occupied much of his time. More expedient was the verbal consent to travel given to resident laborers who went seeking work in Concepción and San Pedro.<sup>31</sup> Such consent Uriarte was known to give upon channeling labor to acquaintances in those lucrative districts. It is also likely that Uriarte held informal judicial hearings on behalf of other residents, especially militia soldiers, who sought his justice and saw him as the main boss in town.<sup>32</sup>

All these acts intentionally encroached on the jurisdiction of the appointed civil magistrate of the villa, Venancio Candia. Unlike Uriarte, Candia made Salvador his primary residence. He too was a middling rancher, though of even more modest holdings than Uriarte, most of which he had inherited from his wife in marriage. He too looked to use his position to make gains in wealth and influence locally.<sup>33</sup> As *juez*, he was to decide on minor judicial cases not directly involving militia soldiers or church officials. Candia was also responsible for pursuing intruders, vagrants, and thieves as well as enforcing “public morality” against out-of-wedlock unions. Such enforcement was never consistent though, especially in a countryside, where extramarital adventures were common.<sup>34</sup> And Candia trod carefully in the exercise of his office with Uriarte in town, knowing who had the commandant’s protection and who did not. But Candia’s position provided another potential powerbroker in the villa from whom residents could seek justice. Also, whenever Uriarte left the pueblo to attend to his affairs, he had to leave his command with Candia.

Uriarte sought his advantage in the cultivation of closer ties to the ultimate political patron in Asunción. Both he and Candia owed their appointments to the president. In 1849, however, the incidence of a national congress—the first held since Carlos Antonio López’s formal election to the presidency in 1844—provided Uriarte the mechanism to manifest his sway in Salvador as well as to further ensconce his own position in the aura of the republic and presidential authority. The district of Salvador could elect its own contingent of deputies to the then two-hundred-member congressional chamber. In the proceedings of the district electoral junta that followed—held in the parish church and overseen by Uriarte—the commandant managed to cajole the gathering of local notables to elect him as a deputy.<sup>35</sup> It was another important exercise of power, both theatrical in action and with real political stakes, showing who was boss in town.<sup>36</sup> In June, Uriarte proudly made his way downriver to the capital to participate in the congress. He perhaps donned new shoes, traded gossip, smoked

cigars, and eyed other more prominent rivals in the corridors of the Asunción cabildo, all before taking his place on a bench in the chamber to hear the words of the president in Spanish outline the accomplishments of the national government. Many like Uriarte were content to let the esoteric air of the discourse wash over them. Others were not afraid to take the floor and pronounce their own words, if only in awkward, slavish praise. What really mattered was to be present for the formal act of congressional approval of presidential decrees and to clamor noisily in electoral “protest” when Carlos Antonio López performed his own theatrical maneuver, proffering his resignation only to incur the unanimous rejection by the legislature.<sup>37</sup> Playing his part in the charade of popular sovereignty, Uriarte reassured the president that he was his man in Salvador—sentiments that López himself likely reciprocated in a personal audience.

Meanwhile, Candia and the resident parish priest, Venancio Toubé, had not won election to the 1849 congress and remained back in Salvador—but not without also doing their part to partake in the national electoral charade. It was here that rituals of central state sovereignty took on critical local manifestations, which were particularly important in such a precarious frontier landscape. Candia and Toubé acted in Uriarte’s absence as the principal representatives of state authority in Salvador, and when news of the successful completion of the congress reached the villa, it fell to them to carry out the necessary ceremonies for the benefit of the local populace. Candia did so with due decorum, gathering what he could of the townsfolk, reading the official announcement in Spanish and explaining it in Guaraní. He then ordered the national flag to be raised to the ringing of bells and firing of volleys. The priest Toubé promised to say a thanksgiving mass for the congress the following day.<sup>38</sup> Candia believed that he had done his duty. But even this satisfaction Uriarte later sought to undermine. Uriarte was the one who usually oversaw the festivities of patriotic ritual with their serenades and dances in the commandant headquarters that often accompanied the masses and flag raisings.<sup>39</sup> When Uriarte returned from his participation in the congress in Asunción, he spread rumors among other local notables about how weak Candia was.<sup>40</sup>

Uriarte saw Candia as someone he could dominate. With the priest Toubé, however, he proceeded more carefully. It was no secret in town that Toubé perhaps did as much drinking as preaching. He entreated parishioners to supply him with jugs of sugarcane liquor often smuggled into town from ports downriver. Word had it that he also got drunk on the stores of communion wine. Toubé was from an aging generation of independence-era priests. He had spent

the bulk of his career serving various rural parishes during the time of Dr. Francia—a time of neglect for the provincial church and its clergy. Aspirations were more limited then, and priests settled with what resources they could build with sacramental fees and spiritual influence. At that time, Toubé had also provoked outcry with bouts of public drunkenness and scandalous affairs with married women.<sup>41</sup> These were nonetheless not unknown vices even among the clergy. Uriarte, understanding the influence any man of the cloth could carry, turned a blind eye to the drinking by the priest. He also appreciated the opportunity to publically humiliate Toubé when in April 1850, on the president's orders, he reprimanded the priest “for his scandalous and incessant drunkenness” before two witnesses in the commandant's headquarters.<sup>42</sup>

This was not the first time the priest had been humiliated before the local populace. Toubé conducted the ritual affairs of his office from a ramshackle chapel. He also lived in a small thatched house, offering little protection from the elements, particularly the oppressive heat for seven months of the year. In his advancing age, Toubé approached Uriarte in 1849 with the request to compel local parishioners to build him a new residence. Uriarte refrained from fulfilling the priest's request. He understood that Toubé was hardly destitute, as the cleric controlled land and livestock and employed peons to help work his fields. Uriarte instead instructed Toubé to request the construction of the house from his parishioners straight from the pulpit. The priest did so and a year later was still waiting for the building to begin. With bitter words, Toubé complained about the alleged ingratitude of people that he claimed to serve night and day. Meanwhile his dilapidated house revealed the lack of compelling authority of an old, hard-drinking cleric.<sup>43</sup>

Still, Uriarte remained wary about discounting the priest altogether. Toubé was a man who carried out his duties, saying regular mass, celebrating religious and political holidays, hearing confession, performing sacraments, and dispensing penance.<sup>44</sup> In the tripartite blend of local authority and sanction among commandant, magistrate, and priest, it was ultimately from Toubé's office that all claims and representations of state sovereignty sprung. Even more so than its predecessors, the López regimes clung to the spiritual sanction and legal regime of the Catholic Church as a fundamental arm of governance. Toubé was the physical representation of this sanction and regime in Salvador. Moreover, he was one of few in town who mastered the power of writing. In a social world of spoken Guarani and limited literacy, knowledge of the traditional written language of state, Spanish, afforded significant influence. Toubé recorded baptisms,

marriages, deaths, and even censuses that still marked parishioners' fundamental legal identities with the state. By 1850, he also served as the ecclesiastical judge for his district to arbitrate marriage disputes among his parishioners, and he decided what to write and report back to Asunción in such cases.<sup>45</sup> Finally, his ability with the quill was such that he composed biting missives directly to the president.<sup>46</sup> Uriarte and Candia found his control of writing threatening.

Uriarte and Candia did not exercise the same power over the critical medium of writing. Although hardly illiterate, the degree of their literacy was limited enough to undermine their ability to compose records in proper legal form and write correspondence that also succored the essential link between their offices and the aura of presidential authority. For the proper recording of judicial proceedings, the keeping of accounts, and the critical discursive exchange of texts between frontier periphery and political center, both Uriarte and Candia turned to the local schoolteacher, Buenaventura Carmona. Aged, poor, and suffering from urinary incontinence, Carmona lived from the patronage of these town officials and what donations he could extract from local residents for his services as teacher. Candia later praised Carmona as a devout patriot.<sup>47</sup> The praise spilled from appreciation of Carmona's role as one of many obscure lettered functionaries that dotted the Paraguayan countryside who produced the records and letters that carried the signatures and rendered voices of others.<sup>48</sup> In this fashion, he primarily served Uriarte and portrayed the commandant, in his communications with the president, as an altruistic servant of the state. A promised donation of palm branches to the government from the commandant's personal stock, for example, spilled into commentary on international politics and praise for the sagacity of Carlos Antonio López in one April 1851 letter.<sup>49</sup> It was through the hand of Carmona that Uriarte, two years after the congress, continued to cultivate ties with his distant political patron in Asunción and sustain the aura of his own authority in Salvador.

Shortly thereafter, in June, Uriarte drew on Carmona's talents in a desperate bid to hold onto public office. Animosity sowed with powerful rivals in Concepción were coming back to haunt Uriarte. He had reason to believe that Santurino Bedoya and Blás Martínez were conspiring against him, and the two were formidable enemies to have. Martínez was the principal yerba producer of the prominent northern district. Bedoya too worked in the yerba trade as a merchant but, most importantly, had married into the ruling López family. Both men owned substantial livestock holdings.<sup>50</sup> Bedoya, in particular, had the president's ear and did not hesitate to denounce Uriarte for perceived offenses. The commandant of Salvador responded with an incredible flourish of a letter

that described both men as predatory playboys who chased after loose mulatas, scandalized homes of other married men, and had designs on Uriarte's grown daughter, who remained back on his estate in Concepción. This was the targeted employment of salacious gossip as political weapon. The letter questioned the patriotic loyalty of his rivals and impetuously suggested that they be conscripted to serve as common soldiers on a frontier garrison. Meanwhile, it depicted Uriarte as "a loyal, patriotic servant and lover of my *patria*" who worked tirelessly "defending against the savages and moving this Pueblo forward." Finally, it announced Uriarte's intention to return to Concepción "to fix the disorder" of his home before traveling to Asunción to speak personally with Carlos Antonio López.<sup>51</sup> Through the pen of Carmona, Uriarte managed quite the rhetorical stand. His influential enemies, though, got the best of him. Later that month, the president relieved him of his commandant post in Salvador and named Venancio Candia as his replacement.<sup>52</sup>

## THE REVENGE OF URIARTE

We are not privy to the informal exchanges that took place between Uriarte and the president in Asunción that led to the commandant's removal. Whatever the case, the events that unfolded in Salvador over the next year and a half demonstrate that Uriarte was not ready to yield his claim as top caudillo in town and reveal just how contested local control over state resources, labor, and the exercises of sovereignty could become.

By July 1851, as both magistrate and commandant of Salvador, Venancio Candia stood poised to concentrate a preponderant amount of local power into his own hands. The realm of civil justice in the town was entirely in his domain. And he, like Uriarte, did not hesitate to make prolific use of the whipping post and the lash. Also like Uriarte, he did not hesitate to utilize his control over state resources to build his web of patronage in town. He lent state-owned oxen and wagons to poorer residents to move their agricultural produce to local markets as well as to one prominent free black, José Franco, to move his own harvest of bamboo and palm all the way to buyers in Asunción. Well ingratiated already with the local populace, Candia, it seems, was dispensing this material patronage in directions it had not previously gone—in particular to certain "honorable pardos" over whom the new commandant himself held few pretensions of racialized superiority.<sup>53</sup> Meanwhile, in communications with the president, Candia



was disposed to defend local residents' commerce with nearby indigenous clans. And during the prominent chieftain's visits to the pueblo, he received Cacique Rubio in his own home.<sup>54</sup> Finally, in January 1852, Candia extended permission to travel to the *parada* to Ramona Romero so she could go to the capital to register an official complaint against the former commandant Uriarte for his extrajudicial flogging of her. Here Candia wrote the president confirming the incident and Uriarte's own illicit sexual liaisons in town.<sup>55</sup>

The replication of Uriarte's tactics—and the attempt to turn those very tactics against him—was partially a function of his lingering influence. The ex-commandant maintained his own ties and interests in town—clients who still enjoyed the way he spun a tale and boasted, shared the mate gourd, and extended favors, and laborers who still worked his ranching lands that reached into the orbit of Salvador. There were friends that could inform and conspire, and it was here that Uriarte realized the convenience of remaining in the relative good graces of the parish priest Toubé. Whatever tensions that might have simmered previously between the two men now cooled under their mutual dislike of Venancio Candia. According to Candia himself, Toubé on several occasions marched into his home to berate him with a typical battery of “violent words.” Meanwhile the priest lent to the machinations of Uriarte, with vindictive eloquence, the pen of his sacred office. By mid-1852, the priest produced letters sent directly to the president—one on behalf of a client of Uriarte, another on his own account—denouncing the new commandant. One letter took issue with Candia's employment of the “oxen of the *patria*.” It alleged that those lent to the free black, José Franco, were returned in ruin. “The *patria* needs them here,” Toubé wrote, and charged that their abuse “hurt the *patria* when other residents [had to] offer their oxen and wagons” for the work of the local government.<sup>56</sup> In his biting eloquence, the priest wrapped his appeal, and along with it the state-owned oxen and wagons, in the discursive sanctity of the *patria*.

One factor mitigated the assault on the effective authority of Candia's office: his extension of patronage to the schoolteacher Carmona. Already by July 1851 upon assuming control of the commandant office, Candia had sponsored (though Carmona penned) a petition to the president for a full set of new clothes, including poncho and sombrero, for Carmona. The letter praised Carmona for his work as schoolteacher that imparted on pupils “obedience to parents and superiors, devotion to the Supreme Being and religion, and respect for Your Excellency and the *patria*.” It also lauded his work as a lay catechist, “indoctrinating parishioners during feast day celebrations” during the absences of the parish priest—a perhaps not-so-subtle dig at the alleged negligence of Toubé.<sup>57</sup> In any case, Candia

had also recognized his need to secure the textual lifeline that tied the authority of his office to the aura of nationhood anchored in Asunción.

Carmona reciprocated with his own eloquence in the correspondence of Candia to the president. He crafted the boasts that as commandant Candia insured that “thieves, killers, and others of grave defects” who were sent upriver in internal exile became “well-behaved, settled, subjugated, and devout” as soon as they set foot in Salvador. Carmona also composed for Candia patriotic commentaries on international political developments reported by the state newspaper. In one instance from January 1852, he depicted Candia’s patriotic call for the enemy Argentine dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas, who refused to recognize Paraguayan independence, “to suffer the agony of a slow fire,” being burnt at the stake, for “his bloody deeds, bad faith, lack of religion, and terrible impositions against our Republic, our current Supreme Government, and all Americans.” Carmona described Candia announcing patriotic glad tidings in Guarani, sounding the church bell in the plaza, ordering official celebration with a flag raising, gun salutes, and, Mass to be held in the parish church.<sup>58</sup> The schoolteacher also composed Candia’s correspondence defending himself against the accusations of the priest Toubé. Later in September, the two men collaborated on their most ambitious appeal yet to the president. They requested in the name of the “Divine Savior of the world, entitled patron of this Villa,” the construction of a new parish church “fit for the adoration of such a divine master.” The petition claimed the collective support of the townsfolk, who were willing to donate labor and materials for a construction that would “accumulate doubly immense sums of glory and honor to the *patria* and important services to God.”<sup>59</sup> All that they asked was the appointment of a master carpenter to direct the efforts. In the face of Toubé and Uriarte’s machinations, Candia—upon issuing the petition and looking to oversee such a vast undertaking—sought to have more glory and sanctity of the *patria* double back on the figure of his own authority.

In the end, it was the loss of two ranch hands on the orders of Candia that prompted Uriarte to exact his revenge. The informal channeling of labor to his estates was a perk of office that Uriarte no longer controlled, and the convict workers had made Candia aware of their irregular situation. Carmona confirmed that no presidential orders retaining them on Uriarte’s estate existed. Candia did not look the other way and had the laborers removed from Uriarte’s charge. Thus, over the course of October 1852, Uriarte began showing up more frequently in town. In one instance, he marched into the commandant’s headquarters with an air of “supreme judge” and, in Candia’s relation, presumed to “take account and charge of my entire administration.” He then threatened

Candia that he would go to the capital to see the president, who would supposedly welcome him warmly, saying “Don Casimiro Uriarte, from where do you come?,” to which Uriarte claimed that he would reply, “From Salvador where I have seen nothing but immorality, injustice, and bad things going on.” In another instance, Uriarte interrupted a meeting Candia was conducting with Cacique Rubio. Here he greeted his old client warmly, offering him honey and an invitation to come converse at his residence in town. Rubio accepted and subsequently heard all the normal slanders against Candia—that he was weak and cowardly, that nobody liked him, but also that, because of Candia’s poverty, the cacique’s people could expect little patronage from him. The insinuation, as Candia interpreted it, was that Cacique Rubio and his people should “rise up” against the commandant and the pueblo in general.<sup>60</sup>

Yet the most dramatic assault came against Candia’s pillar of lettered strength precisely during the preparations for the celebration of the president’s birthday. It was the evening of November 1. Uriarte had left town, but he sent a trusted retainer in his stead, a man who arrived on horseback, furtively, without passport and with a scarf over his face: Donato. Later described as “mulatto and defiant,” Donato was Uriarte’s peon from his estate in Concepción. In Salvador, he hid in the house of another friend of Uriarte and bided his time. Word spread of the schoolteacher Carmona’s more difficult bouts with incontinence of late. And that evening, as the teacher walked along his usual route from the small school house toward Candia’s residence, Donato jumped from the shadows. He grabbed Carmona by the hair, pulled his head back, and drenched him with animal urine. Only when Donato released his hair could Carmona scream in terror. Inquiries revealed the perpetrator’s whereabouts in the house of Uriarte’s friend, and Candia immediately sent soldiers to the residence. Donato emerged from the house on horseback, spurned the soldiers sent to arrest him, and galloped away into the dark of the night.<sup>61</sup>

## THE SUBALTERN STRIKE BACK

Imagine the outrage of Candia when his missives to authorities in Concepción to track down the perpetrator were ignored. Consider too his enfeebled state when after the attack, the humiliated Carmona left town seeking justice and Candia remained lamenting his own ignorance and lack of effective ability to “make paper.” And this while all the while the priest Toubé boasted in public

of written denunciations against Candia that he continued to send to the president.<sup>62</sup> Although weakened, Candia survived in the office of the commandant for another year, often relying heavily on the floggings of alleged delinquents to sustain his claim on legitimate authority, before he was relieved by a military man from Asunción. He nonetheless stayed on as *juez* long enough to witness in December 1853 one last defiant public outburst by Toubé. In this instance, the priest, while drunk, was wearing only a chiripa loincloth and poncho when he stumbled upon the new commandant and again denounced encroachments on his holy authority. The old priest died shortly thereafter, wasting away in a mere eight days from illness.<sup>63</sup>

The significance of such power plays and humiliations on the Paraguayan frontier is questionable if not also for the evidence of machinations from below. People on the margins sensed the divisions of fragmented sovereignty and contests for authority and often threw themselves into the fray. While we might appreciate, for example, Venancio Candia's attempts to extend patronage and build his influence upon assuming the charge of commandant, the initiatives of Ramona Romero, the convict laborers on Uriarte's estate, and even the schoolteacher Carmona forced his hand. They had their own axes to grind against the bawdy *estanciero* from Concepción, and his removal from public office served up quite the opportunity. They pressed Candia to seek their justice and not vice versa. Similarly, we might also appreciate the machinations of Uriarte to undermine Candia and expose his lack of effective authority, but it was Donato who relished in the protection of the ex-commandant to do with impunity what countless laborers in the Paraguayan countryside often already did: to move freely through forested frontier spaces and skirt the restrictions of state surveillance and control. We can almost hear his cackle of delight when, as later reported by Candia, he told the soldiers sent to arrest him, "You all can do what you want, but I'm out of here" before galloping away and, as Candia added, "leaving the soldiers looking like fools."<sup>64</sup>

Even so, the contrivances of Cacique Rubio in the affair are most revealing of the contingent dynamics of frontier authority. Candia himself was made well aware of his precarious standing with the valuable chieftain when the latter conspicuously left the commandant headquarters in the company of his retinue to follow Uriarte back to where the *estanciero* was staying for obsequious talk and exchange. It was Rubio, then, who gave notice that Uriarte was still the caudillo in town. And he did so before returning to the residence of Candia to eat and tell the commandant's wife, while Candia was away toiling in his fields,

what an impish wretch Uriarte believed Candia to be.<sup>65</sup> Rubio was actively playing one side against the other, and his own employment of salacious gossip contributed to the nervous environment that later turned a devilish prank into a matter of state security.

Years later, after the ambitions of Uriarte in the Villa receded and Candia took up life again as a regular townsman, Salvador would remain a place of intrigue among local actors. Aspirations to build petty fiefdoms of control over local resources and labor drove the actions of pueblo officials who still cultivated both formal and extrajudicial exercises of power. The textual and ceremonial lifelines to the political center similarly remained a foundation of sanctioned authority while disputes exposed underhanded maneuvers and provided subalterns the opportunities to pull the strings of power to their advantage. Here, for example, a lover of a sitting commandant would have soldiers build her a house and get another soldier arrested and beaten, and a woman parishioner would dare issue a denunciation against another lustful, hard-drinking, violent priest.<sup>66</sup> Meanwhile, the presence and interactions of autonomous indigenous clans among the forests stayed a part of every local political calculus in a persistent landscape of fragmented and overlapping sovereignties.<sup>67</sup>

Casimiro Uriarte had realized some measure of revenge in the heady days of November 1852, but he never recovered his position as the main boss of Salvador. He subsequently kept his ambitions focused on his ranching interests in Concepción, and years later, when pressed, he had to admit that in the end, from the government of Carlos Antonio López he “received many benefits” and through it became a rich man. It was a frank admission of the essential and symbiotic ties that bound the early López regime with the middling landed elites of a countryside engulfed in frontier. Indeed, he had imagined the personal bond that he held with the president as his strongest measure of influence. Uriarte thus continued to berate state officials that he believed were below his stature. He questioned recruits of the growing national army as to whether their officers took care of them in proper patriarchal fashion. And he harbored quiet doubts when in 1862 old man López died and his eldest son took over the reins of power in Asunción.<sup>68</sup>

In fact, Uriarte was probably part of the local electoral junta in Concepción that in the 1862 congress sent a deputy ready to debate the authority of a presidential office being passed from father to son.<sup>69</sup> He and other landowners had felt the growing strains on their own resources and access to labor as a result of the national military mobilization that only intensified after Francisco Solano

López took the helm. A major division was stationed in Concepción, and soldiers labored on a myriad of projects that also required the likes of Uriarte and others to lend their livestock and wagons for the service of the state. Men like Uriarte sought official reprieves for the recruits that also worked in their employ and to whom they typically advanced wages to help secure their services and loyalty. But working for multiple masters was burdensome enough for soldiers also looking to attend to their own homes and plots. Such was the case with the soldier Manuel José Rodríguez who in March 1863 seized the opportunity to relieve himself of obligations owed to Casimiro Uriarte.<sup>70</sup>

We will never know whether Uriarte indeed said the seditious remarks that Rodríguez claimed that the ex-military commandant of Salvador made. It is suggestive that another acquaintance of Uriarte in Concepción corroborated that the *estancionero* was prone to complaining about the state of political affairs. The alleged remarks were also consistent with Uriarte's well-known boastful ways. But it is almost a more exciting analytical possibility if Uriarte never said them at all. In any case, Rodríguez, a mere ranch hand and regular soldier who spoke only Guarani, was well aware of the currents of dissent buzzing through the northern districts, especially in the wake of Solano López's election. When he relied on the intercession of Uriarte to obtain a license of leave from his military service, he had aims to work on his house and tend his fields. Rodríguez also answered numerous calls by Uriarte to help with cattle drives, as was expected for the advance on wages he received; but some calls he began to ignore when they became more insistent and overbearing. In late March, he approached one of his officers to make a deposition. Rodríguez claimed that during a recent drive Uriarte had told a gathering of workers and friends that "although the president was dead, the same government remained and they would have no relief because the same ruin continued." These utterances came in a flourish of other laments that also expressed concern for the plight of an arrested slave and a jesting desire to soon die and be free of the worries of the world.<sup>71</sup>

The deposition proved a brilliant strike from below that exploited the tensions of the upper political atmosphere. The act of the 1862 Concepción electoral junta left the entire district under suspicion by Solano López while the pressures on the local landed elite to conform continued to build. Utterances airing political discomforts that previously could travel the frontier air without much consequence now landed even an important man in jail. Meanwhile, if these utterances were not even said (certainly Uriarte denied making them), then Rodríguez artfully projected onto the *estancionero* sentiments that he likely

heard elsewhere. Uriarte indeed was arrested, and the prominent military commandant of Concepción oversaw a full-scale judicial proceeding that featured numerous soldiers, officials, and local rivals testifying against the *estancionero*. He was the fish now to be fried—one of several cautionary examples to be made for the district's rambunctious ways—and the soldier Rodríguez escaped having to pay back in labor the thirty-some pesos of wages that Uriarte advanced to him.<sup>72</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS

In nineteenth-century Paraguay under the López regimes, local politics mattered. Provincial state officials and other local power brokers were not mere extensions of the wills of autocrats; they had their own material and political interests at stake in the still tenuous business of state formation amid the frontier. Even in the more compact political geography of postcolonial Paraguay, this business remained far from finished, and the ties connecting center and periphery remained fluid, dynamic, and subject to disruption. Formal vestiges of authority carried their weight. The ceremonial and textual reproductions of the cosmological bluster of nationhood bolstered the power of officials and strongmen. But in a landscape of fragmented and overlapping sovereignties, the ability to blow hard, talk big, extend favors, build clientele, and channel violence could make or break pretensions to bend others to one's personal will and rule a town. Indeed, informal, personal connections to the principal autocrat in Asunción were also critical complements in contests for local power that proved persistent, heated, and multifaceted. Rival public officials could undermine. Powerful personal rivals could undercut. Meanwhile, subordinate laborers and other marginal figures actively threw themselves into frays and tried to play local political divisions toward their own profit and advantage. Even unconquered indigenous peoples had skins in the game and coaxed the divisions to keep the effective extension of state sovereignty at bay.

The proposition here is that the experiences of Casimiro Uriarte, his bid to dominate a frontier town, and his eventual downfall at the manipulations of his own peon were typical, not exceptional, expressions of local politics and state formation in nineteenth-century Paraguay. The López regimes depended on such figures to project the pretense of their postcolonial sovereignty across a broken landscape, and nearly all parties involved tacitly recognized this reality. Even so, not always does the bundle of power dynamics that these local



caudillos towed with them come bleeding through the documentary record as they did with the case of Uriarte and Salvador. Indeed, even the record of the judicial proceeding against Uriarte ends before we learn of his fate. Moreover, so much of what local officials did was left purposefully off of what was reported back to Asunción. But the hints and glimpses are numerous enough to indicate that below the veneer of unanimous loyalty and monolithic, personalist rule from the capital, contestations and machinations simmered. And it was precisely in these interactions—well beyond the direct control of fat autocrat presidents—that the postcolonial state—with all its limitations, contradictions, and exploitations—became a flesh-and-blood reality in the lives of everyday people.

## NOTES

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  6. John Hoyt Williams, “Tevegó on Paraguayan Frontier: A Chapter in the Black History of the Americas,” *Journal of Negro History* 56, no. 4 (October 1971): 272–83.
  7. Alfredo Viola, *Cárceles y otras penas: Época de Carlos Antonio López* (Asunción: Servilibro, 2004), 108–12; Williams, “Tevego on the Paraguayan Frontier,” 279. Venancio Candia a Carlos Antonio López (hereafter CAL), 19 July 1851, Correspondencia de Salvador (hereafter CS), Archivo Nacional de Asunción–Sección Historia (hereafter ANA-SH), vol. 409, no. 1, fol. 384–87.
  8. Resquín a CAL, 10 October 1860, Correspondencia de Concepción, ANA-SH, vol. 369, no. 1, fol. 1188–89.
  9. Candia a CAL, 10 November 1853, Pasaportes, Nota de Bogado al juez de paz de Asunción, CS, ANA-SH, vol. 409, no. 1 (II), fol. 526–27, 623–39.
  10. Areces, *Estado y frontera*, 219–85.
  11. Candia a CAL, 8 July 1852, CS, ANA-SH, vol. 409, no. 1, fol. 451–56; Informe de José Daniel Chuna, 19 August 1854, CS, ANA-SH, vol. 409, no. 1 (II), fol. 579–80. For typical cattle holdings of inhabitants, see livestock tithe collection records, Salvador 1857, Archivo Nacional de Asunción–Sección Nueva Encuadernación (hereafter ANA-NE), vol. 3044. The overwhelming majority of estancia holders (thirty-nine in 1857, less than 10 percent of the total resident population) held less than fifty head total each.
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  15. Livestock tithe collection records, 1857 Concepción, ANA-NE, vol. 3044.
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# 6

## BEYOND *HISTORIA PÁTRIA*

### The Jesuit-Guarani Missions, World Heritage, and Other Histories of Cultural Patrimony in Mercosul/Mercosur

DARYLE WILLIAMS

CULTURAL PATRIMONY—be it tangible/material or intangible—has played an integral role in the cultural and political processes associated with state building across the Triple Frontier and throughout the modern world. Patrimonial “goods” (Portuguese: *bens culturais*; Spanish: *bienes culturales*) delimit national territories in space and time. They reify national memories, canonize national cultural traditions, and monumentalize national heroes. In Latin America, especially after the 1930s, the appeal of “national cultural patrimony” has justified the existence of agencies, laws, and professionals charged with heritage protection. Nationalist causes have marshaled themselves to the defense of sites and artifacts imperiled by the ravages of time, violence, oblivion, foreigners, and “bad” citizens. The social movements that organize around cultural preservation have served as powerful mechanisms in the identity politics of national belonging. Heritage and nation, in short, share vital life support systems.

Yet the interdependence of patrimony and nation has been strained, and at times constrained, by the ascriptions of “universal,” “global,” and “world” value to patrimonial goods known historically as “national” cultural treasures. The 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, better known as the World Heritage Convention, and the attendant appeal of “world heritage” (Portuguese: *patrimônio da humanidade*; Spanish: *patrimonio de la humanidad*) have raised vexing questions for sovereign

nation-states seeking to maintain claims to cultural and political goods of exceptional *universal* value located within national borders.

Such questions include the following: Does a convention signatory effectively relinquish control over national treasures to a supranational authority when it submits to the rules that govern world heritage? How do the social movements that have historically worked within a phenomenon known by British geographer David Lowenthal as “the heritage crusade” adapt to shifting sociocultural landscapes where the appeals to universal heritage originate in local and foreign governments, multilateral financial institutions, and transnational advocacy networks as well as the central state? The cultural nationalist and the cultural historian are left to question whether the advent of a multilocal politics of world heritage has rendered apart the historical interdependence of the national and the patrimonial.

In this chapter I explore such questions, focusing on the interaction of national, local, regional, and global histories of preservation and conservation, frontiers and borders, travel and tourism, and regional (re)integration in and across the Triple Frontier. The Jesuit-Guarani mission system is the primary case study, but the wider discussion encompasses the complex meanings and practices of cultural patrimony in a multilateral trading bloc known as Mercosul/Mercosur.

## A SHORT HISTORY OF THE JESUIT-GUARANI MISSION SYSTEM

The Jesuit-Guarani mission system is shorthand for a chain of missionary settlements established along the middle and upper branches of the Paraná River watershed between the late sixteenth and early eighteenth centuries. The Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) granted the Spanish Crown sovereignty over all of Paraguay, as the Paraguay-Paraná-Uruguay watershed was known, but matters of governance were in practice fluid across time and space. Under the Spanish Hapsburgs, the Society of Jesus received royal sanction to administer the remote hinterlands of the Paraná and Uruguay Rivers for the express purposes of Christianizing local indigenous groups and fixing imperial territorial boundaries. Under the Jesuits, a network of agropastoral settlements known as reductions (Portuguese: *reduções*; Spanish: *reducciones*) was established to evangelize the Guarani, a seminomadic indigenous group who occupied the region. The oldest



reductions were established in the contemporary Paraguayan departments of Misiones and Itapúa, west of the Paraná River. Construction on the easternmost settlement, São Miguel Arcanjo (contemporary Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil), began after 1687. At the system's height, reached in the middle of the eighteenth century, thirty *reducciones* were home to about 150,000 Guarani. Throughout the active phase of missionary life, the reductions faced the ongoing challenges of predatory secular Spaniards who resided on the margins of the Jesuit settlements as well as from slave raiders striking out from Portuguese America. Although the feature-length motion picture *The Mission* (1986) portrayed the Society of Jesus as the benevolent protectors of Indians and indigenous life, episodes of Guarani resistance to the missionary priests were an essential feature of rule throughout the Jesuit period.

The missions began to exhibit signs of systemic stress in the 1740s due to disease, Indian flight, and violent clashes with outsiders. Indian upheaval (especially the Guarani War) followed by the expulsion of the Society of Jesus from Portuguese America (1759) and Spanish America (1767), caused significant disruption to mission society, accelerating economic decline. Over the last quarter of the eighteenth century, thousands of mission Indians abandoned the settlements to enter regional labor markets controlled by *criollos* and *peninsulares*. Others struck out into receding frontier. The reductions progressively emptied.<sup>1</sup>

Depopulation east of the Uruguay River accelerated after 1801, when Luso-Brazilian troops seized the seven settlements between São Borja and São Miguel. Population dislocation quickly extended westward as the wars of independence fragmented the former Jesuit province into a contested, porous international border region. Effectively abandoned following progressive sackings, several of the reductions were swallowed up by an encroaching subtropical forest. For the small, impoverished, multiethnic population that took up residence on lands near the dilapidated settlements, the vestiges of the missionary structures were sometimes repurposed for civil construction.

Largely forgotten by the early national leaders in Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, and Asunción, the mission region was occasionally visited by itinerant travelers in the decades following national independence. French naturalists Aimé Bonpland (1773–1858) and Auguste de Sainte-Hilaire (1779–1853) toured the district in the 1820s and 1830s. The German physician Robert Avé-Lallemant (1812–1884) visited in 1858. The following decade, Martin de Moussy (1810–1869), another French naturalist, journeyed from the River Plate and envisioned a

region ripe for commercialization. In 1863, the French-born priest who became vicar of São Borja, João Pedro Gay (1815–1891), published one of the first social histories of the district, *Historia da Republica jesuítica do Paraguay*. The following year, Alfred Demersay (1815–1891) published a two-volume history informed by studies of tobacco and yerba mate cultivation in Paraguay.<sup>2</sup>

Foreigners tended to see past the national boundaries that national map-makers periodically tried to impose on the Paraná-Uruguay watershed. Gay, for instance, found it impossible to write a history of the reductions located in Brazilian territory without writing a larger history of the entire mission region. “As I set myself to the work of writing a general history, I found it impossible to avoid engagement with the other Jesuit settlements, which share a history with the Seven Settlements situated east of the Uruguay.”<sup>3</sup> Nonetheless, when the accounts circulated as published texts among the lettered classes in Rio and Buenos Aires, they were integrated into emergent mental geographies of nation. It is precisely these kinds of texts—serialized in newspapers, circulated as promotional pamphlets, and included in the official journals of national historical academies—that Benedict Anderson identifies as central to the imagination of territorially bounded national communities.<sup>4</sup>

After 1880, when the conditions for colonization and commercialization improved, a new class of educated men—land surveyors, railway engineers, and scientists—journeyed to the remote region to assess opportunities for development. Their personal impressions and technical reports cast nationalizing hues on a region erroneously imagined to be an underpopulated *tierra de nadie*.<sup>5</sup> Cultural figures joined these liberal professionals in projecting the missions into the mental maps of lettered nationhood.<sup>6</sup> *Rioplatense* author-diplomat Horácio de Quiroga (1878–1937) elevated the missions into the Argentine national literary consciousness. Vicente Gambón (1857–1925), the first Jesuit priest to return to the Argentine missions since the mid-eighteenth century, rhapsodized about the deep roots of the Catholic faith in the region, from the distant colonial period to the recent settlements of devout Polish immigrants residing a short distance from the former mission at Apóstoles.<sup>7</sup> Overseas, Scottish historian R. B. Cunningham Graham (1852–1936) published his melodramatic *Vanished Arcadia* (1901).<sup>8</sup>

The material and cultural mapping of the mission region continued into the first decades of the twentieth century thanks to improved transportation and communication networks, the regularization of property rights, and market integration. Yerba mate, tobacco, and sugar cultivation became mainstays of the

regional economy, while grains and fruits were cultivated for local consumption. Certain ethnic-cultural changes accompanied the expansion of capitalist relations. In Paraguay, a mestizo regional culture was gradually replaced by a hybridized Guaraní culture. In Argentina, Eastern European immigrant enclaves took root among the mixed native born of the humid northeast. In Brazilian territory, European settlers established a foothold among *gaúcho* agriculturalists and ranchers. Throughout the region, small bands of Guaraní Indians moved among and across natural and man-made frontiers. With the regularization of border controls and the introduction of national institutions including schools and military service, the multiethnic residents of the mission region were increasingly drawn into parallel but distinct spheres of Brazilian, Argentine, and Paraguayan national belonging.

### MISSION RESTORATION AND POST-1930 CULTURAL NATIONALISM

The preservation of the ruined *reducciones* was a minor concern for national elites in their projects of integration and modernization. As the Brazilian ethnographer and future National Historical Museum founder Gustavo Dodt Barroso (1888–1957) famously lamented, the Brazilian intellectual and popular classes lacked a “cult of nostalgia.” In the coastal capitals, urbanization swept aside historical sites. At the far margins of national territory, colonial-era structures crumbled in silence. Locally, in places such as Santo Ângelo, resource-poor municipal governments allowed stones from mission ruins to be used in public works. In nearby São Borja, where new communities with no connection to the missionary period had sprung up directly on the former mission lands, the remaining vestiges of the former reductions were basically erased from the landscape.

However, the idea of a formal preservationist stance toward the missions circulated episodically after 1880. Argentine ethnographer Juan Bautista Ambrosetti (1865–1917), who visited Misiones Province on several occasions in the 1890s, mused that the restored ruins might be turned into a destination for *porteño* tourists. Land surveyor Juan de Queirel (1849–1907) came to a similar conclusion in publications that circulated in the capital at the turn of the twentieth century.<sup>9</sup> Ambrosetti and Queirel received little support, but the preservationist imagination endured.

Even if preservation had occupied a more important place in national or regional political imaginaries, any potential preservationist effort would confront the reality that all of the mission settlements had fallen into a state of advanced ruination; some had been razed to the ground only to be rediscovered through later archaeological excavation. The handful of sites that retained significant vestiges of colonial-era construction had been overtaken by vegetation. Struck by the exuberant vegetation that had overtaken the ruins at San Ignacio, Argentine art theorist Julio E. Payró (1899–1971) observed in 1937, “the spectacle that the most prominent ruins of Misiones is neither friendly nor picturesque: it is grave, intense, and dramatic like primordial beauty.”<sup>10</sup>

The conditions for preservation shifted gradually amid the globalized tumult of 1929–1930. In Argentina, a coalition of conservative civilians, desperate to shore up the faltering export economy, allied themselves with army officers and overthrew the ruling Radical party. In Brazil, army officers joined a civilian reformist coalition led by Getúlio Vargas (a native of São Borja) to overthrow the oligarchical republican party establishment. Although the immediate measures taken by these self-styled “revolutionary” movements differed greatly, in time, both took advantage of the disruption in the liberal order to promote economic diversification, import substitution, and political reform. Each coalition also articulated a language of cultural mobilization that envisioned the defense of “national” interests and a strengthened central state. The call to defend *lo nacional—o nacional* legitimated new cultural practices and institution building that would soon have a direct effect on the mission region, particularly through the mechanism of historical preservation.

The incipient preservationist movement benefited from calls for the defense of national traditions and the enlargement of the state responsibilities that accompanied the regime changes. In Brazil, official preservation took its modern form in 1933–1934, when Vargas approved petitions to designate Ouro Preto a national monument and to establish the *Inspetoria dos Monumentos Nacionais* (Inspectorate for National Monuments), the first federal agency of its kind in South America. By November 1937, the Brazilian president-dictator had authorized a comprehensive preservation law, Decree-Law 25.<sup>11</sup> In Argentina, where commemorative statuary and other monuments to fallen heroes had been a major part of bourgeois cultural practice for several decades before 1930, the historical preservationist movement came out of legislative attempts to give the national government the authority to designate national monuments and historic places. Under the guidance of the prominent *porteño* historian Ricardo

Levene (1885–1959), a series of preservationist laws were enacted between 1938 and 1943.

Working independently of one another, federal preservationists in Brazil and Argentina put the Jesuit-Guarani missions near the top of their respective national agendas. The Brazilian Serviço do Patrimônio Histórico e Artístico Nacional (SPHAN), created in January 1937, designated the Sete Povos as “national historical and artistic patrimony” in 1938. (Note the irony: these “national” historical sites had been part of Spanish America until 1801, when they were sacked by Luso-Brazilian troops.) The Argentine Comisión Nacional de Museos, Monumentos, y Lugares Históricos (CNMMLH), founded in 1938, extended similar recognition to the ruins at San Ignacio Miní and Santa Maria la Mayor two years later. On both banks of the Uruguay River, the legal designation of patrimony was quickly followed by the arrival of federal agents who set out to survey the ruins for stabilization and restoration.

São Miguel and San Ignacio Miní—where significant sections of the original reductions had survived warfare, pillage, and time—received the lion’s share of official attention from the Brazilian and Argentine governments, respectively. East of the Uruguay, modernist architect Lucio Costa made a preliminary survey of the seven reductions in 1937 in preparation for inscription in the official registries created under Decree-Law 25, known as the *Livros do Tombo*. Finding the ruins on the verge of collapse, he proposed an urgent plan for stabilization.<sup>12</sup> A detailed restoration of the church façade was carried out three years later under the supervision of Brazilian architect Lucas Mayerhofer.<sup>13</sup> In the meantime, local vicar João Hugo Machado received authorization to collect mission-era religious artwork that had scattered throughout the region since the eighteenth century. Machado faced suspicion and occasional threats of violence from private individuals who did not wish to relinquish artifacts.<sup>14</sup> At San Ignacio, Argentine architect Mario Buschiazzo (1902–1970) drafted the plans for restoration of the main church and surrounding buildings in 1938.<sup>15</sup> Restoration work was completed in 1946. A small federal museum opened at each location. (Architectural idioms varied; the Brazilian museum exhibited elements of modernism whereas its Argentine counterpart was in the colonial revival style.) In both instances, the restored ruins quickly became architectural showpieces in a national collection of patrimonial treasures that was widely promoted by federal preservationist agencies as proof of national civilization, past and present.

The logic of national boundaries was clearly evident in the way in which stabilization and reconstruction efforts proceeded in Brazil and Argentina. The

technical surveys conducted by Costa and Buschiazzo, as well as the promotional information circulated in the press, turned on a politics of place (and placing) that recognized certain ruins as *national* historical monuments. Lucio Costa's trip to Rio Grande do Sul took him within fifty kilometers of the closest Argentine missions. Nevertheless, his reports submitted to Rodrigo Melo Franco de Andrade, director of the Brazilian preservationist agency, like those submitted by Buschiazzo to Levene, made only passing reference to the transnational history of the mission ruins, plotting instead the reductions relative to national boundaries. This mapping of "Brazilian," "Argentine," or "Paraguayan" missions would have been alien to Jesuit and Guarani alike during the missions' classical period and strange to the region's nineteenth-century residents. The logic of preservation, highly informed by the logic of national borders, nonetheless allowed for a preservationist cartography that adhered to current national political boundaries and projected such boundaries into the past. Preservation was at the leading edge of cultural nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s, delimiting the national territory in space and time.

Aside from a handful of professional preservationists, the restored ruins at San Ignacio and São Miguel were initially seen by very few citizens from outside the immediate region. Annual visitation to the Museu das Missões in São Miguel averaged just 3,250 for the period 1944–1947.<sup>16</sup> By 1956, monthly visitation to San Ignacio rarely exceeded 700. Two decades later, San Ignacio still registered a modest 8,900 annual visitors.<sup>17</sup> Nevertheless, the monumentalized missions afforded nationalists of all ideological stripes the ability to claim the missions as the anchors and the limits of the national past.

### **"NATIONAL" MONUMENTS AND LOCAL, REGIONAL, AND UNIVERSAL HERITAGE**

By 1945, a handful of professionals working for federal preservationist agencies provided general oversight of the ruins while locals tended to the monuments' day-to-day upkeep. Local priests would sometimes contribute to the preservation of religious artifacts that had been scattered throughout the region. All major conservation efforts, as well as visitor services and signage, were coordinated by federal employees outside of the mission region. Official meaning was ascribed from the national capital onto the locality. The actual work of preservation was handled by local caretakers drawing a modest federal wage,

volunteers, and small-scale entrepreneurs who tried to make a living off of the tourist trade. Indeed, artisans, laborers, merchants, and educators residing near the ruins were the principal custodians and memory keepers of these national monuments for several decades following historical registry and restoration. The relations between professional preservationists headquartered in the national capital and caretakers in situ were symbiotic and complex, providing multiple opportunities for a micropoliticking of preservation that had important effects on day-to-day life at a heritage site.

This dynamic of micropoliticking of the 1940s through the 1960s helped routinize and structure *national* historical monument status at the local level. The terms under which locals could avail themselves of national monuments for local purposes became the primary vehicle for local-federal relations during this period. In comparison with the grandiose rhetoric about national monuments espoused by national elites, the actual subject matter of federal-state correspondence of the postwar period might seem inconsequential: when the local parish would be able to use the mission grounds for the procession of the town's patron saint; who would be authorized to sell postcards and other tourist materials on the mission grounds; whether a community soccer field might be relocated to a site farther away from the rear of the cloister at San Ignacio. An especially curious dynamic began in late 1952 as caretaker Patricio Barrios sought permission to pasture two cows and a horse within the mission compound walls. After submitting a hand-drawn map of possible sites near the caretaker's modest house located at the edge of the mission grounds, Barrios received approval. Three years later, however, Barrios was denied permission to grow yerba mate for distribution among local laborers who cared for the ruins.<sup>18</sup> In 1968, another caretaker secured permission to maintain a cow on the mission grounds but on the CNMMLH's condition that the animal not be seen by the visiting public.<sup>19</sup>

The strength of the nation-state, not to mention the national state, would not turn on these small-bore matters of soccer pitches, cow pastures, and domestic horticulture. The SPHAN and CNMMLH continued to claim supreme control over the mission ruins designated as national historical sites. However, the contours of national belonging, particularly for locals living among patrimonial sites, often turned on the resolution of such "minor" issues of daily sustenance and the uses of space understood to be of some public utility. The negotiations of such issues enlisted locals of modest means into a heritage crusade that would take a transnational turn in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Several developments taking place the 1970s created new possibilities for a politics of preservation that would reorder the high cultural nationalism of the 1930s and 1940s and the micropolitics of the 1950s and 1960s. First, regional interests began to make claims to the missions that competed with preexisting national and local claims. These regional interests—state and provincial political parties, regional intellectuals, and regional economic development agencies—saw in the missions the material necessary to articulate a subnational identity somewhere between the national and the local. Second, the field of preservation experienced internal renewal. Finally, the emergence of transnational heritage movements resulted in an opened-ended (re)integration of the mission system in overlapping, but not necessarily complementary, networks of preservation, identity, tourism, and development.

The first major change—rising claims to national patrimony articulated at a regional level—might be seen as an extension of the earlier practices. For example, in December 1969, the governor of Misiones designated the ruins of Santa Ana, Concepción, Mártires, San Javier, Apóstoles, and San José to be *provincial* historical landmarks. Two years later, the governor requested the jurisdictional transfer of San Ignacio to the provincial government, citing the federal government's inattention to the ruins.<sup>20</sup> The governor's actions mirrored measures taken by the federal governments of Argentina and Brazil in the 1940s, when newly empowered federal agencies asserted legal and moral control over imperiled heritage sites owned by nonfederal actors.

In 1970, San Ignacio's Comisión Municipal de Turismo sought authorization from the CNMMLH to hold a monthly folkloric mass on the mission grounds.<sup>21</sup> The request continued a long tradition of locals seeking concessions from the federal government to make local use of a national landmark. The key difference was that a local tourism council intended to use the mission grounds to stage a *regional* folkloric show for tourists, hiring Indians from Argentina and Paraguay to perform scenes that were supposed to capture the cultural essence of the entire mission region. The CNMMLH denied the request, characterizing the folklore show as inappropriate for a national monument. State, municipal, and private interests persisted, later winning concessions from national preservationist agencies to organize theatricalized son et lumière spectacles. Parallel new cultural centers, tourist information booths, and museums run by regional actors also narrated the ruins, their folk, and their pasts.

The economic implications of a regionalized heritage crusade were measurable: tourism to the mission district increased dramatically in the 1970s, when



a visit to the reductions came to be marketed as an ideal destination for automobile tourism as well as added value to a trip to Iguazú Falls. In 1974, Brazil's *Touring* magazine published an attractive photospread promoting car travel to the district.<sup>22</sup> Similar stories followed in major dailies of the Brazilian southeast, especially in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, where the mission district and eighteenth-century Guarani hero Sepé Tiaraju became icons of *gaúcho* identity. In 1975, the *riograndense* secretariats of tourism and education established a commission to turn São Miguel into a major tourist destination featuring a son et lumière spectacle and other attractions. In the meantime, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) extended assistance to the Argentine, Brazilian, and Paraguayan governments to develop an accord on tourism in the Misiones-Iguazú region. The political implications were equally important. In Misiones, local actors formed a local preservationist league, the Asociación Cooperadora de la Reducción Jesuítica de San Ignacio Miní, in 1976, inserting an element of voluntarism into a politics that has historically been highly associated with lettered elites who held civil service jobs.<sup>23</sup> By early 1980, regional interests joined forces with the CNMMLH and the venerable Asociación Estimulo de Bellas Artes (founded in 1876) to lobby against a hydroelectric dam planned on the Paraná River near Corpus. Fearing that the dam's reservoir might have an adverse effect on the ruins at Candelaria, Santa Ana, and San Ignacio, these varied actors secured the attention of the foreign ministry.<sup>24</sup> The development of regional heritage crusade opened spaces for new forms of political participation and engagement that occupied an intermediate space between national and local politics.

Finally, the cultural implications of a regional heritage were considerable: a distinct *misionero/missioneiro* identity took more definite form throughout the region, where regional party politics, school textbooks, and local rituals exalted a mythology of the missions that made the ruins a sacralized place while elevating Jesuit brother Montoya, Sepé Tiaraju, and the Uruguayan caudillo Andresito Guaçurará into regional heroes.

Another impulse for change, of equal importance to the forces of regionalization, emerged within the field of preservation, where a new generation of specialists proposed a renewal of established practices, especially through multilateralism. In Brazil, a small group of reform-minded conservationists rallied around Aloísio Magalhães (1927–1982), the director of the Centro Nacional de Referência Cultural (CNRC), who advocated a number of radical changes to traditional principles and practices of heritage conservation.<sup>25</sup> Informed by

innovations in social anthropology, these reformers envisioned a politics of preservation that looked beyond monumental edifices to the social contexts that produced and maintained patrimonial goods. In 1978, Magalhães envisioned a new politics of patrimony that involved a four-stage process of identification, classification, restitution to the community, and collective reflection. This process differed from the traditional idea that patrimony was an imperiled cultural relic that had to be “rescued” by high priests of patrimony (i.e., professional architects, historians, and engineers) and venerated by a faithful populace.<sup>26</sup>

Like their predecessors, Magalhães and his allies maintained a certain nationalistic logic in their advocacy for reforms: the official preservation agency held the right to protect and preserve symbols of a national cultural calling. Patrimony remained a privileged vehicle for national integration. (Clearly in dialogue with the developmentalist ideology that reigned under military presidents Geisel and Figueiredo, Magalhães found cultural integration to be compatible with economic integration.) The CNRC drew on the rhetoric of loss that has been an essential discursive device for Brazil’s pioneer generation of preservationists.<sup>27</sup> The differences lie in the functionality of preservation, as patrimonial goods became cultural referents rather than sacred objects. That is, the social context of the production and use of a patrimonial good mattered just as much as the formal artistic attributes. This logic opened opportunities for a more pluralistic politics of preservation, decentering the built environment and its enthroned interpreters and opening up possibilities for a more inclusive politics of patrimonial usage and appreciation.

An innovation of equal importance was Magalhães’s willingness to adopt a multilateral approach to cultural preservation that sought collaboration from sub-, supra-, and transnational actors. Magalhães took a special interest in winning the attentions of the World Heritage Committee, a UNESCO division operating under the provisions of the 1972 World Heritage Convention. The reasons for courting UNESCO support were self-evident: the committee had the specific charge to assist national preservation agencies in protecting unique cultural and natural treasures. Through the World Heritage Fund, the committee had the ability to extend emergency financial support for the stabilization and restoration of imperiled sites. Well-managed world heritage sites were eligible for far greater financial support through international development programs, corporate philanthropy, and the exploding heritage tourism industry.

Brazilian and UNESCO officials had engaged in low-level discussions about a World Heritage designation of a Brazilian site since 1978. Curiously, the

Jesuit-Guarani missions were not part of an initial list of potential sites developed by the Instituto do Patrimônio Histórico e Artístico Nacional (IPHAN) director Renato Soeiro shortly after Brazil signed on to the World Heritage Convention on July 2, 1977.<sup>28</sup> Magalhães, on the other hand, recognized that conditions were promising to fast-track UNESCO recognition of the missions.<sup>29</sup> (Soeiro's successor drew on various proposals to link the Brazilian missions to transnational heritage and tourist circuits that dated back to an Organization of American States [OAS] meeting held in Quito, Ecuador, in 1967.)

In February 1981, Magalhães met with the governor of Rio Grande do Sul and declared his plan to see São Miguel included on the World Heritage List. UNESCO responded by sending Robert di Stefano, an Italian specialist in architecture restoration, to assist in a comprehensive survey of the ruins. Magalhães died unexpectedly soon after his historic announcement in Porto Alegre, but his intention to win World Heritage status for the missions was carried forward by his successor Marcos Vinícius Vilaça and the government of Rio Grande do Sul with continued UNESCO support.

As a Brazilian World Heritage bid took shape, the ministers of culture for Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay met in Posadas to discuss possible coordination of preservationist strategies throughout the mission region, including a world heritage bid that included sites located in the constituent nations. Multilateral arrangements among the authoritarian regimes in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay had already been established in areas of security and countersubversion (notoriously), tourism, infrastructure, and energy. What distinguished the 1981 meeting in Posadas and its Plan de Acción was an emergent politics of multilateral cultural preservation that had few regional precedents. At Posadas, historical preservation, economic development, and tourism were discussed as issues that did not correspond to conventional political jurisdictions (i.e., municipal, state/provincial, federal). These issues required new political institutions capable of administering a transnational heritage network as well as a new mental mapping of the place that projected the missions as *regional* heritage rather than three distinct collections of national historical treasures.

The paradox, of course, was that the overlapping regional, multilateral, and transnational dimensions of cultural integration were channeled through familiar national governmental actors. That is, the preservationist agenda set in Posadas—as well as future multilateral agreements related to the integration of regional patrimony in the mission region—was negotiated by representatives of federal preservationist agencies, ministries of foreign affairs, and national

economic development agencies. The concerns of local and regional actors (e.g., representatives of municipal and provincial governments, protectionist leagues, the Catholic Church, history associations, and citizens' organizations) were not wholly excluded from the discussions at Posadas, but they had to be subsumed into the positions adopted by the official representatives accredited by the central governments. As a procedural matter, then, patrimony was still heavily weighted toward the central state even at a moment of ascendant multilateralism.

Another procedural problem raised by the Plan de Acción concerned the integration of thirty specific localities, each with its own micropolitics, into a transnational patrimonial network that would be administered under stringent and consistent technical standards. The limitations of rural poverty and inexperience were ever present. The previous half century of preservation efforts had demonstrated that the local populations of the mission region could come to see their interests as tied to the defense of national patrimonial sites, but not necessarily in ways that immediately corresponded with experts who followed national and international preservationist standards. International conventions



FIGURE 6.1 Jesuit Reduction and World Heritage Site, San Ignacio Miní, Misiones, Argentina, 2001. Courtesy Daryle Williams.

such as the Venice Charter (1967) made specific provisions for accommodating local concerns. However, these same international conventions set technical standards for professional competence that proved difficult to replicate at the local level, particularly in regions with limited economic and educational opportunities. A strict multilateralism was apt to institutionalize a power structure under which locals without access to international resources might encounter increasingly limited opportunities to participate in the administration of patrimonial sites.

## TOWARD A HISTORY OF WORLD (AND OTHER) HERITAGE

The procedural challenges raised in the formulation of the 1981 Plan de Acción did not impede the progress of multilateral collaboration. Argentine, Brazilian, and Paraguayan officials continued to discuss further coordination of preservation, tourism, and economic development in the mission region. UNESCO, joined by the OAS, continued to encourage collaborative work. By 1983, the governments of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay had agreed on the outlines of a five-year, US\$28 million international campaign to raise funds for conservation and restoration work in the mission region.<sup>30</sup>

UNESCO, meanwhile, played a significant role in moving forward the multilateral agenda of securing a world heritage designation in the mission region. The Brazilian and Argentine representatives to the World Heritage Committee received specific instructions to coordinate preservation efforts. And, on the premise that the Jesuit-Guarani mission *system* might be the first multinational entry on the World Heritage List, UNESCO offered technical assistance to restoration projects in progress.<sup>31</sup> (Some officials at the International Council on Monuments and Sites wanted to see a bid that included Jesuit missions throughout South America.) Multilateral protectionism became a self-actualizing project as multilateral resources were made available for multilateral projects, which in turn required multilateral coordination.

The success of this external reward system was mixed. UNESCO could readily adopt a transnational posture toward cultural heritage, but preservationists working within local, regional, and national contexts found it difficult to act and think beyond nation. This is not surprising given the close historical relations between patrimony and the nation.

A draft version of the Brazilian proposal to designate São Miguel as a world heritage site is illustrative. The proposal, prepared in the final month of 1982, readily acknowledged that the Jesuit “state” transcended modern political boundaries. It located the mission system within the global phenomenon of colonialism. The authors accurately anticipated that a World Heritage designation could only be won with language noting the exceptional universal qualities of the proposed site. Thus, São Miguel ruins were characterized as globally unique in its artistic and architectural features. Nevertheless, the draft still traded on nationalist precepts. The Brazilian proposal invoked conventional language about the exceptional artistic, architectonic, and historical features of São Miguel *as a Brazilian historical landmark* and said little about the missions in Argentine and Paraguayan territory that exhibited similar characteristics.<sup>32</sup> The disposition of the Brazilian proposal was never made contingent upon Argentine and Paraguayan actions, although the Brazilians were well aware that the World Heritage Committee wished to consider the missions as a group. In a moment of multilateral collaboration, the Brazilian delegation still guarded the right to act independently.

The Argentine and Brazilian governments ultimately failed to complete all required application elements on the same time schedule and opted to make separate submissions to the World Heritage Committee. The committee agreed to consider the bids independently, though the representatives of the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) continued to envision a single regional heritage designation.<sup>33</sup> The Brazilian application for São Miguel was the first to win approval in late 1983. Argentina’s application to include San Ignacio Miní, Santa Ana, Loreto, and Santa Maria La Mayor on the World Heritage List was approved the following year. (The inscriptions of the Paraguayan missions at La Santísima Trinidad de Paraná and Jesús de Tavarangue came in 1993.)

In Brazil, the news of the winning bid was extremely well received at the national, state, and local levels. In a moment of self-congratulatory exuberance, the national secretary of culture, Marcos Vinícius Vilaça, stated that the world heritage designations were a global stamp of approval for federal preservationist efforts that dated back to the 1930s.<sup>34</sup> For Vilaça, then, World Heritage legitimated the long-established defense of national heritage. The *riograndense* establishment was equally enthusiastic about the World Heritage designation, filling the regional newspapers with celebratory ads and announcements that paired photos of the ruins at São Miguel, line drawings of Sepé Tiaraju, and

plugs for local businesses, commercial associations, and social clubs.<sup>35</sup> RBS, the main television station in Rio Grande do Sul, proclaimed “That which was ours is now for everyone / that which had passed is now eternal / Missões. Now Universal Patrimony.” The municipal government of Santo Ângelo congratulated the citizens of the municipality for their hard work in protecting

São Miguel das Missões  
Patrimônio do Município de Santo Ângelo  
Patrimônio da História Gaúcha  
Patrimônio da Cultura Brasileira  
agora PATRIMÔNIO DA HUMANIDADE

Once the celebrations ended, the obligations of universal heritage became a matter of very local politics. The effect of São Miguel’s universal status was felt immediately in Santo Ângelo, where citizens residing in the environs of the São Miguel mission were instructed by municipal authorities to vacate residential and commercial constructions built adjacent to the ruins. The newly designated World Heritage site may have “belonged” to an unbroken chain of social actors that began in the home of every *santo-angelense* and ultimately expanded to include all humanity, but locals living on the perimeter of the missions were not to have use of lands that sat too close to universal heritage.

Before world heritage status, the disposition of land in the Villa de São Miguel was a matter adjudicated at the local level. In the 1960s, for example, SPHAN officials reached an agreement with locals to stop using a small cemetery located on the mission grounds. The government had legal powers to compel the locals to cease burials on federal property, but the matter was resolved in a more informal manner, as the SPHAN helped locals identify an alternative burial site. When World Heritage came to the region, however, the question of securing a no-build zone around the ruins became a matter of greater urgency and visibility. Local custom and federal law continued to guide negotiations over land usage. However, all parties came to be aware that international preservationist standards might influence the resolution of land disputes.

World Heritage, then, altered the established rules of micropolitics. The key distinction to be drawn from earlier incarnations of micropoliticking was the presence of a new actor—humanity (*humanidade*)—who enjoyed certain legal and cultural “rights” in determining how the missions would be protected and performed. The World Heritage Convention and its attendant international



treaties as well as the growing body of international preservationist standards helped shaped the parameters of the permissible in World Heritage sites.

On-the-ground usage of Brazilian patrimonial sites could still remain a function of evolving relations among educated professionals from outside the region, municipal authorities, local caretakers and craftsmen, entrepreneurs, and neighboring landowners. In the case of São Miguel, relations post-World Heritage inscription came to include a group of Mbyá-Guarani families who settled near a water well located at the edge of the mission compound between 1989 and 1994. With the consent of the national preservation service authorities, the families initiated a small trade in indigenous artifacts sold to visitors within the mission complex. Subsequently settled about thirty kilometers away but still active in the commercialized performance of indigeneity on mission grounds, the Guarani became integral participants in the micropoliticking of Brazil's principal mission-era landmark.<sup>36</sup>

"Humanity" could be no more than a mere chimera in the prolonged negotiations to fix the precise boundaries of the no-build perimeter at São Miguel or the settlement of Guarani families in São Miguel and the regulation of craft sales at the heritage site. Yet federal officials, municipal authorities, and local residents might still invoke World Heritage when justifying their stance toward zoning, social development, cultural tourism, and land rights. Their positions were typically backed up by federal law, municipal authority, and local custom—that is, by national and subnational powers. Supra- and transnational authorities had precarious standing. Nevertheless, the rights and responsibilities of world heritage gradually became part of the political vocabulary of space and time in São Miguel.

The local arrangements brokered in Brazil were not so easily reached in Argentina, where the World Heritage designation stoked political and social tensions. On the one hand, CNMMLH officials in Buenos Aires continued to harbor suspicions that locals were disinterested in protecting the ruins and would continue to be an impediment to the World Heritage process. Carlos Onetto, the architect designated by the CNMMLH to survey the missions during the preparatory stages of the 1993 UNESCO bid, reported that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to overcome "the consensus in the region that the Jesuit settlements are largely condemned to disappear."<sup>37</sup> According to Onetto, multilateralism was bound to fail as long as locals in the province of Misiones shirked their responsibility to assist the federal government and the international community in protecting the ruins. Such an argument fit a long tradition of national-level



preservationists criticizing “bad” local citizens who failed to assume their patriotic responsibilities and rise up in defense of national patrimony.

Municipal and provincial officials, on the other hand, were suspicious of the CNMMLH—which most closely represented the interests of the World Heritage Committee—in questions of land use, economic development, and visitor services. Under the context of an ever-expanding collective ownership of the missions, regional hostility toward the federal government increased steadily after San Ignacio and Santa María received world heritage status in 1984. By February 1992, the provincial secretariat of culture bluntly informed CNMMLH president Jorge Hardoy that “all questions related to the Jesuit ruins should be under the jurisdiction of the province of Misiones.”<sup>38</sup> The provincial government of Misiones demanded the defederalization of a national historical treasure.

In response to provincial opposition to federal oversight, Carlos Saúl Menem, president of Argentina between 1999 and 2009, indicated an openness to provincialize the ruins while maintaining their status as national historical monuments. Hardoy, who opposed provincialization, responded with language typical of a nationalist position:

Cultural patrimony belongs to “all Argentines” [Patrimonio cultural es de “todos los argentinos”], it is an asset that stands to the totality of Argentines as a referent on par with the Buenos Aires Cabildo, or the Casa de Tucumán, and it falls on the Nation to oversee its preservation and conservation in the same manner done to the present.<sup>39</sup>

In his fixation on the idea that the central state should divest from all but the most essential government functions, Menem did not necessarily discount Hardoy’s foundational vision of nation and patrimony, but the guiding ideology of *menemismo* stressed decentralization, globalization, private initiative, and mass consumption in federal cultural policy.<sup>40</sup> In this mindset, the president decreed the provincialization of San Ignacio ruins in late July 1992. Misiones governor Ramón Puerta and local leaders in Posadas celebrated the measure as a victory for regional self-determination.<sup>41</sup>

Yet provincial control did not necessarily relieve provincial authorities of the entanglements of national heritage. The CNMMLH and Dirección Nacional de Arquitectura (an agency of the public works ministry) continued to assert moral, financial, and technical authority over the provincialized heritage. In late

1995, an earthmoving project associated with the construction of interpretation centers at Santa Ana, Loreto, and Santa Maria la Mayor caused serious damage to the archaeological ruins at Santa Ana. Also damaged were a cluster of modest houses occupied by indigenous families at the edge of the mission compound. The provincial archaeologist Ruth Adela Poujade turned to the local press to denounce the physical damage to provincial heritage sites, casting aspersions on architects who worked for a joint federal-provincial technical commission. Town authorities from Santa Ana also decried the damage, calling (ironically) for federal intervention. The executive council of the CNMMLH, with which provincial authorities had a history of tense relations, conceded the need to have on-site a trained architect and an archaeologist who resided in the region to supervise subsequent work.<sup>42</sup> (Lost in the public debate was the fate of the indigenous families whose residences had been affected.)

At face value, world heritage had a modest influence on the disputes between the provincial government and the Menem administration. The World Heritage Convention could accommodate patrimonial sites administered by entities other than federal governments, but the World Heritage Committee was not equipped to broker disputes between federal and provincial authorities. World Heritage came to matter, though, in certain key ways, particularly in strategies adopted by various actors seeking external funds for restoration projects as well as identity politics.

In the first instance, the mantle of World Heritage was an important asset in securing aid from international entities, including the government of Spain, the IDB, the American Express Company, the University of Naples, and UNESCO. To varying degrees, each expressed interest in supporting a systematic restoration at San Ignacio and new restoration and archaeological work at Loreto, Candelaria, and Santa Ana. Once it became clear that the World Heritage designation could be used to leverage funds and technical assistance from bilateral and multilateral actors interested in attaching their names to the World Heritage movement, federal, regional, and local officials scrambled to establish their claims to the World Heritage site. Ironically, the necessities of presenting a united front to outside funding entities tended to encourage a reconciliation of sorts between federal and provincial authorities, who collaborated on several projects undertaken in the early to mid-1990s.

The financial and political incentives for collaboration steadily increased once the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay began to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Asunción, the 1991 agreement to create a

regional common market known as the Mercado Comum do Sul (Mercosul, known in Spanish as “Mercosur”). Culture, which had little weight in the original scope of the Asunción agreement, became more integral to the document between the years 1992 and 1995, as the ministers of culture of the Mercosul member states formally agreed to place cultural integration on equal footing with economic liberalization and the consolidation of democratic governance. “Mercosul Cultural,” as the process and end result of cultural integration was dubbed, quickly adopted the Jesuit-Guarani missions as a top priority.

In March 1996, fifteen years after the first multilateral discussions to designate the missions as a regional cultural unit, representatives of the governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay returned to Posadas and signed an agreement creating the “Proyecto Misiones Mercosur Cultural.” The missions were quickly integrated into various promotional campaigns developed by the Mercosul Cultural working groups, including the International Jesuit-Guarani Missions Tourist Circuit.

The motives for placing the missions at the top of the Mercosul Cultural agenda were fairly obvious: the mission region encompassed three of the four original Mercosul member states. (Uruguay would soon be included when Colonia del Sacramento was linked to the missions through the International Jesuit-Guarani Missions Tourist Circuit as well as the World Heritage List.) For two decades before the formation of the Mercosul bloc, the mission region had been the site of various international development projects, especially in hydroelectric power generation. Speaking directly to the aspirations of an integrated cultural bloc, the mission region had a shared history, especially during the Jesuit and independence eras; the region was home to thousands of Guarani speakers who crossed national boundaries; and, finally, the region enjoyed the unusual honor of winning the world’s first transnational World Heritage site designation. The missions offered a ready-made model for cultural integration that transcended the boundaries of nation-states. Among the most enthusiastic supporters of Mercosul Cultural, the missions actually prefigured regional integration.

The administrative and financial aspects of cultural integration followed a pattern established in the 1980s: multilateral resources most readily flowed toward projects and actors exhibiting the ability and willingness to act multilaterally. UNESCO, understandably, was especially supportive of the multilateral cultural initiatives among the Mercosul member states. In early 1997, UNESCO’s director general threw his support behind an Argentine proposal pending with the IDB, writing,

The primacy ascribed to the mission sites by the culture ministers of the Mercosur member states, in addition to the human and economic resources directed by the respective nations toward the preservation of the invaluable heritage, demonstrate a political will to strengthen subregional integration through cultural initiatives.

UNESCO, for its part, supports these endeavors through its broad cooperation with the member states to achieve full development, not solely in the preservation of monuments but above all the development the community found throughout the far-flung territory where the Jesuits originally established the missionary settlements.<sup>43</sup>

The Argentine bid for IDB support proved to be unsuccessful, but it encouraged Argentine officials, especially in the CNMMLH, to continue to seek out multilateral funds for ongoing restoration and archaeological works as well as regional development projects that included heritage tourism.

The enduring conundrum of regional integration propelled by multilateral funds was the disconnect between projects with strong multilateral backing and locals living in the immediate mission zone. Ana Maria Gorosito Kramer, an anthropologist who led the provincial heritage service in Misiones in 1998, has observed that well-intentioned projects with multilateral funding, such as the Muro Piloto program, failed to excite locals. Although UNESCO officials extolled the importance of local communities to the preservation process, the on-the-ground politics of preservation often ended up alienating residents who lived with the missions. It appears that space for securing material concessions and bargaining rights won by locals during the micropoliticking of the 1940s through the 1980s, was slowly eroded by heritage projects that relied on multilateral funding sources and international organizations. The ensuing dilemma, then, was how locals might fully enjoy their “rights” to local heritage sites that belonged simultaneously to the nation, the Mercosul member states, and to all mankind.

## **WORLD HERITAGE ACROSS THE TRIPLE FRONTIER**

The entanglements of heritage and participatory democracy prove central to mapping the place of power in patrimony in the Mercosul bloc. On the one hand, the transnational heritage movement has created mechanisms for fairly democratic engagements among multiple actors who have participated in international summits, multilateral agreements, site studies, ethnographies,

and restoration projects. Somewhat kitschy, the son et lumière spectacles at São Miguel and San Ignacio still do the hard work of evoking nationalist fantasies embedded within a transnational imaginary. (Such folksy boundary crossing reinforces the type of border crossing that links the missions together as an experience for the car and motor coach tourist.) At São Miguel, the negotiation over the administration of world heritage released democratic urges among government officials and everyday citizens that afforded space for the indigenous actors who had been written out of the history of the mission region since the nineteenth century. Transnational heritage has democratized the impulse to embrace and protect heritage sites of universal value and local meanings. In Misiones, on the other hand, locals have chafed at various episodes of exclusion from decision-making processes. Their frustrations suggest that the expanding heritage crusade is not, by definition, inclusive. Nonetheless, even in San Ignacio, the world heritage movement has enabled locals to assert a certain degree of symbolic, economic, and administrative power over patrimonial sites long claimed by national elites in distant Buenos Aires.

The question to ask is what are the implications for governance and sovereignty, especially when heritage designation emanates from and reflects supranational political jurisdictions? How do central states, which continue to maintain preexisting claims to national monuments, make ideological and administrative accommodations to the legal, financial, professional, and discursive demands created in transnational heritage movements? How, in turn, do subnational and transnational actors use centralized preservationist laws and administrative structures to pursue preservationist agendas that may or may not coincide with federal objectives? What, then, does World Heritage mean for the enduring power of the nation-state and the writing of its histories in the age of globalization?

Various sociocultural movements organized for environmental protection, indigenous rights, and just wages are an integral part of the political culture of the Mercosur/sul member states. The Jesuit-Guarani missions have the potential to organize new, unprecedented movements organized around cultural preservation. The research questions include the following: What influence does world heritage have on preexisting and new social movements? Does the sociology of world heritage preservationism tend to box in grassroots heritage crusades? In the case of Mercosul, is it possible to envision a sociocultural movement organized around cultural patrimony that operates within and beyond national borders?

The research completed for this chapter strongly suggests that all patrimonial designations that have followed the original national categories—and their attendant political and social meanings—have been additive. That is, claims made by municipal and regional governments, UNESCO, Mercosul, foreign governments, and multinational corporations *have not* superseded the preexisting national status of the missions' ruins. The 1992 political crisis surrounding the provincialization of the ruins in Misiones was a unique moment when powerful political interests organized around a logic of denationalization of patrimony. The Menem administration's resolution—ceding administration of the missions to the provincial government while maintaining the ruins' national monumental status and the technical standards of World Heritage—was a largely unhappy experiment. It was also a cautionary tale.

Global patrimony may, in fact, reinforce certain older political arrangements in that federal heritage agencies find themselves at a distinct advantage relative to regional and local actors in the administration of world heritage. The central state retains its privileged place outside of the national state when seeking technical and financial support from abroad.

The poetics and politics of patrimony, nevertheless, have shifted significantly with the addition of new claims that emerge out of transnational designations. These new claims present complex problems in the meaning of the “national” and the “patrimonial.” World heritage pushes heritage outside the confines of the nation—symbolically, politically, and socially—and presents new opportunities for the reterritorialization of identities, social and economic development, and cultural hybridization. By their very nature, universal and transnational heritage (e.g., the International Jesuit-Guarani Missions Tourist Circuit, the Maya Trail, Routes of Santiago de Compostela) invite a broad range of actors and organizations to make national heritage sites their own through claims and acts of preservation and conservation, collaboration and dispute, commercialization, and, finally, scholarship about the past and its makers.

## NOTES

This chapter is dedicated to John D. Wirth (1936–2002), the late Gildred Professor of Latin American Studies at Stanford University and a passionate student of Mercosul integration. An earlier version appeared as “Além da história pátria? As missões Jesuítico-Guaraní, o Patrimônio da Humanidade, e outras histórias,” *Revista do Patrimônio* 34 (2010): 281–301. The original research was made possible

by a Rockefeller Postdoctoral Fellowship in the Humanities and the Programa de Investigaciones Socioculturales en el Mercosur-Instituto de Desarrollo Económico y Social (Buenos Aires, Argentina).

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# 7

## WALKING ON THE BAD LAND

### The Guarani Indians in the Triple Frontier

EVALDO MENDES DA SILVA

IN THIS CHAPTER I explore the Triple Frontier from the viewpoint of the Guarani Indians, a group that occupies a cluster of villages at the confluence of the Paraná and Iguazú Rivers. The starting point of this analysis is the spatial movements of the Guarani across international borders, their wanderings through the cities in the border area, and the multiple social interactions that take place during these journeys. An indigenous perspective helps reimagine the Triple Frontier as a space of mobility where the Guarani walk and live different social experiences. More than just a social or cultural production of space in the region, the history of the Guarani underscores the symbolic production of groups living in border areas.

The Guarani already occupied this area before the arrival of the first Spaniards and Portuguese conquerors in the sixteenth century. Today, as in the past, the area continues to present a permanent spatial occupation by the Guarani, and it is an important route of passage for families and groups crossing international borders toward distinct areas in all three countries.

The Guarani living in the Triple Frontier are part of a group of hundreds of small villages scattered in an area of more than 350 square kilometers between the basins of the Paraná, Paraguay, and Uruguay Rivers to the west and the Atlantic coast to the east. The total Guarani population of about one hundred thousand competes for space in an area that presents the largest industrial and agricultural centers of Latin America as well as some of the highest rates

of urban density in Brazil, exemplified by the cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.<sup>1</sup> They are speakers of the Guarani language (Tupi linguistic branch) and communicate in Spanish or Portuguese with Indians from other ethnic groups and the *jurua* (non-Indians).

The historical experiences lived by the Guarani—such as attempts at conversion to Christianity that occurred between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, forced displacement, and colonial and postcolonial wars—shaped new patterns of culture and sociospatial organization. Today, Guarani populations comprise several subgroups, each occupying different areas of the geographical space, speaking multiple variations of the Guarani language, and having particular cultural traits and specific forms of sociospatial organization. The population of the Mbyá subgroup occupies northeastern Argentina, Eastern Paraguay, northern Uruguay, and parts of southern and southeastern Brazil. The Caiuá, or Paĩ Tevyterã, inhabit the border area between the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso do Sul and Eastern Paraguay. The Nhandeva, or Chiripá, reside in Eastern Paraguay, the southwestern Brazilian states of Paraná and Santa Catarina, and the coast of the state of São Paulo, also in Brazil. The Chiriguano-Chané live in southern Bolivia and northern Argentina. And the Aché-Guayaki reside in Eastern Paraguay.<sup>2</sup>

Despite geographical distance and sociocultural and linguistic differences, all Guarani consider themselves to belong to the same ethnic group and refer to each other as *nhanderetarã*—“our kin.” They travel long distances to visit their kin; to celebrate weddings, parties, and religious rituals; to establish political alliances; to provide mutual assistance; and to practice various forms of solidarity and reciprocity.<sup>3</sup>

## THE GUARANI OF THE TRIPLE FRONTIER

In the sixteenth century, the area of confluence between the Paraná and Iguazú Rivers was the scene of intense territorial disputes between Portuguese and Spanish colonial forces seeking gold, silver, and slaves for their new colonies. It was in this context, in 1542, that the Spanish conqueror Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca saw, for the first time, several Guarani groups, recording in his diary his first impressions:

These Indians belong to the Guarani tribe; they are farmers who sow maize and manioc twice a year, raise chickens and ducks in the same way that we do it in

Spain, have many parrots, occupy a large extent of land, and speak one language. But [they] also eat human flesh, which can be either of the Indian enemies, Christians, or their own fellow tribesmen. It is a very friendly people, but also very warlike and vindictive.<sup>4</sup>

Between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, under Spanish rule, this region was part of the historical and thriving Provincia del Guairá, which harbored dozens of *pueblos* run by Jesuit priests and populated by Indians from various indigenous ethnic groups, mostly Guarani, who fled the atrocities of colonial wars and the persecution of slave hunters.

With the decline of the Jesuit missions and the expulsion of the Jesuits by the Portuguese crown in 1759 and by the Spanish crown in 1768, the Indians dispersed throughout the region. Part of the Guarani population gathered in the forests surrounding the small villages on the banks of the Paraná River, forming some of the ancestral grounds of the current Guarani population. Another part was assimilated into the national societies of Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina.<sup>5</sup>

The independence of Paraguay (1811), Argentina (1816), and Brazil (1822) created the conditions for various territorial and border conflicts between these nations. The territorial demarcation of the Triple Frontier as we know it today was definitively established only in the late nineteenth century, after the War of the Triple Alliance (1864–1870). This war brought a profound sociospatial disorganization to the Guarani not only because they had to leave their villages but also because many males, including children, were forcibly recruited by local governments and died in combat.

With the end of the war, the governments of all three countries implemented various projects to attract and retain national populations along their international borders. As part of these border occupation efforts, the Brazilian government founded Foz do Iguaçu as a military colony in 1889. The Argentine government across the border made plans for a similar state-sponsored colony in the area of the future town of Puerto Iguazú in 1902.<sup>6</sup> Later, in 1957, the Paraguayan government established the town of Puerto Flor de Lis on the banks of the Paraná River, and soon after changed its name to Puerto Presidente Stroessner, named after the dictator Alfredo Stroessner. In 1989 it was renamed Ciudad del Este.

Despite the public engagement of different governments in promoting colonization, much of the colonization of the border was done by the private sector. During the first half of the twentieth century, private colonization companies

razed the remaining forests, parceled and sold land to farmers, and expelled Indians from their lands at the same time they used them in road construction and public works. Between the 1940s and 1970s, the governments created “indigenous areas” designed to receive people who had been displaced. In those places were settled, in addition to the Guarani, indigenous peoples of other ethnicities, such as the Kaingang, Xokleng, and Xetá among others. However, these lands were already populated and unsuitable for agriculture, and many families left in search of better living conditions.<sup>7</sup>

The following decades witnessed an intense movement of indigenous populations traversing international borders with families and groups crossing from one side to the other to flee land grabbers and seek new settlement sites. Small Nhandeva groups, for example, managed to find refuge in forest areas at the Brazilian and Paraguayan margins of the Paraná River. Among the Mbyá, there were those who could not settle in government reserves and moved to distant regions in northeastern Argentina and in southern and southeastern Brazil.

In 1973 the governments of Brazil and Paraguay signed the cooperation agreement for the construction of the Itaipu Dam on the Paraná River. In 1982, the dam’s reservoir was flooded to create a lake over 1,300 square kilometers in size. As a result, Nhandeva villages by the river were covered with water, and the population was once again displaced. Government agencies of the two countries transferred the affected Indians to new lands on the lakeshore, where they established the Ocoí reserve on the Brazilian side and the Kirito, Acaray-Mi, and Arroyo Guazú reserves on the Paraguayan side.

Over the past decade, there has been an increasing number of demarcated indigenous lands for the Guarani at the Triple Frontier area. However, they are not enough to meet the needs of the entire population. This is evidenced by the growing large number of indigenous settlements in the region’s urban peripheries and along the major highways linking the three countries.<sup>8</sup>

## WALKING ON THE BAD LAND

The ethnographic data presented in this work was collected in the following villages: Ocoí, Tekoa Anhetete, Rio das Cobras (Taquara, Lebre, and Pinhal villages), Mangueirinha (Palmeirinha village), and Marrecas (Koendy Porã village), all located in the west and southwest of the state of Paraná in southern Brazil; Acaray-Mi, Kirito, and Arroyo Guazú in the department of Alto Paraná,

in Eastern Paraguay; and Fortin Mbororé and M'Bocaí, on the banks of the Iguazú River in the province of Misiones in northeastern Argentina. These settlements are part of a broader *tekoa guasu*, a designation that the Guarani use to refer to clusters of villages whose close-knit community is maintained by the frequent contact and visits of relatives. This *tekoa guasu* consists of about forty villages with a total population estimated at five thousand people distributed between the Mbyá and Nhandeva subgroups.<sup>9</sup>

The villages (*tekoa*) are like islands among extensive agricultural plantations, sometimes located alongside highways or close to urban areas. Almost all are surrounded by wire and have an entrance gate with a sign that reads “No Entry—Indian Area.” They are established in tracts of various sizes, usually in old cattle-ranching areas or secondary forest camps. Dwellings are scattered over the terrain, forming small clusters of houses of close relatives (*tei'y*). The houses are made of wooden planks or bricks and covered with clay tiles, asbestos, or palm leaves. The kitchen, separated from the rest of the house, is constructed of various materials such as bamboo, canvas, aluminum plates, logs, and tree branches. The electrical grid reaches only the houses close to the highways; thus, not all households have electricity despite the dwellers being neighbors to the second largest hydroelectric plant in the world.

Sanitary conditions are very precarious; the waste of households is deposited directly into the soil in pits or washed away by rain. Like electricity, water supply also does not reach the entire population, leading some families to obtain water from wells, rivers, and streams. Crop plots are close to the dwellings and grow corn, beans, manioc, sweet potato, and banana. In the absence of forests and animals to hunt or fish, dwellers complement their diet by buying products in the city. They rely on these nearby markets for buying meat, sugar, salt, coffee, soybean oil, noodles, and wheat flour. Adults, young men, and even children are employed in neighboring farms during the planting and harvesting seasons, working in the fields and loading the trucks that transport the products. Women and children prepare handicrafts such as seed necklaces and bracelets, artificially dyed chicken feather headdresses, decorative bows and arrows, woven straw baskets, and animal sculptures to sell to tourists on the streets of Foz do Iguacu, Puerto Iguazú, and Ciudad del Este.

In general the settlements have only elementary schooling with indigenous teachers who teach children in Guarani, Portuguese, and Spanish. Students who wish to continue studying have to go on foot or by bus (provided by local governments) to the nearest schools. Health clinics have Native nursing assistants

and *jurua* nurses and doctors visit the villages two or three times a week. Severe cases are referred to local hospitals.

The House of Pray (*Opy*) is the core of community life. It is where every night locals gather to sing, dance, smoke the pipe (*petygua*), and listen to the “beautiful words” (*arandu porã*) of the elders (*xamôî*). The entrance doors and the altar (*amba*) must face eastward, the mythical region where it is believed the Land without Evil (*Yvy Marãeÿ*) is located, which is the house of the gods and the destination of the Guarani after death.

The myth of Earth’s creation can give us some clues about the Guarani perception of space and surface and how they interpret their wanderings in the Triple Frontier area. For the Guarani, the Earth (*Yvy*), also called Evil Land or Imperfect Land (*Yvy Vái*), is the “place of unhappiness.”<sup>10</sup> This is the second Earth, because the original, literally the “First Earth” (*Yvy Tenonde*), the “true land of the Guarani,” was destroyed by a universal flood. The catastrophe occurred because of the “misbehavior” of its inhabitants. During the flood, all men and women “without evil” (*marã e’ÿ*) reached the “state of perfection” (*-aguyje*) and therefore rose to the Land without Evil to live next to the divinities. The other inhabitants of the earth, that is, the “imperfect,” drowned. Once the First Earth was destroyed, “Our Father” (*Nhanderu*) molded from the clay with his own hands a new Earth, the Evil Land: an island floating on the “Great Waters” (*Yguazu*). To inhabit this new world he carved in wood (*yvyra*) images similar to the divinities and placed them “in front” (*-ovai*) and “standing” (*-ã*) to walk on Earth. These are the “true humans” (*avaete*), as the Guarani call themselves. For the other inhabitants of the Earth—the *jurua*, animals, and ghosts of the dead (*-ãgue*)—are all considered nonhuman beings because they are not the “image” of the divinities. Collectively we are called “terrestrials” (*yvygua*) because we are born, die, and remain on this earth. As once told to me by a shaman Nhandeva in Ocoí, “You whites were made of clay, as it is said in your Bible. You were made of land, and when you die, you go back to the land once again.” “Back to be soil” is also the destination of animals. Ghosts, who are the souls of people who made “evil” on this earth, will wander this earth forever scaring people at night on the paths.

As outlined below, the Guarani maintain a relationship of respect and fear with the earth and the beings that inhabit it. On the one hand, this land was a gift from the gods given specifically to the Guarani, a kind of second chance to restore the broken ties with the divinities after the destruction of the First Earth. On the other hand, it is an imperfect Earth and a dangerous surface



inhabited by nonhumans that may jeopardize the final destiny of the Guarani to regain their place among the gods. In this regard, the geographical area of the Triple Frontier is a privileged *locus* to understand how the Guarani system of thought operates in practice.

There is always a steady stream of Guarani people crossing international boundaries via the Friendship Bridge on the Paraná River between Brazil and Paraguay and the Brotherhood Bridge on the Iguazú River between Brazil and Argentina. They are groups living in local villages or coming from distant areas who are doing what they call “walks” (*-guata*).<sup>11</sup> Such walks can be short trips between the villages and the nearest towns for shopping, selling handicrafts to tourists, visiting the doctor, going to school or work, looking for jobs, or simply “walking aimlessly” (*-guata rei*). They can also consist of long commutes to visit relatives in distant villages on journeys that can last several days and cover over one thousand kilometers. During these trips, short or long, they use the available means of transport according to affordability. They usually alternate between stretches of walking, biking, riding buses or vans, taking motorcycle taxis, and riding trucks when commuting to work in plantations.

During their wanderings, they walk through trails, rural roads, highways, borders, farmland, and cities, interacting with different people and enjoying multiple intercultural contact experiences with Indians from other ethnic groups and, especially, with *jurua*. Although these cities, roads, bridges, and vehicles provide the means that enable their wanderings, these elements of *jurua* life also act as a barrier that hinders the Guarani’s movements.

The memory of the elderly is filled with vivid recollections, lived or heard, from a time before the many modern barriers to the cross boundary mobility of the Guarani. Memories that date back to the first decades of the twentieth century and that refer to the old routes that connected this area to other distant areas in Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay. Memories of crossing the Iguazú and Paraná rivers on boats that the Indians themselves carved in wood logs, or of a time with an abundance of berths for rafts along those rivers. They say that at that time it was possible to walk for several days on the trails in the woods without finding any *jurua*, or if they were found, they would be loggers, hunters, or yerba mate collectors who did not prevent the Guarani from following their walk. The elderly also recall that the groups moving in these ways were large, made up of several families and counting men, women, and children together. They say that when they were hungry, men entered the woods and hunted with shotguns or bows and arrows, bringing birds, capybaras, armadillos,

peccaries, deer, and honey. The women cleaned and roasted meat, and the children searched for fruits and small game such as rabbits, agoutis, and coatis. To spend the night, the men built shelters with palm leaves at the margins of the trails, and in the morning they continued their trip without being bothered by anyone. They remember that, gradually, paths started “to close” as a result of the widening of the roads by the *jurua* and their tractors, axes, and chainsaws.

From the 1950s on, the development of international trade and the increase in the flow of people crossing borders also intensified police surveillance at border posts. For the Indians, the situation deteriorated in the late 1960s with the construction of the bridge between Brazil and Paraguay and in the 1980s with the construction of the bridge between Brazil and Argentina. Older Guarani say that the customs authorities made many questions and demanded “papers” that the Indians did not possess, a situation that further hampered their movement.

Even today, problems with documentation and communication between Indians and immigration officers continue to be the main obstacle in the crossing of the international bridges. Some Guarani explain that at the time of crossing they do not always carry a passport, identity card, or birth certificate for the children. There are cases of people who simply do not possess any of these documents, such as parents without the documents of their children or relatives who travel with someone else’s children without the proper authorizations. The lack of documentation among the Guarani is an issue that comes from the way in which national governments have conducted local geopolitics. As we have seen, with the agricultural expansion from the mid-twentieth century on, the Guarani were systematically persecuted and driven away from their land, wandering from one place to another without the protection of national citizenship. When they headed to Brazil they were treated by the local authorities as illegal aliens, that is, identified by physical appearance and Spanish accent as “Paraguayan” and sent back. In Paraguay and Argentina, the same thing happened, with the local authorities expelling those people who had no documentary evidence of their nationality. This situation persists today, and *foreigner* is one of the labels used by farmers and their advocates in the three countries to deny the Guarani the right of access to land, education, health, and other civil rights.

According to the Guarani, Brazilian and Argentine immigration officers are the most rigorous in monitoring. Indians, therefore, have developed tactics that help decrease the chances of being held up at border control points. Instead of walking on the Brotherhood Bridge, as many people do, they prefer to cross it on buses that take tourists, merchants, and workers. Thus, the Indians choose

the busiest times—normally in the morning, at lunchtime, or late in the day—when the buses run crowded and police monitoring decreases. At the Friendship Bridge, on the other hand, inspection is not as strict. Brazilian and Paraguayan officers rarely ask for documents of passengers crossing on foot as they instead focus surveillance on cars, motorcycles, and buses. Thus, the Guarani cross this bridge on foot, intermingling with the crowd of shoppers who seek mainly to buy cheap Chinese products in the bustling streets of Ciudad del Este.

With or without documentation, the fact remains that the Guarani say they are not Paraguayans, Brazilians, or Argentines. They are Guarani, who were there long before the *jurua* arrived and who find it wrong to ask permission to walk on an earth of which the *jurua* are not the “owners.” They therefore focus on the creation myth that teaches that the earth was made by “Our Father” for the Guarani to walk on. From this view, the earth is conceived as an immense surface free of obstacles, without barriers to the movement of people and on which all groups (Guarani, *jurua*, animals, and ghosts) must trace a path and keep walking.

In many ways, the Guarani notion of space approaches the concept of “nomad space” (as opposed to “sedentary space”) as described by Deleuze and Guattari. It is true that the nomads in Deleuze and Guattari are groups of shepherds from the Eurasian steppes whose movement in space is dictated by rainfall patterns and the life cycles of plants. This is not the case of the Guarani, but much of what these authors say can help us reflect on the meanings implied in these spatial wanderings. The “striated” or “sedentary space” of Deleuze and Guattari is the space of the city: cut, measured, scanned, with paths linking points of departure and arrival. While walking through this space, the authors say, the sedentary individual performs a “trip distance”—his journey is guided by predefined paths that lead from one point to another, as when he goes from home to work, he follows a path that connects points A and B. By contrast, the “nomadic space” is designed as an open or “flat” space, because when walking, the nomad does not follow a trajectory—he “slides” on space, tracing his own path.<sup>12</sup>

The idea of “sliding” over space is reflected in the relative freedom of older generations in walking, choosing, and opening paths—in sum, in “sliding” over space without many obstacles. In this regard, the difficulties posed to the Guarani in traversing the Triple Frontier borders, such as police harassment and the requirement of documents, are seen as barriers to movement not only by preventing the passage through space itself but also by imposing on the Guarani a path and a way of walking that are not theirs. When police request immigration

documents and ask the Guarani about where they go, when they will come back, and what they will do, these representatives of *jurua* society project the spatial notion of a “sedentary space” constituted of clearly defined and planned trajectories and points of arrival and departure. In turn, the Guarani want to “slide” on space without asking anyone’s permission, without precisely defining a path, a time, or a predetermined destination. They want to repeat on this earth the walk of their gods, like Tupã, whose firm stamping leaves a convoluted trail of light wherever he goes (i.e., the thunder and lightning we hear and see in a stormy day).

Contrary to what we might assume, the importance of walking for the Guarani does not relate to a statement of tradition or a mythical-religious requirement. For the Guarani, to walk is to live, to be alive. In the Guarani language the words *walk* (*-guata*) and *live* (*-iko*) have similar senses.<sup>13</sup> The intransitive verb *-iko* can be used both to indicate life, as in *jaiko va’e* (we are living), and to indicate movement in space, as in *ka’aru peve oiko* (he walked until late). It can also indicate the place where one lives but without a definition of fixed location, as in *xero py aiko*, which in a free translation could be “I am living [or walking] in my house.”

## WALKING IN THE CITY OF WHITES

The issues involving the wanderings of the Guarani are not only restricted to the crossing of international borders. The cities of Foz do Iguaçu, Ciudad del Este, and Puerto Iguazú constitute obligatory stops for those crossing these borders, and as such they present many obstacles to Guarani movement. When arriving in the city, or “place of *jurua*” (*juruaireko*), issues such as how long they will stay and which routes they will follow may suffer sudden changes according to the circumstances of the moment. If the sale of handicrafts is good, people may decide to stay a few more days in the same place. If a baby gets sick or if the rain does not stop for some days, the whole family might decide to return to the village of origin. Once in the city, individual or collective plans can change suddenly; an unexpected encounter with relatives at the bus station, a premonitory dream, a new job opportunity, a football game, a quarrel, and new plans may redefine the trajectories.

When walking in the city, they seldom walk alone. It is common to walk in pairs or trios of friends or siblings, young couples (sometimes with a baby in

their arms), groups consisting of nuclear families (father, mother, and children), or groups of five or six people with different degrees of kinship. When they cannot afford to sleep in hotels or have lunch in restaurants, they start searching for other places to rest, sleep, sell handicrafts, eat, drink, smoke, and drink *tereré* (a yerba mate beverage).<sup>14</sup>

For selling their handicrafts the Guarani prefer the busiest tourist places, such as the entrance gate of the Iguazú Falls, the entrances of hotels, restaurants, and shopping centers, or the sidewalks of the busy shopping streets. For lunchtime and siesta they look for benches in squares, in the shadows of trees in streets and avenues, or on sidewalks under the awning of stores. Stories about direct contact with the *jurua* in the city reflect the marginalized experiences of the Guarani, such as the case of a Paraguayan businessman who poured water on a family that slept on the sidewalk in front of his store, or the security guard that kicked over the handicrafts set up on a step at the entrance of a shopping mall. Far more positive stories also exist, and *jurua* also are known to express solidarity by providing food, water, clothing, and money. One example of a good non-Indian (*jurua porã*) is of the owner of a bakery in Foz do Iguaçu who saves unsold bread to give away to the Guarani.

Finding places to sleep in the city is a much more difficult task. At night, cities in the border region pose many risks: there are thieves, drug dealers, drug addicts, homeless people, armed gangs, and the police. Twenty-four-hour bus stations are the safest alternative, as they are well lit and have a continuous presence of people. However, guards almost never allow passengers to sleep on the benches or floor of these stations. Alternative to this are the sidewalks and gardens around the stations, which are likewise well lit and relatively safe. Women and men sleep on separate sides with babies and young children in between them, clinging to the women, sheltered from the wind, and covered with blankets and pieces of clothing. Young men take turns to guard the group while some sleep, circulating through the station, watching TV, smoking, drinking, carving wooden animals with pocket knives, playing cards, and talking.

In warm summer nights, sleeping outdoors does not present an immediate problem. During the winter, however (between the months of April to July), temperatures can drop to  $-2^{\circ}\text{C}$  at night, and their clothes may not be enough to keep their bodies warm. Then, the groups roam the city looking for shelter from wind and the dew that freezes and covers the ground with a thin layer of frost. The Guarani recall that decades ago people sought shelter under bridges and in abandoned houses and vacant lots. However, many of these sites have

become dangerous, as they turned into refuges for drug users. Another increasingly abandoned practice was to gather sticks on the streets to light bonfires at night. This has been suppressed by security guards at bus stations, who argue that concrete sidewalks can crack with the fire.

The walkers say they do not want conflict with the *jurua*, have no intention of claiming ownership over the places they choose to stay, and just want to rest and keep walking. In this sense, their strategy to avoid conflicts consists of not staying for too long in the same place and splitting into smaller groups to avoid the clustering of large groups at the same site. In these settings, the Guarani developed two distinct skills, each equally effective for their wanderings in the city. The first is to attain a form of social invisibility by mimicking the urban environment through wearing clothes and shoes similar to those of the *jurua*. Women wear lipstick, makeup, nail polish, rings, bags, and arrange their hair in a way that is not seen when they are in their villages. Men wear pants, tucked in shirts, belts, socks, and shoes. They also hide their necklaces under their clothes and keep the wooden pipes (*peteygua*) in the women's handbags.

By attempting to erase the signs they believe to be the most evident of their indigenous identity, the Guarani signal to the *jurua* that they want to go through the city discreetly, almost unnoticed. Invisible and wandering, the Guarani update what Virilio calls the "fleet in being," or the "motion art of bodies unseen," that is, the military strategy of crossing the oceans without being detected by the enemy. The second "ability" of the Guarani walkers is the opposite of the first. It occurs when they overvalue the alleged traces of a perceived indigenous ethnicity to sell handicrafts on the streets or to perform singing and dancing for tourists in front of the hotels and restaurants and in schools on commemorative dates. There, they exhibit gestures, clothes, paintings, and body adornment objects that supposedly correspond to the image that *jurua* have of the "indigenous."<sup>15</sup>

If the city as the "place of *jurua*" presents itself as a hostile space to the presence of Indians, it also provides the Guarani with urban facilities that allow them to proceed with their movements. They appropriate such spaces, even if only for a few hours, turning bus station courtyards into their bedrooms, squares into kitchens and dining rooms, and sidewalks into handicraft outlets. All temporarily, until they leave the sites and keep walking—or "surfing," to use the Deleuzian metaphor of sliding on the water surface free of obstacles.<sup>16</sup> As in the Guarani myth, they walk on the city space as if sailing in the Great Waters toward the abode of the gods.

## THE “EVIL” LURKING IN THE PATHS

The physical and geographical proximity between the Guarani and the *jurua* is interpreted as the source of several evils (*-axy*) that can afflict the Guarani.<sup>17</sup> To explain the evil and its effects, the Guarani resort to a theory based on their creation myth. As we have seen, the story explains that this is a “Bad Land,” inhabited by the Guarani (the real humans) and nonhuman beings (the *jurua*, animals, and ghosts of the dead). Nonhumans are considered to be carriers and transmitters of evils, which is one of the main obstacles to the full realization of human perfection by the Guarani. The Guarani worldview, as with several Amerindian cosmologies, considers evil as foreign to humanity because humans were designed to live in “a state of perfection” on Earth. In this regard, evil has an external source, as it can be brought on by beings such as the *jurua* and can settle down between the Guarani.

As observed in ethnographic studies, the human condition of the Guarani is not a permanent, unchanging state.<sup>18</sup> This means that over a lifetime a person can undergo transformations and lose this condition. What the Guarani call *jepota* is the process that transforms human beings into nonhuman beings. This shift includes changes to the body and the way of life of the person affected, who starts to show the same social behavior, eating habits, and use of language of the species that he or she has now become. If a person begins to manifest an evil behavior—becoming aggressive, disrespectful to family and elders, drinking alcohol in excess, or avoiding work in the fields—he or she may be suffering from *jepota*. This is an evil that can transform the body physically into the shape and behavior of a particular animal or *jurua*. If the transformation process is not treated and halted by shamans, one continues to live that way, and when one dies, he or she will remain on this Earth, returning “to the dust” or wandering as a ghost. Therefore, the *jepota* is seen as a great evil, nullifying the human/divine condition of a person and devolving them to a nonhuman condition. And as alerted by the myth, a person deprived of humanity can never reach the Land without Evil.

These questions bring us to the issues concerning the body, as has been the case in studies of Amerindian perspectivism, particularly the work of the anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro.<sup>19</sup> What these studies show is that many domains of the social life of Amerindian groups can be understood by the Native notion of body. The principle of these systems of thought is that the body is not a support, ready and finished, on which we invest cultural meanings;

it is, instead, transformed, manufactured, continuously molded, retouched and, therefore, susceptible to mutations in its nature.<sup>20</sup>

Returning to the Guarani social cosmology, the transformation of the human condition to a nonhuman state occurs in certain social contexts involving physical proximity or bodily contact. Thus, if the Guarani go on to live, eat, sleep, or walk too close to *jurua* or animals, they can suffer *jepota*, losing their human condition and getting the form and habits of those whom they approached. Yet physical proximity alone might not be capable of triggering changes, as those who have the “strong body” (*-ete mbaraete*), that is, those who live “without evil,” are not at risk of being transformed. Life “without evil” concerns an idealized life: to live with a healthy body (*hete rexaĩ reve oiko*) constitutes the walkers’ primary challenge. Their goal is to keep their body human, healthy, and without evil, all while walking on a surface populated by nonhumans.

According to the Guarani thought, all beings that walk on this Earth form their own “community,” each with their own “way of life” (*-eko*), with their habits, language, beliefs, food preferences, and their own “bodily substances” (*-etã*). The bodies of the *jurua*—along with their customs and habits—are made of the dust on the ground (*-etã*). Their “way of life” is called *juruaireko*. The Guarani, on the other hand, have wood as the constitutive substance of their bodies. They were carved by Our Father in the sacred wood (*yvyra*). Their “way of life” is the *-eko porã*, the perfect way of life. Thus, each species has its *-eko* and its *-etã*. For example, dogs have their *jaguareko* and *jaguaretã*, chickens their *urureko* and *ururetã*, frogs their *ju’ireko* and *ju’iretã*, ghosts their *ãguereko* and *ãguereta*, and so on.

In the Guarani thought, the Earth, or any portion of its surface, does not have an “owner.” This is true because the Earth’s “true owner” is “Our Father,” who created it. And despite that, all beings that walk the Earth are in “transit” on it, which prevents them from establishing a link with any particular place. In the particular case of the Guarani, “walking the Earth” has an even greater goal: to fulfill their destiny of reaching the mythical Land without Evil on the other side of the Great Waters. In this respect, the difficulties and barriers they face when moving in the Triple Frontier area are also seen as obstacles to the full realization of their humanity. And for this reason, the lands around the Triple Frontier are also “evil lands,” and the troubles afflicting the Guarani when walking there are interpreted as evidence that the “end of the world” is near and that Our Father will again destroy the earth—this time with fire.

The Triple Frontier, as part of the Bad Land, is seen by the Guarani as a space where evil dwells everywhere. As a result, walkers find themselves in a



state of permanent threat. The evils mentioned by them have different origins, which are related to the presence and proliferation of the *jurua* and how they have appropriated and transformed the space. For the Guarani, many of the evils affecting them are caused by environmental changes caused by the *jurua*: the cutting of forests, the disappearance of animal species, the contamination of rivers with pesticides, and the flooding of the land by the Itaipu reservoir. These evils extend to the untimely death of infants and the various diseases “that make people die sooner,” all of which exacerbate existing problems by making their lands barren, invoking heatwaves, and changing rainfall patterns.

A Guarani shaman who lives in the Ocoí village at the shore of the Itaipu reservoir commented on the ecological imbalance caused by the dam. He said that several species of fish, birds, and land animals such as the capybara, the tapir, and the jaguar have disappeared since the formation of the lake. At the same time, certain aquatic animals, such as toads and frogs, saw a huge population growth. The shaman believes that the proliferation of these amphibians and the consequent physical contact of people with them have brought many evils to the community. He told the story of a teenager who got an “evil” while swimming with his friends in the reservoir. According to the shaman, the teenager began to feel weak and discouraged, stopped eating or even going home, spending all day sitting silent and alone in the lake with water up to his waist. Brought by his mother to consult the shaman, it was discovered that the boy was suffering from *jepota* and that the evil was caused by physical proximity and frequent contact with frogs (*juytara*) living on the banks of the lake. In a dream, the shaman found himself surrounded by frogs, so many that just to walk forward he had to push them away with his ritual stick. Their croaking was deafening, and they leapt agitated in front of him as if trying to prevent his passage. With difficulty the shaman progressed until he saw the teenager at a distance in the middle of a cluster of amphibians. The shaman explained that the boy had a frog body, croaking and jumping with them. But as a shaman, he still managed to see the teenager as “people” (*ava*). Getting closer, he held the stick for the teen to grab, but the boy did not want to leave, as he was already feeling himself part of that animal species and was getting used to that “way of life.” The shaman, however, refused to give up, and in one swift blow he managed to catch him by the hand and bring him back to his “real kin.” After the dream and after passing through various rituals of healing, the shaman said the teenager began to resume his behavior as “people,” going back to eating, talking, playing, and studying. Advised by the shaman, the teenager began avoiding the banks of the lake.

The Guarani also point to population growth in cities and the countryside throughout the Triple Frontier area as a cause for new evils. In their view, the *jurua* population boom had generated an unavoidable physical and geographical proximity that has increased the frequency of contacts (i.e., the source of evils). They cite the example of interethnic marriages between Indians and *jurua*, arguing that the mestizo children are born weak, die as babies, and when they do not die, they become lazy adults and physically weak for lacking the “strong body” of the “real human.” Many Guarani also worry about the increasing number of Indians living the “wrong way” with a different behavior in relation to the “real humans.” One example is the accusation, by the Ocoí residents in Brazil, that their kin living in the Acaray-Mi and Kirito settlements in Paraguay are losing their “good way of living” and have adopted the “evil behavior” of the *jurua*. They argue that the residents of Acaray-Mi and Kirito spend much time in town, working, studying, or drinking *cachaça* (Brazilian rum) with the *jurua*, and as a consequence they have adopted inappropriate behavior, such as buying guns to threaten and kill people, consuming alcohol, taking drugs, and having sex with *jurua* prostitutes.

Similar arguments are used by the Mbyá on the Argentine bank of the Iguazú River against the Guarani arriving from “São Paulo” (i.e., the Guarani villages at the Atlantic Seaboard of Brazil), who are seen as the carriers of many evils obtained from walking with the *jurua*. This criticism is especially applied to young people who prefer to spend money on clothes, shoes, baseball caps, and cell phones instead of helping their families. In these cases, the problem is not related to specific places but rather is inherent to the people who “come from far away” and bring evil with them in the process. In this sense, the Triple Frontier area, as a high-transit nexus of people—especially *jurua*—is considered a space conducive to the spread of evil, a situation that can endanger the very meaning of life for the Guarani and their ability to live as humans on Earth.

## CLOSING REMARKS

The Guarani live an apparent paradox: walking on this Earth is the only way to perpetuate humanity and fulfill their destiny of eternal divinity. But the earth’s paths have come to present numerous dangers that can derail their existential project. In this sense, the space of the Triple Frontier area plays an important role as a place that both generates instability and affirms the human condition

of the Guarani. It is an unstable space due to its intense flow of people, most of whom are seen as potential carriers of evil. It is also a hostile space, surrounded by nearly insurmountable obstacles to the conductivity of the walkers. Yet in the eyes of the Guarani, the Triple Frontier area is not a distinct, strange, or unknown territory; on the contrary, they traverse the area with dexterity and an ever-present internal compass. In Foz do Iguaçu and Ciudad del Este, they are well aware of the points and bus lines, street names, shops, places where to sell handicrafts, and squares with taps for drinking water and washing clothes. As they cannot stay for long in any one place, they never stop walking and make use of transborder buses that take them from one country to another within minutes.

Many Guarani claim to like it in the city, that they rejoice in wandering through its streets, looking at the shop windows and façades, and that they welcome the movement of people and cars. It is not that they prefer urban life—even those who have lived in the city say life in the villages, next to their kin, is always better. However, walking in the city brings an experience of joy that life in the villages does not offer in the same manner. In the city there is entertainment, distraction, the chance to eat different foods, meet different people, discover new places, make money, get a job. In this regard, for the Guarani, to walk the paths of the Triple Frontier area is a way of putting to the test their own human condition. There are those who manage to cross it and move on, proving to themselves and others that they have the “strong body” and continue to be “true humans.” But others let themselves get carried away by evil while walking in this space, losing their humanity and, in the process, devolving into other beings.

In Guarani cosmology, however, nothing is permanent. Those who today are human may lose this condition, and nonhumans can return to humanity just as easily. This ongoing dispute between humanization and its opposing forces is at the core of Guarani thought. This worldview is based on the dual attempt to overcome and control earthly urges while still balancing the desire to achieve the perfection of the gods.

## NOTES

1. There are no current demographic data on the Guarani population. The estimate of one hundred thousand people is by Grumberg and Melià. By comparison, the anthropologist Pierre Clastres estimates that the Guarani population of the sixteenth century in this area was approximately 1.5 million people distributed between several inhabited villages with an average of 600–700 residents. Georg

Grumberg and Bartomeu Melià, *Mapa Guarani Retã 2008: Povos Guarani na fronteira Argentina, Brasil e Paraguai* (São Paulo: CTI, 2008); Pierre Clastres, *A sociedade contra o estado: Pesquisas de antropologia política* (Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves, 1978), 48. The challenge of defining a “Native point of view” has been a central concern of anthropologists since the end of nineteenth century. Without directly engaging in this scholarly debate, this chapter approaches the “Native perspective” of the Guarani Indians through the ethnographic methodology used to conduct research. The findings presented herein are the product of ethnographic fieldwork undertaken between 2002 and 2003 as the author lived with Guarani groups for twelve months as they moved across the frontiers of Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina.

2. According to some scholars, the people who make up the Mbyá and Caiuá subgroups would be the descendants of the ancient “Guarani do Mato,” groups that remained relatively distant from contact with settlers between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Nhandeva or Chiripá would be the direct descendants of the ancient “Guarani das Missões,” catechized by Jesuit priests between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. After the expulsion of the missionaries in 1759, the Indians would have returned to live in the forests on the banks of the Paraná River at the border between Brazil and Paraguay. As for Chiriguano-Chané, there is evidence that they would have migrated in the period before the Spanish conquest from the Chaco region toward the highlands of the Bolivian Andes, where they would have merged with Chané (Arawak). About the Aché-Guayaki of Eastern Paraguay, Pierre Clastres develops a controversial hypothesis, but no less fascinating, that the Guarani groups would have “returned” to a previous cultural level, turning to hunting and gathering, developing large social differences compared with other current Guarani subgroups. See Bartomeu Melià, “A Terra sem Mal dos Guarani: Economia e profecia,” *Revista de Antropologia* 33 (1990): 33–46; León Cadogan, “En torno a la aculturación de los Mbya-Guarani del Guairá,” *América Indígena* 10, no. 2 (1960): 133–50; Pierre Clastres, *Crônica dos índios Guayaki: O que sabem os Ache, caçadores nômades do Paraguai* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora 34, 1995); Isabelle Combés and Thierry Saignes, *Alter ego naissance de l'identité Chiriguano* (Paris: Édition de l'école des hautes études en sciences sociales, 1995).
3. According the ethnologist Bartomeu Melià, frequent visits between the Guarani groups living in geographically distant places reinforce a “reciprocity economy,” a fundamental principle that is expressed not only in economic terms but also that refers to various fields of social, political, and religious life, uniting these spatially dispersed populations. Bartomeu Melià, “A Terra sem Mal dos Guarani.”
4. Álvaro Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca, *Naufrágios e comentários* (Porto Alegre: L & M, 1999), 129. At first glance, it might appear strange that Cabeza de Vaca described chickens and ducks among the livestock of the Guarani, as these birds had originally been introduced in the Americas by European colonizers. Although Cabeza de Vaca was the first European to visit this area in particular, it must be noted that the Guarani Indians whom he encountered were already aware of the existence

of Europeans elsewhere. Moreover, it is possible that the Guarani themselves had earlier come into contact with Europeans in farther-away locations. In his diary, Cabeza de Vaca explained that he began his journey on the coast of Santa Catarina (in southern Brazil) and followed the “Caminho de Peabiru,” a path through the forest used by Indians before the arrival of Europeans. These *caminhos* (roads) were part of a larger network through which people and goods circulated widely, linking Guarani Indians in the coastal regions of southern Brazil to inland communities that lived in the tropical forests near the confluence of the Paraná and Iguazú Rivers. Cabeza de Vaca himself noted that some of the men accompanying his troops were Guarani Indians and that their knowledge of the area—a region previously unknown to Europeans—was important to the success of their expedition. We can thus infer that the chickens and ducks observed by Cabeza de Vaca (much like the many other material goods of European origin) probably arrived to the local Guarani by way of the Caminho de Peabiru. It is worth mentioning that the Guarani living on the Island of Santa Catarina had contact with Europeans since 1503, nearly four decades before Cabeza de Vaca’s journey inland.

5. Bartomeu Meliã, Marcos Saul, and Valmir Muraro, *O Guarani: uma bibliografia etnológica* (Santo Ângelo: Fundames and Centro de Cultura Missioneira, 1987).
6. See Frederico Freitas’s “Argentinizing the Border,” chap. 4 in this vol.
7. There are few historical and ethnological studies that portray the situation faced by the Guarani groups in the first decades of the twentieth century, a period of intensified migration of farmers toward the Triple Frontier area. Some scholars refer to a “demographic vacuum” in historical and anthropological literature on the indigenous presence in the region. Other scholars argue that one reason for this silence in the regional bibliography is that indigenous populations were described in historical and documentary sources of the period as “Paraguayan” or “savages.” In Packer’s analysis, this “silence” or “emptiness” of historical sources was a deliberate effort by government and private agencies to deny rights and any kind of protection to the Indians and thus to allow the advance of the agricultural expansion fronts. See Lúcio Tadeu Mota, *As guerras dos índios Kaingang* (Maringá: EDUEM, 1994); Sarah Iurkiv Gomes Tibes Ribeiro, “O horizonte é a terra: Manipulação da identidade e construção do ser entre os Guarani no Oeste do Paraná” (PhD diss., Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, 2002); Ian Packer, “Violação dos direitos humanos e territoriais dos Guarani no Oeste do Paraná (1946–1988): Subsídio para a Comissão Nacional da Verdade” Centro de Trabalho Indigenista, Biblioteca Digital, January 4, 2014, <http://bd.trabalhoindigenista.org.br/documento/viola%C3%A7%C3%B5es-dos-direitos-humanos-e-territoriais-dos-guarani-no-oeste-do-paran%C3%A1-1946-1988-sub>.
8. On this theme, the article by Misuzaki describes in detail the history of these occupations and the situation of poverty in which many Guarani groups lived in the far west of the Paraná State, near the border with Paraguay. Teresa Itsumi Misuzaki, “A luta dos povos Guarani no Extremo Oeste do Paraná,” in “Mundo do trabalho,” special issue, *Revista Pegada* 16 (2015): 75–88.

9. The number of households and total population of a *tekoa guasu* are difficult to estimate because of the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion that define which villages belong to each particular set, something that is really flexible. It depends often on the personal assessment of each indigenous informant or the context in which the information was recorded. That said, the computation of forty estimated villages for this set has the membership criteria geographically linked to the proximity of the Triple Frontier area; in other words, they are included in this set of villages, the ones located within a 200-kilometer buffer around the point of intersection of the three international boundaries (Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay). For an estimate of the total population, the numbers of residents per village collected in the last five years by the local offices of the Brazilian National Indian Foundation, the Argentine National Aboriginal Pastoral Team, and the Paraguayan Indigenous Institute were considered.
10. Pierre Clastres, *A fala sagrada: Mitos e cantos sagrados dos índios Guarani* (Campinas: Papirus, 1976).
11. The spatial wandering of the Guarani is a classic theme in South American ethnology. In the pioneering work of ethnologist Curt Nimuendajú *Legends of Creation*, it is evident that the “long walks” of the Guarani had strong ties to their mythical-religious system. Nimuendajú describes the wandering of many Guarani groups that, in the early twentieth century, left the border of Brazil with Paraguay and walked on foot for over a thousand kilometers to reach the coast of São Paulo. In the author’s analysis, this movement was motivated by the belief that walkers could reach *Yvy Marãejy*, the Land without Evil, a mythical paradise where they would live in peace with ample food and eternal life. This analytical perspective was taken up and developed by various scholars, enabling an expansion of our knowledge of the relationship of the Guarani with the geographical space. Ethnologists such as León Cadogan, Egon Schaden, Hélène Clastres, and Bartomeu Melià each in their own way addressed the spatial wanderings of Guarani groups in different perspectives and arrived at different conclusions. Nevertheless, what can be seen in these studies is an attempt to unify the social and religious fields into the same plane. On the sociological level, these scholars point out that the Guarani have a model of social organization that is realized by associating their nonfixation on space with a cosmological system that locates the Land without Evil on the other side of the Atlantic. From this perspective, walking for the Guarani is a concrete way to update a system of thought that encodes meanings for their social life in their spatial wandering. See Curt Nimuendajú, *As lendas da criação e da destruição do mundo como fundamentos da religião dos Apapocúva-Guarani* (São Paulo: Editoria Hucitec, 1987); León Cadogan and Egon Schaden, “Ayvu Rapyta: Textos míticos de los Mbyá-Guaraní del Guairá,” *Revista de Antropologia* 1, no. 1 (1953): 35–41; Egon Schaden, *Aspectos fundamentais da cultura Guarani* (São Paulo: Difusão Européia do Livro, 1962); Hélène Clastres, *Terra sem Mal: O profetismo Tupi-Guarani* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1978); Bartomeu Melià, “A Terra sem Mal dos Guarani, 33–46. On the spatial movements of the Guarani in the Triple Frontier, I suggest read-

- ing Evaldo Mendes Silva, *Folhas ao vento: A micro-mobilidade de grupos Mbya e Nhandéva (Guarani) na Tríplice Fronteira* (Cascavel: EDUNIOESTE, 2010).
12. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Capitalisme et schizophrénie: Mille plateaux* (Paris: Minuit, 1980).
  13. This equivalence between the terms is recorded in the *Vocabulário y Tesoro* of Montoya that presents the following meanings for the term *ycó*: “being, living, live, walk, understand something, be.” Antonio Ruiz de Montoya, *Gramática y diccionarios (arte, vocabulario y tesoro) de la lengua Tupi ó Guaraní* (Vienna: Faesy y Frick and Maisonneuve, 1876).
  14. Traditional beverage of the Guaraní Indians and other indigenous groups in South America. It is widely consumed by the non-Indian population of Paraguay, Argentina, and southern Brazil. It is prepared from the infusion of yerba mate (*Ilex paraguariensis*). When served cold it is called *tereré*, and when served hot it is called *chimarrão* (in Portuguese) or *mate* (in Spanish).
  15. Paul Virilio, *Vitesse et politique: Essai de dromologie* (Paris: Galilée, 1977), 46.
  16. Gilles Deleuze, *Pourparlers* (Paris: Minuit, 1990), 165.
  17. The suffix *-axy* sets a very broad universe of meanings that can be applied to a single person, a community, or a specific situation. *-Axy* can be a disease or physical discomfort (as discouragement to walk, to work, drowsiness, lack or excess of appetite for food or sex, body aches, fever, wounds, skin damages, vomit, diarrhea, and alcoholism). It can refer to the “evils” that afflict some or all of the Guaraní population, such as the scarcity of land, food, or the contempt of the youngest for language and cultural traditions. It can also indicate a “bad behavior,” individual or collective, which is called *eko-axy* (wrong or bad way to live life). It is a behavior that deviates from the principles of “good behavior” (*eko porã*) recommended by the gods and shamans.
  18. Elizabeth de Paula Pissolato, *A duração da pessoa: Mobilidade, parentesco e xamanismo Mbya (Guarani)* (São Paulo: Editora da UNESP, 2007); Carlos Fausto, “Se Deus fosse jaguar: Canibalismo e cristianismo entre os Guaraní (séculos XVI–XX),” *Mana* 11, no. 2 (2005): 385–418.
  19. Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, *A inconstância da alma selvagem e outros ensaios de antropologia* (São Paulo: Cosac & Naify, 2002).
  20. On body transformation processes in Amazonian Tupi groups, see Aparecida Vilaça, “Making Kin Out of Others in Amazonia,” *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 8, no. 2 (2002): 347–65; Carlos Fausto, “Of Enemies and Pets: Warfare and Shamanism in Amazonia,” *American Ethnologist* 26, no. 4 (2000): 933–956.

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# PART IV

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## DEVELOPMENT



# 8

## A TURBULENT BORDER

### Geopolitics and the Hydroelectric Development of the Paraná River

JACOB BLANC

ON JANUARY 19, 1964 Brazilian president João Goulart received his Paraguayan counterpart, General Alfredo Stroessner, at his farm in Mato Grosso do Sul. The two leaders spoke for six hours in a climate that Goulart described as “very cordial and very affectionate.” Stroessner, for his part, called it “a historic meeting, with tremendous importance for the future relations of both nations.”<sup>1</sup> A press release from the Brazilian government explained that “the thinking of both men was perfectly aligned, with complete and mutual respect.”<sup>2</sup> Given the political context at the time, this meeting might have seemed impossible: Goulart was a leftist social reformer while Stroessner was a right-wing dictator at the head of a violent regime. Moreover, the governments of the two countries harbored a deeply rooted animosity that stretched back to the War of the Triple Alliance (1865–1872), a victory for Brazil and its allies that killed well over half of Paraguay’s male population. What common cause could Goulart and Stroessner possibly have found? And what enabled such friendly interactions between seemingly antagonistic presidents? The sole purpose of their gathering was to discuss the hydroelectric development of the Paraná River, which formed the border between Brazil and Paraguay. The river was considered a massive source of untapped energy and wealth, and by the end of the meeting it was agreed that both governments would collaborate in building “the largest dam in the world.”<sup>3</sup> Over the course of the next two decades this project materialized as the Itaipu Binational Dam.

Although Stroessner would help oversee the construction of Itaipu, Goulart never did; barely three months after the Três Marias meeting, a military coup installed a dictatorship in Brazil that remained in power until 1985. Yet the Goulart-Stroessner encounter was emblematic of the allure that the Paraná River held for each country and hinted at how it would soon redefine the geopolitical landscape of the entire region. The frontier zone between Brazil and Paraguay had been contested since the late nineteenth century, but by the 1960s a new era of development goals led each country to aggressively stake its claim to the shores of the Paraná River. As they sought to make the Itaipu Dam a reality, the two nations vacillated between conflict and cooperation, with moments of extreme tension punctuated by declarations of unity and binational cooperation. In this chapter I trace the geopolitical relationship between Brazil and Paraguay in the 1960s and 1970s, exposing the tense and nearly violent events that paved the way for the Itaipu Dam. Moreover, I will show how debates and political maneuvering over interpretations of the Brazil-Paraguay border helped consolidate a new era of power relations for the entire Southern Cone. At the heart of this conflict were questions regarding the countries' shared border in the Guaíra region: what exactly were its limits, how did it divide the waters of the Paraná River, and who had the right to redraw its boundaries. Far from geographical semantics, these issues had profound geopolitical implications. For nearly a century, the difference in the border's interpretation surfaced mainly as diplomatic bickering. In the mid-1960s, however, the new impetus of hydroelectric development reanimated this conflict in increasingly dramatic ways. In 1965 a standoff took place in which troops from both countries were mobilized along the border, government officials were arrested, and battles of popular unrest and public opinion were fought. An armed conflict was avoided only with the signing of the 1966 Act of Iguazu, an agreement that marked the first official step toward the project that would become Itaipu. These problems continued to fester until the exact contours of the dam were established in the 1973 Treaty of Itaipu, a document that codified the uneven geopolitical relations between Brazil and Paraguay.

The border conflict functioned as a platform for Brazil's rise to power. With the backing of the United States, Brazil's military regime refused to recognize Paraguay's historical claim to the frontier zone. Although the Paraguayan government did benefit from entering Brazil's sphere of influence—through participation in a binational dam project—it could only do so on the terms stipulated by Brazil, one of its greatest historical rivals. Brazil's actions throughout the

border standoff also served to marginalize Argentina, whose own borders lay downstream on the same Paraná River. Even before the 1965 saga began, Brazil had already begun to overtake Argentina as the region's major power broker, but the control of the Paraná's hydroelectric potential helped entrench a new geopolitical hierarchy.<sup>4</sup>

In this chapter I highlight pivotal moments in three events: the 1965 border standoff, the 1966 Act of Iguacu, and the 1973 Treaty of Itaipu. In addition, in an epilogue I will trace the grassroots responses from farmers whose homes would be lost in Itaipu's 1982 flood. The geopolitical events described in this chapter were only the first stage in a longer history of how the Itaipu Dam reoriented the political, environmental, and social landscape of the entire region. The border standoff was a function of space as *territory* that was imbued with questions about sovereignty, diplomacy, and nation-states. From this initial history a new conflict emerged in the late 1970s over the meanings of space as *land* when small farmers and peasants led a grassroots movement against Itaipu. Whereas the military regimes viewed this landscape through a lens of geopolitics and industrial development, the soon-to-be-displaced farmers defended their own vision of land as both a physical provider of agriculture and a source of communal identity. From a contested international territory to the site of agrarian livelihoods, the Paraná borderlands was a space of overlapping meanings and experiences. Before Itaipu became a reality, however, and before approximately sixty thousand people were displaced on both sides of the border, the governments of all three countries engaged in a prolonged standoff.

The initial decade of geopolitics functioned as more than just the antecedents of Itaipu; rather, it was a process through which each country sought to redefine its place in the changing landscape of Latin America. For Paraguay, this was a chance to shed its image as a defeated nation. Most of the border debate extended back to the Loizaga-Cotegipe Treaty of 1872, when the victorious nations redrew the postwar boundaries. The War of the Triple Alliance began in 1865, and it is no coincidence that exactly one hundred years later, the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner resuscitated a debate over a treaty that had dismantled his country. For Paraguay, challenging the border stipulations of the 1872 treaty became a way to challenge the legitimacy of the war itself and an opportunity to rewrite a century of its haunting legacy. The Paraguayan regime's efforts to deflect internal opposition toward an outside force were only partially successful, however, as popular dissent formed against both the Brazilian "invasion" of the border and Stroessner's complicity in "selling out" the

Guáira waterfalls. Even with this domestic tension, the government's nationalist rhetoric meant that despite the concessions eventually made to Brazil, Stroessner could still claim the construction of a Paraná dam as a victory for the Paraguayan people.

The Brazilian government, on the other hand, used the border question as a test case for what politics and power would look like during the infancy of its dictatorship. Despite its overwhelming political and economic strength, the Brazilian regime realistically foresaw that it would have to allow its smaller neighbor to participate in a binational development project. Yet the Brazilian government concealed its willingness to collaborate, and it consistently strong-armed Paraguay. In this exercise of geopolitical posturing, the Brazilian government's refusal to capitulate on its interpretation of the border allowed it to unilaterally dictate the terms of how Itaipu's energy would be distributed.<sup>5</sup>

In this chapter I explore how the border question at Guáira triggered debates over the legacy of war in Latin America, the meanings of national sovereignty and political boundaries, and the complexities of how neighboring military regimes coexisted. The Itaipu Dam has been a central catalyst in the development of both countries: the dam currently provides over 90 percent of all energy in Paraguay and has been cited as a key driver of Brazil's ascent as the most powerful nation in Latin America.<sup>6</sup> Despite Itaipu's importance, almost no attention has been given to its bellicose beginnings—the few authors that do discuss these antecedents are limited by either their nationalist approaches or their periodization.<sup>7</sup> This oversight should not be surprising, since Itaipu has continually been held up as a model of Latin American cooperation.<sup>8</sup> This makes it all the more necessary to explore the turbulent roots that made possible “the project of the century.”

## ONE BORDER, TWO INTERPRETATIONS

Brazil and Paraguay had fundamentally different perceptions of their shared border. This difference of interpretation had two main components, each of which was based on the legacy of the Treaty of 1872. The first relates to the set of waterfalls that were designated as the dividing line between nations. Paraguay referred to them collectively as the Salto de Guairá, an understanding that all seven of the falls belonged to one singular body of water. Brazil, on the other hand, called these the Sete Quedas (“seven falls”), implying that each was




FIGURE 8.1 Map of the contested border and the Guairá waterfalls. Courtesy of the University of Wisconsin Cartography Lab; adapted by Frederico Freitas.



unique from the others.<sup>9</sup> This distinction is critical because the Treaty of 1872 stipulated that the border between Brazil and Paraguay would stretch from the Mbaracajú mountain range toward “the waterway or canal of the Paraná River . . . to the Great Fall of the Seven Falls.”<sup>10</sup> Paraguay thus interpreted the treaty to mean that the border stretched to the northern end of the waterfalls and encompassed all of them, while Brazil considered the frontier to bisect at the fifth fall—the tallest of the seven cascades. In the 1960s drive to harness the untapped energy of the Paraná River, Paraguay’s understanding that the *waterfall* (singular) belonged to both countries protected its claim to participate in any development project that included any portion of the falls. For Brazil, however, the belief that the border bisected the *waterfalls* (plural) justified building a hydroelectric dam on its section of the river that would completely circumvent Paraguayan waters.

The second component deals with how each country viewed the development of the border in the one hundred years since the War of the Triple Alliance. Paraguay emphasized that although the 1872 treaty designated the Mbaracajú mountains as a frontier line, the demarcation of this border stopped 20 kilometers east of the Guáira waterfalls, leaving a substantial “no man’s land” on Paraguay’s side of the Paraná River. Conversely, Brazil was steadfast in its belief that at no point was there a contested frontier zone and that the border had been “definitively outlined” ever since 1872.<sup>11</sup> By 1965 these diverging interpretations had become firmly ossified in the political imaginary of each country, producing a stalemate wherein both governments felt that their position was the only possible version of the truth. A report from Brazil’s National Intelligence Service (Serviço Nacional de Informações [SNI]) would later describe Paraguay’s beliefs as “entirely absurd, a perversion of legal-historical fact . . . by a pseudo-geographic worldview.”<sup>12</sup> Paraguayan officials, for their part, considered their stance to be “completely solid” and ridiculed Brazil’s assertions that the border had been “definitively and fully demarcated since 1872.”<sup>13</sup>

A parallel controversy implicated Argentina, a country with an equally important claim to the Paraná. Although the river originates in Brazilian territory, its downstream flow forms the border with both Paraguay and Argentina before finally emptying out into the Plate basin and the Atlantic Ocean. Throughout the twentieth century, Argentina encouraged river-use regulations based on the principle of “prior consultation” in order to protect itself from any damages from upstream development—specifically targeting Brazil. In the first half of the century, when Argentina’s regional superiority was more evident, its

proposals for river regulation were respected.<sup>14</sup> As Brazil's influence grew, however, it rejected Argentina's attachment to prior consultation and instead cited the 1895 Harmon Doctrine—named for the former U.S. attorney general—to claim that it had no obligation to share water with any downstream nations.<sup>15</sup>

After simmering as a persistent yet relatively uneventful issue for nearly a century, the question of how to use the Paraná River was thrust into the spotlight in the mid-1960s. The timing of the border conflict was particularly significant for the shifting power dynamics of the Southern Cone. Paraguay had been ruled by the Stroessner dictatorship since 1954, and by the mid-1960s the government had begun to move the country away from its traditional alliance with Argentina (its neighbor to the west) in favor of Brazil (its neighbor to the east). Brazil, meanwhile, had just seen the overthrow of democratically elected João Goulart in April of 1964. The new military regime was determined to transform the country into a global player and maneuvered to overtake its Latin American neighbors for regional and hemispheric power. Argentina's major backlash against what would become the Itaipu Dam did not take place until the 1970s—when it repeatedly denounced Brazil in front of the United Nations—but the origins of this river rivalry were fortified in the 1960s.<sup>16</sup> It was in this climate of mutual distrust that the simmering border conflict began to boil over.

## THE BORDER TAKES CENTER STAGE

On March 21, 1965, a group of nearly one hundred Paraguayans gathered along the shores of the Paraná River, the waters of which marked the physical border with neighboring Brazil. Among this contingent were high-ranking figures from the Stroessner dictatorship, various government authorities, and a large group of school children. They proceeded to raise the Paraguayan flag, sing the national anthem, and give rousing speeches about the pride and sovereignty of their nation.<sup>17</sup> Three Brazilian citizens who lived nearby witnessed these actions and reported what they saw to the nearest military office.<sup>18</sup> This information was then passed along to General Álvaro Tavares do Carmo, commander of the 5th Military Region, who on April 8 authorized members of the Brazilian military to be deployed to the exact location where the Paraguayans had held their ceremonies.<sup>19</sup>

Two months later, on June 17, a detachment made up of one sergeant and seven soldiers crossed the Paraná River and set up camp just south of a small



FIGURE 8.2 Brazilian detachment in Porto Renato on June 18, 1965. Photo courtesy Revista do Clube Militar, Rio de Janeiro.

outpost known as Porto Coronel Renato.<sup>20</sup> For Paraguay, this “act of aggression” was nothing short of a complete violation of its territorial sovereignty.<sup>21</sup> Brazil, on the other hand, considered Porto Renato to be within its own national boundaries and thus saw Paraguay’s previous actions in March—and not its own movement in June—as the *actual* invasion. Well aware of the reactions that this military incursion would incite, the Brazilian government declared that the detachment was only there to protect against terrorism and contraband operations along the border.<sup>22</sup> Internal documents, however, indicate that Brazil explicitly sent the detachment in order to “counteract Paraguay’s growing presence in the region.”<sup>23</sup>

News of Brazil’s garrison in Porto Renato quickly made its way to Asunción, and within days Paraguayan authorities began applying diplomatic pressure for the removal of the troops. Chancellor Raúl Sapena Pastor met routinely with Jaime Souza Gomes, the Brazilian ambassador in Asunción, and General Stroessner made numerous appeals directly to his colleagues in Brazil.<sup>24</sup> For nearly two months Brazil neither gave a response nor officially acknowledged that it had even sent troops across the Paraná River. On September 1, Brazil’s

president, General Humberto Castelo Branco, finally sent a letter to Stroessner in which he stated that the group in Porto Renato “can by no means indicate a strategy of pressure, coercion, or repression on the part of the Brazilian Government.”<sup>25</sup> This marked the beginning of a back-and-forth exchange between foreign ministries that one Paraguayan official referred to as “a veritable paper war.”<sup>26</sup> As this conflict unfolded in the sphere of diplomatic communication, it also began to materialize on the ground itself.

In the middle of October, Paraguay received reports that Brazil was constructing barracks, roads, and even an airstrip on the lands adjacent to Porto Renato. In response, chancellor Pastor commissioned a group of Paraguayan authorities to travel to the “un-demarcated zone” to report back personally to him.<sup>27</sup> On the morning of October 21, 1965—exactly seven months after Paraguay’s previous trip to the border region—five men boarded a plane in Asunción, and after landing on an empty road because of a lack of proper airports, drove in a jeep to where the Brazilian detachment was stationed. This group consisted of Pedro Godinot de Villare, the undersecretary of foreign relations; Carlos Saldivar, the chancellor’s legal advisor; Emilio Meza Guerrero, a military engineer with the National Border Commission; Conrado Pappalardo, Stroessner’s chief of staff; and an accompanying photographer. The group arrived in Porto Renato in the early afternoon and began taking pictures of the newly constructed facilities along the eastern shore of the Paraná River. A truck carrying Brazilian soldiers quickly appeared and instructed the group that they were under arrest, at which point they were taken into custody and detained for several hours.

What happened next depends on who is telling the story, as each country would craft a narrative according to its own geopolitical needs. For understanding the importance of these actions, however, what matters is not distilling the “truth” of what happened. Rather, we must trace how these competing stories were used by each nation in the unfolding border conflict.

The only two members of the arrested Paraguayans still living, Carlos Saldivar and Conrado Pappalardo, offer their version of what took place in Porto Renato. Both men recall that the Brazilian sergeant refused to provide a reason for their detainment and was extremely insulting. Saldivar remembers feeling particularly anxious because, to him, the previous months “had felt like a war, . . . We knew what had happened [in the War of the Triple Alliance], and our arrest could have started another one.”<sup>28</sup> Brazilian reinforcements soon appeared with “heavily armed soldiers” who assumed “combat positions” and treated them

with “total incivility.”<sup>29</sup> A Paraguayan press release emphasized these details, accusing Brazilian authorities of “mistreatment.”<sup>30</sup> For the remainder of the afternoon, the Paraguayans were forced to sit outside—on tree stumps, according to Saldívar—until the commander of Brazil’s southern army arrived and gave the authorization to release the five men.<sup>31</sup>

The Brazilian government claimed that the Paraguayans were never detained against their will and instead gave the following sequence of events.<sup>32</sup> When initially approached by the Brazilian soldiers, the Paraguayan authorities refused to give their names or hand over their photography equipment. When the commanding officer arrived, he instructed the Paraguayans that they were not permitted to take photographs of Brazil’s military presence and, moreover, that they had intruded two kilometers into Brazilian territory. Outraged at the suggestion that this land belonged to Brazil, Meza Guerrero drew his gun and threatened to “send an armed squadron of Paraguayans.” Meza Guerrero was asked to surrender his weapon and the situation calmed down immediately. According to Brazil, “everything ended with a perfect understanding, with normal farewells,” and Meza Guerrero even extended a cordial invitation to the Brazilian officers to spend the December holidays with their families in Asunción.

Regardless of how exactly this incident transpired, it served to rapidly accelerate the border conflict. And whereas the early months of this stand-off had mostly existed in the realm of interembassy exchanges, the events of October 21 attracted widespread media attention and inaugurated the battle for public opinion that would play out over the following year. Paraguay in particular seized on this new theater of conflict and routinely portrayed Brazil as the aggressor. As Christine Folch has shown, the Paraguayan public was told that Brazil’s presence in Guairá “was nothing less than a provocation to war and an affront to Paraguay’s national sovereignty. Speeches and letters to the editor in repudiation of Brazilian aggression were an almost a daily feature in October and November 1965.”<sup>33</sup> In response, Brazil maintained that there did not exist a disputed region and that the land near Porto Renato was entirely within its own boundaries.<sup>34</sup> News of the October 21 arrests circulated widely and sparked debate over the possibility of international mediation as Argentina, Uruguay, and even the United Nations were proposed as potential arbiters.<sup>35</sup>

While politicians and military officials worked behind the scenes, the unfolding border conflict motivated popular forces to mobilize direct responses. On November 27 a demonstration was organized in Asunción by the youth sections

of the Febrerista and Christian Democrats opposition parties. In full defiance of Paraguay's Law 294 that outlawed almost all forms of public protest, the crowd wound its way through downtown, stopping only at targeted locations: they burned a Brazilian flag in front of the commerce office of the Brazilian embassy, threw Molotov cocktails through the windows of various Brazilian-owned business, lit smoke bombs across from the Center for Brazilian Studies, and spread graffiti on the walls of the Brazilian military offices proclaiming "Paraguay sí, bandeirantes no: Fuera los mamelucos" (Paraguay yes, invaders no: out with the bastards).<sup>36</sup> The Paraguayan police descended on the protestors, violently dispersed the crowd, and arrested fifteen students.<sup>37</sup>

Tensions continued to mount, and according to Mario Gibson Barboza—who had just been appointed as Brazil's ambassador in Asunción—1966 began in a climate of "enormous difficulty. Brazil found itself on the brink of war with Paraguay. . . . The conflict was strong and violent, the impasse deep and insurmountable . . . and all over the great problem of sovereignty, that magical word for which people kill and are killed."<sup>38</sup> Seeking to win the support of the international community, Paraguay began sending out copies of its previous communication with Brazil to embassies and foreign ministries all over the world.<sup>39</sup> Along with distributing its exchanges with Brazil, Paraguay also appealed directly to various foreign diplomats by explaining its interpretation of the history of the border conflict while also explicitly calling for the removal of Brazilian troops.<sup>40</sup>

The changing geopolitical landscape was evident to all governments involved. In Paraguay, the Stroessner regime sought to leverage its position between Brazil and Argentina—both geographically and politically—to increase its own economic standing. A report from the U.S. embassy in Asunción observed that "to bring pressure on Brazil . . . Paraguay is now playing up improved relations with Argentina."<sup>41</sup> This eventually led Stroessner to negotiate a deal with Argentina for a second binational dam on the same Paraná River, a project that resulted in the Yacyretá hydroelectric station only five hundred kilometers downstream of the future Itaipu site. Paraguay was thus able to play into the Brazil-Argentina rivalry to stake a claim to two different hydroelectric projects along its borders. For Argentina, competition over the Paraná River was part of what the former Argentine diplomat Juan Archibaldo Lanús referred to as the "hydroelectric saga."<sup>42</sup> Along with threatening its own energy projects farther downstream, a Brazil-Paraguay dam would cut off Argentina's shipping and commercial lines to São Paulo through the Paraná-Tietê river systems.

Brazil's willingness to antagonize neighboring countries is explained in part by the fact that it could still count on the support of the U.S. government. At an economic forum held in Buenos Aires, Lincoln Gordon—now the assistant secretary for inter-American affairs—was approached by Paraguayan delegates who wished to speak with him about the border conflict at Guáira. Gordon acknowledged that he had indeed received all of the documents that Paraguay had sent over the previous year—none of which received an official response—but indicated “that it would be very difficult for Brazil to remove its military forces.” Moreover, he voiced his concerns about a “smear campaign” in the Paraguayan media against Brazil. Although Gordon let it be known that his government was siding with Brazil in the border conflict, he did inform the Paraguayans that the administration of Lyndon Johnson was very interested in the prospect of building a hydroelectric dam on the Paraná River.<sup>43</sup>

In early April, Stroessner gave a lengthy speech to the House of Representatives in which he denounced Brazil's invasion of Guáira and its failure to honor the legal and moral codes of “Pan-Americanism that serve as the foundation of cooperation, solidarity, and friendship among the peoples of this hemisphere.” His description of Brazil as an imperialist nation was intended to juxtapose his characterization of Paraguay as a “generous, welcoming, and heroic” country that harbored neither “a domineering spirit nor greed.”<sup>44</sup> Juracy Magalhães, for his part, consistently gave interviews with brash and often belittling statements about Paraguay. In response to Paraguay's chancellor having called Brazil “aggressive and expansionist,” Magalhães said that “all of the Americas are well aware of the situation of our two governments and know which of the two must resort to fabricating artificial storylines.”<sup>45</sup> Magalhães also gave a speech to the Chamber of Deputies on May 18 that hinted at the underlying current of the border conflict that would very soon take center stage: “We hope that the Paraguayan government trusts in the genuine sincerity of our offer to meet together for the well-being of both of our friendly nations in hopes of jointly developing all of the resources offered by the Sete Quedas waterfalls.”<sup>46</sup>

## THE ACT OF IGUAÇU AND THE BIRTH OF ITAIPU

On June 21, 1966, representatives from both countries met in the border region for two intense days of negotiations that produced the Act of Iguaçu, a relatively short document that laid the framework for a binational dam on the



Paraná River.<sup>47</sup> Despite eventually coming to terms, these negotiations were very tense, highlighted by a particular moment when Chancellor Sapena Pastor insinuated that the Treaty of 1872 needed to be reassessed. Magalhães responded by stating that a treaty could only be renegotiated by another treaty or by a war, and since Brazil refused to discuss a new treaty, he asked whether Paraguay was willing to start a war. Taken aback, Sapena Pastor asked whether the Brazilian chancellor was threatening Paraguay. Magalhães said that he was simply trying to have a realistic conversation based on facts.<sup>48</sup> At 7 p.m. on June 22, in the presence of both delegations and various newspaper and radio reporters, the final document was presented and signed by Magalhães and Sapena Pastor. It consisted of eight articles, with numbers three and four being the most important. Article 3 stated that Brazil and Paraguay agreed to jointly explore the hydroelectric potential of their shared waters—recognizing that both nations shared equal domain to the Paraná River.<sup>49</sup> Article 4 was the most controversial part of the final agreement; although it proclaimed that the energy produced would be “divided equally between both countries,” it also stipulated that each nation maintained the right to buy the other’s unused portion “at a fair price.” With a fraction of the population and energy needs of Brazil, it was obvious that Paraguay would use nowhere near its 50 percent share of the energy. Paraguay had initially proposed that the leftover energy be sold “at market value” but gave in when Brazil threatened to end negotiations during the afternoon of the second day.<sup>50</sup> As such, Brazil’s insertion of the intentionally vague “fair price” clause guaranteed its ability to eventually reap tremendous profits from the Itaipu Dam.<sup>51</sup>

A single memorandum was also attached to the final text. This document declared that although Brazil was firmly convinced of its territorial rights as granted by the Treaty of 1872, it would remove its troops from the border as a sign of goodwill. The very next paragraph states that Paraguay also maintains its interpretation of the Treaty of 1872 and asserts its own sovereign claim to the exact region occupied by Brazil’s military. What appears to be a fundamental paradox—both countries using an alleged peace treaty to codify the exact reasons that nearly brought them to war—is actually a perfect embodiment of the border conflict itself. Each government was willing to make public gestures of cooperation only because it helped lead to the development of a hydroelectric project. Yet neither was willing to change its ideological approach, a contradiction that hints at the ways in which the border conflict would continue to evolve for years to come.



Less than a week after the act was signed, an *O Globo* article reported that Brazil withdrew its soldiers from Porto Renato.<sup>52</sup> If this were true it would have indicated that Brazil had been negotiating in good faith and that it was genuinely interested in building a new period of mutual prosperity. Yet the Brazilian government made no such efforts, and the detachment remained firmly entrenched along the border. By September, Paraguay had grown so frustrated that it sent Sapena Pastor to New York to give a speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations denouncing Brazil for having reneged on its promises. In response, Brazil said that although most of its troops had been removed, one sergeant and one corporal remained in order to guard the barracks and “dissuade contraband activities.”<sup>53</sup> It was not until December 3—nearly eighteen months after its soldiers first arrived in Porto Renato—that Brazil finally withdrew all of its forces.

Although the exact location of Itaipu would not be determined until the early 1970s, the project design that was eventually chosen reveals the dam’s underlying geopolitical core; as Brazil’s foreign minister wrote in a confidential report, the dam “should flood the entire disputed zone, and as such, would finally resolve this problem.”<sup>54</sup> This eventually did occur in November of 1982, when twenty-nine billion cubic meters of water formed the Itaipu reservoir. This area included the Guaira waterfalls, located roughly one hundred miles north. After a hundred years of geopolitical standoffs, Brazil and Paraguay would finally find a way to make their border conflict literally disappear.

Before the exact plans for Itaipu were outlined—and before it was officially decided that the disputed border region would be flooded—there still remained a great deal of planning, negotiating, and political posturing. In April of 1969, representatives from Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, Uruguay, and Bolivia met in Brasília to sign the *Tratado da Bacia do Prata* (Treaty of the Plate Basin), a broad agreement that sought to establish a basis for the “rational development and physical integration” of the rivers and tributaries that formed the greater Plate basin.<sup>55</sup> A year later, the Joint Technical Commission oversaw the signing of a Cooperation Accord (*Convênio de Cooperação*) between Eletrobras and Administración Nacional de Electricidad (ANDE), the government energy agencies for Brazil and Paraguay, respectively.<sup>56</sup> This accord marked the first tangible step forward in the dam’s conception, and in January of 1973 the official proposal for Itaipu was presented to both governments.

As the details of Itaipu started to take shape, opposition to the project also began to form throughout the region. Oscar Creydt, the leader of the

Paraguayan Communist Party denounced the Stroessner regime for having “sold the Guairá waterfall” to Brazilian imperialism and called on people to resist Brazil’s occupation by overthrowing Paraguay’s dictatorship.<sup>57</sup> One of the loudest voices of protest during this period came from Argentina, as its government became increasingly worried that the Itaipu Dam proposal would jeopardize its own development goals, specifically the Corpus hydroelectric dam that it was hoping to build on a lower portion of the Paraná River. Argentine politicians, nationalists, and engineers all joined the chorus of opposition in calling Brazil “hegemonic” and a “regional bully.”<sup>58</sup> On two occasions, Argentina even took its case against Brazil to the United Nations.<sup>59</sup> The conflict between Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay over these competing binational dams persisted throughout the decade and was only resolved in 1979 when the Tripartite Agreement was signed in October of 1979, well after primary construction on Itaipu had already been completed.<sup>60</sup> By this point, however, enough momentum had gathered behind the Itaipu proposal that the criticisms against it—and the geopolitical conflicts that had previously forestalled it—were minimized to the point of irrelevance. The main questions that still remained concerned Itaipu’s administrative structure and how the dam’s energy would be distributed between Brazil and Paraguay.

## THE 1973 TREATY OF ITAIPU

The process of negotiation in the lead-up to the 1973 Treaty of Itaipu was drastically different from what had occurred with the Act of Iguazú. In 1966, the preceding border conflict meant that the bulk of the actual negotiations took place over the tense two days of in-person meetings. By 1973, almost all of the groundwork had already been laid, either by the initial 1966 act, the various international summits, or most importantly, through the work of the Joint Technical Commission. Official deliberations were still held, and politicians in both countries were given space to voice concerns, but the Treaty of Itaipu was essentially agreed on long before presidents Médici and Stroessner met in Brasília to sign it on April 26, 1973. The ease with which this treaty came into being was, of course, the end result of an incredibly contentious fifteen-year process of border standoffs and geopolitical posturing. So although the final “negotiations” lacked the drama of their 1966 predecessor, the Treaty of Itaipu must be seen as a more benign culmination of an earlier and highly contested history.

The 1973 Treaty of Itaipu consisted of twenty main articles complemented by three lengthy appendixes. Most of the treaty was devoted to outlining the dam's engineering and administrative contours, yet a few smaller items tucked into the final appendix ultimately proved to be the most important and controversial section. Part 3 of Appendix C outlines the financial details for how Itaipu's energy would be shared between Brazil and Paraguay.<sup>61</sup> Honoring the agreement made in the 1966 Act of Iguazu, the 1973 treaty maintained that both countries shared equal right to the energy produced, but it elaborated by saying that all unused energy could only be sold to the other nation at a far-below-market fixed price of US\$300 per gigawatt hour.<sup>62</sup> Shocking as it might seem, this price could not be modified for fifty years—it was stipulated that the entire treaty could not be revised until the year 2023. Moreover, this transaction had to be paid for “in the currency available to the Binational,” which in practice meant Brazilian cruzeiros. Paulo Schilling (an economist) and Ricardo Canese (an engineer) have argued that these stipulations served to entrench Paraguay's dependency on Brazil by pegging a substantial portion of its GDP to the Brazilian currency and effectively forcing Paraguay to spend the money it received on Brazilian imports.<sup>63</sup>

In light of these facts, and given the perception of Brazilian imperialism held by much of Paraguay's society, it is important to ask why the Paraguayan government accepted Brazil's terms. Along with Stroessner's personal attachments to Brazil, it can be inferred that no matter how uneven the conditions, participation in the Itaipu project still promised unprecedented growth and prestige for the small, landlocked nation. Jan M. G. Kleinpenning has further argued that Stroessner's acquiescence was motivated by a keen awareness that Brazil was far more powerful in a military, political, and economic sense—a geopolitical dominance that has been on display throughout this chapter.<sup>64</sup> However, proponents of the treaty argued that far from “exploiting” Paraguay, Itaipu represented a fair partition of energy and resources since almost all construction costs were fronted by the Banco do Brasil.<sup>65</sup> Moreover, Paraguay would only ever use roughly 5 percent of the electricity generated by Itaipu.

The Treaty of Itaipu was greeted by a steady stream of popular criticism. In Paraguay, the Democratic Christian Party declared that the 1973 treaty was even worse than the concessions made at the end of the War of the Triple Alliance, writing that “We have just witnessed the most deafening failure of Paraguayan diplomacy in its history. In 1870, we were defeated after a heroic resistance, but at least we were able to negotiate with pride.” In contrast, they believed that

the Paraguayan government had now sold out its people: “the miniscule price at which we must sell our energy is absurd. The fifty years of this price fixing is nothing short of cowardly.”<sup>66</sup> Anger at the 1973 treaty was also evident in Argentina, where the continued stalemate over the Itaipu and Corpus dams was held up as an example of Brazil’s attempts to bully its neighbors. An editorial in the Argentine newspaper *Mayoria* compared the relationship between Brazil and Paraguay at Itaipu with that of Panama and the United States over the Panama Canal, and another magazine even called Itaipu “Brazil’s Hydro Bomb.”<sup>67</sup>

These nodes of opposition were often overshadowed by mainstream celebrations of what was hailed as a modern marvel of the twentieth century. Stroessner declared that “Itaipu is a sign of our sovereign and fraternal destiny” and further offered that Itaipu would function as the “morale boost” that would lift Paraguay to a new level of prosperity.<sup>68</sup> Particularly in Brazil, the celebratory narrative focused on how the benefits of Itaipu would be shared throughout the hemisphere. In a speech to Congress, Deputy Amaral de Souza declared that Itaipu would

unite the nations of a new Continent; it is the start of a new phase in the relations between Latin American peoples defined by reality, without political or ideological prejudice, and devoted exclusively to the economic, social, and cultural development of a vast and extensive region whose population aspires to and demands an exit from its unjustified underdevelopment.<sup>69</sup>

## CONCLUSION

In 1973, before ground had even been broken on Itaipu’s construction, it was evident that a significant change had already occurred. Over the previous fifteen years, Brazil and Paraguay jockeyed for control not only of the waters and lands that made up their shared border but for the right to determine how that border was perceived. On paper, Itaipu was important because it would become the largest hydroelectric dam in the world, a feat of engineering brilliance that would produce enough energy to modernize two countries. But in practice Itaipu took on a completely separate set of meanings.

This duality was not lost on contemporary observers, as even the Brazilian Minister of Mines and Energy, Antônio Dias Leite, admitted that “Itaipu is essentially political. The largest role in bringing it about was not done by

[my ministry] but by the Ministry of Foreign Relations.”<sup>70</sup> From the late 1950s through 1973, the events and debates over what would become the Itaipu Dam helped crystallize new and increasingly uneven power relations throughout the region. In the wake of the Treaty of Itaipu, a North American Council on Latin America article observed that “The objective sought by Brazil is clear: Whoever controls the energy of the River Plate basin could dominate the subregion and emerge as a great power throughout the entire hemisphere.”<sup>71</sup> Brazil thus succeeded in setting the stage for Itaipu in such a way that helped it to redefine the geopolitical landscape of the Southern Cone.

Despite the rhetoric of equal cooperation with Paraguay, Brazilian leaders had always seen the dam through geopolitical lenses, meaning that all decisions were guided by an underlying set of goals relating to the theory of “Brasil Grande”—an idea that for most of the twentieth century had envisioned the political and ideological ascension of Brazil as a global power. The intentions of the Brazilian government regarding the eventual Itaipu Dam remained consistent across political climates: both the nationalist left regime of João Goulart and the authoritarian dictatorship that deposed him were determined to tap into the financial and geopolitical potential of the Paraná River. The appeal of a massive hydroelectric project dam provided a rare thread of continuity in a period otherwise defined by rupture.

For nearly fifty years Itaipu’s hegemonic narrative has been that it helped trigger unprecedented development in each country—a claim that in many ways holds true. But what is often overlooked is that Itaipu also solidified the uneven power relations that were on display throughout the preceding geopolitical crisis. Publicly, Brazil’s leaders spoke of equal cooperation with Paraguay, yet their actions were guided by goals that sought to use Itaipu as a launching pad for Brazil’s rise as a global power. And although Paraguay did benefit greatly from this new source of energy, it was marginalized by the stigma of being a secondary nation stuck in Brazil’s shadow. Itaipu emerged from a collaboration built not on trust or mutual respect but on conflict, and only by revisiting this history can we fully explore its eventual magnitude.

## EPILOGUE: THE STRUGGLE FOR LAND AT ITAIPU

The geopolitical events presented in this chapter offer only a partial account of Itaipu’s larger history. Once the international treaties were finally signed

and once the dam became more than an abstract goal of two military dictatorships, attention shifted to building the project. From an engineering standpoint Itaipu was unparalleled. At its height, Itaipu poured an average of three hundred thousand cubic meters of concrete a day—enough to build a twenty-story building every fifty-five minutes. When primary construction was completed in 1984, the Itaipu Dam stretched nearly five miles across and contained enough iron and steel to build three hundred and eighty Eiffel Towers.<sup>72</sup> Beginning in 1974 over thirty-five thousand workers from both Brazil and Paraguay took part throughout the nearly twenty years of construction, with a peak of almost thirty-one thousand workers employed in 1978 alone. The overwhelming mass of these workers migrated from outside the region, leading to massive growth on both sides of the border. In Brazil, western Paraná's population rose from fifty-six thousand in 1974 to over 250,000 less than six years later. Similarly, the Paraguayan city of Puerto Presidente Stroessner boomed to over one hundred thousand inhabitants, making it the second largest city in the country.<sup>73</sup>

As the region's urban areas witnessed a massive demographic spike, the Alto Paraná countryside trended in the opposite direction. Scheduled to be flooded in November 1982, the dam's reservoir was slated to cover 1,350 square kilometers on both sides of the border—becoming the largest artificial lake on the planet. This area, however, was a fertile agriculture zone that was home to over forty thousand Brazilians and twenty thousand Paraguayans.

The result was the multiscale evolution of the Paraná borderlands. From the early 1960s to the early 1970s, the landscape was defined in geopolitical terms. But once construction on Itaipu began in 1974, the border transformed from an abstract space between nation-states into a material reality with wide-reaching consequences. Half a decade before Itaipu's flood would irreversibly change the region's environmental and social landscape, a grassroots movement emerged to defend a particular vision of agrarian and democratic rights. This struggle was led mostly by landed smallholders but also included peasants, sharecroppers, tenant farmers, and day laborers. A small contingent of indigenous Avá-Guarani also staged their own parallel campaign against Itaipu.<sup>74</sup> Tracing the rural mobilizations against Itaipu shows how the initial geopolitical standoff manifested a decade later as a localized struggle for land. While scholars elsewhere have provided the parallel history of rural mobilization in Paraguay, in this section I will look only at events on the Brazilian side of the border.<sup>75</sup>

For nearly a decade farmers in Brazil struggled against Itaipu under the banner of the Justice and Land Movement, the *Movimento Justiça e Terra*

(MJT). This campaign primarily fought to receive better prices for the soon-to-be-flooded lands and staged two major land encampments that drew national attention and solidarity from some of the most important sectors of Brazil's democratization movement. The evolution of the MJT struggle at Itaipu sheds light on the overlapping history of agrarian struggles and political opposition at a tense moment in Brazil's transition away from dictatorship, a process known as *abertura* (the Portuguese word for "opening"). As a project conceived by the military regime yet brought to completion after the 1985 return to civilian rule, Itaipu was a physical link between dictatorship and democracy. And for the ways in which popular movements confronted the dam and its supporters, Itaipu became a space where the very notions of dictatorship and democracy were negotiated and put into practice.

Yet the farmers' standoff at Itaipu was more than just a local expression of the political reawakening that was unfolding across Brazil. It took place in a region that was separated both geographically and politically from major urban centers. In interviews, many farmers recalled that Itaipu represented their first direct encounter with the military regime, often using the terms *Itaipu* and *government* interchangeably.<sup>76</sup> In a region that had historically received little attention from the central government, Itaipu became a stand-in for the dictatorship itself. Moreover, the region's proximity to two neighboring military regimes produced a steady transborder flow of exiles and opposition forces. Within the western Paraná landscape, numerous farmers referred to the fight against Itaipu as a "political classroom" in which rural communities learned to defend both their rights to land and their rights as citizens. So rather than serving as a passive setting on which the Brazilian state could imprint its grand development schemes, the peripheral nature of this border region cultivated a unique form of political consciousness.

The earliest actions in the struggle against Itaipu occurred in the mid-1970s, when the Pastoral Land Commission, a branch of the Lutheran Church, began holding meetings and study groups in western Paraná to raise awareness of the impending displacement and the need to organize in defense of the region's farmers. In these early years, the central demands related to the farmers' desire to receive more money for their soon-to-be-flooded lands and to be given new lands nearby so that they would not have to migrate out of the state. This, of course, largely discounted the livelihoods of landless peasants and indigenous communities that did not have the same "legal title" to their lands. At general assemblies, frustrated farmers shared stories that told of Itaipu paying unequal amounts for identical plots of land; the Bank of Brazil taking illegal

commissions on land sales; and Itaipu employees bullying farmers into signing below-market contracts. The growing conflict came to a head in 1980 and 1981 when the farmers staged a pair of land encampments outside the offices of Itaipu that lasted a combined three months, occupied headlines in Brazil's largest newspapers, and helped catapult the lives of farmers in western Paraná into national debates over land, development, and democracy. Standing at the foot of the world's largest hydroelectric dam, the thousands of protesting farmers became emblematic of the abuses of the military regime, and their demands for land and justice reverberated throughout the country.

This epilogue will now provide a brief glimpse into the MJT's second—and largest—land encampment. By March of 1981, with less than two years remaining before the area's planned flooding, barely 60 percent of the indemnification cases had been settled. As such, the MJT attempted to stage a protest camp inside the Itaipu construction site itself. The protesting farmers, however, never made it beyond the dam's entrance gates, where they were blocked by dozens of gun-wielding state troopers and nearly one hundred agents from Itaipu's private security force. Pushed back by this threat of violence, the farmers set up an encampment along the adjacent fork in the road. This location came to be known as the Field of Shame (*Trevo da Vergonha*), an area in front of the entrance gates that placed the protest in full view of anyone visiting the hydroelectric project. Situated along highway BR-277 (the regional access point to the Pan-American Highway), the encampment was also visible to drivers going to Paraguay, tourist buses, and commercial vehicles. Similar to the media coverage at the start of the Santa Helena camp, newspapers quickly announced the events unfolding in Foz do Iguaçu. In this instance, however, the press focused on the violent specter posed by the military's presence. One headline wrote in capital letters that "ITAIPU RESISTS WITH GUNS,"<sup>77</sup> while another reproduced an increasingly popular phrase among the farmers and their allies: "Are the guns of Itaipu the symbol of the abertura?"<sup>78</sup>

Throughout the fifty-four-day encampment, farmers developed an intricate network of committees tasked with organizing all aspects of camp life. These included food preparation, sanitation, the shuttling of families back and forth from their farms, and perhaps most important in light of the extreme heat, the delivery of fresh water to the encampment. Media coverage was especially admiring of the organization of camp life, as headlines called readers' attention to how the farmers had created "a mini-city" and "an evolved society."<sup>79</sup> The largest newspaper in the state, *O Estado do Paraná*, called it "the encampment of the century."<sup>80</sup>



Another sign of the growing influence of the Foz do Iguaçu protest was how much it was discussed by politicians, both at the national and state levels. During the camp's first week, it received its highest-profile opposition figure to date: Leonel Brizola, the former governor and head of the Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro [PTB]). Brizola had recently returned from exile after having been one of the most visible and outspoken critics of the dictatorship—according to one historian, only a few years beforehand Brizola had been “anathema to the military.”<sup>81</sup> *O Estado de São Paulo* reported that Brizola gave “an impassioned speech” at the farmers’ encampment and was received by a series of standing ovations.<sup>82</sup> Additionally, more than a dozen speeches were given in federal Congress and in the Senate during the opening weeks of the camp, primarily from members of the PMDB opposition party (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro). Deputy Paulo Marques addressed the Chamber of Deputies in Brasília and noted that perhaps Itaipu’s display of force was the actual symbol of the *abertura* and declared that it only served as further “proof of the government’s false intentions” in the alleged opening of democracy.<sup>83</sup> By early May of 1981, over 30 percent of the region’s expropriations remained unfulfilled.<sup>84</sup> In a climate of anxiety and uncertainty and with a growing national spotlight cast on Foz do Iguaçu, there was tremendous pressure on both sides to reach an agreement. On May 8, after nearly two months camped on the periphery of Itaipu, a deal was struck that included a revised proposal of nearly CR\$500,000 per *alqueire* of land—over 60 percent higher than at the start of the protest. At a general assembly, farmers voted to approve the agreement and demobilize the encampment. Press coverage was overwhelmingly in favor of the farmers. Revealing the extent to which public opinion had sided with the MJT, newspapers reported on the final agreement with such headlines as “Making the Leviathan Fold,” “At Itaipu, Unity Was Strength,” and “Farmers Win Their Price: Crisis at Itaipu Is Over.”<sup>85</sup> Organizations that had lent support throughout the farmers’ struggle also celebrated the MJT’s victories. The Paraná Federation of Rural Workers (Federação dos Trabalhados na Agricultura do Estado da Paraná [FETAEP]), issued a statement declaring that “This mobilization of united and organized workers, together with unions and other opposition groups, offered concrete proof . . . that only the mobilization of all [Brazilians] can secure social justice.”<sup>86</sup>

Itaipu’s flood took place some five months after the end of the Foz do Iguaçu encampment. In the final weeks before the flood, the remaining families finally received their expropriation money and left the area. What had recently been a lively agricultural hub was now desolate; abandoned gas stations, cemeteries,

churches, and half-demolished buildings dotted the landscape. One journalist wrote that the region felt as though “it suffered an aerial bombing and all the people living in the small cities below were forced to evacuate in haste.”<sup>87</sup> On October 13, 1982, the area surrounding the Itaipu Dam was flooded. Over fourteen days, twenty-nine billion cubic meters of water formed a lake that covered 1,350 square kilometers of both Brazilian and Paraguayan lands.<sup>88</sup> In a span of two weeks, a landscape that had been lush farmlands supporting thousands of families disappeared under water.

In assessing the significance of the struggle for land and political rights that unfolded at Itaipu, it is essential to understand that the MJT was not simply a popular struggle that tapped into a national wave of political dissent. Rather, it was a movement that emerged from a region located far from established political centers and nestled along the border with two other countries ruled by military regimes. Although little scholarly attention has been given to the political dynamics of Brazil’s borderlands, areas such as western Paraná functioned as unique spaces of dissent. Many exiles returned to Brazil through this border region, and the immediate proximity to Paraguay and Argentina also enabled the formation of international solidarity organizations.<sup>89</sup> This frontier zone was both a place where rural people earned their livelihoods and a porous borderland where politics became internationalized. And although the dictatorship saw the region as a source of untapped natural and geopolitical power, it also became a space where opposition movements saw an opportunity to build democracy.

The historical and geographic location of this landscape allowed the farmers to more easily connect their fight against Itaipu to the broader advances of the *abertura*. Brazil’s return to democracy has often been understood as an urban process pushed forward by established social movements and elite politicians. Yet the specific circumstances of this borderland helped germinate an antidictatorship movement that was rooted in localized struggles for land. In seeking to understand Brazil’s era of dictatorship, scholars must begin to widen their lens—not only to groups such as the MJT but beyond the cities to the various regions that conditioned the emergence of new political actors.

## NOTES

1. The Goulart quotation comes from “Stroessner faz acôrdo com Goulart: Sete Quedas,” *Jornal do Brasil*, January 21, 1964, 1. Stroessner’s quotation comes from Telegram no. 53, DAM/254.(43), February 27, 1964, Arquivo Histórico de Itamaraty, Brasília (hereafter AHI-BSB).

2. “Encontro de Presidentes: Paraguai Apóia Construção de Sete Quedas,” *Última Hora*, January 21, 1964, 6.
3. Ibid.
4. Brazil’s geopolitical overtaking of Argentina began in the 1930s and accelerated in the 1940s when the government of Getúlio Vargas aligned the country with the United States in World War II. In exchange for Brazil’s wartime participation—its troops were sent to fight in Europe, and the United States was allowed to build military bases in the nation’s northeastern regions—Washington then “extended loans and technical assistance for the national steel plant at Volta Redonda, [and] gave Brazil substantial Lend-Lease aid (three-fourths of the total to Latin America);” Stanley E. Hilton, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945–1960: End of the Special Relationship,” *Journal of American History* 68, 3 (1981): 600.
5. Although Brazil and Paraguay technically shared equal domain to the dam’s energy, the 1973 Treaty of Itaipu stipulated that Paraguay had to sell its unused portion of energy exclusively to Brazil at a price that was fixed for fifty years and far-below-market value. The uneven stipulations of the 1973 treaty will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.
6. Nilson Monteiro, *Itaipu, a luz* (Curitiba: Itaipu Binacional, Assessoria de Comunicação Social, 2000), 10.
7. Memoirs written at the time by leading political figures from both countries offer important insight into interembassy relations but are limited by the nationalist blinders of their authors. Leopoldo Ramos Giménez, *Sobre el salto del Guairá al oído de América* (Asunción: Anales del Paraguay, 1966); Mario Gibson Barboza, *Na diplomacia, o traço todo da vida* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 1992); Juracy Magalhães and José Alberto Gueiros, *O último tenente* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 1996). The only relevant academic monograph is an overview of Brazil’s presence in the border region, yet by covering the entire nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it is unable to closely examine the events of the 1960s. Francisco Doratioto, *O Brasil no Rio da Prata (1822–1994)* (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2014).
8. The idea of Itaipu as a model of binational cooperation has received widespread criticism, especially from scholars and activists in Paraguay. Books that discuss the hegemonic practices of Itaipu include Ricardo Canese, *La deuda ilícita de Itaipú: El más nefasto negociado contra el Paraguay* (Asunción: Editorial Generación, 1999).
9. Seeking a neutral position, this chapter employs the term *Guairá waterfalls*, combining both Paraguay’s title of Guairá and Brazil’s use of the plural cascades.
10. See “Tratado de límites entre la República del Paraguay y el Imperio del Brasil,” 1872, Archivo Histórico de la Chancillería Paraguaya, Asunción, Paraguay (hereafter AHCP). A note to readers: the holdings of the AHCP are not categorically organized. As such, cited evidence contains only the identifying numbers of the original documents themselves.
11. Brazil embassy Note 92, March 25, 1966, AHCP.

12. Secret letter from João Baptista Figueiredo to President Emílio Médici, December 1, 1969, Exposição de Motivos no. 056/69, BR AN, BSB N8.o.PSN, EST.285, National Archive, Brasília (hereafter AN-BSB).
13. Paraguay citations come from DPI 712, 12/14/1965, AHCP, and “Suscinta informacion sobre el diferendo paraguayo-brasileño relativo al salto del Guairá,” March 15, 1966, AHCP.
14. Maria Regina Soares de Lima, *The Political Economy of Brazilian Foreign Policy: Nuclear Energy, Trade and Itaipu* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1986), 352–57.
15. *Ibid.*, 347.
16. For more on the role of Argentina in the foreign relations of the Triple Border, see Stanley E. Hilton, “The Argentine Factor in Twentieth-Century Brazilian Foreign Policy Strategy,” *Political Science Quarterly* 100, no. 1 (1985): 27–51.
17. The region is spelled Guaíra in Portuguese, and Guairá in Spanish; this article will employ the former.
18. “Hasteamento da bandeira paraguaia em Coronel Renato provocou a sua ocupação pelos militares brasileiros,” *Jornal do Brasil*, January 6, 1966, 7. This article was second in a five-part series on the border conflict.
19. Ministry of War no. 994/S-102-CIE, in BR.DFAN.BSB.Z4.SNA.CFR.0007, AN-BSB.
20. *Ibid.*, 4. It should be noted that the present article offers the first evidence of the exact date that Brazilian troops occupied the border. In all previous scholarship, it was only known that these soldiers arrived at some point in June.
21. “Antecedentes históricos del litigio Paraguay-Brasil,” May 10, 1966, AHCP.
22. References to the small size of the detachment come from Minutes of the National Security Council (CNS), March 16, 1966, in BR AN, BSB N8.o.PSN, EST.286, AN-BSB; the symbolism of the troops was noted by Chancellor Juracy Magalhães in an interview on May 5, 1966: JM pi 66.04.05/1, Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil/Fundação Getúlio Varga (hereafter CPDOC/FGV).
23. Letter, Figueiredo to Médici.
24. Minutes of the National Security Council.
25. Verbal note from Castelo Branco to Stroessner, September 1, 1965, AHCP.
26. Edgar L. Ynsfrán, *Un giro geopolítico: El milagro de una ciudad* (Asunción: Instituto Paraguayo de Estudios Geopolíticos e Internacionales, 1990), 73. In the following months six letters were exchanged between both foreign ministries on the following dates: September 25, October 22, October 29, November 8, November 9, and December 14, AHI-BSB.
27. DPI 604, December 22, 1965, AHCP.
28. Carlos Saldivar, interview by author, January 14, 2015, Asunción, Paraguay.
29. Conrado Pappalardo, interview by author January 5, 2015, Asunción, Paraguay.
30. “Press release from the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores,” October 26, 1965, AHCP.

31. According to different versions of the story, the Paraguayans were detained between four and six hours.
32. All details included in Brazilian Embassy Note 322, November 8, 1965, AHCP.
33. Christine Folch, "Surveillance and State Violence in Stroessner's Paraguay: Itaipú Hydroelectric Dam, Archive of Terror," *American Anthropologist* 115, no. 1 (2013): 47.
34. "Itamarati nega litigio entre Brasil-Paraguai," *Folha de São Paulo*, November 3, 1965, 13.
35. This news comes from "Brasil propõe ao Paraguai arbitragem internacional," *Folha de São Paulo*, November 16, 1965, 11, and "Brasil quer arbitragem em 7 Quedas," *Jornal do Brasil*, November 18, 1965, 17.
36. *Mameluco* is a Portuguese word that refers to the first-generation offspring of a European and an Amerindian. Its use during the protests in Paraguay can be seen as a reference both to Brazil's alleged sense of superiority (for having descended from European culture) and the historical violation that Brazil wrought on native lands.
37. Descriptions of the November 27 demonstration come from 1F 0974-981; 9F 1829-1831, Centro de Documentación y Archivo para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, Asunción, Paraguay (hereafter CDyA); "Hasteamento da bandeira paraguaia em Coronel Renato provocou a sua ocupação pelos militares brasileiros," *Jornal do Brasil*, January 6, 1966, 7, and Ricardo Caballero Aquino, interview by author, January 7, 2015, Asunción, Paraguay.
38. Mario Gibson Barboza, *Na diplomacia, o traço todo da vida* (Rio de Janeiro: Editoria Record, 1992), 85.
39. The most widely distributed of these exchanges occurred in January of 1966, when Paraguay sent out copies of a lengthy letter (DPI no. 712) it had written to Brazil on December 14, 1965, sharing it with twenty different embassies throughout the world; DPI notes 17-42, 1966, AHCP.
40. DPI 167, February 25, 1966, AHCP.
41. Department of State Airgram, no. A-167, October 13, 1963, <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:355471/>.
42. Juan Archibaldo Lanús, *De Chapultepec al Beagle: Política exterior Argentina, 1945-1980* (Buenos Aires: Emecé Editores, 1984), 294.
43. DPI 192, April 14, 1966, AHCP.
44. Stroessner speech to Paraguay's House of Representatives, April 1, 1966, reproduced in Leopoldo Ramos Giménez, *Sobre el salto del Guatía al oído de América* (Asunción: Anales del Paraguay, 1966), 6-13.
45. "Juracy entrega ao julgamento da história a acusação paraguaia," *O Globo*, April 27, 1966, 17.
46. "Diário do Congresso Nacional," May 19, 1966, 61, <http://imagem.camara.gov.br/Imagem/d/pdf/DCD19MAI1966.pdf#page=61>.
47. This agreement was known as the Ata das Cataratas in Portuguese and the Acta de Iguaçu in Spanish. The document contained eight articles that totaled a little over six hundred words. "Diário Oficial da União," August 8, 1966, 9061-62, <http://>

www.jusbrasil.com.br/diarios/2934808/pg-43-secao-1-diario-oficial-da-uniao-dou-de-08-08-1966/pdfView.

48. Ibid., app. 21.
49. Article 3 was celebrated as the Paraguayan delegation's greatest accomplishment; Brazil finally reversed its position that both the waterfalls and their potential energy belonged exclusively within Brazilian territory. Special Border Commission Report, September 1966, AHCP.
50. AAA/DAM/DF/G/SG/75/930.1(42)(43), in JM 66.01.27/1(A) CMRE, app. 22. CPDOC/FGV.
51. Article 8 of app. C of the 1973 Treaty of Itaipu required Paraguay to sell all of its unused energy exclusively to Brazil at the set price of US\$300 per gigawatt hour (GWh). More importantly, this price was nonnegotiable and was stipulated to stay fixed until 2023. Ricardo Canese, *Itaipú: Dependencia o Desarrollo* (Asunción: Editorial Araverá, 1985), 16. These treaty terms were only renegotiated in 2009 under the leftist governments of Inácio "Lula" da Silva in Brazil and Fernando Lugo in Paraguay.
52. "Brasil Abandonou o Guaíra," *O Globo*, June 28, 1966.
53. This information comes from a report marked "secret/urgent" written on June 6, 1967, BR AN, BSB N8.o.PSN, EST.286, pp. 728–37, National Archive, Rio de Janeiro (hereafter AN-RJ).
54. Itamaraty report, July 5, 1967, BR AN, BSB N8.o.PSN, EST.286, p. 736, AN-RJ.
55. This agreement was the culmination of two previous summits held in Buenos Aires in February of 1967 and Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, in May of 1968. The full text of the Treaty of the Plate Basin can be found at [https://www.dpc.mar.mil.br/sites/default/files/ssta/legislacao/hidrovia/trat\\_bcprata.pdf](https://www.dpc.mar.mil.br/sites/default/files/ssta/legislacao/hidrovia/trat_bcprata.pdf). A follow-up meeting was held on June 3, 1971, at the IV Conference of the Chancellors of the Plate Basin, when representatives of the same five countries signed an additional agreement called the Declaração de Assunção Sobre o Aproveitamento de Rios Internacionais.
56. Ministry of Mines and Energy report, MME no. 602.232/73, May 9, 1973, AN-BSB.
57. "El Salto del Guairá ha sido vendido por el regimen military antinacional encabezado por Stroessner," Collection of essays by Oscar Creydt, personal holdings of Martin Almada.
58. As referenced in Milton Cabral, speech to National Congress, September 22, 1972, Diário do Congresso Nacional, Seção II, Ano XXVII, n. 96, and Arthur Fonseca speech to Chamber of Deputies, October 20, 1972, Diário do Congresso Nacional, Seção 1, 1972.
59. "A Argentina cria na ONU um problema para Itaipu," *Jornal da Tarde*, November 23, 1973, 2, and "Na ONU, a Argentina ganha do Brasil," *Jornal da Tarde*, December 13, 1974.
60. This agreement established rules and engineering parameters for how both the Itaipu and Corpus dams could simultaneously function on the same river. For more details on the Itaipu–Corpus conflict and the Tripartite Agreement, see: Paulo R.

- Schilling, *O expansionismo brasileiro: A geopolítica do general Golbery e a diplomacia do Itamarati* (São Paulo: Global, 1981).
61. The full text in Portuguese can be found at [http://www.aneel.gov.br/arquivos/PDF/dlg1973o23\\_IATIPU.pdf](http://www.aneel.gov.br/arquivos/PDF/dlg1973o23_IATIPU.pdf).
  62. The low cost stipulated for Itaipu (US\$300/GWh) is evident when compared to the price allotted for the Yacyretá dam; during this same period Argentina and Paraguay agreed to sell its energy at US\$2,998/GWh.
  63. Paulo R. Schilling and Ricardo Canese, *Itaipu: Geopolítica e corrupção* (São Paulo: Centro Ecumênico de Documentação e Informação, 1991), 29–31.
  64. Jan M. G. Kleinpenning, *Man and Land in Paraguay* (Providence, RI: FORIS, 1987), 180.
  65. When the Treaty of Itaipu was signed in 1973, the Paraguayan government did not have sufficient capital to contribute to the launch of the Binational Corporation, so a deal was reached in which the Banco do Brasil loaned US\$50 million to Paraguay to be paid back at 6 percent annual interest over fifty years. For more, see Osny Duarte Pereira, *Itaipu: Prós e contras* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Paz e Terra, 1974), 227–32.
  66. “Itaipu: la gran entrega,” Boletín DE-CE, Junta Nacional del Partido Demócrata Cristiano, August 1973, CDyA, 224F.2171.
  67. As referenced in Telegram 1141, DAM-1/AIG from the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires, May 4, 1973, AHI-BSB; “Itaipú: la bomba hídrica brasileña,” *Revista Crisis*, May 1973, as referenced in MRE no. 18/73, August 18, 1973, AHCP.
  68. “‘Itaipu es el simbolo de nuestra soberana cocacion fraternal,’ dijo ayer Stroessner,” *ABC Color*, May 26, 1973, 7–9.
  69. Amaral de Souza speech, April 26, 1973, Diário do Congresso Nacional, Seção 1, 1015–16.
  70. As quoted in BR.AN.RIO.TT.o.MCP.AVU.21, AN-BSB.
  71. Gustavo V. Dons, “Brazil on the Offensive,” *NACLA’s Latin America and Empire Report* 9, no. 4 (May 1975): 7.
  72. Construction statistics come from John Howard White, “Itaipu: Gender, Community, and Work in the Alto Paraná Borderlands, Brazil and Paraguay, 1954–1989” (PhD diss., University of New Mexico, 2010), 1, and Monteiro, *Itaipu, a luz*, 94.
  73. Thomas G. Sanders, *The Itaipu Hydroelectrical Project*, UFSI Reports, 1982/no. 35 (Hanover, NH: Universities Field Staff International), 4.
  74. For more on the Avá-Guarani, see Maria Lucia Brant de Carvalho, “Das terras dos índios a índios sem terra o estado e os Guarani do Oco’y: Violência, silêncio e luta” (PhD diss., University of São Paulo, 2013).
  75. Although this chapter’s epilogue focuses almost exclusively on Itaipu as it relates to Brazil, an equally important and at times overlapping history took place in Paraguay. The Itaipu flood covered 570 square kilometers of Paraguayan lands (compared to 780 square kilometers in Brazil) and displaced over twenty thousand local Paraguayans. Much of the scholarship on Paraguay’s history with Itaipu deals with the unfair economic stipulations of the dam’s 1973 treaty that heavily favored Brazil.



- Major works include R. Andrew Nickson, "The Itaipú Hydro-Electric Project: The Paraguayan Perspective," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 2, no. 1 (1982): 1–20; Canese, *Itaipú*; Adrian Mora et al., *La deuda de Itaipú* (Asunción: Fr7, 2006); Juan Antonio Pozzo Moreno, *Itaipu: La apropiación indebida* (Asunción: Editorial Gráfica Mercurio, 2010); Carlos Mateo Balmelli, *Itaipú: Una reflexión ético-política sobre el poder* (Asunción: Aguilar, 2011).
76. Although closely linked to the governments of both Brazil and Paraguay, the Itaipu Binational Corporation technically exists as an autonomous entity governed by its own regulations. Although its administration is made up equally of Brazilian and Paraguayan citizens, Brazil's influence is unquestionable. Over 80 percent of the initial financing and construction equipment was provided by Brazilians, and the country currently uses 90 percent of the dam's generated energy.
  77. "ITAIPIU RESISTE COM ARMAS," *Nosso Tempo*, March 18, 1981, 1.
  78. "Os fuzis de Itaipu são o símbolo da abertura?" *Hoje*, March 28, 1981, 1.
  79. Headline quotations come respectively from "Desapropriados formam uma mini-cidade," *O Mensageiro*, April 1981, 13–14, and "Uma sociedade evoluída em torno de um acampamento de colonos," *Folha de Londrina*, March 29, 1981, 32.
  80. "O acampamento do século," *O Estado do Paraná*, March 29, 1981, 14.
  81. Thomas Skidmore, "Brazil's Slow Road to Democratization: 1974–1985," in *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation*, ed. Alfred Stepan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 29.
  82. "Brizola vai a Abi-Ackel pedir justiça a colonos," *O Paraná*, March 22, 1981, 1.
  83. Paulo Marques congressional speech, March 19, 1981, in *Diário do Congresso Nacional*, Seção 1, 778–79.
  84. "Em fim, Itaipu negociará com agricultores," *Nosso Tempo*, May 6, 1981, 5.
  85. "Dobrando o Leviathan," *O Estado do Paraná*, May 12, 1981; "Em Itaipu, a união faz a força," *Gazeta do Povo*, May 11, 1981; "Colono ganha o preço: fim da crise em Itaipu," *Estado do Paraná*, May 10, 1981.
  86. "Mensagem aos agricultores expropriados pela hídrica Itaipu," May 8, 1981, archive of FETAEP, Curitiba, Brazil.
  87. "Os últimos a deixar a região devastada," *O Globo*, October 10, 1982, 12.
  88. Of the total area flooded for the Itaipu reservoir, 780 square kilometers were Brazilian and 570 square kilometers were Paraguayan. See Maria de Fátima Bento Ribeiro, *Memórias do concreto: Vozes na construção de Itaipu* (Cascavel: Edunioeste, 2002), 27.
  89. In 1979 Paraná hosted the first-ever meeting of Latin American Opposition, a gathering of dissident political leaders from Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, Peru, Chile, and Mexico; "Encontro Latino Americano de Oposições," folder No. 01431, Public Archive of Paraná.

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# 9

## FROM PORTEÑO TO PONTERO

### The Shifting of Paraguayan Geography and Identity in Asunción in the Early Years of the Stroessner Regime

BRIDGET MARÍA CHESTERTON

IN 1969, four years after the opening of the Puente de la Amistad (Friendship Bridge in English or Ponte da Amizade in Portuguese) that connects Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil, to Puerto Stroessner (now Ciudad del Este), Paraguay, the *New York Times* travel reporter Joyce Hill narrated her three-day drive from São Paulo, Brazil, to Asunción, Paraguay. In her words, her trip was from “South America’s fastest-growing city [São Paulo]” to “Asunción, Paraguay, its slowest-paced capital.” The article documents her experience, as she called it, of traveling “backward though time.”<sup>1</sup> Starting in Brazil’s largest, most important, and most modern city, meandering through the countryside of the Brazilian state of Paraná, crossing the Puente de la Amistad, and slowly making her way on Paraguay’s new highway, the sojourner highlighted South America’s many appealing features. But her description of Asunción as “full of innocence, charm[,] and unreality” was certainly a portrayal Paraguayan president Alfredo Stroessner (1954–1989) was determined to end. More to his liking would have been a request for directions to the airport—both to show her how modern transportation *had* arrived in the middle of the twentieth century in the form of the modernized Aeropuerto Alfredo Stroessner and to demonstrate that Paraguayan-owned jets both arrived and, more importantly in this case, departed daily to rid the country of such a condescending reporter.<sup>2</sup>

For the Stroessner regime the opening of the new bridge, the modernized airport along with jet travel, and Hill’s seamless travel across a South American

border represented not a trip into the past but a leap into a bright future. No longer tied to Argentina by boat via the Paraguay River or by train on the slow-moving, antiquated rail line, the new bridge and the new airport would help bring the nation into the modern world. In the minds of those in power in Paraguay, connecting with the dynamic economy and culture of neighboring Brazil by means of automobiles and air travel represented the hope of a better tomorrow. By this time Argentina's economic, cultural, and political dominance of South America had waned significantly. The days of vast Spanish and Italian immigration, Argentine tango singers filling music halls in Europe and the United States, and "vacas gordas" (fat cows) of economic glory days had passed in Argentina.<sup>3</sup> The declining fate of Argentina stood in stark comparison to the perceived rise of Brazil. This trend in local geopolitics and culture was most visible in the periphery, and particularly Paraguay. The bridge signified a new era in Paraguayan history; Paraguay was no longer dependent on the Paraguay River, Argentina, and its major city, Buenos Aires. In a play on words, *asuncenos* (as residents of Asunción are known) had moved away from their river port, and *porteños* (as residents of Buenos Aires are known) had moved toward a Brazilian *ponte* and in the process were becoming *ponteros*. As a result, the middle decades of the twentieth century brought hope for novel Brazilian Paraguayan trade and cultural and social interconnectedness.

Historical studies of Asunción are limited. The few studies of the city tend to focus on the early years of conquest or the time lines of the city's most important landmarks. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, debates about how the city was founded and by whom sparked an initial interest from historians—many of whom were attempting to tie their own family histories to the early conquerors.<sup>4</sup> In the latter part of the twentieth century, historians reexamining the period began questioning the myth of peaceful conquest often retold in earlier works.<sup>5</sup> The anthropologist Branislava Susnik narrates a more complicated and tenuous early relationship between the indigenous Cario-Guarani and the Spanish conquistadors.<sup>6</sup> Her work has gained increasing attention from historians. In recent years, historians have begun to tackle the question about the city's infrastructure development and cultural institutions. More recent work, including that of José Carlos Rodríguez, has noted that urbanization in Asunción in the middle decades of the twentieth century occurred in the direction of metropolitan growth toward Ciudad del Este instead of along the river, as had previously been the case.<sup>7</sup> In this chapter I add to the discussion about urbanization in Paraguay by postulating that this

Asunción-Puerto Stroessner connection radically changed the geopolitical, cultural, and social orientation of the city. No longer limited to the Lower Río de la Plata via river or train but rather extending toward the Triple Frontier by bus and automobile, Asunción became more Brazilian and less Argentine. Paraguayans in the middle of the twentieth century began favoring political alliances with Brazil, copying Brazilian cultural norms, and vacationing in Brazil's larger cities and beautiful beaches. Many elite Paraguayans and government officials hoped—and imagined—that these dramatic changes would lift Paraguay out of an extensive colonial and early national isolation into a new tropical urban modernity. Asunción would not be isolated, sleepy, or backward. It would be connected, active, and even innovative.

## RIVER, RAILROAD, AND HIGHWAY

According to Paraguayan legend, the first European to arrive in the area that is today Asunción was Aleixo Garcia, a Portuguese conquistador working for the Spanish crown in the early sixteenth century. Garcia succeeded in reaching the remote area after making an arduous trip from Santa Catarina, in present-day Brazil, overland to the banks of the Paraguay River. The hardy traveler then continued west to seek out the vast cities of silver that were rumored to exist beyond the river. Garcia never returned from his travels to recount his exploits to other Europeans. His demise remains a mystery. Garcia was one of the few travelers to attempt the overland route to reach the banks of the Paraguay River. The conquistadors who followed, including Juan de Ayolas, Juan de Salazar, and Domingo Martínez de Irala, all traveled up the Paraguay River from the Lower Plata. This method of travel to Paraguay and its capital, Asunción, remained the only safe and viable way for travelers, immigrants, and invading armies to penetrate the region throughout the colonial and early national periods in Paraguay.

As a result of the Spanish conquistadors' achievement in founding the city of Asunción—the first successful Spanish city in the Río de la Plata—conquistadors headed out from Asunción to found other cities, including Corrientes, Buenos Aires, and Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Consequently, Paraguayan historians and nationalists refer to the city as the “mother of cities.” The nickname confers to Asunción and, by extension, to Paraguay as a whole, a greater level of importance in the early colonial era. Nonetheless, after this brief period, Asunción and Paraguay fell into relative obscurity because of their geographic

isolation and lack of easily exportable commodities (with the exception of yerba mate—Paraguayan green tea) in a growing Atlantic and global market. While not entirely cut off from wide regional and global trends in the late-colonial and early national periods, Asunción's limited interaction with the Atlantic basin can be traced to its dependence on the Paraguay River as an outlet to the Atlantic. Repeated interference by Buenos Aires in both the colonial and national periods strained relations between *asuncenos* and *porteños*. As noted by Thomas Whigham, in the period between the Bourbon reforms and the War of the Triple Alliance (1864–1870), the region had “real potential, intermittently realized, for a thriving export economy. This potential, however, was powerfully and repeatedly disrupted by politics.”<sup>8</sup> While outside the scope of this chapter, it is sufficient to write that the river trade on the Paraguay River was dominated not by Asunción river's headwaters but by Buenos Aires and somewhat less so by Montevideo, both at the estuary of the Paraguay River.

During the War of the Triple Alliance, Argentine, Brazilian, and Uruguayan troops who penetrated the region via the same river that had brought the Spanish conquistadors Ayolas, Salazar, and Irala were successful in invading the Upper Plata, and the Allied troops who fought their way to Paraguay via the river occupied the city from 1869 to 1876. The same cannot be said for the troops who traveled from São Paulo to Campinas and Uberaba in Minas Gerais, Brazil, in the hopes of reaching the Paraguay River. Attempting to slash their way through the dense forest, they never arrived. According to Whigham, 568 doomed men headed out of Campinas in April 1865. Another 1,212 men in Uberaba joined them in July with the intention of attacking the Paraguayans from the rear. The plan, however, was foiled by the harsh conditions of travel in the South American forest. Death from disease, starvation, and Paraguayan bullets ensured that this group of Brazilians never reached Asunción or the Paraguay River.<sup>9</sup> They learned the hard way that travel overland from Brazil to the Upper Plata was nearly impossible.

This reality remained even after the end of hostilities. In the late nineteenth century the American travel reporter Theodore Child wrote in *Harper's New Monthly Magazine* that Paraguay, “situated in the heart of the [South American] continent, and communicating with the sea only by the intermediary of the Paraná River . . . has remained a far-away country.”<sup>10</sup> Significantly, forty years later another American, William Reid, also traveled to Asunción. He arrived via the Paraguay River, although he wrote that it was possible to travel from Montevideo or Buenos Aires to Asunción via train “in about 48 or 50 hours”; it

would be faster than traveling upriver, a journey that would require five or six days. He suggested, however, that if a traveler arrived in Asunción by train, it was best to return by river (only three days to return to Buenos Aires or Montevideo) and enjoy magnificent views on the Paraguay River.<sup>11</sup> It is clear from these early travelers that Paraguay, and specifically for our purposes the city of Asunción, was a port city from its founding in the early sixteenth until the middle of the twentieth century. In 1895, travel writer and geographer Élisée Reclus documented this trade when noting that earthenware, lace, and the “extract . . . of orange flowers” were “forwarded to Buenos Ayres.”<sup>12</sup>

Earlier, though, in the middle of the nineteenth century, Paraguayan president Carlos Antonio López (1841–1862) built the first railroad in Paraguay with the dream of improving transportation. Under López, the first 6.4 miles of railroad connected Asunción to its suburbs in 1861. Under the early presidency of his son Francisco Solano López (1862–1870) the railroad was extended “almost to Paraguaí, some 72 kilometers” to the east of Asunción.<sup>13</sup> The War of the Triple Alliance halted the construction of the railroad, but after the conflagration, in 1870 various British investors hoped to earn a profit building a railroad in Paraguay. However, according to the historian Harris Gaylord Warren, “The Paraguay Railway was a lure and a dream rather than a means of transportation” in the late nineteenth century.<sup>14</sup> Nonetheless, in September of 1913, the railroad was finally extended from Villarrica to Encarnación on the Paraná River.<sup>15</sup> From there it was possible to take a ferry to Argentina. By extending eastward from Asunción rather than to the south, the railroad connected Paraguay only to Argentina; Brazil was still out of reach via railroad.

The first highway that headed east from Asunción was begun in 1939 when Marshal José Felix Estigarribia, hero of the Chaco War (1932–1935), in his role as minister to the United States secured a three million dollar loan for road construction.<sup>16</sup> The road reached the town of Coronel Oviedo when completed, about 140 kilometers to the east of Asunción. As a result of his efforts in both the Chaco War and his efforts in securing the funding for the highway, it is commonly known as *ruta Mariscal José Felix Estigarribia* (fig. 9.1).<sup>17</sup>

The second extension toward the east is *ruta VII* (José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia), which connects Coronel Oviedo with what was then known as the city of Puerto Stroessner (today known as Ciudad del Este), located on the Paraná River that forms the border with Brazil.<sup>18</sup> Begun in 1955 with Brazilian financing, the road was completed in January 1959 with a ceremonial opening in June of the same year.<sup>19</sup> With the road completed, *asuncenos* had the first direct



FIGURE 9.1 Postcard with image of ruta II (Mariscal José Felix Estigarribia), date unknown. Personal collection of the author.

overland route to the Brazilian border. Paraguay and its capital city would be forever changed by a new geographic orientation.

## PARAGUAY'S TENSE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL

Up until the construction of the road and bridge connecting Asunción to the Brazilian city of Foz do Iguazu, Brazilians watched begrudgingly as Argentina dominated both the political and cultural landscape of Asunción. Early in the nineteenth century, this Argentine domination was a source of major concern because, as noted by the historian Francisco Doratioto, “the Brazilian Empire [believed] that Buenos Aires had as one of its ambitions becoming that center of a [nation] state that included all of the jurisdiction of the old Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, of which Paraguay had been a part.”<sup>20</sup> After the Allied victory in 1870 in the War of the Triple Alliance, the Brazilians forcefully occupied the city; nonetheless, a hasty end to occupation meant that Brazilian influence was relatively short lived. Even so, in the early years after the war, political forces in Paraguay appeared to favor Brazil. The first political party in Paraguay, the



Asociación Nacional Republicana, commonly known as the Colorados, was led by the pro-Brazilian general Bernardo Caballero, who when elected to the presidency maintained relatively close political relations with Brazil.<sup>21</sup> The opposition party, the Centro Democrático, commonly known as the Liberal Party, favored closer relations with Argentina. Although the Colorados were in control of politics for most of the period before 1904, in the decades following the war, Argentina continued as the most important power in the Upper Plata. After the fall of the Empire of Brazil in 1889, two events, the 1894 Cavalcanti Coup and the Chaco War (1932–1935), highlight the political and economic strength of Argentine influence. During the 1894 Cavalcanti Coup, Brazil, fearing the installation of an anti-Brazilian president, helped to support the election of Juan Bautista Egusquiza.<sup>22</sup> In the end, however, Brazilians were unable to secure his position as the *primer mandatario* (the head of government and state), and Argentine influence in politics dominated throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After the 1904 Liberal Party coup, Argentine political influence and its economic and cultural hegemony were secured until the middle of the twentieth century. For example, during the Chaco War, the Argentines sold supplies and military matériel to the Paraguayans, a clear demonstration of support for the Paraguayan cause over their Bolivian adversary in the Chaco region of South America.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, the largest investor in the region was Carlos Casado, an Argentine from Rosario who built the only railroad in the vast Chaco region in order to grow his *quebracho* (literally ax-breaking tree) extraction business.<sup>24</sup>

This fact was not lost on Paraguayans of the middle twentieth century, including Coronel Ramón César Bejarano, who noted with hostility that “it is well known that the *porteñ[o]* [Buenos Aires] capital, before and after American Independence, attempted to exercise political and economic hegemony over the cities in the interior [of South America]. As a result, there was anarchy in the Río de la Plata [after independence].”<sup>25</sup> Culturally and linguistically, Paraguay had traditionally shared more with Argentina than its larger eastern neighbor. Spanish, the language of the Lower Plata, was and is the language of government, science, business, and religion in Paraguay. Commerce, a shared colonial past, and language connected the Upper Plata to the Lower Plata via the Paraguay River until the middle of the twentieth century. It was precisely for those reasons that Bejarano noted with obvious hostility toward Buenos Aires that “for such reasons, the idea of a search for another outlet to the Atlantic ocean . . . developed into a true obsession of all patriotic governments including

those of [D]on Carlos [Antonio López] and General Stroessner."<sup>26</sup> Even if López, as hinted by Bejarano, had wanted to extend a road toward Brazil, the reality was that a dense forest prevented such a highway.

With the rise of Alfredo Stroessner in 1954, development toward the east became possible. Paraguayan dependence on and preference for all things Argentine shifted dramatically. Through the early 1950s the Paraguayan military and its leadership had shown strong predilections for Brazil over Argentina. This can be traced to the perceived notion that Brazil had a strong military that the Paraguayan army desired to emulate. Stroessner shared these views. Although he did not share Juan Perón's political visions, when Perón was exiled by the military in a coup, Stroessner gave him a safe haven. According to Francisco Doratioto this had more to do with the long tradition in Latin America of welcoming exiled political leaders and less with Stroessner's "fondness" of Perón. Nonetheless, the Argentine military interpreted the event as support for Perón, further pushing Stroessner and Paraguay into Brazil's growing sphere of influence in the Southern Cone.<sup>27</sup>

Stroessner was undoubtedly a Brazilophile, and his desire to strengthen Paraguay's political ties to Brazil helped to ensure that a road connecting the Paraguayan capital to the border, a longtime dream of Colorado Party leaders, was brought to fruition under his watch. Significantly, his presidency oversaw the construction of a bridge over the Paraná River that connected Puerto Stroessner, Paraguay, with Foz do Iguacu, Brazil. The treaty between Brazil and Paraguay to build the bridge was signed on May 29, 1956, only a few short months after Brazilian president Juscelino Kubitschek was sworn into office in January and two years after Stroessner had assumed the presidency of Paraguay in a coup d'état on May 4, 1954.<sup>28</sup> These two men also celebrated the inauguration of the bridge a few years later, in 1961, with speeches that celebrated a new era in Brazil-Paraguay relations. While in this chapter I stress the importance of the bridge for Paraguayan hopes, dreams, and ambitions, the construction of the bridge was also significant for the new Kubitschek government, which was embarking on a series of new building projects that historian Joel Wolfe has described as "developmentalist," including but not limited to the construction of Brasília. These policies started "on his [Kubitschek's] first day in office . . . [when he] laid out plans for expanding basic industries and transportation networks."<sup>29</sup> These Brazilian building and infrastructure projects clearly appealed to a new Paraguayan leadership looking to expand toward a modern Brazil.<sup>30</sup> The thought of a Paraguay connected to a modern, progressive state was not lost



FIGURE 9.2 Postcard of the Puente de la Amistad, date unknown. Personal collection of the author.

on Alfredo Stroessner: at the bridge inauguration ceremony in 1961, he stated, “it is with great pride that I declare that we have arrived from Asunción to this historic event. . . . On the highway that my government has constructed, in service to the great interest of the nation, opening though the dense jungle, a new path for progress and civilization.”<sup>31</sup> When finally opened to the public in 1965, the Puente de la Amistad brought a dramatic geopolitical and economic shift to the region. No longer was Paraguay’s only access to the Atlantic restricted downriver on the Paraguay River; instead, roads (even if only partially paved!) connected Asunción directly to Brazil’s large markets and the nation’s growing cultural hegemony in the Southern Cone (fig. 9.2).<sup>32</sup>

## THE PHYSICAL CITY

Founded as a port city, Asunción long hugged the Paraguay River, with its low-lying areas frequently flooding. Residents and leaders of Asunción, even with the threat of repeated flooding, chose to build homes, businesses, and

government offices along the river. It was the lifeline of the city, bringing in needed goods and services to *asuncenos* and creating a conceptual and logistical attachment to the river that resulted in Asunción's status as a port city. Maps of the city clearly record this trend. Roberto Chodasiewicz and Enrique Mangel's 1870 work shows the city in an interlocking colonial grid expanding outward from the river's edge. The city's most important buildings—and the only ones marked on the map—closely hug the coast. The port is clearly marked, and a road leading from the port to the street is drawn on the map (fig. 9.3).

Significantly, the railroad that was constructed before the War of the Triple Alliance is identified and shown hugging the river. Some fifty years later, a 1920 map by Federico E. Degasperri shows the city expanding both to the north and east. Although the city had grown since the earlier map, it was still small enough that many residents still lived only blocks away from the river. In yet another fifty years, though, a detailed map of the city created by the United States government in 1978 clearly demonstrates how the city was growing toward the east along the newly constructed highway toward Brazil, from the ruta II—that connected with ruta VII—toward Puerto Stroessner and the bridge to Brazil (fig. 9.4).<sup>33</sup>

Asunción's outer suburbs grew along the highway stretching east, appearing almost like an arm reaching out toward Brazil. This was not coincidental; it was driven by Brazil's growing cultural, social, and economic influence in the Southern Hemisphere. An emerging regional and global powerhouse, the promise of Brazil left the Paraguayan government with the hope that it, too, could partake in Brazil's expanding sphere. Asunción was no longer the river city that it once was. Government officials aspired to much more.

## A MORE BRAZILIAN PARAGUAY

On March 27, 1965, the day that the Puente de la Amistad opened to the public (as opposed to its earlier limited use opening in 1961), both Brazilians and Paraguayans celebrated by walking across the bridge.<sup>34</sup> The bridge appeared crammed with people walking across in celebration of the opening in the Paraguayan newspaper *El País*.<sup>35</sup> The throngs of civilians crossing the bridge was preceded by presidents Stroessner and Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco (1964–1967) arriving at precisely 7:45 a.m. on their nation's respective sides of the bridge and walking toward each other for a ribbon cutting in the middle. Both







men were dressed and photographed in “civilian attire,” not the military dress each was accustomed to for such inaugural events. (Stroessner was a general and Castelo Branco was a marshal.) This sartorial choice, as noted in the Paraguayan press, was specifically to highlight the peaceful nature of the twentieth-century bridge that connected the nineteenth-century enemies.<sup>36</sup> Although the bridge connected Paraguay and Brazil, the Paraguayan press gave full credit for its engineering to Brazilians and noted that it was a “historic offering from the Brazilian people to the Paraguayan people.”<sup>37</sup> The bridge was much more than a simple path across a raging river; it was seen by Paraguayans as a gift of friendship that would bring Brazil, and its sleek, urban modernity, that much closer to Paraguay.

In the middle of the twentieth century, a new social magazine (“with the largest circulation in the country” as was often repeated on its cover) appeared in Asunción: *Ñandé* (meaning “ourselves” in Guarani).<sup>38</sup> The magazine, aimed at elite white Paraguayans, contained articles ranging from women’s fashion to recipes to new business endeavors in Paraguay. But, most importantly, it was both a visual and rhetorical propaganda machine for the Stroessner regime as it highlighted and glorified the many positive changes in Asunción. A close inspection of the magazine emphasizes the hopes and desires of the Stroessner regime to increase both social and cultural ties to Brazil and its efforts to convince the educated and moneyed classes in Paraguay that their best hope for the future was a closer and more intimate relationship with Brazil.

A year before the 1965 public inaugural of the bridge, a new experimental Paraguay-Brazil school opened in Asunción (fig. 9.5). This ultramodern building reflected larger trends of architecture popular in Brazil at the time (in particular the recently constructed capital city Brasília). The Brazilian architect Affonso Eduardo Reidy, most famous for his work on the Museu de Arte Moderna do Rio de Janeiro, replicated many features of the building in Rio into his work in Asunción.<sup>39</sup> Specifically, modernist V-shaped façades are predominant features on both buildings.<sup>40</sup>

Although in the end many of the school’s design features were never finished, the building certainly highlighted the growing Brazilian influence in Asunción. In a glowing article written in *Ñandé*, the stated purpose of the school was to help promote Brazilian-Paraguayan friendship and “primarily to train teachers in general psychology, . . . educational theory, Portuguese language, [and] Portuguese and Brazilian literature.” Moreover, the magazine reported that the space was to serve as location for “artistic, cultural, and scientific conferences,



FIGURE 9.5 Experimental Paraguay-Brazil School, Asunción, Paraguay, ca. 1964. Photo courtesy Julio Diarte, 2009.

expositions, concerts, and courses.”<sup>41</sup> The hope that Brazilian Paraguayan amity would overcome the past hostility between the two nations was symbolized in the choice of the new director of the school, Dra. Gladys Solano López, great-granddaughter of Francisco Solano López, the marshal-president who had fought the Brazilians for six years in the nineteenth century. This point was not missed when it was noted that “the new generations have totally surpassed the divergences of the past. The reality is that Brazilians and Paraguayans work toward a fertile peace.”<sup>42</sup> The propaganda directed at the magazine’s readers credited this change of course to Alfredo Stroessner. As clearly highlighted in



the article, the planning and construction of the project began in 1954 with the rise of his presidency. According to this logic, Stroessner was the true peace-maker between Brazil and Paraguay.

Only a month after the inauguration of the experimental school, *Ñandé* reported that the Bank of Brazil was planning to construct in March of 1965 a new building to house the bank's Asunción branch. The edifice, to be built with "Paraguayan material and labor," was to be more than just the location of a new bank, it was also to contain "an exposition hall for Brazilian products [and] a conference room." With these ideas in mind the building was to serve as "vigorous transcendence in the cultural aspect of Paraguayan-Brazilian relations."<sup>43</sup>

Moreover, the building of the large and imposing Bank of Brazil in downtown Asunción symbolized the growing economic importance of Brazil in Paraguay in the middle of the twentieth century. Clearly demonstrating the economic power of South America's largest country in one of South America's smaller nations, the loyal Paraguayan press gave Brazilians an outlet for their growing economic and cultural imperialism. As noted in *Ñandé*, Brazilian businesses from São Leopoldo, a suburb of Porto Alegre, were going to hold an exposition in Asunción from May 18 to 30, 1965, with the hope of showing many Brazilian products. In exchange, in October of the same year, Paraguayan products were to be shown in Porto Alegre, led by Juan Carlos Martinez, the Brazilian owner and operator of the company Importadora del Paraguay Ltda. Although the article does not mention the list of Brazilian products to be exhibited, the Paraguayan products that were to be highlighted and promoted in Brazil were traditional crafts including "aho-poí [fine Paraguayan embroidery], ñanduti [Paraguayan lace], wood working, musical instruments, etc." The hope was that these crafts would be exported on a "large scale" because the show was to be highly promoted in Brazil through "television, radio, newspapers, and even in pamphlets." The exchange seems a bit uneven as the products that Paraguay was expected to export to Brazil could be viewed as "handicrafts" and not sophisticated manufactured products as surely the Brazilians were showing off in Paraguay. However uneven this exchange might have been, it was still likely seen by Paraguayans as a positive step forward, a way to help end their country's perceived isolation. *Ñandé* promised to support the effort "through our pages, [and] our friend, Juan Carlos Martinez, can have the assurances" of continued encouragement.<sup>44</sup>

While Paraguayan goods were clearly relegated to handicrafts, Brazilian technology and industrialization were slowly penetrating the Paraguayan mar-

ket via the Puente de la Amistad. The day after the opening of the bridge, *El País* ran a small article inviting *asuncenos* to come see an exposition of Brazilian autos in Caballero Park. The cars had come to Paraguay via the newly opened bridge in the early hours of March 27, 1964. These Brazilian-made vehicles, Mercedes-Benz autos in particular, were on display to show how accessible Brazilian-made products were to become. It is not insignificant that the cars, out of all Brazilian imports, were highlighted in the paper. Autos, highways, and bridges were the path to modernity according to the Stroessner government, and Brazilian autos arriving via the new bridge and highway symbolized a new Paraguayan hope.<sup>45</sup> While autos were clearly the most important of Brazilian commodities to reach Paraguay via the new bridge, other Brazilian goods were also put on display in Asunción. A late 1960s issue of *Ñandé* announced that the Brazilian industrialist Don José Carlos Pereira López was visiting Asunción with the purpose of giving one of his Climax refrigerators to Stroessner as a sign of friendship and trade.<sup>46</sup> The hope of on demand cold in the tropics brought new hope for a country where unbearable heat made life complicated. Hope ran true that, at least for Paraguay's small moneyed class, the comforts and ease of modernity were within reach.

Beyond economic hope and Brazilian investment in the landlocked country, the new Paraguayan gaze toward the east, at least in the minds of hopeful Paraguayan authorities and journalists, indicated that Brazilians could "see" Paraguayans for the first time. In 1979, an Asunción-based dance troupe traveled to Brazil to perform. According to its leader and teacher Inocencio Báez Villalba, it was the first time that "a Paraguayan folk ballet performed [at the] Palacio [dos Bandeirantes] in honor of Brazilian Independence." According to *Ñandé*, over "7 million Brazilians, including the president Joao [*sic*] Figueiredo" witnessed the event.<sup>47</sup> This larger number was attributed to the fact that the show was televised in color throughout Brazil. That seven million Brazilians could view the performers in vibrant Paraguayan color spoke to the power of the Brazilian media and quite possibly showed the readership of *Ñandé* that Paraguayan folk culture was recognized internationally. Oddly enough, the images of the group were not in color in the magazine (although the magazine did regularly offer color images, and covers were always in color), leaving the reader to wonder about the color of the costumes worn and what exactly their Brazilian neighbors viewed. The fact that Paraguay was technologically behind the more advanced Brazil is not lost in this article. Even so, with stronger connections and economic and cultural exchange, Paraguay could hope to "catch up" to the more

advanced Brazilians. Tying a future to Brazil as opposed to Argentina, far from its glory days at the beginning of the twentieth century, although not directly mentioned was and remained a new hope for the landlocked nation.

The Paraguayan press and the government of Stroessner encouraged Paraguayans to get to know Brazil better. In May 1968, *Ñandé* published a full-page encyclopedia-like article that offered a brief overview of Paraguay's largest neighbor. Encouraging its readers to learn more about the nation, the final paragraph of the article noted that "here, there are only a few ideas about Brazil, its physical realities, its culture, institutions, and economics." The hope was that Paraguayans would be encouraged to find out more about Brazil and its people because "the Brazilian man is exuberant, cordial[,] and happy." To demonstrate this, an image of two Brazilian children, one of African descent and the other European, are shown in a happy embrace. If Brazilians could accept and continue to accept outsiders (according to the article, six million European immigrants had arrived in Brazil since 1863), then it was possible for Brazilians to also accept Paraguayans, a former nineteenth-century enemy, in an equally warm embrace.<sup>48</sup>

But the question remained, how were Paraguayans and Brazilians going to get to know each other better? The imagined possibilities that Paraguayan journalists and government officials concocted about modern transport connecting the two nations can be gleaned from the pages of *Ñandé*. The Paraguayan bus company Rapido Yguazu offered the "most economical and direct route to São Paulo, Brazil." The image of a modern bus highlighted the comfort in which a tourist, businessperson, or cultural ambassador could travel to Brazil. A liner map of the trip highlighted the ease of the trip: Asunción, Puerto Stroessner, Cataratas [Foz do Iguazu], Curitiba, São Paulo. The ease of a modern highway and newly constructed bridge offered the possibility for both Paraguayans and Brazilians to connect to each other's most important cities in luxury and simplicity.<sup>49</sup> Highlighting this comfort, *Ñandé* noted that they had transported four thousand passengers to Brazil on 120 buses in 1963. The prediction was that more travelers could be expected in the next few years. The article, which reads more like an advertisement for Rapido Yguazu than a magazine story, opined that the "inside of the buses are well decorated, and the seats are fluffy and comfortable with anatomical designs that recline and adapt to the body." These traveling South American La-Z-Boys guaranteed that the traveler would not experience discomfort and would relieve the "bodily stress" as promised in the caption of a photo included with the article.<sup>50</sup>

More exciting, however, was that elite Paraguayans and Brazilians in the middle of the twentieth century could and did occasionally travel to and from each other's countries on jet planes that were owned and operated by Paraguayans. In 1957 César Rego Monteiro Porto, a Brazilian businessman, founded the Servicios Aéreos del Paraguay S.A. with 52 percent Brazilian and 48 percent Paraguayan capital. Although the airline failed to make a profit, in 1960 another airline, Lloyd Aéreo Paraguayo, was founded with 88 percent Paraguayan and 12 percent foreign capital; the airline's first route in 1961 was Asunción-Curitiba-São Paulo. In 1963 the two companies merged, and more Brazilian capital was acquired to keep the company flying. However, in the same year, the Paraguayan military started its own national airline Líneas Aéreas Paraguayas (LAP), which became Paraguay's flag carrier and connected the Paraguayan capital to Curitiba, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro.<sup>51</sup> Inaugurating a new era, *Nandé* announced "new hope for . . . our mediterranean [landlocked] [nation]."<sup>52</sup> The new airplanes, like the new buses, were to bring tourists to and from Paraguay. Cities such as São Paulo and Rio were now within reach. Quick and easy travel and "the best service in the air" were what LAP promised to travelers to Brazil on their three weekly trips to those metropolises.<sup>53</sup> In the mind of Paraguayans, modernity now connected Asunción to the world.

By the middle of the twentieth century, it was finally possible to travel overland to Brazil—and by extension to the Atlantic—because of the new bridge connecting Puerto Stroessner to Foz do Iguazu. As a result, a new era in Paraguayan history began, one where Brazil was to play an increasingly important economic, political, and cultural role. The Stroessner regime hoped that the pain of the War of the Triple Alliance would fade away and be replaced by a new hope for prosperity through modernity. A modern highway and jet airplanes were quickly replacing the old fluvial link to the Atlantic via the Paraguay River. *Asuncenos* had left the *porteños* behind and had become "ponteros." Argentina was left in the rearview mirror of busses and cars racing toward the Puente de la Amistad and in the exhaust of jet planes; ahead lay Brazil—and all its tropical modernity—in the windshields.

## NOTES

1. "A Transition from *Muito Obrigado* to *Muchas Gracias*," *New York Times*, April 27, 1969.
2. According to a USAID report from 1983, the runway was extended in 1958 "to accommodate jet passenger planes" with a loan from the Export-Import Bank

of the United States. The report adds, though, that the runway had “soft-spots” and that it was in serious need of repair in the 1980s. Paul Fritz, *A.I.D. History in Paraguay: Report on the Development Assistance Program to Paraguay by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Its Predecessor Agencies, 1942–1988* (Asunción: USAID, 1988), 97–98. While Stroessner and his government officials loved to take credit for the airport, it is quite clear that its construction was much more complicated than simple Paraguayan ingenuity. Clearly the airport in Asunción was part of a larger Cold War initiative of the U.S. government. While clearly beyond the scope of this chapter, I hope to further investigate this.

3. The declining fate of Argentina is difficult to track because authors rarely write about the decline of Argentina in direct relation to the rise of Brazil. However, there is strong evidence of Argentina’s weakening. Matthew B. Karush writes, “For most of the twentieth century, Argentina suffered from severe political instability”; *Workers or Citizens: Democracy and Identity in Rosario, Argentina, 1912–1930* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002). As a result, it became increasingly difficult for Argentina to exert political influence in the Southern Cone. This political instability stemmed from real economic crises; the commodities that had led to turn-of-the-century riches and that had attracted European immigration were subject to the ups and downs of the global market. A new and growing literature about consumption—both in cultural and physical commodities—tracks these challenges for the poorer and emerging middle classes in Argentina. See, e.g., Eduardo Elena, *Dignifying Argentina: Peronism, Citizenship and Mass Consumption* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011); Natalia Milanese, *Workers Go Shopping in Argentina: The Rise of Popular Consumer Culture* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2013); Rebekah E. Pite, *Creating a Common Table in Twentieth-Century Argentina: Doña Petrona, Women, and Food* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013).
4. Efraím Cardozo, one of Paraguay’s most erudite historians, argues in his work *La fundación de la ciudad de Asunción en 1541* (Buenos Aires: Sociedad de Historia Argentina, 1941), that it was Juan de Salazar who founded the city of Asunción. Arguing against this narrative is Vicente Pistilli in *La primera fundación de Asunción: La gesta de Don Juan de Ayolas* (Asunción: El Foro, 1987), who argues that it was Juan de Ayolas who should be credited with European foundation of the city.
5. See, e.g., Alonso Ibarra, *Asunción: Ampara y reparo de la conquista del Río de la Plata* (Asunción: Talleres Gráficos “El Arte,” 1935), and Graham B. Cunninghame, *The Conquest of the River Plate* (New York: Doubleday, Page, 1924).
6. Branislava Susnik’s work *El rol de los indígenas en la formación y en la vivencia del Paraguay* (Asunción: Instituto Paraguayo de Estudios Nacionales, 1982) was the first to place the indigenous population of the region into the history of the city and its foundation. Later ethnohistorians—including Florencia Roulet, *La resistencia de los Guaraní del Paraguay a la conquista española, 1537–1556* (Posadas, Argentina: Editorial Universitaria, 1993), and Dorothy Tuer “Tigers and Crosses:

- The Transcultural Dynamics of Spanish-Guaraní Relations in the Río de la Plata 1516–1580” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2011)—expand on Susnick’s work and highlight some of the major abuses of the conquistadores.
7. José Carlos Rodríguez, “Nuevas narrativas y perfiles urbanos,” in *Reto del future: Asumiendo el legado del bicentenario*, ed. Diego Abente Brun and Dioniso Bora (Asunción: Mercuío Editorial Gráfica, 2011), 191–227.
  8. Thomas Whigham, *The Politics of River: Tradition and Development in the Upper Plata, 1780–1870* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1991), xvii–xviii.
  9. Thomas Whigham, “Road to Armageddon: Paraguay versus the Triple Alliance, 1866–1870” (unpublished manuscript, 2015), 308–25.
  10. Theodore Child, “The Republic of Paraguay,” *Harper’s New Monthly Magazine* 83 (June–November 1891): 222.
  11. William Reid, *Asunción: Paraguay’s Interesting Capital* (Washington, DC: Sun Book & Job Print Office, 1927), 29–30.
  12. Élisée Reclus, *The Earth and Its Inhabitants: South America* (New York: D. Appleton, 1895), 317.
  13. Harris Gaylord Warren, “The Paraguay Central Railway, 1856–1889,” *Inter-American Economic Affairs* 20, no. 4 (1967): 9.
  14. *Ibid.*, 11.
  15. Juan Carlos Herken, *Ferrocarriles, conspiraciones, y negocios en el Paraguay, 1910–1914* (Asunción, Paraguay: Arte Nuevo Editores, 1984), 108.
  16. Ramón César Bejarano, *El Paraguay en busca del mar* (Asunción: Casa Editorial Toledo, 1965), 74.
  17. When President Higinio Morínigo visited the United States in 1943, he met with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. In a memorandum prepared by Secretary of State Sumner Wells in advance of Morínigo’s visit, Wells notes that the Paraguayan government considered the extension of the highway “from Villa Rica [*sic*] to the Brazilian frontier near the Iguazú Falls . . . [to] be a very important contribution to the industrial development of Paraguay.” However because the first part of the highway from Asunción to Villarrica had yet to be completed, the memorandum suggests that “the proposed highway should be deferred until the termination of the present work [from Asunción to Villarrica].” President’s Secretary’s Files, December 1, 1941–June 30, 1943, Presidential Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.
  18. A 1970s study of the possibility of tourism in Paraguay noted the poor state of rutas II and VII. Specifically, the report highlighted that the highways were “too narrow,” failed to have clear signage, and had a “lack of effective and permanent maintenance.” Latinoconsult Paraguay, *Desarrollo del turismo en el Paraguay* (Buenos Aires: Latinoconsult Argentina, 1970), 64.
  19. Ramón César Bejarano, *Vías y medios de comunicaciones del Paraguay (1811–1961)* (Asunción: Editorial Toledo, 1963), 150–51.
  20. Francisco Doratioto, *Una relación compleja: Paraguay y Brasil 1889–1954* (Asunción: Editorial Tiempo de Historia, 2011), 22.

21. Harris Gaylord Warren, *Rebirth of the Paraguayan Republic: The First Colorado Era, 1878–1904* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), 45.
22. Harris Gaylord Warren, “The Paraguayan Revolution of 1904,” *Americas* 36, no. 3 (January 1980): 367.
23. For more on Argentine war matériel, see Carlos Gómez Florentín, “Energy and Environment in the Chaco War,” in *The Chaco War: Environment, Ethnicity, and Nationalism*, ed. Bridget María Chesterton (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 135–56.
24. For more on Carlos Casado, see Gabriela Dalla-Corte Caballero, *Empresas y tierras de Carlos Casado en el Chaco Paraguayo: Historias, negocios y guerras (1860–1940)* (Asunción: Intercontinental Paraguay, 2012).
25. Bejarano, *Vias y medios*, 149.
26. *Ibid.*, 150.
27. Francisco Doratioto, “O democrata e o ditador: As relações entre Brasil de Juscelino Kubitschek e o Paraguai de Alfredo Stroessner (1954–1961),” paper presented at the IV Jornadas de Historia Paraguay en Montevideo, July 23–25, 2014. Thank you to Francisco for sharing a hard copy of the paper. In many ways, this chapter intersects with the work of Jerry Dávila’s landmark study *Hotel Trópico: Brazil and the Challenge of African Decolonization, 1950–1980* (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2010) concerning Brazilian interest in growing economic and cultural ties with West Africa in the middle decades of the twentieth century.
28. Alfredo Stroessner, “Discurso del excmo. Señor Presidente de la republica general de ejercito Don Alfredo Stroessner en la Inauguración del Puente internacional sobre el Río Paraná,” in *Inauguración del puente internacional sobre el Río Paraná* (Asunción: [Sub-Secretaría de Informaciones y Cultura, Presidencia de la República], 1961), 8.
29. Joel Wolfe, “Populist Discourses, Developmentalist Policies: Rethinking Mid-Twentieth Century Brazilian Politics,” in *Transformations of Populism in Europe and the Americas: History and Recent Tendencies*, ed. John Abromeit, Bridget María Chesterton, Gary Marotta, and York Norman (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 179, 188.
30. Ideas about connecting the east coast of Brazil to its vast western interior were put forth by Getúlio Vargas in his program *Marcha para o Oeste* (March to the West) during the *Estado Novo* (1937–1945). Some of these ideas are explored in Seth Garfield, *Indigenous Struggle at the Heart of Brazil: State Policy, Frontier Expansion, and the Xavante Indians 1937–1988* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 28–33, and Joel Wolfe, *Autos and Progress: The Brazilian Search for Modernity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 104–5, 134. A relatively new Portuguese-language volume explores the west in detail: Sandro Dutra e Silva, Dominichi Miranda de Sá, and Magali Romero Sá, eds., *Vastos sertões: História e natureza na ciência e na literatura* (Rio de Janeiro: MAUAD Editora, 2015). Of particular note is the chapter by Sandro Dutra e Silva, Giovana Galvão Tavares, Dominichi Miranda



de Sá, and José Luiz de Andrade Franco, “A construção simbólica do Oeste brasileiro (1930–1940),” 63–89. In an e-mail conversation with Professor Wolfe he wrote “Vargas made a series of pronouncements [the March to the West] and put minimal resources into the project. There was some colonization, but things took off with Kubitschek’s road building and then with the military dictatorship’s resettlement programs [starting 1964].” Joel Wolfe, e-mail correspondence with author, January 12, 2016. At this point I can speculate that the March to the West may have contributed to Brazil’s interest in Paraguayan roads and bridges, but it is impossible to say for sure what the direct effect of the internal Brazilian program was on Paraguayan infrastructure or development.

31. Stroessner, “Discurso,” 7.
32. The Brazilian fondness for auto travel and road construction is explored in great detail in Wolfe, *Autos and Progress*.
33. <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/asuncion-paraguay-25k-1978.pdf>.
34. It is rather unclear to what extent the bridge was being used before March 1965, if at all. What is clear is that before this date, civilians crossed, and most if not all trade was conducted via ferry between Brazil and Paraguay.
35. “Magnífica Realidad,” *El País*, March 30, 1965, 1.
36. “Testimonio elocuente de hermandad entre dos pueblos contituyó el acto vivido en el Puente de la Amistad,” *La Tribuna*, March 28, 1965, 1.
37. “El gran puente internacional: Escenario del encuentro,” *La Tribuna*, March 27, 1965.
38. Paraguay’s long and complex relationship with the indigenous language of Guaraní is beyond the scope of this chapter, although more information on the topic can be found in the work of Andrew Robert Nickson, “Governance and the Revitalization of the Guaraní Language,” *Latin American Research Review* 44, no. 2 (2009): 3–26.
39. Julio Diarte, *Reconstrucción del proyecto: Afonso Eduardo Reidy, Colegio experimental Paraguay–Brazil, 1952–1965* (San Lorenzo, Paraguay: Universidad Nacional de Asunción, 2009), introd.
40. The original design can be found in A. E. Reidy, “Lehrerbildungsanstalt der Universität in Asunción, Paraguay,” *Baukunst und Werkform* (1962): 14–16.
41. “¡Así, se hace panamericanismo practico!” *Ñandé* 6, no. 128 (September 1964): 8.
42. Ibid.
43. “El Banco del Brasil levantará un coloso arquitectonico,” *Ñandé* 6, no. 129 (October 1964): 13.
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49. Advertisement, *Ñandé* 6, no. 122 (1964), no page number.
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# 10

## CIUDAD DEL ESTE AND THE COMMON MARKET

### A Tale of Two Economic Integrations

CHRISTINE FOLCH

**I**N 1996, financial experts at *Forbes* magazine listed the Paraguayan hinterland border town of Ciudad del Este as the world's third-largest port, exceeded only by Hong Kong and Miami in terms of commercial activity. Or so goes an apocryphal tale that has been repeated in the Paraguayan press, on the city's website, and even in some scholarly literature on the Triple Frontier.<sup>1</sup> Although the citation for this story—if it ever existed—is never included, the very fact that such an account could circulate for years about a landlocked border far from the commercial and industrial centers of the continent points to how rapid economic growth transformed the border zone in the last decades of the twentieth and the first decade of the twenty-first centuries. Ciudad del Este lends itself to fantastic accounts: the Arab and Taiwanese merchant communities that settled there or in neighboring Foz do Iguazú during the 1970s and 1980s have been accused of contraband, money laundering, and even harboring base camps for Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah. But the presence of populations that have so captured the imaginations of security experts in the United States and of filmmakers in Hollywood is merely part of a larger economic strategy begun during the Alfredo Stroessner military dictatorship (1954–1989) and later challenged through the development of the Common Market of the Southern Cone.

Globalization, trade liberalization, and deeper integration between the three countries that meet at the confluence of the Paraná and Iguazú Rivers have altered the economic profile of the region through two major developments:

(1) the creation of Ciudad del Este as a free-trade zone from the 1970s onward, designed to hitch Paraguay to the financial ascent of Brazil; and (2) the formation of the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur) by founding members Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, initiated in the 1991 Treaty of Asunción. For the former, the strategy was a free-trade zone archipelago of spaces of exception created through internal differentials within Brazil and Paraguay and between them. On the other hand, Mercosur sought to break down all internal boundaries by eliminating trade barriers, implementing a common passport, and, in so doing, homogenizing space. Ciudad del Este is now the financial capital of Paraguay; Mercosur is the largest economic union in South America in terms of volume, value of trade, and sheer population (Venezuela attained full membership in 2012 and Bolivia in 2015). The city and the common market both rescale the border zone as an economic spatial fix, a political-economic move where regulatory changes in the legal infrastructure facilitate market expansion. In this chapter, I set Ciudad del Este alongside Mercosur, tracing the historical development of these two financial strategies of integration as a way to understand the complexities of late capitalism.

The connection between the city and the Triple Frontier is perhaps more apparent than that between the common market and the borderland. Brazil, after all, shares other “triple frontiers” with Paraguay (with Bolivia) and with Argentina (with Uruguay). However, a binational integration also lies at the foundation of Mercosur: the Brazilian-Paraguayan Itaipu hydroelectric dam, eight miles north of Ciudad del Este. Just as the European Union grew out of coal and steel agreements between France and West Germany following World War II, Mercosur may be traced through the legal genealogies of treaties to the international legal architecture around the massive hydroelectric project on the Paraná River. As I will show in this chapter, energy infrastructure that took advantage of the unique geology of the Triple Frontier (i.e., the hydroelectric potential of the river at the Guairá Cataracts, the waterfalls with the fastest flowrate of any on the planet) led to a region-fashioning customs union. Founded in the context of the Washington Consensus—and as a way to outflank the pressures of neoliberal globalization—the Common Market of the Southern Cone has roots insistently connected to place and to natural resources. And so, my argument challenges despatialized critiques of capitalism because it incorporates water. The desirability of hydro resources in the Triple Frontier gave rise to the political-economic structures and, as we will see, continues to play an important role in the making of the region.

Thus, Ciudad del Este and Mercosur offer two different models of economic integration—one binational, the other supranational—suggesting new ways we might rethink borderland economics. For decades, Ciudad del Este has functioned as a point of triangulation and arbitrage for shoppers from neighboring countries. At the mid-1990s height of the “reexport” trade, between US\$2 and \$4 billion moved through the city; the on-the-books Paraguayan gross domestic product (GDP) approximated US\$8 billion.<sup>2</sup> This trade has diminished in the past two decades, leading some merchants to leave and others to attempt innovative solutions to recapture past financial glory. Mercosur trades around US\$750 billion in imports and exports every year, and as the common market accompanied serious changes from industrialization and liberalization of the Brazilian economy, it also coincided with the economic downturn of the Ciudad del Este reexport economy.<sup>3</sup>

The Triple Frontier is a space for engagement, rather than the site of separation and containment, in keeping with a long-standing body of literature that has contrasted border zones in the Americas. Mikesell distinguished between Anglo-American “frontiers of exclusion” versus Ibero-American “frontiers of inclusion” in 1960.<sup>4</sup> More recently, Weber argued that Latin American frontiers should be thought of as “zones of interaction,” as both place and process.<sup>5</sup> And in even newer work on border thinking, Mbembe has suggested that precolonial sub-Saharan borders were forged specifically with the intention of fostering intersection.<sup>6</sup> But what Ciudad del Este and Mercosur reveal is not just that border zones promote integration and inclusion as economic strategies. They also show how very different types of economic integration overlap and compete with one another. That is to say, the homogenizing impulse of the common market did not instantly supersede the differentiated space of the free-trade zone; the border facilitated them both simultaneously.

In this chapter, I first follow how the Paraguayan government structured Ciudad del Este in order to triangulate wealth from Brazil’s rise through legal architecture and then how this developed from the 1950s to its apex in the 1990s and how the city’s economic model has subsequently suffered. Then the chapter turns to Mercosur, the rise of a new economic model in the region, and how it specifically affected Ciudad del Este–based trade in the Triple Frontier. Not only were the merchants negatively affected by general liberalization, in recent years they attempted to redifferentiate space within Mercosur as a way to revive their profits. By drawing on ethnographic accounts as well as statistics and law, I set the scope and scale of the two integrations against one another to untangle

how border zone economics have worked under capitalist market logics. In the conclusion, I return to questions about the future viability of both integrations as well as the role of hydro-influenced political economics to come.

## CIUDAD DEL ESTE, 2009

“To tell this story, I have to talk about the history of my family. They are from Taiwan,” said Eduardo Yang as we sat in a small conference room in the nondescript office that served as the headquarters of one of the top fifty companies in terms of revenue, in all of Paraguay.<sup>7</sup> He spoke in a fluent Spanish accented by Portuguese but used English-language terms for business and technology jargon. “The estimates that were there were fifteen thousand Taiwanese in Ciudad del Este at the height, and now it’s down to three thousand.”

Yang was one of the key leaders of Ciudad del Este’s electronics importing associations and the head of a premiere technology import-export firm. We drank tea together in the multistory shopping gallery in the city’s *microcentro* (downtown) while he reminisced about his family’s early days in the city.

“In 1983, my father came here. He sold the first computer. In that day, a computer cost \$5,000 to \$7,000. It was a luxury item. He would sell one and make \$3,000, but he only sold one every few months. In 1993 he left. The markup went from 100 percent down to 10 percent. He lives in Miami now,” Yang said.

In a tone of careful respect, he explained why he disagreed with his father’s decision to leave Ciudad del Este when the margins on computers dropped. “The computer went from being a luxury item to a necessity, from a diversion to a tool of development. The Yang family had the privilege of living that history,” he said.

And then he turned to recent changes in Ciudad del Este. “In 2004, for every one hundred personal computers in Brazil, seventy-five came from Ciudad del Este. This went to ten out of every hundred today,” Yang said. “But we are okay because the market doubled every year. It went from \$4 million to \$20 million today. And so 10 percent of \$20 million is \$2 million.” He wrote the calculations on a sheet of paper to illustrate the point.

Though Yang was still involved in technology resales, he had diversified his business and showed me detailed images of the cattle herds he was now ranching in rural Alto Paraná. And before I left, he gave me a brochure for yet another business: helicopter tours of Iguazú Falls and other tourist attractions in the

area. Yang's personal and business experience revealed more than the acumen of his family; they marked changes in the history of trade across the border and showed how the economic interplay between Paraguay's legal architecture and Brazilian consumer demand worked in a context of changing consumption patterns.

From the moment it was founded in 1957 as Puerto Presidente Stroessner, Ciudad del Este has been part of a concerted effort to articulate toward Brazil, a historical turn colloquially referred to as the March to the East (*Marcha hacia el este*). The city's name was changed in 1989 when Stroessner was removed from power in a Colorado Party–led coup. Before Puerto Presidente Stroessner, the major cities in Paraguay tended toward neighbor Argentina: Asunción (near Clorinda), established in 1537, and Encarnación (near Formosa), established in 1615. But the first decade of the Colorado Party administration of Puerto Presidente Stroessner saw a flurry of built environment investments in the underdeveloped eastern frontier with Brazil: an international bridge, a highway stretching east toward the Paraná, and a city at the junction of the bridge and the highway (see also Chesterton, chap. 9). In addition to the graft and direct proceeds from government construction contracts that were doled out to reinforce party loyalty, infrastructure opened up land hitherto inaccessible to massive landholding estates.

Colorado and military elites claimed thousands of hectares of Atlantic Forest and resold/leased it to agribusiness interests or developed it themselves into cattle ranching, cotton, and soy. The soy boom brought Bunge, Cargill, and Monsanto to Paraguay as well as many foreign-born agriculturalists, notably the “brasi-guayo” community of Brazil-born, Portuguese-speaking agro-industrialists who are rumored to make up about 10 percent of the total population in Paraguay (five hundred thousand out of five million). Much of the commercial agriculture exits Paraguay on the international highway that runs through Ciudad del Este, crossing over the Friendship Bridge that links Paraguay to Brazil before dispersing throughout the South American giant or traveling on Brazilian highway 277 to the Atlantic port of Paranaguá.

The financial-legal architecture accompanying Paraguay's eastward development was just as deliberately constructed as the built environment, and it fulfilled its designed intent: to bring wealth to the country and to the Colorado elite by increasing trade with Brazil. Indeed, as figure 10.1 shows, whereas in the first two decades of Puerto Presidente Stroessner's existence Paraguayan exports to Argentina quadrupled, its exports to Brazil grew *exponentially*. As






FIGURE 10.1 Paraguayan exports to Argentina and Brazil 1961–2015, FOB in US\$ billions. Source: CADEP, based on numbers from Banco Central Paraguay.

trade with Brazil passed through the city, municipal revenue increased. The dynamic changes in the earlier decades in figure 10.1 are visually obscured by the dramatic growth in the 2000s, but three crucial trends in the years before 1989 illustrate how the Paraguayan economy in general, and the city's by extension, changed. First, from 1968 to 1970, exports to Brazil jumped by an order of magnitude: in 1968, Paraguay exported US\$232 thousand to Brazil. (1969 was an aberrantly low year, with only US\$90 thousand in exports to Brazil.) But in 1970, Paraguayan exports to Brazil increased to US\$1 million. Second, between 1970 and 1980, Paraguayan exports to Brazil went from US\$1 million to US\$40 million, growing by yet another order of magnitude. And third, in 1982, Brazil overtook Argentina as the chief destination for Paraguayan exports (US\$83.4 million vs. US\$59.2 million, respectively).

The first two points coincide with important regulatory changes in Paraguay in the early 1970s, but they have a critical antecedent in the 1950s. In 1956, before Puerto Presidente Stroessner was founded, an agreement signed between Brazil and Paraguay granted the landlocked country duty-free access to the coastal port cities of Paranaguá and Santos. Goods imported into or

exported from the duty-free warehouses (*depositos francos*) destined for or sourced from Paraguay were exempt from Brazilian tariffs. Paranaguá, because of its location in the south of Brazil, became particularly important to Paraguay. As a landlocked country, Paraguay lay at the mercy of the tariff regimes of its neighbors. Riverine traffic on the Paraná through Argentina was heavily levied by private shipping companies and Argentine customs. With tax-exempt depository warehouses in Brazil, Paraguayan importers and exporters could circumvent Argentina altogether. But it took nearly two decades before trade with Brazil accelerated. Newly cleared land and a growing population of construction and agricultural workers raised demand for imported goods. The Paraguayan government established a tax-exempt free-trade zone (*zona franca*) in Puerto Presidente Stroessner in 1970, the same year that exports to Brazil reached US\$1 million. This was promptly followed by the creation of the Tourism Regimen (*régimen de turismo*) in 1971, which lowered tariffs to 10 percent for imported goods that were then reexported. To its credit, the Paraguayan government of Stroessner correctly anticipated a population boom in the Triple Frontier. By the end of 1966, the governments of Paraguay and Brazil had agreed on basic details of the massive Itaipu hydroelectric project, which eventually brought thirty thousand construction workers in the 1970s and 1980s with cash ready to spend.

The reexport trade—where goods might be flown in or imported duty-free from Paranaguá into Puerto Presidente Stroessner and then purchased by Brazilian (or Argentine) resellers in order to then be resold in those countries—transformed the small town into a major commercial hub in the continent. The shops of the Paraguayan city, like the one owned by the Yangs, specialized in electronics, household appliances, entertainment systems, and even computers, which were smuggled into Brazil by petty merchants and then resold, thus avoiding high tariffs on electronics, a legacy of Brazil's earlier experiment with Import-Substitution-Industrialization. Paralleling the higher-end trade in the shopping galleries, which also showcased perfumes and other luxury items, were rickety sidewalk stalls and stands that sold cheaper manufactured goods and household items for local consumption. Precise numbers for the reexport trade are notoriously difficult to find; undercounting the weight on imports/exports, for a bribe, was one way merchants avoided Paraguay's already low tariffs. Many goods left Paraguay in launches or were carried by hand in large plastic bags by *sacoleiros* (from the Portuguese for "bag") across the Paraná, evading customs enforcement entirely. And still others never made it into Paraguay at

all: documents and proofs of entry/exit with no accompanying shipment were merely stamped by customs officials.

To this day, the most reliable treatment of reexport economics remains a 1998 paper researched by Reinaldo Penner, who worked closely with Paraguay Central Bank numbers. Careful to avoid fabulist accounts—he does not reference the apocryphal *Forbes* story about Ciudad del Este, Miami, Hong Kong—Penner, in fact, distinguishes Ciudad del Este from maritime ports by pointing to the reexport trade, dubbing the city a duty-free shopping mall for *sacoleiros*. His focus is on the peak of the trade in the mid-1990s and its decline in the later part of the decade. According to his estimates, at its height in 1995, the reexport trade amounted to US\$4–4.4 billion, decreasing to US\$2–2.4 billion in 1998.<sup>8</sup> The eastern city was a principal source of foreign exchange in the 1980s and 1990s, with back-linked effects on other industries (e.g., cardboard and plastic container manufacturing for repackaged exports). For those reasons, Penner argues that the reexport trade was not merely a frontier phenomenon (in the manner of the Mexican *maquila*) but rather that it interpolated the entire Paraguayan economy.

In fact, in 1990 the majority of goods imported into Paraguay were then reexported and, from 1993 to 1995 the reexport trade was larger than soy and cotton exports combined. Though newer comprehensive work on the Ciudad del Este economy remains to be done, Yang's off-the-cuff comment on the computer sales revenue for his company alone—US\$2 million in earnings from personal computers in 2009—illustrates why even into the middle of the 2000s, the city was responsible for the majority of the Paraguay government's tributary income.<sup>9</sup> The merchant families that remain in Ciudad del Este remember the 1980s and 1990s as the heyday of Ciudad del Este's reexport trade. Yang's claim that the Taiwanese population had declined mirrors Penner's estimates on financial movements. But if the merchant community dwindled because of declining fortunes, the city is as important as ever to the Colorado Party. Indeed, the Colorado Party controlled the municipal government from 1957 to the time of this publication.

Demographic changes in Puerto Presidente Stroessner and Foz do Iguazu attest to the growing fortunes of the reexport trade. Many of the foreign merchants who owned businesses in Puerto Presidente Stroessner established residences in Foz do Iguazu and ventured daily into Paraguay for work. While many migrants came to the region lured by financial prospects, like Yang's father, the Syrian Lebanese merchant community has drawn scrutiny in recent

years. Unlike earlier groups from the Levant, the Arab community in the Triple Frontier was predominantly Muslim (mosques were constructed in both Puerto Presidente Stroessner and Foz do Iguacu). Israeli and U.S. security experts asserted a connection between the suicide bombings of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires (1992) and of the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina Jewish-Argentine community center (1994) to Hezbollah and to the Muslim community in the Triple Frontier, though the charge of Islamic terrorism in the border zone is vehemently disputed by the government of Brazil and by the merchant community of Ciudad del Este.<sup>10</sup> Within the region, however, Ciudad del Este's reputation for insecurity came from the prominence of black-market and informal trade.

The decision to create an archipelago of differentiated spaces that perforated the two national territories appears to have been the kind of integration favored by authoritarian regimes at a time of heightened rhetoric on national security. Both the Brazilian and the Paraguayan governments, through exercising control over national territory, introduced legal differentials that reframed the economic jurisdictions of specific places. By rescripting the internal space of the Paraguayan national territory into something favorable to Brazilian economic interests, that is, by Brazilianizing Puerto Presidente Stroessner, the government was able to tether the smaller country to the larger one's economic climb. Taking up Agamben and Schmitt, what we might see in this creation of exceptional space is not the dissolution of national state control over territory but indeed a strengthening of the sovereign power of the state.<sup>11</sup> That a binational chain-linked economic integration should be associated with authoritarian regimes suggests that the technique was seen as concentrating, not diffusing, the power of the national executive. Particular individuals had access to the free-trade zones, access over which state actors could exert monopoly power and that could be distributed along clientelist channels. Yet as the military dictatorships in South America gave way to democratic regimes, the kind of economic integration that suited the governments shifted.

## MERCOSUR

For the merchants of Ciudad del Este and the reexport economy, the passage of Mercosur in 1991 unleashed a race against time. Failed attempts at regional economic integration dated to the 1960s, when the Latin American Free Trade

Association (Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio [ALALC]) was signed by all nine Hispanophone countries in South America, Brazil, and Mexico and then foundered. Mercosur succeeded where others had not because of new cooperation between traditional rivals Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s as both countries transitioned to democratic rule and struggled through Latin America's "lost economic decade" amid a new era of economic growth beyond the continent via globalization. At its core, the Mercosur Treaty called for a three-dimensional integration. As a free-trade zone, Mercosur eliminated trade restrictions between member countries. Second, from its beginning, the agreement was to be a customs union with a common external tariff (CET, or *arancel externo común*), implying the cumbrous and ambitious coordination of international trade policy among its members. And third, as a common market, Mercosur entailed the free flow of people, capital, and services within its borders. Thus, detractors on the right and the left have accused Mercosur of being both too protectionist and too neoliberal; neoliberal in its free-trade policies, protectionist in resisting tariff-free globalization.

Importantly, the legal architecture for the rapprochement descended from transboundary water treaties that had unfolded in the region even as ALALC slumped. And here the Triple Frontier played a key role. Treaties have legal genealogies. Two critical antecedents for the 1991 Treaty of Asunción were the 1966 Act of Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil-Paraguay), which formalized the decision to build the massive Itaipu Dam on the Paraná just north of the Argentine border, and the multinational 1969 Plate Basin Treaty (Brasília), which established how Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay might use shared transboundary water resources. The Plate Basin Treaty, in permitting binational agreements as long as other Plate Basin countries were not harmed in the process, paved the way for the 1979 Corpus-Itaipu Tri-Partite Accord between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. Legal analysts at the time were aware that a new phase of Argentine-Brazilian relations was being ushered in via the agreement to harmonize two massive hydroelectric projects.<sup>12</sup> Perhaps the materiality of water and the upstream-downstream dynamics (where upstream activities on transboundary water affect downstream countries and therefore touch on sovereignty) added impetus where pledges of financial connectedness could not.<sup>13</sup>

The six member countries that make up Mercosur today have a combined population of 305 million. Global trade for member countries was US\$581.4 billion in 2015, making it the fifth-largest economy on the planet.<sup>14</sup> And now that Mercosur has signed a free-trade agreement with the Andean Community




FIGURE 10.2 Mercosur Trade 1995–2015, US\$ billions (current prices and current exchange rates). Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

(Comunidad Andina [CAN]), which includes Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, the common market is poised for even greater regional heft. Figure 10.2 situates the volume of trade for Mercosur. In 1995, intragroup trade represented 18.4 percent of the total trade for the union of four countries, or US\$33.7 billion of US\$183.2 billion. Trade peaked in 2011, just before the inclusion of Venezuela and an economic slump in Brazil, by far the largest economy in Mercosur. Compared to 1995, by 2015, intragroup trade had more than doubled to US\$78.8 billion; but total trade more than tripled to US\$581.4 billion, a sign that trade outside the union had grown even more rapidly than trade between member countries. And so, even with the addition of Venezuela to the trade pact, intragroup trade shrank to 13.6 percent of the total trade.

The balance of trade within Mercosur represents a more important market for the smaller countries. In 2009, Argentina and Brazil exported 25 percent and 10 percent, respectively, of their total exports to other Mercosur countries.<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, that same year Paraguay exported 48 percent and Uruguay exported 28 percent of their external sales to other Mercosur countries. Figure 10.2 also shows that, like intragroup trade, trade with the rest of the Americas tripled over the previous two decades but that trade with the rest of the world (including the Americas) grew by a factor of four. The greatest growth in trade, then, was outside of the hemisphere, making Mercosur especially sensitive to prices in Asia and Europe.

But the question remains whether the trade boom, especially with Asian and European markets, came as a result of the Mercosur agreement. Although more than 90 percent of tariff items are in free-trade conditions within the common market, there are still important exemptions (notably regarding sugar and automobiles) and nontariff restrictions that constitute significant barriers to trade, causing some to refer to Mercosur as an incomplete integration. To wit, economic analysts from the region have claimed that one of the greatest (and sole) gains of the treaty, in fact, had to do with the rise in foreign direct investment in individual member countries.<sup>16</sup> The proposed monetary union is still only a proposal, and surely the challenges of the euro as well as the economic volatilities of Mercosur member countries have given planners reason to pause.

Because the framers established Mercosur as a customs union and not just a free-trade association, they set a bold level of integration as the goal at the outset. The common market was a way to adapt to neoliberal globalization and implement change on terms set by regional political elites, counterbalancing the agendas of transnational corporations and the Global North. But the common market also prioritized political context and quality of government. Mercosur was a move to shore up the region as a way to counteract threats and instability that might lead to the return of authoritarian rule. Former Uruguayan president Julio María Sanguinetti remarked that Mercosur, in addition to the economic alliance, was a “club democrático” (club of democracies).<sup>17</sup> In fact, during the irregular Paraguayan presidency of Federico Franco (2012–2013), who had come to power after the 2012 regionally denounced impeachment of Fernando Lugo on questionable charges of mismanaged rural violence, Paraguay was temporarily suspended from the union. With Paraguay’s veto blocked, Venezuela was at last promoted to full membership over Paraguay’s historic negative vote, briefly muted.

The issue that most affected Ciudad del Este was the Common External Tariff (CET), which was the essence of the customs union. To this day, only the national congress of Argentina has approved the CET (in 2012); it still awaits passage by other member countries. Once the CET is implemented, all free-trade zones within Mercosur will be subject to the same tariffs as countries outside the union. Two *zonas francas* were exempted: Manaus in Brazil and Tierra del Fuego in Argentina.<sup>18</sup> Unlike the free-trade zone in Ciudad del Este, both Manaus and Tierra del Fuego are manufacturing oriented rather than reexport based. Raw materials and industrial components are imported duty-free for assembly within the two zones; the final products receive the appellation “made in Argentina/Brazil” (respectively) before being sold on the national market or

exported. The Colorado Party government of Paraguay lobbied to get Ciudad del Este included, but to no avail. Because the country is landlocked, the differential treatment of the Paraguayan city took on additional resonances; free-trade zones carry a heightened valence.

While waiting for the CET to come into force—a date that has been pushed back multiple times, from 2006 to 2013 to 2020—some of those Triple Frontier merchants who decided not to leave at the sign of financial trouble chose to diversify their investments (as Yang’s family did). Others seemed to take a holding pattern, hoping to eke out a profit while they still could. Ciudad del Este’s merchants attributed part of their misfortunes to the rise of the agreement, or, at the very least, they claimed that Mercosur had not helped them. To try to arrest this, the more powerful merchant associations attempted what had worked in the past, albeit without the same success: they sought to structure a binational integration within a supranational one. Since pleas to add Ciudad del Este to the list of CET-exempt zones fell on unsympathetic ears, the next gambit was a last ditch effort at formalizing the reexport trade as part of a proposed Unified Tariff Regimen (UTR; RTU in Spanish and Portuguese). Eduardo Yang was one of the major proponents of the UTR and used his position to personally lobby the presidents of Brazil and Paraguay to pass it.

While it was still only hypothetical, one Asunción-based Brazilian economic affairs officer explained to me that the UTR would be “restricted to Ciudad del Este only. It will be part of the Brazilian system and is designed to facilitate and link Ciudad del Este to the Brazilian system via taxation.”<sup>19</sup> To resuscitate the commercial vibrancy of Ciudad del Este, the UTR would apply a single discounted tariff of 25 percent on technology imports into Ciudad del Este for merchants who had formally registered their businesses with the governments of Brazil and Paraguay instead of the 45 to 60 percent tariff normally charged by the Brazilian Receita Federal. Then the “microentrepreneurs” (*sacoleiros* no longer) would purchase these still competitively priced electronics, register those transactions with both customs offices, and resell the goods within Brazil. The scheme faced opposition from the governments of both Paraguay and Brazil in 2009. The Brazilian economic affairs officer said, “[There is] strong resistance in Brazil to the bill’s approval, especially from Brazilian producers because they fear imports from Paraguay. In Paraguay, there’s a dilemma—there’s a new government. The economic thinking at present is very critical of [short-term] models of development represented in Ciudad del Este. Is Ciudad del Este a temporary situation, a temporary difference?” To allay the concerns of Brazilian



producers who felt that the UTR would make their own manufacturing less competitive, microentrepreneurs were limited to R\$100,000 of imports a year.

After years of discussion between tax experts and lawyers, the UTR finally passed as one small part of a larger 2009 Brazil-Paraguay Joint Declaration signed by Brazilian president Lula da Silva and Paraguayan president Fernando Lugo that had at its base a new energy arrangement around the shared Itaipu Dam. Once more, regional economic integration followed the path of hydro-politics in the Triple Frontier. Three more years of foot dragging occurred before the actual implementation of the regime. But by August 2015, the Paraguayan press bitterly reported that only R\$4.1 million (US\$ 1.2 million) worth of transactions had been registered under the UTR, an “infinitesimal” amount given that reexport commerce ranged from US\$ 2–3 billion annually.<sup>20</sup> In other words, by all appearances, the UTR was a dud.

Even with the concession of the UTR from the Brazilian government, the misgivings of the leftist Paraguayan government of Fernando Lugo in 2009 seem to have been warranted. Not only was Lugo’s government concerned that the city’s moneymaking venture was temporary, the opposition Colorado Party controlled and redistributed government rent from the reexport trade, providing financial support to rival political client-patron networks. The larger neoliberal economic context and increased Brazilian manufacturing, in addition to the advent of Mercosur, portended the end of the exceptional economic model. Bina-tional integration helped local political-economic elites, but once a supranational integration arose, another set of actors profited from the new developments, showing how governments have competing priorities at the local, national, and regional levels. And given the congress-led impeachments of two standing leftist presidents (Lugo of Paraguay, Dilma Rousseff of Brazil), it remains to be seen whether Mercosur fulfills its mandate of protecting democracy.

## CONCLUSION

Like the incomplete neoliberal integration of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, which permitted U.S. corn subsidies that arguably destabilized the Mexican corn industry), Mercosur was a negotiated integration. The designers of the common market had to contend between idealized free trade and economic analyses from within the region—notably, dependency theory critiques and a demonstrated preference for state-directed economic development.<sup>21</sup>

But the particularity of the prominent role played by hydro natural resources in Mercosur's negotiated integration offers a curious contrast to NAFTA and the EU. Not only was water management genealogically involved from the start of Mercosur but also shared water resources remain a crucial, explicitly stated priority of the organization. The common market now comprises the five signatories of the Plate Basin Treaty and sits atop yet another water resource—the Guarani aquifer, a large freshwater reserve that lies across the borders of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. As further testament to the ongoing salience of water to the common market, the prominent official “Mercosur: en pocas palabras” (Mercosur: in a few words) web and print primer highlights five basic facts about the union, three of which are environment/ecology related.<sup>22</sup> This suggests that on the horizon we might additionally expect an ecologically rooted scale for integration rather than one with just national or supranational contours.

The governments of Brazil and Paraguay, while they had benefitted from the financial leverage provided by the free-trade arrangement in Ciudad del Este, had independent reasons for wanting to see that model phased out. Nevertheless, the criticisms of Mercosur as incomplete demonstrate that the incentives for a full common market lagged behind. In theory, strengthened democracy, liberal economic growth, as well as a new neighborly regionalism were within grasp. However, in practice, the holdouts on certain products and leery reticence toward greater financial dependence on countries in crisis mean that Mercosur has an uncertain future. And though Ciudad del Este (and by extension Paraguay) was often framed as a site of insecurity and illegality, it simply would not exist without the multibillion dollar demand from Brazilian consumers. Notwithstanding the resistance from local merchants, the binational model of exceptional space is steadily being attenuated; arbitrage has proven more vulnerable than industrialization.

In spite of the uncertainty of the two integration strategies, the tri-border region promises only increased importance in twenty-first-century economics, and to better understand why, it helps to place the geographic specificity of the Triple Frontier in the context of anthropogenic climate change and strained natural resources worldwide. Water resource management is more than just the historical subtext for the growth of Ciudad del Este and the legal condition for Mercosur. The heightened value of a reliable hydroelectric dam on the scale of Itaipu, which supplies Brazil with nearly 20 percent of its electricity needs, coincides with the Brazilian government push to regularize the border. A newly built customs and immigration center now sits at the Brazilian edge of the Friendship

Bridge, facilitating a higher degree of control. The latest plan to revive Ciudad del Este once again relies on built environment infrastructure and the geographic situation of the city. Architects have designed a new regional airport with runways equipped for cargo-bearing planes with a vision of turning the Paraguayan city into a continental transport hub. And should the river-based Paraná-Paraguay Hidrovía waterway project be completed, allowing access to the agriculture lands of the continent from Brazil through Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina, and Uruguay and even linking up to the potential Atlantic-Pacific railway, perhaps Ciudad del Este will recover its reputation as one of the world's largest ports.

## NOTES

1. See Guillermina Seri, "On the 'Triple Frontier' and the 'Borderization' of Argentina: A Tale of Zones," in *Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics*, ed. Jenny Edkins, Véronique Pin-Fat, and Michael J. Shapiro (New York: Routledge, 2004), 81; and Maria de Lourdes Urban Kleinke, Nelson Ari Cardoso, Clovis Ultramari, and Rosa Moura, "O paraíso dos outros," *Revista Paranaense de Desenvolvimento* 88 (May–August 1996): 24.
2. Reinaldo Penner, *Movimiento comercial y financiero de Ciudad del Este: Perspectivas dentro del proceso de integración* (Asunción: Departamento de Economía Internacional—Gerencia de Estudios Económicos—Banco Central del Paraguay, 1998).
3. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=24397>.
4. Marvin Mikesell, "Comparative Studies in Frontier History," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 50 (March 1960): 65.
5. David J. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 11.
6. Achille Mbembe, "Africa's Refugees and Migrants at Europe's Doorstep Conference" (keynote address, Duke Africa Initiative, Durham, North Carolina, March 7, 2016).
7. Personal communication, August 2009.
8. Penner, *Movimiento comercial*, ii.
9. Fernando Masi, "Paraguay-Brasil: La necesidad de un nuevo trato," Working Paper (Asunción, Paraguay: Centro de Análisis y Difusión de la Economía Paraguaya, 2008), 3.
10. Mariano César Bartolomé, "La Triple Frontera: Principal foco de inseguridad en el Cono Sur Americano," *Military Review* [Spanish version] (July/August, 2002): 61–74; Rex Hudson, "Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America" (report prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, July 2003).
11. Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*

- (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985); Aihwa Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006).
12. Corpus Hydroelectric Dam, planned to lie just south of the junction of the Paraná and Iguazú Rivers, could have decreased Itaipu's ability to generate electricity by altering the head, the height of the river at the foot of the dam, thus decreasing Itaipu's hydroelectric potential. Corpus was never built, but it nevertheless reshaped the landscape of the region.
  13. Magdalena Segre, *La cuestión Itaipú-Corpus: El punto de inflexión en las relaciones argentino-brasileñas* (Buenos Aires: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Programa Argentina, 1990); Christine Folch, *Valuing Renewable Energy: the Ethics of Power in South America*, under review.
  14. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
  15. Gabriel Molteni, Gonzalo De León, and Lucía Giudice, "20 Years On: The Achievements and Pending Challenges of Mercosur," *Integration & Trade Journal* 15, no. 33 (July–Dec. 2011): 56.
  16. Marcel Vaillant, "Mercosur: Southern Integration Under Construction," *Internationale Politik Gesellschaft* 2 (2005): 68.
  17. Jose Maria Sanguinetti, "Globalización, liberalización hemisférica e integración regional" (paper presented at the Conferencia ofrecida con motivo de su visita oficial a la sede de la Secretaría Permanente del SELA, Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe, Caracas, May 20, 1997).
  18. See Vanesa L. Martin and Maria Luisa Carbonell, *Las Zonas Francas y El MERCOSUR, Mayo* (Buenos Aires: Universidad Nacional La Matanza / Instituto de Estudios de las Finanzas Públicas Argentinas, 2012).
  19. Personal communication, March 2009.
  20. "Afirman que el RTU es un total fracasso," *Primera Plana*, August 19, 2015, <http://www.diarioprimeraplana.com/v1/en-destaque/item/2651-afirman-que-el-rtu-es-un-total-fracaso>.
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  22. "En pocas palabras," Mercosur, <http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/v/3862/2/innova.front/en-pocas-palabras>.

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# CONCLUSION

## Space, Nation, and Frontiers in the *Rioplatense* Discourse

GRACIELA SILVESTRI

### IN PRAISE OF AMBIGUITY

*Big Water* focuses on the multiple actors that for four centuries have constructed an imprecise zone known today as the “Triple Frontier.” The first issue presented is the difficulty in determining its exact size, its outer edges, its centers, all of which vary according to the research approaches, time frames, and methodologies of the academic disciplines found herein.

To understand this region we must undoubtedly overcome national divisions, a complicated task given that the area itself is crossed by dividing legal boundaries. It can be seen as a key environmental and historical landscape marked by the presence of dense fluvial networks, namely the Paraná and Uruguay Rivers, and their tributaries. These grand waters flow to the south and to the Atlantic coast and also northward, connecting with Amazonian towns—the original paths of penetration used by conquistadors who lacked overland routes. These same waters were considered by republican creoles as the gateway to free trade. Today, they provide the backbone of Mercosur and power the production of massive amounts of hydroelectric energy. But these paths and routes of penetration also highlight the region’s sociospatial mobility, accentuating the imprecision and ambiguity of the area. The water system is seamlessly connected with neighboring landscapes of swamps, lagoons, low farmlands, and distant horizons of ports

and seas. Some authors, inspired by recent studies on the Guaraní aquifer—one of the largest freshwater deposits on Earth—have taken it as a unifying theme, discussing the transnational nature and interests of regional and extraregional actors.<sup>1</sup> And others have poetically linked the uncontaminated aquifer with ancient Native traditions, like the Land without Evil of the Tupi-Guaraní people.<sup>2</sup> Even then the liquid character of the region appears almost beyond reach, as if the very waters that define this landscape are themselves ungraspable.

So when the editors of this volume posit why this area is a blind spot that only recently has begun to merit adequate historical attention, we cannot hesitate to say that the ambiguity of the region itself is one of the main causes: we, as scholars, have become accustomed to imagining human spaces as precise, with clear edges that go beyond geometric concepts. As indicated by Tim Ingold, our ways of organizing space through lines and surfaces reveal characteristics of ways of living and understanding the world that are not necessarily shared by non-Western cultures.<sup>3</sup> In fact, the ways of living of Native peoples in these lowlands, themselves perpetual travelers, contrast with the fixed spatial patterns and limited schema that receive such extraordinary weight in modern culture and in concepts such as “homeland” or, more precisely, “nation.”

That is why in the introduction to *Big Water*, the editors highlight the ways in which South American national historiographies have avoided more comprehensive approaches to border areas that challenge the territorial assumptions of each nation. The force with which the historical discipline has firmed its grasp over the space of each country results, to a certain degree, from many of the obstacles that the constructed nations themselves had to overcome in South America. The discipline of history was called on in this process to act as an educational arm of the newly formed nation-states in the last two centuries. With this form of “assistance,” the political geographies were constructed through catechism-like narratives to complete the mystique of “national unity.”

These stories drew inspiration from the idea of a modern trinity: the state, providing order; fatherland, a common history; and territory, an earthly domain.<sup>4</sup> But the very construction of the South American republics places in doubt—even more harshly than in Europe—the credibility of the narrative that sustains them. Order is always a promise of the future; origin does not refer to the Native but rather to the conqueror; and territory is disputed, expanded, or, in the case of Hispanic nations, dismembered. That is why the reflection on ambiguous and jumbled borders like the Triple Frontier takes on a particular value that exceeds a purely documentary interest in South America.

The “nation”—or more precisely, the criticism of it—justifies in part the greater attention given in this book to the last century and a half. This scope highlights a series of issues that although rooted in earlier historical moments still feel strongly contemporary. More than just a presentist history, the chapters in this book present a purposefully self-aware history that embodies the living, the open, and the unfinished, mirroring the difficulties in giving precision to the ambiguous spaces of the Triple Frontier.

But it was precisely this tension toward the present day that leads me to reflect on the importance of the ideas and the problems defined in this volume. Above all, the reinterpretation of the concept of “frontier” as a key step in reading landscapes that are unbound by “form” in the classic sense. But we must also note the extension of space as an active catalyst in the evolution of human society: the strong relationship between stories and the environmental sciences, the new contributions of ethnography, and even the political commitment of NGOs with “indigenous peoples.” What role do these new representations play today in our ability to see, to plan, to ponder, and to act?

This is not a generic question. If national histories have acquired this functional dimension, it is because the written word has come to possess a central and ultimately constructive place in the South American world—the Uruguayan Ángel Rama and the Argentine José Luis Romero have worked on this topic from different angles.<sup>5</sup> It is therefore necessary to supplement the historical and geopolitical events, the infrastructural achievements, the abrupt social changes, the concrete forms of Native life, all with the important South American tradition of literary criticism that beyond didactic stories about the “nation” has invoked original configurations of territory and place to focus—at times obsessively—on the national “identity.”

This approach deals with issues that are fundamentally literary in their broader meanings: historiographical, essayistic, and fictional. And although often used with eclectic European and later American sensibilities, this created a process of creolization that many authors have called “Latin American thought.”<sup>6</sup> The contrasts and differences within this literature are relevant (especially among the Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking worlds) but coalesce around a common focus on the importance of “space”: topics such as the effect of vast spatial dimensions on particular forms of government, the wealth or cruelty of climates that define human behavior, or the possibilities and limits of the technical restructuring of territory that existed even before colonial independence. Such reflections cannot be cast to the margins in our current



interpretations because they offer paths as strong if not stronger than the powerful interwoven narratives of the nation.

The same theme of borders discussed by the various authors of this volume also has a foundational role in the literature of the three countries in question. In Argentina, a country abandoned as a peripheral nation in the mid-nineteenth century, texts by writers such as Sarmiento and Echeverría presented *the borders* as key to national identity. Paraguay, dismembered by successive wars, proudly chose to display its idiosyncratic and mixed “Guarani” identity. In Brazil, “the border” was a key theme of national writings. Sérgio Buarque de Holanda stated that all of Brazil could be regarded as “an uncertain border area . . . between Europe and Africa,”<sup>7</sup> an astute comment that allows us to think that the Triple Frontier can in many ways be seen as a border between borders.<sup>8</sup> I will use this conclusion to briefly review the topic of spatial imagination in South American literature as a means to complement the rigorous work presented throughout *Big Water*. I will focus on the literary traditions of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina, discussing themes whose influence help guide us to problems of the present day.

## CONTROLLING THE VOID

### INFLATED SPACE

In 1920, the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset, a frequent visitor to Argentina, explained in the preface to the first Spanish translation of *The Philosophy of History* that Hegel and his followers eliminated American history because of the problems inherent to vast, open landscapes: “When space remains, men seize control of nature.”<sup>9</sup>

Such an idea—without its metaphysical precision—precedes the reflections of Hegel. Even those who, like Alexander Von Humboldt, discussed the arrogant philosophical generalizations about America did not fail to promote the construction of canals and roads to reduce the region’s ungovernable territorial dimensions. The republican creoles were also obsessed with the grand issue of size. Without having read Hegel, Domingo F. Sarmiento wrote in the beginning of his famous *Facundo* that “The curse of Argentina is its void.”<sup>10</sup> The contraction of these bloated spaces did not necessarily mean losing land. Rather, it implied naming, delineating, categorizing, and exploring a basis for the development of infrastructure that would define the territories of the future nation-states. No

wonder, then, that a reflection on the *character* of the people is marked by an *obsession over space* that deploys a far-reaching sociogeographic narrative.

But the spaces in the heart of South America were almost unknown. The Spanish and Portuguese crowns, which recognized the concept of the Tordesillas line, appointed a joint committee of experts to redefine their domains according to the Treaty of Madrid. Even though the results of the *comisionados* made notable inroads in charting knowledge of the area, protagonists of the time such as the Peruvian Miguel Lastarria highlight the persistent unknowableness of these “vast, empty regions cut by rivers, lakes and forests, inhabited almost exclusively by wild and ferocious people.”<sup>11</sup>

Through the end of the nineteenth century, revolution and war precluded a more thorough accumulation of scientific knowledge. No wonder Humboldt became such an assiduous reference for South American patriots like Sarmiento. Despite only touring the northern reaches of South America, Humboldt offered a narrative model of the subcontinent that gave it a distinctive *form* seemingly independent from political judgment or ancestral prejudices and fixed instead by the laws of nature. This was the beacon for South American patriots.

Humboldt introduces a “cultural geography” to be tested throughout South America. A key issue is the Andean superiority over the “lowlands,” a view shared by many of the New Granada’s educated class at the time. This opinion was based on an argument that seemed irrefutable: the wealth of the “Inca” civilization, which was described as a world of high population density, fluid communication networks, taxation systems, agricultural and productive capacities, advanced engineering and agronomic techniques, and stone cities in addition to an extensive iconography that could bear witness to its own past.

The cultural landscapes of the Andes differ sharply from the Caribbean islands, the vast continental plains, and the impenetrable rain forests. How many centuries will it take, writes Humboldt, for civilizational changes to take root in the lowlands of Venezuela, of the Meta and Caquetá, of Buenos Aires? How long until the scorched lands and forests are transformed to allow a “sensible improvement of the moral state of the people?”<sup>12</sup> Humboldt also wields scientific knowledge to guide restless travelers to this region, describing the vertical cliffs of the Andean foothills, the tremendous biodiversity, the intensity and variety of geological phenomena. He also emphasizes the aesthetic, writing that no *horizontal* landscape rivaled the sublime scenes of the Andes. Although the soul, he says, exalts in the boundless solitude, a sadness can devastate travelers in the dreary plains, a horror that penetrates the labyrinthine forest. In short,

since the early nineteenth century, an image has formed of South America that divides the “civilized” Andean world and the wild lowlands whose only redeeming qualities are its natural resources to be exploited and ultimately extinguished. Those who inhabit the lowlands—people of murky worldviews—do not belong to history. Rather, they are immersed and defined by nature itself.

Another dichotomy advanced by Humboldt weighed heavily in South American thought: that between coast and inland. Known early to foreign explorers, the coasts were well charted. But Humboldt noted that the inlands rarely could be seen from maritime journeys, writing that “beyond a barren coast [one] perceives a hill covered by mountain greenery, but whose remoteness precludes their study.”<sup>13</sup> This separation justified the innovative purpose of his trip: the penetration of the inland, an area of yet unknown but certain grandeur. The contrast between coast and inland fluctuated over the next two centuries, from chronicles of glorious coastal cities open to the world to accounts of the lack of authenticity of Westernized seaboards vis-à-vis the ancient values of the hinterland.

These cultural geographies that link environmental landscapes with human values played a central role in the construction of the nations found today in the Triple Frontier. Well into the twentieth century, this Andean-centric discourse helped funnel much of the historical, archaeological, and scientific research into the area of the northern and central Andes. Colonial history also emphasizes the international interest in the highlands, often to the detriment of areas such as the River Plate basin that served as the outer markers of wealthy vicerealties or even to the vast central areas that the Spaniards had not yet dominated. For more nuanced reasons, the Luso-American area was situated in the shadow of the regions seen as far more culturally rich. Especially in the last century, nations occupying the “lowlands” had to imagine stories that inverted the Andean seduction to focus instead on their arid backlands, their solitary plains, their lush jungles, their spurned people. They conceived of these spaces as borders on which nations could advance and as a spatial shrine to be respected.

## PARADISE AND EARTH

This disjointed portrayal of South America acquires another quality defined by the Edenic echoes that were already present in the diaries of Christopher Columbus—the illustrious Andean precedence would draw from this early idea of a “virgin” landscape inhabited by *noble savages*. Recall that the admiral thought he had found evidence of the existence of the Garden of Eden in the

strange animals and beautiful naked Natives that reminded him of Adam and Eve. The extreme heat of the tropics, it was thought, suggested the proximity of the flaming swords of angels guarding the holy doors. On his third voyage, Columbus imagined the vast Orinoco as one of the four rivers flowing down from the mountain of paradise.<sup>14</sup> The Edenic echoes of America can be found in the actions of early settlers who created paradises in the *wilderness* by pushing a radical renovation of old European culture and also in the descriptions of naturalists who tried to identify the primordial history of mankind in isolated tribes during their millenarian preaching.<sup>15</sup> The people of the lowlands conformed to this image, and the seduction has not relented since: simply look at the photographs published by Lévi-Strauss about the Nambikwara.<sup>16</sup> What could be more attractive to those coming from complex societies, highly hierarchical and bureaucratized, than these people with no interest in the accumulation of surpluses, without metal instruments, without social structures resembling hierarchies of power?

Paradises are always accompanied by their infernal counterpart. The publishing house De Bry opened its second American series with a cover decorated by an Indian devouring human body parts. Hell could be found in both the Andean and the Mesoamerican—the “cruelty” of human sacrifice continues to fuel novels and adventure films today. But hell was most feared in the lowlands, stretching ominously from the Caribbean to the River Plate basin. The terrors of a prodigious nature mixed with reports of cannibalism, reverberating in the writings of everyone from Montaigne to Shakespeare. Are we surprised that the Caliban of *The Tempest*—an anagram for cannibal—represents an assiduous reference in South American literature mirrored by the good spirit of Ariel and the magic of Prospero, the builder of utopias? Few issues better express how the “nature/culture” duality in the South American lowlands was implemented: the cannibal was directly associated, despite the warnings of Montaigne, with the natural chaos to which men had been thrown after the fall from Eden, plunging mankind into a bestial existence. As we shall see, this becomes even more noticeable in how the figure of the feared cannibal would serve in the twentieth century to establish the characteristics of a new culture.

#### NATURE, LANDSCAPES, AND CLIMATE

During the formative years of the new South American nations, “nature” constituted more than a form of chaos to be overcome or an arena to be dominated.

Rather, it served as a conception of the world intimately related to a broader vision of “progress.” The freethinkers in the River Plate basin, eager to clear the bureaucratic and clerical cobwebs of colonialism, adhered to a “positivist” thinking—secular, scientific, and radically naturalist both in earth sciences and in matters of the spirit. No wonder, then, that the culture of the time was oriented toward explanations of the environment, climate, evolution, and race. So, too, did it seek to define the human condition and the spirit or genius of mankind. In this context, geography—in its cosmic Humboldtian version—began to play an important role in the joining of history and civic consciousness. As historical narratives continued to tell stories of events, battles, and national heroes, geography provided an eyewitness account of the rich natural world with enough eloquence to enchant young minds. To achieve this goal, geography presented “nature” as a function of the landscape.

This ambiguous notion related fragments of terrestrial morphology with aesthetic representations that offered more conventional meanings. Thus, “landscape” was more successful in compelling a wider audience than scientific descriptions, news of technical achievements, or even dates of battles. Landscape, after all, alluded to a nature in which the fate of the nation would be encrypted. So the naturalistic passions of young creoles, who like their idols went “outdoors” to learn the world, did not focus only on scientific or practical purposes. They instead sought to describe and adequately represent the “parts” of nature that bore witness to the great futures of every nation.

This vast canvassing of the natural world condensed in the twentieth century as a new legal concept: the national park. In Argentina, the National Parks Act of 1907 focused on two border areas: the Parque del Sur (later Nahuel Huapi) and the Iguazú National Park, which Frederico Freitas studies in chapter 4. In both cases, the protection of nature and its scenic beauty was explicitly merged with a selective policy of colonization supported through the 1930s with the Rooseveltian premise of “soft handling” and the need to stop the “advances” of neighboring countries.

But the area of Iguazú presented problems that exceeded those of a *natural* park, namely, what to do with the Jesuit missions? The theme of the missions defined the historical character of the area in the Triple Frontier; three chapters in *Big Water* are devoted to the subject, and one of them (chap. 6, by Daryle Williams) deals with the history of how the Jesuit ruins became a World Heritage site in the late twentieth century. The question then becomes how to balance and depict the work of men with the continuity of the “natural” world.

An early debate formed over a remarkable parallel between nature conservation and heritage conservation. The Iguazú Falls were considered a natural monument. Interest in the location focused mainly on preserving the majestic waters themselves and not the surrounding jungles. As for the Jesuit ruins, which some wanted to rebuild to their original spirit, people like Paul Groussac, an aristocratic mind, warned of the danger in restoring the sites and opening them to a budding and ignorant influx of tourism.<sup>17</sup> According to Groussac, the ruins should look natural, with minimal outward signs of intervention. Other topics that loomed large in debates during the early twentieth century have already been forgotten. For example, how can the actions of the Jesuit order—which had always been seen as antithetical to a linear vision of “progress”—be incorporated into national histories? But the main points of that debate still persist as they put in check an older set of values, the historical and the aesthetic values that Riegl posed as premises for conservation.<sup>18</sup> The idea of heritage concentrated anew in art and architecture, and only recently has progress been made in the recovery of the territorial footprints that give magnitude to the historical actions of Jesuits.

Despite changes in sensibility, the seductive motif of landscapes remains in the encounter between the ruins of the Jesuit empire and the mighty jungle surrounding it. Creole naturalists did not stop imagining organic relationships between the consummate baroque style, with its serpentine lines found in Jesuit-Guarani art, and the call of the wild. This was not only morphological mimicry. A key word used to explain the relationship between areas and voices offered a twist on pure visuality of the notion of landscape. Here, climate became central in various arguments over representations of *the nation* in the early twentieth century.

Take, for example, the texts of Argentine Estanislao Zeballos, a traveler, naturalist, archaeologist, lawyer, and diplomat who was active in negotiations with Brazil for the missionary frontier. Zeballos made it clear that he was not from the northeast of Argentina but rather from the center-south region, where a healthy and virile race could be developed. In Zeballos’s view, the center-south had the moral advantages of a climate “that cultivates a triumphant nature . . . whose splendid forms are the shrouds that keep at bay the soft effeminacy and decrepitude of the races.”<sup>19</sup> Zeballos compared Argentina to its great rival, Brazil, by distinguishing the latter for its “tropical climate.” Argentina, which had already incorporated the Patagonian Andes, chose to define itself through its temperate and cold climates. The Iguazú National Park, where the inhabitants

of Misiones lay their hopes, will forever remain a lesser option in the Argentine imaginary to its Andean counterpart Nahuel Huapi, so visually similar to mountain landscapes in the Swiss Alps.

#### LANDSCAPES OF PEOPLE: THE QUESTION OF IDENTITY

Climate and race lead us to one of the most obsessive questions in South American literature: identity.<sup>20</sup> Compared to the Mesoamerican and Andean nations that could refer back to an ancient “solar” race, the Plate region was inhabited by noncomplex groups, indigenous “nomads” who fought against creoles as recently as the second decade of the twentieth century, Indians who had mixed with Europeans since the beginning of the conquest, in contrast to what authors believed had happened in North America. To further complicate the matter, at the same time that nation-states began to form, new migratory flows consistently altered the demographics in the River Plate basin, resulting in the number of foreigners far exceeding the local population.

This demographic effect further intensified questions regarding identity. It was one thing to promote, through immigration, the “whitening” of Native races; it was another still to receive poor European peasants, mostly from Europe’s hardscrabble southern regions, who dreamed only of returning to their home country after “making it” in America (*hacer la America*). The mixing of races worked in unpredictable ways, radically accentuating the American melting pot. It blurred and mixed traditions and origins, and in countries such as Argentina, it led to the establishment of free public education as a tool for homogenization.

How can we even think of a nation in which one of the basic mythic elements, autochthony, is nonexistent? How can we understand these formless clusters that “grew with the rapidity of a fungus” in desert climates, only to be “flooded” by human beings that drowned hierarchies and histories alike?<sup>21</sup> It will fall to the next generations to provide frameworks for linking social types with categories of landscape and nation, using extensive historical and geographical scenarios that both explain the present and gesture to the future. And in its various forms, the idea of borders plays a central role, with its limitless character—at once fixed and permanent—that forever appears in equal contrast to the grand coastal cities.

In the nineteenth-century world of the River Plate basin, Argentina’s emerging literature focused largely on the frontier. According to Sarlo and Altamirano, “nature and border tended to align in a continuum through which they

move from a social and economic notion to an imposed dimension: the definition of the plains,” which is to say, the inland pampas, the “desert, domain of the ‘Indian and the ‘barbarian.’”<sup>22</sup> The pampa also penetrated the cities, as seen in the famous tale of Echeverría, “El Matadero”: “one edge (as Borges would later say) that, instead of separating, connects the city with the plains: as such, a space of urban sanctuary exposed to rural invasion.”<sup>23</sup> Echeverría rejects these socioenvironmental mixtures of frontiers, perceiving in the peripheries a lack of physical order that reproduces the absence of a social order and can, in turn, infect as miasma the very heart of the city.

Only once the Indians were defeated and the border was “pacified” could the pampas become central to the construction of the nation. No Turnerian epic of frontiers accompanied the conquest of western Argentina: the borders were opened and settled by the national army, and the land was quickly spread among those who had financially supported the *Campaña del Desierto*. And so it was after 1880 that the idea of border emerged as a rigid territorial limit determined either by internecine wars or agreements between governments. The space of the fatherland seemed to have already closed.

Argentina grew dramatically in the first decades of the twentieth century, and these transformations triggered new questions about its elusive national identity. One no longer spoke in terms of ominous borders but rather of the coast and the “interior.” It was now in the journeys to this “interior” that Argentines went to find traditional values, guarded by children of the earth itself who lived a simple and authentic life away from urban alienation. The prototypical figure is the pampa gaucho (cowboy of the plains), a character whose Indian blood and bandit origins are minimized, originating from the borders of Rio Grande do Sul, Uruguay, and the Argentine coast. Other local landscapes accompanied the national cause, demonstrating the eternally rich “nature” even while its significance remained eminently local.

The division between the interior and the *rioplatense* coast is starkly evident in the classical texts by Ezequiel Martínez Estrada, whose essay “Radiografía de la Pampa” helped give structure to an emerging national ideology.<sup>24</sup> His views owe much to Oswald Spengler’s, *The Decline of the West*, translated early into Spanish. In this way one can understand the geological obsession with the “land,” as Spengler insists that although ideas can migrate, races cannot. From this approach Martínez Estrada calls attention to the consequences that have repeated in the Argentine national psyche: the so-called European culture of the *porteños* (inhabitants of the port city of Buenos Aires) is just a mask that



barely hides a deeper barbarism—"the gaucho peeks under his pressed shirt."<sup>25</sup> In these immense solitudes that had turned conquerors into *lords of nowhere*, any attempt to impose civilization ended in fragile, inorganic superstructures.

What place do these national platitudes confer to Argentina's tropical borders, in particular the areas that form the Triple Frontier? Literature has not completely dismissed these seductive landscapes, the school canon includes *Cuentos de la Selva* from the renowned Uruguayan writer Horacio Quiroga. But certainly the violence and cruelty of a world that refused to be dominated has not yet been appropriately intertwined in Argentine life. And indeed, it is in the experience of these boundaries (in the Chaco and Misiones regions) where texts emerged to criticize national sensibilities and denounce the atrocities that governments chose to ignore. Such is the case of the early articles of Spanish journalist Rafael Barret, published in Argentine, Uruguayan, and Paraguayan newspapers. Barret's works took place precisely in the frontier zone at stake in *Big Water*. In *El dolor paraguayo* and *Lo que son los yerbales*, Barret chronicles the brutal working conditions of the *mensú*—laborers for the large yerba mate companies—highlighting the absence of the type of civilization promised by republican states.<sup>26</sup> Far from idealizing the wretched of the earth, Barret outlines two types of humans in this cruel landscape "of extreme degeneration": the slave, a poor frightened beast, and the fierce *habilitado* (enabler), the procurer of urban greed. The universe of Barret's ideas, in short, is not unlike that of the progressive creoles: the jungle is not an Eden but a prison.

Rather than a national perspective, Barret employs a regional approach to introduce the complex problems of the Paraguayan identity. The country that he visited was just barely beginning to recover from the destructive Paraguayan War, which reduced it to a landlocked ward dependent on its powerful neighbors. According to Ana Couchonnal, the end of the war enabled the institution of a modernity that articulated the promises of liberal capitalism with an ideology of a dehistoricized national identity. This narrative extended into the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner (1954–1989) and further invokes memories of the *guerra Guazú* and the condition of Guaraní Indians.<sup>27</sup>

Language was a key element in the definition of the Paraguayan national identity. The relationship between language and territory in Paraguay is rather surprising: the Guaraní language in various inflections is spoken by 87 percent of the population, both inside and outside of national borders. Unlike other indigenous languages, Guaraní crosses diverse ethnic and social boundaries. Rather than an inherently indigenous trait, the language was recognized in Paraguay

“not as a sign of Indianness, but as an obstacle to an early miscegenation . . . a distinctive sign of the national [character].”<sup>28</sup> The stories about Paraguay’s bloody Chaco War with Bolivia (1932–1935) reinforce the idea that because of the language spoken by indigenous and peasant communities in the region, these territories belonged to Paraguay.

Brazil’s path developed very differently. Since the late 1930s, the *bandeirante* trope constituted grounds for nationalistic pride, growing from a purely regional reference (São Paulo) to a key referent in the expansion of the country’s borders. Shawn Michael Austin’s chapter in *Big Water* (chap. 1) chronicles the *bandeirantes* in the Triple Frontier during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Unlike Argentina, Brazil was perceived as a territorially “incomplete” nation with vast unknown areas simply waiting to be dominated and civilized.<sup>29</sup> For this reason borders acquired an explanatory value in the definition of the Brazilian identity. Borders in Brazil, unlike the version told by Turner, held the promise of a bright future. It is generally acknowledged that the conception of a Brazilian national idea first emerged from the texts of the engineer and journalist Euclides da Cunha. In a surprising manner given its time period, Cunha’s canonical work, *Os Sertões*, places in question not only the unity of a Brazilian society in crisis but the very purpose of the republican project.<sup>30</sup>

The notion of *sertão* (great desert) is important to understand in the inland border areas. As Florencia Garramuño notes, the word is not tied to a particular landscape or morphology: Cunha’s great innovation is the presentation of varied backlands landscapes built in a dialectic between tropicalism and aridity and arguing against the uniqueness of the “tropical lushness” that otherwise served as Brazil’s identity.<sup>31</sup> On the other hand, Cunha’s overt criticisms of state violence are silhouetted against the resistance of the Canudos community, a microcommunity in retreat. With no territory and no nation, Canudos forms a powerful image that even today evokes both the figure of isolated groups in the heart of the Amazon and of indigenous communities displaced by large engineering projects.

We will focus now on two other names that will loom large in the conception of borders within Brazilian literature: Gilberto Freyre and Sérgio Buarque de Holanda. The importance of Freyre’s landmark text, *Casa-grande e senzala*, extended beyond the local or national level.<sup>32</sup> Those who visited Brazil in the 1930s—including Roger Bastide, Blaise Cendrars, Claude Lévi-Strauss and Fernand Braudel—appreciated his extensive territorial descriptions treated with an almost Proustian sensitivity. Braudel, in particular, was influenced by Freyre,

as seen in his conceptions of the *longue durée*.<sup>33</sup> In effect, Freyre radically reinterpreted history as a notion of time closely linked to space—a nonabstract space, nor one contained by the “natural” but rather a material space attentive to the particularities of the roads, the cuisines, the houses, the ways of living. As stated by Ricardo Benzaquen, Brazilian culture is presented as “a syncretic symbioses of Brazilian specificity with a heritage and creativity common throughout humanity,” admitting, moreover, the influence of “all traditions, Muslim, black, Jewish, or French, simultaneously extending and altering its own notion of culture.”<sup>34</sup>

Freyre proposed a general picture of the tropical world previously discussed, emphasizing the difference between the Portuguese and Spanish conquistador. Beyond the diverging styles of conquest, we are shown unique forms of spatial articulation. Through literal geometric metaphors, Freyre presents a Weberian type of hybrid species deriving from the already mixed spaces between Europe and Africa. Describing the Portuguese Man, Freyre used the features of a horizontal figure, flattened, elusive, resting with effeminacy in his hammock in the vicinity of the calm waterways that served as his trade routes. The Spanish, however, are pictured as Gothic and quixotic warriors standing vertical and venturing into territory dotted with rivers and rugged mountainous terrain. Hence, concludes Freyre, in Brazil, “we expand ourselves superficially before we develop ourselves internally.”<sup>35</sup>

This was an impressive picture: horizontal versus vertical, surface over depth, softness over rigidity. We can think that the famous opposition coined by Sérgio Buarque de Holanda comes from this inspiration: the Portuguese “planted” cities and lived in rural territories; the Spaniards were *ladrilhadores* (builders), their cities constructed as places of order triumphing over chaos and fear.

Whereas Freyre worked in the Brazilian northeast; Buarque de Holanda’s *Caminhos e fronteiras* (1957) centers on the Triple Frontier at question in this volume—even though it is expanded. And there is another key difference: both in the study of the *bandeirante* expeditions and in the earlier *Monções* (1945) detailing river journeys from São Paulo to central Brazil, border areas are interpreted not only as dialectical areas of edges and defined centers but as twists, roads, and riverways, increasing a sense of mobility that is likewise anchored in territorial interpretations. These Brazilians don’t rest in hammocks: they travel. The themes of these early works would resurface in his posthumously published *O extremo oeste* (1986), where *bandeirantes*, travelers, explorers, and muleteers are the protagonists of a varied and changing landscape, resistant at its core to spatial or temporal boundaries.

In the notes to the first edition of *Monções*, Holanda describes the work as part of a future study about the expansion of Brazilian territory and the creation of an almost accidental civilization. In this space, society could accept, assimilate, and produce new forms of life.<sup>36</sup> This is a transparent allusion to Turner and Bolton, although the Brazilian version of the creative impulse focuses on more than simply the “adapted” conqueror or the *mameluco* (mestizo) as a mere mediator. Instead, the “alluvial” societies had stood for centuries in an “unstable and undeveloped” situation. Society, he writes against Freyre, emerged from the creation of paths and movement, “not in agriculture, which creates only sedentary people.”<sup>37</sup>

In short, by emphasizing mobility, mixture, instability, and creativity outside of clear or precise frameworks, Holanda offers an original answer to the questions posed by European ideas of nation—and many other authors had emphasized the same topic. In this approach, Brazilians discarded ideas of autochthony, purity of blood, or even being rooted in one place. It is interesting to note the time period in which Holanda did research for *O extremo oeste*: the post–World War II years when the United States became the new referent not only for Brazil’s economy and geopolitics but also in its cultural landscape. This cultivated a new type of pan-Americanism that included an American academic interest in Hispanic and Lusophone histories and also inspired Brazilian writers to question issues of identity, political democracy, and modernization.

## THE TRAUMA OF DEVELOPMENT

South American developmentalism anchors many of the features of nineteenth-century progressive ideals. As they did then, the great projects of the postwar period remain key to solving the contrast between the vast and lonely “interior” and the urban coast. A telling example is the iconic construction of Brasília in the late 1950s. But it is not only plans of urbanization, peasant attachments to land, or even the construction of roads and infrastructure. The very idea of territory is transformed by placing it at the center of national concerns over the production of energy and industry.

Although energy projects already existed, the negotiations and conflicts over harnessing the massive hydroelectric power in the upper Paraná borderlands proved to be a defining feature in the region’s history throughout the second half of the twentieth century. As Jacob Blanc shows in chapter 8, projects like

the Itaipu Dam require one to rethink the meanings of borders and the degree of autonomy they confer on nations. An emblematic example—equally for its veneration of regional unity as for the problems lingering below—was the 1969 Treaty of the River Plate basin that sought to regulate the use and control of the region's waterways and tributaries. These early hydroelectric and geopolitical roots soon expanded farther still, and as Christine Folch details in chapter 10, the economic common market Mercosur codified a new regionalist approach that also brought in other linked countries such as Bolivia and Uruguay.

The literature that addressed these processes also changed its tone, separating itself from the idiosyncratic accents of essayistic prose to instead reinforce a gloss of scientific and technical impartiality. Under this objective appearance, a new wave of literary works put forth a common analysis shared by both the national left and the right: put simply, the abstract benefits of modernization.<sup>38</sup>

*Modernization*, as a term, had already lost its historical dimension that originally posited its universality, becoming a word with strong economic undertones. The closely related idea of social development soon emerged. In Argentina, sociologists such as Gino Germani located the key to the country's hardships in the imbalance between modernization and development.<sup>39</sup> Such "solutions" also permeated literature that denounced the world empire, the United States. In these productivist schemes, a vision of the "other side" of the wall was adopted and aligned with the Soviet Union, including Cuba—the bright star of the revolutionary Third Worldism in Latin America.

An overview from the 1950s to the 1980s in South America cannot help but marvel at the scale and magnitude of industrial development projects. Striking, too, is the world of art and architecture, with innovations ranging from powerful forms of Brazilian modernism to the architectural appearance of interstellar devices from Cuzco to La Plata.<sup>40</sup> These developments took place in vastly different political situations, although most emerged in the context of the technocratic desires of military dictatorships that governed Paraguay, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. The extent and intensity of these dictatorships united the destinies of the Southern Cone between 1964 and 1989, though the dates are not the same for the whole. Although the unbridled nationalism of military governments made multinational cooperation difficult in the realm of large infrastructure plans, agreements proved far easier in the development of "counterinsurgency" against revolutionary undercurrents. The famous example is Operation Condor, a cross-continental approach planned since the late 1960s and institutionalized in 1975.<sup>41</sup> This joint endeavor of South American

security services enabled the practices of kidnapping and killing beyond borders and regardless of nationalities. This sinister form of “South American brotherhood” developed with the support of the U.S. government, which, a decade later, in contrast, played a decisive role in the fall of dictatorships.<sup>42</sup>

We see then how South American dictatorships kept alive the technocratic and modernizing impulse. In the aftermath of the repression unleashed, this impulse could no longer be interpreted as *progress* but rather as a form of *exclusion*. The propensity toward thinking about the future—so dominant in the postwar decades—was now replaced by the obsession of *memory*, the manner of collectively dealing with a rejected past. To remember and to preserve involves more than just words; they extend into the physical realm. These dictatorships had not only done away with individuals (the figure of the disappeared is different from the executed; it never leaves a trace) but also entire neighborhoods, whether by means of the construction of new highways or agricultural projects and dams that wiped out indigenous communities and landscapes. Nonetheless, these new perspectives focused not on borders but on cities, places formalized by history, strongly articulating both an aesthetic and a political representation. The Habermasian idea of *public sphere* acted as a safeguard of *Nunca más* (never again).

Along with the recovery of constructed memory, the postdictatorship period witnessed the growth of a “green sensibility” that until a short time ago was unconnected to progressive political action. This idea paradoxically corresponded to the rise of the public sphere despite the opposing logics wherein environmentalism is linked with “the natural” and political representation emphasizes the preeminence of the city. But even within this debate, their differences soften against a common enemy: the technocratic modernization that aimed to destroy both “nature” and “memory.”

It was at this point that the constellation of ideas led by radical groups in the United States became important even in countries such as Argentina that had previously resisted its influence. While American culture had imbued nature with a powerful ideology of transcendent meanings, in South America nature was seen more as an obstacle to either be dominated, studied scientifically, or exploited for its resources. The winds of revolution, as they say, had not changed these beliefs. By the 1990s, however, an ecological sensibility grew in tandem with the extension of a public sphere, which included numerous institutional structures and global frameworks. Since the Brundtland report, the articulation of environmental, economic, and social concerns has constituted a radical ideological shift. This change also responded to the end of continental Europe as the

unquestioned mecca of both South American intellectuals and the continent's educated public in general.

For some time now the American naturalist passion has concentrated on those areas that still remained "virgin," especially in the Amazon, emphasizing the harmonious relations of Native groups with "nature."<sup>43</sup> But the new conceptual approaches to landscapes that would redefine the question of borders also emerged from other American perspectives, or more precisely, American interpretations of European notions. The "spatial turn," whose initial impulses borrowed from French poststructuralism, arrived in South America in the 1990s via American debates, similar to what happened with radical relativism and cultural and postcolonial studies. As such, the turn-of-the-century recovery of the Turnerian vision of society advancing toward frontiers—which, as we have seen, inspired many South Americans—was now repositioned as a fundamental issue.

The tangible effects of these ideological changes were felt in different ways in Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina. In Brazil—perhaps due to the tradition of anthropologists drawing eclectically from disciples of Boas and Lévi-Strauss or the early exposure to American culture—there were early and radical efforts to craft legislation to protect the rights of Native peoples. A stark example is the case of the Xingu Indigenous Park in the Amazon, certified as such by the federal government in 1961. From its inception, the park exhibited a philosophy that stood in contrast to the militaristic and strategist character of the long-standing ideology of Brazil's March to the West; rather than progressing toward new and increasingly modern frontiers, the park focused on the area's biodiversity and indigenous ways of life. However, the general situation of indigenous groups remained dire, as demonstrated by the Figueiredo Report in 1967 that brought sweeping international repercussions. Given the problems posed by federal policies of indigenous integration, it was later decided to create reserves "in absentia," avoiding all contact with isolated groups by altering the very notion of "national territory" and placing strict limits on expansion. The preservation of the last earthly "paradise" has been far from successful; the absence of the state in the vast protected areas did not stop the raids of private exploiters of both resources and people.

The Amazon serves as an inevitable reference when discussing the internal borders of the South American lowlands, an area also inhabited by indigenous communities, some of whom were also only recently contacted. By invoking the Amazon in this conclusion I seek to elucidate its seductive allure and global

prestige while at the same time exposing the limits of the Amazon example through the particular dynamics and history of the Triple Frontier, an area distinguished by its fast-paced transformations, the early mixture of its inhabitants, and the ambiguity of its borders. As shown implicitly in Guillermo Wilde's description of territorial reconfiguration, ethnogenesis, and population mobility during the Jesuit period, the reduction of complex processes into singular categories results in a dehistoricized understanding of local communities, reproducing the old European image of noble savages in paradise.

This basic duplicity also accompanies current debates about forms of territorial occupation. In Brazil, although social and environmental protection policies continued to develop, so too did the government's impulse toward modernization. As seen in the case of the Itaipu hydroelectric dam, this developmentalist approach was intimately linked to the context and ideologies of military rule, yet it continues today even under democratic society. The Belo Monte Dam on the Xingu River in the Amazonian state of Pará, for example, reaffirms Brazil's enduring technocratic drive even in the face of widespread international criticism.

The Argentine case presents different angles: the homogenizing concept of territory and population render invisible, even today, claims of indigenous communities. In Argentina, the country's technical-productive capacity is minimal compared to Brazil's, its neighbor to the northeast. Nonetheless, growing conflicts in recent years have pitted large mining and energy projects against popular movements seeking to protect the nation's social and environmental heritage. In the Triple Frontier, when the government prepared to inaugurate the Yacyretá Dam, the province of Misiones voted in an open plebiscite against the Corpus facility that would form part of the hydroelectric complex.<sup>44</sup>

These contradictions have become heightened after the political changes of the past decade, as a strong reaction against the savage neoliberalism of the 1990s led people to revisit the need for autonomous productive development. This approach, it is hoped, might finally produce a new social balance. The emergence of a neodevelopment narrative is especially evident in Argentina, whose national self-image points strongly to moments of inclusion and social ascension in the postwar period. This framework is able to incorporate environmental sensibilities without limiting the end goal. It is fair to wonder whether this duality and the tensions between development and conservation, between modernization and pastoral nostalgia, ultimately forms part of our own South American culture and perhaps also that of the Americas more broadly.<sup>45</sup> New



approaches have tried to overcome the static boundaries between nature and technology, or more precisely, the purity of paradise and the hell of modernization. In emphasizing the ambiguities of these very borders and frontiers, we might come to realize how inadequate they actually are.

### HYBRID LANDSCAPES

Toward the end of the twentieth century, particularly in the humanities and social sciences, new radical interpretations emerged to criticize universal concepts that affected our spatial imagination. Among other ideas that eclectically flooded the intellectual field of the River Plate countries were issues such as borders as “intermediate areas,” extraterritoriality, the use of forensic evidence in physical sites to expose historical violence, seeing catastrophes as the norm rather than the exception, networks and nodes, and the changes and resilience of topologies.

In Argentina, the 2001 crisis reinforced this trend, driving experimental work that proved particularly powerful in the field of architecture. This led to debates that went beyond theoretical positions to instead discuss concrete territorial issues such as formalizing strategies for public beautification projects, the image of “place” associated with sedentary societies, and the presumption of boundaries between nature and artifice. The “liquid” areas in the River Plate basin proved masterfully conducive to these reflections.<sup>46</sup>

This reflexive tendency was part of a global trend, which in the new millennium took on additional meanings outside of artistic and academic disciplines. A telling example comes from Hollywood, as the 2005 movie *Miami Vice* was filmed in the Triple Frontier and in other locations of the River Plate basin. “What attracted me to Ciudad del Este,” explained the director Michael Mann, “is the energy of [the city’s] trade, but also the multiethnic environment. . . . That to me says what the world is today.”<sup>47</sup> This city, unknown to most international audiences before the movie, is for Mann the epitome of a fragmented global culture. Along with filming scenes of the majestic Iguazú Falls, the director also used locations in the Uruguayan cities of Montevideo and Atlántida as stand-ins for Havana. In Mann’s eyes, Uruguay could be Cuba, and the teeming markets of Ciudad del Este become interchangeable with the Mexican border cities of Tijuana and Sonora. This pan-Latin Americanism identifies “Latino” with the sumptuously tropical, the mixed and the colorful, the sensual and the backward, the violent and the corrupt—a limitless seduction to draw in a global audience.

Although international perceptions play an indisputable role, South Americans still guard their own particular ways of interpreting the sociospatial hybridity of their borders. Even these more resistant interpretations are inextricably linked to the broader traditions—both global and “local”—discussed throughout this conclusion.

Argentines, for example, are reluctant to be identified or collapsed into the picturesque box of “Latino”—even as their European-tinted capital of Buenos Aires looks increasingly like Paraguay’s Ciudad del Este. These overlapping landscapes are evident in Hernán Vanoli’s novel, *Cataratas*. Situated in the Triple Frontier in an ambiguous but not-too-distant future, Vanoli explores the tension between the city’s aesthetic seduction and its chaotic spaces, at once delocalized and informal, a visceral political rejection of the region’s current conditions.<sup>48</sup> In the border depicted by Vanoli, its inhabitants live in a state of exception, with an ominous presence always looming from a corrupt authoritarian police and international security patrols that offer no guarantee of justice. Some characters, infected with a rare disease, mutate into semiaquatic monsters, as if returning to a prehuman condition. The landscape emerges descriptionless in a pure series of unfolding events, against a backdrop of weapons, radioactive waste, casinos built in dismantled hydroelectric plants, soda cans, and digital devices among the swaying palms, persistent rain, and horizontal rivers—forms of “nature” that no longer are.

In this dystopia, the rupture of the old *nomos* (the triad of territory, order, and birth) produces no new orders, nor does it reanimate any sort of harmonious pre-Columbian landscape. This world dangerously resembles a field like that observed by Arendt and developed by Agamben: with no distinction between exception and rule, without a discernable physical order, humans seem doomed to subsist in their pure biological state, neither human nor animal.<sup>49</sup> Although the author Vanoli was barely a newborn in the years of dictatorship, his work shows how the weight and threat of that authoritarian period still linger in the Argentine imagination. But older roots also predominate: “the jungle” has always imbued Argentina’s literature with ominous accents, hallucinatory and fantastic—the aforementioned Horacio Quiroga mixed an alchemy of science and fiction to portray these borders.

We have already discussed the importance, in Paraguay, of the relationships between identity, space, and the Guaraní language, a perspective that demands a revision of the very idea of territory. It is remarkable that while the image of the Guaraní existed as a constant undercurrent in nationalist speeches and

even as a source of political resistance, writers and poets of the Paraguayan canon invariably wrote in Spanish. In the few cases when authors did write in the Guaraní language, they still employed Western cadences and metrics. This only began to change in the 1980s when poets such as Ramon Silva paid attention to the particular sonority of the Native language, invoking the meanings of oral tradition. The monolingual structure used by Silva is characteristic of Guaraní songs, where according to Melià, the property of every word is emphasized as if each one contains an image and a feeling.<sup>50</sup> Silva also uses a rhythmic pattern inspired by the dances of the Mbyá-Guaraní (one of the major ethnic groups in the Triple Frontier), acoustically suggesting not only movement but also feet on the ground, a materiality hardly achievable by Western written languages.

Some authors speak of *cinematopeya*,<sup>51</sup> calling attention to how sound has played an increasing role in defining the production of films. The Triple Frontier offers an example through Juan Carlos Maneglia and Tana Schembori's widely acclaimed 2012 film, *7 Cajas*. Asunción's enormous Mercado 4 serves as both backdrop and protagonist, with its contrasting accumulation of religious figurines, ñanduty patterns of brightly colored fabrics, flowers and fruits, and endless displays of electronic and digital items, an array of people and goods so dense and vast that even the grand market that is Ciudad del Este cannot spark envy. The language spoken in *7 Cajas* replicates the area's material reality—characters speak mainly in Jopará and Spanish, punctuated by new words in English. In short, Paraguay's territory is the territory of language, but this space, the directors tell us, is as fluid and changing as the boundaries studied in this volume. The flowing, unstable, and ambiguous images associated with "the border" now extend inward to the centers once presumed to be consolidated, formalized, fixed.

Brazil offers a different case. Primarily through its economic but also cultural power, it has become in the last few decades a leading reference in Paraguay and to a lesser extent, in Argentina. In many ways, the structures of Mercosur have lubricated these connections between countries. We can analyze, for example, how the recent valorization of the Guaraní language has emerged not as an idyllic evocation on its own terms, but rather as the result of the Brazilian ethnographic tradition; many Paraguayan intellectuals fled in exile to Brazil during the Stroessner dictatorship, strengthening ties that, as seen in several chapters of this book, replaced Paraguay's traditional alliance with Argentina. The convergence of ethnographic, cultural, and postcolonial studies also led to a theoretical

reinterpretation of findings and arguments forged decades earlier. Such is the case with the work of Pierre Clastres, who studied Tupi-Guarani groups in the Triple Frontier region in the late 1960s, providing an early philosophical-political framework of Native ways of living.<sup>52</sup> Emerging from the global spirit of 1968, the indigenous way of life offered a key point of departure for studying “the origins of work as alienated work,” the advent of the state, the *cold machine* imposed on these forgotten borders, and the imbalance between environment and human settlement.<sup>53</sup> Links between these studies and the well-known hypothesis of Deleuze and Guattari have already been highlighted. Following the path of these thinkers, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro suggests that the current decentered vision of man and the renewed emphasis on the materiality of space owe much to what he calls the “metaphysical Amerindian”: an open willingness, relational, where the exchange with the Other, rather than one’s own identity, is the key determinant.<sup>54</sup> From this theoretical assault, little remains of the trinity between nation, territory, and state.

And yet, national traditions still retain their influence. Viveiros de Castro puts forward, with an eclectic freedom and sensibility for Latin American voices, concepts that continue to mark the Brazilian avant-garde: the positive and enthusiastic assertion of the unprecedented and unplanned mixing between Europe and America. The despised lowlands, which unlike the Andes cannot be equated to the classic ways of “civilization,” simultaneously exist as the extreme west—a final frontier—and as a radical answer to the “universal” ways of life. Even the idea of identity is reimagined in relation to the ancient theme of paradise:

Perhaps it was the Amerindians, not the Europeans, who had the “vision of paradise” in the American encounter. For the former, it was not a question of manically imposing their identity on the other, or even rejecting the other for the sake of their own ethnic excellence, but rather of transforming their own Indian identity through actualizing a relationship with the other (a relationship that had always existed on a virtual level). The inconstancy of the Indian soul, at its moment of opening, is the expression of a way of being where “it is the exchange, not the identity, the crucial value to be affirmed.”<sup>55</sup>

Whether or not we agree with this romantic image, it is clear that Viveiros de Castro works from a framework of elective affinities, freely appropriating the knowledge of our world. While Brazil reaffirms this complicated legacy,

even in times of economic boom Argentina has always nostalgically identified with a lost identity—the gray melancholy of tango serves as enduring proof. And with Paraguay’s dramatic history of destruction and the justified retreat into an idealized Guaraní “origin,” only now are its citizens questioning this traditional discourse.

Even with his misgivings, Viveiros de Castro stresses the disruptive contributions of Brazil’s cannibalistic movement (*antropofagia*) led by the modernists of São Paulo in the 1920s. Here, we return again to persistent South American myths: paradise and hell, Ariel and Caliban, the limits of Prospero’s magic. But the modernists radically inverted these values: hell is much more fun than the paradise.

This perspective was only made possible by a distinctly avant-garde dynamic: to go back, recreating the old world in visions for the future. Paulista intellectuals and artists turned the idea of cannibalism on its head long before writers such as Mikhail Bakhtin formulated theories on the transgressions of Carnival. But unlike Bakhtin’s ideas, the duality between *high* and *low* is blurred in the works of the *movimento antropofágico* in a way that does not simply challenge clearly defined models, it digests them. It is true that the conflict was rooted in an artistic-intellectual debate based in Paris. But these objections do not diminish the revelation of an aesthetic foundation subsequently eroding the essential forms of political-territorial linkages.

To be sure, the Paulista vanguards did not advance beyond the borders of Brazil, reducing *antropofagia* to a key pillar of Brazilianness, justifying without guilt what other South American authors rejected: their polished “European” or “North American” veneer. We cannot forget how through atypical Shakespearean channels the issue has been addressed in the River Plate region since the early twentieth century, reinforced in a contemporary sense through the famous phrase of Caliban: “you taught me language, and my profit on’t / is, I know how to curse.”

Brazilian vanguards went even further: there exist no traces of bitterness or dispute. On the contrary, as Oswald de Andrade said in his famous manifesto dated 374 years after the Bishop Sardinha was swallowed alive, cannibalism unites us, both among ourselves and with the world. Without distinguishing between bishops, planes, and canned food, Andrade writes, “I am only interested in what’s not mine.” He promises a new paradise vastly different from that of Columbus, where not even Hollywood is excluded: “*A idade de ouro anunciada pela América. A idade de ouro. E todas as girls.*”<sup>56</sup>

## NOTES

1. See Ramón Fogel, “La región de la triple frontera: Territorios de integración y desintegración,” *Sociologías* 10, no. 20 (2008): 270–90. For the socioscientific construction of the aquifer, see Martin Walter, “Explaining the Emergence of Transboundary Groundwater Management: The Cases of Guaraní Aquifer System, the Hueco and Mesilla Bolsón Aquifers, and the Génévois Aquifer” (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 2013).
2. Bartomeu Melià, “Y marane’y rekávo: Looking for Uncontaminated Water,” *ReVista, Harvard Review of Latin America* 14, no. 3 (Spring 2015): 33–35.
3. Tim Ingold, *Lines: A Brief History* (New York: Routledge, 2007).
4. Here I paraphrase Arendt’s well-known thesis of the nation/territory/state trinity. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Schocken, 1951).
5. Ángel Rama, *La ciudad letrada* (Montevideo: Arca, 1998); José Luis Romero, *Latinoamérica: Las ciudades y las ideas* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1976).
6. The expression was first used in the 1940s to refer to a complex of ideological phenomena that could not be reduced to philosophy even while participating in the discipline. Ricauter Soler, *El positivismo argentino: Pensamiento filosófico y sociológico* (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1979). This idea was widely used in the River Plate basin beginning in the 1980s, with more emphasis on cultural, rather than ideological, dimensions.
7. Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, *Raízes do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1982), 4.
8. I focus only on some sufficiently representative authors in the canon of literature and “national” prose. However, the reflection on “our identity,” including recent polemics against the essentialism of this idea can be found previously raised by many other authors. In Argentina, a classic critical presentation of this universe is in Carlos Altamirano and Beatriz Sarlo, *Ensayos argentinos: De Sarmiento a la vanguardia* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1983), which traced from Echeverría to authors connected to the magazines *Martin Fierro* and *Sur*. It should be remembered, however, that the “Argentine canon” is almost exclusively *porteño*; recent efforts have broken this hegemony, emphasizing regionalisms and the interior. It would be difficult to summarize in this way the Brazilian canon. Among authors who considered the size, nature, and forms of occupation of space as a key issue to thinking through the “national,” we can further include Alfonso de Taunay, Capistrano de Abreu, Cassiano Ricardo (providing a key account of the *bandeirante* construction of nationality), Oliveira Vianna, and Nelson Werneck Sodré. These authors focus in different ways on the issue of borders and the March to the West. Paulo Prado merits particular mention for his *Retrato do Brasil: Ensaio sobre a tristeza brasileira* (São Paulo: Duprat-Mayença, 1928), addressing issues such as racial mixing (important to ideas of *antropofagia*, or cultural cannibalism), geographical awareness, and spiritual sensibilities. Among scholars who discuss these issues, an excellent summary comes from Candice Vidal e Souza, *A pátria geográfica: Sertão e litoral no pensamento social brasileiro* (Goiânia: Editora UFG, 1997).

9. José Ortega y Gasset, prologue to the first Spanish edition of G. W. F. Hegel, *Leciones sobre la filosofía de la historia universal* (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1974). The article also appeared as “Hegel y América,” *El Espectador* 7 (1930), reprinted in José Ortega y Gasset, *Obras completas*, vol. 2, *El Espectador: 1916–1934* (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1963), 563–70.
10. Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, *Facundo: Civilización y barbarie en las pampas argentinas* (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1979).
11. The comments of Lastarria introduce the relations of one of the most celebrated Spanish *comisionados*, Miguel de Lastarria, “Noticia de la vida y escritos de Don Félix de Azara,” in Félix de Azara, *Viajes por la América meridional* (Buenos Aires: El elefante blanco, 1998, 14).
12. Friedrich Wilhelm Heinrich Alexander von Humboldt, *Viaje a las regiones equinociales del nuevo continente, hecho en 1799 hasta 1804*, bk. 9 (Paris, 1826), chap. 25, p. 51.
13. Humboldt refers primarily to contemporary travelers. Spain, without a doubt, had already penetrated the interior of the subcontinent, although news of these events remained secret. Humboldt, *Viaje a las regiones equinociales*, introd., p. 6.
14. The editing house De Bry opens its illustrated collection of American news with the image of Adam and Eve in paradise. Theodor De Bry, *América*, ed. G. Sieverbieh (Madrid: Siruela, 1997).
15. For more on this theme and its importance in South America—along with its contrasts in Puritan imagery—see Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, *Visão do Paraíso* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1969).
16. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Saudades do Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia das letras, 1994).
17. Paul Groussac, *El viaje intelectual: Impresiones de naturaleza y arte segunda serie* (Buenos Aires: Librería de Jesús Mendez, 1920), 231.
18. Alois Riegl, “La balsa de la Medusa,” in *El culto moderno a los monumentos: Caracteres y origen* (Madrid: Visor, 1987).
19. Estanislao Zeballos, *Descripción amena de la República Argentina*, bk. 1 (Buenos Aires: Peuser, 1881).
20. The term *race* was widely used throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the Plate region, linked to ideas of social Darwinism. Nonetheless, in countries like Mexico, the notion was used against presumptions of ethnic superiority by authors such as José Vasconcelos.
21. In quotes, I mention typical figures of speech that are still in common use.
22. Altamirano and Sarlo, *Ensayos argentinos*.
23. Ibid.
24. Ezequiel Martínez Estrada, *Radiografía de la Pampa* (Buenos Aires: Hyspamerica, 1986).
25. Ibid.
26. Rafael Barret, *El dolor paraguayo: Lo que son los yerbales* (Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual, 2010). Barret’s views inspired many authors, including the Paraguayan Augusto Roa Bastos, one of the main writers of the Latin American “boom” and who explicitly cites this influence in *Hijo de hombre* (Buenos Aires: Losada, 1960).



27. Ana Couchonnal, "La lengua Guaraní en la configuración política y territorial del Paraguay: espacios, voces oficiales y actores silenciados en la posguerra de la Triple Alianza" (working manuscript, 2015).
28. Ana Couchonnal, "La instancia del Guaraní en el inconsciente identitario (o la razón desde la lengua)," in *Melià . . . escritos de homenaje*, ed. Ignacio Telesca and Gabriel Insaurralde (Asunción: ISEHF, 2012), 63–79.
29. Souza, *A pátria geográfica*.
30. Euclides da Cunha, *Los sertones: Campaña de Canudos* (Buenos Aires: Tierra Firme, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2003).
31. Florencia Garramuño, "Pueblo sin Estado: *Los sertones* y el imaginario moderno," prologue to Cunha, *Los sertones*, 37.
32. Gilberto Freyre, *Casa-grande e senzala: Formação da família brasileira sob o regime da economia patriarcal* (Recife, Pernambuco: Fundação Gilberto Freyre, 2003).
33. Susanne Klengel, "El estilo de la historia en tiempos de guerra: Gilberto Freyre y los ensayistas latinoamericanos en la obra de Fernand Braudel," *Revista Chilena de Literatura* 88 (December 2014): 153–171.
34. Ricardo Benzaquen de Araújo, *Guerra e paz: Casa-Grande e Senzala e a obra de Gilberto Freyre nos anos trinta* (São Paulo: Editora 34, 1994), 103.
35. Gilberto Freyre, *Sobrados e mucambos* (São Paulo: Global, 2003).
36. Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, *Monções e capítulos de expansão paulista* (São Paulo: Companhia das letras, 2014 [1945]), 13.
37. *Ibid.*, 34.
38. For a thorough analysis of the various authors who discuss the theme of postwar Latin America, especially in relation to territorial development, see Adrián Gorelik, "Pan-American Routes: A Continental Planning Journey Between Reformism and the Cultural Cold War," *Planning Perspectives* 32, no. 1 (January 2017): 47–66.
39. Gino Germani, "La Argentina: Desarrollo económico y modernización," *200 millones*, *Revista de la Confederación General Económica* 1, no. 10 (1963).
40. Barry Bergdoll, Carlos Eduardo Comas, Jorge Francisco Liernur, and Patrio del Real, *Latin America in Construction: Architecture 1955–1980* (New York: MOMA, 2015).
41. Centro Internacional para la Promoción de los Derechos Humanos (CIPDH), *Operación Condor, 40 años después* (Buenos Aires: UNESCO, 2016).
42. *Ibid.*
43. The first United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm 1972 saw the publication of *World Ecological Areas Program*, focusing on the plight of the Amazon jungle, linking climate risks and the destruction of "the way of life of the indigenous peoples who inhabit these areas." The journal's symbol was an Indian with a bow and arrow. <http://www.edwardgoldsmith.org/963/world-ecological-areas-programme-a-proposal/>, originally published in *Ecologist* 1, no. 1/2 (January/February 1980).
44. The initial protocol for Yacyretá was outlined in 1925, but an agreement was only officially signed in the 1973 treaty between Paraguay and Argentina. Construction



- on the binational dam began in 1983, but the project only reached its maximum capacity in 2011. The agreement for another binational complex, the Corpus Christi Dam, was signed in 1971 and also has a long and complicated history that is still debated today.
45. In the United States, one of the first to discuss this tension between radical naturalism and technological modernization is Leo Marx, *The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).
  46. E.g., since the 1990s the São Paulo-based group *Arte-cidade* has worked in the inner city with various artists and architects. Another group is M7red, out of Buenos Aires, an independent platform of activities and research projects on architectonics and art whose first works focused on the “liquid” spaces of the lowlands.
  47. “Miami vice será filmada en Ciudad del Este”, *ABC* (Asunción), April 12, 2005.
  48. Hernán Vanoli, *Cataratas* (Buenos Aires: Random House, 2015).
  49. Giorgio Agamben, “¿Qué es un campo?” *Sibila: Revista de arte, música y literatura* 1 (January 1995): 65–67; Hannah Arendt, “Nosotros los refugiados,” in *Una revisión de la historia judía y otros ensayos* (Barcelona: Paidó, 2005), 364–71.
  50. Bartomeu Melià, *La lengua Guaraní del Paraguay: Historia, sociedad y literatura* (Madrid: MAPFRE, 1992).
  51. Wolf Lustig, “*Nande reko* y modernidad: Hacia una nueva poesía en Guaraní,” presentation given at the annual conference of the Latin American Studies Association, Guadalajara, Mexico, 1997.
  52. For Clastres, Native groups could establish themselves as masters of their domain to the extent that their productive activities were based only on the expenditure of daily energy; the introduction of metal tools, whose efficiency allowed the accumulation of surplus and population growth (this volume, chap. 1), was a dramatic turning point.
  53. Pierre Clastres, *La société contre l'état* (Nancy: Editions Marée Noire, 2007).
  54. Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, *A inconstância da alma selvagem e outros ensaios de antropologia* (São Paulo: Cosac & Naify, 2002).
  55. *Ibid.*, 206.
  56. “The golden age proclaimed by America. The golden age. And all the girls.” Oswald de Andrade, “Manifesto Antropófago,” *Revista de Antropofagia* 1, no. 1 (May 1928).

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