GLOBAL DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL POLICY

# **One Hundred Years of Social Protection**

# The Changing Social Question in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa

# Edited by **Lutz Leisering**

### Global Dynamics of Social Policy

#### **Series Editors**

Lorraine Frisina Doetter University of Bremen Bremen, Germany

Delia González de Reufels University of Bremen Bremen, Germany

Kerstin Martens University of Bremen Bremen, Germany

Marianne Sandvad Ulriksen University of Southern Denmark Odense, Denmark

#### **About the Series**

Te intervention of states in felds such as health, social security and work, dates back to the nineteenth century, and became more dynamic over time. Imperial Prussia, a social policy pioneer, frst showcased its progress at the Paris World Fair in 1900: the Prussian exhibit drew large crowds eager to fnd out more about state pensions. Clearly, social policy had become a matter of great interest to states and citizens alike.

Other nations soon embarked on implementing discrete social policies, thus turning the twentieth century into a time of remarkable welfare state expansion. Te end of World War II marked a new departure, as an increasing number of countries outside the Western hemisphere began to introduce social policy measures. States not only copied established forms of welfare, but often developed measures sui-generis to meet their specifc needs. While episodes of policy retrenchment and ruptures can be observed over time, recent developments point to an expansion of social policies in low-to-upper-middle-income countries of the Global South. Social policy has thus become a global phenomenon.

It is generally accepted that the state is responsible for welfare and that domestic politics and ideas have been a primary driver of its expansion. However, in an increasingly interconnected world, social policy is implemented at the national-level but infuenced by international developments and relations. It is shaped by trade, migration, war, and colonialism. Just as people travel, policy ideas follow. Tese factors merit scholarly attention and demand interdisciplinary collaboration to generate new insights into the global dimension of social policy.

Tis is what the Global Dynamics of Social Policy book series sets out to accomplish. In doing so, it also contributes to the mission of the Collaborative Research Center 1342 (CRC) "Global Dynamics of Social Policy" at the University of Bremen, Germany. Funded by the German Research Foundation, the CRC leaves behind the traditionally OECD-focused analysis of social policy to stress the transnational interconnectedness of developments.

Te book series showcases scholarship by colleagues worldwide who are interested in the global dynamics of social policy. Studies can range from in-depth case studies, comparative work and large quantitative research. Moreover, the promotion of scholarship by young researchers is of great importance to the series.

Te series is published in memory of Stephan Leibfried to whom our research on state and social policy at the CRC is indebted in countless ways.

> Series Editors: Lorraine Frisina Doetter, Delia González de Reufels, Kerstin Martens, Marianne S. Ulriksen

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/16294

Open access of this publication was made possible through funding by Bielefeld University, the Collaborative Research Centre 1342: Global Dynamics of Social Policy at the University of Bremen, funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) – Projektnummer 374666841 – SFB 1342 and Specialised Information Service Political Science – POLLUX.

Lutz Leisering Editor

# One Hundred Years of Social Protection

The Changing Social Question in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa

*Editor* Lutz Leisering Department of Sociology Bielefeld University Bielefeld, Germany

ISSN 2661-8672 ISSN 2661-8680 (electronic) Global Dynamics of Social Policy ISBN 978-3-030-54958-9 ISBN 978-3-030-54959-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54959-6

© Te Editor(s) (if applicable) and Te Author(s) 2021. Tis book is an open access publication. **Open Access** Tis book is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

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## **Preface and Acknowledgements**

Citizens of Western and Northern Europe and some Commonwealth countries tend to take the idea of the welfare state for granted, as an essential part of a good society. In global politics, declarations and campaigns of international organisations abound with terms like "social rights", "inclusiveness", and "universal social protection", suggesting that the world is about to become a welfare state. However, the situation in the Global South and many other countries is very diferent, and it is an open question if substantial public welfare will ever become a principle of a global society.

Te future of public welfare institutions in the world is likely to be shaped by non-Western countries. However, we do not know in what ways: will Western ideas and models spread or will indigenous concepts of the "social" create new institutional pathways? Will social issues be subordinated to other societal concerns and other ways of integrating societies, such as economic growth, nationalism, or religion? In short, we do not know to what degree and in what ways the "social question" will matter in the world to come. Social protection by itself is not a "sexy" subject, but a range of old and new global challenges—such as climate change, pandemics, migration, and precarious work—are demonstrating the need for livelihood protection all around the world. While we do not know the future, we can ascertain how the Global South has addressed social issues in the past. Tis is the subject of this volume, which derives from the Research Group "Understanding Southern Welfare", which I convened together with Ulrike Davy, a colleague from the law department of my university, at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF) at Bielefeld University, Northern Germany.

Te volume starts with the assumption that Southern countries have their own social policy histories, external infuences from foreign powers notwithstanding, and that these histories are under-researched. We need to know more about these histories—the agents, their ideas, interests, activities, and structural constraints—to "understand" Southern welfare. Te volume delves into the national histories of social protections since their beginnings around 1920. When we applied for funding, we said that we would start in the 1940s, but during our research, we realised that we would need to go back to the 1920s.

To understand Southern welfare policies and avoid Eurocentrism, we give domestic actors a voice by analysing contemporary political documents. In theoretical terms, we have developed a new approach to analysing social protection, which focuses not just on welfare programmes or outcomes, but on the fundamental ideas and concepts that underlie social protection policies, as articulated by Southern actors. We assume that welfare programmes are only the visible surface; they are underpinned, less visibly, by a range of ideas—values, beliefs, perceptions, and images relating to social problems, welfare institutions, statehood, and society. Te Research Group, therefore, sought to investigate the ideational foundations of Southern social protection. Tis kind of research has not been done before.

I owe the idea of an ideational approach to my teacher Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, the doyen of the German sociology of social policy, who, despite his age, attended a preparatory conference. Kaufmann is one of the few thinkers who has developed a genuinely sociological theory of the welfare state in the institutionalist Weberian tradition, which contrasts with the dominant political economy tradition rooted in Marxism. Kaufmann's concept of the welfare state as a cultural phenomenon has inspired me. Focusing the Group's analysis on ideas was a daring undertaking, and I am happy that the members of the Research Group not only could relate to this approach but also took it up in their research. I was not sure if the approach would work out, especially since the volume is not about the role of ideas in selected social reforms or selected periods of time (which would be interesting enough), but about ideas in the evolution of social protection over 100 years. I hope that the readers of this volume will see the yields of an ideational and pluralist approach to studying social protection.

When planning the Research Group, we decided not to choose area specialists from Western countries as group members (and contributors to this volume), but to recruit colleagues from the countries under investigation or scholars who have roots in them. Tis approach was demanding—we experienced difculties fnding appropriate researchers from these countries.

One reason for the renewed interest in Southern welfare programmes is the rise, since the 2000s, of so-called social cash transfer programmes for the poor in most countries in the Global South. Tese programmes provide a modicum of social protection to large sections of Southern populations who had previously been excluded. In an earlier research project, FLOOR, I undertook a comprehensive study of social cash transfers, including the construction of a dataset that covers all Southern countries (see www.foorcash.org). Ulrike Davy and Benjamin Davy (the latter from TU Dortmund University) had led the law group and the land policy group, respectively, in FLOOR. After FLOOR, we felt the need to investigate select countries in greater depth. Tis led us to the idea of case studies focused on middle-income countries since they might shape the global future of public welfare. Te literature has analysed middle-income countries mostly in economic terms—as "emerging markets" or liable to a "middle-income trap"—or in political terms—as new democracies or authoritarian regimes—but much less in regard to public welfare policies. We chose Brazil, India, China, and South Africa because they represent diferent continents, political regimes, paths of economic growth, and cultures.

Tis volume is not the result of just one conference. Rather, the contributors mostly worked together as members of the Research Group "Understanding Southern Welfare" over fve years, beginning with preparatory conferences 2014–2016, continuing as fellows in residence at the ZiF (March to July 2018), and concluding with a fnal conference in 2019. Te ZiF provided both the venue and funds for our conferences and the research in residence. Ulrike Davy and I had written the funding application together with Benjamin Davy. Unfortunately, Ben had to drop out in 2017 for reasons beyond his control.

Te Research Group had two subgroups: the law group led by Ulrike Davy and the social science group led by me and from which this volume fows. Te social science group included sociologists, political scientists, global and comparative historians, and a political economist. Originally, there was a third group, the land group, which we had to disband when Benjamin Davy left, but the issue of land kept cropping up in the research process. Gabriel Ondetti and Sony Pellissery switched from the land group to the social science group. Gabriel's contribution to the volume focuses on land issues, and Sony has published separately on land issues (see footnote).

I am indebted to the fellows in the law group. We learnt a great deal from the legal approach to social policy, including the emphasis on constitutions, courts, and human rights. Te law fellows included Albert Chen Hun-yee (University of Hong Kong), Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz (Kings College, London), Letlhokwa George Mpedi (University of Johannesburg), Sarbani Sen (O.P. Jindal Global University, New Delhi), and Ulrike Davy as convenor.

Te ZiF is Germany's frst Institute for Advanced Study, founded in 1968, and provides a wonderfully secluded space for scholarship (https:// www.uni-bielefeld.de/(en)/ZiF/index.html). Te Institute is situated at the edge of a forest, in a purpose-built building with a modernist 1960s' architecture, and includes apartments for the fellows and their families. Te ZiF provides a broad range of services that make scholars' stays as productive and pleasant as possible.

Research groups at the ZiF are interdisciplinary, and this Research Group was also very international. For me and the fellows, it was a most rewarding experience of scholarly exchange and learning—social science is truly global. I am grateful to the fellows—the contributors to this volume—for engaging in this common experience. Te ties between the fellows are leading to further scholarly cooperation.

Te Research Group was very active. During the residence period, we had a weekly *Jour Fixe*, which included discussions on pertinent publications, guest lectures, and presentations by the fellows. We also invited external scholars from abroad to our preparatory conferences and workshops, as well as colleagues from other research centres at Bielefeld University, such as the Center for InterAmerican Studies and the Institute for World Society Studies. Fellows gave lectures at the University. Te Research Group also made a trip to the Federal Social Court in Kassel, Germany. At the ZiF, we also had exchanges with another research group that investigated global labour markets.

Te Research Group organised a series of conferences and workshops, which included invited external speakers, whom we thank for their contributions, which supported the Group's work: Workshop "Understanding Southern Welfare—the B(R)ICS Countries", convened by Ulrike Davy, Lutz Leisering, and Benjamin Davy, 24–26 November 2014 (external speakers: Sandra Liebenberg, South Africa; Niraja Gopal Jayal, India; Marcus André Melo, Brazil; Yitu Yang, China; André van der Walt and Sue-Mari Viljoen, South Africa; Augusto Zimmermann, Brazil; and James Midgley, USA); Workshop "Social policies in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa: Towards a Deeper Understanding of Southern Welfare", convened by Ulrike Davy, Lutz Leisering, and Benjamin Davy, 23–25 November 2015 (external speakers: Marcus André Melo, Brazil; Shitong Qiao, Hong Kong; Andries du Toit, South Africa; and Vivek Nenmini Dileep, India); Workshop "Towards Understanding Southern Welfare: Preparatory Workshop for the ZiF Research Group", convened by Ulrike Davy, Lutz Leisering, and Benjamin Davy, 5–7 December 2016 (external speaker: Prerna Singh, USA/India); Seminar (law group) "Social Policies in Brazil, India, China and South Africa, Past and Present—Perspectives from Law", convened by Ulrike Davy, Albert Chen, Octavio Ferraz, Letlhokwa George Mpedi, and Sarbani Sen, 3–4 April 2018 (external speaker with a social science background: Frances Lund, South Africa); Workshop (social science group) "Hundred Years of Social Security in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa—the Rise of Social Ideas and Policies, 1920–2020", convened by Lutz Leisering, 12–13 July 2018; Workshop (law group) "Social Rights and Values in Middle-Income Countries—Brazil, India, China, and South Africa in Comparison", 16–17 July 2018; Closing Conference of the Zif Research Group "Understanding Southern Welfare—Social Policies in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa", convened by Ulrike Davy and Lutz Leisering, 11–12 July 2019 (external speakers: Kinglun Ngok, China; Ravi Ahuja, Germany; Leila Patel, South Africa; Sonia Fleury, Brazil; Sarah Cook, Australia; Eberhard Eichenhofer, Germany; and Göran Terborn, UK); Workshop (social science group) "Social Policy in Low and Middle-Income Countries: Perspectives of Comparative Research", convened by Lutz Leisering, 13 July 2019. Maria Virginia Lorena Ossio Bustillos coordinated all events.

Te chapters in this volume are all original, except for the chapter on India (Chap. 5) by Ravi Ahuja, who joined the group at a late stage and contributed a revised and shortened version of an earlier article. In addition to this volume, the fellows of the social science subgroup of the Research Group have also produced a number of articles,1 and the law group is editing their own volume.

Large-scale research endeavours incur many debts. First of all, I thank the ZiF and its staf for enabling this Research Group and providing a tremendously supportive environment for the fellows. Te staf was extremely committed to serving the needs of the fellows, and the Centre's fnancial and non-fnancial support was generous and unbureaucratic. I particularly thank Nesrin Ak, Tomas Balls-Ties, Daniela Brinkmann, Hans-Jürgen Brinkmann, Andreas Hellwig-Sellin, Marina Hofmann, Mary Kastner, Britta Padberg, Katharina Peters, Marc Schalenberg, Claudia Schumacher and her team, Claudia Schunck, Mo Tschache, Trixi Valentin, and others at the ZiF.

I am also deeply indebted to Maria Virginia Lorena Ossio Bustillos, who served as coordinator of the Research Group. Lorena contributed to the Group's work both as a scholar, providing her legal expertise and Latin American experience to the Group, and as an impeccable Group

<sup>1</sup>Hu, Aiqun (2016) Social insurance ideas in the People's Republic of China: a historical and transnational analysis. *Transnational Social Review* 6, 3: 297–312; Ondetti, Gabriel (2016) Te social function of property, land rights, and social welfare in Brazil. *Land Use Policy* 50: 29–37; Shi, Shih-Jiunn (2017) Reviving the dragon: social ideas and social policy development in Modern China. *Issues & Studies: A Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Afairs* 53, 3: 1–25; Pellissery, Sony, Amrutha Jose Pampackal, and Partha Bopaiah (2015) Caste and distributive justice: can social policy address durable inequalities? *Social Policy & Administration* 49, 6: 785–800; Pellissery, Sony and Ivar Lødemel (2020) Property and social citizenship: social policy beyond the North. *Social Policy and Society* 19, 2: 275–292 (the lead article of a themed section on "Property and Social Citizenship" edited by the authors).

organiser who was unceasing in her engagement. She also provided invaluable eforts furthering the social relationships within the Group and with the ZiF staf.

I also thank Benjamin Davy, who has been an inspiration due to his creative, non-mainstream thinking. He also forged links with colleagues from land-use studies and provided insight into land as a crucial dimension of social welfare that no longer fgures in the collective memory of European social policy but plays a major role in Southern countries.

I also thank Prerna Singh, who attended a preparatory conference. Although she could not join the Research Group for personal reasons, her sharp insights were important to the Group's work. I also thank Johannes Schmidt and André Kieserling from the Luhmann project at my university for tracing quotes by Niklas Luhmann in Luhmann's vast writings.

I also thank Cansu Erdoğan and Timotheus Brunotte, who acted as efcient and committed editorial assistants. My former secretary Else Lück also supported the work, as did Tobias Böger and Kerem Öktem. I am also indebted to my wife Maria, who hopes that this is the last book I did.

I thank Aad Blok, Executive Editor of the International Review of Social History, for allowing me to use a revised and shortened version of an article by Ravi Ahuja for this volume.

I thank Jennifer Koester for her perceptive, sophisticated, and highly committed language editing of the non-native speakers' contributions, and Wordvice for efcient organisation of the editing work. I also thank Flora Tomson-DeVeaux for translating Lena Lavinas' contribution from the Portuguese. Te ZiF funded both.

Te publication of this volume in the book series of the Collaborative Research Centre (CRC) 1342 "Global Dynamics of Social Policy" of the German Research Council was enabled by Lorraine Frisina Doetter, Kerstin Martens, and Irina Wiegand from Bremen University. I am most grateful to them.

Last but not least, I was happy to have Sharla Plant and Poppy Hull as very supportive and patient partners at Palgrave Macmillan. SPi Technologies India provided high-quality copy-editing. Tanks also go to the reviewers who provided extensive reviews on my book proposal. Te reviews infuenced and improved our work.

Open access of this publication was made possible through funding by the Collaborative Research Centre (CRC) 1342 "Global Dynamics of Social Policy", Specialised Information Service Political Science— POLLUX, and by Bielefeld University's Open Access Publication Fund.

Bielefeld, Germany Lutz Leisering May 2020

## **Contents**




**Index** 429

## **Notes on Contributors**

**Ravi Ahuja** is Professor and head of the Research Group "Modern Indian History" at the Centre for Modern Indian Studies, Georg-August-University Göttingen, Germany. He joined the Centre as its founding director in 2009. Before, he taught at the South Asia Institute in Heidelberg, conducted research at the Centre for Modern Oriental Studies in Berlin, and was appointed Professor of Modern South Asian History at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London. Ahuja has worked on various aspects of India's social history from the eighteenth to twentieth centuries, including urban history, the history of infrastructure, and the social history of war, on the social history of South Asian seafarers, and the emergence of a labour-centred social policy in mid-twentieth-century India. Ahuja published/edited seven books and numerous articles in German, Anglo-Saxon, and Indian journals and edited volumes.

**Aiqun Hu** is Associate Professor of Asian/Global History at Arkansas State University and member of the Guangdong Institute for Social Policy, China. She holds degrees from Chinese, British, and US universities. Hu's research focuses on China's social security in historical and global perspectives, China's pension reforms, global social insurance, and global social policy. Her articles have appeared in the *Journal of Global History*, *Journal of World History*, *World History Connected*, and *Chinese*  *Public Policy Review*. Her book *China's Social Insurance in the Twentieth Century: A Global Historical Perspective* (2015) covers both Taiwan and mainland China, and applies a unique global perspective.

**Lena Lavinas** is Professor of Welfare Economics at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Institute of Economics. She is a member of the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. As of late, she has been working on the impact of fnancialized capitalism on welfare regimes. Her topics of interest include healthcare and the links between private and public provision, the fnancialization of college education, the prevalence of monetary transfers over provisions in kind and the collateralization of social policy. She wrote the book *Te Takeover of Social Policy by Financialization. Te Brazilian Paradox* (Palgrave 2017). Journals in which her articles have appeared include the *New Left Review*, *Development and Change*, *Latin American Perspective*, *New Political Economy*, and the *International Social Security Review*.

**Lutz Leisering** is Professor Emeritus of Social Policy in the Faculty of Sociology, Bielefeld University, Germany, and founding member of the Institute for World Society Studies. He holds a PhD (econ.) from the London School of Economics, and Diploma (MPhil) in sociology from Bielefeld University and in mathematics from Bonn University. He has done research on social policy in Europe and the Global South, especially on old-age security, social assistance, international organizations, and the global difusion of ideas. His articles have appeared in leading social policy and sociology journals, including *Journal of Social Policy*, *International Journal of Social Welfare*, *Global Social Policy*, and *Journal of International Relations and Development*. He has published monographs with Cambridge University Press (1999) and Oxford University Press (2019, *Te Global Rise of Social Cash Transfers*) and has edited a fve-volume work on German social policy (Springer 2013). He is a national and international policy adviser and member of the Executive Board of HelpAge Germany.

**Gabriel Ondetti** is Professor of Political Science at Missouri State University. His research has focused on fscal and land rights issues in Latin America. His projects include a study of the political economy of the tax burden and an examination of the difusion and impact of the concept of the social function of property. Ondetti's research has appeared in scholarly journals such as *Global Social Policy*, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, *Land Use Policy*, and *Latin American Politics and Society*. He has written books on the Brazilian land reform movement (2008) and the politics of taxation in Latin America (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

**Sony Pellissery** is a professor and Director of the Institute of Public Policy, National Law School of India University, Bengaluru. He is a public policy specialist with special interest in distributive justice across a broad range of issues. After his doctoral degree from Oxford University, he served as an associate professor at the Institute of Rural Management, Anand. In 2009 he won the India Social Science Research award for his academic contributions. His monograph *Te Politics of Social Protection in Rural India* (2009) investigates the limits of policies to reach the poorest sections where social forces constrain the state. His articles have appeared, among others, in *Journal of Social Policy*, *International Journal of Social Welfare*, *Gender and Development*, *Journal of Social Quality*, and *Social Policy and Society*.

**Jeremy Seekings** is Professor of Political Studies and Sociology and Director of the Centre for Social Science Research at the University of Cape Town, South Africa, and Visiting Professor of Political Science and African Studies at Yale University. He holds a BA and DPhil Oxon. He is among the pioneers of a theoretically founded and empirically based comparative study of welfare state-building in the Global South, covering Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. He also specializes in the politics and economics of distribution and redistribution in South Africa, in the sociology of work, and race and class in comparative perspective. His interests concern the making and implementation of welfare policy in Africa and the Caribbean from the late colonial period to the present. His numerous contributions to journals include articles in the *Journal of African History, Current Sociology*, and the *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*. His most recent book is a co-edited volume, *Te Politics of Social Protection in Eastern and Southern Africa* (2019).

**Shih-Jiunn Shi** is a professor at the Graduate Institute of National Development, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan. His felds of research include comparative social policy with a particular regional focus on mainland China and Taiwan, and EU social policy. He has conducted research projects on the development of social policy in Greater China and is collaborating with other scholars in research on East Asian Social Policy, now also including Japan. Special topics covered include old-age security, rural social security, federalism in welfare states, and the role of ideas. His articles have appeared in renowned journals, including the *Journal of Social Policy*, *Social Policy & Administration*, *Policy and Politics*, *International Journal of Social Welfare*, *Ageing & Society*, and *Public Management Review*.

**Marianne S. Ulriksen** is an associate professor at the University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Department of Political Science and Public Management, and the Danish Centre for Welfare Studies (DaWS). She is afliated to the Centre for Social Development in Africa (CSDA), University of Johannesburg, as a senior research fellow. Ulriksen's research areas include comparative politics, political economy of welfare policy development, social protection, social justice, poverty and inequality, resource mobilization and taxation, and state-citizens relations. Her research work focuses on Southern and Eastern Africa. Her articles have appeared in top journals like *World Development*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Global Social Policy*, *Development Policy Review*, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, and *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*.

# **List of Figures**


#### **xxii List of Figures**


# **List of Tables**



# **Part I**

**Introduction**

# **1**

# **Social Protection in the Global South: An Ideational and Historical Approach**

**Lutz Leisering**

## **Towards a New Approach to Analysing Social Policy in the Global South1**

Te centres of gravity in the world are shifting. Some of the countries formerly referred to as developing or Tird World countries are emerging as global players in terms of their share of the global economy, world population, and international political power. Tese shifts are changing the face of global society in many ways. As regards social welfare, we2 cannot simply expect that the Northern concept of the "welfare state" will "travel" to the Global South. Gough and Terborn (2010: 711) posit

L. Leisering (\*)

<sup>1</sup> I thank Sony Pellissery, Jeremy Seekings, Marianne Ulriksen, and Timotheus Brunotte for comments on an earlier draft. I am also indebted to Tobias Böger and Shih-Jiunn Shi for advice. Timotheus Brunotte helped to collect the data on the four countries.

<sup>2</sup> "We" in the introduction refers to views discussed and shared by the contributors of the volume, whereas "I" refers to the author's views and arguments.

Department of Sociology, Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany e-mail: lutz.leisering@uni-bielefeld.de

that the "developmental paths of European welfare states are not likely to be repeated" elsewhere. Some writers even question the possible spread of formal social protection programmes in the South on cultural grounds (Rieger and Leibfried 2004; Walker and Wong 1996). Te global future of public welfare will be shaped by the Global South. At present, the majority of the population in the South lack formal social protection. What ideas and institutional models of public welfare are developing in the Global South?

"If we want to know where to go, we have to know where we came from" (Kaufmann 2012: 1). Accordingly, this volume investigates the evolution of social protection ideas and policies in four key middleincome countries—Brazil, China, India, and South Africa—from the 1920s to the present day. We seek to trace the formative ideas and models that have inspired key actors in these four countries and defned institutional paths in order to "understand" Southern welfare. We begin with the early twentieth century, because, as we argue, the history of social policy in the South had already started before World War II (Midgley 1984: 1). In all four countries, intellectuals debated the use of social insurance as a "modern" kind of social welfare as early as the 1920s, and the frst social legislation was passed.

Te post-war welfare state in Europe was part of the rise of "democratic welfare capitalism"—the mixed or "hyphenated society" (Marshall 1981a). Today, these countries spend 20–35 per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on monetary transfers and social services. In the Global South, other developments prevailed during those decades, such as struggles for political and/or economic independence, decolonialisation, nation-building, and "development". State-provided social protection mostly took a back seat, and state social spending has continued to be low through the present day, making up regional averages of 5–13 per cent of GDP with outliers around 2 and 20 per cent. Only selected groups were covered. However, since the late 1990s, social protection policy has moved higher up on the agendas of many Southern governments and international development organisations. Social cash transfers to the poor mushroomed in the South in the 2000s and 2010s and provided a modicum of social protection to sections of the population that had previously been excluded. Brazil, China, and South Africa all pioneered social cash transfer programmes (Barrientos 2013; Leisering 2019), and the Indian Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act has also received much attention in the global development community.

Tese recent developments have been much discussed in global political and scholarly arenas, but the early history of social policy in the Global South is only beginning to be researched—unlike the evolution of the Northern welfare state, which scholars have comprehensively analysed both in empirical and theoretical terms (comparative studies include Rimlinger 1971; Flora and Heidenheimer 1981; Alber 1982; Lindert 2004a, b). A whole continent of early social policy in the Global South awaits discovery.

Tis volume contributes to the flling of three research gaps by adopting a *historical, ideational, and source-based approach*.

First, although research on formal social protection programmes and policies in the South has cropped up since the mid-2000s, this literature has a *presentist* bias, focusing on changes since the 1990s and even more on changes since the 2000s, when "social protection"—a term which tends to supersede the older term "social security"—became a new paradigm for development policy (Holzmann et al. 2003). Te global social policy literature barely takes notice of the small but growing body of research on Southern social policy during colonial and early post-colonial times.3 Similarly, in the historical memory of Southern societies and general historical studies of the South, social policy does not normally fgure in a major way. To understand and explain Southern welfare policies, therefore, this volume pursues a *historical* approach that traces the development of social protection ideas and policies in the four middle-income countries back to the 1920s.

Te historical perspective implies attention to timing, critical junctures, founding moments, and historical "paths" (Mahoney and Telen 2015). Lustick (1996) warns against a possible bias created when social

<sup>3</sup>However, see Midgley and Piachaud (2011), Seekings (2007a, b, 2011, 2013, 2016), Lewis and Lloyd-Sherlock (2009), Lindner (2014), Hu and Manning (2010), and Schmitt et al. (2015) (the latter two on the global history of social insurance), Schmitt (2015) on colonies, Collier and Messick (1975) on the historical sequences of social security adoption worldwide, Hort and Kuhnle (2000) on adoption sequences in Southeast Asia. See also the pioneering study by Midgley (1984).

scientists draw selectively on extant historiographical studies. Social scientists have to be careful, especially if there is a rich and long tradition of historiographical studies in the feld under investigation rather than an undisputed "historical record" (Lustick 1996: 615). However, in the feld of social protection, such tradition is absent, and the contributors to this volume themselves act as historians. In fact, two of the contributors are historians (Hu and Ahuja), and the author of two other chapters (Seekings) has a record of primary source-based historical studies.

Historical and comparative small n research (i.e. with few cases) has "played a central role in driving the agenda of research on welfare states" (Amenta and Hicks 2010: 118) and seems promising also for the South. Concentrating on a few cases enables in-depth primary research, and the comparative and historical perspectives may also contribute to theorising social policy by revealing the varieties of social policies. Even in research on the Global North, comparative qualitative historical studies are rare, especially comprehensive studies of welfare states rather than particular programmes (Rimlinger 1971, Pinker 1979, de Swaan 1988, Kaufmann 2013a; partially quantitative: Flora and Alber 1981).

Second, in the Weberian tradition, this volume focuses on the *ideas* that underpin social policies. While most policy studies centre on the interests of and struggles between actors, such as political parties, business, and workers, and analyse, for example, corporatism, cross-class alliances, political settlements (for the Global South, see Lavers and Hickey 2016), and political alignments (Haggard and Kaufman 2008), we examine the ideas that underlie social policies and, from a constructivist point of view, even co-defne interests. By "ideas" we not only and not even primarily mean broad ideologies and values, such as liberalism, social democracy, or social justice, but complex, multi-layered confgurations of ideas that encompass broad ideas as well as more specifc normative and cognitive ideas: beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, theories, and images relating to welfare institutions, social problems, statehood, and visions of society. In the Introduction, I develop a multi-layered model of social ideas—the "onion skin model"—which has the *social question* as the pivot. Raising the "social question" means that a society recognises social issues in a generalised way as a key concern of society to be addressed by the state, linked to a call for political remedies. Te underlying assumption is that the state is responsible for individual welfare.

By focusing on ideas, the volume also seeks to contribute to a *theory* of "social policy in development contexts" (UNRISD 2001; Gough et al. 2004), which is a desideratum (for a call for theory, see, e.g. Surender 2013: 29). Most studies on global social policy are reports by or for international organisations or case studies, and/or have a descriptive character and practical concerns or are interspersed with advocacy.

Tis introduction tackles the theorisation of Southern welfare in four steps (next four sections): (a) I start by sketching out a methodological framework, a constructivist sociology of knowledge approach, which brings in ideas in a constitutive way akin to constructivist and discursive institutionalism. Te next three steps relate to substantive theorisation. (b) I discuss four basic strategies for theorising Southern welfare, and I opt for starting from Northern welfare state theories to be modifed for a globally applicable theory. (c) I draw on the rich tradition of explanatory theories of Northern welfare state development and specify modifcations. (d) Eventually, I develop a new, multi-layered model of social ideas, visualised as an onion with layers—therefore called the "onion skin model". Te model combines elements from the (small) tradition of ideational welfare state theories.

Tird, the volume goes back to historical *sources*, that is, to original documents like parliamentary records and manifestos that refect the views of contemporary actors. Te idea is to give a voice to domestic elites and social movements, rather than imposing preconceived concepts from Northern welfare state research on Southern societies. Tis volume's authors come from the countries under investigation or have roots in them, which helps the authors to read and contextualise contemporary documents. Such contributions are signifcant because systematic recourse to documents is not widespread in the social policy literature.

We assume that over the last hundred years, social policy, by and large, has expanded in many Southern countries and, sometimes linked, gained prominence on the agendas of international organisations. We seek to trace and partially explain this process in our four countries. Our general *research question* is: What changes in ideas among elites and the citizenry underpinned—or inhibited—the rise of social protection policies? When did basic "social" categories and terms like "social problems" and "social security" emerge? What contestations accompanied the evolution of social protection? More specifcally we inquire:


Te concluding chapter of the volume discusses the fndings of the country-centric chapters in comparative and theoretical terms.

We chose Brazil, China, India, and South Africa because in all four countries public welfare programmes have expanded since the 1990s (Tillin and Duckett 2017; India the least), and they cover all non-European continents except Australia and the Pacifc. Te history of the four countries includes democratic, semi-democratic, and authoritarian regimes. Surprisingly, scholars have rarely analysed social policy in the four countries comparatively, and not with a focus on ideas or from a historical perspective. Tillin and Duckett (2017) focus on politics, OECD (2010), Rodgers (2013), and Fakier and Ehmke (2014) on employment-related issues, and practical concerns for "extending social security" drove the study by the International Social Security Association (ISSA 2013). Tis volume is closest to Midgley and Piachaud (2013) who focus on institutions (of social protection). Teir volume provides valuable descriptions of the institutional arrangements for social protection in the four countries, including broad contexts and history. Tey do not take the spread of social protection for granted (Piachaud and Midgley 2013: 276f.) and address the challenge of aligning welfare goals with economic and other goals (Midgley 2013: 17–20). Tey also address ideas, via policy goals. While all this has an afnity to the approach taken in our volume, Midgley and Piachaud's research is not conceived as a source-based and theory-driven study of ideas.

Te volume by Breman et al. (2019a) addresses the social question in selected countries from all world regions, including our four countries, but is primarily concerned with objective socio-economic conditions rather than the ways that politics and society articulated these conditions as the social question. Te focus is on labour issues and class actors. In this Marxist approach, ideas only fgure in broad terms as class-related ideologies, especially neoliberalism and social democracy. Breman et al. (2019b: 245, 249) diagnose a recent global "return of the social question" which, however, as they argue, powerful global actors currently seek to limit and prevent.

Why *social protection*? In Global North countries, social protection is the key focus of the welfare state and accounts for the bulk of social spending: income maintenance and health are the biggest items. Almost everyone is covered, and social protection has increasingly shaped people's lives in these countries. But in many countries of the Global South, social protection is thin.

We chose the term "social protection" for the title of this volume because there is not one overarching term that was used throughout the last hundred years and in all countries, and, furthermore, "social protection" has come to complement or even replace the term social security in international debates since around the year 2000. "Social security" is the older term, but was not used throughout the world and past either. Te International Labour Organization (ILO), the original champion of the concept of "social security", switched to using "social protection" in the second edition of its "World Social Protection Report" (ILO 2017). Not using the term "social security" in our title also avoids references to US usage, which is largely restricted to old-age security.

Te meaning of the term "social security" varies between authors, as does the meaning of "social protection". "Social protection" often covers (contributory) social insurance, non-contributory provisions and allowances, social assistance, and labour rights, whereas authors tend to more narrowly defne "social security" as mainly social insurance and social assistance. "Social security" is a term with a considerable history, encapsulating much of the history of social policy (Petersen and Béland 2014: 298). If and how the term "social security" emerged and how it was defned is part of the studies presented in this volume. In the concluding chapter of this volume, I will discuss the term and idea of social security in greater detail. Te volume focuses on what nowadays is mostly viewed as "social security"; labour rights that relate to the workplace and to collective action are mostly excluded. Health is included regarding entitlements to medical services, through social insurance, but not regarding the provision of services.

Te Introduction focuses on theorising, in four steps as explained above (next four sections). After the theoretical sections, there is a section that provides basic data on the history, the international context, and the socio-economic condition of the four countries. Te Introduction concludes with a section that summarises the volume's chapters.

## **Ideas: A Constructivist Sociology of Knowledge Approach**

"Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, directly determine people's actions. But: the 'world views' created by 'ideas' have, like a switchboard operator, often set the future course according to which the dynamics of interests have conditioned action" (Max Weber, translated by Ryan DeLaney; in Lepsius 2017: 23).4 In this famous quote, Max Weber identifes interests and ideas as the key forces of social action but places a special emphasis on ideas. Ideas provide legitimacy for interests and mobilise people. Yet more fundamentally, ideas may even co-constitute—shape, defne, and redefne—interests in the frst place. In this sense, the contributions to this volume do not aim to provide histories of ideas as such. Rather, they are about ideas that matter in politics and how they matter.

<sup>4</sup>German original: "Interessen (materielle und ideelle), nicht: Ideen, beherrschen unmittelbar das Handeln der Menschen. Aber: die 'Weltbilder', welche durch 'Ideen' geschafen wurden, haben sehr oft als Weichensteller die Bahnen bestimmt, in denen die Dynamik der Interessen das Handeln fortbewegte" (Weber 1978: 252).

To grasp the impact of ideas, an in-depth analysis of ideas is required. Lepsius (2017: 23–25, 33), a major Weber scholar, writes on Weber:

"His body of work is pervaded with the efort to analyze the intertwining of interests and ideas … ideas need to be unfolded in their cognitive structure in order to recognize the relevance for action contained within the ideas' characteristics… . Only when this is done can their actual importance for the actions of individuals and collectives and for institutionalization processes be identifed. As long as ideas are described in general terms and their internal structure is not determined, their consequences for social action also cannot be exactly specifed, and social behavior cannot be attributed to them… . this agenda does not imply an idealistic philosophy of history… . the focus here is on the empirically demonstrable attribution of social phenomena to cultural elements… . Interests and ideas … describe two analytical perspectives … [that] must be viewed in their complementarity."

Accordingly, our theoretical aim is to model the cognitive structure of the ideas that constitute the feld of social policy. To this end, I have developed a multi-layered ideational model, the "onion skin model", which is refected in the chapters of this volume.

References to ideas are common in the Northern *welfare state literature*, especially normative approaches that defne social policy through values such as equality, solidarity, social justice, or security. Political economy approaches also take into account ideas by distinguishing class-based ideologies—liberalism, conservatism, social democracy—that are viewed as characterising diferent welfare regimes with social democracy as the hallmark of fully fedged welfare statism (Esping-Andersen 1990). In comparative empirical research, these ideologies fgure as the doctrines of the political parties in power. Values and ideologies obviously matter in social policy development, but it is more specifc ideas that shape policies and the problems addressed by them. In the research on developed welfare states, the social construction of the problems addressed is mostly taken for granted and left unexplored like the defnition of the social risks that social protection programmes address (explicitly so, e.g. by Baldwin 1990: 12, FN 10). However, in a historical analysis of the rise of social policy, we need to trace when and how such categories were constructed in the frst place.

Te ideational or discursive turn in *policy analysis* has also drawn attention to ideas5 but mostly refers to ideas in particular policy processes, like explaining the introduction of a certain welfare programme, rather than to the ideational foundations of social policy in the history of a country. However, we can use Hall's (1993) concepts of "policy paradigms" and "paradigm shifts" to detect more far-reaching ideational changes in policies. *Development economics* is more interested in issues of fnance and policy implementation than in ideas. When ideas are systematically addressed, this is done by way of normative theory, which discusses, for example, how poverty should be defned and social justice be conceived and what fnancial allocation is optimal (e.g. Barrientos 2013), rather than investigating the ideas held by actors. However, social policy is not only about fnancial fows, redistribution, and administration but also about ideas and social recognition (Kaufmann 2012: 251, 255–256; 2015: 12–18).

Our analysis of ideas is based on fve assumptions.

First, ideas matter for social policy. Ideas may imbue actors with a purpose beyond simple considerations of utility and material interests. "Whenever afective orientations can be collectively mobilised towards certain ideas, as recently happened with regard to peace and environmental concerns or female emancipation, there is a chance for new, powerful elements of normative culture" (Kaufmann 1991: 23; transl. L.L.).

Second, whereas recent ideational approaches in policy research mostly take ideas as a distinct factor besides other factors (Fischer 2003; overview von Gliszczynski 2015: ch. 1), exerting infuence only under certain circumstances of, for example, instability and crisis (Blyth 2002; Béland 2009; Campbell 2002), we adopt a *constructivist* sociology of knowledge approach based on the assumption that ideas and knowledge pervade politics and thereby co-constitute interests, institutions, and policies (Nullmeier 2003). Te challenge, therefore, is to analyse how contemporary actors constructed interests, institutions, and policies. Te constructivist perspective also helps us avoid Eurocentrism.

<sup>5</sup> Ideational approaches to policy research emerged in the North in the 1990s. For a discussion, see von Gliszczynski (2015: 8–13), for proponents see V.A. Schmidt (2008, "discursive institutionalism") and Béland (2009). Early proponents include Heclo (1974, see especially 305–306) and Hall (1993).

Tird, from the perspective of interpretive sociology, we emphasise that ideas are subject to *interpretations* by actors, with interpretations varying across time and space. In this way, we extend the constructivist approach to apply to ideas. For example, basic ideas like human rights, "development", "inclusion", and "poverty" can be interpreted in very different ways, leading to diferent policies.

Fourth, the focus on "ideas" is not only about the broad ideologies and values that are at the forefront of social policy debates but also about more *specifc* normative and cognitive categories that constitute policymaking and institution building. Substantial social policy is predicated on the emergence of specifc "social" categories or "social knowledge" in politics and society (Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1996). Pereira and Bertholini (2017), for example, fnd that the belief in "social inclusion" cuts across political ideologies in post-1988 Brazil. Te historical rise of social protection relies on the formation of "social" concepts that relate to social problems, such as poverty or disability, to ideational models of welfare programmes like "social security" or "social insurance", or to statehood. Epistemic communities, political parties, and social policy communities may entrench the emerging social categories in policymaking. We can conceptualise the infux of "social" concepts and categories as a "socialisation" of politics (Leisering 2019: 325f.). Socialisation may include the rise of new ideas and actors as well as a social specifcation of older and more general ideas (like Christian thought or Confucianism) and actors.

Fifth, the ideas articulated early on in a country's development may create a *path* for future development. Tis is why ideas matter beyond single policy acts and why a historical-ideational approach can help us to understand present-day social policy. Ideas—especially how the "social question" is articulated early on—shape institution building in the feld of public welfare (Kaufmann 2013a: 32f.). For instance, defning the social question as the workers' question is likely to lead to the introduction of employment-based contributory social insurance programmes as the mainstay of a country's social protection arrangement as it did in nineteenth-century Germany under Bismarck. Trough epistemic and policy communities that operate as the bearers of ideas, social ideas may acquire a degree of relative autonomy and independent dynamics. Path-dependent development does not mean determination, but, instead, indicates the social costs of changing an institutional path. A path may be transformed, for example, by a new interpretation of the idea that defnes the path, such as the idea of "social insurance".

All in all, our approach incorporates elements from historical, discursive, and constructivist institutionalism (Peters 2012; for historical institutionalism in social policy research see Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1996).

Tere is a vast literature that focuses on causes and efects of welfare states, but only a few scholars have investigated the nature of the welfare state as an ideational and cultural project.6 Te ideational and cultural strand of welfare state research is part of the pluralist Weberian-Durkheimian tradition, which conceives of social policy as a response to broad processes of modernisation rather than merely a response to capitalism, as assumed in the Marxist and political economy traditions (see the analysis of theoretical approaches by Alber 1982: 73–88 and Pinker 1971: ch. 1). From a pluralist angle, a broad range of ideas beyond classbased ideologies come into view. Te pluralist tradition represents an almost-forgotten, mostly sociological approach to the study of the welfare state and has been eclipsed by political economy approaches. Te ideational approach in this volume builds on the pluralist strand of research.

Assuming that the spread of public welfare is predicated on far-reaching changes in collective mindsets, the pluralist authors take a historical approach to welfare state analysis. Tomas Humphrey Marshall (1950) analyses the rise of the idea and institutions of equality in the wake of state-building, focusing on social rights and their societal requisites, which includes a "welfare consciousness" among citizens and elites (Marshall 1981b: 89) and the formation of social professions. Although Marshall is the most frequently quoted theorist of the welfare state, it is

<sup>6</sup>For the UK, see Marshall (1950, 1981a, b) and Pinker (1979); for the United States, see Janowitz (1976) and Heclo (1995); for the Netherlands, de Swaan (1988) and van Kersbergen (1995); for Germany, Kaufmann (1991, 1997, 2013a, 2012), Nullmeier (2000), Zacher (2013), and Achinger (1979, frst published 1958); for India, see Singh (2015a, b); and for social anthropology and Southeast Asia, see von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann (1994). Lessenich (2003) and Béland and Petersen (2014) explore basic concepts of the welfare state and of social policy, respectively. John W. Meyer's (2009) neo-institutionalist theory of world society posits the existence of a "world culture" that took of in the 1940s and includes ideas of social progress, a growing awareness of social problems, and statehood.

rarely acknowledged that his work follows a constructivist methodology, which difers from mainstream research (see the reconstruction in Leisering 2019: 51–56).

Abram de Swaan (1988) analyses the rise of a "social conscience" in Western societies and related new confgurations of knowledge among citizens and elites, such as professionalisation and the "protoprofessionalisation" of the citizens. Franz-Xaver Kaufmann (2015) conceives of the welfare state as a demanding and historically unlikely "cultural idea"7 imbued with national "intellectual traditions", even "autonomous cosmologies… It begins with the terms that are used and the associations they bear, carries over into diferent fundamental notions about the relationship between state and society, and culminates in diferent social policy ideals and the articulation of the problems these entail" (Kaufmann 2013a: 33).

In this cultural sense, Kaufmann (2013c: 31) classifes the United States as "capitalism" rather than a "welfare state". Robert Pinker (1979) argues that the notions of social obligations among citizens precede the notion of rights and do not necessarily support state-provided welfare. It is the "subtle interplay of loyalties which characterize people's notions of welfare obligation and entitlement" (Pinker 1979: 10), and allegiance to the state is only one of several nested socio-spatial loyalties, which include family, local community, and international community.

#### **Strategies for Theorising Southern Welfare**

Studies on formal social security in the South are relatively recent. Well into the 1990s, development scholars equated "social security" in the South with informal relationships between kin and within small communities (e.g. Lachenmann 1997). Te bulk of the research on state-led welfare was case studies, often of a descriptive nature (however, see Midgley 1984 and von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann

<sup>7</sup>For cultural theories of social policy, see also Pfau-Efnger (2005, 2009), Ullrich (2003), and van Oorschot et al. (2008). For religious roots see van Kersbergen (1995), van Kersbergen and Manow (2009), and Rieger and Leibfried (2004) on Confucianism.

1994). Other studies focused on subsistence production as a livelihood (Arbeitsgruppe Bielefelder Entwicklungssoziologen 1979) or interpreted work in the informal sector of the economy as a "quest for security" (Evers et al. 1983). Anthropological studies of developing countries used to focus on informal relationships and livelihoods rather than new, formal welfare institutions.8 Macro theories relevant to the study of development—post-colonial theories, cultural studies, theories of economic growth, and theories of global capitalism—help to contextualise social policy but arguably are too broad to explain specifc policies and institution building.9 At the same time, research on Northern welfare states had almost completely neglected countries in the Global South until the 2000s. Pioneering comparative studies include Gough et al. (2004) and Haggard and Kaufman (2008).

What theories, then, are appropriate for analysing "social policy in development contexts"? We can distinguish *four strategies for theory building:* drawing on "old" (extant) theories, designing new ones, adapting old theories to make them applicable to the Global South, and producing a generalised theory that applies to both North and South.

Te frst strategy would mean simply applying theories and conceptual instruments familiar from research on Northern welfare states to the South—"testing old theories in new surroundings" (Kangas 2012: 73). Generally, moving to a new feld of investigation (here: the South) does not necessarily entail constructing new theories. Te same factors could be relevant but the values could be diferent, such as minor industrialisation or a weak role for trade unions. By defnition, developing a "theory" is ascertaining general patterns that shed light on diverse cases. Using Northern-based theories, however, might entail a Euro-centric bias that produces a negative perspective on Southern welfare, such as pointing out the "underdevelopment" of social welfare or the absence of ideas about the future among Southern citizens and, therefore, of the idea of social security (for a critique see von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann 1994).

<sup>8</sup>However, see the legal anthropologists von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann (1994)'s early study questioning the distinction between formal and informal welfare.

<sup>9</sup>Yet, see Lavinas (2017 and 2018) who relates the recent rise of social cash transfers to changes in global capitalism, especially the fnancialisation of social relationships.

Te second strategy argues for designing new concepts and theoretical tools from scratch, tailored to development contexts. Yet, it is not plausible that the broad repertoire of concepts and theories on social policy that Northern welfare state research has produced since the 1970s should be entirely irrelevant to the study of formal welfare in the South, since basic institutions, like social insurance and social assistance, are similar, at least formally.

Te third strategy occupies an intermediate position between applying old theories and inventing new ones. Te idea is to start from "old" concepts from Northern research and strip them of their Northern origins by adapting and re-specifying them in view of Southern conditions, as Gough (2008) explored and Böger and Leisering (2020) implemented in a case study.

Te fourth strategy would also start from Northern concepts but, rather than adapting them to the South, would aim at creating a general theory of social policy that covers both North and South—a global theory of social policy. Tis would mean not surrendering but qualifying the ingrained distinction between the North and South. In a broader sense, Midgley (2017: 201–204) calls for a "one world perspective". A generalised (global) approach would refer to *general* categories of social protection that we can expect to matter in most countries (see von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann 1994), such as "social" contingencies (like widowhood or ill-health), related regulations (embedded in social relationships, like family life and community, or under specialised agencies, such as grain stores or hospitals), and collective agents (like family, kin, tribes, and states). Such a conceptual model does not presuppose the specifc institutions, ideas, and societal contexts that have characterised the historical (Northern and Western) European experience of welfare statism.10 We can re-specify this kind of generalised model for either Southern or Northern conditions or, for that matter, to any country under investigation, whether Northern or Southern. Tis volume pursues the fourth strategy, which I develop in the next sections.

<sup>10</sup>For a discussion of the pioneers of a generalised North-South theory of social policy (Ian Gough, Jeremy Seekings, and Franz and Kebeet von Benda-Beckmann), see Leisering (2019: 28–32).

## **Explanatory Theories of Social Policy**

Te most common approach to analysing social policy in Northern welfare state research is *political economy*, which Esping-Andersen (1990) exemplifes. Students of political economy centre their analysis on the capital and labour divide and conceive of social policy as a response to structural problems in formal labour markets under capitalism, politically driven by class-based actors and the grand, nineteenth-century European ideologies—liberalism, conservatism, and social democracy. Te Power Resources Approach, in particular (re-stated by Korpi 2006), focuses on the struggles between employers and the labour movement and related political parties. Tese theorists defne the purpose of social policy as "decommodifcation", that is, relieving workers from the pressure to sell their labour in the labour market (Esping-Andersen 1990). Social policy creates "forms of existence outside the labour market" (Ofe 1984: 94) by which workers can survive if they are unemployed, sick, or old, through unemployment beneft, sick pay, and old-age pensions. Some scholars have applied a political economy approach to the comparative study of Southern countries, for example, classifying Southern welfare regimes using Esping-Andersen's typology of liberal, conservative, and social democratic welfare state regimes (e.g. Barrientos 2009).

Yet, key concepts of the classical political economy approach are of limited use in the South. Esping-Andersen's concept of decommodifcation presupposes wholesale commodifcation of labour, but labour in the South is predominantly informal, and the division between capital and labour is not as dominant as in the North. In many Southern countries, labour movements look diferent or play a lesser role than ethnic or religious movements (for India, see Singh 2015a, b). Moreover, the great ideologies of nineteenth-century Europe that defne political party lines (liberalism, conservatism, and social democracy) are absent or take on diferent shapes in the South. Te decommodifcation index (Esping-Andersen 1990) and the similar generosity index (Scruggs 2007), which measure the quality of entitlements to social security benefts, make little sense if Southern politics does not address some of the key risks that the indices cover, or if programmes that cover certain risks exclude the majority of the population, especially the rural population, migrant workers, or persons in the informal urban labour sector. Moreover, clientelism and clan rule may eclipse formal political institutions and legal entitlements.

Tillin and Duckett (2017), in their theoretical framework for the study of social policy in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, also qualify the power of explanatory factors common in political economy, such as political parties and ideologies, organised labour, and economic globalisation. Instead they draw attention to domestic political factors like political leaders and policy entrepreneurs, ideas, federalism, courts, and the perceived quality of government.

Nevertheless, political economy approaches in the broader sense, which emphasise the impact of economic structures on politics, have contributed to the study of Southern welfare, especially for middleincome countries (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Huber and Stephens 2012 for Latin America; Mares and Carnes 2009; Rudra 2007). Rudra (2007) analyses varieties of decommodifcation in the South, while Mares and Carnes (2009) examine the impact of authoritarian governments. Haggard and Kaufman (2008) highlight "production regimes", "growth models", and "critical realignments" that denote changes in the confguration of power resources. Ulriksen (2012) draws attention to the role of taxation, and Lavinas (2017, 2018) emphasises the impact of the fnancialisation of global capitalism on domestic welfare politics. Gough's global approach builds on Esping-Andersen's concept of "welfare regime" but generalises the concept by stripping it of political economy features (Wood and Gough 2006; Abu Sharkh and Gough 2010).

Including, but going beyond political economy, Northern research has produced a comprehensive explanatory model of the emergence and expansion of the Northern welfare states—the *orthodox model* (Gough 2008: 5; for early integrated models see Gough 1979, Flora and Alber 1981, Alber 1982, Uusitalo 1984, and Huber et al. 1993). Te orthodox model summarises and integrates the explanatory factors used in the literature, even though few authors make full use of all factors. According to the comprehensive model, three main groups of factors account for welfare state development:


Tis is the "Tree Is" model, which includes the components: Industrialisation, Interests, and Institutions.

In a seminal, but rarely exploited meta-theoretical article, Gough (2008) discusses the need for revising the orthodox explanatory model in view of developmental contexts in the Global South. For each of the three groups of factors—Industrialisation, Interests, and Institutions— Gough discusses the potential diferences between the North and South, and he adds two more groups of factors, namely Ideas and International Infuences, which we can expect to particularly matter in the South. Tis results in a model with fve groups of factors that Gough terms the "Five Is" (Fig. 1.1).

Te Five-Is model illustrates the complex multi-causality of social policy (for an application of Gough's model to social pensions see Böger and Leisering 2020). Te breadth of the groups of factors and the factors within each group may seem unsatisfactory because the model does not ofer a simple answer to the question of what drives welfare state development. Tis is a key message of the Five-Is model: grand theories that centre on one key factor like global capitalism or post-colonialism— "primacy theories" (Luhmann 1997: 571; transl. L.L.)—are of little avail when attempting to explain social policy (Alber 1982: 201). Instead, a "combination of structural factors, interest-based mobilisation, political institutions, and policy discourses has determined patterns of social policy development… Social policy… [is]… embedded in structural, political, and institutional contexts" (Gough 2008: 63). Te Five-Is model

**Fig. 1.1** A simple model of social policymaking (the "Five Is"). (*Source*: Gough 2008: 44)

implies that a range of demanding requisites must be met in order for a comprehensive social policy arrangement to emerge.

Tis volume focuses on the ideational requisites (Ideas), in interaction with the other four Is. I argue that ideas are no less relevant than socioeconomic power relationships (Interests) and political regimes (Institutions) and that ideas co-constitute the other "Is", following a constructivist methodology. A recent example of the way that ideas coconstitute interests is the emergence of new, individualised theories of economic development and the agency of the poor during the 1990s (von Gliszczynski 2015; von Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016). Te new concepts make an economic case for social cash transfers to the poor by identifying the poor as agents of development and economic growth and conceiving of transfers to the poor as economic investment: "growth through redistribution" (von Gliszczynski 2015: 84–85). Previously, the poor had predominantly been seen as mere victims and as unable to use cash rationally.

Te ffth "I", "International Infuences", includes ideas. International infuences were signifcant in the history of Northern social policy right from the beginning in the late nineteenth century but are particularly important in the Global South. When Southern social policy began to emerge, Northern countries had already established welfare states that Southern countries could observe and use as models. As early as the 1920s, some Chinese and Indian intellectuals identifed the Northern model of social insurance as an instance of modernity that they could use to overcome the "backwardness" of their own countries, although others were critical of ILO models (Seekings 2008a). Southern policymakers considered diverse Northern programmes as models (for China see Hu 2015, 2016; Leisering et al. 2017) in the light of their scarcity of domestic legal and administrative expertise. Moreover, international organisations engage much more in domestic policies in Southern than Northern countries. In global discourses, social policy principles have been articulated since the "welfare internationalism" of the 1940s (Kaufmann 2012: ch. 4). In particular, the UN has championed human rights, and, since the 1990s, international organisations have increasingly turned to social issues (see Deacon et al. 1997: 3) and infuenced domestic social policies worldwide.

When analysing the historical rise of social security policies in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa since the 1920s, we need to treat the Five Is as evolving social forces. Te research question then is: have "social" Interests, Institutions, Ideas, and International Infuences evolved at all, and, if so, when, based on what ideas, and with what impact.

### **Conceptualising Social Policy Ideas: A Multi-layered Model11**

In order to follow Max Weber's ideational methodology depicted above, we need to trace the cognitive structure of ideas that constitute social policies. Te model of the ideational structure of social policy that I present in this section difers from common conceptualisations in two respects. First, I use highly *generalised* concepts and categories that do not presuppose any specifc social value or norm, in line with the fourth

<sup>11</sup>Tis section draws on Leisering (2019: 34–46).

**Fig. 1.2** The ideational fabric of social policy—the onion skin model. (*Source*: The author)

strategy for theorising social policy that I described above. Second, rather than naming single, broad ideas, like values or ideologies, I conceive of a complex *multi-layered* fabric of social ideas.12

I conceive of four layers, ranging from the concrete to the abstract: models of welfare institutions; policy paradigms, including social problem defnitions; social questions; and collective social responsibility. Frames are a ffth, outer layer or a cross-cutting dimension. Te model can be visualised as an *onion* with several layers (Fig. 1.2).13

Te four dimensions highlight the challenges that any country faces when seeking to establish substantial social protection policies and institutions in a sustainable way: devising models for welfare institutions;

<sup>12</sup>For scattered multi-level ideational approaches to social policy, see Marshall (1981b: 96–98), Ullrich (2003), Pfau-Efnger (2005, 2009), Kaufmann (2015), Hall (1993), Nullmeier (2006: 296f.); for development contexts (and more generally), see von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann (1994: 19–23) and Lavers and Hickey (2016); for global social policy, see von Gliszczynski (2015: 22f.).

<sup>13</sup>For an earlier version, see Leisering (2019: 34).

identifying, selecting, and constructing social conditions as "social problems"; raising a broad "social question" to direct public attention to social issues; and attributing to the state and other collectivities an explicit social responsibility for the well-being of all citizens. Te task of empirical analysis is to ascertain if and how each layer is realised in a country. Te model leaves open which social problems the state seeks to address and what broader "social question" it articulates, which welfare institutions tackle particular social problems, and what kind of "social" responsibility the state assumes. Tis allows for diversity between, but also within, the North and South.

Te four layers signify four connected but relatively independent dimensions of variation between diferent countries. Few states establish all four layers completely—these states could be called "welfare states" in a cultural sense. From a comparative perspective, two countries may differ in some layers, while resembling each other in other layers. Moreover, Southern countries may be infuenced by general Northern or global ideas (bottom layers), but may set up welfare institutions (top layer) of their own making or even do without institutionalisation (decoupling). Tis is also true in reverse: countries may receive models for welfare institutions from other countries or international organisations but may place them in a diferent normative context (social question, policy paradigm) particular to that country.

Tis multi-layer model is anchored in the tradition of the pluralist, Weberian sociology of the welfare state depicted above. In particular, we can identify all four layers in the work of Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, even if uncombined, and we can even reconstruct the four layers from Tomas Humphrey Marshall's work.14 Te layers also fgure separately in the writings of some other authors. We can fnd the term "responsibility" in the social policy literature (e.g. in Gough et al. 2004: 30), but it is not normally developed as an analytic concept. Girvetz (1968) introduced collective social responsibility as the most abstract layer of the social, which Kaufmann (1997) then took up and explored as the hallmark of the welfare state. Te concept of the social question is systematically addressed by Kaufmann (2013a: 32–33), Heclo (1995), Pankoke (1970), and

<sup>14</sup> See Leisering (2019: 37, FN 13) for Kaufmann, and Leisering (2019: 51–56) for Marshall.

Castel (2003) from a historical perspective, and in global terms by Kreckel (2008), Faist (2009), Breman and van der Linden (2014), and Breman et al. (2019a). Te term "policy paradigm" stems from policy analysis (Hall 1993), and the social defnition of social problems, which is a part of a policy paradigm, draws on social problems theory (Schetsche 1996). Te concept of frames is common in policy analysis and social analysis more generally (van Hulst and Yanow 2016).

Each of the four layers of political commitments has its own political arena, political actors, and ideational logic. Te most abstract layer, the assumption of *collective social responsibility*, in particular, refers to states, which continue to be decisive actors in global social policy. UN human rights declarations explicitly address states as the agents in charge of implementing human rights. Te concept of the state's collective social responsibility contrasts with clientelism and patrimonialism as modes of governance that do not refect a universalistic and rights-based sense of welfare responsibility. A commitment to "the social" may be articulated in a country's constitution through "social" clauses and by ratifcation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR; UN 1966), and other human rights documents. Constitutional assemblies, courts, legal scholars, politicians, and (sometimes) the citizenry have a hand in these processes. Te assumption of collective social responsibility, if it exists, is rooted in the (national) "societal community", which Talcott Parsons (1969: 11–12, 253) sees as "the focus of solidarity or mutual loyalty".

Te *social question*, as I defned in the frst section, is the pivot of the onion skin model. Te social question relates to issues of social cohesion and the integration of society. It asks "how to hold society together amid vast destabilizing change" (Heclo 1995: 675). Similarly, Castel holds that "the 'Social Question' is a fundamental aporia, through which a society experiences the enigma of its own cohesion and tries to forestall the dangers of its disintegration" (2003: xix f.). Social policy is not only about redistribution but also, at least as important but often neglected, about the social recognition of social groups and issues. In a sociological sense, the social question relates to both redistribution and recognition. By expressing social recognition, social policy addresses sociocultural aspects of societal integration that redistributive policies do not address (Kaufmann 2012: 21–23). Te concept of the social question emerged in the 1830s and 1840s in France and Germany (Castel 2003: xx; Kaufmann 2013b: 32). "Poverty, inequality, and social injustice are ancient plagues of humankind. But they emerged as a 'social question' rather late, in a context of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution—the former by putting inequality and human rights on the agenda…, and the latter by producing poverty and misery by wage labor" (Terborn 2019: ix).

Te workers' question in nineteenth-century Europe referred to labour rights—the labour question. Labour rights include individual rights, the right to collective action, and the right to monetary support in case of employment-related risks, but the latter moved to centre stage only after World War II, as "social security", which extends beyond employmentrelated risks. In agrarian societies, the land question is likely to become a signifcant social question. Te three social questions—land, labour, and social risks more generally—may interact or compete with each other. International organisations' global defnitions of a social question may also infuence domestic social questions. For example, around 2000, poverty became the number one social question in global social politics (Noël 2006; Hulme 2015). A comparative analysis of nationally defned social questions can distinguish welfare states on sociocultural grounds, as an alternative to classifcations based on a political economy point of view. For Europe, Kaufmann (2013a, c) distinguishes between the workers' question, which has historically shaped the German welfare state, the poverty question (UK), the family question (France), and the inequality question (Sweden).

Te social question may be eclipsed or even counteracted by other societal questions, especially the national question, a concern for economic growth and development, or religion. However, other questions can also support and reinforce the social question, for example, when social protection is viewed as a productive force to promote economic growth or when social policies are designed to strengthen national unity, as under Bismarck in Imperial Germany, 1883–1889, in the wake of German unifcation in 1871 (for China see Shi 2017).

Te other societal questions often act as *frames* of social protection. Social policy by itself mostly enjoys only a limited legitimacy and needs more powerful normative underpinnings within larger constituencies. References to the collective—economic, political, and social—utility of social policy beyond individual welfare were major drivers of the rise of social policy in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe (Kaufmann 2012: 278–283). Frames in this sense include references to "non-social" issues, especially economic and, more recently, ecological challenges, and transnational principles that international organisations have advanced, above all human rights (which are global frames). Te recognition of international organisations and donors as knowledge actors rests on their claims to represent universal, world cultural values and ideas (Meyer 2009: 186). We call frames that compete with or even counteract social policies "counter frames".

#### **A First Glimpse of the Four Countries: Basic Social, Political, and Economic Data**

Few studies compare Brazil, India, China, and South Africa in social and cultural (rather than economic) terms, but drawing on scattered literature, we can sketch a frst comparative picture of the four countries.

In *economic* terms, all four countries have recently experienced massive growth. Te "average annual increase in GDP in the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) exceeded 8 per cent in the 2000s, signifcantly higher than the average of 2.6 per cent in developed countries and the global average of 4.1 per cent over the same period" (ISSA 2013: 13).

While the economic rise of the four countries is widely known, it is less well known that the four countries, except for India, are currently among the leaders in *social protection* in the Global South (see Table 1.1, section "Social protection"). Going back in history, our four countries adopted *social insurance* programmes later than many Northern countries, but they were often earlier adopters (than Northern countries) if related to GDP or demographic ageing at the time of adoption (for the demographic ageing see Lindert 2004a: 218). However, as the country chapters show, the early programmes only applied to small privileged groups and implementation was weak (Midgley 1984: 117). Collier and Messick


**28**


(1975) distinguish four global waves of frst adoptions of social insurance up to 1960: 1883–1891, 1892–1901, 1908–1922, and 1923–1960 (no adoptions between 1901 and 1908). Roughly speaking, adoptions in Europe happened during the frst, second, and third periods, making their way from Northern to Southern Europe; adoptions in Latin America and former British colonies occurred in the third (including Brazil and South Africa) and fourth periods; and adoptions in the Middle East and Asia occurred in the fourth period (including China, but excluding Japan, whose adoption took place in the third).

Te picture of the overall *welfare regime* in the four countries (Table 1.1, section "Welfare regime") is more variegated and less impressive than the data on social protection in the Table, which only refers to basic income protection and coverage and disregards beneft levels, welfare outcomes, and dimensions like morbidity and literacy. Gough et al. (2004), Abu Sharkh and Gough (2010), and Wood and Gough (2006) generalise Esping-Andersen's concept of "welfare regime" to simply "regime" and distinguish between three global types of regimes: "welfare state regimes" as Esping-Andersen originally conceived of Northern welfare states, "informal security regimes", and "insecurity regimes". Te assumption is that security is a meaningful category not only for welfare states ("social security") but also in development contexts (similarly von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann 1994), and that informal (nonstate) agencies have a bigger share in generating security in developing countries. Te studies by Gough, which include Eastern European countries, name around ffteen "proto-welfare state regimes", including Brazil, that are countries bordering on becoming Northern welfare state-like regimes. From 1990 to 2010, the proto-welfare state regimes have been relatively stable (for 2010 see Karmann's 2017 re-analysis and update of Abu Sharkh and Gough's study).

Seekings (2008b, 2012, 2013) applies the nineteenth-century European distinction of policy for workers versus policy for the poor to the Global South, distinguishing between workerist welfare regimes (that rely on employment-based social insurance for formal workers) and pauperist welfare regimes (that rely on poor relief or, later on, on meanstested social assistance programmes, including social pensions) in the early and mid-twentieth century. In addition, Seekings describes land-based agrarian regimes, and "minimalist" regimes that lack a clear orientation towards either workers or the poor and spend less than average on both. By the end of the twentieth century, Seekings posits a decline in agrarian regimes and a recasting and expansion of pauperist regimes as citizen-based social security regimes, founded on social cash transfers. According to Seekings, our four countries fall into distinct types (see Table 1.1, section "Welfare regime", second line).

Te *political regimes* (see Table 1.1, section "State") difer between the four countries, and all four underwent marked changes during the twentieth century. Regarding national independence, only China was formally never dependent, except limited territories.

Te four countries difer considerably concerning their historical links to the world society (Table 1.1, section "Society"). India was a colony, while South Africa and Brazil were not simply colonised, but also settled, through waves of immigration by farmers, workers, and slaves. Te four countries also represent distinct world religions, which give us a frst clue to the country's chances for public social welfare. Roman Catholicism has an afnity for state welfare (as has Islam; Lindert 2004a: 219), whereas Protestantism comes in pro- and anti-welfare state varieties (van Kersbergen and Manow 2009). Confucianism, a *Weltanschauung* rather than a religion, is seen by some as adverse to extended public welfare (Rieger and Leibfried 2004).

All four countries had weak formal links to global "social" norms *(world society links)* after World War II and forged them rather late (Table 1.1, section "World cultural links").

All four countries experienced considerable economic growth over the last hundred years (Fig. 1.3), but India and China stagnated for a very long period of time, 1920 to c. 1980. South Africa was in the lead until 1980, but was surpassed by Brazil thereafter. China skyrocketed in the 2000s, while India like China started to grow in the 1980s, but at a much lower pace. All four countries experienced a massive upturn in the 1990s and 2000s, but growth rates abated in the 2010s.

Over the last three decades, social progress has been massive in all four countries (Table 1.2), but they started from exceedingly low levels regarding life expectancy at birth, literacy, and poverty. India scores lowest, followed by South Africa. By and large, advancement has been

**Fig. 1.3** Real GDP per capita in 2011 USD in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa. (*Source*: The author, data from Maddison Project Database, version 2018; Bolt et al. 2018)

continuous, but the curve of life expectancy in South Africa refects the HIV-created bulge in the 1990s and 2000s. China has caught up and nowadays surpasses the other three countries, while Brazil has fallen behind in relative terms. Te fgures only give a rough picture, since they were reported by the countries themselves.

Despite economic growth and social betterment, all four countries are riddled with excessive inequality of incomes, with South Africa as the most extreme case (Fig. 1.4). Inequality has increased massively since 1980—the cost of economic growth. All four countries are "large uneven developers" (Frazier 2011: 90). Moreover, the social organisation of labour, especially the vast informal labour and the low participation of women in the labour force, above all in India (Table 1.3), difers sharply from most countries of the Global North. Inequality, informal labour, and the position of women are major challenges and limitations to social policy. Te high share of rural workers also raises issues of social protection. Industrial employment has risen in India and China, but deindustrialisation and the rise of the service economy already show in the recent fgures, except for India.


**Table 1.2** Basic social indicators for Brazil, India, China, and South Africa

*Source*: The author, data from World Bank (n.d.), World Development Indicators a2004

b2010 c 1981 d1991 e2001 f 1982 g2010 h2007 i 2017

In response to the social problems arising from industrialisation, urbanisation, dislocation, and other social processes, all four countries took social policy measures. Social spending is a rough measure of social efort. Diferences in social spending between the four countries (Fig. 1.5) roughly correspond to the diferences in real per capita GDP between the countries (as shown in Fig. 1.3), with two exceptions. Brazil is a big social spender, much more ahead of South Africa than its real per capita GDP would suggest. Tis might be partially explained by the share of social insurance in Brazil. Te second exception is China, which ranks relatively low in social spending as compared to its high ranking in real per capita GDP. Since China has considerably expanded the coverage of social

**Fig. 1.4** Gini index of income in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa. (*Source*: The author, data from Alvaredo et al. n.d., World Inequality Database)


**Table 1.3** Basic labour indicators for Brazil, India, China, and South Africa

*Source*: The author, data from ILO (n.d.), ILOSTAT database, estimates a2010 b2012

**Fig. 1.5** Public social protection expenditure (in % of GDP) in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa. (*Source*: The author, data from ILO 2017: 397–404, Table B.16; for defnitions and data sources see ILO 2017: 199–209, Annex II)

protection during the 2000s and early 2010s, low spending might indicate low beneft levels and patchy implementation. India ranks lowest, as on most other accounts. Tis suggests that there is little political efort to address the widespread poverty and destitution in the country. However, the overall trend in social spending is upwards in all four countries. In China, the increase is not linear, seemingly refecting the swings in social protection policies analysed in Chap. 3 of this volume.

Social problems abounded in all four countries, and over the last hundred years, the Brazilian and the South African economies increasingly provided resources to tackle them. In India and China, real economic growth started as late as the 1980s. Economic performance relates to the factor bundle "Industrialisation" in Gough's explanatory model of welfare state development, the Five Is model, as outlined above. In 1920, all countries started from a roughly similar low economic level, except South Africa which had a per capita GDP that was double India's and China's per capita GDP (Fig. 1.3). Te question is if, when, and how the countries addressed their social problems. Regarding politics and polity (factor bundles "Interests" and "Institutions" in Gough's Five Is model), all countries were to experience considerable upheaval, including war, civil war, foreign oppression, struggle for independence, revolution, and authoritarian rule, all of which may eclipse—or fuel—"social" concerns. Te chapters in this volume bring in the factor bundle "Ideas" (and International Infuences) from Gough's Five Is model, conceptualised as a complex confguration, the onion skin model.

## **The Chapters**

Te volume has two chapters on each country, except South Africa, for which there are three chapters.

*China* is the only socialist country among the four countries, at least since 1949. Te two chapters on China by Hu Aiqun and Shi Shih-Jiunn (Chaps. 2 and 3) focus on the years 1912–1949 and 1978–2020, the People's Republic of China's reform era. Both chapters address the years 1949–1978, but in less detail, because they have been much researched earlier.

*Hu Aiqun* argues that the thirty years before 1949 were formative years that provided the foundations for social legislation after 1949 when the People's Republic of China was founded and the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan. Te decades before 1949 witnessed the public emergence of "social" issues in intellectual debates, bills, acts, and public language, including the concept of "social security". Te quest for stability by a society torn apart by economic backwardness, foreign oppression, and social divisions provided the context for the rise of the social question. Chinese elites turned to a range of Western social ideas to "save the nation" in the face of imperialism. Some actors adopted communism, whereas reformist intellectuals espoused organic concepts of society that led to a concern for stability and harmony. In the 1930s, the Nationalist Party in government reinterpreted Confucianism as part of its state ideology to answer the need for stability. During the Sino-Japanese war, Chinese elites were attracted to the contemporary global idea of universal social security, and this fuelled developments in social security. Although Western ideas played an important role, Chinese elites emphasised China's "special situation".

#### **1 Social Protection in the Global South: An Ideational…**

*Shi Shih-Jiunn* analyses the changing semantics of social policy in China as an indicator of changing policies. He argues that social policy in China was not just socialist in an egalitarian sense but has been subject to considerable swings regarding institutional design, concepts, terms, and frames, and that the swings ensued from the Communist Party's legitimacy problems. Tese systemic concerns rather than those for individual rights shaped social policy. Accordingly, Shi reconstructs four recent phases of development in China: under socialism (1949–1978) the social question was seen to be resolved in the institutions of socialist production, and social protection programmes centred on urban workers. Te reform years after 1978 witnessed the advent of the social question, frst through the "socialisation" of social welfare (transferring social responsibility from the state to non-state agencies) and "GDPism" from 1978 to 2000. From 2000 to 2012, the state massively expanded social protection under the fag of "social security", "inclusive growth", and "social management". Since the authoritarian turn in 2012, social protection is understood as "social governance", including using surveillance systems rather than supporting individual rights and civil society activity, in order to achieve national greatness ("Chinese Dream").

Te frst chapter on *India* by Sony Pellissery (Chap. 4) takes a broad view, covering the last hundred years of social policies against the background of India's history and culture. Te second chapter on India by Ravi Ahuja (Chap. 5) focuses more specifcally on issues of labour protections in late colonial India.

*Sony Pellissery's* main argument is that in India the social question has been stifed until the present day. Te idea of the state's universalistic concern for the individual welfare of all members of society never materialised. Rather, narrow and particularistic versions of the social question prevailed, which related to scheduled castes and tribes, poverty, and hunger. Caste-based social identity rather than citizenship informed calls for extending social protections. Pellissery names several reasons for this. After independence in 1947, other concerns, especially nation-building and economic development, crowded out the social question. Several visions of society competed with each other (those of Gandhi, Nehru, and Ambedkar), but only Ambedkar's vision refected a (weak) notion of the social question. Te broader background includes traditional Hinduism, which culturally denies equality and is tangible in the caste system. Tere has been a strong move towards political and legal equality, but this has been of little avail in the face of vast socio-economic inequality. From the late-twentieth century, social issues have become stronger but mostly in a particularistic and populist vein.

*Ravi Ahuja* aligns with Pellissery's fnding of a weak social question in India. Up to the present day, India has never come even near to institutionalising social protection as a part of citizenship. Trough an in-depth analysis of a limited time period, Ahuja draws a variegated picture of social ideas and legislation. Legislation was passed as early as the 1910s, passage continued during the interwar years, and reached a peak from 1946 to 1952, with the Employees' Social Insurance Act of 1948 as its core. Te intimations of a social question were limited: it only concerned labour (the labour question) and only formal workers, resulting in "minoritarian labour welfare". Social legislation was generally patchy, applied only to select industries and types of workers, and included many exceptions. Moreover, there was a massive decoupling between legislation and implementation. At the same time, Ahuja also demonstrates that there were repeated calls to extend the coverage of social rights and to turn social rights into a "birthright". However, this "horizon of expectation" never materialised. External ideas from the ILO and the UK made themselves felt but mostly only infuenced political language. Ahuja, a labour historian, also argues that the distinction between formal and informal labour was not a given economic distinction but was co-created by social law.

Te chapters on South Africa and Brazil relate to settler societies. Te three chapters on *South Africa* investigate pre-*apartheid* South Africa (1910–1948), *apartheid* South Africa (1948–1990), and the post*apartheid* years.

In the chapter on pre-*apartheid* South Africa (Chap. 6), *Jeremy Seekings* fnds a remarkable expansion in the state's social protection that started in the 1920s. By 1948, a "nascent welfare state" had emerged, a kind of liberal welfare regime. Te contours of the social question became visible with the rise in the usage of comprehensive terms like "social policy" (1934) and "social security" (1942). Te social question was racialised throughout this period: the "poor white problem" was the state's key concern. To secure the whites' morals and behaviours, the social question included concern for deviant behaviours to be addressed through social work and institutional care. Moreover, there was a decoupling between legislation and implementation. Seekings argues that beyond the general racist fabric of South African politics, we need to trace specifc ideas and cultural factors to explain the development of social protection policies. South African politics and society developed a range of ideas to justify their models of society and resultant social policies. Tese ideas were in fux, and pro as well as antisocial policy views were advanced. Afrikaner nationalists were ambivalent about social policy, whereas neo-Calvinists opposed state-provided social protections. Key ideas of the time included the whites' superior "civilisation", which gave rise to a racial hierarchy, and the "native question" that eclipsed (and shaped) the social question, Reformed Protestantism, especially neo-Calvinism, and the quest for modernising society.

*Marianne Ulriksen's* chapter on *apartheid* South Africa (Chap. 7) shares Seekings' assumption that ideas matter under a racist regime. Te "poor white problem" of the pre-*apartheid* period became part of the wider "civilised workers' question", by which the government sought to secure racial purity, framed by the idea of "separate development" for diferent races. Te civilised workers' question refected the uneasy intersection of race and class in South Africa that gave the labour question a unique nature. Tere was little change in the design of welfare programmes (oldage pensions) throughout this period. However, the conceptions of racial relationships and collective social responsibility changed. Te state's social responsibility was racially graded since the beginning, but in this era, the state further divided it through the creation of separate "homelands" for the non-white population, under the new frame "independent nations". Only towards the end of the period did more universalistic notions of social responsibility emerge under pressure from anti-regime activists and global protests. Ulriksen draws on contemporary documents, as the other contributors do, but she also makes use of qualitative content analysis.

*Jeremy Seekings'* second chapter, on post-*apartheid* South Africa (Chap. 8), investigates the changes in the social question after 1994. He focuses on the key reformer of the 2000s, Zola Skweyiya, who was Minister of Social Development from 1999 to 2009. Remarkably, the state did not extend social protections during the 1990s, the advent of democracy notwithstanding. Yet, the 2000s witnessed a substantial expansion under Skweyiya. Seekings argues that the social question was signifcantly reformulated as an issue of dignity. Tis reframing went beyond economic developmentalism and labourism, both of which narrowed the social question to the concerns of formal workers. Besides dignity, the social question was also phrased in terms of rights, with the courts assuming an important role in implementing and discussing the social question. Skweyiya embodied a paternalistic conservatism that linked developmentalism with broader social concerns for the poor and the dignity of all citizens. Still, the social question remained limited, providing only partial legitimisation for a welfare state. Although social protections were imagined as universal, practically, they were mainly for formal workers, and social cash transfers were only for groups seen as deserving. Attitudes in South African politics about social issues remained ambivalent, especially those of the members of the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), which remained labourist. Te ANC's developmentalism also checked the extension of social protections. Te social question was also eclipsed by a concern for political and civil rights rather than social rights. Seekings also demonstrates that social protection ideas and policies cut across the regime change of 1994. Yet, the legacy of *apartheid* also fuelled calls for dignity and universal rights that were conducive to expanding social protection.

*Lena Lavinas'* chapter (Chap. 9) depicts *Brazil's* rich history of ideas, political actions, legislation, and changes in political regime but also the structural limitations of social protections until the present day. Contributory social insurance began in the 1920s, laying the foundation for later expansion and shaping social protection since. Lavinas identifes fve social questions over the past hundred years: people's needs were at the origins of the frst massive mobilisation at the turn of the twentieth century; the labour question was at the centre of political struggles from the 1920s, but the land question also lingered from the 1950s onward. Te more general social question—social protection for all citizens including the poor—only became signifcant after 1988, under democracy, when a comprehensive social security system was introduced, with contributory pensions, labour-related benefts, anti-poverty targeted benefts, and universal health coverage. More recently, the social question has been reframed by claims of inclusiveness. Te Citizen Constitution of 1988 played a major role in advancing social legislation. However, the discrepancy between talk and action, legislation and implementation (decoupling), was massive. Brazil underwent several extreme political regime changes; yet social policies have increased under both democracy and dictatorship. Under the frst period of dictatorship (Vargas, 1930–1945), social policy was instrumentalised as a means of social control through state-organised labour relations while denying civil rights. During the second period of dictatorship (1964–1985), social protection was modernised. After 1988, social security remained largely underfnanced. Te overall arrangement of social protection remains fragmented and selective. Te deep social and racial cleavages in Brazilian society remain a major challenge.

*Gabriel Ondetti's* chapter (Chap. 10) on Brazil is the only chapter in the volume that focuses on the land question or, as it is mostly referred to in Brazil, the "agrarian question". Brazil has one of the most unequal distributions of land in the world, which has been a major factor in politics and society. Ondetti shows that the three big social questions—in historical order: the land question, the labour or workers question, and the broader social question comprising social protection—may exist in parallel, may compete, or may relieve each other. For example, the introduction of rural pensions in 1971 and conditional social cash transfers in the 2000s diverted attention from the land question. Ondetti depicts the broad range of ideas that shaped the social question including doctrines like reformism, communism, labourism, left Catholicism, legal doctrines, and, more recently, environmentalism. Economic interests and ideas could be pro or contra land reform. Legal ideas were the earliest: the lawyer Duguit conceived of a "social function of property" in 1911, which was taken up in political debates later, as were Torres' ideas of 1914 on land reforms. External ideas also mattered: Duguit was French; socially focused European constitutions infuenced the constitutions of 1934 and 1946; and the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) shaped left Catholicism. Ondetti depicts the range of instruments used or designed for land policies and concludes that a far-reaching response to the land question—a thorough redistribution of land—never materialised, not even under recent leftist governments.

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# **Part II**

**China**

# **2**

# **The Early Rise of Social Security in China: Ideas and Reforms, 1911–1949**

**Aiqun Hu**

## **Introduction: The Early Rise of Social Ideas and Policies**

Republican Era (1911–1949) was a time of upheaval in Chinese history, but it is less well known that it was also the beginning of the rise in ideas and policies on social security. Social security in China is mostly understood as beginning in the post-1949 era, after the Chinese revolution, with the rise of the People's Republic of China and the retreat of the Guomindang (GMD, the Chinese Nationalist Party or Kuomintang) government to Taiwan. Tis chapter argues that substantial social security ideas and policies had already made their appearance during the Republican years prior to 1949.

I would like to thank Lutz Leisering, the editor of this volume, for his extensive and detailed comments on the earlier versions of this chapter.

A. Hu (\*)

Arkansas State University, Jonesboro, AR, USA e-mail: aiqunhu@astate.edu

Te term "social security" frst appeared in the 1935 US Social Security Act. International organisations ofcially used it in the early 1940s, and it gained wide usage after the Second World War. Social security, a major type of social policy—defned as state actions via legislation and administration to solve social problems—refers to a combination of social insurance and social assistance or any government programmes providing cash and in-kind benefts to those with inadequate income.

In China, "social security" as an imported term emerged in ofcial documents in 1945. Troughout China's long imperial history, Chinese people mainly relied on the family, clan and neighbourhood for their social security needs. China's imperial state, however, provided temporary famine relief (*huangzheng*) after disasters and regular poor relief for individuals labelled as "widowers, widows, orphans, elderly without children, and the infrm (*guangua gudu fei*)"1 . In the 1900s (the last decade of the Qing rule), the Qing Dynasty set up vagrant workhouses as a new type of poor relief, which soon disintegrated after the fall of the Qing in 1911. Te succeeding Republic of China, in its frst two chaotic decades under the Beijing government (1911–1927), was able to restore some of the poorhouses and workhouses, as well as issue factory and labour protection laws. In the two decades of GMD rule (1927–1949), the GMD government developed social security ideas and policies, including relief homes and labour insurance in the 1930s, as well as social relief and social insurance in the 1940s.

Historical studies on Republican China were conventionally very critical of the GMD government and attributed its defeat by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to corruption, incompetency, and factionalism (Eastman 1984). Recently, revisionist scholarship has treated the GMD government more favourably, concentrating not only on what it achieved in extremely tough circumstances but also on the signifcance of its achievements for the succeeding People's Republic (Wakeman and Edmonds 2000). In terms of social welfare broadly defned, however, studies predominantly focus on relief for refugees, victims of famines,

<sup>1</sup>Elderly men without wives were widowers (*guang*), elderly women without husbands were widows (*gua*), elderly people without sons were *du*, children without fathers were orphans (*gu*), and disabled persons were the infrm (*fei*).

and the poor (MacKinnon 2008; Chen 2012), and they barely pay attention to social insurance and social security (except Hu 2015; Ma 2012, 2014). Some scholars in social sciences have explored the ideational aspects of China's social welfare but treat the ideas as an independent factor (Leung and Nann 1995). In other words, these studies tend to conceive of ideational factors in social policymaking in terms of broad ideas (Hu 2012; Shi 2017; Breman et al. 2019) and neglect more specifc ideas, like "social security" or "social questions", and the interactive and formative role of ideas.

Te present study attempts to fll this research gap by applying Lutz Leisering's "onion skin model" of social policy ideas (Leisering 2019, chapter 2, 21–63, and chapter 9, 327–330; see also the introduction to this volume). Based on theories of the constructivist sociology of knowledge, this model creatively treats ideas as a multi-layered system that not only interacts with but also co-defnes other structural factors. According to this model, social policy ideas consist of four layers plus frames on top of the layers. From the most abstract to the most concrete, each of the four layers is collective social responsibility, social question, social problems, and welfare institutions, and on top of these four layers, there exist "frames" such as "discourses on nation building, development, economy, or world cultural principles, or any other frames" (*ibid.,* 34–35).

According to Leisering, the collective social responsibility layer refers to the state's recognition and assumption of its social responsibility, which is often written in a country's constitution. Te social question layer is a generalised recognition of social problems that require state policy remedies. Te social problems layer refers to the process of labelling, defning, and theorising social problems and seeking policy remedies. Te welfare institutions layer refers to the state's adoption of certain welfare institutions, such as social assistance and social insurance as a response to perceived social problems. Policy frames are broader ideas that can legitimise or negate the adoption of certain social policies (*ibid.,* 327–330).

As an empirical study applying Leisering's ideational model, this chapter reveals that China saw an early rise in social security ideas and institutions in the frst half of the twentieth century, which include certain continuities across the 1949 divide between the nationalist and communist regimes. Western imperialism, along with domestic developments, led to unprecedented social upheavals in China, which provoked Chinese intellectuals and ofcials alike to constantly seek a way out to "save the nation" (Zanasi 2006; Fung 2010). Tese Chinese elites turned to Western social ideas, especially sociological knowledge, to identify social problems and seek relevant social policies to tackle these social problems in the early decades of the twentieth century, especially in the interwar era of the 1920s and 1930s. With the breakout of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the above-mentioned trends were strengthened during the war. In the early 1940s, Chinese elites were attracted to the emerging global idea of universal social security, which led to a signifcant and intensifed period of social policy development in China. Tis had policy signifcance for post-war social security programmes, mainly in Taiwan, but also in China in the 1950s.

Although Western social ideas played an important role, this study argues that Republican China, especially the GMD state, emphasised collectivistic rather than individualist notions of social problems and social policy that ft the perceived special Chinese situation, which was viewed as a mixture of such factors as an agrarian society, backward production, an unorganised society that could not prevent foreign oppression, and a deep-rooted tradition of Confucianism as well as Western imperialism. Overall, this study contends that in the entire Republican era, especially under the GMD regime, the social question remained strong, but social policy to respond to the social question was treated as a crucial part of state building based on a combination of reinterpreted Confucianism and Western social ideas. Tus, social policy emphasised not only productivism but also social order and harmony, with the ultimate purpose of advancing China's national interests and achieving wealth, power, and glory for China.

It is helpful to trace the evolution of the ofcial terms used to discuss social security in Republican China, as this ideational study is related to the literature on the conceptual history of social policy (Rodgers 1998; Kettunen and Petersen 2011; Kaufmann 2013; Béland and Petersen 2014). In the last decade of the Qing dynasty, the government maintained the imperial poorhouses or *yangji yuan* (nurture-relief homes) for "those unable to work". Te government also established *xiyisuo* (workhouses) for vagrants and petty criminals, and a new type of poorhouse, *jiaoyang yuan* (teaching-nurture homes), for "unruly people". Tese workhouses and poorhouses continued to exist under the Beijing government (1911–1927) but in a disintegrated state (Chen 2012). In Republican China in the 1920s, the Beijing government called for "social insurance" in response to the International Labour Organization's (ILO) request, while the CCP-led labour movement demanded for "social insurance" (Hu 2015).

In the frst decade of the GMD's rule (1927–1937), a single "relief home" (*jiuji yuan*) incorporated the functions of all sorts of previous poorhouses and workhouses, while "labour insurance" appeared in the 1931 Constitution. In addition, the term "social relief" referred to a broad range of poor relief, labour insurance, and other types of social welfare in the 1930s, while "social insurance" appeared in scholarly discussions in the 1920s and 1930s. In the 1940s, the GMD state used such terms as "social welfare" and "social insurance", while "social security" began to emerge in ofcial usage in 1945. Furthermore, the content of the term "social relief" in the 1940s shrank to refer to social assistance only as "social insurance" became ofcially recognised. Te CCP also used similar terms, such as social relief, labour insurance, social insurance, and labour protection laws in its documents for areas under its control.

Tis chapter is divided into fve parts. Part one introduces pre-Republican China's state relief with a focus on the ideational transition from Confucian benevolence to Western disciplined labour as the baseline for ensuing discussions. Part two analyses the rise of social problems in China and the accompanying Chinese Marxist and non-Marxist concepts, explaining these social problems, mainly in the 1920s. Part three discusses the GMD state's social policy in its frst decade (1927–1937), especially poor relief and labour insurance, and argues that the GMD state's social policy, as part of its state-building eforts, emphasised productivist and collectivistic notions of social problems and social policy. Part four focuses on the GMD state's wartime social policy (1937–1945). It argues that the Allied forces' emerging concept of universal social security had a profound impact on the GMD state's social security, but Chinese elites emphasised China's special situation when designing China's social security (both social relief and social insurance) policies. Part fve concerns itself with the institutionalisation of social security in the post-war era and explores the implications of the GMD state's social security on that of the People's Republic. Meanwhile, parts three to fve consider the years under GMD rule, including discussions of social security in the CCP-controlled areas. Finally, the conclusion highlights the major fndings.

## **Social Security in Imperial China: From Benevolence to Disciplined Labour**

Imperial China, largely a unitary state system for over 2000 years, began to provide emergency famine relief during the Han Dynasty (206 BCE—220 CE) and regular poor relief during the Tang Dynasty (618–907 CE), with the majority of people dependent on their families, kin groups, and neighbourhoods for social security. Some scholars even argued for an earlier origin of state famine relief, for example, one scholar contends that the Zhou rulers (1046–256 BCE) established well-managed granaries for famine relief, and granaries existed even in the Xia Dynasty of the sixteenth century BCE (Wang 2002: 153–154). Te reason for the early recognition of state responsibility for providing social relief is closely related to China's long-lasting and deeply rooted Confucianism. Confucianism, together with Daoism and Legalism, took shape during the three centuries proceeding the Qin state's unifcation of China in 221 BCE. Tese early intellectual schools focused on restoring the social and political order, as centuries of warfare had caused great sufering, chaos and confusion, following the disintegration of the Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE).

Confucianism, however, was established as the state ideology during the Han Dynasty in 136 BCE and was restored during the Song Dynasty (960–1279 CE) as neo-Confucianism, which incorporated many philosophical ideas from Buddhism in the twelfth century. Confucianism thus remained as the state ideology for the rest of Chinese imperial rule and emphasised the value of benevolence (*ren*), benevolent government (*renzheng*), familism, and harmony. In terms of familism, the family was regarded as a prototype of the state: the family was a mini-state, and the state was an enlarged family. Te emperor as the son of heaven was the father of his subjects; thus, the emperor should take care of the well-being of his sons or his subjects (Leung and Nann 1995). Terefore, state relief was regarded as necessary emperor and state benevolence.

In any case, the Han Dynasty established ever-normal granaries (*changping cang*). Tese granaries not only aimed to stabilise market grain prices at a "normal" level, which led to the term "ever-normal" but also distributed grains to famine victims in times of disaster. By the Sui and Tang Dynasties (581–907 CE), the state not only inherited the ever-normal granaries but also set up charity granaries (*yi cang*) and community granaries (*she cang*). Te government organised charity granaries and collected taxes or donations of grain to redistribute to the poor in times of famine and other disasters, while villages organised and managed community granaries, which collected and distributed grains to the poor for relief purposes. Tis granary system remained the main state measure for famine and disaster relief throughout imperial history (Will and Wong 1991).

Furthermore, the Chinese imperial state began to provide medical and material relief to the poor during the Tang Dynasty. India-originated Buddhism became so infuential that the Tang Dynasty launched a suppression of it in 845 CE and took over the Buddhist medical relief institutions (Cai 2003: 37). Tese medical relief institutions survived into the succeeding Song Dynasty, which also opened up other types of relief institutions to provide material support to the poor (Wang 2007: 234). Te Song poor relief, according to recent scholarship, represented the highest level of development of social policy in Chinese imperial history, surpassing the levels of the succeeding Ming and Qing Dynasties (Sun and Bi 2018; Zhang 2017).

Nonetheless, the succeeding imperial dynasties inherited the poorhouses, which were grouped into four types by the mid-nineteenth century: nurture-relief homes (*yang-ji yuan*), universal-relief halls (*pu-ji tang*), soup kitchens (*zhou chang*), and vagrants' shelters (*qi-liu suo*). Te emperors decreed these poorhouses, which local governments then managed. Local revenue fnanced the nurture-relief homes and admitted those within the local administration's jurisdiction. Tey provided food, winter clothes and money to the inmates. Unlike the nurture-relief homes, the universal-relief halls did not have stable fnancial sources because they relied on government subsidies and private donations and investment. As shown by the name, these halls did not have local residency requirements; they not only provided food, winter clothes, and money but also included soup kitchens and other facilities to provide cold water in the summer and warm ginger soup in the winter (Zhang 2012).

After the mid-nineteenth century, however, the Qing government's famine and poor relief declined, as the Qing dynasty's central fnancial situation rapidly deteriorated due to both internal crisis and Western imperialism. Tis situation not only provided an opportunity for nongovernmental and non-family-based charities operated by local gentries to play an increasingly important role in social relief in this period (Liang 1997) but also inspired Chinese elites to reform the existing poorhouses based on the "positive" methods used by Western missionaries to manage their charities in China.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Western missionaries operated schools and charities to facilitate their missionary activities in China. Te Chinese elites viewed the Westerners' methods for running their charities as "positive" because these charities not only provided material support but also taught children how to read and write and the skills they needed for future employment. Te elites thus began to introduce these positive methods to reform the declining poorhouses. For instance, the vagrants' shelters, which originally only provided food, clothing, and medicine, began to provide job training to the inmates. Te Shanghai vagrants' shelter was one of the frst to do so in 1879. Te Tianjin *guangrentang* (a comprehensive charitable institution), which was established in 1878 and followed the model of missionary hospitals, included workshops that required homeless inmates to work (Huang 2011; Wang 2008).

In the 1900s, the above-mentioned trends continued as the Qing government launched new policies, a set of comprehensive political and economic reform measures. Among these reforms was the establishment of handicraft and industrial training centres (*gong-yi ju*) as part of the policy to develop industry, which coincided with Qing Dynasty's penal system reforms, which established workhouses (*xi-yi suo*) based on Japanese models. While the training centres gradually declined due to lack of funding, workhouses were widely set up for both criminals and vagrants. Te frst workhouses included the 1904 Tianjian Criminal Workhouse, the 1905 Tianjin Vagrant Workhouse, and the 1906 Beijing Capital Workhouse for both criminals and non-criminals. Meanwhile, new types of poorhouses (*jiaoyang yuan*) were established as reformatories for convicts, and the centuries-old poorhouses, such as universal-relief halls (*puji tang*), were converted into "indoor institutions that required labour in exchange for relief" (Chen 2012: 31).

Tis shift from the centuries-old state relief system based on Confucian benevolence and Buddhist kindness to Western-style workhouses and poorhouses based on "compulsory labour in exchange for relief" demonstrates the infuence of Western social ideas and institutions on China's social relief ideas and institutions.

#### **The Rise of the Social Question: Non-Marxist Versus Marxist Concepts, 1900–1920s**

In the early twentieth century, the terms "social problems" and "social policy" emerged in China shortly after the introduction of Western sociology into China, along with socialism and, later, Marxism. By the 1920s, Chinese mainstream intellectuals mainly consisted of returned students, frst from Japan, then from Europe, and the USA. Among them were China's early sociologists, who were trained in the classical sociological tradition for which Auguste Comte (1798–1857), Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), and Emily Durkheim (1858–1917) advocated. Meanwhile, Marxism became very infuential following the 1917 Russian Revolution, the 1919 May Fourth movement and the establishment of the CCP in 1921. Tus, the 1920s saw the emergence of both non-Marxist and Marxist concepts of social problems and social questions.

Sociology was frst introduced into China in 1895 when Yan Fu described Spencer's sociological studies together with Darwin's theory of evolution in his article *On the Origin of Strength* (*yuan qiang*). In this article, Yan Fu describes how Spencer established sociology as a science of society, his basic sociological principles, subject-matter, and research methods (Ding 1988: 86–87). In 1903, Yan Fu translated Spencer's most infuential book *Te Study of Sociology* (1874), the frst book with "sociology" in its title. Spencer was the single most infuential sociologist in the late nineteenth century; he inherited the conceptions of society and sociology from Comte while adding his evolutionary framework to the new discipline. For Spencer, society was an organic whole, and sociology was "a holistic, naturalistic, and evolutionary science of society" (Breslau 2007: 40). Spencer's evolutionary sociological ideas had a profound impact on Chinese intellectuals and sociologists in the early twentieth century.

Marxism came to China at the turn of the twentieth century, however, in the name of socialism. In the beginning, socialism was often refuted as radical, inhuman, and unsuitable for China and, thus, had little infuence in intellectual circles. It was not until after the 1919 May Fourth Movement, and even after the establishment of the CCP in 1921, that Marxism began to become increasingly infuential, as a small group of Communist theorists disseminated Marxism, especially Leninism. Tese early Marxists, like Qu Qiubai and Shi Fuliang, taught at Shanghai University (1923–1927), the only higher institution that taught such courses because it was controlled by the nascent Communists. When teaching, they adopted Marxist books as their major textbooks, such as Bukharin's *Historical Materialism* (1921) and Lenin's *Imperialism* (1917) (Chiang 2001).

In the 1920s, China's mainstream intellectuals, some of whom became GMD party members, and Marxists began to debate China's "social problems". Tese contemporary writings included the term "social problems" in their titles, and not only discussed "social problems" in general but also analysed specifc social problems regarding family, women, vagrancy, poverty, and labour. Te debates focused on: what is society? What are social problems? What is or are China's most important social problem or problems? What are the causes of China's social problems? And what are solutions to China's social problems?

Almost all Republican non-Marxist intellectuals accepted the classical sociological idea of "society as a social organism" (Tsin 1997, 1999; Culp 2017). Tey also viewed "social problems" as a social disease threatening social order. But Republican intellectuals disagreed on the most important social problems in China and their solutions. Tat is, in the 1920s, sociologists and many other intellectuals agreed that poverty was the most pressing issue, while Marxists argued that the labour question was the most important, and Nationalist leader Sun Yat-sen focused on the land question as the most fundamental. Mainstream intellectuals, including Nationalist leaders, advocated for social policy while refuting social revolution and class struggle, for which only Marxists advocated.

One of the earliest scholarly books on social problems was written by Tao Menghe, a representative of China's early sociologists, professor, and chair of the Sociology Department of Beijing University in the 1920s. Tao published his 1924 book titled *Social Problems (shehui wenti)* as a textbook for senior high school students. Tao defned a "society" as "an organic collection of individuals" and "social problems" as "the diseases of a society" that hindered humans' collective lives (Tao 1924: 15). Tao criticised Marxist explanations for social problems as relying on a single factor (the economy) and discussed the natural, biological, demographic, psychological, economic and historical factors that cause "social problems". Tao then identifed "poverty" as the fundamental and central social problem in China (*ibid.,* 174–175). Tao applied his multi-factor explanation to rank the importance of these factors for contributing to poverty, natural and political were the most important, familial factors were very infuential, and only after those factors were under control could economic and labour conditions be addressed, and they were not the only ones. As Tao put it, "if people had the ability to control nature, if political integrity could be achieved, and if new economic organisations could be developed, then economic and labour conditions might be the most important causes of poverty", he continued, "we should not think that they are the only causes for poverty" (*ibid.,* 165). Tao discussed poor relief as temporary solutions and social reforms as fundamental solutions to poverty.

On the other hand, China's early socialists and communists, such as Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu, Qu Qiubai, and Shi Fuliang argued for Marxist explanations of social problems, which Tao criticised. Shi Fuliang taught a course on Social Problems at Shanghai University. Based on his translated book *Outlines of Social Problems* (1929), we can discern the content of his course. As he made it clear, his book was a translation of the work of Japanese socialist intellectual Hitoshi Yamakawa (1880–1958), a leader in establishing the Japanese Communist Party in 1922. Te book gives a Marxist analysis of the social question, which he regarded as the labour question, a product of capitalism. In the preface, Shi put it directly, "Te labour question, which is at the centre of all social problems, is the product of capitalist contradictions. Te solution to capitalist contradictions is socialism" (Shi 1929: 2). In this book and his 1930 book on social problems, however, Shi did not particularly discuss China's social problems (Shi 1930).

However, GMD labour leaders and sociologists discussed China's labour question using non-Marxist concepts. Ma Chaojun (1885–1977), who studied political economy at Meiji University in Japan and served as the head of the Labour Bureau of the Nationalist state in 1927, pointed out in his 1926 book *China's Labour Question* that the labour question was the most important social question in the world, but it was not the time for Chinese labourers to fght capitalists yet, as there were not any capitalists in China due to China's inadequate production. Ma criticised those calling for "labourers to rise up to fght capitalists" as being "ignorant of the time and circumstance" (1926: 3). His solution to China's labour question was to provide labour protection measures rather than class struggles as promoted by the communists.

Chen Da, a most accomplished sociologist on China's labour question, expressed similar views in his 1929 *China's Labour Question*; as he put it, "in our country, this (labour) question is simpler than that of the West, but it will become more complicated with the development of China's industry. So it is necessary to study China's labour question without any delay" (Chen 1929: 2). Chen also proposed that developing welfare institutions, such as compulsory insurance, was the fundamental solution to the labour question.

Most of the sociologists and early Marxists, who were still at the stage of absorbing Western ideas, which were industry and urban oriented, did not pay enough attention to the land question as well as related peasant problems until the 1930s.2 However, Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the GMD and the Republic of China, insisted that the land question should be China's biggest social question as demonstrated in his lectures on people's livelihood in 1924. In these lectures, Sun refuted Marxism and criticised Marxist class struggle as "inverting causes and efects" and argued that China's social question should be solved by "equalising land rights" and "regulating capital", which meant preventing large landlords from controlling key industries. Sun continued to argue that, because of China's poverty and insufcient industrial production, China should develop its national capital and revive industrial production (Sun 1924, Lectures I and II).

Te ruling Beijing government, although unstable and short lived, did respond to these social problems. In 1915, it inherited and continued its support for the Qing Dynasty's workhouses by issuing *Regulations on Vagrant Workhouses* (*youmin xiyisuo*) "to nurture young homeless people and reform juvenile delinquents (aged 8–16 years) so that they have the general knowledge and basic skills to make a living" (Yue 2006: 227–228). For the labour question, the Beijing government, under the pressures of the CCP-led labour movement, the GMD's Southern Regime, and the ILO, issued its Provisional Factory Regulations in 1923 (revised in 1927) and the Factory Inspections Regulations in 1927. Te two factory regulations and the factory inspections regulations, however, were not implemented because the GMD government soon replaced the Beijing government (Hu 2015).

#### **The GMD State's Social Policy: State-building, Productivism, and Collectivism, 1927–1937**

Upon ascending to power, the GMD state started its state-building process, which claimed to follow Sun Yat-sen's legacy, notably his three peoples' principles and his three-stage process of revolution (from military rule through political tutelage to constitutional government). In 1929,

<sup>2</sup>However, Mao Zedong, the would-be founder of the People's Republic, was a notable exception and carried out several surveys on peasant issues in the 1920s.

the GMD state claimed to enter the political tutelage stage, in which the GMD had the highest power in the political system and would guide state afairs. By the early 1930s, a fve-sector government, or a fve-yuan system, was established, following the American model (Myers 2000; Strauss 2000). By 1935, Jiang Jieshi (known in Western countries as Chiang Kai-shek) became the indisputable leader after winning over local warlords, driving the CCP out of its Jiangxi base and defeating his political competitors.

Under the GMD's one-party rule, the dynamic and tolerant political environment of the 1910s and 1920s changed dramatically. Te GMD state was explicitly against Marxist class struggle as well as the individualism of capitalist society. It promoted an "inclusivist and co-optive strategy" to incorporate all those who could be co-opted because of the GMD's belief in "the organic unity of the Chinese people" and its fear of open division (Strauss 2000: 90). Tis strategy was the result of incorporating Confucianism into the party-state's ideology and learning from the West, including fascism. Fascism was only viewed as a way of restoring China: the GMD state was not fascist in nature but an authoritarian and military dictatorship (Wakeman 2000; Clinton 2017; Tsui 2019).

In the feld of social policy, the GMD state immediately responded to the social problems widely discussed in the 1920s. To solve the poverty problem, it issued a series of regulations afecting poor relief organisations and private charities, with the dual purposes of providing welfare and social control. By 1935, these regulations consolidated existing poorhouses and workhouses within an administrative jurisdiction into a single relief home and brought private charities under the state's control (Cai 2003: 254–261). In response to the labour question, the GMD state drafted the famous Labour Code Draft in 1929, which did not become law but served as the model for a series of labour protection laws issued in the early 1930s and a labour insurance bill that was not issued because of the breakout of the Second Sino-Japanese war. Te GMD state's social policy was outlined in its 1931 Provisional Constitution in chapter four, which covered the "national livelihood" (*guomin shengji*). While the relief homes functioned to some degree—although not always fulflling their stated purposes—the labour laws basically were never put into practice. Tis was mainly due to the fact that these laws copied the contents of Western laws, which surpassed the fnancial and administrative abilities of the Chinese state. Rhetorically, Sun Yat-sen's three peoples' principles, especially people's livelihood, guided the GMD state's policy for poor relief and labour protection. In reality, the immediate purpose of these policies was to root out communist infuence (Ma 1927).

Productivist approaches adopted in 1927 greatly infuenced the GMD state's social policy, which had its roots in Sun Yat-sen's people's livelihood principle. In 1924, Sun Yat-sen ultimately "identifed an increase in national production as the central solution to the social problem" (Zanasi 2006: 70). Te GMD state pursued Sun's productivism to guarantee people's livelihood, which, in turn, reinforced the state's belief in "compulsory labour in exchange for relief". Due to the GMD state's productivism, ofcials and sociologists alike frequently criticised China's traditional poor relief as passive and as producing paupers. In his 1935 book on China's poverty, Ke Xiangfeng identifed that the result of China's traditional relief policy was "a society full of beggars, even professional beggars, and dependent poor" (Ke 1935: 325–326). As a correction to China's traditional relief policy, the GMD state claimed that its poor relief provided active relief through compulsory labour to help recipients become independent and turn them from consumers into producers.

Collectivist notions of society and social problems also infuenced the GMD state's social policy. Following the introduction of Spencer's works, Durkheim's *Te Rules of Sociological Method* (1895) was translated into Chinese in 1924 and methodologically defned sociology as an independent and positivist social science. In 1935, in the midst of the GMD state's revitalisation of Confucianism, Durkheim's *Te Division of Labour in Society* (1893) was translated into Chinese. Tis book presented Durkheim's main concern for how to maintain social order through "mechanical solidarity" in "primitive societies" and through "organic solidarity" in advanced industrial societies, as well as his concern for the transition from primitive to industrial societies, which, he argued, might lead to major crises and anomie that was pathological to modern society.

Durkheim's two books were well received. According to Sun Benwen, arguably the most important ofcial sociologist in the Republican era, Durkheim's two books were the most important sources of China's "synthesis school" of sociology, which was very infuential in this time period (Sun 1948 [2011]: 270). Sun identifed himself with this school in 1948, whereas before he had been well known for his emphasis on cultural factors (*ibid.,* 276–279). It is not difcult to understand why China's ofcial sociologists received Durkheim's works so well. Durkheim's concerns with the transition from a traditional to a modern society agreed with China's situation, as the GMD state engaged in modernising China. In addition, Durkheim's notion of "society as a social organism", which emphasised that society had a common purpose that transcended those of individuals, and it would impose that common purpose on its individual members, ft in squarely with China's Confucianism, which was being revived under GMD rule. Tus, the GMD state could take advantage of this notion to justify the party's authoritative rule over society.

Sociologist Zhu Yisong, one of the leading scholars of the synthesis school, wrote about introductory sociology as well as social problems and social policy. His 1933 *Social Policy* was one of a very few books that discussed China's social policy in the 1930s; although there were several books published with the term "social policy" in their titles, they were either Chinese translations of foreign works or merely introductions of foreign social policies. Te notion of a social organism inspired Zhu's book, and he argued that the purpose of social policy was to increase order, peace, and harmony. Zhu's arguments were in agreement with the GMD state's ofcial ideology.

In *Social Policy*, Zhu treated society as a system which had both harmonising and conficting interests and defned social problems as "problems that have threatened the order, peace, and happiness of society" (1933: 4). He argued for adopting a social policy that could increase the interests of a society or state (labelled as harmonising interests) and decrease the interests of groups or individuals (labelled as conficting interests). As Zhu put it, social policy's purpose is "to coordinate all sorts of interests so that groups and individuals can realise their interests under a single social system" (*ibid*., 6). He continued that, "a society thus achieved is a democratic society", and "such a society will be full of happiness, people will be friendly with one another, and such a society will become a closely connected organism, in which there will be no room for a philosophy of hatred" (*ibid.*). Finally, Zhu argued that in such a society Marxism would naturally lose its attraction for workers, peasants and young people: as he put it, "when the soil becomes unsuitable, Marxists will not harvest anything even if they disseminate the seeds" (*ibid.*).

While the GMD determined to uproot the CCP's infuence, the CCP survived in rural areas. However, the communist-controlled Shanghai University closed in 1927, Qu Qiubai, a CCP leader, was executed, and Shi Fuliang was expelled and his translations of Marxism were banned. Nonetheless, the CCP established 15 bases in rural areas from 1928 to 1934. Te Soviet Union strongly infuenced the policies of the CCP's Central Committee by appointing its leaders. In February 1930, the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern helped the CCP Central Committee draft fve laws on land, labour, economic policy, the red army, and organisation of the Soviets, respectively, which were the basis for the Outline of the Constitution, Land Law, Labour Code, and Resolution on Economic Policies all issued in 1931. Tese laws attempted to establish a political regime modelled on the Soviet socialist system (Yu 1995: 45–46).

Te Labour Code was applied to all workers in all sorts of enterprises, imitating the Soviet Labour Code of the 1920s in all aspects. It stipulated an eight-hour workday, a series of paid public holidays that totalled 175 days per year, a high level of wages and welfare, and a set of comprehensive social insurance benefts (*ibid*., 90–99). However, implementation of the Labour Code was a failure. By spring 1933, the Labour Code caused the shutdown of many small enterprises and, thus, unemployment of workers, due to the unrealistic benefts mentioned earlier (Zhang and Sun 2011). As a result, half a year later, the CCP issued a revised Labour Code on 15 October 1933, which made it more fexible in terms of working hours and other labour conditions to suit local situations (Yu 1995: 338–356). However, the new Labour Code could not be fully applied because the CCP was driven out of its bases and began the Long March to Northwest China on 16 October 1934.

## **Wartime Social Policy: Universal Social Security and China's "Special Situation" (1937–1945)**

Te outbreak of war with Japan did not change the features of the GMD state's social policy, which continued to be part of the nation-building process, embodied collectivist notions of social problems and attempted to promote production. On the other hand, however, the Atlantic powers introduced the idea of universal social security, which greatly attracted Chinese elites in social policymaking, although they continued to emphasise China's special situation.

Te war made the refugee issue an unprecedented national crisis, which led to the establishment of the National Relief Commission (NRC) in 1938, an emergency organisation to deal with the refugee crisis. Meanwhile, the war provoked the GMD state to tighten its monitoring of mass mobilisation, and the GMD party consequently established the Ministry of Social Afairs in 1939.

However, in 1940, with the war at a stalemate, the Social Afairs Ministry was transferred to the Executive Yuan, which served as the state council and thus the highest administrative agency. Te ministry not only retained its former responsibilities but also took over other social duties from the Interior Ministry, the Industries Ministry, the Economic Ministry, and the NRC. Accordingly, the ministry was made up of three subordinate departments for social welfare, social movements, and cooperative afairs, respectively. Te social welfare department included six divisions and one bureau, each of which was, respectively, in charge of social insurance, labour welfare, social services, job centres, social relief, children's welfare, and factory inspections (Qin 1983b, vol. 97: 14–28).

Te 1940s were a decade of "welfare internationalism" (Kaufmann 2012, chapter 4, 94–130). Te term "social security" began to appear in international documents in the early 1940s. In August 1941, the Atlantic Charter referred to "the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic feld with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security". In 1942, the ILO, at its Montreal ofce, published *Approaches to Social Security: An International Survey,* which promoted the idea of coordinating and integrating existing social insurance and means-tested social assistance programmes into a single national scheme, as exemplifed by the New Zealand system (ILO 1942). In November 1942, Britain published the Beveridge Report, titled *Social Insurance and Allied Services*, which embodied similar ideas as those of the ILO 1942 Survey. Te Beveridge Report proposed a thorough plan for the government to address the fve giants identifed by the report: want, disease, idleness, ignorance and squalor. What the report proposed was a single national fat-rate social insurance system, which was universal in its population coverage and comprehensive in its covered social risks in order to provide a national minimum safety net via fat-rate benefts and contributions. More importantly, the Beveridge Report committed to three larger objectives, which were full employment, family allowances, and a general revenue-fnanced National Health Service system free for the entire population.

If the ILO's 1942 survey did not draw immediate attention, the Beveridge Report had an immediate impact on circulating the idea of a universal social security scheme and the post-war ideals advocated for in both the ILO survey and the Beveridge Report. Te Beveridge Report became a milestone in the history of the development of the post-war welfare state. As Rodgers commented, "of all the welfare state programs and platforms that were to follow, none was to match its infuence or the electricity of its reception" (1998: 489). As a result, the USA passed the Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill in 1943 and Canada published its Marsh Plan in 1943. In 1944, India, supported by two ILO experts, considered issuing an Indian Beveridge Plan based on the Adarkar draft of a health insurance programme (Kumar 2003). Te ILO further reinforced the ideas embodied in its 1942 survey and the 1942 Beveridge Report at its 1944 Philadelphia Conference, which recognised the ILO's obligation to advance global programmes that would achieve full employment, a basic income, and comprehensive medical care. In terms of social security, the Conference Declaration called for extending social security measures to provide not only a basic income but also a comprehensive medical care to all who were in need (Johnston 1970). China was not exempt from this global trend of emerging universal social security policies, especially under the leadership of the newly consolidated Ministry of Social Afairs stafed with Euro-American-trained sociologists and other social scientists (Hu and Manning 2010; Hu 2015; Ma 2012, 2014).

Te Ministry of Social Afairs began to extensively recruit China's sociologists. Gu Zhenggang, the Social Afairs Minister during the ministry's existence (1939–1949),3 studied at Berlin University from 1922 to 1925 and returned to China in 1926 as a GMD party member. In 1931, Gu became a Deputy Minister for the Interior Ministry, then the Social Afairs Minister in 1939. Under his leadership, the Social Afairs Ministry appointed sociologists Xie Zhengfu and Zhang Hongjun as the head of the Social Welfare Department from 1942 to 1944 and from 1944 to 1949, respectively.

Furthermore, the ministry invited Chinese sociologists to participate in every step of the ministry's work on social policy formation from the initial policy design through drafting legislation to assessing policy implementation. For instance, many sociologists attended a series of important conferences the ministry held from January 1941 to the end of 1942 (Qin 1983b, vol. 97). In 1942, based on the ministry's suggestions, sociologists from universities in the Chengdu region established a research committee on social relief, and the ministry's Research Ofce began to edit a book series on social administration written by Chinese sociologists (Ke 1943: 1). By 1944, universities began to add sociology departments and opened courses on social administration and social afairs (Yan 2010: 261–262). Te ministry also recruited university graduates and dispatched outstanding ones to study social policy in the USA and Europe.

As a result of the ministry's intensive eforts, the Social Relief Law was promulgated in 1943. Compared with its forerunner—the 1928 Regulations on Local Relief Homes—this law signifcantly enlarged its target groups and improved the beneft levels, a result of learning from worldwide trends. As the ministry put it in its explanation of the social welfare bill, "according to the implications of the Grand Unity (*Da Tong*) in the *Books of Rites* on relief principles and in reference to various countries' relief administration trends, we have drafted this social relief bill"

<sup>3</sup> In 1949, the Social Afairs Ministry was abolished and its major responsibilities were incorporated into the Interior Ministry under its Social Afairs Department, and Gu Zhenggang became the Minister of the Interior Ministry in 1950.

(Yue 2006: 236). According to the ministry, the bill adopted four major ideas embodied in worldwide trends. First, it assumed the idea of state responsibility and abandoned former ideas of benevolence and kindness in providing social relief. Tis means that it is the state's responsibility rather than the state's mercy and grace to provide social relief. Second, accordingly, relief methods should transition from passive, post-event material assistance only to preventive and positive relief to help people become independent, useful instead of useless, and producers instead of consumers. Tird, coverage should be extended from "the poor, old and weak, and disabled and sick" (*pinqiong laoruo canji*) to the entire population, including pregnant women, children, the physically disabled, and labourers, as well as citizens in such situations as renting a home, contributing to economic cooperatives, and providing for family consumption. Benefts should cover all types of contingencies. As the ministry put it, "all countries around the world have provided their peoples with all sorts of benefts from birth to death". Fourth, with the expansion of coverage and circumstances, the state should take responsibility and also greatly encourage people and organisations to operate private relief organisations (*ibid*., 236–238).

Te passage of this social relief law also refected changes in attitudes towards poverty. As early as the turn of the century, eradicating poverty was linked to China's national survival. By the 1920s, Chinese elites largely emphasised the personal faws of the poor and blamed them for their poverty, and criminalised vagrants and other poor. In the 1930s, sociologists, like Ke Xiangfeng, diferentiated "pauperism" from "poverty": pauperism was defned as "dependency on others who were not naturally or legally responsible" for them (1935: 10). Tis implies that poverty rather than pauperism should be socially supported. It was in the 1940s during the war that intellectuals began to emphasise that "poverty is not a crime", and laziness was not the source of poverty but, instead, social factors, such as the war, caused many diligent and frugal people to experience poverty (Zhou 1944).

From its inception, the ministry recognised the novelty and importance of social insurance in solving social problems that industrialisation created and maintaining social order. It planned to set up a Social Insurance Bureau in the near future. It viewed drafting social insurance bills as one of its major tasks: for that purpose, it collected and translated a series of social insurance laws from Euro-American countries and the Soviet Union. By 1943, the ministry had already drafted a series of social insurance bills, and a Chinese translation of the Beveridge Report reached the Ministry in 1943, leading to wide-ranging discussions of its major ideas by the ministry's experts and the desire to draft China's own Beveridge plan in 1944 (Ma 2012: 337–344). Although no social insurance laws were enacted during the war, the ministry chose the district of Ziliujin in Northern Sichuan to experiment with social insurance funds for salt miners. In 1943, it had established about ten insurance societies in ten counties, covering around 50,000 workers altogether.

Overall, although "world trends" played an important role in the GMD state's wartime social policy formation, Chinese intellectuals and ofcials emphasised China's inherent social ideas and China's own situation, as demonstrated by a 1943 GMD Propaganda Department document on wartime social administration. Tis document frst stated that China's inherent ideal society was harmonised, and then it discussed major features of China's social administration as compared to those of Euro-American countries. Tis shows the GMD state's continued rhetoric reliance on Confucianism while learning from the West.

According to this document, we can summarise the major features of China's social administration as follows. First of all, as the purpose of China's state-building was to realise the three peoples' principles, the party-state needed to train the masses to achieve national independence. Second, while Western countries were industrialised and their living standards were relatively high, China was still primarily agricultural and all socio-economic levels of society sufered from low living standards, especially when China was at war. Terefore, although Western countries' social administration programmes focused on redistribution, China's social administration should aim to improve industrial production. Tird, while Western countries had class confict caused by capital, China had no classes at all. As a result, while Western countries' social policies targeted workers to reduce class confict, China's social policies needed to target the entire population to prevent the emergence of classes (Qin 1983a, vol. 96: 15–49).

#### **2 The Early Rise of Social Security in China: Ideas and Reforms…**

In 1944, in his article "Several Principles of Social Administration from the Last Tree Years", the Social Afairs Minister Gu Zhenggang analysed the issue of what kind of social policies China should adopt. In this article, Gu mentioned that China's social administration's biggest task was to solve China's social problems and complete its social reconstruction. Whereas there were three kinds of global social policies—capitalist, socialist, and fascist—he recommended that China should adopt the three peoples' social policy because of China's state ideology, social needs, and social problems. As Gu put it, "we should know that state ideology and social needs are the two conditions that determine the types of social policies of any country. Te three peoples' principles are our country's supreme ideology and principles, and our country's social problems have their own nature. Terefore, our social policy must be based on the three peoples' principles" (Qin 1983c, vol. 99: 1–3).

Upon the outbreak of the war, the GMD and CCP formed a second united front, and the CCP abandoned "its policies of armed revolt, sovietisation, and forcible confscation of landlords' land" (Van Slyke 1967: 92–93). With the war's stalemate in late 1939 and 1940, the united front became fragile due to both military and ideological conficts. In response, in January 1940, Mao Zedong published his essay "On New Democracy", arguing for the establishment of a new democratic republic that would be a proletarian-led, multi-class coalition regime in transition to a socialist regime (Mao 1940). In other words, the essay emphasised class coordination between national capitalists and the working class as well as a transition to a socialist regime in the future.

Accordingly, in late 1940 and 1941, the CCP promoted a wartime labour policy that abandoned its previous radical labour policy (Central Committee 1985, vol. 3: 42). Te *Labour Policy Outline* provided concrete measures for major aspects of labour policy. Te *Labour Policy Outline* pointed out that "social insurance should be set up as contingencies for sickness and death"; however, "if there are difculties in setting up social insurance, regulations on benefts for workers' injuries, accidents, and deaths should be provided" (*ibid.,* 52–54).

During the rectifcation campaign of 1942 and 1943, the CCP further criticised the radical labour movement as subjective, which "blindly applied the set of measures suitable in industrial urban areas to the wartime base areas", and was described as "rural, economically backward, repeatedly attacked by enemies, and characteristic of the new democratic economy and politics" (Tang et al. 2002: 537–539). Tus, production, rather than improving workers' livelihoods, was stressed, especially after Mao's 1943 call "to organise up", which led to another round of largescale production campaigns (Mao 1991: 933).

As a result of implementing the wartime labour policy that emphasised class coordination and increased production, social insurance disappeared in all labour protections and collective contract regulations issued by administrators in major bases from 1941 to 1944 (*ibid.,* 75–119). In contrast, we recall that social insurance was part of the 1930s Labour Code, and, as late as 1940, public enterprises in a major base area ofered labour insurance funds to provide benefts to workers' families in the event of sickness, death, or injury (*Xinhua Daily*, 1 May 1941, in *ibid.,* 149). Yet, wartime regulations provided labour compensation rather than social insurance benefts.

## **Post-war Development: Establishing Social Security Institutions, 1945–1978**

In May 1945, at its Sixth National Congress, the GMD adopted its famous four principal social policies, including the National Health Programme, Labour Programme, Agrarian Programme and Preliminary Facilities for a Post-war Social Security Programme (Chinese Ministry of Information 1947). Te post-war social security programme was brand new, and the 1942 British Beveridge Report and the ILO's post-war reconstruction plan greatly infuenced it. It used the term "social security" in its title and pointed out that, "the main tasks of a postwar social security programme shall be vocational guidance, social insurance, and social relief"; and "social insurance" referred to a comprehensive social insurance programme, its fnancial sources, and principles for determining benefts (*ibid.,* 52). In 1946, the GMD state approved "Implementing Measures to Establish Preliminary Facilities for a Postwar Social Security Programme", which provided a strategy and specifc agenda for setting up social insurance programmes (Chen 1984: 368). Meanwhile, the 1947 Constitution provided "social security".

In 1946, the GMD government was able to set up a Preparation Department to establish the Central Social Insurance Bureau under the Ministry of Social Afairs. Tis Preparation Department drafted Principles for Social Insurance Laws (*shehui baoxianfa yuanze*), which was passed by the National government's state conference in 1947 and became the frst social insurance law in modern China. Te explanation of the 1947 Principles made clear reference to the British National Insurance Act of 1946, and the ILO's publications, such as the ILO's 1942 *Approaches to Social Security*, and many other contemporaneous foreign laws and materials (Nanjing Archives 1947). In 1948, China not only participated in the drafting of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights but also ratifed the declaration, which included social security as a major human right. Te GMD took over the workhouses and poorhouses in areas Japan previously occupied. With hyperinfation, the collapse of the economy, and the deterioration of the refugee situation, poverty-related problems became even more challenging, although the GMD state continued to stress positive relief and labour productivity.

On the eve of victory in the Second Sino-Japanese War, the CCP claimed to continue its wartime new democratic labour policy and called for a social insurance programme. As Mao Zedong contended in his 1945 report "On Coalition Government", the government would adopt social insurance, eight- to ten-hour workdays and unemployment relief to protect workers' interests (Mao 1945). As a result, from 1945 to 1948, various bases adopted labour protection regulations that included a section on "labour insurance" or "social insurance" (Zhou et al. 2002: 326–347). As the CCP took over more and more cities from the GMD, they called for a meeting of trade unions from all liberalised areas in 1948, which turned into the Sixth National Labour Conference. Labour insurance for public enterprises became a major issue at the conference because the number of state enterprises had increased. Tus, the Resolution of the Conference states that "places with large concentrations of industrial workers can initiate labour insurance programmes" (All-China Trade Union 1957: 373). Shortly after the Sixth Labour Conference concluded, in December 1948, the Northeast Region adopted a labour insurance programme, which was based on the Soviet model of social insurance.

In 1949, the People's Republic was ofcially established in October, and, upon its defeat, the GMD central government retreated to Taiwan in December. Shortly thereafter, in 1950, Taiwan adopted a labour insurance programme at the provincial level, while China adopted its labour insurance model at the national level in 1951. Both labour insurance systems were continuations of the GMD and CCP's pre-1949 eforts to provide social insurance (Hu 2015, 2016). Te fate of each system, however, contrasted greatly in the following decades, until the early 1980s when China entered a new era. By 1952, Taiwan's labour insurance programme had rapidly extended to all enterprises with more than ten workers, while in the 1950s separate labour insurance schemes were established for the self-employed, fshermen, and sugar employees. In 1958, all these existing systems were incorporated into a single labour insurance system (Hu 2015). In contrast, China's labour insurance scheme only applied to enterprises with 100 workers or more, and the system's operation deteriorated during the Great Leap (1958–1960) and broke down completely during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).

In both China and Taiwan, government employees and military servicemen received privileged social benefts either in the form of social insurance as in Taiwan or from the state's budget as in China. By the 1980s, only farmers, housewives, and other unemployed populations were excluded from the existing social insurance system in Taiwan, but in China, a much larger population remained without coverage as "state paternalism" was "practiced on the principle of exclusivity" (Lee 2019: 59). In Taiwan, the 1943 social relief law was in efect until 1980, and, in China, the government provided both emergency and social relief to urban residents.

Furthermore, China implemented a separate social security system for peasants due to the urban-rural divide. Tis divide materialised as a result of the household registration system that the government developed in the 1950s, which classifed the population into rural and urban residents and made it extremely hard for rural residents (peasants) to become urban residents. In the countryside, the state inherited the emergency relief system and set up a system for the *wubaohu* (households similar to the historical *guangua gudu fei*) in which local rural collectives rather than the government provided them with the basics like food, clothing, and housing. Te state provided free public education and organised rural health cooperatives for all rural residents through the local People's Communes (for China's Commune welfare programme, see Dillon 2015). Both systems were globally recognised and highly praised. Tis rural system has undergone great changes since 1978, when China ofcially entered the reform and opening-era (Shi, Chap. 3 of this book).

#### **Conclusion: Ideas and Reforms**

Tis chapter analysed the rise of social security ideas and policies in China in the frst half of the twentieth century using Leisering's "onion skin model" of social policy ideas (see the summary in Table 2.1). It frst discussed China's imperial state relief policies and demonstrated the infuence of Western missionaries and Western poor relief on China's relief system from the late nineteenth century to the frst decade of the twentieth century. It then analysed the rise of social problems and the social question in China in the 1920s, and the accompanying debates between China's mainstream non-Marxist intellectuals and early Marxists at a time when the political environment remained tolerant before the GMD came to power and suppressed Marxism and liberalism. Parts three to fve examined the GMD state's social security policies during its reign from 1928 to 1949 and argued that its social policy was regarded as part of its state-building processes and it adopted collectivistic notions of social problems and social policy that emphasised production rather than redistribution and individual rights. In particular, part four explored the wartime social policy, including the impact of universal social security ideas on the GMD state's social policy. Parts three to fve also introduced the CCP's social security policies in the areas that it controlled.

Several ideational points are worth highlighting. First, this chapter revealed that there was an early rise in social security ideas and institutions in China in the frst decades of the twentieth century, although these ideas often did not become bills, bills often did not become legislation, and related laws were often not implemented due to China's weak


acts (1933)

**Table 2.1**Social protection in Republican China: changing ideas and policies

**82**


central state during this turbulent time. Te early 1940s, however, began to see intensifed social policy development in China, partially due to the great impact of the Allied powers' universal social security ideas on China. Te result was the issuance of a series of social security laws and decrees, including the Social Relief Law in 1943, the Employee's Welfare Law in 1943, and the Principles of Social Insurance Laws in 1947. In addition, the GMD party issued the Four Principal Social Policies in 1945, which included the frst policy with the term "social security" in its title. Tis, in turn, paved the way for "social security" to be written into the 1947 Constitution. Unlike most of the laws in previous decades, the two laws on social relief and employees' welfare were not only implemented but also had a signifcant impact (together with the 1947 Principles) on Taiwan's social security throughout the post-war era.

Second, the above-mentioned two laws from 1943 also had an impact on Communist China's social security policies in the sense that China carried on the enduring tradition of state emergency relief and continued some social relief and employee's welfare practices in the 1950s. It thus partially agreed with the recent literature, arguing there were ideological and practice continuities across the 1949 divide between the GMD and CCP regimes. However, this chapter insisted that the GMD state's social security policy was the direct source of Taiwan's social security programme in the post-war era, whereas Communist China's social security model originated in the areas it controlled before 1949 and emulated the Soviet models as shown by pertinent discussions throughout this chapter.

Tird, in Republican China, almost all non-Marxists, who remained the mainstream intellectuals, accepted the organic concept of society promulgated in the classic sociological tradition of Comte, Spencer and Durkheim, which viewed "social problems" as social diseases that threaten the social order. Te organic concepts of society led to a concern for stability and harmony in society, and this concern was reinforced under the GMD rule in the 1930s when Confucianism was incorporated into the party-state's ideology. By abandoning Marxist notions of class struggle and radical revolution, as well as suppressing liberal notions of individual rights, the GMD state adopted collectivist notions of social policy, which emphasised economic growth and increasing production.

#### **2 The Early Rise of Social Security in China: Ideas and Reforms…**

Fourth, although external ideas played an important role in China's social security policy as discussed earlier, Chinese elites emphasised China's special situation when debating and designing China's social policy. Te GMD state recruited many Western-trained sociologists to its social administration as advisors and ofcials, especially after the Ministry of Social Afairs was established in the 1940s. While these intellectuals and ofcials paid close attention to global trends, they consistently argued that China's social problems had their own causes and forms, which were diferent from those of the West, and China had its own state ideology, which was diferent from foreign ones. Tus, they continued, China should not adopt any existing foreign social policies (neither Soviet, capitalist, nor fascist), but its own social policy based on China's special situation, which was ofcially labelled as the three peoples' social policy.

#### **References**


Ke, Xiangfeng (1943) *Social relief*. Shanghai: Zhongzheng Shuju.


Wakeman Jr., Frederic (2000) A revisionist view of the Nanjing Decade: Confucian fascism. In *Reappraising Republican China*, ed. Frederic Wakeman, Jr. and Richard L. Edmonds, New York: Oxford University Press, 141–178.


Zhou, Zhengben, Zhu Zhu, Shi Hua, Mingkui Liu, and Yuliang Tang (eds.) (2002) *Te working class and workers' movements in liberated areas during the Liberalisation War*, *vol. 14* of *Te working class and workers' movements in Modern China*, ed. Yuliang Tang and Mingkui Liu. Beijing: Te CCP's Central Party School Publisher.

Zhu, Yisong (1933) *Social policy*. Shanghai: Commercial Publisher.

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# **3**

# **Social Security: The Career of a Contested Social Idea in China During the Reform Era, 1978–2020**

**Shih-Jiunn Shi**

## **Introduction: The Rise of the Idea of "Social Security" in China**

In the history of the People's Republic of China, social welfare is a domain that has witnessed dramatic institutional changes. In various phases of economic development, the state established or restructured social security systems in a rather radical way: from the overwhelming state predominance in the socialist period (1949–1978), to the retreat of public responsibility at the beginning of the reform era (1978–2000), and, fnally, to the recent return of the state that seems to be successively reclaiming its authority over other societal sectors and organisations. Te inconsistency of welfare reform logic from period to period compelled the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to craft delicate ideas to justify each policy change. One prime example is the notion of "social security",

Graduate Institute of National Development, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan e-mail: sjshi@ntu.edu.tw

S.-J. Shi (\*)

which did not exist in socialist China until years after the CCP launched its "reform and openness" (*gaige kaifang*) policy in 1978. Initially borrowed from the policy materials of international organisations, "social security" has been gaining recognition in both ofcial documents and domestic academic articles as the way to characterise the state's collective commitment to individual well-being and the corresponding institutional arrangements the state has made to honour this pledge.

Te rise of the idea of "social security" in Chinese social policy has received scant scholarly attention. Indeed, most of the studies on this topic take this idea for granted without exploring its conspicuous emergence in the reform era. Even those accounts that reference Chinese culture generally suggest the impact of traditional familialism or community relief on the minimal role of the state but leave the question of why, and in what ways, new social policy ideas sprout unanswered (e.g. Chen 1996; Wong 1998; Twohey 1999). Tis is surprising given that the instrumental role semantics (or to use a more pejorative term, *propaganda*) has played in the CCP's rule. Since its foundation in 1921, the party has mastered the discursive skills necessary to frame political and social situations in specifc ways, as well as to enable mass mobilisation in its favour. Unveiling particular semantic contexts is the key to grasping the development of various policy felds, such as social welfare. Te present study seeks to fll this gap by tracing ideational developments in these related felds. I argue that the career of the term "social security" and its variants neatly refects the *zeitgeist* of social policy of the reform era, especially with respect to the relations of the state to other societal sectors (markets, social organisations, and others). Te latter aspect is crucial but also problematic, given the monopolistic nature of CCP's authoritarian rule. Te consequence is a trajectory of somewhat elusive, if not contradictory, understandings of "social security" in the reform era.

It is important to note that the chronological sequence of various ideas analysed below by no means presumes a linear evolution or ideational continuity of the "social security" concept, rather the aim is to outline how, and in what ways, pertinent social welfare ideas arise and undergo semantic changes—at times intersecting with or even at odds with one another—in the Chinese context. To some extent, the coexistence of occasionally inconsistent ideas helps mitigate the potential contradictions that would otherwise undermine the legitimacy of the government's reform eforts. Te frst section ofers a historical background of socialist welfare ideas from 1949 to 1978. Te following sections then outline the early idea of welfare "socialisation", the subsequent début of the concept of "social security", and its recent reinterpretation as "social governance". Te fnal section summarises the chapter's fndings and refects on their implications for social policy in contemporary China.

## **Socialist Welfare Ideas, 1949–1978: Urban Labour Insurance Versus Rural Residual Welfare**

When founding the People's Republic in 1949 after the civil war, the CCP laid out a blueprint to build a socialist system that would uphold its ideological supremacy *vis-à-vis* capitalism. In the Cold War era, the Soviet model of urban development with a focus on heavy industry set the precedent for the new Chinese nation to follow and emulate, leading to what Selden (1988: 11) termed "mobilisational collectivism" both in urban and rural regions and, ultimately, class struggle, mass mobilisation, collectivisation of the economy, elimination of market mechanisms, and equal distribution. Te state-owned enterprises (SOE) in conjunction with the *danwei* (work unit) system and the people's communes became two distinctive pillars of the Chinese socialist model.

#### **Urban Welfare**

Urban welfare rested on SOE welfare programmes. Workers' benefts, including comprehensive, non-contributory, and fully fedged welfare benefts, stemmed entirely from the work units to which workers belonged. Given the vanguard role of workers in socialist ideology, the government established a full employment system (the iron rice bowl),1 coupled with a comprehensive system of labour-related social benefts

<sup>1</sup>A Chinese term denoting secure livelihood.

and guaranteed low-price food supply (Dixon 1981; Leung and Nann 1995; Lü and Perry 1997). Urban welfare featured high employment, generous benefts, and low nominal wages. Underpinning the urban system was labour insurance that covered such risks as old age, sickness, work injury, and maternity (in addition to unemployment since 1986). Each SOE was responsible for the fnancial expense of the insurance programmes for its employees: 3 per cent of total enterprise wages fowed into a collective fund for labour insurance. Te trade union in each enterprise organised contribution collection under the umbrella of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), which represented party-afliated worker organisations. In the case of specifc SOEs' fnancial difculties, the state claimed fnal responsibility for the SOEs' contribution liabilities using tax revenue. Since all SOEs belonged to the state, management bore little concern for the operation's profts or losses, nor did the enterprise's performance have any impact on employees' welfare benefts.

A central element of urban social policy was labour insurance (*laodong baoxian*): an urban-centred and labour-frst idea. Te year 1952 saw the promulgation of *Labour Insurance Regulation of the People's Republic of China*, which laid the foundation of the urban welfare programmes. While the term "labour" revealed the employment basis of social welfare programmes and urban workers' privileged access to public benefts *visà-vis* other social classes (e.g. rural peasants), "insurance" defned the state's commitment to preventing social risks for this specifc group (Dillon 2015). To achieve the goal of industrialising with a focus on heavy industry, the state's monopoly over crop prices in the pricing and marketing of agricultural products transferred rural economic resources to the urban sector.2 In a time when China remained an underdeveloped economy and peasants made up the majority (80 per cent) of the population, the establishment of labour insurance appeared premature but revealed the CCP's ardent zeal for industrialisation.

One characteristic defning the labour insurance programme in the socialist era was the absence of unemployment insurance because joblessness was considered a pathology of the capitalist economy that would

<sup>2</sup>Total resources directed in this way is estimated at over 600 billion yuan (Lin et al. 2000: 149).

(and should) not exist in socialism. Indeed, the architecture of the labour insurance programme strengthened the image of the state caring for citizens from the cradle to the grave. Te underlying social contract between the state and urban workers assured the former's responsibility for employment security in exchange for the latter's lifelong devotion. Te *danwei* became the organisational interface between the state and urban workers, undertaking care-taking responsibilities for their employees. For urban workers, afliation to the *danwei* entailed economic resources in exchange for labour, political power through rankings in the organisation hierarchy, and symbolic esteem socially (Cheng and Selden 1997; Lü and Perry 1997). By the same token, urban social assistance programmes have remained largely rudimentary because poverty was an unusual incident that only occurred in the case of physical and mental disabilities or loss of family support. Aside from these two rare misfortunes, the labour insurance programme virtually covered all workplace risks and secured the urban livelihood.

#### **Rural Welfare**

Te socialist institutional framework of resource allocation in favour of urban workers operated at an enormous price, largely paid by the majority of the rural population. Owing to the rigid system of household registration (*hukou*) that prohibited peasants from freely moving around and choosing their residence, peasants often stayed trapped in the People's Communes, which granted meagre public benefts, and the land and families were the mainstays of social provision.3 In this respect, the tacit understanding between the state and peasants brought the principle of self-reliance to the fore. Unlike the situations covered by urban labour insurance, this pronounced residualism left little room for any active state involvement in rural social protection programmes. Within the People's Communes, the main programme, "fve-guarantees" (*wubao*), provided care for people in need, particularly frail elderly people, persons with

<sup>3</sup>Te residualist ideology underpinning the relationship between the state and peasants also refects a moral economy, albeit a much more limited one compared to its urban counterpart.

disabilities, and young orphans who could expect no support from other sources. Originally consisting of food, fuel, clothing, education, and burial, the *wubao* programme was decentralised. Te number of benefts and the eligibility criteria depended on local fnancial resources, leading to a considerable variation among the communes.

Te cooperative health system (*nongcun hezuo yiliao*) established in the 1950s constituted the second pillar of rural welfare. Originating from the voluntary self-aid medical care system in some regions, this programme saw nationwide implementation during the 1960s (Bloom and Fang 2003; Liu 2004). It provided afordable, basic medical care for rural residents, promoted primary medical knowledge, and took sanitary measures such as vaccination. Tis health programme operated on the premiums collected from the communes' collective welfare funds. Together with *wubao*, rural welfare in the socialist era featured a strong decentralised structure in terms of fnance and administration. Each locality was responsible for its own social provisions.

With the introduction of the *hukou* system, Chinese society was *de facto* divided into two separate worlds of social citizenship, that is, an employment-based, comprehensive social insurance system for urban residents and a community-based, residual social assistance system for rural inhabitants. Tis dualisation highlighted the stratifcation of social benefts based on the *hukou* status diference (urban vs. rural) and pronounced administrative decentralisation. Even during the turbulent period of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), when political tumult paralysed the central government, local implementation of the urban and rural welfare systems remained partially intact. Te institutional legacy of the Maoist era has lingered for a long time even after economic reforms began.

### **The Ideational Turn in the Course of Economic Reforms, 1978–2000: "Socialisation" of Welfare**

Starting from our national circumstances, socialisation of social welfare adopts the multi-channel forms of state, collective, and individual provision to forge ahead with the joint development of multiple-ownership of the welfare institutions. ("Opinions on accelerating the socialisation of social welfare" issued by the State Council, no. 19, February 2000)

Te Tird Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP in December 1978 marked the start of the reform process. Unique for this event was the ofcial revision of the collectivist approaches of the Maoist era, with the conclusion that the introduction of market mechanisms along with a reduction of state intervention in economic spheres should be the key to reviving the moribund socialist economy. In 1979, the second session of the Fifth National People's Congress ratifed the party-state's resolutions, with the overall goal of realising four modernisations in industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defence. Te bold moves under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping ushered in the "reform and openness" era that tremendously increased the national wealth in the following decades.

#### **SOE Reform and Its Effects**

Tese ambitious plans could not succeed without overhauling the conventional, socialist welfare edifce. Urban SOEs frst won discretion to retain a certain percentage of their profts for investment, welfare provisions, and bonuses. Te SOEs' autonomy gained further authorisation in 1984 when the government launched various management responsibility system experiments to allow room for independent decision-making of enterprises. Tese eforts led to a concrete policy in 1988 when the National People's Congress passed the "Law of state-owned industrial enterprises of the PRC" to allow SOEs to operate at the managers' own discretion. However, the eforts to separate SOEs from the trammel of the planned economy inevitably triggered a massive dismissal of their redundant labour force. In tandem with the loss of jobs was the erosion of generous welfare benefts meant to unchain SOEs from the severe burden of welfare liabilities for employees. Te consequence was large-scale job loss and a suspension of pension payments to retirees.

Te dismissal of the redundant labour force created a new impoverished group whose needs posed a huge challenge for the existing social security system (Chan 1998; Smyth 1998, 1999; Whyte 1999). What characterised the unemployment protection of the post-socialist transition was the unique *xiagang* system—literally of-the-post—which prescribed SOEs to pay those laid-of a certain amount of monthly allowance despite their status as inactive. Due to the lack of a real unemployment benefts system, as is the case in a capitalist society, *xiagang* created a peculiar relationship between the laid-of workers and their enterprises in which the former temporarily left their positions but remained "employed" by the SOEs. Tis semantic invention allowed room for the CCP to avoid confronting the awkward question of why a socialist economy, in which unemployment should not exist at all, now witnessed a surge of laid-of workers.

However, the transitional *xiagang* arrangement hardly appeased the laid-of workers because many SOEs failed to honour their fnancial obligations. Payment deferral or even default resulted in hardship for the people concerned. Worries about the waning of the *danwei* system went hand-in-hand with scepticism over the sustainability of the withering socialist welfare system (Chan and Chow 1992; Leung and Nann 1995; Wong and Macpherson 1995; Wong 1998; Lee 2000). Uneven welfare retrenchment in the work units also produced an age-based hierarchy: while older cohorts generally benefted greatly from the occupational welfare system, younger cohorts who joined the work units later were most susceptible to the cutbacks in welfare provisions. Conceivably, the SOE reforms made a painful process palpable to the urban workers involved, especially the late 1990s saw the peak of SOE mass dismissals, which numbered in the millions.

Te restructuring of the SOEs and the heavy toll incurred could not proceed smoothly without the refurbishment of ideas. Tis particularly applied to the case of urban workers who used to stand for the supremacy of the socialist ideal *vis-à-vis* Western capitalism. Te Chinese socialist economy rested on the tacit premise that the government would provide for workers' well-being in exchange for their lifelong devotion to the socialist fatherland. Now, the normative foundation of this moral economy crumbled with the retrenchment of urban welfare programmes—a moral crisis the CCP had to avert with an alternative justifcation for this situation. Against this background, the conventional socialist ideas required novel elements to accommodate the new circumstances.

Te reinvention of terms culminated in the "Opinions on accelerating the socialisation of social welfare" issued by the State Council (No. 19) in 2000, in which the central government explicitly addressed its goal to invite the joint participation of various societal sectors in welfare production. Noteworthy is the specifc understanding of the term "socialisation" (*shehuihua*) and its Chinese characteristics during the reform era. Whilst Western readers may wonder if this notion signals a more public recognition of the state's responsibility to provide social necessities, its content points in the opposite direction both in rhetoric and reality. Te "socialisation of social welfare" stands in sharp contrast to the conventional socialist mode of work unit provisioning (*danweihua*), in which the SOEs bore the majority of the burden of providing welfare services, and refers to the transfer of fnancial responsibilities to non-state agencies (here the enterprises and employees themselves) (Wong 1995). "Socialisation" in this regard entails a clear territorial distinction between the state and society, with the latter encompassing all those sectors outside of the state hierarchy. In a similar vein, "socialisation" touches upon service provision. Already in the mid-1980s, the Ministry of Civil Afairs adopted the slogan "Social welfare provided by society" (*shehui fuli shehui ban*)—in view of contracting fscal capacity—to probe the possibility of communitylevel service arrangements. Echoing the term "socialisation", the idea behind the policy change suggested the state's attempt to delegate its omnipresent responsibilities.

#### **Policy Reforms: Pensions and Healthcare**

Nonetheless, behind the ofcial euphoria for welfare pluralism (*fuli duoyuan zhuyi*) lay the reality of the state's outright retreat from all major welfare responsibilities for urban workers. In various policy domains, "socialisation" has come close to efectively meaning marketisation and privatisation. Pensions are one prime example: during the 1990s, reform eforts of this policy area centred on the introduction of a multi-pillar pension system. Inspired by advice from the World Bank (1994), the State Council issued an announcement (*guanyu shenhua qiye zhigong yanglao baoxian zhidu gaige de tongzhi*) stipulating that the programme would consist of a combination of basic social pension insurance, topped up by a personal account for individual workers (so-called *shehui tongchou yu geren zhanghu*). Te establishment of individual accounts aimed to expand the funding base and reduce employers' contributions as well as provide incentives for employees to also contribute. All workers owned a personal fund account that was portable throughout their job career. Te individual contribution rate was set at no more than three per cent of the individual's average wages for the previous year, which would then rise by 1 per cent every two years.

In many aspects, the reality of pension "socialisation" during that period was far from rosy. For one, many localities with SOEs in fundamental fnancial difculties had to bear enormous pension liabilities in addition to the monthly allowances provided to spare workers who had been laid-of. Deferred payments or even defaults due to enterprise bankruptcy had become so widespread that they plagued the old-age security of many pensioners. Te late 1990s witnessed the disgruntled urban pensioners' large-scale protests, which placed huge pressure on local governments who had to answer to these protesters' demands without jeopardising social stability. Moreover, the mixture of social pooling and individual accounts failed to fulfl its acclaimed promise to provide multipillar support for old-age security. Quite the contrary: due to the decentralised political structures and the lack of legal frameworks during the reform period, the central government had little leeway to enforce penalties for local non-compliance (Béland and Yu 2004; Frazier 2010; Shi 2011). Te individual accounts were often empty because most of the contributions paid into them were unlawfully diverted to settling more urgent pension liabilities for current pensioners—instead of accumulating in the prescribed funds. Especially in places that traditionally had many SOEs, not least the Liaoning province, local labour departments (the main bodies of implementation) often found it difcult to coerce enterprises to make contributions, particularly those already struggling to survive.

To tackle these urgent issues, the central government implemented local-level experiments in 2000—starting with Liaoning—and subsided the provincial governments in their eforts to liquidate the empty individual accounts. Financial challenges posed by the above period of pension "socialisation" did not recede until a decade later when the booming Chinese economy replenished the public purse with abundant tax revenue. Local governments won more fscal leverage to resume payments to pensioners and *xiagang* workers. But even so, the problem of empty individual accounts still haunts the urban pension insurance programme up to today, mainly due to the increasing pace of population ageing that largely countervailed the dividends from strong public fscal growth. Te latest "China pension actuarial report 2019–2050" that the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS 2019) compiled estimated that, unless either institutional reforms took place in due course or enormous public subsidies chipped in, China's pension insurance programmes would begin to run defcits in 2035. In short, policy eforts to "socialise" pensions achieved the goal of limiting the state's responsibility at the expense of enterprises and individual workers.

In healthcare and education policies, the "socialisation" of welfare went even further. Te programmatic reform of the urban healthcare system (alongside pension reform) began in the 1990s. Te retreat of the state proceeded with a rise in private providers in the urban stationary health sector (marketisation). As public subsidies to hospitals declined, they could not help but turn to issuing more drug prescriptions for proft. Te situation in rural areas also changed for the worse because the existing Rural Cooperative Healthcare programme broke down following the collapse of the People's Communes (Duckett 2011; Unger 2002). Marketisation has led to the exacerbation of social inequality by increasing the risk of poverty in case of illness. Te "socialisation" of welfare also entailed uneven territorial politics: the central government imposed meritocratic mandates on local cadres, which prioritised performance evaluations based on economic growth over social redistribution in their jurisdictions. Te lopsided emphasis on local economic growth (GDPism) led to low social expenditures and unequal welfare rights throughout the 1980s and 1990s, especially in felds that had large, local fnancial responsibilities (such as education and healthcare) (Shi 2012b; Béland et al. 2018). All of these problems put enormous pressure on the party-state, as illustrated by the new phrase "three big mountains" (*sanzuo dashan*) that referred to the new social risks associated with healthcare, education, and housing. Tis term mirrored the extremely negative public perception of the economic reforms' marketisation consequences.4

### **The Emergence of the Idea of "Social Security" in the New Millennium: From GDPism to Inclusive Growth**

Social security is a human right and is defned as the set of policies and programmes designed to reduce and prevent poverty and vulnerability throughout the life cycle. (International Labour Organisation 2017: 1)

Te state's attempts to "socialise" their welfare responsibilities led to public discontent and social unrest. Against this background, a semantic turn began to take place in the late 1990s: the state largely shifted away from their initial touting of public-private welfare partnerships to a reemphasis on the comprehensive public responsibility for social provisioning. Ofcial documents boasted the ideas of "take humanity as basis" (*yiren weiben*) or "inclusive growth" (*baorongxing zengzhang*), which demonstrated the party-state's growing awareness that social policy was an essential tool for redressing the dire consequences of the economic reforms (Gong and Su 2010). A cognitive shift took place in tandem with this discursive change: while economic growth remained crucial, its sustainability would require social protections that would address the social misfortunes resulting from the ongoing market reforms. Te idea of social security thus entailed the imperative to redress the results of the uneven stress on economic development by focusing on income redistribution and human well-being.

Te reframing of overall social problems contributed to the "return" of the state's role in social provision. Alarmed by the widespread perception of social injustice resulting from the economic reforms, central government initiatives since 2000 have introduced new social policies covering

<sup>4</sup>Te slogan "Tree big mountains" frst appeared in Mao Zedong's revolutionary call to overturn China's three major obstacles: imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism.

almost all segments of the population while simultaneously granting special payment transfers to laggard inland regions in support of their social programmes. Further reform eforts have promoted the institutional integration of existing social insurance programmes (CDRF 2012; Shi 2012a). For example, in 2003, the central government played a direct role in the introduction of the New Rural Cooperative Medical System and, in 2007, the abolition of school fees and the introduction of universal health insurance coverage. In addition, in 2012, the government contributed to the instalment of the new social insurance programme for serious illnesses (Brown et al. 2009). In 2016, some local governments also launched their pilot, long-term care policy programmes.

It is interesting to note that the term "social security" (*shehui baozhang*) did not appear in mainland Chinese until the late 1980s when academics and welfare practitioners realised that the dire social consequences of the economic reforms would not be resolved unless the state initiated comprehensive social policy reforms. In addition, the term *shehui baozhang* denoted the collective responsibility of the state for providing a basic safety net for the people—in stark contrast to the notion of welfare socialisation that was dominant in the welfare reforms of the preceding period. Tis new idea referred to both the normative reframing of the state-market-society nexus (in which the state should resume its leadership role) and the institutional restructuring of the welfare system (which should include public social insurance, social assistance, and social service programmes to secure citizens' well-being).

Furthermore, international organisations' knowledge difusion played a role. Te ideational void left over by the Cultural Revolution prompted Chinese elites to search for new ideational elements appropriate for the new epoch. Tey found inspiration in the documents of renowned international organisations, such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International Social Security Association (see Hu 2015; Liu and Leisering 2017). Whilst no evidence could specify the original authorship of the Chinese term *shehui baozhang*, its debut in 1986 in the Seventh Five-Year Plan signalled ofcial recognition of the need to address social policy issues directly. Tis juncture witnessed the introduction of the frst People's Republic unemployment insurance programme, an unprecedented step in tackling the rising *xiagang* problem.5 Later social insurance reforms also witnessed the involvement of international organisations.

To be sure, the early appearance of a new idea such as social security is certainly not equivalent to its immediate public popularity. Te state's primary role in social policy expansion did not take shape until much later (the new millennium), owing to the even more acute challenges that arose out of the SOE reforms in the 1990s. In other words, the emergence of the concept of social security merely sowed a seed in intellectual (and ofcial) minds but remained far from formal institutionalisation in public policy domains. For the mid-1980s to the late 1990s, the state's attempts to "socialise" social welfare prevailed, leaving little space for the realisation of the social security model. It was not until the late 1990s that one can observe the growing signifcance of the social security idea in Chinese social policy, both ideationally and institutionally. In academic literature and ofcial discourses alike, the use of the term *shehui baozhang* mushroomed with a clear reference to the state's responsibility to establish a basic social safety net for the people. Characteristic of this understanding is the ofcial interpretation as follows:

Social security (*shehui baozhang*) is the cornerstone of the people's wellbeing. It is a vital socio-economic institution, including primarily social insurance, social assistance, social welfare, and charity activities… Te Chinese government highly appreciates the construction of a social security system, in accommodation with the economic development level.

(Chinese government's website at http://big5.www.gov.cn/gate/big5/ www.gov.cn/test/2012-04/20/content\_2118401.htm, accessed 29 March 2020.)

Te advent of the Hu-Wen era (2002–2012) introduced real, substantial change in terms of the state's reversal regarding "welfare socialisation" (see Howell and Duckett 2019). Under the rubrics of "take humanity as basis" and the "harmonious society" (*hexie shehui*), the Hu-Wen

<sup>5</sup>Te insurance programme had the title "job-seeking insurance" (*daiye baoxian*) rather than "unemployment insurance" (*shiye baoxian*), which indicates the state's awkward handling of this social problem in a self-proclaimed socialist economy.

leadership sent an unequivocal message of the state's return to the social domain. Since 1998, there has been a quantum leap in social policy expansion in both urban and rural areas. Social policy expansion in terms of a fully fedged, basic layer of social security protections for all, especially for vulnerable population groups, such as farmers, migrant workers, unemployed workers, and the urban poor. One of the most essential eforts was the urban-rural harmonisation programme, which established new basic social pension and health insurance programmes to cover both urban and rural residents (Shi 2012a). At the same time, policies addressing the woes of transient populations also took shape: many localities granted migrant workers access to the urban worker social insurance programme, although many migrants remained reluctant to take advantage of this ofer. Te diverse designs of the disparate insurance programmes in the various regions often deterred insured migrants from transferring their entitlements when they moved. Meanwhile, the government achieved signifcant progress in improving rural livelihoods, notably with the introduction of the New Rural Cooperative Medical System in 2003, the abolishment of agricultural taxes in 2006, and the guarantee of nine years of free education for children the following year. Even in the residual social assistance environment, a modern programme "Minimum living-standard guarantee" (*zuidi shenghuo baozhang, dibao*) replaced the traditional *wubao* to become the major pillar of poor relief for urban (in 1999) and rural (in 2006) households in need (Leung and Xiao 2015; Gao 2017).

Te term "social security" thus took a crucial turn both in rhetoric and in substance—away from the state's retreat in the "socialisation" sense to the acknowledgement of the state's comprehensive public responsibility for all citizens. Tanks to the solid state treasury funded in times of rapid economic growth, the Hu-Wen leadership trod an alternative path to social policy expansion. Te CCP's Seventeenth National Congress's 2007 report expounded on the necessary components of social security:

Social security is the cornerstone of social stability (*shehui wending*). It should be based on social insurance (*shehui baoxian*), social assistance (*shehui jiuzhu*), and social welfare (*shehui fuli*) with an emphasis on basic oldage security, basic healthcare, and a minimum livelihood guarantee supplemented by charity activities and commercial insurance. We should accelerate our pace for establishing a unifed social security service system.

(Te People Net; http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/6429195.html; accessed 12 August 2019)

However, it would be misleading to conceive of the recent policy advancements as constituting a generous social security system for all. What emerged from the renewed state endeavour was a welfare edifce with basic protections for all and ample room for stratifed beneft levels to accommodate diferent occupational groups and regional diversity (Shi 2012b; Béland et al. 2018). Te state explicitly envisioned that the new social security system would entail a basic pillar of social security with universal coverage and need-based entitlements (*guangfugai, dishuiping*) to which supplementary schemes could be established according to local circumstances (*duocengci*), while also securing the long-term fnancial sustainability of social security (*kechixu*). Given China's vast size and enormous regional diversity, social security as a leitmotif needed to ensure some leeway for decentralised governance, namely fexibility in institutional design and policy implementation. Understanding this feature is crucial to grasping the specifcally Chinese version of social security, which implied that the state's responsibility was to provide basic security to all citizens but left room for the stratifcation of social benefts among diferent population groups *and* across the regions.

Moreover, the accentuation of social security for all should by no means disguise the state's intent to police the lives of its citizens. From the very beginning, the state conceived of social security as a useful tool for maintaining social stability (*weiwun*). While this type of social control is not foreign to social policies elsewhere, the ofcial semantic context of the concept of "social security" reveals certain Chinese characteristics. Already in the Hu-Wen era, the concept of "social management" (*shehui guanli*) had burgeoned to underline the importance of administering society as an object. Tis idea originated in 1998 from a central government proposal to recognise social management as a central administrative function. Subsequently, in 2004, "innovating social management" (*chuangxin shehui guanli*) became a core concept for the fourth plenary session of the Sixteenth CCP Congress. Te session also coined the phrase "party leadership, government responsibility, societal cooperation, public participation" to describe key policy principles.6 Te term "social management" gained recognition in the Eleventh and the Twelfth Five-Year plans: one chapter specifed it as a key government target (Pieke 2012). Subordinating social security to the state's overall governance goal of maintaining social stability has since taken root.

### **Social Security as "Social Governance", 2012– Present: From Regulatory Managerialism to Statist Control**

Te construction of a comprehensive social safety net in the new millennium takes on an ambivalent feature: on the one hand, it embodies the governmental response to various population groups' demands for more public, social provisions. On the other hand, underneath the pronounced expansion of social security lies the frm grip of the state over civil society. What is noteworthy about the idea of "social management" is its essence of regulatory managerialism that advances a new understanding of the mixed public-private welfare economy, somewhat akin to the Western notion of the "regulatory welfare state" (Shi 2017a; see Leisering 2011). Tis concept explicitly encourages the participation of non-state organisations (NGOs) in providing welfare support under the supervision of the CCP: the party-state establishes a regulatory framework that deploys non-state actors in provisioning social services. Inviting these social organisations into the service domains that the state conventionally dominated resulted from necessity because the state could no longer meet the growing public demand for social services. Tis situation is reminiscent of the "socialisation" idea delineated before and, yet, the state's "social management" appears even more ambitious in its attempt to ensure the incorporation of non-state organisations into the state's overall development vision. Te Hu-Wen era witnessed a widening spectrum of civic

<sup>6</sup>A shift towards social governance in China. *East Asia forum*, 9 September 2011, accessed on 15 January 2019 at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/09/09/a-shift-toward-social-governancein-china/.

participation under this doctrine (Spires 2011; Teets 2013). Even NGOs found their niche in various parts of Chinese society.

However, hope for a nascent civil society soon vanished after the advent of the ffth-generation Xi-Li leadership. With the slogan "Chinese Dream", Xi Jinping advocated for the grandiose resurgence of the Chinese nation under the CCP's command (Economy 2014; Shi 2017b). Underneath this overarching, strategic goal lay his endeavour to empower a new state that would assume a pre-emptive role in orchestrating all societal sectors' contributions to the Dream. A signifcant semantic shift took place from "social management" to "social governance" (*shehui zhili*). Tough seemingly equivalent terms, the nuance between "social management" and "social governance" lies in the latter's broader goal: for the state to steer (even monitor) society from all sides. Hailed as the "Fifth modernisation" at the Tird Plenum of the Eighteenth CCP Central Committee in 2013, the aim was to upgrade (modernise) the state's capacity for governing the nation.7 In essence, "social governance" unravelled an explicit, technocratic vision of the party-state's *engineering* of society via rule by law (not *rule of law*!) under changing economic and social circumstances (Li 2018). "Social governance" had nothing to do with supporting the fourishing of civil society, as "social management" might still entail. Quite the contrary: it implied the circumscription of the state's range of civic participation and only by the monopolistic CCP rule. To fulfl this statist project, Xi adopted a much more draconian approach towards social organisations than his predecessors: lawyers engaging in human rights activism were arrested in a nationwide crackdown in 2015—all remain in jail today—followed by strict police regulation of foreign NGOs in 2017. Even businesses faced new limits after the government announced an ordinance requesting the insertion of CCP personnel into corporate management (*dangjian*), foreign companies included.

In social policy, Xi-Li leadership largely followed the expansionary direction of the Hu-Wen era, albeit in an instrumental fashion. In order

<sup>7</sup>Te term "Fifth modernisation" echoes the slogan "Four modernisations" (*sige xiandaihua*; refers to modernising industry, agriculture, national defence, and science) the then premier Zhou Enlai promulgated in the 1960s and the second-generation leader Deng Xiaoping re-emphasised in the late 1970s (see the above analysis on the "socialisation" of welfare).

to accelerate the pace of interregional development, "urbanisation" (*chengzhenhua*) took the lead as the guiding principle for social cohesion. In 2014, the *hukou* system experienced a fundamental overhaul that eliminated the urban-rural household registration barrier by granting peasants urban resident status should they work and live in middle- and small-sized cities for a certain period of time.8 In addition, the central government requested that local cadres implement all necessary measures in a bid to eradicate (rather than alleviate) poverty by 2020—a temporal horizon the party-state outlined to make China a well-of, middle-range society (*xiaokang shehui*).

Consequently, the notion of social security experienced a fundamental shift during the Xi-Li era. It denoted a contributory means to building an auspicious society under the proclaimed socialist banner rather than an end to achieving social rights for the people *per se*. Since social security implementation falls within a range of administrative jurisdictions, citizens' access to social benefts is in danger of falling victim to arbitrary bureaucratic discretion. In other words, social governance is coercive in nature because it grants or withholds social rights based on the conduct of ordinary people, gauged by the ofcial yardstick of "good citizenry". Indicative of this substantive change to the idea of social security was the introduction of the "social credit system" (*shehui xinyong tixi*) in 2015, which grades each citizen according to his/her conduct in daily life.9 Te omnipresence of surveillance, closed-circuit televisions (CCTVs) enables the government to track the behaviour of every person. Te government limits or even denies those with low "citizen scores" access to common activities, such as purchasing train tickets or opening bank accounts. Some localities have gone even further and barred the children of those families who failed the credit test from attending local schools.10 Above

<sup>8</sup>Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee's "Opinions regarding the further deepening of *hukou*-reform" (*Renmin Ribao*, 1 July 2014). Local governments followed this directive by passing relevant reform measures in the following years. However, metropolises, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou, kept in place strict barriers to resident status for newcomers.

<sup>9</sup>China "social credit": Beijing sets up huge system. *BBC News*, 26 October 2015. Accessed on 10 November 2019 at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-34592186

<sup>10</sup>A recent report by the agency of the "social credit system", the National Public Credit Information Centre, states that, in 2018 alone, the court declared around 12.8 million Chinese citizens "creditless". Information collected on 13 December 2019 from the central government website: http:// big5.www.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/fuwu/2019-02/19/content\_5366674.htm

all, migrant workers, who already sufer inferior social rights due to their secondary *hukou* status, have become an easy target of the new control measures. Te Beijing government's use of the pejorative term "low-end population" (*diduan renkou*) in its expulsion of migrant workers from the suburban Daxing District in the winter of 2017 is a recent expression of explicit, ofcial discrimination. Te recent news release of the government's new plan to extend the application of the "social credit system" to foreign companies has aroused much anxiety amongst Western corporations who fear political censorship.

Te recent initiation of the "social credit system" lays bare the fact that, although "social security" as an idea is taking shape in the reform era, the scope and extent of its social rights protection remain vulnerable to bureaucratic infringement. Whilst modern Western welfare states may also restrict or even withhold welfare rights, they mostly do so to immigrants with a more limited legal status (e.g. denizen, non-citizen, or asylum seeker) than citizens. Tis diferentiation of citizenship in terms of status and rights entitlement corresponds to Lockwood (1996)'s description of "civic stratifcation", suggesting that access to, and the capacity to demand, citizenship rights critically depends on the possession of moral or material resources. In this vein, the Chinese case exemplifes the unequal nature of the "social credit system" in which the state bureaucracy wields considerable power in allocating limited resources based on an individual's merit or demerit *de jure*. Te absence of any check on the bureaucracy's power (such as a free press or independent jurisprudence), to keep possible administrative abuse at bay, further erodes the statutory (and substantive) foundation of social citizenship rights.

## **Conclusion: Social Security in the Shadow of Hierarchy**

Te emergence of the concept of "social security" and its changing interpretations in the reform era testifes to the shifting contexts of collective perception of social questions and to changing state-society relations as a result of social policy reforms (for a summary see Table 3.1). In various phases of "reform and openness" policies, the party-state adopted


**Table 3.1** Seventy years of social protection in China: changing ideas and policies elaborate rhetorical devices to frame the contexts in which public responsibility for social provisioning experienced constant redefnition. Whilst an overall trend of social policy expansion has dominated since the new millennium—set in motion by the Hu-Wen leadership—the accentuation of the "social security" concept in the current Xi-Li era has undergone some nuanced but substantial changes. One crucial distinction lies in the role of social policy. Unlike his predecessors in the Hu-Wen era who associated "social security" with humanity-based social harmony, the current leader Xi Jinping seems resolute to place "social security" under the direction of a strong state (Shi 2017b). Te changing interpretation of "social security" has led to diferent social policy models that at times swing between extremes: whilst the Soviet model dominated the socialist period, the "reform and openness" era witnessed aspirations to follow the examples of other countries, such as Chile's pension privatisation when Chinese welfare reforms focused on the "socialisation of welfare" or the ILO notion of social security for all when the states resumed responsibility for welfare (Hu, in this volume).

"Social security" is undergoing yet another signifcant change in content under the current leadership. In the name of the party-state's "Chinese Dream", "social security" must conform and subordinate itself, if necessary, to the national goal of China's rise on the global stage. Instead of serving as an end in itself, namely to protect the social rights of each citizen, "social security" is now part of the social governance framework that empowers the party-state's rule over society and individuals. Te immediate consequence of this interpretation of "social security" is that it is vulnerable to bureaucratic infringement and thus is fragile. In addition to the alleged public responsibility for the people's well-being, "social security" is now charged with subduing civil society and individuals per the code of conduct that the state bureaucracy unilaterally defnes.

To be sure, the social control innate to social policy is neither unique nor confned to China. Te collective utilisation of social policy has been crucial for the historical rise of nation-building in the West. However, there welfare states have generated synergies between the individual and collective benefts (Kaufmann 2012: chapter 8), whilst in China, the collective interests of nationhood and social stability have often overridden concerns for individual welfare rights. Moreover, bureaucratic control over citizens' behaviour in Western welfare states has proceeded within the rule of law, democracy, and a free civil society, a circumstance largely unknown in contemporary China. Te authoritarian regime's unchecked grip has infringed on civil society and individuals on an unprecedented scale, leaving very little statutory space for any civic engagement and citizenship rights protection. Although the quantitative growth in social policies may point to the emergence of a Chinese welfare state, one must not overlook the background of an assertive Leviathan with an everexpanding range of statecraft that encroaches on the core substance of the "social" ideas inherent in "social security", namely the individualist understandings of social protections and rights, beginning when the term frst appeared in ofcial semantics. Te erosion of this normative foundation, which is present in the reform era of the 2000s, may well foreshadow the end of this progressive reform journey.

#### **References**


#### **Internet Sources**


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# **Part III**

**India**

# **4**

# **Social Policy in India: One Hundred Years of the (Stifed) Social Question**

**Sony Pellissery**

## **Introduction**

What social policy is possible in a context in which the culture denies equality between citizens but at the same time the constitution guarantees it? To answer this central question, I describe the way the "stifing" mechanism acts on the idea of the "social" from the point of view of interests, institutions, and international infuences. I use "stifing" to indicate "non-recognition", an idea Hegel originally developed

S. Pellissery (\*)

e-mail: sony.pellissery@stx.oxon.org

Tis chapter is the result of a long engagement with the Centre for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF), University of Bielefeld, Germany, since 2011. I would like to express my gratitude to Lutz Leisering, Ulrike Davy, and Benjamin Davy for the opportunity to engage with two subgroups of the ZiF research group from which this volume fows. Ideas presented in this chapter were mainly developed in consultation with diferent scholars in residence at ZiF. I would also like to thank colleagues at the Institute of Public Policy, Bangalore, for inputs on the draft paper. Some of the articles in which these ideas were earlier published include Davy and Pellissery (2013), Pellissery et al. (2015), Pellissery (2016, 2017), and Pellissery and Anand (2017).

Institute of Public Policy, National Law School of India University, Bengaluru, India

L. Leisering (ed.), *One Hundred Years of Social Protection*, Global Dynamics of Social Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54959-6\_4

(1807/1966) in his classic *Te Phenomenology of the Spirit*<sup>1</sup> to show how unequal relations develop. Usage of this framework is in tandem with the idea that "the core of citizenship is about recognition, not about material levelling" (Davy et al. 2013: 6).

"Social" in Indian languages refers to "belonging to a community".2 Tis is very close to the early meaning of "social" in Greek and Roman traditions, in which we fnd human cohabitation described as the Aristotelian *zoon politicon* and in Latin as *animal sociale* (see contestations of this translation in Arendt 1958 and Kaufmann 2013). However, the "community" of reference in Indian languages is not a "public" from which we could derive a Marshallian "universal citizenship" (also see Tönnies 1887/2001; Arendt 1958). Rather, citizens derive their identity through their community afliations—religious, regional, and caste which thus produces diferentiated citizenship (Young 2000). Tat is why Jayal (2011) contends that citizenship in the Indian context is delinked from welfare. However, the English-language usage of "social policy", "social welfare", "social issues", or "social service" in political discourses, academic contexts, budgets, and administrative settings gets close to the ideas of anti-poverty policies and, thus, the idea of the "social" ("social question with distributive aims") as Heclo (1995) or Kaufmann (2012, 2013) elucidates. Te problematique of this chapter is how the "social question" in this context has only feebly addressed "social inequality", which is the key causative factor requiring social policy intervention.

<sup>1</sup>Hegel refers to one individual's realisation of conscious existence and the impossibility of the counterpart's self-consciousness. Tis imbalance is created through the former fulflling a "desire for recognition" and the negation of the same by the latter. Hegel wrote about this process in a highly condensed fashion (229–240). However, subsequent scholars (Fanon 1967; Mannoni 1962; Kojève 1969; Gadamer 1976; and Honneth 2014) have interpreted and elaborated on this rich text. See a good summary of these interpretations in Bulhan (1985) and Fraser and Honneth (2003). Communication forms the crux of the defning relationship between two human beings. It is exactly because of this that "intersubjective recognition constitutes a necessary prerequisite for attaining self-consciousness" (Honneth 2014: 4). Tis is a radical departure from Kant, who argued that self-consciousness is the Self observing its own consciousness. Several scholars today have applied the idea of recognition in social policy contexts. Charles Taylor (1992) argued that the politics of recognition is at the heart of justice.

<sup>2</sup>Te expressions in Sanskrit-root languages (for instance, the Hindi language uses *samajik*) and Dravidian-root languages (for instance, the Tamil language uses *samuha*) refer to "community".

#### **4 Social Policy in India: One Hundred Years of the (Stifed)…**

Tis chapter is arranged in eight parts. Broadly, I aim to divide Indian history into diferent periods in which qualitative changes to the social question took place. In each of the historical settings, "stifing" of the social question took place in unique ways. In the frst stage, the religious reforms addressed the social question in the context of culturally rooted inequality. In the second stage, the labour question in the context of the production process—particularly the Asiatic mode of production—is taken up. Te third stage is the prioritising of political freedom over the "social question" in the context of anti-colonial movements. In the fourth period, the battle of ideas (on the social problem) between three prominent public intellectuals during the foundation of the republic is discussed. While these three public intellectuals had clear ideas on redistribution policies, their ideas on the identity question also shaped the valuation of social policies. Te ffth and sixth periods referred to in the chapter analyse how two main identity categories in India (caste and religion) shaped the social question. Te seventh part of the chapter discusses how prioritising economic development over the "social question" neglected addressing inequality. In the fnal section, I discuss how intellectual colonialism thrust the last nail in the cofn of the social question in India. Tis chapter demonstrates the ways in which the dominant social idea in each stage prevented the recognition of social inequality. Tese historical periods stifing the "social question" are inconsistent with the modernity that the nation-state wants to achieve and the functional aspirations of a heterogeneous population.

#### **Religious Reforms as Social Reforms**

To investigate the societal and cultural dimensions of the origins of the "social question" in India, one has to revisit the period 2000 years ago, because the rationalist challenge to authority systems (in this case religious systems) (comparable to the Enlightenment in Europe) began when the Buddha rejected God as well as the Hindu social order. Without a brief examination of this legacy, documenting the evolution of the "social question" in India would be incomplete.

Hindu social order and ancient Indian jurisprudence3 symbiotically evolved together. Te caste system's organisation of society formed the primary pillar of India's political economy:4 "India has a unique social division: the (endogamous) caste system. *Caste is class at a primitive level of production, a religious method of forming social consciousness in such a manner that the primary producer is deprived of his surplus with the minimum of coercion*" (Kosambi 1954: 14; italics in original). Until 800 BCE, caste was not viewed as an institution of discrimination (or a "social problem" in the sense we understand today) since inter-dining and intermarriage was possible. During the late Bronze Age and early Iron Age, pastoral-nomadic communities developed into four castes. Kosambi (1955: 42) explains this development as follows:

Te reason for caste stratifcation is the new productive basis, which had led to relations of production between groups, higher than in the tribal stage but with still primitive tools. Tus, we have a tenant of Brahminism for state policy that each caste and subcaste (*jati*), tribal district, guild, and even large family group had to be judged by its own particular laws, obviously because it was then a unit of production. Terefore, the state could not uniformise the juridical structure within groups, but only regulate transactions between groups.5

Religion was used to valorise some functions and devalue others. In other words, the actions of the highest caste (*Brahmins*), such as ofering sacrifces, were most noble compared to the activities of the labouring caste (*Shudras*): "Brahminism had constructed the acts of tilling the land,

<sup>3</sup> "India" as a nation-state is a recent construction as a result of colonisation and integration of several kingdoms. Prior to that, the expression used was "Hindustan", referring to the region near the Indus River. Tis had a geographic stretch roughly similar to that of South Asia today.

<sup>4</sup>Prominent academic works on caste have not taken the political economy approach seriously. Te works of Max Weber and Louis Dumont (1966) emphasised the cultural dimensions of caste. In recent times, there is a renewed interest in examining the caste issue from this missing angle. Singh (2014) argues that underlying the issue of caste relations is property and land rights.

<sup>5</sup>Note that Kosambi uses the term "caste-class". B. R. Ambedkar and subsequent writers, for instance, Omvedt (2007), have emphasised that the caste system's origin is not "functional diferentiation" as happened in the capitalist stage of European development. Te caste system originated in the pre-capitalist mode of the production period. Ambedkar repeatedly maintained that caste is not "division of labour, but division of labourers".

removing a carcass from the village, skinning a carcass, and transforming hide into leather as flthy. In other words, the whole process of human intercourse with nature, land, plants, and animals in productive and creative modes was constructed as unclean" (Iliah 2007: 303). Te untouchables or *dalits*, who did menial jobs, were kept outside of formal Hindu society.6 Tis rigid caste structure, which prevented mobility, warranted a revolution.

Buddhism was that revolution in Aryan society circa 400 BCE. It began as a religious revolution and evolved into a social and political revolution (Ambedkar 1956/1987). It challenged the caste system, accepted members from the lower castes as priests (a role reserved for *Brahmins*, the highest caste, in Hinduism), and gave equal status to women. Tese were explicit challenges to the societal power structure. At the core of the Buddhist revolution was the principle of social equality. Tis was possible because of the reasoned rejection of God. King Ashoka (304–234 BCE) accepted these Buddhist ideas and put them into practice. As a result, the religious revolution became a social revolution and received the patronage of the state.

In response, Brahmanical forces solidifed the caste system through much stricter laws that Manusmriti developed (Ambedkar 1956/1987), and the regime that succeeded King Ashoka persecuted Buddhists using the Manusmriti code of law (compiled between 200 BCE and 200 CE). Te *dharmic* system codifed during this period emphasised individuals' duties rather than rights, and it was considered the duty of every individual to work for the well-being of society (Sharma 1984).7

<sup>6</sup> Several scholars (for instance, Galanter 1984) have documented how discrimination was institutionalised through the legal system, which I need not repeat here.

<sup>7</sup>Various Hindu scriptures even defned not only individuals' duties but also their mutual relations; for example, "Stri dharma paddhati" defnes married women's duties and "Rajadharma" defnes a king's duties. Similarly, the "Ashram-dharma" prescribes an individual's duties during various life stages, and, according to this, it is an individual's duty to look after one's family, which includes the elders, ancestors, progeny, and other members of the family who need protection (Kane 1941). Te joint-family system that emerged out of this idea has always provided a sense of protection and security for the elderly and disabled.

Te biggest assault on rationality is rejecting reason in favour of religious precepts:8 "Hindus observed untouchability and caste not because they were inhuman or wrong-headed. Tey observed caste because they were deeply religious" (Ambedkar 1936: 68). Tus, the very social philosophy of Hinduism focuses neither on the individual nor on society, but on "Brahminic supermen" (Haragopal and Sukumar 2007).

Tere have been similar challenges to the Hindu social order from time to time, such as the development of Jainism (500 BCE) or Sikhism (1500 CE), which were revolutionary religions and ofered a dignifed life outside of the Hindu caste system. During the medieval period, Bhakti saints (such as Kabir and Nanak) preached social equality and castelessness. In the nineteenth century, there was an intellectual renaissance during which many reformers (some infuenced by Western thoughts) advocated for liberation and the abandonment of class and caste distinctions (see Tapar 1966). Ambedkar and millions of *dalits* converted to Buddhism in 1956. In a nutshell, what appears to be religious reform or conversion is a response to the systemic inability to raise the "social question" of inequality. In a later part of the chapter, we examine how social policies have responded to inequality, particularly that arising from caste discrimination. However, before that, we need to examine other institutional frames that contributed to the ideational architecture of social policies.

## **"Asiatic" Stifing**

Marx frst raised the question of why the history of the East was the history of religion. He did not discover the characteristics of feudalism in his analysis of India and China. In what he called the Asiatic mode of production (AMP), he identifed two central reasons for this: "Te stationary nature of this part of Asia, despite all the aimless activity on the political surface, can be completely explained by two mutually supporting circumstances: 1. Te *public works* system of the central government and, 2.

<sup>8</sup>Ambedkar argues that the reason for the disappearance of Buddhism from India is Brahmanical persecution rather than Islamic invasion.

Alongside this, the entire Empire which, apart from a few large cities, is an agglomeration of *villages*, each with its own distinct organisation and each forming its own small world" (Marx 1853).9

Some scholars have challenged this self-sufciency theory of village life (Srinivas and Shah 1960). However, there is a consensus that the village was the centre of the agrarian production system, and private property ownership was absent before the advent of the British empire. In *Grundrisse*, Marx (1858) further expanded on this idea: "a part of their surplus labour belongs to the higher community". Tis would tremendously change during British rule:

Te inordinate and unscrupulous greed of the East India Company caused gradual disintegration of these gram panchayats. Te deliberate introduction of the Ryotwari system as against the village tenure system dealt a deathblow to the corporate life of the village republics. Te centralisation of all executive and judicial powers in the hands of the British bureaucrats also deprived the village functionaries of their age-long powers and infuence. (Agarwal 1946: 52)

Tis analysis has two implications for the term "social". First, as long as a surplus of labour served the British administration, the workers' question would remain dormant. Breman (1996) traces how the exploitation of *dalit* (outcast) labourers—the cultural conditions of whom I described in the previous section—intensifed during British colonial rule. Marx (1853) himself commented that the Asiatic system created an unresisting human who was limited to a vegetative state; it "restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass".

Second, the breaking of the common property system meant that many citizens did not own property and, thus, penury was rampant (Pellissery and Biswas 2012). Te origins of this deprivation go back to

<sup>9</sup>Marx formed these views based on the works of François Bernier (1934) and documents from the British Empire. It is worth quoting one of the accounts of a governor of the Raj: "Te village communities are little republics, having nearly everything they want within themselves, and almost independent of any foreign relations. Tey seem to last where nothing else lasts. Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down; revolution succeeds to revolution; Hindu, Pathan, Mughal, Maratha, Sikh, English, are masters in turn but the village communities remain the same" (Lord Metcalfe 1833: 470).

the historical circumstances described in this section. At the same time, it is important to distinguish between the notion of "feudalism" as understood in Europe and India when the emergence of the social is discussed in these diferent contexts. In the Indian context, caste as an institution prevented functional diferentiation (the defning feature of modernity in Europe), and labour was never valued. Labouring was the duty of the lower strata in the societal hierarchy to those who occupied higher positions. Te imagined organic unity of the society without functional differentiation stifed the emergence of the idea of the social.

However, colonial rule had the potential to change this. In several countries, colonial rule provided a historical break from the past and a move from a traditional society to a modern society. But, what happened in India?

## **Political Freedom over Social Justice**

One of the foundational experiences of the Indian population coming together as a nation-state is their struggle for freedom, which lasted for about a century (1857–1947).10 Did this struggle facilitate the rise of the "social question" so that all sections of society could come together against the colonial power? A section within the Congress party, which spearheaded the freedom struggle, argued that social reform (in a limited sense) must precede political reform. However, those who held the view that political reform and independence from the British was more important silenced the Social Reform Party. Ambedkar (1936: 28) analysed the reasons for this. He pointed out that the Social Reform Party was concerned with reforming the Hindu family and not wider concerns for the reorganisation of Hindu society:

Te Social Conference was a body which mainly concerned itself with the reform of the high caste Hindu family. It consisted mostly of enlightened high-caste Hindus who did not feel the necessity for agitating for the

<sup>10</sup>Te frst organised revolt against the East India Company took place in 1857, after which the British crown directly took over the rule of India.

abolition of caste or had not the courage to agitate for it. Tey felt quite naturally a great urge to remove such evils as enforced widowhood, child marriages, etc., evils which prevailed among them and which were personally felt by them. Tey did not stand up for the reform of the Hindu society. Te battle that was fought centred round the question of the reform of the family. It did not relate to the social reform in the sense of the break-up of the caste system. It was never put in issue by the reformers. Tat is the reason why the Social Reform party lost.

Tus, the elitist nature of the freedom struggle and the fact that the writers of the constitution were English-speaking, Western-educated Indians were precedents to the suppression of important social questions.

Te Drafting Committee Chairman of the Constituent Assembly, Ambedkar (1948) (who was from a low caste), strongly made this argument: "Democracy in India is only a top dressing, on an Indian soil, which is essentially undemocratic". He further cautioned that if inequality was not reduced, the poorest sections of Indian society would undo the constitution and democracy itself. Te Constitution of 1950 specifcally recognised two social groups as hugely disadvantaged. Tese groups were: Scheduled (listed in the constitution) Castes or *dalits* (literally meaning "broken" people: outcasts from the Hindu caste system and, therefore, untouchables. Note that the Constitution of India does not abolish the caste system but abolishes discrimination based on caste, creed, and language) and Scheduled Tribes or *adivasis* (people who lived in the forests or indigenous people). Presently, *dalits* constitute 16.6 per cent of the Indian population and *adivasis* constitute 8.5 per cent.11

Tese groups remained loyal supporters of the Congress party until the 1970s when they realised that remaining within the Congress party system would not help them raise the question of inequality. Since the early 1980s, the Congress party system has withered, and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and regional parties have reaped the advantages of this. However, the leaders of the Congress party were not unanimous in their

<sup>11</sup>Various reports and studies (both by government agencies and civil society organisations) provide evidence of the discrimination against lower castes and *adivasis* in education, health, and access to public services, and an over-representation of these groups below the poverty line (for a synthesis of these reports, refer to World Bank 2011, which need not be repeated here).

"ideas" of the social and the policy recourse they should take. In the next section, we will discuss these tensions.

## **Three Ideas of the "Social" at the Founding Moment of India**

Tree distinct development models and interventions existed in early independent India. We can trace their origins to the ideological leanings of three social reformers and policymakers of the nascent nation in the late 1940s. First, Mahatma Gandhi, icon of the Indian independence struggle, emphasised the disorder of the markets and, therefore, the need to pursue development based on local resources. His concept of *swaraj* (which literally means "self-rule") was an ideal combination of political and economic freedom by giving political power to the people and providing for individual emancipation, particularly for the poorest of the poor. Second, Jawaharlal Nehru, the frst prime minister of the country, drew signifcant inspiration from Soviet planning models as well as capitalist advancements in Western Europe. He called for a development model that could combine both these approaches. His advocation for national development through public-sector industrialisation came in direct confict with Gandhi's development model based on local resources. B. R. Ambedkar propounded a third development model: a social justice model for development. Coming from a historically excluded, lowercaste community, he emphasised "annihilation of the caste" for the success of social democracy.

All three of these infuential leaders agreed on the urgency of the "social question". However, they difered signifcantly in their understanding of the "social" as well as the proper course of action that the state should take. Despite this, they agreed to put their diferences aside (to build the nation-state), and all agreed to advance the "social". Chatterjee (2004: 36) captures this as the "antinomy between the homogenous national and the heterogeneous social". Let us look at the subtle diferences between these three views, which is useful for understanding the underlying tension that required the stifing of the "social".

#### **4 Social Policy in India: One Hundred Years of the (Stifed)…**

Ambedkar's ideas focused primarily on the question of *representation*. He disagreed with Gandhi that development should be centred around the village (Ambedkar felt that the "village was a den of ignorance and exploitation" from which *dalits* should escape).12 In this dispute, he found an ally in Nehru who wanted to support industrialisation and urban progress. Fabian socialism13 deeply infuenced Nehru. Tis led him to create several state-owned, state-operated, and state-controlled means of production. Some of these sectors included steel, transportation, telecommunications, mining, and electricity generation. Te government used permits, high tax rates, and rationing to regulate private activity, property rights, and entrepreneurship. To a great extent, the pre-1980s' Indian developmental model was the Fabian Society version of socialism. Ambedkar was decidedly supportive of urbanisation and industrialisation because they would increase mobility for *dalits* (as an economist, he believed that industrialisation was the only economic alternative to lowproductivity agriculture). However, unlike Nehru, he stressed training and the reservation system (discussed in the next section in detail) for *dalits* to help them access new opportunities both in the workplace and in politics. He was against the Leftist strategy of striking. Compared to him, Nehru facilitated trade unions, on the one hand, and made truces with trade union leaders in order to avoid strikes, on the other.14

Gandhi, who explicitly withdrew from positions of power after independence, took strong exception to the Nehruvian industrialisation strategy,15 as well as the strategy of state control. According to Gandhi, the state machinery would work against the emancipation and full realisation of the individual.

Gandhian economic philosophy was strongly rooted in "trusteeship" because John Ruskin's book Unto Tis Last had inspired him during his

<sup>12</sup>Ambedkar's disagreement with Gandhi on the question of the political representation of marginalised classes also has important signifcance for this chapter. We will discuss this in the next section when we explore the efectiveness of the quota-based welfare system.

<sup>13</sup>Te Fabian Society of Britain aimed to create a democratic socialism grounded on the principle of reforming the capitalism, rather than overthrowing the capitalism.

<sup>14</sup> I am grateful to Professor Babu Mathew for introducing this insight into Nehruvian strategy.

<sup>15</sup> Sanyal (2007: 155) compares the Gandhi-Nehru debate on industrialisation to that of the debate between Lenin and Narodniks in Russia and discusses the paradox of the initial victory of Nehru and Narodniks and contemporary disenchantment with such capital-intensive models.

studies in England. Te idea of trusteeship also had origins in Indian scriptures and the belief that possessions are immoral and sinful.16 Tus, Gandhi believed that only moral conduct could lead one to the truth, and he contended that morality could not be translated using the language of rights and obligations. It is this conception of a duty-bound individual that informs Gandhi's views on human rights. On two occasions (frst to H. G. Wells in 1940 and later to Dr Julian Huxley, Director-General of UNESCO, in 1947), Gandhi emphasised that the discourse on human rights is erroneous, and instead, duties should be emphasised and the rights would follow.

In his aspiration to give autonomy to each individual, he advocated for decentralised governance structures and self-rule. Such a decentralised governance structure would coordinate diferent autonomous village units. Ambedkar disagreed with this proposal and, instead, wanted a strong state that would contain the social forces that perpetuated casteism. It is also important to remember that Ambedkar, who once created the Labour Party (and who also went on to become a labour minister), was responsible for introducing several classical measures of labour protection, such as "minimum wage" (enacted in 1948), maternity benefts, and limited working hours, to India. Te most signifcant of Ambedkar's contributions was the emancipation of oppressed castes through the reservation system.

## **Did the Reservation System Achieve Its Goal?**

One of the key commitments of the Constitution of India was to improve the welfare of marginalised groups—women, children, and oppressed castes. Tis commitment defned the social justice goals of the Constitution

<sup>16</sup>Te monist philosophies of ancient Indian religions had several written texts (the *Upanishads*) during 700–100 BCE that articulated this. Most popular among them is *Om*. "Tat (*Brahman*) is infnite, and this (universe) is infnite. Te infnite proceeds from the infnite. (Ten) taking the infnitude of the infnite (universe), it remains as the infnite (*Brahman*) alone" (*Brahadaranyaka Upanishad* 5.1.1). Tis classical text on monism was composed in 700 BCE. A later text (written in 100 BCE) describes moral principles more directly: "Whatever there is change in this ephemeral world, all that must be enveloped by the Lord. By this renunciation, support yourself. Do not covet the wealth of anyone" (Verse 1 from the *Isha Upanishad*).

of India and was operationalised through quota-based reservation policies. Over the years, this afrmative action strategy has defned the law of the land as well as shaped the political discussions on equality and social justice. However, what has been achieved?

Te challenges to afrmative action in India were based on the criteria for inclusion in the reservation system. One argument was that economic criteria should be the only criteria for inclusion, and, therefore, only "backward groups" should receive the benefts of afrmative action. Tis position maintained that if any other criteria are used, the principle of "merit" would be sacrifced. However, others contested this view because caste-based discrimination is not merely economic. For example, despite being economically well of, one could experience social discrimination and, thus, barriers to both social and economic mobility. Ambedkar (1920) articulated this when he compared India to "a tower which had several storeys without a ladder or an entrance. One was to die in the storey in which one was born". Ambedkar argued that political representation with separate electorates was the ideal solution to this problem, but Gandhi opposed this. Gandhi argued that although he was from an upper caste, he could represent untouchables. Tey resolved this confict through negotiations in the 1930s (known as the Poona Pact) and agreed to reserve seats for untouchables within the Hindu electorate. Tis model of representation has persisted till date.

Similar debates took place on the topic of untouchables' economic welfare. Nehru gave in to Ambedkar's arguments in practice but not in principle:

frankly…I would like to put an end to such reservations as still remain. But again, speaking frankly, I realise that in the present state of afairs in India that would be not a desirable thing to do, that is to say, in regard to the Scheduled Castes. I try not to look at it from the religious minority, but rather in the sense of helping backward groups in the country.17

He based his position on his conviction that caste was a *division of labour* (Ambedkar's argument that caste was a *division of labourers*). On this,

<sup>17</sup> Speech in the Constituent Assembly, 26 May 1949. Constituent Assembly on India Debates, Vol. VIII: 331.

Nehru agreed with Gandhi, and, fnally, the Constitution of India did not abolish the caste system, only caste-based untouchability.

Eventually, the argument for afrmative action based only on economic measures was rejected, and 15 per cent jobs, educational opportunities, and political positions were reserved for scheduled castes and 7.5 per cent for *adivasis*. Tis was in proportion to the population break down of these groups. Te creation of a "schedule" and listing communities who were eligible to beneft from these quotas has been controversial. More and more groups wanted inclusion in these lists. From time to time, this schedule has been revised, primarily as a function of electoral politics. However, the argument for afrmative action based on economic criteria has persisted, and a commission was appointed in 1979 to identify "socially or educationally backward classes". Tis commission prepared a list of communities who ft the new economic and social criteria. Tis new list consisted of 52 per cent of India's population. After intense political opposition from upper castes, the government reserved 27 per cent of the novel reservations for the newly identifed "Other Backward Classes". Eventually, the Supreme Court decreed that reserved positions cannot exceed 50 per cent (*Indra Sawhney and others v. Union of India and others*, 1992).

Originally, when the constitution was written, the authors planned for reservations for oppressed castes to last only 50 years. However, the deeprooted caste political system (mobilisation of castes on political lines to win elections) has made it nearly impossible to end any part of the afrmative action programme. Diferent types of groups' demands for reservations are increasing. In some states in India, quotas in particular employment categories have reached 75 per cent. Nationally, in 2019, an additional quota of 10 per cent was extended to economically weaker sections of the country in addition to the existing quotas outlined in the 124th Constitutional Amendment.

It is worth refecting on how afrmative action has shaped ideas of the "social". Tere is no doubt that the material welfare of a large number of members of groups who beneft from afrmative action has increased. However, this has created a "creamy layer" within these oppressed groups and, eventually, divided members of these groups. Tis is clear based on the demand for sub-quotas" since some subgroups within these categories have never benefted from afrmative action, even while other subgroups have repeatedly benefted (Ramavat 2018). Critics of reservation have also pointed out its inability to address the intersectionality of disadvantage (e.g., women from marginalised groups). Furthermore, job opportunities in the public sector have declined in the wake of liberalisation because several governmental industries were outsourced to the private sector.18

Even more interesting is the question of indigenous communities, which were recognised as "Scheduled Tribes". Internationally, India refused to recognise that India has an "indigenous" population since all Indians are historically from India (unlike in Canada, the USA, and Australia, where outsiders conquered and dispossessed local indigenous populations).19 Although the government domestically recognised the presence of indigenous people by listing them in the schedule, it had limited impact on the ground in terms of this group's quality of life. Tus, the Dhebar Commission was appointed in 1960 to address this challenge. Tis commission recommended that the schedule list 52 communities as "Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups" who require particular types and numbers of welfare interventions.20 Te quota approach has been less successful, since larger market interventions deprive people of livelihoods, compared to the state welfare system. For instance, Das and Padel (2010) demonstrated how the nexus between the state and mining companies displaced indigenous communities from traditional land, where the indigenous communities had control over and access to natural resources. Furthermore, providing welfare does not make up for their loss

<sup>18</sup> In some sectors, there is a demand for quotas for private-sector jobs.

<sup>19</sup> India has refused to ratify the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169 concerning indigenous and tribal peoples in independent countries, because the concept of "indigenous peoples" is not relevant to India and there is no need for external cooperation or evaluation, including from the United Nations (UN), for tribal development programmes in India (full report on this is available in the report of the Joint Stakeholders submission on the situation of the rights of indigenous people in India for the third cycle of the Universal Period Review [UPR] of India, 27th Session of the Human Rights Council [Apr–May 2017]. Te report is accessible here: https:// www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/document/india/session\_27\_-\_may\_2017/js46\_upr27\_ ind\_e\_main.pdf). It is also interesting to note that India has supported the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), 2007, which is a non-binding agreement.

<sup>20</sup>As of 2020, this number has increased to 75.

of land and resources, nor does it substantially improve their quality of life.

Most of the regional states in India and the union government have "social welfare departments" or "social justice departments". Tese departments have limited functions available to enforce the schemes designed for the two most disadvantaged communities—scheduled castes (*dalits*) and scheduled tribes (*adivasis*). Tis is indicative of the disconnect between the social and labour questions.

However, on a positive note, the reservation system recognised that the dominant communities had perpetuated historical injustices against these groups, which has tremendously energised localities where these scheduled groups were able to use legal recourse to end systems of injustice. Tis includes resisting violence, claiming rights to land, and demanding a proportionate share in welfare funds, cooperatives for economic enterprises, and other resources. Tese demands indicate these groups' increased representation in the polity. Te efectiveness of political representation (compared to economic compensation through the quota system) is an indication that the "social question" is primarily political when it comes to questions of caste.

## **Democracy's Coexistence with Religion**

As I explained in the frst section of this chapter, the "social" was closely associated with the idea of community (including religion) in India. Tus, when the Republic of India adopted its modern constitution in 1950—although there were diferences of opinion about the nature of the "social" (as explained in the preceding section)—there was wide agreement that social justice was a key principle of the Indian constitution. However, it was only in 1972 (through the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution of India)21 that two key terms (socialist and secular) were added to the original terms: "sovereign", "democratic", and

<sup>21</sup>Te 42nd Amendment to the Constitution was passed during a turbulent time in India's democracy, namely during the Congress government and the then prime minister Indira Gandhi's state of Emergency (25 June 1975–21 March 1977). One of the amendment's key aims was to make parliamentary powers dominant over those of the Supreme Court (Austin 1999).

"republic" in the preamble22 to the Indian constitution. How the single amendment added both "socialist" and "secular" shows the two terms' indivisible relationship in the Indian context.23 Terefore, both the delay in introducing these two ideas and their implications when added deserve our attention.

Secularism as a concept is important for understanding the rule of law in India: all citizens irrespective of their religious faith are treated equally. Tis idea developed during the struggle for independence, when Pakistan became a Muslim state and India positioned itself as a secular state. However, the contradictions of this position were clear. Leaders of the independence struggle, such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Gandhi, used Hindu texts and symbols to organise and bring people together against the British colonial rulers. Tus, the idea of secularism addresses the tense relationship between members of the majority religion (Hindus constituted about 85 per cent of the population) and members of minority religions. Te Indian state does not have an ofcial religion. Unlike the idea of secularism in Western constitutions (in which the separation of church and state is key), Indian secularism professes "pluralism" or the responsibility of the state to protect all religions and religious groups.

Tis advocacy of secularism has limited the social rights of citizens on matters of inheritance, maintenance, marriage, and divorce. Since the personal laws that govern individual conduct in these domains derive primarily from religious conventions and rules, very often there is a contradiction between state and personal laws. Te contestation point of recent secular policies is whether to adopt a uniform civil code (spurning all personal religious-based laws) or not. Tis question primarily touches on gender (and family law) and, thus, has signifcance for social policy.

Te Indian Constituent Assembly debated this question while framing the constitution and made uniform civil code an ideal to achieve in the

<sup>22</sup>Although courts decide certain matters, the preamble of the constitution has a radiating efect on their interpretations of certain topics (Mathew et al. 2020).

<sup>23</sup>Te Congress government was overthrown via a democratic process after the Emergency. Although the subsequent government (the Janata Party) proposed two amendments (the 43rd and 44th) to restore the constitution, they did not completely succeed. At the same time, the Congress Party in opposition underwent an internal reassessment at this point in time. Some leaders within the Congress Party fought for the modernisation, socialisation, and democratisation of the party (Johari 1973).

future. However, the question again publicly arose when a Muslim woman approached the court to grant her income maintenance from her husband, who had divorced her (after 43 years of married life and fve children) per Muslim personal law.24 Te woman pleaded her case under the Code of Criminal Procedure, which applied to all Indians. In 1985, the Supreme Court of India upheld the decisions of a lower court and maintained that, irrespective of the personal laws, the husband is obliged to provide income maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Tis judgement caused an uproar. While human rights groups celebrated the judgement as a victory for the protection of women, Muslim communities saw it as a state attack on their identity and rights.

Along similar lines, questions related to the inheritance of property arose in 1986 among Christians. Among Kerala Christians, the personal law provided a woman with only one-fourth of share in her father's property, whereas the son got the majority share. Te Supreme Court of India decided that the Indian Succession Act provided for equal shares for both son and daughter.25 In another development in 2014, the Supreme Court decided that even though Muslim personal law prohibited the adoption of children, an Indian Muslim could legally adopt children. Tese cases have kept the discourse on whether to implement a uniform civil code alive. Paradoxically, in 2019, the Indian parliament dominated by the Hindu majoritarian party (Bharatiya Janata Party) made *talaq* (Islamic divorce) illegal, which progressive Muslim women had long demanded. While this move is viewed as a step towards a uniform civil code, it is also seen as an example of the majoritarian religion forcing its personal laws on minority religions. Several feminist groups have decried this as hypocrisy since the human rights of Hindu widows have not been addressed at all. In other words, the common denominator for a uniform civil code (if agreed to as a principle in a pluralist polity) should be women's welfare, not the standards of a majoritarian religion. Majoritarian standards (as in the case of a state religion) could be civil, but could also easily erode social rights.

<sup>24</sup>Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (1985 SCALE 767 = 1985 SCR 844 = 1985 SCC 556 = AIR 1985 SC 945).

<sup>25</sup>*Mrs Mary Roy Etc. Etc v. State of Kerala & Ors* on 24 February 1986, AIR 1011, 1986 SCR (1) 371.

#### **Economic Development over the Social Question**

Independent India's development plans were not meant to reduce inequality. Poverty alleviation was only added in the ffth development plan (the late 1970s). Te history of two concrete poverty interventions (that of land redistribution and industrialisation policy) will prove this point. First is the question of land reform. As I show in section "Religious Reforms as Social Reforms" of this chapter, colonial rule created property inequality. For a nation that is committed to the constitutional principle of equality, the redistribution of assets is an important step. Several assessments on land reforms (Appu 1996; Jeyaranjan et al. 2010; Pellissery et al. 2017) show some land transfer from a small section of upper-caste landlords to the middle and lower castes but not to the outcasts (*dalits*). Te idea of land reform primarily came from the Communist Party, and communist ideology emphasises the class rather than the caste question. Tis explains why land reform strategy was the least efective when it came to the redistribution of land to *dalits*.

Second, industrialisation as a strategy involved state protections for capitalists, unlike in Europe, where capitalists emerged as entrepreneurs through industrial investment. A handful of industrialists in Bombay prepared the "Bombay Plan", which would become the blueprint for national development over the next few decades under Nehru (Chibber 2003). Although the Bombay Plan was not socialist (Pellissery et al. 2020), Nehru believed that industrialisation was possible without the sufering that Europe experienced, in contrast to Gandhi, who believed that industrialisation was inherently a problem.

After the initial balancing of investment in small-scale and large-scale industries, the Indian planning process hugely favoured capital-intensive large industries. Te strategy was to extract surplus from agriculture to support the development of industry. As Chakraborty (1987: 21) states, "it was necessary for agriculture to contribute to the building up of a modern industrial sector by providing cheap labour and also cheap food". Tus, the capital-good hypothesis (the state should invest in the creation of tangible property such as machine tools) and the wage-good hypothesis (the state should invest in sectors where labour-intensive production will happen) simultaneously worked in India. Sanyal (2007: 167) argues that, although there was no surplus extraction, the very process of separating the means of labour from labour itself was sufcient to establish the process of primitive accumulation in early independent India.

India's development programmes were primarily "Five-Year Plans", inspired by the erstwhile socialist planning model of the Soviet Union. Sen (2017) considers the First Five-Year Plan (1951–56) not as a development plan but as a reconstruction of the economy that was completely damaged due to centuries of exploitation under British rule. Te Second Plan (1956–61) began with an obligation to "increase the growth rate of the gross domestic product" by establishing publicly supported heavy industries. Te emphasis of this plan was on rapid industrialisation and increasing the economy's savings rate. Te Tird and Fourth Plans were also designed to broadly focus on continuing the agenda set by the second plan.

Despite these diferent approaches, poverty still haunted the nation. Terefore, by the 1970s, the basic needs and poverty reduction approaches took centre stage. Te Fifth Plan (1974–79) is considered an important milestone in the development trajectory of India because it is when the ideas of poverty alleviation entered the agenda of the planning process with the then prime minister Indira Gandhi coining the term *"Garibi hatao"* (eradicate poverty). Since then, all plans have attempted to balance economic development and welfare programmes. Later, the focus of development programmes shifted to industrial growth and boosting the national income.

To evaluate these development programmes from the "social question", we need to ask whether these plans recognised and addressed social inequality. At the outset, we can say that the reservation strategy addressed only "social inequality" since the constitution provided positive discrimination for "scheduled" populations (*dalits* and *adivasis*). However, this strategy actually created two classes of services in public institutions. Discrimination continued to prevail against socially ostracised groups. Two important arenas for social policy intervention—education and health care—have demonstrated the reality of the syndrome "services for the poor are poor services". Poor-quality services (for instance, teacher and doctor absenteeism from schools and hospitals) have alienated people from accessing these services.

Te third intervention most aptly demonstrates how economic development has stifed the social question. Te key concern for the sovereign state of India after independence was how to feed its citizens and build a hunger-free nation. In other words, the material dimension of the social question was recognised as early as the 1940s. Food importation policies of the 1950s gave way to what is known as the Green Revolution in the 1960s, which was based on biotechnological inventions. Tree interlinked policies were introduced in the mid-1960s consisting of (1) output-price policies including minimum support prices for farmers when grains are procured, (2) input-price subsidies, and (3) a public distribution system (PDS) to provide relatively low-cost food grains without harming the interests of the producers. Tis new agricultural strategy was largely successful in increasing production, which more than doubled, from 63 million tons in 1965 to 154 million tons in 1991, and drastically reduced the need for food grain imports (Suryanarayana 1995). Tese asset-focused policies were completely blind to the question of rural labour, which the *dalit* communities primarily provided (Siegel 2018). In other words, despite achieving food sufciency, the outcome was deprivation amidst plenty.

Te arguments developed hitherto in this section should not be construed as ignorance of the artifcial distinction between the "social and economic" (Mkandawire 2001; Midgley and Tang 2001). Development interventions have ingeniously brought these two together. However, whether developmental interventions have addressed social inequality directly is an open question. In the Indian context, the empirical examination of expenditure data shows how infrastructural projects gained more attention than social inequality.

We can observe two broad types of spending in the public fnance accounts relevant to social policy. First is development expenditure, which includes spending on agriculture and allied activities, rural development, special area programmes, irrigation and food control, energy, industry and minerals, transport and communications, science and technology, and environment. Second is money spent on social services, which includes expenditures on education, sports, art and culture, medical and public health, family welfare, water supply and sanitation, housing, welfare of historically deprived communities, labour and labour welfare, social security, nutrition, relief on account of natural calamities, and urban development.

As per the mandate of the Constitution of India, the majority of the social sectors fall under the domain of state governments, hence spending on their part is higher compared to the central government. Kaur et al. (2014) analysed the data available and concluded that state governments alone incur 80 per cent of government (both centre and state) expenditures on social services. Te education and health services combined account for 60 per cent of the total social expenditures of state governments. Between 1990–91 and 2013–14, per capita social-sector spending recorded a threefold increase, of which education-sector spending increased by 2.7 and health-sector spending increased by 2.3 times. Te majority of the increase in social-sector spending occurred after 2000. However, despite this increase, India still remains below the international standard of expenditure in the social sector.

Apart from social expenditure data, the confrmation of our argument of the inefectiveness of developmental expenditures to address social inequality is the demand for community-specifc funds. General expenditures on both development and social welfare neglected the most disadvantaged sections of society—*dalits* and *adivasis*. Tis led to the demand for special component plans. Tese plans argued that state government budgets should allocate spending in proportion to the population for the welfare of these populations. For instance, 15 per cent of the union budget should be earmarked for *dalits* since 15 per cent of the population are *dalits*.

Tis is an example of how the "social question" may be populistically responded to within the aggregate democratic framework (Young 2000). Solidarity ideals of the "social" are dismissed in favour of appeasing fragmented vote banks. Te "social" is no longer a tool to increase and encourage dialogue with other communities and to gain "recognition". Rather, recognition is reduced to gaining access to state resources for material well-being.

### **Authoritarian Democracy Stifes the "Social" Question**

Te Hegelian tension of the citizen's two roles in the public sphere26 is absent in Indian discourses due to the post-colonial process of nationstate creation that several South Asian countries witnessed. Tus, the "social question" was transplanted to consolidate the legitimacy of the rulers of the post-colonial states, rather than challenge them (as happened in post-revolutionary France and, generally, in Europe by raising the social question). Tis approach demobilised the possibility of raising the social question. Te demobilisation of the power of the people coexisted with an authoritarian democracy that could and did stife the "social" question.

An important aspect of South Asian and, specifcally, Indian democracy is the authoritarian nature of the democratic leaders (Baxter 1985; Jalal 1995), especially the leaders of political parties (and thus national leaders). Tese parties appoint leaders based on their ascriptive identities, such as family lineage, membership in the aristocracy, or even descent from erstwhile feudal rulers (or provincial kings). Te patronage these leaders provide to the local population enables them to win elections through the democratic process and to retain their positions of power.

Tis authoritarian democracy has had a crucial impact on the limits and opportunities for raising the social question within the polity, three aspects of which deserve specifc attention within this chapter. Te frst implication of authoritarian democracy is the lack of responsiveness to the welfare question. Since elections are won on diferent criteria (e.g., patronage or religious identity), the indirect accountability model27

<sup>26</sup>Te two roles of a citizen are "as a citizen (*citoyen*) of the state and as a member (*bourgeois*) of civil society" (Kaufmann 2012: 63). Partha Chatterjee (2004: 38) dismisses the role of the *citoyen*—in which a citizen has rights. He does so because only a small elite who have access to the state apparatus could enforce these rights. Te majority of citizens have to resort to politics to enforce their rights. Terefore, he proposes the concept of "political society" in a subaltern context.

<sup>27</sup>Te indirect accountability model describes the ability of service recipients to demand services directly from service providers. Compared to this, the direct accountability model outlines the power of electors to hold the elected responsible through their ability to vote them out of power if they do not deliver services. Elected representatives indirectly infuence bureaucrats to improve their services (World Bank 2004).

(World Bank 2004) fails. A political model that fails to generate a social question produces a large vacuum in society. Vibrant civil society voices in the form of non-governmental organisations (NGO) and media sources then fll this vacuum. In the late 1960s, there was a surge of these organisations, because political non-responsiveness to the poverty question was evident throughout the Congress Party's uninterrupted rule of over 20 years (Chandhoke 1995). Te term NGO became identifed with development agencies. Most NGOs operated as an extended arm of the government in remote areas of the country where bureaucracy had limited reach.28 Teir grassroots-level contacts made them more efective agencies for raising the social question in a contextualised manner.

A report in 2015 stated that India had 3.2 million registered NGOs: "Indians have more per capita NGOs than hospital beds" (Down to Earth 2005). Te Central Statistical Organisation of India noted the existence of "four NGOs for every 1,000 people in urban areas and 2.3 NGOs for every 1,000 people in rural areas". Tis spectacular growth was largely due to funding from foreign countries, particularly from the Global North. Funding agencies found that the government was an ineffcient agent of development and social service delivery, so they began to route resources directly through NGOs. However, the question that is relevant for this chapter is whether NGOs can raise the social question. An answer to that question becomes clear as we examine the second implication of authoritarian regimes for the social question in South Asia.

Te second implication of authoritarian democracy is the capture of bureaucracy.29 Te bureaucracy (including the judiciary) fails to perform its role as a countervailing force to the legislative branch. Te subordinated bureaucracy must serve the objectives of the elected politicians rather than the people. Tus, the direct model of accountability also fails. Elected politicians primarily control the bureaucracy through

<sup>28</sup>As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, each village acted as an autonomous republic, treating those outside the moral community of the village as aliens (on the moral community of the village, please refer to Platteau [1990] for the debate on the distinction between the rational and moral peasant with reference to the implications for social security).

<sup>29</sup>Te current Indian Administrative Service (IAS) is patterned after the former Indian Civil Service of British India (or ICSI). Apart from central government–appointed civil servants, who may serve in any part of the country, the regional state governments also appoint civil servants, who may serve in any part of the state.

appointments and transfers (Wade 1985). Furthermore, bureaucrats operate in constituencies, where politicians are elected on patronage grounds and require middlemen to fulfl their promises (Reddy and Haragopal 1985; Pellissery 2006). In other words, governance is, in fact, collusion between the politician and the bureaucrat. Te key breeding ground for corruption is this collusion, which requires detailed elaboration later in this section. Te second generation of NGOs resisted this arrangement. Especially after a brief spell of Emergency rule in the country (June 1975 to January 1977), several bureaucrats, disillusioned by the politicians, resigned and decided to work in the civil society space. Te NGOs they worked for were not merely an extended arm of the government; instead, they encouraged citizens to challenge what the elected government was doing.

Te third implication of authoritarian democracy for the social question is the paradoxical operation of "trust". Rothstein (2005) successfully demonstrates that trust is the cement of institutions to deal with the "social" problem. Authoritarian regimes roll out welfare programmes to perpetuate their patronage relationship with the electorate.30 Tus, the patronage modality in the context of social cleavage destroys "system trust". Citizens trust individual politicians but not the political system. Tis paradoxical trust breeds corruption. Te bribe that a citizen pays to a politician is viewed as a "gift" for the politician or bureaucrat's extra eforts (Pellissery and Bopaiah 2020). Tis is the fertile ground for the capture of the modern institutions by the traditional power sources.

All the three illnesses emanating from authoritarian democracy point out that, unless nurtured and adapted to the cultural settings, even the institution of democracy could be counter- productive to the "social".

<sup>30</sup>As shown by Keefer and Khemani (2005) in the context of information asymmetry in developing countries, the public choice approach is optimal because it provides welfare only to the targeted population rather than to everyone. Tis could translate as politicians reaching out to their own voter blocs often organised as religious or social groups.

## **Ideational Stifing from International Regimes**

Various scholars (including the author of this chapter), and prominently Ambedkar, have shown that the "social question" is not indigenous to Indian philosophy and religion. However, has borrowing ideas from elsewhere facilitated the raising of the social question in a meaningful manner in India? Te most telling aspect of this question is the political responses to the question of inequality. India has witnessed the political mobilisation of both left-wing and right-wing ideologies. Both these political ideologies succumbed to Western notions of class, while the question of inequality is not addressed. Te Indian variant of class-caste interplay (Pellissery et al. 2015) was neglected. Leftist political parties,31 which rose to power in some of the states through the democratic process (including Kerala, West Bengal, and Tripura) by championing the causes of the working class and poor, also completely ignored how caste creates inequality (Rajan 2003).32 Tis disappointment with left-wing politics is why identity-based political parties emerged in the late 1970s. Tey were generally known as "samaj" (community or caste) or political parties that made the social question their core.

Failure to raise the contextualised social question is attributable to intellectual colonialism that persisted through the funded projects, evaluation schemes, and policy advocacies of international organisations, such as the World Bank, the WTO, and UNICEF. In the rest of this section, I examine, in detail, a case study33 of the ways in which ILO operations in India distorted one of the social questions.

India, as a colony of Britain, was a founding member of the ILO. Yet, ILO conventions had very little impact on raising the "social question" and increasing labour welfare for Indian workers until independence. Tensions between the ILO and India became apparent on ratifcation of some conventions after independence. What requires our attention is the

<sup>31</sup> It is also interesting to note that by the mid-1970s, leftist political parties were vertically split between "Communist Party Marxists" and "Communist Party of India", primarily on the degree to which they were dogmatic.

<sup>32</sup>Globally, this is similar to how leftist political groups have ignored the feminist question.

<sup>33</sup>Te case study is primarily informed by the research work at Centre for Labour Studies at the Institute of Public Policy, Bangalore.

International Conventions on Forced Labour (C029 of 1930) and the Abolition of Forced Labour (C105 of 1957), among other international human rights instruments. India has ratifed these conventions. However, in the 1940s, the Indian Constituent Assembly's discussion on forced labour was without any reference to the ILO convention of 1930.

Te caste-based system of forced labour was endemic to Indian society and did not require debt as a form of coercion for its perpetuation. Tere was widespread recognition of this coercive system at the beginning of the process of consulting on and drafting the Indian constitution. Te Constituent Assembly extensively discussed "*begar*", a then-prevalent form of forced labour, and, as a result, drafted and passed Article 23 of the 1950 Constitution of India, granting people a fundamental right not to be exploited through trafc in human beings, *begar*, and other forms of forced labour (with the exception of state-enforced public service, as long as it was imposed in a uniform, non-discriminatory manner).

After 25 years, through another unique law—the 1976 Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act—India prohibited a wide gamut of bonded labour practices. Te bonded labour system was primarily based on the caste-based exploitation of lower scheduled castes and tribes by the upper castes.34 Other legislative measures like the 1989 Scheduled Castes and Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act provided a broad framework of legislative measures to challenge caste oppression.35 Tese were in conjunction with measures for positive discrimination programmes (discussed extensively in an earlier section) in education and employment to address the systematic caste oppression in India.

Tere was a marked diference between the ILO's conceptualisation of "forced labour" and India's conceptualisation. Combined with their stance on slavery (including modern slavery), the ILO's defnition imagined employers' (including the state as an employer) exploitation of

<sup>34</sup>Evenforty-three years after the enactment of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, forced and bonded labour continue to be prevalent in India. As of 2018, the Ministry of Labour reported having earmarked money for the rehabilitation of 289,222 workers rescued from bonded labour. In the absence of disaggregated government statistics on bonded labour, this remains the most reliable authoritative fgure.

<sup>35</sup> In the year 2013 alone, all over India, 39,327 crimes committed against *dalits* were reported. Out of these, 13,975 cases were registered under this law.

employees using "force". Te Indian defnition used the term "bonded labour system" to indicate that force emerged from the caste system rather than a transaction between two individuals.

Tese difering conceptualisations also gave rise to divergent strategies. Te ILO emphasised the identifcation and rescue of individuals trapped in forced labour arrangements. In contrast, India emphasised the transformation of the polity by ending the bonded labour *system*. India also emphasised the rehabilitation of former bonded labourers by providing alternative livelihoods directly.

Furthermore, the ILO emphasised criminalising the use of forced labour. Criminalisation as a strategy to achieve social aims is antagonistic to the ideal of solidarity. Tis is specifcally true when the perpetrators of forced labour, as they are in this context, are farmers on whom a labourer depends for a job in their community. Criminalisation creates a rupture in a community, afecting the possibility of employment for labourers. However, criminalisation is a continuation of the individualisation of social rights since 1993 and in tandem with the state's neoliberal strategy of retreating from positive action36 (Davy 2013). Tis is the beginning of the era of providing for "social rights" in the form of material well-being while underplaying the need to uphold citizens' civil and political rights.

## **Conclusion**

Te central question this chapter aimed to address is the potential and possibility of social policy in contexts in which equality among citizens is culturally denied but at the same time constitutionally guaranteed. Unlike Breman et al. (2019), this chapter argued for the need to broaden the scope of analysis beyond Marxist class analysis when we considered the social question. Tis chapter demonstrated how efected reforms and changes—religious, social, economic, developmental, and political (see Table 4.1 for a summary)—were denied the full recognition of the

<sup>36</sup> See Nussbaum's (2003) articulation of the diference between positive liberty in the Indian constitution and negative liberty in the American constitution.

**Table 4.1**Social protection in India: changing ideas and policies

(*continued*)



problem of inequality. In other words, the Indian polity has sidestepped the "social question" of group inequality during diferent historical phases.

Tis chapter has shown that prior to the formation of the modern Indian state, several attempts to raise the social question were thwarted as a result of a strong, socially held, religious philosophy and feudal control over the peasantry. Te possibility of raising the social question was lost during the independence struggle since political priorities dominated. Similarly, after independence was won, against the background of nationstate construction, unity among the various leaders forced them to set aside their diferences on "social" problems. By the time "social" issues were formally recognised as a state objective in the mid-1970s, the country had a divisive political scene. Te middle class was solidifying, and the social question was beginning to be perceived as partisan. Tese series of historical eforts to stife the "social question" are inconsistent with the modernity that the nation-state wants to achieve and the functional aspirations of a heterogeneous population.

If the "social" question in independent India had to be appropriately framed within a modernist frame, it should have been within a Hindu reformation frame, that is, a challenge to the internal contradictions of Hindu social philosophy in the light of the modernist values of the midtwentieth century. Policies focusing on redistribution and representation have fallen short. A rediscovery of public sphere, where recognition is the core of moral economy, is essential to achieve this ideal (Table 4.1).

#### **References**


Tapar, Romila (1966) *History of India.* Penguin Books, New Delhi.


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# **5**

# **Minoritarian Labour Welfare in India: The Case of the Employees' State Insurance Act of 1948**

**Ravi Ahuja**

## **Welfare in India: Institutional Pillars and Social Contexts**

Welfarism in postcolonial India, in its policies and institutional forms, has not been based on the universal human right to social security that was proclaimed in the centres of metropolitan capitalism in the period following World War II (Nullmeier and Kaufmann 2010; Pierson and Leimgruber 2010). In terms of enforceability, "welfare" never became an integral attribute of citizenship in postcolonial India (Goyal 2013). Tis

R. Ahuja (\*)

Tis is a severely abridged version of my essay (Ahuja 2019a). Te original article engages in much more detail with the historical contexts, both international and national, from which Indian labour welfarism emerged while this chapter confnes itself mainly to the process of legislation and the key structural features of one key welfare law, the Employees' State Insurance Act of 1948. Te following acronyms are used in the footnotes: BL = British Library; ILOrep = Monthly Report of the ILO India Branch Ofce; IOR = India Ofce Records; RCLI = Royal Commission on Labour in India; ToI = Times of India.

Georg-August-University Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany e-mail: Ravi.Ahuja@sowi.uni-goettingen.de

blatant historical fact has facilitated the almost complete exclusion of India from the existing scholarship on global welfarism, which, until recently, has been largely confned to the North Atlantic rim.1 Tis exclusion has appeared to be justifed even to scholars of South Asian societies who often believe that international policy debates on welfare had largely bypassed India before the end of colonial rule and whose analyses of Indian social policy tend to begin with India's political independence in 1947 (Goyal 2013). However, key characteristics and global connections of India's postcolonial social policy become perceivable only if we turn to their—generally miserable—origins in the colonial period, under political conditions of a barely veiled despotism where the State was less exposed to democratic pressures and in less immediate need of legitimizing authority than most European polities.

Te colonial Government of India survived, after all, with limited political damage, a chain of famines of genocidal proportions that stretched over the last three decades of the nineteenth century2 —the very decades when foundations for the European "welfare state" were laid in response to growing labour movements (Kuhnle and Sander 2010). As late as in 1943, the lack of formal entitlements, or citizen rights, to social protection let the political cost appear bearable to the British authorities of millions of starvation deaths in Eastern India3 —at a time when the introduction of a system of universal social protection seemed unavoidable on the British Isles even to conservatives. Nevertheless, the last seven decades of colonial rule, beginning with the Famine Codes of the 1880s, were arguably also the period when the foundations were laid for the pillars of Indian social policy as we know it, even though the edifce was fully erected and distinguishable in its present-day form only after the attainment of political independence in 1947. Tree such pillars of social policy are distinguishable, which have borne the weight of

<sup>1</sup>Tis is exemplifed by paradigmatic studies such as Esping-Andersen (1990). Te more recent Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State (Castles et al. 2010) does present a section on "Emerging Welfare States" that contains chapters on Latin America, East Asia, Eastern Europe and Russia, but still not on South Asia.

<sup>2</sup>Tere is now a rich historiography of famines in India that includes the important monographs by Bhatia (1991, 3rd ed) and Davis (2001).

<sup>3</sup>Tis has not been lost on either contemporaries or later scholars. See, for example, Nehru (1989: 496) (1st ed. 1946) and Sen (1981).

the—altogether limited—Indian welfarism unevenly, the proportions shifting over time.

Te frst of these pillars originated from older conceptions of *poor relief*. After the famine crises of the last third of the nineteenth century, these forms of social policy took the shape of targeted "workfare" programmes and, if politically unavoidable, of price controls on essential goods or of provisioning schemes (Brennan 1984). India's postcolonial and perpetually contentious food rationing systems, the more recent (if now increasingly hollowed out) "National Rural Employment Guarantee" or the "Midday Meal Schemes" for school children are important instances for this policy lineage (Mooji 1998; Amrith 2008; Siegel 2018). A second pillar consists in the establishment of *quotas* regulating the access of specifc social groups to public employment and public goods (crucially, education). Tis pillar, too, originated in the colonial period but assumed growing importance after the end of British rule and particularly when movements of *Dalit* and "other backward" castes became more assertive in the 1980s (Assayag 2012: 451–455; Jafrelot 2012: 470–476; Srivastava 2018).4 Tis chapter is solely concerned with the third pillar, which made social welfare benefts *conditional on specifc forms of employment*. Such policies followed the welfare logic established by the Bismarckian social insurance reforms of the 1880s in that they conceived of welfare entitlements not as a universal right inherent in citizen status, but as derived from legally defned types of employment status and thus as a special right (or, legal privilege) conferred on certain categories of employees.

If the historiography of Indian social policy is meagre in general, it is almost non-existent in regard to employment-based welfare schemes.5 To many they would appear, in any case, as being of little consequence to the vast majority of India's wage-earning population. For 93 per cent of the Indian workforce are conventionally (and somewhat simplistically)

<sup>4</sup> See also Chap. 4, in this book.

<sup>5</sup>Even the historian of Indian labour perhaps most sensitive to issues of social security assumed that state-born welfare schemes were largely irrelevant in colonial India, Das Gupta (1994: 612–620). Te only colonial welfare laws that have attracted more serious historical analysis so far are the provincial Maternity Beneft Acts and, more particularly, that of Bombay (cf. Chhachi 1998; Srivastava 2018).

reckoned to be employed in the so-called informal sector and thus largely exempted from the ambit of labour law and employment-based welfarism. Even of the remaining 7 per cent about half are reported to be employed "informally" *within the "formal sector"* (Sanyal and Bhattacharyya 2009: 39). Tey are, in other words, employed by contractors or in other ways that permit to pay much lower wages, evade labour law and withhold employment benefts. Many critical scholars agree with apologists of neoliberalism that India's labour laws—including employment-based social security schemes—have been relevant only to a small proportion of the country's workforce and have hermetically sealed of a privileged labour aristocracy of formally employed workers from the vast informal labour economy.6

Tis seemingly uncontroversial line of argument needs to be interrogated, however. At issue is not whether massive social diferences exist among India's workforce: the shrinking proportion of efectively tenured workers in public sector enterprises has undoubtedly very little in common, for instance, with the day labourers constituting the majority of India's enormous construction labour force. Rather the question is how to conceptualize this wide scope for diferentiation among India's wageearning people in terms of income, employment conditions, social status and economic security. Like Jan Breman (2013), I would plead for a dynamic, non-dualistic understanding of the phenomenon.7 For harsh exclusionary practices and merciless competition between segments of the workforce operate within a structure of *graded informality*: rather than assuming a stationary dichotomy between formal and informal labour status, I propose to examine formalization and informalization *as processes* that are contingent, continuous and contentious. Boundaries and passages between the various segments of the workforce are, in other words, multiple and shifting; they are produced and reproduced through social conficts and coalitions; and they possess *relative stability* only.

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, Parry (2013: 45), where formal sector workers are characterized as a "complacently cocooned enclave of labour inhabiting a 'citadel' of state-sponsored privilege, progressively protected against incursions by workers from outside".

<sup>7</sup>Breman (2013; see esp. Chap. 1) has summed up and updated his argument, frst presented in 1976 in a series of articles.

For labour and employment-based social security laws have played a major role not only in the defnition of boundaries but also of *passages* between sharply diferentiated segments of the workforce. Tis is not to play down the potency of structural boundaries, which has been refected in all-too-real difculties faced by trade unions in developing workable strategies encompassing all sections of the working classes based on a commonality of interest. But taking account also of the passages permits to perceive counter-tendencies, potentials for cross-sectional alliances and to make sense of the persistent demands of informally employed workers to be included in schemes like the Employees' State Insurance or the Provident Fund. If employment-based social security programmes thus have mattered not only to the fraction of the working classes covered by them explicitly but to wider sections of India's workforce, it is because they span, together with other labour laws, a horizon of expectation, defne possibilities and help to formulate demands.

If we thus assume "(in)formalization" to be a dynamic, bidirectional, even reversible *process*, and that "formality" and "informality" are, accordingly, not to be understood as stable attributes of static and hermetically sealed "sectors" of the labour market, we need to reconstruct this process *historically*. We need to trace, in other words, the historical evolution of those patterns of segmentation within the workforce that came to be described from the 1970s onwards in many parts of the world with the adjectives "formal" and "informal". Law has served, as Prabhu Mohapatra's studies show, as a crucial regulatory technology for the separation of "formal" from "informal" modes of employment (Mohapatra 2005, 2012). A historical—as against a merely logical—reconstruction of this process of separation, a chronology of the intertwined processes of formalization and informalization is still lacking, however. As we begin to retrace this chronology, the middle of the twentieth century emerges as a key moment of these processes: almost all major pieces of legislation that have marked out the parameters of India's postcolonial regime of labour regulation up to the present day were passed during the six years from 1946 to 1952. Tese acts have regulated labour relations, industrial disputes procedures, trade union rights and also employment-based social benefts, including the Employees' State Insurance and Provident Fund schemes mentioned already.8

Largely ignored by historians, this spate of legislation was, in the immediate political context of the post-war situation, a response of the outgoing colonial administration and their nationalist successors to the extreme political volatility encompassing India in general and to alarming levels of working-class unrest in particular (see Ahuja 2019b). But these changes also had a longer history, dating back to World War I at least, and were conditioned by larger and deeper international as well as India-level contexts: these are discussed more fully in the long version of this essay9 and can here only be briefy alluded to. International debates on labour welfare did by no means bypass late colonial India: they provided the "language of welfare" that was used in political controversy and policymaking. Welfarist arguments were taken up both from the debates around the International Labour Organization (ILO) of which India was a founding member and from social policy developments in post–World War I Britain and other Euro-American nation states. Established formats of welfare legislation such as maternity beneft, workmen's compensation, sickness or old-age insurance were freely borrowed from these international contexts and from the memoranda of ILO councillors. In the same vein, British social policy experts such as John Henry Whitley or William Beveridge came to be involved in legislative processes in India.

While the *discursive and regulatory forms* of early welfarism in India were thus strongly shaped by these international contexts, the specifc *regulatory content* (and particularly the strong exclusionary, minoritarian focus) of the emergent regime of labour welfarism was largely determined by India-level contestations between (a) the late colonial and, subsequently, the early postcolonial State, (b) British expatriate as well as Indian big business and (c) an expanding and politically plural labour movement. To cut a long story short, the State became increasingly involved in issues of "labour efciency" and, therefore, of the social reproduction of the workforce during the World Wars both as a growing

<sup>8</sup>For an overview, see International Labour Organization—ILO (1957).

<sup>9</sup>For a detailed discussion, see Ahuja (2019a), especially sections "Te Employees' State Insurance Act: Te Making of a Law" and "Repercussions: Graded Informality, a "birthright" Lost and a Horizon of Expectation".

industrial employer and as a consumer of strategic commodities; Indian industrialists, on their part, faced increasing international competition and temporary labour market bottlenecks, expanded into more capitalintensive sectors, all of which implied that infuential sections of big business came to promote the "rationalization" of industrial labour processes and to acknowledge the importance of raising the living standards of at least sections of the workforce to reduce labour turnover and "absenteeism"; Indian labour movements not only proliferated massively since World War I and came to involve, especially since the 1940s, sections of the workforce even beyond large-scale industry, but they were also a feld of contestation between various political forces with a marked presence of militant communist and socialist tendencies.

Te historians' lack of interest in the origins of employment-based social security legislation thus points us towards a wider gap in the historiography of contemporary South Asian societies. Te present essay approaches this gap from a specifc and limited angle: it traces the prehistory and the making of one major piece of protective labour legislation, the Employees' State Insurance Act of 1948. Tis was a compulsory insurance scheme fnanced by contributions from employers, employees and the state, which was to provide workers employed in "permanent factories" with monetary benefts as well as medical services to protect them from the risks of sickness, childbirth and employment injury while regulating sickness leave also. In this essay, I confne myself to discussing the political and legislative process from which this piece of labour legislation emerged and how it both gave legal expression and contributed to an increasing diferentiation among the industrial workforce along the lines that would later be described in terms of a "formal"-"informal" divide.

Te chapter is organized as follows. Te section "Early Industrial Welfare and the Debate on Welfare Legislation in Interwar India" traces early industrial welfare schemes at the company level and discusses why the reproduction of the industrial workforce emerged as a political issue at the all-India level during the interwar period. Te following section "Te Employees' State Insurance Act: Te Making of a Law" traces the making of the Employees' State Insurance Act in the political feld of forces of the transitional 1940s. Te concluding section "Repercussions: Graded Informality, a 'Birthright' Lost and a Horizon of Expectation" argues that the results of this process were contradictory: while the specifc form of Indian health insurance contributed to a harsh segmentation of the working classes, and while the promise of welfare as a citizen's right remained unfulflled, horizons of expectation were spanned simultaneously that continue to inform struggles for social equality.

## **Early Industrial Welfare and the Debate on Welfare Legislation in Interwar India**

Before World War I, employers both British and Indian, colonial ofcials and large sections of the press agreed that India did not require protective labour legislation or a welfarism focused on industrial labour. Two lines of argument stood out, the frst asserting that India's young industry could not aford expensive welfare measures if it was to compete internationally. A leading nationalist newspaper, *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, formulated this position with admirable clarity in 1875: "A larger death rate amongst our operatives is far more preferable to the collapse of this rising industry. […] We can, after the manufactures are fully established, seek to protect the operatives".10 Te second line of argument insisted that labour welfare was largely irrelevant to India since the country had "as yet practically no factory population, such as exists in European countries" (Indian Factory Labour Commission 1908: 18). Factory work, the adherents of this latter view reasoned, was no more than a temporary occupation of and a supplementary source of income for a migratory workforce. Te mill worker, it was held, was "essentially an agriculturalist": "His heart is in the country and not in his work" (Burnett-Hurst 1925: 60). Moreover, the workers' health was provided for by their rural families and other "traditional" village-based forms of mutual aid: "in most cases" the Indian Factory Labour Commission asserted in 1908, "he is secured against want by the joint family system" (p. 19) and an ofcial report on the industrial city of Bombay concurred in 1923 that periodical visits to the home village had "a benefcial efect upon their health as refected by

<sup>10</sup>*Amrita Bazar Patrika,* 2 September 1875, quoted in Chandra (1966: 336).

weight and counteracts to a very large extent the efects of working and living conditions".11

Such opinions continued to be pronounced well into the postcolonial period, and cracks appeared, at frst, in this hegemonic construct only in certain industrial sectors and for limited periods. Exceptions were capitalintensive industrial enterprises such as the Tata steel works, founded in 1907 and operational by 1912, where profts depended on the stable employment of a skilled workforce and where—as in the case of the railways and their extensive engineering workshops—strategic needs of the empire were at stake. Here welfare schemes, including housing and health services, were created even before World War I and expanded in the course of the 1920s (Lala 2006: 284; RCLI 1931a: 53–69 and passim). Other exceptions were observable even in India's more typical labourintensive industries when severe bottlenecks of labour supply threatened to stife industrial production for periods sufciently long to afect capital returns. Bombay's cotton textile industry experienced such a bottleneck during the plague crisis of the late 1890s. Tis induced industrialists to look for devices restricting the mobility of the workforce—devices that included company-level welfare measures and, more particularly, housing programmes (cf. Sarkar 2018: 202–211). When the exigencies of the "Great War" dictated a greater British reliance on India's labour markets and industries, the cracks widened and the "welfare" of industrial labour emerged, for the frst time, *as a political issue at the all-India level*. Te Indian Industrial Commission (1916–1918) was appointed by the Government of India with no labour representative, while half of its members were Indian or British businessmen. Interestingly, the Commission moved cautiously away from the earlier consensus in its report: the lack of welfare facilities that addressed dismal health conditions among the industrial workforce was now identifed as a competitive handicap since even the cheap wages of Indian workers could not make up, the Commission believed, for their alleged low "efciency":

<sup>11</sup>T. Maloney, *Report on Humidifcation in Indian Cotton Mills,* Delhi: Government of India Press, 1923, quoted in Burnett-Hurst (1925: 60, fn. 1).

Te conditions under which industrial operatives live and work in this country ought, if efciency be aimed at, to approximate, as nearly as circumstances permit, to those of temperate climates. […] Te problem, not only on moral grounds, but also for economic reasons, must be solved with the least avoidable delay, if the existing and future industries of India are to hold their own against the ever-growing competition, which will be still fercer after the war. No industrial edifce can be permanent, which is built on such unsound foundations as those aforded by Indian labour under its present conditions. (Indian Industrial Commission 1918: 179f)

Te recommendation of measures implying legal obligations on the part of employers was, however, carefully avoided. Even so, the argument of welfare as a precondition for "efciency" stuck and was taken up time and again in the following years. Accordingly, in April 1922, a report published in *Te Servant of India*, mouthpiece of an infuential social reform society, summed up the rationale of India's frst "Industrial Welfare Conference" as follows:

Welfare work wherever conducted on right lines has been found to be a veritable boon to the worker and a sound business proposition to the employer. India cannot hope to compete successfully with other countries unless the present low level of efciency of the Indian labour is considerably raised. (Kanekar 1922: 136)

Unprecedented levels of labour unrest and the emergence of numerous trade unions after the "Great War" added the desideratum of "social harmony" to that of "efciency". Tis induced Gandhi, for instance, to ofer a nativist justifcation for welfarism by developing during these years the idea of a paternalist "trusteeship" that employers were morally obliged to take upon themselves for the beneft of their employees (Chandavarkar 1998). During the interwar years, a growing minority of industrial employers came up with voluntary factory-level welfare schemes that addressed issues of social reproduction by providing for housing, crèches, educational facilities, subsidized grain shops, credit or dispensaries. Tese generally modest schemes often had a sharp disciplinary edge, as they sought to suppress the militancy and to reduce the horizontal mobility of core segments of the factory workforce. Tey were particularly prevalent in areas with large concentrations of industrial employment such as the cotton textile metropolises of Bombay and Ahmedabad, where strikes and unionization were on the rise and where sizeable local labour markets enabled workers, at least in boom years, to shift to employers who ofered better conditions (RCLI 1931b: 260f).12

A "social policy" in the sense of a legal regulation of the workforce's social reproduction based, in part, on statutory contributions by employers was resisted, however, on the whole successfully throughout the interwar period. As in other countries (Kuhnle and Sander 2010: 71–74) a "Workmen's Compensation Act" was the frst piece of labour welfare legislation in colonial India. It was enacted in 1923 and put into force a year later. Te divergence between European and Indian legislation was already perceivable, however, as the scope of workmen's compensation was defned much more narrowly than, for instance, in Britain. Smallscale industries and agriculture (including the sizeable quasi-industrial plantation complex) were expressly exempted from the law (Punekar 1950: 55). Numerous loopholes were created even with regard to labour market segments covered by it, which included initially not more than four million workers (ILO 1957: 95). Moreover, the implementation was left to district magistrates in general; even 20 years later, a special commissioner to adjudicate workmen's compensation cases had been appointed solely in Bombay, while in Bihar, Bengal and Madras, Labour Commissioners were charged with workmen's compensation as an additional duty (Punekar 1950: 73). As a result, the "Compensation Courts" appear to have sat in some of India's vast Provinces only twice a year (Health Survey and Development Committee 1946: 77). Even more importantly, adjudication could only begin after private negotiations between the injured worker and the employer had failed, which made it almost impossible for uncounselled workers to stake their compensation claims. Te injured worker, it was observed, ran "the risk of losing his job on top of losing a limb, if he decides to fght a case" (Adarkar 1947: 14). Even when adjudication took place, after all, the actual payment of the

<sup>12</sup> See also: *Bulletins of Indian Industries and Labour 63: "Sickness Insurance",* Government of India: New Delhi, 1937, p. 82 and Srivastava (2018).

awarded compensation was often not enforced (Lokanathan 1929: 107; Punekar 1950: 74).

When the economics professor and government councillor B.P. Adarkar submitted his "Report on Health Insurance for Industrial Workers" to the outgoing colonial dispensation in 1945, he recommended to scrap the Workmen's Compensation Act altogether. It was to be replaced by an integrated healthcare scheme, as the working of the former had been "far from satisfactory". He had very similar remarks for the other major item of interwar labour welfare legislation, that is, the Maternity Beneft Acts that had been passed in the majority of provinces after Bombay made a start in 1929 (Adarkar 1945: 10; s.a.: ILO 1957: 100f). Te Report of the (Rege) Labour Investigation Committee similarly observed in 1946 that the

main defects of maternity benefts legislation are that it is neither uniform nor universal, that there is no provision for free medical aid before, during or after confnement except in a few provinces […], and that there is no provision for preventing an employer from dismissing a woman worker on the frst sign of pregnancy except in a few provinces.

Te Report also stated that women workers had often been dismissed when the Acts were put in force and that employers continued to "show a preference for the employment of unmarried girls, widows and women past child-bearing age" (Labour Investigation Committee 1946: 57). In a circular letter to the provincial governments in May 1945, H.C. Prior, Secretary to the Government of India, concurred that the Workmen's Compensation and the Maternity Beneft Acts had "serious defects […] which cannot be removed except by means of an integral scheme of insurance".13

Even though employers resisted any legal obligation to pay for welfare measures as an interference with the freedom of labour contract, the demand for social security legislation became if anything more insistent from the late 1920s onwards. Te report of the Royal Commission on

<sup>13</sup>H.C. Prior, Secretary to the Government of India, to all Provincial Governments, 4 May 1945 ("Subject: Health Insurance Scheme"), BL: IOR/L/E/8/4948 ("Health Insurance for Industrial Workers, incl. Sickness Statistics").

Labour in India (RCLI), presented to the British Parliament in 1931, accepted the view that continuing circulatory migration between city and countryside distinguished Indian factory workers from their European counterparts, but refuted the conventional notion that the former were "essentially" peasants (RCLI 1931b: 11–13). Tey conceded that the "villages have hitherto provided a measure of insurance against the efects of the various changes which may reduce, interrupt or destroy the earning capacity of the worker" (p. 19). Yet, they added, this "measure of insurance" did not prevent workers even after short periods of illness from falling into debt and from fnding themselves "destitute of resources, unable to take proper measures to restore [their] health and in difculties regarding even the means of subsistence" (p. 265). Te RCLI thus recommended the development, in due course, of a system of sickness insurance for industrial workers, funded by contributions from employers as well as employees (pp. 265–269). However, one of its members, N.M. Joshi, a prominent social reformer, legislator and trade union leader with close links to the ILO in Geneva, went beyond this Bismarck-style employment-based conception of social security: in February 1932, the consultative Committee of the Round Table Conference discussed (and promptly turned down with reference to "the peculiar conditions of India") his suggestion

that the chapter on Fundamental Rights in the new Reformed Constitution for India should include a clause entitling every citizen to support from public funds, if no work could be found for him and to the provision, through a system of State insurance or otherwise, for maintenance during sickness, infrmity or old age and in the case of women for a reasonable period before and after confnement.14

Te oppositional Indian National Congress, too, endorsed demands for social welfare: during the campaign for the provincial elections in 1936–1937, its manifesto promised "protection against the economic

<sup>14</sup> ILOrep 3/1932, p. 65 (citing *Te Hindu*, 1 March 1932). Te Roundtable Conferences prepared the Government of India Act of 1935, which was the last quasi-constitutional legal framework of colonial rule before independence.

consequence of old-age, sickness and unemployment".15 A National Planning Committee (NPC), instituted by the National Congress in the late 1930s, was chaired by the moderate socialist Jawaharlal Nehru, but it also included a strong posse of Indian businessmen. In 1940, the NPC resolved that "social security should be assured to all classes of workers" (National Planning Committee 1940: 60). More specifcally, the NPC announced that "[a] system of compulsory and contributory social insurance for industrial workers should be established directly under the control of the State, to cover the risks of sickness and invalidity". Tis as well as other schemes were envisaged for independent India and to "be extended by stages, priority being given to particular classes of workers, with due regard to the relative urgency of their needs, facility of application, and to the ability of the community to provide for them" (p. 55). Te NPC thus applied the globally circulating term "social security" to the Indian context as early as in 194016 but limited it, in the main, to labour welfare: it made entitlements to social benefts conditional, at least initially, on industrial employment and did not seek to establish them as a constitutional citizen's right. It thus chose to follow the RCLI's more restricted Bismarck-style approach rather than N.M. Joshi's universalism.

With the Indian National Congress assuming in 1937 the government of the majority of provinces, including Bombay with its sizeable industrial centres, the latter emerged as the main hub for the development of a nationalist labour policy. In their "Labour Programme" of August 1937, the Bombay government already dampened the expectations raised during the election campaign17 and had their Labour Commissioner declare a few months later that "conditions do not at present exist in the Presidency for the successful operation of a scheme of sickness insurance as it is understood and worked in the United Kingdom or other foreign

<sup>15</sup> "Industrial Reform in Presidency", *ToI,* 18 August 1937, p. 6.

<sup>16</sup>During the interwar period, the phrase "social security" had circulated in the Indian press with increasing frequency, especially after the US "Social Security Act" of 1935, but mainly with reference to international developments. From the beginning of the 1940s onwards, the term was applied to Indian contexts more regularly. For evidence, see, for instance, the digital archive of the Times of India. Te quoted instance from the resolutions of the National Planning Committee in 1940 might be signifcant in this respect.

<sup>17</sup> "Industrial Reform in Presidency", *ToI,* 18 August 1937, p. 6.

countries". As preliminary, cautious steps, the government proposed to frst generate the required statistics, to legally sanction three to four weeks of paid sick leave for industrial workers and to deduct part of the wages for this leave period in order to create a State-administered provident fund. Tese were seen as frst steps towards a social insurance scheme that was to be restricted to industrial workers.18

#### **The Employees' State Insurance Act: The Making of a Law**

When the colonial government declared India's war entry in September 1939 without consulting the nationalist opposition, the provincial governments led by the Indian National Congress stepped down. In 1942, Nehru and other nationalist leaders were arrested, and the National Planning Committee ceased to function. Te Congress' temporary exclusion from policy-making circles did not, however, cut short the debate on social insurance for industrial workers. Discussions between employers' spokesmen, trade unions and representatives of the Government of India on a compulsory sickness insurance continued during the early years of the war, and if they remained fruitless, this was justifed now more often by a lack of funds rather than by asserting the undesirability or the irrelevance to India of such a scheme.19

Tis political impasse ended only in the latter half of 1942, when the colonial suppression of the nationalist Quit India Movement was in full swing and when the British War Cabinet discussed the expediency, under these circumstances, of a "more progressive social and industrial policy" in India.20 Te Government of India's new Labour Member B.R. Ambedkar, a towering leader of India's "untouchables", used this situation to suddenly announce a social insurance bill that would be

<sup>18</sup>*Bombay Chronicle,* 15 November 1937, p. 8 ("Sickness Leave with Pay for Industrial Labour") and p. 6 ("An Essential Reform"); see also ILOrep 11/1937, pp. 18f.

<sup>19</sup> See, for example, ILOrep 1/1942, pp. 4–6 (special reports produced on the basis of participants' minutes and papers distributed at the 3rd Labour Ministers' Conference).

<sup>20</sup>BL: IOR/L/E/8/2527 Social Reform in India, 1942–1944. See also above.

introduced in the Legislative Assembly by spring 1943.21 B.P. Adarkar was appointed by the Labour Ministry to develop a "Report on Health Insurance for Industrial Workers", which was submitted in the fall of 1944.22 Te Report drew upon various tentative schemes developed in the preceding years (Adarkar 1945: 14–16) but developed a concrete fnancial and administrative structure for the frst time. It was vetted subsequently by ILO experts at the request of the Government of India and revised by Adarkar by July 1945.23 Te Workmen's State Insurance Bill was introduced in the Central Legislative Assembly towards the end of the following year and eventually passed as the Employees' State Insurance Act (ESI Act) in March 1948. It was to provide workers in perennial factories with more than ten employees with eight weeks of paid sick leave, monetary benefts in case of maternity, accident and invalidity, as well as medical benefts to be ofered by special medical services that were to be created for the purpose.24

Te law remained a dead letter for several years, however. Te *Times of India* observed a year after the passing of the Act that while the ESI depended on the close cooperation of the Central Government, the Provincial Governments and of employers, "[a]ll the three are too preoccupied with their own problems to attend to the teething troubles of a child whom none consider as their own".25 In 1951, the All-India Organisation of Industrial Employers, a body representing Indian big business, demanded a further postponement of its implementation and particularly of any raising of contributions from the employers since they considered the scheme "socially unjust" and even "disastrous" in its economic consequences, as it imposed "on industry a burden which it cannot bear".26 Infuential forces within the ruling Indian National Congress supported this stance: the government of the populous northern province

<sup>21</sup> ILOrep 10/1942, p. 5 (cites *Te Statesman,* 14 October 1942).

<sup>22</sup> ILOrep 10/1944, pp. 24f (cites "Unofcial Note issued by the Bureau of Public Information, Government of India", n.d.).

<sup>23</sup> ILOrep 7/1945, p. 18 (referring to *Indian Labour Gazette [hereafter: ILG]* 6/1945).

<sup>24</sup> *ILG* V/10 (April 1948), pp. 698–701; ILOrep 4/1948, pp. 90–93 (cites *Te Statesman,* 2 and 3 April 1948).

<sup>25</sup> "Employees' State Insurance Corporation", *ToI,* 30 August 1949, p. 11.

<sup>26</sup> ILOrep 5/1951, pp. 16–18 (cites *Hindustan Times,* 17 May 1951).

of Uttar Pradesh had previously "signifed their opposition to the scheme following a representation made to the Centre Government by certain employers at Kanpur"—the *Times of India's* commentator even feared that the project was about to be abandoned.27 In 1952, Jawaharlal Nehru fnally inaugurated a pilot scheme that was confned, however, to Delhi and the industrial city of Kanpur.28 It was only in the course of the late 1950s that ESI coverage was rolled out more widely though considerable parts of the country still remained outside the remit of the Act. A full decade after the ESI Act had been passed by the Parliament of independent India, a "Study Group on Social Security" set up by the Ministry of Labour believed that of 2.2 million factory workers to which the law extended, a mere 1.3 million were actually covered by the mechanisms of implementation established by then (Study Group on Social Security 1958: 25).

Te passing of the law had clearly not put a stop to the struggle over health insurance for workers—trench warfare over legislation now merely turned into an unending battle of attrition over its implementation. While these struggles over implementation require further research, we can here only discuss schematically four major lines of contestation that emerged already in the process of legislation in negotiations between business representatives, trade unionists and state ofcials. Tese were (a) the compulsory nature of the scheme, (b) its contributory character and the connected issue of fnancial liability, (c) its administrative structure as a *state* insurance and (d) the vexed question of scope.

Backed up by the 1944 Recommendation of the ILO, government ofcials and experts as well as trade union spokesmen agreed that sickness insurance for industrial workers had to be *compulsory* if it was to have any impact (Punekar 1950: 3,9; Adarkar 1945: 24).29 Tis caused some discomfort in business circles and even among industrialists who admitted a certain need for an improvement of health services for industrial workers. At issue was not only that compulsory participation in a health insurance

<sup>27</sup> "State Insurance Scheme. Employers' Opposition", *ToI,* 18 August 1950, p. 5; "A Sorry State", *ToI,* 20 September 1950, p. 6. See also: Albuquerque (1958: 108f).

<sup>28</sup> ILOrep 2/1952, pp. 94f (cites *Te Statesman* and *National Herald*, 25 February 1952).

<sup>29</sup> See also *Trade Union Record,* IV/5–6 (1–2/1945: 38f).

scheme implied an obligation to contribute to it fnancially—an aspect we shall discuss instantly. Employers were also concerned that a compulsory scheme regulating, among other things, the employees' right to paid sickness leave brought the conditions of work or the modalities of the performance of the labour contract under the scrutiny of state ofcials. Employer spokesmen thus pointed out repeatedly that the issue of health insurance was directly connected to that of holidays with pay30—the scheme was thus not external to the labour relationship, but a mechanism that restricted the "freedom" of employers to fashion labour contracts as they pleased. In 1935, the Bengal Chamber of Commerce had fatly opposed any social insurance scheme based on compulsion, had suggested voluntary schemes at the company level according to a "model scheme" to be drawn up by government and had demanded that existing "adequate" arrangements should not be interfered with.31 By 1943, when many employers recognized that a compulsory sickness insurance scheme could be forestalled for some time but not avoided altogether, the Bombay Chamber of Commerce still demanded that existing voluntary employer schemes should be allowed to continue, thus opening a route towards the exemption from legal obligation.32 Trade unionists insisted, on their part, that "[e]xceptions in favour of any private factories will lead to unfair practices".33 Adarkar, while recommending strictly regulated exceptions wherever employers had created satisfactory insurance schemes for their workforces, emphasized that such schemes were extremely rare: "Te existing medical facilities in most places are no doubt extremely inadequate; even some of the so-called health insurance schemes are a mere parody of what they should be" (Adarkar 1945: 186). At the end of the day, employers could not prevent that the ESI Act defned health insurance as a compulsory scheme. Te interdependence between

<sup>30</sup> ILOrep 8/1940, pp. 35f (cites Circular no. 146, dated 8 August 1940, of the Employers' Association of Northern India in Kanpur); ILOrep 6/1943, p. 12 (citing Proceedings of Bombay Chamber of Commerce for May 1943).

<sup>31</sup> ILOrep 11/1935, p. 12 ("Abstract of Proceedings of the Committee of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce for Sept. 1935").

<sup>32</sup> ILOrep 6/1943, p. 12 (excerpted from Proceedings of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, May 1943).

<sup>33</sup> "Memorandum submitted by the All-India Trade Union Congress…", *Trade Union Record,* IV/5–6 (January–February 1945), p. 39.

employment-based health insurance and the conditions of the performance of the labour contract was even brought forward openly by B.R. Ambedkar as an argument for the urgency of regulating employment conditions through the Standing Orders Act that was passed by the Central Legislative Assembly in 1946.34

Te second line of contestation emerged over the *contributory character* of the ESI scheme and the connected issue of *fnancial liability*. From the early war years onwards, state ofcials and trade union representatives had agreed that the envisaged social insurance scheme needed to be based on contributions by employers and employees. Business spokesmen and trade unionists had, at the same time, concurred in the opinion that a fnancial contribution by the State was required.35 Raising the threshold for the passing of an unwelcome law without having to contradict government openly was surely one of the tactical considerations that prompted employers to pursue this line. Te War Government at the central level responded by taking the comfortable stand that if state subsidies were required, they would have to come from the provinces—predictably, the latter ruled this out altogether (Adarkar 1945: 164).36 Te Adarkar Report, in 1945, argued strongly for a fnancial contribution by the State, but it outlined two alternative models of funding, only one of which involved state subsidies (Adarkar 1945: 38–45, 105–109). Te Report also advocated a state guarantee for the solvency of the social insurance scheme (Adarkar 1945: 63f)—a demand taken up by the Bombay Millowners' Association when the Bill was eventually under discussion in the Constituent Assembly, in order to protect the employers from fnancial liabilities.37 As per the Act fnally passed a year later, the Government of India undertook to cover two-thirds of the administration costs for the frst fve years, while the provinces were asked to fnance one-third of the costs of the medical facilities that were to be established

<sup>34</sup> "Fixing of Labour Conditions by Employers", *ToI,* 13 April 1946, p. 8.

<sup>35</sup> ILOrep 1/1942, pp. 4–6 (special reports on the 3rd Labour Ministers' Conference and the preceding meeting of the Labour Ministers with employer and worker representatives in January 1942). <sup>36</sup> See also: "Health Insurance Plan for Workers. Provincial Govt.'s Attitude", *ToI,* 31 October 1944, p. 4.

<sup>37</sup> ILOrep 7/1947, pp. 28f (cites proceedings of the Committee of the Bombay Millowners' Association for January to March 1947).

for the provision of the medical benefts. An estimate calculated that, on this basis, employers were to contribute 60 per cent of the total ESI budget, while employees and the State were answerable for 20 per cent each (Punekar 1950: 194f). Again, the actual implementation of the Act created a rather diferent scenario: business advocates achieved a temporary exemption of companies from the payment of "maximum contributions",38 and by the end of the 1950s, trade unions calculated that employees had, in fact, contributed signifcantly more to ESI funds than employers.39 Te state governments, on their part, renegotiated their share of expenses for the ESI scheme's medical services and succeeded in reducing it from one-third to one-quarter (Albuquerque 1958: 108f).

Since state contributions remained narrowly circumscribed, the operational costs of the ESI scheme were mainly borne by bipartite contributions from employers and employees. Te *administrative structure*—the third line of contestation we need to take account of—assumed a strongly tripartite form, however, and came to be dominated by state ofcials: while employers' associations and trade unions were entitled to appoint their representatives, the administrative bodies in control of the ESI funds were controlled by government servants as were the special arbitration structures for ESI disputes (Albuquerque 1958: 108; Punekar 1950: 148–150, 158f). Tis was a major departure from the implementation structure of the Workmen's Compensation Act where the respective employer was in charge of payments to benefciaries and where hurdles had been created intentionally, as we have seen earlier, to render recourse of claimants to legal adjudication more difcult. Te state-centred administrative structure of the ESI was created with the explicit aim of preventing the malfunctions of the earlier Acts that were believed to be rooted in the principle of "employer liability": "for if the employer is saddled with the responsibility of compensation, he is bound to fnd ways of avoiding it" Adarkar 1947: 14, see also 11–17, 23, 1945: 12).

Te fourth and even more defning line of contestation arose in regard to the issue of *scope*. When the debate grew more intensive in 1940, an

<sup>38</sup> "Health Insurance Scheme. Central Act Likely to be Amended", *Bombay Chronicle,* 5 December 1950, p. 1; *Report of the Study Group on Social Security,* pp. 24f.

<sup>39</sup>*A Question to Trade Unions: On ESI, PF and Pension Schemes*, p. 107.

alliance of British and Indian industrialists demanded that a compulsory social insurance scheme, if it had to be created at all, was to have an extensive reach from the start. Tey insisted to include the Princely States—comprising almost one third of the subcontinent—to avoid unfair competitive advantages for industrialists operating from these territories.40 For the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, this was an issue suffciently important to justify the "postponement of the scheme for several years".41 Sir Vithal Chandavarkar, spokesman of the Employers' Federation of India, even combined his appeal to the new government of independent India not to "scare away private enterprise" with the demand that the undue focus of labour legislation on industrial workers should be overcome and that its scope needed to be extended to agricultural workers. Ostensibly in the best interest of the working classes, such proposals seemed to have the main objective of derailing the project by raising the hurdles.42 Adarkar envisaged a universal scheme in the long run, but recommended for the initial period a narrow focus on workers in perennial (i.e. non-seasonal) factories in three industrial sectors that had employed about 1.3 million workers in 1942: textiles, engineering, "minerals and metal" (i.e. the metallurgical and oil industries) (Adarkar 1945: 29, 159). Tis would have covered about 60 per cent of the factory workforce.43 Te All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) demanded a wider scope to include all employees of "organized industries", irrespective of occupation, whether working in factories or not, and including employees of seasonal factories (e.g. those processing agricultural produce like sugar) as

<sup>40</sup>Adarkar quoted a resolution to this efect of a Joint Conference of the (expatriate British) Employers' Federation of India and the All-India Organisation of Industrial Employers (controlled by Indian big business interests) in September 1940 (Adarkar 1945: 164). See also: ILOrep 8/1940, p. 37 (summarizing a "Letter to the Superintendent of Industries, Delhi, sent by the Secretary, All-India Organisation of Industrial Employers, on 15-8-1940, copy of which was forwarded to this Ofce"). Tis line of reasoning was endorsed by the Bombay Millowners' Association and the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce. Cf. ILOrep 9/1940, p. 26 and ibid., 10/1940, p. 15.

<sup>41</sup> "Scheme for Sickness Insurance. 'Should be on All-India Basis'", *ToI,* 30 June 1943, p. 6. See also: ILOrep 6/1943, p. 12 (excerpted from Proceedings of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, May 1943).

<sup>42</sup> "Employers' Federation Pledge Support to Government", *Bombay Chronicle,* 20 December 1947, p. 3. See also ILOrep 7/1943, p. 12 (cites *Journal of the Indian Merchants' Chamber*, July 1943).

<sup>43</sup> ILOrep 10/1944, pp. 24f (cites "Unofcial Note issued by the Bureau of Public Information, Government of India", n.d.).

well as "[s]ome of the dependents".44 Two ILO experts, Raghunath Rao and Maurice Stack, were assigned the task to revise the scheme and recommended to extend it to all factory workers in perennial factories.45 Tis recommendation was incorporated into Adarkar's fnal report and subsequently in the Employees' State Insurance Act of 1948.46

Consequently, smaller manufacturing units, agricultural labour, including the workforce of India's sizeable quasi-industrial plantation economies, the enormous construction sector as well as miners and transport workers remained outside the remit of the ESI Act, though it allowed provincial governments to expand its scope. Nor were the workers' families initially covered by the health insurance. Furthermore, provincial governments were empowered to grant exemptions from the law to industries considered to be unable to contribute to the scheme. Te provisions for the Act's implementation allowed for further exceptions even within the industries explicitly covered by the Act. Crucially, "the conditions of qualifying period for cash beneft exclude[d] casual workers", while unpaid apprentices were not granted protection because the Act applied to remunerated labour only (Punekar 1950: 84).

### **Repercussions: Graded Informality, a "Birthright" Lost and a Horizon of Expectation**

While the ESI Act thus permitted a diferentiation of employment conditions even on the same shop foor, it also contributed to a process of differential formalization that generated a pattern of graded entitlements in

<sup>44</sup> "Memorandum submitted by the All-India Trade Union Congress …", *Trade Union Record,* IV/5–6 (January–February 1945), pp. 38, 40; see also: ILOrep 3/1945, pp. 24f.

<sup>45</sup> "Note on the Report prepared by Professor B.P. Adarkar on a Scheme of Health Insurance for Industrial Workers, by Mr. M. Stack and Mr. R. Rao of the International Labour Ofce", p. 3, BL: IOR/L/E/8/4948 ("Health Insurance for Industrial Workers, including Sickness Statistics").

<sup>46</sup> *ILG* V/10 (April 1948), pp. 698–701; ILOrep 4/1948, pp. 90–93 (referring to *Te Statesman,* 2 and 3 April 1948). For a contemporary analysis of the Act in its fnal form, see confdential report by K.D. Jones, Labour Adviser to the High Commissioner for the UK in New Delhi, to Secretary, Ministry of Labour and National Service, Overseas Department, London, 18 May 1948, in: BL: IOR/L/E/8/6222.

the labour market and multiple rifts among the working classes as a whole. Certain sections of the workforce had, for instance, access to health facilities that were and would remain far superior to the ones provided by the ESI scheme—this was the case with the nationalised railways, which had generated their own medical services in the course of the 1920s, and it would hold true for new public sector enterprises of Nehruvian India.47 Other and much larger sections of the industrial workforce were, at the same time, legally entitled only to a level of sickness and invalidity protection much inferior to that ofered by the ESI. Tis becomes evident if we return to the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1923, which the ESI Act was to replace. In fact, it did so only for about a third of the six million workers that were entitled to workmen's compensation by the early 1950s. Te incongruent remits of the two laws thus implied that the industrial workforce of postcolonial India was further divided into a minority segment entitled (by the ESI Act) to *pensions* in the event of work accidents and another segment, twice as large, entitled (by the Workmen's Compensation Act) to *lump sum payments*, which provided not only less security but were also more difcult to claim (ILO 1957: 95, 104; see also Punekar 1950: 54–57, 154–158).

Tis is only one of many similar instances, one element of a much larger phenomenon: multiple and overlapping central and provincial labour laws have defned the "workman", the "worker" or the "employee" and, accordingly, their remit in sharply diverging ways, while labour tribunals and courts of justice have added to the complexity of these defnitions by way of conficting interpretations (Karuna 2019).48 Te Employees' Provident Fund Act of 1952 applied, on its part, only to about half of the factory workers covered by the ESI Act of 1948 (Narasimhan 1953: 49). Te incongruence of labour- and employmentbased welfare laws in terms of scope thus generated a complex site of confict that was to engage employers, trade unions, judges, government

<sup>47</sup>RCLI, *Evidence,* Vol. VII, part 1: Railways, London: H.M.'s Stationary Ofce, 1931, pp. 53–69; Dilip Subramaniam, "'No Room for Class Struggle in Tese National Undertakings': Providing Social Welfare for Indian State Sector Industrial Workers (circa 1950–2000)," *MAS* 49 (2015), pp. 1526–1579.

<sup>48</sup>Tis issue will be examined more systematically elsewhere. For a perceptive exploration of conficts over the legal status of "worker" and "employee" in South India see: Karuna (2019).

ofcials and various other social actors for the decades to come: legislation did not result in a formal/informal bifurcation of the workforce into two "sectors", but in an unstable, contested and to some extent malleable structure of graded (in)formality.

Despite its narrowly confned remit, postcolonial India's frst Labour Minister, Jagjivan Ram, celebrated the ESI Act, when it was passed, as a breakthrough: "the tiny and tender sapling" would "in its own time, grow into a gigantic tree" and the scope of the scheme would be "extended gradually and steadily so that ultimately it becomes all-comprehensive".49 Health Minister Rajkumari Amrit Kaur confrmed that the scheme was to be extended, in due course, to about 85 per cent of the population.50 A propaganda flm, released by the Government's Films Division in 1952, pronounced that the ESI scheme would be extended "until its benefts are available in every industrial section of our country, until not only our 2.5 million workers, but all employees, including our agriculturists, enjoy this, their birthright".51 Te choice of these words, read out in the King's English as the footage shifted from machine operators to ploughing farmers, was signifcant: "swaraj [self-governance] is my birthright" had been a rousing slogan in the independence struggle, associated with the militant nationalist Bal Gangadhar Tilak. Quoting this phrase elevated security from illness to the status of a fundamental right intrinsic to *citizenship* of independent India. Te universalization of health insurance from an employment-based privilege to a citizen right was thus announced and explicitly married to the nation-building project. Tis ofcial promise survived the bleak facts of implementation for quite some time. In 1965, when V.V. Giri's infuential *Labour Problems in Indian Industry* was reprinted once again, the former Labour Minister and future President of India still characterized ESI as "a nucleus of a general social insurance scheme" (Giri 1965[1959]: 267; see also Albuquerque 1958: 108).

However, the universalization of health insurance turned out to be, as we know today, one of the unfulflled promises of postcolonial

<sup>49</sup> "Speech by the Minister of Labour, Jagjivan Ram, at the inaugural ceremony of the Employees' State Insurance Corporation", 6 October 1948, BL: IOR/L/E/8/6222 "Te Employees' State Insurance Act 1948". See also: "'India Has Turned the Corner Now'", *ToI,* 7 October 1948, p. 3. <sup>50</sup> ILOrep 4/1949, pp. 71f (citing *Hindustan Times,* 22 April 1949).

<sup>51</sup>Government of India, Films Division, "Dawn of Social Security" (1952).

citizenship and was postponed ad infnitum. As late as in 2013, a mere 3 per cent of India's almost half billion–strong workforce or less than half of the "organized sector" workers were entitled to often unsatisfactory ESI benefts (Duggal 2015: 19). Instead, the Employees' State Insurance Act came to be one of the key mechanisms for the separation of India's formal and informal labour economies into an embattled, segmented structure of graded entitlements. Despite the many references to Beveridge and Geneva, the guarantee of a national minimum standard did not diffuse to India in subsequent decades as the basis of a universalist welfare policy. Employment-based Indian welfarism remained robustly minoritarian, confned to a very small and mostly male section of those who built postcolonial India for wages. When consulted on the ESI scheme by the outgoing colonial government in 1945, William Beveridge had stated that "freedom from want [was] probably to be sought for the greater part of the Indian population" in a "diferent direction". Tis not only was prescient but also indicates that even liberal British reformers did not rule out, at the time, the *possibility* in India of social policies more far-reaching and comprehensive than those the postcolonial dispensation chose to accept as inheritance from their colonial and deeply conservative predecessors.52

Yet the lines, drawn by labour welfare laws of the 1940s and 1950s, should not be understood solely as borders breaking the workforce into a multiplicity of fragments but also as a horizon of expectation—a horizon that would remain out of reach for most workers but has been well in sight: it has created a language for the formulation of standards of "decent work" that are transgressively utopian as well as eminently carnal in their concreteness. Tey have thus endowed labour struggles with a moral edge and could even serve as blueprints for legislative initiatives for the protection of informally employed workers. A particularly striking case in point is the Dock Workers Act of 1948, which served as a template for mobilizations among the enormous and almost completely "informal" construction workforce for the establishment of welfare boards and for

<sup>52</sup>W. Beveridge to D. Monteath, India Ofce, draft letter, 21 September 1945, BL: IOR/L/E/8/2903 "Social Security in India. Proposed Visit by Sir W. Beveridge".

the (no doubt severely diluted) Unorganized Workers' Social Security Act of 2008 (Dietrich 1992: 1970–1972; Agarwala 2013: 4, 47–49). Similarly, contract workers and employees of predominantly "informal sector" industries have for many years raised the demand for inclusion in "ESI"53—a demand that has signifed not only the desire for protection against the existential risks and economic perils of sickness. For entering the remit of one of India's employment-based welfare laws—such as the ESI or the Provident Fund—also implied a formal acknowledgement of their employment status. Tis was no negligible achievement since certifed employment status could serve as a legal basis for claiming further entitlements. Table 5.1. summarizes the analysis.

Employment-based social security schemes thus have mattered not only to the minority of the Indian workforce covered by them explicitly but to wider sections of the working classes, as they have defned possibilities, together with other labour laws, and have helped to formulate demands. While undeniably dividing wage earners according to graded entitlements, these schemes have simultaneously established a form for collective claims of workers against employers and a sense that the State bears an—if often shirked—duty to guarantee such claims. Tis sense of entitlement has made it difcult to do away altogether with the Employees' State Insurance and other labour welfare schemes despite three decades of largely unmitigated neoliberal policies in India. However, in a signifcant new development, the second Modi government introduced to the Indian parliament in late 2019 a "Social Security Code", which aims at "amalgamating" and "corporatizing" eight existing labour welfare schemes, including ESI, while simultaneously reducing compulsory contributions. It remains to be seen whether this new law will, in fact, do more than undermine the existing, doubtlessly minoritarian welfare schemes (mainly, as some trade union argue, by transforming legal entitlements

<sup>53</sup>For a case concerning construction workers see "Road roko: police remove construction workers", *Te Hindu,* 10 February 2011. For a case concerning powerloom workers see "Over 5,000 powerlooms fall silent in Chennimalai", *Te Hindu,* 28 October 2007. For recent cases of contract workers demanding inclusion in the ESI, see, for example, "Workers rampage at DLF site, seek better work conditions", *Te Hindu,* 22 July 2017; "Contract power staf on strike to seek service regularisation", *Te Hindu,* 25 July 2018.


**Table 5.1**Social protection in India, 1880s–2014: changing ideas and policies **183**


simultaneity of contradictory tendencies. (c) The governments under Narendra Modi since 2014 appear to usher in a new phase when older welfare structures are dismantled and those supposed to take their place are not yet clearly discernible. The political and economic impact of the Covid 19 crisis seems to trigger a further informalisation of employment patterns thereby exacerbating the decay of employment-based social protection. However, no schematic representation is possible at present

**184**

**Table 5.1**

(continued)

into benefts to be doled out by the executive at their discretion) and achieve the proclaimed goal of expanding health services to larger parts of the workforce.54

#### **References**


<sup>54</sup> See, for instance, "Code on Social Security 2019: Sharp division among trade unions over benefts to workers", *Business Today,* 13 December 2019, https://www.businesstoday.in/sectors/jobs/ code-on-social-security-2019-rss-afliated-bms-left-afliated-citu-division-among-trade-unionsover-beneft-to-workers/story/391993.html; Rajat Mishra: "A Quick Look at the Social Security Bill 2019", *Outlook Money,* 21 December 2019, https://www.outlookindia.com/outlookmoney/ talking-money/a-quick-look-at-the-social-security-bill-2019-4069.


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# **Part IV**

**South Africa**

# **6**

# **The Social Question in Pre-***apartheid* **South Africa: Race, Religion and the State**

**Jeremy Seekings**

## **Introduction**

In South Africa, as across much of the world, the period between the 1910s and 1940s was one of extraordinary intellectual as well as social and political turmoil. Not only were societies being rapidly transformed through migration, urbanisation and industrialisation, but there were competing and conficting visions of "modernity". Intellectuals, elites and ordinary people alike grappled with the shifting relationships between state and society, as states were "modernised", old social institutions (including churches) lost some of their authority and new social institutions (including trade unions) emerged. Social relations—of gender, class and race—were contested and reimagined.

In contrast to the democracies of Northwest Europe, however, contestation over the social question in South Africa did not entail simply struggles over the form of social citizenship, as the state assumed an expanded role in the social and economic inclusion of citizens. In

J. Seekings (\*)

University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa

<sup>©</sup> Te Author(s) 2021 **191**

L. Leisering (ed.), *One Hundred Years of Social Protection*, Global Dynamics of Social Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54959-6\_6

Northwest Europe, social democracy emerged as a powerful ideology to address the social question, and existing conservative and liberal ideologies were reinvented. Te working classes and the poor enjoyed considerable political power through the ballot box, strikes and the threat of direct action. Welfare states expanded, providing a considerable measure of social citizenship for all. Tis picture was refected in South Africa with regard to one part of its population. But the majority of South Africa's population was excluded from social citizenship. Te social question entailed exclusion as well as inclusion, with protracted debates and struggles over the boundaries of social citizenship—i.e. who is a social citizen—as well as the content and mechanisms of achieving it.

In some respects, South Africa was not unlike other parts of the world. In Latin America, most clearly, immigration, industrialisation and urbanisation defned the social question in terms of the inclusion of politically powerful groups—including the small, organised working class—while excluding the larger population of urban and rural poor. Te dominant corporatist ideology framed this combination of inclusion and exclusion (see especially Malloy 1979; Huber and Stephens 2012). Social citizenship across much of Latin America—as in the southern states of the USA—was racialised. South Africa was distinctive, however, in the extent to which social citizenship was fundamentally rooted in the country's racial politics.

Te Union of South Africa was established in 1910 as the outcome of protracted negotiations following the British defeat of independent Boer republics in the South African War (see glossary at the end of the chapter for an explanation of South African terms including "Boer" and "coloured"). Te new Union comprised the two former British colonies (the Cape and Natal) together with the two former Boer republics (of the Orange Free State and Transvaal). Te political settlement provided for a substantially independent white-supremacist state, notionally under British control, with limited rights for the "coloured" population, very limited rights for the "native" African majority and almost no rights at all for the small immigrant Indian population. (White) Afrikaners comprised a majority of the electorate, with the result that the Union had three former Boer generals as prime minister for its frst thirty-eight years (Louis Botha, 1910–1919; Jan Smuts, 1919–1924 and 1939–1948; J.B.M. [Barry] Hertzog, 1924–1939). Te Union had a parliamentary system, with a prime minister accountable to a bicameral legislature. From 1910 to 1924, the government was run by the South African Party. Te 1924 elections resulted in a "Pact Government" comprising the National (i.e. Afrikaner nationalist) Party and small Labour Party (linked to Labour Parties in Britain and Australia). Te Pact Government disintegrated in 1933–1934, with most of the National Party joining the South African Party in a "Fusion Government", and then combining as the United Party. A minority of the National Party led by D.F. Malan remained independent, as the *Gesuiwerde* ("Purifed") National Party. In 1939, many of the former National Party Members of Parliament (MPs) left the United Party over the issue of the Union's participation in the Second World War, joining with the *Gesuiwerde* National Party in a *Herenigde* (Reunited) National Party. In 1948, the National Party returned to government, with Malan as prime minister, and began to implement *apartheid* (see chapter by Ulriksen in this volume).

South African politics and society were defned primarily by white privilege. Te white minority comprised approximately one-ffth of the population, including both farmers who had settled on the land and urban workers drawn to South Africa by the extraordinary industrialisation that followed the discovery of diamonds in the 1860s and gold in the 1880s. Te African population was largely rural, divided between whiteowned farms and the "reserves" set aside for "natives". Many African men worked at some point of their lives as migrant workers on the mines. Legislation restricted what work African people could do, where they lived and (above all) their political rights. Almost all white South Africans concurred that their hold on power should be preserved, but there was some disagreement over the fexibility of the boundaries of political (and, as we shall see, social) citizenship. Tere were also deep divisions among white South Africans over the division of power among them. An obvious cleavage divided Afrikaner nationalists from English-speaking South Africans as well as those Afrikaners who were reconciled with their loose incorporation into the British Empire. Class also divided the white population: Both English- and Afrikaans-speaking workers resented the extraordinarily wealthy mine owners (and their infuence over the state). Te commercialisation of agriculture also generated new class divisions: Many Afrikaans-speaking farmers lived on the edge of poverty; many of these "poor whites" migrated to towns. Without skills, they were unable to compete with either skilled white workers or unskilled African workers. Te Labour Party, Afrikaner nationalist parties, communists, syndicalists and anarchists competed for the support of white workers. In 1922, white mineworkers on the Witwatersrand rose in violent rebellion (the Rand Revolt) before being suppressed brutally by the army and air force (Krikler 2005; Simons and Simons 1969; Greenberg 1980; O'Meara 1983; van der Walt 2011).

In this context, demands for policy reforms were understood in very diverse ways. Tere was little or no discussion of the "social question" per se, nor any consensus—even within white politics—over which of several other, interrelated "questions" was most pressing. Te "native question" was clearly of great importance: Should African people, or some African people, be included in any way in a common society? If not, how should they be excluded? But there were other pressing "questions" also. Te "poor white question" attracted considerable attention, not least because poverty among white people undermined the racial hierarchy and white solidarity. Tere was also a "labour" or "worker question" in that many (white) workers asserted their "rights" in relation to their (white) employers and some contemplated alternatives to capitalism. Tere was also the question of women's rights, not only to the vote but also to control over many other aspects of their lives.

For many (but certainly not all) white South Africans, the state was an attractive vehicle for tackling these questions in self-consciously modernist ways. Te post-1910 South African state accumulated considerable infrastructural power: In the collection and use of statistics, fscal capacity (including especially income taxes), strategic interventions in infrastructural and industrial development, the regulation of wages and employment, and with respect to the regulation of the family and the amelioration of poverty, all administered through a professionalised bureaucracy (Seekings 2016; Freund 2019). Te South African state contrasted sharply with the "paper leviathans" of Latin America (Centeno and Ferraro 2013). Some white South Africans had grave reservations about this modern state. Some liberals welcomed many aspects of state support for business but were wary of what they saw as overreach. Neither anarchism nor syndicalism enjoyed as much support in South Africa as in some Latin American cities in the early twentieth century, but South African socialists and communists also had mixed feelings about a modern state that seemed to be closely tied to capitalist elites. More importantly, the powerful "Reformed" Protestant churches (including the largest, the Dutch Reformed Church, known by its Afrikaans initials as the NGK) included a variety of conservatives anxious to retain important roles for the churches. Whilst the NGK had long embraced a missionary role that encouraged charity, it also saw itself as a *volkskerk* (people's church), referring to the Afrikaner *volk*. In the late 1930s the NGK became more ambivalent about the state, in part through the spreading infuence of the neo-Calvinist ideology associated with the Dutch theologian (and politician) Abraham Kuyper. Kuyper's theology revolved around the idea that diferent spheres of life (including the family) were all divinely sovereign, providing a new and powerful justifcation for restricting the scope of the state. Te African population was unsurprisingly even more ambivalent about the role of the state, which they experienced as more repressive than progressive.

Te result between the 1920s and 1940s was a gradual deployment of state power to address the "native", "poor white", labour and other (social) "questions", but the expansion of the state was shaped by the ambivalence and opposition of important sections of the white population. Te battle lines in these contested reforms were often surprising, not least because Afrikaner nationalism was torn between modernisers who sought to use the state (including Hendrik Verwoerd, who was later to become the key architect of *apartheid* in the 1950s and 1960s) and NGK-linked opponents of state power. Tis shifting division within Afrikaner nationalism was to be especially important for social welfare policy. Te result, by 1948 (when the National Party, by then committed to the *apartheid* project, was elected back into ofce), was a welfare state that had signifcant reach in terms of social assistance programmes and the regulation of the family (and delinquency) but not with respect to social insurance.

Tis chapter charts policy reforms and identifes the underlying understandings and motivations of key reformers (and their opponents) in three broad periods: Te period of the Pact Governments from 1924 to 1933; the period of the Fusion or United Party governments from 1933/34 until the outbreak of war in 1939; and the period during and immediately after the war, also under United Party governments but with growing opposition from an opposition National Party radicalised in part by new religious beliefs.

Whilst the conditions framing debates in South Africa might have been unique, the South African participants in these debates were immersed in global networks of ideas. At every point, South African debates were informed by ideas and models from elsewhere. Te South African state followed the British lead in using commissions of inquiry to investigate possible policy reforms. Tese commissions typically collated a mass of information on policies elsewhere in the world (and generally summarised these in their reports). When, in the late 1920s, the Pienaar Commission investigated welfare policy reforms, it drew heavily on information provided by the International Labour Organization (ILO), as well as information from Britain and elsewhere. Several members of the commission visited the ILO in Geneva, attended one of the ILO's annual International Labour Conferences and visited various European capitals in order to collect additional information. In addition, many prominent South Africans studied abroad. Prime Ministers Smuts and Hertzog studied in Cambridge (1892–1894) and Amsterdam (1888–1892), respectively. Others who played important roles in policy debates included Jan Hofmeyr (Oxford, 1913–1916), E.G. Malherbe (New York, the early 1920s) and Hendrik Verwoerd (mostly in Germany, 1926–1928). Individual Members of Parliament (MPs), trade unionists and academics travelled and had contacts elsewhere in the world, especially in Australia and New Zealand. For all these reasons, innovative foreign reforms and proposals had immediate and wide impact within South Africa. In the early 1940s, as we shall see, reforms in New Zealand and the proposals set out in the Beveridge Report in Britain framed South African debates. American ideas about social casework also had a strong infuence. Not all foreign ideas strengthened reforms, however. Many Afrikaner nationalist theologians studied at the neo-Calvinist Free University in Amsterdam, founded by Kuyper.

#### **Securing the Racial Hierarchy, 1924–1933: State, Church and the "Poor White Problem"**

Prior to 1924 the state's involvement in social regulation and provision expanded slowly but remained very limited. Te South African Party governments in ofce from 1910 to 1924 were broadly pro-business. Te state provided modest poor relief, almost entirely for "poor whites", supplementing the charitable work of churches (Bottomley 1990; Butler 2017). Compensation was introduced for the (white) victims of industrial accidents. Te 1913 Children's Protection Act—based on British legislation from 1908—provided for the state to place (white) children in need of care in institutions and for state subsidies to both these residential institutions and churches or other child welfare societies that oversaw other children in need of care. In 1921, pensions were provided to (mostly white) mothers (as well as stepmothers and grandmothers) who had been widowed or abandoned by their husbands, to reduce the need to place destitute children in residential institutions (Du Toit 2018; Chanock 2001). Reformatories and industrial schools were also established for (mostly white) boys and girls (Chisholm 1990).

Tese reforms were racialised in intent. White families organised around Christian marriage were seen as a bulwark against the degeneration of the white population. It was when white men disregarded their obligations to their wives and children that children were neglected, dropped out of school and thus rendered unft to compete for jobs against coloured or African people. Flawed families meant that girls risked sliding into prostitution, and poor white men and women risked sinking into "a demoralising and corrupt intercourse with non-Europeans", as a parliamentary committee put it. Te 1913 Children's Protection Act thus sought to maintain the "boundaries of whiteness" (Chanock 2001: 205–209). Under the 1913 and 1921 Acts, it was hard for coloured children or their mothers to access benefts and almost impossible for African children or their mothers to do so. Sexual "impropriety"—typically across racial lines—was the main reason for white girls being placed in institutions (Chisholm 1990). Te protection of the white family—and hence white supremacy—required intensifed segregation to limit mixing between white and non-white children.

Reforms accelerated under the Pact Government elected in 1924. Te Pact Government comprised the National Party, based in poor rural areas, and the ostensibly socialist Labour Party, whose core support was among skilled urban workers. Tese parties had broadly antagonistic relationships with the mining companies and other large businesses. Te National and Labour Parties had campaigned on platforms for tackling both the "poor white problem" and the excessive profts of mining capitalists. Solving the poor white problem meant protecting unskilled white workers (and their dependents, in both rural and urban areas) who lacked the skills required for skilled employment and were unable to compete for unskilled work with cheaper African labour. Te National and Labour parties had accused the then governing South African Party of jeopardising the future of white South Africans "as a civilised people" and pandering to "big fnancial" interests. Te National Party was unashamedly racist. Te Labour Party comprised both unabashed racists and socialists who felt uncomfortable with explicit racial discrimination but were opposed to the exploitation of "cheap labour".

In ofce, the Pact Government sought to deepen racial segregation, not only keeping white and African people apart but also protecting poor white people from competition from African people. Te colour bar in employment was strengthened, and parastatals (especially the railways) were instructed to employ unskilled white workers. Subsidies were extended for white farmers, especially on smaller or family farms. Te Labour Party secured regulatory institutions that protected workers' wages (along the lines of policies in Australia). In 1926, the Pact Government appointed the Pienaar Commission (chaired by a senior National Party MP, P.J. Pienaar) to examine a comprehensive system of social insurance and assistance. In its frst Report, in 1927, the commission recommended the introduction of means-tested old-age and invalidity pensions. But African men and women were excluded, and coloured pensioners were to receive lower benefts than white pensioners. Legislation was passed in 1928, and the frst pensions were paid in 1929 (Seekings 2007).

Te most important factor behind the expansion of public provision and care was the imperative—for the National Party—of protecting its "poor white" supporters against *gelykstelling* (social levelling) and the risk of becoming subordinate to or intermingling with African people. Oldage pensions constituted one cornerstone of the segregationist policies through which the Pact Government sought to raise all-white people to "civilised" standards of living, above, rather than below or alongside, the "native" (African) population. Te racial hierarchy had to be maintained. As one National Party Member of Parliament (MP) put it, the "poor white" problem

is a question which not only concerns the poor; it afects the whole white civilisation of this country. It confronts us with the question whether we, the descendants of the staunch old pioneers, will maintain their civilisation and hand it over to our children. … It may be asked whether there is poverty only in South Africa and whether other countries do not sufer from the same thing. Tere are poor people everywhere, but the circumstances in South Africa are unique. In Europe poverty has proved a great breeding place for Socialism and Bolshevism. If grievances arise there it is simply an economic matter. In this country, however, there is a small number of whites against the natives, a few civilised people against uncivilised hordes, and for that reason it is so important that not a single white person should be allowed to go under.1

Tese beliefs were not confned to the National Party. In 1933, the frst woman elected to Parliament, Leila Reitz, was a member of the South African Party. Reitz, who was active in the emerging feld of social work, emphasised in her maiden parliamentary speech that poor (white) families "constitute a danger to the moral life of this country, a danger to themselves, a danger to our social order, our national character, and, in the end, a danger to our white civilization itself". Poor (white) people must be "lifted" up to save "our white civilization".2 For most MPs, in most if not all parties, white people were the guardians and agents of modernity in the face of the threats posed by the African majority.

<sup>1</sup>*Hansard*, House of Assembly, 12 August 1924, col. 429–32 (Stals).

<sup>2</sup>*Hansard*, House of Assembly, 5 June 1933, col. 294–5 (Reitz).

Te NGK played a central role in the Afrikaner nationalist movement and National Party in particular. D.F. Malan was a dominee (priest) in the NGK prior to becoming editor of the infuential newspaper *Die Burger*, provincial leader of the National Party, minister in the Pact Government and then national leader in 1934. Malan himself came out of the missionary tradition within the NGK that sought to recruit African people (into racially segregated branches of the NGK) and was even supportive of charity towards the African population as well as white population. In the 1920s and 1930s, Malan—and the NGK, more broadly—came to perceive African people as more of a threat to poor whites, warranting more systematic exclusion and discrimination (Elphick 2012; Koorts 2014).

Whilst the NGK and National Party became increasingly resolute over the exclusion of African people, they also worried about the transfer of responsibilities from church to state. Sections of the NGK and National Party pushed for amendments to the Old Age Pensions Act. Te Carnegie Commission into the "poor white problem", established by the NGK not the state, called in its 1932 report for social welfare functions to be shifted back to churches and families. Financial support to the poor should be reduced because it encouraged "dependency". Interventions should address instead the "weak traits" of the poor, including improvidence, thriftlessness, dishonesty and indolence. Te NGK succeeded in partially rolling back the old-age pension in the early 1930s by giving ofcials much more discretion in taking into account the capacity of kin. But modernisers in the National Party (led by Verwoerd) and state fought back. MPs from various parties demanded the expansion of the pension programme, citing cases of deserving constituents who had been denied pensions despite the lack of familial support. "I very much favour the principle that children should provide for their parents", one MP declared, "but … we can go too far in that direction".3 Public provision continued to expand (see Seekings 2008).

<sup>3</sup>*Hansard*, House of Assembly, 8 June 1933, col. 543–4.

### **The Institutionalisation of "Social Policy" Under the Fusion Governments, 1933–1939**

In 1933–1934, economic crisis precipitated the collapse of the Pact Government. A new coalition, comprising most of the National Party together with the South African Party, formed the Fusion Government, and the parties proceeded to merge as the United Party. Te basis of the Fusion Government—and United Party—was the concession by Smuts's South African Party to Hertzog's National Party to deepen racial segregation. Te Fusion Government was, politically, a very illiberal administration, although it included prominent liberals in some positions (including, especially, Jan Hofmeyr as minister with responsibility for education, public health [until 1936] and social welfare [from 1936]). In the face of economic crisis and fuelled by improved public revenues (swelled through taxes on the gold mines), ministers expanded existing programmes, including public works programmes, for unemployed white men, subsidies for white farmers (devastated by drought) and poor relief for other poor whites—and then moved towards more innovative government interventions.

In 1934 MPs began for the frst time to refer to "social policy" to describe favourably policies to address poverty. A newly elected South African Party MP proposed a motion calling for a "broad social policy" to address the inequities and hardships associated with unemployment. Hofmeyr referred to "the social policy of the Government". Another minister described the introduction of a limited contributory unemployment insurance programme as a component of South Africa's developing "social legislation".4

MPs from diferent parties insisted on the need to relax constraints on the award of old-age pensions to elderly white men and women. "Te older people who are not assisted by their children must be the defnite care of the Government", asserted one MP.5 A senior MP in the National Party—now in opposition—demanded "security" for the poor man and

<sup>4</sup>*Hansard*, House of Assembly, 27 February 1934, col. 826–57 (Wadley); 17 April 1934, col. 2299 (Hofmeyr); 17 April 1935, col. 5191–2 (Fourie).

<sup>5</sup>*Hansard*, House of Assembly, 27 February 1934, col. 851–3.

worker: "To-day we have the position that, in order to get an old age pension, a poor man has to prove that he has no children from whom he can get anything, and who earn sufcient. Tat is a wrong and humiliating position".6 In 1937 the government relaxed some of its restrictions on old-age pensions and lowered the age of eligibility for women from 65 to 60. Between November 1936 and November 1939, the number of white old-age pensioners rose by 55 percent and total expenditure on old-age pensions almost doubled. A series of committees recommended reforms to policies on blind people, children, health insurance and poor relief.

Te new "social policies" were institutionalised within a dedicated ofce for Social Welfare, initially part of the former Department of Labour (renamed the Department of Labour and Social Welfare) then in a new, stand-alone Department of Social Welfare. Te new department's approach was, in its understanding of poverty, conservative. In his frst report, the new secretary for Social Welfare explained that his department focused on "cultural" aspects of the "rehabilitation" of "socially maladjusted" (white) people. Even if poor white men found employment, they remained in need of the state's help in reforming "their habits, attitudes and interests" (South Africa 1940). Te newly appointed (British) Professor of Sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand, John Gray, was struck by what he saw as the resilience of a Calvinist tradition and the perpetuation of a Poor Law tradition (Gray 1937: 278–80). At the same time, the new department saw this cultural poverty as the responsibility of the state, not of the churches. Te secretary of Social Welfare himself noted that government policy was now based on "a new conception of duty to the poor arising from the slowly dawning realisation that the poor need not be a liability but that they are a potential asset" (South Africa, 1940: 4). Moreover, science itself could be harnessed to the tasks of rehabilitation, as some of the members of the Carnegie Commission had recognised. Te department championed social work rooted in casework and backed up by research. A detailed study of *Poverty and Dependency in Cape Town*—supervised by (then-Professor) Verwoerd—examined how the "dependent" destitute might be "rehabilitated" (Wagner 1936). Te department also oversaw the expansion of social assistance for the blind

<sup>6</sup>*Hansard*, House of Assembly, 1935, col. 417 (Bremer).

and invalids. "It is generally accepted that it is the duty of the State to see that its citizens have the opportunity of making a living", explained one MP, adding that "it is doubly the duty of the Government to see that unft persons shall be given means of existence. It is shameful that people have to beg on the streets".7 Te new invalidity pensions were—like the old-age pensions—means-tested, taking into account the income of coresident unmarried children (and, in exceptional cases, of children who resided elsewhere also).

Provision for children was also expanded. Pressure from women's, child welfare and liberal organisations (Du Toit 2018) as well as from the handful of (white) women newly elected to Parliament resulted in the appointment of an inter-departmental committee on "Destitute, Neglected, Maladjusted and Delinquent Children" and then, in 1937, a new Children's Act. Te new Act provided for care in two main respects, both intended to prevent (white) children becoming "socially maladjusted" or delinquent as a result of growing up in bad conditions at home. First, a battery of measures provided for the state to intervene where children were being neglected and to "rehabilitate" those who were already delinquent. Local ofcials were empowered to place in a foster home or institution any children who were identifed as being "in need of care", including (inter alia) children with absent or delinquent parents, children who were themselves delinquent and—in an acknowledgment of the anxieties of the time—any child that "frequents the company of any immoral … person, or is otherwise living in circumstances calculated to cause or conduce to its corruption, seduction or prostitution".8 Te objective, as the Department of Social Welfare explained, was "to conserve for the nation the socially desirable qualities of those persons whose normal development is in danger of being retarded or frustrated through physical or mental defects, social maladjustments or unwholesome environmental stimuli". In implementing these provisions, the department embraced casework and "scientifc social analysis" (South Africa 1940: 53), refecting the new enthusiasm for scientifc "poverty knowledge" (Davie 2015). Secondly, the 1937 Act provided for the expanded

<sup>7</sup> S.P. Le Roux (Oudtshoorn), *Hansard*, House of Assembly, 26 March 1936, col. 2056.

<sup>8</sup>Act 31 of 1937, para 1.

payment of cash grants-in-aid to poor people caring for children, and to institutions or associations caring for children.

By the late 1930s, South Africa had an extensive system of social assistance providing for sections of the white population, including the elderly, blind and disabled, children and single mothers. Gray, in his inaugural lecture in 1937, assessed that "Today the provision for [the] European population … is scarcely less complete than that of Great Britain" (Gray 1937: 270). Gray's endorsement overlooked the limited extent of social insurance. Te only contributory pension schemes were company- or sector-based, with few members. Unemployment insurance was fnally introduced in 1937, but only in selected sectors (Meth and Piper 1984). Poverty among white working-age adults continued to be addressed primarily through public works and farm-support programmes. But the most important diference between South Africa and Great Britain was that the South African welfare state excluded almost entirely the African majority of the population.

Te more liberal ministers, MPs and state ofcials had begun to promote a more inclusive approach. From 1936, pensions were paid to blind African as well as blind white and coloured people. Growing anxiety about juvenile delinquency among African adolescents in town prompted the approval of grants to a slow trickle of African mothers and children (Du Toit 2018: 11–13). Te 1937 Committee that drafted the Children's Protection Bill made no distinction on racial grounds, arguing that "the principles underlying the treatment of children "in need of care" or of delinquents are of equal validity whether the children to whom they apply are of one race or another". Whilst there were "special social circumstances which afect the application of these provisions in the case of non-Europeans", it would be a mistake to adopt diferent standards for the welfare of non-European children. Te Committee explicitly recommended the expansion of public provision of institutional care for black children (South Africa 1937: 52–3). When it came to implementation, however, African children continued to be excluded from public programmes (Du Toit 2018).

Te exclusion of (or discrimination against) African people was justifed using a variety of arguments. Te general exclusion of the African majority was based on the perception, among almost all white policymakers, that African people were diferent and inferior, in part because they were seen to be incompletely Christian (practising polygamous marriage and witchcraft) (Chanock 2001). Te African population was also viewed increasingly as a threat to the "poor white" population and hence "white civilisation". Te more charitable, missionary tradition within the NGK weakened during the 1920s and 1930s (Elphick 2012). With respect to social welfare programmes specifcally, the extension of public provision to the African population was widely assessed as impractical and unafordable (Du Toit 2018). It was also asserted that African people did not need public assistance, either because they had lower needs or because they could be supported by extended kin. Te Native Economic Commission found in 1932 that:

Te poverty of individuals which occurs among Europeans is not common among Natives. Teir communal system cares for all its people. Broadly speaking there is no starvation because each man will share his food with others. … Such poverty as exists, therefore, applies to the whole of the community among which it occurs, but urban conditions are beginning to break down the communal traditions, and instances were quoted to us of Natives who found it necessary to hide what food they have, because sharing would tend to leave them without the necessaries for their own subsistence. (South Africa 1932: para 998–9)

Tis argument became a pillar of the ideology of *apartheid* after 1948: Te African population had its own traditions and practices. Te Department of Social Welfare denied maintenance grants and "mother's pensions" to African people on the grounds that "under Native law it is the natural duty of the head of the kraal or guardian-at-law to support any minor belonging to his kraal or under his care". Moreover, "the granting of maintenance by the State will probably lead to an evasion of the responsibility resting upon the Natives under their own customs" (quoted in South Africa 1940: 64; see also Du Toit 2018). Tere was, of course, little evidence for this argument: Poverty was very widespread among African people, and (as in the white population) kin were often either unable or unwilling to assist. Tis denial of reality was the privilege of the powerful.

## **The Experience of War, 1939–1945: External Infuences, Local Conditions and "Social Security"**

Te Second World War had a major efect in South Africa, as elsewhere across the British Empire and beyond. It precipitated a change of government and political realignment. It forged a political environment in which the government was unusually open to reform. And it introduced new proposals for reform, primarily through the difusion of new ideas from abroad. Te war thus changed the agenda for and the political possibility of reform. At the same time, opposition to public provision strengthened within the opposition National Party, in part through the infuence of neo-Calvinist theology from abroad.

Te outbreak of war led to the collapse of the Fusion Government and a split in the United Party. Prime Minister Hertzog advocated neutrality but lost a parliamentary vote. Hertzog resigned, the Anglophile Smuts was appointed as Prime Minister, and Hertzog led some (but not all) of his former National Party MPs to reunite with Malan's faction of the former National Party already in opposition. Te exit of Hertzog and his supporters allowed the United Party, under Smuts, to tilt in a slightly more liberal direction. Its weak "liberal" wing was led by Hofmeyr, who served as Minister of Finance and intermittently as acting prime minister. Reform was also supported by the rump of the Labour Party. Whilst Hofmeyr was undoubtedly liberal, Smuts himself was more complex. During the war, Smuts made encouraging public speeches about the need to build a better society, including "a better life for all sections of the population", including (explicitly) the "native population".9 At the same time he expressed concerns in his private correspondence: "I don't like all this preoccupation with the post-war paradise on earth which makes us all concentrate less on the war and more on schemes which confuse and divide us", he wrote to a close friend in London in early 1943; "it is here [in South Africa] very much as with you [in Britain], where people talk

<sup>9</sup>*Hansard*, House of Assembly, 12 January 1942, col. 5–6 (Smuts).

Beveridge instead of war and Hitler".10 Nonetheless, Smuts allowed Hofmeyr the space to proceed with modest reforms, perhaps hoping to defuse the militancy shown by industrial workers—including white, coloured and African workers (Alexander 2000).

Te frst set of ideas to invigorate debate in South Africa during the war were independent of the war itself. In 1938, New Zealand's Labour Party government enacted universal old-age pensions and other benefts (McClure 1998). Te New Zealand "model" was cited frequently in South Africa in 1941–1942 (see Miles-Cadman 1941; Burrows et al. 1942; Batson 1943). Several MPs visited New Zealand and referred to it in parliamentary debates. Introducing a debate on social welfare reforms in January 1942, a Labour Party MP asked explicitly "Can our government do what New Zealand has done?"11

Most reformers did not seek simply to replicate the New Zealand reforms, however. One of the United Party's more liberal MPs, Leslie Blackwell, had been born in Australia, before his family migrated to South Africa when he was ten years old. In the late 1930s he was fascinated with the New Zealand Labour Party's "full-blooded policy of 'Socialism in our time'" (Blackwell 1938). In 1941, Smuts sent him to Australia and New Zealand, charging him (inter alia) with investigating their social security systems. Blackwell returned to South Africa with reservations about the replicability of the New Zealand model:

New Zealand is known throughout the Empire and beyond as the home of social security. It was here that the frst full-blooded social security charter was put into operation, and it is here that it is being tested out most thoroughly today, but when I returned to South Africa I told my colleagues that they must be careful not to take it for granted that results arrived at in New Zealand could necessarily be predicted for the Union. New Zealand is a rich pastoral country with a homogeneous population and a high standard of living, without the extremes of wealth which are still to be found in South Africa. It has almost no problem of native or coloured people, and, most important of all, it has operated its social security experiment in times

<sup>10</sup>Letter, Smuts to Leo Amery, 21 February 1943, reproduced in J. van der Poel (ed.), *Selections from the Smuts Papers*, Vol. 6 (Cambridge, 1973), 414.

<sup>11</sup>*Hansard*, House of Assembly, 6 Jan 1942, col. 3304 (Van der Berg).

of great agricultural prosperity and commercial expansion. (Blackwell 1946: 125)

In the parliamentary debate on social welfare in January 1942, Blackwell (1946: 156–8) argued that comprehensive reforms were not feasible until African people in South Africa earned more.

In the meantime, pressure was building outside of Parliament, through what became known as the "social security movement". In September 1942, an economist and Vice Principal of the Durban Technical College, Joseph Sullivan, organised a Social Security Congress in Durban. Sullivan himself had been born in New Zealand. A team of economists from the University of Natal, led by Professor H.R. Burrows, published a detailed set of proposals (Burrows et al. 1942). Under pressure, Smuts established a Social and Economic Planning Committee to examine economic and social reforms, as well as a Commission of Inquiry into a National Health System.

Te publication of the Beveridge Report in Britain in December 1942 further invigorated debate in South Africa. Beveridge was discussed in popular pamphlets (e.g. Sullivan 1942; Batson 1943) and in parliamentary debates (by MPs from diverse parties). In January 1943, Smuts appointed a Social Security Committee, including Burrows, to examine and cost options. Parliament dedicated considerable time to debating social security. In the June 1943 parliamentary election, Smuts and the United Party campaigned around the slogan "A better life for all", holding out a vision of a society in which "there will be no forgotten men" and the spectres of "want, poverty, and unemployment" would be "combated to the best of our ability". With the apparent blessing of the United Party, Sullivan stood successfully for election as an independent MP. In September 1943, the Social Security Committee recommended massive public expenditure on welfare (together with Keynesian macroeconomic policies). Te Committee's report used Beveridge's terminology and referred to the new international approach to social security which had the "ultimate aim" of "a comprehensive, unifed and socially-adequate security plan under the auspices of the State" (South Africa 1943: 11). Crucially, this would provide for at least some African people. Te 1943 report acknowledged that "overcrowding of the Reserves, primitive farming methods and low unskilled wages" made it "increasingly difcult" for African people to support their kin. African men and women might not need the "elaborate cash benefts indispensable for a civilised community", but "nominal payments" in cash or kind were now "essential" for the elderly and disabled. Te Committee therefore recommended that old-age pensions be extended to the African population.

Support for the extension of old-age pensions was not limited to liberal reformers. Te extent of poverty in rural areas—and the failure of migrant workers in towns to provide and care for all of their rural dependents—was of growing concern to the magistrates responsible for rural administration and the employers who sought to recruit labour in rural areas. In addition, policies of "infux control" could not prevent the growth of the urban African population, including women and children. Tis fuelled anxiety about the decline of marriage and the rise of juvenile delinquency within the African population. African political leaders through both the elected but conservative councils in some rural areas and the (at the time) slightly less conservative African National Congress—demanded social citizenship, although they were generally distracted by the more important issue of political citizenship (Sagner 2000; Seekings 2000, 2005; Posel 2005).

Reformers made faltering steps towards extending some social programmes. In 1940, the new Acting Prime Minister Jan Hofmeyr instructed that all applications for grants under the Children's Act, regardless of race, should be assessed on merit. In practice, only applications for urban African children were entertained, and benefts were paid at a much lower level than for white children, probably because of the cost implications (Du Toit 2018). Old-age pensions were introduced for African men and women in both rural and urban areas in 1944, albeit with much lower benefts than for white pensioners. By 1946, there were almost twice as many African pensioners as white pensioners, although total expenditure on white pensioners was higher (Jones 1948: 42). Residential institutions were also established for a very small number of "non-European" men and women. In 1946, the state subsidised nineteen old-age homes for a total of 753 elderly white men and women, but only two homes for 217 "non-European" men and women (Jones 1948: 425).

In these debates on programmatic reform—in public and in Parliament—three positions predominated. First, there was the proreformist position, articulated outside of Parliament by the various strands of the informal "social security movement" and inside Parliament by the more progressive members of the United Party. Reform here entailed partial deracialisation and expansion of existing programmes. Tis position was informed by "New Liberal" thought: Te laissez-faire, small-government approach of the classic liberals had given way to an appreciation of the need for the government to assume responsibility for tackling various problems that afected society as a whole, including poverty among the elderly and children. Te war legitimated these arguments in favour of a more active government. Army service may have radicalised some South Africans (Roos 2003), as it did in New Zealand (Fennell 2017). Classic liberal sceptics tended to keep quiet. A second, also pro-reform position was a more social democratic one, articulated by the very small rump of Labour Party MPs (including van der Berg and Miles-Cadman). Te third position—the National Party's—was in fux, as we shall see next. Tese positions certainly did not exhaust the full range of views within Parliament (or white South African society), but they were the positions articulated publicly. People with other views tended to keep quiet.

Te main public opposition to programmatic reforms came from the National Party. Te National Party had wavered in its support for an expanding state, especially in the early 1930s, but the modernisers (led by Verwoerd) had prevailed, ensuring that programmes were introduced (and expanded) for white people. Te party never accepted, however, that pensions and other programmes should be introduced for African people. Moreover, shifts in the character of Afrikaner nationalism and especially the rise of neo-Calvinist theology within the NGK pushed the National Party to reconsider its support for expanding the welfare state. Until the 1920s, Stellenbosch was the unchallenged base of Dutch Reformed theology, with a strong emphasis on its evangelical mission. Paternalistic charity was integral to this. Whilst the NGK sought to retain a leading role, the National Party itself had embraced an expanded role for the state in tackling the "poor white" question. In the 1930s, however, the hitherto marginal strand of neo-Calvinist theology, based in the small *Gereformeerde*

Dutch Church and its associated university (formerly seminary) in Potchefstroom, gained increasing infuence—at the same time as the Transvaal National Party grew in importance relative to the Cape National Party within the (federal) National Party.

Te neo-Calvinists were inspired by the thought of the Dutch theologian and politician Abraham Kuyper. Many South African theology students studied at Amsterdam's Free University, founded by Kuyper (with the "Free" meaning free from state control). For Kuyperians, "the fundamental error of European history was a consistent erosion, since the French Revolution, of the sovereignty of God in favour of the autonomy of the individual" (Kinghorn 1997: 143). Kuyper was as critical of liberal individualism as he was of communism. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, some South African neo-Calvinists firted with national socialism, despite its excessive interest in state power; some assumed leadership positions in the pro-Nazi *Ossewa Brandwag*, which briefy seemed to ofer a more radical alternative to Malan's National Party (Marx 2008). But it was the National Party itself that served as the vehicle through which neo-Calvinist ideas shaped public policy, including over welfare reform. Kuyperian neo-Calvinism was deeply ambivalent about the welfare *state*—as evident in the speeches of some National Party MPs in Parliament. Whilst the systematic racism of *apartheid* cannot be attributed to neo-Calvinist theology, the concept of "Christian nationalism" was imported into the ideology of the NGK and National Party from the Netherlands, where Kuyper had used the concept with reference to church-run but state-funded schools (Elphick 2012). Te NGK and National Party's evolving approach to social programmes—and what later (in the 1950s) came to be known as the "welfare state"—reveals a clear imprint of neo-Calvinism, perhaps in part because Kuyperian thought accorded with the prior scepticism towards social programmes, which had begun to be evident in the early 1930s. After its electoral victory in 1948, the National Party struggled to reconcile its deep ambivalence over the state's social programmes with the political pressure to expand them (Seekings 2020).

In private, and in the wider white South African society, conservative (as well as openly racist) views were undoubtedly much more widespread than was evident in Parliament. Tis conservatism had surfaced publicly in arguments for social work rather than social assistance in the late 1930s, as we saw above, and in the archival records examined by Du Toit (2018). It is unlikely that the war transformed what most white South Africans really thought. But it did delegitimate the public articulation of conservative and racist views outside of the National Party (and *Ossewa Brandwag*).

## **Conclusion**

In South Africa, as elsewhere, political actors had their own ideas about the roles of the state, kin, markets and non-state organisations such as churches. Tey had their own ideas about the form of social contract linking individual citizens to the state and society, as well as about who was deserving of assistance (whether public or private) and who was not. At the same time, local actors' understanding of who should get what and how were shaped—but not determined—through interactions with ideas from elsewhere. South African reformers, in each of Parliament, state and civil society, were well informed of diverse models of social policy reform, including new programmes (such as old-age pensions and diferent forms of social insurance) as well as "modern" forms of casework in social work. Policy reforms in Australia, New Zealand and Britain were especially infuential, as is evident in ofcial government reports, parliamentary debates and writings by activists in civil society.

Whilst there was no shortage of ideas on the public agenda, most of these were never implemented. Te bold visions of social policy set out in the reports of a long series of government commissions and investigative committees—from the Pienaar Commission in the late 1920s to the Gluckman Commission (on a national health service) and the Social and Economic Planning Council in the early 1940s—were not realised. Neither social health insurance nor a national health service was introduced (Marks 1997). Unemployment insurance remained limited (Meth and Piper 1984). Contributory pensions remained privately run (although often mandated by government, hence what I have called elsewhere "semi-social" insurance—Seekings [2002]). Nonetheless, by 1948 South Africa had what was clearly a nascent welfare state: Social assistance and unemployment relief (as well as the very much less important workmen's compensation) were being paid to at least 600,000 people, and probably more than 700,000 people, out of a total population of under 12 million. Te state was also widely involved in the regulation of the family and interventions to contain delinquency. Expenditure on these social policies was one of the largest items on the government's budget. Moreover, the system has been partially and unevenly extended to African people, albeit with discriminatory benefts. Tis was a liberal welfare regime, in the sense that the role of the state was residual, providing for people when and only when the market failed (although, as in the wage earners' welfare regimes of Australia and New Zealand—see Castles 1985—the state intervened strongly to raise the wages of white workers). It was less liberal in its continued veneration of the family, although eligibility conditions for pensions and other programmes recognised that families—white or African—were less extended than they were imagined to have been in the past.

Tis nascent welfare state was shaped by the "power resources" of various local actors. Most obviously, the African majority lacked electoral power and had limited power through the deployment or threat of direct action. White workers had some organisational power, although they were divided between competing unions. Tey and the less skilled "poor white" population were, however, empowered by their votes. Changes in the voting preferences of white voters brought about changes in government with real consequences for public policy. Industrial employers wielded considerable infuence, largely because the government was economically dependent: Few social policy reforms were efected without at least the acquiescence of industrial employers, especially the mining companies. Industrial employers supported the extension of old-age pensions to African people, i.e. to people who would otherwise be the dependents of their employees, but generally resisted the expansion of state-run contributory programmes. (White) farmers also enjoyed massive infuence within the National Party, which meant that reforms could be imposed on them more easily when (as in the war years) the National Party was in opposition.

Identifying the political power of diferent classes or interest groups begs the questions of how these groups understood their interests and how they legitimately pursued them in public. In South Africa, race and racism—shaped all of this. Te "social question" could not be separated from South Africa's racial version of the "national question" (nor vice versa). White employers, white farmers and white workers almost always saw themselves as white, with a specifc interest in preserving their privileges as white people in an African context. Even liberals' enthusiasm for deracialising policies was paternalistic (when it wasn't simply selfinterested). Tere was no signifcant social democratic movement because the racial hierarchy was generally viewed as more important than the relations of production, with the result that there was little solidarity between white workers and other workers. Race shaped even the way in which most reformers tackled the "social question" within the white population, drawing on ideas from other, less racialised contexts. Much of the impetus to the initial introduction of programmes to support the (white) elderly as well as (white) mothers and children as well as attempts to regulate (white) families came from anxiety about the efects of poverty on white solidarity and the racial hierarchy. Tis view was most pronounced within the National Party but extended also into the Labour Party (at least in the 1920s) as well as sections of the South African Party (and later the United Party). Social democrats opposed to capitalist hierarchy and progressive liberals opposed to a rigid racial hierarchy remained marginal to white politics and, except during the unusual circumstances of the Second World War, policymaking.

Contestation over the social question in South Africa (for a summary of the analysis, see Table 6.1) was also infused with shifting religious beliefs. Heclo noted in very Weberian terms the need to understand the moral and religious convictions of the actual people who built welfare states:

Te closer one looks at the lives of the men and women involved in every country, the clearer it becomes that those pushing for changes that academics would later label as social citizenship were people with deeply ethical commitments, usually of a religious nature. Te project they set for themselves, each in his or her own way, was to bring social practice into closer alignment with religious/ethical principles of sympathy, brotherhood, and a just humanity. (Heclo 1995: 675)


**Table 6.1**The social question in pre-*apartheid* South Africa, 1910–1948: changing ideas and policies protection policies did not change neatly with the change of government in 1948. The pre-1948 government began to back-pedal from about 1945, whilst the post-1948 National Party government was unsure what to do on key issues for several years, only hitting its stride in the 1950s

In South Africa, as in Europe (Kahl 2005; van Kersbergen and Manow 2009), the construction of the welfare state was shaped by religious beliefs. Some of the proponents of reform came from more secular backgrounds. Others understood the need for state action through religious lenses. Religious beliefs were especially important for the *opponents* of reform, frst in the 1920s and early 1930s and then again in the 1940s. Whilst the social question was framed in primarily racial terms, religious beliefs inhibited (without forestalling entirely) the statist form of policies to address the social question.

## **Glossary12**


**Bantu An offcial** *apartheid***-era and hence derogatory term for African people.**


<sup>12</sup> South Africa's racialised history had given rise to a host of distinctive terms for diferent sections of the population.

#### **References**


**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

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# **7**

# **A Racialised Social Question: Pension Reform in** *Apartheid* **South Africa**

**Marianne S. Ulriksen**

## **Introduction**

It is apparent that the *apartheid* regime promoted a racialised and exclusionary system, but we still need to understand how social security policies ft into the broader *apartheid* project. When the National Party (NP) came to power in 1948, it inherited a social security system based on means-tested social assistance programmes for the needy (the elderly and disabled) and a fragmented system of contributory pensions (see Chap. 6). However, the *apartheid* regime undertook no major social security reforms, which is puzzling. Focusing on social security policies for the elderly, as this group is the most likely to receive social security benefts from the state, it is curious that the state did not push for the creation of a state-run national contributory pension scheme because the *apartheid* government was otherwise willing to pass reforms and content with a strong state. In addition, why did the regime continue to include blacks

M. S. Ulriksen (\*)

University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark e-mail: mu@sam.sdu.dk

as non-contributory pension benefciaries (albeit at lower beneft levels) when in other areas the regime had no problem implementing harsh exclusionary policies for black South Africans? While the *apartheid* regime sought to promote the interests of their white, primarily Afrikaner, constituencies, the aim of this chapter is to understand how pension policy developments were justifed within the *apartheid* ideology as well as the regime's reactions to global discourses. Te argument is that selfinterests may be a driver in policymaking, but policymakers also seek to justify their decisions in relation to dominant discourses and ideas, and, consequently, by studying the normative underpinnings of policy, we can fnd explanations to counter-intuitive scenarios such as this one.

Tus, this chapter addresses the following question: what ideas and concepts underpinned social security policies for the elderly in *apartheid* South Africa? In analysing this question, I use as my theoretical framework the "onion skin model", as discussed in the next section. My analysis focuses on the ideas and perceptions of white politicians because only the white population had any say in policymaking in this period (up to 1953, some coloured people could vote, and up to 1959, the African population had three white representatives in parliament). I do not disregard the voices of other population groups, nor do I condone such an exclusionary approach to politics and policymaking. However, since my goal is to understand the ideas that lay behind pension policies during the *apartheid* era, my primary focus should be the perceptions and justifcations of the people involved in policymaking. Other population groups and the international society can indirectly play a role in infuencing the positions of white politicians, and this is also refected in the analysis when relevant.

In focusing on the ideational basis of social security policies in *apartheid* South Africa, the chapter flls a void in the literature. Tere is a substantial body of work on *apartheid* (i.e. Giliomee 2003; Hodder-Williams and Hugo 1976; Lodge 2017; Posel 1991; Ritner 1967; van der Westhuizen 2007; Welsh 2009). Only a few studies take an ideational approach (Klotz 1999; Legassick 1974; Norval 1996), but they do not focus on social security policies. Tere is some work on social security during *apartheid* (van der Berg 1997; Devereux 2007; Patel 1992, 2015; Simkins 1984; Scully 2019), but none of these takes an ideational approach.

My analysis builds on a reading of parliamentary debates (Hansards) and historical accounts (see the appendix for methodological considerations). I predominantly conduct a qualitative reading of the material with the purpose of understanding the ideas and positions of diferent actors with respect to policy, but I have also conducted quantitative counts of keywords in the *Hansards* to gauge the dominance of and shift in overall key ideas over time (Figs. 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3). In terms of terminology, I focus on formal social security policies for the elderly—contributory pension schemes and non-contributory old-age pensions—thereby omitting the important work of community-based organisations providing care during the *apartheid* era (see instead Patel 1992). Non-contributory pensions are also labelled social pensions, oldage pensions, and social grants. Te appendix in Chap. 6 explains the names given to the population groups of South Africa. I use the terms

**Fig. 7.1** Dominant frames expressed by South African MPs, 1945–1990. (*Source*: The author, based on author's analysis (see Appendix) of the Hansards from the South African House of Assembly, 1945–1990)

**Fig. 7.2** Terms used by South African MPs to reference the African population. (*Source*: The author, based on author's analysis (see appendix) of the Hansards from the South African House of Assembly, 1945–1990)

**Fig. 7.3** Dominant frames vocalised by South African MPs, 1980–1990. (*Source*: The author, based on author's analysis (see appendix) of the Hansards from the South African House of Assembly, 1980–1990)

generally accepted during the periods of analysis even though some would now qualify as racist or as problematic in some other sense. Considering the extensive reference to concepts and terms used by contemporary actors in my analysis, I do not always use quotation marks for terms that are obviously contemporary.

#### **Changes in Ideas, 1948–1990: An Outline of the Analysis**

To explore how ideas justifed and legitimised limited pension policy reforms in *apartheid* South Africa, I apply the onion skin model (see Leisering, Chap. 1). Leisering argues that, while pension policies (more broadly "welfare institutions") make up the visible surface of social policy, we have to look underneath the surface to understand the normative infrastructure that shapes social policy reform. At the deepest level, "frames" inform policies and are non-social ideas within which social policies are embedded. Tese ideas can be related to nation-building and development as well as global frames such as human rights and communism. Te normative justifcations of social policy are aligned to dominant frames but can also contrapose global frames that key policymakers regarded as illegitimate.

Based on the dominant frames of non-social ideas are four layers of social ideas that, at diferent levels, provide the ideational underpinnings of social policy. First, at the more abstract level, the "construction of social responsibility" designates the extent to which the state takes responsibility for a social issue and to whom in society this responsibility is directed. Te recognition of central "social questions", which require political remedies, informs which social issues the state takes up. For instance, this could include the recognition that the issue of poverty requires political attention. Within the category of broader social questions, specifc problem groups are identifed, and their social problems are put on the policy agenda (the "policy paradigm"). It is within this policy paradigm that policy solutions are identifed, which in turn make


**Table 7.1** The onion skin model applied to South Africa, 1948–1960

up the visible social policies ("welfare institutions"). Each period of analysis starts with a table summarising the application of the onion skin model to South Africa, which also structures the in-depth narrative.

Following Leisering's model, I start with the ideational frames that dominated the discourse among white members of parliament (MPs) during *apartheid*. Figure 7.1 illustrates how frames have shifted over time. In 1948, when the National Party came to power, the frame "*apartheid*"—the idea of separate development for diferent racial groups dominated. Tis changed in the early 1960s when the concept of homeland/homelands—the idea of "independent nations" for diferent racial groups—came into more frequent use. As I will elaborate in the analysis below, this change does not indicate a general shift in the fundamental belief of racial separation but powerfully shows how frames changed to ensure continued legitimisation for (a lack of) policy reforms. Around 1980 there was another shift. Te attempt to promote the idea of "independent nations" for Africans outside of white-dominated areas failed, and the *apartheid* regime increasingly came under pressure from both within and abroad. Figure 7.1 illustrates a period with no clear ideational direction, which in turn had consequences for pension policy; a point that will be explored in the penultimate section.

Te shifts in dominating frames delineate the periods into which the analysis is divided, although the partition into specifc periods is artifcial as frames and ideas are fuid and continuously refned or re-examined. Table 7.1 summarises the frst period of analysis, 1948–1960, following Leisering's onion skin model, which I further elaborate on in the following sections (text in bold are the key focus areas).

#### **1948–1960: "Separate Development" and the Problem of "Civilised Labour"**

[T]he election of the National Party in 1948 marked not so much a turning point in South African history as the intensifcation of a process which had been going on for three hundred years. (Wilson and Ramphele 1989: 204)

As the world moved towards a recognition of global human rights and decolonisation, South Africa marched in the opposite direction with deeply entrenched social and racial separation and the development of an increasingly draconian state. Te National Party that came into power stood in opposition to the previous governing party, the United Party (UP), which J.C. Smuts led. Although in the 1940s there was some extension of social benefts to Africans (Chap. 6), the UP government also harboured fears of social mixing across race, and "Smuts never wavered in his belief that Africans were inferior people" (Tompson 2006: 177). Tus, while power changed hands in the parliament in 1948, the main political parties (the NP and UP, the ofcial opposition) generally agreed on the need for social separation based on race, and there was continuous support for discriminatory social security policies in the national parliament. However, some critical voices were represented in the Parliament, by groups like the Labour Party, the Communist Party, and the "natives'" white representatives (the latter representation was removed in 1959) (Norval 1996). Although most MPs then shared ideas of separate development, the NP distinguished itself from the previous government's central concept of "segregation" by promoting the idea of "*apartheid*" (Fig. 7.1).

#### **Frame: "***Apartheid***"—The Idea of Separate Development**

Te National Party started to use the term "*apartheid*" after the party lost elections in 1943, but it was in the 1948 election campaigns that the concept started to gain greater expression (Evans 2017; Giliomee 2003). Scholars dismiss the idea that there was a blueprint or an *apartheid* grand plan. Instead, the concept of *apartheid* developed in contrast to the opposing UP's concept of "segregation" and global frames such as communism and human rights. Te *apartheid* frame was also constructed to respond to the perceived challenges of controlling the African population and maintaining white dominance (Posel 1991; Norval 1996). In order to discuss the *apartheid* frame in more detail and how it is diferent from segregation, it is useful to frst present an excerpt from NP leader D.F. Malan's campaign speech in Paarl, South Africa, 29 March 1948:

Tere are two sections of thought in South Africa in regard to the policy afecting the non-European community. On the one hand, there is the policy of equality, which advocates equal rights within the same political structure for all civilized and educated persons, irrespective of race or colour, and the gradual granting of the franchise to non-Europeans as they become qualifed to make use of democratic rights. On the other hand, there is the policy of separation (*apartheid*) which has grown from the experience of the established European population of the country, and which is based on the Christian principles of justice and reasonableness. Its aim is the maintenance and protection of the European population of the country as a pure White race, the maintenance and protection of the indigenous racial groups as separate communities, with prospects of developing into self-supporting communities within their own areas, and the stimulation of national pride, self-respect, and mutual respect among the various races of the country. (Malan 1948: 2–3)

#### **7 A Racialised Social Question: Pension Reform in** *Apartheid***…**

Malan's reference to the "policy of equality" relates to the segregation policies of Smuts' government. Similarly to the NP, Smuts and his government were concerned with how to control the African population in ways that would limit their infux into the cities while maintaining white South Africans' access to cheap black labour, and the policy of segregation was also aimed at maintaining white political domination. However, Smuts underestimated many Afrikaners' fear of "the 'swamping' of white civilisation" (Terreblanche 2002: 314) and the extent to which many perceived that the policy of segregation had failed to stem the increasing urbanisation of the African population (Evans 2017; Norval 1996).

*Apartheid* was also framed in opposition to communism, which was perceived as a primary threat to Afrikaner nationalism because the communist doctrine completely disregarded racial diferences. As explained below, Afrikaner nationalism—the idea of an Afrikaner *volk*—was an important element in the NP's rise to power, and, consequently, the communist demand for equal rights and a breakdown of racial barriers "was a thrust at the very heart of [the Afrikaners'] ethnic existence" (Norval 1996: 136). During the *apartheid* era, anyone advocating for equal rights across racial groups was regarded as a communist, although many of these advocates were, in fact, anti-communist (Norval 1996).

*Apartheid* was based on ideologies of nationalism and religious particularism within which pro-*apartheid* intellectuals emphasised that the differentiation between races was divinely ordained and each race had its own character and calling. Surprisingly perhaps, they argued that any policy of exploitation and oppression by whites was in confict with the Christian basis of Afrikaner national life; instead, the NP vowed to facilitate opportunities for each racial group to develop according to its *volk*'s character (Welsh 2009; Norval 1996). As Malan put it that March day in 1948:

In their areas, the non-European racial groups will have full opportunities for development in every sphere and will be able to develop their own institutions and social services whereby the forces of the progressive non-Europeans can be harnessed for their own national development. (Malan 1948: 3)

Hence, whereas segregation entailed "the concept of *one* community embracing diferent but interdependent elements", *apartheid* dictated "the concept of *several* alien and fundamentally incompatible national groups" (Ritner 1967: 27, my emphasis). In theory then, diferent "nonwhite racial groups" were not "inferior" to the "white race" but rather "irreconcilably diferent" (Ritner 1967: 27). However, in practice, NP politicians continued to perceive whites as superior to blacks. Moreover, because they did not believe that actual implementation of geographical separation was possible, they saw it as their ordained duty to provide "trusteeship and guidance" to the black population (Ritner 1967).

Te idea of separate development in individual "nation-states" (i.e. homelands) only gained traction from the late 1950s to the early 1960s (see below and Fig. 7.1). In the frst decade of NP rule, the focus was on the maintenance of the white population as a "pure white race" and complete eradication of any interracial mixing, although with a primary focus on the uplifting of the white Afrikaner community.

#### **Racially Graded Social Responsibility**

As in the pre-*apartheid* era, in the 1950s, white politicians on both sides of the House also argued that their social responsibility should primarily be for the white population because how "long can the Europeans carry the non-Europeans on their backs?" (USA 1954: Mr Loubser: 3501). Yet there was a marked diference between segregationist and *apartheid* discourses. Te former made a distinction between "Europeans" (Englishand Afrikaans-speaking whites) and "natives" (the African population) and treated each as a homogeneous group. Te *apartheid* discourse, in contrast, promoted the idea of *volkseie*, which denotes the attributes that are particular to an ethnic/national group, i.e. *volk*, with a particular interest in the characteristics and identity of the Afrikaner *volk* (Norval 1996).

To elaborate, an underlying factor in the National Party's victory in the 1948 elections was the resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism, which united Afrikaners in a cross-class *volksbeweging* (people's movement). Te governing alliance of Smuts and Hertzog from the 1920s to the 1940s had largely downplayed past conficts between Afrikaans- and Englishspeaking white South Africans, but many Afrikaners felt that this alliance was perpetuating the dominance of the English-speaking community. Te 1930s and 1940s saw rapid social change and (continued) substantial economic inequality between Afrikaners and the English. In addition, Afrikaners perceived the United Party's retention of symbolic connections to Britain and the rapid urbanisation of Africans as the real threats to their identity (Welsh 2009; van der Westhuizen 2007). Te National Party took advantage of this situation. As Terreblanche (2002: 298) explains:

By overemphasising the alleged injustices done to Afrikaners by British imperialism and foreign capitalism and exaggerating the dangers of *swart oorstroming* ('black swamping'), Afrikaner ideologues succeeded in creating a 'syndrome of victimisation'—i.e., the idea that the existence and interests of the Afrikaner *volk* were endangered by other population groups.

Tus, although the logic of *volkseie* would later be transposed to other "groups" in society, the concern of the Afrikaner nationalist movement was initially focused on the construction and purifcation of the Afrikaner community, and, as a result, the social responsibility of the *apartheid* state was primarily constructed to beneft the Afrikaans population (Van der Westhuizen 2007; Norval 1996).

Consequently, the focus on *volkseie* enabled the NP to emphasise its social responsibility towards the Afrikaner volk over that of the (British) English-speaking white South Africans. However, NP politicians vacillated between using the term "race" to refer to *volk* (to diferentiate between groups within the white population) and to "colour" (to diferentiate between "white" and "black"). In distancing themselves from "non-white" groups, Afrikaner nationals emphasised white unity and the whites as the "civilised" population in contrast to the "uncivilised" black population.

Hence, the construction of social responsibility was categorised across racial lines. Te white "race"—and within this group, particularly the Afrikaner *volk*— was the *apartheid* state's primary concern. Te state paternalistically regarded the black population as an "uncivilised" group that needed to be "carried by the Europeans" and, therefore, required some minimum of support, for instance, social pensions.

#### **The Racialised Social Question Legitimised by the Civilisation Argument**

Te concept of "civilisation" has been important in white-dominated regimes since the eighteenth century: white "civilisation" was contrasted with African "savagery", thereby justifying the white population's dominance and privilege over other population groups. Te rhetoric of "civilisation" remained an important means by which the NP mobilised support throughout the *apartheid* era (Van der Westhuizen 2007).

Te 1930s and 1940s saw an increasing infux of low-skilled Afrikaners into the cities in search of work. Having grown up in rural areas, they were ill-prepared for city life and faced strong competition from the African population in the labour market. In addition, at this time, the low-income segments of all South African groups in the cities were increasingly intermingling, something which alarmed Afrikaans nationalists, as, in their view, they had to protect racial "purity" at all costs (Van der Westhuizen 2007).

Tus, the ruling NP government's social question was, in the frst instance, how to ensure the separation of low-income Afrikaners from the African population. Tis concern was connected to other questions prevalent in South Africa: the "native" question, particularly trying to stem the infux of Africans into the cities, and the "poor white" question, which was dominant in the 1930s (see Seekings, Chap. 6). Nevertheless, the dominant issue in the frst decade of *apartheid* was separating the Afrikaans working class from the African working class, which was made possible by labelling the former as "civilised" (i.e. white) and the latter as "uncivilised" (i.e. black) labour (Norval 1996).

Following this, I argue that the social question was racialised. Te main social question for the NP government was the "civilised workers question", that is, a call for political remedies to ensure that low-income and low-skilled Afrikaners' economic position would be improved to prevent their intermingling with other racial groups. Te regulation of "black" labour as a social threat to a lesser extent called for social policy remedies but rather those of control and oppression.

#### **Policy Paradigm: Afrikaner Upliftment as the Social Problem**

Given that the social question concerned the situation of "civilised" (i.e. white) low-skilled workers, the NP focused on policy solutions that could eliminate the competition between black and white workers. Moreover, the Afrikaners were perceived as the primary problem group, given their disadvantaged position vis-à-vis the white English-speaking population, so the government pursued preferential treatment to ensure Afrikaner upliftment. From an ideational perspective, Afrikaner upliftment was important to ensure the unity of the Afrikaner *volk* by avoiding letting "working-class Afrikaner … consciousness as Afrikaners … be eclipsed by class-consciousness" (Welsh 2009: 13). However, it is also important to note that the NP was relying on low-income Afrikaners for their electoral victory in 1948 and in the many elections that followed (Van der Westhuizen 2007).

In order to improve the socio-economic status of Afrikaners, the *apartheid* state implemented job reservations and training programmes for low-skilled Afrikaners and, in various formal and informal ways, devised the exclusion of Africans from decent employment, such as by entrenching black subordination in employment, non-recognition of black unions, and "closed shop" agreements that gave vetoes to white unions (Van der Westhuizen 2007; Welsh 2009). Tis created lucrative employment opportunities for Afrikaners, particularly in the public sector and parastatals, which "contributed considerably to the rapid … embourgeoisement of Afrikaners" (Terreblanche 2002: 303). Afrikaners' share of the national personal income went from 27.9 per cent in 1946 to 32.4 per cent in 1960. In addition, the inequality gap between English- and Afrikaans-speaking whites closed: in 1946, the Afrikaners' per capita income was about 40 per cent of English-speakers' per capita income, whereas in the late 1970s it was 80 per cent (Van der Westhuizen 2007).

#### **Racially Graded Pension Schemes**

Te NP had clear priorities concerning pension policies: "Our frst consideration and our frst interest is the lot of the White worker and the European old people in South Africa. Tat is our frst interest and our frst responsibility" (USA 1955, Dr de Wet: 1499–1500). During this period, the opposition raised proposals to introduce a national contributory pension scheme, but the government was content with regulating private pension funds and promoting separate contributory pension schemes in the public and parastatal sectors to which Afrikaners were given preferential access.

Opposition parties repeatedly proposed motions to introduce a national contributory pension scheme. One argument for such a scheme was that under the current system of means-tested social pensions and some private pension schemes, many had no social security in old age. In fact, "it is the people in the middle-income group who fnd things difcult today" (USA 1954, Mr Tighy: 342–343). Another argument was that a national contributory scheme could replace the existing expensive social pensions, thereby actually enabling the country to save money (USA 1953, Mr Eaton: 728; USA 1955, Mr Lewis: 1465–1472). Finally, there was also the aspiration to "[be in] line with other Commonwealth and European countries" (USA 1951, Mr Eaton: 6702).

While the opposition parties called for a national contributory scheme, there was disagreement about whether such a scheme should include all South Africans. Te Labour Party argued that the government could not eliminate non-Europeans from the defnition of "worker", and, therefore, "non-Europeans … are as much entitled to … a pension on a contributory basis as any European" (USA 1954, Mr Eaton: 350–351). However, the UP-dominated opposition's main view was based on the civilisation argument that demands for a national contributory scheme "fows from the advance in our civilised standards of living" (USA 1959, Mr Durrant: 540).

Te NP government was unsurprisingly in line with the civilisation argument and also emphasised that the circumstances between the "native" worker and a qualifed artisan "difer too greatly" (USA 1960, Mr van der Heever: 1865). However, the NP government did not accept the idea of *one* national scheme because not only did the circumstances across racial groups difer, but one also could not "establish a pension scheme for mineworkers on the same basis as one for public servants", and so "the whole solution to the pension problem is to be found in…various schemes" (USA 1960, Mr van der Heever: 1865).

Tus, the NP government persistently argued against the idea of introducing a national contributory pension scheme, suggesting that such a scheme would be costly and that the white population would contribute disproportionally to other population groups, given that the new scheme would require, at least initially, state support:

If there were a change to a national pension scheme to-day it would have to be taken through to the bitter end and I ask the supporters of this motion whether they have considered the implications of their proposal for a young country such as South Africa with its small White population and its overwhelming Native population. Speakers have said that if we introduce such a pension scheme the Natives and Coloureds will be included in it. Have you ever considered what it would cost a certain section of the people, people who contribute to taxation to-day, and from whose pocket the extra taxation would have to come? (USA 1955, Mr du Plessis: 1519–1520)

Instead, the government sought to promote the extension of private pension funds with the 1956 Pension Funds Act that served as the legislative foundation to regulate pension schemes to which employers and employees would both contribute. As explained by the Minister of Finance, the government saw a range of advantages to this new arrangement, such as it did not encourage dependency and minimised the need for social pensions in the future:

Te point I want to make is that these private pension funds serve the great social object of getting people to look after themselves, of being selfsupporting and independent … For that reason there should be every encouragement from the side of the Government, and … [T]here is positive support in the form of the taxation relief given to the employer as well as to the employee contributing to a fund of this nature … if these schemes are established and extended, we can expect in future to have less provision made in the Pensions and Social Welfare Votes. (USA 1959, Minister of Finance: 573–575)

Furthermore, the government praised itself for instituting a nondiscriminatory policy: "Te attitude we on this side adopt when we plead for the encouragement of the various private schemes is that we do not exclude the non-Whites. We say it is a matter for the employer and the employee themselves" (USA 1960, Mr de Villiers: 1881). However, as the opposition pointed out, although some schemes were available for the "natives", "to a very large extent the Natives are not in a position to make voluntary contributions and they are consequently not able to draw benefts" (USA 1960, Dr de Beer: 1878).

Te NP government not only encouraged private pension funds but was also instrumental in expanding contributory pension schemes to public-service and parastatal employees in administration, the police force, prisons, the defence force, and the railways, among other sectors in which Afrikaners beneftted from preferential employment. Trough employment, white staf were granted membership in these contributory pension funds, whereas black staf were, at best, entitled to a gratuity at the time of retirement (USA 1956, Minister of Transport: 1117–1118). Interestingly, while over the years the immense costs of the social pensions were a repeated concern (see below), there was much less mention of the costs of keeping the public sector pension funds sound, although budget allocations were made for such purposes most years (USA 1955, Mr Hepple: 3391; RSA 1967, Mr van der Walt: 4890). Tus, the budget for public-service pensioners was heavily in favour of the white employees.

Together with the white workers, the condition of the "European old people" was the government's frst priority (USA 1955, Dr de Wet: 1499–1500). Tis also implies that the situation of elderly blacks was only of secondary concern, and after 1948 when the NP government came to power, the government sought to restrict the numbers of Africans receiving social pensions by encouraging a stricter application of the eligibility criteria, and although many more Africans received a pension over other population groups and this number increased in the 1950s and 1960s, the number of African benefciaries decreased relative to white, coloured and Indian benefciaries (see Table 7.2). Similarly, while the nominal value of social pensions increased for all population groups, Africans continued to be seriously disadvantaged—in 1944, the pension


**Table 7.2** Old-age pension benefciaries in South Africa, 1949–1968

*Source*: The author, data from House of Assembly debates (Hansards), 1949–1968

value for whites was 12 times higher than for Africans, while in 1965 white pensioners received a grant that was 11 times higher (Devereux 2007).

Only very few parliamentarians voiced concerns about the lower rates paid to other population groups, and then it was often because they were elected as their representatives. How small the pensions were for Africans and how unfairly they were administered is well illustrated by this quote from Mr Lee-Warden, representative of the "natives":

Te average pension which is paid to an African today is £13. Now, it is not £13 a week; it is not £13 a month; it is £13 a year! If you break that down it comes to 5s. [shilling] a week. To relate that to the cost of living one realizes how little it is.… It means that one person could buy six loaves of bread, costing 10d. [penny] each, in any one week. (USA 1960, Mr Lee-Warden: 3371–3373)

However, in general, racial discrimination in benefts was unquestioned, seemingly because the diferentiated levels of civilisation were an undisputed paradigm and parliamentarians were primarily concerned with pensions for the white population. In fact, "policy debates were…predominantly conducted as if South Africa consisted of 4 million whites in a modern economy with few structural problems" (Beukes and Fourie 1992: 98). One aspect of the social pensions that did receive some criticism was the means test because it was perceived to "penalize the thrifty and set a premium on recklessness and thriftlessness" (USA 1955, Mr Gay: 1483). Critics argued that the means test was unfair to the elderly who had saved and owned assets. Nevertheless, the government would not remove the means test given the high expected costs.

Overall, the social pension programme proved resilient. In the parliamentary debates in the 1950s, there was a strong sense that social pension was an expenditure that could not be cut:

I agree with my friends over there that the cost structure is high. It was also high under their regime. Te greatest expansion in the public service came under that Government and not under this Government. [But…do] they want us to abolish those services. Do they want us to abolish Social Welfare and all those things? No, of course not! (USA 1952, Minister of Economic Afairs: 68)

Although social pensions were not reformed in any way and only incrementally adjusted, the amount spent on pensions quadrupled from 1948 to 1960, given gradual increases in beneft levels and the number of benefciaries (USA 1960, Mr van der Heever: 1859). Te NP government's view on pensions was double-sided. On the one hand, it was sympathetic towards the needs of the elderly and believed that "we should try to see whether we cannot do more for our aged" (USA 1959: 568–569). Tis was not exclusive to the white population because—as explained earlier—the NP government accepted its (temporary) duty to care for other population groups under its "trusteeship". In addition, the government actively used social pensions for Africans to counter South Africa's negative image internationally (Patel 2015). On the other hand, the government had misgivings with the fact that only a small section of the (white) population "carried the rest on their back": "there are few countries in the world were such a small section of the taxable population does so much for those sections of the population who do not pay taxes" (USA 1956, Mr Haak: 2837).

To sum up, the *apartheid* government did not pursue any major policy reforms on pensions. Te main new legislation was the Pension Funds Act of 1956, which was put in place to control and regulate pension funds. Calls for a national pension scheme were discarded: the government was content that private- and public-sector schemes would cover their constituency of Afrikaner workers because of their preferential access to employment. Social pensions, inherited from the previous regime, were supplementary. Race diferentials were not questioned because the idea of diferent levels of living standards was generally accepted. Incremental adjustments in beneft values and accessibility caused a continuous increase in social pension expenses, a concern for which would continue in the succeeding periods.

#### **Shifting the Dominant Frame: From** *Apartheid* **to "Independent Nations"**

When Hendrik Verwoerd—often named the architect of *apartheid* became prime minister in 1958, the term *apartheid* was already in common use and a central frame. However, with Verwoerd's regime came another important change in the usages of concepts that would defne the next two decades. Until then, the government had labelled the indigenous African populations "natives", implying that they were a homogenous group of people. However, now the government began to categorise Africans as distinct "Bantu ethnic groups", thereby laying the foundation for the development of separate independent "homelands", where each "ethnic" group had limited autonomy (Norval 1996). Tis dramatic shift in key concepts is illustrated in Fig. 7.2, which documents that around 1958 parliamentarians gradually replaced the term "native" with "Bantu". Figure 7.1 also makes it evident that a shift in frames took place by noting when the terms "homeland"/"homelands" replaced—although a few years later—the term "*apartheid*". However, these shifts in frames do not indicate a fundamental change in the underlying ideas of the *apartheid* project but rather a change in the justifcations used to legitimise the regime.

Current events also prompted the shifts in discourse. Te frst months of 1960 was a difcult period for the *apartheid* government because of the Sharpeville shootings, international condemnation, the failed assassination attempt on Verwoerd, and the massive outfow of capital (Welsh 2009). In the South African media "the word *apartheid* itself was blamed as the source of the trouble" because it had negative connotations abroad (Van der Westhuizen 2007: 41). Te government, instead, steered the discourse away from "separate development" and towards "multinationalism" and "ethnic self-determination". Te government claimed that Africans would be given the right to self-government in their homelands (Posel 1991). As a result, "independent nations" (i.e. homelands) became the key "non-social" frame of the subsequent period.

### **1961–1979: "Independent Nations" and the Government's Attempt to Abandon Social Responsibility for Non-white Groups**

Te 1960s and 1970s were in many ways a turbulent period in South Africa and included several dramatic events, such as the assassination of Verwoerd in 1966 and the Soweto uprising in 1976. However, very little changed with pension policies. Te *apartheid* government focused on establishing homelands with the desired aim of freeing the government from the responsibility of taking care of non-white population groups and ultimately maintaining white domination. In practice, the homelands scheme required extensive funding to facilitate, and although government spending increased, it was insufcient. Given the afuence of the white population, there was little need to pursue any major pension reforms. Te 1956 legislation continued to regulate contributory pensions, although the number of funds grew, and the main change in social pensions was the introduction of the "principle of discrimination", which underscores the embedded nature of the civilisation argument. Table 7.3 summarises the application of the onion skin model for this period and is further elaborated in the following.

#### **Frame: Homelands ("Independent Nations")**

Welsh (2009) argues that the homeland solution was Verwoerd's second phase of *apartheid*. Whereas the frst phase was pre-eminently about ensuring white control and Afrikaner upliftment, "the new phase purported to advance African ethnic 'nations' to self-determination in their 'homelands'" (Welsh 67–68). Te term "ethnic self-determination"


**Table 7.3** The onion skin model applied to South Africa, 1961–1979

mimicked the language used further north in Africa by African nationalists fghting to achieve independence, and, in this way, the government tried to gain legitimacy with its critics by distancing itself from colonialism and, instead, co-opting the ideas of rights to political independence (Posel 1991; Klotz 1999).

Te 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act established the statutory basis for homelands, and the 1971 Bantu Homelands Constitution Act completed the legislative framework (Welsh 2009; Tompson 2006). Practically, the government established "Bantu territories", and any black person in white areas and cities that was deemed "superfuous to 'white' South Africa's needs" was forcibly removed to an area the government identifed as ftting the black person's ethnic identity (Van der Westhuizen 2007: 126). Te state forcibly removed and internally relocated 3.5 million people between 1960 and 1982 (Marais 2011). In efect, the population of the homelands grew from 4.2 million in 1960 to 11 million in 1980. "About half of the black rural families had been rendered landless [by 1980] in what was basically rural slums without services, facilities or employment" because there was not enough land and economic investments were also sparse (Van der Westhuizen 2007: 101). Te actual establishment of independent states took time, was costly, and, in many places, was incomplete. Transkei spearheaded the process and became "self-governing" in 1963 and "independent" in 1976. Bophuthatswana became independent in 1977, Venda in 1979, and Ciskei in 1981. As the "nations" became independent, their citizens lost their South African citizenship (Tompson 2006).

#### **Outsourcing Social Responsibility to "Independent Nation-States"**

Te goal of the homeland scheme was to enable African groups to take responsibility for their own advancement, and the homelands became semi-autonomous political structures with responsibility for certain policy felds, most notably social welfare, but not other areas, such as defence and economic planning (Legassick 1974). However, so-called selfdetermination allowed white South Africa to shy away from its responsibility for and contribution to the development of other communities because "what nation-state can be held responsible for the educational expenditure or the unemployment, old-age, and other welfare benefts needed in another sovereign land?" (Wilson and Ramphele 1989: 205).

In reality, white authorities did not provide the necessary economic support to make the new scheme work, and Afrikaners continued to lead the homeland bureaucratic systems. Te homelands, therefore, remained totally economically dependent on the white regime for employment opportunities and funding. Furthermore, although the South African state continued to fnance social welfare policies, there was less pressure to pass any pension reforms that could beneft the African population because "the extension of the services [should] be a function of the ability of the Bantu to pay" (Legassick 1974: 19; Picard 2005).

#### **Racialised Social Question**

Te social issue of Afrikaner upliftment in the 1950s was no longer pressing. South Africa experienced tremendous economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, and the Afrikaners particularly—beneftting from preferential employment—experienced increased afuence. By 1970 the Afrikaners had become a predominantly urban people, and their per capita incomes rose in comparison to those of English-speaking whites: from 49:100 in 1946 to 70:100 in 1970. Te total white population's per capita income grew by nearly 50 per cent during the 1960s. Te decade was one of unprecedented afuence that led to the suggestion that white South Africans rivalled Californians "as the most wealthy community in the world" (Lodge 2017: 176; Welsh 2009). Africans also beneftted from industrial advancement; for instance, they gained from the increase in manufacturing employment opportunities. However, their income only rose by 23 per cent in the 1960s, and, thus, inequality between blacks and whites became even more accentuated (Lodge 2017).

In this context, the social question of the "civilised worker" lost some of its relevance because, within the new discourse on "independent nations", the strategy was to make the previously labelled "backward" and "uncivilised" rural areas attractive to Africans. Nevertheless, racial discrimination continued largely undisputed in the white-dominated South African Parliament, and the idea of diferent standards of living was still used when politically convenient.

#### **Policy Paradigm: The "Superfuous Appendages"**

Policy solutions were not clearly related to a social question in this period. Instead, the defning policy paradigms were predominately about maintaining white dominance, and central to this plan was the removal of as many Africans from white areas as possible. Consequently, the main perceived problem group that the government needed to address was that of the "superfuous appendages" (see below), although pension policies played a smaller role in solving social problems. As a government circular stated in 1961:

It is accepted Government policy that the Bantu are only temporarily resident in the European areas…for as long as they ofer their labour there. As soon as they become, for some reason or another, no longer ft or superfuous in the labour market, they are expected to return to their country of origin or the territory of the national unit where they ft in ethnically if they were not born and bred in the homeland. (quoted in Posel 1991: 234–235)

Te government determined that "no stone is to be left unturned to achieve settlement in the homelands of non-productive Bantu" (Legassick 1974: 27), and, therefore, the policy grew more aggressive during the 1960s and the categories of "superfuous" people multiplied. Africans regarded as inessential to the "European" labour market included the aged, widows, the "unft", and women with dependent children, as well as doctors, attorneys, traders, and others. Te Deputy Minister of Justice, Mines and Planning G.F Froneman referred to these groups as the "superfuous appendages"—add-ons or extra "limbs" of the African labour force who were unnecessary in white areas. Helen Suzman was quite alone in the Parliament when she gave the voiceless majority's perspective:

In other societies, the aged, the sick, the widows and the very young are treated with special care. In our society, they are singled out for especially harsh treatment…they are the 'superfuous appendages'. What does the honourable minister think the endorsing out of African families does to them? He is very proud of the number of people he has kept out of the urban areas, but never stops to think what…they live on and what their family lives are like. (Suzman 1970: 114–115)

#### **Pension Policies**

Te *apartheid* government was intent on making the homelands more attractive than the cities to the Africans, which led to a redesign of the system that categorised the values of social pension benefts to diferent racial groups. In 1965, the government established a "principle of discrimination", according to which the government paid pension benefts in the ratio of 4:2:1 to whites, coloureds and Indians, and Africans, respectively. Tis principle was based on a civilisation argument in which "both the Indian and the Coloured live at very much lower levels than the White man and their income is also on a smaller scale" (Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions, as quoted in Devereux 2007: 544–545). Te civilisation argument was, however, somehow reversed for Africans. In the 1950s, the government diferentiated between rural and "detribalised" Africans who lived in the cities and, therefore, had lost their "tribal" identity and connections, which in turn led to diferentiated pension rates for Africans living in cities, towns, and rural areas, with higher rates for the former and the lowest for the latter.

However, by 1965, the government abolished this diferentiation and set a uniform payment, which, in efect, slightly increased the pensions paid to Africans living in the rural areas while decreasing it for Africans living in the cities. Tus, in this case, the argument for diferent levels of civilisation no longer applied, because the government was intent on making the previously described "uncivilised" homelands attractive to ("superfuous") Africans and removing incentives to move to the cities (Wilson and Ramphele 1989; Devereux 2007; Posel 1991). Subsequently, pension levels started to even out somewhat to be in line with the "principle of discrimination". Tus, while the annual amount paid to white persons increased by 124 per cent from 1965 to 1975, the amount for the coloured and Indians increased by 154 per cent, and that for Africans by 238 per cent. Yet, at a ratio of 7:3:1, there was still some way to go to reach the 4:2:1 target (Devereux 2007). Moreover, while 3.2 per cent of the white population received a social old-age pension, this was only true of 1 per cent of blacks (RSA 1980, Mr Goodall: 2747).

Contemporaneously, the opposition again pleaded for a national contributory pension scheme and linked this proposal to the simultaneous removal of the much-criticised means test for social pensions, the idea being that with a national contributory scheme, social pensions would in time become (almost) redundant (RSA 1967; i.e. Mr Oldfeld and Mr Fisher: 4873–4882). Te government, however, did not want to remove the means test, although it was relaxed in various ways in the mid-1960s (RSA 1965, Minister of Social Welfare: 276–78). Te government also seemed content to continue with the fragmented system of contributory pension funds whereby separate schemes could cater to "separate needs". In order to expand the pension schemes, the government would rather "try to compel … employers to … introduce private schemes … and … to conduct research on the basis of [the 1956 legislation to control and register all pension funds] to ascertain whether it will not be possible to make better provision for our workers in that way" (RSA 1967, Mr van der Walt: 4891).

Notwithstanding the government's resistance to pursuing any kind of pension reform, the number of pension funds increased from 6570 in 1972 to more than 12,000 by the end of the 1970s (RSA 1980, Mr Goodall: 274–2749). Given that it was estimated that 38.8 per cent of the economically active population in South Africa belonged to a pension scheme in 1976 (RSA 1980), we can assume that this meant that the white population was already well covered by the existing fragmented system, which again helps to explain the government's reluctance to expand contributory pensions to a national scheme for which the state would ultimately be responsible.

To sum up, there were no fundamental changes to pension policies in the 1960s and 1970s. Te idea of diferent levels of civilisation was further entrenched and specifed by the "principle of discrimination", and, although social pensions were improved slightly for Africans in rural areas, deprivation was widespread. Finally, the government saw no need to pursue any contributory pension reforms.

#### **Shifting the Dominant Frame: From Independent Nations to an Ideational Void**

Te Soweto uprising in 1976 was "a seminal event in the decline of *apartheid*" and a turning point in many ways because it "occurred at a time when international isolation and pressure for economic sanctions were increasing" (Welsh 2009: 101). Te "grand idea" of the homeland schemes became increasingly hard to maintain, as few believed the government was sincere about easing its domination (Van der Westhuizen 2007; Tompson 2006). Tis is also refected in Fig. 7.1, which illustrates when the terms "homeland"/"homelands" started to lose traction. Te Soweto events provoked some reforms in which "salary parity for teachers of all races with equal qualifcations" was a key component (Welsh 2009: 108). Te idea of parity was also raised with respect to social pensions around 1976. Te opposition argued that discrimination based on race should be discontinued (RSA 1976, Mr Oldfeld). During the same debate, the deputy minister of Social Welfare and Pensions stated that the "the Government has already declared itself prepared to … eliminate the gap with regard to the payments made to the various population groups" (RSA 1976: 7746). However, the "fact of the matter is that it cannot be done at the moment" (RSA 1976: 7746). Tis is an important shift away from ideas of separate development and diferent levels of civilisation even if these changes were not immediately feasible according to the government. Nevertheless, within the government itself, there did not seem to be complete agreement on the idea of parity in wages and social benefts. For instance, the Minister of Information and the Interior Dr C.P. Mulder apparently—also in 1976—declared that "Blacks at the lower levels of work have to show greater productivity if the wage gap with the Whites was to be bridged" (RSA 1976, Mr Webber: 6110–6111). *Parity* became important in the 1980s debates, although the white parliamentarians also remained concerned about the possible cost implications of equal access to and value of pensions.

## **1980–1990: "A Country of Minorities" and Equalisation to an Extent**

South Africa experienced a signifcant recession beginning in the late 1970s and extending into the 1980s, and many whites experienced a decline in income. Moreover, administration of the complex network of *apartheid* laws was extremely costly (Tompson 2006; Welsh 2009). International pressures, including increased anti-*apartheid* activism and the enforcement of international sanctions that signalled to the domestic opposition that there was international support for racial equality, further exacerbated the *apartheid* state's troubles (Klotz 1999). Table 7.4 summarises the application of the onion skin model for the period 1980-1990 and is further elaborated in the following.

#### **Frame: Power-Sharing and Unclear Directions**

Te NP government recognised that given the crisis of the *apartheid* state, some racial concessions were unavoidable (Van der Westhuizen 2007). However, P.W. Botha, prime minister of the *apartheid* government, fatly denied anti-*apartheid* actors' suggestion of a unitary political system based on the principle of one-man-one-vote (Botha 1985). Botha


**Table 7.4** The onion skin model applied to South Africa, 1980–1990

remained committed to the idea of separate development, and "[f]undamental to his thinking was that South Africa was 'a country of minorities', each of which was to be accorded recognition. 'Groups' had to be the building blocks of any new system" (Welsh 2009: 209).

Although some political concessions were needed, the NP government could not contemplate giving Africans efective infuence because the party feared the possible consequences of African majority rule on the white population (Tompson 2006). Instead, the NP drew inspiration from the US political scientist Arend Lijphard's idea of "consociationalism", which was essentially "power-sharing arrangements in heterogenous societies where minorities felt threatened by majority rule" (Van der Westhuizen 2007: 116). Tat the concept of power-sharing was dominant in the minds of white politicians in the early 1980s is also evident from Fig. 7.3. In addition, Fig. 7.3 highlights that, unlike previous periods in which we could identify a single ideational frame, there was no clear ideational direction in the 1980s, particularly after Botha's push for power-sharing based on his *apartheid*-related concept of "a country of minorities" faltered. For instance, although the idea of "parity" was discussed (see below), it was not a dominant frame. Instead, what became the overriding issue in parliamentary debates was either a concern for regime survival or a movement for regime overthrow. Figure 7.3 illustrates the popularity of the concept "ANC", which is not an ideational frame but rather a context-based issue demonstrating an ideational void as conficts increased and the future direction of the country became uncertain.

Te government devised the Tricameral Constitution of 1983 as a solution to the problem of power-sharing, although it failed to gain credibility. Under this arrangement, whites shared power with Indian and coloured groups through the establishment of a new parliament consisting of three "uniracial" chambers (House of Assembly for whites, House of Representatives for coloureds, and House of Delegates for Indians). Africans were excluded from this arrangement. Each chamber became responsible for its "own afairs", such as social welfare, education, health, and local government, whereas a multiracial cabinet, representing all three chambers, became responsible for "general afairs", including taxation, defence, state security, law and order, commerce and industry, and African afairs (Tompson 2006).

#### **Social Responsibility: Each to Their Own or White Obligation?**

We can view the tricameral constitution as a mechanism for the white government's further divesting of responsibility for coloureds and Indians, who were now also accountable for "their own" social issues, as was also the case—at least in principle—in the ten homelands. However, members of the Conservative Party (right-wing opponents of the NP government, who were voted into parliament in 1983) felt that in reality (and unfairly in their view), the white population was still bearing the burden for other population groups:

If we look at the Constitution, which was passed last year, it is clear that social welfare is the frst matter to be classifed as an own afair but—and this is the snag—subject to any general law with regard to norms and standards for the provision of fnancing for welfare services. Terefore, it is actually a general afair from beginning to end … one must keep the contribution of the taxpayers, who are represented here in the House of Assembly, in mind. For the fnancial year 1982–83, it amounts to R3 152 million, and 2,206,000 people who are economically active paid it by way of personal income tax. Te taxpayers of the House of Representatives paid R77 million, and 987,000 economically active people paid it. Te amount for the House of Delegates was R74 million, and 235,030 people contributed to the State cofers. (RSA 1985, Dr Snyman: 2098)

Tus, some white politicians continued to feel that each group should take responsibility for only their members. Yet, within the NP, there was a growing recognition that somehow the *apartheid* system should transform and that the homelands' funding should by supported by white taxpayers (Hodder-Williams and Hugo 1976), that is, the state should take *responsibility for all its citizens* (including those living in the homelands). However, given the economic recession, international sanctions, a shrinking tax capacity, a sluggish economy, an excessive bureaucracy, and increased spending on defence, security, and black education, there was limited fnancial capacity to meet all needs (Terreblanche 2002; Tompson 2006).

#### **Eclipsed Social Question: Equality How?**

Although the government committed to move towards parity in wages and social benefts in the late 1970s (van der Berg 1997), exactly how parity was perceived to relate to equalisation is somewhat confusing. Te Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions had a rather convoluted suggestion that brings to mind the civilisation argument of earlier periods but without the race element somehow. Using the fgures from a research report on the living standards of various groups, the minister argued:

Does a Black person who spends R8 on housing have to receive the same pension as the White person who spends R55 on housing?… I think we should completely remove the element of colour from pensions. We should adjust pensions to people's basic needs in respect of food, clothing, housing, and miscellaneous things, for if we did that, it would no longer be

#### **7 A Racialised Social Question: Pension Reform in** *Apartheid***…**

necessary to speak of Black, Coloured, Indian, or White pensions. Surely there is not a single hon member of the ofcial Opposition who can rise and say that if a person's housing costs him R8, we should give him R55. On the other hand, surely there is no one who can say that if a person's actual expenditure on housing is R55, we should give him R8. (RSA 1980, Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions: 7317–7318)

Te minister emphasised that equalisation for contributory pensions did not imply that "the man who contributed least should get out the same as the man who contributed most" (RSA 1980, Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions: 2777). Put more bluntly, although the minister had earlier argued to remove the "element of colour" from contributory pensions, he elaborated that "the idea of egalitarianism must not be promoted in such a way that the White man's contribution must carry the black man" (RSA 1980, Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions: 2778). Terefore, it seems that the NP government's understanding of equalisation in the early 1980s translates to "you get what you contribute" and that actual redistribution through social pensions should remain limited. Te minister's arguments highlight a search for justifcations for inequality in a time of great insecurity, and given the intense political climate, the regime's struggle for survival largely eclipsed social issues.

#### **Policy Paradigms and Pension Policies: Cost Containment**

Te overarching policy paradigm of the time, given the government's fnancial constraints, was one of cost containment, which is also evident in the debates on pension policies. Opposition parties to the left of the government (i.e. the Progressive Federal Party and the South African Party) had not stopped their criticism of the means test for social pensions, which "to many people…is only slightly less complicated than Einstein's theory of relativity" (RSA 1980, Mr Widman: 2767). However, like the NP, they were concerned with the potential rising costs of social pensions in the years to come:

In 1968, there were 98,134 old-age pensioners receiving an amount of R35,587,000 per annum. Eleven years later, in 1979, there were 137,760 old-age pensioners to whom an amount of R142,553,000 was paid out every year … Working on the present basis, we shall fnd that in 20 years there will be 216,952 pensioners receiving R352,485,000 per annum. I am referring to Whites alone. What would the position be if other races were included and annual increases were taken into account in this regard? I do not want to think about it; the amount would be astronomical. (RSA 1980, Mr Rossouw: 2738–2739)

Te potential cost implications were also "astronomical" because "we in South Africa are committed to the equalisation of pensions for all races in South Africa" (RSA 1980, Mr Goodall: 2747). As a result, the opposition argued that there is an urgent need to establish a national contributory pension scheme "without delay" and presented a motion to that efect (RSA 1980, Mr Rossouw: 2736–2737). Te minister responded that a national scheme would "involve everyone", but "one certainly could not permit the Whites to carry the Blacks, the Coloureds, and the Indians in regard to such a scheme. Tey would have to look after themselves" (RSA 1980, Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions: 2773–2774). However, the minister promised to look into the matter, which in efect meant that the government once again shelved the idea of a national contributory scheme (a select committee was only appointed in 1984) (RSA 1985, Deputy Minister of Health and Welfare: 2125).

Despite earlier confusion on the terms of equalisation, the government remained committed to parity in social pensions, and the gaps between the races continued to narrow, although much too slowly according to the opposition on the left (RSA 1988). In 1985, white pensioners still received twice as much as African pensioners. Even so, "White pensioners, receiving R180 per month and living alone, could only just (and not always) keep their heads above water. Black pensioners, averaging R79 per month, were below the poverty datum line" (Wilson and Ramphele 1989: 64).

It was particularly Afrikaner farmers and lower-class people who were hit hardest among the white population by the economic recessions, and they found support from the newly formed Conservative Party that argued their case in the Parliament: "it is the White who has become drastically impoverished during the past year as a result of redistribution of income" (RSA 1985, Mr Snyman: 2095). Te Conservative Party members were intent on defending whites' social pensions and felt provoked by debates to equalise benefts in the other chambers:

We are sick and tired of a Minister like the hon Minister Hendrickse saying he will freeze White pensions. Let me tell this hon Minister to keep his hands of White pensioners. Let him concern himself with his own afairs and levy taxes in his own House—not in this one! … We are tired of being milked by every group in this country and then being accused of discrimination. (RSA 1985, Mr Barnard: 872)

In the months leading up to this debate in early 1985, a new cycle of resistance, protest, and violence had fared up (Welsh 2009). It has been suggested that the government increased social pensions to the African population in the 1980s, not only as part of a move towards parity but also to "win-hearts-and-minds" (Devereux 2007; Welsh 2009). Although it is hard to fnd evidence of a government's covert motivations, it is striking that the government announced early in 1985 that old-age pensioners of all races would receive an R14 increase in their payments as of the frst of October as well as a one-time bonus of R36 in May 1985 (RSA 1985, Minister of Cooperation, Development, and Education: 2372–2373). Terefore, even in the context of cost containment and widespread concerns over an uncontrollable social pensions budget, the government made additional payments, presumably to appease the population at a time of increased confict.

In 1986, the mounting resistance led Botha to abolish the pass laws, which had been used to restrict the movement of the black population. Although the government had passed other reforms and made various concessions, urban infux control was "the central plank of *apartheid*" (Welsh 2009: 215). Te ANC was no longer easily ignored, and the fundamental opposition to the NP government—and the *apartheid* regime was increasingly extra-parliamentary (Welsh 2009). Any noteworthy debates on pension policies were limited after the mid-1980s; the majority of parliamentarians (except those on the right) now accepted the move to parity, and the main debate centred on the pace with which it could be achieved within the given budget constraints (RSA 1988). Full parity in pensions was reached in 1993, the year before the country held the frst free democratic elections. Spending on social old-age pensions increased from 0.59 per cent of the GDP in 1970 to 1.82 per cent by 1993 (van der Berg 1997). Consequently, social pensions were resilient and a constant feature of the *apartheid* era. Contributory pensions for their part did expand, but in fragmented ways, and the state's functions remained merely regulatory, ensuring that the pension funds catered to those with the ability to contribute and, hence, beneft.

## **Conclusion**

Ideational frames changed remarkably in nature during the *apartheid* era, but these shifts do not refect policy changes but rather the need to modify ideational justifcations for the existing policy. Table 7.5 summarises the ideational layers, frst, during the period in which the concept of separate development dominated (1948–1979) and, second, during the period of the 1980s when ideational justifcations could no longer be maintained. Both the 1950s "separate development" frame and the 1960s–1970s "independent nations" frame sit frmly within the *apartheid* ideology in which the state's social responsibility primarily targeted whites. Te main social question was how to separate the "civilised" whites from the "uncivilised" blacks and refects the policy paradigm focusing on white upliftment with only charitable concern for blacks. Based on these underlying ideas, a continuation of the fragmented and racially graded pension system suited the *apartheid* government. In the 1980s, the *apartheid* government scrambled to fnd ways to maintain white power and limit the fnancial costs to the white population. Prime Minister Botha's insistence on maintaining group rights ("each group to take care of themselves") conficted with the emerging global norm of racial equality, which was based on an individual-rights paradigm. Eventually, the former ideological stance had to give way, but it was not replaced by a clear ideational vision. In the end, fnally, the complex



*apartheid* system and, with it, the whites-only Parliament and racialised old-age security scheme withered away.

What is striking about the South African case during *apartheid* is how the idea of social responsibility, justifed with reference to civilisation arguments, was constructed to serve a discriminatory, racialised system. Advocating the idea of separate development and independent nations allowed the white political elite to focus on the welfare of their "own people" while blinding themselves to the obvious responsibility the government had for other racial groups. Te white regime could then construct social support for other population groups, for instance old-age pensions, as charity to people for whom the government was not directly responsible. However, the government could not maintain the regime's ideational foundation because it had constructed social responsibility based on the diferent civilisation levels of various ethnic groups—an idea already dying out in the mid-twentieth century and belatedly in South Africa. Today, when countries make distinctions between citizens deserving of social policy and others, i.e. migrants, who are not deserving of state contributions, the construction of a state's social responsibility and its consequent impacts on policy are highly relevant areas of research, and the *apartheid* state is a reminder of how far policy can be pushed with reference to ideational and normative justifcations.

## **Appendix**

#### **Data Collection and Sources**

Te primary data are the Hansards: Debates in the South African Parliament from the years 1948 to 1990. I selected this data source, frst, because I seek to gauge the ideas, views, and justifcations of the *apartheid* government's ministers and politicians as well as those of the opposition white politicians, as they, particularly the former, were the primary policymakers in South Africa during this period. Second, using contemporary debates permits my own assessment of what was said—there and then—instead of necessitating reliance on stakeholders' subsequent recollections and (perhaps misleading/self-proclaimed) interpretations. Tird, the volume of the debates is immense and rich. While the immenseness of material creates its own challenges, which I have sought to handle in various ways as explained in the following, the Hansards are an undisturbed picture of the spoken thoughts and opinions of white politicians during the *apartheid* era.

Te Parliamentary Library in Cape Town kindly made the Hansards available to me as PDF fles. Each PDF fle (volume) typically covers about three months of debates of a given year and has an average length of about 1400 pages; each volume is saved under its year and a letter (a, b, c, or d) to clarify which period of that year the document covers (for example, 1950b is the second volume of 1950). While almost every single year is represented in my data by at least one—often more—volume(s), there are also gaps, either because certain volumes have not (yet) been made available to me, or because some volumes have been poorly scanned and I cannot search them. While some critical knowledge might be missing, I feel confdent that I have a sufcient representation of data to meaningfully interpret the ideational foundations of pension debates in South Africa. In all, my active database of the Hansards consists of 141 volumes and almost 200,000 pages.

#### **Quantitative Analysis: Frequencies and Word Selection**

As the frst step in my analysis, I sought to substantiate the dominant "frames" that white politicians used, i.e. what did the white political elite perceive as key concepts and challenges in South Africa (for the theoretical background of frames and non-frames, see Chap. 1). I used computational linguistic techniques to show the frequencies of key terms as they appeared in each Hansard and the temporal changes in the use of key terms across the whole collection of Hansards over time (as illustrated in Figs. 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3). I opted to use all the Hansards available, even though the number of volumes per year is not even. However, as my purpose is to illustrate trends in word use and changes over time and each volume is roughly the same length, I do not see a problem with this method of counting.

I selected words based on reading historical sources and academic works. I expected some terms to matter at certain times and less so at other times (as the fgures also illustrate), i.e. ideas/ideologies such as "segregation", "*apartheid*", and "homelands", labels such as "native" and "Bantu", and concepts/justifcations such as "self-determination" and "parity". Nevertheless, some words could not be used—although relevant—because they could have numerous meanings and therefore would provide a misleading picture. For instance, the idea of "independence" (for "Bantu" nations), the label "blacks" (representing the African or nonwhite population), and the justifcation of "rights" are all examples of words that can be used in many other contexts beyond the one relevant to this study, and, therefore, I have not included them.

#### **Qualitative Analysis: Constructive Reading**

To get an in-depth understanding of the pension debates, I picked volumes in which (based on previous word counts) the terms "pension" and "contributory pension" were particularly prevalent. I conducted a careful reading of these selected volumes (11 in all, representing the years 1951, 1955, 1956, 1959, 1960, 1965, 1967, 1970, 1976, 1980, and 1985). Since I seek to understand the broader debates surrounding the specifc discussions on pension policies, I do not believe that a computationbased selection of "snippets" of text would allow me to understand some of the underlying tones and emotions involved. Consequently, I read longer sections of parliamentarians' speeches and discussions related to pension bills or other topics in which pensions somehow became an issue. Based on this careful reading, I have collected more than 80 pages of direct debates, which I then, in a subsequent reading, boiled down to a 13-page data overview in which I highlighted opinions for and against social pensions and a national contributory pension scheme, respectively, and the race-related justifcations for these opinions. Te narrative in this chapter is drawn from this fnal data overview and other information gathered from the Hansards, as well as additional information and historical data available in other literature (listed in the references).

#### **References**


**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

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# **8**

# **(Re)formulating the Social Question in Post-***apartheid* **South Africa: Zola Skweyiya, Dignity, Development and the Welfare State**

**Jeremy Seekings**

## **Introduction**

In 1994, for the frst time, "African", "coloured" and "Indian" South Africans voted alongside their "white" counterparts in the country's frst non-racial election. (For an explanation of terms used in South Africa, see glossary in Chap. 6). Te African National Congress (ANC), led by Nelson Mandela, secured a substantial majority, and Mandela became President. For almost three years he presided over a Government of National Unity, in which the ANC participated alongside the party of *apartheid*, the National Party,1 although real power lay with the ANC. From early 1997, the ANC governed alone. Te ANC's core support base comprised the African majority of the population that had been most oppressed under *apartheid* and remained largely disadvantaged as of 1994.

<sup>1</sup>As well as the Zulu nationalist Inkatha Freedom Party.

J. Seekings (\*)

University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa

Unsurprisingly, the social question was redefned. For the frst time in South African history, all South Africans were full citizens, with the full social and economic rights of citizenship as much as political rights. Given the enduring racialised pattern of disadvantage, the social question was inevitably going to be redefned to focus unambiguously on the experiences of black, and especially African, South Africans. Prior to 1994, the South African state had often been concerned with poverty or wages or employment among white South Africans (and, in the 1980s, coloured and Indian South Africans), but only occasionally with how these issues were experienced by the African majority. In the 1980s, the *apartheid* state had redefned the social question in response to the threat to it posed by protesting black workers, students and other township residents and sought to win them over or at least to secure their acquiescence through modest policy reforms. But this political opportunism was halfbaked as well as belated. Democratisation in 1994 marked a far more radical rupture with the past.

Democratisation opened up multiple possibilities of change. Whilst African people had all experienced discrimination and oppression under *apartheid*, diferent classes within the African population put forward their distinct claims to redress and thus sought to reframe the social question in their own, often sectional interests. African workers, organised into powerful trade unions, demanded higher wages and improved conditions of employment. Te African middle classes, from whom much of the political elite came, demanded improved opportunities in professional and managerial occupations. Te rapidly forming African elite, including much of the political leadership, demanded opportunities to seize a share of the country's wealth through "Black Economic Empowerment" (both legal and corrupt). Te urban and rural poor wanted jobs and improved public services. Te ANC was pulled and pushed by all of these demands.

Te result was contestation over precisely how the social question was to be reframed. For African industrial workers—organised into powerful trade unions, with close ties to the ANC and a strong intellectual wing the social question entailed primarily a racialised version of the struggle over inequalities generated through capitalist relations. Te unions denounced the *apartheid* (or racial) "wage gap", between highly paid, skilled, managerial and professional occupations (disproportionately flled by white South Africans) and unskilled and semi-skilled occupations (mostly flled by African South Africans). Tey demanded and quickly secured basic social democratic reforms: strengthened processes for collective bargaining over wages and conditions of employment (and for setting minimum wages in unorganised sectors); corporatist policymaking institutions; and worker-oriented skills development. Tese reforms entailed further expansion of South Africa's system of "semisocial" insurance for workers in formal employment. Workers in formal employment in most economic sectors were required to contribute to pension funds and, to a lesser extent, private health insurance. Most of these funds were, in practice, run by the trade unions. Te government's unemployment insurance fund was extended, at least nominally. Unionised workers—more and more of whom were more middle- than working-class—became, in important respects, economic "insiders", concentrated in high-productivity sectors or the protected public sector.

For the African middle classes and elite, the social question revolved around the substitution of race-based afrmative action in place of *apartheid*-era racial discrimination, to open up rapidly opportunities for upward economic and social mobility. Te fast-growing African middle classes and elites (at least outside of public sector employment) looked primarily to the private sector for their retirement pensions and health insurance (as well as for healthcare and the education of their children). High earners were not allowed to claim from the Unemployment Insurance Fund.

For the largest part of the population, however, the social question revolved around poverty and efective exclusion from the economy. Almost no one in the poorest half of the population enjoyed formal employment or trade union membership or access to the educational credentials required for highly paid occupations or the connections required for wealth accumulation. Without land, formal employment, educational credentials or connections, the poor were "outsiders" from the largely capitalist economy (Seekings and Nattrass 2005, 2015). Trade unions generally neglected workers outside of formal employment and the unemployed (Bramble and Barchiesi 2003; Buhlungu 2010). Indeed, the success of organised labour in addressing the "worker's question" arguably framed the poverty question by pushing the economy down a skill- and capital-intensive economic growth path. Te poorest half of the population enjoyed some power as voters and through the use (or threat) of direct action. Tese forms of power were limited, however, by the design of the electoral and political systems, especially in comparison with the power of other, non-poor classes (Seekings and Nattrass 2015). Te poor thus remained heavily dependent on how poverty and the poor themselves were perceived by the country's more powerful political players, including especially the ANC leadership.

Given the success of the black elite, middle class and organised working class in accessing improved opportunities and standards of living, the fundamental post-*apartheid* social question revolved around poverty and crucially around elite perceptions of poverty and the poor. Under ANC governments, for the frst time, poverty moved to the forefront of the rhetoric of the governing party and new state. Te questions of workers' rights and racial redress were at least as important in terms of commanding the attention of the government, but the unresolved poverty question framed successive government documents and ANC election manifestos.2 In the late 1990s ANC ministers and ANC-appointed ofcials reframed poverty as a largely developmental problem, representing the poor as the victims of *apartheid* in the sense that *apartheid* had denied them opportunities—just as it had denied fair opportunities to black workers or the aspirant middle classes and elite. In the 2000s, the social question was reframed, emphasising more the legitimacy of a claim (or right) to dignity on the part of the poor. Tis was refected in the acknowledgement of the importance of social assistance programmes as a necessary and efective mechanism for mitigating poverty. Te reframing of the social question was shaped by the rights talk associated with the post*apartheid* constitution (and subsequent jurisprudence) and promoted strongly by civil society, as well as by the imperatives of electoral competition. Within government, the person who was most responsible for the embrace—and subsequent expansion—of social assistance was Zola Skweyiya, the minister responsible for Welfare (or "Social Development",

<sup>2</sup> Several other "questions", including the "land question" and questions of enduring discrimination against women and other groups, were far less of a priority.

as it was renamed) from 1999 to 2009. Tis chapter examines, frst, the ANC's developmental ambitions between 1994 and 1999, then turns to Skweyiya's successful eforts to legitimate social assistance during the 2000s and, fnally but briefy, considers the period of partial reaction after 2009.

Tis chapter does not consider in detail the policies adopted in response to the reframing of the social question because these have been documented extensively elsewhere. In summary, the state's policies to create jobs were misguided and unsuccessful. Rather than emphasise the creation of jobs in labour-intensive sectors for unskilled workers, government policy focused on raising productivity and wages, resulting in more capital- and skill-intensive production in the formal economy. Te inadequate numbers of new "jobs" entailed mostly low-earning selfemployment in the informal economy. Government policy was especially unfortunate in view of the failure to improve the quality of public education and hence continued shortages of skilled labour. Successive ANC governments also failed to expand agricultural livelihoods. Te primary cause of a slow reduction in poverty rates in the 2000s was therefore not employment but rather the social assistance system, inherited from *apartheid* but expanded through (primarily) a new Child Support Grant. Te basic shape of the social welfare system remained unchanged, however, with a limited social insurance system and large holes in the social safety net. Te combination of rising unemployment and an inadequate social assistance safety net was that poverty persisted (Seekings and Nattrass 2015; Nattrass and Seekings 2019).

#### **"Poverty Knowledge" and the Developmental Imperative (1994–1999)**

Te ANC formed a government in 1994 alert to the scale of the challenge of poverty. Te previous year, the ANC had backed an initiative by the World Bank and the University of Cape Town (UCT) to map poverty through South Africa's frst countrywide income and expenditure survey (Wilson 1996). Te *apartheid* state had never collected good data on countrywide poverty. Te 1993 survey was led by UCT Professor Francis Wilson, who in the 1980s had led a research programme on poverty that brought together local and thematic studies (see Wilson and Ramphele 1989). Te 1993 survey provided the "scientifc" data—or "poverty knowledge"—that had been lacking hitherto (see Davie 2015). Using a poverty line set at about R840 (i.e. about US\$250, at the time) per month for an urban family comprising two adults and three children, and at a slightly lower level in rural areas, almost one half of the population of South Africa lived in poverty. In some parts of the country—notably the Eastern Cape and Northern Transvaal—about two-thirds of the population lived in poverty (Whiteford *et al*. 1995). Te poverty line widely used within South Africa was about 60 per cent more generous than the standard international poverty measure of (at the time) US\$1 per person day (adjusted for local purchasing power). Even using the austere \$1/day measure, however, as many as one in four South Africans lived in poverty, which was a much higher proportion than in other countries with similar levels of development or GDP per capita.

At the same time, few ANC leaders had much recent experience in the poorest, rural parts of the country. Many had spent as long as three decades in exile or jail. Most of the ANC's "internal" leadership was drawn from urban areas. In the social welfare policy feld, ANC activists were drawn primarily from the urban Western Cape, where they were especially familiar with the failings of *apartheid*-era social work and in some cases had been involved in community-based struggles over housing, rents and service delivery. Few ANC policymakers had close and recent experience of rural poverty.

Te ANC frst spelt out its understanding of and response to poverty in its 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP, which served as an extended election manifesto). Poverty was described as "the single greatest burden on South Africa's people". Te ANC promised "a better life for all". "Attacking poverty and deprivation" would be "the frst priority of the democratic government". Te poor would be empowered "to sustain themselves through productive activity". Te government's primary responsibility would be to "create opportunities for all South Africans". Tis would be supplemented with a safety net based on social security (ANC 1994). In his inaugural State of the Nation address, Mandela committed his government to ensuring that South Africans enjoyed freedom from want, hunger and deprivation, as well as political freedoms. Tese, he said, were "fundamental to the guarantee of human dignity". Tey would be achieved through reconstruction and development. In his address, Mandela sketched a minimal safety net: primary school feeding schemes and workfare. His government would "confront the scourge of unemployment", he added, "not by way of handouts but by the creation of employment opportunities".3

Te ANC inherited a signifcant safety net, despite the fact that the National Party—in government through the entire *apartheid* period had been deeply ambivalent about the welfare state (Seekings 2020). In 1994, just over two million elderly or disabled people received meanstested, non-contributory old-age pensions or disability grants. About half a million other social grants were paid out. Te total cost of these social assistance programmes came to more than 2 per cent of GDP. Racial discrimination in benefts had been abolished prior to the 1994 elections, although racial discrimination persisted in terms of access to some of the programmes. Social and semi-social insurance programmes provided little in the way of a safety net for the poor. Despite the importance of social assistance in mitigating poverty, the new ANC government was not enthusiastic. In his inaugural presidential address, Mandela himself denounced "handouts".4

After winning the election, the ANC formed a coalition government with the National Party. Te Ministry of Welfare was one of the few ministries given to the National Party, which refected its perceived insignifcance. An ANC Member of Parliament (Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi) was appointed as deputy-minister, and an ANC-aligned academic and activist (Dr Leila Patel) was appointed as a special advisor to guide the process of drafting a new "white paper" (i.e. government policy proposals) on social welfare. In January 1996 Patel was appointed as director-general (i.e. senior bureaucrat) in the Department of Social Welfare. In mid-1996, the ANC's Fraser-Moleketi took over as minister.

<sup>3</sup>Mandela, State of the Nation Address, 24 May 1994; available on https://www.gov.za/ state-nation-address.

<sup>4</sup>Mandela, State of the Nation Address, 24 May 1994; available on https://www.gov.za/ state-nation-address.

Trough the 1990s the ANC-led government framed the challenge of poverty using three primary discourses: a conservative discourse focused on but not limited to costs; a technocratic discourse emphasising the authority of statistical measurement; and—especially—a developmental discourse (or, more accurately, ideology). Each of these three played its part in reframing the social question. Te discourse of paternalistic conservatism later articulated by Skweyiya (see later) was very muted during this period.

Te Department of Welfare emphasised the unafordability of the social assistance system inherited from *apartheid*. In the face of "spiralling" costs, the government concluded that it could "no longer aford the social security function". Te Department would "re-evaluate" social security to render it more cost-efective. Expenditures would be reduced by "eliminating" fraud, which were said to cost as much as 10 per cent of the social assistance budget. Applying the means test more strictly would also save "millions of rands" (South Africa 1995: 7; 1996: 20). A pressing dilemma was what to do about the State Maintenance Grant (for poor single mothers), which in practice excluded African people. Faced with a prospective bill amounting to about 2 per cent of GDP—that is, doubling expenditure on social assistance—if the exiting programme was extended to the whole population, the government's frst instinct (in 1995) was to propose doing away with the programme (Lund 2008: 18–19).

Tese sentiments might have been promoted by the continued role of the National Party within the Department of Welfare during 1994–1997, but they also ftted with powerful sentiments within the ANC. ANC leaders and ANC-aligned ofcials seem to have associated social grants with *apartheid*-era social work, which focused on the supposed failings of individuals and the ensuing need for individual casework. Te ANC wanted a more modern approach.

Te ANC's modernism was both refected in and pushed forward by its investment in statistical data. Te South African state had for many decades demonstrated a "mania for measurement" (Posel 2000), albeit selectively (e.g. never measuring poverty among the entire population) (see also Davie 2015). Te post-1994 state took this passion for measurement to new heights. Te parastatal Statistics South Africa was transformed: besides collecting standard economic and demographic data, it initiated annual household surveys and a fve-yearly income and expenditure survey. Te government also commissioned a major study of poverty and inequality. Te ensuing data demonstrated, again and again, the extent of poverty. Poverty on this scale could not be due to the failings of any individuals but must rather have structural roots. For the ANC it was obvious that *apartheid* was *the* cause of South Africa's pervasive poverty because *apartheid* had denied black South Africans the opportunities to prosper. Vice-President Tabo Mbeki articulated this in his description in 1998 of South Africa as comprising "two nations": one, white and prosperous, the other, black and poor (see Nattrass and Seekings 2000).

What was needed was the abolition of racially discriminatory constraints on black South Africans and a massive programme of "reconstruction and development" (the RDP)—echoing the language used to frame state-driven programmes in Europe, following the Second World War. Te ANC's priority was to promote development, not to expand "welfare" through either social grants or social work. Te Department of Welfare said that it accepted the need for social grants but, "to ensure that those receiving welfare do not become permanently dependent on state aid, social grants for certain target groups will be closely linked to job creation and other anti-poverty programmes. Successful development programmes will empower people to earn a living, move of the social security system and achieve economic independence" (South Africa 1996: 19–20). As Mandela himself explained in speeches, the poor would achieve dignity through self-help, that is, through taking advantage of the opportunities that would open up now that *apartheid* had been abolished. In his 1996 State of the Nation Address, Mandela appealed to the poor not to "sit back, expecting charity" (whilst also urging the rich to stop viewing the poor as "hordes of irritants").5 Te ANC bought into the developmentalist ideology that had been hegemonic in Africa in earlier decades (Mkandawire 1999), along with the anxieties about "dependency" that often accompanied it (see, e.g. Seekings 2017a).

<sup>5</sup>Mandela, State of the Nation Address, 9 February1996; available on https://www.gov.za/ state-nation-address.

Te new developmentalism was central to the White Paper for Social Welfare, drafted through a consultative process in 1995–1996 under Patel's leadership and then published in August 1997. Te White Paper committed the government to the goal of "developmental social welfare" and "re-orienting [its] services towards developmental approaches". Tis meant helping people to meet their own needs, through "the development of human capacity and self-reliance", rather than relying on the state: "South Africans will be aforded the opportunity to play an active role in promoting their own well-being and in contributing to the growth and development of our nation". Te developmental emphasis was perhaps aimed primarily at professional social work (which was "largely rehabilitative" rather than "preventative and developmental"), and the White Paper did commit itself to the principle of "appropriate social assistance for those unable to support themselves and their dependents". But the emphasis was clearly placed on enhancing the capacity of "vulnerable individuals and families … to earn a living through employment creation, skills development, access to credit and, where possible, through facilitating the transition from informal to formal employment". Tis encouraged a critique of the "welfare state" for promoting "dependency" through unearned "hand-outs". Te White Paper itself proposed the establishment of a government unit "to identify groups of benefciaries who could be absorbed into public works and other employment programmes" and seemed to envisage that the old-age pension programme would be scaled back as contributory pension programmes expanded (South Africa 1997; see further Patel 2005; Gray 2006). As the Minister of Welfare, Fraser-Moleketi, told parliament, "welfare has become associated with charity and hand-outs, with food parcels and pensions, something in which it was alleged bleeding hearts got involved". She called for a shift in thinking about "welfare", "from paternalism to self-reliance" and investment in development.6

Tis new approach was shaped by ideas from outside of South Africa. One important infuence was the work of the South African–born but later US-based scholar James Midgley, whose book *Social Development:* 

<sup>6</sup>Debate on Appropriation Bill, Vote no.37—Welfare, Wed 27 May 1998, Hansard, col 3193-5, 3201.

#### **8 (Re)formulating the Social Question in Post-***apartheid***…**

*Te developmental perspective on social welfare* was published in 1995. Midgley's book advocated "social development" as a new approach to social welfare distinguished by "its attempt to harmonize social policies with measures designed to promote economic development. … It stresses the need for a wider commitment to economic develop-ment and emphasises the importance of social interventions that are compatible with economic development objectives" (Midgley 1995: 1–2). Midgley's description of "distorted development" across much of the "Tird World", informed no doubt by his adolescence in South Africa, resonated with South African policymakers after 1994. Patel (2014, 2015) acknowledges the deep infuence of Midgley's work, as well as of the UN World Summit for Social Development held in Copenhagen in 1995 (see also Gray 2006). Whilst Midgley and Patel were not hostile to social grants, nor (at that time) were they enthusiasts.

Tis thinking shaped the reform of the State Maintenance Grant, which was to have far-reaching and not entirely intended consequences. Te grant provided generous support to poor, single mothers, but almost entirely excluded South Africa's black African population. When it was pointed out that abolishing the programme would cause massive hardship, the government appointed a committee to be chaired by another social work academic and activist, Francie Lund. Te Department of Welfare described the Lund Committee's brief as to "look at ways of linking social grants with developmental programmes, so that single parent families can move towards becoming self-supporting". It would also look at ways of making absent parents contribute to the costs of raising their children (South Africa 1996: 22). In its report, completed in late 1996, the Lund Committee recommended that the State Maintenance Grant be replaced with a new Child Support Grant that would be rolled out to the entire population from 1999. Accepting tight fscal constraints, the Committee had to recommend that benefts be parsimonious and older children be excluded (Lund 2008).

Te government's thinking was clearly set out by Fraser-Moleketi in speeches to parliament. In early 1997 she declared that:

With regard to poverty, we believe that development goes beyond redistribution and safety-net measures and implies a pattern of growth facilitated by carefully designed Government interventions to reduce poverty and inequality. … We intended to ensure that there is a restructuring of the social security system … to foster the ability of the poor in our country to produce their way out of poverty through programmes which will generate and enhance livelihood as a fact and means of achieving household food security.7

Later in 1997, she told parliament that the new emphasis on developmental welfare would "empower individuals and communities so that they can break out of the poverty trap". She reafrmed the government's "commitment to poverty reduction through cash transfers which supplement the household incomes of poor families", that is, the safety net. But, "welfare expenditure" had reached "its ceiling" so that in future budgetary allocations would increase slowly:

Te challenge facing us is to use the available resources optimally and bring about savings in the total welfare function through aligning expenditure with priorities, promoting greater efciency and accountability in delivery and ensuring that programmes are well targeted at those in the greatest need and that the design of programmes is appropriate and cost-efective.8

Te modesty of the benefts under the proposed new Child Support Grant was justifed on the basis that resources should be directed to other, more developmental programmes (especially during a period of fscal crisis):

In an ideal world, I too would wish to be able to spend more on social security in the immediate term. However, in a developing country such as ours, we have to balance competing demands and decide how to use scare resources in the most efective way. Ultimately, the most efective antidote to poverty is for all our people to have a meaningful stake in the economy. While administering cash transfers, the Ministry of Welfare, in collaboration with other ministries, has embarked on a number of projects aimed at

<sup>7</sup>Fraser-Moleketsi, *Hansard*, House of Assembly, response to State of the Nation Address, 11 Feb 1997, col 41.

<sup>8</sup>Fraser-Moleketsi, *Hansard*, House of Assembly, Budget vote, 8 May 1997, col 2309-14.

giving a hand up to the many who remain excluded from the mainstream economy.9

Te Department of Welfare's fagship programme was a training programme for unemployed women with young children that would reduce their "dependence" on social grants. In early 1999, as the new Child Support Grants were being rolled out, Fraser-Moleketi told Parliament of women who had been "dependent on state maintenance grants" but who were now earning much more through projects such as brick-making and vegetable-growing: "We want to ensure that many of the benefciaries move from dependency to self-sufciency and towards building the selfesteem of women."10

Fraser-Moleketi's views were shared by other leading ANC policymakers. Te infuential chairman of the parliamentary portfolio committee overseeing social welfare, Cas Saloojee, acknowledged the importance of a social safety net but at the same time insisted that even a "comprehensive" system of social security would limit "the social security obligation of the state … to the poorest of the poor, the most vulnerable and the unemployed". (In fact, the state provided almost no support for the unemployed). Saloojee continued: only by reducing the expense of social grants could the state divert "funds that are currently committed to social security … to developmental social welfare services":

We have got to acknowledge that social security cannot solve the problem of the magnitude of poverty that we face, but that such fnancial resources can make a signifcant impact on job creation and empowerment of people to become self-reliant. Te old expression 'Give a man a fsh, and you feed him for a day; teach him to fsh, and you feed him for a lifetime', comes to mind again.11

Te ANC viewed developmental eforts, including training programmes, as the priority. Te real value of old-age pensions and disability

<sup>9</sup>*Mail and Guardian*, 9 May 1997.

<sup>10</sup>Fraser-Moleketsi, *Hansard*, House of Assembly, debate on the State of the Nation Address, 9 Feb 1999, col. 305; also budget vote, 19 March 1999, col.2851-5.

<sup>11</sup> Saloojee, *Hansard*, House of Assembly, Budget vote, 19 March 1999, col 2859-60.

grants was allowed to fall, and total expenditure on social grants fell as a proportion of GDP.

President Mandela himself mentioned social grants only twice in his six State of the Nation Addresses between 1994 and 1999. In his frst, in 1994, he mentioned that his government would address the backlog of applications for old-age pensions. In his last, in 1999, he said that pensions and disability grants would be raised, by a small amount—although this was not enough to raise their real value to the level when he had become president fve years before. Mandela never mentioned the new Child Support Grants in his State of the Nation Addresses. By contrast, he mentioned development a total of 89 times in the six addresses.12

## **Zola Skweyiya's Partial Reframing of Poverty (1999–2009)**

In mid-1999, following the election, the new president, Mbeki, appointed a new Minister of Social Welfare, Zola Skweyiya. Skweyiya was considerably older than his predecessor (he was born in 1942) and came from a rather diferent background. First, he knew from personal experience what it meant to go to bed without supper or to go to school without breakfast.13 Second, he was immersed in the African mission-educated, Christian political tradition that was liberal on many issues but paternalistically conservative on others. His schooling had concluded at the elite Lovedale College—established by missionaries more than a century earlier—where he overlapped with Tabo Mbeki. He went on to the University of Fort Hare before following Mbeki into exile. Like Mbeki, Skweyiya did not return to South Africa until 1990. Whilst in exile he studied law (completing a PhD in communist East Germany) and held a series of largely diplomatic posts for the ANC as well as setting up its Legal and Constitutional Afairs Department. Both before and after 1990 he represented the ANC at the UN Commission for Human Rights. He

<sup>12</sup>Mandela, State of the Nation Addresses, 1994-1999; available on https://www.gov.za/ state-nation-address.

<sup>13</sup>*Hansard*, House of Assembly, Social Development budget vote, 27 March 2003.

was frmly part of the ANC's "nationalist", non-Communist wing. In 1994, Mandela appointed him minister of Public Service and Administration. In 1999, his old friend Mbeki moved him to the Ministry of Social Welfare.

At the time of his appointment as minister of Social Welfare in 1999, fewer than 3 million grants were paid monthly. When he stepped down, ten years later, about 13 million grants were paid monthly—an increase of an average of 1 million grants per annum over Skweyiya's ten years as minister. Over the same period, expenditure on grant payments approximately trebled, in real terms (i.e. taking infation into account). Whilst economic growth was strong across much of this period, expenditure also grew signifcantly in relation to GDP. As subsequent studies made clear, this expansion of social assistance played a major part in the slow reduction of income poverty (van der Berg *et al*. 2006; Leibbrandt *et al*. 2010).

Tis future expansion of social assistance was not suggested in Skweyiya's frst comments after becoming minister. He initially seemed to take up where Fraser-Moleketi had left of. His Department continued to emphasise "the promotion of self-reliance to reduce dependency on … social grants" (South Africa 1999: 6) and was renamed the Department of Social Development. It adopted a "Ten Point Plan" that listed its priorities, in apparent order of importance: the frst priority was "restoring the ethics of care and human development in all welfare programmes" (which entailed "the rebuilding of families and communities"); the second was "developing and implementing an integrated poverty eradication strategy"; only third did the Plan list social security (South Africa 2000).

In early 2000, however, Skweyiya struck a diferent note in his frst major speech as Minister of Social Welfare. Skweyiya began by quoting President Mbeki on the importance of a "humane and people-centred society".14 He went on to describe some of what he had learnt over the past year whilst travelling around South Africa:

I met the grandmother in the rural village of Inanda caring for a HIVpositive daughter, the girl-child taken from school to care for her siblings,

<sup>14</sup>*Hansard*, House of Assembly, Welfare budget vote, 18 April 2000, col. 2661.

and the single mother who cannot fnd a job. I saw the pain on the face of a young child who had been abused and raped in Claremont near Durban. I heard the frustration of a father with disability who wants to learn new skills in Maokeng, Kroonstad, but has nowhere to turn to. I listened to the anguish of the devastating efect of the loss of a pension or grant in poor families.15

He concluded that "much more needs to be done" to reverse the degradation and marginalisation of the poor.16 Trough his "encounters" with the poor, Skweyiya learnt something that researchers subsequently confrmed: Social grants were very important in sustaining dignity (see, especially, Wright *et al*. 2014, 2015).

Te chairman of the parliamentary portfolio committee, Saloojee, followed Skweyiya's lead, striking a more positive tone. He referred explicitly to the need to restore "the dignity of all of our people" through poverty reduction—and then emphasised repeatedly the importance of social grants to the relief of poverty. He lamented the lack of an "integrated poverty strategy" but envisaged an expansion of social assistance, especially through the Child Support Grant. "Te initial strategy for targeting our country's poorest children is to be followed by broader coverage, to ultimately include all the country's poor", he said. "If these children go hungry and have parents with no visible means of support, we have failed these children by not providing them with support to ensure their protection and development".17 Te government would be guided by the recommendations of a Committee of Inquiry (to be chaired by Professor Viviene Taylor) appointed to examine what might be entailed in a more comprehensive system of social security.

In comparison with the fve years of the Mandela presidency, this was an extraordinary embrace of social assistance. It was dressed up in the discourse of dignity that Mandela (and his then vice-president, Mbeki) had used previously, but the discussion of social assistance gave this discourse new substance. In the late 1990s the discourse of dignity had been embedded in South Africa's new Constitution (in 1996) and in

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., col. 2663.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., col. 2663–4.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., col. 2673-7.

subsequent constitutional jurisprudence, giving the discourse heightened prominence and legitimacy. Te 1996 constitution recognised respect for a person's "inherent dignity" as one of the founding values underpinning the new constitutional order. Tis represented a "stark and dramatic" break with the *apartheid* past (as then Chief Justice Mahomed put it in 1998, quoted in Chaskalson 2000: 193). As Constitutional Court Justice O'Regan elaborated in 1995:

Respect for the dignity of all human beings is particularly important in South Africa. For *apartheid* was a denial of a common humanity. Black people were refused respect and dignity and thereby the dignity of all South Africans was diminished. Te new Constitution rejects this past and afrms the equal worth of all South Africans. Tus recognition and protection is the touchstone of the new political order and is fundamental to the new Constitution. (quoted in Chaskalson 2010: 1381)

O'Regan wrote this in connection to capital punishment, which the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional. Dignity was central also to judgements on issues such as corporal punishment and gay marriage. But dignity had very clear relevance also to the interpretation of social and economic rights, as Arthur Chaskalson (the then president of the Constitutional Court and later also Chief Justice) acknowledged explicitly. Section 27 of the Constitution enshrined "the right to have access to … social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents, appropriate social assistance"; it committed the state to taking "reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization" of this right. As Chaskalson commented in 2000: "Tese rights are rooted in respect for human dignity, for how can there be dignity in a life lived without access to housing, health care, food, water or in the case of persons unable to support themselves, without appropriate assistance?" Chaskalson went on to explain that the Constitution did not "contemplate" complete equality of goods or wealth. Rather, it required the state "to show respect and concern" for those citizens whose basic needs were not being met at the same time as taking into account "the general interests of the community concerning the application of resources", through taking "reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation" of access to the goods that were minimally necessary for human dignity (Chaskalson 2000).

Skweyiya's concern for the dignity of the poor framed his positive attitude towards social grants. In 2001, he described social assistance as "the Government's *primary* investment in poverty alleviation" (emphasis added). He added that, whilst "the current grant amounts are not sufcient to address large-scale poverty, deprivation and inequality in South Africa", the government would "continue to increase spending on social assistance as resource constraints allow".18 His department's Annual Report for 2001 similarly identifed social security as—for the frst time—its primary priority, acknowledging that its developmental training programme for unemployed women had foundered (South Africa 2001: 9).

Tis new perspective was far from hegemonic, however, as soon became clear in the debate over the Taylor Committee's report. In its somewhat chaotic report, completed in early 2002, the Taylor Committee endorsed the hegemonic developmental approach to "social protection": public health, education and other services were necessary to enhance the capabilities of the poor. In the short term, however, the Committee recommended that the holes in the existing safety net be flled through the extension of the Child Support Grant to the age of 18 and then the introduction of a modest "basic income grant" for *all* adults (South Africa 2002). Skweyiya himself initially seemed favourable. But he faced strong opposition within the ANC leadership and government. Te powerful government spokesman Joel Netshitenzhe reiterated the mantra that able-bodied adults should not receive "handouts" but instead should be helped to "enjoy the opportunity, the dignity and the rewards of work". Te government would not support a basic income grant, he said, because it had a rather diferent "philosophy".19

Te proposed basic income grant never attracted signifcant support within the ANC leadership: grants for unemployed adults were routinely

<sup>18</sup>*Hansard*, House of Assembly, Social Development budget vote, 3 April 2001, col 1956-7.

<sup>19</sup> *Sunday Times*, 28 July 2002. See also Matisonn and Seekings (2003); Meth (2004); Barchiesi (2007).

denounced as "handouts". Pensions for the elderly were never really questioned (although the government did resist lowering the age at which men became eligible for old-age pensions). Te disability grant became more controversial over time, with ANC MPs voicing concerns that ablebodied people were receiving grants or, even, that they were contracting HIV in order to access grants (Kelly 2013). Te most controversial issue, however, was the Child Support Grant, paid mostly to poor mothers. Opponents argued either that it was not afordable or that it encouraged undesirable behaviour. Te question of afordability brought Skweyiya into confict with, especially, the powerful Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel. By challenging the supposed unafordability of expanded grants, rather than contesting the philosophy, Skweyiya put Manuel on the defensive:

Te ANC will not be bamboozled into doing things that it knows are not possible. We would like to give each and everybody that basic income grant. We would like to ensure that each and every family eats every night. Te basic question is, how do we do that? We have a problem here. We introduced the child support grant to be given to each and every child under the age of seven … Up to the present moment half a million children are still not getting that. Te money is there, but the question is how to bring it to the people.20

Under pressure, the government did announce that the age limit for Child Support Grants would be raised (in phases, between 2003 and 2005) from a child's 7th birthday to the child's 14th birthday.21 Although President Mbeki himself made this announcement in 2003, he subsequently seemed less than enthusiastic. One year later, in his 2004 State of the Nation Address, he pointedly did not include social grants in his list of the ANC government's achievements since 1994. Instead, he referred to the need to "create the conditions … to reduce the numbers of our people dependent on social grants".22 Te ANC did decide, however, to emphasise strongly the rising number of social grants in its campaign for

<sup>20</sup>*Hansard*, House of Assembly, Social Development budget vote, 27 March 2003.

<sup>21</sup>Mbeki, State of the Nation Address, 14 Feb 2003.

<sup>22</sup>Mbeki, State of the Nation Address, 6 Feb 2004.

the country's third democratic general election in April 2004—although it did not promise any signifcant expansion of social grants, emphasising instead the prospect of one million new "job opportunities" through the workfare programme (ANC 2004). Following the elections, Mbeki delivered a second State of the Nation Address. Now he did refer to the consolidation of a "social security net". But he also reiterated the imperative of reducing dependency on social grants, declaring that "a society in which large sections depend on social welfare cannot sustain its development".23 Tat same year the government launched its new, "Expanded" Public Works Programme, to provide a small proportion of unemployed people with some of the "dignity of work"—a concept with deep roots in the ANC and South Africa (Barchiesi 2011; Ferguson 2015)—and, through enhancing skills and the experience of work, "reduce, over time, the proportion of our people who subsist solely on social grants".24

Over the following years, Skweyiya balanced the defence of selective social assistance—for deserving categories of poor people—with the kind of developmental rhetoric that had prevailed prior to 2000. In a 2005 debate, he emphasised that his department had "sought to ensure the provision of comprehensive social protections services against vulnerability and poverty to as many deserving people as possible", including through expanded social assistance programmes. At the same time, he trotted out an old denunciation of fraud. His department had ofered indemnity to anyone who came forward and admitted to receiving a grant illegally. A total of 30,000 people had done so, resulting in considerable savings. But "we are not satisfed with the result of the campaign" because "more people should have come forward". Now, the law would be enforced, beginning with public servants and the syndicates behind fraud. Also, he suggested, the sustainability of the social protection system depended on poor people taking advantage of improved economic opportunities so as to become less dependent on the state.25

<sup>23</sup>Mbeki, State of the Nation Address, 21 May 2004.

<sup>24</sup> Skweyiya, 2004 budget vote, *Hansard*, 3 June 2004, col. 594.

<sup>25</sup> Skweyiya, 2005 budget vote, *Hansard*, 5 April 2005, col. 1333-1400

#### **8 (Re)formulating the Social Question in Post-***apartheid***…**

Skweyiya's message may have been mixed but was far more positive about social grants than many of his colleagues in the ANC. One ANC MP invoked the need for "moral regeneration" whilst declaring that modest grants would merely create dependency. "Te ANC does not believe that it was supposed to create a South Africa where people would depend on the state for food, without opportunities for development", he proclaimed, speaking in Zulu; "it is not part of the African culture to wait to be fed instead of doing things on your own".26 Another ANC MP, reinforced this point:

Our people are not waiting for handouts. Te budget is such that people can provide for themselves. People have heeded the call: 'Wake up and do it yourself". In this budget we are trying to support them in their eforts to become independent. … In the rural areas people plough and do diferent kinds of job to sustain a living.

In response to opposition parties' rhetorical support for the expansion of social assistance through some kind of basic income grant, this ANC MP declared that "the basic income grant that [an opposition MP] is referring to is not the solution for the needs of the people. People have their own way of living, not by getting handouts".27 Skweyiya felt the need to rebut his own colleague, noting that "it had been proved beyond any reasonable doubt" that grants did not create a culture of dependency (see also Surrender et al. 2010; Ferguson 2015). He also took care to point out that the government's caution was not because ANC leaders were "scrooges", but rather because of resource constraints.28

Skweyiya successfully legitimated social grants for selected categories of deserving poor, not for the unemployed (the dreaded "handouts"). He did not do away entirely with the earlier developmentalist doctrine. His Department for Social Development initiated a new developmental programme (*Gwebindlala*) to "provide income support while simultaneously

<sup>26</sup>*Hansard*, House of Assembly, Social Development budget vote, 5 April 2005, col. 1350-7 (Lewis Nzimande).

<sup>27</sup>*Hansard*, House of Assembly, Social Development budget vote, 5 April 2005, col. 1389 (B. Solo).

<sup>28</sup>*Hansard*, House of Assembly, Social Development budget vote, 5 April 2005, col. 1398-1400 (Skweyiya).

developing the human capital of benefciaries through skills development and job-placement services".29 Tis rhetoric was not unlike the rhetoric associated with the welfare state in Europe and elsewhere, except that in the South African context programmes like this provided support and services for very few people, whilst a very large number of people received no income support at all and many others received very modest income support. Te developmentalist discourse appealed to the ANC's more conservative MPs, one of whom commented that "maintaining our lives through charity is not black people's way of living … Whenever we found ourselves in situations beyond our control, we would be given a cow. Although one would not get ownership of the cow, one would be able to get milk and plough the felds".30

Te distinction between those poor who deserved grants (i.e. the elderly, disabled, children and caregivers) and those who needed to be put to work meant that government documents both celebrated and criticised grants. A discussion document released in early 2007 emphasised the "dignity of work". It criticised social grants that lacked any mechanism for helping benefciaries to fnd work and explicitly advocated more eforts to promote the kinds of employment appropriate for people with minor disabilities (and currently receiving disability grants). Te document advocated "active labour market measures, skills development programmes, special employment and labour-intensive development programmes and labour-intensive government services", as well as further "consideration" of an "aggressive expansion" of public works programmes: "the drive to get all South Africans working when they are able to do so must become a central preoccupation" (South Africa 2006a).31 Similarly, the Department of Social Development's "Strategic Plan" for 2006–2010 referred to its continuing commitment to a "paradigm shift" from a welfarist approach to "developmental welfare" (South Africa 2006b). Te ANC's 2007 policy discussion document on "social transformation" also emphasised the "dignity of work" and the importance of public works

<sup>29</sup>*Hansard*, House of Assembly, Social Development budget vote, 28 March 2006, col. 986 (Dr Jean Benjamin (Deputy-Minister).

<sup>30</sup>*Hansard*, House of Assembly, Social Development budget vote, 28 March 2006, col. 1000 (B. Solo).

<sup>31</sup>Later, in the early 2010s, the term "activation" entered the policy discourse in South Africa.

programmes as an alternative to social assistance. Arguing (rather unclearly) against a basic income grant, the ANC suggests that discussion should take place "in the context of our challenges as a *developmental state* rather than against the ideological backdrop of a *welfare state*" (ANC 2007: 3, emphasis added). Te primary emphasis of the "attack on poverty" should entail empowering people "to take themselves out of poverty". Te social safety net should be limited to the protection of "the most vulnerable in our society" (*ibid*: 2), implying specifc groups of deserving poor rather than the poor in general.

Te government's overall approach thus remained resolutely developmental: poverty reduction required simply that the benefts of economic growth be "shared". In early 2006, the government launched its Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA). Tis envisaged that poverty and unemployment rates would be reduced by one half through increasing the economic growth rate (to 6 per cent p.a.) and sharing growth, primarily through absorbing more labour into the "mainstream economy". Key elements of the plan included increased public investment in infrastructure, accelerated skill development and reducing the regulatory burden on small- and medium-sized businesses (South Africa 2005). Whilst economic growth rates remained strong up to the global economic crisis of 2008–2009, the benefts were not shared widely: wages rose but employment in the formal economy remained stagnant.

Skweyiya recognised that he needed to rebut the lingering distaste for social grants among many of his ANC colleagues, which they often dressed up in their commitment to developmentalism. Skweyiya's solution was to commission research that would provide the data to undermine his colleagues' objections. Te frst of the ensuing reports, completed in late 2006 and presented to Cabinet, dispelled "assertions that our social assistance programme encourages teenage pregnancies, that children are fostered for the purpose of accessing grants, and that people with disability will harm themselves in order to continue accessing social grants" (as Skweyiya reported to Parliament in 2007).32 Further reports

<sup>32</sup>*Hansard*, House of Assembly, Social Development budget vote, 28 March 2007, col.2393 (Skweyiya).

examined the efects of grants on poverty alleviation and development, the benefts of raising the age limit on the Child Grant, the means-test and conditions on grants.

Tese reports did not persuade all ANC leaders that social grants should be expanded further. At a national conference in December 2007, the ANC resolved that the Child Grant age limit be "gradually extended to eighteen years" and the age threshold for men to receive the old-age pension be reduced to sixty years. But the ANC resolved also that "grants must not create dependency and thus must be linked to economic activity" (ANC 2007). In his State of the Nation Address at the beginning of 2008, President Mbeki—who had been defeated by his rival Jacob Zuma in the contest for the presidency of the party at the December conference—referred to the age threshold for pensions but pointedly did not mention the Child Grant. When, a few days later, Skweyiya told the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee and then announced in a press briefing that the age limit for the Child Grant would be increased to 18 years, this was almost immediately contradicted by the minister of Finance.

Less than a year later, however, the government confrmed that the age limit would be raised. ANC leaders (including the Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel) attributed the government's shift to the "compelling evidence" in "recent research" that the Child Grant had reduced child poverty. He (and interim President Motlanthe in his 2009 "State of the Nation Address") seems to have been referring not to the research commissioned by Skweyiya but to research commissioned by the Treasury that attributed the decline in income poverty (and child hunger) in the early 2000s to the Child Grant.

Unsurprisingly, ANC leaders did not draw attention to two other factors: factional politics within the ANC combined with the imminence of the 2009 elections. In late 2007, an eclectic coalition supported Jacob Zuma and ousted Mbeki as party leader; one year later the coalition ousted Mbeki as president of the country. At the time this was widely interpreted as a "shift to the left" within the ANC (e.g. Proudlock 2011: 154; and generally Booysen 2011). Te new leadership proved to be more opportunistic than left wing. Te decision to raise the Child Grant age limit—which was not made until almost one year after the pro-Zuma coalition secured control over the ANC—seems to have been due more to the sidelining of Mbeki personally and electoral opportunism. Te ANC in 2009 faced a resurgent parliamentary opposition (comprising both the Democratic Alliance, supported largely by racial minorities, and the new Congress of the People led by Mbeki supporters who defected from the ANC) and widespread extra-parliamentary protests (the socalled "rebellion of the poor"—Alexander 2010). Under Zuma, the ANC sought to project itself as a party that had both achieved much hitherto and was now regenerated under new leadership (Beresford 2015; Booysen 2011). Crucially, the "new" ANC needed to demonstrate that the government was doing something new and positive to reduce poverty. Given that most of the other political parties were calling for the Child Grant age limit to be raised, the ANC chose to emphasise in its election manifesto that its expansion of social grants had "pushed back the frontiers of poverty" (ANC 2009).

More generally, the courts and civil society activists had transformed the normative and discursive context. Activists and the courts rarely agreed on precisely how social and economic rights should be operationalised, but they concurred, for the most part, on the underlying understanding of "dignity" and community, rooted in a Kantian moral philosophy. Tey thus continued to strengthen and legitimate the alternative discourse around social grants adopted (at least sometimes) by Skweyiya. Te strongest judicial statement of this was in two cases in which the Constitutional Court ordered the government to pay pensions and grants to legally resident non-citizens on the same basis as citizens. In one of these judgements, Justice Mokgoro emphasised the constitutional commitment to building a "caring society". Permanently resident noncitizens should not be abandoned "to destitution if they fall upon hard times"; the state should not force them into "relationships of dependency upon families, friends and the community in which they live" (Mokgoro 2004). Te government resisted legal eforts to expand social assistance programmes. Ofcials in Skweyiya's own department fled afdavits opposing cases brought by civil society activists to expand social grants. Moreover, the courts themselves were generally reluctant to push the executive too far or too fast, especially when policy shifts had major fnancial implications. In a series of major cases, the courts decided that the government was not obliged to provide very expensive healthcare or housing for all, nor to extend old age pensions or child grants. In a case that provoked the ire of civil society activists, the Constitutional Court decided unanimously against determining any "minimum core" of public services that citizens could claim under the constitution (see, e.g. Langford *et al*. 2013). But the courts ensured that the experience of poverty continued to be viewed as an indignity that society had to address. As one legal scholar put it, drawing on the work of American philosopher Martha Nussbaum, "conditions of poverty are not a refection of the moral blameworthiness of groups experiencing poverty rather they refect how we as a society have failed to value human dignity". Respect for human dignity requires "redressing the social and economic conditions of those whose capacity for development and agency is stunted by poverty"—and accepting shared responsibility to enable the poor to live as equal members of society (Liebenberg 2005: 12–14).

Skweyiya's complex defence of social grants for deserving categories of poor people but preference for job creation for able-bodied adults entailed an understanding of "social citizenship" and solidarity that accorded with popular opinion and norms. Quantitative and qualitative evidence suggested that most South Africans shared a strong sense that a large number of people were deserving of the support of society as a whole. Almost all South Africans concurred that diferences in income (as well as diferences in wages among working people specifcally) were too large, and that the government should redistribute from rich to poor (Roberts 2014). Most South Africans, without regard to race or class, not only supported the principle of tax-fnanced pensions for the elderly but believed that the value of the pension should be increased (even if it meant that they themselves paid higher taxes). Most South Africans also included in the "deserving poor" people who were unable to work because they were disabled or sick, or who were caring for children or the elderly (Seekings 2007, 2010). Tere was even some evidence that people believed that the unemployed had some "right" to some kind of support (e.g. CASE 2005; Roberts 2014). At the same time, there was widespread scepticism about social grants for unemployed adults and outright condemnation of grant recipients who "misspent" their grants (e.g. on alcohol) (Seekings 2007; Dawson and Fouksman 2020).

### **The Conservative Backlash: The Social Question After Skweyiya (from 2009)**

Skweyiya did not stand for re-election to parliament in 2009. His immediate successor, Edna Molewa, was Minister of Social Development for a little more than one year before she was in turn replaced (in November 2010) by Bathabile Dlamini. Dlamini, who was a loyal member of the faction around Zuma, remained minister until Cyril Ramaphosa ousted Zuma as president in February 2018. Dlamini's term as minister—lasting more than seven years—is remembered primarily for the controversy surrounding the award of the national contract to pay social grants to the multinational company Cash Paymaster Services and her ensuing incompetence and dishonesty in solving the crisis (Gronbach 2017). But it was also a period of conservative reaction against the expansion of the social assistance system under Skweyiya, albeit a reaction that did not lead to any clear retrenchment of social grant programmes. Under Dlamini, the Department of Social Development began to emphasise more strongly the need to strengthen the family so that the family could take over from the state much of the responsibility for care. A 2012 White Paper emphasised "self-reliance", that is, the converse of dependency (South Africa 2012a).

President Zuma himself provided a clear line to his ministers. In 2011, he reportedly told businessmen that "we cannot be a welfare state"; taxpayers should develop the country "rather than feed the poor".33 Tis might sound like an argument against further expansion, but Zuma later made clear his own patriarchal criticism of paying grants to young women. In a 2015 speech to traditional leaders, Zuma branded teenage mothers as irresponsible bad mothers, claimed that they were not using the child support grant for their children and suggested that they were cheating the system. Instead of being allowed to drop out of school, Zuma suggested they should be sent to somewhere like Robben Island the *apartheid*-era prison for political prisoners—where they could complete their schooling, thus empowering them to work and support their

<sup>33</sup> "Zuma says S. Africa can't be welfare state: SAPA", 24 November 2011; https://af.reuters.com/ article/topNews/idAFJOE7AN04C20111124.

children themselves. If they were to be given grants, then the grants should not be paid in cash, which recipients could spend as they like, but rather in vouchers that could only be used to buy designated items. Zuma, together with many other conservatives, saw the "problem" in terms of the supposed immorality of young women, not the economic and other structural factors that encouraged teenagers to become mothers.34 Other ministers worried about "dependency" with regard to other areas of public policy. Announcing a new model for funding public housing, Minister Lindiwe Sisulu, for example, stated that "giving free houses creates a dependency syndrome". Te government "cannot continue giving out free houses anymore", but instead would "give people subsidies so that they can build houses themselves".35 Te ANC adopted a very ambivalent stance towards social protection in its election manifestos (ANC 2014).

Under Zuma, the government and ANC emphasised poverty as much as previous governments in their plans and resolutions. Inequality was emphasised even more strongly than hitherto. But the plans emphasised the developmental state not the welfare state. Te most prominent plan completed during this period—the 2012 National Development Plan (South Africa 2012b)—focused on the reduction of poverty and inequality. As the Plan made clear in its chapter on social protection: "Tese goals can be achieved by building capabilities that enable individuals to take part in the formal economy and in other parts of society"—reversing the efects of *apartheid*. "If apartheid destroyed opportunities for the majority of the population and trapped them in poverty, the challenge for the next 20 years is to rebuild the opportunity structures and help individuals develop the capabilities to live the life they wish to lead". Whilst "employment is the best form of social protection", the state should continue to provide for those who cannot provide for themselves—in "labour market and employment friendly" ways. A "balance" should be struck between the provision of a safety net and "incentivizing and supporting

<sup>34</sup>http://mg.co.za/article/2015-03-11-zuma-send-teenage-mums-to-robben-island.

<sup>35</sup>Xaba, V. 2016. No more free RDP houses to curb dependency. *Te Sowetan*

http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2016/04/10/no-more-free-rdp-houses-to-curb-dependency.

individuals to develop their own ability to respond to shocks and save for rainy days". Te Plan envisaged replacing the existing, and admittedly patchy, safety net with a comprehensive "social foor"—borrowing the concept promoted by the ILO, culminating in the ILO's 2012 Recommendation 202 on Social Protection Floors—but the Plan proposed no new programmes that might actually achieve the ambition. Social assistance would be expanded only insofar as more eforts would be made to ensure that eligible individuals applied for and received existing grants. Te "social foor" for the unemployed working-age population would entail not social grants but rather "various active labour market initiatives such as public works programmes, training and skills development, and other labour market related incentives". Te Plan seemed to envisage vaguely a massive expansion of these initiatives, but there were few specifc proposals. Te Plan also worried about the continued afordability of existing programmes.

Zuma's State of the Nation Addresses indicate his disinterest in social grants. In 2009 he told Parliament that "We are mindful of the need to link the social grants to jobs or economic activity in order to encourage self-reliance amongst the able-bodied". In 2011 he repeated this point: "Since we are building a developmental and not a welfare state, the social grants will be linked to economic activity and community development, to enable short-term benefciaries to become self-supporting in the long run." He regularly reported on action to prevent fraudulent grant payments. From 2012 he reported the rising number of benefciaries—due to decisions taken before he took ofce, combined with population growth—but otherwise barely mentioned grants at all.36

Te ideological shift within the ANC may have corresponded with deepening ambivalence among the public (although it is unclear whether elite discourse led public opinion or vice versa). Both quantitative and qualitative research suggests that support for social grants in South Africa is conditional on the behaviour of the recipients. More than 50 per cent of respondents in a representative countrywide survey in 2015 agreed that young women spent too much of their grants on alcohol. One half of the sample also agreed that young women have children so that they can access a child grant. When the same questions were asked in a 2018

<sup>36</sup>https://www.gov.za/state-nation-address#2009.

survey, public opinion seems to have become more critical. As many as 60 per cent of respondents agreed that young women spent too much of their grants on alcohol. In both 2015 and 2018, more than half of the respondents agreed that adults who were physically able to work should be required to do so in return for any money received from the government. In 2018, the same proportion agreed that citizens become lazy when they rely on government grants or pensions.37 Roberts (2014) reports that support for the redistribution of income by the government seems to have declined modestly (by some but not all measures) between the mid-2000s and the early 2010s. If so, this may be driven by declining concern with inequality and support for government action among the growing African middle classes (Seekings 2017b). More and more qualitative researchers fnd evidence that at least some poor people are quite critical of the payment of social grants, especially to young women (e.g. Mosoetsa 2011; Blake 2018).

In practice, the Zuma governments of 2009–2018 presided over a marked lack of development and job creation. As became clear later, large parts of the state were "captured" by private interests, who used the state for personal enrichment rather than national economic development or poverty reduction. Te government's corrupt allocation of the national contract to pay social grants and its inability to address the subsequent abuse of grant payments were indicative of the broader malaise.

Skweyiya—like Mandela—was, for the most part, conservative. But his conservatism was paternalistic, unlike the more reactionary patriarchal conservatism articulated by Zuma. Skweyiya was surely horrifed by "state capture" and the crisis of grant payments under Zuma. Skweyiya believed that all people, however poor, were members of the broader community and had some claim to collective resources, alongside a general responsibility to strive for self-reliance. Whilst he was minister, childcare grants were rolled out for an additional ten million children, at a cost of more than 1 per cent of GDP. Tis was, to his mind, the right thing to do. Te social question, for Skweyiya, meant assisting poor people who were unable to satisfy their own minimum needs through their own

<sup>37</sup>Data from 2015 Comparative National Election Study and 2018 Afrobarometer survey, my analysis.

eforts. For Zuma, in contrast, the social question appears to be a cultural or moral one: decadent urban and/or Western morality needs to be rolled back, and a disciplined and patriarchal African social order re-established.

Skweyiya would have been unlikely to preside over the expansion of the welfare state had he not taken over what was already a welfare state, notwithstanding the hostility or ambivalence towards it both within the National Party (under *apartheid*) and the ANC (in the period 1994–1999). Te reframing of the "social question" in South Africa in the early 2000s was, in important respects, path dependent: existing, *apartheid*-era social assistance programmes had helped to cement an understanding within the general population of who is deserving and who is not. Tis permeated into elite thinking in the late 1990s sufciently to deter major programmatic retrenchment and in the 2000s to facilitate programmatic expansion. Skweyiya himself was party to a long tradition of paternalist conservatism within South Africa's African elite. Nonetheless, there was nothing inevitable about the expansion of social assistance under Skweyiya. Te ANC might have chosen other programmes to shore up its electoral support among the poor. It might have adopted a more patriarchal line long before Zuma became president.

Te frst two phases in the post-*apartheid* reframing of the social question involved some infuence of ideas from abroad. Te developmental turn from "welfare" to "social development" was infuenced by the ideas articulated by Midgley. It may also have been infuenced by the large number of Nordic, other European and Australian policy consultants who fooded into South Africa in the 1990s, most of whom fuelled a vision of skill-intensive, high-wage job creation, with unemployment being tackled through active labour market policies. Skweyiya's advocacy of expanded social assistance coincided with the global embrace of social assistance by international organisations (von Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016). Under Skweyiya, the Department of Social Development commissioned research from a series of foreign researchers to support his argument for expansion. In both phases, however, reframing was rooted frmly in the convictions of South African policymakers. Whilst many of the individual technocrats held more progressive views, the dominant approaches within the ANC leadership were all conservative, whether


The social question in post-*apartheid* South Africa, 1990s–2017: changing ideas and policies

developmental (in the late 1990s), paternalistic (Skweyiya) or patriarchal (under Zuma). Te result was that a social (protection) foor or comprehensive safety net remained an ambition rather than a reality. Table 8.1 summarises the analysis.

#### **References**


*income grant in South Africa,* eds. Guy Standing and Michael Samson, Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 56–76.


**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

Te images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **Part V**

**Brazil**

# **9**

# **The Anatomy of the Social Question and the Evolution of the Brazilian Social Security System, 1919–2020**

**Lena Lavinas**

## **Brazil: A Crude Path to Modernity**

Brazil's slide into modernity has been marked by the brand of exclusion. Ours was a crude modernity, built on negation and the stifing of citizenship, whether in terms of civil, political, or social rights.

At each level of development, at each new cycle of economic growth, under authoritarian regimes or living in democracy, in crises or during periods of reconstruction, the anatomy of Brazil's social question refects tensions over the fght for inclusion and the struggle to carve out a social existence, and the forces resisting that change. Te shape of social policies

L. Lavinas (\*)

My thanks to Angela de Castro Gomes, Ana Carolina Cordilha, Andrej Slivnik, and José Maurício Domingues for their valuable contributions to this chapter. I also beneftted from the stimulating refections of Lutz Leisering and a group of intellectually engaged scholars who contributed with their critiques to a previous draft (see the much more detailed working paper Lavinas 2020). Finally, I would like to thank Flora Tompson-DeVeaux for her talent in translating the original manuscript from the Portuguese.

Institute of Economics, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

and their progress through time mirror that clash, or the silencing thereof. Tey are thus the fnal expression of the struggle for public recognition of the people's demands.

As we argue, in Brazil, the essence of the social question, or the process of the construction of citizenship, developed fairly independently from the construction of the social protection system, although Social Security, instituted by the 1988 Citizen Constitution, is one of the most remarkable conquests on that score.

Te aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it develops a periodization and typology of the multiple historical confgurations of the social question in Brazil over the past 100 years in order to observe its relationship with the construction of the social protection system, Social Security, in particular. As guaranteed in the 1988 Constitution, that system includes social insurance, social assistance, and public healthcare. Second, the chapter systematizes how social movements, confict-led dynamics, labour, and diferent regimes of accumulation shaped social policies and citizenship, contributing to defne patterns of inclusion—which varied over time, lending new form to the social question, the many facets of which seem to form a kaleidoscope of "social questions".

Over the course of this chapter, we seek to demonstrate that, in the span of just over a century, the social question took on a variety of forms, but was repeatedly marked by the struggle for recognition and the fght for inclusion—a strong indication that the process of constructing citizenship has been something of a permanent efort to break down boundaries.

In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the present chapter is divided into four sections. Tis structure refects the periodization adopted in attempts to characterize the essence of the social question, which expresses itself in terms of clashes between society and the State. Tese phases are associated with changes at the level of the political regime, patterns of development, the shape and function of institutions, and the agendas driven by the social conficts that they spring from. Tey include struggles for labour rights, access to land, democracy, better living conditions, equality, inclusion, mobilization against racism and sexism, and the fght to preserve rights that, once attained, are immediately threatened and contested.

Following this introduction, the second section covers 1899–1929 and is divided into two subsections. In this phase, the social question is, above all, "the question of the needs of the people" (Castro Gomes 2005: 49).

Te third section focuses on the period that saw the construction of regulated citizenship (Dos Santos 1979): 1930–1963, a span that includes a prolonged authoritarian period (1930–1945) but also a democratic respite (1946–1963). Te State led the charge on this front. With the consolidation of social insurance for a small portion of the working class, the social question was transformed into a regional question, framed by the struggle for increased access to land.

In the fourth section, the chapter situates the social question within the struggle for democracy and against inequality, mobilizations that would swell and multiply throughout both the "economic miracle" and the severe recession that followed.

Te ffth section goes from the civil-military coup of 1964, which entailed a loss of political rights, to the mid-1980s, when the severity of the economic crisis broke the prevailing political pact and led the military to support a "slow, gradual, and secure opening". During this phase, the social question may be defned as the democratic question, coupled with the fght against inequalities.

Te fnal section analyses the period after re-democratization (post-1988), which brought a transition to a civil government and the reinstatement of open elections for the presidency. Here, the social question would become the question of full, unrestricted citizenship in the attempt to build a new Brazil (Paoli 1989). Social Security was implemented, broadening the scope and scale of social protection and introducing universal rights for the frst time in Brazil's history.

#### **1889–1929: The Social Question as the Needs of the People—Under the First Republic— Repression, Concealment, and Reshaping**

Two phases precede the classical model of associating the social question to labour and the emergence of the social protection system.

In the frst phase, which we place between the proclamation of the Republic in 1889 and the end of the 1910s, the social question was framed by grassroots movements around the cost of living, the right to housing, and unionization. Tis time frame is also justifed by the fact that in 1919, Brazil—as a signatory of the Peace Conference and Treaty of Versailles, which led to the creation of the International Labour Organization (ILO)—formally recognized the power of the international workers' movement, with important consequences for domestic policy. As a founding member of the ILO, Brazil took part in the frst International Labour Conference that year and adhered to the tripartite system of representation determined there, bringing together governments, employers, and employees.

Brazil's adhesion to institutions such as these, which would begin to mould relations within this new community of nations and implement a new international order, would have an important efect on the framing of its frst labour laws.

Te second phase, between 1919 and 1929, saw the discussion and passage of the country's frst social laws to regulate wage labour, and the frst initiatives designed to ensure the right to retirement benefts and pensions.

To the eyes of many authors (Castro Gomes 1979, 2005; Cardoso 2010), the 1920s were the years in which the social question shifted from the struggle over the cost of living and a lack of afordable housing—a broad-ranging movement that had become increasingly radical over the years—to the feld of labour rights in a strict sense. At stake were the number of work-hours per week, women and minors at work, vacation time, and the lingering, urgent matter of occupational accidents—compensation for which, when it did come, depended on the goodwill of one's employer.

Te introduction of the Commission on Social Legislation in the Chamber of Deputies in late 1918, as well as the frst vote on the Occupational Accidents Law in 1919, would contribute to redefne the social question and lend it new centrality. Both measures refected the strengthening of the workers' movement on an international level and provoked a backlash from national elites.

Employers worked to restrict the measures as best they could, looking to avoid excesses that might undermine their process of accumulation. In the words of Castro Gomes (1979), employers put on a united front that was complex and contradictory: on the one hand, their stance preserved "the classical principles of liberalism, defending the 'freedom to work,' but gradually grafted onto it an acceptance of state intervention, an acceptance that was forced upon them and limited to specifc issues" (163).

In 1915, the federal government had put forth a bill proposing mandatory compensation for occupational accidents. While the proposal remained tabled for a number of years, it would be joined by other issues, such as the establishment of a minimum wage for industrial workers. Tese scattered demands were the refection of budding pressure, born of the advance of industrialization and urbanization.

Te period was thus shaped by the emergence of a regulatory framework focused on wage labour, meeting the needs of a very small subsection of the working population.

Te business community lobbied for women to be able to work the same hours as men, instead of daily shifts of up to six hours.1 Tey supported a ban on work for minors under 10 (not 12), spoke in favour of a minimum age of 15 (not 16) for a young person to be considered an adult on the labour market; pressed for a 56-hour work week; and opposed the establishment of schools and childcare facilities within factories, a long-time demand of social movements. In other words, they contested the workers' demands, point by point.

Tey did, however, accept the establishment of private workers' compensation policies (for minor accidents, death, or disability), taken out with insurance companies. Tese policies only covered the worker in question, with no provision for dependents, and would not trigger payment of retirement benefts or pensions for those who ceased to work. In other words, they vehemently denied the creation of Social Security. And it would be on these terms that the occupational accidents bill would

<sup>1</sup>Tey successfully contested the idea of banning women from working night shifts, as well as eliminating a proposal that would have ensured a period of rest (with two-thirds of pay) before and after childbirth (Castro Gomes 1979: 177).

fnally pass in 1919, the regulatory cornerstone of the nation's social protection system.

Te capital-labour confict was transformed into an individual, external issue, regulated by a contract and designed to be dealt with between the worker and the insurer. In the words of Dos Santos (1979), "until 1924, suits over occupational accidents would remain in the realm of private conficts. Strictly speaking, they were matters for the police, and victims had to request an investigation" in order to determine whether or not compensation was in order.

Tus, the event commonly celebrated as the frst conquest of the incipient working class—protection against accidents in the workplace—fell outside the scope of public social insurance. Te Eloy Chaves Act, passed in 1923 (see later), likewise failed to include worker's compensation as a part of the incipient social protection system. It would remain subject to private contracts, outside the realm of social rights. For the next 40 years, employers' associations staunchly opposed the adoption of collective, contributory, public insurance systems.

In 1921, the social question remained present, and it would make its presence felt in the heated electoral debate. But not even that could guarantee the efective functioning of the National Department of Labour, which had been created in 1917 in response to a wave of strikes. Te aim was to monitor compliance with the laws that were beginning to establish a new system of protection for labourers. Due to pressure from business interests invested in delaying and hindering the efective application of these new laws, the department would remain functionally inoperative. In its stead came the National Labour Council (Conselho Nacional do Trabalho, or CNT), instituted in 1923, even as the government aggressively repressed mobilizations by the emergent working class. Workers on the federal and state railways had been on the point of outright rebellion, and their walkouts during the general strikes had seriously afected other productive sectors. Tey were the most organized and mobilized group calling for workers' rights.

Tese obstacles, however, failed to foil some of the most important institutional innovations of the so-called First Republic (1889–1930). One was the Eloy Chaves Act of 1923, which created the nation's frst fully funded pension scheme by instituting the Pension and Retirement Fund for the workers on the São Paulo Railway. Te Fund would also provide other labour-related benefts. In addition, there were the Lei de Férias (which regulated vacation time) and the Código de Menores (which stipulated working conditions for minors). Te Pension and Retirement Funds (CAPs) were created in Brazil at the initiative of a group of lawyers, businessmen, and public fgures (Malloy 1986), strongly infuenced by Argentina, where similar funds had been in place since 1904.

Not even this would blunt the impact of the Funds on the ascendant Brazilian business class, which believed that it would be essential for the State to act, not as a gendarme, but now as a "machine for progress" (Pio Vieira 1978: 119). Tis was the tone taken by the leader of the movement in Brazil, federal deputy Eloy Chaves, a scion of the colonial oligarchical elite and the Paulista aristocracy.

Eloy Chaves' proposal revealed a Bismarckian inspiration, relying on mandatory contributions from both employees and employers to a selfadministered, non-state pension fund. Te project called for a broad range of other provisions: medical care and medication for the policyholder and his family; regular retirement benefts; pensions for employees' heirs; immediate coverage of funeral expenses; and disability retirement. Te fund was to be administered by the benefciaries themselves (Pio Vieira 1978: 236), with the participation of the employer.

Chaves proposed a constellation of decentralized funds outside the umbrella of the State and administered by the private sector. He opposed a general rule for pensions and the creation of a public fund. True to his liberal values, he put his foot down at State intervention into the provision of retirement benefts and pensions.

Te act was fnally passed in January of 1923. Each railway company would have to create a retirement and pension fund for its employees (whether permanent or temporary). Te funds would be fed by monthly contributions from employees (3% of their salary) and an annual contribution from the railway companies (1% of gross income2 ); and the State would not contribute funds of its own, but would allocate revenue from

<sup>2</sup>Dos Santos (1979) clarifes that, in the absence of oversight, the 1% contribution was efectively made, not based on gross revenue but rather the wage bill. Tis situation persisted through the 1960s, substantially reducing the employer's contribution.

an extra tax of 1.5% on railway fares. Tese resources would be deposited in a special account in a bank chosen by the administrators of the Fund, with no government participation, and would be put towards purchasing national or state bonds.3

Old-age pensions were calculated based on the worker's average salary over their last fve years of service, granted after 30 years of service and 50 years of age,4 and were lifelong. Moreover, a worker who sufered "total and permanent disability [would] have the right to retirement, no matter the length of his service" (Pio Vieira 1978: 267). Retirement benefts for the disabled would be equivalent to 50% of the retirement beneft received by workers with over 30 years of service and 25% for workers who had between 10 and 30 years of service. It would not be possible to receive multiple regular old-age pensions or retirement benefts concurrently.

Te most important part, which had to do with the model of capitalization, is laid out specifcally in Article 39: "Retirement benefts and pensions may be lesser than stipulated in this law if resources in the Fund cannot sustain the respective charges, and this may be the case while resources remain insufcient" (Pio Vieira 1978: 271). In other words, the rule established a defned contribution and an undefned beneft, exempting the employer from guaranteeing a true substitute income in the period after one's working life.

Attempts to extend the Eloy Chaves Act to major companies in all sectors soon followed, while resistance to the law spread within the railway sector. Chaves himself came out against proposals that sought to expand the model to other sectors and attempts to involve the State in fnancing pensions. In his vision, the new Funds ought to live of of their own resources and go without public fnancing, unlike the classical Bismarckian model, which included state subsidies. More generally, "State contribution had to be avoided at all costs in the structuring of any other Funds for any other categories of workers" (Pio Vieira 1978: 300).

<sup>3</sup>Law 4.682 of January 24, 1923. Pio Vieira (1978: 266).

<sup>4</sup>Te initial recommendation was a minimum age of 55, but, under pressure from the railway workers, Eloy Chaves reduced it to 50.

Tus, we need to qualify the classical reading that the corporative, paternalistic structure of the government under the First Republic was responsible for developing Brazil's frst mechanisms of social protection (Slivnik 2018).

Te CAPs would stand as the country's main social insurance model through 1931, when the system underwent its frst reform. By then, some 98 company-specifc Caixas had been created, covering close to 147,000 members (Slivnik 2018).

According to Slivnik (2018), the CAPs persisted throughout the 1920s as "civil societies run by Advisory Boards, composed of representatives for employers and employees, which were to determine [the Fund's] investment policy and deliberate over the concession of retirement benefts and pensions" (45). Te Chaves Act rejected the mutualist tradition developed within the workers' movement, which had been able to ofer lowcost medical services and medicine.

On another legislative front, the country saw increased regulation of wage labour. Employer associations' attempts to quash the approval of vacation rights came to naught. A law guaranteeing 15 days of vacation for employees, labourers, and workers at banks and other institutions was passed in 1925 (Castro Gomes 1979). Te legislation would not go into efect for factory workers until 1930, however, thanks to violent resistance on the part of the industrial bourgeoisie and the indiference of the governing authorities.

Child labour would be regulated in 1927; underage workers were a considerable contingent of the agricultural workforce, but also in rapidly expanding urban sectors, especially industrial production. Employers successfully proposed that youth aged 14–18 be treated as adults, while children of ages 10–14 would be able to work up to six hours per day.

Te balance of these frst few decades of republican rule is fairly slim. Despite minor advances in terms of labour regulations, the absence of compliance oversight and repeated stonewalling on the part of employers in commerce and industry hamstrung hopes of more far-reaching gains for urban workers. In the 1930s, only 3% of the working population were covered by these new labour regulations (D'Araújo 2019).

We may, however, safely dismiss the idea that before the Vargas era, the social question was treated as "a matter for the police" (D'Araújo 2019; Castro Gomes 1979). At this point in time, it combined both dimensions. "Social legislation far beyond the political aim of ensuring social peace and spill over into the economic realm, as coercion made it possible to secure greater productivity from the workforce" (Castro Gomes 1979: 215).

In addition of being incipient, the foundations of the Brazilian labour and social insurance legislation left out the majority of those working on the streets or at odd jobs.

## **1930–1945: The Social Question as a Workers' Question**

Te Revolution of 1930, that put an end to the First Republic, was a military coup d'état led by Getúlio Vargas, who had run for president in 1930 as the candidate of the Aliança Liberal (Liberal Alliance). Te Alliance's motto was "Let us carry out the revolution serenely, before the people do it violently". Tis newly formed coalition cast itself as an alternative to the political establishment represented by major cofee producers and exporters, who had dominated the system during the First Republic. Getúlio was defeated; the administration's candidate, a representative of the São Paulo oligarchs, won but was kept from taking ofce by the coup. Getúlio Vargas became the head of the Provisional Government, awarding himself broad powers. Te 1891 Constitution was revoked, and Vargas began governing by decree. A new constitution would only be put in place in 1934.

Before leading the military coup, Getúlio Vargas—who was to govern Brazil through an authoritarian regime from 1930 to 1945—once declared on the campaign trail: "We cannot deny the existence of the Social Question (*questão social*) in Brazil as one of the problems that must be addressed seriously by the authorities. What little we have in terms of social legislation is not applied, or only the smallest part of it is, sporadically, despite our commitments in that regard as signatories of the Treaty of Versailles."5

<sup>5</sup> Speech made on January 2, 1930, in Rio de Janeiro. Documents from Biblioteca Nacional, 1963.

Brazilian social legislation was moved forward by an unprecedented international scenario in which multilateral accords took on the strength of legislation. But in the real world, that very legislation was powerless. Still, Vargas pointed out a social question, and it would fall to the State to address it. Tis would be one of the great legacies of the Vargas Era: the construction of an institutional framework designed to protect labour and workers, albeit during a period of authoritarianism and the repression of unions and grassroots movements, leaving out the majority of non-regular workers.

Social policy post-1930 focused on the matter of labour, a central pillar of the new regime of accumulation. Tis new social engineering was, in Vargas' words,6 designed to overcome "pauperism and all the ills that stem from an excess of activity without fxed occupation". It began with the creation, following the Revolution of 1930, of the Ministry of Labour, Industry, and Commerce, and the foundation of the National Department of Labour in 1931.7 Finally armed with an institutional structure designed to analyse, formulate, and execute social and labour laws, the State would take vigorous, direct action towards regulating capital-labour relations, supported by a new union law approved the same year, which would repress, delegitimate, and demobilize free unionization (which had been legal since 1907). To this end, one of the new government's frst measures was a 1931 law governing unions.

In order to exist, any union organization would have to be formally recognized by the Ministry of Labour. Employee and employer unions were instituted, organized by branches and professions. Te new union law also stipulated that, from 1943 onward, it would become compulsory for every worker in a given category to pay a union tax. Tese new unions were denied the right to political or ideological manifestations and ultimately served to stand beside the government in defending the economic, social, and legal interests of their professional categories; drawing up contracts; maintaining cooperatives; and providing social services (D'Araújo 2019). In practice, over the 1930s, Vargas' social legislation led to the

<sup>6</sup>Vargas in 1938, quoted by Cardoso (2010: 786).

<sup>7</sup>Te measure had frst been proposed in 1917, but it was blocked by uncompromising resistance on the part of employers.

destruction of autonomous unions and the independent organization of the working classes.

Only unionized workers would enjoy the benefts of labour legislation and its associated rights (including vacation), and only they could participate in collective bargaining. Non-union members were also unable to fle ofcial complaints (Dos Santos 1979). At its root, then, the legal and institutional framework taking shape thus worked to set peers apart.

Before 1930, the Brazilian government had taken a liberal approach to the unions, repressing their mobilizations while refraining from regulating them. Te period that followed saw the making of state-led, corporate unionism, guided by the principle of the "collaboration between classes".8 Independent unions were subject to interventions and police invasions, and their members might be jailed (Castro Gomes 2005).

Starting in the early 1930s, despite the grave economic crisis that had overtaken the country in the wake of the 1929 crash, an important set of measures would broaden the scope of the regulation of the labour market in a move to encourage the ongoing accumulation process. Tey included the ofcial recognition of certain professions; the frst rules governing the adoption of collective agreements; wage equality; workday laws in industry and commerce; new rules about the employment of women and minors; and a law that "nationalized" the workforce (requiring that twothirds of employees be Brazilian citizens).

Te employment record book of 1932 became a watershed, separating out urban workers who were gainfully employed, belonged to recognized, State-regulated professions, and bore the ofcial stamp of the union. Tis confguration thus established a durable, stubborn link between one's employment record book, one's status as a unionized worker, and access to social benefts.

In 1934, a new Constitution would introduce the labour court system. At that point, it was overseen by *juízes classistas*, union representatives who stood in as labour judges. Tis indirectly expanded executive action into the realm of the judiciary, concentrating more power in state hands when it came to adjudicating labour conficts.

<sup>8</sup>A turn of phrase coined in 1931 by Senator Lindofo Collor, then Minister of Labour.

Dos Santos (1979) refers to this complex process of constructing new institutions as *regulated citizenship*:

All members of the community who fnd themselves in any occupation recognized and defned by law are considered citizens. Citizenship is thus expanded through the regulation of new professions and/or occupations, frst of all, and through the broadening of the scope of the rights associated to said professions, rather than the expansion of the values inherent to the concept of belonging to the community. Citizenship is embedded within one's profession, and the rights of the citizen are limited to the rights relevant to his place in the productive process, as enshrined in law (75–76).

Of course, this regulated citizenship was aimed at industrial workers, who were relatively few in number, and failed to take in the rural population: in 1940, 70% of the population lived in rural areas, and only 3% of that group owned land (Cardoso 2010). Rural poverty would be addressed not through agrarian reform—eternally postponed and sidestepped (see Chap. 10, in this book)—but by expanding the nation's agricultural frontier and occupying Amazonia and the Centre-West, seen as demographic voids. Tis made it possible to boost the meagre productivity of smallscale rural production without touching highly concentrated landholdings—and hence without challenging the bases of reproduction for many of the country's elites.

When it came to rights and benefts, social policy came to reproduce the same stratifcation instituted in the job market, setting apart those recognized as workers from the masses without citizenship. In the process, antagonisms and divisions were fostered amongst working people who were aforded diferent statuses.

One of the frst measures in the realm of social protection would be the reform of the Old-Age Pension and Retirement Funds (CAPs), in 1931. Te Eloy Chaves Act was modifed: the benefts aforded to railway workers were now extended to the employees of other companies that provided public utility services (transportation, electricity, telegraph and telephone service, water and sewage). Tis expansion did not challenge the company-specifc model, nor did it alter the fnancing rules stipulating that State representatives could not participate in the Advisory Boards.

While the number of CAPs would continue to rise (by 1936, there were 189, as opposed to 98 in 1931) (Slivnik 2018), their institutional status was shaken by the restructuring of the social insurance system, which came under State control, with the creation of the Institutes of Retirement and Old-age Pensions (Institutos de Aposentadoria e Pensões, or IAPs) in 1933.

Te frst IAP was created for maritime workers and would set the mould for the rest. From 1934 onward, other professions would create their own Institutes, among them commercial employees (IAPC), bank employees (IAPB), industrial employees (IAPI), and transportation and cargo workers (IAPTEC). Tis movement would gradually lead to the reorganization of the CAPs (one was created for civil servants in 1939).

Both models—CAPs and IAPs—would persist through the 1960s, functioning in diferent ways. Not only did they move away from the company-specifc framework and bring together all the workers in a given sector across the nation, but the IAPs also included federal representatives on their Advisory Boards who were tasked with appointing the chair. Slivnik points out another relevant diference: "the funds corresponding to the State's quota, for IAP contributions, which were obtained through newly created fees and taxes, now went through the National Treasury, unlike the Eloy Chaves Act, wherein the funds were collected by the companies themselves and deposited directly into the Funds" (Slivnik 2018: 54–55). Tis would seem to be the expression of an actuarial concern on the part of the State, which now also began to use the resources saved up in the IAPs.

By separating out the workers recognized as such into sectors controlled by State-authorized unions, the emergent social insurance model maintained the splintering of horizontal solidarity and heightened the struggle for benefts specifc to each category.

Te problems caused by this fragmented model are well known. Tey would be listed in an ILO report published in 1935 by the Ministry of Labour, Industry, and Commerce.9 Among other measures, the report

<sup>9</sup> In 1934, Adrien Tixier, an ILO employee and specialist in Social Security, came to Brazil on an independent mission to evaluate the incipient social insurance system (see Slivnik 2018: Chap. 2).

suggested the creation of the National Institute of Social Insurance (INSS) to unify the social insurance system and provide uniform rights and benefts; to set up regional funds with a minimum of 50,000 associates per organization (to ensure fnancial solvency and resilience);10 and that Brazil's social insurance legislation be brought into greater compliance with the international conventions led by the ILO.11

Te recommendations fell on deaf ears, and the IAP model was enshrined in 1937, the year in which Vargas proclaimed the Estado Novo (the new state), quashing individual and political freedoms and tightening control over unions.

As Vargas put it in 1938, responding to complaints of his curtailing of individual freedoms: "Te Estado Novo does not recognize the rights of individuals over the collective. Individuals do not have rights, they have responsibilities!" Te National Security Law of 1935 had already hammered a nail into the cofn of social movements, turning the social question into a matter of national security (177), in light of the Communist threat (Castro Gomes 2005).

Despite the advance of the social insurance system, the severe defcits in the country's social protection network were countless and unquestionable, as conservative ideologues and jurists12 associated with the Varguista push did not deny. In the early 1940s, disability benefts were far below subsistence level; those in search of outpatient services or hospitalization would fnd few options; and there was no credit available for low-income housing, one of the great demands at the time.

Moreover, very few enjoyed that insufcient protection to begin with. According to the 1940 Census, out of "26.8 million workers, only 16.6% could be considered potential benefciaries of social insurance under the legislation governing CAPs and IAPs. Among those 'left out' (those whose professional activities went unrecognized by law), 9.4 million were rural workers, 2.9 million worked in undefned or undeclared professions, and

<sup>10</sup>At that point, 80% of CAPs had fewer than 1000 covered members.

<sup>11</sup>Compensation for work accidents (1925); work-related illnesses (1925); equal treatment for foreign and domestic workers (1925); compulsory health insurance (1927); and compulsory disability, old age, and death insurance (1933).

<sup>12</sup>On this, see Cardoso (2010) for a deep analysis of the works of Oliveira Viana as a consultant for the Ministry of Labour under Vargas.

9.9 million were domestic workers"13 (Slivnik 2018: 98, 200), generally unremunerated. Even in the trades covered by legislation, coverage ranged between one-fourth and three-fourth of workers; by 1940, coverage was far from complete (Slivnik 2018).

Finally, these various institutes and funds did not provide unemployment insurance or any sort of aid for workers who left the job involuntarily. Nor were the benefts provided uniformly, except in the case of retirement benefts and pensions, which were the cornerstone of the system. Diferent sums and rules applied across each sector.14 As Werneck Vianna (1998) explains, medical assistance was only ofered if resources were available and conditioned on a supplementary contribution.

While retirement benefts for disabled and other workers' categories were slim, old-age pensions were even more so, thanks to the application of a 50% reduction.

Te minimum wage, another institutional innovation of the Vargas era, born in 1936 and still a linchpin of labour rights, began to be regulated by the federal government in 1940. Its nominal value was set very low; under no circumstance would it sufce to meet a family's needs in terms of food, clothing, hygiene, and transportation, as the law that created it imagined. Moreover, the minimum wage varied across 14 diferent administrative regions. Te minimum wage would only be established nationwide in 1984, under the military dictatorship that had been in power since 1964.

Te institutional framework that included and standardized labour laws and welfare rights would take on its defnitive form in 1943 with the introduction of the Consolidated Labour Laws (Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho, or CLT), consolidating all laws that had been created since the Revolution of 1930 to govern individual and collective labour relations (individual contracts and collective agreements; workdays, vacation, and weekly rest; protection for workers, women, and children; occupational medicine, labour courts, etc.).

In 1945, shortly before he was forced out of ofce, Vargas approved a decree creating the Brazilian Institute of Social Insurance, which was

<sup>13</sup>A total of 99% women, according to the 1940 Census (Slivnik 2018: 108).

<sup>14</sup>For more details, see Slivnik (2018).

designed to centralize and unify all existing social insurance regimes. Te decree would be revoked by his successor that year, however, leaving the fragmentation, selectivity, and minimal efcacy of Social Security intact.

Nevertheless, the creation of the CLT seems unquestionably tied to a desire to resolve the social question—understood in that moment as a labour question—in that it established the positive value of productive work.

In the scenario depicted by the "myth of concessions", labour laws and social rights emanate directly from State action and are conceded by its representatives in a peaceful process (Castro Gomes 2005), moving past conficts and struggles and addressing the social question ignored under the First Republic. Te Estado Novo is seen to have thrown itself into the task of forging a social democracy, in spite of the ongoing suppression of individual and political freedoms.

Prevailing dissatisfaction with living and working conditions, even amongst those benefting from regulated citizenship, may explain the outbreak of strikes and protests after the fall of the Estado Novo (1945) and the return to a democratic regime.

#### **1945–1963: The Social Question as the Regional Question Under Democratic Rule**

Vargas was deposed by a military junta on the eve of the frst democratic elections in 15 years. A new Constitution was ratifed in 1946, which preserved the social rights secured over the course of the 1930s, as well as their exclusionary rules. Te document represented a new commitment to democratic rule and political freedoms. It broadened political citizenship by extending the vote to all those over age 18, while still excluding the illiterate. Te right to strike would be restricted and ultimately regulated by decree, efectively banning stoppages across nearly all professions (Schwarcz and Starling 2018). Not even this rule would prove efective, however. In 1946 and 1947, bottled-up grievances spi lt onto the streets again.

Vargas was democratically elected and returned to power in 1950, having run on a campaign of expanding his nationalist, industrializing agenda—but not even this could placate the workers covered by his social legislation. In addition to factory strikes, mass mobilizations took over the streets again. In 1953, the March of the Empty Pots, against the cost of living and in support of wage increases, rallied 60,000 people in the industrial heart of the nation, São Paulo. Te marchers' demands included price freezes, an expansion of the water and sewer networks, and reforms to extend protective legislation to rural workers, among others.

Shortly thereafter came the Strike of the Tree Hundred Tousand, which took in countless industrial sectors. After a month of action, the government backed down and conceded an average salary increase of 32% (Schwarcz and Starling 2018). Beyond the salary increases, the general strike had a major impact in that it put the urban question back on the map of social demands. In the words of Leal (2011), spaces of reproduction—housing, transportation, basic sanitation, electricity, healthcare, schooling, postal services, and consumption—would reframe the essence of the social question through spontaneous action during this new phase of peripheral capitalist development.

Against a background of extreme social polarization, the Organic Social Insurance Law (LOPS) was passed in 1960, designed to unify legislation around the Institutes and Funds for retirements and pensions. Fleury (1994) describes LOPS as a second attempt to rationalize the system, the frst having been Vargas' abortive Brazilian Institute of Social Security.

LOPS marks a fundamental change: it moves away from the fully funded model and introduces the public simple distribution model, as well as authorizing the inclusion of self-employed workers in cities as individual contributors (Teixeira 1990). "Te focus shifted to standardizing benefts and broadening coverage—preserving the original exclusion of rural workers—and the end result was a demagogical gesture that worsened the system's fnancial straits even as it failed to expand its narrow fnancial base" (Fleury 1994: 194).

Instead of ebbing, this tension and social agitation would draw strength from the protagonism of new social actors, who had not yet been incorporated into the realm of regulated citizenship. Te independent mobilization of rural workers would redefne the social question, which had hitherto been framed in terms of social legislation and an existing framework that marginalized them.

Small farmers and their families rose up across the country, calling for access to and legalization of the occupied land where they were working and resisting attempts to expel them. Te struggle against the latifundia system entailed fghting both the concentration of property and the profound poverty to which the citizenship-deprived masses were subjected. Tese rebellions began in southern Brazil, but the Northeast would see the emergence of a peasant organization that would expand the social question beyond the urban industrial sphere.

Te Peasant Leagues, formally constituted in 1955,15 served to put land reform on the nation's political and social agenda. Te right to land, here, was equated with the right to decent work, free of oppressive relations. Te Leagues formed in the sugarcane felds, a region where the majority of the enslaved population had been taken during the colonial period. Tere followed four centuries of absolute, quasi-feudal control by *coronéis*, local landowners, whose power was now threatened by the independent organization of largely illiterate and destitute farm workers, forgotten by the Republic and by its democracy.

Reluctant to collaborate with the State, the Leagues moved to occupy fallow or abandoned plots of land to allow poor, exploited peasants to cultivate them and thus improve their standard of subsistence. Tey provided legal advice and medical assistance and defended members who were threatened or expelled by major landowners, who subsequently refused to compensate them for their investment in the land. On the whole, the Leagues worked to denounce violence as a way to regulate labour relations.

For the frst time, working independently, the citizenship-deprived rural population would act to reframe the social question in Brazil.

Overlapping rural and agrarian issues, compounding the rural-urban confict and the new shape of the urban question, would make approaches

<sup>15</sup>Te Union of Rural Farmworkers and Labourers (ULTAB) had been created in São Paulo the year before, and it would become the National Confederation of Workers in Agriculture (CONTAG) in 1963.

to the social question as a whole even more fraught. In 1963, practically faced with a looming insurrection, João Goulart's labour-friendly administration introduced two aggressive measures designed to meet the demands of rural workers.

First, the legislature approved a bill that had been tabled since 1956, creating the Rural Workers' Statute (EST), which fnally extended to rural wage labourers the same labour rights which urban workers had enjoyed for two decades: unionization, a minimum wage, vacation, paid weekends, advance notice, and compensation. Te statute also included special measures designed to protect women and children. While undoubtedly innovative, it was also selective, leaving out the vast majority of the diverse workforce in the countryside. Even so, its potential to reform and modernize social relations in the countryside posed such a threat that the EST would be revoked in 1973, during the most repressive period of the military dictatorship.

Second, the government created the Rural Worker Assistance Fund (FUNRURAL). Tis pioneering measure stipulated that labourers in the countryside would have the right to 1% of the sale price of their products. Te funds would be channelled through the Institute of Retirement and Pension Benefts for Industrial Workers (IAPI). In practice, the programme ran consistent defcits, given obstacles to revenue collection. It would be reformulated and made independent, with an administrative structure of its own, in 1971, under the military regime.

In both instances, these attempts to regulate citizenship for rural workers and small farmers proved unsatisfactory, as the concept represented a threat to the power of agrarian oligarchies, which frontally opposed the logic of individual and social rights (see Ondetti, in this volume).

## **1964–1988: Dictatorship, the Authoritarian Modernization of Social Insurance, and the Struggle for Democracy**

Te authoritarian context that followed the civil-military coup of 1964 was marked by the suppression of political freedoms and the furious repression of all opposition. It gained decisive support from the urban middle classes, fuelled by their dread of Communism and the consequences of prolonged economic stagnation. Buoyed by these fears, a military dictatorship would govern the country for the next 21 years, with a technocratic model of development that attained eye-popping growth rates (11% per year from 1968 to 1973). Tis growth lent some legitimacy to the military government; at the same time, inequality also deepened.

Surprisingly, amidst a severe policy of wage reduction, which would diminish the purchasing power of the minimum wage and the working classes, the military regime completely reorganized the social insurance system, in an overhaul focused on efciency. Te system would undergo not one, but two profound administrative reforms.

Te frst reform came in 1966: the unifcation of all IAPs, with the exception of the institute for civil servants (IPASE), led to the creation of the National Institute of Social Insurance (INPS). Te authoritarian regime was able to overcome resistance from unions,16 aided by their lack of funding. Te union base was stifed, and control of the system was shifted to a public structure, centralized at the federal level.

Tose covered by the INPS were entitled to retirement, pensions, and other social insurance benefts, as well as medical treatment at partnering public or private hospitals. Tese benefciaries were formally employed workers (and their dependents), those with their employment record books up to date. Left out were the informally employed, domestic workers, the clergy, and rural workers. Te reform established a compulsory contribution rate for employers and employees, and the beneft calculation rules were applied uniformly, regardless of each sector's organizational strength.

Tis was yet another step towards the universalization of the system. However, this unifcation was motivated less by universality than by efciency, as it preserved occupational distinctions at its foundation. Civil servants, for example, were maintained in a parallel system along the lines of the old IAPs. In 1968, however, the regime began allowing those not

<sup>16</sup>Werneck Vianna (1998) recalls that previous attempts to unify the IAPs under democratic regimes failed because union and social insurance activists mobilized workers in protected occupations in defence of their rights, thus preserving their political privileges.

formally employed—employers, as well as the self-employed—to contribute to the system independently. Tis expanded the system's fnancial base, and the improvement in coverage was taken by some as compensation for the repression of social demands (Teixeira 1990).

Another creation from this period was the Severance Indemnity Fund (*Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço*, or FGTS), a sort of unemployment insurance instituted after lobbying from the business sector. Formally employed workers were entitled to a savings account in their name, linked to their work contract, into which a sum corresponding to 8% of their salary would be deposited on a monthly basis. Tose dismissed without cause would be able to access the funds in the account. In fact, the FGTS was introduced to make it legal to fre workers who'd been continually employed for over ten years, since under the terms of the CLT they had achieved *estabilidade* (tenure) and could not be dismissed.

Another important institutional innovation that arose from this restructuring, led by the now-unifed Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance, was the framing of a national healthcare system that privileged an assistance-based approach funnelled through private networks. It was at this point that, as part of its economic development project, the military government supported the growth of a powerful medical-industrial complex, driving the privatization of medical assistance, whether through purchases in the private sector funded by Social Security or public subsidies for the construction of private hospitals. Tis would kick-start the process of the internationalization of the healthcare system, as multinational companies arrived in Brazil to meet the healthcare consumption demands of the rising middle classes.

In the feld of healthcare, a new pattern of stratifcation manifested itself. Low-income workers who were currently formally employed were treated at public hospitals, institutions plagued by defcient fnancing and with dismal records in terms of patient outcomes. As increased demand led to bottlenecks, new routes of access to private medical services emerged, company health plans chief among them. Te result was that State increasingly purchased third-party services on the market to meet the needs of social insurance benefciaries (Werneck Vianna 1998). Meanwhile, the middle classes and those with signifcant purchasing power were drawn in by the promise of better care through private medical institutions, driven by fscal incentives (individual tax deductions17) and rising incomes. All the while, the poor, those deprived of citizenship, remained at the mercy of a meagre network of philanthropic institutions.

At the same time, "exclusionary expansion" continued to hold sway, with the gradual, almost always incomplete incorporation of new categories. PRORURAL, or the Programme of Assistance for Rural Workers, was instituted in 1971; despite the new name, this was merely a revamped version of the 1963 FUNRURAL. In spite of challenges to implementation and its negligible functional efcacy, PRORURAL did provide textual reinforcement of social rights for groups that had previously gone wholly unprotected or had only patchy coverage.

Another relevant extension of coverage came with the 1972 regulation of the profession of domestic worker and its subsequent incorporation into the social insurance system. As recently as 2013, the majority of working women in Brazil were domestic workers. But the law remained a dead letter.

Te second and most signifcant reform of the social insurance system under the authoritarian regime would come in 1977 when the military government completely overhauled the National System of Social Insurance and Assistance (SINPAS). For the frst time, social assistance was included in the system's organizational structure. In an attempt to ensure better management, diferent services were addressed by a variety of bodies. Social Security remained with INPS; medical care was taken over by the National Social Insurance Medical Assistance Institute (INAMPS);18 and the Brazilian Assistance League Foundation (FLBA)19 and National Foundation for the Welfare of Minors (FUNABEM)20

<sup>17</sup>Te 1966 tax reform and the 1967 Constitution inaugurated a new array of tax deductions.

<sup>18</sup>Other creations of the period included the Institute for the Financial Administration of Social Insurance and Assistance (IAPAS), tasked with collecting contributions, overseeing resources, and managing the system's funds, and DATAPREV (Public Pension System Data Base), which worked to systematize and manage the network's data.

<sup>19</sup>Originally the Brazilian Assistance League—the organization was founded in 1942 to provide aid to the families of soldiers serving in World War II. It was reorganized as a Foundation in 1969 by the dictatorship.

<sup>20</sup>Created in 1964. Under the military dictatorship, juvenile delinquents came to be seen as a "national security issue", and there emerged a consensus that poor children belonged in boarding schools. Te repressive policy of sending delinquents to reform school lasted through the start of the re-democratization process in the mid-1980s.

would be brought in to address the indigent population, albeit employing a repressive approach. In practice, the system continued to segregate services by clientele. More troublingly, as this assistance was institutionalized, it developed a clear punitive bent; the groups it attended almost exclusively were single mothers (LBA) and juvenile delinquents (FUNABEM), both targeted by public policy by virtue of their deviant behaviours.

Such a distorted perspective of social assistance explains why the government implemented no poverty-fghting programmes supported by cash transfers to mitigate the hardships sufered by those unable to meet their most basic needs. Poverty mitigation, meanwhile, remained largely charitable and provided by private institutions.

As the 1970s' decade drew to a close, the economic miracle began to melt away and the social question was channelled into the struggle for democratic freedoms, amnesty (1979), and political opening. With the support of the Catholic Church, society organized and mobilized in working-class neighbourhoods. Associations of all stripes were formed, rooted in a shared logic of resistance to the dictatorship. One item on the agenda, just as at the turn of the century, was the cost of living: the working population bore the brunt of skyrocketing infation (211% in 1983) and considerable wage cuts, which reduced the real value of the minimum wage by over 50% (Lavinas 2017). Tough GDP per capita rose 6.1% p.a. from 1970 to 1980, the Gini index, as measured by household income, went from 0.504 in 1960 to 0.592 in 1980. Tis was the rise of the "new trade unionism" (Schwarcz and Starling 2018), which broke away from the state-controlled model of the Vargas era and opened up a phase in which leaders would seek to forge a unifed representation for the working classes, moving beyond socio-occupational categories.

Pressure to put an end to the dictatorship grew across the country. So, too, did reactions from within the armed forces from those opposed to a return to democratic order; repressive mechanisms which had never been dismantled were set to work again.

On January 15, 1985, a new civil government inaugurated the New Republic, and a Constituent Assembly would be called in 1987 to draw up the nation's new carta magna. Rarely had Brazil seen such widespread mobilization and engagement with the constitutional debate. Trough associations, committees promoting grassroots participation, activist gatherings, and unions, petitions would be drawn up and hundreds of proposed amendments were submitted from all sectors of society. Tis may serve to show how it is nearly impossible to speak of *the* social question in Brazil, given the enmeshed tangle of issues that would come to shape the Citizen Constitution of 1988. Tat Constitution would become the repository of collective hopes of addressing a whole variety of social issues.

Among the groups most active in drawing up the section on social rights, scholars, politicians, and activists from the feld of Social Security took pride of place.

#### **1988–2015: A New Wave of Democracy—Social Security for All21**

Te 1988 Constitution establishes citizenship as one of its fundamental pillars. Among its explicit objectives are the construction of a free, just society rooted in solidarity, the eradication of poverty and the reduction of social and regional inequalities, as well as the welfare of all, without prejudice or any form of discrimination. Te document guarantees the participation of civil society across a variety of forums (healthcare; education; social assistance) to democratize the decision-making process.

Te process of re-founding the nation (Paoli 1989) and the return of democratic rule, would, however, unearth issues that had to be addressed urgently. Extreme poverty, that long-stifed element of the social question, fnally came to the fore. It had worsened belatedly, not as a consequence of the waves of industrialization and the impoverishment of the working classes—which predated workers' mobilizations—but as a manifestation of inertial infation, which had been forcing up the prices of basic necessities since the 1970s. In 1993, hyperinfation hit 2477% (IPCA—IBGE, Contas Nacionais 2018), threatening the very survival of multiple sectors of the population.

<sup>21</sup>Part of this section draws on Lavinas (2017).

Te fght against hunger would become a central element of the social agenda. As in the past, it would focus on the struggle against the cost of living. Te frst major social mobilization along these lines was the campaign for Citizen Action Against Hunger, Extreme Poverty, and For Life.

Poverty as a social question would become a central part of the landscape of social struggles, as the social protection system enshrined in the 1988 Constitution, with the creation of Social Security, was regulated and implemented. For the frst time, the term "Social Security" was added to the body of the law, and Brazil's poor became entitled to rights.

Te Constitution of 1988 was a watershed moment in Brazil in terms of social rights. With it, the country would be transformed. Articles 194 and 195 of the Constitution implemented a Social Security System, comprising healthcare, pensions and other labour-related benefts, welfare schemes, and unemployment insurance (Article 201). Under the Citizen Constitution, healthcare is defned as universal and free of charge. Nonetheless, private institutions may work to complement the Unifed Health System (Sistema Único de Saúde, or SUS), in keeping with directives established by the public system. Social insurance, including unemployment insurance, is contributory and guarantees a relatively broad array of types of coverage in cases of forced or defnitive inactivity (payas-you-go model). Social insurance also guarantees pensions and other benefts to small family farmers irrespective of prior contribution records Tis is a major achievement in the process of universalizing access to pensions for both rural and urban workers. Non-contributory old-age pensions to rural workers, both male and female, are paid out of the general budget of the Social Security System (collecting contributions from both employees and employers). Tey are not considered welfare benefts but a solidary principle in order to promote equality of rights. Social assistance schemes, meanwhile, introduce the right to a safety net for the demonstrably poor, subject to means test.

Te incorporation of social assistance under the umbrella of Social Security comes as an extremely relevant institutional innovation. Until this point, care for the poorest and destitute had been mostly limited to charity and philanthropic organizations, but then it has become the State´s legal obligation (Lavinas et al. 2017).

#### **9 The Anatomy of the Social Question and the Evolution…**

Other equally important rights were written into the letter of the law: the right to housing and the social function of the city and urban property; the social function of agricultural property (see Chap. 10, in this book) and the promotion of agrarian reform; food security; the right to free and secular education at all levels (day care and preschool; primary, middle, and high school; college; and youth and adult education); and the right to security, to say nothing of the Constitution's considerable expansion of labour and union rights. Eduardo Fagnani and Flavio Tonelli Vaz write that the Constitution of 1988 inaugurated "a social protection system inspired by the values of the social welfare state" (2013: 98–99) as seen in Europe.

Finally, the Constitution reafrmed the ILO model of tripartite fnancing for Social Security. Should the National Treasury need to transfer fscal resources to the General Social Insurance Regime (RPPS, which is contributory), one might argue that the situation would not constitute a "defcit", but rather a follow-through of a constitutional responsibility (Fagnani 2005).

To shore up the social order outlined in the Constitution, the members of the Constituent Assembly established a specifc budget for Social Security, set apart from the fscal budget (revenues from which would go towards fnancing other social rights, such as education, sanitation, housing, etc.). Te idea was to ensure a measure of fscal autonomy for Social Security by feeding it with certain exclusive revenue streams drawing on a variety of sources.

With this in mind, the Social Security budget draws of of contributions from employees and employers and from voluntary contributors (self-employed workers, idle working-age adults, etc.), in keeping with the logic of contributory Social Security. It is also fed by so-called social contributions, which include taxes on consumption, refecting a societywide contributive efort, or on company earnings, rather than income tax. Finally, there are also contributions from lotteries and revenue from the ministries that make up the various sectors of Social Security, although these are modest sums. In theory, all of these revenue sources are tied to Social Security and supply it exclusively. However, since 1994, the federal government started slashing the Social Security budget in order to shift funds over to the fscal budget, applying a 20% cutback22 (dubbed as the Unbinding of Federal Revenue or DRU).

#### **National Social Insurance Scheme**

Brazil adopted two public social insurance regimes in addition to the complementary fully funded regime, which is voluntary. Tey were all instituted by the Social Security Organic Law n. 8.212 of 1991.

Te General Social Insurance Regime (Regime Geral da Previdência Social, or RGPS) provides pensions and other contributory benefts for workers in the private sector, and is operated by the National Social Security Institute (Instituto Nacional da Seguridade Social, or INSS). Te Special Social Insurance Regime (Regime Próprio da Previdência Social, or RPPS), meanwhile, covers civil servants at all levels of government and the military, and it is included in the fscal budget (not in the Social Security budget). Finally, the 1988 Constitution created the Complementary Social Insurance Regime, served by open (run by banks and fnancial institutions) and closed (company-based) private pension funds, a system designed to complement workers' incomes after their defnitive retirement. Tese complementary fully funded pension schemes are subject to private regulations. Te open private pension fund are voluntary, whereas the company-based funds tend to be mandatory, reaching the fraction of wages that surpasses the public contribution cap (see later).

Te RGPS is contributory and compulsory for workers in the private sector covered by the Consolidated Labour Laws but also takes in a broad range of voluntary policyholders (working-age adults, the self-employed, individual micro-entrepreneurs, and rural producers). It is a pay-as-yougo regime, with rules that, though distinct, cover both rural and urban dwellers.

Te contribution rate is 20% of received remuneration or any contribution between the social insurance foor (the current minimum wage) and the contribution cap, set at R\$5840.00 (USD 1500) per month in

<sup>22</sup>Lifted to 30% in August 2016.

2019. Tis 20% is split between workers and employers; the workers' part is graduated, varying from 8% to 11%, while the rest is the employer's responsibility. Non-salaried contributors pay the full 20%, with the exception of Individual Micro-Entrepreneurs (*Microempreendedores Individuais*, or MEIs), for whom the rate was lessened (invariably 5% of a minimum wage), and small family farmers, who are taxed 2.1% of the value of the gross revenue from the sale of their production. In addition to this category of contributor, classed as "specially insured", rural social insurance includes two other forms of membership, which fall under the general contribution rules for the RGPS.23

Te array of benefts provided by social insurance is a varied one, ranging from retirement plans and pensions to paid maternity leave, unemployment insurance, family allowance, sick pay, accident benefts, and aid for inmates' families, among others. Not all working categories are eligible to all benefts. Te regulations vary according to the beneft and the benefciary, but over recent years, they have trended towards greater uniformity, even between the RGPS and the RPPS (for instance, the foor and the cap are the same across both regimes).

As of 2019, approximately 30.3 million retirees and pensioners are covered by the RGPS. Around two-thirds of all RGPS' monthly retirement benefts and pensions amount to the social insurance foor, which stands at the minimum wage. Of all benefts, 80% fall below the level of two minimum wages. Around 85% of the elderly population (60+) is covered by social insurance or assistance old-age benefts (Continuous Cash Beneft—BPC, see later) in Brazil.

A broad pension reform was approved in 2019, with the purpose of unifying both regimes (private sector and civil servants) as recently achieved in China (see Chap. 3, in this book) and trying to impose a short-term transition towards a fully funded compulsory system. Tis reform will have further impacts on the Social Security system as a whole, negatively afecting the healthcare system and welfare schemes.

<sup>23</sup> In addition to the "specially insured worker" (a category exclusive to small rural producers working on family farms), rural social insurance also includes the categories "individual contributor" (rural producer and self-employed worker) and "rural employee" (worker who provides services of a rural nature to an employer on a non-sporadic, remunerated basis). For individual contributors, a 20% rate is levied on the base salary, while rural employers have 8, 9, or 11 percent of the base salary withheld and levied by their employer.

#### **Social Assistance**

Te right to a minimum level of protection by the State has completely reconfgured the social pact. Now, the Organic Social Assistance Law (LOAS, Law n. 8.742), passed in 1993, guarantees a minimum wage to poor senior citizens (aged 65 or older) and the handicapped living in families with per capita household income below one-fourth of the current minimum wage. Te number of recipients of the BPC (Non-Contributory Regular Pension) amounts to 4.9 million. Te monthly beneft corresponds to a minimum wage, equivalent to R\$998 in 2019. As stated by the Constitution, it is universal, though means-tested, applying to both rural and urban areas.

In parallel, since 2003, those who are not eligible for a BPC—that is, millions of children, young adults and able-bodied adults—can now qualify for a Bolsa Família stipend. In this respect, Bolsa Família went on to fx the limited coverage imposed by the eligibility criteria of the BPC. As an anti-poverty programme, it is less costly than BPC, given the diference in the average beneft—which in the case of Bolsa Família is R\$185 (US\$ 48) per month. Te household beneft is subdivided in a basic stipend and a variable one paid for children or youth aged 0–17. In 2019, while federal spending with Bolsa Família corresponded to 0.48% of Brazilian GDP, the BPC represented 0.88% (Lavinas 2020). Targeting mechanisms also difer; unlike the BPC, Bolsa Família recipients are subject to controls and conditionalities (school attendance, medical visits, immunization). In 2019, 14 million families are Bolsa Família benefciaries, a headcount that certainly falls short of the total target population. "Bolsa Família" has been recognized nationally and internationally as an exceptional public poverty-fghting policy. None of this, however, was enough to ensure that the programme be enshrined as a right, ensuring full coverage for its target population. As a non-right, "Bolsa Família bends to budgetary logic and fails to expand its coverage as a countercyclical measure, as might be expected" (Lavinas 2017: 131).

#### **The Unifed Healthcare System**

Te utopia of healthcare for all is undeniably the hallmark of not just the 1988 Constitution but also the entire societal ideal in play at the time. Te 1988 Constitution created the Unifed Health System (Sistema Único de Saúde, or SUS), specifcally as a counterpoint to the trend towards the privatization of Brazilian healthcare, inherited from the years of the dictatorship. It was authorized by the SUS Organic Law n. 8.080 of 1990.

Te principle behind the public healthcare system, inspired on universal European models, is "health and democracy". Te slogan speaks to the basic idea behind the public health movement, which led to the healthcare reform, as well as to its mobilizing power. Te aim is to break away from the legacy of liberal, proft-oriented medicine and cut down on the use of the designation "philanthropic" for healthcare institutions. In their place would come a public system committed to full service, universal coverage, and equal access.

Nevertheless, SUS does not guarantee full public provision, since most services are contracted out to the private sector via concessions. Despite the tremendous expansion of the public health network in the 1990s and its open-door treatment policy, private providers grew quickly, gained momentum, and ultimately drained SUS funding through tax waivers and tax credits. To give some sense for the contradictions and ambiguities that plague healthcare policy, total public spending at all levels of government on healthcare stands at 4% of GDP (multilateral agencies recommend 6%). Private spending, meanwhile, which is largely out of pocket, has come to 5.5% of GDP. Te public network treats 75% of the population, while the other 25% patronize the private sector; this is an eloquent testament to the twinned, hybrid health system in Brazil.

Ever since its creation, the Unifed Health System has sufered from chronic underfnancing as a result of the government's decision to support the expansion of the private sector—which is now increasingly international and fnancialized. To this day, the healthcare plan market, created in 1968 by the military regime, is being underwritten by hefty tax incentives. Ocké-Reis and da Gama (2016) estimate that, between 2000 and 2013, tax credits on healthcare (through waivers) in relation to total expenditures by the Ministry of Health remained practically stable, around 30% per year.

Programmes such as Farmácia Popular, which allows for the free distribution of medication and has extremely high approval ratings, meet just one-third of prevailing demand. Te result is that medications are the ffth quintile of the income distribution's number one healthcare expense (Lavinas and Gentil 2018). In short, the Brazilian health system remains deeply stratifed by income.

At its birth, then, Social Security was marked by a mixture of improvements and ambiguities that refect historic problems and the challenges posed by multiple social questions. Tis is due in part to prevailing macroeconomic policy, which has given no quarter to a more efective universalization of social rights. Social spending has risen signifcantly, but it remains predominantly concentrated in cash transfers—they make up for 68.8% of social spending across all levels of government—as opposed to in kind provision (Lavinas 2017)—which has been seen to have much broader redistributive efects and to homogenize the patterns of social reproduction across social classes.

Te importance and scale that the social protection system acquired through the consolidation of Social Security broadened the process of social inclusion, which was also driven by a new cycle of economic growth that incorporated tens of millions into the mass consumer market who had previously been excluded or only marginally included. Tis would become clear at the peak of the social-developmentalist model (2003–2014), which combined three drivers of growth: a renewed focus on natural resources, the expansion of the domestic consumer market, and investments (Bielschowsky 2012).

But amidst a period of wage recovery, with broadened poverty-fghting programmes, access to credit, and incorporation into the mass consumer market, Brazilians—now armed with citizenship—took to the streets en masse to call out for public transportation, quality public healthcare and education, and afordable housing.

Tese would ultimately attract anti-Workers' Party right-wing groups and serve as a magnet for the frustrations and aspirations of multiple political positions' deepening political divergences. Te Landless Workers' Movement (MST), created in 1984, and the Homeless Workers' Movement (MTST), from 1997, are evidence that forms of exclusion persist in both rural and urban environments. Democracy and the consolidation of a social protection system—understood as access to social ownership—have not alleviated the hardships faced by those seeking to live of the land they work or those who hope to fnd a decent roof under which to live.

Te Black movement, and its struggle for racial equality, is another social force that has redefned the terms of the social question in Brazil. While the 1989 Caó Act made racism a non-bailable crime with no statute of limitations, it proved necessary to create a Statute of Racial Equality in 2010 to ensure the practical application of equality of opportunity; the defence of individual, collective, and difuse ethnic rights; and the fght against discrimination. Black and Brown people represent 52% of the Brazilian population, but they are disproportionately poor, undereducated, and most vulnerable to violence, especially when wielded by the State. Being a Black, in Brazil, is still "a matter for the police", as the saying goes.

A hundred years after the abolition of slavery, the recognition that racism is an essential aspect of the social question in Brazil made it possible to take steps away from colourism and a long past of exclusion. Legally mandated diversity has advanced, moving towards the universalization of access. Te 2012 Law of Social Quotas, for example, set aside 50% of admission spots at federal public universities for young people from lowincome families (per capita household income of up to 1.5 times minimum wages) who attended public high school, a measure which signifcantly boosted Black enrolment. Te 2014 Law of Racial Quotas set aside 20% of federal jobs for Black, Brown, and Indigenous candidates.

Te social question in twenty-frst-century Brazil remains defned by the ongoing struggle for the recognition of social cleavages that have become naturalized and masked, and by the implosion of certain barriers that reinforced selectivity, stratifcation, and discrimination.

## **Conclusion: The Social Compact at Risk**

Tis chapter has sought to systematize multiple facets of the social question in Brazil, covering a period that opens with the incipient debate about social protection begun in the late 1910s (for a summary, see Table 9.1). Looking back on the century-long process of the construction of a system of Social Security in a peripheral economy marked by deep structural heterogeneity, we may see that the layers of recognition (Leisering 2019, see also Chap. 1 of this book) of the social question have continued to multiply and remain intertwined and indivisible.

Social policy has expanded both under democracy and dictatorship. Under the frst period of dictatorship (Vargas, 1930–1945), social policy has been instrumentalized as a means of social control. Labour relations were at the foreground of social policy and labour legislation built on the denial of the civil rights of workers and citizens. During the second period of dictatorship, 1964–1985, Social Security was modernized.

We have seen the continual, growing advance of coverage against risks, which moved from the regulated citizenship of the frst phases of state-led industrialization to the universalization of rights enshrined in the Citizen Constitution of 1988. Te social question, newly framed in terms of social inclusion, redefned the scope of social policies and reafrmed universalistic value orientations.

While the early social security and labour legislation would organize the labour market to ballast the process of industrialization and the conservative modernization of Brazilian society, the consolidation of citizenship belatedly introduce an entirely new dynamic.

Te re-democratization of Brazilian society in 1988 allowed for the creation of a relatively solid, broad system of social protection bolstered by exclusive funding, which included both labour rights and the struggle against poverty.

Tis being said, the realm of the public provision of goods and decommodifed services is also a stronghold for resistance to the equalization of opportunities. We have not yet been able to bypass income and status as forms of access to quality education, healthcare, or even public safety, although identity-driven movements are currently leading the


The social question in Brazil: changing ideas and policies

**Table 9.1** **337**

(*continued*)


**L. Lavinas**

**Table 9.1**

(continued)

charge in denouncing how this exclusionary universalization acts in a discriminatory fashion and undermines citizenship.

Tis positive and promising outlook is nevertheless at stake and has been under attack since the impeachment of democratically elected President Dilma, in 2016, and the following election of far-right President Jair Bolsonaro, who took ofce in January 2019 and is openly committed to the dismantling of the public sphere in Brazil.

Two labour reforms, adopted in 2018, have already reinforced informality and work precariousness, representing a blow to social rights. With declining contributions from employees and payroll exemptions for employers, the Social Security budget will soon be stifed and unable to fund pensions and other labour benefts. As a consequence, the structural heterogeneity that decades of industrial policymaking and various developmentalist models failed to overcome will amplify again, magnifying inequalities, as is already the case. Sick-pay, occupational accident insurance, and maternity leave are benefts in peril. Tey risk being moved from the scope of the Social Security system to the fnancial sector, through contracts with private insurers. New waves of pension reform will probably undermine further the public pay as you go system.

Even the Bolsa Família programme, relying on targeting mechanisms, is now contested, collapsing the most innovative dimension of the 1988 social compact: the right to minimal protection from the State, through a subsistence income. A sign that compensatory anti-poverty schemes, albeit cheap and central to the logic of residual welfare policies, do not escape the grip of the neoliberal mindset that governs today's Brazil.

Te assault on the social through disenfranchisement, if unstopped, will interrupt and prevent social citizenship from fully consolidating in Brazil.

#### **References**

Bielschowsky, Ricardo (2012) Estratégia de desenvolvimento e as três frentes de expansão no Brasil: um desenho conceitual. *Economia e Sociedade* 21 (especial): 729–747.


**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

Te images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **10**

# **Ideational Bases of Land Reform in Brazil: 1910 to the Present**

**Gabriel Ondetti**

Brazil's colonial past conferred upon it a highly unequal landowning structure in which the large majority of the rural population was either landless or land-poor, while many vast holdings were not intensively utilised. Neither independence from Portugal in the early nineteenth century nor the transition from monarchy to republic near the end of that century ameliorated this situation. At least in part because of this underlying structural context, the "agrarian question," or what to do about a highly unequal rural landholding structure, has been a longstanding source of debate and political confict. Few issues have been as salient or provoked as much strife.

Te agrarian question is diferent from the issues discussed in the rest of this volume. Most obviously, unlike a social security system, land reform for the most part only benefts the rural population. In addition, the agrarian question has not been just a social question but also an economic one. Indeed, its rise as a national issue in Brazil was driven to a substantial extent by concerns that an unproductive farm sector would

G. Ondetti (\*)

Missouri State University, Springfeld, MO, USA e-mail: GabrielOndetti@missouristate.edu

<sup>©</sup> Te Author(s) 2021 **343**

L. Leisering (ed.), *One Hundred Years of Social Protection*, Global Dynamics of Social Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54959-6\_10

hinder industrialisation. Still, there is good reason to address land reform as a social issue. Given the frequent exclusion of rural populations from early social security development, land reform can be thought of as a kind of proto-social protection programme for the countryside, providing a measure of income and food security in lieu of cash transfers. Indeed, some would argue that it is superior to cash, since land ownership provides a degree of autonomy and self-sufciency that cash cannot.

Tis chapter explores the historical trajectory of the agrarian question in Brazil. It focuses, in particular, on ideas about the nature of the agrarian structure, its consequences and how to address the problems it causes. However, as with other chapters in the volume, it is not simply an intellectual history. Rather, it examines how ideas have interacted with other variables, especially collective actors, legal institutions and policy outcomes. While the emphasis is on ideas advanced by advocates of reform, some attention is devoted to opposing arguments. It draws on both existing scholarly works and a variety of primary sources, including constitutional texts, newspaper reports, documents published by social movement and non-governmental organisations and ofcial land reform data. Te chapter flls a signifcant gap in the scholarship on land reform in Brazil. Although the literature in this area is rich, there are few historical overviews, and those that do exist (Camargo 1986; Linhares and Teixeira da Silva 1999) do not focus specifcally on ideas. In addition, those works are now somewhat dated.

A historical analysis virtually demands some kind of periodisation as a way of making sense of the evolution of events, but breaking history into discrete segments is a somewhat arbitrary and artifcial exercise. No claim is made that the scheme used here is the only one possible or even the best one for all purposes. Nevertheless, the chapter argues that the trajectory of the agrarian question can be usefully understood in terms of four basic periods, each of which was characterised by a distinct set of political dynamics with regard to this issue.

During the frst, which encompasses the 1910s, some of the ideas that would most profoundly shape the agrarian question in Brazil were articulated. However, a political context marked by strong landowner dominance sharply limited their infuence. Te second period, from the 1920s to the mid-1950s, was characterised by important political transformations and the recognition of the agrarian question as a pressing issue. Pro-land reform ideas difused more widely and gained tentative expression in legal institutions, especially the constitution. However, the state did little to alter the structure of landholding, in part because the direct benefciaries of land redistribution, the rural lower class, remained politically quiescent.

Te third period, from the end of the 1950s through the mid-1980s, brought greater confict over land. It was marked initially by the emergence, for the frst time in Brazilian history, of a grassroots land reform movement. However, rather than achieving its goal, the movement contributed to the rise of a repressive military dictatorship that ultimately rejected its demands. Still, the conficts of the period brought signifcant institutional advances and the emergence of an intellectual and political movement within the Catholic Church highly favourable to land reform. Both would infuence the events of the fourth period.

From the late 1980s to the present, the democratisation of Brazilian politics has helped produce unprecedented increases in both mobilisation for land and actual implementation of land reform. Although the major ideas supporting reform have remained largely the same as in the past, some new rationales have emerged in recent decades, linked mainly to environmental and health concerns. In addition, facing greater threats than before, landowning elites and their allies have engaged in innovative forms of organisation and devised new rhetorical strategies focusing on the modernisation of agriculture and on the failings of the many land reform settlements (see below) that now dot the countryside.

While land reform has clearly reached its historical peak during this most recent period, the degree of change in the agrarian structure remains modest, hardly altering the general distribution of rural property, which remains among the world's most unequal. Overall, then, Brazil is a case in which pro-land reform ideas have deep historical roots and have achieved considerable institutional expression, but in which actual land redistribution has remained superfcial, due to a political power balance that has favoured large landowners over the major direct benefciaries of land redistribution, the rural landless and land-poor.

## **Emergence of Pro-land Reform Ideas: the 1910s**

Land reform would not become a substantial national political issue in Brazil until the 1930s. However, some of the core ideas behind it emerged earlier. Te 1910s constitute a particularly important period in this sense, since they saw the publication of a number of texts providing compelling rationales for state intervention in rural land ownership.

Some scholars trace the origins of the Brazilian agrarian question to late nineteenth-century liberal political elites, like Andre Rebouças, an advisor to Emperor Pedro III who advocated the end of slavery and the distribution of land to former slaves (Camargo 1986: 56),1 or Rui Barbosa, a legislator and government minister who, following the establishment of a republic in 1889, pushed for reforms that would create a more fuid land market (Linhares and Teixeira da Silva 1999: 71–75). However, a lucid general argument in favour of promoting equitable landownership would only appear some years later.

Tat argument came from the pen of Alberto Torres, a politician and intellectual known for his nationalist views (Pinto 2010). During the frst half of the 1910s, Torres published a series of essays and books that advanced major criticisms of Brazilian society. Many had to do with the political regime established by the 1891 constitution, but he also laid out a sophisticated critique of an economic system devoted to producing a handful of export commodities (mainly cofee, sugar, latex and cacao) on large estates. Torres argued that this system enriched a narrow landowning elite at the expense of society as a whole. Not only did it concentrate the income from agriculture, but it also contributed to high food costs (since the best land was devoted to export crops) and tended to degrade the environment because the easy access of wealthy planters to land discouraged careful use of soils.

Torres advocated reforms that would partially reorient agriculture towards the production of food for the domestic market and promote wider ownership of land. Such a system, he argued, would increase

<sup>1</sup> Slavery ended in 1888, later than in any other country in the Americas. Rebouças' advocacy notwithstanding, the freed slaves did not receive land.

popular welfare, stem migration of the rural poor to the cities and promote better stewardship of natural resources. Torres did not go as far as to urge expropriation of private land, but he did suggest that the state should take the lead in distributing unused or unclaimed lands in small parcels to the landless and land-poor. According to the author:

"it would make sense to promote…the division of properties in order to disperse wealth, thus consolidating popular welfare. Our politicians have not yet grasped that Brazil needs to strengthen its people, endowing the poor classes of society with that minimum level of security and welfare that comes from owning property…Our policies should move with greater courage – without attacking property or established rights – toward a wider distribution of wealth and a more complete levelling of opportunities and means for action." (Torres 2002 [frst published in 1914])2

At roughly the same time that Torres was elaborating his critiques, another author in distant France was launching a broader attack on property rights that would eventually wield signifcant infuence in Brazil, as well as other Latin American countries. Based partially on earlier writings by August Comte, the jurist Léon Duguit argued in a series of lectures delivered in Argentina in 1911 that private ownership of land (and other capital assets) should be understood not as an inalienable individual right but as a "social function" (Duguit 1918). As such, it involves an obligation to use land in ways that beneft society as a whole, which in practice mainly means putting it into agricultural production. If the owner does not fulfl this obligation, the state, Duguit suggested, should have the power to coerce him to do so.

Like Torres, Duguit was not a socialist and did not oppose private property. Nevertheless, he did believe that nineteenth-century liberalism had gone too far in championing individual rights, and he argued for a reorientation of legal codes towards obligations to the collective good. Although Duguit's ideas about property did not achieve great infuence in his native Europe, his emphasis on productive use of assets was potentially more compelling in Brazil, where agriculture remained the core of

<sup>2</sup>All translations in this chapter are by the author.

the economy and land ownership was concentrated in a small elite who often failed to use their holdings productively. Te contrast between huge, lightly cultivated estates and the millions of peasant families who scraped out a precarious living on tiny holdings or on other people's land was destined to make the social function an appealing concept to reformers in Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America.

However, at the time of their publication, neither Torres' nor Duguit's ideas appear to have had much impact on Brazilian society. Tis was probably because the system Torres was criticising, based on the kind of strong property rights regime that Duguit denounced, rested on powerful pillars of support. Te decentralised oligarchic system created after the fall of the monarchy had not yet faced major challenges. Despite the trade disruptions caused by World War I, commodity exports continued to be a key source of growth, and the groups who dominated that sector, especially the cofee "barons" of the state of São Paulo, enjoyed great prestige and political infuence. Given the low levels of urbanisation and industrialisation, there were few actors capable of forcefully questioning the status quo.

## **Societal Recognition of the Agrarian Question: 1920s to the Mid-1950s**

Political and economic transformations that occurred during the 1920s and 1930s altered the balance of power and thus favoured the wider diffusion and further elaboration of pro-land reform ideas. To some extent, awareness of the agrarian question came to infuence legal institutions, most notably the constitutions drafted in 1934 and 1946. However, the awakening of society to this issue had two crucial limitations. First, the prospective direct benefciaries of land reform did not engage in signifcant political action. Second, and relatedly, the state did little to promote a more equitable pattern of landholding.

Two events were especially important in destabilising the oligarchical system. First, in 1922 a movement arose within the armed forces that criticised the political regime as corrupt and unresponsive to popular needs. Made up of junior ofcers, the *tenentes* (or "lieutenants") undertook repeated armed rebellions. From 1924 to 1927, a *tenentes* force roamed the interior of the country, seeking support from the population and resisting various attempts to destroy it. Although it ultimately dissolved, the movement constituted a blow to the system's legitimacy. Second, the stock market crash of 1929 initiated a global economic crisis that undermined Brazil's export-oriented development model and helped provoke a political regime change. Prior to that point, there had been an informal agreement between the elites of São Paulo and neighbouring Minas Gerais to rotate in controlling the presidency. In an attempt to protect their interests in the face of the crisis, in 1930 São Paulo broke with this arrangement and sought to hold onto the ofce for a second term. In response, Minas Gerais joined some other states in organising a military coup that brought to power Getúlio Vargas, a wily politician who would deeply infuence Brazil's development.

Vargas led Brazil from 1930 to 1945, mainly as a dictator, and again from 1951 to 1954 as a democratically elected president. During these years, he centralised power in the national executive branch and increasingly used the state to promote industrialisation and diversify the economy away from agriculture. He was also largely responsible for the creation of the country's social security system and a labour code that extended signifcant new rights to workers while also imposing corporatist controls on their organisations (Malloy 1979). Te Vargas presidencies thus played a crucial role in the rise of the statist development model that Brazil would pursue until at least the early 1990s.

Te Great Depression and Vargas' rise to power favoured the emergence of the agrarian question as a national issue. Te collapse of trade and the sufering it caused called into question the benefts of export-led development and diminished the prestige enjoyed by planters and their associates. While the landowning elite remained powerful, other social groups, especially industrialists but also civil servants and urban workers, saw their status rise as a function of the growing emphasis on state-led industrialisation. Political space expanded within the state and the broader society for ideas that questioned the compatibility of the landholding system with public welfare. Consequently, in the early 1930s, both Torres' ideas and the concept of the social function gained considerable popularity.

Despite having died in 1917, Torres became among the most infuential intellectuals of the Vargas era, since his nationalism and rejection of export-based development were in tune with political trends (Bravo 2016). His books were republished, and three works by other authors came out on his life and thought (Rachum 2015: 89). A society was formed in 1932 called the "Friends of Alberto Torres," which included prominent intellectual and political fgures. Torres' ideas regarding the rural sector were endorsed by the former *tenentes*, who became key advocates of land reform in the early 1930s and in some cases held infuential positions within the state (Camargo 1986; Bravo 2016). To advance their reformist views, in 1931 the *tenentes* created an organisation called the "October 3 Club," which issued a manifesto that refected many of Torres' views.3 On the agrarian question, the document asserted that it should be "obligatory for governments to reduce to the minimum possible all forms of latifundia [i.e., large landholdings]" and urged the state to distribute land to the landless (Bravo 2016: 122).

Vargas himself also echoed some of Torres' ideas about rural society, both during the early 1930s and in later years. In speeches, Vargas sometimes underscored the problem of rural-urban migration and the irony of landlessness in a land-rich country; for example, in a 1933 speech he argued that, because of the allure of the cities to destitute rural workers, "the urban proletariat has increased disproportionately, leading to pauperism and all the ills resulting from the surplus of work without permanent jobs" (quoted in Cardoso 2010: 786). In a 1941 address, he asserted that "it is impossible for us to maintain the dangerous anomaly of peasants without their own land in a country where rich valleys like the Amazon remain uncultivated and vast pastures are without livestock." Furthermore, he warned that if rural living conditions did not improve, Brazil could "witness an exodus from the felds and the overpopulation of the cities, an imbalance with unforeseeable consequences, capable of weakening or annulling the campaign for the integral improvement of the Brazilian man" (quoted in Cardoso 2010: 784).

<sup>3</sup> Its name came from the date on which the 1930 coup d'état was initiated.

Just as Torres had, Vargas and his *tenente* allies called for reforms that would promote more equitable landownership without frontally attacking the institution of private property. Upon taking ofce, Vargas announced a programme of government, one aspect of which was the distribution of farmland in order to "encourage, without violence, the progressive extinction of the latifundium" (quoted in Rachum 2015: 89). A similar position was laid out in the October 3 Club's manifesto. Rather than demanding massive expropriation of private estates, it called on the state to "promote the social utilisation of public lands and those that have been illegally occupied and exploited so that, once they have reverted to state control, they can be used to establish cooperative agricultural colonies" (quoted in Bravo 2016: 122). While the *tenentes* would fade as a political force after the mid-1930s, Vargas continued to rhetorically endorse land reform periodically until his dramatic death by suicide in 1954 (Camargo 1986).

Like Torres' ideas, the social function of property, after being largely ignored in Brazil in previous decades, became the subject of substantial discussion during the early 1930s. Editorials about it were published in newspapers by eminent lawyers and politicians and some major political parties incorporated it into their programmes (Sodré n.d.: 54). It was also a topic of debate during the 1933–1934 constituent assembly and, as discussed below, would have some infuence on the resulting constitutional text. Te concept was endorsed by actors of diverse perspectives; for example, Antônio Augusto Borges de Medeiros, an erstwhile Vargas ally who sided with the conservative São Paulo opposition after the 1930 coup, argued that property should no longer be "the sacred and inviolable right of the French Revolution of 1789" but rather a "social function" and that, as such, "its exercise is subordinated to the norms and prescriptions that the state assigns it in the name of the public interest" (Medeiros 1933: 34). In its 1932 manifesto, the pro-Vargas October 3 Club asserted that "With regard to property, individual interests cannot be allowed to override the social function" (quoted in Bravo 2016: 121). Finally, João Mangabeira, a prominent legislator who opposed Vargas from the left, was an enthusiastic defender of the concept. In a 1934 editorial, Mangabeira called Duguit "the most profound, the most brilliant, the most original, the greatest of French constitutionalists," and argued that in the jurist's Argentine lectures, Duguit "frames the question in such terms and resolves it in such a way that he turns his doctrine, frankly, victorious" (quoted in Maldaner 2015: 72).

While ideas advanced by Torres and Duguit gained considerable prominence after 1930, land reform advocates did not limit themselves to parroting these ideas. One relatively new theme that developed during these decades was the link between land reform and industrialisation. Torres had believed deeply in Brazil's agricultural vocation and showed little interest in promoting industry. However, that position ran contrary to the thrust of state policymaking under Vargas and his successors. Post-1930, the agrarian question was increasingly tied to the ongoing processes of import-substitution industrialisation and construction of a social security system to meet the needs of urban workers (Moreira 1998; Linhares and Teixeira da Silva 1999). For Brazilian manufacturing to prosper, it was argued, it would need a substantial domestic consumer market. Tat fact that much of the population was made up of destitute peasants was an obstacle to that goal, one that could be addressed through land redistribution. Moreover, by the 1950s, there were growing concerns that insufcient farm production would impede industrial development by stoking infation and limiting inputs for sectors like food and textiles (Linhares and Teixeira da Silva 1999).

Such arguments were most forcefully articulated by economic nationalists, who played an important role not only in the *varguista* coalition but also in forces to the left of that coalition, especially the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) (Moreira 1998). Although banned from elections during most of this period, the PCB had signifcant intellectual infuence and was increasingly involved in labour organising. Communists tended to frame the problems of the rural sector as refecting the persistence of "feudal" or "pre-capitalist" economic relations that tied landless families to large landowners (Caminha 2018). Land reform would modernise the countryside by replacing these paternalistic, patron-client types of relations with ones based on market exchange. Te PCB supported a more aggressive approach to land reform than other groups. Most of the *tenentes* and other moderate nationalists, including Vargas, called for a gradual transition away from the latifundium-dominated land tenure structure (Bravo 2016). Tey viewed forcible expropriation of private holdings as a tool to be used cautiously and seemed to believe that much could be achieved simply by taxing fallow land. In contrast, the communists called for more abrupt and sweeping change.4 In a manifesto published in 1958, for instance, the PCB endorsed "the radical transformation of the agrarian structure, with the liquidation of the land monopoly and pre-capitalist labour relations" (quoted in Santos 2008: 139).

Duguit's ideas regarding the social function of property were also not necessarily accepted without debate or in their original form (Maldaner 2015). Even critics tended to acknowledge during these years that private property rights could not be absolute. However, they (particularly conservative Catholic jurists) questioned Duguit's broader critique of individual rights as vague and dangerous. Rather than *being* a social function, they argued, private property should be thought of as *having* a social function and thus being subject to certain legal constraints on its use (Sodré no date; Maldaner 2015: 65–66). Probably owing to both the logical force of this argument and ignorance of Duguit's actual writings, which were not easily accessible, this perspective would become the dominant way of understanding the social function in Brazil, as in much of Latin America (Mirow 2010; Ondetti and Davy 2018).

As this discussion suggests, by the 1950s, the agrarian question was well established in Brazil at the ideational level. Te belief that rural land inequality exerted a negative efect on the country's social and economic development was widespread, at least among more informed sectors of society. Tere was also substantial support for reform of the land tenure structure, although opinions varied considerably regarding the character of that reform. In terms of the onion model discussed in the introduction, the "agrarian question" was a type of social question, implying a general concern about the acute concentration of rural landownership coupled to a call for a solution. Te agrarian question gave rise to diferent "policy paradigms" that framed the issue in diferent ways and envisaged diferent policies, ranging from rapid liquidation of all large estates to a gradualist approach based on distribution of public lands and

<sup>4</sup> It is worth noting, however, that the most prominent PCB leader, Luís Carlos Prestes, was a former *tenente*. Prestes' embrace of Marxism made him a major exception to the moderate reformism that characterised the *tenentes*.

taxation of unproductive private holdings. Te rise of the agrarian question was part of the more general "social question" that was arising as a result of changes set in motion by the global economic crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s. At the same time, however, it was also an aspect of an emerging societal concern with developing a modern industrial economy that would make Brazil autonomous of foreign powers, that is, an "economic question."

To a signifcant extent, societal recognition of the agrarian question came to be refected in legal institutions. Most importantly, it had some impact on the new constitutions drafted in 1934 and 1946. Infuenced by both domestic events and examples of socially oriented post-World War I European constitutions, the 1934 document featured a variety of social, labour and educational provisions symbolising the state's recognition of the social question. Tese included several provisions related to land access, an issue ignored by the 1891 constitution. Among other measures, the new constitution:


In addition, the 1934 constitution contained an at least implicit social function clause. Te initial draft had included a clause referring explicitly to that concept in a section titled "Te Social Order." It read, "Guaranteed is the right to property, with content and limits to be defned by law. Property has, above all, a social function which cannot be exercised against the collective interest" (Maldaner 2015: 73). Over the protests of João Mangabeira and some other constituents, the clause was moved to the "Declaration of Rights and Obligations" section and its wording altered to: "Guaranteed is the right to property, which cannot be exercised against the social or collective interest." Tese changes shifted the emphasis from social obligations to individual rights. Nevertheless, by asserting that property rights are limited by obligations to society as a whole, it represented a change relative to the 1891 constitution, which had merely allowed the state to seize private property for public projects such as roads or parks.

Te 1937 constitution, which framed Vargas' dictatorial *Estado Novo* (New State) regime, excluded most of the pro-land reform provisions. However, the 1946 document, drafted under a more democratic regime after Vargas' resignation, restored them, albeit in somewhat diferent form. Te state's obligations to "fx the rural man in the countryside" and create agricultural colonies were reafrmed, and the area obtainable through squatting was increased to 25 hectares. In addition, the notion of a social function of property was reintroduced, without, once again, using that term. Te section on individual rights stated, "Guaranteed is the right to property, save in the case of expropriation for public necessity or utility, or for social interest, conditional on prior and just indemnity in cash." In addition, the section on the "Economic and Social Order" indicated that "Te use of property will be conditioned on social welfare. Te law can…promote the just distribution of property, with equal opportunity for all." While this language was generally more favourable to land redistribution than the corresponding language in the 1934 constitution, the new stipulation requiring that owners of expropriated land be indemnifed in cash imposed a limitation of no small importance (Camargo 1986: 173). Due to this rule, any substantial land reform based on expropriation of private holdings would be vastly expensive to the government that implemented it.

Despite the intellectual rise of the agrarian question and the inclusion of moderately pro-land reform language in the constitution, little was actually done during these decades to alter the structure of rural landowning. Vargas established several colonisation projects on public land. Most were a part of a highly publicised, but practically insignifcant initiative during the early 1940s called the "March to West" by which the state tried to populate and develop a part of Brazil's vast rural hinterland (Lenharo 1986). Following the 1945 democratic transition, a number of bills were introduced in Congress that sought to advance land reform (Camargo 1986: 171–187). Most attempted to provide a statutory basis for the state to expropriate underutilised private holdings, and at least one tried to skirt the constitutional requirement of compensation in cash through a creative interpretation of this provision.5 Nevertheless, none of them was ultimately approved. Similarly, as Lavinas points out in this volume, the state did very little during these years to extend to workers in the countryside the social and labour policies that beneftted urban workers. As with land reform, Vargas and his allies made repeated promises to carry out such reforms, but ultimately did not do so (Camargo 1986; Fausto 2006).

Te key reason behind the lack of progress was an imbalance of political infuence in favour of conservative forces. Vargas' rise to power had both refected and reinforced the weakening of the rural oligarchy. Nevertheless, landowners retained great power, due to their wealth, their role as suppliers of foreign exchange and their vast political network. In 1932, the São Paulo cofee oligarchy had spearheaded an armed rebellion against Vargas. Although the government eventually triumphed, the confict lasted three months and took hundreds of lives. Vargas subsequently bowed to São Paulo's demand for a transition towards an elected, constitutional government. Tis concession was the beginning of the end of the infuence of the *tenentes*, the most important social reformist faction associated with Vargas. Te conservative turn was consolidated under the *Estado Novo*. Te democratic opening of 1945 did not initially revert this situation, since landowners used their infuence in Congress to frustrate eforts at land reform. Much of that infuence was exercised through the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the more powerful of the two *varguista* parties, which owed its electoral force largely to conservative rural political networks. By the 1950s, relatively few voices openly defended the agrarian status quo. However, various motives were averred for resisting land reform bills, including the importance of protecting property rights, the need to postpone reform until a supposed future time of greater

<sup>5</sup>A 1952 bill endorsed by President Vargas would have mandated the state to compensate expropriated landowners at the original purchase value of their land, rather than its current market value (Camargo 1986: 180).

political tranquillity and the risk of undermining investment and production (Camargo 1986; Linhares and Teixeira da Silva 1999).

One important underlying reason for the persistence of landowner power was the quiescence of the rural lower class. While Brazil experienced some non-political symptoms of rural discontent, such as millenarian movements and rural banditry (Façó 1991; Martins 1995), no substantial grassroots movement for land reform or other state policies emerged during these years. For the most part, large landowners remained solidly in control of their workforces and communities. To the extent that land reform arose as a national issue, it was because of the actions of urban political elites who sought to use it to advance their own agendas. Had there been a substantial mobilisation of the rural poor, Vargas and his followers might have leveraged it to attempt substantive land reform, or at least extend social and labour rights to the countryside. However, the lack of a signifcant challenge made such a turn of events unlikely.

#### **Mobilisation Without Reform: Late 1950s to Mid-1980s**

What could be thought of as a third period in the evolution of the agrarian question runs from the end of the 1950s until the reestablishment of democracy in the mid-1980s. Tis period was characterised most notably by, on the one hand, the emergence of a substantial grassroots movement for land reform and, on the other, a conservative reaction that ended up stonewalling the movement's core demand and contributing to the rise of a military dictatorship. Although this period ultimately did not result in signifcant land reform and was not as fertile ideationally as the previous ones, it was not totally sterile for advocates of this policy. Institutional reforms occurred, which would set a high bar for future authorities. In addition, certain ideas arose that would gradually come to have a signifcant impact on the struggle for land.

Te traditional passivity of the rural lower class came to an end in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Mobilisation began among tenant farmers in the state of Pernambuco and, with the support of leftist politician Francisco Julião, gradually spread to other parts of the poor north-eastern region of Brazil (Azevêdo 1982; Bastos 1984). Known as the "Peasant Leagues," the movement was involved in both providing its members with practical assistance with problems like legal defence and medical care and demanding sweeping land reform, which it vowed to pursue "by law or by force." Another regional movement for land emerged in Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil's southernmost state. Like the Peasant Leagues, the Movement of Landless Farmers (MASTER), was initially a defensive response by poor farmers with precarious land access (Eckert 1984; Wagner 1989). However, with the implicit support of leftist governor Leonel Brizola, it began invading properties considered to be vulnerable to state seizure, due to abandonment or dubious ownership claims.

During the 1960s there also arose a rural unionisation movement. For years, PCB activists had sought to organise rural workers, but their progress was impeded by landowner hostility, lack of a favourable legal structure and the indiference or hostility of governing authorities. Under the left-leaning government of João Goulart (1961–1964), however, the political climate became more hospitable and, in 1963, the Congress passed the Rural Worker Statute, which facilitated union registration. PCB-led unions grew in number, especially in the northeast (Maybury-Lewis 1994; Pereira 1997). Concerned that the rising rural mobilisation would be harnessed by leftist forces, groups associated with the Catholic Church also entered the fray, organising progressive but non-communist unions. State authorities likewise sought to encourage and channel the growing rural labour movement, at least initially as a way of counterbalancing the Peasant Leagues, which had rejected collaboration with Goulart. Te unions were more active in organising wage laborers than the Leagues, but the social bases of the two overlapped signifcantly. Although more focused on bread-and-butter issues than the Leagues, the unions also endorsed land reform.

Nevertheless, the growing clamour for land redistribution did not result in signifcant reform. President Goulart, who represented the more leftist faction within *varguismo*, introduced legislation that would have allowed a far-reaching land reform, in part by eliminating the constitutional requirement of prior compensation for expropriations in cash (Dezemone 2016: 141). However, Congress refused to pass it, along with some other progressive reforms. Moreover, Goulart's eforts to use mass protest to pressure legislators into approving his agenda backfred, helping provoke a military coup in 1964 and the establishment of a conservative authoritarian regime that would last until 1985. Although the regime initially showed signs of wanting to implement its own expropriationbased land reform (including legislation discussed below), it ultimately backed of this proposal. Instead, its agricultural policies focused on promoting technical modernisation, mainly through the provision of subsidised credit to large producers. To the extent they were addressed at all, rural social problems were dealt with through other policies. Reviving a Vargas-era initiative, the regime established a series of agricultural colonisation projects in frontier areas, especially the vast Amazon River basin. In 1971, it also introduced a social security programme, including pensions and healthcare, exclusively for people involved in agriculture and other rural activities. Although the benefts were extremely modest, the programme was extensive and did not require any contribution from benefciaries (Malloy 1979: 132–134; Houtzager 2008).

To make matters worse for the land reform cause, doubts about the wisdom of advancing it grew within the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), traditionally among its most ardent defenders. As mentioned earlier, the PCB had long stressed the importance of mobilising the peasantry to struggle for land, since breaking up large estates would encourage a thorough transition to capitalism in the countryside (Passos Guimaraes 1963). However, that view was increasingly challenged by Caio Prado Jr., a leading Marxist intellectual (Prado 1963, 1966). What distinguished the Brazilian rural society, Prado suggested, was not its feudalism (which he questioned), but the weak ties of the population to land. Te Portuguese had established an economy based on vast plantations relying on slave labour. Outside of these estates, few families enjoyed stable access to enough land to maintain an independent family farm, even after the end of slavery. Tey therefore depended deeply on large landowners for their livelihood, whether in the form of wages or quasi-wage compensation. Tus, with the exception of a few rural areas afected by European immigration, Brazil lacked a landed peasantry. Consequently, Prado believed, calls to mobilise for land redistribution were destined to fall largely on deaf ears. Instead, he urged the PCB to focus its appeals to rural dwellers on labour-oriented demands, such as better wages and working conditions (Prado 1963). While Prado's arguments probably helped encourage the PCB's embrace of an incremental, union-based strategy in the countryside, the party continued to call for land reform as a longterm solution (Pereira 1997; Santos 2008).

Despite the lack of substantial land redistribution and the wavering advocacy of the PCB, this period did bring some developments with positive implications for advocates of land reform. First, signifcant advances occurred with regard to legal institutions. In 1964 President Humberto Castello Branco, the frst leader of the military regime, decreed the Land Statute, which appeared to mandate a substantial land reform. Te law allowed expropriation of private holdings based not only on low productivity but also on sheer size. In other words, even a productive estate could be expropriated if it exceeded a certain number of hectares. A constitutional amendment approved at the same time removed the requirement that expropriated landowners be indemnifed in cash and instead allowed compensation in bonds payable over a 20-year span.6 Te law declared that its purpose was to "condition the use of land on its social function," "promote the just and adequate use of property" and "make obligatory the rational exploitation of land" (article 18), among other objectives. In addition, the regime's 1967 constitution became the frst in Brazil's history to use the term "social function," stating that one of the principles of the "Economic and Social Order" was "the social function of property" (article 157). Although they went largely unimplemented, these robust legal provisions, as discussed later, established a high baseline for subsequent legislative initiatives.

Second, this era brought some innovative ideas related to the agrarian question. Te most consequential arose within the Catholic Church, a crucial institution in this traditionally Catholic country. Te church had long been considered a bastion of the status quo. Its occasional advocacy of social reform, including land redistribution, was motivated largely by fears that social grievances would be exploited by godless communists. However, during the late 1960s and 1970s, it developed a strong left

<sup>6</sup>Payment would be based on values declared for the purposes of the federal land tax. Since landowners had an incentive to minimise the value of their land for that purpose, this rule would tend to exert downward pressure on compensation.

wing of its own. Tis "popular church" movement was deeply committed to land reform, a policy it came to view as the embodiment of Christian values of fraternity and solidarity with the poor and downtrodden. Not only did the church advocate land redistribution, but Catholic lay activists and priests also became actively involved in organising rural people to struggle for land (Mainwaring 1986; Martins 1991; Adriance 1995).

Central to this process was the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB), which, beginning in about the early 1970s, adopted a consistent pro-land reform position. In 1975, moreover, the CNBB founded the Pastoral Commission on Land (CPT), an entity devoted to supporting demands for land reform through advice, legal defence, donations and direct involvement in organising initiatives (Poletto and Canuto 2002). Tough initially focused on the Amazon, where the military regime's development initiatives had spurred violent confict over land, the CPT quickly established local chapters throughout much of the country. It supported eforts to unionise workers and, as will be discussed later, played a fundamental part in creating what would become the key land reform organisation of the post-military era, the Movement of Landless Rural Workers (MST), in 1984. CPT activists used religious symbols and biblical references to frame the struggle, comparing it, for example, to Moses' decades-long trek through the desert to the promised land. Although the military had little interest in redistributing land, the church's activism helped revive the agrarian question during the early 1980s, forcing authorities to adopt eforts to quell land-related confict, especially in Amazonia.

Te popular church movement had both international and domestic roots. In part, it was a response to the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), a series of gatherings through which the global Catholic Church had resolved to make itself more relevant to the lives of the faithful (Adriance 1986). In Latin America, this call was interpreted as a mandate to develop a "preferential option for the poor" or, in other words, to adopt eforts to materially improve the lives of the poor in the here-andnow, not simply through charity but by supporting political eforts at equity-enhancing reforms. During the late 1960s and 1970s, Latin American theologians, including the Brazilian priest Leonardo Bof, played a fundamental part in the development of "liberation theology," a school of thought that argues that the church has a moral and doctrinal responsibility to intervene in society on behalf of the poor. While the popular church movement extended throughout much of Latin America, Brazil was one of the countries most afected by it (Bruneau 1982; Mainwaring 1986).

Tus, although the period analysed in this section was characterised most notably by the state's ultimate rejection of the demands for land reform raised by the Peasant Leagues and other actors of the pre-coup era, by the early 1980s, buoyed by frontier violence and Catholic Church sponsorship, the agrarian question was re-emerging as a national issue. In addition, the military had left a relatively positive institutional legacy, including the Land Statute and a constitution that explicitly recognised private property's social function.

### **Democracy, Protest and Limited Reform: Mid-1980s to the Present**

Te period since the return of elected civilian governance in 1985 has been marked by two major shifts related to the agrarian question. First, grassroots mobilisation for land reform achieved a scale and level of organisation unprecedented in Brazil's history. Second, land redistribution by the state, though still limited, also reached its historical peak. Tese changes are related to the broad context of regime democratisation but do not refect gains in legal institutions specifc to agrarian reform, which arguably deteriorated relative to the military era. Te key ideas underpinning the struggle for land have continued to be largely the same as those in earlier eras, but in recent decades the actual implementation of land reform has given rise to a relatively new debate about its virtues and faws, with advocates often emphasising the environmental and health benefts of smallholder production and detractors disparaging land reform settlements as poverty-ridden shanty towns.

Te armed forces' control of the federal executive branch, seized through the 1964 coup, was returned to civilians in 1985.7 Over the next fve years, Brazil extended the sufrage to illiterates (who had previously been denied the vote), approved a new constitution and held its frst popular presidential election since 1961. Despite numerous crises and the removal of two presidents by Congress, democracy has survived more than three decades.

Sustained democracy, combined with the support of other civil society actors, helped give rise to a grassroots land reform movement that by the second half of the 1990s constituted a substantial political force (Fernandes 1996; Wright and Wolford 2003; Ondetti 2008a; Pahnke 2018). It was anchored by the Movement of Landless Rural Workers (MST), an organisation combining centralised national leadership with local afliates throughout the country. Te MST arose in the extreme south of Brazil, but gradually expanded to other regions. While its creation was largely a product of activism by the popular church, especially the CPT, it eventually became autonomous of the church. It developed its own secular worldview made up of a heterogeneous mixture of mainly Marxist ideas, as well as its own distinctive tactical methodology, based on massive invasions (or "occupations," as activists term them) of underutilised private estates and the formation of roadside squatter camps. While overshadowed by the MST, the rural unions also continued to struggle for land and, inspired by the MST's relative success, adopted some of its methods. Te movement peaked in the late 1990s, when there were some 850 land occupations nationwide (see Fig. 10.1). In recent years it has declined, due in part to authorities' growing unwillingness to grant land to people who occupy it. Nevertheless, at its peak the movement was undoubtedly a much larger and better-organised phenomenon than its counterpart of the early 1960s.

Land reform has also intensifed greatly relative to the past. Ofcial data suggest that some 95% of the families that have beneftted from land reform in Brazil received their land during the current democratic period

<sup>7</sup>Te legislature was only closed for a short period during the early 1970s but functioned under substantial restrictions thereafter. Te frst post-coup civilian president, José Sarney, was chosen by a special electoral college. It was only in 1989 that a popular election was held for president.

**Fig. 10.1** Land occupations in Brazil, 1988–2018. (*Source:* The author, data from reports of the Comissão Pastoral da Terra (CPT; https://www.cptnacional.org.br/ index.php/publicacoes-2/confitos-no-campo-brasil) and the database Dataluta of the Núcleo de Estudos, Pesquisas e Projetos de Reforma Agrária (NERA), Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP; http://www2.fct.unesp.br/nera/relatoriosbr.php))

(see Table 10.1). Tis period also accounts for more than 75% of all expropriated farmland. Clearly, protest actions led by the MST and other groups have played a key role in pressuring the state to redistribute land, mainly by calling the attention of the media and the public to the plight of the landless (Carter 2011). Protest has been relatively efective in part because Brazilians, as opinion polls have consistently shown, generally support land reform (Ondetti 2008a, b; Simonetti et al. 2012) and, in a society with a free press and competitive elections, authorities cannot ignore public preferences entirely.

Nevertheless, reform activity has been inconsistent. As Table 10.1 indicates, the frst three presidents of the democratic era (José Sarney, Fernando Collor and Itamar Franco) did not redistribute much land. Tat trend ended, however, under Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) of the centrist Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB), who settled more landless families than all his predecessors combined and expropriated almost as much private land. His successor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010) of the leftist Workers' Party (PT), also granted land to a substantial number of families but did so mainly by distributing public lands, legalising informal holdings and flling vacancies in existing


**Table 10.1** Land reform in Brazil, 1900–2019

*Source:* The author, data from Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (INCRA)

a2019 fgures are through July

settlements, rather than expropriation. After da Silva's frst term (2003–2006), reform began to tail of, and it has ground to a virtual halt in recent years. Even Dilma Roussef (2011–2016) of the PT did little in this area. Tese fuctuations arguably refect the fact that land reform is only materially relevant to a small minority of Brazilians, given that more than 80% of the population now lives in urban areas. Its salience thus tends to surge in response to dramatic events, such as instances of violent repression against land occupiers, only to fade as public attention inevitably shifts to other issues (Ondetti 2008b). Moreover, during the last two decades the expansion of the conditional cash transfer programme *Bolsa Família* has undermined land reform by providing an alternative approach for fghting rural poverty (Morton 2015).

Inconsistent implementation of reform helps explain why land inequality remains high.8 Current fgures are unavailable, but data from the 2006 agricultural census show a level of inequality, measured in terms of the Gini coefcient, almost identical to that of 1985 (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, IBGE). Even within Latin America, which has the most skewed rural land distribution of any region, Brazil ranks among the fve most unequal countries, with a Gini of 0.87 (Oxfam 2016: 22).

Te institutional framework for land reform has played an ambivalent role in the fate of this policy under democracy (Mészáros 2013; Ondetti 2016). On the one hand, the new constitution ratifed in 1988 follows the military era constitution in explicitly adhering to the social function principle and allowing the state to expropriate large rural properties that do not fulfl that function, compensating the owners with bonds. Furthermore, it seemingly sets a higher bar for satisfying the social function, requiring not only "rational and adequate exploitation" of the land but also preservation of the natural environment, observation of labour laws and "exploitation that favours the welfare of both owners and workers" (article 186). On the other hand, Article 185 states fatly that "productive property" cannot be expropriated. Inserted in response to landowner pressure, this article would seem to neutralise the last three social function criteria, since they can only serve as the basis for expropriation if the property is also unproductive. In addition, unlike the 1964 Land Statute, the 1988 constitution does not provide for the possibility of expropriation based on the sheer size of a property. In fact, by stating that productive land cannot be expropriated, it explicitly eliminates that possibility. Tus, although the 1988 constitution is widely known for its pioneering social provisions, with regard to land reform it is a deeply ambivalent document.

Te ideas deployed during this period to justify land reform have for the most part been the same ones used by activists in earlier decades: land reform can alleviate rural poverty and hunger, both for humanitarian reasons and to slow down migration to the overcrowded cities; it can increase agricultural output by putting unutilised land into production; it can

<sup>8</sup> Socio-economic trends, such as the growth of soybean production, which is characterised by strong economies of scale, may also contribute to inequality.

lower the prices of farm goods; and it can dynamise the economy by making consumers out of people who previously earned barely enough to meet subsistence needs. Tese arguments can be found in the public statements and documents of the MST, rural unions and CPT, as well as in hundreds of books, articles, theses and editorials published by leftleaning intellectuals and land reform activists.9

Nevertheless, recent decades have brought some ideational innovations, at least in a relative sense. Tese have come from both the advocates of land reform and their adversaries, who have grown in organisation. Among defenders of land redistribution, the most novel trend is the attempt to frame land reform as a policy favouring environmental protection and human health. In its early years, the MST leadership sought to mould its settlements into large cooperatives operating essentially as commercial farms, albeit within a socialist framework (Ondetti 2008a: 125–126; Andrade Neto 2015). Te commitment to cooperativism has for the most part endured, despite often encountering resistance from settlers (Brenneisen 2002; Devore 2015). Over time, however, the MST's discourse has become increasingly critical of large-scale commercial farming methods, especially the use of technology packages marketed by multinational frms like Monsanto and Bayer, involving chemical fertilisers and pesticides and genetically modifed seeds.

Initially, opposition to such technologies focused on the costs involved, which MST leaders argued were prohibitive for small-scale producers, as well as on the physical risks to farmers from applying highly toxic pesticides. Gradually, however, the MST has come to frame its rejection of modern farm technologies more broadly as refecting a commitment to organic agriculture or "agroecology" (Coordenação Nacional do MST 2010; Bosatto and de Carmo 2013; De'Carli 2013). Since about the mid-2000s, it has increasingly sought to position land reform as a policy in harmony with the growing consumer interest in food that is free of pesticides and genetically modifed organisms (GMOs). It promotes agroecological practices among MST settlers through courses and internal publications and advertises its achievements externally via urban

<sup>9</sup> Stédile (2013a) and Stédile (2013b) provide a representative sample of contemporary pro-land reform writings, as well as some anti-reform views.

organic food markets, seminars and participation in pro-organic food coalitions. Among other achievements, it claims to be the largest producer of organic rice in Latin America (Camargo 2017). According to the president of an MST rice cooperative in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, organic production:

isn't just an economic alternative, but a choice for an integral way of life, which views agriculture as an ecological activity for the beneft of both the families that produce and those that consume, with respect to the environment and biodiversity. Ideologically, we don't want to argue with anyone, but it's been proven that when you apply insecticides to crops, what will follow is toxicity." (Quoted in Camargo 2017)

In advancing this position, MST leaders have made common cause with politicians, celebrities, non-governmental organisations and other movement organisations that oppose the growing technifcation of food production. Te MST forms part of such entities as the National Articulation for Agroecology and the Permanent Campaign against Chemical Pesticides and in Favour of Life, both of which promote organic farming within Brazil. It is also part of an international network called La Via Campesina, which opposes chemical and GMO use as part of a broader defence of small-scale agriculture that includes support for domestic production of foodstufs (i.e. "food sovereignty"), domestic control of land and water resources and land reform (La Via Campesina 2019).

Tus, the largely Marxist emphasis on the class struggle and opposition to capitalism that characterised the MST's discourse for most of its history has gradually given way to one in which "post-material" concerns with the environment and food safety play a larger role. Tis transformation has been driven by the changing views of Brazilian society as a whole and, in all probability, a desire on the part of the MST to build a broader set of alliances. To some extent, this shift has also been embraced by other entities representing smallholders, such the Confederation of Workers in Agriculture (CONTAG), which brings together the rural unions, and the CPT (Sabourin et al. 2017: 365). In fact, over the last two decades, there has been a convergence of the land reform and organic farming movements that has helped make Brazil one of the regional leaders in pro-organic agriculture policymaking (Sabourin et al. 2017).

However, the innovations have not been limited to pro-land reform forces. Faced with unprecedented challenges to their property rights, combined with an inability to fall back on military intervention, landowners have engaged in new eforts to defend their interests. During the mid-1980s, in response to the announcement of a land reform plan by Sarney, the frst president of the democratic era, landowners from across Brazil created a peak organisation called the Democratic Rural Union (UDR). Te UDR sought to both lobby against land redistribution at the national level and support local eforts to defend rural properties from land occupations. Its association with acts of violence eventually led to its disappearance as a national organisation, but during the 1990s landowning and commercial farming interests gradually constructed a legislative coalition whose breadth and discipline easily exceeded those of most of Brazil's numerous political parties. Since then, the Parliamentary Front for Agriculture10 has typically controlled 20–25% of the seats in Brazil's Congress and used its weight to advance bills that favour big agriculture with regard to land, labour rights, environmental protection and other areas (Simionatto and Costa 2012; Corrêa 2018).

As part of its eforts to fght of land reform, Brazil's commercial farm sector and its allies and sympathisers in the state, press and intelligentsia have developed a discourse that emphasises stability, efciency and economic growth. To a large extent, their messaging echoes that of past opponents of land reform. However, some themes are relatively new. First, to a greater extent than in earlier eras, opponents of land reform have argued that, due to the intense process of agricultural modernisation since the military era, the unproductive latifundium has been essentially extinguished from the countryside (Graziano Neto 1999; Navarro 2014; Bergamo 2015). Agriculture, they emphasise, is now the most efcient and internationally competitive sector of the Brazilian economy. At the same time, it employs relatively few people, due to mechanisation and urban-rural migration. From this perspective, land reform is an anachronism, a policy rendered irrelevant by economic progress. As one author

<sup>10</sup>Tis group is better known by its informal name, *bancada ruralista*.

puts it, "…the economic and productive changes of the new phase of our agricultural history have laid to rest the Brazilian agrarian question and it is unlikely to be revived" (Navarro 2014: 700).

A second relatively new theme consists of attacks on existing land reform settlements, which barely existed prior to the current democratic period. Critics point out that settlements sufer from low levels of production, widespread poverty and heavy dependence on government income support programmes. Rather than thriving smallholder communities, they are miserable "rural shanty towns" (*favelas rurais*), ofering residents few prospects for economic progress. As a result, many settlers end up selling or abandoning their plots (*O Estado de São Paulo* 2014). Opponents of land reform typically attribute these problems to both the settlers' lack of "vocation" for agriculture and the state's failure to provide settlements with adequate infrastructure (e.g. roads, electricity, irrigation), credit and extension services. Te proper response to this situation, they argue, is to slow down or even halt the distribution of new land and instead focus on equipping settlements with needed infrastructure and services. To the extent that land reform continues, in their view, it should focus on granting plots to people selected on the basis of their proven experience in agriculture.

Of course, these points are disputed by land reform activists. Te apparent productivity of large landholdings, they argue, has much to do with the failure to update the indices of agricultural production used to judge whether a property is fulflling its social function. Advances in farm technology have made possible greater per hectare yields, yet the indices used date back to the 1970s.11 Moreover, while acknowledging the poverty of many settlements, they insist that the state ought to improve settlement quality while at the same time also intensifying land redistribution. Nevertheless, the views endorsed by commercial farming interests and their supporters have clearly informed state policies over the last decade or so, as refected in the sharp decline of land expropriations and new settlements, even under nominally left-leaning governments (Simonetti 2015).

<sup>11</sup>Te da Silva government proposed updating the indices, but backed down under pressure from farm interests (Éboli 2011).

#### **Conclusions**

Tis chapter has examined the evolution of the key ideas regarding the agrarian question in Brazil, as well as their interaction with actors, institutions and policy outputs. It has argued that the history of the agrarian question can be understood in terms of four periods defned by intellectual and political events that afected how it was understood and acted upon. Te characteristics of each period are summarised in Table 10.2.

As the chapter has suggested, most of the core ideas supporting redistribution of rural land were already well established by the mid-twentieth century. Beginning in about the 1910s, land redistribution gradually came to be viewed by many Brazilians as a vital tool for relieving poverty, slowing down rural-urban migration and promoting economic development. To a large extent, these are the same notions propagated by land reform activists today.

Nevertheless, ideas about the agrarian question have not remained wholly static. New arguments have risen in favour of it, emphasising especially its coherence with Catholic social teachings and, later, concerns about the environment and human health. In addition, there have been changes in the criticisms of land reform, most (though not all) of which have come from conservatives. In recent decades, these have gone beyond the traditional emphasis on property rights and stability to underscore both the obsolescence of land reform, given the modernisation of agriculture and the accompanying rural exodus, and the failure of ofcial settlement policy to produce thriving rural communities.

Tese ideational innovations have occurred not in isolation, but as initiatives in an ongoing political struggle over the distribution of land. For decades, pressure for land reform came mainly from urban middleclass reformers who championed it out of a blend of humanitarianism and concern for advancing industrialisation. Beginning in the late 1950s, however, the potential benefciaries of land reform, that is, poor smallholders, tenant farmers, sharecroppers and rural wage workers, began to mobilise to demand this policy. Ironically, the result was not so much reform as repression and conservative agricultural modernisation. However, the military years did bring certain changes ultimately


**372**


favourable to land redistribution, most notably an institutional acknowledgement of the legitimacy of this policy and the rise of a progressive movement within the Catholic Church that placed great priority on land reform. Te return to democracy since the mid-1980s has helped translate these advances (despite some backtracking in the institutional realm) into an unprecedented increase in expropriation and settlement activity, in part by facilitating the rise of a grassroots movement able to exert substantial pressure on the state.

Nevertheless, Brazil's agrarian structure remains highly unequal. In the last decade, moreover, the state has made little efort to redistribute additional land. Under President Jair Bolsonaro, who came to ofce in January 2019, land redistribution has even been ofcially suspended (Maisonnave 2019). Te contrast between the broad acknowledgement of the importance of land reform in Brazilian society and the lack of actual reform can be understood as a product of the power imbalance between the landless and land-poor, who control few economic or political resources, and the owners of large landholdings, a group comprised of relatively wealthy people who often enjoy considerable infuence within the state. While many Brazilians who are not members of either of these categories sympathise with the idea of land reform, their support for this policy is generally too tepid and wavering to overcome the determined resistance of landowners. Tus, Brazil seems likely to remain a country in which the agrarian question is broadly acknowledged ideationally and institutionally, but only superfcially addressed in actual policy.

## **References**


Brazil. *Te Journal of Peasant Studies* 42: 1201–1223. doi:https://doi.org/1 0.1080/03066150.2014.990447.


Torres, Alberto (2002) *A organizaçao nacional*. EbooksBrasil. http://www. ebooksbrasil.org/eLibris/torresc.html. (Accessed 15 September 2019).

Wagner, Carlos (1989) *A saga do João Sem Terra*. Petrópolis: Vozes.

Wright, Angus, and Wendy Wolford (2003) *To inherit the Earth: Te Landless Movement and the struggle for a new Brazil*. Oakland: Food First Books.

**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

Te images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **Part VI**

**Conclusion**

# **11**

## **One Hundred Years of Social Protection: The Rise of the Social Question in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, 1920–2020**

**Lutz Leisering**

Tis volume ventures into a largely uncharted territory, enquiring if, when, and how the social question has been raised in four countries over the last hundred years—countries that are better known as "emerging markets" in the early twenty-frst century. Assuming that the social question refects problems of social integration in modernising societies against the background of modern ideas of equality and human rights, the contributors to this volume investigate social policies in the four countries, starting from the interwar years, with special emphasis on social protection.

Te volume provides an analysis focused on ideas refected in contemporary documents—ideas as a strand of social protection in their own right and as legitimising and constituting interests and institutions. Ideas are a key factor in explaining the rise of social protection, as depicted in

L. Leisering (\*)

© Te Author(s) 2021 **383**

Department of Sociology, Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany e-mail: lutz.leisering@uni-bielefeld.de

L. Leisering (ed.), *One Hundred Years of Social Protection*, Global Dynamics of Social Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54959-6\_11

Gough's summary explanatory model of the "Five Is" (see Chap. 1, Fig. 1.1). Te volume takes a historical approach to overcome the presentist bias of the current literature on social policy in the Global South. Midgley's (1984) historical study, now a classic, went largely unnoticed at the time of publication.

In addition to our substantive research interest, we also seek to contribute to theorising Southern welfare. Accordingly, in this concluding chapter, I1 present the main fndings of the country-focused chapters in a comparative perspective and framed by fve overarching concepts—historical evolution, social construction, political language, multireferentiality, and transnational difusion—that build on the theoretical framework developed in Chap. 1. Te fve concepts can generally serve as a conceptual template for studies of social protection in Southern countries. For each of the fve concepts, I give examples, counterexamples, and specifcations from the country studies. Te chapter closes with theoretically and empirically grounded thoughts about the future of social protection in middle-income countries.

Te frst fnding relates to the *historical evolution* of social protection: the hundred years from 1920 to 2020 mark the rise of social protection programmes in the four countries. Te second fnding relates to the *social construction of the social*, that is, to the articulation of "social" issues: all four countries, except India, have articulated social issues in a generalised way as a social question, which is the core of a multi-layered confguration of social ideas, as conceptualised in the onion skin model (see Fig. 1.2, Chap. 1). Te third fnding concerns *political language*: the use of "social" semantics has spread in all four countries. Te fourth fnding concerns "*multireferentiality*", that is, the linkage of social protection to diverse ideas and interests beyond purely "social" ideas (like social justice or solidarity): social protection policies were largely driven and shaped by "non-social" ideas and interests that acted as frames. Te ffth fnding

<sup>1</sup>As in Chap. 1, "I" refers to the author's views and arguments, while "we" refers to the volume's contributors' views and fndings. I thank Sony Pellissery, Marianne Ulriksen, Gabriel Ondetti, Hu Aiqun, and Jeremy Seekings for comments which helped to improve the chapter (the latter gave particularly extensive comments). I am also indebted to John Berten for communication on the history of the terms "social insurance" and "social security", and to Ravi Ahuja for explaining to me the meaning of socialism in India.

describes the *transnational difusion* of ideas: external ideas have pervaded domestic social protection policies from the beginning, testifying to the rise of world society, conceived as a global consciousness and shared world culture (Meyer 2007: 262f.).

### **Historical Evolution: 1920 to 2020 Was the Century of Social Protections for These Four Countries**

In Europe, the social question arose in the 1830s and 1840s, and substantial social policy measures were taken from the 1880s onward. After World War II, the "welfare state" as a new type of state and society unfolded. Social policy in the Global South, including our four countries, came later but not as late as often assumed. When we initiated our collaborative research project, we frst thought of starting with the 1940s. However, the empirical evidence taught us to start earlier. We found that all four countries had an *early start* regarding ideas and actual legislation. Tis is our frst fnding on the evolution of social protection policies. Between 1920 and 1950, many of the basic social categories that were used in later debates already fgured in politics. Te year 1920 is not a neat cut-of point, though. Some social ideas and (highly selective) measures started earlier, such as the ideas of Duguit and Torres on land reform (1911, 1914) that were applied in Brazil later, the famine codes in late nineteenth-century India, and the late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century debates on the "cost of living" in Brazil.

We know that social protection policies do not simply refect socioeconomic conditions, as the functionalist theory of the "logic of industrialisation" assumed in the 1960s. Instead, political factors mediate processes of industrialisation, urbanisation, and dislocation. Although the four countries started social protection roughly around the same years, they did so at diferent levels of economic development, except China and India which started from the same very low level (see Chap. 1, Table 1.3).

Te second fnding regarding the evolution of social protection is, as expected, the *expansion* of social protection over the last hundred years. Te social question was articulated in an increasingly inclusive way, and new discourses, actors, and categories relating to the social emerged. Moreover, older debates, doctrines, and actors were "socialised", that is, they turned to social issues. Even in periods of upheaval, war, and civil war, and under democracy and dictatorship alike (the latter in Brazil from 1930 to 1945 and 1964 to 1985 and in China since 1949), social protections were debated and legislated. Tere were periods of intensifed social policy activity, as in South Africa from 1924 to 1933, Brazil from 1930 to1945, India from 1946 to 1952, China from the 2000s until the early 2010s, and during the 1940s in all four countries. In South Africa, a key component of the national social protection arrangement, old-age pensions, did not change much during *apartheid*.

Te fnding of overall expansion needs *qualifcation*. First, there were periods of retrenchment, notably in China during the early reform era (1978–2000), similar to what Rimlinger (1971) calls a "liberal break" in his analysis of the rise of Northern social policy. Tis describes a period in which older welfare institutions (in the case of China: socialist welfare) are crumbling, while new institutions that would address the social problems ensuing from economic liberalisation are still rudimentary. Second, expansion mainly refers to the extension of coverage and not necessarily to raising beneft levels and improving the quality of services. Tird, there was massive decoupling or delayed coupling between ideas and legislation and also between legislation and implementation, as in the case of the Employees' Social Insurance Act of 1948 in India. Implementation was often defcient or absent. Debates tended to produce an ideational surplus, which could refect either empty promises or powerful ideas that would mobilise people and fuel later reforms. In Brazil, decades of calls for thoroughgoing land reform produced very modest results, even under leftist governments. In Brazil, there was also a gulf between the Constitution, which is rich in social promises, and the reality of social services and living conditions. India's history is replete with ideas that created a "horizon of expectation" (Ahuja), which largely remained a horizon. In China, the implementation of the industrial accident insurance has been very patchy (Liu and Leisering 2017).

Did the early beginnings of social protection ideas and programmes constitute an institutional *path*? Te answer is mixed. Tere is evidence of social protections' institutional continuity across major historical junctures (qualifying Piachaud and Midgley 2013: 267). Tis seems to indicate that the institutional arrangements of social protection may have acquired a dynamic of their own early on. Post-*apartheid* South Africa largely built on the institutional legacy of the *apartheid* era. Even the deracialisation of social protection began in the early 1940s, accelerated in the 1980s, and was completed in the 1990s. New programmes like the Child Support Grant built on programmes set up under the *apartheid* regime and before. In Brazil, social protection remained labourist under both democratic and authoritarian governments, and even Vargas' farreaching social reforms built on earlier institutionalisations of social protections.

However, the year of the foundation of the People's Republic of China, 1949, marked a break with earlier periods: socialist social protection and the Soviet variety of social insurance associated with Stalin replaced earlier institutions in the 1950s (but Taiwan built on the pre-1949 legacy). Tere were further signifcant departures from or extensions of historical paths. While Brazil remained labourist overall, Brazil's early introduction of a non-contributory rural pension in 1971 was remarkable, as was Brazil's pioneering role in the feld of social cash transfers in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Regarding the latter, it is an open question whether the mushrooming of social cash transfers for the poor across the Global South indicates a new social model even in countries that had been labourist for a long time. China is the country with the most conspicuous path changes, from socialist social protections (1949/1951–1978), to a liberal period of retrenchment (1978–2000), then more inclusive social protections (2000–2012), and fnally, more authoritarian "social governance" thereafter.

## **Constructing the Social: All Four Countries, India the Least, Have Articulated Social Issues as a Social Question**

In all four countries, India the least, a social question was voiced, and generalised terms like social insurance and social security emerged. Social problems are ubiquitous in any society but they are not necessarily articulated, that is, turned into a public issue. In most societies, some social problems are articulated, but few societies voice a generalised concern for social issues as a threat to the integration of society to be tackled by the state, that is a social question.

Te social question has three facets: frst, the social question refects "objective" socio-economic conditions, such as industrialisation, dislocation, urbanisation, wage labour, factory labour, and de-agrianisation. Second, it refers to intellectuals, experts, politicians, and social movements' articulation of such conditions as a general concern for society to be addressed by the state. Tese articulations may be ahead of the socioeconomic conditions of the country, like raising the labour question in a largely agrarian society (as some early critics of social protection in India argued), or they may lag behind, underrating the scale of social problems. Tird, the social question involves references to political measures to be taken in response to the articulated social problems. Each of these three facets or dimensions has its own history. Tey are related but in a contingent way—a loose coupling.

Te country-centric chapters identify three main varieties of the social question—in historical order: the land question, the labour question, and a less distinct variety that I propose to call "exclusion/inclusion". Furthermore, there are variants of the three main types, and other, more specifc social questions, such as the poverty question (which heralded "exclusion/inclusion") and the hunger question, which has been particularly central to Indian politics and is related to the issue of food security. Te three main varieties of the social question do not represent distinct historical stages. Te land question often co-existed with the labour question, and the seeds of "exclusion/inclusion" were sown early on, through the poverty question, as in South Africa from the 1920s.

#### **11 One Hundred Years of Social Protection: The Rise…**

Te *land question*—or agrarian question—was frst. Tis cannot come as a surprise, considering that agricultural production and related ways of living prevailed during the early years of industrialisation. Pellissery and Lødemel (2020) make a case that property rights in land remain an essential component of social citizenship today. In Brazil, both anti-feudalism and anti-capitalism played a role in the struggle over land reform, as did the ideas of early reformist thinkers, especially Duguit and Torres, and, towards the end of our observation period, novel ideas like agroecology and food safety that redefned the land question. In China in the 1920s, Sun Yat-Sen posited the land question as *the* social question, and in the aftermath of the revolution in 1949, the People's Republic of China achieved the only thorough land reform among the four countries.

Te *labour question* or workers' question came second, confning the social question to workers and, more specifcally, to formal workers and, originally, to selected groups of industrial workers only. As Ahuja argues for India, the distinction between formal and informal workers, which is crucial for social protection across the Global South, was created in the process. In India, even the very category of "labour" emerged as a legitimate political category in the decades before independence (Ahuja 2018: 319). Te labour question revolved around work issues, especially working conditions, individual labour rights, and collective labour rights, that is, the right to collective action through unions to empower the workers vis-à-vis employers and markets. Social protection was part of the labour question in the shape of social insurance programmes. Most countries in the Global South introduced industrial accident insurance—sometimes called workmen's compensation—as the frst branch of social insurance (Usui 1994), and this branch is most closely related to labour issues. Brazil was strongly labourist, with Vargas establishing state corporatism. China was labourist to a degree before 1949 but more narrowly so in succeeding decades. South Africa was mixed pauperist-labourist, focusing on the "poor white problem" in the 1920s and 1930s and the racialised "civilised workers' question" under *apartheid*; but public and semi-public social insurance was weakly developed. India was labourist with regard to a very small group of workers, and social protections even for these workers were limited; yet, the construction of the social question as the labour question culminated in the labour legislation of the 1940s.

Te more universalistic question of *exclusion/inclusion* came later and extended beyond formal workers to the poor and possibly all citizens, including informal workers, the rural population, women, and persons with disabilities. In South Africa, the poverty of white persons was articulated as a social problem in the early and mid-twentieth century because it questioned the racial hierarchy. Te "poor white problem" was primarily a problem of non-workers, especially persons who could not work due to age, infrmity, disability, or children (single mothers) and could not support themselves out of employment-related insurance. Tey should get work and the children should receive schooling. More inclusive policies started during the last decade of *apartheid* to be further developed in the 1990s, and during the 2000s, the discourse became more inclusive. In Brazil, the Constitution of 1988 was a major boost to social policy, and since 1988, belief in "social inclusion" became dominant across political ideologies (Pereira and Bertholini 2017). In China, the 2000s and early 2010s witnessed more inclusive policies associated with broader ideas, such as "inclusive growth", "humanity-based" policies, and "rights". In South Africa, "dignity" and "social rights" came to the fore in the same years, underpinning a universalistic agenda responsive to the needs of the poor; in a less pronounced way, this also happened in India. In India and South Africa, references to social rights introduced the courts as actors in social protection. Social protections geared to the poor, mainly cash transfers, were generally established late, spreading from the 2000s onward, with precursors in South Africa (1928) and in Brazil (1971). India had been concerned with the hunger question since the latenineteenth century but gave prominence to the needs of the poor and hungry at a fairly late stage and in particularistic ways: the ffth Five-Year Plan (of 1974) frst put poverty on the country's agenda. In South Africa, what could be called the "deviance question" also mattered. It referred to the problem of delinquency and morally improper behaviour by poor white persons, which the state tried to address through social work and institutional care.

Te three social questions sometimes intertwined. For example, we can interpret the introduction of a non-contributory rural pension in 1971 in Brazil as a way of alleviating the land question. In South Africa, the poverty question also intersected with the land question. From the 1920s through to the present, the expansion of social assistance in South Africa was necessitated by—and understood in terms of—the decline of agrarian society, frst among "poor whites" because of the commercialisation of "white" farming and then among the black majority as a result of dispossession of and forced removals of the land.2

Remarkably, the earliest and most privileged welfare provisions, namely for persons close to the government—public sector employees, soldiers, teachers, and the like—were not normally discussed in the context of a social question. Instead, it seems that the need for these provisions was taken for granted, as in Europe, where provisions for persons in the public sector were the earliest forms of state social protection, starting in the eighteenth century, apart from public poor relief introduced in the sixteenth century.

Te social question was not ubiquitous. China and India are examples of this. When China was socialist in the strict sense (1949–1978), the social question was dormant, assumed to be resolved in the institutions of socialism. Social protection was embedded in the socialist institutions of production: the rural People's Communes, the state-owned enterprises, and the urban work units. In sociological terms, these were functionally difuse institutions in which the welfare function was weakly diferentiated. Every person was assumed to be integrated into the socialist organisation of work and, thereby, covered by social protection. Te state-owned enterprises provided social insurance but of the statist Soviet-type associated with Stalin (Hu and Manning 2010). In the People's Communes, a plot of land, to which every person had access by birth, sustained the members' welfare. In the socialist institutional setting, a social policy community could not develop, and the supremacy of the Communist Party left little room for the open articulation of social problems. Civil society and non-governmental organisations were non-existent.

Te absence of the social question under socialism makes sense, at least theoretically, since socialism is designed to extinguish capitalist markets and the attendant social damages. During the negotiations that led to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1946–1948, the Soviet Union

<sup>2</sup>Te early introduction of old-age pensions for farmers in European countries also refected a link between social protection and the land question (Leisering et al. 2002: 58–61).

maintained that its socialist institutions already realised social rights—a socialist understanding of social rights as human rights that difered from liberal understandings (Davy 2014). In the communist German Democratic Republic (1949–1990), the very notion of "social policy" was suspect till the mid-1960s (Schmidt 2013: 30).

After the dormancy of the social question in socialist China, the Chinese government explicitly denied the social question during the liberal break period (1978–2000) when they delegated the social responsibility of the state to non-state actors under the fag of "socialisation". When I acted as a consultant to the Chinese government in 2001 (Leisering et al. 2002), many Chinese actors still denied the need for state-provided old-age pensions in rural areas; they referred to the land and family as sufcient resources for living. South African state ofcials used a similar argument to justify the exclusion of poor African people from social pensions and other kinds of social assistance in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as during the frst decades of the *apartheid* regime.

In India, the social question was stifed throughout the last hundred years because of the cultural denial of equality in the Hinduist tradition. Individualised measures of social protection were weak, often eclipsed by "socialist" macroeconomic policies. In the late 1940s and the 1950s, the Indian Congress proclaimed a socialist orientation, and "socialism" was even included in the constitution in 1976. However, "socialism" only indicated a kind of etatism that comprised policies like Soviet-style planning, state regulation of industries, and Keynesianism. In later decades, particularistic, identity-based claims to social protections relating to the *dalits* and *adivasis* curtailed the social question.

#### **State Responsibility, Policy Paradigms, and Welfare Models**

In theoretical terms, the social question is the pivotal middle layer in the onion skin model of social ideas. It is related to the top and bottom layers of the model—to the social responsibility of the state, policy paradigms, and models of social protection—but in a contingent way.

#### **11 One Hundred Years of Social Protection: The Rise…**

*State Responsibility*. Te articulation of the social question puts demands on the state as the addressee of social responsibility. Remarkably, all four countries hold strong notions of national statehood, even in the face of marked divisions based on ethnicity, religion, caste, and the rural/ urban divide. Before 1949, the Chinese state was weak: warlords ruled in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Empire, and, afterwards, the confict between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party led to civil war and regional divisions. Te joint war against Japan added to the upheaval. During the 1920s and 1930s, Chinese intellectuals studied Western ideas of an organic society. After 1949, the People's Republic proclaimed state socialism, underpinned by a symbiosis between state and party. However, up until 1978, the social organisation of the country was actually decentralised, comprised of a large number of collectives, mainly the rural People's Communes, the state-owned enterprises, and the units of the state and party. In the frst two decades of the reform era, that is, after 1978, the state retreated from social welfare provisioning. From 2012, the party-state has deepened.

Since independence, India has been a democracy and as such potentially responsive to social issues. Although the proclamation of "socialism" conjured up the notion of a strong state, the federal structure allowed for highly divergent social policies in the various Indian states, and some Indian states, such as Kerala, became quasi-welfare states (Singh 2015a, b). In the 1940s debates on the future of Indian society, Gandhi advocated a model of local communities that would have precluded a strong "social" state. Te South African state was deeply racialised. Trough the creation of separate "homelands" for black persons in the 1960s and 1970s, the state surrendered its social responsibility for many of its citizens in the most extreme form.

*Policy Paradigms*. What policymakers defne as the problem to be tackled is a key element of a policy paradigm. Countries may defne very diferent groups as problem groups that deserve state-provided social protection. In China, "social problems" were discussed in the 1920s in both Marxist and non-Marxist terms. Persons close to the government and, for example in South Africa, war veterans, were considered the most deserving. Socio-economically defned groups, above all workers, were the centre of the labour question, but countries difered as to which branches of industry were covered by their social insurance programmes (for Brazil, see the historical study by Lewis and Lloyd-Sherlock 2009). Life-course groups, above all children and older persons, were also key addressees, mostly by means-tested programmes, that is, based on need. South Africa (old-age pensions in 1928) and Brazil (rural pensions in 1971) were pioneers. In the move towards social cash transfer programmes since the early 2000s, life-course groups are the main targets (Leisering 2019: 161, 181), while non-disabled persons of working age—the working poor, unemployed, and underemployed—mostly lack own entitlements (also in our four countries), calls for universal rights-based benefts notwithstanding. In India, social protection focuses on identity groups based on caste. Few countries defne the addressees of basic income security in a non-categorical way, purely by need; the Chinese cash transfer programme *Dibao* and some provisions under Brazil's *Bolsa Família* are examples.3

*Models of welfare institutions*. A range of models emerged over the hundred years: the most common was and still is the model of social insurance, which is closely associated with the labour question. However, non-contributory social assistance programmes also fgured early on, for example, in 1928 in South Africa. Towards the end of our observation period, since the 1990s, more universalistic models have arisen or been called for. Te new social cash transfer programmes, mostly a variety of social assistance (only 20 per cent of the programmes are not meanstested; Leisering 2019: 169f.), are designed to make up for the limitations of social insurance programmes. State-regulated private protection, such as industrial accident insurance in Brazil in the 1920s, may also refect a social concern of the state.

#### **Tracing the Social Question**

In Chap. 1, I have defned the concept of "social question": "Raising the 'social question' means that a society recognises social issues in a generalized way as a key concern of society, to be addressed by the state, linked

<sup>3</sup>Te Indian Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act is a public works programme rather than a social cash transfer programme.

to a call for political remedies. Te underlying assumption is that the state is responsible for individual welfare". When applying the concept in empirical studies, we need to operationalise it. How can we ascertain if the social question is raised in a particular country or not? Since some social issues are articulated in some way in almost any society, we need to defne more precisely what we mean by the "social question". Tis is not normally done in the literature, for example, not even by Heclo in his article "Te social question" (1995), who, like Castel (2003: xix f.), defnes the social question through its intended efect, namely societal integration. Such a functionalist defnition is unsatisfactory because there are functional equivalents to the social question: rulers may seek to secure societal integration through nationalism, mobilisation for war, or religious fundamentalism.

Based on the test of the concept in the chapters on the four countries, I propose eight criteria for ascertaining if, and to what degree, a society raises a social question:


Tese eight defning characteristics of the social question can also be used as a template for comparative research. Te range, depth, and content of the social question also depend on the arenas of political deliberation and *discursive spaces*. Zacher (2013: 87–109) emphasises that the welfare state requires the institutions of liberty to enable free deliberations on the social question according to the changing needs of and ideals among citizens. Authoritarian regimes put severe constraints on public deliberations, including, among others, freedom of the media. Especially since 2012, China has constrained civil society activity, relying on GONGOs (government-organised non-governmental organisations) instead to secure Party policies. In democratic societies, illiteracy and high morbidity rates may act as constraints on public deliberations, as in India and South Africa, respectively (see Table 1.2 in Chap. 1).

#### **Political Language: The Spread of "Social" Semantics**

Ideas are closely connected to language. Changes in ideas may be associated with changing semantics, but new ideas can also emerge using existing language, through reinterpretation of terms—new wine in old bottles. And vice versa, old wine in new bottles, is also common. Te rise of social ideas often corresponds with a new language for talking about social problems and welfare institutions (for Northern countries see Petersen and Béland 2014a).

In all four countries, social-oriented language has spread, including new terms that indicate a *generalised* understanding of social issues beyond miscellaneous social grievances that can be found in any society. Te key comprehensive terms that fgure in all four countries are "social insurance"—denoting a generalised model of welfare; "social security" a generalised policy paradigm; and, less pronounced and more contested, "welfare state"—a term that refects a generalised understanding of the state's social responsibilities. Tis list also outlines the historical order in which they appeared and the increasing abstraction of the concepts. "Social security" occupies an intermediate position between the narrower concept of "social insurance" and the wider concept of the "welfare state".

Te term *social insurance* was the earliest term used that went beyond individual problems and programmes. Te ILO, which champions the social insurance model (Seekings 2008), has used the term from the beginning of the period under review (e.g. ILO 1925; see Berten 2020). In the period's early years, the narrower term "labour insurance" was in use, as in China in the 1920s and 1930s and in China's 1931 Constitution. However, participants had already referenced "social insurance" in the Communist-led second Labour Conference in 1925, and the Nationalist government referred to it in 1941. Social insurance was (and still is) a comprehensive term, since it covered a comprehensive range of basic social "risks" that the ILO codifed. In this way, "social insurance" bore the seeds for extending social protection beyond the group of formal workers because the list of covered risks extended beyond the risks of work to the general contingencies of everyday life, and the reference to the workers' families and dependents potentially opened up a broader range of addressees, including women.

*Social security* as a term came later, in the 1940s, and turned into a platform for extending the scope of social protection. In India, the Indian National Congress frst mentioned the term in 1940, but mainly limited to labour welfare. In South Africa, a movement, committee, and plan all referred to the term in 1942. In China, the term became ofcial from 1945 onwards and was even included in the Constitution in 1946/1947. China seems to be the only country in which the term disappeared for a signifcant period of time: the law of 1951 refers to "labour insurance" and the term "social security" did not appear in the Constitution of 1954, but reappeared in the 2004 Constitution (and already 1986 in the Seventh Five-Year Plan) and was put into practice in the policies of the 2000s. In Brazil, the term "social security" entered into law as late as 1988 in the new Constitution and encompassed social insurance, universal healthcare, and social assistance.

*Te welfare state* is a broader concept than the other two (Petersen and Béland 2014b: 298) and, even more than the others, refers both to provisions and ideational underpinnings or even cultural beliefs. Te term "welfare state" is less frequently used in the four countries and highly contested. In South Africa, President Zuma explicitly rejected the idea of a welfare state, as the National Party had emphatically done already under *apartheid*, for example, in Parliament, although, remarkably, the National Party had been happy with the notion of a "social welfare state".

However, regarding the scope of social protections, actual developments, or at least policy goals developed towards what could be called a "welfare state". Seekings (Chap. 6) describes South Africa as a "nascent welfare state" by 1949. Te "four principal social policies" that China's Nationalist Party (Guomindang) articulated in 1945 also came close. Te welfare state is a key element of the self-image of societies in Britain, Germany, and the Nordic countries, but it is an open question if this will ever occur in the four countries that we investigate or many other Southern countries. Regarding social efort, even Southern countries with fairly comprehensive social protections spend much less on public welfare (see Fig. 1.5 in Chap. 1) than do Northern welfare states (which spend 20–35 per cent of their GDP).

Tere are several other comprehensive terms. Te oldest and most comprehensive is "social policy", which was mentioned in South Africa as early as 1934. Te term originated in mid-nineteenth-century Europe and spread globally throughout the twentieth century (Kaufmann 2013b: 36–39 and passim). More recent expressions, mostly spreading since circa 2000, include "social protection", which has a somewhat broader meaning than "social security", "social pensions", "corporate social responsibility", "social sustainability", "social safety nets" (World Bank 2018), and "social cash transfers" (for the origin of the latter term see von Gliszczynski 2015: 28–30). Te proliferation of terms with the component *social* testifes to the increasing recognition of social issues across the globe.

What is the meaning of the inconspicuous word "social"? Te precise meaning of "social" in the context of social policy is difcult to pin down: "the systemic character of social policy is not nearly as evident as that of the market economy. What 'the social' means in distinction to the economic and the political, or in other words: which social phenomena and problems are relevant as the efective sphere of social policy and why—to this day no clarity has emerged on this question" (Kaufmann 2013b: 97–98). In common usage, the "social" is often set in opposition to the economic or, alternatively, to the individual. Historically, "social" as an idea and a term originated in France and Germany in the 1830s and 1840s (Kaufmann 2012: chapter 2; Kaufmann 2013b, c) and was used in the then-new terms "social reform", "social policy", "social question", and others (Pankoke 1970). "Social" implies the recognition of the cleavage between the modern political ideal of equality and the socio-economic inequalities of emerging industrial-capitalist societies, which the German philosopher Hegel (1770–1831) frst explicated in systematic terms. While Marx's solution to this cleavage was to overthrow capitalism, his contemporary Lorenz von Stein (1815–1890), like Marx (1818–1883) a Hegelian, conceived of social policy *(sociale Politik)* as a way to bridge and mitigate this cleavage by reforming capitalism. Accordingly, social policy and the social question are reformist rather than revolutionary policy concepts.

#### **The Career of "Social Security"**

As expected, "social security" has been a key term and idea in the history of social policy in the four countries. Terefore, it is worth tracing the career of the term beyond its appearance in the four countries.

According to the authoritative study on the concept of security (Kaufmann 1973, 2012: chapter 5), "security" is a key normative idea of modern society or, more specifcally, of the functionally diferentiated society, as systems theorists conceive of modern society. Marx identifed security as the overarching idea of civil society (or of capitalism, as he later termed it): "*Security* is the supreme social concept of civil society …" (Marx 1978: 43).4 Social security is a variety of the broader concept of security. While "social", the "social question", and other related terms emerged in the second third of the nineteenth century, the term "social security" only emerged a century later. One might have expected "social security" to originate in Western and Northern Europe, but the frst use of the term is commonly attributed to American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1934, and the term fgured explicitly in the name of the US "Social Security Act" of 1935, which was part of the New Deal. Yet only the term was new; it hardly conveyed new ideas that were previously unknown in Europe (Kaufmann 2012: 135).

<sup>4</sup>German original: "Die *Sicherheit* ist der höchste soziale Begrif der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft …" (Marx 1956: 365; written in 1843).

In international arenas, "social security" emerged in the 1940s as a key term and idea as part of the "welfare internationalism" of that decade, refecting visions of a new post-war order (Kaufmann 2012: chapter 4). Te term was mentioned in the Atlantic Charter of 1941, and the ILO used the term from 1940 onwards, ofcially from 1942 (Berten 2020). Latin American countries also took up the term at the Inter-American Conference on Social Security in Santiago de Chile in 1942. Although social security was defned rather narrowly at the conference, it was set in a wider context: the conference emphasised "the role of social insurance as the principal method of organising social security … social security policy … demands for its success concurrent measures to promote full employment, to increase national income, to raise the standard of living and education upon which health and capacity depend" (Inter-American Conference on Social Security 1942: 688).

From then on, the concept quickly spread globally, although (or just because) international organisations and states both interpreted it in very diverse ways. In 1948, social security became a human right under the newly founded United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, Article 22, which lays down the right, and Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 1966, which restates this right in a more binding way, have just one sentence on this right, much less than for other rights. Te articles name no standard and no agent in charge of specifying and implementing the right. Tis was left to the ILO (Davy 2014), which issued the key Convention no. 102, the "Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention" (ILO 1952). Te ILO tended to refer to the term narrowly as social insurance but had mentioned social assistance in many documents right from the beginning (Berten 2020). Out of our four countries, only Brazil has ratifed Convention no. 102, but all have ratifed the ICESCR, although South Africa did so as late as 2015 (see Table 1.1 in Chap. 1).

Te use of the term "social security" in relevant political contexts indicates the emergence of a substantial understanding of the social in four respects.

First, social security is a *comprehensive* term that may cover a range of welfare policies and programmes. Te use of the term indicates that the country in question has developed an overarching notion of the various common insecurities in individuals' lives and the need for political responses. To confront the "Five Giants"—Want, Ignorance, Disease, Squalor, and Idleness—William Beveridge in his report of 1942 designed a "plan for social security": "it is a plan all-embracing in scope of persons and of needs" (Beveridge 1942: 9). At the time, "social security" was a very recent term, and, although it pervades Beveridge's report, the report was actually entitled "Social Insurance and Allied Services". Te term "social insurance" had played an overarching role before in policies and programmes, but a truly overarching term had been missing in the interwar years (Berten 2019, 2020). "Social security" is potentially broader in scope than "social insurance", in particular because it includes noncontributory benefts for the poor, and, if fully realised, social services (Kaufmann 1973: 95).

Second, as Kaufmann emphasises, social security has a double character, denoting a set of welfare programmes and services as well as an *idea*, namely that the state should ameliorate the insecurity of its citizens' lives in a comprehensive sense. While the English language only has one term, "social security", the German distinction between *soziale Sicherung*, which denotes the institutional side, and *soziale Sicherheit*, which denotes the guiding idea, refects the two sides of social security. When the idea of "social security" emerged globally in the 1940s, it was associated with visions of a new post-war society and new welfare ideas like prevention and rehabilitation (Kaufmann 1973: 95–98). However, it was a vision without specifc instruments, "a normative concept … in search of institutional realisations" (Kaufmann 1973: 98; transl. L.L.). Tis might help to explain its trajectory, and it demonstrates that powerful ideas may take precedence over actual social protection measures.

Te advent of the concept of social security also historically signalled a transition from the labour question to more universalistic ideas of inclusion. In the Global North after World War II, social policy changed in character from class-based politics, which had emphasised collective labour rights, working conditions, and "labour insurance", to redistributive policies for all citizens in order to enhance individual welfare—"social security" (Kaufmann 2013b). Redistribution was not so much between classes, but between older persons and the young (in the form of old-age pensions and long-term care, often based on the idea of a contract between generations), between the sick and the healthy (in the form of medical services), and between families and persons without children.

Tird, unlike traditional poor relief and charity, but similar to social insurance, social security is not only about welfare provisions in the here and now but also oriented to the *future*, 5 both providing and requiring a "long view" by citizens (de Swaan 1988, using a term by Norbert Elias). Te designated outcome of social security programmes is not only fnancial betterment but also "security" for citizens in planning their lives. Te idea of security includes self-assurance as psychological security of the self (Kaufmann 1973, ch. 4.5). Von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann (1994) have challenged the view that traditional societies in the Global South lack a concept of social security because their members are absorbed by daily exigencies, unable to plan for the future. Based on research in Indonesia, the von Benda-Beckmanns argue that traditional societies also have a notion of the future and develop distinct ideas of and rules for social security. However, social security is mostly embedded in functionally difuse social settings like the family, kinship, and the village.

Fourth, social security refects a *reformist* strategy, with an emphasis on achieving security within capitalism rather than challenging the structural inequalities of capitalism (Heclo 1995: 667). Te above quote from Marx reads in full: "*Security* is the supreme social concept of civil society, the concept of the *police*. Te whole society exists only in order to guarantee for each of its members the preservation of his person, his rights, and his property" (Marx 1978: 43).6 Tat is, the concept of security is geared to securing rather than transcending civil society or capitalism (Marx 1956: 36). Te idea of preserving a person and the person's rights and property, if extended to the social, encapsulates the thrust of the concept of social security or even the welfare state. Social security is about the livelihood of persons, their social rights, and "social property". Entitlements to social security, especially through social insurance

<sup>5</sup>On the temporality of the idea of security in general see Kaufmann (1973: ch. 4.3).

<sup>6</sup>German original: "Die *Sicherheit* ist der höchste soziale Begrif der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, der Begrif der *Polizei*, daß die ganze Gesellschaft nur da ist, um jedem ihrer Mitglieder die Erhaltung seiner Person, seiner Rechte und seines Eigentums zu garantieren" (Marx 1956: 365f.; written in 1843).

programmes, may acquire the legal status of property for the propertyless, as, for example, endorsed by the Supreme Court (Constitutional Court) in Germany (Zacher 2013: 95). Social security is about securing the livelihood of the wage labourer and other members of society, but leaves the basic relations of production intact, as does the general concept of security. Te earlier concept of social insurance was similarly reformist, but social security implies a more far-reaching remoulding of living conditions under capitalism.

### **Multireferentiality: Social Protection Is Largely Driven and Shaped by "Non-social" Ideas and Interests**

When talking about social policy ideas, one tends to think of "social" norms and values like social justice, solidarity, equality, and welfare. Such norms drive social movements and NGO work. Yet to promote social policies, referencing these norms is not enough. Kaufmann (1997, 2012: 277–285) holds that, historically, social policy in Europe only expanded because its collective utility beyond simply its welfare impacts—its economic, political, social, and cultural utility—could be demonstrated to the key actors. Similarly, Midgley (2013: 9–20) distinguishes several "functions of social protection" beyond the welfare function that need to be considered. Policymakers who seek to advance social policy need to create "synergies" between social and economic (and other) goals (Kaufmann 2012: 284; see also Rodgers 2013).

In all four countries references to the non-social functions of social protections fgured explicitly and prominently in political debates. Tese references operated as *frames* of social protection, either supporting or countering extensions of social protection. Tis shows that opposition to social policy is not only about interests; rather, counter ideas are developed to justify the rejection of more substantial social protections. When tracing frames, we also found that counter ideas are more complex and less immediately interest driven than common terms like "neoliberalism" or, referring to South Africa, racism suggest. Marianne Ulriksen (Chap. 7) concludes that "the apartheid state is a reminder of how far policy can be pushed with reference to ideational and normative justifcations".

In the introduction, I distinguish between three types of frames: nonsocial frames, global frames, and counter frames (see the onion skin model, Fig. 1.2; for global frames see the next section). Social policy is not just underpinned by "social" ideas but relies on ideas originating from other spheres of society (Achinger 1979). Tese frames of the social difer between the four countries and across time: social security was conceived, alternatively, as facilitating, counteracting, or irrelevant to other, potentially broader societal concerns, especially economic growth, development, nation-building, social cohesion, and social peace. Surprisingly, the key arguments and contestations about social protections were similar in the four countries, and they also resemble debates in the Global North, with similar arguments and frames for or against social protection.

We identifed a broad range of frames that operated in the four countries. In South Africa under *apartheid* and before, the "native question" was the racialised national question, and it framed the social question. Te native question was about securing the white and Christian "civilisation" and, in conjunction, the racial hierarchy. In post-*apartheid* South Africa, developmentalism was used to protest the extension of social protections or at least was indiferent to them. Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC) were strong developmentalists. After *apartheid*, racial redress was another important frame that eclipsed the social question. However, anti-racism movements also helped to bring "dignity" to the fore, which became a key legitimising idea of more universalistic and rights-based social protection in the 2000s. Dignity is a strong frame because it is a basic value and can rally support from all political camps. In postcolonial India, the struggle for independence from foreign oppression and a developmentalist emphasis on economic growth tended to crowd out the social question. In China, securing social stability and the rule of the Communist Party have been the overarching frames of social protections in the reform era. In conjunction, the frame developmentalism or "GDPism" served to justify welfare retrenchment from 1978 to 2000. In Brazil and Argentina, developmentalist thinking was particularly infuential in the 1950s and 1960s (Sikkink 1991).

Tere were other infuential frames. In South Africa, a moral frame gave rise to what I have described above as the deviance question. Ideas on creating an ecological society also came in at the end of our observation period, in the debate on land reform in Brazil. Religious frames also mattered. Neo-Calvinism acted as a counter frame to social protections in South Africa from the late 1930s onward, and the Hindu culture in India generally stifed the social question. Liberation theology in Brazil, inspired by left Catholicism, was a forceful movement in favour of farreaching social reforms.

Remarkably, reference to human rights sometimes counteracted the extension of social protections. According to T. H. Marshall (1950), citizenship is made up of three kinds of rights: political, civil, and social. Yet in political discourses, social rights often take a backseat, and social protections in particular are not "sexy". Calls for political and civil rights may crowd out demands for social rights. Te fght against *apartheid* in South Africa was a case in point. It was primarily a fght for political and civil rights. Nelson Mandela was a freedom fghter and not much interested in issues of social protection. India has experienced strong movements for political and legal rights, while universal social rights are consistently underdeveloped. Political and legal equality can do little to counter the vast inequalities in Indian society. In international politics, for a long time, NGOs similarly focused on political and civil rather than social rights. For example, NGOs from all major political camps rejected or disregarded the idea of cash benefts for the poor well into the 1990s (Leisering 2019: 5f.).

Non-social ideas not only support or inhibit the extension of social protections but may also *shape* policies. Social ideas often mix with other ideas, leading to a hybridisation of the normative foundations of social protection, especially with regard to who is seen as deserving public benefts. For example, at the time of the early labour question, social protections were largely confned to industrial workers because they were seen as crucial to the economic development of the country. Te social cash transfer programmes that have emerged since 2000 mostly focus on children (and older persons) while neglecting persons of working age. Tis refects a developmentalist approach in a diferent way: the argument is that children are the economic agents of tomorrow (von Gliszczynski 2015: 132f.). South Africa's post-*apartheid* social reformer Zola Skweyiya was a paternalist conservative who balanced the idea of a caring society with developmentalism, which resulted in a hybrid understanding of the state's social responsibilities.

Frames are not static; they may be interpreted in diferent ways and change over time. Economic arguments have been brought forward against and in favour of the extension of social protection. Social protection for industrial workers, for example, was meant to bolster the import substitution model of economic growth, as in Brazil. Christian ideas can equally work against or in favour of social protection, as neo-Calvinism in South Africa and the liberation theology in Brazil illustrate. Proponents of social protection may also be ambivalent about the extension of social protections, for example, the National Party under *apartheid* South Africa or the ANC after *apartheid*.

#### **Transnational Diffusion: External Ideas Have Pervaded Domestic Debates on Social Protection from the Beginning (the 1920s)**

All four countries have experienced external infuence in one way or another. Colonisation was Northern powers' most direct inroad into the Global South but in the strict sense, only one of the four countries was a colony, India under the British Raj, while South Africa and Brazil were not simply colonised but also settled by farmers, workers, and slaves at diferent stages, and China experienced "externally-induced modernisation" (see Table 1.1 in Chap. 1). Some colonial rulers introduced rudimentary social protections and shaped administrative traditions that have repercussions till the present day.7 For settler societies, one can generally assume that the legacy of the settlers' countries of origin—Portugal, Britain, the Netherlands, Germany—played a role, and that later associations, especially the Commonwealth, had an infuence on the nation's historical trajectory.

<sup>7</sup> See Schmitt (2015) and Leisering (2019: 157) on present-day diferences between anglophone and francophone countries in Africa.

Is there a reason to assume a wholesale domination by Northern powers? Or do Northern perspectives on the Global South unduly obscure indigenous ideas and practices? It is generally plausible to assume that external ideas had a formative infuence on the feld of social protection for several reasons (see Chap. 1: availability of Northern models, lack of domestic expertise, and international organisations' and donors' activity).

Te chapters in this volume provide ample evidence that external ideas—concepts pertaining to society and social welfare, institutional models of welfare, and expert knowledge—were omnipresent in all four countries—even in China under authoritarian rule after 1949, the Communist Party's claim to self-governance notwithstanding. Our fndings align with a key tenet of the bourgeoning literature on difusion and policy transfer, namely that external ideas are not usually simply transplanted to the receiving country but are subject to translation, adaptation, interpretation, syncretisation, and combination with domestic ideas. Communism became Sino-communism in China. "Socialism" in India did not mean the overthrow of capitalist society, but a kind of etatism as explained above. In the Indian state of Kerala, the Communist Party had a strong nationalist tendency (Singh 2015a). Te concept of social insurance, which the ILO propagated, took on diferent shapes in the countries of the South (for Brazil see Lewis and Lloyd-Sherlock 2009), and the socialist countries, including China in the 1950s, adopted the etatiste Stalinist version of social insurance rather than the Bismarckian (Hu and Manning 2010). In the 2000s, China almost completely copied the German model of industrial accident insurance but did not adopt the self-governance in the administration of the insurance, which was seen as a threat to Party rule (Liu and Leisering 2017). Our fndings also confrm the general insight of difusion research that "decoupling" (Meyer 2009: 182) between the adoption of international norms and ideas, on the one hand, and domestic policies, on the other hand, is endemic.

Some Latin American countries, including Brazil, were remarkably independent early proponents of extensive welfare commitments by governments and even pushed Northern governments to do more in international arenas. Latin American governments—not the Soviet Union as is sometimes assumed—were key drivers of social rights in the years 1946–1948 in the preparation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Davy 2013, 2014).

From the late twentieth century onwards, there were two almost parallel but incongruous ideational movements.8 Economic liberalisation and marketisation, often described as "neo-liberalism", became globally hegemonic doctrines in the 1980s and 1990s that thoroughly transformed domestic politics worldwide, including our four countries (for the global spread of liberalization as a process of difusion, see Simmons et al. 2008). Tis shift even afected "socialist" China, where it triggered economic reform and the attendant liberal break in social protection. However, almost simultaneously, from the 1990s onwards, an individualised understanding of social human rights also spread: the right to social security was interpreted as denoting individual entitlements to public benefts, superseding earlier collectivist, developmental or socialist, understandings (Davy 2013, 2014). Te reference to "rights" and "rights-based" programmes and policies became part of the social discourse, and international organisations used this discourse to mobilise action on social protection and other social concerns. Te new rights discourse also found its way into domestic politics, especially in South Africa and even in China during the 2000s and early 2010s. In operative terms, international organisations increasingly pushed for the extension of social protection through global campaigns and interventions in Southern policies (for social cash transfer programmes see von Gliszczynski 2015). From the early 2000s, even the ILO eventually took to actively advocating for non-contributory social cash transfers besides social insurance under the fag of "Social Security for All" (ILO 2003; see Leisering 2020). Brazil's, China's, and South Africa's pioneering models of social cash transfers (see Table 1.1 in Chap. 1) came earlier, though, testifying to a "development revolution from the global South" (Hanlon et al. 2010).

Our fndings challenge two frames of reference of much of the policy transfer literature. First, the literature mostly analyses the activity of *one* sending agent, be it an international organisation or another country.

<sup>8</sup> In international politics, Koehler (2015: 740f.) identifes a related disjunction between the "frst UN" and the "second UN". In the UN system, neoliberalism came to dominate the "frst UN", that is, the member states, while the "second UN", that is, the UN secretariat and UN agencies, restored the UN's ideals of the UN Charter by calling for social justice and human rights.

Second, studies mostly investigate the spread of *policies*—such as the World Bank's global campaign for a larger share of private old-age security in the 1990s and 2000s. In contrast, we detected a multiplicity of external agents and infuences that shape several layers of the social (rather than only policies).

First, regarding the *multiplicity of external agents*, a range of Northern welfare states acted as agents of difusion. British ideas, such as the Beveridge Report of 1942, impacted debates in India and South Africa. South African politicians observed not only models from Commonwealth countries, especially New Zealand and Australia, but also US casework models. Te Netherlands played a role in South Africa's societal development through Dutch neo-Calvinist theologians. Te German model of social insurance, which the ILO had taken up, was infuential worldwide, except in socialist countries. However, in the reform era, even China adopted a Bismarckian industrial accident insurance programme. Marxism, originating in Germany, was a major infuence on China since the 1920s. Te Soviet Union infuenced Chinese thinking as early as the 1920s and 1930s and more forcefully so after the Communist revolution in 1949, by spreading the Soviet Union's model of industrial development and the Stalinist model of labour insurance. Ideas from the Soviet Union also resonated in India. Furthermore, there were countries that acted as mediators between Northern and Southern ideas, above all Japan, which had taken in Northern ideas as early as the nineteenth century and infuenced Chinese thinking before 1949. South Korea also acted as mediator. Te Soviet Union was a mediator of Marxist ideas.

International organisations were also active in disseminating ideas around the world. Meyer (2009) conceives of these organisations as key proponents of "world culture", that is, globally shared principles—such as universalism, individualism, rationalism, and human rights—and models—such as statehood, constitutions, and education. Te ILO was founded in 1919, with India as a founding member. Te creation of the United Nations in 1945 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 gave rise to a diversifying landscape of international organisations, both governmental and non-governmental, that would become major social policy actors from the 1990s onwards (Deacon et al. 1997), such as UNICEF, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), plus national development agencies and donors. Te ILO, the key player in the feld of social protection since the interwar years, lost its hegemony. Global religious organisations also played a role. Te Latin American liberation theology echoed the new thinking of the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965).

Diverse difusion mechanisms were operative. Emulation, rather than policy learning, was frequent. Emulation is about receiving socially accepted ideas from select senders, that is, it is about social construction (e.g. of social problems and models of social security) rather than the close empirical observation and hard evidence that characterises policy learning (Dobbin et al. 2007: 450–454).

More concrete mechanisms of dissemination included the translation of Western academic literature, which was infuential in domestic debates on "social problems", "social policy", and modernisation in China in the 1920s, and academic study abroad by thousands of Southern intellectuals. In China, students returning from Japan, Europe, and the USA discussed Marxist and non-Marxist concepts of society. Te key architect of *apartheid* Hendrik Verwoerd and the major reformer in post-*apartheid* South Africa Zola Skweyiya both studied in Germany. During the last decade of *apartheid*, external pressure from the global public helped to loosen the hold on power of the racist regime.

Tese multiple external infuences interacted in various ways. A synthesis of external infuences, combined with domestic ideas and practices, may give rise to unique national solutions. Te Chinese social assistance programme *Dibao* is a case in point (Leisering et al. 2017). Te strength of various external infuences also varied over time. China was the most extreme case among our four countries, switching to Soviet ideology in 1949 (before, the Communist Party had only been active in some regions) and repeatedly changing between external models in the feld of old-age security during the reform era (Hu 2015, 2016). Te conspicuous swings in social policy in China after 1978 pinpointed by Shih-Jiunn Shi partially happened in conjunction with swings in references to external models.

Second, regarding the *multi-layered nature of external infuences*, we found that external infuences operated on each of the four layers of the onion skin model, rather than only on the policy level, and that the infuences on the four layers were incongruent in some instances. Some infuences only afected the most general layers—the state's social responsibility and the social question—without necessarily impacting policies or institutions. In the process, the language of social welfare changed to include new terms like "social insurance" and "social security" and, more recently, "social inclusion" or "social sustainability", but related changes in actual policies came much later or not at all ("decoupling"). In China, since 2012, it has worked the other way around. While China has been jettisoning references to rights and civil society, distancing itself from key "Western" ideas, actual social protection programmes remain largely unchanged. Some new social categories have even entered constitutions, thereby entrenching the social responsibility of the state. Te Brazilian Constitutions of 1934 and 1946 refected socially minded European constitutions, the Chinese constitution of 1946 adopted the term "social security", and, in 2004, even China added human rights to its Constitution as well as the aim of establishing a social security system.

All in all, the countries we study in this volume reveal a plethora of external infuences but talk and action were often decoupled. Countries were subject to heterogeneous infuences from several senders and in several layers of the social. An in-depth study of these types of difusion processes remains a desideratum. Moreover, various infuential senders that have exerted infuence besides the ILO are not analysed in this volume.

## **The Social Question in Flux: Diversifcation and Traps**

Te four countries, except India, have achieved a degree of social protection coverage over the last hundred years, which ranks them among the leaders in the Global South (see Table 1.1 in Chap. 1). For some time, Western observers had held the view that India would demonstrate the superiority of democracy vis-à-vis communist China. However, around 1980, China took the lead in economic growth and, from the 2000s, also in the feld of social protection. Will the four countries further expand their social protection systems, even become welfare states? Or will they remain stuck at the current level of social protection—a "middle social protection trap", similar to the much discussed "middle income trap" with regard to economic development?9 Or will they even fall back? What social questions will be raised?

While Northern welfare states reached "growth to limits" (Flora 1986) in the 1980s, covering almost all citizens by all major social services, countries in the Global South, even the most advanced ones, are far from this state: a restricted range of programmes, patchy coverage, low beneft levels, uneven quality of services, weak implementation, and clientelism and corruption are all widespread and social spending remains low (see Fig. 1.5 in Chap. 1). In the Global South, countries with comprehensive and universalistic social service programmes are rare. Few Southern countries are "proto-welfare state regimes"(including Brazil; see Table 1.1 and the discussion in Chap. 1). Only 16 out of 148 Southern countries have put in place social cash transfers that provide basic income security for all citizens, at least by law (in 2012/13; Leisering 2019: 194), and this includes Brazil and China, and South Africa is close (see Table 1.1). Only 29 per cent of the global population, North and South, are covered by social protection programmes in all key areas of protection (ILO 2017: 168), often with limited benefts. All in all, despite recent extensions, Southern social protections remain precarious and moderate at best.

Te success model of social protection in the Global North and main pathway to universalism, social insurance, remains structurally limited in the Global South, due to the large share of informal workers. Breman and van der Linden (2014) even see informal work as a global threat that increasingly extends to the Global North. Terborn (2019: ix) and Breman et al. (2019) see evidence of a new global social question revolving around multiple forms of precarious labour. Yet, the ILO (2015) sticks to the notion of formal employment and seeks to spread it worldwide, and thereby also social insurance (see historically Seekings 2008). Te Indian government is increasingly providing social security like

<sup>9</sup>Real GDP per capita declined in Brazil during the 2010s and stagnated in South Africa (see Fig. 1.3 in Chap. 1).

maternity allowances and small pensions to informal workers but disjointed from job security.

#### **"Exclusion/Inclusion": The New Social Question?**

Te social question had already started to shift beyond the workers' question in the 1940s, with "social security" as an ideational horizon. South Africa had focused on non-workers as early as the 1920s, under the fag of the "poor white problem". Since the 1990s, the social question has further moved towards ideas of universalistic "inclusion". "Inclusion", "inclusiveness", and "inclusive policies" have become standard terms in the global development community's lexicon (e.g. UN 2018). Yet, the potential new social question "exclusion/inclusion" is less distinct than the labour question or the land question. "Inclusion" seems to provide an open platform that can accommodate a variety of ideas and concepts.

What aspects of the social does "inclusion" address? Te concept goes beyond the problems of the capitalist labour market and inequalities of class, which defned the labour question. Te contributors to this volume demonstrate that social issues revolve around a range of fundamental inequalities besides economic class, including ethnicity/"race", caste, gender, land ownership, and the urban/rural divide. "Inclusion" is a very broad term that would cover all these forms of inequality. However, the concept of inclusion extends even further, by highlighting a new facet of inequalities. "Inequality" is an abstract and impersonal term, whereas the language of exclusion/inclusion is often used to specify who exactly is excluded, who excludes, and from what it is that persons are excluded. Tis perspective has particularly been applied to issues of gender, to persons with disabilities, and "vulnerable" persons. Te latter term denotes diverse groups, such as children, especially handicapped or orphaned children, persons with disability, older persons, or women.

Tere is another usage of "inclusion", which further difers from "inequality". While addressing social inequalities presupposes a comparison of a person's or group's position with that of another, pointing out defcient inclusion can also refer to socially defned standards, without necessarily or primarily involving comparisons. In this sense, inclusion is about enhancement, refecting the welfare state's intellectual origins in the Enlightenment, especially the idea of the self-perfectibility of man (Janowitz 1976). Education and medical services, for example, aim to develop citizens' cognitive and physical capabilities. Amartya Sen (1983) links inequality and inclusion to emphasise the absolute core of relative poverty, arguing that economic inequalities (or relative poverty) may impair inclusion (defned in "absolute" terms of capabilities). Sen's concept of capabilities is part of this inclusion tradition, as is T. H. Marshall's concept of social citizenship (see Leisering 2019: 51f.).

In collective terms, enhancement may mean raising the general standard of living in poor countries, that is, tackling collective poverty rather than individual poverty or inequality in the frst place. Tis concept of enhancement is akin to a developmental notion of welfare, which Drèze and Sen (1991: 22) call "growth-mediated security", which is marketdriven, in contrast to "support-led security" provided by the state.

Defciency of inclusion is socially defned. From a constructivist perspective, social policy attends to forms of inclusion that political actors deem insufcient in view of socially defned standards (Kaufmann 2012: 153). Marshall (1950: 11) defnes the substance of social citizenship in an open way by referencing "the standards prevailing in the society". Te constructivist understanding opens up the concept of inclusion to a wide range of social issues: to diverse kinds of inequality and related exclusions, and to collective enhancement in respect to diverse aspects of living. In political terms, the openness of the concept of inclusion may thus enable consensus between diferent stakeholders. However, the openness of the forms and standards of inclusion also blurs the social question. Diverse interpretations are possible, giving rise to strong or weak, individualist or collectivist notions of the social question.10

Some authors see dependence/autonomy as the most fundamental social question and the core concern of the welfare state (Vobruba 1997; Leisering 2019: 49). Vocalising the social question as exclusion/inclusion is indiferent to the question of dependence/autonomy. Dependence/ autonomy refects an individualistic interpretation of inclusion, which

<sup>10</sup>Tis is similar to the use of "universalism" by international organisations. "Universalism" belongs to the semantic feld of "inclusion" and is also vaguely defned (see Leisering 2020).

would, for example, require "de-familialisation" (Esping-Andersen 1999: 45) to secure individual autonomy particularly for women and children, analogous to and supplementing "decommodifcation" (Esping-Andersen 1990) in the labour market. By contrast, conservatives and socialists tend to conceive of including persons as members of their families or other collectivities, with pre-defned rights and duties, rather than individual rights bearers.11 Autonomy would also require de-clientelisation of social relationships. Clientelism and patronage is especially widespread in the Global South and a major concern for social policymakers (Wood and Gough 2006: 1707–1709).

What is the future of the social question if defned as social exclusion/ inclusion? I have distinguished three facets of social questions: "objective" socio-economic conditions, the articulation of problematic conditions as societal concerns, and welfare institutions set up in response. Te frst and third facets indicate problems that could limit or even halt the further extension of social protections in many countries in the Global South. I postulate that there are two potential traps: the "residualism trap", which refers to welfare institutions (third facet), and the "inequality trap", which refers to socio-economic conditions (frst facet).

#### **The Residualism Trap**

Several countries in the Global South, including our four countries, have a reasonable amount of economic resources and administrative expertise to plan and create substantial welfare institutions. Indicators like education, literacy, means of transport, or the use of digital technologies have all improved, even in many poorer countries. However, with rising social problems and expectations, more resources will be needed. For example, health services for all citizens according to the standards of Western and Northern European welfare states, or comprehensive social assistance to those in need, are currently elusive for Southern countries. In consequence, as long as countries are caught in a middle-income trap, it is unlikely they will escape a middle-social protection trap.

<sup>11</sup> I owe this distinction to Jeremy Seekings.

Rising expectations are particularly pronounced among members of the middle class who aspire to Northern standards of public welfare, such as generous pensions and high-quality health services. However, "inclusion" is often meant to be achieved through universal welfare programmes, which tend to provide meagre fat-rate benefts to all citizens, such as non-means-tested, non-contributory pensions and low-quality services. Such programmes may be appropriate in societies in which most people are in or near poverty but tend to be less attractive for the rising middle class, who then invest in private provisions. If many members of the middle class have done so, it might be too late to win them back to statebased provisions. As a result, the middle classes' political support for public welfare will dwindle, the fscal space also for services for the poor will shrink, and the universalistic services for the poor will become residual12—a residualism trap. In addition, demographic ageing might be too advanced in some countries, especially in China, to make the case for large-scale contributory and earnings-related old-age pensions.

#### **The Inequality Trap**

Economic inequality is extreme in all four countries and has risen massively in the wake of neoliberal policies since the 1990s (see Fig. 1.4 in Chap. 1).13 Social cash transfers to the poor have tangibly reduced extreme poverty in many countries but have hardly afected inequality (World Bank 2018: 61; for Brazil and South Africa see Barrientos et al. 2013). Social protection in general has done little to reduce inequality14 and has even produced massive new cleavages (for socialist China see Dillon 2015). Social inequalities in the four countries have seemingly become too exaggerated to be contained by social protection programmes. Social

<sup>12</sup> See Esping-Andersen (1990: 25), Korpi and Palme (1998), and the discussion in Leisering (2019: 340–343).

<sup>13</sup>For inequality and stratifcation in the four countries, see generally Li et al. (2013) and Frazier (2011).

<sup>14</sup>For welfare outcomes of social policies in the BRICS countries, see Maiorano and Manor (2017), for the role of employment policies for income inequality see OECD (2010). In a major study of the relationship between social protection and inequality, Midgley (2020) revitalises the egalitarian claim of social protection.

protection policies are facing the challenge of switching from "easy redistribution" to "hard redistribution" (Holland and Schneider 2017).

Wulfgramm and Starke (2017) argue that in societies with extreme socio-economic inequalities, attempts at more far-reaching redistribution can become divisive. Based on data that includes Brazil, South Africa, and other middle-income countries, they fnd (2017: 20f.) that "both market inequality and state redistribution have dividing efects on public opinion… while the problem of income inequality certainly is driving a wedge into societies, the solution of more redistribution may be equally divisive from a certain level onwards… for progressive policy advocates in advanced welfare states, keeping the primary distribution of incomes in check may be preferable to further redistribution in order to avoid a more divided public… However, … many of the institutional preconditions of egalitarian 'predistribution'… may be extremely difcult to create and sustain in countries without historical precedent". Tat is, even if social protection policies escaped the residualism trap and achieved hard redistribution, they risk being divisive, not to mention that changes in primary distribution are beyond the reach of social protection policies.

At this point, we are reminded of the reformist nature of the social question concept. Marx scorned the reformist ideas of his time. In his 1875 *Kritik des Gothaer Programms* (Critique of the Gotha Programme)—a critique of the draft of a programme for a unifed social-democratic workers' party in Germany—Marx criticised the expression "social question" as empty journalist talk that suggested a state-led strategy, as opposed to class struggle that would bring down capitalism. Tat is, Marx rightly saw the "social question" as the key semantics of the then-emerging reformist concept of "social policy":

the physic of the prophet! … In place of the existing class struggle appears a newspaper scribbler's phrase: '*the* social *question*', to the *'solution'* of which one 'paves the way'. Instead of arising from the revolutionary process of transformation of society, the 'socialist organization of the total labour' 'arises' from the 'state aid' that the state gives to the producers' co-operative societies and which *the state*, not the workers, *'calls into being'*. It is worthy of Lassalle's imagination that with state loans one can build a new society just as well as a new railway! (Marx 1977: n.p.)15

In fact, social protection policies in the South have left private ownership of the means of production and capital largely untouched. Capitalism—more precisely: predatory capitalism and oligarchical rule has persisted, most visibly in Brazil and South Africa, or has appeared in a new guise in China, combining state capitalism with oligarchical Party rule. Te earliest form of the social question, the land question, was about property, but no thoroughgoing land reform has ever been achieved, except for China in the early years after the communist revolution, although the reform was dismantled during the era of socialist transition (1953–1956) with the agricultural collectivisation, which in turn has been tacitly upturned during the era of expanding state capitalism. In Brazil, even Duguit's reformist concept of a "social function of property", despite its prominent place in the constitution, had little substantive impact.

Marx, in the above quote, asserted the limitations of "state aid" for workers in the face of the structural constraints of capitalism and pleaded for class struggle instead. Pellissery et al. (2015) extend Marx' argument beyond capitalist structures and economic inequalities. Tey demonstrate that both targeted and universalistic social protection policies cannot redress the "durable inequalities" of caste in India, but that political participation and mobilisation are needed to bring about structural change.

All in all, social protection policies in the four countries might be trapped by extreme inequalities and the residualist tendencies of inclusive welfare institutions. While reformist social strategies are subject to these traps, socialist social protections put in place in China between 1949 and 1978 are no solution either, since they provided minimal security at best

<sup>15</sup>German original: " das Heilmittel des Propheten! … An die Stelle des existierenden Klassenkampfs tritt eine Zeitungsschreiberphrase—*die* soziale *Frage*, deren *Lösung* man 'anbahnt'. Statt aus dem revolutionären Umwandlungsprozesse der Gesellschaft 'entsteht' die 'sozialistische Organisation der Gesamtarbeit' aus der 'Staatshilfe', die der Staat Produktivgenossenschaften gibt, die *er*, nicht der Arbeiter, *ins Leben ruft*. Es ist dies würdig der Einbildung Lassalles, daß man mit Staatsanlehn ebensogut eine neue Gesellschaft bauen kann wie eine neue Eisenbahn!" (Marx 1962: 26).

in a society characterised by collective poverty.16 Moreover, social protection in socialist China was highly stratifed (Dillon 2015). Developmentalist strategies geared to growth-mediated security (be it through markets or a socialist command economy) are no cure either; they have produced the high levels of inequality in the frst place and are prone to incur environmental damages with new problems of securing livelihoods. Both socialist and unfettered developmentalist strategies fail to give adequate attention to the exigencies of social protection.

Since the 2010s, all four countries studied in this volume have had radical leaders—Bolsonaro, Modi, Xi Jinping, and Zuma (the latter till 2018)—who took to nationalist policies, which are, sociologically speaking, a functional equivalent to social policy as means of societal integration, especially in times of abating economic growth rates.

#### **Renewing the Social Question**

Authors in the Marxist political economy tradition, such as Breman et al. (2019) and Terborn (2019), paint a gloomy picture of the future of the global social question, focused on the global spread of precarious labour.17 Nor do the residualism and inequality traps promise a glamorous future.

Yet, when examining the core facet of the social question—the articulation of problematic conditions as societal concerns—a somewhat brighter picture emerges. From the angle of neo-institutionalist world society theory, Meyer (2009: 199) argues: "the growing list of perceived 'social problems' in the world indicates not the weakness of world-cultural institutions but their strength. …. A world with so many widely discussed social problems is a world of Durkheimian and Simmelian integration, however much it may also seem driven by disintegrative tendencies". However, do these global perceptions and discussions actually matter? International organisations operate with a surplus of "social" ideas, as Southern countries have also increasingly done since the 1990s.

<sup>16</sup>For the predicaments of socialist social policies in a relatively well-of country, the German Democratic Republic (1949–1990), see Schmidt (2013).

<sup>17</sup> Interestingly, Terborn (2019: ix) also speaks of "inclusion" as the new social question but conceives of it in narrow labour terms.

Representations and recognition of social problems and problem groups abound, but they are only loosely coupled with actual measures and are often phrased in vague terms (see Leisering 2020 for the indistinctive use of "universalism" in global debates). However, several studies by Meyer and associates and other authors show that international organisations' ideas and models do infuence domestic policies, even if only in the long run (for social pensions see Böger and Leisering 2020).

Furthermore, global discussions have been broadening, efecting a diversifcation of the social question. Over the last two decades, migration, climate change, environmental decay, global epidemics, and digitalisation have emerged as new (or newly addressed) global phenomena that raise issues of exclusion and inclusion. In the process, new ideational resources and frames from these "non-social" spheres may revitalise the social question. For example, the concept of "sustainability" ties the social question to the ecological question, which has a broader constituency and more political clout. Hybrid terms like "social sustainability" and "social and ecological sustainability", as addressed in the UN Sustainable Development Goals of 2015, redefne the concept of development as well as the role of social protection policies. Climate activists, the digital community, gender-rights advocacy groups, and the disability movement also bring new power and ideas to social policies. However, the challenges of hard social divisions by race (South Africa, Brazil), caste (India), class, and gender (all four countries) remain.

Te future seems neither gloomy nor bright, but diverse. Some countries are pursuing more successful reformist strategies than others. It might be that a few Southern countries will build up a generous, wellmanaged, and rights-based architecture of social protections that includes all strata of society, based on a culture of publicly addressing the social question and a socially responsible state. Te common reference to "Northern welfare states" obscures that even in the Global North, genuine welfare statism in this cultural sense is largely confned to a few countries in Western and Northern Europe and the Commonwealth (Kaufmann 2013a, c).

## **References**


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## **Index1**

**A**

African National Congress (ANC), 40, 209, 249, 253, 263, 264, 266–271, 275–277, 280–287, 290, 291, 293, 405, 407 Afrikaner, 39, 192–196, 200, 210, 222, 229–234, 236, 238, 240, 242, 252 Agrarian question, 41, 343–346, 348–357, 360–362, 370, 371, 374, 389 *See also* Land question *Apartheid*, 38–40, 193, 195, 205, 211, 221–258, 263, 264, 266, 267, 269–271, 279, 290, 293, 386, 387, 389, 390, 392, 399, 405–407, 411 Atlantic Charter, 72, 401

**B**

Beveridge, William, 162, 181, 207, 208, 402 Beveridge Report, 73, 76, 78, 196, 208, 410 *Bolsa Família*, 332, 339, 365, 394

Bolsonaro, Jair, 339, 374, 420 Buddhism, 60, 61, 125, 126, 126n8

# **C**

Capitalism, 4, 14–16, 16n9, 18–20, 66, 93, 98, 102n4, 131n13, 157, 194, 231, 359, 368, 400, 403, 404, 418, 419 Caste, 37, 38, 122–126, 124n4, 124n5, 128–130, 129n11, 132–134, 136, 139, 146–148, 159, 393, 394, 414, 419, 421

1Note: Page numbers followed by 'n' refer to notes.

© Te Author(s) 2021 **429**

L. Leisering (ed.), *One Hundred Years of Social Protection*, Global Dynamics of Social Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54959-6

scheduled castes, 37, 133, 134, 136, 147 Catholicism, 31, 41, 406 Children, 56, 56n1, 62, 72, 75, 105, 109, 132, 138, 159, 197–204, 209, 210, 214, 244, 265, 268, 273, 275, 278, 281, 284, 285, 288–292, 311, 318, 322, 325n20, 332, 390, 394, 403, 406, 414, 416 Child Support Grant, 267, 273–276, 278, 280, 281, 289, 387 Citizenship, 37, 38, 96, 110, 113, 122, 157, 180, 181, 191–193, 209, 214, 242, 264, 288, 303–305, 315, 319–322, 325, 327, 334, 336, 339, 389, 406, 415 Civil society, 37, 107, 108, 112, 113, 129n11, 143n26, 144, 145, 212, 266, 287, 288, 327, 363, 391, 397, 400, 403, 412 Class, 9, 39, 65–68, 76–78, 84, 93, 124, 126, 131n12, 134, 139, 140, 146, 148, 151, 161, 162, 164, 170, 177, 179, 182, 191–193, 213, 232, 252, 264–266, 288, 292, 305, 308, 309, 314, 323–324, 326, 327, 334, 345, 347, 357, 368, 402, 414, 417–419, 421 Clientelism, 19, 25, 413, 416 Communist Party, 37, 139, 146n31, 227, 391, 393, 405, 408, 411 Confucianism, 13, 15n7, 31, 36, 58, 60, 68–70, 76, 84 Caste (*cont.*)

Conservative, 18, 20, 158, 181, 192, 195, 202, 209, 211, 212, 270, 276, 284, 289–295, 317, 336, 351, 353, 356, 357, 359, 371, 407, 416


#### **D**

Decoupling, 24, 38, 39, 41, 386, 408, 412 Democracy, 6, 9, 11, 18, 20, 40, 41, 113, 129, 130, 136–138, 143–145, 191, 192, 303–305, 319, 321–336, 357, 362–370, 374, 386, 393, 412 Deserving/deservingness, 40, 200, 212, 256, 282, 283, 285, 288, 293, 393, 406 Development/developmentalist/ developmentalism, 4, 5, 7, 13, 16, 21, 26, 36, 37, 39, 40, 57, 66, 73, 124, 124n5, 126, 130, 131, 141, 142, 144, 169, 170,

182, 225, 227, 242, 263–294, 303, 304, 323, 339, 349, 353, 360, 361, 395, 405–407, 420, 421 Deviance question, 390, 406 Dictatorship, 41, 68, 318, 322–327, 333, 336, 345, 357, 386 Difusion, 103, 206, 348, 384, 385, 407–412 Dignity, 40, 263–294, 390, 405 Duguit, Léon, 41, 347, 348, 351–353, 385, 389, 419 Dutch Reformed Church, 195

*See also* Neo-Calvinism

#### **E**

Economic growth, v, vii, 16, 21, 26, 31, 32, 35, 84, 101, 102, 105, 242, 266, 277, 285, 303, 334, 369, 396, 405, 407, 412, 420 *See also* Gross domestic product (GDP) Eloy Chaves Act, 308, 310, 315, 316 Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, 11, 18, 19, 30, 158n1, 416 Europe, 4, 18, 26, 27, 30, 63, 74, 123, 128, 139, 143, 199, 216, 271, 284, 329, 347, 385, 391, 399, 400, 404, 411, 421 Exclusion, 158, 171, 192, 200, 204, 233, 265, 320, 335, 344, 388, 390, 392, 414–416, 421 Expenditure, 35, 101, 141, 142, 202, 208, 209, 213, 238, 242, 251, 267, 270, 271, 274, 276, 277, 334 social spending, 141, 142

Experiments, 76, 97, 100, 207 Explanatory model, 19, 20, 35, 384

#### **F**


#### **G**



Health/health care/health insurance, 9, 10, 41, 73, 81, 96, 99–103, 105, 129n11, 140, 142, 164, 165, 168, 169, 173–175, 178–180, 185, 201, 202, 212, 249, 265, 279, 280, 287, 304, 317n11, 320, 324, 327, 328, 331, 333–336, 345, 359, 362, 367, 371, 398, 401, 416, 417 Hinduism, 38, 125, 126 Homelands, 39, 226, 230, 239–246, 249, 250, 258, 393 *Hukou*, 95, 96, 109, 110 Human rights, 13, 22, 25–27, 79, 108, 132, 138, 147, 157, 225, 227, 228, 383, 392, 401, 406, 409, 409n8, 410, 412 Hunger, 37, 269, 286, 328, 366, 388, 390 Hunger question, 388, 390

#### **I**

ILO, *see* International Labour Organization Inclusion, 13, 133, 134, 182, 182n53, 191, 192, 303, 304, 320, 334, 336, 355, 388, 390, 402, 414–417, 420n17, 421 Independence, 4, 8, 31, 36, 37, 76, 128, 130, 131, 137, 141, 146, 151, 158, 169n14, 180, 241, 258, 271, 343, 389, 393, 405 Inequality, 26, 32, 38, 101, 123, 126, 129, 139–142, 146, 151, 231, 233, 243, 251, 264, 271, 274, 280, 290, 292, 305, 323, 327, 339, 353, 366, 366n8, 400, 403, 406, 414, 415, 417–420

Inequality question, 26 Inequality trap, 416–420 Informal/informal labour/informal workers, 15, 16, 18, 19, 30, 32, 38, 160, 161, 163, 180, 181, 210, 233, 267, 272, 349, 364, 369n10, 389, 390, 413, 414 Intellectuals, 4, 15, 22, 36, 58, 60, 63–66, 75, 76, 81, 84, 85, 104, 123, 126, 146, 191, 229, 264, 344–346, 350, 352, 355, 359, 367, 371, 388, 393, 411, 415 Inter-American Conference on Social Security, 401 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 25, 401 International Labour Organization (ILO), 9, 22, 38, 59, 67, 72, 73, 78, 79, 102, 103, 112, 135n19, 146–148, 162, 167–169, 172, 173, 178, 179, 196, 291, 306, 316, 316n9, 317, 329, 398,


#### **K**

Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver, 4, 6, 12, 13, 15, 22, 24, 26, 27, 58, 72, 112, 122, 143n26, 157, 395, 399–404, 415, 421

**L**

Labour question/workers question, 13, 26, 38–41, 65–68, 123, 127, 136, 312–319, 388, 389, 393, 394, 402, 406, 414 Landless, 241, 343, 345, 347, 350, 352, 364, 374 Land occupations, 363, 364, 369 Land question, 26, 40, 41, 65–67, 266n2, 388–390, 391n2, 414, 419 Land reform, 41, 139, 321, 343–374, 385, 386, 389, 406, 419 *See also* Land question Liberal break, 386, 392, 409 Liberation theology, 361, 406, 407, 411 Life expectancy, 31, 32 Literacy, 30, 31, 416 Logic of industrialisation, 20, 385 Luhmann, Niklas, 20

#### **M**

Mandela, Nelson, 263, 269, 271, 276–278, 292, 405 Marshall, Tomas Humphrey, 4, 14, 24, 406, 415 Marx, Karl, 126, 127, 127n9, 400, 403, 403n6, 418, 419, 419n15 Marxist/Marxism, vi, 9, 14, 59, 63–68, 71, 81, 84, 148, 353n4, 359, 363, 368, 393, 410, 411, 420 *See also* Marx, Karl Meyer, John W., 14n6, 27, 385, 408, 410, 420, 421 *See also* World culture/world cultural


#### **N**

Nationalist/nationalism, v, 36, 39, 57, 65, 66, 162, 164, 170, 171, 180, 193–196, 200, 210, 229–232, 241, 277, 320, 346, 350, 352, 395, 398, 408, 420 National People's Congress, 97 Nation-building/nation building, 4, 8, 37, 57, 72, 112, 180, 225, 405 Native question, 39, 194, 232, 405 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 37, 130, 131, 131n15, 133, 134, 139, 158n3, 170, 171, 173 Neo-Calvinism, 39, 211, 406, 407 Neoliberalism/neoliberal, 9, 148, 160, 182, 339, 404, 409, 409n8, 417

#### **O**

Onion skin model, 7, 11, 23, 25, 36, 57, 81, 225, 226, 241, 248, 384, 392, 396, 405, 412 defnition, 7, 23

**P**

	- 30, 413

Race, 39, 191, 204, 209, 214, 227–231, 239, 246, 250, 252, 253, 288, 414, 421 Recognition, 12, 25, 27, 57, 60, 92, 99, 103, 107, 122, 122n1, 123, 142, 147, 148, 151, 225, 227, 233, 248, 250, 279, 304, 314, 335, 336, 345, 348–357, 399, 400, 421 Religion, v, 26, 31, 123, 124, 126, 132n16, 136–138, 146, 191–216, 393 Residualism trap, 416–418 Rights, 9, 10, 13–15, 21, 22, 25–27, 37, 38, 40, 41, 79, 81, 84, 101, 102, 108–110, 112, 113, 124n4, 125, 131, 132, 135n19, 136–138, 143n26, 147, 148, 157–159, 161, 164, 166, 170, 174, 180, 192–194, 225, 227–229, 240, 241, 253, 254, 258, 264, 266, 279, 287, 288, 292, 303–306, 308, 310, 311, 313–315, 317–319, 321, 322, 323n16, 325, 327–329, 332, 334–336, 339, 347–349, 351, 353–357, 369, 371, 383, 389, 390, 392, 401–403, 406, 408–410, 409n8, 412, 416 *See also* Human rights Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 400

#### **S**

	- *See also* Poor relief
	- Bismarckian, 159, 309, 310, 408, 410
	- Stalinist, 408, 410
	- 23–25, 37, 39, 57, 230–232, 240–247, 249–250, 254, 256, 392, 393, 396, 397, 407, 412

Social security, 5, 8–10, 13, 15, 16, 18, 22, 30, 31, 36–38, 40, 41, 55–85, 91–113, 142, 144n28, 157, 159n5, 160, 161, 163, 168–170, 170n16, 182, 206–212, 221, 227, 234, 268, 270, 271, 274, 275, 277–280, 303, 343, 344, 349, 352, 359, 384n1, 388, 397–405, 409, 411–414 Sociological/sociology, vi, 7, 10–15, 24, 25, 57, 58, 63, 64, 69, 70, 74, 84, 391 Soviet Union, 71, 76, 140, 391, 408, 410 State Council, 72, 97, 99, 100 State-owned enterprises (SOE), 93, 94, 97–100, 104, 391, 393 Sun Yat-Sen, 65, 67, 69, 389

#### **T**

Taiwan, 36, 55, 58, 80, 84, 387 Torres, Alberto, 41, 346–348, 350–352, 385, 389 Transnational, *see* Difusion

#### **U**

United Nations (UN), 22, 25, 79, 135n19, 401, 409n8, 410, 411, 414 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 25, 79, 391, 401, 409, 410 *See also* Human rights Universalism, 170, 410, 413, 415n10, 421

Urbanisation, 20, 33, 109, 131, 191, 192, 229, 231, 307, 348, 385, 388

#### **V**

Vargas, Getúlio, 41, 311–313, 313n6, 317–320, 317n12, 326, 336, 349–352, 355–357, 356n5, 359, 387, 389 Verwoerd, Hendrik, 195, 196, 200, 202, 210, 239, 240, 411 Vouchers, 290

#### **W**

Weber, Max/Weberian, 6, 10, 10n4, 11, 22, 24, 124n4, 214 Welfare internationalism, 22, 72, 401 Welfare regimes, 11, 18, 19, 30, 31, 38, 213 Welfare state, v, vi, 3–7, 9, 11, 14–20, 22, 24, 26, 30, 35, 40, 73, 110, 112, 113, 158, 192, 195, 204, 210–214, 216, 263–295, 329, 385, 397–399, 403, 410, 413, 415, 416, 418 Women, 32, 56n1, 64, 75, 125, 125n7, 132, 135, 138, 168, 169, 194, 197, 198, 201–203, 209, 214, 244, 266n2, 275, 280, 289–292, 306, 307, 307n1, 314, 318, 318n13, 322, 325, 390, 398, 414, 416 World Bank, 99, 129n11, 143n27, 144, 146, 267, 399, 410, 417

World culture/world cultural, 14n6, 27, 57, 385, 410, 420 World War II (WWII), 4, 26, 31, 56, 157, 193, 206, 214, 271, 325n19, 385, 402 WWII, *see* World War II

**X** Xi, Jinping, 108, 112, 420

**Z**

Zuma, Jacob, 286, 287, 289–293, 295, 398, 420