

CHRISTOPHER ADAIR-TOTTEFF

Max Weber's
Sociology of Religion

Mohr Siebeck

Christopher Adair-Toteff
Max Weber's Sociology of Religion



Christopher Adair-Toteff

Max Weber's Sociology of Religion

Mohr Siebeck

Christopher Adair-Toteff, born 1950; 1992 PhD in philosophy from the University of South Florida; has held professorships in Europe and the US; has published widely on the Neo-Kantians and especially on Max Weber; currently affiliated with the University of South Florida (Tampa) and the University of Kent (Canterbury).

e-ISBN PDF 978-3-16-154430-9

ISBN 978-3-16-154137-7

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliographie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at <http://dnb.dnb.de>.

© 2016 by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Germany. www.mohr.de

This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that permitted by copyright law) without the publisher's written permission. This applies particularly to reproductions, translations, microfilms and storage and processing in electronic systems.

The book was typeset using Garamond typeface, printed on non-aging paper and bound by Gulde Druck in Tübingen.

Printed in Germany.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
1. Max Weber's Mysticism.	13
2. Max Weber's Charisma	29
3. Max Weber's Pericles: The Political Demagogue	47
4. Max Weber's Notion of Asceticism	61
5. Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Politics: Weber on Conscience, Conviction, and Conflict.	79
6. Max Weber's Charismatic Prophets	99
7. Max Weber and "Kulturprotestantismus".	119
8. Max Weber on Confucianism versus Protestantism	139
9. "Sinn der Welt": Max Weber and the Problem of Theodicy.	157
10. Statistical Origins of the "Protestant Ethic".	177
Acknowledgements.	197
Index of Names	199
Index of Subjects	203

Introduction

In one sense this introduction is similar to a typical one because it serves to introduce the ten previously published articles now collected in this book. In a second and larger sense, it is not similar to a typical introduction for two reasons. First, my path to the writings of Max Weber was not a typical path, and second, my approach to, and my understanding of, Weber's writings are not very typical. Accordingly, this introduction has two parts; in the first part I explain how I began to approach Weber's thinking and in the second, what prompted me to write the pieces in this collection and how I think they have fared over the years since they first appeared.

A Path to Weber

The education and training that I have is not in sociology but philosophy and my interest in sociologists is relatively speaking, rather recent. All of my degrees, including my Ph.D., are in philosophy. Beginning in the late 1960s, I studied philosophy which in the United States at the time was dominated by what is usually referred to as analytical philosophy and is divided into two types, one earlier and one later. The earlier one was based primarily on the writings of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein and emphasized that philosophy was a wrong-headed experiment which could be cleared up by making sure that language is used like mathematics and logic. The later philosophy was based on Wittgenstein, and while he later changed his mind about the degree of complexity in the use of language, he still contended that philosophical problems were mostly problems with language. If one cleared up the linguistic ambiguities and difficulties, then one would be on the way to solving problems in philosophy.

Both of these approaches to philosophy were somewhat attractive because they centered on language, but both were less than compelling because they lacked the focus of what philosophy was historically; that is, an understanding of the nature of human life, society, and of a future life. After a couple of years' interruption I returned to philosophy, but this time I studied classical

philosophy – the Pre-Socratics, Plato, and Aristotle. A change in universities prompted a change in emphasis – less on the Greeks and more on the Germans, particularly Kant. A return to the University of South Florida did not mean a return to the Greeks; rather, it meant a continuation of the study of Kant with the expectation that I would write a doctoral dissertation on Kantian epistemology in which I would be focusing on the Paralogisms section of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. This was going to be, and was, the first dissertation in the brand new Ph.D. program in philosophy at the University of South Florida; hence it was not going to be a typical one and so it turned out. Instead of writing on Kant's *Kritik*, I was encouraged to write it on the Neo-Kantian arguments over the nature of space and I successfully defended my dissertation *The Neo-Kantian "Raum" Controversy: From Trendelenburg to Vaihinger* in the spring of 1992. Having devoted much of two decades to philosophy, I was rather certain that the next two decades would have a similar focus. After all, I was a firm believer in David Hume's "principle of nature's uniformity" – that the future will conform to the past. In a curious twist that I am convinced that Max Weber would have found amusing, I accepted a professorship at the American University in Bulgaria in 1994. My primary task was to teach the history of philosophy, something I did for the first two years of my time there. However, at the end of 1996 the political and economic situation in Bulgaria was collapsing: there was rampant inflation, increasing shortages, and rationing of food. The history of philosophy no longer seemed so interesting because it no longer seemed relevant. The students at the American University in Bulgaria were primarily Bulgarian, and those who were not came from other eastern European countries whose populations were undergoing similar political and economic upheavals. As a result, I turned my attention to teaching courses that I thought would better reflect the upheavals that the students were living through – so I began teaching courses on social-political philosophy and that led me back to Max Weber.

The first time that I began to read Max Weber was shortly after finishing my Ph.D. I was Prof. Stephen Turner's assistant at the University of South Florida and had participated in his graduate seminar devoted to Weber. As Turner's assistant, I was also somewhat involved in the editing of Turner's *Max Weber. The Lawyer as Social Thinker* (along with Regis Factor, Routledge 1994). My tasks included commenting on the second chapter of Turner and Factor's book with the Neo-Kantian context and its influence on Weber. Both Turner's graduate seminar and their book emphasized Weber's long-standing concerns with methodological issues in sociology and law, which meant an emphasis on reason. However, Turner had a keen apprecia-

tion for and an understanding of the irrational aspects of Weber's thinking and he frequently drew my attention to that. In fact, it was not the usual approach to Weber and the development of reason that concerned me in Bulgaria, but the irrational and personal aspects: "Leidenschaft", "Augenmaß", "Gesinnungsethik", and "Charisma". These were regarded as interesting topics by many scholars who wrote on Weber, but were not thought of as being as important for Weber as other topics like reason, calculation, and socio-economics. Close readers of the *Protestantische Ethik* quite properly focused on self-controlled practice of asceticism, although I found that the irrational basis for that to be far more interesting. The first result of my concern with Weber's sociology of religion was thus an article on mysticism. While I have certainly appreciated Wolfgang Schluchter's ground-breaking study of Weber's development of rationality, I have also been impressed by those who have looked at the "less-rational" side of Weber: Wolfgang Mommsen, Wilhelm Hennis, and Friedrich Tenbruck. Added to that, my own writings on Weber's sociology of religion have tended to focus on many of these "irrational" forces. While I agree that rationalism plays a fundamental role in the thought of Max Weber, it is my belief that there are irrational aspects of human life which are just as important. Rational capitalism may very well be the most important force in modern life, but Weber also maintained that charisma was its equal. Furthermore, as Weber pointed out in the famous "switch metaphor" in the "Einleitung" to the first volume of the *Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen* interests may be the predominate forces in everyday living. However, ideas are the switches determining the tracks those interests move along. Indeed, much of the "Einleitung" is devoted to the determining ideas and irrational forces and not to material and ideal interests or to the process of rationalization.

The Individual Essays

The ten articles in this collection represent almost half of the twenty-plus essays that I have published over the last fifteen years. As with most of my writings on Max Weber, they were inquiries into specific aspects of his thinking and certainly not written with the expectation that they would one day be part of a collection. Nonetheless, this collection has a cohesiveness that goes beyond the topic of the sociology of religion and also displays a pattern of development. Later investigations often impelled me to reexamine what I had written previously. This is most evident in the notion of charisma but also applies to other themes. These ten essays have been chosen because

they focus explicitly on specific aspects of Weber's sociology of religion; however, they often reflect concerns which overlap with other aspects of Weber's thought. That is because Weber's thinking was rarely confined to one discipline but frequently encompassed several. Trained in law, professor of economics, a political thinker, and a founder of sociology, Weber's interests were wide-ranging. And although this is one of many fascinating things about Max Weber's work, it is also one that sometimes causes difficulties in writing about him. During Weber's lifetime many scholars preferred to specialize in one discipline and while this inclination is still often encouraged today, Weber rejected it as being too confining and artificial. So here too I think it is to our scholarly benefit to follow him.

Chapter One is on Max Weber's mysticism and its origins are two-fold. Western mysticism has always been fascinating and one of my earliest publications partially focused on it. "The Antinomy of God" was published in the *Simmel Newsletter* – now entitled *Simmel Studies* – and in it I attempted to show how Simmel looked at two opposing views of the relationship between God and man. Meister Eckhart's mysticism represented the attempt to lose oneself in order to achieve the mystical union with God. Nietzsche's claim "God is dead" represented its antinomy – that God needed to disappear in order for man to become who he is destined to be. Simmel did not seem to take sides, although I suspect that he suffered from agreeing with both. The relevance here is that Eckhart was an example of the passive vessel that Weber is known for. Weber frequently used opposites in order to clarify concepts, and so he used the conceptual opposition between the passive mystic and the active ascetic to highlight the characteristics of each type of religious figure. In this essay I attempted to draw more attention to his conception of the mystic, both because I believed that it was definitely warranted and because I thought that a fuller account of what Weber believed a mystic is, was warranted. The essay concluded with an account by Eduard Baumgarten about an exchange between Max and Marianne regarding the possibility of being a mystic. It is likely that the story is accurate and there is a distinct sense that Weber may have occasionally thought that he had some mystical tendencies. I did not claim that he was one and I do not do so now; however, I believe even more that Weber had a much fuller understanding and far better appreciation of mysticism than many scholars give him credit for.

Chapter Two deals with Max Weber's notion of charisma. When I began investigating this subject I realized that some scholars had published a num-

ber of articles on it. I learned a great deal from Stephen Turner's "Charisma Revisited" which appeared in the *Journal of Classical Sociology* in 2003 and from Martin Riesebrodt's "Charisma" that was included in that great collection by Riesebrodt and Hans G. Kippenberg *Max Webers "Religionssystematik"* (Mohr Siebeck 2001). I also benefited greatly from Thomas Kroll's "Max Webers Idealtypus der charismatischer Herrschaft und die zeitgenössische Charisma-Debatte" contained in that other very helpful collection *Max Weber's Herrschaftssoziologie* edited by Edith Hanke and Wolfgang J. Mommsen (Mohr Siebeck 2001). I learned from these scholars that Weber borrowed the notion of charisma from Rudolf Sohm and that he modified it to apply to various instances of leadership. What I did not learn from them was how much Weber modified it and, perhaps more importantly, what he actually meant by "charisma". "Max Weber's Charisma" was my attempt to go back to what Weber believed charisma was and to explain it. This essay was only the third one that I had written on Weber and, while I believed that it would prove helpful, I never expected how important it would become. It has become one of the few "standard works" on charisma. Since 2009 it has been the "Most Cited" article in the *Journal of Classical Society*. Moreover, it has helped clarify what Weber believed charisma to be and to help stimulate others to explore this foundational concept.

Chapter Three is devoted to Pericles. "Max Weber's Pericles – the Political Demagogue" evolved from three important sources. First was Wilhelm Hennis' *Max Weber und Thukydides* (Mohr Siebeck 2003) and the second was from doing a review essay of Peter Lassman's *Max Weber* (Ashgate 2006). This massive collection was filled with important contributions in a wide-ranging area of Weber's thinking, but what I believed to be the most important section was on Weber's politics. "Thirty Years of Political Thinking: Peter Lassman's *Max Weber*" was published in a 2008 issue of *History of the Human Sciences*. Both collections convinced me of the primacy of the political but also revealed a lack of appreciation of Weber's Greek sources for his political philosophy. The third source was Weber's remarks in *Politik als Beruf* where he reminds us that "demagogue" did not originally have politically charged sense and that Pericles was as much of a demagogue as Cleon. In doing the research for this essay I discovered that Weber was intrigued by the Greeks and had developed a high regard for Thucydides. It also revealed that as much as the original notion of charisma may have been predicated on actions, much of it was also founded upon the power of words. Pericles represented the rare charismatic leader who led as much by his words as he did by his actions. Finally, it helped re-enforce the notion that Weber often

looked to history in order to help explain modern phenomena and that historical figures could provide an ideal for contemporary problems.

Chapter Four is about asceticism. Given Weber's apparent lack of interest in mysticism, it was understandable that this topic was mostly ignored by scholars. However, given the amount of attention that Weber devoted to asceticism, it was not understandable why this topic remained neglected. "Max Weber's Notion of Asceticism" was intended to help rectify this by explaining exactly what he meant by the term "asceticism" and by comparing his use of this concept with the more traditional use. Despite the fact that the notion of asceticism played a prominent role in his thinking, Weber never provided a full definition of it. He did however provide a contrast between what he referred to as "polar concepts": between "asceticism" and "mysticism". However, in the history of Christianity these two concepts were not at odds with each other but were frequently applied to the same individual. Two things seemed apparent from the investigation of Weber's accounts of asceticism: first, his account was not to be regarded as historically accurate but was an "ideal typical" account, and second, that he softened his opposition between the terms. This was partially because of his understanding of the four major monastic reform movements. Thus, as much as Weber frequently contrasted concepts in order to achieve more methodological clarity, he fully recognized that in the "real historical world" there was often conceptual overlap.

The next three chapters are not just concerned with religious and sociological subjects but also with political thinking. Like the chapter on Pericles, these chapters cross over the borders between disciplines and underscore Weber's multi-disciplinary approach. The study on asceticism reinforced the belief that there was a political component to Weber's conception and that he considered Luther's rejection of politics and acceptance of authority to be an unfortunate consequence of his more traditional and more compromising type of religious convictions. It also reinforced Weber's subtle preference for Calvin's more radical theology and his approval for Calvin's political convictions. Luther was more of a naïve idealist and a religious believer in worldly harmony whereas Calvin was more of a revolutionary and a realist who believed that politics was a matter of conflict. This study also reinforced my own belief that many scholars writing on Weber lack the proper understanding of the theological disputes that lurked in the background to Weber's writings in the sociology of religion. In this case, the mid-nineteenth century Protestant debate about conscience was cru-

cially important for understanding Weber's political interpretation of asceticism.

Chapter Five is focused on Weber's views regarding the differing Protestant approaches to politics. Both Luther and Calvin believed man's fall from grace was self-inflicted and they emphasized that God gave humans a conscience which was their primary moral guide. They also believed the state was necessary; however, they had differing approaches to the state. For Luther, the state was a necessary evil and as such politics should be shunned. Since the state was the earthly kingdom, one was expected to obey the ruler under all circumstances. For Calvin, the state was necessary but not an evil; it was more like food and water. Like Luther, Calvin believed that one was bound to obey the ruler, but only up to a point. In Calvin's view, the ruler has a contract with his subjects and he breaks that contract when the ruler becomes a tyrant. More importantly, the tyrant has also broken his contract with God. Accordingly, Calvin believed the subjects not only have the right, but the duty, to rise up against the tyrant. Weber's own political inclinations were far closer to Calvin's active politics than to Luther's passive indifference. Furthermore, Weber believed that Luther's belief in the highest moral code was not possible for most people – only those like Jesus and St. Francis could live the saintly life. The belief in peace on earth was a dangerous illusion and those who were that idealistic had no business playing in politics. In Weber's view, politics is struggle and the political actor must be both realistic and responsible.

Chapter Six is on Weber's writings about ancient Judaism and specifically the role of the Old Testament prophets. Eckart Otto had just published the volume on *Das antike Judentum* and reading through this prompted me to reevaluate what I had written in "Max Weber's Charisma." When I wrote that piece I regarded myself as fortunate because Weber specifically identified Rudolf Sohm as the source for the basis of his conception of charisma. This was one of the rare times that Weber singles out the source for his idea but which unfortunately made me content to concentrate primarily on Sohm. Weber's discussions of the Old Testament prophets made me reconsider and recognize that they also served as ideal typical representatives of the charismatic leader: ones who combined religious and political convictions. In "Max Weber's Charismatic Prophets" I attempted to show that Weber was not just interested in the religious and cultural ideas of ancient Judaism but that he regarded some of the prophets as possible "models" for contemporary society. Amos, Jeremiah, and Isaiah were called by God to be

prophets and to remind the Jews of their Covenant. In so doing, they emphasized the need for political justice as well as ethical fairness and with their sense of ethical responsibility were representatives of genuine, responsible political leaders.

Chapter Seven focuses on “Kulturprotestantismus”. This term is somewhat difficult to define but it more or less represents the dominant conception of Protestantism in northern Germany during the second half of the nineteenth century. Protestantism was not regarded merely as a religious phenomenon, although it was one and an important one at that. In addition, it represented the sense of German “culture.” “Kultur” was not just applicable to the arts and sciences but rather represented the most elevated and noble aspects of German thinking. It is not too much of an exaggeration to suggest that “Kultur”, and by extension “Kulturprotestantismus”, contained the “essence” of being “German.” Of course this excluded entire groups of people, including Catholics and Jews. However, since most Germans seemed to believe that members of both of these groups were insufficiently German anyway, it did not matter. Besides, Bismarck had convinced many Germans that German “Kultur” needed to be defended against the Catholic Pope and his Doctrine of Infallibility, while the on-going current of anti-Semitism ensured that Jews would continue to be regarded as a “Pariah-People”. It is against much of this background that “Weber and ‘Kulturprotestantismus’” was written. Shortly before he died, Heinz Steinert had published a book that was rather critical of Weber’s *Protestant Ethic*. Invited to contribute to a collection in Steinert’s honor, I thought that “Weber and ‘Kulturprotestantismus’” would accomplish two goals. First, it would address some of Steinert’s points about not understanding Weber and second, it would provide a theological-cultural background for a better understanding of Weber’s work. This context included discussions of the “Kulturkampf” as well as of the special Luther celebrations of 1883. Many theologians gave addresses in honor of the 400th anniversary of Martin Luther’s birth whereby I focused on three of the most important, Julius Köstlin, Albrecht Ritschl, and Adolf Harnack. I also included Heinrich von Treitschke because he was not only one of the most influential German professors and political thinkers but was a close family friend of Max Weber Sr. and Max Weber Jr.’s teacher in Berlin. All four of these men regarded Luther as more than a religious reformer, having laid the foundation for “Kulturprotestantismus” which for Max Weber was the modern embodiment of both the strengths and weaknesses of modern German politics and culture.

Chapter Eight is devoted to the question of the connection between China and capitalism. Written originally as a paper for the London conference on Weber and China, “Max Weber on Confucianism versus Protestantism” was my attempt to explicate the reasons why Weber thought that capitalism could never develop in China. It is important to note two things: that Weber was not chauvinistic about China and that he never maintained that it could not develop into a capitalist society. Weber adhered religiously to his often stated principle that scholarship should be value-free and did so in his writings on the economic ethics of the world’s religions. He also maintained that capitalism had not and could not develop in China until the incredible power of traditionalism was overcome. Luther, and more importantly, Calvin had radically challenged traditionalism in the West and had led the way to the development of capitalism. Weber sought to show that while China shared a number of important traits with the West, there were enough significant differences accounting for the lack of capitalist development. Weber was happy to concede that China was a rational and legally-oriented society. However, he pointed out that rationalism was rather focused and not all-encompassing with the law based more on tradition than on reason. More importantly, China embraced magic and traditionalism, revering ancestors, the earth and heavens. Finally, Confucianism taught that moderation and honor led to happiness, prosperity, and long life, whereas Protestantism was radically ascetic and did not believe in any of those ideas. Instead, one denied that one’s life on earth had any redeeming value and devoted one’s self to the belief in a better future life. As a result, the differences between the West and China not only did not challenge Weber’s claim but rather served to underscore his thesis that rationalism developed only in the West.

The penultimate chapter confronts the thorny problem of theodicy. As the title indicates “‘Sinn der Welt’: Max Weber and the Problem of Theodicy” two interconnected issues are addressed. First the issue of “meaning” or “sense” for Weber. Weber had two broad ways of employing the word “Sinn”. In one way, “Sinn” was scholarly and was applicable to scientific investigations. There was an “objective sense” that could be explicated and verified. In another way, “Sinn” was personal and was applicable to personal values. In particular, it dealt with the question of whether life (“the world”) had sense. Either it did have “sense” or it was random, arbitrary, and chaotic. The fact that there is so much suffering in the world leads one to suspect that the world has no meaning; why would a powerful and beneficial deity either inflict pain and suffering or allow it to happen? Also, it is not simply

a question of whether evil people deserve to suffer, because the innocent ones seem to suffer just as much if not more. The problem of theodicy is the problem of how to reconcile the belief in God with the notion of suffering. Weber sets out answers to this in his discussions of the three major religious approaches to the problem of suffering. In addition, he adds a new type of theodicy: a positive theodicy where individuals who have been granted good fortune attempt to justify it on the grounds that they somehow deserve it. This essay shows how important the “philosophical” question of the meaning of life was to Max Weber. While he may have little use for his more speculative predecessors, Weber was just as convinced that the questions of what to believe and how to live were just as important to him as they had been to Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel.

The last chapter focuses on the first several pages of the *Protestant Ethic*. It almost always seemed that commentators on Weber’s books skimmed over much of the initial chapter of the book and moved on to the more interesting sections on Luther, Calvin, and the Sects. These seemed more engrossing because they dealt with the fundamental themes of the book: the notion of “Beruf”, the Doctrine of Double Election, the ascetic life, rational calculation, and profitability. However, while of some interest in themselves, both theological notions seemed more like prologues to the economic and sociological aspects of the book. Even though the two theological notions did not generate all that much interest they at least received some. In contrast, the opening pages were virtually ignored because they were not understood, Weber having begun with a series of references to an obscure author named Martin Offenhacher. These were statistics and quotations drawn from his studies about the confessional differences in Baden, a small, southwestern part of Germany. Yet Weber included them for a reason and much of the “Statistical Origins of the ‘Protestant Ethic’” was devoted to uncovering what that reason was. It was statistical confirmation of the claim that religious affiliation influenced economic well-being and showed that Catholics in this area tended to be less well off than the Protestants who also lived there. As one of Weber’s former students, Offenhacher provided a statistical starting point to the question of how modern capitalism developed. Werner Sombart had just published his two-volume *Der moderne Kapitalismus* and Weber believed that while Sombart had made some valuable points, his overall thesis was theoretically questionable and factually unsound. The first section is Weber’s critique of Sombart’s theory and his substitution of a less grandiose and more probable explanation. The “Statistical Origins” of the ‘Protestant Thesis’” does more than explore and explain Weber’s reliance

on Offenbacher's dissertation in that it also provides a critique of some of Weber's detractors who insisted that he and Offenbacher misused or misinterpreted the statistics. Instead of misleading his readers, Weber used Offenbacher's work as a "paradigm case" to help explain the origins of modern capitalism.

Concluding Comments

Weber's thinking continues to fascinate and this is particularly true regarding his writings on the sociology of religion. Many of his major themes justify more scholarly investigation. Many of them could benefit from further examination and many of his key concepts could be helped by more clarification. The essays assembled in this collection were never intended to be definitive statements, but impulses to prompt others to examine these notions. I have recently tried to deal with many of these themes in a more comprehensive treatment in the *Fundamental Concepts in Max Weber's Sociology of Religion* (Palgrave 2015). With his various writings, Max Weber is justifiably regarded as the founder of the sociology of religion and will continue to fascinate scholars far into the future. For me, the essays contained in this collection do not represent the end of my study of Max Weber's sociology but only its beginning. It is my continuing hope that scholars will find some ideas in this collection which might spur them to engage further in Max Weber's thinking and especially in his sociology of religion.

Chapter One

Max Weber's Mysticism

During Max Weber's life time a number of German thinkers investigated mysticism: among them Wilhelm Preger, Rudolf Otto, and Weber's own friend and colleague Ernst Troeltsch. To this we can add the intriguing figure of Friedrich von Hügel (Preger 1962, Otto 1971, 1997, Troeltsch 1912, von Hügel 1999). However, the standard view is that Weber was not interested in mysticism or if he was it was for other reasons. Marianne Weber mentions mysticism only once and that in connection to Rilke; Bendix puts Oriental asceticism in opposition to occidental asceticism; and Schluchter, who is the authority on Weber's sociology of religion, focuses primarily on the opposition between ascetic activity and mystical passivity (Weber 1926: 464; Bendix 1977: 203; Schluchter 1989: 132). There is no question that Weber's concern from *Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* (1905) to his last years was with asceticism; however, from that work until his death he was intrigued by mysticism. There are a number of passages where he treats the topic, some in *Protestantische Ethik*, more in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, and to a greater extent in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*. Except for Schluchter's treatment and Mitzman's comments (Mitzman 1979), there is virtually nothing written on Weber's interest in mysticism. There are only two works that even deal with the topic and both of those are concerned with other matters as well: Bynum is interested in Medieval women mystics (Bynum 1988) and Robertson is also concerned with Hegel, Luther and modernity (Robertson 1975). In what follows, I will argue that, for Weber, mysticism was more than an intellectual antipode to asceticism; indeed, as I shall argue, Weber had a growing interest in mysticism from 1910 onwards.

It is not easy to say what mysticism is, although it is not very difficult to say what it is not: it has no confession, it has no dogma, it has no church, etc. (Tauler 1923: I: XIX). Bernard McGinn, one of the leading authorities on mysticism, declines to define it but he notes that its origins lie in the notion of "hiddenness" (McGinn 1994: XI, 41). Instead, he offers three markers for it: it is a part of religion, it is a process, and it is the attempt to express the consciousness of God (McGinn 1991: xiv-xvi). He summarizes mysticism as

the “consciousness of the presence of God” (McGinn 1994: 70, McGinn 1998: 12). William James was also reluctant to attempt to define mysticism (James 1994: 413). His reluctance partially stemmed from his belief that his own constitution shut him out from enjoying mystical experiences. Nonetheless, in his Gifford Lectures from 1902 – *The Varieties of Religious Experience* – he suggested that it is an ability to see the truth in a special way (James 1994: 412). He offered his famous four markers for mysticism: 1) It is ineffable, there is no positive way to describe it; it must be experienced; 2) Nonetheless, it has noetic qualities, so that it counts as a type of knowledge, albeit not in any normal sense¹; 3) Mystical states are transient and of short duration²; 4) It is passive – the person in a mystical state feels gripped by some higher power. James’ discussion of mysticism caused considerable interest but also considerable concern. Von Hügel was so impressed by *Varieties of Religious Experience* that when he completed his own two-volume *The Mystical Element of Religion* in 1908 he sent an autographed copy to James (see Adams 1986: 69). Von Hügel shares with James the emphasis on experience and he makes a number of appreciative remarks about him.³ However, in a letter to James he complained that James’ treatment of religion seemed to over-emphasize the “personal and the private” (see Adams 1986: 69). And, in *The Mystical Element of Religion*, von Hügel acknowledges that in the history of religion there was the almost exclusive emphasis on theological concepts and formulations to the exclusion of the individual and the experimental. Now, however, he objects to James’ *Varieties of Religious Experience* because James’ overemphasis on the personal and experiential. His friend, Ernst Troeltsch, shared von Hügel’s assessment.⁴ Troeltsch published a review of James’ *Varieties of Religious Experience* and in the same year he devoted considerable space to James in his *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft*.⁵

¹ See James 1994: 414–415, 442, 461. Lewis White Beck wrote: “Now one thing that philosophers seem unable to do is remain silent about the unnameable, the indescribable, the ineffable.” Beck 1996: 50.

² The Beguine mystic, Mary of Oignies, seems to be the exception. She supposedly had an ecstatic rapture that lasted 35 days. See McGinn 1998: 37–38 and 337, note 42.

³ Peter Neuner held that experience plays a fundamental role in von Hügel’s thinking. Neuner 1977: 49. For von Hügel’s comments on James, see von Hügel 1999, II: 30, 41, 266.

⁴ The Protestant theologian Troeltsch and the Catholic religious thinker von Hügel had a long friendly relationship. Their correspondence began in 1901 and ended with Troeltsch’s sudden death in 1923. This cancelled Troeltsch’s trip to Great Britain where he was to give lectures in London, Oxford, and Edinburgh. Von Hügel had arranged this trip. He edited the lectures that Troeltsch was going to give and published them in 1923 (Troeltsch 1979). For an account of their relationship and Troeltsch’s letters to von Hügel, see Troeltsch 1974.

⁵ See Troeltsch 1982: 69 and Troeltsch 1905. Troeltsch also gave a complementary yet critical account of James after his death. See Troeltsch 1913.

Troeltsch begins by noting contemporary thinkers' mistrust of church dogma and their endorsement of empiricism (Troeltsch 1905: 6). That he has James in mind is clear: he refers to James' *Varieties of Religious Experience* as the "best and finest achievement of modern psychology of religion." (Troeltsch 1905: 14). He applauds James for his emphasis on empirical studies and commends him for showing the psychological element in religious feeling (Troeltsch 1905: 16–17). However, Troeltsch objects that this is only psychology and that it leads James to under-appreciate the intensity of religious and mystical feelings. He also objects to the emphasis on the single and empirical, which tends to blind James to the whole and rational side that makes up religious experiences (Troeltsch 1905: 22–23). Troeltsch looks to Kant as a corrective to James' all pervasive emphasis on the empirical. That does not mean that Troeltsch agrees with Kant's transcendental idealism when it comes to religious investigations. Schleiermacher had already complained that Kant's religion is too ethical and that he did not appreciate the religious sense that he describes as the feeling of absolute dependence on God (Troeltsch 1905: 34–35). Troeltsch approvingly lists Schleiermacher's investigation of his self with the mystical self-preoccupations of Augustine and the mystics. One point of Troeltsch's work is to comment on James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*. A second point is to show that there are Protestant correctives to James and Kant. But a third point is to show the depth of mystical feeling, regardless of whether it is Catholic or Protestant. Troeltsch's *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie* is valuable in itself, but its importance increases when it is presented in context. He read it in St. Louis at the 1904 International Congress of Arts and Letters that was held in commemoration of the 100 years of the Louisiana Purchase. He and his friend Max Weber traveled there together, spending approximately five weeks in close company.⁶ When Troeltsch was working on *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie*, Weber was working on *Protestantische Ethik*. During their journey to America they had numerous discussions and it is likely that the topic of mysticism arose.⁷ In any case, even in *Protestantische Ethik* there are "tantalizing references" to mysticism (Robertson 1975: 242).

The first references are to the German mystic Johannes Tauler (Weber 1993: 36–38, 47). Tauler was a student of Meister Eckhart and learned much

⁶ See Rollman 1993. We have yet to have a definitive account of the Weber-Troeltsch relationship. We know that they were friends for over seventeen years, that the Troeltschs lived upstairs in Weber's Heidelberg house from 1910 to 1915, and that they had a high regard for each other's works and opinions. See Graf 1987.

⁷ Hennis claims that James was a major influence on Weber and that it was through Troeltsch that he learned to appreciate James. See Hennis 1996: 54–66.

from him. They are two of the most important Rheinland mystics and both where highly influential. There are, however, a number of dissimilarities. Meister Eckhart was a trained scholastic and his sermons were filled with metaphysics. He was not always understood and he knew this: he reportedly asked: "what may I do if someone does not understand that?"⁸ Tauler, by contrast, strove to write in such a way that his many listeners could follow what he was saying (Preger: Band 3, 140; Clarke 1949: 44–45). Moreover, after his "conversion" he was far more concerned about the welfare of his listeners and he tailored his sermons to deal with mundane matters as well as metaphysical ones.⁹ These first references are on Weber's chapter on Luther (Chapter 3). The connection between the mystic Tauler and the reformer Luther may seem tenuous at first. However, from 1515 to 1518 Luther read Tauler and he learned to appreciate many of his ideas. Weber was aware of this influence and he assumes that many of his readers would know that as well. That is why in his remarks on the origin of the word "Beruf" he notes that the first similar usage is found in one of those German mystics whose influence on Luther is recognized (Weber 1993: 37). In a note Weber allows that there is no certainty that there is a direct influence from Tauler's use of "Beruf" to Luther's use; nonetheless, he suggests that there is.¹⁰ Furthermore, he stresses that there are strong traces of Tauler's thinking in Luther's works such as "Freiheit der Christenmenschen" (Weber 1993: 36, note 40). In a slightly later note Weber contends that Tauler's use of the word "Beruf" is in principle the same as Luther's, both in its spiritual sense as well as the worldly, and this is an instance where the German mystics share a common opposition to the Thomists (Weber 1993, 41, note 45). In the same note Weber states that Luther and the mystics share the same belief in the equality of vocations but also that there is a hierarchy that is God given. Another similarity that Luther shares with the mystics against the Church

⁸ "Was mac ich, ob ieman daz niht enverstêt?" He also said "Who has understood this sermon, to him I wish him well. Were no one present here I would have preached to this collection box." See Otto 1971: 18.

⁹ See Preger 1962, III: 97. The story of Tauler's "conversion" is that, supposedly, a man came to him and told him that he was only a beginner and did not understand spiritual matters. This prompted Tauler to devote a number of years to self-examination. Tauler 1923, I: XXXI. However, there has been research that purportedly shows that this person was not Tauler. See Clarke 1949: 41–43. Beck stresses Meister Eckhart's single concern with the soul and his indifference towards the world: "But Eckhart has little interest (in his mystical works at least) in the world; he is interested in the soul". Beck 1996: 52.

¹⁰ Weber's justification is Tauler's "beautiful sermon" on Eph. 4 where Paul appeals to his readers to "lead the life worthy of the calling to which you have been called." Tauler begins with "Brüder, ich gebundner Mensch in Gott, ich bitte euch, daß ihr würdig wandelt in der Berufung, zu der ihr berufen seid, mit aller Demut und Sanftmut und mit Geduld einander in Liebe vertrag." What follows is Tauler's four point commentary. Tauler 1923: 42–48.

is the belief that there is no priest that can help and that religion is essentially personal.¹¹ Weber cites or mentions Tauler at least five more times.¹² Perhaps most interesting is Weber's connection of Luther to the mystics in regard to the *unio mystica* (Weber 1993:71). Now Weber allows that this developed in Lutheranism. He also acknowledges that Luther's *unio mystica* is not the yearning to be one with God as found in "That Contemplative" Bernard of Clairvaux.¹³ And, Weber does draw the distinction between the medieval Catholics who lived from hand to mouth and the Lutherans and especially the Calvinists who dedicated their lives to work (Weber 1993, 76). He also notes that Luther never had the inclination to take flight from the world, one of the defining characteristics of a mystic (Weber 1993: 90 note 145, McGinn 1994: 120, 127). And he draws his distinction between the passivity of the mystic with the activity of the ascetic (Weber 1994: 72–73). However, he cautions: that "mystical contemplation and rational 'Berufsaekese' do not exclude each other" (Weber 1993: 72 note 99). More importantly, the famous distinction between the mystic as vessel and the ascetic as tool was added in 1920 when Weber had completed his studies on *Wirtschaftsethik* and had prepared *Protestantische Ethik* for Band 1 of his *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* (Weber 1993: 73, 183 [221] As the 45 pages of changes and additions in Weber 1993 show, Weber made a number of important changes. These included a number of additional references to Troeltsch – in particular, to Troeltsch's *Soziallehren*.¹⁴ Like *Protestantische Ethik*, Troeltsch's *Soziallehren* was first published in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* beginning in 1908 and ending in 1910. The *Archiv* was the journal that Weber, Edgar Jaffe and Werner Sombart took over in 1903.¹⁵ Troeltsch then reworked major parts of *Soziallehren* and published it as Band 1 of his *Gesammelte Schriften* in 1912. He also added chapters on Calvinism, sects, mysticism, and a conclusion. Troeltsch and Weber had many points of convergence, such as their views on Luther and Calvin and the distinction between Church and Sect (Winckelmann 1987: 200). However, as Troeltsch pointed out in 1910, he and Weber had different objectives and different goals (Winckelmann 1987: 189, 192). Whereas Weber dealt with religion in so far as it was an economic issue, Troeltsch dealt

¹¹ Guttandin 1998: 74. Weber writes: "no one could help him. No priest – for only the chosen can spiritually understand the Word of God." ("Niemand konnte ihm helfen. Kein Prediger – denn nur der Erwählte kann Gotteswort spiritualiter verstehen.") Weber 1993: 62.

¹² Weber 1993: 45 note 56, 47 note 61, 72 note 99, 80 note 127, 96 note 157.

¹³ For a detailed account of Bernhard's erotic mysticism and especially his erotic commentary on the "Song of Songs" see McGinn 1994: 158–224, esp. 178–180, 187–190, 193–222.

¹⁴ See especially Weber 1993: 158 [1], 175 [123], 177 [149], 191 [328], 195 [384].

¹⁵ Weber and Sombart dropped out of their editor roles in 1909. See Weber 1990: 603 note 3.

with it as a larger cultural one. Furthermore, Weber was concerned primarily with Church and Sect. This was not the case with Troeltsch. As Trutz Rendtorff has shown, Troeltsch devotes 50 pages to sects and over 90 pages to mysticism (Rendtorff 1993, 179 note 2). And, he devotes approximately 40 pages to asceticism.

Troeltsch took up Weber's distinction between Church and Sect but he added a third type: mysticism.¹⁶ Much of Troeltsch's discussion of mysticism is not relevant for the purposes of this paper: he discusses a number of Protestant mystics, including Munzer, Schwenkfeld and Sebastian Franck. He also treats the mysticism of the Dutch and the English as well as that of the Quakers and the Herrnhuter (Troeltsch 1912: 878–925). In addition to these, Troeltsch also looks at philosophers. Leibniz and Spinoza have mystical elements in their writings, and he notes that both Schelling and Hegel confess to having been influenced by the German mystics. What is of concern here is Troeltsch's overall view of mysticism. Like Weber, Troeltsch sees mystical elements in Luther (Troeltsch 1912: 849). And, like Weber, Troeltsch sees Protestant mysticism as stemming from Bernard and others from the late Middle Ages (Troeltsch 1912: 850). The mystic rejects any "objectification" of the religious experience, such as dogma or rites, and believes that mysticism in the widest sense is the experience of the immediate presence of God. He traces mystical experiences to Paul but notes that ancient civilizations such as the Greeks and the Persians also had people who had mystical experiences.¹⁷ There is also mysticism in a narrower technical sense, and here he points to, among others, the intellectual mysticism of the Dominicans and the willing mysticism of the Franciscans (Troeltsch 1912: 856). Mysticism is an immediate and individual living process as opposed to external authority, dead letters and sterile ceremonies (Troeltsch 1912: 858–859). Instead, "The entire mystical thinking stands indeed in the service of a personal living piety...."¹⁸ None of this is found in Calvin, who is bound up with the notion of sects. Instead, mystical elements are found in Luther (Troeltsch 1912: 860). Now Troeltsch is able to spell out the differences between the Baptismal sects and the mystical individual. The former knows the laws of Jesus, the Sermon on the Mount, and with the living according to the absolute law of nature. The latter knows only the spirit, its freedom

¹⁶ Troeltsch sets out the three types in a paper from 1911 entitled "Epochen und Typen der Sozialphilosophie des Christentum" where he defines the mystic as one who has the "belief in the immediate presence of Christ in the soul." Troeltsch 1925: 126.

¹⁷ Troeltsch 1912: 851–852. He cites a number of sources but particularly Erwin Rhode's *Psyche* and William James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*.

¹⁸ Troeltsch 1912: 859. Among others, Troeltsch cites von Hügel's *The Mystical Element of Religion*.

and its inner movement (Troeltsch 1912: 863). The Baptist has the external word as rule and external authority; the mystic has the inner word and internal tiny spark.¹⁹ There is some degree of individuality in the sects, but it is nothing like the “radical individuality” of the mystic (Troeltsch 1912: 864–865). The mystic is indifferent to others; his primary, if not exclusive, concern is with God. However, Troeltsch admits that there is a social aspect to the mystic. There may be connections with other like-minded people outside of the monastery (Troeltsch 1912: 866). Troeltsch again stresses the difference between a member of a sect and a mystic, with the former basing his beliefs upon text and authority while the latter bases his beliefs upon the feeling of freedom (Troeltsch 1912: 875–876). Troeltsch concludes his “overview” of mysticism by remarking on its lack of inclination towards organization and stressing the mystic’s concern with his (or her) soul.²⁰

We do not know Weber’s thoughts regarding Troeltsch’s discussion of mysticism in the *Soziallehren*. However, we can get a fairly good idea from comments that he made on a paper that Troeltsch presented at the first meeting of the *Deutsche Soziologischen Gesellschaft* in Frankfurt in October 1910. The paper that Troeltsch gave was “Das stoisch-christliche Naturrecht und das moderne profane Naturrecht.” There he sets out the three types: Church, sect, and mysticism. The last, he argues, is “in truth a radical, ‘community less’, individuality.”²¹ It is independent of history, culture and other intermediaries.

We can get a sense of Weber’s estimation of Troeltsch’s paper in a letter to Franz Eulenburg. He thought it excellent (“ausgezeichnet”), in part because it was totally “value free.” And, the debate about it was the day’s best.²²

In 1917 Rudolf Otto published *Das Heilige* which some compare in importance to Schleiermacher’s *Reden*. Like James and many others, Otto does not offer a definition of mysticism. He does give the essential characteristic as that of the divine dominating the mortal.²³ He emphasizes the

¹⁹ Troeltsch 1912: 863. While many mystics spoke of a small spark, it is perhaps best associated with Meister Eckhart. Clarke 1949: 19–20.

²⁰ Troeltsch 1912: 939–940. Consider this remark about Troeltsch’s mystic: “The mystic, one could say, can live with the Church, though the Church does not mean very much to him or her. Mysticism sets a pattern for a personal quest for religious well-being.” Steeman 1975: 200.

²¹ Troeltsch 1925: 173. The mystic stands in immediacy with Jesus or God. Later, he says that mysticism “is the radical, organizationless, individuality of the immediate religious experience.” Troeltsch 1925: 186.

²² Wolfgang Schluchter suggests that Weber’s interest in mysticism was prompted initially by his work on the Russian Revolution of 1905, but that the catalyst for a major rethinking came with Troeltsch’s paper. See Schluchter 1989: 129. See Weber 1994: 655.

²³ Otto 1997: 107 note 1. He bases this on part on Schleiermacher’s *Reden* of which he

mere mortal mystic's feelings of nothingness with the greatness of God, and following Schleiermacher he stresses the Christian's feeling of absolute dependence on God (Otto 1997: 9–12, 20–25, 30). We do not know what Weber thought of the book, or indeed whether he had read it.²⁴ However, we have good grounds to believe that Weber read the two articles on mysticism in the second edition of *Logos. Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur*, if for no other reason than that he was involved in developing the journal. One article was entitled “Mystik und Metaphysik” by Sergius Hessen from St. Petersburg and the other “Formen der Mystik” by Georg Mehlis, the editor of *Logos*.²⁵ Mehlis argued that, despite the apparent contradiction between form and mysticism, he could distinguish between two types: theoretical and practical. Like Windelband, who considered Meister Eckhart to be the father of mysticism (Windelband 1993: 264), Mehlis regarded him as the dominant theoretical mystic (Mehlis 191: 246–247). It is Eckhart's attempts to deal with the “coincidenta oppositorum” and with the necessity of absolute quietness (Mehlis 248, 243). It is the notion of absolute silence that Weber emphasizes.

In the section on “Religionssoziologie” from *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* Weber writes: “Only if the creaturely in man is totally silent can God speak in the soul”.²⁶ In the “Religionssoziologie”, Weber places mysticism on an almost equal footing with asceticism. He writes that “either” there is the ascetic “or” there is the mystic. The ascetic works in the world as a “tool” (“Werkzeug”) of God (Weber 1980: 328, 331, 332). This does not mean that the ascetic approves of the world; indeed, the ascetic is world-rejecting (“Weltablehnend”). In contrast, the mystic does not simply reject the world, the mystic wishes to flee from it (“Weltflucht”) (Weber 1980: 330). Weber draws another contrast between the activity of the ascetic and the passivity of the mystic—the former is God's tool and the latter is God's “vessel” (“Gefäß”) (Weber 1980: 331). The mystic does not *do*; the mystic wishes to *have*. What the mystic wishes to have is a certain type of knowledge; that is,

thinks highly. Otto wrote an enthusiastic introduction to his edition of the *Reden* published in 1899 in honor of the 100 years since its first appearance. It is dedicated to Dilthey because of his biography of Schleiermacher. It also includes three references to James. See Schleiermacher 1899.

²⁴ Marianne Weber does not mention Otto and there is nothing in the 1911–1912 correspondence. But it is difficult to believe Weber and Troeltsch did not discuss Otto and his works given the latter's extremely high regard for him. Both Troeltsch and Otto believed in the history of religions theory and both had considerable respect for Schleiermacher based on serious studies of him. See Drescher 1993: 379 note 257.

²⁵ Hessen 1912 and Mehlis 1912. See also Weber 1998: 75, 77, 87, 96–97.

²⁶ “Nur wenn das kreatürliche im Menschen völlig schweigt, kann Gott in der Seele reden....” Weber 1980: 330.

specifically, of God. Weber insists that this particular type of feeling counts as a particular type of knowledge for the mystic. In order to know God, that is, to overcome the distance between God and man, man must refrain from action and must empty himself as much as possible. This is necessary to create the possibility for the mystic to engage in the "unio mystica" with God (Weber 1980: 330). Weber appears to acknowledge that there are difficulties with maintaining the opposition between the active ascetic and passive mystic when he allows that the distinction is fluid (Weber 1980: 330). The mystic is not completely passive; the emptying of oneself is an activity. Furthermore, Weber writes of the "energetic concentration" that is the mark of the mystic (Weber 1980: 331). The difference that Weber seems to suggest is that, for the ascetic, activity is a goal in itself whereas, for the mystic, it is merely a means to an end. To the ascetic, the mystic's inactivity is an indication of the mystic religious sterility with his emphasis on feeling. The ascetic also believes that the mystic abdicates his role in working for God. From the mystic's point of view, the ascetic's concern with worldly activities leads to a life containing insurmountable tensions between power and good (Weber 1980: 331). Weber points to another contrast: the world-fleeing mystic is perhaps more dependent on the world than the world-rejecting ascetic. The mystic lives on the voluntary offerings of man and nature, be they berries and nuts or alms and donations (Weber 1980: 331). Weber offers another contrast between the ascetic and the mystic, since the ascetic lives and works within the world he has an interest in the meaning of it. For the mystic, who cares not for the world but for another higher "reality", there is no need to be concerned with the world's meaning (Weber 1980: 332). Weber also contrasts the differences in humility. For the ascetic, humility is the way in which he must regard his worldly success—that it is not his, but rather God's success. For the mystic, humility is associated with the way in which he lives within the world – he minimizes his worldly activity in order to achieve the silence that is necessary for him to seek refuge in God (Weber 1980: 332). He seeks the continuous "quiet euphoria" of contemplation. This need for quiet marks all mystics, whether they are from the East or the West (Weber 1980: 330). As in *Protestantische Ethik*, here also Weber uses Tauler as the representative of Western mysticism. It is Tauler who after the day's work wishes to retire at night in order to have the possibility of the "unio mystica" (Weber 1980: 333, 330). And, like Troeltsch, Weber stresses the mystic's individuality and lack of social interaction. In fact, the mystic does not have a strong sense of social activity in general. He is alone and wishes to be alone: he does not want to do, but to "feel." If there is any basis for the development of a "genuine mystic community action" ("genuiner Mystik Gemeinschaftshan-

deln"), it stems from the acosmism of feeling of mystical love (Weber 1980: 333). Contemplation, not action, has been the watchword of Christian mystics. Weber claims that certain mystics have even seen that activity is better than contemplation, and he cites Meister Eckhart as an example (Weber 1980: 334). Eckhart gave a sermon in which he commented on Luke 10: 38–42. In that passage, Martha complains that she is working hard and Mary is doing nothing but listening. Jesus tells Martha that she should not be troubled and that Mary does the "one needful thing." Mystics, from Origen on have interpreted this passage as Jesus' endorsement of contemplation over activity (McGinn 1991: 69, 126, 215, 249). According to Weber, however, Eckhart finally preferred Martha over Mary.²⁷ Is Weber misunderstanding or misusing Eckhart? We have no way of telling. However, Weber suddenly speaks of the "echter Mystik" ("true mystic") and the "genuin mystischen Gottesbesitz" ("genuine mystical possession of God") (Weber 1980: 332, 365). Has Weber's interest in asceticism prompted him to devalue mysticism again? A few points support this interpretation. One is his interest in action. A second is his antipathy towards the irrationality of feeling (see Weber 1980: 362). A third builds on his three-fold distinction of legitimate domination: traditional, charismatic and rational (Weber 1980: 122–140). All mysticism and mystery cults believe in the habit of (traditional) rituals, which he claims leads one away from *rational action* (Weber 1980: 322, his italics). Furthermore, the mystic's attraction is charismatic (Weber 1980: 322). Finally, Weber distinguishes between the Western mystic's conception of the world and that of the Eastern mystic; the former believes that it is a created "work" whereas the latter believes that it is simply a given for all eternity (Weber 1980: 335): In his later work, Weber will make more of the contrast between Eastern and Western mysticism.

The section on "Religionssoziologie" in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* was probably written in 1912 or 1913. As Tenbruck has argued, the whole of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* is problematic and the editors of *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe* are trying to address most of the issues (Tenbruck 1999: 133–156, Schluchter 1991: 597–598). Nonetheless, Weber's discussion of mysticism seems to be an investigative midpoint between the mild interest shown in *Protestantische Ethik* and the investigations from 1915 onwards which are to be found in the three volumes of *Religionssoziologie*.

In volume One Weber focuses on the mysticism of Laotse. Like all mystics, Laotse seeks God, or perhaps better, seeks the "godly principle" which

²⁷ Weber 1980: 334. A reading of Luke 10: 38–42 does not support such an interpretation. Nor apparently does Eckhart's sermon. See Eckhart 1979: 158–164.

is Tao (Weber 1989: 383, 386). As with other mystics, Laotse is contemplative, which is a point Weber repeatedly stresses (Weber 1989: 107, 383, 385, 389, 391). As such, Laotse seeks to arrive at Tao through contemplation, and not through action. Even if he does not totally reject action, he seeks to minimize it (Weber 1989: 384). Like all mystics, he is absolutely indifferent to the world (Weber 1989: 380, 390). Thus, he does not even engage in any *active* struggle against the world (Weber 1989: 389). The mystic is utterly indifferent to the world and its rational social ethics (Weber 1989: 389). Weber quotes a German translation of Laotse: "This all is without use for your person."²⁸ It is without use because it in no way furthers the "unio mystica." This would be the peacefulness that the mystic seeks (Weber 1989: 379). Weber also draws the conclusions that the mystic is indifferent to the everydayness of the world and that his interest is really in himself (Weber, 1989: 113).

In the second volume Weber stresses the self-interest in one's soul that the Brahman possesses (Weber 1996: 271). The Brahman also seeks knowledge, specifically a mystical reunification. Once again, Weber stresses that this is not knowledge in any ordinary sense, but rather a "Haben" ("having").²⁹ And, he also stresses the Indian's life of thought to the minimization of activity (Weber 1996: 282).

The Buddhist mystic differs from the usual mystic in that he is not necessarily self-absorbed. Instead, he seeks an unlimited feeling for man and animal.³⁰ In this, the mystic seeks to be God-like. Weber again points to the difference between man and God: man has a need for, and interest in, activity. In contrast, rest is Godly (Weber 1996: 530).

It is in the "Zwischenbetrachtung" ("Intermediate Reflection") section of *Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligion* that Weber again takes up the issue of mysticism. Once more Weber places active asceticism against contemplative mysticism (Weber 1989: 481). It is here that he calls the ascetic and the mystic "polar concepts." On the one side there is the God-willed activity of the ascetic who considers himself to be God's tool; on the other side there is the contemplation of the mystic who regards himself as God's vessel. He does not *do*, but rather *has* possession of the holy (Weber 1989: 482). This opposition lessens if the ascetic moves towards the mystic by minimizing work and maximizing contemplation, just as the mystic moves towards the ascet-

²⁸ "Dies alles ist ohne Nützen für deine Person." Weber 1989: 386.

²⁹ Weber 1996: 280. Later he writes "The mystical knowledge is not, at least not adequate and rational, communicable." Weber 1996: 529. Compare this with James' first two points about mysticism, above.

³⁰ Weber notes the similarity with Father Zosima from Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov* and with Platon Karataev from Tolstoy's *War and Peace*. Weber 1989: 333 and note 4.

ic by not drawing the world-fleeing conclusion but choosing instead to remain within the world's order. Weber has four categories:

<i>Ascetic</i>	<i>Mystic</i>
(1) innerworldly	(2) world-rejecting
(3) otherworldly	(4) world-fleeing

The mystic will minimize activity even if he remains within the world, for he must not *do* but must *be* (Weber 1989: 482–483). The fundamental principle for any true mystic is to remain silent, for only then can he hear God speak. For the innerworldly ascetic it is through activity that there is godliness, and even while rejecting the world, by acting, the ascetic dominates the world. To the mystic, the ascetic seems preoccupied with vain self-justice; to the ascetic, the mystic seems preoccupied with pleasurable self-absorption (Weber 1989: 483). As Weber makes clear, there are degrees of opposition between asceticism and mysticism.

Weber was never preoccupied with mysticism, although I believe that I have demonstrated that he had a growing interest in it. Whether it was kindled by his work on the Russian revolutions, as Schluchter suggested, or by Troeltsch's 1910 paper, as Mitzman believed (Mitzman 1979: 195) or by some other cause is not of primary importance. What is of primary importance is that Weber had a growing appreciation for mysticism, and not simply from a scholar's point of view. In an often-cited letter to Ferdinand Tönnies written in 1909, Weber remarks that in religious matters he is "unmusical."³¹ Weber wrote another letter less than two weeks later in which he discussed the historical significance of mysticism. He adds that he does not have the psychic capacity to experience such religious feelings, again because he is religiously "unmusical." Perhaps the best support for this comes from Eduard Baumgarten who recounts a story that Marianne Weber told him sometime around 1918 or 1919. Max and Marianne would often sit in their salon before retiring. They would sit there mostly in silence, with Max enjoying a cigar. On one occasion he said:

"Tell me, can you picture yourself to be a mystic?"

"That would certainly be the *last thing* that I could think about myself. Can *you* then picture *yourself* as one?"

"It could even be that I *am* one. How much more in my life have I 'dreamt' than one ought actually to allow oneself, thus I never feel *entirely* dependably at home. It is, as I could (and want) just as well as also to withdraw myself *entirely* from *everything*."³²

³¹ The letter is dated 19 February. Weber 1994: 65.

³² "Sag mal, kannst Du Dir vorstellen, Du seist ein Mystiker?"

This passage is instructive for what it does say as well as what it does not say. First, Weber does not respond directly to Marianne's assertion that it would be the *last thing* that she could imagine herself to be. Second, he does not address her high degree of certainty. Instead, he says that he certainly *could be* a mystic. Third, he speaks of the number of times that he has "dreamt" but does not explain what he means—does he mean nightly dreams, daytime reveries, or of making the plans? What he does say is that he has done more dreaming than one ought to allow oneself. Again, he is silent on what he means by this – has he somehow broken some self-regulation or has he engaged in dreaming that is somehow too pleasurable? Fourth, he says that he never reliably feels at home—does he mean that he never *completely* or *comfortably* feel at home? The second possibility is strengthened when one considers "*daheim*" to be a sense of belonging, a sense of being at ease in one's place or in one's surrounding. It is a sense of not being alienated, but rather feeling at one with the world. Finally, the last sentence is crucial—that he could and would *withdraw himself from everything*. This is a variation of the contemplative mystic's "flight from the world" – he would not flee but would deliberately remove himself from it. The passage is fascinating because it is enigmatic. Finally, we have the enigmatic last words that Weber uttered: "The true is the truth."³³

I have not suggested that Max Weber ever was a mystic, despite Marianne's story. But I have suggested that Weber developed an interest in mysticism, an interest that seemed to grow in the last five years of his life. Until the correspondence from those years is made available and until we have a reliable biography of him, we may never really know how he felt about mysticism.

References

- Adams, James Luther (1986): *The Prophethood of All Believers*. Ed. by George K. Brach. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Baumgarten, Eduard (1964): *Max Weber. Werk und Person*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

"Das wäre gewiß das *Letzte*, was ich mir Denken könnte. Kannst *Du* es den etwa für *Dich* dir vorstellen?"

"Es könnte sogar sein, daß ich einer *bin*. Wie ich mehr in meinem Leben "geträumt" habe als man sich eigentlich erlauben darf, so bin ich auch nirgends *ganz* verläßlich daheim. Es ist, als könnte (und wollte) ich mich aus *allem* ebensowohl auch *ganz* zurückziehen." Baumgarten 1964: 677.

³³ "Das Wahre ist die Wahrheit." Weber 1926: 711.

- Beck, Lewis White (1996) [1968]: *Early German Philosophy. Kant and his Predecessors*. Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
- Bendix, Reinhard (1977) [1960]: *Max Weber. An Intellectual Portrait*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Bubnoff, Nicolai (1920): "Das Problem der spekulativen Mystik." *Logos* VIII.
- Bynum, Caroline Walker (1988): "Mystik und Askese im Leben mittelalterlicher Frauen. Einige Bemerkungen zu den Typologien von Max Weber und Ernst Troeltsch." In Schluchter, 1988.
- Clarke, James M. (1949): *The Great German Mystic*. New York: Russell & Russell.
- Drescher, Hans-Georg (1993): *Ernst Troeltsch. His Life and Work*. Tr. by John Bowden Minneapolis: Fortress Press.
- Eckhart, Meister (1979): *Meister Eckhart. Deutsche Predigten und Traktate*. Herausgegeben und übersetzt von Josef Quint. Zurich: Diogenes.
- Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm (1987): "Friendship between Experts: Notes on Weber and Troeltsch", in Wolfgang Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds.), *Max Weber and his Contemporaries*. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Guttandin, Friedheim (1998): *Einführung in die "Protestantische Ethik" Max Webers*. Oplanden Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Hennis, Wilhelm (1996): *Max Webers Wissenschaft von Menschen*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Hessen, Sergius (1912): "Mystik und Metaphysik." *Logos*. II.
- James, William (1994)[1902]: *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. New York: Random House.
- Käsler, Dirk (1998): *Max Weber. Eine Einführung in Leben, Werk, und Wirkung*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag.
- McGinn, Bernard (1991): *The Foundations of Mysticism. Origins to the Fifth Century*. New York: Crossroad.
- McGinn, Bernard (1994): *The Growth of Mysticism, Gregory the Great through the 12th Century*. New York: Crossroad.
- McGinn, Bernard (1998): *The Flowering of Mysticism. Men and Women in the New Mysticism -1200-1350*. New York: Crossroad.
- Mehlis, Georg (1912): "Formen der Mystik." In *Logos* II.
- Mitzman, Arthur (1979): *The Iron Cage-An Historical Interpretation of Max Weber*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Neuner, Peter (1977): *Religion zwischen Kirche und Mystik. Friedrich van Hügel und der Modernismus*. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Joseph Knecht.
- Otto, Rudolf (1971)[1926]: *West-östliche Mystik*. Dritte Auflage. München: C.H. Beck.
- Otto, Rudolf (1997) [1917]: *Das Heilige. Über das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum Rationalen*. München: C.H. Beck.
- Preger, Wilhelm (1962)[1874-1893]: *Geschichte der deutschen Mystik im Mittelalter*. 3 Bände. Aalen: Otto Zeller Verlagsbuchhandlung.
- Rentdorff, Trutz (1993): "'Meine eigene Theologie ist spiritualistisch.' Zur Funktion der 'Mystik' als Sozialform des modernen Christentums." In Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and Trutz Rentdorff, eds. *Ernst Troeltschs Soziallehren*. Guterslohe: Gerd Mohn.

- Robertson, Roland (1975): "On the Analysis of Mysticism: Pre-Weberian, Weberian, and Post-Weberian Perspectives." *Sociological Analysis*, 1975, vol. 36, no. 3.
- Rollman, Hans (1993): "Meet Me in St. Louis: Troeltsch and Weber in America." In Helmut Lehmann and Guenther Roth, eds. (1993) *Weber's Protestant Ethic. Origins, Evidence, Context*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schleiermacher, Friedrich (1899): *Über die Religion. Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern*. Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Schluchter, Wolfgang, ed. (1988): *Max Webers Sicht des okzidentalen Christentums. Interpretation und Kritik*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Schluchter, Wolfgang (1989): *Rationalism, Religion, and Domination. A Weberian Perspective*. Trans. by Neil Solomon. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Schluchter, Wolfgang (1991): *Religion und Lebensführung*. Band 2. *Studien zu Max Webers Religions- und Herrschaftssoziologie*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Steeman, Theodore (1975): "Church, Sect, Mysticism, Denomination: Periodological Aspects of Troeltsch's Types." *Sociological Analysis*. Vol. 36. No. 3.
- Stephuhn, Feodor (1912): "Die Tragödie des mystischen Bewußstein." *Logos* III.
- Tauler, Johannes (1923): *Johannes Tauler. Predigten*. Mit 1 Tafel. Übertragen und eingeleitet von Walter Lehmann. Jena: Eugen Diederichs.
- Tenbruch, Friedrich (1999): *Das Werk Max Webers. Gesammelte Aufsätze zu Max Weber*. Herausgegeben von Harald Homman. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1905): *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1910): "Die Kulturbedeutung des Calvinismus." In Winkelmann 1987.
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1912): *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Sekten. Gesammelte Schriften* I. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1913): "Empiricismus und Platonismus in der Religionsphilosophie. Zur Erinnerung an William James." In *Gesammelte Schriften* II. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1925): *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte und Religionssoziologie*. Herausgegeben von Hans Baron. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1974): *Ernst Troeltsch. Briefe an Friedrich von Hügel*. Paderborn: Verlag von Bonifacius.
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1979): *Historismus und seine Überwindung. Fünf Vorträge eingeleitet von Friedrich von Hügel*. Aalen: Scientia Verlag.
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1982): *Ernst Troeltsch Bibliographie*. Herausgegeben, eingeleitet und kommentiert von Friedrich Wilhelm Graf und Hartmut Ruddies. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Von Hügel, Friedrich (1999)[1908, 1923 second edition]: *The Mystical Elements of Religion. As Studied in Saint Catherine of Genoa and her Friends*. New York: Crossroads.
- Weber, Marianne (1926): *Max Weber. Ein Lebensbild*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1922)[1920]: *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*. Zweite Auflage. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

- Weber, Max (1980): *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Fünfte, Revidierte Auflage, besorgt von Johannes Winckelmann. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1989): *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. Konfuzianismus und Taoismus*. Herausgegeben von Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer in Zusammenarbeit mit Petra Kolonkon. *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. I/19. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1990): *Max Weber. Briefe. 1906–1908*. Herausgegeben von M. Rainer Lepsius und Wolfgang J. Mommsen in Zusammenarbeit mit Birgit Rudhard und Manfred Schön. *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. II/5. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1993): *Die Protestantische Ethik und der "Geist" des Kapitalismus*. Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Klaus Lichtblau und Johannes Weiß. Weinheim: Belt Athenäum.
- Weber, Max (1994): *Max Weber. Briefe. 1909–1910*. Herausgegeben von M. Rainer Lepsius und Wolfgang J. Mommsen in Zusammenarbeit mit Birgit Rudhard und Manfred Schön. *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. II/6. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1996): *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. Hinduismus und Buddhismus*. Herausgegeben von Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer in Zusammenarbeit mit Karl-Heinz Golzio. *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. I/20. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1998): *Max Weber. Briefe. 1911–1912*. Herausgegeben von M. Rainer Lepsius und Wolfgang J. Mommsen in Zusammenarbeit mit Birgit Rudhard und Manfred Schön. *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. II/7. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Winckelmann, Johannes (Herausgeber) (1987): *Max Weber. Die protestantische Ethik, II. Kritiken und Antikritiken*. Güterslohe: Gerd Mohn.
- Windelband, Wilhelm (1993)[1912]: *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie*. 18, (6) Auflage. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Chapter Two

Max Weber's Charisma

Max Weber's longstanding interest in the notion of authority is well documented. It is evident in a number of his works but is found especially in his *Herrschaftssoziologie*, which Wolfgang Mommsen has referred to as "the monumentally great work" (Mommsen 2001: 303). In *Herrschaftssoziologie*, which is part of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Weber identifies three types of legitimate *Herrschaft*: legal, traditional, and charismatic (Weber 1976: 124). His main interest seems to be in bureaucratic authority, which he argues is the purest form of legal authority, and this interest apparently stems from his continual interest in the rise of Western rationality. It is bureaucratic authority that helps bring about the replacement of tradition by rules. For Weber, bureaucratic authority has many positive features: it is based upon reason, it is impartially implemented by paid trained officials, and its future is stable. Weber also has considerable interest in the second type of authority, that which is traditional. This authority is based upon strong traditional rules and has much in common with legal authority. In both types the person in authority is merely the servant: in traditional authority the person serves the "community"; in legal authority the person serves in his or her capacity for interpreting the rules (Weber 1976: 129–130). Both types have to do with this world: the person holding traditional authority is interested in power and money, hence Weber's concern is economic; and the person holding bureaucratic authority is interested in power and law, hence Weber's concern is legal.

Certainly the first two types figure prominently in Weber's early work. Weber takes pains to show in the *Protestantische Ethik* how rationality (bureaucratic authority) replaces tradition (traditional authority) whereas charisma is not even mentioned. When it comes to the third type there is widespread disagreement. Some scholars appear to believe that Weber had little interest in the notion of charisma.³⁴ Others suggest that his conception was not easy to comprehend because it was multi-faceted, if not inherently con-

³⁴ Wilhelm Hennis provides a representative sampling of a number of German scholars who downplay the notion in Weber's works. See Hennis 1996: 83.

trudictory. For example, Kurt Becker insists that Weber's notion of charisma contains both power and weakness (Becker 1988: 26). Still other scholars have contended that Weber was not necessarily interested in what charisma was; rather, he was far more interested in its transformation into something permanent and institutionalized. Indeed, Weber himself seems to justify this – so S.N. Eisenstadt seems to be correct in his assertion that Weber's concern was charisma and its relationship to institutions (Weber 1968: ix-lvi). And, of course, there are those who, like Leo Strauss, believe that Weber's notion of charisma paves the way for Hitler (Strauss 1953: 43–43). However, others have maintained that Weber's notion of charisma is intrinsically important: Thomas Kroll claimed that it counts as one of the most significant discoveries of Weber's *Herrschaftssoziologie* (Kroll 2001: 47). But even here it seems that its importance stems mostly from its modern widespread usage. Martin Riesebrodt maintained that Weber's concept of charisma has become so commonplace as to have become almost banal (Riesebrodt 2001: 151). Others have also pointed this out: in "Charisma Reconsidered" Stephen Turner argues that "The term has been widely appropriated" (Turner 2003: 6), noting that it is now a woman's given name and has been adopted by numerous businesses. Christoph R. Hatscher in *Charisma und Res Publica* suggests that for some it has become an empty word and he notes that it is commonly used in business – there is even now "charisma training" (Hatscher 2000: 19–20). He also quotes from the author of a work on charisma training that "everyone knows what it means...but almost no one can explain it. You have it or you do not have it" (Hatscher 2000: 20, note 7). Despite its general usage and its place in Weber's work, Riesebrodt (Riesebrodt 2001: 151) is correct to complain that neither in the general sociological studies nor in the specific Weber literature has the concept been thoroughly explained. It may not be too far-fetched to paraphrase Weber and suggest that charisma is a "Schmerzenkind unserer Herrschaftssoziologie" ("problem child of our 'Herrschaftssoziologie'").³⁵ Accordingly, my intention here is simply go back to what Weber wrote and try to spell out carefully what he took charisma to be. In so doing I will follow Weber himself in contrasting what charisma is not.

Originally Weber was not interested in charisma because it was irrational, personal, and temporary. For the most part, he was concerned with that which was rational, impersonal, and permanent, hence his interest in legal

³⁵ In "Die 'Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis'" Weber wrote: "Werte – jenes Schmerzenkind unserer Disziplin." Weber 1988: 209–210).

Herrschaft.³⁶ It is my contention that, partially because of personal concerns and partially because of political reasons, the notion of charisma began to fascinate Weber. Charisma is extremely personal, it is highly irrational, it is very temporary, and above all, it is especially unusual. Unlike the other types of *Herrschaft*, the possessor of charisma is a leader who is “extraordinary.” The charismatic leader is a *dämonischer* type who appears only in chaotic times. He or she is, in the view of Weber’s friend Karl Jaspers, a “demonic power” (Jaspers 1919: 166–169).

In what follows I will begin by trying to establish that Weber’s interest in charisma dates from around 1910. Then, in the main part of the article I will show how Weber’s notion of charisma differs from his conceptions of traditional and legal *Herrschaft*. Next, I will show how Weber thought of the “deviant” type of charismatic leader, the “personality.” Finally, before making my concluding remarks, I argue that, while Weber endorses the notion of the charismatic leader, he is well aware of both the strengths and weaknesses inherent in such authority. But first, I briefly want to discuss a few terms and concepts in Weber’s *Herrschaftssoziologie*.

Herrschaft can be rendered as “rule”, “dominion”, “control”, “power”, or “sway.” In the first section of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, entitled “Soziologische Grundbegriffe” (“Basic Sociological Concepts”), Weber provides definitions of concepts. This part, written in 1919/1920 can be taken as some of Weber’s last views on his work.³⁷ Here he writes “‘Herrschaft’ soll heißen die Chance einen Befehl bestimmten Inhalts bei angebbaren Personen Gehorsam zu finden.” (Weber 1976: 28).³⁸ This could be rendered “‘*Herrschaft*’ should mean the probability that a specific group of people would obey an order with a specific content.” This passage clearly indicates that Weber connects *Herrschaft* with *Macht* (“power”) and *Zwang* (“compulsion”), and that *Herrschaft* means the power to compel people to obey (Weber 1976: 28–29). Weber’s interest in all three concepts was life-long. In *Politik als Beruf*, the speech that he gave to the Munich students in late January 1919, he quotes with some sense of approval Trotsky’s claim that every state is

³⁶ Reinhard Bendix underscores the sense of permanence of both bureaucratic and traditional *Herrschaft*. Bendix 1977: 299.

³⁷ For the dating see the general editorial comments to *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Weber 2001a: xvii.

³⁸ This is more or less repeated on p. 122. The emphasis is on both the order which is given and that it is obeyed. Weber defines obedience in a particularly Kantian way – that the person who obeys the order makes the content of that order the same as the willing of the maxim of one’s own behavior. Weber 1976: 123. Compare with Kant’s various formulations in the *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten*. Kant 1911: 402, 421.

founded upon force (Weber 1992b: 158).³⁹ Many years earlier, in 1895, in his Inaugural Lecture at Freiburg, he spoke of economic, political, and even military domination. And, he specifically spoke of the “herrschenden Machthaber und Klassen” (“dominating power possessors and classes”) (Weber 1993: 560–562). A Nation, a class, or a person must submit to them – even if the nation, the class, or the person would rather not do so. Accordingly, domination appears to be an acceptable translation of *Herrschaft*. However, later in the same part of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* Weber writes of *Herrschaft* and immediately adds “Autorität” (“authority”) (Weber 1976: 122). And, in *Politik als Beruf* he coupled *Herrschaft* and “Autorität” in his discussion of “‘charismatische’ Herrschaft” (Weber 1992b: 160). Thus, “domination” may be perfectly acceptable for both traditional and legal *Herrschaft*; however, because the charismatic person does not, and cannot, resort to compulsion, “authority” seems a better choice for charismatic *Herrschaft*.⁴⁰ But, as I will stress below, there are two points to make clear: first, Weber usually speaks of the charismatic *person*, and, second, he speaks not so much of the person claiming *authority* as of the person claiming *leadership*. Thus, instead of “domination” or “authority” it is better to refer to this as “charismatic leadership.”

There is virtually no argument that one of the greatest preoccupations for Weber, if not the greatest, was the rise of Western rationality. It is one of the cardinal factors in the *Protestantische Ethik*, in *Wissenschaft als Beruf*, as well as in the “Vorbemerkung” for the *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* that he had written shortly before his death.⁴¹ Anything that seemed “irrational” seemed alien to him. Thus, he wrote to Ferdinand Tönnies that in religious matters he was “unmusical” (Weber 1994: 65, 70). It was also the same regarding poetry. Marianne Weber tells of how, when they were living in Freiburg, Weber’s friend and colleague Heinrich Rickert

³⁹ “‘Jeder Staat wird auf Gewalt gegründet’ sagte seinerzeit Trotzki in Brest-Litowsk. Das ist in der tat richtig.” (“‘Every state is founded on force’ said Trotsky in Brest-Litowsk. That is in fact correct.”) Weber 1992b: 158. He adds that the state is that which has the “legitimate monopoly on physical force”, a claim similar to the one he also makes in the “Zwischenbetrachtung”: the state has the claim on the “monopoly [of] *legitimate force*.” Weber 1989: 491, Weber’s emphasis.

In *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* he also insists “Alle politische Gebilde sind Gewaltgebilde.” (“All political structures are power structures.”) Weber 2001a: 222.

⁴⁰ See the lengthy discussion of the problems in translating *Herrschaft* in *Economy and Society*. Weber 1978: 61–62, note 31. H.H. Bruun translates *Herrschaft* as “authority” and notes the connection with “power” and “submission”. He does not seem to differentiate among the three types of *Herrschaft*. See Bruun 1972: 287–288.

⁴¹ My point is that while Weber was interested in rationality for most of his adult life, from 1910 on he seems to have been interested in irrationality as well.

passionately and beautifully read a number of Stefan George's poems but Weber was totally indifferent and remained unmoved. (Weber, Marianne 1984: 463). She continues, however, and that after recovering from his illness it was totally different. In 1910 Weber was impressed with not only Stefan George but also Rainer Maria Rilke (Weber, Marianne 1984: 463). Also, from this time on a number of Russian writers became important for him, especially Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. Paul Honigsheim could not remember a single Sunday *Jour* at Weber's house on which Dostoevsky's name was not mentioned (Honigsheim 1985: 240–241). In a 1910 letter to his wife Marianne, Weber writes of lying in bed and reading Tolstoy for two hours (Weber 1994: 675). He also reported to her in a letter from March 1911 that his friend Emil Lask referred to him as Tolstoy's disciple (Weber 1998: 142). Moreover, that summer he wrote to Rickert about an article on Tolstoy that he wanted to publish in the journal *Logos* (Weber 1998: 250), and Tolstoy figures in *Politik als Beruf* and even more so in *Wissenschaft als Beruf*. I will return to this later; for now the point is from 1910 on Weber was capable of not only understanding but also appreciating people who held "irrational" beliefs and committed "irrational" acts. For him, both Stefan George and Tolstoy were charismatic leaders who were "irrational." It is time to turn to what Weber means by the charismatic leader and I begin by discussing the other two types.

The first is traditional authority. In *Politik als Beruf* Weber speaks of the different holders of traditional authority, patriarchs and patrimonial leaders, but he is less interested in the holders than he is in the type of authority. He suggests that it is often based upon "geheiligte *Sitte*" ("holy *custom*") and upon the "Heiligkeit altüberkommener ('von jeher bestehender') Ordnungen und Herrengewalten" ("foundation of the holiness from any old traditional customs [from standing orders] and dominating powers") (Weber 1976: 130). In *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* Weber stresses the difference between *Sitte* and *Konvention*. He notes that the line separating them is fluid but it seems clear that he holds the difference to be similar to that between *physis* and *nomos*, between "nature" and "convention."⁴² Several pages later he refers to Tönnies' *Die Sitte*. There Tönnies discusses the "authority" of *Sitte*, as in "die *Sitte* erlaubte es, daß die Geschlechter gemeinsam badeten" ("Morality permitted the genders to bathe together") and that he speaks of the obligation that we have towards it (Tönnies 1909: 13). There are two points here: first, that the *Sitte* has authority over us and second, this au-

⁴² Later Weber differentiates between the two by noting that there is no compulsion regarding *Konvention* whereas there is regarding *Sitte*. Weber 1976: 187, 15.

thority is based upon the age of the *Sitte*. Hegel, the authority on *Sittlichkeit* and one of the best commentators on Sophocles' *Antigone*, quotes from the claim that the Laws of the underworld are eternal:

Nicht etwa jetzt und gestern, sondern immerdar
lebt es, und keiner weiß, von wannen es erschein
(not now and yesterday but rather eternally,
it lives, and no one knows from when it appeared.

Hegel 1952: 311

Hegel's point is that the traditional laws are permanent, a point he makes explicit in his lectures on *Rechtsphilosophie* in Heidelberg in 1817. There he speaks of the *Gesetz* as eternal. While *Antigone* complains about her destiny in being compelled to obey the power of law, still she knows that her complaint is unjustified (Hegel 1983: 90–91). As Hegel put it in the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*: “Sie sind” (“They are”) (Hegel 1952: 311). Weber makes a similar point when he speaks of this authority as stemming from the “ewig Gestrigen” (“the eternal yesterdays”) (Weber 1992b: 160). These laws and customs transcend time, and the people who claim traditional authority can issue new laws only when these are in accordance with the old laws. In this sense, traditional authority has no regard for persons.

Something similar can be said with respect to legal authority, the person cannot have regard for individual people. But, rather than being based upon age-old traditions, the holder of bureaucratic authority has been trained to act impartially according to the rules governing his or her office.⁴³ He or she must be impartial; nothing about the person can in any way influence his or her decision. Weber insists that the holder of legal authority must act without “hate” or “passion”, without “love” or “enthusiasm”. The person must act “ohne Ansehen der Person” (“without regard for the person”). That is why Weber emphasizes that the person must act “sine ira et studio” (“without hate and without love”).⁴⁴

Permanence, rules, and impartiality are three of the basic factors of both traditional and bureaucratic authority. Traditional authority lacks the rationality and the competence that is found in bureaucratic authority, so

⁴³ See Weber's extensive treatment of the holder of bureaucratic authority. Weber 1976: esp. 126–131. Also see Wolfgang Schluchter's wide-ranging discussion of this subject. Schluchter 1989: 315–319.

⁴⁴ These are phrases that Weber uses repeatedly. They are found a number of times in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Weber 1976: 129, 562, see also Weber 2001b: 400–401, 429. They are also found in “Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft”. Weber 1988: 476 and they are present in his *Wirtschaftsethik* as well as in *Politik als Beruf*. Weber 1989: 491; Weber 1992b: 190. In *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* he also used the formulation “sine ira ac (et) studio”. Weber 1976: 563. The phrase stems from Tacitus.

where as the former can be described as “routine”, the latter is better described as “rationally routine” (Weber 1988: 476, 478 and Weber 1976: 126). In both cases, however, the emphasis is on “routine” or better “everydayness, as in *Alltäglichkeit*. This leads to the biggest differentiation between traditional and bureaucratic domination and charismatic leadership – the notion of *Außeralltäglichkeit*.

In *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* Weber insists that, while bureaucratic and traditional *Herrschaft* are often in contrast with each other, they are absolutely one in the sense of having “Stetigkeit” (“continuity”, “permanence”) (Weber 1976: 654).⁴⁵ He also refers to this as “Dauergebilde” (“permanent structure”) and “Alltagsgebilde”; that is, it occurs in the “Alltag” (“everyday”). Earlier, he maintained that both traditional and bureaucratic *Herrschaft* are specific “Alltagsformen” of *Herrschaft* (Weber 1976: 141). He also emphasized that this sense of permanence is indispensable for economic growth in general and for capitalism in particular (Weber 1976: 654, 659). Indeed, he refers to it as “Alltagskapitalismus.” In order for capitalism to function there must be rules and order, a point that he had made much earlier in the *Protestantische Ethik*. (see Weber 1992a: 12–16, 24–27). However, Weber makes a larger point when he notes that the sense of “everydayness” is important in many spheres. Thus, he speaks of “Alltagsordnung” (“everyday order”), the “familiengebundene Alltagshandeln” (“family-bound everyday actions”), “Alltagsinteressen” (“everyday interests”), “Alltagschristen” (“everyday Christians”), and even of the “Alltagsmenschen” (“everyday men”) who practice “Alltagslebensführung” (“everyday conduct”) in the “Alltagswelt” (“everyday world”) (Weber 2001b: 368, 371, 314, 323, 319, 314–315). The emphasis here is on “routine”, and life under the conditions of traditional or bureaucratic *Herrschaft* is, and must be, routine. It matters not whether this sense of routine is founded on old ways of thinking or on recently implemented rules. It is the world of *Alltag*.

In contrast, the charismatic leader is “spezifisch außeralltäglich” (“specifically extraordinary”) (Weber 1976: 140).⁴⁶ On the next page he specifically contrasts charisma with the other two forms of *Herrschaft* and stresses that it is “*außeralltäglich*.” In “Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft” he repeats this with the same emphasis, but adds that this is a “rein persön-

⁴⁵ One of the differences between bureaucratic and traditional *Herrschaft*, if not the key one is that the former is based upon the concept of “competence”, which is lacking in the latter. See Weber 1988: 478, 482. In *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* Weber also includes “Kompetenz” as one of the marks of that seems to be lacking in traditional *Herrschaft*. Weber 1976: 131. Also in that work Weber maintains that “Wissen” (“knowledge”) or rationality is the fundamental character of bureaucratic *Herrschaft*. Weber 1976: 129.

⁴⁶ “Alltäglich” means both “ordinary” and “everyday.”

liche soziale Beziehung" ("pure personal social relation") (Weber 1988: 485). Earlier he had stressed that the relationship between the "Führer" ("leader") and the "Junger" ("disciple") was a personal one in which the disciple has a personal devotion to the leader (Weber 1988: 482). Again, he contrasts this with the other two types: this relationship is not one based upon a discipline or a class, or on any household or similar relationship.

The sections of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* which are devoted to the notion of charisma are exceedingly helpful in clarifying the "extraordinariness" of the charismatic leader. The "Anhänger" ("followers") have an entirely personal devotion to their leader. And, this devotion is brought forth by the "leader's" ability to seem to be able to perform "miracles" or to perform heroic acts (Weber 1976: 140). Later, Weber insists that anyone who wishes to become some sort of leader must perform miracles.⁴⁷ The followers recognize and acknowledge the personal qualification and characteristics of the possessor of charisma (Weber 1976: 655). It is the sense that the leader has been chosen, that he (or she) belongs to God's grace (Weber 1976: 140). So, it seems as if the charismatic leader possesses the power and holds sway over his followers. However, Weber insists that the charismatic leader is dependent upon the followers for recognition.⁴⁸ In a similar way, while it seems as if by acting religiously the charismatic leader is a servant of God, he (or she) is instead compelling God to do certain acts. Weber clarifies this in the section on "Religiöse Gemeinschaften" in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, a section that is just as helpful for Weber's conception of charisma as those sections devoted specifically to it (Weber 2001b: 154). There he writes of the priest and the magician, but notes that the line that divides them is fluid. He writes: "Der Gegensatz ist in der Realität durchaus flüssig, wie fast alle soziologischen Erscheinungen" ("The opposition is in reality thoroughly fluid, as [are] almost all sociological appearances" (Weber 2001b: 157, also see 158). Weber continuously connects magic and charisma; he often writes of "magical charisma" (Weber 2001b: 161, 178–179, 242, 305, 318).

Weber acknowledges that his source for charisma was Rudolf Sohm and his studies about early Christianity, so it is not hard to consider Weber's notion of "magical charisma" applying to Jesus (Weber 1976: 124; see Turner and Factor 1994: 110–116).⁴⁹ Weber's interest is not so much in Jesus as in the

⁴⁷ "Er muß Wunder tun, wenn er ein Prophet, Heldentaten, wenn er ein Kriegsführer sein will." Weber 1976: 656.

⁴⁸ "Kein Prophet hat seine Qualität als abhängig von der Meinung der Menge über ihn angesehen". Literally: "No prophet has his quality recognized as dependent from the opinion of the crowds about him."

⁴⁹ Alan Sica is right to express surprise at Talcott Parson's claim: "Charisma is a sociological term coined by Weber himself." Weber 1992a: 281, note 105; see Sica 1988: 171.

role of the prophet. A prophet, as Weber defines one, is a “personal charisma carrier.”⁵⁰ Whereas a priest may not have a personal “Beruf” (“calling”), the prophet necessarily has one (Weber 2001b: 178). Weber does not mean that the priest cannot have charisma; he may, but he is a member of a particular society and derives his authority from his position in that society. In contrast, the prophet as well as the charismatic magician derive their power simply from their personal gifts (Weber 2001b: 178, see also 333 and 447). Weber appears to place Jesus within the tradition of the Old Testament prophets when he discusses how tenuous their authority was, and he reminds us of Jesus’ insistence that “I am the way, and the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father, but by me” (John 14: 6–7; Weber 2001b: 179). Weber looks to the New Testament, where faith is placed in the “Seelenhirten” (“shepherds of the soul”) who have a “specific charisma” of the extraordinary trust given to them by God. He adds that faith is a surrogate to magical capability (Weber 2001b: 355). In any case, the prophet is a specially chosen one who has a particular relationship to God.

This brings up the question of the relationship between the charismatic leader (prophet) and asceticism and mysticism. At first glance it would seem as if the charismatic leader would fit into Weber’s notion of the ascetic – he certainly appears to be an ascetic. He appears to be the active “Werkzeug” (“tool” or “instrument”) of God (Weber 2001b: 320). However, Weber takes pains to emphasize the irrationality of both the mystic and the charismatic leader (Weber 2001b: 323). In fact, Weber refers to irrationality as “anti-rational” and stresses that the charismatic leader believes and is believed in especially because it goes against what we know (Weber 2001b: 355–356; see esp. 365, note 65). In the “Zwischenbetrachtung” Weber insists on the irrationality of the world and he connects the charismatic leader with the sense of “Außeralltäglichkeit”. (Weber 1989: 482–485).

These points can be clarified by briefly setting out the opposition between the mystic and the ascetic.⁵¹ The ascetic differs from the mystic in a number of ways. First, the ascetic is God’s instrument and actively seeks to work in the world, whereas, in opposition, the mystic believes that he is a “Gefäß” (“vessel”) and proclaims that it is his duty to be passive.⁵² Weber stresses that

⁵⁰ “Wir wollen hier unter einem ‘Propheten’ verstehen einen rein *personalischen* Charismaträger, der Kraft seiner Mission eine religiöse *Lehre* oder einen göttlichen Befehl verkündet”, “We want here to understand by ‘prophet’ a pure *personal* charisma carrier, whose power of his mission is to announce a religious *teaching* or a holy command”. Weber 2001b: 177.

⁵¹ For a discussion of Weber’s notions of asceticism and mysticism, see Adair-Totoff 2002.

⁵² This is Weber’s thesis in the *Protestantische Ethik*. The Calvinist worked intensively for the greater glory for God, but also to seek to have some sign that he is a member of the elect. See especially Weber 1996: 61–63, 69–71. There, Weber appears to contrast the active “inner-

it is the fundamental maxim of the mystic to be silent so that God can speak (Weber 1989: 482). So, the ascetic accepts the everydayness of the world while both the mystic and the charismatic leader reject it. As Weber puts it: "Die Kontemplation bedarf, um zu ihrem Ziel zu gelangen, stets die Ausschaltung des Alltagsinteressen" ("Contemplation demands that in order to reach one's goal [one must] always shut out the everyday interests" (Weber 2001b: 323). In addition, and more importantly, Weber himself draws the connection between the mystic and charisma: "Die Disposition zur Mystik aber ist ein individuelles Charisma" ("The disposition to mysticism, however, is an individual [type of] charisma") (Weber 2001b: 307). Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the prophet and the mystic to close the eternal gap between this world and the other world. But, Weber insists that this demand is not based upon any rational foundation, but stems entirely from the person's own charisma. In this sense, the prophet, mystic, and holy man are one (Weber 1989: 498). Again, the point that needs to be stressed is that the prophet, the charismatic leader, and the mystic reject the everydayness of the world.

This rejection is underscored by the rejection of economic gain. Again, the opposition between the traditional and bureaucratic *Herrschaft*, on the one hand, and the charismatic leadership, on the other, is clear. The former are obviously interested in wealth, even if it is more important in bureaucracy.⁵³ Weber stresses the opposition between "Alltagskapitalismus" and charisma (Weber 1976: 659). Earlier, he had written: "Reines Charisma ist spezifisch *wirtschaftsfremd*." ("Pure charisma is specifically *economically alien*.") (Weber 1976: 142). He continues by allowing that all types of charismatic leaders do accept money that is either given or appropriated; but, he insists that they reject anything along the lines of a traditional or rational "Alltagswirtschaft": that is, they reject any type of everyday routine and regulated economy (Weber 1976: 142, 146). Part of this is because of the charismatic leader's belief in his (or her) given task or personal "Beruf" (Weber 1976:

worldly asceticism" of Calvin with the passive "otherworldly mysticism" of Luther. For the Lutheran the highest religious experience is the "unio mystica" with God. Weber 1996: 71–72. Weber continued to hold this view of the Lutherans' exultation of the "unio mystica". Weber 2001b: 331. For passive "unio mystica" and the sense of the mystic's "Weltflucht" ("world flight") in contrast to the active "Wetablehnung" ("world rejection") of the ascetic, see also Weber 2001b: 324. Weber also claims that not acting is also not thinking. But, he adds that the contrast between the ascetic and the mystic is fluid. Weber 2001b: 325. For more of the opposition between the mystic and the ascetic, see Weber 1989: 482; Weber 2001b: 320–221, 326, 329; also see Adair-Totef 2002.

⁵³ See for example, his notions of the connection of the traditional *Herrschaft* with economics (Weber 1976: 133, 136) and the connections between traditional and bureaucratic *Herrschaft* and economic *Alltag*. Weber 1976: 654.

142). But, part of this is because of the charismatic leader's rejection of anything impersonal. And, Weber insists that money is the most abstract and impersonal object in human life.⁵⁴ It is evident that the charismatic leader whose leadership is predicated on his personal qualities would reject something as impersonal as money and economy.

As the charismatic leader rejects money, so too he (or she) rejects politics, or at least there is a major antagonism between wishing to be political and wishing to be apolitical (Weber 2001b: 390–392). Taking Jesus as the embodiment of this internal conflict, consider his demands that one should turn one's cheek with the claim that he has come to bring not peace but a sword (Matthew 5: 38 ff.).

Because Weber's great love was politics, it comes as no surprise that much of his interest in the charismatic leader centers on the charismatic political leader. Besides the prophet and the warrior hero there is the great demagogue, and he lists Cleon and Napoleon as examples (Weber 1988: 481, 483). But, it is Pericles who appears to hold the greatest interest for Weber. After claiming that the demagogue has been the leading type of politician (since the beginning of democracy), he reminds us that when we have a particular distaste for that word we need to remember that it was first applied to Pericles (Weber 1976: 829). Weber makes the identical point in *Politik als Beruf* (Weber 1992b: 191). There, he adds that the followers are moved by his words and recognize his greatness (Weber 1992b: 211). The charismatic leader does not "live from" politics as many politicians do; rather, he "lives for" politics.⁵⁵ And, because he "lives for" politics, he moves his followers not by any abstract program but simply through their personal devotion (Weber 1992b: 204). But, along with honor comes, or must come, the charismatic leader's recognition of his "*Eigenverantwortung*" ("*self-responsibility*") (Weber 1992b: 180). Weber lists the three qualities that the true political leader must have: "*Leidenschaft*", "*Verantwortungsgefühl*", and "*Augenmaß*" (Weber 1992b: 227). All three are important: "*Leidenschaft*" is "passion"; "*Augenmaß*" is literally "eye-measure", but it means to have the appropriate distance to be able to assess people and situations; and "*Verantwortungsgefühl*" is a "sense of responsibility." It is this sense of responsibility that sets the true political leader apart from the mere "dilettante" (Weber 1992b: 228).

⁵⁴ "Geld ist das Abstrakteste und 'Unpersönlichste' was es im Menschenleben gibt." ("Money is the most abstract and "impersonal" thing at is found in human life.") Weber 1989: 488.

⁵⁵ Weber makes the distinction in *Politik als Beruf* and notes that the opposition is in no way exclusive. Weber 1992b: 169. However, it would seem that the charismatic leader is the least likely to be moved by financial or other material rewards.

What Weber has in mind are the “dictators of the street”, meaning people like Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg (Weber 1992b: 223 and note 104). These types suffer from the deadly political sin of vanity. They are the ones who are making the revolution merely a “Karneval” (Weber 1992b: 227). While Weber does not make this explicit, it seems that they lacked the sense of responsibility. It is no coincidence that in *Wissenschaft als Beruf* Weber included the feeling of responsibility as one of the three “wissenschaftliche” “virtues” (Weber 1992b: 104). Those professors who brought politics into the classroom lacked a sense of intellectual integrity; they lacked a sense of responsibility. He tells those professors to do their work, that is, to analyze facts scientifically and to refrain from pushing personal values. He tells them to be professors and not leaders (Weber 1992b: 101). If they wish to be leaders, then they need to leave the classroom, where there is no place for criticism (Weber 1992b: 95). If they wish to be “prophets” and “demagogues”, then they need to go into the streets and speak publicly, because that is where criticism is possible (Weber 1992b: 97).

The notion of responsibility, while a key concern for Weber, was not as straightforward as it seems, especially regarding the charismatic leader. The true charismatic leader is often held to a type of ethics that Weber referred to as *Gesinnungsethik*, or the “ethics of conviction.” Unlike the person who held to *Verantwortungsethik*, the “ethics of responsibility”, the holder of *Gesinnungsethik* did not care about any possible (foreseeable) results of his or her action or even non-action (Weber 1992b: 237). The ethics of conviction is totally unconditional – Weber’s example is the Sermon on the Mount with its unconditional demand for peace (Weber 1992b: 234–236, 244). Weber believed that Jesus and Luther were adherents to such an ethic, and Weber quotes Luther’s refusal to change his mind “ich kann nicht anders, hier stehe ich” (Weber 1992b: 250). Weber includes Dostoevsky’s holy men and Platon Karatejev from Tolstoy’s *War and Peace* along with Jesus and Francis of Assisi as being “not of this world” (Weber 1992b: 247). But, as much as he admired these people and their beliefs, he held that the politician needed to look at the “realities of life” and employ power and force when and where it was necessary (Weber 1992b: 241, 249).⁵⁶

Karl Loewenstein suggested that Weber spent his entire life fighting against what he called “political enemy number one” which was the “uncon-

⁵⁶ See also his comments in his 1916 piece “Zwischen zwei Gesetzen” and his lecture “Sozialismus” given to a large number of Austrian officers in Vienna in 1918. Weber 1984: 95–98, 624–627.

trollable, limitless domination by bureaucracy" (Loewenstein 1965: 37, 39).⁵⁷ In *Politik als Beruf*, Weber offers the opinion that there are only two choices: one choice is the democratic domination by bureaucrats, or what Weber calls the "Berufspolitiker" who lacks his or her "Beruf"; the other choice is the "Führerdemokratie mit 'Machine'" – in other words, the charismatic leader (Weber 1992b: 224). The question of which he endorses is a matter of dispute, but it is of no real concern here. However, it does seem as if he endorses the latter, but with significant reservations.

The effects of the war, the German revolutions of 1918–1919, and their aftermath prompted Weber to have new issues. He was concerned that the younger generation was being too greatly influenced by the new demagogues with their charisma. He was convinced that they were bowing down before two idols: "personalities" and "Erleben" ("experience" or "lived experience") (Weber 1992b: 84).⁵⁸ He was afraid that the younger generation was avoiding making the hard decisions required by life. That is why he ends *Wissenschaft als Beruf* with the insistence that they live up to the "demands of the day" by listening and following their own "Dämon" (Weber 1992b: 111; see also Weber 1984: 98). And, that is why he concluded *Politik als Beruf* with the insistence that only those with great patience and great understanding have the political "Beruf." The charismatic leader should and often does have these traits. But, Weber was keenly aware of the revolutionary nature of charisma.⁵⁹ The charismatic leader appears in revolutionary times (see Weber 1992b: 172). Furthermore, Weber knew that the leader kept his charismatic appeal only as long as he was or at least seemed to be successful (Weber 1988: 483).⁶⁰ The charismatic leader was extraordinary; he was

⁵⁷ J.P. Mayer calls attention to its importance by translating Weber's remarks from 1909 warning against bureaucratization. Mayer 1944: 94–95.

⁵⁸ There are true personalities but these are rare – he names Goethe. But, Weber's concern is about the false "personalities", hence the term "idol". For Weber's concerns about "personalities" see the Editors' Introduction. Weber 1992b: 29–42. "Erlebnis" here is not simply "experience" but a heightened if not artificial experience. Weber claims that previously this was called "Sensation."

⁵⁹ Bendix believes that charisma occurs most frequently during emergencies. Bendix 1977: 300. Mommsen holds that the pure form of charisma always depends on something abnormal. Mommsen 1974: 59. Schluchter maintains that when everyday life is radically torn apart, then the situation is ripe for people to seek the charismatic leader, the person with extraordinary capacities or competencies. Schluchter 1988: 538.

⁶⁰ Consider what he says in another work: "Die einfachste Frage: ob man einen bestimmten Gott oder Dämon überhaupt durch Zwang oder Bitte zu beeinflussen versuchen soll, ist zunächst lediglich eine Frage des Erfolgs. Wie der Zauberer sein Charisma, so hat der Gott seine Macht zu *bewähren*." ("The simplest question: if one should seek to influence a specific God or *Dämon* in general through compulsion or pleading, is first of all simply a question of success"). Weber 2001b: 161.

“das ewig Neue” (“the eternally new”) (Weber 1988: 481). And, he was fated to lose his charismatic power. In a passage that ranks along with a number of other masterful passages in his work, Weber writes:

Auf diesem Wege von einem stürmischen-emotionalen wirtschaftsfremden Leben zum langsamen Erstickungstode unter der Wucht materiellen Interessen befindet sich aber jedes Charisma in jeder Stunde seines Daseins, und zwar mit jeder weiteren Stunde in steigendem Maß.

(Each charisma finds itself on this way from a stormy-emotional economic-alien life to a slow suffocating death under the weight of material interests in each hour of its life and indeed with each growing hour in increasing measure.)

Weber 1976: 661 ⁶¹

Because of the personal, revolutionary, and temporary qualities of the charismatic leader, Weber became increasingly aware of and concerned for the power of the contemporary political leader. Unlike the traditional domination, which in the West had mostly passed away, and unlike the bureaucratic domination, which generally was very predictable, the charismatic leader was by his or her very nature “extraordinary” – hence the difficulties in foreseeing the duration and future consequences of charismatic domination/leadership.

One could speculate why Weber’s interest in the notion of charisma increased later in life, but it may have grown along with his greater recognition of and appreciation for life’s irrationalities. What is important, however, is to note that when he recognized its contemporary sociological importance and its future political implications, he discussed its essence and its effects in considerable detail. Although he preferred to discuss “ideal types”, he was also enough of an historian and realist to see the ramifications of the charismatic leader in religious circles, in social settings, as well as in political groups. Many of his ideas have received the recognition that they deserve and have become part of classical sociology. Weber’s carefully nuanced discussions of charisma should also be evaluated as another of his major contributions.

⁶¹ Although Weber wrote extensively on the problem of succession and evolution of charisma into bureaucratic or traditional *Herrschaft*, it is beyond the scope of this paper to take up that issue. Another question that cannot be discussed here regards Weber’s notion of the “plebiscitary leadership.”

References

- Adair-Toteff, Christopher (2002): "Max Weber's Mysticism". *Archives européennes de Sociologie*. XLIII (3): 339–353.
- Becker, Kurt E. (1988): *"Der römische Cäsar mit Christi Seele": Max Webers Charisma-Konzept. Eine systematisch kritische Analyse unter Einbeziehung biographischer Faktoren*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
- Bendix, Rheinhard (1977): *Max Weber. An Intellectual Portrait*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Bruun, H.H. (1972): *Science, Values and Politics in Max Weber's Methodology*. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.
- Hatscher, Christoph R. (2000): *Charisma und Res Publica: Max Webers Herrschaftssoziologie und die Römische Republik*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
- Hegel, G.W.F. (1952): *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Herausgegeben von Johannes Hoffmeister. Hamberg: Felix Meiner.
- Hegel, G.W.F. (1983): *Die Philosophie des Rechts. Die Mitschriften Wannemann (Heidelberg 1817/1818) und Homeyer (Berlin 1818/1819)*. Herausgegeben von Karl-Heinz Ilting. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Hennis, Wilhelm (1996): *Max Webers Wissenschaft von Menschen*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Honigsheim, Paul (1985): "Erinnerungen an Max Weber". In *Max Weber zum Gedächtnis*. Herausgegeben von René König und Johannes Winckelmann. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag. 161–271.
- Jaspers, Karl (1919): *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*. Berlin: Julius Springer.
- Kant, Immanuel (1911): *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. *Akademieausgabe*, Band 4.
- Kroll, Thomas (2001): "Max Webers Idealtypus der charismatischen Herrschaft und die zeitgenössische Charisma-Debatte." In *Max Webers Herrschaftssoziologie*. Herausgegeben von Edith Hanke und Wolfgang Mommsen. Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck. 47–72.
- Loewenstein, Karl (1965): *Max Webers staatspolitische Auffassungen in der Sicht unserer Zeit*. Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum Verlag.
- Mayer, J.P. (1944): *Max Weber and German Politics. A Study in Political Sociology*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Mommsen, Wolfgang (1974): *Max Weber: Gesellschaft, Politik, und Geschichte*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Mommsen, Wolfgang (2001): "Politik im Vorfeld der 'Hörigkeit der Zukunft': Politische Aspekte der Herrschaftssoziologie Max Webers". In *Max Webers Herrschaftssoziologie*. Herausgegeben von Edith Hanke und Wolfgang Mommsen. Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck. 303–319.
- Riesebrodt, Martin (2001): "Charisma". In *Max Webers "Religionssystematik"*. Herausgegeben von Hans G. Kippenberg und Martin Riesebrodt. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 151–166.
- Schluchter, Wolfgang (1988): *Religion und Lebensführung: Band 2: Studien zu Max Webers Religions- und Herrschaftssoziologie*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

- Schluchter, Wolfgang (1989): *Rationalism, Religion, and Domination. A Weberian Perspective*. Trans. by Neil Solomon. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Sica, Alan (1988): *Weber, Irrationality, and Social Order*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Strauss, Leo (1953): *Natural Right and History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Tönnies, Ferdinand (1909): *Die Sitte*. Frankfurt am Main: Rütten & Loening.
- Turner, Stephen P. (2003): "Charisma Reconsidered". In *Journal of Classical Sociology*. Vol. 3. No. 1: 5–26.
- Turner, Stephen P. and Factor, Regis A. (1994): *Max Weber. The Lawyer as Social Thinker*. London: Routledge.
- Weber, Marianne (1984): *Max Weber. Ein Lebensbild*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1968): *Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building*. Ed. with an Introduction by S.M. Eisenstadt. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Weber, Max (1976): *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Herausgegeben von Johannes Winckelmann. 5 Auflage. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1978): *Economy and Society*. Ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Weber, Max (1984): *Zur Politik im Weltkrieg. Schriften und Reden 1914–1918*. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang J. Mommsen in Zusammenarbeit mit Gangolf Hübinger. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. Band I/15.
- Weber, Max (1988): *Gesammelte Schriften zur Wissenschaftslehre*. Herausgegeben von Johannes Winckelmann. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1989): *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Konfuzianismus und Taoismus. Schriften 1915–1920*. Herausgegeben von Helwig Schmidt-Glintze in Zusammenarbeit mit Petra Kolonko. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. Band I/19.
- Weber, Max (1992a): *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Trans. by Talcott Parsons. London: Routledge.
- Weber, Max (1992b): *Wissenschaft als Beruf/Politik als Beruf*. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang J. Mommsen und Wolfgang Schluchter in Zusammenarbeit mit Birgitt Morgenbrot. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. Band I/17.
- Weber, Max (1993): *Landarbeiterfrage, Nationalstaat, und Volkswirtschaftspolitik*. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang J. Mommsen in Zusammenarbeit mit Rita Aldenhoff. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. Band I/4.
- Weber, Max (1994): *Max Weber. Briefe. 1909–1910*. Herausgegeben von M. Rainer Lepsius und Wolfgang J. Mommsen in Zusammenarbeit mit Birgit Rudhard und Manfred Schön. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. Band II/6.
- Weber, Max (1996): *Die protestantische Ethik und der "Geist" des Kapitalismus*. Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Klaus Lichtblau und Johannes Weiß. Weinheim: Beltz-Athenäum. 2. Auflage.
- Weber, Max (1998): *Max Weber. Briefe. 1911–1912*. Herausgegeben von M. Rainer Lepsius und Wolfgang J. Mommsen in Zusammenarbeit mit Birgit Rudhard und

- Manfred Schön. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. Band II/7.
- Weber, Max (2001a): *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Gemeinschaften*. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang J. Mommsen in Zusammenarbeit mit Michael Meyer. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. Band I/22–1.
- Weber, Max (2001b): *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Religiöse Gemeinschaften*. Herausgegeben von Hans G. Kippenberg in Zusammenarbeit mit Petra Schilm unter Mitwirkung von Jutta Niemeier. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. Band I/22–2.

Chapter Three

Max Weber's Pericles – The Political Demagogue

Much has been written about Max Weber's political thinking in general and about his notion of "Herrschaft" in particular.⁶² There have been continuous debates regarding his nationalism as well as wide-ranging discussions over his legacy. Scholars have noted the affinities between Weber and Machiavelli and they have shown the similarities between Weber and Nietzsche. However, few scholars have examined the part that the Greeks play in Weber's political thought. While Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle play small but crucial roles in Weber's work, the particular Greek that I will focus on is Pericles. At first glance it seems that Pericles has little impact on Weber's thinking, or, to put it differently, Weber scholars have been almost totally silent about Pericles.⁶³ But, I think that Pericles is especially important for Weber as the best type of political demagogue. Before attempting to justify this claim, I need to address two connected and interrelated possible problems. First, Weber appears to deny that Pericles possesses any legitimacy. In one passage Weber specifically calls Pericles' "authority" "illegitimate" and even "not legal." Second, as a "political demagogue" Pericles fits somewhat awkwardly in Weber's discussions of charisma. In Weber's opinion, Pericles' "authority" derives neither from performing miracles nor from winning battles. Instead, it stems primarily from his ability to make speeches. I think that these two problems of Pericles the political demagogue can be resolved. Moreover, I think that Weber came to appreciate Pericles and to consider him an "ideal type" of the consummate realist who is committed to political and cultural ideals. Before discussing these issues, it will be beneficial to set out briefly the part that the Greeks played in Weber's life and then his conceptions of Greek philosophy and Greek politics.

⁶² "Herrschaft" means "domination", "rule", or "authority." In Pericles' case "authority" seems preferable.

⁶³ There are a few exceptions. Wolfgang Mommsen quotes Weber's mention of him. Mommsen 1974: 202. Wilhelm Hennis refers to Fritz Baumgarten and two of Nietzsche's references. Hennis 2003: 27 and 34–35. Wilfried Nippel briefly discusses Pericles in relation to the city. Nippel 2001: 196–201.

Weber and the Greeks

Weber was trained in Roman law, he wrote extensively on Roman agrarian problems, and he often cited Roman writers. He wrote on ancient Judaism, ancient Christianity, and ancient Eastern religions. In contrast, Weber's writings on the ancient Greeks pale in comparison. In light of this, it is legitimate to ask: What did Weber know and think about the Greeks? We know from Marianne Weber that Helene, Max Weber's mother, was introduced to Homer early in her life and that his influence stayed with her into old age (Weber 1989: 513–514) and it appears that her interest in Homer was passed on to her son. In his early letters, Weber contrasts his favorable image of Greek authors with Roman writers. The fourteen year-old Weber wrote to his cousin Fritz Baumgarten that he prefers Homer to Virgil (Weber 1935: 10). He comments that of all of the writers that he has read, Homer is the best. While he concedes that it is not easy to establish why, he does suggest that it is Homer's great naturalness in describing heroic and tragic deeds (Weber 1935: 9). Weber also expresses a keen interest in Greek history. He notes that although Livy wrote four hundred years after Herodotus, they make the same mistakes but that Livy lacks the advantages that Herodotus has (Weber 1935: 11). Towards the end of the year Weber writes again to Fritz about his interests, indicating once more his fascination with Greek history – having waded through Curtius' three-volume *Griechische Geschichte*.⁶⁴

If Weber had virtually unreserved admiration for Homer and Herodotus, he had rather mixed responses to Socrates and Plato. He contends that Socrates gave the West one of the greatest gifts of knowledge – the concept (Weber 1992: 89). And, he draws attention to Plato's doctrine of the cave for its setting out of knowledge of “actual reality” in contrast to the play of shadows on the cave wall (Weber 1992: 88). But, in the same breath Weber claims that Plato's search for the “eternal truth” and “true being” was nothing more than the search that resulted in illusions (Weber 1992: 89). Because Plato's search was the first in a two thousand year-long search for various true entities (art, science, etc.), we can surmise that Weber not only holds Plato responsible for his own illusions (Weber 1992: 90–93). However, it is not Plato's cold truth that interests Weber as much as it is his less rational side. Weber speaks of the parable of the cave as a “wonderful picture” and he

⁶⁴ Weber 1935: 17. Hennis writes that Weber hurriedly read through the 2511 page work. This number is somewhat incorrect because it appears to refer to a later edition. However, the earlier edition is only slightly shorter. Hennis quotes Weber's letter to Fritz from 19 January 1879 where he referred to it as a “solid” book. Hennis 2003: 22.

draws attention to the “passionate enthusiasm” of the *Republic* (Weber 1992: 88–89). And, he insists that cool calculation alone is insufficient for results; it must be coupled with “intoxication” – Plato’s sense of “mania” (Weber 1992: 83). Weber has a more single-minded opinion of Aristotle: while Indians attempted to discover logic and in all of the Asian countries there were doctrines of states, it was Aristotle who conceptualized and systematized political philosophy (Weber 1920: 2 and Weber 1992: 89). As for Thucydides, in the “Vorbemerkung” to the *Gesammelte Schriften zur Religionssoziologie* Weber maintains that it was Thucydides’ “pragmatic” approach to history that separated his work from all other attempts at history writing.

Weber, Thucydides, and History

While Weber had considerable interest in historical issues, he did not write simple histories.⁶⁵ Instead, he provided historical analyses as well as philosophy of history. He was more like Georg Simmel and Heinrich Rickert than Leopold von Ranke or Jacob Burckhardt. While Weber was always interested in history, it was never just for history’s sake; but rather, it was for what history could teach us. Thucydides, too, was not interested in history for merely history’s sake; he wished to discuss what it could teach the human race. Not only was he one of the “first” historians, but he was the first *philosopher* of history. Thucydides diminishes the impact of the Persian war by claiming that the Peloponnesian war, the one he is writing about, was the greatest of all wars (I: 1).⁶⁶ Not only does he discount the Persian war, he also dismisses Herodotus’ account of it. Whereas Herodotus was more interested in providing a poetic account, Thucydides insists that he is providing a true account (I: 20–21). Furthermore, he claims that his account will be useful for all time (I: 22). The question arises: does Herodotus offer an “artistic” story and Thucydides provides a “scientific account”? To give Weber’s response we should look at *Wissenschaft als Beruf*. There, Weber argues that there is a fundamental difference between art and science and this difference is based upon the notion of progress (Weber 1992: 85). In art there is no progress. Weber would not deny that there are artistic *trends* but he would deny that a Picasso is progressively better than a Rembrandt. In sci-

⁶⁵ This remark is not meant to denigrate Weber’s historical acumen. I only wish to point out that Weber’s interest was not merely historical but was broader. His two dissertations were legal histories, his early agrarian writings and his later Munich lectures were primarily economic.

⁶⁶ References to Thucydides are cited by conventional book and chapter.

ence there is progress. It is the nature of research to be “old” in fifty, twenty, or even five years. In this light Herodotus may provide the artistic story; but Thucydides’ work is neither art nor science. Furthermore, there are questions about whether Thucydides’ work intended to provide us with a discussion of the “causes” of the war. This is not the place to discuss whether he did or did not; but, it is the place to point out that F.M. Cornford is undoubtedly right to argue that we err if we try to impose our notion of “history writing” on Thucydides: “The time for investigating causes, and making hypothetical constructions was not yet” (Cornford: 1971: 76). What Thucydides did do was to discuss human nature and power in the war between the Athenians and the Spartans. Leo Strauss suggested that Thucydides studied “war writ large” and provided an account of “the eternal or permanent character of political life as such” (Strauss 1989: 81, 76). And, Thucydides discussed these issues both in terms of speeches (“logoi”) and events (“erga”).⁶⁷ We know from his account that he mostly refrained from making value judgments. However, we can tell that he thought that some events were good and some bad, and that some leaders were better than others (Strauss 1989: 85). To give a few examples: he condemned the Athenians’ Sicilian expedition and the destruction of Mytilene, but he supported the Athenian defense and goals.⁶⁸ He certainly disapproved of Cleon and largely disliked Alcibiades, but he had almost unconditional approval for Pericles.⁶⁹ As I will show later, Weber approved of Pericles for many of the same reasons that Thucydides did.

Weber, Pericles, and “Non-legitimate Authority”⁷⁰

The first difficulty to address is Weber’s remark about Pericles and non-legitimate authority. The passage in question runs as follows:

⁶⁷ Cornford 1971: 14 and 53. Beginning with Homer the Greeks tried to combine words and deeds. See Gomme 1945: II, 123.

⁶⁸ In almost all cases I write of the Athenians and the Spartans. I follow M.I. Finley who does not speak of Athens and Sparta but of people. His argument is that the *polis* was not a territory but was a people, a community. Finley 1982: 3–4.

⁶⁹ See Erbse 1989: 88–89 and 115. Many commentators contrast Pericles and Cleon but a number also contrast Pericles and Alcibiades. Balot argues Thucydides insists that Nicias possessed Pericles’ “forethought” but lacked Pericles’ other virtues while Alcibiades “has charisma but lacks foresight”. Balot 2001: 164–165. It would be interesting to know what Weber’s views of Alcibiades were. The two references to him in *Die Stadt* are non-committal.

⁷⁰ “Non-legitimate authority” is a difficult concept. Here it means “no formal belief” in the right to rule; but it is still “authority.”

The actual political leader who was created by the actualized democracy, the demagogue, was in formal Periclean Athens routinely the leading military official. However, his real position of power rested not on law or office; but rather, thoroughly on personal influence and trust of the Demos. It was, therefore, not only not legitimate; but rather, not even legal (Sie war also nicht nur nicht legitim, sondern nicht einmal legal....). Weber 1999: 219.

Several initial points need to be made here. First, the "Sie" (feminine) ["It"] does not refer to Pericles or to the demagogue; but rather, to "the position of power" ("die Machstellung") (feminine). Second, the English translation given in the Roth and Wittich edition of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* skews the sense by placing "legitimate" and "legal" in quotation marks (Weber 1978: 1314). They were probably inclined to do this because the context makes clear that Weber's issue is with legality and not with personality.

In the previous two paragraphs Weber writes about the ancient "functionary" but concedes that this "official" is not an "official" in the modern sense of the word (Weber 1999: 219). He does not spell out what a modern "official" is here but he does so in several other places. The briefest is in *Politik als Beruf* where he describes the "legal" authority of competent officials who enforce rationally based rules (Weber 1992: 160). Weber repeats this in "Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft" but adds several points. The official is duty-bound to follow the legitimate rules and to apply them equally – "without regard for the person" and "without prejudice for or against" (Weber 1988a: 476). But, it is in two sections of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* that Weber really expands upon "legal authority." Early in the work Weber stresses both the modernity and the rationality of legal rules (Weber 1976: 124). He adds that these rules are "impersonal" and are to be applied by "professionals." These are highly trained and specialized individuals who serve in a specific hierarchy (Weber 1976: 126–127). Strict control and discipline are particular marks of legal authority (Weber 1976: 127). Later, Weber stresses the notion of the official's "calling" and how he, or she, can expect to be promoted based upon fair and open criteria (Weber 1976: 566). And, he stresses that "legal authority" is equality, rationality, and technicality (Weber 1976: 555, 569). Furthermore, the rules are relatively fixed and learnable (Weber 1976: 552). Weber clarifies that these rules are either an "administrative ordinance" ("Verwaltungsreglement") or "laws" ("Gesetze") (Weber 1976: 551). In either case, they are binding on all because of their rationality and their impartiality of the office holder.

Weber apparently thinks that he is entitled to hold the Greeks to his modern conception of law. On the one hand, he speaks of "general rules" and "laws", but also allows that the laws are not always made by a legal group.

Rather, they are imposed by an individual (Weber 1999: 218). But, he also says that a “law” (“Gesetz”) is a “nomos.” While there is much to support this interpretation, it also overlooks the sense of “custom” or “usage” that “nomos” has.⁷¹ In this sense “nomos” is closer to Weber’s notion of “traditional” authority, especially when in *Politik als Beruf* he speaks of “eternal laws” (“ewige Gestrigen”).⁷²

To summarize, Weber appears to claim that Pericles was not only not legitimate, but also not legal because of several factors. One, Greek “laws” lack the modern standards of rationality, impartiality, and equality and the position of power itself is neither legitimate nor legal. Second, Pericles’ authority is neither based upon laws or traditions, but is charismatic. However, each of these points can be addressed. If Weber did attempt to judge Pericles by modern legal theory, he was wrong to do so. Second, Weber’s remarks are not to be taken as his final words on Pericles. *Die Stadt* was published after Weber’s death in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* (See Weber 1999: 45). More importantly, it appears to have been composed sometime between 1911 and 1913. During this time Weber’s interest in charisma was relatively minor. However, his interest in charisma grew later, and especially after the war, with respect to Pericles.

Weber, Charisma, and Pericles

Weber’s interest in charisma stems from his interest in “Herrschaft.” But, for the most part, his concern is not with political charisma but primarily with religious charisma. In the “Zwischenbetrachtung” section of the *Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen*, where Weber differentiates between the ascetic and the mystic and he stresses the rationality of the former and the irrationality of the latter, he speaks of the charismatic qualities that the religious leader might possess.⁷³ Later, he writes of “holy charisma”, “reli-

⁷¹ Liddel and Scott 1968: 1180 and Finley 1982: 18.

⁷² Weber 1992: 160. The sense of “custom” is also found in Tönnies’ *Die Sitte*. Tönnies 1909. The notion of “eternal laws” is found in *Antigone*, 450–460. Cornford notes the similarity with the Athenians’ speech to the Melians. Cornford 1971: 182. Gomme discusses the “nomos” of the Athenians burying their dead. For Sophocles, the “unwritten laws” were “universal” and “divine”; but, for Thucydides they were Athenian customs. Gomme 1945: II, 113. Ehrenberg claims that for Sophocles the “unwritten laws” were divine and that they were “essential, fundamental, and universal”. For Pericles, they were not. Ehrenberg stresses Pericles’ rationality but insists that he is midway between the older generation’s religiosity and the Sophists’ amorality. Ehrenberg 1954: 31–32 and 41.

⁷³ Weber 1989: 483. But, he tends to assign charisma to the mystic rather than the ascetic. Weber 1989: 499.

gious charisma”, and the “absolute charisma of the virtuous religiosity” (Weber 1989: 493, 495–497 and Weber 2001b: 319). Weber lists a number of charismatic religious leaders: Buddha, Jesus, St. Francis (Weber 1989: 521). In particular, he emphasizes the “extraordinary” charisma of the New Testament “shepherds of the soul” (“Seelenhirten”) of which Jesus would be the most important (Weber 2001b: 355). In *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* he also includes the prophets (Weber 2001b: 247). In other works Weber adds that there is also “magical charisma” (Weber 1999: 500; Weber 2001a: 217; Weber 2001b: 122, 124, 318). Furthermore, Weber connects “speech charisma” of the sermon not just to the “magical” religions of China, but also to Western religions (Weber 2001b: 215). Granted, Weber’s interest is primarily in religious charisma; still, it is odd that Weber does not include Pericles in the list of charismatic speakers. It is also peculiar that in the few passages where Weber writes of charisma of the “warrior class” he does not include Pericles (Weber 2001a: 277). However, in a passage on charisma near the end of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Weber expressly writes of Pericles, claiming that his demagogic “Herrschaft” stems from the “charisma of spirit and speech,”⁷⁴ and there is the passage in *Politik als Beruf* where Weber again names Pericles as (charismatic) demagogue. But, before discussing that, we will examine some of the sources of Weber’s knowledge of Pericles.

Weber's Knowledge of Pericles

As Wolfgang Will writes in *Thukydides und Pericles*: “the way to Pericles is through Thucydides” (Will 2003: V). We know for certain that Weber’s knowledge of Thucydides and especially of Pericles comes from at least two sources: his reading of Curtius’ *Griechische Geschichte* and from Eduard Meyer’s *Geschichte des Altertums*. We know about Curtius from Weber’s early correspondence as noted above. We know about Meyer from Weber’s numerous citations from this work in *Die Stadt*. Someone might mention Weber’s disappointment with Meyer in the section “Zur Auseinandersetzung mit Eduard Meyer” from “Kritische Studien auf dem Gebiet der Kulturwissenschaftlichen Logik” and suggest that Meyer was not a good source. However, Weber makes it clear in the article that his disagreement is with Meyer’s historical methodology and not with his history. Weber’s

⁷⁴ “Charisma von Geist und Rede.” Weber 1976: 665. “Rede” can be translated as “rhetoric” but not here for two reasons. Rhetoric is Aristotelian so post-dates Pericles; but also “logos” is “speech”, “word”, or “account.”

multiple references to him in *Die Stadt* support this (Also see Tenbruck 1989: 234–257).

Curtius' *Griechische Geschichte* has many interesting qualities. It is full of facts and some figures, but it is written more as a story than as an account. Curtius' description of the war is accurate – the “bloody struggle” between the Athenians and the Spartans, but it is told as a narrative (Curtius 1888: II, 371). His account of the Athenian plague is similarly vivid (Curtius 1888: II, 409–411). But, we do not seem to learn very much about Pericles. However, we do learn from Curtius that while Pericles wanted peace, he also wanted the war (Curtius 1888: II, 390, 397). And, we learn that he had the Athenians' greatness as his goal (Curtius 1888: II, 419). But, how or why the Athenians followed him is not very clear from Curtius' history.

In contrast to Curtius, Eduard Meyer provided Weber not only with the history of the Peloponnesian war but also with a clear and compelling portrait of Pericles. Meyer's portrait of him would have been appealing to Weber: Pericles is depicted as being intelligent, intellectually curious, and resourceful.⁷⁵ He is portrayed as totally concerned with the twin issues of the Athenians' safety and prosperity. He is shown as being relatively indifferent to his own problems and concerns; and he is always regarded as having an incorruptible character (Gomme 1945: I, 67–68). He spent considerable effort to defend Athens by expanding its fortified walls and he spent considerable funds on building the Athenians' great treasures.⁷⁶ He was aristocratic by birth and cultured by inclination, but he was dedicated to the expansion of people's rights and to the strengthening of Athenian culture. He was noble in intentions, idealistic in outlook, yet fundamentally a realist (Meyer 1901: IV, 48–50). Overall, he was passionately committed to the greatness of the Athenians (Meyer 1901: IV, 8–9, and 51).

Weber and Pericles

Will argues that although Pericles died in the third year of the war, Pericles is the “true protagonist” of Thucydides' *History* as well as its center (Will 2003: 101, 183). The contradictory traits that endeared him to Thucydides are the same ones that Weber endorsed with respect to power: rationality,

⁷⁵ Pericles was on good terms with a number of playwrights and philosophers, especially Sophocles and Anaxagoras. Meyer 1901: IV, 48.; Hammond and Scullard 1970: 801.

⁷⁶ Meyer writes of Pericles' efforts to expand Cimon's walls. Meyer's detailed analysis of Pericles' economic programs would have intrigued Weber. Meyer 1901: IV, 21, 35–36 and 28, 34, and 38–39.

passion, moderation, ambition, self-control, realism, and idealism. Balot in particular emphasizes Pericles' virtues of rational judgment and courage as well as his sense of moderation (Balot 2001: 146–148, 153, 172–175). However, Weber is often of two minds about Pericles, and this is confirmed by those instances where he links Pericles and Cleon (Weber 1976: 665, and possibly Weber 1999: 298). But, in that important passage from *Politik als Beruf* Weber separates the two demagogues:

Since the time of the constitutional state and even since the time of democracy the leading politician is the “demagogue.” The unpleasant taste of the word should not allow us to forget that it was not Cleon who first carried this name; but rather, Pericles. (Weber 1992: 191).

Weber did not explain what he meant to his audience; he may have assumed that they were familiar with Cleon's reputation. But, in order to help explicate Pericles, it is worth while briefly to contrast Pericles' antipode.

In Thucydides' opinion, Cleon is irresponsible in regard to power. He is all-consumed with power. He is despotic, ruthless, and violent. He is vulgar and self-serving (Hammond and Scullard 1970: 251). Cleon did not want peace because the war would give him the fame and honor that he so selfishly needs (V, 16). Cleon did win backing from the lower classes because of his negative treatment of the nobility, but at the same time he seemed to despise those same lower class supporters (see Meyer 1901: IV, 327–329). While concerned with being a concerned political leader; he was, in fact, almost a despot. Not only did he mislead the Athenians regarding domestic issues, he tried to mislead the Athenians in foreign matters. There is no clearer evidence of this than his speech regarding the Mytilenians. Cleon originally insisted that the Athenians must kill the men and sell the women and children into slavery (III, 36). Out of a hasty sense of revenge the assembly agreed; but then they had second thoughts. Cleon spoke again but this time he argued that it would be best to slaughter all the women and children as well as all of the men (III, 37–40). He insisted that the Mytileneans were the most dangerous type of enemy because of their audacity; that Athens as the despotic empire that she was, needed to deal with them accordingly. And, this sort of vacillation showed why democracy was ineffective. Finally, the Athenians should not be moved by the terrible emotions of pity, sentimentality, and indulgence. For Cleon, this was simply a matter of the ruthless use of power. It is with reason that Thucydides names him the most violent man of Athens.⁷⁷ Given Thucydides' unflattering portrait of Cleon we are left wondering how it was that he managed to become the leader of the

⁷⁷ Hobbes refers to him as “a most violent sycophant in those times.” Schlatter 1975: 15.

Greeks (Will 2003: 81). But, Will also points out that maybe the differences between Cleon and Pericles may not have been as great as Thucydides would have liked to have believed (Will 2003: 86). This is not the place to argue how correct Thucydides' opinion of Cleon was, but it does seem accurate enough that we can assume that most all of Cleon's traits were the opposites of Pericles (and Weber's).

Thucydides sets out many of Pericles' positive traits concerning power and domination. Pericles is shown as being fair and objective, idealistic and realistic, and that he was totally concerned with the Athenians. To consider each one: Curtius notes that Pericles was clear-sighted about the war and that he fully recognized the importance of not overestimating the Athenians' strength or overestimating the Spartans' weaknesses (Curtius 1888: II, 383). His fairness is evident in his speech in response to the displeasure of the Athenians. There, he is willing to accept blame for some of the mistakes and misfortunes; but, he reminds the Athenians that they agreed that, since war was inevitable, they needed to fight. And, while he refuses to be held accountable for the plague that had ravished the city, he admits that some of his choices may not have been the best (II, 60–64). For Weber, the lack of responsibility ranked among the chief political sins. In particular, he accused both the German political leaders as well as the German revolutionaries of being dilettantes. And, he accused both of not taking their tasks seriously and accepting the responsibility that goes with their decisions.⁷⁸ In contrast, Pericles had taken responsibility for his decisions, even when they led to unfortunate results. For Weber, the “deadly enemy” of all political leaders is vanity, the lack of distance to one's self and to the cause (Weber 1992: 228). In the same speech, Pericles appealed to the Athenians' sense of patriotism, reminding them both of the greatness of the city as well as their duty to it. For Thucydides and others, there was no question that Pericles was totally devoted to the Athenians' welfare and safety (Curtius 1888: II, 397).

Weber's speeches contain a number of striking similarities to Pericles' “funeral speech”, both in style and substance. Like Pericles, Weber begins both *Wissenschaft als Beruf* and *Politik als Beruf* by asserting that the speech is bound to disappoint. In Pericles' case, he maintains that the heroes' deaths confer sufficient honor on them. But, he also insists that one man's words

⁷⁸ Weber 1992: 227–229. Consider Weber's claim about the “horrible incapacity” of the German diplomats and the “hysterical vanity of the monarchy”. Weber 1921: 458 and 467. Weber calls the monarchy “crowned dilettantes” and he refers to the “Leibknechtian band” as “mob rule” (“Ochlocraty”). Weber 1921: 470 and 482. Consider also his warnings about the recklessness in increasing submarine warfare. Weber 1984: 115–125.

can never fully convey the sense of sacrifice and honor that they deserve (II, 35). In Weber's two speeches, he intends to disappoint the audience by intentionally refusing to speak about the current "scientific" and especially "political" situations (Weber 1992: 71, especially 157). Pericles believed in Athens' greatness and he attributes much of this to its democracy, the rule of the many. He emphasized the Athenians' freedom, with people having the opportunity to hold office regardless of their lack of wealth. And, he stressed the Athenians' freedom in their private lives where each is able to live as he chooses. This freedom, however, is not license any more than democracy is anarchy. Rather, Athenians not only obey the magistrates and the written laws, but the unwritten laws as well (II, 37–38). Further, Athenians possess the right sense of balance and this manifests itself in several ways. Athenians spend the proper proportions of effort on business as well as on leisure. Athenians possess great wealth; however, it is for use and not for show. And, Athenians are noted for great generosity, but this originates in liberality rather than from expediency (II, 40). Proper balance shows too, in the Athenians' approach to education and culture; it is neither too "feminine" nor is it too "masculine." Unlike the Spartans, who devote all of their education to instilling courage, the Athenians do not need to do so, because, as Pericles maintains, Athenians are by "nature" ("physis") courageous (II, 39). It is, however, in the use of power that the Athenians show their greatest sense of balance. While they may act with daring, they act at the same time out of deliberation (II, 40). Pericles acknowledged the laws of nature and spoke of the possible decline of Athens; nonetheless, he acknowledged and accepted that Athens was a great power and as such must use her power wisely. Weber also had a sense and an appreciation of the central role that Germany must play in world politics. In "Zwischen zwei Gesetzen" Weber differentiates Germany from the smaller countries like Switzerland and Denmark. They do not have the same responsibility towards the future that Germany has (Weber 1984: 195–196). Weber claims that like Greece, Germany is a "Machtstaat" (Weber 1984: 163, 192), but this does not mean that Greece (or Germany) would advocate the indiscriminate or ruthless use of power that Cleon endorses. If Cleon was calculating, it was only to see what he could get for himself, to satisfy his vanity. Pericles is the opposite in this regard. He had what Weber would consider the proper "coolness" (or "distance") to the situation. This is Pericles' ability to see the issue clearly and objectively, regardless whether it is his own city or his enemies'. Thucydides himself was a "rationalist" and he appreciated Pericles' ability to reason. Because of Athens' greatness under Pericles, she was a "school" for all of Greece (II, 41). In summing up Pericles' rule, Thucydides praises it for its wisdom and its jus-

tice (II, 65). In commenting on this speech, Busolt maintained that “Thucydides-Pericles” has set out the “essence” of the Athenian state, had characterized its intellectual and moral freedom, and all in all, painted an ideal picture (Busolt 1967: III, 939). For Weber, there cannot be any “essence” of a state any more than there can be one of a “people.” But, unlike Pericles, Weber clearly questioned the relationship between politics and morality. Then, as in *Politik als Beruf*, Weber offered a compelling ideal picture of the true political leader. Thucydides intended to *represent* the ideal political leader in the person of Pericles, Weber intended to *conceptualize* the ideal political person in *Politik als Beruf*.

Thucydides’ portrait of Pericles is as flattering as that of Cleon is unflattering. But, Curtius also points out that Pericles was by no means universally loved. The property-holders felt that Pericles threatened their wealth; the priests felt that Pericles threatened their power with his emphasis on free-thinking; and the aristocrats felt that Pericles threatened their existence by his efforts to expand democracy (Curtius 1888: II, 389). Pericles’ enemies first attacked him indirectly, going after his philosopher and artist friends as well as after Aspasia. But, then they accused him of misusing state money and finally they convinced the Athenians to hold him accountable for all of their misfortunes. But, Pericles was able to persevere, in large measure because of his positive qualities.

Conclusion

We know that the second half of the nineteenth century saw a great resurgence of interest in ancient Greece. And, we know directly from Weber himself that the Greeks played a small, but important, role in his thinking. Unfortunately, until there is a definitive biography we will not know how much Pericles influenced Weber. However, I think that Weber’s later references suggest that he viewed the importance of the state and the role of the statesman in much the same way as Pericles did. Weber’s reactions to the loss of the war and the ensuing revolutions prompted him to reevaluate the role of the charismatic/demagogic leader. Because there were too many dilettantes pretending to be political leaders, Weber called for sober and responsible people to step forward to become the new leaders. In the last several years of Weber’s life, the portrait of Pericles came to be one of the portraits of the real and positive political demagogue. Hobbes found in Thucydides someone who helped him become one of the great political philosophers; maybe it is not too much to claim that Weber found in Pericles someone who

helped him to become one of the great political thinkers (Schlatter 1975: xi, xxvii–xxviii).

References

- Balot, Ryan K. (2001): *Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Breuer, Stefan (1994): *Bürokratie und Charisma: Zur Politischen Soziologie Max Webers*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Busolt, Georg (1967)[1893–1904]: *Griechische Geschichte bis zur Schlacht bei Chaeroneia*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag.
- Classen, Johannes (1879): *Thukydides Erklärt*. Band I. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung. Dritte Auflage.
- Cornford, Francis M. (1971)[1907]: *Thucydides Mythistoricus*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Curtius, Ernst (1888): *Griechische Geschichte*. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung. Siebte Auflage.
- Erbse, Hartmut (1989): *Thukydides-Interpretationen*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Ehrenberg, Victor (1954): *Sophocles and Pericles*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Finley, I.M. (1982): *Authority and Legitimacy in the Classical City-State*. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.
- Gomme, A.W. (1945–1981): *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hammond, N.G.L. and Scullard, H.H. eds. (1970): *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Second edition.
- Hennis, Wilhelm (2003): *Max Weber und Thukydides*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Liddell, Henry George and Scott, Randall (1968)[1843]: *A Greek-English Lexicon*. Revised by Sir Henry Jones with Robert McKenzie. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 9th ed.
- Meyer, Eduard (1901): *Geschichte des Altertums*. Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger.
- Mommsen, Wolfgang (1974)[1959]: *Max Weber und die Deutsche Politik. 1890–1920*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Nippel, Wilfried (2001): "Die antike Stadt in Max Webers Herrschaftssoziologie." In *Max Webers Herrschaftssoziologie*. Herausgegeben von Edith Hanke und Wolfgang J. Mommsen. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 189–202.
- Schlatter, Richard (1975): *Hobbes' Thucydides*. Edited with an Introduction by Richard Schlatter. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Strauss, Leo (1989): "Thucydides: The Meaning of Political History." In *The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 72–102.
- Tenbruck, Friedrich H. (1989): "Max Weber and Eduard Meyer." In *Max Weber and his Contemporaries*. Edited by Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel. London: Unwin and Hyman. 234–267.

- Thukydides (1917): *Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Krieg*. Translated by Theodor Braun. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag.
- Thukydides (1919): *Thucydides*. Translated by C. Forster Smith. London: William Heinemann.
- Tönnies, Ferdinand (1909): *Die Sitte*. Frankfurt am Main: Anstalt Rütten & Loening.
- Weber, Marianne (1989): *Max Weber. Ein Lebensbild*. München: Piper Verlag.
- Weber, Max (1920): *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck)
- Weber, Max (1935): *Jugendbriefe*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1976)[1921]: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Herausgegeben von Johannes Winckelmann. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Fünfte Auflage.
- Weber, Max (1978): *Economy and Society*. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Weber, Max (1984): *Zur Politik im Weltkrieg*. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang J. Mommsen und Gangolf Hübinger. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe I/15*.
- Weber, Max (1988a)[1922]: *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1988b): *Zur Neuordnung Deutschlands: Schriften und Reden 1918–1920*. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang J. Mommsen und Wolfgang Schwentker. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe I/16*.
- Weber, Max (1989): *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Konfuzianismus und Taoismus*. Herausgegeben von Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer mit Petra Kolonko. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe I/19*.
- Weber, Max (1992): *Wissenschaft als Beruf/Politik als Beruf*. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang J. Mommsen und Wolfgang Schluchter mit Birgitt Morgenbrod. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe I/17*.
- Weber, Max (1999): *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Die Stadt*. Herausgegeben von Wilfried Nippel. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe I/22–5*.
- Weber, Max (2001a): *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Gemeinschaften*. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang J. Mommsen und Michael Meyer. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe I/22–1*.
- Weber, Max (2001b): *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Religiöse Gemeinschaften*. Herausgegeben von Hans G. Kippenberg mit Petra Schilm und Jutta Niemeier. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe I/22–2*.
- Will, Wolfgang (2003): *Thucydides und Pericles: Der Historiker und sein Held*. Bonn: Dr. Rudolf Halbelt.

Chapter Four

Max Weber's Notion of Asceticism

The notion of asceticism is one of the key concepts in Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. However, in neither the 1904–1905 articles nor in the 1920 version of this work did Weber offer anything constituting a full account of what he specifically meant by the notion of asceticism. Furthermore, he never provided a complete or a definitive account of asceticism in any other work. Instead, Weber offers us a contrast between asceticism and mysticism; first, in *Economic Ethics of World Religions* and second, in *Economy and Society*. Given the importance that the notion of asceticism plays throughout many of Weber's writings, at first glance it seems surprising so little attention has been devoted to it. But, upon further reflection, this lack of attention is not so puzzling. First, Weber's account is neither conceptually complete, nor is it historically accurate. Second, he places importance on the theological aspects of the notion of asceticism; and Weber scholars seem hesitant to address the theology in his works. In what follows I hope to rectify this situation by examining what Weber means by the notion of asceticism and by considering the role that it plays in his thinking.

First, I discuss Weber's initial and rather marked contrast between asceticism and mysticism. Second, I provide a brief history of the notion of asceticism from its practice by the early Christian ascetics to that of the early medieval monks. In so doing I will show how much Weber's concept of asceticism conforms to, and departs from, the accounts offered by his theological contemporaries. Third, I explain how Weber, in discussing a number of critical reform movements, moves away from his original distinction between the "inner-wordly" ascetic and "world-fleeing" mystic. Finally, I conclude with a discussion concerning Weber's views regarding his Lutheran background and his Calvinist inclinations and I link them to his political and private views of asceticism.

Asceticism

In the *Protestant Ethic* Weber emphasizes the importance that the role of asceticism plays in the rise of Western capitalism. But, its importance is not limited just to the economic sphere. For Weber, not only modern capitalism, but all of modern culture was founded on the notion of “rational life-conduct” (“rationale Lebensführung”). This “rational life-conduct” is based upon the “idea of ‘calling’” (“Berufsidee”) which, in turn, was “born out of the spirit of *Christian asceticism*.”⁷⁹ Given its importance, it is surprising that in the *Protestant Ethic* Weber does not offer an account of asceticism. And, just as surprising, scholars have not devoted a great deal of attention to Weber’s notion of asceticism.⁸⁰ Instead, they have asked whether Weber’s thesis that modern capitalism can be traced back to early Protestantism is correct. I will not enter into this lengthy debate. Instead, I will focus solely on the notion of asceticism and on what Weber meant by it.

“Asceticism” is not easy to define so it is unsurprising that Weber does not attempt to provide a specific definition of it. (Seeberg, 1897: 139–140 and Lohse, 1969: 11–13). Rather, what Weber does provide is a contrast between asceticism and mysticism.⁸¹ This distinction is merely suggested in the first edition of the *Protestant Ethic*. However, in the second edition Weber emphasizes its complete opposition. “*Either*” it is the mystic’s feeling that he is a ‘vessel’ in which he receives God; “*or*” it is the ascetic’s feeling that he is a “tool” of God’s power.⁸² The mystic seeks the peace of contemplation in order to receive God into one’s soul and to find the “*unio mystica*” – that is, the “union with God” (Weber, 1991: 129). The defining trait of the mystic is passivity. In contrast, the defining trait of the ascetic is activity (Weber, 1991: 130). Weber points to Luther’s “passivity” and contrasts that with Calvin’s relentless “activity” (Weber, 1991: 130). However, Weber’s more extensive treatments of the contrast between asceticism and mysticism are found in the section “Religious Communities” in *Economy and Society* and in the “Intermediate Reflection” (“*Zwischenbetrachtung*”) section of *The Economic Ethics of the World Religions*. In the second work, Weber refers to them “as polar concepts” (“als polare Begriffe”) (Weber, 1989: 482). He uses

⁷⁹ “– geboren aus dem Geist der *christlichen Askese*”. Weber, 1991. Weber’s emphasis.

⁸⁰ Two major exceptions are Hubert Treiber and Lutz Kaelber. But, neither Treiber nor Kaelber focus on asceticism per se. See Treiber, 2001 and Treiber, 2005: 124–129; and Kaelber, 1998.

⁸¹ Weber’s treatment of mysticism has gone unnoticed as much if not more so than his discussion of asceticism. The two exceptions are Krech, 2001 and Adair-Totef, 2002.

⁸² Weber, 1905 and Weber, 1991: 130. “Werkzeug” can mean “tool” or “instrument”. The emphasis on either/or is Weber’s.

these concepts as ideal types in order to set out the differences as clearly as possible. However, he immediately backs away from this stark contrast first, by asking us to regard them “*as*” polar concepts and second, by placing both “ascetic” and “mystic” in quotation marks. Weber is not concerned with all types of the ascetic; rather, he focuses on what he refers to as the “inner-world ascetic”. This distinction is critical but for now we can concentrate specifically on the traits of this type of ascetic. As he did in the second edition of the *Protestant Ethic*, so in the “Zwischenbetrachtung” and in the “Religiöse Gemeinschaften” Weber maintains that the ascetic feels himself to be God’s “tool” (Weber, 1989: 482 and Weber, 2001: 326). But, here Weber expands on this: the ascetic does not act of his own choosing; rather, he acts with the “consciousness that God directs his action” (Weber, 2001: 320, see also 323). As he acts according to God’s commands, he is convinced that he is “God’s warrior” (“Gotteskämpfer”) (Weber, 1989: 494; see also Weber, 2001: 329). And, the ascetic believes that his actions are in accordance with God’s inscrutable plan. Furthermore, since he is acting according to God’s wishes, the consequences of his actions are not his own but are those of God. Weber quotes: “the Christian does right and leaves the consequences to God” (Weber, 1989: 498–499 and Weber, 2001: 328). And, for this type of ascetic, there is no issue regarding the possibility of conflict between earthly or heavenly powers because “man must obey God more than men” (Weber, 1989: 498, also 495). Finally, the ascetic sees every struggle as a means of gaining assurance of God’s grace (Weber, 2001: 324).

In contrast, the mystic does not believe that he was put upon earth to do battle for God. Instead, he seeks to minimize the world’s impact on his life; he attempts to divest himself from everything that reminds him of the world. As Weber explains, it is “the absolute minimization of all inner and outward activity” to seek God (Weber, 2001: 323). The mystic does not wish to do, but to think; he does not want to act, but to contemplate. But, even this is too much; as Weber says the mystic does not even want to engage in contemplation. Instead, the mystic wants to achieve absolute stillness. The mystic believes that he must be absolutely quiet so as to hear God (Weber, 1989: 482 and Weber, 2001: 323).

Weber’s primary concern is with the “inner-wordly” ascetic and not with the “other-worldly” mystic. Weber sets out this contrast between the former who is “world-rejecting” and the latter who is “world-fleeing.” “World-rejection” (“Weltablehnung”) is, as Stefan Breuer rightly notes, a key concept (Breuer, 2001: 227). It is, however, a concept that is difficult to grasp. Weber places most of his emphasis on the *activity* of the “world-rejecting” ascetic and how he looks forward to the “always new victory” (Weber, 2001: 324).

Weber also emphasizes the purposefulness of the “world-rejecting” ascetic and contrasts that with the “world-fleeing” contemplative mystic. Weber further underscores the “radical opposition” by pointing to the work that the “inner-worldly” ascetic does in accordance with his “worldly calling” (Weber, 1989: 482). However, as Breuer suggests the proper contrast should be between “world-affirming” and “world-denying” and he directs us to the article on the topic in the first edition of *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Breuer, 2001: 238, note 28). There, Hermann Mulert contrasts the “innocent enjoyment” of the richness and fullness of the world with the denial and the rejection of it (Mulert, 1913: 1914). The “world-rejecting” ascetic refuses to enjoy the richness of the world and instead focuses his attention on his divinely-assigned task. Furthermore, the “inner-worldly” ascetic does not totally reject human drives; rather, he recognizes them as part of God’s plan. Thus, he sees the problem with sexual lust, but recognizes that “sober” procreation is God-ordained. And, while one must not enjoy the pleasures that come from wealth, one can appreciate it as a sign of God’s blessing and as an indication that one is a member of the elect (Weber, 2001: 322). But, Weber notes that the mystic objects to this “vain self-righteousness” – and in turn the ascetic accuses the mystic of “self-enjoyment” (Weber, 2001: 483). Yet, Weber himself notes that the stark contrast between the “world-rejecting” ascetic and the “world-fleeing” mystic begins to melt when one considers the “world-fleeing” ascetic (Weber, 1989: 482). Perhaps more importantly, in his reply to his critic Felix Rachfahl, Weber tried to defend his specific notion of asceticism and to spell out the differences between the Catholic and Protestant ascetics. Weber appeared to realize that his discussion about the ascetic Protestant was somewhat unconventional and as a result he repeatedly insisted that he was using the term “in my sense” (Weber, 1987: 154, 160, 314,315). Furthermore, he agreed that there were similarities between the Catholic monk and the Protestant ascetic: both “practiced” the strict delineation of time, the emphasis on work, and the rejection of that which binds humans together, i.e. friendships. But, Weber also maintained that the differences between the Catholic monk and the Protestant ascetic were easy to set out. The monk practices chastity but the Protestant ascetic also practices it in marriage. By this Weber insists that all desires are suppressed and sexual relations are restricted solely to the “rational natural purpose” of producing offspring (Weber, 1987: 314). Finally, Weber claims that there are three fundamental differences between the “world-fleeing” Catholic monk and the “world-rejecting” Protestant ascetic: the latter rejects the former’s inclination to irrational ascetic means, the latter rejects the desire for contemplation, and above all, the latter turns “in-

ner-worldly”, that is, to one’s family and one’s vocation (Weber, 1987: 315). To understand Weber’s own notion of Protestant asceticism it is helpful to look at origins and its history.

History of Asceticism

Although Weber is credited with the discussion concerning the “inner-worldly” ascetic it was his friend and colleague Ernst Troeltsch who devoted considerable effort to uncovering the origins of the term “ascetic.” Troeltsch was correct to note that the role that asceticism played in the Church was important and long lasting. However, his claim that its origins are found in the philosophies of the Cynics and Stoics is somewhat questionable (Troeltsch, 1925: 96–97). While it is true that the Cynics “saw rigorous self-denial” as a pathway to happiness; its origins are found elsewhere (Ware, 1995: 3–4). Its origins were also noted in an article “Askese” by Reinhold Seeberg, which Weber cited in the *Protestant Ethic* (Weber, 1905: 28–29, note 56 and Weber, 1990: 215, note 78). In this article that is included in the third edition of the *Realencyklopädie für Protestantische Theologie und Kirche* Seeberg states that the philosophical use of the term was based upon the athletic term for “practice” (Seeberg, 1897: 134). This notion is found earlier; in his *Kritische Geschichte der Askese* (1863) Otto Zöckler translated “askesis” as “Uebung” (“practice”).⁸³ And, this claim was echoed by Karl Heussi, one of the greatest German authorities on “asceticism.”⁸⁴ In his article “Askese: II. Kirchengeschichtlich” for the first edition of *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* Heussi wrote that it originally meant the athletes’ practice of preparation for competition.⁸⁵

Weber was following his theological contemporaries when he emphasized the practice of asceticism. However, when he associated asceticism with the Calvinists he no longer appeared to follow them; because they linked it to the early Christian monks.⁸⁶ The origin of the monks is a much disputed

⁸³ The Oxford *Greek-English Lexicon* defines “askesis” as “exercise, training, practice”. Liddell-Scott, 1978: 267. Also see Derrett, 1995: 88.

⁸⁴ Heussi (1877- 1961) was Professor of Church History at Jena (1924–1953). His writings on monks and asceticism include Heussi 1908, 1912, 1927, 1930, and 1936. His *Kompendium* which was first published in 1909 had, by 1981, gone through sixteen editions.

⁸⁵ Heussi, 1908: 727. This emphasis on athletic preparation is also found later in the article on asceticism in the second edition of *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Pfister, 1927: 520).

⁸⁶ Zöckler, 1863: 4, 56; Seeberg, 1897: 136–137; and Mulert, 1913: 1915. Troeltsch wrote approvingly of Zöckler’s book. Troeltsch, 1912: 98, note 46.

topic, as Heussi admitted (Heussi, 1933: 104). And, it is a complex topic because there are two fundamentally different types. First, there are the “anchorites” who lived alone. The German word “Mönch” and the English word “monk” are both derived from the Latin word “monachus” – meaning “alone” (Bertholet, 1930: 130, Heussi, 1936: 54). These monks were referred to as either “hermits” or “anchorites” – i.e., the ones who “withdrew” from the world. These “anchorites” were the most “radical” of the monks (Heussi, 1933: 103). They regarded the human world as a place of temptation and human desire as something to be overcome. They were the ones who fled the human world in order to create a “special world” (Heussi, 1912: 427 and Heussi, 1936: 40, 53, 55). This was not just Heussi’s contention; the famous Protestant theologian (and Weber’s friend) Adolf Harnack referred to this in his “Das Mönchtum, seine Ideale und seine Geschichte”.⁸⁷ Heussi, Harnack, and others described how the early monks went out and lived their ascetic lives in the deserts of Egypt (Heussi, 1933: 103, Heussi, 1936: 111, Harnack, 1904: 97, Völter, 1900: 28, and Grützmaker, 1903: 228–231). They rejected everything worldly – possessions, marriage, personal honor, and even their personal will – in order to live a life in the service of God (Völter, 1900: 9, Harnack, 1904: 83; and see Grützmaker, 1903: 215). These ascetics were called “desert wanderers” or “desert ascetics” (Heussi, 1936: 207–208). They withdrew from the human world into the desert and into their own “special world”. This reflected their belief in different types of dualism: the “world of Satan” versus the “world of the Father”, spirit versus flesh and light versus darkness (Völter, 1900: 31; Harnack, 1904: 90, and Pfister, 1927: 571). In particular, they believed that they were in a fundamental struggle with their own bodies; for the body was regarded as an enemy to the “seeker of God” (Zöckler, 1863: 17 and Pfister, 1927: 571). Seeberg referred to this as a “moral struggle to overcome the flesh” (Seeberg, 1897: 135–136). This moral struggle was really with Satan and his demons (Heussi, 1936: 46, 111). They were the tyrants who plagued the ascetics and drove them to do things against their will (Weiß, 1898: 411). Accordingly, the early ascetic needed to do two things: “to meet God and to fight the demons” (Ware, 1995: 7, 14, note 30). Weber’s account departs from his theological contemporaries when he insists that it is not the ascetic but the mystic who desires the union with God. And, his account also breaks from those of Seeberg, Heussi, and other ex-

⁸⁷ Harnack first published this work in 1880 and then republished it in his 1904 collection *Reden und Aufsätze* (1904), 1904: 99. Troeltsch cites Harnack’s article a number of times. Troeltsch, 1912: 96, note 46a, 231, note 106, and 238, note 110. Daniel Völter and Karl Müller also call it a “Sonderwelt”. Völter, 1900: 31 and 128; Müller, 1906: 205.

perts in that Weber ignores the ascetic's struggles with the devil and his minions.

Adolf Harnack, in his *Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten*, gave one of the best accounts of the ascetics and their struggles against demons.⁸⁸ Although demons and temptation are found in the Old and New Testaments, the belief in them spread in the first three centuries (Harnack, 1906: 108). The belief in the existence of demons was extensive and the recognition of their great powers was widespread. The power of the demons was the power of darkness (Harnack, 1906: 110–111, Weinel, 1899: 2, 22–24). Even if God was responsible for the creation of the world, it has become hell and is filled with demons (Harnack, 1906: 113). To fight these demons demanded extreme vigilance and unwavering faith in God (Weinel, 1899: 15). This involved fasting and praying as well as walking naked or barefoot in the wilderness (Seeberg, 1897: 136–137). Völter emphasized the powerful individuality of these early ascetics; they followed no rules and belonged to no church (Völter, 1900: 9).

Around the end of the second century and the beginning of the third, these ascetics began to stop their desert wanderings (Völter, 1900: 4, 17, 30, Harnack, 1904: 100–101, Heussi, 1933: 103). More importantly, rather than living alone (“kata monas”) or in small colonies in the desert, these ascetics began to live together within walled communities (Heussi, 1930: 135). By the beginning of the fourth century monks lived the communal life (“koinos bios”) (Heussi, 1936: 115). Thus, the name for the second and later type of monks was “cenobite.” But, it is misleading to think that the monks were living together as part of the community of the Church. As Harnack noted, the monks continued to “flee the world”; but they also fled the increasingly powerful “world-Church” (Harnack, 1904: 101). The new monks still despised the world, but they were becoming increasingly distrustful of the Church's growing institutional power (Grützmann, 1903: 226). Moreover, they believed that the Church's increasing reliance on dogma conflicted with the highest goal of the Gospel: to have a “perception” (“Anschauung”) of God (Harnack, 1904: 102). Seeberg emphasized that this desire to be close to God was closely connected with the ascetic practices of Christian activity (Seeberg, 1897: 139–140). And, what Seeberg also stressed was the growing “regulation” governing the Christian activities of fasting, waking, and praying (Seeberg, 1897: 139). Meditation, sacraments, and prayer were not institutional but individual; nonetheless the new monks strove towards an ascet-

⁸⁸ Weber was well aware of Harnack's book; his letter from 1906 was to thank Harnack for it. Weber, 1990: 34.

ic life that “functioned more steadily, healthily, and regularly” (Seeberg, 1897: 141, 142). It was necessary to establish some order because the ascetics no longer lived independent lives in the wilderness, but were now beginning to live together (Grützmacher, 1903: 215). Between the fourth and seventh centuries some 30 books were written on how to govern and how to act in monasteries (Prinz, 1980: 35, McGinn, 1999: 27). But, it was Benedict of Nursia who in the sixth century provided the monks with his *Regula* (Rule). And, it was Benedict who emphasized that the monks should not, and could not, devote their entire day to prayer. Instead, Benedict insisted that it was the monks’ duty to work. Heussi had insisted that from the time that the ascetic monks left the desert and moved into monasteries, they combined the life of contemplation with the life of work. While the monk was supposed to pray, he was also supposed to work with his hands (Heussi, 1936: 214–220). Whereas Weber insisted that the mystic lived only the life of contemplation, Heussi and others showed that the vast majority of the medieval monks not only lived the “vita contemplativa” but also lived the “vita activa” – the active life of work (Heussi, 1936: 214). It was Benedict who codified this dual life and helped begin the first of the four major reform movements that Weber mentions in the *Protestant Ethic*.

Reform Movements

The four major reform movements that Weber mentions are the Benedictine, the Cluniac, the Franciscan, and the Jesuit. Weber briefly discusses three of them in a crucial passage in the *Protestant Ethic*. Because of the importance of this passage it is worth quoting in full:

In the Middle Ages the Christian ascetic already displays its rational characteristic in its highest form of appearance. The world historical significance of the monastic way of life in the Occident in opposition to the Oriental monasticism rests on this. In principle, its significance is already present in the Rule of Saint Benedict, still more by the Cluniac and Cisterciensien, and finally most specifically in the Jesuits who were emancipated from the aimless world-flight and the virtuoso self mortification.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ “Die christliche Askese trägt ja in ihren höchsten Erscheinungsformen bereits im Mittelalter durchaus diesen rationale Charakter. Die welthistorische Bedeutung der mönchischen Lebensführung im Occident in ihrem Gegensatz zum orientalischen Mönchtum beruht auf ihm. Sie ist im Prinzip schon in der Regel des heiligen Benedikt, noch mehr bei den Cluniensern und Cisterziensern, am entscheidensten endlich bei den Jesuiten, emanzipiert von planloser Weltflucht und virtuosenhafter Selbstquälerei.” Weber, 1905: 28. The changes that Weber made for the 1920 version are minimal; the most significant perhaps being that this was

Weber then adds the fourth: St. Francis and the Tertiary Order (Weber, 1905:30; Weber, 1991:136). This reciting of the Benedictine, Cluniac, Franciscan, and Jesuit reform movements is repeated in the “Religiöse Gemeinschaften” section of *Economy and Society* (Weber, 2001: 337–338). That this is found in both his earliest writings on medieval Christianity as well as his later ones, leads one to believe that Weber did not change his views on these reforms in ascetic monasticism. In Weber’s view, each of these four movements reflected an increasing emphasis on rationality. But, each also exhibited a growing emphasis on dissatisfaction with the Church. And, each prompted both a re-examination of the monks’ lives and a re-evaluation of the monks’ views of the “outside world”. Towards the end of the *Protestant Ethic* Weber wrote that “the ascetics left their monastic cells” (“die Askese aus den Mönchszellen”) and carried their calling into the world (Weber, 1991: 188). To understand Weber’s remarks it is important to briefly discuss these monastic reforms.

As noted above, Benedict’s *Regula* was not the first attempt at codification of the monks’ way of life and there is no doubt that he drew from earlier works. However, there is little disagreement that the *Regula Benedicti* was not merely a compilation. Instead, scholars believe that it is a “closed work” with a single purpose – that of the monk’s complete devotion of his life to God (Lohse, 1969: 227, 229). Furthermore, there is general agreement on Benedict’s importance. Bernard McGinn maintains that “the *Regula Benedicti* is the single most important document in the history of Western monasticism, and arguably the most significant text from the whole late antique period.” (McGinn, 1999: 27). Bernhard Lohse argued that one cannot understand the entire Western tradition of monks without understanding this work (Lohse, 1969: 226). And, Harnack said that it was nothing short of revolutionary (Harnack, 1904:118).

It was revolutionary in large measure because, in Weber’s view, Benedict’s *Rule* showcased the “sobering rationalism” in the ascetic propensities (Weber, 2001: 337). Weber argued that the Roman influence pushed away the irrational and emotional emphasis on ecstasy and replaced it with the “strict, matter-of-fact, rationalism” that became the enduring trait of Western Christianity (Weber, 2001: 337). Benedict’s main concern is to order his own community (McGinn, 1999:28). In this vein, scholars correctly stress Benedict’s demand for strict obedience (See *Rule*, Chapter V). However, Harnack points out that Benedict’s greatness was not limited to just that. Like Weber,

a new paragraph, that “rationalen” is now in italics, and that instead of the Cistern being conjoined with the Cluniac, it is now regarded “as still more”. Weber, 1991: 134–135.

Harnack emphasized Benedict's rules that should govern daily life (Weber, 1905: 28, 29–30, Harnack, 1904: 119). This emphasis on overall rules prompted Grützmaker, in his book on Benedict's *Rule*, to underscore Benedict's tendency to legislate (Grützmaker, 1892: 20, 41). However, Benedict's notion of "soberness" is found in more than in his interest in rationality and order. Indeed, it is found in Benedict's beliefs regarding every aspect of life; McGinn maintained that "Moderation is the leitmotif" of the *Rule* (McGinn, 1999:28–29). Many of the desert ascetics were immoderate in their enthusiasm and their practice of asceticism (Ware, 1995: 9). In response, Benedict warned that a "harsh zeal" can lead to evil.

Benedict also challenged the desert ascetic's insistence on the primacy of contemplation. He warned of living only the "vita contemplativa"; one must also live the "vita activa" (Prinz, 1980: 19). Hence, Benedict's insistence on "ora et labora"; that is, "prayer and work". In Benedict's view, "idleness is the enemy of the soul"; however, work is no longer to be regarded as punishment for sin. Even Augustine regarded work as a continuation of God's creation; Benedict contended that work is for the glory of God (Chapter XLVIII, Prinz, 1980: 68). Work is that which connects the ascetic to the world and hinders the ascetic's desire to flee it (Prinz, 1980: 71). The worker should do good work, not in order to take pride in it, but to glorify God. And, the cost of the work should be lower than a comparable cost demanded from someone from the outside world (Chapter LVII). In Harnack's view, Benedict underscored the importance of work (Harnack, 1904: 119).

The second reform movement mentioned by Weber and discussed by Harnack was the Cluniac reforms. In Grützmaker's view, the Cluny reform wished to return to the foundations of the Benedictine Order (Grützmaker, 1898: 181). It was the attempt to restore the purity that had begun to be lost. Weber believed that this reform continued to emphasize the "entire method of rational simplicity" that was found in Benedict (Weber, 2001: 337–338). In order to combat the growing influence of the nobility on the Church, the Church needed to extend its influence over the pious nobility. But, if the Benedictine reforms applied only to those who lived within the walls of the monastery, then the Cluniac reforms extended to most of the entire "world Church" (Harnack, 1904: 122–123). It did this by extending the Benedictine life to the outside world (Harnack, 1932: 335, 339). If the most astonishing task of Gregory the Great was to have the monks flee the world in the service of the "world Church", the great task of these later reforms was to go out into the world in order to save the Church (Harnack, 1904: 124–125 and Harnack, 1932: 338). If the Universal Church wished to expand its considerable influence, it also indirectly expanded the impor-

tance of the individual (Harnack, 1932: 340). The intersection of the lives of the monks and the “world Church” increasingly grew larger, and that gave rise to the third living reform, that of the rise of the Mendicant Orders and their founder, St. Francis.

We know that Weber had the highest regard for Francis of Assisi. Weber links his name with Jesus (Weber, 1989: 520 and Weber 1992: 235). St. Francis wished to live the life of Christ, so, that meant living a life based upon true Christian beliefs (Harnack, 1904: 127; Harnack, 1932: 423). The main tenets of this life were humility, poverty, and love (Harnack, 1932: 421–422). Harnack emphasized the wide ranging consequences of Francis’ reforms. First, Western monasteries were no longer populated by the sons of the aristocrats, thereby diminishing the nobility’s influence.⁹⁰ Second, Francis’ emphasis also led to a radical appreciation of the individual as opposed to the institution (Grützmacher, 1903: 233, Harnack, 1904: 130). For Francis, it was not the Church that was of major importance; rather, it was the preaching of the Gospel (Harnack, 1904: 127). Third, the thirteenth century Franciscan view of the world differed greatly from that of the sixth and even the eleventh century (Harnack, 1904: 128). The Franciscans did not view the world as a place of evil and temptation; rather they regarded it as a “beautiful garden” (Harnack, 1904: 129). The Franciscans, or Mendicants, were the ones who went out from the monasteries, not just into the world but into the cities (Weber, 1989: 87, Heussi, 1912: 441, Ohlemüller, 1931: 1054). Karl Müller also stressed the importance of the cities for the Mendicant Orders and suggested that the economic prosperity that was found in the urban areas allowed them to beg successfully (Müller, 1906: 207). It was the place in which they could fulfill their goal. As Weber wrote, they rationally went out into the world in order to bring about “systematic Caritas” (Weber, 2001: 338). Harnack pointed out that the Franciscans were highly successful because they lived with the people and they spoke their language (Harnack, 1904: 130). And, the Tertiary Order was probably the most successful. The First Order was the monks; the Second was the nuns. But, the Third Order lived within the world and had taken no vows (Ohlemüller, 1931: 1054). And, even though they were “at home” in the world, like the later Protestant ascetics, they limited the types of food and drink, avoided dancing and shows, and despised refinement and luxuries of all types (Ohlemüller, 1931: 1055). Like the later Protestants, they were dedicated to God *and* they were

⁹⁰ Grützmacher, 1903: 232. Harnack maintained that until the Twelfth Century the monastery was by and large an aristocratic institution reserved primarily for the nobles. The likelihood of the common people living in a monastery was as great as living in a nobleman’s castle. Harnack, 1904: 128. Also see Harnack, 1932: 424–425.

dedicated to their worldly calling. They lived an ascetic life but they did not give up their lives in the world (Werner, 1913: 1136). To put it differently, they were also between “world and Church” (Zöckler, 1899: 218).

If the goal of the Franciscans was love and charity; the goal of the Jesuits was order and domination. If the former were at ease in the world; the latter wished to control it (Harnack, 1904: 135–136). And, in Weber's view they did it by means of rationality. Weber notes that it is “in principle” found in Benedict's *Rule*, but to a greater extent in the Cluny reforms, and finally, “decisively” in the Jesuits (Weber, 1991: 134–135). The goal of all these was to free oneself from the “virtuous self-torture” and to emancipate one's self from the “planloser Weltflucht” (“purposeless world flight”).⁹¹ The goal was to overcome one's “natural state” and to free one's self from the “power of irrational drives”. Finally, it was to reduce one's dependence on the world and nature. Instead, the emphasis was on the supremacy of “planned willing” (“planvollen Wollens”) and by having continuous “self-control” (“Selbstkontrolle”) and “self-mastery” (“Selbstbeherrschung”). In Weber's view, both the ascetic monks and the ascetic Protestants shared the high desire for “order in one's life conduct” (“*Ordnung* in der Lebensführung”) (Weber, 1991: 135–136). The problem was that the medieval monks lapsed into a world of relative comfort and enjoyment; a problem that Weber came to realize also affected the Lutherans. Weber objected to the drunken and raw Lutheran way of life; what Germans call “natürlich” and “Gemütlich”. And, he objected to the sense of ‘passivity’ and ‘helplessness’ found in Lutheran spirituality (Weber, 1991: 142). As he wrote in a 1906 letter to Harnack, he despised Lutheranism for its softness, its tolerance, and its naïve belief in goodness. He bemoaned the fact that Germany never went through the “school of hard asceticism” (“Schule des harten Asketismus”) (Weber, 1990: 32–33). Whereas the Lutherans had minimum ascetic penetration in their private and political lives, the Calvinists enforced the ascetic penetration throughout their entire lives (Weber, 1991: 142–143).

Weber's Asceticism

We know from Marianne Weber that the *Protestant Ethic* exemplified “the deepest roots of [Weber's] personality and in an undefinable way bears its

⁹¹ “Planloser Weltflucht” is difficult to translate. “Fleeing the world” is adequate for “Weltflucht” but “planloser” could be rendered by “aimless”, “directionless”, and perhaps “purposeless”. Weber intends to contrast this with the “aimed”, “directed”, and “purposeful” work by the Puritans in the world. Weber, 1991: 135.

stamp" (Weber, 1926: 350). Given this, it is not difficult to regard the *Protestant Ethic* as a "self-testimonial" as Helmut Lehmann has done (Lehmann, 1996). And, in a later article Lehmann suggested that Weber's illness and the *Protestant Ethic* marked a crucial turning point in Weber's personal life. Lehmann draws our attention to Weber's radical physical transformation – from the corpulent, life-enjoying young professor to the older, haggard-looking scholar with the penetrating gaze (Lehmann, 2005: 43). Towards the end of the biography Marianne likened her husband to the old knight in Albrecht Dürer's "Knight, Death, and Devil" (Weber, Marianne, 1926: 679–60; 686). In this etching, Dürer shows a gaunt and exhausted-looking man. Shown too are the devil and death; the knight's only companion is his equally old and tired dog. Although Marianne does not specify the year, the reference to Dürer is during the time that Weber took up his chair at Munich. Thus, it comes during the same time as Weber's two "swan songs". In *Wissenschaft als Beruf* and *Politik als Beruf* the themes of death, gods, and demons are pronounced. If one is to engage in politics, Weber contends that one must be strong, disciplined, and prepared to work with "diabolical powers". In the same vein, if one is to engage in science one must have intellectual honesty; one must "become old to understand the devil" (Weber, 1992: 249, 105). However, in the modern, disenchanting world, both God and the devil are gone; as are the demons. What remains is not the "demon" from Christianity, but the "Dämon" from Goethe (Albrow, 1990: 66–67, 70). As Lawrence Scaff wrote, "Dämon" was for Weber, as for Goethe, the same as "fate" (Scaff, 1989: 68–69). Scaff maintains that the key to Weber can be found in a line from Goethe's poem "Dämon" where Goethe writes that "So you must be, you will not escape yourself" (Scaff, 1989: 69). The point is that one must face one's own destiny. Weber himself had no doubt that he had to face his own fate. However, to those who are unable to "manly endure" the "fate of time" Weber advises them to turn to the "wide and mercifully opened arms of the old church" (Weber, 1992: 110). Even if Weber were so inclined to take this escape, he could not have done so. We know from an oft-cited letter to Tönnies that Weber believed himself to be "unmusical" in religious matters (Weber, 1994: 65). Weber clarifies this, saying that upon closer reflection, he finds that he is neither "anti-religious nor *irreligious*". Instead, he considers himself to be a "cripple or a mutilated man". In another letter to Tönnies written the next month, which is rarely cited, Weber suggests that even if he is unable to experience certain religious feelings, he is able to understand them and their consequences (Weber, 1994: 70). Lehmann suggests that Weber understood how "cut off" he was from other people who had naive but genuine religious experiences (Lehmann,

2005: 40). But, Weber had no need for religious experiences. Instead he believed that it was “easy and simple” to face the “demands of the day” if one “finds and obeys the ‘Dämon’ who holds the threads of *his* life” (Weber, 1992: 111). Weber had found his own “Dämon” and he obeyed the command to embrace his fate. And, he recognized that he was fated to fulfill two fundamental tasks: to fight the temptation to believe that “science” could give meaning to life and to dispel the illusion that politics could lead to happiness. To try to accomplish these tasks required rigor, precision, and the ability to confront one’s own tendency to self-delusion. In his contribution to the *Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber* Gerhart von Schulze-Gaevernitz set out the various traits that Weber contended were those of the Calvinist: self-mastery and self-trust, independence from the opinions and help from others, independence from one’s own inclinations, mistrust of feelings and instincts, and the planned conduct of life (Schulze-Gaevernitz, 1923: IV). In other words, those fundamental characteristics that he ascribed to the Calvinist are the same disciplined, ascetic traits that Weber himself embraced.

References

- Adair-Toteff, Christopher (2002): “Max Weber’s Mysticism.” *Archives européennes de sociologie*. XLIII, 3. 339–353.
- Albrow, Martin (1990): *Max Weber’s Construction of Social Theory*. London: Mac-Millan.
- Bertholet, Alfred (1930): “Mönchtum. I. Religionsgeschichtlich.” *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Zweite Auflage. Band IV. 130–134.
- Breuer, Stefan (2001): ‘Weltablehnung’. *Max Webers ‘Religionssystematik’*. Herausgegeben von Hans G. Kippenberg und Martin Riesebrodt. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 227–240.
- Derrett, J. and Duncan M. (1995): “Primitive Christianity as an Ascetic Movement.” In Wimbush and Valantasis, 1995. 88–107.
- Grützmacher, Georg Konstans (1892): *Die Bedeutung Benedikt von Nursia und seiner Regel an der Geschichte des Mönchtums*. Berlin: Mayer & Müllen.
- Grützmacher, Georg Konstans (1898): “Cluny und die Cluniacenser.” *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung. Dritte Auflage. Band 4. 181–186.
- Grützmacher, Georg Konstans (1903): “Mönchtum”. *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung. Dritte Auflage. Band 13. 214–235.
- Harnack, Adolf (1904) [1880]: “Das Mönchtum, seine Ideale und seine Geschichte.” In *Reden und Aufsätze*. Gieszen: J. Ricker’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung (Alfred Töpelmann). Erster Band. 81–139.

- Harnack, Adolf (1906): *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten*. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. Zweite neu durchgearbeitete Auflage.
- Harnack, Adolf (1932): *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Dritter Band. Die Entwicklung des Kirchlichen Dogmas*. Fünfte, Photomechanisch Gedruckte Auflage.
- Heussi, Karl (1908): "Askese. II. Kirchengeschichtlich." *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band I. 727–729.
- Heussi, Karl (1912): "Mönchtum." *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band IV. 427–446.
- Heussi, Karl (1927): "Benediktiner." *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Zweite Auflage. Band I. 894–896.
- Heussi, Karl (1930): "Mönchtum. II. Christliches Mönchtum." *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Zweite Auflage. Band IV. 134–145.
- Heussi, Karl (1933): *Kompendium der Kirchengeschichte*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Achte, verbesserte Auflage.
- Heussi, Karl (1936): *Der Ursprung des Mönchtums*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Kaelber, Lutz (1998): *Schools of Asceticism. Ideology and Organization in Medieval Religious Communities*. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Krech, Volker (2001): "Mystik." *Max Webers 'Religionssystematik'*. Herausgegeben von Hans G. Kippenberg und Martin Riesebrodt. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 241–262.
- Lehmann, Helmut (1996): *Max Webers "Protestantische Ethik". Beiträge aus der Sicht eines Historikers*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Lehmann, Helmut (2005): "Max Webers Weg von Kulturprotestantismus zum asketischen Protestantismus". In Schluchter und Graf, 33–48.
- Liddell, George Henry and Scott, Robert (1978): *A Greek-English Lexicon*. Revised and Augmented Throughout by Sir Stuart Jones. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press.
- Lohse, Bernhard (1969): *Askese und Mönchtum in der Antike und in der alten Kirche*. München und Wien: R. Oldenbourg.
- McGinn, Bernard (1995): "Asceticism and Mysticism in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages." In Wimbush and Valantasis. 1995. 58–74.
- McGinn, Bernard (1999): *The Growth of Mysticism. Gregory the Great through the 12th Century*. New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company.
- Mulert, Hermann (1913): "Welt usw: V. Weltbejahung und Weltverneinung." *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band V. 1912–1920.
- Müller, Karl (1906): "Christentum und Kirche Westeuropas im Mittelalter." *Die Christliche Religion. Mit Einschluss der Israelisch-Jüdischen Religion. Die Kultur der Gegenwart*. Teil I. Abteilung IV. Berlin und Leipzig: Druck und Verlag von B.G. Teubner. 183–220.

- Ohlemüller, Gerhard (1931): "Tertiärer und Tertiärerinnen." *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Zweite Auflage. Band V. 1054–1056.
- Pfister, Friedrich (1927): "Askese: I. Religionsgeschichtlich". *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Zweite Auflage. Band I. 570–574.
- Prinz, Friedrich (1980): *Askese und Kultur. Vor- und frühbenediktinisches Mönchtum an der Wiege Europas*. München: C.H. Beck.
- Rubenson, Samuel (1995): "Christian Asceticism and the Emergence of the Monastic Tradition." In Wimbush and Valantasis. 1995. 45–57.
- Scaff, Lawrence A. (1989): *Fleeing the Iron Cage. Culture, Politics and Modernity in the Thought of Max Weber*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Schluchter, Wolfgang and Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm, Eds. (2005): *Asketischer Protestantismus und der 'Geist' des modernen Kapitalismus*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Schulze-Gaevernitz, Gerhart von (1923): "Max Weber als Nationalökonom und Politiker." *Hauptprobleme der Soziologie. Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber*. Herausgegeben von Melchior Palyi. München und Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot. Band I. XIII–XXII.
- Seeberg, Reinhold (1897): "Askese". *Realencyklopädie für Protestantische Theologie und Kirche*. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrich'sche Buchhandlung. Dritte Auflage. Band 2. 134–142.
- Treiber, Hubert (2001): "'Askese'. Max Webers 'Religionssystematik'". Herausgegeben von Hans G. Kippenberg und Martin Riesebrödt. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 263–278.
- Treiber, Hubert (2005): "Der 'Eranos' – Das Glanzstück im Heidelberger Mythenkranz?" *Asketischer Protestantismus und der 'Geist' des modernen Kapitalismus*. In Schluchter und Graf, 75–153.
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1906): "Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit." *Die Christliche Religion. Mit Einschluss der Israelisch-Jüdischen Religion. Die Kultur der Gegenwart*. Teil I. Abteilung IV. Berlin und Leipzig: Druck und Verlag von B.G. Teubner. 253–458.
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1912): *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Gesammelte Schriften I*.
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1925): *Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte und Religionssoziologie*. Herausgegeben von Dr. Hans Baron. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Gesammelte Schriften IV*.
- Völter, Daniel (1900): *Der Ursprung des Mönchtums. Ein Vortrag*. Tübingen und Leipzig: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Ware, Kallistos (1995): "The Way of the Ascetics: Negative or Affirmative." In Wimbush and Valantasis. 1995. 3–15.
- Weber, Marianne (1926): *Max Weber. Ein Lebensbild*. München: R. Piper Verlag.
- Weber, Max (1904): "Die protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus." *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*. Band XX. 1–54.
- Weber, Max (1905): "Die protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus." *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*. Band XXI. 1–110.

- Weber, Max (1922): *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik. III. Abteilung Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1986): *Die protestantische Ethik. II. Kritiken und Antikritiken*. Herausgegeben von Johannes Winckelmann. Güterslohe: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn.
- Weber, Max (1988)[1922]: *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1989): *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. Konfuzianismus und Taoismus. Schriften 1915–1920*. Herausgegeben von Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer in Zusammenarbeit mit Petra Kolonko. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. I/19.
- Weber, Max (1990): *Briefe 1906–1908*. Herausgegeben von M. Rainer Lepsius und Wolfgang J. Mommsen in Zusammenarbeit mit Birgit Rudhard und Manfred Schön. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. II/5.
- Weber, Max (1991): *Die Protestantische Ethik I. Eine Aufsatzsammlung*. Herausgegeben von Johannes Winckelmann. Gütersloh: Güterslohe Verlag-Haus Mohn.
- Weber, Max (1992): *Wissenschaft als Beruf/Politik als Beruf*. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang J. Mommsen und Wolfgang Schluchter in Zusammenarbeit mit Birgitt Morgenbrod. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. I/17.
- Weber, Max (1994): *Briefe 1909–1910*. Herausgegeben von M. Rainer Lepsius und Wolfgang J. Mommsen in Zusammenarbeit mit Birgit Rudhard und Manfred Schön. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (2001): *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Die Wirtschaft und die gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen und Mächte. Nachlaß. Teilband 2: Religiöse Gemeinschaften*. Herausgegeben von Hans G. Kippenberg in Zusammenarbeit mit Petra Schilm unter Mitwirkung von Jutta Niemeier. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. I/22–2.
- Weinel, Heinrich (1899): *Die Wirkungen des Geistes und der Geister im nachapostolischen Zeitalter bis auf Irenäus*. Freiburg im Breisgau, Leipzig und Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weiß, Johannes (1898): "Dämonische." *Realencyklopädie für Protestantische Theologie und Kirche*. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. Band 4. 410–419.
- Werner, Johannes (1913): "Tertiärer und Tertiärerinnen." *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band V. 1135–1145.
- Wimbush, Vincent L. and Valantasis, eds. (1995): *Asceticism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Zögler, Otto (1863): *Kritische Geschichte des Askese. Ein Beitrag zu Geschichte Christlichen Sitte und Cultur*. Frankfurt am Main und Erlangen: Verlag von Heyden & Zimmer.
- Zögler, Otto (1899): "Franz von Assisi." *Realencyklopädie für Protestantische Theologie und Kirche*. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrich'sche Buchhandlung. Band 6. 197–222.

Chapter Five

Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Politics: Weber on Conscience, Conviction, and Conflict

Introduction

Every student of Weber knows that his reputation rests primarily on his work regarding the development of modern rational capitalism. Readers of the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* understand that Weber attempts to provide an ideal typical account of this process. He traces its beginnings to its theological roots: Luther's notion of "calling" and Calvin's doctrine of predestination. He then discusses its theological foundation in certain Protestant sects and its moral grounding in Franklin's monetary convictions. Weber concludes with a treatment of the secular forms and the repercussions of modern capitalism. What students apparently do not recognize is that Weber believes there is a political development that is parallel to this economic development.⁹² Weber himself does not provide an account, but by looking at a number of his works such an account can be constructed. To offer an account of the parallel political development would likely require a work as long as the *Protestant Ethic* itself. My intention here is far more limited: I will focus primarily on Weber's treatment of certain key features of the two major Protestant reformers in relation to political activity. These include their shared notion of conscience and their common belief in a God-ordered world. It also includes a discussion of their differing theological principles and the consequences those have for their beliefs regarding political activity and confrontation. Luther's conservative and passive theology meant shunning politics and avoiding political conflicts; Calvin's radical and active theology meant taking political stances and even justifying rebellion and revolution.⁹³

⁹² "The entire process (of the development of the modern state) is a complete parallel to the development of the capitalistic enterprise...." Weber, 1992: 165. In the "Zwischenbetrachtung" the discussion of the political order follows the treatment of the economic order and Weber speaks of "homo politicus" as being similar to "homo oeconomicus". Weber, 1989: 487-491.

⁹³ There is no doubt that Calvin was interested in founding a theocratic state and there is

This paper is divided into four sections.⁹⁴ In the first section I briefly set out the notion of conscience and show how Luther and Calvin used it to justify their theological rejection of Catholic authority. In the second I focus on what Weber takes to be Luther's fundamental theological principles. I show how Weber believes that Luther's theology of love is rather conservative and that his doctrine of two kingdoms leads to a quiet resignation in earthly matters. In the third I show Weber's contrasting view of Calvin. Weber believes that Calvin's theology of awe and his doctrine of predestination lead not only to a basic right to political activity, but even more, to a fundamental duty to resist tyranny. In the final section I address many of the "theological" aspects of Weber's *Politik als Beruf*. Weber's 1919 speech is widely, and correctly, regarded as Weber's political masterpiece; however, religious names and theological themes are found throughout that work. Weber mentions Jesus, John, Luke, Mark, Luther and Calvin, and he discusses the notion of theodicy and the absolute ethics of the Sermon on the Mount. In this section I set out Weber's rejection of Christians as political actors as well as his emphatic denunciation of their secular successors – the modern German revolutionaries. I end by briefly discussing Weber's own convictions concerning the necessary traits that one must have to engage in modern political conflicts.

Conscience

At first it would seem that Weber has no interest in the notion of conscience because he apparently does not use the term. However, there are three reasons for supposing that he was very familiar with the term and what it meant. First, there is a strong connection between a number of Heidelberg theologians and the study of the concept of conscience. Richard Rothe, Daniel Schenkel, and Wilhelm Gass were all professors of theology at the university during the middle decades of the nineteenth century. And, Eduard Güder was a close friend and colleague of another significant Heidelberg

much to be said for the claim that Calvinist discipline leads to the rise of the early modern state. See Gorski, 2003. To address this thesis lies beyond the scope of this paper. My concern here is with Weber's concentration on the radical and revolutionary aspects of Calvin's doctrine.

⁹⁴ For Weber's account I have tended to rely on those sources that he himself cites: Matthias Schneckenberger, Max Scheibe, F.W. Kampschulte, Erich Marcks, and of course Weber's close friend and colleague Ernst Troeltsch. I cite the German as it is given which explains the variations in spelling.

theology professor, Karl Hundeshagen.⁹⁵ Second, as these and other scholars argue, the notion of conscience is in general a fundamental part of the Protestant Reformation and is in particular a major factor in the works of Luther and Calvin.⁹⁶ Finally, as I will suggest, Weber's notion of "conviction" ("Gesinnung") is almost identical to the notion of "conscience" ("Gewissen").

In 1876 Albrecht Ritschl, another significant source for Weber's understanding of Protestant theology, published an article entitled "Ueber das Gewissen." In this work Ritschl brings together a number of important points regarding our understanding of this concept, points that were made separately by others. First, he notes that the idea of conscience is found first in the ancient world and was used to signify the "inner and individual" as opposed to the outward and legal (Ritschl, 1896: 177–178). Second, it is both extremely personal and universal. This point was made earlier (1869) by Gass in his *Die Lehre vom Gewissen* when he said that it was individual and universal (Gass, 1869: 113). It is universal in the sense that every human being has a conscience (Gass, 1869: 207). Gass concludes "Who is without conscience must be Christ or the devil", which is a variation of his quotation from the *Theologia deutsch*: "Who is without conscience is either Christ or the devil" (Gass, 1869, 89 and note 2). But, it was Rothe who emphasized the personal side of conscience. In his *Theologische Ethik* he insists that we do not speak of "the conscience"; but rather, of "my conscience" (Rothe, 1869, II: 28, see also Ritschl, 1896: 181, 190 and Hoffman, 1910: 4: 1405). However, it is not purely individual and subjective; but rather, it is also "objective". This is clarified by three authorities: Ritschl suggested that it was the "voice of God" (Ritschl, 1896: 182, 183). Schenkel, in his 1856 article "Gewissen" for the first edition of the *Real-Encyclopädie für protestantische Theologie*, wrote of the "consciousness of God" or the "agreement with God" (Schenkel, 1856, V: 133, 134). And, Güder, in his 1857 essay "Die Lehre vom Gewissen nach der Schrift", wrote that it was the "voice of God", or the "knowing with God" (Güder, 1857: 247, 273). The emphasis by Ritschl, Schenkel, and Güder is that when one acts according to one's conscience one is acting in

⁹⁵ Hundeshagen was responsible for ensuring that a number of works by Matthias Schneckenburger were posthumously published. Güder was the editor of Schneckenburger's *Vergleichende Darstellung des lutherischen und reformirten Lehrbegriffs*. Weber refers to this work many times in the *Protestant Ethic* and it serves as a major source for his understanding of the differences between Luther and Calvin.

⁹⁶ According to Weber's cousin, Otto Baumgarten, the fundamental principle of Protestantism is freedom of conscience. Baumgarten, 1910: II: 1193. And, in the article "Gewissen" for the third edition of the *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche* "freedom of conscience" is the dominant theme. Kahler, 1899: 650.

accordance with God. As Troeltsch wrote: the Lutheran “knew only *one* authority, God and one’s own conscience, in which God spoke” (Troeltsch, 1908: 81). It is this sense of allegiance to God that gave the Protestants the courage to stand up to the authority of the Catholic Church. Thus, Ritschl writes that it was Luther’s belief in his “personal conscience” that gave him the moral authority to stand up against the “highest worldly power” (Ritschl, 1896: 201). Güder writes that it is the “authority of Jesus” that allows us to fight the “good fight” (Güder, 1857: 285). In Schenkel’s view, one’s conscience is the “central organ” for moral authority and one must obey it (and God).⁹⁷ Both Luther and Calvin placed the highest emphasis on listening to their consciences (Holl, 1928: 255). This is why the notion of conscience, meaning the freedom of conscience, was so important to the Reformers in general and to Luther in particular (Schenkel, 1856: 137, 135, 141–142).

Weber recognized the greatness of acting according to one’s conscience. However, he preferred to speak of convictions. Indeed, Weber sets out what he calls the “ethics of conviction” (“Gesinnungsethik”).⁹⁸ In *Politik als Beruf* Weber identifies Luther with this “ethics of conviction” and he praises him for his words and deeds of protest: “I cannot do other, here I stand”.⁹⁹ But, Luther’s protest led to many others. As Gass pointed out, Luther prompted “thousand others” also to stand up (Gass, 1869: 177–178). This firm belief in what is right is why Weber could have such a high opinion of Luther. In a 1906 letter to the Berlin theologian Adolf Harnack, Weber wrote that *personally* Luther “towered above all others” (Weber, 1990: 32). However, Weber immediately added that as a *historical* manifestation Lutheranism was “the most terrible of the terrible”. To see how Weber could have such a high opinion of Luther and yet so despise Lutheranism we must turn to Weber’s account of the latter.

Weber on Luther’s Theological and Political Thinking

We know from Weber himself that his understanding of the doctrinal differences between Lutheranism and Calvinism comes primarily from Mat-

⁹⁷ Troeltsch quoted Calvin’s claim that he was certain in his conscience that what he taught and wrote did not come from himself, but came from God. Troeltsch, 1912: 613, note 313.

⁹⁸ Troeltsch uses the term “Gesinnungsethik” a number of times in his *Soziallehren* and he refers to Luther’s conscience at least once. Troeltsch, 1912: 437–438, 441, 447, and 456.

⁹⁹ “ich kann nicht anders, hier stehe ich”. The Editors add “Ich kann nicht anderst, hie stehe ich, Got helff mir, Amen.” Weber, 1992: 250 and note 151.

tias Schneckenburger (Weber, 1905: 5. note 4). For the Lutheran, the important doctrine was justification; for the Calvinist, it was the doctrine of predestination (Weber, 1905: 2 and 20–21). Schneckenburger believed that ultimately whether one believed in Luther's teachings or in Calvin's was a matter of personal preference (Schneckenburger, 1855: I: 8–9). And, this preference was mostly a matter of psychology. The Lutheran is self-conscious in recognizing one's immediate turn to God; the Calvinist is self-conscious in recognizing the steps to salvation (Schneckenburger, 1855: I: XXXVIII). But, the difference also comes down to the Lutheran's emphasis on Jesus as a person versus Calvin's emphasis on Jesus' teaching. However, for Weber the real difference seems to be between the Lutheran and the Calvinist conceptions of God. In the second part of the *Protestant Ethic* Weber mentions the notion of a "double" God (Weber, 1905: 9, note 9). Both Luther and Calvin shared this notion, although each emphasized different aspects. According to this notion, there are two "types" of God: one type is the all-merciful God while the other is the all-powerful one. As Weber puts it, one type is like the "loving modern father" while the other is the "strict royal patriarch" (Weber, 2001: 361). Or, to put it differently, there is the grace-giving and loving father of the New Testament; and there is the arbitrary despot – Jehovah of the Old Testament (Weber, 1905: 9, note 9). However, Schneckenburger is not Weber's source for these types; rather, they come from Ritschl and Julius Köstlin. Weber refers to the former's *Geschichte des Pietismus* but I cannot locate any passages.¹⁰⁰ Weber cites Köstlin's article "Gott" in the third edition of the *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*. There, Köstlin writes of the "double-sided" religious notion of God: one who is loving and forgiving in contrast to one who has absolute sovereignty (Köstlin, 1899: 791). While Luther and Calvin initially seemed to have shared this conception, Weber maintained that Calvin moved closer to the idea of the absolute sovereign while Luther moved closer to the notion of the forgiving father. Weber maintains that Luther's God is the one from the New Testament. This is the heavenly father who is good and forgiving.¹⁰¹ Köstlin writes of children's trust in the closeness to God and in the enjoyment of fatherly love (Köstlin, 1899: 782). For Luther, God is the God of love and the conception of love dominates Luther's theology (Köstlin, 1899: 790–791). This notion of God's mercifulness underscores Luther's faith that even if one loses God's grace, one can regain it by doing

¹⁰⁰ However, Ritschl does offer a number of similar comments in his three-part article "Geschichtliche Studien zur christlichen Lehre von Gott."

¹⁰¹ Weber, 1905: 9, note 9. Also Weber writes of the "humanly comprehensible 'father in Heaven'". Weber, 1905: 10. Also see Weber, 1989: 491.

enough penance (Weber, 1905: 9). Schneckenburger also stresses the Lutheran's belief in God's mercifulness and emphasizes that the Lutheran anticipates eternal salvation (Schneckenburger, 1855, I: 103, 182). Schneckenburger also places emphasis on the Lutheran's simple faith in being one of God's children (Schneckenburger, 1855: I: 103, 203, 211). Weber makes much of Luther's insistence on mere faith and he stresses his opposition to intellectual rationalism. (Weber, 2001: 225; Weber, 1989: 483). And, Troeltsch insisted that in every opposition between reason and faith, understanding and mysticism, Luther always "came down on the latter side" (Troeltsch, 2004: 148). Troeltsch also insisted that despite all of Luther's scholastic and humanistic training, he always remained "a child of the people" and the "son of a peasant" (Troeltsch, 2004: 145). For Luther, it is ultimately a matter of the "unio mystica" – the union with God. This longing for the mystical union with God is, according to Schneckenburger, the whole point of every religion (Schneckenburger, 1855: I: 38, 83). As Weber noted, the highest religious experience for the Lutheran is the mystical union (Weber, 1905: 21; Troeltsch, 1912: 618). But, as Weber also noted later, this mystical union is the most irrational of religious experiences: it transcends boundaries, it knows no form, and it is inexpressible (Weber, 1989: 483, 501). It is the "objectless experience of the mystic" (Weber, 1989: 507). And, it is inherently *passive*. It means contemplative possession; it means that the mystic feels himself to be a "vessel" (Weber, 1905: 22; Weber, 1989: 482). As a result of all this, the mystic "flees" the world (Weber, 1989: 482). The issue of how mystical Luther was has been a source of some controversy. What was not controversial was that, at best, Luther was "indifferent about the world" (Weber, 2001: 359; Troeltsch, 1912: 461, 473, 477).

The Lutheran's "opposition" or "indifference" to the world is also based on another critical aspect of his theology: the doctrine of the "two kingdoms." Weber's cousin Baumgarten maintained that the separation of the "spiritual and the worldly swords" was one of the most fundamental principles of Luther's theology (Baumgarten, 1919: 70). And, Christian Luthardt believed that Luther's distinction between the Godly realm and the worldly realm was basic to Luther.¹⁰² And, according to Troeltsch, this was the distinction between the "world in Christ" and the "world outside Christ". This "world outside Christ" is the "world of the devil" and in it man is a "tool of the devil" (Troeltsch, 2004: 161). As such, it was a work of reason and was a

¹⁰² Luthardt, 1867: 76. Troeltsch maintained that despite a tendency to gloss over doctrinal differences Luthardt's book was still the best work on Luther's ethics. Troeltsch, 1912: 475.

necessary evil (Troeltsch, 1912: 561). These points have far-reaching ramifications for Luther's conceptions of politics and political activity.

Julius Köstlin noted that as much as Luther disliked Aristotle and his philosophy, he agreed with him that man was a being who naturally needed others: "a solitary being is either a beast or a God." (Köstlin, 1883. II: 485–490). As such, humans needed to live in a state. In Luther's opinion the state was somewhat divine (Troeltsch, 1912: 561). Luther did not mean that it was really divine, for that would go against his doctrine of the two kingdoms. However, it was the heavenly father who grounded the laws and principles needed to ensure the peace and order in this world (Troeltsch, 1912: 485, 532–535, 540). However, Luther also maintained that humans were inherently evil, thus the state was inherently "unchristian" if not "evil" (Troeltsch, 1912: 562). But, it was an evil necessary to ensure order in this world. Thus, Luther had an interest in the political order only in so far as it was a manifestation of his theological concerns. In Troeltsch's opinion, this lack of concern regarding the state did not rest on a lack of political talent, as many people have maintained. For, if it were, it could be cultivated. Rather, Troeltsch maintained that it lay in Luther's fundamental theological principles which are necessarily foreign to political matters (Troeltsch, 1912: 567). In one sense, it rested on Luther's sole personal concern: "What must I do in order to have God's grace?" (Schmidt, 1901: 51). This concern with grace and love also carried over to Luther's political concerns. In another sense it had to do with Luther's ideal of the "pure community of love". This community did not need the state and its laws; but, according to Troeltsch, this ideal was merely a vision of "Christian utopia" (Troeltsch, 1912: 562, 595; see also 427, 478). As Troeltsch often repeated, Luther's ideas were "radically conservative" (Troeltsch, 1911: 181; Troeltsch, 1912: 436, 456, 486, 532). They were radical in that they broke with the Church, its authorities, and its doctrines; and instead embraced the notions of faith, individuality, and conscience (Troeltsch, 1908: 81–83). But, like Catholic dogma, Luther's doctrine held that the political order stemmed from God and any rebellion against the authorities was tantamount to a rebellion against God. The use of force is strictly forbidden because it is both "completely contradictory" and "unchristian" (Troeltsch, 1911: 182). As such, there could be no justification for rebellion or resistance (Troeltsch, 1912: 562–563). If he were to take up arms he would only harm his soul. The authorities may harm him by spoiling his goods, his wife, and his daughter, but they cannot harm his soul (Schmidt, 1901: 59). What was allowed was only passive resistance (Troeltsch, 1912: 534, 561; Müller, 1902: 2: 477). Luther's theology of universal love and forgiveness coupled with his doctrine of the two kingdoms meant that political

activity was a necessary evil and should be shunned if possible and that political resistance should be avoided at all costs. As Weber suggests, “normal Protestantism” legitimizes the state and leaves the question of force to it (Weber, 1992: 244). However, Weber also suggests that Calvin’s very different theology leads to some very different political conclusions.

Weber on Calvin’s Theological and Political Thinking

The Church historian Karl Müller offers one of the best concise formulations of the contrast between Luther and Calvin.¹⁰³ In his *Kirchengeschichte* Müller writes that Calvin rejects Luther’s central belief in God’s “mercifulness and kindness”. For Calvin, it is not a matter of trusting God; it is a matter of fearing him (Müller, 1902: 2:475). Kampschulte adds to this sentiment by saying that Calvin’s God is not the forgiving and merciful God of the Gospels, but is the angry and punishing Jehova of the Old Testament.¹⁰⁴ What is important is not Luther’s notion of God’s love, but Calvin’s insistence on God’s absolute majesty (Troeltsch, 1912: 615–616). And, in contrast to Luther’s longing for God, Calvin believes that there is an “unbridgeable gulf” between man and God (Weber, 1905: 10). Finally, instead of Luther’s doctrine of “radical ethics of love”, there is Calvin’s doctrine of predestination.¹⁰⁵

According to this doctrine of predestination, God has foreordained everything. In addition, this is a “double decree”: God chose to save a few and has damned all others (Scheibe, 8, 66, 72, 89; Stähelin, 1863: 273). Those among the elect are the members of the invisible “true church” (Scheibe, 1897: 8; Hadorn, 1913: 4: 2113). Like the “true church” itself, its members show no outward signs that they belong to it (Weber, 1905: 18). And, no one can be certain whether one is among the elect or among the damned (Kampschulte, 1869: I: 265–266; Marcks, 1892: 292; Scheibe, 1897: 42; and Weber, 1905: 13). Our individual fate is unknown to us and unknowable by us (Weber, 1905: 10). Anyone who attempts to penetrate God’s secrets is, Calvin

¹⁰³ Weber appreciated Müller’s work and he mentions him several times in the *Protestant Ethic*. Weber, 1905: 6, n. 4, 62 n. 123, 65, n. 128.

¹⁰⁴ Kampschulte, 1869: I: 277. He adds that it is no accident that the sense of the Old Testament permeates Calvin’s *Institutes*. Marcks also emphasizes how much of the spirit of the Old Testament is found in Calvin’s writings. Marcks, 1892: 295, 321. Stähelin wrote that Calvin wanted to found a theocratic state that was similar to those described in the Old Testament. Stähelin, 1897: 3: 669.

¹⁰⁵ Troeltsch, 1912: 636, 638. Weber tells us that he bases his interpretation of this doctrine on Max Scheibe’s *Calvins Prädestinationslehre*. Weber, 1905: 9. What he does not say is that he undoubtedly made use of Troeltsch’s views on predestination. See Troeltsch, 1913a.

insists, doomed to find oneself in a labyrinth from which there is no exit (Kampschulte, 1869: I: 265). Calvin maintained that all of this is beyond human understanding and to try to comprehend it drives us into the gravest of perplexities.¹⁰⁶ The most we know is that some people are chosen while others have been damned (Weber, 1905: 10).

In addition, this decree is eternal and unchangeable (Marcks, 1892: 131; Scheibe, 1897: 7, 24, 29; and Troeltsch, 1913a: 4:1706). Since this is an eternal decree one cannot lose grace, but neither can one ever hope to gain it (Scheibe, 1897: 7, 9; Weber, 1905: 9–10, 19). Whereas Luther held that one could regain grace with sufficient penance, humility, and trust in God's word and sacraments, Calvin believed that one's state of grace or damnation was fixed and immutable (Scheibe, 1897: 9). Luther believed that while humans were naturally corrupt, they could strive toward gaining God's forgiveness. However, this could be taken as a type of Pelagianism. Pelgius had argued that since God is the greatest good, we, his creations, have the capacity to be good. Pelgius placed his emphasis on morality and free will. Augustine strongly objected to Pelgius's views and in his fight with him, Augustine placed his emphasis on grace and predestination. Since Adam's fall from grace, man is totally corrupt. As such, humans completely lack the capacity to be good; only by God's grace is one saved. Calvin agreed with Augustine that man does not have the choice to be good or bad. Humans have sinned against God, which Weber defined as having breached our faith with God (Weber, 2001: 293). Calvin repeatedly insists that those elected for salvation have done nothing, and could do nothing, to warrant it. And, one who has been damned can do nothing to redeem oneself. God's eternal decree is solely for his glorification and for the humility of humans (Scheibe, 1897: 59, 61). To think that there is anything in us that would make us worthy is an affront to God. And, it is an affront to God to try to apply "earthly standards of justice" to him (Weber, 1905: 10; Scheibe, 1897: 57; Kampschulte, 1869: I: 262). God is the ground and norm of all grounds and norms; however, there are none that stand over him or by which one could judge him (Kampschulte, 1869: I: 262; Troeltsch, 1912: 615). That some may be saved and others damned through no specific fault of their own may seem unreasonable or unfair to us. Because humans are totally corrupt, God could have chosen to have damned all humans. God, in his righteousness has chosen to damn many. However, in his mercifulness he has chosen to save some (Scheibe, 1897: 23). Calvin had no difficulty maintaining two apparently conflicting

¹⁰⁶ Weber writes: It is "the recognized impossibility to measure God's decree by human standards". Weber, 1989: 521; Scheibe, 1897: 48, 57, 126.

concepts: that God is all powerful – and that man has full responsibility for himself. And, he saw no contradiction in maintaining that God fore-ordained everything – and that man was guilty of his sins (Holl, 1928: 263). Again, Calvin's point is that humans have no right to protest against God's choice; we cannot make any claims against God. Given the greatness of God and the severity of our sins, we have no right to make any ethical claims against God (Weber, 2001: 301). And, as Weber says, to complain of our lot is like an animal complaining that it was not born a human.¹⁰⁷ What is of sole importance is God's majesty and that everything (even all things social and political) is done for the "greater glory for God" (Weber, 1905: 15). In contrast to Calvin's emphasis on the doctrine of predestination, there is little mention of it in Luther's theology of grace (Troeltsch, 1913a: 4: 1706). Instead of emphasizing God's power and majesty, the Lutheran prefers to emphasize God's goodness and love. And, where there is a theology of love, there is a community of believers who have hope for the future life. However, Calvin's doctrine of predestination leads to inner isolation; as Weber puts it; it leads to that "*illusionless and pessimistically colored individualism.*"

If Calvin's doctrine of predestination leads to this type of individualism, it also leads to a solution to one of the most perplexing problems of Christianity: namely, the problem of theodicy.¹⁰⁸ It was Leibniz who gave the term much of its currency. Troeltsch and Otto Lempp wrote the articles on theodicy for the first edition of *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Troeltsch wrote that it is the problem of attempting to explain the relation between God and the world, and Lempp defined it as the answer to the question concerning the reason, sense, or purpose of evil. (Troeltsch, 1913b: 5: 1186; Lempp, 1913: 5: 1177; see Hanke, 2001: 221). In his *Das Problem der Theodicee* Lempp asked how could an all-powerful, all-knowing, all merciful God create such a world of suffering, a veritable "vale of tears"? (Lempp, 1910: 5, 7, 15, 36, 42). How can one reconcile God's twin properties of being all-powerful and all-good with the evil and suffering in the world? Weber describes the "theodicy of suffering" as how can one reconcile the notion of a perfect deity with such an imperfect world.¹⁰⁹ In *Politik als Beruf* he poses

¹⁰⁷ Weber, 1905: 10. Weber uses virtually the same words in the section "Das Problem der Theodicee" in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* as does Troeltsch in his *Soziallehren*. Weber, 2001: 297; Troeltsch, 1912: 615.

¹⁰⁸ Otto Lempp points out that it is a problem in most religions but it is especially acute in Christianity. Lempp: 1913: 5: 1177. Troeltsch suggests that the doctrine of predestination releases the Calvinist from all problems of theodicy which had so plagued the Lutherans. Troeltsch, 1912: 617.

¹⁰⁹ Weber, 2001: 296. Weber also writes of a "theodicy of happiness". Those who are happy are not content just with the fact that they are happy; they also want this happiness to be "le-

the problem: How can a power that is both all powerful and good create an irrational world of such undeserved suffering and so many unrighted wrongs and has such stupidity which can never be meliorated (Weber, 1992: 241)? He believes that there are three possible answers: dualism, Hinduism, and Calvinism.¹¹⁰ Here Weber's concern is with Calvinism.

Like Luther, Calvin believes that we are placed in a world ordered by God. And, God demands obedience to him and to those earthly authorities who rule in his name (Marcks, 1892: 298–299). Unlike Luther, who had little interest in politics, Calvin demonstrated “astonishing knowledge” of political life (Bohatec, 1937: XVI). Marcks stressed both his legal background and his political interests, and he referred to Calvin as a theologian and a statesman (Marcks, 1892: 284–285). Like Luther, Calvin believed the state is necessary, but not in the sense of a necessary evil. Instead, it is necessary in the same way that we need food and drink, water and light (Kampschulte, 1869: I: 270). However, the state is not only a necessary legal organization; it is also a moral community (Marcks, 1892: 298; Bohatec, 1937: 11). Furthermore, the sovereignty and authority of earthly rulers do not come from themselves, but are granted to them by the “creator of the state ordinances” – God himself (Bohatec, 1937: 12). Calvin hated the idea of anarchy so he was fearful of democracy which might lead to it (Carduans, 1903: 43; Bohatec, 1937: 23, 30, 60). However, he was just as adamant against the notion of the monarchy because he was concerned that it would lead to tyranny. Unlike God, who by his essence is incapable of being tyrannical, men certainly can be and often are (Bohatec, 1937: 25). Humans have no right or standard by which to judge God; however, they do have the right to judge their fellow humans. For Calvin, there is, and must exist, a contract, a “mutual obligation”, between ruler and subject (Bohatec, 1937: 66, 89). As long as the ruler acts as subject to this highest authority and holds up his end of the contract, he has the right to demand obedience from his subjects (Bohatec, 1937: 65). Thus, like Luther, a revolution is not just resistance against earthly authority; it is also resistance against God's authority (Bohatec, 1937: 75, 77).

gitimate”. As Weber puts it, they want the “right” to this happiness; they want to be convinced that they “deserve it”. Weber, 1989: 89–90.

¹¹⁰ In the Introduction to the *Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen* Weber writes that there are three: the individual doctrine of Karma, Zarathustrian dualism, and the predestination decree. Later he refers to the first as the Indian doctrine of Karma. Weber, 1989: 95, 520–522. In the section “Das Problem der Theodizee” Weber lists these three but refers to the Indian doctrine of “Karma” as the belief in the transmigration of souls. Weber, 2001: 299). In his article on predestination Troeltsch suggests that there are four: dualism, Buddhism, the doctrine of predestination, and pure pantheism. Troeltsch, 1913b: 5: 1187.

However, Calvin parts ways with Luther when a ruler breaks his contract with his subjects, for then he is also breaking his bond with God. As such, the tyrannical ruler has absolutely no claim to obedience because he has broken God's order. (Bohatec, 1934: 137). This is a revolution against God, and it justifies and even demands resistance (Bohatec, 1934: 139, Schmidt, 1901: 62). Marcks maintained that Calvin always believed that he was "responsible before God" (Marcks, 1892: 319). And, Calvin frequently invoked the Biblical injunction that it is always better to obey God than man (Herzog, 1854: 2: 516; Schmidt, 1901: 62; Carduans, 1903: 45; Troeltsch, 1912: 688). But, in Calvin's view such a tyrant is not even a man – a "prince" who acts like this is no longer worthy to be counted as a human. (Carduans, 1903: 43; Bohatec, 1937: 79). Such a rebel is even lower than a flea or a worm, for they are still God's creatures (Carduans, 1903: 42). Bohatec puts it this way: the prince has robbed God of his right and his throne; therefore, one should spit in his face rather than obey (Bohatec, 1934, 137; Bohatec, 1937: 78). Men are supposed to obey, but God determines when men must rebel against such tyranny. Thus, this is not just "passive resistance" but a "right to active resistance" and even a duty (Bohatec, 1934: 140, 151). As men are "tools in the hands of God", they must fight against the tyrannical power (Bohatec, 1934: 149). They are "chosen" to fight against the Godless so the issue of the use of force is no issue (Weber, 2001: 363–366, 391). Marcks makes much of Calvin's fighting spirit and how this spirit infused his later followers (Marcks, 1892: 286, 291, 295, 316, 320, and 325). For the Calvinist, it becomes a duty to mount a forceful defense of faith against tyrants and even to wars of faith (Weber, 2001: 393; Weber, 1992: 244). It was this "exception" of Calvin that led the way to the entire Huguenot doctrine of active resistance (Kampschulte, 1869: I: 273; Carduans, 1903: 51; Bohatec, 1934: 202–203).

Troeltsch claimed that the "cry of the people" was always the ultimate justification for Calvin and his successors (Troeltsch, 1912: 684). Whether this is true of Calvin may be disputed; what is not disputed is that Calvin's theory of the right to active resistance was taken up by his students, Beza and Hotman, the first "Monarchenmacher" (Troeltsch, 1912: 685; see Marcks, 1892: 359; and see Weber, 1992: 187). And, it leads to the the notions of the right to resistance, the sovereignty of the people, and even to civil and human rights (Troeltsch, 1912: 685, 687, 691).

Weber's Own Political Thinking

Unlike his Heidelberg colleagues Troeltsch and Georg Jellinek, Weber never had much interest in the notions of natural and human rights. And, it is relatively easy to understand why: Weber rejected the teleological principles which underlie the first and he disputed the belief in natural equality that supports the second. Instead of conceiving the world as an ordered one in which lasting peace and happiness could be found, Weber believed that it was a chaotic place in which economic and political conflicts eternally occur. And, instead of believing that consequences were God's concern, Weber held that they were ours and ours alone. By considering these fundamental convictions about the world we can envision Weber's likely responses to Luther, Calvin, and their "intellectual" heirs. And, we can regard these responses as answers to the question of what is the "real connection between ethics and politics?" (Weber, 1992: 233).

For the "true Christians" there is no connection because they truly hold to the "absolute ethic of the Gospels". These are the Christians who answer the question of whether the use of force is ever justified with an "unconditional and unequivocal" "NO" (Weber, 1992: 234). In their view, one does not resist evil with force, and if struck one turns the other cheek. This ethic is one of complete and total pacifism. One can never use force, even if to bring about absolute justice on earth (Weber, 1992: 245). There is a total trust in God and complete faith in doing what God commands. As Weber puts it: "the Christian does right and leaves the consequences to God." (Weber, 1992: 237; see Troeltsch, 1912: 637). But, Weber recognizes the difficulties of living according to this ethic and he acknowledges that the number must be small. Weber says that those who live by the absolute ethics are, like Jesus and St. Francis, "not from this world". (Weber, 1992: 247). This is because one must be a saint like Francis and live like Jesus to be able to adhere to it (Weber, 1992: 235).

Most people are unwilling or unable to live like that and most people are unable or unwilling to accept injustice in the world. Weber cites a 1906 study in which only a minority blame their lack of faith on the results of modern science. Instead, the great majority blame their loss of faith on the gross injustices in this world (Weber, 1989: 95). These are the people who cannot accept the world as it is and wish instead to establish heaven on earth. These are the workers, socialists, and revolutionaries who hope for the "socialism of the future" (Weber, 1984: 462, 629). They dream of an idyllic future in which there is total equality and there is no longer "the dominance of man over man" (Weber, 1984: 617). However, politics is exactly that: "the relation

of dominance of man over man” (Weber, 1992: 160). These are people who confuse the line between ethics and politics. These are the modern German revolutionaries who claim to want heaven on earth but will use strikes and terror to achieve it. These “dictators of the street” do not adhere to the maxim of peaceful protest – they use violence when it suits them (Weber, 1992: 223). Weber likens this to Schopenhauer’s remark about causality; that the absolute ethics is not a carriage in which one can get on and off when one feels like it (Weber, 1992: 234). Furthermore, they object to war when it suits their purposes. In Weber’s opinion there is no question that, if given the choice between a few years of war and then the revolution, or immediate peace but no revolution, these “revolutionaries” would no doubt choose more war and then revolution (Weber, 1992: 239; see also Weber, 1984: 632).

In Weber’s opinion it is not enough for these people to have “noble intentions” (Weber, 1992: 170, 234, 228–229). Indeed, Weber’s major complaint against these “literary types” is that they neither understand nor appreciate the seriousness of politics. And, in Weber’s view, they are simply “political dilettantes”. But, politics is “not a frivolous intellectual game” nor is it a “vain self-admiration in the feel of power” (Weber, 1992: 228–229. Also, see 232–233). The first is a delusion and the second is an illusion; instead, politics is the striving for real power. (Weber, 1992: 159). Thus, politics is not a matter either for dilettantes or for children.¹¹¹ Unfortunately, these people hopelessly confuse ethics and politics.

Weber does not have any of this confusion. He fully recognizes that one who strives for politics, strives for power. And, Weber does not have any illusions about what this means – it means dealing with “diabolical powers”. Furthermore, it means acknowledging that ethics does not enter into political considerations. The war and its revolutionary aftermath did not prompt Weber to adopt these views; although they did seem to strengthen them (Weber, 1984: 94–98, 163). Indeed, these are present in his early writings. In 1892 Weber objected to the literary dilettantes and their social-political “*Dilettantismus*” – they approached the issue of struggle as “an inexperienced child” (Weber, 1993: 235). These thoughts are amplified three years later in his “Freiburg Address”. There, Weber insisted that we must give up “the naïve freedom-like ideals of our early youth” (Weber, 1993: 552). And, while it is fine for youths to have ideals, mature people must not cling to

¹¹¹ In *Wissenschaft als Beruf* Weber uses the same tone concerning the “big children” (“große Kinder”) of the professorial pulpits and the editorial rooms. Weber, 1992: 92. The editors of volume four of the *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe* quote from one of Weber’s 1896 letters where he wrote of the “political children” who “play with fire and then set the house ablaze.” Weber, 1993: 613.

them (Weber, 1993: 573). It is an illusion to believe in the “soft well-being” and to have “optimistic hopes for happiness” (Weber, 1993: 572–573). Grown-ups must give up the “dream of peace and human happiness” (Weber, 1993: 559–560). The world is not the place where love can prevail over force and where good can come only from good and evil only from evil. Weber insists that “whoever does not see this is, in fact, politically a child” (Weber, 1992: 240–242). In reality, politics is struggle (Weber, 1984: 482, 487, 537). On the one hand, Weber agrees that one should passionately follow one’s heart and he allows that politics should not be done solely with one’s head (Weber, 1992: 249). But, on the other hand, Weber denies that it should be done solely with the heart. Politics requires a tremendous amount of focus, strength, and perseverance – it is like the “long boring through hard wood”. Therefore, it requires both “true” (not “sterile”) “Leidenschaft” (“passion”) as well as “Augenmaß” (Weber, 1992: 252–253). “Augenmaß”, as Weber defines it, is the capacity to see the realities with calmness and collectedness – it is the “distance” between things and men (Weber, 1992: 226). It is the ability to see “the realities of life” and not see mere illusions (Weber, 1992: 240). The politician must not mistake the “illusion” of the “acosmic ethics of love” for the “world of realities” (Weber, 1992: 240, 249). There is, then, a fundamental tension between those who hold an “ethics of conviction” with the “realities of the world” (Weber, 2001: 367). For politics demands just the opposite to the Sermon on the Mount; “you *should* forcefully resist evil” (“du *sollst* dem Übel gewaltsam widerstehen”) (Weber, 1992: 235). The specific tasks of politics demand that one use force to solve them. Thus, those who want to save their souls, or save the souls of others, should not seek the path of politics (Weber, 1992: 247). Politics, like economics, is the struggle to the death, and one must be prepared to fight with all one’s powers (Weber, 1993: 573). For Weber, acting according to one’s convictions is not enough; one needs to be responsible for the foreseeable consequences of one’s actions. It is this third notion, the notion of responsibility that is of paramount importance for Weber (Weber, 1992: 227). It is not enough that one wants to make impressions and to play with the “shining illusion of power”, for that leads to the abdication of responsibility (Weber, 1992: 229). And, it is not enough to leave the consequences to God. Whether it was because Weber believed that he lived in a post-Nietzschean world, or that he was “unmusical” in matters of faith, or simply for some other reason, Weber insisted that one no longer had the luxury to act solely according to one’s conscience and to disregard the consequences. Instead, politics demands that one acts with regard to the foreseeable consequences of those actions; that is, politics demands that one act responsibly. But, this is not Luther’s or

Calvin's belief in their *responsibility before God*. Instead, we have a *responsibility to history*, a conviction that Weber held all throughout his life. At the conclusion of his Freiburg Address, Weber writes of our "responsibility to history" ("Verantwortlichkeit vor der Geschichte") (Weber, 1993: 567, 573). And, at the conclusion of *Politik als Beruf*, Weber means the same thing when he speaks of our "responsibility for the future" ("Vorantwortung vor der Zukunft") (Weber, 1992: 232; see also Weber, 1984: 595). The weight of this responsibility is heavy and its demands are arduous; thus, Weber insists that politics is neither for those who are weak-willed nor for those who are sentimental. In Weber's opinion, only those who have strong nerves and will take responsibility for their political actions should be permitted "to stick their hands in the spokes of the wheel of history."¹¹²

References

- Baumgarten, Otto (1910): "Gehorsam". *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band 2: 1193–1194.
- Baumgarten, Otto (1919): "Das Ende der Staatskirche. Das Ergebnis der Geschichtlichen Entwicklung". In *Revolution und Kirche. Zur Neuordnung des Kirchenwesens im deutschen Volksstaat*. Herausgegeben von Friedrich Thimme und Ernst Rolffs. Berlin: Verlag von Georg Reimer. 70–83.
- Bohatec, Josef (1934): *Calvin und das Recht*. Feudingen in Westfalen: Verlag: Buchdruckerei und Verlagsanstalt.
- Bohatec, Josef (1937): *Calvins Lehre von Staat und Kirche. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Organismusgedankens*. Breslau: M. & H. Marcus.
- Cardauns, Ludwig (1973)[1903]: *Die Lehre vom Widerstandsrecht des Volkes gegen die rechtmäßige Obrigkeit im Luthertum und Calvinismus des 16. Jahrhunderts*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Gass, Wilhelm (1869): *Die Lehre vom Gewissen. Ein Beitrag zur Ethik*. Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer.
- Gorski, Philip S. (2003): *The Disciplinary Revolution. Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Güder, Eduard (1857): "Erörterungen über die Lehre vom Gewissen nach der Schrift". *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*. 245–296.

¹¹² "... was für ein Mensch man sein muß, um seine Hand in die Speichen der Geschichte legen zu dürfen." Weber, 1992: 226–227. Also see "Über das Programm des Nationalsozialen Vereins" (1896): "Aber die Politik ist ein hartes Geschäft, und wer die Verantwortung auf sich nehmen will, einzugreifen in die Speichen des Rades der politischen Entwicklung des Vaterlandes, der muß feste Nerven haben und darf nicht zu sentimental sein, um irdische Politik zu treiben." Weber, 1993: 622. "Weil wir ein Machtstaat sind, und weil wir also, im Gegensatz zu jenen 'kleinen' Völkern, unser Gewicht in dieser Frage der Geschichte in die Wagschale werfen können." Weber, 1984: 96. Finally, "Nur Herrenvölker haben den Beruf, in die Speichen der Weltentwicklung einzugreifen." Weber, 1984: 594. Weber's emphasis.

- Hadorn, Wilhelm (1913): "Reformierte Kirche". *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band 4: 2109–2115.
- Hanke, Edith (2001): "Erlösungsreligionen". In *Max Webers 'Religionssystematik'*. Herausgegeben von Hans G. Kippenberg und Martin Riesebrodt. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 209–226.
- Herzog, Johann Jakob (1854): "Calvin". In *Real-Encyclopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*. Stuttgart und Hamburg: Rudolf Besser. Band II: 511–538.
- Hoffman, A. (1910): "Gewissen". *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band 2: 1405–1409.
- Holl, Karl (1928)[1909]: "Calvin". In *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte*. Tübingen: Verlag J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band III: *Der Westen*.
- Kähler, M. (1899): "Gewissen". *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. Band 6: 646–654.
- Kampschulte, F.W. (1869): *Johann Calvin. Seine Kirche und sein Staat in Genf*. Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot.
- Kampschulte, F.W. (1899): *Johann Calvin. Seine Kirche und sein Staat in Genf*. Zweiter Band. Nach dem Tode der Verfasser herausgegeben von Walter Goetz. Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot.
- Köstlin, Julius (1883): *Luthers Theologie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und ihrem inneren Zusammenhange*. Stuttgart: Druck und Verlag von J.F. Steinkopf. Zweite Ausgabe.
- Köstlin, Julius (1899): "Gott". *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. Dritte Auflage. Band 6: 779–802.
- Lempp, Otto (1910): *Das Problem der Theodizee in der Philosophie und Literatur des 18. Jahrhunderts bis auf Kant und Schiller*. Leipzig: Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung.
- Lempp, Otto (1913): "Theodizee: I. Geschichtlich". *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band 5: 1177–1186.
- Luthardt, Christian Ernst (1867): *Die Ethik Luthers in ihren Grundzügen dargestellt*. Leipzig: Dörffling und Franke.
- Marcks, Erich (1892): *Gaspard von Coligny. Sein Leben und das Frankreich seiner Zeit*. Erstes Band. Stuttgart: Verlag von J.G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung, Nachfolger.
- Müller, Karl (1902): *Kirchengeschichte*. Tübingen und Leipzig: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Grundriss der theologischen Wissenschaften. Viertes Teil*.
- Ritschl, Albrecht (1896): "Ueber das Gewissen". In *Gesammelte Aufsätze*. Freiburg i. B. und Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J.C.B. Mohr. Neue Folge. 177–203.
- Rothe, Richard (1869): *Theologische Ethik*. Wittenberg: Harman Koelling. Zweite, völlig neu ausgearbeitete Auflage. Zweiter Band.
- Scheibe, Max (1897): *Calvins Prädestinationslehre. Ein Beitrag zur Würdigung der Eigenart seiner Theologie und Religiosität*. Halle a. S.: Max Niemeyer.
- Schenkel, Daniel (1856): "Gewissen". *Real-Encyclopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*. Stuttgart und Hamburg: Rudolf Besser. Band 5. 129–142.

- Schmidt, Hans Georg (1901): *Die Lehre vom Tyrannenmord. Ein Kapitel aus der Rechtsphilosophie*. Tübingen und Leipzig: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Schneckenburger, Matthias (1855): *Vergleichende Darstellung des lutherischen und reformirten Lehrbegriffs*. Stuttgart: Verlag der J.B. Metzler'schen Buchhandlung.
- Stähelin, R. (1863): *Johannes Calvin. Leben und ausgewählte Schriften*. Elberfeld: Verlag von R.L. Friderichs.
- Stähelin, R. (1897): "Calvin". *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. Dritte Auflage. Band 3: 654–683.
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1908): "Luther und die moderne Welt". In *Das Christentum. Fünf Einzeldarstellungen*. Leipzig: Verlag von Quelle & Meyer.
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1911): "Das stoisch-christliche Naturrecht und das moderne profane Naturrecht." In *Verhandlungen des Ersten Deutschen Soziologentages*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 166–192.
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1912): *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1913a): "Prädestination: III. dogmatisch." *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band 4. 1706–1712.
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1913b): "Theodizee: II. systematisch." *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band 5: 1186–1192.
- Troeltsch, Ernst (2001): *Schriften zur Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die moderne Welt (1906–1913)*. Herausgegeben von Trutz Rendtorff in Zusammenarbeit mit Stefan Pautler. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*. 8.
- Troeltsch, Ernst (2004): *Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit. (1906/1909/1922)*. Herausgegeben von Volker Drehsen in Zusammenarbeit mit Christian Albrecht. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*. 7.
- Weber, Max (1905): "Die protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus. II." *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*. XXI. 1–110.
- Weber, Max (1984): *Zur Politik im Weltkrieg. Schriften und Reden 1914–1918*. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang J. Mommsen in Zusammenarbeit mit Gangolf Hübinger. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. I/15.
- Weber, Max (1989): *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. Konfuzianismus und Taoismus. Schriften 1915–1920*. Herausgegeben von Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer in Zusammenarbeit mit Petra Kolonko. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. I/19.
- Weber, Max (1990) *Briefe 1906–1908*. Herausgegeben von M. Rainer Lepsius und Wolfgang J. Mommsen in Zusammenarbeit mit Birgit Rudhard und Manfred Schön. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. II/5.
- Weber, Max (1992) *Wissenschaft als Beruf/Politik als Beruf*. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang J. Mommsen und Wolfgang Schluchter in Zusammenarbeit mit Birgitt Morgenbrod. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. I/17.
- Weber, Max (1993) *Landarbeiterfrage, Nationalstaat und Volkswirtschaftspolitik. Schriften und Reden 1892–1899*. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang J. Mommsen in

- Zusammenarbeit mit Rita Aldenhoff. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. I/4.
- Weber, Max (2001) *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Die Wirtschaft und gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen und Mächte. Nachlaß. Teilband 2: Religiöse Gemeinschaften*. Herausgegeben von Hans G. Kippenberg in Zusammenarbeit mit Petra Schilm unter Mitwirkung von Jutta Niemeier. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. I/22–2.
- Weber, Max (2005) *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Die Wirtschaft und gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen und Mächte. Nachlaß. Teilband 4: Herrschaft*. Herausgegeben von Edith Hanke in Zusammenarbeit mit Thomas Kroll. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. I/22–4.

Chapter Six

Max Weber's Charismatic Prophets

There may be questions concerning the meaning of Weber's conception of charisma, but there is no question about Weber's source for it, because he specifically names him. In a major departure from his usual practice Weber not only refers to Rudolph Sohm, but he does so a number of times. In another change from his usual practice, Weber singles out Sohm for high praise. Accordingly, scholars justifiably believe themselves to be very fortunate that Weber indicated the origin for his notion of charisma.¹¹³ Unfortunately, many of them seem content with this knowledge and have not pursued some of its implications. One implication comes from the fact that Weber borrowed the notion of charisma from Sohm, but that he utilized it in a much different form than did Sohm. For Sohm, charisma was an important, but a relatively minor, weapon in his theological battle about the origins of Roman Catholicism and its doctrine of canon law. For Weber, it was not only important, but it was a major part in his tripartite conception of "Herrschaften". Another implication stems from Sohm's fundamental focus on the anonymous early Christian leaders. In contrast, Weber's primary focus is on political and ethical leaders. This specific concern prompted Weber to examine one group of charismatic leaders – the Old Testament prophets. In the "Religiöse Gemeinschaften" section of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* Weber writes: "Under 'prophet' we will here understand a pure *personal* carrier of charisma...."¹¹⁴ Weber not only emphasizes the personal aspects of charisma, but in the remainder of the sentence he will set out a number of charisma's other defining characteristics. While Weber will discuss many types of prophets in this section, his main focus is on the Old Testament Prophets. Unfortunately, Weber's comments here have been overlooked, with the single exception of Peter L. Berger. In "Charisma and Religious

¹¹³ Bendix 1977; Turner and Factor 1994; Kroll 2001; Riesebrodt 2001; Adair-Toteff 2005; Weber 2005. Weber lists a second, but rather minor, source – Karl Holl. Weber briefly refers to Karl Holl's 1898 doctoral dissertation *Enthusiasmus und Bussgewalt beim Griechischen Mönchtum*. Holl 1898; Weber 1922: 124.

¹¹⁴ "Charismaträger...." Weber 2001: 177. Abraham Malamat noted that while there is no exact word in the Old Testament to match "charisma", it is clear that there was something like a charismatic leader. Malamat 1981: 116–117.

Innovation: The Social Location of Israeli Prophecy” Berger maintained that: “One of the building blocks of Weber’s theory of charisma was his understanding of Israeli Prophecy.” Berger further suggested that Weber’s understanding of the Israeli Prophets came from a close reading of the leading German specialists.¹¹⁵ Berger was correct in both claims; unfortunately, in the fifty years since he published his article no one seems to have followed up on his suggestions and examined more closely Weber’s treatment of the Old Testament prophets. An examination of Weber’s discussions regarding the Old Testament prophets is important; it not only adds to the political and ethical components of Weber’s notion of charisma, but it also provides examples for his personal conception of the genuine political leader.¹¹⁶

This essay is divided into five sections. In the first I discuss Sohm’s notion of charisma and its importance for Weber and then I draw the contrasts between their conceptions. In the second I focus on Weber’s “sociological” notion of prophet and its embodiment of charisma. In the third I set out the general context for Weber’s understanding of the Old Testament prophets. In the fourth I examine the political and ethical importance of the three Old Testament Prophets who were the best examples for Weber’s conception of charisma. In the final section I show how these prophets affected Weber personally and how they served as influential examples for his conceptions of modern charismatic political leaders.

Weber, Sohm, and Charismatic Differences

There is no question that Rudolph Sohm was a source for Weber’s notion of charisma and there is little doubt that Sohm was a major influence on Weber’s overall thinking. Sohm was a widely respected legal scholar who wrote extensively on the nature and history of law. Furthermore, he had a well-deserved reputation as a teacher. He taught at Strassburg and at Freiburg, and at Leipzig from 1887 until his death in 1917. As a student Weber heard Sohm

¹¹⁵ Berger 1963: 940, 943. That Weber relied on his contemporaries for understanding the Old Testament prophets should be readily understandable. He admitted that he was not a theologian and so he relied on the Old Testament specialists, just as he relied on Protestant authorities when he was writing *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.

¹¹⁶ Since “Max Weber’s Notion of Charisma” appeared in 2005 in the *Journal for Classical Sociology* several things have been published which have prompted me to rethink Weber’s origins for his idea of charisma. First, the *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe* volume *Herrschaften* was published in 2005. Second, the *Gesamtausgabe* volume *Das Antike Judentum* appeared the same year. Third, the *Gesamtausgabe* volume containing Weber’s last lecture course on “Staatssoziologie” was published late in 2009.

lecture. This was during Weber's military service in Strassburg and he confirmed it in his academic "Lebenslauf" (Weber 2008: 352–353). Weber relied on a number of Sohm's legal writings, beginning with Sohm's 1880 essay "Fränkisches Recht und römisches Recht" as well as his 1888 article "Die Deutsche Genossenschaft" (Weber 2008: 214–215, 330, 405, 424). However, it was *Kirchenrecht*, Sohm's book on Church law that Weber utilized in developing his notion of charisma.

Weber cites Sohm for being his source for the notion of charisma at least seven times in four different works: twice in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, once in "Probleme der Staatssoziologie", twice in "Die drei reinen Typen der Herrschaften", and twice in *Allgemeine Staatssoziologie* (Weber 1922: 124; Weber; 2005: 735, 755; Weber 2009: 78–79). He compliments Sohm for being the first scholar to consider charisma from a purely historical point of view and he praises Sohm for offering an account of charisma that was "brilliantly developed" (Weber 2005: 755, 462).

Sohm discussed charisma in the first volume of his *Kirchenrecht* which was published in 1892. Sohm's major contention was that the Catholic notion of Church law was a contradiction in terms and that it fundamentally violated the original spirit of Christianity. (See Sohm 1892: 2–3). Sohm's thesis was provocative and was later challenged by the noted Church historian Adolf Harnack. Harnack argued that that Church law was not only a part of the early Church, but that the Church was able to survive only by developing a hierarchy and an authority based upon offices and doctrines. This debate was heated and extensive and is theologically important. Moreover, several commentators have suggested that this debate heavily influenced Weber. Both Wilfried Nippel and Thomas Kroll have suggested that Weber developed his notion of charisma in the context of this debate between Sohm and Harnack (Nippel 2000: 10; Kroll 2001: 53–54). While Nippel and Kroll were correct to point out the similarities and they were right to suggest that this theological debate had some influence on Weber, they overlook the major differences and accordingly ignore the importance that the Old Testament prophets play in Weber's conception of charisma.

Charisma, for Sohm, is the special, "personally" God-given gift of grace (Sohm 1892: 6, 54). Sohm insists that the charismatic person is the true "leader" of the true "church". The "true" church is the "Ecclesia"; it is the gathering of the believers in which God's gift of charisma operates (Sohm 1892: 18). This gathering need not be large; indeed, Sohm cites Matthew 18, 20 where Jesus will be there where "two or three gather in my name" (Sohm 1892: 20; Sohm 1912: 28–29, 49). According to Sohm, the "Ecclesia" differs from the institutional Church, not just in size but also in leadership. The

Roman Catholic Church is founded upon law, but the "Ecclesia" is based upon love. The Office of the Church demands "unfree" obedience, but the "Ecclesia's" charismatic leader asks for "free" recognition (Sohm 1892: 27). It is through prophecy that the Holy Spirit is called (Sohm 1892: 14, 30–32). Thus far there are a number of similarities between Sohm's notion of charisma and that of Weber, enough of them to prompt Kroll to announce that they are similar (Kroll 2001: 64). However, when one places these notions within their respective contexts, they are rather different. The context for Sohm was strictly theological and his sole purpose was to prove that Catholicism with its emphasis on church authority and canonical law is far removed from early Christianity. Roman Catholic doctrine maintained that the Church was an organization of believers and that the Church hierarchy had the divinely given authority to regulate and enforce all parts of religious life (Sohm 1912: 19–21). At the head of this organization stood the Pope; and he was the only person who could be a Christian in the "full sense of the word" – all others were "second class" Christians (Sohm 1912: 22). The Pope is infallible and has jurisdiction over every aspect of life, including scholarship and science (Sohm 1912: 31). Not only does canon law have no place in evangelical doctrine, but the true Ecclesia is a charismatic organization (Sohm 1912: 10, 50). In contrast to the Catholic Church, the Ecclesia is a "disorderly" organization; or as Sohm insists, it is "pneumatic anarchy" (Sohm 1912: 54, 61). Charisma is important to Sohm but primarily in his claim that there can be no theological justification for Church authority which is based upon canon law. The only true Christian "authority" is God-given charisma and that has nothing to do with political, legal, or religious orders (Sohm 1912: 47–49). In marked contrast Weber's conception of charisma is fundamentally political, and that is manifested in his use of prophets as examples of "charismatic carriers".

"Prophet" – "Sociologically Speaking"

In *Religiöse Gemeinschaften* Weber asks: "What is, sociologically speaking, a prophet?" He then answers: "By 'prophet' here we will understand a purely *personal* carrier of charisma, whose power of his mission is revealed by a religious *teaching* or a divine command."¹¹⁷ These teachings and commands were neither ordinary nor regular; as Julius Wellhausen, one of Weber's con-

¹¹⁷ "Wir wollen hier unter einem 'Prophet' verstehen einen rein *persönlichen* Charismaträger, der Kraft seiner Mission eine religiöse *Lehre* oder einen göttlichen Befehl verkündet". Weber 2001: 177.

temporaries insisted, the prophets were “warners” and “witnesses” (Wellhausen 1906: 4). Weber emphasizes that he is unconcerned with the question whether this is revealing an old revelation or a new one; or as he also puts it, whether this is a “religious renewer” or a “religious establisher”. What he is concerned with is emphasizing the “personal”, and he contrasts the “personal” of the prophet with the “office” of the priest. The priest offers salvation by virtue of his office in contrast with the prophet who does so by virtue of his personal charisma. This does not mean that a priest cannot have personal charisma; Weber admits that occasionally one does have it (Weber 2001: 178). Weber also contrasts the charisma of the magician with that of the prophet – the former works through an oracle or by dream divination – the latter by the “specific gift of the spirit” (Weber 2001 179). Wellhausen noted that the prophets did not speak from the law; but rather, from the spirit (Wellhausen 1906: 5). To emphasize again: the charismatic leader has specifically *personal* powers given by God.

To understand what Weber means by charisma, it is helpful to follow Weber himself who primarily set out his concept of charisma in contrast to the two other types of legitimate authority; namely, what he terms legal authority and traditional authority.¹¹⁸ Legal authority is based upon the foundation of rules and the capacity for competence; the operative word here is knowledge (Weber 1976: 125–126, 129). Legal authority is largely a modern phenomenon and it tends to replace traditional authority. Traditional authority is based upon the foundation of long-standing tradition and includes the important notion of privilege (Weber 1976: 135). Here, authority is based upon tradition; specific knowledge and rules are lacking. Legal authority is fully non-personal: the official follows his or her duty to base the decision upon rules, regardless who the person is (“ohne Ansehen der Person”) (Weber 1976: 129, Weber 2005a: 727). In contrast, the traditional authority is vested in the person, so that the patriarch or tribal leader has some degree of personal leeway in rendering his decision. However, Weber writes of legal authority being impersonal, by virtue of the impersonal office, and traditional authority being impersonal, by virtue of a long and impersonal tradition (Weber 2009: 90). Weber also insists that both legal authority and traditional authority rest on norms (Weber 2005: 247). Whereas the former norms are abstract laws and rules; the latter are specific and holy (Weber 2005: 247). Weber repeatedly emphasizes the pious aspect of tradition (Weber 2005: 248, 251, 257, 468, 257). Furthermore, Weber makes it abundantly clear that

¹¹⁸ For the difficulties in translating “Herrschaft” see Adair-Toteff 2005: 191–192. In the following translations I try to capture the best sense of the word, but I freely admit that there are other possible renditions.

the traditional leader is strictly bound by the past and by no means is entitled to make arbitrary decisions (Weber 1976: 130, Weber 2005a: 729). Both legal authority and traditional authority are marked by a sense of permanence, which Weber stresses by his repeated usage of various forms of “everyday”. He speaks of “everyday”, in the case of legal authority he speaks of “everyday forms” (“Alltagsformen”) and insists that rules apply “everyday” (“Alltag”). In the case of traditional authority, Weber writes about the “everyday beliefs of faith” (“Alltagsglauben”) (Weber 1976: 124, 126, 141–143). In the part of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* that has been published as *Religiöse Gemeinschaften* Weber employs even more forms of “everyday”. These include “ökonomischen Alltags” (“economic everyday”), “Alltagsinteressen” (“everyday interests”), “Alltagsordnung” (“everyday ordering”), “Alltagsethik” (“everyday ethics”), and “Alltagshandel” (“everyday trade”) and “Alltagskapitalismus” (“everyday capitalism”) (Weber 2001: 157, 323, 368, 312, 371; and Weber 2005a: 485). Both legal authority and traditional authority need and perpetuate a sense of permanence and both function well during ordinary times and under ordinary circumstances. Weber calls the patriarch the “natural leader of the everyday” and he refers to legal authority as maintaining a system of “calculable continuing needs” (Weber 2005: 753). Both types of authority flourish during ordinary times and require ordinary people. This is true whether they follow tradition like “traditional authority” or they follow rules like bureaucratic authority.

Extraordinary times, however, call for extraordinary people. People who seem to have charismatic authority appear primarily during periods of great unsettledness and upheaval. Times of crisis require special leaders – charismatic leaders. In Weber’s considered view, charisma is a radical, and even revolutionary, power. In “Drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft” Weber calls charisma “one of the greatest revolutionary powers in history” and in his last lecture course subtitled “Staatssoziologie” Weber says that charisma is a “revolutionary power from above”. There, he also refers to rationality and charisma as the “two great revolutionary powers” (Weber 2009: 92–95; see also Weber 1976: 142).

Charisma is revolutionary in part because it is the antithesis to legal authority. Unlike “rational” legal authority, charisma is “irrational”. Legal authority is impersonal and regular, whereas charismatic authority is personal and exceptional. Charismatic authority is also anti-traditional, because it breaks with what has always been. It not only breaks all traditional or rational norms; it also inverts all values. Weber cites Jesus’ insistence that “It is written but I say unto you” (Weber 1976: 141; Weber 2005a: 468; Weber 2005b: 653). Weber insists that “the old law is broken through new revela-

tion” and that the charismatic leader gives “new commands” (Weber 2009: 92–93, Weber 1976: 141). Charisma is also revolutionary because it is “the eternally new” (“Das ewig Neue”) (Weber 2005: 735). It is radical because of its extraordinariness. Weber continuously emphasizes charisma’s “extraordinariness” calling it the “außertägliche Qualität” (“extraordinary quality”) and (“außeralltägliche Character”) (“extraordinary character”) (Weber 2001: 740, Weber 2001: 122). He also refers to it as the “außeralltägliche Kraft” (“extraordinary power”) (Weber 2009: 90–91).¹¹⁹

Charisma’s extraordinariness also rests on its almost exclusive personal characteristic. Weber constantly refers to it as personal: it is the “personal authority” and it is “personally effective” (Weber 2005: 469, 467). It demands devotion or submission to the person and it is the belief or faith (“Glaube”) in the person (Weber 2005: 734, 740–741). Some of the charismatic leaders have specific powers: the charismatic magician has the “capacity for magic”, the charismatic war hero has performed heroic deeds, and the ancient charismatic demagogue had the power of his own words.¹²⁰ For these charismatic people, their powers are very personal in that they seem to belong to them, but it is different for the Old Testament prophets.

Weber and the Old Testament Prophets

Weber distinguishes between two different types of prophets. First, there is what he calls “exemplary prophets” and second, there is what he refers to as “ethical prophets”.¹²¹ Weber engages in his usual practice of accenting the contrasts between the two types, but it seems reasonable that there are overlaps; that is, a prophet can be regarded as both “exemplary” and “ethical”. People are drawn to the “exemplary” prophets because of who they are as *persons*. These prophets show the way to salvation by virtue of their own lives. Weber offers as examples, Zarathustra, Jesus, and Mohammed (Weber 2001: 178). People are drawn to the ethical prophets because of the “*doc-*

¹¹⁹ Weber refers to charisma as “außerwerktätlich” and “unwerttätlich” – two terms that resist translation but mean “out of the workday” and “not like a workday”.

¹²⁰ Weber 2005: 735–737. Weber often has Pericles in mind when he writes about the ancient demagogue. Weber goes to some lengths to remind his readers and listeners that the term ‘demagogue’ did not always have such an unpleasant sense and that he refers specifically to Pericles. Weber 2005: 507, 736–737 and Weber 1992: 191. For Weber’s discussion of the demagogue and Pericles, see Adair-Totef 2008. Eckhart Otto noted that for Weber “demagogue” carried no negative overtones. Weber 2005b: 608, note 2.

¹²¹ For a helpful discussion of Weber’s distinction between the two types, see Martin Riesebrodt, “Ethische und exemplarische Prophetie”. Riesebrodt 2001, especially 200–203.

trine” that they reveal or teach (Weber 2001: 178). This revelation or doctrine may be concrete or it could be abstract; in both cases, obedience is an “ethical duty” (Weber 2001:189). Weber identifies Buddha and the Old Testament prophets as examples of “ethical prophets”.¹²² The followers have an ethical duty to obey the doctrine, but the prophet must also be obedient and first respond to his “calling”. It is with the notion of calling that Weber’s sources offer important information.

The Old Testament prophets are “called” and that prompted some commentators such as Marti to refer to this calling as one’s “prophetic calling” (Marti 1900: XVII, see Marti 1900: XX). This calling is specific; Cornill refers to this as one’s “calling vision” (“Berufsvision”) and he cites the year in which the prophet was “called”.¹²³ Weber notes that this type of calling is radically different from the type of “calling” that is commonly used to describe people in academia, business, or in government. For these people, their “calling” (“Beruf”) is shown normally by their everyday experience, knowledge, and practice. This is why Weber calls the priest’s “Beruf” a “normal” one (Weber 2001: 214). In marked contrast, the truly religious charismatic person has a “special” “Beruf”, even “a special supernatural” ‘Beruf’ (Weber 2001: 173, Weber 2005: 460, see Lang 2001: 172). Duhm noted that the prophets were called by a higher being, that is, by God (Duhm 1903: XI, Duhm 1916: 82, Sellin 1912: 31, Hölscher 1914: 189). Giesebrecht refers to this as the “godly calling” (“göttlicher Beruf”) or “heavenly calling” (“himmlischer Beruf”) (Giesebrecht 1894: XI, Giesebrecht 1897: 24–25, Giesebrecht 1894: 52). These individuals were singled out and were given the special gift of being able to have an exchange with an “invisible world” (Duhm 1916: 82, 91). It was as if they had two natures; that is, one in which they could see the things that normal people could and another in which they could see God (Marti 1900: 164, 167, Gunkel 1913: 1869, Gunkel 1915: XXII). In any case, the prophets seemed to carry with them something secretive (Gunkel 1915: XX). Gunkel suggested that the fundamental experience of the prophets (the “Nabi”) was ecstasy and sometimes the term seemed to apply to anyone who had visions and heard things. Weber seems to have adopted this view from Gunkel, and to a lesser extent from Hölscher’s view (Weber 2005b: 384–385, 633–637). However, Gunkel was writing about the whole range of prophets and not just the great ones and Hölscher

¹²² It appears that Weber may be following Duhm here because Duhm specifically mentions Jeremiah and lists Buddha, Mohammed, as well as Paul as “prophetic forms”. Duhm 1889: 7.

¹²³ Cornill 1891: 133, 154, see Weber 2005b: 639. Sellin writes of the “hour” in which Jeremiah was called. Sellin 1912: 72.

was attempting to counter a highly rational conception of them. Duhm maintains that “Nabi” is not identical with “prophets” as it covers a slightly wider group of people (Duhm 1916: 81). Duhm sometimes regarded the prophets as ecstatic but other times seemed to think that they were not ecstatic but that the seers were (see Giesebrecht 1897: 55). Like Duhm, Weber insisted that the prophets never sought ecstasy (Duhm 1903: XI). Instead, it came to them, and Weber allowed that the prophets had it in varying degrees (Weber 2005b: 639, 632). Furthermore, Weber noted that Amos emphatically rejected the title of “Nabi” even if he did have visions (Weber 2005b: 386, Weber 2001: 179, see Sellin 1912: 31). But, as Giesebrecht argued, Amos had very few visions and was rarely ecstatic. For the most part, the great Old Testament prophets neither had visions nor were moved by ecstasy (Giesebrecht 1897: 38). Yet, there is a sense of something “otherworldly” in that the prophets were “called” and were given a mission (Weber 2001: 252). Weber refers to this simply by “missions” as in having a “prophetic mission” or a “religious mission” (Weber 2001: 203, 187). Other times, Weber refers to this as a “Sendung”, specifically, a “Godly mission” (Weber 2005: 462–464, 467, Giesebrecht 1897: 16, 19, 21, Hölsher 1914: 199, and Duhm 1916: 4). Even when Weber writes of the “personal mission” and the “personal effectiveness” of the charismatic person, he makes it very clear that this is neither the mission nor effectiveness of the *person*, but rather of *God* who has given the prophet this task.¹²⁴

Many of the prophets distanced themselves from others who claimed the title. Weber suggested that the “true” prophets were often peasants and almost all were outsiders (Weber 2005b: 622, 626). Yet, Jeremiah came from a famous family of priests (Duhm 1903: X). Like the official seers or royal priests, most of the professional prophets were regarded as frauds. Unlike priests and oracles, these prophets were reluctant to speak; indeed, they often indicated that God forced them to speak (Weber 2005: 633–635). In particular, Amos made it plain that he was forced to prophesize against his will (Sellin 1912: 31). Unlike the priests and seers, the prophet does not lie; rather, the prophet speaks the truth no matter what – God’s truth (Weber 2001: 192).

Certain of the prophets claimed not to be speaking in their own voices, but in God’s. Either God spoke directly through them or they retold what

¹²⁴ Weber 2005: 467. Riesebrodt notes Weber’s inconsistent usage of the terms “exemplary prophets” and “ethical prophets” and prefers to emphasize the notion of “mission” by calling the latter “ethische Sendungsprophetie”. Riesebrodt 2001: 200–203; see Weber 2005b: 510. Lang also differentiates between “Sendungsprophetie” and “exemplarischer Prophetie”. Lang 2001: 172.

God had said to them (Weber 2005b: 636). Gunkel went so far as to maintain that the prophets' "fundamental conviction was that these thoughts came directly from God" (Gunkel 1913: 1867). The prophets did not speak normally; instead, they "called" or "cried out" (Gunkel 1915: XXIV). What they said was not their own; but, it was God's "voice", his "word", his "mouth" (Weber 2005b: 643, 653, Duhm 1903: XXV, XXIX, XXXII; Gunkel 1915: XXVIII). Those who did speak from "their own hearts" were not considered true prophets; instead they were regarded as the "lying prophets" ("Lügenpropheten") (Gunkel 1913: 1867, Gunkel 1915: XXXIII). The true prophets regarded themselves simply as God's servants and they believed that they were God's instrument ("Werkzeug") (Weber 2005b: 616, 626). This was clearly true for Amos; it was less true for Isaiah. The latter tended to speak in the first person and used the third person in regard to God; the former constantly used variations of "God spoke" (Giesebrecht 1897: 41). God does not "speak about this or that"; his message is a simple "powerful unity" (Giesebrecht 1897: 49). Often, though, the message was not heard and the messenger reviled. It was rare that a prophet was offered remuneration, but when it was, the prophet refused it (Weber 2001: 179–180). Mostly the prophet is in fear for his life and his honor (Weber 2005: 615). This is especially true of the political prophets who draw attention to corruption and injustice and warn of the sinking power and the rising threats (Weber 2005: 654). Often they are forbidden to speak to the people or on the streets, and Weber likens this to the modern issue of freedom of the press (Weber 2005: 613). Prophets were seen as a threat to the existing ruler and there was some validity to this fear. The prophets themselves did not see their missions to replace one set of human orders with another, but to divinely usurp them (Weber 2001: 185). Unfortunately, most of the prophets were Cassandra-like in nature and, as Weber pointed out, most often the people did not heed them (Giesebrecht 1897: 14, Hölscher 1914:239, Weber 2001: 194).

Amos, Jeremiah, and Isaiah

These three prophets hold a special place in the history of Old Testament prophets and just as importantly they have a special meaning for Max Weber. They had certain key beliefs and convictions that animated their conduct and determined their lives. Amos is the oldest of the great Old Testament prophets and serves as the best introduction to certain of their characteristics. Jeremiah is the purest and illustrates the prophet at the "highest

perfection” and, according to Marianne Weber, held a particular fascination for her husband (Cornill 1891: 174, 154; M. Weber 1926: 605). Weber believed that Amos and Jeremiah were the “most powerful of the writing prophets” (Weber 2005b: 432). Isaiah is probably one of the most tragic of the prophets and, as I will show, plays a particularly important role in Weber’s own thinking (see Cornill 1891: 132). Finally, Weber himself makes considerable use of these three in his own writings on ancient Judaism.

Amos was a raw and harsh man who wished to live a simple life, but God “called” him and told him to prophesize (Weber 2005b: 307, 620–621; Sellin 1912: 29, 31; Duhm 1916: 94). Amos rejected the name “Nabi” and he insisted that he was no learned prophet nor did he belong to any community of prophets (Weber 2001: 180, Giesebrecht 1897: 7; Hölsher 1914: 196). God compelled him to speak because the people had turned against him. Instead, they lived immoral lives, practiced a perverse religion, and worshipped a cult-like, false God (Weber 2005b: 626–631; Sellin 1912: 32). The old values were gone; now it was the egoistical individual against what remained of the community, the rich against the poor, and the higher class against the lower one (Hölscher 1914: 192). The richer people would sell things at such inflated prices so that the poor were forced into slavery. This allowed the rich to spend more and more on drink – at the cost of the poor (Hölsher 1914: 204). Drunkenness was everywhere and orgies were frequent (Weber 2005b: 510). All of this prompted God to have Amos “speak” – but Amos almost always claimed that his words are God’s words (Hölsher 1914: 196). Amos’ speeches were not like those of the older “prophets” – he had no hallucinations and he did not speak in a half-understandable language. He was not forced to speak by some mystical power nor was he moved by some poetic force (Duhm 1916: 91). Nor did he preach by giving lengthy speeches. Instead, he spoke briefly with sharp, clear logic but with pathos and passion. His “truly, passionate anger stemmed” from the immorality of the people; this intensity prompted Duhm to call Amos “the prophet of anger” (Duhm 1916: 93, 95). All of the plagues that the people suffered – famine and drought, war and earthquakes – may have been sent by God but the people brought them on themselves because of their immoral acts (Hölscher 1914: 194; Weber 2005b: 551). God did not demand this or that – he demanded one, simple, but important, thing: justice (Hölsher 1914: 203). Amos warned of the “coming catastrophe” if the people did not return to God’s ways (Giesebrecht 1897: 11; Hölscher 1914: 196; Duhm 1916: 89).

Jeremiah also saw that his people had fallen into drunkenness and debauchery and he, too, wanted to save his people (Duhm 1903: XIII, XXIV). Like some of the other prophets, Jeremiah initially resisted God’s com-

mandment that he speak, saying that "I am too young" (See Sellin 1912: 63). Unlike Amos and some of the earlier prophets, Jeremiah seemed to care less about the community and cared more about the individual. That is why he spent so much time wandering the streets and alleys "testing" people (Duhm 1903: XIV, XXIII; Duhm 1916: 253). He apparently sought their "inner person" in hopes of finding something good; but he was almost always disappointed (Duhm 1916: 255–256). Duhm suggested that Jeremiah had little regard for the community with its "letter of the law" and instead concentrated on the individual who had the "spirit of ethics" (Duhm 1903: XIV; Sellin 1912: 64). Yet, Duhm also emphasized that Jeremiah was probably the most politically active and most politically influential of all of the great prophets (Duhm 1903: XVI–XVII).

If Amos came from a family of shepherds and Jeremiah from a family of priests, Isaiah came from a noble background (Duhm 1916: 145, 171). As was fitting for someone of that stature, it was incumbent upon him to fight against wrongs. Rather than doing so from any official position, Isaiah was determined to follow his calling as prophet (Marti 1900: XX). Perhaps with some justification, some people have suggested that Isaiah was the "prince" among the prophets, but much of this had to do with his specific task (Sellin 1912: 42). It was his duty to speak of the coming collapse and to constantly warn of the impending dark day of doom (Duhm 1916: 151, 157, 161). Instead of the typical prophetic complaint about injustice and the oppression of the poor, Isaiah was more concerned about the corrupting politics of the powerful (Hölscher 1915: 238, 244). Isaiah warned of the Assyrian threat but he also warned of the mistake of seeking Egypt's aid. It was not that he had some blind hatred of foreigners; rather, he had a full understanding of the political risks associated with accepting such help (Duhm 1916: 164, Sellin 1912: 135). The people had brought on this misfortune by seeking riches, power and honor rather than in being law-abiding and just (Marti 1900: XXI; Duhm 1916: 171, 174). If Isaiah had a defining objection to the people, it was his contempt for their overwhelming arrogance (Hölscher 1914: 249). All of these prophets objected not just to the way in which many of the Israelis chose to live their lives, they condemned them for their willful rejection of the agreement that they had with God. Weber was interested in them not only because of their historical and sociological importance, but because of their significance as political and ethical leaders.

Weber and Modern Prophets

Weber had completed his studies on Hinduism and Buddhism during the summer of 1916 and by the Fall he was working on ancient Judaism. He had been very interested in comparing the Eastern religions, but his interest in Judaism seemed even greater. Marianne testified that his study of the Old Testament prophets made a significant impact on her husband. Writing in her biography *Max Weber. Ein Lebensbild* she noted how he found the great Old Testament prophets exceptionally appealing, because they were the “first historically certifiable political demagogues” and their writings were the “earliest, immediately contemporary political pamphlets” (M. Weber 1926: 604). However, she noted that Weber’s interest in them was not purely scholarly; and she suggested that he was personally drawn to them. This was because they acted whenever great powers threatened their homeland (M. Weber 1926: 604). Marianne believed that of all of the prophets, it was Jeremiah who held the greatest fascination for her husband and for her. She wrote that Jeremiah was forced to speak and that of which he spoke was extremely powerful. However, Jeremiah’s words were met with contempt and ridicule. While “charisma was his privilege”, he had no interest in gaining sway over his disciples in the manner in which a Christian charismatic leader did. Instead, Jeremiah’s “pathos was inner loneliness”. Marianne wrote that when Max read to her about Jeremiah, she saw her husband’s own destiny.¹²⁵ There is much to be said for Marianne’s selection of Jeremiah as the most important prophet for her husband – especially the fact that Jeremiah was one of the most political of them. Yet, there are many things that speak against her choice. As Sellin pointed out, we know more about Jeremiah than virtually any other prophet and that he stands closest to us as a human being (Sellin 1912: 62). But, his psychological makeup is completely foreign to Weber’s; Jeremiah’s heart is warm and soft, and if he had not been called to become a prophet, undoubtedly he would have become a poet (Sellin 1912: 68; Hölscher 1914: 269, 275; Duhm 1916: 244). He possessed the greatest naiveté and his life was filled with a tension between duty and love, or as Schmidt wrote between the softness of his nature and the hardness of his task (Giesebrecht 1894: XI; Hölscher 1914: 269; Schmidt 1915: 201). Ernst Troeltsch, Weber’s friend and colleague, set out the opposition between Amos and Jeremiah in a work which he acknowledged relied heavily on Weber’s just published Hebraic study. In “Glaube und Ethos der hebräis-

¹²⁵ “Wenn er der Gefährtin abends daraus vorlas, so sah sie in manchem sein eignes Schicksal.” M. Weber 1926: 605.

chen Propheten” Troeltsch argued that Jeremiah embodied love and inner warmth, in contrast to Amos with his sense of force and the majesty of God (Troeltsch 1925: 46). Giesebrecht and Sellin also noted that Jeremiah had no majestic spirit and they pointed out that he lacked a sense of darkness and pessimism (Giesebrecht 1894: X, Sellin 1912: 68). While Jeremiah was an important prophet, he was not the best voice to warn against the approaching dark times. Instead that voice belonged to Amos. And, it was Amos who can serve as the best example for Weber and his belief in the urgent need for a modern charismatic prophet.

Perhaps more than any of the other prophets, Amos cared about nothing more than about morality (Wellhausen 1914: 107). As Wellhausen wrote: “Angry and destroying, making holy reality valid, she [the truth] decimates the illusion and the vain.”¹²⁶ Schmidt maintained that Amos rejected false equality and hopeless ideals, but was always concerned with justice and responsibility (Schmidt 1917: 43, 63, 69). Cornill believed that Amos had the greatest sense of righteousness and that he incorporated the moral law (“Sittengesetze”). Religious feeling was not a “comfortable resting pillow” (“bequeme Ruhekissen”) but was an “ethical demand” (“ethische Forderung”) (Cornill 1894: 44). Consequently, Amos spoke “hard words” (“harte Worte”) with “strong passion” (“heftige Leidenschaft”) (Gretzmann 1910: 322). Amos had sufficient grounds for his beliefs and he was certain of his warnings. (Smend 1899: 180). He recognized that it was his duty to use the power of his words to warn others of the impending dangers and to compel them to change their ways. It is mostly Amos’ concern for the future that seems to have drawn Weber’s attention the most.

As the war continued Weber became increasingly more pessimistic about Germany’s future, and with Germany’s loss and the resulting political upheaval he was even more concerned. In his post-war scholarly writings and in his later university lectures, Weber adhered to his dictum of avoiding making value judgments and instead offered mostly dispassionate accounts of general constitutional issues. However, in his open lectures he was very personal and extremely passionate about questions of leadership. He warned against childish idealism and romantic diletantism. He cautioned the older generation against its longing for an idealized past in which order and stability reigned. He warned the younger generation against yearning for a future utopia in which there would be freedom, justice, and equality for all. Most importantly, Weber warned of “false prophets”. Towards the end of *Politik*

¹²⁶ “Zornig, zerstörend macht sich die heilige Realität geltend; sie vernichtet den Schein und das Eitle.” Wellhausen 1906: 23.

als Beruf he spoke scathingly about the little “Kathederspropheten” of the auditoriums and the radical “dictators of the streets” (“Diktatoren der Straße”) (Weber 1992: 110, 223). Both types are dilettantes and they suffer from vanity and self-delusion (Weber 1992: 105, 176, 183). They take themselves too seriously and do not regard the situation seriously enough; instead of maintaining the “proper distance” (“Augenmaß”) to themselves and to the issues, they engage in “intellectual frivolity” (Weber 1992: 227–229). Worse still, they excuse whatever costly errors and deadly mistakes they make with the simple declaration that they have “noble intentions” (Weber 1992: 234). As the Old Testament prophets warned of the future, Weber warned the students not to anticipate the blooms of the summer day but should instead be prepared for the “polar night of icy darkness”.¹²⁷

Max Weber’s companion speech *Wissenschaft als Beruf* is primarily about the nature of the scholar, but it is also about the future of Germany. This is especially evident in the closing pages of the work where he speaks of Germany’s destiny and of the disenchantment of the world (Weber 1992: 109). He also speaks of the “swindle and self-delusion” of seeking mystical revelations in book stores and he warned again of the fanatical sects of the “Kathedersprophetie” (Weber 1992: 109–110). The “Kathederspropheten” were the modern equivalents to the “lying prophets”; so instead Weber invokes the “true prophets” and quotes the Isaiah-Oracle “Duma” (Isaiah, 21, 11/12):

Es kommt ein Ruf aus Seir in Edom: Wächter, wie lang ist es Nacht? Der Wächter spricht: Es kommt Morgen, aber noch ist es Nacht. Wenn ihr fragen wollt, kommt ein ander Mal wieder. (Weber 1992: 111).¹²⁸

Zu mir ruft’s von Seir: Wächter, wie weit in der Nacht, Wächter, wie weit in der Nacht? Spricht der Wächter: Es kommt Morgen und auch Nacht – Wenn ihr fragen wollt, fragt, kehre wieder, kommt! (Duhm 1902: 126).

As Marti pointed out, Edom was a perpetual wasteland and was in chronic need. Marti also noted that because the question is repeated, indicates the urgency of the situation (Marti 1900: 166). In Duhm’s opinion, day and night are symbolic and represent the ending of oppression and hunger and the beginning of freedom and happiness (Duhm 1902: 126–127; Marti 1900: 166). What struck Duhm, was the objectivity and neutrality and the insistence on factuality (Duhm 1902: 127). What struck both Duhm and Marti, was that

¹²⁷ Weber 1992: 251. Loewenstein, who heard both *Beruf* lectures, recounted how Weber had set out in “unmerciful clarity the thorn-filled path of the politician”. Loewenstein 1966: 34.

¹²⁸ From Seir in Edom comes a call: Watchman, how much longer is the night? The watchman speaks: The morning comes but it is still night. If you want to ask, come another time.

the watchman could not offer a clear answer, hence the suggestion for the person to come back and again ask (Duhm 1902: 127; Marti 1900: 166).

Weber immediately comments on this passage that we know that the Jews had asked and had waited for two thousand years, and that we also know of their heart-wrenching fate. The lesson that Weber says we should draw from this is that simply asking and waiting is insufficient by itself; instead, we must attend to our work and face the “demands of the day”. Implicit in Weber's comments is that the age of the Old Testament prophets who had placed all of their faith in God had long since passed. In Nietzsche's famous phrase, “God is dead”; or, in Weber's own admission that he was “unmusical in religious matters”, there is no God to help us. He believed that we must meet our fate alone. However, this recognition should not lead us to despair. It was Nietzsche who insisted that pessimism need not be just a symptom of decline and instead spoke of a “pessimism of strength”.¹²⁹ We are on our own to meet our fate; what we must have is intellectual honesty and political responsibility (Weber 1992: 110, 226). If we have both of those virtues and if we listen to our “Dämon”, then, as Weber says, “It is simple and easy...to hold on to life's threads.”¹³⁰ At the end of *Politik als Beruf* Weber insists that the person who can lead must not only be a “leader” (“Führer”), but also a “hero” (“Held”) (Weber 1992: 252). Malamet suggested that the Judges in the Old Testament were not just leaders, but they were also charismatic heroes (Malamet 1981: 113). And, they were “daemonic” – in Weber's sense.

It was Weber's scholarly source Hermann Gunkel who drew attention to the “daemonic” nature of the Old Testament prophets and their “tragic calling” (Gunkel 1913: 1872, 1867). But, it was Weber's close friend Karl Jaspers who wrote that the “daemonic” is found deep within certain special individuals and that it is the most powerful force that moves their entire being (Jaspers 1919: 169). There are, of course, significant differences between Max Weber and some of these Old Testament prophets; they were moved by their religious feelings, whereas Weber was moved by his love for Germany. However, Weber not only recognized kindred spirits, but he realized that their sense of conviction and responsibility and their passionate need to speak unpleasant truths was similar to the need for political leaders.¹³¹ For

¹²⁹ Nietzsche 1988: 12. See also Lawrence Scaff's penetrating comments. Scaff 1989, 68–71.

¹³⁰ Weber's use of “Dämon” can be taken as referring to one's “inner self.” Both Scaff and Wolfgang Schluchter point to Goethe, and it is the latter who suggests that it means “individuality” and “character”. Schluchter 2009: 15. The whole passage is: “Die aber ist schlicht und einfach, wenn jeder den Dämon findet und ihm gehorcht, der *seines* Lebens Fäden hält.” Weber 1992: 111.

¹³¹ Karl Loewenstein, who was twenty years old when he first met Weber in 1912 has given one of the best portraits of Weber the man. In 1964, he remembered that Weber was a “great,

him, the Old Testament prophets served as important examples of the truly charismatic leaders who tended to appear in troubled times. There is no question that Rudolph Sohm was the historical source for Weber's conception of charisma; but there should be little doubt Weber regarded the Old Testament prophets as exemplars for the modern political leader.

References

Weber's Writings

- Weber, Max (1922): *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1992): *Wissenschaft als Beruf/Politik als Beruf*. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang J. Mommsen und Wolfgang Schluchter in Zusammenarbeit mit Birgitt Morgenbrod. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *MWG I/17*.
- Weber, Max (2001): *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Religiöse Gemeinschaften*. Herausgegeben von Hans G. Kippenberg in Zusammenarbeit mit Petra Schilm unter Mitwirkung von Jutta Niemeier. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *MWG I/22–2*.
- Weber, Max (2005a): *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Herrschaft*. Herausgegeben von Edith Hanke in Zusammenarbeit mit Thomas Kroll. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *MWG I/22–4*.
- Weber, Max (2005b): *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. Das antike Judentum. Schriften und Reden 1911–1920*. Herausgegeben von Eckhart Otto unter Mitwirkung von Julia Offermann. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *MWG I/21*.
- Weber, Max (2008): *Zur Geschichte der Handelsgesellschaften im Mittelalter. Schriften 1889–1894*. Herausgegeben von Gerhard Dilcher und Susanne Lepsius. Tübingen: J.C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *MWG I/1*.
- Weber, Max (2009): *Allgemeine Staatslehre und Politik (Staatssoziologie). Unvollendet. Mit- und Nachschriften 1920*. Herausgegeben von Gangolf Hübinger in Zusammenarbeit mit Andreas Terwey. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *MWG III/7*.

Old Testament Sources

NOTE: Where possible I have used the sources that Weber explicitly cited or have used other works by those authors or works with which he was likely to have been familiar. See Weber 2005b: 607–608, note 217.

Bousset, Wilhelm (1903): *Das Wesen der Religion. Dargestellt an ihrer Geschichte*. Halle a. S.: Verlag von Gebauer-Schwetschke Druckerei und Verlag.

volcanic, passionate man” and that his “volcanic temperament was constantly breaking through”. Loewenstein maintained that Weber was one of the most powerful speakers that he had ever heard. Loewenstein 1966: 30–33. Loewenstein does not explicitly say whether he regarded Weber as possessing charisma, but it seems clear enough that he, and many others, thought he did.

- Cornill, Carl Heinrich (1891): *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*. Freiburg i. B.: Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Grundriss der Theologischen Wissenschaften*. Zweiter Teil. Erster Band.
- Cornill, Carl Heinrich (1894): *Der israelitische Prophetismus. In fünf Vorträgen für gebildete Laien geschildert*. Straßburg: Verlag von Karl J. Trübner.
- Duhm, Bernhard (1889): *Über Ziel und Methode der theologischen Wissenschaft. Antrittsvorlesung*. Basel: Benno Schwabe. Schweihauserische Verlagsbuchhandlung.
- Duhm, Bernhard (1902): *Das Buch Jesaja*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. Zweite verbesserte Auflage. *Handkommentar zum Alten Testament*. III. Abteilung, *Die prophetischen Bücher*, 1. Band.
- Duhm, Bernhard (1903): *Das Buch Jeremia*. Tübingen und Leipzig: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Duhm, Bernhard (1916): *Israels Propheten*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 2. Verbesserte Auflage.
- Giesebrecht, Friedrich (1894): *Das Buch Jeremia*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. *Handkommentar zum Alten Testament*. III. Abteilung, *Die prophetischen Bücher*. 2. Band, 1. Teil.
- Giesebrecht, Friedrich (1897): *Die Berufsbegabung der Alttestamentlichen Propheten*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.
- Gretzmann, Hugo (1910): *Die älteste Geschichtsschreibung und Prophetie Israels (von Samuel bis Amos und Hosea)*. Übersetzt, erklärt und mit Einleitung versehen von Hugo Gretzmann. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Gunkel, Hermann (1913): "Propheten. II. Seit Amos". *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band IV: 1866–1886.
- Gunkel, Hermann (1915): "Einleitung." In Schmidt 1915. VIII–LXXII.
- Hölscher, Gustav (1914): *Die Profeten. Untersuchungen zur Religionsgeschichte Israels*. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrich'sche Buchhandlung.
- Marti, Karl (1900): *Das Buch Jesaja*. Tübingen Freiburg i. B. und Leipzig: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Schmidt, Hans (1915): *Die großen Propheten. Übersetzt und erklärt von Hans Schmidt. Mit Einleitung versehen von Hermann Gunkel*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. *Die Schriften des Alten Testaments*. Zweite Abteilung. Zweiter Band.
- Schmidt, Hans (1917): *Der Prophet Amos. Sechs Vorlesungen an einem Kriegshochschulkurs*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Sellin, Ernst (1912): *Der alttestamentliche Prophetismus. Drei Studien*. Leipzig: A. Deichert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung.
- Smend, Rudolf (1899): *Lehrbuch der alttestamentlichen Religionsgeschichte*. Freiburg i. B., Leipzig and Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Zweite umgearbeitete Auflage.
- Wellhausen, Julius (1906): "Die Israelitisch-Jüdische Religion". In *Die Christliche Religion. Mit Einschluss der Israelitisch-Jüdischen Religion. Die Kultur der Gegenwart. Ihre Entwicklung und ihre Ziele*. Teil I, Abteilung IV. Herausgegeben von Paul Hinneberg. Berlin und Leipzig: Druck und Verlag von B.G. Teubner. 1–40.
- Wellhausen, Julius (1914)[1894]: *Israelitische und Jüdische Geschichte*. Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer. Siebente Ausgabe.

Other Sources

- Adair-Totef (2005): "Max Weber's Charisma." *Journal of Classical Sociology*. Vol. 5. Issue 2. 189–204.
- Adair-Totef (2008): "Max Weber's Pericles: The Political Demagogue." *Max Weber Studies*. Vol. 7. No. 2. 147–162.
- Berger, Peter (1963): "Charisma and Religious Innovation: The Social Location of Israeli Prophecy." *American Sociological Review*. Vol. 28. No. 6. 940–950.
- Bendix, Reinhard (1977)[1960]: *Max Weber. An Intellectual Portrait*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hanke, Edith und Mommsen, Wolfgang J. (2001): *Max Webers Herrschaftssoziologie*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Hatscher, Christophe R. (2000): *Charisma und Res Publica: Max Webers Herrschaftssoziologie und die römische Republik*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
- Holl, Karl (1898): *Enthusiasmus und Bussgewalt. Beim Griechischen Mönchtum*. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs' Buchhandlung.
- Jaspers, Karl (1919): *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*. Berlin: Verlag von Julius Springer.
- Kippenberg, Hans G. und Riesebrodt, Martin, Herausgeber (2001): *Max Webers "Religionssystematik"*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Kroll, Thomas (2001): "Max Webers Idealtypus der charismatischen Herrschaft und die zeitgenössische Charisma-Debatte." In Hanke und Mommsen. 47–72.
- Lang, Bernhard (2001): "Prophet, Priester, Virtuose." In Kippenberg und Riesebrodt. 167–192.
- Loewenstein, Karl (1966): "Persönliche Erinnerungen an Max Weber." In *Max Weber. Gedächtnisschrift der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München zur 100. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages 1964*. Herausgegeben von Karl Engisch, Bernhard Pfister, Johannes Winckelmann. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 27–38.
- Malamat, Abraham (1981): "Charismatische Führung im Buch der Richter." In *Max Webers Studie über das antike Judentum. Interpretation und Kritik*. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang Schluchter. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 1981. 110–133.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (1988): "Versuch einer Selbstkritik." *Die Geburt der Tragödie*. Berlin: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag de Gruyter. *Kritische Studienausgabe*. Band 1.
- Nippel, Wilfried (2000): "Charisma und Herrschaft." In *Virtuosen der Macht. Herrschaft und Charisma von Perikles bis Mao*. Herausgegeben von Wilfried Nippel. München: Verlag C. H. Beck. 7–22.
- Otto, Eckart (2002): *Max Webers Studien des Antiken Judentums*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Riesebrodt, Martin (2001a): "Charisma." In Kippenburg und Riesebrodt. 151–166.
- Riesebrodt, Martin (2001b): "Ethische und exemplarische Prophetie." In Kippenburg und Riesebrodt. 193–208.
- Scaff, Lawrence A. (1989): *Fleeing the Iron Cage. Culture, Politics and Modernity in the Thought of Max Weber*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Schluchter, Wolfgang (2009): "Die Entzauberung der Welt": Max Webers Sicht auf die Modernen". In Wolfgang Schluchter, *Die Entzauberung der Welt. Sechs Studien zu Max Weber*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 1–17.
- Sohm, Rudolf (1892): *Kirchenrecht. Erster Band. Die geschichtlichen Grundlagen*. Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot.
- Sohm, Rudolf (1912): *Wesen und Ursprung des Katholizismus*. Leipzig und Berlin: Verlag B.G. Teubner.
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1925) [1916]: "Glaube und Ethos der hebräischen Propheten." In *Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte und Religionssoziologie*. Herausgegeben von Dr. Hans Baron. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Pauls Siebeck). *Gesammelte Schriften*. Band IV. 34–65.
- Turner, Stephen P. (2003): "Charisma Reconsidered." *Journal of Classical Sociology*. Vol. 3. 5–26.
- Weber, Marianne (1926): *Max Weber. Ein Lebensbild*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Chapter Seven

Weber and “Kulturprotestantismus”

Max Weber’s *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* is regarded as a “classical text.” However, Heinz Steinert has observed, “everyone knows it, but nobody reads it.” (Steinert 2010: 11). Steinert insisted that if we do read it, that we will understand it only if we know its historical context (Steinert 2010: 13, 16–17, 31). The historical context of *Die protestantische Ethik* is, as he emphasizes, *protestantisch*. To understand *Die protestantische Ethik* we need to understand what Protestantism was for Weber and for Weber’s Germany. The critical need for this historical understanding of Protestantism is demanded by a reading of the very first pages. The first part is entitled “Das Problem”, but as Steinert observes, Weber does not begin with a statement of a problem; he begins by introducing “doubtful statistics” regarding the economic and social differences between Protestants and Catholics in Germany. These statistics were taken from the recent work by Weber’s former student Martin Offenbacher regarding the southern German state of Baden and are buttressed by his own, earlier research on East Prussia (Steinert 2010: 42). These statistics are designed to show that Protestants emphasize the ethic of work and that Catholics do not. This belief in the superiority of Protestantism was not peculiar to Weber; rather, it was embedded in German culture throughout most of the nineteenth century. Steinert insists that to comprehend Weber’s writing, we need to understand its culture, meaning that we must be familiar with the relevant traditions and controversies. The tradition that Steinert has in mind is “Kulturprotestantismus” and the controversy that Steinert refers to is the “Kulturkampf.” “Kulturprotestantismus” refers to the belief in the greatness of Protestant theology and culture. Weber insisted that he was not religious, but he was well-versed in the culture of German Protestantism. Weber was brought up in a Protestant household and he continued to be interested in Protestant religion and culture. He frequently published his writings in “Die Christliche Welt”, one of the main organs of Protestant political culture. At Heidelberg he was a very close friend and colleague of the Protestant theologian Ernst Troeltsch and he was a member of the Eranos-Kreis, which was devoted to investigating religious questions (Steinert 2010: 51).

"Kulturkampf" refers to the great "Protestant offensive" in the struggle between the two Christian Confessions over the issue of authority: State or Church? (Steinert 2010: 27). While this controversy was more or less confined to the 1870s, its after effects were still apparent when Weber was writing *Die protestantische Ethik*.

Steinert reminds us that while we must accept the edition of *Die protestantische Ethik* that is found in the 1920 edition of the *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* as the "definitive work", we must also remember that it was written as a two-part essay during 1904 and 1905. While Weber made important additions to the 1920 version, it is fundamentally a turn of the century work. Consequently, it predates the First World War, the Russian revolutions, and the German ones. Steinert also reminds us that it is centered primarily on "Arbeit als Beruf" and insists that the 1920 "Vorbermerkung", with its emphasis on Occidental rationality, "definitively does not belong" to *Die protestantische Ethik* (Steinert 2010: 30). He maintains that only by recognizing these points and understanding its context can we understand this work. He also insists that Weber's writing may be clothed as a "scholarly investigation" but, is in fact, really a "Kampfschrift." It is not a scientific account but is a religious pamphlet – one designed to show the superiority of Protestantism. Steinert may not be completely correct in his analysis; but he is certainly right to insist that we put "*protestantische*" back into *Die protestantische Ethik*.

It is my intention to honor Heinz Steinert by adding to his work which stresses the considerable importance that "Kulturprotestantismus" had for Max Weber. I will first build upon Steinert's brief treatment of "Kulturprotestantismus." Second, I will add to his short discussion of Bismarck's "Kulturkampf." Third, I will discuss four of the most important and relevant cultural speeches which were given in honor of Luther's 400th birthday. The speeches were given by Julius Köstlin, Albrecht Ritschl, Adolf Harnack, and by Heinrich von Treitschke, one of the greatest Protestant politicians. In the fourth section, I will discuss the impact that he had on Max Weber. Weber had a very complex reaction to Treitschke as a man and to his thinking. Like his contemporaries, Weber was immersed in the discussions about Protestantism and culture; but for him, Treitschke practically embodied some of the beliefs and values of Protestantism, culture, and politics. Consequently, nineteenth-century German Protestantism is one of the most important keys to unlocking the text of *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*.

“Kulturprotestantismus”

The term “Kulturprotestantismus” is problematic. While most scholars agree that the term is polemical and that it was used to justify the belief in the cultural superiority of Protestantism over Catholicism, “Kulturprotestantismus” does have many meanings (Graf 1984: 214–215; Hübinger 1994: 7). There is also some question about how long it has been in use; some trace it back to 1920 while Steinert seems to suggest its origins are more recent. This claim that it is more recent is supported by the fact that in the third edition of the six-volume *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* there is no separate entry for “Kulturprotestantismus.” (RGG III). There is also the issue of who coined the term; Friedrich Wilhelm Graf quotes from Manfred Schick’s 1970 dissertation that the originator of the term has not yet been discovered (Graf 1984: 214). Finally, there is the question about the beginnings as well as the duration of “Kulturprotestantismus”, with some scholars suggesting that it ranged from 1900 to 1914 while others have insisted that it began about a decade earlier. Still others consider that “Kulturprotestantismus” began as a movement when the “Protestantenverein” was first formed around 1865 while still others suggest that it covers an epoch; from Schleiermacher to Troeltsch (Graf 1984: 214–215; Hübinger 1994: 26).

It is to Schleiermacher’s credit that religion was no longer despised by the cultured and the intellectuals and it is to Hegel’s credit that theology could be understood historically. It is to the credit of both of them that their students took that positive interest in theology and religion and transformed it from being simply a matter of faith into the subject of serious scholarly concern. This was demonstrated in a number of ways, first, by the new journals that the students of Schleiermacher and Hegel founded. Although the editors and contributors to journals, such as the *Theologische Jahrbücher* and the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, held differing viewpoints that represented their schools; they all shared the interest in developing an historical account of Christianity. Second, this is manifested by a number of historical works, such as *Leben Jesu*, by David Strauß, and the multi-volume history of dogma by F.C. Baur and the massive history of the Church by August Neander. Third, it is shown by the existence of a scholarly encyclopedia; several scholars had this idea and it became the *Real-Encyclopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*. This eighteen volume work was to have been under the editorship of Matthias Schneckenburger, who figures prominently in *Die protestantische Ethik*; but his early death meant that his influence was restricted primarily to the first volume (Hundeshagen: 1860: Band13: 618; Sieffert 1899: Band 7: 786). Fourth, scholars turned their atten-

tion to Luther's life and work. According to Adolf Harnack, two of the most important treatments of Luther's biography and theology were the books by Julius Köstlin and Harnack's father Theodosius (Harnack, A. 1890: 700, note 2). According to Theodosius Harnack, Luther had two conceptions of God: the hidden God and the revealed one. The first is the "deus absconditus" that will also be found particularly in Calvin and, by extension, Max Weber. This Deity is the creator God who cannot be fathomed. This is also the Deity that Luther refers to as the "God outside of Christ". This Deity is in contrast to the "God in Christ"; that is, the "Savior God". The first is the God of wrath ("Zorn"); the second is the God of love ("Liebe") (Harnack, T. 1927: Band I: 85–87, 93, 94, 96, 102–103). The first God is the God of predestination, who out of wrath has damned people to Hell: He is to be feared. However, Harnack maintains that Luther gave up this unconditional determinism soon after 1525. Instead of maintaining that most people were eternally damned, Luther now believed that God wants all to be saved. Instead of unconditional wrath there is unconditional love. This is Luther's "anti-predestination" doctrine which then lays great weight on the notion of the "eternal, fatherly, grace giving" will. (Harnack, T. 1927: I: 111–112, 136, 145, 166–168, 178–179).

Although Harnack's *Luthers Theologie* was important and influential, the writings by Julius Köstlin were probably more important. Köstlin was partially responsible for the beginning of the Weimar edition of Luther's works as well as the later and much shorter Braunschweig edition (Eck 1912: Band III: 1580). Besides writing all three lengthy entries on Luther for the *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche* he also wrote two massive works on Luther. In his entry on Luther for the first edition Köstlin reasonably complained that no one had yet provided a full scientific account of Luther's theology (Köstlin 1857: Band 8: 617). Köstlin's entry was scientific and objective; however, despite its 40 pages in length, it was not a full account. The response to this entry was so overwhelming that Köstlin decided to write his biographical and theological works on Luther. It was with some pride and a fair amount of justification that Julius Köstlin could claim to have offered the first complete and scientifically written Luther biography (Köstlin 1881: Band 9: 74). He was referring to his two volume *Martin Luther, sein Leben und seine Schriften*. Köstlin did not intend his biography to appeal only to other scholars; he wrote it more for popular consumption. However, he intended his two volume work *Luthers Theologie* to be read by educated people. This two volume work appeared in 1863 with a second edition in 1883.

Köstlin’s *Luthers Theologie* can be said to be divided into three parts. Part one is devoted to setting out Luther’s life until approximately 1523, thereby chronicling Luther’s early years. These years include his life as a monk and as a professor. And, they especially include his many vigorous fights against the Catholic Church. The second part focuses on Luther’s life from roughly 1523 until his death. Köstlin devotes most of this part to discussions concerning Luther’s theological disputes with other Reformers. The third part is Köstlin’s attempt to provide a systematic discussion of Luther’s theology.

In part one, Köstlin shows Luther’s “negative” side. That is, he shows how and why Luther’s antagonism towards the Pope and the Church prompted him to insist on its radical reformation. Köstlin aptly demonstrates that Luther’s complaint was not with the overall practice of Indulgences; rather, he was concerned with the Pope’s own misuse of that practice as well as his countenance of others’ abuse of it (Köstlin 1883a: I 180–247). This misuse prompted Luther to question the Church’s authority, both in the personal form of the Pope and in the institutional form of the Catholic Church. As Köstlin repeatedly stresses, Luther’s objections were not capricious but were firmly based upon Scripture. Thus, based upon the Bible, Luther questioned the Catholic account that provided Peter with the sole authority over religious matters. In Luther’s opinion, it was bad enough that the Pope claimed control over both churchly and earthly realms. But, it was even worse in that the Pope demanded total “oriental submission.” Furthermore, as an institution the Church tried to justify this use of Papal force, which Luther referred to as the “tyranny of the hierarchy.” In other passages, Luther is more specific, calling it the “Roman hierarchy.” (Köstlin 1883a: Band I: 212, 253–259, 267–271. See also 342–346). Furthermore, Köstlin shows that Luther had not only a firm understanding of both the Old and the New Testament but of the Church Fathers as well. And, he used that knowledge against the abuses by the Pope and by the Church. Consequently, Luther had considerable respect for Moses and the Law; it is just that Christ and grace replaced them. Furthermore, Köstlin shows how much Luther understood the teachings of the Church Fathers. He shows how much Luther took from Augustine and from other mystics. His latter rejection of mysticism was only partial: he always believed in mystic’s sense of Jesus’ inner dwelling; he rejected the extreme subjectivity of certain mystically inclined people.¹³²

Köstlin details Luther’s objections against the “traditional” church practices. Thus, he argues against the church practice of celibacy and its refusal

¹³² Köstlin, 1883: Band I, 139–140, 145, 153, and II, 75, 243, 259–263. The question of Luther’s mysticism in general and his use of Tauler in particular, are crucial issues for Max Weber.

to allow marriage. He also takes it to task for the practices of general Mass and private confession. He condemns the church practices of praying to the Virgin Mary and the saints for protection and intercession. Finally, he argues against the traditional church belief in Purgatory. Köstlin again underscores Luther's contention that his arguments are not merely his; rather, that they rest upon the authority of Scripture. And, the Catholic Church cannot claim to be a higher authority than the Bible (Köstlin 1883a: Band II: 4–33, 50).

In the third part Köstlin discusses Luther's positive theology. Most important is Luther's insistence that the sole authority is the "Word", that is, Holy Scripture. Köstlin cites Luther's insistence that it is better to have more faith in a lay person who acts in accordance to the Bible than it is to have faith in the Pope who does not. In Luther's view, grace and truth belong to Jesus and not in the hand of any person (Köstlin 1883a: Band I: 246, 277, 281). The Bible is the norm and the source for how a Christian should conduct his or her life. The Bible is, for Luther, the "objective" word of God and it contains the real truth (Köstlin 1883a: Band I: 249, 252–255, 286). The Bible, according to Luther, tells us to have faith in God and that the only way to heaven comes through Jesus Christ. Thus, Luther discounts the importance of the notion of a church and he bases this in part on Jesus' remark that where two or three come together that is where he will be. The church is nothing more or less than the community of the holy ones; that is the community of the believers (Köstlin 1883a: Band II: 434–436, 444, 534–536). Köstlin's account of Luther's positive theology lacks some force; Köstlin gives a far better picture of Luther as critic and fighter.

For many German theologians, Köstlin's interpretation of Luther's theology was more influential than that of Harnack. However, Harnack's interpretation seems to have had more of an impact on Troeltsch. It is likely that Max Weber's discussion in the *Die protestantische Ethik* of the two Gods relies on Ernst Troeltsch's recommendation of Harnack's *Luthers Theologie*. In his important contribution on Luther and the modern world in *Das Christentum* from 1908, Troeltsch writes that in his opinion, Harnack's presentation is the best to date (Troeltsch, 1908: 161). What is odd is that Troeltsch had not even mentioned Harnack's work in his discussion of Luther in his 1906 edition of *Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit*. If more people had adopted Harnack's views, the "Kulturkampf" may not have been totally avoided but many of its ugly episodes might have been minimized.

The "Kulturkampf"

Luther's theological concern about religious issues in the sixteenth century had prompted him to take issue with Church authority; by the nineteenth century political issues were beginning to cast doubt on religious authority. While the German Revolution of 1848 never materialized, many of the liberal sentiments that underlie it continued for decades. At the beginning of the 1870/1871 War there was an outpouring of national sentiment. Bismarck wished to take advantage of such feelings of unity to extend northern Germany's influence to the south. While the Constitution of 1871 was a compromise of sorts, Bismarck was able to consolidate power over almost all of Germany. As Nipperdey writes, after 1871, there were two major issues that concerned Germans: one was the extension of the German Constitution from just a document to something more significant which would control peoples' lives (Nipperdey 1998: 75, 85). The other was the "Kulturkampf." This was a struggle between Protestants and Catholics and has been described as a conflict between state and church (Hartmann 1995: 365). It revolved around the issue of authority. Which had the higher authority: the State or the Church? Rudolf Sohm noted that some educated Catholics strongly objected to the Papal claim (Sohm 1888: 179; Mulert 1913: Band V: 1432–1434). However, most German Catholics believed that they owed their allegiance not to Germany, but to "over the mountains" – meaning to Rome.

Originally, the term "Ultramontanism" had only a geographical meaning: "beyond the mountain" and it stemmed from the Middle Ages when German students would go "over the mountains" to study at Bologna and other schools (Beurath 1908: Band 20: 215; Mulert 1913: Band V: 1430). But, by 1871 it had begun to take on political and religious overtones. The origin of the conflict can be centered on the doctrine of Papal infallibility which the Vatican announced in July 1870.¹³³ The doctrine was based upon the "absolute certainty" of the supreme wisdom of the Pope when he spoke "ex cathedra" and therefore demanded "absolute respect." (Köhler 1910: Band II: 782). Furthermore, this demand for absolute obedience was interpreted to mean obedience to the Pope in religious and moral matters, but also in every other matter as well. In short, the "Roman question" had to do with the resurgence in the belief in the Pope's domination of the world. (Nipperdey 1998: 364–365, 370; Beurath 1908: Band 20: 217). Thus, Harnack suggested that on the basis of the Pope's claims, one could choose the year 1870

¹³³ This was the latest in a series of controversial decrees; the first was the decree of 1854 regarding the Virgin birth which was followed by the one ten years later which rejected modern principles. See Nipperdey 1998: 428.

as the founding of the Papacy. The Pope had ruled over not just the Church but over the entire world in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, so the claim was that the contemporary Pope wanted to do the same. (Harnack 1911: 213). The term "Kulturkampf" began to circulate in 1872; the high point occurred two years later with assassination attempts on Bismarck's life by Catholic supporters (Foerster 1912: Band VI: 1810). By the late 1870s, however, the liberal era was over and the stridency of the "Kulturkampf" had ebbed to some degree.¹³⁴ However, the Bismarckian sense of nation and the belief in progress increased while Catholics continued to believe in internationalism and Papal authority.

Luther's Commemoration

Probably the single most important year for "Kulturprotestantismus" was 1883, the 400th commemoration of Luther's birth. This celebration was partially a reaction to Catholicism, but more so, it was the outpouring of immense pride in this great German. Celebrations were held everywhere – in large cities and small towns. Virtually every major thinker was asked to give a speech. However, each celebration and every speech needs to be considered in relation to the "Kulturkampf." That is why there is so much emphasis on Luther's enormous contributions to every aspect of German life; not just theologically, but literary, scientifically, and even politically.

There were numerous speeches that deserve attention, but here I consider the four given by Köstlin, Ritschl, Harnack, and Treitschke. All four speeches emphasized Luther's greatness and in varying degrees all four included defences against some of the Catholic charges. However, each of the four speakers stressed what he thought most important about Luther and his legacy.

If the other speeches were to emphasize Luther's massive contributions to Germany, Köstlin's speech was intended to provide a far more personal picture of him. Despite having published the massive biography that showed Luther in all his complexities as well as publishing the two-volume work treating Luther's detailed theology, Köstlin took pains in his speech to show that fundamentally Luther was a person who believed in the good and simple German traits and who acted according to the dictates of his conscience.

¹³⁴ While there was considerable resistance by numerous Catholic teachers and officials, Nipperdey insists that the "Ultramontanists" won. They rejected the progress of the modern world and the "god of the people", and instead embraced tradition and the hierarchical authority of the Church. Nipperdey 1998: 428, 431, 436.

In this, he was going back to his entry on Luther in the first edition of the *Real-encyklopädie* (Köstlin 1860: Band 8: 576.). Köstlin insisted that despite Luther's education and despite his fame, he never forgot that he was nothing more than a son of a German peasant. Moreover, he never forgot that he was a man of the people (Köstlin 1883b: 3, 4, 72). He was brought up with the belief that God was loving and merciful and he continued to hold that belief while he pursued his studies in philosophy. He was not very interested in typical disputes and he tended to approve of the values in the new humanism. However, the sudden death of a close friend was such a shock that he temporarily lost that belief and took the vows of a monk. At the Erfurt monastery Luther learned that his early belief in God's love was naïve; instead, God's fundamental essence was power and will (Köstlin 1883b: 5–9, 15). Luther's basic hope and faith in God's goodness was replaced by the belief in the Church's form and authority. But, during this time he also began to read the mystic Tauler and while he took from him the mystic's belief in the inner striving for the union with God he rejected the mystic's metaphysical inclinations as empty and abstract. In the same way, Luther objected to scholastic philosophy as being both too abstract and too subtle (Köstlin 1883b: 19–20, 16, 61, 65). Köstlin paints Luther's move towards reform as a move away from that which is abstract and foreign to something more simple and innate. That is why Köstlin emphasizes Luther's sense of conscience. When asked to recant, Luther said that he would not; when demanded to desist, Luther maintained that he could not. It was not a matter of external Church authority but was a matter of internal belief formed by his own reading of the Gospel. Furthermore, he rejected the attempt by anyone to substitute Luther's authority for that of the Church: "You must not be Luther's disciple but Christ's" (Köstlin 1883b: 23–25, 30, 34, 38, 42, 55). It was a matter of individual thought and faith, hence he insisted on freedom of conscience – claiming that "thinking is toll free". Because Luther believed that each person must listen to God, he believed it important to ensure that each person could read the word of God; hence, his translation into simple, natural, German (Köstlin 1883b: 43, 53, 57, 70–71). In his simple, truly human manner, Luther represented the simple and truly human German "Volk" – and, this is what Köstlin wished to remind his audience (Köstlin 1883b: 4, 75).

The second speech to be considered was given by Albrecht Ritschl. Despite the great amount that Ritschl wrote on theology, his speech given on November 10, 1883 in Göttingen, was the primary document in which he offered his portrait of Luther (Ritschl 1906: Band 17: 25). It is, in many ways, a true expression of Ritschl: It is powerful and personal; it is positive and

critical. It begins, however, in a rather surprising way. Ritschl reminds his audience that there are some who think that Luther was single-handedly responsible for all modern positive developments. He cites a book published 80 years before, in which the author, a Frenchman by the name of Charles Villers, contended that Luther was responsible for modern science and the modern state. Luther was, in Villers’ view, one of the highest scientific authorities. Furthermore, Luther provided the freedom in religion, morals, and history. In fact, for Villers, we have Luther to thank for the entire “Aufklärung” (“Enlightenment”) (Ritschl 1887: 5–6).

In Ritschl’s opinion, these are great exaggerations, as are many of the Catholic accusations against him. However, Protestants tend to glorify Luther’s heroic character while ignoring his personal flaws. Here, Ritschl would neither defend Luther against the Catholic diatribes nor go into detail over Luther’s personal problems. Instead, he wishes to give an account of Luther’s historical greatness. Luther never wanted to be regarded as a pope nor as a prophet (Ritschl 1887: 6–7). And, in regards to modern culture, Luther was not responsible for modern science or for the modern state. In fact, many of the impulses for the “revolution” in the Church came not from Luther, but from the Mendicant Orders (“Bettelorden”) of the Church itself.¹³⁵

Luther’s greatness stems instead from his twin concerns with Christian freedom and Christian morality, both of which are based upon faith. Faith and trust in God were most important, patience and humility were also crucial.¹³⁶ And, Luther’s greatness comes because of two worldly things that he stressed. One, instead of the emphasis on the Catholic doctrine of fleeing the world, Luther insisted on the importance of the world as part of God’s plan. Second, instead of the Catholic doctrine of the two groups – the high group of priests and low group of laymen, Luther emphasized the importance of work. It did not matter whether the person was engaged in the “high” priestly “Beruf” or the “low” “Beruf” of the common people; all were in the service of God (Ritschl 1887: 15–16).

¹³⁵ Ritschl 1887: 9. The “Bettelorden” stem from the 13th Century. Heussi 1913: Band IV: 441. They include the Franciscans, Dominicans, and certain groups of Augustiners, among others. Hauck 1897: Band 2: 671. Catholics tended to glorify these Orders for their lives dedicated to simplicity and poverty while minimizing the fact that these Orders grew out of the rejection of the Church’s power and wealth. Harnack offers an excellent but short account of their history and importance. Before the Thirteenth century monasteries were primarily filled with the sons of the nobility. But, because of the influence of St. Francis and others the poor as well as the rich went to live and study there. Harnack also credits the “Bettelorden” for the great scholastics as well as for the inspiration for the great artists of that century. Harnack 1904b: Band I: 128–132.

¹³⁶ Ritschl 1887: 7, 9–10. Ritschl acknowledged that these were the virtues of the Stoics, but he stressed their importance for Christians. Ritschl 1887:11–14.

In much of the second half of the speech Ritschl provides a short account of Church history. He begins by emphasizing that the Reformation did not spring full blown out of the Medieval Church like some Athena. Like Luther himself, many bishops and nobles had for some time objected to the Church's power and wealth, and wanted a return to the notions of responsibility and morality. The Reformation was not a total break from the Church. As with the Catholic Church, a number of Lutheran followers believed in the importance of the individual mystical union with God. And, Ritschl objected to this, believing that it meant a return to the world-fleeing, ascetic tendencies of the Catholic Church (Ritschl 1887: 17–22).

Unfortunately, the Catholic Church, the "Ultramontanists", had embarked on an intentional overcoming of the Protestant Church. For 40 years, Ritschl insisted, the "Ultramontanists" had worked to stress their type of piety (Ritschl 1887: 23–26). But, Ritschl emphasized that Luther did not believe that true piety was found in the philosophy and rhetoric of the Catholic Church. It is not the knowledge of the visible Church that is important. Instead, what is of foremost importance is one's personal faith and trust in God. Ritschl notes that without understanding this, one cannot understand Luther. Ritschl quotes from Luther: "If God is for us, who is against us?" Ritschl concludes by expressing his fervent conviction that Protestantism will be victorious (Ritschl 1887: 28–29).

The speech that Adolf Harnack gave in Giessen on November 10, 1883 would not have drawn as much attention as the one by Köstlin and Ritschl because he was not yet as famous as the others. He had yet to publish his *Dogmengeschichte* nor his *Das Wesen des Christentums*, but he had already made enough of a name for himself that his speech was bound to draw considerable interest. Like Harnack's earlier work, the title of his Luther speech indicates his scientific concern with history: "Martin Luther, in seiner Bedeutung für die Geschichte der Wissenschaft und der Bildung." As with Ritschl, Harnack contends that Luther's significance in science and education was great. Harnack counts Luther as an incomparable man and one of the very few people who have changed history in general and Germany in particular. Harnack claims that as Germans, "we speak with his words, judge by his standards, and we find the power of his spirit in our excellence as well as our failures." (Harnack 1904a: Band I: 143–144). In spite of this, Harnack asks, how well do we really know him? Is he not too great for us? Is he not too distant from us? Is he not too resolute for us? How can we know this man who was both as powerful as a hero and yet as simple as a child? Only a master could answer these questions; Harnack restricts himself to sketching Luther's significance in culture. Yet, even here there are

difficulties: Luther had not discovered something important, like the laws of gravitation. Nor, can one point to a single work and say, here is Luther, in the sense that one can consider that the *Divine Comedy* is Dante or perhaps *Faust* is Goethe. Only when we consider Luther in light of his religious convictions can one begin to understand him. His religious beliefs were the secrets and the strengths of his life. This meant dealing with the questions concerning the purpose and the goal of human life (Harnack 1904a: Band I: 144–146).

For Harnack, Luther's impact on science was only indirect; but, that is not to say that it was minimal. In fact, Harnack insists that it was maximal. To show this, Harnack suggests that we look back to the beginning of the Fifteenth century. At that time the Church was the fundamental power ruling almost everything. For almost a thousand years the "dogmatic system" had scarcely changed. As Augustine had taught, so it remained. Theology was primary and all else was subservient, including science. Augustine taught a two-world doctrine: there is the sensible world and there is the spiritual one. And, while the Church maintained dominance in this world, it did so mostly because of its emphasis on a "world-fleeing metaphysic." This particular type of metaphysic impeded all science (Harnack 1904a: Band I: 146–150).

As there was a doctrine of two worlds there was also a doctrine of two truths. One truth was valid for theology and the other was valid for philosophy. But, the philosophical "truth" was mostly a weak protest against the "irrationality of Church dogma." As things had been, so they seemed destined to be forever. Harnack suggests that someone might wish to object to this picture because it appears to ignore the role of the Renaissance. But, he addresses this: while the Renaissance gave us the Humanists and rediscovery of antiquity, it did not give us a way to a newly powerful morality or a means to discover the boundary lines between faith and knowledge, between spirit and nature, and between beauty and truth (Harnack 1904a: Band I: 153).

It was Martin Luther who gave us these; he rejected the philosophical and mystical conceptions of God, and he embraced the notion of the living God. No manner of Churchly asceticism could lead us to God; instead, it was a matter of free, individual faith. However, this freedom was not an "empty emancipation" or a freedom for some "subjectivity." Rather, it was the recognition of our subservience to God and with that a freedom from all earthly laws. In the love of God we find the highest law and the meaning of our lives (Harnack 1904a: Band I: 155).

With Luther's rejection of Church dogma and his demonstration that the Church was not infallible, it appeared that the foundation of civilization was foundering. This was enormously significant, because it meant not only the break with the Church of the Middle Ages, but it also meant a return to the source. Instead of placing his trust in the Church, Luther placed his faith in the Word of God. That had additional implications: this knowledge of God and Christ was not based upon some empty letters, but upon the living Gospel. It also meant certainty for the worldly orders of marriage, family, state and "Beruf" (Harnack 1904a: Band I: 158–160). It now meant that religious authority was not something external and that the state was no longer to be regarded as a necessary form of force. Quoting Goethe, it meant that "we have again the courage to stand with firm feet on God's earth" (Harnack 1904a: Band I: 164). Finally, it meant that we have freedom and responsibility in our "Beruf", no matter what it is. Luther's clear and living convictions mandated a whole range of new ideas: his people, his church, his education. For Harnack, Luther was not merely a man; "He was the Reformation". In Harnack's closing remarks, he insisted that Luther was the personal embodiment of all that is great and powerful and enduring and that Luther will remain the ideal for all time (Harnack 1904a: Band I: 168–169).

Heinrich von Treitschke's speech was entitled "Luther und die deutsche Nation" and on first glance it may not seem as focused on religion as the other three. However, he speaks just as passionately as the others about Luther's religion, comparing Luther's conversion to Paul's "metanoia" and he regards Luther's theological conflicts with the Church as parallel to those of Jesus against the Pharisees (Treitschke 1907: 143). He underscores Luther's fight against the Church's rigidity, its false dogma, and the numerous abuses by the Church. He praises Luther's commonsense and his belief in the goodness of the world and the work of the common man (Treitschke 1907: 141, 141). He focuses on Luther's relation to God and claimed that with "child-like trust" he built his belief on the power of God's word alone. Treitschke also emphasizes Luther's Germanness in quoting his claim "For my Germans am I born, they I wish to serve" ("für meine Deutschen bin ich geboren, ihnen will ich dienen.") This is also indicated by Luther's determination to have God speak to Germans in German (Treitschke 1907: 140, 151). Treitschke places most of his emphasis on Luther's importance in history and culture; it was Luther who introduced modernity, not the Italian poets and painters. It was Luther who was responsible for the modern German state. Although Luther was not a politician, he was politically astute enough to help bring about the German nation in a manner that was more peaceful and required less force than anywhere else (Treitschke 1907: 146, 149). This

he did by helping to break the state away from the Church's dominance and by supporting the sovereignty of the state. It was a matter for the state to determine laws, to regulate loans, and to care for the poor. These were political duties and no longer fell under the province of the Church. The individual was also freed from Church authority; for Luther, one obeyed one's own conscience. Treitschke pays special tribute to Luther's demand for the "autonomy of conscience", and this was in keeping with the recent emphasis by Protestant theologians on the moral imperative for freedom of conscience (Treitschke 1907: 138, 143, 153. See also Adair-Toteff 2011: 21–24). As Treitschke noted, it was unfortunate that not every German could participate in this celebration of Luther: Catholics will not, and could not, grasp the greatness of Luther's spirit, a spirit which fills the air of the State, society, home, and science. Treitschke contrasts the freedom to think and decide for one's self with the stifling stench that comes out of the "Lügenstübchen" of the Vatican (Treitschke 1907: 143–143, 156). Treitschke does have hope – German Catholics are still German and they share many of the fundamental traits and virtues of all Germans. In this respect they are far closer to the German Protestants than they are to their fellow Spanish believers. And, he believes that the day will come when all Germans will honor Martin Luther, Germany's hero and teacher (Treitschke 1907: 141, 157).

Weber and Treitschke

There are many reasons to link Weber and Treitschke: Treitschke was a frequent visitor to the Weber house in Berlin, when Max was young. Max often mentioned him in his letters to his cousin, Otto Baumgarten. Otto's own father had been on close terms with Treitschke before breaking with him. Later, Max attended Treitschke's lectures in Berlin.¹³⁷ Then there are the similar traits: the love of scholarship and the passion for nationalism. It would not be a great exaggeration to suggest that, with the exception of Bismarck himself, Treitschke represented the best and the worst of German nationalism and its connection to German Protestantism. Given these reasons, it seems odd and even unfortunate that we lack a serious study comparing Weber and Treitschke: two German giants.

What we do have is mostly psychological speculation. Arthur Mitzman suggested that Treitschke was like a father figure, against whom young Max

¹³⁷ Wolfgang Mommsen argued that Weber heard not only Treitschke's lectures on "Staat und Kirche" but also his "Politik." Mommsen notes that Weber never listed him as his academic teacher. Mommsen 1974: 10 and note 38.

rebelled. Mitzman argues that Max fought against the “cynical ruthlessness” of those two “despots”: Max Sr. and Treitschke (Mitzman 1970: 24, 36, 52, 61, 150). More recently, Joachim Radkau suggested that there was a connection between Treitschke and Weber’s uncle Adolf Hausrath. Like Weber Sr., Hausrath defended Treitschke and they all seemed to express German chauvinism (Radkau 2005: 131, 209, 607). While studying in Heidelberg Max would occasionally visit his uncle, but relations between the two never seemed to be very good.

We know from Weber’s early letters that he had a mixed opinion of Treitschke. On the one hand, in a letter to his cousin Fritz Baumgarten Weber wrote that Treitschke’s *Deutsche Geschichte* was a “true joy” and, in a later letter to his mother he expressed his anticipation of the second volume (Weber 1936: 74, 29, 64). On the other hand, he was concerned about Treitschke’s lack of scholarly objectivity, as indicated in a letter that Max wrote to Hermann Baumgarten (Weber 1936: 175; Weber 1926: 80, 336). Baumgarten was a critical influence on the young Weber, with Radkau going so far as referring to him as Weber’s political mentor. Radkau also suggests that Weber’s emphasis on separating politics from scholarship has its origins in Baumgarten’s writings (Mommson 1974: 7; Radkau 2005: 38–39). After volume two of Treitschke’s *Deutsche Geschichte* appeared Baumgarten published a short and highly critical work called *Treitschkes Deutsche Geschichte*. Baumgarten objects to Treitschke’s pronounced subjectivity and his political activity. For Treitschke, history is not a goal but is simply a means to win over the reader to his specific view of the present. For Treitschke is not an historian, but a party man and publicist, so truth and objectivity do not matter. Baumgarten believes that nothing worse could happen to German education than if this attempt to draw students into the party struggles of the day becomes widespread (Baumgarten 1883: V, 5–6. 50). Marianne Weber wrote how as a student Weber witnessed first-hand the enormous power that Treitschke’s demagoguery had on young people. Weber was twenty-three years old when he listened to Treitschke as he tried to politicize his listeners and to persuade them of Bismarck’s greatness and to warn them about the influence of the Jews. (Weber, 1926: 102, 127). In this conflict between Baumgarten and Treitschke, Weber sided with Baumgarten. In a letter to his father, Max recounted a visit where Hausrath attacked Baumgarten, insisting that one could make dozens of Baumgartens out of one Treitschke. Max wrote how he attempted to defend his uncle Hermann from his uncle Adolf, but that he was fearful that Adolf was going to turn his attack totally on him (Weber 1936: 74). Like Baumgarten, Weber objected to Treitschke’s blurring the line between scholarship and partisanship –

in his lectures on state and church he propagandized for his values. Marianne wrote how Weber learned from that experience; he resolved never to allow himself to blur the lines between politics and scholarship and that he would refrain from substituting subjective values for objective facts. In "Wissenschaft als Beruf" Weber objects to those who bring their values into the lecture hall, where there is no possibility of criticism. The ones who do are not teachers, but demagogues: people who want to be leaders. (Weber 1992b). When he said that, Weber was likely remembering Treitschke. For Treitschke, there was nothing wrong in what he did; he condemned what he called "bloodless objectivity" and he objected to the misuse of the stance "Sine ira et studio." (Barth 1913: Band V: 1327). In contrast, Weber makes much of the importance of "sine ira et studio" in scholarship. In fact, it ranks among his fundamental principles of scholarship. This does not mean that Weber always followed his own advice. Anyone reading his speeches recognizes that he is prone to overstep his distinction between facts and values. An example of this is his Freiburg "Antrittsrede", where his passionate nationalism overshadows his cool scholarship.¹³⁸ Anyone reading his writings will also notice that he often exaggerates his thesis and overstates his case. Examples of this can be found in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* where he announces the difference and then concedes that it is not as hard and fast as he had first indicated.¹³⁹ Maybe the differences between Weber and Treitschke are not as pronounced as Weber might have liked. But, one could claim that Treitschke represented one part of the legacy of "Kulturprotestantismus", the side that was subjective, and idealized German culture and tradition. One could insist further that Weber represented the other side, the side that valued scholarship, progress, and tolerance. There is no doubt that Treitschke thought there was absolutely nothing wrong in misusing scholarship in the service of Germany. And, there is certainly no question that Weber believed that this practice was intellectually dishonest and that it was morally reprehensible to do.

Heinz Steinert might have been inclined to exaggeration in his assessments of Max Weber's *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*. He might not be completely convincing in his discussions of what he took to be its flaws. However, there can be no doubt that after reading *Max Webers Unwiderlegbare Fehlkonstruktionen* no one will read Weber's work the same way again. Steinert has proven that we simply cannot be content to

¹³⁸ Weber, 1921. See Mommsen's comments about Weber's passionate remarks in this speech with his later denunciation "Von allen Arten der Prophetie" and his banning of practical values from the lectern. Mommsen 1974: 39.

¹³⁹ See his treatment of "Herrschaft." In Weber 1922a.

regard this work as a classic and cannot try to honor Weber by making the obligatory references to “Geist”, “Arbeit”, or “Kapitalismus.” Steinert has shown that we must learn to read this work carefully and this is accomplished by recapturing its historical context. In my tribute to Steinert, I have tried to recapture the historical context of “Kulturprotestantismus”; and I have done so out of respect for both Max Weber and Heinz Steinert.

References

- Adair-Toteff, Christopher (2011): “Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Politics: Weber on Conscience, Conviction and Conflict.” *History of the Human Sciences*. Vol. 24, no. 1 21–24.
- Barth, A. (1913): “Von Treitschke”, *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band V.
- Beurath, Karl (1908): “Ultramontanismus.” *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs’ sche Buchhandlung. Dritte Auflage. Band 20.
- Burg, Joseph (1905): *Kontrovers-Lexikon. Die Konfessionellen Streitfragen zwischen Katholiken und Protestanten*. Essen-Ruhr: Verlag der “Sozialen Revue”.
- Baumgarten, Hermann (1883): *Treitschkes Deutsche Geschichte*. Straßburg: Verlag von Karl Trübner.
- Eck, Samuel (1912): “Köstlin, Julius.” *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band III.
- Foerster, D. (1912): “Kulturkampf.” *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr Paul Siebeck). Band VI.
- Harnack, Adolf (1890): *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte. Zweiter Band. Die Entwicklung der Kirchlichen Dogmas II und III*. Freiburg im Breisgau: Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Harnack, Adolf (1904a): “Martin Luther, in seiner Bedeutung für Geschichte der Wissenschaft und der Bildung”. In Adolf Harnack, *Reden und Aufsätze*. Gießen: J. Ricker’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung (Alfred Töpelmann). Band I.
- Harnack, Adolf (1904b): “Das Mönchtum. Seine Ideale und Seine Geschichte.” In Adolf Harnack, *Aufsätze und Reden*. Gießen: J. Ricker’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung (Alfred Töpelmann).
- Harnack, Adolf (1911): *Aus Wissenschaft und Leben*. Gießen: Verlag von Alfred Töpelmann (Vormals J. Ricker).
- Harnack, Theodios (1927)[1862/1886]: *Luthers Theologie. Mit besonderer Beziehung auf seine Versöhnungs- und Erlösungslehre*. München. Kaiser.
- Hartmann, Tyrell (1995): “Max Weber, Bismarck und der Kulturkampf.” In *Religionssoziologie um 1900*. Volker Krech und Hartmann Tyrell, Hrsg. Würzburg. Ergon Verlag.
- Hauck, Albert (1897): “Bettelmönche.” *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*. Leipzig: J.C.Hinrichs’ sche Buchhandlung. Dritte Auflage. Band 2.

- Heussi, Karl (1913): "Monchtum." *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Hundeshagen, Karl Bernhard (1860): "Matthias Schneckenburger". *Real-Encyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*. Gotha: Verlag von Rudolf Besser. Band 13.
- Köhler, Walther (1910): "Ex Kathedra." *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band II.
- Köstlin, Julius (1857): "Luther." *Real-Encyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*. Stuttgart und Hamburg: Rudolf Besser. Band 8.
- Köstlin, Julius (1881): "Luther." *Real-Encyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. Band 9.
- Köstlin, Julius (1883a): *Luthers Theologie. In ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und ihrem inneren Zusammenhang*. Druck und Verlag von J.F. Steinkopf.
- Köstlin, Julius (1883b): *Martin Luther, der deutsche Reformator. Festschrift zur Feier des 400jährigen Geburtstags Martin Luther*. Halle an der Saale: Verlag von Otto Hendel. Halle an der Saale.
- Mitzman, Arthur (1970): *The Iron Cage. An Historical Interpretation of Max Weber*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Mommsen, Wolfgang (1974): *Max Weber und die deutsche Politik. 1890–1920*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Mulert, Hermann (1913): "Ultramontanismus". *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band V.
- Nipperdey, Thomas (1998): *Deutsche Geschichte. 1866–1918*. München: Verlag von C.H. Beck.
- RGG III (1957–1962): *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Dritte Auflage.
- Radkau, Joachim (2005): *Max Weber. Die Leidenschaft des Denkens*. München: Carl Hanser Verlag.
- Ritschl, Albrecht (1887): *Drei Akademische Reden*. Bonn: Bei Adolf Marcus.
- Ritschl, Otto (1906): "Ritschl, Albrecht Benjamin." *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs' schein Buchhandlung. Dritte Auflage. Band 17.
- Sieffert, Friedrich (1899): "Johann Jakob Herzog." *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*. J.C. Hinrichs' schein Buchhandlung. Leipzig 1899. Dritte Auflage. Band 7.
- Sohm, Rudolf (1888): *Kirchengeschichte im Grundriß*. Leipzig: Verlag von Georg Böhme. Leipzig.
- Steinert, Heinz (2010): *Max Webers Unwiderlegbare Fehlkonstruktionen. Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*. Frankfurt/New York: Campus.
- Treitschke, Heinrich von (1907): "Luther und die deutsche Nation." In Treitschke, *Ausgewählte Schriften*. Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel. Dritte Auflage.
- Weber, Marianne (1926): *Max Weber. Ein Lebensbild*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1921): "Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik." In Max Weber, *Gesammelte politische Schriften*. München: Drei Masken Verlag.

- Weber, Max (1922a): *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1922b): "Wissenschaft als Beruf." In *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1936): *Jugendbriefe*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1976): *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Herausgegeben von Johannes Winkelmann. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Chapter Eight

Max Weber on Confucianism versus Protestantism

When Max Weber first published his *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* in 1904 and 1905, he expected that criticisms of it would come primarily from theologians. He admitted that he was no specialist in theology and he allowed that his account of the relationship between Protestantism and the rise of modern capitalism was not complete. He only claimed that he was offering an “idealist” sketch of the relationship; and that his was in marked contrast to the fuller “materialist” conceptions offered by Karl Marx and his followers. Furthermore, Weber denied that his account was a causal one, meaning that it was unlike those provided by the adherents of historical determinism. Instead, he simply suggested that his was one possible explanation. Despite all of these admissions, qualifications, and clarifications, Weber was still attacked. Weber was right about the degree of criticism, but he was wrong about their sources – these attacks were not mounted by theologians, but initially they came from historians and later they were made by economists. Felix Rachfahl and H. Karl Fischer were among the historians, while Werner Sombart and Lujo Brentano numbered among the economists (Weber 1987: 5, 7, see also Hamilton 2000: 161–166). But, all of these critics focused on Weber’s views of Protestantism and the West.

In contrast to these critics, those who have been critical of Weber’s discussion of capitalism and the East have tended to be sociologists, sinologists, and historians. They have attacked his account of why industrial capitalism did not develop in China and they have criticized his discussions of rationalism and tradition. Like the critics who attacked Weber’s focus on the West, these critics were similarly harsh in their criticisms of Weber’s concern with the East. And, like those critics, these were mostly wrong. What I intend to do in this paper is to set out Weber’s reexamination of his Protestant thesis in light of his studies on Confucianism. I begin with a short discussion of Weber’s critics; I then move to provide a detailed examination of Weber’s own writings on Confucianism, Protestantism, and modern capitalism.

Weber's Critics

The following is by no means a complete account of every criticism of Weber's views on Confucianism and capitalism, but it will provide some sense of the various kinds of comments that scholars have made. I examine these for two reasons: first, they provide a historical context which shows how critics have consistently viewed Weber's writings on China, and second, they demonstrate how they fail to recognize Weber's significant theoretical points because of their almost exclusive focus on empirically verifiable factors.

The earliest criticism of Weber's examination of China appeared in 1923 as part of the two-volume remembrance of Weber. The article was entitled "Religion und Wirtschaft in China" by Arthur von Rosthorn. Rosthorn was regarded as an expert, but unfortunately, he did not take into consideration the final published piece in volume one of the *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*.¹⁴⁰ Instead, he concentrated on the pieces which Weber had published in 1915 in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*. What is even more unfortunate is that Rosthorn took Weber's writings to be criticisms of China. As Rosthorn made abundantly clear in a speech that he gave in 1919, he regarded the Chinese as socially superior to Europeans. Not only were they more civilized, they also lived better lives. Tradition and moral customs ("Sitten") ensured order and they guaranteed social respect for others (Rosthorn 1919: 5, 11). The Chinese education system was humanistic and moral, rather than technical and intellectual as in the West (Rosthorn 1919: 13, 15, 19). Rosthorn suggested that the Chinese economic system guaranteed that labor was relatively cheap, but he also insisted that the cost of living was also low. What it also meant was that there was no heavy industry and no capitalism. Rosthorn agreed with Weber on this, but disputed Weber's explanation for the reasons why these were missing in China.

Rosthorn suggested that China's highly developed hand work precluded industrialization and he claimed that its cities rejected the need for capital (Rosthorn 1923: 225). He accused Weber of misunderstanding the Chinese way of life – as when Weber said that the Chinese lacked the word for reli-

¹⁴⁰ Weber knew of Rosthorn's work and regarded him as a "significant authority". Weber 1989: 287, Weber's note 2. See also Weber 1989: 286, note 1; 287, note 6; 292, note 25. He especially pointed to Rosthorn's 1919 "Das soziale Leben der Chinesen" and said that Rosthorn was "one of the best specialists" on China. Weber 1989: 131–132. Weber knew him from the time when Rosthorn gave a lecture in Heidelberg (1906) and then met him when he was teaching in Vienna (1918). See Weber 1989: 41–43.

gion. Weber thought of religion as dogma, but as Rosthorn pointed out the Chinese regarded it as ethical. And, Rosthorn noted that when Weber suggested that the Chinese were not "free", he failed to understand that the lack of laws actually entailed more freedom for the Chinese, not less (Rosthorn 1923: 228–229). However, Rosthorn himself misunderstood Weber when he claimed that Weber wanted to find the "causal connection" between religion and economics, and he also erred in thinking that Weber had disdain for the Chinese preoccupation with world order and human happiness. Most importantly, Rosthorn was certainly wrong to believe that Weber thought that he could prove the differences between Puritanism and Confucianism (Rosthorn 1923: 230, 232). However, Rosthorn was correct to state that the emphasis on tradition and lack of technical innovation were undoubtedly obstacles to the development of a rational system of economics like that found in the West (Rosthorn 1923: 225, 230).

If Rosthorn believed that he had found numerous problems in Weber's account of China, Otto B. van der Sprenkel was convinced that Weber's discussion made a fundamental contribution to the study of China (van der Sprenkel 1965: 348). Van der Sprenkel acknowledged that Weber had no specialized training in the area, that he worked from second-rate translations, and that some of his judgments were wrong; but he was convinced that Weber made a lasting contribution to our knowledge of China (van der Sprenkel 1965: 348, 370). In particular, Weber emphasized the importance of Chinese bureaucracy and he stressed the roles that education and rationalism played in it. But, one of the things that seemed to have impressed Weber the most, according to van der Sprenkel, was its "enduring stability" (van der Sprenkel 1965: 353). Unfortunately, he primarily focused on Weber's discussion concerning Chinese bureaucracy and mostly ignored Weber's examination of the connections between religion and economics (van der Sprenkel 1965: 358–367).

Despite van der Sprenkel's praise for Weber, Arnold Zingerle criticized him for reducing Weber's account to one of stability and even stagnation (Zingerle 1983: 181–184, 191). In addition, Zingerle criticized scholars in general for dismissing the need for thorough examinations of Weber's writings on the East by simply regarding them all as counterpoints to Weber's Protestant ethic thesis (Zingerle 1983: 174). This was the thrust of his contribution to Wolfgang Schluchter's collection on Weber and China. This article was a continuation of Zingerle's earlier book.

It is in the book *Max Weber und China* that Zingerle addresses Weber's thesis in detail. That this book is a reworking of his dissertation should not detract from its considerable worth. In the first half Zingerle examines We-

ber's "sociology of domination" ("Herrschaftssoziologie") in respect to China and in the second half he focuses on Weber's "sociology of religion" ("Religionssoziologie") with regards to China. However, his major focus is to examine Weber's Protestant Ethic thesis as related to China. Zingerle's examination of this is extensive; given the limited scope of this paper I can only offer a brief account of it.

Zingerle makes three crucial introductory points: first, that Weber was the pioneer who recognized the religious factor in the massive change in Europe's transition to modernity; second, that he investigated this in relation to other world religions; and third, that he used the term "capitalism" as short-hand for the "'spirit' of capitalism" (Zingerle 1972: 98–101). For Zingerle, rationalism and innovation are two key elements in Weber's conception of capitalism (Zingerle 1972: 101–105, 117, 121, 129, 139–140, 143). As a result, Zingerle focuses on the activity of the individual. Unfortunately, this emphasis leads him to misunderstand Weber's conceptions of the ascetic and the mystic, but it also leads him to underestimate the importance of the Puritan's transcendent God in relation to the Chinese beliefs. I might suggest that Zingerle's preoccupation with sociological concepts diverted him from a sufficient appreciation of Weber's emphasis on religious factors – factors which I will return to later.

In the beginning of his "Warum hat das vormoderne China keinen industriellen Kapitalismus entwickelt? Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Max Webers Ansatz" Mark Elvin discusses Weber's general sociological theory; he notes that Weber wants to examine the relationship between "motive" and "given circumstances" (Elvin 1983: 115). Specifically, Elvin wants to know why industrial capitalism did not develop in China and in his explanation he appears to utilize factors that were found in Zingerle's account: he places emphasis on rationality and innovation and he stresses economic concerns (Elvin 1983: 117–120). In addition, he believes that verifiable factors better explain the lack of capitalism. In accordance with this approach, the second half of the paper is devoted to topics like money and taxes, agriculture and water regulation.

Stephen Kalberg's focus in his "Weber's Critique of Recent Comparative-Historical Sociology and a Reconstruction of his Analysis of the Rise of Confucianism" is, as the title indicates, primarily a theoretical investigation in which he uses Weber's writings on Confucianism as a concrete illustration (Kalberg 1999: 208). As such, it is likely to be of more interest to students of methodology and to social theorists than to those seeking to understand Weber's contrast between Confucianism and Puritanism. Nonetheless, Kalberg is extremely helpful in pointing out the importance of the

clan and bureaucracy and even more so by emphasizing the ritualism and utilitarianism of the literati. These factors, coupled with the concern for this world, meant that it could never “give birth to a notion of salvation, or even meditations upon the problem of theodicy” (Kalberg 1999: 226–230). These points are crucial, and are ones I will return to later.

The most recent contribution to the discussion of Weber on China is John Love's “Max Weber's Orient”. As the title indicates, Love provides an overview of all of Weber's writings on the Orient, not just on China. But, he does emphasize Weber's writing on Chinese traditionalism and its impact on its bureaucracy and he stressed Weber's discussion on the importance of the family in Chinese society (Love 2000: 175–177). Love also addresses some of the criticisms directed at Weber's writings on China. Most of these criticisms have alleged that Weber misunderstood Confucianism and that he was wrong to think that it was the obstacle to the development of capitalism in China. Most of these critics suggest that it was found in other, economic factors (Love 2000: 179–184). Love admits that Weber's account should be modified in light of modern scholarship, but he insists that the account is fundamentally correct. And, he praises Weber for realizing that he needed to reexamine his Protestant thesis in light of his China study. Weber's research showed that China possessed some “rational, ascetic, scientific and commercial cultural elements”; therefore, he needed to demonstrate how Chinese rationalism differed from that of the West (Love 2000: 173).

Weber's Account

Each of these preceding papers contributes to our understanding of Weber's conception of China, while some provide greater insight into the relationship between Confucianism and China's economic history. However, all of these focus primarily on material factors, thus they overlook the “idea” factors, which I believe are the keys to understanding Weber's reasons for explaining the lack of modern industrial capitalism in China. In this regard it is worth recalling what Weber wrote in the crucial “Einleitung” to the *Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen*. Weber writes that “Interests (material and ideal), not: ideas, immediately drive human activity”, he adds the critical modifier: “But: the ideas through which ‘world-images’ are created, very often work the switches that determine the tracks which further move along the dynamic of the interests of the actors”.¹⁴¹ Weber acknowledges the im-

¹⁴¹ “Interessen (materielle und ideelle), nicht: Ideen, beherrschen unmittelbar das Handeln

portance of interests, but he also emphasizes that there are times when certain fundamental ideas will determine the directions in which those interests move. This was why he focused on the two “ideas” in *Die protestantische Ethik* – Luther’s concept of “Beruf” and Calvin’s doctrine of predestination. Weber expanded his efforts at uncovering these particular ideas in *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen* and one of his goals was to account for why capitalism failed to develop in China. For Weber, this was a critical issue given China’s emphasis on rationality; thus, there had to be some other important difference. While material and immaterial interests were important, Weber sought to reveal the “ideas” upon which these interests were “based”.

Throughout his volume on China Weber offers a number of reasons for why rational capitalism did not arise in China. He notes the various obstacles: the lack of legal form and the sociological groundwork for capitalism (Weber 1989: 257). It lacked the “rational *calculable* functions for administration and law” (Weber 1989: 279). And, it lacked the “rational functioning of the apparatus of the state” – and it lacked “machine-like calculations”. For Weber, *why* these things were missing in China was “the deciding question” (Weber 1989: 283).

In Weber’s view, one of the most important and defining characteristics of China was its great emphasis on “education”. But, it is not merely education for the sake of education; there must be some fruitful end-result. Weber contrasts the well-known Kantian “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” with a version more appropriate for the Chinese: “Thinking without fruit from reading is sterile”.¹⁴² The Chinese student was trained to be the life-long servant of the state (Flitner 2001: 269, 278–279). Weber, of course, uses the German term “Bildung” that is far more expansive than the English word “education”. While the Chinese system used exams, the successful candidate was required to be more than simply competent in any area; he was expected to be especially well-versed in Chinese culture. As a result, Weber differentiates the Chinese literary man from the Christian and Islamic clerics, from the Jewish Rabbis, the ancient Egyptian priests, from the Indian Brahmins, and from the Egyptian and Indian scribes by the fact that he was so important to all facts of Chinese life. He was the person responsible for maintaining “the unity of Chinese

der Menschen. Aber: die ‘Weltbilder’, durch ‘Ideen’ geschaffen wurden, haben sehr oft als Weichensteller die Bahnen bestimmt, in denen die Dynamik der Interessen das Handeln fortbewegte.” Weber 1989: 101.

¹⁴² “Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind”. Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. “Denken ohne Lesefrüchte ist steril”. Weber 1989: 360.

culture" and he was regarded as a "living library" (Weber 1989: 285–286, 292). He was a "cultural man" who knew all the rituals and maintained tradition. He was the "single carrier of the unity of Chinese culture" (Weber 1989: 288–289, 303).

The Chinese culture differed from that of the West in that it was overwhelmingly humanist and literary. China lacked the speculative philosophy of ancient Greece but it had a form of philosophy that Weber referred to as one of "practical sobriety" ("praktischer Nüchernheit"). Confucianism was its highest form. The educated man was a noble literary type but he was not one who studied calculations (Weber 1989: 311). Weber indicated that as the centuries passed the science of calculation kept receding until it was virtually gone. In addition to lacking mathematics, China also lacked natural sciences, geography, and the study of language (Weber 1989: 312).

Mathematics and the natural sciences were of increasing importance in the West, but in China it was the notion of traditional culture that continued to remain the most important. Traditional culture encompassed a range of notions: harmony, decorum, and piety among them. Weber emphasizes each of these in turn. Harmony, order, beauty – these are "cosmic" virtues that humans should strive to emulate (Weber 1989: 318–320). Zingerle made the important point that one of the major characteristics of Confucianism's tradition was that the elder was the irreplaceable role model who was supposed to be emulated (Zingerle 1972: 113). The officials should act with temperance and moderation; and Weber even emphasized that "decorum" ("Schicklichkeit") is the "Confucian fundamental concept!" ("konfuzianischer Grundbegriff!") (Weber 1989: 351, 359, 452, 473). Weber repeatedly refers to the "noble" and "educated" Chinese man as "Gentleman" (Weber 1989: 165, 357, 359, 472–474). Weber's choice of the English term is deliberate, because it suggests the cultivated, refined man who understands and maintains his correct place in society. Societal harmony and personal equanimity are required, just as the lack of ostentation and the suppression of passion are encouraged (Weber 1989: 351). There is no such thing as "sin", except in the sense of "sinning" against the "social fundamental duty" ("soziale Grundpflicht"). "Piety" is the "cardinal virtue", but it is not piety in the Western abstract sense; rather, it is both personal and communal. It is the piety, honor, and respect accorded to the parents, teachers, and officials. The children's pious respect for their parents was "the absolute primary of all virtues" ("die absolut primäre aller Tugenden") (Weber 1989: 352). Piety is also the "mother of discipline" – not so much as the sense of the individual, but the sense of a component in social life (Weber 1989: 360). Discipline, order, and obedience are all important in each of Weber's three types of "Herr-

schaft” (“authority” or “domination”). They are traditional, bureaucratic, and charismatic. What is distinctive in Chinese traditional authority is its extreme emphasis on how its legitimacy rests on the patriarchy (Weber 1989: 121). China was rational and had its codification of laws; however, the rationality was rather narrowly focused and the laws were based upon the personal interpretation of the “traditional” bureaucrats. This is what Weber called “patrimonial bureaucracy” (Weber 1989: 125). While there were some similarities between China and the medieval cities, they were rather minimal and were mostly related to the regulations governing apprentices. However, the Chinese cities lacked the absolute monopoly over the apprentices and it also lacked the political and military powers of the medieval cities (Weber 1989: 158). Furthermore, the Chinese official lacked both the legal form as the foundation for law and the sociological framework for the accumulation of capital (Weber 1989: 257). What the patrimonial bureaucracy seemed to do was to further social leveling (Weber 1989: 254). However, Weber modifies this when he returns to the discussion about the respect accorded to the officials (Weber 1989: 333–335). This respect was not based so much upon respect for the law, as it was respect for the person. In the section on patrimonialism in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* Weber emphasizes that in bureaucratic authority respect is given to the impersonal laws, but in patrimonial authority it is given to the person (Weber 2005: 247–248, 251). The West had the “binding norms and regulations” of bureaucracy; China lacked these (Weber 2005: 293). In contrast, Weber writes of the “holiness of tradition” and the respect for the “eternal laws” (Weber 2005: 247, 251, 257). Helwig Schmidt-Glitzner maintains that there is an analogy between patriarch and ruler and that one must respect both (Schmidt-Glitzner 2001: 226). Furthermore, the Western bureaucrat has the duty towards competence whereas the Chinese has the duty towards his superior (Weber 2005: 295). The emphasis was on the piety towards the officials and teachers and on the strict adherence to the traditional order (Weber 2005: 329). As a result, military-like discipline is all-important in every aspect of social life. For Confucius, “‘insubordination’ is worse than a lower character” (“‘Insubordination’ ist schlimmer als niedrige Gesinnung”) (Weber 1989: 353). Freedom was less important than order. Accordingly, Weber suggests that “‘Reason’ of Confucius was a rationalism of *order*: better to live as a man in peace than to live as a man in anarchy” (Weber 1989: 367).

This notion of harmony and order is also found in the economic sphere. Some of the differences between China and the West can be attributed to the cultural attitudes towards work and wealth. Weber suggests that the Chinese value work – when it is masterful handwork (Weber 1989: 274). In ad-

dition, there is a saying: “a noble person is not a tool” (“Ein Vornehmer ist kein Werkzeug”), meaning that he regards himself as a goal and does not see himself as merely a means to some end. Furthermore, the factual competence of the educated bureaucrat is not limited; the “higher man” strives for multiplicity and variety (Weber 1989: 356–357). What the Chinese do not value is wealth simply for wealth’s sake, because that would be ostentatious. And, he insists that the seeking of profit counts as the source of social unrest. The balance and harmony of the soul is shaken by the drive for wealth. And, historically it was the corrupt officials who sought to become enriched by bribes (Weber 1989: 355). This cultural rejection of wealth should not suggest a lack of economic theory; indeed, Weber warns against thinking that the Chinese do not understand the law of supply and demand. He notes that they actually have a firm and modern understanding of that as well as the relationship between speculation and profit (Weber 1989: 354).

One of the biggest differences is in the area of law. We should remember that Weber was trained as a lawyer; both his dissertation and his “Habilitationsschrift” were in law (Weber 2008: 2–3; Weber 1986: 2, 5–12). We should recall that he often viewed social theory through legal thinking (Turner and Factor 1994: IX, 1, 166, 177). And, we should remind ourselves that Weber was convinced that the development of rational law was one of the key factors in allowing modern capitalism to develop in the West. He reminds us of this in the “Vorbemerkung” to the *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* where he insists that the Western “rational structure of law” provided the conditions that made guaranteed calculations possible (Weber 1920: 11). In his last lectures at Munich he spoke of how the “systematic, definitively determined and easily taught” “rational law” was the decisive factor for the rise of modern capitalism (Weber 2011: 370–372). Rational law provided the freedom to enter into contracts and it also provided the possibility of guarantees. According to Weber, this expansive legal freedom made it possible for the United States to have the greatest economic success.

At first glance it might seem that China would also be a place for the development of both rational law and capitalism. In the “Einleitung” to the *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* volume on law, Werner Gephard and Siegfried Hermes note that it would seem that the dominating class of bureaucrats would make China a likely place for systematic, rational law to develop. Chinese law was systematic, but it did not become rational in the Western sense (Weber 2010: 619). They point out that it is wrong to blame this on religious grounds. Instead, they suggest that Weber sought the answer in the Chinese legal culture (Weber 2010: 93–94).

Chinese law lacked many of the features of law found in the West. It did not have a free market and it lacked free exchange. It lacked the Western legal form and it lacked the “rational *calculable* functions for administration and law” (Weber 1989: 256–257, 279). It lacked the “rational functioning of the apparatus of the state” – and it lacked “machine-like calculations”. In the *Recht* volume Weber discussed how traditional law in general lacks a sense of permanence. Weber noted that “holy tradition” appears to be permanent but it is not always the case – someone can announce a new revelation (Weber 2010: 445–446, 462). Traditional law is often dependent on everyday needs; something from which rational law is emancipated (Weber 2010). In his lectures Weber gave the following example. Someone could buy a house and then if he became poor, have the legal right to have the seller buy it back (Weber 2011: 373). It was clear to Weber that many features of Western jurisprudence were missing in Chinese law; for him, “the deciding question” was *why?* (Weber 1989: 283).

Chinese law was rational in that it had a codification of laws; however, the rationality was rather focused and the laws were based upon the personal interpretation of the “traditional” bureaucrats. Weber called this “patrimonial bureaucracy” (Weber 1989: 125). What is distinctive in Chinese traditional authority is its extreme emphasis on how its legitimacy rests on the patriarchy (Weber 1989: 121). While there were some similarities between China and Western medieval cities, they were rather minimal and were mostly related to the regulations governing apprentices. The Chinese cities lacked the absolute monopoly over the apprentices and it also lacked the political and military powers of the medieval cities (Weber 1989: 158). And, China was oriented towards the continual organization around familial power and honor – all based upon honor and morality. (Weber 1989: 258–259, 262). The court that had primary jurisdiction over organization and disputes was not some abstract civil one; rather it was the “Temple” court that enjoyed the people’s trust (Weber 1989: 268). Thus, he was more than aware that the Chinese had Confucian ethics to regulate society and to determine outcomes in cases of dispute (Quan 2010: 38, 43–44).

The Chinese had great respect for the law; however, it was not the respect for the abstract rule but was the respect for the person. The Western bureaucrat has the duty towards competence whereas the Chinese has the duty towards his superior (Weber 2005: 295). In the section on patrimonialism in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* Weber emphasizes that in bureaucratic authority respect is given to the impersonal laws, but in patrimonial authority it is given to the person (Weber 2005: 247–248, 251). The West had the “binding norms and regulations” of bureaucracy; which China lacked (Weber 2005:

293). In contrast, Weber writes of the "holiness of tradition" and the respect for the "eternal laws" (Weber 2005: 247, 251, 257). Helwig Schmidt-Glitzner maintains that there is an analogy between patriarch and ruler and that one must respect both (Schmidt-Glitzner 2001: 226).

Weber was well aware of the importance of law regarding the peculiarities of China's agriculture. He knew of the importance of water supply and he was cognizant of the problems in securing permanent ownership of land (Weber 1989: 243). And, he was well aware of the need for order and how various attempts at reform were blocked (Weber 1989: 246–247). Finally, he was knowledgeable about the systematic codification of Chinese law (Weber 1989: 249).

Weber's "Results"

In the critical section "Konfuzianismus und Puritanismus" of the volume on China Weber takes stock of his account and then embarks on proving the results of his study. He notes that there are two important areas of difference between what he calls "Confucian rationalism" and "Puritan rationalism". These are the differences in regard to magic and the differences with respect to the world and to God (Weber 1989: 450). The way that Weber announces the two areas of difference might suggest that they carry equal weight; however, the importance of magic is considerably less than the importance of the world and God. Accordingly, I will only briefly treat the former while concentrating more fully on the latter.

Before turning to the differences regarding magic, it is helpful to consider Weber's discussions of magic in his other works. In *Die protestantische Ethik* of 1904–1905 the notion of magic is mostly missing but it does figure prominently in the "religiöse Gemeinschaften" section of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. There, Weber stresses the importance of symbolism for magic effectiveness (Weber 2001: 127). Moreover, the real deciding issue is whether the magician can perform; Weber says that it is simply a question of results (Weber 2001: 161). The magician was primarily the rain-maker; this was the case throughout history and the world, but this was especially so in the areas of northern China. Because of the region's unstable rain patterns, a magician who could make rain was clearly needed there. But, the magician did not simply have the power to bring about rain; he also was the one with the power to restore the "cosmic order" (Weber 1989: 176–177; Weber 2001: 191). The magician's power points to a number of issues: first, while the Chinese lacked an "all-powerful and all-knowing" Deity of Judaism and

certain forms of Christianity, the gods and the spirits were still regarded as being extremely powerful (Weber 1989: 172). Second, the “god of heaven” was immensely important, not simply because the rains came from him.¹⁴³ Weber noted that the “Himmelgeist” was “*primus inter pares*” (Weber 1989: 261, Weber’s note 7. See also the editor’s note 17.) Third, the gods did not “speak to people”; rather they revealed themselves to certain individuals (Weber 1989: 170). Thus, the magician was one who was chosen to understand them and had the power to influence them. Fourth, the “ethical” heavens protected the all-important “eternal order” (Weber 1989: 176). In short, magic was a crucial part of Chinese life, and it was in his study of China that Weber first accorded it a place of real importance.¹⁴⁴

In the “Resultat” section of his book on China Weber emphasizes how prominent magic was for “Confucian rationalism”. For the Chinese, the world was a “magic garden” (“Zaubergarten”) and the practice of magic was part of normal everyday life. Weber stresses that this emphasis was both natural and positive (Weber 1989: 450–451). In contrast, the ascetic rationalism was at the highest level and magic was considered abnormal. Everything magical was regarded as bogus and suspect – even devilish. The West had reached the point of the “complete *disenchantment of the world*” (“*ganze Entzauberung der Welt*”) (Weber 1989: 450).

This opposition in regards to magic leads to an even more important opposition – the differing relationships with the world. For the Chinese, there is no question that the world makes “sense”, the good and the bad simply exist. For the Westerner there is a question of how to make sense of the world; i.e. how to account for evil in a world created by an all benevolent and omnipotent deity (Hanke 2001: 215–226). This is the question of theodicy and Weber even uses Leibniz’ phrase, that “this is the best of all possible worlds” to indicate the Chinese belief about this world. They believe in the natural harmony of the heavens and they believe that it can be found in the order of the human world as well. Piety is the cardinal virtue; the pious person can look forward to a long life, health, and riches. There is, of course, something akin to the notion of sin; but, it is the type of a breaking of social norms. It is the matter of extreme tastelessness and is an affront against so-

¹⁴³ Weber 1989: 169. In this Weber is following the account written by P.D. Chantepie de la Saussaye and partially revised by Edmund Buckley. Chantepie de la Saussaye 1897: 56–57. See Weber 1989: 130.

¹⁴⁴ Breuer 2001: 119–120. Stefan Breuer maintained that Weber’s emphasis on the overwhelming importance of magic for the Chinese stemmed also from a Dutch scholar named Johann Jakob Maria de Groot. Breuer 2001: 130.

ciety, thus, it generates shame. In contrast, sin is a personal matter, so it generates guilt, inner loneliness, and uncertainty (Weber 1989: 452). To understand this, it is necessary to recall some important features of asceticism from the *Protestantische Ethik*.

Neither in the *Protestantische Ethik* nor elsewhere does Weber provide a detailed account of asceticism (Adair-Toteff 2010: 109). A large part of this is because he was not a theological historian, but a larger part was that his account was not historical, but ideal typical. Hence, his concern is with the "spirit" of asceticism, just as he is preoccupied with the "spirit" of capitalism (Weber 1996: 53). Thus, he is not so interested in the "world-fleeing" asceticism and mysticism; rather, he is concerned primarily with one specific type of asceticism – what he calls "inner-worldly" asceticism. The "original" form of this type of inner-worldly asceticism is Calvinism, but many of its features are carried over into later forms. The concern here is only with Calvinism, because it is perhaps the "purest" form; thus allowing us to see the doctrinal beliefs better.

The single most important doctrine for Calvin was the doctrine of predestination. It maintained that God ordained from the beginning that most of humankind is condemned and only a few have been elected for salvation. This decree is eternal and immutable; there is no possibility of change. Accordingly, Calvinists believed that there is an insurmountable "gap" ("Kluft") between humans and God (Weber 1996: 61). God is an absolutely transcendent deity; unlike the loving God of Luther, Calvin's deity is more like the Old Testament God. The difference was that the Israelis had a covenant with God – which they broke. Calvin's God has no such covenant with humans, because that would suggest that humans have an equal standing with God. Instead, Calvin's God is far above and far removed from humans; and he would be indifferent to any entreaties by mere mortals. This doctrine has several results: first, there is an absolute emphasis on the beyond ("Jenseits"); that is really the question about salvation (Weber 1996: 55, 65, 68). Second, there is an absolute preoccupation with the question of whether one is saved; and, there is absolutely no way of knowing whether one is or is not a member of the elect (Weber 1996: 60–63).

Taken together, these beliefs have far reaching implications. First, there is the "eternal loneliness" of the isolated individual. There is no priest, sacrament, or church that can help the person. That also means that the person cannot trust anyone – not friends and not even family. It also means that the person has an absolute obligation to work solely for the greater glory for God, and that the person must maintain systematic self-control (Weber 1996: 62–64, 75, 85, 120). Thus, the person is an ascetic with a single-minded

devotion to God; but unlike the Catholic ascetics who “fled the world” and retreated behind monastery walls, these Protestant ascetics were “inner-worldly”. Following Luther’s expansion of the importance of “calling” to all vocations, the Calvinist believed in the restless work for God. In contrast to the passive mystic, who regarded himself as a “vessel” for receiving God, the active ascetic believed that he was the tool or instrument destined to do God’s work. To summarize: the followers of Calvin believed in a transcendent and unapproachable God; they rejected magic as well as sacraments. They were cut off from friends and family, from society and even the natural world. They were doomed to inner loneliness, pessimism, and uncertainty. Their only “recourse” was constant self-control and systematic rational activity, which because of its excessiveness, was basically irrational. The followers of Confucius believed in the order of the cosmos and sought it in the human world. They believed in magic and sacraments; their world was composed of spirits and family. They belonged in the natural world of beauty as well as the human world of order: their lives were filled with societal relationships, tempered optimism, and belief in the eternal order of things. There was no real sin, only the breach of decorum. The highest ideals consisted of temperance and cultivation. The Calvinist worked endlessly with the single focus on the afterlife; the follower of Confucius appreciated handwork and enjoyed the beauty of life.

Concluding Remarks

Weber’s work on China and Confucianism prompted him to reexamine the connection between rationalism and modern capitalism; however, it did not force him to change his opinion about it. His study of the economic ethics of the world religions underscored their shared similarities; but it also sharply pronounced the differences between East and West. From the power of the individual Old Testament prophets to the individual ascetic monks, from the Christian notion of individual sin and redemption to the leveling of worth of vocations, there is a pronounced emphasis in the West on the individual and change rather than that of the East on the community and continuity. In his last lectures in Munich on “Staatssoziologie” Weber insisted that rationalism and charisma were the two most revolutionary powers (Weber 2009: 94–95). Charisma was the personal power from within; it was extraordinary and fleeting. Rationalism was the impersonal power from without; it was routine and permanent. Charisma was economically alien

whereas rationalism facilitated economic progress.¹⁴⁵ But, both charisma and rationalism were inherently anti-traditional. It was the fact that rationalism tended to be anti-traditional which led Weber to determine that there were two types of rationalism – the *moderate means* of the Confucian form of rationalism and the *excessive ends* of modern Western rationalism. The first used rationalism as a means to maintain order, balance, and beauty, the second transformed rationalism into an end in itself (Schluchter 1980: 10). In closing, I want to stress two things. First, Weber insisted that he was certainly not trying to demonstrate that one type of economic ethics was superior to any other; he was simply trying to understand them. Second, Weber absolutely never implied that China could not become a capitalist economy; he only suggested that thus far the Chinese emphasis on order and tradition prevented it from becoming one. There is a recently published book that suggests that Mao was the unintended founder of modern Chinese capitalism, because it was he, and only he, who had the force and the conviction to break the power of tradition in China. Whether that is true is beyond the scope of my paper; what I wanted to show was how Weber's study of Confucianism made him realize more fully the immense power of tradition; and that was what prompted him to reexamine his Protestant thesis.

References

- Adair-Toteff, Christopher (2010): "Max Weber's Notion of Asceticism". *Journal of Classical Sociology*. Vol. 10. No. 2. 109–122.
- Breuer, Stefan (2001): "Magie, Zauber, Entzauberung". In Kippenberg und Riesebrodt. 119–130.
- Chantepie de la Saussaye, P.D. (1897): *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*. Freiburg und Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Zweite völlig neu gearbeitete Auflage. Erster Band.
- Elvin, Mark (1983): "Warum hat das vormoderne China keinen industriellen Kapitalismus entwickelt? Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Max Webers Ansatz". In Schluchter 1983a. 114–133.
- Flitner, Elisabeth (2001): "Grundmuster und Varianten von Erziehung in modernen Gesellschaften. Eine erziehungswissenschaftliche Lektüre der Herrschafts- und religionssoziologischen Schriften Max Webers." In Hanke und Mommsen. 265–281.
- Hamilton, Alastair (2000): "Max Weber's *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*". In Turner 2000. 151–171.
- Hanke, Edith (2001): "Erlösungsreligionen". In Kippenberg und Riesebrodt. 209–226.

¹⁴⁵ Weber 2009: 92–93. Weber acknowledged that charisma occurred in China, but it was rare and largely restricted to warrior leaders who won battles. Weber 2009: 90–91.

- Hanke, Edith und Mommsen, Wolfgang (2001): *Max Webers Herrschaftssoziologie*. Herausgegeben von Edith Hanke und Wolfgang Mommsen. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Kippenberg, Hans G. und Riesebrodt, Martin, Hrgn. (2001): *Max Webers "Religions-systematik"*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Kalberg, Stephen (1999): "Weber's Critique of Recent Comparative-Historical Sociology and a Reconstruction of his Analysis of the Rise of Confucianism in China." *Social Theory*. Vol. 19. 207–246.
- Love, John (2000): "Max Weber's Orient". In Turner. 172–199.
- Quan X.Y. (2010): "Traditional Chinese Law versus Weberian Legal Rationality". *Max Weber Studies*. Vol. 10. No. 1. 29–45.
- Rosthorn, Arthur von (1919): *Das soziale Leben der Chinesen*. Leipzig: Der Neue Geist Verlag.
- Rosthorn, Arthur von (1923): "Religion und Wirtschaft in China". In *Erinnerungs-gabe für Max Weber*. Herausgegeben von Melchoir Palyi. München und Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot. II. 221–233.
- Schluchter, Wolfgang (1980): *Rationalismus der Weltbeherrschung. Studien zu Max Weber*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Schluchter, Wolfgang (1983a): *Max Webers Studie über Konfuzianismus und Taoismus. Interpretation und Kritik*. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang Schluchter. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag.
- Schluchter, Wolfgang (1983b): "Einleitung. Max Webers Konfuzianismusstudie – Versuch einer Einordnung." In Schluchter 1983a. 11–54.
- Schmidt-Glitzner, Helwig (2001): "China und die Angemessenheit des Begriffs der 'Patrimonialbürokratie'". In Hanke and Mommsen. 223–231.
- Turner, Stephen, ed. (2000): *The Cambridge Companion to Weber*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2000.
- Turner, Stephen and Factor, Regis (1994): *Max Weber. Lawyer as Social Thinker*. London: Routledge.
- Van der Sprinkel, Otto B. (1965): "Max Weber on China". *American Sociological Review*. Vol. 30. No. 3. 348–370.
- Weber, Max (1987): *Die protestantische Ethik II. Kritiken und Antikritiken*. Herausgegeben von Johannes Winckelmann. Güterslohe: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn. 5. Auflage.
- Weber, Max (1989): *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. Konfuzianismus und Taoismus. Schriften 1915–1920*. Herausgegeben von Helwig Schmidt-Glitzner in Zusammenarbeit mit Petra Kolonko. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe I/19*.
- Weber, Max (1996): *Die protestantische Ethik und der "Geist" des Kapitalismus*. Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Klaus Lichtblau und Johannes Weiß. Weinheim: Beltz Athenäum. 2. Auflage.
- Weber, Max (2001): *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Teilband 2: *Religiöse Gemeinschaften*. Herausgegeben von Hans G. Kippenberg in Zusammenarbeit mit Petra Schilm unter Mitwirkung von Jutta Niemeier. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe. I/22–2*.

- Weber, Max (2005): *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Teilband 4: *Herrschaft*. Herausgegeben von Edith Hanke in Zusammenarbeit mit Thomas Kroll. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. I/22–4.
- Weber, Max (2009): *Allgemeine Staatslehre und Politik (Staatssoziologie), Unvollendet. Mit- und Nachschriften 1920*. Herausgegeben von Gangolf Hübinger in Zusammenarbeit mit Andreas Terwey. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. III/7.
- Weber, Max (2011): *Abriß der universalen Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Mit- und Nachschriften 1919/1920*. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang Schluchter in Zusammenarbeit mit Joachim Schröder. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. III/6.
- Zingerle, Arnold (1972): *Max Weber und China. Herrschafts- und religionssoziologische Grundlagen zum Wandel der chinesischen Gesellschaft*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
- Zingerle, Arnold (1983): "Max Webers Analyse des chinesischen Präbendalismus. Zu einigen Problemen der Verständigung zwischen Soziologie und Sinologie". In Schluchter 1983a. 174–201.

Chapter Nine

“Sinn der Welt”: Max Weber and the Problem of Theodicy

Max Weber uses the term “sense” (“Sinn”) in a number of different senses. He uses it in the sense of “objective sense”, “possible sense”, and as in the “sense of action”.¹⁴⁶ Then there is the “sense of the world” (“Sinn der Welt”), and by this Weber means the attempt to understand the world. For Weber, making “sense” of the world is not simply a scholarly task; it is fundamentally an existential question. For Karl Jaspers, Weber’s focus was always on what it means to be a human being, and for Weber that is trying to find meaning in the world.¹⁴⁷ Specifically, it is the attempt to reconcile the notion that there is suffering in a world which has been created by a deity who is both all powerful and is totally benign. This is the problem of theodicy, and it is one which Weber examined very carefully. This essay is devoted primarily to setting out Weber’s discussion of the problem of theodicy, but it is also intended to show how this was an intensely important and personal matter for Max Weber.

The problem of theodicy is the age-old difficulty of attempting to reconcile the fact that there is evil and suffering in this world with the idea of a supremely benevolent and omnipotent God. Gottfried Leibniz had coined the term when he published a book by the same name in 1710. Since then, numerous German scholars have devoted considerable attention to the topic. Its importance was underscored by the fact that in the early 1900s there

¹⁴⁶ In his *Max Weber Dictionary* Richard Swedberg’s entry “Sinn” simply directs the reader to the lengthy entry “Meaning”. In his lengthy introduction to *Max Weber. Critique of Stammler* Guy Oakes suggests that “Sinn” can be replaced by “Bedeutung” (“significance”). These suggest that something is “meaningful, understandable, or interpretable”. Richard Swedberg, *Max Weber Dictionary*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2005: 245; 160–163; Oakes 1977: 25.

¹⁴⁷ See Jaspers’ comments in his *Max Weber. Eine Gedenkenrede* as well as his *Max Weber. Politiker, Forscher, Philosoph*. Karl Jaspers, (*Eine Gedenkenrede*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 1921. 6–10) and Karl Jaspers, (*Max Weber. Politiker, Forscher, Philosoph*. München: Verlag von C.H. Beck). 1958. 8–9, 42, 49–50. Jaspers stressed that while Weber was a scholar, he recognized the limits of knowledge. Jaspers 1958: 61. In the section of his *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* on “Grenzsituationen” Jaspers utilizes Weber’s treatment of theodicy. Karl Jaspers. (*Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*. Berlin: Verlag von Julius Springer. 1919). 253–254.

was a special competition in Germany devoted specifically to the impact and the history of the problem of theodicy. Several of the entries charted the development of the problem from Leibniz to Kant and from Schiller to Goethe, with one entry containing the claim that Goethe's entire *Faust* could be considered as a "poetic theodicy". (Lempp 1910, Kremer 1910, Wegener 1909, Hanke 2001: 221–222, note 72, Troeltsch 1913b: 678–679, note 1, and Troeltsch 1913b: 682 and note 8). Weber was quite likely aware of this line of thinking, but if for some reason he was not, his attention would have been directed to it by his close friend and colleague Ernst Troeltsch. Troeltsch not only wrote the second entry of "Theodicy" in the massive *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* but he also reviewed two of these prize submissions (Troeltsch 1913a and Troeltsch 1913b). In his entry he referred to the problem of theodicy as one of the most "fundamental questions of all religion" (Troeltsch 1913a: 1186; see Lempp 1910: 1). This notion is not just central to his sociology of religion; it also goes into the realms of his political thinking and even into his personal beliefs. This does not mean that this is a "core" or "central" theme in Weber's writings. What it does mean is that it is a very important conception that occurs throughout many of Weber's writings and that at different times he views it differently, depending on his focus of concern.¹⁴⁸ Weber devotes a considerable amount of effort to the problem of theodicy; not just because he recognizes its significance in the realm of objective scholarship, but because he clearly acknowledges its enduring importance to him. Given such importance, it is surprising that so few scholars have paid any attention to Weber's discussions of the problem of theodicy. Yet, Weber's contributions are important, if not unique, for several reasons. First, unlike most of the people who have addressed the problem of theodicy, Weber does not tackle the problem from a theological or ethical point of view; but rather, he appropriates it and discusses it primarily from a sociological perspective. Second, and in a similar vein, he takes up Nietzsche's notion about "Ressentiment", but he divests it of Nietzsche's polemical overtones and offers a much more nuanced account of this important notion. Third, Weber provides a detailed contrast between the theodicy of suffering and his unique theodicy of fortune; he argues that the lucky few also have a fundamental and critical need for one. Finally, Weber addresses the problem of theodicy, not simply from the detached viewpoint of the

¹⁴⁸ For a discussion of "pre-critical" and "critical" writings and how they relate to the Max Weber *Gesamtausgabe* see Klaus Litchblau, "Book Reviews", *Max Weber Studies*. 2010. Vol. 10. No. 2. 251–256.

scholar; he also approaches it from the emotional viewpoint of the person who tries to make sense of the world.¹⁴⁹

The following discussion of Weber's notion of theodicy necessitates a brief explanation of methodology. Two recent books on Weber's *Protestant Ethic and the Sprit of Capitalism* exemplify two opposing methodological approaches: In *Weber, Passion and Profits* Jack Barbalet takes a sociological approach that is rather "critical and destructive" and insists that "it is a fragment, it is polemical, and it is a personal manifesto" (Barbalet 2008: 8, 223). He concludes that it is the "best known but least worthy of Weber's books", in part because Barbalet sees Weber's thinking as being mostly monolithic (Barbalet 2008: 225). In *A Historian Reads Max Weber* Peter Ghosh believes that *The Protestant Ethic* is extraordinary, but he insists that it must be approached "with the most ruthless disregard for any canonical status" (Ghosh 2008: 3). His approach is "uncompromisingly historical" and he regards as "misplaced" the question whether Weber was historically correct. Instead, he insists that "we must understand the *PE* within Max Weber's entire *oeuvre*, and within the fragile life of a single man" (Ghosh 2008: 3). Having said that, Ghosh correctly points out that Weber often held convictions throughout his life; however, he also points out that Weber did change his mind, and in fundamental ways. Ghosh offers as an example Weber's views on capitalism; how he moved from connecting it with "landlords to uncovering its religious origins" (Ghosh 2008: 79, 89). It will be evident from the following that I take an approach to Weber similar to Ghosh's in that I will note how much Weber's views on the problem of theodicy remained the same throughout his life, but also how they were subject to revision.

This paper is divided into four main sections: First, I show how Weber relates the social-psychological question of how to make sense of the world with the theological notion of theodicy. Second, I set out the three main "scientific" treatments of what Weber calls the "theodicy of suffering": Hinduism, dualism, and predestination. Third, I discuss Weber's notion of a Jewish theodicy and how he takes issue with Werner Sombart regarding the position of the Jews in world history. Here I show that his interest is scholarly as well as political and even personal. Fourth, I show how Weber moves from Sombart to Nietzsche and argue that the latter's theory of "Ressentiment" helps to form Weber's own, unique notion of a "theodicy of happiness". In the concluding remarks I show how Weber's strong personal

¹⁴⁹ Sam Whimster has appropriately and repeatedly drawn our attention to Weber's emotional side. For some of his latest comments, see Sam Whimster, *Understanding Weber*. London: Routledge. 2007. 71–72. I would like to thank Sam Whimster for prompting me to think more about the existential aspect and for his thoughtful advice on a number of other issues.

considerations made the problem of theodicy so fundamentally important to him.

Theodicy and "Making Sense of the World"

In the "Religiöse Gemeinschaften" section of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* Weber writes that the theological problem of theodicy is the "unsolvable problem" of how to reconcile the recognition of the "imperfection of the world" with the belief in an all powerful deity (Weber 2001: 296–297). Towards the end of *Politik als Beruf* Max Weber provides a more complete version of the "age old problem of theodicy" when he poses the question: "How is it possible that such a power, which is both all powerful and all good, could have created such an irrational world which is filled with such undeserved suffering, so many unpunished injustices, and such unreformable stupidity?"¹⁵⁰

Weber's concern is not so much with a particular version of a theodicy as it is with the general notion of it. Such a notion of a theodicy is fundamentally a "justification" of God and that it is bound up with one's conception of this deity (Weber 1989: 516, Weber 2001: 292). The person who contends that the deity that rules the world is an arbitrary despot has no need for such a justification; it is simply a matter of that deity's will and power. Similarly, there is no need of a theodicy for a person who places everything in faith; the Church has the answer that will eliminate any doubts, and that is the doctrine of original sin (Lempp 1910: 1–3). However, for the person who believes that we are, or should be, in a position to understand, there is the problem of theodicy. As Lempp put it: "God is all powerful, all wise, all merciful, but the world that he created is bad, [it is] a valley of tears, humanity is ensnared in original sin, so why did not God make this world different?" (Lempp 1910: 5). As long as religion remained a matter of faith, there would be little interest in thinking this is a problem (Troeltsch 1913b: 679). It is only with the rise of (Western) rationalism with its contention that we can understand virtually everything that the problem of theodicy arises (Lempp 1910: 7).

¹⁵⁰ Weber 1992: 241. "Das uralte Problem der Theodicee ist ja die Frage: Wie kommt es, daß eine Macht, die als zugleich allmächtig und gütig hingestellt wird, eine derartig irrationale Welt des unverdienten Leidens, des ungestraften Unrechts and der unverbesserlichen Dummheit hat erschaffen können." This is not to suggest that there is an equivalence of texts; in the first Weber's concern is primarily scholarly and in the second it is mostly personal.

In *Wissenschaft als Beruf* Weber singles out two major innovations that paved the way for the rise of Western rationalism: the discovery of concept and the introduction of the rational experiment (Weber 1992: 89–90). These were part of the larger process of systemization, in which the world was increasingly “disenchanted” of magical powers. Wolfgang Schluchter argued that this process can be split into two: that which was performed by science and that which was accomplished by religion – specifically, by the religions of salvation (Schluchter 2009: 7–13). However, the two are linked because the rise of rationality broadened the ability to try to make sense of the world and by extension to solve the problem of theodicy. Unfortunately, the emphasis on understanding ultimately leads to the complete failure of providing satisfactory answers to the difficulties raised by theodicy.

Understanding the world includes, as Lempp stated in his article on “Theodicy”, determining the “reason, sense, or purpose of evil in the world” (“Grund, Sinn oder Zweck des Übels in der Welt”), or as Troeltsch maintained in his article, discovering the “final sense and reason of the world” (“letzten Sinn und Grund der Welt”) (Lempp 1913: 1177, 1183, Troeltsch 1913a: 1186, 1188). Troeltsch also uses the simpler phrase, “Sinn der Welt”, which is the same phrase that Weber uses. Weber uses the term “Sinn” (“sense”) in a number of different ways. Wolfgang Schluchter claims to have found three different ways in which Weber uses “Sinn”: a metaphysically true sense, a dogmatically correct sense, and a subjectively meant sense (Schluchter 1991: 542). There is little doubt that this claim is correct; but for the purposes here I want to examine Weber’s use of “Sinn” from a different perspective. Weber often uses the word “Sinn” in an everyday way as when he writes of the “correct sense” in “Die ‘Objektivität’ sozialwissenschaftliche und sozialpolitische Erkenntnis” or the “sense of ‘Wertfreiheit’” in “Der Sinn der ‘Wertfreiheit’ der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenschaften” (Weber 1922b: 195 and 451). In *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* Weber writes of the “sense of religion” and the “sense of traditionalism” (Weber 2001: 121, 346). And, in *Wissenschaft als Beruf* Weber introduces the topic of “Beruf” or “calling” by first setting out the “material sense of the word” and he refers to the “sense” of Plato’s “mania”. In these and other passages Weber is speaking of the technical or “Wortsinn” of the word or concept (Weber 1992: 71, 85, 86, 105, 109). However, Weber frequently uses “Sinn” in a much larger and more metaphysical, if not more “ethical sense” (“ethischer ‘Sinn’”) (Weber 1989: 94). This is the “‘Sinn’ der Welt”, which Weber uses repeatedly (Weber 1989: 515, 519, Weber 1992: 92, Weber 2001: 324, 328, 356). In *Wissenschaft als Beruf* he introduces this notion by referring to Tolstoy’s question whether death has any sense. As Weber puts it: “if death is a meaningful

occurrence or not" ("ob der Tod eine sinnvolle Erscheinung sei oder nicht"). For Tolstoy the answer was a clear "No" for the "Kulturmenschen". Weber clarifies this by pointing out that the "Kulturmenschen" live by "thoughts, knowledge, problems," and that they can only be "tired of life". For them, death is meaningless. In contrast, death had sense for "Abraham or some peasant in the old days" because they were "sated with life" (Weber 1992: 87–88). Weber elaborates upon this in the "Zwischenbetrachtung" when he writes of the "completion of life". Not only do Abraham and the peasant have a meaningful death because they have lived a meaningful life; the "lord of the manor" ("Grundherr") and the "war hero" ("Kriegsheld") also do. They have fulfilled the "life cycle of their existence" ("Denn beide erfüllten einen Kreislaufs ihres Seins") (Weber 1989: 518). In the "Zwischenbetrachtung" Weber's point is that "culture" with its emphasis on progress is limitless (Weber 1989: 518). In *Wissenschaft als Beruf* it is the "sense" of "science" that it can never be "filled" or completed; it is the "progress of infinity". We must expect that our scientific answers are destined to become outdated in 10, 20, or 50 years. Weber says "that is the fate, indeed: that is the *sense* of the task of science".¹⁵¹ His larger point is that science cannot give our lives meaning or sense. Weber *does not* maintain that the "scientific" person does not have a "meaningful vocation" ("sinnvoller Beruf"), but what he *does* maintain is that science cannot give life its meaning (Weber 1992: 88). Each of the previous attempts are illusions; regardless whether they are the "way to true being", the "way to true art", the "way to true God", or even the "way to true happiness". These attempts are all illusions; in addition, they lack sense because they cannot answer the two most fundamental questions: "What should we do? How should we live?" ("Was sollen wir tun? Wie sollen wir leben?") (Weber 1992: 93). Science cannot approach the "last sense" ("letzter Sinn"), which is to answer the question of the relationship of "God, man and world" (Weber 1992: 93, Weber 2001: 167, 301, Hanke 2001: 215).

This "last sense" is the relation between God and man. Or, to put it differently, why is it that good and just people suffer and the bad and unjust do not? Weber formulates this into a general question: why is there such "undeserved" or "unjust" suffering in the world? (Weber 1989: 94, 515, 519). This is what he calls the "theodicy of suffering" ("Theodizee des Leidens") (Weber 1989: 93, 95). One of the earliest and best known stories of undeserved suffering is in the Old Testament Book of Job. Here the good, pious, and honest servant of God loses everything – family, property, and even his rep-

¹⁵¹ "Das ist das Schicksal, ja: das ist der *Sinn* der Arbeit der Wissenschaft..." Weber 1992: 85.

utation. One of Weber's major sources on old Judaism, Hermann Gunkel, wrote that Job's story is not just a moving story; it is also one of the first instances of doubt in the Old Testament. Previously, people simply believed that the pious would have health, happiness, and prosperity while the impious would suffer (Gunkel 1912: 39–40). They also believed that God punished only the wicked, or if he punished the good, it was to serve as an example. However, Gunkel pointed out that neither of these applied in Job's case (Gunkel 1912: 45–46). Bernhard Duhm, another of Weber's sources, suggested that the primary focus of the book was the problem of misfortune (Duhm 1897: VII–VIII, XII). Lempp suggested that the Book of Job was designed to show that every theory about God's justice "smashed against reality" (Lempp 1913: 1179). Weber held that the Book of Job was an attempt to intellectualize the problem of theodicy, but that it failed to offer a solution (Weber 2001: 275, 260). To the question whether there is a moral world order, there is no answer; there is only God's overwhelming power (Weber 2001: 260, Duhm 1897: V). What the Book of Job did accomplish was to contribute to the increasing Jewish desire to provide answers in the form of doctrines, as the Old Testament prophets were doing (Weber 2001: 197). Weber maintains that the Book of Job comes from the Jewish intellectual circle and stems from the "natural rational desire of intellectualism to grasp the world as a meaningful cosmos".¹⁵² As the belief in magic diminished so did the belief in the world's "magical meaning". As confidence in intellect grew the world began to make less "sense"; it was transformed into a place where things simply happened, and are merely happening now. As a result, there was an increasing demand for the world and one's life to be "meaningfully" ("Sinnvoll") ordered (Weber 2001: 273). It is by virtue of the movement towards intellectualism that there is the need for the "pure *thinking* comprehension of the world and its 'sense'" ("rein *denkenden* Erfassung der Welt und ihres 'Sinnes'" (Weber 1989: 104). Weber emphasizes that this need for a "theodicy of suffering" is a *rational* need.¹⁵³ This is the rational need to understand suffering. If one believes that one suffers because one is possessed by a demon or is punished because of God's anger, then there is no need for a theodicy (Weber 1989: 89). Or, if one contends that the world is simply chaotic or that it is dominated by magical forces, then there is no way to comprehend it; hence no need for a theodicy. However, if one maintains

¹⁵² "natürliche rationalistische Bedürfnis des Intellektualismus, die Welt als sinnvollen Kosmos zu begreifen..." Weber 2001: 272. See also "'Sinn' des Kosmos." Weber 2001: 275.

¹⁵³ "Theodizee des Leidens". He also refers to it as a "theodicy of dying" ("Theodizee des Sterbens") or a "theodicy of death" ("Theodizee des Todes"). Weber varies the spelling. Weber 1989: 94–95, 493.

that we humans have the capacity to understand the world *and* that the God who governs does so justly then there is the need to explain why there is suffering. This is shown by the extraordinarily strong rational need for an explanation of why there is injustice in the world. Weber notes that this need continues even into the twentieth century and he points to a 1906 study that asked a number of workers for the reason why they lacked faith. Only a minority attributed this lack of faith to the results stemming from modern scientific theories while the majority placed the blame directly on the "injustice" of "this world order" (Weber 1989: 95). Thus, there is the continuing need to solve the problem of theodicy.

The Three Types of Theodicy

Every type of theodicy acknowledges that there is evil and suffering in the world. The task then is to try to explain why they exist – either by insisting that God is not all powerful or that God is not all good. Weber looks at the types of theodicy by their choice of explanation. According to him, there are three types of theodicy. In *Wissenschaft als Beruf* Weber merely lists them: they are the "Persian dualism", the "Indian doctrine of Karma", and the doctrine of predestination with its attendant notions of original sin and "Deus absconditus" (Weber 1992: 241). At the end of the "Zwischenbetrachtung" Weber lists these three again, but here he does more than simply enumerate them.

Weber's shortest treatment is on Persian dualism, and here the choice is to believe that God is not all powerful. In this dualism there are two dueling powers: the forces of light and the powers of darkness, or put differently, between the "pure" and the "impure" (Weber 1989: 520–521). Evil is not a "privation", but is a "real" power and the world is the "showplace" of the "dramatic struggle" between these powers.¹⁵⁴ God is not the cause of injustice, unfairness, and sin; that is, all the conditions that provide for the need for a theodicy (Weber 2001: 298). There is no point in trying to justify God and the forces of light; rather one must help these good forces to overcome the dark powers (Weber 2001: 298–299, see Lempp 1913: 1178). The dark

¹⁵⁴ See Lempp 1913: 1178. I cite Lempp because, as I indicated above, Weber undoubtedly knew of Lempp's work on theodicy because of Troeltsch. Moreover, Weber liked and used the *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* as indicated by his using other entries. Finally, the editors of the volume on the economic ethics of the world's religions containing the "Einleitung" refer to Lempp's theodicy entry. However, they do not name him and the volume number that they give is wrong. It is not Band V; but Band IX. Weber 1989: 90, note 11.

powers are connected to the heaviness of the material world, while the forces of good are linked to the pure and light. As a result, there is an “aristocratic feeling of prestige” connected with the “pure and chosen” (Weber 2001: 299). As an aside, Weber notes that Zarathustrian dualism is found in the general opposition between the forces of “heaven” and “hell” (Weber 1989: 521).

The second form of theodicy that Weber lists in the “Zwischenbetrachtung” is the Indian “intellectual-religious” version, which he refers to as the “superior” (“hervorragende”) form of theodicy (Weber 1989: 522). Like the Persian dualism, the notion of an all-powerful deity recedes, but unlike the dualism, the “cause” of the suffering is not ascribed to any outside force, but rather to our own sinful nature. In his article on “Theodizee” Lempp suggests that it is in the “Indian religion” that the problem of theodicy first is the major focus. It is also here that all human suffering is not blamed on some outside force but on the individual himself. As Lempp writes, all unfilled needs and imperfections, all social necessities and the caste system, all political difficulties and even natural catastrophes are the result of our own bad deeds (Lempp 1913: 1177). And, he calls this a very “strict moral order”. In the volume devoted to Hinduism and Buddhism Weber speaks to this order by insisting that the Hindu theodicy is fundamentally rational. He adds that it is extraordinarily rich with doctrines (Weber 1996: 201–202, 271). There are, he insists, two interconnected doctrines which no Hindu would contest: they are “Samsara” (“transmigration of souls”) and “Karma” (“repayment”). In essence these two doctrines combine to form the contention that the individual is destined to atone for his or her own transgressions; or those of one’s family, by constantly being reborn. Weber contends that the idea that one is fated to eternally repeat one’s specific life is something that appears totally senseless and unendurable, so the question is, how does one get off this “wheel” of life? Lempp answers this by pointing to the need for a second theodicy. Here, the individual can hope to escape from the endless reincarnations by denying all bodily desires (Lempp 1913: 1178). Weber takes up this theme when he notes the demand for order and discipline and by the need for everyday asceticism (Weber 1996: 241, 245, 250–254). Weber notes that there is no economic influence on the development of these doctrines and that they instead grew out of the belief in a rationally-ethically determined cosmos (Weber 1996: 206, 218). Weber believes that it achieves its “extraordinary metaphysical performance” (“außerordentliche metaphysische Leistung”) because it combines one’s self-dissolution with the universal approach to salvation and by the strictest “world-rejection” (“Weltablehnung”) with organic social ethics. It also achieves this by

combining the highest path to salvation with an "inner-worldly vocational ethics" ("innerweltlicher Berufsethik") (Weber 1989: 522).

The third type of theodicy is, in Weber's opinion, the most important form of theodicy and is found in the Calvinist doctrine of predestination. As with the other two, the doctrine of predestination is prompted by the massive presence of "poverty, need, and destiny" (Troeltsch 1913c: 1706). As with the Hindu form of theodicy, the deity's goodness is safeguarded by placing the blame for suffering in the world on its human occupants. But, here the emphasis on blaming humans is even greater. The world is a place of suffering because every human being is equally corrupted (Weber 1989: 465). However, as Weber indicates, even if everyone is equally corrupt, not everyone has the same "chance" for religious salvation. Indeed, only a "chosen few" are to be part of the "Ecclesia pura" while the vast majority are condemned to damnation (Weber 1989: 110, 464–465). Weber also emphasizes that this is not a temporal decree but an eternal one (Weber 1989: 465–466, Weber 2001: 297). Elsewhere Weber insists that the salvation that is granted to the select few does not come from anything that they might have done or do, but is simply a "totally free foundationless gift of grace" ("ganz freies grundloses Gnadengeschenk") (Weber 2001: 362). In the "Zwischenbetrachtung" Weber directs us to what he had written about the doctrine of predestination in the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Weber 1989: 521, see Weber 1922a: 91). We cannot hope to understand God's decision; it is based upon God's "omniscience" ("Allwissenheit") (Weber 1989: 521, Weber 2001: 297). Nor are we in any position to evaluate it; to try to apply human standards is both senseless and an affront to God (Weber 1922a: 92). Finally, we do not have any grounds for complaint; to do so is like an animal complaining that it was not born a human being (Weber 2001: 297, Weber 1922a: 93). This deity is not the "revealed God", it is the "hidden God" – the "Deus absconditus" (Weber 1989: 95, Weber 2001: 297). The sole point, or value, is God's sovereignty, his majesty and his glory (Weber 2001: 297, Weber 1989: 521, Weber 1922: 94, Troeltsch 1913c: 1707–1708). Any claim to God's goodness is sacrificed, what remains is the intention to "save" God's omnipotence. The "recognized impossibility" of measuring God's decrees by human standards signifies with "lifeless clarity" ("liebloser Klarheit") the impossibility of making "sense of the world" by human understanding. And, that puts an end to the problem of theodicy (Weber 1989: 521). Thus, the problem is not with God, but with humans. Yet, this answer does not fully address the underlying problem of theodicy: even if humans are morally corrupt, why would an all powerful and all merciful God allow such horrible suffering. Rather than providing an answer to the problem of

theodicy, the Calvinist attempt ends in failure. As John Love pointed out, the emphasis on understanding was supposed to “master the world and transform it for God’s glory, but this had unexpected results for it led ultimately to science and the disenchantment of the world” (Love 2000: 220).

The Jews and Sombart

Weber believed that there was a group that should be considered forerunners to Calvinism, and this group was the Jews (Fleischmann 1981: 266, 270–271). He also believed that the Calvinists shared certain features of their attempts at a theodicy, as evidenced by the form used by the Old Testament prophets (see Hanke 2001: 223). Both are strictly limited in their pursuit of an answer to the problem of theodicy (Weber 2001: 298, Weber 2005: 668, note 86). Both the Calvinists and the prophets believed in an all-powerful deity and both held that humans, because of their weaknesses and defective natures, were responsible for their sufferings (see Weber 2005: 667). However, the Calvinists believed that this was true of all human-kind, whereas the prophets focused almost exclusively on their own people. The problem of theodicy was not an abstract and remote question. Rather the “entirely great questions of theodicy” go directly and immediately to the heart of the Jewish religion and that the Jews suffered massively under the “difficult theodicy problem” (Weber 2005: 530, 532). This “final question” was a “fundamental thesis of prophecy” (Weber 2005: 541–542). Since the prophets in particular and the Israelis in general rejected the power of magic they could not blame the undeserved suffering on demons and evil spirits. Human suffering did not come from irrational sources such as “blind accident” or through magical powers. Instead, it was an understandable and “fundamental thesis” that all evil stemmed from God (Weber 2005: 551, 666). While the evils came from God, humans brought them on themselves. Weber relies on Hermann Gunkel’s article on the God of the Old Testament in *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Weber 2005: 661, note 51). Originally, God loved “Israel as a father loves his sons” and he “protected, led, and cared” for it as a shepherd does for his flock (Gunkel 1910: 1532). Even Israel’s military victories were regarded as a direct result of “help” from God. However, God was also Israel’s “highest judge” so when Israel turned away from God’s justice and morality and engaged instead in injustice and sacrilege, God moved to punish it (Gunkel 1910: 1533). The true prophet believed that he was the “guardian of morality” (“Sittenwächter”) and he repeatedly emphasized that God is a “sovereign” (“Herrscher”) and he re-

peatedly warned of God's "wrath" ("Zorn") and impending catastrophe (Weber 2005: 666–667, 671, 730, 735). Loss of property, sickness, and poverty were all taken as indications of God's wrath (Weber 2005: 738). Weber maintained that all of this pain, suffering, and poverty led to the creation of "the single real, earnest *Theodicy*" ("die einzige wirklich ernsthaft *Theodizée*") (Weber 2005: 736). While the Jews regarded themselves as the chosen "people", they also believed that they were chosen to suffer.

In 1911 Sombart published *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben*. In it, he explains that he was prompted to return to the question of modern capitalism by Weber's *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. In particular, Weber's attempt to trace the origins of modern capitalism to Luther's notion of "Beruf" and specifically to the religious ethics of Calvinism prompted Sombart to examine more carefully the role of the Jews in the rise of capitalism (Sombart 1911: V). Sombart acknowledged both Weber's influence on his thinking and he admitted to the similarities between the Puritans and the Jews (Sombart 1911: 292–295). However, Sombart believed that there was an even closer affinity between the Jews and capitalism than one might believe, and because of their extensive connections and their specific economic practices they were really the ones who were responsible for the expansion of capitalism throughout Europe (Sombart 1911: 49, 199–205, 242). Weber completely rejected Sombart's claim that the Jews were responsible for the rise of modern capitalism (Fleischmann 1981: 268–269). In Weber's view, Sombart had critically erred in attempting to locate its origins in the Jewish money economy when it was the Protestant emphasis on productivity that actually accounted for the rise of modern capitalism (Fleischmann 1981: 268; Lichtblau 2001: 285). Finally, Weber dismissed Sombart's claim for the massive Jewish economic power; arguing instead that the Jews were a "pariah people". I do not want to take up Weber's contentious claim regarding the "Pariavolk", but to briefly address another one; that is, the issue of Nietzsche's impact on Weber. In one regard there is little doubt that Nietzsche was a major force on Weber's thinking; Weber himself said that Nietzsche's influence on German thinking was paramount; only Karl Marx could be considered to have a similar impact (see Baumgarten 1964: 554–555, note 1).

Nietzsche, "Ressentiment" and the "Negative Privileged"

Several scholars have suggested that it was not Sombart but Nietzsche who was the focus of Weber's concerns (Otto 2002: 239 265; Lichtblau 2001: 285–

286). Both Weber and Nietzsche contended that the Jews occupied a special place in the history of religion and that they both approached this from a shared problematic (Lichtblau 2001: 279). This is not the place to enter into the discussion about Nietzsche's influence on Weber; rather, the sole focus here is on Nietzsche's notion of "Ressentiment" and the function that it plays in Weber's conceptions of theodicy.

In the Preface to *Zur Genealogie der Moral* Nietzsche referred to his first literary attempt. As a thirteen year old boy he tried to tackle the age old question of the origin of evil. In it he gave "God the honor" and made him the "father of evil" (Nietzsche 1988: 249). In the first part of *Zur Genealogie* Nietzsche makes a far more sophisticated attempt at determining the origin of evil, and this time he attributes it to the Jews. Previously human history suggested that there was an equivalence of values: "Good=noble=powerful=beautiful=fortunate=God-loved" and that was accompanied by a hatred of weakness (Nietzsche 1988: 267). The noble and fortunate simply believed that they were entitled to their good fortunate and they had no reason even to reflect upon the question whether or not they deserved it (Owen 1991: 80). In marked contrast, the Jews spent an inordinate amount of effort on the question of why they "deserved" to suffer. In Nietzsche's narrative, the Jews adopted what he called a "slave morality" and developed hatred of strength. They rose up against "the good, the beautiful, the fortunate", whom they "hated" and "resented", hence Nietzsche's notion of "Ressentiment" accompanied by his theory of "the revaluation of all values" (Nietzsche 1988: 270–271).

It is to Eckart Otto's credit that he stresses the importance of Nietzsche's notion of "Ressentiment" on Weber's thinking, which he does in the fourth section of his *Max Webers Studien des Antiken Judentums* and in his lengthy introduction to the volume *Das antike Judentum* (Weber 2005: 70, 128–130, Otto 243–245). However, it is mentioned only a couple of times in *Das antike Judentum* and in one of those times the term is used in describing God's "passionate wrath or sharp resentment" against the godless (Weber 2005: 732, 813–814). Weber's discussions of it are instead found in two other places: in the Introduction to *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen* and in the "Religiöse Gemeinschaften" section of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. According to Weber, Nietzsche was the first to recognize that "Ressentiment" was at the foundation of the Jewish ethical salvation-religiosity and that he had set this out in his "brilliant essay" *Zur Genealogie der Moral* (Weber 2001: 257, Weber 1989: 88). For the Jews, suffering was not something to be looked down upon but to be embraced; the fortunate people who looked down on the unfortunate should not to be envied but should be despised.

Weber specifically points to the Psalms as being filled with the need for revenge (Weber 2001: 258). The Jewish religion was one of revenge and retribution (Weber 2001: 259). In Weber's view the "feeling of revenge" is expressed by the notion of "Ressentiment" (Lichtblau 2001: 291). In many points, Weber shares Nietzsche's insights; but there are fundamental differences. First, Nietzsche was wrong to attribute this simply to the "rising up of the slaves" ("Sklavenaufstand") (Weber 1989: 89, Weber 2001: 263). Second, Weber's treatment of the notion of "Ressentiment" differs fundamentally from Nietzsche's: he offers a dispassionate scholarly analysis of it, whereas Nietzsche provides a passionate denunciation of it. Weber thinks that this is a small but important sociological notion; Nietzsche contends that it is the fundamental metaphysical/ethical point of view that is responsible for virtually the entire decline of Western civilization. Weber is quick to acknowledge that it was Nietzsche who first drew attention to this notion and that it grew out of the forceful recognition of the "unequal distribution" of suffering. And, it led directly to the form of a theodicy of what Weber calls the "negative privileged" (Weber 2001: 258). Unfortunately, Nietzsche did not pursue this last point, so the third difference is that Weber's own treatment is bound up with the important, but neglected notion, of the "negative privileged".

The Jews were not the only "negative privileged" people in the world, there have been many other disadvantaged people as well. Weber also pointed out that it was not just the Jewish religion, or even the Christian religion which was the only salvation religion. Rather, virtually all of the religions of the oppressed peoples were religions of salvation – and the more the people were oppressed, the more powerful was their hope of salvation (Weber 2001: 255–256). In contrast to the noble and privileged people who have no need for salvation religions, they hold a special place for the poorer and "negative privileged" people (Weber 2001: 249, 252). In the past, the positive privileged people were the nobles; in the present they as well as the bureaucrats make up this class (Weber 2001: 234). In the past, the negative privileged people included the slaves and the free day laborers; today, it also includes the proletariat (Weber 2001: 234, 246). These are the economically, politically, and socially disadvantaged classes who have little hope of being able to better their lot in life. Weber singles out Sombart's 1906 book entitled *Das Proletariat* for its "beautiful form" in describing how the modern factory worker and his family have lost almost all sense of freedom and the ability to relate to nature (Weber 2001: 246). Instead, the masses have almost nothing to soothe their lives; even their most basic needs are often unsatisfied (Weber 2001: 247). Weber insists that it is, in fact, the special need of the negative

privileged to seek release (salvation) from suffering.¹⁵⁵ The Jews may have felt singled out for suffering and that in turn led to the "Ressentiment" towards the more fortunate. The Jews may have had a special need for a theodicy, but the need for religious salvation is found in every type of the "negative privileged classes".¹⁵⁶

The "Theodicy of Fortune"

Weber notes that throughout history people believed bodily deformities and other types of sufferings were considered to be indications of God's wrath. In contrast, those who were strong and beautiful were believed to have been blessed by the gods (Weber 2001: 253–254, Weber 1989: 89). This does not mean that the fortunate were indifferent to religion, because they were not. Unlike Nietzsche, Weber maintained that the beautiful and strong also looked to religion. They did not, however, seek it as a source of consolation: a "theodicy of suffering". Instead, they saw religion as a source of legitimacy for their fortune – in other words, a "theodicy of fortune". As Lichtblau put it, they had a need for "religious justification", i.e. the need to feel that their fortune was "legitimate" (Lichtblau 2001: 281). Or, as Weber put it, this was a "psychical need for comfort for the legitimization of fortune" ("seelische Komfortbedürfnis nach Legitimität des Glückes") (Weber 2001: 253). This need manifested itself in the search for legitimizing one's political destiny, in the difference in economic situations, in bodily health, and even in accounting for success in erotic competition, among other things (Weber 2001: 253). Weber acknowledges that not every privileged person has this need and not everyone has the need for legitimization to the same degree (Weber 2001: 253–254). However, Weber insists that "The fortunate are seldom satisfied with the fact of the possession of their fortunateness" ("Der Glückliche begnügt sich selten mit der Tatsache des Besitzes seines Glückes") (Weber 1989: 89). Just as the person wanted to believe that those who were less fortunate, somehow "deserved" that, he also wanted to believe that he "deserved" his happiness. The person wanted a "right" to justify his fortune, to show how his power, the honor, the possessions and enjoyments were "earned" (Weber 1989: 90). If the world's poor masses needed a "theodicy of suffering", the fortunate few also required a "theodicy of fortune".

¹⁵⁵ "Ihr spezifisches Bedürfnis ist Erlösung von Leiden." Weber 2001: 254.

¹⁵⁶ Weber 2001: 261. The particular need for salvation was not only an issue of class; Weber points out that throughout history women have often been the ones seeking salvation. Weber 2001: 250–252.

Max Weber counted himself as being one of the fortunate ones – in at least one respect. He was appointed professor at Freiburg at the age of 29 and then took over the prestigious chair in national economy at Heidelberg at 33. He recognized that he was very fortunate and he must have thought about it throughout his life. He refers to it in *Wissenschaft als Beruf* where he warns his student audience of the hazards and dangers of pursuing a scholarly position. He told them that he was fortunate to be promoted to full professor at a rather young age while many older and more deserving candidates were passed over. Because of this Weber insisted that he has such a “sharpened eye” for an “undeserved fate” (“unverdientes Schicksal”) (Weber 1992: 75). For most people, making the choice for an academic life is a “wild hazard”, and for some there is no chance. For those who are Jewish, Weber advises them to remember Dante’s “abandon all hope” (Weber 1992: 75, 79–80). For those who do begin the effort, he cautions that they must be able to tolerate the fact that “year after year the mediocre ones will be promoted over you.” If you are not favorably regarded by the students as a good teacher you will receive the “academic death sentence”, even if you are one of the best scholars in the world (Weber 1992: 80, 78). And, the students may base their unfavorable opinion upon the smallest of factors, like one’s temperament and even tone of voice. In Weber’s opinion, the academic life is dominated in the highest degree by “chance” and “accident” (“Zufall”); indeed, he insists that he can scarcely imagine any other career on earth (“Laufbahn auf Erden”) in which “chance” and “accident” play such a role. One person who took Weber’s advice seriously was not his student in any technical sense, but one who was immensely influenced by Weber’s life and writings: Karl Jaspers.

Concluding Comments

In his philosophical autobiography Jaspers talks about his decision to write his *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* and how it grew out of the terrible years during the First World War. He points specifically to the section on “Grenzsituationen” where he writes about death, suffering, accidents, and struggle (Jaspers 1977: 33; Jaspers 1919: 229–280). Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche feature prominently in this section, but when Jaspers discusses the notion of theodicy he specifically draws on Weber’s treatment of the three types (Jaspers 1919: 252–255). For Jaspers, philosophy was the attempt to understand existence and that is why he looked to Weber. In his speech given shortly after Weber’s death, Jaspers spoke of how Weber was a philosopher, but not in the general sense (Jaspers 1921: 3). Jaspers admitted that

Weber had no philosophical system and that it would be impossible to set out Weber's philosophical 'doctrine' (Jaspers 1958: 65). But, for him, Weber was the living embodiment of philosophy – not the abstract and sterile philosophy of Rickert and Windelband (Saner 1970: 34; Jaspers 1977: 35). Jaspers insisted that Weber was more important than anyone else for the development of his "Existenzphilosophie" and he suggested that that philosophy began with the *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* (Jaspers 1977: 34). He believed that Weber's philosophy was a "philosophy of life" and that he provided a "justification of the world". In *Max Weber. Politiker, Forscher, Philosoph* Jaspers refers to Weber's comments in the "Vorbemerkung" to his collected essays on the economic ethics of the world religions (Jaspers 1958: 69). There, Weber offered this unusually revealing observation: "It is true that a glimpse of even a portion of the course of human destiny shocks and brands the heart."¹⁵⁷ Jaspers took these kinds of expressions and went on to make a philosophy out of Max Weber (Adair-Toteff 2002). However, Weber himself counseled "One would do well to keep one's little personal commentaries to oneself...". At the close of *Wissenschaft als Beruf* Weber notes that "all theology is the intellectual *rationalizing* of the possession of religious salvation" (Weber 1992: 106). But, he counsels those who cannot face the existential fate to go quietly into the embracing arms of the church (Weber 1992: 110). He admits that with these sentiments he is close to sounding like a prophet; however, he knew that there are those rare occasions when it is necessary to move from being the detached scholar to the subjective human who makes his own values clearly evident.¹⁵⁸ *Wissenschaft als Beruf* was one of those times in which he believed it important to make his "little commentaries" – commentaries about "making sense of the world."

¹⁵⁷ "Daß der Gang von Menschenschicksalen dem, der einen Ausschnitt daraus überblickt, erschütternd an die Brust brandet, ist wahr." Weber 1922a: 14.

¹⁵⁸ Whimster notes another occasion, that is in Weber's Freiburg Inaugural lecture, but questions how Weber "squared that" with his belief that "it was wrong to reveal to students what one's own personal viewpoint was." Whimster 2007: 274, note 41. I rarely take issue with Whimster, but I would suggest two points. First, Weber's complaint was that so many of his colleagues moved silently between facts and values with the result that students rarely recognized the difference. That is why in the "Objectivität" essay Weber insists that a person has the duty to make clear (to all but also especially to oneself) where the argument ends and the belief begins (Weber 1922b: 157). Weber readily admits that it is a "hair-fine line" that separates science from belief (Weber 1922b: 212). Second, in the Freiburg speech Weber is convinced that in order to safeguard Germany's future, it is necessary to speak about the need for radical social and economic change.

References

- Adair-Toteff, Christopher (2002): "Max Weber as Philosopher: The Jaspers-Rickert Confrontation". *Max Weber Studies*. Vol. 3, Issue 1. 15–32.
- Barbalet, Jack (2008): *Weber, Passion and Profits. "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" in Context*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Baumgarten, Eduard (1964): *Max Weber. Werk und Person*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Duhm, Bernhard (1897): *Das Buch Hiob*. Freiburg im Breisgau, Leipzig, und Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Fleischmann, Eugène (1981): "Max Weber, die Juden und das Ressentiment". In *Max Webers Studie über das antike Judentum. Interpretation und Kritik*. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang Schluchter. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 263–285.
- Ghosh, Peter (2008): *A Historian Reads Weber. Essays on the Protestant Ethic*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.
- Grundmann, Reiner and Stehr, Nico (2001): "Why is Werner Sombart Not Part of the Core of Classical Sociology? From Fame to (Near) Oblivion". *Journal of Classical Sociology*. Vol. 1. No. 2. 257–287.
- Gunkel, Hermann (1910): "Gott: I. Gottesbegriff im AT." *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band II: 1530–1545.
- Gunkel, Hermann (1912): "Hiobbuch". *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band III: 39–48.
- Hanke, Edith (2001): "Erlösungsreligionen". In Kippenberg und Riesebrodt. 209–226.
- Jaspers, Karl (1919): *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*. Berlin: Verlag von Julius Springer.
- Jaspers, Karl (1921): *Max Weber. Eine Gedenkenrede*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Jaspers, Karl (1958)[1932]: *Max Weber. Politiker, Forscher, Philosoph*. München: R. Piper & Co. Verlag.
- Jaspers, Karl (1977): *Philosophische Autobiographie*. Erweiterte Neuauflage. München: R. Piper & Co. Verlag.
- Kippenberg, Hans G. und Riesebrodt, Martin (2001): *Max Webers "Religionssystematik"*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Lempp, Otto (1910): *Das Problem der Theodicee in der Philosophie und Literatur des 18. Jahrhunderts bis auf Kant und Schiller*. Leipzig: Verlag der Durr'schen Buchhandlung.
- Lempp, Otto (1913): "Theodizee: I. Geschichtlich". *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band V: 1178–1186.
- Lichtblau, Klaus (2001): "Ressentiment, negative Privilegierung, Parias". In Kippenberg und Riesebrodt. 279–296.
- Lichtblau, Klaus (2010): "Book Reviews" *Max Weber Studies*. Vol. 10, no. 2. 251–256.
- Love, John (2000): "Max Weber's *Ancient Judaism*." In *The Cambridge Companion to Weber*. Ed. by Stephen Turner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 200–220.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (1988): *Jenseits von Gut und Böse/Zur Genealogie der Moral*. Herausgegeben von Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari. München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag. Kritische Studienausgabe. Band 5.

- Oakes, Guy (1977): "Introductory Essay". In *Max Weber. Critique of Stammler*. New York: Free Press.
- Otto, Eckart (2002): *Max Webers Studien des Antiken Judentums. Historische Grundlegung einer Theorie der Moderne*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Owen, David (1991): "Autonomy and 'inner distance': a Trace of Nietzsche in Weber". *History of the Human Sciences*. Vol. 4, no. 1. 79–91.
- Saner, Hans (1970): *Jaspers*. Hamburg: Rowolth Taschenbuch.
- Schluchter, Wolfgang (1991): *Religion und Lebensführung. Studien zu Max Webers Religions- und Herrschaftssoziologie*. Frankfurt: Surkamp. Band 2.
- Sombart, Werner (1911): *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben*. Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot.
- Strong, Tracy B. (1992): "'What do we have to do with morals?': Nietzsche and Weber on History and Ethics". *History of the Human Sciences*. Vol. 5, no. 3. 9–18.
- Swedberg, Richard (2005): *The Max Weber Dictionary. Key Words and Central Concepts*. With the assistance of Ola Agervall. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1913a): "Theodizee: II. Systematisch". *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band V: 1186–1192.
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1913b): "Otto Lempp: Das Problem der Theodicee in der Philosophie und Literatur des 18. Jahrhunderts bis auf Kant und Schiller" (1910); Richard Wegener: Das Problem der Theodicee in der Philosophie und Literatur des XVIII. Jahrhunderts mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Kant und Schiller." In Troeltsch 2004. 678–682.
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1913c): "Prädestination: III. Dogmatisch". *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Band IV: 1706–1712.
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1925): *Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte und Religionssoziologie*. Herausgegeben von Hans Baron. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Gesammelte Schriften* IV.
- Troeltsch, Ernst (2004): *Ernst Troeltsch. Rezensionen und Kritiken (1901–1914)*. Herausgegeben von Friedrich Wilhelm Graf in Zusammenarbeit mit Gabriele von Bassermann-Jordan. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. *Ernst Troeltsch Kritische Gesamtausgabe*. Band 4.
- Turner, Bryan (1981): *For Weber. Essays on the Sociology of Fate*. London: Routledge.
- Weber, Max (1922a): *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1922b): *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1989): *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. Konfuzianismus und Taoismus. Schriften 1915–1920*. Herausgegeben von Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer in Zusammenarbeit mit Petra Kolonko. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. Band I/19.
- Weber, Max (1992): *Wissenschaft als Beruf/Politik als Beruf*. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang J. Mommsen und Wolfgang Schluchter in Zusammenarbeit mit Birgitt Morgenbrod. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. Band I/17.

- Weber, Max (1996): *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. Hinduismus und Buddhismus. 1916–1920*. Herausgegeben von Helwig Schmidt-Glitzner in Zusammenarbeit mit Karl-Heinz Golzio. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. Band I/20.
- Weber, Max (1998): *Briefe 1911–1912*. Herausgegeben von M. Rainer Lepsius und Wolfgang Mommsen in Zusammenarbeit mit Birgit Rudhard and Manfred Schön. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. Band II/7.
- Weber, Max (2001): *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Religiöse Gemeinschaften*. Herausgegeben von Hans G. Kippenberg in Zusammenarbeit mit Petra Schilm unter Mitwirkung von Jutta Niemeier. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe* Band I/22–2.
- Weber, Max (2005): *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. Das antike Judentum. Schriften und Reden 1911–1920*. Herausgegeben von Eckart Otto unter Mitwirkung von Julia Offermann. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*. Band I/21.
- Wegener, Richard (1909): *Das Problem der Theodicee in Philosophie und Literatur: mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Kant und Schiller*. Halle a. S.: Niemeyer.
- Whimster, Sam (2002): "Translator's Note on Weber's 'Introduction to the Economic Ethics of the World Religions'". *Max Weber Studies*. Vol. 3, Issue 1. 74–98.
- Whimster, Sam (2007): *Understanding Weber*. London: Routledge.

Chapter Ten

Statistical Origins of the *Protestant Ethic*¹⁵⁹

In his *A Historian Reads Max Weber. Essays on the Protestant Ethic* Peter Ghosh makes the general claim: "...that the *Protestant Ethic* has been a celebrated and profusely discussed text since its first publication in 1904–5, yet *historical* exploration of its origins, genesis and meaning of its most central themes is still in its infancy." (Ghosh 2008: 4). This is particularly true regarding the origins and genesis of the *Protestant Ethic*; many readers are unaware of what prompted Weber to write this work and most are puzzled by Weber's use of the statistics that he utilizes in the opening section. Weber uses these statistics to set out the economic differences between Protestants and Catholics, and he explicitly borrows them from Martin Offenbacher; consequently, Offenbacher plays a critical role in providing the statistical origins for the *Protestant Ethic*. There have been a few scholars who have examined Offenbacher's work, but in their eagerness to disprove Weber's thesis, they have underappreciated Offenbacher's overall contribution to Weber's thinking.¹⁶⁰ Yet, Offenbacher's contribution is crucial because it is the empirical starting point for Weber's entire Protestant Ethic thesis. The topic of Offenbacher and the role that he plays is not as narrow as it may seem; my goal is to begin to satisfy Ghosh's demand that we address the origins and genesis of the *Protestant Ethic*, and I do so by illuminating Offenbacher's importance for Weber. Only when we have a better understanding of the origins and the meanings of the general themes will we be able to appreciate his Protestant Ethic thesis.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ I want to thank the four reviewers from the *Journal for Classical Sociology* for their careful reading and their constructive criticisms. I also want to thank Stephen Turner for commenting on several drafts of this essay.

¹⁶⁰ Ghosh is an exception: he notes that Offenbacher's work "supplies the academic foundation of its opening chapter" but his concern is with Jews. Ghosh 2008: 129.

That Weber would use the work of his former student as a foundation for the *Protestant Ethic* is not necessarily unusual. As Lutz Kaelber has shown, Weber's own "Doktorvater", Levin Goldschmidt, cited Weber's work "time and time again" in his own major writing. Kaelber 2003: 32, 35.

¹⁶¹ Of the four collections devoted to the *Protestant Ethic* (*Weber's Protestant Ethic*, *Max Webers "Protestantische Ethik"*, *The Protestant Ethic Turns 100*, *Asketischer Protestantismus und der 'Geist' des modernen Kapitalismus*) and the volume devoted to Weber's work on

In this essay I will argue that the origins of Weber's *Protestant Ethic* are found in a significant series of statistics which were compiled by one of Weber's own students – Martin Offenbacher. In 1900 Offenbacher published a small volume entitled *Konfession und soziale Schichtung* in which he used a massive amount of statistics to help explain the social and economic superiority of Protestants over Catholics. His statistics supported his claim that Protestants were better educated workers with more high paying jobs which resulted in their economic superiority over Catholics. His study was focused on the southwest German state of Baden but he also mentioned similar studies about the Rhineland and eastern Germany. He does not cite them specifically but he does say that they also contributed to the “protestantischer Charakter des Kapital” (Offenbacher 1900: 1). Offenbacher's notion of the “Protestant character” prefigures Weber's “Protestant Ethic” while Weber actually uses Offenbacher's title as his own title to the first section of the *Protestant Ethic*. In addition to this, Weber cited Offenbacher and his statistics eight times in the first several pages of the *Protestant Ethic*. With impressive and comprehensive research Offenbacher provided Weber with the statistical basis to develop his Protestant Ethic thesis.

There are important reasons for believing that Offenbacher was Weber's source for inspiration, but to explicate them properly first necessitates discussing Weber's years during and, especially prior, to his breakdown and illness. Accordingly, I will proceed in the following way: First, I will briefly

Western Christianity (*Max Webers Sicht des Okzidentalen Christentums*) show that of 60 articles only one can be said to deal with the origins of Weber's thesis: Helmut Lehmann's “The Rise of Capitalism: Weber versus Sombart”. Lehmann 1993. See also Poggi 1983: 5; Brocke 1987: 36; Guttandin 1998: 13; Kaesler 1998: 106.

The thinking is that since Sombart had investigated the genesis of capitalism in his 1902 *Der moderne Kapitalismus* and that Weber cites him several times, he must simply be responding to Sombart. To show that this is erroneous would require its own essay; suffice it to say that there are many problems with this answer. To offer two: Weber's references in *The Protestant Ethic* to Sombart are fleeting and very general. Moreover, Weber was not impressed with Sombart's scholarship; he often considered it shoddy and was intended solely to be provocative. Sam Whimster writes “Weber's references to Sombart, while aiming to be corrective are also slightly belittling, and they give the effect that Sombart's thesis can be disregarded.” Whimster 2007: 35. Weber wanted a response to Sombart, but as co-editor of the *Archiv* with Sombart, he felt that he should not be the one to write a review. Thus, he turned to the expert Lujó Brentano. Despite repeated requests, Brentano did not write this review; instead his critical review came in 1913. Lehmann suggests that Brentano's refusal might have prompted Weber to look at the origins of capitalism more closely. While this is an intriguing possibility, it does not undermine my thesis about Offenbacher's earlier role. Lehmann 2012: 88–94. In his introduction to Weber's last lectures on economic history, Wolfgang Schluchter has a brief account about Weber's repeated requests for Brentano to review *Der moderne Kapitalismus* and he also notes that most experts thought that Sombart was vain and self-promoting with an inclination to provocation, in short, an “Enfant terrible”. Weber 2011: 24–25.

discuss Weber's "lost years" – the "silent" years which immediately followed his breakdown. Second, I will spend the major portion of this essay focusing on Martin Offenbacher's *Konfession* and discuss his goals and his reasoning. In the third section I will examine the criticism of Offenbacher's statistics and how Weber makes use of them. In the final section I will address the claim that Weber had "misunderstood" the cause of modern capitalism and that it was to be found in something other than Confessional differences; the so-called "alternative hypothesis". Accordingly, my overall goal here is to examine Offenbacher's writing and show how he prompted Weber to write *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.

Weber's "Lost Years"

In the summer of 1897 Max Weber had a violent quarrel with his father over his mother's right to continue her Heidelberg visit. Shortly afterward his father died, without reconciliation. For the next six years Max suffered from extreme nervousness and sleepless nights and often relied on drugs for help. He struggled to teach but often could not complete the semester (Weber 2008: 50). Weber asked the ministry of Baden to be let go, it was finally with his third request in 1903 that it was granted. For long periods of time Weber was unable to concentrate on work. The years from 1898 to 1903 are often regarded as Weber's "lost years" and a glance at his publications tends to confirm this: In 1898 Weber rewrote one work and published a single two-page article. In 1899 he published a brief note and two editor's remarks – the total number of pages for that year was 14. The following year was no better: three editor's comments which totaled fewer than ten pages (Kaesler 1998: 274–275). But, it would be a mistake to believe that Weber was so incapacitated that he could not function either as a scholar or a teacher. While he could not lecture he was actively involved with a number of students and aided them with the completion of their dissertations. One such student was Leo Wegener who wrote *Der Wirtschaftliche Kampf der Deutschen mit den Polen um die Provinz Posen: Eine Studie* and which has all the markings of Weber's influence. While it is dedicated to a medical doctor who apparently saved his life, Wegener indicates that it was Max Weber who prompted his interest in this project (Wegener 1903: III, V). Wegener offers Weber one of the highest tributes that a student can offer when he concludes his preface with the words: "Whoever has had the privilege to be allowed to name Professor Max Weber as his teacher, knows that he will remain in his debt forever." (Wegener 1903: VI). Wegener's book was published in Posen, but sev-

eral of the other dissertations were published in Weber's home state of Baden. Perhaps the most famous of these dissertations was the one written by Weber's own wife. Marianne had studied under Heinrich Rickert and wrote her dissertation under his direction, but Max seemed to have supported her.¹⁶² Her *Fichte's Sozialismus und sein Verhältnis zur Marx'schen Doktrin* was published as part of the series *Volkswirtschaftliche Abhandlungen der Badischen Hochschule*. This series was started in 1897 and its editorial board originally consisted of four members: These included Heinrich Herkner, Carl Johannes Fuchs, and Gerhart von Schulze-Gävernitz. The fourth member was Max Weber himself. The publisher was none other than Weber's own, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) located in Tübingen. Weber wrote a short text in which he noted that the works published in the series would either be from teachers in Baden or from their students.¹⁶³ He wrote the editor's remarks for several volumes, including the one by Marianne; however, he did not write anything for Offenbacher (Kaesler 1998: 275). Martin Offenbacher's *Konfession und soziale Schichtung. Eine Studie über die Wirtschaftliche Lage der Katholiken und Protestanten in Baden* was published in two versions, one in 1900 and a second one in 1901; but it appears to be a reprint of the previous version. Like Wegener, it is obvious that Weber had a major influence on him and his writing. The second title page of Offenbacher's book reads: "Aus dem SEMINAR DES HERRN PROF. Dr. MAX WEBER in Heidelberg". The seminar was likely Weber's 1897/1898 Heidelberg seminar on agrarian politics, which he based upon his earlier agrarian studies. Offenbacher refers to Weber's work showing the notable difference between Protestants and Catholics in Eastern Germany (Offenbacher 1900: 1). Weber's work on agrarian policies was not just theoretical, but he knew from personal experience what was happening in parts of Prussia. He was stationed in Pozen in 1894 during his second tour of military service.¹⁶⁴ As a result, he saw first-hand the social-economic problems which came from the religious-cultural differences. Weber was rather concerned with what was happening because of his own experiences as well as his research. As a result, he was able to pass on his expertise in the agrarian matters to his students, both at Freiburg and then at Heidelberg.

¹⁶² Bärbel Meurer contests this and insists that Max was too envious of her ability to work. Meurer 2010: 144.

¹⁶³ Fuchs and Schulze-Gävernitz were teachers who published in the series; students included Robert Liefmann, Walter Borgius, and Walter Abelsdorff. Weber 1993: 674–675.

¹⁶⁴ Baumgarten 1964: 687–688; Weber 2008: 69. Mommsen insists that Weber was also there in 1888. Mommsen 1974: 22.

Martin Offenbacher and Max Weber

In Weber's view one of the most pressing problems facing Germany was the influx of workers from the East. So, it was natural for him to advise students who were interested in this problem and to support their research and their dissertations. For comparison's sake I begin with a brief look at Wegener's *Der Wirtschaftliche Kampf der Deutschen mit den Polen um die Provinz Posen*. Although there is no concrete evidence it is likely that the title was Weber's suggestion – the phrase “economic struggle” is found throughout Weber's writings. Like many of Weber's own writings, Wegener's book is both dryly statistical and highly political; Wegener has dozens of pages of tables coupled with political analyses. And, as with Weber's work, it is both historical as well as contemporary; Wegener offers a lengthy discussion of the history of the movements of Germans to the East as well as noting the current problems. Most interesting, he discusses the growing Catholic population and the resulting issues with Catholic schools. Partially because the schools were overfilled and partially because the parents needed the children to work, the children were less inclined to attend classes (Wegener 1903: 75–76). More importantly, Catholics are not as “tüchtig” (“industrious”); they do not work as hard as the Protestants nor do they appreciate the competency of the Protestant doctors, lawyers, and other trained professionals (Wegener 1903: 207–208). Although Wegener concentrated on the differences between Protestants and Catholics, there were other factors at play: not only was there the social-economic difference, there were also cultural, linguistic, and even racial differences.

If a study were to be undertaken in order to show the differences based solely or primarily on religious difference then that study would have to eliminate all of these other factors. That is what Martin Offenbacher does in his study. By focusing on one part of Germany he could focus just on the differences between Protestants and Catholics. It is this focus that Weber then uses in *The Protestant Ethic*. Weber makes the connection to Offenbacher explicit in a number of ways. First, Weber's choice of title for the introductory section of Part One is *Konfession und Soziale Schichtung* – which is the exact title of Offenbacher's book. Second, Offenbacher wrote of the “Protestant character of capitalism” which is very similar to Weber's “Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.” Third, Weber cites Offenbacher more often than just about any contemporary scholar.

Very little seems to be known about Offenbacher and not very much about his book. Some commentators have mentioned it but it is unclear whether they have actually read it. It is a rather short work, running to just

over one hundred pages. Unlike Wegener's book, Offenbacher's is not polemical; but, like his, it is often very dry. Offenbacher devotes thirty pages alone to statistics. He also provides four detailed maps of Baden as well as a number of smaller maps, all designed to help illustrate his points.

In 1900 Baden was a member of the German Reich, a comparatively small state compared to Prussia and Bavaria, but one of considerable importance. In the north was the university city of Heidelberg and nearby was Mannheim, one of the leading manufacturing cities. The Rhine served as a western border and Lake Constance was to the south. Constance was also part of Baden. The state was long and narrow; it would not be enlarged until 1952 when it merged with Württemberg to become Baden-Württemberg. Offenbacher deals briefly with Baden's history, which he divides into three unequal periods. The first period ran up to the time of the Peace of Augsburg, meaning 1555. The second continued until 1571, and it included the rapid rise in the number of Protestant converts and the reintroduction of Catholicism. The third began with the reaction and continued until 1799. Offenbacher suggests that things did not deviate much after that (Offenbacher 1900: 4).

If Baden's history is not of paramount importance to Offenbacher, it is obvious that methodology is. He makes several critical remarks about how his study is related to pressing contemporary issues and how his differs from those of others. The pressing issue is the continuing question of how one's social-economic situation is connected to one's religious affiliation. Both Protestants and Catholics fought over it, with the former claiming that the Catholics were inferior and the latter insisting that they were not. This was not some idle question; it was of major concern for decades and with both sides arguing for their respective superiority. A major point of conflict came during the 1870s with Bismarck's "Kulturkampf", which was a response to the recent Infallibility Decree. Bismarck insisted that a citizen's allegiance was to the State and not to the Church. Others chimed in to insist on the intellectual freedom needed for science. Many Catholics simply avoided the conflict while others sided with the Pope. There were also some who tried to combine religious conviction with intellectual progress. Two of these scholars were B. Schell and von Hertling. The first wrote *Der Katholizismus als Prinzip des Fortschrittes* and the second published *Das Prinzip des Katholizismus und die Wissenschaft*. Both authors took pains to try to establish that Catholics were not anti-science and anti-progress: Catholicism is the principle of progress and the principle of Catholicism is science. These works were of such contemporary importance that Offenbacher cites them and Weber also (Offenbacher 1900: 23–24, Weber 1904: 1). Offenbacher mentions additionally that research into the confessional differences has been going on for

decades; however, in his opinion most of this research was flawed because of methodological problems. He points specifically to the research done in the East and notes that one cannot get accurate results in comparing religious affiliations with social-economic situations because there are so many other factors involved (Offenbacher 1900: 1). To minimize these difficulties and to maximize the accuracy of his conclusions Offenbacher decided to focus on Baden – it had a single language, it was relatively compact, and was culturally relatively homogeneous. He makes it clear that he is uninterested in doctrinal and theological issues; his single focus is on the economic conditions of both religious groups. Thus, he claims that the way that he intends to use it is in the “anthropological” way (Offenbacher 1900: 1).

Offenbacher notes how Baden embodies a number of important features. First, is the “natural and the political-historical influences” of the region. Baden is a region rich in natural resources – from the many forests to the fertile agricultural lands. It is also divided rather clearly into different sections – those populated by Protestants and those by Catholics. In Offenbacher’s view, this land is fruitful and blessed for both Confessions (Offenbacher 1900: 12–13). Besides the “natural and political-historical influences” he will also examine what he calls the “cultural influences”, by which he primarily means the educational differences. Given this background, Offenbacher believes that it is less difficult here than in other territories to answer the two questions: Which factors are present in the different regions for the different Confessions, and more importantly, how do the different Confessions make use of the “natural” resources found in Baden. Offenbacher aims to answer these questions by looking first at the differences in the types of properties that the Protestants and Catholics own. He admits that this may not be the single cause of the differences in the economic situations, but he insists both that it is legitimate to consider this a result and that there both parts stand in an indisputable interconnectedness.

Offenbacher contends that it is necessary to investigate the “cultural influences”; that is, he intends to investigate the general and the vocational educations of both Protestants and Catholics. When one Confession places considerably more value on education than the other, then it is reasonable to assume that this has a direct relation on the social and economic positions of the adherents to that faith. It is this last point that Offenbacher suggests deserves special attention (Offenbacher 1900: 2–3).

Offenbacher begins by providing historical statistics regarding the division of Baden into Protestant, Catholic, and mixed regions. The earliest statistics are from 1828, the next are from 1861, with the most recent stemming from 1895. Offenbacher immediately notes as interesting the increasing

numbers of Catholics in Baden's south (Offenbacher 1900: 7). But, even more interesting to him is the increase in Protestants throughout Baden (Offenbacher 1900: 7–8). These are important points; however, what strikes one as being more important are the differences in numbers. Offenbacher gives the numbers for seven predominately Catholic areas as a total of 6301 Catholics but only 101 Protestants; for four predominately Protestant areas there are 4864 Protestants to only 70 Catholics (Offenbacher 1900: 6). This radical difference seems startling in 2012, but it must not have seemed unusual to Offenbacher in 1900. This major difference is found not only among regions but also among towns. Again, the north/south divide is present; Catholic towns and cities are found primarily in the south while the Protestant ones are located in the north. To use two Catholic examples: Constance was 92.9% Catholic and only 5.7% Protestant; Freiburg was 73.8% compared to 24.5%. For two Protestant examples there is Mannheim with 52.6% Protestant and 42.2% Catholic; Heidelberg had 61.8% compared to 35.5% (Offenbacher 1900: 9). The differences for the northern Protestant cities may not have been as strong as for the southern Catholic ones; there are still significant differences.

Offenbacher then moves to discuss the “cultural influences” which he believes can be set out in terms of education. He notes that education is compulsory for both Protestants and Catholics so it is relevant to look at the educational differences. In contrast to the United States, Germany in 1900 as well as today had a variety of different types of schools. Offenbacher had no need to explain the German education system and its hierarchy of schools to his readers but it is helpful to try to explain some of this here. The “höheren Bürgerschulen” were the most basic of the school types that Offenbacher lists and were the easiest to get into and to finish. “Realschulen” were higher and required better grades to enter and were more difficult to finish. “Oberealschulen” were the next step up, followed by “Realgymnasien”. These were a combination of vocational and academic schools. At the highest level were the “Gymnasien” – which had the most stringent entry requirements. They required the highest entry scores and grades and were almost exclusively devoted to humanistic training. The primary purpose of these was to educate the students in such a manner that they could go on to a university. The numbers here are also interesting: in the four lower categories Protestant students made up a significantly higher percentage than Catholics, but at the “Gymnasium” level it was reversed, but only slightly.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁵ Catholics 46% to 43% Protestants. The remaining percentage was Jewish. Offenbacher 1900: 16.

This is explained by the large numbers of Catholics who study theology. In line with this Offenbacher discusses other vocational choices: Protestants are the majorities in the military, in law, in medicine, and in science. Catholics have the higher percentage in the fields of finance, tax, and veterinary medicine (Offenbacher 1900: 19–20).

However, in terms of education and vocation these percentages are not fully understandable; unless one places them within the context of the entire population of Baden. In 1895 there were a total of 1,725,464 inhabitants in Baden, of which 25,903 were Jewish, 637,946 Protestant, and 1,057,075 were Catholic. Thus, the Jewish percentage was 1.5, the Protestant was 37.0, and the Catholic was 61.3. So, in the context of these percentages the percentages of Catholics who continue in the higher schools and take up the “higher” vocations are far less than it would otherwise seem. Offenbacher’s point is that Protestants generally make up the larger percentage of students in the higher levels than do Catholics, but when one factors in the smaller number of Protestants to Catholics then this percentage is really much larger and much more important.

Offenbacher then moves to take up his other issue, the one about property ownership. This is, as Offenbacher noted, related to his first issue; that the better educated one is the greater income the person is likely to have and the greater the income the greater the likelihood of owning more/more valuable property. He cautions that these numbers are general and they are based upon various types of taxes. And, he notes that the numbers are somewhat skewed because of the difference in the cultural and economic practices of the different religions. He points specifically to the Catholic practice of donating money to the churches and monasteries. But, he also suggests that this is not sufficient to account for the noticeable difference between Protestant and Catholic property owners (Offenbacher 1900: 22). What he points to instead is that overall one finds that the significant beginning of modern German industry occurred in Protestant areas. In the second section of his book Offenbacher sets out the relationship between confessions and contemporary economic differences. What is immediately noticeable is how Protestants tend to be found more in the cities than in the rural areas (Offenbacher 1900: 33, 38). He then contrasts this with two specific rural areas, the forests in the Schwarzwald in the Southwest and the Odenwald in the Northeast. The first is almost exclusively Catholic; the second is more mixed. He then considers two types of major vocation in these areas – forestry and hunting. In both Catholics are heavily represented (Offenbacher 1900: 39–40). In contrast to these two areas with their two primary vocations, Offenbacher next considers the other areas of Baden and notes that

the number of different types of vocation in the areas of industry, mining, etc. is 160. He focuses on two types of workers – the untrained or less trained worker and the heavily trained one – and he looks at the areas with the locally recruited industrial workers and those areas without locally recruited workers. With regards to the first, Offenbacher looks to specific industries within specific areas. For example, he looks at the tobacco industry in Mannheim and Karlsruhe in the North and Freiburg in the South. This is the lowest social and economic group of workers and the majority is Catholic (Offenbacher 1900: 43). He then compares this with the textile industry in the three areas and he finds that the officials and the independent workers are overwhelming Protestants (Offenbacher 1900: 45). With respect to the second, he looks at the building and machine fabrication as well as breweries and paper industries. He again finds that in these fields the higher social and economic workers tend to be Protestant. (Offenbacher 1900: 46–55). The individual numbers tend to confirm the result: Protestant workers are considerably better off economically. Based on his statistics, Offenbacher's conclusion is that Protestants are better educated, better trained, work in larger industries, are better paid, and own more property (Offenbacher 1900: 17, 22, 42). Protestants are more likely to consider hard work as a virtue ("Ehre der Arbeit"; "honor of work") whereas Catholics appear to think that other practices are more important (Offenbacher 1900: 19). Weber quotes extensively from Offenbacher's conclusion: Catholics are content with less in contrast to Protestants; they do not care to work too hard in contrast to the ever striving Protestants. Weber suggests that the saying may be meant as a joke: "Either good eating or peaceful sleeping. In the preceding case the Protestant eats well, while the Catholic wants to sleep peacefully."¹⁶⁶

That citation was one of a total of eight that Weber uses regarding Offenbacher's *Konfession und Soziale Schichtung*. And, all eight occur within the first seven pages of *The Protestant Ethic*.¹⁶⁷ These include page 2 notes 3, 4, 5, 6; page 4 notes 7, 8; page 5 note 9; and page 7, note 11. Some of these are short references, such as notes 4, 7, and 11 but some are Weber's confirming

¹⁶⁶ "Der Katholik [in Baden] ist ruhiger; mit geringerem Erwerbstrieb ausgestattet, gibt er auf einen möglichst gesicherten Lebenslauf, wenn auch mit kleinerem Einkommen, mehr, als auf ein gefährdetes, aufregendes, aber eventuell Ehren und Reichtümer bringendes Leben. Der Volksmund meint herzlich: entweder gut essen, oder ruhig schlafen. Im vorliegenden Fall ißt der Protestant gut, während der Katholik ruhig schlafen will." What Weber does not mention but certainly would approve of is Offenbacher's insistence that he is not judging one or the other, because "the choice is a matter of faith, not a matter of science." Offenbacher 1900: 68. Weber 1904: 6–7.

¹⁶⁷ The number is nine if one counts footnote 2; that is, the reference to Schell and von Hertling.

that he relied primarily on Offenbacher's statistics and conclusions. These include notes 5, 6, and 9. However, note 3 is the most important one because in it Weber first mentions Offenbacher and notes how much he relies on his student's work. Because of its importance I give it here in its entirety:

Several years ago one of my students had worked through the most exhaustive material on this matter which we possess, the *Baden* Confessional statistics. See *Martin Offenbacher, Konfession und soziale Schichtung. Eine Studie über die Wirtschaftliche Lage der Katholiken und Protestanten in Baden*, Tübingen and Leipzig 1901 (Volume IV, Issue 5 of the *Volkswirtschaftlichen Abhandlungen der badischen Hochschulen*). The facts and numbers that will be used for illustration all stem from this work.¹⁶⁸

Notes 5 and 6 indicate how immensely Weber relies on Offenbacher's work. Most commentators overlook Weber's use of Offenbacher, but there are two scholars who do not. Unfortunately, Richard F. Hamilton and Kurt Samuelsson are highly critical of both Weber and Offenbacher's use of statistics.

Statistical Criticisms

In *The Social Misconstruction of Reality* Richard Hamilton spends a considerable amount of effort criticizing Max Weber and his *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. He makes a number of criticisms, but he focuses primarily on Weber's statistics. Not content to regard them as erroneous, he also takes aim at Weber's source – Offenbacher. Hamilton is not alone in attacking Weber and Offenbacher; he is joined by Kurt Samuelsson and his *Religion and Economic Action. A Critique of Max Weber*. Since Hamilton acknowledges that he relies heavily on Samuelsson's book, it seems fair to examine Hamilton and Samuelsson together.

Hamilton's *The Social Misconstruction of Reality* has the subtitle *Validity and Verification in the Scholarly Community*. He defines "social misconstruction" as the "widespread agreement about facts or interpretation that is mistaken" (Hamilton 1996: 1). Hamilton's intent is to debunk a number of social misconceptions or as he also puts it, myths. Hamilton is very proud of his skepticism which he claims "has allowed me to get behind texts that

¹⁶⁸ "Einer meiner Schüler hat vor einigen Jahren das eingehendste statistische Material, welches wir über diese Dinge besitzen, die *badische* Konfessionsstatistik, durchgearbeitet. Vgl. *Martin Offenbacher, Konfession und Soziale Schichtung. Eine Studie über die wirtschaftliche Lage der Katholiken und Protestanten in Baden*. Tübingen und Leipzig 1901 (Bd IV, Heft 5 der volkswirtschaftlichen Abhandlungen der badischen Hochschulen). Die Thatsachen und Zahlen, die nachstehend zur Illustration vorgeführt werden, entstammen alle dieser Arbeit." Weber 1904: 2, note 3.

other readers have taken at face value.” (Hamilton 1996: xi). He takes on a number of myths; including the myth that Mozart died in poverty and that Hitler’s support did not come from middle-class, educated German citizens. He bemoans the fact that too often academics are not skeptics but he admits that skepticism is often difficult to practice. He admits to having given the Protestant ethic “credence through the early 1970s before gradually recognizing and discovering many serious difficulties.” (Hamilton 1996: x–xi). However, he did not recognize these difficulties on his own, as he admits that he relies heavily on Samuelsson’s work. Samuelsson, a Swedish economist, published his book in 1957 with the English translation appearing in 1961.

Both Hamilton and Samuelsson take issue with the vast majority of works written about Weber’s Protestant thesis. They both claim that virtually everyone agrees with Weber that there is a connection between capitalism and Protestantism; the disagreement was only about how much of a connection there was. In Samuelsson’s view, neither Weber’s proponents nor his critics framed the question properly – they were too preoccupied with determining what the relation was between Protestantism and capitalism when, in Samuelsson’s view, the more fundamental issue was whether there even was such a relationship (Samuelsson 1961: 26). He then spends the remainder of this short work attempting to show that there was no such relationship. Hamilton shares this conviction with Samuelsson; indeed, he bases much of his own criticism of Weber on the earlier work (Hamilton 1996: 33). Specifically, he looks at Weber’s use of Offenbacher’s statistics and, like Samuelsson, claims that they are wrong. While I believe that there are several fundamental problems with Samuelsson’s and Hamilton’s criticism, I will focus only on the criticism of Weber’s and Offenbacher’s statistics.

I begin with Samuelsson: he correctly points out that Offenbacher’s book contains a typographical error which skews his reading of the Protestants by 15%; an error which is carried over by Weber (Samuelsson 1961: 138). But, as Hamilton notes, Samuelsson’s numbers are also incorrect (Hamilton 1996: 33). Moreover, Samuelsson is highly selective; he reproduces only a handful of Offenbacher’s charts; thus, it is difficult to verify his own numbers. Samuelsson suggests that the most that Weber could claim is that there is a regional, and not a religious, correlation. He notes that Weber’s and Offenbacher’s statistics show that Protestants tended to live in cities, in contrast to Catholics who lived in rural areas. He acknowledges that Catholics owned large estates whereas Protestants tended to invest differently (Samuelsson 1961: 142, 144). However, he does not address the issue that Catholics would keep their lands within the family, thus they would not benefit from the sale whereas the Protestants would be able to profit from their invest-

ments. Nor, does Samuelsson address the issue of schooling, other than to say only that Catholics tended to go to Catholic schools whereas Protestants went to Protestant ones. Thus, he misses Weber's point that the rural Catholic schools tended to be more traditional and conservative in contrast to the more innovative and modern Protestant schools. This lack of understanding is also shown by his statement regarding the claim that 35 Protestants chose the officer corps in contrast with only 14 Catholics: "In what way the officer corps could be more "capitalistic" than the priesthood, which was a more usual career amongst Catholics, is not specified." (Samuelsson 1961: 142). It should be obvious that priests are primarily interested in souls and less interested in money, but that the officer corps is a means of establishing one's reputation and developing future financial connections. For Offenbacher there was no question that religious affiliation played the most important role in determining one's financial well-being. More valuable property and better education gave Protestants a greater opportunity for better jobs, thus contributing even more to greater wealth. In contrast, the traditional inclination to live in traditionally rural areas and be engaged in traditional agricultural work meant that they continued to be less productive and less wealthy than the Protestants. In this Weber followed Offenbacher's contention that the social and economic differences between Protestants and Catholics could be traceable to their religious traditions and beliefs.¹⁶⁹

The "Alternative Hypothesis" Criticisms

Hamilton's statistical criticisms appear relatively minor compared to his complaint about Weber's main thesis about Confessional differences. He believes that there is an "alternative hypothesis" that Weber simply ignored. This is a powerful charge and Hamilton expends considerable effort to make it. He begins again with Offenbacher, noting that he had begun his work by setting out the natural and historical background. Hamilton is rather care-

¹⁶⁹ George Becker has three articles purporting to undercut both Offenbacher's and Weber's conclusions. Becker 1997, Becker, 2000, and Becker 2009. However, the target of Becker's critique seems to be Robert Merton. Becker also believes that we should be "struck by Weber's failure to view Offenbacher's school enrollment statistics in the politically and religiously charged context of the times." Becker 2000: 321; Becker 2009: 199–200. However, Weber's whole work indicates that he was well aware of this context. Equally important, Becker's emphasis on the "Kulturkampf" reinforces the scholarly and objective importance of Offenbacher's and Weber's statistics. Even Becker admits that the statistics are mostly correct and he acknowledges the lack of educational parity between Protestants and Catholics. Becker 1997: 491; Becker 2000: 320; Becker 2009: 202. What Becker really seems to object to, is Weber's "idealist" misinterpretation. Becker 1997: 494; Becker 2000: 322; and Becker 2009: 209.

ful here and he is mostly correct. The only real point of contention is Hamilton's claim that the land in the Catholic southern part of Baden was of "very poor quality" whereas Offenbacher stressed that all of Baden was fertile (Hamilton 1996: 45; Offenbacher 1900: 12–13). Hamilton's larger point focuses on something different – the location of Protestants and Catholics. He notes that Weber had pointed out that in the sixteenth century cities overwhelmingly turned Protestant, and that allowed Weber to draw a conclusion about the nineteenth century, and that was that cities continued to be predominantly Protestant. The corollary was that Catholics tended to live in small towns and rural areas, and the distances in the rural areas made access to education difficult. Hamilton maintained that in the late nineteenth century the Realgymnasiums, which emphasized modern languages, sciences, and mathematics, tended to be found in heavily urban areas. His conclusion was that "on the whole, that attendance in such schools was easier for Protestants than for Catholics" (Hamilton 1996: 45). Hamilton derived part of his support for his conclusion from Samuelsson; Samuelsson had indicated that more Protestants lived in cities than did Catholics and that Protestants were more likely to send their children to schools in which the education was better suited for future merchants (Samuelsson 1963: 137). However, Samuelsson contended that Weber was premature in identifying the causal relationship between economic development and religious beliefs, and he insisted that Weber had ignored other possible grounds for this relation (Samuelsson 1963: 137, 144–146). Samuelsson does not spend much time on this question and moves to making (unwarranted) criticisms of Weber's heuristic device of "ideal types". In contrast, Hamilton devotes a considerable amount of effort to examining this question. He begins by insisting that "Most methods texts list three requirements for a demonstration of causality." (Hamilton 1996: 47). He concedes that Weber easily meets the first two: that there the two variables are associated, and that one is chronologically prior to the other. However, in Hamilton's opinion, Weber paid "little attention" to the third requirement. In Hamilton's words the third requirement is: "that no other prior third variable can, when held constant, cause the original association to disappear." This is what he calls the "alternative hypothesis" and he claims that Weber's treatment of this was "extremely casual" (Hamilton 1996: 47). Hamilton himself does not set this out. Instead, he casts doubt on Weber's use of sources purporting to connect Protestantism and business sense, calling it "casual citation" and complaining of Weber's "confident judgment" (Hamilton 1996: 49). What he seems to be suggesting is that Weber has overlooked another possible explanation for the connection between Protestantism and economic success.

What this "alternative hypothesis" could be is relatively easy to answer: it could be the correlation between *cities* and economic prosperity. After all, both Hamilton and Samuelsson note that more Protestants lived in cities than did Catholics. More importantly, both Weber and Offenbacher argue that financial prosperity is found in Protestant cities and that economic backwardness is a Catholic rural phenomenon. An "alternative hypothesis" could be that economic differences are not predicated on the differences between Protestants and Catholics, but on the differences between urban centers and rural areas. It might be simply a happenstance that the majority of city dwellers were Protestants and that most Catholics lived in rural regions. In light of the above, this "alternative hypothesis" has much to recommend it. Nonetheless, this "alternative hypothesis" can be dismissed.

Offenbacher does spend a great deal of time and effort discussing the differences between Protestants and Catholics in cities. He divides the towns into those with under 2,000 inhabitants, those between 2,000 and 5,000, those between 5,000 and 20,000, and finally those over 20,000 (Offenbacher 1900: 90–99). I want to focus on the larger towns, those over 20,000 people. These in the south include Constance, Ueberlingen, and Freiburg. In 1828 Ueberlingen proper had 7,352 Catholics and only 10 Protestants; by 1895 it had been joined by the towns of Meersburg and Salem and had 25,708 Catholics and 1,003 Protestants (Offenbacher 1900: 71). Freiburg had 60,689 Catholics and 18,576 Protestants, thus being more like the northern cities because of the higher ration of Protestants to Catholics. In the north the cities include Heidelberg (with Neckargmünd) and had 53,302 Protestants and 27,179 Catholics; Pforzheim, which had 55,525 Protestants and 12,474 Catholics, and Mannheim; which had 63,580 Protestants and 53,768 Catholics. Not only were the northern towns composed of a more mixed ratio than the southern ones, but there were other fundamental differences. Like Constance, Ueberlingen, Meersburg, and Salem were and still are resort areas but had (and have) virtually no major industries. Freiburg also lacks industry but it did have the university (Constance did not gain a university until 1966). Compare this with some of the northern cities: Like Freiburg, Heidelberg had a university, but it also had some major industries: cement and printing press manufacturing. Pforzheim had jewelry and leather factories, and Mannheim was and is a major trading city. Furthermore, it was (and) is the major intersection for European rail and ship traffic. It also had a significant reputation in the 1880s and 1890s for modern technological innovations with names like Siemens and Benz. These three northern Baden cities share the fundamental feature of heavy industry.

In a final move, Offenbacher focuses on the major industries in these cities and he differentiates between the untrained and trained workers in them. There are some revealing statistics: In Mannheim, Protestants made up 64.2% of highly trained machine builders compared to 35.8% of Catholics, and these figures held true to some degree in Karlsruhe (64% to 35.6%) and Freiburg (64.3% to 35.7%); only in Constance are these reversed (14.7% to 85.3%). (Offenbacher 1900: 96). In contrast, Catholics made up the greater percentage of untrained employees. Mannheim had 52.2 % Catholics to 47.8% Protestants; Freiburg had 64.2% to 35.8%; Constance 58.9% versus 41.1%. Only in Karlsruhe are these columns reversed with 56.4% Protestants in contrast to 43.1% Catholics. To give another example: in Karlsruhe 77.8% of the gold and silver smiths and jewelers was Protestant, compared to 22.2% of the Catholics. These are just a fraction of the statistics that Offenbacher uses to help show that Protestants were better educated and better employed than Catholics and that served to explain the economic discrepancy between the two Confessions. In light of the above, it is hard to believe that neither Offenbacher nor Weber had considered the “alternative hypothesis”; indeed, it seems that both went out of their way to show that it was not possible. Martin Offenbacher had focused on the considerable importance that Protestants placed on higher vocational choices, thus prefiguring Weber’s emphasis on the heightened importance of “calling” and the greater conviction that money seems to matter more to Protestants. Accordingly, both showed that there was a correlation between Confessional conviction and prosperity. Weber made use of these statistics and observations and then traced them back to Luther’s notion of “Beruf” and Calvin’s doctrine of Predestination.

Concluding Remarks

There is very little information regarding Offenbacher, and I have been unable to learn anything about him after finishing his time as Weber’s student. What we have learned, however, is that Offenbacher had been a diligent student and that it is evident that Weber instilled in him the importance of empirical inquiry and the value of objective scholarship (Offenbacher 1900: 68). Offenbacher’s dissertation, with its focus on educational and professional differences between Catholics and Protestants in Baden, provided Weber with a “paradigm case” for developing his Protestant thesis. Furthermore, Offenbacher’s work seems to have prompted Weber to rethink the relationship between capitalism and Protestants and to realize that it was

more complex than either he or Offenbacher had originally believed. The result was that Weber came to understand that this relationship was not merely about capitalism and Protestants; but, it rather was more about the different *types* of Protestants. Offenbacher's efforts helped spur Weber to think more about Protestants and money, but it was Weber himself who realized that the key to understanding the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism was not to be found with the comfortable lives of late-nineteenth century German Protestants, but in the beliefs and doctrines of sixteenth and seventeenth century Protestant ascetics. The investigation into the statistical origins of the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* provides us with a much needed beginning into the inquiry of the genesis of that famous work.

References

- Baumgarten, Eduard (1964): *Max Weber. Werk und Person*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Becker, George (1997): "Replication and Reanalysis of Offenbacher's School Enrollment Study: Implication for the Weber and Merton Theses." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*. Vol. 36, no. 4. 483–495.
- Becker, George (2000): "Educational 'Preference' of German Protestants and Catholics: The Politics Behind Educational Specialization." *Review of Religious Research*. Vol. 41, no. 3. 311–327.
- Becker, Georg (2009): "The Continuing Path of Distortion: The Protestant Ethic and Max Weber's School Enrollment Statistics". *Acta Sociologica*. Vol. 52, no. 3. 195–212.
- Brocke, Bernhard von (Herausgeber) (1987): *Sombarts "Moderne Kapitalismus". Materialien zur Kritik und Rezeptionen*. München: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag.
- Ghosh, Peter (2008): *A Historian Reads Max Weber. Essays on the Protestant Ethic*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.
- Guttandin, Friedhelm (1998): *Einführung in die "Protestantische Ethik" Max Webers*. Opladen/Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Hamilton, Richard F. (1996): *The Social Misconstruction of Reality. Validity and Verification in the Scholarly Community*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Kaelber, Lutz (2003): "Max Weber's Dissertation". In *History of the Human Sciences*. Vol. 16. No. 2. 27–56.
- Kaesler, Dirk (1998): *Max Weber. Eine Einführung in Leben, Werk und Wirkung*. Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag.
- Lehmann, Hartmut (1993): "The Rise of Capitalism: Weber versus Sombart". In Lehmann and Roth. 195–208.

- Lehmann, Hartmut (1996): *Max Webers "Protestantische Ethik". Beiträge aus der Sicht eines Historikers.*
- Lehmann, Hartmut (2012): "Anmerkungen zum Entstehungskontext von Max Webers 'Die protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus'". In *Max Webers Protestantismus-These. Kritik und Antikritik. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften.* Herausgegeben von Christian Fleck. Band 23, no. 3. 86–99.
- Lehmann, Hartmut and Roth, Guenther (Editors) (1993): *Weber's Protestant Ethic. Origins, Evidence, Contexts.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lenger, Friedrich (2001): "Max Weber, Werner Sombart und der Geist des modernen Kapitalismus." In *Max Webers Herrschaftssoziologie. Studien zu Entstehung und Wirkung.* Herausgegeben von Edith Hanke und Wolfgang J. Mommsen. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 167–186.
- MacKinnon, Malcolm H (1993): "The Longevity of the Thesis: A Critique of the Critics". In Lehmann and Roth. 211–243
- Meurer, Bärbel (2010): *Marianne Weber. Leben und Werk.* Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Mommsen, Wolfgang J. (1974): *Max Weber und die Deutsche Politik 1890–1920.* Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 2., überarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage.
- Mommsen, Wolfgang J. und Schwentker, Wolfgang (Herausgeber)(1987): *Max Weber und seine Zeitgenossen.* Göttingen und Zürich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Offenbacher, Martin (1900): *Konfessionen und soziale Schichtung. Eine Studie über die wirtschaftliche Lage der Katholiken und Protestanten in Baden.* Tübingen und Leipzig: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Poggi, Gianfranco (1983): *Calvin and the Capitalist Spirit. Max Weber's "Protestant Ethic".* Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Samuelsson, Kurt (1961): *Religion and Economic Action. A Critique of Max Weber.* New York and Evanston: Harper and Row.
- Schluchter, Wolfgang (Herausgeber)(1983): *Max Webers Sicht des okzidentalen Christentums. Interpretationen und Kritik.* Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Schluchter, Wolfgang und Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm (Herausgeber)(2005): *Asketischer Protestantismus und der 'Geist' des modernen Kapitalismus.* Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Sombart, Werner (1902): *Der moderne Kapitalismus. Erster Band. Die Genesis des Kapitalismus. Zweiter Band. Die Theorie der kapitalistischen Entwicklung.* Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot.
- Steinert, Heinz (2010): *Max Webers Unwiderlegbare Fehlkonstruktionen.* Frankfurt am Main: Campus.
- Swatos, Jr., William and Kaelber, Lutz (2005): *The Protestant Ethic Turns 100. Essays on the Centenary of the Weber Thesis.* Boulder and London: Paradigm Publishers.
- Swatos, Jr. William and Kivisto, Peter (2005): "The Contexts of the Publication and the Reception of the *Protestant Ethic*". In Swatos and Kaelber 2005: 111–137.
- Weber, Marianne (1926): *Max Weber. Ein Lebensbild.* Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1904): "Die protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus." *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik.* Band XX. 1–54.

- Weber, Max (1905): "Die protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus". *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*. Band XXI. 1–110
- Weber, Max (1922): *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max (1993): *Landarbeiterfrage, Nationalstaat und Volkswirtschaftspolitik. Schriften und Reden 1892–1899*. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang J. Mommsen in Zusammenarbeit mit Rita Aldenhoff. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe* I/4.
- Weber, Max (2008): *Agrarrecht, Agrargeschichte, Agrarpolitik. Vorlesungen 1894–1899*. Herausgegeben von Rita Aldenhoff-Hübinger. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe* III/5.
- Weber, Max (2011): *Abriß der universalen Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Mit- und Nachschriften 1919/1920*. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang Schluchter in Zusammenarbeit mit Joachim Schröder. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe* III/6.
- Wegener, Leo (1903): *Der Wirtschaftliche Kampf der Deutschen mit den Polen um die Provinz Posen: Eine Studie*. Posen: Verlag von Joseph Jolowicz.
- Whimster, Sam (2007): *Understanding Weber*. Abingdon, Oxon and New York, NY: Routledge.

Acknowledgements

Chapter One was originally published in 2002 as “Max Weber’s Mysticism” in the *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*. Vol. XLIII. No. 3, pp. 15–32.

Chapter Two was originally published in 2005 as “Max Weber’s Charisma” in the *Journal of Classical Sociology*. Vol. 5. No. 2. pp. 339–353.

Chapter Three was originally published in 2008 as “Max Weber’s Pericles: The Political Demagogue” in *Max Weber Studies*. Vol. 7. No. 2. pp. 147–162.

Chapter Four was originally published in 2010 as “Max Weber’s Notion of Asceticism” in the *Journal of Classical Sociology*. Vol. 10. No. 2. pp. 109–122.

Chapter Five was originally published in 2012 as “Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Politics: Weber on Conscience, Conviction, and Conflict” in the *History of the Human Sciences*. Vol. 24. No. 1. pp. 19–35.

Chapter Six was originally published in 2013 as “Max Weber and ‘Kulturprotestantismus’” in *Max Webers Protestantismus-These. Kritik und Antikritik*. Herausgegeben von Christian Fleck. *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften*. Vol. 23. No. 3. pp. 50–66.

Chapter Seven was originally published in 2014 as “Max Weber’s Charismatic Prophets” in the *History of the Human Sciences*. Vol. 27. No. 1. pp. 3–20.

Chapter Eight was originally published in 2014 as “Max Weber on Confucianism versus Protestantism” in *Max Weber Studies*. Vol. 14. No. 1. pp. 79–86.

Chapter Nine was originally published in 2013 as “‘Sinn der Welt’: Max Weber and the Problem of Theodicy” in *Max Weber Studies*. Vol. 13. No. 1. pp. 87–107.

Chapter Ten was originally published in 2015 as “Statistical Origins of the ‘Protestant Ethic’” in the *Journal of Classical Sociology*. Vol. 15. No. 1. pp. 58–72.

I wish to thank Dr. Edith Hanke (Max Weber Gesamtausgabe, Bavarian Academy of Science and Humanities, Munich) for our initial conversation about the possibility of this book and for suggesting that I consider Mohr Siebeck as the publisher.

I wish to thank Dr. Stephanie Warnke-De Nobili (Chief Editor History, Philosophy and Social Sciences, Mohr Siebeck) for her editorial advice and support.

Finally, I wish to thank my wife Prof. Dr. Stephanie Adair-Toteff both for her help in writing the original essays and in helping me to put them into this book.

Index of Names

- Adair-Toteff, Christopher 3, 37–38, 43,
62, 74, 99, 103, 105, 117, 132, 151, 153,
173–174
Adair-Toteff, Stephanie 198
Adam 87
Adams, James Luther 14, 25
Albrow, Martin 73–74
Alcibiades 50
Amos 7, 107–112, 116
Antigone 34, 52
Aristotle 2, 47, 49, 85
Aspasia 58
Augustine, St. 15, 70, 87, 123, 130
- Barbalet, Jack 159, 174
Barth, A. 134–135
Baumgarten, Eduard 4, 24–25, 168, 174,
180, 183
Baumgarten, Fritz 47–48, 133
Baumgarten, Hermann 133, 135
Baumgarten, Otto 81, 84, 94, 132
Baur, Ferdinand Christian 121
Beck, Lewis White 14, 16, 26
Becker, George 189, 193
Becker, Kurt 30, 43
Bendix, Reinhard 13, 26, 31, 41, 43, 99,
117
Berger, Peter L. 99–100, 117
Bernard of Clairvaux 17
Bertholet, Alfred 66, 74
Beurath, Karl 125, 135
Bismarck, Otto von 7, 120, 125–126,
132–133, 135, 182
Bohatec, Josef 89–90, 94
Bousset, Wilhelm 115
Brentano, Lujo 139, 178
Brocke, Bernhard vom 178, 193
- Bruun, H.H. 32, 43
Bubnoff, Nicolai 26
Burg, Joseph 135
Busolt, Georg 58–59
Bynum, Caroline Walker 13, 26
- Calvin, John 6–9, 17–18, 38, 62, 74,
79–83, 86–91, 94–966, 122, 144, 192,
194
Carduans, Ludwig 89–90
Chantepie de la Saussaye, P.D. 150, 153
Clarke, James 16, 21
Classen, Johannes 59
Cleon 50, 55–59
Cornford, Francis M. 50, 52, 59
Cornill, Carl Heinrich 106, 109, 112, 116
- Dostoevsky, Fyodor 23, 33, 40
Drescher, Hans-Georg 20, 26
Duhm, Bernhard 106–111, 113–114, 116,
163, 174
Dürer, Albrecht 73
- Eck, Samuel 135
Eisenstadt, S.N. 30, 44
Elvin, Mark 142, 153
Erbse, Hartmut 50, 59
Ehrenberg, Victor 52, 59
Eulenberg, Franz 19
- Factor, Regis 2, 36, 44, 99, 147, 154
Fischer, H. Karl 139
Fleischmann, Eugène 167–168, 174
Flitner, Elisabeth 144, 153
Foerster, D. 126, 135
Francis, St. 7, 40, 53, 69, 71, 91
Franklin, Benjamin 79

- Fuchs, Carl Johannes 180
- Gass, Wilhelm 80, 82, 94
- George, Stefan 33
- Ghosh, Peter 159, 174, 177, 193
- Giesebrecht, Friedrich 106–109, 111–112, 116
- Goethe, Wolfgang von 41, 73, 114, 130–131, 158
- Goldschmidt, Levin 177
- Golzio, Karl-Heinz 28, 176
- Gomme, A.W. 50, 52, 54, 59
- Gorski, Philip S. 80, 94
- Gretzmann, Hugo 112, 116
- Grundmann, Reiner 174
- Grützmaker, Georg Konstans 66, 68, 70–71, 74
- Güder, Eduard 80–82, 94
- Gunkel, Hermann 106, 108, 114, 116, 163, 167, 174
- Guttandin, Friedhelm 17, 26, 178, 193
- Hadorn, Wilhelm 86, 95
- Hamilton, Alstair 139, 153
- Hamilton, Richard 187–191, 193
- Hanke, Edith 5, 43, 59, 88, 95, 97, 115, 117, 150, 153–155, 158, 162, 167, 174, 194, 198
- Harnack, Adolf von 8, 66–67, 74–75, 82, 101, 120, 122, 125–126, 128–131, 135
- Harnack, Theodosius 122, 124, 135
- Hartmann, Tyrell 125, 135
- Hatscher, Christophe R. 30, 43, 117
- Hauck, Albert 128, 135
- Hausrath, Adolf 133
- Hegel, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm 9, 13, 18, 34, 43, 121
- Hennis, Wilhelm 3, 5, 15, 26, 29, 43, 47–48, 59
- Herodotus 48–50
- Hertling, von Georg 182, 186
- Herzog, Johann Jakob 90, 95, 136
- Hessen, Sergius 20, 26
- Heussi, Karl 65–68, 71, 75, 128, 136
- Hitler, Adolf 30, 186
- Holl, Karl 82, 88, 95, 99, 117
- Hölscher, Gustav 106, 108–111, 116
- Homer 48, 50
- Honigsheim, Paul 33, 43
- Hübinger, Gangolf 44, 60, 96, 115, 121, 155, 195
- Hügel, Baron von 13–14, 18, 26–27
- Hundeshagen, Karl Bernhard 81, 121, 136
- Isaiah 7, 108–111, 113
- James, William 14–15, 18–20, 23, 26–27
- Jaspers, Karl 31, 43, 114, 117, 157, 172–173
- Jellinek, Georg 91
- Jeremiah 7, 106–112
- Jesus 7, 18–19, 22, 36–37, 39–40, 53, 71, 80, 82–83, 91, 101, 104–105, 123–124, 131
- Job 162–163
- Kaesler, Dirk 178–180, 193
- Kalberg, Stephen 142–143, 154
- Kampschulte, F.W. 80, 86–87, 89–90, 95
- Kant, Immanuel 2, 9, 15, 26, 31, 43, 95, 144, 158, 174–176
- Kippenberg, Hans G. 5, 43, 45, 60, 74–75, 95, 115, 117, 153–154, 174, 176
- Köhler, Walther 125, 136
- Köstlin, Julius 8, 83, 95, 120, 122–124, 126–127, 135–136
- Krech, Volker 62, 75, 135
- Kroll, Thomas 5, 30, 43, 97, 99, 101–102, 115, 117, 155
- Lang, Bernhard 106–107, 117
- Lask, Emil 33
- Lassman, Peter 5
- Leibniz, Gottfried 9, 18, 88, 150, 157–158
- Lenger, Friedrich 194
- Lempp, Otto 88, 95, 158, 160–161, 163–165, 174–175
- Lepsius, M. Rainer 28, 44, 77, 96, 115, 176
- Lichtblau, Klaus 28, 44, 154, 168–171

- Liebknecht, Karl 40
 Love, John 143, 154, 167, 174
 Luke 22, 80
 Luthardt, Christian Ernst 84, 95
 Luther, Martin 6–10, 13, 16–18, 25, 38,
 40, 62, 79, 80–91, 93, 95–96, 120–136,
 144, 151–152, 168, 192
 Luxemburg, Rosa 40

 Machiavelli 47
 Malamat, Abraham 99, 114, 117
 Mark 80
 Marti, Karl 106, 110–113–114, 116
 Marx, Karl 139, 168
 Mary 22
 Mary, the Virgin 124
 Martha 22
 Mayer, J.P 41, 43.
 Matthew 39, 101
 McGinn, Bernard 13–14, 17, 22, 26,
 68–70, 75
 Mehlis, Georg 20, 26
 Meurer, Bärbel 180, 194
 Meister Eckhart 4, 15–16, 19–20, 22, 26
 Meyer, Eduard 53–55, 59
 Meyer, Michael 45, 60
 Mitzman, Arthur 13, 24, 26, 132–133,
 136
 Mohammed 105–106
 Mommsen, Wolfgang J. 3, 5, 26, 28–29,
 41, 43–44, 47, 59–60, 77, 96, 115, 117,
 132–134, 136, 153–154, 175–176, 180,
 194–195
 Mulert, Hermann 64–65, 74, 125, 136

 Napoleon 39
 Neander, August 121
 Niemeier, Jutta 45, 60, 77, 97, 115, 154,
 176
 Nietzsche, Friedrich 4, 47, 114, 117,
 158–159, 168–172, 174–175
 Nipple, Wilfried 47
 Nipperdey, Thomas 125–126, 136

 Oakes, Guy 157, 175
 Offenbacher, Martin 10, 119, 177–194

 Otto, Eckart 7, 105, 115, 117, 168–169
 Otto, Rudolf 13, 16, 19–20, 26

 Parsons, Talcott 44
 Paul 16, 18
 Pericles 5–6, 39, 47–60, 105, 117, 197
 Pfister, Friedrich 65–66, 76, 117
 Picasso, Pablo 49
 Plato 2, 47–49, 161
 Poggi, Giafranco 178, 194
 Preger, Wilhelm 13, 16, 26
 Prinz, Friedrich 69, 70, 76

 Quan, X.Y. 148,150

 Rachfahl, Felix 64, 139
 Radkau, Joachim 133, 136
 Ranke, Leopold von 49
 Rembrandt 49
 Rentdorff, Trutz 26
 Rickert, Heinrich 32–22, 49, 173–174,
 180
 Riesenbrodt, Martin 117
 Ritschl, Albrecht 8, 81–83, 95, 120,
 126–129, 136
 Ritschl, Otto 136
 Rollman, Hans15, 27
 Rosthorn, Arthur von 140–141, 154
 Roth, Guenther 27, 44, 51, 60, 193–194
 Rothe, Richard 80–81, 95
 Rudhard, Birgit 28, 44, 77, 96, 176
 Russell, Bertrand 1

 Samuelsson, Kurt 187–191, 194
 Saner, Hans 173, 175
 Scaff, Lawrence 73, 76, 114, 117
 Scheibe, Max 80, 86–87, 95
 Schenkel, Daniel 80–82, 95
 Schiller 95, 158, 174–176
 Schmidt, Hans Georg 88, 90, 96, 111–112
 Schmidt-Glitzner, Helwig 28, 60, 77, 96,
 146, 149, 154, 175–176
 Schneckenberger, Matthias 80
 Schön, Manfred 28, 44–45, 77, 96, 176
 Schopenhauer, Arthur 92
 Schulze-Gaevnitz, Gerhart von 74, 76

- Sieffert, Friedrich 122, 136
 Sellin, Ernst 106–107
 Sica, Alan 36, 44
 Smend, Rudolf 112, 116
 Socrates 47–48
 Sohm, Rudolf 5, 7, 36, 99–102, 115, 118, 125, 136
 Sombart, Werner 10, 17, 139, 159, 167–168, 170, 174–175, 178, 193–194
 Stähelin, R. 86, 96
 Steeman, Theodore 19, 27
 Steinert, Heinz 119–121, 134–146, 194
 Strauß, David 121
 Strauss, Leo 30, 44, 50, 59
 Swatos Jr., William 194
 Swedberg, Richard 157, 175
- Tenbruck, Friedrich 3, 22, 54, 59
 Tauler, Johannes 13, 25–17, 21, 27, 123, 127
 Thucydides 5, 49–50, 52–60
 Tönnies, Ferdinand 24, 32–33, 44, 52, 60, 73
 Treitschke, Heinrich von 8, 120, 126, 131–136
- Troeltsch, Ernst 13–21, 26–27, 65–66, 76, 80, 82, 84–91, 96, 112, 118–119, 121, 124, 158, 161, 164, 166, 175
 Trotsky, Leo 31–32
 Turner, Bryan 175
 Turner, Stephen 30, 36, 44, 99, 118, 147, 153–154, 174, 177
- Van der Sprenkel, Otto B. 141, 154
 Villers, Charles 128
 Virgil 48
- Weber, Marianne 4, 13, 20, 24–25, 27, 32–33, 44, 48, 60, 72–73, 76, 109, 111, 118, 133–134, 136, 180, 194
 Wegener, Leo 179–182, 195
 Wegener, Richard 158, 176
 Weinel, Heinrich 67, 77
 Weiß, Johannes 28, 44, 66, 77, 154
 Wellhausen, Julius 102–103, 112, 116
 Werner, Johannes 72, 77
 Whimster, Sam 159, 173, 176, 178, 195
 Will, Wolfgang 53–54, 56, 60
 Winckelmann, Johannes 17, 27–28, 43–44, 60, 77, 117, 137, 154
 Windelband, Wilhelm 20, 28, 173
 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1
- Zarathustra 105
 Zingerle, Arnold 141–142, 145, 155

Index of Subjects

- activity 13, 17, 20, 21–24, 62–63, 76,
79–80, 85–86, 133, 142–143, 152
“Alltäglichkeit” 104
“alternative hypothesis” 179, 189–192
America 15, 27
anarchy 57, 89, 102, 146
ancestor 8
animal 27, 88, 166
ascetic 4, 7, 17, 21, 24, 37–38, 52, 61–75,
142, 151–152, 193
asceticism 3, 6–7, 13, 18, 20, 22–23,
37–38, 61–76, 130, 151, 153, 165, 197
audacity 55
“Augenmaß” 3, 39, 93, 113
Augsburg, Peace of 182
authority 6, 13, 19, 29, 31–34, 37, 47, 59,
82, 89, 101–102, 104, 120, 123–124,
126–127, 190
– bureaucratic 29, 34, 104, 146,
– charismatic 104, 146
– Church 80, 102, 123, 125, 127, 132
– external 18–19
– legal 29, 34, 51, 103–104, 146
– Luther’s 127
– legitimate 103
– non-legitimate 50–53
– Papal 126
– personal 105
– religious 125, 131
– traditional 29, 33–34, 52, 103–104, 146
Baptist 19
Bavaria 182
belief, beliefs 3, 6, 9, 14, 16, 18–19, 33, 38,
40, 50, 66–67, 70–72, 82, 84, 86, 89, 91,
94, 104–105, 108, 112, 119–121,
124–127, 130–131, 142, 150–152, 158,
160, 163, 165, 173, 189–190, 193
Berlin 8, 82, 132
“Beruf” 9, 16, 37–38, 41, 106, 128, 131,
144, 161, 168, 192
“Berufaskese” 17
“Berufsethik” 166
“Berufsidee” 62
“Berufsvision” 106
“Bettelorden” 128
Bible 123–124
book 1–2, 8–9, 20, 48–49, 75, 67–68, 70,
84, 101, 113, 122, 128, 141, 150, 153,
157–159, 162–163, 170, 179–182, 185,
187–188, 198
Brahmins 144
breakdown 178–179
Buddhism 28, 89, 111, 165, 176
bureaucracy 38, 41, 141, 143, 146, 148
calculation 3, 9, 49, 144–145, 147–148
Calvinism 17, 27, 82, 89, 94, 151, 167–168
carriers 102
Catholic, Catholics 7, 10, 14–15, 17, 64,
80, 82, 85, 99, 101–102, 119, 121,
123–126, 128–129, 132, 152, 177–178,
180–186, 188–193
castle 71
cave 48
charisma 3–5, 7, 29–44, 52, 99–105, 111,
115, 117–118, 152–153, 197
– God-given 102
– magical 36, 53
– religious 53
– speech 53
characteristics 4, 17, 19, 36, 68, 74, 99,
105, 108, 144–145

- child, children 30, 55, 83–84, 92–93, 129, 145, 181, 190
- China 8–9, 53, 139, 150, 153–155
- Christian, Christians 20, 22, 35, 61–63, 65–68, 76, 80, 85, 91, 99, 102, 111, 120, 124, 128, 144, 152, 170
- Christianity 6, 36, 48, 69, 88, 101–102, 121, 150, 173–174, 178
- church 13, 15–19, 27, 65, 67, 69–74, 82, 85–86, 101–102, 121, 123–132
- class, classes 32, 36, 53, 55, 102, 109, 147, 170–171, 181, 188
- clerics 144
- community 19, 21, 29, 50, 67, 69, 85, 88–89, 109–110, 124, 152, 187, 193
- competition 65, 158, 171
- compulsion 31–33, 41
- contemplation 17, 21–23, 38, 62–64, 68, 70
- confession 13, 120, 124, 183, 185, 187, 189, 192
- conflict 6, 39, 63, 79–80, 91, 123, 131, 133, 135, 182, 197
- Confucianism 8, 139–146, 148, 150, 152–154, 197
- consciousness 13–14, 63, 81
- Constance 182, 184, 191–192
- constitution 14, 125
- conscience 6, 79–85, 93, 126–127, 132, 135, 197
- conviction 6–7, 40, 79–82, 91, 93–94, 108, 114, 129–131, 135, 153, 159, 182, 188, 192, 197
- culture 7–8, 19, 54, 57, 62, 76, 117, 119–120, 128–129, 131, 134, 144–145, 147, 162
- “Dämon” 4, 73–74, 114
- darkness 66–67, 112–113, 164
- “Diktatoren der Straße” 113
- death 13–14, 32, 42, 52, 56, 73, 93, 100, 121, 123, 127, 161–163, 172
- debauchery 109
- demagogue 5, 39–41, 47–48, 50–56, 58, 60, 105, 111, 117, 134, 197
- “demonic power” 31
- “Deus absconditus” 122, 164, 166
- development 3, 8, 21, 79, 128, 141, 143, 147, 158, 165, 173, 190
- devil 67, 73, 81, 84
- devotion 36, 39, 69, 105, 152
- dispute 6, 41, 123, 127, 148
- dilettante 39, 56, 58, 92, 113
- doctrine 7, 9, 48–49, 80, 83–86, 88–90, 99, 101–102, 106, 122, 125, 128, 130, 144, 151, 160, 163–166, 173, 192–193
- dogma 13, 15, 18, 67, 75, 85, 121, 130–131, 135, 141
- drives 64, 72
- drought 109
- drunkenness 109
- dualism 66, 89, 159, 164–165
- East 21, 139, 141, 152, 181, 183
- “Ecclesia” 101–102, 166
- economics 3–4, 38, 93, 141
- Edinburgh 14
- empiricism 15
- education 1, 57, 127, 129, 131, 133, 140–141, 144, 183–185, 189–190
- equality 16, 51–52, 91, 112
- “eternal truth” 48
- Europeans 140
- extraordinary 31, 35, 37, 41–42, 53, 104–105, 152, 159, 165
- famine 109
- fear 108
- feeling, feelings 15, 19–25, 40, 62–63, 74, 112, 114, 125, 165, 170
- flight 17, 25, 38, 68, 72
- Freiburg 32, 92, 94, 100, 134, 172–173, 180, 184, 186, 191–192
- fortune 9, 158, 171
- future 1–2, 9–10, 29, 92, 57, 88, 91, 94, 112–113, 173, 189–190
- German, Germans 2, 7–8, 13, 15–16, 18, 23, 29, 41, 56, 65–66, 80, 92, 100, 120, 124–127, 129, 131–133, 144, 157, 168, 178, 181, 184–185, 188, 193

- Germany 10, 57, 72, 112–114, 119, 125–126, 129, 134, 158, 173, 178, 180–181, 184
- goal 5, 8, 17, 21, 38, 50, 54, 57, 67, 72, 130, 133, 144, 147, 177, 179
- God 4, 7, 9, 13–24, 36–38, 41, 62–64, 66–67, 69–71, 73, 79, 81–91, 101–103, 106–110, 112, 114, 122, 124, 126–131, 149–152, 160, 162–164, 166–169
- Greek, Greeks 2, 5, 18, 47–48, 51–52, 56, 58
- habit 22
- hallucinations 109
- happiness 8, 65, 74 88–89, 91, 113, 141, 159, 162–163, 171
- Heidelberg 15, 34, 80, 91, 119, 172, 179–180, 182, 184, 191
- Hell 67, 122, 165
- Herrnhuter 18
- “Herrschaft” 5, 29, 31–32, 34–35, 38, 42, 47, 51–53, 99–101, 103–104
- “hiddenness” 13
- hierarchy 16, 51, 101–102, 123, 184
- Hinduism 89, 111, 159, 165
- history 2, 5–6, 14, 19–20, 48–50, 53–54, 63, 65, 67, 69, 94, 100, 104, 108, 121, 128–129, 131, 133, 147, 149, 158–159, 169, 171, 178, 181–182
- homeland 111
- honor 8, 20, 39, 55–57, 66, 108, 110, 120, 132, 135, 145, 148
- humanity 160
- humility 21, 71, 87, 128
- ideal 3, 6, 55–58, 88, 92, 112, 152, 189
- ideal types 5–6, 42, 47, 139, 143
- idealism 15, 54, 56, 63, 79, 112, 131, 151, 180
- illness 33, 73, 178
- illusion, illusions 48, 74, 92–112, 162
- impartiality 3–4, 51–52
- industry 140, 185–186, 191
- ineffable 14
- injustice, injustices 91, 108, 110, 160, 164, 167
- isolation 88
- Israel 167
- Israeli, Israelis 100, 110, 151, 167
- issue, issues 2, 9, 17, 22–23, 41–42, 47, 49–51, 54–55, 57, 63, 84, 90, 92, 108, 112–113, 120–121, 123, 125, 144, 149, 159, 168, 171, 181–183, 185, 188–189
- justice 7, 24, 89, 91, 109–110, 112, 163, 167
- Jehovah 83
- “karma” 89, 164–165
- “Kathederpropheten” 113
- knowledge 14, 20–21, 23, 35, 48, 53, 89, 99, 103, 106, 123, 129–130, 157, 162
- “Kultur” 7
- “Kulturkampf” 8, 119–121, 125–126, 182, 189
- “Kulturprotestantismus” 7–8, 119–124, 126, 128, 130,
- language 1, 71, 109, 130, 132, 134–135,
- law, laws 2, 4, 9, 18, 29, 34, 48, 51–52, 57, 85, 99–104, 110, 112, 123, 130, 132, 134, 141, 144, 146, 149, 185
- leadership 5, 32, 35, 38–39, 42, 101, 112
- “Leidenschaft” 3, 39, 93, 112
- Leipzig 100, 187
- “life conduct” 62, 172
- “logos” 53
- London 8, 14
- Louisiana Purchase 15
- Lutheranism 17, 72, 82
- majesty 86, 88, 112, 166
- magic 36, 105, 149–150, 152, 163, 167
- magician 36–37, 103, 105, 149–150
- Mannheim 182, 184, 186, 191–192
- mathematic, mathematics 1, 145, 190
- meditation, meditations 67, 173
- meaning, meanings 9, 21, 66, 74, 99, 108, 121, 162–163, 177
- Meersburg 191
- methodology 53, 142, 159, 182
- misfortune 56, 58, 110, 163

- modernity 13, 51, 131, 142
 monastery 19, 70–71
 money 29, 38–39, 58, 142, 168, 185, 189,
 192–193
 monk, monks 61, 64–72, 123, 127, 152
 morality 33, 58, 87, 112, 128–130, 148,
 167, 169
 movement, movements 6, 19, 61, 68–71,
 121, 163, 181
 Munich 31, 49, 73, 147, 152
 mystical union 4, 84, 129
 mysticism 3–4, 6, 13–25, 37–38, 61–62,
 84, 123, 151

 nation 32, 126, 131
 nature, natures 1–2, 18, 21, 33, 41–42, 50,
 57, 72, 100, 106, 108, 111, 113–114, 130,
 165, 167, 170
 “negative privileged” 168–171
 Neo-Kantian 2
 New Testament 37, 53, 67, 83, 123
 nobility 55, 70–71, 128
 “noble intentions” 92, 113
 noetic 14
 “nomos” 33, 52
 North 182, 184, 186

 obedience 31, 69, 89–90, 102, 106, 125,
 145
 objective 9, 17, 56–57, 81, 122, 124,
 157–158, 189, 192
 Old Testament 7, 37–38, 83, 86, 99–101,
 105–108, 111, 113–115, 151–152,
 162–163, 167
 omniscience 166
 organization 19, 89, 102, 148
 Oxford 14

 pamphlet 111, 120
 pariah-people 7
 passivity 13, 17, 20, 62, 72
 peasant 84, 107, 127, 162
 Persian, Persians 84, 107, 127, 162
 pessimism 112, 114, 152
 people 7, 9, 18–19, 31, 33–34, 39–41, 50,
 54, 57–58, 71, 84–85, 87, 90–92,
 104–110, 122–129, 131, 133–134, 148,
 150, 158, 162–163, 167–172, 191
 personality 31, 51, 72
 phenomena 6
 philosopher 14, 18, 49, 54, 58, 174
 philosophy 1–2, 5, 47, 49, 85, 127,
 129–130, 145, 172–173
 pioneer 142
 poems 33, 73
 Pope 7, 102, 123–126, 182
 power, powers 5, 8, 14, 21, 29–34, 36–37,
 40, 42, 50–52, 54–58, 62–63, 67, 72–73,
 82–83, 88–90, 92–93, 102–105,
 108–112, 114–115, 125, 127–128, 133,
 146, 145, 150, 152–153, 157, 160–161,
 163–168, 171
 prayer 67–68, 70
 priest 17, 36–37, 40, 53, 99, 102–103,
 106–107, 110, 128, 144, 151, 189
 prophets 7, 37, 40, 53, 99, 102–103,
 105–112, 167
 – charismatic 99–118
 – ethical 105–107
 – exemplary 105–107
 – Old Testament 7, 99–101, 105, 111,
 113–115
 provocation 178
 Prussia 119, 180, 182
 Purgatory 124

 Quakers 18

 Rabbis 144
 rationalization 3
 reality 21, 36, 48, 93, 112, 163, 187
 rebellion 79, 85
 “reevaluation of all values” 169
 Renaissance 130
 religion
 – history of 14, 20, 169
 – sociology of 3–4, 6, 10–11, 13, 142, 158
 resistance 85–86, 89–90, 126
 responsibility 7, 38–40, 56–57, 88, 93–94,
 112, 114, 129, 131
 “Ressentiment” 158–159, 168–171
 revenge 55, 170

- revolution, revolutions 19, 24, 41, 58, 79,
 89–90, 92, 120, 125, 128
 revolutionary, revolutionaries 41–42, 56,
 69, 80, 91–92, 104–105, 152
 rule, rules 19, 29, 31, 34–35, 47, 50–51,
 56–57, 67–70, 72, 89, 103–104, 148, 160
 ruler 89–90, 108, 146, 149
- sacrament, sacraments 67, 87, 151–152
 sacrilege 167
 Salem 191
- science, sciences 7, 48–50, 73–74, 91, 102,
 128–130, 132, 145, 185–186, 190
 scholars 3–7, 10, 24, 29–30, 47, 61–62, 69,
 73, 81, 99–102, 113, 121–122, 140–141,
 150, 157–159, 168, 172–173, 177, 179,
 181–182, 187
 scholarship 132–134, 143, 158, 178, 192
 sect, sects 9, 17–19, 79, 113
 self- 9, 15
- absorbed 23–24
 - administration 92
 - conscious 83
 - control 3, 55, 72, 151–152
 - delusion 74, 113
 - denial 65
 - dissolution 65
 - enjoyment 64
 - examination 16
 - interest 23
 - justice 24
 - mastery 72, 74
 - mortification 68
 - preoccupation 15
 - promotion 178
 - righteousness 64
 - responsibility
 - serving 55
 - testimonial 73
 - torture 72
 - truth 74
- shepherds 37, 53, 110
 silence 20–21, 24
 “Sine ira et studio” 34, 134
 sermon, sermons 16, 22, 53
 Sermon on the Mount 18, 40, 80, 93
- “Sitte”, “Sitten” 33–34, 52, 140
 slaughter 55
 slave morality 169
 slaves 170
 slavery 55, 109
 soberness 70
 society 1, 7–8, 37, 132, 143, 145, 148, 152
 sociology 1, 4, 6, 10–11, 13, 42, 142, 158
 South 125, 182, 184, 186, 191
 sovereignty 83, 90, 132, 166
 speech, speeches 31, 47, 50, 52–53, 55–58,
 80, 109, 113, 120, 126–127, 129, 131,
 134, 140, 172–173
 speculation 131, 134, 140, 172–173
 state, states 7, 14, 31–32, 49, 55, 58, 72,
 78–80, 85–87, 89, 119, 120, 125, 128,
 131–132, 134, 144, 148, 178, 180, 182
 Strassburg 100–101
 stupidity 162
 style 56
 substance 56
 success 21. 41, 147, 171, 190
 succession 92
 successors 80, 90
 suffering 9, 88–89, 157–160, 162–172
 supporters 55, 126
- task, tasks 2, 38, 56, 64, 70, 74, 93, 107,
 110–111, 124, 157, 162, 164
 theme 3, 9, 10, 73, 80–81, 158, 165, 177
 theodicy 9, 80, 88, 143, 150, 157–172,
 174, 176
 “theodicy of fortune” 171
 theology 6, 61, 79–81, 83, 86, 88, 119,
 121–124, 126–127, 130, 139, 173, 185
 Thomists 16
 tool 17, 20, 23, 37, 62–63, 84, 90, 147, 152
 tradition 8, 29, 34, 37, 52, 69, 76,
 103–104, 119, 126, 134, 139–140,
 145–146, 148–149, 153, 189
 translations 103, 141
 truth 14, 19, 25, 37, 48, 107, 112, 114, 124,
 130, 133
- Ueberlingen 191

- “Ultramontanism” 125–126, 129,
 135–136
 “unio mystica” 17, 21, 23, 38, 62, 84

 value judgments 50, 112
 vanity 40, 56–57, 113
 vessel 4, 17, 20, 23, 37, 62, 84, 152
 vigilance 67
 “vita activa” 68, 70
 “vita contemplativa” 68, 70
 visions 106–107
 vocation 16, 65, 162, 162, 167, 170, 172,
 174, 176, 197

 “Welt” 9, 75, 96, 118–119, 150, 157–167
 “Wetablehnung” 20, 38, 63, 74, 165
 “Weltflucht” 20, 38, 68, 72
 West 8–9, 21, 42, 48, 139–140, 143,
 145–148, 150, 152
 wilderness 67–68
 women 13, 26, 55, 171
 world 6, 9, 16–17, 20–25, 29, 35, 37–38,
 40, 57, 61–64, 66–67, 69, 73, 79, 81,
 84–85, 88–89, 91, 93, 106, 113, 120,
 124–126, 128–131, 141–143, 149–150,
 152, 157, 159–167
 wrath 122, 168–169, 171
 writers 33, 48